Cornell University Library 
 DA 68.12.W45H78 
 
 Wellington; 
 
 3 1924 027 999 584 
 
The original of tliis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027999584 
 
^mim Mm ot Action 
 
 WELLINGTON 
 
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 ■*;■'* 
 
 ■I I 
 
 j'l- 
 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY, afterwards DUKE OF WELLINGTON 
 From a painting by Robert Home (1806) 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 GEOEGE HOOPEE 
 
 ILonlron 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 AND NEW YORK 
 
 1889 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Arthur Wesley . . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 Welleslet's Early Indian Services . . .15 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Maheatta Campaigns . . . . 59 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 Home : Soldier and Civilian ... 85 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The First Rescue of Portugal .... 94 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The Second Rescue of Portugal . 106 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Last Campaign in Portugal 128 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Wellington's Offensive Campaigns . . .163 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 "Wateeloo . . .... 200 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 Diplomatist and Statesman . . . .228 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 Old Age -. . 250 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 ARTHUR WESLEY 
 
 Sometime in the spring of 1769, either in April or May, 
 at Dublin or in Dangan Castle, County Meath, the boy 
 was born whose name became, and is, familiar and 
 famous to all the world — Wellington. His father was 
 Garret, Earl of Mornington, a lover and composer of 
 music ; his mother was Anne Hill, a daughter of Lord 
 Dungannon ; he was christened Arthur, and he had three 
 brothers who were men of mark in their day. The 
 family name of his house, then Wesley, was afterwards 
 transformed into Wellesley, which is described as the 
 ancient spelling; but if one of that family came from 
 Somerset, the spelling in the reign of Edward the First 
 was Wellesleigh — Richard de Wellesleigh being set down 
 in Rymer as the leader of a body of levies who took part 
 in the Scottish wars. According to Mr. Gleig, Arthur 
 was descended from a man of English stock, Walter 
 Colley or Cowley, who migrated in the fifteenth century 
 from Rutlandshire to Ireland. His surname he derived 
 from the Wesleys, also ancient settlers therein, his 
 grandfather, Richard Colley, having acquired that name 
 ffi B 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 by adoption into the Wesley family. As Lady Morn- 
 ington always insisted that her son Arthur was born on 
 May-Day, 1769, and as Arthur himself kept that as his 
 birthday, we may reasonably accept it, although his 
 baptismal certificate is dated the 30th, and an election 
 committee of the Irish House of Commons decided that 
 he must have been born before April 29th ; but the 
 committee's decision cannot be regarded as trustworthy 
 evidence. Let the Duke's birthday stand as May 1st, 
 just as that of the young Corsican, Bonaparte, who 
 was named Napoleon, is now allotted to August 15th 
 in the same year, despite surviving doubts whether it 
 was on that or on another day that his mother, the 
 beautiful Lsetitia, hurried from church to give the 
 world a conqueror. The curious traveller and the 
 political enthusiast visit the Casa Bonaparte, in Ajaccio, 
 the well-spring of a grand realistic romance. Wellington 
 has no shrine ; and we must be content to know that he 
 was an Irishman sprung from an English stock, whose 
 birth-place and birthday neither the Duke nor any 
 member of his family " treated as worthy of a moment's 
 consideration." Indifference to non-essentials is one note 
 of Wellington's career, throughout which the theatrical 
 and legendary element was conspicuous by its absence. 
 But it wa,s not wanting in romance ; for, as we shall see, 
 " the dunce of the family " came to be the victor of 
 Assaye, Vittoria, and Waterloo. 
 
 The incidents of his childhood and youth are only 
 faintly indicated in the traditions which remain. We 
 are told that his mother had no fondness for her son 
 Arthur ; Mr. Gleig says that her feeling towards him was 
 " not far removed from aversion " ; and thus he had not 
 
AT ANGERS 
 
 much home-life after he had passed out of the nursery. 
 Certain it is that he rarely alluded to his early days, 
 and the conduct attributed to Lady Mornington may 
 account for his perfunctory visits to her when he was 
 " the Duke," which made Mr. Greville, who could know 
 nothing of the facts, write him down a hard man. At 
 some time, then, he was placed in a school at Chelsea, 
 whence, for a brief period, he went to Eton. In neither 
 did he shine, and it has been often said that, in after 
 years, when Eton was proud of him, nothing could be 
 remembered to his credit or discredit except that he 
 fought a battle with " Bobus " Smith, the brother of the 
 witty Canon of St. Paul's. From Eton he was sent to a 
 French military school, England, according to her wont, 
 having none of her own, and no military institutions of 
 any sort, nothing but makeshifts for institutions. The 
 French school selected for Arthur Wesley was at Angers 
 on the Maine. Mr. Eaikes was told by General Sir A. 
 Mackenzie that the school was much frequented by young 
 Englishmen, because the Governor, the Marquis de 
 Pignerol, an Engineer, looked after their studies, and 
 also because his brother had a fine riding-school. The 
 General remembered the young Arthur, but all he could 
 say was that the boy was rather weak in health, " not 
 very attentive to his studies, and constantly occupied 
 with a little terrier called Vick, which followed him 
 everywhere." A more definite glimpse of the student 
 than that we cannot get : it is as vague as the boxing- 
 match at Eton; but it enables us to picture the slim 
 bright-eyed boy, idling in the streets of the picturesque 
 old town, or playing with "Vick'' on the steep cliffs 
 which rise out of the water just below the confluence of 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 three streams. Did he read King John, or the Memoirs 
 of Bichelieu, or try to comprehend on the spot the foolish 
 fight at the Pont de C6, down on the Loire ? He dined 
 ■with the neighbouring great folks, met Sidsyfes and de 
 Jaucourt, and acquired some knowledge of the French 
 tongue which served him well in after life. It is not on 
 record when he went to Angers nor how long he stayed 
 there — he said, himself, " a year, perhaps " ; nor when 
 he quitted the school, so dim it all is ; but General 
 Mackenzie told Mr. Eaikes that they left Angers together, 
 and drove into Paris, "in a broken cabiolet de posie," and 
 that " they put up at a mean sort of inn near the Palais 
 Eoyal," probably towards the end of 1786, for in 1787 
 Arthur Wesley became an ensign in the Seventy-third 
 Foot, the first fixed date in his story subsequent to the 
 year of his birth. 
 
 His elder brother Eichard, Earl of Mornington since 
 his father's death in 1781, and a shining academic 
 scholar, watched over the lad and pushed him along. 
 Political and social influences went for much then, what- 
 ever they do now, and the ensign soon appeared as a 
 lieutenant of the Seventy-sixth and Forty-first, a sub- 
 altern in the Twelfth Light Dragoons, and next as a 
 captain in the Fifty -eighth Foot, and then as captain 
 in the Eighteenth Light Dragoons, all between 1787 
 and 1792. Nor did the shifting process end there, 
 for he first got a majority, and then, by purchase, 
 the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Thirty-third in the 
 autumn of 1793. It was his brother who helped him to 
 the money which made the last step feasible; the 
 brother who probably knew his capacity when it was 
 invisible to others, and whose insight was amply justified. 
 
I AIDE-DE-CAMP IN DUBLIN 5 
 
 Thus Arthur had the command of a battalion at twenty- 
 four ; but he was beaten in that line by Stapleton Cotton, 
 whose family influence placed him, in 1794, when he 
 was twenty-one, at the head of the Twenty-fifth Light 
 Dragoons. Wealth and interest were nearly all-power- 
 ful ; it was the palmy day of purchase which George the 
 Third had tried and had failed to abolish, and, until the 
 Duke of York became Commander-in-Chief, infants of 
 both sexes figured in the army-list as the holders of 
 commissions. 
 
 Before he had blossomed into a battalion-commander 
 the Viceroy of Ireland, Lord Westmoreland, put him on 
 his staff, and his successor. Lord Camden, retained him 
 as an aide-de-camp. He also entered the Irish House of 
 Commons, sitting for the borough of Trim, and it was on 
 this occasion that a committee had to decide whether or 
 not, in April, 1790, he had attained his majority. They 
 seated him, but their report cannot be accepted as 
 evidence of his age, for party knew no scruples. Neither 
 the Vice-regal Court nor the Parliament House were 
 highly moral schools. One was profligate and the other 
 corrupt, but his subsequent career showed that the young 
 soldier took no harm from either. How he behaved 
 under temptations common to all and resistless for many 
 is not authentically recorded, and we have to infer it 
 from the fruits borne by the tree in riper years. Stories 
 are told of extravagance and debt, and of loans advanced 
 by tradesmen which enabled the young soldier to go 
 abroad on foreign service. They may be true ; though 
 why it should be thought astonishing that a younger son 
 in a semi-royal court could not live on his pay, and 
 why drapers and shoemakers should not lend money as 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 well as bankers and bill-discounters, has never been made 
 clear. In after years the Duke of Wellington said that 
 he never got into debt, vi^hich cannot mean that he 
 always paid ready money ; and the Dublin anecdotes, 
 which are very vague, refer probably to nothing more 
 than the stress on the pocket caused by a summons to 
 embark for the West Indies or the Low Countries. The 
 one fact about him which is indubitable is that he 
 was cheerful and had many friends, and that he wooed 
 and won Lady Charlotte Pakenham, daughter of Lord 
 Longford ; that when her parents refused their consent 
 to the match, the two young folks sighed and obeyed, 
 like Gibbon, yet, unlike him, their affections endured the 
 trial of discouragement and absence ; so that when, ten 
 years afterwards, the little aide-de-camp returned from 
 India as a Major-General and a victor in great battles, 
 the Lord and Lady Longford discovered that he was a 
 prize, and the faithful lovers were rewarded for their 
 constancy. The truth is that the Dublin folks did not, 
 or could not, look below the surface, and that the essential 
 qualities of the young soldier were precisely those which 
 courtiers and politicians are the least likely to discern. 
 He was dull, so they thought, because he had not the 
 superficial glitter and precocity, the conventional hall- 
 marks which common minds often regard as signs of 
 talent or genius. He was the "ugly duckling,'' whose 
 brilliant transformation is such a source of astonishment 
 and perplexity to the ordinary run of mankind. 
 
 The butterfly period of his life, when he had to hover 
 in attendance on the Viceroy, ended with his promotion 
 to the command of the Thirty-third Foot in September, 
 179.3. Here we come upon a fact which illustrates the 
 
I COLONEL OF THE THIRTY-THIRD FOOT 7 
 
 character of the young colonel, and is certainly a note of 
 promise. For he took up his work as a leader of men 
 in earnest, and proved at once that, while apparently 
 idle and frivolous, he had not wasted his time. So 
 steadily did he apply himself to the task of working his 
 regiment up to the highest attainable point, that in a 
 few months it was officially declared to be the best- 
 drilled and most efficient within the hmits of the Irish 
 command. The reason, of course, was that Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Wesley not only directed the work but saw that 
 it was done. This labour was the first piece of hard 
 practical duty he had to perform, and the result gives a 
 clue to his life-work, which in all he undertook was 
 thorough. The quality of the man came out when the 
 touchstone was applied, and only required a larger field 
 and a tougher task to produce stiU more surprises. 
 
 "While he was drilling the Thirty-third, the youthful 
 genius who signed himself, at that date, " Buonaparte," 
 was engaged in wresting Toulon from the Eoyalists and 
 the English upon a plan which he had the courage to tell 
 the Minister of War was the only practicable plan, a truth 
 which, luckily for them, the Committee of Public Safety 
 recognised. It is instructive now to read even the names 
 of some of the batteries — the "Breechless," the "Fear- 
 less Men," the "Mountain," the "Convention" — to learn 
 from him who was to become Napoleon, that General 
 Dugommier fought with truly " republican " courage, and 
 that his business-Hke and indefatigable eulogist was con- 
 structing improved furnaces for the heating of red-hot 
 shot, wherewith to burn up " the ships of the despots." 
 But it was the correct tone and language. Whatever his 
 words might be at one epoch or another, the fixture 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 Emperor was just as much in earnest and as thorough- 
 going as the colonel of the Thirty-third Foot. The French 
 Eevolution, which prepared a field for both during that 
 winter of 1793-94, had brought forth the Eeign of 
 Terror, and was displaying its wickedness within and 
 its vast strength without. Young France had "risen 
 against tyrants," and old Europe had risen against France. 
 Ever since the beginning of 1793 warfare, in which 
 England took part, had raged in the Low Countries, at 
 first with a show of vigour and success, which later was 
 impaired, then ruined by inaptitude and selfishness. 
 The memorable siege of Toulon, with its result, was only 
 one among many reverses endured by the Allies, nor can 
 it be said that they were undeserved. By the end of 
 the year the invading armies of the first coalition were 
 all thwarted and compelled to retire, and during the 
 next young France broke over the frontier in fiery 
 torrents which could not be withstood. The bearing of 
 the English troops under the Duke of York was worthy 
 of their ancient renown, but they shared in the general 
 disaster, and were obliged to retreat before the repub- 
 lican hosts. The summer months of 1794 saw, indeed, 
 the downfall of Eobespierre and the "glorious 1st of 
 June," but they also saw the English army thrust back 
 as far as Antwerp, and the whole line of the Allies 
 thrust back everywhere from the Pyrenees to the mouth 
 of the Scheldt. 
 
 Sometime in May, probably before the Allies had 
 been beaten at Turcoiug, the English Government pro- 
 jected one of those expeditions to the coast of France 
 which young Bonaparte, a year later, spoke of with 
 such scorn. Lord Moira was to make a descent upon 
 
CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND 
 
 Brittany, and the Thirty-third was included in the corps 
 destined for that operation. Arthur Wesley at once 
 resigned his seat and hastened to Cork, where he joined 
 his regiment. But the deplorable intelligence from 
 Belgium showed the Government that succour- must be 
 sent promptly to the Duke of York, and Lord Moira 
 embarked his battalions for Ostend. Yet so swiftly ran 
 the stream of French success that he had only just time 
 to land the greater part of his troops, and to hurry out of 
 Ostend on the road to Malines as the French were pouring 
 in from the other side. The Thirty-third did not march 
 with the main body, but went by sea to Antwerp, where, 
 beaten at Oudenarde, the Duke and his army soon 
 arrived. At this moment the Allies were cut in two by 
 the French armies, the Austrians having retreated over 
 the Meuse by Maestricht, and the English having taken 
 the road to Holland. Thenceforward they had no alter- 
 native but retreat, and Wesley's first active service was 
 rendered in a British army marching away from its foes. 
 First the Duke moved from Antwerp upon Breda, 
 but unable to remain there, lest he should be turned, he 
 fell back still farther, trusting that he might be able to 
 pass the Meuse near Grave, and thus retain his connec- 
 tion with Germany. Had the Dutch people been 
 friendly, he might have tried to defend Holland, but 
 their sympathies were with the French and the Revolu- 
 tion, and consequently safety alone lay in a northward 
 march. To cover the columns heading for the Meuse 
 he placed a rear-guard of Hessians in Boxtel, a village 
 on the Dommel; but on September 14th Pichegru's 
 Frenchmen forded the stream, broke into the village, 
 and cut up the detachment. The Duke, who was then 
 
WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 at Uden on the Aa, sent Greneral Abercrombie with the 
 Guards, four Line regiments, a complement of horse, and 
 some guns, to retake Boxtel. They marched in the night, 
 and sighted the position at dawn only to find the enemy 
 on the alert and in great force. Abercrombie judged 
 that it would be well not to attack, yet did not so 
 decide until part of his troops were engaged. In fact 
 the Guards company in advance lost men and prisoners, 
 and in the retreat there was some confusion in a lane, 
 where a light dragoon regiment mixed themselves up with 
 the infantry. Throughout the morning the Thirty-third 
 were in support, and at this critical moment were well 
 handled, for Colonel Wesley noting the entanglement, 
 and seeing the enemy's horse preparing to charge, drew 
 up his battalion across the outlet from the lane, leaving 
 an opening for the retreating crowd. Then, when they 
 had got clear, he wheeled the centre companies into line 
 to fill the gap, and the Thirty-third opening a steady fire 
 upon the pursuers, slew and wounded many and brought 
 the pursuit to an end. It was a trifling incident in war, 
 but important to us, because the skirmish near Boxtel 
 was Wesley's first engagement, and because his coolness 
 and promptitude attracted the notice of Dundas, a shin- 
 ing light in the world of tactics and parade manoeuvres. 
 The French halted on the Aa, and the Duke of York, 
 crossing the Meuse at Grave, next placed the Waal, one 
 branch of the Rhine, between him and his foes. He 
 could not stay even there, but was obliged to recede 
 over the next channel of the Ehine at Arnheim. There 
 he quitted the army to assume the post of Commander- 
 in-Chief in England, and Count Walmoden led the much- 
 tried troops ever northward until they reached Bremen 
 
COMMANDS THE REAR-GUARD 
 
 and the British transports. This retreat was made in 
 winter weather of unusual severity, so that the troops 
 endured great privations, fatigues, and miseries. But 
 they persisted, despite the ice and snow, and attained 
 the ships in the spring. What we have to note is that 
 Colonel Wesley was selected to command the rear-guard, 
 and faithfully accomplished the arduous task. To him 
 the escape seemed miraculous. In after years, says Mr. 
 Gleig, he used to describe how the army was conducted. 
 "If we happened to be at dinner and the wine was 
 going round, it was considered wrong to interrupt us. 
 I have seen a packet handed in from the Austrian head- 
 quarters and thrown aside unopened, with a remark, 'That 
 will keep till to-morrow morning.' It has always been a 
 marvel to me how any one of us escaped." But the lesson 
 struck deep into that young observant mind, and bore 
 fruit in after years. Bonaparte, in like manner, writing to 
 the Committee of Public Safety towards the end of 1793, 
 described the staff before Toulon as a " te d'igncfrants " 
 who did not understand their trade. The business of 
 warfare had to be learnt by both sides in the exacting 
 school of experience ; because, as the precocious young 
 Corsican said, " three-fourths of mankind never concern 
 themselves with what is necessary until they feel the 
 want of it, and then it is too late." Yet the French had 
 one great advantage, which has not escaped the keen 
 eye of Sir Edward Hamley. They had the heritage of 
 regular systematic training given in the camps of instruc- 
 tion under the old rigime, when the new methods were 
 devised and taught which enabled the Republican levies 
 to prevail over the old tactics. The costly lesson 
 is as old as the world, but there are nations which still 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 have to learn that Bacon's maxim — " not to advance is 
 to go back " — ajjplies to nothing so strictly as it does to 
 military institutions and the conduct of war. 
 
 The commander of the Thirty-third brought back his 
 regiment to England in the spring of 1 795 ; we can imagine 
 in what meditative frame of mind. War, he knew, was 
 a most serious business, one on the management of which 
 not only the lives and limbs of men, but the fortunes of 
 kingdoms, were put to hazard. Yet how strangely had 
 he seen it conducted — so conducted, indeed, that escape 
 from the supreme risks involved seemed miraculous. It 
 ran counter to all his ideas of exactitude, vigilance, fore- 
 sight, and thoroughness. The facts of that campaign in 
 Belgium and Holland left an ineradicable impression, 
 out of which grew grave and earnest meditations which 
 bore unexpected fruit. Wesley, on leave of absence 
 being obtained, went to his home at Trim. He must 
 have thought over the condition of his profession in 
 Britain, and wondered to himself whether it were a 
 wise man's part to follow the career of arms. That is 
 evident from the letter which, after consulting his brother 
 Lord Mornington, he wrote to Lord Camden, the Viceroy, 
 in June 1795. Fresh from a campaign in which he, at 
 least, had won some credit by faithful service, he asked 
 humbly for a place in some civil department, the Revenue 
 or Treasury Board by preference, but declared his wil- 
 lingness to accept the Viceroy's decision. "You will 
 be surprised," he wrote, " at my desiring a civil instead 
 of a military office. It certainly is a departure from 
 the line which I prefer, but I see the manner in which 
 military offices are filled, and I don't wish to ask you 
 for that which I know you cannot give me." The 
 
I ASJICS FOR CIVIL EMPLOYMENT 13 
 
 source of this remarkable attempt to quit the army 
 may be clearly traced to his disgust at the mode in 
 which it was managed, and the small prospect of any 
 effective change for the better. His application must 
 be regarded by the light he himself sheds upon that 
 period of his life, when he described the slovenly mode 
 of conducting war which marked the campaign of '94- 
 '95. If circumstances, he is reported to have said, had 
 not made him a soldier, having the gift of rapid and 
 correct calculation, he would probably have become 
 distinguished in public life as a financier. Nothing is 
 more probable ; but Lord Camden did not comply with 
 his request, and his pre-eminent business faculty re- 
 mained for use where it was so greatly needed. Still, 
 for a time at least, he ran the risk of dying of yellow 
 fever. After a brief sojourn in Ireland he was ordered 
 to join his regiment, which had been selected to form 
 part of an expedition to the West Indies. He and they 
 embarked, but the autumn winds were adverse, and 
 after striving for six weeks to get out of the Channel, 
 the squadron of transports and men of war sought rest 
 and safety in the waters whence they started at Spithead. 
 He led his regiment to Poole in January 1796, and while 
 there he became so ill that when the Thirty-third was 
 ordered this time to the East Indies, the Colonel, unfit to 
 embark, was compelled to remain. But he secured a 
 passage in a swift man-of-war, and overtook the trans- 
 ports at the Cape. His destination was Calcutta ; and 
 the change wrought by science in navigation is brought 
 home to the modern traveller when he is told that the 
 Thirty -third and its commander did not land in the 
 capital of Bengal until February 1797. 
 
14 WELLINGTON 
 
 Arthur Wesley was now in his twenty -eighth year. 
 He had been obscure as a neglected schoolboy, un- 
 marked as a military student on the Maine, supposed 
 to be an idler as an aide-de-camp, and nearly silent as 
 a Member of Parliament. For never in his life was 
 he in the least self -advertising. Probably few except 
 his brothers, especially Richard, guessed what sterling 
 qualities lurked under the surface, or knew how much 
 he worked in his own way, how quietly he filled his 
 mind with really useful knowledge, and pondered gravely 
 upon men and things. When the test was appilied, and 
 he had a distinct duty to perform, he at once excelled 
 in the doing of it, and the young colonel made a model 
 regiment. When he had to face the enemy and beat 
 him, he was equal to the exigency ; and as soon as he 
 became famous it was remembered how finely he covered 
 a horrible retreat with his weak rear-guard. Some, at 
 the moment, saw his soldierly merits, or he would not 
 have been selected to do what was urgently needed. 
 As a matter of course, when the work was done, he 
 sank into the ruck of colonels, but only to emerge a 
 victorious general on the plains of India. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 WELLESLEY'S EAELY INDIAN SERVICES 
 
 AnTHXTR Wesley, or Wellesley, as his name shall now 
 be written, for he soon followed the usage of his family 
 in adopting that spelling, arrived in India at an important 
 moment. The great administration of Lord Comwallis 
 had been followed by that of Sir John Shore, which, 
 though useful, cannot be called great, and soon after 
 the Colonel landed. Shore, with the title of Lord Teign- 
 mouth, set sail for England. There was an interval of 
 some weeks, during which period Lord Hobart was 
 acting Governor-General, and then came Eichard, Lord 
 Mornington, the brilliant scholar and tried administrator, 
 who was destined to leave a broad mark on British policy 
 in India, to extend the frontiers and augment the power 
 of the Company, and stamp the name of Marquess Wel- 
 lesley upon the pages of its astonishing history. It was 
 the union of the two brothers, in council and on the 
 field, which imparted such solidity and lustre to those 
 eventful years ; for although the younger was conspic- 
 uous as a Man of Action, he was also a sagacious 
 statesman, and known to be so by the large-minded 
 and enterprising Viceroy. 
 
 Some have thought and said that a change came over 
 Arthur Wellesley in 1797. It is not so ; the unity of his 
 
i6 WELLINGTON 
 
 character is complete from the beginning to the end. 
 The faculties he possessed came with him when he was 
 born, and remained neither more nor less. Like the rest 
 of us, great and little, he could cultivate, he could not 
 add to them ; and the peculiarity in his case is that he 
 cultivated them in a manner different from that of other 
 men. Lord Morniugton was distinguished at school 
 and college because he stood the accepted tests ; Arthur 
 could not be distinguished, that is, recognised, because 
 he took his own way, to which none of the received tests 
 applied. Intrinsically, as the result showed, he was just 
 as able — that is, he could do as much and even say as 
 much, if the substantial sense be regarded, as his eloquent 
 and polished brother. Arthur had acquired and assimi- 
 lated the knowledge of things that would be useful to 
 him, and had trained his judgment; but the things 
 were not those which would have won him a high 
 place in a class-list, and the judgment he developed 
 was essentially practical. In his voluminous writings 
 one looks in vain for a spark of imagination ; yet the 
 quality must have been in his mind, for without a 
 powerful imagination no man can be a great general. 
 In him it worked upon facts, and he called it a gift of 
 rapid and accurate calculation. He had passed his life, 
 he once said to Croker, in trying to see what was " on 
 the other side of a hill," and a vivid as well as sober 
 imagination is essential to the accomplishment of that feat 
 in peace as well as in war. His was not the oratorical 
 and literary mode of demonstration ; and, because he had 
 not the current coin of culture, he was supposed to be 
 poor in capacity and dull in mind. The mistake was 
 natural and inevitable at the time, but it is now without 
 
ff/S CHARACTER 
 
 17 
 
 excuse. He had, and proved that he had, -when tried, 
 an inborn wealth of nature, an immense stock of useful 
 practical knowledge, and a solid judgment which no 
 man can obtain by mere exercise of will. They came 
 out for use as soon as he got a command in Ireland ; 
 they were visible to his comrades in Holland under the 
 ordeal of a painful and desperate retreat ; and they soon 
 became conspicuous to men on the large and hazardous 
 field of Southern India. The man did not change ; 
 he remained the same ; but he found much arduous 
 work to be done, and he did it with a vigour and 
 thoroughness which prove how great were his capacities, 
 and how well he was prepared, although his mode of 
 preparation, his mental and moral culture, had not 
 received the conventional stamp. It may be said of 
 him, as much as of any man, that he was self-made ; 
 but it must also be added that the happy advent of his 
 brother as the King's representative and the Company's 
 chief servant gave him the opportunity at this early 
 period of disclosing his worth as an administrator, a 
 statesman, and a soldier. That was the gift of Fortune; 
 the rest he supplied from his own stores. 
 
 The proof is to be found in his published writings. 
 It is plain from them that he went fully armed for his 
 work, that he took a large view of it, and that he fell 
 upon it with the quiet, unflagging industry which 
 marked his whole career. Although there are no 
 records of his Angers school -days and few glimpses 
 of his Dublin life, it is impossible to believe that the 
 climate of the Ganges Valley gave him suddenly a 
 great intellect, a piercing insight, a matured judgment, 
 and the power of steady application. That he was 
 
 C 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 recognised as a man of ability may be inferred from 
 the fact that within two months of his landing he was 
 consulted by General St. Leger on a project for estab- 
 lishing light artillery, and was nominated to command 
 an expedition against the Manilla Islands. If his 
 observations upon the artillery question are now out 
 of date, seeing that horse -artillery batteries have long 
 been established in India, they were sensible and prac- 
 tical when made; for in 1797 it was utterly imprac- 
 ticable to find horses in numbers sufficient to supply 
 the loss and waste. But his suggestion that a beginning 
 should be made on a small scale is characteristic. Not 
 less so is the request which he preferred to the govern- 
 ment that the chief command should be given to another 
 officer, while at the same time he says in a letter to his 
 brother that if the off"er were repeated he would accept 
 it, "taking the chance that the large force they intend 
 to send, the known pusillanimity of the enemy, and my 
 exertions, will compensate in some degree for my want 
 of experience." Steady in upholding his rights, he never 
 pushed himself forward ; but that did not prevent him 
 from stating his opinions firmly on all occasions, and it 
 is easy to see now the weight which they must have 
 carried. The Manilla command fell to Colonel Wellesley, 
 but the troops did not embark until August, and were 
 recalled in September, when they had got no farther than 
 Penang on the Malay Peninsula. The expedition is, how- 
 ever, so far remarkable that it caused the thoughtful 
 young commander to compose a series of "regimental 
 orders for on board ship," which even now may be read 
 with profit; and led him to write a memorandum on 
 " Pulo Penang,'' showing how thoroughly he dealt with 
 
EARLY EMPLOYMENTS 
 
 the subject, not merely or mainly in its military aspects, 
 as might have been expected, but in its relation to and 
 bearing upon commerce. Another paper, written about 
 the same time, "On Bengal," puts in a still stronger light 
 the economic tendencies of the man who, if he had 
 not been a soldier, would have been a financier. The 
 comments and arguments have now only a historical 
 importance, but they exhibit him as a pleader for less 
 interference with the freedom of trade than that which 
 subsisted, and they show the far-reaching nature of his 
 youthful speculations. 
 
 The personal apart from the speculative view of him 
 is disclosed in some of his letters. There is now and 
 then a touch of sarcasm, even at this early period, not 
 of the flighty, but rather the grim kind. Thus, after 
 telling Lord Momington that Sir John Shore had made 
 a kind of agreement with "the Nabob" of Oude, the 
 Colonel assumes that it will not be observed, "as it 
 seems a rule of policy here," he adds, "never to give 
 assistance to your friend when he stands most in need 
 of it, and always to break your treaty with him at the 
 moment when it would be most convenient to him that 
 you should fulfil its stipulations" — a hit intended to 
 strike both sides. He complained that the Medical 
 Board had transferred the care of the sick on board 
 ship to the surgeons, and among other things he de- 
 scribed it as depriving him of that part of the superin- 
 tendence over his corps which was most gratifying to 
 him, one in which he could render the greatest service 
 to his soldiers. Another grievance was that the troops 
 were to be placed under the command of the ship's 
 captain, but he sent in such a spirited remonstrance 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 that Sir John Shore at once revoked the foolish order. 
 In writing to his brother concerning the French in India, 
 the Colonel says that as long as they have an establish- 
 ment in the Mauritius, " Great Britain cannot call herself 
 safe in India." They will come here, he insists, seek 
 service in the armies of the Native Princes, and soon 
 " discipline their numerous armies in the new mode, 
 which they have adopted in Europe, than which nothing 
 can be more formidable to the small body of fighting 
 men of which the Company's armies in general consist;" 
 so that, as he afterwards put it, the question was even 
 then whether the French or we shall be masters in the 
 Deccan. The new mode of fighting he had seen and 
 knew its power, but it did not make him alter his 
 own. From the same source we learn that after a 
 year's experience he thought India a miserable country 
 to live in, and that he had formed an opinion of the 
 natives not at all favourable to them, and far too sweep- 
 ing in its denunciations. The Hindoos were bad, but 
 the Moslems were worse, and they were all " atrociously 
 cruel." Their "meekness and mildness" did not exist, 
 but they stood in awe of Europeans. As to perjury, 
 there was more of that in Calcutta alone than "in all 
 Europe taken together." Harsh judgments which time 
 might or might not have modified ; but bad as India 
 was he hoped his brother would become Governor- 
 General, a hope then about to be fulfilled, for a fort- 
 night after expressing it news came to hand that his 
 wish would be gratified. It was then, as he was on the 
 point of sailing for Penang, that he wrote, " I shall be 
 happy to be of service to you in your government ; " 
 adding, apparently in reply to some fraternal remark 
 
VISITS MADRAS 
 
 in Lord Mornington's letter, "but such are the rules 
 respecting the disposal of all patronage in the country 
 that I can't expect to derive any advantage from it 
 which I should not obtain if any other person "were 
 Governor- General" — forgetting that no one would fail 
 to remember that he was the Governor - General's 
 brother, an indestructible fact which helped to give 
 his strong personal character fair-play and his genius 
 free scope. 
 
 In the cold weather of 1797 he visited Lord Hobart 
 at Madras. The coast was to him a new country, 
 and as even then the eyes of men were turned 
 towards Mysore, and they dreaded or seemed to dread a 
 fresh irruption into the Carnatic, the colonel profited by 
 the chance to make himself acquainted with the topo- 
 graphy of the hills. There is no record of his excursions, 
 but his military memoranda contain passages which 
 prove that he inspected personally a considerable 
 district on both sides of the main line of march to 
 Bangalore. "When I was in the country," he wrote, 
 "I thought that the road from VeUore to Tripatore 
 might be shortened and removed from the frontier by 
 carrying a hne through the Agarum valley. I was 
 informed, however, that it would want water." At that 
 time, 1797, he went into the Barahmahal, where he 
 found that a Colonel Eead had made a fine road through 
 this savage region by Ryacotta to the outlet on the 
 Bangalore side. Political knowledge he could obtain at 
 the desk, but topography, which ever had a special 
 interest for him, was only to be studied in the saddle. 
 He made the most of his holiday rambles, and, indeed, 
 he always, wherever he went, almost to the end of his 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 life, imprinted on his retentive mind the features of any 
 tract through which he travelled. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley returned to Calcutta, and in the 
 first months of 1798 there were great changes in Fort 
 St. George and Fort William. Lord Hobart went home 
 and was succeeded for some months by General Harris. 
 Sir John Shore embarked early in March, and Lord 
 Mornington, after halting a fortnight at Madras, 
 landed on May 17th in the capital of his realm. It 
 was at the foot of a letter announcing the fact to Mr. 
 Lushington, a high official at Fort St. George, that the 
 colonel first signed as " Arthur Wellesley." From this 
 time he comes more directly in contact with the grave 
 and stirring questions of policy which pressed upon the 
 new Governor-General, who had to handle at once the 
 difficult problems which had been shirked by his pacific 
 predecessor ; and it was then that the coolness and 
 judgment of the younger brother came into play. 
 
 The state of India was perplexed and perplexing. 
 The Mahratta chiefs were the masters of Hindustan, 
 except Oude and the Company's possessions in Bengal, 
 and the Great Moghul existed in Delhi under the shadow 
 of their swords. They were also the principal power in 
 the Deccan, for the neutrality enjoined upon Sir John 
 Shore had enabled them to defeat the over- confident 
 Nizam at Kurdlah ; but the weakness of this formidable 
 confederacy was radical — the leaders were engaged in 
 perpetual strife for supremacy. The other power in 
 the Deccan, the power most dreaded, was Tippoo, Sultan 
 of Mysore, who, although his wings had been clipped 
 by Lord Cornwallis, was yet a constant menace to the 
 Carnatic. He was a neighbour; he had a sea-coast 
 
n POLITICAL STATE OF INDIA 23 
 
 and ports through which he could and did communicate 
 with the French; he had defeats to avenge; he was 
 inspired by Moslem fanaticism unrestrained by the 
 politic considerations which governed the Nizam, and 
 he was a new man, the second and the last, as it proved, 
 of the house which his able father, Hyder Ali, hoped 
 to found. The European adventurer, who sought 
 wealth and often found it in the native courts, was also 
 a characteristic of the hour. The Savoyard, De Boigne, 
 who was almost a genius, had disciplined a body of 
 infantry, counted by tens of thousands, in Scindia's 
 dominions north of the Nerbudda; and a Scotchman 
 had helped to cast the guns, which men of several 
 nations organised into a powerful artillery. At Hydera- 
 bad M. Eaymond, a Frenchman, had formed a corps 
 numbering fourteen thousand ; and alike in Hindustan 
 and the Deccan, soldiers of fortune followed in the 
 steps, if none reached the eminence, of Dupleix and 
 Bussy. The Mahratta power in the south stretched 
 from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea, but it was 
 enfeebled by dissensions ; the two Mohammedan states, 
 Mysore and Hyderabad, were jealous of each other; 
 and though all desired to expel the intruders who came 
 across the seas, experience showed that Hindoo and 
 Moslem could not combine to effect the common wish. 
 In the north-west the Afghan Zemaun, a feeble repre- 
 sentative of the great Ahmed Shah, who sought to rival 
 the victor of Paniput, could only contrive to inspire a 
 vague dread either in Delhi or Calcutta. The young 
 Wellesley, a cool observer, rightly judged that the 
 invader of the Punjab would get no farther than 
 Lahore, basing his opinion on "what he called the 
 
24 WELLINGTON 
 
 inutility as well as the diflBculties of the enterprise. 
 "There is no plunder to be got now;" and Zemaun's 
 object, he thought, was only to drive farther from him 
 those "worst of neighbours," the Sikhs. 
 
 The British settlements were a mere fringe on the 
 edges of India. The stronghold was Bengal, with its 
 influence stretching up the Ganges Valley into Oude 
 on one side and Central India on the other. The 
 Madras possessions were a strip on the coast ; and 
 Bombay held little more than its island home, and was 
 a power only by dint of ships and treasure. But the 
 Company, a mystery inexplicable to the native Indian 
 mind, had the priceless advantage of political unity to 
 compensate for geographical separateness, a unity which 
 the firm hands of Lord Mornington wielded with irre- 
 sistible power. 
 
 The people in England wished to enjoy incompatible 
 advantages — to retain their oriental dominions, yet hold 
 back from conquests. It could not be done. If they 
 did not desire to advance inland, and there can be no 
 doubt that the desire was sincere, the Native Princes 
 passionately longed to expel the alien intruders, or bring 
 them into subjection. Their ability to do so was limited 
 by the impossibility of combination among inveterate 
 rivals ; yet it was alwaj's possible for two or more to 
 form a temporary alliance which, if it did not succeed 
 in the main object, caused disturbance and inflicted loss. 
 Even one state, as Hyder and Tippoo had shown, could 
 imperil the existence of Madras. A policy of quietism, 
 therefore, incurred a maximum of risk with a minimum 
 of security ; and, as the rule of Cornwallis and Shore 
 distinctly proved, even, a policy of quietism could not be 
 
II HIS BROTHER GOVERNOR-GENERAL 25 
 
 strictly observed. Cornwallis had to war against Tippoo, 
 and Shore felt bound to intervene in Oude and set up 
 Saadat Ali with the strong hand. 
 
 When Lord Mornington arrived in India, he found 
 that the nearest peril was still Mysore. He had come 
 fresh from Europe, then ringing with French successes, 
 and the first intelligence which greeted him was that 
 Tippoo had just concluded an alliance with the French 
 Governor of the Mauritius, and that a French frigate 
 had actually landed ^ome scores of soldiers at Man- 
 galore, followed a few weeks later by the impressive 
 news that Bonaparte, at the head of a large army, 
 had invaded Egypt with the professed ulterior object of 
 attacking India by the Eed Sea route. Some exercise 
 of the imagination is required to realise the effect pro- 
 duced by such startling facts at a time when news 
 travelled slowly and was magnified by distance. 
 Whether Bonaparte intended or not to push his 
 enterprise, if he could, so far as India, certain it is that 
 he spoke of seizing Egypt when he was yet in Italy, and 
 that as soon as he got to Paris he besought the French 
 War Office to lend him Eennel's map of Hindustan. 
 Lord Mornington, of course, did not know facts which 
 came to light when the Napoleon Correspondence was 
 published. It was enough for him that Tippoo had sent 
 envoys to the Mauritius, that he had sought, and that 
 Governor Malartic in a public proclamation had 
 promised, French assistance, which Tippoo only required 
 to declare war against the English, and "purge India of 
 these villains." Lord Mornington, therefore, resolved 
 on instant war, and sent orders directing General Harris, 
 Acting-Governor of Madras, to collect his troops and 
 
26 WELLINGTON 
 
 march upon Seringapatam. He was too impetuous. 
 The authorities were appalled at the prospect, for they 
 had not the means of waging war; and a strong 
 argumentative letter from Secretary Webbe, backed by 
 the dry declaration of Adjutant-General Close that six 
 months would be needed for preparation, effectually 
 cooled his ardour, and "with pain and regret" he read 
 both, and cancelled the order. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley had already given his opinion on 
 the subject with his usual coolness. He went direct to 
 the heart of the matter, admitted that the cause of war 
 was sufficient, but held that the moment was inopportune. 
 With characteristic moderation he thought it possible to 
 save British honour without doing anything that would 
 render war inevitable ; and suggested that if explanation 
 were demanded, Tippoo, finding that he had gained so 
 little by the French alliance, would " deny the whole 
 and be glad of an opportunity of getting out of the 
 scrape.'' The young statesman had too good an opinion 
 of Tippoo's common sense when he offered his pacific 
 advice, tempered by the wise remark that " in the mean- 
 time we shall believe as much as we please, and shall be 
 prepared against all events." Although no demand for 
 explanation was made on Mysore at that stage, the 
 Viceroy was resolved to strike when prepared, especially 
 as he learned, at a later period, from the Secret Com- 
 mittee of the Court of Directors, that they were really 
 alarmed by the sailing of Bonaparte's expedition from 
 Toulon and the startling proceedings in the Mauritius ; 
 and it is an instructive fact that the ruling minds in 
 London and Calcutta, though so far apart, reached 
 identical - conclusions at precisely the same time — the 
 
n DREAD OF THE FRENCH 27 
 
 middle of June. But Lord Mornington could not act 
 until he had ample means, and was compelled to wait 
 six months before these could be arrayed. He employed 
 the time in renewing relations with the Nizam, in 
 cleverly disbanding the French disciplined battalions 
 at Hyderabad, substituting for them Company's Sepoys, 
 and in making a subsidiary treaty with that ruler. He 
 now had an ally, and he trusted with reason that the 
 chronic quarrels between the Mahrattas would keep 
 them and their vast resources quiet. 
 
 So the summer months passed away and the cold 
 season returned, yet still the work of preparation was 
 going forward. Colonel Wellesley spent much of the 
 summer in writing military and political memoranda for 
 the use of his brother, papers which remain to show the 
 man as he was, and how deeply he had studied the 
 politics as well as the military topography of southern 
 India. Scindia had practically obtained control over the 
 Peishwah, and the question was whether the Government 
 of India could justly attack Scindia in order to set 
 free the nominal head of the Mahratta confederacy, and 
 enable him to help us in the war with Tippoo. Wellesley 
 took up the Act of Parliament, examined it thoroughly, 
 and came to the conclusion that the Government had no 
 right to make war on him unless he were secretly allied 
 with Tippoo, and even then " it must be clear that the 
 alliance exists and must not be a mere surmise " ; and 
 the upshot of his inquiries is just this : that even were 
 Scindia to contemplate or begin hostilities against the 
 rival Mahratta's chiefs, "the Government cannot in a 
 new treaty (with the Peishwah) make an engagement to 
 attack him." Then he adds this caustic remark which 
 
28 WELL/NGTON 
 
 illustrates the dry directness and rectitude of his under- 
 standing. "It is true/' he says, "that this almost 
 entirely annihilates the power of making treaties, but I 
 imagine that to have been the purpose and intention of 
 the Act of Parliament." The greatest stickler for legality 
 could not have put the fact more forcibly ; and it is all 
 the more creditable to the young soldier because he knew 
 that the question then was, were we or the French to 
 have the superiority in the Deccan ? 
 
 That question was partly answered by the decisive 
 measures at Hyderabad, which ended in the shipment of 
 the French officers for Europe ; but Tippoo still remained, 
 and the work of providing adequately against him went 
 on apace. In August Wellesley with the Thirty-third 
 was sent from Calcutta to Madras. The transport struck 
 on the Saugor Reef, but happily the wind was light and 
 she suffered little damage ; but she was three weeks in 
 sailing from the mouth of the Hooghly to Fort St. George. 
 
 " Tell ," he wrote from shipboard, " that I conceive it 
 
 to be very inconsistent ivith the principles of the Christian 
 religion to give people bad water,'' and "you may say, 
 likewise, that a Gentile could not have done worse than 
 give us a bottle of good rum, by way of muster (or 
 sample), and fill the casks with the worst I ever saw. I 
 have written to him a public letter on the subject," and 
 let us hope that the dishonest purveyor suffered accord- 
 ingly, though no penalties could be discovered which 
 would make these rogues honest. From the effects of 
 the bad water Wellesley and, he says, nearly every man, 
 had dysentery, while fifteen soldiers, "as fine men as 
 any we had," died ; but that was the crime of the store- 
 keeper at Fort William, who, to save himself trouble, 
 
II PROCEEDS TO MADRAS 29 
 
 filled the casks from the foul stream off Calcutta ! The 
 army commissariat was always a matter on which Welles- 
 ley kept an eye. He had also to look out for himself. 
 In September he asks his brother Henry to send him 
 " some Bengal sheep, some potatoes, some smoked humps 
 and rounds of beef ; " and when it became probable that 
 the army would take the field, he asks for a soup- 
 tureen and dishes for twelve people. "I shall not 
 want plates, knives, forks, nor spoons," he says, " as 
 everybody in an Indian camp brings those articles for 
 himself ; the host finds eatables and dishes only. '' He 
 is always alive to social influences, hoping that " Morn- 
 ington has been introduced to the ladies of Calcutta, 
 and that you give dinners frequently;" indeed one of 
 the strildng things in his correspondence is the fraternal 
 anxiety he shows throughout upon all subjects affecting 
 the reputation and prosperity of the Governor-General. 
 But his vigilance was everywhere. We have seen 
 how careful he was of the health of his men, especi- 
 ally those in the Thirty-third. Writing from Madras 
 to the Adjutant-General at Calcutta, with that touch of 
 irony which sometimes gives an edge to his letters, he 
 says, " I am well acquainted with the manner in which 
 recruits are looked after and taken care of in Fort 
 William, and I shall, therefore, be much obliged to you 
 if you will take measures to send them to me as soon as 
 possible," and warn the storekeeper "not to send bad 
 water with these recruits." A certain major had the 
 temerity to object to his interfering with the Thirty- 
 third when not actually under his immediate command. 
 He reproved, but gave the officer good advice, adding, 
 " Of this you may be certain, that however my attention 
 
30 WELLINGTON 
 
 may be engaged by other objects, whenever I find it 
 necessary I shall interfere in everything which concerns 
 the Thirty -third. " Not a safe man to contend with, 
 especially when you are in the wrong. 
 
 Upon the great question of peace or war the younger 
 Wellesley was persistently for peace, if it could be had ; 
 but in any case for such preparation as would enable the 
 Government to defend the Carnatic or invade Mysore. 
 In maintaining that position he had to battle with the 
 advisers of Lord Olive, the new Grovernor of Madras, 
 who was not so dull as he appeared to be, but un- 
 accustomed to consider questions of the magnitude of 
 those then before him, yet one who improved and became 
 docile under gentle treatment. He was embarrassed also 
 by the Military Board, that " cursed institution,'' but 
 he found General Harris intelligent, reasonable, and 
 anxious to have Lord Olive "kept in the right way.'' 
 He had made friends who were to become famous — 
 Munro and Malcolm, for example — and he described 
 Barry Close as the ablest officer in the Oompany's service. 
 With the strong help of his brother he so. far triumphed 
 over opponents as to secure attention to the abounding 
 wants of the army, and thus fulfilled that half of his plan 
 which concerned what we should now call mobilisation. 
 By slow degrees, hard work, and careful management, a 
 respectable force was collected between midsummer and 
 Ohristmas. But he could not avert war. Lord Morning- 
 ton intended to negotiate with Tippoo in due time. 
 " I am very anxious,", wrote Wellesley to his brother 
 on September 19th, " to hear of the conclusion of your 
 negotiations with the Peishwah and the Nizam, that you 
 may make your proposition, whatever it may be, to 
 
IT IVELLESLEV'S LABOURS IN CAMP 31 
 
 Tippoo as soon as possible, and that he may see that j'oii 
 are not bent on annihilating him ; " and he counted on 
 the display of strength in the Carnatic to render the 
 Mysorean eager for a fair settlement. As late as 
 October 21st he thought war should be avoided if 
 possible, though he was, of course, ready to make it 
 short and sharp if no other issue could be attained. That 
 is why he urged on the local authorities ; but it was a 
 wearisome task, and made him write on the 24th, " I 
 am heartily sick of the business and wish I was anywhere 
 else," so discouraging is the combat with stupidity. 
 Nevertheless he worked on, pushing forward the battering 
 train to Vellore, collecting draught-cattle, and intent, as 
 ever, upon supplies. He prevailed on Lord Olive to 
 appoint a commissary of stores, and hoped he would 
 appoint a commissary of grain and provisions. " Matters 
 will then be brought into some shape," he writes to 
 Henry Wellesley at the end of October, " and we shall 
 know what we are about, instead of trusting to the vague 
 calculations of a parcel of blockheads who know nothing 
 and have no data." Always the spirit of the man of 
 business is to be found in the general who is great, when 
 not on the battlefield as well as when fired by visible 
 strife ; and that spirit animated the young soldier just 
 as much when his military life began as when he was 
 at the height of his career. The same indications are 
 seen in the youthful Bonaparte. " The sans culottes of 
 the South," we find him writing in November, 1793, 
 "should have no other thought than that of purging the 
 Eepublic of tyrants." Then follows the thoroughly 
 practical conclusion : "In order to achieve so essential an 
 end promptly, citizens, you must procure horses for the 
 
32 WELLINGTON 
 
 park of artillery which is besieging Toulon." So, without 
 any high-flown declarations, Wellesley laboured hard to 
 collect his draught-bullocks, fill the provision and muni- 
 tion depots, and provide well-supplied bazaars. 
 
 Early in November Lord Mornington decided to act 
 in a way which would bring matters to a crisis. He 
 addressed a letter to the Sultan of Mysore, friendly in its 
 tone and substance, but taking note in a firmly polite way 
 of the discrepancy between Tippoo's professions of amity 
 and his negotiations with the French. The Governor- 
 General was able to say that the Peishwah and the Nizam 
 concurred with him — for Hyderabad had become an ally 
 and Poonah had been neutralised — and that he proposed 
 to send "Major Doveton, who is well known to you," 
 who would explain the " sole means " which the Govern- 
 ment and its allies thought would remove distrust and 
 suspicion and establish peace on a durable foundation. 
 This step only produced from Tippoo a reply saying 
 that the French, " full of vice and deceit," " the enemies 
 of mankind," had put about reports to ruffle the minds 
 of both governments, and glossing over the Mauritius 
 incident. He was surprised that any allusion to war 
 should be addressed to such a peaceful man as himself. 
 He was, he said, " resident at home, at times taking the 
 air, and at others amusing myself with hunting at a spot 
 which is used as a pleasure ground ; " he was content to 
 rest on the observance of treaties, and thought, though 
 he did not say, that Major Doveton need not trouble 
 himself to visit Seringapatam. The answer was thus an 
 evasion on the main point, and instinct with deceit all 
 over ; but it proved the accuracy of Arthur Wellesley's 
 estimate that at this stage Tippoo's " grand object would 
 
n LORD MORNINGTON AT MADRAS 33 
 
 be to gain time till he could see what was going on in 
 Egypt and Europe," though it did not confirm the 
 earlier conjecture that he would seize the opportunity of 
 getting out of a scrape. Practically, the question of war 
 or peace was then decided ; and strong as the case against 
 the Mysorean looks now, it must have appeared ten 
 times stronger to the men who were living in the heated 
 atmosphere of '98, and who were at hand-grips with a host 
 of enemies. 
 
 Wellesley's great aim now was to bring his brother to 
 Fort St. George. He had felt the full force of dull 
 inertia, and he wanted the steam-power of a resolute 
 Governor-General to drive the public machinery. Lord 
 Momington did not long delay, but before he arrived at 
 Fort St. George a duel had been fought, the result of 
 which placed Arthur in command of the troops collected 
 about Arnee. His senior. Colonel Aston, had been 
 mortally wounded in a duel which was no fault of his, 
 and the duties he perforce relinquished Colonel Wel- 
 lesley was directed to perform. He was now in his 
 place, directing with all his might the final preparations 
 for his first Indian campaign. 
 
 His life in the camps on the Palar was far more active 
 and anxious than that he had led in Fort St. George. 
 An army, said Frederick the Great, "goes upon its belly"; 
 and "Wellesley's first care was for his bazaars, on which 
 the comfort of the troops depended, for his grain-supply, 
 of which there was none, and his draught-cattle, without 
 which the army could not move. It was no easy task, 
 but he accomplished it by dint of strict regulations and 
 personal supervision. He had to contend with dishonest 
 and incapable agents, European as well as Asiatic ; with 
 D 
 
34 WELLINGTON 
 
 the caprice of the brinjaries, or native grain-merchants, 
 and he managed them by humouring their fancies ; with 
 the slowness of the Madras officials, and general slack- 
 ness and bad methods all round. There was a different 
 rate of exchange in the several camps, and a government 
 rate which agreed with none, so he suspended the latter. 
 " We are sadly off for money," he wrote to Henry 
 Wellesley. " Between ourselves, the Paymaster-General 
 has too many mercantile concerns." On another occasion 
 he found that the Superintendent of Bazaars had the 
 contract for the sale of arrack, and his remonstrance on 
 the impropriety had an instant effect. He asked for 
 help when he took command, having started at an hour's 
 notice without a servant, and the Madras people sent 
 him two Company's officers, neither of whom understood 
 a syllable of the language, and " one so stupid that I 
 can make no use of him, and the other such a rascal that 
 half of my occupation consists in watching him, lest, 
 under the authority of my name, he should play tricks 
 in the country.'' In addition to his labours in provid- 
 ing the troops with provisions, transport, and equipment, 
 he attended assiduously to their discipline and trainings 
 so that when General Harris arrived in the camp on 
 January 29th, 1799, to take command, he found a fine, 
 well organised, and effective division. It so happened 
 that it became a question whether or not Lord Morning- 
 ton should join the army in the field. His brother was 
 aghast at the notion, as he saw that it would deprive 
 the General of the command. " All I can say upon the 
 subject is," was his frank comment, "that if I were in 
 General Harris's situation and you joined the army, I 
 should quit it." Lord Mornington cordially agreed, re- 
 
It LABOURS IN CAMP 35 
 
 marking that he had only raised the question because 
 certain persons made such a clamour. We may guess at 
 the amount of friction even he had to endure from his 
 statement that only with the utmost difficulty could he 
 restrain the Council from interfering with the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief ; but that he had now plainly declared 
 war against every attempt of the kind. In that whole- 
 some mood the Colonel sought to keep him steadfast by 
 saying that it was " impossible to make the General too 
 respectable, or hold him too high." Perhaps there was 
 some exaggeration, but it was of the right kind, springing 
 from a zeal for thoroughness which is absolutely essential 
 to efficiency in military affairs. Eesolved to do every- 
 thing in his power to "insure the grand object," he 
 borrowed money and sold his own horses to aid 
 in promptly moving troops, and he paid into the 
 public chest moneys which previously other officers 
 had always " taken to themselves." So the " ponderous 
 machine " was prepared, despite the " incapacity," the 
 want of decision and of attention to essentials, so 
 painfully visible to the active young man of business ; 
 and in a short time it started forward by the hill 
 roads that led to the capital of Mysore. Down to 
 the last moment Colonel Wellesley, seeing how short 
 was the available time, feared that th^ enterprise 
 would not be finished in less than two campaigns. 
 Audacious and resolute, he was not sanguine, even in 
 youth. 
 
 The signal having been given, the army moved slowly 
 into and through the hill country on its westerly course. 
 The Nizam's contingent, six thousand foot under Colonel 
 Eoberts and Captain Malcolm, and ten thousand horse. 
 
36 WELLINGTON 
 
 which, says Wellesley, they call twenty -five thousand, 
 under Meer Allum, having descended towards the coast, 
 joined the main body. The Hyderabad troops were 
 then reinforced by the Thirty-third Regiment, and the 
 whole placed under Wellesley's command. The direction 
 of the march was upon Bangalore through the Baramahal 
 — a parcel of rugged hill territory obtained from Tippoo 
 by Cornwallis. Simultaneously, a force from Bombay 
 under General Stuart, six thousand strong, landed at 
 Cannanore, ascended the Ghauts, and took post near 
 Sedaseer, a summit whence the table -land of Mysore, 
 lying sheer below, was clearly visible almost as far as 
 Seringapatam. Harris crossed the frontier on March 
 5th, and Stuart attained his eyry on the 2nd, thus 
 placing himself within reach of Tippoo, if Tippoo chose 
 to attack. He did choose. For while the immense 
 columns of the main army were struggling through the 
 valleys in order to gain the plateau, and before they 
 could extricate themselves from the jungle paths, Tip- 
 poo resolved to strike his weaker Bombay antagonist. 
 On March 5th, when General Harris was barely over 
 the frontier, Stuart from his watch-tower saw a 
 huge camp arise below and a green standard floating 
 above a great pavilion. The next day, before Stuart 
 could concentrate his little band, or even reinforce the 
 advanced post at Sedaseer, Tippoo was on him with a 
 tiger-spring. Three native Sepoy battalions were sud- 
 denly assailed in front and rear by the hostile troops 
 which had stealthily crept up through the jungles ; and 
 General Hartley, on the alert at break of day, had only 
 just time to warn Stuart of the peril. The troops were 
 surprised; yet those three battalions, commanded by 
 
n ACTION AT SEDASEER 37 
 
 Colonel Montresor, so stoutly fought Tippoo for more 
 than four hours, that the General had time to bring up 
 the Seventy-seventh and part of the Seventy-fifth Foot, 
 and these, after half an hour's fight, prevailed and swept 
 away the enemy's column which had assailed the rear of 
 Montresor's sturdy band. Still it was a near thing, for 
 the Sepoys were exhausted by fatigue, and their supply 
 of ammunition was nearly at an end. Tippoo retreated 
 to his camp, and in a few days disappeared ; but Stuart 
 also thought it prudent to withdraw at once to Seeda- 
 pore, where he still covered the magazines in Coorg. Had 
 Tippoo brought up his whole army instead of a part, 
 he might have driven Stuart down the Ghaut — might, 
 but probably would not, considering the stoutness of 
 the Bombay Sepoys and the tougher materials furnished 
 by two English regiments. 
 
 It was not until three weeks later that the Mysorean 
 encountered his other and more redoubtable foe. His 
 army was weaker by several hundreds and discouraged 
 by defeat, but he was in his own country, had a fine 
 body of horsemen, and still preserved a central position 
 between the column from Bombay on the west and the 
 host pressing on from the eastward. His opportunities, 
 had he known how to use them, were considerable ; for 
 General Harris had to move through a country of rock, 
 jungle, and forest, and guard a convoy which covered 
 a vast area. The army, Wellesley's force being on the 
 left, marched in two columns, enclosing the huge mass 
 of guns, animals, and carts. There were a battering train 
 of fifty pieces, " a moving arsenal," another fifty cannon, 
 and altogether above a hundred thousand bullocks. 
 " Besides all these," writes the Colonel, " the number of 
 
38 WELLINGTON 
 
 elephants, camels, bullocks, carts, coolies, and plunderers 
 belonging to individuals in the army, particularly in that 
 of the Nizam, was beyond calculation," yet at least "double 
 the number in the employment of the public." In short, 
 when on the march " there was a multitude in motion 
 which covered about eighteen square miles." The 
 consequence was that when they entered the Mysore 
 country, the draught -cattle began to die for want of 
 food. "However, on inquiry," says Colonel Wellesley, 
 "it was found that the root of the evil lay in a parcel 
 of absurd, impracticable, shopkeeping regulations which 
 had been made for the bullock-department, under which 
 no great undertaking could prosper, and the first step," 
 when the army got near Bangalore, "was to abolish 
 them all." Then the "useless lumber," which Wellesley 
 had jjressed the General to leave at Vellore, was de- 
 stroyed, and nothing survived but the useful equipment. 
 He was, however, of opinion that if Tippoo had had 
 sense and spirit sufficient to use his cavalry and infantry 
 as he might have done, the army would have been kept 
 much longer in the jungles of Bangalore. As it was, his 
 light horse, " the best of their kind in the world," kept 
 the enemy in sight and even destroyed as much forage 
 as they could. Nevertheless the army covered ten or 
 twelve miles a day, and sometimes more, and suffered 
 no loss of importance during the whole march. 
 
 The frontier places, mostly fortified hills which rose 
 in isolated blocks sheer from the plain, were easily 
 ' captured or surrendered, and the army, bending west- 
 ward, made for the quarter where Tippoo gathered up 
 his flustered troops. They were found near Mallavelly, 
 on the right bank of the Maddoor, an affluent of the 
 
II ACTION AT MALLAVELLY .39 
 
 Cauvery. General Harris did not intend to attack 
 when he came in sight of the enemy on March 27th. 
 He was about to encamp for the day, but as the advance 
 guard and even the lines selected were under fire, and 
 as the Mysore cavalry showed a disposition to charge, 
 the General supported his front, and an impromptu com- 
 bat ensued. Wellesley, the Thirty-third leading, moved 
 in echelon against the right flank of Tippoo's array, 
 and as the operation seemed to open a gap in the centre, 
 Tippoo tried to break through. But in the rear stood 
 three regiments of horsemen under General Floyd, who 
 dashed at once into the offensive column, routing and 
 driving it from the field. Wellesley's vigorous onset, 
 combined with Floyd's charge, really decided the action. 
 On the other flank, a small body of the enemy's horse 
 rode at the European brigade, some of them piercing 
 the line, but most of them falling before it. The com- 
 bat was over in a couple of hours, neither Tippoo's 
 infantry nor cavalry being able to stand for a longer 
 period, itself a sufficient testimony to the unhesitating 
 dash of the British brigades. In fact Mallavelly gave 
 them the moral ascendency which they steadily main- 
 tained. They lost a few score in killed and wounded ; 
 the Mysoreans perhaps two thousand. It was Wellesley's 
 first Indian battle. 
 
 Want of water compelled General Harris to fall back 
 on Mallavelly, where there were tanks, and here he halted 
 for a day. Tippoo, hovering in the vicinity, expected 
 that his opponent would move straight on the capital by 
 the left bank of the Cauvery. He was soon disappointed, 
 for rightly judging that Tippoo was unprepared on the 
 other bank. General Harris on the 29th deftly and 
 
40 . WELLINGTON 
 
 secretly marched upon Sosilly, where the next day the 
 whole army crossed the river by an easy ford. He thus 
 put the river between him and Tippoo, approached 
 General Stuart and the small columns operating on his 
 own left, gained access to a country not yet ravaged, 
 and was able to march upon the least defensible side of 
 Seringapatam, the point where he was not expected. 
 Five short marches brought him unopposed to the 
 southern side of the fortress into which Tippoo had 
 retired after his defeat. On April 6th, General Floyd 
 was sent with a strong detachment of all arms to 
 meet General Stuart, but before he started the siege 
 operations began. 
 
 Seringapatam stands, or stood, on an island formed by 
 the Cauvery, and filled up the westerly end with forti- 
 fied fronts on both branches along the river banks, and 
 of course on those facing south and east. The palace 
 and mosque towered above the walls, and pleasure- 
 grounds, interspersed with ruined buildings and cut off 
 by a line of entrenchments, occupied the larger half of the 
 island. Coming up from the southward. General Harris 
 pitched his camp, facing east, behind an aqueduct 
 which was carried in a southerly direction, his rear 
 protected by rough ground, and his left resting on the 
 Cauvery above the town. The space between the aque- 
 duct and the fortress was occupied by the enemy whose 
 rockets annoyed the camp, and on the day of his arrival 
 he determined to dislodge him by a night attack. Here 
 we come upon what has been made so much of as 
 " Colonel Wellesley's repulse." Two columns were sent 
 against the line of Tippoo's foreposts; the left, under 
 Colonel Shaw, succeeded; the right, under Wellesley, 
 
H SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM 41 
 
 failed. The aqueduct meandered in the form of the 
 letter S. In the upper limb was a tope or grove; in the 
 lower the village of Sultanpetah. The Thirty-third got 
 into confusion in the gloom, and Wellesley's attack was 
 frustrated. His explanation is that the night was dark, 
 that the enemy was strongly posted, and that he " could 
 not find out the post " which he was to occupy ; but he 
 attacked it at dayUght on the 6th, he writes, and " carried 
 it with ease and little loss." He resolved thenceforth, 
 and his reason explains the failure, that of his own 
 vriU he would "never suffer an attack to be made by 
 night upon an enemy who is prepared and strongly 
 posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitred by 
 daylight." Evidently that had not been done, and the 
 hurried enterprise was an exemplification of " more haste 
 less speed." General Harris, visiting the spot two days 
 afterwards, found it not so favourable for keeping 
 hold of as Colonel Shaw's position higher up. He also 
 states that, on the 4th, General Baird, having gone out 
 by night against the enemy's horse and cut them up, 
 " missed his road coming back, although one would have 
 thought it impossible," for it was starlight. No wonder 
 night attacks so often fail. In the abortive skirmish 
 Wellesley was hit in the knee, "a slight touch from 
 which I have felt no inconvenience " ; and according to 
 General Harris, he was in a good deal of agitation 
 when he reported his ill success at midnight. Plainly 
 he was much vexed ; but the story put about years after- 
 wards that General Baird's friendly intervention alone 
 gave him an opportunity of retrieving his failure is not 
 credible. In fact, the reflection of General Harris on 
 the night attacks — " altogether, circumstances considered, 
 
42 WELLINGTON 
 
 we got off very well "■ — is not the language of an angry 
 Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 When the Bombay army entered the camp on April 
 14th, the besiegers were solidly established on a strong 
 line stretching from the bank of the Cauvery below 
 to the bank above the town ; and as it had been de- 
 termined to attack the north-western angle, because it 
 could be battered by converging fires, Stuart's troops 
 were sent over the river. This served the double pur- 
 pose of taking ground beyond the Cauvery, whence a 
 flank fire from the north could be brought to bear on 
 the weak angle of the fortress, and of misleading Tippoo. 
 He had not, like his father, a soldier's eye, nor, like his 
 father, that steadfast courage which glows more brightly 
 as perils increase. His resolve to fight was unshaken, 
 but he fought in the spirit of a doomed man, yet with- 
 out displaying any of that bright invention which is 
 sometimes the fruit of despair. He seems to have known 
 instinctively that his annihilation as a sovereign had been 
 decreed, as it had, and to have run half-way to meet his 
 fate. He had made up his mind to die fighting, but 
 while Sultan he would also gratify his vengeance — he 
 had some European prisoners of war, and he murdered 
 them by torture, hammering nails into their skulls. He 
 had nothing left but his gloomy valour and his cruelty. 
 
 The besiegers worked steadily on, advancing their 
 posts, building their batteries, and pounding the pro- 
 truding angle from both sides. The Mysoreans, dashing 
 out upon the Bombay troops, who seemed the best mark, 
 were firmly met, and retired with a loss of many hundred 
 men. No other sortie was attempted ; and on May 2nd 
 two heavy batteries, opening at short range on the cur- 
 
n STORMING OF SERINGAPATAM 43 
 
 tain south of the bastion at the angle, made a practicable 
 breach in a couple of days. Enterprising officers explored 
 the river-bed, and some crept up to the foot of the de- 
 fences. They found the water in the hard bed of the river 
 not much more than a foot deep, and the obstacles on the 
 inner side easily surmountable. Therefore it was resolved 
 to storm the place a little after noon on the 4th, when 
 the native, who is alert at night and dawn, is apt to seek 
 repose ; but lest his suspicions should be aroused by any 
 ob-\rious movement, four thousand three hundred troops, 
 more than one-half Europeans, were packed into the 
 trenches early in the morning. General Baird, who had 
 been a prisoner in Seringapatam when Hyder ruled there, 
 commanded the whole. He gave one column to Colonel 
 Sherbrooke, another to Colonel Dunlop, and put the 
 reserve under Colonel Wellesley. When the hour ar- 
 rived for the onset, Baird, giving the signal, led the 
 stormers out of the trenches ; in ten minutes the fierce 
 columns, though struck by a sharp fire, had forded the 
 river, ascended the breach, and planted the British flag 
 on the ruins. Then Sherbrooke cleared the walls to the 
 south, and Dunlop's troops, for Dunlop fell on the breach, 
 swept the northern side, and in two hours the place was 
 won. Not without encountering the grim resistance of 
 fanaticism and despair, for Tippoo, surprised by the 
 sudden onset and uproar, mounted his horse and flung 
 himself in the path of Dunlop's column, heading his 
 host with commanding bravery and dying in the midst 
 of five hundred men, whose bodies were piled up above 
 and around his corpse. Wellesley entered the fortress 
 " immediately after the assault," says Colonel Gurwood, 
 "and was one of the few present when Tippoo Sultan's 
 
44 WELLINGTON 
 
 body, which was still warm, was discovered in the sally- 
 port gateway," on the northern front of the woi'ks. The 
 sons of Tippoo surrendered to General Baird, who the 
 next morning was succeeded in the command of Seringa- 
 patam by Colonel Wellesley. No reason for the 
 change has been given. "Major-General Baird, having 
 desired to be relieved, Colonel Wellesley being next 
 on the roster, was ordered on the same night [the 
 4th] to command within the fort ; " such is Gurwood's 
 brief but explicit statement. On the other hand Baird 
 simply says in his official report that he was relieved 
 by Colonel Wellesley, and he certainly remonstrated in 
 terms so intemperate that he requested and obtained 
 permission to withdraw them. Whatever the reason it 
 cannot in the least affect the character of Wellesley, who 
 as usual obeyed orders. General Harris did not consult 
 Lord Mornington, but he divined his wishes, and 
 learned two months afterwards that had he not ap- 
 pointed the Colonel to the post, the Governor-General 
 would have done so, because the knowledge and experi- 
 ence which he had of his character showed that his 
 brother possessed the necessary qualifications for such 
 employment. Nor was the step taken too soon. That 
 the troops should plunder was inevitable ; they had come 
 to push of bayonet with Tippoo's people and had stormed 
 his capital. But the disorder had to be stopped for the 
 sake of the army as well as the place. " Nothing," wrote 
 Wellesley, " can have exceeded what was done on the 
 night of the 4th ; scarcely a house was left unplundered." 
 He called at once for fresh troops ; he asked for a provost- 
 marshal, saying that until a few were hanged, the maraud- 
 ing would not cease. Some were hanged, and some, of 
 
II WELLESLEY PLACED IN COMMAND 45 
 
 course, flogged, and, by dint of just action, he was able 
 to report two days later that the plunder was stopped, 
 the fires extinguished, and that the inhabitants, who had 
 fled, were returning. In short, by vigour and justice, 
 he restored confidence among a people who are quick to 
 recognise the strong just man whom they can respect as 
 well as fear. 
 
 During the next three months the Governor of Ser- 
 ingapatam was engaged in the numberless occupations 
 which beset a man of business. He was obliged to 
 be soldier, engineer, statesman, trafiic - manager, and 
 even sanitary authority. It was his duty to restore 
 discipline, shaken a little not only by the plunder of 
 the town, but by the enormous amount of the prize- 
 money, over a million sterling, which for a moment it 
 was feared would not be distributed according to the 
 General's promise. Then he had to bury Tippoo, which 
 was done vrith due pomp and circumstance, and to see 
 that proper respect was shown to his family. But the 
 Government had determined to restore the old Hindoo 
 dynasty dispossessed by Hyder, the representative of 
 which was at that time following the trade of a potter. 
 The sons and wives of Tippoo, duly pensioned, were sent 
 to Vellore, the Hindoo gentleman, to his delight and 
 astonishment, was placed on the musnud, and Mysore 
 town was fixed on as his seat of government. Wellesley's 
 strong opinions on the question of prize were creditable 
 to his sense of decency as well as equity. He was dis- 
 gusted with an order to search the zenana for treasure, 
 and only obeyed when he could not avert that grasping 
 action, taking " every precaution to render the search as 
 decent and as little injurious to the feelings of the ladies 
 
46 WELLINGTON 
 
 as possible." The prize -agents proposed to sell the 
 clothes of Tippoo by public auction, which would " not 
 only be disgraceful " but might be unpleasant; he stopped 
 them and recommended that the raiment should be 
 bought by the Government or given to the Princes. 
 "You may conceive," he writes to his brother, "what 
 sharks they are. This day (August 19th) I have been 
 obliged to send an order to prevent them from selling 
 the doors in the palace." Indeed, he had " no little 
 difficulty" in keeping "private property" out of their 
 maws. He took his own share, which was his due, but 
 Lord Mornington refused to accept the hundred thousand 
 pounds derived from the sale of ordnance and stores, 
 which Mr. Pitt and the Company offered to him. Here it 
 may be noted that Wellesley's first thought was to repay, 
 out of his prize-money, the sum advanced by his brother 
 to purchase his rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The answer 
 was, " No consideration can induce me to accept payment 
 of the sums which I have formerly advanced for you''; so 
 strong and genuine was the friendship of these great 
 men. At the same time the Colonel was serving the 
 public at a loss. His allowances did not cover the ex- 
 penses entailed by his situation. "I was sent here," he 
 writes, "with a garrison consisting of about half the 
 army and a large staff, and I have not received one 
 shilling more than I did at Fort St. George. The conse- 
 quence is that I am ruined." Yet he did his daily tale of 
 duty just as thoroughly as if the General had taken the 
 trouble to remove the scandal. He says that since the pre- 
 ceding December he had in some months spent five times, 
 in others four times, more than he received, and that 
 he signed papers authorising officers under his command 
 
II WELLESLEY AND THE PRIZE-AGENTS 47 
 
 and living upon him, by the custom of the service, to 
 obtain nearly half as much more than was by regulation 
 due to him. No wonder he wrote to his brother saying 
 that he would not have referred to the subject had there 
 been any probability that General Harris would repre- 
 sent his case before the Governor-General left Madras. 
 The reason of his suffering was not only that he had 
 been neglected by the General, but that he would not 
 do "the dirty things" done elsewhere, that is, pocket 
 what did not rightly belong to him. As early as May 
 8th he put his sentiments on the Company's adminis- 
 tration in plain terms. " I intend to ask to be 
 brought away with the army if any civil servant of the 
 Company is to be here with civil authority who is not 
 under my orders, for I know that the whole is a system 
 of job and corruption from beginning to end, of which 
 I and my troops would be made the instruments." Never 
 could he bear with meanness, corruption, or disorder. 
 
 All kinds of work came before him, and tested his 
 administrative capacity; he shirked none and was equal 
 to all — from the drawing up a regulation for the admin- 
 istration of justice within his domain, to the duties of a 
 commissariat clerk, which he performed for a month, none 
 having been sent him. In settling the future of the 
 conquered province and its division among the victors, 
 his opinion of course was sought ; but what it is most 
 interesting to note is that the system he favoured was 
 based on an estimate of what would be safe, creditable, 
 and " not likely to lead us into new wars." So that 
 from the outset the great captain, who said that "nothing 
 was more horrible than a victory except a defeat," had 
 no love for war. He accepted it as a duty and a 
 
48 WELLINGTON 
 
 necessity : he waged it with all the vigour and skill he 
 could command ; but he would always have avoided war, 
 if avoidance would be compatible with imperial safety 
 and imperial honour. 
 
 By the middle of August General Harris, who had 
 been employed in reducing hill-forts, delivering Tippoo's 
 country from marauding bands, and restoring tranquillity 
 so far as that could be done, retired to Madras, and the 
 post he quitted fell to Colonel Wellesley, whose appoint- 
 ment to the command of the troops in Mysore is 
 dated August 24th, 1799. His new field of action was 
 extensive and his duties onerous. The half-robber chiefs 
 in the western hills were and long remained unsubdued; 
 the Mahrattas on the north could not give up their love of 
 a foray ; the former troopers of Tippoo who had taken to 
 the jungle disturbed the country. There were large 
 tracts, like Wynaad, to reduce, and vassal rulers to pro- 
 tect. The normal state of the districts between Mysore 
 and the sea was one of war, and it was the business as 
 well as duty of the Company to repress violence and 
 establish tranquillity. Wellesley did all he could to 
 overcome the disturbers. He kept a sharp eye on all 
 their doings ; he stimulated the energy of his subor- 
 dinates ; enjoined severe but just measures, seeing clearly 
 that men who relied on, believed in, and lived by force 
 would yield to no other remedy ; and he visited nearly 
 the whole of the area under his control. So far as the 
 settlement of the country was concerned, he favoured the 
 dismantling of the rock-fortresses and the making of 
 roads, so that the cultivators might be freed from the 
 marauders and the traders protected from highwaymen. 
 His great capacity for work enabled him to perform his 
 
II COMMANDS IN MYSORE 49 
 
 varied public duties thoroughly and yet omit none of the 
 social and humanising kind. It is pleasant to find him, 
 on his return from the camp to Seringapatam, sending a 
 proper assortment of garden-seeds to a lady, and looking 
 after the building of an abode for Colonel Close. " As 
 the [boundary] walls are not handsome," he writes, " I 
 will cover those which must be near your house with a 
 creeper. ... I have sent you some plantain trees and 
 shall have others for you when the season for cutting 
 arrives." "When Lady Clive proposed to visit Mysore, 
 he suggested that she should not come before June, " as 
 April and May are very hot here '' ; and he hoped she 
 would stay at his quarters, the Dowlut Bang, "the zenana of 
 which, when a little improved, will accommodate her and 
 her family admirably. Neither of the palaces," he adds, 
 "would answer for a woman at all, as they are so much 
 exposed." These examples of thoughtfulness, and there 
 are many, show the man as he was. And he looked 
 after the interests and comforts of the poor and weak 
 quite as carefully as those of the rich and strong, being 
 a stern, hard man to evil-doers, yet always merciful, 
 charitable, and kind. 
 
 Other and more stirring employment lay before him. 
 Throughout the autumn of 1799 and the foUowing spring 
 we hear repeatedly of a certain Dhoondiah Waugh who had 
 " taken to the road." He was a Mahratta who began life 
 in Ryder's cavalry, grew wearied of service under Tippoo, 
 and began business on his own account, perhaps inspired 
 by the success of the former. The Tiger managed to 
 have him captured, kept him in gaol, made him a Moslem 
 against his will, and gave him a new name. After the 
 storming of Seringapatam, let loose from prison by the 
 
 E 
 
50 WELLINGTON 
 
 victors, he becanie at once a freebooter, and easily found 
 followers. His first essays were sharply repressed by 
 the British and the border Mahrattas, but being alert 
 and deft, as well as valiant, he vanished in the jungles. 
 He reappeared shortly afterwards in the service of the 
 Eajah of Kolapore, himself a plunderer of the first 
 order, and, fighting for the KolajDore men, he killed 
 Pureshram Bhow, a famous Mahratta of those days. 
 Then he returned to the wild country about Savanore, 
 and Wellesley at Seringapatam heard of a plot devised 
 by Dhoondiah to " carry off the young princes who are 
 here, at the time when they should be hunting with me." 
 The Colonel, who put no trust in the report, duly looked 
 into it ; but he did not stop his hunting, though he kept 
 the princes at home. In the spring he journeyed to the 
 coast of Malabar, and was haunted all the way by reports 
 of Dhoondiah, upon whom he kept an eye, while studying 
 the Nairs and Moplahs and encouraging the Eajah of 
 Coorg, whom he judged to be more sincere than any 
 native he had yet seen. Soon he heard that the free 
 lance had gained ground in the Savanore country, and, 
 when the Colonel reached Seringapatam in the middle 
 of April, the disturber had become a serious personage. 
 The aspect of affairs in May was not bright. " I think 
 that upon the whole," he says to Munro, "we are 
 not in the most thriving condition in this country. 
 Polygars, Nairs, and Moplahs in arms on all sides of 
 us ; an army [Dhoondiah' s] full of disaffection and 
 discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the 
 northern frontier, which increases as it advances, like a 
 snowball in snow." By this time the adventurer had 
 taken Dummel, a fort in the jungle country beyond the 
 
II ADVENT OF DHOONDIAH WAUGH 51 
 
 Werdah, and had actually defeated a body of Mahrattas 
 headed by Appah Saheb, who hoped to avenge the death 
 of his father, Pureshram Bhow; his army, recruited 
 from many places, was numbered by thousands, and he 
 was meddling in Malabar. The spectral, shadowy, flitting 
 figure had become substantial, a " despicable enemy " in 
 the Colonel's eyes, yet one so full of danger that he had 
 to be destroyed. Out of Dhoondiahs in India came the 
 founders of States. In any case, while he was afoot there 
 could be no peace. The Government of Madras were 
 aroused at the end of May, and Mr. Secretary Webbe wrote 
 to WeUesley : " You are to pursue Dhoondia Waugh, 
 wherever you may find him, and to hang him on the first 
 tree. For this purpose you will receive immediate 
 authority to enter the Mahratta frontier." That brought 
 on the campaign which occupied all the hot weather. 
 
 Wellesley was promptly in the field, joining his army 
 at Hurryhur on the Toombuddra about June 15 th. 
 He was none too soon, for the south-west monsoon had 
 broken, pouring its mighty rains upon the Western 
 Ghauts, whence, from the hills beyond Poona to the 
 forests of Canara, rolled the floods which filled all the 
 great affluents of the Kistna. Over this immense tract 
 they ran from the westward easterly, and thus crossed 
 Wellesley's intended line of march. For Dhoondiah had 
 set up his tents in the jungles at the confluence of 
 the Toombuddra with the Kistna, and especially 
 between the Werdah and Malpurba, where at Dummel 
 and Savanore he fronted the coming host. He was 
 aided by the polygars, or independent chiefs, and 
 partially vexed by the Mahrattas, notably Doondo Punt 
 Goklah. Practically he had carved his dominions out of 
 
52 WELLINGTON 
 
 Mahratta territory, but he had the audacity to demand 
 villages and lands from the Nizam and Mysore, offering 
 in exchange the services of twenty-five thousand horse- 
 men. Before Wellesley, hindered by the waters, could 
 cross them, Dhoondiah had swooped down upon and 
 killed Goklah in action, the second Mahratta chief who 
 fell under his sword. But as soon as the army were 
 over first the Toombuddra and next the Werdah, the 
 freebooter was compelled to rely more on his shiftiness 
 and less on his valour. So great were the obstacles 
 that Savanore was not occupied until July 12th, by 
 which time, however, Wellesley had cleared away 
 everything hostile upon his flanks and rear. The enemy 
 moved up as if intending to fight, but fled northward 
 rapidly when he found his foes were coming at him, 
 leaving his fort at Dummel to be taken by storm on the 
 26th, and all the posts and villages near captured. 
 Goklah's Mahrattas, under his son, now joined the 
 Colonel, eager to be avenged upon, but still greatly 
 afraid of Dhoondiah. Wellesley, marching towards 
 Manowly on the Malpurba, surprised the enemy's camp, 
 charging into it with his cavalry, all the troops he had 
 with him, and routing the defenders. All the baggage, 
 two elephants, many camels, horses, and bullocks, were 
 captured. Dhoondiah's six cannon had been passed over 
 the river, but two ofiioers and some men, seeing a boat 
 under the fort on the other side, swam over, seized, and 
 brought away the guns. The stroke should have been 
 fatal, but a dexterous Mahratta adventurer is not easily 
 caught. For more than a month he led the English a 
 weary chase through dense jungles and over swollen 
 streams, nor was it till September 10th that Wellesley 
 
II DEATH OF THE FREEBOOTER 53 
 
 ■was able to try conclusions -with him again. On the 
 previous evening, being then at Yelpulpurvy with four 
 regiments of cavalry, his infantry being a march behind, 
 he learned that the Mahratta was in camp about nine 
 miles distant. The night was so bad, and the horses 
 and men so wearied with the day's march, that he 
 halted until dawn. After an anxious night, he moved 
 out in the morning. Dhoondiah had also started, and to 
 his amazement saw his dreaded adversary athwart his 
 path. Some five thousand strong, his forces took 
 up a strong position resting on the rock and village 
 of CoonaghuU, where they "stood with apparent firmness." 
 Then Wellesley, forming his four regiments into one line 
 and leading the way, dashed into the enemy's ranks. 
 The action was brief, for the headlong charge of men 
 angered by so much marching could not be withstood. 
 Dhoondiah was killed, and his death, ended the warfare 
 he had called down upon himself. In his camp his little 
 son was found and rescued by the Colonel, who took him 
 in his charge, and when he quitted India left some 
 hundreds of pounds to be expended on the boy, of 
 whom he was often mindful in after years. He lived 
 until 1822, when he died of cholera. Dhoondiah's career 
 was short, but it was typical. Had he not been 
 resolutely tackled he might have founded a robber 
 state, and imitated his exemplars, the Sultans of Mysore. 
 The campaign against the Mahratta trooper, none 
 the less because the enemy was " despicable," revealed 
 the qualities possessed by the young commander — 
 decision and boldness tempered by prudence. It also 
 brought out afresh those aptitudes for administration, 
 which make so faint a show on the pages of history. 
 
S4 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 because the details are dull, yet constitute a large as well 
 as an essential element in success, and even mitigate the 
 effects of failure. And, while intent on catching 
 and crushing Dhoondiah, the Colonel did not fail to 
 keep an eye upon the whole of his command, or neglect 
 to watch closely the politics of the Deccan. When the 
 little war was over, he still remained a few months in 
 the field, attending to business of all kinds growing out 
 of the settlement of the extensive tracts which it was 
 necessary to rescue from plundering chieftains, and to 
 render familiar with the advantages of tranquillity. He 
 did not return to Seringapatam until the end of 
 November, and on December 2nd he was ordered by 
 the Governor -General, now Marquess Wellesley, to 
 assume the command of certain forces about to be 
 assembled at Trincomalee in Ceylon, and he at once 
 started for that port, leaving Colonel Stevenson with 
 admirable instructions to direct operations in Wynaad 
 and against the polygars in the recently - acquired 
 territories. The Government were moved to this step by 
 the successes of the French in Europe and Egypt, and 
 they designed to attack the Mauritius or send an 
 expedition to the Eed Sea. Colonel Wellesley laboured 
 with his wonted ardour to prepare the troops, and 
 judging that Bombay would be the best base, he on his 
 own responsibility transferred the small army to that 
 harbour. It was a bold step, but it saved the expedi- 
 tion from failure. The Colonel had not sought and did 
 not like a position which took him from Mysore, but he 
 liked still less to be deposed and placed under the orders 
 of General Baird, who was suddenly appointed to 
 command ; and he was hurt by the public announcement, 
 
II THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT 55 
 
 as he put it, that he was considered competent to prepare 
 but not to lead the troops. The truth is, that the 
 Governor-General, not without a little external pressure, 
 found that he was obliged by the rules of the service to 
 employ a Major-General, and consequently that he must 
 disappoint Arthur, who, however, felt aggrieved because 
 he thought that something like a slur was put on him. 
 His brother wished him to act as second in command, a 
 post most distasteful to him when Baird was chief, but 
 he would have submitted, and had made up his mind to 
 the sacrifice of inclination to duty, when, fortunately, 
 the malaria from the Bombay swamps gave him a serious 
 fever. He therefore remained behind, and permission 
 to resume his post in Mysore soon came. It is proper 
 to state that the Colonel cherished no rancour against 
 Baird, whose "kind, candid, and handsome manner'' to 
 him he went out of his way to acknowledge ; but he 
 seems to have dreaded needlessly that the supersession 
 would be interpreted as evidence of incapacity. He was 
 also much distressed on account of the ofiicers who 
 had quitted Mysore to serve on his staff', and who were 
 naturally anxious about their future when transferred 
 to other duties. He himself lost nothing, for though 
 the expedition made an interesting march from Kosseir 
 to the Nile, it was too late for active operations, as 
 Menou at Cairo had surrendered to Hutchinson; yet 
 the report that an Indian column was approaching from 
 the Eed Sea had some influence on the French 
 commander. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley, still suffering a little from the 
 fever, travelled by way of Cannanore and the Western 
 Ghauts to Seringapatam, which place he entered on 
 
56 WELLINGTON 
 
 May 7th. Writing to his brother Henry, he laughingly 
 says, "I found your friend Mrs. Stevenson, who had 
 been with difficulty restrained from turning the house 
 out of doors and windows during the time I was 
 absent;" but that, of course, did not prevent him in 
 true Anglo-Indian fashion from expressing a polite 
 hope that she and the Colonel would make use of 
 his house so long as they might find it convenient. 
 The Government of Madras were glad to have him 
 back, and seconded his efforts to render the city less 
 unhealthy, his measures for the welfare of the troops, 
 and the judicial steps he was obliged to take at 
 Seringapatam for the purpose of hunting out and 
 punishing corruption and malversation "which would 
 disgrace the Newgate Calendar." But the condition of 
 Mysore was gratifying. " The Eajah's government," he 
 wrote, " is in the most prosperous state ; the country is 
 become a garden where it is inhabited, and the inhabit- 
 ants are returning fast to those parts which the last 
 savage [an irreverent allusion to Tippoo] had forced them 
 to quit." He still harped, however, on the old string, 
 supersession, which he had done nothing to deserve, and 
 had some thoughts of going home, should he see no 
 prospect of active service. Against this Henry Wellesley 
 pleaded strongly, pointing out that as a general peace 
 was evidently near at hand, India was the only place 
 in which he was likely to be employed. " Although you 
 care less about money than any man I ever yet met with," 
 a remark worth remembering, still even in respect of 
 cash, India, " this hateful country," was better than any- 
 where else. So of course he stayed, perhaps never had 
 more than a passing wish for home, and thus remained 
 
II WELLESLEY A MAJOR-GENERAL 57 
 
 to do more solid work and gather more laurels. For 
 nearly two years he was stationary at Seringapatam, 
 actively engaged in various tasks, ruling with diligence, 
 protecting the natives, assiduous in his care for sanita- 
 tion, bringing the troops up to a high state of discipline, 
 watching intently the movements in native politics, and 
 always eager for intelligence from Europe, where the 
 greater world-drama wasperf ormed. He became a Major- 
 General in April, 1802, but the official announcement 
 of that event did not reach him until the autumn. His 
 brother, the Governor-General, ran imminent risk of recall, 
 yet finally held his post. The peace of Amiens quieted 
 down for the time the turbulent sea of European politics, 
 and the report of its conclusion aroused no enthusiasm 
 in India. " I agree with you entirely about the peace," 
 he wrote to Mr. Webbe. "It establishes the French 
 power over Europe, and when we shall have disarmed 
 we shall have no security except in our own abjectness ; " 
 a strong expression which events did not justify, yet not 
 unnatural to a soldier looking upon affairs from a point 
 so far removed from the centre of politics. The peace 
 was a truce, but the security was in the sturdy spirit and 
 not in the abjectness of our heroic and tenacious fore- 
 fathers. India, however, was strictly under its own 
 necessities, and almost independent of the peace. 
 Nevertheless, closely gauging the pressure of English 
 opinion upon the Eastern politics. Colonel Wellesley 
 thought there would be an outcry for the reduction of 
 Indian armaments, perhaps to the prejudice of Indian 
 interests, which really stood apart from those of the 
 Western world far more in 1803 than they do now. 
 But events occurred in the Mahratta empire which set 
 
58 WELLINGTON 
 
 aside all idea of reduction, and, indeed, brought armies 
 alike in the Deccan and Hindustan once more into the 
 field. To render the new campaign and the conduct 
 of its leaders intelligible, a brief political sketch is 
 necessary. 
 
CHAPTEE III 
 
 THE MAHRATTA CAMPAIGNS 
 
 TiPPOO's defeat and death had a decisive effect on the 
 politics of the Deccan, because it left the Company face 
 to face with one of the most curious contrivances which 
 ever grew up in any country — the Mahratta Confederacy. 
 There was really no other native power in the peninsula, 
 for Oude was a subject state, and the arrangement with 
 the Nizam placed him under the Company's protection, 
 guarded by disciplined troops in the Company's service, 
 and paid out of the revenues of the Ceded Districts, part 
 of the old Mysore state. The Nizam, therefore, relieved 
 from Mahratta oppression, was the ally of the Company, 
 and when the Nawab of the Carnatic was reduced to the 
 state of one who reigned but did not govern, the British 
 power had no possible enemy in the Deccan or indeed 
 beyond it, except the Mahrattas. They were not what 
 they were in the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
 for the great edifice buUt up by Sivajee and enlarged by 
 his successors had become a partnership of a remarkable 
 kind. The nominal headship had passed from his race 
 to the Brahmins who supplanted his descendants. The 
 redoubtable Peishwah received his investiture from the 
 Bajah of Sattara, who has been likened to the Holy 
 Roman Emperor, but the real power in the Confederacy 
 
6o WELLINGTON 
 
 was his who could seize it ; the Peishwah or his minister, 
 if either were strong, and, if one or both were weak, 
 Scindia or Holkar, who were not Brahmins. A certain 
 deference was paid in point of form by the audacious 
 partners towards the Peishwah, and he was never set 
 aside. Still the actual power was sometimes taken from 
 him, and the ceaseless struggle for supremacy led to 
 endless intrigues and frequent destructive wars over an 
 immense extent of territory which lay between the 
 Sutlej and the Bay of Bengal, the Ganges and the Toom- 
 buddra, the plains of Nagpore and the ports on the 
 western sea. There was rarely peace in the lands over 
 which the Mahratta chiefs held sway, and before as well 
 as after the fall of Tippoo Sultan they were engaged in 
 ruthless combats. A great minister at Poona, Nana 
 Furnavese, had endeavoured, not without success, to up- 
 hold the State, but when he died in 1800 all wisdom 
 and moderation departed from the Government; for 
 Bajee Eao, the last Peishwah, who substituted cunning 
 and treachery for those high attributes, proved quite 
 unequal, even with the aid of Nana, to contend with the 
 partners who were equally deceitful and far more 
 courageous ; so that, when his minister died, he soon 
 fell from his high estate and called in the British to save 
 him from his jealous and overbearing rivals. 
 
 It was this event which brought General Wellesley 
 again into the field at the head of an army. Some years 
 before, the death of Tuckajee Holkar was followed by a 
 disputed succession. He left two legitimate sons,' and 
 Dowlut Eao Scindia, supreme at Poona, finding he could 
 not secure the Indore musnud for one brother, treacher- 
 ously attacked and murdered the other. But there were 
 
in HOZKAR ATTACKS POONA 6i 
 
 also two illegitimate sons ; one of these, Vittojee, was 
 trampled to death by an elephant in the presence and 
 with the approval of Bajee Eao ; the other, Jeswunt, fled, 
 was imprisoned in Berar, escaped to Hindustan, and at 
 once made war on Scindia, whose troops he defeated 
 and whose cities he plundered. Scindia, therefore, 
 hastening to Hindustan, fought, routed, but did not 
 capture Jeswunt, who, crossing the Nerbudda and the 
 Taptee, entered the Peishwah's territories. He was a 
 bold dashing leader of the true Mahratta stamp, and the 
 flutter of his flag and the magic of his name brought 
 thousands to his side. He fought his way victoriously 
 through Kandeish; and in October, 1802, he marched 
 direct on Poona, whither Scindia had sent a detachment 
 of infantry to aid the Peishwah. Jeswunt met them on 
 the 25th in battle near the city. There were European 
 ofiicers in command on both sides, a characteristic of a 
 period when assuredly adventures were to the adven- 
 turous ; but the victory which Holkar won that day was 
 due to his own valiant exertions at the head of his 
 horsemen, whom he led in charge after charge upon the 
 infantry and guns. His resolute character may be 
 inferred from the fact that, when his troops did not obey 
 his command, that they should not enter Poona, he com- 
 pelled obedience by turning his guns upon them. Bajee 
 Eao, frightened by the uproar of the battle, fled during the 
 fight to Singurh, thence, when he knew the residt, by Mhar 
 to Sevemdroog on the coast, and finally in a British ship 
 to Bassein, a fort on the mainland opposite the northern 
 end of Salsette. Holkar, with a spear wound in his body 
 and a sabre cut on his head, which he bore gaily, remained 
 at Poona for a time, to rule by torture and robbery. 
 
62 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 The complex situation which grew out of these 
 sanguinary events had a decisive effect on Eritish policy. 
 The Mahratta chiefs suddenly became, one and all, eager 
 for British interference. Holkar desired Colonel Close, 
 the resident at Poena, to mediate between the rivals. 
 Bajee Rao did more — he agreed to the conditions proposed 
 by the Governor-General as the price of his protection, 
 acquiesced in the establishment of a subsidiary force of 
 infantry and guns, assigned territory to meet the cost, 
 bound himself not to employ any Europeans hostile to 
 England, and undertook neither to negotiate with, nor 
 make war upon, other states without the knowledge and 
 consent of the British Government. It was a complete 
 surrender, and put him on a level with the Nizam, from 
 whom he could no longer exact tribute, and the Gaikwar 
 also, who had just been drawn within the British system. 
 Scindia, of course, could not have approved a treaty 
 which the Peishwah secretly detested; but General 
 Wellesley affirms that the Gwalior chief was informed 
 of the Peishwah's negotiations, and " urged the British 
 Government to interfere in the Mahratta affairs, as the 
 only mode of settling their actual confusion." None of 
 them intended to fulfil the bond, but each hoped in 
 some way to overreach his rival, and all to defeat the 
 Company. Jeswunt Eao alone had no hope, for, being 
 illegitimate, he was the natural enemy of all ; but, 
 trusting to his sword, his valour, his abilities, and being 
 a shining leader of free lances, he fought thenceforth for 
 his own hand, and wrote his name so deeply on the 
 military annals of India, that his pursuit of Monson is 
 still remembered where Assaye and Laswarree are 
 forgotten. 
 
Ill THE TREATY OF BASSEIN 63 
 
 The treaty of Bassein (December 31st, 1802) was a 
 masterpiece of policy, because it consolidated British 
 power in Southern India, and settled, once for all, the 
 question who should ultimately hold the strongest sway 
 in the peninsula. General Wellesley, seated at Seringa- 
 patam, had always used his influence on the side of 
 . peace ; and he even hoped at this period that the 
 Mahratta chiefs, if they were actuated by prudential 
 motives, would fall in Avith the new arrangement. 
 They were far from being so inclined, yet they dreaded 
 a rupture or wished to defer one until they could 
 combine. While General Stuart, Commander-in-Chief 
 in Madras, was collecting troops on the northern frontier 
 of Mysore to fulfil the Treaty of Bassein, Scindia 
 brought his fine army over the Nerbudda, listened to 
 the overtures of Holkar, entered into close relations 
 with the Eajah of Berar, and posted himself at Burhan- 
 pore, not far from the Nizam's boundarjr. There he 
 halted in evident hesitation, giving an apparent 
 assent, and betraying no wish to prevent the restoration 
 of the Peishwah under the new conditions. The 
 Governor -General believed him to be sincere, because 
 prudence dictated inaction ; and while Scindia remained 
 quite remote from Poona, General Wellesley marched 
 up from the south and replaced Bajee Eao in his 
 capital. 
 
 He was specially fitted, from previous experience in 
 the southern Mahratta country, to perform the task, 
 and at the request of Lord Clive, General Stuart gave 
 him the command of a mixed European and native force 
 slightly exceeding ten thousand men, technically called 
 a detachment, but really a small army. It included his 
 
64 WELLINGTON 
 
 own Mysore troops, which had long been prepared and 
 admirably equipped for any service. Thus in approach- 
 ing the rendezvous at Hurryhur, he could say in a letter 
 to Colonel Montresor, "I get on well. I can march 
 with as much celerity as ever, and with equal if not 
 greater ease." That was because he had obtained good 
 cattle and took care of them, maintained discipline, . 
 encouraged the travelling grain-dealers, and protected 
 the natives in his camps as well as in the villages. 
 Again, when he was some distance forward, he tells 
 Colonel Close that his cattle are in good order, adding, 
 "I get plenty of forage; and I have little doubt of 
 bringing up my detachment in good style, at least as far 
 as the Kistna." The reason was that he had himself 
 attended to every detail in giving orders and had kept a 
 close watch on the execution of his behests. He crossed 
 the Toombuddra on March 9th, and when he wrote 
 the words we have quoted he had tried the marching 
 powers of his detachment for a week. 
 
 The general plan of operations adopted was that 
 Colonel Stevenson, with the Hyderabad subsidiary con- 
 tingent and the Nizam's troops, should move up to the 
 river Seenah at Purinda, on the frontier towards Poena ; 
 and that Wellesley should march northward as rapidly 
 as possible, connect himself with Stevenson, who was to 
 be under his orders, and enter the Mahratta capital. 
 The distance to be traversed was over five hundred, 
 Wellesley says nearly six hundred, miles, and it was 
 covered in forty -two days. He moved his army by 
 Darwar to Erroor on the Kistna, and thence to Meritch, 
 a march beyond the river. Here he turned off to his 
 right in a north-easterly direction heading for Punder- 
 
Ill THE MARCH ON POONA 65 
 
 pore ; but he did not proceed as far east as that fort, 
 having found it more expedient to effect a junction with 
 Stevenson near the confluence of the Neera and the 
 Beema. Then, leaving the Hyderabad contingent on 
 the left bank of the latter stream, he turned to the 
 ■westward by Baramuttee and Jejory, made his way 
 with some loss of transport and cattle through the 
 rugged roadless hills, descending • on Poona from the 
 eastern side. He arrived with his cattle much the 
 worse for the wear ; for, after crossing the Kistna, the 
 route of the army lay through a region desolated by the 
 bands of Holkar. " They have not left a stick standing 
 at the distance of 150 miles from Poona; they have 
 eaten the forage and grain, have pulled down the 
 houses and used the material as firewood, and the 
 inhabitants have fled with their cattle. Excepting in 
 one village I have not seen a human creature since I 
 quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch." Such was 
 Mahratta warfare as depicted by Wellesley to his 
 brother. 
 
 In the last march, with the cavalry only, he rode 
 sixty miles in thirty-two hours. For there came a 
 report to his camp on April 19th that Amrut Eao, 
 who held Poona for Jeswunt Rao Holkar, intended 
 to burn the city ; therefore Wellesley went off at once, 
 and, moving all night, did not halt until he had entered 
 the place on the following morning. The Mahratta 
 chief did not fulfil his threat, as he wished to make 
 terms for himself. So he prudently decamped, going 
 out on the northern road a few hours before Wellesley's 
 tired troopers came in sight of the Peishwah's palace. 
 The infantry did not come up until the 21st. Major 
 
66 WELLINGTON 
 
 John Malcolm, sent by Lord Wellesley, joined, and was 
 heartily welcomed by his friend the General at Hooblee ; 
 and both were skilful enough to conciliate the principal 
 southern Mahratta Sirdars, who hated and distrusted 
 the Peishwah as much as they trusted the word of the 
 British. They even led their troops to Poena, and it 
 was partly through their influence, and partly through 
 confidence in Wellesley, that during this long march 
 the people remained in their villages, that the bazaars 
 were well supplied, and that the long line of com- 
 munication was uninterrupted. On March 30th 
 he was thus able to write, after stating the alter- 
 native before him, " In any one of these cases I 
 hope to reach Poona about the 20th of April" — the 
 very day of his advent. On the line of march he had 
 thought of the future, not only establishing posts, but 
 enjoining the construction of basket-boats and the 
 enlistment of boatmen, so as to secure the passage of 
 the rivers and maintain his communication with Stuart 
 when the monsoon broke ; and almost his first care on 
 reaching Poona was to direct the manufacture of pon- 
 toons at Bombay — the pontoons he had so longed for 
 when chasing Dhoondiah Waugh three years before. 
 The Government did not then sanction his demand or 
 approve his suggestion. Now he was able to secure 
 assent to his request for the movable bridges, which, 
 he so justly said, would give him an immense advan- 
 tage over the native armies during the season of 
 rain. 
 
 So far the enterprise had been rapidly and success- 
 fully executed. The next steps were to hasten the 
 arrival of the Peishwah from Bassein, and establish a 
 
Ill RETURN OF THE PEISHWAH 67 
 
 new line of communication, by the Ghauts, through 
 Panwell with Bombay. Wellesley marched a few miles 
 to the westward, but soon halted, because his absence 
 caused alarm in Poona, not yet recovered from dread of 
 Holkar's marauders. There is, or was twenty years 
 ago, a foolish tradition in the hills that Wellesley in 
 great straits flung two guns into a tank ; but the guns 
 so abandoned belonged to Colonel Cockburn's force, the 
 rear-guard of which under Hartley fought such a 
 brilliant action fourteen years before near Wargaom. 
 The General did not encamp near the Bhore Ghaut ; 
 but a huge rock at Khandalla still bears the name of 
 the "Duke's Nose." In 1803 it looked down on the 
 rough military road as it wound up the hills from the 
 Concan ; now it towers above the famous railway which, 
 running straight up from Callian, has not wholly super- 
 seded the highway from Poona to Panwell. In 1870 a 
 venerable elephant was killed on the Bombay flats in 
 order that his skeleton might be placed in the Museum. 
 He was reputed to be the last survivor of Arthur 
 WeUesley's transport-train. 
 
 More than a fortnight elapsed before Bajee Eao 
 passed up the Ghauts — a delay which vexed the im- 
 petuous Malcolm, and increased the anxieties of his 
 sober comrade. For Holkar had moved upon Aurunga- 
 bad, and Stevenson was sent towards the Godavery to 
 keep him in check, and it was still a question whether 
 the Mahratta chiefs would combine either for a dash 
 into the Nizam's territories or upon Poona. Wellesley 
 judged that they would not be able to settle their 
 personal differences, yet saw clearly that, in any case, 
 they should be prevented from raiding to the southward. 
 
68 WELLINGTON 
 
 Malcolm, and his expressions paint the moment, said, 
 "If Bajee Eao were at all practicable, I should have no 
 fears, but I apprehend much from the weakness and 
 depravity of his character." In addition Colonel Collins, 
 the British agent with Scindia, did not discourage the 
 suggested advance of that chief to Poona, thus increasing 
 the confusion and the danger. Nor was the apparent and 
 perhaps real peril much diminished by the advent of the 
 Peishwah, who entered his capital on Friday, May 
 •13th; for Wellesley was detained another three weeks 
 before he was free to approach Stevenson, avert the 
 calamity of an inroad, and bring the pending questions 
 to a final issue. The delay was not wholly due to 
 Mahratta double-dealing, since he had to get European 
 iron from Bombay to repair his gun carriages, and he 
 says in a letter to General Stuart, June 2nd, " I. have made 
 150 wheels since I came here " ; but, at that moment, he 
 thought himself better equipped, in respect of carriages, 
 than he was when he started from Hurryhur. The army 
 marched northward on June 4th, and speedily fell 
 under the exacting exigencies of Indian campaigning. 
 There was no forage on the ground ; the cattle belonging 
 to the native dealers died ; the dealers themselves, whom 
 he had so well treated, played him false ; and he felt 
 keenly the absence of the Mahratta horse, detained by 
 the intrigues and duplicities of the Peishwah. But 
 some few arrived by degrees, and, after a period of 
 relative privation, his prospects of supply improved. 
 Still he thought the army would have fared better in an 
 enemy's country, for the peasants, uncertain who was to 
 be master, concealed their grain, and what was obtained 
 had to be dug out of pits. Neither Poona nor Bombay 
 
MARCHES AGAINST SCINDIA 
 
 promptly satisfied his wants; he talked of falling back, 
 and of the folly of operating so many hundreds of miles 
 from an assured base in Mysore. 
 
 His situation, indeed, during the months of June and 
 July, was very embarrassing. In his rear was a ruler 
 at Poona whom he could not trust — the character of the 
 Peishwah's government he found to be deceit ; Bajee Eao 
 promised much and performed nothing, and was more- 
 over in treacherous correspondence with his late enemies. 
 Amrut Eao, it is true, listened to persuasive arguments, 
 and ultimately brought his troopers into the British 
 camp, while Holkar, mistrusting all sides, especially the 
 two Mahrattas, set out for Malwa with his store of 
 plunder. But in Wellesley's front, south of the Taptee — 
 for Scindia, who had been joined by the Eajah of Berar, 
 had come on to the edge of the Nizam's frontier — were 
 two powerful armies. The aim of Scindia was to defer 
 hostilities until the rains ceased and the rivers fell, so 
 that he might move with freedom in any direction. 
 Therefore he evaded a plain answer to the questions 
 addressed to him by Lord Wellesley's agent, and pre- 
 pared for war, at his own time, with Lord Wellesley's 
 brother. Such a state of suspense became at length 
 intolerable, and it was brought to an end so soon as 
 the General was entrusted with powers as a political 
 agent sufficiently large to warrant a policy of decision. 
 In the middle of July those powers arrived in his camp, 
 and he did not let them rust. A steady advocate of 
 peace, he had done all he could to preserve it, but 
 when the objects of Scindia became apparent he went 
 straight to the mark. He summoned Scindia to prove 
 the sincerity of his friendly professions by withdrawing 
 
70 WELLINGTON 
 
 into Hindustan, and the Rajah of Berar to manifest his 
 goodwill by retiring to Nagpore. Both said they did 
 not intend to fight or oppose the fulfilment of the treaty 
 of Bassein. " If you are sincere in this declaration of 
 your friendly intentions," said Wellesley, "there appears 
 to be no occasion for assembling your army and joining 
 it with that of the Eajah of Berar, on the Nizam's 
 frontier." The thrust went home. " When you shall 
 have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations 
 beyond the Nerbudda," continued the General, " I also 
 shall draw back those under my command to their usual 
 stations." If the proof of sincerity were not given, 
 then the confederates would be attacked. Colonel 
 Collins was ordered to press for an explicit reply, and 
 retire if one were not given. The strong and simple 
 language of the General sharply wound up the long 
 delay. At the beginning of August he had moved his 
 army to Walkee, six miles south of Ahmednugger, a 
 fort held for Scindia. It was there he received the 
 preposterous counter propositions of the Mahratta chiefs 
 — they were to retire to Burhanpore when the British 
 and allied armies had reached their stations in Madras, 
 Seringapatam, and Bombay. Wellesley's reply was 
 prompt and plain. On August 6th, characterising the 
 proposal as inadmissible and unreasonable, he put 
 his case in a few energetic words — "I oifered you 
 peace upon terms of equality and honourable to all 
 parties ; you have chosen war and are responsible for all 
 the consequences." Such a downright negotiator, who 
 planted himself squarely on the facts, who meant what 
 he said, and spoke with frank simplicity, proved fatal 
 to the game of Mahratta evasion. 
 
1 1 1 CAPTURES A UR UNGABAD 7 1 
 
 As swift in action as he was plain in speech, Welles- 
 ley at once directed the British troops in Guzerat to 
 attack Scindia's garrisons, and moved up to Ahmed- 
 nugger on August 8th. That very day he stormed the 
 pettdh, or fortified suburb, which was defended by 
 a body of Arabs and a battalion of Scindia's regular 
 infantry. The lofty walls had no ramparts, so that 
 when the stormers climbed up they had no ground on 
 which they could stand. Yet they held on, drove the 
 defenders to the houses, and finally after a brisk and 
 gallant contest expelled them from the place. The 
 next day a battery for four guns was built, which, 
 opening on the 10th, was so destructive that the 
 governor notified his desire to treat. He wished that 
 the cannonade should be stayed, but "I told him that 
 I should not cease firing till I should have taken the 
 fort or he should have surrendered it.'' Finally he 
 was allowed to depart with the garrison and his own 
 private property, and on the 12th he "marched out 
 with 1400 men," and the British troops marched in. 
 The success was rapid and the loss not great — thirty 
 killed, including four British officers, and one hundred 
 and eleven wounded. The fort thus swiftly captured 
 was the strongest in the country, and in the General's 
 opinion only less formidable than Vellore. Its posses- 
 sion secured the line of advance, and the sharp stroke 
 gave its conqueror a moral ascendency he always 
 retained. 
 
 No time was lost in despatching the troops to the 
 Godavery, which they crossed at Toka to support Colonel 
 Stevenson, who, it will be remembered, was north of 
 Aurungabad watching the Mahrattas. Wellesley him- 
 
72 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 self, having much business to transact and letters to 
 write, did not reach Toka until the 22nd, for he had to 
 communicate with Poona on many things ; with the 
 Bombay" Government, which did not work well with 
 him, but, as usual, was disposed to fight for its own 
 hand ; with General Stuart, who did sustain him in the 
 most ample and ungrudging spirit, who sent him rein- 
 forcements and took care to preserve the southern line 
 of communication through the Nizam's western districts. 
 Arrived at Toka he pushed on to Aurungabad, which 
 he entered on the 29th at a critical moment. He learned 
 that Scindia had deceived his antagonist, and had broken 
 into the Nizam's country. The task which Stevenson 
 had to perform was arduous. In his front were the 
 ranges of hills which ran up from the Taptee valley. 
 They were, like all such apparent barriers, passable at 
 more than one point. Stevenson had carefully watched 
 the Adjunta Ghaut, the most likely route, but he had 
 also to keep an eye on the opening at Badoolah, farther 
 east. These passages could not both be guarded, being 
 too far apart. Scindia took advantage of this condition. 
 He ostentatiously rode off with his horsemen towards 
 Badoolah, and when he found that his opponent made 
 a corresponding movement on the other side of the 
 range, the Mahratta turned in his track, sped swiftly 
 to Adjunta, rapidly crossed the hills, swooped down 
 upon Jaulna by the valley of the Poorna, and put 
 himself between Stevenson and Aurungabad. The 
 danger was that he would dash over the Godavery and 
 make for Hyderabad. It was not great, however, for 
 although on hearing of Wellesley's advent he went 
 farther eastward, still, when the General at once 
 
in COMING TO CLOSE QUARTERS 73 
 
 marclied to the Godavery at Eakisbaum, the Mahratta 
 retired northward upon the line leading back to Adjunta. 
 It was a prudent step, since he had only horsemen, and 
 Stevenson, coming down from Badoolah, not only re- 
 covered Jaulna but harassed his camps by night attacks. 
 These incidents occurred between August 22nd and 
 September 9th. The reason of Wellesley's apprehension 
 respecting Hyderabad was that the Godavery suddenly 
 fell and became fordable anywhere. 
 
 It may be doubted, however, whether Scindia had any 
 plan, seeing that neither his regular infantry nor his 
 heavy guns had joined the swarming horse. Wellesley 
 was glad to hear that both were coming, as the infantry 
 would be " something solid " to go upon, and the guns 
 would retard the marches, and give him a better 
 chance of coming up with them. His own army was 
 " never in such marching trim," he told the sympathetic 
 Malcolm, then absent and ill : " I marched the other 
 day twenty-three miles in seven and a half hours; all 
 our marches are now niade at the rate of three miles an 
 hour." On September 18th a much-needed convoy 
 with a military chest and many cattle came up from 
 Mysore, and that set Wellesley free to act. He moved 
 at once northward towards the enemy, joined Steven- 
 son near Sailgoan and Budnapore on the 21st, and 
 arranged a plan of offensive operations. The Mahratta 
 army, at that time complete in horse, foot, and guns, was 
 understood to be near Bokerdun on the little river 
 Kaitna. Between them and the British rose a chain of 
 heio-hts above the right bank of the Pooma, and their 
 camps could only be reached by traversing the passes 
 in two bodies and uniting on the northern slopes. 
 
74 WELLINGTON 
 
 Stevenson took the western and Wellesley the eastern 
 road, designing to fall on both flanks of the Mahratta 
 host. That movement led to the battle of Assaye, or 
 Assye as it is written in the old books and maps. 
 
 Wellesley marched on September 22nd into the hills 
 between Budnapore and Jaulna, and farther on the 
 next day as far as Naulniah, which he reached at eleven 
 in the morning and where he intended to encamp. But 
 here he found himself unexpectedly within six miles of 
 the confederates. A dragoon patrol brought in some 
 grain-dealers, who told him that the Mahrattas were 
 there, and might be seen from a rising ground, but that 
 they were preparing to depart, and that the cavalry had 
 already gone. So, after securing the baggage in the 
 camp at Naulniah, he marched on, intending to assail 
 the infantry ; but instead of these alone, he found the 
 whole army, and yet he resolved to attack, because 
 retreat in the face of the abounding Mahratta horse 
 would have been perilous, and, what is more important, 
 because there was a chance, indeed a certainty that 
 getting wind of Stevenson's advance, they would 
 withdraw the infantry and guns. In fact, it was a great 
 opportunity as well as a great risk, and Wellesley was 
 not long in resolving to run the risk and seize the 
 opportunity. Wellesley had a correct knowledge of 
 Mahratta character, and he never showed it more 
 emphatically than when he determined, almost as 
 soon as he saw the enemy, to fight him where he 
 stood. About one o'clock he was at the head of his 
 little band scanning the masses of infantry, the lines of 
 batteries, the columns of cavalry, some of whom crossed 
 the Kaitna to watch him ; and then he quickly decided 
 
Ill IN SIGHT OF THE MAHRATTAS 75 
 
 that he would move along the front of their camps and 
 suddenly strike their left. It was a bold resolve, for he 
 had not more than two thousand Europeans in his 
 available force of five thousand men and eighteen guns, 
 while the enemy had an army put by some at fifty and 
 certainly exceeding forty thousand, and above one 
 hundred cannon ; it was a prudent resolve, because in 
 fighting an Indian army victory follows the flag of the 
 assailant who begins with, and by his onward rush 
 retains, that moral superiority which is worth myriads of 
 men. 
 
 What Wellesley saw from the rising ground to the 
 south was a series of camps set up within an angle of 
 ground formed by the Kaitna and the ravine of the Jouah. 
 The trained infantry. Begum Sumroo's, Pohlman's, and 
 Dupont's, were on the left above the rocky channel of 
 the Kaitna, and with them was the formidable train of 
 artillery. The cavalry stood on the right, extending 
 far up the stream towards Bokerdun. The fortified 
 village of Assays, on the nullah which covered the rear, 
 was occupied by some foot. Wellesley's design was to 
 march his little column diagonally to this front, until he 
 reached an unguarded ford at Peepulgaum, near the 
 junction of the two ravines — the existence of which he 
 inferred from the fact that there were houses on both 
 banks — then cross it rapidly, form athwart the angle, 
 and falling upon the left of Scindia's regulars, roll up the 
 whole line. For some time, although horsemen rode out 
 to look at him, his intention was not discerned. 
 Probably he was not credited with the daring plan 
 devised. When the troops reached the ford the 
 Mahratta guns opened with great effect, and as the 
 
76 WELLINGTON 
 
 destructive fire did not arrest the steady advance across 
 the Kaitna, the real object of the movement dawned 
 upon the European officers in the Mahratta army. With 
 the greatest regularity and precision, admired by their 
 opponents, the regulars changed front, forming line 
 across the open space, nowhere more than a mile wide, 
 facing the confluence of the water -courses, the right 
 resting on the Kaitna, the left upon Assaye, and the 
 clouds of horse in the rear. Wellesley drew up his 
 handful of infantry in two lines, placing the cavalry 
 behind as a reserve, and it thus happened that instead 
 of attacking a flank perpendicular to his front, he had to 
 engage a line parallel to his own. He, therefore, altered 
 his plan, which now was to keep back his right, push 
 forward his left, and throw the hostile forces upon 
 Assaye and the nullah in its rear. But the battle was 
 not so fought at the outset, for the picquets or leading 
 troops on the right were by mistake led off" towards 
 Assaye, uncovering the second line, and falling themselves 
 into a deadly converging fire ; the Seventy -fourth followed 
 the picquets into the cannonade, and a great gap was thus 
 made in the array. The enemy's horse rode up to charge, 
 and so serious was the peril on the right, that the Nine- 
 teenth Light Dragoons and a native cavalry regiment 
 were obliged to charge at once. Eager for the fray they 
 galloped up, cheering as they went and cheered by the 
 wounded ; and riding home even into the batteries, saved 
 the remnants of the picquets and the Seventy -fourth. On 
 the British left the swift and steady rush of the Seventy- 
 eighth and the Sepoys had carried the first line of guns and 
 crushed in upon the second, thus hurling the Mahratta 
 regulars upon the Jouah nullah. In this part of the field 
 
Ill BATTLE OF ASSAYE 77 
 
 the work was done with the bayonet, not more than two 
 rounds being fired by the British. As the second hne 
 of guns was carried, shots came from the first, for the 
 gunners who had been spared rose up when the troops 
 swept onward and opened fire, so that a resolute charge 
 to the rear, headed by the General, was needed to punish 
 the treachery. This incident did not stop the forward 
 sweep of the Hne, which was in the nature of a right 
 wheel, and brought the troops almost parallel to the 
 Jouah ravine. The decisive strokes were the splendid 
 charge of the Dragoons and the irresistible sweep of the 
 Seventy -eighth upon the Mahratta right. The whole 
 action was fought out in a comparatively small space, 
 for the triangle formed by the ravines is nowhere more 
 than a mile wide ; and the stress of the combat fell upon 
 Scindia's gunners and regulars, for the cavalry scarcely 
 took any part. When the infantry fled over the nullah, 
 the Nineteenth again charged, and unhappily Colonel 
 Maxwell was killed. The battle began a little after 
 three o'clock, it was over at six ; and in that brief space, 
 out of less than five thousand, there were above four 
 hundred Europeans and more than sixteen hundred 
 natives killed and wounded, — a rare proof of the courage 
 and resolution which, in three hours, crushed a great 
 army, destroyed a much'- prized native infantry, and 
 captured one hundred and two guns and all their 
 tumbrils. Moreover these grand soldiers had actually 
 marched twenty-four miles before they stepped across 
 the Kaitna into the battlefield. Wellesley, of course, 
 says nothing of his own conduct in the fight, but others 
 testify that he was always in the thick of the action, 
 a horse dying under him ; and that he was not only cool, 
 
78 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 but displayed that springing valour already conspicuous 
 when he led his horsemen upon the bands of iDhoondiah 
 Waugh. Munro, who, by the light of the rules of war, 
 criticised sharply the mode of attack, admitted that 
 "though it might not have been the safest it was 
 undoubtedly the most decided and heroic ; it will have 
 the effect of striking greater terror into the hostile armies 
 than could have been done by any victory gained with 
 the assistance of Colonel Stevenson's division, and of 
 raising the national military character, already high in 
 India, still higher.'' No General could desire, from a 
 competent judge, more emphatic approval of his great 
 achievement. 
 
 Although the operations were prolonged for nearly 
 three months, yet the victory of Assaye practically 
 decided the war in the Deccan. While Wellesley kept 
 his division ready to move anywhere, Stevenson crossing 
 the Taptee captured Burhanpore and the strong hill 
 fort of Asseerghur. No efforts of the enemy availed to 
 avert these results. At first the combined Mahratta 
 army made a feint in a southerly direction, which drew 
 Wellesley towards Aurungabad, but he soon discovered 
 it and returned before they could meddle with Stevenson. 
 Then Scindia, sending the remains of his infantry over 
 the Nerbudda, halted on the Taptee, and the Berar 
 Eajah alone pushed southward again, passing the hills 
 on the west and moving towards Aurungabad. Wellesley 
 at once came down the Ghaut, and at his approach the 
 Mahratta went eastward, trying, but in vain, to snatch 
 a heavy convoy, the escort of which beat off his horse. 
 The General, marching one hundred and twenty miles 
 in eight days, saved all his convoys, defended the Nizam's 
 
in BATTLE OF ARGAUM 79 
 
 territories, and ■would have smashed the Eajah had the 
 convoy not demanded his care. " But all the subsequent 
 solid operations of the war,'' he wrote to his brother, 
 "depended on the arrival of that convoy, and it was 
 more important to secure it than to gain a victory over 
 a body of horse." After resting the troops, he followed 
 the Eajah into Berar, and Stevenson moved into the 
 same territory. Scindia had by this time, influenced, 
 perhaps, by Lake's brilliant victories, made a sort of 
 peace which he did not observe ; but as the Eajah held 
 aloof, hoping to save Gawilghur, both armies con- 
 verged upon him, and, after being separated for two 
 months, joined together at Parterly on November 29th. 
 Though the enemy had decamped, he was still visible 
 on the march from a tower : his cavalry skirmished with 
 the advance ; and when Wellesley rode out to push up 
 infantry supports, he discerned his antagonists posted in 
 front of Argaum, where he designed to encamp. It was 
 late and hot, but he determined to attack. Designing 
 to press the enemy's left he advanced in two lines, the 
 right thrown forward ; but when his Sepoys came within 
 range of the guns, remembering, perhaps, the slaughter 
 of Assaye, they fell into a panic and faced about. 
 "Luckily," the General wrote, "I happened to be at no 
 great distance from them, and I was able to rally them 
 and re-estabHsh the battle. If I had not been there I 
 am convinced we should have lost the day." So that it 
 was a critical moment. When formed again they be- 
 haved steadily, and as only Scindia's horse really fought, 
 the action was soon over. Yet so much time had 
 been lost that, as Wellesley wrote to his brother, "not 
 more than twenty minutes' sun remained when I led on 
 
8o WELLINGTON 
 
 the British cavalry to the charge." Fortunately the 
 moon was bright, and the horse galloped on and gathered 
 much spoil. The routed enemy left on the field thirty- 
 eight guns and all his ammunition. " The troops were 
 under arms, and I on horseback, from six in the morning 
 until twelve at night." The immediate fruit of the 
 battle was that Eagojee Bhonsla, "the only Mahratta 
 who cared about his country," soon yielded. For the 
 formidable stronghold of Gawilghur, built upon a block 
 of mountain and only accessible on one side, to reach 
 which Stevenson struggled for a week through the 
 roadless hills, was battered for two days and stormed 
 on the third (December 15th) ; and that fine exploit, 
 which induced the Berar Eajah to sign a treaty, ended 
 the war in the Deccan. 
 
 On the day after the fall of the Berar fortress, a 
 welcome visitor arrived in camp — Malcolm, who had 
 been so long absent ill at Bombay. The two men 
 thoroughly liked and appreciated each other, and 
 Malcolm's gaiety and high spirits were a luxury to the 
 staff. Wellesley had grown graver and older-looking 
 under the stress of his immense labours as a soldier- 
 diplomatist ; for the whole charge lay upon him, and 
 "something of this gravity," says Sir John Kaye, 
 "communicated itself to his associates. Much work 
 and much thought imparted a sombre tint to the social 
 aspects of life at headquarters." They were tired and 
 still. " Unless there was something of unusual interest 
 to excite him the General spoke little at table." Hence 
 " Malcolm's arrival in camp was like a sudden burst of 
 sunshine." From one of his letters we obtain a glimpse 
 of the two men, for Malcolm says, " I have written in 
 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 the same manner as I have been accustomed to speak 
 while partaking your favourite recreation," that is, 
 pacing up and dovm before his tent in the Deccan as 
 a few years after, in a gray greatcoat, he moved up and 
 down the little square at Freneda, and in his old age he 
 walked with Arbuthnot on the platform at Walmer. 
 
 When the treaty with the Berar Eajah was ratified 
 Wellesley set out on his return to the south, striking at 
 a strong band of marauders on his way, and warmly thank- 
 ing his troops, who marched sixty miles in twenty hours, 
 for their " persevering activity." He visited Poena and 
 then descended the Ghauts to Bombay, where he remained 
 some days, and then once more ascended to the cooler 
 Deccan. " I was feasted out of Bombay as I was feasted 
 into it," he wrote to a friend ; but whether so greeted 
 or not he never ceased his public labours, and his 
 prolific pen was never idle. A deep difference of 
 opinion had arisen respecting the proper policy which 
 should be pursued towards Scindia, and Wellesley 
 strongly urged the G-overnor-General to restore Gwalior 
 to that chief. If that were not done and war was 
 renewed, Wellesley would enter upon it with zeal and 
 ardour, having no doubt of success. " But," he added, 
 " however I may be pleased with the prospect of that 
 success, as far as I am concerned I should prefer the 
 continuance of peace for the public and for you." He 
 laments that the system of moderation and conciliation 
 on which he made the much-praised treaties should be 
 in danger of being given up. " The Governor-General 
 may write what he pleases at Calcutta ; we must con- 
 ciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his 
 business ; and all his treaties, without conciliation and 
 
 G 
 
82 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 an endeavour to convince the Native Powers that we 
 have views besides our own interest, are so much waste 
 paper." Such were his princijiles, and he always acted 
 on them to the best of his abihty and knowledge — a 
 warrior who sought peace, a statesman who had a single 
 eye to the commonweal. 
 
 The period of his sojourn in India was now approach- 
 ing its term. In June, 1804, the Governor-General 
 called him to Bengal, whither he at once went, passing 
 through Seringapatam and Madras, and, of course, 
 diligently transacting business all the way. Not long 
 after he joined his brother came the startling news of 
 Monson's disasters, which he called in a letter to Mr. 
 Webbe, " the greatest and most disgraceful to our 
 military character of any that have ever occurred." 
 The memory of it yet lives in native song, and in 
 September, 1804, the unlooked-for success of Holkar 
 seemed to shake for a moment the bases, not of our 
 j)ower, but of the recently -concluded peace. The 
 Governor-General gave General Lake the opportunity 
 of asking for the services of Wellesley, but he desired 
 that the latter should return to the Deccan. Thither, 
 accordingly, he went in November, resolved to embark 
 for England as soon as Holkar had been defeated and 
 his brother would give permission. Holkar was routed 
 by Lake in December, and at the beginning of 1805, all 
 signs of danger having disappeared, the General made 
 up his mind to depart. The English mail arrived at 
 Madras on February 16th, 1805, with letters of Sep- 
 tember 4th, 1804, and a Gazette, notifying that Lake had 
 been made Lord Lake of Delhi and Laswarree, and a 
 Knio-ht of the Bath. That night he determined on 
 
Ill HETURNS TO ENGLAND 83 
 
 going to England. Lord William Bentinck had suc- 
 ceeded to the Governorship of Madras, and Sir John 
 Cradock, afterwards Lord Howden, to the post of Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. To the latter Wellesley wrote in 
 January, "You think about my staying in India like a 
 man who has just come out, and I like one who has been 
 here for seven years involved in perpetual troubles." 
 No Indian situation would tempt him to stay, even were 
 he certain that in England no employment would be 
 given to him. "I am not rich," he added, "in com- 
 parison with other people, yet quite sufficiently so for 
 all my wants," and he was • therefore independent of 
 office. The truth is, a sort of home-sickness had come 
 upon him ; he was inexpressibly anxious to see his friends 
 again, especially perhaps a fair friend. She had told 
 him that the small-pox had ravaged her beauty, but, of 
 course, he did not allow that misfortune to break his 
 troth. He was really ill. " He appears plagued with a 
 slow fever," wrote Malcolm to Major Shawe : " He frets 
 himself, which I never knew him do before." So it was. 
 Writing to an agent respecting a passage, he said that 
 he was "not very particular about accommodation," did 
 not " care a great deal about the price," nor " much who 
 the captain is or what the ship," so eager was he to fly 
 from India. The Admiral ofi"ered him a passage on the 
 Trident, and after bidding farewell to his friends and 
 comrades personally, or by letter, taking leave of the 
 troops so long under his command, and depositing a 
 sum of money for the benefit of Salabut Khan, the son 
 or adopted son of Dhoondiah Waugh, Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley sailed from Madras in March, 1805, bearing 
 with him proofs of public gratitude and private affection, 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 alike from natives who knew him to be just and humane, 
 and from Europeans who admired his great actions, his 
 honest, frank, and high-minded character. He sailed 
 none too soon. To his brother he wrote in July, from 
 St. Helena, that his health was restored, but that had 
 he not quitted India he would have had a serious fit 
 of illness; and to Malcolm he said, "I was wasting 
 away daily, and latterly, when at Madras, I found my 
 strength failed which had before held out." 
 
 It was therefore time he should quit the trying 
 climate which he had braved so many years, and it was 
 well for England that he reached her shores, not only 
 with the renown he had won and the lustre of the great 
 services he had performed fresh upon him, but with 
 body and mind alike abounding in the solid strength 
 and tireless energy required to front and overcome the 
 tremendous perils and obstacles which lay hid in the 
 future. Without undue ambition he was, what he 
 desired to be, a great and, so far as man can be, un- 
 selfish servant of his country, who held himself bound 
 in duty to uphold and promote by honourable means 
 her honour, prosperity, and power. Such he was in 
 India, and such he remained to the end of his days. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 HOME: SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN 
 
 At the moment when Wellesley landed on September 
 lOth, 1805, although. Nelson had not yet won his 
 immortal victory, Consul Bonaparte, now Emperor 
 Napoleon, had relinquished his plan of invasion, and 
 was preparing to march across the Ehine on the path 
 which led to Ulm and AusterUtz. The splendour of his 
 deeds dazzled the eyes but did not daunt the hearts of 
 his insular adversaries, who had resumed that stupendous 
 conflict by land and sea, which they conducted with 
 Roman tenacity to a Roman conclusion. The great 
 qualities of the " Sepoy General " were known only to a 
 few, perhaps to none in their fulness, except his elder 
 brother and those comrades who had seen and shared 
 his toils. The plains of the Deccan were more remote 
 than they are now, and it was far more difficult even 
 than it is in our day to realise and appreciate the merit 
 of services in India. The Minister, Mr. Pitt, who saw 
 him more than once, " was at a loss which most to ad- 
 mire, his modesty or his talents,'' saying "he had never 
 met with any military officer with whom it was so 
 satisfactory to converse.'' So that his character soon 
 impressed itself upon the men with whom he was brought 
 into contact, and, on the whole, although a little later 
 
86 WELLINGTON 
 
 he was for a time thrust into a civil post, there is no 
 ground for saying that as a soldier he really suffered any 
 neglect. Indeed, within six weeks of landing he was 
 ordered on active service, taking part as brigadier in an 
 abortive expedition to Hanover. For some time also he 
 commanded a brigade at Hastings, part of the force 
 watching the French on the opposite coast. He did 
 his duty in this subordinate position as thoroughly as 
 he had done it when at the head of a great army, for 
 it was his principle to serve the King and his Govern- 
 ment whenever and wherever they might employ 
 him. In the spring of 1806, accepting, with the ap- 
 proval of his friends, an offer from Lord Grenville, Mr. 
 Pitt's successor as Prime Minister, he entered the House 
 of Commons as Member for Eye, and in April he married 
 Lady Catherine Pakenham, to whom he had pledged 
 himself before he sailed for India. In Parliament he 
 came at once to the front and made a deep impression 
 by the masterly, lucid, and convincing speeches which 
 he delivered in defence of his brother's policy and ad- 
 ministration. Nor did he coniine his efforts to the 
 House. He wrote a memorandum on the Marquess 
 Wellesley's Government, which has been justly described 
 as still the most practical and correct essay written 
 on the great subject ; and he may be said to have en- 
 lightened and converted some of the severest critics of 
 his brother's career. Well might he say : "By your 
 firmness and decision you have not only saved but 
 enlarged and secured the invaluable empire entrusted to 
 your government at a time when everything else was a 
 wreck, and the existence even of Great Britain was 
 problematical." What a fine censure on the folly, party 
 
IV CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND 87 
 
 spirit, and ignorance which for years animated the 
 assailants of Lord Wellesley ! " You will have seen," 
 he writes to Malcolm, July 1806, "that I am in Parlia- 
 ment, and a difficult and most unpleasant game I have 
 had to play in the present extraordinary state of parties;" 
 nor to parties was he ever subservient. 
 
 He was soon to take a more active and certainly not 
 less difficult and unpleasant part. The death of Pitt, 
 almost on the morrow of AusterHtz, brought in " all the 
 talents," and Fox at the Foreign Office filled Napoleon 
 with unfounded hopes of acquiescence in his terms. But 
 Lord GrenviUe and his colleagues were as tenacious as 
 Pitt, and the peace which Napoleon says he hoped for 
 could not be obtained. In 1807 the famous Ministry 
 struck on the hard rock of Bang George's inveterate 
 prejudices against the Eoman Catholics. His subjects 
 of that faith served in the army and navy it was true, 
 but, as it were, on sufferance. On this delicate question 
 Sir Arthur, who held and openly expressed the opinion 
 that no subject should be precluded from serving the 
 State on account of his religious belief, nevertheless 
 thought that from a practical point of view no measure 
 was required, since Dissenters of all shades did serve 
 and had served for years ashore and afloat. The Cabinet 
 wished to make the grant of commissions to any subject 
 lawful, and brought in a Bill for that purpose. But the 
 King was steadfast, considered himself ungenerously 
 treated, and by his opposition obliged the Ministry to 
 resign. One result of the political change was that Sir 
 Arthur was offered and accepted the post of Chief 
 Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, the Duke 
 of Richmond. He held that ungrateful office for two 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 years, but twice during the period he was engaged in 
 active service in Denmark and Portugal. It is not 
 necessary, nor would it be practicable, to dwell on his 
 Irish secretaryship, which may be regarded as an episode, 
 and dealt with briefly once for all. His first labour was 
 to secure the return of members favourable to the 
 Government. He had to buy, and did buy openly by 
 gifts of places, pensions, and titles, those persons high 
 and low who disposed of seats, just as he detached an 
 Amrut Eao from the Mahratta confederacy, or induced 
 an Umeer Khan to enter the Nizam's service. It was 
 the custom of a corrupt time, and he did not attempt to 
 pretend that it was otherwise than disgraceful to the 
 men who put themselves up to the highest bidder. 
 They were for sale, he bought them ; they were a 
 minority, yet were needed. "For one Member," he 
 said in after life, " who was returned to the Parliament 
 of 1807 through what you call corruption, ten took their 
 seats the honest advocates of the opinions which they 
 held ; " and he thought that the tenth might be secured 
 "rather than allow them to go over to the opposition." 
 When asked whether he justified the buying and selling 
 of seats, he answered that the inquiry opened up the 
 whole question of constitutional government. Such was 
 his point of view. He heartily despised a venal poli- 
 tician, but he thought it right to use influence in. the 
 counties and open boroughs, where, in that day, 1807-9, 
 "almost every man of mark in the State had his 
 price." His object was to uphold authority and preserve 
 the integrity of the kingdom, and, setting aside his 
 private feelings, he employed the means then usual to 
 attain his chief end. He would not ignore or gloss the 
 
IV IRELAND IN 1 807 89 
 
 great facts. What they were, and the passage is start- 
 ling when read in 1888, is succinctly stated in a letter 
 to Lord Hawkeshury. " I am positively convinced," he 
 \vrote from Dublin in May, 1807, "that no political 
 measure which you could adopt would alter the temper 
 of the people of this country. They are disaffected to 
 the British Government ; they don't feel the benefits of 
 their situation; attempts to render it better either do 
 not reach their minds or they are represented to them 
 as additional injuries ; and in fact we have no strength 
 here but our army." There is no great change now, 
 despite the removal of grievances ; but the maintenance 
 of the Union does not now so much depend upon the 
 army as it does on the resolution of the people of Great 
 Britain. At any rate time has justified the prescience 
 of Arthur Wellesley, who eighty years ago clearly saw 
 the facts and governed himself accordingly. For the 
 rest his policy, as ever, was moderation and concilia- 
 tion ; and among his practical acts was one to establish 
 the Dublin Police, and the suggestion of a measure, 
 subsequently adopted, .which rendered the Irish and 
 British Militia available for service anywhere in the 
 United Kingdom. He took civil duty solely on 
 the condition that he should not be precluded from 
 active service, and he insisted on its fulfilment, saying, 
 '' No political oflace could compensate to me the loss of 
 the situation which I held in the army, and nothing 
 shall induce me to give it up." Therefore he sought 
 and he obtained the military employment which best 
 suited his genius. 
 
 Napoleon and Alexander of Eussia gave him the 
 opportunity of playing a subordinate, yet not obscure 
 
90 WELLINGTON 
 
 part in the great drama. The Italian genius, who led 
 the French and the nations whom he subjected to them, 
 had almost eclipsed the brightness of Austerlitz by the 
 crushing victory over Prussia at Jena, and in the spring 
 and summer of 1807 he captured Dantzic and overcame 
 the stubborn Eussian army in the sanguinary battles of 
 Eylau and Friedland. Driven over the Niemen the 
 Russians were induced to negotiate ; the terms of the 
 peace then attained were embodied in the Treaty of 
 Tilsit, and the two Emperors appeared before the world 
 if not as friends — for Napoleon said, alluding to his royal 
 associates, " there are no friends among us " — yet as 
 close allies. He had no open enemy on the continent, 
 and he and his ally settled matters as they pleased in 
 their treaty of peace. But to that instrument there were 
 secret articles, and one of them was that the resources of 
 Denmark, especially her fleet, should be placed in the 
 hands of Napoleon. He hoped also to obtain that of 
 Sweden, and called the King " arch-madman " when he 
 refused. If these ends were gained, then the French 
 Emperor would dispose of a large.French, Dutch, Spanish, 
 and Danish naval force, which, combined with that of 
 Russia, would give him sixty sail of the line in the North 
 Sea and the Baltic alone. By some means the secret 
 was revealed to the British Government, and no wonder, 
 for the Russians raged under their defeat and hated the 
 treaty. One day, July 15th, Count Woronzov gave to 
 Lord Castlereagh a letter which had come to hand from 
 Sir Robert Wilson, who was with the Russian court; 
 and on the 19th, only four days afterwards, the British 
 G-overnment resolved to anticipate Napoleon and demand 
 the temporary custody of the Danish ships of war. A 
 
IV COPENHAGEN 91 
 
 combined naval and military expedition was organised 
 and sent to sea with great promptitude, for by the end of 
 the month it was on its way to Copenhagen. How well 
 the British Government were informed, and how correctly 
 they judged, may be shown from the Napoleon Corre- 
 spondence. One provision made at Tilsit was that the 
 Emperor of Russia should offer to mediate between 
 England and France. On August 2nd Napoleon, 
 who, then knew nothing of the British expedition, thus 
 wrote from St. Cloud to Bernadotte, who had an army 
 of Dutch and Spanish troops on the Lower Elbe, — "If 
 England does not accept the mediation of Eussia, Den- 
 mark must either declare war or I shall declare war on 
 Denmark. In the latter case you will be destined to 
 take possession of ' tout le continent Danois.' " When he 
 learned, some days later, that the expedition had arrived 
 he directed Bernadotte to offer the Crown Prince all the 
 help he might need " to resist the unjust aggression of 
 England." The two despatches form an instructive con- 
 trast. It is evident that nothing except the audacious 
 policy of the British Government prevented Napoleon 
 from acquiring what he considered an important naval 
 reinforcement ; and the law of self-preservation, which 
 applied with imperative force at that moment, justified 
 them in thwarting a formidable adversary who was 
 master of the continent. 
 
 The command of the army, which, including the troops 
 already in the Isle of Kugen, consisted of twenty-seven 
 thousand men, was entrusted to Lord Cathcart, who had 
 for assistants Sir Harry Burrard and Sir David Baird, 
 while the Eeserve, four battalions and a few German horse, 
 was under Sir Arthur Wellesley. Lord Cathcart's demands 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 were refused ; the powerful fleet invested the islands ; 
 the troops were landed in the middle of the month, north 
 and south of the town, and while Wellesley drove the 
 Danish forces in the field out of Zealand, batteries were 
 erected and the city compelled to endure an awful and 
 destructive bombardment. Thus coerced, Major-General 
 Peyman, the Governor, agreed on September 6th to 
 surrender the fortress, the arsenal, and the fleet ; the 
 articles were drawn up the same night by Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley and ratified the next morning. His share in 
 the whole transaction was confined to operations in the 
 field and the negotiation of the surrender entrusted to 
 him by Lord Cathcart. He won golden opinions from 
 the country folk, gentle and simple, because he protected 
 them and punished ©{Tenders, keeping his fine brigade in 
 admirable order. There are some passages in his letters 
 which imply that he did not approve of the bombard- 
 ment, which was so horribly effective. " I acknowledge," 
 he wrote to Lord Hawkesbury, August 28th, "that I 
 should prefer an establishment upon Amag as a more cer- 
 tain mode of forcing a capitulation than a bombardment. 
 In fact, the Danes are fighting only for their credit ; 
 it would be disgraceful not to bear a bombardment ; but 
 no city with a population of seventy or eighty thousand 
 inhabitants can be expected to hold out when cut off from 
 all supplies of provisions. Besides, I think it behoves us 
 to do as little mischief to the town as possible, and to 
 adopt any mode of reducing it rather than a bombard- 
 ment." At the same time he admitted that "no man 
 can judge of the propriety of any particular plan of 
 operations so well as the person who conducts them and 
 knows everything." For his part he accepted the parole 
 
IV RETURN TO ENGLAND 93 
 
 of the officers he captured in action, and did all he could 
 to conciliate the inhabitants among whom he moved ; and 
 it is at least probable that had he led the expedition its 
 essential object would have been attained by milder, 
 yet not less effective methods. Even conducted as it 
 was it affords a fine example of what a maritime power 
 can do in a brief space of time. The resolve to 
 anticipate Napoleon was taken on July 19th, and by 
 October 20th the fleet and army had returned to 
 England, bringing back fifteen line - of - battle ships, 
 several frigates, and twenty thousand tons of very valu- 
 able naval stores; but, as Mr. James remarks, "the 
 benefit to England was not what she had acquired, but 
 what Denmark, that is Napoleon, lost." Wellesley had 
 long preceded his comrades. As there was nothing 
 more to be done, a week after the capitulation he asked 
 for leave to depart, and on the first day of October was 
 dating his letters from "No. 11 Harley Street, London," 
 preparing to face, in Ireland, "the long nights fast 
 approaching," a suggestive phrase too common in the 
 records of that unhappy country. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FIRST RESCUE OF PORTUGAL 
 
 Eight months afterwards lie once more left the Irish 
 Office for the field. Without a foe in arms on the 
 continent, Napoleon, who had long looked on Spain 
 as a dependent ally, soon after he returned from his 
 triumphs at Tilsit set on foot that series of dark and 
 intricate political and military manoeuvres which, be- 
 ginning with the seizure of Portugal, led to the quasi 
 captivity of the Bourbons and the proclamation of 
 Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. No mere cap- 
 rice induced the Emperor to take a step which had 
 such disastrous consequences. The extension of the 
 dominions of his house was necessary to his system; 
 and he never scrupled to do whatever in his judg- 
 ment was likely to enlarge and consolidate his 
 empire. The order to form a Corps of Observation at 
 Bayonne was given on July 29th, 1807, its object being 
 then Portugal; on August 19th Junot was named as 
 the commander, and on October 12th he was directed 
 to march for Lisbon, as "in order to anticipate the 
 English there was not a moment to lose." These 
 dates are anterior to the treaty of partition signed at 
 Fontainebleau at the end of the month, and show that 
 the policy applied to the Peninsula had long been de- 
 
CHAP. V THE FRENCH IN PORTUGAL 95 
 
 signed. Junot, at the head of a Franco-Spanish army, 
 easily occupied Portugal, the King flying to Brazil on 
 his approach. In like manner the several corps sent 
 in his wake into Spain immediately seized the great 
 fortresses, and Murat was master of Madrid in March. 
 King Charles was "induced" to cede his throne to 
 Napoleon, who at once sent his brother Joseph to 
 fill itj but even before he entered the capital the 
 severe repression of a furious revolt in Madrid having 
 set the land aflame, the enraged Spaniards rose and 
 took the field in every province. Napoleon persevered, 
 and poured in more troops ; but although B^ssieres beat 
 Cuesta and Blake at Eio Seco, Dupont surrendered an 
 army to Castanos at Baylen, and so great was the terror 
 at Madrid that Joseph hurried away to Burgos, and the 
 first week of August saw him and his whole army behind 
 the Ebro. England heartily and lavishly supported the 
 Spaniards, gave them in abundance arms, ammunition, 
 clothing, money, and finally, sending her soldiers as 
 well as her ships and treasure, she began her great and 
 sustained coniiiot in the Peninsula with the enormous 
 power of Napoleon. The first army of succour was 
 commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 A small force, collected at Cork for another purpose 
 and suddenly turned upon the Peninsula, it numbered 
 less than ten thousand men. The General, embarking 
 in July, preceded his fleet of transports, and, landing at 
 Coruna, examined the state of affairs for himself. He 
 had the option of operating either in Spain or Portugal, 
 and he selected the latter, because Napoleon had obliged 
 Junot to detach some troops, and that officer could no 
 longer depend upon his Spanish auxiliaries. Eesolving 
 
96 WELLINGTON 
 
 to land forthwith at Mondego Bay, he ordered General 
 Spencer to bring up his division from Cadiz as soon as 
 possible, and prepared to face the conqueror of Portugal. 
 When oif the coast at the beginning of August he learned 
 that his army was to be reinforced by Sir John Moore's 
 division, then in Sweden, and some thousands from 
 England. "Several general officers senior to me," he 
 wrote to the Duke of Richmond, had been ordered to 
 sail, and Sir Hew Dalrymple (from Gibraltar) to com- 
 mand the whole army. " I hope," he added, " that I 
 shall have beat Junot before any of them shall arrive, 
 and then they will do as they please with me." In that 
 hope he was disappointed. It is explained that the troops 
 under orders were too many for a Major -General, and 
 that is the reason why he was exposed to an unexpected 
 trial. The Ministers would have trusted him, but the 
 customs of the service were too strong for them. 
 
 Wellesley had measured the risk and was prepared 
 to incur it. His information was good, for he estimated 
 Junot's available force at less than twenty thousand 
 men, and the fact was that he had not more than 
 seventeen thousand with which to defend Lisbon, and 
 could not concentrate all these for a battle. The little 
 British army, composed of splendid fighting men, but 
 weak in cavalry and guns, was therefore put ashore on 
 the rocky and wind-beaten coast of Portugal during the 
 first week of August. General Spencer, too, came up 
 from Cadiz in time, having sailed as soon as he heard of 
 Dupont's defeat and before Sir Arthur's orders reached 
 him. Even with his reinforcement, the army was less 
 than fourteen thousand strong, but it was a solid force and 
 eager to encounter the French. The Portuguese in arms, 
 
V LANDS ON THE MONDEGO 97 
 
 of no use as soldiers, disposed to be presumptuous, and 
 requiring management, were a moral help rather than a 
 military adjunct. From the Mondego, having the sea 
 and friendly ships on the right, the army started on the 
 9th for Leiria, a town on the high road from Lisbon to 
 Oporto. That very day. Napoleon at Nantes, desiring 
 to dispel the fears of his brother Joseph, who was then 
 not at Burgos, whither the letter was addressed, but be- 
 yond the Ebro, told him that " the English were of little 
 account ; they have never more than one-fourth of the 
 numbers they pretend to have. Lord Wellesley has not 
 4000 men. Besides, they are directed, I believe, upon 
 Portugal." Trusting to his own grand projects for the 
 subjection of Spain, and evidently misinformed, he 
 undervalued the military power of England, which, no 
 doubt, was then an unknown quantity, chiefly because her 
 enormous strength had been frittered away in fantastic 
 expeditions. He also believed, as appears from a letter 
 to Junot, dated two months earlier, that the affairs of 
 Spain would be ended before the winter : another proof 
 that continuous success had taken the edge off his usually 
 accurate judgment and had made him over-confident. 
 
 The British descent upon the coast caught Junot 
 unprepared, and the Spanish insurrection had shaken his 
 nerve. As soon as he heard of the landing, he sum- 
 moned Loison's division from Estremoz on the Spanish 
 frontier, sent out Laborde from Lisbon to support the 
 troops on the high road, ensure if possible a junction 
 with Loison, who had to cross the Tagus at Abrantes, 
 and prepared to follow, if needed, with the reserve. But 
 Wellesley was too quick and resolute. He entered Leiria 
 before Laborde ; and before Loison, who was moving by 
 H 
 
98 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 forced marches, arrived at Santarem on the Tagus, the 
 former General had been compelled to retire upon Eoliga, 
 a village near Obidos, covering the road to Torres Vedras. 
 Thus, says Napier, " Sir Arthur's first movement had 
 cut the line of communication " between these Generals, 
 so far that he was able to force Laborde to a battle, 
 while Junot, who had joined Loison at Alcoentre with 
 the reserve, was remote from the field. Having his foe 
 at a disadvantage, Wellesley pressed on through Caldas, 
 and drew up on the 16th at Obidos before Laborde's 
 position. The French General halted there because he 
 did not wish to uncover the road to Lisbon, and also 
 because he thought that Loison might push through 
 the hills and come into line on his right. But Wellesley, 
 not disposed to give time, attacked on the 17th. Mov- 
 ing out of Obidos in the early morning he led himself 
 the bulk of his army and twelve guns upon the heights 
 of Eoliga, detached a small Portuguese force under 
 Colonel Trant to threaten the French left, while General 
 Ferguson with two brigades and six guns was sent up 
 the mountain which shut in the valley on the south, to 
 move along the ridge and turn the French right. Thus 
 assailed, Laborde, who has been rightly called a prac- 
 tised warrior, relied on the suppleness as well as the 
 courage of his soldiers, and frustrated the flanking 
 movements by dexterously drawing off to the higher 
 ground on the next terrace of the rugged and wooded 
 hills above a village called Columbeira. The British 
 pursued, still bringing a powerful pressure to bear on 
 the right of the enemy, which he as tenaciously held 
 fast, because on that side lay the line of succour as well 
 as retreat. The combined onset, too impressive to be 
 
V THE BATTLE OF ROLiqA gg 
 
 withstood, led to hard fighting in the gullies and woods, 
 and some loss, for the foremost British battalions in their 
 eagerness mistook the path, and were driven back before 
 they could form on the crest. But, when the force was 
 developed in front and flank, Laborde, wounded, yet still 
 holding his place in the combat, again drew clear out of 
 the hostile grasp and formed afresh on another eminence. 
 It was his last rally, and as Ferguson came abreast of his 
 right, he glided along the crest and gained the road to 
 Euna, weaker by the loss of three guns and six hundred 
 killed and wounded. The British return gives four 
 hundred killed and wounded and seventy missing. It 
 was a brilliant action, and if the invincible soldiers of 
 Napoleon found out that the Britons could fight, the 
 latter learned that their opponents were brave, adroit, 
 and well commanded. 
 
 Wellesley did not pursue. At first he resolved, 
 indeed, to enter the hills by Torres Vedras, but in the 
 evening news came that the brigades of Anstruther and 
 Acland were off the coast, and he took up a position 
 near Vimiero to cover the landing. The reinforcement 
 was a valuable addition to the army. The newcomers 
 landed on the 19th and 20th, in light marching-order — 
 their uniforms and a blanket, a few rations, and sixty 
 rounds of ammunition a man. In that state they went 
 at once to the front and plunged into battle. But it is 
 recorded of these troops that "the men had great joy, for 
 they were relieved of their hair -tying, which was an 
 operation grievous to be borne." A stroke of state had 
 actually abolished the pigtail ! 
 
 During this halt above Maceira Bay Junot had 
 united and reorganised his troops at Torres Vedras. 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 He was still inferior in number, but he had a vast 
 superiority in cavalry, the arm in which the British were 
 deplorably weak. Hoping to surprise his foe, he set 
 forward on the evening of the 20th, but found the road 
 so difficult that his army was not able to emerge from 
 the defile until six o'clock the next morning. The 
 British army had passed the night on a ridge which ran 
 eastward from the sea up to a valley, where stood the 
 village of Vimiero. Above the dip rose a lofty plateau, 
 forming a position which defended all the roads leading 
 from Torres Vedras, and also the road to Lourinha. It 
 stood above the two converging ravines traversed by the 
 water-courses forming the Maceira ; and on its left the 
 heights continued for a couple of miles, when they swept 
 backward to the sea. The British had been under arms 
 since daybreak and were alert and prepared. 
 
 The march of the French, reported in the night, was 
 indicated in the forenoon first by dust, and next by 
 spirays of horse on the right and columns of foot bending 
 to the left. Then they almost disappeared in the 
 hollows and woods. The General, seeing the drift of 
 the movement, sent Anstruther and Fane over the valley 
 to hold the hill above Vimiero, directed Ferguson, 
 Nightingale, Bowes, and Acland, to form on the left, but 
 kept Hill as a reserve on the eminence where he had 
 bivouacked, behind the right. These operations were 
 still in progress when the battle began by a fierce advance 
 on the position held by Fane and Anstruther. The 
 French dashed forward with their usual impetuosity and 
 drove back the Ninety-seventh, but were brought to a 
 stand by that regiment combined with a flank attack 
 from the Fifty-second. Next Laborde tried to pass the 
 
THE BATTLE OF VIMIERO 
 
 left of Fane, but lie brought his guns to bear with terrible 
 effect, and the Fiftieth charging with a will, the column 
 was shattered. Then Kellerman threw a body of grena- 
 diers into the fray, compelling the Forty-third to give 
 ground, but again they fell under the fire of artillery, and 
 the Forty-third rallying bore furiously down upon the 
 head of the column, and with a short but fierce struggle 
 drove it back in confusion. The Twentieth Light Dra- 
 goons, two hundred sabres, dashed into the disordered 
 crowd, but Margaron, galloping up at the head of the 
 French horse, routed the hardy Dragoons and killed their 
 colonel. Practically, the battle was now over on this 
 side, but it still raged on the British left. For Junot 
 had sent two brigades to turn it, not knowing the 
 obstacles in the way, how strong the ground was and 
 how well filled. Solignac's brigade, coming along the 
 crest, was crushed by Ferguson's infantry, its commander 
 wounded and six guns taken ; but Brenier, who had been 
 struggling all the morning in the ravines below the 
 ridge, suddenly broke out upon the flank of the British 
 advance and recairtured the guns. The astonished 
 troops quickly rallied, turned heavily on this unexpected 
 foe, and not only defeated his column and recovered the 
 lost guns, but captured Brenier. It was only noon, so 
 sharp as well as swift had been the fight. The French 
 divisions were cut asunder, and they had no reserves at 
 hand, for all had been engaged. Wellesley, who had 
 closely watched the battle, knew this, and now desired 
 to complete his victory by pushing Junot into the valley 
 of the Tagus, and by occupying the mountains to cut 
 him off" from Lisbon. But here Sir Harry Burrard took 
 command, stopped the army, saved Solignac from 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 capture by Ferguson and Junot from pursuit. The 
 pause of a moment enabled the quick French troops to 
 gather themselves up and regain Torres Vedras. Their 
 loss was one general, two thousand men, and thirteen 
 guns ; the British, seven hundred and twenty. 
 
 Wellesley's share in the campaign of Portugal ended 
 about noon on the 21st, when, for what he admitted to 
 be fair military reasons, Burrard, on taking command, 
 declined to accept his plans. His original design, formed 
 as early as August 8th, was to move Sir John Moore's 
 division from Mondego upon Santarem, so as to cut 
 off the retreat of the French upon Elvas, and turn 
 the line of Torres Vedras by the Tagus ; but Sir Harry 
 Burrard objected ; when the third commander. Sir Hew 
 Dalrymple, landed on the 22nd, he agreed with Burrard, 
 and Moore was ordered to land at Maceira. Neverthe- 
 less Sir Hew agreed to march the next day, but in the 
 afternoon General Kellerman arrived with a flag of truce, 
 opened negotiations for the evacuation of Portugal by 
 the French army, and was actually allowed to draw up 
 himself the terms of suspension of hostilities pending the 
 settlement of a definite convention. Wellesley signed 
 it at the request of Sir Hew. He says that "it was 
 negotiated by the General himself in my presence and 
 that of Sir Harry Burrard, and, after it had been drawn 
 up by Kellerman himself, Sir Hew directed me to sign 
 it;" but he did not approve of it, and only put his name 
 to the document out of deference to the Commander-iu' 
 Chief, and "to avoid being considered the head of a party 
 against his authority.'' He regretted afterwards that he 
 had signed it, even for such reasons, and was so deeply 
 impressed by the waste of fine opportunities that he 
 
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA 103 
 
 described himself privately to the Duke of Eichmond as 
 sick of all that was going on. 
 
 Nor was his feeling unreasonable. He had commanded 
 the army, won two actions, and was not permitted to 
 reap the fruits of his skill and energy. As a matter of 
 fact the command was taken from him on the morning 
 of the 20th, for then Sir Harry, who was on board ship, 
 directed him to halt on the 21st, "for which day I had 
 ordered the army to march." So that, had Junot 
 succeeded in surprising Wellesley on that morning, it 
 would not have been his fault. " I took the command in 
 the battle" (of Vimiero), he says, "because Sir Harry 
 was still in his ship, and because, if he had been on the 
 ground, he could have done nothing." In fact, he 
 won the battle for the other generals, and then fell back 
 into a subordinate position. When the Convention, 
 finally signed at Lisbon and not at Cintra, was known 
 in England, there was an outburst of wrath, which at 
 first fell in all its fury on Sir Arthur and greatly vexed 
 him. But he would not attack Sir Harry, and, although 
 Sir Hew accused him of imprudence and temerity, and 
 otherwise assailed him, he said, " I have thought it but 
 just and fair to Sir H. Dalrymple to avow that I was of 
 opinion that the French ought to be allowed to evacuate 
 Portugal," as matters stood after Moore had been directed 
 to re-embark the men he landed at Mondego in order to 
 march on Santarem. If that had not been done, and if 
 his own plans, which were sound, had been carried out, 
 "we should have been some days ago," he wrote to Fer- 
 guson on August 29th, "in a situation to have refused 
 to the French any capitulation excepting on the terms 
 of their laying down their arms." Whether that would 
 
104 WELLINGTON 
 
 have been so or not can never be known, for the plan 
 was not tried ; but in any case, no blame for the 
 Convention can rest on the man who, after winning the 
 battles which broke the spirit of the French, was cut 
 short in a victorious career by generals of lesser ability, 
 who frustrated his plans and did negotiate the Conven- 
 tion. On the whole, even if we agree with Napier that 
 " the Convention was a great and solid advantage for 
 the Allies, a blunder on the part of the French," it must, 
 be admitted that Wellesley's far-reaching and vigorous; 
 designs were never tested ; and that, considering his 
 genius, he might well have achieved the large ends he 
 had in view, captured the Army of Portugal, and held 
 fast the country as he did in after years. As matters 
 fell out, he was exposed to public odium for offences 
 which he did not commit, and had to appear before a 
 Court of Inquiry to defend what he had not done. In 
 the end he was vindicated, and the whole transaction 
 now stands on record as only one among many examples 
 of the blunders of which governments, nations, and 
 armies may be guilty, when, without knowledge or 
 capacity, and tied up with too much red tape, they 
 plunge into the tremendous hazards of warfare, and 
 make their interests and passions the judges of methods 
 and results. 
 
 Wellesley left the army on September 20th, bear- 
 ing with him the affectionate regards of his officers, 
 and arrived in London early in October. He at once 
 visited Lord Castlereagh, and Sir Hew being recalled, 
 he learned to his delight that Sir John Moore, whom he 
 greatly esteemed, had been appointed to lead the army 
 into Spain. " I find," he wrote to Moore, " that I am 
 
V ONCE MORE AT HOME 105 
 
 placed under your command, than which nothing can be 
 more satisfactory to me." He hoped to join him at 
 once, but the inquiry at Chelsea anent the Convention 
 detained him in London until December ; and thus his 
 destiny was not Coruna, but Dublin Castle. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE SECOND RESCUE OF PORTUGAL 
 
 The ■winter of 1808-9 was marked by a great calamity, 
 but one which had its compensations. Sir John Moore, 
 who drove into the heart of northern Spain at the head 
 of a small army, was compelled to retreat before the 
 overwhelming numbers and masterful combinations of 
 Napoleon, and died a hero's death at Coruna. Although 
 he was not aided by the Spaniards, he saved the south 
 of Spain for the moment from invasion, and arrested 
 the march of armies upon the weak Britigh and 
 Portuguese force left to guard the town and the harbour 
 of Lisbon. King Joseph re-entered Madrid ; the French 
 armies were strongly posted from the Mediterranean to 
 the Atlantic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Tagus. The 
 fierce spirit of resistance was still unquenched, even by 
 the smoking and ensanguined ruins of Saragossa; yet 
 before the last British soldier had embarked from 
 Coruna, or Saragossa had capitulated, Napoleon told 
 his brother Jerome that the affairs of Spain were 
 ended. So liable are men of great genius to miscalcu- 
 lation. He remained at Valladolid until January 17th, 
 and then started for Paris to enter on a fresh struggle 
 with Austria for which he had long been preparing. 
 "What waters do they drink in Vienna," he ironically 
 
CHAP. VI AGAIN EMBARKS FOR LISBON 107 
 
 asked, " those of the Danube or the river of Lethe % " 
 And again, " if the Emperor of Austria makes the least 
 movement, he will soon have ceased to reign." The 
 offence of Austria was that she would not be sufficiently 
 submissive ; she " intrigued " with England, as was 
 natural ; she raised a considerable army, and was 
 resolved to fight once more, for she was not yet a vassal 
 state. Nor can it be doubted that Napoleon resented 
 symptoms of independence which seemed likely to 
 embarrass his projects in Spain as well as in Germany. 
 "In a few months," he wrote to the Saxon King in 
 February, "the matter will be decided, either by the 
 disarming of Austria and the re-establishment of her 
 army on a peace footing, or by war, which will be fol- 
 lowed by the ruin of this grand and ancient monarchy.'' 
 England would not make peace, he insisted, so long as 
 she had the means of troubhng the continent, and " the 
 continent will not be tranquil so long as Austria is in 
 opposition to us." In this spirit he plunged into a care- 
 fully prepared war with Austria ; his draughts of soldiers 
 from Spain lessened the stress upon the Peninsula ; and 
 he quitted that country, never to return, although he 
 retained a villa at Madrid for his use should he again 
 cross the Pyrenees. He set out from Paris on April 
 14th, and on that day Sir Arthur Wellesley, driven 
 back to Portsmouth by a tempest in the Channel, was 
 waiting a fair wind to sail for Lisbon. 
 
 Sir John Moore's campaign and its result perplexed 
 the Government, gave arms to the Opposition which they 
 freely used, and sobered the enthusiasm but did not 
 shake the resolution of the British people. If the 
 Ministers, burdened by an enormous task, appeared to 
 
io8 WELLINGTON 
 
 shrink from the contest in the Peninsula, their better 
 judgment soon regained its ascendency, and perhaps it 
 was Lord Castlereagh's confidence in Wellesley that 
 produced this fortunate effect. Maturely reflecting on 
 the facts, Sir Arthur drew up a memorandum, in which he 
 firmly maintained that whatever might be the issue of 
 the conflict between Napoleon and the Spanish people, 
 Portugal at least could be defended, and Portuguese 
 troops raised and disciplined until they could face the 
 French. He stood alone, or almost alone, in looking on 
 Lisbon as the best base of operations, while others 
 preferred the apparent but delusive advantages of Cadiz 
 and Gibraltar ; and his opinions were so clearly and 
 cogently expounded, that the Cabinet yielded in the 
 end, and he was appointed to command the army, if 
 on arriving at Lisbon he thought it expedient to do 
 so. The post was then held by Sir John Cradock; 
 and if he were found to be successfully engaged in 
 the field. Sir Arthur said he could not reconcile it 
 to his feelings to supersede him and send him to 
 Gibraltar as Governor. He sailed on the 16th, landed 
 at Lisbon on the 22nd, and, as no fresh incident 
 had happened, he relieved Sir John and practically 
 assumed command on April 24th, 1809. Then he 
 began that series of operations which not only defended 
 Portugal, but carried his flag from the Eock of Lisbon to 
 the walls of Toulouse. 
 
 The spirit of the nation rose at once when he 
 appeared in the streets of Lisbon, and added tenfold to 
 the moral force exerted on the side of the Allies. Sir 
 John Cradock had maintained himself courageously with 
 very small means when he was for weeks left without 
 
VI HE TAKES COMMAND IN PORTUGAL 109 
 
 instructions of any kind, and he took the prudent 
 resolution of securing a feasible retreat by preparing a 
 place of embarkation. The defeat of Moore, an advance 
 of Soult to Oporto, the presence of Victor on the Tagus, 
 and the apathy of the Portuguese, were so many dangers 
 vphich he confronted with manly constancy. As time 
 went on there were some alleviations. More troops 
 trickled in from England. The Portuguese regency 
 offered the command of their army to a British officer ; 
 they wished to have Wellesley, but he declined the post, 
 and it fell to Beresford, who had a talent for organisation. 
 Finally, the French neither advanced across the Tagus 
 within the borders of Portugal, nor pushed on from the 
 Douro to Lisbon. But no one would set the military 
 capacity of Cradock in rivalry with that of Wellesley, 
 and the Government, so fiercely assailed, deserves at 
 least the credit of selecting him. Soon after be landed 
 the Portuguese named him Marshal-General, which gave 
 him a solid hold upon the troops and resources of the 
 country : so strong was their confidence, a confidence 
 which in a few weeks he justified abundantly. 
 
 It was five days after landing that he publicly notified 
 his assumption of command, and on May 2nd he was 
 in the field at the head of five and twenty thousand 
 men, nine thousand of whom were Portuguese, and 
 thirty guns. His first step was to organise his 
 commissariat and assure the people that all provisions, 
 supplies, and means of transport would be paid for. His 
 next to decide on the line of operations. There were 
 two enemies before him — Soult at Oporto, well within 
 reach, and Victor, remote, yet more dangerous in 
 appearance because he had a road to Lisbon, if he dared 
 
I lo WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 to follow it, and the means if he thought fit to use them. 
 But Victor was far up the Tagus valley ; to fight him, 
 concert with the quarrelsome Spanish chief Cuesta was 
 needed, which would take time, while Soult, close by, 
 held rich provinces and a great city ; he was cut off from 
 Victor by the mountains and the partisans, and if the 
 abler Marshal could be defeated swiftly, the other could 
 be dealt with later. Wellesley, therefore, determined 
 to organise a line of defence upon the right bank of the 
 Tagus, sufficient to delay Victor if he came on, and 
 with the main body to strike boldly at Oporto. There 
 were other reasons for attacking Soult, for a French 
 officer visited the camp and revealed the fact that he and 
 several comrades wished to depose the Marshal, who, 
 having taken on himself the title of Governor-General 
 of Portugal, was called by the soldiers in derision 
 Nicholas the First. In that military conspiracy, really 
 directed against Napoleon, there was not much depth, 
 but it indicated a loosening of the bonds of discipline and 
 a species of disloyalty very discreditable to soldiers. 
 Wellesley refused point blank to regulate his operations 
 by any such contrivances, and the officer returned across 
 the Douro, where, his machinations being discovered, he 
 was arrested but escaped. At his last visit to the 
 British head-quarters, Napier tells us, the traitor, by the 
 orders of Sir Arthur, was conducted through by-paths, 
 so that he saw little, and thus, when questioned by Soult, 
 he led him to believe that the hostile army could not 
 move for several days. All this told against Soult. 
 He did not know that an army was close upon him at a 
 moment when the disposition of his own troops favoured 
 an attack. His main body was at Oporto and on the 
 
MARCHES ON OPORTO 
 
 Tamego, separated by the Douro from the infantry and 
 horsemen under Mermet and Franceschi, who were 
 posted between the Douro and the Vouga. Wellesley 
 had his army at Coimbra on the Mondego, and his plan 
 was to hold the French left in check with the Portuguese, 
 supported by a British detachment under Beresford, and 
 to surprise if possible and overwhelm the right, whose 
 only line of retreat lay by the boat-bridge at Oporto. 
 Beresford, therefore, marched east of the Sierra in 
 which the Vouga rises, and Wellesley on the 7th with 
 sixteen thousand men moved along the high road 
 between the sea and the hills, reaching the river on the 
 9th, the troops having halted one day to give Beresford 
 time to arrive on the Upper Douro. 
 
 Franceschi, at Albergaria Nova, had no notion that 
 an army was within a few miles of his camp, and the 
 object was to surprise him. To effect this Hill was sent 
 in boats from Aveiro to Ovar at the head of an inlet of 
 the sea ; Paget and Sherbrooke marched by the bridge 
 over the Vouga ; while Trant, commanding a Portuguese 
 party, was pushed out to turn the French right, and Cotton 
 with the British horse was directed on the left. 
 Accidents thwarted the plan, Trant coming on an 
 impassable ravine, and Cotton being misled by guides ; 
 so that on one flank Franceschi was not turned, and on 
 the other Cotton came full on his horse and foot by day, 
 and had to halt. Even then the brilliant Italian did not 
 know how large a force was near, but soon Wellesley 
 came up, and drove off the infantry, yet could not reach 
 the horse, which adroitly withdrew at dark to Grijon. 
 Here the French fought on the 11th for their line of 
 retreat, but not long, as their position was easily turned ; 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 yet again they escaped the grasp of the assailant, and 
 moving all day got safely over the Douro, for once more 
 orders miscarried and accidents occurred, so that the 
 project of smashing the French right south of the Douro 
 failed of its full effect. 
 
 Nevertheless, the surprise of Soult was, complete, and 
 he seems to have trusted to the unfordable Douro for 
 such brief protection as would give him time to slip 
 away. His intention was to retreat by Amarante into the 
 Salamanca country, towards which he sent his heavy im- 
 pedimenta ; and he did not know that Beresford had 
 driven Loison over the Tamega, and that this General, 
 so hated by the Portuguese, had fallen back to Guimar- 
 aens, leaving the Allies in possession of the river passage. 
 So he determined to defend the Douro, and not to march 
 until the 13th. The wished-for delay was not granted 
 to him by his adversary. Bringing the army up to the 
 river early on the 12th, Wellesley eagerly sought the 
 means of crossing. Opposite Oporto the stream flows 
 round a high bluff, the Serra, which overhangs it like a 
 bastion and bears, or bore, a convent. Under this on the 
 eastern face the troops were collected, hidden by the 
 mass from the city. From the summit Wellesley gazed 
 on the deep broad river and the further bank, meditating 
 how to secure the transit for his ardent and hardy 
 soldiers. He quickly observed an isolated building in an 
 enclosure on the opposite shore, having walls on three 
 sides, open to the river on the fourth, and accessible 
 from the city by one gate only. Could boats be obtained — 
 Soult had drawn them all to the right bank — the troops, 
 sheltered by the bluff, would be able for a time at least 
 to pass unseen. Wellesley therefore sent General John 
 
VI THE PASSAGE OF THE DOURO 113 
 
 Murray with the Germans up the river to Avintas, to 
 cross there, and planting a battery on the bluff sought 
 for boats. By the aid of a Portuguese Colonel Waters 
 found them ; three barges were got from the other side, 
 and when he knew that Murray had also obtained some 
 craft, Wellesley gave the signal for the troops to cross. 
 That work was deftly done, and solid possession of the 
 enclosure obtained before the French detected the 
 movement. Then they dashed up, opened a heavy fire 
 and wounded General Paget, whose place was taken by 
 Hill, but could make no impression in front, nor try the 
 flanks, because Wellesley's guns swept the approaches. 
 For some time three battalions stood alone beyond the 
 river and sustained the furious assault. At last Murray 
 was seen moving down the right bank ; the townsfolk 
 sent over boats to Sherbrooke's men at a point below 
 the bluff ; the uproar in the city indicated a retreat, the 
 French were visibly marching towards Vallonga under a 
 heavy fire, and Sherbrooke, at length over the river, issued 
 from the city and pressed on the rear. Murray did not 
 attack or even fire, as he should have done, on the retir- 
 ing columns, who were only molested by two squadrons 
 of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons, led by Brigadier 
 Charles Stewart and Major Hervey. The passage of the 
 Douro, a brilliant action in the face of an enemy, cost 
 the British twenty killed and ninety-six wounded. The 
 French lost five hundred killed and wounded, and five 
 guns, besides fifty without carriages found in the arsenal. 
 Too much is often expected not only from a general, 
 but from his soldiers, whom exacting censors should re- 
 member are also human beings. Wellesley halted one 
 day at Oporto, not only because he had to bring his 
 
 I 
 
114 WELLINGTON 
 
 baggage and stores over a wide stream, but because his 
 men had marched eighty miles in four days. On the 
 14th he started for Braga, where he hoped to intercept 
 Soult, who, he heard, had destroyed his guns and ammu- 
 nition and crossed the hills towards Braga. That was 
 true, but not all the truth. Finding to his dismay that 
 Loison had abandoned Amarante, Soult, on the 1 3th, got 
 rid of every encumbrance and, taking a mountain path- 
 way up the course of a torrent, by his quenchless energy 
 urged the wearied troops over the Sierra to Guimaraens, 
 where he had the good fortune to assemble the whole of 
 his army. Then he destroyed the guns belonging to 
 Loison and Lorge, and turning to the right once more 
 plunged into the hills. He made for Montalegre on the 
 road to Orense, outstripping pursuit, securing by daring 
 efforts possession of two narrow bridges over the torrents 
 in his way, crossing Montalegre on the 17th, two days 
 after filing over the frontier near Allaritz, and the next 
 entering Orense. Wellesley had failed to overtake any 
 part of his fugitive force except a rear-guard, and 
 neither Beresford nor the Portuguese partisans had 
 been able to cut him off. He owed his escape entirely 
 to himself ; he made his exit from Portugal without a 
 gun, but he escaped a fate which, at one moment, seemed 
 inevitable — capitulation in the open field. If his renown 
 was not diminished, how much that of his opponent was 
 increased ! Sir Arthur landed at Lisbon on April 22nd ; 
 he began his forward march on May 7th, and twelve 
 days afterwards, so resolute as well as swift were his 
 movements, not a single French soldier remained on 
 the soil of Portugal. Moreover, Soult had been driven 
 into Galicia, and was separated by a wide interval from 
 
-v-i TURNS ON MARSHAL VICTOR 115 
 
 Victor, whose threatening position in the Tagus valley 
 ceased to be an immediate danger. 
 
 He was now the object of attack. In the midst of 
 the operations against Soult, the Duke of Belluno had 
 made a show of passing the Tagus at Alcantara, which 
 led to the destruction of the bridge, set General Mac- 
 kenzie in motion from Abrantes, and made Wellesley, 
 when the intelligence reached him, turn a part of his army 
 southward. But Victor, hearing of Soult's defeat, at once 
 filed over the boat-bridge of Almaraz and took post at Pla- 
 sencia on the Alagon, covering the road to Madrid ; so 
 that by the time Wellesley's army had marched to 
 Abrantes the French in the Tagus valley were reduced 
 to the defensive. There had been a brief period, before 
 Victor's retreat, when it seemed possible to strike him 
 between the Guadiana and the Tagus; but Cuesta as 
 usual was intractable, nothing could be done, and Victor 
 got away. Sir Arthur was about to have his first ex- 
 perience of Spanish temper and Spanish bad faith. 
 
 Towards the end of June the various armies which 
 exerted an influence upon the immediate field of action 
 were spread over a wide extent of territory. Three 
 French corps in the north, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth, 
 commanded by Laborde, Mortier, and Ney, had just 
 been placed by Napoleon under the command of Soult 
 as the senior ofiicer, with orders to act together, only 
 together and not in fractions. They were to " advance 
 on the English, pursue them without cessation, beat them, 
 and fling them into the sea." Writing on June 11th 
 from Schonbrunn, he said to his generals : " the English 
 alone are redoubtable — they alone; if the army is not 
 difierently managed, before the lapse of a few months 
 
Ii6 WELLINGTON 
 
 they will bring upon it a catastrophe.'' Unfortunately 
 Ney and Soult were bitter enemies, and it was difficult 
 to effect a hearty co-operation. Soult, having designs 
 against Ciudad Eodrigo, moved on Zamora, calling up 
 Mortier; and Ney, feeling that he was deserted, aban- 
 doned Galicia entirely, and went to Astorga, reaching 
 that town at the end of June ; two days later, Soult 
 entered Zamora. The point to notice is that these corps, 
 more than fifty thousand strong, were separated from the 
 Tagus valley only by the mountains of Be jar. About the 
 same time King Joseph and Jourdan, his adviser, were in 
 Madrid ; Sebastiani was watching the Spanish general 
 Venegas, who lurked in the Sierra Morena ; Victor was 
 at Plasencia, facing Cuesta, who had come from the 
 Guadiana to the Tagus ; and Wellesley was at Abrantes, 
 striving to gain the assent of Cuesta to some reasonable 
 plan. At length it was agreed that these two should 
 effect a junction on the right bank, and that, to aid this 
 movement, Venegas should advance across the upper 
 Tagus and threaten Madrid. 
 
 It was on June 27th, 1809, that the British army, 
 about twenty-one thousand men and thirty guns, marched 
 from Abrantes in two columns upon Castello Branco, 
 where they merged in one, and headed for Plasencia, 
 which was reached on July 10th. That very day 
 Wellesley went to Mirabete and had a long conference 
 with Cuesta, which ended in some sort of agreement. 
 The British commander was alive, yet not sufficiently alive 
 to the danger which threatened from the side of Bejar, 
 and sent Beresford to Perales ; Cuesta grudgingly under- 
 took to watch the pass of Banos, but only sent thither 
 an inadequate force. Wellesley at this time, and even 
 
VI THE MARCH INTO SPAIN 117 
 
 later, underrated the power which Soult might bring to 
 bear, not knowing that he had so far recovered from his 
 beating, and that he had three corps under his orders. 
 He therefore persevered in the offensive, trusting over 
 much to the Spaniards, whose troops, it turned out, 
 would not stand fire, and whose Junta fulfilled none of 
 its promises to furnish transport and supplies. 
 
 The advance from Abrantes, the approach of Cuesta 
 to the Tagus at Almaraz, and the presence of Sir Eobert 
 Wilson's partisan corps near Madrid, had induced Victor 
 to retire, first to Talavera and then behind the Alberche, 
 where he was on June 28th, so that the junction of 
 the British and Spanish armies was effected without 
 molestation of any kind. Wellesley was at Oropeza on 
 July 20th, and Cuesta in his front at Vellada. But 
 here new perils arose. The Spaniards, who undertook 
 to furnish food and transport, had provided neither, 
 and the army was already on half rations. The conse- 
 quence was that Sir Arthur declared that he would not 
 pass the Alberche, a threat he had to reiterate later, 
 unless promises were redeemed and his wants were 
 supplied. The threat produced no effect, and the 
 safety of the allied army depended upon fasting troops ! 
 Victor had now so posted his men that he covered the 
 line of retreat upon Madrid through Toledo, which could 
 not be assailed, and awaited the movements of the Allies 
 with the more confidence because he learned their plans 
 from his spies on Cuesta's staff. Earely has any general 
 been in a more embarrassing position than Sir Arthur at 
 this moment j for when the fairest chances of overthrow- 
 ing the French were presented, the Spaniard sulked, and 
 when they were few or none he was eager to fall on. 
 
Ii8 WELLINGTON 
 
 Wellesley, for example, as early as July 22nd, rode over 
 the river, and from the southern heights took a survey 
 of the French position. He saw that it was pregnable 
 and devised a plan, but Cuesta took to his bed, and the 
 great opportunity was lost. Then, when Victor shifted 
 his divisions a little to the rear, Cuesta followed on the 
 24th, but the French had gone out of reach. 
 
 Two days later he got within their grasp, for he 
 moved recklessly on, and when they turned upon him 
 on the 26th beyond the Alberche, he would have been 
 cut to pieces at Alcabon, had not Wellesley placed two 
 divisions and some cavalry on the left of that stream, 
 the sight of whom stopped the French. This offensive 
 stroke, though not pushed home, implied that the 6nemy 
 had recovered confidence. The reason was that Joseph, 
 providing for the defence of Madrid, and summoning 
 Sebastiani from La Mancha, had marched out to join 
 Victor, and did so on the 25th behind the Guadarama. 
 He had also, through General Foy, given Soult the 
 permission he sought to advance by the pass of Banos 
 upon Plasenoia, and lead thither all his corps. The 
 peril which beset Wellesley will now be understood. 
 He was far into Spain, acting beside, it can hardly be 
 said in concert with, a most ill-conditioned and dangerous 
 ally. In his front everything that could be spared from 
 Madrid had been thrust into the valley, a result rendered 
 possible by the treachery of the Junta, which, jealous 
 of Cuesta, had ordered Venegas not to push for the 
 capital. On his left rear, but still north of the hills, 
 unknown to him, were three French corps, pointing to 
 roads which cut in on his line of retreat as well as his 
 flank. And his army was half starved by the rulers of 
 
VI PRELUDE TO TA LA VERA 119 
 
 the people lie was there to aid ! It was with the greatest 
 difficulty that Cuesta, fresh from, his risk at Alcabon, 
 could be induced to cross the Alberche and take post at 
 Talavera; nor was he persuaded until, as he said, he 
 " made the proud Englishman go down on his knees.'' 
 
 Wellesley then, leaving a strong guard on the Al- 
 berche, made ready to fight a battle at Talavera. He 
 had, nominally, fifty -four thousand men and a hundred 
 guns, but only nineteen thousand trusty soldiers, his 
 British and Germans. The French came on with some 
 fifty thousand veterans and eighty guns. Wellesley 
 placed the Spaniards on the right, in the partially forti- 
 fied town of Talavera, which was close to the river, and 
 his own brigades on the hills extending northward, and 
 ending in a loftier eminence overhanging a narrow valley 
 beyond which were the mountains. The troops, from 
 right to left, were Campbell's, Sherbrooke's, and the 
 German Legion, with Donkin's brigade on the bluff 
 which was the key of the position. Hill and the horse 
 in the rear. Early on the morning of the 27th, Mac- 
 kenzie was still at the front when the French broke over 
 the stream; they surprised the British outposts, bear- 
 ing down with such speed that Sir Arthur was nearly 
 captured. He rode up from Talavera at the first news, 
 says Sir Samford Whittingham. " We advanced into the 
 midst of our skirmishers. The fire was hot, and the 
 enemy rapidly approaching. Sir Arthur leaped off his 
 horse and scrambled up the wall of an old ruin close at 
 hand. But he was obliged to throw himself down on 
 his hands and knees and remount instantly, for the 
 enemy's sharpshooters had nearly surrounded the build- 
 ing, and a minute's delay would have constituted him 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 a prisoner." The French were checked by the Forty- 
 fifth, "a stubborn old regiment," some companies of the 
 Sixtieth, and the personal efforts of the commander. They 
 lost some hundreds in the confusion, but retreated, never- 
 theless, through the cork trees and olives to the position, 
 where Mackenzie halted behind the centre. This in- 
 auspicious beginning was followed by a stroke from 
 Victor which almost ruined his adversary. While a 
 feint by the French horse on the town side sent the 
 Spaniards flying by thousands, and the peril was only 
 averted by Sir Arthur, who brought up some English 
 horse and those Spaniards who did not run, Victor ap- 
 peared on the allied left, and opened fire from his guns. 
 He saw that the great hill was imperfectly occupied, 
 and being familiar with the ground, he knew the value 
 of that post, and tried to surprise and overwhelm its 
 defenders. Just as the twilight was at hand, he ordered 
 Euffin with a whole division to storm in upon Donkin's 
 brigade. For a moment the chance was in favour of 
 the French. They crowned the hill, steep as it was, for 
 their numbers enabled them to turn the British brigade ; 
 but, just as they were exulting in success. General Hill 
 brought up the Twenty-ninth Foot, which charged home, 
 and the intruders were roughly expelled. The Forty- 
 eighth and a scratch battalion followed, and were in time 
 to break the force and finally rout a second French attack, 
 made in the growing darkness with a larger force and 
 pushed with great resolution. The left centre, German 
 Legion, had also been assailed, and although the French 
 were worsted, indeed lost a thousand men, they had 
 tested the weakness as well as the strength of the line, 
 and were prepared for the trials of the morrow. 
 
THE BATTLE OF T A LA VERA 
 
 It is a peculiarity of the conflict near Talavera that it 
 was divided into several acts. The severe combat in the 
 gloaming of the 27th was renewed at daybreak RuiEn, 
 supported by VUatte, once more dashed forward, this 
 time on a broad front which turned the shoulder of the 
 hill. His march was covered by artillery fire, and his 
 hardy men went on determined to win, but they were 
 met with greater resolution by the soldiers of Donkin 
 and Hill, who did not run when turned, and who finally 
 prevailed, forcing their adversaries down the steeps with 
 the loss of fifteen hundred men. Then the guns from 
 the opposite hdls renewed their tearing cannonade, and 
 the wearied and shattered assailants regained their former 
 lines. The desperate attack showed Wellesley that he 
 must farther strengthen his left, which he did by placing 
 Bassecour's Spanish cavalry, begged from Cuesta, beyond, 
 and a body of horse, British and German, facing the 
 valley. They were soon after joined by Albuquerque, 
 who hated his own stupid commander. 
 
 Now ensued a pause. The soldiers of both armies 
 gathered on the banks of the rivulet in the ravine to 
 drink, while the French Generals held a council, when 
 Jourdan urged the King to retire behind the Alberche 
 and wait for Soult, whowas coming south from Salamanca. 
 He was to have been at Plasencia on the 31st, but 
 during the high debate a letter from Soult showed that 
 he could not be there until the 2nd or even the 5th of 
 August. News also .came in that Venegas had at length 
 marched, and had approached Toledo ; and swayed by 
 fear of an attack on Madrid and Victor's eagerness 
 to fight, the King rejected the prudent advice of Jourdan 
 and allowed the battle to be renewed. At this time 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 Wellesley, seated on the lofty hill, received through 
 Donkin a message from Albuquerque to the effect that 
 Cuesta was a traitor. He was intently watching 
 the motions of his adversaries, and, says Napier, he 
 " listened to this somewhat startling message without so 
 much as turning his head, and then drily answering, 
 ' Very well, you may return to your brigade,' continued 
 his survey of the French." In after years Wellington 
 did not remember the incident, and Lord Stanhope says 
 he evidently did not believe a story which, if not vrai, 
 is certainly waisemblable. 
 
 The stress of the battle was yet to come ; it was 
 resumed after mid-day and continued with great violence 
 for more than five hours. Victor's plan was to turn the 
 left and break in the centre. He directed Euffin to turn 
 the left by the valley, while half Vilatte's division went 
 against the Key -hill, and Sebastiani's men fell on the 
 troops between its summit and the Spaniards about 
 Talavera. This latter body, preceded by a terrible fire 
 from the French guns, dashed upon Campbell's division 
 and fared ill, for their fierce onset was met by a fiercer 
 counterstroke, in which Mackenzie and some Spaniards 
 joined, and the French were not only routed, but ten 
 guns were captured, while an attempt to rally in the 
 olive groves and charge again was quickly frustrated. 
 Nor did better fortune befall the French right attack, for 
 seeing the troops coming on, Wellesley sent against them 
 Anson's cavalry. The German Hussars were stopped by 
 a deep chasm, but the Twenty-third Light Dragoons came 
 upon an easier passage, and, headed by John Elley and 
 Frederick Ponsonby, rode through Vilatte's columns, 
 charged Strolz's French horse brigade beyond the 
 
THE DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH 
 
 astonished infantry, and were only beaten when, ex- 
 hausted, they in turn were charged by Polish Lancers 
 and German troopers drawn by Victor from the reserve. 
 The heroic Twenty-third lost Colonel Seymour and more 
 than two hundred men, and the survivors found shelter 
 with Bassecour's Spaniards ; but the audacious charge of 
 the regiment was so impressive that it actually arrested 
 the turning movement of Euffin up the valley. The great 
 hill was untouched, and thence Wellesley watched the 
 eddying fight. For the centre was again ravaged by can- 
 non and assailed by infantry. The storm this time fell on 
 the Germans and the Guards ; they threw it back, but the 
 Guards pursuing hotly were struck in front and flank, and 
 the French reserves pressing on, the whole fell into con- 
 fusion. Wellesley, who saw the error of the pursuit, sent 
 down from his eyry the Forty-eighth Foot under Colonel 
 Donellan, and Cotton's cavalry, as he says without orders, 
 moved up. They arrived just in time, for the centre 
 was broken. Donellan led his infantry into the tumul- 
 tuous throng, which, says Napier, " seemed sufficient to 
 carry it away bodily ; but wheeling back by companies 
 that regiment let the crowds pass through, and then 
 resuming its proud and beautiful line fell on the flank of 
 the victorious French column, pljang them with such a 
 destructive musketry, and closing up on them with such 
 a firm and regular step, that their offensive movement 
 was checked." The broken troops reformed, Cotton's 
 light cavalry, two squadrons only, charged, the guns did 
 their work, and the centre was once more solid and 
 impenetrable. No fresh attempt was made by the 
 French, who, worsted at all points, drew off under the 
 protection of their batteries and light troops. The 
 
124 WELLINGTON 
 
 sanguinary battle was won. The British loss in the 
 several actions was more than six thousand, and that of 
 the French, two generals and upwards of seven thousand. 
 Two British generals, Langworth and Mackenzie, were 
 killed, and three were wounded. Ten guns were 
 captured in the fight, and seven more were found in the 
 woods the next day, when Victor retired over the 
 Alberche. 
 
 Talavera must rank with the great actions recorded 
 in British annals, because, compared with their assailants, 
 the real defenders of the position were so few, and 
 made good the deficiency by freely sacrificing their lives. 
 It is an example of tenacity, the only misfortune of the 
 day arose when the valour of the Guards got the better 
 of their discretion. But it was a general's as well 
 as a soldier's battle, for the watchful commander was 
 the soul of the fight. Some have pretended that, 
 after all, it was a French victory. Napoleon, if his 
 testimony be needed, may be allowed to decide that 
 question. Writing from Schonbrunn, August 25th, he 
 says, " Tell the King that I see with pain how he calls 
 his soldiers conquerors ; and that the fact is, I have 
 lost the battle of Talavera." Publicly he held another 
 language, but privately he spoke the truth. 
 
 Foiled on the field, and fearing that Venegas on one 
 side and Wilson on the other might reach Madrid, King 
 Joseph marched away on the 29th to save the capital. 
 Victor remained in the valley alert, and ready to retire 
 at the first sign of danger, and a fine reinforcement 
 reached the British army. General Robert Crawford, 
 leading the Fifty-second, the Forty-third, and the Ninety- 
 fifth, the nucleus of the coming Light Division, passed over 
 
VI RETREATS OVER THE TAG US 125 
 
 the battlefield and took outpost duty, having marched in 
 a July heat sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours. One 
 peril had been averted, another was close at hand. On 
 the very day of the battle, Soult began his advance upon 
 Plasencia, and as the Spaniards fled from Banos without 
 firing a shot, the leading columns of the Fifth Corps 
 entered the town on the 31st. Wellesley heard of 
 Soult's march on the day before, and a little later that 
 he was in the valley. Leaving Cuesta in Talavera to 
 protect and send away the wounded, he set out himself 
 with his own army to combat the French Marshal, not 
 knowing even then that three corps Avere moving 
 through the hills. Cuesta was better informed, but 
 concealed his knowledge, and it was only when the 
 British chief reached Oropeza on August 3rd that 
 he discovered how great was the risk he ran. For he 
 acquired the knowledge that fifty thousand Frenchmen 
 were pressing forward, that Soult's dragoons were over 
 the Tietar not far from the bridge at Almaraz, and that 
 Cuesta had determined to quit Talavera at once, and 
 abandon the hospitals full of sick and wounded. The 
 crisis was sharp, but Sir Arthur, cool and qrdet, took an 
 instant decision. The Don now wanted to fight at 
 Oropeza, which must have been ruinous, especially as his 
 army was not strong in battle ; and as he would not stir, 
 at daybreak on the 4th the British army alone filed over 
 the bridge of Arzobispo and gained the Col de Mirabete, 
 which ensured a line of retreat to Badajoz. Crawford's 
 active Light Brigade, at the same time, passed the rugged 
 hills on the left bank, and stood on the 5th masters of 
 the bridge of Almaraz, rapid movements which foiled 
 Soult and made all secure. Cuesta also managed to 
 
126 WELLINGl^ON 
 
 pass the river, yet had a narrow escape ; and two days 
 afterwards his post on the Tagus was surprised, and his 
 army in flight to Deleztoza. There was no end to the 
 embarrassment caused by this incapable and crabbed 
 officer, and had not Wellesley interfered he would have 
 done more mischief and lost half his guns. By August 
 11th the Allies were in line once more, and the next 
 day Cuesta resigned, his jjlace being taken by Eguia. 
 In the enemy's camps the old discord broke out between 
 Ney and Soult, and the several corps soon separated, one 
 remaining at Plasencia and another at Talavera, while 
 Ney went to Valladolid, beating Wilson on the way, and 
 Victor joined the King. Napoleon, in Austria, was 
 enraged at the whole series of operations. He condemned 
 Soult's march on Plasencia, and insisted fiercely that 
 the corps in the north should have joined the King 
 through Madrid and have operated in a mass — the only 
 road to success, he said, in a country where lines of 
 communication are insecure. He wrote thus to Clarke 
 from Schonbrunn, August 15th : "The plan of directing 
 Marshal Soult on Plasencia is faulty and contrary to all 
 rule. It has every inconvenience, and no advantage. 
 1. The English army can pass the Tagus, support itself 
 upon Badajoz, and from that moment has no fear of 
 Marshal Soult. 2. It may beat both armies in detail. 
 If, on the contrary, Soult and Mortier had moved on 
 Madrid they would have been there by the 30th, and 
 the army, united by August 15th, could have given 
 battle and conquered Spain and Portugal." Sir Arthur 
 justified the foresight of Napoleon to the letter. He not 
 only crossed the Tagus, but when the conduct of the 
 Spanish Junta could no longer be borne — their soldiers 
 
VI HIS COURSE VINDICATED BY NAPOLEON 127 
 
 plundered his baggage and even fired on his foragers, while 
 they vpithheld supplies and transport — he fell back to the 
 neighbourhood of Badajoz, whence he had secure com- 
 munications with Lisbon. His brother Lord Wellesley 
 was now ambassador at Seville, but his great influence 
 was exerted in vain. " I am worked like a galley slave," 
 he writes, "and can eifect nothing ;" and Sir Arthur, now 
 Viscount Wellington and Baron Douro, surveying the 
 whole position of affairs, and seeing into the heart of 
 them as clearly as Napoleon, resolved to trust in future 
 to his o\vii resources, and hold fast by his great original 
 idea of defending the Peninsula in Portugal with his 
 British troops and growing Portuguese army. The 
 Seville Junta gave him the title of Captain-General, 
 which he accepted, but, with his marked disinterested- 
 ness, vindicating as he had done before in Portugal his 
 brother Henry's words about his indifference to money, 
 he refused the pay of the rank conferred ; just as later, 
 when they gave him an estate, he paid the rents into the 
 Treasury during the war. At home, the Portland Govern- 
 ment had been broken up. Canning and Castlereagh had 
 fought a duel, the public mind was seething with rage over 
 the Walcheren failure, which might have been a success, 
 and the scandals afi'ecting the Duke of York. Wellington, 
 who did not escape the insults of faction and the wrath of 
 ignorance, remained unmoved, and unremittingly walked 
 in the path of his duty, supported faithfully by Lord 
 Liverpool, who succeeded Castlereagh as Minister of 
 War. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE LAST CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL 
 
 This autumn of 1809 may be regarded as the turning- 
 point in his career. For it was then that he resolved to 
 create those Lines of Torres Vedras which proved such 
 a bitter surprise to the French army. He went to Lisbon 
 in the beginning of October and finally settled that im- 
 portant matter, and then travelled to Seville, where he 
 conferred with his elder brother, then about to depart 
 for England and accept office as Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. By the middle of November he was again in 
 Badajoz, and a letter which he sent thence to Lord 
 Liverpool shows how distinctly he foresaw the tempest 
 against which the shelter of the Lines was prepared. 
 At the end of July, before he knew what had happened 
 at Talavera, Napoleon from Schonbrunn directed Clarke 
 to stop any movement upon Portugal, but to prepare 
 for an expedition in the following February. Wellington 
 did not know of this, nor was he aware that on October 
 7th, 1809, Napoleon, now at peace with Austria, though 
 still in her capital, notified to his Minister of War that 
 in December one hundred thousand men should be col- 
 lected between Bayonne and Orleans, and that he himself 
 would lead these vast reinforcements into Spain. With 
 what object? A fortnight earlier, in the dispatch ap- 
 
ORIGIN OF " THE LINES" 129 
 
 pointing Soult Major-General of his army in Spain, he 
 saj^s : " The King having no experience in war, my in- 
 tention is that, until I arrive, you should be responsible. 
 I wish myself to enter Lisbon as soon as possible.'' 
 How did Wellington look on the same situation 1. " The 
 enemy ought to make the possession of Portugal their 
 first object when their reinforcements will arrive in 
 Spain," he wrote to Lord Liverpool, November 19th, 
 penetrating Napoleon's design. "I do not think they 
 will succeed with an army of seventy or even eighty 
 thousand men if they do not make their attack for 
 two or three months, which I believe is now impos- 
 sible. I conceive not only that they may, but that they 
 will make the attack before they will subdue the north 
 of Spain." It was to parry this foreseen onset that he 
 created the Lines of Torres Vedras, and managed to 
 keep his great project secret, not only from the enemy, 
 but from his own army ! 
 
 It was towards the end of his long sojourn on the 
 Guadiana that the Spanish Junta, against his advice, 
 once more sent forward their soldiers to defeat — 
 Areizaga's army was routed at Ocana and Del Parque 
 was worsted at Alba de Tormes — and thus Andalusia 
 was laid open to the French. Wellington held his 
 ground as long as he deemed it prudent, but towards 
 the end of November, when the Spanish authorities 
 were bent on following their own course, and even 
 trying to force him into a dependent position, he trans- 
 ferred his main body from the Guadiana to the Mondego, 
 and left the trusty Hill at Abrantes to watch the Tagus 
 valley. Then followed the invasion of Andalusia by 
 Joseph and Soult, and the speedy capture of everything 
 
 K 
 
I30 WELLlt^GTON 
 
 up to the walls of Cadiz, which, saved by Albuquerque's 
 rapid march, was now reinforced by British troops drawn 
 from Wellington's army — troops he could ill spare, yet did 
 spare, so ready was he to subordinate his own interests to 
 the common cause. During the spring and summer of 
 1810 even his steadfast mind was most severely tried. 
 Napoleon, bent on divorcing the faithful Josephine and 
 obtaining a new wife from a royal house — he first asked 
 for a Russian and next secured an Austrian Archduchess, 
 — engrossed by the affairs of a stupendous empire which 
 he was enlarging year by year, and involved already in 
 an incipient quarrel with Eussia, was unable to keep his 
 word and conduct a second campaign in the Peninsula. 
 But he poured tens of thousands of troops over the 
 Pyrenees, urged on and lashed his marshals and 
 generals, gave them almost absolute power within the 
 limits of their commands, and not only made Soult 
 military dictator in Joseph's realm, but appointed 
 Mass6na, Prince of Essling, to command the army 
 which was to conquer Portugal. Under Napoleon's 
 vigorous stimulus fortress after fortress fell in fighting 
 Catalonia, and throughout Spain the French appeared 
 to stride from victory to victory. One force, flowing 
 from the heart of the nation, could not be repressed. 
 The 'partiAas and guerillas, irregular warriors under 
 irregular chiefs, were everywhere beaten and everywhere 
 present. Hardly one single line of communication, 
 though strongly guarded, was safe from incursions ; 
 letters were intercepted, convoys cajDtured, weak detach- 
 ments beaten, and stragglers murdered. Nevertheless 
 the French in masses were always and easily victorious 
 in the field, and as the strong places yielded, sometimes 
 
VII HIS DIFFICULTIES AND FIRMNESS 131 
 
 after a stout and sometimes after a feeble resistance, 
 tiie Emperor's lieutenants appeared to have a grip of 
 the country. In the midst of this tempest Wellington 
 and the armies he commanded were the only solid forces, 
 erect, compact, and undaunted. The commander had 
 not only to contend with an enemy led by redoubtable 
 captains. He had to combat and control foes in the 
 Portuguese Regency, and sustain his own Government. 
 He had to vrithstand even the officers of his army, some 
 highly placed, who helped the opposition, bombarded 
 their friends at home with shrieks of despair, and 
 rendered the House of Commons reluctant to vote 
 supplies. "The truth is," wrote Lord Liverpool in 
 September 1810, "the contest could never have been 
 maintained in Portugal through the winter and spring 
 if it had not been for the determination of the Govern- 
 ment to persevere in it at all risks to themselves, against 
 not only the declared opinions of their opponents but the 
 private remonstrances of many of their friends.'' Never- 
 theless the credit of tenacity is Wellington's due, for had 
 he flinched nothing coiild have averted a retreat from 
 Portugal, perhaps from the Peninsula. Nor was it a 
 bHnd tenacity, but one based on a sober and correct 
 estimate of the facts — the superb qualities of his British 
 troops ; the weakness as well as the mighty strength of 
 •the French; Spanish folly and Spanish obstinacy; the 
 steadfast and docile spirit of the Portuguese people; 
 the disturbed condition of home politics which helped 
 to enfeeble the Government, not less than the natural 
 defect which made the statesmen of all parties, and 
 still more the parties themselves, incapable of taking 
 profound and far-reaching views of any great military 
 
132 WELLINGTON 
 
 plans. He surveyed the whole field, so vast and so 
 complex, formed just conclusions, and stood firmly by 
 his judgment. But it was only after he had achieved 
 splendid, but still qualified successes, that the greatness 
 of his character was recognised and the confidence of the 
 British people won. 
 
 In the spring of 1810 the common cause seemed to be 
 falling into ruin. No power in Europe, except England, 
 was on foot against Napoleon, who was striving with all 
 his might to exclude her from the continent and destroy 
 her commerce. Wellington and his little army were in 
 the north of Portugal watching the storm gathering over 
 the frontier. For Mass6na, having a wide command, 
 had come to the front in May, intent on wresting Ciudad 
 Eodrigo from the Spaniards in order to secure a solid 
 base for the invasion of Portugal. He assembled more 
 than eighty thousand men, and had under his control 
 nearly forty thousand more ; for Eegnier on the Tagus 
 and Bonnet in the Asturias were within his jurisdiction. 
 When Ciudad was invested by Ney in June, the 
 Spaniards and Portuguese eagerly besought Wellington 
 to march to its relief ; but an essential quality of a great 
 commander is strength to resist temptation. He had 
 that quality ; and, although it was hard to resist, it 
 would have been weak to yield, since even success, always 
 doubtful against superior numbers of good troops, would 
 not have improved his position. He was threatened from 
 the side of Estremadura as well as Castille, had to watch 
 narrowly the movements on all sides, maintain a sharp 
 contest with the obstructives in the Portuguese Regency, 
 and make up for the shortcomings of his Government as 
 well as he could. Nothing shook his constancy of mind. 
 
Yii MASSENA AND WELLINGTON 133 
 
 Ciudad Eodrigo surrendered early in July, yet he 
 still held his ground. Before and during the siege the 
 famous Light Division, commanded by Robert Craufurd, 
 faced the French on the Agueda, and performed many 
 actions which showed how perfect it was, and how 
 dangerous to assail. Wellington had expressly ordered 
 Craufurd not to fight beyond the Coa, the next deep 
 affluent of the Douro on the plain ; but Craufurd did 
 not obey. The fall of Ciudad still found him in front 
 of the river; and when on July 24th Ney bounded 
 forward at the head of twenty-nine thousand men, 
 including a host of cavalry, the Light Division leader, 
 carried away by his pugnacity, lingered to fight him, and 
 it was a marvel that his hardy men escaped. But they 
 did, thanks to their own great qualities, although the 
 sole line of retreat, was over a bridge at the bottom of a 
 deep ravine ; and when by luck and judgment they had 
 crossed, no Frenchmen, or few, followed, for the deadly 
 musketry drew a line on the bridge which none could 
 pass. "I am glad to see you safe, Craufurd," said the 
 General when he met him. " Oh, I was in no danger, I 
 assure you," replied the fighting Scot. " But I was from 
 your conduct," said Wellington. Craufurd's sole private 
 
 comment was, "He is d d crusty to-day," — and he had 
 
 reason to be. The British lost three hundred and forty- 
 two killed, wounded, and prisoners, but the French were 
 fewer by a thousand men. Then Almeida, which stands 
 beyond the Coa, was invested ; a lucky shell falling in 
 the magazine paralysed the defence, and the strong 
 little fortress, which should have resisted for some weeks, 
 surrendered. The two places which Mass^na needed for 
 the security of his advance were thus in his power, and 
 
134 WELLINGTON 
 
 the long-deferred wrestle with the mighty French army 
 was now to begin. 
 
 Wellington still held his positions, and kept them 
 until the arrival of Eegnier at Guarda, the gate into the 
 line on the right, made it clear that Mass6na was coming 
 on. Then he began to retreat in accordance with his 
 carefully prepared plan, and directed Hill and Leith, who 
 were near Abrantes and Thomar, to join him in front of 
 Coimbra. For he never intended to risk a battle so far 
 from Lisbon, or fight at all, unless on formidable ground. 
 The disposition he had made of his divisions was framed 
 for the purpose of guarding all the practicable lines of 
 invasion, and concentrating upon that which the ad- 
 versary might select. So that when, in the middle of 
 September, the French Marshal started forward, Wel- 
 lington yielded the ground he occupied in order to secure 
 his retreat upon the Lines. He watched his opponent 
 closely, and was so quick that his troops were united on 
 the Alva when the French were at Viseu ; for Hill had 
 detected the movement of Eegnier, and, anticipating 
 orders, had marched at once towards his chief. Mass^na 
 selected for his line of advance the right bank of the 
 Mondego, said to be the worst road in Portugal, and 
 when his masses of troops and baggage emerged from 
 the defiles he found himself between the river and a 
 curving range of mountains, and on the mountains the 
 allied army barring his way to Coimbra. The two 
 armies had moved on each bank of the river, but the 
 Allies crossed to the right where the stream breaks 
 through the lofty heights, and occupied the position of 
 Busaco on the ridge which closes the deep and wooded 
 vales. Eeduced since May by disease and combat to 
 
vii RETREATS ON TORRES VEDRAS 135 
 
 fifty-six thousand men, the French were wedged in 
 between the Mondego and the Caramula Sierra, with no 
 outlet known to them except over the crest of the ridge, 
 where Wellington halted to fight a battle. 
 
 That serious risk did not form part of his original 
 design. He had induced the Eegency to enforce the 
 old laws exacting service from all able-bodied Portuguese, 
 and besides the thirty thousand regulars trained by 
 Beresford, there w^ere under arms in the hills, from the 
 Minho to the capes of Algarve, from the sea to the 
 rugged frontier, many score thousands of men, willing 
 and eager but badly armed and ill-fed, commanded by 
 local leaders or partisan chiefs, like Trant and John 
 Wilson and Silveira. When the French moved south- 
 ward these swarmed on their flanks and rear, easily 
 brushed away, yet ever returning. Wellington proposed 
 and the Eegency agreed to act on the stern, harsh, yet 
 effective plan of wasting the whole country between the 
 Estrella and the sea, and transporting the people who 
 could not hide in the mountains into the Lines ; so that 
 Massena, deprived of all sources of supply, and having 
 no magazines, because he acted on Napoleon's maxim 
 that war should support war, would be forced to retreat 
 when he "was stopped before the fortified positions 
 covering Lisbon. It was therefore not necessary to 
 fight, and if the British General chose to do so, though 
 he afterwards thought it a mistake, he did so deliberately 
 and because^ at the time, he thought a battle would raise 
 the confidence and gratify the yearnings of his troops, 
 and give a certain splendour to his retreat. He could 
 trust his greatly outnumbered British troops in a strong 
 defensive position, and, not doubting their good-will, he 
 
136 WELLINGTON 
 
 could test the worth of Beresford's Portuguese in actual 
 combat. It was a risk, because Leith and Hill were 
 near, but not on the field, when the leading columns of 
 the French appeared ; but when he thought it right to 
 run a risk, he was never the man to shirk the respon- 
 sibility. And considering that the French armies had 
 been so triumphant in Spain, it was just as well to 
 remind them again, before getting beyond their reach 
 behind works, that they were not invincible. 
 
 Perhaps the risk was greater than he judged it to be, 
 for when Ney and Regnier came in sight of the position 
 the allies were not in array, and Ney desired to begin a 
 battle at once. But Mass6na was some miles distant, 
 Ney dared not fight without leave ; and before the French 
 commander joined the Marshal the opportunity, if any 
 such really existed, had passed away. As they were 
 closing on the Sierra, Wellington was obliged to take 
 command of the Light Division, in order to prevent 
 Craufurd from plunging into action. Always burning 
 to fight, he had waited so long that " all the skill of the 
 General," says Napier, " and the readiness of the troops 
 could scarcely evade a disaster." Luckily, the General 
 was ubiquitous, which means that he saw where the 
 pinch was likely to be. He was usually foremost in an 
 advance, and with the hindmost in a retreat. When 
 Mass6na on the afternoon of the 26th reconnoitred the 
 position, he found it well occupied, yet he resolved to 
 fight on the following day. 
 
 The position of Busaco was a mountain crest eight 
 miles long, extending from the Mondego on the right to 
 the impassable ridges of the Caramula Sierra on the left. 
 The highest ground was in the centre, and there stood 
 
vu BATTLE OF BUSACO 137 
 
 Spencer with tlie First Division. On his right were 
 Picton, Leith, and Hill; forward, yet below him, was 
 Pack ; and on his left front, upon a lower bastion-like 
 rocky spur, was the Light Division and a G-erman 
 brigade ; while Cole held the extreme left, abutting on 
 the pathless Caramula. Three roads coming from 
 Martagoa cut through the position, each running on to 
 Coim.bra, one passing a large convent in rear of the left 
 centre ; and a road also ran along the crest behind the 
 front of battle. The French troops were on the opposing 
 ridges, separated from Busaco " by a chasm so profound 
 that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the move- 
 ment of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow 
 that twelve - pounders could range across." Masstoa 
 feared lest the British General should not wait the 
 shock ; the British General was confident of success if 
 he were assailed. For Mass6na need not have fought, 
 he might have turned the line before him; but while 
 Wellington knew of the rough narrow track from 
 Martagoa through the Caramula to Boyalva, and hoped 
 that it was guarded by Trant, who could not have 
 resisted but only delayed an army, the French Marshal 
 was ignorant of the road, and even had its existence 
 been reported to him, he would probably still have 
 preferred a battle to a manoeuvre. Thus at dawn on 
 September 27th Eegnier and Ney sent forward columns 
 of attack ; Junot the Marshal held in reserve ; and 
 the Battle of Busaco began. The French made two de- 
 termined onsets, widely separated and not simultaneous. 
 Eeonier's brigades, directed against the right, climbed 
 the slopes with unflagging strides, and were first in 
 action. Driving in Picton's skirmishers and their 
 
138 WELLINGTON 
 
 supports, they won the crest; and while one portion 
 turned to the right, the other formed across the ridge 
 facing the Mondego. Wellington himself brought up 
 two guns, which opened on the flank of the former 
 intruders with grape, while musketry struck their front ; 
 finally a resolute charge by the Eighty-eighth and half the 
 Forty-fifth swept them from the height and down the 
 steep up which they had valiantly ascended. The other 
 part of the column did not long retain its vantage ground. 
 General Leith, who saw their progress up the hill, 
 hastened forward with one brigade, and the Ninth, under 
 Colonel Cameron, running in without firing a shot, 
 turned them out of the position, but did not pursue 
 except mth musketry, and Hill coming up as well as 
 Leith's second brigade, the struggle was over, for Eegnier 
 was unable to resume the battle. On the other flank 
 Ney fared no better. His hardy soldiers also overcame 
 the obstacles in their path until they had nearly gained 
 the summit, but then the line once more mastered the 
 column. Craufurd, alone on a rock, waited until the 
 French were close below the crest, following the retiring 
 riflemen, and at the right moment he sent the Forty-third 
 and Fifty-second into the fray. Their fury could not be 
 resisted, for their charge broke the head of the column ; 
 their flre struck both front and flanks, and " three terrible 
 discharges at five yards' distance shattered the wavering 
 mass." Here again discipline prevailed, and the pursuit 
 was stayed. These two severe combats virtually ended 
 the battle, for afterwards no serious attack was made. 
 The position had been assailed and found impregnable. 
 The killed and wounded on the side of the Allies is put 
 down at thirteen hundred men : while the French lost 
 
VII MASSENA STUMBLES ON "THE LINES" 
 
 139 
 
 one general and eight hundred men killed, and three 
 generals wounded, their total loss being estimated at 
 four thousand five hundred. It was a rude lesson. 
 
 During the afternoon, for the battle ceased soon after 
 midday, Mass6na took council, and learning accidentally 
 that a rough road over the Caramula would enable him 
 to turn the position, he resolved to take it at once. The 
 next day, covered by skirmishing in the ravines, the 
 French army disappeared from the front and were seen 
 traversing the mountains on the left. Napier gives us a 
 glimpse of his commander on the evening of the 28th. 
 From the ground occupied by the Light Division ho 
 "looked at the distant columns with great earnestness : 
 he seemed uneasy, his countenance bore a fierce, angry 
 expression; and suddenly mounting his horse, he rode 
 away without speaking. One hour afterwards the whole 
 army was in movement," heading by different routes for 
 the Lines. The "fierce, angry, expression" may be 
 referred to the failure of Trant, for which he was not to 
 blame, to obstruct the narrow path to Boyalva. 
 
 The army retired by easy marches towards Lisbon, 
 and as Mass6na fondly hoped to embark in their ships 
 and leave him master; but when he approached the 
 mountains the British army had vanished through the 
 passes, and the French Marshal stood baffled and 
 astonished before the formidable works of an entrenched 
 camp which snatched from his grasp the fruits of the 
 campaign. It was a surprise, not only to the Prince of 
 Essling, but to the Portuguese and the British army; and 
 it may be said that the stupendous design realised in the 
 secret and assiduous construction of the Lines of Torres 
 Vedras revealed for the first time, to his own country- 
 
I40 WELLINGTON 
 
 men as well as to Europe, the military genius of 
 England's great captain. 
 
 Mass6na marched his troops boldly up to the verge of 
 the fortified hills. He had declared that the position of 
 Busaoo was the strongest in Portugal ; here he found 
 a stronger, and, after a close examination of all he could 
 see, he refrained from attack. But the line visible to 
 him was only one of a series. Wellington and the 
 engineer. Colonel Fletcher, had converted the heights 
 flanked by the Tagus and the Atlantic into a fortress, 
 and the General had formed his design and the Colonel 
 had begun the work in October, 1809, to meet the 
 exigency which arose in October, 1810. It was the 
 corner-stone of the system whereby he undertook to 
 defend Portugal, when he asked first for thirty, and then 
 for thirty -five thousand British troops, the greatest 
 number he could feed. There were three lines. The 
 foremost extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the 
 mouth of the Zizandre on the sea. That, though power- 
 ful, was not absolutely impervious to attack at the 
 outset, but became so when the rains filled the streams 
 and flooded the banks of the Zizandre. The second, 
 which touched the meadows of the Tagus south of the 
 Calandrix and the ocean at the mouth of the St. Lour- 
 en^a, was the real defence ; and behind these two was a 
 third on the estuary below Lisbon, drawn around the 
 castle of St. Julian, garrisoned by Marines, and thrown 
 up as cover for an embarkation. So that all emer- 
 gencies, even the worst, were provided for ; but 
 Wellington never believed that the French would be 
 able to drive him to his ships, and only feared lest the 
 British Government should recall his army. The whole 
 
vu THE WINTER OF 1810-1811 141 
 
 stupendous array, which barred all the roads through 
 the mountains, was well armed and ampljr manned by a 
 victorious army, while every day the mighty strength of 
 the original works was increased by the energy and 
 invention of the defenders. Mass6na judged rightly 
 when he stood aloof and took post between Villa Franca 
 and Sobral, until dire necessity obliged him to retire 
 upon Santarem, and also to permit his veterans to spread 
 themselves abroad in search of food and thus ruin their 
 fine discipline. The Marshal held on to the Tagus 
 and the Zezere, partly because he got some provand 
 from that unwasted country, and also because he still 
 hoped that Soult or Mortier from the south would join 
 him. WeUington had called Eomana and six thousand 
 Spaniards into the Lines. They crossed the Tagus at 
 Aldea Gallega opposite Lisbon, and Napoleon declared 
 that Soult ought to have followed them, as if that would 
 have been practicable in itself or in the conditions 
 governing the proceedings of Soult. But Napoleon was 
 not well informed, and he had got into the habit of 
 demanding too much from his generals. The truth is 
 that in the winter of 1810-11, while Mass^na was cut 
 off from communication even with his magazines, Soult 
 could neither take Cadiz nor detach sufficient troops 
 from Andalusia to relieve the Army of Portugal. Coim- 
 bra, with a host of wounded, had been captured by 
 Trant almost before the Trench were on the Tagus, and 
 Silveira, taking post in the mountains, had turned back 
 Gardanne with supplies from Ciudad Eodrigo. 
 
 Wellington, secure behind his rocks and redoubts, 
 ready to spring forward so soon as his foe retreated, was 
 still in danger from his friends and allies. Certain 
 
142 WELLINGTON CHAP. 
 
 members of the Regency opposed and harassed him 
 until he could only free himself by threatening to with- 
 draw, and, when that did not avail, changing the govern- 
 ing body in self-defence. It was the arrogant faction 
 which had failed to devastate the country, thus leaving 
 resources within reach of the French, and it was the 
 same men who starved their own people and soldiers and 
 strove to inflame the populace of Lisbon against their 
 defenders. In addition to the folly of the Portuguese he 
 had to wrestle with the political weakness of his own 
 Government, growing out of causes which seemed 
 inherent in the British system. Even in January, 1811, 
 he wrote to Mr. "William Pole that the only instructions 
 he had were " to save the British army, and that is the 
 only object," he said, "officially stated to me for keeping 
 an army in the Peninsula." But privately the object 
 was plainly declared. He had, he said, scarcely the force, 
 thirty-five thousand infantry, originally promised; he 
 wanted more troops and more money ; and he remarks 
 that "if we cannot persevere in carrying it [the contest] 
 on in the Peninsula, or elsewhere on the continent, we 
 must prepare to make one of our own islands the seat of 
 war." If he were largely reinforced, he was tolerably 
 certain of the result; and, he added, "I am equally cer- 
 tain that if Bonaparte cannot root us out of this country, 
 he must alter his system in Europe, and give us such a 
 peace as we ought to accept." At the same time he doubted 
 whether the administration had the power, inclination, 
 or nerve to do what should be done. They allowed him 
 no patronage or power, such as a commander always 
 had ; and though he was " the mainspring of all other 
 operations," yet they gave him neither influence, nor 
 
VII MASSENA OBLIGED TO RETREAT 143 
 
 support, nor means of acquiring influence. " I have not 
 authority to give a shilling, or a stand of arms, or a round 
 of ammunition to anybody. I do give all, it is true, but 
 it is contrary to my instructions and at my peril." Not 
 another officer in the army would " even look at " the 
 risks he incurred every day; but if he did not incur 
 them the contest could not go on for a moment. These 
 warm words paint the situation in strong colours, and 
 they show that Wellington was the soul of the war in 
 the Peninsula. Reinforcements were on the way, and also 
 notes of discouragement still went out from his officers 
 and came from London ; yet he remained firm and con- 
 stant, and literally saved the Government and the 
 country he served by his strength of mind and unswerv- 
 ing fidelity. Such was his duty as a servant of the 
 State, and his duty he always performed. At that very 
 moment the Spaniards on the Guadiana, neglecting to 
 destroy or defend the bridge at Merida, had allowed the 
 French to threaten the Alentejo, that is the approach to 
 the left bank of the Tagus opposite Lisbon, and had thus 
 increased the necessity of guarding the headlands on the 
 harbour. Soult, indeed, was now seriously bent on cap- 
 turing Olivenca, Badajos, and Elvas, before co-operating 
 with Mass^na. He took the first, but ere Badajos sur- 
 rendered on March 11th Mass6na had been four days on 
 the road to northern Spain; and as Graham defeated 
 Victor at Barossa on the 5th, Soult gained nothing 
 except Badajos, which was much, for he was obliged to 
 hurry back to guard Andalusia. 
 
 The enemy had lingered long in the valley of the 
 Tagus, and had offered no opening for attack. " Mass6na 
 is an old fox," Wellington writes from Cartaxo, after the 
 
144 WELLINGTON 
 
 retreat of the French to Santarem, " he risks nothing.'' 
 So it was ; but at length, when no news came from 
 Soult, and no reinforcements except a few thousands 
 under Drouet, who did not pass Leiria and failed to 
 open the line of communication, when disease and want 
 had reduced his army to some fifty thousand men, the 
 old Marshal resolved to retreat. He began his stealthy 
 movement on the second day of March, with the baggage 
 and Ney's corps, but Junot and Eegnier did not slip away 
 until the evening of the 5th, and the whole movement 
 was so cleverly managed that Wellington was not able 
 to follow in force until the 7th. But the Light 
 Division was off in pursuit early on the 6th, and soon 
 the whole army was on the track of the French. From 
 that time it was a race for positions and lines of retreat, 
 but although Mass6na desired to seize Coimbra and 
 secure the high road to Oporto and the line of the 
 Douro, his object was frustrated, partly by the failures 
 of his subordinates and greatly by the vigour of the 
 pursuit. Eegnier had retreated by the road from 
 Thomar to Espinhal, while Ney and Junot took the 
 mountain paths towards Pombal. The former was 
 followed by one brigade and some horse, the latter by 
 the main army ; Leith and Picton advancing from the 
 Lines by Leiria along the road to Coimbra, the others 
 over the hills from Santarem and Thomar. Mass6na 
 halted his two corps at Pombal, still uncertain whether 
 Trant could be frightened out of Coimbra, and on the 
 10th the Allies were up in his front. An attempt at 
 resistance was speedily overcome, and the French fell 
 back towards Condeixa. Ney, however, hard pressed, 
 stopped to fight or gain time at Eedhinha on a plain 
 
vn NEY S FIGHTING REAR-GUARD 145 
 
 commanding the hollow through which ran the high road, 
 flanked by a pine wood and the Sierra. "Wellington, 
 who was early on the ground, reconnoitred the position, 
 but Ney had made so fine a display that his force 
 seemed larger than it was. Therefore Wellington sent 
 the Light Division on one flank and Picton on the other, 
 and drew up his main body against the centre. A 
 contemporary letter from a gallant gunner engaged in 
 the fight says : " Figure to yourself fourteen thousand 
 men with their colours unfurled advancing in line, and 
 supported by solid columns of infantry and cavalry on 
 their flanks, and a second line in rear of the centre \ 
 indeed, it was such a sight that all former military 
 spectacles must give way to." StiU, for once Wellington 
 had been imposed on, for according to Napier there 
 were already on the ground enough troops to overwhelm 
 Neyj and when the "gorgeous lines" started forward, 
 the enemy had vanished over the river Soure, and could 
 only be struck by the artillery. That was to the credit 
 of Ney as a master of tactics, but he ran a great risk 
 and was taught a useful lesson. From Eedhinha the 
 pursuit followed fast through Condeixa. Mass6na, it is 
 true, halted again behind that town, yet only to cover 
 his line of retreat and outface his adversary. Wellington 
 then assumed a masterful initiative, and turned the 
 French left with the Third Division; whereupon Ney 
 burned Condeixa, and the enemy retreated in some 
 confusion towards Marcella, where a bridge spanned the 
 Alva just above its confluence with the Mondego, the 
 sole road open. Ney, who had all the fighting, stood 
 fast at Casal Navel until, being assailed in front and 
 turned on his left, he was forced to give ground ; and 
 
 L 
 
146 WELLINGTON 
 
 the left bank of the Ceira being the higher, he thought 
 it desirable to hold it, and with some six thousand men 
 faced his pursuers at Foz D'Aronce, with a river in his 
 rear. There he waited too long, for Wellington, knowing 
 his audacious temper, closed with him at once, inflicted 
 great losses on one wing of his gallant troops, and 
 obliged him to cross the Ceira in the night. This was 
 on the 15th, a week since the pursuit began, during 
 which time Mass6na, allowed no rest, had been driven 
 from every position, thrust aside from Coimbra, and 
 compelled to take the road to Ciudad Eodrigo ; and he 
 would have suffered still more severely had not 
 Welling-ton's plans been frustrated by the heedlessness 
 of some of his subordinates. The French corps were 
 now again united, for Eegnier had come up, and the 
 British brigade which had followed him also joined the 
 main body. Mass6na having broken the bridges made 
 one more attempt to stand behind the Alva, and seemed 
 confident in his position. Yet he was speedily shaken 
 and again in retreat when he saw the British soldiers 
 traversing the rugged heights on his left, and less than 
 three weeks after he began his clever movements from 
 Santarem, he was in Celorico, the point from which he 
 launched his invading columns down the Mondego in 
 September, 1810. He now vnshed to transfer his army 
 through Guarda to Coria on the Alagon, and threaten 
 Lisbon from the side of the Tagus. Ney openly dis- 
 obeyed his orders ; the Marshal thereupon sent him back 
 to France, gave the Sixth Corps to Loison, and moved to 
 Guarda where he joined Eegnier. He hoped to remain 
 there, but Wellington, whose reinforcements had arrived 
 at the front, and filled up the gap made by the march of 
 
VII BECKWITH AT SABUGAL 147 
 
 Cole's division to join Beresford on the left bank of the 
 Tagus, closed upon Guarda, and on the 29th tumbled 
 the French out of that strong position, compelling them 
 to retreat beyond the Coa and occupy Sabugal. 
 Mass6na still clung to the idea of conquering Portugal, 
 and continued his duel with Wellington to the last. 
 Fortune did not smile on him, and on April 3rd 
 Wellington enveloped and defeated Eegnier who held 
 Sabugal ; and the next day the whole invading army 
 crossed the frontier into Spain. This last engagement, 
 which brought out once more the fine qualities of the 
 Light Division, was marred of its full effect by 
 accidents, but the principal events in that astonishing 
 fight will always shed a glory on the names of Sydney 
 Beckwith, Captain John Hopkins, and the ofiicers and 
 men of the Light Division and their comrades. Elder's 
 Portuguese Ca9adores, whose skill, valour, and tenacity 
 received the high reward of Wellington's public and 
 unqualified praise. Four days afterwards Mass6na, 
 leaving a division at Ciudad Eodrigo, retired upon 
 Salamanca, having lost every battle and combat and 
 thirty thousand men in the campaign. Wellington then 
 invested Almeida and took up once more the line of the 
 Agueda over against the great frontier fortress. Well 
 might Lord Liverpool, while publicly expressing the 
 pride and pleasure of his Government, say in a private 
 letter to Wellington, "The retreat of the French certainly 
 forms a new era in the war." "The event," he added, "has 
 fully confirmed all your predictions," adding that the 
 Government was "determined not to be diverted from 
 the Peninsula to other objects." His " difficulties as to 
 finance and specie were great," but instead of recalling 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 troops, a regiment of horse which he asked for was sent 
 out, and the G-overnment, which a few weeks earlier had 
 refused to allow him to accept the command of the 
 Spanish armies, now recovered sufficient courage to ask 
 for the great commander's opinion respecting what could 
 be done in the interior of Spain. The letters, dated 
 April 11th, mark the period of change from apprehension 
 to confidence. 
 
 That was something gained ; yet Wellington's position 
 was still most embarrassing, because the Portuguese 
 authorities were neglectful, if not treacherous, and 
 because the French had made such progress in Estre- 
 madura, capturing Olivenga, Badajos, and Campo Mayor. 
 When it was certain that Mass^na must retire, Beresford 
 was reinforced and sent towards the G-uadiana with two 
 divisions to oust Mortier and recover the fortresses. By 
 rapid marches he did succeed in snatching back first 
 Campo Mayor and then Oliven^a, but was not equally 
 happy in dealing with Badajos, although the breaches 
 were still open. At the beginning of April Wellington 
 started from the front on the Agueda to try what he 
 could do in the south, leaving Sir Brent Spencer in 
 command. He was near Badajos in Beresford's camp 
 on April 21st, and did what was possible, which was 
 not much, to rally the Spaniards and remedy errors; 
 and in the midst of his exertions came the startling and 
 unexpected intelligence that Massena was once more near 
 Ciudad Rodrigo, and bent on raising the blockade of 
 Almeida. Wellington instantly hurried to his northern 
 army, moving with such expedition that he rejoined it 
 on April 28th. "It was lucky," he writes, "that I 
 came when I did." Mass6na had obtained the reluc- 
 
VII BATTLE OF FUENTES d'oNORO 149 
 
 tant aid of Bessiferes, who commanded in Castille, and 
 was resolved to make one more throw for victory. He 
 did not know it, but Napoleon had already transferred 
 the command of the Army of Portugal to Marmont ; nor 
 did he know that he was starting to fight his last battle. 
 When the French became threatening, the British 
 divisions were collected about Fuentes d'Onoro, a village 
 on the Duas Casas, a torrent running in a deep ravine 
 parallel to the Turones and the Coa, on the right bank 
 of which stream stood the beleagured Almeida. Mass6na 
 brought up, on May 2nd, four C(yr])& d'armie and the 
 horse lent by Bessieres. He had perhaps more than 
 forty thousand men, including a force of cavalry far 
 superior to that of the Allies ; and he was the assailant, 
 for Wellington fought a defensive battle. The position 
 he held, although it had some advantages, was not a good 
 one. Its strength lay in the deep trench of the Duas 
 Casas and the rocky elevations which extended from that 
 torrent back to the Turones. Its weakness was the 
 easily accessible plain on the right below the ridge of 
 rough ground, over which the enemy might strive to force 
 his way and gain the line of retreat upon the bridge span- 
 ning the Coa at Castello Bom. The left was secured by the 
 Fifth Division on the road to Almeida, and the Sixth op- 
 posite the village of Almeida ; the First and Third were 
 in and near Fuentes, while the Seventh, together with 
 the Spanish cavalry of Julian Sanchez, was advanced into 
 the plain on the right. The Light Division was held in 
 reserve. The fight began on the 3rd with an attack by 
 Loison upon Fuentes, into which he penetrated, but from 
 which he was expelled after a sharp combat and driven 
 over the stream. The next day Mass^na and Bessieres 
 
I50 WELLINGTON 
 
 examined the position, and the armies were quiet. On 
 the 5th the tempest broke. One corps skirmished on 
 the left of the British line, and Fuentes was again the 
 scene of a fiercer encounter, which raged in the village 
 street and about the chapel on the summit. But the 
 main attack was made upon the right, where the divisions 
 of the French Sixth Corps, supported by the whole of 
 their numerous cavalry, except the horsemen of the 
 Imperial Guard, crossed the Duas Casas and burst 
 through the wood into the plain. Julian Sanchez was 
 driven or retired over the Turones ; the British cavalry, 
 outnumbered, remained to support the infantry, which 
 was also obliged to fall back, and Norman Ramsay saved 
 his battery by charging right through the French horse. 
 At the earliest indication of the formidable onset Wel- 
 lington had sent forward the Light Division to sustain 
 the Seventh, and both were thrown into squares, yet not 
 before some men of the latter were slain, though no 
 square was broken. Then the Light Division, once 
 more under Craufurd, covered the retreat of the Seventh 
 over the Turones, and, always attended by the faithful 
 British horse, withdrew majestically in their compact 
 formation back towards the heights, defying the swarms 
 of French cavalry who " danced " about them yet dared 
 not charge. It is admitted that the moment was one 
 full of peril, and the French contend that had Loison 
 pushed on with a will they must have won. They also 
 say that he dared not take upon himself to act without 
 orders, and that " the four divisions and all the cavalry, 
 by an inconceivable fatality, suddenly stopped short just 
 as they should have gathered the fruit of victory." 
 Perhaps the stout bearing and steady movement of the 
 
vn BRENIERS EXPLOIT 151 
 
 Light Division had some effect; but, in any case, the 
 French did not strike, and the British General got out 
 of his difficulty by forming a new front of battle. The 
 rest of the combat was confined to a cannonade and a 
 contest for the village, where the adversaries with 
 varying fortune fought all day ; but the higher portion 
 was never relinquished, and at night the French withdrew 
 over the river. The French admit a loss of two thousand 
 killed and wounded; that of the British was fifteen 
 hundred, including three hundred prisoners. The 
 possession of Almeida was secured by the battle ; but 
 Brenier, who commanded there, burst many guns, 
 exploded mines in the bastions, and sallying forth carried 
 safely through the investing force four-fifths of his 
 garrison of fifteen hundred men. This fine success of 
 the Frenchman drew from Wellington the caustic remark 
 in a private letter that he began to be of opinion that 
 " there is nothing on earth so stupid as a gallant ofiicer. 
 They were all sleeping in their spurs even ; but the 
 French got off." Publicly he put a severe rebuke on 
 carelessness and over-confidence into a general order. 
 Mass6na, after his repulse, did not remain long on the 
 Duas Casas, and on the 10th the French were again over 
 the Agueda, where the war-worn veteran gave over the 
 command to Marmont, who moved the army to Sala- 
 manca. 
 
 Wellington, having shaken off the Army of Portugal 
 for the third time, turned his eyes again towards the 
 south. He was still near Almeida when news came 
 from Beresford that Soult was moving to succour 
 Badajos, and before either he or the troops he had 
 detached from the Beira could reach the Guadiana, 
 
152 WELLINGTON 
 
 the terrible battle of Albuera had been fought and won 
 by a grand display of disciplined courage ; yet so hard 
 was the task, that at the end "eighteen hundred un- 
 wounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquer- 
 able British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill." 
 When Wellington arrived, Soult had drawn back to 
 Llerena in the mountains, where in the middle of June 
 he was joined by Drouet. From that post he watched 
 the siege of Badajos, Wellington's first serious attempt 
 to recover the fortress, not according to the rules of 
 art, for he had not the means, but by rougher measures, 
 since he had to win or lose in a given time with the few 
 and imperfect resources at his command. Brialmont, 
 a competent judge, condemns all Wellington's sieges 
 "from an artistic pioint of view," but he cannot help 
 admiring them " as examples of what courage and per- 
 severance can effect, when opposed by adverse fortune 
 and the vices of a backward military organisation." In 
 this first effort to take Badajos he failed. Napoleon 
 had ordered Marmont to join Soult, and as the former 
 went south from Salamanca Spencer quitting Beira took 
 the same direction, and each arrived on the scene about 
 the same time. Wellington, therefore, raised the siege, 
 and occupied a position behind the Caya, for the two 
 Marshals had sixty-four thousand men, and his force 
 barely exceeded two-thirds of that number. For some 
 reason they did not attack, perhaps because " ces vieux 
 guerriers, toujours vainquers dans le Nord et si souvent 
 en Espagne, n'abordferent plus les Anglais qu'avec une 
 certaine defiance.'' Or, as Napier puts it, "Marmont's 
 army was conscious of recent defeats at Busaco, Sabugal, 
 and Fuentes d'Onoro ; the horrid field of Albuera was 
 
VII FACES SOULT AND MARMONT 153 
 
 fresh, the fierce blood there spilled still reeked in the 
 nostrils of Soult's soldiers;" and thus the bold bearing 
 of "Wellington, assumed at great risk to impose on the 
 enemy, had an ally in the chastened temper of his once 
 confident foes. 
 
 The sum and substance of this great effort of con- 
 centration by the French was the relief of Badajos. 
 The two Marshals, who would not risk a battle, soon 
 separated again, because, Wellington having induced 
 Blake to enter Andalusia and having set other Spanish 
 Generals in motion, Soult was obliged to hurry to the 
 rescue of Seville and Grenada, and Marmont did not 
 feel strong enough to stand alone. King Joseph also 
 added to the trouble by going suddenly to Paris, de- 
 claring he would abdicate. Napoleon made concessions 
 to pacify him, gave him more money and sent more 
 troops, including part of the Imperial Guard, through 
 the Pyrenees; yet although he publicly admitted that 
 the combat with England would be fought thenceforth 
 in Spain, and still spoke .of going thither himself, he 
 was at that instant considering a descent on Ireland, 
 forming schemes for the invasion of England from 
 Antwerp, Boulogne, and Cherbourg, and preparing on 
 all sides for the rapidly approaching war with Russia, 
 which Wellington scented in the wind. At this moment, 
 when his position was full of peril, when the French had 
 not only captured the eastern fortresses, but, what con- 
 cerned him more nearly, held Badajos and Ciudad 
 Eodrigo, leaving Elvas alone as a support in the south 
 and nothing in the north ; when Spanish resistance was 
 at its lowest ebb, and almost confined to the irrepres- 
 sible giierillas ; when the Portuguese native authorities 
 
154 WELLINGTON 
 
 were all but openly hostile and quite openly obstructive, 
 the steadfast Captain kept a constant mind. He had 
 hours of doubt and righteous wrath when the mighty 
 burden pressed upon him, and he talked of retiring 
 from the turmoil ; but that supreme sense of duty, his 
 greatest quality, soon prevailed ; and as he manfully 
 confronted, so he overcame his thronging troubles. 
 
 From the pestilential Guadiana the war shifted once 
 more towards the north, and after a series of adroit 
 manoeuvres Wellington and Marmont were on the 
 frontiers of Castille. The English General cherished 
 the design of wresting Giudad Eodrigo from his foe, 
 and in August he caused a battering -train, sent from 
 England, to be landed at Oporto secretly, and dragged 
 over the mountains to the valley of the Agueda. At 
 one moment it seemed possible that the fortress might 
 be blockaded and surprised when scantily supplied with 
 food, but that moment passed, the French being too quick 
 and the convoys too well guarded. Yet Wellington re- 
 mained close by watching for a chance, and Marmont 
 was equally on the alert to frustrate his adversary. He 
 had great means, for he could call up large forces, and 
 was daring as well as capable. In point of numbers the 
 opponents were not fairly matched, as Wellington could 
 only dispose of some forty-four thousand men. While vigil- 
 ant on th6 Agueda, Wellington, always provident, re- 
 paired the famous Lines on both banks of the Tagus, and 
 vainly endeavoured to make the Eegency improve the 
 roads and bridges in his rear, moved thereto by the 
 menaced advent of Napoleon. In September Marmont, 
 called on to throw fresh stores into Ciudad, collected sixty 
 thousand men at Tamanes on the 21st, and not only 
 
vn MARMONT's ADVANCE. EL BODON 155 
 
 poured abundant supplies into the fortress, but dashed in 
 among the British divisions, which were widely separated, 
 yet not so posted that they could not unite if time were 
 gained. It was gained, for Wellington with a weak force 
 daringly resisted anattackby a mass of cavalry at ElBodon, 
 and when the Seventy-seventh and Fifth Regiments were 
 obliged to retreat, they did so in one square, defying and 
 punishing the swarming horsemen, and falling back slowly 
 towards Guinaldo, after being joined by other regiments 
 of the Third Division. At Guinaldo, a few redoubts 
 formed a sort of entrenched post, and in the afternoon 
 it was occupied by about fourteen thousand men. Later 
 came in two regiments which had been thrust off the 
 direct route, . and the Light Division was still absent. 
 After devious wanderings, apparently caused by Crau- 
 furd's preference for his own line of retreat, and when 
 Marmont had assembled an immense force on the British 
 front, the Light Division arrived, fatigued but entire. 
 Wellington then drew in all his divisions and concen- 
 trated them upon a position behind the stream of Villa 
 Mayor. The French Marshal attacked the outposts at 
 Aldea Ponte, but pushed his advantages no further, 
 and let slip the fairest chance he ever had of beating 
 Wellington. The latter retired to even a stronger 
 position in a loop of the Coa, and was not molested 
 or followed. Nothing beyond brilliant combats resulted 
 from these formidable-looking French operations, and it 
 is easy to see that Wellington owed his safety to his 
 coolness in danger, the intrepidity of his troops, and 
 to the moral ascendency which he had established over 
 the minds of his adversaries by his uniform success in 
 baffling their manoeuvres and defeating their armies. 
 
156 WELLINGTON CHAP. 
 
 The French returned to their old quarters at Salamanca 
 and in the valley of the Tagus ; the British troops were 
 quiet for months, distributed in cantonments over a wide 
 area ; and Wellington, busy as he always was, found time 
 occasionally to hunt with Lord Tweeddale's imported pack 
 of foxhounds, giving out, to mislead the French, that he 
 would have two packs next year. 
 
 During this period of inaction the main design cher- 
 ished by the Commander-in-Chief was the recovery of Ciu- 
 dad Eodrigo. To that object he bent all his energies, 
 and kept his secret so well that none guessed it down to 
 the moment of execution. He brought up the battering- 
 train to Almeida, which revealed nothing, as the guns 
 were apparently obtained to arm the fortress ; he kept his 
 divisions spread out for the sake of subsistence, and that 
 looked like weakness ; he constructed a bridge to be 
 used on the Agueda, and accumulated other means, but 
 the purpose was never conjectured. The boldness of the 
 project was favourable to success, since the French did 
 not think that in the depth of winter he would venture 
 on any large and hazardous enterprise. So, keeping 
 his O'ivn counsel, he prepared and watched for a fitting 
 opportunity. It came at the end of the year. Napoleon, 
 dravnng away the Imperial Guard and all the Poles, re- 
 arranged his armies in Spain in December, giving, as he 
 said, forty-two in lieu of the thirty-six battalions which 
 he abstracted, but the quantity did not make up for the 
 quality, and he took no account of the horse. Moreover, 
 he wanted Marmont not only to counteract Wellington 
 but also to reinforce Suchet, and he seemed to draw a 
 line between the operations of Marmont and Soult, tend- 
 ing to deepen the existing jealousies which the feeble 
 
VII SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO 157 
 
 Joseph was not competent to soothe or dispel. 
 Wellington, taking advantage of the transition or 
 confusion, reaped the fruit of his own astute line of 
 conduct which had bewildered one Marshal, and Hill's 
 intelligent energy which had upset the calculations of 
 another. When least expected he swooped down upon 
 Ciudad Rodrigo, and was master of its defences before 
 Marmont could collect an army of relief. 
 
 Success depended on rapidity, and rapidity meant a 
 great loss of life ; but in no other way could the place be 
 captured under the conditions, and the sacrifice 
 brought more solid gain than if it had occurred in battle. 
 With all his propelling power, Wellington could not begin 
 the siege until January 8th, 1812, when, by a daring stroke, 
 Colberne stormed the exterior redoubt on a hill called 
 the Great Teson, and established the first parallel. The 
 working parties were hindered by the severe weather and 
 the want of transport, as well as by the enemy's fire ; but 
 by the 1 3th twenty-eight guns were in the batteries, and 
 on the afternoon of the 14th they opened fire at long 
 range. In order to anticipate the coming of a relieving 
 army, it was resolved to effect a breach or breaches and 
 storm in at once without blowing in the counterscarp. 
 The operation was aided by the capture of two convents 
 outside the body of the place, and the approaches were 
 pushed forward to the Lesser Teson. Despite a destruc- 
 tive defence, ten days after the first shot was fired the 
 breaches were declared to be practicable, and the next 
 day the storming columns were in action. The principal 
 resistance was at the great breach where the conflict was 
 deadly ; but through the lesser breach the Light Division 
 regiments forced an entrance, and thus turned the 
 
158 WELLINGTON 
 
 position of the defenders, so that the Third Division also 
 broke in. On all sides the storming parties were 
 victorious, the tov\rn filled rapidly with soldiers, and 
 the Governor, retreating to the castle with a great part 
 of the garrison, soon surrendered. It was a brilliant 
 example of resolute valour, but the price of victory was 
 great. The Allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety 
 officers killed and wounded, one half in the breaches ; 
 the list including Craufurd and Mackinnon who were 
 slain, and Vandeleur and Colborne who were wounded. 
 The fruits of that day were fifteen hundred prisoners, 
 large stores of ammunition and one hundred and fifty 
 guns, among which was Marmont's battering-train ; but 
 the greatest prize was the fortress itself, which, constitut- 
 ing a barrier to the invasion of Portugal, opened a road 
 into Spain. The British made their triumphant General 
 an Earl; the Spaniards, Duke of Ciudad Eodrigo; 
 and the Portuguese, Marquis of Torres Vedras. The 
 capture of Ciudad marked a new stage of the war. 
 
 One measure of his merit is the consternation of his 
 adversaries. Marmont, who only heard of the siege on 
 the 15th, assembled forty-five thousand men at Salamanca 
 on January 25th, nearly a week after the fortress had 
 succumbed, when learning the fact, he withdrew to Valla- 
 dolid. It was not until the 27th that Napoleon got news 
 of an English movement on Ciudad Eodrigo, which 
 he thought was undertaken as a diversion to aid Valen- 
 cia, then besieged by Suchet, and he instantly author- 
 ised a temporary detention of the Imperial Guard as a 
 support for Marmont. Learning that Ciudad had fallen 
 he insisted that the Marshal, if he could not retake it, 
 should occupy Salamanca and make an incursion into 
 
VII SIEGE OF BADAJOS 159 
 
 Portugal in order to detain Wellington in Beira. A little 
 later (February 18tli) he reiterated his orders at great 
 length, directing Marmont to keep his troops together, 
 so that if Wellington committed the great " fault " of 
 moving on Badajos, the Marshal from Salamanca might 
 bring him swiftly back by moving on Almeida. Before 
 that advice reached Marmont Wellington had committed 
 the fault, and his northern opponent was not in a position 
 to do anything that would arrest or punish his audacious 
 enterprise — audacious, yet based on a cool estimate of 
 the facts, and no heedless spring upon a tempting prey. 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that the preparations for the 
 recapture of Badajos were in progress before the siege of 
 Ciudad was begun. Success in the latter case depended 
 more on the disposition of the hostile armies, in the 
 former on climatic considerations ; in both, to a great 
 extent, on the French belief that Wellington was a timid 
 general who would not incur great risks. Yet had they 
 studied his career they would have known that few 
 surpassed him in boldness, still fewer in far-reaching plans, 
 and none then living in accomplishing much vrith small 
 means. He took Ciudad in the depth of winter ; he fell 
 upon Badajos in the spring, because he relied on the 
 annual rains to fill the torrents and the streams which 
 crossed the great road into Portugal, on the Portuguese 
 militia and irregular troops to obstruct the passes, and 
 most on his superior quickness and the valour of his 
 troops, who trusted him as he trusted them. In addition, 
 the Spanish bands and regulars were set in motion to 
 harass Soult, and were lying in wait to dash on Seville 
 and Grenada if he moved upon the Guadiana. Therefore 
 he transferred his army from Beira early in March, 
 
i6o WELLINGTON 
 
 and on the 16th began his hard task, all the harder 
 because Philippon, the Governor of Badajos, was an able 
 warrior and his ample garrison brave men. Covering 
 the siege operations with an army in the field under 
 Hill and Graham, he employed, at first, the Third, 
 Fourth, and Light Divisions, not much more than 
 three times the strength of the garrison, and later the 
 Fifth, to win this great fortress. And he won it in 
 twenty-one days. " The soldiers swear we shall succeed," 
 he wrote on the 20th, "because we invested on St. 
 Patrick's eve and broke ground on St. Patrick's day." 
 And next to the inflexible resolution of the General, it 
 was the officers and soldiers who mastered Badajos. 
 For defective resources and imperative political reasons 
 again set aside the rules of art, few of which could be 
 obeyed. By sustained efforts three breaches were made ; 
 yet the approaches were so difficult that neither could 
 be attacked by compact formations nor stormed, even by 
 the fiery intrepid men who on the night of April 6th 
 sacrificed themselves in hundreds rather than recede. 
 They struggled for hours against the terrible obstacles, 
 and just when the awful slaughter, with no result, made 
 Wellington order the recall of these obstinate heroes, he 
 learned that Pioton's division had carried the castle by 
 escalade, itself an enterprise of splendid daring, that the 
 Fifth Division had mastered the bastion of St. Vincent, 
 and that the stronghold was practically his own. Then 
 the other troops poured in and Philippon, driven for 
 refuge to San Christoval, surrendered with all his men. 
 The siege had cost the assailants more than five thousand 
 killed and wounded, the greater moiety during the 
 conflict on that terrible night ; and none who know how 
 
VII FRUITS OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN i6i 
 
 tender was the heart of the Great Captain will be 
 astonished to learn that the dread total moved him to a 
 passion of tears. Pity it is that the victorious soldiers 
 stained their fame by committing outrages hardly yet 
 forgotten; that they heeded not his orders, and that 
 they turned their bayonets on the General himself when 
 he sought to restore discipline. 
 
 The capture of Badajos, following so close on that of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo, was a great blow to the French. The 
 mere wind of the siege brought Soult through the moun- 
 tains, but when he heard that the place had fallen and 
 that the Spanish Generals were moving on Seville, he 
 hurried back to Andalusia. Wellington had designed a 
 mighty stroke in that quarter which could not be 
 delivered, because Marmont took the field at the end of 
 March, threatened Ciudad and crossed the Coa, finally 
 turning upon Sabugal and Castillo Branco. Wellington, 
 therefore, passing the Tagus, obliged the French to 
 retreat without effecting more than the partial dispersion 
 of the Portuguese militia, and in April, 1812, the adver- 
 saries faced each other on the old ground. The Spaniards 
 having neglected to repair and provision Ciudad, the 
 army was obliged to bring up the stores and remedy the 
 defects. If the two Marshals had not worked in harmony 
 during this vigorous campaign, the failure was partially 
 due to the profound and well-meant counsels of Napoleon. 
 For Marmont could not act on his own judgment in 
 defiance of orders for which he waited, and when they 
 arrived it was too late ; while Soult was vexed because 
 the aid he looked for from his colleague did not come. 
 Wellington ably profited by these errors, increasing their 
 effects by the impulse which he imparted to the Spanish 
 M 
 
i62 WELLINGTON 
 
 bands from Ferrol to Alicant. For all the operations 
 were interdependent, and remote successes as well as 
 defeats told on the fortunes of the Anglo-Portuguese 
 army, which was always the mainstay of the great 
 contest. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Wellington's offensive campaigns 
 
 The time was now near when it would be possible and 
 profitable to assume the offensive, and strike directly at 
 the French in Leon and Castille. Portugal had been 
 secured by the craft and daring which wrested the two 
 frontier fortresses from the enemy. The next thing was 
 to break the direct line of communication between Seville 
 and Madrid, and that was accomplished when Hill, the 
 best of all his lieutenants, victoriously surprised the 
 Erench at Almaraz, broke the bridge, destroyed the 
 works on the right bank, and blockaded the fort on the 
 Mirabete on the left, which an irresolute officer failed to 
 seize. The French having been deprived of Almaraz, by 
 Wellington's direction the Engineer Sturgeon repaired 
 the bridge at Alcantara, and thus a shorter line of com- 
 munication was established between the British forces on 
 the Agueda and those in Estremadura. At the same 
 time the navigation of the Douro and the Tagus was im- 
 proved to facilitate the transport of supplies, and finding 
 that both Marshals expected to be attacked, Wellington 
 did all he could to confirm each in his opinion. The 
 consequence was that no plan of concerted operations 
 against him could be formed, and from his own sources 
 of intelligence and their intercepted letters he was 
 
1 64 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 acquainted with the dissensions raging in the hostile camps. 
 King Joseph, who had been made Commander-in-Chief, 
 was unable to exact obedience from his captains ; and 
 thus the British General, who was bent on an offensive 
 movement, enjoyed the advantage which it confers on 
 one acting against perplexed and jealous adversaries. 
 By patience and sound judgment at all times, by a wise 
 audacity at the right moment, he had obtained a military 
 as well as a moral ascendency, and was about to reap the 
 harvest which his long-suffering, his ceaseless labours, 
 and his genius as a soldier and statesman, had sown and 
 nurtured in an ungrateful soil. 
 
 When Napoleon, on June 13th, at the head of the 
 Grand Army was advancing on the Niemen, the little 
 Anglo -Portuguese host, so long held at bay, sprang 
 joyfully over the Agueda and marched towards 
 Salamanca. Four days afterwards they were over the 
 fords of the Tormes, and, while one division invested the 
 fortified convents, Wellington faced Marmont from the 
 heights of San Christoval. The French Marshal 
 advanced to relieve the forts which were now enduring 
 a siege, and he had a fair chance, for the means, as usual, 
 were insufficient, although on this occasion the error in 
 judgment was caused by the imperfect report of spies. 
 Hence the guns were too few or unsuitable, the bright 
 moon hindered the working parties, and the engineers 
 were still engaged in their task when Marmont hastened 
 over the plain with twenty-five thousand men. Then, 
 while the forts were battered, day after day the two 
 main armies manoeuvred and wrestled on the hills 
 and on both sides of the Tormes. Neither would take 
 the initiative in a battle, Marmont because he could 
 
VIII BEGINS THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN 165 
 
 not get a chance which suited him, Wellington because 
 he would not risk the success of his large plans, even 
 when his rival furnished an opportunity. At one moment 
 the siege operations were stayed for want of ammunition, 
 and it was not until June 27th, ten days after the in- 
 vestment, that the garrison was compelled to surrender. 
 For some reason, either weakness in cavalry or the 
 knowledge that reinforcements from the north and centre 
 would not arrive, Marmont, after the fall of the forts, 
 retreated over the Douro. The mere incursion of Wel- 
 lington had shaken the French defensive system, for 
 Bonnet's fine division was drawn from the Asturias, which 
 enabled the Galician troops to invest Astorga, and the 
 partisans on the coast, aided by Admiral Popham's squad- 
 ron, as far east as Bilboa to resume their activity. The 
 French held Toro, Tordesillas, and Tudela on the river ; 
 and Wellington, following, took post on the left bank, for 
 his advance was arrested by the strength of the position, 
 and his usual difficulties growing out of want of money 
 were almost fatal. Bonnet there joined Marmont, and 
 the latter thought that the time had come to retort upon 
 his adversary. He resolved to cross the Douro, and his 
 plans were so cleverly laid and neatly executed that he 
 succeeded in gaining an initial advantage. For he 
 marched two whole divisions to the left bank at Toro, 
 and when attention had been drawn thither, he rapidly 
 marched them back, and flung his whole army over the 
 stream at Tordesillas. Wellington was not wholly sur- 
 prised, but he was in peril. To meet an attack from 
 Toro, he had collected his left and centre on the 
 Guarena, but the right was still on the Trabancos under 
 Sir Stapleton Cotton, and on July 18th was in the 
 
1 65 WELLINGTON 
 
 presence of the French army. He held his ground and 
 imposed on the adversary for a few hours, but some 
 French horse dashing over the stream, and nearly cap- 
 turing both Wellington and Beresford, found that only 
 a part of the army was in line. Thereupon Marmont, 
 who was bold enough and apt in invention, sent his masses 
 onwards towards the Guarena, bent on turning the 
 British right, and the two armies marched for ten miles 
 on an open plain in parallel lines. The French Marshal 
 hoped to reach the commanding table-land at Vallesa, 
 but he was forestalled by his alert antagonist and lost 
 some men and a general in a combat near Castrillon. 
 After a day's halt, the game of manoeuvres was resumed 
 by Marmont, who, moving swiftly up the Guarena, crossed 
 it near its sources and fairly turned the right of the 
 Allied position at Vallesa ; and then the two armies 
 once more marched side by side, racing to gain positions 
 near Salamanca. The French had the better, for 
 although Wellington secured the hills in front of San 
 Christoval, Marmont planted his troops on the heights 
 above the Tormes which commanded the ford at Huerta, 
 which gave him an access to the country on the left bank. 
 So far the Marshal had won the advantage in 
 manoeuvring. In other respects the armies were fairly 
 matched. The slight superiority in number was on the 
 side of the Allies, who also had more cavalry, but the 
 French were nearly as many, and they had more 
 guns. Whether there would be a battle now depended 
 upon Marmont, for Wellington would not fight unless 
 his rival gave him a fair occasion. The Allies 
 fell back to San Christoval, and on the 21st, when 
 Marmont, crossing the Tormes, took up a position at 
 
VIII BATTLE OF SALAMANCA 167 
 
 Calvarizza de Ariba, Wellington, leaving the Third 
 Division to watch a French division established at Babila 
 Fuente, also planted his army on the same side of the river. 
 He was still, while watching for a chance to fight, medi- 
 tating a retreat when the enemy on the 22nd furnished 
 an occasion. The Allies were posted on a line at right 
 angles to the Tormes, and the French gathering over 
 against them began the fray by a contest for the com- 
 manding hills, among which were the famous Arapiles, 
 two isolated craggy heights near the British right. In 
 the first rush the French gained the outer and the 
 British the inner hill, from which at first the leading 
 companies were driven, but quickly recovering half-way 
 down, and enraged at their mishap, they dashed forward 
 and secured the summit. It was from this elevation that 
 Wellington watched the movements of his opponent, who 
 was opposite the British left. The French divisions 
 coming out of the forest were seen to extend more and 
 more to their own left, and the English line was changed 
 until it was parallel to the Tormes. As there was no 
 longer any need to guard the other bank, the Third 
 Division was brought over and posted on the right in 
 the low ground about Aldea Tejada. The day advanced, 
 yet there was no general action. Wellington went to 
 sleep, desiring to be roused when the French left, then 
 pointing towards the Eodrigo road, reached a certain 
 wood. Lord Fitzroy Somerset duly awakened his 
 Chief, who, mounting the hill, gazed steadily on the 
 French array, and seeing how great was the gap be- 
 tween the moving hostile divisions and the centre, he 
 gave the signal for battle. The whole line, pivoting 
 upon the mountain block, descended into the lower 
 
i68 WELLINGTON 
 
 ground, moving upon the flank of the erring enemy, 
 while the Third Division threw itself forward on the front 
 of the column, and Cotton's horsemen were straining to 
 charge. The contest was brief, for the French division 
 was crushed by the infantry and ridden over by the 
 cavalry which came like a torrent up the valley, and 
 in less than an hour Marmont's line of battle was irre- 
 trievably broken. At the earliest perception of the 
 danger, when he saw that Wellington, detecting his 
 rashness, had prepared to strike, he rode forward to 
 rectify or mitigate the blunder, but was hit severely and 
 carried from the field. Bonnet, who succeeded, shared 
 a like fate, and then the heavy task fell upon Clausel. 
 At that time the whole British line had swung forward, 
 pivoting on the left, until it was again parallel to the 
 Tormes, so swift had been the stroke, and the great 
 cavalry charge had spent its terrible force ; so that the 
 French, still numerous, were driven to the verge of the 
 forest. By great energy and greater skill, Clausel, him- 
 self wounded, formed a fresh front of battle, and even 
 made an attack ; but at the right moment, when there 
 was apparent danger, Wellington, ever watchful and 
 resolute, brought up the Sixth Division, frustrated his 
 able foe, and continued to push him back. Clausel was 
 now fighting to cover his retreat. He had one great 
 advantage. The Spanish garrison posted in Alba de 
 Tormes had been withdrawn without notice to Welling- 
 ton, and thus the French got clear off in the gloom ; for 
 Wellington, thinking Alba blocked, pursued to the 
 Huerta ford, where he found no one ; his great plan 
 was thwarted by Spanish neglect. It was in riding to 
 the Huerta ford that he was struck by a shot which 
 
viii ENTERS MADRID 169 
 
 happily first passed through a holster. " I saw him late 
 on the evening of that great day," writes Napier, " when 
 the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching 
 as far as the eye could command, showed, in the darkness, 
 how well the field was won ; he was alone, the flush of 
 victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and 
 watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle." How 
 different from the fierce and angry countenance and 
 silent, abrupt bearing seen by the same acute observer 
 on the Sierra of Busaco. It marks the difference between 
 a retreat upon Torres Vedras before the " spoilt child of 
 victory" and an advance which was to carry him to 
 Madrid. 
 
 Clausel with his diminished host was forced persist- 
 ently back upon Burgos. King Joseph, who had moved 
 out of Madrid over the Guadarama mountains, hearing 
 of Marmont's defeat, returned hastily to his capital, 
 which he had to quit again in disorder, because the 
 Allied right wing was at his heels, and there was 
 no succour nearer than Suchet. Wellington entered 
 Madrid on August 12th, and was welcomed as a de- 
 liverer by the people, who " crowded around his horse, 
 hung on his stirrups, touched his clothes, and throwing 
 themselves on the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend 
 of Spain." When he had forced the French garrison in 
 the Eetiro to surrender, Madrid for a time was free 
 from the enemy. Yet not for many weeks. One object 
 of the campaign was to set free Andalusia, and it was 
 accomplished. Soult, reluctantly obeying the orders of 
 King Joseph, raised the siege of Cadiz, destroyed guns 
 and stores, and a fortnight after Wellington entered 
 Madrid had passed through Seville on the road to 
 
I70 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 Valencia. An Anglo-Sicilian expedition was at Alicant ; 
 Hill watched the passes through the Sierra Morena ; and 
 Spanish troops should have followed the French to the 
 Alcaraz mountains, but did not, which had serious results 
 at a later period. 
 
 Now it was when the British General received sure 
 intelligence that Soult was leaving Andalusia, that he 
 quitted Madrid to push his warfare beyond the Douro. 
 Nor did he move a moment too soon ; for the enter- 
 prising Clausel drove the Spaniards from Valladolid in 
 the middle of August, Foy made a bold dash down the 
 river to pick up the garrisons left in Taro and Zamora, 
 and the safety of the road to Salamanca was imperilled. 
 But when on the first week of September Wellington 
 crossed the Guadarama and moved upon the Douro, 
 Clausel drew in his daring troops, Valladolid was re- 
 covered, and the able Frenchman was forced back, not 
 only to Burgos, but to Briviesca on the Oca. The 
 obstacle now was the castle of Burgos, heavily armed, 
 garrisoned by seventeen hundred French troops, and 
 commanded by Dubreton whose fame rivals that of 
 Philippon. Upon the speedy reduction of this strong- 
 hold much depended ; for it was a question of time, 
 since if Soult could not be detained beyond the Tagus, 
 or if a French army could be collected to relieve the 
 place, the Allies would be forced to retreat upon Ciudad 
 Eodrigo. Wellington began the siege on the 19th, 
 hoping to finish it early, but it was strong, his guns 
 were few and insufficient, the assaults failed, the 
 Portuguese troops were inapt for the work, and the 
 enemy was ingenious as well as bold. Not only were the 
 means inadequate, but the General underrated the task. 
 
■viu FAILS TO TAKE BURGOS 171 
 
 and after more than a montli spent in desperate efforts 
 to beat down the work, he was obliged to raise the siege 
 and hurry away. 
 
 For the French General Souham, sent from France, 
 had assembled an army at Briviesca and was moving 
 forward. The combinations designed to embarrass Soult 
 had failed ; he had joined Joseph at Almanza in the first 
 days of October, and both were advancing on Madrid. 
 Nothing stood in their way except the army under Hill 
 on the Tagus, and he could not encounter the combined 
 forces of Soult and the King. Andalusia had been 
 relieved, but the whole available French strength was 
 thereby enabled to converge upon the Allies. With one 
 body numerically superior close upon him, and a still 
 more dangerous foe pointing towards his line of retreat 
 upon Portugal, it behoved Wellington to seek safety. 
 Nor was it easily attained. For Souham came on with 
 resolution; and it was only by the daring step of 
 crossing the Axlanzon under the guns of the castle, a 
 feat done by night with deftness and celerity, that the 
 army was drawn out of reach. Yet the whole road 
 backward to the Douro was the scene of recurring com- 
 bats, for the French are great in pursuit, and all 
 Wellington's coolness and judgment was required to 
 extricate himself from his peril. He succeeded, and on 
 the 29th, eight days after he filed past Burgos, his army 
 was over the Douro. The bridges were broken behind 
 him, but a French captain and his company swam the 
 river at Tordesillas and won the tower there, a feat 
 which would have enabled Souham to cross, had not 
 Wellington at once moved his army to the left and 
 forbade the attempt. At this time Hill was still on the 
 
172 WELLINGTON 
 
 Tagus, and opposite to him the King's powerful army 
 under Soult. The English General was so trusted by 
 his chief that he gave him the choice of his line of 
 retreat, but he expressed his preference for the 
 Guadarama route which would enable the two fractions 
 to unite. Hill took that line, yet not before he was 
 pressed ; and removing or destroying the stores in 
 Madrid, he passed the mountains, and took the shorter 
 line to Alba de Tormes, because Souham, being ex- 
 peditious in bridging the Douro, obliged Wellington to 
 retire direct upon San Christoval, instead of effecting a 
 junction with Hill at Arevalo on the Adaja. Thus 
 on November 8th, after much marching and fighting, 
 the chief and his lieutenant, at the head of sixty-eight 
 thousand men, were united and arrayed near the battle- 
 field of Salamanca, while the combined armies of the 
 French, a hundred thousand strong, were rushing down 
 upon them over the plains of Castille and Leon. 
 
 The English General held his ground and rested his 
 wearied troops, prepared to fight if he could, to retreat 
 if he must. While Marshal Jourdan counselled battle, 
 Soult preferred to manoeuvre, and his advice prevailed. 
 But it was not until the 14th that the French host, 
 diminished by detachments to ninety thousand men, 
 began the operation of turning the British position by 
 ascending and crossing the Tormes in the hope of 
 gaining the road to Ciudad Eodrigo. Then the Allied 
 host was concentrated on the old battle-ground and 
 held there in the hope of being attacked ; but as Soult 
 still worked away to his left, Wellington resolved, 
 although they were so near, to march round the French 
 army, a feat which he accomplished by dint of audacity, 
 
yiii RETREATS ON PORTUGAL 173 
 
 swiftness, the aid of a thick fog, and better roads. An 
 astonishing exploit, even in war where so much is 
 unexpected, and only explicable on the supposition that 
 Wellington's marches, victories, and good fortune had 
 given him a mastery over the minds of his antagonists. 
 Thus the roads to Ciudad Rodrigo were secured, and on 
 the 19th the troops were back on the Agueda. The 
 retreat from Salamanca was not made without losses of 
 men and baggage, the capture of General Paget, and 
 one sharp combat on the Huerba ; but there the pursuit 
 stopped, and the campaign was over. A little later the 
 army went into winter quarters over a wide territory, 
 and the man who was the soul of the war in the 
 Peninsula, ever active in so many and such divers ways, 
 began to meditate those final plans which brought his 
 prolonged and mighty exertions to a victorious close. 
 "Although we have not been able to hold the two 
 Castilles," he wrote to Dumouriez, November 30th, 
 from Freneda, " our campaign has not been a bad one, 
 and we are in a position to make a good one next 
 year.'' Such was his modest way of describing a great 
 success. 
 
 The circumstances of the hour were growing more and 
 more propitious. Napoleon's gigantic Eussian invasion 
 had gone to wreck. On the day when Wellington flitted 
 so deftly from Burgos, the French Emperor had just seen 
 the last of Moscow, and at the moment when Wellington 
 was writing the letter which has been quoted, Napoleon 
 was dating his despatches from villages on the right 
 bank of the ice-laden Beresina, which he had crossed 
 three days before. The full extent of his prodigious 
 misfortunes was not then known in Freneda, but enough 
 
174 WELLINGTON 
 
 had been reported to render it certain that the genius of 
 Napoleon would be taxed to keep a hold on Germany, 
 and that he would have few resources or none to spare 
 for Spain. Another fact, which gave some little help, 
 was that the Cortes had sanctioned the appointment of 
 Wellington to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
 Spanish armies ; and during the winter he visited Cadiz 
 in order to make the arrangement as solid and useful as 
 might be possible. Far greater in importance was the 
 increased weight conferred on him at home by his 
 victories and the evident fruits of his victories. He was 
 raised to the rank of Marquess, thanked again by both 
 Houses, and granted £100,000. The Opposition no 
 longer spoke of him with contempt. Lord Grey, who, 
 having objected to the vote of thanks proposed after 
 Talavera, had handsomely retracted his earlier opinions 
 when Mass6na was driven from Portugal, now joined 
 Lord Wellesley in his attack on the Government because- 
 they had not sufficiently supported their great General ! 
 As Wellington stood apart from politics and served his 
 country, the wholesome change wrought at home by the 
 magician success, increased still further his moral power, 
 not only over the British, the Spaniards, and the 
 Portuguese, but over the enemy. Therefore, when he 
 received reinforcements during the winter, especially in 
 cavalry, he was able under better auspices and on firmer 
 ground to prepare for the coming campaign. 
 
 The awful disaster in Russia had placed the defenders 
 and invaders of Spain on less unequal terms. The 
 French army of occupation, diminished in number yet 
 still reckoned by the hundred thousand, was without a 
 competent head, for Joseph had induced his brother to 
 
viil EFFECTS OF NAPOLEON' S DISASTERS 175 
 
 recall Soult, and Napoleon imposed on Hs subordinates 
 in Spain tasks which a captain equal to himself alone might 
 have been able to achieve. He underrated the obstacles, 
 did not or would not understand that the political and 
 miHtary facts had become adverse to his cause, and that 
 there was at hand a genius who could profit by the 
 conjuncture. Wellington, indeed, was now to secure the 
 reward of his long tried patience and ever active skill. 
 During the spring of 1813 he set on foot a series of 
 operations all over Spain and on her coasts which 
 occupied, bewildered, and paralysed the French com- 
 manders, organised strongly his own army, which 
 exceeded seventy thousand men, framed a plan of 
 campaign which the adversary could not or did not 
 penetrate, and then, suddenly breaking in upon them 
 where he was least expected, shook down the fabric of 
 their power at one blow. The months of labour, the 
 astute contrivances, the assiduous care which embraced 
 small things as well as great, and the far-reaching appli- 
 cation of sound business principles to the furtherance of 
 his design, must be digested in detail to be appreciated. 
 Here we can only deal with the bold outhnes of the 
 fascinating story. 
 
 The French armies were scattered between Toledo 
 and the Pyrenees, expecting an attack but uncertain 
 where the stroke would fall, when the Anglo-Portuguese 
 army, quitting winter quarters, started forward into the 
 heart of the disarray. Sir Thomas Graham with forty 
 thousand men moved first, stealthily crossing the Douro 
 at Oporto and Lamego, and working through the Tras- 
 os-Montes in order to surprise the French on the Esla. 
 When he was well forward. Hill brought up the right 
 
176 WELLINGTON 
 
 wing to Bejar, and the centre assembling in front of 
 Ciudad Eodrigo, Wellington rode in from Freneda and 
 joined that body. Both pushed out towards Salamanca, 
 flanked by Spanish cavalry, and it is written that on 
 passing the Agueda on May 22nd the General rose 
 in his stirrups, took off his hat, and cried "Farewell, 
 Portugal ! " So the columns strode along, the French 
 outposts falling back before them, and so well-timed 
 were the marches that both Generals arrived together on 
 the Tormes, where the Frenchman, Vilatte, waited too 
 long, and being overtaken near Santa Marta and Aldea 
 Lengua, his troops suffered and he lost six guns. That 
 encounter was followed up by a march on the Douro at 
 Zamora and Toro, whither Graham ■ had not yet come ; 
 but by the end of the month his junction with the other 
 columns was secured. For Wellington, leaving Hill in 
 command, had passed over the Douro in a basket slung 
 on a rope stretched from rook to rock, and his presence 
 in Graham's camp supplied a stimulus which always told. 
 Then the difficulty of crossing the Esla was overcome, 
 and bridges being laid on the Douro, the whole army, 
 ninety thousand strong, with one hundred guns, was soon 
 in line on the right bank of that river. As the troops were 
 eager and hardy, and the leading good, a fortnight 
 had sufficed to draw this mass together from -svidely 
 separated starting-points, and the result was a complete 
 surprise to an adversary ignorant of Graham's march, 
 the mighty array beyond the Douro seeming to have 
 sprung out of the earth. The French, astonished and 
 hesitating, abandoned Madrid and managed to hurry 
 their divisions over the river and get well upon the high 
 road to France. After a halt at Toro, the pursuers 
 
via THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 177 
 
 sprang forward on June 4th, and on the 7th they 
 were over the Carrion; King Joseph was driven to 
 Burgos, the Spaniards swarming on his flanks and the 
 Allies at his heels. He did not halt, but, blowing up 
 the castle of Burgos, hastened with his stores, his host of 
 followers, his court and his treasure, over the Ebro, 
 holding Pancorvo and its forts to cover his position, 
 hoping that he might be allowed to regain the lost 
 initiative. Not so. Wellington, working by his left, 
 swung over the Ebro far above Miranda, opened 
 communication with Santander as a new base, and swept 
 through and over the stony and rugged hills by roads 
 and no roads which fairly turned the enemy's right, his 
 soldiers on their arduous way meeting unexpectedly and 
 beating two French brigades. Thus on the 18th, while 
 Eeille, who had suffered in that combat, held a position 
 on the Bayas stream at Subijana, the main body of the 
 French filed through the pass of Puebla into the valley 
 of Vittoria, where, after a long race, it was brought to 
 bay. For Eeille, unable to stay on the mountain, went 
 over the Zadorra on the 19th; and Wellington, using 
 the following day to reconnoitre, framed his plan of 
 battle. 
 
 The Zadorra, flowing from the eastward until it reaches 
 the hills, is there shouldered off abruptly to the south and 
 enters the Ebro through the defile of Puebla. Within 
 the elbow formed by the river was the French position. 
 The right was high up at the bridges, near Ariaga 
 and Gamara, Major and Minor, not far from Vittoria. 
 There Eeille, the best French soldier on the field, held a 
 position which guarded the high road through Tolosa to 
 Bayonne. But the main body was posted on a transverse 
 
 N 
 
178 WELLINGTON 
 
 ridge six miles to the westward, its right resting on the 
 Zadorra where it bends to the south, its left upon the 
 mountain running east from the Puebla defile. Behind 
 Vittoria, blocking the royal road, were the military chest, 
 the baggage, the equipages of the Court, and the 
 artillery-parks. The army was diminished by a strong 
 detachment sent with a convoy towards France, but 
 General Clausel was approaching from the side of Logroiio, 
 and Foy, who was in Guispucoa, was ordered up to 
 Vittoria. Those two, although Clausel came near, 
 never reached the field. 
 
 Having inspected the ground, and being always in- 
 clined to go forward and get close — he was cannonaded 
 during his ride — Wellington resolved to direct 
 Graham against Eeille's troops at Gamara and 
 Ariaga, send Hill through the Puebla defile to attack 
 the left on the ridge, and lead his main body himself 
 straight through the mountains upon the right and centre 
 of the French line. The troops were in movement at 
 daj'break on June 21st, 1813, but they had steep 
 and rough ground to traverse, and the action did not 
 begin until the forenoon, when Hill, having cleared the 
 defile, pressed in upon the French left. At this time 
 Wellington's divisions were over the hills and among the 
 woods in the Zadorra valley, heading for the bridges, 
 none of which had been broken. Away on the British 
 left, beyond the visible spires of Vittoria, the smoke of 
 Graham's guns rose above the trees and their muffled 
 roar was faintly heard. A peasant informed Wellington 
 that the bridge at Tres Puentes was unguarded, and 
 Kempt's brigade of the Light Division was instantly 
 sent across, established close to the French line, and 
 
viii BATTLE OF VITTORIA 179 
 
 employed at once to fall on the foe up the river, and 
 enable the Third and Seventh Divisions to cross almost 
 unopposed. Then the Fourth advanced over the bridge of 
 Nanclares, and thus the fight was developed on a broad 
 front. Hill had gained ground on one side, Picton and 
 Dalhousie on the other, while the sound of Graham's 
 battle became more and more audible. The French line 
 was shaken and the King intent on retreat, when 
 Wellington, who had ridden far to the front, seeing that 
 a hiU near the village of Arinez, in the centre of the 
 position, was barely guarded, himself took the Third 
 Division- — Picton riding at its head, dressed in a blue 
 coat and round hat, — • led it at a running pace 
 diagonally across the front of both armies, and carried 
 the hill. The combat now raged along the ridges with 
 great fury, for the French were fighting to gain time 
 and form afresh to the rear. That time was not 
 granted. The hills and the villages were seized, and 
 sweeping onward the Allies drove the enemy step by 
 step through the fields and woods close up to Vittoria, 
 and all the time Graham's artillery thundering on 
 their right rear quickened their pace or steadied 
 their resistance, for as the sound did not advance it 
 showed that Eeille held his ground. The strife in front 
 of Vittoria was fierce, desperate, and prolonged until 
 the line was turned ; and as the transport blocked the 
 high road to Bayonne, Joseph was obliged to retreat on 
 Pampeluna. Eeille all day defended his bridges, which 
 were taken and retaken more than once, and saved the 
 army, for he did not yield until the leading pursuers 
 from the main battle rushed in upon him ; then he ably 
 drew off, hotly followed, and getting through Metauco 
 
i8o WELLINGTON 
 
 in the darkness, joined the flying host on the road to 
 Pampeluna. 
 
 Such, in brief, was the decisive victory at Vittoria. 
 The enemy's loss of men, including prisoners, was hardly 
 greater than that of the Allies — five or six thousand. 
 But they lost one hundred and fifty out of one hundred 
 and fifty -two guns ; all their ammunition-waggons, baggage 
 public and private, their provisions, transport- animals, 
 and one million sterling of treasure ; Jourdan's baton, 
 much jewellery, many pictures, and a mass of official 
 records, were taken, while the field was littered with the 
 plunder which the King and his Generals had endeavoured 
 to carry away. The Swiss did not capture more when 
 they surprised Charles the Eash at Granson in 1476, and 
 took his camp and all that was his to the value of three 
 million crowns. 
 
 While King Joseph retreated through the mountains to 
 France pursued by part of the Light Division, Wellington 
 was intent on keeping him separated from Clausel, or 
 snapping up that General if he gave a chance; and Graham 
 went down the royal road to deal with Foy. Clausel 
 gave no chance, but descending the Ebro to Saragossa, 
 hastened thence northward, and regained his country by 
 the pass of Jaca. In passing by Pampeluna the King 
 reinforced the garrison, and Foy, before retiring through 
 Tolosa, filled San Sebastian with good troops. None of 
 the invading host save Suchet now remained in Spain, 
 and he was, or thought he was, fully occupied by the 
 insurrection and the Anglo-Sicilian army in Valencia and 
 Catalonia. In order to secure a new base on the Biscayan 
 coast Sir Thomas Graham was ordered to invest and 
 besiege San Sebastian, and Wellington disposed the rest 
 
SOULT ORDERED TO SPAIN 
 
 of his army so as to blockade Pampeluna and cover the 
 siege operations. A fortnight after the battle of Vittoria 
 the foreposts of the Allied army were on the French 
 frontier, facing their redoubtable adversaries from the 
 famous pass of Eoncesvalles to the mouth of the 
 Bidassoa. 
 
 On the first day of July Napoleon in his quarters at 
 Dresden received disquieting news from Spain, refer- 
 ring apparently to Joseph's retreat from Burgos upon 
 the Ebro. Whatever the scope of that intelligence, it 
 was of a character to make him adopt a strong resolu- 
 tion. Addressing Soult, then in his camp, he said, " You 
 wiU start before ten o'clock this evening, travel incognito, 
 reach Paris on the 4th, obtain the best information from 
 the Minister of War and the Arch-Chancellor ; stay not 
 longer in Paris than twelve hours, but continue your 
 route to take the command of my armies in Spain." 
 Soult obeyed with such diligence that on July 12th 
 he reached Bayonne and took on himself a burden too 
 heavy for Joseph and Jourdan ; and although the 
 army was not in Spain, it still derived its title from 
 that ill-used country. Napoleon, at this time fresh 
 from Ms latest triumphs at Lutzen and Bautzen, hoped 
 that his lieutenant would preserve the line of the Ebro 
 and ward off danger from that quarter. An armistice 
 had stopped hostilities in Germany, but it only covered 
 preparations on both sides for a future and deadlier 
 struggle. While providing Soult with nearly a hundred 
 thousand men, the Emperor believed he could make 
 head against the coahtion. To Caulincourt, his pleni- 
 potentiary at Prague, where the Powers were conferring, 
 he said, "Tell them that if they wish to prolong the 
 
i82 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 armistice, I am ready; if they wish to fight, I am 
 ready ; " and reporting what was the fact, that on July 
 24th (25th really) Soult had marched on Pampeluna. 
 " The English," he said, " surprised by a prompt move- 
 ment which they did not expect, were falling back " 
 before the Marshal's host. 
 
 And it was so. Sir Thomas Graham began the 
 siege of San Sebastian on the 10th ; on the 25th his 
 troops were repulsed in an attempt to storm through 
 the breaches, and Wellington hastening to the camp 
 suspended all further operations, because while there 
 he got the news that Soult, whose advance was expected, 
 had burst in on the right of the British line. Therefore 
 Wellington hurried back to Lesaca, and arrived in time 
 to deal with his formidable adversary. Then ensued 
 that exciting strife on the mountains and amid the 
 valleys which can only be appreciated if studied in 
 detail, for which here there is no space. In order to 
 cover Graham's siege and the blockade of Pampeluna, 
 the greater part of the British army was posted on the 
 north side of the central ridge which crossed all the 
 ravines and vales from Eoncesvalles to Lecumberri. 
 Thus the line was long, and by selecting the extreme 
 right as the point of attack Soult secured to himself 
 the greatest advantages and the best chances of beating 
 his opponent in fractions. He therefore cleverly as- 
 sembled Clausel and Eeille's divisions near St. Jean 
 Pied de Port, and directed them upon the passes 
 of Lindouz and Ibaiieta, while d'Erlon's divisions, 
 starting from Espelette, assailed the centre under Hill. 
 The advance was made on the 25th, the very day when 
 Wellington galloped to San Sebastian ; and it succeeded 
 
VIII SOUL T DEFEA TED AT SA UROREN 183 
 
 SO far as to press back both fronts, yet not enough to 
 master the ridge on the first day. For Cole and Byng 
 stoutly resisting on the British right, and d'Erlon halting 
 after a fierce combat on the Col de Maya, Wellington 
 was able, when he rode to the front on the 26th, to 
 direct all the troops within reach upon the valley of 
 Lanz, where they would be in communication with 
 Picton who took command on that side. So on the 
 27th the whole line was in full retreat. The French 
 followed fast, but on that day Soult, with Clausel and 
 Eeille's men, pouring through the Val Zubiri, were 
 stopped by Picton who faced about on the hills near 
 Pampeluna. The same evening, when the French 
 endeavoured to seize the heights above Zabaldica and 
 Sauroren, they were promptly repelled by Cole, and 
 forced to form up in the narrow highlands between the 
 Val Zubiri and the valley of Lanz. Then Wellington 
 arrived. He had ridden down the Lanz valley from 
 Ostiz, and had entered Sauroren as Clausel was ap- 
 proaching along the hills. He wrote a dispatch on 
 the bridge parapet, which Lord Fitzroy Somerset, his 
 sole staff officer at that moment, carried to Hill and 
 Dalhousie who were approaching from the left. Then 
 he rode up towards Vilalba, and as his well-known form 
 and face appeared the troops sent up hearty cheers of 
 welcome. It is related that Soult was pointed out to 
 Wellington as he sat on his horse separated from the 
 Marshal only by a narrow gulf; and that the British 
 Captain then uttered some sentences which have become 
 famous. "Yonder," he is reported to have said, "yonder 
 is a great commander, but he is cautious, and will delay 
 his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers : that 
 
lS4 WELLINGTON 
 
 ^v^ll give time for the Sixth Division to arrive and I shall 
 beat him.'' The Sixth had been told they must arrive 
 at their destination, and he knew they would obey. 
 Thus, when night fell and a tempest shook the hills, 
 both armies stood between the Guy and the Lanz 
 torrents, making ready for the morrow. On that day, 
 the 28th, Soult's troops attacked with great heartiness, 
 but, as foreseen, the Sixth Division had come up on the 
 British left, and the French were repulsed again and 
 again, even when they had perseveringly climbed on to 
 the rocky crest. When the evening came, Wellington's 
 sixteen thousand, though considerably diminished in 
 number after the "bludgeon work," as he called it, 
 had victoriously thwarted the valorous onsets of nearly 
 double their strength, and the main purpose of Soult 
 was frustrated. 
 
 For the British divisions, marching in the mountains, 
 were nearer together than the French, the Light 
 Division only being, or seeming to be, afar and in danger. 
 Quiet prevailed on the 29th, but on the 30th Soult 
 joined d'Erlon, who had come up to Lizasso and was 
 about to fall upon Hill's weaker force. The French 
 Marshal formed a new plan of operations which would 
 have placed his army in Guipuscoa; but he reckoned 
 without his host, for on that very day, while d'Erlon 
 was fighting Hill, Wellington struck a direct blow at 
 Reille and Clausel on the old ground of Sauroren, 
 defeated them utterly, pushed on in pursuit, compelled a 
 great body under Foy to retreat on France by a separate 
 line, and thus left Soult himself isolated with only one 
 pass open to him, that of Dona Maria. Over it he went, 
 and though closely pursued he halted in San Estevan. 
 
viii PURSUED TO THE BIDASSOA 185 
 
 It was here that except by one exit he was surrounded. 
 Wellington, watching from the hills, awaited the fitting 
 moment to close on his opponent. Straggling was 
 prohibited, no fires were permitted. But suddenly he 
 saw three red-coated marauders, who had entered the 
 valley, snapped up by four French gendarmes, and soon 
 after the drums beat and the enemy was seen in column 
 of march heading for Sumbilla and the bridge at Yanzi. 
 The British followed, the Spaniards came down to the 
 bridge, the Light Division appeared on the other bank 
 of the Bidassoa, and the French filing through the narrow 
 ledge between the clifis and the torrent under a hot 
 fire, turned off towards Echallar. From that point they 
 were driven on August 2nd, and on the 3rd, after ten 
 days of march and battle, the French were again in 
 their own frontier. The losses in both armies had been 
 great, but the defeated French were the more heavily 
 punished. In the combat near Echallar Wellington was 
 nearly captured as he was examining his maps. His 
 forward habit constantly led him into peril, but he 
 never grew more cautious either in action or on the 
 march, and always rode where he judged his presence 
 would be useful. He has been blamed for not, while his 
 opponents were in disorder, at once pushing his advan- 
 tages. On the spot he judged diff'erently, and considered 
 that San Sebastian must be reduced before he entered on 
 so great an enterprise as the invasion of France. Besides, 
 Suchet in Catalonia inspired him with misgivings. In 
 the Spanish war he had never to reckon with only the 
 enemy in his front. It was his duty and habit to survey 
 the whole political and military field, which really 
 embraced Germany as well as Spain, and follow that 
 
1 86 WELLINGTON 
 
 course which seemed most likely to secure solid and 
 lasting results. 
 
 Therefore he resumed the siege of San Sebastian. 
 During the whole year he was not seconded by the 
 Government at home as well as he should have been ; 
 for not only did the Ordnance Office languidly comply 
 with demands for guns and ammunition, but the 
 Admiralty did not maintain such a squadron on the 
 coasts of Spain and Portugal as would have enabled 
 supply-ships to sail when required, and might perhaps 
 have prevented the French from pouring men and 
 stores into the fortress by sea. When the battering- 
 trains did arrive, the complement of ammunition was 
 not in quantity proportioned to the guns; so that 
 there was first delay and then grave neglect, and 
 Wellington did not leave the Admiralty in doubt re- 
 specting his opinion of their shortcomings. The plan of 
 attack was censured at the time, apparently on grounds 
 justified by the results ; but to say that the place was 
 taken by accident is a perverse exaggeration. It 
 was won by sheer valour; and the explosion which 
 gave so decided an advantage to the assailants was one 
 of a kind not uncommon in war. The siege was begun 
 again on August 5th, when Soult had been chased 
 to his frontier, but the real work could not commence 
 until the 22nd, because the guns from home had not 
 arrived. The assault was made on the 31st and the 
 garrison driven into the castle, where the stout governor, 
 Emmanuel Eey, held out until September 8th, when 
 his rocky refuge was a ruin. The operations were im- 
 pressively dramatic, and gave full scope to the bravery 
 of the Portuguese as well as to the heroism of the 
 
viil SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN 187 
 
 British soldier; but some hideous atrocities which 
 followed on the storming, although they were perpetrated 
 by a few, threw a dark stain on the whole, unjustly 
 perhaps, yet inevitably, and the sack of San Sebastian 
 figures as an indelible disgrace. Neither Graham not 
 WeUiagton could have prevented the shameful acts 
 which filled them with rage, but both deeply resented 
 and finally repelled the calumnies which like a mon- 
 strous growth sprang out of facts suflSciently horrible 
 in their naked reaUty. The officers on duty did all they 
 could to restrain and punish the ofienders. Wellington's 
 share in the siege was intermittent, he had so much to 
 do, and besides, the business was Graham's ; but he did 
 more than once interfere, and four days after the assault 
 he was on the breach in conversation with Colonel John 
 Burgoyne, who had succeeded to the command of the 
 Engineers when Sir Eichard Fletcher was killed. The loss 
 inflicted on the Alhes in this murderous siege approached 
 the total of three thousand killed and wounded, and the 
 garrison were reduced to one half their original strength. 
 At this price the General bought a fortress of the utmost 
 value to him as a secure place for hospitals and magazines, 
 although the value was impaired by the dreadful confla- 
 gration begun by the French as part of the defence, and 
 perhaps enlarged by the plunderers. 
 
 Unwilling to allow San Sebastian to fall without 
 another attempt to delay if not avert its capture, Soult 
 crossed the Bidassoa on the last day of August, when the 
 stormers were vainly struggling to win the breach and 
 the shot from Graham's guns were smashing the curtain 
 wall above them. He had made close and powerful 
 combinations to break through the Allied hne, and his 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 columns did push up the huge spurs of the Pena de 
 Haya mountain ; but, forewarned, "Wellington was pre- 
 pared and ready to repel the front attack. The French 
 came on in two large masses between Iran and Vera; 
 one under Eeille was repulsed on the heights of San 
 Marcial, where, stimulated by Wellington's voice and 
 gestures, the Spaniards were prevailed upon to stand 
 alone ; the other, commanded by Clausel, after pushing 
 up the steeps, was paralysed by a strong demonstration 
 on his left rear from the side of Lesaca. In the after- 
 noon a tempest deluged hill and valley, staying the 
 battle and converting the stream into a swollen torrent ; 
 and while the greater part of the French got back in 
 safety, one brigade was caught at the bridge of Vera and 
 lost its general. The stroke was heavy, but it failed to 
 relieve San Sebastian ; the aggregate losses of both sides 
 exceeded five thousand men, so well did each fight ; and 
 in the end Soult felt constrained to stand on the defen- 
 sive for the future, and use the pick and spade to fortify 
 the slopes and summits of the folded hills between the 
 Nivelle and the Bidassoa. 
 
 Hehad more than a monthfor preparation. There were 
 three things which operated to hinder the advance of the 
 Allies — the steadfastness of the Governor of Pampeluna, 
 the state of the war in Germany, and the superiority main- 
 tained by the French on the east coast of Spain, where, 
 although Suchet had retired to Catalonia and blown 
 up the old walls of Tarragona, he still defeated Lord 
 William Bentinck at Ordal, and held on to the province. 
 But when Pampeluna surrendered at the end of October, 
 when the intelligence from Saxony showed that Napoleon 
 was worsted by the Allied armies, when it seemed almost 
 
VIII PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA 189 
 
 certain that Suchet would not act with Soult, the Field- 
 Marshal finished the plans for the invasion of France 
 which he had resolved to undertake as soon as San 
 Sebastian fell. " I am waiting here [Lesaca]," he wrote to 
 his brother on September 12th, "till the animals of the 
 pontoon-train will be relieved from the work consequent 
 on the siege, when I shall cross the Bidassoa," showing 
 that even then his plan of movement was conceived. 
 From Vera, October 31st, he wrote, " It is impossible that 
 Napoleon can stand, and the Confederation of the Ehine 
 is gone." At that time, however, his troops had entered 
 France. The able manoeuvres which carried him over the 
 frontier began on October 7th by the passage of the 
 Bidassoa. Long prepared, and preceded by movements 
 designed to deceive his adversary, when set in operation 
 they took Soult by surprise. For the Allies broke in upon 
 his long line of earthworks, obstructions, and mountain 
 crests, precisely where they were not expected. Calculat- 
 ing the time to a minute, the time being dependent on the 
 tide, Wellington sent a strong column from Fuenterabia 
 and Irun over the river just above its mouth, poured a 
 serried host from the heights of San Marcial and the 
 bridge of Vera upon the centre and left, and fighting all 
 day, not only mastered the low country towards the sea, 
 but drove the French out of their strong works thrown 
 up to defend the rugged hills, and on the 8th captured 
 and occupied the very summit of the Great Ehune, the 
 loftiest hill in those parts. So that the French were 
 forced back into the fortified lines constructed on both 
 banks of the Mvelle, and Wellington again proved to 
 Soult that he could cross a river in the face of a large 
 army. Another month elapsed in relative quiet ; during 
 
I go WELLINGTON 
 
 whicli Wellington tendered his resignation of command 
 over the Spanish army, justly indignant with the Spanish 
 authorities, who shamefully neglected their troops in the 
 field and broke their covenants with the generalissimo. 
 At the same time a very able soldier. Sir John Hope, 
 joined the army, where his presence was most welcome, 
 the Field-Marshal's three lieutenants being now Hope, 
 Beresf ord, and Hill. Early in November another forward 
 move was made, and on the 10th and 11th the Allies, 
 skilfully directed, tumbled the French out of all their 
 fortifications, drove and followed them over the Nivelle, 
 taking fifty-one guns, all the field- magazines, and many 
 hundreds of prisoners. By the 12th Soult was 
 established in and about the entrenched camp at 
 Bayonne, a series of formidable works on both banks of 
 the Adour. Though he required every available sabre 
 and bayonet for offensive operations, Wellington at this 
 time ordered all his Spanish troops, except Morillo's 
 division, into Spain, as a punishment for their deeds of 
 plunder and outrage in contravention of his proclamation, 
 which he intended should be obeyed, promising protection 
 to the persons and property of the French people. This 
 evident proof of his good faith brought provisions to his 
 camps, but the violence of the Spaniards and the want 
 of money, always very pressing, prevented him from 
 carrying out his great plans. Early in December, 
 despite difficulties of all kinds, he once more assumed the 
 offensive and effected the passage of the Nive above its 
 confluence with the Adour. The work was finely done on 
 December 9th, but as the Allied army was separated 
 by the Nive, Soult thought he had a good chance of 
 winning a victory by falling on the left under Hope, 
 
vni PASSES THE NIVE AND NIVELLE 191 
 
 thus taking advantage of -what is called Wellington's 
 over-confidence. He therefore started forth, and during 
 three days strove ineffectually to profit by the oppor- 
 tunity thus offered. Failing to defeat Hope he turned 
 upon Hill, and on this occasion had his best chance ; but 
 Hill was equal to the stress put on him, and 
 "Wellington, who had watched and sustained the battle 
 with fresh troops, taking the offensive, Soult again 
 thwarted drew his main body over the Adour. The 
 Allies lost many hundreds and had five generals 
 wounded. The French loss was more severe, and at the 
 end of the last day's fighting three German regiments 
 passed into the camp of the Allies. 
 
 Another period of comparative inactivity followed — ■ 
 comparative, for although the troops were quiet, their 
 captain was incessantly occupied, devising modes of 
 feeding them, wrestling with the foolishness of the 
 Spanish, Portuguese, and British Governments, even with 
 the gold he received coining Napoleons, because that 
 money could be the more easily exchanged by his 
 soldiers. His repeated and plain-spoken remonstrances 
 had produced some change for the better in the 
 Admiralty, and consequently in the co-operation of the 
 Navy ; still he had to resist plans suggested from home, 
 and he always suffered from want of funds. But when 
 the Allies had crossed the Ehine, and Napoleon had 
 begun his inimitable though fruitless campaign of 1814, 
 Wellington also pressed upon his able adversary, whose 
 forces had been diminished to reinforce the Emperor, 
 and yet remained within a few hundreds equal to those 
 of the British Field-Marshal. In February he was once 
 more in motion, executing a plan which was not his least 
 
192 WELLINGTON 
 
 masterly conception. Intending to invest Bayonne, he 
 boldly resolved to throw a great bridge over the Adour 
 below the town, and to facilitate the project assailed the 
 French left, thus drawing Soult away from the fortified 
 camp, while Sir John Hope and Admiral Penrose worked 
 together to bridge the broad tidal stream. Eepeated 
 and successful manoeuvres and attacks between the upper 
 course of the Nive and the Adour deceived and be- 
 wildered Soult, who receded farther and farther from 
 the decisive point. Then Hope accomplished his daring 
 enterprise with greater daring, and between the 24:th 
 and 25th of February, after severe labours, he mastered 
 the river and invested Bayonne. By the time this great 
 exploit was finished, Wellington had compelled Soult to 
 retreat over the Gave d'Oleron and even the Gave de 
 Pau, on the right bank of which he halted to fight at 
 Orthez. Beresford passed the stream some miles below, 
 and moving up the right bank to Baights, covered the 
 passage of all the army at Berenx, except Hill's two 
 divisions, which were opposite the bridge of Orthez and 
 threatened the French left. Soult, uncertain of the 
 strength before him, formed a fresh line of battle, and 
 on February 27th, instead of being as he had de- 
 signed the assailant, found himself the defender. For 
 some time he kept Beresford at bay on his right, repelled 
 an attack on his left, and thought he was about to defeat 
 his old opponent. If so, he was over sanguine. 
 Wellington, who had been watching the conflict from 
 an elevated central position on the site of a Eoman camp, 
 finding he could not break in on the French right wing, 
 developed a powerful attack along the whole front, and 
 sent the Fifty-second regiment across a marsh to smite 
 
VIII BATTLE OF ORTHEZ 193 
 
 the exposed inner flanls: of the right wing. Hill at the 
 same time ascended the river to find a point of passage, 
 and by the time he was crossing at Souars the combined 
 onset organised on the Roman camp, especially the hardy 
 march and fighting of the Fifty-second, had disordered 
 and overthrown the enemy, who, finding himself worsted 
 at all points and Hill menacing his rear, yielded the field, 
 and only essayed a formation to cover the retreat. As 
 Hill was now oyer on the Pan road, that line was gone, 
 and Soult was obliged to flit away towards St. Sever on 
 the Adour, in order to preserve his communication with 
 Toulouse. He succeeded by dint of rapid marching, 
 breaking down as he moved the bridges on the many 
 streams. In this battle the French lost six guns, and 
 Wellington was wounded, being struck from his horse ; 
 yet he speedily rose to his feet, and, it is said, laughed at 
 Alava, who was hit in a soft part, always a source of 
 mirth. The contusion, or the deep bridgeless rivers, 
 perhaps both, stayed the rapidity of pursuit, and the next 
 day all the French on the St. Sever road were over the 
 Adour. Hill, moving on the right, had a smart skirmish 
 with Clausel at Aire, defeated him and seized his 
 magazines. Those at Dax and Mont San Marsan also 
 were captured. 
 
 The French Marshal, now cut off from Bordeaux, 
 fearful of being driven into the Landes, and still hoping 
 that Suchet might come to his aid, clung to the spurs 
 of the Pyrenees, and covered the roads to Toulouse. 
 Wellington followed as far as the country about Aire, 
 but there he halted for some days, having detached 
 Beresf ord and two divisions to Bordeaux. The Bourbons 
 were already in the field, but the General did not 
 
 
 
194 WELLINGTON 
 
 directly help them, being restrained from that course by 
 his o-ivn Government, and honestly stating the truth to 
 the Bourbon partisans, who incurred his wrath when 
 they endeavoured to force his hand. Finding Wellington 
 inactive, Soult actually resumed the offensive on March 
 13th, pushing his divisions close up to Aire. That 
 bold movement, however, did not succeed; for Wellington, 
 who had got back Beresford and one of his divisions 
 from Bourdeaux, retorted on his adversary with such 
 vigour that he was forced to fall back rapidly through 
 Tarbes and St. Gaudens to his entrenched position at 
 Toulouse. At this time the population of the districts 
 through which poured the stream of warfare, far from 
 rising in arms, did nothing to aid Soult, and brought 
 provisions readily into the British camps, and they did 
 this because they were scrupulously well treated and paid 
 for all they supplied. "The English General's policy,'' 
 a French official wrote, "and the good discipline he 
 maintains does us more harm than ten battles ; every 
 peasant wishes to be under his protection." That is 
 decisive testimony, if any were needed ; but it must be 
 admitted that the Spanish divisions, sent back because 
 they were guilty of outrage, yet some of which he was 
 obliged to call up afresh, nearly effaced by their crimes 
 the good feeling won by the General's noble conduct. 
 The French peasants were tired of the long and exacting 
 wars of Napoleon, and, if they were not eager for the 
 Bourbons, they were athirst for peace. 
 
 Soult believed he could make good his strong post in 
 front of Toulouse; for he had fortified the Mont Rave, 
 a high ridge rising between the stream of the Ers and 
 the canal on the eastern face of the town, while the 
 
VIII BATTLE OF TOULOUSE 195 
 
 entrenched suburb of St. Cyprian in a loop on the left 
 bank defended tbe bridge over the Garonne. The 
 Allies came up on that side, but in order to master the 
 defences of Toulouse, after several tentative measures 
 above, Wellington, keeping Hill before St. Cyprien, threw 
 his bridges below, sent over all the other divisions, and 
 cutting off Soult from Montauban, moved up the Ers 
 into the narrow space between it and the French lines. 
 That involved a flank march by two divisions under 
 fire, in order to reach and storm a height on the south. 
 The troops endured the loss and carried the height, and 
 although the Spaniards suffered reverses from assaulting 
 the northern redoubts too soon, and Picton was repelled 
 when he changed a false into a real attack, yet Beres- 
 f ord's divisions, the Fourth and Sixth, overpowered their 
 foes, and charging along and through the works on the 
 Mont Eave, obliged Soult to withdraw behind the canal \ 
 yet he stiU held fast to the redoubts and bridges which 
 defended and gave access to the Carcassonne road, his 
 only available line of retreat. This was not done without 
 much persevering fighting, and always at great risk ; but 
 it was done. The French lost five, and the Allies four 
 generals, and several thousand men killed and wounded. 
 Soult, fearing that he might be cut off altpgether, with- 
 drew from Toulouse on the night of the 11th, leaving 
 eight guns and his wounded to the conqueror, who the 
 next day entered Toulouse. 
 
 Here terminated the last act of Wellington's cam- 
 paigns, begun in Portugal and finished in France. The 
 sanguinary fight on the Garonne, and the still later sortie 
 from Bayonne, were both subsequent to the abdication of 
 Napoleon. That great event was virtually completed on 
 
196 WELLINGTON 
 
 April 7th, but not officially communicated to the Allied 
 Powers until the 11th, and, of course, could not be and 
 was not known to Soult before the battle of Toulouse. 
 Nor would he recognise the fall of his Emperor until an 
 aide-de-camp brought the authentic papers from Napoleon 
 himself. Then the British army which had done so much 
 was dispersed, and its General travelled to Paris, where he 
 arrived early in May to find himself Duke of Wellington. 
 He was not allowed to stay long in the French capital, as 
 his presence was requested in Madrid, where Ferdinand 
 the Seventh of evil memory had at length ascended 
 the throne. To that monarch he gave honest advice, 
 but it availed nothing. As a grandee of Spain the Duke 
 was entitled to keep his hat on in the royal presence, but 
 he did not know it. During his stay in Madrid, the 
 King showed himself to the people from a balcony of the 
 palace, while his suite stood in a room behind. " The 
 people, I believe," said Wellington to Croker, "and the 
 King desired me to come forward, which I did bare- 
 headed ; of course I should have done so anywhere else. 
 The King immediately said to me ' be covered ' ; in the 
 face of the people I could not at once bring myself to do 
 it, but the people about us hastened to remind me that I 
 was a grandee of the first class, and that I ought to have 
 been covered." Fortunately he had been engaged in 
 more serious labours than a study of the privileges be- 
 longing to a Spanish grandee. Quitting Spain, he 
 returned in June through Paris to England, having 
 been abroad, steadfast in his country's service, without a 
 break for five years ! 
 
 What he did in that period we have seen. How 
 crowded, how splendid the vista which runs back from 
 
VIII NAPOLEON ABDICATES 197 
 
 the triumph of 1814 to the passage of the Douro in 1809 ! 
 He had freed Lisbon the year before, now he was to set 
 forth upon an enterprise in the success of which few 
 believed — the liberation of Portugal, as a step to the 
 liberation of Spain. But, although Napoleon was the 
 master of the continent. Sir Arthur Wellesley, when 
 he began his stupendous task, saw the weak plates in the 
 giant's armour, and believed firmly that he could pierce 
 his vitals. Napoleon also detected at once the new 
 power which had struck into the strife on the Peninsula, 
 and, after Oporto, he never ceased to tell his brother 
 and his Marshals that there was nothing in Portugal or 
 Spain "except the English." That was why his great 
 lieutenant, perhaps his greatest, Mass6na, was sent to 
 overwhelm the dreaded adversary. In the Prince's path 
 arose not only the soldiers of Busaco, but the Lines of 
 Torres Vedras, which revealed the most profound, as 
 well as the grandest conception of the time. The defence 
 of those Lines was the turning-point in the war, and if 
 the large consequences did not make the British Ministers 
 see that every man, gun, and guinea they could spare 
 should be given to Wellington it was because the 
 Ministers were not, nor could they be expected to be, the 
 equals of the General who alone at that time, scanning 
 the future, foresaw what could be done. It was his 
 patience, not less than his vast business knowledge and 
 inventiveness, which helped him to win. He could wait 
 as well as strike. His enemies called him cautious and 
 timid, just as after Talavera they called him rash and 
 adventurous ; yet in one winter he wrested from them 
 two great fortresses, and made them the warders of the 
 little realm he guarded ; and when he had fixed himself 
 
igS WELLINGTON 
 
 firmly on his frontier, he marched into Spain, beating 
 Marmont at Salamanca, as he had beaten Mass6na at 
 Fuentes d'Onoro. Frustrated at Burgos, and followed 
 in retreat by a great host, he showed Soult on the 
 Tormes that he could manoeuvre as well as fight ; and, 
 when once more in Portugal, he had the satisfaction of 
 knowing that his marches and battles had raised the 
 siege of Cadiz and liberated the whole of Andalusia. 
 Napoleon went to Eussia and furnished the opportunity 
 for which Wellington had fought and waited and 
 watched. The next campaign carried his country's flag 
 through the field of Vittoria to the crests of the Pyrenees, 
 expelling from Spain all French armies save one on the 
 east coast, and bringing the invasion of France within 
 the reach of his arm. Nothing stopped him when he 
 sprang forward, neither the fortified mountains, nor the 
 deep and abounding rivers, nor the gallant soldiers of 
 France, nor, at the end, the mighty entrenchments of 
 Toulouse. We can see the shining results of five years' 
 unremitting endeavour, and track the passage of the 
 great captain from the Rock of Lisbon to the shores of the 
 Garonne ; but what none can now fully realise are the 
 vast and varied obstacles which beset his career and that 
 of his matchless soldiers, and the ingenious devices which 
 he contrived to lessen or overcome them. That which 
 carried him through was not only his quality as a great 
 and daring commander, but his honesty and uprightness 
 as a man. His single aim was the service of his country, 
 and he never swerved from that high standard through- 
 out his long ordeal. He defined himself, in regard to 
 Spain, as a conquirant sans ambition, adding, " all the 
 world knew that I desired nothing but to beat the 
 
vni FIVE YEARS TOILS AND TRIUMPHS 199 
 
 French out of Spain, and then go home to my own 
 country, leaving the Spaniards to manage theirs as they 
 pleased." And we have seen that his endurance, mod- 
 eration, and genius enabled him to achieve his desire. 
 All through his life it will be found that Duty and 
 Service were his guiding stars. He went home from 
 the field of his infinite labours. Peace seemed to have 
 closed a horrid era of bloodshed ; yet only seemed, for 
 the great conqueror, who was not without ambition, was 
 brooding in his Island of Elba how he might retrieve 
 the throne he had solemnly renounced, if not the pre- 
 datory Empire which he had staked and lost. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 WATERLOO 
 
 Weaky of war, yet proud of her own unyielding 
 obstinacy in the prolonged contest, England heartily 
 welcomed back a General who, like John Churchill a 
 hundred years before, brought home her colours, rent 
 indeed in the tempest of battle, yet untarnished by 
 defeat. If his strong character was not spoiled by 
 popular applause, it was not the fault of his admirers. 
 When he reached Westminster Bridge on June 23rd, 
 1814, the multitude dragged his carriage to the house of 
 the Duchess in Hamilton Place. The next day Lord 
 Bathurst hurried him to Portsmoirth, where the Regent 
 and his guests, the Empierors and Kings, were to witness a 
 naval review. Returning, he took his seat as a Peer — 
 all his titles having been conferred since he sailed for 
 Lisbon in 1809. He was thanked and congratulated on 
 the part of the House of Commons by a committee of 
 fifteen, as was the Duke of Marlborough ; and on July 
 1st, clad in Field -Marshal's uniform and wearing the 
 Garter and the Golden Fleece, he thanked the House in 
 person from a place within the bar on the left of the 
 entrance, expressing his gratitude for "the noblest gift 
 that any subject had ever received" — the grant of 
 £400,000 voted on May 12th. A week later he carried 
 
AMBASSADOR AT PARIS 
 
 the Sword of State -when the solemn Thanksgiving for 
 peace was rendered in St. Paul's ; and in July the city 
 gave him a banquet in the Guildhall. It was the high, 
 yet not the highest tide of his popularity— that was to 
 come ; and we may infer from his letters that without 
 being unduly elated, he received plaudits and honours 
 alike as marks of the confidence felt in him by the 
 princes and the people. But his judgment was not 
 misled, nor was his manly simplicity of character im- 
 paired by this outburst of enthusiasm in all ranks. 
 
 The Duke did not long enjoy a well-won period of 
 rest at home. Always ready, as he told the House of 
 Commons, to serve his Majesty in any capacitj', the 
 Ministers speedily sent him as ambassador to the capital 
 of France, precisely where his presence, one might have 
 imagined, would be unwelcome to so many. On his road 
 he took a military survey of Belgium, when his eye was 
 attracted by the position at Waterloo in relation to the 
 great lines of operation from the side of France, and he 
 reported on the fortresses which were the wrecks of the 
 old Barrier. The embassy to Paris was not productive 
 of much advantage. Before the winter came, hostility 
 was shown by the courtiers in the palace, as well as the 
 Bonapartists in the streets, and the Ministers, fearing 
 that some mischance might occur, were anxious to bring 
 him home. They invented the pretext of sending him 
 to command in America, but he steadfastly refused to 
 be frightened away, and so far prevailed that Lord 
 Liverpool at length gave him permission to select his 
 own time of departure from a post he should not have 
 been selected to fill. He said that, as matters stood, 
 the Ministers could not allow him to quit Europe ; for, 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 should anything occur, and he repeatedly pointed to its 
 probability, "there' is nobody but myself," he wrote, 
 "in whom either yourselves or the country, or your 
 allies, would feel any confidence." So he stayed on 
 until the spring was near, and then quitted Paris, to 
 replace Lord Castlereagh at the congress of quarrelsome 
 sovereigns held in Vienna. 
 
 Peace had come, but it rested on no solid basis, 
 hardly on any basis at all. The conquerors all the winter 
 were on the point of fighting for the spoil, and it wa's 
 evident at an early hour that a new war could only 
 be avoided by a series of compromises in the redistribu- 
 tion of territory. The measure of the peril is the secret 
 treaty of alliance between Austria, France, and England, 
 to resist the Northern Powers who had extensive views 
 on Saxony and Poland. When the Treaty of Vienna is 
 criticised, it should never be forgotten that it was the 
 jDrioe of peace in Europe, and that the ends sought by 
 those who most fiercely denounced it could only have 
 been attained if at all, which is doubtful, by another 
 twenty or thirty years of internecine war. The English 
 Government consented to, rather than concurred in, the 
 arrangements ; they were obliged to take part, because 
 without them there could have been no general settle- 
 ment ; and the penalty of refusal would have been battle 
 and confusion. 
 
 The issue out of the chaos was one not foreseen. 
 Napoleon in Elba, affecting to be an homnie morf, 
 absorbed in the management of his household, his 
 cows, and his poultry, closely watched the course of 
 events, and gradually prepared to make his spring. He 
 was in communication, direct or indirect, with the dis- 
 
IX NAPOLEON REAPPEARS 203 
 
 contented fragments of his old armies, the temper of 
 which Wellington detected soon after he set foot in 
 Paris. Dumouriez, as early as December, saw clearly 
 into the facts, when he said that Napoleon was not an 
 homme mart, that he had been imprudently placed 
 too near France and Italy, and that his spirit, reigning 
 through and through the French army, still fed him 
 with hope. Murat, in Naples, was also and always a 
 more or less faithful ally of the deposed Emperor, sure 
 to stir if the latter showed signs of vitality. The move- 
 ments of Murat, indeed, correspond with the ceaseless 
 but careful preparations of his brother-in-law, and the 
 King of Naples would not have been condemned for 
 selfish haste had the Emperor Napoleon finally been 
 victorious. The peace with the United States, terminat- 
 ing a war mainly begun and waged to serve Napoleon 
 and the Slave Power, though based on a good pretext, 
 was an event adverse to the plans meditated in the 
 island of Elba ; but it may have helped to precipitate 
 their execution before the flower of the British army 
 could be brought over the Atlantic. In other respects 
 the Emperor, who had good grounds to work on, judged 
 that the conditions were favourable, and early in March 
 the startled Congress learned first, that he was in 
 France striding triumphantly towards the capital, and 
 next, that he was once more master of the resources of 
 France. It was the military spirit, detected by Dumou- 
 riez and noticed by Wellington, which enabled Napoleon 
 to march unopposed from the Gulf of Juan to the Tuileries. 
 The miracle was wrought in his name, but it was the 
 work of the army. " The Marshals have recalled Bona- 
 parte," said Ney to the Prefect of St. Ain, because they 
 
204 WELLINGTON 
 
 were insulted by the men about the King. "I know 
 all that we have to fear," he added, "but I would rather 
 be brayed in a mortar by Bonaparte than humiliated by 
 fellows who never fought. Le& imicjris ont encore perdu 
 le Roi." The statement was not true of all the Marshals, 
 but the words of Ney fairly paint the time. The Bona- 
 partists may have conspired sur la place piiUique, but 
 Napoleon knew well what armed support he would get 
 when he embarked at Porto Ferrajo, whence three 
 thousand years ago Etruscan Populonia drew its stores 
 of iron. 
 
 The sovereigns and plenipotentiaries at Vienna acted 
 with promptitude and unanimity. On March 7th, when 
 the courier brought Wellington the news from Florence 
 that Napoleon had quitted Elba, they set their armies in 
 motion towards France, and Metternich records that at 
 Presburg a few days later a regiment of cuirassiers 
 defiled before Wellington on its way to the Ehine, which 
 a short time before he had seen in Vienna on its road 
 to quarters in Hungary. Wellington himself, as usual, 
 looked to business and was at ease. " You will have 
 seen what a breeze Bonaparte has stirred up in France," 
 he wrote to his brother Henry on March 24th. " We 
 are all unanimous here, and in the course of about 
 six weeks [rather a sanguine estimate] there will not be 
 fewer than seven hundred thousand men on the French 
 frontier. I am going to take the command of the army 
 in the Netherlands,'' where, we may note, the Prince of 
 Orange, if not General Kleist, was in great alarm. "Hurry 
 out everything : no time must be lost,'' the Prince wrote 
 to Lord Bathurst on the same day, when Napoleon, re- 
 ported to be at Lille, was actually in the Tuileries, where 
 
IX WELLINGTON ARRIVES IN BELGIUM 205 
 
 he had been installed three days. In Paris shrewd ob- 
 servers at that moment, looking realities in the face, saw- 
 in the return from Elba "war — implacable, immediate, 
 universal," not only because Napoleon was a menace to 
 "the Engs," but still more a menace to liberty. Na- 
 poleon, said M. de Fontanes to Villemain, "Napoleon 
 cannot endure this time, because he no longer enjoys 
 the natural conditions of life.'' His quarrel is now, 
 said another, " more with the peoples than their rulers '' ; 
 he might conquer at first, but he must fall in the end. 
 One pulse throbbed throughout Europe, and in France 
 there was neither hope nor enthusiasm outside the pale 
 of the army. Napoleon, who had renounced his solemn 
 renunciation of the French throne, was placed by the 
 Congress liars la loi in the declaration adopted on 
 March 13th, and the treaty of the 25th provided the 
 means of enforcing the judgment of the public tribunal. 
 It was after this instrument had been signed that 
 Wellington started for Brussels, where he arrived on 
 April 4th. 
 
 There he began the hard task of forming an army, 
 managing the King of the Netherlands — "the most 
 difficult person to get on with I ever met" — and knitting 
 closely his relations with that portion of the Prussian 
 army which had been brought on the ground. The English 
 Ministry found it impossible to furnish the promised 
 quota of troops from any source, nor could they supply 
 Wellington with the forty thousand British infantry and 
 fifteen thousand British cavalry with which he would 
 have been satisfied. Yet by degrees the trusty little 
 host grew stronger as the transports poured into Ostend 
 and the continental troops assigned to him reached 
 
2o6 WELLINGTON 
 
 Belgium ; but at the end of May he could only muster one 
 hundred and five thousand men of varied nationalities for 
 all purposes, while the British and Germans, upon whom 
 he could thoroughly rely, formed little more than a third 
 of the force available for service in the field. At the same 
 period the Prussians had become a considerable mass, 
 and both armies were in close communication. Napoleon, 
 on regaining power, at once set about organising an 
 army on the basis of the troops he found afoot, but a 
 large nominal force of all kinds only gave him some 
 hundred and thirty thousand men for the invasion of 
 Belgium. He tried hard, but failed, to gain time; and then 
 instead of waiting until the Allies were ready to attack, he 
 quitted Paris on June 12th and fell upon his foremost 
 foes. The quality of these three armies varied greatly. 
 Napoleon's array was one of the best he ever led, being 
 composed in the main of veterans. The Prussians were 
 all of one nation ; they also had fought in the War of 
 Independence, and were animated by the fierce and 
 lofty spirit which years of subjection had aroused. The 
 Duke's army was composite — ^ Britons, Hanoverians, 
 Dutch, Belgians, Brunswickers, Nassauers, — in no way 
 equal to the hardy soldiers who stormed through the 
 Pyrenees. " I command a very small British army with 
 a very large British staffi to which my superiors are 
 adding every day," he wrote three weeks before the 
 campaign opened. At an earlier period he begged the 
 Horse Guards to refrain from forwarding more generals 
 until they sent him troops. He thought the British 
 Government were afraid " to touch the question of war," 
 they had so " unaccountably delayed their preparations." 
 In the end, he had to do his best with an army which 
 
IX napoleon's bold stroke 207 
 
 contained only thirty thousand British troops of all 
 arms, including the German Legion which was second 
 to none. 
 
 When Napoleon drove out of Paris on June 12th 
 the Allied forces in Belgium, the only part of the 
 Great Alliance ready for battle, were posted at different 
 points between Oudenarde on the Scheldt and Liege 
 on the Meuse. The British, on the right, drew their 
 supplies from Ostend and Antwerp, the Prussians from 
 Cologne. Blucher had his head- quarters at Namur, 
 "Wellington at Brussels ; and each was prepared to assist 
 the other by marching to the right or left, or concen- 
 trating on the centre, should that be assailed. Now 
 through that centre ran the high road to Brussels, cut 
 almost at right angles at Quatre Bras by the transverse 
 line of communication between Nivelles and Namur 
 which secured the connection between the two armies. 
 Wellington's troops, except the reserve in and near the 
 Belgian capital, were all to his right, or west of the 
 central highway, and Blucher's on the left, except that 
 Ziethen's corps was in Charleroi and extended beyond it 
 up the Sambre towards Maubeuge, and therefore in 
 front of the British troops near Mons. Napoleon, 
 noting this distribution, resolved to strike at the line of 
 junctiori, hoping that by long swift marches he might 
 interpose a mass between the two, defeat each in 
 succession, or drive them to unite if they could beyond 
 Brussels. It was a bold project, but one which imposed 
 on his troops labours greater than they could perform, 
 and in addition allowed nothing for accident or fortune, 
 requiring, for success, the exact and punctual fulfilment 
 of its exorbitant demands. Wellington did not divine, 
 
208 WELLINGTON 
 
 as it is called, the plan of this master in the practice of 
 war, and thought to the end of his days that Napoleon 
 might have done better; and this "mis-judgment," 
 though it did not prevent his success, is paraded as a 
 proof of his inferiority as a general. 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, started with a great advantage — 
 he was going to strike where he was least expected ; and 
 by skilful management he was able to concentrate his 
 army, almost though not quite unobserved, just within 
 the French frontier, opposite the supposed gap or weak 
 place through which he intended to break. His depar- 
 ture from Paris was known at Namur and Brussels. 
 Ziethen's troopers, who kept a vigilant watch, saw the 
 red flush of the French bivouac-fires above the forest ; 
 and the Allies were alert and ready to move. Wellington 
 did not issue any order or change the distribution of his 
 divisions when he knew only that Napoleon was on the 
 frontier, but he was prepared to march to his left just 
 as Blucher was ready to close to his own right. The 
 difference was that Wellington desired some definite 
 indication that the Emperor was not about to strike at 
 his communications with England, whereas Blucher, who 
 had no need to fear for his line of supply, was eager at 
 the first warning to take up a position for battle. So it 
 fell out that on the night of the 14th, when Napoleon's 
 orders were actually issued, Blucher directed Ziethen, if 
 attacked, to retire fighting on Fleurus, and his three 
 other corps to concentrate behind it at Sombreffe. But 
 on the 14th no information whatever reached Brussels 
 which went farther than the fact that Napoleon was on 
 the frontier. The reason for the difference is that the 
 Prussian outposts touched the French army, and there- 
 
IX THE FRENCH OVER THE SAMBRE 209 
 
 fore the intelligence from the front went swiftly to 
 Namur and slowly to Brussels. The situation strongly 
 illustrates the grave danger attending the operations 
 of allied armies acting in concert from divergent bases 
 under independent commanders. One Commander- 
 in-Chief would have known all that was to be known, 
 and have guided himself accordingly. 
 
 While the Prussian corps were moving on the 15 th 
 from Lifege, Namur, and Ciney, towards the chosen field 
 of Ligny, not a man stirred from the British cantonments. 
 The French at dawn sprang forward in three columns — 
 Eeille and d'Erlon down the Sambre; Vandamme, 
 Lobau, and Napoleon direct from Beaumont upon 
 Charleroi ; and Gerard from Phillippeville upon Chatelet. 
 Though Ziethen forgot to break down the bridges, 
 still he ably handled his retreating troops, delayed 
 the enemy, kept up a bold front, and at eventide 
 remained in possession of Fleurus. Accidents and mis- 
 understandings for which Napoleon did not allow 
 actually occurred, and at night the farthest points 
 attained by his leading troops were Frasne, Wagn^e, and 
 Lambusart. The rear extended to the right bank of 
 the Sambre near Charleroi and to the left bank of that 
 river opposite Chsitelet. The Emperor was satisfied with 
 the day's work, and, if we may judge from his language, 
 retired to Charleroi in the confident belief that the next 
 day his troops would be in Brussels. 
 
 Not the faintest intimation that anything unusual had 
 occurred in the valley of the Sambre reached the British 
 head-quarters until three in the afternoon. For eleven 
 hours there had been steady marching and fighting, 
 within forty miles of Brussels and ten miles of the 
 
 P 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 British outjtosts at Frasne, yet not a whisper of conflict 
 was heard by Wellington. The Prince of Orange rode 
 in from NivcUes and brought to the Duke about three 
 o'clock a report that some skirmish or hostile movement 
 had happened at Thuin ; and a very little later General 
 Muffling received a despatch from Namur giving the same 
 or similar intelligence. Upon that Wellington would 
 not act decisively : he awaited a messenger from Mons ; 
 but he issued orders for all the divisions to concentrate 
 at fixed points and stand prepared to march. Sometime 
 before midnight direct information came from the out- 
 posts of Mons, all there being quiet, that the French 
 attack was directed upon Charleroi, where the infantry 
 fire was very hot, and then he sent out orders for the 
 troops to march by Nivelles, Braine le Comte, and 
 Enghien, that is from right to left, towards the scene of 
 conflict. The reserve was to march from Brussels by 
 Waterloo and Genappe. At midnight the Duke called 
 on Muffling to tell him what he had done, so that Blucher 
 might be informed. " The numerous friends of Napoleon 
 here will be on tiptoe," he said to the German General, 
 "the well intentioned must be pacified; let us therefore 
 go to the Duchess of Richmond's ball, and start for 
 Quatre Bras at 5 A.M." The remark and the action are 
 alike characteristic of one whose equanimity rarely broke 
 down, and never in moments of peril. He had done all 
 he could when his orders were issued, and, considering 
 how strong the French, or rather the Bonajiartists, were 
 in Belgium, he was wise when he showed his serene and 
 cheerful countenance at a ball destined to be famous. 
 
 In the morning he set out for the front, and near 
 Waterloo passed the reserve, then halted and eating 
 
LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS 
 
 their breakfast, and riding onward readied Quatre Bras 
 about eleven. Finding that the French were only 
 skirmishing with the outposts towards Frasne, he sent 
 an order for the reserve to march from "Waterloo, and 
 then rode oif by the Namur Eoad to the Prussian 
 position, which he entered by the right rear, and joined 
 Blucher at the windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and 
 Bry. There he undertook to give the Prussians direct 
 aid, providing he was not attacked himself ; but, from 
 his own observation and the reports of Sir Henry 
 Hardinge, he gravely doubted whether the Prussians 
 would be able to escape a defeat, and, when he got back 
 about three o'clock to Quatre Bras, he saw enough to 
 convince himself that he also would have a hard task to 
 maintain his ground. 
 
 At this moment, when the struggle on both fronts had 
 begun, when the sound of Napoleon's battle was audible 
 plainly at Quatre Bras, and Ney's onset had become 
 severe and continuous, we may briefly sketch the general 
 situation. Blucher had concentrated three corps at 
 Ligny, and would have had four but for one of those 
 accidents which are not infrequent in war. The 
 Emperor, in error at first respecting the strength of the 
 Prussians — he called them a body of troops — as soon 
 as he was better informed, brought up two corps and 
 the Guard, keeping Lobau in reserve. On the Brussels 
 road Ney had two corps, but it was not until about 
 three o'clock that the whole of one of them, Eeille's, 
 was up to the front, while the other, d'Erlon's, the victim 
 of error and zeal, wandered between the two armies all 
 day, useless to either. Wellington's divisions, except 
 two Dutch-Belgian brigades present on the field, were all 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 on the march, and on their arrival he depended to 
 frustrate Ney. Muffling, seeing the state of affairs on 
 the spot, had taken care to let Blucher know that no 
 help could come to him from his ally. On his return 
 from Bussy the English General found the Prince of 
 Orange contending with a force superior in all arms yet 
 not strong enough .to seize Quatre Bras. The Duke's 
 presence gave new life to the battle, and when Picton's 
 division, followed by the Brunswickers and van Merle's 
 Belgian horse, arrived, he took the offensive, pushing 
 forward right up to the edge of the farm of Gemion- 
 court. Ney, reinforced by the rest of Eeille's corps and 
 part of Kellerman's cavalry, violently retorted, and in 
 the charge, which partially broke into spray before the 
 squares, Wellington ran the risk of death or capture. 
 But he leaped his horse over the Mnety-second High- 
 landers lining the ditch on the Namur road, while his 
 gallant pursuers, cut up by the infantry fire, were killed 
 or driven off. Ney was further reinforced by more guns 
 and cavalry, and Wellington's brigades continued to 
 arrive in parcels. The Marshal was always superior in 
 horsemen and cannon, but after five o'clock his opponent 
 had larger numbers of foot. Holding firmly to the cross 
 roads and the highway to Namur, Wellington became 
 the stronger as the day waned ; and when the Guards 
 emerged from the Nivelles road and the Allies pressed 
 forward, Ney, who had no fresh troops, was driven 
 back, and his antagonist remained at sundown master 
 of the whole field of battle. The position was main- 
 tained, but the cost was great, for there were no fewer 
 than four thousand six hundred killed and wounded, 
 more than half being British soldiers. The thunder of 
 
IX RETREAT ON WATERLOO 213 
 
 cannon to the eastward had also died away, but none 
 knew as yet at Quatre Bras how Blucher had fared at 
 the hands of his redoubtable foe. 
 
 "Wellington, who slept at his head-quarters in Genappe, 
 was on the field and scrutinising his outposts at day- 
 break on the 17th. Soon after came a report, confirmed 
 a little later, that the Prussians had retreated on 
 Wavre. Their rear-guard had remained all night near 
 the French, and when they retired by Tilly and 
 Gentinnes, their foes missed all trace of them. Napoleon 
 had a belief that Blucher would retreat upon Li6ge, 
 which caused him at a late hour in the day to despatch 
 Grouchy to that side, and thus touch was lost. While 
 the French were cooking and Napoleon was pondering, 
 definite intelligence was brought to Wellington, who, 
 learning for certain that Blucher was at Wavre, 
 promised to stand fast himself at Mont St. Jean and 
 fight, if Blucher would support him with two corps. 
 The intrepid Marshal replied that he would come with 
 his whole army, and Wellington got the famous answer 
 before night. Thus was made, between generals who 
 thoroughly trusted each other, that combination which 
 led to the Battle of Waterloo. It was no chance combat, 
 but the result of a deliberate design, rendered capable of 
 execution, even when Blucher was wounded, by his 
 resolve to retreat upon Wavre, and by Napoleon, who 
 acted on conjecture that the Prussians would hurry 
 towards their base at Liege. The morning at Quatre 
 Bras was peaceful ; the Allies cooked their food before 
 starting rearward. Wellington, it is said, lay down for 
 a moment, and snatched perhaps a little sleep. There 
 was no stir in front or on the exposed left flank ; and, 
 
214 WELLINGTON 
 
 covered by a strong display of horsemen, the Allied 
 divisions tramped steadily towards Mont St. Jean. 
 Napoleon had hesitated long before he took any 
 decision; and when about mid-day Ney's horsemen 
 showed on the highway and Napoleon's leading 
 squadrons were approaching from Ligny, there was 
 no force near Quatre Bras except cavalry. The Duke 
 was still to the fore. As the French came on, the 
 heavy and light brigades retired over the Dyle by fords 
 or through the defile of Genappe. The French horse 
 followed and beyond Genappe essayed a charge, at first 
 with some success, but soon they were overborne by the 
 First Life Guards, and then held aloof. So the retreat 
 continued all day. A thunderstorm, so often a pre- 
 cursor of Wellington's battles, deluged the fields with 
 rain, and pursuer and pursued, struggling through the 
 mire, were drenched to the skin by nightfall. Napoleon 
 was with the light horse in advance when they halted at 
 La Belle Alliance, and fired a fcAV guns which were 
 answered from the opposite ridge. D'Erlon, Lobau, and 
 the Guard had come up, but Eeille was still at Genappe, 
 and did not rejoin until the next morning. 
 
 The results of two days' warfare may be thus summed 
 up. Napoleon had inflicted a defeat, yet not a decisive 
 defeat, upon the Prussians, who escaped from his ken to 
 Wavre. He had then, at a late hour on the ] 7th, de- 
 tached Grouchy with thirty-three thousand men to follow 
 them, and Grouchy at night from Gembloux reported that 
 they had retired in three directions. Moving himself in 
 the afternoon, Napoleon, uniting with Ney, had pursued 
 Wellington to Mont St. Jean, and slept in the comfort- 
 able belief that he had separated the Allies. At that 
 
IX RESULTS OF TWO days' WARFARE 215 
 
 very time Wellington, who had assembled his whole 
 force except seventeen thousand men, including the British 
 brigades who were posted at Hal and Tubize, was in close 
 communication with Blucher, and intended on the 18th 
 to stop Napoleon by delivering battle, and to hold him 
 fast until Blucher could cut in on his right flank and 
 rear. Thus it was the Allies who were united practi- 
 cally, and the French army which was separated into two 
 groups unable to support each other. Considering that 
 in the estimation of a modern school of English military 
 critics Wellington and Blucher were second or third- 
 rate generals, and that the former roughly pitched his 
 estimate of Napoleon's presence at forty thousand men, 
 the facts, on the evening of the 17th, tell rather in 
 favour of second-rate generalship. But the truth i,s 
 that the military critics, after years of investigation 
 and deep study, possess a knowledge not vouchsafed 
 to either Napoleon or "Wellington, and its fruit is the 
 kind of judgment, wprh a/wp, which is supposed to 
 be so instructive and is often so unjust. What would 
 Napoleon or Wellington or both not have given for one 
 tithe of the exact information which enables criticism 
 to make use of the advantage which its enlarged horizon 
 affords — that is, to judge the generals by a series of facts 
 and results which were not, and could not have been, 
 known to them at the time ! 
 
 The tempest which burst over the retreating columns 
 on the 17th followed them to their bivouacs and raged all 
 night, and did not cease until late on the fateful Sunday. 
 Wellington, mounting his faithful Copenhagen at break 
 of day, rode from the village of Waterloo to the field, 
 where the armies on both sides, protected by watchful 
 
2i6 WELLINGTON 
 
 sentries, were still contending with the mischiefs inflicted 
 by the storm. The position was the crest of a gentle 
 slope stretching from Smohain to the Nivelles road, 
 having upon and in advance of its right the chateau, 
 garden, and wood of Hougoumont, and in the centre, 
 where the Charleroi road cut through the little ridge, 
 the farm of La Haye Sainte. Both these posts were 
 occupied, but the latter, unfortunately, not so solidly as 
 Hougoumont. The greater portion of the Allied army, 
 forming the right and centre, was on the west, and the 
 left along the Wavre cross-road on the eastern side of 
 the highway. Behind Hougoumont the ground trended 
 back towards Braine la Leud and Merbe Braine, and 
 here the reserves were posted. It was, indeed, combined 
 with Hougoumont, the store -house and strength of 
 battle. The front, about two miles long, was held by 
 infantry and guns ; the cavalry, except two light brigades 
 on the extreme left, were in rear on the gentle northern 
 slope, and invisible from the French position. Behind 
 all were the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, the Brunswickers, 
 and, after the action had begun, Lambert's British 
 brigade from Ghent. The position was well filled by 
 the sixty-nine thousand men of all arms and one hundred 
 and fifty-six guns which were present that day. 
 
 Napoleon, who slept at the farm of Caillou, and who 
 had been out on foot to the front during the night, was also 
 early in the field, and glad of the gift which he thought 
 fortune had placed in his hands. When Reille had joined 
 him from Genappe, he had seventy -two thousand men, all 
 admirable soldiers, and two hundred and forty guns, with 
 which to engage in combat, and he reckoned that the 
 chances were ninety to ten in his favour. He mounted his 
 
IX BATTLE OF WATERLOO 217 
 
 charger, reconnoitred his opponent's position, and then 
 gave the orders which, promptly and finely obeyed, dis- 
 closed the French array. There were two lines of in- 
 fantry, two of heavy cavalry, backed by a reserve of both 
 arms, and finally the imposing masses of the Imperial 
 Guard. The front stretched from Prischermont, across 
 the Charleroi to the Nivelles road, and one may imagine 
 with what admiration and interest Wellington and his 
 officers watched the formation of that grand example of 
 order and power, and listened to the outcries which 
 greeted the Emperor when he rode along his majestic 
 liues. It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and, although 
 his opponent knew it not, Wellington had got news of 
 the march from Wavre of Bulow, whose leading troops 
 were actually, at that time, close to the wood of St. 
 Lambert on the French right ; while Grouchy was at 
 Sart les Walhain, between Gembloux and Wavre. 
 
 It is not practicable here to give a full account of the 
 battle of Waterloo ; we can only describe its broad out- 
 lines. The first gun was fired about twenty or thirty 
 minutes past eleven, and preluded a dashing and sus- 
 tained attack on Hougoumont, which failed to carry 
 the house, garden, or orchard, but did gain the wood. It 
 was probably intended to divert attention from the attack 
 on the left and centre, which Ney, massing his guns 
 opposite the British left, was preparing to execute. 
 Wellington watched and in some measure controlled the 
 fight for Hougoumont, and then rode off to the centre, 
 taking post at a solitary tree which grew near the 
 Charleroi road above La Haye Sainte. Ney at half-past 
 one sent forward the whole of D'Erlon's corps, and 
 although some of them pushed close up to and over the 
 
2i8 WELLINGTON 
 
 Wavre road, stormed the orchard of La Haye Sainte and 
 took the Pappelotte farm, yet at the critical moment 
 Sir William Ponsonhy's Union Brigade of horse charged 
 into the French infantry, already shattered hy the fire of 
 Picton's troops, and the net result of the combined oper- 
 ation was that two eagles and three thousand prisoners 
 were captured, while nearly that number of killed and 
 wounded remained on the ground. On the other side of 
 La Haye Sainte the Household Brigade, led by Lord 
 Anglesea in person, charged in upon and routed a large 
 body of French cuirassiers. The grand attack thus 
 completely failed, and the centre, like the right, remained 
 intact. It was just before this combat began that 
 Napoleon saw something like troops towards St. Lambert 
 and despatched two brigades of light cavalry to recon- 
 noitre. A Prussian staff officer was caught beyond 
 Planch enoit, and from him came the unexpected and un- 
 welcome information that the whole Prussian army was 
 approaching ; and after the defeat of D'Erlon Napoleon 
 detached Lobau's corps to cover his right, the Imperial 
 G-uard moving up from Eossomme to take his place. So 
 that two heavy blows came almost together, and the 
 force pressing on Wellington was reduced by more than 
 ten thousand men, the first fruit of the steady Prussian 
 advance. 
 
 The signs of danger on his right flank, the punishment 
 of D'Erlon's corps, the ineffectual attempt upon the 
 British Guards in and about Hougoumont, were followed 
 by a kind of pause, and the combat reverted to cannon- 
 ading and skirmishing. But towards four o'clock 
 Napoleon, increasing the fire of his artillery, threw 
 forward a mass of cavalry, forty squadrons, and then 
 
IX THE FRENCH CAVALRY CHARGES 219 
 
 began that series of reiterated onsets of horse which 
 lasted for two hours. Their advent was foreseen, and 
 the infantry west of the Charleroi road went at once 
 into squares and oblongs, a form devised by Major, 
 afterwards Sir James Shaw Kennedy, so that the horse, 
 which rode through the batteries in the crest, wasted 
 themselves in vain against the intrepid infantry. Twice 
 they were driven down the slope, and the third time, 
 when they came on, they were strengthened by Keller- 
 man and Guyot until they reached a force of seventy- 
 seven squadrons, or twelve thousand men; but these also 
 were repulsed, the British horse, what remained of them, 
 charging when the French were entangled among the 
 squares and disordered by the musketry and guns. 
 Four times these fine troopers charged, yet utterly failed 
 to penetrate or move a single foot battalion. But some 
 time before the final efifort, Ney by a fierce attack got 
 possession of La Haye Sainte, and thus, just as the cavalry 
 were exhausted, the French infantry were established 
 within sixty yards of the Allied centre. And although 
 the Emperor was obliged to detach one-half of his Guard 
 to the right, because Blucher had brought into play 
 beyond Planchenoit against Lobau nearly thirty thou- 
 sand men, still the capture of La Haye Sainte was justly 
 regarded as a grave event. Wellington during the 
 cavalry fight had moved three brigades on his right 
 nearer to Hougoumont, and had called up Ohass6 and 
 his Belgians to support them ; and it was a little before 
 this time that he cried out to Brigadier-General Adam, 
 
 "By Q. J Adam, I think we shall beat them yet!" 
 
 A little later Shaw Kennedy, in some trepidation, rode 
 up to the Duke to report that the centre of the line was 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 open, for the Hanoverians had been wasted away by the 
 ceaseless fire. " This very startling information he re- 
 ceived with a degree of coolness, and replied to with such 
 precision and energy, as to prove the most complete self- 
 possession." He said to Kennedy, "I shall order the 
 Brunswick troops to the spot, and other troops besides ; 
 go you and get all the German troops of the division to 
 the spot that you can, and all the guns that you can find." 
 The Duke himself led forward the Brunswickers ; the 
 Hanoverians and Nassauers rallied ; Vivian's cavalry 
 rode up from the left, where Ziethen's advance was in 
 sight ; the danger passed away, and Wellington rode back 
 to the rear of the Foot Guards. 
 
 The crisis of the battle had come for Napoleon. Un- 
 able after eight hours' conflict to do more than capture La 
 Haye Sainte ; hardly pressed by the Prussians, now strong 
 and aggressive ; owing such success as he had obtained 
 to the valour and discipline of his soldiers — the Emperor 
 delivered his last stroke, not for victory — he could no 
 longer hope to win — but for safety. He sent forward the 
 last ten battalions of his Guard to assail the British right, 
 and directed the whole remaining infantry force available 
 to attack all along the line. The Guard marched onward 
 in two columns, which came successively in contact with 
 their opponents. Napier's guns and the British Guards, 
 who rising from the ground showed across the head of 
 the first column, fired heavily and charging drove them 
 in confusion back towards La Belle Alliance ; and the 
 second column, struck in flank by the musketry of the 
 Fifty- second and Ninety-fifth, was next broken by a 
 bayonet charge and pursued by Colonel Colborne to and 
 beyond the Charleroi road. As Ziethen's Prussians were 
 
THE FINAL MOMENTS 
 
 falling upon the French near Pappelotte, and Pirch and 
 Bulow wrestling with the Imperial Guard in Planchenoit, 
 "Wellington ordered thewholeof the Britishlineto advance. 
 The cheers arising on the right where he was, extended 
 along the front and gave new strength to the wearied 
 soldiers. He led the way. As he neared the Charleroi 
 road, the riflemen, full of Peninsular memories, began to 
 cheer him as he galloped up, but he called out, " No cheer- 
 ing, my lads ; forward and complete your victory." He 
 found that good soldier, Colborne, halted for a moment 
 before three squares of the rallied Imperial Guard. "Go 
 on, Colborne," he said ; " better attack them, they won't 
 stand." Nor did they. Wellington then turned to the 
 right, where Vivian's Light Cavalry were active in the 
 gloom, and we next find him once more with the Fifty- 
 second near Eossomme, the farthest point of the advance, 
 where that regiment halted after its grand march over the 
 battlefield. Somewhere on the highway he met Blucher, 
 who had so nobly kept his word, and it was then that 
 Gneisenau undertook to chase the fugitives over the 
 frontier. The French, or perhaps we should say the 
 Napoleonic army was destroyed, and the power which 
 its mighty leader had built up on the basis of its aston- 
 ishing successes was gone for ever. 
 
 Wellington returned to the vUlage of Waterloo that 
 night, and as he dismounted, after having been so many 
 hours in the saddle, his trusty Copenhagen, still fresh, 
 gave a playful kick, remembered by his master in after 
 years. How he felt after his well-won triumph has been 
 often recorded. The man who has been lightly accused 
 of having a cold heart wept bitterly when the strain 
 of duty was relaxed, and he saw the list of killed and 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 wounded. What can better illustrate the iciness of his 
 nature than the expressive saying, drawn from him by 
 Waterloo, that " nothing is worse than a victory except 
 a defeat," or the manly pathos of his letters to the 
 relatives of his dead friends. But there was nothing of 
 the actor about him, and that defect, if it be one, is mis- 
 taken for cold insensibility by the lovers of the theatri- 
 cal element in daily life as well as in war. Dr. Hume 
 found him in bed early on the morning of the 19th. 
 " He had as usual taken off his clothes but had not 
 washed himself. As I entered he sat up in bed, his face 
 covered with the dust and sweat of the previous day, and 
 extended his hand to me, which I took and held in mine, 
 whilst I told him of Gordon's death, and of such of the 
 casualties as had come to my knowledge. He was 
 much affected. I felt the tears dropping fast upon my 
 hand, and, looking towards him, saw them chasing one 
 another in furrows over his dusty cheeks.'' That is a pic- 
 ture of private life, and it is not the only example of Wel- 
 lington's genuine tenderness of heart, exhibited in the quiet 
 days of peace as wellas on the morrow of a tragic victory. 
 What was his share in the supreme triumph achieved 
 on the Eighteenth of June 1815? After years of eager 
 investigation it has been discovered that he should have 
 fortified and garrisoned the farm-buildings of La Haye 
 Sainte with more care, and that he should have 
 summoned Colville's two British brigades from Hal. 
 These are the two heinous faults which minish his 
 renown, although committing them he still won the day. 
 Next it is said, not, however, by the same order of 
 minds, that he owed his success to the Prussians. 
 Certainly, just as the Prussians owed their success to the 
 
AFTER THE VICTORY 223 
 
 British. The latter had been fighting stiffly for five 
 hours before a Prussian shot was fired, and they fought 
 on for nine hours. But that was the bargain. WelHngton 
 was to run the great hazards of a battle long enough to 
 bring the Prussians into action, and he redeemed his 
 pledged word, not less, assuredly, than Blucher, a worthy 
 comrade, redeemed his, not merely by fighting, which 
 came later, but by pushing forward Bulow's leading 
 troops, which compelled Napoleon to detach Lobau as 
 early as two o'clock. The full stress of the Prussian 
 battle was not developed until after six o'clock, and 
 even then the defeat of the Imperial Guard preceded the 
 capture of Planchenoit. But why dispute over shares 
 of glory when there is so much for all ? 
 
 It is not necessary to follow the Allied armies in their 
 march on Paris, and it may be sufficient to say that 
 on July 3rd, fifteen days after the rout of Waterloo, 
 hostilities ceased, Paris capitulated, the French army 
 retired beyond the Loire, and on the 8th the Bourbon 
 King entered the capital of France. Wellington had 
 done all he could to restrain the anger of Blucher, who 
 wished to hang Napoleon if he caught him, and blow up 
 the bridge of Jena. The Emperor fled to Rochefort and 
 the Belleroplion, escaping from Blucher to perpetual 
 exile at St. Helena ; and Wellington rescued the bridge 
 from destruction by reason and good management. To 
 his great influence, also, France was indebted for the 
 slight territorial changes made in her frontier. Practi- 
 cally his active military life ended on July 3rd, 1815; 
 but he sojourned in France three years longer in 
 command of the Army of Occupation. During that 
 period ho was requested to adjust, and did adjust, the 
 
224 WELLINGTON 
 
 many grave questions arising out of claims on France and 
 counter-claims by the French. He reduced the amount 
 against her by nearly one-fourth ; and finally, although 
 adverse to his own personal interests, he persuaded the 
 allied sovereigns to terminate the occupation, which by 
 treaty might have been continued for some years. He 
 never afterwards commanded an army in the field. 
 His career as a Man of Action was over. 
 
 And now we may glance back on that career, and ask 
 whether it is or is not the career of a Great Captain % 
 The question is not so foolish as it looks, because high 
 authority has recently denied him a place in the foremost 
 rank of commanders. Lord Wolseley has declared that 
 Wellington cannot be placed in the first line of generals 
 because he did not secure, or even try to secure, the 
 affection of his soldiers. Certainly that never was the 
 motive of his conduct. He had a totally different idea 
 of the duty alike of citizen and soldier; that idea he 
 always tried his utmost to realise, and it was not to 
 make himself beloved, but to perform his task faithfully 
 and if possible which was not easy, make others perform 
 theirs. But if he was not adored like Napoleon, he was 
 loved by the men he led so well ; for if not, why did 
 Napier print that truthful and touching dedication which 
 stands on the first page of his immortal book \ " This 
 History," he wrote, "I dedicate to your Grace because I 
 have served long enough under your command to know 
 why the soldiers of the Tenth Legion were attached to 
 Csesar." No troops ever followed any general with more 
 alacrity, stood fast with more "unconquerable determina- 
 tion," or, at his word, started joyously forward into more 
 deadly perils, than the British and even the Portuguese 
 
IX WAS WELLINGTON A GREAT GENERAL? 225 
 
 soldiers of Wellington's armies. Lord Wolseley also 
 asserts that if Napoleon had been the man he was at 
 Austerlitz he would have won the battle of "Waterloo. 
 It is a pure hypothesis, and about as reasonable as one 
 which might be framed thus — if Soult or Clause], instead 
 of Arabi, had commanded the Egyptian army in 1882, 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley would not have won the battle of 
 Tel-el-Kebir. What is the value of criticism which 
 alters all the conditions on one side, and does not venture 
 to alter them on the other % Napoleon and Wellington 
 and Blucher fought out their fight in the circumstances 
 existing between the 14th and 19th of June. We can 
 only judge them by the light of those circumstances. All 
 else is pure phantasy ; and if the greatest general is he 
 who makes the fewest mistakes and does not wage war 
 on conjectural grounds, then Wellington was the greater 
 on the fields of Belgium, for incontestably he made 
 fewer mistakes, and acted on fewer and less dangerous 
 conjectures, than his mighty antagonist. It is an idle 
 controversy. The intellectual greatness of Napoleon is 
 as manifest as his selfishness and freedom from the 
 fetters of moral principle ; but it was the radical vices of 
 his nature which rendered his vast, we might say supreme 
 intellect of no avail, and sent him to finish his turbulent 
 life in the dreariness of exile. That form of intellectual 
 activity which is called military genius is, when free from 
 the restraints of all moral principle, a curse to mankind ; 
 and that will be an ill day for England when her generals 
 come to prefer and adore such a form ; for it makes the 
 soldier of genius master of the State for personal objects, 
 instead of being, what he should be, the servant alike 
 of the State and of the loftiest idea of duty. 
 
 Q 
 
226 WELLINGTON 
 
 Wellington throughout his life used his abilities — call 
 them talents or genius — not to magnify himself, but to 
 serve his country according to his lights. If he is not 
 entitled to rank with the foremost, to be, not the 
 greatest, but among the few Great Captains, it would be 
 interesting to know in what military greatness consists. 
 He succeeded in all he undertook. His Indian career 
 alone presents a model of what a soldier should be, and 
 should have exempted him from the foolish charge of being 
 timid and over cautious, wanting in vigour and decision. 
 We may be allowed to measure a man's genius, if that is 
 the correct word, by the relations which his means bear 
 to the ends he attains. Except Frederick the Second 
 and Bonaparte in Italy, no generals in modern times have 
 performed so much as Wellington with such scanty and 
 uncertain resources. We have also to remember his 
 boundless confidence, his inexhaustible patience in gloom 
 as well as sunshine, and imagine if we can the kind of 
 courage it required to face and overcome the endless 
 obstacles raised up by the British, Portuguese, and 
 Spanish Governments. If we adopt for once the prac- 
 tice of indulging in suppositions, let us ask what might 
 not Wellington have been able to accomplish had he 
 possessed, like Napoleon, absolute command over the 
 wealth and manhood of England, Spain, and Portugal, 
 instead of being obliged to beg for a small army of 
 Britons, deal as he best could with the Eegency at 
 Lisbon and the Cortes at Seville or Cadiz ; and perform 
 in turn all parts, civil as well as military, which the 
 exigencies of the movement or the paucity of competent 
 men demanded from day to day. Quite apart from the 
 crowning event of Waterloo, there is ample room in 
 
IX HIS IMMENSE SBR VICES 227 
 
 the Indian and Peninsular campaigns of Wellington to 
 give him a place among the foremost Avarriors. " With 
 a little army," says Charras, "he did great things, and 
 that army was his work. He should remain, and he 
 will remain, one of the grandest military figures of this 
 century." It is a just verdict; and we heartily trust 
 that, regardless of party and faction and self-interest, 
 England's generals, and for reasons as valid, whether 
 they be styled men of genius or men of talent, will 
 always deserve to be ranked with Wellington as the 
 servants of duty and their country. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 DIPLOMATIST AND STATESMAN 
 
 Before Wellington sailed from the Continent in the 
 autumn of 1818, he had accepted the office of Master- 
 General of the Ordnance with a seat in Lord Liverpool's 
 Cabinet. The England to which he returned was 
 neither peaceful nor prosperous. She was exhausted 
 by the long war, her rulers increased the distress by 
 pursuing selfish objects, and it is not surprising that her 
 people were riotous and discontented. Happily the 
 Master-General was not called upon to take an active 
 part in maintaining order, but his advice was sought 
 and given. He busied himself in improving his estate 
 at his own cost, having a profound conviction, on which 
 he always acted, that property has its duties as well as 
 its rights. He spent his entire rental upon the land 
 from which it was derived, draining and fencing, build- 
 ing new cottages, providing large gardens — he held that 
 a labourer should have one acre of land — and promoting 
 the comfort of his tenants to such a degree as to draw 
 praise from censorious Cobbett himself. In dealing 
 with his office he unearthed the arrangements of James 
 the Second, a " weak fellow," but a good man of business. 
 Finding they were " excellent," the Duke brought the 
 
ciTAP. X TFIE QUEEN'S TRIAL 229 
 
 department "back very mucli to what he had made it," 
 a remarkable fact preserved by Lord Stanhope. 
 
 The accession of George the Fourth in 1820 brought 
 to a head the long standing quarrel between that per- 
 sonage and his wife. The sins of both were notorious, 
 but the new King was so unpopular that the people, 
 including all ranks, made a heroine of the Queen. 
 With her the Duke had no sympathy; but he dis- 
 approved of the proceedings initiated behind the backs 
 of his Ministers by the King, and only tacitly ac- 
 quiesced in those pursued in Parliament. At a criti- 
 cal moment, when the Bill of Pains and Penalties had 
 been read a third time by a small majority, and not 
 passed but postponed for six months, he submitted a 
 memorandum to the King, pointing out the peril of 
 pushing the matter further. If it were pushed, inquiry 
 by both Houses was inevitable, " an inquiry," he boldly 
 said, " in which not the Queen, but your Majesty your- 
 self, and your English and Hanoverian servants, and 
 the servants of the Duchy of Cornwall, and those 
 employed by them, will be put on their trial." That 
 memorandum was effectual apparently, for nothing more 
 was done, and the King did not even try to change a 
 Ministry which failed to satisfy his anger. The Duke 
 was made Lord High Constable, and as such, took part 
 in the coronation. It is commonly said that Queen 
 Caroline was refused admission to Westminster Abbey, 
 but the Cabinet decided that she could not be excluded 
 from an open ceremony ; a place was reserved for her 
 among the Peeresses, and it was she who refused to 
 enter the Abbey and sit with them. The Duke's 
 part in bringing about the "convulsion," as Canning 
 
WELLINGTON 
 
 called it, which shook the kingdom, was slight and 
 always on the moderating side; and he reminded the 
 King that " every evil which had occurred in the course 
 of the inquiry was foreseen and foretold by Ministers,'' 
 who, however, which he does not say, could not muster 
 courage to oppose the royal will. In fact, the only 
 Minister who resigned was Canning. The King was 
 furious, but the offence was not mortal, for within 
 two years, chiefly through the influence of Wellington, 
 Canning, on the death of Lord Londonderry, became 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Before that event occurred the Duke accompanied his 
 sovereign to Belgium in 1821, and was his guide over 
 the field of Waterloo. The King listened to his ex- 
 planations, but showed no special interest, or took it 
 " coolly," as the Duke said, until he came to the grave of 
 Lord Anglesey's leg, and then he burst into tears. He 
 could sympathise, at least, with the loss of a handsome 
 limb. 
 
 There was a general peace in Europe, but the Con- 
 tinent was not peaceful. The empires and kingdoms 
 were no longer at war with each other, but, more or 
 less, the people were at war with the emperors and 
 kings. Greece was in open revolt, the Janissaries 
 overawed the Sultan, the Neapolitans obtained a tem- 
 porary mastery over their monarch, and the Spaniards 
 held their king in practical duress. Then the Holy 
 Alliance came into play in a notably worldly fashion. 
 It was supposed at the time, and may be still, that the 
 British Government was subservient to a sanctimonious 
 confederacy invented by the Emperor Alexander. But 
 even his brothers of Austria and Prussia, who signed the 
 
x THE VERONA CONGRESS 231 
 
 treaty because they did not wish to offend him, thought 
 he was "affected in his mind." So far as the British 
 Ministers were concerned they had nothing to do with 
 what Castlereagh described as " a piece of sublime mysti- 
 cism and nonsense," which Alexander himself laid before 
 him. " The Duke of Wellington," he wrote, " happened 
 to be with me when the Emperor called, and it was not 
 without difficulty that we went through the interview 
 with becoming gravity:" The Holy Alliance, although 
 England had no share in it, was a real force enough. 
 ^^^len the Neapolitans broke into insurrection, the 
 British Government stood out for non-interference, which 
 was always Wellington's doctrine, and declined to be a 
 party to Austrian intervention. The internal conflicts in 
 Spain placed them in still greater hostility to the plans of 
 the Holy Allies. To determine what should be done a 
 Congress was held at Verona, and WelHngton was sent 
 thither to represent his country. How he bore himself 
 may be read in his despatches ; but he only carried out 
 strictly the policy of his colleagues and his own. Lord 
 Liverpool, writing to Canning before the Congress met, 
 said that even if a change of dynasty were brought about 
 in Spain, it would be no ground for hostile interference 
 by the Powers ; and that the conduct and character of 
 King Ferdinand made " even the personal question the 
 weakest he ever recollected in a case of revolution." 
 Wellington at Verona informed the Emperor of Eussia 
 that " with us it had become a principle not to interfere 
 in the internal affairs of any country excepting in a case 
 of necessity," and that this principle did not grow out 
 of our parliamentary constitution, but ought to be " the 
 guide of all governments, be their constitutions what 
 
232 WELLINGTON 
 
 they might." Nothing can be plainer or more consistent 
 with the entire course of Wellington's career. He told 
 the Emperor, at a later period, that, in his anxiety to 
 fight the revolutionists, he had left one ally out of his 
 calculation. '"Which is it?' Alexander asked. I 
 replied, Time ! Time would remedy many of the evils 
 complained of as resulting from the Spanish and other 
 revolutions.'' But if that remedy were awaited, said 
 Alexander, " the hon gens and Eoyalists would be lost." 
 And so they parted. The truth is that the "Ultra 
 Eoyalists," led by the Comte d'Artois and M. de Chateau- 
 briand, were bent on invading Spain in order to fly the 
 French flag and gather glory for the Restoration. Ee- 
 specting the heir to the throne, Wellington in 1818 
 uttered some prophetic words. "The descendants of Louis 
 the Fifteenth," he wrote, " will not reign in France ; and 
 I must say, and always will say, that it is the fault of 
 Monsieur and his adherents." It was they who forced 
 on the Spanish war of invasion ; and it was they who 
 ceased to reign in 1830. The Congress of Verona was 
 the grand climacteric of the Holy Alliance; and it 
 expired almost before the death of its projector and 
 patron, the Emperor Alexander. One picturesque little 
 fact, outside the gloomy arena of politics, which oc- 
 curred in the ancient city, has been preserved. Among 
 strange scenes, few are stranger than that of Wellington 
 and the Empress Maria Louisa, mother of the sometime 
 King of Eome, playing at ScarM, and paying each other 
 in napoleons. She was grateful to the Duke for win- 
 ning Waterloo, because in 1815 she had a lover, who 
 afterwards became her husband, and she was not in a 
 condition to return with safety to her imperial spouse. 
 
X THE duke's defence OF HIS CONDUCT 233 
 
 Eeturning to^ England in the beginning of 1823, the 
 Duke was obliged to defend, and did defend with point 
 and vigour, the course pursued by himself as the agent 
 of the Government at Verona. There was a strong 
 desire in some quarters to take part with the Spaniards, 
 a desire which even those who felt it would have re- 
 pressed had they been in office. We have seen what 
 the policy was, how it was adverse to the domineering 
 views of the Holy Alliance, and failed only because 
 England by reason alone could not prevail, and dis- 
 claimed the idea of using force on either side. It is 
 instructive to observe that all parties were under the 
 delusion that the French invasion of Spain would 
 strengthen the Bourbon monarchy, a delusion entertained 
 by the French themselves ; whereas it was one of the 
 causes which led to the ultimate expulsion of Charles the 
 Tenth. Wellington's course in the matter was honest and 
 above-board, and the sharp criticism showered upon him 
 must be set down mainly to party exigencies as well as 
 parliamentary custom. Canning, more impatient and 
 defiant than the Duke, who never indulged in threats, 
 longed to speak out his mind to the French ; but it was 
 not until four years afterwards that he uttered the 
 famous sentence, "I called the New World into existence 
 to redress the balance of the Old," being determined 
 that if France had Spain she should not have Spain 
 and the Indies. The difference between the Duke and 
 his colleague regarding the recognition of the Spanish 
 Colonies was one of degree, not principle. Canning 
 wished to do the thing at once; the Duke, as usual, 
 favoured moderation ; yet even he, slow to move in such 
 a matter, saw that recognition must come, only he would 
 
234 WELLINGTON 
 
 have gone no further than was necessary, but have had 
 each case determined on its merits. At Verona, where 
 the subject was discussed, he carefully left it in such a 
 state that his Government might do what it pleased. 
 If Canning did not exactly call the New World into 
 existence, since it had been more or less much alive since ' 
 the beginning of the Peninsular War, he did call up 
 something else — the " Monroe doctrine " can claim him 
 as its parent, for he suggested the declaration to Mr. 
 Rush. 
 
 At Verona Wellington succeeded in averting a war 
 between Eussia and Turkey which threatened the 
 general peace ; and Alexander went home a sadder, if 
 not a wiser man. Towards the end of 1825 he died 
 rather suddenly at Taganrog, and his brother Nicholas, 
 by virtue of a family compact, reigned in his stead. 
 Wellington was despatched to St. Petersburg on the 
 accession of the new Emperor, which gave him an 
 opportunity of ascertaining, if possible, the intentions of 
 the Czar towards Greece and Turkey. He was soon 
 involved in a diplomatic tussle, not only with Nesselrode, 
 but with the Emperor also ; and in the end he could do 
 no more than defer for a time the meditated attack on 
 the Sultan, and obtain a protocol, having for its object 
 a peaceful settlement of the acute Greek difficulty on a 
 basis suggested by the Eussians themselves. 
 
 The time was now at hand when he would be sum- 
 moned to take a more prominent position in the State, 
 so far as office went. George the Fourth made the Duke 
 Constable of the Tower in 1826; and when the death 
 of the Duke of York, early in the next year, left vacant 
 the post of Commander-in-Chief, it was at once bestowed 
 
s THE DUKE AND CANNING _ 235 
 
 on the Field Marshal, who announced his appointment 
 to the army with characteristic simplicity and brevity. 
 He was now in his right place, but fate decided that he 
 should not remain in it long. Lord Liverpool, Prime 
 Minister since 1812, fell hopelessly ill, and in April 
 the King, sending for Canning, empowered him in the 
 usual way to reconstruct the Ministry on the principles 
 which guided that of Lord Liverpool. "I need not 
 add," Canning said in writing to the Duke, "how 
 essentially the accomplishment [of his task] must depend 
 upon your Grace's continuance as a member of the 
 Cabinet." In reply to the "obliging proposition" the 
 Duke desired to know who was to be the Prime Minister, 
 and the answer was in brief Mr. Canning, who added 
 that he had laid the letters before the King. Thereupon, 
 observing that he thought Mr. Canning, with the best 
 intentions, would not be able to hold fast the Liverpool 
 principles, the Duke declined to join him and followed 
 up his refusal by resigning the offices of Commander-in- 
 Chief and Master-General of the Ordnance. The Duke 
 was vehemently censured for his conduct, but it should 
 be observed that he had no confidence in Canning, who 
 himself had no right, political or moral, to the co-opera- 
 tion of Wellington. During the Ministry of the brilhant 
 orator the King affected for three months to command 
 the army; the Duke of Clarence became Lord High 
 Admiral ; and Eussian influences so far prevailed in the 
 Cabinet that the protocol of St. Petersburg was con- 
 verted into a vague treaty which led 'to the battle of 
 Navarino, and forwarded Eussian aggression quite as 
 much as Greek emancipation. 
 
 Lord Goderich, afterwards Earl of Eipon, succeeded 
 
236 WELLINGTON 
 
 Canning, but he could not hold his colleagues together, 
 and in January, 1828, the King sent for the Duke and 
 made him his Prime Minister. He did not seek the 
 office. In 1827 he said that he should be "worse than 
 mad to think of such a thing ; " but when requested by 
 the King he took the post as he had taken others, 
 holding himself to be, as he always put it, " the retained 
 servant of the Crown." It is in this light that we must 
 regard his assumption of a great responsibility, an office 
 for which he said he was not qualified, yet was really 
 far more qualified than many other men. The Canning- 
 ites joined the Grovernment ; and although the Emperor 
 Nicholas, seeing his opportunity, made war on Turkey, 
 the Duke loyally carried out the treaty negotiated by 
 Canning, with the policy of which personally he so 
 strongly disagreed. But he never would consent to be 
 the mere leader of a party ; he was always the servant 
 of the State, and kept its compacts. 
 
 That conviction of his duty was finely illustrated 
 when he had to deal with the Eoman Catholic question. 
 Ireland, as he believed, especially after the election of 
 O'Connell for Clare, was on the verge of civil war, and 
 what civil war is he well knew. Moreover, it was his 
 fixed opinion that "whenever the consent of the Crown 
 could be obtained, the question could be settled." 
 Personally, no religious prejudice withheld him from 
 enfranchising the Eoman Catholics ; his opposition rested 
 on broad and deep political grounds. But when the 
 tide of opinion in both islands rose to a dangerous 
 height, looking only to the common weal and setting 
 aside his personal bias, he boldly told the truth to the 
 King and secured his needed consent. He remarked 
 
X THE DUKE PRIME MINISTER 237 
 
 long afterwards, that justice would not be done to his 
 action in settling the vexatious dispute until his com- 
 munications to the King were published; and those 
 documents, now accessible to all, are his justification. 
 They, and all his writings on his native country show 
 that he did not at any time blink the facts which under- 
 lay its unhappy condition. If he were stern in requiring 
 obedience to law, he did not spare "the gentlemen of 
 Ireland," whose treatment of their landed estates and 
 neglect of their duties were so repugnant to his con- 
 science and opposed to his practice. Dreading a civil 
 war, as one who knew what it was, he strove to avert 
 the calamity, and fortunately did not strive in vain. 
 How thoroughly he had gauged the dangers lurking in 
 the whole question may be judged from the fact that, 
 in one of his earliest letters to the King, he foresaw 
 "the possibility — I might state it more strongly," he 
 says, "of the Eoman Catholic tenantry refusing to pay 
 tithes or rents. The clergy and the landlords might 
 have recourse to the law. But how is the law to be 
 enforced % How can they distrain for rent or tithes on 
 millions of tenants % " He said it would probably be the 
 first measure of resistance and rebellion ; the words 
 testify to his prescience, but the measures foreseen were 
 not attempted until he had been many years in his grave. 
 One might think that the men who set them in motion, 
 not for their own sake, but as means to obtain an in- 
 dependent parliament, had studied and caught up their 
 schemes from the Duke's writings. 
 
 He has been taunted with inconsistency because he 
 brought his great influence to bear on all who were 
 opposed to Eoman Catholic emancipation; but no act 
 
238 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 of his life was in stricter accord with the fundamental 
 principles governing his conduct. Early in the struggle 
 with the King, he said, " It is the duty of all to look our 
 difficulties in the face and to lay the ground for getting 
 the better of them." He had no fixed hostility to the 
 concession ; that it had been so long delayed was not his 
 fault ; and when he saw that it would deliver the country 
 from a civil war, he thought it high time that the con- 
 cession should be made. He was right in doubting 
 whether it would pacify Ireland, which he had long seen 
 aimed at independence ; but whether it would or not, 
 the contest with rebellion would be less arduous. 
 Politics has been called the science of exigencies, and in 
 this exigency the Duke, keeping the permanent interests 
 of the United Kingdom in view, did what he believed 
 was best for them. It was an act of expediency, and 
 he certainly would never have set it upon what some 
 would call a higher level. In like manner he acquiesced 
 in the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, a futile 
 remnant of exclusiveness which the legislature had to 
 nullify every year by an Indemnity Act ! The passing 
 of these measures was accomplished because the Prime 
 Minister of the day was not a party man. 
 
 Three considerable episodes, two serious, and one 
 comic, enlivened the stormy period of the Duke's ad- 
 ministration. The comic episode grew out of the pre- 
 tensions of the Duke of Clarence, Lord High Admiral. 
 He took on himself to hoist his flag in the Thames, 
 summon his board to Portsmouth, set forth in command 
 of a squadron, all in excess of his powers under the law. 
 The Duke firmly but courteously remonstrated, even 
 the King declared his brother hopelessly in the wrong ; 
 
X POLITICAL TROUBLES ' 239 
 
 and in the end the Lord High Admiral, unable to prevail, 
 resigned. But he bore no malice, for after defying his 
 board, or council, he ended by shaking hands, and ask- 
 ing them all to dinner at Bushey ! Another disturbing 
 influence of a grimmer kind was the Duke of Cumber- 
 land ; and the constant troubles wrung from Wellington 
 a cry of impatience. "Between the King and his 
 brothers," he wrote to Peel, "the government of this 
 country has become a most heart-breaking concern." 
 Another trial was more grave. Mr. Huskisson thought 
 fit to vote against his Government, and immediately to 
 give the Duke an opportunity of placing his office in 
 other hands. The Duke took him at his word; but 
 Mr. Huskisson did not mean to resign, he meant to 
 draw forth a request that he should stay. The Duke, 
 convinced that " it was not with one individual but a 
 party " that he had to deal, would not entreat ; and so 
 Mr. Huskisson went out of ofiice and all the Canningites 
 with him. Principles were paraded, but they were not 
 at stake. The Duke said that he could not get a 
 definition or clear idea of Whig, Tory, Liberal, or Mr. 
 Canning's principles; adding in a pregnant passage — 
 "This I know, that this country was never governed, 
 in practice, according to the extreme principles of any 
 party whatever; much less according to the extremes 
 which other opposing parties attribute to their adver- 
 saries." The Canningites were replaced and took their 
 share out of the Government in passing the measure so 
 long supported alike by Castlereagh and Canning— 
 Koman Catholic Emancipation. 
 
 The third episode sprang armed out of the heat of 
 the desperate conflict. The old Tories never forgave 
 
240 WELLINGTON 
 
 the Duke for his desertion as they called it, and 
 Lord Winchelsea wrote and published a letter in 
 which he accused the Duke of having long used "a 
 show of zeal for the Protestant religion '' as a cloak 
 under which he might carry out his "insidious designs" 
 for the introduction of pojDery. The insult was poig- 
 nantj and as, after repeated attempts to obtain it, full 
 reparation was refused, the Duke demanded "satis- 
 faction." Probably Lord Winchelsea never expected 
 that he would be called to account so sharply, and 
 was astonished when he found that his victim turned 
 upon him. But he would not yield except on the 
 ground, although he went to Battersea Fields with a 
 determination not to fire at the Duke, and when he had 
 stood fire to express his regret. So the duel passed; 
 Wellington fired wide, Winchelsea in the air, and an 
 apology was given in writing, on the ground and publicly. 
 The Duke was a dangerous man to triiie with, but it is 
 notable that he had never been " out " before, and did 
 not possess any duelling pistols. The Duke, however, 
 always held that he was bound to act as he did. Lord 
 Winchelsea, he said to Mr. Gleig in after years, " did 
 his best to establish the principle that a man in my 
 situation must be a traitor unless he adheres through 
 thick and thin to a policy once advocated. His attack 
 on me was part of a plan to render the conduct of public 
 affairs impossible to the King's servants," and thus the 
 admission that he was wrong had to be extorted from 
 him. Nor should it be forgotten that the Duke took up 
 the libel as a public matter. Writing a few weeks 
 afterwards, he said that the duel was " as much a part 
 of the Catholic question as anything else he was obliged ' 
 
X MISERIES OF OFFICE 241 
 
 to do." He was living in "an atmosphere of calumny " : 
 after the hostile meeting the air was cleared; and if 
 the event itself shocked many good men, still it was 
 necessary in the public interests, and none can say it was 
 not effective in staying the evil. 
 
 Throughout the whole contest with the King, the 
 Duke of Cumberland, the Lievens, and the old Tories, 
 he was determined to carry the business, and also "to 
 fight the battle in his own way." How much he 
 felt at times is shown by his passionate outbursts 
 in private, when the strain became too severe or the 
 scenes at Windsor too distressing even for his 
 patience. "If I had known in January 1828," he 
 wrote in November 1829, "one tithe of what I do 
 now, and of what I discovered one month after I 
 was in office, I should never have been the King's 
 Minister and should have avoided loads of misery. . . . 
 I believe there never was a man who sufi'ered so much 
 and for so little purpose." An extravagant picture, 
 perhaps ; yet who can say what a man so straightforward 
 and honest must have endured during nearly three 
 years of office from the kind of people with whom he 
 had to deal, not only, if mainly, in conducting home 
 affairs in a troubled time, but in working out a foreign 
 policy left him as a legacy, and in thwarting, so far as 
 he could, the designs of the Eussian Emperor and his 
 unscrupulous agents of both sexes. The hope he ex- 
 pressed in November 1829, that he might soon be 
 reheved from the unhappy lot which had befallen him, 
 was gratified a year later, when, after the accession of 
 William the Fourth the Revolution of July was the signal 
 for an imperative demand for the reform of Parliament. 
 R 
 
242 WELLINGTON 
 
 The Whigs saw their chance ; the old Tories, bent only 
 on a policy of revenge, gratified their rancour regardless 
 of anything else; in November 1830 the Wellington 
 administration, defeated on a side issue, ceased to be, 
 and the Duke got rid of his heavy burden. 
 
 Although out-voted on the question of referring the 
 Civil List to a committee, it was Parliamentary Keform 
 and Tory rancour which killed the Duke's Government. 
 Not that he was hostile to gradual change, such as the 
 transfer of seats from corrupt boroughs to great towns. 
 Had his advice prevailed, Birmingham would have sent 
 members to Parliament long before 1832. He had as 
 keen a contempt for the " boroughmongers '' as Cobbett 
 himself, and spoke with indignation of their conduct in 
 selling seats to the highest bidder, which, vile in 
 itself, was also the abuse of a great trust. The close 
 boroughs, he considered, should have been used to bring 
 able men of all shades of political opinion into Parliament, 
 so as to produce a genuine representation, not of numbers 
 but of character and intellect. But the boroughmongers 
 were as faithless to their obligations as the absentee 
 landlords in Ireland, and all landlords who, looking only 
 to their convenience or gains, neglected the duties in- 
 cumbent on them as owners of landed property. This 
 was the more grievous to him because he held the 
 doctrine that the Constitution had a territorial basis, 
 and that one of its foundation-stones was the influence 
 of real property. When people talked to him of " the 
 rights of the aristocracy," he said he knew nothing of 
 them. The Peers have rights and privileges under the 
 constitution, but "out of doors" the Peers are "no 
 more than others of her Majesty's subjects," except that 
 
X THE REFORM BILL 243 
 
 they are exempt from arrest, have titles of honour and 
 rank, and precedence in ' society. In short, what he 
 dreaded was a " democratic Parliament," which would 
 he in its nature hostile to the great institutions of the 
 country and the essential interests of " the society called 
 the British Empire." What he failed to see was that a 
 change was coming, if it had not come, over the nation, 
 which made the representative machinery of 1830 in- 
 compatible with peaceful national life ; that the pivot of 
 power had at least begun to shift from land to trade, 
 commerce, and industry, and that the claim of these to 
 share in power could not be denied. Nor is he to be 
 blamed for that, still less for standing up steadfastly 
 in defence of his convictions. " I feel no strength," he 
 said, "excepting in my character for plain manly deal- 
 ing ; " and he could not pretend to say he approved of 
 measures which he passed, or those he abstained from 
 opposing, when he did not love them. He fought the 
 sweeping Whig Reform Bill as long as he could ; he 
 tried to form a Government against it ; he strove to 
 modify, when he could not reject it ; but he announced 
 his intention of absenting himself from the House of 
 Peers so soon as he saw that the national safety could 
 only be preserved by the passing of the Bill. Then he 
 frankly accepted it as the law of the land, and hoped 
 that the inevitable changes would be brought about so 
 slowly as to mitigate their effects. 
 
 He has been soundly rated for half a century because 
 he made an imprudent declaration against a special 
 measure of reform. It is a testimony to his worth,, 
 and his candour should have been appreciated ; but 
 simplicity, frankness, and plain manly dealing do 
 
244 WELLINGTON 
 
 not serve the interests of political parties or leaders 
 of parties. The Duke, as it seems to us, was not, by 
 his character, fitted for the work which they perform ; 
 he was never a mere party man or party leader — 
 he was always the devoted servant of the Crown 
 and the State ; and the really astonishing thing is that 
 he remained in office for nearly three years. Nothing 
 but his high character kept him there ; and it was his 
 high character which finally expelled him. He belonged 
 to the pre-democratic era, just going below the horizon 
 in 1832. He did not quail before the multitude, nor 
 mistake the quality of their cheers or groans. When 
 Apsley House was threatened he was prepared to defend 
 it by force ; when the windows were broken he put up 
 iron shutters and never took them down; nor did he 
 ever fail to point to them on occasions, when crowds 
 saluted him with hurrahs. He was beset by a furious 
 mob on the anniversary of Waterloo in 18.32, when 
 riding home from the Mint, and owed his life, perhaps, 
 to the accident that he had an appointment in Lincoln's 
 Inn, where the lawyers gallantly provided for his safety. 
 The incident is ever -memorable as a shining example 
 of popular fickleness and folly. One can imagine 
 the scene as he rode at a walking pace out of the Inn, 
 through the howling mob, pale, but with a severe coun- 
 tenance, immovable on his saddle, and looking straight 
 before him. Sir Edward Sugden and another barrister 
 forming the advance guard in this striking procession. 
 Yet at this very moment the Reform Bill had become 
 the Eeform Act, and its final passage through the House 
 of Lords was really effected by the prudence and wisdom 
 of the man so bitterly assailed and outraged. But all 
 
X HIS CHARACTER AS A POLITICIAN 245 
 
 mobs behave alike -when under the influence of ignorance 
 and passion, whether clad in broadcloth or fustian ; and 
 none knew that better than the Duke, who never allowed 
 either to drive him from the course marked out for 
 him by his sense of duty. That he could and did put 
 aside his personal convictions for the common good 
 is true, but to physical threats and the imminence of 
 personal danger he never yielded one jot. The story 
 of the Reform Bill is now ancient history, yet no 
 generous mind can study it without recognising the 
 honourable and manly conduct of a statesman whose 
 first and last thought was for his country, and never 
 for himself. 
 
 That is why, with a standpoint so different, party 
 men, who wanted to and did admire him, could never 
 quite understand or calculate his course. The political 
 crisis in the winter of 1834-35 — which was preceded by 
 that somewhat astonishing incident, the selection of the 
 Duke as Chancellor of the University of Oxford — affords 
 another illustration. The first Government of Lord 
 Melbourne, from the action of causes to which we cannot 
 even allude, suddenly disappeared one November morn- 
 ing. The Duke was at Strathfieldsaye, and was just 
 going out hunting when a king's messenger arrived from 
 Brighton at six in the morning bearing a summons from 
 King William. Thither the Duke hastened at once, and 
 when the King told him that he had no Ministry, he at 
 once recommended his Majesty to send for Sir Eobert 
 Peel, and as Sir Eobert was in Italy, the Duke offered 
 to carry on the Government until the wandering states- 
 man reached England. The King assented, and the 
 Duke was immediately appointed First Lord of the 
 
246 WELLINGTON 
 
 Treasury, and sworn in as Secretary of State for the 
 Home Department, which enabled him to act in all the 
 other offices. Nothing could be more astounding to the 
 ordinary party mind, except the promptitude with which 
 a man who always went straight for the thing to be 
 done entered on his collective functions. The same 
 day, November 17th, he went direct to the Home 
 Office, did business, looked in at the other offices, and 
 assumed his place, making no changes, but doing the 
 work to be done. Sir Eobert was summoned home by 
 express, and, despite the wishes of the King, no appoint- 
 ment was made until he arrived. Thus to the astonish- 
 ment, amusement, and admiration of the public, the 
 Duke for three weeks conducted what he laughingly 
 called his Dictatorship, in complete accordance with the 
 constitution. He fixed his head-quarters at the Home 
 Office, and thence sallied forth to perform his functions 
 in the others. Sir Erskine May regards the expedient 
 as one of a " doubtful and anomalous character," adding 
 that " as the Duke had exercised the extraordinary 
 powers entrusted to him with honour and good faith," 
 he was not subjected to parliamentary censure, even at a 
 time Avhen the temper of the House of Commons was so 
 inflamed. In short, the Duke spoke truly when he said 
 that he had not disposed of a single office, nor done any 
 act "not essentially necessary for the service of the King 
 and the country." It was a novel experience for the 
 parties who divided the State, and certainly raised 
 the Duke in general estimation. If they did not 
 understand the motive which actuated him as a public 
 servant, they appreciated the courage of the man who 
 took all the responsibility and none of the patronage ; 
 
FOREIGN MINISTER 247 
 
 who suddenly found tlio King without a Grovernment, 
 and at once supplied one in his own person. 
 
 Peel returned to London in December ; and, forming 
 a Ministry in the usual way, gave the Foreign Office to 
 the Duke. Parliament was dissolved, but the appeal to 
 the country did no more than reinforce the Conservatives, 
 who, beaten on successive divisions, resigned in April. 
 The Duke's share in the labours of this brief administra- 
 tion is remarkable for two things. It was necessary to 
 appoint a new ambassador to St. Petersburg, and the 
 Duke selected Lord Londonderry. He never even 
 started for his post; so huge an uproar was raised 
 in and out of Parliament by the Opposition that he 
 retired. It was a pure bit of party fighting, and had 
 nothing to do with the sole thing that animated the 
 Minister in selecting him — his fitness. Mr. Greville, 
 reporting the Duke's conversation at the time, has this 
 significant entry : " He said he was not particularly 
 partial to the man, nor ever had been ; but that he was 
 very fit for the post, was an excellent ambassador, 
 procured more information and obtained more insight 
 into the affairs of a foreign court than anybody, and that 
 he was the best relator of what passed at a conference, 
 and wrote the best account of a conversation of any 
 man he knew." So that the fit man was sacrificed to 
 party animosity and nothing else. It will be seen that 
 in making this selection, imprudent from a party 
 point of view, because it gave the Opposition a pretext, 
 the error of the Duke consisted in looking about for the 
 man best fitted to do the work of an ambassador, which 
 one might have supposed was precisely the duty of a 
 foreign secretary. But the Duke never could be got 
 
248 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 to regulate his conduct on the curious and artificial rules 
 of the politician, who is bound to think first of himself 
 and his party. The other incident of his Ministry 
 redounded to his honour in a different way. The 
 horrible cruelties practised by each side in the Carlist 
 wars moved him to despatch Lord Eliot to Spain with 
 instructions to bring both within the area of civilisation. 
 He was successful in his eff'orts, the slaughter of prisoners 
 was stayed, and their treatment regulated by the Eliot 
 Convention. It did not long endure, but it was an 
 attempt to make civil war humane, and deserved a 
 longer sway. 
 
 Although the Duke of Wellington was included in 
 the Cabinet formed by Peel in 1841 and 1846, he never 
 again held any political office. His function was to 
 lead in the House of Lords, and holding that position 
 he so acted as to moderate opposition, and help the 
 Ministers whenever he could. He has himself, in a 
 letter to Lord Stanley (1846) when pressing him to 
 assume the leadership, described the principles on which 
 he conducted his management of the Upper House for 
 twenty years. He objected to all extreme and violent 
 measures of opposition ; supported the Grovernment on 
 important occasions, used his influence " to prevent the 
 mischief of anything like a difference or division between 
 the two Houses " : he endeavoured to guide, and did 
 guide, opinion in the Peers, and induced them to do what 
 he thought best for the Crown, the Constitution, and the 
 country. His last political service was in joining Sir 
 Robert Peel to abolish the Corn Laws — much against 
 his personal wish ; and when that dangerous question 
 came to a head, he wrote a letter to the Queen, severing 
 
X QUITS POLITICAL LIFE 249 
 
 his connection with the Conservative party, which made 
 him anxious that Lord Stanley should take his place and 
 do as he had done. "It is impossible," he writes, "for 
 me to do otherwise than is indicated in my letter to the 
 Queen. I am the servant of the Crown and people. I 
 have been paid and rewarded, and consider myself 
 retained; and that I can't do otherwise than serve as 
 required, when I can do so without dishonour, that is to 
 say, as long as I have health and strength to enable me 
 to serve." 
 
 The principle which determined his course in 1845-46 
 was one now familiar to us from him. The question to 
 be considered when Sir Eobert Peel undertook to do 
 what Lord John Eussell would not attempt, he said, was 
 " not what the Corn Laws should be, but whether the 
 Queen should have a Government " ; or as he told Croker, 
 "the position he had taken up was not on the Corn 
 Law — his object was to maintain a Government in the 
 country." That position after long years came to be 
 well understood by the public, and the knowledge of it 
 finally extinguished every idea that the Duke was a 
 High Tory, or even a party man, a dictator, or a mere 
 soldier. He was, in his political, as well as in his military 
 character, pre-eminently a great national servant, always 
 intent on promoting what according to his cool judgment 
 was best for the common weal. 
 
CHAPTEE XI 
 
 OLD AGE 
 
 "If the Dake of Wellington were twenty or thirty years 
 younger, he ought to be on horseback and on the field 
 with Runjeet Sing, instead of being called in to arrange 
 the affairs of maids of honour and the palace,'' was his 
 remark to Lord Stanhope in March 1839. Two years 
 later, George Broadfoot, shut up in Jellalabad, wrote, 
 " Set the Duke down at Ferozepore with carte blanche ; 
 both contempt of the enemy and timidity would dis- 
 appear, and Afghanistan would soon be our own to keep 
 or abandon.'' The dream of the valiant young soldier, 
 of course, could not be realised ; his hero was, and 
 felt himself to be, too old. His deafness, the result of 
 improper treatment, became yearly worse, and he had 
 suffered from those severe attacks of illness which made 
 O'Connell chuckle over the thought that one of whom 
 he was always afraid would soon die. The death of 
 Lord Hill in 1842 made Wellington Commander-in- 
 Chief, by patent and for life. All remember how, when 
 the news of Chillianwallah filled men with dismay, asked 
 to submit three names to the Government as fit suc- 
 cessors to Sir Hugh Gough, he wrote down thrice, " Sir 
 Charles Napier." Still more does it dwell in the memory 
 
CHAP. XI " GENIUS OF THE COUNTRY" 251 
 
 that he fixed the resolution of Sir Charles hy saying, 
 "If you will not go, I must." That was an appeal which 
 could not be withstood. Later still, the old fire blazed 
 up when he undertook to thwart the Chartists on 
 April 10th, 1848, and kept his word so well, and 
 made such solid arrangements, that tranquillity was 
 preserved without showing a soldier or firing a shot. 
 "Well, Duke, it has all turned out as you foretold," 
 said Sir John Campbell. " Oh yes," was the reply, " I 
 was sure of it, and I never showed a soldier or musket. 
 But I was ready. I could have stopped them wherever 
 you liked, and if they had been armed it would have 
 been all the same." That was his last military triumph, 
 and he was pardonably elated at its bloodless success. 
 
 Few living can remember him as he was in the prime 
 of his manhood, but many cherish the recollection of the 
 silver-haired veteran, wearing a blue coat and white 
 waistcoat and trousers, riding or walking through the 
 streets, or painfully listening, with one hand to his best 
 ear, in the House of Lords. Age slowly sapped his 
 strength. Music, which he so loved, was lost to him : 
 he had to give up his hunting ; but he rose early, worked 
 as of old, and neglected no duty. If he became irritable 
 and had his quick temper less under control, that was 
 due to failing powers, and he was painfully conscious of 
 the weakness. It was only trifles that moved him : on 
 grave subjects he was patient and ready to bear with 
 opposition all his life; but no man is so privileged as 
 to escape human infirmity. The publication of his 
 despatches by Colonel Gurwood raised him immensely 
 in public estimation, and he was seen as he was for the 
 first time. One might say that, despite the splendour 
 
252 WELLINGTON chap. 
 
 of his active military career, and the enthusiasm it 
 aroused, men did not come to know him truly until he 
 had grown old, and then admiration passed into a sort 
 of reverence which shed a halo over his declining years. 
 Baron Stockmar having said that he was " one-sided," 
 Prince Albert answered, " He is a fresh illustration of 
 the truth that, to achieve great results and do great 
 deeds, a certain one-sidedness is essential." Certainly, 
 it is better to be a Wellington than a Hamlet. The 
 nation agreed with Queen Victoria when she said, "He 
 was the pride and the genius, as it were, of the country.'' 
 How true the phrase is, was sho"\vn when his startling 
 letter to Sir John Burgoyne was printed. From his 
 watch-tower at Walmer he looked around, saw that the 
 South of England was defenceless, and said so in plain 
 terms. The nation was electrified, and from that day in 
 1848 maybe dated the modern measures for the defence 
 of our coast and the reinforcement of our army. The 
 warning came with triple energy from one who had been 
 always a votary of real economy, and a fervid champion 
 of peace. It was he who wrote in 1841, "May G-od pre- 
 serve the general peace. Man will not if left to himself." 
 Throughout his life he was generous and gave without 
 stint. His conduct towards Alava aifords a conspicuous 
 example. Even Cobbett, who called him an "old 
 ruffian," found that the Duke was "not a miser." He 
 carried loose sovereigns in his pocket to bestow on any 
 of his old soldiers in distress. When General Brenier, 
 captured at Vimiero, was a prisoner, Sir Arthur, as he 
 then was, lent the Frenchman five hundred pounds, 
 which were nevpr repaid. He was absolutely unosten- 
 tatious in giving. Mr. Gleig once saw a private record 
 
XI HIS LAST YEARS 253 
 
 of his charities which in one year reached four thousand 
 pounds. He was the cheerful victim of impostors and 
 even delinquents, saying when rebuked, " What could I 
 do? One could not let the man starve." His kind-hearted- 
 ness came out in many ways. Seeing a short gentleman, 
 on one occasion at Court, straining every joint to obtain a 
 glimpse of the Queen, he placed him before himself, and 
 the little man was so delighted that he asked for a 
 living. At a review in the Champ de Mars, he be- 
 friended a small boy by mounting him on the back of 
 his own chair. Obliged to join the French Princes, the 
 Duke consigned the boy to the care of his father, and a 
 few days afterwards the father applied for a loan. Such 
 experiences never narrowed his sympathies. His kind- 
 ness to children is well known. Georgina, Dowager 
 Lady de Eos, has told us how he romped with the 
 children, and allowed his young guests at Walmer to 
 fight the battle of Waterloo with him, a conflict which 
 began by one of them flinging a cushion at the news- 
 paper he was reading ; and how indignant he was when 
 he saw that his little favourites had no jam with 
 their bread and butter. But the prettiest story is told 
 by Lord Stanhope. Two tiny guests at Walmer, seeing 
 that every one received letters by post, wished that they 
 might have some. Thereupon the Duke wrote a little 
 letter to each every morning, and had it delivered to 
 them when the post arrived. It was a different feehng, 
 indeed a sense of justice, which made him, as Constable 
 of the Tower, give to non-commissioned officers the post 
 of Yeoman Warder. Preceding Constables, following 
 an old usage, had sold them. 
 
 One of his latest acts was a serious proposal that the 
 
254 WELLINGTON 
 
 Prince Consort should command the army through a 
 Chief of the Staff — an obvious error, whicli the Prince 
 had the prudence to set aside. In the year when it was 
 made, 1850, a little prince was born on May 1st, the 
 Duke's birthday. The name of Arthur was bestowed 
 on him, and King William of Prussia and the Duke 
 were the sponsors. The next year, at the opening of 
 the first Exhibition, as the Queen records, "the old 
 Duke and Anglesey walked arm in arm in the procession, 
 which was a touching sight." Another year passed, and 
 then the Duke faded peacefully away at Walmer, in 
 September, and after lying in state at Chelsea Hospital, 
 was solemnly buried by the side of Nelson in St. 
 Paul's Cathedral. All the nations in Europe, except 
 Austria, were represented at his grave ; and as the organ- 
 peals ceased and the mighty multitude separated, the 
 whole world felt not only that an epoch had visibly 
 ended, but that a great captain and a supremely dutiful, 
 honest man, leaving behind him a stainless record, had 
 gone from among them for ever. 
 
 THE END 
 
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 General Gordon. By Colonel Sir William Butler. 
 
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