(flnrtipll Kaui irlynnl Bjibrarg 
 
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Cornell University Library 
 KD 691.M46 1920 
 
 On the interpretation of statutes / 
 
 3 1924 021 652 189 
 
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ON THE 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 Sir peter BENSON ^XWELL, 
 
 CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE BTRAITB SETTLEMENTS, 
 AND LEGAL ADMINISTRATOR IN EGYPT, 1883-4, 
 
 '* Benigniaa leges interpretandsB sunt, quo voluntas carum conaervetur.*' 
 
 Dig. 1, 3. 18 
 
 SIXTH EDITION 
 
 W. WYATT-PAINB, 
 
 OF THB INNEB TEMPLE AND NORTH EASTERN CIRCUIT, BARBISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 ATTTHOK OF "A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS," ETC., KTC. 
 
 EDITOR OF THE 4TH EDITION OF "MACQUEON'S LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,* 
 
 THE 16th and 16TH EDITIOSS OP ''CHITTY ON CONTRACTS," AND TKE 3RD, 
 
 4lH, 5TH, AND 6TH EDITIONS OF "CLEITK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS.*' 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 SWEET AND MAXWELL, LTD., 3, GHANOBEY LANE, 
 
 Xaw iPublfsbers 
 
 TORONTO : 
 THE CAESWBLL CO., LTD., 19, DUNCAN STREET. 
 
 1920 
 
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1st Edition .... 1875 
 
 2nd „ 1883 
 
 Srd „ By A. B. Kbkpe 1896 
 
 *tli .. ,, J. A. Theobald 1905 
 
 5tt „ „ F. Stboud 1912 
 
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 PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION. 
 
 The present edition is an at't'empt to make one of 
 the greatest authorities on the Interpretation of 
 Statutes worthy of its classic reputation. To do 
 this something more was needed than the mere 
 addition of modern cases. It was essential that 
 the Statutes themselves should be considered in 
 order that the precise legal signification of the 
 words employed therein might be ascertained. 
 For though very many of the Acts of Parliament 
 discussed by the learned author have either fallen 
 into temporary or complete disuse, or have been ex- 
 punged from the Statute Book, the principles of 
 Interpretation, slowly crystallised by generations 
 of eminent jurists, still constitute the canons by 
 which the construction and sense of Acts of Parlia- 
 ment are to be determined, and form no mean part 
 of the inheritance bequeathed to this generation by 
 the great lawyers of the past. 
 
 In the present edition, the Editor has endeav- 
 oured to retain the original style of the work in 
 spite of the fact that very many emendations in 
 the text were essential. Every living system of 
 jurisprudence is necessarily in a constant state of 
 
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IV PEEFACB. 
 
 flux; the needs of each, generation are not those 
 of that which either precedes or follows it. Con- 
 sequently in preparing a new edition of a work like 
 Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes two 
 essentials seemed necessary — ^first, to retain the 
 style of the original author, and second, to make 
 the work of real utility to the practitioner of the 
 present day. 
 
 How far the Editor has succeeded in combining 
 these desiderata it is for the reader of the present 
 edition to determine, although no trouble has been 
 spared in the attempt to make the book worthy of 
 its high reputation. Valuable assistance in the 
 preparation of the Index, Table of Statutes and 
 Table of Cases has been given to the Editor by his 
 friend, Mr. J. E. Macllraith, of the Middle Temple 
 and Northern Circuit, barrister-at-law. 
 
 W. WYATT-PAINE. 
 
 Inker TbmfiiB, 
 1920. 
 
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CONTENTS. 
 
 FAGE 
 
 Table of Cases . . ix 
 
 Table of Statutes . olv 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 PBELIMINAEY SUBVET. 
 
 Sect. I. Iniaroductory 1 
 
 II. Literal construction . ... 3 
 
 III. The context — External circumstances .... 35 
 
 rV. The context — Earlier and later Acts — Analogous Acts. 54 
 V. The title — Preamble — Marginal notes — Schedule — 
 
 Bules and orders 72 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 TEEATMENT OF GENERAL WOBDS. 
 
 Sbct. I. Words understood according to the subject-matter . 95 
 II. Beneficial construction 123 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 EESTRICTION TO THE SPECIFIC OBJECT IN VIEW. 
 
 Consequences to be considered — Presumption against 
 any alteration of the law beyond the specific object 
 of the Act — Mens rea in criminal law . . . 148 
 
 1* 
 
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VI CONTENTS. 
 
 OHAPTEE IV. 
 
 EXTENSION OF THE LBTTEB TO PREVENT EVASION 
 OR ABUSE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. Construction to prevent evasion .... 206 
 
 II. Construction to prevent abuse of powers . . • 226 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 RESTRICTION OF THE LANGUAGE TO BE IN HARMONY 
 WITH OTHER PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 Sect. I. Presumptions against ousting established, and creating 
 
 new, jurisdictions . . .... 235 
 
 II. The Crown not affected if not named .... 244 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 Sect. I. Presumption against intending an excess of juris- 
 diction 255 
 
 II. Presumption against a violation of international law . 262 
 
 III. How far statutes conferring rights affect foreigners . 273 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID COLLISION WITH OTHER 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 Sect. I. Eepugnancy— Repeal by implication — Acts in, or in- 
 volving, the negative . ••.'.. 280 
 II. Consistent affirmative Acts ...... 296 
 
 III. Generalia specialibus non derogant .... 313 
 
 IV. Implied repeal in penal Acts ..... 329 
 
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CONTENTS. Vli 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION MOST AGEEEABLB TO JUSTICE AND REASON. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. Presumption against intending what is inoonveaient 
 
 or Tinreasonable 339 
 
 II. Presumption against intending injustice or absurdity . 356 
 III. Construction against impairing obligations, or per- 
 mitting advantage from one's own wrong . . 869 
 rV. Eetrospeetive operation — 1. As regards vested rights ; 
 
 2. As regards procedure . . . . B81 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 EXCEPTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 Sect. I. Modification of the language to meet the intention . 406 
 II. Equitable construction . ... 447 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 STRICT CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 Sect. I. Construction of penal laws 462 
 
 II. Statutes encroaching on rights, or imposing burdens — 
 
 By-laws 501 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 SUBORDINATE PRINCIPLES; 
 
 Sect. I. Effect of usage . . 531 
 
 II. Construction imposed by statutes . . 541 
 
 III. Construction of words in bonam partem — Effect of 
 
 multiplicity of words — ^Of variation of language . 553 
 
 IV. Associated words understood in a common sense 571 
 V. Generic words following more specific . . . 583 
 
 VI. Meaning of some particular expressions . . 603 
 
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vm CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 INTENTIONS ATTEIBUTED TO THE LEGISLATUKB WHEN 
 It BXPEESSES NONE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. Implied enactments — Necessary incidents and conse- 
 quences . 615 
 
 II. Implied powers and obligations . . 623 
 
 III. Imperative or directory . . . 647 
 
 IV. Lex non cogit ad impossibUia — Cuilibet Ucet renuntiare 
 
 juri pro se introducto 673 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT. 
 
 Sect. I. Contracts connected with illegal acts ' 688 
 
 II. Public and private remedies . . . 705 
 
 III. Kepeal — Revival — Conamencement . 727 
 
 INDEX . 748 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Aaronson, Exp. (1878), 7 Oh. D. 713 ; 47 L. J. Bank. 60 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 243 ; 26 W. R. 470 227 
 
 Abbott, Exp. (1880), 15 Ch. D. 447 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 417 ; 29 W. R. 143 31,223 
 
 V. Middleton (1858), 7 H. L. Cas. 68 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 110 ; 
 
 115 R.R. 38 5,99 
 
 V. Rogers (1855), 16 C. B. 277 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 158 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 804 ; 100 R. R. 725 690,694 
 
 Abel V. Lee (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 365 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 154 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 844 ; 19 W. R. 625 447 
 
 Aberdare v. Hammett (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 162 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 
 
 49; 32L. T. 20 184 
 
 Aberdeen R. Co. v. Blaikie (1854), 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 461 ; 
 
 2 Eq. R. 1281, H. L 698 
 
 Abergavenny (Marquis) v. Bp. of Llandaff (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 
 
 460 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; 58 L. T. 812 ; 36 W. R. 859 . . 642 
 V. Brace (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 145 ; 41 L, J. Ex. 120 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 514 ; 20 W. R. 462 321 
 
 Aberystwith Pier Co. v. Cooper (1865), 35 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 13 
 
 L. T.273; 14W. R. 28 119 
 
 Abley v. Dale (1851), 11 C. B. 378 ; 2 L. M. & P. 443; 21 
 
 L. J. C. P. 104 ; 16 Jur. 427 6 
 
 „. (1850), 10 C. B. 62 ; 1 L. M. & P. 626 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 
 
 33; 14 Jur. 1069; 87 R.R. 697 644 
 
 Abrahams «. Dimmook, [1914] W. N. 449 680 
 
 Acebal v. Levy (1834), 10 Bing. 376 ; 4 M. & Scott 217 ; 38 R. R. 
 
 469 273 
 
 Achers v. Howard (1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 273 .. .. 637, 663 
 Adam v. Bristol Inhabitants (1834), 2 A. & E. 889 .. 13, 458 
 V. British and Foreign Steamship Co. (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 844 .. .. .. .. .. 274,317 
 
 Adams v. Graham (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 
 356 ; 9 L. T. 606 ; 12 W. R. 282 368 
 
 V. G. W. R. Co. (1861), 6 H. & N. 404 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 124 ; 
 
 3 L. T. 631 ; 9 W. R. 254 119 
 
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X TABLE OP OASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Adey d. Trinity House (1853), 22 L. J. Q. B. 3 ; 17 Jur. 489 .. 297 
 Aerated Bread Co. v. Gregg (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 355 ; 42 
 
 L. J. M. C. 117 ; 28 L. T. 816 481,482 
 
 Agricola, The (1843), 2 W. Rob. 10; 7 Jur. 157 619 
 
 Ahier v. Ahier (1885), 10 P. D. 110 ; 54 L. J. P. D. & A. 70 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 744 ; 33 W. R. 770 677 
 
 Ailesbury-B. PattiBon (1778), 1 Doug. 28 602 
 
 Akers V. Howard (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 739 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 273 ; 
 
 54 L. T. 651 ; 34 W. R. 609 ; 50 J. P. 519 637,663 
 
 Alabama Arbitration (1872), London Gazette, Sep. 20, p. 4135 44 
 Albon V. Pyke (1842), 4 M. & G. 421 ; 2 Scott N. R. 241 ; 11 
 
 L. J. C. P. 266 239 
 
 Alderson 1). PaUiser (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 935 681 
 
 Alexander, He, [1892] 1 Q. B. 216 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 677 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 133; 40W.B. 202; 9M.B. R. 13 97 
 
 V. Newman (1846), 2 C. B. 141 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Ca. 404 ; 15 
 
 L. J. C. P. 134; 10 Jur. 313 ; 69 R. R. 398 74 
 
 D. Vaughan (1776), 1 Cowp. 409 267 
 
 Alexander Larsen, The (1841), 1 W. Rob. 288 401 
 
 Alina, The (1880), 5 Ex. D. 227 ; 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 40 ; 42 
 
 L. T. 517 ; 29 W. R. 94 6, 34, 244 
 
 AUcroft V. London (Bp.), [1891] A. C. 666 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 92 ; 55 J. P. 773 432 
 
 Allen V. Flicker (1839), 10 A. & E. 640 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 42 ; 4 
 
 P. & D. 735 ; 3 Jur. 1029 283,545 
 
 V. Gold Reefs Synd., [1900] 1 Ch. 656 ; 69 L. J. Ch 266 130 
 
 V. Small, [1904] 2 L R. 705, Ir 474 
 
 V. Thompson (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 336 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 
 
 102; 22L. T. 472; 18W. R. 1196 490 
 
 AUiance Bank of Simla v. Carey (1880), 5 C. P. D. 429 ; 49 
 
 L. J. C. P. 781 ; 29 W. R. 306 ; 44 J. P. 735 . . . . 278 
 
 AUkins V. Jupe (1877), L.R. 2 C. P. D.'375 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 824 ; 
 
 36L. T. 851 11 
 
 Allsopp V. Day (1862), 7 H. & N. 457 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 41 ; 5 L. T. 320 212 
 
 Alma Spinning Co., Be (1881), 16 Ch. D. 681 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 167 ; 
 
 43 L. T. 620 ; 29 W. R. 133 .. .. ." 202 
 
 Alresford v. Scott (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 210 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 103 ; 
 
 45L. T. 73; 29W.R. 741; 45J.P. 619 621 
 
 Alton Wood's Case (1600), 1 Rep. 47 282 
 
 Altrrncham Union Assesst. Com. v. Cheshire Lines Com. (1885), 
 
 15 Q. B. D. 597 ; 50 J. P. 85 .. 529 
 
 Amalia, The (1863), 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 471 ; B. & L. 151 ; 
 
 9 Jur. N. S. 1111 ; 12 W. R. 24 ; 8 L. T. 679 ; 32 L. J. P. M. 
 
 &A. 191 257,272,277 
 
 Ambergate Ry. Co. v. Midland Ry. Co. (1853), 2 El. '& Bl. 793 ; 
 
 23L.J.Q. B. 17; 18Jur. 243.. „ 307 
 
 Ambler v. Bradford Corporation, [1902] 2 Ch. 594 .. .. 75 
 
 Amedie, The (1810), 1 Acton, 240 266 
 
 American Fur Co. v. U. 8. (1829), 2 Peters 367 464 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. XI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Amherst v. Sommers (1788), 2 T. R. 372 ; 1 R. R. 497 . . .. 246 
 
 Amos «;. Duflfy (1890), 6 T. L. R. 339, C. A 628 
 
 Ancketill v. Baylis (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 577 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 
 
 48 L. T. S142 ; 31 W. R. 233 ; 47 J. P. 356 ; 1 Colt. 289 .. 361 
 Andalusian, The (1878), 3 P. D. 182 ; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 204 ; 27 W. R. 172 653 
 
 Anderson v. Anderson, [1895] 1 Q. B. 749 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 457 ; 
 
 72 L. T. 313 ; 43 W. R. 322 590 
 
 1). Bank of Columbia (1876), 2 Ch. D. 654 543 
 
 V. Hamlin (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 221; 59 L. J. M. C. 151 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 168 ; 54 J. P. 757 706,718 
 
 Anderson's Estate, i?e, [1916] P. 49 127 
 
 Andrew, J?e(1876), 1 Ch. D. 358 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 57 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 556 ; 24 W. R. 197 65 
 
 V. Handcock (1819), 1 B. & B. 37 ; 3 Moore 278 ; 21 R. R. 
 
 569 622 
 
 Anglo-Greek Steam Co., Be (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 1 ; 35 Bea. 399 592 
 Anna, The (1876), 1 P. D. 253 ; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 16 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 895 532 
 
 Annapolis, The (1861), Lush. 295 263 
 
 Anon. (1464), Jenk. 120, 3rd Cent. Case 41 314 
 
 (1584), Skinn. 110 446 
 
 (1675), 1 Ventr. 267 663 
 
 (1703), 6 Mod. 27 715 
 
 (1774), Lofft. 465 304 
 
 Anstee v. Nelms (1856), 1 H. & N. 225 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 5 ; 108 
 
 R. R. 536 .. .. 41 
 
 Anstey v. Edwards (1855), 16 C. B. 212; 100 R. R. 700 .. 510 
 
 Antelope, The (1825), 10 Wheat. 66 266 
 
 Antony V. Cardenham (1700), 2 Bott. 194 126 
 
 Apothecaries' Co. v. Jones, [1893] 1 Q. B. 89 ; 67 L. T. 677 ; 41 
 
 W.R. 267; 57 J. P. 56; 17 Cox C. C. 588 474 
 
 Appleby ^;. Myers (1867), L. R. 1 0. P. 615 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 651 ; 
 
 36 L. J. C. P. 331 ; 16 L. T. 669 674 
 
 Archer v. James (1862), 2 B. & S. 61 ; 10 W. R. 565 ; 31 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 153 8, 501 
 
 Argos, Cargo ex (1873), L. R. 5 P. C. 134 244 
 
 Armagh Union Guardians v. Bell, [1900] 2 Ir. R. 371 ; Ir. .. 632 
 Armour v. Walker (1883), 25 Ch. D. 673 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 413 ; 50 
 
 L. T. 292 ; 32 W. R. 214 430 
 
 Armstrong v. Lewis (1834), 2 C. & M. 274 ; 4 M. & Scott 1 ; 
 
 3L. J. Ex. 359; 41R. R. 10 .. .. .. .. 693 
 
 Armytage iJ. Williamson or Wilkinson (1878), 3 App. Cas. 355 ; 
 
 47 L. J. P. C. 31 ; 38 L. T. 185 ; 26 W. R. 559 .. .. 507 
 Arnold V. Arnold (1837), 2 M. & Cr. 256 ; 1 Jur. 255 ; 39 R. R. 
 
 222 270 
 
 V. Cheque Bank, Ltd. (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 562 .. .. 201 
 
 V. Dimsdale (1853), 2 E. & B. .580 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 1157 644 
 
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XU TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Arrow Shipping Co. v. Tyiie Commiasioners, [1894] A. C. 508 ; 
 
 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 146 ; 71 L. T. 346, H. L 356 
 
 Arthuri;.Bokenham(1708), UMod. 150 ..149 
 
 Average Association, Se (1876), L. R. 10 Ch. 642 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 569 ; 32 L. T. 713 ; 23 W. R. 939 , 51? 
 
 Ascough's Case (1638), Cro. Car. 526 244, 24o 
 
 Ash V. Abdy (1678), 3 Swanst. 664 49,384,511 
 
 V. Lynn (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 270 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 159 ; 14 
 
 L. T. 224; 14W. R. 583; 7B. &S. 255 300 
 
 Ashbumham v. Bradshaw (1740), 2 Atk. 36 384 
 
 Ashbiirton, Lord v. Nocton, [1915] 1 Ch. 274, C. A 298 
 
 Ashbury &c. Co. v. Riche (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 653 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Ex: 186; 33 L. T. 451, H. L 577, 619, 620, 671 
 
 Ashby V. White (1703), 1 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.) 266 .. .. 714 
 
 Ashdown v. Curtis (1862), 31 L. J. M. C. 216 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 511 ; 
 
 6 L. T. 331 ; 10 W. R. 667 677 
 
 Ashford v. Thornton (1818), 1 B. <S; Aid. 405 ; 19 R. R. 349 .. 736 
 Ashton-under-Lyne v. Pugh, [1898] 1 Q. B. 45 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 32; 77L. T. 583; 46 W. R. 100; 61J. P. 788 .. .. 314 
 
 Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Lennard's Carrying Co., [1914] 1 K. B. 
 
 419, C. A . .. .. 276,677 
 
 Aspinall v. Sutton, [1894] 2 Q. B. 349 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 205 ; 58 
 
 J. P. 622 6o6 
 
 Athlumney, iJe, [1898] 2 Q. B. 551 391 
 
 Atkins V. Kilby (1840), 11 A. & E. 777 ; 9 L. J. M. 0. 52 ; 52 
 
 R. R. 503.. 679 
 
 Atkinson, Re (1882), 21 Ch. D. 100 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 452 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 850 ; 30 W. R. 562 270 
 
 V. Bradford Bldg. Soc. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 377 ; 59 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 360; 62L. T. 857; 38W. R. 630 454 
 
 V. Newcastle Waterworks Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 441 ; 46 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 775 ; 36 L. T. 761 ; 25 W. R. 794 .. 715,721,722 
 V. Sellers (1859), 5 C. B. N. S. 442 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 
 
 5 Jur. N. S. 21 ; 116 R. R. 720 121 
 
 Attorney-General v. Alexander (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 20 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 3 ; 31 L. T. 694 ; 23 W. R. 255 119 
 
 1). Allgood (1743), Parker 3 244 
 
 V. Bailey (1847), 1 Ex. 281 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 9 ; 74 R. R. 672 107 
 
 V. Barker (1872), L R. 7 Ex. 177 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 57 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 34; 20 W. R. 509 249 
 
 ■ V. Basingstoke (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 726 ; 24 W. R. 817 .. 709 
 
 ■ V. Bradbury (1851), 7 Ex. 97 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 12 ; 16 Jur. 130 507 
 
 V. Bradlaugh (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 667 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 205; 
 
 52 L. T. 589; 33 W. R. 673 568, 708 
 
 V. Brecon (1878), 10 Ch. D. 204; 48 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 40 L.T. 
 
 52; 27 W. R. 332 626 
 
 u. Bristol (1820), 2 Jac. & W. 321 ; 22 R. R. 136 .. .. 533 
 
 V. Cambridge (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 303 ; 22 W. R. 37 . . 530 
 
 v.- Campbell (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 524 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 
 
 611; 21W. R. 34n 270 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Xlii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Attorney-General «. Capell (1686), 2 Show. 481 610 
 
 v. Chelsea Waterworks (1731), Fitzg. 195 281 
 
 -^^ V. Conduit Colliery Co. (1894), 64 L. J. Q. B. 207, C. A. .. 59 
 
 V. Constable (1879), 4 Ex. D. 172 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 455 ; 27 
 
 W. R. 661 249 
 
 V. Davies (1802), 9 Ves. 535 ; 7 R. R. 295 216 
 
 V. Day (1794), 1 Ves. Sen. 221 454, 455 
 
 V. Donaldson (1842), 10 M. & W. 117 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 338 ; 
 
 62R. R. 540 244,248 
 
 V. Dorking (1882), 20 Oh. D. 595 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 585 .. 170 
 
 w. Dorin (1912), 81 L. J. Ch. 225 .. 527 
 
 V. Edison Telephone Co. (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 244 ; 50 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 43 L. T. 697 ; 29 W. R. 428 .. .. 140 
 
 w. EUis (1895). 64 L. J. Q. B. 813 508 
 
 V. Emerson (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 56 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 192 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 21 ; 38 W. R. 102 232 
 
 V. Exeter Corp., [1911] 1 K. B. 1092 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 636 ; 
 
 104 L. T. 212 ; 75 J. P. 280 150,324,706 
 
 «. Forster (1805), 10 Ves. 338 532 
 
 V. Furness Ry. Co. (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 776 ; 38 L. T. 555 ; 
 
 26W. R. 650 529 
 
 V. , [1899] 2 Q. B. 267 508 
 
 v.a. E. Ry. Co. (1879), 11 Ch. D. 449; 48 L. J. Ch. 428 ; 
 
 40L. T. 265 76,619 
 
 V. (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 475 ; L. R 6 H. L. 367 ; 41 
 
 L. J. Ch. 505 ; 26. L. T. 749 ; 20 W. R. 599, H. L 328 
 
 V. Hackney Board (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 626 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 
 
 545 ; 33 L. T. 244 360 
 
 V. HaUett (1857), 2 H. & N. 368 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 89 ; 115 
 
 R. R. 594 97 
 
 • V. Hanwell, [1900] 2 Ch. 337 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 626 ; 82 L. T. 
 
 778 ; 48 W. R. 690 231 
 
 V. Hill (1836), 2 M. & W. 160 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 46 
 
 R. R. 542 248 
 
 V. Hooper, [1893] 3 Ch. 483 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 18 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 340; 57 J. P. 564 641 
 
 V. Horner (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 254 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 33 
 
 W. R. 93 ; 49 J. P. 326 502 
 
 V. Jones (1863), 2 H. & C. 347 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 6 L. T. 
 
 655 532 
 
 V. Kwok-a-Sing (1873), L. R. 5 P. 0. 179 ; 42 L. J. P. C. 
 
 64 ; 29 L. T. 114 ; 12 Cox C. C. 565, P. 0. .. 45, 123, 159, 255, 
 
 407, 468 
 V. Lamplough (1878), 3 Ex. D. 214 ; 47 L. J. Ex. 555 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 87 ; 26 W. R. 323 • 68,728 
 
 V. Leicester Corp., [1910] 2 Ch. 359; 83 L. J. Ch. 21 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 214 ; 74 J. P. 385 231 
 
 V. Lewes Corp. (1911), 81 L J. Ch. 40 414 
 
 ■«. Hloyd (1747), 3 Atk. 5.51 384 
 
 I.S. 2 
 
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XIV TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Attorney-General v. Lockwood (1842), 9 M. & W. 378 ; 10 Id. 
 
 464 ; 6 Jur. 171 10, 140, 301, 333, 406, 479 
 
 V. L. & N. W. Ry. (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 216 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 170 ; 44 L. T. 236 ; 29 W. K. 346 ; 45 J. P. 390 .. .. 509 
 
 u. L.C.C. (1901), 70 L. J. Ch. 367, 0. A 620 
 
 V. Manchester (1881), 18 Ch. iD. 609 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 562 . . 47 
 
 V. -, [1906] 1 Ch. 643 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 330 ; 54 W. R. 307 ; 
 
 70J. P. 201 620 
 
 V. Margate Pier Co., [1900] ] Ch. 749 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 331 ; 
 
 82 L. T. 448 ; 48 W. R. 518 ; 64 J. P. 405 75 
 
 I). Mersey Ry., [1907] lA. C. 415; 76 L. J. Ch. 568; 97 
 
 L. T. 524 ; 71J. P. 449 231,619 
 
 V. Metrop. Ry. Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 384 ; 69 L. T. 811 ; 42 
 
 W. R. 381 ; 58 J. P. 342 628 
 
 V. Napier (1851t, 6 Ex. 217 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 173 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 253; 86 R. R. 247 271 
 
 V. Newcastle-upon-Tyne and N. E. Ry. Co. (1889), 23 
 
 Q. B. D. 492 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 558 620 
 
 u. Panter (1772), 6 Bro. P. C. 486 740 
 
 ■«. Parker (1747), 3 Atk. 576 116,532 
 
 V. Pontypridd, [1906] 2 Ch. 257 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 578 ; 95 
 
 L. T. 224 ; 70 J. P. 394 ; 4 L. G. R. 791 231 
 
 V. Richmond (Duke), [1909] A. C. 466 ; 78 L. J. K. B. 1, 
 
 998 ; 101 L. T. 241, H. L 220 
 
 ■«. Saggers (1814), 1 Pri. 182 480 
 
 V. Seacombe (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 913 218 
 
 V. Siddon (1830), 1 Or. & J. 220 ; 1 Tyr. 41 ; 35 R. R. 701 189 
 
 V. Sillem (1863), 2 H. & C. 431 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 262 ; 33 
 
 L. J. Ex. 93 ; 12 W. R. 257 ; 11 L. T. 223 .. .. 43, 51 
 V. (1864), 10 H. L. Cas. 704 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 209; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 446 ; 10 L. T. 434 400, 519 
 
 V. Smith, [1893] 1 Q. B. 239 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 288 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 6 ; 41 W. R. 245 ; 57 J. P. 389 505 
 
 V. Southampton (1849), 17 Sim. 6 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 393 .. 236 
 
 V. Theobald (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 557 ; 62 L. T. 768 ; 38 
 
 W. R. 527 395,400 
 
 «. Tyndall (1764), Ambl. 614 215 
 
 u. Tynemouth Corp. (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 489 .. .. 620 
 
 V. West Gloucestershire Water Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 338 ; 78 
 
 L. J. Ch. 746 ; 101 L. T. 258 ; 73 'J. P. 453 . . .. 231 
 V. Westminster Chambers Association (1876), 1 Ex. D. 
 
 469 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 886 ; 35 L. T. 224 ; 24 W. R. 996 .. 4, 71 
 
 v. Weymouth (1743), Ambl. 22 74 
 
 Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Ostrum, [1904] A. C 
 
 144 ; 73 L. J. P. C. 11 ; 89 L. T. 509 ; 20 T. L. R, 64, P. C. 505 
 Attorney-General (Ontario) v. A.-G. Dominion of Canada 
 
 (1896), 65 L. J. P. C. 26 524 
 
 Attree v. Hawe (1878), 9 Oh. D. 337 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 38 L, T. 
 
 733; 26W. R. 871 .. ., 216 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. XV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A ttwater, Ux p. (1877), 5 Ch. D. 27 ; 46 L. J, Bank. 41; 35 
 
 L. T. 682 ; 25 W. R. 206 .. ... ... .. 8,298,543 
 
 Auckland, Lord v. Westminster Board of Works (1872), L. R. 
 
 7 Ch. 697 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 723 ; 26 L. T. 961 ; 20 W. R. 845 58 
 Austen v. Howard (1816), 7 Taunt. 28, 327 ; 2 Marsh. 352 .. 307 
 
 Austerberry v. Oldham Corp. (1885), 29 Ch. D. 750, C. A. .. 685 
 
 Austin «. Bowley (1913), 108 L. T. 920 47 
 
 V. Bunyard (1865), 6 B. & S. 687 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 11 
 
 Jur. N. S. 879 ; 12 L. T. 452 ; 13 W. R. 773 .. 226, 351 
 V. Mills (1854), 9 Ex. 288 ; 2 C. L. R. 411 1 23 L. J. Ex. 40 ; 
 
 18 Jur. 16 ; 96 R. R. 717 238 
 
 Avanzo v. Mudie (1854), 10 Ex. 203 ; 102 R. R. 533 .. .. 651 
 
 Avery v. Wood, [1891] 3 Ch. 115 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 75 ; 65 L. T. 122 ; 
 
 39 W.R, 577 .. .. 543 
 
 Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald (1883), 8 App. Cas. 623, H. L. 
 
 528, 633 
 
 B. 
 
 Backwell's Case (1683), 1 Vernon 152 427,428 
 
 Badcock V. Hunt (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 145 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 134 ; 
 
 60 L. T. 314 ; 37 W. R. 205 ; 53 J. P. 340 98 
 
 Baddeley v. Earl Granville (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 423 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 501 ; 57 L. T. 268 ; 38 W. R. 63 ; 51J. P. 822 .. .. 682 
 
 Badische Anilin und Soda Pabrik v. Hickson, [1906] A. C. 427 , 
 
 H.L 165 
 
 Bagg's Case (1616), 11 Rep. 99 639 
 
 Bagge V. Whitehead, [1892] 2 Q. B. 355 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 778 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 815 ; 40 W. R. 472 ; 56 J. P. 548 . . . . 167, 188 
 
 Bailey v. Harris (1849), 12 Q. B. D. 905 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 115 ; 
 
 13 Jur. 341 107,699 
 
 V. Sweeting (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 843 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 150 ; 
 
 9W. R. 273 513 
 
 Baily v. De Crespigny (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 180 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 98; 19 L. T. 681; 17 W.R. 494 .. .. .. .. 687 
 
 Bainbridge v. Postmaster-General, [1906] 1 K. B. 186, C. A. .. 145 
 Baines v. Wormsley (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 844 ; 39 L. T. 85 ; 27 
 
 W.R. 36 429 
 
 Baird v. Tunbridge WeUs, [1894] 2 Q. B. 867 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 151 ; 71 L. T. 211 ; 59 J. P. 36 314 
 
 Bake v. French, [1907] 2 Ch. 215 ; 76 L. J. Ch. 605 .. .. 347 
 
 Baker, Ee (1857), 2 H. & N. 219 334 
 
 , Be (1890), 44 Ch. D. 262 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 661 ; 62 L. T. 817 ; 
 
 38 W.R. 417 436 
 
 i;. Berkeley (1827), 3 C. & P. 32 563 
 
 u. Hedgecock (1888), 39 Ch. D. 520 702 
 
 u. Herd (1894), 58 J. P. 413 193 
 
 Balaghat Gold Co., Be, [1901] 2 K. B. 665; 70 L. J. K. B. 866 ; 
 
 85.L. T. 8; 49W. R..625 617 
 
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XVI TABLE OF CASES., 
 
 FAGE 
 
 Baldwin, Ei: p. (1858), 2 De G. & J, 230 ; 27 L. J. Bank. 17 ; 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 522 112 
 
 Ball, Ms p. (1882), 20 Ch. D. 670; 51 L. J. Ch. 911 ; 47 L. T. 
 
 213 ; 30 W. R. 738 227 
 
 Balls t>. Attwood (1791), 1 H. Bl. 546 240 
 
 Bancroft v. Mitchell (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 549 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 257 ; 16 L. T. 558 ; 15 W. R. 1132 ; 8 B. & S. 558 .. .. 100 
 
 Bane v. Methuen (1824), 2 Bing. 63 ; 9 Moore 161 ; 27 R. R. 546 624 
 Bank of Bengal v. Ramanahan Chetty (1916), L. R. 43 Ind. 
 
 App.48, P. C 135 
 
 Bank of England v. Anderson (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 589, 666 ; 
 
 7 L. J. Ch. 265 ; 44 R. R. 271 213,531 
 
 V. Vagliano, [1891] App. Cas. 107 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 353 ; 39 W. R. 657, H. L. 47, 109 
 
 Bank of N. S. Wales v. Piper, [1897] A. C. 383 ; 66 L. J. P. C. 
 
 73; 76L. T. 572; 61J. P. 660, P. C 195 
 
 Bank of Scotland v. Stewart (1891), 28 Sc. L. R. 735, Sc. .. 627 
 
 Bank of U. S. D. Donnally (1834), 8 Peters 361 277 
 
 Bankes v. Small (1887), 36 Ch. D. 716 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 832 ; 57 
 
 L. T. 292 ; 35 W. R. 765 160 
 
 Bankruptcy Notice, Be A, [1895] 1 Q. B. 609 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 429 ; 43 W. R. 305 ; 72 L. T. 312 ; 2 Mans. 164 .. .. 97 
 
 Banks v. Hollingsworth, [1893] 1 Q. B. 443 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 239 ; 
 
 68 L. T. 477 ; 41 W. R. 225 ; 57 J. P. 436 171 
 
 Barber V. Gamson (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 281 431 
 
 V. Waite (1834), 1 A. & E. 514 ; 3 N. & M. 611 ; 3 L.J. M. C. 
 
 101 98 
 
 Barclay, Exp. (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 567 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 449; 30 
 
 L. T. 479 ; 22 W. R. 608 174 
 
 u. Pearson (1893), 62 L. J. Ch. 636 , .. 199 
 
 Barker v. Edgar, [1898] A. C. 749; 67 L. J. P. C. 115 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 151 315 
 
 V. Palmer (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 9 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 110 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 480 ; 30 W. R. 59 656 
 
 Barkworth v. Young (1856), 4 Drew. 1 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 3 ,Jur. 
 
 N. S. 34 ; 5 W. R. 156 512 
 
 Barlow v. Ross (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 381 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 183 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 552 ; 38 W. R. 372 ; 54 J. P. 660 . . . . 123, 128 
 V. Teal (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 403; 54 L. J. Q. B. 400 ; 53 
 
 L.T. 52 543,604 
 
 V. Terrett, [1891] 2 Q. B. 107 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 104 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 148 ; 39 W. R. 640 ; 55 J. P. 632 475 
 
 Barnacle v. Clark, [1900] 1 Q. B. 279 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 15 ; 81 L. T. 
 
 484 ; 48 W. R. 336 ; 64 J. P. 87 496 
 
 Barnardo v. Ford, [1892] A. C. 326 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 728: 67 
 
 L. T. 1; 56 J. P. 629, H. L .. 371 
 
 Barnes u Ackroyd (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 474; 41 L. J. M. C. 110; 
 
 26 L. T. 692 ; 20 W. R. 671 137,189 
 
 V. Glenton, [1899] 1 Q. B. 885 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 502 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 606 ; 47 W. R. 435 303 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Xvii 
 
 PACE 
 
 Barnes v. Shore (1846), 8 Q. B. 640 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 688 161 
 
 Barraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 672 
 
 243, 550 
 Barrack v. McCuUooh (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 105 ; 3 Kay & J. 110 ; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 180 ; 112 B. R. 60 146 
 
 Barrow, JS»i). (1797), 3 Ves.Jun. 554 153 
 
 : V. Wadkin (1858), 24 Beav. 327; 27 L. J. Ch. 129; 116 
 
 R. R. 1 76 
 
 Bartlett v. Kirwood (1853), 2 E. & B. 771 ; 2 C. L. R. 253 ; 23 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 9 ; 18 Jur. 173 642 
 
 v. Vinor (1692), Carth. 252 688,690 
 
 Barton v. Piggott (1874), L. R. 10 Q. B. 86 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 5 ; 
 
 31 L. T. 404 ; 23 W. R. 233 230, 426, 691 
 
 V. Port Jackson Co. (1853), 17 Barbour N. York R. 397 .. 698 
 
 V. Taylor (1886), 11 App. Cas. 203 ; 55 L. J. P. C. 1 . . 632 
 
 Barton Regis v. Liverpool (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 295 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 
 
 62; 37 L. T. 713; 26 W. R. 382 38C 
 
 Barwick v. English J. S. Bank (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 259 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 147 ; 16 L. T. 461 ; 15 W. B. 877 138 
 
 Bastable v.. Little, [1907] 1 K. B. 59 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 77 ; 96 L. T. 
 
 115; 71 J. P. 52; 5 L. G. R. 279 489 
 
 Bateman and Parker, Re, [1899] 1 Ch. 599 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 330 ; 80 
 
 L. T. 469 ; 47 W. R. 516 ; 63 J. P. 345 125 
 
 V. Mid Wales Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 499 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 
 
 205; 12 Jur. N. S. 453 ; 14 W. R. 672 632 
 
 V. Service (1881), 6 App. Cas. 386 ; 50 L. J. P. C. 41 .. 267 
 
 Bates V. Bates (1888), 14 P. D. 17 ; 58 L. J. P. 85 ; 60 L. T. 125 ; 
 
 37W. R. 230 100,101 
 
 V. Winstanley (1815), 4 M. & S. 429 293 
 
 Bath V. Berwick, [1892] 1 Q. B. 731 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 136 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 258 ; 40 W. R. 414 ; 56 J. P. 296 383 
 
 Bathishill v. Reed (1856), 18 C. B. 696; 25 L. J. C. P. 290; 107 
 
 R. R. 465 611 
 
 Batt V. Metropolitan Water Board, [1911] 2 K. B. 966 .. .. 393 
 V. Price (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 264 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 170 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 808 ; 24 W. R. 318 711 
 
 Battersby v. Kirk (1835), 1 Hodges 451 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 584 ; 3 
 
 Scott 11 ; 5 L. J. C. P. 166 80 
 
 Battersea Vestry v. Provincial Electric Co., [1899] 1 Ch. 474 ; 68 
 
 L. J. Ch. 238 ; 80 L. T. 31 170 
 
 Batthyany V. Boiich (1881), 50 L. J. Q.< B. 421 569 
 
 Battye v. Gresley (1807), 8 East 319 645 
 
 Baum, Be (1878), 7 Ch. D. 719 ; 47 L. J. Bank. 48 ; 38 L. T. 367 ; 
 
 26W. R. 568 .. 228 
 
 Baumann v. James (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 508 ; 18 L. T. 424 ; 16 
 
 W. B. 877 41 
 
 Baxendale v. G. E. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 244 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 137 ; 17 W. R. 412 36? 
 
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XVIU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Baxendale v. Hart (1852), 6 Ex. 769 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 123 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 126 ; 86 R. R. 465 419 
 
 Baxter v. Langley (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 21 ; 38 L. J. M. 0. 1 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 321 ; 17 W. R. 254 575 
 
 Beal, Exp. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 387 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 161; 18 
 
 L. T. 285.; 16 W. R. 852 ; 9 B. & S. 395 .. .. 481,491 
 V. Ford (1878), 3 C. P. D. 59 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 56 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 408 ; 26 W. R. 146 ; 2 Hop. & C. 374 116 
 
 V. Town Clerk. of Exeter (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 300 ; 57 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 128 ; 58 L. T. 407 ; 36 W. R. 507 ; 1 Fox 31 . . 117 
 
 Beard v. Knight (1858), 8 B. & B. 865 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 359 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 782 ; 112 R. R. 810 553 
 
 .■». Rowan (1835), 9 Peters 317 79 
 
 Beardsley v. Giddinga, [1904] 1 K. B. 847 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 378 ; 
 
 90 L. T. 651 ; 53 W. R. 78 ; 20 T. L. R. 315 ; 68 J. P. 222 101 
 Beaufort v. Swansea (Mayor) (1849), 3 Ex. 413 ; 67 R. R. 677 541 
 Beoke v. Smith (1836), 2 M. & W. 191 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 54 ; 46 R. R. 
 
 567 4, 406, 411 
 
 Beckett v. Midland Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 94 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 
 
 40 ; 15 L. T. 572 ; 15 W. R. 404 172,724 
 
 V. Tower Assets Co., [1891] 1 Q. B. 638 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 493 ; 
 
 55 J. P. 438; 64L. T. 497; 39 W. R. 438 .. .. .. 211 
 
 Beckford v. Hood (1798), 7 T. R. 620 ; 4 R. R. 527 .. .. 716 
 
 V. Wade (1805), 17 Ves. 91 ; 11 R. R. 20 157 
 
 Beckham ?;. Drake (1841), 2 H. L. 579 ; 11 M. & W. 315 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 486 ; 13 Jur. 921 ; 81 R. R. 301 349 
 
 Beckwith j;. Talbot (1877), 5 Otto 289 512 
 
 Beddow v. Beddow (1878), 9 Oh. D. 89 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 558 ; 26 W. R. 
 
 570 151 
 
 Bedo «. Sanderson (1617), Cro. Jac. 440 210 
 
 Beds V. St. Paul (1852), 7 Ex. 650 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 224 ; 86 R. R. 
 
 777 247 
 
 Beer v. London and Paris Hotel Co. (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 412 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 715 : .. .. .. .. 511 
 
 Beeston v. Beeston (1875), 1 Ex. D. 13 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 230 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 700; 24W. R. 96 694 
 
 Behn v. Bumess (1861), 3 B. & S. 751 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 207 ; 8 
 
 L. T. 207 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 620 42 
 
 Belasco v. Hannant (1862), 3 B. & S. 13 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 225 ; 9 
 
 Cox C. C. 203 ; 10 W. R. 867 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1226 .. .. 81 
 
 Bell 1^. BUton (1828), 4 Bing. 615 395 
 
 V. Crane (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 481 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 122 ; 29 
 
 L. T. 207; 21 W. R. 911 438 
 
 V. Dudley (Earl), [1895] 1 Ch. 182 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 291 ; 72 
 
 L. T. 14 ; 43 W. R. 122 .. 627 
 
 Bellamy v. Debenham (1890), 45 Ch. D. 481 ; 63 L. T. 220 612 
 V. Hoyle (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 220 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 169 : 33 
 
 L. T. 21 ; 23 W. R. 754 625 
 
 V. SauU (1863), 4 B. & S. 265 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 366 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 534; 11 W. R. 800 668 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. XIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Bell-Cox, &ij. (1887), 20 Q. B.D. 1 51 
 
 V. Hakes (1890), 15 App. Cas. 506 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 392 ; 39 W. R. 145 ; 54 J. P. 820 ; 17 Cox C. C. 158 49, 
 
 446 
 Belton V. Busby, [1899] 2 Q. B. 380 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 859 ; 81 
 
 L. T. 196 ; 47 W. R. 636 ; 63 J. P. 709 600 
 
 Bence, Be, [1891] 3 Ch. 242 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 636 ; 65 L. T. 530 .. 559 
 Beneficed Clerk v. Lee, [1897] A. C. 226 ; 66 L. J. P. C. 8 ; 75 
 
 L..T. 461 489 
 
 Benfieldside Local Board v. Consett Iron Co. (1878), 3 Ex. D. 54 ; 
 
 47 L. J. Ex. 491 ; 26 W. R. 114 ; 38 L. T. 530 . . .. 59 
 
 Benjamin v. Storr (1874), L. R. 9 0. P. 400 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 162 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 362 ; 22 W. R. 631 724 
 
 Bennett v. Atkins (1879), 4 C. P. D. 80 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 66 ; 27 W. R. 231 684 
 
 V. Brumfitt (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 28 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 25 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 213 ; 16 W. B. 131 ; 1 H. & P. 407 70 
 
 V. Daniel (1830), 10 B. & C. 500 378, 567 
 
 ■;;. Edwards (1839), 7 B. & C. 586 ; 7 L. J. M. C. 49 ; 8 Id. 
 
 71 ; 1 M. & R. 482 ; 6 Ring. 230 ; 31 R. R. 403 .. 145,494 
 
 «. Tatton, [1918] W. N. 291 728,732 
 
 a;. Watson(1814), 3M. &S. 1 153 
 
 Bensley v. Bignold (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 335 ; 24 R. R. 401 . . 696 
 
 Bent V. Roberts (1878), 3 Ex. D. 66; 47 L. J. Ex. 112 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 673 ; 26 W. R. 128 120 
 
 Bentham v. Hoyle (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 289 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 51 ; 37 
 
 L. T. 753; 26 W. R. 314 523 
 
 Bentley v. Rotherhani (1876), 4 Ch. D. 588 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 284 74, 82 
 
 Bentson I'. Taylor, [1893] 2 Q. B. 274 42 
 
 Benwell, Ex p. (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 301 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 677 ; 33 W. R. 242 577 
 
 Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 79 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 316 ; 61 L. T. 150 ; 37 W. R..548 ; 53 J. P. 805 .. 153, 155 
 Berkeley w.Elderkin (1853), 1 El. & Bl. 805 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 
 
 l7Jur. 1153 238 
 
 V. Thompson (1884), 10 App. Cas. 45 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 1 ; 33 W. B. 525 ; 49 J. P. 276 259 
 
 Berkeley Peerage (1861), 4 H. L. Cas. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 21 ; 4 L. T. 
 
 686 ; 4 Camp. 419, H. L 369 
 
 Berwick «;. Andrews (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 971 449 
 
 V. Oswald (1853), 3 E. & B. 678 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 321 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 395 ; 5 H. L. Cas. 856 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 383 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 743 ; 101 R. R. 416 H. L 686 
 
 Bessey v. Windham (1844), 6 Q. B. 166 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 66 
 
 R. R. 336 376 
 
 Best, Exp. (1881), 18 Ch. D. 488 ; 45 L. T. 95 683 
 
 V. Pembroke (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 363; 42 L. J. Q. B. 212; 
 
 29 L. T. 327 ; 21 W. R. 919 65 
 
 Beta, The (1869), 3 Moo. P. C. N. S. 23 ; 38 L. J. P. M. & A. 76 ; 
 
 12 L. T. 1 416 
 
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XX TABLE OP OASES- 
 
 PABE 
 
 Betham i;. Gregg (1834), 10 Bing. 352 ; 3 L. J. C. P. 121 ; 4 M. & 
 
 Scott, 230; 38 R. R. 449 381 
 
 Betts V. Armstead (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 771 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 100 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 811; 36 W. R. 720; 52 J. P. 471 186 
 
 V. Stevens, [1910] 1 K. B. 1 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 17 ; 101 L. T. 
 
 564; 73 J. P. 486 489 
 
 Beven v. Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Co., [1902] 20 R. P. C. 
 
 69 593 
 
 Bidden V. Leeder (1823), 1 B. & C. 327 . . . . • • ■ • 702 
 
 Biddulph V. St. George's Vestry (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 411 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 434; 8 L. T. 44 ; 11 W. R. 524 227 
 
 Biffin V. Yorke (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 428 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 162 ; 6 Scott 
 
 N. R. 234; 63R. R. 337 7,8 
 
 Biggar v. Eastwood (1886), 19 L. R. Ir. 65, Ir 215 
 
 Biggs V. Mitchell (1862), 2 B. & S. 523 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 163 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 817; 6 L. T. 242; 10 W. R. 559 581 
 
 Bill V. Bament (1841), 9 M. & W. 36 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 60 R. R. 
 
 658 512 
 
 Billings t;. Prinn (1775) 2 W. Bl. 1017 045 
 
 Bills V. Smith (1865), 6 B. & S. 314 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 154; 12 L. T. 22 ; 13 W. B. 407 214 
 
 Binns v. Hey (1843), 1 D. & L. 661 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 1154 402 
 
 Binstead, Be, [1893] 1 Q. B. 199 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 207 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 31 ; 41 W. R. 452 ; 9 M. B. R. 319 97 
 
 Birch ?). Lake (1674), 1 Mod. 185 291 
 
 Birchall v. Bullough, [1896] 1 Q. B. 325 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 252 ; 74 
 
 L. T. 27 ; 44 W. R. 300 204 
 
 Bird V. Adcock (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 26 W. R. 634 328, 734 
 V. Davey, [1891] 1 Q. B. 29 ; 63 L. T. 741 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; 
 
 39W. R. 40 16 
 
 Birkenhead Docks v. Laird (1853), 4 De G. M. & G. 732 ; 23 
 
 L. J. Ch. 457 ; 18 Jur. 883 328 
 
 Birkmyr v. Darnell (1704), 1 Sm. L. C. 299 273 
 
 Birley v. Chorlton (1841), 3 Beav. 499 ; 52 R. R. 202 .. .. 2.36 
 
 Birmingham?). Shaw (1849), 10 Q. B. 868 ; 3 New Seas. Cas. 445 ; 
 
 18 L. J. M. C. 89 ; 13 Jur. 357 ; 74 R. R. 523 ■ .. .. 341 
 
 Birnie u. Marshall (1876), 35 L. T. 373 646 
 
 Bishop i;. Bryant (1834), 6 C. & P. 484 679 
 
 V. Curtis (1852), 18 Q. B. S78 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 391 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 23 ; 88 R. R. 819 156 
 
 ■». Duffy (1894), 22 R. 192 ; Soo 121 
 
 Bishops, Case of (1606), 12 Rep. 7 727 
 
 Blackburn v. Parkinson (1858), 1 E. & E. 71 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 7 ; 
 
 117R. R. 145 240 
 
 Blackburn (Mayor) v. Sanderson, [1902] 1 K. B. 794 ; 71 L. J 
 
 K. B. 590 ; 86 L. T. 304 ; 66 J. P. 452 348 
 
 Blackmore v. Mile End Vestry (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 451 ; 51 
 
 L. J.Q. B.496; 46L. T. 869; 30W. R. 740 .. .. 726 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. XXI 
 
 PA.OS 
 
 Blackpool Motor Car Co., JSe, [1901] 1 Ch. 77 114 
 
 Blackwood v. R. (1882), 8 App. Cas. 81 ; 52 L. J. P. C. 10 ; 
 
 48 L. T. 441 ; 31 W. R. 645 57,271 
 
 Blaiberg, Ex p. (1883), 23 Ch. D. 254 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 461 ; 49 
 
 L. T. 16 ; 31 W. R. 906 379 
 
 Blain, Ex p. (1879), 12 Ch. D. 512 ; 41 L. T. 46 ; 28 W. R. 334 267 
 
 Blake «. AttersoU (1824), 2 B. & C. 875 582 
 
 Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co. (1832), 1 M. & K. 154 ; 
 
 36R. R. 289 528 
 
 Blaker v. Tillstone, [1894] 1 Q. B. 345 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 72 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 31 ; 42 W. R. 253 ; 58 J. P. 184 186 
 
 Blankley v. Winstanley (1789), 3 T. R. 279 ; 1 R. R. 704 .. 532 
 Blithman, Be (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 23 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 255 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 84 ; 14 L. T. 6 ; 35 Beav. 219 269 
 
 Bloxam v. Favre (1883), 9 P. D. 130 ; 53 L. J. P D. & A. 26; 
 
 50 L. T. 766 ; 32 W. R. 673 268 
 
 Bloxsome v. Williams (1824), 3 B. & C. 232 ; 5 D. & R. 82 ; 
 
 1 C. & P. 294 ; 27 R. R. 337 379,691 
 
 Blundell v. Gladstone (1841), 3 McN. & Gor. 692 ; 12 L. J. Ch. 
 
 225 . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
 
 Blunt V. 'keslop (1838), 3 N."& P. 553; 7 L. J.Q. B. '216 ; 47 
 
 R. R. 664 606 
 
 Blyth V. Birmingham Waterworks (1856), 11 Ex. 781 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 
 
 212 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 333 ; 105 R, R. 791 628 
 
 Boast V. Firth (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 1 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 264 ; 17 W. R. 29 674 
 
 Boddington, 5e, [1915] H. B. R. 183 118 
 
 Boldero w. Jackson (1809), 11 East, 612 209 
 
 Bolina, The(1812), lGallison75 466 
 
 Bolton V. Bolton (1876), 2 Ch. D. 217 ; 34 L. T. 123 ; 24 W. R. 
 
 426 681 
 
 Bolton Corporation v. Scott (1913), 77 J. P. 193, C. A 348 
 
 Bonaker v. Evans (1850), 16 Q. B. 163 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 15 
 
 Jur. 460 ; 83 R. R. 409 642 
 
 Bonar v. MitcheU (1850), 5 Ex. 415 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 302 .. .. 672 
 Bond V. Bond (1860), 29 L. J. P. M. & A. 143 ; 2 S. & T. 93 ; 8 
 
 W. R. 630 261 
 
 V. Evans (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249 ; 67 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 411 ; 36 W. R. 767 ; 52 J. P. 612 .. 191, 192, 490 
 
 ». Hopkins (1802), 1 Sch. & Lef. 433 455 
 
 V. Rosling (1860), 1 B. & S. 371 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 4 L. T. 
 
 442; 9W. B. 746 569 
 
 V. St. George's (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 314 ; 40 L. J. 0. P. 47 ; 
 
 23 L. T. 494 ; 19 W. R. 101 ; 1 Hop. & C. 427 .. .. 117 
 
 Bonella v. Twickenham Bd. (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 63 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 
 
 1; 58L. T. 299; 36W. R. 50; 52J.P. 356 366 
 
 Bones ?;. Booth (1778), 2 W. Bl. 1226 560 
 
 Bonham's Case (1609), 8 Rep. 118a . . .. 1.50, 272, 459, 461 
 
 Bonner v. G. W. R. (1883), 24 Ch. D. 1 ; 48 L. T 619 ; 32 W. R. 
 
 190 ; 47 J. P. 580 526 
 
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XXll TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Bonnewell v.. Jenkins (1878), 8 Ch. D. 70 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 758 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 81 ; 26 W. R. 294 512 
 
 Bonomi v. Backhouse (1856), 9 H. L. 503 ; E. B. & E. 622 ; 27 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 378 ; 28 Id. 380 ; 34 Id. 181 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 809 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 769 ; 113 R. R. 799 12 
 
 Boodle V. Davis (1853), 8 Ex. 351 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 69 . . . . 402 
 Boon V. Howard (1874), L. R. 9 0. P. 277 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 115 ; 
 
 29 L. T. 382 ; 22 W. R. 535 ; 2 Hop. & C. 208 . . 357, 447 
 Booth V. Bank of England (1840), 7 CI. & F. 509 ; 2 Scott N. R. 
 
 701 ; 6 Bing. N. C. 415 ; 4 Jur. 762 ; 44 R. R. 272 .. 213 
 V. Olive (1851), 10 0. B. 827 ; 2 L. M. & P. 283 ; 20 
 
 L. J. 0. P. 151 ; 15 Jur. 563 414 
 
 u. Ibbotson (1827), 1 Yo. & J. 360 531 
 
 V. Trail (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 8 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 471- 32 W. R. 122 . .. .. .. •- 711 
 
 Boothroyd, i?e"(1846), 15 m! & W. 1 ; 15 L. J.' M. 0. 57 ; io 
 
 Jur. 117 446 
 
 Bosanquet v. Woodford (1843), 5 Q. B. 310 ; D. & M. 419 ; 13 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 93 ; 8 Jur. 242 ; 64 R. R. 504 669 
 
 Bosley v. Davies (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 84 ; 45 L. J. M. 0. 27 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 528; 24 W. R. 140 191, ,351, 565 
 
 Bostock V. N. Staffordshire Ry. Co. (1852), 3 Sra, & G. 283 ; 25 
 
 L. J. Ch. 325 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 245 ; 107 R. R. 89 „ .. 526 
 V. Ramsey U. D. C, [ISOO] 2 Q. B. 616 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 945 ; 
 
 83 L. T. 358 ; 64 J. P. 660 ; 16 Times R. 520 .. .. 359 
 
 Bottoraley v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1916), 84 
 
 L. J. K. B. 354, D. C 210 
 
 Bottomley's Case (1881), 16 Ch. D. 681 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 167 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 620 ; 29 W. R. 133 654 
 
 Boucicault v. Chatterton (1877), 5 Ch. D. 275 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 305 ; 
 
 35,L. T. 745 ; 25 W. R. 287 99 
 
 Bound V. Lawrence, [1892] 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 844 ; 40 W. R. 1 ; 56 J. P. 118 585 
 
 Bourke i;. Nutt, [1894] 1 Q. B. 725 9 
 
 Bower D. Peate (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 446 633 
 
 Bowlby V. Bell (1846), 3 C. B. 284 ; 4 Rly. Cas. 692 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 
 
 18; 10 Jur. 669 575 
 
 Bowman v. Blyth (1857), 7 E. & B. 26, 47 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 359 167,649,664 
 
 Bows V. Fenwick (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 339 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 107 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 524 ; 22 W. R. 804 129,599 
 
 Bowyerw. Bampton(1741), 2 Stra. 1155, 372 
 
 Boyce v. Higgins (1854), 14 C. B. 1 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 5 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 333 ; 98 R. R. 510 345 
 
 Boydell v. Druramond (1809), 11 East 142 ; 2 Campb. 157 ; 10 
 
 R.R.45Q 455,512 
 
 Boyle V. Smith, [1906] 1 K. B. 432 Ill 
 
 Brace v. Abercarn Colliery Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 699 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 706; 40 W.R. 3; 56 J. P. 20 564 
 
 Bracy's Case (1696), 1 Salk. 348 465 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. ^ xxn 
 
 FAGE 
 
 Bradbury v. HoUen (1872), L. R. 8 Ex. 1 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 28 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 450 ; 21 W. R. 126 350 
 
 Bradford Corporation ?;. Myeis, [1916] 1 A. C. 242, 11. L. .. 109 
 
 Bradford Union v. Wilts (1868), L. R. 3. Q. B. 604 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 
 
 129 ; 18 L. T. 514 ; 16 W. R. 1197 365 
 
 Bradlaugh, Exp. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 509 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 680; 26W. R. 758 237 
 
 V. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 354 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 681 ; 47 J. P. 405 ; 31 W. R. 677, H. L. 3, 4, 39, 68, 110, 
 
 453, 561, 706 
 
 Bradley v. Baylis (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 195 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 183 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 253 ; 30 W. R. 823 ; 45 J. P. 847 ; 1 Colt. 163 .. 121 
 V. Greenwich Board of Works (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 384 ; 47 
 
 L. J. M. C. Ill ; 38 L. T. 849 ; 26 W. R. 693 ,. ..29 
 
 V. Newcastle (1854), 2 E. & B. 427 ; 23 L. .J. Q. B. 35 ; 95 
 
 R. R. 620 541 
 
 Bradshaw v. Lane. & York. Ry. Co. (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 189 ; 
 
 44 L. J. C. P. 148 ; 31 L. T. 847 449 
 
 Brain?;. Thomas (1881), 50 L. J. Q.B. 662 714 
 
 BraU, Be, [1893] 2 Q. B. 381 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 457 ; 69 L. T. 323 ; 
 
 41 W. R. 623 ; 10 M. B. R. 166 377, 568 
 
 Bramston v. Colchester (1856), 6 El. & Bl. 246 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 
 
 73 ; 2 Jur. K S. 809 ; 106 R. R. 587 326 
 
 Brand v. Hammersmith Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 171 ; 
 
 L. R. 2 Q. B. 241 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 21 L. T. 238 ; 18 
 
 W.R. 12 368 
 
 Brandling v. Barrington (1827), 6 B. & C. 475 457 
 
 Brandon, Re (1884), 9 App. Cas. 589 ; 53 L. J. P. C. 84 .. 386 
 Brandon Hill, Ltd. v. Lamb, [1915] 1 K. B. 250 ; 59 Sol. Jo. 75 
 
 118, 380, 703 
 
 Braneth v. Havering (1639), Duke on Charit. uses, p. 83 .. 156 
 Brantom v. Griffits (1877), 1 C P. D. 349 ; 2 C. P. D. 212 ; 46 
 
 L. J. C. P. 408 ; 36 L. T. 4 ; 29 W. R. 313 212 
 
 BranweU v. Penneck (1827), 7 B. & C. 536 ; 1 M. & R. 409 .. 585 
 Bray v. Lancashire JJ. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 484 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 
 
 54 ; 37 W. R. 392 ; 53 J. P. 499 246, 247 
 
 Bread Co. v. Stubbs (1896), 74 L. T. 704 482 
 
 Brenan'a Case (1847), 10 Q. B. 492 ; 11 Jur. 755 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 285 ; 74 R. R. 409 661 
 
 Breslauer V. Brown (1878), 3 A. C. 689 158 
 
 Brett V. Brett (1826), 3 Add. 210 82 
 
 Breull, Ex p. (1880), 16 Ch. D. 484 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 580 ; 29 W. R. 299 , 119 
 
 Brewer t». McGower (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 259 169 
 
 Brewster V. Kitchell (1698), 1 Salk. 198 685,686 
 
 Bridge v. Branch (1876), 1 C. P. D. 633 ; 34 L. T. 905 .. 237, 553 
 
 V. Parsons (1863), 3 B. & S. 382 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 95 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 796 ; 7 L. T. 784 ; 11 W. R. 424 474 
 
 Bridgeman v. Fitzgerald (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 9 590 
 
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XXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Bridger, Ee, [1894] 1 Ch. 297 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 186 ; 70 L. T. 204 ; 
 
 42W. R. 179 386 
 
 V. Richardson (1814), 2 M, & S. 568 ; 15 R. R. 355 . . 581 
 
 V. Savage (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 363 ; 54 L. J. Q. B., 464 ; 53 
 
 L. T. 129 ; 33 W. R. 891 ; 49 J. P. 725 692 
 
 Brierley Hill Local Board v. Pearsall (1884), 54 L. J. Q. B. 25, 
 
 II. L 242 
 
 Brig Ann, The (1812), 1 Gallison, 62 740 
 
 Brigden v. Heighes (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 330 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 58 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 242 ; 24 W. R. 272 221,350 
 
 Brighton Guardians v. Strand-Guardians, [1891] 2 Q. B. 156 ; 60 
 
 It. J. M. C. 105 ; 64 L. T. 722 ; 39 W. R. 581 ; 55 J. P. 743 556 
 Brighton Marine Co. v. Woodhouse, [1893] 2 Ch. 486 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 697 ; 68 L. T. 669 ; 41 W. R. 488 46 
 
 Brighty v. Norton (1862), 3 B. & S. 305 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 38 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 495 ; 7 L. T. 422 ; 11 W. R. 167 608 
 
 Brindle, ^x^. (1887), 66L. T. 498 576 
 
 Bristol Aerated Bread Co. v. Maggs (1890), 44 Ch. D. 610 ; 59 
 
 L. J. Ch. 472 ; 62 L. T. 416 ; 38 W. R. 574; 2 Meg. 150, 
 
 205 512 
 
 City, The (1901), 71 L. J. P. 5 522 
 
 Corporation v. Sinnett, [1918] 1 Ch. 62, C. A 342 
 
 Tramways Co. v. Fiat Motors, [1910] 2 K. B. 831 ; 79 
 
 L. J. K. B. 1109; 103L. T. 443; 26T. L. R. 629 .. .. 48 
 
 Bristow «. Piper, [1915] 1 K. B. 271 121 
 
 Britain v. Rosaiter (1879), 11 Q. B. D. 128 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 362 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 240 ; 27 W. R. 482 455 
 
 British Farmers, &c. Co., Be (1878), 48 L. J. Ch. 56 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 757; 26 W. R. 839 6 
 
 Insulated Wire Co. v. Prescot U. D. C, [1896] 2 Q. B. 463 ; 
 
 64 L. J. Q. B. 811 ; 73 L. T. 383 ; 44 W. R. 224 .. .. 671 
 Linen Co. «. Drummond (1830), 10 B. & C. 903 ; 34 R. R. 
 
 595 278 
 
 South Africa Co. v. De Beers Mines, [1910] 2 Ch. 502; 79 
 
 L. 'J. Ch. 345 ; 80 li. J. Ch. 65 ; 103 L. T. 4 ; 54 S. J. Ii79 ; 
 
 revsd., [1911] W. N. 245, H. L 620 
 
 Salicyclates, iJe, [1919]2Ch.l55 60 
 
 Britt V. Robinson (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 503 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 265 ; 
 
 23 L. T. 188 ; 18 W. R. 866 495 
 
 Britton i;. Ward (1619), 2 Rol. 127 464 
 
 Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co. (1867) 9 De G. M. & G. 436 ; 26 
 
 L. J. Ch. 276 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 221 92 
 
 -^ — V. Shepherd, [1901] 2 K. B. 274 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 628 ; 84 
 
 L. T. 844; 49 W. R. 521; 65 J. P. 499 655 
 
 Broadhead v. Holdsworth (1877), 2 Ex. D. 321 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 
 
 172; 36L. T. 320 484 
 
 Brockbank v. Whitehaven Ry. Co. (1847), 7 H. «fc N. 834 ; 31 
 
 L.J. Ex. 349 437 
 
 Brockelbank, Be (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 461 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 375 ; 
 
 61 L. T. 543 ; 37 W. R. 537 ; 6 M. B. R. 138 .. 358, 421 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. XXV 
 
 Brooklehurst v. Lawe (1857), 7 E. c& B. 176 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 107 ; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 436 162 
 
 Brockwell v. Bullock (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 667 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 289 ; 37 W. R. 455 ; 53 J. P. 405 305 
 
 Brodie v. Chandos (1773), 1 Bro. C.C. 444 n 215 
 
 Bromley v. Holden (1828), Moo. & M. 175 ; 31 R.R. 727 714 
 
 Brook V. Brook (1858), 9 H. L. Gas. 193 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 7 
 
 Jur. N. S. 422 ; 9 W. R. 461 ; 4 L. T. 93 .. . . 256 261 
 V. Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 Q. B. 356 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 657 ; 
 
 44W.R. 670 128 
 
 Brooke v. Shadgate (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 352 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 98 ; 
 
 29L. T. 90 168 
 
 Brooker v. Wood (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1052 ; 3 L. J. K. B. 96 ; 
 
 3N. &M. 96 694 
 
 Brooks V. Bookett (1847), 9 Q. B. 847 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 178 ; 11 
 
 Jur. 284 402 
 
 V. Cock (1835), 3 A. & E. 138 ; 4 N. & M. 652 ; 1 H. & W. 
 
 129 ; 42 R. R. 348 651 
 
 u. Hamlyn (1899), 79 L. T. 734 288,646 
 
 c. Mason, [1902] 2 K. B. 743 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 19 .. .. 187 
 
 , Jenkins & Co. v. Torquay, [1902] 1 K. B. 601 , 71 L. J. K. B. 
 
 109 ; 85 L. T. 785 ; 66 J. P. 293 626, 671 
 
 Bros, Re, [1911] 1 K. B. 159; 80 L. J. K. B. 147 ; 103 L. T. 728 ; 
 
 74J. P. 483 150 
 
 Broughton v. Manchester Waterworks (1819), 3 B. & A. 1 ; 22 
 
 R. R. 278 619 
 
 Brown, Re (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 545 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 108 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 682 ; 26 W. R. 757 520 
 
 Re (1864), 5 B. & S. 280 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 193 . . 165, 6.32 
 
 V. Duncan (1829), 10 B. & C. 93 ; 5 M. & R. 114 ; 39 R. R. 
 
 698 699 
 
 V. Foot (1892), 61 L. J. M. C. 110 ; 66 L. T. 649 ; 56 J. P. 
 
 581 ; 17 Cox C. C. 509 190 
 
 V. G. E. Ry. Co. (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 406 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 231 ; 
 
 36 L. T. 767 ; 25 W. R. 792 634 
 
 V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1882), 9Q. B. D.744 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 529; 
 
 47 L. T. 216 ; 30 W. R. 671 ; 46 J. P. 803 .. .. 97, 281, 293 
 V. Holyhead Board (1863), 1 H. & C. 601 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 25 ; 
 
 7 L. T. 332 ; 11 W. R. 71 705 
 
 V. Howard (1820), 2 B. & B. 73 , 4 Moore .508 .. .. 12 
 
 V. London (Mayor) (1862), 9 C. B. N. S. 726 ; SOL. J. C. P. 
 
 225 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 755 ; 3 L. T. 813 ; 9 W. R. 336; & 13 
 
 C. B. N. S. 828 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 280 ; 8 Jur. N. S. ll03 ; 10 
 
 W. R. 522 687 
 
 -w. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1863), 4 B. & S. 326; 32 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 218 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 234 ; 11 W. R. 884 .. 119, 318 
 V. McLachlan (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 643 ; 42 L. J. P. C. 18 ; 
 
 21 W. R. 277 ; 9 Moo. P. C. N. S. 384 571 
 
 . V. McMillan (1846), 7 M. <fc W. 196 ; 8 D. P. C. 852 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 1090 325 
 
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XXVI TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Brown v. Patch, [1899] 1 Q. B. 892 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 588 ; 80 L. T. 
 
 716; 47 W. R. &23; 63 J. P. 421 .. .. .. 129,600 
 
 V. Shaw (1876), 1 Ex. D. 425 656, 677 
 
 v.-Skirrow, [1902] P. 3; 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 19 ; 85 L. T. 
 
 645 14 
 
 V. Tombs, [1891] 1 Q. B. 253 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 38 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 , 114 ; 55 J. P. 359 ; 1 Fox 196 139 
 
 Brown's Case (1799), 2 East P. C. 487 487 
 
 Browne w. La Trinidad (1887), 37 Ch. D. 1 655 
 
 Browning, Ex p. (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 583 ; 43 L. J. Bank. 129 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 481 ; 22 W. R. 638 702 
 
 Brownrigg v. Pike (1882), 51 L. J. P. 29 384 
 
 Brownscombe v. Johnson (1898), 78 L. T. 265 ; 62 J. P. 326 .. 523 
 
 Bruce, iJe (1832), 2 Or. & J. 436 ; 2 Tyr. 475 270 
 
 Brumfitt V. Bremner (1860), 9 C. B. N. S. 1 ; K. & G. 352 ; 30 
 
 L. J. C. P. 33 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 371 ; 3 L. T. 375 ; 9 W. R. 144 660 
 
 V. Roberts (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 224 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 301 ; 18 W. R. 678 ; 1 Hop. & C. 387 . . . . 169, 674 
 
 Bruner I). Moore, [1904] 1 Ch. 305 43 
 
 Brunsfcill v. Watson (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 418 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 
 
 103; 18L. T. 432; 16 W. R. 1009 515 
 
 Bruyeres v. Halcomb (1835), 3 A. & E. 381 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 228 554 
 Bryan v. Child (1850), 5 Ex. 368 ; 1 L. M. & P. 429 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 
 
 264 ; 14 Jur. 510 ; 82 R. R. 710 .. 75, 79, 92, 377, 567 
 
 Buccleuch (Duke of) v. Metrop. B. of Works (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 
 221 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 130 ; 23 L. T. 255 ; & L. R. 5 H. L. 418 ; 
 
 41 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 27 L. T. 1 538 
 
 Buokhurst Peerage, The (1881), 2 App. Cas. 1 704 
 
 Buckle V. Wrightson (1864), 5 B. & S. 854 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 43 ; 
 
 11 Jur. N. S. 280 ; 11 L. T. 341 ; 13 W. R. 92 .. . . 300 
 
 Bulkeley v. Schutz (1871), L. R. 3P. C. 764 ; 6 Moo. P. C. N. S. 
 
 481 267,268 
 
 Bull V. Chapman (1853), 8 Ex. 444; 22 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 91 R. R. 
 
 577 690 
 
 BuUi Coal-Mining Co. v. Osborne, [1899] A. C. 351 ; 68 L. J. P. C. 
 
 49; 80L. T. 430; 47 W. R. 545 12 
 
 Bullivant v. A.-G. Victoria, [1901] A. C. 196 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 
 
 645; 84L. T. 737; 50W. R. IP. C... 218 
 
 Bulteel & Colmore v. Trustee in Bankruptcy (1916), 32 T. L. R. 
 
 661 114 
 
 Bunny, Hx p. (1857), 1 De G. & J. 119; 26 L. J. Bank. 83; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 1141 612 
 
 Burbury v. Jackson, [1917] 1 K. B. 16 .. .. .. 259 
 
 Burden, Be (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 24 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 570 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 149; 36 W. R. 896; 5M. B. R. 166 .. .. 470 
 
 ■«. Kennedy (1757), 3 Atk. 739 .... 250 
 
 Burdett, 5e (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 310 ; 57 L. J. Q. B.263 ; 58L T 
 
 708 ; 36 W. R. 345 ; 5 M. B. R. 32, C. A 702 703 
 
 Burge V. Ashley and Smith, [1900] 1 Q. B. 744 ; 69 L. J Q B ' 
 538; 82L. T. 518; 48 W. R..438 .. .. ' 199 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Xxvii 
 
 FACE 
 
 Burgess v. Wickham (1863), 3 B. & S. 698 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 17 .. 42 
 Burgess v. Clark (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 735 ; 33 W. E. 269 ; 49 J. P. 
 
 388 496 
 
 Burgess's Case (1880), 15 Ch. D. 507 ; 49 L. J. Cli. 541 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 45;28W. K. 792 876 
 
 Burkill V. Thomas, [1892] 1 Q. B. 312 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 322 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 150 ; 40 W. R. 250 411 
 
 Burkinshaw V. Nicolls (1878), 3 A. C. 1004 6 
 
 BurUngv. Harley (1858), 3 H. & N. 271 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 258 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. S. 789 414 
 
 Burn V. Carvalho (1834), 4 N. & M. 889 ; 1 A. & E. 883 .. 740 
 Burnby 1). BoUett (1848), 16 M. & W. 644 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 190 ; 11 
 
 Jur. 827 184 
 
 Burnett v. Berry, [1896] 1 Q.'B. 641 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 118; 74 
 
 L. T. 494 ; 44 W. R. 512 ; 60 J. P. 375 523 
 
 Burnley, &c. Society v. Carson, [1891], 1 Q. B. 75 .. ..194 
 
 Burns, The, [1907] P. 137 108,109 
 
 Bums V. Nowell (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 444; 49 L. J. Q. B. 468; 43 
 
 L. T. 342 ; 29 W. R. 39 ; 44 J. P. 828 385 
 
 Burton v. Henson (1842), 10 M. & W. 105 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 348 ; 62 
 
 R. R. 531 624 
 
 and Blinkhorn, Be, [1903] 2 K. B. 300 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 
 
 752 ; 89 L. T. 549 : 51 W. R. 668 437 
 
 Turnpike Trs. v. Wincanton Highway Board (1870), 39 
 
 L. J.M. C. 155 91 
 
 Bury V. Cherryholm (1876), 1 Ex. D. 457 ; 35 L. T. 403 .. 306 
 
 Busfield, Be (1886), 32 Ch. D. 123 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 54 L. T. 
 
 220 ; 34 W. R. 372 271,518 
 
 BusheU V. Hammond, [1904] 2 K. B. 563 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 1005 ; 
 
 91 L. T. 1 ; 52 W. R. 453 ; 68 J. P. 370 .. .. 76, 77 
 
 Bustros V. White (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 835 ; 24 W. R. 721 543 
 
 Butcher v. Henderson (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 335 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 139 ; 16 W. R. 855 ; 9 B. & S. 403 730, 7.33 
 
 Bute V. Grindall (1786), 1 T. R. 338 ; 2 H. Bl. 265 ; 1 R. R. 220 247 
 Butterknowle Colliery Co. ■y. Bishop Auckland Socy., [1906] A. C. 
 
 305 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 541 ; 94 L. T. 795 ; 70 J. P. 361 .. . . 627 
 
 Butterley Co. v. New Hucknall Colliery Co., [1909] 1 Ch. 37 ; 
 
 [1910] A. C. 381 ; 78 L. J. Ch. 63 ; 79 Id. 411 ; 99 L. T. 
 
 818 ; 102 L. T. 609 ; H. L 41 
 
 Buxton V. N. E. Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 549 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 258 ; 18 L. T. 795 ; 16 W. R. 1124 ; 9 B. & S. 824 .. 720 
 V. Rust (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 1, 279 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 1, 173 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 502 ; 27 L. T. 210 ; 20 W. R. 100, 1014 .. .. 513 
 
 Byerley u. Prevost (1868) L. R. 6 C. P. 144 212 
 
 Byrne Exp. (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 310 702, 703 
 
 C. 
 
 Cable V. Marks (1882), 52 L. J. Ch . 107 ; 47 L. T. 432 ; 31 W. R. 221 131 
 Caistor v. N. Kelsey (1890), 59 L. J. M. C. 102; 62 L. T. 731 .. 365 
 
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XXVIU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Calder «. Bull (1872), 3 Dallas 390 384 
 
 V. Halket (1840), 3 Moo, P. C. 28 ; 50 R. R. 1 359 
 
 and Hebble Nav. Co. v. Pilling (1845), 14 M. & W. 76 ; 3 
 
 Rly. Cas. 735 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 9 Jur. 377 ; 69 R. R. 660 525 
 Caldow V. Pixell (1877), 2 C. P. D. 562 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 541 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 469 ; 25 W. R. 773 650,661 
 
 CaldweU ». Bethell, [1913] 1 K. B. 119 192 
 
 Caledonian Ry. Co. v. N. Brit. Ry. Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 114 ; 
 
 29 W. R. 685, H. L 36 
 
 V. "Walker's Trustees (1882), 7 App. Cas. 259 ; 46 L. T. 826 ; 
 
 30 W. R. 569 ; 46 J. P. 676 172 
 
 Californian Fig Syrup Co., Be (1889), 40 Ch. D. 620 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 
 
 341; 60 L. T. 590; 37 W. R. 268 272 
 
 Calthorpe v. Treachraann, [1906] A. C. 24 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 92 ; 94 
 
 L. T. 68 ; 54 W. R. 365 717 
 
 Cambridge Union v. Parr (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 991 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 
 
 241 67 
 
 Cameron v. Cameron (1834), 2 M. & K. 289 ; 4 L. J. Ch. 28 .. 52 
 Caminada v. Hulton (1891), 60 L. J. M. C. 116 ; 64 L. T. 572 ; 
 
 39 W. R. 540 ; 55 J. P. 727 210 
 
 Campbell, Ex p. (1871), L. R. 5 Ch. 703 ; 23 L. T. 289 ; 18 
 
 W. R. 1056 543 
 
 V. Im Thuru (1876), 1 C. P. D. 267 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 482 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 265 ; 24 W. R. 675 158 
 
 V. Strangeways (1877), 3 C. P. D. 105 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 6 ; 
 
 37L. T. 672 610 
 
 Canada Shipping Co. v. British Shipowners' Mutual Protection 
 
 Society (1889), 58L. J. Q. B. 462 124, 517 
 
 Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. Reg., [1898] A. C. 735; 67 
 
 L. J. P. C. 126 ; 79 L. T. 146 40 
 
 Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Parke, [1899] A. C. 535 ; 68 L. J. P. C. 89 ; 
 
 81 L. T. 127 ; 48 W. R. 118 630 
 
 V. Roy, [1902] A. C. 220 ; 71 L. J. P. C. 51 ; 86 L. T. 127 ; 
 
 SOW. R. 415 628,630 
 
 Candy v. Maugham (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 710 ; 1 D. & L. 745 ; 7 
 
 Scott N. R. 401 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 17 ; 7 Jur. 1040 . . ..250 
 
 Oannan v. Abingdon, [1900] 2 Q. B. 66 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 517 ; 82 
 
 L. T. 382 ; 382 ; 48 W. R. 470 ; 64 J. P. 504 .. .. 595 
 
 Canterbury's (Archbp.) Case (1596), 2 Rep. 46b 601 
 
 Capel V. Child (1832), 2 Cr. & J. 558 ; 1 L. J. Ex. 205 ; 2 Tyr. 
 
 689; 37R. R. 761 642 
 
 Capson «. Capson (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 677 384 
 
 Cargo ea; Argos (1873), L. R. 5 P. C. 134 244 
 
 CarlJohann, The (1821), cited 1 Hagg. Adm. 113 .. ..276 
 
 Carlton Illustrators v. Coleman, [19111 1 K. B. 771 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 
 
 510; 104 L.T. 413 .. ..' 708,709 
 
 Carmania, The (1916), 32 T. L. R. 395 102 
 
 Carpue v. Lond. and Bright. Ry. Co. (1844), 5 Q. B, 747 ; D. & M. 
 
 608 ; 3 Rly. Cas. 692; 13 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 8 Jur. 464 ; 90 
 
 R. R. 911 414 
 
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'J^ABLE OF CASES, xxix 
 
 I'AGK 
 
 Carr W.Dougherty (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 371 201 
 
 V. Fowle, [1893] 1 Q. B. 251 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 177 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 123 ; 41 W. R. 365 ; 57 J. ?. 136 .. .. .. .. 504 
 
 V. Fracis Times & Co., [1902] A. C. 176 264 
 
 V. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. (1864), 5 B. & S. 433, 941 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 316; 33 L. J. Q. B. 63 ; 10 L. T. N. S. 265 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 127 82 
 
 Carron Iron Co. v, MacLaren (1855), 5 H. L. Cas. 459; 24 
 
 L. J. Ch. 620 ; 101 R. R. 229 ; H. L. 119 
 
 Carruthersu. Sydebotham (1815), 4 M. & 8. 77 ; 16 R. R. 392 .. 619 
 Carter v. Boehm (1766), 3 Burr. 1918 ; 1 W. Bl. 593 .. .. 454 
 
 -y. Murcot (1768), 4 Burr. 2163 180 
 
 V. Thomas, [1893] 1 Q. B. 673 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 104 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 436 ; 41 W. R. 510 ; 57 J. P. 438 630 
 
 and Kenderdine, Be, [1897] 1 Ch. 776 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 408 ; 
 
 44 W. R. 484 ; 76 L. T. 476 377,568 
 
 Caruthers, £a; p. (1807), 9 East 44 291 
 
 Case V. Story (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 319 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 115 ; 20 
 
 L. T. 618 ; 17 W. R. 802 574 
 
 Casher v. Holmes (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 592 ; 36 R. R. 680 .. 601 
 
 Casswell v. Worth (1856), 5 El. & B. 849 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 2 
 
 Jur. N. S. 116 ; 103 R. R. 780 .. 307 
 
 Castelli V. Groom (1852), 18 Q. B. 490 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 308 ; 16 
 
 ' Jur. 888 430,442 
 
 Castioni, Re, [1891] 1 Q. B. 149; 60 L. J. M. C. 22 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 344 ; 39 W. R. 202 ; 55 J. P. 328 ; 17 Cox C. C. 225 .. 39 
 
 Castle, Be, [1917] 2 K. B. 725 ; 87 L. J. K. B. 753 . . . . 203 
 
 Cates t). Knight (1789), 3 T. R. 442 .. .. 238,240,556 
 
 Cathcart V. Hardy (1814), 2 M. & S. 534 ; 5 Taunt. 2 .. ' .. 609 
 Catling V. King (1877), 5 Ch, D. 660 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 526 ; 25 W. R. 550 .. 514 
 
 Catlow i;. Catlow (1877), 2 C. P. D. 362 26 
 
 Caton v. Caton (1867), 35 L. J. Ch. 292 455 
 
 • Cator V. Cator (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 139 70 
 
 Cave V. Hastings (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 125 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 575; 45 
 
 L. T. 348 512 
 
 Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson (1876), 1 Ex. D. 428; 45 
 
 L. J. Ex. 821 ; 35 L. T. 275 ; 25 W. R. 71 .. .. .. 120 
 
 Chadwick v. Ball (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 855 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 396 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 949 .. .. 237, 238 
 
 V. Pearl Life Assrce. Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 507 ; 74 L. J, K. B. 
 
 671 ; 93 L. T. 25 ; 54 W. R. 78 1 500, 505 
 
 Challeston u. Parker, [1914] W. N. 200 126 
 
 Chamber Colliery Co. v. Rochdale Canal Co., [1895] A. 0. 564 54 
 Chamberlain v. Bradford (1901), 83 L. T. 518 ; 64 J. P. 806 . . 510 
 V. King (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 474 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 736 ; 19 W. R. 931 414 
 
 V. West End and Crystal Pal. Ry, Co. (1863), 2 B. & S. 
 
 617 ; 32 L. J. Q. B 173 j 9 Jur. N. S. 1051 ; 8 L. T. l49 ; 
 
 IJ W. R,472 , 172 
 
 I.S. s 
 
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XXX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chamberlaine v. Chester and 'Birkenhead Ry. Co. (1848), 1 Ex. 
 
 370; 18 L. J. Ex.494 .. 716,718,723 
 
 Chambers v. Green (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 552 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 600 237 
 V. Manchester Ry. Co. (1864), 5 B. & S. 588 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 268 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 700 523,655 
 
 Champion v. Plummer (1805), 1 N. R. 252 ; 5 Esp. 240 ; 8 R. R. 
 
 795 .. .. .. .. 513 
 
 Chancer. Adams (1696), ILd. Raym. 77 74 
 
 Chapman v. Chapman (1877), 4 Ch. D. 800 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 104 .. 590 
 V. Milvain (1850), 5 Ex. 61 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 228 ; 1 L. M. & 
 
 P. 209 ; 82 R. R. 564 294 
 
 V. Robinson (1858), 1 E. & B. 25 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 30 ; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S.434 344 
 
 V. Shepherd (1867), L. R. 2 0. P. 228 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 113 ; 
 
 15 L. T. 477 ; 15 W. R. 314 203 
 
 Chappell V. North, [1891] 2 Q. B. 252; 60 L. J. Q. B. 554 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 23; 40W. R. 16 46 
 
 V. Purday (1843), 12 M. & W. 303 ; 1 D. & L. 458 ; 13 
 
 L.J. Ex. 7; 67 R. R. 357 396 
 
 Charles v. Blaokwell (1877), 2 C. P. D. 151 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 368 ; 
 
 36 L. T. 195 ; 25 W. R. 472 135 
 
 Charlewood v. Bedford (Duke) (1738), 1 Atk. 497 .. .. 513 
 
 Charlotta, The (1810), 1 Dods. 387 194 
 
 Charlton v. Hay (1875), 31 L. T. 437 ; 23 W. R. 129 , . .: 717 
 
 Charrington v. Meatheringham (1837), 2 M. & W. 228 ; 6 L. J. 
 
 Ex 23 729 
 
 Charters. Charter (1874), L."r. 7 H. L. 364 ; 43'l. J. P. & M. 
 
 73 43 
 
 Chartered Bank of India v. Netherland S. N. Co. (1883), 10 
 
 Q. B. D. 521 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 220 ; 48 L. T. 546 ; 31 W. R. 
 
 445 ; 47 J. P. 260 277,368 
 
 Chartered Merc. Bank v. Wilson (1878), 3 Ex. D. 106 ; 47 
 
 L. J. Ex. 153 ; 38 L. T. 254 ; 26 W. R. 265 . . 577, 578 
 
 Chasteauneuf v. Capeyron (1882), 7 App. Cas. 3 27 ; 51 L. J. P. C. 
 
 37 ; 46 L. T. 65 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 489 653 
 
 Chatterton v. Cave (1877), 2 C. P; D. 42 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 587 ; 25 W. R. 102 ; «& 3 App. Cas. 483 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 
 
 545 ; 38 L. T. 397 ; 26 W. R. 498 350 
 
 w, Parker (1914), 78 J. P. 339 497 
 
 Chell v. Hall (1896), 12 T. L. R. 408 .. .. ., .. 704 
 
 Chelsea Vestry v. King (1865), 17 C. B. N. S. 625 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 
 
 9 ; 10 Jur. 1150 ; 11 L. T. 419 ; 13 W. R. 157 .. . . 475 
 Waterworks v. Bowley (1851), 17 Q. B. 358 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 
 
 520; 85R.R. 482 691 
 
 Cherry's Estate, i?e (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 351 25 
 
 " Chic" IM.,Be, [1905] 2 Ch. 345-; 74 L. J. Oh. 597 ; 93 L. T. 
 
 301 ; 53W. R. 659 592 
 
 Chick ?;, Smith (1840), 8 D. P. C. 337 ; 4 Jur. 86 .. ..610 
 
 Child V. Hearn (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 176 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 100; 22 
 
 W.R. 864 603 
 
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TABLE OF CASKS. XXXl 
 
 PA GE 
 
 Chillington Iron Co., Be (1885), 29 Ch. D. 159 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 
 
 624 ; 52 L. T. 504 ; 33 W. R. 442 155 
 
 Chilton V. London and Croydon R. Co. (1847), 16 M. & W. 212 ; 
 
 16 L. J. Ex. 89 ; 11 Jur. 149 ; 73 R. R. 460 526 
 
 China, The (1868), 7 Wallace 53 619 
 
 Chinery, Exp. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 342 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 50 
 
 L. T. 342 ; 32 W. R. 469 ; 1 M. B. R. 31 477 
 
 Ching V. Surrey C. C, [1910] 1 K. B. 736 ; 78 L. J. K. B. 927 ; 
 
 79 L. J. K. B. 481 ; 102 L. T. 414 ; 74 J. P. 187 ; 8 L. U. R. 
 
 369 634 
 
 Chinnery v. Evans (1864), 11 H. L. Cas. 115 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 855 ; 
 
 11 L. T. 68 ; 13 W. R. 20 218 
 
 Chisholm v. Doulton (1889), 22 Q. B. T>. 726 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 
 
 133 ; 60 L. T. 966 ; 16 Cox C. C. 675 ; 37 W. R. 749 ; 53 
 
 J. P. 550 189 
 
 Cholmeley School v. Sewell (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 820 .. .. 412 
 
 Chorlton v. Lings (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 374; 38 L. J. C. P. 25 ; 
 
 19 L. T. 534 ; 17 W. R. 284 ; 1 Hopw. & C. 1 .. .- 155 
 
 Christ's Hospital v. Hawes (1640), Duke on Charifc. Uses, p. 84 156 
 Christie v. Cooper, [1900] 2 Q. B. 522 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 708 ; 83 
 
 L. T. 54; 49W. R. 46; 64 J. P. 692 191 
 
 Christophersen v. Lotinga (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 809; 33 
 
 L. J. C. P. 121 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 180 ; 9 L. T. 688 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 410 24,141,447 
 
 Church u. Hubbard (1804), 2 Cranch 87 272 
 
 Churchill v. Crease (1828), 5 Bin^. 180 ; 2 M. & P. 415 301, 728 
 
 Cigala's Settlement, Be (1878), 7 Ch. D. 351 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 166 ; 
 
 38L. T. 439 270 
 
 Citizen Insurance Co., Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 A. C. 125 .. 205 
 Citizens Life Assurance Co. v. Brown, [1904] A. C. 423, P. C. .. 138 
 City & S. London Ry. v. London C. C. , [1891] 2 Q. B. 513 ; 60 
 
 L. J. M. C. 149 ; 65 L. T. 362 ; 40 W. R. 166 ; 56 J. P. 6 
 
 285, 286 
 City of Westminster Council v. Watson, [1902] 2 K. B. 717 .. 113 
 Clack V. Sainsbury (1852), 11 C. B. 695 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 41 ; 2 
 
 L. M. &P. 627 303,304 
 
 Clan Gordon^ The (1882), 7 P. D. 190 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 513 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 490 ; 30 W. R. 691 619 
 
 Clapham v. Langton (1864), 5 B. & S. 729 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 
 
 10 L. T. 875 ; 12 W. R. 1011 42 
 
 Clarence R. Co. v. G. N. of England R. Co. (1845), 13 M. & W. 
 
 706 ; 3 Rly. Cas. 426 ; 7 Jur. 55 ; 3 G. & D. 389 ; 4 Q. B. 
 
 46 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 145 627 
 
 Clark, Be, [1894] 2 Q. B. 393 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 806 ; 70 L. T. 751 ; 
 
 lManson207 349 
 
 V. Bury St. Edmunds (1857), 1 C. B. JST. S. 23 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 
 
 12; 107 R. R. 561 120 
 
 «. Denton (1830), 1 B. & A. 92 705 
 
 v: Gaskarth (1818), 8 Taunt. 431 ; 2 Moore 491 ; 20 R R. 
 
 516 587 
 
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XXXU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGl. 
 
 Clark V. Molyneux (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 237 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 
 
 37 L. T. 694 ; 26 W. R. 104 ; 14 Cox C. C. 10 .. .. 415 
 V. R. (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 92 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 66 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 136 J 33 W.R. 226; 49 J. P. 246 474 
 
 V. Wallond (1883), 52 L. J. Q. B. 321 ; 48 L. T. 762 ; 31 
 
 W. R. 551 ; 47 J. P. 551 542 
 
 Clarke v. Bradlaugh (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 63 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 
 
 46 L. T. 49; 30 W.R. 63; 46 J. P. 278 610 
 
 V. Crowder (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 638; 38 L. J. M. C. 118 ; 
 
 17W. R. 857 420 
 
 V. Gant (1853), 8 Ex. 252; 22 L. J. Ex. 67; 17 Jur. 239 283, 
 
 ' " - ' 659 
 
 V. Powell (1833), 4 B. <& Ad. 846 ; 1 N. & M. 492 ; 2 
 
 L.J. K. B. 145 64 
 
 . V. Roche (1877), 3 Q. B. B. 170; 47 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 37 
 
 L.T. 633; 26 W.R. 112 226,351 
 
 Clay «. Ray (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 188 694 
 
 «. Sudgrave (1700), 1 Salk. 33 535 
 
 Claydon v. Green (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 511 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 226 ; 
 
 18 L. T. 607 ; 16 W. R. 1126 74,76 
 
 Clayton's Case (1585), 5 Rep. 1 b 609 
 
 Clegg «. Earby Gas Co., [1896] IQ. B. 592 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 339; 
 
 44W. R. 606 723 
 
 Clelland v. Ker (1843), 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 35 ; affirmed 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 
 
 288 Ir 282 
 
 Clementson v. Mason (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 217 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 
 
 171; 32 L. T. 325; 23 W.R. 620 22 
 
 Clerke v. St. Helen's Corporation (1916), 85 L. J. K. B. 17, 
 
 C. A 414 
 
 Clerkenwell Vestry v. Peary (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 703; 59 
 
 L. J. M.C. 82; 62 L.T. 697; 54 J. P. 676 641 
 
 Cliflford V. Watts (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 577 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 36 ; 
 
 22 L. T. 717 ; 18 W. R. 925 674 
 
 Climpson v. Coles (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 465 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 346 ; 
 
 61 L. T. 116 ; 38 W. R. 110 173 
 
 Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh Water Trustees, [1904] A. C. 64 ; 
 
 73 L. .T. P. C. 32 ; 89 L. T. 589 627 
 
 Cliquot's Champagne (1865), 3 Wallace 114 509 
 
 Cloete V. R. (1854), 8 Moo. P. C. 484, P. C 87 
 
 Clothier v. Webster (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 750 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 
 
 216 ; 10 W. R. 624 173,630 
 
 Clow V. Harper (1878), 3 Ex. D. 198 ; 47 L. J. Ex. 393 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 269 ; 26 W. R. 364 538 
 
 Clowes V. Staffordshire Potteries (1872), L. R. 8 Ch. 125 ; 42 
 
 L. J. Oh. 107 ; 27 L. T. 521 ; 21 W. R. 32 529 
 
 Clyde Navigation v. Barclay (1877), 1 App. Cas. 790 .. .. 517 
 
 V. Laird (1883), 8 App. Cas. 658 .. .. 131, 538, 539, 540 
 
 Coalheavers' Case (1768), 1 Leach 66 616 
 
 Coatsworth -e. Johnson (1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 220 .. ,. 569 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. xxxiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Cobb, Ex p. (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 727 ; 42 L. J. Bank. 6.3 ; 29 
 
 L. T. 123 ; 21 W. R. 777 228 
 
 V. Mid-Wales R. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 342 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 117 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 228 ; 14 W. R. 775 510 
 
 Gobbett V. Grey (1850), 19 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 4 Ex. 729 .. .. 736 
 Cooh V. AUoook (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 1 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 489 .. 430 
 Cochrane v. Entwistle (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 116 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 418 ; 62 L. T. 852 ; 38 W. R. 587 703 
 
 V. Matthews (1879), 10 Ch. D. 80 n 212 
 
 Cockerell w. Dickens (1840), 3 Moo. P. C. 133 269 
 
 Cocking V. Ward (1845), 1 C. B. 858 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 245 ; 68 R. R. 
 
 831 455 
 
 Codd «;. Cabe (1876), 1 Ex. D. 352, C. A 232 
 
 Coe V. Lawrance (1853), 1 El. & Bl. 516 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 140 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 1115 10 
 
 Coggins w. Bennett (1877), 2 C. P. D. 568 611,612 
 
 Cohen, Exp. (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 20 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 17 ; 25 
 
 L. T. 473 ; 20 W. R. 69 225 
 
 V. Arthurs (1912), 56 Sol. Jo. 344 47 
 
 V. Kittell (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 680 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 241 ; 60 
 
 L. T. 932 ; 37 W. R. 400 ; 53 .1. P. 469 692 
 
 V. Mitchell (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 262 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 
 
 63 L. T. 206 ; 38 W. R. 588 ; 54 J. P. 804 349 
 
 Colbron v. Travers (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 181 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 
 
 257 ; 6 L. T. 287 ; 10 W. R. 603 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1105 .. 223 
 Colchester v. Brooke (1846), 7 Q. B. 339 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 59 : 
 
 9 Jur. 1090 ; 68 R. R. 458 724 
 
 V. Kewney (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 368 ; 2 Id. 253 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Ex 172 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 743 ; 16 L. T. 463 .. .. 99, 248 
 
 Cole V. Coulton (I860), 2 E. & B. 695 ; 29 L. J» M. C. 125 ; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 698 333 
 
 V. Greene (1843), 6 M. & G. 872 ; 7 Scott New Rep. 682 ; 
 
 13L. J. C. P. 30 667,671 
 
 V. N. W. Bank (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 354 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 
 
 233 ; 32 L. T. 733 162 
 
 Colebrook ?;. Layton (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 578 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 95 ; 
 
 1 N. & M. 374 ; 38 R. R. 314 225 
 
 Coleman v. Birmingham (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 615 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 
 
 92 ; 44 L. T. 578 ; 29 W. R. 715 ; 45 J. P. 521 .. .. 154 
 
 i;. Upcot (1706), 5 Yin. Ab. 527, pi. 17 512 
 
 Coles V. Bristowe (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 160 203 
 
 Collier V. Worth (1876), 1 Ex. D. 464 ; 35 L. T. 345 .. ..480 
 Collins V. Blantern (1767), 2 Wils. 341 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 369 .. 208 
 V. Gwynne (1833), 9 Bing 544 ; 2 M. & Scott 640 ; 51 
 
 R.R. 43 702 
 
 V. Middle Level Commrs. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 279 ; 
 
 38 L. J. C. P. 236 ; 20 L. T. 442 ; 17 W. R. 929 .. .. 630 
 V. Rose (1839), 5 M. & W. 194 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 270 ; 7 D. 0. P. 
 
 796 611 
 
 Collinsonv, NewcastleR. Co. (1844), IC. &K. .546 .. ..714 
 
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XXXIV TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CoUis V. Cater (1898), 78 L. T. 613 481 
 
 CoUtnan v. Mills, [1897] 1 Q. B. 396 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 170 ; 75 
 
 L. T. 590 ; 61J. P. 102 ; 18 C. C. C. 481 187 
 
 - — V. Roberts, [1896] 1 Q. B. 45 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 63; 74 
 
 L. T. 198 ; 44 W.R. 445 ; 18 C. C. C. 273 ; 60 J. P. 184 .. 125 
 Colls V. Home and Colonial Stores, [1904] A. C. 179 .. ■• 17 
 
 Colonial Bank v. Whinney (1886), 11 App. Cas. 426 ; 30 Ch. D. 
 
 261 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 43 ; 55 L. T. 362 ; 34 W. R. 705 ; 3 
 
 M. B. R.207 .. .; 70,543 
 
 of Australia v. Willan (1874), L. R. 5 P. C. 417 ; 43 
 
 L. J. P. C. 39 P. C 237 
 
 Colquhoun v. Brooks (1887), 14 App. Cas. 493 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 53; 61L. T. 518 270 
 
 V. Heddon (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 129 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 465 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 853 ; 38 W. R. 545 268, 274 
 
 Coltman, In re (1881). 19 Ch. D. 64 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 3 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 392 ; 30 W. R. 342 655 
 
 Colvill V. Wood (1846), 2 C. B. N. S. 210 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Cas. 
 
 483 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 160 ; 10 Jur. 336 ; 69 R. R. 473 . . 71 
 
 Colvin V. Buckle (1841), 8 M. & W. 680 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 33 ; 58 
 
 R. R. 834 12 
 
 Colyer, Be (1880), 50 L. J. Ch. 79 ; 43 L. T. 454 .. .. 522 
 
 Combe u. Pitt (1763), 3 Burr. 1434 610 
 
 Commins i'. Scott (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 11 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 563 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 420 ; 23 W. R. 498 512,514 
 
 Commissioner for Stamp Duties v. Byrnes, [1911] A. C. 386 ; 80 
 
 L.. J. P. C. 114 ; 104 L. T. 515 218 
 
 of Police V. Cartman, [1896] 1 Q. B. 655 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 
 
 113 187 
 
 Commissioners of Metropolitan Police v. Hancock, [1916] 1 K. B. 
 
 190 624 
 
 of Public Works V. Logan, [1903] A. C. 355 ; 72 L. J. P. C. 
 
 91;88L. T. 779 501,502 
 
 of Trade, &c. I;. Bell (1902), 71 L. J. P. C. 109 .. ..184 
 
 Companhia de Mocambique v. British South Africa Co., [1892] 
 
 2Q. B. 358 7 
 
 Cone u. Bowles (1690), 1 Salk. 205 510 
 
 Connan, Bb (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 690 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 472 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 281 ; 5 M. B. R. 89 685 
 
 Constable v. Constable (1879), 48 L. J. Ch.621 384 
 
 Constantine i). Constantine (1801), 6 Ves. 100 .. .. .. 281 
 
 Constitution, The (1879), 4 P. D. 39 ; 48 L. J. P. D. & A, 13 ; 
 
 40 L. T. 219 ; 27 W. R. 739 203 
 
 Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Heath (1913), 29 T. L. R. 
 
 308 • .. .. .. .. 702 
 
 Conybeare v. L. School Bd., [1891] 1 Q. B. 118; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 44; 63 L. T. 651 ; 39 W. R. 288 ; 55 J. P. 151 ; 17 Cox C. C. 
 
 191 261 
 
 Cook Vr Loveland (1799), 2 Bos. & P. 31 ; 5 R. R. 533 .. .. 645 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. XXXV 
 
 I'AGK 
 
 Cook V. N. Metropolifcan Tramways Co. (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 683 ; 
 
 56 L. J. Q. B. 309 ; 56 L. T. 448 ; 57 L. T. 476 ; 35 W. R. 
 
 577;51J.P. 630 585 
 
 Cooke V. Vogeler, [19011 A. C. 102 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 181 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 10; 8 Mans. 113 267,339 
 
 Cockney v. Anderson (1863), 1 De G. J. & S. 365 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 
 
 427 518 
 
 Coomber v. Berks Justices. (1884), 9 Q. B. D. 26 ; 10 Id. 267 ; 9 
 
 App. Cas. 61 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 239; 47 L. T. 687 ; 47 J. P. 
 
 164 ; 31 W. R. 356 247 
 
 Coope «. Cresswell (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 112 89 
 
 Cooper, JJe (1918), 119 L. T. 303 102 
 
 V. Hawkins, [1904T 2 K. B. 164 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 113 ; 89 
 
 L. T. 496 ; 52 W. R. 233 ; 68 J. P. 25 ; 1 L. G. R. 833 .. 251 
 
 V. Hubbuck (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 456 : 31 L. J. C. P. 323 .. 17 
 
 V. Prichard (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 351 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 526 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 848 ; 31 W. R. 834 33 
 
 V. Simmons (1862), 7 H. & N. 707 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 138 ; 8 
 
 Jur. N. S. 81 ; 5 L.T. 712 ; 10 W. R. 270 194 
 
 V. Wandsworth Board (1863). 14 C. B. N. S. 180 ; 32 
 
 L. J. C. P. 185; 9 Jur. N. S.. 1155 ; 11 W. R. 646 .. .. 641 
 V. Whittingham (1880), 15 Ch. D. 501 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 752 ; 
 
 43 L. T. 16 ; 28 W. R. 720 708 
 
 V. WooUey (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 88 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 27 ; 15 
 
 L. T. 539 ; 15 W. R. 4.W 366 
 
 Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina (1891), 144 U. S. 550 .. 92 
 Cope V. Barber (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 393 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 891 ; 20 W. R. 885 601 
 
 V. Doherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 600 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 541 ; 116 R. B. 370 .. .. 61, 257, 274, 276, 543 
 -V. Rowlands (1836), 2 M. & W. 149 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 63 ; 2 
 
 Gale 231 ; 46 R. R. 532 697 
 
 1)." Thames Haven R. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 841 ; 6 Rly. Cas. 
 
 83 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 345; 77 R. R. 859 654 
 
 Copeland, Ex p. (1853), 2 De G. M. & G. 914 ; 22 L. J. Bank. 
 
 17 ; 17 Jur. 121 ; 95 R. B. 371 66, 479, 494, 570 
 
 Copeman v. Gallant (1716), 1 P. Wms. 320 .. .. 83, 91 
 
 Copland v. Davies (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 358 ; 21 W. R. 1, H. L. 82 
 
 ?). Powell (1823), 1 Bing. 373 601 
 
 Coppen V. Moore (No. 2), |1898] 2 Q. B. 306; 67 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 689 ; 78 L. T. 520 ; 46 W. B. 620 ; 62 J. P. 453 . . 184, 191 
 Corbet v. Haigh (1879), 5 C. P. D. .50 ; 42 L. T. 185 ; 28 W. R. 
 
 430; 44 J. P. 39 350 
 
 Corbet's Case (1600), 1 Rep. 88 448 
 
 Corbett, Ex. p. (1880), 14 Ch. D. 122 ; 49 L. J. Bank. 74 ; 42 
 
 L. T. 164 ; 28 W. R. 569 357 
 
 Corbyn «. French (1799), 4 Ves. 418 215 
 
 Core V. James (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 135 ; 41 L, J. M. C. 19 ; 25 
 
 L. T. 593 ; 20 W, R. 201 137 
 
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XXXVX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 tko* 
 Cork and Bandon Ry. Co. v. Goode (1853), 13 C. B. 837 ; 22 
 
 L. J. C. P. 198 ; 17 Jur. 555 ; 93 R. R. 655 .. •• 583 
 and Youghal Ry. Co., Be (1866), L. R. 4 Ch. 748 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 277 ; 21 L. T. 735 .. .. 655,690 
 
 Cornell v. Hay (1873), L. R. 8 C..P. 328 ; 42 ,L. J. C. P. 136 ; 
 
 28 L. T. 475 ; 21 W. R. 580 204 
 
 Cornill v. Hudson (1857), 8 E. & B. 429 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1257 ; 112 R. R. 636 399, 564 
 
 Cornish v. Hocking (1853), IE. & B. 602 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 142 ; 
 
 17 Jur. 1049; 93 R.R. 304 401 
 
 Cornwall Mining Co. v. Bennett (1860), 5 H. & N. 432; 29 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 157 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 539 654 
 
 Cortis V. Kent Waterworks (1827), 7 B. &C. 314 .. 143, 293 
 
 Cory m. Prance, [1911] 1 K. B. 114 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 346 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 649 ; 11 Asp. M. C. 499 149, 339, 406 
 
 Costa Rica v. Erlanger (1874), 3 Ch. D. 62 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 743 ; 
 
 35 L. T. 19 ; 24 W. R. 955 400 
 
 Costarw. Hetherington (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 198 .. .. 608 
 
 Cother D. Merrick (1657), Hard 94 282 
 
 Cotton V. James (1830), Moo. & Mai. 273 ; 3 C. & P. 505 ; 8 
 
 L. J. K. B. 345 ; 35 R. R. 244 576 
 
 ■ w. Vogan, [1896] A. C. 457 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 486 .. ..107 
 
 Couch V. Steel (1854), 3 E. & B. 402 ; 2 C. L. R. 940 ; 23 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 18 Jur. 515 ; 97 R. R. 555 .. 709, 715, 717, 718, 
 
 720, 727 
 Coulbert v. Troke (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 1 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 7 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 340; 24 W. R. 41 612 
 
 County Theatres v. Knowles, [1902] 1KB. 480 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 
 
 351; 86L. T. 132 46 
 
 Courier, The (1891), 61 L. J. P. 11 •• 607 
 
 Courtauld v. Legh (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 130 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 45 ; 
 
 19 L. T. 737 ; 17 W. R. 466 556 
 
 Courteen's Case (1618), Hob. 270 ; 1 Hale P. C. 542 .. ..Ill 
 
 Coverdale v. Charlton (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 104 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 128 ; 40 L. T. 88 ; 27 W. R. 257 38, 170, 545 
 
 Cowen, Ex p. (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 563 ; 36 L. J. Bank. 41 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 469 ; 15 W. R. 859 227 
 
 V. Kingston-upon-HuU, [1897] 1 Q. B. 273 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 185 ; 75 L. T. 693 ; 45 W. R. 413 ; 61 J. P. 356 .. .. 577 
 Cowley V. Byas (1877), 5 Ch. D. 944 ; 37 L. T. 238 ; 26 W. R. 1 294 
 V. Newmarket Loc. Bd., [1892] A. C. 345 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 65 ; 67 L. T. 486 ; 56 J. P. 805, H. L 726 
 
 Cowper-Essex v. Acton (1889), 14 App. Cas. 153 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 594; 61L. T. 1; 38 W. R. 209; 53 J. P. 756, H. L. .. 172 
 
 Cox, £a; p. (1887), 56 L. J. Q. B. 532 283 
 
 V. Ambrose (1890), 60 L. J. Q. B. 114 ; 55 J. P. 23 . . 496 
 
 V. Cannon (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 453 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 288 .. 685 
 
 V. Hakes (1890), 15 App. Cas. 606 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 392 ; 39 W. R. 145 ; 54 J. P. 820 .. 4, 49, 110, 166 
 — D. Hill (1892), 67 L. T. 26 200 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. xxxvii 
 
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 Cox Ws-Lawrance (1853), 22 L. J. Q. B. 140 483 
 
 V. Leigh (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 333 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 123 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 494 ; 22 W. R 730 537 
 
 V. Rabbits (1878), 3 App. Cas. 473 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 385 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 430; 26 W. R. 483 506 
 
 Cox's Trusts, Be (1878), 9 Ch. D. 159 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 735 ; 27 
 
 W.R. 53 .. .: 592 
 
 Coxhead v. Mullis (1878), 3 C. P. D. 439 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 761 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 349 ; 27 W. R. 136 11 
 
 Crabtree I). Hole (1879), 43 J. P. 799 191 
 
 Cracknell v. Thetford (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 629 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 353 628 
 
 Craft u Boite (1669), 1 Saund. 247 459 
 
 Craig & Sons, 5e, [1916] 2 K. B. 497 390 
 
 Craig's Claim, Se, [1895] 1 Ch. 267 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 859 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 705 ; 43 W. R. 244 101 
 
 Crake v. Powell (1852), 2 E. & B. 210 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 183 ; 95 
 
 R. R. 498 428 
 
 Crane v. Lawrence (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 152 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 110 ; 
 
 63 L. T. 197 ; 38 W. R. 602 ; 54 J. P. 471 .. .. 474, 475 
 V. Powell (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 123 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 43 ; 20 
 
 L. T. 703 ; 17 W. R. 161 512 
 
 Craven v. Smith (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 146 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 90 ; 20 
 
 L T. 400 ; 17 W. R. 710 200 
 
 Crawford v. Spooner (1846), 6 Moo. P. C. 1 6 
 
 Crawley r. Philips (1664), Sid. 220 159 
 
 Crawshaw v. Harrison, [1894] 1 Q. B. 79 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 94 ; 69 
 
 L. T. 860 ; 1 Manson 407 378 
 
 Crayford v. Rutter, [1897] 1 Q. B. 650 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 506 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 392 ; 45 W. R. 542 ; 61J. P. 134 572 
 
 Credits Gereundeuse v. Van Weede (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 171 ; 53 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 142 ; 32 W. R. 414 ; 48 J. P. 184 .. 271 
 
 Cree v. St. Pancras Vestry, [1899] 1 Q. B. 693 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 389; SOL. T. 388 414 
 
 Crespigny V. Wittenoom (1792), 4 T. R. 793 582 
 
 Crigglestone Co., Be, [1906] 2 Ch. 327 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 95 L. T. 
 
 510 ; 13 Manson 233 592 
 
 Crisp ,v. Bunbury (1832), 8 Bing. 394 ; 1 L. J. C. P. 112 ; 1 
 
 M. & Scott 646 ; 34 R. R. 747 238 
 
 V. Churchill (1794), cited 1 B. &. P. 340 693 
 
 Crispin, Ex p. (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 374 ; 42 L. J. Bank. 65 ; 
 
 28 L. T. 483 ; 21 W. R. 491 267 
 
 Crocker v. Knight, [1892] 1 Q. B. 702 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 466 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 596 ; 40 W. R. 353 ; 56 J. P. 420 299 
 
 Croft V. Lumley (1858), 6 H. L. Cas. 672 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 321 ; 
 
 108R. R. 252 213,214 
 
 Crofts V. Haldane (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 194 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 85; 
 
 16 L. T. 116 ; 8 B. & S. 194 175 
 
 Croker v. Marquis of Hertford (1844), 4 Moo. P. C. 339 111, 682 
 
 Crooke v. De Vandes (1803), 9 Ves. 197 ; 11 Ves. 330 ; 45 R. R. 
 
 343 n. ■ .. 558 
 
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XXXVUl TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Crboke's Case (1691), Show 208 245 
 
 Cross Be; Exp. Payne (1879), 11 Ch. D. 539, C. A 8 
 
 V. Watta (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 239 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 73 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 776; 7. L. T. 463 ; 11 W. E. 210 221 
 
 Croysdale v. Sunbury, &c. Urban Council (1898), 67 L. J. Ch. 
 
 585 364 
 
 Crumble v. Wallsend Loc. Bd., [1891] 1 Q. B. 503 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 392 ; 64 L. T. 490 ; 55 J. P. 421 611 
 
 Cuckfield Board, Re (1854), 19 Beav. 153 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 585 ; 
 
 105R. R. 104 .. : 245,321,325 
 
 Cull V. Austin (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 234 ; 41 L. J. 0. P. 153 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 767 ; 20 W. R. 863 ; 1 Hop. & C. 741 .. .. 4 
 
 CuUen V. Trimble (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 416 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 
 
 132 ; 26 L. T. 691 ; 20 W. B. 691 242,625 
 
 CuUerne v. London Bldg. Socy. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 485 ; 59 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 525 ; 39 W. R. 88 ; 63 L. T. 511 .. .. 554 
 
 Culverson v. Melton (1840), 12 A. & E. 753 ; 2 M. & Rob. 200 ; 
 
 4 P. & D. 445 ; 4 Jur. 1130 22 
 
 Cumberland v. Copeland (1862), 1 H. & C. 194; 31 L. J. Ex. 
 
 353 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 253 ; 7 L. T. 334 291, 311 
 
 Cuming v. Toms, or Jones (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 29, 288 ; 8 Scott 
 
 N. R. 827 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Gas. 151 ; 8 Jur. 1052 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 
 
 54; 66R. R. 653 136 
 
 Cunard v. Hyde (1858), E. B. & E. 670; 27 L. J. Q. B. 408; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S. 40 ; 113|R. R. 824 694 
 
 V. (1859), 2. E. &. E. 1 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; 6 Jur. N. S.14 694 
 
 Cundell v. Dawson (1847), 4 C. B. 376 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 311; 72 
 
 R. R. 621 696,701 
 
 Cundy v. Le Cocq (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 210 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 125 ; 
 
 51 L. T. 265 ; 32 W. R. 769 ; 48 J. P. 599 ,. 125, 179, 181, 186 
 
 Cureton «. R. (1861), 30 L. J. M. C. 149 241 
 
 Curlewis v. Mornington (1857), 7 E. & B. 283 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 660 ; & 27 L. J. Q. B. 269 ; 4 Jur. N. S, 535 ; 
 
 llOR. R. 594 454,531 
 
 Curry w. Edensor (1790), 3 T. R. 524 507 
 
 Curtis V. Embery (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 369 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 39 ; 
 
 21W. R. 143 566 
 
 V. Mundy, [1892] 2 Q. B. 178 ; 40 W. R. 317 .. .. 166 
 
 - — V. Stovin (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 513 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 174 ; 60 
 
 L. T. 772 ; 37 W. R. 315 411,419 
 
 Cusack «. L. & N. W. Ry., [1891] 1 Q. B. 347 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 208 ; 64 L. T. 45 ; 39 W. R. 244 ; 55 J. P. 341 .. .. 676 
 
 Gushing V. Dupuy (1880), 5 App. Gas. 409 ; 49 L. J. P. G. 63 ; 
 
 42L. T. 445 252 
 
 Gustodes u. Ginkes (1651), Styles 283 154 
 
 Cybele, The (1878), 3 P. D. 8 ; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 86 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 773 ; 26 W. R. 345 112 
 
 Czech V. Gen. St. Nav. Go. (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 14; 37 
 
 L. J. C. P. 3 ; 17 L. T. 246 ; 16 W. R. 130 .. .. 367, 368 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. XXXIX 
 
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 Daglish, Ex p. (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 1072 ; 42 L. J. Bank. 102 ; 
 
 29 L. T. 168 ; 21 W. R. 893 173 
 
 Dakins v. Seaman (1842), 9 M. & W. 777 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 274 ; 6 
 
 Jur. 783 ; 60 R. R. 883 309 
 
 Dale's Case (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 376; 7 App. Gas. 240; 50 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; 43 L. T. 786 ; 45 J. P. 284, H. L. .. 321, 542, 
 
 646, 657 
 
 D'Allax «. Jones (1856), 26 L. J. Ex. 79 701 
 
 D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835), 1 Yo. & C. 301 ; 4 L. J. Ex. Eq. 21 ; 
 
 41R. R. 273 350 
 
 Damodhar «)..Deoram (1876), 1 App. Cas. 332, P. C 517 
 
 Danby v. Watson (1877), 46 L. J. M. C. 181 710 
 
 Daniel v. Janes (1877), 2 0. P. D. 351 167, 193 
 
 Daniels v. Trefusis, ri914] 1 Ch. 788 515 
 
 Dannebrog, The (1874), L. R. 4 A. & E. 386 ; 44 L. J. Adm. 21 ; 
 
 31 L. T. 759 ; 23 W. R. 419 580 
 
 D'Arcy v. Tamar Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 2 Ex. 158 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 
 
 37; 4H. &C. 463 645 
 
 Dargan v. Davies (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 118 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 122 ; 
 
 35 L. T. 810 ; 25 W. R. 230 361 
 
 Darlaston Loc. Bd. v. L. & N. W. Ry., [1894] 2 Q. B. 694 ; 63 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 826 ; 71 L. T. 461 ; 43 W. R. 29 ; 8 Rly. & 
 
 Canal Cas. 216 ., 436 
 
 Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127 ; 
 
 55 L. J. Q. B. 529 ; 54 L. T. 882 ; 51 J. P. 148 ; 32 W. R. 
 
 947 12,59,611 
 
 Darlington Wagon Co. v. Harding, [18911 1 Q- B. 245 ; 60 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 110 ; 64 L. T. 409 ; 39 W. R. 167 .. .. 201 
 
 Dart, The, [1893] P. 33 ; 62 L. J. P. D. & A. 32 ; 69 L. T. 251 ; 
 
 41W. R. 153 292 
 
 Darvill v. Terrv (1861), 6 H. & N. 807 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 355 .. 376 
 
 Dash V. Van Kleek (1811), 7 Johnson 477 383, 401 
 
 Dashwood v. Magniac, [1891] 3 Ch. 306 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 809 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 811 41 
 
 Davenports. R. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 115; 47 L. J. P. C. 8; 37 
 
 L. T. 727 375, 643 
 
 Daventry Union v. Coventry Union (1917), 86 L. J. K. B. 276 116 
 
 David V. Ackland, Ee, [1914] 2 K. B. 691 145 
 
 Davidson v. Burnand (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 117 ; 38 L.J. C. P. 73; 
 
 19 L. T. 782 ; 17 W. R. 121 577 
 
 Davidsson v. HUl, ri901] 2 K. B. 606 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 788 ; 85 
 
 L, T. 118 ; 49 W R. 630 ; 9 Asp. M. C. 223 .. Ill, 244, 261, 275 
 Davies v. Berwick (Lord) (1861), ,3 E. & E. 549 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 
 
 84 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 410 ; 3 L. T. 697 ; 9 W. R. 334 .. .. 585 
 
 V. Eitton (1842), 2 Dr. & War. 225 ; 90 R. R. 885 .. .. 223 
 
 V. Garland (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 260 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 727 ; 24 W. R. 252 27 
 
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xl TABLE OP CASES. 
 
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 Davies v. Griffiths (1837), 4 M. & W. 377 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 70 ; 7 
 
 D. P.O. 204 313 
 
 V. Harvey (1874), L. R 9 Q. B. 433 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 121 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 629 ; 22 W. R. 733 .337,496 
 
 V. Makuna (1885), 29 Ch. D. 596 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 1148 ; 53 
 
 L. T. 314 ; 33 W. E. 668 ; 50 J. P. 5 689 
 
 V. Rees (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 408 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 363 ; 54 
 
 L. T. 813 ; 34 W. R. 573 380 
 
 Davis, ^x ^. <1872), L. R. 7 Cii. 526; 41 L. J. Bank. 69; 27 
 
 L. T. 53 ; 20 W. R. 791 523 
 
 V. Bryan (1827), 6 B. & C, 651 ; 30 R. R. 491 .. .. 378 
 
 V. Comitti (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 419 ; 52 L. T. 539 .. .. 131 
 
 ■ V. Curling (1846), 8 Q. B. 286 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 10 Jur. 69 ' 134 
 
 v. Curry, [1918J 1 K. B. 109 67 
 
 u. Hardacre (1810), 2 Camp. 375 209 
 
 V. Harris, [1900] 1 Q. B. 729; 69 L. J. Q. B. 232 ; 81 L.T. 
 
 780 ; 48 W. R. 445 ; 64 J. P. 136 130 
 
 u. Jeans (1904), 41 So. L. R. 426, Sc 474 
 
 ■;;. Marlborough (Duke) (1819), 1 Swan. 74 ; 53 R. R. 29 . . 25 
 
 V. Park (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 862 n.; 42 L. J. Ch. 673 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 295 ; 21 W. R. 301 267 
 
 V. Strathmore (1810), 16 Ves. 419; 90 R. R. 846 . . .. 456 
 
 V. Taff Vale Ry„ [1895] A. C. 542 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 488 ; 72 
 
 L. T. 632 ; 44 W. R. 172 53 
 
 -— V. Treharne (1881), 6 App. Cas. 463 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 605 ; 29 
 
 W. R. 869 627 
 
 Davison v. Farmer (1851), 6 Ex. 252 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 86 R. R. 
 
 266 294 
 
 Davys v. Douglas (1859), 4 H. & N. 180 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 193; 
 
 118R. R. 377 574 
 
 Daw V. L. C. C. (1890), 59 L. J. M. C. 112 ; 62 L. T. 937 ; 54 J. P. 
 
 302 423 
 
 V. Metrop. Board of Works (1862), 12 C. B. TST. S. 161 ; 31 
 
 L. J. C. P. 223 293,322,329 
 
 Dawdy, Re (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 426 ;. 54 L. J. Q. B. 474 . . 646 
 
 Dawes v. Painter (1674), Freem. K. B. 175 . . . . 465, 477 
 
 • 1). Thomas, [18921 1 Q. B. 414 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 482 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 451 ; 40 W. R. 305 ; 56 J. P. 326 622 
 
 Dawson, Ex p. (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 433 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 49 ; 
 
 32 L. T. 101 ; 23 W. R. 354 392,403 
 
 V. Fitzgerald (1876), 1 Ex. D. 257 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 893 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 220 ; 24 W. R. 773 235 
 
 «. Meuli (1918), 16 L. G. R. 308 267 
 
 V. Midland Ry. Co. (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 8 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 
 
 21W. R. 56 129 
 
 Day V. Brownrigg (1878), 10 Ch. D. 294 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 173 ; 39 
 
 L. T. 553 ; 27 W. R. 217 151 
 
 ■«. Savadge (1614), Hob. 87 272,459,461 
 
 V. Simpson (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 680 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 149 ; 
 
 11 Jur. N. S. 487 ; 12 L. T. .386 ; 13 W. R. 748 .. 211, 591 
 
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 Deal V. Scliofield (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 8 ; 37 L. J. M. 0. 15 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 143; 16 W. R. 77; 8B. &S. 760 222 
 
 Dean v. Bennett (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 489 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 452 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 169 ; 19 W. R. 363 526 
 
 1). Green (1882), 8 P. D. 79 283 
 
 V. Mallard (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 19 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 282 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 346 ; 11 W. R. 913 731 
 
 Dean of York's Case (1841), 2 Q. B. 1 ; 57 R. R. 545 .. . . 52 
 De Beauvoir v. Welch (1827), 7 B. & C. 266 ; 1 M. «&. R. 81 .. 438 
 De Beers Mines v. Howe, [1906] A. C. 455 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 858 ; 
 
 95 L. T. 221 ; 13 Mans. 394 271 
 
 De Begnis v. Armistead (1833), 10 Bing. 107 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 214 ; 
 
 3 M. & Scott 511 ; 38 R. R. 406 692 
 
 De Bode v. R. (1849), 13 Q. B. 364 ; 14 Jur. 970 ; 78 R. R. 407 253 
 Debtor, £e A, [1903] 1 K. B. 705 ; 72 L. J. Q. B. 382 ; 88 L. T. 
 
 401 ; 51 W, R. 370 ; 10 Mans. 130 43 
 
 Deck V. Deck (1860), 29 L. J. P. M. & A. 129 ; 2 Sw. & Tr. 90 ; 
 
 8 W. R. 666 ; 2 L. T. 542 261 
 
 Deere, Be (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 658 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 120 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 115 ; 23 W. R. 866 303 
 
 Deerhurst, Be (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 411 ; 64 L. T. 118 .. .. 210 
 Delano, The, [1895] P. 40; 64 L. J. P. 8 ; 71 L. T. 544 ; 43 
 
 W. R. 66 292 
 
 De la Vega v. Vianna (1830), 1 B. & A. 284 ; 35 R. R. 298 .. 278 
 
 De Londo's Case (1765), 2 East P. C. 1098 582 
 
 De Mattos v. Benjamin (1894), 03 L. J. Q. B. 248 ; 70 L. T. 560 ; 
 
 42W. R. 284 693 
 
 Denn v. Diamond (1825), 4 B. & C. 243 ; 28 R. R. 237 .. •• 504 
 
 t). Reid (1836), 10 Peters 524 7 
 
 Dennis v. Tovell (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 10 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 33 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 482 ; 21 W. R. 170 8,175 
 
 Denny's Trustee v. Denny, [1919] 1 K. B. 583 ,. . . 112, 145 
 Denny v. Thwaites (1876), 2 Ex. D. 21 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 141 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 628 414 
 
 Dent w. Allcroft (1861), 30 Beav. 335 221 
 
 V. Clayton (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 503 ; 10 Jur. 671 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 865 ; 12 W. R. 903 444 
 
 Derby v. Bury Commissioners (1868), L. R. 4 Ex. 222 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 100 ; 20 L. T. 927; 17 W. R. 772 .. .. 291, 310 
 
 De Rosaz, ^ (1877), 2 P. D. 66 ; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 6 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 263 ; 25 W. R. 352 41 
 
 Devonport Corporation v. Tezor, [1902] 71 L. J. Ch. 754 .. 527 
 
 Devonshire (Duke) v. Barrow Steel Co. (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 286; 
 
 46 L. J. Q. B. 435 ; 36 L. T. 355 ; 25 W. R. 469 ., .. 686 
 
 V. O'Connor (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 468; 59 L. J. Q. B. 206 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 917 ; 38 W. R. 420 ; 54 J. P. 740 . . . . 76, 502, 547 
 Dewhurst v. Feilden (1845), 7 M. & Gr. 187 ; 8 Scott N. R. 1013 ; 
 1 Lut, Reg. Cas. 274 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 126 ; 9 Jur. 376 ; 66 
 R. R. 696 70, 72 
 
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xlii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Dewsbury Waterworks Board v. Penistonc Union (1885), 16 
 
 Q. B. D. 585 529 
 
 De Winton v. Brecon Corporation (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 600 .. 302 
 De Wolf V. Lindsell (1868), L. R. 5 Eq. 209 ; 37 L. J. Gli. 293 ; 
 
 17 L. T. 487 ; 16 W. B. 324 392 
 
 Dews V. RUey (1851), 11 C. B. 434 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 264 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 1159; 87.R. R. 718 555 
 
 Diamond Coal Cutter Co. v. Mining Appliances Co., [1915] W. N. 
 
 340 .. 593 
 
 Diana, The (1842), 4 Moo. P 0. IJ , P. C. 517 
 
 Dick, Be, [1891] 1 Ch. 426 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 64 L. T. 32 ; 39 
 
 W. R. 225 123 
 
 V. Badart (1883), 10 Q, B. D. 387 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 49 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 391 ; 47 J. P. 422 523 
 
 Dickins v. Gill, [1896] 2 Q. B. 310 ; 65 L.J. M. C. 187 ; 75 L. T. 
 
 32; 44 W. R. 686; 30 J. P. 488 486 
 
 Dickinson, Be (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 736; 20 Ch. D. 315; 47 L. T. 
 
 266; 30W. R. 667 648 
 
 V. Barrow, [1904] 2 Ch. 339 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 701 ; 91 L. T. 161 455 
 
 1). Ead (1914), 78 J P. 326 182 
 
 V. N. E. Ry. Co. (1864), 2 H. & C. 735 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 91 .. 106 
 
 Dicks V. Brooks (1880), 15 Ch. D. 22 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 812,; 43 L. T. 
 
 71.;29W. R.87 481 
 
 Dickson v. Neath and Brecon Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 87 ; 38 
 
 L. J. Ex. 57 ; 19 L. T. 402 ; 17 W. R. 501 24 
 
 Diggle t) Higgs (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 721, C. A 199 
 
 V. London and Blackwall Ry. Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 442 ; 6 Rly. 
 
 Cas. 590 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 308 ; 14 Jur. 937 654 
 
 Dimmock V. Allenby (1811)„cited 2 Marsh 582 563 
 
 Dingley w. Moor (1600), Cro. Eliz. 750 734 
 
 Direct U. S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co. (1877), 2 App. 
 
 Cas. 394 ; 46 L. J. P. C. 71 ; 36 L. T. 265 .. .. .36,515 
 
 Diss V. Aldrich (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 179 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 183 ; 36 
 
 L..T. 663 517 
 
 Ditcher v. Denison (1858), 11 Moo. P. C. 324 ; 117 R. R. 32, 
 
 P. C 101 
 
 Ditton's Case (1701), 2 Salk. 490 370,676 
 
 Dixon V. Wells (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 249 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 116 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 812 ; 38 W. R. 606 ; 54 J. P. 725 ; 17 Cox C. C. 
 
 48 681, 684 
 
 ■«. White (1883), 8 App. Cas. 833 627 
 
 Dobbs ■«. Grand Junction Waterworks (1883), 9 App. Cas. 49 ; 
 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 50 ; 49 L. T. 541 ; 32 W. R. 432 ; 48 J. P. 5 71 
 Dobell V. Hutchinson (1835), 3 A. & E. 355 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 201; 
 
 5 N. & M. 251 ; 1 H. & W. 394 ; 42 R. R. 408 .. .. 512 
 
 Dobson V. Eesti, [1891] 2 Q. B. 92 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 481 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 551 ; 39 W. R. 481 267 
 
 Dodd «. Dodd, [1906] P. 189 152 
 
 Dodds V. Shepherd (1876), 1 Ex. D. 75 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 457 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 358 ; 24 W. R. 322 .. .. .. .. .. .. 314 
 
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 Doe V. Allaop (1821), 5 B. & Aid. 142 456 
 
 V. Bancks (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 401 ; Gow. 220 ; 23 R. R. 
 
 318.. .. 373 
 
 V. Bartle (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 492 ; 1 D. & R. 81 .. . . 157 
 
 V. Beynon (1840), 12 A. & E. 431 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 359 ; 
 
 4 P. & D. 193 ; 54 R. R. 592 41 
 
 V. Bold (1847), 11 Q. B. 127 ; 13 Jur. 871 ; 75 R. R. 304 .. 384 
 
 V. Brandling (1828), 7 B. & C. 643 ; 1 M. & R. 600 .. 83 
 
 V. Bridges (183i), 1 B. & Ad. 847 ; 9 L. J. (O. S.) K. B. 9 ; 
 
 35R. R. 483 708,709 
 
 — - V. Carter (1798), 8 T. R. 57, 300 ; 4 R. R. 586 .. 213, 225 
 
 «. Chambers (1814), 4 Camp. 1 209 
 
 «. Gooch (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 664 209 
 
 V. Gwinnell (1841), 1 Q. B. 682 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; 
 
 IG. &D. 180 616 
 
 «. Harvey (1825), 4 B. & C. 610 99 
 
 «. Holt (1852), 21 L. J. Ex. 335 730 
 
 ■«. Jessep (1810), 12 East 288 5 
 
 V. Jesson (1805), 2 Bligh, 2 ; 21 R. R. 1 99 
 
 V. Olley (1840), 12 A. & E. 481 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 379 ; 4 
 
 P. & D. 275 ; 4 Jur. 1084 ; 54 R. R. 607 58 
 
 V. Owens (1842). 9 M. & W. 455 ; 1 D. N. S. 404 ; 12 
 
 L. J. Ex. 53 ; 2D. N. S. 426 ; 7 Jur. 91 ; 10 M. & W. 521 ; 
 
 62R. R. 691 531 
 
 V. Page (1844), 5 Q. B. 767 ; D. & M. 601 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 153; 8 Jur. 999 .384 
 
 -y. Pitchers (1815), 6 Taunt. 359 381 
 
 ■». Powell a839), 7 Dowl. 539 142 
 
 V. Ries (1832), 8 Bing. 178 ; 1 L. J. C. P. 73 ; 1 M. & Scott 
 
 259.. ., 541 
 
 w. Roe (1852), 22 L. J. Ex. 17 730 
 
 V. Rugeley (1844), 6 Q. B. 107 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 615 ; 66 R. R. 305 .. .. 686 
 
 «. Snaith (1832), 8 Bing. 152 : 1 M. & Scott 230 .. ..504 
 
 V. Waterton (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 149 ; 22 R. R. 328 .. 56, 144 
 
 Doey V. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., [1919] 1 K. B. 623 23 
 
 Doggettu. Catterms (1864), 19 C. B. N. S. 765 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 46 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 243 ; 12 L. T. 355 ; 13 W. R. 390 .. 129, 598 
 Doherty v. Allman (1879), 3 A pp. Cas. 728 ; 39 L. T. 129 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 513 .. . .. .. .. . 228 
 
 Don V. Lippmann (1837), 5 Cl'.' & F. 1 ; 47 R. R. i,' H. L.' .'.' 278 
 
 Donkin v. Pearson, [1911] 2 K. B. 412 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 1069 .. 171 
 
 Donne V. Martyr (1828), 8 B. & C. 62 116 
 
 Donoghue v. Brook (1888), 57 L. J. Q. B. 122 ; 58 L. T. 411 ; 
 
 1 Fox 100.. 117 
 
 Dore 1). Grey (1788), 2 T. R. 358 ; 1 R. R. 494 544 
 
 Dorin «. Dorin(1876), L. R. 7 H. L. 568 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 652 ; 23 
 
 W. R. 570 ; 33 L. T. 281, H. L 106 
 
 Dormont v. Furness Ry. Co. (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 496 ; 52 L. J. 
 
 Q, B. 331 ; 49 L. T. 134 ; 47 J. P. 711 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 127 .. 429 
 
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xliv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Downing v. Capel (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 461 ; 36 L. J. M. 0. 97 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 323 ; 15 W. R. 747 *14 
 
 Doyle V. Falconer (1866), L. R. 1 P. 0. 328 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 34; 
 
 15 W. R. 366 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 203 632 
 
 Dragoman, The (1895), 11 T. L. R. 428 315 
 
 Drake v. Pootitt (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 201 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 141 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 42 ; 45 J. P. 798 *97 
 
 Draper V. Glenfield (1631), 2 Bulstr. 345 154 
 
 Driffield Co. ■;;. Waterloo Co. (1886), 31 Ch. D. 638 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 
 
 391 ; 54 L. T. 210 ; 34 W. R. 360 586 
 
 Drover v. Beyer (1879), 13 Ch. D. 242 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 37 ; 41 
 
 L. T. 393 ; 28 W. R. 110 100 
 
 Drucker (No. 2), Be, [1902] 2 K. B. 210; 71 L. J. K. B. 688 ; 
 
 86 L. T. 692 ; 50 W. R. 592 ; 9 Mans. 241 258 
 
 Drummond, Be, [1891] 1 Ch. 524 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 258 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 246 ; 39 W. R. 445 285 
 
 V. Drummond (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 32 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 15 
 
 L. T. 337 ; 15 W. R. 267 51,91,518 
 
 i;. Nicholson (1915), 79 J. P. 525 189 
 
 Drury i;. Defontaine (1808), 1 Taunt. 131 379 
 
 Dubout V. Maopherson (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 496 271 
 
 Duck V. Tower Galvanizing Co. (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 625 .. 645 
 
 Dudgeon v. Pembroke (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 581 ; 1 Q. B. D. 96 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 36 & 2 App. Cas. 284 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 409 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 382 ; 25 W. R. 499 694 
 
 Duignan v. Walker (1859), Johns. 446 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 867 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 976 ; 33 L. T. O. S. 256 ; 7 W. R. 562 612 
 
 Duke of Buccleuch, The, (1889), 15 P. D. 86 419 
 
 , [1891] A. C. 310 359 
 
 Dumfries, The (1856), Swab, 63 • .. -277,400 
 
 Dunbar Corporation v. Roxburgh (1835), 3 CI. & F. 335, H. L. .. 533 
 Duncan v. Dowding, [1897] 1 Q. B. 575 ; 66 L. .J. Q. B. 362 ; 76 
 
 L. . T. 294 ; 45 W. R. 383 ; 61 J. P. 280 ; 18 C. C. C. 
 
 527 342 
 
 V. Lawson (1889), 41 Ch. D. 394 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 502 ; 60 
 
 L.T. 732; 37 W. R. 524; 53 J. P. 532 269 
 
 V. Scottish N. E. Ry. Co. (1870), L. R. 2 Sc. Ap. 20, H. L. 317 
 
 V. Tindal (1853), 13 C. B. 258; 22 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 347 ; 93 R. R. 525 , 570 
 
 Dundalk Ry. Co. v. Tapster (1841), 1 Q. B. 667 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 186 ; 1 G. & D. 657 ; 2 Rly. Cas. 686 ; 5 Jur. 699 .. 239, 710 
 Dundas v. Dutens (1790). 1 Ves. Jun. 196 ; 1 R. R. 112 .. 112 
 
 Dunelm, The (1884), 9 P. D. 171 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 81 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 214 ; 39 W. R. 970; 5 Asp. M. C. 304 98 
 
 J}xmn,Mp.(1889), 23 Q. B. D. 461 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 375; 61 
 
 L. T. 543; 37 W. R. 537; 6M.B. R. 138 357 
 
 V. Birmingham Canal Co. (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 42 ; 42 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 34 ; 27 L. T. 683 ; 21 W. R. 266 628 
 
 Dunston v. Paterson (1859), 5 C. B. N. S. 267 ; 28 L. J. C. P, 
 
 185 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 516 ; 33 L. T. 0. S. 222 ; 7 W. E. 163 .. 117 
 
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 _ I'AGB 
 
 Durant v. Withers (1874), L. R. 9 0. P. 257 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 113 ; 
 
 22 W. R. 156 ; 9 Hop. & C. 202 217 
 
 Durham C. C. v. Chester-le-Street, [1891] 1 Q. B. 330 ; 60 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 9; 63L. T.461; 39 W. R. 188; 54 J. P. 759 .. 247 
 
 Dutton,^a;^. (1911), 75J. P. 558 150 
 
 V. Atkins (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 373 ; 40 L. J. M. 0. 157 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 507 ; 19 W. R. 799 .. 371 
 
 Dyer v. Best (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 152 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 142 ; 13 L. T. 753 ; 14 W. R. 336 ; 4 H. & C. 189 .. 534 
 Dyke v. Elliot (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 184 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 65 ; 20 
 
 L. T. 45 ; 20 W. R. 497 494 
 
 V. Gower,[1892] 1 Q. B. 220 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 70 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 760 ; 56 J. P. 168 ; 17 Cox. 421 58, 186 
 
 E. 
 
 Earbly's Case (1637), 2 Bulstr. 354 229 
 
 Earl of Auckland, The (1861), 30 L. J. Adm. 121 ; Lush. 164 .. 522 
 Earle v. Roworoft (1806), 8 East 126 ; 9 R. R. 385 .. ..190 
 
 East and West India Dock Co. v. Shaw (1888), 39 Ch. D. 531 ; 
 
 57 L. J. Ch. 1053 ; 60 L. T. 142 ; 6 N. & M. 94 .. . . 74 
 
 East Anglian Ry. Co. v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (1852), 11 
 
 C. B. 775 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 23 ; 16 Jur. 249 ; 87 R. R. 783 619, 672 
 East Fremantle Corporation v. Annois (1901), 71 L. J. P. C. 
 
 39 630 
 
 East Gloucestershire Ry. Co. v. Bartholomew (1868), L. R. 2 Ex. 
 
 16 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 17 ; 17 L. T. 256 168,374 
 
 East India Co. w.Paul (1849), 7 Moo. P. C. 85 ; 14 Jur. 253, P. C. 408, 
 
 678 
 East India Ry. Co. v. Secy, for India, [1905] 2 K. B. 413 ; 74 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 779 ; 93 L. T. 220 ; 54 W. R. 4, C. A. . . 500, 505 
 
 East London Ry. Co. v. Whitechurch (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 81 ; 43 
 
 L. J. M. C. 159 ; 30 L. T. 412 ; 22 W. R. 665 .. 32, 72, 417 
 East London Waterworks Co. «. Bailey (1827), 4 Bing. 283 .. 163 
 East V. Pell (1839), 4 M. & W. 665 ; 8 L. J. M. C. 33 ; 1 H. & H. 
 
 421 622 
 
 Eastern Archipelago Co. v. R. (1853), 1 B. & B. 310 ; 2 E. & B. 
 
 857 ; 23 L. J, Q. B. 82 j 18 Jur. 481 ; 95 R. R. 856 573,574 
 
 Eastern Counties Ry., Be (1856), 5 E. & B. 974 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 
 
 49 ; 103 R. R. 828 342 
 
 Eastern Counties Ry. Co. v. Marriage (1862), 9 H. L. Cas. 32 ; 31 
 
 L. J. Exch. 73 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 53 ; 8 W. R. 748, H. L. .. 92 
 Eastman Photographic Co. v. Compt. of Patents, [1898] A. C. 571 ; 
 
 67 L. J. Ch. 628 ; 79 L. T. 195 ; 47 W. R. 152, H. L. 36,40 
 
 Easton & Co. v. Nar Valley Drainage Com. (1892), 8 T. L. R. 649 365 
 Eaton V. Basker (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 529 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 444 ; 44 
 
 L. T. 703 ; 29 W. R. 597 ; 45 J. P. 616 671 
 
 Ebbs V. Boulnois (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 479 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 691 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 342 ; 23 W. R. 820 412 
 
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xlvi TABLE OP OASES. 
 
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 Eccles V. Cheyne (1856), 2 K. & J. 681 105,106 
 
 Eceles Corp. v. S. Lancashire Tramways Co., [1910] 2 Ch. 263 ; 
 
 79 L. J. Ch. 759 ; 103 L. T. 158 ; 74 J. P. 345 . . 231, 633 
 Ecclesiastical Persons, Case of (1601), 5 Rep. 14a .. .• 252 
 
 Ecroyd v. Coulthard (1898), 67 L. J. Oh. 458 547 
 
 Eddington ?;. Borman (1790), 4 T. R. 4 317 
 
 Edgware Highway Board v. Harrow Gas Co. (1874), L. R. 10 Q. B. 
 
 92 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 31 L. T. 402 554 
 
 Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Edinburgh, []!894] A. C. 456, 
 
 489 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 769 ; 71 L. T. 301 .. .. 231,633 
 
 V. Torbain (1878), 3 App. Oas. 68 ; 37 L. T. 288 .. .. 36 
 
 Edleston v. Barnes (1875), 1 Ex. D. 67 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 73 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 497 .. .. 338,497 
 
 Edmunds w. Edmunds, [1904] P. 362 146 
 
 Edward v. Trevellick (1855), 4 E. & B. 59; 2 0. L. R. 1605 ; 24 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 9; 1 Jur. N. S. 110; 99 R. R. 345 .. .. 177 
 Edwards v. Aberayron Insurance Society (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 563 ; 
 
 34L. T. 457 • .. 235,512 
 
 V. Coombe (1872), L. R. 7 0. P. 519 ; 41 L. J. 0. P. 202 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 315 ; 21 W. R. 107 238 
 
 V. Dick (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 212 ; 23 R. R. 255 . . . . 372 
 
 V. Edwards (1876), 2 Ch. D. 291 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 391 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 472; 24 W. R. 713 212,458 
 
 u. Hall (1856), 6 De G. M. & G. 74; 25 L. J. Ch. 82 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1189; 106 R. R. 32 206, 218, 221 
 
 V. Islington (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 338 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 165 ; 60 
 
 L. T. 851 ; 37 W. R. 753 134 
 
 V. Roberts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 302 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 6 ; 55 J. P. 
 
 439 677 
 
 V. Rusholme (1869), L: R. 4 Q. B. 554; 17 W. R. 821; 38 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 153 ; 10 B. & S. 526 81 
 
 v. Walters, [1896] 2 Ch. 157 25 
 
 Eede, JJe (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 228 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 376 ; 38 W. R. 
 
 683 713 
 
 Eggington v. Lichfield (1855), 5 E. & B. 100 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 360 ; 
 
 1 Jur. N. S. 908; 103 R. R. 387 611 
 
 Eilbeck, Be, [1910] 1 K. B. 136 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 265 ; 101 L. T. 
 
 688 ; 17 Mans. 1 133 
 
 Elder v. Carter (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 194 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 516 ; 38 W. R. 612 ; 54 J. P. 692 155 
 
 Eliott V. Majendie (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 429 ; 41 L. J. M. 0. 147 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 504 ; 20 W. R. 721 476 
 
 EUerton, Exp. (1864), 33 L. J. Bank. 32 ; 10 Jur. 502; 10 L. T. 
 
 317, 722 309 
 
 EUiott, Ee (1891), 39 W. R. 297 269 
 
 V. Richardson (1870), L. R. 5 0. P. 744 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 340 ; 
 
 22L. T. 858; 18 W. R. 1157 .. .. 692 
 
 Ellis V. Kelly (1861), 6 H. & N. 222 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 35 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 113 193 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. xlvii 
 
 _ TAOB 
 
 Ellis V. McCormick (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 271 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 127 ; 
 
 20 L. T. 223 ; 17 W. R. 506 ; 10 B. & S. 83 .. . . 465 
 
 V. McHenry (1871), 40 L. J. C. P. 109 272 
 
 Elstone and Rose, Re (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 4 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; 
 
 19L. T. 280; 17 W. R. 62; 9B. &S. 509 69 
 
 Elve V. Boyton, [1891] 1 Ch. 501 ; 60 L. J. Oh. 383 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 482 107 
 
 Ely (Dean) v. Bliss (1852), 2 De G. M. & G. 459 ; 95 R. R. 169 297 
 
 V. Oash (1846), 15 M. & W. 617 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 341 .. 297 
 
 Emanuel V. Constable (1827), 3 Russ. 436 82 
 
 Emary v. NoUoth, [1903] 2 K. B. 264 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 620 ; 89 
 
 L. T. 100 ; 52 W. R. 107 ; 67 J. P. 354 188 
 
 Emerson v. Newfoundland Judges (1854), 8 Moo. P. 0. 157 ; 97 
 
 R. R. 39, P. C 639 
 
 Emmerson V. Oliver (1905), 43 Sc. L. R. 291 Sc. .. ..607 
 
 Enderby ». Gilpin (1821), 5 Moo. 0. P. 571 210 
 
 English, Scottish, &c. Bank, Be, [1893] 3 Oh. 385 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 826 ; 69 L. T. 268 ; 42 W. R. 4 457 
 
 Englishman, The (1878), 3 P. D. 18 ; 47 L. J. Adm. 9 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 412 359 
 
 Enraght v. Lord Penzance (1882), 7 App. Gas. 240 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 506 ; 46 L. T. 779 ; 30 W. R. 753 ; 46 J. P. 644 .. .. 321 
 
 ErdaUe V. Payne (1886), 52 L. T. 530 52 
 
 Esher Urban Council w. Marks (1902), 71 L. J. K. B. 309 .. 533 
 Eslick, Be (1877), 4 Ch. D. 496 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 30 ; 35 L. T. 914 ; 
 
 25W. R. 260 173 
 
 Evans v. Davies, [1893] 2 Ch. 216 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 661 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 244 ; 41 W. R. 687 127,575 
 
 ?/. Duncan (1831), ITyrw. 283' 455 
 
 V. Hoare, [1892] 1 Q. B. 593 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 470 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 345 ; 40 W. R. 442 ; 56 J. P. 664 515 
 
 w. Oakley (1843), 1 Car. &K. 125 100 
 
 V. Rees (1861), 9 0. B. N. S. .391 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 16 313, 510 
 
 V. Stevens (1791), 4 T. R. 224, 459 98,602 
 
 and Fynch's Case (1638), Oro. Car. 473 71 
 
 Evatt V. Hunt (1853), 2 E. & B. 374 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 348 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 1028; 95 R.R. 611 582 
 
 Everard v. KendaU (1870), L. R. 5 0. P. 428 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 234 ; 
 
 22 L. T. 408 ; 18 W. R. 892 244 
 
 Everett v. Wells (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 269 ; 10 L. J. 0. P. 81 ; 9 
 
 D. P. C. 424 ; 2 Scott. N. R. 525 25 
 
 Everingham v. Ivatt (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 685 156 
 
 Eversfield v. Mid Sussex Ry. Co. (1858), 3 De G. & J. 286 ; 28 
 
 L. J. Ch. 107 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 776 ; 114 R. R. 389 .. .. 528 
 Ewart V. Graham (1859), 7 H. L. 0. 331 ; 29 L. J, Ex. 88 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 773 ; 33 L. T. 0. S. 349 ; 7 W.R. 621 ; 115 R. R. 177, 
 
 H. L 547 
 
 Eyre v. WaUer (1860), 5 H. <& N. 460 ; 29 L. J, Ex. 247 ; 2 L. T. 
 
 253 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 512 ; 8 W. R. 450 70 
 
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xlviii TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Eyre & Leicester Oorpn., Be, [1892] 1 Q. B. 136 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 438 ; 65 L. T. 733 ; 40 W. R. 203 ; 56 J. P. 228 . . 409, 428 
 Eyston v. Sfcudd (1574), Plow. 459 177 
 
 F. 
 
 Fairley v. Boosey (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 697 273 
 
 Falkland Islands Battle, Be; Ex p. H.M.S. Canopus (1917), 86 
 
 L.J. P. 47 102 
 
 Fanny Carvill, The (1875), 13 App. Cas. 455 n. ; 32 L. T. 646 ; 2 
 
 Asp. M. 0.565 359 
 
 Farley v. Bonham (1861), 2 Johns. & H. 177 ; 30 L. J. Ch; 239 ; 
 
 7 Jur. N. S. 232 ; 3 L. T. 806 ; 9 W. R. 299 .. 52,324 
 
 Farrell v. Tomlinson (1761), 5 Bro. P. C. 438 .. .. 12, 14 
 
 Fearnside v. Flint (1883), 22 Ch. D. 579 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 479 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 154 ; 31 W. R. 318 303 
 
 Feather v. R. (1865), 6 B. & S. 257 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 200 ; 12 L. T. 
 
 114.. .. 539,573 
 
 Fellowes v. Clay (1843), 4 Q. B. 313 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 212 . . 83, 89 
 
 ■ 1). Clay (1848), 18 L. J. Ex. 89 89 
 
 Felsted v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1914), 83 L. J. K. B. 
 
 1192 134 
 
 Felton «. Bowers, [1900] 1 Q. B. 598 280 
 
 Fbnnell v. Ridler (1826), 5 B. & C. 406 ; 8 D. & R. 204 ; 4 L. J. 
 
 O. S. K. B. 207 ; 29 R. R. 278 501, 691 
 
 Fenton v. Hampton (1858), 11 Moo. P. C. 0. 347 ; 6 W. R. 341 ; 
 
 117R. R. 32 632 
 
 — V. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 787 ; 89 L. T. 
 
 314; 52 W. R. 81 75 
 
 Fenwick v. E. London Ry. Co. (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 544 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Ch". 602 ; 23 W. R. 901 104,529 
 
 V. Schmaltz (1868), L. E. 3 C. P. 313 ; 37 L. J. 0. P. 78 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 27 ; 16 W. R. 481 584 
 
 Ferguson and Hutchinson, Ex p. (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 280 ; 40 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; 24 L. T. 96 ; 19 W. R. 746 .. 131,485 
 
 Fergusson v. Norman (1838), 6 Scott 749 ; 5 Bing. N. C. 76 ; 1 
 
 Arm. 418 ; 3 Jur. 10 ; 50 R. R. 613 700 
 
 Ferrand v. Hallas Land Co., [1893] 2 Q. B. 135 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 479; 69 L. T. 8 ; 41 W. R. 580; 67 J. P. 692 .. 364, 366 
 
 Fielden v. Morley Corporation, [1900] A. C. 133 ; [1899] 1 Ch. 
 
 1 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 611 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 314 ; 79 L. T. 231 ; 47 
 
 W. R. 295, H. L. 75,104,510 
 
 Fielding r. Thomas (1896), 65 L. J. 0. P. 103 632 
 
 Filburn v. People's Palace Co. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 268 ; 69 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 471 ; 38 W. R. 706 ; 55 J. P. 181 .. .. 474 
 
 Filby D. Hounsell, [1896] 2 Ch. 737 514 
 
 Finch V. Finch (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 816 ; 35 L. T. 235 .. .. 278 
 
 Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley U.D.C., [19031 1 Ch. 
 
 437 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 88 L. T. 215 ; 51 W. R. 375 ; 67 
 
 J. P. 97 ; 1 L. G. R. 244, C. A 171 546 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. xlix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Fine Art Society v. Union Bank of London (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 70, C. A 201 
 
 Firebrace v. Firebrace (1879), 4 P. D. 63 ; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 41 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 94 ; 26 W. R. 617 256 
 
 Firth V. McPhail, [1905] 2 K. B. 300 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 458 ; 92 
 
 L. T. 567 ; 69 J. P. 203 ; 20 Cox. C. 0. 821 .. .. 475 
 
 Fisher D. Blight (1803), 2 Cranch 399 6 
 
 V. Bridges (1854), 3 E. & B. 642 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 157 094 
 
 V Howard (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 42 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 304; 11 
 
 L. T. 373 ; 13 W. R. 145 121 
 
 Fishmongers' Co. v. Dimsdale (1852), 12 C. B. 557; 22 
 
 L. J. C. P. 44 506 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861), 2 Johns. & H. 31 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 
 
 777 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1006 ; 5 L. T. 233 ; 5 W. R. 850 315, 321, 325 
 Fitzmaurice v. Heaketh, [1904] A. C. 266 ; 73 L. J. P. C. 53 ; 
 
 90 L. T. 216 ; 20 T. L. B. 302 489 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Kelly (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 337 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 
 
 132 ; 28 L. T. 558 ; 21 W. R. 681 .. . . 58, 186, 562 
 
 Flannigan v. Bishopwearmouth (1857), 8 E. & B. 451 ; 27 
 
 L. J. M. C. 46; 3 Jur. N. S. 1103; 112R. R. 639 .. .. 470 
 Fleming v. Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. (1902), 4 F. 890, Sco. .. 124 
 V. SeK (1855), 3 De G. M. & G. 997 ; 3 Bq. 14 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 
 
 29; 1 Jur. N. S. 25 164 
 
 V. Smith (1861), 12 Jr. C. L. R. 404, Ir 84 
 
 Fletcher v. Birkenhead Corporation, [1907] 1 K. B. 218 ; 76 
 
 L. J. K. B. 218 75,92,93 
 
 V. Calthrop (1845), 6 Q. B. 880 ; 14 L. J. M. C. 49 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 205 ; 1 New. Sess. Cas. 529 241,464 
 
 V. Fields, [1891] 1 Q. B. 790 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 102 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 472 ; 39 W. R. 655 ; 55 J. P. 502 473 
 
 V. Hudson (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 611 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 48 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 125 ; 30 W. R. 349 ; 46 J. P. 372 466 
 
 V. Sondes (1826), 3 Bing. 580 ; 1 Bligli N. S. 144 ; 30 
 
 R.R. 32 465,603 
 
 Flight V. Salter (1831), 1 B. & A. 673 ; 35 R. R. 413 . . . . 224 
 
 Flint V. Barnard (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 90 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 37 
 
 W. R. 185 101 
 
 Flower v. Lloyd (1877), 6 Ch. D. 297 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 838 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 454 ; 25 W. R. 793 517 
 
 ■ V. Low Leyton L. B. (1877), 5 Ch. D. 347 ; 46 L. J. Ch 
 
 621 ; 36 L. T. 760 ; 25 W. R. 545 360 
 
 Floyd V. Lyons, [1897] 1 Ch. 633 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 350 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 251 ; 45 W. R. 435 98 
 
 Floyer i;. Edwards (1774), 1 Co wp. 112 209 
 
 Foat V. Margate (Mayor) (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 299 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 711 ; 47 J. P. 535 360 
 
 Foley V. Fletcher (1858), 3 H. & N. 769 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 100 ; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S. 342 ; 117 R. R. 967 464, 500 
 
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 Foley V. Inland Revenue (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 263 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 109 311 
 Folkestone Corp. v. Woodward (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 159 ; 42 
 
 L. J. Ch. 782 ; 27 L. T. 574 487 
 
 Foot u. Prowse (1725), 1 Stra. 625 666 
 
 Forbes v. Cochrane (1824), 2 B.& C. 448: 2 D. & R. 679 ; 26 
 
 R. R. 402 .. 266 
 
 V Eccles Com. (1873), L. R. 15 Eq. 51 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 97 ; 
 
 27 L. T. 611 ; 21 W. R. 169 157 
 
 V. Lee Conservancy Board (1879), 4 Ex. D. 116 ; 48 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 402 ; 27 W. R. 688 634 
 
 ■W.Smith (1855), 11 Ex. 161; 24 L. J. Ex. 299; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 503; 105R. R. 467 409 
 
 Ford and Hill, Be (1879), 10 Ch. D. 365 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 327 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 41 ; 27 W. R. 371 539 
 
 Ford V. Drew (1880), 5 C. P. D. 59 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 172 ; 41 
 
 L. T. 478 ; 28 W. R. 137 .. .- 116 
 
 V. Hart (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 273; 43 L. J. C. P. 24; 29 
 
 L. T. 685; 22 W. R. 159 ; 2 Hop. & C.167 ., .. .. 117 
 V. Kettle (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 139 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 558 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 666 ; 30 W. R. 741 15,369 
 
 V. Pye (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 269 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 21 ; 29 
 
 L. T. 684 ; 22 W. R. 159 ; 2 Hop. & C. 157 117 
 
 V. Wiley (1883), 23 Q. B. D. 203 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 145 ; 60 
 
 L. T. 74 ; 37 W. R. 709 ; 53 J. P. 485 ; 16 Cox. C. C. 683 .. 196 
 
 Fordham v. Sheis (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 67 288 
 
 Fordyce v. Bridges (1847), 1 H. L. C. 1 ; 11 Jur. 157 .. .. 1 
 
 Ford's Hotel Co. v. Barlett, [1896] A. C. 1 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; 
 
 73 L. T. 665 ; 44 R. R. 241 46 
 
 Foreman v. Canterbury (Mayor of) (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 ; 40 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; 24 L. T. 385 ; 19 W. R. 719 .. 725, 726 
 
 Forsdike v. Colquhoun (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 71 ; 49 L. T. 136 ; 47 
 
 J. P. 393 147 
 
 V. Stone (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 607 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 301 .. 608 
 
 Forster V. Taylor (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 887 ; 3 L. J. K. B. 137 ; 
 
 39R. R. 698 696,701 
 
 Fortescue v. St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, [18911 2 Q. B. 170 ; 60 
 
 L. J. M. C. 172 ; 63 L. T. 443 ; 39 W. R. 31 . . . . 335, 336 
 
 Forth w. Chapman (1720), 1 P. Wms. 663 558 
 
 Foster v. Diphwys Casson Slate Co. (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 429 ; 56 
 
 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 51 J. P. 470 128, 579 
 
 V. Gt. W. Ry. Co. (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 515 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; 
 
 46L. T. 74; 30W. R. 398 151 
 
 i) L. C. & D. Ry. Co., [1895] 1 Q. B. 711 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 65 526 
 
 D. Oxford, c%c. Ry. Co. (1853), 13 C. B. 200 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 
 
 99 ; 17 Jur. 167 ; 93 R. R. 494 698 
 
 Foster's Case (1590), 5 Rep. 59 285 
 
 i). Case (1614), 11 Rep. 63 a 296 
 
 Fotherby v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1866), L B. 2 C. P. 188 ; 36 
 
 L. J. C. P. 88 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 1005 ; 15 L. T. 243 ; 15 W. R. 
 
 112 716 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. li 
 
 », . _ PACE 
 
 Foulgar v. Taylor (1860), 5 H. & N. 202 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 154 ; 8 
 
 W. R. 279 553 
 
 Foulger v. Steadraan (1873), L. K. 8 Q. B. 65 ; 42 L. J. M. 0. 3 ; 
 
 26L. T. 395 194 
 
 Foveaiix, Re, [1895] 2 Ch. 501 ; 64 L. J. Oh. 856 ; 73 L. T. 202 ; 
 
 43W. R. 661 .. .. 448 
 
 Fowler v. Barstow (1882), 20 Ch. D. 240 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 103 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 603 ; 30 W. R. 113 518 
 
 «. Padget (1798), 7 T. R. 509 ; 4 R. R. 511 422 
 
 Fox V. Wallis (1877), 2 C. P. D. 45 ; 35 L. T. 690 ; 25 W. R. 287 655 
 Foxon V. Goscoigne (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 654 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 
 
 31 L. T. 289 ; 22 W. R. 939 24 
 
 Frame u. Dawson (1807), 14 Ves. 387 455 
 
 France v. Button, [1891] 2 Q. B. 208 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 488 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 793 ; 39 W. R. 696 135 
 
 Francis, Ex p., [1903] 1 K. B. 275 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 120; 88 
 
 L. T. 176 ; 51 W. R. 267 ; 67 J. P. 153 ; 20 C. C. C. 381 .. 610 
 v. Maas (1888), 3 Q. B. D. 341 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 83 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 100 ; 26 W. R. 422 90 
 
 Franconia, The (1877), 2 P. D. 163 ; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 33 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 640 ; 25 W. R. 796 ,. .. 556 
 
 Frankland, Re (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 18; 42 L. J. Q. B. 13 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 18 65 
 
 Franklin v. B. of England (1826), 1 Russ. 575 ; 9 B. & C. 156 ; 
 
 4 M. & R. 11 ; 32 R. R, 611 457 
 
 «. Godfrey (1894), 63 L. J. M. C. 239 193 
 
 Fraser v. Hill (1853), 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 392 ; 1 C. L. R. 
 
 7, H. L 693 
 
 Frederici i;. Vanderzce (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 194 .. ..141 
 
 Fredericks v. Howie (1862), 1 H. & C. 381 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 249 ; 
 
 8 Jnr. N. S. 750 ; 6 L. T. 544 ; 10 W. R. 796 .. ..591 
 Free v. Burgoyne (1826), 2 Bligh N. S. 78 ; 5 B. & C. 400 ; 6 
 
 B. &C. 27, 538; 9D. &R. 14; 31R. R. 2 161 
 
 Freeman v. Appleyard (1862), 32 L. J. Ex. 175 ; 7 L. T. 282 ; 
 
 IN. R. 30 575 
 
 V. Moyes (1834), 1 A, & E. 338 ; 3 N. & M. 883 .. . . 403 
 
 ■ V. Read (1860), 9 C. B. N . S. 301 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 141 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 846 .. .. 289, 606, 680 
 Freemantle v. London and N. W. Ry. Co. (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 
 
 89; 31L. J. C. P. 12; 9 W. R. 611; 2F. &F. 337 .. 628 
 Freestone, Ex p. (1856), 1 H. & N. 93 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 121 ; 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 525 ; 108 R. R. 471 574 
 
 Freke i;. Carbery (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 461 269 
 
 Fremington School, Be, Ex p. Ward (1846), 10 Jur. 512 . . . . 643 
 Frend^;. Dennett (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 576; 27 L. J. C. P. 
 
 314 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 897 ; 114 R. R. 859 .. .. 654, 671 
 
 Fricke v. Poole (1829), 9 B. & 0. 543 ; 4 M. & R. 48 .. .. 464 
 Fritz V. Hobson (1880), 14 Ch. D. 542 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 735 ; 42 
 
 L. T. 677 ; 28 W. R. 722 321 
 
 Frost, 5e (1893), 67 L. J. Ch. 691 511 
 
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lii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Fry V. Cheltenham Corporation (1911), 81 L. J. K. B. 41 .. 414 
 Fuller V. Redman (1859), 26 Beav. 600 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 324 ; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1045 29, 727 
 
 Fumivalli;. Coombes (1843)^ 5 M. & G. 736 ; 12 L, J. 0. P. 265 ; 
 
 63R. R. 455 283 
 
 V. Hudson, [1893] 1 Ch. 335 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 178 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 378 ; 41 W. R. 358 135 
 
 Fusilier, The (1865), 3 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 51 ; 34 L. J. P. M. & A. 
 
 27 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 289 ; 12 L. T. 186 ; 13 W. R. 592, P. C. 98, 112 
 
 G. 
 
 Gage w. McDaid, [1898] W. N. 104 653 
 
 Gale V. Laurie (1826), 5 B. & C. 156 ; 29 R. R. 199 .. 516, 564 
 
 Galena i;. Amy (1866), 5 Wallace 705 441 
 
 Gallagher v. Rudd, [1898] 1 Q. B. 114 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 65 ; 77 
 
 L. T. 367 ; 46 W. R. 108 ; 61 J. P. 789 ; 18 C. C. C. 654 .. 351 
 Gallini v. Laborie (1793), 5 T. R. 242 ; 2 R. R. 581 . . . . 692 
 
 Galloway v. London (Mayor) (1864), L. R. 1 H. L. 34 ; 35 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 477 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 747 : 14 L. T. 865 530 
 
 V. Maries (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 275 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 53 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 763 ; 30 W. R. 151 ; 46 J. P. 326 600 
 
 Gallsworthy v. Selby Commissioners, [1892] 1 Q. B. 348 ; 61 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 372 ; 66 L. T. 17 ; 56 J. P. 356 629 
 
 Gambart i). Ball (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 306 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 166 ; 
 
 8 L. T. 426 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1059 ; 11 W. R. 699 .. 146, 481, 491 
 V. Sumner (1859), 5 H. & N. 5 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 98 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1109 ; 8 W. R. 27 290 
 
 Gambler v. Lydford (1854), 3 E. & B. 346; 23 L. J. M. C. 69 ; 
 
 2 C. L. R. 951 ; 18 Jur. 352 ; 97 R. R. 518 247 
 
 Gapp V. Bond (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 200 ; 56 L J. Q. B. 438 ; 57 
 
 L. T. 437; 35W. R. 683 131 
 
 Garby v. Harris (1852), 7 Ex. 591 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 160 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 456 410 
 
 Gardiner, Re (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 249 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 149 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 119; 36 W. R. 142; 5M. B. R. 1 476 
 
 Gardner u. Lucas (1878), 3 App. Cas. 582 386,401 
 
 V. Mansbridge (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 217 ; 57 L. T. 265 ; 35 
 
 \V. R. 809 ; 51 J. P. 612 ; 16 Cox C. C. 281 348 
 
 w. Whitford (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 665 .. .. - 289,325 
 
 Garland r. Mead (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 411 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 179 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 421 ; 19 W. R. 1156 156 
 
 Gamett v. Bradley (1878), 3 App. Cas. 944 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 186 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 261; 26 W. R. 698 285, 289, 314, 315 
 
 Gaskell and Walters' Contract, Re, [1906] 2 Ch. 10 C. A. 144 
 
 Gaskell v. King (1809), 11 East 165 ; 10 R. R. 462 . . 564, 704 
 Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hardy (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 619 ; 56 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 168; 55L. T. 585; 35W. R. 50; 51 J. P. 6 .. 108 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. liii 
 
 TAQE 
 
 Gaslight & Coke Co. li. St. Mary Abbott's (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 1 ; 
 
 54 L. J. Q. B. 414 ; 33 W. R. 892 632 
 
 V. Turner (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 324 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 336 ; 8 
 
 Scott 609 ; 54 R. R. 808 694 
 
 Gatty V. Fry (1877), 2 Ex. D. 265 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 605 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 182 ; 25 W. R. 305 226,351 
 
 Gatward v. Knee, [1902] P. 99 ; 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 34 ; 86 
 
 L. T. 119 127 
 
 Gaudet v. Brown (1872), L. R. 5 P. C. 134 ; 42 L. J. Adm. 1 ; 
 
 28 L. T. 77 ; 21 W. R. 420 34,244 
 
 Gauntlet, The (1871), L. R. 4 P. C. 184 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 65 ; 26 
 
 L.T. 45 465 
 
 Gay w. Matthews (1863), 4 B. & S. 425 .. ■• .. ..312 
 
 Geams v. Baker (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 355 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 334 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 86 ; 23 W. R. 543 631 
 
 Geddis v. Bann Reservou- Co. (1878), 3 App. Cas. 430 .. 628, 630 
 Geere v. Mare (1863), 2 H. & C. 339 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 50 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 463 694 
 
 General Auction Co. v. Smith, [1891] 3 Ch. 432 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 
 
 723; 65 L. T. 188 ; 40 W. R. 106 626, 655 
 
 General Iron Screw Co. v. Schurmanns (1860), 1 John. & H. 
 
 180 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 877 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 883 ; 8 W. R. 732 ; 4 
 
 L. T. 138 277 
 
 General St. Nav. Co. v. Brit. Col. St. Nav. (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 
 
 238 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 97 ; 20 L. T. 581 ; 17 W. R. 741 .. 563 
 V. Guillon(1843), 11. M. & W. 877 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 168 ; 63 
 
 R. R. 807 278 
 
 Gentel v. Rapps, [1902] 1 K. B. 160 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 105 ; 85 
 
 L. T. 683 ; 50 W. R. 216 ; 66 J. P. 117 523 
 
 George, Me (1890), 44 Ch. D. 627 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 709 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 49; 38 W. R. 617 25 
 
 Gerard's Estate, Re, [1893] 3 Ch. 251; 63 L. J. Ch. 23; 69 
 
 L T 393 .. 70 
 
 German Date Coffee Co., Re (i882),"20 Ch!'D. 169 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 
 
 564; 46L. T. 327; 30W. R. 717 592 
 
 Gibbons «. Hickson (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 119 212 
 
 Gibbs V. GuUd (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 59 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 313; 46 
 
 L. T. 248 ; 30 W. R. 591 12 
 
 V. Lawrence (1860), 30 L. J. Ch. 170 589 
 
 V. Liverpool Docks (1858), 3 H. &. N. 164 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 
 
 321 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 636 ; 117 R. R. 636 173 
 
 V. Stead (1828), 8 B. & C. 528 ; 2 M. & R. 457 .. .. 608 
 
 Giblett V. Hobson (1833), 3 M. & K. 517 ; 4 L. J. Ch. 41 ; 41 
 
 R. R. 114 215 
 
 Gibson v. Holland (1865), L. R. 1 C. P. 8 ; 1 H. & R. 1 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1022 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 5 ; 14 W. R. 86 ; 13 L. T. 
 
 293 273,513 
 
 V. Preston Corporation (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 219 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 131 ; 22 L. T. 293 ; 18 W. R. 689 ; 10 B. & S. 
 
 942 306,726 
 
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liv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Giflford V. St. Luke's, Chelsea (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 141 ; 59 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 612; 61 L. T. 388 ; 54 J. P. 104 653 
 
 and Bury, Ee (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 368 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 
 
 58 L. T. 522 ; 36 W. R. 468 ; 52 J. P. 119 657 
 
 Gilbert «. Gosport & Alverstone U. D. C, [1916] 2 Ch. 587 .. 510 
 
 u. Jones, [1905] 2 K. B. 691 133 
 
 Gildarfc v. Gladstone (1810), 11 East 675 ; 12 East 439, 668 .. 528 
 Giles V. Grover (1832), 1 CI. & F. 74 ; 2 M. & Scott 197 ; 9 Bing. 
 
 128 ; 36 B. R. 27 250,610 
 
 Gillow V. Durham C. C, [1911] 1 K. B. 222 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 380 ; 
 
 104 L. T. 36 ; 75 J. P. 33 ; 8 L. G. R. 1059 634 
 
 Gilmore v. Shuter (1678), 2 Lev. 227 ; 2 Mod. Rep. 310 .. 384 
 
 Girdlestone v. Allan (1822), 1 B. & C. 61 431 
 
 Glasbrook t>. Owen (1890), 7 T. L. R. 62 201 
 
 Glasgow Ry. Co. v. Hunter (1871), L. R. 2 Sc. App. 78, H. L. 172 
 
 Glass «. Patterson, [1902] 2 Ir. R. 660 1 
 
 Glassington I). Rawlins (1800), 3 East 407 606 
 
 Gleaves v. Marriner (1876), 1 Ex. D. 107 ; 34 L. T. 496 ; 24 
 
 VV. R. 639 661 
 
 Glossop V. Heston Local Board (1879), 12 Ch. D. 102 ; 49 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 89 ; 40 L. T. 736 ; 28 W. R. Ill 723, 724 
 
 Glynn v. Margetson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 337 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 186 ; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 466 ; 66 L. T. 142 ; 40 W. R. 264 ; 7 Asp. M. C. 
 
 148 368 
 
 Goddard, Be (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 25 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; 87 
 
 R. R. 522 705 
 
 Godlonton v. Fulham, &c. Property Co., [19051 1 K. B. 431 ; 
 
 74 L. J. K. B. 242 ; 92 L. T. 362 652 
 
 Godman V. Croftor, [1914] 3 K. B. 803 675 
 
 Godwin v. Walker (1896), 12 T. L. R. 367 523 
 
 Goerz v. Bell, [1904] 2 K. B. 136; 73 L. J. K. B. 448 ; 90 L. T. 
 
 675; 53 W. R. 64 .. .. 271 
 
 Goldberg v. Liverpool Corporation (1900), 82 L. T. 362 . . . . 231 
 
 Golding V. Stocking (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 516 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 
 
 122 ; 20 L. T. 479 ; 17 W. R. 722 ; 10 B. & S. 348 . . 67, 492 
 
 Goldshede v. Swan (1847), 1 Ex. 154 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 284 ; 74 R. R. 
 
 623 ■ 43 
 
 Goldsmid, Be (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 295 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 195 ; 35 
 
 W. R. 148 214 
 
 V. Hampton (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 94 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 286 • 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 1108 ; 116 R. R. 578 66, 542 
 
 Goldsmiths Co. v. West Metro. Ry., [1904] 1 K. B. 1 ; 72 L. J. ' 
 
 K. B. 931 ; 89 L. T. 428 ; 52 W. R. 21 ; 68 J. P. 41 ; 20 
 
 T. L. R.7 607 
 
 V. Wyatt, [1907] 1 K. B. 95 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 166 ; 95 
 
 L.T. 855; 71J. P. 79 62,539 
 
 Goldson V. Buck (1812), 15 East 372 323 
 
 Goodman's Trusts, Ee (1881), 17 Ch. D. 266 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 425 • 
 
 44 L. T. 527 ; 29 W. R. 586 256 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. Iv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Goodwin v. Sheffield Corporation, [1902] 1 K. B. 629 ; 71 
 
 L. J. K. B. 492 ; 86 L. T. 682; 66 J. P. 533 326 
 
 Gordon, JfiB p. (1875), 44 L. J. Bey. 97 309 
 
 Gordon d. G.W.R.|(1881), 8 Q. B. D. 44 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 58; 
 
 45 L. T. 509 ; .30 W. R. 230 ; 46 J. P. 294 370 
 
 v. Howden (1845), 12 CI. & F. 237, H. L 693 
 
 v. Jennings (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 45 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 417 ; 
 
 46 L. T. 534 ; 30 W. R. 704 ; 45 J. P. 519 .. .. .. 585 
 
 V. London City & Midland Bank (1902), 71 L. J. K. B. 215 ; 
 
 C. A 201 
 
 Gore V. Grey (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 138 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 100 .. 287 
 Gorely, Exp. (18B5), 4 De G. J. & S. 477 ; 34 L. J. Bank. 1 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 1085 ; 11 L. T. 319 ; 13 W. R. 60 .. 86, 564 
 
 Gorham v. Exeter (Bp.) (1850), Moore, 462 ; 2 Rob. Ec. Rep. 1 ; 
 
 13 Jur. 238 43 
 
 V. 15Q.B.73; 10C.B.102; 5Ex. 630; 19L.J.Q.B. 
 
 279; 19 L.J. C. P. 200; 19 L. J. Ex. 376 ; 14 Jur. 480, 
 
 522, 876 ; 81 R. R. 504; 82 Id. 797 ; 89 Id. 725 .. .. 535 
 
 Gorman, Ex p., [1894] App. Cas. 28 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 84 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 46 ; 58 J. P. 316 ^31 
 
 V. Waterford, &e. Ry. Co., [1900] 2 Jr. R. 341, Ir 636 
 
 Gorris v. Scott (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 125 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 92 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 431 ; 22 W. R. 575 354,725 
 
 Gough V Davies (1856), 2 K. & J. 623 ; 25 L. J. Cli. 677 ; 110 
 
 R. R. 402 84 
 
 Gould V. Birkenhead Corporation (1910), 8 L. G. R. 395 .. 723 
 V. Haynes (1890), 59 L. J. M. C. 9 ; 61 L. T. 732; 54 J. P. 
 
 405 ; 16 Cox C. C. 732 210 
 
 V. Stuart, [1896] A. C. 575; 65 L. J. P. C. 82; 75 L. T. 
 
 110 254 
 
 Goulder v. Rook, [1901] 2 K. B. 290 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 747 ; 84 
 
 L. T. 719 ; 49 W. R. 684 ; 65 J. P. 646 186 
 
 Gover's Case (1876), 1 Ch. D. 182 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 83 ; 33 L. T. 619 ; 
 
 24W.R. 125 717 
 
 Gowan v. Wright (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 201 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 131 ; 
 
 35W. R.297 378,567 
 
 Gower I). Tobitt (1891), 39 W. R. 193 147 
 
 Gower's Walk Schools v. London T. & S. Ry. Co. (1890), 24 
 
 Q. B. D. 326 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 162 ; 62 L. T. 306 ; 38 W. R. 
 
 343 172 
 
 Grace v. Bishop, (1856) 11 Ex. 424 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 68 ; 105 R. R. 
 
 606 114, 358 
 
 Graham v. Ingleby (1848), 1 Ex. 651 ; 5 D. & L. 737 ; 74 R. R. 
 
 808 683 
 
 V. Lewis (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 1 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 117 ; 37 
 
 W. R. 73 ; 53 J. P. 166 ; 59 L. T. 35, C. A 118 
 
 Grainger v. Gough, [1896] A. C. 325 ; 65 L. J. Q.B. 410 ; 74 L. T. 
 
 435 ; 44 W. B. 561 ; 60 J. P. 692 271 
 
 Gramophone Co. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K, B. 89 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 
 
 834 ; 99 L. T. 39 ; 15 Manson 251 271 
 
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Ivi TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Grand Junction W. W. Co. v. Hampton U.C, [1898] 2 Ch. 331 ; 
 
 67 L. J. Ch. 603 ; 78 L. T. 673 ; 46 W. B. 644 . . .. 708 
 
 Grant v. Anderson & Co., [1892] 1 Q. B. 108 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 107;66L. T. 79 267 
 
 V. Ellis (1841), 9 M. & W. 113 ; [11 L. J. Ex. 228 ; 60 
 
 R.R. 694 .. 297 
 
 V. Kemp (1834), 2 Or. & M. 636 403 
 
 V. Langaton, [1900] A. C. 383; 69 L, J. P. 0. 66 ; 82 L. T. 
 
 629; 64J. P. 644 .. .; 71 
 
 Graves v. Ashford (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 410 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 139 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 98 ; 15 W. R. 498 146,481 
 
 V. Legg (1854), 9 Ex. 642 ; 2 C. L. R. 1266 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 
 
 228; 96 R. R. 931 41 
 
 Graves' Case (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 715 ; 20 L. T. 877 ; 17 W. R. 
 
 1018 345 
 
 Gray w. Cookson (1812), 16 East 13 .330,376 
 
 V. PuUen (1864), 5 B. & S. 970 ; 34 L, J. Q. B. 265 ; 11 
 
 L. T. 669 ; 13 W. R. 257 .. 633 
 
 V. Smith (1889), 43 Ch. D. 208 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 335; 38 W. R.310 512 
 
 V. Sylvester (1897), 61 J. P. 807 ; 46 W. R. 63 . . .. 523 
 
 Graydon, Be, [1896] 1 Q. B. 417 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 328 ; 44 W. R. 
 
 495 ; 74 L. T. 175 ; 3 Mans. 5 576 
 
 Great Australian Co. v. Martin (1880), 5 Ch. D. 1 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 
 
 289; 35L. T. 874; 25 W. R. 246 518 
 
 Great Central Gas Co. v. Clarke (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 838 ; 32 
 
 L. J. C. P. 41 ; 11 W. R. 123 327 
 
 Great Charte v. Kenniugton (1743), 2 Stra. 1173 150 
 
 Great Eastern Ry. Co. v. Goldsmid (1884), 9 App. Cas. 927 ; 54 
 
 L. J. Ch. 162 ; 52 L. T. 270 ; 33 W. R. 81 ; 49 J. P. 
 
 260 480,682,683 
 
 Great Northern Committee v. Inett (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 284 ; 46 
 
 L. J. M. C. 237 ; 25 W. R. 584 684 
 
 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Winder, [1892] 2 Q. B. 595 ; 61 
 
 L. J.Q. B. 608 712 
 
 Great Northern Steamship Co. v. Edgehill (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 
 
 225 . 715 722 
 
 Great WesternRy. Co. v. Bailie (1864)," 5 B. '& S. 928 ; 34 ' 
 
 L. J. M. C. 31 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 264 ; 11 L. T. 418 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 203 196 
 
 V. Bishop (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 550; 41 L. J. M. C. 120 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 905 ; 20 W. R. 969 475 
 
 V. Rly. Commrs. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 182 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 483 ; 
 
 45 L. T. 206 ; 29 W. R. 901 ; 56 J. P. 35 520 
 
 V. Solihull Rural Council (1902), 86 L. J. Q. B. 852, C. A. 633 
 
 V. Swindon and Cheltenham Ry. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 809 ; 
 
 58 L. J. Ch. 1075 ; 51 L. T. 798 ; 32 W. R. 957 ; 48 J. P. 
 
 820 296 
 
 Great Yarmouth Union v. Bethnal Green Union (1907), 97 L. T. 
 
 440 116, 117 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. Ivii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Greathead v. Morley (1841), 3 M. & G. 139 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 246 ; 
 
 SScottN. R. 638; 60R. R. 479 547 
 
 Greaves v. Tofield (1881), 14 Ch. D. 563 ; 50 L. J. Oh. 118 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 100 ; 28 W. R. 840 542 
 
 Green w. Gray (1832), 1 Dowl. P. C. 850 377 
 
 V. Jenkins (1860), 1 De G. F. & J. 454 ; 28 Beav. 87 ; 29 
 
 L. J. Ch. 505 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 515 ; 8 W. R. 380 .. 313,654 
 
 V. R. (1876), 1 App. Cas. 513 ; 35 L. T. 495 294, 329, 502 
 
 V. Wood (1845)j 7 Q. B. 178; 14 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 756 35, 447 
 
 Greenaway «. Hurd (1792), 4 T. R. 553 414 
 
 Greener, Ex. p. (1880), 15 Ch. D. 457 ; 43 L. T. 184 ; 28 W. R. 
 
 899 685 
 
 Greenhow v. Parker (1861), 6 H. & N. 882; 31 L. J Ex. 4; 4 
 
 L. T. 473 ; 9 W. R. 578 .-. .. 496 
 
 Greenwood, Ex. p. (1857), 27 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; 8 E. & B. 605 ; 112 
 
 R. R. 706 418 
 
 V. Greenwood (1877), 5 Ch. D. 954; 47 L. J. Ch. 298; 37 
 
 L. T. 712 ; 26 W. R. 5 444 
 
 1). London (Bp.) (1814), 5 Taunt. 727 704 
 
 Gregory's Case (1596), 6 Rep. 19b 315 
 
 Gregson v. Potter (1879), 4 Ex. D. 142; 48 L. J. M. C.-86; 27 
 
 W. R. 840 651 
 
 Greig V. Bendeno (1858), E. B. & E. 133 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 294 ; 113 
 
 R. R. 576 81,474 
 
 Grenfell v. Inland Rev. (1876;, 1 Ex. D. 242 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 465 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 426 ,• 24 W. R. 582 270 
 
 Greves v. Wimborne (Lord) (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 862 : 633, 722, 725 
 Grey v. Pearson (1857), 6 H. L. Cas. 61 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 473 ; 5 
 
 W. R. 454 ; 108 R. R. 19 5 
 
 Grieves i;. Case (1792), 4 Bro. C. C. 67 53 
 
 Griffith, Ex. p. (1883), 23 Ch. D. 69 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 717 ; 48 L. T. 
 
 450 ; 31 W. R. 878 214 
 
 V. Taylor (1876), 2 C. P. D. 194 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 15 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 5 ; 25 W. R. 196 415,608 
 
 Grill V. General Screw Collier Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 600 ; 35 
 
 L. J. C. P. 321 ; 17 Jur. N. S. 727 ; 14 L. T. 711 ; 14 W. R. 
 
 893 ' .. 65.200 
 
 Grimes, Ex. p. (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 153 ; 2 E. & B. 546 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 554 126 
 
 Grimwade, Ex. p. (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 357 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 495 ; 
 
 3M. B. R. 166 97 
 
 Grindley v. Barker (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 229 ; 4 R. R. 787 .. 645 
 Grizewood v. Blane (1852), 11 C. B. 538 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 46 .. 210 
 Grocers' Co. v. Donne (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 34 ; 5 L. J. C. P. 
 
 307 ; 3 Scott 356 ; 2 Hodges 120 ; 43 R. R. 591 .. .. 630 
 
 Grocock 4). Grocock, [1919] W. N. 163 259 
 
 Gross, In the goods of (1904), 73 L. J. P. 82 . . . . 75, 123 
 
 Groves v. Wimbourne, [1898] 2 Q. B. 402 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 862 ; 79 
 
 L. T. 284 ; 47 W. R. 87 ... 633, 722, 725 
 
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Iviii TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Guerin, iJe (1888), 53 J. P. 468 150 
 
 Gully V. Smith (1884), 12 Q. B. D, 121 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 35 ; 48 
 
 J. P. 309 489 
 
 Gundry v. Pinniger (1852), 1 D. G. M. & G. 502 ; 21 L. J. Oh. 
 
 405 5 
 
 Giinnestad v. Price (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 65 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 44 ; 
 
 32 L, T. 492 ; 23 W. B. 470 34 
 
 Guthrie v. Fisk (1824), 3 B. & C. 178 ; 3 Stark. 153 ; 5 D. & R. 
 
 24 .. .. 623 
 
 Gutteridge v. Munyard (1834), 1 Moo. & R. 336 42 
 
 Gwyn V. Hardwicke (1856), 1 H. & N. 49 ; 25 L. J. M. 0. 97 ; 
 
 108R.R. 448 533 
 
 Gwynne v. BumeU (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 453 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 39 ; 
 
 2 Soott N. R. 711 ; 1 West 342 ; 7 CI. & F. 572 ; 51 R. R. 
 
 43,H.L 7,11,452,662 
 
 V Drewitt, [1894] 2 Ch. 616 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 870 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 190.. .. 732 
 
 Gye ©. Fulton (1813), 4 Taunt. 876 380 
 
 H. 
 
 Habergham v. Vincent (1793), 1 Ves. Jun. 68, 410 ; 2 Ves. Jun. 
 
 204; 5T. R. 92 682 
 
 Hack V. London Prov. Bldg. Socy. (1883), 23 Ch. D. 103 ; 52 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 541 ; 48 L. T. 250 ; 31 W. R. 393 .. .. 164,238 
 
 Hacking v. Lee (1860), 2 E. & E. 906 ; 29 L. J. Q. E. 204 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 952 ; 8 W. R. 495 523 
 
 Hackney Furnishing Co. v. Watts (1912), 28 T. L. R. 417 .. 652 
 
 Hadden I). The Collector (1866), 5 Wall. 107 74 
 
 Haddon's Estate Act, [1889] W. N. 96, C. A 621 
 
 Hadfleld's Case (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 306 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 146 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 901 ; 21 W. R. 637 63 
 
 Hadji All Akbar v. Anglo Arabian Persian S.S. Co. (1906), 11 
 
 Com. Cas. 219 368 
 
 Hadley v. Perks (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 444 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 177 ; 
 
 12 Jur. N. S. 662 ; 14 L. T. 325; 14 W. R. 730 ; 6 B. & S. 
 
 375 564,581 
 
 Haggin v. Oomptoir d'Escompte (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 519 ; 58 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 508 ; 37 W. R. 703 119 
 
 Haigh V. Kaye (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 469 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 567 ; 26 L.T. 
 
 675 ; 20 W. R. 597 454 
 
 V. West, [1893] 2 Q. B. 31, C. A 144 
 
 Haldane v. Beauclerk (1849), 6 D. & L. 642 ; 3 Ex. 658 ; 18 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 227 ; 13 Jur. 326 566 
 
 Hale, ife, [1915] 2 Ir. R. 362, Ir 127 
 
 Hall V. Knox (1863), 4 B. & S. 515 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 9 L. T. 
 
 380 ; 12 W. R. 103 . 420 
 
 -tf. Nixon (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 152 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 51 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 87; 23W..R. 612 625,704 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. lix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Halll«. Wright (1859), E. B. & E. 765 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 43 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 193 ; 8 W. JR. 160 ; 113 R. E. 874 674 
 
 HaU Dare v. Hall Dare (1886), 81 Ch. D. 251 ; 55 L. J. Oh. 154 ; 
 
 54 L. T. 120 ; 34 W. R. 82 ICO 
 
 Hallett w. Andrews (1897), 42 L. J. 68 141 
 
 Halsey «. Hales (1797), 7 T. R. 194 105 
 
 ■y. Lowenfeld, [1916] 2 K. B. 707 12 
 
 Halton V. Cove (1830), 1 B. & A. 538 ; 35 R. R. 373 . . .. 78 
 
 Hamilton, ife (1878), 9 Ch. D. 696 61 
 
 Hammersmith Ry. Co. v. Brand (1868), L. R. 4 H. L. 171 ; 18 W. R. 
 
 12; 21 L. T. 238 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 265, H. L. 92, 172, 628 
 
 Hammersmith Bent Charge, Ke, (1849), 4 Ex. 87; 19 L. J. Ex. 
 
 66 642,644 
 
 Hammond v. Pulsford, [1895] 1 Q. B. 223 ; 64 L. J. M. C.'63; 71 
 
 L. T. 767 ; 43 W. R. 236 623 
 
 Hampden v. Walsh (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 189 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 852 ; 24 W. R. 607 199 
 
 Hampton v. Rickard (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 133; 30 L. T. 636 276 
 Hancock v. Somes (1859), 1 E. & E. 795 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 196 ; 7 
 
 W. R. 422 ; 8 Cox C. C. 172 608 
 
 Hancocks v. Labache (1878), 3 C. P. D. 197 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 514 ; 
 
 38L. T. 753; 26W. R. 402 30,445 
 
 Haney's Trusts, Re (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 275 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 272 ; 
 
 23 W. R. 662 . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 
 
 Hanfstaengl v. Baines,'il895] A. C. 20 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 81 ;'72 L. T. 
 
 1, H. L 60 
 
 -y. Empire Palace, [1894] 2 Ch. 1 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 417 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 459 ; 42 W. R. 454 60,146 
 
 V. Newnes, [1894] 3 Ch. 109 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 70 L. T. 854 ; 
 
 42W. R. 681 146 
 
 Hann, iJe (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 393 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 55 L. T. 
 
 820 ; 35 W. R. 370 ; 4 M. B. R. 16 519 
 
 Harben v. Phillips (1883), 23 Ch. D. 14 ; 48 L. T. 334 ; 31 W. R. 
 
 173 655 
 
 Harbert's Case (1584), 3 Rep. 13b 149,315 
 
 Hardcastle v. Bielby, [1892] 1 Q. B. 709 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 101 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 343 ; 56 J. P. 549 189 
 
 Harden v. Hesketh (1859), 4 H. & N. 175 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 118 
 
 T> T> QI7Q ^ _ _ _ 297 
 
 Harding v. Headington'(1874J,' L.R."9 Q. B. 157 ;"43 L.J. M. C. 
 
 59 ; 29 L. T. 833 ; 22 W. R. 262 222 
 
 V. Queensland Commissioner of Stamps (1898), 67 L. J. P. C. 
 
 144, P. C 270 
 
 Hardyw. Bem(1794), 5T. R. 538 .. 294 
 
 V. Fothergill (1888), 13 App. Cas. 351 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 659 ; 36 W. R. 629 101 
 
 V. Ryle (1829), 9 B. & C. 603 ; 4 M. & R. 295 .. . . 611 
 
 Hardy's Case (1794), 24 State Trials 200 550 
 
 Hardymann v. Whiteker (1749), 2 East. 573 n 353 
 
 Harford V. Linskey, [1899] I Q. B. 852 139 
 
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Ix TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Harford's Trusts, Be (1879), 13 Ch. D. 135 ; 28 W. R. 238 ; 41 
 
 L.T.382 .. .. 522 
 
 Hargreaves v. Diddams (1875), L. K. 10 Q. B. 582 ; 44 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 178 ; 32 L. T. 600 ; 23 W. R. 828 194 
 
 Harlock v. Ashberry (1882), 19 Ch. D. 539 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 96 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 602 ; 30 W. R. 112 218 
 
 Harman v. Ainslie, [1904] 2 K. B. 698 ; [1903] 2 K. B. 241 ; 73 
 
 L. J. K. B. 533 ; 88 L. T. 770 134 
 
 Harper v. Carr (1797), 7 T. R. 270, 448 ; 4 R. R. 440 .. .. 641 
 
 «. Taswell (1833), 6 C. & P. 166 450 
 
 Harrington v. Ramsay (1853), 8 Ex. 879 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 326 ; 2 E. 
 
 &B. 669; 22L. J. Q. B.460 424 
 
 Harris v. Birch (1842), 9 M. & W. 594 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 219 ; 1 
 
 D. N. S. 899 ; 60 R. R. 834 .. .. ' 504 
 
 w. Boston (1810), 2 Camp. 348 210 
 
 ■ u. De Pinna (1886), 33 Ch. D. 238 688 
 
 V. Franconia (1877), 2 C. P. D. 173 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 363 .. 265 
 
 V. Jenns (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 152 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 183 ; 3 
 
 L. T. 408 ; 9 W. R. 36 295,594 
 
 ■!;. Lucas, [1919] 2 K. B. 291 290 
 
 Harrison, Exp. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 753 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 977 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 878 97 
 
 , ^a;^. (1858), 2DeG. & J. 229 674 
 
 V. Blackburn (1864), 17 C B. N. S. 678 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 109 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 1131 ; 11 L. T. 453 ; 13 W. R. 135 .. .. 689 
 V. Carter (1876), 2 C. P. D. 26 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 57 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 511 ; 25 W. R. 182 ; 2 Hop. & C. 324 577 
 
 V. London and Brighton Ry. Co. (1862), 2 B. & S. 122 ; 29 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 209 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 8 Jur. 740 .. .. 417 
 V. Rutland, Duke of, [1893] 1 Q. B. 142 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 117 ; 
 
 68L. T. 35; 41W.R. 322; 57 J. P. 278 .. .. 492,547 
 
 V. Stickney (1847), 2 H. L. Cas. 108 ; 81 R. R. 61 . . . . 365 
 
 Harrison's Case (1777), 1 Leach 180 573 
 
 Harrod v. Worship (1861), 1 B. & S. 381 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 165 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 153 ; 9 W. R. 865 502 
 
 Harrop v. Ossett (Mayor), [1898] 1 Ch. 525 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 347 ; 
 
 78 L. T. 387 ; 46 W. R. 391 ; 62 J. P. 297 .. .. 104,510 
 
 Hart V. Herwig (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 860 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 457 .. 269 
 
 V. Marylebone Borough Council (1912), 76 J. P. 257 .. 414 
 
 Hartley (Goods of), [1899] P. 40 ; 68 L. J. P. 16 ; 47 W. R. 287 245 
 
 ■!;. Elnor (1917), 86 L. J. K. B. 938 67 
 
 w. Hooker (1777), 2 Cowp. 524 616 
 
 Hartnall v. Ryde Commissiooers (1863), 4 B. & S. 361 ; 33 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 39 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 257 ; 11 W. R. 763 .. .. 726 
 Harvey v. Axchbold (1825), 3 D. & C. 626 ; 5 D. & R. 500 ; R. & 
 
 M. 184 209 
 
 W.Lyme Regis (1869), 38 L. J. Ex. 141 222 
 
 Hasker v. Wood (1885), 54 L. J. Q. B. 419 ; 33 W. R. 697 .. 316 
 
 Haslett V. Sharman, [1901] 2 L R. 433, Ir. 98 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. Ixi 
 
 PAGK 
 
 Hasluck V. Pedley (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 271 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 143 ; 23 
 
 W. R. 155 385 
 
 Hastings, Be (1877), 6 Ch. D. 610 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 137 ; 25 W. R. 
 
 842 303 
 
 Haw u. Planner (1665), 1 Saund. 10 624 
 
 Hawes v. Paveley (1877), 1 C. P. D. 418 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 18 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 835 ; 24 W. R. 895 237 
 
 Hawkins v. Gathercole (1854), 6 De G. M. & G. 1 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 
 
 332 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 481 ; 106 R. R. 1 298,314 
 
 V. Rutter, [1892] 1 Q. B. 668 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 146 ; 40 W. R. 
 
 238 128 
 
 V. Walrond (1876), 1 C. P. D. 280 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 772 ; 35 
 
 < L. T. 210 ; 24 W. R. 824 300 
 
 Hawthorne, Be (1883), 23 Ch. D. 743 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 750 ; 58 L. T. 
 
 701 ; 32 W. R. 147 269 
 
 Hawtry v. Butlin (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 290 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 163 ; 
 
 28 L. T. 532 ; 21 W. R. 633 173 
 
 Hay u. Ayling (1851), 20 L. J. Q. B. 171 373 
 
 V. Tower JJ., [1898] 24 Q. B. D. 561 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 79 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 290 ; 13 W. R. 414 ; 54 J. P. 500 396 
 
 Haycraft Gold Reduction and Mining Co., Be (1900), 69 L. J. Ch. 
 
 497 .. 645 
 
 Hayes v. Stephenson (1860), 3 L. T. JST. S. 296 ; 9 W. R. 53 .. 475 
 Haymani;. Flewker (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 526 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 
 
 132 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 895 91 
 
 Haynes v. Ford, [1911] 2 Ch. 237 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 234, 490 ; 104 
 
 L. T. 696 ; 75 J. P. 401 ; 9 L. G. R. 702 683 
 
 Hayward v. E. London Waterworks (1884), 28 Ch. D. 138 ; 54 
 
 L. J. Ch. 523 ; 52 L. T. 175 709 
 
 V. Giffard (1838), 4 M. & W. 194 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 256 ; 6 D. P. C. 
 
 699 ; 51 R. R. 529 510 
 
 Heame v. Garton (1859), 2 El. & El. 66 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 216 ; 
 
 5 Jur. N. S. 648; 33 L. T. 256 183 
 
 Heath v. Heape (1856), 26 L. J. M. C. 49 ; 1 H. & N. 478 ; 108 
 
 R. R. 681 470 
 
 Heawood v. Bone (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 179 ; 51 L. T. 125 ; 32 W. R. 
 
 752; 48 J. P. 710 121 
 
 Hebbert v. Purchas (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. 605 ; 40 L. J. Ecc. 33 ; 
 
 19 W. R. 898 ; 7 Moo. P. C. N. S. 468, P. C. 50, 535, 536, 537, 735 
 Hecquard, Be (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 71 ; 38 W. R. 148 ; 6 M. B. R. 
 
 282 . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . 71 
 
 Hed-worth u. Jackson (i662). Hard. 318 ." '.. 51 
 
 Heelis v. Blain (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. 90 ; 34 J. L. C. P. 88 . . 63 
 Heinemann v. Hale, [1891] 2 Q. B. 83 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 650 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 548 ; 39 W. R. 485 267 
 
 Helen, The (1810), 6 Cranch 203 729 
 
 Hemstead v. Phoenix Gas Co. (1865), 3 H. & C. 745 ; 34 L. J. Ex. 
 
 108 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 626 ; 13 W. R. 662 ; 12 L. T. 313 . . 52 
 Henderson, Be (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 509 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 253 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 835 ; 36 W. R. 567 ; 5 M. B. R. 62 .. . . 97, 477 
 
 I.S. 5 
 
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Ixii TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Henderson «. Biae (1822), 3 -Stark. 168 478 
 
 V. Maxwell (1876), 4 Oh. D. 163 ; 5 Oh. D. 892 ; 46 L. J". Oh. 
 
 59; 25 W. R. 66 651 
 
 u-Eoyal British Bank (1857), 7 E. & B. 356 ; 1 H. & N. 
 
 685 n. ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 112 ; 3 Jur. N. S. Ill ; 110 R. R. 629 669 
 
 ■y. Sherborne (1837), 2 M. & W. 236 ; 6 L. J. M. 0. 28 •• 333, 
 
 466, 500 
 Henley, Be (1878), 9 Oh. D. 469 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 147 ; 39 L. T. 53; 
 
 26W. R. 885 249 
 
 Henrette v. Booth|(1863), 15 0. B. N. S. 500 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 
 
 9 Jur. N. S. 1293; 9 L. T. 392 ; 12 W. R. 173 .. .. 71 
 
 Henry v. Newcastle Trinity House (1858), 8 E. & B. 723 ; 27 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 57 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 685 ; 112 R. R. 743 .. .. 16 
 
 Herbert v. Sayer (1844), 5 Q. B. 965 ; 2 D. & L. 49 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 209 ; 8 Jur. 812 349 
 
 Hermann v. Seneschal (1862), 13 0. B. N. S. 392 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 
 
 43 ; 6 L. T. 646 ; 11 W. R. 184 414 
 
 Herron v. Rathmines Improvement Commissioners, [1892] A. C. 
 
 498 527 
 
 Herschfield v. Clark (1856), 11 Ex. 712 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 113 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 239 ; 105 R. R. 743 24,141 
 
 Hertford Union v. Kimpton (1855), 11 Ex. 255 ; 25 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 41 ; 105 R. R. 533 241 
 
 Hertfordshire C. 0. v. New River Co. (1904), 74 L. J. Oh. 49 .. 635 
 Heseltine v. Siggers (1848), 1 Ex. 856 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 166 ; 74 R. R. 
 
 862 575 
 
 V. Simmons, [1892] 2 Q. B. 547 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 5 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 611;41W.B. 67 380 
 
 Hesketh v. Atherton, L. B. (1873), L. R. 9 Q. B. 4 ; 43 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 37; 29 L. T. 530 644 
 
 Hewitt's Estate (1858), 6 W. R. 537 ; 110 R. R. 962 .. ..209 
 V. Price (1842), 4 M. & G. 355 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 292 ; 3 Railw. 
 
 Gas. 175 ; 5 Scott N. R. 229 479,494 
 
 Hewlett V. AUen, [1894] A. C. 383 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 608 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 94; 42W. R. 670; 58 J. P. 700, H. L 138 
 
 Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Rep. 7b 39,123,486 
 
 Hey wood's Estate, Be, [1916] P. 47 127 
 
 Hickman -y. Maisey, [1900] 1 Q. B. 752 563 
 
 Hicks, Hxp. (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 143 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 106 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 432; 23 W. R. 862 .. .. 611 
 
 Hickson v. Darlow (1883), 23 Oh. D. 690 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 453 ; 48 
 
 . L. T. 449 ; 31 W. R. 417 386 
 
 Higginson v. Simpson (1877), 2 0. P. D. 76 ; 46 L. J. 0. P. 192 ; 
 
 36 L. T. 17 ; 25 W. R. 303 210 
 
 Higgs V. Schroeder (1878), 3 C. P. D. 252 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 426 ; 
 
 26W. R. 831 26 
 
 Hilder v. Dexter, [1902] A. 0. 474 ; 71 L. J. Oh. 781 ; 87 L "r 
 
 311 ; 7 Com. Cas. 268 ; 9 Mans. 378, H. L. .. 50 
 
 Hill, Mx p. (1877), 6 Oh. D. 63 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 116 ; 37 L. T. 46'- 
 
 25 W. R. 784 
 
 97 
 
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TABLK OF CASES. Ixiii 
 
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 Hill, Exp. (1827), 3 0. & P. 225 ; 33 E. R. 664 602 
 
 V. Crook (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 283 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 702 ; 22 
 
 W. R. 137 41,106 
 
 V. East & West India Dock Co. (1884), 9 A. C. 456 j 53 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 842 ; 50 L. T. 163 ; 32 W. R. 925 ; 48 J. P. 788 
 
 203, 357, 457 
 V. Hall (1876), 1 Ex. D. Ill ; 45 L. J, M. C. 153 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 860 306 
 
 V. London & County Assrce. Co. (1857), 1 H. & N. 398 ; 26 
 
 L. J. Ex. 89 ; 108 R. R. 6 440 
 
 V. Settle, [1917] 1 Ch. 319, C. A 412 
 
 Hilliard V. Lenard (1829), M. & M. 297 397 
 
 HUls u. Shepherd (1858), 1 F. & F. 191 198 
 
 Hinde v. Chorlton (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 104 ; 12 .Jur. N. S. 1008 ; 
 
 15L. T. 472 169 
 
 Hinds V. Buenos Ayres Tramways Co. (1906), 76 L. J. Ch. 17 ; 
 
 95L. T. 780 626 
 
 Hinks V. Safety Lighting Co. (1876), 4 Ch. D. 607 ; 36 L. T. 391 653 
 Hinton v. Dibbin (1842), 2 Q. B. 646 ; 2 G. & D. 36 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 113 ; 6 Jnr. 601 ; 57 R. R. 754 23 
 
 Hipkins v. Birmingham Gas Co. (1861), 6 H. & N. 250; 30 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 60 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 213 ; 9 W. R. 168 .. . . 188, 529 
 
 Hirst V. Molesbury (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 130 ; 23 L. T. 55 ; 19 
 
 W. R. 246 588 
 
 V. West Riding Union Banking Co., [1901] 2 K. B. 560 ; 70 
 
 L. J. K. B. 828 ; 85 L. T. 3 ; 49 W. R. 715, C. A. . . 110, 138 
 Hiscock, Be, [1901] P. 78 ; 70 L. J. P. D. & A. 22 ; 84 L. T. 61 127 
 Hitchcock V. Way (1837), 6 A. & E. 943; 6 L. J. K. B. 215; 
 
 2 N. & P. 72 ; W. W. & D. 491 ; 45 R. R. 653 . . 396, 733 
 Hobbs V. Henning (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 791 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 117 694,695 
 
 ■;;. Winchester Corp., [1910] 2 K. B. 271 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 
 
 1123; 102 L. T. 841 ; 74 J. P. 413 ; 8 L. G. R. 1072 186, 475 
 Hobson V. Neale (1853), 8 Ex. 131 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 175; 91 R. R. 
 
 396 404, 730 
 
 Hodgkinson v. Wyatt (1843), 4 Q. B. 749 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 54 . . 733 
 Hodgson V. Bell (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 525 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 231 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 481 ; 38 W. R. 325 " .. .. 291 
 
 V. Carlisle, L. B. (1857), 8 E. & B. 116 ; 112 R. R. 469 .. 247 
 
 V. Jex (1876), 2 Ch. D. 122 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 388 . . . . 590 
 
 V. Temple (1813), 5 Taunt. 181 ; 1 Marsh 5 ; 14 R. R. 738 
 
 694, 699 
 Hodsden u. Harridge (1669), 2 Wms. Saund. 64 a .. ..454 
 
 Hodson V. Sharpe (1808), 10 East 350 ; "10 R. R. 324 .. 198, 380 
 
 Hoggan V. Wood (1889), 16 R. (Justiciary) 96 Sco 735 
 
 Holborn Union v. St. Leonard, Shoreditch (1876), 2 Q. B. D. 145 ; 
 
 46 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; 35 L. T. 400 ; 25 W. R. 40 .. .. 715 
 Holgate V. Slight (1852), 2 L. M. & P. 662 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 74 .. 066 
 
 Holland,^j;^. (1902), 71L. J. Ch. 518 513 
 
 HoUingworth v. Palmer (1849), 4 Ex. 281 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 409 36, 406 
 
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Ixiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 FACE 
 
 Holman w. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp. 341 694,695 
 
 Holme V. Guy (1877), 5 Ch. D. 901 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 648 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 600 ; 25 W. R. 547 ' 47 
 
 Holmes v. Clarke (1861), 6 H. & N. 349 ,- 30 L. J. Ex. 135 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 397 ; 3 L. T. 675 ; 9 W. R. 419 & 9 L. T. 198 .. 720 
 
 -. i;. Pipers, [1914] 1 K. B. 57 191 
 
 V. Service (1854), 15 C. B. 293 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 24; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 258; lOOR. R. 357 28 
 
 Holt V. CoUyer (1881), 16 Ch. D. 718 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 311 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 214 ; 29 W. R. 502 107 
 
 Honeybone v. Hainbridge (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 418 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 46 ; 56 L. T. 365; 35 W. R. 520 ; 51 J. P. 103 ; 1 Fox 26 130 
 
 Hood «. Barrington (1868), L. R. 6 Bq. 218 514 
 
 Hood Barrs v. Heriot, [1897] A. C. 177 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 356 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 299 ; 45 W. R. 507, H. L 102 
 
 Hope V. Hope (1854), 4 De G. M. & G. 328 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 682 ; 
 
 102R. R. 146 518 
 
 Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Bd. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 712 ; 59 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 250 ; 62 L. T. 783 ; 38 W. R. 499 ; 54 J. P. 693 . . 641 
 Hopper, Be (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 367 ; 8 B. & S. 100 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 97 ; 15 L. T. 566 ; 15 W. R. 443 646 
 
 Hopton V. Thirlwall (1864), 9 L. T. 327 ; 12 W. R. 72 .. .. 184 
 
 Hordon D. Hesketh (1859), 4 H. & N. 175 297 
 
 Horn V. Ion (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 78 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 153 ; 1 N. & 
 
 M. 627 570 
 
 Homsey L. Bd. v. Monarch Building Society (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 
 
 1 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; 38 W. R. 85 ; 53 J. P. 774, C. A. 4, 372 
 Homsey U.D.C. v. Hennell, [1902] 2 K. B. 73 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 
 
 479 ; 86 L. T. 423 ; 50 W. R. 521 ; 66 J. P. 613 . . 248, 549 
 
 Horsfall v. Davy (1816), 1 Stark, 169 714 
 
 Horton v. Colwyn Bay U. C, [1908] 1 K. B. 327 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 
 
 215 ; 98 L. T. 547 ; 72 J. P. 57 ; 6 L. G. R. 211 .. .. 172 
 
 Hough V. Windus (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 224 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 165 ; 
 
 50 L. T. 312 ; 32 W. R. 452 ; 1 M. B. R. 1 . . 390, 501, 556 
 
 How V. L. & N. W. Rail. Co. (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 368 . . 519 
 
 Howard, -w. Beall, [1889] 23 Q. B. D. 1 156 
 
 V. Bodington (1877), 2 P. D. 203 . . . . 649, 656, 658 
 
 Howarth v. Sutcliie (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 729 128 
 
 Howe ■«. Synge (1812), 15 East, 540 704 
 
 Howe Machine Co., JJe (1889), 41 Ch. D. 118 .. .. 618 
 
 Howell V. Coupland (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 258 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 
 
 33 L. T. 832 ; 24 W. R. 470 674 
 
 V. London Dock Co. (1858), 8 E. & B. 212 ; 27 L. J. M C 
 
 177; 4Jur. N. S. 205; 112R. R. 524 .. .. 429 
 
 Howes V. Inl. Rev. (1876), 1 Ex. D. 385 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 
 
 46 L. J. M. C. 15 ; 35 L. T. 584 ; 24 W. R. 897 .. .. 574 
 
 Hoyland v. Bremner (1846), 2 C. B. 84 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 381 ; 
 
 15 L. J. C. P. 133 ; 10 Jur. 36 ; 69 R. R. 417 . . 165 374 
 
 Hoyle, Re, [1893] 1 Oh. 84; 62 L. J. Ch. 182 ; 67 L. T. 674 • 41 
 
 W.R.81 512,513 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. IxV 
 
 Hoyle V. Hitchman (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 233 ; 48 L. J. M. 0. 97 : 40 
 
 L. T. 252 ; 27 W. R. 487 491 
 
 Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Bing. N. 0. 202 ; 2 Scott 304 ; 1 
 
 Hodges 206 ; 42 R. R. 598 .. . 278 
 
 Hubert v. Treherne (1842), 3 M. & G. 743 ; 60 R. R. 600 .. 69 
 
 Hudson w. Bray, [1917] 1 K. B. 520 100 
 
 V. Ede (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 412; 37 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 764 ; 16 W. R. 940 ; 8 B. & S. 640 .. .. 42 
 V. McRae (1863), 4 B. »& S. 685 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 12 
 
 W. R. 80 167, 180,194 
 
 V. Tooth (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 46 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 18 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 462;26W. R. 95 51,521 
 
 Hudston V. Midland Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 366 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 213; 20L. T. 526; 17 W. R. 705 565 
 
 Huggins K. Bambridge (1740), Willes 241 245,260 
 
 Hughes, Exp. (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 138 ; 2 0. L. R. 1542 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 447 685 
 
 , Be, [1893] 1 Q. B. 595 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 558 ; 68 L. T. 629 ; 
 
 41 W. R. 466; lOM. B.R. 91 99 
 
 V. Buckland (1846), 16 M. & W. 346 ; 3 D. & L. 702 : 
 
 16 L. J. Ex. 233 ; 10 Jur. 884 ; 71 R. R. 701 .. .. 413 
 V. Chatham (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 64 ; 7 Scott N. R. 581 ; 1 
 
 Lut. Reg. Cas. 51 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 44 ; 7 Jur. 1136 .. 217, 218 
 V. Chester Ry. Co. (1862), 1 Dr. & Sm. 524 ; 3 De G. P. & 
 
 J. 352 ; 8 Jur. 221 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 97 ; 7 L. T. 197 ; 9 W. R. 
 
 760 91 
 
 V. Coed Talon Colliery Co., [1909] 1 K. B. 957 ; 78 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 639 ; 10 L. T. 565 55,346 
 
 V. Lumley (1854), 4 E. & B. 358 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 29 ; 99 
 
 R. R. 609 404 
 
 V. Morris (1862), 2 De G. M. & G. 349 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 761 ; 
 
 16 Jur. 603 465,570 
 
 V. Smallwood (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 306 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 503 ; 
 
 63L. T. 198 553 
 
 Hull Dock Co. V. Browne (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 59 ; 36 R. R. 459 
 
 500, 504, 628 
 Humble V. Mitchell (1839), 11 A. & E. 205 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 29 ; 2 
 
 Rail. Cas. 70 ; 3 P. & D. 141 ; 62 R. R. 318 .. „ 70, 575 
 
 Hnmfrey v. Gery (1849), 7 C. B. 567 ; 78 R. R. 762 .. .. 303 
 
 Humphreys v. Green (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 148 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 140 ; 
 
 48 L. T. 60 ; 47 J. P. 244 455 
 
 Hungerford Market Co. v. City Steam Bt. Co. (1860), 3 E & E. 
 
 365 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 67 ; 3 L. T. 732 .. 679 
 Hunt V. G. Northern Ry. Co. (1851), 10 C. B. 900 ; 2 L.M. & P. 
 
 268 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 349; 15 Jur. 400 ; 84 R. R. 840 .. 297 
 V. Hibbs (1860), 5 H. & N. 123 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 222 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 78 ; 2 L. T. 379 ; 8 W. R. 238 660 
 
 V. Wimbledon Loc. Bd. (1878), 4 C. P. D. 48 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 
 
 207 ; 39 L. T. 35 ; 27 W. R. 123 671 
 
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Ixvi TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Hunter «. Clare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 635 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 278 ; 80 L. T. 
 
 197 ; 47 W. R. 394 ; 63 J. P. 308 193 
 
 V. Gibbons (1856), 1 H. & N. 459 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 5 W..R. 
 
 91 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1249 ; 108 R. R. 672 12 
 
 V. Nockolds (1850), 1 Mac. & G. 640; 1 H. & T. 644 ; 19 
 
 L. J. Ch. 177 ; 14 Jur. 256 ; 84 R. R. 217 .. .. 74, 303 
 
 V. Potts (1791), 4 T. R. 182 ; 2 H. Bl. 403 ; 2 R. R. 353 .. 269 
 
 Hurcum u. Hilleary, [1894] 1 Q. B. 579, C. A 419 
 
 Hurlbatt v. Bamett, [1893] 1 Q. B. 77 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 67 
 
 L. T. 818 ; 41 W. R. 33 561 
 
 Hussey v. Home Payne (1879), 4 App. Gas. 311 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 
 
 846 ; 41 L. T. 1 ; 27 W. R. 585 512 
 
 Hussey's Case (1611), |9 Rep. 71, b 153 
 
 Hutching ■». Player (1663), Bridg. 272 315,322 
 
 Hutchinson, Be (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 521 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 582 ; 
 
 34W. R. 476 ., 31 
 
 V. Gillespie (1856), 11 Ex. 798 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 103 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 403 ; 105 R. R. 799 711 
 
 V. Greenwood (1855), 4 E. & B. 324 ; 3 C. L. R. 115 ; 24 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 2 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 329 ; 99 R. R. 491 .. .. 510 
 Huxham V. Wheeler (1864), 3 H. & C. 75 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 153 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 545 ; 10 L. T. 342 ; 12 W. R. 713 .. .. 322 
 Hyams v. Stuart King, [1908] 2 K. B. 696 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 794 ; 
 
 99L. T. 424 210 
 
 Hyde v. Johnson (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 776 ; 5 L. J. C. P. 291 ; 
 
 3 Scott 289; 2 Hodges 94; 42 R. R. 737 .. .. 69, 138 
 
 Hyman v. Van den Bergh, [1908] 1 Ch. 167 ; 77 L. J. Ch. 154 ; 
 
 98I^T. 478 17 
 
 I. 
 
 lies V. West Ham Union (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 69 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 17 ; 46 L. T. 149 ; 30 W. R. 303 ; 46 J. P. 660 & 8 App. 
 
 Cas. 386 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 650 ; 49 L. T. 205 ; 31 W. R 928 ; 
 
 47J. P. 708 350 
 
 Imperial Gas Co. v. London Gas Co. (1864), 10 Ex. 39 ; 2 C. L. R. 
 
 1230 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 303 ; 18 Jur. 497 ; 2 W. R. 627 ; 102 
 
 R. R. 466 12 
 
 Income Tax Commrs. v. Pemsel, [1891] App. Cas. 531 ; 61 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 266 ; 55 J. P. 806 .. .. 1, 108, 448, 640, 544 
 
 India, The (1863), 32 L. J. P. M. & A. 185 ; 1 B. & L. 221 ; 12 
 
 L. T. 316 278 
 
 (No. 2) (1864), 33 L. J. P. M. & A. 193 . . . . 296, 735 
 
 Indian Chief, The (1800), 3 Rob. C. 12 111,265 
 
 Industry, The (1812), 1 Gallison 114 .. .. 338, 500, 501 
 
 Ingate^!. Austrian Lloyd's Co. (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 704 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 323 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 976 ; 114 R. R. 905 673 
 
 Inglis V. G. K Rail. Co. (1852), 16 Jur. 895, H. L. Sco. .. 138, 139 
 Ingliss ?;. Grant (1794), 5 T. R. 530 258 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. Ixvil 
 
 TAGB 
 
 Ingram & Royle v. Services Maritimes du Tr^port, [1914] 1 K. B. 
 
 541, C. A 276,677 
 
 Ings V. London & S. W. Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 19 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 86 ; 17 W. R. 120 , .. .. 398 
 
 Inland Revenue v. Angus (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 579 ; 38 W. R. 3 504 
 V. Forrest (1891), 15 App. Cas. 334 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 
 
 63 L. T. 36 ; 39 W. R. 33 ; 54 J. P. 772 508 
 
 V. Oliver, [1909] A. C. 427 ; 78 L. J. P. C. 146 ; 101 L. T. 
 
 140; 53 S. J. 649 509 
 
 V. Scott, [1892] 2 Q. B. 152 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 432 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 173 ; 40 W. R. 632 ; 56 J. P. 580, 632 544 
 
 Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood, [1894] App. Cas. 347 ; 
 
 63 L. J. P. C. 74 ; 71 L. T. 205 .. .. 66,93,283,527 
 
 International Pulp Co., Jie (1876), 3 Ch. D. 594 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 
 
 446 ; 35 L. T. 229 ; 24 W. R. 535 269 
 
 lona, The (1867), L. R. 1 P. 0. 426 ; 4 Moo, P. C. N. S. 336 ; 16 
 
 L. T. 158 517 
 
 lonides v. The Pacific Insurance Co. (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 517 ; 
 
 41 L. J. Q. B. 190 ; 26 L. T. 738 ; 21 W. R. 22 .. .. 204 
 Irish Land Commission v. Brown, [1904] 2 Ir. R. 200, Ir. .. 457 
 V. Grant (1884), 10 App. Cas. 14 ; 52 L. T. 228 ; 33 W. R. 
 
 357 .. .. .. .. .. . .. 297 
 
 Irish Peat Co. v. Phillips (1861), 1 B. & S.'598 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 363 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1189 ; 4L. T. 806 ; 9 W. R. 873 .. 654 
 
 Ironsides, The (1862), Lush. 458 ; 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 129 ; 6 
 
 L. T. 59 401 
 
 Irresistible, The (1822), 7 Wheat. 551 733 
 
 Isaacson, Re, [1895] 1 Q. B. 333 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 191 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 812 ■ 43 W. R. 278 .. 702 703 
 
 Isherwood v. Oldkiiow (1815)'," 3 M.'& S. 382 ; leR. R."305 .. ' 539 
 Isitt V. Beeston (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 159 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 89 ; 20 
 
 L. T. 371 ; 17 W. R. 620 576 
 
 Ives, iJe (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 665 151 
 
 -y.lWillans, [1894] 2 Ch. 478; 63 L.J. Ch. 521 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 674 ; 42 W. R. 483 47 
 
 Iveson ■». Moore (1699), 1 Salk. 15 723 
 
 Jackson*. BarryRy. Co., [1893], ICh. 238,.C. A 151 
 
 V. Beaumont (1855), 11 Ex. 300 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 301 ,• 105 
 
 R. R. 536 683 
 
 V. Burnham (1852), 8 Ex. 173 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 13 ; 91 R. R. 
 
 421 .. 349 
 
 V. Roth (1918), 35 T. L. R. 59. D. C 210 
 
 V. Spittall (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 542 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 321 ; 
 
 22 L. T. 755 ; 18 W. R. 1162 277 
 
 V. WooUey (1858), 8 E. & B. 778 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 448 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. S. 656 ; 112 R. R. 774 391 
 
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Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Jacobs V. Brett (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 1 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 377 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 522 ; 23 W. R. 556 .. .. .. 235,237,238 
 
 V Credit ILyonnais (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 589 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 156 ; 50 L. T. 194 ; 32 W. R. 761 277, 674 
 
 V. Hart (1900), 2 F. (Just. Cas.) 33, Sco 78 
 
 James v. Buena Ventura Syndicate, [1896] 1 Ch. 457 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 
 
 284 ; 74 L. T. 1 ; 44 W. R. 372 130 
 
 ■». S. W. Ry. Co., (1872); L. R. 7 Ex. 287 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 82 ; 
 
 27 L. T. 382 ; 20 W. R. 238 241,678 
 
 Jameson, Be, [1908] 2 Ch. Ill ; 77 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 98 L. T. 745 41 
 V. Brick Co. (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 208 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 39 
 
 L. T. 594 ; 27 W. R. 221 .. ..♦ 349 
 
 Jaques ». Withy (1788), 1 H. Bl. 65 733 
 
 Jarman, Ex. p. (1877). 4 Ch. D. 835 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 485 .. .. 566 
 
 Jarrett v. Hunter (1886), 34 Ch. D. 182 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 141 ; 55 
 
 L. T. 727 ; 35 W. R. 132 ; 51 J. P. 165 514 
 
 Jarvis v. Hemmings (No. 1), [1912] 1 Ch. 462 652 
 
 Jay V. Johnstone, [1893] 1 Q. B. 25, 189 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 128 ; 
 
 68 L. T. 129 ; 41 W. R. 161 ; 57 J. P. 309 542 
 
 Jay's Furnishing Co. v. Brand & Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 132 ; Affd., 
 
 [1915] 1K.B. 458 652 
 
 JefiFerys v Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. Cas. 815 ; 3 C. L. R. 625 ; 24 
 
 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 615 .. 4, 74, 273, 274, 275, 291 
 
 Jeffreys v. Gurr (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 833 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 23 ; 36 
 
 R. R. 769 617 
 
 Jeffries v. Alexander (1860), 8 H. L. C. 594 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 148 ; 7 
 
 Jur. N. S. 221 ; 2 L. T. 768 208,210,216,225 
 
 Jenkins v. Gt. Central Ry. (1912), 81 L. J. K. B. 24 .. .. 26 
 V. Jones (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 128; 51 L. J. Q. B. 438 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 795 ; 30 W. R. 668 310 
 
 Jenner v. S. E. Ry. Co. (1911), 105 L. T. 131 ; 75 J. P. 419 ; 55 
 
 S.J. 553 635 
 
 Jennings v. Hammond (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 225 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 493;31W. R.40 091 
 
 Jennings' Cabe (1838), 2 Lew. C. C. 1.30 582 
 
 Jesson V. Wright (1820), 2 Bligh 55 ; 21 R. R. 1, H. L 369 
 
 Jestons D. Brooke (1778), 2 Cowp. 793 210 
 
 Jesus College Case (1616), Duke on Charit. Uses, p. 78 . . . . 156 
 
 Jewel V. Stead (1856), 6 E. & B. 350 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 294 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1136 612 
 
 Jeyes 1!. Booth (1797), 1 B. & P. 97 685 
 
 Johannes, The (I860), Lush. 182 268,272 
 
 Johannesberg Co., Be, [1892] 1 Ch. 583; 61 L. J. Ch. 284; 66 
 
 L. T. 605; 40 W. R. 456 436 
 
 Johns 1). Ware, [1899] 1 Ch. 359 174 
 
 Johnson, Ex p. (1863), 3 B. & S. 947 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1128 ; 32 
 
 L. J. M. C. 193; 11 W. R. 620; 8L. T. N. S. 275 .. .. 13 
 
 , ^tc^. (1839), 7Dowl. 702 585 
 
 V. Colam (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 544 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 185 ; 
 
 32 L. T. 725 ; 23 W. R. 697 242 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Johnson v. Croydon (Mayor) (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 708 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 117 ; 54 L. T. 295 ; 50 J. P. 487 523 
 
 V. Harris (1855), 15 C. B. 357 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 40 ; 100 R. R. 
 
 386 104 
 
 V. Hogg (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 432 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 343 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 435; 31 W. R. 768; 5Asp. M,C. 51 577 
 
 V. Hudson (1809), 11 East 180 ; 10 R. R. 465 .. .. 699 
 
 V. Johnson, [1900] P. 19 ; 69 L. J. P. 13 ; 81 L. T. 791 ; 64 
 
 J. P. 72 152,519 
 
 «>. Rees(1915), 84L. J. K. B. 1276 211 
 
 • i; Upham (1859), 2 E. & E. 250 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 252 .. .. 450 
 
 i;. WUson (1882), 46 L. T. 647 .. .. " .. ..319 
 
 Johnston v. Coal Consumers' Co. of Toronto, [1898] A. C. 447 ; 
 
 67 L. J. P. C. 33 ; 78 L. T. 270, P. C 721,722 
 
 Johnstone v. Abercrorabie (1892), 30 Sc. L. R. 260, Sc. . . 474 
 
 Jolly V. Hancock (1852), 7 Ex. 820 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 38 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 550 648 
 
 Jones, Ex. p. (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 663 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 124 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 116 ; 23 W. R. 886 502 
 
 , Be (1852), 7 Ex. 586 ; 16 Jur. 801 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 116 .. 574 
 
 , Be (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 589 ; Affd. 59 L. J. Q. B. 331 .. 358 
 
 , Be, [1891] 2 Q. B. 231 ; 60iL. J. Q. B. 751 ; 64 L. T. 804 ; 
 
 40 W. R. 95 ; 8 M. B. R.210 576, 579 
 
 u Badley (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 635 221 
 
 -v. Bird (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 837 ; 1 D. & R. 497 ; 24 R. R. 
 
 579 630 
 
 V. Carmarthen (1841), 8 M. & W. 605 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 401 ; 
 
 58R. R. 826 621 
 
 V. Conway Water Supply, [1893] 2 Ch. 603; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 767 ; 69 L. T. 265 ; 41 W. R. 616 ; 57 J. P. 501 .. .. 363 
 
 V. Davies, [1901] 1 K. B. 118; 70 L. J. K. B. 38 .. .. 126 
 
 V. , [1898] 1 Q. B. 405 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 294 .. ..589 
 
 V. Eestiniog Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 733; 37 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 18 L. T. 902 ; 17 W. R. 28 ; 9 B. & S. 835 632 
 
 V. Harrison (1851), 6 Ex. 328 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 166 . . 428, 438 
 
 V. Johnson (1852), 7 Ex. 452 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 102 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 840 365 
 
 V. Llanrwst U. C, [1911] 1 Ch. 393 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 751 ; 75 J. P. 68 ; 9 L. G. R. 222 723 
 
 • ■y.Mersey Docks Co. (1864), 11 H. L. Cas. 443; 35 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 1 ■ .. .. 229,543 
 
 V. Ogle (1872), L. R. 8 Ch. 192 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 332 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 245; 21 W. R. 239 384 
 
 V. Shervington, [1908] 2 K. B. 539 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 771 ; 99 
 
 L. T. 57 ; 72 J. P. 381 75,187 
 
 I'. Smart (1785), 1 T. R. 44 21 
 
 V. Taylor (1859), 1 E. & B. 20 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 117 
 
 R. R. 122 194 
 
 V. Thompson (1858), E. B. & E. 63 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N S. 338 ; 113 R. R. 545 101 
 
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IXX TABLE OP CASES. 
 
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 Jones V. Victoria Graving Dock Co. (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 314 ; 46 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 36 L. T. 144, 347 ; 25 W. R. 348, 
 
 501 273, 512, 515 
 
 Jones Bros. w. Joyner (1900), 82 L. T. 768 513 
 
 Jones Lloyd & Co., He (1889), 41 Ch. D. 159 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 582 ; 
 
 61 L. T. 219 ; 37 W. R. 615 ; 1 M. B. R. 161 .. .. 129 
 
 Jordeson v. Sutton Gas Co., [1899] 2 Ch. 217 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 457 ; 
 
 80 L. T. 815 ; 63 J. P. 692 .. 630 
 
 Jorgensen v. Neptune Steam Fishing Co. (1902), 4 Fraser 992, 
 
 Sco .. .. 268, 269 
 
 Jortin V. S. E. R. Co. (1855), 6 De 6. M. & G. 270 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 
 
 343 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 433 ; 106 R. R. 95 702 
 
 Jubb V. Hull Dock Co. (1846), 9 Q. B. 443 ; 3 Rly. Cas. 795 ; 15 
 
 L. J. 0. B. 403 ; 11 Jur. 15 ; 72 R. R. 332 406 
 
 Julius V. Oxford (Bp. of) (1880), 5 App. Cas. 214 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 577 ; 42 L. T. 546 ; 28 W. R. 726 ; 44 J. P. 600 427, 432, 433, 
 
 434, 435, 438, 443 
 
 K. 
 
 Kaufman v. Gerson, [1903] 2 K. B. 114 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 320 .. 44 
 Kay «. Goodwin (1830), 6 Bing. 576 ; 31 R. R. 500 .. ..728 
 Kearney v. Whitehaven Colliery Co., [1893] 1 Q. B. 700 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 129 ; 68 L. T. 690 ; 41 W. R. 594 ; 57 J. P. 645 .. 704 
 Reams v. Cordwainders' Co. (1859), 6 C. B. N. S. 388; 28 
 
 L. J. C. P. 285 ; 5 Jnr. N. S. 1216 91, 578 
 
 Keates v. Lewis Merthyr Collieries, [1910] 2 K. B. 445 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 722 ; 102 L. T. 898 ; 74 J. P. 292 202 
 
 Keen «. Price, [1914] 2 Ch. 98 199 
 
 Keep V. St. Mary's, Newington, [1894] 2 Q. B. 524 ; 63 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 369 ; 70 L. T. 509 ; 58 J. P. 748 336 
 
 «. Stevens (1909), 73 J. P. 112 351 
 
 Keighley's Case (1609), 10 Rep., 140a 228 
 
 Keilley v. Carson (1843), 4 Moo. P. C. 0. 63 ; 7 Jur. 137, P. C. 632 
 Kelly, Be, [1895] 1 Q. B. 180 ; 64 L.J. Q. B. 129 : 71 L. T. 843 ; 
 
 43W. R. 191 438 
 
 Kemp ■». Lewis, [1914] 3 K. B. 543 138 
 
 V. Neville (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 158 272 
 
 V. Waddingham (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 358 727 
 
 Kennedy v. Cowie, [1891] 1 Q. B. 771 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 170 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 598 ; 39 W. R. 686 ; 65 J. P. 680 ; 17 Cox C. C. 320 168 
 
 1). Gibson (1869), 8 Wallace 498 .. ..' .. 445 570 
 
 Ketit C. C, Ex p., [1891] 1 Q. B. 725 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 435 ; 65 ' 
 
 L. T. 213 ; 39 W. R. 465 ; 55 J. P. 647 .. . 542 
 V. Gerrard, [1897] A. C. 625 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 077 ; 77 L. T 
 
 109 ; 46 W. R. Ill ; 61 J. P. 804 94 
 
 Kenworthy v. Schofield (1824), 2 B. & C. 945 ; 4 D. •& R. 556 ; 
 
 26R. R. 600 512 
 
 Kenyon v. Eastwood (1888), 57 L. J. Q. B. 455 . . 15 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Kenyon v. Hart (1865), 6 B. & S. 249 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 87 ; 11 
 
 Jur. N. S. 602 ; 11 L. T. 733 ; 18 W. R. 406 .. .. 167 
 
 Kerrison ■». Cole (1807), 8 East 231 703 
 
 Keynaham v. Baker (1864), 2 H. tfc C. 729 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 41 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1346 ; 12 W. R. 156 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 418 .. .. 119 
 
 Kibble, Exp. (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 63 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 392 
 
 Kimberley W. W. Co. v. De Beers Mines, [1897] A. C. 515 ; 66 
 
 L. J. P. C. 108 ; 77 L. T. 117, P. C 125 
 
 Kimbray*. Draper (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 160 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 80 ; 
 
 18 L. T. 540 ; 16 W. R. 539 ; 9 B. & S. 80 .. .. 401, 403 
 Kine V. Evershed (1847), 10 Q. B. 148 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; 11 
 
 Jur. 673 414 
 
 King V. George (1877), 5 Ch. D. 627 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 759 ; 25 W. R. 638 583 
 
 Kingsford v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 761 ; 33 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 307 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 804 ; 10 L. T. 722 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 1059 24, 141 
 
 Kingston-upon-HuU Dock Co. v. Browne (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 59 ; 
 
 36R. R. 459 500,504,528 
 
 Rinning, Exp. (1847), 10 Q. B. 730 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 257 .. 643 
 ■;;. Buchanan (1849), 8 C. B. 271 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 332 ; 79 
 
 R. R. 490 643,644 
 
 Kippins, JUx p., [1897] 1 Q. B. 1 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 95 ; 75 L. T. 
 
 421 ; 45 W. R. 188 ; 60 J. P. 791 ; 18 0. C. C. 459 . . .. 574 
 
 Kirk V. Todd (1882), 21 Ch. D. 484 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 224 ; 47 L. T. 
 
 676; 31 W. R. 69 12, 369 
 
 Kirkland v. Peatfield, [1903] 1 K. B. 756 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 355 ; 
 
 88 L. T. 472 ; 51 W. R. 544 303 
 
 Kirkleatham Local Bd., Se, [1893] 1 Q. B. 375 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 180 ; 67 L. T. 811 ; 57 J. P. 229 293 
 
 Kirkpatrick v. Tattersall (1845), 13 M. & W. 766 ; 1 C. & K. 
 
 577 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 209 ; 9 Jur. 214 69 
 
 Kirkstall Brewery, Se (1877), 5 Ch. D. 535 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 424 ; 
 
 37L. T. 312 .. 556 
 
 Kirshenboim v. Salmon and Glucksteln, [1898] 2 Q. B. 19 ; 67 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 601 ; 78 L. T. 658 ; 46 W. R. 573 ; 62 J. P. 439 195 
 Kish V. Taylor, [1911] 1 K. B. 625 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 607 ; 103 L. T. 
 
 785 ; 16 Com. Cas. 59 370 
 
 Kitchen, iJe (1919), 35 T. L. R. 612 127 
 
 V. Bartsch (1805), 7 East 53 j 3 Smith 58 532 
 
 V. Shaw (1837), 6 A. & E. 729 ; 7 L. J. M. C. 14 ; 1 N. & P. 
 
 791 ; W. W. & D. 278 585 
 
 Kitson V. Ashe, [1899] 1 Q. B. 425 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 80 L. T. 
 
 323 ■ 03 J. P. 325 .. .. .. 523 
 
 Kittow v. Liskeard (1875), L.R. lOQ. B.'7 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 23'; 
 
 31 L. T. 601 ; 23 W. R. 72 ■ 129 
 
 Knight, Be (1848), 1 Ex. 802 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 168 ; 12 Jur. 101 ; 
 
 74R. R. 857 297 
 
 V. Crockford (1794), 1 Esp. 190 ; 5 R. R. 729 .. .. 69 
 
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Ixxii TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Knight ?;. Famaby (1706), 2 Salk. 670 459 
 
 V. Lee, [1893J 1 Q. B. 41 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; 67 L. T. 688 ; 
 
 41 W. R. 125 ; 57 J. P. 117 385 
 
 Knight of St. Michael, The, [1898] P. 30 107 
 
 Knill '«. Towse (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 186 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 136, 
 
 697 ; 63 L. T. 47 ; 38 W. R. 521 ; 54 J. P. 789 .. .. 61 
 
 Knowles & Sons, Ltd. v. Bolton Corporation, [1900] 2 Q. B. 257 142 
 Kodak Lim. v: Clarke, [1903] 1 K. B. 505 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 369 ; 
 
 88 L. T. 155 ; 51 W. R. 459 ; 67 J. P. 213 271 
 
 Konigsberg, The, [19171 P. 174 102 
 
 Kronheim v. Johnson (1877), 7 Ch. D. 60 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 132 ; 37 
 
 L. T. 751 ; 26 W. R. 142 512 
 
 Kruse v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q. B. 91 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 782 ; 78 
 
 L. T. 647 ; 46 W. R. 630 ; 62 J. P. 469 . . . . 523, 525 
 
 Kutner v. Phillips, [1891] 2 Q. B. 267 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 505 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 628 ; 39 W. R. 526 280, 314 
 
 Kyle 1). Jeffreys (1859), 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 611, H. L 291 
 
 Kynaston v. Mackinder (1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 37 L. T. 390 B08 
 
 L. 
 
 Lade D. Trill (1842), 6 Jur. 272 678 
 
 Lafone v. Smith (1859), 3 H. & N. 735 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 33 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1064 ; 117 R. R. 9.59 211 
 
 Laird 1). Briggs (1881), 19 Ch. D. 22 35 
 
 Lake v. Butler (1855), 5 E. & B. 92 ; 3 C. L. R. 1124 ; 24 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 273 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 499 ; 103 R. R. 383 .. .. 612 
 Lakeman v. Stephenson (1868), L. R. 3Q. B. 192 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 
 
 57; 18L. T. 539; 16 W. R. 509; 9B. &S. 54 .. .. 495 
 Laker v. Hordern (1876), 1 Ch. D. 644 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 315 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 88 ; 24 W. R. 543 43 
 
 Lamb v. Brewster (1879), 48 L. J. Q. B. 277, 421 .. .. 223 
 V. N. London Ry. Co. (1870), L. R. 4 Ch. 522 ; 21 L. T.98 ; 
 
 17W. R. 746 , 529 
 
 V. Stott (1899), 36 Sc. L. R. 913, Se 575 
 
 Lambert v. Hutchinson (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 858 ; 3 Scott N. R. 
 
 ^21 142 
 
 V. Taylor (1825), 4 B. & C. 138 ; 6 D. & R. 188 .. .. 249 
 
 Lambton i;. Parkinson (1887), 35 W. R. 545 152 
 
 Lamplough v. Norton (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 452 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 279 ; 37 W. R. 422 ; 53 J. P. 389 40,708 
 
 Lancashire v. Stretford (1858), E. B. & E. 225 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 
 
 209; 4 Jur. N. S. 1274; 113R. R. 613 247 
 
 Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry.'Co. v. Bury; (1889), 14 App. Cas. 
 
 417 ; 61 L. T. 417 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 85 .. .. 131,035 
 V. Knowles (1888), 14 App. Cas. 248 ; 20 Q. B. D. 391 ; 57 
 
 L. J. 0- B. 150 ; 52 J. P. 340 54 
 
 ^Brick, &c. Co. v. Lanes. & Yorks. Rail. Co., [1902] 1 K. B. 
 
 651, C. A 91 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Lancaster, Be (1878), 3 Ch. D. 498 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 147 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 649; 24W. R. 1010 135 
 
 D. Greaves (1829), 9 B. «fc C. 628 585 
 
 Lane v. Bennett (1836), 1 M. &. W. 70 ; 1 Gale 368 .. .. 30 
 
 V. Cotton (1701), 12 Mod. 485; 1 Ld. Raym. 746 .. .. 145 
 
 V. Lane, [1896 J P. 133 ; 65 L. J. P. D. & A. 63 ; 74 L. T. 
 
 557; 60 J. P. 345 397 
 
 V. Rendall, [1899] 2 Q. B. 673 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; 81 L. T. 
 
 445 ; 48 W. R. 153 ; 63 J. P. 757 196 
 
 V. Tyler (1887), 56 L. J. Q. B. 461 198 
 
 Lang «. Kerr (1878), 3 App. Cas. 536, H. L 92 
 
 V. Walker (1902), 40 Sc. L. R. 284, Sc 474 
 
 Langham Rink Co., iJe (1877), 5 Ch. D. 669; 46 L. J. Ch. 345; 
 
 36L. T. 605 592 
 
 Langrish v. Archer (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 44 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 47 ; 
 
 47 L. T. 548 ; 31 W. R. 183 ; 47 J. P. 295 ; 15 Cox C. C. 
 
 194 492, 600 
 
 Langton v. Hughes (1855), 1 M. & S. 593 ; 14 R. R. 531 688, 694 
 
 Lanman «. Audley (1837), 2 M. & W. 535 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 136 .. 518 
 Lanston Monotype Coi'pn. v. Anderson, [1911] 2 K. B. 15 ; 80 
 
 L. J. K. B. 951 ; 104 L. T. 503 504 
 
 Larpent v. Bibby (1855), 5 H. L. Cas. 481 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 
 
 101 R. R. 252, H. L 388 
 
 Latham v. Hide (1832), 1 C. &JVI. 128 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 72 ; 1 D. P. C. 
 
 594; 3Tyr. 143 697 
 
 V. Lafone (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 115 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 97 ; 15 
 
 W.R. 453 ; 15 L. T. N. S. 627 92 
 
 Latless V. Holmes (1792), 4 T. R. 660 740 
 
 Lauri v. Renad, [1892] 3 Ch. 402 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 580 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 275 ; 40 W. R. 679 382,387 
 
 Lavy V. L. C. C, [1895] 2 Q. B. 577 ; 64 |L. J. M. C. 262 ; 73 
 
 L. T. 106 ; 43 W. R. 677 ; 59 J. P. 630 58 
 
 Law V. Hodaon (1809), 11 East 300 ; 2 Camp. 147 ; 10 R. R. 513 695 
 Law Society v. Shaw (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 1 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 
 
 46 L. T. 187 ; 30 W. R. 820 ; 46 J. P. 308 and 8 App. Cas. 
 
 407 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 674 ; 49 L. T. 141 ; 31 W. R. 754 .. 471 
 Lawrence v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1851), 16 Q. B. 643 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 293 ; 15 Jur. 652 ; 6 Rly. Cas. 656 ; 83 R. R. 645 .. .. 630 
 V. King (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 345 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 78 ; 18 
 
 L.T. N. S. 356; 16W. R. 966; 9B. &S. 325 .. 67,564 
 V. Wilock (1840), 11 A. & E. 941 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 284 ; 
 
 3P. &D. 536; 8D. P. C.681 683 
 
 Laws «. Smith (1883), 9 A. C. 356, P. C 269 
 
 Lawson v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1896] 2 Ir. R. 418, Ir. 270 
 
 -y. Reynolds, [1904] 1 Ch. 718 150 
 
 V. Vacuum Brake Co. (1884), 27 Ch. D. 137 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 
 
 16 ; 51 L. T. 275 ; 33 W. R. 186 430 
 
 Lea u. Facey (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 354 413 
 
 Leach v. Jay (1878), 9 Ch. D. 42 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 876 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 99; 39L. T. 242 106 
 
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Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Lead Smelting Co. v. Richardson (1762), 3 Burr. 1341 ,. ..572 
 
 Leader V. DuflFey (1888), 13 A. C. 294 13,14 
 
 V. Yell (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 584 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 231 ; 10 
 
 L. T. 532 ; 10 Jur.N. S. 731 ; 12 W. R. 915 .. .. 475 
 
 Learoyd, ^x p. (1880), 13 Ch. D. 321 345 
 
 V. Bracken, [1894] 1 Q. B. 114; 63 L. J. Q. B. 96 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 668 ; 42 W. R. 196 700 
 
 Leatt V. Vine (1861), 30 L. J. M. 0. 217 ; 8 L. T. 581 . . . . 194 
 
 Leconfield (Lord) v. Lonsdale (Lord) (1870), 39 L. J. C. P. 305 64 
 Lee V. Bude & Torrington Ry. Co. (1871"), L. R. 6 C. P. 576 ; 40 
 
 L. J. C. P. 285 ; 24 L. T. 827 ; 19 W. R. 954 228, 440, 460 
 V. Dangar, [1892] 2 Q. B. 337 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 780 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 548 ; 40 W. R. 469 ; 56 J. P. 678 .. 167, 188, 332, 473 
 V. Simpson (1847), 3 C. B. 871 ; 4 D. & L. 666 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 
 
 105 ; 11 Jur. 127 ; 71 R. R. 524 178, 575 
 
 V. Taylor (1912), 23 Cox C. C. 220 193 
 
 Leech v. N. Staffordshire Ry. Co. (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 150 ; 8 
 
 W. R. 216 ; 5 H. & N. 160 635 
 
 Lees V. Newton (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 658 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 285 ; 
 
 14W. R. 938 100 
 
 ■«. Summergill (1811), 17 Ves. 508 82 
 
 Leefce v. Hart (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 322 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 157 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 292 ; 16 W. R. 676 414 
 
 Le Eeuvre v. Miller (1857), 8 E. & B. 3^ ; 26 L. J. M. C. 175 ; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 1255 ; 122 R. R. 582 654, 667 
 
 Leggott V. G. N. Ry. Co. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 599 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 657 ; 35 L. T. 334 ; 24 W. R. 784 449 
 
 Leicester Corporation v. Burgess (1833), 5 B. & A. 246 ; 2 N. & M. 
 
 131 ; 39 R. R. 450 321 
 
 Leigh V. Kent (1789), 3 T. R. 362 .. .. 240,532,534,735 738 
 
 Leith Council v. Leith Harbour Comm., [1899] A. C. 508 : 68 
 
 L. J. P. C. 109 ; 81 L. T. 98, H. L 626 
 
 Leith Harbour Comm. v. Poor Inspector (1866), L. R. 1 Sc. App. 
 
 17 247 
 
 Le Louis (1817), 2 Dods. 229 263, 266, 272 
 
 Leman v. Houseley (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 66 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 22 : 
 
 31 L. T. 833 ; 23 W. R. 235 .. 394 
 
 Lemayne v. Stanley (1681), 3 Lev. 1 .-. .. .. 69, 514 
 
 Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1895), 64 L. J. P. C. 97 .. . 256 
 
 Lemm v. Mitchell, [1912] A. C. 400 ; 81 L. J. P. C. 173 .. 9 
 
 Lemy V. Watson, [1915] 3 K. B. 731 191 
 
 Le Neve v. Le Neve (1747), Amb. 436 456 
 
 Leng, Re, [1895] 1 Ch. 652 ; 64 L. J. Oh. 468 ; 72 L. T. 407 • 43 
 
 W. R. 406 174 
 
 Lennox v. Stoddart, [1902] 2 K. B. 21 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 747 ■ 87 
 
 L. T. 283 ; 66 J. P. 469 600 
 
 Leominster Canal Co. v. Shrewsbury, &c. |Ry. Co. (1857), 3 
 
 K. & J. 654 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 764 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 930 ; 112 R. R, 
 
 328 654 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. IxxV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Leon, The (1881), 6 P. D. 148 ; 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 59 ; 44 L, T. 
 
 613 ; 29 W. R. 916 ; 4 Asp. M. C.404 .. .. 277, 278 
 
 Leroux v. Brown (1852), 12 C. B. 801 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 3 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 1021 ; 92 R. R. 889 263,273 
 
 Leslie v. Richardson (1848), 6 C. B. 378 ; 6 D. & L. 91 ; 17 
 
 L. J. C. P. 324 ; 12 Jur. 730 142 
 
 Lester, Ex. p., [1893] 2 Q. B. 113 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 372 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 739 ; 41 W. R. 488 477 
 
 V. Foxcroft (1701), Colles 108 ; 1 Wh. & T. L. Cas. 881 .. 455 
 
 V. Garland (1808), 15 Ves. 248 ; 10 R. R. 68 . . . . 605 
 
 V. Hickling, [1916] 2 K. B. 302 16,703 
 
 V. Torrens (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 403 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 280 ; 25 
 
 W. R.691 351,361 
 
 Le Sueur u. Le Sueur (1876), 1 P. D. 139 ; 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 73 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 511 ; 24 W. R. 616 256 
 
 Leverson v. R. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 394 ; 18 W. R. 251 54, 538 
 
 Levet V. Gas Light & Coke Co, (1918), 35 T. L. R. 47 . . . . 17 
 Levi V. Sanderson (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 330 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 135 ; 
 
 17 W. R. 413 ; 9 B. «& S. 410 728,730 
 
 Levy «;. Warburton (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 708 693 
 
 V. Yates (1838), 8 A. & E. 129 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; 3 N. & P. 
 
 249 ; 1 W. W. & H. 219 692 
 
 Lewes V. Barnett (1876), 6 Ch. D. 252 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 144 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 101 365,371 
 
 Lewis, Ex. j>. (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 626 ; 24 L. T. 785 ; 19 W. R. 
 
 835 212 
 ,Ex.'2>. (1888), 21 Q. B. D. m ; 57 L. J.M. C."l08; 59 
 
 L.T. 338; 37 W.R. 13; 52J.P.773 426 
 
 , Be (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 724 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 816 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 859 ; 24 W. R. 1017 347 
 
 V. Carr (1876), 1 Ex. D. 484 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 314 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 44;24W.R.940 500 
 
 V. Davis (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 86 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 86 ; 23 W. R. 
 
 635 664 
 
 V. Fermor (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 532 ; 56 L. J. M. C. 45 ; 56 
 
 •L. T. 236 ; 35 W. R. 378 ; 51 J. P. 371 ; 16 Cox C. C. 176 196 
 V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 195 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 
 
 37 L. T. 774 ; 26 W. R. 255 41 
 
 «. Hughes, [1916] 1 K. B. 831, C. A 732 
 
 ■;;. Roberts (1862), 11 C. B. N. S. 23 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 51 ; 
 
 K. & G; 402 ; 8 Jur. K S. 485 ; 5 L. T. 351 136 
 
 V. Weston-Super-Mare Local Board (1888), 40 Ch. D. 55 ; 
 
 58 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 59 L-.T. 769 ; 37 W. R. 121 .. 140, 231, 530 
 
 Lichfield Corporation v. Simpson (1845), 8 Q. B. 65 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 78;70R. R. 417 714,715 
 
 Liddell v. Lofthouse, [1896] 1 Q. B.295 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 64 ; 74 
 
 L. T. 139 ; 44 W. R. 349 ; 60 J. P. 264 600 
 
 Liffin «. Pitcher (1842), 6 Jur. 537 ; 1 D. N. S. 767 .. ..607 
 Lightfoot V. Tenant (1796), 1 Bos. & P. 551 ; 4 R. R. 735 . . 695 
 Limland «. Stephens (1801), 3 Esp. 269 177 
 
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Ixxvi TABLE OF OASES. 
 
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 Lincoln College Case (1595), 3 Rep. 59 b 54, 375 
 
 Lincoln v. Wright (1859), 4 De G. & J. 16 ; 28 L. J. Oh. 705 .. 454 
 
 Lindsey i>. Barron (1848), 6 0. B. 291 271 
 
 V. Leigh (1848), 11 Q. B. 455 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 99 ; 17 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 50 ; 12 Jur. 286 464 
 
 Linton v. Blakeney Co-op. Soc. (1865), 3 H. &. C. 853 ; 34 
 
 ii. J. Ex. 211; 13L. T. 39; 13W. R. 843 731 
 
 Lion Insurance Co. v. Tucker (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 176 ; 53 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 189 ; 49 L. T. 764 ; 32 W. R. 546 .. .. 96 
 
 Lismore V. Beadle (1842), 1 Dowl. N. S. 566 683 
 
 Little V. Poole (1829), 9 B. & C. 192 ; 7 L. J. (0. S.) K. B. 158 ; 
 
 32R. R. 630 696 
 
 Littledale, Ex. p. (1873), L. R. 9 Ch. 257 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 529 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 213 ; 22 W. R. 443 202 
 
 Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner (1861), 2 De G. F. & J. 502 ; 
 
 SOL. J. Ch. 379 569,649,653,667 
 
 Llandaff Market Co. o. Lyndon (1861), 8 10. B. IST. S. 515 ; 30 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 105 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1344 ; 8 W. R. 693 .. .. 322 
 
 Llanover, He, [1903] 2 Ch. 330 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 88 L. T. 856 ; 
 
 51W. R. 615 385 
 
 Lloyd, i;a!. ^. (1851), 1 Sim. N. S. 248 544 
 
 , Ex. p., [1891] 2 Q. B. 231 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 751 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 804 ; 40 W. R. 95 ; 8 M. B. R. 210 576, 579 
 
 V. Lloyd (1885), 14 Q. B. D.' 725 ; 53 L. T. 536 ; 33 W. R. 
 
 457 ; 49 J. P. 630 ; 15 Cox 0. 0. 767 420 
 
 Lloyd Italiano, Re (1885), 29 Ch. D. 219 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 748 ; 33 
 
 \V.R.728 268 
 
 Lobb V. Stanley (1844), 5 Q. B. 574 ; D. & M. 635 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 117; 8 Jur. 462 .. 69 
 
 Lock, Re, Ex. p. Poppleton (1890), 63 L. T. 320 ; 39 W. R. 15 ; 7 
 
 M. B. R. 184 28 
 
 Lockwood V. Att.-Gen. (1842), 10 M. & W. 464 .. .. .. 10 
 
 Lodge V. Huddersfield Corpn. (No. 1) (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 568 314 
 
 v.\ (No. 2) (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 571 314 
 
 Logsdon V. Booth, [1900] 1 Q. B. 401 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 131 ; 81 
 
 L. T. 602 ; 48 W. R. 266 ; 64 J. P. 165 133 
 
 V. Trotter, [1900] 1 Q. B. 617 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 312 ; 82 L. T. 
 
 151 ; 48 W. R. 365 ; 64 J. P. 421 133 
 
 Lolley's Case (1812), 1 R. & R. 236 ; 2 0. & F. 567 n. ; 37 R. R. 
 
 249 256 
 
 London and Blackwall Ry. Co. v. Lim'ehouse (1857), 3 K. & J. 
 
 123 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 164 314,322 
 
 and N. W. Ry. v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 1 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 67 
 
 L. T. 630 ; 41 W. R. 149 .'. 627 
 
 and N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ashton, [1919] 1 K. B. 623 ; W. N. 
 
 234 23,367 
 
 and S. W. Ry. Co. v. Flower (1876), 1 0. P. D. 77 ; 45 
 
 L. J. 0. P. 54 ; 33 L. T. 687 634 
 
 and S. W. Ry. Co. v. Hills, [1906] 1 K. B. 512 ; 75 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 340 ; 94 L. T. 517 ; 70 J. P. 212 523 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii 
 
 • 
 
 London and Suburban Land Co. v. Field (1881), 16 Ch. D. 645 ; 
 
 50 L. J. Ch. 549 ; 44 L. T. 444 107 
 
 — — and Yorks. Bank v. Belton (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 457 ; 54 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 568 ; 34 W. R. 31 ; 50 J. P. 861 .. .. 129 
 Association of Shipowners v. London and India Docks, [1892] 
 
 3 Ch. 242 ; 62 L. J. Oh. 294 ; 67 L. T. 238 ; 7 Asp. M. C. 
 
 195 550 
 
 ■ Bank of Mexico v. Apthorpe, [1891] 2 Q. B. 378 ; 60 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 653 ; 65 L. T. 601 ; .39 W. R. 564 270 
 
 Brighton & S. C. Ry. v. Truman (1885), 11 App. Cas. 45 ; 55 
 
 L. J. Ch. 354 ; 42 L. T. 250 ; 34 W. R. 657 ; 50 J. P. 388 630 
 Brighton & S. C. Ry. v. Watson (1879), 4 C. P. D. 118 ; 48 
 
 L. J. C. P. 316 ; 40 L. T. 183 711, 712 
 
 Chatham & Dover Ry. v. S. E. Ry. (1889), 40 Ch. D. 100 ; 
 
 58 L. J. Ch. 75 ; 60 L. T. 370 ; 37 W. R. 65 680 
 
 (City of) V. Wood (1701), 12 Mod. 669 . . 272, 459, 461 
 
 (Corporation) v. G. W. Ry. Co. [1910] 2 Ch. 314 : 79 
 
 L. J. Ch. 622 ; 103 L. T. 20 ; 54 Sol. J. 562 . . .. .. 42 
 
 (Corporation) v. London Joint Stock Bank (1881), 50 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 594, H. L ,. 549 
 
 Cotton Co., Be (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 53 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 
 
 14 L. T. 135 ; 12 Jur. 313 ; 14 W. R. 575 . . . . . . 60 
 
 C. C. V. Att.-Gen., [1902] A. C. 165 ; 71 L. J. Ch. 268 ; 86 
 
 L. T. 161 ; 50 W. R. 497 ; 66 J. P. 340 .. 231, 619, 623 
 C. C. V. Aylesbury Co., [1898] 1 Q. B. 106 ; 67 L. J. Q, B. 
 
 24 ; 77 L. T. 440 ; 61J. P. 759 465 
 
 C. C. V. Bermondsey Bioscope Co , [1911] 1 K. p. 445 ; 80 
 
 L. J. K. B. 144; 103 L. T. 760 ; 75 J. P. 53 ; 9 E. G. R. 79 75, 
 
 77, 524 
 C. C. V. Humphreys, [1894] 2 Q. B. 755 ; 63 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 215 ; 58 J. P. 734 ; 38 Sol. Journ. 632 ; 71 L. T. 201 ; 43 
 
 W. R. 13 113 
 
 C. C. V. London School Board, [1892] 2 Q. B. 606 ; 40 W. R. 
 
 604; 56 J. P. 791.. .. 280 
 
 C. C. V. Payne (No. 2), [1905] 1 K. B. 410 196 
 
 C. C. V. S. Metrop. Gas Co., [1904] 1 Ch. 76 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 
 
 136 ; 89 L. T. 618 ; 52 W. E. 161 ; 68 J. P. 5 ; 2 L. G. R. 
 
 161 ; 20 T. L. R. 83, C. A 108,611 
 
 C. C. V. Wandsworth & Putney Gas Co. (1900), 82 L. T. 562 286 
 
 , &c. Dairy Co. v. Morley & Lanceley (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 
 
 908 446 
 
 Furnishing Co. v. Solomon (1912), 28 T. L. R. 265 .. 652 
 
 Joint Stock Bank v. London (Mayor) (1875), 1 C. P. D. 1 ; 
 
 45 L. J. C. P. 213 ; 32 L. T. 781 549,574 
 
 School Board v. Wood (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 415 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 
 
 145 ; 54 L. T. 88 ; 50 J. P. 54 371^ 
 
 School Board v. Wright (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 578: 53 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 266 ; 50 L. T. 606 ; 32 W. R. 577 ; 48 J. P. 484 371 
 Long V. Gray (1863), 1 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 411 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 805 ; 8 L. T. 738 ; 11 W. R. 900, P. C. 555 
 
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Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Long Eaton Recreation Grounds Co. -y. Midland Ry. Co. (1902), 
 
 71 L. J. K. B. 837 687 
 
 Longford, The (1889), 14 P. D. 34 ; 58 L. J. P. & A. 33 ; 60 L. T. 
 
 373 ; 37 W. R. 372 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 371 . . • • 108, 361 
 Longman v. Bast (1878), 3 0. P. D. 142 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 211 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 1 ; 26 W. R. 183 519 
 
 Looker «. Halcomb (1827), 4 Bing. 188 241 
 
 Lopez V. Burslem (1843), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 300, P. 278 
 
 Lord, Be (1855), 1 K. & J. 90 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 103 R. R. 27 403 
 11. Lee (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 404 ; 9 B. & S. 269 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 121 ; 16 W. R. 856 '. 142 
 
 Love V. Bell (1884), 9 App. Cas. 286 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 1 ; 32 W. R. 725 ; 48 J. P. 516 627 
 
 Lovering v. Dawson (1875), L. R. 10 0. P. 711 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 
 
 321 * 32 L T 819 .. .. ■• -. •• 644 
 
 Low V. Routledge "(1868), 33 lV J. ChV 717 ; 'lO JurV 922 ; 'io L. T. 
 
 838 ; 12 W. R. 1069 and L. R. 1 Ch. 42 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 114 ; 
 
 11 Jur. N. S. 939 ; 13 L. T. 421 ; 14 W. R. 90 and L. R. 
 
 3 H. L. 100 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 454 ; 18 L. T. 874 ; 16 W. R. 
 
 1081, H.L 111,651 
 
 Lowcock V. Broughton Overseers (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 144 .. 63 
 Lowe, E£ p., [1891] 1 Ch. 627 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 292 ; 64 L. T. 487 ; 
 
 39 W. R. 369 ; 2 Meg. 418 61 
 
 V. Fox (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 667 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 53 L. T. 
 
 886; 34 W. R. 144; 50 J. P. 244 402, 608 
 
 V. Myers, [1906] 2 K. B. 265 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 651 ; 95 L. T. 
 
 35 55,346 
 
 Lowther v. Bentinck (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 166 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 197 ; 
 
 31 L. T. 719 ; 32 L. T. 156 597 
 
 ■ V. Radnor (1806), 8 East 113 ; 20 R. R. 542 n 585 
 
 Lucas V. Harris (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 127; 56 L. J. Q. B. 15 ; 55 
 
 L. T. 658 ; 35 W. R. 112; 51 J. P. 261 126 
 
 Lucey v. Ingram (1840), 6 M. & W. 302 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 196 ; 55 
 
 R. R. 621 619 
 
 Luckraft v. Pridham (1877), 6 Ch. D. 205 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 744 ; 37 
 
 L. T. 208 ; 26 W. R. 33 325 
 
 Ludlow V. Pike, [1904] 1 K. B. 531 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 274 ; 90 L. T. 
 
 458 ; 62 W. R. 475 ; 68 J. P. 243 ; 20 T. L. R. 276 .. .. 224 
 Lumley, Be, [1894] 3 Ch. 135 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 897 ; 71 L. T. 7 ; 42 
 
 W. R. 633 402 
 
 Lundy Co., Be (1871), L. E. 6 Ch. 462 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 588 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 922 ; 19 W. R. 609 502 
 
 LuDt V. London and N. W. Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 277 ; 35 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 409 ; 14 L. T. 225 ; 14 W. R. 
 
 . 497 636 
 
 Lurcott V. Wakely, [1911] 1 K. B. 905 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 713 ; 104 
 
 L. T. 290 42 
 
 Lyde V. Barnard (1836), 1 M. & W. 101 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 117 ; 1 Gale 
 
 388 ; 46 R. R. 269 „ ,, 419,445 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. Ixxix 
 
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 Lylea v. Southend-on-Sea, [1905] 2 K. B. 1 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 484 ; 
 
 92 L. T. 586 ; 69 J. P. 193 413,510 
 
 Lyme Regis v. Henley (1832), 1 Bing. N. C. 222 ; 5 Bing. 91 ; 3 
 
 B. &A. 77; 3M. &P. 278; 37R. R. 125 724 
 
 Lyn V. Wyn (1662), Bridg. Rep. by Bannister, 122 280, 314, 318 
 
 Lyne's Settlement Trusts, Re Gibbs, [1919] 1 Ch. 80 .. .. 268 
 
 Lyon !'. Fishmongers' Co. (1876), 1 App. Cas. 662 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 
 
 68 ; 35 L. T. 569 ; 25 W. R. 165, H. L. .. 630, 578, 724 
 
 Lysaght, Re, [1898] 1 Ch. 115 ; 67 L. J. Oh. 65 ; 77 L. T. 637 .. 147 
 
 V. Clark, [1891] 1 Q. B. 652 ; 64 L. T. 776 267 
 
 Lysons i. Knowles, [1901] A. C. 79 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 170 .. 124 
 
 M 
 
 Maas V. Pepper, [1905] A. C. 102 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 462 ; 92 L. T. 
 
 371 211 
 
 Mac, The (1882), 7 P. D. 126 ; 61 L. J. Adm. 81 ; 46 L. T. 907 131 
 McAUisteru. Rochester (Bp.) (1880), 5 C. P. D. 194 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 
 
 . 443 ; 42 L. T. 481 ; 28 W. R. 584 678 
 
 Macbeth v. Ashley (1874),"L. R. 2 Sc. App. 352, Sco. 218, 233, 234 
 
 V. Chislett, [1910] A. C. 220 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 376 .. .. 94 
 
 MoCalmont v. Rankin (1853), 2 De G. M. & G. 403 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 
 
 554; 95R. R. 151 570 
 
 McCausland v. O'Callaghan, [1904] 1 Ir. R. 376, Ir 174 
 
 Macclesfield's (Lord) Case (1725), 16 State Trials 1389 .. .. 73 
 
 MaoDougall v. Paterson (1861), 11 C. B. 766 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 27 ; 
 
 2 L. M. & P. 681 ; 6 Ex. 337 n. ; 15 Jur. 1108 ; 87 R. R. 
 
 869 4,117,428,437 
 
 Mace ■». Cadell (1774), Cowp. 232 86 
 
 — ^ V. Philcox (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 600 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 124 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 680 ; 9 L. T. 766 ; 12 W. R. 670 633 
 
 Macey w. McKenzie (1903), 67 J. P. 261 187 
 
 McEwen v. West London Wharves, &c. Co. (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 
 
 655 374 
 
 Macfarlane v. Lord Advocate [1894] A. C. 307 108 
 
 McGregor v. Deal, &c. Ry. Co. (1853), 18 Q. B. 618 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 69 ; 7 Rly. Cas. 227 ; 17 Jur. 21 ; 88 R. R. 715 .. .. 672 
 
 McHenry, .Ba;. JJ. (1883), 24 Ch. D. 35, C. A 228 
 
 M'Inany v. Hildreth, [1897] 1 Q. B. 600 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 376 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 463 ; 61 J. P. 325 600 
 
 Mcintosh, iJe (1892), 61 L.J. Q.B. 164 682 
 
 Maclver v. Burns, [1895] 2 Ch. 630 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 73 L. T. 
 
 39;44W.R.40 267 
 
 Mackay, Exp. (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 643 ; 42 L. J. Bank. 68 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 828 ; 21 W. R. 664 212 
 
 McKinnon v. Penson (1854), 9 Ex. 609 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 513 725 
 
 Mackonochie v. Martin (1881), 6 A. C. 424, H. L 60 
 
 McLean v. Nichol (1861), 7 Jur. IS. S. 999 ; 4 L. T. 863 ; 9 W. R. 
 
 §11 513 
 
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IXXX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PA&E 
 
 McLean v. Prichard (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 285 ; 58 L. T. 337 ; 36 
 
 W. E. 508 120 
 
 Macleary D. Tate, [1906] A. C. 24 204 
 
 Macleod v. Att.-Gen. for N.S.W., [1891] A. C. 455 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 
 
 55 ; 65 L. T. 321, P. C. 257 
 
 McManus v. Cooke (1887), 35 Ch. D. 681 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 56 
 
 L. T. 900 ; 35 W. R. 754 ; 51 J. P. 708 455 
 
 M 'Master v. Lomax (1835), 2 Myl. & K. 32 ; 4 L. J. Ch. 28 .. 51 
 
 MacPhail u. Phillips, [1904] 1 Ir. R. 159, Ir 590 
 
 McQueen v. Jackson, [1903] 2 K. B. 163 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 606 ; 
 
 88 L. T. 871 ; 1 L. G. R. 601 ; 67 J. P. 353 607 
 
 Macrow t». G-. W. Ry. Co. (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 300 .. ..565 
 
 McSlaraith v. Dublin, &c. Ry. Co. (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 139 .. 374 
 McAVilliam v. Adams (1852), 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 136 .. .. 62 
 
 McWilliams, Ex p. (1803), 1 Sch. & Lef. 169, Ir 100 
 
 Maddison v. Alderson (1883), 8 App. Cas. 473 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 737 ; 49 L. T. 303 ; 31 W. R. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 . . 454, 455 
 Madell V. Thomas, [1891] 1 Q. B. 230 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 9 ; 39 W. R. 280 209,212 
 
 Madrazo v. Willes (1820), 3 B. & Ad. 353 ; 22 R. R. 422 .. 266 
 Magdalen College Case (1615), 11 Rep. 71b-73a .. 207, 245, 252 
 Hospital V. Knotts (1879), 4 App. Cas. 324 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 
 
 579 ; 40 L. T. 466 ; 27 W. R. 682 373, 375 
 
 Maggi, Re (1882), 20 Ch. D. 545 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 560 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 362; 30 W.R. 729 174 
 
 Magnet, The (1875), L. R. 4 A. & E. 417 ; 44 L. J. Adm..l .. 359 
 Main v. Stark (1890), 15 A. C. 388 ; 59 L. J. P. C. 68 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 10 382 
 
 Makin V. Watkinson (1870), L. R. 6 Ex. 25 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 33; 
 
 23 L. T. 592 ; 19 W. R. 286 634 
 
 Maleverer t;. Redshaw (1670), 1 Mod. 35 701 
 
 Malins v. Freeman (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 395 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 212 ; 
 
 44R. R. 737 373 
 
 Mallan v. May (1844), 13 M. & W. 511 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 48 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 19; 63R. R. 708 4 
 
 Manchester (Mayor) v. Lyons (1883), 22 Ch. D. 277 .. ..295 
 
 Manley v. St. Helens Co. (1858), 2 H. & N. 840 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 
 
 159 ; 115 R. R. 842 635 
 
 Mann V. Nurse (1901), 17 T. L. R. 569 180 
 
 Manning i». Lunn (1845), 2 Car. & K. 13 622 
 
 V. Phelps (1854), 10 Ex. 59 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 62 ; 102 R. R. 
 
 475 297 
 
 Mansel v. Cogham, [1905] 1 Ch. 568 ; 74 L. J. Ch. 327 ; 92 
 
 L. T. 230 626 
 
 Mansell v. R. (1857), 8 E. & B. 54 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 4 ; Dears. & 
 
 B. C. C. 375; 112R. R. 468 543 
 
 Mantle v. Jordan, [1897] 1 Q. B. 248 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 284; 75 
 
 L. T. 552 ; 61 J. P. 119 ; 18 C. C. C. 467 523 
 
 Manton v. Tabois (1885), 30 Ch. D. 92 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 1008 ; 53 
 
 L. T. 289 ; 33 W. R. 832 .. .. .. ■.. .. 59Q 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Maple & Co. V. Junior A. & N. Stores (1882), 21 Ch. D. 369; 52 
 
 L. J. Oh. 67 ; 47 L. T. 589 ; 31 W. R. 70 131 
 
 March, Re, Manderw. Hams (1884), 27 Ch. D. 166 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 
 
 143; 51 L. T. 380 ; 32 W. R. 241 155, 385 
 
 Margate Pier Go. v. Hannam (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 266 ; 22 R. R. 
 
 378 665 
 
 Maria, The (1839), 1 W. Rob. 95 619 
 
 Marianna Flora, The (1826), 11 Wheat. 1 272 
 
 Marine Mansions Co., Re (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 601 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 113 669 
 
 Market Harborough v. Kettering (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 308 ; 42 
 
 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 28 L. T. 446 ; 21 W. R. 737 .. .. 90 
 
 Markham v. Stanford (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 376 ; 8 L. T. 277 .. 678 
 Marks v. Benjamin (1839), 5 M. & W. 565 ; 9 L. J. M. C. 20 ; 
 
 3 Jur. 1194 ; 52 R. R. 839 499 
 
 Marlborough, Re Duke of, [1894] 2 Ch. 133 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 471 ; 
 
 70 L. T. 814 ; 42 W. R. 456 454 
 
 Marsden, Ex p. (1876), 2 Ch. D. 786 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 141 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 700 ; 24 W. R. 714 645 
 
 V. Meadows (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 80 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 536 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 301; 29W. R. 816 174,212 
 
 V. Saville Foundry (1878), 3 Ex. D. 203; 26 W. R. 784 .. 17 
 
 Marsh v. Higgins (1850), 9 C. B. 551 ; 1 L. M. & R 253 ; 19 
 
 L. J. C. P.297; 82R. R. 436 388,397 
 
 MarshaU v. Berridge (1882), 19 Ch. D. 233 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 329; 
 
 45 L. T. 599 ; 30 W. R. 93 ; 46 J. P. 279 511 
 
 V. Bowen (1845), 7 M. & Gr. 188 ; 8 Scott N. R 899 ; 1 
 
 Lut. Reg. Cas. 278 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 129 ; 9 Jur. 164 ; 66 
 
 R. R. 700 165, 374 
 
 V. Exeter (Bp.) (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 820; 31 L. J. C. P. 
 
 262 532 
 
 i;. James (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 281 610 
 
 V. Martin (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 239 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 85 ; 21 
 
 L. T. 788 ; 18 W. R. 378 313 
 
 V. NichoUs (1852), 18 Q. B. 882 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 343 ; 16 
 
 Jur. 1155 ; 88 R. R. 822 238 
 
 V. Pitman (1833), 9 Ring. 601 ; 2 M. & Scott 745 ; 35 
 
 R. R. 630 229 
 
 V. UUeswater Co. (1863), L. R. 7 Q. B. 171 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 41 ; 25 L. T. 793 ; 20 W. R. 144 724 
 
 Marshalsea Case (1613), 10 Rep. 73a 39 
 
 Marson V. Lund (1849), 13 Q. B. 664 428 
 
 Martin, Ex p. (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 212, 491 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 667 ; 
 
 28W. R. 143 624 
 
 w. Ford (1793), 5 T. R. 101 494 
 
 V. Hemming (1854), 10 Ex. 478 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 3 ; 102 
 
 R. R. 686 .. .. 52 
 
 V. Maoonochie (1868), L. R. 2 P. C. 365 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 
 
 19 L. T. 503 ; 17 W. R. 187, P. C 647 
 
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Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Mary Clark Home v. Anderson, [1904] 2 K. B. 645 ; 73 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 806 ; 91 L.>T. 457 ; 20 T. L. E. 626 99 
 
 Mason v. Aird (1882), 51 L. J. Q. B. 244 ; 30 W. R. 522 .. 414 
 
 j;. Barker (1843), 1 C; & K. 100 670 
 
 Masper v. Brown (1876), 1 C. P. D. 97 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 203 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 254 ; 24 W. R. 369 .. 362 
 
 Masserene (Viscount) v. Inland Revenue, [1900] 2 Jr. R. 138, Ir. 509 
 Massey v. Burton (1858), 2 H. & N. 597 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 101 ; 3 
 
 Jur. N.S. 1130; 115 R. R. 714 217 
 
 I). Johnson (1810), 12 Bast 67 611 
 
 V. Morris, [1894] 2 Q. B. 412 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 185 ; 70 L. 'I'. 
 
 873 ; 42 -W. R. 638 ; 58 J. P. 673 192, 490 
 
 V: Sladen (1868), L. R. 4 Ex. 13 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 34 .. .. 608 
 
 Masters, Re (1869), 33 L. J. Q. B. 146 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 733 .. 82 
 
 V. Child (1698), 3 Salk. 66 216 
 
 Mather v. Brown (1876), 1 C. P.'D. 596 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 547 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 869 ; 24 W. R. 736 ' 30,651 
 
 V. Fraser (1856), 2 K. & J. 536 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 361 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 900; 110 R. R. 350 174 
 
 V. Scott (1837), 2 Keen 172 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 300 ; 44 R. R. 229 215 
 
 Mathers u. Penfold, [1915] 1 K. B. .514 96 
 
 Mathieson v. Harrod (1868), L. R. 7 Eq. 270 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 139 ; 
 
 19 L. T. 629 ; 17 W. R. 99 651 
 
 Mattison v. Hart (1854), 14 C. B. 385 ; 2 C. L. R. 314 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 108 ; 18 Jur. 380 ; 98 R. R. 668 5 
 
 Maurice v. Marsden (1850), 19 L. J. C. V\ 152 711 
 
 May, Ex p. (1862), 2 B. & S. 426 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 161 . . . . 342 
 V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1873), L. R. 7 Q. B. 364 ; L. R. 8 Q. B. 
 
 26 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; 26 L. T. 17 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 620 7,501 
 
 Mayer -y. Harding (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 410 ; 16 L. T. 429 ; 15 
 
 W. R. 813; 9B. &S. 27n 674 
 
 Mayfair Property Co., Be, [1898] 2 Ch. 28 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 337 .. 39 
 Mayhew v. Wardley (1803), 14 C. B. N. S. 550 ; 8 L. T. 504 
 
 353 492 547 
 Mayor t;. Collins (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 361 ; 59 L. J. Q B. 199; 62 ' 
 
 L. T. 326 ; 88 W. R. 349 166 
 
 Mecca,- The (1894), 64 L.J. P. D. & A. 40 278 
 
 Meeking w. Meekiug, [1916] W. N. 367 .. .. •.. ..160 
 
 Meggeson V. Groves, [1917] 1 Ch. 158 70 
 
 Melliss V. Shirley Loc. Bd. (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 446 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q..B. 143 4 53 L. T. 810 ; 24 W. R. 187 ; 50 J. P. 214 .. 671, 
 
 688, 697 
 Melson, Be, [1906] 1 Ch. 841 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 509 ; 94 L. T. 641 ; 
 
 54 W. R. 468 ; 13 Mans. 190 592 
 
 Mercantile Bank v. Gladstone (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 233 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Ex.130 678 
 
 Mercer v. Denhe, [1904] 2 Ch. 534 ; [1905] 2 Ch. 538 ; 74 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 723 55 
 
 - — V. Liverpool, &c. Ry. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 128 .. .. 172 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. ' Ixxxiii 
 
 Mercers' Co. «. Bowker (1725), 1 Stra. 639 : 4^59 
 
 Merchant Taylors v. Truscott (1856), 11 Ex. 855 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 
 
 173 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 356 823 
 
 Meredith v. Holman (1847), 16 M. & W. 798 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 126 ; 
 
 73R. R. 718 469 
 
 Merle, The (1874), 31 L. T. 447 8 
 
 Merrick v. Liverpool Corp., [1910] 2 Ch. 449 ; 79 L. J. Ch. 751; 
 
 103 L. T. 399; 74 J. P. 445 ; 8 L. G. R. 966 708 
 
 Merry weather w. Nixon (1799), 8 T. R. 186 354 
 
 Mersey Docks w. Cameron (1864), 11 H. L. C. 443 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 
 
 22 ; 12 L. T. 643 ; 13 W. R. 1069 ; 20 C. B. N. S. 50 ; 11 
 
 Jur. N. S. 746 246,247 
 
 V. Gibbs (1866), L. R. 1 H. L. 93 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 12 
 
 Jur. 571 ; 14 L. T. 677, H. L 145,629 
 
 V. Henderson (1888), 13 App. Gas. 595 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 152 ; 
 
 59 L. T. 697 ; 37 W. R. 449 ' .. .. 423 
 
 V. Lucas (1883), 8 App. Cas. 891 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 4 ; 51 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 116 ; 49 L. T. 781 ; 32 W. R. 34; 48 J. P. 212 
 
 246, 289, 325 
 
 V. Turner, [1893] A. C. 468, H. L 6 
 
 Messon v. Alcard (1853), 8 Ex. 260 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 45 .. .. 19 
 
 Metrop. Asylums District v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 ; 50 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; 44 L. T. 653 ; 29 W. R. .617 ; 45 J. P. 664, 
 
 H. L 589,630 
 
 Metrop. Board «. MacCarthy (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 243 ; 43 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 385 : 31 L. T. 182 ; 23 W. R. 115, H. L 172 
 
 V. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 192 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 
 
 172 ; 19 L. T. 744 ; 17 W. R. 416 631 
 
 V. Steed (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 447 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 24 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 612 ; 30 W. R. 891 423 
 
 Metrop. Ry. v. Fowler, [1893] A. C. 416 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 553 ; 69 
 
 L. T. 390 ; 42 W. R. 270 ; 57 J. P. 756, H. L 591 
 
 Metrop. Water Board v. Solomon, [1908] 2 Ch. 214 ; 77 L. J. Ch. 
 
 520 ; 98 L. T. 712 ; 72 J. P. 259 ; 6 L. G. R. 594 .. .. 630 
 
 Mette V. Mette (1859), 1 Sw. &jTr. 416 ; 28 L. J. P. 117 .. 256 
 
 Mew, Re (1862), 31 L. J. Bank. 89 ; 10 W. R. 790 .. .. 51 
 
 Michell V. Brown (1858), 1 E. & E. 267 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 53 ; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S. 707 ; 117 R. R. 206 334,335 
 
 Micklethwait, lie (1855), 11 Ex. 452 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 19 ; 105 R. R. 
 
 614 504 
 
 Middlesex JJ. v. R. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 757 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 509 ; 
 
 51 L. T. 513 ; 48 J. P. 104 ; 33 W. R. 49 ; 15 Cox C. C. 542 . . 75 
 Middleton v. Chichester (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 152 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 237 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 173 ; 19 W. R. 299, 369 371 
 
 Midland Ry. Co. v. Pye (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 179 ; 30 L. J. 0. P. 
 
 314 ; 4 L. T. 510 ; 9 W. R. 658 9,382 
 
 V. Withington Loc. Bd. (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 788 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 689 ; 49 L. T. 489 ; 47 J. P. 789 414 
 
 Mighell V. Sultan of Johore (1893), 63 L. J. Q. B. 593 . . .. 263 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Ixxxiv TABLl; OV CASES. 
 
 PJGK 
 
 Migotti V. Colvill (1878), 4C. P. D. 233 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 695 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 747 ; 27 W. K. 744 ; 14 Cox C. C. 305 .. .. 606, 610 
 
 Milch V. Frankau, [1909] 2 K. B. 100 608 
 
 Mile End Guardians v. Hoare, [1903] 2 K. B. 483 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 
 
 651 ; 89 li. T. 276 ; 67 J. P. 395 ; 1 L. G. R. 732 .. .. 492 
 
 Miles V. Bough (1843), 3 Q. B. 845 ; 3 G. & D. 119 : 3 Bly. Cas. 
 
 668 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 74 ; 61 R. R. 409 138 
 
 V. Hatchings, [1903] 2 K. B. 715 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 775 ; 89 
 
 L. T. 420 167 
 
 MUl V. Hawker (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 92 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 177 ; 24 W. R. 348 555 
 
 Miller, He, [1893] 1 Q. B. 327 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 68 L. T. 367 ; 
 
 41 W.R. 243f57 J. P. 469; lOM.B. R.21 .. .. 133 
 
 «. Dudley JJ. (1898), 46 W. R. 606 81 
 
 V. Salomons (1853), 7 Ex. 475 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 197 6, 8, 20, 369 
 
 406, 452, 552 
 
 Miller's Case (1764), 1 W. Bl. 451 729 
 
 Mills V. Scott (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 202 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 57 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 265 ; 21 W. R. 438 617 
 
 «. Wilkins (1703), 6 Mod. 62 74 
 
 Mills' Estate, Se (1887), 34 Ch. D. 186 ; 56 L. J. Ch . 118 ; 55 L. T. 
 
 665 ; 35 W. R. 133 151,152 
 
 Milnes v. Huddersfield (Mayor of) (1886), 11 App. Cas. 511 ; 56 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 55 L. T. 617 ; 34 W. R. 761 ; 50 J. P. 670 .. 528 
 
 Milton V. Faversham (1867), 10 B. & S. 548 n 480 
 
 Minehead Loc. Bd. v. Luttrell, [1894] 2 Ch. 178 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 
 
 497; 70L. T. 446; 42 W. R. 667 364 
 
 Minet v. Leman (1855), 20 Beav. 278 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 547 ; 7 De 
 
 G. M. & G. 340 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 410, 692 ; 109 R. R. 155 150, 324 
 Minor v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1857), 1 C. B. N. S. 325 ; 26 
 
 L. J. C. P. 39 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1168 ; 28 L. T. O. S. 104 ; 107 
 
 R. R. 681 119,580 
 
 Minty V. Sylvester (1916), 84 L. J. K. B. 1982, D. C 210 
 
 Mirehouse v. Rennell (1833), 1 CI. & F. 527 ; 8 Bing. 490 ; 1 
 
 M. & Scott 683 ; 7 Bligh N. S. 241 ; 36 R. R. 139 .. .. 7 
 
 Mirfin v. Attwood (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 330 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 
 
 20 L. T. 778 ; 17 W. R. 820 ; 9 B. & S. 414 728 
 
 Mist V. Metropolitan Water Board (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 2041 .. 393 
 Mitchell V. Aberdeen Insurance Committee, [1918] W. C. & Ins. C. 
 
 206, Ct. of Sess., Sco 109 
 
 V. Crawshaw, [1903] 1 K. B. 701 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 389 ; 88 
 
 L. T. 463 ; 67 J. P. 179; 20 Cox C. C. 395 187 
 
 V. Simpson (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 183 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 355 ; 
 
 63 L. T. 405 ; .38 W. R. 565 109 
 
 Mitford Union v. Wayland Union (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 164 ; 59 
 
 L. J. M. C. 24 ; 63 L. T. 299 ; 38 W. R. 632 ; 54 J. P. 757 314 
 Mobbs V. Vandenbrande (1864), 4 B. & S. 904 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 177 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 745 ; 9 L. T. 760 ; 12 W. R. 405 ., 510 
 
 Mogg «. Hodges (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 52 638 
 
 Mohummud e;. Bareilly (1874), L. R. 1 Ind. App. 167 .. ..14 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
* * 
 
 548 
 
 R. 
 
 
 , , 
 
 685 
 
 36 
 
 
 .. 
 
 96 
 
 , 
 
 644 
 
 35 
 
 
 137, 
 
 ,139 
 
 
 160 
 
 .. 
 
 566 
 
 J. 
 
 
 ,, 
 
 520 
 
 ,, 
 
 532 
 
 ,, 
 
 385 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. IXXXV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Moir V. Waiiams, [1892] 1 Q. B. 264 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 33 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 215 ; 40 W. R. 69 ; 56 J. P. 197 
 
 Mollwo & Co. V. Court of 'Wards (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 419 
 Molton V. Camroux (1848), 4 Ex. 17 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 356 ; 80 R. 
 
 461 
 
 Monck V. Hilton (1877), 3 Ex. D. 268; 46 L. J. M. C. 163 ; 
 
 L. T. 66; 25 W. R. 373 
 
 Monkleigh, Exp. (1848), 5 D. & L. 404 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 76 
 Monks V. Jackson (1876), 1 C. P. D. 683 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 162 ; 
 
 L. T. 95 
 
 Monlc^ue, iJe, [1896] 1 Ch. 549 
 
 Montague v. Smith (1852), 17 Q. B. 688 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 73 
 Montreal (Mayor of) v. Stevens (1878), 3 App. Cas. 605 : 47 L. 
 
 P. c. 67, P.O. • :. 
 
 Montrose Peerage (1853), 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 401, H. L. 
 
 Moon V. Burden (1848), 2 Ex. 22 ; 76 R. R. 479 .. 
 
 Moore, Ex p.. In re Faithful! (1865), 14 Q. B. D. 627 ; 34 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 190; 52L.T. 376; 33W. R. 438; 2M. B. R. 52 .. 97 
 ■ V. Clench (1875), 1 Ch. D. 447 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 13; 24W. E. 169 637 
 
 V. Gamgee (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 244 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 505 ; 38 
 
 W. R. 669 681 
 
 V. Lambeth W. Works Co. (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 462 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 304 ; 55 L. T. 309 ; 34 W. R. 559 ; 50 J. P. 756 .. 726 
 V. Oxford (Bp.), [1904] A. C. 283 ; 73 L. J. P. C. 43; 90 
 
 L. T,425, H. L. 489 
 
 . — - V. Pearce's Dining, &c. Rooms (1895), 65 L. J. M. C. 7 .. 476 
 V. Smith (1859), 1 E. & E. 597 ; 28 L. J. M. 0. 126 ; 117 
 
 R. R. 363 251 
 
 Moran v. Place, [1896] P. 214 ; 65 L. J. P. D. & A. 83; 74 L. T. 
 
 661; 44W. R. 593 102 
 
 Morant v. Taylor (1876), 1 Ex. D. 188 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 78 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 139 ; 24 W. R. 461 74 
 
 Morden v. Porter (1860), 7 C. B. N. S. 641 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 213 ; 
 
 1 L. T. 403 ; 6 W. R. 262 182 
 
 Moreton v. Holt (1855), 10 Ex. 707 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 169 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 215 ; 102 R. R. 789 238 
 
 Morgan v. Bowles, [1894] 1 Q. B. 230 ; 63 L. .J. Q. B. 84 ; 42 
 
 W. R. 269 319 
 
 V. Brown (1836), 4 A. & E. 516 ; 6 N. & M. 57 ; 1 H. & W. 
 
 717 ; 43 R. R. 422 ; 5 L, J. M. C. 77 ; 43 R. R. 422 .. 353 
 
 — V. Crawshay (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 304 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 202 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 889; 20 W. R. 554, H. L 535, 672 
 
 V. Davies (1878), 3 C. P. D. 260 ; 39 L. T. 60 ; 26 W. R. 816 604 
 
 V. Edwards (1860), 5 H. & N. 416 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 379 ; 29 
 
 L. J. M. C. 108 655,674,675,684 
 
 V. London Gen. Omnibus Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 832 ; 52 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 352 ; 51 L. T. 213 ; 32 W. R. 759 ; 48 J. P. 603 . . 685 
 ■ V. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 97 ; 38 L. J. C. PI 
 
 87 528 
 
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Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Morgan v. Palmer (1824), 2 B. & C. 729 ; 4 D. & R. 283 ; 2 L. J. 
 
 (0. S.) K. B. 145 ; 26 R. R. 537 415 
 
 V. Parry (1856), 17 0. B. 334 ; 25 L. J. 0. P. 141 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 285 ; 104 R. R. 715 660 
 
 ■;;. Thome (1841), 7 M. & W. 400 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 125 ; 9 
 
 D. P. C. 228 ; 5 Jur. 294 728,730 
 
 Morish v. Harris (1865), L. R. 1 C. P. 155 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 101 ; 
 
 12 Jur. N. S. 627 ; 14 L. T. 764 ; 14 W. R. 479 ; 1 H. & R. 
 
 358; IH. &P.305 590,594 
 
 Morisse v. Royal Brit. Bk, (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 67 ; 26 L. J. C P. 
 
 62 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 137 ; 107 R. R. 582 283, 440 
 
 Morrall v. Sutton (1844), 1 Phil. 533 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 266 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 637 ; 65 R. R. 434 98,281 
 
 Morrell u. Studd & Millington, [1913] 2 Ch. 648 43 
 
 Morris u. Baron, [1918] A. C. 1, H. L 70 
 
 V. Carnarvon C. C, [1910] 1 K. B. 840 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 670 ; 
 
 102 L. T. 524 ; 74 J. P. 201 ; 8 L. G. R. 485 .. .. 634 
 
 — v.Howden, [1897] 1Q.B. 378 496 
 
 V. Mellin (1827), 6 B. & C. 446 . . .. 378, 542, 567 
 
 ■!;. Wilson (1859), 5 Jur. N. S. 168 512 
 
 Morrison v. Gen. Steam Navig. Co. (1853), 22 L. J. Ex. 233 .. 326 
 
 V. Glover (1850), 4 Ex. 430 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 20 ; 80 R. R. 645 164 
 
 Morritt V. N. E. Ry. Co. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 302 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 289 ; 34 L. T. 940 ; 24 W. R. 386 23 
 
 Morton v. Copeland (1855), 16 C. B. 517 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 169 ; 1 
 
 Jur. N. S. 979 135 
 
 V. Palmer (1882), 51 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 45 L. T. 426 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 115 121 
 
 Mosdel v. Middleton (1673), 1 Vent. 237 701 
 
 Moses V. Parker, [1896] A. C. 245 ; 65 L. J. P. C. 18 ; 74 L. T. 
 
 112 . .. . 252 
 
 Mostyn v.' Fa.hiigB.s (1770), Cowp. 161 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 591 " '.'. 273 
 
 Motteram v. E. C. Ry. Co. (1859), 7 C B. N. S. 58 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 
 
 59 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 583 446 
 
 Mouflet V. Cole (1872), L. R. 8 Ex. 32 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 678 ; 21 W. R. 175 612 
 
 Moul V. Groenings, [1891] 2 Q. B. 443 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 715 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 327 ; 39 W. R. 691 556 
 
 Mounsey v. Ismay (1865), 3 H. & C. 486 ; 34 L. J. Ex. 52 ; 11 
 
 Jur. K. S. 141 51,579 
 
 Mount V. Taylor (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 645 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 325; 
 
 18 L. T. 476 ; 16 W. R. 866 728 
 
 Mountcashel v. O'Neill (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 937 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1030 ; 101 R. R. 458, H. L 136 
 
 Mountifield v. Ward, [1897] 1 Q. B. 326 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 246 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 202 ; 45 W. R. 288 ; 61 J. P. 216 ; 18 C. C. C. 515 .. 222 
 Mountjoy v. Wood (1856), 1 H. & N. 58 ; 108 R. R. 453 .. 249 
 
 Mousell Bros. v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 837 ; 87 
 
 L. J. K. B. 82 1.35,182,183,184,604,613 
 
 Mouysv. Leake (1799), 8 T.R. 411 .... .. .. .. 703 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii 
 
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 Moxon V. Sheppard (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 627 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 726 ; 38 W. R. 704 24,25 
 
 Moyle V. Jenkins (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 116 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 112 ; 30 
 
 W. R. 324 55 
 
 Much Waltham i-. Peram (1696), 2 Salk. 474 217 
 
 Muggeridge, iJe (1860), Johns. 625 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 288 .. ..112 
 •Muir V. Hore (1877), 47 L. J. M. C. 17 ; .37 L. T. 315 .. .. 304 
 V. Keay (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 594 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 143 ; 23 
 
 W. R.700 574 
 
 Mulkem v. Lord (1879), 4 App. Cas. 182 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 745 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 594 ; 27 W. R. 510 164,239 
 
 Mullett V. Huchison or Hutchinson (1828), 7 B. & C. 639 .. 506 
 Mulliner v. Midland Ry. Co. (1879), 11 Cli. D. 611 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 
 
 258 ; 40 L. T. 121 ; 27 W. R. 330 633 
 
 MuUins V. Collins (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 292 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 
 
 67 ; 29 L. T. 838 ; 22 W. R. 297 178,190 
 
 Mumford v. Collier (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 279 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 552 ; 
 
 38W. R. 716 703 
 
 Munday v. Asprey (1880), 13 Ch. D. 855 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 216 ; 28 
 
 W. R. 471 512 
 
 Municipal Bldg. See. v. Kent (1884), 9 App. Cas. 260; 53 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 290 ; 51 L. T. 6 ; 32 W. R. 681 ; 48 J. P. 
 
 352 164,238 
 
 Munro V. Butt (1858), 8 E. & B. 738 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1231 ; 112 
 
 R. R. 752 .. 368 
 
 Murphy, Be (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 397 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 193 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 698; 26 W. R. 536 298 
 
 Murray V. Charming Betsy (1804), 2 Cranch 64 263 
 
 V. E. I. Co. (1821), 5 B. & Ad. 204 ; 24 R. R. 325.. .. 571 
 
 V. Epsom Local Board (1896), 66 L. J. Ch. 107 .. .. 698 
 
 V. Thomiley (1846), 2 C. B. 217 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Cas. 496 ; 
 
 1 Bar. & Am. 742 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 155 ; 10 Jur. 270 ; 09 
 
 R. R. 477 64 
 
 Murtagh v. Barry (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 632 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 388 ; 
 
 38W. R. 526 152,519 
 
 Musgrove, ^x ^. (1843), 3 M. D. & D. 386 685 
 
 w. PandeUs, [1919] 2 K. B. 43, 0. A 86 
 
 Mussell V. Burch (1876), 35 L. T. 486 180 
 
 Musurus Bey v. Gadban, [1894] 2 Q. B. 352 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621 ; 
 
 71 L. T. 51 ; 42 W. R. 545 264 
 
 Mutter V. Eastern and Midlands Ry. (1888), 38 Ch. D. 92 ; 57 
 
 L. J. Ch. 315 ; 59 L. T. 117 ; 36 W. R. 401 617 
 
 Myers v. Bradford Corporation (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 306 413, 414 
 V. Veitch (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 649 ; 38 L. J. Q. B 316 ; 
 
 20 L. T. 847 ; 17 W. R. 918 567 
 
 N. 
 
 Nance, Be, [1893] 1 Q. B. 590 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 500 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 733 ; 41 W. R. 370 023 
 
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Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Nash u. Finlay (1902), 85 L. T. 682 523 
 
 National Merc. Bank, Ex p., Be Haynes (1880), 15 Ch. D. 42 ; 
 
 49 L. J, Bank. 62 ; 43 L. T. 36 ; 28 W. B 848 ; 44 J. P. 
 
 780 31,484 
 
 National Telephone Co. v. Baker, [1893] 2 Ch. 186 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 699 ; 68 L. T. 283 ; 57 J. P. 373 628 
 
 ■;;. Kineston-upon-HuU (1903), 89 L. T. 291 ; 52 W. R. 26 ; 
 
 IL. G. R. 777 413 
 
 Nelson v. Anglo- American Land Co., [1897] 1 Ch. 130; 66 
 
 L. J. Ch. 112 ; 75 L. T. 482 ; 45 W. R. 171 617 
 
 Nesbitt V. Lushington (1792), 4 T. R. 783 ; 2 R. R. 519 . . . . 577 
 
 Netherlands Steamboat Co. v. London Corporation (1904), 68 J. P. 
 
 377, C. A. .. .; 527 
 
 NethersoU v. Indig. Blind Schoor(1870), L. R. 11 Eq. 1 ; 40 
 
 L. J. Ch. 26 ; 23 L. T. 723 ; 19 W. R. 174 .. .. :. 638 
 
 Nettleton v. Burrell (1844), 8 Scott N. R. 738 ; 7M. & Gr. 35 ; 
 
 8 Jur. 1033 ; 2 D. & L. 598 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Cas. 157 ; 14 
 
 L. J. C. P. 37 ; 66 R. R. 658 26 
 
 New Eberhardt Co., Be (1889), 43 Ch. D. 118 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 73 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 301 ; 38 W. R. 97 ; 1 Meg. 441 16 
 
 New River Co. v. Johnson (1860), 2 El. & El. 435 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 
 
 93; 6Jur. N. S. 374; 8W. R. 179 172 
 
 New Sharlston Collieries v. Westmorland, [1904] 2 Ch. 443 n. ; 
 
 73L. J. Ch. 341n 627 
 
 New Windsor Corporation v. Taylor, [1899] A. C. 41 ; 68 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 87 ; 79 L. T. 450 ; 63 J. P. 164 295 
 
 Newby v. Colt's Arms Co. (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 293 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 148 ; 26 L. T. 164 ; 20 W. R. 383 119 
 
 V. Sims, [1894] 1 Q. B. 478 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 229 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 105; 58 J. P. 263 463 
 
 Newcastle Corporation v. A.-G. (1845), 12 CI. & F. 402 ; 69 
 
 R. R. Ill, H. L 156,532 
 
 V. Morris (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 661 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 4 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 569 ; 19 W. R. 26 320,546 
 
 Newington v. Cottingham (1879), 12 Ch. D. 725 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 
 
 226; 40L. T. 58 687 
 
 Newman v. Hardwioke (1838), 3 N. & P. 368 ; 7 L. J. M. C. 101 ; 
 
 8 A. &E. 124; 1 W. W. &H. 284 605,606 
 
 ■;;. Jones (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 137 ; 55 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 55 
 
 L. T. 327 ; 50 J. P. 373 190,192 
 
 Newport Bridge, Be (1859), 2 E. & E. 377 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 52 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. S. 97 ; 1 L. T. 131 4.30 
 
 Trustees, Hx p. (1849), 16 Sim. 346 ; 18. L. J. Ch. 49 ; 12 
 
 Jur. 932 ; 80 R. R. 88 617 
 
 New's Trustee v. Hunting, [1897] 1 Q. B. 607 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 554, C. A 214 
 
 Newson,i?e, ife Two Solicitors (1909), 53 Sol. Jur. 342 .. .. 438 
 
 Newton v. Boodle (1847), 3 C. B. 795 ; 4 D. & L. 664 ; 16 
 
 L. J. C. P. 135 ; 11 Jur. 148 26 
 
 V. Cowie (1827), 4 Bing. 234 ; 12 Moore 457 ; 29 R. R. 541 651 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Newton v. Ellis (1855), 5 E. & B. 115 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 1 
 
 , Jur. N. S. 850 ; 103 R. R. 396 134, 413, 586 
 
 «. Young (1805), 1 B. & P. N. R. 187 365 
 
 Nga Hoong v. R. (1857), 7 Cox. 489 ; 7 Moo. Ind. App. 72, 
 
 P. C 111,265 
 
 Niboyet v. Niboyet (1879), 4 P. D. 1 ; 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 1 ; 39 
 
 • -^ L. T. 486 ; 27 W. R. 203, C. A 256,261 
 
 NichoU V. Allen (1862), 1 B. & S. 934 ; 31 L. J/ Q. B. 283 ; 
 
 6 L. T. 699 ; 10 W. R. 741 436, 634 
 
 Nicholls V. Hall (1873), L. R. 8 0. P. 322 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 
 
 21W. R. 579 ; 28 L. T. 473 182 
 
 Nichols V. Marsland (1876), 2 Ex. D. 1 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 174 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 725 ; 25 W. R. 173 674 
 
 Nicholson v. Ellis (1859), E. B. & E. 267 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; 
 
 5 Jur. N. S. 385 ; 113 R. R. 639 348 
 
 V. Fields (1862), 7 H. & N. 810 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 233 ; 10 
 
 W. R. 304 76, 464, 466, 500, 504 
 
 V. Holborn Assessment Committee (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 161 ; 
 
 56 L. J. M. C. 54 ; 55 L. T. 775 ; 35 W. R. 230 ; 51 J. P. 
 
 341 247 
 
 NicoU V. Fenning (1882), 19 Ch. D. 258 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 166 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 738 ; 30 W. R. 95 107 
 
 Nina, The (1867), L. R. 2 P.^C. 38 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 17 ; 17 L. T. 
 
 585 ; 5 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 60 278 
 
 Nind w. Arthur (1849), 7 D. & L. 252 26 
 
 Nitro-phosphate Co. v. London, &c. Docks Co. (1878), 9 Ch. D. 
 
 503 ; 39 L. T. 433; 27 W. R. 267 724 
 
 Nixon V. Phillips (1852), 7 Ex. 192 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 88 .. 9, 304 
 
 Noble «. Durell (1789), 3 T. R. 271 540 
 
 ■ — - u. Gadban (1855), 5 H. L. Cas. 504 388 
 
 Norcutt«. Dodd (1841), Cr. & Ph. 100 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 296; 64 
 
 R. R. 224 112, 146 
 
 Norden «. James (1777), 2 Dick. 533 258 
 
 Nordenfelt, Ee, [1895] 1 Q. B. 151 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 182 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 565 71 
 
 Norman, Be, [1893] 2 Q. B. 369 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 674.. 405 
 
 Normandy, The, [1904] P. 187 ; 73 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 90 , 
 
 L. T. 351 ; 52 W. R. 634; 20 T. L. R. 239 113 
 
 Norris, iJe (1888), 5 Morrell 111 267,580 
 
 V. Carrington (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 10 674 
 
 «. Crocker (1851), 13 Howard 429 333 
 
 North, Be, [1895] 2 Q. B. 264 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 694 ; 72 L. T. 854 ; 
 
 59 J. P. 724 ; 2 Mans. 326 608,610 
 
 N. Central Wagon Co. v. Manchester S. & L. Ry. Co. (1888), 32 
 
 Ch. D. 477 ; 35 Ch. D. 191 ; 13 App. Cas. 554 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 
 
 780 ; 56 Id. 609 ; 58 Id. 219 ; 59 L. T. 730 ; 37 W. R. 305, 
 
 HI ..97 
 
 N. Eastern Breweries ^'. Gibson (1904), 68 J. P. 356 ... .. 195 
 N. Eastern Ry. v. Hastings (Lord), [1900] A. C. 260, H. L. .. 132 
 
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XC TABLE OP OASES. 
 
 FAGE 
 
 N. Eastern Ry. Co. v. Wanless (1874),. L. R. 7 H. L. 12; 43 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 185;, 30 L. T. 275 ; 22 W.R. 56 635 
 
 N. London Ry. Oo. v. Metrop. B. of Works (1859), Johns. 405 ; 
 
 28 L. J. Oh. 909; 5 Jur. N. S. 1121 .. .. .. ,. 530 
 
 N. Metrop. Tramways Oo. v. London C. 0., [1898] 2 Oh. 145 ; 
 
 67 L. J. Ch. 449 ; 78 L. T. 711 ; 46 W. R. 554 ; 62 J. P. 488 510 
 N. of England Ry. ■;;. Langbaurgh (1871), 24 L. T. 544 .. .. 131 
 
 N. StaflFordshire Ry. Oo. v. Dale (1858), 8 E. & B, 836 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 M. 0. 147 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 631 ; 112 R. R. 800 .. .. 635 
 
 V. Waters (1913), L. G. R. 289 719 
 
 N. Wales Gunpowder Oo., Be, [1892] 2 Q. B. 220 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 625 ; 67 L. T. 178 ; 40 W. R. 561 289 
 
 Northampton Oorporation v, Ellen (1904), 70 L. J. K.B. 329 .. 679 
 Northumberland (Duke) v. Inl. R«v., [1911] 2 K. B. 343; 80 
 L. J. K, B. 875 ; 104 L. T. 506 ; reversed on appeal, 81 
 
 L. J. K. B. 240, 0. A 504 
 
 Northwich v. St. Pancras (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 164 ; 58 L. J.M. 0. 
 
 73 ; 60 L. T. 444 ; 37 W. R. 206 ; 53 J. P. 196 .. 313,314 
 Norton v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Oo. (1879), 9 Ch. D. 623 ; 11 Ch. D. 
 
 118 ; 13 Oh. D. 268 ; 40 L. T. 597 ; 27 W. R. 773 .. .. 526 
 
 u. Simmes (1614), Hob. 12 701 
 
 Noseworthy v. Buckland (1873), L. R. 9 0. P. 233; 43 L. J. 0. P. 
 
 27; 29 L. T. 675 ; 22 W. R. 155 ; 2 Hop. & 0. 127 .. .. 653 
 
 Notley «;. Buck (1828), 8 B. & 0. 164 7 
 
 Novello V. Sudlow (1852), 12 0. B. 177 ; 21 L. J. 0. P. 169 ; 16 
 
 Jur. 689 ; 92 R. R. 674 716 
 
 V. Toogood (1823), 1 B. & 0. 554 ; 2 D. & R. 833 ; 25 R. R. 
 
 507 205 
 
 Nowell V. Worcester (Mayor) (1854), 9 Ex. 457 ; 2 p. L. R. 981 ; 
 
 23 L. J. Ex. 139 ; 18 Jur. 64 ; 96 R. R. 793 672 
 
 Nugent V. Smith (1876), 1 0. P. D. 423 ; 44 L": J. 0. P. 697 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 827 ; 25 W. R. 117 672 
 
 Nunn V. Fabian (1865), L. R. 1 Oh. 35 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 140 .. 455 
 
 V. Tyson, [1901J 2 K. B. 487 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 854; 85 L. T. 
 
 123; 50W. R. 16 102 
 
 Nunn's Estate, ^e, [1894] llr. R. 252, Ir 505 
 
 Nuttall ^;. Pickering, [1913] 1 K. B. 14 125 
 
 Nutter u. Moorhouse (1904), 68 J. P. 134 13 
 
 Nutton V. Wilson (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 744 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 443 ; 37 
 
 W. R. 522 ; 53 J. P. 644 496 
 
 O. 
 
 Oakes v. Turquand (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 325 ; 36 L. J. Oh. 949 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 808, H. L 376 
 
 Oaten v. Auty, [1919] 2 K. B. 278 676 
 
 Oath before Justices (1611), 12 Rep. 131 624 
 
 O'Connor v. Bradshaw (1850), 5 Ex. 882 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 26 .. 213 
 Odell, Ex p^ (1879), 10 Oh. D. 76 ; 48 L. J. Bank. 1 ; 39 L. T 
 
 333 ; 27 W. R. 274 , 21? 
 
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 FAGE 
 
 .. 12 
 
 108 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 ..38, 
 
 281, 294 
 
 P. 259 ; 
 
 30 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 201 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 69 
 
 ., 
 
 .. 607 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. XCl 
 
 Oelkers ». Ellis, [1914] 2 K. B. 139 
 
 O'Flaherty v, McDowell (1852), 6 H. L. Cas. 142 ; 
 
 61 
 
 Ogden V. Benas (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 513 ; 43 L. J. C. 
 
 L. T. 683 ; 22 W. R. 805 
 
 OgUvie V. Foljambe (1817), 3 Mer. 53 ; 17 R. R. 13 
 
 O'Hara v. Elliott (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B. 317 
 
 Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka Jemverks Aktiebolag, [1914] 1 K. B. 
 
 715 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 561, C. A 120 
 
 Oldfieldw. Dodd (1853), 8 Ex. 578; 22 L. J. Ex. 144; 17 Jur. 
 
 261 ; 91 R. R. 641 424 
 
 Oliver v. N. E. Ry. Co. (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 409 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 198 635 
 
 O'Loghlen, Exp. (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 406 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 28 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 878 ; 19 W. R. 459 267,343 
 
 Onslow V. Inland Revenue (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 465 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 556 ; 63 L. T. 513 ; 38 W. R. 728 & [1891] 1 Q. B. 239 ; 60 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; 64 L. T. 211 ; 39 W. R. 373 .. 97,509 
 
 Oram v. Brearey (1877), 2 Ex. D. 346 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 481 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 475 ; 25 W. R. 695 235,238 
 
 O'Reilly V. Thompson (1791), 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 273 ; 2 R. R. 41 . . 455 
 Oriental Bank, Be, Exp. the Crown (1884), 54 L. J. Ch. 327 .. 249 
 V. Wright (1880), 5 App. Cas. 842 ; 50 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 177 .. .. 504 
 
 Orme's Case (1872), L. R. 8 C. P. 281 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 146 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 901 ; 21 W. R. 637 64 
 
 Ormskirk Union?;. Chorlton Union, [1903] 2K. B. 498 ; 72 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 721 ; 89 L. T. 256 ; 1 L. G. R. 692 99 
 
 V. Lancaster Union (1913), 107 L. T. 620 99 
 
 Ornamental Woodwork Co. v. Brown (1863), 2 H. & C. 63 ; 32 
 
 L. J. Ex. 190 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 578 ; 8 L. T. 306 ; 11 W. R. 
 
 600 7 
 
 Osborne v. Amalgamated Socy. of Ry. Servants, [1911] 1 Ch. 540 ; 
 
 80 L. J. Ch. 315 ; 104 L. T. 267 702, 704 
 
 V. Mihiian (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 471 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 263 ; 56 
 
 L. T. 808 ; 35 W. R. 397 ; 51J. P. 427 713 
 
 Oscar 11., The, [1919] P. 171 276,544,677 
 
 O'Shanassy v. Joachim (1876), 1 App. Cas. 82 ; 45 L. J. P. C. 
 
 19 ; 34 L. T. 265 ; 24 W. R. 792 157 
 
 O'Shea v. Wood, [1891] P. 237, 286 ; 60 L. J. P. 82 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 30 155, 156 
 
 Osraerod v. St. George's Iron Works, [1908] 1 Ch. 505, C. A. .. 617 
 
 Owen, ife, [1894] 3 Ch. 225 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 749 372 
 
 V. Body (1836), 5 A. & E. 28 ; 5 L. J. K. B. 191 ; 2 H. & W. 
 
 31; 6N.&M. 448 554 
 
 V. Burnett (1834), 2 Cr. & M. 335 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 76 ; 4 Tyr. 
 
 133; 39R. R. 794 86 
 
 y. Henshaw (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 267 26 
 
 V. Saunders (1697), 1 Ld. Rayxn, 158 289 
 
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xcii talBle of cases. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Owens V. Jones (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 469 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 159; 
 
 18 L. T. 357 ; 16 W. E. 932 ; 9 B. & S. 243 .. 308, 334 
 
 Owen's Patent, 5e (1898), 79 L. T. 458 389 
 
 Oxford Corporation v. Wildgoose (1690), 3 Lev. 293 .. .. 62 
 
 Pacific, The (1864), 33 L. J. P. M. & A. 120; B. & L. 243 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. nil ; 10 L. T. 541 99 
 
 , [1898] P. 170 ; 67 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 79 L. T. 125 ; 46 
 
 W. R. 686 .. .- 268 
 
 Paddingfcon Burial Board v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 
 
 (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 224 246 
 
 Paddington Union v. Westminster Union, [1915] 2 K. B. 644 .. 383 
 Padstow Assur. Assoc, He (1882), 20 Ch. D. 137 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 
 
 344 ; 45 L. T. 774 ; 30 W. R. 326 555,091 
 
 Page, lie (1876), 2 Ch. D. 323 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 1 ; 34 L. T. 638 ; 
 
 24W. R. 502 227 
 
 V. Bennett (1855), 2 GiflF. 117 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 398 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 
 419;8W. R. 339 392 
 
 V. Pearce (1841), 8 M. & W. 667 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 434 .. 609 
 
 Paget V. Foley (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 679; 5 L. J. C. P. 258 ; 3 
 
 Scott 120 ; 2 Hodges 32 ; 42 R. R. 698 303 
 
 Pain V. Boughtwood (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 353 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 45 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 284 ; 38 W. B. 428 ; 54 J. P. 469 ; 16 Cox C. C. 
 
 747 137, 186 
 
 Paine, Be, Ex p. 'Read, [1897] 1 Q. B. 122; 66 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; 
 
 75 L. T. 316 ; 45 W. R. 190; 3 Mans. 309 114 
 
 Painter v. Liverpool Gas Co. (1836), 3 A. & E. 433 ; 5 L. J. M. C. 
 
 108; 6N. &M. 736; 2H. & W. 233; 42R. R. 423 .. 641 
 
 Palliser v. Dale, [1897] 1 Q. B. 257 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 236 ; 76 L. T. 
 
 14 ; 45 W. R. 291, C. A 164,239 
 
 Pallister v. Gravesend (1850), 9 C. B. 774 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 358 ; 
 
 82R. R. 522 530,704 
 
 Palmer v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 259 .. .. 680 
 
 - — V. Snow, [1900] 1 Q. B. 725 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 356 ; 82 L. T. 
 
 199 ; 48 W. R. 351 ; 64 J. P. 342 584 
 
 V. Thatcher (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 346 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 58 ; 37 
 
 L. T. 784 ; 26 W. R. 314 11,301 
 
 Palmer's Trade Mark, In re (1882), 21 Ch. D. 47 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 
 
 673 ; 46 L. T. 787 ; 46 J. P. 772 369 
 
 Pape V. Pape (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 76 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 58 L. T. 
 
 399 ; 36 W. R. 125 ; 52 J. P. 181 470 
 
 Paradine v. Jane (1647), Aleyn 26 674 
 
 Parbury, Ex p. (1861), 3 De G. F. & J. 80 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 513 ; 7 
 
 Jur. N. S. 503 ; 4 L. T. 62 ; 9 W. R. 470 .. .. 19, 374 
 
 Pardo V. Bingham a869), L. R. 4 Ch. 735 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 170 ; 20 
 
 L. T. 464 ; 17 W. R. 419 399 
 
 Parish «. Sleeman (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 96 622 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. xem 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Park Gate Iron Co. v. Coatea (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 634 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 317 ; 22 L. T. 658 ; 18 W. R. 928 .. 680, 683, 684 
 
 Parker, Be (1888), 21 Ch.D. 408 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 159 ; 47 L. T. 63 ; 
 
 31 W. R. 212 ; 47 J. P. 36, 516 692 
 
 V. Adler, [1899] 1 Q. B. 20 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 79 L. T. 381 ; 
 
 47 W. R. 142 ; 62 J. P. 772 ; 19 C. C. C. 191 .. .. 186 
 V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1844), 7 M. & G. 253 ; 7 Scott N. R. 835 ; 
 
 13 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 8 Jur. 194 528 
 
 V. Inge (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 584 ; 55 L. J. M. C. 149 ; 55 L. T. 
 
 300; 51J. P. 20 555 
 
 V. London C. C, [1904] 2 K. B. 501 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 561 ; 
 
 90 L. T. 415 ; 52 W. R. 476 ; 68 J. P. 239 ; 2 L. G. R. 662 ; 
 
 20T. L. R. 271 413 
 
 V. Talbot, [1905] 2 Ch. 643 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 8 ; 93 L. T. 522 ; 
 
 54W. R. 132; 4L. G. R. 27; 70 J. P. 43 133 
 
 V. Taswell (1858), 2 De G. & J. 559 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 812 .. 569 
 
 Parker, Gaines & Co. v. Turpin, [1918] 1 K. B. 358 .. .. 47 
 
 Parkinson V. Potter (1885), 16 Q. B. I). 161 205 
 
 Parkyns v. Preist (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 313 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 148 ; 50 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 648; 30 W. R. 13; 45 J. P. 751 481 
 
 Parlement Beige, The (1880), 5 P. D. 197 ; 42 L. T. 273 ; 28 
 
 W. R. 642 263,264 
 
 Parrish «. Hackney Corp. (1912), 55 S.J. 670 558 
 
 Parry v. Croydon Gas Co. (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 568 ; 9 L. T. 
 
 694 ; 12 W. R. 212 ; 11 C. B. N. S. 579 .. 327, 335, 504 
 
 Parsons v. Brand (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 110 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 189 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 479 ; 38 W. R. 388 16 
 
 Partheriche V. Mason (1774), 2 Chit. 658 631 
 
 Partington V. A.-G. (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 100 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 205, 
 
 H. L 504 
 
 Partridg v. Naylor (1596), Cro. Eliz. 480 .. .. 354, 356, 717, 718 
 
 Partridge v. Mallandaine (1880), 18 Q. B. D. 276 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 251 ; 56 L. T. 203 ; 35 W. R. 276 555 
 
 Pascal, Bx p. (1876), 1 Ch. D. 509 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 81 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 10; 24W. R. 263 267 
 
 Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle U. D. C, [1898] A. C. 387 ; 67 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 635 ; 78 L. T. 569 ; 62 J. P. 628 . . . . 709, 723 
 
 Passey v. Oxford L. B. (1879), 43 J, P. 622 589 
 
 Patent Bread Co., Be (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 289 ; 26 L. T. 228 ; 20 
 
 W. R. 347 669 
 
 Paterson «. Poe (1883), 8 App. Cas. 678 394 
 
 Pathe Freres Cinema, Ltd. v. United Electric Theatres, Ltd., 
 
 [1914] 3 K B. 1253, C. A 141 
 
 Patorni v. CampbeU (1843), 12 M. & W. 277 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 85 .. 271 
 Patten v. Rhymer (1860), 3 E. & E. 1 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 189 ; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1030 ; 2 L. T. 352 ; 8 W. R. 496 .. .. 350, 361 
 
 Patterson v. Patterson (1870), 2 P. & M. 189 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 
 
 5 ; 23 L. T. 568 ; 19 W. R. 232 100 
 
 Pattison D. Bankes (1777), Cowp. 543 82 
 
 Paxton V. Popham (1808), 9 Bast 408 694 
 
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XCIV TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Payne, Ex p. (1849), 5 D. & L. 679 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 197 ; 13 Jur. 
 
 634; 79R. R.892 318 
 
 , Ex p., Re Cross (1879), 11 Ch. D. 539, C. A 8 
 
 V. Cork Co., Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 308 523 
 
 V. Regem, [1902] A. C. 552 ; 71 L. J. P. C. 128 ; 87 L. T. 
 
 84; 51 W. B. 351 218 
 
 V. Thomas (1891), 60 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 63 L. T. 456 ; 54 J. P. 
 
 824 . . . . . - - . . 23 
 
 Peacock r." Reg. (1858)," 4 C. B. N. S. 264 ;" 27 L.'j. O.P. 224"; 
 
 114R. R. 707 611,656,684 
 
 Peake, Re (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 753 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 977 ; 51 L. T. 
 
 878 97 
 
 Pearoe w. Bulteel, [1916] 2 Ch. .544 112,145 
 
 V. Gardner, [1897] 1 Q. B. 688 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 457 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 441 ; 45 W. R. 518 513 
 
 V. Scotcher (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 162 ; 46 L. T. 342 ; 46 J. P. 
 
 248 194 
 
 Pearks Gunston V. Ward, [1902] 2 K. B. 1 186 
 
 Pearlmoor, The, [1904] P. 286 368 
 
 Pearse v. Morrice (1834), 2 A. & B. 84 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 4 N. & M. 
 
 48 380 
 
 Pearson, Re, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 585 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 367 ; 40 W. R. 532 ; 9 M. B. R. 185 267 
 
 V. Holborn Union, [1893] 1 Q. B. 389 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 77 ; 
 
 68 L. T. 351 ; 57 J. P. 169 247 
 
 V. Kingston-on-Hull (1865), 3 H. & C. 921 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 
 
 36;13L. T. 180 476,594 
 
 Pease v. Chaytor (1863), 3 B. & S. 620 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 121 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 664 ; 8 L. T. 613 ; 11 W. R. 563 .. .. .. 611 
 
 V. Norwood (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 235 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 
 
 17W. R. 320 611 
 
 Peate v. Dickin (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 422 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 28 ; 5Tyr. 
 
 116 584 
 
 Peerless, iJe (1841), 1 Q. B. 143 150 
 
 Pelham v. Pickersgill (1787), 1 T. R. 660 ; 1 R. R. 348 .. .. 711 
 Pelham Clinton v. Newcastle, Duke (1901), 71 L. J. Ch. 53, C. A. ; 
 
 (1902), 72 L. J. Ch. 424, H. L 99 
 
 Pellew V. Wonsford (1829), 9 B. & C. 134 ; 4 M. & R. 130 ; cited 
 
 49R. R. 693 12,606 
 
 Pendlebury v. Greenhalgh (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 36 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 3; 33L. T. 472; 24W. R. 98, C. A 189,726 
 
 Penn v. Alexander, [1893] 1 Q. B. 522 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 68 
 
 L. T. 355 ; 41 W. R. 392 ; 17 Cox C. C. 815 ; 57 J. P. 118 .. 121 
 Penny & S. E. Ry. Co., Re (1857), 7 E. & B. 660 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 225 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 957 ; 110 R. R. 773 237 
 
 Penstred v. Payer (1639), Duke on Charitable Uses, p. 381 .. 53 
 
 People, The K. Tibbetts. (1825), 4 Oowen 358 401 
 
 V. Utica Insur. Co. (1818), 15 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 352 .. 92 
 
 Pepin v. Bruyfere (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 39 269 
 
 Peppin V. Cooper (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 431 307 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. XCV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Perchard v. Heywood (1800), 8 T. R. 468 ; 53 R. R. 128 317, 527 
 
 Perkins, Be (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 613 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 226 ; 38 
 
 W. R. 710 ; 2 Meg. 197 ; 7 M. B. R. 32 .. ... .. 369 
 
 V. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1874), 1 Ry. & Can. Traffic Gas. 327 617 
 
 w.Sewell (1766), IW.Bl. 659 .. .. 82 
 
 Perks V. Severn (1806), 7 East 194 ; 3 Smith K. B. 339 .. .. 464 
 
 Perring v. Trail (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 88 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 775 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 248 ; 22 W. R. 572 638 
 
 Perry V. Clements, [1901] 49 W. R. 669 346 
 
 V. Eames, [1891] 1 Ch. 658 ; 60 L. J. Oh. 345 ; 64 L. T. 438 ; 
 
 39W. R. 602 .. .. 245,252 
 
 V. Skinner (1837), 2 M. & W. 471 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 124 ; M. & H. 
 
 122 ; 1 Jur. 433 ; 46 R. R. 656 369, 389, 417 
 
 PeshaU «. Layton (1788), 2 T. R. 712 362 
 
 Peters v. Cowie (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 131 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 177 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 107 67, 154 
 
 V. Sheehan (1842), 10 M. & W. 213 ; 1 D.N. S. 943 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 739 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 177 684 
 
 Peto V. West Ham Overseers (1859). 2 E. & E. 144 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 
 
 240 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1209 ; 7 W. R. 586 572- 
 
 Pettamberdass v. Thackoorseydass (1850), 7 Moo. P. C. 239 ; 5 
 
 Moo. Ind. App. 109 ; 15 Jur. 257, P. C 385 
 
 Pharmaceutical Society v. Armson, [1894] 2 Q. B. 720 ; 64 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 32 ; 71 L. T. 315 ; 42 W. R. 662 ; 59 J. P. 52 .. .. 558 
 
 V. Jacks (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 767 689 
 
 V. London, &c. Supply Assoc. (1880), 5 App. Cas. 857 ; 49 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 736.; 43 L. T. 389 ; 28 W. R. 957 ; 45 J. P. 20, 
 
 H. L 110,573,689 
 
 V. Nash,. [1911] 1 K. B. 520 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 416 ; 103 L. T. 
 
 802 ; 75 J. P. 151 140,689 
 
 V. Piper, [1893] 1 Q. B. 686 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 490 ; 41 W. R. 447 ; 57 J. P. 502 558 
 
 V. Wheeldon (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 683 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 400 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 727 ; 54 J. P. 407 140 
 
 . V. White, [1901] 1 K. B. 601 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 386 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 188 ; -49 W. R. 407 ; 65 J. P. 340 140 
 
 Philipps V. Rees (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 17 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 61 
 
 L. T. 713 ; .38 W. R. 53 ; 54 J. P. 293 43 
 
 Phillipp's Charity, i?e (1845), 9 Jur. 959 643 
 
 Phillips, i?e (1861), 30 L. J. Bank. 1 210 
 
 V. Clark (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 156 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 168 ; 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 467 ;• 5 Jur. N. S. 1081 ; 109 R. R. 646 .. .. 367 
 11. Eyre (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 1 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; 10 
 
 B. &S. 1004 384 
 
 V. Goff (1886),. 17 Q. B. D. 805 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 512 ; 35 
 
 W. R. 197 ; 50 J. P. 614 663 
 
 V. Hopwood (1829), 10 B. & C. 39 ; 5 M. & R. 15 .. .. 727 
 
 V. Hunter (1795), 2 H. Bl. 402 ; 4 T. R. 182 ; 2 R. R. 353 269 
 
 . u. Poland (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 204 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 128 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 260 358 
 
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xcvi TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Phillpott V. St. George's Hospital (1857)', 6 H. L. Cas. 338 ; 27 
 
 L. J. Ch. 70 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 1269 ; 108 R. R. WO 208, 215, 221 
 PhiUpotfcs V. Phillpotts (1850), 10 C. B. 85 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 11 ; 
 
 84R. R. 460 165,374,376 
 
 Phipson V. Harvett (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 473 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 36 ; 6 
 
 Tyr 54 2"^' ^^° 
 
 Phoenix Bessemer Co., Re (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 33 L. T. 403 ; 
 
 24W. R. 19 388,404 
 
 Phythian v. Baxendale, [1895] 1 Q. B. 768 ; 64 L. J. M. C. 174 ; 
 
 72L. T. 465 •• 125 
 
 Pickard v. Marriage (1876), 1 Ex. D. 364 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 594 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 343 ; 24 W. R. 88 212 
 
 Pickering v. llfraoombe Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 2.35 ; 37 
 
 L. j! C. p. 118 ; 16 L. T. 650 ; 16 W. R. 458 ,. . . 702 
 V. James (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 489 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 217 ; 21 
 
 W. R. 786 ; 29 L. T. 210 637,716 
 
 V. Marsh (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 143 ; 22 W. R. 798 . . 343 
 
 V. Noyes (1825), 4 B. & C. 639 ; 7 D. & R. 49 ; 28 R. R. 430 546 
 
 Pickup V. Wharton (1834), 2 Cr. & M. 405 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 97 ..403 
 Picton (Municipality) v. Geldert, [1893] A. C. 524 ; 69 L. T. 510 ; 
 
 42 W. R. 114 ; 63 L. J. P. C. 37 726 
 
 Pierce V. Hopper (1720), 1 Stra. 249 19,242 
 
 Piggott V. Rush (1836), 4 A. & E. 912 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 272 ; 6 
 
 N. &M. 376; 2H. &W. 29 454 
 
 Pike «. Hoare (1783), Eden, 184 7 
 
 V. Nicholas (1869), L. R. 5 Ch. 251 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 435 ; 18 
 
 W. R. 321 350 
 
 PJlcher V. StaflFord (1864), 4 B. & S. 775 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 651 ; 9 L. T. 759 ; 12 W. R. 407 497 
 
 Pilkington v. Cooke (1848), 16 M. & W. 615 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 141 .. 301 
 
 u. Rois, [1914]3K.B.321 188 
 
 Pinhorn v. Sonster (1853), 8 Ex. 138 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 336 ; 22 
 
 L. J. Ex. 18 .. ..• 403,404 
 
 Pinkerton v. Easton (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 490 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 878 ; 
 
 29 L. T. 364 ; 21 W. R. 943 24 
 
 Piot, ^ p. (1883), 48 L. T. 120 255 
 
 Pitman «. Maddox (1699), 2 Salk. 690 544 
 
 Pitt V. Shew (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 208 450 
 
 Pitts V. Millar (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 380 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 96 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 77 377 .. . . 98 474 
 
 Planche v. Braham (1837), 4"Bing. N. C. 17 ; 8*0. & P. 68 ; 6 ' 
 
 Scott 242 ; 3 Hodges 288"; 1 Jur. 823 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 25 ; 44 
 
 R. R. 642 ■ 350 
 
 Plant V. Potts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 256 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 730 ; 55 J. P. 277 ; 1 Fox 206 419 
 
 Plasterers Co. v. Parish Clerks Co. (1851), 6 Ex. 630 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 
 
 362 ; 15 Jur. 965 ; 86 R. R. 413 8 
 
 Piatt V. Sheriffs of London (1550), Plowd. 35 . . . . 316, 452 
 Pletts V. Campbell, [1895] 2 Q. B. 229 ; 64 L. J. M. C. 225 ; 73 
 
 L. T. 344 ; 43 W. R. 634 ; 59 J. P. 502 490 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. XCVll 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plumstead Bd. of Works v. Spaokman (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 878 ; 
 
 53 L. J. M. C. 142 ; 51 L. T. 760 ; 49 J. P. 132 .. .. 357 
 
 Plymouth, &c. Tramway Co. v. General Tolls Co. (1897), 75 L. T. 
 
 467 595 
 
 Pointon v. Hill (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 306 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 62 ; 50 
 
 L. T. 268 ; 32 W. R. 478 ; 48 J. P. 341 ; 15 Cox C. C. 461 .. 474 
 Poland, Re (1866), L. R. 1 Ch. 356 ; 35 L. J. Bank. 19 ; 14 L. T. 
 
 502 ; 12 Jiir. 425 '. .. .. 114,358 
 
 Pole t). Bright (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 139 519 
 
 Poll V. Dambe, [1901] 2 K. B. 579 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 721 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 870 ; 50 W. R. 28 ; 65 J. P. 774 ; 9 Asp. M. C. 220 .. 257 
 
 Pollard, Re (1868), L. R. 2 P< C. 106 ; 5 Moo. P. C. N. S. Ill, 
 
 P. C 639 
 
 Pollock V. Lands Imp. Co. (1888), 37 Ch. D. 661 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 
 
 853 ; 58 L. T. 374 ; 36 W. R. 617 314 
 
 Pommery v. Apthorpe (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 155 ; 56 L. T. 24 ; 35 
 
 W. R. 307 271 
 
 Ponsford V. Walton (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 167 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 113 ; 
 
 17 L. T. 511 ; 16 W. R. 363 204 
 
 Pope V. Tearle (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 499 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 129 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 789 ; 22 W. R. 950 562 
 
 Porter v. Bradley (1789), 3 T. R. 143 ; 1 R. R. 675 .. .. 559 
 
 Portingell, Exp., [1892] 1 Q. B. 15 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 603 ; 40»W. R. 102 ; 56 J. P. 276 55 
 
 Portsmouth (Mayor of) v. Smith (1885), 10 App. Cas. 364 ; 54 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 473 ; 53 L. T. 394 ; 49 J. P. 676 61 
 
 Postmaster-General, Ex p. (1879), 10 Ch. D. 595 ; 48 L. J, Bank. 
 
 84 ; 40 L. T. 16 ; 27 W. R. 325 249,252 
 
 V. Early (1827), 12 Wheat. 136 551, 552 
 
 V. Nail Telephone Co., [1907] 1 Ch. 621 146 
 
 Potter V. Duffield (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 4 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 472 ; 22 
 
 W. R. 585 514 
 
 V. Newman (1836), 2 C. M. & R. 742 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 93 n. ; 4 
 
 D. P. C. 504; IT. &G. 29 142 
 
 Poulsum V. Thirst (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 449 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 324 ; 15 W. R. 766 134 
 
 Poulters' Co. v. Phillips (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 314 ; 9 L. J. C. P. 
 
 190;4Jur. 124 62,357 
 
 PowdreU v. Jones (1855), 2 Sm. & G. 407 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 123 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 1111 ; 97 R. R. 273 56,616 
 
 PoweU V. Boraston (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. 175 ; 1 H. •& P. 179 ; 
 
 34 L. J. C. P. 73 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 160 ; 11 L. T. 734 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 465 590 
 
 V. Fall (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 597 ; 49 h. J. Q. B. 428 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 562 628, 632 
 
 — - V. Guest (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 72 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1238 ; 13 
 
 W. R. 274 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 69 ; 1 H. & P. 149 ; 11 L. T. 599 117 
 v. Kempton Racecourse Co., [1899] A. C. 143 ; [1897] 2 Q. B; 
 
 242 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392 ; 80 L. T. 538 ; 47 W. R. 585 ; 63 
 
 J.P. 260, H. L 73,92,129,599,600 
 
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xcvui TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Powell V. Main Colliery Co., [1900] A. C. 366 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 758 ; 83 L. T. 85 ; 49 W. R. 49 346 
 
 Powlter's Case (1610), n Rep. 33b 74 
 
 Pratt V. Martin, [1911] 2 K. B. 90 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 711 ; 105 L. T. 
 
 49; 75 J. P. 328 353 
 
 Preece u. Pulley (1880), 49 L. J. C. P. 686 522 
 
 Prentice v. London (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 679 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 353 ; 
 
 33 L. T. 251 ; 25 W. R. 695 164,239 
 
 Price V. Union Lighterage Co. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 374 65, 200 
 
 Prices of Wine (1618), Hob. 215 545 
 
 Prince t). U. S. (1814), 2 Gallison 204 388 
 
 Pritchard v. Arbouin (1827), 3 Russ. 456 ; 27 R. R. 106 .. 215 
 
 V. Bangor Corporation (1888), 13 A. C. 241, H. L. .. 153 
 
 Proctor V. Manwaring (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 145 .. 299, 466, 490 
 
 Protector, The (1839), 1 W. Rob. 45 517 
 
 Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal Co. (1879), 4 App. Cas. 197 ; 49 
 
 L. J. Ex. 130 ; 40 L. T. 630 ; 27 W. R. 666 504 
 
 Pulborough School Board Election, He, [1894] 1 Q. B. 725 ; 63 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 497 ; 70 L. T. 639 ; 42 W.R. 388 ; 58 J. P. 572 ; 
 
 lMansonl72 384,389,396 
 
 Pulbrook, JEx p., [1892] 1 Q. B. 86 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 91 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 159 ; 40 W. R. 175 ; 56 J. P. 293 ; 17 Cox C. C. 464 .. 134 
 
 Pulling V. Gt. Eastern Ry. Co. (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 110 .. .. 449 
 
 Pulsford u. Devenish, [1903] 2 Ch. 634 .714 
 
 Purdy V. Smith (1859). 1 E. & E. 511 ; 5 Jur. N. g. 912 ; 28 
 
 L. J. M. C. 150 ; 117 R. R. 314 542 
 
 Q. 
 
 Quartz Hill Co., Se (1882), 21 Ch. D. 642 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 940 ; 31 
 
 W. R. 173 105 
 
 Queensland Industrial Soey. v. Pickles (18651, 35 L. J. Ex. 1 .. 731 
 Quilter v. Mapleson (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 672 ;' 52 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 
 
 47 L. T. 562 ; 31 W. R. 75 393 
 
 Quin V. O'Keefe (1859), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 393 35 
 
 Quinn V. McKinlay, [1902] 2 K. B. Jr. 315 316 
 
 Quinton v. Bristol (Mayor) (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 524 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 
 
 783 ; 30 L. T. 112 ; 22 W. R. 434 530 
 
 R. 
 
 Radcliffe v. Bartholomew, [1892] 1 Q. B. 161 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 63 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 677 ; 40 W. R. 63 ; 56 J. P. 262 607 
 
 Radford v. Williams (1914), 78 J. P. 90 125, 490 
 
 Radnorshire Bd. v. Evans (1863), 3 B. & S. 400 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 
 
 100 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 890 ; 7 L. T. 677 588 
 
 Raebum v Andrews (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 118 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 15 ; 22 W. R. 489 618 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. xcijc 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Railton V. Wood (1890), 15 App. Cas. 363 ; 59 L. J. P. 0. 84 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 13, H. L 162,357 
 
 Railway Sleepers Co., Re (1885), 29 Ch. D. 204 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 720 ; 
 
 52 L. T. 731 ; 33 W. R. 595 607 
 
 Ramsden v. Lupton (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 17 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; 
 
 29 L. T. 510 ; 22 W. R. 129 226 
 
 Ramshay, Ex p. (1852), 18 Q. B. 173 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; 16 
 
 Jur. 684 639 
 
 Randall, Ltd. v. British & American Shoe Co. (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 
 
 683 669 
 
 Randleson, ^a; p. (1828), 1 Mont. c& M'Arth. 86 213 
 
 Randolph v. MUman (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 107 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 81 ; 
 
 17W. R. 262 502 
 
 Rapier v. London Tramways Co., [1893] 2 Ch. 588 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 
 
 36; 69L.T. 361 630 
 
 Rashleigh, Kx p. (1875), 2 Ch. D. 9 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 29 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 193 ; 24 W. R. 496, C. A 398,406 
 
 Raven, iJe (1915), 111 L. T. 938 147 
 
 Rawley v. Rawley (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 466 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 675 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 191 ; 24 W. R. 995 74,101 
 
 Rayuer v. Rayner, [1904] 1 Ch. 176 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 114 .. .. 99 
 
 Rayson v. South London Tramways Co., [1893] 2 Q. B. 304 ; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 693 ; 69 L. T. 491 ; 42 W. R. 21 .. ., .. 92 
 
 Read v. Anderson (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 779 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 
 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 532 ; 51 L. T. 55 ; 32 W. R. 590 ; 49 J. P. 4 .. 210, 
 
 693 
 
 V. Edwards (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 245 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 31 .. 563 
 
 V. Joannon (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 300 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 544 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 387 ; 38 W. R. 734 61 
 
 V. Lincoln (Bp.), [1892] A. C. 644 ; 62 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 128 ; 56 J. P. 725 43, 50, 108, 736 
 
 V. Storey (1861), 6 H. & N. 433 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 110 284, 645 
 
 Beade v. Conquest (1862), 11 C. B. N. S. 479 178 
 
 Readshaw «. Balders (1811), 4 Taunt. 57 704 
 
 Rebeckah, The (1799), 1 C. Rob. 230 529 
 
 Receiver of Police District v. Bell (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 433 ; 41 
 
 L. J. M. C. 163 328 
 
 Recker v. N. British & Mercantile Insurance Co. (1915), 84 
 
 L. J. K. B. 1813 538 
 
 Rede i;. Farr (1817), 6 M. & S. 121 ; 18 R. R. .329 .. ..373 
 
 Redfem, Re (1878), 6 Cli. D. 133 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 17 .. .. 444 
 
 V. Redfem, [1891] P. 139 ; 60 L. J. P. 9 ; 64 L. T. 68 ; 39 
 
 W. R. 212 ; 55 J. P. 37 166 
 
 Redgate v. Haynes (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 89 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 779 191, 490 
 
 Reece v. Muller (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 626 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 64 .. 180 
 Reed v. Ingham (1854), 3 E. & B. 889 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 156 ; 2 
 
 C. L. R. 1496 ; 1 Jur, N. S. 61 ; 97 R, R, 821 ,, 515, 587 
 
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C ' TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 FAGE 
 
 Reed V. Nutt (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 669 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 635 ; 38 W. R. 621 ; 54 J. P. 599 362 
 
 V. Wiggins (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 220 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 131 ; 
 
 7 L. T. 423 ; 11 W. R. 148 388 
 
 Reeve v. Gibson, [1891] 1 Q. B. 652 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 451 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 141; 39 W. R. 420 316 
 
 V. Yeates (1862), 1 H. & C. 435 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 241 ; 10 
 
 W. R. 779 470 
 
 Regent U. S. Stores, Re (1878), 8 Ch. D. 75 ; 38 L. T. 84 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 425 680 
 
 Reid V. Croft (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 68 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 22 . 668 
 V. Reid (1886), 31 Ch. D. 402 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 294 ; 54 L. T. 
 
 100 ; 34 W. R. 332 382,387 
 
 V. Wilson (1895), 64 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 71 L. T. 299 ; 43 W. R. 
 
 47;58J. P. 544 574,575 
 
 Reigate Rural Council v. Sutton District Water Co. (1908), 99 
 
 L. T. 168 83, 94 
 
 Reigate Union v. Croydon Union (1889), 14 App. Cas. 465 ; 59 
 
 L. J. M. C. 29 ; 53 J. P. 580 126 
 
 Rein v. Lane (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 144 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 8 
 
 B. &S. 83 507 
 
 Rendall v. Blair (1890), 45 Ch. D. 139 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 641 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 265 ; 38 W. R. 698 502 
 
 Renpor, The (1883), 8 P. p. 115, C. A 112 
 
 Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Re, [1914] 1 Ch. 139 ; 
 
 83L. J. Ch. 226 205,264 
 
 Restall V. L. and S. W. Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 141 : 37 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 89 ; 18 L. T. 331 ; 16 W. R. 872 730 
 
 R. ■B.Abbot (1780), Doug. 553 237,328 
 
 Adams (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 66 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 903 ; 53 J, P. 377 ; 16 Cox C. C. 544 488, 501 
 
 Adamson (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 201 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 46 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 840 ; 24 W. R. 250 426, 439, 441, 442 
 
 Adlard 1825), 4 B. & C. 772 115 
 
 Aikin (1765), 3 Burr. 1785 681 
 
 Aldborough (1849), 13 Q. B. 190 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 81 .. 645 
 
 Allan (1864), 4 B. & S. 915 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 98 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 796 ; 9 L. T. 761 ; 12 W. R. 422 674 
 
 Ailday (1837), 7 E. & B. 799 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 292 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 961 ; 110 R. R. 835 621 
 
 Allen (1812), 15 East 333 248 
 
 (1872), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 367 ; 41 L. J. M- C. 97 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 664 ; 20 W. R. 756 ; 12 Cox C. C. 193 558 
 
 Allendale (1789), 3 T. R. 382 217 
 
 All Saints (Derby) (1810), 13 East 143 522 
 
 All Saints (Wigan) (1876), 1 App. Cas. 611 ; L. R. 9 Q. B. 
 
 327 ; 35 L. T. 381 ; 25 W. R. 128 365 
 
 Ampthill (1824), 2 B. & C. 847 675 
 
 Anderson (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. 161 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 400 ; 17 W. R 208 ; 11 Cox C. C. 198 264 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. ci 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. Anglesey JJ., [1892] 2 Q. B. 29 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 143 ; 67 
 
 L. T. 322 ; 56 J. P. 440 656 
 
 Antonelli (1906), 70 J. P. 4 489 
 
 Arkwright (1848), 12 Q. B. 960 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 26 ; 13 Jur. 
 
 300 ; 76 R. R. 442 658 
 
 Armagh (Archbp.) (1722), Stra. 516 252,253 
 
 Armitage (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 773 ; 42 L. J. M. 0. 15 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 41 ; 20 W. R. 1015 18,676 
 
 Ashburton (1846), 8 Q. B. 871 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 97 .. .. 26 
 
 Astley (1785), 4 Doug. 389 216 
 
 Aston (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 491 ; 4 New Sess. Gas. 283 ; 19 
 
 L. J. M. C. 236 ; 14 Jur. 1045 608, 676 
 
 Athos (1723), 8 Mod. 144 82,91 
 
 Atkins (1765), 3 Burr. 1706 708 
 
 Audly (1700), Salk. 526 229 
 
 Bacon (1870), 11 Cox C. 0. 540 497 
 
 Badger (1856), 6 E. & B. 137 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 81 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 419 ; 106 R. R. 547 167, 179 
 
 BaUey (1800), Rus. & Ry. 1 740 
 
 Baines (1706), 2 Lord Raym. 1267 241 
 
 (1840), 12 A. & E. 227 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; 4 P. & D. 
 
 362; 5 Jur. 337 283 
 
 Ball (1834), 6 C. & P. 563 ; 40 R. R. 819 85 
 
 Balme (1777), 2 Cowp. 648 707 
 
 Banbury (1834), 1 A. & E. 136 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 76 ; 3 N. & M. 
 
 292 . 6 
 Bank of England", [1891] 1 Q. B. 785 ; 60 L." J. Q. JS. 497"; 
 
 64 L. T. 468 ; 39 W. R. 558 ; 55 J. P. 695 164 
 
 Barclay (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 306 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 27 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 102 ; 30 W. R. 472 ; 46 J. P. 167 & 8 Q. B. D. 480 ; 51 
 
 L. J. M. C. 47 ; 46 L. T. 335 ; 30 W. R. 672 ; 46 J. P. 693 .. 504 
 
 Barham (1828), 8 B. & C. 99 10 
 
 Barlow (1693), Garth. 293 ; 2 Salk. 609 .. 425, 441, 707 
 
 Bamet Sanitary Auth. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 558 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 
 
 105; 35L. T. 362 13 
 
 Barret (1708), 1 Salk. 383 681 
 
 Bateman (1858), 8 B. & B. 584 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 301 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 95 ; 112 R. R. 705 80 
 
 Baude (1603), Cro. Jac. 41 466 
 
 Bawbergh (1823), 2 B. & G. 222 ; 3 D. & R. 338 .. ..380 
 
 Bayly, [1898] 2 Ir. R. 335, 347, Ir 642 
 
 Beadle (1857), 7 E. & B. 492 ; 26 L. J. M. G. Ill ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 863 ; 110 R. R. 694 249 
 
 -^— Beaney (1820), R. & R. 416 467 
 
 Beecham (1851), 5 Cox G. C. 181 499 
 
 Bellamy (1823), 1 B. & C. 500 12 
 
 Belton (1848), 11 Q. B. 388 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 77 ; 17 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 70 ; 75 R. R. 423 521,678 
 
 Benson, [1908] 2 K. B. 270 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 644 ; 98 L. T. 
 
 933; 72 J. P. 286 493 
 
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CU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 FAGE 
 
 R. w. Berkley (1754), 1 Ken. 80 249 
 
 Berkshire Jus. (1878),. 4 Q. B. D. 469 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 
 
 27W. R. 798 608,609 
 
 Berry (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 320 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 O. S. 323 ; 7 W. R. 229 ; 1 Bell C. C. 46 681 
 
 Bertrand (1867), L. R. 1 P. C. 520 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 51 ; 16 
 
 L. T. 752 ; 16 W. R. 9 ; 4 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 460 .. 683 
 
 Beverley Gas Co. (1837), 6 A. & E. 645 ; 6 L. J. M. C. 84 .. 110 
 
 Bewdley (1712), 1 P. Wms. 223 538 
 
 Bigg (1717), 3 P. Wms. 434 ; 2 East P. C. 882 . . . . 92 
 
 Bird (1898), 42 Sol. J. 397 480 
 
 Birmingham (1846), 8 Q. B. 410 106 
 
 (1828), 8 B. & C. 29 ; 32 R. R. 332 216 
 
 Bishop (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 259 ; 14 Cox C. C. 404 ; 49 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 45 ; 42 L. T. 240 ; 44 J. P. 330 ; 28 W. R. 475 .. 187 
 
 Biswell (1847), 2 Cox C. C. 279 .. : .. ..487 
 
 Bjomsen (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 180 ; 10 Cox C. C. 74 ; L. & 
 
 C. 545 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 589 ; 13 W. R. 664 ; 12 L. T. 473 .. 265 
 
 Blaby, [1894] 2 Q. B. 170 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 133 .. .. 396 
 
 Blane (1849), 13 Q. B. 769 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 597 ; 18 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 216 ; 13 Jur. 854 43,275,276 
 
 Bleasdale (1792), 4 T. R. 809 353 
 
 Bloomsbury C. C. Judge (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 778 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 443 ; 56 L. T. 321 ; 51 J. P. 212 674 
 
 Bloxham (1844), 6 Q. B. 528 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 13 ; 1 New 
 
 Sess. Cas. 370 ; 2 D. & L. 168 ; 8 Jur. 1117 683 
 
 Blues (1855), 5E. & B. 291 521 
 
 Board of Education, [1910] 2 K. B. 165 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 
 
 595 ; 102 L. T. 578 ; 74 J. P. 259 ; 8 L. G. R. 549 „ .. 229 
 Boiler Explosion Commrs., [1891], 1 Q. B. 703 j 60 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 544 ; 64 L. T. 674 ; 39 W. B. 440 131 
 
 Bond (1837), 6 A. & E. 905 .. 655 
 
 Boteler (1864), 4 B. & S. 959 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 101 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 466 .. .. 441 
 
 Boultbee (1836), 4 A. & E. 498 ; 6 N. & M. 26 ; 5 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 57 ; 43 R. R. 412 248 
 
 Boulton (1850), 1 Den. C. C. 508 ; 2 C. & K. 517 ; 3 Cox 
 
 C. C. 576 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 13 Jur. 1034 499 
 
 - — Bowerman, [1891] 1 Q. B. 112 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 13 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 532 ; 39 W. R. 207 ; 55 J. P. 373 ; 17 Cox C. C. 151 472 
 
 Bowman, [1898], 1 Q. B. 663 233 
 
 Bowyer (1831), 4 C. & P. 559 485 
 
 Brackenridge (1868), L. R. 1 C. C. 133 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 86 • 
 
 18 L. T. 369 ; 16 W. R. 816 ; 11 Cox C. C. 96 .. 343 
 Bradford (1860), Bell C. C. 268 ; 8 Cox C. C. 309 ; 29 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 171 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1102 ; 2 L. T. 392 ; 8 W. R. 531 .. 489 
 Bradford Navigation (1865), 6 B. & S. 631 ; 34 L. J. Q B 
 
 191 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 769 ; 13 W. R. 892 .. .. 632 
 Bradlaugh (1883), 2 Q. B. D. 569 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 286 and 3 
 
 Q. B. D. 607 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 5 346 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. ClU 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. Bradshaw (1860), 2 E. & E. 836 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 176 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 629 ; 8 W. R. 435 341,342 
 
 Brice (1821), R. & R, 450 487 
 
 Bridge (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 609 ; 59 L. J. M. 0. 49 ; 62 L. T, 
 
 297 ; 38 W. R. 464 ; 54 J. P. 629 ; 17 Cox C. C. 66 . . . , 326 
 
 Bridgewater (1774), 1 Cowp. 139 153 
 
 ■- — (1790), 3 T. R. 550 217 
 
 Bridgnorth (1839), 10 A. & E. 66 ; 8 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 2 P. & 
 
 D. 317 ; 3 Jur. 384 ; 50 R. R. 334 217 
 
 Brighton (1861), 1 B. & S. 447 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 197 ; 5 L. T. 
 
 56; 9 W. R. 831 106 
 
 Bristol Dock Co. (1810), 12 East 429; 11 R. R. 440 .. 723 
 
 Brixton Prison (Governor), Slattmann, Ex p., [1912] 3 K. B. 
 
 424 159 
 
 Brodribb (1816). 6 C. & P. 571 85 
 
 Brooks (1847), 2 C. & K. 402 101 
 
 Brown (1800), 2 East P. 0. 1007 470 
 
 ^- (1852), 17 Q. B. 833 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 113 .. .. 574 
 
 Buchanan (1846), 8 Q. B. 883 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 736 708, 712, 713 
 
 Buck (1726), 2 Stra. 679 709 
 
 ^ Bucks JJ. (1803), 3 East 342 19,370 
 
 — (1853), 2 E. & B. 447 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 139 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 530; IC.L. R. 443 295 
 
 Burnaby (1703), 2 Lord Rayni. 900 179 
 
 Butler (1685), 1 W. Bl. 649 153 
 
 Byrde (1890), 60 L. J. M. C. 17 ; 63 L. T. 645 ; 39 W. R. 
 
 171 ; 55 J. P. 310 ; 17 Cox C. C. 187 426 
 
 Cambridge JJ. (1835), 4 A. & E. Ill ; 5 L. J. M. C. 6 ; 5 
 
 N. & M. 440 ; 1 H. & W. 600 237, 645 
 
 (1839), 8 Dowl. 89 426, 439, 441 
 
 Cambridge University (1722), Stra. 557 639 
 
 Canterbury (Archbp.) (1848), 11 Q. B. 483 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 252 ; 12 Jur. 862 ; 75 R. R. 458 532 
 
 (1859), 1 E. & E. 545 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 958; 117R. R. 331 643 
 
 , [1903] 1 K. B. 289 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 188 ; 88 L. T. 150 ; 
 
 51W.R.277 254 
 
 Carew (1851), 20 L. J. M. C. 44 n 135 
 
 Carlile (1819), 3 B. & AM. 161 ; 22 R. R. 333 . . . . 330 
 
 Carnarvon (1820), 4 B. & Aid. 86 ; 22 R. R. .636 . . . . 655 
 
 (1835), 5 N. & M. 364 681 
 
 Carr (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 76 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 47 L. T. 451 : 
 
 31 W. R. 121 ; 47 J. P. 38 ; 15 Cox C. C. 129 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 
 
 604 264 
 
 Castro (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 360 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 32U ; 22 W. R. 187 ; 1 Hopw. & C. 741 .. .. 4 
 
 Cator (1802), 4 Burr. 2026 333 
 
 Champneys (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 384 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 181 ; 19 W. R. 386 314 
 
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CIV TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 R. V. Chantrell (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 587 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 94 ; 32 
 
 L. T.305 .. .. .. 18>637 
 
 Chapman (1838), 8 C. & P. 558 232 
 
 Charles (1772), Burr. Set. C. 706 116 
 
 — Charlesworth (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 117 ; 20 L, J. M. C. 181 ; 
 90R. R. 816 , 574 
 
 Charretie (1849), 13 Q B. 447 501 
 
 Cheltenham (1841), 1 Q. B. 467 ; 1 G. & D. 167 ; 10 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 99 ; 55 R. R. 321 150,237 
 
 — Chertsey J J. (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 104 636 
 
 Cheshire Lines Comm. (1873), L.R. 8 Q. B. 344; 42 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 100; 28L. T. 808 640 
 
 Chichester (Bishop of) (1859), 2 E. & E. 209 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 23 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 120 432 
 
 ^ Child (1830), 4 C. & P. 442 .. .. ' .. •• 468,469 
 
 Chorlton Union (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 5 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 34 659 
 
 Christchurch (1849), 12 Q. B. 149 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 28 ; 83 
 
 R. R. 863 392 
 
 Cinque Ports JJ. (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 191 ; 55 L. J. M. C. 
 
 156 ; 34 W. R. 789 371 
 
 Cityof London Court Judge (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 28 .. 244 
 
 (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 339 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 492 ; 38 W. R. 638 .. .. '. 168 
 
 , [1892] 1 Q. B. 273 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 66 L. T. 135 ; 
 
 40 W. R. 215 ; 7 Asp. M. C. 140 6, 244 
 
 (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 905 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 330 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 537 ; 33 W. R. 700 ; 49 J. P. 407 710 
 
 ■ Clark (1777), 2 Cowp. 610 352,354,355 
 
 Clear (1825), 4 B. & C. 899 ; 7 D. & R. 393 ; 28 R. R. 498 714 
 
 Cleworth (1864), 4 B. & S. 927 ; 9 L. T. 682 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 
 
 79 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 360 ; 12 W. R. 375 584 
 
 ■ Clifton (1794), 2 East 168 522 
 
 Coaks (1864), 3 E. & B. 249 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 2 C. L. R. 
 
 947; 18 Jur. 378 153 
 
 Cohen (1868), 8 Cox C. C. 41 ; 18 L. T. 489 ; 16 W. R. 
 
 941 184 
 
 Coke (1721), 1 East P. C. 400 468 
 
 CoUingwood (1848), 12 Q. B. 681 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 252 ; 
 
 17 L. J. M. C. 168 ; 12 Jur. 750 .. 126 
 
 Commanding Officer Middlesex Regiment, [19171 2 K. B. 129 267 
 
 Consistory Court (1862), 2 B. & S. 339 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 106 ; 
 
 5 L. T. 795 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1131 ; 10 W. R. 343 .. ..509 
 
 Cook (1790), 3 T. R. 319 , .. 248 
 
 (1774), 2 East P. C. 616 572 
 
 Corfe Mullen (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 211 663, 666 
 
 Cornforth (1742), 2 Stra. 1162 106,486 
 
 Cottle (1851), 16 Q. B. 412 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 162 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 721 ; 83 R. R. 519 480 
 
 — Cotton (1859), 1 E. & E. 203 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 22 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 311 ; 7 W. R. 62 241 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. CV 
 
 PAGB 
 
 R. V. Cousins (1864), 4 B. & S. 849 ; 33 L. J. M. 0. 87 . . . . 522 
 
 Coward (1851), 20 L. J. Q. B. 359 118 
 
 Cowper (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 60, 533 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 228 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 583 ; 38 W. R. 408 70 
 
 Cox (1759), 2 Burr. 785 450 
 
 Crawshaw (1860), 30 L. J. M. C. 58 ; 3 L. T. 51 ; 9 W. R. 
 
 68 ; Bell C. C. 303 ; 8 Cox C. C. 375 713 
 
 Croke (1774), 1 Cowp. 26 342,528 
 
 Crowan (1850), 14 Q. B. 221 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 663 ; 19 
 
 L. J. M. C. 20 ; 13 Jur. 1099 404 
 
 Cubitt (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 622 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 132 ; 60 . 
 
 L. T. 638 706 
 
 Cumberland (1803), 3 B. & P. 354 248 
 
 (1836), 4 A. & B. 696 438 
 
 Cumberworth (1836), 4 A. & E. 731 528 
 
 Cunningham (1804), ,5 East 478 572 
 
 Cutbush (1768), 4 Burr. 2204 526 
 
 (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 379 538 
 
 DamareU (18671, 37 L. J. M. C. 21 22 
 
 DarUngton School (1845), 14 L. J. Q. B. 67 . . . . 526, 642 
 
 Davie (1837), 6 A. & E. 374 114, 122, 532 
 
 Davis (1783), 1 Leach 271 332 
 
 (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 551 ; 2 N. & M. 349 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 
 
 29;39R. R. 563 464 
 
 (1853), 22 L. J. M. C. 143 22 
 
 (1870), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 272 31,484 
 
 Dean (1843), 12 M. & W. 39 354,356 
 
 Deaville (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 272 600 
 
 Deighton (1844), 13 L. J. Q. B. 241 118 
 
 De Mamey, L1907] 1 K. B. 388 196 
 
 De Mattos (1836), 7 C. & P. 458 265 
 
 Denbyshire JJ. (1803), 4 East 142 663 
 
 Denton (1852), 21 L. J. M. C. 207 729 
 
 Depardo (1807), 9 R. R. 693 265 
 
 Derby (1694), Skin. 370 425 
 
 Derby JJ., [1917] 2 K.B. 802 424 
 
 Derbyshire JJ. (1845), 7 Q. B. 193 13 
 
 (1758), 2 Ken. 299 237 
 
 Dickenson (1857), 7 E. & B. 831 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1076 ; 110 R. R. 852 588 
 
 Dickinson, 1 1917] 2 K. B. 393 96 
 
 ■ Dixon (1814), 3 M. & S, 11 ; 4 Camp. 12 ; 15 R. R. 381 .. 184, 
 
 Dobbins (1883), 48 J. P. 182 342 
 
 Doherty (1887), 16 Cox 306 178 
 
 Doubleday (1861) 3 E. & E, 501 595 
 
 Dove (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 596 283 
 
 . Dowling (1857), 8 E. & B. 605 ; 27 L.'J. Q. B. 28 ; 112 R. R. 
 
 706 418 
 
 Downes (1789), 3 T. R. 660 300 
 
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CVl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 R, w.D'Oyly (1840), 12 A. & E. 139 ; 4 Jur. 1056 ; 4 P. & D. 52 ; 
 
 54R. R. 553 155 
 
 Dunne (1813), 2 M. & S. 201 100 
 
 Unrsley (1832), 5 A. & E. 10 ; H. & W. 9 ; 6 N. & M. 333 365 
 
 Dyott (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 47 ; 61 L. J. M. 0. 104 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 799; 47 J. P. 54 28 
 
 Dyson, [1894] 2 Q. B. 176 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 124 ; 58 J. P. 
 
 528 ; 70 L. T. 877 ; 42 W. R. 526 ; 1 Mansou 283 .. .. 197 
 
 Eastbourne (1803), 4 East 103 275 
 
 East London W. W. Go. (1852), 17 Q. B. 512 ; 21 L. J. M. C . 
 
 49; 2E. &E. 447 591 
 
 Eaton (1-787), 2 T. R. 472 ; 1 R. R. 436 217 
 
 Edmundson (1859), 2 E. &E. 77 ; 8 Cox C. C. 212 ; 28 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 213 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1351 597 
 
 Edwards (1829). 9 B. & C. 652 100 
 
 (1853), 9 Ex. 628 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 42 ; 18 Jur. 384 ; 2 
 
 C. L. R. 590 ; 96 R. R. 886 250,610 
 
 (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 586 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 149 ; 51 L. T. 
 
 586 .. • 398 
 
 Effls (1854), 6 Q. B. 501 27 
 
 Blmsly (1834), 2 Lew. 0. C. 126 467 
 
 Ely (1850), 15 Q. B. 827 ; 4 New Seas. Cas. 222 ; 19 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 223 ; 14 Jur. 966 ; 81 R. R. 822 635 
 
 Erdheim (1896), 65 L. J. M. C. 176 618 
 
 Essex (1864), 34 L. J. M. C. 41 ; 11 L. T. 486 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 186 345 
 
 (17-92), 4 T. R. 591 ; 2 R. R. 470 .. .. 535, 626 
 ; C. C. Judge (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 704 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 315 ; 57 L. T. 643 ; 35 W. R. 511 ; 51 J. P. 549 .. 708, 710 
 
 Evans (1890), 54 J. P. 471 439 
 
 ^ — , [1896] 1 Q. B. 228 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 29 ; 44 W. R. 271 ; 
 
 60 J. P. 39 259 
 
 Everdon (1807), 9 East 101 421 
 
 Everett (1852)i 1 E. & B. 273 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 3 ; 93 R. R. 
 
 133.. .. 297 
 
 Eye Corporation (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 271 ; 2 D. & R. 172 ; 
 
 IB. &C. 85; 23R. R. 270 438 
 
 Eyre (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 487 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 159 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 511 ; 16 W. R. 754 ; 9 B. & S. 329 603 
 
 Farewell (1744), 2 Stra. 1209 249 
 
 Farmer,- [1892] 1 Q. B. 637 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 736 ; 40 W. R. 228 ; 56 J. P. 341 ; 17 Cox C. C. 413 . . 259 
 
 Farrow (1857), D. & B. C. C. 164 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 167 .. 490 
 
 Faversham Fishery Co. (1799), 8 T. R. 352 ; 4 R. R. 691 .. 704 
 
 Fawcett (1868), 11 Cox C. C. 305 426,442 
 
 Fell (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 380 240 
 
 Ferrall (1850), 2 Den. C. C. 51 ; T. & M. 390 ; 20 L.J. M. C 
 
 39; 15 Jur. 42 .. .. 707 
 
 Finnis (1859), 1 E. & E. 935 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 201 ; 5 Jur 
 
 N-.-S. 791; 117R. R.-530 •• .. .. .. .. 342,441 
 
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 R. V. Fitchie (1857), 1 D. & B. C. C. 175 ; 7 Cox 0. C. 257 ; 26 
 
 L. J. M. C. 90 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 413 .. 499 
 
 Fitzroy-Cowper (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 533 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 583 ; 38 W. R. 408 139 
 
 Fletcher (1871), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 320 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 742 ; 19 W. R. 781 ; 12 Cox C. C. 77 .. . . 681 
 
 Ford (1907), 12 Canada Or. Cas. 555 179 
 
 ■ Fordham (1839), 11 A. & E. 73 ; 3 P. & D. 95 ; 9 L. J. M. C. 
 
 3; 52R. R. 281 667 
 
 Forrest (1789), 3 T. R. 38 ; 1 R. R. 628 645 
 
 Foulkes (1875), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 150 ; 44 L. J. M. 0. 65 : 32 
 
 L. T. 407 ; 23 W. R. 696 494 
 
 FranciB.(1735), 2Stra. 1015 466 
 
 French (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 507 10 
 
 Fretwell (1862), L. & C. 161 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 145 ; 9 Cox 
 
 C. C. 152 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 466 ; 6 L. T. 333 ; 10 W. R. 545 .. 490 
 
 Frost (1839), 9 C. & P. 129 564 
 
 Fylingdales (1827), 7 B. & C. 438 150 
 
 Gale (1876), 2 Q. B. D. 141 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 134 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 526 ; 13 Cox C. C. 340 491 
 
 Ganz (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 93 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 419 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 592 265 
 
 Gardner (1774), Cowp. 79 110 
 
 Garrett (1853), Dears. C. C. 233 ; 6 Cox C. C. 260 ; 2 C. L. R. 
 
 106 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 20 ; 17 Jur. 1060 472 
 
 Giles (1820), 8 Pri. 293 ; 36 R. R. 27 610 
 
 Gillyard (1848), 12 Q. B. 527 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 153 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 655 .. J. .. .. ., .. .. . 237 
 
 Glamorganshire (1850), "i L. M. & P."336 ; 'i9 L. J. M. C. 
 
 172 ; 15 Jur. 679 232 
 
 Glover (1814), R. R. 269 492 
 
 Gompertz (1847), 9 Q. B. 824 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 204; 72 R. R. 458 204 
 
 Gordon (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 354 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 117 ; 60 L. T. 
 
 872 ; 53 J. P. 807 ; 16 Cox C. C. 622 493 
 
 ^ Gould (1704), 1 Salk, 381 712 
 
 Gravesend (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 240 689,690 
 
 Great Bolton (1828), 8 B. & C. 71 560,564 
 
 Great Faringdon (1829), 9 B. & C. 641 145 
 
 Great Salkeld (1817), 6 M. & S. 408 ..217 
 
 Great Yarmouth JJ. (1882), 8 Q. B. D.525 150 
 
 G. W. Ry. (1858), 28 L. J. M. C. 59 429 
 
 G. W. Ry. Co. (1852), 1 E. & B. 874 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 263 .. 436 
 
 Qreen (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 130 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 168 ; 15 
 
 Jur. 128 705 
 
 Greene (1837), 6 A. & E. 548 ; 1 N. & P. 631 ; W. W. & D. 
 
 291 .. .. .. .. .. 550 
 
 ^-^'(1852)', 17 Q. B. 793 ; 21 L. J. M." 0. 137 ; 16 Jur. 663 625 
 
 Greenland (1867), L. R. 1 C. C. 95 ; 11 Cox C. C. 193 ; 36 
 
 L.J.M..O. 37;.19L, T. 364; 17 W. R,179 308 
 
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 R. V. Gregory (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 555 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 25 ; 2 N. & 
 
 M. 478 713 
 
 Griffiths, [1891] 2 Q. B. 145 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 39 W. R. 
 
 719 386 
 
 Grirawade (1844), 1 Cox C. C. 85 ; 1 Den. 330 ; 1 C. & K. 
 
 592 .. 488 
 
 Gwenop (1789), 3 T. R. 133 78,91 
 
 Hadfield (1870), L. R. 1 0. C. 253 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 131 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 664 ; 18 W. R. 955 ; 11 Cox C. C. 574 489 
 
 Haigh (1813), 3 T. R. 637 707 
 
 Haines (1821), R. & R. 451 487 
 
 Halifax (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 211 216 
 
 Hall (1822), 1 B. & C. 123 ; 25 R. R. 321 95 
 
 (1828), 3 C. & P. 409 179 
 
 , [1891] 1 Q. B. 747 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 124 ; 64 L. T. 394 ; 
 
 17CoxC. C. 278 710,714 
 
 Hammond (1852), 17 Q. B. 772 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 153 ; 85 
 
 R.R. 674 118 
 
 Hampden (1637), 3 State Trials 1235 459 
 
 Hamstall Rid ware (1789), 3 T. R. 380 645 
 
 Hanson (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 519 300 
 
 Hants JJ. (1840), 1 B. & Ad. 654 ; 9 L. J. M. C. 109 ; 35 R. R. 
 
 407 105,346 
 
 Harden (1852), 2 E. d, B. 188 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 299 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 804 288 
 
 Hardy (1871), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 278 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 62 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 785 ; 19 W. R. 359 ; 11 Cox C. C. 656 489 
 
 Harper (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 78 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 90 : 44 L. T. 
 
 615 ; 29 W. R. 743 ; 14 Cox C. C. 574 .. .. .. 472 
 
 Harrald (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 361 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 616 ; 20 W. R. 328 155 
 
 Harris (1836), 7 C. & P. 429 467 
 
 (1836), 7 C. & P. 446 582 
 
 ■ (1842), Car. & M. 661 498 
 
 (1791), 4 T. R. 202 ; 2 R. R. 358 707 
 
 Harrogate (1850), 15 Q. B. 1012 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 25 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 422 ; 4 New Sess. Ca. 319 246 
 
 Harvey (1747), 1 Wils. 164 465 
 
 Hastings (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 692 n. ; 1 D. & R. 148 ; 24 R. R. 
 
 657 427 
 
 Haughton (1853), 1 E. & B. 501 ; 22 L. J. ]Vt 0. 89 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 455 ; 93 R. R. 264 .. .. 550 
 
 Havering-atte-Bower (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 691 ; 2 D. & R. 
 
 176 ; 24 R. R. 532 427 
 
 Hawkesworth (1786), 1 T. R. 450; 2 East P. C. 255 .. 204 
 
 Hazelton (1874), L. R. 2 C. C. 134 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 11 ; 31 
 
 L. T. 451 ; 23 W. R. 139 493 
 
 Hellier (1851), 17 Q. B. 229 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 5 ; 15 Jur. 901 312 
 
 Helton (1742), Burr. S. C. 187 ; 2 Stra. 1168 .. .. 106 
 
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 .. 152 
 
 
 473,490 
 
 '581 .'." 
 
 .. 607 
 
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 R. ^.'Henley, [1892], 1 Q. B. 504 ; 61 L. J. 
 
 675 ; 40 W. B. 383 ; 56 J. P. 391 
 
 Hennah (1877), 13 Cox C. 0. 547 
 
 Herefordshire Jus. (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 
 
 Herford (1860), 3 E. & E. 115 ; 29 L J. Q. B. 249 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 750 • 8 W. R. 579 . . . 532 
 Hermann' (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 284; 48" L. J. M. C. 106; 40 
 
 L. T. 263; 27 W. R. 475 485 
 
 Hertford College (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 693 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 649; 39L. T. 18; 27W. R. 347 51 
 
 Hertford Union (1915), 111 L. T. 716 414 
 
 Hey wood (1813), 1 M. & S. 624 585 
 
 Hicklin (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 89 ; 16 
 
 W. R. 801 ; 11 Cox C. C. 19 ; 18 L. T. 395 196 
 
 Hicks (1855), 4 E. & B. 633 ; 24 L. J. M. 0. 94 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 654 ; 99 R. R. 663 718 
 
 Higginson (1862), 2 B. & S. 471 ; 31 L. J. M. 0. 189 .. 342 
 
 Higham (1857), 7 E. & B. 557 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 116 .. 22 
 
 HUlman (1864), L. & C. 343 ; 9 Cox C. C. 386 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 
 
 60 ; 9 L. T. 518 ; 12 W. R. Ill 490 
 
 Hipswell (1828), 8 B. & C. 466 ; 2 M. & R. 474 .. 381, 690 
 
 Hodges (1829), 1 Moo. & M. 341 ; 20 R. R. 464 n. .. 588 
 
 Hodnett (1786), 1 T. R. 96 5, 7, 106, 464, 486 
 
 Hogg (1787), 1 T. R. 721 ; 1 R. R. 375 .. .. 533, 540 
 
 . HoU (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 575 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 763 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 69; 46 J. P. 53 .. .. 415 
 
 HoUoway Prison (Governor) (1912), 76 J. P. 310 . . . . 255 
 
 Hopkins, [1893] 1 Q. B. 621 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 292 ; 41 W. R. 431 ; 57 J. P. 152 .. .. .. .. 332 
 
 How (1864), 33 L. J. M. C. 53 ; 9 L. T. 385 . . 153, 155 
 
 Howell (1839), 9 C. & P. 437 497 
 
 Hube (1792), 5 T. R. 542 ; 1 Peake 181 ; 2 R. R. 669 .. 352 
 
 Hughes (1857), Dears. & B. 188 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 133 .. 217 
 
 (1832), 3 A. & E. 425 641 
 
 (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 614 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 151 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 685.. : 681,684 
 
 Hull (1853), 2 E. & B. 182 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 914; 95R. R. 495 621 
 
 Hull Dock Co. (1824), 3 B. & C. 516 ; 5 D. & R. 359 .. 515 
 
 Hull and Selby Ry. Co. (1844), 6 Q. B. 70 ; 3 Rail. Gas. 705 ; 
 
 13 L. J. Q. B. 257 ; 8 Jur. 491 711 
 
 Hulme (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 377 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 149 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 673 ; 18 W. R. 830 415, 553, 570 
 
 Humphreys, [1898] 1 Q. B. 875 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 534 ; 78 L. T. 
 
 360 ; 46 W. R. 543 ; 62 J. P. 409 600 
 
 Humphreys, Ex p. Ward, [1914] 3 K. B. 1237 . . . . 276 
 
 Huntingdonshire (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 78 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 
 
 127 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 101 13,135 
 
 — Huntley (1854), 3 El. & Bl. 172 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 106 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 745 ; 97 R. R. 433 312 
 
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 R. V. Hyde (1852), 7 E. & B. 859 n. ; 21 L. J. M. C. 94 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 337 .. .. 237 
 
 Idle (1818), 2 B. & Aid. 149 312 
 
 Ingall (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 199 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 552; 25 W. 11.57 649,659,660 
 
 — Ingham (1864), 5 B. & S. 257 ; 9 Cox C. 0. 508 ; 33 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 183 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 968 ; 10 L. T. 456 ; 12 W. R. 793 569 
 
 Ingram (1697), 2 Salk. 593 660 
 
 Inland Revenue Commrs. (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 569 ; 57 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 92 ; 59 L. T. 378 ; 36 W. R. 696 ; 52 J. P. 390 . . 296 
 Ipstones (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 216 ; 37 L. J. M. 0. 37 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 497 ; 16 W. E. 538 ; 9 B. & S. 106 103 
 
 Ipswich Union (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 269 ; 46 L. J. M. C 207 ; 
 
 36 L. T. 317 ; 25 W. R. 511 382,386 
 
 James (1786), 1 East 303 n ..249 
 
 Jay (1858), 8 E. & B. 469 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 25 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 407 ; 112 R. R. 649 246 
 
 Jeans (1844), 1 0. & K. 539 467 
 
 Jenkins (1863), 3 B. & S. 116 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 570 ; 7 L. T.272 ; 11 W. R. 20 639 
 
 Jenniug's Case (1838), 2 Lewin 0. 0. 130 582 
 
 Jepson (1767), 2 East P. C. 1115 488 
 
 - — - Johnson (1839), 6 01. i& F. 41 ; 49 R. R. 14, H. L 322 
 
 (1720), 1 Stra. 261 681 
 
 Jones (1841), 12 A. & E. 684 ; 10 L. J. M. C. 5 ; 54 R. R. 
 
 661 464 
 
 (1851), 5 Cox C. C. 226 488 
 
 (1897), 67 L. J. Q. B. 41 471 
 
 Jordan (1836), 7 C. & P. 432 487 
 
 Kane, [1901] 1 K. B. 472 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 143 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 240; 65 J. P. 26 586 
 
 Kensington (1847), 12 Q. B. 654 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 332 ; 2 
 
 Jur. 747 230 
 
 — Kent (Inhabitants) (1811), 13 East 220 ; 12 R. R. 330 . . 634 
 Kent JJ. (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 305 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 112 ; 
 
 12W. R. 635 135 
 
 (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 181 ; 59 L. J. M. 0. 51 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 114 ; 38 W. R. 253 ; 54 J. P. 453 ; 17 Cox C. C. 61 .. 361 
 
 Kerrison (1813), 1 M. & S. 435 ; 14 R. R. 491 .. ..635 
 
 Kettle, [1905] 1 K. B. 212 344 
 
 Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63 ; 13 Cox C. C. 403 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 
 
 17 264,265,274,277 
 
 King (1711), 1 Salk. 182 354 
 
 (1716), 1 Sess. Cas. 27 492 
 
 Kingston-upon-Thames JJ. (1858), E. B. & E. 256 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 M.C. 199 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 758 ; 113 R. R.631 341 
 
 Kipps (1850), 4 Cox 0. C. 167 * 487 
 
 Knapp (1853), 2 E. & B. 447 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 139 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 530 ; 1 C. L. R. 443 ; 95 R. R. 634 295 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. CXI 
 
 PAQE 
 
 R. «. Knight (1909), 73 J. P. 15 179 
 
 Lambe (1792), 5 T. R. 76 360 
 
 Lancashire (1858), 8 E. & B. 563 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 375 ; 27 
 
 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 112 R. R. 693 655 
 
 Land Tax Com. (1853), 2 E. & B. 694 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 386 ; 
 
 18 Jur. 285 ; 95 R. R. 759 357 
 
 Langford (1842), Car. & M. 602 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 252 . . 179, 497 
 
 • LangriviUe (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 83 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 124 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 253 ; 33 W. R. 213 47 
 
 Lawrence (1830), 4 C. & P. 231 487 
 
 (1909), 25 T. L. R. 374 683 
 
 Leeds Ry. Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 343 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 193 398, 399 
 
 Leicester (1827), 7 B. & C. 6 ; 9 D. & R. 772 ; 5 L. J. (O. S.) 
 
 M. C. 95 ; 31 R. R. 135 662 
 
 Leicestershire JJ. (1850), 15 Q. B. 88 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 124 ; 
 
 19 L. J. M. C. 209 ; 14 Jur. 550 674, 677 
 
 Leigh R. D. C, [1898] 1 Q. B. 836 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 562 ; 78 
 
 L. T. 604 ; 46 W. R. 471 ; 62 J. P. 355 365 
 
 Lesley (1860), 1 Bell 220 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 8 Cox C. C. 
 
 269; 6 Jur. N. S. 202 ; 8 W. R. 220 ; 1 L. T. 452 . . . . 264 
 
 Leverson (1867), L. R. 4 Q. B. 394 ; 18 W. R. 251 .. .. 539 
 
 Lewes Prison (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 576 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 
 
 176 ; 32 L. T. 673 ; 24 W. R. 13 735 
 
 Lewis (1857), D. & B. 182 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 104 .. 265, 557 
 
 Lichfield (1842), 2 Q. B. 693 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 122 ; 2 G. & D. 
 
 10 ; 6 Jur. 624 ; 57 R. R. 768 .. • 577 
 
 Lightfoot (1856), 6 B. & B. 822 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 115 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 786 ; 4 W. R. 655 ; 20 J. P. 677 ; 106 R. R. 814 23, 258 
 
 Lindsey (1811), 14 East 317 ; 12 R. R. 529 634 
 
 Linford (1857), 7 E. & B. 950 ; 110 R. R. 909 .. .. 342 
 
 Littlechild (1871), 40 L. J. M. C. 137 352 
 
 Little Coggleshall (1817), 6 M. & S. 264 220 
 
 Liverpool JJ. (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 638 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 114 ; 
 
 49 L. T. 244 ; 33 W. R. 20 ; 47 J. P. 596 17 
 
 • Llangian (1863), 4 B. & S. 249 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 225 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 422 ; 11 W. R. 776 287,562 
 
 Lloyd (1767), 2 East P. C. 1122 488 
 
 Local Govt. Bd. (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 321 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 4 ; 
 
 48 L. T. 173 ; 31 W. R. 72 ; 47 J. P. 228 92 
 
 Lofthouse (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 433 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 619 ; 14 L. T. 359 ; 14 .W R. 649 ; 7 B. & S. 747 660 
 
 London (1764), 3 BuiT. 1456 729 
 
 London (Bp.) (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 243 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 169 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 167 ; 38 W. R. 214 ; 54 J. P. 340 .. . . 442, 443 
 London C. C, [1892], 1 Q. B. 190 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 75 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 168 ; 40 W. R. 286 ; 56 J. P. 8 150 
 
 London JJ. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 357 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 146 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 253 ; 39 W. R. 11 340 
 
 , [1895] 1 Q. B. 616 ; 64 L. J. M. C. 100 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 211 ; 43 W. R. 387 ; 59 J. P. 820 105,346 
 
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CXU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PACE 
 
 R. V. London J J. & C. C, [1893], 2 Q. B. 476 ; 69 L. T. 682 .. 360, 
 "■ -' 673, 674 
 London (Mayor of) (1847), 13 Q. B. 1 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 
 
 llJur. 867 323 
 
 Long (1841), 1 Q. B. 740 ; 1 G. & D. 367 ; 6 Jur. 98 ; 55 
 
 R.R 409 .. .. .. 680 
 
 Loom (1827), 1 Moo. 0. C. 160 572 
 
 Lopes (1858), 1 D. & B. 525 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 48 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 98 ; 7 Cox C. C. 431 264 
 
 Loveless (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 349 ; 6 C. & P. 596 ; 40 R. R. 
 
 825 85 
 
 Loxdale (1758), 1 Burr. 447 62,66,522 
 
 Luflfe (1807), 8 East 193 ; 9 R. R. 406 126 
 
 Lundie (1862), 31 L. J. M. C. 157 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 640 ; 5 L. T. 
 
 830 ; 10 W. R. 267 .. .. 704 
 
 Lynch, [1903] 1 K. B. 444 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 167 ; 88 L. T. 
 
 26; 51 W. R. 619; 67 J. P. 4] 267 
 
 - — • , [1898] 1 Q. B. 61 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 59 ; 77 L. T. 568 ; 
 
 46 W. R. 205 ; 8 Asp. M. C. 363 ; 18 C. C. C. 677 .. .. 168 
 
 Mabe (1835), 3 A. & E. 531 10 
 
 McCann (1868). L. R. 3 Q. B. 677 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 115 ; 16 W. R. 985 247 
 
 MoKenzie (1820), R. & R. 429 729 
 
 McMahon (1894), 15 N. S. W. L. R. 131 Aust 485 
 
 Maidenhead (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 494 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 444 ; 46 
 
 J. P. 724 365 
 
 Mainwaring (1858), E. B. & E. 474 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 278 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. S. 928 ; 113 R. R. 735 13 
 
 Mallinson (1758), 2 Burr. 679 581 
 
 Manchester (1857), 7 E. & B. 453 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 110 
 
 R. R. 678 91, 200 
 
 (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 504 ; 38 R. R. 258 n 99 
 
 (1854), 3 E. & B. 336 ; 2 C. L. R. 974 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 
 
 48 ; 18 Jur. 267 ; 97 R. R. 511 247 
 
 Manchester Corp., [1911] 1 K. B. 560 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 263 ; 
 
 104L. T.54; 75 J. P. 73; 9L. G. R. 129 53 
 
 Manchester Waterworks (1823), 1 B. & C. 630 ; 3 D. & R. 
 
 20 591 
 
 Mankelow (1853), Dears. C. C. 169 ; 6 Cox «. C. 143 ; 22 
 
 L. J. M. C. 116 ; 17 Jur. 352 487 
 
 Mann (1727), 2 Stra. 754 250 
 
 Mansel Jones (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 29 ; 60 L. T. 860 ; 37 W. R. 
 
 508; 53 J. P. 739 139 
 
 Margram (1793), 5 T. R. 153 15 
 
 Marks (1802), 3 East 157 ; 6 R. R. 577 85 
 
 Marriot (1692), 4 Mod. 144 709 
 
 Marsh (1824), 2 B. & C. 717 190 
 
 Mashiter (1837), 6 A. & E. 153 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 121 ; 1 N. & 
 
 P. 314 ; W. W. & D. 173 ; 45 R. R. 433 .. 114, 122 532 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. CXIU 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. Mattersey (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 211 ; 2 L. J. M. C. 16 ; 1 N. 
 
 &M. 49 216 
 
 Matthews (1797), 10 Mod. 26 353 
 
 Maude (1842), 2 Dowl. N. S. 58 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 120 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 646 ; 65 R. R. 753 ,. 106,486 
 
 Maulden (1828), 8 B. & C. 78 ; 32 R. R. 344 .. .. 365 
 
 Mawgan (1838), 8 A. & E. 496 ; 3 N. & P. 502 .. .. 729 
 
 Meade (1916), 80 J. P. 332 426 
 
 (1909), 78 L. J. K. B. 476 178 
 
 Medway Union (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 383 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 
 
 100 ; 18 L. T. 431 ; 16 W. R. 979 ; 9 B. & S. 439 .. .. 313 
 
 MeUingham (1732), 2 Bott. 363 15 
 
 Merionethshire (1844), 6 Q. B. 163 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 114 .. 232 
 
 (1844), 6 Q. B. 343 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 158 .. .. 734 
 
 Metrop. Board of Works (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 358 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 201 ; 17 W. R. 1094 172 
 
 • Metrop. Com. Sewers (1853), 1 E. &B. 694 ; 22 L. J. Q.B. 
 
 234; 17 Jur. 787; 93 R. R. 348 242 
 
 Metrop. District Ry. (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 698 ; 40 L. J. 
 
 M C 113 32 
 Meyer (1876), 1 Q. B.D.'l73 ; 34 L. T. 274;"s«i nom. R. v. 
 
 Harrison, 23 W. R. 392 150 
 
 Middlesex (1851), 1 L. M. & P. 621 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 302 ; 
 
 20 L. J. M. C. 42 ; 86 R. R. 893 135 
 
 ■ (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 818 ; 36 R. R. 758 293 
 
 (1817), 6 M. <fe S. 279 346 
 
 Middlesex JJ. (1843), 2 Dowl. N. S. 724 608 
 
 (1888), 32 Sol. J. 221 345 
 
 Middlesex Regiment (Commanding Officer), [1917] 2 K. B. 
 
 129 2(i7 
 
 Midland Ry. Co. (1855), 4 E. & B. 958 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 797 ., 572, 
 
 592 
 (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 389 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 753 ; 23 W. R. 921 572, 592 
 
 Mildenhall (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 374 116 
 
 Miles (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 423 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 56 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 572 ; 38 W. R. 334 ; 17 Cox C. C. 9 ; 54 J. P. 549 .. .. 362 
 Mill (1850), 10 C. B. 379 ; 1 L. M. & P. 695 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 
 
 16 ; 15 Jur. 59 ; 84 R. R. 618 369,390 
 
 Milledge (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 332 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 139 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 748 ; 27 W. R. 659 152 
 
 Millis (1844), 10 CI. &F. 534 ; 8 Jur. 717 ; 59 R. R. 134 .. 4 
 
 Mills (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 578 645 
 
 Mitchell (1818), 10 Bast 518 117 
 
 Mitchell, mcp. Livesey (1913), 77 J. P. 148 ; 82 L. J. K. B. 
 
 153 430, 435, 436 
 
 Monck (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 544 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 251 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 720 38, 357 
 
 Moore (1852), 3 C. & K. 319 ; 16 Jur. 750 178 
 
 Moreley(1760), 2Burr. 1011 236 
 
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CXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 R. V. Morgan (1736), 2 Stra. 1066 
 
 Monson (The Veronica Case) (1903), 67 J. P. 267 
 
 Morris (1867), L. R. 1 C. C. 90 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 84 ; 
 
 636 ; 15 W. R. 990 ; 10 Cox C. C. 48 .. 
 ■ (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 441 
 
 16 L. T. 
 
 28 L. J. 
 
 T. 611 
 
 Morrison (1859), Bell C. C. 158 ; 8 Cox C. C. 194 ; 
 
 M. C. 210 ; 33 L. T. O. S. 220 ; 7 W. R. 554 
 Morton, [1892] 1 Q. B. 39 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 65 L 
 
 40 W. R. 109 ; 56 J. P. 105 
 
 Most (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 244 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 823 ; 29 W. R. 758 ; 45 J. P. 696; 14 Cox C. C. 583 
 Mount (1875), L. R. 6 P. C. 283 ; 44 L. J. P. C. 58 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 279; 23 W. R. 572 
 
 Murrow (1835), 1 Moo. C. C. 456 
 
 Mursley (1787), 1 T. R. 694 
 
 Mvott (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 138 
 
 ■ • N4ath (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 707 ; 40 L. J. M. C 
 
 Neville (1846), 8 Q. B. 452 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 33 
 
 738 
 Newman (1882), 's Q.B.' 0.706; 5i"l. J.'m. C. 87; 46 
 
 L. T. 394 ; 30 W. R. 550 ; 46 J. P. 612 
 
 Nicholson (1810), 12 East 330 ; 11 R. B. 398 
 
 Norfolk (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 238 ; 2 L. J. M. C. 23 
 
 • (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 990 ; 39 R. R. 713 
 
 193 
 70 R. R. 
 
 115, 
 
 North CoUingham (1823), 1 B. & C. 578 
 
 North Curry (1825), 4 B. & C. 953 ; 7 D. & R. 424 
 
 Northleach (1834), 5 B. & A. 978 
 
 NorAvich (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 310 
 
 Novis, [1905] 2 K. B. 456 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 633 ; 93 L. T. 
 
 534 ; 69 J. P. 288 ; 21 Cox C. C. 33 
 
 O'Connor (1882), 15 Cox C. C. 3 ; 45 L. T. 512 ; 46 J. P. 
 
 214 
 
 Oldham (1852), 21 L. J. M. C. 134 ; 2 Den. 473 
 
 (1868), Mayor and Corporation of, L. R. 3 Q. B. 474 ; 
 
 37 L. J. M. C. 169 ; 18 L. T. 240 ; 46 W. B. 789 ; 9 B. & S. 
 
 202 
 
 Overseers (1847), 10 Q. B. 700 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 110 ; 
 
 11 Jur. 487 
 
 ■ Owens (1859), 2 E. & E."86 ; 28 L. J.' Q. B. 316 
 ■ (1828), 1 Moo. C. C. 205 
 
 Oxford (Bp. of) (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 525 ; 48 L. J. Q 
 
 41L. T. 122 
 
 Oxford (V. C.) (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 471 ; 26 L. T 
 
 Oxfordshire J J. (1813), 1 M. & S. 446 
 
 Oxley (1852), 6 Q. B. 256 
 
 Paddle (1822), R. & B. 484 
 
 Paget (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 151 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 9 ; 
 
 794; SOW. R. 336 
 
 Papworth (1802), 2 East 413 
 
 Parker (1837), 7 C, & P. 829 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 1 
 
 734 
 683 
 
 362 
 729 
 
 499 
 
 152 
 
 489 
 
 262 
 582 
 220 
 217 
 592 
 
 591 
 
 472 
 116 
 
 426, 438 
 .. 521 
 .. 564 
 .. 115 
 
 293, 296 
 .. 663 
 
 341 
 
 588 
 76 
 
 551 
 
 ..■ 625 
 .. 152 
 .. 467 
 B. 609 ; 
 
 426, 432 
 506 71, 117 
 655 
 705 
 488 
 
 45 L.T. 
 
 101 
 103 
 493 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CSV 
 
 R. V. Patteson (1832), 4 B. & A. 9 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 33 ; 1 N. & M. 
 
 612; 38R. R. 191 
 
 Paty(1770), 2 W. Bl. 721 
 
 Pawlefct (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 491 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 
 
 L. T. 390 
 
 Payne (1866), L. R. 1 C. C. 27 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 170 
 
 N. S. 476 ; 14 L. T. 416 ; 11 W. R. 661 
 
 Pease (1832), 4 B. & A. 30 ; 2 L. J. M. C. 26 ; 38 R 
 
 Pelly, [1897] 2 Q. B. 33 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 519 ; 76 L 
 
 45 W. R. 604 ; 61 J. P. 373 ; 18 C. C. 0. 556 
 Pembridge (1842). 3 Q. B. 901 ; 3 G. & D. 603 ; 7 Jur. 553 
 
 12 L. J. Q. B. 47, 259 ; 61 R. R. 433 .. 
 
 Pharmaceutical Society, [1899] 2 Ir. R. 132 .. 
 
 Phillips (1842), 2 Moo. C". 0. 252 
 
 (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 648 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 217 
 
 N. S. 920; 14 W. R. 791 
 
 Pickford (1861), 1 B. & S. 77 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 133 
 
 Pierce (1814), 3 M. & S. 62 ; 15 R. R. 410 . . 
 
 157; 29 
 
 12 Jur. 
 
 R. 207 
 T. 467 ; 
 
 45, 103, 
 
 668 
 603 
 
 521 
 
 596 
 628 
 
 361* 
 
 510 
 
 61 
 
 179 
 
 12 Jur. 
 
 369, 424 
 18 
 .. 87 
 . . 102 
 .. 126 
 .. 653 
 237 
 
 Pilfield, [1919] 2 K. B. 249 
 
 Pilkington (1844), 2 E. & B. 546 ; 17 Jur. 554 
 
 ■ Finder (1855), 24 L. J. Q. B. 148 
 
 Plowright (1686), 2 Mod. 95 
 
 ■ Ponsonby (1842), 3 Q. B. 14 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 1 G. .'v: D. 
 
 713 ; 6 Jur. 642 ; 61 R. R. 128 
 Poole (Mayor of) (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 602, 683 ; 56 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 131 ; 57 L. T. 485 ; 36 W. R. 239 ; 52 J. P. 84 ; 16 
 
 CoxC. 0.323 .. 
 
 Pooley (1800), R. & R. 12 
 
 Poor Law Commissioners (1838), 6 A. & B. 1 ; 6 L. J. M. C. 
 
 41;1N. &P. 371 7,315,556,560 
 
 Port of London Authority, Ex. p. Kynock, [1919] 1 K. B. 
 
 176, C. A. 
 
 Portsea (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 384 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 144 
 
 Portugal (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 487 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 567 ; 34 
 
 W. R. 32 
 Poulter (1888), 20 Q. b'.'d. 132 ; 57" L. J. Q. B. 138; 58 
 
 L. T. 534 ; 52 J. P. 244 ; 36 W. R. 117 
 
 Powell (1852), 21 L. J. M. C. 78; L. R. 2 C. C. R. 403 ; 16 
 
 Jur. 177 
 
 Poynder (1823), 1 B. & C. 178 ; 2 D. & R. 258 ; 25 R. R. 345 
 
 Pratt (1855), 4 E. & B. 860 ; Dears. C. C. 502 ; 3 C. L. R. 
 
 686 ; 24 L. J. M. 0. 113 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 681 . . 492, 547, 
 
 Preston (1839), 7 Dowl. 593 
 
 Price (1833), 5 C. & P. 510 
 
 (1840), 11 A. & E. 727 ; 3 P. & D. 421 ; 4 Jur. 291 706, 
 
 (1854), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 203, P. C 
 
 Prince (1875), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 122 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 700 ; 24 W. R. 76 ; 13 Cox C. C. 138 . . 180, 181, 190 
 
 (1827), 2 C. & P. 517 586 
 
 Pugh (1779), 1 Dougl. 188 315,322 
 
 247 
 
 726 
 498 
 
 109 
 392 
 
 586 
 
 172 
 
 498 
 120 
 
 563 
 103 
 497 
 ,707 
 606 
 
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ex VI TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 E. V. Purdey (1864), 5 B. & S. 909 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 4 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 153 ; 11 L. T. 309 ; 13 W. R. 75 346 
 
 Ratcliffe (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 40 ; 47 L. T. 
 
 388 ; 15 Oox 0. C. 127 304 
 
 Read (1849), 13 Q. B. 524 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 7 ; 18 L. J. 
 
 M. 0.164; 13 Jur. 789 365 
 
 (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 131 ; 14 Cox 0. C. 17 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 
 
 50 ; 37 L. T. 722 ; 26 W. R. 283 471, 491 
 
 ■ Reason (1853), Dears. & B. C. 0. 226 ; 2 C. L. R. 120; 6 
 
 Cox C. C. 227 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 11 ; 17 Jur. 1014 .. ..494 
 
 Reyce (1767), 4 Burr. 2075 616 
 
 Richards (1800), 8 T.R. 634; 5 R.R. 489 708 
 
 Riley, [1896] 1 Q. B. 309 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 74; 74 L. T. 254 ; 
 
 44W. R. 318 ; 60 J. P. 519; 18 0. C. C. 285 .. .. 146 
 Roberts, [1901] 2 K. B. 117 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 590 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 530; 49 W.R. 488; 65 J. P. 359 426 
 
 Robins (1844), 1 0. & K. 456 487 
 
 Robinson (1759), 2 Burr. 800 331,707 
 
 (1859), 28 L. J. M. 0. 38 ; Bell 0. 0. 34 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 203 ; 32 L. T. 502 ; 7 W. R. 203 471 
 
 (1852), 17 Q. B. 466 705 
 
 Robsou (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 137 ; 55 L. J. M. 0. 55 ; 53 L. T 
 
 823 ; 34 W. R. 276 ; 50 J. P. 488 ; 15 Cox C. 0. 772 .. 114 
 Rochester (1851), 7 E. & B. 910; 27 L. J. Q. B. 45; 110 
 
 R. R. 889 660, 663 
 
 Rose (1847), 2 Cox 0. 0. 329 176 
 
 (1855), 5 B. & B. 49 ; 24 L. J. M. 0. 130 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 803 ; 103 R. R. 358 526 
 
 Rowlands (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 530; 51 L. J. M. 0. 51; 46 
 
 L. T. 286 ; 30 W. R. 444 ; 46 J. P. 437 ; 15 Oox 0. 0. 31 . . 467 
 Russell (1849), 13 Q. B. 237 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 368 ; 18 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 106 ; 13 .Jur. 259 283 
 
 (1833), 1 Moo. 0. 0. 377 487 
 
 (1805), 6 East 427 ; 2 Smith 424 ; 8 R. R. 506 . . 723 
 
 • , [1901] A. C. 446; 70 L. J. K. B. 998; 85 L. T. 253; 
 
 20CoxC. 0. 51 258 
 
 Saddlers' Co. (1863), 10 H. L. Cas. 404; 32 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 337; 9 Jur. N. S. 1081; 11 W. R. 1004, H. L. 112, 306, 357 
 Saffron Walden (1846), 9 Q. B. 76 ; 9 New Sess. Oas. 360; 
 
 15 L. J. M. 0. 115 ; 10 Jur. 639 ; 72 R. R. 186 .. .. 612 
 
 Sainsbury (1791), 4 T. R. 456 ; Nolan 8; 2 R. R. 433 150, 706 
 
 ■ • St. Albans (1853), 22 L. J. M. 0. 142 ; 17 Jur. 531 .. 237 
 
 St. George's Hanover Square (1812), 3 Camp. 222 ; 13 R. R. 
 
 792 306 
 
 St. George's Union (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 90; 41 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 30; 25 L.T. 696; 20 W.R. 179 71 
 
 St. GUes (R. V. Chadwick) (1847), 11 Q. B. 173 ; 75 R. R. 
 
 313 106 
 
 St. Gregory (1835), 2 A. & E. 99 ; 4 L. J. M. C. 9 ; 4 N. & 
 
 M. 137 376 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. cxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. St. James, Westminster (1836), 5 A. & E. 391 ; 2 H. & W. 
 
 253 322 
 
 St. Martin's (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 493 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 99 ; 
 
 8B. &S. 536; 16L. T. 625; 15W. R. 1096 246 
 
 St. Mary Abbotts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 378 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 52 ; 
 
 64 L. T. 240 ; 39 W. R. 278; 55 J. P. 502 135 
 
 St. Mary, Lambeth (1838), 3 Nev. & P. 416 ; 47 R. R. 613 155 
 
 St. Mary, Whitechapel (1848), 12 Q. B. 127 ; 12 Jur. 792 ; 3 
 
 New Sess. Gas. 262 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 172 ; 12 J. P. 598 .. 392 
 
 -St. Matthew (1875), 32 L.T. 558 153 
 
 St. Nicholas (1737), 2 Stra 1066 ; Gas. temp. Hardw. 323 . . 376 
 
 St. Pancras (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 375 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 245 ; 38 
 
 W. R. 311 ; 54 J. P. 389 229,442 
 
 St. Paul, Exeter (1829), 10 B. & G. 12 15 
 
 St. Peter, Hereford (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 916 15 
 
 ■ ^ St. Sepulchre (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 924 216 
 
 (1859), 1 E. & E. 813 ; 28 L. J. M. G. 187 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 876; 7W. R. 447 386 
 
 Salisbury (1838), 8 A. & E. 716 ; 3 N. & P. 476 . . . . 320 
 
 Salop (1838), 8 A. & E. 173 607 
 
 (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 669; 50 L. J. M. C. 72 ; 29 W. R. 
 
 667 677 
 
 Saltren (1784), Gald. 444 640 
 
 Sanchee (1697), 1 Ld. Raym. 323 305 
 
 Sanders (1839), 9 C. & P. 79 579 
 
 Sankey (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 379; 47 L. J. Q. B. 96 .. .. 625 
 
 Scaife (1851), 17 Q. B. 238 ; 5 Gox C. G. 243 ; 2 Den. C. C. 
 
 281 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 229; 15 Jur. 607 534 
 
 Scot (1790), 3 T. R. 602 532 
 
 Scott (1856), Dears. & Bell G. G. 47 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 1 28 ; 2 
 
 Jur. N.S. 1096 618 
 
 Seburg (1870), L. R. 1 G. G. 264 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 133 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 623 ; 18 W. R. 935 ; 11 Cox G. G. 520 264 
 
 Sedgley (1831), 2 B. & A. 63 ; 36 R. R. 475 572 
 
 Selby Dam Drainage Gommissioners (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 372 629 
 Senior (1864), 1 L. & C. 401;" 9 Cox C. G.'469; 33 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 125 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 547 ; 10 L. T. 428 ; 12 W. R. 749 295 
 
 Serva (1845), 1 Den. 104 ; 2 C. & K. 53 266 
 
 Shadbolt (1833), 5 G. & P. 504 467 
 
 Shaw (1865), L. & G. 579; 10 Gox G. G. 66; 34 L. J. M. G. 
 
 169 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 415 ; 12 L. T. 470 ; 13 W. R. 692 .. 681 
 Shee (1843), 4 Q. B. 2; 3 G. & D. 80; 12 L. J. M. G. 53, 
 
 186 ; 7 Jur. 810 ; 62 R. R. 266 247 
 
 Shepherd (1841), 1 Q. B. 170 ; 4 P. & D. 534 ; 5 Jur. 432 . . 247 
 
 Shiles (1841), 1 Q. B. 919 369,424 
 
 Shrewsbury (1853), 1 E. & B. 711 ; 22 L. J. M. G. 98 . . 13 
 
 Shrewsbury Gas Co. (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 216 ; 1 L. J. M. G. 
 
 18; .37R. R. 409 595 
 
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CXVIU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 I'AGE 
 
 R. V. Shurmer (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 323; 55 L. J. M. C. 153; 55 
 
 L. T. 126; 34 W. R. 656 ; 50 J. P. 743 .. .. 55, 678 
 Silvester (1864), 33 L. J. M. C. 79; 10 Jur. N. S. 360; 4 
 
 B. & S. 927 ; 9 L. T. 682; 12 W. R. 375 584 
 
 Simpson (1842), Car. & M. 669 498 
 
 Skeen (1859), Bell C. C. 97 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 91 . . 6, 357 365 
 
 Slade (1888), 21 Q. B. IX 433; 57 L. J. M. C. 120 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 640; 37 W. R. 141 ; 52 J. P. 599; 16 Cox C. C. 496 127, 471 
 Slater (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 267 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 246 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 410 ; 46 J. P. 694 27,568 
 
 Sleep (1861), 1 L. & C. 44 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 170 ; 8 Cox C. C. 
 
 472; 7 Jur. N. S. 979 ; 4 L. T. 525 ; 9 W. R. 709 .. .. 184 
 
 Smith (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 604 22 
 
 (1870), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 266 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 112 ; 18 
 
 W. R. 932 145,146,478 
 
 (J860), 29L. J. M. C. 216; 8W. R. 589 .. .. 346 
 
 (1791), 4 T. R. 414 542 
 
 (1844), 5 Q. B. 614 ; D. & M. 564 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; 
 
 8 Jur. 599 642 
 
 (1868), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 110 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 6 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 263 ; 16 W. R. 140 ; 11 Cox 0. C. 10 681 
 
 (1862), 1 L. & C. 131 ; 9 Cox C. C. 110 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 
 
 105 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 199 ; 5 L. T. 761 ; 10 W. R. 273 . . 733 
 (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 146 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 46 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 129 ; 21 W. R. 382 734 
 
 Sneyd (1841), 9 D. P. C. 1001 ; 5 Jur. 962 ; 61 R. R. 843 .. 663 
 
 Somersetshire JJ. (1826), 5 B. & C. 816 ; 6 D. & R. 469 . . 237 
 
 Southampton (1852), 21 L. J. M. C. 201 ; 18 Q. B. 841 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 254 306 
 
 Southampton Income Tax Commissioners, Ex p. Singers, 
 
 [1917] 1 K. B. 259 ; 86 L. J. K. B. 66, C. A 9 
 
 South Kilvington (1844), 5 Q. B. 216 ; 3 G. & D. 157 ; 13 
 
 L. J. M.C. 3; 7 Jur. 1108 218 
 
 South Shields Licensing JJ., [1911] 2 K. B. 1 ; 80 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 809; 75 J. P. 299 465,614 
 
 South Wales Ry. Co. (1849), 13 Q. B. 988 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 310 ; 13 Jur. 1095 ; 6 Rly. Cas. 197 ; 78 R. R. 569 . . . . 237 
 (1850), 14 Q. B. 902 ; 6 Rly. Cas. 489 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 272 ; 14 Jur. 828 638 
 
 South Weald (1864), 5 B. & S. 391 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 193 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1099 ; 10 L. T. 498 ; 12 W. R. 873 
 
 Sparrow (1740), 2 Stra. 1123 
 
 -^ — Spratley (1856), 6 E. & B. 363 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 257 : 
 
 N. S. 735; 106R. R. 632 '. 
 
 Spurrell (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 72; 35 L. J. M. C. 
 
 Jur. N. S. 208 ; 13 L. T. 364 ; 14 W. R. 81 .. 
 
 StaflFordshire JJ. (1802), 3 East 151 
 
 (1854), 2 EI. & Bl. 689; 23 L. J. M. C. 17 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 1073 15 
 
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 438, 
 
 ,566 
 
 662, 
 
 663 
 
 2 Jur. 
 
 
 .. 
 
 597 
 
 ■4; 12 
 
 
 
 120 
 
 , , 
 
 , 13 
 
TABLE OF CASES. cxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. Sbalfordshire JJ. (1806), 7 East 549 ; 3 Smith 555 ; 8 Ei. R. 
 
 668 19,370,374 
 
 (1810), 12 East 572 7 
 
 (1«37), 4 A. & E. 842; 6 N. & M.477; 2 H. & W. 48; 
 
 6L. J. M. 0. 165 521 
 
 Stainforth (1848), 11 Q. B. 66 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 53 ; 17 
 
 L. J. M. C. 25; 12 Jur. 95 464 
 
 Stephens (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 251 ; 15 
 
 Jur. N. S. 961 ; 14 L. T. 593 ; 14 W. R. 859 . . . . 137, 184 
 Stepney (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 383 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 145 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 808 735 
 
 Stepney Corporation, [1902] 1 K. B. 317 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 
 
 238 709 
 
 Stevens (1834), 1 Moo. C. C. 409 467, 582 
 
 Stewart (1858), 8 E. & B. 360; 27 L. J. M. C. 81 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 187; 112 R. R. 597 246, 247, 248 
 
 Stimpson (1863), 4 B. & S. 307 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 208 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 41; 9 Cox 0. C. 356 180 
 
 Stock (1838), 8 A. & B. 405 734 
 
 Stoddart, [1901] 1 K. B. 177 ; 70 L J. K. B. 189 ; 83 L. T. 
 
 538 ; 49 W. R. 173 ; 64 J. P. 774 ; 19 Cox C. C. 587 .. 210 
 Stoke BHss (1844), 6 Q. B. 158 ; D. & M. 135 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 
 
 151; 8 Jur. 536; 66 R.R. 332 705 
 
 Stoke Damerel (1836), 7 B. & C. 563 ; 1 M. & R. 458 .. 10, 
 
 15, 380 
 Stone (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 14 ; Dears. C. C. 251 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 1106 469 
 
 (1796), 1 East 639 681 
 
 Storr, (1766), 3 Burr. 1698 708 
 
 Strachan (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 463 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 210; 26 
 
 L. T. 835; 20W. R. 629 417 
 
 Stratford-on-Avon (1809), 11 East 176 116 
 
 Streeter, [1900] 2 Q. B. 601; 69 L. J. Q. B. 915; 83 L. T. 
 
 288; 48 W. R. 702; 64 J. P. 537 478 
 
 Stretfield, (1683) 32 L. J. M. C. 236 ; 11 W. R. 736 .. 365 
 
 StrugneU (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 93 581 
 
 Sunderland Customs (1914), 83 L. J. K. B. 555 .. . . 102 
 
 Surrey (1849), 6 D. & L. 736 621 
 
 Surrey JJ. (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 100 ; 50 L. J. M. 0. 10 19, 345 
 
 Sussex (1865), 4 B. & S. 966; 34 L. J. M. C. 69 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 300; IIL. T. 740; 13 W. R. 471 19 
 
 (1797), 7 T. R. 107 ; 4 B. R. 390 344 
 
 Swan (1849), 4 Cox C. C. 108 729 
 
 Sykes (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 52 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 39 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 566 ; 24 W. R. 141 230,636 
 
 Sylvester (1862), 2 B. & S. 322 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 93 .. 233 
 
 Tankard, [1894] 1 Q. B. 548; 63 L. J. M. C. 61 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 42 ; 42 W. R. 350 ; 58 J. P. 300 ; 17 Cox C. C. 719 . . 114, 622 
 Tart (1859), 1 E. & E. 618 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 679; 117R. R. 374 137 
 
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CXX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 R. V. Tatlock (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 157 ; 46 L. J. M. 0. 7 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 520;13Cox328 499 
 
 Taylor (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1671 134 
 
 Tewkesbury (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 639 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 285 ; 
 
 18 L. T. 851; 16 W. R. 1200 ; 9 B. & S. 683 .. .. 152 
 Thallman (1863), L. & C. 326 ; 9 Cox C. C. 388; 33 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 58; 9L. T. 425; 12W. R. 88 492 
 
 Thomas (1878), L. R. 2 0. C. 141 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 42 ; 31 
 
 L. T. 849; 23W. R. 344 46f5 
 
 (1830), 4 0. & P. 237 497 
 
 ThornhiU (1838), 8 C. & P. 574 683 
 
 Thurston (1662), 1 Lev. 91 740 
 
 Tillingham (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 180 216 
 
 Timmins (I860), 30 L. J. M. 0. 45 ; Bell C. C. 276 ; 8 Cox 
 
 C. C. 401; 6 Jur. N. S. 1309 ; 3 L. T. 337 ; 9 W. R. 36 .. 487 
 
 Tinkler (1859), 1 P. & F. 513 180, 181 
 
 Tithe Commissioners (1850), 14 Q. B. 474; 19 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 177 ; 80 R. R. 271 425,427 
 
 Titterton, [1895], 2 Q. B. 61 ; 64 L. J. M. C. 202 ; 73 L. T. 
 
 345; 43 W. R. 603; 59 J. P. 327 62, 328 
 
 Todmorden (1841), 1 Q. B. 185 ; 10 L. J. M. 0. 65 .. .. 660 
 
 Toke (1838), 8 A. & E. 227 ; 7 L. J. M. C. 74 . . . . 464 
 
 ToUey (1803), 3 East 467 12 
 
 Tolson (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 168 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 60 L. T. 
 
 899 ; 37 W. R. 716 ; 54 J. P. 4 ; 16 Cox C. C. 629 .. 178, 181 
 
 Tone Conservators (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 561 567 
 
 Totnes (1848), 11 Q. B. 80 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 46 .. .. 645 
 
 Totnes Union (1845), 7 Q. B. 690; 2 New Sess. Cas. 82; 14 
 
 L. J. M. C. 148; 9 Jur. 660; 68 R. R. 539 639 
 
 Townrow (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 465 493 
 
 Treeve (1796), 2 East P. C. 821 ; 15 R. R. 381 . . . . 184 
 
 Trueman, [1913] W. N. 198 211 
 
 Tuchin (1704), 2 Lord Raym. 1066 250 
 
 Tucker (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 417 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 197 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 478 ; 25 W. R. 697 ; 13 Cox C. C. 600 574 
 
 Turvey (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 520 457 
 
 Twyford (1836), 5 A. & E. 430; 6 N. & M. 830 .. .. 624 
 
 Tyler, [1891] 2 Q. B. 588 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 38 .. .. 134 
 
 Univ. of Cambridge (1723), 1 Stra. 557 639 
 
 Upper Papworth (1802), 2 East 413 103 
 
 Usworth (1836), 5 A. & E. 261 ; 5 L. J. M. C. 139 . . . . 71 
 
 Vandeleer (1718), 1 Stra. 69 622 
 
 Varlo (1775), 1 Cowp. 250 532 
 
 Vasey, [1905] 2 K. B. 748; 75 L. J. K. B. 117, C. C. R. .. 44 
 
 Verelst (1813), 3 Camp. 432 ; 14 R. R. 775 665 
 
 Vine (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 195 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 842; 23 W.R. 649; 13 Cox CO. 43 396 
 
 Wagstaff (1819), R. & R. 398 488 
 
 Walker (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 355 ; 44 L. J. M. C, 167 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 167 707 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. Cxxi 
 
 PA GR 
 
 R. 1). Wallis (1793), 5 T. R. 379 49,532 
 
 Walne (1879), 11 Cox C. 0. 647, C. 0. R 493 
 
 Walsall (1854), 3 C. L. R. 100 232 
 
 Waltham (1849), 3 Cox C. C. 442 467 
 
 * Warwick (1846), 8 Q. B. 926 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 962 ; 70 R. R. 694 127,509 
 
 Warwickshire (1856), 6 E. & B. 837 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 119 ; 
 
 106R. R. 819 341 
 
 Washbrooke (1825), 4 B. & C. 732; 7 D. & K. 221 .. 658 
 
 Watson (1806), 7 East 214 ; 3 Smith 283 7 
 
 Waudby, [1895] 2 Q. B. 482; 64 L. J. M. C. 536 ; 73 L. T. 
 
 352; 44 W. R. 64; 18 Cox C. C. 194; 59 J. C. 505.. .. 582 
 
 Wa veil (1779), 1 Doug. 115 .. ..229 
 
 (1829), 1 Moo. C. C. 224 471 
 
 Webb, [1896], 1 Q. B. 487 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 98 ; 74 L. T. 
 
 428; 44W. R. 527; 60 J. P. 280; 18C. C. C. 312 .. .. 269 
 Weil (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 701 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 74; 47 L. T. 
 
 630 ; 31 W. R. 60; 15 Cox C. C. 189 420 
 
 Welch (1875), 40 J. P. 183 349 
 
 Welland (1822), R. & R. 494 467 
 
 WeUs (1836), 4 Dowl. 562 735 
 
 Westbeer (1740), 2 Stra. 1133 498 
 
 ■ Western (1868), 32 J. P. 390 464 
 
 West Riding (1842), 2 Q. B. 705 521 
 
 (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 667 521 
 
 (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 623 ; 23 R. R. 421 606 
 
 (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 220 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 358 728 
 
 , [1891] 1 Q. B. 722 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 122 .. .. 296 
 
 West Riding C. C, [1896] 2 Q. B. 386 233 
 
 West Riding JJ. (1841), 1 Q. B. 325 33 
 
 , [1900] 1 Q. B. 291 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 13 .. .. 586 
 
 Weymouth (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 332 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 139 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 748 ; 27 W. R. 659 152 
 
 White (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 358 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 23 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 116 ; .33 W. R. 248 ; 49 J. P. 294 626 
 
 Whiteley (1858), 3 H. & N. 143 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 120 ; 117 
 
 R. R. 634 295 
 
 ■ (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 482 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 164 ; 61 L. T. 
 
 253; 54 J. P. 134 496 
 
 Widdop (1872), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 3; 42 L. J. M. C. 9 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 693 ; 21 W. R. 176 ; 12 Cox C. C. 251 .. .. 618, 681 
 
 Wigg (1705), 2 Salk. 460 330 
 
 Wacock (1845), 7 Q. B. 329 ; 1 New Sess. Cas. 651 ; 14 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 104 ; 9 Jur. 729 ,.. .. 74,446 
 
 Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. 2527 228 
 
 Williams (1758), 1 W. Bl. 95 74,448 
 
 (1790), 1 East P. C. 424 468 
 
 (1843), 1 Cox C. C. 16 488 
 
 (1884), 9 App. Cas. 418 ; 53 L. J. P. C. 64 . . .. 629 
 
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CXXU TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 FACE 
 
 R. V. Willmett (1848), 3 Cox C. C. 281 184 
 
 Wilson (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 42 ; 37 L; T. 354 ; 25 W. R. 44; 
 
 13 Cox C. C.630 45 
 
 (1857), D. & B. 127 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 18; 7 Cox C. C. 
 
 190; 2Jur.N. S. 1146 473,490 
 
 Wimbledon Local Board (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 459; 51 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 219 ; 46 L. T. 47 ; 30 W. R. 400 .. .. 153, 155 
 
 Windsor, Mayor (1844), 7 Q. B. 908 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 337 .. 554 
 
 Winwick (1800), 8 T. R. 454 645 
 
 Withyham (1854), 2 C. L. R. 1657 230 
 
 Wood (1855), 5 E. & B. 49 237 
 
 (1830), 4 C. & P. 381 467 
 
 (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 559 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 144 ; 20 L. T. 
 
 654; 17 W. R. 850; lOB. &S. 534 481 
 
 Woodhouse, [1906] 2 K. B. 501 108 
 
 Woodland (1786), 1 T. R. 261 ; 3 East 11 n 216 
 
 Woodrow (1846), 15 M. & W. 404 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 846 ; 
 
 16 L. J. M. C. 122 184 
 
 Woolcock (1833), 5 C. cfe P. 516 469 
 
 Worcestershire JJ. (1839), 3 P. & D. 465 ; 12 A. & E. 283 ; 
 
 I Arn. & H. 80 ; 3 Jur. 1050 7 
 
 (1854), 3 E. & B. 477 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 113 .. ..242 
 
 (1816), 5 M. & S. 457 ; 17 R. R. 397 287 
 
 Worksop Board (1865), 5 B. & S. 951 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 220 ; 
 
 II Jur. N. S. 1015 ; 10 L. T. 297 ; 12 W. R. 710 .. .. 658 
 
 Wright (1834), 1 A. & E. 434 74, 245, 253 
 
 (1758), 1 Burr. 543 709,712 
 
 Wycombe Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 310; 36 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 121 ; 15 L. T. 601 ; 15 W. R. 489 ; 8 B. & S. 259 .. .. 528 
 
 Wymondham (1843), 2 Q. B. 541 126 
 
 Wynn (1719), Bunb. 39 250 
 
 York (1837), 6 A. & E. 419 ; 25 R. R. 423 n 110 
 
 York and N. Midland Ry. Co. (1853), 22 L. J. Q. B. 41 .. 529 
 
 Yorkshire (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1003; 3 L. J. M. C. 54; 1 
 
 A. &E. 563 217 
 
 (1815), 3 M. & S. 493 681 
 
 Youle (1861), 6 H. & N. 753 ; 30 L. J, M. C. 234 ; 4 L. T. 
 
 299;9W. R. 637 330,334 
 
 Younger (1793), 5 T. R. 449; 2 R. R. 638 450 
 
 Zulueta (1843), 1 C. & K. 215 44, 262 
 
 R. (Gallagher) w. Tyrone J J., [1901] 2 Ir. R. 497, Ir 118 
 
 Reuss V. Bos (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 176; 40 L. J. Ch. 665; 24 
 
 L. T. 641 151 
 
 Reuss Kostritz, iJe (1880), 49 L. J. P. & M. 67 278 
 
 Reya, Exp. (1877), 6 Ch. D. 332 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 122 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 17; 26 W. R. 193 223 
 
 Reynolds v. Att.-Gen., Nova Scotia, [1896] A. C. 240 ; 65 L. J. 
 
 P. C. 16; 74L. T. 108 382 
 
 Rhodes v. Rhodes (1882), 7 A. C. 192, P. C 5 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. cxxiu 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rhodes -c. Smethurst (1838), 4 M. & W. 42 ; 6 Id. 351 ; 7 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 273 ; 9 Id. 330; 1 H. & H. 237 ; 2 Jur. 893 ; 4 Jur. 702 369 
 Rhymney Ry. Co. o. Rhymney Iron Co. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 146 ; 
 
 59 L. J. Q. B. 414; 63 L. T. 407 ; 38 W. R. 764 .. .. 709 
 Richards v. Dyke (1842), 3 Q. B. 256; 2 G. & D. 493; 6 Jur. 
 
 1035 286 
 
 V. James (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 285 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 116 ; 16 
 
 L. T. 174 ; 15 W. R. 580 ; 8 B. & S. 302 379 
 
 V. McBride (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 119 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 15 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 677; 46 J. P. 247; 30 W. R. 121 14 
 
 Richens v. Wiggens (1863), 3 B. & S. 953 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 144 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1055 ; 8 L. T. 384; 11 W. R. 617 303 
 
 Richmond v. N. Lond. Ry. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 679 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 886 530 
 
 Richmond Gas Co. v. Richmond Corp., [1893] 1 Q. B. 56 ; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 172 ; 67 L. T. 554 ; 41 W. R. 41 ; 56 J, P. 776 622 
 Richmond Hill Co. v. Trinity House, [1896] 2 Q. B. 134 ; 65 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 561; 75L. T. 8; 45 W. R. 6 127 
 
 Rickard v. Graham, [1910] 1 Ch. 722 ; 79 L. J. Ch. 378 ; 102 L. T. 
 
 482 373 
 
 Ricket V. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 175; 36 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 205 ; 16 L. T. 542; 15 W. R. 9.37, H. L. .. 560, 724 
 
 Ricketts v. Bodenham (1836), 4 A. & E. 433; 5 L. J. K. B. 102; 
 
 6 N. & M. 171 ; 1 H. & W. 753 ; 5 D. P. C. 120 ; 43 R. R. 
 
 384 286 
 
 Rider v. Kidder (1805), 10 Ves. 360 ; 53 R. R. 269 . . . . 112 
 V. Wood (1860), 1 K. & J. 644 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 103 R. R. 
 
 295 176 
 
 Ridgway v. Stafford (1851), 6 Ex. 404; 20 L.J. Ex. 226; 86 
 
 R. R. 347 300 
 
 V. Wharton (1854), 6 H. L. Cas. 238 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 46 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 173 512 
 
 Ridler «. Punter (1593), Cro. Eliz. 291 376 
 
 Ridsdale v. Clifton (1877), 2 P. D. 276; 46 L, J. P. C. 27 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 865 50,97,536,537 
 
 RUey V. Read (1879), 4 Ex. D. 100 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 437 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 414 116 
 
 Ringer v. Cann (1838), 3 M. & W\ 343 ; 1 H. & H. 67 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 
 
 108; 2 Jur. 256; 49 R. R. 627 589 
 
 Ripley j;. Waterworth (1802), 7 Ves. 425 457 
 
 Ripon City, The (1897), 66 L. J. P. 110 263 
 
 Rishton v. Whatmore (1878), 8 Ch. D. 467 ; 47 L. J. Oh. 629 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 827 512, 513 
 
 Ritcher v. Hughes (1824), 2 B. & 0. 499 ; 3 D. & R. 788 ; 2 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 61; 26R. R. 424 622 
 
 Ritchie v. Smith (1849), 6 C. B. 462; 18 L. J. C. P. 9; 13 Jur. 
 
 63; 77 R. R. 369.. 693 
 
 River Wear Commrs. v. Adamson (1877), 1 Q. B. D. 546 ; 2 App. 
 
 Cas. 743; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 37 L. T. 643 1, 8, 40, 150, 176, 529 
 
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CXXIV TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 PASE 
 
 Elvers v. Adams (1878), 3 Ex. D. 361 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 47 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 39; 27 W. R.381 617 
 
 Rix i;. Borton (1840), 12 A. & E. 470 284,308 
 
 Roberts, Se, [1900] 1 Q. B. 129; 69 L. J. Q. B. 19 .. .. 577 
 
 V. Davey (1833), 4 B. & A. 665; 1 N. & M. 443; 38 
 
 R.R. 348 375 
 
 V. Egerton (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 494; 43 L. J. M. C. 135; 
 
 30 L. T. 633 ; 22 W. R. 797 562 
 
 V. Orchard (1864), 2 H. & C. 769 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 9 L. T. 
 
 727; 12 W. R.253 414 
 
 V. Phillips (1855), 4 E. & B. 450 ; 3 C. L. R. 513 ; 24 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 171; 1 Jur. N. S. 444; 99 R. R. 553 515 
 
 V. Woodward (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 412 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 129; 
 
 63 L. T. 200 ; 38 W. R. 770 ; 55 J. P. 116 ; 17 Cox C. C. 139 193 
 Robertson, Exp. (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 733; 44 L. J. Bank. 99; 
 
 32 L. T. 697 ; 23 W. R. 906 683 
 
 V. Amazon Tug and Lighterage Co. (1881), 51 L. J. Q. B. 68 715 
 
 Robinson v. Briggs (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 1 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 17 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 395 121 
 
 V. Collingwood (1865), 17 C. B. N. S. 777 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 18 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1080 ; 11 L. T. 313 ; 13 W. R. 84 . . . . 198 
 
 V. Dixon, [1903] 2 K. B. 701 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 717; 89 
 
 L. T. 132; 52 W. R. 8 ; 67 J. P. 386 185 
 
 V. Emerson (1866), 4 H. & C. 352 .. . . 298, 333, 466 
 
 V. Jenkins (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 275 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 439 ; 38 W. R. 360 471 
 
 V. Waddington (1849), 13 Q. B. 753 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 250 ; 
 
 13 Jur. 537 607, 
 
 Robson, Be (1881), 19 Ch. D, 156 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 337 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 418 ; 30 W. R. 257 208,216 
 
 V. The Kate (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 13 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 546 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 557 ; 36 W. R. 910 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 330 113 
 
 Rochdale Building Society v. Mayor &c., Rochdale (1886), 51 
 
 J. P. 134 340 
 
 Rochdale Canal v. King (1849), 14 Q. B. 122 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 
 
 14 Jur. 16 ; 80 R. R. 222, 233 236 
 
 Rochefoucauld v. Boustead (1896), 66 L. J. Ch. 75 .. .. 263 
 
 Rochfort V. Atherley (1876), 1 Ex. D. 511 ; 35 L. T. 602 .. 345 
 
 Rockett V. CUppingdale, [1891] 2 Q. B. 293 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 782 ; 
 
 64L. T. 641 289 
 
 Roddam v. Morley (1857), 1 De G.& J. 1 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 438 ; 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 449; 118R. R. 1 503 
 
 Roddy V. Fitzgerald (1858), 6 H. L. Cas. 823 ; 108 R. R. 327, H. L. 99 
 Roderick v. Aston Local Board (1877), 5 Ch. D. 328 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 
 
 802 ; 36 L. T. 328 ; 25 W. R. 403 631 
 
 Rodrigues v. Melhuish (1854), 10 Ex. 110 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 26 ; 2 
 
 W. R. 618; 102R. R. 503 11 
 
 Rogers, Be, [1894] 1 Q. B. 425 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 178 ; 70 L. T. 107 ; 
 
 lManson387 577 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. CXXV 
 
 Rogers v. Hull Dock Co. (1864), 34 L. J. Ch. 165 ; 11 L. T. 463 ; 13 
 
 W. R. 217 604 
 
 Rogers, Jungblut & Co. v. Martin (1910), 26 T. L. R. 459 ; afi'd. 
 
 [1911], 1 K. B. 19, C. A 652 
 
 Roles «. RosevTell (1794), 5 T. R. 538 294 
 
 Rolle V. Whyte (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 286 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 560 ; 16 W. R. 593 ; 8 B. & S. 116 .. .. 64, 565 
 
 Rolls V. St. George, Southwark (1880), 14 Ch. D. 785 ; 49 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 691 ; 44 J. P. 680 ; 43 L. T. 140 ; 28 W. R. 867 . . 170, 545 
 Roniney Marsh v. Trinity House (1872), L. R. 5 Ex. 204 ; 39 
 
 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 22 L. T. 446; 18 W. R. 869 and L. R. 7 Ex. 
 
 247 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 106 .' .. 724 
 
 Rona, The (1882), 51 L. J. Adm. 65 34 
 
 Ronard, .Be (1916), 85 L. J. K. B. 393 H8 
 
 Rooker, iJe, [1916] W. N. 293 114 
 
 Rooke's Case (1598), 5 Rep. 100a 228 
 
 Roper V. Knott, [1898] 1 Q. B. 868 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 574 ; 78 L. T. 
 
 594 ; 46 W. R. 636 ; 62 J. P. 375 348 
 
 Rose V. Groves (1843), 5 M. & G. 613 ; 6 Scott N. R. 645 ; 1 D. 
 
 & L. 61 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 7 Jur. 951 ; 63 R. R. 415 . . 724 
 
 • 1). Himeley (1808), 4 Cranch 241 257 
 
 V. Rose, [1897] llr. R. 9, Ir 407 
 
 Rosewarne v. Billing (1863), 15 0. B. N. S. 316 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 
 
 55; 10 Jur. N. S. 496 ; 9 L. T. 441 ; 12 W. R. 104 .. .. 693 
 
 Ross V. Rugge-Price (1876), 1 Ex. D. 269 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 777 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 535; 24 W. R. 786 714 
 
 Rosseter v. Cahlmann (1853), 8 Ex. 361 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 128 .. 257, 
 
 259, 260 
 Rossiter v. Miller (1877), 3 App. Cas. 1124 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 10 ; 39 
 
 L. T. 173 ; 26 W. R. 865 .. .. 514 
 
 Rothes V. Kirkcaldy Waterworks Commrs. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 
 
 702, H. L 357 
 
 Rothschild V. Inland Revenue, [1894] 2 Q. B. 142 ; 70 L. T. 667 ; 
 
 42 W. R. 542 ; 58 J. p. 399 11 
 
 Routledge v. Low (1868), L. K. 3 H. L. 100 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 454 ; 
 
 18 L. T. N. S. 874 ; 16 W. R. 1081, H. L 274 
 
 Rovard, He (1916), 58 L. J. K. B. 393 380 
 
 Rowning i;. GoodchUd (1773), 2 W. BL 906 716 
 
 Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 409 ; 66 L. T. 513; 40 W. R. 450; 66 J. P. 404 .. .. 27 
 
 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham, [1894] 2 Q. B. 715 ; 64 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 99 ; 71 L. T. 168 ; 43 W. R. 22 .. .. 226, 351 
 
 Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856), 6 E. & B. 327 ; 24 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 327 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1086 ; 106 R. R. 623 . . . . 672 
 
 Royal Mail Co. v. Braham (1877), 2 App. Cas. 381 ; 46 L. J. 
 
 P. C. 67 ; 36 L. T. 220; 25 W. R. 651 573 
 
 Ruabon Co. ■;;. G. W. R., [1893] 1 Ch. 427 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 483 ; 68 
 
 L. T. 110; 41 W. R. 418 ' 627 
 
 Ruck V. WUliams (1858), 3 H. & N. 308 ; 27 L. J . Ex. 357 ; 117 
 
 R. R. 697 173,724 
 
 I.S. 9 
 
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CXXVl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 • PAGE 
 
 Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy (1852), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 4; 5 Moo. 
 
 Ind. App. 234 409 
 
 Rumball V. Schmidt (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 603 ; 46 L. T. 661 ; 30 
 
 W. R. 949 ; 46 J. P. 567 612 
 
 Rumsey v. N. E. Ry. Co. (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 641 ; 32 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 244 ; 10 Jiir. N. S. 208 ; 8 L. T. 666 ; 11 W. R. 911 .. 678 
 
 Russell, ^a;j3. (1812), 19 Ves. 163 249 
 
 , Ex p. (1875), L. R. 10 Oh. 255 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 42 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 4 ; 23 W. R. 817 227 
 
 V. Oambefort (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 526 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 498 ; 
 
 61 L. T. 751 ; 37 W. R. 707 267 
 
 V. Men of Devon (1788), 2 T. R. 667 ; 1 R. R. 585 . . . . 726 
 
 i;. Prat (1589), 1 Leon. 193 449 
 
 Russell Institution v. St. GUes «S;c., Bloomsbury (1854), 23 L. J. 
 
 M. 0. 65 508 
 
 Rustomjee v. R. (1877), 1 Q. B. D. 487; 2 Q. B. D. 69 ; 46 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 238 ; 36 L. T. 190 ; 25 W. R. 333 249 
 
 Ruther v. Harris (1876), 1 Ex. D. 97; 45 L. J. M. C. 103; 34 
 
 L. T. 825 490 
 
 Rutland v. Rutland (1595), Cro. Eliz. 377 449 
 
 Ryall r;. RoUe (1749), 1 Atk. 165 91 
 
 i;. Rowles (1750), 1 Ves. 367 112 
 
 Bylands v. Fletcher (1868), L. R. 3 H. L. 330 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 
 
 19L. T. 220 632 
 
 S. 
 
 Sadler v. Whiteman, [1910] 1 K. B. 868 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 800; 
 
 [1910] A. 0. 514 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 1050 ; 103 L. T. 296 . . 540 
 
 Saffery v. Mayer, [1901] 1 K. B. 11 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 145 ; 83 L. T. 
 
 394 ; 49 W. R. 54 ; 64 J. P. 740 556,693 
 
 St. Cross i). Howard de Walden (1795), 6 T. R. 338 .. ..108 
 
 St. GUes, Camberwell v. Hunt (1887), 56 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 52 J. P. 
 
 132 367 
 
 St. Gobain Co. v. Hoyermann's Agency, [1893] 2 Q. B. 96 ; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 485 ; 69 L. T. 329 ; 41 W. R. 563 .. .. 267 
 
 St. John, Hampstead v. Cotton (1886), 12 App. Cas. 6 ; 56 L J. 
 
 Q. B. 225; 56L. T. 1; 35 W. R. 505; 51J. P. 340 .. 4,5 
 
 St. Juan Nepomuceno (1824), 1 Hagg. Adm. 265 .. .. 266 
 
 St. Leonard's v. Franklin (1878), 3 C. P. D. 377 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 
 
 727; 39 L.T. 129; 16 W. R. 882 110, 573 
 
 St. Losky V. Green (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 370; 2 F. & P. 106: 30 
 
 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 394 ; 3 L. T. 297 ; 9 W. R. 119 543 
 
 St. Mary j;. Radcliffe (1717), 1 Stra. 60 116 
 
 St. Pancras v. Battenbury (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 477; 26 L. J 
 
 C. P. 243 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 1106 ; 109 R. R. 765 . . . . 240 712 
 
 St. Sepulchre, ^a;jp. (1863), 33 L. J. Oh. 372 .. .. 1125 
 
 St. Thomas's Hospital v. Hudgell (1900), 70 L. J. K. B. 115 .. 506 
 St. Werburgh Overseers v. Hutchinson (1880), 5 Ex. D. 19 • 49 
 
 L. J. M. C. 23; 42L. T. 153; 28W. R. 153 .. .. ' 17,8! 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. cxxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Salaman v. Warner, [1891] 1 Q. B. 734; 60 L. J, Q. B. 624; 39 
 
 W. R. 547 97 
 
 Sale V. Lambert (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 1 ; 43 L. J. Cli. 470 ; 22 W. R. 
 
 478 514 
 
 Sales Agency V. Elite Theatres, [1917] 2 K. B. 164, C. A. .. 225 
 
 Salford (Mayor) v. Lancashire C. C. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 384; 38 
 
 W. R. 661 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 576 ; 63 L. T. 409 .. .. 617 
 
 Salisbury's (Bishop of) Case (1613), 10 Rep. 60b 375 
 
 Salkeld v. Johnston (1849), 2 C. B. 749 ; 1 Mac. & G. 242 ; 2 Ex. 
 
 256 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 493; 84 R. R. 255 .. .. 52, 74, 89, 91 
 
 Salmon v. Buncombe (1886), 11 App. Cas. 627 ; 55 L. J. P. C. 69 ; 
 
 55L. T. 446 44,407,408 
 
 Salomons v. Miller (1853), 8 Ex. 778 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 169 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 463; 91R. R. 759 20,552 
 
 Salt V. Scott-Hall, [1903] 2 K. B. 245 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 627 ; 88 
 
 L. T. 868 ; 52 W. R. 95 ; 67 J. P. 306 ; 1 L. G. R. 753 .. 525 
 Salt Union v. Wood, [1893] 1 Q. B. 370 ; 68 L. T. 92 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 M. 0. 75 ; 41 W. R. 301 ; 57 J. P. 201 ; 7 Asp. M. C. 281 . . 132 
 Salters' Co. v. Jay (1842), 3 Q. B. 109 ; 2 G. & D. 414 ; 11 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 173 ; 6 Jur. 803 ; 61 R. R. 147 323 
 
 Saltmarshe v. Hewett (1834), 1 A. & B. 812 ; 3 N. & M. 656 ; 40 
 
 R. R. 436 224 
 
 Saltoun V. Adv.-Genl. (1860), 3 Macq. 659 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 713 ; 8 
 
 W. R. 565 108 
 
 Sandiman v. Breach (1827), 7 B. & C. 96 ; 9 D. & R. 796 ; 31 
 
 R. R. 169 584 
 
 Sandys, Ex p. (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 863 ; 1 N. & M. 591 . . . . 642 
 
 Sankey, Be (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 17 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 238; 38 W.R. 
 
 533 . 618 
 
 SanPaulo Ry. Co. v. Carter, £1896] A. C. 31 ; 65 L.J. Q. B. 161 ; 
 
 73 L. T. 538 ; 44 W. R. 336 ; 60 J. P. 84 270 
 
 San Teodoro v. San Teodoro (1880), 5 P. D. 79 ; 49 L. J. P. 20 ; 
 
 42L. T. 331 256 
 
 Santos V. lUidge (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 861 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 317 ; 
 
 29 L. J. C. P. 348 ; 8 W. R. 705 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1348 44, 262, 266 
 Saunders, Be, [1895] 2 Q. B. 117, 424; 64 L. J. Q. B. 739 ; 73 
 
 L. T. 172 ; 44 W. R. 30 ; 59 J. P. 740 ; 2 Mans. 361 .. 126 
 V. Holborn Bd. of Works, [1895] 1 Q. B. 64 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 101 ; 71 L. T. 519 ; 43 W. R. 26 715, 726 
 
 V. S. E. Ry. Co. (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 456 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 761 ; 
 
 43 L. T. 281 ; 29 W. R. 56 ; 44 J. P. 781 121 
 
 Savarkar, Ux p., [1910] 2 K. B. 1056 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 57 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 473 134 
 
 Savings Institution u. Makin (1844), 23 Maine .360 .. ..282 
 
 Savoy (Overseers) v. Art Union of London, [1896] A. C. 296 ; 65 
 
 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 74 L. T. 497 ; 45 W. R. 34 ; 60 J. P. 660 . . 508 
 Saxonia, The (1862), Lush. 410 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 201 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 315 ; 10 W. R. 431 ; 6 L. T. 6 ; 15 Moo. P. C. C. 262 .. 277 
 Scadding v. Eyles (1846), 9 Q. B. 858 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 364 . . 402 
 Scale «. Rawlins, [1892] A. C, 342 ,, ., , 14 
 
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CXXVm TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Scales V. Pickering (1828), 4 Bing. 448 ; 1 M. & P. 195 .. .. 528 
 
 Scaltock V. Harston (1875), 1 C. P. D. 106 ; 45 L. J. G. P. 125 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 130 ; 24 W. E. 431 634 
 
 Scarborough (Mayor of) v. Rural Authority of Scarborough 
 
 (1876), 1 Ex. D. 344 ; 34 L. T. 768 554 
 
 Scatohard v. Johnson (1888), 57 L. J. M. C. 41 ; 52 J. P. 389 .. 125, 
 
 187, 490 
 Schmitz, Exp. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 509; 53 L. J. Oh. 1168; 
 
 50 L. T. 747 ; 32 W. E. 812 ; 1 M. B. R. 55 477 
 
 Sohofield, JEx p., [1891] 2 Q. B. 428 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 157 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 780; 39 W. R. 580 ; 56 J. P. 4 ; 17 Cox C. C. 303 .. .. 134 
 
 Schwerzerhof v. Wilkins, [1898] 1 Q. B. 640 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 476 ; 
 
 78 L. T. 229 ; 62 J. P. 247 410 
 
 Scott V. Avery (1856), 5 H. L. C. 843; 25 L. J. Ex. 303; 2 
 
 Jur, N. S. 815 235 
 
 ■». Craig's Representatives (1896), 24 E. 462, Sco 395 
 
 V. Glasgow, [1899] A. C. 470 ; 68 L. J. P. C. 98 ; 81 L. T. 
 
 302; 64 J. P. 132 523 
 
 V. Morley (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 120; 57 L. J. Q. B. 43; 57 
 
 L. T. 919 ; 36 W. R. 67 ; 52 J. P. 280 ; 4 M. B. B. 286 .. 476 
 
 V. Paquet (1867), L. R. 1 P. C. 552 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 65 ; 
 
 4 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 505 465 
 
 V. Royal Wax Candle Co. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 404; 45 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 586 ; 34 L. T. 683 ; 24 W. E. 668 .. .. 573 
 V. Uxbridge Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 596 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 
 
 293 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 602 440 
 
 Scottish "Widows' Fund v. Craig (1882), 20 Ch. D. 208; 51 
 
 L. J. Oh. 363 ; 30 W. R. 463 709 
 
 Sorimshire ■;;. Scrimshire (1752), 2 Hagg. Cons. 395 .. ..260 
 
 Soutt V. Freeman (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 1*77 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 
 
 35 L. T. 939 ; 25 W. B. 251 319 
 
 Seaman «. Busley, [1896] 2 Q. B. 344, C. A. .. • .. .. 166 
 Secretary of State for India v. Sooble, [1903] A. C. 299 ; 72 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 617 ; 89 L. T. 1 ; 51 W. R. 675, P. C 500,505 
 
 Sefton, Se, [1898] 2 Ch. 378 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 518 ; 78 L. T. 765 ; 47 
 
 W. R. 49 144 
 
 Selkrig v. Davis (1814), 2 Rose 311 ; 2 Dow. 250 269 
 
 Sellar v. Bright & Co., Ltd., [1904] 2 K. B. 446; 73 L. J. K. B. 
 
 643 ; 91 L. T. 9 ; 52 W. R. 563 ; 20 T. L. R. 586 .. .. 579 
 
 Selmes v. Judge (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 724 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 905 ; 19 W. E. 1110 414 
 
 Senior v. Metrop. Ey. Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. 258 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 
 
 225 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 802 ; 8 L. T. 544 ; 11 W. E. 886 .. . . 172 
 
 Seward v. The Vera Cruz (1884), 10 App. Cas. 59 ; 54 L. J. P. 9; 
 
 52 L. T. 474 ; 38 W. E. 477 ; 49 J. P. 324 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 
 
 386 8,63,314,317 
 
 Scwell V. Taylor (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 160; 6 Jur. N. S. 582 ; 29 
 
 L. J. M. C. 50; IL. T. 37 574 
 
 Shackell v. Eosier (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 634 ; 3 Scott 59 ; 2 
 
 Hodges 17 ; 42 R. E. 666 ; 5 L. J. C. P. 193 702 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. cxxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Shaftesbury v. Russell (1823), 1 B. & C. 666 ; 3 D. & E. 84; 25 
 
 B. R. 534 236 
 
 Shaftoe's Charity, Be (1878), 3 App. Cas. 872 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 98 ; 
 
 38L.T.793 345 
 
 Shardlow v. Cotterell (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 353 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 572 ; 30 W. E. 143 511 
 
 Sharmam;. Merritt (1916), 32 T. L. R. 360 363 
 
 Sharp w. Eettie (1884), 11 C. of SesB. Cas. (4th series) 745 So. .. 722 
 Sharpe, Ex p. (E. v. Arnold) (1864), 5 B. & S. 322; 33 
 
 L. J. Mat. 152 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1018 ; 10 L. T. 458 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 756 26 
 
 w. Thomas (1830), 6 Bing. 416 214 
 
 V. Wakefield (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 239 ; 58 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 
 
 60 L. T. 130 ; 37 W. R. 187 ; 53 J. P. 206 and [1891] A. C. 
 
 173 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 73 ; 64 L. T. 180 ; 39 W. R. 561 ; 55 
 
 J. P. 197, H. L 108,228,233 
 
 Sharpington v. Fulham, [1904] 2 Ch. 449 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 777 ; 91 
 
 L. T. 739; 52 W. R. 617; 68 J. P. 510; 2L. G. R. 1229 .. 413 
 Shaw V. Benson (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 563 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 575 555, 691 
 V. Crompton, [1910] 2 K. B. 370 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 52 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 501 62 
 
 V. Q. W. R., [1894] 1 Q. B. 373 ; 70 L. T. 218 ; 42 W. R. 
 
 285; 58 J. P. 318 46 
 
 V. Morley (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 137 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 15 ; 16 W. R. 763 599 
 
 — V. ReoMtt, [1893] 1 Q. B. 779 ; 68 L. T. 688 ; 41 W. R. 497 429 
 V. Simmons (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 117 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 29 ; 32 
 
 W. R. 292 103 
 
 ■•!». Thompson (1595), 4 Rep. 30b 616 
 
 Shears v. Jacob (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 513 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 14 
 
 L. T. 286 ; 14 W. E. 609 619 
 
 Sheatley, In the Goods of, [1891] P. 172 ; 60 L. J. P. 56 .. 515 
 
 Sheffield Corporation v. Sheffield Electric Light Co., [1898] 
 
 ICh. 209 606 
 
 Sheil, Ex p. (1877), 4 Ch. D. 789 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 62 ; 36 L, T. 
 
 270; 25 W. E. 420 502,503 
 
 Shells V. Eait (1849), 7 C. B. 116 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 120 .. .. 580 
 Shelley v. Bethell (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 11 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 16 ; 49 
 
 L. T. 779; 32 W. B. 276 ; 48 J. P. 244 581 
 
 SheUey's Case (1581), 1 Rep. 93b 610 
 
 Shepheard v. Broome, [1904] A. C. 342; 73 L. J. Ch. 608 ; 91 
 
 L. T. 178; 53 W. R. Ill ; 11 Manson 288 717 
 
 Shepherd w. Hall (1812), 3 Camp. 180 195 
 
 V. Hills (1855), 11 Ex. 55 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 105 R. R. 386 .. 711, 
 
 712 
 
 V. Hodsman (1852), 18 Q. B. 316; 21 L. J. Q. B. 263 ., 320 
 
 Shepherdess, The (1800), 5 Chr. Rob. 262 176 
 
 Sheppard i;. Gosnold (1672), Vaugh. 169 533 
 
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CXXX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
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 Sherborn v. Wells (1863), 3 B. & S. 784 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 179 ; 8 
 
 L. T. 274 566 
 
 Sherras v. De Eutzen, [1895] 1 Q. B. 918 ; 64 L. J. M. C. 218 ; 
 
 72 L. T, 839 ; 43 W. B. 526 ; 59 J. P. 440 .. 137, 179, 186, 187, 
 
 190, 195 
 Sherwood v. Bay (1837), 1 Moo. P. C. 353 ; 43 E, E. 90, P. C. .. 101 
 
 Shields «. Bait (1849), 18 L. J. 0. P. 120 580 
 
 Shiels V. Q. N. By. Co. (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 331 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 
 631; 4L. T. 479 119 
 
 Shillito V. Thompson (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 12 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 18 ; 
 
 33 L. T. 506 ; 24 W. E. 57 526, 596 
 
 Shine, Ex p., [1892] 1 Q. B. 522 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 253 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 146 ; 40 W. E. 386 ; 9 M. B. E. 40 576 
 
 Shipman V. Henbest (1790), 4 T. B. 109 .. .. 238,240,734 
 
 Shipperdson's Trusts, iJe (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 619 .. ..522 
 
 Shoolbred v. Eoberts, [1899] 2 Q. B. 560 ; [1900] 2 Q. B. 497 ; 68 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 998, C. A 199,350 
 
 V. St. Panoras JJ. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 346 ; 59 L. J. M. 0. 
 
 63 ; 62 L. T. 287 ; 38 W. E. 399 ; 54 J. P. 231 .. . . 480 
 
 Shore I). Cunningham, [1917] 2 Ir. E. 360 78 
 
 Short V. Hammersmith Corporation (1911), 104 L. T. 70 .. 726 
 
 V. McCarthy (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 626 ; 22 E. E. 503 .. 12 
 
 Shortrede v. Cheek (1834), 1 A. & E. 57; 3 N. & M. 366; 40 
 
 E. E. 258 41,512 
 
 Showers v. Chelmsford Union, [1891] 1 Q. B. 339 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 
 
 55 ; 64 L. T. 755 ; 39 W. E. 231 247 
 
 Shrewsbury v. Beazley (1865), 19 C. B. N. S. 651 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 328 ; 14 W. E. 31 ; 13 L. T. 281 92 
 
 V. Soott (1860), 6 C. B. N. S. 1, 221 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 34, 190 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. S 452, 472 74,296,548 
 
 Shrimpton v. Sidmouth By. Co. (1867), L. E. 3 C. P. 80; 17 
 
 L. T. 647 440 
 
 Shuttleworth, Be (1846), 9 Q. B. 651 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 470 ; 
 
 16 L. J. M. 0. 18 ; llJur. 41 653 
 
 ■;;. Le Fleming (1865), 19 C. B. N. S. 687 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 309 ; llJur. N. S. 840 ; 14 W. E. 13 55,450,578 
 
 Sill i;. Worswiok (1791), 1 H. Bl. 665 ; 2 E. E. 816 .. .. 269 
 
 Sillence, Ex p. (1877), 7 Ch. D. 239 ; 47 L. J. Bank. 87 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 676 ; 26 W. B. 129 608 
 
 Simmonds i;. EUiott, [1917] 2 K. B. 894 675 
 
 V. Fulham Vestry, [1900] 2 Q. B. 188; 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 560 ; 82 L. T. 497 ; 48 W. E. 574 ; 64 J. P. 548 .. .. 367 
 V. Mailing, [1897] 2 Q. B. 433 ; 66 L. J, Q. B. 585 ; 77 
 
 L. T. 341 ; 45 W. E. 603 ; 61J. P. 502 523 
 
 V. Woodward, [1892] App. Cas. 100 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 252 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 534 ; 40 W. E. 641, H. L 118 
 
 Simms v. Begistrar of Probates, [1900] A. C. 323 ; 69 L.J. P. C. 
 
 51 ; 82 L. T. 433, P. C 206,218 
 
 Simpkin, Ex p. (1859), 2 E. & E. 392 ; 29 L, J. M. C. 23 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 144 611,656 
 
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TABLE OP OASES. CXXXi 
 
 Simpkm V. Birmingham JJ. (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 482 ; 21 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 102 ; 26 L. T. 620 ; 20 W. B. 702 17 
 
 Simpson, Be, [1916] 1 Ch. 502 14,268 
 
 V. Blues (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 230 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 121 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 697 ; 20 W. R. 680 34 
 
 V. Ready (1844), 11 M. & W. 846 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 193 . . 728 
 
 V. S. Staffordshire Waterworks (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 380; 4 
 
 De G. J. & S. 679 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 463 ; 13 W. R 729 .. 528 
 V. Teignmouth, &c. Bridge Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 405 ; 72 
 
 L. J. K. B. 204 ; 88. L. T. 117 ; 51 W. R. 545 ; 67 J. P. 65 ; 
 
 1 L. G. R. 235, C. A 71,481,595 
 
 i). Unwin (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 134 ; 39 R. R. 359 .. .. 410 
 
 Sims ?;. Doughty (1799), 5 Vea. 243 281 
 
 V. Pay (1889), 58 L. J. M. 0. 39 ; 60 L. T. 602 ; 53 J. P. 
 
 420; 16 Cox C. C. 609 .. 333 
 
 V. Thomas (1840), 12 A. & B. 536 ; 4 P. & D. 233 ; 9 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 399 ; 4 Jur. 1181 112,146,303 
 
 V. TroUope, [1897] 1 Q. B. 24 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 11 ; 75 L. T. 
 
 351 ; 45 W. R. 97 16 
 
 Simson v. Moss (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 543 ; 36 R. R. 655 .. .. 322 
 
 Sinnott v. Whiteehapel (1858), 3 C. B. N. S. 674 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 
 
 177 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 263 ; 111 R. R. 788 344 
 
 Sion College v. London Corp., [1901] 1 K. B. 617 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 
 
 369 ; 84 L. T. 133 ; 49 W. R. 361 ; 65 J. P. 324 .. 317, 527 
 Skinner v. Usher (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 423 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 158 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 430 ; 20 W. R. 659 566,574 
 
 •Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 413 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 
 
 67 L. T. 696 ; 41 W. R. 217 593 
 
 Slattery v. Naylor (1888), 13 App. Gas. 446 ; 57 L. J. P. C. 73 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 41 ; 36 W. R. 897 527 
 
 Slowey V. Threshie (1901), 38 Sc. L. R. 799, S. C 523 
 
 Smale v. Burr (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 64; 42 L. J. 0. P. 20 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 555 ; 21 W. R. 193 225 
 
 Small V. Nat. Prov. Bk., [1894] 1 Ch. 686 ; 63 L.J. Ch. 270; 70 
 
 L. T. 492 ; 42 W. R. 378 173,174 
 
 Smelting Co. of Australia v. Inl. Rev., [1897] 1 Q. B. 175 ; 66 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 75 L. T. 534 ; 45 W. R. 203 ; 61 J. P. 116 128 
 Smith, Ex p. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 374; 26 W. R. 682 ; 47 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 104 230,231,636 
 
 , Ek p. (cited in Alexander v. Vaughan (1737), 1 Cowp. 402 267 
 
 , lie (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 536 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 554 ; 38 W. R. 
 
 744 ; 7 M. B. R. 246 212 
 
 , Re (1877), 2 Ex. D. 47 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 75 ; 35 L. T. 858 .. 250 
 
 , Re Hands v. Andrews, [1893] 2 Ch. 1 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 336 ; 
 
 68 L. T. 337 ; 41 W. R. 289 ; 57 J. P. 516, C. A. .. 109, 303 
 , Be, [1896] 2 Ch. 590 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 761 ; 74 L. T. 810 ; 45 
 
 W. R. 29 107 
 
 , /?e (1919), 88 L. J. K. B. 113 412 
 
 V. Adams (1855), 5 De G. M. & G. 712 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 258 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 968 ; 104 R. R. 249 56,144 
 
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CXXXU TABLE OP OASES. 
 
 VAfili 
 
 Smitl;.«. Baker, [1891] App. Gas. 349; 60 L. J. Q. B. 691 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 467; 56 J. P. 660, H.L 109 
 
 «. Bamham (1876), 1 Ex. D. 419 ; 34 L. T. 774 .. .. 588 
 
 V. Birmmgham Guardians (1857), 7 E. & B. 483 ; 26 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 105 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 769 ; 110 E. B. 689 246 
 
 V. Brown (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 729 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 808 ; 19 W. E. 1165 63,556 
 
 V. Callander, [1901] A. C. 297 ; 70 L. J. P. C. 53 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 801 .. .. .. 382 
 
 «. Cooke (1915), 79 J. P. 245 194 
 
 V. Dauney, [1904] 2 K. B. 186 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 646 ; 90 L. T. 
 
 760 ; 20 T. L. E. 444 116 
 
 V. Pox (1848), 6 Hare 386 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 170 ; 12 Jur. 130 ; 
 
 77E.E.152 12 
 
 V. G. W. Ey. Co. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 165 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 97 ; 
 
 37 L. T. 645 ; 26 W. E. 130 357 
 
 V. Huggett (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 55 ; K. & G. 434 ; 31 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 38 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 617 ; 5 L. T. 357 ; 10 W. E. 80 .. 653 
 
 «. Jones (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 328 660 
 
 y. Keats (1832), 4 Hagg. Ecc. 275 248 
 
 V. Kirby (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 131 ; 24 W. E. 207 . . .. 516 
 
 V. Kynnersley, [1903] 1 K. B. 788 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 357 ; 88 
 
 L. T. 449 ; 51 W. E. 548 ; 67 J. P. 125 ; 1 L. G. E. 393 71, 595 
 V. Lambeth Assessment Committee (1883), 9 Q. B. D. 585 ; 
 
 52L. J. M. C. 1 129 
 
 «;. Lancaster (1869), L. E. 5 C. P. 246 169 
 
 V. Lindo (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 395 ; 5 Id. 587 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 
 
 196, 335; 4 Jur. N. S. 974; 114 E. E. 785 .. 64, 478, 532, 697 
 
 v. Lister (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 154 158 
 
 V. Mawhood (1845), 14 M. & W. 452 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 149 .. 699 
 
 ■». Moody (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 43 85 
 
 V. Northleaoh Eural District Council, [1902] 1 Ch. 197 ; 71 
 
 L. J. Ch. 8 359 
 
 V. Portsmouth JJ., [1906] 2 K. B. 229 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 851 ; 
 
 95 L. T. 5 ; 54 W. E. 598 ; 70 J. P. 497 76 
 
 V. E. (1878), 3 App. Cas. 614 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 51 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 233 640 
 
 V. Eosario Nitrate Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 174 ; 70 L. T. 68 ; 7 
 
 Asp. M.C. 417 .. 42 
 
 V. Southampton Corp., [1902] 2 K. B. 250 658 
 
 V. Sparrow (1827), 4 Bing. 84 ; 2 C. & P. 544 ; 29 E. E. 514 691 
 
 u. Tilley (1664), 1 Keb. 712 534 
 
 V. Walton (1877), 3 C. P. D. 109 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 45 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 437 501 
 
 V. White (1866), L. E. 1 Eq. 626 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 454 ; 14 L. T. 
 
 350; 14 W. E. 510 693 
 
 V. Whitmore (1863), 1 Hem. & M. 576 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 218 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 65 ; 10 L. T. 128 236 
 
 V. Wood (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 23 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 5 ; 61 L. T. 
 
 870 ; 38 W. E. 138 ; 54 J. P. 324 469 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. CXXXUl 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Smith's Estate, Be (1887), 35 CJi. D. 589 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 726 ; 56 
 
 L. T. 850 ; 35 W. E. 514 ; 51 J. P. 692 318 
 
 Smithett v. Blythe (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 509 ; 35 E. E. 358 .. 549 
 
 Smithies v. Bridge, [1902] 2 K. B. 13 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 555 ; 87 
 
 L. T. 167 ; 50 W. E. 686 ; 66 J. P. 740 186 
 
 Smyth V. North (1872), L. E. 7 Ex. 242 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 103; 20 
 
 W. E. 688 203 
 
 Sneed t>. Commonwealth (1838), 6 Dana 338 (Kentucky) .. 6 
 
 Sneezum v. Marshall (1841), 7 M. ife W. 417 ; 9 D. P. 0. 267 ; 10 
 
 L.J. Ex. 193 504 
 
 Soci6t^ Anonyme Beige des Mines d'Aljustrel v. Anglo-Belgian 
 
 Agency, (1915), 84 L. J. Ch. 849, 0. A 196 
 
 Society des H6tels Bennies D. Hawker (1913), 29 T. L. E. 578 .. 44 
 Societe G^n^rale de Paris v. Tramway Unions Co. (1884), 14 
 
 Q. B.D.455 .. .. ". 202 
 
 Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler (1814), 2 Gallison 
 
 105 388 
 
 Solarte v. MelviUe (1827), 1 Man. & Ey. 198 209 
 
 Somerset (Duke of). He (1887), 34 Ch. D. 465 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 733 ; 
 
 56 L, T. 145 ; 35 W. E. 273 163 
 
 Somerset v. Hart (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 360 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 77 ; 48 
 
 J P 327 ' 192 490 
 V. Wade, [1894] Tq. B.'574; 63 L. J.*M. c!'l26 ; '70 L. T. ' 
 
 482; 42 W.E. 399; 58 J. P. 231 .. .. 187,192,490 
 
 Southam, Be (1882), 19 Ch. D. 169 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 207 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 635 ; 30 W. E. 126 606 
 
 Southampton Bridge Co. ■;;. Southampton L. Bd. (1858), 8 E. & B. 
 
 808 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 128 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1261 ; 112 E. E. 785 629 
 
 South of Ireland Colliery v. Waddle (1868), L. E. 3 C. P. 468 ; 37 
 
 L. 3. C. P. 211 ; 18 L. T. 405 ; 16 W. E. 756 and L. E. 4 
 
 C. P. 617 ; 38 L. J. 0. P. 338 ; 17 W. E. 896 ^ .. 163, 619 
 S. E. Ey. Co. V. Ey. Commrs. (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 586 ; 50 L, J. 
 
 Q. B. 201 ; 44 L. T. 203 ; 45 J. P. 388 520 
 
 Southport Banking Co. «. Thompson (1887), 57 L J. Ch. 114 .. 173 
 Southport (Mayor of) v. Morriss, [1893] 1 Q. B. 359 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 47 ; 57 J. P. 231 ; 41 W. E. 382 ; 68 L. T. 221 ; 7 Asp. 
 
 M. C. 279 132 
 
 South Staffordshire Tramways Co. •y.-Sickness, &c. Assrce. Assn., 
 
 [1891] 1 Q. B. 402 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 47, 260 ; 64 L. T. 279 ; 
 
 39 W. E. 292 ; 55 J. P. 372 606 
 
 Southwark, &c. Water Co. v. Hampton Urban Council (1898), 
 
 68 L. J. Q. B. 207 572 
 
 V. Wandsworth Board, [1898] 2 Ch. 608 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 657 ; 
 
 79 L. T. 132 ; 47 W. B. 107 ; 62 J. P. 756 - 630 
 
 South Yorkshire Ey. Co. v. G. N. Ey. Co. (1853), 9 Ex. 55 ; 22 
 
 L. J. Ex. 305 ; 96 E. E. 550 619,655 
 
 Sowerby v. Smith (1874), L. E. 9 C. P. 524; 43 L. J. C. P. 290 ; 
 
 31L. T. 309; 23 W. E. 79 502,546,647 
 
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CXXxiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Spaokman, Re (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 728 ; 59 L, J. Q. B. 306; 62 
 
 L. T. 849 ; 38 W. K. 497 ; 7 M. B. B. 100 99 
 
 Spaekman's Case (1849), 1 McN. & G. 170; 18 L. J. Ch. 261 .. 592 
 Spencer v. Metrop. Bd. of Works (1882), 22 Ch. D. 142; 52 
 
 L. J. Ch. 249; 47 L. T. 459; 31 W. E. 347 557 
 
 Spice V. Baoon (1877), 2 Ex. D. 463 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 713 ; 86 L. T. 
 
 896; 25 W. E. 840 651 
 
 Spioer v. Barnard (1859), 1 E. & E. 874; 28 L. J. M. C. 176; 5 
 
 Jur. N. S. 961 ; 7 W. E. 467; 117 R. E. 497 167 
 
 Spiers & Pond v. Bennett, [1896] 2 Q. B. 65 ; 65 L. J. M. 0. 144 ; 
 
 74 L. T. 697 ; 44 W. E. 510 ; 60 J. P. 437 .. . . 58, 59, 186 
 
 Spilsbury v. Micklethwaite (1808), 1 Taunt. 146; 9 E. E. 717 .. 632 
 Spittall V. Brook (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 426 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 48 ; 56 
 
 L. T. 364; 35W. E.520; lFox22 117 
 
 S. S. B., iJe, [1906] 1 Ch. 724 , .. 144 
 
 Stable, JJe, [1919] P. 10 127 
 
 Staoey v. Lintell (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 291 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 108 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 553 ; 27 W. E. 551 126 
 
 StaUard v. Marks (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 412 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 91 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 566 ; 26 W. E. 694 212 
 
 Stamp, Ba;^. (1846), IDeG. 345 177 
 
 Standard Manufacturing Co., Be, [1891] 1 Ch. 627; 60 L. J. Ch. 
 
 292 ; 64 L. T. 487 ; 39 W. R. 369, 0. A 61, 816 
 
 Stanford i;. Eoberts, [1901] 1 Ch. 440 70 
 
 Stanley v. Dodd (1822), 1 D. & E. 397 ; 2 D. & E. 800 .. .. 496 
 V. Western Insurance Co. (1868), L. E. 3 Ex. 71 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Exoh. 215 ; 16 W. E. 369 ; 17 L. T. N. S. 518 .. .. 107 
 
 V. Wild (1900), 69 L. J. Q. B. 318 249 
 
 Stapleton v. Haymen (1864), 2 H. & C. 918 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 497 ; 12 W. E. 817 653 
 
 Starey v. Ohilworth Gunpowder Co. (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 90 ; 59 
 
 L. J. M. C. 13 ; 62 L. T. 73 ; 38 W. E. 204 ; 54 J. P. 436 ; 17 
 
 CoxC. C. 65 195 
 
 Stead V. Carey (1845), 1 C. B. 496 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 177 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 511 395 
 
 Steavenson v. Oliver (1841), 8 M. & W. '234; 5 Jur. 1064; 10 
 
 L.J. Ex. 338 728 
 
 Steed i-. Henley (1824), 1 C. & P. 574 697 
 
 Steel «. Dartford Log. Bd. (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 256 .. ..726 
 
 Steele v. Brannan (1872), L. E. 7 C. P. 261 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 85 ; 
 
 26 L. T. 509 ; 20 W. E. 607 196, 330 
 
 V. Midland Ey. Co. (1866), L. E. 1 Ch. 282 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 
 
 218 ; 14 L. T. 3 ; 14 W. E. 367 53 
 
 Steinson V. Heath (1694), 3 Lev. 400 711 
 
 Stephens i;. Mysore Eeefs Mining Co. (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 295 .. 592 
 
 v. Eobinson (1832), 2C. & J. 209 696 
 
 Stephenson v. Higginson (1851), 3 H. L. C. 638, H. L 471 
 
 Stettin, The (1862), Br. & L. 199 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 208 ; 6 L. T. 
 
 613 563 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. CXXXV 
 
 PASE 
 
 Stevens, Exp. (1875), L. E. 20 Eq. 786 ; 44 L. J. Bank. 136 ; 83 
 
 L. T. 135 ; 23 W. E. 908 225 
 
 w. Evans (1761), 2 Burr. 1152 710 
 
 V. Gourley (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 99; 1 P. & F. 498; 29 
 
 L. J. 0. P. 1 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 147 ; 1 L. T. 33 .. .. 647, 688 
 V. Jeaoooke (1848), 11 Q. B. 731 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 163 ; 12 
 
 Jur. 477 354,718 
 
 V. Lasoles, [1912] 1 K. B. 36, C. A 55 
 
 Steward v. Greaves (1843), 10 M. & W. 711 ; 2 D. N. S. 485 ; 12 
 
 L. J. Ex. 109 ; 6 Jur. 1116 294 
 
 Stewart v. Jones (1852), 1 E. & B. 22 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 1020 326 
 
 t;. Lawton (1823), 1 Bing. 374 532 
 
 Stiles V. Galinski, [1904] 1 K. B. 615 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 485 ; 90 
 
 L. T. 437 ; 52 W. E. 462 ; 68 J. P. 183 ; 2 L. G. E. 341 ; 20 
 
 T. L. E. 219 525 
 
 Stock and Share Auction, &o. Co., Be, [1894] 1 Ch. 736 ; 63 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 245 ; 70 L. T. 235 ; 42 W. E. 300 ; 1 Manson 125 .. 561 
 Stocker v. Warner (1845), 1 C. B. 167 ; 9 Jur. 136 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 
 
 90 389 
 
 Stockport, &c Schools, Be, [1898] 2 Ch. 687 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 41 .. 587 
 Stockport, &o. Ey. Co., Be, (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 251 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 614 ; 10 L. T. 426 ; 12 W. E. 762 172 
 
 Stockton & Darlington Ey. Co. v. Barrett (1844), 11 CI. & F. 590 ; 
 
 8 Scott N. E. 641 ; 65 E. E. 261 504, 528 
 
 V. Brown (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 246 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1168 ; 8 
 
 W. E. 708 231 
 
 Stoker i;. Morpeth Corpn., [1915] 2 K. B. 511 .. .. 444,657 
 
 Stokes V. Grissell (1854), 14 C. B. 678; 2 C. L. E. 730; 23 
 
 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 18 Jur. 519 ; 98 E. E. 814 612 
 
 V. Mitcheson, [1902] 1 K. B. 857 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 677 ; 86 
 
 L. T. 767 ; 50 W. E. 553 ; 66 J. P. 615 840 
 
 Stokes' Trusts, Be (1872), L. E. 13 Eq. 333 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 290 ; 
 
 26L. T. 181; 20 W. E. 396 522 
 
 Stone V. Dean (1858), E. B. & E. 504 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 819 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 534 674 
 
 V. Yeovil Corpn. (1876), 1 C. P. D. 691 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 
 
 657 ; 34 L. T. 871 ; 24 W. E. 1073 and 2 C. P. D. 99 ; 46 
 
 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 36 L. T. 279 ; 25 W. E. 240 . . .. 419 
 Stonor V. Fowle (1887), 18 App. Cas. 20 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 387 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 1; 36 W. E. 742; 52 J. P. 228 644 
 
 Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland v. P. & O. Steamship Co. 
 
 (1882), 7 A. C. 816 66 
 
 Storie v. "Winchester (1850), 17 C. B. 653 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 217 .. 881 
 Story, Exp. (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 166 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 266 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 29; 26W. E. 329 241 
 
 Stoy V. Eees (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 748 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 49; 38W. R. 683 ' 118 
 
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CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange, [1896] A. C. 166 ; 65 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 178 ; 74 L. T. 468 ; 44 W. B. 497 ; 60 J. P. 468, 
 
 H. L 199 
 
 Stradling «. Morgan (1558), Plow. 204 ..110 
 
 Straker «. Eeynolds (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 262 156 
 
 Stratford Union Council v. Manchester, &c. Ey. Go. (1903), 
 
 IL. G. E. 683 633 
 
 Streatley, IntheGoodsof (1891),60L. J. P. 56.. .. 69,515 
 
 Stretton's Derby Brewery v. Derby (Mayor), [1894] 1 Ch. 431 J 
 
 63 L. J. Ch. 135 ; 69 L. T. 791 ; 42 W. B. 583 .. .. 628 
 
 Strickland v. Hayes, [1896] 1 Q. B. 290 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 55 ; 74 
 
 L. T. 137 ; 44 W. B. 398 ; 18 C. C. C. 244 ; 60 J. P. 164 .. 523, 
 
 524 
 Strother v. Hutchinson (1838), 4 Bing. N. 0. 83 ; 5 Scott 346 ; 
 
 6 D. P. C. 238 ; 3 Hodges 294 ; 2 Jur. 16 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 1 .. 451 
 Stroud V. Wandsworth Bd. of Works, [1894] 2 Q. B. 1 ; 68 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 88; 70L. T. 190; 42W. B. 355; 58 J. P. 652 .. 231 
 
 Studds V. Watson (1884), 28 Ch. D. 305 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 626 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 129 ; 33 W. B. 118 .. ' .. 512 
 
 Sturgis V. DareU (1860), 4 H. & N. 622 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 366 and 6 
 
 H. & N. 120 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 472 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1351 ; 118 B. E. 
 
 652 458,543 
 
 Submarine E. 14, B«, [1917] P. 85 102 
 
 Suburban Hotel Co., Be (1867), L. E. 2 Ch. 737 ; 86 L. J. Ch. 
 
 710 ; 17 L. T. 22 ; 15 W. E. 1096 592 
 
 Suche & Co., Be (1875), 1 Ch. D. 48; 45 L. J. Ch. 12; 33 L. T. 
 
 774 ; 24 W. E. 184 391 
 
 Sully V. Atty.-Genl. (1860), 5 H. & N. 711 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 464 ; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1018 ; 8 W. E. 472 270 
 
 Summerlea Iron Co. v. Thomson, [1913] S. C. (J.) 34, Sco. .. 138, 
 
 202, 210 
 Summers v. Holbom Bd. of Works, [1893] 1 Q. B. 612 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 81; 57 J. P. 326; 68 L. T. 226; 41 W. E. 
 
 445 336 
 
 Sunderland Bd. v. Frankland (1873), L. E. 8 Q. B. 18; 42 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 13 ; 28 L. T. 18 623 
 
 Sunderland Gdns. v. Sussex (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 99 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 
 
 33 ; 46 L. T. 98 ; 80 W. E. 337 ; 46 J. P. 375 .. .. 386 
 
 Supervisors u. U. S. (1866), 4 Wallace, 435 .. .. 439, 441 
 
 Surtees V. Ellison (1829), 9 B. & C. 752 728 
 
 Sussex Peerage (1844), 11 CI. & F. 85 ; 8 Jur. 793, H. L. 1, 6, 78 
 
 256, 260, 501 
 Sutton V. Sutton (1883), 22 Ch. D. 515 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 383 ; 48 L. T. 
 
 95;31W. E. 369 62,73,76,303 
 
 Sutton's Case (1627), 10 Eep. 31a 99 
 
 Swaine v. WUson (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 252; 59 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 309 ; 38 W. B. 261 ; 54 J. P. 484 . . . . 702, 704 
 
 Swan V. Sanders (1881), 50 L. J. M. C. 67 ; €4 L. T. 424 ; 29 
 
 W. E. 588 ; 14 Cox C. C. 566 474 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Sweeney v. Spooner (1863), 3 B. & S. 329 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 691 ; 7 L. T. 623 ; 11 W. E. 264 470 
 
 Swift V. Jewsbury (1874), L. E. 9 Q. B. 301 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 31 ; 22 W. E. 319 138 
 
 V. KeUy (1836), 3 Knapp, 257 ; 40 E. E. 22, P. C 260 
 
 Swindells. Bulkeley (1886), 18 Q. B. B. 250; 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 613 ; 66 L. T. 38 ; 35 W. E. 189 454 
 
 Sydney Municipal Council v. Bourke, [1895] A. C. 433, P. C. .. 726 
 
 Sydney, The, [1916] P. 300 102 
 
 Syers u, Conquest (1873), 37 J. P. 342 211 
 
 Sykes v. Sowerby U. D. C, [1900] 1 Q. B. 584 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 464; 82 L.T. 177; 64 J. P. 340 364 
 
 Symingtons Petitioners (1905), 43 Sc. L. E. 157, Sc 592 
 
 Syred v. Carruthers (1858), E. B. & E. 469 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 273 ; 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 949 ; 113 E. E. 732 675 
 
 T. 
 
 Tabernacle Bldg. Soc. v. Knight, [1892] A. C. 298 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 50 ; 67 L. T. 483 ; 56 J. P. 709 293 
 
 Taff Vale Ey. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ely. Servants, [1901] 
 
 A. C. 426 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 905 ; 85 L. T. 147 ; 50 W. E. 44 ; 
 
 65 J. P. 596 ; 17 T. L. E. 698 629,705 
 
 Talbot V. Shrewsbury (1873), L. E. 16 Eq. 26 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 877 ; 
 
 21W. E. 473 303 
 
 Tarrant v. Baker (1854), 14 C. B. 199 ; 2 C. L. E. 78 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 21 ; 18 Jur. 15; 98 E. E. 589 414 
 
 Tassel v. Ovenden (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 383 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 228 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 696 ; 25 W. E. 692 350,351 
 
 Tate D. Wellings (1790), 3 T. E. 531 209 
 
 Tatham v. Eeeve, [1893] 1 Q. B. 44 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 30 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 683 ; 41 W. E. 174 ; 57 J. P. 118 556,693 
 
 Tattle v. Grimwood (1826), 3 Bing. 493 727 
 
 Tawny's Case (1704), 2 Salk. 531 365 
 
 Taylor, Be (1877), 4 Ch. D. 159 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 399 ; 36 L. T. 169 ; 
 
 26W. E. 69 228 
 
 V. CaldweU (1863), 3 B. & S. 826 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 164 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 356 ; 11 W. E. 726 674 
 
 V. Crowland Gas Co. (1854), 11 Ex. 1 ; 2 C. L. E. 1247 ; 23 
 
 L. J. Ex. 254 ; 18 Jur. 913 ; 105 E. E. 360 119 
 
 V. (1854), 10 Ex. 293 ; 2 C. L. E. 1247 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 
 
 254 ; 18 Jur. 913 697 
 
 V. Goodwin (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 228 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 104 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 458 ; 27 W. E. 489 481 
 
 V. Greenhal^h (1876), 24 W. E. 311, reversing L. E. 9 Q. B. 
 
 487 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 168 ; 31 L. T. 184 ; 23 W. E. 4 .. 189, 726 
 V. Humphreys (1861), 17 C. B. 539 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 429 ; 30 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 242 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1288 ; 4 L. T. 514 ; 9 W. E. 705 121 
 
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CXXXVm TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PABE 
 
 Taylor v. Newman (1863), 4 B, & S. 93 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 186 ; 9 Cox 
 
 C. C. 314 ; 8 L. T: 424 ; 11 W. B. 752 74, 167 
 
 V. Oldham (1877), 4 Ch. D. 395 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 105 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 696 ; 25 W. B. 303 72,301 
 
 V. Oram (1862), 1 H. & C. 370 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 252 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 748 ; 7 L. T. 68 ; 10 W. E. 800 574 
 
 u. PMlips (1802), 3 East 155 ; 6 B. E. 575 682 
 
 V. Bogers (1881), 50 L. J. M. 0. 132 ; 45 L. T. 314 .. .. 290 
 
 V. St. Mary Abbotts (1871), L. B. 6 0. P. 309 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 
 
 45 ; 23 L. T. 493 ; 19 W. B. 109 ; 1 Hop. & C. 421 .. . . 117 
 V. Smetten (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 207 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 101 ; 48 
 
 J. P. 36 600 
 
 V. Taylor (1876), 1 Ch. D. 426 ; 3 Ch. D. 145 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 
 
 378, 848 ; 25 W. B. 279 ; 35 L. T. 450 520 
 
 leather. Ex p. (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 7 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 70 .. 642 
 
 Tempest v. Kilner (1846), 3 0. B. 249 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 10 .. 575 
 
 Temiant v. Bell (1846), 9 Q. B. 684 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 31 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 946 608 
 
 V. Bawlings (1879), 4 C. P. D. 133 ; 27 W. B. 682 .. 656, 677 
 
 V. Smith, [1892] A. C. 150 ; 61 L. J. P. C. 11 ; 66 L. T. 327 ; 
 
 56J. P. 596 505 
 
 V. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] App. Cas. 31 ; 63 L. J. 
 
 P. C. 25 ; 69 L. T. 774 252 
 
 Tepper v. Nichols (1865), 18 C. B.!N. S. 121 ; 1 H. & P. 202 ; 34 
 
 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 18 ; 11 L. T. 509 ; 13 W. B. 
 
 270 632 633 
 
 Ternan, Se (1864), 5 B."& S. 645 ; 33"l. J. M. C. 201 ; 9 CoxC. C. ' 
 
 522 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 34 ; 10 L. T. 499 ; 12 W. B. 858 .. .. 123 
 
 Terrell, Be (1878), 4 Ch. D. 293 ; 47 L.J. Bank. 60 ; 38 L. T. 243 ; 
 
 26 W. B. 470 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 47 227 
 
 Terry v. Brighton Aquarium Co. (1875), L. B. 10 Q. B. 306 ; 44 
 
 L. J. M. C. 173 ; 32 L. T. 458 ... 574 
 
 V. Terry (1915), 32 T. L. B. 167 152 
 
 Tewkesbury u. Twyning (1632), 2 Bott. 1 ; Buls. 349 .. ..216 
 
 Tewkesbury Union v. Upton-on-Sevem Union (1913), 83 L. J. 
 
 KB. 37 116 
 
 Thacker v. Hardy (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 685 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 39 
 
 L. T. 595 ; 27 W. B. 158 210 
 
 Thames, Conservators of v. Hall (1868), L. B. 3 C. P. 415 ; 37 
 
 L. J. C. P. 163 ; 18 L. T. 361 ; 16 W. B. 971 .. .. 311, 314 
 Thames Haven Co. v. Bose (1842), 4 M. & G. 552 ; 2 D. N. S. 104 ; 
 
 5 Scott N. E. 524 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 90 ; 3 EaUw. Cas. 177 ; 61 
 
 E. B. 599 202 
 
 Theberge v. Laudry (1877), 2 App. Cas. 102 ; 46 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 35 
 
 L. T. 640 ; 25 W. E. 216 251,252 
 
 Theta, The (1894), 63 L. J. Adm. 160 244 
 
 Thiskell ?;. Cambi, [1919] W. E. 195 70 
 
 Thistleton w. Frewer (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 230 394 
 
 Thoda;^, Exp. (1877), 2 Ch. D. 229, 797 ; 45 L. J. Bank. 64, 159 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 261, 705 345 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. CXXXIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Thomas, Re (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 380 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 574 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 447 ; 36 "W. K. 375 ; 5 M. B. K. 153 249 
 
 u. Kelly (1888), 13 A. C. 506, H. L 16 
 
 V. Pritohard, [1903] 1 K. B. 209 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 23 ; 87 L. T. 
 
 688 ; 51 W. E. 58 ; 67 J. P. 71 ; 20 C. C. C. 376 .. 249, 252 
 
 V. Quartermaine (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 685 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 340 ; 
 
 57 L. T. 537 ; 35 W. R. 555 ; 51 J. P. 516 . . .. 628, 682 
 
 V. E. (1874), L. E. 10 Q. B. 44 ; • 44 L. J. Q. B. 9 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 439; 23 W. R. 176 250 
 
 u. Ehymney EaU Co. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 141 .. .. 720 
 
 V. Stephenson (1853), 2 E. & B. 108 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 597 ; 95 E. E. 463 483 
 
 V. Suiters, [1900] 1 Oh. 10 ; 69 L. J. Oh. 27 ; 81 L. T. 469 ; 
 
 48W. E. 133 523,525 
 
 Thomas' Estate, Re (1918), 34 T. L. E. 626 127 
 
 Thompson, Re, [1894] 1 Q. B. 462 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 238; 42W.E.462 347 
 
 JJe (1919), 88 L. J. K. B. 646 389 
 
 V. Brighton (Mayor), [1894] 1 Q. B. 332 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 
 
 70 L. T. 206 ; 42 W. E. 161 ; 58 J. P. 297 726 
 
 V. Farrer (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 372 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 534 ; 47 
 
 L. T. 117 ; 4 Asp. M. 0. 562 57 
 
 i;. Gibson (1841), 10 L. J. Ex. 243 608 
 
 V. Goold, [1910] A. C. 409 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 905; 103 L. T. 
 
 81 .. .. ■ 25,55,346 
 
 V. Harvey (1859), 4 H. & N. 254; 28 L. J. M. 0. 163; 118 
 
 E. E. 418 670 
 
 V. HiU (1870), L. E. 5 0. P. 564 ; 39 L. J. 0. P. 264 ; 22 L. T. 
 
 820; 18 W.E. 1070 636 
 
 Thomson v. Adv.-Gen. (1848), 12 01. & F. 1 ; 9 Jur. 217 ; 29 E. E. 
 
 1, H. L 270 
 
 «. Olanmorris (Lord), (1900) 69 L. J. Oh. 337 .. ..583 
 
 Thorbum v. Barnes (1867), L. E. 2 0. P. 384 ; 36 L. J. 0. P. 184 ; 
 
 16 L. T. 10 ; 15 W. E. 623 639 
 
 Thorley, Re, [1891] 2 Oh. 613; 60 L. J. Ch. 537 ; 64 L. T. 515 ; 
 
 39W. E. 565 504,509 
 
 Thome, Exp. (1876), 3 Oh. D. 457; 45 L. J. Bank. 158 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 532 ; 25 W. E. 186 543 
 
 V. Heard, [1895] A. 0. 495 ; 64 L. J. Oh. 652 ; 73 L. T. 291 ; 
 
 44W. E. 155 12 
 
 Thorp «. Browne (1867), L. E. 2 H. L. 220, H. L 118 
 
 Thorpe v. Adams (1871), L. E. 6 0. P. 125 ; 30 L. J. M. 0. 52 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 810 ; 19 W. E. 352 314 
 
 -^ V. PriestnaU, [1897] 1 Q. B. 159; 66 L. J. Q. B. 248; 45 
 
 W. E. 223 ; 60 J. P. 821 101 
 
 Thursby v. Briercliffe, [1894] 2 Q. B. 11 ; [1895] A. 0. 32 ; 63 
 
 L. J. M. 0. 137 ; 70 L. T. 618 ; 42 W. E. 450 ; 58 J. P. 428, 
 
 H.L 572 
 
 p:hwaites v. Coulthwaite (1896), 65 I;. J. Ch. 238 .. .. 598, 599 
 
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Cxl TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Thwaites v. Wilding (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 4 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 49 
 
 L. T. 396; 32W. R. 80 652 
 
 Tidd, Be, [1893] 3 Oh. 154; 62 L. J. Ch. 915; 69 L. T. 255; 42 
 
 W. E.25 454 
 
 Tidey v. MoUett (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 298 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 235 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 800 ; 10 L. T. 380 ; 12 W. E. 802 . . 569 
 
 Tidswell, Re (1887), 56 L. J. Q. B. 548 ; 57 L. T. 416; 35 W. E. 
 
 669 558 
 
 Timmins u. Timmins, [1919] , P. 75 152 
 
 Timms v. WUliams (1842), 3 Q. B. 413 ; 2 G. & D. 621 ; 11 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 210 ; 6 Jur. 1012 239 
 
 Tisdell V. Combe (1838), 7 A. & E. 788 ; 3 N. & P. 29 ; 1 W. W. & 
 
 H. 5; 2 Jur. 32 587 
 
 Titmus V. Littlewood, [1916] 1 K. B. 272 Ill 
 
 Tobacco Pipe Makers v. Woodroffe (1826), 7 B. & C. 838; 5 D. & 
 
 B. 530 62,306 
 
 Tobin V. E. (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 505 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1130; 8 L. T. 392, 730 ; 11 W. R. 701, 915 .. .. 250 
 Todd V. Robinson (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 739; 54 L. J. Q. B. 47; 52 
 
 L.T. 120; 49 J. P. 278 496 
 
 ToUemaohe's Estate, ;fe, [1917] P. 246 127 
 
 Toilet t;. Thomas (1871), 24 L. T. 508 588 
 
 Tomkins v. Ashby (1827), 6 B. & C. 541 ; 9 D. & R. 543 .. .. 506 
 
 Tomlinson v. BuUock (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 230; 48 L. J. M. C. 95 ; 
 
 40 L. T. 459 ; 27 W. E. 552 610 
 
 V. Consolidated Credit Corpn. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 135 ; 62 
 
 L.T. 162; 38 W.R. 118; 54 J. P. 644 198 
 
 Tompson v. Browne (1835), 3 M. & K. 32 ; 5 L. J. Ch. 64 .. 223 
 Toms V. Claoton (1898), 78 L. T. 712 ; 46 W. R. 629 ; 62 J. P. 505 510 
 V. Cuming (1845), 7 M. & G. 88 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 90 136 
 
 V. Wilson (1863), 4 B. &. S. 442 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 382 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 201 ; 7 L. T. 421 ; 11 W. E. 117 608 
 
 Tone Conservators v. Ash (1829), 10 B. & C. 349 ; 34 R. R. 441 .. 617 
 Toomer «. London Ch. & D. Ey. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 450; 47 
 
 L. J. Ex. 276 ; 37 L. T. 161 ; 26 W. R. 31 520 
 
 Tooth i;. Power, [1891] A. C. 291 157 
 
 Toronto (Corporation) v. Vurgo, [1896] A. C. 88 ; 65 L. J. P. C. 
 
 4; 73 L. T. 449 524 
 
 Tottenham Board v. Rowell (1876), 1 Ex. T>. 514; 46 L. J. Ex. 
 
 432; 25 W.R. 135 348 
 
 Toutill V. Douglas (1863), 33 L. J. Q. B. 66 ; 8 L. T. 426 .. 731 
 
 Towler v. Chatterton (1829), 6 Bmg. 258 ; 3 M. & P. 619 ; 31 
 
 R. R. 411 397 
 
 Towns V. Wentworth (1858), 11 Moo. P. C. 543 99 
 
 Townsend v. Deacon (1849), 3 Exch. 706 ; 6 D. & L. 659 ; 18 
 
 L. J. Ex. 298 ; 13 Jur. 366 409 
 
 Tracey v. Pretty. [1901] 1 K. B. 444 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 234 ; 88 
 
 L. T, 767 ; 49 W. R. 282 ; 65 J. P. 196 ; 19 C. C. C. 593 .. 231 
 Traill «). McAllister (1890), 25 L. B. Ir. 524 .. .. ,73? 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. cxli 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Travis v. Uttley, [1894] 1 Q. B. 233 ; 63 L. J. M. G. 48 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 242; 42 W.B. 461; 58 J. P. 85 4 
 
 Tredwen v. Holman (1862), 1 H. & C. 72 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 398 ; 8 
 
 Jiir. N. S. 1080 ; 10 W. K. 652 235 
 
 Trethowan, Be (1877), 5 Ch. D. 559 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 43 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 70; 25W. E. 399 173 
 
 Trevor -Battye's Settlement, Be (1912), 81 L. J. Ch. 646 .. 41 
 
 Triumph, H.M.S., and Usk, H.M.S., Be (1917), 86 L. J. P. 127 .. 103 
 Tromans v. Hodkinson, [1903] 1 K. B. 30 : 72 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 87 
 
 L. T. 549 ; 51 W. E. 286 ; 67 J. P. 30 ; 20 C. 0. C. 360 . . 600 
 Trowell v. Shenton (1878), 8 Ch. D. 324 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 738 ; 38 
 
 L. T. 369 ; 26 W. R. 837 512 
 
 Trower v. Chadwick (1839), 3 Bmg. N. C. 334 ; 3 Scott 699 ; 2 
 
 Hodges 267 ; 43 E. E. 659 630 
 
 Tuflfv. Drapers'Co. (1913), 82L. J. K. B. 174 224 
 
 Tunbridge Wells v. Baird, [1896] A. C. 434 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 451 ; 
 
 74 L. T. 385 ; 60 J. P. 788 170,545 
 
 Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners v. Southborough 
 
 Local Bd. (1888), 60 L. T. 172 671 
 
 TunnioUffe d. Birkdale (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 450 ; 56 L. J. M. C. 
 
 109 ; 59 L. T. 190 ; 36 W. E. 360 ; 52 J. P. 452 .. .. 247 
 
 Tumbull V. Forman (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 234 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 489 ; 
 
 53 L. T. 128 ; 13 W. E. 768 ; 49 J. P. 708 387 
 
 Turner, Be (1846), 9 Q. B. 80 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 140 .. .. 176 
 V. Browne (1846), 3 C. B. 157 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 223; 10 Jur. 
 
 811 ; 4 D. & L. 201 685 
 
 - — V. Evans (1853), 2 E. & B. 515 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 412 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 1073 ; 2 De a. M. & G. 740 ; 95 E. E. 312, 681 . . . . 41 
 V. Morgan (1875), L. E. 10 C. P. 587 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 
 
 33L. T. 172; 23W. E. 659 420 
 
 Tnrquand v. Bd. of Trade (1886), 11 App. Cas. 286 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 417; 55 L. T. 30 54,78 
 
 Turtle «. Hartwell (1795), 6 T. E. 426 123 
 
 Twigg's Estate, Be, [1892] 1 Ch. 579 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 444 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 604 ; 40 W. E. 297 446 
 
 Two hundred Chests of Tea (1824), 9 Wheaton 430 .. .. 107 
 
 Twycross v. Grant (1877), 2 0. P. D. 469; 4 C. P. D. 40; 46 
 
 L. J. C. P. 636 ; 36 L. T. 812 ; 25 W. E. 701 .. 39,123, 
 
 204 449 717 
 Tyerman v. Smith (1856), 6 E. & B. 719 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 359; 2 ' 
 
 Jur. N. S. 860 680 
 
 Tyson «. Thomas (1825), McClel. & Y. 119 .. .. 696,735 
 
 U. 
 
 Uckfield U. D. C. v. Crowborough Water Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 664 ; 
 
 68 L. J. Q. B. 1009 ; 81 L. T. 539 ; 48 W. E. 63 .. .. 286 
 
 Underhill 1). EUicombe (1825), McCleL & Y. 450 711 
 
 V. Longridge (1859), 29 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 221 .. 446, 
 
 482, 497 
 
 I.S. 10 
 
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cxlii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 I'AGE 
 
 Ungley u. Ungley (1877), 5 Ch. D. 887; 46 L. J. Ch. 854; 37 
 
 L. T. 52 ; 25 W. R. 733 454 
 
 Union Bank v. Lenanton (1878), 3 0. P. D. 243 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 
 
 409 ; 38 L. T. 698 158 
 
 Union S. S. Co. of New Zealand v. Melbourne Commrs. (1884), 9 
 
 App. Cas. 365 ; 53 L. J. P. C. 59 ; 50 L. T. 337 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 
 
 222 P. C ...... 93 
 
 United Alkali" Co. v- Simpson',' [1894] 2 Q. B. 116 ;'63 L. J. M. C. 
 
 141 ; 71 L. T. 258 ; 42 W. E. 509 ; 58 J. P. 607 .. .. 445 
 United Land Company v. G. E. Ey.Co. (1875), L.E. 10 Ch. 586 ; 
 
 44 L. J. Cli. 685 ; 33 L. T. 292 ; 23" W. E. 896 .. .. 526 
 United States y. Coombs (1838), 12 Peters 72 .. 464,465,583 
 
 V. Fisher (1805), 2 Cranch 358 ; 3 Id. 390 . . 75, 148, 149, 263 
 
 u. Gooding (1827), 12 Wheat. 460 464 
 
 ?;. Hartwell (1867), 6 Wall. 385 6,465,484 
 
 u. Helen, The (1810), 6 Cranch 203 729 
 
 V. Howard (1818), 3 Wash. 340 265 
 
 ?;. Kessler (1829), Bald. 15 265 
 
 ■!;. Kirby (1868), 7 Wall. 482 177 
 
 i-. Klintock (1820), 5 Wheat. 144 265 
 
 ?;. McLain (1800), 2 Brev. 443 (Tennessee) 467 
 
 v. Morris (1840), 14 Peters 464 492 
 
 V. Palmer (1818), 3 Wheat. 610 75, 265, 557 
 
 V. Thirty-six barrels Of wine (1870), 7 Blatchf. 459 .. .. 508 
 
 V. Wiltberger (1820), 5 Wheat. 76, 95 .. 6, 463, 464, 465 
 
 ^— i;. Wood (1840), 16 Peters 342 336 
 
 Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, [189^] ^- C. 166; 65 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 74 L. T. 468 ; 44 W. E. 497 ; .60 J. P. 468, 
 
 H. L 199 
 
 Unwin v. Hanson, [1891] 2 Q. B. 115 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 582 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 511 ; 39 W. E. 587 ; 55 J. P. 662 98 
 
 Upame, The (1912), 81 L. J. P. 110 113 
 
 UpfiU V. Wright, [1911] 1 K. B. 506 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 254 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 834 693 
 
 Uppom i;. Sumner (1779), 9 W. Bl. 1251 250 
 
 Urquhart, Se (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 723 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 364 ; 38 
 
 W. E. 612; 7M.B. E. 94 133 
 
 Urwin v. Hanson, [1891] 2 Q. B. 115 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 531 .. 100 
 
 V. 
 
 Vale of Neath Colliery v. Purness (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 276 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 231 ; 24 W. E. 631 511 
 
 Valentmi v. Canali (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 166 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 74 ; 
 
 61 L. T. 731 ; 38 W. E. 331 ; 54 J. P. 295 376 
 
 Vallance v. Falle (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 109 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 459 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 158 ; 32 W. R. 770 ; 48 J. P. 519 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 280 669, 722 
 
 Vallejo V. Wheeler (1774), Cowp. 143; Lofft. 631 .. .. 196 
 
 Van Sandau, Ea; J). (1846), 1 De G. 303 658 
 
 Vane v. Vane (1874), L. K. 8 Ch. 383 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 299 .. .. 160 
 
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 Vansittart, Be, [1893] 1 Q. B. 181; 9 M. B. E. 280; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 67 L. T. 592 ; 41 W. B. 32 ; 57 J. P. 132 . . 130 
 v.. Taylor (1855), 4 E. & B. 910 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 198 ; 99 
 
 E. E. 823 382, 404 
 
 Vaughan v. Tafif VaUey E. Co. (1860), 5 H. & N. 679 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 
 
 247 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 899 ; 2 L. T. 394 ; 8 W. E. 594 .. .. -628 
 
 Vautin, iJe, [1900] 2 Q. B. 325 214 
 
 Vaux «. VoUans (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 525 ; 38 E. E. 305 .. ..656 
 
 Veitch V. Exeter (1858), 8 E. & B. 986 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 116 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 584 ; 112 E. E. 853 222 
 
 Venour, Be (1876), 2 Ch. D. 522; 45 L. J. Oh. 409; 24 W. E. 
 
 752 76 530 
 
 Verdin ti.'Wray "(1877)V2 Q. B. D. 608; 46 L. J.'q. B.*i70; 35 ' 
 
 L. T. 942 ; 27 W. E. 274 845 
 
 Vernon, The (1842), 1 W. Eob. 316 277 
 
 Vernon v. St. James' Vestry (1880), 16 Ch. D. 449 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 
 
 81 ; 44 L. T. 229 ; 29 W. E. 222 227,630 
 
 Viokers v. Evans, [1910] A. 0. 444 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 955 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 292 ' 25 
 
 Victorian Daylesford Syndicate, Ltd. v. Dott, [1905] 2 Ch. 624 .. 700 
 
 Vigers Bros. v. London C. C, [1919] 1 K. B. 56 58 
 
 Vinter v. Hind (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 63 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 359 ; 31 W. E. 198 ; 47 J. P. 373 420 
 
 Violett V. Sympson (1857), 8 E. & B. 344 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; 3 
 
 Jnr. N. S. 1217 12 
 
 Virginia & Maryland S. Nav. Co. v. U. S. (1840), Taney and 
 
 Campbell's Maryland Eep. 418 609 
 
 Vowles i;. Cohner (1895), 64 L. J. Ch. 414 364 
 
 Vron Colliery Co., Be (1882), 51 L. J. Ch, 389, C. A. .. -.. 60 
 
 W. 
 
 Waddington v. London Union (1859), E. B. & E. 370; 28 
 
 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 113 E. E. 680 365 
 
 V. Neale (1917), 96 L. T. 786, D. C 162 
 
 Wadham v. Postmaster-General (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 644 ; 40 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; 24 L. T. 545 ; 19 W. E. 1082 .. .. 687 
 
 Wadley v. Baylis (1814), 5 Taunt. 752; 15 E. E. 645 .. .. 541 
 Wadmore v. Dear (1871), L. E. 7 C. P. 212; 41 L. J. C. P. 49; 
 
 26 L. T. 28 ; 20 W. E. 239 169,632 
 
 Wadsworth, Be (1885), 29 Ch. D. 517 ; 54 L. J. Ch.-638 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 613 ; 33 W. E. 558 25 
 
 Wain V. Warlters (1804), 5 East 10; 1 Smith K. B. 299 ; 7 E. E. 
 
 645 511 
 
 Wainewright, Be (1843), 1 Phil. 258 25,444,484 
 
 Waits V. Bingley (1882), 21 Ch. D. 674 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 651 ; 30 
 
 W. E. 698 269 
 
 V. Jones (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 656 ; 1 Scott 730 ; 1 Hodges 
 
 166.. . .. ., 702 
 
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cxliv TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Wake V. Sheffield (Mayor of) (1880), 12 Q. B. D. 142; 53 
 
 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 50 L. T. 76 ; 32 W. E. 82; 48 J. P. 197 342, 708 
 
 Wakefield, &o. Bank V. Yates, [1916] 1 Ch. 452 458 
 
 Walker i>. Constable (1798), 3 Wils. 25 604 
 
 V. Crystal Palace Gas Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 300; 60 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 781 ; 65 L. T. 86 ; 39 W. B. 716 .. .. 607 
 V. Goe (1859), 3 H. & N. 395 ; 4 H. & N. 350 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 
 
 184; 5 Jur. N. S. 737 ; 117 B. E. 751 ; 118 E. E. 488 .. 724 
 V. Hobbs (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 458 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 93 ; 38 
 
 W. E. 63 140 
 
 V. Homer (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 4 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 34 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 601 .. .. 489 
 
 V. Better, [1911] 1 K. B. 1103 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 623 ; 104 
 
 L. T 821 ■ 75 J. P. 331 .. .. , .. 295 
 V. Eichar'dson (1837), 2'm. & W. 889 ; 1 M. & hV251 ; 6 
 
 L. J. Ex. 229 ; 46 E. E. 782 91, 573 
 
 V. Stretton (1896), 44 W. E. 625 ; 60 L. J. 313 .. .. 523 
 
 Wallace v. Att.-Gen. (1864), L. E. 1 Ch. 1 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 124 .. 244 
 V. BlaekweU (1856), 3 Drew 538 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 656; 106E. E. 425 283,611 
 
 v. King (1788), 1 H. Bl. 13 450 
 
 Wallgrave v. Tebbs (1856), 2 K. & J. 313 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 241 .. 221 
 Wallis V. Pratt, [1910] 2 K. B. 1003 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 1018 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 118 48 
 
 Wahnsley v. MUne (1860), 7 C. B. N. S. 115 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 
 
 6Jur. N. S. 125 .. .. 173 
 
 Walsh V. Lonsdale (1882), 52 L. J. Ch. 2 '.. 569 
 
 V. Southwell (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 78 ; 6 Ex. 150 ; 20 
 
 L. J. M. C. 165 135 
 
 Walsingham's Case (1579), Plowd. 562 282 
 
 Walter v. Steinkopff, [1892] 3 Ch. 489 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 184 ; 40 W. E. 599 350 
 
 Walton, Exp. (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746; 50 L. J.Ch.657 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 1;30W. E. 395 36,203,457 
 
 Wandsworth v. Golds, [1911] 1 K. B. 60 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 126 ; 
 
 103 L. T. 568 ; 74 J. P. 464 .. .. 367 
 
 Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co. (1884), IS 
 
 Q. B. D. 904 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 51 L. T. 148 ; 32 W. E. 
 
 776; 48 J. P. 676.. 170,545 
 
 Wanklyn v. Woollett (1847), 4 C. B. 86 ; 72 E. E. 545 . . . . 26 
 
 Wanstead Bd. v. Hill (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 479 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 
 
 135 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 972; 7 L. T. 744 ; 11 W. E. 368 .. .. 589 
 
 Wanthier v. Wilson (1911), 27 T. L. E. 582 224 
 
 Warburton v. Huddersfield Industrial Soc, [1892] 1 Q. B. 817 ; 
 
 61 L. J. Q. B. 422; 67 L. T. 43 ; 40 W. E. 346; 56 J. P. 
 
 453 590 
 
 v. Loveland (1828), Hud. & Bro. 623, Ir. 5 
 
 Ward, Be (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 53 142 
 
 . V. Beck (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 668; 32 L, J. C. P. 113 ; 9 
 
 Jur. N. S. 912 542,653 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. • cxlv 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Ward V. Gray (1865), 6 B. & S. 345 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 146 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 738 ; 12 L. T. 305 ; 13 W. E. 653 98 
 
 V. Hobbs (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 150 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 90 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 654 ; 26 W. R. 151 and 4 App. Cas. 13 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 
 
 40L. T.73; 27 W. E. 114 719 
 
 i;. Scott (1812), 3 Camp. 284 157 
 
 Warden i;. Dean of St. Paul's (1817), 4 Price 65 575 
 
 V. Tye (1877), 2 C. P. D. 74; 46 L. J. M. C. Ill ; 35 L. T. 
 
 852 361. 
 
 Wardsop (John), Ira <fee i;«i(ife o/, [1917] P. 54 15 
 
 Warkworth, The (1884), 9 P. D. 145 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 
 
 51 L. T. 558 ; 33 W. E. 112 ; 5 Asp. M. 0. 326 .. 124, 517 
 Warne v. Beresford (1837), 2 M. & W. 848 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 192 401, 729 
 
 r. Varley (1795), 6 T. E. 443 413 
 
 Warner v. Armstrong (1834), 3 M. & K. 45 208, 693 
 
 V. Murdoch (1877), 4 Ch. D. 750 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 121 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 748 ; 25 W. E. 207 400 
 
 Warrmgton, Exp. (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 159 ; 22 L. J. Bank. 
 
 33 ; 17 Jur. 480 ; 98 E. E. 95 304 
 
 V. Furbor (1807), 8 East 242 ; 6 Esp. 89 .. .. 507, 508 
 
 Warwick t;. White (1722), Bunb. 106 241 
 
 Warwick Canal Co. v. Birmingham Canal Co. (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 
 
 550 520 
 
 Washer v. Elliott (1876), 1 C. P. D. 169 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 144 ; 34 
 
 L. T. 56 ; 24 W. E. 432 .. .. 151 
 
 WaterfaU v. Penistone (1857), 6 E. & B. 876 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 100 ; 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 15 ; 106 E. E. 841 173 
 
 Waterford Peerage, The (1832), 6 CI. & P. 133 ; 49 E. E. 55, 
 
 H. L 539 
 
 Waterhouse v. Keen (1825), 6 D. & E. 257 ; 4 B. & C. 200 ; 40 
 
 E. E. 858 422 
 
 Waterton v. Baker (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 173; 37 L. J. Q. B. 65 ; 
 
 17L. T. 468 676,680 
 
 Watkins v. Major (1875), L. E. 10 C. P. 662 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 164 ; 
 
 33 L. T. 352 ; 24 W. E. 164 • 182, 194 
 
 Watson, Be (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 27 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 394 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 209; 38-W. E. 567; 7M. B. E. 155 209,212 
 
 , iJe (1892), 62 L. J. Q. B. 85 644 
 
 V. Martm (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 50 ; 10 Cox C. C. 56 ; 11 
 
 Jur. N. S. 321 ; 11 L. T. 372; 13 W. E. 144 588 
 
 Watton V. Watton (1866), L. E. 1 P. D. 227 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 95 ; 
 
 14 L. T. 742 ; 15 W. E. 288 404 
 
 Watts V. Ainsworth (1862), 1 H. & C. 83 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 448; 6 
 
 L. T. 252 512 
 
 Waugh V. Middleton (1853), 8 Ex. 352 ; 22 L. J. Ex. Ill .. 388 
 
 Waymell v. Eead (1794), 5 T. E. 599 ; 2 E. E. 675 .. .. 695 
 
 Weavers Co. u. Forrest (1746), 1 Stra. 1241 573 
 
 Webb, Be; Exp. Board of Trade (1914), 83 L. J. K. B. 1386 .. 227 
 
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cxlvi • TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Webb V. Bird (1862), 10 C. B. N, S. 268; 4 L. T. 445; 9 W. E. 
 
 899 and 13 C. B. N. S. 841 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 335 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 621 579 
 
 V. Pairmanner (1838), 3 M. & W. 473; 6 D. P. C. 549; 7 
 
 L.J. Ex. 140 606 
 
 V. Knight (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 530; 46 L. J. M. C. 264; 36 
 
 L. T. 791 ; 26 W. E. 14 107 
 
 V. Manchester E. Co. (1839), 4 My. & C. 116 ; 48 B. E. 28 528 
 
 Webster v. SoTithey (1887), 36 Oh. D. 9; 56 L. J. Ch. 785; 56 
 
 L. T. 879; 35 W. E. 622; 52 J. P. 36 325, 638 
 
 w. Webster (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 115 455 
 
 Weeks v Wray (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 212 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 84 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 498; 16 W. E. 399; 9B.&S. 62 606 
 
 Welch V. Nash (1807), 8 Bast 394 ; 9 E. E. 478 369 
 
 Weldon v. De Bathe (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 339 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 
 
 53 L. T. 520 ; 33 W. E. 328 402 
 
 V. Winslow (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 784 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 528 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 643 ; 33 W. E. 219 402 
 
 Welford w. Beazley (1747), 3 Atk. 503 512 
 
 Wellington (Mayor) v. Lower Hult (Mayor), [1904] A. C. 773 ; 73 
 
 L. J. P. C. 80; 91 L. T. 539; 20T. L. E. 712 .. .. 125 
 Wells V. Kingston-on-Hull Corporation (1875 ), 44 L. J. C. P. 257 .. 163 
 V. London and Tilbury By. Co. (1877), 5 Ch. D. 126; 87 
 
 L. T. 302 ; 25 W. E. 325 502 
 
 i;. MoSherry, [1914] 1 K. B. 616 684 
 
 V. Porter (1836), 2 Biag. N. C. 722 ; 3 Scott 141 ; 2 Hodges 
 
 42; 5L. J. C. P. 250 478 
 
 Welsh V. West Ham (Mayor), [1900] 1 Q. B. 324 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 114; 82 L. T. 262 612 
 
 Wemperis, ife, [1914] 1 Ch. 502 154 
 
 Wendon v. L. C. C, [1894] 1 Q. B. 812 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 117 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 94 58 
 
 Wenlook v. Eiver Dee Co. (1885), 10 A. C. 354, H. L 655 
 
 Wenman v. Lyon & Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 192 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 663 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 136 ; 39 W. E. 519 130 
 
 Werle v. Colquhoun (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 753 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 323 ; 
 
 58 L. T. 756; 36 W. E. 618 ; 52 J. P. 644 271 
 
 Wescomb's Case (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 110 ; 19 L. T. N. S. 397 .. 117 
 West V. Francis (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 737 ; 1 D. & E. 400 ; 24 E. E. 
 
 541 178,290 
 
 V. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 15 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 587 ; 104 L. T. 
 
 759 92,382,385,393 
 
 West Derby Guardians v. Metro. Life Assurance, [1897] A. C. 
 
 647 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 726 ; 77 L. T. 284 ; 61 J. P. 820, H. L. .. 284 
 West Ham v. Fourth City Bldg. Society, [1892] 1 Q. B. 654 ; 60 
 
 L. J. M. C. 128 ; 66 L. T. 350 ; 40 W. E. 446 ; 56 J. P. 
 
 488 281,296 
 
 West Ham Corporation v. G. E. Ey. Co. (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 340 520 
 West Ham Overseers v. lies (1883), 8 App. Cas. 386; 52 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 650 ; 49 L, T. 206 ; 31 W. E. 928 ; 47 J. P. 708 .. 91 
 
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TABLE OP CASES. CXlvii 
 
 West India Improvement Co. v. A.-G. of Jamaca, [1894] A. C. 
 
 243; 70L. T. 80 615 
 
 West India Telegraph Co. v. Home & Colonial Marine Insurance 
 
 Co. (1896), 65 L. J. Q. B. 616 694 
 
 Westbrook v. Blythe (1854), 3 El. & Bl. 737 ; 2 C. L. R. 1660 ; 28 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 386 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 85 ; 97 R. E. 731 .. .. 321 
 
 Westbury V. Coston (1703), 2 Salk. 532 217 
 
 Western Counties Ry. Co. v. Windsor & Annapolis Ry. Co. 
 
 (1882), 7 App Cas. 178 ; 51 L. J. P. C. 43 ; 46 L T. 351 .. 501 
 Western National Bank v. Perez, [1891] 1 Q. B. 304 ; 60 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 272 ; 64 L. T. 543 ; 39 W. E. 245 267 
 
 Western Suburban, &o.. Building Society v. Martin (1886), 17 
 
 Q. B. D. 609 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 882, C. A 164 
 
 Westerton v. Liddell (1857), reported by Moore ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1178 647 
 
 Westminster u. Gerrard (1621), 2 Bulst. 346 486 
 
 Westminster Council v. London C. C, [1902] 1 K. B. 326 ; 71 
 
 L. J. K. B. 244 ; 86 L. T. 53 ; 50 W. R. 429 ; 66 J. P. 199 . . 113 
 
 «;. Watson, [1902] 2 K. B. 717 113 
 
 Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Co. 
 
 (1888), 13 A. C. 699 86 
 
 Westminster Vestry v. Hoskins, [1899] 2 Q. B. 474 ; 68 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 840 ; 81 L. T. 390 ; 47 W. E. 649 ; 63 J. P. 725 . . 247 
 Westmore v. Paine, [1891] 1 Q. B. 482 ; 60 L. J. M. C. 89 ; 64 
 
 L. T. 55 ; 89 W. E. 463 ; 55 J. P. 440 ; 17 Cox C. C. 244 . . 684 
 
 Westmoreland, The (1845), 2 W. Rob. 394 151 
 
 Westover v. Perkms (1859), 2 E. & E. 57 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 227 248, 549 
 Wethered v. Calcutt (1842), 5 Scott N; R. 409 ; 4 M. & G. 566 ; 
 
 11 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 6 Jur. 487 ; 61 R. R. 606 . . 82, 116, 122 
 
 Wetherell u. Jones (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 221 699 
 
 Wetherfield'v. Nelson (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 571 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 
 
 220 ; 20 L. T. 366 ; 17 W. R. 651 519 
 
 Weymouth v. Nugent (1865), 6 B. & S. 22 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 81 ; 11 
 
 Jur. N. S. 465; 11 L. T. 672; 13 W. R. 338 549 
 
 Wheat V. Brown, [1892] 1 Q. B. 418 ; 61 L. J, M. C. 94 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 464 ; 40 W. R. 462 ; 56 J. P. 153 475 
 
 Wheaton v. Maple & Co., [1893] 3 Ch. 48 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 963 ; 69 
 
 L. T. 208 ; 41 W. R. 677 252 
 
 Whidbome V. Eocles. Com. (1878), 7 Ch. D. 375; 47 L. J. Ch. 
 
 129; 37 L. T. 846 157 
 
 Whinney, Ex p. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 476 ; 1 M. B. R. 185 . . 477 
 
 Whistler v. Forster (1868), 14 C. B. N. S. 248 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 
 
 8 L. T. 317 ; 11 W. R.648 351 
 
 Whitaker, Re, [1901] 1 Ch. 9 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 6 ; 83 L. T. 449 ; 49 
 
 W. R. 106 174 
 
 , iJe, Whitaker ?;. Palmer, [1904] 1 Ch. 299 174 
 
 Whitchurch v. Fulham Board (1866J, L. E. 1 Q. B. 233 ; 35 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 145 ; 14 W. E. 277 ; 13 L. T. 631 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 353 . . 229 
 White, Ex p. (1864), 88 L. J. Bank. 22 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 189 ; 9 L. T. 
 
 702; 12 W. E. 390 385 
 
 , Be, [1913] 1 Ch. 231 146 
 
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cxlviii TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 PASE 
 
 White w. Boot (1788), 2 T. B. 274 735 
 
 V. Feast (1872), L. B. 7 Q. B. 353 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 81 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 611 ; 20 W. E. 382 180,288,645 
 
 V. Fellowes (see Whitehouse v. Pellowes). 
 
 17. Pulham Vestry (1896), 74 L. T. 425 367 
 
 w. Granada SS. Co. (1896), 13 T. L. E. 1 368 
 
 V. Hindley Loc. Bd. (1875), L. B. 10 Q. B. 219 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Q.B. 114; 32L. T. 460; 23W. E. 651 726 
 
 V. Morley, [1899] 2 Q. B. 34 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 702 ; 80 L. T. 
 
 761; 47 W.B. 583; 63 J. P. 550 523 
 
 V. Steel (1863), 12 C. B. N. S. 383 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 5 L. T. 
 
 449 155 
 
 ■«. Wright (1824), 3 B. & 0. 273 209 
 
 Whitechuroh v. E. London By. Co. (1873), L. E. 7 Ex. 424 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 494 ; 21 W. B. 28 32 
 
 Whitehead v. Smithers (1877), 2 C. P. D. 553 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 234 ; 
 
 37L. T. 378 290 
 
 Whitehouse v. Fellowes (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 780 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 
 
 305 ; 29 L. T. 168 ; 21 W. E. 893 .. .. 173, 611, 629 
 
 Whiteley v. Barley (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 154 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 643 ; 
 
 60 L. T. 86 ; 36 W. B. 823 ; 52 J. P. 595 496 
 
 V. Chappell (1869), L. B. 4 Q. B. 147 ; 38 L. J, M. C. 51 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 355 ; 17 W. E. 175 470 
 
 ■«, Heaton (1858), 27 L. J. M. C. 217 295 
 
 Whitfield V. Langdale (1876), 1 Ch. D. 61 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 177; 33 
 
 L. T. 592 ; 24 W. B. 313 41 
 
 Whithorne v. Thomas (1845), 7 M. & Gr. 1 ; 8 Soott N. S. 783 ; 1 
 
 Lut. Beg. Cas. 125 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 38 ; 8 Jur. 1008 .. ..117 
 
 Whitley Partners, Re, Ex p. Callan (1886), 32 Ch. D. 337 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 540; 54L. T. 912; 34W. E. 505, C. A. .. .. .. 69 
 
 Wigton V. Snaith (1851), 16 Q. B. 496 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 110; 15 
 
 Jur. 346 406 
 
 Wilberforoe v. Hearfield (1877), 5 Ch. D. 709 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 584 ; 
 
 25 W.B. 861 157 
 
 Wild Banger, The (1862), IJ. & K. 180 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 134 ; 32 L. J. 
 
 Adm. 49 ; 11 W. E. 255 ; 7 L. T. 724 277 
 
 Wiley V. Crawford (1861), 1 B. & S. 253 ; 80 L. J. Q. B. 319 ; 7 
 
 Jur. N. S. 943 ; 4 L. T. 653 ; 9 W. B. 741 . . . . 564, 692 
 
 Wilkes V. Hungerford Market Co. (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 281 . . 724 
 Wilkinson v. Calvert (1878), 3 C. P. D. 360 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 679 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 813 ; 26 W. E. 829 604 
 
 V. Evans (1866), L. B. 1 C. P. 407 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 600 ; 14 W. B. 963 ; 1 H. & B. 552 .. .. 513 
 
 Wilkinson's Settlement, Be, [1917] 1 Ch. 620 14 
 
 Williams, ^cB p. (1824), 13 Price 673 153 
 
 , Be (1853), 2 E. & B. 84 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 125 ; 95 E. E. 446 341 
 
 Williams and Stepney, He, [1891] 2 Q. B. 257 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 636 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 208 ; 39 W. B. 538 395 
 
 Williams u. Allen, [1916] 1 K. B. 425 186 
 
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TABLE OP OASES. . oxlix 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Williams v. Burgess (1840), 12 A. & E. 635 ; 4 P. & D. 348 ; 9 
 
 D. P. C. 544; lOL. J. Q. B. 10 607 
 
 V. Byrnes (1863), 1 Moo. P. C. 0. N. S. 154, P. 511 
 
 ■ y. Gary (1695), 4 Mod. Bep. 403; 12 Mod. 71 .. ..449 
 
 -= — V. EUis (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 175 ; 49 L. J. M. C. 47 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 249 ; 28 W. E. 416 ; 44 J. P.. 394 71,481,578 
 
 V, Evans (1875), L. E. 19 Eq. 547 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 319 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 359 ; 23 W. E. 466 454 
 
 V. (1876), 1 Ex. D. 277 ; 35 L. T. 864 .. .. 482,497 
 
 V. aolding (1865), L. E. 1 0. P. 69 ; 35 L. J. G. P. 1 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 51 ; 13 L. T. 291 ; 14 W. E. 60 586 
 
 V. Q. W. Ey. Go. (1874), 10 Ex. 16 ; 102 E. E. 449 .. .. 526 
 
 V. Harding (1866), L. E. 1 H. L. 9; 85 L. J. Bey. 25 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 457 389,398 
 
 1!. Hathaway (1877), 6 Gb. D. 544 288 
 
 ■«. Jones (1811), 12 East 346; 11 E. E. 411 .. .. .. 116 
 
 V. Jordan (1877), 6 Gh. D. 517 ; 46 L. J. Gh. 681 ; 26 W. E. 
 
 230 511 
 
 V. Lake (1859), 2 E. & E. 349 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 
 45; IL. T. 56 511,513 
 
 V. Lear (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 285 ; 41 L. J. M. G. 76 ; 25 
 
 L. T. 906 542 
 
 V. Lords of Admiralty (1851), 11 G. B. 424 617 
 
 V. Mason (1873), 28 L. T. 232 ; 21 W. E. 386 . . . . 138 
 
 V. North's Navigation GoUieries, [1904] 2 K. B. 44 ; 73 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 575; 91 L. T. 3; 52 W. E. 564; 68 J. P. 371 ; 20 
 
 T. L. E. 448, C. A 188 
 
 0. (1906), 75 L. J. K. B. 334 201,202 
 
 V. Pritohard (1790), 4 T. E. 2 ; 2 E. E. 310 .. .. 317, 527 
 
 V. Eoberts (1852), 7 Exch. 618 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 61 . . . . 369 
 
 V. Eose (1867), L. E. 3 Ex. 5 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 12 ; 17 L. T. 253 ; 
 
 16W. E. 316 358 
 
 V. Smith (1859), 4 H. & N. 559 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 286 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1107; 118 E.E. 611 890 
 
 - — — V. Swansea Navigation Ganal Go. (1868), L. E. 3 Ex. 158 ; 
 
 37L. J. Ex. 107 656,664 
 
 ■«. Wheeler (1860), 8 G. B. N. S. 299 278 
 
 Williamson v. Maggs (1859), 28 L. J. Ex. 5 28 
 
 V. Norris, [1899] I Q. B. 7 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 31 ; 79 L. T. 415 ; 
 
 47 W. E. 94; 62 J. P. 790; 19 0. C. G. 203 .. .. 111,177 
 
 Willion V. Berkley (1562), Plow. 223 ; 11 Eep. 72a. .. 244, 252 
 
 Willis u. Brown (1839), 10 Sim. 127 456 
 
 V. Gipps (1846), 5 Moo. P. 0. 379, P. 87 
 
 V. Howe (Earl), [1893] 2 Gh. 545 ; 62 L. J. Gh. 690 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 358; 41 W. E. 433 12 
 
 V. Thorp (1875), L. E. 10 Q. B. 383 ; 44 L, J. Q. B. 137 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 11 ; 23 W. B. 780 587 
 
 V. Wells, [1892] 2 Q. B. 225 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 606 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 316; 41 W.E. 64; 56 J. P. 775 164,239 
 
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Cl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Willmot V. Rose (1854), 3 El. & Bl. 563 ; 2 C. L. B. 677 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 518 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 97 R. R. 654 300 
 
 Willock V. Noble (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 580 ; 44 L.J. Ch. 345 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 419; 23 W. R. 809 157 
 
 Wilson, Re (1878), 8 Ch. D. 364 ; 47 L. J. Bank. 116; 38 L. T. 
 
 730 ; 26 W. R. 582 349 
 
 V. , [1916] 1 K. B. 382 388 
 
 u. Halifax (1868), L.R. 3 Ex. 114; 37 L.J. Ex.44; 17 L. T. 
 
 660 ; 16 W. R. 707 134,413,574 
 
 V. Knubley (1806), 7 East 128 ; 3 Smith 123 89, 90, 449, 453 
 
 ■ ■ V. Marryat (1798), 8 T. R. 31 ; 1 B. & P. 430 ; 53 R. B. 104 111 
 
 V. Nightingale (1846), 8 Q. B. 1034 ; 10 Jur. 917 ; 15 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 309; 70R. R. 727 55 
 
 V. Rankin (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 162 ; 6 B. & S.208 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 173 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 13 W. R. 404 ; 12 L. T. 20 and 
 
 85L. J. Q. B. 203; 14W. R. 198; 13L. T. 664 .. .. 694 
 
 V. Rastall (1792), 4 T. R. 757 ; 2 B. R. 51 5 229 
 
 V. Robertson (1855), 4 E. & B. 923 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 1 
 
 Jur. N. S. 755 ; 99 R. R. 827 222 
 
 ■ V. West Hartlepool Co. (1865), 2 De G. J. & S. 475 ; 34 
 
 L. J. Ch. 241 455,654 
 
 V. Wilson (1854), 5 H. L. Cas. 40 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 697 ; 101 
 
 R R 25 . . ..... 444 
 
 Wimbledon Local Board v. Underwood, [1892] 1 Q. B. 836 ; 61 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 484 ; 67 L. T. 55 ; 40 W. R. 640 ; 56 J. P. 633 169 
 
 Wimperis, 5e, [1914] 1 Ch. 502 154 
 
 Winch V. Thames Conservators (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 878 ; 43 
 
 L. J. C. P. 167 ; 31 L. T. 128 ; 22 W. E. 879 634 
 
 Windsor & Annapolis By. v. B. (1886), 11 A. G. 607, P. C. .. 539 
 
 Wingfield I). Wingfield, [1919] 1 Ch. 462 24 
 
 V. (1878), 9 Ch. D. 658 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 227;26W.E.711 • 559 
 
 Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 10 M.. & W. 109 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 
 
 415 368 
 
 Wiseman «. Gotten (1663), 1 Lev. 79 582 
 
 Wlthington Loc. Bd. v. Manchester, [1893] 2 Gh. 19 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 393 ; 68 L. T. 330 ; 41 W. B. 306 ; 57 J. P. 340 .. .. 589 
 
 Withipole's Case (1628), Cro. Car. 134 568 
 
 Withnell v. Gartham (1795), 6 T. B. 388 ; 1 Esp. 323 ; 3 B. B. 
 
 218 541 
 
 Wixon V. Thomas, [1911], 1 K. B. 43 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 104 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 730; 75 J. P. 58 ; 8 L. G. E. 1042 247 
 
 AVoking Urban Council (Basingstoke Canal) Act, 1911, He 
 
 (1914), 83 L. J. Ch. 201 76 
 
 Wolton?). Gavin (1850), 16 Q. B. 48; 20 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 329 666 
 
 Wolverhampton Waterworks v. Hawksford (1859), 11 C. B.N. S. 
 
 456 ; 31 L. J. G. P. 184 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 844 ; 6 L. T. 618 .. 669 
 Wood, Be (1872), L. B. 7 Gh. 302 ; 41 L. J. Banlc. 21 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 113; 20 W. B. 403 570 
 
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TABLE OF OASES. cli 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Wood V. Boosey (1868), L. R. 2 Q. B. 340 ; 7 B. & S. 869 ; 36 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 103 ; 15 L. T. 530 ; 15 W. K. 309 and L. R. 3 
 
 Q. B. 223; 9 B. & S. 175; 37 L. J. Q. B. 84 ; 18 L. T. 105 ; 
 
 16W. R. 485 651 
 
 V. Burgess (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 162 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 11 ; 6i 
 
 L. T. 593 ; 38 W. R. 381 ; 54 J. P. 325 ; 16 Cox 729 . . 195 
 
 V. Dixie (1845), 7 Q. B. 892 ; 9 Jur. 796 ; 68 R. R. 590 .. 376 
 
 V. Priestner (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 66, 282 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 127 41, 43 
 
 V. RUey (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 26 ; 37 L. J. C, P. 24 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 216 ; 16 W. R. 146 780 
 
 Woodall, Exp. (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 832 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 71 ; 59 
 
 L. T. 841 ; 36 W. R. 655 ; 52 J. P. 581 134 
 
 Woodgate v. Godfrey (1880), 5 Ex. D. 24 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 42 
 
 L. T. 34 ; 28 W. E. 816 212 
 
 Woodhouse v. Woods (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 149 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 
 421;1L. T. 59 655,674,675 
 
 Woodward v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 Ex. D. 121 ; 47 
 
 L. J. Ex. 263 ; 38 L. T. 321 ; 26 W. R. 354 578 
 
 — - V. Sarsons (1875), L. E. 10 C. P. 733 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 293 ; 
 
 32L. T. 867 663 
 
 V. Watts (1853), 2 E. & B. 452 ; 17 Jur. 790 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 
 
 149; 95R. R. 638 21 
 
 Woolf «. HamUton, [1898] 2 Q. B. 887, C. A 878 
 
 WooUord's Trustee v. Levy, [1892] 1 Q. B. 772 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 546 ; 66 L. T. 812 ; 40 W. R. 483 ; 56 J. P. 694 .. .. 473 
 
 WooUey v. Kay (1856), 1 H. & N. 307 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 351 ; 108 
 
 E. E. 584 496 
 
 Woolverton Estates, Be (1878), L. R. 7 Ch. D. 197 ; 47 L. J. Oh. 
 
 127 ; 37 L. T. 578 ; 26 W. R. 188 43 
 
 Woolwich V. Fulham, [1906] 2 K. B. 240 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 680 ; 
 
 [1907] A, C. 255 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 739 ; 97 L. T. 117 ; 71 J. P. 
 
 - 361 ; 5 L. G. R. 801 486 
 
 Worcester v. Droitwich (1876), 2 Ex. D. 49 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 241 ; 
 
 36 L. T. 186 ; 25 W. R. 336 366 
 
 Worcester Banking Co. v. Firbank & Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 784 ; 63 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 542 ; 70 L. T. 443 ; 42 W. R. 402 .. .. 267 
 
 Worcestershire C. C. v. Worcester Union, [1897] 1 Q. B. 480 ; 66 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 323 ; 76 L. T. 138 ; 45 W. R. 309 ; 61 J. P. 244 247 
 Worley v. St. Mary Abbot's, [1892] 2 Ch. 404 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 601 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 747 ; 40 W. R. 566 58 
 
 Worms V. De Valdor (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 261 ; 41 L. T. 791 ; 28 
 
 W. R. 346 256 
 
 Wray v. Ellis (1858), 1 E. & E. 276 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 45 ; 117 E. R. 
 
 208 328 
 
 Wright, Be (1856), 2 K. & J. 595 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 621 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 465 106 
 
 , Ee (1855), 11 Ex. 458 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 49 269 
 
 V. Frant Overseers (1863), 4 B. & S. 118 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 39 ; 8 L. T. 455 ; 11 W. R. 883 . . 424 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
chi TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PASB 
 
 Wright V. Greenroyd (1861), 1 B. & S. 758 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 4 ; 8 Jur, 
 
 N. S. 98; 5L. T. 847 394 
 
 V. Hale (1860), 6 H. & N. 227 ; L. J. Ex. 40 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1212; 3L. T. 444; 9W. E. 157 400,403 
 
 V. Horton (1887), 12 App. Cas. 371 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 873; 56 
 
 L. T. 782 ; 36 W. E. 17 ; 52 J. P. 179, H. L. .. 669, 698 
 V. Ingle (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 379 ; 55 L. J. M. C. 17 ; 54 L. T. 
 
 511; 34 W. E. 220; 50 J. P. 436 487 
 
 ■ v. Legge (1815), 6 Taunt. 48 621 
 
 V. London General Omnibus Co. (1877), 2 Q. B. D, 271 ; 46 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 36 L. T. 590 ; 25 W. E. 647 .. .. 362 
 
 ■!). Maunder (1841), 4 Beav. 512 668 
 
 V. Mills (1859), 4 H. & N. 488 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 771 ; 118 E. E. 566 610 
 
 V. Monarch Investmt. Soc. (1877), 5 Ch. D. 726 ; 46 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 649 164,238 
 
 V. Pearson (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 582 ; 38 L. J. Q, B. 213 ; 
 
 20 L. T. 849 ; 17 W. E. 1099 ; 10 B. & S. 723 .. .. 603 
 V. Williams (1836), 1 M. & W. 77 ; 1 Tyr. & G. 375 ; 1 Gale 
 
 410 ; 46 E. E. 265 17,406 
 
 Wrightup V. Greenaore (1847), 10 Q. B. 1 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 246 .. 313 
 Wroughton v. Turtle (1843), 11 M. & W. 561 ; 1 D. & L. 473 ; 13 
 
 L.J. Ex. 57 506 
 
 Wyatt^. Barwell (1815), 19 Ves. 439; 13E. E. 236 .. .. 456 
 V. Gems, [1893] 2 Q. B. 225 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 158 ; 69 L. T. 
 
 456 ; 42 W. E. 28 ; 57 J. P. 665 336 
 
 V. G. W. Ey. Co. (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 204 .. .. 635, 636 
 
 V. Metrop. B. of Works (1862), 11 C. B. N. S. 744 ; 31 L, J. 
 
 C. P. 217 621 
 
 Wynne t». Middleton (1745), 1 Wils. K. B. 125 501 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yarmouth v. Simmons (1878), 10 Ch. D. 518 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 792 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 881 ; 26 W. E. 802 282, 502 
 
 Yates, Be (1888), 38 Ch. D. 112 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 697 ; 59 L. T. 47 ; 
 
 36W. E. 563 174 
 
 V. Higgins, [1896] 1 Q. B. 166 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 31 ; 44 W. E. 
 
 335; 60 J. P. 88 474 
 
 V. E. (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 648 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 258; 52 L. T. 
 
 305 ; 33 W. E. 482 ; 49 J. P. 436 363, 568 
 
 Ydun, The, [1899] P. 236 ; 68 L. J. P. 101 ; 81 L. T. 10 ; 8 Asp. 
 
 M. C. 651 400,413 
 
 Yeadon Loo. Bd. v. Yeadon Waterworks (1888), 41 Ch. D. 52 ; 58 
 
 L. J. Ch. 563 ; 60 L. T. 550; 37 W. E. 360 444 
 
 Yearwood's Trusts, Be (1877), 5 Ch. D. 545; 46 L. J. Ch. 478; 
 
 25W. E. 461 296 
 
 Yewens v. Noakes (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 535; 50 L. J. Q. B. 132; 44 
 
 L. T. 128 ; 28 W. R. 562 ; 45 J. P. 468 43 
 
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TABLE OF CASES. cliii 
 
 _ i_ PAGE 
 
 York and N. Midland Ey. Co. v. R. (1853), 1 !E1. & Bl. 858 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 690 ; 22 L. .J. Q. B. 225 ; 7 Eailway Cas. 459 ; 93 R. R. 
 
 444 , .. 10,436 
 
 York (Dean of) v. Middlesburgh (1828), 2 Y. & J. 196, 214 ; 31 
 
 E. R. 566 84 
 
 York's (Dean of) Case (1841), 2 Q. B. 1 ; 57 R. R. 545 .. .. 52 
 
 Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v. Maclure (1882), 21 Ch. D. 309; 
 
 51 L. J. Ch. 857; 47 L. T. 290; 30 W. R. 761 .. .. 224 
 
 Youle V. Mappin (1861), 30 L. J. M. C. 234 ; 6 H. (S? N. 753 . . 334 
 Young V. Adams, [1898] A. C. 469 ; 67 L. J. P. C. 75 ; 78 L. T. 
 
 506 9, 382, 395 
 
 V. Billiter (1860), 6 E. & B. 1 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 169 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 438 ; 8 H. L. Cas. 682 375,377 
 
 V. Davis (1863), 7 H. & N. 760 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 250 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 286 ; 6 L. T. 363 ; 10 W. R. 524 and 2 H. & C. 177 ; 8 
 
 Jur. N. S. 79 ; 9 L. T. 145 ; 11 W. R. 735 725 
 
 V. Gratridge (1868), L. R. 4 Q. B. 166 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 67 .. 594 
 
 V. Higgon (1840), 6 M. & W. 49 ; 8 D. P. C. 212 ;' 9 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 29 605,606 
 
 V. Hughes (1859), 4 H. & N. 76 ; 28 L. .T. Ex. 161 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 101 ; 32 L. T. O. S. 259; 118 R. R. 337 .. 382, 394 
 V. Leamington (Mayor) (1882), 8 App. Cas. 527 ; 51 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 297 369, 542„654 
 
 V. Royal Leamington Spa (1883), 8 App. Cas. 517 ; 52 L. J, 
 
 Q. B. 713 ; 49 L. T. 1 ; 31 W. E. 925 ; 47 J. P. 660 .. 671 
 
 Ystradyfodwg, &o. Sewerage Board v. Benstead, [1906] 1 K. B. 
 
 294 171 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zalinoff v. Hammond, [1898] 2 Ch. 92 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 370 ; 78 
 
 L. T. 456 47 
 
 Zeta, The, [1893] App. Cas. 468 ; 53 L. J. P. 17 ; 63 L. T. 630; 
 
 57J. P. 660 244 
 
 Zeus, The (1888), 13 P. D. 188 244 
 
 Zollverein, The (1856), Swab. 90 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 429 .. 257, 263, 
 
 272, 279 
 
 Zouch V. Empsey (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 522 607 
 
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Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 9 Hen. III., Magna Charta .. .. .. .. ..64,145,4(39 
 
 20 Hen. III., Merton .. .. .. .. .. 253,616 
 
 52 Hen. III., Marlbridge .. .. .. .. .. 253 601 
 
 3 Ed. I., Westminster 1 .. .. .. .. .. 45l' 533 
 
 6 Ed. I., Gloucester .. .. .. .. .. .. 449 452 
 
 13 Ed. I., Westminster 2 .. .. 49, 153, 252, 451, 602,' 715 
 
 circumspecte agatis .. .. .. .. .. 452 
 
 21 Ed. I., de malefactoribus in parois . . . . . . . . 515 
 
 17 Ed. II. c. 10, de prerogativa regis . . . . . . 143 144 
 
 4 Ed. III. st. 1, o. 6, amendments .. .. .. .. ., 250 
 
 o. 7, trespass .. .. .. .. .. 449 
 
 25 Ed. III. St. 4, c. 4, weirs . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
 
 st. 5, c. 2, treason .. .. .. ,, .. 479 
 
 c. 22, provisors .. .. .. .. .. ge 
 
 42 Ed. III. 0. 1, confiiination of charters .. .. .. .. 459 
 
 1 Bich. II. c. 12, prisoners .. .. .. .. .. .. 451 
 
 6 Rich. II. c. 2, venue .. .. .. .. .. .. 459 
 
 c. 5, justices 662 
 
 15 Rich. II. c. 3, admiralty . . . . . . . . . . . . 534 
 
 16 Rich. II. c. 5, prsemunire .. .. .. .. .. 96 
 
 5 Hen. IV. c. 10, jail 451 
 
 13 Hen. IV. c. 7, suppression of riots • .. 660 
 
 2 Hen. V. c. 3, jurors 448 
 
 0. 4, justices 661 
 
 3 Ed. rV. c. 4, imports 727 
 
 3 Hen. VII. c. 4, fraudulent conveyance . . . . . . . . 376 
 
 6 Hen. VIII. c. 6, procedendo 534 
 
 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13, clergy 176,709 
 
 22 Hen. VIII. c. 5, bridges 115 
 
 26 Hen. VIII. 0. 14, suffiagan bishops .. .. .. ., 739 
 
 27 Hen. VIII. 0. 10, uses 63, 573 
 
 0. 20, 305 
 
 28 Hen. VIII. c. 11, clergy 309 
 
 c. 14, wines .. .. .. .. .. .. 545 
 
 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1, wills 156 
 
 c. 9, land 309 
 
 c. 28, discontinuances .. .. .. .. 253 
 
 84 & 35 Hen, VIII. c. 5, will 156,157 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
clvi 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 37 Hen. VIII. o. 17, ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
 88 Hen. VIII., Diike of Norfolk's attainder 
 1 Ed. VI. 0. 12, horse-stealing 
 5 & 6 Ed. VI. c. 1, prayer-book 
 
 0. 16, sale of offices .- 
 
 c. 25, public-house 
 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 12, distress 
 
 4 & 5 Ph. & M. o. 8, abduction 
 1 Eliz. c. 1, supremacy 
 
 0. 2, recusants 
 
 5 Eliz. c. 4, apprentice .. .. " 
 
 c. 23, writ de contumace capiendo .. 
 
 13 Eliz. c. 5, fraudulent odnveyance 
 
 c. 7, bankrupts 
 
 c. 10, ecclesiastical leases . 
 
 c. 20, benefice 
 
 14 Eliz. c. 11, ecclesiastical leases . 
 18 Eliz. c. 11, ecclesiastical leases . 
 28 Eliz. 0. 2, witchcraft (Irish) 
 31 Eliz. c. 5, penal action 
 
 o. 6, simony .. 
 
 c. 12, accessories 
 39 Eliz. c. 5, hospitals 
 43 Eliz. c. 2, poor 
 
 c. 4, charitable uses . . 
 
 c. 6, costs 
 1 Jac. I. c. 11, bigamy 
 
 c. 15, bMikrupt 
 3 Jac. I. c. 10, conveyance of felons 
 
 c. 12, fish 
 7 Jac. I. 0. 12, shop books 
 
 21 Jac. I. 0. 16, limitations 
 
 0. 19, bankrupt 
 16 Car. I. c. 10, petition of right 
 
 12 Car. II. c. 17, clergy 
 
 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4, uniformity 
 
 c. 12, poor . . 
 
 22 & 23 Car. II. o. 1, Coventry Act . 
 
 0. 9, costs' 
 
 c. 25, game . . 
 25 Car. II. o. 2, tests .. .. ' . 
 29 Car. II. 0. 3, Statute of Frauds . 
 
 c. 7, Sunday Observance 
 31 Car. II. c. 2, Habeas Corpus 
 
 1 W. & M. c. 18, toleration .. 
 
 2 W. & M. 0. 5, landlord and tenant 
 
 I'AOE 
 
 .. 545 
 
 282 
 
 157, 466, 467 
 
 '.. 536 
 
 .. 250 
 
 479, 709 
 
 .. 354 
 
 83, 106 
 
 .. 291 
 
 .. 536 
 
 15. 376 
 
 .. 657 
 
 112, 145, 376 
 
 428 
 
 253, 298, 313, 317, 375, 600 
 
 224 
 
 317,318 
 
 317 
 
 736 
 
 534 
 
 253 
 
 477 
 
 156 
 
 71, 100, 154, 229, 246, 287, 521, 
 
 572, 662, 706, 710 
 
 52, 448, 544 
 
 312, 730 
 
 .. 257' 
 
 422, 428 
 
 86 
 
 .. 581 
 
 .. 544 
 
 29, 30, 68, 69, 264, 289, 302, 312, 
 
 313, 391, 397, 408, 455, 458, 571, 678 
 
 86 
 
 291 
 
 158 
 
 50, 536 
 
 .. 287, 331, 425, 707 
 
 468 
 
 312 
 
 581, 601 
 
 20 
 
 49, 69, 70, 250, 272, 384, 454, 
 511, 514, 515, 575 
 
 2,378,584 
 
 159 
 
 352 
 
 ..55, 300, 450, 679 
 
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TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 clvii 
 
 2 W. & M. c. 8, swine 
 
 3 W. & M. 0. 14, debt 
 
 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11, poor .. 
 
 4 & 5 W. & M. 0. 20, judgments 
 
 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 25, conveyances 
 o. 35, Quakers 
 
 9 Will. III. c. 35, blasphemy 
 
 c. 41, pubUc stores 
 
 10 & 11 WiU. III. c. 17, lottery 
 
 c. 23, larceny 
 
 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 7, piracy 
 
 4 & 5 Anne, e. 16, limitations 
 
 5 & 6 Anne, c. 14, game 
 
 6 Anne, c. 16, brokers 
 
 7 Anne, c. 12, ambassadors . . 
 
 c. 20, registration 
 
 8 Anne, c. 7, customs .. 
 
 c. 14, taxation 
 c. 19, copyright 
 
 9 Anne, c. 10, post-office 
 
 c. 14, gaming 
 e. 20, mandamus 
 
 10 Anne, c. 2, church .. 
 
 12 Anne, c. 14, exercise of trades 
 
 st. 2, c. 16, usury .. 
 
 I Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, riot 
 
 st. 2, c. 13, Papist .. 
 
 5 Geo. I. c. 8, poor 
 
 c. 27, artificers 
 
 6 Geo. I. c. 18, Bubble Act .. 
 
 7 Geo. I. 0. 21, bottomry 
 
 9 Geo. I. c. 7, appeal .. 
 
 c. 22, Black Act .. 
 
 10 Geo. I. c. 4, Papist 
 
 5 Geo. II. c. 20, pilotage 
 
 7 Geo. II. c. 8, stock-jobbing 
 
 8 Geo. II. c. 13, copyright .. 
 
 9 Geo. II. 0. 36, mortmain . . 
 
 10 Geo. II. c. 31, apprentice .. 
 
 II Geo. II. c. 19, distress 
 
 12 Geo. II. o. 29, quarter sessions 
 18 Geo. II. 0. 18, certiorari . . 
 14 Geo. II. c. 6, cattle stealing 
 
 17 Geo. II. 0. 3, poor rate 
 
 c. 38, poor 
 
 18 Geo. II. c. 20, justices 
 
 19 Geo. II. 0. 22, harbours .. 
 
 20 Geo. II. c. 19, apprentice 
 
 23 Geo. II. c. 13, artificers . . 
 
 24 Geo, II, c, 44, justices 
 
 I.S. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 330 
 
 89 
 
 381 
 
 28 
 .'. .. 165, 374 
 
 304 
 
 330, 737 
 
 188 
 
 712 
 
 729 
 
 .. 176 
 
 29,30,264 
 
 190,492 
 
 64,697 
 
 205, 264 
 
 321, 456 
 
 480 
 
 537 
 
 274,716 
 
 716 
 
 372,559 
 
 49 
 
 352 
 
 353 
 
 303 
 
 468 
 
 20,552 
 
 67 
 
 338 
 
 64 
 
 295 
 
 19 
 
 832,615 
 
 552 
 
 359 
 
 478 
 
 .. 146, 480, 650, 651 
 144, 214, 221, 325, 384, 573 
 
 689 
 
 198,587,714 
 
 668 
 
 248 
 
 602 
 
 28 
 
 .. 81, 145, 287, 312 
 
 21,665 
 
 335 
 
 585 
 
 333 
 '.'. '.. "284,308,606 
 
 11 
 
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clviii TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 25 Geo. II. e. 6, wills 81 
 
 26 Geo. II. c. 14, fees at sessions .. .. .. .. ■• 664 
 
 c. 33, clandestine marriages .. .. .. ■■ 106 
 
 32 Geo. II. c. 28, arrest 109,362 
 
 2 Geo. III. c. 19, game 410 
 
 5 Geo. III. c. 14, fish 492 
 
 6 Geo. III. c. 19, gloves 480 
 
 c. 25, master and servant . . . . . . . . 334 
 
 12 Geo. III. o. 11, Boyal marriages .. .. .. .. 260 
 
 o. 24, destroying stores . . . . . . . . 737 
 
 o. 61, gunpowder .. .. .. .. .. 581 
 
 14 Geo. III. c. 78, fire insurance 85,86 
 
 16 Geo. III. c. 30, deer 332 
 
 17 Geo. III. c. 26, annuities 105,582 
 
 c. 50, auction duty . . . . . . . . . . 373 
 
 c. 56, larceny .. .. .. .. .. .. 596 
 
 21 Geo. III. c. 70, East India Company 359 
 
 22 Geo. III. c. 75, Colonial Offices 87 
 
 c. 83, poor relief .. . . . . . . . . 145 
 
 23 Geo. III. c. 58, stamps .. .. 507 
 
 25 Geo. III. c. 51, post-horse duties .. .. .. 240,566 
 
 26 Geo. III. c. 71, slaughter-house 737 
 
 c. 107, poor 78 
 
 27 Geo. III. c. 44, ecclesiastical courts .. .. .. .. 161 
 
 28 Geo. III. c. 48, apprentice 690 
 
 33 Geo. III. c. 13, date of Acts 77,740 
 
 c. 54, friendly societies .. .. .. .. 311 
 
 34 Geo. III. c. 54, conspiracy .. .. .. .. .. 550 
 
 35 Geo. III. c. 101, poor 287,312,420 
 
 36 Geo. III. c. 52, legacy duty 270 
 
 37 Geo. III. c. 123, oaths 84 
 
 38 Ge9. III. c. 5, land tax 99 
 
 c. 60, land tax 99 
 
 39 Geo. III. c. 34, game 410 
 
 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 99, pawnbrokers 693,700 
 
 42 Geo. III. c. 90, militia 78 
 
 43 Geo. III. c. 59, bridge 430 
 
 c. 84, benefices .. .. .. .. .. .. 609 
 
 o. 99, distress .. .. .. .. .. .. 236 
 
 c. 108, church 318 
 
 e. 161, duties .. .. .. .. .. .. 542 
 
 44 Geo. III. c. 98, conveyancer .. .. .. .. .. 697 
 
 47 Geo. III. c. 68, coals 696 
 
 48 Geo. III. c. 55, house tax .. .. .. .. .. 71 
 
 o. 106, expired Acts .. .. .. .. .. 741 
 
 c. 143, hcenoe duties .. .. .. .. .. 300 
 
 50 Geo. III. c. 41, hawkers .. .. .. .. .. .. 322 
 
 51 Geo. III. c. 36, justices .. .. .. .. .. .. 665 
 
 52 Geo. III. i;. 93, taxes 67'0 
 
 53 Geo. III. c. 127, justices 286 
 
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TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 clix 
 
 53 Geo. III. c. 141, annuities 
 
 t. 159, shipowner 
 
 c. 160, doctrine of the Trinity 
 
 54 Geo. III. o. 84, justices .. 
 
 c. 1.'59, harbours 
 
 55 Geo. III. c. 137, poor 
 
 c. 184, stamps .. 
 c. 194, apothecaries 
 
 56 Geo. III. c. 50, farm stock 
 
 c. 58, excise 
 
 57 Geo. III. c. xxix, paving . . 
 
 0. GO, court of Exchequer 
 
 c. 93, distress 
 
 c. 99, clergy 
 59 Geo. III. c. 46, appeal of murder 
 
 c. 50, poor 
 
 o. 69, foreign enlistment 
 1 Geo. IV. c. 117, larceny 
 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 18, witchcraft 
 
 3 Geo. IV. c. 89, warrant of attorney 
 
 c. 71, cruelty 
 
 c. 126, turnpikes . . 
 
 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, master and servant 
 
 c. 76, marriage 
 0. 95, turnpikes 
 
 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, vagrants .. .. 66,96, 
 
 c. 84, felon 
 c. 97, artificers 
 o. 113, slave trade 
 
 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, bankruptcy .. .. 66,69 
 
 c. 50, false verdict 
 c. 57, settlement .. 
 c. 125, pilots 
 
 7 Geo. IV. c. 46 joint-stock banks .. 
 
 c. 57, insolvents .. 
 7 & 8 Geo. c. 27, criminal statutes .. 332^477, 
 c. 28, criminal law 
 c. 29, false pretences 
 c. 30, riot .. 
 c. 71, arrest 
 0. Ixxv, watermen 
 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, limitation 
 
 o. 23, bankers 
 
 c. 31, murder at sea .. .. 83, 
 
 c. 40, lunatic prisoner .. 
 
 o. 60, corn .. 
 
 o; 61, public-house 
 
 c. 69, game 
 
 c. 74, criminal law 
 
 10 Geo. IV. 0. 7, Eoman Catbolio relief ,. ., 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 .. 431 
 
 
 516, 543, 737 
 
 
 .. 330 
 
 
 .. 662 
 
 
 .. 334 
 
 
 98,298 
 
 
 308, 506 
 
 
 474, 688 
 
 
 299, 300 
 
 
 301, 479 
 
 
 .. 336 
 
 
 .. 697 
 
 
 .. 295 
 
 
 224, 655, 656 
 
 
 .. 736 
 
 
 .. 563 
 
 
 .. 44 
 
 
 .. 729 
 
 
 .. 736 
 
 34 
 
 , 378, 566, 567 
 
 
 .. 602 
 
 292, 
 
 319, 380, 549 
 
 
 176, 194, 334 
 
 
 .. 106 
 
 
 .. 549 
 
 474, 
 
 475, 486, 586 
 
 
 ,. • 84,661 
 
 
 .. 333 
 
 
 44, 262 
 
 1, 86,' 
 
 258, 422, 541 
 
 
 .. 736 
 
 
 71, 563 
 
 
 ♦. 563 
 
 
 .. 294 
 
 
 410, 411, 668 
 
 492, 
 
 515, 602, 615 
 
 
 .. 538 
 
 
 499, 579 
 
 
 .. 497 
 
 
 .. 324 
 
 
 587, 689 
 
 68,' 
 
 138, 397, 445 
 
 
 .. 308 
 
 106,' 
 
 264, 352, 468 
 
 
 .. 734 
 
 
 .. 493 
 
 294i 
 
 565, 709, 734 
 
 
 .. 546 
 
 
 .. 83 
 
 
 .. 20 
 
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clx TABLE OF STATUTES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 10 Geo. IV. 0. 56. friendly societies 163,164 
 
 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 47, debt 89 
 
 c. 51, beer .. .. .. .. 301 
 
 c. 64, beer 300, 301, 321, 322, 479, 480 
 
 c. 68, carriers „ .. 22, 23, 367, 419 
 
 c. 70, procedtire .. .. 253,307 
 
 1 Will. IV. c. 18, poor 161 
 
 o. 22, evidence .. .. .. .. .. .. 430 
 
 1 «fe 2 Will. IV. c. 22, backney carriage 566 
 
 0.32, game .. ..182,353,410,479,492,581,601 
 
 c. 37, Truck Act 137,138,201 
 
 c. 41, special constables .. .. .. ., 624 
 
 c. 58, interpleader .. .. .. .. .. 250 
 
 c. Ixxvi, coal .. .. ., .. .. .. 469 
 
 2 Will. IV. c. 33, land suits ■ 518 
 
 c 45, representation of the people .. .. 63,71,590 
 
 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71, prescription .. .. 16, 17, 55, 323, 578 
 
 0. 100, tithes 87, 297 
 
 c. 120, stage carriages .. .. .. 240,566 
 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, dramatic copyright .. .. .. .. 135 
 
 c. 27, limitations 159,297,302 
 
 c. 42, limitations 29, 30, 142, 302, 402, 403, 458, 583 
 c. 53, customs .. .. .. .. ., 356 
 
 c. 74, fines and recoveries 160, 285, 320, 321, 443, 648 
 
 0. 90, poor 591 
 
 c. 98, usury 303,304 
 
 c. 105, dower 52, 55, 56 
 
 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 36, 0. C. Court 537 
 
 c. 76, poor .. .. 33,98,298,625,639,660,686 
 c. 82, stock 518 
 
 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 41, bankrupt securities .. .. 372, 541, 542 
 
 c. 50, highways 100, 103, 125, 189, 229 284, 308, 
 
 340, 424, 481, 496, 566, 691, 725 
 c. 54, prohibited degrees .. .. 101, 260, 261 
 
 c. 63, weights and measures . . 196, 259, 482 
 
 0. 76, municipal corporations .. 127, 136, 155, 483, 
 
 577, 597, 660 
 0. 83, patent .. .. .. .. .. 389 
 
 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 56, Scotland, process 736 
 
 c. 71, tithes 157,622 
 
 0. 76, newspaper stamps .. .. .. .. 606 
 
 0. 86, registration .. .. .. .. .. 707 
 
 0. 96, assessment .. .. .. ., 69, 70, 666 
 
 c. c, shippmg 108,361 
 
 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, wills .. 14, 127, 156, 456, 514, 559 
 
 c. 45, parish notices .. .. .. .. 28 
 
 0. 85, injuries .. .. .. .. 582 
 
 1 & 2 Vict. c. 80, special constables .. .. .. .. 640 
 
 c. 106, clergy .. 309,609,656,709 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES. clxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, insolvents .. 65, 112, 146, 286, 297, 321, 
 
 324, 418, 579, 668 
 
 2 & 3 Vict. 0. 11, judgments .. .. .. .. .. .. 29 
 
 e, 37, usury 303 
 
 0.47, police 331,332,565,581,591 
 
 0. 71, poUce 127, 327, 331, 581 
 
 c. 73, slave trade .. .. .. .. .. .. 272 
 
 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, costs 812,730 
 
 c. 54, lunatic prisoner .. .. .. .. .. 735 
 
 0. 61, beer 230,669 
 
 c. 66, admiralty .. .. .. ., .. .. 401 
 
 0. 85, cliimneys . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 
 
 c. 86, church discipline .. .. .. .. 431,432 
 
 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, corporations .. .. .. .. .. 551 
 
 5 Vict. c. 27, ecclesiastical leases ^. .. .. .. .. 313 
 
 5 & 6 Vict. 0. 14, com duties 493 
 
 c, 22, lunatic prisoner .. .. .. .. .. 286 
 
 o. 35, income tax .. .. .. .. 223, 544, 555 
 
 c. 39, factors 364,575 
 
 c. 45, copyright .. .. .. .. .. 131, 651 
 
 c. 54, tithes 427 
 
 0. 79, stamps 507 
 
 c. 93, adulteration .. .. .. .. .. 184 
 
 c. 95, sessions .. .. .. .. .. .. 326 
 
 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, registration 70, 136, 710 
 
 c. 36, exemption from rating .. .. .. .. 507 
 
 c. 66, cognovit actionem .. .. .. 35,378 
 
 c. 68, plays 211 
 
 c. 73, attorneys 402,438,713 
 
 c. 76, extradition .. .. .. .. .. .. 122 
 
 c. 86, hackney coaches .. .. .. .. .. 566 
 
 c. 96, Campbell's Act (libel) 211 
 
 7 & 8 Vict. c. 12, copyright * .. 651 
 
 c. 15, factories 307,494 
 
 c. 24, engrossing .. .. .. .. .. .. 736 
 
 c. 29, game 547 
 
 c. 84, metropolis . . .. .. .. .. .. 306 
 
 0. 96, insolvency .. .. .. .. .. .. 104 
 
 c. 101, poor 18,258,275,625 
 
 0. 110, companies 440,690 
 
 8 & 9 Vict. o. 16, companies clauses .. 202, 316, 373, 440, 654 
 
 o. 18, lands clauses 245,325 
 
 c. 20,raUways 104,131,712 
 
 o. 84, customs .. .. .. .. .. .. 356 
 
 c. 100, lunatics .. .. .. .. .. •• 187 
 
 c. 106, real property 310,319,569 
 
 c. 109, wagers 198,385,559,692 
 
 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, poor removal 99 
 
 c. 93, fatal accidents 261,275,316 
 
 c. 95, county courts .. .. .. 238,288,643 
 
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elxii TABLE OF STATUTES, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 10 & 11 Vict. c. 15, gasworks 97,335 
 
 c. 27, harbours .. .. .. .. ■• 175 
 
 c. 102, insolvency .. .. .. .. ■• 418 
 
 11 & 12 Vict. c. 21, India 19 
 
 c. 42, justices 426,603 
 
 c. 43, justices .. .. 252, 289, 898, 534, 538, 614 
 
 c. 44, county court ., .. .. .. .- 27 
 
 o. 45, companies .. .. .. .. .. 428 
 
 c. 63, public health .. .. 347,589,594,658,667, 
 
 670, 671 
 c. 123, nuisances 241, 287, 288 
 
 12 & 13 Vict. e. 45, sessions 79,249,289,312 
 
 c. 92, cruelty to animals .. .. ..18,361,474 
 
 0. 96, high seas 262,557 
 
 c. 103, poor .. 898 
 
 c. 106, bankruptcy 66, 79, 357, 877, 888, 494, 567, 576 
 
 18 & 14 Vict; c. 5, mutiny 666 
 
 c. 60. trustees 522 
 
 c. 61, county courts 428,680,730 
 
 c. 97, stamps .. .. .. .. .. .. 310 
 
 14 & IS.Vict. c. 36, house duty 116 
 
 o. 71, Church of Ireland 318 
 
 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, county court 730 
 
 c. 76, common law procedure .. 27, 28, 401, 404 
 c. 86 Chancery 105 
 
 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, vexatious indictments .. .. .. .. 200 
 
 0. 34, income tax .. .. .. .. 271,544 
 
 c. 41, lodging-house 132,133 
 
 c. 51, succession duty .. .. 97,102,218,270 
 
 c. 59, cheque .. - 201 
 
 c. 96, lunatics 652 
 
 c. 107, customs 272 
 
 c. 119, betting-houses 598,600 
 
 c. 128, smoke 189 
 
 c. 187, charitable trusts .. .. .. .. 587 
 
 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, railways 46,416 
 
 o. 36, bills of sale .. 120,121,178,197,212,379 
 
 c. 88, gaming 827 
 
 c. 60, animals .. .. .. .. .. .. 474 
 
 c. 90, usury 209,481 
 
 c. 102, corrupt practices . . . . . . . . 495 
 
 c. 104, merchant shipping 64, 111, 181, 182, 151, 199, 
 
 265, 268, 811, 416, 
 
 522, 548, 563, 569, 
 
 653, 677, 691, 722 
 
 c. 120, merchants shipping .. .. .. .. 516 
 
 c. 125, common law procedure . . 23, 24, 28, 65, 141 
 
 18 & 19 Vict. c. 48, cinque ports 665 
 
 c, 118, public-houses .. .. .. .. .. 294 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES. clxiii 
 
 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, metropolis management 
 
 PARE 
 
 .. 170, 240, 247, 322, 
 
 
 326, 336, 367, 641 
 
 c. 121, nuisance 
 
 137, 310, 338 
 
 c. 122, metropolitan building 
 
 174, 306, 558, 585, 
 
 
 647, 688 
 
 c. 124, charitable trusts 
 
 637 
 
 19 & 20 Vict. 0. 97, mercantile law 
 
 .. 390,391, 392, 399 
 
 c. 108, county courts 
 
 318, 319 
 
 20 Vict. c. 19, poor 
 
 386 
 
 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3, penal servitude .. 
 
 262 
 
 c. 43, appeal .. 
 
 251, 340, 344, 674, 684 
 
 c. 83, obscene books .. 
 
 195 
 
 c. 85, matrimonial causes 
 
 26,261 
 
 c. 157, Mayor's court .. 
 
 319 
 
 c. cxlvii, Thames Conservancy 
 
 311, 578 
 
 21 & 22 Vict. c. 42, prescription 
 
 578 
 
 c. 49, Jews 
 
 20 
 
 c. 90, medical .. 
 
 394 
 
 c. 95, probate .. 
 
 394 
 
 c. 108, matrimonial causes .. 
 
 26 
 
 22 & 23 Vict. c. 21, Exchequer 
 
 518 
 
 0. 35, property 
 
 392 
 
 c. 66, weights .. 
 
 167,168 
 
 28 & 24 Vict. c. 27, refreshment-houses . . 
 
 81,574 
 
 c. 28, stock jobbing .. 
 
 478 
 
 c. 38, judgments 
 
 29 
 
 0. 63, Jews 
 
 ,. 20 
 
 c. 88, homicide 
 
 262 
 
 c. 125, metropolis gas 
 
 326 
 
 c. 126, common law procedure 
 
 403 
 
 c. 127, solicitors 
 
 ..24, 471, 713 
 
 c. 136, charities 
 
 637 
 
 c. 139, gunpowder 
 
 581 
 
 24 & 25 Vict. 0. 10, admiralty .. 62, 278, 
 
 316, 317, 401, 580, 677 
 
 c. 21, excise 
 
 284, 545 
 
 c. 31, Sierra Leone 
 
 256 
 
 c. 61, local government 
 
 347 
 
 c. 91, stamps .. 
 
 311, 574, 667 
 
 c. 95, criminal statutes 
 
 352,497,579 
 
 e. 96, larceny .. 166, 414, 471, 
 
 472, 478, 493, 499, 586 
 
 c. 97, mischief 
 
 348, 497 
 
 e. 98, forgery 
 
 146, 443 
 
 e. 100, offences against the person .. 178, 257, 258, 
 
 
 264, 265, 304, 352, 
 
 
 486, 489, 558 
 
 c. 101, S. L. E., 1861 
 
 105, 507, 582 
 
 c. 109, salmon fishery 
 
 .. 184, 565, 581, 589 
 
 c. 114, domicile 
 
 268 
 
 c. 134, bankruptcy 
 
 51, 546 
 
 25 & 26 Vict. 0. 61, highways 
 
 555 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
clxlv TABLE OP STATtTEg. 
 
 PAaK 
 
 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, merchant shipping .. ..65, 124, 131, 276 
 
 0. 68, copyright .. .. .. .. .. 60 
 
 c. 86, lunacy 305 
 
 c. 87, friendly societies .. .. .. .. 731 
 
 c. 89, companies 59, 103, 130, 202, 249, 316, 555, 592, 
 
 619, 622, 669, 690, 698 
 0. 102, metropolis management 57, 58, 285, 360, 423, 
 
 475, 641 
 
 o.'lOS, assessment 
 
 ■ ■ 
 
 .. 659 
 
 c. 114, game 
 
 
 .. 420 
 
 26 & 27 Vict. c. 29, election 
 
 
 27, 415, 692 
 
 c. 33, beerhouse 
 
 ■ • . 
 
 .. 480 
 
 c. 85, S. Africa 
 
 • > 
 
 .. 256 
 
 c. 41, innkeepers 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 651 
 
 C..112, telegraphs 
 
 
 .. 146 
 
 0. 118, companies 
 
 .. 
 
 617 
 
 c. 125, S. L. R., 1863 158, 
 
 253, 376, 
 
 421, 448, 545, 
 661, 727 
 
 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, naval prize 
 
 >• 
 
 .. 102 
 
 c. 43, annuities 
 
 ., 
 
 .. 102 
 
 c. 55, metropolitan police 
 
 
 331, 832 
 
 0. 95, fatal accidents .. 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 261 
 
 0. 101, highways 
 
 
 67, 566 
 
 28 & 29 Vict. c. 83, locomotive 
 
 .. 
 
 250, 251, 481 
 
 c. 86, partnership 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 503 
 
 0. 96, revenue .. 
 
 
 .. 311 
 
 c. 116i foreign jurisdiction .. 
 
 
 .. 256 
 
 29 & 30 Viet. c. 19, Parliament 
 
 .. 
 
 561, 706 
 
 0. 90, sanitary .. 
 
 
 241, 288 
 
 30 & 31 Vict. c. 6, asylum 
 
 ■■■ 
 
 .. 630 
 
 0. 23, insurance 
 
 ,. 
 
 204, 511 
 
 c.59, S. L. E.. 1867 
 
 303, 333, 
 
 , 853, 359, 552 
 
 c. 62, test abolition .. 
 
 ■ . 
 
 .. 20 
 
 c. 84, vaccination 
 
 ,. 
 
 .. 370 
 
 0. 131, companies 
 
 .. 129, 
 
 , 203, 619, 717 
 
 c. 134, metropolis 
 
 
 .. 473 
 
 c. 142, county courts . . 
 
 .'.■ 69, 
 
 307, 403, 730 
 
 c. 146, workshops 
 
 
 .. 306 
 
 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54, judgments extension .. 
 
 
 . 618 
 
 c. 71, county courts . . 
 
 ,. 
 
 113, 243 
 
 0. 116, larceny .. 
 
 
 114, 478 
 
 c. 121, pharmacy 
 
 ,, 
 
 140, 558 
 
 c. 122, poor law 
 
 
 .. 98, 287, 298 
 
 32 & 33 Vict. 0. 14, revenue 
 
 , , 
 
 .. 670 
 
 c. 19, stannaries 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 622 
 
 c. 27, beerhouse 
 
 .. 
 
 280, 636, 734 
 
 c. 41, assessment 
 
 ,, 
 
 17, 81 
 
 e. 46, debts 
 
 , ^ 
 
 .. 303 
 
 c. 51, county courts .. 
 
 .. 
 
 33, 113, 243 
 
 c. 55, municipal elections 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 155 
 
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TABLE OP STATUTES. clxV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 32 &. 33 Vict. c. 62, debtors 15, 35, 101, 151, 250, 358, 371, 377, 378, 
 
 421, 470, 471, 472, 476, 645 
 0. 67, metropolis valuation .. 360,659,666,672,673 
 0. 70, diseases of animals .. .. 182, 719, 725 
 
 c. 71, bankruptcy 32, 33, 97, 158, 203, 214, 223, 227, 
 228, 258, 411, 412, 570, 576, 648 
 c. 73, telegraphs .. .. .. .. .. 146 
 
 o. 83, debtors 104, 325, 567, 576 
 
 c. 99, habitual criminal .. .. .. .. SO 
 
 c. 117, pharmacy .. .. .. .. .. 140 
 
 33 & 34 Vict. c. 9, peace preservation .. .. ., .. 373 
 
 0. 14, naturalisation ■ .. .. .. .. 266,268 
 
 0. 29, public-houses . . . . . . . . . . 395 
 
 c. 35, apportionment . . . . . . 147, 384, 592 
 
 c. 52, extradition 45,122,420 
 
 c. 71, national debt .. .. .. .. .. 164 
 
 c. 75, education 261,306,371 
 
 c. 90, foreign enlistment .. .. .. .. 494 
 
 o, 91, clerical disabilities .. .. .. .. 161 
 
 c. 93, married woman .. .. 30, 153, 154 
 
 c. 97, stamps .. .. 225, 226, 311, 506, 508, 509 
 
 c. 99, revenue 311,506,667 
 
 34 & 35 Vict. c. 8, West Africa 256,264,408 
 
 c. 31, trade unions .. .. .. .. .. 299 
 
 0. 43, ecclesiastical dilapidations .. .. .. 661 
 
 0. 48, oaths 161, 552 
 
 c. 79, lodgers' goods protection .. .. .. 652 
 
 e. 98, vaccination .. .. .. .. .. 484 
 
 c. 112, habitual criminals 30,474 
 
 c. 116, S. L. E., 1871 145, 421, 550, 690 
 
 35 & 36 Vict. c. 19, kidnapping 256,385 
 
 0. 33, ballot .. .. 21, 60, 470, 636, 637, 663, 716 
 
 c. 63, S. L. R., 1872 .. .. .. 253, 300, 376 
 
 c. 65, bastards 259 
 
 c. 74, adulteration . . . . . . . . 58, 561 
 
 c. 77, mines 127,128,579 
 
 c. 78, wUd birds 290 
 
 c. 86, local courts .. .. .. .. .. 171 
 
 c. 92, constables 425 
 
 c. 93, pawnbrokers 693,700 
 
 o. 94, Ucensing 23, 81, 111, 125, 179, 186, 190, 192, 361, 
 
 490, 520, 565, 734 
 c. 96. dilapidations .. .. .. .. .. 661 
 
 86 & 37 Vict. c. 38,' vagrants 588 
 
 o. 60, extradition 45, 550 
 
 c. 66, judicature .. 11, 151, 165, 166, 291, 292 
 
 c. 71, salmon fishery .. .. .. .. .. 589 
 
 c. 76, railways .. .. .. .. •■ 151 
 
 0. 85, shipping .. .. .. .. .. 359 
 
 0. 88, slave trade .. .. .. .. ■• 272 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
clxvi TABLE OF STATUTES, 
 
 36 & 37 Vict. c. 91, S. L. K, 1873 .. 
 
 PAGl! 
 
 410, 563, 668 
 
 37 & 38 Vict. c. 88, Straits Settlements .. 
 
 408 
 
 0. 49j licensing 
 
 222,342 
 
 0, 57, limitation 
 
 .. 302,371, 872, 458 
 
 c. 62, infants 
 
 376, 392 
 
 c. 68, solicitors 
 
 254 
 
 0. 85, public worship .. 
 
 521, 658 
 
 0.96, S.L. B., 1874 .. 
 
 ., 303,566,639,713 
 
 38 & 39 Vict. c. 25, public stores protection 
 
 183 
 
 c. 36, artizans' dweUings 
 
 128 
 
 c. 50, county courts . . 
 
 291, 292, 677 
 
 c. 51, Pacific Islands .. 
 
 256 
 
 c. 54, justices .. 
 
 21 
 
 c. 55, public health .. 132, 168, 
 
 170, 185, 186, 241, 248, 
 
 310, 326, 
 
 338, 342, 847, 848, 363, 
 
 364, 365, 
 
 366, 444, 496, 545, 554, 
 
 589, 594, 
 
 , 656, 657, 658, 667, 671 
 
 c. 60, friendly society .. 
 
 133 
 
 c. 63, adulteration 
 
 .. 58, 186, 491, 561- 
 
 c. 66, S. L. E., 1875 .. 
 
 587 
 
 c. 76, ecclesiastical 
 
 521 
 
 0. 77, judicature 28, 49, 166, 
 
 174, 289, 319, 391, 543 
 
 e. 79, solicitor 
 
 402 
 
 c. 86, conspiracy .. 15, 
 
 , 85, 168, 176, 194, 334, 
 
 
 376, 430, 585 
 
 c. 90, employers and workmen 
 
 330 
 
 c. 94, defilement 
 
 304 
 
 39 & 40 Vict. 0. 22, trades union . . 
 
 299 
 
 c. 29, wild birds 
 
 290 
 
 c. 36, customs 
 
 272,584,738 
 
 c. 45, industrial societies 
 
 731 
 
 c. 61, parish 
 
 883, 630 
 
 0. 79, education 
 
 298, .371 
 
 c. 80, merchant shipping 
 
 57, 127 
 
 41 & 42 Vict. c. 15, customs 
 
 184 
 
 0. 16, factories .. 
 
 306, 494 
 
 c. 17, adulteration 
 
 90 
 
 c. 31, bills of sale .. 15,31, 
 
 120, 130, 135, 173, 210, 
 
 
 211, 225, 316 
 
 0. 49, weights and measures . . 
 
 196, 259, 483 
 
 c. 54, debtors .. 
 
 371 
 
 0. 73, piracy 
 
 265 
 
 c. 77, highways 
 
 170, 545 
 
 42 & 43 Vict. 0. 11, banks 
 
 156 
 
 c. 30, adulteration 
 
 58 
 
 c. 49, summary jurisdiction .. 
 
 15, 101, 252, 326, 340, 
 
 
 341, 844, 525, 684 
 
 0. 59, civU procedure .. 
 
 403, 459 
 
 43 & 44 Vict. c. 9, time 
 
 605 
 
 c. 19, taxes 
 
 236 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TABLE OP STATUTES. 
 
 clxvii 
 
 43 & 44 Viot.,0. 20, revenue .. 
 
 o. 35, wild birds 
 
 o. 42, employers' liability 
 
 44 & 45 Vict. c. 12j revenue . . 
 
 c. 21, married women (Scotland) 
 
 c. 25, dilapidations 
 
 c. 41, conveyancing 
 
 c. 58, army 
 
 c. 59, civil procedm'e . . 
 
 c. 60, newspaper libels 
 
 c. 61, Welsh Sunday closing 
 
 45 & 46 Vict. c. 14, metropolis 
 
 c. 20, poor rate assessment . . 
 c. 22, boilers .. 
 e. 39, conveyancing .. 
 c. 43, bills of sale .. 15, 16, 31, 118, 135, 168, 169 
 173, 198, 210, 211, 212, 316. 
 379, 380, 386, 703 
 c. 50, municipal corporations 127, 136, 139, 155, 483, 
 
 551, 597, 620, 624, 660 
 c. 61, bills of exchange 25,48,201 
 
 PAGE 
 
 .. 301 
 
 .. 290 
 
 55 
 
 120, 223, 395, 505 
 
 393, 394 
 
 661 
 
 392, 393 
 
 126, 666 
 
 519 
 
 "362,363, 740 
 
 14, 147 
 
 113 
 
 .. 17, 28, 81 
 .. 131 
 .. 648 
 
 c. 75, married women's property 
 
 
 30, 153, 154, 157, 
 163, 285, 318, 387, 
 , 402, 445, 558 
 
 46 & 47 Vict. c. 47, small intestacies 
 
 
 .. 299 
 
 c. 49, civil precedure .. 23, 24 
 
 [, 87 
 
 , 250, 401, 403, 404 
 
 e. 51, corrupt practices 
 
 27; 
 
 , 415, 429, 470, 692 
 
 c. 52, bankruptcy . . 31, 
 
 101, 
 
 114, 158, 196, 197, 
 
 212, 
 
 214, 
 
 , 258, 267, 377, 389, 
 
 390, 
 
 435, 
 
 , 436, 477, 568, 648 
 
 c. 56, education 
 
 
 .. 495 
 
 c. 57, patents . . 
 
 ,, 
 
 386, 579, 593 
 
 c. 61, agricultural holdings .. 
 
 , . 
 
 .. 129 
 
 47 & 48 Vict. c. 41, building societies 
 
 , , 
 
 .. 164 
 
 c. 43, summary jurisdiction .. 
 
 ,, 
 
 33, 289, 340, 714 
 
 c. 64, India 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 735 
 
 c. 76, post-office protection .. 
 
 ,, 
 
 485, 486 
 
 48 & 49 Vict. c. 3, representation of the people 
 
 ., 
 
 .. 71 
 
 c. 46, votLag 
 
 
 .. 130 
 
 0. 51, customs .. 
 
 ,. 
 
 .. 479 
 
 c. 61, Secretary for Scotland 
 
 
 58 
 
 c. 69, criminallaw .. 
 
 , , 
 
 256, 304 
 
 c. 72, artisans' dwellings 
 
 , , 
 
 .. 140 
 
 49 & 50 Vict. c. 33 J international copyright 
 
 
 386, 387, 556 
 
 50 & 51 Vict. c. 7, customs .. 
 
 
 .. 272 
 
 c. 28, merchandise marks 
 
 ,, 
 
 191, 195 
 
 c. 29, margarine 
 
 
 .. 474 
 
 c. 55, sheriffs .. .. 109, 
 
 167, 
 
 188, 362, 472, 473 
 
 c. 58, coal mines 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 704 
 
 c. 59, S. L. R., 1887 .. 
 
 .. 
 
 .. 305 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
^ Clxviii TABLK OF STATUTES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 50 & 51 Viet. c. 66, bankruptcy 3^8 
 
 51 & 52 Vict. c. 8, revenue 97,700 
 
 c. 21, distress 130, 295, 679 
 
 c. 25, railways and canals .. .. .. .. 151 
 
 0.33, forgery 322 
 
 e. 37, landlord and tenant .. .. .. .. 136 
 
 c. 41, local government .. .. .. .. 623 
 
 c. 42, mortmain .. .. 214,325,384,448,573 
 
 0. 43, county courts . . 27, 28, 69, 130, 238, 288, 291, 292, 
 
 319, 348, 411, 428, 518, 537, 
 
 553, 580, 643, 677, 680, 730 
 
 0. 56, bishop 738 
 
 o. 57, S. L. E., 1888 248, 286 
 
 c. 64, criminal procedure .. .. .. .. 363 
 
 52 & 53 Vict. c. 7, revenue ' .. .. 223,395 
 
 c. 21, weights and measures .. .. .. 193, 426 
 
 c. 45, factors 161,364,575 
 
 c. 49, arbitration .. .. 46, 200, 201, 409, 428 
 
 c. 63, interpretation .. 66, 77, 110, 332, 439, 604, 612, 
 
 613, 625, 728, 731, 733, 739, 741 
 
 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5, lunacy 27,187,305,653 
 
 c. 21, inland revenue . . .. .. .. .. 324 
 
 c. 29, intestacy .. .. .. .. .. 446 
 
 c. 35, boilers 211 
 
 c. 37, foreign jurisdiction .. .. .. .. 256 
 
 0. 39, partnership . . . . . . . . . . 503 
 
 0. 44, judicature .. .. .. .. .. Ii7 
 
 0. 51, S. L. E., 1890 518 
 
 e. 53, bankruptcy .. .. .. .. .. 173 
 
 c. 59, public health 186,211 
 
 c. 63, companies ., .. .. .. .. 561 
 
 c. 70, housing of working classes ., .. .. 128 
 
 c. 71, bankruptcy 386, 405, 608 
 
 54 & 55 Vict. c. 8, tithe 40,224 
 
 c. 85, bills of sale 173,211 
 
 c. 38, stamp duties ., .. .. .. .. 308 
 
 0. 39, stamps .. 128, 204, 226, 509, 511, 668, 700 
 
 c. 73, mortmain .. .. .. .. .. 215 
 
 c. 76, public health 310,326,338,738 
 
 55 & 56 Vict. c. 9, gaming 199, 385, 600, 693 
 
 c. 10, short titles 73 
 
 c. 13, conveyancing . . . . . . . . . . 393 
 
 c. 19, statute law revision, 1892 ' . . . . . . 737 
 
 c. 32, clergy discipline 432,489 
 
 c. 62, shop hours .. .. .. .. .. 125 
 
 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39, industrial societies .. .. .. 590,731 
 
 c. 54, S. L. E., 1893 254,325,332 
 
 c. 61, public authorities protection .. 28, 104, 108, 109, 
 
 134, 284, 308, 358, 359, 
 360, 413, 510, 586 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES. clxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, married women's property .. .. 102, 387 
 
 0. 71, sale of goods .. .. 48, 70, 390, 511, 575 
 
 57 & 58 Viot. 0. 16, supreme court .. .. .. .. .; 579 
 
 o. 17, public office 87 
 
 c. 24, wild birds 290 
 
 c. 56, S. L. E., 1894 ., 27 
 
 o. 57, animals .. .. .. .. .. .. 719 
 
 0. 60, merchants shipping .. 57, 65, 111, 124, 127, ISi, 
 
 132, 151, 158, 199, 256, 
 265, 268, 276, 311, 359, 
 416, 485, 516, 517, 543, 
 563, 569, 653, 677, 684, 
 691, 720, 722 
 c. clxxxvii, Thames conservancy .. .. .. 359 
 
 c. ocxiii, London building 113, 174, 285, 423, 445, 558, 
 
 585, 586, 636, 647, 688 
 
 58 & 59 Vict. c. 33, fugitive criminals 45,550 
 
 c. 37, factory and workshop .. .. .. .. 410 
 
 c. 39, summary jurisdiction (married women) 152, 396, 
 
 59 & 60 Vict. c. 14, short titles '73 
 
 c. 19, public health 707 
 
 c. 25, friendly society .. .. .. 133,507 
 
 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, workmen's compensation . . 124, 345, 346 
 
 c. 65, land transfer 245,309 
 
 61 & 62 Vict. c. 10, finance 185 
 
 c. 11, bishop .. .. .. .. .. .• 738 
 
 62 & 63 Vict. 0. 4, solicitors 438 
 
 c. 6, supreme court . . . . . . . . . . 147 
 
 c. 14, London government .. .. .. .. 322 
 
 c. 27, marriages .. .. .. .. •• 474 
 
 c. 51, food and drugs .. .. .. .. .. 58 
 
 63 & 64 Vict. c. 26, land charges .. ..'' 321 
 
 1 Ed. VIL c. 10, embezzlement 499,586 
 
 c. 22, factories 307,410,492 
 
 c. 24, intoxicating liquors .. .. .. .. 187 
 
 2 Ed. VIL c. 15, musical copyright 640 
 
 c. 42, education .. .. .. .. .. ■• 215 
 
 3 Ed. VII. c. 36, motor cars .. •• 251 
 
 c, 39, housing of working classes .. .. .• 322 
 
 c. 42, county courts .. .. .. .. 69,411 
 
 4 Ed. VIL c. 4, wild birds 290 
 
 c. 28, weights and measures 426 
 
 5 Ed. VIL c. 11, railway fires 628 
 
 c. ccix, London building . . . . . • • • "^ 
 
 6 Ed. VIL c. 15, extradition 122 
 
 c. 16, justices 665 
 
 c. 32, dogs.. 343 
 
 c. 36, copyright 640 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Clxx TABLE OP STATUTES. 
 
 FAQK 
 
 6 Ed. VII. 0. 89, intoxicating liquors 121 
 
 c.»47, trade disputes .. .. .. .. •■ 705 
 
 c. 48, merchant shipping .. 279, 534, 654; 720, 722 
 
 c. 58, workmen's compensation .. ..55,345,346 
 
 7 Ed. VII. c. 9, territorial forces 247 
 
 c. 17, probation of offenders, 1907 525 
 
 18, infants .. • 285 
 
 c. 21, adulteration 424 
 
 c. 24, limited partnerships .. .. .. .. 503 
 
 c. 29, patents 386,389,593 
 
 c. 31, vaccination.. .. .. .. .. .. 371 
 
 c. 43, education .. .. .. .. .. .. 298 
 
 0. 47, marriages .. .. .. .. .. .. 261 
 
 c. clxxi, water .. .. .. .. .. .. 393 
 
 8 Ed. VII. c. 11, wild birds 290 
 
 c. 15, costs in criminal cases . . . . 103, 586, 645 
 
 c. 28, agricultural holdings .. .. .. 486,716 
 
 c. 45, incest .. .. .. .. .. .. 106 
 
 o. 48, post office 129 
 
 0. 49, S. L. B., 1908 322 
 
 o. 53, distress 162,652 
 
 c. 55, poisons 140,689 
 
 c. 67, children 188 
 
 c. 69, companies (consolidation) 48, 60, 103, 107, 129, 
 
 130, 147, 163, 202, 203, 
 
 316, 428, 440, 655, 561, 
 
 592, 619, 622, 669, 
 
 690, 691, 698, 717 
 
 9 Ed. VII. c. 34, electric lighting 128 
 
 0. 44, housing .. .. .. .. .. .. 140 
 
 10 Ed. VII. c. 8, finance 284,545,700 
 
 10 Ed. VII. & 1 Geo.-V. o. 24, licensing (consolidation) 23, 102, 111, 
 
 121, 125, 147, 179, 186, 187, 
 
 190, 192, 222, 231, 232, 294, 
 
 342, 361, 395, 490, 520, 
 
 565, 636, 734 
 
 c. 35, finance .. .. .. .. 670 
 
 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 27, animals 361, 474 
 
 o. 38, money lenders .. .. .. .. ^ .. 381 
 
 c. 46, copyright .. 60,131,135,146,275,290,387, 
 
 480, 491, 556, 651, 716 
 
 2 & 3 Geo. V. c. 20, criminal law 256 
 
 o. 31, pilotage 16, 19, 416, 517, 522, 619 
 
 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 27, forgery 146,343,486 
 
 c. 28, mental deficiency .. .. .. .. 653 
 
 c. 34, bankruptcy .. .. .. .. .. 553 
 
 o. 37, national insurance .. .. .. .. 537 
 
 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 17, aliens 266,267,268 
 
 c. 47, deeds of arrangement .. .. .. 388,405 
 
 c. 58, criminal justice administration .. 86, 664 
 
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TABLE OF STATUTES. clxxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 4 & 5 Geo. V. . 59, bankruptcy .. 33, 66, 70, 79, 100, 112, 114, 
 
 158, 197, 203, 212, 214, 223, 
 227, 249, 258, 267, 309, 320, 
 349, 357, 377, 386, 412, 421, 
 435, 470, 477, 542, 546, 568, 
 570, 576, 579, 608, 645, 648 
 c. 61, constables .. .. .. .. .. 624 
 
 5 & 6 Geo. V. c. 61, government of India 256,359 
 
 6 & 7 Geo. V. 0. 14, summertime .. .. .. .. .. 605 
 
 c. 45, time, Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 605 
 
 c. 50, larceny .. 114,472,478,487,491,493, 
 
 498, 499, 586 
 
 7 & 8 Geo. V. o. 25, courts (emergency powers) .. .. .. 686 
 
 c. 64, representation of people .. 63, 70, 71, 130, 
 
 136, 137, 139, 153, 155, 
 165, 554, 577, 590, 710 
 
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ON THE 
 
 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 SECTION I. — INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 A STATUTE is the will of the Legislature ; and 
 the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which 
 all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to 
 be expounded " according to the intent of them 
 that made it " (a). And if the words of the 
 statute are in themselves precise and unam- 
 biguous no more is necessary than to expound 
 these words in their natural and ordinary sense, 
 the words themselves in such case best declaring 
 the intention of the Legislature (b). The object 
 of all interpretation of a statute i? to determine 
 what intention is conveyed, either expressly or 
 impliedly, by the language used, so far as is 
 
 (a) 4 Inst. 330; Sussex Peerage (1844), 11 01. & R 143. 
 
 (6) Income Tax Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A. 0. 534, 
 p. 543 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; Biver Wear Commissioners v. Adanson 
 (1877), 2 App. Oas. 743, at p. 778 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193 ; see also 
 Fordyce v. Bridges (1847), 1 H. L. 0. 1, p. 4 ; Glass v. Patterson, 
 [1902] 2 Ir. E. 660, at p. 667. 
 
 I.S. 1 
 
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^ INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 necessary for determining whether the particular 
 case or state of facts presented to the interpreter 
 falls within it. When the intention is expressed, 
 the task is one of verbal construction only ; but 
 when the statute expresses no intention on a 
 question to which it gives rise, and yet some 
 intention must necessarily be imputed to the 
 Legislature regarding it, the interpreter has to 
 determine it by inference grounded on certain 
 legal principles. The Act (a), for instance, which 
 imposes a penalty, recoverable summarily, on 
 every tradesman, labourer and other person who 
 carries on his worldly calling on a Sunday, 
 would give rise to a question of the former kind, 
 when it had to be determined whether the class 
 of persons to which the accused belonged was 
 comprised in the prohibition. But two other 
 questions arise out of the prohibition : is the 
 offender indictable as well as punishable sum- 
 marily ? and, is the validity of a contract entered 
 into in contravention of the Act affected by it ? 
 On these corollaries or necessary inferences from 
 its enactment, the Legislature, though silent, 
 must nevertheless be held to have entertained 
 some intention, and the interpreter is bound to 
 determine what it was. 
 
 And in such case the interpretation must be 
 that which best accords with the public benefit, 
 (a) Sunday Observance Act, 1677 (29 Oar., 11 Ch. 7). 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 3 
 
 thus where a statute imposes a penalty without 
 expressly stating to whom it is to be paid such 
 penalty by implication goes to the Crown (a). 
 
 The subject of the interpretation of a statute 
 seems thus to fall under two general heads : What 
 are the principles which govern the construction 
 of the language of an Act of Parliament ? and 
 next, What are those which guide the interpreter 
 in gathering the intention on those incidental 
 points on which the Legislature is necessarily 
 presumed to have entertained an opinion, but on 
 which it has not expressed any ? 
 
 SECTION II. — LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 The first and most elementary rule of construc- 
 tion is, that it is to be assumed that the words 
 and phrases of technical legislation are used in 
 their technical meaning if they have acquired one, 
 and, otherwise, in their ordinary meaning ; and, 
 secondly, that the phrases and sentences are to 
 be construed according to the rules of grammar. 
 From these presumptions it is not allowable to 
 depart, where the language admits of no other 
 meaning ; nor, where it is susceptible of another 
 meaning, unless adequate grounds are found, 
 either in the history or cause of the enactment 
 or in the context or in the consequences which 
 
 (a) Bradlaugh v. Clarhe (1883), 52 L. J. Q. B. 505 (H. L.). 
 
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4 INTBKPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 would result from the literal interpretation, for 
 concluding that that interpretation does not give 
 the real intention of the Legislature (a). If there 
 is nothing to modify, nothing to alter, nothing to 
 qualify, the language which the statute contains, 
 it must be construed in the ordinary and natural 
 meaning of the words and sentences (b). 
 The great fundamental principle is : — 
 
 " In construing iWills, and indeed, Statutes 
 and all Written Instruments, the grammatical 
 and ordinary sense of the words is to be 
 adhered to, unless that would lead to absurdity, 
 or some repugnancy or inconsistency with 
 the rest of the instrument ; in which case 
 the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
 words may be modified so as to avoid that 
 
 (a) Bac. Ab. Statute (I.) 2 ; Beche v. Smith, (1836), 2 M. & W. 
 191, p. 195 ; 46 E. E. 567 ; Cox v. Makes (1890), 15 App. Gas. 
 506 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; McBougal v. Paterson, 21 L. J. 0. P. 27 ; 
 Mallan v. May (1844), 13 M. & W. 511 ; 67 E. E. 707 ; per 
 Maule J., Jeffery v. Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. Gas. 815 ; B. v. Millis, 
 59 E. E. 134, per Lord Brougham ; A.-G. v. Westminster 
 Chambers Assoc. (1876), 45 L. J. Ex. 886, per Jessel M.E. ; 
 Cull v. Austin (1872), 41 L. J. 0. P. 153 ; B. v. Castro (1874), 
 43 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 505, per Lord Fitzgerald; Mornsey v. Monarch Bldg. Soey., 
 24 Q. B. D. 5, per Lord Esher M.E. ; Travis v. Uttley (1893), 
 63 L. J. M. G. 48. 
 
 (b) St. John, Hampstead v. Cotton (1886), 12 App. Gas. 6, per 
 Lord Halsbury L.O. 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 5 
 
 absurdity, repugnancy, or inconsistency, but 
 no further " (a). 
 
 In repeating this canon in Abbott v. Middleton (6), 
 Lord Wensleydale said : " This rule was in sub- 
 stance laid down by Mr. Justice Burton in War- 
 burton V. Loveland (c). It had previously been 
 described by Lord EUenborough, in Doe v. 
 Jessep {d), as ' a rule of common sense as strong 
 as can be.' It had been stated by Lord Cranworth 
 (when Chancellor) as ' a Cardinal Eule,' from 
 which, if we departed, we should launch into a sea 
 of difficulties not easy to fathom (e) ; and as the 
 ^Olifteit JSlule when applied to Acts of Parliament, 
 by Jervis C. J., in Mattison v. Hart " (/), who there 
 states " we ought ... to give to an Act of Parlia- 
 ment the plain, fair, literal meaning of its words, 
 where we do not see from its scope that such 
 meaning would be inconsistent, or would lead to 
 manifold injustice." 
 
 When the language is not only plain but admits 
 
 (a) Per Lord Wensleydale, Grey v. Pearson, 6 H. L. Gas. 106 ; 
 26:L. J. Ch. 481 ; see also Vestry St. John's, Eampstead v. Cotton 
 (1886), 12 App. Gas., at p. 6, and note especially Bhodes v. Bhodes 
 (1882), 7 App. Gas. (P. G.) 192, at p. 205. 
 
 (5) (1858), 7 H. L. Gas. 114, 115 ; 28 L. J. Gh. 114. 
 
 (c) 1 Huds. & Bro. 648. 
 
 Id) 12 East, 293. 
 
 (e) Gtmdry v. Pinniger (1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 502; 
 21 L. J. Gh. 405. 
 
 (/) (1854), 23 L. J. G. P. 108, at p. 114; 14 G. B. 385. 
 
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6 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can 
 hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable, says 
 Vattel, to interpret what has no need of interpreta- 
 tion (a), Ahsoluta sententia expositore non indiget (h). 
 Such language best declares, without more, the 
 intention of the lawgiver, and is decisive of it (c). 
 The Legislature must be intended to mean what 
 it has plainly expressed, and consequently there is 
 no room for construction {d). It matters not, in 
 such a case, what the consequences may be. 
 Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal 
 language capable of only one meaning, anything 
 is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, 
 even though it be absurd or mischievous (e). 
 
 (a) Law of N., b. 2, s. 263. 
 
 (6) 2 Inst. 533. 
 
 (c) Per Buller J., B. v. Hodnett, 1 T. E. 96 ; Sussex Peerage 
 (1844), 11 01. & P. 143 ; U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wallace, 395 ; 
 U. S. V. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95. 
 
 {d) Per Parke J., B. v. Banbury, 1 A. & B. 142 ; per Cur., 
 Fisher v. Blight, 2 Oranoh, 399. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Esher M.E., B. v. City of London Court, [1892] 
 1 Q. B. 273, dissenting from the rule laid down by Jessel M.E. 
 in The Alina, 5 Ex. D. 227 ; per Lord Herschel, Mersey 
 Docks &c. Board v. Turner, [1893] A. C, at p. 477 ; per 
 Lord Campbell, B. v. Skeen, 28 L. J. M. C. 94 ; per Jervis C.J., 
 Alley V. Bale, 21 L. J. C. P. 104; per Pollock C.B., Miller v. 
 Salomons, 21 L. J. Ex. 197 ; per Lord Brougham, British Farmers 
 &c. Co., In re (1878), 48 L. J. Ch. 56 ; affirmed su6. nom, Burkin- 
 shoM V. Nicolls (1878), 3 A. C. 1004 ; Crawford v. Spooner, 6 
 Moo. P. C. 9. See Sneedv. Commonwealth, 6 Dana, 339 (Kentuoky)_ 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 7 
 
 The underlying principle being that the meaning 
 and intention of a statute must be collected from 
 the plain and unambiguous expressions used 
 therein rather than from any notions which may 
 be entertained by the Court as to what is just or 
 expedient (a). If the words go beyond what was 
 probably the intention, effect must nevertheless 
 be given to them (b). They cannot be construed, 
 contrary to their meaning, as embracing or 
 exclU'ding cases merely because no good reason 
 appears why they should be excluded or em- 
 braced (c). However unjust, arbitrary or incon- 
 venient the meaning conveyed may be, it must 
 receive its fuU effect (d). When once the meaning 
 is plain, it is not the province of a Court to scan 
 its wisdom or its poHcy (e). Its duty is not to 
 
 (a) Ghm/nne v. Burnell (1839), 7 01. & P. 572 ; Coleridge J., at 
 p. 606 ; 51 E. E. 43. 
 
 (6) Notley v. Buch (1828), 8 B. & G. 164. 
 
 (c) Pike V. Hoare (1763), 2 Eden, 184, per Lord Northington ; 
 but see Companhia de Mocambique v. British South, Africa Co., 
 [1892] 2 Q. B. 358, 0. A. ; and;perOur., Dmn v. Beid (1836), 10 
 Peters, 524 ; an American case. 
 
 (d) Ornamental Woodwork Co. v. Brown, 2 H. & C. 63, per 
 Martin B. and Bramwell B. ; Mirehouse v. Bennell, 1 01. & E. 
 546, per Parke J. ; B. v. Poor Law Commissioners, 6 A. & E. 7 ; 
 Biffin V. Torke, 63 E. E. 337, per Erskine J. ; May v. 6?. W. B. 
 Co., 41 L. J. Q. B. 104. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Ellenborough, B. v. Watson, 7 East, 214, and 
 B. V. Staffordshire, 12 East, 572; B. v. Eodnett, 1 T. E. 100, per 
 Lord Mansfield ; B. v. Worcestershire, 3 P. & D. 465, per Lord 
 
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8 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 make the law reasonable, but to expound it as 
 it stands, according to the real sense of the 
 words (a). 
 
 Apparently, however, the statutory crystallisa- 
 tion of an existing common law liability wiU not, 
 in the absence of express words to that effect, 
 create a new and extended application of that 
 obKgation (6). And where there are general 
 words in a later Act capable of reasonable and 
 sensible application without extending them to 
 subjects specially dealt with by earlier legisla- 
 tion it is not to be held that such earlier and 
 special legislation is either indirectly repealed, 
 altered or derogated from merely by force of such 
 general words, without any indication of a par- 
 ticular intention to do so (c). Moreover, although 
 the effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it 
 as completely as if it had never been passed this 
 rule must be taken with the qualification that it 
 does not deprive persons of vested rights acquired 
 
 Denman ; per Bramwell B., Archer v. James, 2 B. & S. 61 ; 
 Miller v. Salomons, 21 L. J. Ex. 197, per Pollock C.B. ; Exp. 
 Attuoater, 5 Oh. D. 30, per James L.J. Followed in Payne 
 Exp. Gross, In re (1879), 11 Ch. D. 539, note, p. 552. 
 
 (a) Biffin v. Yorke, 63 E. E. 337, jjer Oresswell J. See ex. gr. 
 Plasterers Go. v. Parish Glerks Go., 20 L. J. Ex. 362 ; Dennis v. 
 Tovell (1872), 42 L. J. M. G. 33 ; " The Merle " (1874), 31 L. T. 
 447. 
 
 (6) Miver Wear Gommissioners v. Adamson (1877), 2 A. 0. 743. 
 
 (c) Seward v. Vera Gruz (1884), 10 A. 0. 59, at p. 68. 
 
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LITERAL OONSTRUOTION. 9 
 
 by them in actions duly determined under the 
 repealed law (a). 
 
 But although as a general principle retro- 
 spective operation ought not to be given to a 
 statute unless the intention of the Legislature 
 that it should be so construed is expressed 
 in plain and unambiguous language (6), it seems 
 where vested rights are divested, and acts 
 which were perfectly lawful when done are 
 subsequently made unlawful by a statute, those 
 who have to interpret the law must give effect 
 to it(c). And they are bound to do this even 
 when they suspect (on conjectural grounds only) 
 that the language does not faithfuUy express 
 what was the real intention of the Legislature 
 when it passed the Act, or would have been its 
 intention if the specific case had been proposed 
 to it. "It may have been an oversight in the 
 framers of the Act," says Parke B., in one case, 
 " but we must construe it according to its plain 
 and obvious meaning " (c?). "Our decision," says 
 
 (a) Lemm v. Mitchell (1912), 81 L.J. P. 0. 173; [1912] A. 0. 
 400 P. C. Comp. Sex v. Southampton Income Tax Commissioners ; 
 Singer, Exp. (1916), 86 L. J. K B. 66, 0. A.; [1917] 
 1 K. B. 259. 
 
 (6) Tomig v. Adams, [1898] A. 0. 469, p. 476 (P. 0.) ; Bourlt v. 
 Nntt, [1894] 1 Q. B. 725, C. A. 
 
 (c) Midland B. Co. v. Pye, 10 C. B. N. S. 179, per Erie G.J. 
 
 (d) Nixon V. Phillips (1852), 21 L. J. Ex. 88. 
 
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10 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Lord Tenterden, in another (a), "may, in this 
 particular case operate to defeat the object of the 
 Act ; but it is better to abide by this consequence 
 than to put upon it a construction not warranted 
 by the words of the Act, in order, to give effect to 
 what we may suppose to have been the intention 
 of the Legislature." " I cannot doubt," says Lord 
 Campbell, in another (b), " what the intention of 
 the Legislature was ; but that intention has not 
 been carried into effect by the language used. . . . 
 It is far better that we should abide by the words 
 of a statute, than seek to reform it according to 
 the supposed intention." " The Act," says Lord 
 Abinger, in another (c), "has practically had a 
 very pernicious effect not at all contemplated ; but 
 we cannot construe it according to that result." 
 
 In short, when the words admit of but one 
 meaning, a Court is not at liberty to speculate on 
 the intention of the Legislature, and to construe 
 them according to its own notions of what ought 
 to have been enacted (d). Nothing could be more 
 dangerous than to make such considerations the 
 
 (a) B. V. Barham, 8 B. & 0. 99 ; see also per Bayley J., B. v. 
 Stohe Damerel, 7 B. & 0. 569. 
 
 (b) Coe V. Lawrence, 22 L. J. Q. B. 140. 
 
 (c) A.-G. V. Lochwood, 9 M. & W. 395 ; Lochwood v. A.-G., 10 
 M. & W. 464. Per Lord Denman, B. v. Male (1835), 3 A. & B. 
 
 531. 
 
 (d) Per Cur., Torh & N. Midlcmd By. Go. v. B., 22 L. J. Q. B. 
 225, and comp. The Queen v. French (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 507. 
 
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LITEEAL CONSTRUCTION. 11 
 
 ground for construing an enactment that is un- 
 ambiguous in itseK. To depart from the meaning 
 on account of such views is, in truth, not to con- 
 strue the Act, but to alter it (a). But the business 
 of the interpreter is not to improve the statute ; it 
 is, to expound it. The question for him is not 
 what the Legislature meant, but what its language 
 means (6); i.e. what the Act has said that it 
 meant (c). To give a construction contr,ary to, 
 or different from, that which the words import or 
 can possibly import, is not to interpret law, but 
 to make it ; and judges are to remember that their 
 o£&ce is jus didere, not jus dare{d). 
 
 Though this rule appears so obvious, it is so 
 frequently appealed to that it is advisable to illus- 
 trate it by some examples to show its general scope 
 and the limits of its application. Thus, for in- 
 stance, it was repeatedly decided at law (before 
 the Judicature- Act, 1873, s. 24) that the statutes 
 of limitation which enacted that actions should 
 not be brought after the lapse of certain periods 
 
 (a) Per Lord Brougham, Choynne v. Burnell, 51 E. E. 42 ; per 
 Lord Westbury, Exp. St. Sepulchre's (1863), 33 L. J. Oh. 372 ; 
 per Grove J., Allhins v. Jupe, 2 C. P. D. 375. 
 
 (6) Wigram, Interp. Wills, 5th ed., 1914, p. 7 ; per Cock- 
 burn C.J., Palmer v. Thatcher, 3 Q. B. D. 353; per Lord 
 Coleridge, Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439. 
 
 (c) Per Mathew J., Bothschild v. Inl. Bev., [1894] 2 Q. B. 145. 
 
 (d) Lord Bacon, Essay on Judicature. Per Pollock C. B., 
 Bodrigues v. Melhuish, 10 Ex. 116. 
 
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12 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 from the time when the cause of action accrued, 
 barred actions brought after the time so limited, 
 though the cause of action was not discovered or, 
 practically, discoverable by the injured party at 
 the date of accrual, or was even fraudulently con- 
 cealed from the wrong-doer until the time limited 
 by the Act had expired (a). The hardship of such 
 decisions was obvious, but the language admitted 
 of no other construction. So, if an Act provides 
 that convictions shall be made within a certain 
 period after the commission of the offence, a con- 
 viction made after the lapse of that period would 
 be bad, although the prosecution had been begun 
 within the time Hmited, and the case had been 
 adjourned to a day beyond it, with the consent, or 
 even at the instance, of the defendant (6). So, 
 
 (a) Short v. McCarthy, 22 E. E. 503 ; Brown v. Howard, 2 Brod. 
 & B. 73 ; Golvin v. BucMe, 58 E. E. 834 ; Imperial Gas Co. v. 
 London Gas Co., 23 L. J. Ex. 803 ; Bonomi v. Backhovse (1856), 
 27 L. J. Q. B. 378 ; Smith v. Fox, 77 E. E, 152 ; Violett v. 
 Sympson, 27 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; Hunter v. Gibbons, 26 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 
 Barley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1885, 1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 
 529. As to concealed fraud, see Bulli Coal Co. v. Osborne (1899), 
 68 L. J. P. C. 49 ■ Oelhers v. Ellis, [1914] 2 K. B. 139 ; Gibbs v. 
 Guild, 51 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; Willis v. Barl Howe, 62 L. J. Oh. 690 ; 
 and Thome v. Heard, 64 L. J. Ch. 652. See also Kirh v. Todd, 
 52 L. J. Ch. 224. As to the effect upon the contracts of an alien 
 enemy, see Halsey v. Lowenfeld, [1916] 2 K. B. 707, G. A. 
 Comp. Chap. IX, Sec. II. 
 
 (6) B. V. Bellamy, 1 B. & C. 500; B. v. Tolley, 3 East, 467; 
 Pellew V. Wonford, 9 B. & C. 134 ; Farrell v. Tomlinson, 5 Bro. 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 13 
 
 when an Act gave to persons aggrieved by an 
 order of justices a certain period, after the making 
 of the order, for appealing to the Quarter Sessions, 
 it has been held that the time ran from the day 
 on which the order was verbally pronounced, not 
 from the day of its service on the aggrieved 
 person (a). Even when the order was made be- 
 hind his back, as in the case of stopping up a 
 road, the time ran from the same date,* and not 
 from the day on which he got notice of it (6), 
 notwithstanding the manifest hardship and in- 
 justice resulting from such an enactment (c). 
 
 And as a general proposition of law the rule laid 
 down by Lord Halsbury in Leader v. Duffey for the 
 construction of wUls applies d fortimi to the con- 
 struction of statutes, consequently "whatever 
 the instrument, it must receive a construction 
 according to the plain meaning of the words and 
 sentences therein contained . . . and it is arguing in 
 a vicious circle to begin by assuming an intention 
 apart from the language of the instrument itself. 
 
 P. 0. 438 ; Adam v. Bristol, 2 A. & B. 389 ; B. v. 
 27 L. J. M. 0. 278. 
 
 (a) B. V. Derbyshire, 7 Q. B. 193 ; B. v. HuntingdonsUre (1850), 
 19 L. J. M. G. 127 ; Exp. Johnson, 32 L. J. M. 0. 193 ; B. v. 
 Barnet, 45 L. J. M. C. 105 ; Nutter v. Moorhouse (1904), 68 J. P. 
 134. Gomp. B. v. Shrewsbury, 22 L. J. M. C. 98. 
 
 (6) B. V. Staffordshire, 3 East, 151. 
 
 (c) Per Lord EUenborough, Id. 153. 
 
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14 INTBBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and, having made that fallacious assumption, to 
 bend the language in favour of the assumption so 
 made " (a). 
 
 Where an Act ordained that no converted 
 Papist should be deemed a Protestant unless he 
 received the sacrament, took the abjuration oath, 
 and filed certain certificates within 6 months from 
 his declaring himself a Protestant, a compKance 
 one day iiffcer that period was held too late (b). 
 The Welsh Sunday Closing Act, 1881, being 
 fixed to come into operation on the day "next 
 appointed" for the annual hcensing meeting, was 
 by a literal construction postponed for a year later 
 than was, in all probability, intended ; but the 
 Court refused to avert this result by any departure 
 from the primary meaning of the words (c). The 
 Wills Act, 1837 (d), which requires, s. 9, a testa- 
 tor to sign his will "in the presence" of two 
 witnesses, has been construed as meaning the 
 actual visual presence (e). And prior to the passing 
 
 (a) Leader v. Buffey (1888), 13 A. C. 294, at p. 301. See also 
 Scale V. Bawlins, [1892] A. G. 342. 
 
 (h) Farrell v. Tomlinson, 5 Bro. P. 0. 438. See also Mohum- 
 mud V. Bareilly, L. E. 1 Ind. App. 167. 
 
 (c) Bichards v. McBride (1881), 51 L. J. M. 0. 15. 
 
 {d) 7 Will. IV., 1 Vict. e. 26. 
 
 (e) 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 9. Brown v. Shirrow, 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 
 19. As to the effect of foreign domicile on s. 9, see Simpson, 
 In re, [1916] 1 Ch. 502. See also Wilkinson's Settlement, 
 In re, [1917] 1 Ch. 620. As to nuncupative wills in case of 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 15 
 
 of 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, s. 17, which repealed 5 
 Eliz. 0. 4, s. 25, it was held that if an Act of 
 Parliament provided that no deed of apprentice- 
 ship should be vaUd unless signed and sealed by- 
 justices of the peace, the omission of the seal would 
 be fatal to the validity of the instrument (a). So, 
 if an Act authorises orders of commitment "in 
 open Court," an order not in the Court, but signed 
 in another part of the building also open to the 
 public, would be invalid {b), and generally it is 
 provided by s. 21 (1) of the Summary Jurisdic- 
 tion Act, 1879, that any Act (other than a purely 
 ministerial act, such as the signing of summons, 
 &c.) must be heard, tried, determined or adjudged 
 in open Court. The Bills of Sale Act, 1878, 
 requiring an affidavit of the due attestation as weU 
 as of the execution of the deed, the omission in the 
 former to mention the attestation was held fatal, 
 although the attestation clause of the deed asserted 
 it (e). It would not be open to the interpreter, in 
 
 sailors or soldiers killed in action, see JoTin Wardrop, in the estate 
 of, [1917] P. 54. 
 
 (a) B. V. Stohe Damerel, 7 B. & C. 563. See also B. v. Melling- 
 Tiam, 2 Bott. 363 ; B. v. Margram, 5 T. E. 153 ; B. v. St. Peter's, 1 
 B. & Ad. 916 ; B. v. St. PauVs, 10 B. & 0. 12 ; B. v. Staffordshire, 
 23 L. J. M. 0. 17. 
 
 (b) Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 5 ; Kenyan v. 
 Eastwood, 57 L. J. Q. B. 455. 
 
 (c) Ford V. Kettle, 51 L. J. Q. B. 558. The necessity for 
 attestation by a solicitor is avoided by s. 10 of 45 & 46 Vict. 
 
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16 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 such cases, to shut his eyes to the formalities 
 required, because he deemed them unimportant, or 
 because a hardship or failure of justice might 
 result, in the particular case before him, from a 
 neglect of any of them. 
 
 An Act which enacted that a pilot was to deliver 
 up his licence to the pilotage authorities " when- 
 ever required to do so," would call for implicit 
 obedience to the letter, however arbitrarily the 
 power which it conferred might be misused, and 
 although the withdrawal of the licence would in 
 effect amount to a dismissal of the pilot from his 
 employment (a). The Prescription Act, 1832, 
 making easements "indefeasible" which were 
 enjoyed for a number of years " next before some 
 suit or action wherein the claim or matter " was 
 brought in question, was held to leave the title to 
 the easements inchoate only, no matter how long 
 they had been uninterruptedly enjoyed, until a 
 
 c. 43. Attestations may now be made " by one or more credible 
 witness or witnesses not being a party or parties thereto." As 
 to the Act of 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 9 ; Thomas v. Kelly 
 (1888), 13 App. Cas., per Lord Halsbury, p. 511. See also 
 Parsons v. Brand, 59 L. J. Q. B. 189 ; Comp. Bird v. Davey, 60 
 L. J. Q. B. 8. See other illustrations in Be New Eberhardt Co., 
 59 L. J. Ch. 73 ; Sims v. Trollope (1897), 66 L. J. Q. B. 11 ; 
 Lester v. HicMing, [1916] 2 K. B. 302. 
 
 - (o) Henry v. Newcastle Trinity House (1858), 27 L. J. M. C. 57. 
 Sec. 20 (2) of 2 & 3 Geo. V. c. 31, limits the power of the 
 Pilotage Authority in this matter to certain specified cases. 
 
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LITERAL OONSTEUOTION. 17 
 
 suit or action was brought, when the title ripened 
 into a complete right (a). Prior to the passing of 
 45 & 46 Vict. c. 20, s. 3 (which altered the 
 law), the earlier Act which provided that if the 
 occupier assessed to a rate ceased to occupy before 
 the rate was wholly discharged, the overseers 
 should enter his successor in the rate book, and 
 the outgoer should not be liable for more than his 
 due proportion, did not relieve such outgoer from 
 the rest of the rate, when the premises remained 
 unoccupied after his removal (&). 
 
 An enactment that a magistrate might, on the 
 application of the mother of a bastard, summon 
 its putative father for its maintenance, within 12 
 months from its birth, would not authorise a 
 second magistrate to issue a second summons 
 after the expiration of the 12 months, merely 
 because the first summons could not be served by 
 reason of the defendant having absented himself, 
 and could not be renewed or continued, because 
 
 (o) 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71 ; Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores, 
 [1904] A. 0. 179, Lord Macnaghten at pp. 189, 190 ; Wright v. 
 Williams (1836), 46 E. E. 265 ; Cooper v. Hubbuch, 31 L. J. 0. P. 
 323; Hyman v. Van Den Bergh, 77 L. J. Oh. 154. See also 
 Levet V. Gas Ught & Cohe Go. (1918), 35 T. L. E. 47. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 16 ; iS**. Werburgh v. Hutchinson, 49 
 L. J. M. 0. 23. See, as otlier illustrations, Marsden v. Saville 
 Foundry, 3 Ex. D. 203 ; Simphin v. Birmingham, L. E. 7 Q. B. 
 482 ; B. V. Liverpool Justices, 62 L. J. M. 0. 114. 
 
 I.S. 2 
 
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18 INTEBPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 the justice who had issued it had died (a). And 
 as the same enactment required the justices to 
 hear the evidence of the mother at the hearing, 
 and such other evidence as she might produce, 
 and, if her evidence was corroborated, to adjudge 
 the man to be the putative father, it was held that 
 no order could be made against the putative father 
 when the mother could not be examined, having 
 died after the summons and before the hearing (b). 
 "Where an Act (c) prohibits the removal of a con- 
 viction by Certiorari to the Supreme Court, that 
 writ cannot be issued (the justices having jurisdic- 
 tion) even for the purpose of bringing up a case 
 stated by justices for the opinion of the Court ; 
 although the object of such a prohibition is to 
 prevent convictions being quashed for technical 
 defects, but not to exclude the jurisdiction of the 
 Supreme Court, when consulted on a substantial 
 question which the justices themselves have 
 raised (d). An Act which imposed a penalty on 
 any person who pUoted a ship in the Thames 
 before he was examined and admitted a Trinity 
 House pilot, was held not to reach one who had 
 been expelled from the Society after examination 
 
 (o) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101 ; B. v. Pich/ord (1861), 30 L. J. M. 0. 
 133. 
 
 (b) B. V. Armitage (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 16. 
 
 (c) 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 26. 
 
 (d) B. V. Chantrell (1875), U L. J. M. 0. 94. 
 
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LITERAL CONSTEUOflON. 19 
 
 and admission (a). The Indian Insolvent Act, 11 
 & 12 Vict. c. 21, wliich required the insolvent to 
 file a schedule of all his creditors, and provided 
 that his discharge should be a bar to all demands, 
 like a certificate under the bankruptcy laws in 
 England, was held to bar a debt which had not 
 been included in the schedule, and the creditor 
 had consequently been deprived by the neglect or 
 design of his debtor of the opportunity of opposing 
 the discharge (6). So, where an Act gave an 
 appeal to the next session, and directed that " no 
 appeal should be proceeded upon " if it was found 
 by the session that no reasonable notice had been 
 given, but should be adjourned to the next session, 
 the appellant was enabled to secure delay by 
 omitting to give any notice, so that the session 
 could not find that " reasonable notice " had been 
 given (c). In these two cases the construction 
 worked an injustice and enabled a person to td,ke 
 
 (a) Pierce v. Hopper (1720), 1- Stra. 249. Sec. 48 (d) of 
 2 & 3 Geo. V. c. 31, subjects a pilot who acts during suspension 
 to a penalty not exceeding £100. 
 
 (6) Exp. Parhury (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 518 ; Comp. Wesson v. 
 Alcard, 22 L. J. Ex. 45. 
 
 (c) 9 Geo. I. c. 7 ; JR. v. Bucks, 3 East, 342 ; B. v. Stafford- 
 aJtire, 8 E. E. 668, The better law, however, at the present day 
 appears to be that an appellant cannot by any conduct on his 
 part make impracticable the sessions which otherwise would be 
 the next practicable sessions; -R. v. Surrey Justices (1880), 
 6 Q. B. D. 100, at p. 107, and see B. v. Sussex, 34 L. J. M. C. 69, 
 
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20 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 advantage of his own wrong or neglect (a) ; but 
 the language of the Legislature admitted of no 
 other construction. 
 
 The Act which required members of Parliament, 
 before voting in the House, to take the abjuration 
 oath in a form which concluded with the declara- 
 tion that it was taken " on the true faith of a 
 Christian," received a literal construction, which 
 had the effect of excluding Jews from Parliament ; 
 although the history of the enactment showed 
 that it was intended to test the loyalty, not the 
 religious creed, of the member, and was directed 
 solely to the exclusion of Roman Catholics ; and 
 though those who refused to take the oath would 
 have been deemed Popish recusants, and liable to 
 banishment as such (6). So the plain language of 
 the Test and Corporation Acts of Charles II., 
 though the first of them was really aimed only at 
 the actual holders of oflBLces, and the second at 
 Roman Catholics, had the effect of disqualifying 
 Protestant Dissenters from public employment. 
 Where an Act disqualified from killing game all 
 persons not possessing land of a certain value, 
 
 (a) See Chap. VIII, See. III. 
 
 (h) 1 Geo. I. St. 2, c. 13 ; Miller v. Salomons, 21 L. J. Ex. 
 161 ; 22 Id. 169 ; Salomons v. Miller, 8 Ex. 778. Jews were 
 relieved from having to take the oath " on the true faith of a 
 Christian " by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 49, amended by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 63. 
 As to Eoman Catholics, see 10 Geo. IV. c. 7, & 30 & 31 Vict. c. 62. 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUOTION. 21 
 
 except the heir apparent of an esquire or other 
 person of higher degree, it was held that esquires 
 not possessed of the requisite property quahfioation 
 were not excepted. However strange it might 
 seem that the Legislature should refuse them the 
 privilege which it had granted to their eldest 
 sons (a), it was held to be safer to adopt what the 
 Legislature had actually said rather than to con- 
 jecture what they had meant to say (b). So, 
 until 1875 under an Act which qualified for the 
 magistracy owners in immediate remainder or 
 reversion of lands leased for two or three lives, 
 it was held that a remainderman expectant on 
 the death of a tenant for life in possession was 
 not qualified, as there was no lease. There was 
 perhaps no good reason why the quahfioation 
 should not have been extended to such a remain- 
 derman, but there was no actual absurdity, incon- 
 venience, or injustice in the omission (c). The 
 rule in the Ballot Act, 1872, which provides that 
 a candidate may undertake any duties which any 
 agent of his, if appointed, might have performed, 
 and may assist his agent in the performance of 
 such duties, and " may be present at any place 
 at which his agent may, in pursuance of the Act, 
 
 (a) Jones v. Smart (1785), 1 T. E. 44. 
 (6) Per Ashurst J., Id. 51 
 
 (c) 18 Geo. II. c. 20 ; Woodward y. Watts, 22 L. J. M. 0. 149, 
 See 38 & 39 Vict. c. 54. 
 
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22 INTBBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 attend," was construed literally as authorising 
 the presence of the candidate absolutely, and not 
 only in the event of his undertaking the duties 
 of his agent or assisting him; though it was 
 conceded that this construction gave a barren 
 and useless, or even mischievous, right against 
 which the other provisions of the Act seemed to 
 militate (a). • 
 
 A statute which empowered a Court of Bequests 
 to summon any person residing in a town or navi- 
 gating from its port, by leaving the summons at 
 his abode, and to proceed ex parte if he did not 
 appear, was held to justify ex parte proceedings 
 against a seafaring man who had for months before 
 the summons, and during the whole of the pro- 
 ceeding, been absent beyond the seas (6). So, 
 where an Act authorised justices to hear bastardy 
 cases on proof that the summons had been served 
 at the last place of abode of the putative father, 
 it was held that they had jurisdiction in a case 
 where the latter was abroad, and had had no 
 cognizance of the summons (c). The Carriers Act, 
 
 (a) Clementson v. Mason, 44 L. J. 0. P. 171. See per Brett J., 
 Id. 217. 
 
 (6) Guherson v. Melton, 12 A. & E. 753. 
 
 (c) B. V. Bamarell,.31 L. J. M. 0. 21. See also B. v. Bams, 
 22 L. J. M. C. 143 ; B. v. Higham (1857), 26 L. J. M. 0. 116. 
 Comp. B. V. Smith (1875), L. E. 10 Q. B. 604. It should be noted 
 that in bastardy a summons cannot be served on the alleged 
 
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LITERAL CONSTRUCTION ILLUSTRATED. 23 
 
 1830 (a), which exempted a common carrier from 
 liability for the loss of or injury to certain classes 
 of goods unless the value was declared and 
 insured (6), was construed literally as exempting 
 him from liability, even when the loss was owing 
 to his negligence, so long as such negligence did 
 not amount to a wilful misfeasance, or a wrongful 
 act inconsistent with his character of carrier (c). 
 The provisions of s. 8, Licensing Act, 1872 (repld. 
 s. 69, Licensing Act, 1910), requiring intoxicating 
 liquors, sold by retail. not in cask or bottle or 
 in quantities less than half a pint, to be sold 
 in measures marked according to the imperial 
 standard, would be violated by the sale of beer, 
 even at the request of the customer, in a vessel 
 containing one-third of a quart, there being no 
 imperial measure answering to that quantity (c?). 
 The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, which 
 empowered by s. 50 (repld. by 46 & 47 Vict, 
 c. 49) a judge to order either party to a cause 
 to produce documents upon the application of the 
 
 putative father out of England, B. v. Lightfoot (1856), 20 J. P, 
 677. 
 
 (a) 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Wm. IV. c. 68. 
 
 (6) Doey v. L. & N. W. By. Co., [1919] 1 K. B. 623. See 
 also L. & N. W. By. Go. v. Aahton, [1919] W. N. 234, 
 
 (c) Einton v. Dihbin (1842), 57 E. E. 754; Morritt v. 
 N. K By. Co. (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 289. 
 
 (d) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94 ; Payne v. Thomas, 60 L. J. M. 0. 3. 
 
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24 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 other party supported by his own affidavit, was 
 held not to authorise an order on the affidavit 
 of another person in its stead (a), even though the 
 party is absent beyond seas (&). And the same 
 Act, by s. 60 (repld. by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), in 
 empowering a judgment creditor to obtain an 
 order for the examination of his debtor, was held 
 not to authorise the examination of the directors 
 when the debtor was a corporate body (c). So, 
 the Solicitors Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28, 
 which authorises the imposition of a charge for 
 costs on property "recovered or preserved" {d) 
 through the instrumentality of a solicitor, was 
 held not to authorise such a charge where the 
 suit was to prevent or stop an invasion of the 
 right to light ; for this was a suit not respecting 
 property, but respecting an easement merely, or 
 the mode in which it was enjoyed (e) ; nor to a 
 case where the proceedings had not gone beyond 
 a decree for an account, and the parties had then 
 compromised without the knowledge of the solicitor 
 of the party who thereby did recover property (/). 
 
 (o) Christopherson v. Lotinga, 33 L. J. C. P. 121; Gomp. 
 Kingsford v. G. W. B. Co., 33 L. J. C. P. 307. 
 (6) Eerschfield v. Glarh (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 113. 
 
 (c) Diclcson v. Neath & Brecon B. Co. (1869), 38 L. J. Ex. 57. 
 
 (d) As to what constitutes recovery and preservation, see 
 Wingfield v. Wingfield, [1919] 1 Ch. 462. 
 
 (e) Foxon v. Gascoigne, 43 L. J. Gh. 729. 
 
 (/) Pinherton v. Hasten, 42 L. J. Oh. 878. Comp. Moxon v. 
 
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NO ADDITION OR OMISSION. 25 
 
 A direction on his deathbed by the holder of a 
 promissory note that it should be destroyed as 
 soon as found, was held not " an absolute and 
 unconditional renunciation of his rights" on the 
 note within s. 62, Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (a). 
 And a like rule applies where, without renunciation 
 in writing, the bill is given up to a third party (6). 
 It is but a corollary to the general rule in ques- 
 tion, that nothing is to be added to or to be taken 
 from a statute, unless there are similar adequate 
 grounds to justify the inference that the Legisla- 
 ture intended something which it omitted to 
 express (c) : "it is a strong thing to read into an 
 Act of Parliament words which are not there, and, 
 in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong 
 thing to do "(d); "we are not entitled to read 
 words into an Act of Parliament unless clear 
 reason for it is to be found within the four corners 
 of the Act itself " (e). 
 
 Sheppard, 59 L. J. Q. B. 286, where money had been paid into 
 Court. See also Be Wadsworth, 54 L. J. Oh. 638. 
 
 (a) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 ; Be George, 59 L. J. Oh. 709. 
 
 (6) Edwards v. Walters, [1896] 2 Ch. 157, C. A. 
 
 (c) Seeder Tindal O.J., Everett v. Wells, 2 M. & Gr. 277; per 
 Lord Eldon, Dams v. Marlborough, 53 E; E. 29; per Lord 
 Westbury, Exp. St. Sepulchre, 33 L. J. Ch. 375 ; Be Cherry's 
 Estate, 31 L. J. Ch. 351. Camp. Be Wainwright, 1 Phil. 258. 
 See also inf. Chap. IX, Sec. L 
 
 {d) Per Lord Mersey, Thompson v. Goold, 79 L. J. K. B. 911. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Lorebum L.C., Vickers v. Evans, 79 L. J. K. B.955. 
 
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26 
 
 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 But where a section of a public Act is incor- 
 porated in a private Act the subsequent repeal 
 of the public Act will not repeal the section inter- 
 polated in the private Act (a). 
 
 A case not provided for in a statute is not to 
 be dealt with merely because there seems no good 
 reason why it should have been omitted, and the 
 omission appears consequently to have been un- 
 intentional. Thus, a Divorce Act, which provided 
 that any order made for the protection of the 
 earnings of a deserted married woman might be 
 discharged by the magistrate who made it, was 
 held not to empower his successor to discharge 
 it, though the magistrate who had made it was 
 dead (b), and this rule is of general application (c). 
 An Act which authorises the removal of lunatics 
 to a hospital when there is no lunatic asylum 
 established in the county, does not authorise 
 such a removal when a county asylum exists, 
 but is so full as to be unable to receive another 
 
 (a) JenMns v. Gt. Central By. (1912), 81 L. J. K. B. 24. 
 
 (6) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21, amended by 21 & 22 Vict. o. 108, 
 ss. 7-9 ; Exp. Sharpe (1864), 5 B. & S. 322. See also Nettleton v. 
 Burrell, 66 E. E. 658; WanUyn v. Woollett, 72 E. E. 545; 
 B. V. Ashhurton, 8 Q. B. 871. 
 
 (c) Eiggs v. Schroeder (1877), 47 L. J. Q. B. 426 ; Newton v. 
 Boodle, 16 L. J. C. P. 135 ; Nind v. Arthur, 7 D. & L. 252 ; 
 Owen V. Henshaw (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 267 ; Gatlow v. Gatlow 
 (1877), 2 C. P. D. 362. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
NO ADDITION OR OMISSION, 27 
 
 lunatic (a). It was at one time held that if an Act 
 requires that a writ, on renewal, shall be sealed with 
 a seal denoting the date of renewal, a copy of the 
 writ cannot be substituted for the original for this 
 purpose, when the original is lost (6), but it is 
 now provided by Order 8, E. S. C, r. 3, that " where 
 a writ of which production is necessary, has been 
 lost, the Court or a judge, upon being satisfied of 
 the loss, and of the correctness of a copy thereof, 
 may order that such copy shall be sealed and 
 served in Keu of the original writ." So, also, it 
 was held under the repealed Act 26 & 27 Vict. c. 
 29, s. 7, which enacted that answers made to an 
 election commission should not be admitted in 
 evidence in any proceeding except in cases of 
 " indictment " for perjury, left such answers ex- 
 cluded in " informations " for perjury filed by the 
 Attorney- General (c). Similarly, an Act requiring 
 notice of action for " anything done " by a person 
 in the execution of his office, was held not to 
 extend to actions for words spoken in the execu- 
 tion of it (d) ; and the provisions of the County 
 
 (o) B. V. Ellis (1844), 6 Q. B. 501. This contingency is now 
 provided for by s. 68 of the Lunacy Act, 1890. 
 
 (&) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76 ; Bavies v. Garland, 45 L. J. Q. B. 137. 
 
 (c) B. V. Slater (1881), 51 L. J. Q. B. 246, and see 46 & 47 
 Viet. 0. 51, s. 59, and Schedule 4. 
 
 (d) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 9, repealed by S. L. E., 1894, 
 Boyal Aquarium v. Parkinson, 61 L. J. Q. B. 409. 
 
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28 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Court Act, 1888, which require certain formali- 
 ties to be gone through before bringing an action 
 against the bailiff, do not extend to a motion by a 
 trustee in bankruptcy for the delivery up by the 
 bailiff of property seized (a). 
 
 When the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 
 abolished the writ of distringas without providing 
 for the service of a writ on lunatics in confinement 
 and inaccessible, it was found that no actions 
 could be prosecuted against them (J). So, when 
 extra-parochial places were made rateable, without 
 either repealing the enactments which required 
 that a copy should be afSxed on or near the doors 
 of all the churches in the parish, or making any 
 other provision for publication, it was held, where 
 there was no church in the extra-parochial place, 
 that a rate aflSxed on a church door fifty yards 
 from the boundary was invalid for want of publi- 
 cation (c). 4 & 6 W. & M. c. 20, which required 
 
 (a) 51 &52 Vict. c. 43, s. 50; Be Loch (1890), 63 -L. T. 320. 
 Sec. 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 
 Vict. c. 61) repeals so much of any public Act, including the 
 County Courts Act, as contains a provision that notice of action 
 shall be given. 
 
 (6) Holmes v. Service (1854), 24 L, J. C. P. 24 ; Williamson v. 
 Maggs, 28 L. J. Ex. 5. See s. 17 of the Common Law Procedure 
 Act, but see Judic. Act, 1875, and Ord. 9 (5), E. S. C. 
 
 (c) 17 Geo. II. c. 3, and 1 Vict. c. 45 ; B. v. Byott (1882), 
 51 L. J, M. C. 104 ; s. 4 of 45 & 46 Vict. c. 20, avoids the 
 difficulty discovered in this and cdgnate cases. 
 
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NO ADDITION OR OMISSION. 29 
 
 that judgments should be docketed, enacted that 
 undocketed judgments should not affect lands as 
 regarded purchasers or mortgagees, or have pre- 
 ference against heirs or executors ; 2 & 3 Vict, 
 c. 11, abolished docketing, and enacted that no 
 judgment should have effect unless registered ; 
 but it made no provision for the protection of 
 heirs and executors. Though this was perhaps an 
 oversight, resulting in hardship on an executor 
 who had paid simple contract debts without keep- 
 ing su£Scient assets to meet an unregistered judg- 
 ment of which he had no notice, the Court refused 
 to supply the omission (a). These were all casus 
 omissi which the Court could not reach by any 
 recognised canons of interpretation. 
 
 Where an Act authorised the apportionment of 
 the cost of making a sewer, without limiting any 
 time for the purpose, the Court refused to read 
 the Act as limiting the exercise of the power to a 
 reasonable time (b). 21 Jac. I. c. 16, having pro- 
 vided that the Statute of Limitation should not 
 run while the plaintiff was beyond the seas, and 
 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, having made a similar provision 
 where the defendant was abroad, s. 7, 3 & 4 W. IV. 
 c. 42, enacted that no part of the United Kingdom 
 
 (o) Fuller v. Bedman (1859), 29 L. J. Oh. 324 ; this mischief 
 is remedied by s. 3 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38. 
 
 (6) Bradley v. Greenwich Board of Works (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 
 111. 
 
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30 INTEBPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 . should be deemed " beyond the seas " within the 
 meaning of the former Act, but made no mention 
 of the latter Act ; and it was held that. 3 & 4 W. IV. 
 0. 42, could not be stretched to include the latter 
 Act (a). There may have been no good reason for 
 thus limiting the new enactment to the Act of 
 James; but there was no sufficient ground either 
 in the context or in the nature of the consequences 
 resulting from the omission, for concluding that 
 the Act of Anne was intended to be included. So 
 when the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 
 (repealed with certain savings by 46 & 46 Vict. c. 75, 
 s. 2), empowered a married woman to sue, without 
 making her liable to be sued, it was held that no 
 action lay against her (&). Sec. 11, Habitual Crimi- 
 nals Act, 1869 (repealed by 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112), 
 in enacting that upon a trial for receiving stolen 
 goods, a previous conviction for any offence involv- 
 ing dishonesty should be admissible against the 
 prisoner as evidence of his having received with 
 guilty knowledge, provided that notice were given 
 to him that the conviction would be put in 
 evidence " and that he would be deemed to have 
 known that the goods were stolen until he proved 
 the contrary," omitted, however, to enact substan- 
 
 (a) Lane v. Bennett, 1 M. & W. 70 ; Battershy v. Kirk, 2 Bing. 
 N. C. 584, and see Mather v. Brown (1876), 1 0. P. D. 596. 
 
 (6) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 11; Hancocks v. LaUache, 47 
 L. J. 0. P. 514. 
 
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NO ADDITION OK OMISSION. 31 
 
 tively that this effect should be given to the 
 conviction ; and it was held that the omission 
 could not be supplied (a). Without such an 
 emendation, the notice was incorrect and mis- 
 leading; but it did not lead to any injustice or 
 inconvenience or other mischievous consequence. 
 Although the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, required that 
 the execution of every bill of sale should be 
 attested by a solicitor, and that " the attestation 
 should state" that the instrument was explained 
 by the solicitor to the grantor before execution, it 
 was held that no explanation was required ; for 
 the Act did not expressly enact that an ex- 
 planation should be given ; it required only 
 that the attestation should assert that it had 
 been given (b). , Again, although the Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1869, provided for securing for the general 
 body of creditors the proceeds of goods of a debtor 
 sold in execution, it made no express provision for 
 dealing with his goods when seized under an elegit ; 
 and it was held that the omission, however fatal 
 to the whole policy of the Act, could not be sup- 
 plied by any stretch of judicial interpretation (c). 
 
 (a) B. V. Davis (1872), L. E. 1 0. 0. E. 272. 
 
 (6) Eepaaled as regards attestation by solicitor by 45 & 46 
 Vict. c. 43, s. 10 ; Exp. National Merc. Bank (1880), 49 L. J, 
 Bank. 62. 
 
 (c) Exp. Ahbott, 50 L. J. Oh. 80. Cured by 46 & 47 Vict. 
 c. 52, s. 146. See also Be Hutchinson (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 582. 
 
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32 INTBEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Where a Eailway Act provided that the com- 
 pany, while in possession, under the Act, of lands 
 liable to assessment to parochial rates, should, 
 until its works were completed and liable to 
 assessment, be bound to make good the deficiency 
 in thfe parochial assessment by reason of the land 
 having been taken, it was held, at first, that the 
 company was bound to make good the deficiency 
 in any one of the parishes through which the line 
 ran, only until the line was completed within the 
 parish (a); but this construction was rejected by 
 the House of Lords, who held that when the com- 
 pany have completed and are actually working a 
 line, or part of a line, within any parish, the 
 company can claim, and is liable, to be assessed in 
 respect of the actual letting value of the line, or 
 part of a line, so completed and actually worked, 
 whether it be or be not as valuable as the assessable 
 property for which it is substituted, and whether 
 the whole of the line of railway authorised by 
 their Act of Parliament has or has not been 
 completed (6). So s. 49, Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 
 which enacted that " an order of discharge shall 
 not release the bankrupt from any debt or liability 
 incurred by means of any fraud or breach of trust," 
 
 (a) Whitechurch v. East London By. Co., L. E. 7 Ex. 248, 
 424; see also B. v. Metrop. Bistr. By. Co., 40 L. J, M. G. 
 113. 
 
 (6) East London By. Go. v. Whitechurch, L. E. 7 H. L. 81. 
 
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NO ADDITION OB OMISSION. 33 
 
 was held not to be confined to a fraud or breach. of 
 trust committed by the bankrupt personally; for 
 such a construction could only have been put 
 upon the words either by reading "his" instead 
 of "any" before the words "fraud or breach, of 
 trust," or by adding the words " committed by 
 him " after them (a). 
 
 A construction which would leave without 
 effect any part of the language, would be rejected, 
 unless justified on similar grounds (6). Thus, 
 where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one 
 Quarter Sessions to another, it was observed that 
 such a provision, though extraordinary and per- 
 haps an oversight, could not be eliminated (c). 
 32 & 33 Vict. c. 51, which gives to certain County 
 Courts power to try claims under i6300, arising out 
 of " any agreement in relation to the use or hire 
 of a ship," or in relation to the carriage of goods, 
 with an appeal to the Court of Admiralty, and 
 power to the latter Court to transfer any such 
 causes to itself, was at first held not to give the 
 County Court jurisdiction over suits for the breach 
 of a charter-party, notwithstanding the compre- 
 
 (a), 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 ; Cooper v. Pritchard, 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 526, and see the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 26 (3.Z.). 
 
 (6) See Chap. IX, Sec. I. 
 
 (c) B. V. West Biding, 1 Q. B. 329, and 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, 
 s. 103. This mistake is cured by 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43, s. 4, and 
 Schedule. 
 
 I.S. 3 
 
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34 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 hensive nature of the language used; on tlie 
 ground that the literal construction would involve 
 the presumably unintended anomalies of giving by 
 mere implication a large, novel, and inconvenient 
 jurisdiction to the Court of Admiralty, and to the 
 suitor the remedy of proceeding in rem when his 
 claim was under £300, which he did not possess 
 when it exceeded it (a). But this construction 
 did not prevail, because it left without effect the 
 words which gave jurisdiction over any agreement 
 in relation to the use or hire of a ship (b) ; and 
 yet it was difficult to believe that the resulting 
 consequences were within the contemplation of the 
 Legislature or the scope of the enactment. 
 
 In a case where the technical language used 
 was precise and unambiguous, but incapable of 
 reasonable meaning, the Court held that it was 
 not at liberty, on merely conjectural grounds (c), 
 to give the words a meaning which did not belong 
 to them, 3 Geo. lY. c. 39, had made warrants of 
 attorney to confess judgment void as against the 
 
 (o) Simpson v. Blues, 41 L. J. C. P. 121; Gunnestad v. Price, 
 44 L. J. Ex. 44. 
 
 (6) Gaudet v. Brown, L. E. 5 P. G. 134; " The Alina" (1880), 
 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 40. This right includes claims by holders 
 of bills of lading for damage to goods on board ship during 
 voyage, " The Bona " (1882), 51 L. J. Adm. 65, and see cases 
 in note at end of Chap. V, Sec. I. 
 
 (c) See, however. Chap. IX, Sec. I. 
 
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FALLACY OF LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 35 
 
 assignees of a bankrupt, if not filed within 21 days 
 from execution, or unless judgment was signed 
 "or" execution was "issued" within the same 
 period; and the Court of Queen's Bench refused 
 to alter "or" into "and," and "issued" into 
 "levied"; though the passage was unmeaning as 
 it stood, and the proposed alterations would have 
 given it an efieet which, because rational, was 
 probably, but only conjecturaUy, the efi'ect in- 
 tended by the Legislature (a). This subject, how- 
 ever, will be further considered in a subsequent 
 chapter (b). 
 
 SECTION III. — THE CONTEXT — EXTERNAL 
 CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
 The foregoing elementary rule of construction 
 does not carry the interpreter far; for it is con- 
 fined to cases where the language is precise and 
 capable of but one construction, or where neither 
 the history or cause of the enactment, nor the 
 context, nor the consequences to which the literal 
 interpretation would lead, show that that interpre- 
 tation does not express the real intention. 
 
 (a) Green v. Wood, 14 L. J. Q. B. 217. This Act is extended 
 by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 66, and applied to " Judges Orders " by 32 & 
 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 28, and camp. Laird v. Briggs (1881), 19 Ch. D. 
 22, at p. 33 ; Quin v. O'Keefe (1859), 10 Ir. 0. L. E. 393. 
 
 (6) Chap. IX. 
 
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36 mTERPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 But it is another elementary rule, that a thing 
 which is within the letter of a statute will, gene- 
 rally, be construed as not within the statute unless 
 it be also within the real intention of the Legisla- 
 ture (a), and the words, if sufficiently flexible, must 
 be construed in the sense which, if less correct 
 grammatically, is more in harmony with that 
 intention (6). Language is rarely so free from 
 ambiguity as to be capable of being used in 
 more than one sense ; and to adhere rigidly to its 
 literal and primary meaning in all cases would be 
 to miss its real meaning in many. If a literal 
 meaning had been given to the laws which forbade 
 a layman to "lay hands" on a priest, and pun- 
 ished all who drew blood in the street, the layman 
 who wounded a priest with a weapon would not 
 have fallen within the prohibition, and the sur- 
 geon who bled a person in the street to save his 
 life, would have been liable to punishment (c). 
 On a literal construction of his promise Mahomed 
 
 (a) Bac. Ab. Statute (I.) 6. 
 
 (6) See ;per Cur., SLollingworth v. Palmer (1849), 18 L. J. Ex. 
 409 ; Caledonian B. Go. v. N. Brit. B. Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 114, 
 at p. 122, per Lord Selborne ; per Lord Blackburn, Edinburgh 
 Tramways Co. v. Torbain, 1 App. Cas. 68 ; Eastman Photographic 
 Co. V. Comptroller of Patents, [1898] A. C. 571, Lord Halsbury, 
 at pp. 575, 576 ; Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tele- 
 graph Go. (1877), 2 App. Cas. 394, at p. 412 ; and per Jessel M.E., 
 Walton, Exp. (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746, at pp. 750 et seq. 
 
 (c) 1 Bl. Comm. 61 ; Puff. L. 5, c. 12, s. 8. 
 
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FALLACY OF LITERAL CONSTEUOTION. 37 
 
 II. 's sawing the Venetian governor's body in two, 
 was no breach of his engagement to spare his 
 head ; nor Tamerlane's burying alive a garrison, 
 a violation of his pledge to shed no blood (a). 
 On a literal construction, Paohes, after inducing 
 the defender of Notium to a parley under a pro- 
 mise to replace him safely in the citadel, claimed 
 to be within his engagement when he detained 
 his foe until the place was captured, and put him 
 to death after having conducted him back to 
 it (b) ; and the Earl of Argyll fulfilled in the same 
 spirit his promise to the laird of Glenstane, that 
 if he would surrender he would see him safe to 
 England ; for he did not hang him until after he 
 had taken him safely across the Tweed to the 
 English Bank (c). 
 
 The equivocation or ambiguity of words and 
 phrases, and especially such as are general, is said 
 by Lord Bacon to be the great sophism of soph- 
 isms (d). They have frequently more than one 
 equally obvious and popular meaning ; words used 
 in reference to one subject or set of circumstances 
 
 (a) Vattel, L. N. b. 2, s. 273. 
 
 (6) Thucyd. 3, 34; Grote's Greece, vol. 6, chap. 50. 
 
 (c) Burton's Sc. Crim. Tr. 17. Immaturce puellm, quia more 
 tradito nefas esset virgines strangulari, vitiatce prius a carnifice, dein 
 strangulatce. Suet. Tiberius, s. 61, and see Tacitus, Hist. Lib., V., 
 c. 9. See other instances of such frauds collected in Grot, de 
 jure b., b. 2, c. 16, s. 5. See also Herodotus, iv. 154. 
 
 (d) Lord Bacon, Advancement of Learning, b. 2. 
 
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38 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 may convey a meaning quite different from what 
 the same words used in reference to another set of 
 circumstances and another object would convey. 
 General words admit^ of indefinite extension or 
 restriction, according to the subject to which they 
 relate, and the scope and object in contemplation. 
 They may convey faithfully enough all that was 
 intended, and yet comprise also much that was 
 not; or, be so restricted in meaning as not to 
 reach all the cases which fall within the real 
 intention. Even, therefore, where there is no 
 indistinctness or conflict of thought, or careless- 
 ness of expression in a statute, there is enough 
 in the vagueness and elasticity inherent in lan- 
 guage to account for the difficulty so frequently 
 found in ascertaining the meaning of an enact- 
 ment, with the degree of accuracy necessary for 
 determining whether a particular case falls within 
 it. But statutes are not always drawn by skilled 
 hands, and they are always exposed to the risk 
 of alterations by many hands which introduce 
 different styles and consequent difficulties of 
 interpretation. Nothing, it has been said by a 
 great authority, is so difficult as to construct 
 properly an Act of Parliament ; and nothing so 
 easy as to pull it to pieces (a). It is not enough 
 
 (a) Per Lord St. Leonards, O'Flaherty v. McDowell (1857), 
 6 H. L. Gas. 142, at p. 179 ; and see Coverdale\. Charlton (1878), 
 48 L. J. Q. B. 128, per Bramwell L.J., 2 Q. B. D. ; B. v. Monch 
 
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FALLACY OF LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. 39 
 
 to attain to a degree of precision whicla a "person 
 reading in good faith can understand, it is neces- 
 sary to obtain a degree of precision whicli a person 
 reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand (a). 
 
 The Uteral construction then, has, in general, 
 hvit primd facie preference. To arrive at the real 
 meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact 
 conception of the aim, scope, and object of the 
 whole Act ; to consider, according to Lord 
 Coke (6), 1. What was the law before the Act was 
 passed ; 2. Wbat was the mischief or defect for 
 which the law had not provided ; 3. What remedy 
 Parliament has appointed; and 4. The reason of 
 the remedy. According to another authority, " in 
 order properly to interpret any statute it is as 
 necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported 
 Heydon's Case to consider how the law stood 
 when the statute to be construed was passed, what 
 the mischief was for which the old law did not 
 provide, and the remedy provided by the statute 
 to cure that mischief" (c). The true meaning 
 
 (1877), 544, at p. 552 ; Twyeroas v. Grant (1877), 2 C. P. D. 
 469, at p. 496 ; 4 Q. B. D. 104, at p. 115. 
 
 (a) Per Stephen J., Gastioni, Exp., [1891] 1 Q. B. 149 ; 60 
 L. J. M. C. 22. 
 
 (6) Heydon's Case, 3 Eep. 7b ; Marshahea Case, 10 Eep. 73a. 
 Gomp. Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 A. 0. 354, at p. 366, et seq. ; 
 52 L. J. Q. B. 505. 
 
 (c) Per Lindley M.E., Mayfair Property Co., In re, [1898] 
 2 Ch. 28, at p. 35 ; 67 L. J. Oh. 337. 
 
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40 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 of any passage, it is said, is to be found not merely 
 in the words of that passage, but in comparing it 
 with other parts of the law, ascertaining also what 
 were ' the circumstances with reference to which 
 the words were used, and what was the object 
 appearing from those circumstances, which the 
 Legislature had in view (a). Every clause of a 
 statute should be construed with reference to the 
 context and the other clauses of the Act, so as, so 
 far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of 
 the whole statute or series of statutes relating 
 to the subject matter (b). 
 
 As regards the history, or external circumstances 
 which led to the enactment, the general rule which 
 is applicable to the construction of all other docu- 
 ments is equally applicable to statutes (c), viz., 
 that the interpreter should so far put himself in the 
 position of those whose words he is interpreting, 
 
 (a) See per Lord Blackburn, Biver Wear Com. v. Adamson 
 (1877), 2 App. Gas. 743 ; and per Lord Halsbury L.O., Eastman 
 Co. V. Comptroller of Patents, [1898] A. C. 576. 
 
 (b) Per Lord Davey, Canada Sugar Bejtning Co. v. Beg., 
 [1898] A. C. 741. 
 
 (c) It has indeed been said that it is safer to abstain from 
 imposing with regard to Acts of Parliament any further canons 
 of construction than those applicable to all documents: Per 
 Bowen LJ., Lamplough v. Norton (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 452; 
 58 L. J. Q. B. 279. As to the decision in this case, see now 
 Tithe Act, 1891, s. 6 (1). 
 
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EXTERNAL CIBCUMSTANOES. 41 
 
 as to be able to see what those words relate to. 
 Extrinsic evidence of the oiroumstanoes or sur- 
 rounding facts under which a will or contract was 
 made, so far as they throw light on the matter to 
 which the document relates, and of the condition 
 and position and course of dealing of the persons 
 who made it or are mentioned in it, is always 
 admitted as indispensable for the purpose not only 
 of identifying such person and things, but also of 
 explaining the language, whenever it is latently 
 ambiguous ,or susceptible of various meanings or 
 shades of meaning, and of applying it sensibly to 
 ^the circumstances to which it relates (a). Thus, 
 when a Charter-Party stipulates that " detention 
 by ice " is not to be reckoned among laying days, 
 the meaning intended by this term cannot be 
 accurately determined without that knowledge of 
 
 (a) Wigram Int. Wills, Prop. 5, cited by Lindley L.J., Bash- 
 wood V. Magniac (1891), L. J. Oh. 817 ; Trevor-Batty e's Settlement, 
 In re (1912), 81 L. J. Ch. 646 ; Anstee v. Nelms, 1 H. & N. 
 225, per Bramwell B. ; Wood v. Priestner, 36 L. J. Ex. 127 ; 
 SJiortrede v. GJieeTe, 40 E. E. 258 ; Baumann v. James, L. E. 3 
 Ch. 508 ; Doe v. Benyon, 12 A. & E. 431 ; Blundell v. Gladstone, 
 12 L. J. Ch. 225 ; Turner v. Ilvatis, 22 L. J. Q. B. 412; Graves 
 V. Legg, 23 L. J. Ex. 228 ; Lewis v. G. W. B. Co., 47 L. J. Q. B. 
 133, per Bramwell L.J. ; Be Be Bosaz, 2 P. D. 66 ; Whitfield v. 
 Langdale, 1 Ch. D. 61 ; Eill v. Crook, L. E. 6 H. L. 283 ; Be 
 Jameson, 77 L. J. Ch. 729 ; Butterley Co. v. New HucJcnall Colliery 
 Co., 78 L. J. Ch. 63 ; 79 lb. 411 ; Trevor-Batty e's Settlement, 
 In re (1912), 81 L. J. Ch. 646. 
 
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42 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the circumstances of the port and trade which the 
 parties possessed, or are conclusively presumed to 
 have possessed; and evidence of these circum- 
 stances is received for the purpose of accurately 
 construing the contract (a). When a vessel is 
 warranted seaworthy, the meaning must vary with 
 the nature, not only of the vessel but of the voyage ; 
 and evidence of these circumstances is admitted 
 in order to ascertain the precise intention of the 
 parties. In a lease of a house with a covenant to 
 keep it in tenantable repair, it is necessary to 
 ascertain whether the house is an old or a new 
 one, whether it is a tenement in St. Giles's or a 
 palace in Grosvenor Square ; for that which would 
 be a repair of the one, might not be so of the 
 other (b). So, on the sale of a horse warranted to 
 go well in harness, the qualities of a good goer 
 would be different in one fit to draw a lady's 
 carriage, and a brewer's dray ; and it would therefore 
 be necessary to inquire what was the kind of horse 
 which was the subject of the warranty (c). Where 
 
 (a) Hudson v. Ede, 37 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; on whc. see per Esher 
 M.E., Smith V. Bosario Nitrate Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 178; see 
 also Behn v. Bumess (1861), 32 L. J. Q. B. 207, and Bentson v. 
 Taylor, [1893] 2 Q. B. 274. 
 
 (6) Guiteridge v. Munyard, 1 Moo. & E. 336 ; London v. G. W. 
 B. Co., 70 L. J. Ch. 622 ; LurcottY. WaJcely, [1911] 1 K.B. 905. 
 
 (c) See jdgmt. of Blackburn J., Burges v. WickJiam (1863), 
 33 L. J. Q. B. 17, at p. 28 ; Clapham v. Langton (1864), 34 
 L. J. Q. B. 46. Both of these cases relate to Marine Insurance. 
 
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EXTEENAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 43 
 
 a guarantee is worded in language equally applic- 
 able to a past and to a future credit, evidence of 
 the state of the dealings of the parties at the 
 time, may be given in order to determine which 
 was the real sense in which they used the words (a). 
 So, in the interpretation of statutes, the inter- 
 preter, in order to understand the subject matter 
 and the scope and object of the enactment, must, 
 in Coke's words, ascertain what was the mischief 
 or defect for which the law had not provided ; that 
 is, he must call to his aid all those external or 
 historical facts which are necessary for this pur- 
 pose, and which led to the enactment [b], and for 
 these he may, as regards ancient statutes, consult 
 contemporary or other authentic works and writ- 
 ings (c), and may also consider whether a statute 
 was intended to alter the law, or leave it exactly 
 where it stood before (d). It being " a very serious 
 
 (a) Goldshede v. Swan, 16 L. J. Ex. 284 ; Wood v. Priestner, 
 36 L. J. Ex. 127. See also Laher v. Horderrp, 45 L. J. Ch. 315 ; 
 Be Woolverton Estates, 47 L. J. Ch. 127 ; Charter v. Charter, 
 43 L. J. P. M. & A. 73 ; and compare Bruner v. Moore, [1904] 
 1 Ch. 305 ; Morrell v. Studd Sf Millington, [1913] 2 Ch. 648. 
 
 (6) Gorham v. Exeter (Bp.), Eep. by Moore, p. 462 ; see per 
 Bramwell B., A.-O. v. Sillem (1863), 2 H. & C. 431, at p. 531 ; 
 per Coleridge J., B. v. Blane, 13 Q. B. 773 ; per Thesiger L.J., 
 Tewens v. Noakes, 6 Q. B. D. 535, and see Phillips v. Bees 
 (1889), 59 L. J. Q. B., at p. 4. 
 
 (c) See Bead v. Lincoln (Bp.), 62 L. J. P. C. 1 ; inf. p. 108. 
 
 {d) Per Cdzens-Hardy L.J., Be a Debtor, [1903] 1 K. B. 705. 
 
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44 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 matter to hold that when the main object of a 
 statute is clear it shall be reduced to a nuUity 
 by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance 
 of law " (a). In his celebrated judgment in the 
 Alabama arbitration, Cockburn, C.J., showed, by 
 a reference to their history, that both the American 
 and English Foreign Enlistment Acts of the early 
 part of the nineteenth century were intended, 
 not to prevent the sale of armed ships to belli- 
 gerents, but to prevent American and English 
 citizens from manning privateers against belli- 
 gerents (b). 5 G-eo. IV. c. 113, for the abolition 
 of the slave trade, was construed to extend to 
 offences committed by British subjects out of the 
 British dominions, that is, on the West Coast of 
 Africa, by the light of the notorious fact that the 
 crime against which the Act was directed, was 
 mainly, if not exclusively committed there (c) ; 
 though it may, perhaps, not have extended to our 
 subjects in other parts of the world beyond our 
 territories (d). An ordinance of the colony of 
 
 (a) Salmon v. Buncombe (1886), 11 App. Cas., at p. 634; 
 Bex V. Vasey (1905), 75 L. J. K. B. 117, [1905] 2 K. B. 748, 
 C. 0. E. 
 
 (&) Supplement to the London Gazette, 20 Sept. 1872, p. 4135. 
 
 (c) B. V. Zulueta (1843), 1 Car. & K. 215 ; SociSte des Hotels 
 Beunis v. Hawher (1913), 29 T. L. E. 578. 
 
 (d) Per Bramwell B., Santos v. Illidge (1859-60), 8 C. B. N. S. 
 861, and see the judgment of Wright J., in Kaufman v. Oerson, 
 [1903] 2 K. B. 114 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 320. 
 
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BXTEBNAL CIECUMSTANOES. 45 
 
 Hong Kong which authorised the extradition of 
 Chinese subjects to the government of China, when 
 charged with " any crime or offence against the 
 law of China," was construed, either by reference 
 to the circumstances under which the treaty (which 
 the ordinance enforced) had been made or to the 
 geographical relation of Hong Kong to China, as 
 limited to those crimes which all nations concur 
 in proscribing (a). An Act which authorised " the 
 Court " before which a road indictment was pre- 
 ferred, to give costs, was construed as authorising 
 the judge at Nisi Prius to do so, partly on the 
 ground of the well-known fact that such indict- 
 ments were rarely tried by the Court in which 
 they were, in the strict sense of the word, " pre- 
 ferred " (6). In construing an Extradition Act 
 the terms of the treaty which it was intended to 
 carry into effect should be considered, as the two 
 documents ought not to conflict ; accordingly 
 where the treaty provided that no extradition 
 should be made for offences committed before it 
 came into operation, the Act, though silent on the 
 point, should be limited in the same way (c). 
 
 There is some presumption that statutes passed 
 to amend the law are directed against defects 
 
 (a) A.-G. V. Kwoh-a-Sing (1873), L. E. 5 P. C. 179, 197. 
 (6) B. V. Pembridge, 12 L. J. Q. B. 47, 259. 
 (c) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, amended by 36 & 37 Vict. c. 60, and 
 by 58 & 59 Vict. c. 33 ; B. v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. D. 42. 
 
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46 INTERPRETATION OV STATUTES. 
 
 whicli have come into notice about the time when 
 those statutes passed; and on the ground that 
 s. 7, Eailway & Canal Traffic Act,, 1854, was 
 passed to correct a state of the law brought into 
 notice by a legal warfare which had been waged 
 about negligence only, the reference in that 
 section to losses of goods "occasioned by the 
 neglect or default of" such company or its 
 servants, has been held not to extend to a loss 
 by the theft of a servant of the company without 
 negligence on their part, that not being, a loss by 
 neglect or default on their part (a). 
 
 Agaiu, on the ground that it was to prevent 
 delay and costs that the Legislature enacted in 
 s. 4, Arbitration Act, 1889, that, " before delivery 
 of any pleadings or taking any other steps in the 
 proceedings," any party may apply to the Court 
 to stay the proceedings, it was held by the House 
 of Lords, that a defendant who had taken out a 
 summons and obtained an order for further time 
 for dehvering his defence had taken a " step " 
 within the section (b). 
 
 (a) 17 & 18 Yict. c. 31 ; Shaw v. G. W. B. Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 
 373. 
 
 (6) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49 ; Ford's Hotel Go. v. Bartlett, [1896] 
 A. C. 1. But see Ghappell -v. North, 60 L. J. Q. B. 554:, &n3. Brighton 
 Marine Co. v. Woodhouse, 62 L. J. Oh. 697 ; County Theatres, 
 Ltd. V. Knowles, 71 L. J. K. B. 351. But the mere filing of 
 aflSdavits in answer to a motion for a Eeoeiver is not " a step 
 in the proceedings'' within the section, Zalinoff v. Hammond, 
 
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EXTEENAL CIKCUMSTANCES. 47 
 
 The external circumstances which may be thus 
 referred to, do not, however, justify a departure 
 from every meaning of the language of the Act. 
 Their function is limited to suggesting a key to 
 the true sense, when the words are fairly open to 
 more than one, and they are to be borne in mind, 
 with the view of applying the language to what 
 was intended and of not extending it to what was 
 not intended (a). 
 
 It has been said that unless for some special 
 reason, e.g., where a provision is of doubtful 
 import, or employs words of technical meaning, 
 the pre-existing law is not to be taken into con- 
 sideration in construing a Codifying Act, which 
 implies not only the collection, but in some 
 respects the alteration of the law (6). Such an 
 
 67 L. J. Ch. 370, nor is a mere request for a Statement of 
 Claim, Ives v. Williams, 63 L. J. Ch. 521 ; nor is giving notice of 
 intention to defend by filling up the slip attached to a default 
 summons. Austin v. Bowley (1913), 108 L. T. 920. But on the 
 other hand attendance before a master, and acquiescing without 
 protest on an order has been held to be " a step in the pro- 
 ceedings." Cohen v. Arthur (1912), 56 Sol. J. 344. Taking 
 out a summons for discovery is also " a step." Parher, Gaines & 
 Go. V. Turpin, [1918] 1 K. B. 368. 
 
 (a) See dictum of Jessel M.E., Holme v. Ouy, 5 Ch. D. 905 ; 
 and B. v. Langriville, 54 L. J. Q. B. 124; but see Hall V.C. in 
 A.-G. V. Manchester (1881), 18 Ch. D., at p. 609 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 
 562. 
 
 (&) Per Lord Herschell, Bk. of England v. Vagliano, [1891] 
 A. C. 144. 
 
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48 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Act, in the main, expresses in abstract proposi- 
 tions the conclusions of law or equity which have 
 been reached by the Judicature, ex gr. Bills of 
 Exchange Act, 1882, and Sale of Goods Act, 1893. 
 In relation to the latter, Cozens-Hardy, M.E., has 
 said in a modern case : " I rather deprecate the 
 citation of earlier decisions. The object and 
 intent ojf the statute was no doubt simply to 
 codify the unwritten law applicable to the sale of 
 goods ; but in so far as there is an express statu- 
 tory enactment, that alone must be looked at and 
 must govern the rights of the parties, erven though 
 the section may, to some extent, have altered the 
 prior Common Law " {a). Yet counsel, and even 
 eminent judges, will refer to the earlier decisions 
 if only for elucidating an argument (6). And, 
 indeed, as regards a Consolidation Act — ex. gr. 
 Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 — if it re- 
 enacts, with a like context, a word or phrase in 
 one of the Acts consolidated which has received 
 judicial interpretation, that interpretation will, 
 generally, be applicable to the same word or 
 phrase in the Consolidation Act (c). 
 
 Eeference has been occasionally made to what 
 
 (o) Bristol Tramways Go. v. Fiat Motors (1910), 79 L. J. K. B. 
 1109. 
 
 (6) See judgment of Parwell L.J., Wallis v. Pratt (1910), 79 
 L. J. K. B. 1023. 
 
 (c) See, however, cases cited, p. 109, inf. 
 
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EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANOES. 49 
 
 the framers of the Act, or individual members of 
 the Legislature intended to do by the enactment, 
 or understood it to have done (a). Chief Justice 
 Hengham said that he knew better than counsel 
 the meaning of the 2d Westminster, as he had 
 drawn up that statute (b). Lord Nottingham 
 claimed that he had some reason to know the 
 meaning of the Statute of Frauds, because, he 
 said, it had had its first rise from him, he having 
 brought it into the House of Lords (c). Lord 
 Kenyon supported his construction of 9 Anne, 
 c. 20, by the argument that so accurate a lawyer 
 as Mr. Justice Powell, who had drawn it, never 
 would have used several words where one 
 sufficed (d). Lord Field refers to the improba- 
 bility that the eminent lawyers who framed the 
 Judicature Act, 1875, would not have made a 
 certain exception if they intended it(e). Lord 
 Halsbury states however that he has, on more 
 than one occasion, said that the worst person to 
 construe a statute is the person who is responsible 
 for its drafting, for he is much disposed to confuse 
 
 (a) For an exposition of the general rules governing the Con- 
 struction of Statutes, see Halsbury L.C., in Gox v. Hakes, [1890] 
 15 A. C, at pp. 577 et seq. 
 
 (6) Year Book of 33 Ed. I. M. Term. (Eolls Ed.) 82. 
 
 (c) See Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst. 664. 
 
 {d) B. V. Wallis, 5 T. E. 379. 
 
 (e) Bell-Gox v. Bakes (1890), 60 L. J. Q. B. 89; 15 A. C, at 
 p. 544. 
 
 I.S. 4 
 
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50 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 what he intended to do with the effect of the 
 language which in fact he has employed (a). Yet, 
 in determining the meaning of the rubric on vest- 
 ments in the Prayer-book (enacted by the Uni- 
 formity Act, 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4), the Privy 
 Council, in one ecclesiastical case, referred to the 
 introduction of a proviso by the Lords in that 
 Act, and its rejection by the Commons, and to 
 the reasons assigned by the latter, in the con- 
 ference which ensued, for the rejection, as an 
 indication of the intention of the Legislature (b) ; 
 and in another, to a discussion between the 
 bishops who framed or revised the rubric and the 
 Presbyterian divines at the Savoy Conference in 
 1662, as showing the meaning attached to it by 
 the former (c). And it has been stated as a 
 general proposition in ecclesiastical matters that 
 if the law excludes all historical investigation 
 and discussion on antecedent usage in matters of 
 ritual and practice it excludes one source of light 
 upon doubtful questions (d). Lord Westbury, 
 when Chancellor, referred to a speech made by 
 himself, as Attorney-General, in the House of 
 
 (a) Hilder v. Dexter (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 781, at p. 783. 
 (6) Hebbert v. Purchas, 40 L. J. Bcc. 33, and see MachonoMe 
 V. Martin (1881), 6 A. C. 424. 
 
 (c) Bidsdale v. OUftort, 46 L. J. P. C. 27. 
 
 (d) See Halsbury L.C. in Bead v. Bishop of Lincoln, [1892] 
 A. C, at p. 652. 
 
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EXTEENAL OIEOUMSTANOES. 51 
 
 Commons, in 1860, in introducing the Bankruptcy 
 Bill, which was passed into law in the following 
 year; and one of his reasons in favour of the 
 construction which he put on the Act was that it 
 tallied best with the intention which the Legisla- 
 ture (that is, the three branches of the Legislature) 
 might be presumed to have adopted, as it was the 
 ground on which application had been made to 
 one of the three. But he observed, at the same 
 time, that he had endeavoured, in forming his 
 opinion, to divest his mind, as far as possible, of 
 all impressions received from the past, and to 
 consider the language of the Act as if it had been 
 presented to him for the first time in the case 
 before him (a). The reports furnish other in- 
 stances (6). But it is unquestionably a rule that 
 what may be called the parliamentary history of 
 an enactment is not admissible to explain its 
 meaning (c). Its language can be regarded only 
 as the language of the three Estates of the realm, 
 
 (a) Be Mew, 31 L. J. Bank. 89, and see Hamilton, In re (1878), 
 Bacon G J., 9 Ch. Div., at p, 696. 
 
 (6) Ex. gr. per Hale C.B., Hedworih v. Jackson, Hard. 318; 
 McMaster v. Lomax, 2 Myl. & K. 32 ; Mounsey v. Ismay, 3 H. & 
 0. 486 ; Drummond v. Drummond, 36 L. J. Ch. 153 ; Hudson v. 
 Tooth, 47 L. J. Q. B. 18, and see Bell-Oox, Exp. (1887), 20 
 Q. B. D. 1, at p. 30. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. per Cur., B. v. Hertford College, 47 L. J. Q. B. 
 649 ; per Pollock C.B., A.-O. v. Sillem, 2 H. & G. 521, and per 
 Bramwell B., 537. 
 
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52 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and the meaning attached to it by its framers or 
 by individual members of one of those Estates 
 cannot control the construction of it (a). Indeed, 
 the inference to be drawn from comparing the 
 language of the Act with the declared intention 
 of its framers would be that the difference between 
 the two was not accidental but intentional (6). 
 Accordingly, the Dower Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV. 
 0. 106, was construed to apply to gavelkind lands, 
 although this was avowedly contrary to the in- 
 tention of the real property commissioners who 
 prepared that Act ; for they stated in their report 
 that it was their intention that it should not 
 extend to lands of that tenure (c). Sir Francis 
 Moor, who drew the Statute of Charitable Uses, 
 43 Eliz. c. 4, says, in his reading on it, that a gift 
 of lands to maintain a chaplain or minister for 
 divine service, or to maintain schools for cate- 
 chising, was not within its meaning, having been 
 intentionally omitted, lest they should be con- 
 fiscated; since rehgion being variable according 
 to the pleasure of succeeding princes, that which 
 
 (a) Dean of Yorh's Case (1841), 2 Q. B. 1 ; 57 E. E. 545. Per 
 Pollock C.B. and Parke B., Martin v. Hemming (1854), 10 Ex. 
 478 ; Cameron v. Cameron (1834), 2 Myl. & K. 289 ; Hemstead v. 
 Phcenix Gas Co. (1865), 34 L. J. Ex. 108. 
 
 (6) Per Tindal C.J., Salkeld v. Johnston (1847), 2 0. B. 749, at 
 p. 757, and see Esdaile v. Payne (1885), 52 L. T. 530. 
 
 (c) Farley-tv. Bonham (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 239. 
 
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EXTERNAL OIROUMSTANCES. 53 
 
 was orthodox at one time might be superstitious 
 at another, and so be forfeited (a) ; but such 
 devises were nevertheless afterwards held to fall 
 within the Act (b). So, what took place before 
 the committee cannot be invoked for putting such 
 a construction on a private Act(c), as wiU limit 
 its application to one party to the detriment of 
 the general public. Although for the purpose of 
 construing it the Court would be at liberty to 
 consider the position of the parties concerned, and 
 may come to the conclusion that a particular 
 clause was inserted at the instance of a party who 
 was present, for his protection, and conferred 
 upon him such an interest as to entitle him to a 
 mandamus to compel compliance therewith (d). 
 
 Another class of external circumstances which 
 have, under peculiar circumstances, been some- 
 times taken into consideration in construing a 
 statute, consists of acts done under it, for usage 
 may determine the meaning of the language, at 
 
 (a) Duke, Char. Uses, 125. 
 
 (6) Id. 134, Penstred v. Payer, Id. 381 ; Grieves v. Case, i Bro. 
 C. C. 67. 
 
 (c) Davis & Sons v. Taff Vale By. Co., [1895] A. 0. 542 ; Steele 
 V. Midland B. Co., L. E. 1 Ch. 282 ; per Lord Alverstone C.J., 
 B. V. Manchester Corp., 80 L. J. K. B. 265. 
 
 (d) B. V. Manchester Corp. (1910), 80 L. J. K. B. 263. As 
 to the principles for construing such clauses, see inf. pp. 
 527-530. 
 
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54 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 all events when the meaning is not free from 
 amhiguity (a). 
 
 SECTION IV. — THE CONTEXT — EAELIEB AND LATER 
 ACTS ANALOGOUS ACTS. 
 
 Passing from the external history of the statute 
 to its contents, it is an elementary rule that con- 
 struction is to be made of all the parts together, 
 and not of one part only by itself (b). Incivile est 
 nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua partioula ejus pro- 
 posita, judicare vel respondere{o). Such a survey is 
 often indispensable, even when the words are the 
 plainest {d) ; for the true meaning of any passage 
 is that which (being permissible) best harmonises 
 with the subject, and with every other passage of 
 the statute. If one section of an Act, for instance, 
 required that "notice" should be "given," a 
 verbal notice would, generally, be sufficient ; but 
 if another section provided that it should be 
 
 (a) See ex. gr. Leverton v. B. (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 394, at 
 p. 404, and other cases referred to inf., Chap. XI, Sec. I. 
 
 (b) Co. Litt. 381a ; Lincoln College Case, 3 Eep. 59b. Per 
 Lord Blackburn, Turquand. v. Board of Trade (1886), 55 
 L. J. Q. B. 417. 
 
 (c) Dig. 1, B, 84. 
 
 {d) Per Lord Esher, M.E. and Ery L.J., Lancashire and Torks. 
 B. Go. V. Enowles (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 391 ; and see Chamber 
 Colliery Co. v. Bochdale Canal Co., [1895] A. 0. 564, at p. 571, 
 et seq. 
 
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THE CONTEXT. 55 
 
 "served" on a person, or "left" with him, or in 
 a particular manner or place, it would obviously 
 show that a written notice was intended (a). 
 Sec. 2, Prescription Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. IV. 
 c. 71, in protecting certain stated easements from 
 disturbance after specified periods of enjoyment, 
 uses an expression which unambiguously includes 
 all such easements, that is, those in gross as well 
 as those appurtenant. But s. 5, which, in pro- 
 viding a form of pleading to be applicable to all 
 rights within the Act, gives a form which could, 
 from its nature, be applicable only to rights appur- 
 tenant, shows that the wide expression in the 
 earlier section was used in the restricted sense of a 
 right appurtenant (b). So, in the Dower Act, 1833, 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, the word "land," which it 
 
 (a) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42; 2 W. & M. c. 5; Moyle v. Jenkins, 
 51 L. J. Q. B. 112 ; Wilson v. Nightingale, 70 E. E. 727 ; B. v. 
 Shurmer, 55 L. J. M. C. 153. See Portingell, Exp., 61 L. J. M. 0. 1. 
 See also Workmen's Compeiisation Act, 1906, s. 2, providing 
 that Notice of accident is to be " given " ; which, on the context, 
 imports that the Notice is to be in -writing {Hughes v. Coed Talon 
 Colliery Go. (1909), 78 L. J. K. B. 539), (as to what constitutes 
 notice in writing see Stevens v. Insoles, [1912] 1 K. B. 36, 0. A.), 
 whilst the Claim which, under the same section, has to be 
 " made," maybe oral {Lowe v. Myers (1906), 75 L. J. K. B. 651, 
 (note, p. 656), and need not be for a specific sum {Thompson 
 V. Goold (1910), 79 L. J. K. B. 905). 
 
 (6) Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 34 L. J. 0. P. 309 ; approved, 
 followed in Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Oh. 534 ; [1905] 2 Gh. 
 538; 74 L. J. Ch. 723. 
 
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56 INTBKPEETATION OP STATUTES, 
 
 defines as including manors, messuages, and all 
 other hereditaments, both corporeal and incor- 
 poreal, except such as are not liable to dower, was 
 held not to include copyhold lands ; because s. 6, 
 which provides that a widow shall not be entitled to 
 dower, when " the deed " by which the land was 
 conveyed to her husband contains a declaration 
 to that effect, showed that only lands which were 
 transferable by deed were within the contempla- 
 tion of the Legislature (a). So a colonial statute 
 which required an executor to file particulars of 
 the "personal estate " of the testator was held to 
 refer to such personal estate only as was held by 
 the testator in the colony, it being clear that in 
 other parts of the context a number of similar 
 expressions had to be subjected to limitations or 
 qualifications of the same nature. One of the 
 safest guides, it has been said, to the construction 
 of sweeping general words, which are difiScult to 
 apply in their full literal sense, is to examine 
 other words of like import in the same instrument, 
 and to see what limitations must be imposed on 
 them ; and if it is found that a number of such 
 expressions have to be subjected to limitations 
 and qualifications, and that such limitations and 
 qualifications are of the same nature, that circum- 
 
 (a) Smith v. Adams, 24 L. J. Ch. 258 ; Powdrell v. Jones, 24 
 L. J. Ch. 123. Comp. Doe v. Waterton, 22 E. E. 328; inf. 
 p. 144. 
 
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THE CONTEXT. 57 
 
 stance forms a strong argument for subjecting the 
 expression in dispute to a like limitation and 
 qualification (a). Where one section of an Act 
 empowered the Board of Trade, when it had 
 "reason to believe" that a ship could not go 
 to sea without serious danger to human life, to 
 detain it for survey ; and another gave the ship- 
 owner a right to compensation if it appeared that 
 there was not reasonable cause for its detention, 
 by reason of the condition of the ship or the act 
 or default of the owner ; it was held that the latter 
 section so modified the sense of the earlier one, 
 that the Board of Trade would be liable to com- 
 pensate the owner, though it had reasonable 
 ground for belief when it ordered the detention, 
 if it appeared from the evidence at the trial that 
 a person of ordinary skill would have thought that 
 there was no reasonable ground for detention (6). 
 
 So, where one section of 25 & 26 Vict, c. 102, 
 enacted, that if " any building " projecting beyond 
 the general line of the street was pulled down, the 
 Board of Works might order it to be set back, 
 giving compensation ; and the next section enacted 
 that under certain circumstances "no building" 
 should be erected in any street, without the 
 
 (a) Blaclcwood v. B. (1882), 52 L. J. P. 0. 10. 
 
 (6) 39 & 40 Vict. o. 80, ss. 6 and 10, repealed by 57 & 58 
 Vict. c. 60 ; see s. 459, and Thompson v. Farrer (1882), 51 L. J. 
 Q. B. 534. A case under the repealed Act. 
 
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58 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 consent of the Board, beyond the general line ; the 
 latter section, which, fer se, would have included 
 alterations, whether on new sites or old, was con- 
 fined by the former to buildings erected on land 
 which had been hitherto vacant (a). Where one 
 section of a repealed Act imposed a penalty for 
 selling " as unadulterated " articles of food which 
 are in fact adulterated ; and another declared that 
 a person who sold an article of food " knowing it 
 to have been mixed with another substance to 
 increase its bulk or weight," and did not, in selHng 
 it, declare the admixture to the purchaser, should 
 be deemed to have sold an adulterated article, the 
 different wording of the two sections showed that 
 under the former the seller would be liable though 
 he was ignorant of the adulteration (6). Comment- 
 ing on this latter section. Lord Bussell of KiUowen 
 says in Spiers ^ Pond v. Bennett, " I do not think 
 there need be mens rea in order to constitute an 
 
 (a) Lord Auckland v. Westminster Board of Worlcs (1872), 
 41 L. J. Ch. 723 ; Wendon v. L. G. C, 63 L. J. M. 0. 117 ; as to 
 the meaning of " obstruction " or " encroachment " within s. 1 of 
 the Act of 1862, see Vigers Bros. v. London C. C, [1919] IK. B. 56. 
 Comp. Worley v. St. Mary Abbotts, 61 L. J. Oh. 601. See also 
 Doe V. Olley, 54 E. E. 607 ; Lavy v. L. G. G., 64 L. J. M. 0. 262. 
 
 (6) 35 & 36 Vict. o. 74, repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 1, 
 which latter Act is amended by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30, 48 & 49 
 Vict. c. 61, s. 5, 62 & 68 Vict. c. 51, and 7 Ed. VII. c. 21 ; 
 Fitzpatrich v. Kelly (1873), 42 L. J. M. 0. 132 ; ByU v. Gmer 
 (1891), 61 L. J. M. 0. 70; [1892], 1 Q, B. 220. 
 
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COMPAEISON OF SECTIONS. 59 
 
 offence under the second part of the section, if 
 the article which was in fact altered by abstraction 
 was sold without disclosure it would constitute an 
 offence under this section " (a). A provision in an 
 Enclosure Act which reserved to the lord his right 
 to minerals, and to the working of them as fully as 
 if the Act had not been passed, without paying 
 compensation, is materially limited by a direction 
 that " highways should be set out over the land " ; 
 for this latter provision would preclude him from 
 working the minerals under the highways without 
 leaving adequate support (6). One section of 
 the Companies Act, 1862, which enacted that 
 where a company was being wound up by or 
 under the supervision of the Court, any distress or 
 execution put in force against the property of the 
 company after the commencement of the winding- 
 up " shall be void to aU intents," was so modified 
 by another which enacted that when an order for 
 winding-up 'had been made, no action or other 
 proceeding should be proceeded with against the 
 company, except with the leave of the Court, that 
 its true meaning and effect was only to invalidate 
 the proceedings which it pronounced void, when 
 
 (a) (1896), 65 L. J. M, 0. 144, at p. 147. 
 
 (6) Benfieldside Local Board v. Oonsett Iron Co., 47 L. J. 
 Ex. 491; and see A.-G. v. Conduit Colliery Co. (1894), 64 
 L. J. Q. B. 207, C. A.; as to right of action in successive 
 subsidences, see Barley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1886) 
 55 L. J. Oh. 529. 
 
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60 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the Court did not sanction them (a). Clause 21 
 in the Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872, which in 
 express terms requires the presiding officer at each 
 station to exclude all persons except the clerks, 
 the agents of the candidates, and the constables 
 on duty, was found to include also the candidates 
 themselves in the exception, since a subsequent 
 clause (61) provides that a candidate may be 
 present at any place at which his agent may 
 attend (&), The words of s. 1, Fine Arts Copyright 
 Act, 1862, which give to the author of every 
 original painting the sole and exclusive right of 
 copying, engraving, reproducing, and multiplying 
 such painting, and the design thereof, by any 
 means and of any size, are seen (when reference 
 is made to subsequent sections empowering the 
 owner of the copyright to obtain a forfeiture of the 
 piratical imitations) to be inapplicable to the repre- 
 sentation of a painting by a tableau vivant (c). In 
 all these instances, the Legislature supplied in the 
 context the key to the meaning in which it used 
 
 (a) Be London Cotton Co. (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 425. See also 
 Vron Colliery Co., In re (1882), 51 L. J. Gh. 389, 0. A., and 
 British Salicylates, Ltd., In re, [1919] 2 Ch. 155. See now 
 ss. 140, 142, Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908. 
 
 (6) Clementson v. Mason (1875), 44 L. J. C. P. 171. 
 
 (c) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, amended, and partially repealed, by 
 Copyright Act, 1911 ; Sanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 
 2 Ch. 1 ; see further, Eanfstaengl v. Baines, 64 L. J. Ch. 81, 
 [1895] A. C. 20. 
 
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REFERENCE TO EARLIER ACTS. 61 
 
 expressions which seemed free from doubt ; and 
 that meaning, it is obvious, was not that which 
 literally or primarily belonged to them. 
 
 Where the later of two Acts provided that the 
 earlier Act should, so far as was consistent, be 
 construed as one with it, an enactment in the later 
 statute that nothing therein should include deben- 
 tures was held to exclude debentures from the 
 earlier one also (a). It has been observed, however, 
 that when an Act embodies several distinct Acts, 
 one part throws no further light on the other parts 
 than would be cast upon them by separate and 
 distinct enactments to the same effect (b). 
 
 Where a single section of an [Act is introduced 
 into another statute, it must be read in the sense 
 which it bore in the original Act from which it is 
 taken, and consequently it is legitimate to refer 
 to all the rest of that Act in order to ascertain 
 what the section meant, although one section only 
 is incorporated in the new Act (c). 
 
 (a) Bead v. Joannon, 59 L. J. Q. B. 544 ; see also Standard 
 Mfg. Co., In re, [1891] 1 Oh. 627, 0. A. ; and Exp. Lowe, 60 
 L. J. Oh. 292. 
 
 (6) Per Turner L.J., Cope v. Boherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367 ; 
 27 L. J. Ch. 600. As to incorporation of earlier Acts in a 
 subsequent statute, see Knill v. Towse, [1890] 24 Q. B. D. 186 ; 
 59 L. J. Q. B. 136, 697 ; B. v. Pharmaceutical Society, [1899] 
 2 Ir. E. 132. And see inf, p. 541 et seq. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Blackburn, Mayor of Portsmouth v. Smith (1885), 
 10 App. Gas. 371. 
 
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62 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Probably, the rule as to the exposition of one 
 Act by the language of another is satisfactorily 
 and most comprehensively laid down in the broad 
 statement of Lord Mansfield, that : " Where there 
 are different statutes in pari materia, though made 
 at different times, or even expired and not refer- 
 ring to each other, they shall be taken and 
 construed together, as one system and as explana- 
 tory of each other " (a). 
 
 For instance, a by-law which authorised the 
 election of " any person " to be Chamberlain of 
 the City of London would be construed so as to 
 harmonise, and not to conflict, with an earlier 
 one which limited the appointment to persons 
 possessed of a certain quahfication, and " any 
 person" would be understood to mean only any 
 eligible person {b). Where a question arose as to 
 whether s. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act, 24 Vict, 
 c. 10, which gives that Court jurisdiction over any 
 
 (a) B. V. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 447, adopted in the C. A., Gold- 
 smiths Co. V. Wyatt (1907), 76 L. J. K. B. 169 ; but in B. v. 
 Titterton, [1895] 2 Q. B. 67, Lord Eussell of Killowen G J., 
 observes that " it is proper to refer to earlier Acts in pari 
 materia only where there is an ambiguity." See also per 
 Cotton L.J., Sutton v. Sutton, 52 L. J. Gh. 337, cited by Bray J., 
 Shaw V. Grompton, 80 L. J. K. B. 56; McWilliam v. Adams, 1 
 Macq. H. L. 136, per Lord Truro. 
 
 (6) Tobacco Pipe Makers v. Woodroffe (1826), 7 B. & C. 838 
 (overruling Oxford v. Wildgoose, 3 Lev. 293). See also Poulterer's 
 Co. V. Phillips (1840), 6 Bing. N. G. 314 ; 9 L. J. G. P. 190. 
 
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KBFEBENCE TO LATER ACTS. 63 
 
 claim for " damage " done by any ship, included 
 injuries done to persons by collision ; one reason 
 for deciding in the negative was that in other Acts 
 in pari materid, loss of life and personal injury, on 
 the one hand, and loss and damage to ships and 
 other property, on the other, were invariably 
 treated distinctly, and the word " damage " was 
 nowhere, in them, applied to injuries to the 
 person (a). So, the expression " poasession " in 
 s. 26 (now repealed) of the Eepresentation of the 
 People Act, 1832, which enacts that no person 
 shall be registered in respect of his estate or interest 
 in lg,nd as a freeholder, unless he has been "in 
 actual possession " of it for six months (b), was 
 construed in the same sense as in the Statute 
 of Uses, which declares that the person who has 
 the use of the land is to be deemed in lawful 
 "possession" of it; and consequently the grantee 
 of a rent-charge by a conveyance operating tinder 
 the latter statute was held to be in possession of 
 it, within the meaning of the Eepresentation of 
 the People Act, 1832, from the date of the execu- 
 tion of the deed (c) ; though a grantee under a 
 
 (a) Smith V. Brown (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; Seward v. The 
 Vera Cruz (1884), 54 L. J. P. D. & A. 9, inf. p. 317. 
 
 (6) The qualifying period under 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64, is six 
 months, see s. 6. 
 
 (c) Heelis v. Blain (1864), 34 L. J. 0. P. 88 ; Eadfield's Case 
 (1873), 42 L. J. 0. P. 146. See also Lowcock v. Broughton Over- 
 seer's (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 144. 
 
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64 INTBEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 common law conveyance would not be in posses- 
 sion, within the same Act, until he had received a 
 payment of the rent-charge (a). 
 
 Not only may the later Act be construed by the 
 light of the earlier, but it sometimes furnishes a 
 legislative interpretation of the earlier. Thus 
 Chapter 23 of Magna Charta (9 Hen. III.), which 
 provides that " all weirs shall be put down through 
 Thames and Medway, and through all England, 
 except by the sea-coast," was held to apply only 
 to navigable rivers, because 25 Ed. III. aind other 
 subsequent statutes spoke of it as having been 
 passed to prevent obstruction to navigation (b). 
 To determine the meaning of the word " broker," 
 in 6 Anne, c. 16, the Bubble Act (6 Qeo. I. c. 18)^ 
 passed twelve years later, was referred to, where 
 the same term was used(c). In s. 299, of the 
 repealed Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, which 
 enacted that damage arising from non-observance 
 of the saiKng rules should primd facie be deemed 
 to have been occasioned by " the wilful default " of 
 the person in charge of the deck, the expression 
 
 (a) Murray v. Thorniley (1846), 15 L. J. C. P. 155 ; 69 E. E. 
 477 ; Orme's Case (1872), L. E. 8 C. P. 281 ; 42 L. J. 0. P. 48. 
 
 (6) 25 Ed. III. Stat. 4, c. 4 ; Bolle v. Whyte (1868), 37 L. J. 
 Q. B. 105 ; and see Leconfield {Lord) v. Lonsdale (Lord) (1870), 
 L. J. C. P. 305 ; Callis on Sewers, 258, 4th ed., at p. 305. 
 
 (c) Clarke v. Powell, 4 B. & Ad. 846 ; Smith v. Lindo (1858), 
 27 L. J. C. P. 196, 335. 
 
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BEFERENOE TO LATER ACTS. 65 
 
 "wilful default " was construed by the light of 
 the later Act (a), 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 29, of which 
 declares that the ship which occasioned the 
 collision shall he deemed to be "in fault," as 
 including a negligent as well as a criminal fault (&). 
 But where one Act (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18) 
 gave the effect of judgments to rules of Court, 
 for the payment of money, and a later one 
 (Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 60) 
 authorised creditors who obtained judgment to 
 recover the amount by the new process, which 
 it introduced, of foreign attachment, it was held 
 that this remedy did not apply to rules of 
 Court, the object of the former Act appearing to 
 be merely to give to rules the then existing 
 remedies of judgments, and of the latter, to confine 
 the new remedy to judgments in the strict accepta- 
 tion of the term (c). 
 
 General rules and forms made under the authority 
 of an Act which enacted that they should have the 
 same force as if they had been included in it have 
 also been referred to for the purpose of assisting in 
 the interpretation of the Act {d). And now by the 
 
 (a) Eepealed by 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 745 and Sched. 22. 
 
 (6) Grill V. General Screw Collier Go. (1866), L. E. 1 C P. 
 611, per Willes J. ; 35 L. J. C. P. 321 ; and see Price v. Union 
 Lighterage Go. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 374. 
 
 (c) Be Frankland, 42 L. J. Q. B. 13 ; Bestv.Pembrolce (1873), 
 42 L. J. Q. B. 212. 
 
 (d) Re Andrew, 45 L. J. Bank. 57. 
 
 i.s. 5 
 
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66 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 31, it is provided that 
 rules, orders, etc., made under an Act shall be 
 construed as using expressions in the same sense 
 as the Act (a). 
 
 The language and provisions of expired and 
 repealed Acts on the same subject, and the con- 
 struction which they have authoritatively received, 
 are also to be taken into consideration ; for it is 
 presumed that the Legislature uses the same 
 language in the same sense, when dealing at 
 different times with the same subject, and also 
 that any change of language is some indication 
 of a change of intention (b). Thus s. 202 of the 
 repealed Bankruptcy Act of 1849, which made 
 "void" aU securities given by a bankrupt to a 
 creditor to induce the latter to forbear opposition 
 to the bankrupt's certificate, was construed in the 
 same sense as that which had been given to the 
 same provision in the earlier and repealed Bank- 
 ruptcy Act of 6 G-eo. IV. (c). What was meant in 
 s. 4, Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, by 
 
 (a) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63. See Institute of Patent Agents v. 
 Lochwood (1894), L. J. P. 0. 74, inf. p. 93. 
 
 (6) See Chap. XI, Sec. III. ; B. v. Loxdale, sup. 62, and see 
 Devonpurt Corpn. v. Tozer (1902), 71 L. J. Oh. 754. Principle 
 approved in Stoomvart Maatschappy Nederland v. P. <b 0. Steam- 
 ship Co. (1882), 7 A. 0., at p. 816. 
 
 (c) Goldsmid v. Hampton, 27 L. J. C. P. 286. See also Gopeland, 
 Exp., 22 L. J. Bank. 17, inf. p. 479 ; 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, is now 
 the statute relating to Bankruptcy; see s. 44 as to preference. 
 
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REFERBNOES TO REPEALED ACTS. 67 
 
 " running away, leaving his or her child charge- 
 able to the parish " (a), was determined by referring 
 to the earher Act of 6 Greo. I., which spoke of 
 persons who " run or go away from their abodes 
 into other counties or places, and sometimes out 
 of the kingdom," and was therefore held not to 
 apply to a woman who left her children at the 
 door of the workhouse, and returned to her usual 
 abode in the town, where the workhouse was 
 situated (6). Where a repealed Act imposed a 
 penalty on the owner of cattle found lying on a 
 highway " without a keeper," and the same pro- 
 vision was re-enacted without the last words, the 
 omission was construed as obviously showing the 
 intention that the presence of a keeper should no 
 longer absolve the owner from liability (c). 
 
 Where a part of an Act has been repealed, it 
 may, although not of operative force, still be taken 
 into consideration in construing the rest, for it is 
 part of the history of the new Act{d). If, for 
 instance, an Act which imposed a duty on 
 
 (a) For other offences under this section, see Davis v. Ckrry 
 (fortune telling), [1918] 1 K. B. 109; Hartley v. Elinor 
 (suspected person) (1917), 86 L. J. K. B. 938. 
 
 (6) Cambridge Union v. Parr, 30 L. J. M, G. 242, per Byles J. ; 
 and see Peters v. Gowie, 46 L. J. M. G. 177. 
 
 (c) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 101, s. 25 ; Lawrence v. King (1868), 37 
 L. J. M. G. 78; and see Qolding v. Stocking (1869), L. E. 
 4 Q. B. 516. 
 
 (d) See sup. pp. 40-48. 
 
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68 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 racehorses, cabhorses, and all other horses, were 
 repealed as regards racehorses, the remaining 
 words would stUl obviously include them, if the 
 enactment were read as if the repealed words had 
 never formed a part of it (a). Where a statute 
 imposed a duty on artificial mineral waters, and on 
 all other waters to be used as medicines, and the 
 duty on artificial mineral waters was afterwards 
 repealed, the repealed words were held essential 
 for determining whether what still subsisted of 
 the Act, though wide enough to include artificial 
 waters, was intended to include them. It has 
 been said, however, to be an extremely hazardous 
 proceeding to refer to provisions which have been 
 absolutely repealed, in order to ascertain what the 
 Legislature meant to enact in their stead, though 
 there may be occasions on which such a reference 
 would be legitimate (b). 
 
 The construction which has been put upon Acts 
 of similar scope on similar subjects, even though 
 the language should be different, may for a similar 
 reason be referred to. Thus, the provision of 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, requiring that an acknowledgment 
 to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitation 
 should be signed " by the party chargeable 
 thereby," was held not to include an acknowledg- 
 
 (a) Per Bramwell L J., A.-G. v.Lamplough (1878), 3 Ex. D. 214. 
 (6) Per Lord Watson, Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 
 354, at p. 380. 
 
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BEFERENCE TO ANALOGOUS ACTS. 69 
 
 ment by his agent, on the ground that when the 
 Legislature intended to include the signature of 
 agents, not only in other Statutes of Limitation, 
 but also in several sections of the Statute of 
 Frauds, one of which was recited in the Act, 
 express words had been used for the purpose (a). 
 So, the repealed County Court Act of 1867, 30 & 31 
 Vict, c, 142, s. 11, which gave jurisdiction in 
 ejectment when the value of the tenement did 
 not exceed £20, was construed, as regards the 
 measure of value, by reference to the Parochial 
 Assessments Act, 1836, 6 & 7 WiU. IV. c. 96 (6). 
 That which was held a sufficient signature to a 
 will or contract under the Statute of Frauds (c) 
 was held for that reason sufficient under the 
 repealed Bankruptcy Act, 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, s. 
 131 (c?), under the Statute of Limitation (e), and 
 
 (a) Hyde v. Johnson (1836), 5 L. J. G. P. 291. For limitations 
 on the principle underlying this decision, see Whitley Partners, 
 In re Gallan (1886), 55 L. J. Oh. 540, 0. A. (Cotton L.J.). 
 
 (6) Be Elstone and Base, 38 h. J. Q. B. 6. See now County 
 Court Acts, 1888, s. 59, and 1908, s. 3, under which the value 
 has been raised to £100. 
 
 (c) Lemayne v. Stanley (1681), 3 Lev. 1 ; Streatley in the Goods 
 of (1891), 60 L. J. P. 56 ; EnigM v. Groehford, 5 E. E. 729 ; 
 Hubert v. Treherne, 60 E. E. 600 ; Ogilvie v. Foljamhe (1817), 17 
 E. E. 13. 
 
 (d) Kirhpatrich v. Tattersall (1845), li L. J. Ex. 209. 
 
 (e) Lobb V. Stanley, 5 Q. B. 574, per Patterson J. ; as to what 
 will constitute a valid authentication of a contract, see Caton v. 
 Caton (1867), L. E. 2 H. L., at p. 139. 
 
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70 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 under the repealed Parliamentary Voters' Eegistra- 
 tion Act, 1843 (a). 
 
 But where the Acts are not in pari materid, it is 
 fallacious to take the construction which has heen 
 put upon one as controlling the construction of 
 another (6). For instance, the meaning put on 
 the words " goods " in the reputed ownership clause 
 of the Bankruptcy Acts would be no guide to its 
 meaning in s. 17, Statute of Frauds, now s. 4, 
 Sale of Goods Act, 1893, not only because the 
 words associated with it are different, but because 
 the objects of the Act are wholly different (c). For 
 the same reason, the Parochial Assessments Act, 
 1836, 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 96, was held to throw but 
 little (if any) light on the meaning of " the clear 
 yearly value " of a tenement which qualified a 
 voter under the Eepresentation of the People Act, 
 
 (a) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 17 ; repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64, 
 s. 47, and Schedule VIII. ; Bennett v. Brumfitt, 37 L. J. 0. P. 25. 
 Comp. B. V. Cowper, 24 Q. B. D. 60, 533. 
 
 (6) Dewhurst v. Feilden, 66 E. E. 696, per Maule J. ; Eyre v. 
 Waller, 29 L. J. Ex. 247, per Wilde B. ; Gerard's Estate, Be 
 (1893), 63 L. J. Gh. 23 ; and see Stanford v. Boherts, [1901] 1 
 Oh. 440. 
 
 (c) HumUe v. MitcMl (1839), 52 E. E. 318 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 29, 
 and see Colonial Bank v. Whinney (1886), 11 A. 0. 426 ; 56 
 L. J. Ch. 43 ; for later cases under s. 4, see Morris v. Baron, 
 [1918] A. C. 1, H. L. (B) ; Meggeson v. Groves, [1917] 1 Ch. 158 ; 
 Parker v. Grisp, [1919] 1 K. B. 481 ; Thishell v. Camhi, [1919] 
 W. N. 195. 
 
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CONFINED TO ANALOGOUS ACTS. 71 
 
 1832(a). Because chambers are a "house" for 
 the purposes of assessment to a poor rate under 
 43 Eliz. c. 2 (b), of gaining a settlement under 
 6 Geo. IV. 0. 57(c), of qualifying for a vote under 
 the repealed Representation of the People Act, 
 1832 (d), and also as a place in which a burglary 
 might be committed (e), it did not foUow that 
 the same meaning was to be given to the expres- 
 sion in the House Tax Act, 1808, 48 Geo. III. 
 c. 55, repealed as to London, which imposed a 
 duty on " inhabited houses " (/). A bicycle, which 
 is a " carriage " within an enactment against furious 
 driving, would not necessarily be also a carriage 
 under a turnpike Act which imposed a toll on 
 carriages propelled by steam or other agency (g). 
 
 (a) 2 Will. IV. 0. 45, s. 27 (repealed but re-enacted with 
 modifications in 48 & 49 Vict. c. 3, s. 5) ; Cohill v. Wood (1846), 
 69 E. E. 473; 15 L. J. C. P. 160 j Dobhs v. Grand June. W. W. 
 (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 50. 
 
 (6) B. V. St. George's Union (1871), 41 L. J. M. 0. 30. Comp. 
 Be Hecqmrd, 24 Q. B. D. 71 ; Be Nordenfelt, 64 L. J. Q. B. 182. 
 
 (c) B. V. Ustoorth (1836), 5 A. & B. 261. 
 
 (d) Henrette v. Booth (1863), 33 L. J. C. P. 61, as to existing 
 law, see Eepresentation of the People Act, 1918. 
 
 (e) Evans and Fyneh's Case, Cro. Car. 473. 
 
 (/) A.-G. V. Westminster Chambers Assoc. (1876), 45 L. J. Ex. 
 886 ; Grant v. Langston (1899), 69 L. J. P. 0. 66. See also 
 B. V. Oxford (V.C), L. E. 7 Q. B. 471. 
 
 (g) Williams v. Ellis (1880), 49 L. J. M. C. 47. See also 
 Sim,pson v. Teignmouth Co. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 204, G. A. ; 
 Smith V. Kynnersley (1903), Id. 357. 
 
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72 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It may be added that in construing Acts of a 
 private or local character, such as Eailway Acts, 
 the Courts do not shut their eyes to the fact that 
 special clauses, frequently found embodied in them, 
 are in effect private arrangements between the 
 promoters and particular persons; and are not 
 inserted by the Legislature as part of a general 
 scheme of legislation, but are simply introduced at 
 the request of the parties concerned (a). If the 
 general provisions of such Acts were to override 
 such special clauses, those in whose favour the 
 latter are inserted would have a just claim to be 
 heard in Committee on every clause of the Act, 
 which would make it impossible to conduct any 
 private legislation (6). Such special clauses are 
 therefore treated as isolated, and foreign to the 
 rest of the Act; so that their wording, contrary 
 to the general rule, is not to be regarded as 
 throwing any light on the construction of it (c). 
 
 SECTION v. — THE TITLE — THE PREAMBLE — MARGINAL 
 NOTES SCHEDULE — ^RULES AND ORDERS. 
 
 Originally, bills in Parliament were mere peti- 
 tions to the King. They were entered on the rolls 
 
 (a) But see sup. pp. 53-54. 
 
 (6) Per Jessel M.E., Taylor v. Oldham (1877), 46 L. J. Oh. 
 105. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Caims, East London B. Co. v. Whitechurch 
 (1874), L. E. 7 H. L. 89. 
 
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THE TITLE. 73 
 
 of Parliament, with the King's answer; and at 
 the end of the session, the Judges drew up these 
 records into statutes to which they gave a title (a). 
 In the execution of their task, they occasionally 
 made additions, omissions, and alterations; but 
 the practice ceased in the reign of Henry VI., 
 when bills in the form of statutes without titles 
 were introduced (6). The title was first added 
 about the eleventh year of Henry VII. (c). In the 
 Lords the original title of a bill is amended at any 
 stage at which amendments are admissible, when 
 alterations in the body of the bill have rendered 
 any change in the title necessary; and in the 
 Commons since 1854 either in committee (cZ) or 
 report (e) or on the third reading stage of a bill (/). 
 This title is always on the roll (g). 
 
 (a) Co. Litt. 272a. And see Ilbert on Legislative Methods, p. 5. 
 (6) Per Lord Macclesfield se defendendo (1725), 16 St. Tr. 
 1389 ; May, Parlmy. Pr., 12th ed. chap. 15, p. 346. 
 
 (c) Barrington, Obs. Stat. 403. 
 
 (d) May, Parlmy. Pr., 12th ed. chap. 15, p. 376. 
 
 (e) Id., p. 382. 
 
 (/) May, Parlmy. Pr., 12th ed. chap. 15, p. 385, and see 
 Powell V. Kempton Park Bacecourse Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 242, at 
 p. 289 (0. A.). 
 
 {g) Per Jessel M.E., Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D. 511, at p. 513. 
 In order to facilitate citation a Short Titles Act was passed 
 in 1896, and according to modern practice the House of Lords 
 requires every Act of Parliament to have, for facility of 
 reference, a short title in addition to its formal long title, 
 Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, p. 272. 
 
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74 INTBEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 But although, the title of a statute was recog- 
 nised and attached to it by Parliament until quite 
 modern times, it was not considered a part of the 
 statute, and was therefore held to be excluded 
 from consideration in construing the statute 
 thus : — " The title cannot be resorted to," says 
 Lord Cottenham, "in construing the enact- 
 ment " (a). " The title, though it has occasionally 
 been referred to as aiding in the construction of an 
 Act, is certainly no part of the law," was laid 
 down by the Court of Exchequer, in a well-known 
 and considered judgment, " and, in strictness, 
 ought not to be taken into consideration at all " (6). 
 And Lord Denman remarked that the Court had 
 often laid that down (c). 
 
 The rule was not, indeed, invariably observed (cZ) ; 
 
 (a) Hunter v. NocJcolda, 84 E. R. 217. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., Salkeld v. Johnston, 84 E. E. 255, citing Lord 
 Coke, Powlter's Case, 11 Eep. 33b ; Lord Holt, Milk v. Wilkins, 
 6 Mod. 62; Lord Hardwicke, A.-O. v. Weymouth, Ambl. 22; 
 Lord Mansfield, JB. v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 95. See also Chance v. 
 Adams, 1 Lord Eaym.^77 ; and per Byles J., Shrewsbury v. Scott, 
 6 C. B. N. S. 1 ; per Lord St. Leonards, Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 
 H. L. Cas. 982 ; per Grove J., Morant v. Taylor, 1 Ex. D. 194 ; 
 per Willes J., Claydon v. Green, L. E. 3 C. P. 522 ; and the 
 American case, Madden v. The Collector, 5 Wallace, 110. 
 
 (c) B. V. Wilcock, 14 L. J. M. C. 104. 
 
 {d) See ex. gr. B. v. Wright, 1 A. & B, 446 ; Alexander v. 
 Newman, 69 R. E. 438 ; Taylor v. Newman, 32 L. J. M. C. 189 ; 
 Bawley v. Bawley, 45 L. J. Q. B. 675 ; Bentley v. Botherham, 46 
 L. J. Ch. 284 ; East & West India Bock v. Shaw, 39 Ch. D. 531 ; 
 
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THE TITLE. 75 
 
 for the mind, when labouring to discover the 
 design of the Legislature, naturally seized on 
 everything from which aid could be derived (a); 
 
 AND IT IS NOW SETTLED LAW THAT THE TITLE OP A 
 STATUTE IS AN IMPOBTANT PART OF THE ACT (6), and 
 
 may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining 
 its general scope (c), and of throwing light on its 
 construction {d), and this rule seems to apply alike 
 to the " long " and " short " title (e). 
 
 Apparently, however, the construction of a 
 statute is not limited by its title (/). 
 
 Formerly the bill was, at one of its stages, en- 
 grossed without punctuation on parchment (g) ; 
 
 per Selborne L.C., Middlesex Justices v. B., 9 App. Gas. 772 ; 
 Bryan v. Child, inf. p. 79. 
 
 (a) Per Cur., U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386 ; U. S. v. Palmer, 
 3 Wheat. 631. 
 
 (6) Per Lindley M.E., Fielding v. Morley Corporation, [1899] 
 
 1 Oh. 3 ; per Sutton J., Jones v. Shervington (1908), 77 L. J. K. B. 
 774 ; per Eomer L.J., in Amhler v. Bradford Corporation, [1902] 
 
 2 Ch. C. A., at p. 594. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Maonaghten, Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 447 ; 
 A.-G. V. Margate Pier Co., 69 L. J. Ch. 331 ; per Lord Alver- 
 stone C.J., London County Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co., 80 
 L. J. K. B. 144. 
 
 (d) Ilbert on Legislative Methods and Forms, p. 269. 
 
 (e) A.-G. V. Margate Pier Co. (1900), 69 L. J. Ch. 331. 
 
 (/) Gross in the goods of (1904), 73 L. J. P. 82 ; as to 
 headings of sections, Fletcher v. Birkenhead Corporation (1907), 
 76 L. J. K B. 218. 
 
 (g) 1 Bl. Com. (Ed. 1844) 183. 
 
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76 INTEEPRBTA.TION OF STATUTES. 
 
 but as neither the marginal notes nor the punctua- 
 ation appeared on the roll, they formed no parts of 
 the Act (a). This practice was discontinued in 
 1849, since which time a copy of each Act, printed 
 on veUum by the King's printer, is preserved in 
 the House of Lords and constitutes the official 
 record of statutes (6). Both marginal notes and 
 punctuation now appear on the rolls of Parlia- 
 ment ; nevertheless, it has been said they are 
 not to be taken as parts of the statute (c). But as 
 regards marginal notes, the rule as to their re- 
 jection for the purposes of interpretation is now 
 of imperfect obligation. For the purpose of 
 interpretation a marginal note was used by 
 Martin B. (d) and by Collins M.E. (e), which latter 
 
 (a) Barrington, Obs. on Stat. 394 ; see Barrow v. Wadkm, 24 
 Beav. 327 ; per Maule J., B. v. Oldham, 21 L. J. M. C. 134. 
 (6) May, Parlmy. P., 12th ed., chap. 15, p. 399. 
 
 (c) Per Willes J., and Bovill O.J., Claydon v. Green (1868), 
 L. E. 3 C. P. 521 ; per James L.J., A.-G. v. G. E. B. Co., 
 11 Ch. D. 465 ; per Jessel M.E., Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Oh. D. 513, 
 retracting his opinion in Be Venour, 2 Ch. D. 525; and per 
 Lord Esher M.E., Duke of Devonshire v. O'Connor, 24 Q. B. D. 
 478. 
 
 (d) Nicholson V. Fields, 31 L. J. Ex. 233. 
 
 (e) Bushell v. Hammond (1904), 73 L. J. K. B. 1005, and 
 Smith V. Portsmouth Justices, 75 L. J. K. B. 851. In s. 12 
 and 24, London Building Act, 1905 (5 Ed. VII. c. OCIX), 
 marginal notes in that Act are used as references, and see also 
 Woking Urban Council (Basingstoke Canal) Act, 1911, In re 
 (1914), 83 L. J. Ch. 201. 
 
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THE PREAMBLE. 77 
 
 learned Judge said in Bushell v. Hammond {inf.), 
 "the side-note, although, it forms no part of the 
 section, is of some assistance, inasmuch as it 
 shows the drift of the section." 
 
 As to headings prefixed to sections, see inf. 
 p. 92. 
 
 The indorsement by the Clerk of Parliaments 
 of the "date of the passing of the Act is part of it 
 since 1793 (a). 
 
 No iatroductory words are necessary to each 
 section (6). 
 
 The preamble of a statute has been said to be a 
 good means to find out its meaning, and, as it 
 were, a key to the understanding of it (c) ; and as 
 it usually states, or professes to state, the general 
 object and intention of the Legislature in passing 
 the enactment it may legitimately be consulted 
 for the purpose of solving any ambiguity, or of 
 fixing the meaning of words which may have more 
 than one, or of keeping the effect of the Act 
 within its real scope, whenever the enacting part 
 
 (o) 33 Geo. III. c. 13. 
 
 (&) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 8. 
 
 (c) "I very much regret that the practice of inserting pre- 
 ambles in Acts of Parliament has disappeared ; for the preamble 
 often helped to the solution of doubtful points " ; per Lord 
 Alverstone O.J., London County Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope 
 Co., 80 L. J. K. B. 144. 
 
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78 INTERPEBTATION OP STATUTES, 
 
 is in any of these respects open to doubt (a). 
 Thus s. 3, 26 Geo. III. o. 107 (b), empowered every 
 person who had served in the militia and was 
 married, to set up in trade in a corporate town, as 
 freely as soldiers might under an earlier enact- 
 ment, and declared that "no such militiaman" 
 should be removable from the town until he 
 became chargeable, — it being open to doubt 
 whether this expression included all married 
 militiamen, or only married militiamen who had 
 set up in trade in towns, the preamble of an 
 earlier Act fixed the latter as the true construc- 
 tion, as it was stated that the mischief to be 
 remedied was the state of the law which prevented 
 soldiers from setting up in trade in corporate 
 towns (c). So, as an Act which authorised aliens 
 who "shall have been resident" in the country 
 for two years, to hold land, might either be limited 
 
 (a) Bae. Ab. Stat. (I.) 2 ; Co. Litt. 79a, 4 Inst. 330, Plowd. 
 369; Halton v. Cove, 35 E. R. 373; per Lord Selbome, 
 Turquand v. Board of Trade, 11 App. Gas. 286 ; Sussex Peerage, 
 11 01. & F. 143, 144. But where the language used in the 
 schedule to an Act of Parliament varies from that of the 
 enacting clause to which it relates the language of the enacting 
 clause prevails, Jacobs v. Hart (1900), 2 F. (Just. Cases) 33, at 
 p. 37; Shore v. CunningTiam, [1917] 2 Ir. E. 360. For an 
 article on " The Ofi&ce of" a Preamble," see 55 Solicitors' 
 Journal, 340. 
 
 (6) Repealed 42 Geo. III. o. 90, s. 1. 
 
 (c) B. V. Gwenop (1789), 3 T. E. 133. 
 
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EXPLAINS WHAT IS DOUBTFUL. 79 
 
 to persons who had so resided before the passing 
 of the Act, or extend to those who should at any 
 time reside for the required time, the preamble 
 was resorted to in order to determine which of 
 the two meanings was the more agreeable to the 
 policy and object of the Act ; and as it recited 
 that aliens were prevented by law from holding 
 lands in the State, and it was the interest of the 
 State that such prohibitions should be done away 
 with, it showed that the former construction was 
 less adapted to give effect to the intention of the 
 Legislature than the latter (a). Sec. 137 of the 
 (repealed) Bankruptcy Act of 1849, which enacted 
 that a Judge's order to sign judgment, given by 
 a trader defendant, should be void if not filed, was 
 held limited to traders who became bankrupt, a 
 conclusion favoured by the heading prefixed to the 
 section which professed to enact it "with respect 
 to transactions with the bankrupt " (b). A wider 
 construction, it may be added, would have had the 
 unjust effect of enabling the trader who had not 
 become bankrupt to set aside as void his own 
 deliberate act, an intention not to be imputed 
 to the Legislature, if the language admits of any 
 other meaning (c). Sec. 18, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, 
 
 (a) Beard v. Bowan (1835), 9 Peters, 301. Ad American 
 case on an American statute. 
 
 (6) Brym v. Child, 82 E. E. 710. See 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, 
 for existing law. 
 
 (c) See Chap. VIII, Sec. III. 
 
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80 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 which enacted that " any order " of Quarter Ses- 
 sion might be removed to the Queen's Bench for 
 enforcement, was similarly confined to orders in 
 appeal cases, by the preamble, which, in reciting 
 that it was expedient that the law should be made 
 uniform in cases of appeal, showed the limited 
 scope of the Act (a). Under a statute which 
 enacted that when a person came into the occupa- 
 tion of premises for which the preceding tenant 
 was rated to the poor, the old and new occupants 
 should be liable to the rate iu proportion to the 
 time of their occupation, the question arose 
 whether either, and if so, which of them, was to 
 pay for the interval between the removal and the 
 beginning of the second occupation ; and this was 
 determined by the preamble, which, by reciting 
 that in consequence of rated occupiers removing 
 without paying their rates, and other persons 
 entering and occupying the premises for a part 
 of the year, great sums were lost to the parish, 
 showed that the object of the Act was not to 
 make an equitable adjustment between the two 
 occupiers, but to protect the parish from loss ; it 
 was therefore held that the rates were payable 
 for the interval between the two occupations, and 
 that the burden fell on the outgoing tenant, who 
 
 (a) B. V. Bateman, 27 L. J. M. C. 95. The section quoted 
 on p. 79 does not apply to an order of quarter sessions to abate 
 a nvdsance. 
 
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EXPLAINS WHAT IS DOUBTFUL. 81 
 
 was formerly liable under the Act of Elizabeth for 
 the whole rate (a). An Act which made it penal 
 for a publican to allow bad characters to " assemble 
 and meet together " in his house, would not be 
 broken by his permitting such persons to enter for 
 taking refreshment, and remaining there as long 
 as was reasonably necessary for that purpose; 
 if the preamble showed that the object in view 
 was the repression of disorderly conduct, not the 
 absolute denial of all hospitality to persons of bad 
 character (b). Under the repealed Act, 23 G-eo. II. 
 c. 6, which recited in the preamble a doubt as to 
 who were legal witnesses to a will of land, and 
 enacted that legatees and devisees who attested 
 " any will " should be good witnesses, but that the 
 bequests and devises to them should be void, the 
 enacting part was limited by the preamble to wills 
 of land. Wills of personality, at that time, needed 
 no attestation ; and the principle of cessante ratione 
 
 (a) 17 Geo. II. e. 38, s. 12; Edwards v. Busholme, L. E. 
 4 Q. B. 554; 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 12, was replaced by 32 & 33 
 Vict. c. 41, s. 16, on which see Overseers of St. Werhurgh v. 
 Hutchinson, 49 L. J. M. 0. 23 ; 32 & 33 Vict. e. 41, s. 16, is 
 further amended ; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 20, s. 3. 
 
 (6) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 27, s. 32, repealed in part by 35 & 36 
 Vict. c. 94, s. 75 ; Greig v. Bendeno (1858), 27 L. J. M. 0. 294. 
 See Belasco v. Hannant, 31 L. J. M. C. 225. Gomp. s. 14, 35 & 36 
 Vict. c. 94. In order to justify a conviction under this latter 
 Act affirmative evidence must in every case be given by the 
 prosecution, Miller v. Dudley J J. (1898), 46 W. E. 606. 
 
 LS. 6 
 
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82 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 cessat lex, as well as the injustice of depriving 
 persons of property, making it reasonably doubtful 
 whether the Legislature had used the expression 
 " any will "in its full and unrestricted meaning, 
 the preamble was legitimately invoked to determine 
 the scope of the enactment (a). 
 
 But the preamble cannot either restrict or extend 
 the enacting part, when the language and the 
 object and scope of the Act are not open to 
 doubt (b). It is not unusual to find that the 
 enacting part is not exactly co-extensive with the 
 preamble. In many Acts of Parliament, although 
 a particular mischief is recited, the legislative 
 provisions extend beyond it. The preamble is 
 often no more than a recital of some of the incon- 
 veniences, and does not exclude any others for 
 which |a remedy is given by the statute (c). The 
 evil recited is but the motive for legislation ; the 
 remedy may both consistently and wisely be 
 
 (a) Emmanuel v. Constable, 3 Euss. 436, overruling Lees v. 
 Summersgill, 17 Ves. 508 ; Brett v. Brett, 3 Addams, 219. See 
 also Weihered v. Galcutt, 61 E. E. 606 ; Garr v. Boyal Exchange 
 Ass. Co., 33 L. J. Q. B. 63; Be Masters, 33 L. J. Q. B. 146. 
 
 (h) 4 Inst. 330; per Lord Mansfield, Pattison v. Bankes 
 (1777), Oowp. 543, and Perkins v. Sewell (1766), 1 W. Bl. 659; 
 Copland v. Bavies (1872), L. E. 5 H. L. 358; Bentley v. 
 Botherham (1876), 46 L. J. Oh. 284. 
 
 (c) Per Fortescue J., B. v. Athos (1723), 8 Mod. 144. 
 
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EXPLAINS WHAT IS DOUBtFtL. ^3 
 
 extended beyond the cure of that evil (a) ; and if 
 on a review of the whole Act a wider intention 
 than that expressed in the preamble appears to be 
 the real one, effect is to be given to it notwith- 
 standing the less extensive import of the pre- 
 amble (b). And generally, although in cases where 
 the meaning of words used in a statute is 
 absolutely clear the Court has no right to go 
 beyond them, when the words are capable of one 
 meaning, and at the same time of a more extended 
 meaning, the Court will look to the object and 
 policy of the Act to see what meaning they ought 
 to have (c). Thus, 4 & 5 Ph. cS; M. c. 8 (d), made 
 the abduction of all girls under sixteen penal, 
 though the preamble referred only to heiresses 
 and other girls with fortunes (e). So, 13 Eliz. 
 c. 10, which makes void all leases, gifts, grants 
 and conveyances of estates, made by any dean and 
 chapter or master of a hospital, of an heredita- 
 ments, parcel of the possessions of the cathedral 
 church or hospital, except for the limited term 
 
 (a) Per Lord Denman, Fellowes v. Clay (1843), 4 Q. B. 349. 
 (6) Per Lord Tenterden, Doe v. Brandling (1828), 7 B & C. 
 660. See also Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wms. 320. 
 
 (c) Beigate Bural Council v. Sutton District Water Co. (1908), 
 99 L. T. 168. 
 
 (d) Eepealed as to England, 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, s. 1, which see 
 as to India, 9 Geo. IV. o. 74, s. 125. 
 
 (e) Co. Litt. 88b, n. 14. 
 
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84 iNTEEPEETATlON OF STATUTES. 
 
 allowed by the Act, was not narrowed or controlled 
 by a preamble which recited only that divers 
 ecclesiastical persons endowed of ancient palaces, 
 mansions, and buildings belonging to their bene- 
 fices, not only suffered them to go to decay, but" 
 converted the materials to their own benefit, 
 and conveyed away their goods and chattels to 
 defeat their successors' claims for dilapidations (a). 
 5 Geo. IV. c. 84, s 26, which, after reciting that 
 transported felons in New South Wales, after 
 obtaining remissions, sometimes "by their industry 
 acquired property, in the enjoyment whereof it 
 was expedient to protect them," enacted that 
 every felon who received such remission should 
 be entitled to sue for the recovery of any property, 
 real or personal, acquired since his conviction, — 
 was held not limited by the preamble to property 
 acquired by his own exertions, but applied to all 
 property howsoever acquired, as for instance by 
 inheritance (b). It has been more than once 
 decided that the preamble of the stUl unrepealed 
 37 Geo. III. c. 123, which refers only to the 
 mischiefs consequent on inciting men to sedition 
 and mutiny, and on administering to them oaths 
 with this object, did not restrict the enacting part 
 
 (a) York V. Middlehorough (1828), 31 E. E. 566 ; 2 Y. & J. 
 196. 
 
 (6) Gough V. Davies, 25 L. J. Oh. 677, and see Fleming v. 
 Smith (1861), 12 Jr. G. L. E. 404. 
 
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DOES NOT AFFECT WHAT IS PLAIN. 85 
 
 of the statute, which made it felony to administer 
 oaths not only with a view to mutinous or sedi- 
 tious purposes, but also with a view to disturb 
 the peace, or to be a member of any association 
 for a;ny such purpose, or not to reveal any unlawful 
 combination or illegal act ; but that the latter 
 words included offences foreign to politics and 
 military discipline, such as the administration of 
 oaths to poachers not to betray their companions, 
 and to workmen similarly binding them to secrecy 
 as members of an association for raising wages by 
 a strike, or for not working under certain prices (a). 
 So the preamble of 14 Geo, III. c. 78, which 
 declared that an earlier Act for the regulation 
 of buildings and the prevention of fire in the cities 
 of London and Westminster had been found in- 
 efficacious, and that it would tend to the safety 
 of the inhabitants of those cities if other regula- 
 tions w«re established, was not suffered to restrict 
 to the metropolis s. 83 of that Act, which enacted 
 in general terms that in order to deter persons 
 from wilfully setting fire to their houses, with a 
 view to gain to themselves the insurance money, 
 the directors of insurance offices should, in 
 
 (a) B. V. Brodribb (1816), 6 C. & P. 571 ; B. v. Marls, 
 6 E. E. 577 ; B. v. Loveless, 40 E. E. 825 ; B. v. Ball, 40 E. E. 
 819, and comp. Smith v. Moody (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 43 ; a 
 case decided under s. 7 of the Conspiracy & Protection of 
 Property Act, 1875. 
 
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86 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 suspicious cases, lay out the insurance money in 
 reinstating the damaged buildings (a). This con- 
 struction, however, was further justified by the 
 circumstance that the section in question was a 
 re-enactment of a similar provision in the earlier 
 and repealed Act, with the significant omission of 
 the words "within the limits aforesaid," which 
 words remained in most of the other sections of 
 the later Act (6), Sec. 11, 21 Jac. I. c. 19(c), 
 which empowered bankruptcy commissioners to 
 dispose of goods which were in the possession 
 of the bankrupt, as reputed owner, with the real 
 owner's consent, was prefaced by a preamble which 
 recited the mischiefs of bankrupts " secretly con- 
 veying" their goods to other persons, and yet 
 remaining in the reputed ownership of them ; but 
 the enactment was not confined to this particular 
 form of the mischief (d). 
 
 3 Jac. I. c. 10 (e), which, after reciting that the 
 King's subjects were charged with conveying 
 
 (a) Exp. Gorely, 34 L. J. Bank. 1, per Lord Westbury. See 
 also Owen v. Burnett, 2 Cr. & M. 353. The application of 
 14 Geo. III. c. 78, s. 83 to Scotland has been doubted, see 
 Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Go. (1888), 
 13 A. C. 699. 
 
 (6) As to the construction of s. 86, see Musgrove v. Pandelis, 
 [1919] 2 K. B. 43, 0. A. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, s. 1. 
 
 (d) Mace V. Cadell (1774), Cowp. 232. 
 
 (e) Eepealed by 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 58, s. 44 and Sched. IV. 
 
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DOES NOT AFFECT WHAT IS PLAIN. 87 
 
 "felons and other malefactors and offenders 
 against the law" to jail, punishable by imprison- 
 ment there, enacted that " every person " com- 
 mitted to the county jail by a justice "for any 
 offence or misdemeanor," should bear his own 
 charges of conveyance, if he had property, and 
 that if he had not, they should be borne by the 
 parish where he was apprehended, was held not to 
 be confined by the preamble to offenders against 
 the ordinary law, but to apply to deserters from 
 the army (a). So, the preamble of 22 Geo. III. 
 c. 75(6), which recited the mischief of granting 
 colonial offices to persons who remained in England, 
 and discharged the duties of their offices by deputy, 
 was not suffered to exclude judicial offices from 
 the general enacting part, 'which authorised the 
 Governor and Council to remove "any" office- 
 holder for misconduct ; although the mention of 
 delegation in the preamble showed that the judicial 
 office was not there in contemplation (c). 
 
 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 100 {d), which after reciting 
 that the expense and inconvenience of suits for 
 the recovery of tithes ought to be prevented by 
 
 (a) B. V. Pierce (1814), 15 E. E. 410 ; 3 M. & S. 62. 
 
 (6) Commonly attributed to Burke, but really an Act of Lord 
 Shelburne's; see Shelb. Life, Vol. III. p. 337. Act amended 
 by 57 & 58 Vict. c. 17, s. 1. 
 
 (c) Willis V. Oippa (1846), 5 Moo. P. 0. 379 ; see also Cloete v. 
 The Queen (1854), 8 Moo. P. C. 484. 
 
 (d) Eepealed as a publio Act by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49, g. 4. 
 
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88 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES, 
 
 shortening the time required for the valid establish- 
 ment of claims to exemption from tithes, enacted 
 that when a claim to tithes was made by a layman, 
 a claim to exemption should be deemed conclu- 
 sively estabhshed by proof of non-payment for 
 sixty years, gave rise to a celebrated legal con- 
 troversy, in which the effect of the preamble was 
 much considered. Before the passing of that Act, 
 no layman could establish exemption from tithes, 
 except by proving that the land in respect of 
 which they were claimed had formerly belonged 
 to one of the great monasteries, and had been 
 exempt in its hands ; the latter proposition being 
 usually established by such evidence of non- 
 payment in modern times as sufficed for founding 
 the inference of exemption. It was held by some 
 of the Judges (a), that the enactment was confined 
 to claims of this kind ; and the preamble was in- 
 voked in support of this view. But it was con- 
 sidered by others (6), and finally decided (c), that 
 the Act applied to all cases whatsoever ; and that 
 upon proof of non-payment for sixty years the 
 landowner was exempt, whether the land had ever 
 been monastic or not. The enactment was free 
 
 (o) Wigram V.-C, Tindal C.J., Oresswell, Patteson, and 
 Coleridge JJ. 
 
 (6) Lord Denman, Williams, Coltman, Erie JJ., Pollock C.B., 
 Parke, Alderson, and Piatt BB. 
 
 (c) By Lord Cottenham. 
 
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PREAMBLE MAY RESTEIOT THE ENACTMENT. 89 
 
 from ambiguity, and contained no flexible ex- 
 pression capable of different meanings (a) ; wMle 
 the preamble, which one side understood as mean- 
 ing that the expense and inconvenience of the 
 same kind of suits as before ought to be prevented, 
 was thought on the other to mean that expensive 
 and inconvenient suits ought to be prevented in all 
 cases; and that this was best effected by giving 
 the more easy method of establishing exemptions 
 by simple proof of non-payment for a certain 
 time (6). 
 
 Where the preamble is found more extensive 
 than the enacting part, it is equally inefficacious 
 to control the effect of the latter, when otherwise 
 free from doubt. For instance, 3 W. & M. o. 14, 
 s. 3 (c), which gave creditors an action of " debt " 
 against the devisees of their debtor, was held not 
 to authorise an action for a breach of covenant, 
 or for the recovery of money not strictly a 
 " debt " {d); though the preamble recited that it 
 was not just that by the contrivance of debtors 
 their creditors should be defrauded of their debts, 
 
 (a) Per Lord Cottenham, Salkeld v. Johnston (1849), 1 
 Mae. & G. 264 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 493. 
 
 (6) See Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Mac. & G. 242 ; Fellowes v. Clay 
 (1843), 12 L. J. Q. B. 202 ; 4 Q. B. 313 ; and see S. C. (1848), 
 18 L. J. Ex. 89 ; and see upon the general question Cfeojpe v. 
 Cresswell (1866), L. E. 2 Ch. 112, at p. 118. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 1 Will. IV. c. 47, s. 3. 
 
 (d) Wilson V. Knvhley (1806), 7 East, 128. 
 
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90 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 but that it had often happened that after binding 
 themselves by bonds " and other specialities " they 
 devised away their property. The mention, it was 
 observed, of the action of debt in the enacting 
 part was almost an express exclusion of every 
 other (a). An Act which made it penal to dye 
 seeds so as to give them the appearance of seeds 
 of '" another kind," could not be extended to 
 similar manipulations of old or inferior seeds, to 
 make them appear as new of the same species, by 
 a recital that the practice of adulterating seeds in 
 fraud of the Queen's subjects and the detriment 
 of agriculture required repression (b). An^ Act 
 which required the trustees of a turnpike trust to 
 apply the monies which they received, first, in 
 paying "any interest which might from time to 
 time be owing," next, in keeping the road in 
 repair, and finally, in paying off the principal 
 sums due by the trust, was held not to authorise 
 the payment of arrears of interest ; although this 
 enactment was prefaced by a preamble which 
 recited that arrears of interest as well as principal 
 sums were due by the trust, and could not be paid 
 off unless further powers were granted (c). Such 
 
 (a) Per Lord Ellenborongh, 7 East, 135. 
 
 (6) Francis v. Maas (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 83 ; 41 & 42 
 Viet, c 17, was passed to overcome the difficulties experienced 
 in this case. 
 
 (c) Marhet Earhorough v. Kettering {181 B), 42 L. J. M. C. 137 ; 
 
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PREAMBLE MAY RESTRICT THE ENACTMENT. 91 
 
 an extension of the Act would have required very 
 clear words, since it would have had the effect of 
 throwing on the ratepayers of one year a burden 
 properly belonging to those of another (a). 
 
 It has been sometimes said that the preamble 
 may extend, but cannot restrain the enacting part 
 of a statute {b). But it would seem difficult to 
 support this proposition (c). Several of the cases 
 above cited might be referred to as instances of a 
 restricted meaning having been judicially given to 
 an enactment by its preamble (d). It could hardly 
 be doubted that a statute which, in general terms, 
 made it felony to alter a bill of exchange, would 
 
 but see Burton Turnpike Trustees v. Wincanton Highway Board, 
 39 L. J. M. C. 155. 
 
 (a) See Chap. X, Sec. II. 
 
 (6) B. V. Athos (1723), 8 Mod. 144; Copeman v. Gallant, 
 1 P. -Wms. 320 ; per Lord Abinger, Walker v. Bichardson (1837), 
 46 E. E. 782 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 229 ; per Willes J., Haymanv. Flewker, 
 32 L. J. 0. P. 132; per Turner L.J., Drummond v. Brummond 
 (1866), L. E. 2 Oh. 44 ; per Growder J., Kearns v. Cordwainers' 
 Co., 6 C. B. N. S. 388. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. per Parker C.B. aud Lord Hardwicke, Byall v. 
 Bolle, 1 Atk, 174, 182. See also ^er Lord Blackburn, West Ham 
 Overseers v. lies (1883), 8 App. Gas. 386, at p. 388. 
 
 {d) B. V. Gwenop (1789), 3 T. E. 133 ; SaJkeld v. Johnston, 
 sup. pp. 74, 89. See also per Gur., B. v. Manchester (1857), 
 26 L. J. M. C. 65 ; Hughes v. Chester B. Co., 31 L. J. Gh. 97. 
 See also Lancashire Brick &c. Co. and Lancashire & Yorkshire 
 By. Co., [1902] 1 K. B. 651, G. A. 
 
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92 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 be restrained to fraudulent alterations, by a 
 preamble -which recited that it was desirable to 
 suppress cheats and frauds effected by altering 
 bills (a). The function of the preamble is to 
 explain what is ambiguous in the enactment (&), 
 and it may either restrain or extend it as best 
 suits the intention. 
 
 But it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot 
 be made use of to control the enactments them- 
 selves when they are expressed in clear and un- 
 ambiguous terms (c). 
 
 The headings prefixed to sections or sets of 
 sections in some modem statutes are regarded as 
 preambles to those sections (d). 
 
 {a)'B. V. Bigg (1717), 3 P. Wms. 434, arg. For a resume of 
 cases on this point, see Archbold's Criminal Pleading, 25th ed., 
 at pp. 772, 773. 
 
 (6) The People v. Utica Insur. Co., 15 Johns. N. Y. Eep. 389. 
 See also Coosmo Mining Go. v. South Carolina (1891), 144 U. S. 
 550, at p. 563. 
 
 (c) Powell V. Kempton Parle Bacecourse Co., [1899] A. 0. 143, 
 at p. 185 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392. 
 
 (d) See ex. gr. Brya/n, v. ChUd (1850), 82 K. E. 710; 19 
 L. J. Ex. 264; Shrewsbury v. Beazley, 34 L. J. C. P. 328; 
 Eastern Counties B. Co. v. Marriage, 9 H. L. Cas. 41 ; Latham v. 
 Lafone, 36 L. J. Ex. 97 ; Hammersmith By. Co. v. Brand, 
 L. E. 4 H. L. 171 ; Lang v. Kerr, 3 App. Cas. 636 ; Bayson v. 
 South London Tramways Co., [1893] 2 Q. B. 304 ; per Brett L.J., 
 B. V. Local Govt. Bd., 10 Q. B. D. 321 ; per -BuoMey L.J., 
 West V. Gwynne, 80 L. J. Ch. 587, 588. Gomp. Broadbent v. 
 Imperial Gas. Co., 26 L. J. Cb. 276 ; per Farwell L.J., Fletcher v. 
 
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A FUNDAMENTAL PKINOIPLE. 93 
 
 Rules made under an Act which prescribes that 
 they shall be laid before Parliament for a prescribed 
 number of days, during which period they may be 
 annulled by a resolution of either House, but that 
 if not so annulled they are to be of the same effect 
 as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially 
 noticed, must be treated for all purposes of con- 
 struction or obligation or otherwise, exactly as if 
 they were in the Act. If there is a conflict 
 between one of these rules and a section of the 
 Act, it must be dealt with in the same spirit as a 
 conflict between two actions of the Act should be 
 dealt with. If reconciliation is impossible, the 
 subordinate provision must give way, and probably 
 the rule would be treated as subordinate to the 
 section (a). 
 
 In a word, then, it is to be taken as a funda- 
 mental principle, standing, as it were, at the 
 threshold of the whole subject of interpretation, 
 that the plain intention of the Legislature, as 
 expressed by the language employed, is invariably 
 to be accepted and carried into effect, whatever 
 may be the opinion of the judicial interpreter of 
 
 Birkenhead Corporation, [1907] 1 K. B., at p. 218 ; Union S.S. Co. 
 of New Zealand v. Melbourne Commissioners (1884), 53 L. J. P. C. 
 59 ; 9 App. Gas. 365. As to Marginal Notes, see sup. p. 76. 
 
 (a) Per Lord Herschell L.O., Institute of Patent Agents v. 
 Lockmod, [1894] A. C, at p. 360. 
 
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94 INTBRPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 its wisdom or justice. If the language admits of 
 no doubt or secondary meaning, it is simply to be 
 obeyed. If it admits of more than one construc- 
 tion, the true meaning is to be sought, not on the 
 wide sea of surmise and speculation, but "from 
 such conjectures as are drawn from the words 
 alone, or something contained in them " (a); that 
 is, from the context viewed by such light as its 
 history may throw upon it, and construed with 
 the help of certain general principles, and under 
 the influence of certain presumptions as to what 
 the Legislature does or does not generally intend. 
 But the language of a statute must not be strained 
 in order to make it apply to a case to which it 
 does not legitimately, in its terms, apply, on 
 account of the supposed intention of the Legis- 
 lature and the theory that that supposed intention 
 can only be effectually carried out by giving to 
 the words a meaning which they do not naturally 
 bear (6). 
 
 (o) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 2, note by Barbeyrac ; Beigate 
 Btiral Council v. Sutton District Water Go. (1908), 99 L. T. 168. 
 
 (6) Per Lord HerscheU, Kent G. G. v. Gerard, [1897] A. C. 
 639; and see Macheth v. Chislett, [1910] A. C. 220; 79 
 L. J. K. B. 376. 
 
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CHAPTEE II. 
 
 SECTION I. — WORDS UNDERSTOOD ACCORDING TO THE 
 SUBJECT MATTER. 
 
 The words of a statute, when there is a doubt 
 about their meaning, are to be understood in the 
 sense in which they best harmonise with the 
 subject of the enactment and the object which 
 the Legislature has in view (a). Their meaning is 
 found n(}t so much in a strictly grammatical or 
 etymological propriety of language, nor even in its 
 popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion 
 on which they are used, and the object to be 
 attained (6). It is not because the words of a 
 statute, or the words of any document, read in one 
 sense will cover the case, that that is the right 
 sense. Grammatically they may cover it; but 
 whenever a statute or document is to be construed, 
 it must be construed not according to the mere 
 ordinary general meaning of the words, but accord- 
 ing to the ordinary meaning of the words as 
 applied to the subject matter with regard to which 
 
 (a) Sup. pp. 39, 40. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., JB. v. Eall (1822), 1 B. & C. 136 ; Grot, de 
 B. & P. b. 2, s. 16 ; Puff L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 3. 
 
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96 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 they are used, unless there is something which 
 renders it necessary to read them in a sense 
 which is not their ordinary sense in the English 
 language as so applied (a). This is evident enough 
 in the simple case of a word which has two totally 
 different meanings. The Act of Ed. III., for 
 instance, which forbade ecclesiastics to purchase 
 "provisions" at Eome would be construed as 
 referring to those papal grants of benefices in 
 England which were called by that name, and not 
 to food ; when it was seen that the object of the 
 Act was not to prevent ecclesiastics from living in 
 Eome, but to repress papal usurpations (&). The 
 " vagabond " of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. IV- 
 c. 83, is not necessarily the mere wanderer of 
 strict etymology (c). Nor is a person making a 
 bond fide collection in the street for a charitable 
 object a beggar within the mischief of s. 3 of the 
 Vagrancy Act{d). No one is likely to confound 
 the "piracy" of the high seas with the "piracy" 
 of copyright ; or to give, in one branch of the law, 
 the meaning which would belong, in another, to 
 
 (a) Per Brett M.E., Lion Insurance Go. v. Tucker (1883), 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 189. 
 
 (6) 1 Bl. Comm. (Ed. 1770) 60 ; Statutes of Provisors or 
 Praemunire passed in 1350, 1353, 1364, 1390, and 1401. 
 
 (c) Moncl V. Hilton (1877), 46 L. J. M. C. 163; and see 
 Rex V. Diehinson, [1917] 2 K. B. 393. 
 
 {d) Mathers v. Penfold, [1915] 1 K. B. 514. 
 
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SUBJECT MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED. 97 
 
 a host of familiar words, such as " accept," 
 " assure," " issue," " settlement." In the Succes- 
 sion Duty Act, 1853, which provided that the 
 instalments of duty payable by a successor should 
 cease at his death, except when he was " compe- 
 tent to dispose by will of a continuing interest in 
 the property," the competency intended was 
 obviously not mental sanity or freedom from 
 personal incapacity, but the possession of an 
 estate of inheritance which was capable of disposi- 
 tion by will (a). The Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847, 
 did not, by calling the debt due for gas "rent," 
 authorise a distress for the debt under the repealed 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which regulated the power 
 of distress of a landlord " or other person to whom 
 ' rent ' is due " by the bankrupt (6). The Mutiny 
 
 (a) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 21, amended by 51 & 52 Viot. c. 8, 
 ss. 21, 22 ; A.-G. v. Eallett (1857), 27 L. J. Ex. 89. As to a 
 judgment being " final," Bidsdale v. Clifton, 2 P. D. 276 ; Exj). 
 Moore, 14 Q. B. D. 627 ; Exp. Grimwade, 17 Q. B. D. 357 ; Be 
 Henderson, 20 Q. B. D. 509; Onslow v. Inl. Bev. (1890), 59 
 L. J, Q. B. 556 ; Salaman v. Warner (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 624 ; 
 Be Alexander,' [1892] 1 Q. B. 216; Be Binstead (1892), 62 
 L. J. Q. B. 207 ; Be a Bankruptcy Notice, [1895] 1 Q. B. 609. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 34 ; Sill, Exp., 6 Cb. D. 63. See 
 Sarrison, Exp., 13 Q. B. D. 753 ; Peake, Be, 53 L. J. Cb. 977. 
 As to " tolls " in Eailway Acts, see cases collected in judgment 
 of Field J., Broim v. G. W. B. Co., 9 Q. B, D. 750; see also 
 North Central Wagon Co. v. Manchester, 8. 8f L. B. Co., 55 
 L. J. Cb. 780, 56 Id. 609, 58 Id. 219. As to water " rate," see 
 
 I.S. 7 
 
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98 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Acts whioli exempt soldiers from the payment of 
 tolls over " bridges " would not carry the exemp- 
 tion to a steata ferry boat, because it is called a 
 'floating bridge (a). The enactment which pro- 
 hibited parish officials from being concerned in 
 contracts for supplying goods, materials or pro- 
 visions "for the use of the workhouse," meant 
 " for the use of the persons in the workhouse," 
 and therefore did not apply to a contract for the 
 supply of materials for the repair of the buUd- 
 ing'(6). This is too plain to need further illustra- 
 tion. 
 
 In dealing with matters relating to the general 
 public, statutes are presumed to use words in their 
 popular sense; uti loquitur vulgits(e). But when 
 dealing with particular businesses or transactions, 
 words are presumed to be used with the particular 
 meaning in which they are used and understood 
 in the particular business in question (cZ) ; that 
 
 Badcoch v. Hunt (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 145 ; Floyd v. Lyons (1897), 
 66 L. J. Ch. 350 ; Haslett v. Sharman, [1901] 2 I. E. 433, 439. 
 
 (o) Ward V. Gray (1865), 34 L. J. M. 0. 146. 
 
 (6) 55 Geo. III. c. 137, s. 6 ; repealed in part as to s. 6 by 
 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 440 ; Barher v. Waite, 1 A. & B. 514 ; 
 Comp. 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 77, cited inf. p. 298. 
 
 (c) The Fusilier, 34 L. J. P. M. & A. 27, per Dr. Lushington. 
 See ex. gr. Pitts v. Millar, L. E. 9 Q. B. 380. 
 
 [d) Per Lord Esher M.E., Unwin v. Hanson, [1891] 2 Q. B. 
 119 and The Dunelm, 9 P. D. 171; Grot. b. 2, c. 16, s. 3; 
 Vattel, b. 2, s. 276 ; Evans v. Stevens, 4 T. E. 462, per Lord 
 Kenyon ; Morrall v. Sutton (1844), 65 E. E. 434 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 
 
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WORDS CONSTRUED IN POPULAR SENSE. 99 
 
 meaning being rejected, however, as soon as the 
 judicial mind is satisfied that another is more 
 agreeable to the object and intention (a). Thus, 
 38 Greo. III. c. 5 and c. 60, which exempted 
 " hospitals " from the land tax, was construed as 
 applying to all establishments popularly known by 
 that designation, and even as extending to an 
 asylum for orphans (b) ; when it appeared more 
 consonant to the object of the Act to give it that 
 wider meaning, than to restrict it to what are 
 alone "hospitals" in the strict legal sense of the 
 term, that is, eleemosynary institutions in which 
 the persons benefited form a corporate body (c). 
 
 266 ; Doe v. Jesson, 21 E. E. 1 ; Doe v. Harveif, 4 B. & 0. 610 ; 
 Abbott V. Middleton, 7 H. L. Gas. 68 ; The Pacific, 33 L. J. P. M. 
 & A. 120. See per James L. J., Boucicault v. Ghatterton, 5 Ch. D. 
 275 ; Spackman, Be, 24 Q. B. D. 728 ; Hughes, Be, [1893] 1 
 Q. B. 595 ; Baifner v. Bayner (1903), 73 L. J. Oh. 114; [1904] 
 1 Ch. 176, note, p. 191. 
 
 (a) Per Lord Wensleydale, Baddy v. Fitzgerald (1858), 6 H. L. 
 Cas. 877. See also Pelham Clinton v. Newcastle, Duke of (1901), 
 71 L. J. Ch. 53, C. A. ; affirmed (1902), 72 L. J. Ch. 424 ; Towns 
 V. Wentworth (1858), 11 Moore P. 0. 643. 
 
 (6) Colchester v. Kewney, 36 L. J. Ex. 172. See B. v. Man- 
 chester, 4 B. & Aid. 504. For a similar construction of " Alms- 
 house," see Mary Clark Home v. Anderson, [1904] 2 K. B. 645 ; 
 73 L. J. K. B. 806. 
 
 (c) Sutton's Case, 10 Eep. 31a. As to what is an " hospital " 
 within s. 1, Poor Eemoval Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), see 
 Ormskirk Union v. Chorlton Union (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 721 ; 
 Ormskirk Union v. Lancaster Union, 107 L. T. 620. 
 
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100 INTBEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 So the power given in the Highway Act, 1835, to 
 a surveyor to " lop " trees growing near a highway, 
 was construed in the popular sense as confined to 
 cutting off lateral branches, and not extending to 
 " topping " (a). An Act which privileged a bank- 
 rupt fi;om arrest for "debt" was, on the same 
 principle, extended to arrests for non-payment of 
 money ordered to be paid by an order of the 
 Court of Chancery, or by a rale of a Common 
 Law Court, though technically not constituting a 
 debt (b) ; and the provision of the repealed s. 18 (8), 
 
 (a) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, s. 65 ; Urwin v. Hanson, [1891] 2 
 Q. B. 115 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 531. As to what will justify removal 
 of a fence under 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, s. 69, see Evans v. Oakley, 
 1 Car. & K. 125, As to when the occupier of land is under no 
 obligation to the public for an obstruction, see Hudson v. Bray, 
 [1917] 1 K. B. 520. 
 
 (6) By s. 7 of 4 A 5 Geo. V. c. 59 (The Bankruptcy Act, 
 1914), protection is given to the property and person of a debtor 
 subsequently to the making of a receiving order. The following 
 cases are illustrative of protection afforded under repealed 
 Acts in cases where the liability was not technically a debt : 
 M' Williams, Exp. (1803), 1 Sch. & Lef. 169, attachment for 
 contempt; B. v. Edwards (1829), 9 B, & G. 652, attachment 
 under rule of Court ; B. v. Dunne (1813), 2 M. & S. 201, attach- 
 ment for non-payment of Master's award; Lees v. Newton 
 (1866), 35 L. J. C, P. 285, attachment out of Chancery. Oomp. 
 Bancroft v. Mitchell (1867), L. E. 9 Q. B. 549, no privilege under 
 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 7 ; Drover v. Beyer (1879), 13 Ch. D, 242, refusal 
 to grant writ of ne exeat regno ; Patterson v. Patterson (1870), 
 L. E. 2 P. & D. 189, bankruptcy of co-respondent ; Bates v. 
 
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WORDS CONSTRUED IN POPULAR SENSE. 101 
 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which made a composition 
 binding on creditors as regards any " debts " due 
 to them from the debtor and provable in bankruptcy, 
 was held to apply to any contingent liabilities 
 which would be released by an order of dis- 
 charge (a). Words in statutes are not infrequently 
 construed in their popular and not in their technical 
 meaning. Thus, when it was enacted (5 & 6 
 WilL IV. c. 54) that marriages already celebrated 
 between persons within prohibited degrees should 
 not be annulled for that cause, unless by sentence 
 pronounced in a suit then " depending " ; it was 
 held that this last word was to be understood in 
 a popular and not technical sense, and that a suit 
 was "depending" as soon as the citation had 
 been issued (b). Again, " monopoly value " in 
 
 Bates (1888), 14 P. D. 17, no privilege under s. 4 of Debtors 
 Act, 1869, from order to find security for wife's costs ; Bawley v. 
 Bawley (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 675, a right of " set off" only 
 exists where the debt to be set off is enforceable by action. See 
 also Jones v. Thompson (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; B. v. Paget 
 (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 151. A " penalty " is not a sum of money 
 claimed to be due within the meaning of s. 6 of the S. J. Act, 
 1879. 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52 ; Flint v. Barnard, 22 Q. B. D. 90 ; 
 see also Hardy \. Fothergill, 13 App. Gas. 351 ; Craig's Claim, 
 Be, [1895] 1 Oh. 267. 
 
 (6) Sherwood v. Bay (1837), 43 E. E. 90. See Ditcher v. Denison, 
 11 Moo. P. C. 324 ; B. v. Brooks, 2 C. & K. 402. A prosecution is 
 " instituted " by the laying of the information : Thorpe v. Priest- 
 nail, 66 L. J. Q. B. 248 ; Beardsley v, Oiddings, 73 L. J. K. B. 
 
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102 INTEKPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 s. 14 (1) of the Licensing Consolidation Act, 
 1910, means " capital monopoly value " and is a 
 lump sum to be definitely fixed upon the grant 
 of the justices' licence (a). 
 
 The payment of a fixed sum " in each and every 
 calendar month " is the payment of an annual 
 sum within the meaning of the Annuity Act, 1863, 
 and is therefore subject to Income Tax (b). 
 
 For the purposes of s. 42 of the Naval Prize 
 Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 25), only such of His 
 Majesty's vessels " as are actually present at the 
 taking or destroying " of an enemy's ships are 
 entitled to participate in the prize bounty although 
 other ships may have helped in the fight (c). 
 Moreover, such bounty being purely a naval 
 reward, if the taking or destroying of an enemy's 
 ships results from the combined eff'orts of His 
 Majesty's sea and land forces no award of bounty 
 
 378 ; and a written claim to goods taken in execution, served 
 on a sheriff, is a " proceeding instituted " within s. 2, Married 
 Women's Property Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 63) : Nunn v. 
 Tyson, [1901] 2 K. B. 487. See also Hood Barrs v. Heriof, [1897] 
 A. C. 177 ; Moran v. Place, [1896] P. 214. 
 
 (a) Bex V. Sunderland Customs (1914), 83 L. J. K. B. 555 ; 
 Bex V. Pilfield, [1919] 2 K. B. 249. 
 
 (6) Cooper, In re (1918), 119 L. T. 303. 
 
 (c) Falkland Islands Battle, In re H.M.S. Ganopus, Exp. (1917), 
 86 L. J. P. 47. See also The Garmania (1916), 32 T. L. E. 395 ; 
 The Sydney, [1916] P. 300; The Konigsherg, [1917] P. 174; 
 H.M. Submarine Vessel E 14, [1917] P. 85. 
 
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WOEDS CONSTRUED IN POPULAR SENSE. 103 
 
 can be made (a). And in like manner where 
 under the constitution of an association, originally 
 founded in 1861, there were frequent changes of 
 membership, technically amounting to the forma- 
 tion of partnerships after 1862, it was held that 
 as the association was " formed," within s. 4, 
 Companies Act, 1862, before the passing of the 
 Act, the expression must be taken in its popular 
 sense (6). An Act (c) which authorised the Court 
 before which a road indictment was "preferred," 
 to give the prosecutor costs, was held to confer 
 authority to award them to the judge, who tried 
 the indictment at Nisi Prius even after its removal 
 into the Queen's Bench (d) ; for the technical 
 meaning of the word "preferred" would have 
 rendered the Act nugatory in a large majority 
 of cases, road indictments being rarely tried at 
 the Assizes at which they are " preferred " (e). 
 Where judgment was "recovered" for £600 on a 
 
 (a) H.M.S. Triumph and H.M.S. Usk, In re (1917), 86 L. J. P. 
 127. 
 
 (6) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. i, repealed and replaced by s. 1 
 of 8 Bdw. Vn. c. 69 ; see as to earlier Act, Shaw v. Simmons, 12 
 Q. B. D. 117. 
 
 (c) 5 & 6 Will. rv. c. 50, s. 95, repealed as to costs by 8 
 Bdw. VII. c. 15, s. 10 and Schedule. 
 
 {d) B. V. Pemhridge (1842), 12 L. J. Q. B. 47, 259 ; B. v. 
 Preston, 7 Dowl. 593 ; see also B. v. Papwortli, 2 East, 413 ; B. 
 V. Ipstones. L. E. 3 Q. B. 216 ; 37 L. J. M. 0. 37. 
 
 («) Per Coleridge J., 3 Q. B. 906. 
 
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104 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 warrant of attorney to secure an annuity of £B0, 
 of which only ^15 were due, it was held that the 
 defendant was protected from arrest by the enact- 
 ment that no person should be taken in execution 
 on a judgment "where the sum recovered does 
 not exceed ^620." Though technically the judg- 
 ment was " recovered " for the larger sum, the 
 sum really recovered was under £20 (a). The 
 Eailway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, which, 
 while giving companies power to take land for 
 temporary purposes, provided that they should not 
 be exempted from " an action " for nuisance or 
 other injury, was construed as not limited to what 
 were technically " actions," but included all pro- 
 ceedings whether at law or in equity (b). Where 
 the Quarter Sessions were empowered to order 
 " the party against whom an appeal was decided," 
 to pay the costs of the successful party ; it was 
 held that the prosecutor who had procured the 
 conviction successfully appealed against, was for 
 this purpose the party appealed against, though 
 
 (a) 7 & 8 Vict. c. «6, s. 57, repealed by 32 & 33 Viot. c. 83, 
 s. 20 and Schedule, see under repealed Act ; Johnson v. Harris, 
 24 L. J. 0. P. 40. 
 
 (6) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 32 ; Fenwick v. East London B. Co. 
 (1875), L. E. 20 Bq. 544 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 602. " Action " as used 
 in s. 1, Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, has been 
 similarly construed: Harrop v. Ossett (Mayor), [1898] 1 Ch. 
 525 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 347 ; and see FieUen v. Morley Corp. (1900), 
 69 L. J. Ch. 314, A.C. 
 
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WOKDS CONSTRUED IN POPULAR SENSE. 105 
 
 lie was not so on the record, or formally, nor even 
 by being served with notice of the appeal (a). 
 The convicting justices were not the parties 
 appealed against, though the Act required that 
 the notice of appeal should be served on them. 
 Even the word " party " has received the sense in 
 which it is sometimes vulgarly used, of "person," 
 when it is plain that Parliament so intended it ; 
 as in the repealed Chancery Amendment Act of 
 1852, which enacted that any " party " who made 
 an affidavit in a suit should be liable to cross- 
 examination (6). 17 Geo. Ill, c. 26(c), which, 
 after requiring the registration of annuities, to 
 check, as the preamble states, the pernicious 
 practice of raising money by 'the sale of life 
 annuities, except annuities charged on lands 
 whereof the grantor is "seised in fee simple or 
 fee tail in possession," was construed as including 
 in this exception a person who was tenant for life 
 with a general power of appointment ; for such a 
 person, though not technically a tenant in fee 
 simple, is substantially so, since he can dispose 
 of the property absolutely (d). Although the word 
 
 (a) B. V. Hants, 9 L. J. M. C. 109 ; 35 E. E. 407 ; and see 
 Beg. V. London JJ., [1896] 1 Q. B. 616, at p. 631 ; 64 L. J. M. G. 
 100. 
 
 (6) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 40; Be Quartz Hill Co., 21 Gh. D. 
 642. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by S. L. E. 1861. 
 
 (d) Halsey v. Hales (1797), 7 T. E. 194 ; Eccles v. Cheyne 
 
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106 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 " children " is generally confined to legitimate 
 children (a), it would be construed as including 
 illegitimate children when such seemed to be 
 more consonant to the intention. Thus, 26 
 Geo. II. c. 33 (repealed by 4 Geo. IV. c. 76), 
 which declared void the marriage of minors with- 
 out the consent of their parents or guardians, 
 was held to apply to illegitimate children, since 
 clandestine marriages by them were within the 
 mischief which it was the object to remedy (6) ; and 
 the 4 & 5 Ph. & M. c. 8, s. 3 (c), which made it 
 penal to take an unmarried girl under sixteen from 
 the possession of her parents, against their wiU, 
 was held to apply to the taking of a natural 
 daughter from her putative father (c?). 
 
 (1856), 2 K. & J., at p. 681. Oomp. Leach v. Jay (1878), 47 
 L. J. Oh. 876. 
 
 (a) B. V. Helton, Burr. S. 0. 187 ; B. v. BirmingJiam (1846), 
 8 Q. B. 410; B. v. Maude (1842), 65 E. E. 753 ; Hill v. CrooJc 
 (1873), li. E. 6 H. L. 265 ; see jper PoUook G.B., Dickinson v. 
 iV. E. By. Co., 33 L. J. Ex. 91 ; Dorin v. Dorin, L. E. 7 H. L. 
 568. 
 
 (6) B. V. Hodnett (1786), 1 T. E. 96 ; see also B. v. St. Giles 
 (1847), 11 Q. B. 173 ; B. v. Brighton (1861), 30 L. J. M. G. 197 ; 
 see also 8 Edw. VII. c. 45, s. 3 (Punishment of Incest Act, 1908). 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, s. 1. 
 
 (d) B. V. Cornforth (1742), 2 Stra. 1162. In Borin v. Dorin, 
 L. E. 7. H. L. 568 ; Dickinson v. N. E. B. Co., 33 L. J. Ex. 91. 
 As to conflict of Laws and indelibility of bastardy, see Wright, 
 Be (1856), 25 L. J. Oh. 621. 
 
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WORDS CONSTRUED IN POPULAR SENSE. 107 
 
 A limited company incorporated tinder the 
 Companies Acts is not a company " incorporated 
 by Act of Parliament " {a). 
 
 In a Customs Act, which imposes duties on 
 imported commodities, the articles specified would 
 generally be understood in their known commercial 
 sense (b). Thus, " Bohea " tea was understood to 
 mean, not the pure and unadulterated article to 
 which the name strictly belongs, and which alone 
 is known by it in China ; but all teas usually 
 bought and sold at home as Bohea (c). So, to 
 take an illustration from a contract, a fire policy 
 which limited the responsibility of insurers to 
 explosions by " gas," was construed as referring 
 only to that kind of gas which was popularly 
 known by that term, viz., common illuminating 
 gas (d). 
 
 Where a statute applied to the United Kingdom, 
 
 (a) Smith, Be, [1896] 2 Oh. 590. See, however, Elve v. Boyton, 
 [1891] 1 Oh. 501. 
 
 (b) A.-G. V. Bailey (1847), 17 L. J. Ex. 9 ; Bailey v. Harris 
 (1849), 18 L. J. Q. B. 115. 
 
 (c) Two hundred chests of tea, 9 Wheat. 430 ; see also " Gin," 
 Wehb V. Knight, 2 Q. B. D. 530 ; " Spirits," A.-G. v. Bailey, sup. 
 " Grain," Cotton v. Vogan, [1896] A. G. 457 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 486. 
 
 {d) Stanley v. Western Ins. Co. (1868), L. E. 3 Ex. 71 ; The 
 Knight of St. Michael, [1898] P. See as to covenant not to 
 carry on the business of a " beerhouse," Holtv. Collyer, 16 Oh. D. 
 718, London 8f Suburban Land Go. v. Field, 50 L. J. Oh. 549, and 
 Nicoll V. Penning, 51 L. J. Ch. 166. 
 
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108 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and the technical meaning of words differed in the 
 different parts of the kingdom, the language would 
 he taken in its popular sense (a). 
 
 The words of a statute will, generally, be under- 
 stood in the sense which they bore when it was 
 passed (6). For instance, a private Act (6 & 7 
 Will. IV. c. 100, s. 8), which provided that "no 
 action in any of His Majesty's Courts of Law " 
 should be brought against certain shipowners 
 without a month's notice, has been held not to 
 apply to proceedings in the Admiralty Division of 
 the High Court of Justice ; for when the Act was 
 passed, the Admiralty Court was not called, and 
 was not, one of His Majesty's Courts, nor were 
 the proceedings there called an action (c). 
 
 And the same rule has been applied in the more 
 recent case of " The Burns " in which it was held 
 that the six months' limitation prescribed by 56 & 57 
 
 (a) Sdltoun v. Advocate-General, 3 Macq. 659 ; Macfarlane v. 
 Lord Advocate, [1894] A. C. 307 ; Income Tax Commissioners v. 
 Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531. See also London County Council v. South 
 Metropolitan Gas Co., [1904] 1 Ch. 76, C. A ; 73 L. J. Ch. 136. 
 
 (6) See per Lord Esher M.B., Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Hardy, 
 17 Q. B. D. 621 ; Sharpe v. Wahefield, 22 Q. B. D. 242; [1891] 
 A. C. 173 ; Bex v. Woodhouse, [1906] 2 K. B. 501, at p. 530 ; 
 Bead v. Lincoln (Bp.), sup. p. 43. 
 
 (c) The Longford, 14 P. D. 34. See also St, Cross v. Howard 
 de Walden, 6 T. E. 338 ; see also Chap. XI, Sees. I & VI. How 
 far this appUes to new things, see p. 144. 
 
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WORDS RESTRICTED TO THE MATTER. 109 
 
 Vict. c. 61, s. 1 (a) does not apply to an 
 Admiralty action in rem {a). 
 
 In a Consolidation Act (see sup. p. 48), it will 
 be found that the language bears the meaning 
 attached to it in the original enactment. For 
 instance, the provision in the Sheriffs Act, 1887, 
 requiring sheriffs' officers not to take arrested 
 persons to prison for 24 hours, applies only to 
 arrests on mesne process or Crown debts, such 
 being the construction given to the original 
 enactment, 32 Geo. II. c. 28 (6). 
 
 But it is in the interpretation of general words 
 and phrases that the principle of strictly adapting 
 the meaning to the particular subject matter in 
 reference to which the words are used, finds its 
 most frequent application. However wide in the 
 abstract, they are more or less elastic, and admit 
 of restriction or expansion to suit the subject 
 matter. While expressing truly enough all that 
 the Legislature intended, they frequently express 
 
 (a) [1907] P. 137 ; see also Mitchell v. Aberdeen Insurance 
 Committee, Ofc. Sess. (So.) (1918), W. C. & Ins. 0. 206 ; Bradford 
 Corp. V. Myers, [1916] 1 A. G. 242 H. L. (B.) ; Bex v. Port of 
 London Authority ; Kynoch, Exp., [1919] 1 K. B. 176, C. A. 
 
 (6) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 55, s. 14; Mitchell v. Simpson, 25 
 Q. B. D. 183 ; Smith, In re Hands v. Andrews, [1893] 2 Oh. 1, 
 C. A. See also per Lord Watson, Smith v. Baker, [1891] A. C. 
 349, and per Lord Herschell, Bank of England v. Vagliano, 
 [1891] A. C. 144. 
 
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110 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 more, in their literal meaning and natural force ; 
 and it is necessary to give them the meaning 
 which best suits the scope and object of the 
 statute without extending to ground foreign to 
 the intention. It is, therefore, a canon of inter- 
 pretation that all words, if they be general and 
 not express and precise, are to be restricted to the 
 fitness of the matter (a). They are to be construed 
 as particular if the intention be particular (b) ; 
 that is, they must be understood as used in refer- 
 ence to the subject matter in the mind of the 
 Legislature, and limited to it. 
 
 Thus, enactments which related to " persons " 
 would be variously understood, according to the 
 circumstances under which they were used, as in- 
 cluding or not including corporations (c) ; and as 
 limited to persons born in the King's allegiance, 
 
 (a) Bao. Max. 10. 
 
 (6) Stradling v. Morgan (1558), Plowd. 204; Bradlaugh v. 
 aarhe (1883), A. C. 354, at p. 372; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505, 515; 
 Coxy. Hakes (1890), 15 A. C. 506; 60 L. J. Q. B. 89. 
 
 (c) B. V. Gardner, Gowp. 79; B. v. Tori, 6 A. & B. 419; 
 B. V. Beverley Gas Go., Id. 645; Bac. Stat. Uses, 43, 57; 
 Pharmaceutical Soc. v. London Supply Assoc., 5 App. Cas. 857 ; 
 St. Leonard's v. Franklin, 3 C. P. D. 377 ; Hirst v. West Biding 
 Union Banking Go., Ltd,, [1901] 2 K. B. 560, 0. A. By 52 & 53 
 Vict. c. 63, s. 19, in that Act and in all future Acts, " person " 
 includes any body corporate or unincorporate, " unless the 
 contrary intention appears." See also Stroud's Jud. Diet, and 
 Supplement, tit. " Person." 
 
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WORDS RESTRICTED TO THE MATTER. Ill 
 
 or as including also all foreigners actually within 
 the British dominions (a), or in British ships on 
 the high seas (6), or (the meaning in prize and 
 commercial law) only persons domiciled in those 
 dominions (c). Under the Licensing Act, 1872, 
 " no person " may sell intoxicating liquor with- 
 out a license, and " any person " selling without 
 a license is made subject to penalties ; but it was 
 held that the sale prohibited was restricted to a 
 sale by a person who ought to be licensed, and 
 did not apply to a servant who sold liquor, the 
 property of his master, by his master's orders (d). 
 In a repealed Act (e) which provided for the 
 recovery of wages by " persons belonging to a 
 ship," this expression would obviously be confined 
 to persons employed in its service on board ; while 
 in one which related to the salvage of " persons be- 
 longing to the ship," it would as obviously include 
 
 (a) Oourteen's Gase, Hob. 270 ; Nga Hoong v. B., 7 Cox, 489 ; 
 Low V. Boutledge, 35 L. J. Oh. 117, per Turner L.J. 
 
 (b) Davidson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606. 
 
 (c) Wilson V. Marryat (1798), 8 T. E. 31 ; The Indian Chief, 
 
 3 Eob. c. 12; and see Oroker v. Marquis of Hertford (1844), 
 
 4 Moore P. C. 339, at p. 361. 
 
 {d) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 3 (repealed, s. 65, Licensing (Consoli- 
 dation) Act, 1910) ; Williamson v. Norris (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 
 31 ; Boyle v. Smith, [1906] 1 K. B. 432. See also Titmus v. 
 Littlewood, [1916] 1 K. B. 272. 
 
 (e) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 84, repealed by 57 & .58 Vict. c. 60, 
 Sched. 22. 
 
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112 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 passengers as well as crew (a). The 13 Eliz. c. 6, 
 s. 1, whioh made void, as against creditors, all 
 voluntary alienation of " goods," was held to apply 
 only to such goods as were liable to be taken in 
 execution ; as the object of the Act was to pre- 
 vent such property from being withdrawn from 
 the reach of creditors: consequently, the word 
 " goods " was held not to include choses in action, 
 as long as these were not subject to execution (b). 
 But the same word was held to include them in 
 the reputed ownership clauses of former bankruptcy 
 and insolvency Acts (c) ; as they were deemed to 
 fall within the specific object of the Legislature, 
 which was to protect creditors against being 
 deceived by an apparent ownership of property {d). 
 A bungalow constructed of wood and corrugated 
 iron erected on a piece of land for the purpose of 
 
 (o) The Fusilier (1865), 3 Moore P. C. N. S. 51 ; see The Cyhele, 
 3 P. D. 8 ; and see The Benpor (1883), 8 P. D. 115, C. A. 
 
 (ft) Bundas v. Dutens (1790), 1 E. E. 112 ; Bider v. Kidder, 
 53 E. E. 369 ; Norcutt v. Dodd, 54 E. E. 224 ; Sims v. Thomas, 
 12 A. & E. 536. Eor other cases held not within the statute, 
 see Denny, Trustee of, [1919] 1 K. B. 583 ; Pearce v. Bulteel, 
 [1916] 2 Ch. 544 ; see herein 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 12. 
 
 (c) Byall V. Bowles, 1 Ves. Sen. 367 ; Exp. Baldwin, 27 L. J. 
 Bank. 17 ; " Insolvency," camp. Be Muggeridge, 29 L. J. Ch. 
 288, and B. v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. L. Gas. 404. 
 
 (d) As to goods in possession, order or disposition of a 
 bankrupt within the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, see 4 & 5 Geo. V, 
 c. 59, s. 38 (c). 
 
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WORDS EBSTRICTED TO THE MATTER. 113 
 
 exhibition and sale, but not used or occupied, or 
 intended to be used or occupied on the spot on 
 which it was erected, though clearly a "wooden 
 structure or erection of a movable or temporary 
 character," is not within the meaning of those 
 words as used in s. 13, Metropolis Management 
 and Building Acts Amendment Act, 1882 (repealed), 
 see s. 84, 57 & 58 Vict. c. CCXIII., London Building 
 Act, 1894, and does not require a license in 
 writing from the County Council for its erection. 
 The Act was not aimed at such a structure (a). 
 A district surveyor is, however, entitled to notice 
 under s. 145 of the Act (6). Damage caused by 
 a ship to a pier, or by the mainsail gear of a barge 
 coming in contact with a pile-driving engine fixed 
 on a wharf, as the barge was sailing past, would 
 not be " damage by collision " within the meaning 
 of the County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Acts, 
 1868 and 1869 (c). So, in Bankruptcy Acts, the 
 word " creditor " is found to be limited, usually, 
 to persons who are creditors at the time of the 
 
 (a) 45 & 46 Viet. c. 14 ; London G. G. v. Humphreys, [1894] 
 2 Q. B. 755. Gomp. Westminster Council v. London G. G., 71 
 L. J. K. B. 244. 
 
 (&) Gity of Westminster Gouncil v. Watson, [1902] 2 K. B. 717. 
 
 (c) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 71, s. 3 ; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 51, s. 4 ; Bohson 
 V. The Kate (1888), 57 L. J. Q. B. 546 ; The Normandy (1904), 
 73 L. J. P. D. & A. 55; see also The Upcerne (1912), 81 L. J. P. 
 110. 
 
 I.S. 8 
 
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114 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 bankruptcy and entitled to prove under it (a) ; and 
 the statute which makes it a criminal offence for 
 any member of a " co-partnership " to embezzle 
 the moneys belonging to it, has been held not to 
 apply to the case of an association having for its 
 object, not the acquisition of gain, but the spiritual 
 and mental improvement of its members (b). 
 
 The complex term "inhabitant" may be cited 
 as having frequently furnished illustration of this 
 adaptation of the meaning to what appears to 
 suit most exactly the object of the Act. In the 
 abstract, the word would include every human 
 being dwelling in the place spoken of. A right of 
 way over a field to the parish church granted to 
 the " inhabitants " of a parish would include every 
 person in the parish (c). But where the object 
 of an Act was to impose a pecuniary burden in 
 respect of property in the locality (as in the case 
 
 (a) Grace v. Bishop, 25 L. J. Ex. 58 ; Be Poland, 35 L. J. 
 Bank. 19. Under s. 48, Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (repealed by 
 1 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, and re-enacted by s. 44 of that Act, as to 
 which see Bulteel and Golmore v. Trustee in Bankruptcy (1916), 
 32 T. L. E. 661 ; Booker, In re, [1916] W. N. 293. See Paine, 
 Be, Bead, Exp. (1896), 66 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; Blackpool Motor Car 
 Co., In re, [1901] 1 Oh. 77. 
 
 (6) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1 ; B. v. Bobson (1885), 55 L. J. 
 M. C. 55. Comp. B. v. Tankard, [1894] 1 Q. B. 548. Sec. 1 
 of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116 is repealed by 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50, s. 48. 
 
 (c) B. V. MasMter (1837), 6 L. J. K. B. 121 ; 6 A. & E. 165, 
 per Littledale J. See also B. v. Davie (1837), 6 A. & E. 374. 
 
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WORDS EBSTRICTBD TO THE MATTER. 115 
 
 of the Statute of Bridges, 22 Hen. VIII. c. 5, 
 which throws the burden of making and repairing 
 bridges on the " inhabitants " of the town or 
 county in which they are situated, and in the 
 Eiot and Black Acts (a)), the expression would be 
 construed as comprising all holders of lands or 
 houses in the locality, whether resident or not, 
 and corporate bodies as well as individuals, but 
 as excluding actual dwellers who had no rateable 
 property in the place, such as servants ; it being 
 "infinite and impossible " to tax every inhabitant 
 being no householder, and who could not be dis- 
 trained upon for non-payment, and therefore highly 
 improbable that the Legislature intended to tax 
 them (b). 
 
 On the other hand, where the object is to 
 impose the performance of a personal service 
 within the locality, the word " inhabitant " would ^ 
 probably be construed as not comprising either 
 corporate bodies or non-resident proprietors. Thus, 
 it was held that a person who occupied premises 
 in one parish and carried on his business in person 
 there, but resided in his dwelling-house in another, 
 was not an " inhabitant " of the former parish so 
 as to be bound to serve as its constable (c). So, 
 
 (a) B. V. North Ourry (1825), 4 B. & 0. 958, per Bayley J. 
 (6) 2 Inst. 702 ; B. v. North, Gurry, 4 B. & 0. 958, per 
 Bayley J. 
 (c) B. V. Adlard, 4 B. & 0. 772. See also B. v. Nicholson, 11 
 
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116 iNTEEPEETATlON OF STATUTES. 
 
 an Act which authorised the imposition of a rate 
 on all who "inhabited or occupied" any land or 
 house, and the appointment of a number of " in- 
 habitants " to collect the rates, was held to throw 
 the latter duty only on actual dwellers in the 
 locality (a). But here the word " occupied " would 
 suggest a meaning for "inhabitants " distinct from 
 " occupiers." A furnished house, not lived in 
 during the year of assessment, is an "inhabited 
 dwelling-house " and assessable to inhabited house 
 duty (6). 
 
 Again, another meaning would be given to the 
 same expression, where the object was to deter- 
 mine the settlement of a pauper, or the qualifica- 
 tion of an elector. In those cases, a person is an 
 inhabitant or resident in the place in which he 
 usually sleeps (c). What amounts to inhabitancy 
 
 E. E. 398; Williams v. Jones, Id. 411. Comp. Wethered v 
 Calcutt, inf. p. 122. 
 
 (a) Donne v. Martyr (1828), 8 B. & G. 62. 
 
 (6) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 ; Smith v. Damey (1904), 73 L. J. 
 K. B. 646. 
 
 (c) St. Mary v. Badclife, 1 Stra. 60, per Parker O.J. ; E. v. 
 Charles, Burr. Set. C. 706 ; B. v. Stratford, 11 East, 176 ; B. v. 
 Mildenhall, 3 B. & Aid. 374 ; Beal v. Ford, 3 0. P. D. 73 ; 
 Ford V. Drew, 5 0. P. D. 59 ; Biley v. Bead, 4 Ex. D. 100 ; 
 A.-G. V. Parker, 3 Atk. 577, per Lord Hardwicke L.O. For 
 modern decisions on this point, see Gt. Yarmouth Union v. 
 Bethnal Green Union (1907), 97 L. T. 440 ; TewJcesbury Union v. 
 Upton-on-Severn Union (1913), 83 L. J. K. B. 37 ; Daventry Union 
 V. Coventry Union (1917), 86 L. J. K. B. 276. 
 
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WORDS RBSTEIOTED TO THE MATTER. 117 
 
 in this sense, it is impossible to define. Sleeping 
 in a place once or twice does not constitute it; 
 and, on the other hand, such residence generally 
 in a place, in this sense, is quite compatible with 
 much absence from it (a). But if an Act requires 
 residence for a certain time at least, as a quahfica- 
 tion, it would be understood to make actual bodily 
 presence in the place for that time indispensable ; 
 as was held in the construction of the Act con- 
 stituting the congregation of the University of 
 Oxford (b). 
 
 The same expression has received another 
 meaning where the object of the Act was to 
 preserve information as to the place where a 
 person was to be found at times when it was 
 most likely that he should be sought ; as in the 
 enactment which requires a solicitor to indorse 
 his "place of abode " on the summons which he 
 issues; or a witness to a bill of sale, to add to 
 his signature a description of his occupation and 
 
 (a) B. V. Mitchell, 10 Bast, 518 ; Wescomb's Case, L. E. i Q. B. 
 110; Taylor v. St. Mary Abbotts, 40 L. J. C. P. 45; Bond v. St. 
 George's, Id. 47. See also Whithorne v. Thomas, 7 M. & Gr. 1 ; 
 Ford V. Pye, L. E. 9 C. P. 269 ; Ford v. Hart, Id. 273 ; McDougal 
 V. Paterson, 87 E. E. 869; Bunston v. Paterson, 28 L. J. 0. P. 
 185 ; Powell v. Guest, 34 L. J. 0. P. 69 ; Spittall v. Brooh, 18 
 Q. B. D. 426 ; Beal v. Town Clerk of Exeter, 20 Q. B. D. 300 ; 
 Bonoghue ,v. Brooh, 57 L. J. Q. B. 122 ; Gt. Yarmouth Union v. 
 Bethnal Green Union (1907), 97 L. T 440. 
 
 (6) B. V. Oxford (V.C.) (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 471. 
 
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118 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 "residence." In these cases it has been held, 
 considering the object which the Legislature had 
 in view, that the place of business constituted the 
 abode or residence intended (a). But in general 
 the place of business of a person would not be 
 regarded as his " place of abode " (b). It has 
 been held to be his " address " as a witness to a 
 bill of sale under ss. 8-9 and schedule of the Bills of 
 Sale Act, 1882 (c) ; but not to be his " address" 
 for indorsement on a writ as plaintiff in an 
 action (d). 
 
 A clerk or servant does not " carry on business " 
 in the place where he is employed, within the 
 meaning of Acts giving jurisdiction to County and 
 other Courts over persons who dwell or carry on 
 business within their limits (e) ; but the words 
 would receive a wider meaning when the object 
 of the enactment had reference to the distribu- 
 
 («) Thorp V. Browne (1867), L. E. 2 H. L. 220. 
 
 (6) See B. v. Hammond, 21 L. J. Q. B. 153. See also B. v. 
 Deighton, 13 L. J. Q. B. 241 ; B. v. Coward, 20 L. J. Q. B. 359. 
 
 (c) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43 ; Simmons v. Woodward (1892), 61 
 L. J. Ch. 252. See also Brandon Hill, Ltd. v. Lamb (1914), 
 59 S. J. 75 ; Boddington, In re (1915), H. B. E. 183 ; Bonard, 
 In re (1916), 85 L. J. (K. B.) 393. 
 
 {d) Etdes of S. G. Order IV. r. 1 ; Stoy v. Bees, 24 Q. B. D. 
 748. In Ireland a magistrate suing in his ofl&cial capacity may 
 use his ofl&cial place of business, B. v. JJ. Go. Tyrone, [1901] 
 2 Ir. E. 497. 
 
 (e) Graham v. Lewis, 22 Q. B. D. 1 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 117, 0. A. 
 
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WORDS RESTRICTED TO THE MATTER. 119 
 
 tion of business between different Bankruptcy 
 Courts (a). 
 
 Under the provisions of the County Courts Act, 
 which gave the Superior Courts concurrent juris- 
 diction when the parties dwelt more than twenty 
 miles apart, the principal office of a railway com- 
 pany was its dwelling (b) ; but not its other offices 
 or stations (c). But the manufactory or shop, 
 where the business is substantially carried on, 
 and not its registered office, is the dwelling, within 
 the meaning of the same provision, of a manu- 
 facturing company (c?). For fiscal purposes, a 
 corporation is regarded as residing where the 
 govening body carries on the supreme manage- 
 ment, though the scene of its operations and 
 sources of profit, and even the majority of the 
 shareholders, are out of the country, and though 
 it has a foreign domioil and is registered abroad (e). 
 
 (a) Breull, Exp. (1880), 16 Oh. D. 484 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 384. 
 
 (6) Adams v. G. W. B. Co. (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 124; Taylor 
 V. Growland Gas Co., 23 L. J. Ex. 254 ; Minor v. L. & N. W. B. 
 Co., 26 L. J. C. P. 39. 
 
 (c) Shiels V. G. N. R. Co. (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 331 ; Brown v. 
 L. Jt N. W. B. Co. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 318. 
 
 (d) Keynsham v. Baher (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 41. See also 
 Aberystwith Pier Co. v. Cooper, 35 L. J. Q. B. 44. 
 
 (e) Newhy v. Colt's Arms Co., L. E. 7 Q. B. 293 ; Haggin v. 
 Comptoir d'Eseompte (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 519 ; 58 L, J. Q. B. 508 ; 
 Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. Gas. 459. See A.-G. v. 
 Alexander, L. B. 10 Ex. 20. 
 
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120 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 A foreign corporation which had any estahKshment 
 in this country would for the same purpose be 
 considered as resident here, as regards the question 
 of jurisdiction (a). 
 
 This proposition is, however, somewhat whittled 
 down by the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
 Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka Jemverks Aktiebolag (6) 
 in which it was held that a London Firm of 
 Merchants who acted as agents for various firms, 
 including the defendants, did not so represent 
 their principals as to constitute service upon them 
 of a writ as valid service on their principals. 
 
 Again, the word "occupier" has received different 
 meanings, varying with the object of the enact- 
 ment. Ordinarily, the tenant of premises is the 
 " occupier" of them, although he may be person- 
 ally absent from them (c) ; while a servant or an 
 officer who is in actual occupation of premises, 
 virtute officii, would not be an " occupier " {d). 
 But in the Bills of Sale Act, 1854 (repealed by 
 s. 23, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), which provided that 
 
 (o) Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson, 1 Ex. D. 428. 
 (h) [1914] 1 K. B. 715, C. A. ; 83 L. J. K. B. 561. 
 
 (c) B. V. Poynder, 25 E. E. 345 ; 1 B. & 0. 178, and see B. v. 
 Spurrell, 35 L. J. M. C. 74. 
 
 (d) Clark v. Bury St. Edmunds, 26 L. J. C. P. 12 ; Bent v. 
 Boberts, 3 Ex. D. 66 ; B. v. Spurrell, L. E. 1 Q. B. 72 ; McClean 
 V. Prichard, 20 Q. B. D. 285. See in this connection 44 Vict. 
 c. 12, s. 24. 
 
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WOEDS EESTKIOTED TO THE MATTER. 121 
 
 personal chattels should be deemed in the posses- 
 sion of the grantor of a bill of sale so long as they 
 were on the premises " occupied " by him, actual 
 personal occupation, and not merely tenancy, was 
 intended ; and therefore the owner of chattels in 
 rooms which he did not personally occupy was 
 not in the " apparent " possession of them, within 
 that Act (a). 
 
 This restriction of meaning may be carried still 
 further to promote the real intention, and not 
 exceed the object and scope of the enactment. 
 Thus, an Act which, reciting the inconTenienoes 
 arising from churchwardens and overseers making 
 clandestine rates, enacted that those officers should 
 permit " eyery inhabitant " of the parish to inspect 
 the rates, under a penalty for refusal, was held 
 not to apply to a refusal to one of the church- 
 wardens, who was also an inhabitant. As the 
 object of the Act was limited to the protection of 
 
 (a) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36 ; BoUnson v. Briggs, 40 L. J. Ex. 17. 
 As to the word " traveller," see Taylor v. Humphreys, 30 L. J. 
 M. 0. 242 ; Fisher v. Howard, 34 L. J. M. C. 42 ; Atkinson v. 
 Sellers, 28 L. J. M. C. 12 ; Saunders^. S. E. B. Go., 49 L. J. Q. B. 
 761; Penn v. Alexander, 62 L. J. M. 0. 65; and in Ireland 
 6 Edw. VII. c. 39, s. 3 ; in England 10 Edw. VII., 1 Geo. V. 
 c. 24, s. 61 ; " lodger " and " occupier," Bradley v. Baylis, 8 
 Q. B. D. 195, 210 ; Morton v. Palmer, 51 L. J. Q.B. 7 ; Heawood 
 V. Bone, 13 Q. B. D. 179. See also Bishop v. Duffy (1894), 22 
 Eettie, 192, and as to hours of sale, Bristow v. Piper, [1915] 1 
 K. B. 271. 
 
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122 INTERPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 those inhabitants only who had previously no 
 access to the rates (which the churchwardens 
 had), the meaning of the term " inhabitants " was 
 limited to them (a). 
 
 In another case, the majority of the Judges of 
 the Queen's Bench went further than the Chief 
 Justice thought legitimate, in giving an unusual 
 and even artificial meaning to a word, for the 
 purpose of keeping within the apparent scope of 
 the Act. The treaty between Great Britain and 
 the United States of 1842 and the 6 & 7 Vict. 
 c. 76 (6), passed to give the Executive the neces- 
 sary powers for carrying its provisions into effect, 
 having provided that each State should, on the 
 requisition of the other, deliver up to justice all 
 persons who, being charged with murder, " piracy," 
 or other crimes therein mentioned, committed 
 within the jurisdiction of either State, should seek 
 an asylum, or be ' found within the territories of 
 the other; it was held that the word "piracy" 
 was confined to those acts which are declared 
 piracy by the municipal law of either country, 
 such as slave-trading, and did not include those 
 which are piracy in the ordinary and primary 
 
 (a) Wethered v. Calcutt (1842), 5 Scott, N. E. 409. See also 
 B. V. Mashiter (1837), 45 E. E. 433 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 121 ; B. v. 
 Bavie (1837), 6 A & B. 374. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by 33 & 34 Vict. o. 52, s. 27. See also The 
 Extradition Act, 1906 (bribery inclusion). . 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTEUOTION. 123 
 
 sense of the word, that is, jure gentium : for as the 
 latter offence was within the jurisdiction of all 
 States, and was triable by all, and the offenders 
 could not, consequently, be said to seek an asylum 
 in any State, since none could be a place of safety 
 for them, that species of the crime was not within 
 the mischief intended to be remedied by the treaty 
 or the Act (a). 
 
 SECTION II. — BENEtlCIAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 It is said to be the duty of the judge to make 
 such construction of a statute as shall suppress 
 the mischief and advance the remedy (6). Even 
 where the usual meaning of the language falls 
 short of the whole object of the Legislature, a 
 more extended meaning may be attributed to the 
 words, if fairly susceptible of it. If there are 
 circumstances in the Act showing that the phrase- 
 ology is used in a larger sense than its ordinary 
 meaning, that sense may be given to it (c). Thus, 
 the Legislature having intended when passing the 
 
 (a) Ternan, Be, 33 L. J. M. G. 201. See also A.-G. v. 
 ■ Kwok-a-Sing, L. E. 5 P. 0. 179. 
 
 (b) Heydon's Case, 3 Eep. 7b ; per Lord Kenyon, Turtle v. 
 Hartwell, 6 T. R. 429 ; per Cockbuxn O.J., Twycross v. Grant, 2 
 C. P. D. 530. See ex. gr. Be BicTc, [1891] 1 Oh. 426. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Bsher M.E., Barlow v. Boas (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 
 381, at p. 389; 59 L. J. Q. B. 183, and see Gross in the goods of 
 (1904), 73 L. J. P. 82. 
 
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124 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, that every 
 workman in the prescribed trades should be 
 entitled to compensation, it ought to be con- 
 strued so as, as far as possible, to give effect to its 
 primary provisions (a). The repealed enactment 
 (s. 54 (4), 25 & 26 Vict c. 63) Hmiting the liability 
 of shipowners where, among other things, the 
 injury done is "by reason of the improper naviga- 
 tion" of their ships, extends to a case where a 
 collision was owing, not to any default of the 
 crew, but to the breakdown of the steering gear 
 from the negHgence of engineers on shore, who 
 had improperly fixed it{b). It would extend to 
 every case where the negligence is that of any 
 person for whose negligence the owner is respon- 
 sible, unless it occurred with the privity of the 
 latter (c). Where a cplonial statute empowered 
 municipal councils to construct bridges, and pro- 
 vided that in certain circumstances the authorities 
 of "adjacent" districts should contribute to the 
 cost, it was held that the word "adjacent" has 
 not by ordinary usage a precise and uniform mean- 
 ing, and is not confined to places adjoining, but 
 
 (a) .60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 ; Lysons v. Enowles, [1901] A. G. 79, 
 and see Fleming v. Loehgelly Iron & Coal Go. (1902), 4 P. 890. 
 
 (6) The Warkworih (1884), 9 P..D. 145; as to existing law, 
 see s. 503 of 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60. 
 
 (c) Id. per Brett M.E. See also Canada Shipping Co. v. British 
 Shipowners' Mutual Protection Society (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 462. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 125 
 
 that the degree of proximity which would justify 
 its application is frequently a question of circum- 
 stances (a). A young person whose work is partly 
 indoor and partly outdoor, the outdoor work being 
 at some distance from the shop where he is 
 employed, is when employed in outdoor work 
 employed "in or about a shop " within the Shop 
 Hours Act, 1892 (b). To supply beer at a pubUc- 
 house to a drunken man and his sober companion, 
 would be to " sell " the liquor to the drunken man, 
 although it was ordered and paid for by the sober 
 companion (c). A driver who leaves a carriage and 
 horses standing in the highway leaves them while 
 they are "passing" upon such highway within 
 s. 78, Highway Act, 1835 {d). Acts which gave a 
 "single woman" who had a bastard child the 
 
 (a) Mayor of Wellington v. Mayor of Lower Hutt, [1904] A. C. 
 773. But see Kimberley W. W. Co. v. Be Beers Mines, 66 
 L. J. P. C. 108 ; Bateman and Parker, Be, 68 L. J. Gh. 330. 
 
 (6) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 62; Gollman v. Roberts, [1896] il Q. B. 
 457. 
 
 (c) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 13 ; this section repealed as regards 
 England by 10 Edw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, Sched. VII. 
 As to existing law, see s. 75 of Licensing Consolidation Act, 1910, 
 and see Badford v. Williams (1914), 78 J. P. 90 ; Scatchard v. 
 Johnson, 57 L. J. M. 0. 41. See, however, Gundy v. Le Gocq, 
 inf. p. 186. 
 
 (cf) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50 ; Phythian v. Baxendale, [1895] 1 
 Q. B. 768 ; Nuttall v. Pickering, [1913] 1 K. B. 14 ; Chatterton 
 V. Parker (1914), "W. N. 200. 
 
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126 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 right to sue the putative father for its maintenance 
 have been held to include in that expression, not 
 only a widow (a), but also a married woman living 
 apart from her husband (b) ; for, the general object 
 of the Acts being to compel men to contribute to 
 the support of their illegitimate offspring, even a 
 married woman living under circumstances incom- 
 patible with marital access, though not in popular 
 language a single woman, is nevertheless, for the 
 purposes of the Acts, and therefore in the con- 
 templation of the Legislature, as " single " as a 
 woman who has no husband. So where by s. 141, 
 Army Act, 1881, assignments of or charges upon 
 pensions received by officers in respect of past 
 services are forbidden, but nothing is said in terms 
 about executions or attachments, it has been held 
 that these must be regarded as included ; as other- 
 wise the object to be effected, viz., to secure a 
 provision which should keep the pensioners from 
 want, and enable them to maintain a respectable 
 social position, would be frustrated (c), A soldier 
 
 (a) Antony v. Cardenham, 2 Bott, 194 ; B. v. Wymondham, 2 
 Q. B. 541. 
 
 (6) B. V. Pilkington, 2 B. & B. 546, nom. Exp. Grimes, 22 
 L. J. M. 0. 153 ; B. v. Gollingwood, 17 L. J. M. C. 168 ; B. v. Luffe, 
 9 E. E. 406. Comp. Stacey v. Lintell, 4 Q. B. D. 291 ; Jones v. 
 Barnes, [1901] 1 K. B. 118 ; see also Beigate Union v. Croydon 
 Union, 14 App. Gas. 465. 
 
 (c) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 58 ; Lucas v. Harris, 56 L. J. Q. B. 15 ; 
 Be Saunders, 64 L. J. Q. B. 739. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 127 
 
 who has gone into barracks with a view to being 
 drafted to the seat of war is "a soldier in actual 
 military service" within s. 11, Wills Act, 1837(a). 
 The authority given by the Municipal Corporations 
 Act to expend the local funds upon " corporate 
 buildings " was construed as extending to the cost 
 of lining the corporation pew in the church (b). 
 Dogs (c), horses, cattle (d), and shares in a limited 
 company (e), have, by a beneficial construction, 
 been held to be " goods " within the meaning of 
 that word as used in certain statutes; while on 
 the other handj a linen bag has been decided not 
 to be a " case " in which gunpowder may be carried, 
 for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of 
 the Metalliferous Mines Eegulation Act, 1872, that 
 explosives shall not be taken into a mine except in 
 
 (a) 1 Vict. c. 26 ; Hiscock, Be, [1901] P. 78 ; Gattward v. 
 Knee, [1902] P. 99 ; and see Kitchen, In re (1919), 35 T. L. E. 
 612; StaUe, In re, [1919] P. 10; Thomas' Estate, In re (1918), 
 34 T. L. E. 626; Tollemache's Estate, In re, [1917] P. 246; 
 Heywood's Estate, In re, [1916] P. 47 ; Anderson's Estate, In re, 
 [1916] P. 49 ; Hale, In re, [1915] 2 Ir. E. 362. 
 
 (5) 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76 (repealed 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 5) ; 
 B. V. Warwick (1846), 15 L. J. Q. B. 306. 
 
 (c) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 40; B. v. Slade, 57 L. J. M. 0. 
 120. 
 
 (d) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 80, s. 23 (repealed 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60) ; 
 Richmond Hill Go. v. Trinity House, 65 L. J. Q. B. 561. 
 
 (e) E. S. 0. 1883, Order L. r. 2 ; Euans v. Barnes, [1893] 2 
 Ch. 216. 
 
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128 INTEEPRETATION OP STATUTES, 
 
 a "case or canister," as such a case would not 
 effect the object of the statute by affording protec- 
 tion against ignition from sparks (a). An English 
 trade-mark and goodwill are property within the 
 Stamp Act, 1891, and so is a share in a colonial 
 patent (6). On similar grounds the enactment in 
 the Artizans and Labourers' Dwellings Improve- 
 ment Act, 1875, which, after authorising local 
 authorities to purchase land for such dwellings, 
 provides that all rights or easements relating to 
 the purchased land should be extinguished, but 
 compensated for, has been held to include under 
 the word " rights " inchoate as well as complete 
 rights (c). An Act which required a railway com- 
 pany to make, for the accommodation of the 
 owners and occupiers of the adjacent lands, suffi- 
 cient fences for protecting the lands from trespass, 
 and the cattle of the owners and occupiers from 
 straying thereout, was held to include in the term 
 
 (a) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 77, s. 23 (2 6); Foster v. BiphwysOasson 
 Slate Co., 18 Q. B. D. 428. 
 
 (6) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 59 (1) ; Brooke v. Inl. Bev., [1896] 
 2 Q. B. 356; Smelting Co. of Australia v. Inl. Bev., [1897] 1 
 Q, B. 175 ; electrical energy is property, see 9 Edw. VII. c. 34, 
 B. 19. 
 
 (c) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 36, s. 20, repealed s. 22, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 
 70; Barlow v. Boss, 24 Q. B. D. 381. Gomp. Hawkins v. 
 Butter, [1892] 1 Q. B. 668 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 146, where " ease- 
 ment " was construed in its strictest sense. And see Howorth 
 V. Sutcliffe (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 729. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 129 
 
 "occupier" a person who merely had put his 
 cattle on land with the license of the occupier (a). 
 And the same word, even when coupled with 
 "owner" in an Act of Parliament (6), has been 
 construed, with the view of promoting the object 
 of the enactment, as including a person standing 
 on a spot in a park or place where he had no more 
 right to stand than any other person (c). So it 
 has been held under a repealed Act that cows 
 agisted on the terms that the agister should take 
 their milk in exchange for their pasturage, were 
 taken in to be fed at a " fair price " (d), that an 
 agreement by a shareholder with a company to 
 set off a present liability of the company to pay 
 cash to him against future calls on his shares was 
 a payment of the calls " in cash " (e), that the 
 attendance of an uncertificated midwife at the 
 
 (a) Dawson v. Midland By. Go., 42 L. J. Ex. 49. See also 
 Kiitow V. Liskeard, 44 L. J. M. G. 23. As for principles dis- 
 tinguishing a license from a demise, see Smith v. Lambeth Assess- 
 ment Committee (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 585, at. pp. 593 et seq. ; affirmed, 
 52 L. J. M. C. 1. 
 
 (6) See Chap. XI., Sec. IV. 
 
 (c) See Boggett v. Gatterms (1864), 34 L. J. C. P. 46 ; Bows 
 V. Fenwick (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 107 ; Powell v. Kempton Park 
 Bacecourse Co. (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 392; Brown v. Patch 
 (1899), Id. 588. 
 
 (d) 46 & 47 Viet. c. 61, s. 45 (repealed by 8 Edw. VII. c. 28) ; 
 London & Yorks. Bank v. Belton, 15 Q. B. D. 457. 
 
 (e) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 131, s. 25 (repealed by 8 Edw. VII. c. 69) ; 
 Jones Lloyd & Co., Be, 41 Ch, D. 159. 
 
 I.S. 9 
 
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130 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 confinement of the wife of an elector, who was sent 
 to her and paid for by the relieving officer, was 
 "medical assistance," so that the relief afforded 
 did not disqualify the elector from being regis- 
 tered (a), that an antenuptial agreement for a 
 marriage settlement was a " marriage settle- 
 ment "(6), and that "bedding" to the value of 
 £5, which is protected from seizure by s. 147, 
 County Courts Act, 1888, which is incorporated 
 into the Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1888, 
 includes a bedstead (c). " Member " in Art. 27 of 
 Table A to the repealed Companies Act, 1862 — 
 which provided that any increased capital should 
 be offered to the " members " joto mto, -^included 
 the representatives of a deceased member whose 
 name was on the register (rf). A statute which 
 requires a railway company to keep in repair a 
 " bridge " carrying a highway over their lines, 
 requires them also to maintain the roadway upon 
 
 (a) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 46, s. 2 (repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64, 
 note, s. 9) ; Honeyhone v. Hamhridge, 18 Q. B. D. 418. 
 
 (&) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 4 ; Wenman v. Lyon & Co., [1891] 2 
 Q. B. 192 ; see also Be Vansittart, [1893] 1 Q. B. 181. 
 
 (e) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, s. 4; Davis v. Harris (1900), 69 
 L. J. Q. B. 232. 
 
 (d) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89 ; James v. Buena Ventura Syndicate, 65 
 L. J. Oh. 284. See also Allen v. Gold Beefs of West Africa, 69 
 L. J. Oh. 266. A like condition is contained in Article 42 of 
 Table A appended to 8 Edw. VII. c. 69. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTBUCTION. 131 
 
 the bridge (a). A fishing-boat of ten tons provided 
 with masts, which unshipped, and sails used for 
 going to sea, but which was propelled by four oars 
 in harbour and shallow water, was decided to be a 
 "ship" within the Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, 
 which pro\ddes that when a collision between two 
 " ships " takes place, the master of each ship is 
 bound to render assistance to the other, on pain of 
 the cancellation or suspension of his certificate. 
 Though s, 2 of the repealed Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1854, enacted that the term " ship " should 
 "have the meaning" thereby "assigned" to it, 
 viz., that it should " include every description of 
 vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars "(6), 
 this was considered not to be a definition, and as 
 not excluding vessels which it did not include (c). 
 On the other hand, a. steam launch used for the 
 
 (a) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 46 ; Lancashire & Yorks. By. v. Bury, 
 14 A. C. 417 ; North of England By. v. Langhaurgh, 24 L. T. 544. 
 See also as to a " book " within the repealed 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, 
 s. 2. See Maple & Go. v. Junior A. & N. Stores, 52 L. J. Ch. 67 ; 
 Oable V. Marks, Id. 107; Davis v. Comitti, 54 L. J. Ch. 419. 
 For an exhaustive disquisition on the Copyright Act, 1912, see 
 Clerk and LindseU on Torts, tit. "Copyright." And as to a 
 " boiler " within 45 & 46 Vict. c. 22, B. v. Boiler Explosions Act 
 Gommissioners, 60 L. J. Q. B. 544. 
 
 (6) For definition of " vessel," see 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 742. 
 
 (c) Ferguson and Hutchinson, Exp., L. E. 6 Q. B. 280. Gomp. 
 The Mac, 7 P. D. 126; Gapp v. Bond, 19 Q. B. D, 200; Glyde 
 Navigation v. Laird, 8 App. Cas. 658. 
 
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132 INTERPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 purpose of carrying passengers on pleasure trips 
 round an artificial lake has been held not to be 
 a " vessel used in navigation " so as to need the 
 suspension on board of a Board of Trade certifi- 
 cate (a). And perhaps as a general proposition the 
 words of a statute should be construed in accord- 
 ance with the dictum of Lord Watson, who says 
 with regard to deeds, in an unrecorded case, "the 
 deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain 
 the true meaning of its several clauses, and the 
 words of each clause should be so interpreted as 
 to bring them into harmony with the other 
 provisions ... if that interpretation does no vio- 
 lence to the meaning of which they are naturally 
 susceptible " {h). 
 
 Another instance of beneficial construction is 
 afforded by s. 3 of the Common Lodging Houses 
 Act, 1853, which forbids the keeping of " a com- 
 mon lodging-house " unless it has been inspected, 
 approved, and registered. The object of the enact- 
 ment (which is repealed except as to Metropolitan 
 PoHce District by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 65, s. 343) being 
 to secure for the poor using these houses condi- 
 tions safeguarding health and preventing the 
 
 (a) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 2, 318 (repealed by Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894); Mayor of Southport v. Morriss, [1893] 
 1 Q. B. 359 ; see also Salt Union v. Wood, [1893] 1 Q. B. 370. " 
 
 (b) North-Eastern By. v. Hastings {Lord), [1900] A. 0. 260, at 
 p. 267. 
 
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BENEFICIAL OONSTEUOTION. 133 
 
 spread of disease, which people better off are 
 supposed to be able to secure for themselves, it 
 was held to apply to a shelter kept for a charitable 
 purpose and not for gain {a). 
 
 A debtor residing abroad " keeps out of the way 
 to avoid service " of process, within the meaning 
 of the Bankruptcy Eules for substituted service (b), 
 and under s, 15 (7), Friendly Societies Act, 1875 
 (repealed s. 35, Friendly Societies Act, 1896), 
 which provides that registered friendly societies 
 shall be entitled to the privilege of having " any 
 money or property belonging to the society," 
 which shall be in the possession of any officer of 
 the society upon his bankruptcy, handed over to 
 the society in preference to any other debts or 
 claims against his estate, it has been held that 
 the society is entitled to be paid out of such 
 estate any balance due to it, in respect of moneys 
 received by him for it, even though he has not in 
 his possession those moneys in specie, and they 
 cannot be traced (c). 
 
 The statutes which require notice of action for 
 
 (a) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 41 ; Logsdon v. Booth, [1900] 1 Q. B. 
 401 ; Logsdon v. Trotter, Id. 617. . See, however, Parker v. 
 Talhot, 76 L. J. Oh. 8 ; Gilbert v. Jones, [1905] 2 K. B. 691. 
 
 (6) Bankruptcy Eules, 1886, Eule 154 (now Bankruptcy 
 Eules, 1915, Eule 156) ; Be Urquhart, 59 L. J. Q. B. 364. 
 
 (c) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 60, s. 15 (7) ; Be Miller (1893), 62 L. J. 
 Q. B. 324 ; Eilheck, Be (1910), 79 L, J. K, B. 265. 
 
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134 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 anything "done" under them, are construed as 
 including an omission of an act which ought to 
 be done as well as the commission of a wrongful 
 one (a). Even criminal statutes, which are subject 
 to what has been called a strict construction, will 
 be found to furnish abundant illustrations of giving 
 an extended meaning to a word (b). 
 
 A statute which requires something to be done 
 by a person would, except in cases subject to the 
 principle that delegatus non potest delegare, be com- 
 plied with, in general, if the thing were done by 
 another on his behalf and by his authority ; for it 
 would be presumed that there was no intention to 
 prevent the application of the general principle of 
 law that qui facit per alium facit per se ; unless 
 
 (a) Wilson v. Halifax, 37 L. J. Ex. 44 ; Poulsum v. Thirst, 36 
 L. J. 0. P. 225. See also Davis v. Curling, 15 L, J. Q. B. 56 ; 
 Newton v. Ellis, 24 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; Edwards v. Islington, 58 
 L. J. Q. B. 165 ; Rarman v. Ainalie (1904), 73 L. J. K. B. 639 ; 
 [1904] 1 K. B. 698. The Public Authorities Protection Act 
 (1893), 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61, has repealed nearly all the statutes 
 requiring notice of action, and substituted therefor by s. 1 (a) 
 a general period of six months. 
 
 (fe) See Chap. X. As to appeal in a " Criminal cause or 
 matter," see Woodall, Bxp., 57 L. J. M. C. 71 ; Schofield, Exp. 
 ' ' (1891), 60 L. J. M. C. 157; B. v. Tyler, [1891] 2 Q. B. 588; 
 Pulhrooh, Exp., 61 L. J. M. C. 91; Exp. Savarhar (1911), 
 80 L. J. K. B. 57. No right of appeal in cases of " guilty " but 
 " insane " : B. v. Taylor (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1671 ; see also 
 Felstead v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1914), 83 L. J. K. B. 
 1192. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTKUOTION. 135 
 
 there was something either in the language or in 
 the object of the statute which showed that a 
 personal act was intended. On this ground, an 
 Act of Parliament which requires that notice of 
 appeal shall be given by churchwardens is com- 
 plied with if given by their solicitor (a). So in 
 the absence of any provision to the contrary in 
 the Bills of Sale Acts, it has been held that a bill 
 of sale may be executed by attorney, and the 
 grantee may be the attorney of the grantor for such 
 purpose (b). And the repealed (c) Dramatic Copy- 
 right Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, which required 
 the written consent of the author of a drama to its 
 representation, was held sufficiently complied with 
 if the consent were given by the author's agent (d). 
 When an Irish statute, after giving to tenants for 
 lives of for more than fourteen years, the right of 
 felling any trees which they had planted, required 
 
 (a) B. V. Middlesex (1850), 20 L. J. M. C. 42 ; B. v. Carew, 
 20 L. J. M. 0. Un. ; B. v. Kent, 42 L. J. M. C. 112 ; France v. 
 Button (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 488 ; B. v. St. Mary Abbotts (1891), 
 60 L. J. M. C. 52 ; Walsh v. Southwell, 20 L. J. M. C. 165 ; B. v. 
 Huntingdonshire, 19 L. J. M. C. 127; Oharles v. Blackwell, 
 46 L. J. C. P. 368 ; Be Lancaster, 3 Oh. D. 498 ; Mousell Bros. 
 V. L. & N. W. By. (1917), 87 L. J. K. B. 82. As to effect of 
 Power of Attorney in imposing liability, see Banh of Bengal v. 
 Bamanathan Chatty (1916), L. E. 43 Ind. App. 48, P. 
 (6) Furnivall v. Hudson (1893), 62 L. J. Oh. 178. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46, s. 36, Sched. 2. 
 
 (d) Morton v. Copeland, 24 L. J. C. P. 169. 
 
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136 INTEEPEETATIOK OF STATUTES. 
 
 that "the tenant so planting" them should file 
 an affidavit within twelve months, in a form 
 given by the Act, which purported throughout 
 to be made by the tenant personally, the House 
 of Lords construed the Act as satisfied by the 
 affidavit of the tenant's agent. A stricter con- 
 struction, it was said, would have rendered the 
 Act inapplicable to most of the cases which it had 
 in view (a). 
 
 The principle is well illustrated by two decisions 
 under the partially repealed (6) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, 
 which required that the person who objected to a 
 voter should sign a notice of his objection, and 
 deliver it to the postmaster. This was held to 
 require personal signature (c), but not personal 
 delivery or receipt (d). It was material that the 
 person objected to should be able to ascertain that 
 he really was objected to by the objector, which 
 he could not so easily do if a signature by an agent 
 was admitted ; just as, to guard against persona- 
 tion, the signature of a voting paper under the 
 former Municipal Corporations Act must be per- 
 sonal and not by agent (e). But there was no 
 
 (a) Mountcashell v. O'Neill (1856), 5 H. L. Gas. 937. See also 
 51 & 52 Vict. c. 37, s. 1. 
 (6) See 7 & 8 Geo V. c. 64, s. 47, Sched. 8 
 
 (c) Toms V. Cuming (1845), 14 L. J. C. P. 67 ; Lewis v. Roberts, 
 31 L. J. C. P. 51. 
 
 (d) Cuming v. Toms (1844), 14 L. J, 0. P. 54. 
 
 (e) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 32, repealed 45 & 46 Vict. o. 50, 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 137 
 
 valid reason for supposing that the Legislature 
 did not intend to give effect to the rule, qui facit 
 per alium facit per se, in the case of the mere 
 delivery. The knowledge of the servant may be 
 constructively that of the master within the mean- 
 ing of an Act, even when making the master 
 penally responsible (a). An Act (18 & 19 Vict. 
 c. 121) (repealed except as to London) which 
 authorises justices to summon a person by whose 
 act a nuisance arises, or, if that person cannot be 
 ascertained, the occupier of the premises in which 
 it exists, was held to authorise the summoning of 
 the occupier, if the person who had actually done 
 the act was his servant, since in law the act of the 
 latter is that of the former (b). 
 
 On the same principle it has been held that s. 3, 
 Truck Act, 1831, which provides that the entire 
 amount of wages earned by an artificer shall be 
 actually paid to him in the current coin of the 
 
 s. 5, which latter Act is modified by 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64 ; B. v. 
 Tart (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 173. See also Monhs v. Jackson, 46 
 L. J. C. P. 162. 
 
 (a) Gore v. James, L. E. 7 Q. B. 135, per Lush J. (But see 
 Pain V. Boughtwood, 59 L. J. M. 0. 45) ; B. v. Stephens, 
 L. E. 1 Q. B. 702. See also Stroud's Judicial Diet. & Supp., 
 tit. " Knowingly," and Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, chap. 2, 
 6th ed., pp. 62—66. 
 
 (&) Barnes v. Aekroyd, 41 L. J. M. 0. 110. For the converse 
 of this, see Sherras v. De Butzen, [1895] 1 Q. B. 918 ; a case of 
 supplying Uquor to a constable on duty. 
 
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138 INTERPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 realm, would be satisfied by payment being made 
 to his authorised agent (a). 
 
 On the other hand, the Statute of Frauds 
 Amendment Act, 1828, 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, which 
 requires an acknowledgment " signed by the party 
 chargeable thereby," to take a debt out of the 
 Statute of Limitation, has been held to require 
 personal signature, and not to admit of a signature 
 by an agent (b). But this construction was based 
 partly on the circumstance that another Statute 
 of Limitation made express mention of an 
 agent (c). Where an Act required that notices 
 should be signed by certain public trustees, or by 
 their clerk, it was held that the signature of the 
 clerk of their clerk, who had a general authority 
 from his employer to sign all documents issuing 
 from his ofiS.ce, was not a compliance with the 
 Act (d). And a lithographic indorsement of a 
 
 (o) 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 37 ; Hewlett v. Allen, [1894] A. C. 383 ; 
 as to when a " set off " is admissible, see Williams v. North's 
 Navigation Collieries, [1904] 2 K. B. 44, at p. 55, C.'A. ; see also 
 Summerlea Iron Co. v. Thomson (1918), S. C. (J.) 34. As to what 
 is an iUegal contract under the Act, see Kemp v. Lewis, [1914] 3 
 K. B. 543. 
 
 (6) Hyde v. Johnson (1836), 2 Bing. (N. G.) 776. See also 
 Swift V. Jewsbury, L. E. 9 Q. B. 301 ; Williams v. Mason, 28 
 L. T. 232 ; Barwiek v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. E. 2 Ex. 259 ; 
 Hirst V. West Biding Union Banking Co., [1901] 2 K. B. 560 ; 
 Citizens Life Assurance Co. v. Brown, [1904] A. 0. 423, P. G. 
 
 (c) Sup. pp. 68-69. 
 
 (d) Miles V. Brough, 32 B. 845 ; 61 E. E. 409 ; Inglis v. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTKUOTION. 139 
 
 solicitor's name is not a compliance with the 
 provision of the County Court Eules that he 
 should "indorse on the particulars his name or 
 firm," but the solicitor's name written by his 
 authorised clerk will suffice (a). 
 
 Again, where the statute required that the act 
 should be done by the party " himself," it would 
 hardly admit of its being done by an agent, as in 
 the case of the provision that a nomination paper 
 of a candidate for municipal office should be 
 delivered to the town clerk by the candidate 
 himself, or his proposer or seconder (6). A statute 
 which provides that a person, not a party to an 
 election petition, who is charged with corrupt 
 practices, shall have an opportunity of being heard 
 "by himself" and of calling witnesses, does not 
 authorise his appearing by counsel or solicitor (c). 
 So, where an Act required a special qualification 
 
 G. N. By. (1852), 16 Jur. 895, H. L. (Sc.) ; and see Brown v. 
 Tombs, [1891] 1 Q. B. 253. 
 
 (a) Order VI. r. 9, County Court Eules, 1903-1918 ; so held 
 per Pry L.J., B. v. Fitzroy-Cowper (1890), 59 L. J. Q. B. 265 
 Lord Bsher M.E. dissenting. 
 
 (6) Monks V. Jackson, 46 L. J. 0. P. 162, distinguished in 
 Harford v. Linskey (1899), 1 Q. B. 852, at p. 861. The much 
 amended Municipal Corp. Act, 1882, omits " himself " ; in the 
 repealed 3rd Schedule, part 2, s. 7. For present provisions as 
 to voting by proxy, see 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 84, and 3rd Schedule. 
 
 (c) 46 & 47 Vict, c. 51, s. 38; B. v. Mansel Jones, 23 Q. B. D. 
 29 ; see also Monks v. Jackson, 46 L. J. C. P. 162. 
 
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140 INTBBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 for doing anything. As, for example, under the 
 Pharmacy Act, 1868, which by s. 16 prohibited 
 under a penalty the sale of poisons by unqualified 
 persons, the shopman of a qualified employer, not 
 himself qualified, was held liable to a penalty for 
 selling, except under the personal supervision of 
 his employer (a) ; but an unqualified person who 
 receives an order for poison and forwards it to 
 a manufacturer who supplies it directly to the 
 customer, has not the conduct and management of 
 the sale so as to constitute him the seller within 
 the meaning of the Act (h). 
 
 The statute which enacts that in any contract 
 for letting a house for habitation by persons of 
 the working classes there shall be an impKed 
 " condition " that the house is fit for habitation, 
 has been construed as importing a promise by the 
 landlord to that effect, and so giving the tenant a 
 right to sue on it, for the purpose of giving effect 
 to the intention (c). And this principle is ampli- 
 fied by 9 Edw. VII. c. 44, s. 14. 
 
 (a) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 121, s. 15 ; and see 32 & 33 Vict. c. 117, 
 repealing in part the first 15 sections of the earlier Act ; see 
 also 8 Bdw. VII. c. 55, s. 2 ; Pharmaceutical Socy. v. Wheeldon, 
 24 Q. B. D. 683 ; see also Pharmaceutical Socy. V. Nash (1911), 
 80 L. J. K. B. 416 ; Oomjp. Lewis v. Weston-super-Mare (1888), 
 58 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 40 Ch. D. 55. 
 
 (6) Pharmaceutical Socy. v. White, 70 L. J. K. B. 386. 
 
 (c) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 72, s. 12; Walker v. Hohbs, 59 L. J. 
 Q. B. 93. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 141 
 
 Sometimes the governing principle of the 
 remedial enactment has heen extended to cases 
 not included in its language, to prevent a failure 
 of justice and consequently of the probable in- 
 tention. Thus, s. 60, Common Law Procedure 
 Act, 1854, which empowered a Court (upon the 
 application of either party to a cause supported 
 by the affidavit of such party, of his belief that a 
 material document was in the possession of his 
 opponent) to order its production, though at one 
 time it did not admit the affidavit of the solicitor 
 of the party, even when the party was abroad (a), 
 was satisfied by the solicitor's affidavit, where the 
 party was a corporation, and consequently in- 
 capable of making an affidavit, or, perhaps of 
 forming a belief (b), and this power is now ex- 
 tended to persons other than solicitors (c). The 
 governing principle being that all suitors should 
 have power of getting discovery (d) ; and as a cor- 
 poration could make no affidavit, or could formerly 
 make one only by their soHcitor, the affidavit 
 
 (a) Christophersen v. Lotinga (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 121; 
 Frederici v. Vanderzee (1877), 46 L. J. 0. P. 194 ; Herschfield v. 
 Clarh, 25 L. J. Ex. 113. Now any one who can positively 
 testify to the requisite facts is accepted as a competent de- 
 ponent, Hallett V. Andrews (1897), 42 L. J., p. 68. 
 
 (6) Kingsford v. G. W. B. Co., 16 C. B. N. S. 761. 
 
 (c) PatM Frires Cinema, Ltd. v. United Electric Theatres, Ltd., 
 [1914] 3 K. B. 1253, C. A. 
 
 {d) Per Erie C.J., Id. 
 
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142 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the latter was considered a substantial com- 
 pliance with the Act. 
 
 A provision of 3 & 4 Will IV. c. 42, which, 
 after depriving the parties to a reference under a 
 rule of Court or judge's order of the power which 
 they formerly had of revoking the authority of 
 their arbitrator, enacted that a judge might from 
 time to time enlarge the time for the arbitrator to 
 make his award, was at first thought confined to 
 cases where a revocation had been attempted (a) ; 
 or, at all events, applicable only where the arbi- 
 trator had no power to enlarge the time, or had 
 not yet made his award (b) ; but it was afterwards 
 held that a judge had power to enlarge the time 
 in all references made by judicial order (c) ; and to 
 do so even when the arbitrator issued his award 
 after the time to which he was limited had ex- 
 pired, and the award was consequently, so far, a 
 nullity (d). 
 
 The beneficial spirit of construction is also well 
 illustrated by cases where there is so far a conflict 
 between the general enactment and some of its 
 
 (a) Potter v. Newman (1836), 5 L. J. Ex. 93w. 
 (6) Per Tindal C.J., Lambert v. Hutchinson, 2 M. & Gr. 858, 
 and per Patteson J., Doe v. Powell, 7 Dowl. 539. 
 
 (c) Leslie v. Bichardson, 17 L. J. C. P. 324. 
 
 (d) Be Ward, 32 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; Lord v. Lee (1868), 37 
 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; Knowles & Sons, Ltd. v. Bolton Gorporation, 
 [1900] 2 Q. B., at p. 257. See also E. S. C, Order LXIV. 
 r. 14a. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 143 
 
 subsidiary provisions, that the former would be 
 limited in the scope of its operation if the latter 
 were not restricted. An Act which, after autho- 
 rising the imposition of a local rate on all occu- 
 piers of land in a parish, gives a dissatisfied 
 ratepayer an appeal, but at the same time requires 
 the appellant to enter into recognisances to pro- 
 secute the appeal, presents such a conflict. Either 
 it excludes corporations from the right of appeal, 
 because a corporation is incapable of entering into 
 recognisances ; or it extends the right to them, 
 without compHanoe with that special requirement. 
 And the latter would be unquestionably the bene- 
 ficial way of interpreting the statute. The general 
 and paramount object of the Act would receive 
 full effect by giving to corporate bodies the same 
 right of appeal against the burthen imposed on 
 them ; and the subsidiary provision would be 
 understood as apphcable only to those who were 
 capable of entering into recognisances (a). 
 
 The Act De Prerogativa Eegis, which provides 
 that the lands and tenements of lunatics " shall 
 in no wise be aliened," does not prohibit the 
 Court from giving up an interest in the real estate 
 of a lunatic in order to acquire for him a larger 
 and more valuable estate. The statute was passed 
 with the object of preserving the estates of lunatics, 
 
 (a) Gortis v. Kent Waterworks (1827), 7 B. & 0. 314. 
 
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144 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and a contrary interpretation would not have 
 carried out that intention (a). 
 
 The Charitable Uses Act, 1735, 9 Geo. II. o. 36, 
 which prohibited the disposition of lands to a 
 charity by other means than by a deed executed 
 a year before the donor's death, was open to the 
 construction that it applied only to lands which 
 passed by deed, and therefore not to lands of copy- 
 hold tenure (b). But as the object of the statute 
 was, manifestly, to include all lands of whatever 
 tenure in its prohibition, the only consequence 
 that would have followed, if it had been thought 
 impossible that the mode of conveyance provided 
 by the statute should operate to transfer copy- 
 holds, would have been that copyholds would 
 have fallen within the general prohibition abso- 
 lutely, and would have been incapable of passing 
 to a charity by any mode of conveyance (c). 
 
 Except in some cases where a statute has fallen 
 under the principle of excessively strict construc- 
 tion, the language of a statute is generally ex- 
 tended to new things which were not known and 
 
 (a) 17 Edw. II. c. 10; Be Sefton, [1898] 2 Oh. 378; see also 
 S. S. B., In re, [1906] 1 Gh., at pp. 724, 725 ; and Gashell and 
 Walters Contract, In re, [1906] 2 Ch. C. A., at p. 10. 
 
 (6) Gomp. Smith v. Adams (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. '268. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Tenterden, Doe v. Waterton, 3 B. & Aid. 151. 
 As to the presumption of enrolment in such cases, see Haigh v. 
 West, [1893] 2 Q. B. C. A., Lindley L.J., at p. 31. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 145 
 
 could not have been contemplated by the Legisla- 
 ture when it was passed. This occurs when the 
 Act deals with a genus, and the thing which after- 
 wards comes into existence is a species of it (a). 
 Thus, the provision of Magna Charta which 
 exempts lords from the liability of having their 
 carts taken for carriage was held to extend to 
 degrees of nobility not known when it was made, 
 as dukes, marquises, and viscounts (6). The par- 
 tially repealed Poor Belief Act, 1743, which gave 
 parishioners the right of inspecting the accounts 
 of churchwardens and overseers under the poor 
 law of BHzabeth, was held to extend to those of 
 guardians, officers who were created by Gilbert's 
 Act (22 Geo. III.), passed in 1783 (c). 13 Eliz. 
 c. 5, which made void (as against creditors) 
 transfers of lands, goods, and chattels (d), did not 
 originally apply to copyholds or choses in action, 
 
 (a) Per Bovill G.J., B. v. Smith (1870), L. E. 1 C. C. 720 ; 
 per Holt CJ., Lane v. Cotton (1701), 12 Mod. 485, 1. Ld. 
 Eaymond, 746 ; referred to in Mersey Bock Trustees v. Gibbs 
 (1866), L. E. 1 H. L., at p. 124, and Bainbridge v. Postmaster 
 General, [1906] 1 K. B. C. A., at p. 186. 
 
 (b) 1 Inst. 35. 
 
 (c) 17 Geo. II. c. 38 ; 22 Geo. III. c. 83 (repealed S. L. E., 
 1871); B. V. Great Farringdon, 9 B. & C. 541; Bennett v. 
 Edwards, 7 B. & G. 586 ; 6 Bing. 230. 
 
 (d) For cases held not to be within the statute, see Benny, 
 Trustee of v. Benny, [1919] 1 K. B. 583 ; Bavid and Ackland, In 
 re, [1914] 2 K. B. 691 ; Pearce v. Bulteel, [1916] 2 Ch. 544. 
 
 I.S. 10 
 
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146 INTBBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 as these were not seizable in execution (a) ; but 
 when they were made subject to be so taken 
 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110), they fell within the operation 
 of the Act (b). The Act of Geo. II., which pro- 
 tected copyright in engravings by a penalty for 
 piratically engraving, etching, or otherwise, or 
 "in any other manner" copying them, extends 
 to copies taken by photography (c). A telegram 
 may be a forged instrument according to the true 
 interpretation of the Forgery Act (d). The tele- 
 phone is a "telegraph" within the meaning of 
 the Telegraph Acts, 1863 and 1869, though not 
 invented or contemplated in 1869 (e). Every com- 
 pany (including a private company) (/) registered 
 
 (o) Sims V. Thomas, 12 A. & E. 536. 
 
 (6) Norcutt V. Dodd (1841), 54 E. E. 224; Barrack v. 
 McCulloch, 26 L. J. Ch. 105 ; JR. v. Smith, L. E. 1 G. 0. 270, per 
 Bovill C.J. ; Edmunds v. Edmunds, [1904] P. 362. 
 
 (c) 8 Geo. II. c. 13; see 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46, and note; 
 Gambart v. Ball, 32 L. J. 0. P. 166 ; Graves v. Ashford, L. E. 2 
 0. P. 410; A.-G. V. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 378; Comp. Hanf- 
 staengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 2 Ch. 1 ; Id. v. Newnes, [1894] 
 3 Ch. 109; note also cases cited inf. Chap. X., Sec. I; for an 
 exhaustive j-esume of the subject in Clerk and Lindsell on 
 Torts, Chap. XXI. 
 
 id) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, b. 38, partially repealed and 
 re-enacted by the Forgery Act, 1913, 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 27; 
 B. V. Biley, 65 L. J. M. C. 74. 
 
 (e) 26. & 27 Vict. c. 112 ; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 73 ; A.-G. v 
 Edison Telephone Co., 6 Q. B. D. 244 ; Postmaster General v. 
 National Telephone Co., [1907] 1 Ch. 621. 
 
 (/) White, In re, [1913] 1 Ch. 231. 
 
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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION. 147 
 
 under the Companies Acts is a " public company " 
 within s. 5, Apportionment Act, 1870 (a). 
 
 It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that 
 beneficial construction is not to be strained so as 
 to include cases plainly omitted from the natural 
 meaning of the words (6). For instance, the, 
 repealed Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, which re- 
 quired that public-houses should be closed at 
 certain hours on Sundays, was held incapable of 
 being consiJrued as extending to Christmas Day (c), 
 but this incapacity is now remedied by the 6th 
 Schedule to the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 
 1910. And in like manner the anomaly resulting 
 from the decision of the Court of Appeal (d) that 
 the statutory rule directing that applications for 
 new trials in cases tried by a jury should be made 
 to the Court of Appeal, could not be extended to 
 cases tried by an official referee has now been 
 cured by legislation (e). 
 
 (a) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35 ; Be LysagU, [1898] 1 Oh. 115 ; 
 Baven, In re (1915), 111 L. T. 938. 
 
 (6) Sup. pp. 25-26. 
 
 (c) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 61, s. 1 ; Forsdike v. Colquhoun, 11 Q. B. D. 
 71. 
 
 {d) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 44, s. 1 ; Gower v. ToUtt, 39 W. E. 193. 
 
 (e) 62 Vict. c. 6, s. 1. 
 
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CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONSEQUENCES TO BE CONSIDEEED — PKESUMPTION 
 AGAINST ANY ALTEEATION OE THE LAW BETOND 
 THE SPECIFIC OBJECT OF THE ACT — MENS BEA 
 IN CBIMINAL LAW. 
 
 • 
 
 Bepoeb adopting any proposed construction of a 
 passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it 
 is important to consider the effects or consequences 
 which would result from it (a), for they often point 
 out the real meaning of the words (b). There are 
 certain objects which the Legislature is presumed 
 not to intend ; and a construction which would 
 lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided. It 
 is not infrequently necessary therefore to limit the 
 effect of the words contained in an enactment 
 (especially general words), and sometimes to 
 depart, not only from their primary and literal 
 meaning, but also from the rules of grammatical 
 construction in cases where it seems highly im- 
 probable that the words in their wide primary 
 or grammatical meaning actually express the real 
 
 (a) Grot, de B. & P. b. 2, c. 16, s. 4; U. S. v. Fisher, 
 2 Oranoh, 390. 
 (6) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 8. 
 
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PEESUMPTION AGAINST GENERAL ALTERATIONS. 149 
 
 intention of the Legislature ; it being more reason- 
 able to hold that the Legislature expressed its 
 intention in a slovenly manner, than that a 
 meaning should be given to them which could not 
 have been intended. 
 
 One of these presumptions is that the Legislature 
 does not intend to make any substantial alteration 
 in the law beyond what it explicitly declares {a), 
 either in express terms or by clear implication ; 
 or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope 
 and object of the statute. In all general matters 
 beyond, the law remains undisturbed. It is in 
 the last degree improbable that the Legislature 
 would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe 
 rights, or depart from the general system of law, 
 without expressing its intention with irresistible 
 clearness (b) ; and to give any such effect to 
 general words, simply because they have that 
 meaning when used either in their widest, their 
 usual or their natural sense, would be to give 
 them a meaning other than that which was 
 actually intended. General words and phrases, 
 therefore, however wide and comprehensive they 
 may be in their literal sense, must, usually, be 
 construed as being limited to the actual objects 
 
 (a) Per Trevor J., Arthur v. Bokeriham, 11 Mod. 150 ; see also 
 Earhert's Case, 3 Eep. 13b; the above passage cited by counsel, 
 Cory V. France, 80 L. J. K. B, 346 ; and see inf. p. 313. 
 
 (6) 2 Cranch, 390. 
 
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150 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the Act, and as not altering the law 
 beyond (a). 
 
 Thus, a statute which authorised "any" or 
 "the nearest" justice of the peace to try certain 
 cases, would not authorise a justice to try any 
 such oases out of the territorial limits of his own 
 jurisdiction (b) ; or any in which he had a dis- 
 qualifying interest or a bias (c) ; or which he 
 was incapacitated from hearing by any other 
 general principle of law (d) ; still less to hear 
 them by any other course of proceeding than that 
 established by law (e). So, the Debtors Act, 
 1869, empowering " any (inferior) Court " to 
 commit for default of payment of a debt, in pur- 
 suance of an order or judgment of " that or any 
 other competent Court," did not authorise such a 
 
 (a) See per Sir J. Eomilly, Minet v. Leman, 20 Beav. 278 ; 
 Biver Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 1 Q. B. D. 564, per 
 MeUish LJ., 2 App. Gas. 743 ; Sv. A.-G. v. Exeter Corp. (1911), 
 80 L. J. K. B. 636. 
 
 (6) 1 Hawk. P. 0. c. 65, s. 45 ; The Peerless, 1 Q. B. 153 ; B. v. 
 Fylingdales, 7 B. & C. 438 ; Sv. per Darling J., Be Bros. (1911), 
 80 L. J. K. B. 147. 
 
 (c) B. V. Cheltenham, 55 E. E. 321 ; B. v. Meyer (1876), 
 
 1 Q. B. D. 173 ; B. v. L. C. 0., 61 L. J. M. C. 75. B. v. 
 Gt. Yarmouth JJ. (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 525. 
 
 (d) Bonham's Case, 8 Eep. 118a ; Great Charte v. Kennington, 
 
 2 Stra. 1173 ; B. v. Sainslury (1791), 2 E. E. 433 ; Lawson v. 
 Beynolds, [1904] 1 Ch. 718. 
 
 (e) Dalt. c. 6, s. 6 ; Guerin, In re (1888), 53 J. P. 468 ; camp. 
 Button, Exp. (1911), 75. J. P. 558. 
 
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PEESUMPTION AGAINST GENERAL ALTERATIONS. 151 
 
 Court to commit, unless the debtor was subject to 
 its general jurisdiction by residence or business (a). 
 An Act wbioh authorised a distress would not 
 authorise a seizure of goods in custodid legis (6). 
 The provision in s. 26 (8), Judicature Act, 1873, 
 that the Court might grant an injunction in all 
 cases in which it should consider it "just and 
 convenient" that such an order should be made, 
 did not extend the authority of the Court beyond 
 cases where there was an invasion of recognised 
 legal or equitable rights (c). The provisions in 
 R. 1, Order LY, E. S. C. 1875 (now E. 1, Ord. LXV, 
 E. S. C.) and the repealed (d) s. 28, Eailway & 
 Canal Traffic Act, 1873, that the costs of and 
 incidental to proceedings should be in " the dis- 
 cretion of the Court " was construed as giving no 
 wider discretion than had always been exercised 
 by the Court of Chancery, and therefore as not 
 authorising an order on a successful defendant to 
 pay a portion of the plaintiff's costs (e), 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 ; Washer v. Elliott, 45 L. J. G. P. 144, 
 explained in Ives, In re (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 665, at pp. 669, 670. 
 
 (h) 17 & 18 Viet. c. 104, s. 523 ; repealed and re-enacted by 57 & 
 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 693 ; The Westmoreland (1845), 2 Eob. W. 394. 
 
 (c) Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Oh. D. 89 ; Day v. Brownrigg, 48 
 L. J. Oh. 173 ; and per Lord Hatherley, Beuss v. Bos, L. E, 5 
 H. L. 193. See also Jackson v. Barry Bailway Co., [1893] 
 1 Ch. 238 C. A., at p. 249. 
 
 (tZ) Eepealed by 51 & 52 Vict. o. 25. 
 
 (e) Foster v. G. W. E. Co. (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 516 ; Mills' 
 
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152 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 " Fresh evidence " within the meaning of s. 7, 
 Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, 
 which gives magistrates jurisdiction to rescind 
 a separation order previously made under s. 4 of 
 that Act, means the same sort of evidence as that 
 upon which a new trial would in the ordinary 
 course be granted (a). 
 
 An Act which provided that a mayor should not 
 be, by reason of his office, ineligible as a town 
 councillor or alderman, would not make him 
 eligible when he acted in the judicial capacity of 
 returning officer at the election ; for it would not 
 be a just construction of the language used, or a 
 legitimate inference from it, that the Legislature 
 had intended to repeal by a mere side-wind the 
 principle of law that a man cannot be a judge in 
 his own case (b). So, an Act which directed the 
 election of officers, would be understood as autho- 
 
 Estate, Be, 34 Oh. D. 24 ; Lamhton v. Parkinson (1887), 35 W. E. 
 545, 
 
 (a) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39 ; Johnsons. Johnson, 69 L. J. P. D. & A. 
 13 ; Dodd V. Dodd, [1906] P. 189, at p. 199. As to what is 
 " fresh evidence," see Timmins v. Timmins, [1919] P. 75. As to 
 the character of evidence which a justice should require when 
 making an order, see Terry v. Terry (1915), 32 T. L. E. 167. 
 Camp. MurtagJi v. Barry, 24 Q. B. D. 632, inf. p. 519. 
 
 (h) B. v. Owens (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 316 ; B v. Tewkesbury, 
 37 L. J. Q. B. 285 ; B. v. Milledge, 4 Q. B. D. 332, S. C. nom. 
 B. v. Weymouth, 48 L. J. M. C. 139; B. v. Henley, [1892] 
 1 Q. B. 504 ; B. v. Morton, [1892] 1 Q. B. 39. 
 
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PRESUMPTION AGAINST GENERAL ALTERATIONS. 153 
 
 rising such election only on a lawful day, and not 
 on a Sunday (a) ; and if the statute declared that 
 the candidate who had the majority of votes should 
 he deemed elected, it would he construed as not 
 intending to override the general principle, that 
 voters who vote for a person whom they know to 
 he ineligible, throw away their votes (b). 
 
 In the same way, a statute requiring a recog- 
 nisance would not be understood as giving com- 
 petency to minors and married women to bind 
 themselves by such an instrument (c). But since 
 the passing of the Married Women's Property 
 Acts married women possessed of separate estate 
 may enter into recognisances, and it would seem 
 that the rule in the case of infants is not of 
 universal application (d). The Statute of West- 
 minster 2, which gave a judgment creditor the 
 writ of elegit to take half the lands of his debtor, 
 did not authorise the issue of the writ against the 
 
 (a) B. V. Butler, 1 W. Bl. 649; B. v. Bridgewater (1774), 
 1 Cowp. 139. 
 
 (b) B. V. Coaks (18S'4), 23 L. J. Q. B. 183, discussed in 
 Pritchard v. Bangor Oorp. (1888), 13 A. 0. 241 ; Beresford-Hope 
 V. Sandhurst (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 316 ; see 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64, 
 s. 4 ; B. V. How, 33 L. J. M. C. 53 ; B. v. St. Matthew, 32 L. T. 
 558 ; B. V. Wimbledon Loc. Board, 51 L. J. Q. B. 219. 
 
 (c) Bennett v. Watson, 3 M. & S. 1 ; Barrow, Exp., 3 Yes. 554 ; 
 Hussey's Case, 9 Eep. 73. 
 
 (d) Williams, Exp. (1824), 13 Price. 673. 
 
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154 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 heir of the debtor during his minority (a). So, 
 s. 7, 43 Eliz, c. 2, in making the mother and grand- 
 mother of an illegitimate child liable to maintain 
 it, did not reach them when under coverture (h) ; 
 and an Act which punished " every person " who 
 deserted his or her children would not apply to 
 a married woman, without separate estate, whom 
 her husband had deserted (c). 
 
 And now by virtue of the Married Women's 
 Property Acts a married woman is entitled to 
 renounce or disclaim a gift by will of personal pro- 
 perty notwithstanding it is bequeathed subject to 
 a restraint on anticipation {d). 
 
 Again, the enactment which gave a vote for the 
 election of town councillors to every " person" of 
 full age who had occupied a house for a certain 
 time, and provided that words importing the mas- 
 culine gender should include females for aU pur- 
 poses relating to the right to vote, was held, 
 having regard to the general scope of the Act, to 
 remove only that disability which was founded on 
 sex, but not to affect that which was the result of 
 marriage as well as sex, and therefore not to give 
 
 (a) 2 Inst. 395. - 
 
 (6) Gustodes v. JinJces, Styles, 283 ; Draper v. Glenfield, 2 
 Bulstr. 345 ; Coleman v. Birmingham, 50 L. J. M. G. 92 ; but see 
 s. 21, Married Women's Property Act, 1882. 
 
 (c) Peters v. Cowie, 46 L. J. M. C. 177. 
 
 (d) Wimperis, In re, [1914] 1 Oh. 502. 
 
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PEESUMPTION AGAINST GENEEAL ALTERATIONS. 155 
 
 the right of voting to married women (a), but this 
 dieability is now removed by the Eepresentation 
 of the People Act, 1918. An Act which simply left 
 the determination of a matter to a majority of 
 vestrymen "present at the meeting" would not 
 affect the common law right of the minority to 
 demand a poll ; and the " meeting " would there- 
 fore be understood as continuing until the end of 
 the poll (b). R. 7, Order XXXVII, E. S. C, under 
 which the Court has power in any cause or matter 
 at any stage of the proceedings to order the 
 attendance of any person for the purpose of pro- 
 ducing any documents which the Court may think 
 fit to be produced, and which such person could 
 be compelled to produce at the trial, does not 
 authorise an order for the production of documents 
 in the case of a person not a party to the litiga- 
 tion, when there is no trial or application pending, 
 and the production is not necessary for carrying 
 out an order already made (c). 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, s. 9 ; B. v. Barrald, 41 L. J. Q. B. 
 173 ; see Ghorlton v. Lings, 88 L. J. C. P. 25 ; Be March, 54 
 L. J. Ch. 143 ; Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst, sup. p. 153. 
 
 (6) 5 & 6 WUl. IV. 0. 76, s. 18, repealed by 45 & 46 Vict. 
 c. 50; B. V. How, 33 L. J. M. C. 53; White v. Steele, 32 
 L. J. C. P. 1; B. V. St. Mary, 47 E. E. 613; B. v. B'Oyly, 
 12 Ad. & E. 139 ; 54 E. E. 553 ; Be Ghillington Iron Co. (1885), 
 54 L. J. Ch. 624. See B. v. Wimlledon Loc. Board (1882), 
 51 L. J. Q. B. 219. 
 
 (c) Elder v. Carter, 25 Q. B D. 194 ; O'Shea v. Wood, [1891] 
 
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156 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 In making copyholds devisable, the Wills Act, 
 1837, 1 Vict. c. 26, was construed as not intend- 
 ing to interfere with the relation of lord and 
 tenant ; and consequently the devised copyholds 
 did not vest immediately in the devisee, but 
 remained in the customary heir until the devisee's 
 admittance (a). So, 39 Eliz. c. 5, which gave to 
 "all persons" seised of lands in fee, power to 
 found hospitals, was construed as not conferring 
 that power on corporate bodies which were dis- 
 abled from alienation ; though the word " persons " 
 was wide enough to include corporations, and 
 indeed extended to those corporate bodies which 
 possessed the power of alienation, such as munici- 
 palities (6). Again, the Wills Act of Hen. VIII. (c) 
 which empowered " all persons " to devise their 
 lands, did not legalise a devise of land to a cor- 
 poration (J), nor would it have enabled lunatics 
 or minors to make a will, even if the 34 & 35 
 
 » 
 
 P. 237, 286 ; Straher v. BeynoUs (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 262. But 
 secus under 42 Vict. c. 11, s. 7 ; Howard v. Beall (1889), 
 23 Q. B. D. 1. 
 
 (a) Garland v. Mead, 40 L. J. Q. B. 179 ; Bveringham v. Ivatt 
 (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B., at p. 685. See as to choses in action, 
 Bishop V. Curtis (1852), 88 E. E. 819 ; 18 Q. B. 878. 
 
 (b) 2 Inst. 721 ; Newcastle Corp. v. A.-G., 12 CI. & F. 402. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 2. 
 
 (d) 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1 ; Jesus College Case, Duke, Charit. 
 Uses, 78 ; Branetli v. Havering, Id. 83 ; Christ's Hospital v. 
 Hawes, Id. 84. 
 
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PRESUMPTION AGAINST GENERAL ALTERATIONS. 157 
 
 Hen. YIII. c. 1 (a), had not been passed to prevent 
 a different construction (6). The object of the 
 Legislature was, obviously, only to confer a new 
 power of disposition on persons already of capacity 
 to deal with their property and not to abolish an 
 existing disability from disposing or taking those 
 who were under such incapacity. 
 
 A statute which enacted that " every convey- 
 ance " in a particular form should be "vahd," 
 would not thereby cure an initial defect of 
 title (c). 
 
 So, the Tithe Act, 1836, in declaring maps 
 made under its provisions, " satisfactory evidence " 
 of the matters therein stated, as not necessarily 
 evidence on a question of title between land- 
 owners, that being a matter foreign to the scope 
 of the Act (d). But such evidence has been held 
 admissible in the case of a "manor map" made 
 long anterior to the date of action by a deceased 
 
 (a) Eepealed by 1 Edw. VI. c. 12. 
 
 (&) Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 91. Comp. O'Shanassy v. 
 Joachim, 1 App. Cas. 82 ; and see Tooth v. Power, [1891] A. C, 
 at p. 291. And as to married women, before the 45 & 46 Vict. 
 c. 75, see Willoch v. Noble, L. E. 7 H. L. 580 ; Boe v. Battle, 
 5 B. & Aid. 492. 
 
 (c) Ward v. Scott, 3 Camp. 284. See also Whidhorne v. 
 Eccles. Com., 47 L. J. Oh. 129; Forbes v. Eccles. Com., 42 
 L. J. Ch. 97. 
 
 (d) 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 71, s. 64 ; Wilberforce v. HearfieU, 46 
 L. J. Ch. 584. 
 
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158 INTEBPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 person conversant witli the district (a). So, a ship 
 built in England for a foreigner would not be a 
 "British ship" within the provisions requiring 
 registration and transfer by bill of sale, even while 
 still the property of the English builder (&), Sec. 
 126, Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (c), which made a 
 composition accepted under certain circumstances 
 by creditors binding on all creditors " whose names 
 are shown in the debtor's statement," with the 
 proviso that it " shall not affect any other 
 creditor," excluded only non-assenting creditors, 
 but not creditors whose names were not stated 
 in the debtor's statement, who, in fact, assented ; 
 for it was understood as not intending to interfere 
 with the general principle that it is competent to 
 a person to bind himself by such an assent (d). 
 12 Car. II. c. 17 (e), which enacted that all persons 
 presented to benefices in the time of the Common- 
 wealth, and who should confirm as directed by the 
 Act, should be confirmed therein, " notwithstanding 
 any act or thing whatsoever," was obviously not 
 
 (a) Smith V. Uster (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 154. 
 (6) Union Bank v. Lenanton, 47 L. J. 0. P. 409. See s. 1, 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 
 
 (c) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, repealed by 46 & 47 Viet. c. 52, s. 169. 
 For present rules as to compositions, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, 
 s. 16. 
 
 (d) Campbell v. Im Thurn, 45 L. J. C. P. 482, discussed in 
 Breslauer v. Brown (1878), 3 A. C, at p. 689. 
 
 (e) Eepealed S. L. E., 1863. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO SPEOIFIO OBJECT. 159 
 
 intended to apply to a person who had been 
 simoniacally presented (a). It is evident that a 
 literal cons|truotion would, in these cases, have 
 carried the operation of the Act far beyond the 
 intention. 
 
 So, s. 6, Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, which, for 
 the prevention of unjust vexation by reiterated 
 commitments for the same offence, enacts that no 
 person who has been discharged on habeas corpus 
 shaU be imprisoned again for " the same offence," 
 except by the Court wherein he is bound by recog- 
 nisances to appear, or other Court having jurisdic- 
 tion in the cause, would not extend to a case 
 where the discharge was made on the ground that 
 the commitment had been made without jurisdic- 
 tion, though the offence for which he was arrested 
 on the second occasion was the same ; for this 
 was obviously beyond the object of the Act (b). 
 
 So, it was held that s. 26, Keal Property Limi- 
 tation Act, 1833, 3 & 4 WiU. IV. c. 27, which 
 deprives the owner of lands of the right of suing 
 in equity for their recovery, on the ground of fraud, 
 from a purchaser who did not know or have reason 
 to believe that any such fraud had been com- 
 mitted, should be construed as subject to the 
 presumption that the Legislature did not intend, 
 
 (a) Crawley v. Phillips, 1 Sid. 222. 
 
 (b) 31 Car. II. c. 2 ; A.-G. v. Eiook-a-Sing, 42 L. J. P. 0. 64; 
 B. V. Brixton Prison {Govt.) Slattmann, Exp., [1912] 3 K. B. 424. 
 
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160 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 by its general language, to subvert the established 
 principles of equity on the subject of constructive 
 notice ; and was therefore to be read as meaning 
 that the purchaser did not know or have reason to 
 believe, either by himself, or by some agent whose 
 knowledge or reason to believe is, in equity, 
 equivalent to his own (a). Sec. 47, Fines and 
 Recoveries Act, 1833, which excludes the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Court of Chancery in regard to curing 
 defects in the execution of the powers of dis- 
 position given by the Act to tenants in tail, and 
 the rectifyiug under any circumstances of the 
 want of execution of such powers of disposition, 
 has been held not to exclude the jurisdiction of 
 the Court from amending a deed made under the 
 Act so as to make it effect the intention of the 
 parties. The object of the Act being to prevent 
 the application of equitable doctrines so as to 
 alter the effect of a deed executed according to 
 the intention of the parties, and not to exclude 
 the power of the Court to rectify a deed which, by 
 an error, did not conform to that intention (b). 
 
 The Act which exempts Dissenters from pro- 
 secution in the Ecclesiastical Courts for not 
 
 (a) Vane v. Tane (1872), L. E. 8 Ch. 383. 
 
 (6) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, s. 47 ; Hall Dare v. Hall Dare, 31 
 Gh. D. 251. See also Banhes v. Small, 36 Ch. D. 716 • 
 Montague, In re, [1896] 1 Ch. 549 ; Meeking v. Meeking, [1916] 
 W. N. 367. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO SPECIFIC OBJECT. 161 
 
 conforming to the Church of England, does not 
 exempt a clergyman of the Church who has 
 seceded from it, from prosecution in those Courts 
 for performing the Anglican Church service in a 
 dissenting chapel not licensed by the bishop ; for 
 this is a breach of discipline, and not within the 
 scope and object of the Act (a). 27 Geo. III. c. 44, 
 s. 2, which enacted that no suit should be com- 
 menced in any Ecclesiastical Court for inconti- 
 nence or brawling after the expiration of eight 
 months from the commission of the offence, would 
 apply only to suits which might be brought 
 against laymen as well as against clergymen. It 
 would therefore apply to a suit against a clergy- 
 man, when its object was the reformation of his 
 manners, or his soul's health ; but it would not 
 apply to a suit for deprivation for the same 
 offences, for this is a matter of Church govern- 
 ment, foreign to the object and scope of the 
 statute (b). The Factors Act, 1889, enacts inter 
 alia bys. 2 (1) that any mercantile agent entrusted 
 with goods or the documents of title to goods 
 shall be entitled to pledge the same provided 
 they are in his possession with the consent 
 
 (a) 1 "Will. IV. c. 18, s. 4, repealed in part by 34 & 35 Vict. 
 c. 48; Barnes v. Shore (1846), 15 L. J. Q. B. 296. By the 
 Clerical Disabilities Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 91), a clergyman 
 can now relinquish his office. 
 
 (6) Free v. Burgoyne, 31 E. E. 2 ; 5 B. & C. 400. 
 
 I.S. 11 
 
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162 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the owner. But this proviso is confined to 
 transactions entered into by a mercantile agent 
 in the ordinary course of his business qua mer- 
 cantile agent, and consequently does not validate 
 a pledge of household furniture, not in the way 
 of trade, made by an agent to whose possession it 
 had been entrusted (a). So a Colonial Insolvent 
 Act, which provided that no distress for rent 
 should be levied after an order of sequestration 
 had been made, was construed as limited to 
 distress on the goods of the insolvent. To apply 
 it to the goods of a stranger taken on the 
 insolvent's premises, would have extended the 
 operation of the Act to effects and consequences 
 beyond the policy (&). The exception does not, 
 however, apply in England or, to a modified 
 extent in Ireland (c). It has been decided that 
 an Act which empowered the directors of an incor- 
 porated company to make contracts and bargains 
 with workmen, agents, and undertakers, would be 
 construed as conferring on them authority to bind 
 the company by such transactions without consult- 
 ing their shareholders ; but not as so altering the 
 general law as to dispense with those formalities 
 
 (a) Waddington v. Neale (1917), 96 L. T. 786 Div. ; Cole v. 
 North Western Bank (1875), L. E. 10 0. P. 354, p. 372. 
 
 (6) Bailton v. Wood, 59 L. J. 0. P. 84. See Brocklehurst v. 
 Lowe, 26 L. J. Q. B. 107. 
 
 (c) See 8 Edw. VII. c. 53. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO SPECIFIC OBJECT. 163 
 
 by which alone a corporation can bind itself to 
 contracts, that is, by writing under the corporate 
 seal (a), but this has since been overruled (b), and 
 it is now enacted by 8 Edw. VII. c. 69, s. 76, that 
 any contract made on behalf of a joint stock 
 company, within the scope of its business, is valid 
 provided it be made in the manner which if it 
 were the contract of a private person would render 
 the same kind of contract vaHd against him. So, 
 s. 1 (2), Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 
 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, that " a married woman shall 
 be capable of suing and being sued in all respects 
 as if she were a feme sole," is limited to actions 
 relating to herself personally, and does not make 
 her competent to act as a next friend or guardian 
 ad litem (c). 
 
 The provision in the repealed Friendly Societies 
 Act, 1829, which required a reference to arbitra- 
 tion of " every matter in dispute " between a 
 society and any of its members was, on the same 
 principle, held to be confined to disputes with 
 members, as members ; and a breach of covenant 
 by a member to repay a sum borrowed from his 
 society was therefore regarded as not falling within 
 the arbitration clause, the dispute being with the 
 
 (o) East London Waterworks Co. v. Bailey, 4 Bing. 283. 
 (6) South of Ireland Colliery Co. v. Waddle (1868), 37 L. J. 0. P. 
 211; Wells v. Corp. Eingston-on-Eull (1875), 44 L. J. G. P. 257. 
 (c)' Be Duke of Somerset (1887), 56 L. J. Gh. 733. 
 
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164 INTBEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 member as debtor, not as member (a) : And it 
 seems clear law in cases within 's. 2 of the Build- 
 ing Society Act, 1884, that the remedy is by 
 action and not by reference to arbitration (b). 
 Sec. 62, National Debt Act, 1870, which directs 
 the Bank of England to keep a list of unclaimed 
 stock, which is to be " open for inspection at the 
 usual hours of business," would not entitle a person 
 who has no bond fide interest in any unclaimed 
 stock to inspect such list (c). An Act of the Manx 
 Legislature, intituled for amending the criminal 
 law, which declared that its provisions should not 
 affect the right of the Courts to punish contempts 
 as before, and that the House of Keys, the Clerk 
 of the Eolls, and the registrars of Ecclesiastical 
 Courts, should, "when in the execution of their 
 respective offices," have the power of punishing 
 contempts in the same manner as a Court, was 
 
 (a) 10 Geo. IV. c. 66, s. 27 ; Morrison v. Glover, 19 L. J. Ex. 
 20. See also Prentice v. London, 44 L. J. 0. P. 353 ; Willis v. 
 Wells, 61 L. J. Q. B. 606 ; Palliser v. Bale, 66 L. J. Q. B, 236 ; 
 Fleming v. Self (1854), 24 L. J. Oh. 29; Mulkern y. Lord, 
 48 L. J. Ch. 745. But comp. Wright v. Monarch Invest. Socy., 
 46 L. J. Ch. 649, and Hack v. London Provid. Building Socy. 
 (1883), 52 L. J. Oh. 542; Municipal Building Socy. v. Kent, 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 290. 
 
 (6) 47 & 48 Vict. c. 41 ; Western Suburban dec. Building Socy. 
 V. Martin (1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 382 ; 17 Q. B. D. 609, C. A. 
 
 (c) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 71 ; B. v. Bank of England, 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 497. 
 
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EBSTRICTION TO SPECIFIC OBJECT. 165 
 
 construed as limiting this power to the House of 
 Keys only when exercising judicial, not legislative 
 functions. To give it that power when exercising 
 the latter was obviously foreign to the object of 
 the Act, though the language, in its primary and 
 full sense, included it (a). On similar grounds a 
 conveyance of property, knowingly (b) made solely 
 for the purpose of giving a vote contrary to s. 7, 
 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 25, which declares such convey- 
 ances "void and of none effect," is void so far as 
 to prevent the right of voting being acquired (c)> 
 which is the whole aim of the Act; but it is in 
 other respects valid between the parties, so as to 
 pass the property (d). 
 
 Sec. 19, Judicature Act, 1873, which gives the. 
 Court of Appeal jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
 " any judgment or order " save as thereinafter 
 (s. 47) mentioned, was held not to give an appeal 
 against an order of discharge of a prisoner on 
 habeas corpus (though the order was not within 
 the exception), on the ground partly that as no 
 provision was made for enforcing an order of the 
 
 (a) Be Brown (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 193, 280. 
 (6) Marshall v. Bowen, 14 L. J. 0. P. 129 ; but see Hoyland v. 
 Bremner (1846), 69 E. E. 417 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 133. 
 
 (c) This section seems to be repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64. 
 
 (d) PMllpotts V. PhUlpotts (1850), 20 L. J. C. P. 11 ; referred 
 to ia Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Hichson, [1906] A. C, 
 at p. 427. 
 
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166 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Court of Appeal for re-arresting the prisoner, the 
 order would therefore be futile, and partly that so 
 important a change of the law was not con- 
 
 -templated by the Legislature (a). And the pro- 
 visions of Eules 1 and 14, Order XXXI, E. S. C, 
 which entitle a defendant to interrogate a plaintiff, 
 and to discovery of documents, were held at one 
 time not to extend to the case of infant plaintiffs 
 who were not subject to such discovery in 
 Chancery proceedings before the Judicature Acts 
 were passed (6). But the law is now altered by 
 Order XXXI, r. 29. 
 
 In 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, which consolidates the 
 law relating to larceny and analogous offences, the 
 
 .provision (s. 23) which imposes a penalty for 
 "unlawfully and wilfully" killing a pigeon under 
 circumstances not amounting to larceny, was 
 construed as not applying to a man who had in- 
 tentionally and without legal justification shot his 
 neighbour's pigeons which were in the habit of 
 feeding upon hia land ; his object being to prevent a 
 recurrence of the trespass. His act was " unlawful," 
 in the sense that it was actionable ; and" it was 
 
 (o) Cox V. Makes (1890), 15 App. Gas. 506 ; per Lords Hals- 
 bury L.C., Watson, Bramwell, and Macnaghten; diss. Lords 
 Morris and Meld ; see also Seaman v. Busley, [1896] 2 Q. B. 
 344, 0. A. 
 
 (6) Mayor v. Collins, 24 Q. B. D. 361. See Bedfern v. Bedfern, 
 [1891] P. 139 ; Curtis v. Mmdy, [1892] 2 Q. B. 178. 
 
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RESTBICTION TO SPECIFIC OBJECT. 167 
 
 undoubtedly " wilful " also ; but as the object and 
 scope of the Act were to punish crimes and not 
 mere civil injuries, the word "unlawfully" was 
 construed as " against the criminal law " (a). So, 
 an Act which visited with fine and dismissal a 
 road surveyor who demanded or wilfully received 
 higher fees than those allowed by the Act, would 
 not affect a surveyor who, under an honest mistake 
 of fact, demanded a fee to which he was not en- 
 titled (b) ; and a sheriff, whose ofl&cer had made 
 an overcharge by mistake, would not be liable to 
 the penalty imposed by s. 29, Sheriffs Act, 1887, 
 upon any sheriff, etc., who takes or demands any 
 money or reward, under any pretence whatever, 
 other than the fees or sums allowed (c). An Act 
 which empowered inspectors to inspect the scales, 
 weights and measures of persons offering goods for 
 sale, and of seizing any found "light and unjust," 
 was construed as Hmited to cases where the in- 
 justice was prejudicial to the buyer, but as not 
 applying to a balance which gave seventeen ounces 
 
 (a) Tayhr v. Newman (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 186; Co\np. 
 Hudson V. McBae (1863), 33 L. J. M. C. 65. See also Kenyan v. 
 Hart, 34 L. J. M. C. 87 ; Daniel v. Janes, 2 0. P. D. 351 ; 
 Spicerv. Barnard, 28 L. J. M. G. 176 ; Miles v. HutcMngs (1903), 
 72 L. J. K. B. 775. 
 
 (6) B. V. Badger, 25 L. J. M. C. 81. 
 
 (c) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 55 ; Lee v. Dangar, 61 L. J. Q. B. 780 ; 
 Bagge v. Whitehead, 61 L. J. Q. B. 778. See also Bowmfin v. 
 Blyih, 26 L. J. M. 0. 57. 
 
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168 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 to the pound, that is, which was unjust against the 
 seller ; since the object and scope of the Act were 
 limited to the protection of the former (a). So, 
 where a statute makes it an offence in certain cases 
 for any person to intimidate any other person, but 
 provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to 
 seamen, it has been held that the proviso only 
 operates where the offence is committed hy a 
 seaman, and not where it is committed against a 
 seaman (6). And the enactment in s. 14, BlQs of 
 Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act, 1882, that a biU 
 of sale shall be no protection in respect of chattels 
 which but for such bill of sale would have been 
 liable to distress for rates and taxes, must be 
 restricted to cases of distress for such rates and 
 taxes, and has no application where proceedings by 
 way of execution have been taken in the County 
 Court under s. 261, Public Health Act, 1875, or 
 any section of like character in any subsequent 
 Act, as it could not possibly have been intended 
 that a bill of sale should be no protection against 
 
 (a) Brooke v. Shadgate (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 352 ; East 
 GloiicestersMre B. Co. -v. Bartholomew, L. E. 3 Ex. 15. 
 
 (6) 38 & 39 Vict. e. 86, ss. 7, 16 ; Kennedy v. Cowie (1891), 
 60 L. J. M. 0. 170. A seaman within these sections is a person 
 actually employed on board ship ; and persons whose calling is 
 the sea, but who are not actually so employed, are not within 
 the exception ; B. v. Lynch (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 59. See also 
 B. V. City of London Court, 59 L. J. Q. B. 429. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO SPECIFIC OBJECT. 169 
 
 an execution on a judgment if the goods seized 
 were liable to distress for non-payment of rates (a). 
 An Act, which, after appointing trustees to pull 
 down and rebuild a parish church, authorised 
 them to allot the pews, and to sell the fee simple 
 of such of them as were not appropriated by 
 the Act to the inhabitants of the parish, with 
 power to the owners to dispose of them, was held 
 not to authorise a conveyance of the soil and 
 freehold of the land on which the pews stood, but 
 only the grant of an easement, or right to sit in 
 the pew during divine service (6). And where a 
 church was buUt, under a similar Act, by sub- 
 scribers in whom the freehold was vested, and the 
 trustees had power to sell the pews ; and a subse- 
 quent Act, reciting that doubts had arisen as to 
 the estate and interest which the subscribers and 
 proprietors had in the pews, enacted that the fee 
 simple should be vested in them, it was held that 
 it was not the freehold interest in the soil that 
 was vested in them, but a special interest created 
 by Parhament in the easement (c). So, the Public 
 
 (a) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, s. 14; Wimbledon Loc. Board v. 
 Underwood, [1892] 1 Q. B. 836. 
 
 (6) Hinde v. Chorlton, L. E. 2 0. P. 104 ; Wadmore v. Dear 
 (1871), L. E. 7 C. P., at p. 224. 
 
 (c) Brumfitt v. BoherU, 39 L. J. C. P. 95. See also Smith v. 
 Lancaster (1869), L. E. 5 0. P. 246 ; Brewer v. M'Gowen, L. E. 
 5 C. P. 269. 
 
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170 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Health Act, 1876, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 65, and the 
 Metropolis Management Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. 
 c. 120, which enacted that the streets should 
 " vest " in the local authority, were construed as 
 intending not that the soil and freehold should 
 vest, but only the surface of the soil, and as much 
 of it in depth as was necessary for doing all that 
 was reasonably and usually done in streets (a), 
 and for so long only as it continued to be a 
 street (6). And it is now definitely provided by 
 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 27, that all mines and 
 minerals under any highway shall continue to 
 belong to the persons entitled thereto although 
 the surface may have become vested in an urban 
 authority. A local authority has therefore no 
 power under those Acts to excavate the soil and 
 erect lavatories below the surface of a street (c), 
 or to prevent wires being carried over the street 
 at a height which precludes any interference with 
 the user of the street, and the fact that the street 
 was originally constructed by turnpike trustees to 
 whom the fee simple of the site was conveyed 
 
 (a) Coverdale v. Charlton (1878), 48 L. J. Q. B. 128. Comp. 
 Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co., 53 L.J. Q. B. 
 449; Tunhridge Wells v. Baird, [1896] A. C. 434; Battersea 
 Vestry v. Provincial Electric Co., 68 L. J. Ch. 238. See also 
 A.-G. V. Dorhing, Si L. J. Ch. 585. 
 
 (6) Bolls V. St. George, Southwarh, 14 Ch. D. 785. 
 
 (c) Tunbridge Wells v. Baird, sup. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO SCOPE OP THE ACT. 171 
 
 makes no difference (a). But, on the other hand, 
 there can be little doubt that actual property {e.g. 
 drain pipes or things analogous in character) as 
 distinguished from an easement pass to the urban 
 authority (6). 
 
 Sec. 12, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 86, which enacts that no 
 action entered in a local Court of record shall be 
 removed into a Superior Court except by leave of 
 a judge of a Superior Court in cases which shall 
 appear to such judge " fit " to be tried in a 
 Superior Court, would not authorise such removal 
 unless the action were more fit to be tried in the 
 superior than the inferior Court (c). 
 
 The same general principle appears to govern 
 the class of cases which establish that enactments 
 requiring railway or other companies to make, 
 to persons interested in hereditaments taken or 
 " injuriously affected " by the companies, full com- 
 pensation not only for the land but for all damage 
 sustained by reason of the exercise of such parlia- 
 mentary powers, are limited to cases where the 
 damage would have been actionable but for the 
 Act. The general principle relates, therefore, not 
 
 (a) Finchley Electric Light Co. v. FincMey U. B. C. (1903), 
 71 L.J. Oh. 450; 72 Id. 297. 
 
 (6) Tstradyfodwg &c. Sewerage Bd. v. Benstead, [1906] 
 1 K. B. 294. 
 
 (c) Banhs v. Hollingsworth (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B. 239 ; BonMn 
 V. Pearson, [1911] 2 K. B. 412 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 1069. 
 
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172 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 to the person or business of the party prejudiced by 
 the user of the railway in the way authorised by the 
 Act after it is opened to the pubHc, but only to 
 damage resulting from the construction of the rail- 
 way and works, to his estate or right in the land in 
 its original condition, without regard to any use to 
 which it might be put (a). In other words, the 
 object of the enactments is not to create new 
 rights, but to give compensation for actual injury {b) 
 where the right of action has been taken away. 
 And this right being taken away only when the 
 powers are in all respects duly exercised, the pro- 
 visions for compensation do not extend to cases 
 
 (o) See per Cockburn C.J., New Biver Co, v. Johnson (1860), 
 2 E. & E. 435, p. 442 ; per Willes J., Bechett v. Midland B. Co., 
 L. E. 3 C. P. 94; Hammersmith B. Co. v. Brand (1868), 
 L. E. 4 H. L. 171 ; Chamberlain v. West End & Crystal Pal. 
 'B. Co., 2 B. & S. 617 ; Senior v. Metropolitan B. Co., 32 L. J. Ex. 
 225 ; B. V. Metropolitan Board of Works, 88 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 
 Caledonian B. Co. v. Walker's Trustees (1882), 7 App. Gas. 259. 
 Comp. Metrop. Board v. MacCarthy, L. E. 7 H. L. 243 ; Glasgow 
 B. Co. V. Hunter, L. E. 2 So. App. 78. But see the exception, 
 Be Stockport B. Co., 38 L. J. Q. B. 251, upheld by H. L. in 
 Cowper-Essex v. Acton (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 594, applied in 
 Gower's Walk Schools v. London, Tilbury & Southend B. Co., 
 59 L. J. Q. B. 162, and illustrated by Horton v. Colwyn Bay U. C, 
 77 L. J. K. B. 215. See also Stroud's Judicial Dicty. and 
 Supp., tit. " injuriously affected." 
 
 (6) B. V. Poulter (1887), 57 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; Mercer v. 
 Liverpool &c. B. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 128. 
 
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KESTEICTION TO SCOPE OF THE ACT. 173 
 
 where injury has been done through their improper 
 or negligent exercise (a). 
 
 The repealed Bills of Sale Act which required the 
 registration of bills of sale of " personal chattels," 
 under which expression fixtures were expressly in- 
 cluded, gave rise to several decisions governed by 
 the principle in question. The object of the enact- 
 ment obviously did not extend to requiring the 
 registration of every mortgage under which fixtures 
 might happen to pass, for this would include most 
 mortgages of real property ; and it has been held 
 that the Act apphed only to cases where the 
 fixtures were dealt with as separate things. 
 Accordingly, a mortgage of a house for a term of 
 years, with such a separate assignment of the 
 fixtures that the mortgagee might sever and deal 
 with them as distinct from the house, required 
 registration (b) ; but a mortgage for a term of years 
 
 (a) Clothier v. Webster, 12 0. B. N. S. 790 ; Gihbs v. Liverpool 
 Bocks, 27 L. J. Ex. 321 ; Buck v. Williams (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 
 357. See the cases collected in Whitehouse v. Fellowes (1861), 
 10 G. B. N. S. 780. 
 
 (b) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36 (repealed by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 23). 
 See also 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 53, 54 & 55 Vict. c. 35 ; 
 Hawtrey v. Butlin (1878), 42 L. J. Q. B. 163; explained in 
 Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson (1887), 57 L. J. Oh. 114 ; 
 Exp. Daglish, 42 L. J. Bank. 102 ; Waterfall v. Penistone, 26 
 L. J. Q. B. 100, on which see Walmsley v. MiVne, 29 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 
 Me Trethowan, 46 L. J. Bank. 43 ; Be Eslick, Id. 30 ; Climpson 
 V. Coles, 58 L. J. Q. B. 346; Small v. Nat. Prov. Bank, 63 
 
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174 INTBEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of a house with its fixtures, and with a general 
 power of sale over the mortgaged property, not 
 authorising a separate dealing by the mortgagee 
 with the fixtures, did not require registration (a). 
 Sec. 10, Judicature Act, 1875, which provides that 
 in the administration of the assets of a person 
 dying insolvent, the same rules shall be applied as 
 to the respective rights of secured and unsecured 
 creditors, and as to the debts provable, as are in 
 force in bankrupcy, has similarly been the subject 
 of several decisions limiting the scope of its 
 operation (b). 
 
 The Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (c), which 
 gave a right to raise any party structure authorised 
 by the Act, on condition of " making good aU 
 damage" occasioned thereby to the adjoining' 
 premises, was held not to authorise the raising of 
 a structure which obstructed the ancient, lights of 
 
 L. J. Gh. 270. See also Marsden v. Meadows, 50 L, J, Q. B. 
 536. 
 
 (a) Barclay, Exp., 43 L. J. Oh. 449 ; Mather v. Fraser, 25 
 L. J. Ch. 361 ; Tates, Be, 57 L. J. Ch. 697, and see Johns v. 
 Ware, [1899] 1 Ch. 359. 
 
 (b) See Maggi, Be, 51 L. J. Oh 560, and the cases cited there, 
 but this case was in great part overruled by Whttaker, Be (1900), 
 70 L. J. Ch. 6 ; WCausland v. O'Callaghan, [1904] 1 I. E. 376, 
 See also Whitaher, In re Whitaher v. Palmer, [1904] 1 Oh. 299 ; 
 Leng, Be, 64 L. J. Oh. 468. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by London Building Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. 
 c. ccxiii. 
 
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RESTEICTION TO SCOPE OF THE ACT. 175 
 
 the adjoiBing premises ; for the only damage con- 
 templated by the Act was structural, and not that 
 which resulted from the invasion of a right. And, 
 having regard to the scope of the enactment, the 
 expression " making good " was understood to 
 mean that the adjoining premises were to be 
 restored to their original state, not that pecuniary 
 compensation should be made (a). 
 
 Some decisions on the construction of s. 74, 
 Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act, 1847, 
 illustrate the principle under consideration. That 
 section enacts that the owner of a vessel is to be 
 answerable for any damage done by it, or by any 
 person employed in it, to a harbour, pier or dock, 
 except when the vessel is in charge of a duly 
 licensed pilot, compulsorily taken. Construed 
 literally, as it was by the Queen's Bench (6), it 
 made an owner responsible for the injury done by 
 his ship to a pier, after she had been driven 
 aground and necessarily abandoned by her crew 
 and was dashed by the storm against the pier. 
 But e converso House of -Lords held, that the 
 owner was not liable, on the ground that the 
 general scope and object of the Act were merely 
 to collect the clauses which Parliament usually 
 inserted in local harbour bills, and to give facilities 
 
 (a) Crofts V. Haldane, L. E. 2 Q. B. 194. 
 (5) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 27 ; Dennis v. Tovell (1872), 42 L. J. M. 0. 
 33. 
 
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176 DJTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of procedure to the undertakers of such works; 
 and that the section did not create a new liability, 
 but only facilitated proceedings against the regis- 
 tered owner when damages were recoverable (a). 
 
 On this general principle of construction, a 
 statute which made in unqualified terms an act 
 criminal or penal, would be understood as not 
 applying where the act was excusable or justifiable 
 on grounds generally recognised by law. Thus, a 
 statute which imposed three months' imprison- 
 ment and the forfeiture of wages on a servant who 
 " absented himself from his service " before his 
 term of service was completed, would necessarily 
 be understood as confined to cases where there 
 was no lawful excuse for the absence (&). A 
 statute which made it felony " to break from 
 prison," would not apply to a prisoner who broke 
 out from the prison on fire, not to recover his 
 liberty, but to save his hfe (c) ; and one which 
 declared it piracy to " make a revolt in a ship," 
 would not include a revolt necessary to restrain 
 the master from unlawfully killing persons on 
 board (d), even if it could be justly called a revolt. 
 
 (o) Biver Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 2 App. Gas. 743. 
 
 (6) 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, s. 3 (repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, 
 s. 17) ; Turner, Be, 15 L. J. M. 0. 140. But see Eider v. Wood, 29 
 L. J. M. 0. 1. See also 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13 ; Gibs.. Cod. 887. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 560. 
 
 {d) 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 7, s. 9 ; B. v. Bose, 2 Cox, 329; The 
 Shepherdess, 5 Eob. C. 262. 
 
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MENS BBA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 177 
 
 And a seaman would not be guilty of " deserting," 
 who was driven by tlie cruelty of his officers to 
 leave his ship (a). The sheriff who arrests under 
 a warrant the driver of the mails, is not indictable 
 for knowingly and wilfully obstructing and retard- 
 ing the mail (b). 
 
 As Mens Eea, or a guilty mind, is with some 
 exceptions, an essential element in constituting 
 a breach of the criminal law, a statute, how- 
 ever comprehensive and unqualified it be in its 
 language, is usually understood as silently requir- 
 ing that this element should be imported into it, 
 unless a contrary intention be expressed or im- 
 plied ; " the general rule is that, unless the con- 
 trary is expressed. Mens Eea enters into every 
 offence " (c). A statute, for instance, which in 
 general terms enacted that every person who 
 committed a certain act should be adjudged a 
 felon, would not include a child under seven, or 
 an idiot, or a lunatic during the loss of his 
 reason (d) whether caused by intoxication or any 
 
 (a) Edward V. TrevelUck, 24 L. J. Q. B. 9 ; Limland v. Stephens 
 (1801), 3 Bsp. 269. 
 
 (6) U. S. V. Kirby, 7 Wallace, 482. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Eussell of Killowen C.J., Williamson v. Norris 
 (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 34, 
 
 {d) 1 Hale, 706 ; Eyston v. Studd, Plowd, 459a ; Bac. Ab. 
 Stat. (I.) 6. See Exp. Stamp, 1 De Gex, 346. 
 
 I.S. 12 
 
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178 INTEBPBETATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 other voluntary act {a) ; for it would be unreason- 
 able to infer from the mere use of an unqualified 
 term, and intention to repeal the general principle 
 that such persons are not capable of a criminal 
 intention. Drunkenness, although producing tem- 
 porary insanity, is no defence to a crime (b), but 
 where the crime is such that the intention of 
 the accused is a constituent element, it may be 
 taken into consideration in determining whether 
 the accused formed the intention necessary to 
 constitute the crime in question (c). 
 
 On the same principle, an act done under an 
 honest and reasonable belief in the existence of a 
 state of things, which if true would have afforded 
 a complete justification both legally and morally 
 for such act, would not, in general, fall within a 
 statute which prohibited it under a penalty (cZ). 
 Thus, a woman who married a second time within 
 seven years after she had been deserted by her 
 husband, under a bond fide belief on reasonable 
 grounds that he was dead, would not be guilty of 
 bigamy (e). A licensed victualler who supplies 
 
 (o) B. V. Moore, 3 0. & K. 319. 
 
 (6) 1 Hale, 32; but seeiJ.v. Jfeade(1909),78L. J.(K.B.)476. 
 
 (c) B. V. Bolerty (1887), 16 Gox, 306. Comp. West v. Francis, 
 inf. p. 290. 
 
 (d) See ex. gr. Lee v. Simpson (1847), 16 L. J. 0. P. 105 ; 
 Beade v. Conquest (1862), 11 0. B. N. S. 479. 
 
 (-e) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57; B. v. Token (1889), 68 
 L. J. M. 0. 97. 
 
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MEKS BEA IN OBIMINAL LAW. 179 
 
 liquor to a police constable "whom he bond, fide 
 believes to be off duty, is not guilty of supplying 
 liquor to a police constable while on duty within 
 s. 16 (2), Licensing Act, 1872, repealed by s. 78 (16), 
 Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 (a). And 
 under a statute which made it felony for persons 
 tumultuously assembled to demolish a church or 
 dwelUng, they could not be convicted if the demo- 
 lition was done in the bond, fide assertion of a 
 legal right, though there was a riot in doing it (6). 
 So, if a man cut down a tree or demolished a 
 house standing on land of which he was in undis- 
 turbed possession, and believed himself to be the 
 owner, he would not be punishable under statutes 
 which prohibited such acts in general terms; 
 though it turned out that his title was bad and 
 that the property was not his (c). If he demanded 
 goods with threats, bond fide believing that they 
 belonged to him, he would not be guilty of rob- 
 bery, though civilly liable {d). If he forcibly took 
 
 (a) Sherras v. De Bufzen, [1896] 1 Q. B. 918: but comp, 
 Cundy V. Le Gocq, inf. p. 186, and Mullins v. Gollins, inf. p. 190. 
 
 (6) B. V. Phillips, 2 Moo. C. C. 252 ; S. C. nom. B. v. Lang' 
 ford, Car. & M. 602. See B. v. Badger, sup. p. 167. 
 
 (c) B. V. Burnahy, 2 Lord Eaym. 900. 
 
 (d) B. V. Hall (1828), 3 0. & P. 409. See also B. v. Knight, 
 73 J. P. 15. In B. V. Ford (1907), 12 Canada Cr. Cas. 556, it 
 was held no robbery forcibly to retake money won from the 
 defendant at cards in the bond fide belief that prosecutor had 
 cheated. 
 
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180 INTBKPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 a girl under sixteen from the custody of her 
 guardian, in the honest but mistaken belief that 
 he was, himself, invested with that character, and 
 acted simply in the exercise of his right as 
 guardian, he would not be guilty of the criminal 
 offence of abduction, though that is defined as 
 " unlawfully taking a girl under sixteen out of 
 the possession and against the will of the person 
 having the lawful care of her" (a). A man who 
 fished in a tidal river, in the assertion of the 
 general right which the law gives to fish in such 
 rivers (6), and in ignorance or in contestation of 
 the exclusive right of fishing in it claimed by 
 another, would not be liable to conviction for 
 "unlawfully and wilfully" fishing in the private 
 fishery of another (c). On this principle may 
 perhaps rest the general rule of law that the 
 jurisdiction given to justices of the peace, to try 
 an offence summarily, is ousted when a claim of 
 right or title is set up on reasonable grounds (d) ; 
 
 (a) B. V. Tinkler (1859), 1 P. & F. 513. But see B. v. Prince, 
 44 L. J. M. 0. 122, inf. p. 181. 
 (6) Carter v. Mureot, 4 Burr. 2163. 
 
 (c) B. V. Stimpson, 32 L. J. M. 0. 208. See sup. pp. 166- 
 167. But see Hudson v. WBae, 33 L. J. M. 0. 65. 
 
 (d) Per Blackburn J., White v. Feast, L. E. 7 Q. B. 353; 
 Beece v. MUler, 51 L. J. M. 0, 64 ; Mann v. Nurse <1901), 17 
 T. L.E. 569; and as to the whole question, see Musselly. Biirch 
 (1876), 35 L. T. N. S. 486. 
 
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MENS REA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 181 
 
 though their duty iii such cases is, not to acquit, 
 hut to forbear from adjudicating. 
 
 But how far ignorance or erroneous belief of a 
 fact which is essential to the offence is material, 
 is a question which has given rise to some con- 
 troversy and conflict of decisions. The substance 
 of these decisions is, however, that it is necessary 
 to look at the object of each Act that is under 
 consideration to see whether and how far know- 
 ledge is of the essence of the offence created (a). 
 Thus, the offence of unlawfully taking a girl under 
 sixteen out of the possession and against the will 
 of her parents, would be committed, although 
 the offender believed, from her appearance and 
 asseverations, contrary to the fact, that she was 
 older (6). The object of the Legislature being 
 to prevent a scandalous and wicked invasion of 
 parental rights, it must be supposed that they 
 intended that the wrongdoer should act at his 
 peril (c). If, as it has been held, a person would 
 not fall under the enactment which punishes the 
 pursuit of game on the land of another without 
 the consent of the owner, if he had the consent 
 of the person whom he honestly and reasonably 
 
 (a) Per Stephen J., Cundy v. Le Cocq, 13 Q. B. D. 207. 
 
 (h) B. V. Prince, sup. p. 180. See also B. v. Tinkler, sup. 
 p. 180. 
 
 (c) Per Stephen J., B. v. Tohon (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 
 190. 
 
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182 INTBKPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 believed to be the owner (a), he would yet be liable 
 to conviction if he trespassed on land which he 
 beHeved to be part of the property over which he 
 had the license, but which was in fact the property 
 of a different person (6), the statute infringed not 
 being a mere criminal statute, but one passed for 
 the purpose of protecting the peculiar rights of 
 those entitled to shoot game (c). The Contagious 
 Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, and an Order in 
 Council under it, which imposed a penalty on any 
 person having in his possession an animal affected 
 with a contagious disease who did not give notice 
 of it "with all practicable speed " to a constable, 
 was held to apply only where the person knew 
 that the animal was diseased (d). Where a rail- 
 way Act which " for the better prevention of 
 accidents or injury which might arise " on the 
 railway " from the unsafe and improper carriage 
 of certain goods," enacted that every person who 
 should send gunpowder or similarly dangerous 
 articles by the railway should mark or declare 
 their nature, under a penalty enforceable by im- 
 prisonment, it was held that guilty knowledge was 
 
 (a) 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 30 ; B. v. Cridland, 27 L. J. M. G. 28. 
 
 (b) Morden v. Porter, 29 L. J. M. C. 313. As to what will con- 
 stitute a valid defence, see Dickinson v. Ead (1914), 78 J. P. 326. 
 
 (c) Watkins v. Major, 44 L. J. M. C. 164. 
 
 (d) Nicholls V. Ball, 42 L* J. M. G. 105. For the converse of 
 this proposition, see Mousell Bros. v. L. d; N. W. B. Co., [1917] 
 2 K. B. 837. 
 
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MENS RBA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 183 
 
 essential to a conviction, and that an agent who 
 had sent some cases of dangerous goods hy a rail- 
 way, without mark or declaration, not only in 
 ignorance of their nature, but misinformed of it 
 by his principal in answer to his inquiries, had 
 not incurred the penalty ; on the ground that his 
 ignorance, under such circumstances, proved the 
 absence of mens rea {a) ; and yet he was under no 
 legal duty to send the goods, and he might have 
 refused to do so without actual inspection. A 
 similar conclusion was come to where, although 
 there was no knowledge, there were means of 
 knowledge which were neglected. Under 9 & 10 
 Will. III. c. 41 (6), which after reciting that con- 
 victions for embezzhng Government stores were 
 found impracticable, because direct proof of the 
 immediate taking could rarely be made, but only 
 that the goods were found in the possession of 
 the accused, and that they bore the King's mark, 
 enacted that the person in whose possession goods 
 so marked should be found, should forfeit the 
 goods and JB200, unless he produced at the trial an 
 official certificate of the occasion of their coming 
 into his possession ; it was held by the Court for 
 
 (a) Eearne v. Garton, 28 L. J. M. C. 216. For the converse 
 of this proposition, see Mousell v. L. & N. W. By. Go., [1917] 
 2 K. B. 837. 
 
 (&) Bepealed and re-enacted with ampUfications, 38 & 39 
 Vict. c. 25 (Public Stores Protection Act). 
 
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184 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Crown Cases Eeserved, that such a person was not 
 liable to conviction, in the absence of proof that 
 he' knew (though he had reasonable means of 
 knowing) that the goods bore the Government 
 mark (a). This decision, however, might be ques- 
 tioned on the authority of another case, which 
 was not cited, where the Court of Exchequer held 
 that a dealer in tobacco was liable to the penalty 
 imposed by the statute for having adulterated 
 tobacco in his possession, though ignorant of the 
 adulteration (b). It may be doubted whether the 
 literal construction of the language, enforcing 
 vigilance for the protection of the public from 
 danger or robbery, by visiting negligence (c) as weU 
 as misdeed with penal consequences, would not 
 
 (a) B. V. Sleep, 30 L. J. M. C. 170; B. v. Willmett (18^8), 
 3 Cox, 28i ; B. v. Cohen, 8 Cox, 41. See Aberdare v. Hammett, 
 44 L. J. M. C. 49. See also Hopton v. Thirlwall, 9 L. T. N. S. 327, 
 where a person found to " have in his possession the young of 
 salmon," in contravention of s. 15, Salmon Kshery Act, 1861, 
 24 & 25 Yict. c. 109, was held not liable to conviction, who, 
 though he knew he was in possession, did not know the fish 
 was salmon. 
 
 (fe) 5 & 6 Viofc. c. 93 ; amended by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 15, s. 25 ; 
 B. V. Woodrow (1846), 16 L. J. M. C. 122. See also per 
 Parke B., Bumby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644 ; B. v. Trew, 
 2 Bast, P. C. 821 ; JB. v. Dixon, 15 E. E. 381. 
 
 (c) Compare B. v. Stephens (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 251 ; 
 Coppen v. Moore {No. 2), [1898] 2 Q. B. 306 ; Commissioners of 
 Trade &c. v. Bell (1902), 71 L. J. P. C. 109, A, C, ; Mmsell v. 
 L. & N. W. B. (1917), 87 L. J. K. B. 82. 
 
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MENS EEA IN CBIMINAL LAW. 185 
 
 have been more in harmony with the intention, 
 and have more completely promoted the object 
 of the Legislature. The innocent possession of 
 spirits which, owing to natural causes, have 
 exuded from the wood and collected at the bottom 
 of a cask, does not render the owner liable under 
 the Finance Act, 1898, which provides that " a 
 person shall not subject any cask to any process for 
 the purpose of extracting any spirits absorbed in 
 the wood thereof ; or have on his premises any cask 
 which is being subjected to any such process, or any 
 spirits extracted from the wood of any cask " (a). 
 
 At the present time there is a large body of 
 municipal law which has been framed in such 
 terms as to make an act criminal without any 
 mens rea. By-laws which impose regulations in 
 the interest of the health or convenience of the 
 public are generally so conceived, and the mere 
 breach of them is sufficient to constitute an 
 offence. Under s. 117, Public Health Act, 1875, 
 which empowers a justice to order the destruc- 
 tion of unwholesome meat which is exposed for 
 sale and intended for food, and to impose a fine or 
 imprisonment on the person to whom it belongs, 
 the Court decided that in order to support a 
 conviction of the owner under the Section it was 
 not necessary that there should be any proof that 
 
 (a) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 10, s. 4 |(1) ; Bohinsm v. Dixon, 72 
 L. J. K. B. 717. 
 
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186 INTBEE14ETATI0N OF STATUTES. 
 
 he had actual personal knowledge of the condition 
 of the meat, the object of the enactment being 
 that people should not be exposed to the danger 
 of eating poison (a). So the sale of an article 
 of food or a drug not of the nature, substance, 
 and quality of the article demanded, is to the 
 prejudice of the purchaser and is an ofifence 
 under s. 6, Sale • of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, 
 though the seller (who may be a corporation) was 
 unaware of the fact (b). On similar grounds it has 
 been held that a pubhcan would be guilty of an 
 offence against s. 13, Licensing Act, 1872 (repealed, 
 s. 75, Licensing (Consohdation) Act, 1910), if he 
 sold liquor to a drunken person, even though the 
 purchaser had given no indication of intoxication, 
 and the publican did not know that he was in- 
 toxicated (c). He would not, however, in such a 
 
 (a) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55 (extended by 53 & 54 Viet. o. 59); 
 Blaker v. Tillstone, [1894] 1 Q. B. 345 ; see also Hohbs v. Win- 
 chester Corp., (1910), 79 L. J. K. B. 1123 ; and see the interesting 
 case of Williams v. Allen, [1916] 1 K: B. 425. 
 
 (6) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63 ; Betts v. Armstead (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 
 771; Pearks Gunston v. Ward, [1902] 2 K. B. 1 ; Pain v. 
 BougMwood, 24 Q. B. D. 353 ; Dyke v. Gower, [1892] 1 Q. B. 
 220; Spiers & Pond v. Bennett, i[1896] 2 Q. B. 65; Parker v. 
 Adler, [1899] 1 Q. B. 20 ; Goulder v. Book, [1901] 2 K. B. 290. 
 In Smithies v. Bridge, [1902] 2 K. B. 13, the appellant was 
 held to have been rightly convicted for selling new milk de- 
 ficient in fat, although the milk had not been adulterated ; 
 see also Fitzpatrick v. Kelly, inf. p. 562. 
 
 (c; Cundy v. Le Cocq, 18 Q. B. D. 207 ; but camp. Sherras v. 
 
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MENS EEA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 187 
 
 case be guilty of permitting drunkenness on his 
 premises (a). But if a servant, witMn the general 
 scope of his employment, sells liquor to a drunken 
 person, though in the absence of and contrary to 
 the orders of the publican, the publican is guilty of 
 an offence under that section (6). The offence of 
 receiving two or more lunatics in an unlicensed 
 house is committed, though the persons were 
 received in the belief, based on reasonable grounds, 
 that they were not lunatics (c). The honest 
 belief by a licensee that a bottle is properly sealed, 
 is no defence to an information under s. 2, Intoxi- 
 cating Liquors (Sale to Children) Act, 1901 (re- 
 pealed, s. 68, Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910), 
 which renders the sale of liquors to children under 
 fourteen illegal, unless in corked and sealed vessels, 
 if in fact the bottle is not properly sealed (d). But 
 a license holder who has not delegated his authority, 
 nor concurred at a sale, cannot be convicted under 
 the same section by reason of a barman selling to 
 
 Be Butzen, [1895], sup. pp. 137 & 179. See, however, Seatehard 
 V. Johmon, sup. p. 125. 
 
 (a) Somerset v. Wade (1894), 63 L. J. M C. 126. 
 
 (6) Commissioner of Police v. Cartman (1896), 65 L. J. M. C. 
 113. See also Collman v. Mills (1896), 66 L. J. Q. B. 170. 
 
 (c) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 44, repealed and re-enacted by 
 53 Vict. c. 5, s. 315 ; B. v. Bishop (1880), 49 L. J. M. C. 45. 
 
 (d) Brooks v. Mason, [1902] 2 K. B. 743. See also Mitchell 
 V. Orawshaw, 72 L. J. K. B. 389 ; Macey v. MeKenzie, 67 J. P. 251 ; 
 Jones V. Shervington, 77 L. J. K. B. 771. 
 
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188 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a person under fourteen (a). Under a special Act 
 which empowered a gas company to make the 
 necessary works for its business, subject to a 
 penalty if it should " suffer any washings to be 
 conveyed or to flow" into any stream or place, 
 corrupting or fouling the water, the company was 
 held liable to the penalty in a case where the 
 washings percolated through the bottom of its gas 
 tank and polluted a well, without the knowledge 
 of its servants (6). 
 
 The principle that unless the Legislature has 
 indicated the contrary intention, the infliction of 
 penalties is to be presumed to be confined to cases 
 where the offender has the mens rea, is well illus- 
 trated by those cases in which it has been sought 
 to render a master penally responsible for the acts 
 of his servant. Thus a sheriff, though unquestion- 
 ably liable in damages for the act of his officer in 
 seizing things exempt from seizure, would not be 
 liable to the penalty imposed by s. 29, Sheriffs Act, 
 1887, in respect of such wrongful aot(c); and a 
 surveyor could not be convicted of having caused 
 a heap of stones to be laid upon a highway, and of 
 
 (a) Emary v. Nolloth (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 629. As to 
 exclusion of children from bars of licensed houses, see Ghildrens 
 Act, 1908, s. 120 ; Pilkington v. Boss, [1914] 3 K. B. 321. 
 
 (6) Hiplcins v. Birmingham Gas Go., 30 L. J. Ex. 60. 
 
 (c) 60 & 51 Vict. c. 55, s. 29 ; Bagge v. Whitehead, sup. p. 167, 
 following Lee v. Dangar, sup. p, 167. 
 
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MENS KB A IN CRIMINAL LAW. 189 
 
 having allowed it to remain there at night to the 
 danger of any person thereon, where the stones 
 had been laid and allowed to remain there by a 
 carter acting under the orders of a person to whom 
 the surveyor had given general directions as to 
 repairing the road, the surveyor having no personal 
 knowledge of the fact (a). So, under the repealed 
 Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 128, ss. 1, 2, in order to 
 support a criminal charge against an owner or 
 occupier of trade premises within the metropolis 
 of negligently using a furnace employed thereon 
 so that the smoke was not effectually consumed, 
 it was held that evidence of personal negligence 
 was essential, and that evidence of negligence on 
 the part of a servant was insufficient (6). No 
 doubt the legal presumption is that whatever a 
 servant does in the course of the employment 
 with which he is entrusted, and as part of it, is 
 the master's act, unless the contrary be shown (c), 
 and a master may consequently be penally respon- 
 sible for the act of his servant as if it were his 
 own act, unless he can show that what was done 
 
 (a) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, s. 56 ; Hardeastle v. Bielby (1892), 
 61 L. J. M. C. 101 ; but see contra Taylor v. Greenhalgh, 24 
 W. R. 311 ; Pendlehury v. Greenhalgh, 45 L. J. Q. B. 3, C. A. 
 
 (6) Chisholm V. Doulton a889), 58 L. J. M. 0. 133. But see 
 Prummond v. Nicholson (1915), 79 J. P. 525. 
 
 (c) A.-G. V. Siddon, 35 R. E. 701 ; Barnes v. Akroyd (1872), 
 L. R. 7 Q. B. 474. 
 
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190 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 was in contravention of his orders. On this 
 ground a baker has been held liable to a penalty 
 for selling bread in which his servant had mixed 
 alum (a); and a carrier, whose waggoner had 
 carried in the carrier's waggon game not sent 
 by a qualified person (when the 5 & 6 Anne, 
 c. 14, was in force), was properly convicted of 
 carrying the game (b) ; a licensed victualler was 
 held penally responsible, under s. 16, 35 & 36 
 Vict. c. 94 (repealed, s. 78 (lb). Licensing (Con- 
 solidation) Act, 1910), for the act of his servant 
 in knowingly supplying liquor to a constable on 
 duty (c), the act being within the scope of the 
 servant's employment (d) ; and where gaming had 
 taken place upon licensed premises to the know- 
 ledge of a servant who had been placed in charge 
 of the premises, it was held that the licensed 
 person had "suffered" gaming to be carried on 
 on the premises within the meaning of s. 17, 
 Licensing Act, 1872 (repealed, s. 79, Licensiag 
 (Consolidation) Act, 1910), though he had no 
 knowledge -of the gaming, and had not connived 
 
 (a) B. V. Dixon (1814), 15 E. E. 381 ; 3 M. & S. 11. 
 
 (b) B. V. Marsh, 2 B. & C. 717 ; but see per Brett J., B. v. 
 Prince (1875), 44 L. J. M. 0. 122. 
 
 (c) Mullins V. Collins (1874), 43 L. J. M. 0. 67. See also 
 Brown V. Foot, 61 L. J. M. C. 110 ; but see Sherras v. De 
 Butzen (1895), sup. p. 186. 
 
 {d) Per A. L. Smith J., Newman v. Jones, 17 Q. B. D. 137. 
 
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MENS EEA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 191 
 
 at it (a) ; and under the Merchandise Marks Act, 
 1887, a master is criminally liable, if his servants, 
 within the general scope of their employment, 
 sell goods to which a false trade-mark or false 
 description has been applied, although contrary to 
 their master's orders ; unless the master can show, 
 that he has acted in good faith and done every- 
 thing he reasonably could to prevent the com- 
 mission of offences by his servants. That is to 
 say, under this Act the burden of proof is shifted, 
 and is not in accordance with the ordinary rules 
 and principles of criminal law, in that the prose- 
 cution has not to prove a mens rea ; but if the 
 defendant is able to prove an absence of any mens 
 rea, then he is to be acquitted (6). The decisions 
 in these and other like cases were based upon 
 the view of the Court that, having regard to the 
 language, scope, and objects of the Acts, the 
 Legislature intended to fix criminal responsibility 
 upon the master for acts done by his servants in 
 the course of their employment, although such 
 acts were not authorised, and might -have been 
 
 {a) Bond v. Evans (1888), 57 L. J. %. C. 108 ; Bosley v. 
 Dames, 45 L. J. M. C. 27 ; Bedgate v. Haynes, Id. 65 ; Crabtree 
 V. Hole, 43 J. P. 799. 
 
 (6) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28, s. 2 (2) ; Cop^pen v. Moore {No. 2), 
 [1898] 2 Q. B. 306 ; Christie v. Cooper, [1900] 2 Q. B. 522 ; 
 Lemy v. Watson,. [1915] 3 K. B. 781; Holmes v. Pipers, [1914] 
 1 K. B. 57. 
 
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192 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 expressly forbidden. But as soon as it appears 
 that there is no delegation of authority to the 
 servant (a), his act cannot be considered as that 
 of the master, and it is necessary to show that the 
 latter had personal knowledge of the incriminating 
 . circumstances in order to ensure conviction. Thus 
 the committee of a club cannot properly be con- 
 victed of selling liquor without a proper license, 
 where the sale has been by the steward contrary 
 to the express orders of the committee, and with- 
 out their knowledge or assent (&); and where 
 gaming had taken place upon licensed premises 
 to the knowledge of a servant who was employed 
 upon the premises, but there was no evidence to 
 show any connivance or wilful bUndnfess on the 
 part of the licensed person, and it did not appear 
 that the servant was put in charge of the 
 premises, it was held that the justices were right 
 in refusing to convict the licensed person of 
 suffering gaming on the premises (c). Where, 
 however, the facts are such as to constitute prima 
 
 (a) See per Collins J., Somerset v. Wade, [1894] 1 Q. B. 576, 
 referring to the judgment of Stephen J., in Bond v. Hvans 
 (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249, at p. 255 ; 57 L. J. M. G. 105. 
 
 (6) Newman v. Jones, 17 Q. B. D. 132 ; but the person actually 
 selling is liable, Caldwell v. Bethell, [1913] 1 K. B. 119. 
 
 (c) 35 & 36 Viet. o. 94, s. 17, repealed, s. 79, Licensing (Con 
 solidation) Act, 1910 ; Somerset v. Hart (1884), 53 L. J. M. C. 
 77. See also Massey v. Morris, 63 L. J. M. 0. 185 ; and 
 comp. Somerset v. Wade, [1894] 1 Q. B. 574. 
 
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MENS REA IN CRIMINAL LAW. 193 
 
 facie a case, which though not amounting to 
 positive proof of knowledge on the part of the 
 licensed person, nevertheless indicate connivance, 
 such indication is evidence upon which a magis- 
 trate may find knowledge {a). But, on the other 
 hand, it may be remarked that a master would 
 not be liable to be convicted for an unauthorised 
 false representation made by his servant as to the 
 weight of sacks of coal {b) ; secus, if the represen- 
 tation was made by the servant in the course of 
 his employ (c). 
 
 There is a class of eases where the absence of 
 mens rea does not control the language of a statute ; 
 and that is where the offence has been committed 
 in ignorance or misapprehension of the law, and the 
 statute prohibiting the act does not expressly make 
 malice or wilfulness or other intent an essential 
 element of the offence {d). For instance, though a 
 person in possession of naval stores is not liable to 
 conviction unless he knows that they bear the 
 Government mark, he would not escape on the 
 ground that he did not know that the possession 
 of such marked goods was prohibited. A man who 
 
 (a) Lee v. Taylor (1912), 23 Cox, C. 0. 220. 
 (&) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 21, s. 29 (2) ; Boherts v. Woodward, 59 
 L. J. M. 0. 129. 
 
 (c) Baker v. Herd, 58 J. P. 413 ; and see Franklin v. Godfrey 
 (1894), 63 L. J. 239. 
 
 (d) See Ellis v. Kelly, 30 L. J. M. 0. 35 ; Daniel v. Jones, 
 2 0. P. D. 351 ; Hunter v. Clare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 635. 
 
 I.S. 13 
 
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194 INTBKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 unlawfully fished in a non-tidal river, or trespassed 
 on land in search, of game, would not escape 
 conviction because he honestly believed that the 
 public was entitled to fish or shoot there (a); such 
 a right not being known to the law. An apprentice 
 who absented himself from his master's service, 
 did not escape the penal consequences by proving 
 that he had done so in the honest though erroneous 
 belief, founded on his lawyer's advice, that his 
 indentures were void, and that he was consequently 
 at liberty to leave his service (h). So, a cabman 
 who persists in placing his cab on the premises of 
 a railway company, after being requested to remove 
 it, is penally liable for " wilfully trespassing and 
 refusing to quit," though he was under the per- 
 suasion, which was unfounded, that there existed 
 a legal right to place his vehicle there (c). 
 
 It is necessary, as regards mens rea, not to 
 
 (a) Hudson v. McBae, 33 L. J. M. C. 65; Smith v. Gooie 
 (1915), 79 J. P. 245 ; Leatt v. Vine, 30 L. J. M. G. 207 ; 
 Margreaves v. Biddarm, 44 L. J. M. 0. 178 ; WatkiTis v. Major, 
 Id. 164; Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q. B. D. 162. See also The 
 Charlotta, 1 Dod. 387. 
 
 (6) 4 Geo. IV. e. 34, s. 3 ; repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, 
 s. 17. Cooper v. Simmons (1862), 31 L. J. M. 0. 138, an 
 apprenticeship to a corporation is valid : Burnley Sc. Society v. 
 Carson, [1891] 1 Q. B. ,75. 
 
 (c) Foulger v. Steadman, 42 L. J. M. C. 3. Comp. Jones v. 
 Taylor, 1 B. & E. 20. There are no longer privileged cabs at 
 London raUway stations. 
 
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MENS EGA IN CEIMINAL LAW. 195 
 
 confound a guilty mind in the legal sense of the 
 expression, with a guilty conscience, for an inten- 
 tion to do an act prohibited by the penal provisions 
 of a statute constitutes mens rea. On the other 
 hand, the absence of mens rea really consists in an 
 honest and reasonable belief in the existence of 
 facts which, if true, would make the act inno- 
 cent (a). A. statute which prohibited an act would 
 be violated, though the act were done without 
 evil intention, or even under the influence of a 
 good motive. Thus, in order to constitute the 
 offence of applying a false trade description to 
 goods with intent to defraud, within the meaning 
 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, s. 2 (1), it is 
 not necessary that there should be any fraud, in 
 the sense of intent to supply a worthless or inferior 
 article, but it is sufficient that an article is in- 
 tended to be supplied of a different description 
 from that which the customer intends to purchase, 
 and believes he is purchasing (6). So a man who 
 sells an obscene publication is subject to the 
 penalty imposed therefor by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, 
 although his object was not to deprave the mind 
 
 (a) Sherras v. Be Bufzen, sup, p. 179 ; Bank of N. S. Wales v. 
 Piper, [1897] A. C. 383. 
 
 (&) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28 ; Starey v. GMlworth Gwipowder Co. 
 (1889), 59 L. J. M. 0. 13 ; Wood v. Burgess, 59 L. J. M. C. 11 ; 
 EirsherAoim v. Salmon & Qluckstem (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 601 ; 
 North Eastern Breweries v. Gibson (1904), 68 J. P. 356. 
 
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196 INTBRPBETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 of the reader, but to- expose the tenets of a 
 religious sect (a). The master of a ship who, under 
 general instructions to complete his cargo on the 
 iTest terms, traded with the enemy, would be guilty 
 of the crime {b) of barratry, though he acted solely 
 under the motive of serving his employer to the 
 best advantage (c). A railway company which had 
 suffered a weighing machine in its possession to 
 continue out of repair for a fortnight, so that it 
 indicated more than the true weight, was held to 
 fall within the enactment which imposed a penalty 
 for being found in possession of a weighing machine 
 incorrect or otherwise unjust ; although its servants 
 had orders to make a due allowance for the defect, 
 when using it {d). So under s. 31 of the repealed 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which enacted that where 
 an undischarged bankrupt obtained credit to the 
 
 (a) B. V. HieMin (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 89 ; Steele v. Brannm, 
 41 L. J. M. 0. 85. Gomp. Lewis v. Fermor, 18 Q. B. D. 532, 
 questioned by Hawkins J., in Ford v. Wiley, 28 Q. B. D. 203 ; 
 as to publication of obscene pictures or advertisements, see B. v. 
 Be Marney, [1907] 1 K. B. 388. 
 
 (6) Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Oowp. 143. As to meaning of the 
 word enemy, see Societe Anonyme Beige des Mines d'Aljustrel v. 
 Anglo-Belgicm Agency (1915), 84 L. J. Oh. 849, C. A. 
 
 (c) Earle v. Bowcroft, 9 E. E. 385, 8 Bast. 126. 
 
 (d) 5 & 6 WiU. rV. c. 63, s. 28 (repealed), 41 & 42 Vict. c. 49, 
 s. 25 ; G. W. B. Co. v. Bailie (1864), 34 L. J. M. 0. 31. See 
 also Lane v. Bendall, [1899] 2 Q. B. 673; London G. G. v. 
 Payne {No. 2), [1905] 1 K. B. 410. 
 
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EBSTEICTIONS OF OPERATION. .197 
 
 extent of j620 and upwards from any person, 
 without informing such person that he was an 
 undischarged bankrupt, he should be guilty of a 
 misdemeanour, it was no defence to show that 
 there was no intention to defraud (a). 
 
 Probably, it may now be said that in construing 
 the operative verb of a prescribed offence, in a case 
 not covered by authority, it is not unusual to see 
 whether that verb is controlled by such a word as 
 " knowingly " ; if it is, the doctrine of Mens Rea 
 applies, but if it is not, the better opinion is the 
 exclusion of that doctrine. 
 
 Sometimes, to keep the Act within the limits of 
 its object, and not to disturb the existing law 
 beyond what the object requires, it is construed as 
 operative between certain persons, or under cer- 
 tain states of facts, or for certain purposes only, 
 though the language expresses no such circum- 
 scription of the field of its operation (6). The 
 partially repealed Act of 1854(c), for instance, 
 which required, among other things, that where 
 a Bill of Sale was made subject to a declaration 
 of trust, the declaration should be registered as 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52 ; B. v. Dyson, [1894] 2 Q. B. 176. The 
 sum is now reduced to £10, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 155. 
 
 (&) For some illustrations, in addition to those which immedi- 
 ately follow, see Chap. VII, Sec. III. 
 
 (c) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 2. 
 
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198 INTBRPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 well as the bill, on pain of invalidity against the 
 assignee in the event of execution or bankruptcy, 
 was held to apply only to declarations of trust by 
 the grantee for the grantor, but not to trusts 
 declared by the grantee in favour of other persons. 
 The object of the Act being only to protect 
 creditors against sham bills of sale, and such 
 object being completely attained by requiring the 
 registration of the first-mentioned trusts, while 
 the registration of any others would have been 
 foreign to the purposes of the Act (a). See. 18, 
 Bills of Sale Act, 1882, which prohibits the 
 removal of the goods for five days after seizure, is 
 confined to the protection of the person giving the 
 bill, and gives the landlord no right to complain 
 of an earUer removal (6) ; and s. 3, 11 G-eo. II. c. 19, 
 which gives to landlords a right of action to 
 recover double the value of goods fraudulently 
 carried off the premises to avoid a distress, applies 
 to goods of the tenant only, and not to those of a 
 stranger (c). So, the provision in 8 & 9 Vict, 
 c. 109, which, after making all wagers nuU and 
 
 (o) Etlls V. Shepherd (1858), 1 F. & F. 191 ; Bobinson v. 
 Gollingwood, 34 L. J. 0. P. 18. See also Hodson v. Sharjae, 
 10 E. E. 324. 
 
 (6) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43 ; Lam v. Tyler (1887), 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 461 ; Tomlinson v. Gonsolidated Credit Corp. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 
 135. 
 
 (c) Tomlinson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., sup. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO THE SUBJECT. 199 
 
 void, enacts that no suit shall be maintained to 
 recover money won on a wager or deposited to 
 abide the event, was construed as only preventing 
 a party to the wager from suing to recover his 
 winning, but not to prevent him from suing the 
 stakeholder to recover his deposit before it has 
 been actually appropriated (a), and the Gaming 
 Act, 1892, has not altered the law in this respect (b). 
 Moreover an action will be by one partner in a 
 betting business against the other for an account 
 of the partnership dealings (c). So, the general 
 language of s. 299, Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 
 (repealed, s. 419 (3), Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), 
 which provided that, if damage should arise to 
 person or property from non-observance of the 
 sailing rules, it should be considered as the " wilful 
 default " of the person in charge of the deck at 
 the time, was confined, by a due regard to the 
 object in view, to the regulation of the rights of 
 the owners of ships in cases of collision, and was 
 therefore held not to affect the relations between 
 the master and his owners, so as to make the 
 
 (o) Hampden v. Walsh, 45 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; Diggle v. Higgs 
 (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 721, C. A. See also Strachan v. Universal 
 Stock Exchange {No. 2), 65 L. J. Q. B. 178; Universal Stock 
 Exchange v. Strachan, 65 L. J. Q. B. 429. 
 
 (&) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 9 ; Surge v. Ashley & Smith, 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 538 ; Barclay v. Pearson (1893), 62 L. J. Oh. 636 ; Shoolbred v. 
 Boberts, [1899] 2 Q. B. 560, varied, [1900] 2 Q. B. 497, 0. A. 
 
 (c) Keen v. Price, [1914] 2 Ch. 98. 
 
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200 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 former guilty of barratry, which would have been 
 altogether foreign to the scope of the Act (a). 
 The 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, which, after reciting that 
 it was expedient to make provision for preventing 
 the vexatious removal of indictments into the 
 Queen's Bench, enacted that whenever a certiorari 
 to remove one should be awarded at the instance 
 of the prosecutor, he should enter into a recog- 
 nisance to pay the costs if unsuccessful, and that 
 if the recognisance was not entered into, the 
 indictment should be tried in the Court below, 
 was held inapphcable to a prosecutor who removed 
 an indictment against a corporate body which was 
 unable to appear by attorney in the inferior Court. 
 In such a case, the removal of the indictment was 
 a matter of necessity, not option, for it could not 
 be tried by the inferior Court, since the defendant 
 could not appear there ; and it would have been 
 unjust to extend the provision to a case clearly 
 beyond the scope of the Act, which, by its preamble 
 showed, was only to check vexatious removals (6). 
 The words of the Arbitration Act, 1889, which 
 enact that in certain cases an award is to be 
 
 (a) Grill V. General Iron Screw Go. (1866), 35 L. J. C. P. 321, 
 37 Id. 205 ; Price v. Union Lighterage Go. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 
 374. 
 
 (6) B. V. Manchester, 26 L. J, M. 0. 65. See also Graven v. 
 Smith (1869), 38 L. J. Ex. 90. Overruled as to power of under- 
 sheriff to certify for costs. Cox v. Eill (1892), 67 L. T. 26. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO THE SUBJECT. 201 
 
 " equivalent to the verdict of a jury," have been 
 construed as not importing all the incidents of a 
 verdict, ex. gr. the right of appeal on the ground 
 that it is against the weight of evidence, but only 
 the immediate consequences, ex. gr. the mode of 
 execution (a). 
 
 The enactment (16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 19) which 
 made presentment of any draft on a banker pay- 
 able to order or on demand, if purporting to be in- 
 dorsed (though a forgery) by the payee, a sufficient 
 authority to the banker to pay the amount, was in 
 the same way limited in its effect, as in its object, 
 to the relations between banker and customer; 
 and did not prevent the latter from recovering 
 his money from the person who received it (6). 
 But, on the other hand, s. 3, Truck Act, 1831, 
 which provides that the entire amount of wages 
 earned by any artificer shall be actually paid to 
 him in the current coin of the realm, constitutes a 
 bar to a deduction from the wages of a debt due 
 from the workman to his employer (c). Sec. 16, 
 
 (a) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, ss. 14, 15 ; Darlington Wagon Co. v. 
 Handing (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 110 ; Olasbrooh v. Owen, 7 Times 
 Eep. 62 ; Garr v. Dougherty, 67 L. J. Q. B. 371. 
 
 (6) Ogden v. Benas, 43 L. J. C. P. 259 ; Arnold v. Cheque 
 Banh, Ltd. (1876), 45 L. J. 0. P. 562 ; Fine Art Society v. Union 
 Bank of London (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 70, C. A. See now s. 60, 
 Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 ; Gordon v. 
 London City & Midland Bank (1902), 71 L. J. K. B. 215, 0. A. 
 
 (c) 1 & 2 Will. rV. c. 37; Williams v. North's Navigation 
 
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202 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, which 
 provides that no shareholder shall be entitled to 
 transfer any share after a call, until he has paid 
 up all caUs due on all his shares, is only a protec- 
 tion to the company, giving it a lien or charge 
 upon the shares ; but it does not affect the validity 
 of a transfer as regards the creditors of the com- 
 pany,! if the company has assented to it (a). ^So 
 it has been held that the provisions of a Railway 
 Act which placed the management of the com- 
 pany's affairs in the hands of a certain number of 
 directors, were intended for the protection of the 
 shareholders merely, and that it was not open to a 
 stranger to object that they had not been complied 
 with {b). Sec. 153, Companies Act, 1862 (repealed, 
 s. 205, Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908), 
 which declares " void " every transfer of shares in 
 a company which is being wound up, unless the 
 Court otherwise orders, was held not to prevent 
 a broker who had bought and paid for shares in a 
 
 Collieries (1906), 75 L. J. K. B. 334; Summerlee Iron Co. v. 
 Thomson (1913), S. G. (J.) 34, H. L. But see Keates v. Lewis 
 Merihyr Collieries, 79 L. J. K. B. 722. 
 
 (o) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16 ; Uttledale, Exp. (1853), 43 L. J. Oh. 529 ; 
 ■discussed in Societe Generate de Paris v. Tramway Unions Co. 
 (1884), 14 Q. B. D., at p. 455. 
 
 (6) Thames Haven Co. v. Bose (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 552, which 
 case was criticised in Alma Spinning Co., Be (1880), 50 L. J. Oh. 
 171. 
 
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RESTRICTION TO THE SUBJECT. 203 
 
 company so situated from recovering from his 
 principal the money so paid (a). 
 
 Sec. 23, Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which enacted 
 that the trustee in bankruptcy might disclaim any 
 interest of the bankrupt, and that the property 
 disclaimed was to be deemed surrendered on the 
 day of the adjudication, was held to be limited to 
 the relief of the bankrupt and the trustee in 
 bankruptcy from liability ; but not to affect the 
 rights and liabihties of the lessor and original lessee 
 or underlessee (i). Sec. 38, Companies Act, 1867 
 (repealed by s. 81, Companies (Consolidation) Act, 
 1908), which requires that every prospectus shall 
 specify all contracts entered into by the company or 
 by its promoters, before the issue of the prospectus, 
 and declares every prospectus which does not 
 specify them fraudulent on the part of the pro- 
 moters and directors who knowingly issued it, as 
 regards persons taking shares, is, literally, wide 
 enough to include every contract made by a pro- 
 moter even regarding his own private affairs ; but 
 it was limited in construction to the object of the 
 
 (a) Ghwpman v. Shepherd, 36 L. J. 0. P. 113 ; discussed in 
 Coles V. Bristowe (1868), L. E. 6 Eq., at p. 160. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 ; now s. 54, Bankruptcy Act, 1914 
 (4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59) ; Smyth v. North, L. E. 7 Ex. 242 ; Exp. 
 Walton, 17 Oh. D. 746 ; Hill v. E. & W. I. Boch Co., 53 L. J. Oh. 
 842. See under Act of 1914, Castle, In re, [1917] 2 K. B. 725 ; 
 87 L. J. K. B. 753. 
 
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204 INTEEPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Act, which' was the protection of shareholders. It 
 was held, therefore, to include only such contracts 
 as were calculated to influence persons in applying 
 for shares (a) ; and apparently does not create any 
 duty towards bondholders (b). 
 
 So, the Stamp Acts, which enacted that un- 
 stamped documents should not be pleaded or given 
 in evidence, or be available in law or equity, were 
 construed as meaning only that such documents 
 should be unavailable for the purpose of recovering 
 any debt or property (c). The prohibition was, 
 however, held not to extend to cases where the 
 validity of the document was impugned on the 
 ground of fraud or illegality (c). So, s. 93 of 54 & 
 55 Vict. c. 39 (reproducing sec. 7, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 
 23), which invalidates all contracts of sea assurance 
 imless expressed in a poUcy, and (s. 96 (2)) 
 which prohibits giving in evidence any policy 
 not duly stamped, does not prevent the admission 
 of the sHp in evidence, on a collateral question of 
 fraud or misrepresentation (d). 
 
 [a) Tvyycross v. Grant, 46 L. J. C. P. 636; discussed and 
 explained in Macleary v. Tate, [1906] A. C. 24, at p. 29. 
 lb) Cornell v. Hay (1873), 42 L. J. 0. P. 136. 
 
 (c) JR. V. HawhswortTi, 1 T. E. 450 ; B. v. Gompertz, 9 Q.'B. 824 ; 
 Ponsford \. Walton, L. E. 8 0. P. 167. An unstamped pro- 
 missory note may be handed to a witness in order to challenge 
 his recollection, Birchall v. Bullough (1896), 65 L. J. Q. B. 252. 
 
 (d) lonides v. The Pacific Insurance Co., 41 L. J. Q. B. 190 ; 
 
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RESTRICTION TO THE SUBJECT. 205 
 
 In the same spirit, the operation of 7 Anne, 
 c. 12, which, with the view of securing the 
 inviolability accorded to ambassadors by the law 
 of nations, enacted that all processes whereby an 
 ambassador or his servant might be arrested, or 
 his goods seized, should be null and void (a), was 
 held not to extend beyond what might be necessary 
 for the protection of the rank, duties, and religion 
 of the ambassador ; and not to protect his servant, 
 who rented a house, part of which he let in 
 lodgings, from having his goods taken by distress 
 for non-payment of a parochial rate. Upon the 
 principle that, a house of that character not being 
 absolutely necessary for the servant's residence, to 
 extend the operation of the Act to such a case 
 would have been to cover ground foreign to its 
 scope and object (b). 
 
 Citizen Insmance Co., Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 A. 0., at 
 125. 
 
 (a) Be^blie of Bolivia, In re, [1914] 1 Oh. 139. 
 
 (6) Novello V. Toogood, 25 E. E. 507. See also Parhinson v. 
 Potter (1885), 16 Q. B. D., at p. 161. 
 
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CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 SECTION I. — CONSTBUCTION TO PEEVENT EVASION. 
 
 "I NEVEB understood what is meant by an 
 ' evasion ' of an Act of Parliament ; either you 
 are within the Act of Parliament or not. If you 
 are not within it you have a right to avoid it, 
 to keep out of the prohibition ; if you are within 
 it, say so, and then the course is clear " (a). The 
 above is perhaps the dictum of a purist in language. 
 In ordinary life, in courts of law and sometimes 
 even in statutes the phrase " evasion " of an Act 
 of Parliament reaUy connotes an attempt to avoid 
 compliance therewith. 
 
 " Everybody agrees th^t ' evade ' is capable of 
 being used in two senses : (1) which suggests 
 underhand dealing, (2) which means nothing more 
 than the intentional avoidance of something dis- 
 agreeable" (b). 
 
 As regards the first of these senses, it does not 
 really involve a question of verbal construction 
 
 (a) Per Lord Cranworth L.O., Edwards v. Hall, 25 L. J. Oh. 
 84. See post, p. 218. 
 
 (6) Simrm v. Begiatrar of Probates, 69 L. J . G. P. 56. 
 
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CONSTEUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 207 
 
 of a statute at all. It is simply fraud — ^it is no 
 more than a flagitious attempt to pass off an exist- 
 ing state of things as being something other than 
 that which it really is. Words, of course, may 
 be used for the purpose of helping to assist in the 
 illusion, though it is rarely that the meaning of 
 such words will be called in questioi; ; the question 
 will be, Is an evasion being attempted ? If so, the 
 Court will make short work of it. But when the 
 second method of avoidance or technical " evasion ' ' 
 is under consideration it merits careful though 
 not necessarily favourable scrutiny, and if the 
 result of such investigation shows that the avoid- 
 ance is not, in fact, within the mischief con- 
 templated by the statute, it is in a legal sense 
 neither an evasion nor blameworthy. The author 
 beiag proved to have done nothing outside his 
 right. In either case it may be said that there 
 was an attempt at evasion ; but the attitude of the 
 Court towards the one will be very different from 
 that as regards the other. 
 
 It is the duty of the judge to adopt such a con- 
 struction as shall avoid the possibility of any 
 untruthful evasion which might perpetuate the 
 mischief (a). To carry out effectually the object 
 of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat 
 all attempts to do, or avoid doing in an indirect 
 or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited 
 
 (a) Magdalen College Case, 11 Eep. 71b. 
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208 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 or enjoined (a). In fraudem legis facit, qui, salvis 
 verbis legis, sententiam ejus, circumvenit (6) ; and a 
 statute is understood as extending to all such 
 circumventions, and rendering them unavailing. 
 Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne, per 
 quod devenitur ad illud (c). " Whenever it can be 
 shown that the acts of the parties are adopted 
 for the purpose effecting a thing which is pro- 
 hibited, and the thing prohibited is in consequence 
 effected, the parties have done that which they 
 have purposely caused, though they may have 
 done it indirectly " {d). When the thing done is 
 substantially that which was prohibited, it falls 
 within the Act, simply because, according to the 
 true construction of the statute, it is the thing 
 thereby prohibited (e). Whenever Courts see such 
 attempts at concealment, " they brush away the 
 cobweb varnish," and show the transaction in its 
 true light (/). They see things as ordinary men 
 do {g), and so see through them. Whatever might 
 be the form or colour of the transaction, the law 
 
 (a) Bac. Ab. Statute (J.) ; Com. Dig. Parlmt. (E.) 28. 
 
 (6) 3 Dig. 1, 3, 29. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 48. 
 
 {d) Per Blackburn J., Jeffries v. Alexander (1860), 31 L. J. Ch. 
 14; discussed in Bobson, In re (1881), 18 Ch. Div., p. 163. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Cranworth, L.O., PMlpott v. St. George's Hospital, 
 6 H. L. Oas. 338. 
 
 (/) Per Wilmot C.J., Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 349. 
 
 (g) Per Lord Brougham, Warner v. Armstrong, 3 Myl. & K. 45. 
 
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OONSTEUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 209 
 
 looks to the substance (a). For this purpose the 
 Courts go behind the documents and formalities, 
 and inquire into the real facts. They may, and 
 therefore must, inquire into the real nature of that 
 which was done. An Act is not to be evaded by 
 putting forward documents which give a false 
 description of the matter (6). In all such cases, 
 it is, in truth, rather the particular transaction 
 than the statute which is the subject of construc- 
 tion ; and if it is found to be in reality within the 
 statute, it is not suffered to escape from the opera- 
 tion of the law by means of the disguise under 
 which its real character is masked. 
 
 Thus, when either of the Acts against Usury (c) 
 was in force, it was said that if the contract really 
 was an usurious loan of money, the wit of man 
 could not find a shift to take it out of the Act (d) ; 
 and accordingly transactions which were ostensibly 
 a sale of land(e), of goods (/), or of stock (</), or 
 
 (a) Per Lord Tenterden, Solarte v. Melville, 1 Man. & Ey. 204. 
 (5) WaUon, Be (1890), 59 L. J. Q. B. 394 ; Madell v. Thomas 
 (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 227. 
 
 (c) For a list of them, see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90— by which Act 
 they were all repealed. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Mansfield, Floyer v. Edwards, 1 Oowp. 114. 
 
 (e) Doe V. GoocJi, 3 B. & Aid. 664 ; Doe v. Chambers, 4 Camp. 1. 
 (/) Floyer v. Edwards, sup. ; Davis v. Hardacre, 2 Camp. 375 ; 
 
 Harvey v. Archbold, 3 B. & C. 626. 
 
 (gr) Tate v. Wettings, 3 T. E. 531 ; Boldero v. JacJcsm, 11 Bast , 
 612 ; White v. Wright, 3 B. & 0. 273. 
 
 I.S. 14 
 
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210 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a lease (a), or an agency (6), or a partnership (c), 
 when in reality usurious loans, were held to fall 
 within the Act. So, if a contract be a wager 
 in substance, no matter how the end is brought 
 about, it would be void, though the object were 
 concealed in the form given to the transaction (jd). 
 And whether a document ought to be registered 
 under the Bills of Sale Acts is not concluded by 
 its terms or form, but depends on the evidence as 
 to the real nature of the transaction, as to the 
 real intention of the parties. Thus, if A be the 
 real owner of goods, and B the pretended owner ^ 
 and B by a document purports to let the goods 
 
 (a) Bedo v. Sanderson, Cro. Jac. 440; Jestons v. Brooke, 2 
 Cowp. 793. 
 
 (6) Harris v. Boston, 2 Camp. 348. 
 
 (c) Enderhy v. Gilpin, 5 Moo. 571. 
 
 (d) Qrisewood v. Blane (1857), 11 C. B. 538. Gomp. 
 Phillips, Exp., 30 L. J. Bkcy. 1 ; per Wilde B., Jeffries v. 
 Alexander, 8 H. L. Gas. 594 ; Thacker v. Eardy, 4 Q. B. D. 685. 
 See also Bead v. Anderson, 52 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 53 Id. 532 ; 
 Gaminada v. Hulton, 60 L. J. M. C. 116, with which comp. B. v. 
 Stoddart, 70 L. J. K. B. 189 ; see also Hyams v. Stuart King, 
 77 L. J. K. B. 794 ; Be Deerhurst, 60 L. J. Q. B. 411. For 
 recent decisions, see Bottomley v. Director Public Prosecutions 
 (1916), 84 L. J. K. B. 354. Note especially the remarks of 
 Darling J., at p. 356 : Minty v. Sylvester (1916), 84 L. J. K. B. 
 1982 ; Jackson v. Both (1918), 35 T. L. E. 59. As to evasion 
 of Truck Acts, Gould v. Haynes, 59 L. J. M. G. 9. See Higginson 
 V. Simpson, 46 L. J. 0. P. 192 ; Summerlee Iron Co. v. Thomson 
 (1913), S. C. (J.), 34. 
 
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CONSTEUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 211 
 
 to A with liberty to B in a certain event to seize, 
 this may be construed as a license by A, the real 
 owner, to B. If it be found as a fact that it was 
 so given, then however absolute in form the docu- 
 ment may be, it comes within the operation of the 
 Act ; and if it be not registered, it is void (a). An 
 Act which prohibited under a penalty the perform- 
 ance of plays without license, would extend to a 
 performance where the actors did not come on the 
 stage, but acted in a chamber below it, and their 
 figures were reflected by mirrors so as to appear 
 to the spectators to be on the stage (b). Sec. 2, 
 Libel Act, 1843, which requires, under certain 
 circumstances, the insertion of a full apology in 
 a newspaper for a libel, would not be compHed 
 with, if the apology, however suitable in its terms, 
 was printed in such type or in such a part of the 
 paper as would be likely to escape the attention 
 of ordinary readers (c). An assignment of lease- 
 holds to a trustee with the object of protecting 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 4; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, ss. 3, 9 ; see 
 also 53 & 54 Vict. c. 35 ; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 35 ; Beckett v. Tower 
 Assets Go., 60 L. J. Q. B. 493; Maas v. Pepper (1905), 74 
 L. J. K. B. 452; Johnson v. Bees (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1276. 
 
 (6) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 2 ; Day v. Simpson (1865), 34 
 L. J. M. 0. 149 ; see also 53 & 54 Vict. c. 59, s. 51, and Syers 
 V. Conquest, 37 J. P. 342. 
 
 (c) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96; Lafonev. Smith (1859), 28 L. J. Ex. 33. 
 As to the measure of punishinent under a. 5 of this Act, see Bex 
 V. Truemm, [1913] W. N. 198. 
 
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212 INTBEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the mortgagee of them from liability to the cove- 
 nants, after the trustee in bankruptcy had dis- 
 claimed, was treated as an attempt to evade the 
 repealed Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and was a sham 
 and therefore void (a). The repealed Act of 1854 
 which required the registration of bills of sale of 
 personal chattels was held to extend to agreements 
 for a bin of sale, constituting an equitable assign- 
 ment (fc). And where the grantor of a bill of sale of 
 furniture remained in possession as the servant of 
 the grantee, with leave to use the furniture as part 
 of his salary, it was held that the grantee was not 
 in possession by his servant, but that the grantor 
 was in possession withiu the meaning, for the case 
 was within the mischief, of the Act (c). The Acts 
 which protected the monopoly of the Bank of 
 England by prohibiting bodies of more than six 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 55 (6); see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, 
 s. 54 (6) ; Smith, Be, 59 L. J. Q. B. 554. 
 
 (6) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43 ; Machay, Exp., 
 42 L. J. Bank. 68; Edwards v. Edwards, 45 L. J. Oh. 391 ; 
 Brantom v. Griffits (1877), 46 L. J. 0. P. 408 ; Odell, Exp., 
 48 L. J. Bank. 1 ; see, however, Allsopp v. Bay, 31 L. J. Ex. 
 105 ; Byerley v. Prevost, L. E. 5 0. P. 144 ; Marsden v. Meadows, 
 50 L. J. Q. B. 536 ; Woodgate v. Godfrey, 5 Ex. D. 24 ; WaUon, 
 Be, 59 L. J. Q. B. 394 ; Madell v. Thomas, sup. p. 209 ; Cochrane 
 V. Matthews, 10 Ch. D. 80 n. 
 
 (c) Pichard v. Marriage, 45 L. J. Ex. 594. See also Gibbons v. 
 Hichson, 55 L. J. Q. B. 119 ; Exp. Lewis, L. E. 6 Oh. 626. See 
 also Stallard v. Marks, 3 Q. B. D. 412. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 213 
 
 persons "to borrow, owe, or take up money on 
 their bills or notes, payable at less than six months 
 from the borrowing," were construed to make it 
 illegal for such a body of bankers to accept a 
 customer's bill at less than six months : for the 
 effect of such a transaction would admit of com- 
 petition with the Bank of England by the issue 
 of bills and notes (a). And they were also held 
 to prohibit a joint stock bank from engaging with 
 a foreign bank that their manager, who was not 
 a partner, should accept the bUls of the foreign 
 bank, and that they should provide funds for their 
 payment (b). All such transactions were held to 
 come more or less directly within the prohibition 
 to " owe, borrow, or take up money on bills or 
 notes "(c). 
 
 A tenant who covenanted not to assign his 
 lease without his landlord's license, would be held 
 to have broken his covenant by giving a warrant 
 of attorney to confess judgment, if he gave it for 
 the express purpose of enabling the judgment 
 creditor to take the lease in execution; for this 
 was, in affect and intention, an assignment of the 
 lease (d). The transaction would be unobjection- 
 
 (a) Banh of Ungland v. Anderson, (1837), 7 L. J. Oh. 265. 
 
 (b) Booth y. Banh of England, 7 01. & R 509 ; J/ap. Bandleson, 
 1 Mont. & M'Arth. 86. 
 
 (c) See also O'Connor v. Bradshaw (1850), 20 L. J. Ex. 26. 
 
 (d) Boe V Carter, i E. E. 586. See, however, Croft v. Lumley 
 (1858), 6 H. L. Oas, 739. 
 
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214 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 able if divested of the intent to break the 
 covenant (a). A similar warrant of attorney, given 
 by an insolvent to enable a favoured creditor to 
 take his goods in execution, would, in the same 
 way, be within the provisions against fraudulent 
 transfers of property (6). 
 
 The Charitable Uses Act, 1735, 9 Geo. II. 
 c. 36(c), which prohibited the disposition to a 
 charity of land, or money to be laid out in the 
 purchase of land, otherwise than by deed executed 
 twelve months before the donor's death, to be 
 enrolled within six months from its execution, 
 and to take effect immediately, and without power 
 of revocation or any reservation for the benefit of 
 the donor, has frequently been the subject of such 
 experiments. Thus, a bequest of money to the 
 committee of a school, on condition that they 
 would provide land for a charitable purpose, would 
 fall within the Act ; for such a transaction differs 
 but in name from a purchase of the land and a 
 
 (o) Bills V. Smith, 34 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; Vautin, In re, [1900] 
 2 Q. B. 325. 
 
 (6) Sharpe v. Thomas, 6 Bing. 416 ; Croft v. Lumley, 6 H. L. 
 Cas. 672. See 32 & 33 Viet. c. 71, s. 92; (repealed, g. 48. 
 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52); repealed 4 & 5 Geo. V. o. 59, s. 44; 
 Griffith, Exp., 52 L. J. Oh. 717 ; Be Goldsmid, 56 L. J. Q. B. 195. 
 For an exception to this rule, see New's Trustee v. Hunting, [1897] 
 1 Q. B. 607 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 554, 0. A. 
 
 (c) Eepealed save s. 5 by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 42, s. 13. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 215 
 
 devise of it (a). The testator did not, indeed, 
 directly devise the land; but he gave money in 
 consideration of land being 'given to a charity, 
 which was substantially the same thing. So, 
 mone^ bequeathed to be laid out in building 
 houses, where there was no land already in mort- 
 main (b) to build them on, would have been 
 construed as an indirect instruction to purchase 
 land for the purpose (c). So a legacy to trustees 
 of a chapel to be applied by them towards the 
 discharge of a mortgage on the said chapel is 
 void((/). Where the owner of land, with the 
 object of evading the statutes, executed a deed, 
 which he kept concealed tUl his death, whereby 
 he covenanted that he or his executors would pay 
 to trustees for certain charitable purposes, a large 
 sum of money, which would necessarily have to 
 
 (o) A.-G. V. Davies, 9 Ves. 535. See also judgment of Lord 
 Oranworth, L.C., PMlpott v. St. George's Hospital (1857), 6 H. L. 
 Gas. 349 ; 27 L. J. Oh. 70, also sup. p. 208, and inf. p. 221. 
 See, however. Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891. 
 Provision of s. 5 no longer applies to land assured by will 
 for the purpose of an elementary school-house ; 2 Edw. VII. 
 c, 42, s. 23 (5). 
 
 (6) Comp, Brodie v. Chandos, 1 Bro. 0. G. 444 n. ; and 
 Pritchard v. Arhouin, 27 E. E. 106. 
 
 (c) A.-G. V. Tyndall, Ambl. 614 ; Mather v. Scott (1837), 44 
 E. E. 229 ; 6 L. J. Oh. 380 ; Giblett v. Hohson, 41 E. E. 144, but 
 e converso for a reason therein specified, see Biggar v. East- 
 wood (1886), 19 L. E. Ir., at p. 65. 
 
 (d) Gorbyn v. French (1799), 4 Vesey, 418. 
 
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216 INTBBPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 be raised out of his land, this was held to fall 
 within the prohibition of the statute. The 
 creation of a fictitious debt on which execution 
 might issue, and the land be taken, was but an 
 indirect mode of making a gift of the land (a). 
 
 So, a settlement, under the Poor Law, by rent- 
 ing a tenement, was not obtained where the rent- 
 ing was colourable or fraudulent {b). It has been 
 held that where a woman pregnant with an ille- 
 gitimate child was fraudulently removed by the 
 officers of the parish in which she was settled (c) 
 to another parish, the child's place of settlement 
 was not the parish where it was born, but that 
 in which it would, but for the fraudulent removal, 
 have been born (d). Indeed, it has been held that 
 where an unmarried woman was removed to a 
 parish by order of justices, and gave birth to a 
 child there, and the order was quashed on^ appeal, 
 the child was to be regarded as born in the parish 
 where he ought to have been, and not where he 
 
 (a) Jeffries v. Alexander, 8 H. L. Cas. 594 ; and per Cur., 
 Attree v. Hawe, 47 L. J. Oh. 863. Comp. Bohson, Be, 51 
 L. J. Oh. 337. 
 
 (6) B. V. Woodland, 1 T. E. 261 ; B. v. Tillinghcm, 1 B. & Ad. 
 180 ; B. V. St. Sepulchre, Id. 924. 
 
 (c) See B. v. Astley, 4 Doug. 389. 
 
 (d) Masters v. Child, 3 Salk. 66 ; Tewheshury v. Twyning, 2 
 Bott. 3. Compare B. v. Mattersey, 4 B. & Ad. 211 ; B. v. 
 Halifax, 2 B. & Ad. 211 ; and B. v. Birmingham, 32 E. E. 
 332.! 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 217 
 
 actually was born (a). Where a woman, after fail- 
 ing to obtain a bastardy order where she resided, 
 removed to a neighbouring borough for the avowed 
 purpose of trying to get the order there, it was 
 held that the justices of the borough had no juris- 
 diction to make it, under the Act which gives such 
 authority to justices of the place where the woman 
 " resides " (b). It would have been different if she 
 had not removed for the sole object of getting into 
 another jurisdiction (c). 
 
 On this general principle, the Courts have 
 repeatedly refused to review by Mandamus, or 
 otherwise, the proceedings of an inferior Court, in 
 a matter within its jurisdiction, when a writ of 
 Qertiorari is not granted (d). Where the payment 
 of rates constitutes a personal qualification, the 
 Act would not be complied with if they were paid 
 i)y another person on behalf of him who claims 
 the qualification (e). 
 
 (a) Much Waltliam v. Peram, 2 Salk. 474 ; Westbury v. Coston, 
 Id. 532 ; B. v. Great Salkeld, 6 M. & S. 408. 
 
 (6) B. V. Myott (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 138; B. v. Allendale, 
 3 T. E. 382, 385. 
 
 (c) B. V. Hughes, 26 L. J. M. C. 133 ; Massey v. Burton, 27 
 L. J. Ex. 101. 
 
 {d) B. V. TorJcsMre (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1003, and 1 A. & B. 563 ; 
 B. V. Haton, 1 E. E. 436. 
 
 (e) B. V. Bridgnorth (1839), 50 E. E. 334 ; 8 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 
 Durant v. Withers, 43 L. J. 0. P. 113. But compare B. v. 
 Bridgewater, 3 T. E. 550; Hughes v. Chatham (1843), 13 
 
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218 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It is, however, essential not to confound what is 
 actually or virtually prohibited or enjoined by the 
 language, with what is really beyond the enacting 
 part, though it may be within the policy, of the 
 Act; for it is only to the former case that the 
 principle under consideration applies, and not to 
 cases where, however manifest the object of the 
 Act may be, the language is not co-extensive with 
 it. An Act of Parliament is always subject to 
 evasion in this sense ; for there is no obligation 
 not to do what the Legislature has not really 
 prohibited, and it is not evading an Act to keep 
 outside of it (a). This is strikingly illustrated by 
 a case from Australia decided by the Privy 
 Council and in which the very word " evade " 
 came in question (b). By s. 27 (South Australia), 
 Succession . Duties Act, 1893 (which corresponds 
 with s. 8 (English) Succession Duty Act, 1863,' 
 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51), property comprised in any 
 
 L. J. C. P. \U ; B. V. S. Kilvington, 13 L. J. M.l C. 3. See 
 Chinnery v. Evans (1864), 11 H. L. Oas. 115 ; Harlock v. Ashberry 
 (1882) 19 Oh. D. 539. 
 
 (a) See per Lord Cranworth, Edwards v. Hall (1853), sup. 
 p. 206, and per Lord Selborne, Macbeth, v. Ashley (1874), L. E. 
 2 So. App. 359. 
 
 (6) Simms v. Registrar of Probates (1900), 69 L. J. P. 0. 51. 
 See also Bullivant v. A.-G. for Victoria (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 
 645 ; Payne v. Begem, 71 L. J. P. C. 128 ; Gommr. for Stamp 
 Duties V. Byrnes, [1911] A. 0. 386 ; 80 L. J. P. C. 114. See 
 also A.-G. V. Seacombe, 80 L. J. K. B. 913. 
 
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CONSTEUOTION AGAINST EVASION. 219 
 
 non-testamentary disposition, or representing any 
 debt incurred, " with intent to evade the payment " 
 of Succession Duty, was rendered liable to double 
 duty. In the Colonial Court from whom the appeal 
 to the Privy Council came, Way C.J., said that, 
 in that provision, " evade, means some device or 
 stratagem, some arrangement, trust, or other device 
 (whether concealed or apparent) by which what is 
 really part of the estate of the deceased is made to 
 appear to belong to somebody else in order to 
 escape payment of Duty. " That ruling was upheld 
 by the Privy Council, and, accordingly, it was held 
 that a covenant by the deceased in that case to 
 pay j6200,00O to his children which conferred on 
 them a complete ownership of the debt, and which 
 (not having been paid during his life) diminished 
 by that amount his net assets liable to Duty (even 
 though the covenant was a " disposition of pro- 
 perty " within the meaning of the Act), was not 
 entered into " with intent to evade " the Duty, 
 there being no evidence to show that the cove- 
 nant was not a genuine transaction, or anything 
 to impeach its bond, fides. 
 
 So, a lately deceased Duke of Eichmond, being 
 minded that his successors should escape Estate 
 Duty, conceived the idea to and did disentail and 
 acquire the fee simple of certain estates in Scotland, 
 and procured a valuation of the present duke's 
 interest in the estates which came to ^6415,000, 
 
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220 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and another of the present duke's son's interest 
 which came to £287,000. These sums with interest 
 thereon were charged on the estates and were 
 assigned by the present duke and his son to trustees 
 upon trust to pay the income thereof to the present 
 duke for life and after his death to his son. No 
 interest, however, was paid on them, and the late 
 duke from time to time gave bonds for such 
 interest amounting to ^88,314. When the duke 
 died in 1903, the Inland Eevenue claimed Estate 
 Duty in respect of these estates ; but it was held 
 that none was payable, because the said sums and 
 interest amounted in the aggregate to more than 
 the value of the said estates that passed on the 
 death of the late duke (a) 
 
 A hiring for a few days less than a year, though 
 avowedly for the purpose of preventing the servant 
 from acquiring a settlement, was not regarded 
 as any evasion of the Act, which gave a settle- 
 ment on a year's service (6). Where a testator 
 after devising a piece of land in a certain hamlet 
 in fee simple, directed that if any person should, 
 within twelve months after the testator's decease, 
 
 (a) A.-G. V. Buke of Richmond (1909), 78 L. J. K. B. 1, in 
 H. L. Id. 998 ; Lord Shaw (one of the two dissenting Lords) 
 said : " I do not think that the scheme was in this case accom- 
 plished without a contravention of the letter, as well as a very 
 plain violation of the spirit; of the statute." 
 
 (6) B. V. Little GoggesJiall, 6 M. & S. 264 ; E. v. Mursley, 1 
 T. E. 694. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 221 
 
 at his or her own expense, purchase and give a 
 suitable piece of land for almshouses, the trustees 
 of the will should pay a sum of money to the 
 charity so instituted, hut so that no part should be 
 laid out in the purchase of land ; it was held that 
 the bequest was valid, and did not fall within the 
 Charitable Uses Act, 1735 (a). And again, where 
 a testator devised land to two persons absolutely, 
 and signed an unattested paper expressing a desire, 
 with which they were unacquainted until after his 
 death, that it should be applied to charitable pur- 
 poses, it was held that the devise was valid, and 
 did not fall within that Act ; for there was no 
 binding trust for charitable purposes (b). 
 
 Although a beershop-keeper who is licensed to 
 sell beer only to be drunk off the premises, evades 
 the Act if he sells beer to be drunk on a bench 
 which he provides for his customers close to his 
 shop, the intention making it, virtually, a sale for 
 consumption on the premises (c) ; a mere sale 
 through a window, to a person who stood on the 
 road outside, has been held not to be an evasion, 
 
 (a) PMlpott V. St. George's Hospital, 6 H. L. Oas. 338, sup. 
 p. 215 ; Bent v. Allcroft, 30 Beav. 835. See also Edwards v. 
 Hall, 25 L. J. Gh. 82. 
 
 (b) Wallgrave v. Tehhs, 25 L. J. Gh. 241; Jones v. Badley 
 (1867), L. E. 3 Bq. 635. 
 
 (c) Gross V. Watts, 32 L. J. M. C. 73. See also Brigden v. 
 Heighes (1876), 45 L. J. M. 0. 68. 
 
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222 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 though the buyer drank the beer immediately on 
 receiving it (a). A licensee is not authorised to 
 sell liquor during prohibited hours for consumption 
 off the premises, by s. 10, Licensing Act, 1874 
 (repealed, s. 61 (3), Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 
 1910), which allows the sale of liquor at any time 
 to bond fide travellers, by a person licensed to seU 
 liquor on the premises (6). The occupier of a field 
 adjoining a turnpike does not evade, though he 
 avoids, payment of toll, by making a semicircular 
 road between two gaps in his hedge, one on each 
 side of the toll bar, and driving by it instead of 
 along that part of the highway which forms its 
 chord (c). Nor does a shipowner evade harbour 
 dues charged on goods landed in it, by landing 
 his goods a few yards outside the boundary of 
 the harbour [d). 
 
 An enactment which imposed a duty on legacies, 
 did not extend to a gift to take effect on the donor's 
 death, made by a deed which contained a power of 
 revocation ; though such a gift had aU the essential 
 
 (a) Deal v. SchofieU (1867), 37 L. J. M. C. 15 ; a doubtful 
 case decided on particular facts, and probably nullified by 
 s. 66 (1), Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910. 
 
 (6) 37 & 38 Vibt. c. 49 ; Mmntifield v. Ward, 66 L. J. Q. B. 
 246. 
 
 (c) Harding v. Meadington, 43 L. J. M. C. 59 ; Veitch v. Exeter, 
 27 L. J. M. C. 116. 
 
 {d) WiUon V. Bobertson, 24 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; Harvey v. Lyme 
 Regis, 38 L. J. Ex. 141. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 223 
 
 incidents of a legacy (a). A statute which imposes 
 a tax, indeed, is always construed strictly ; but the 
 above decision which is no longer law shows that 
 if legislation closes only one of two doors, it is no 
 evasion to use the other, which may have been left 
 open. So, s. 87 of the (repealed) Bankruptcy Act, 
 1869, which provided that the sheriff should retain 
 for fourteen days the proceeds of goods sold in 
 execution when exceeding £50, and, if he received 
 notice of the debtor's bankruptcy, should pay them 
 to the trustee in bankruptcy, did not prevent a 
 creditor for more than £50 from signing judgment 
 for less than that amount, though he did so 
 avowedly to escape from the operation of the Act (6). 
 An agreement that the rent of demised premises 
 should be reduced when and as soon as the income 
 tax was aboKshed, was held not to fall within the 
 prohibition contained in s. 73 of the Income Tax 
 Act, 1842, of all contracts binding the tenant to 
 pay the income tax without deducting it from his 
 rent (c). But a contract by a tenant to reimburse 
 his landlord the amount paid in respect of tithe 
 
 (o) Tompsonv. Browne (1835), 3 M. & K. 32; 5 L. J. Oh. 64. 
 See, however, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 12, s. 38, and 52 & 53 Vict. c. 7, 
 s. 11. 
 
 (6) Beya, Exp., 46 L. J. Bank. 122. See Abbott, Exp., 50 L. J. 
 Ch. 80; and see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 41. 
 
 (c) Colbron v. Traverse (1862), 31 L. J. 0. P. 257 ; Davies V. 
 Fitton, 90 E. E. 885. See also Lamb v. Brewster, 48 L. J. Q. B. 
 277, 421. 
 
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224 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 rent-charge has been held to be prohibited by the 
 Tithe Act, 1891 (a). A railway company, prevented 
 from raising money by loan, may yet procure 
 money by a sale of a portion of its rolling stock 
 for the sum which it requires, retaining the stock 
 by hiring it for a term, on payment of an annual 
 sum which repays the purchase-money with 
 interest (b). 
 
 A warrant of attorney which authorised the issue 
 of a writ of sequestration on a rectory as often as 
 an annuity granted by the incumbent was in arrear, 
 was held invalid ; as this would amount to a 
 charging of a benefice to pay the annuity, contrary 
 to 13 Eliz. c. 20 (repealed 57 Geo. III. c. 99, 
 s. 1) (c). But where the warrant of attorney pur- 
 ported to be merely to secure the payment of an 
 annuity mentioned in a bond which had been 
 given for its payment, the Court refused to set 
 aside the judgment entered up on the warrant, 
 as it was not a charging of the benefice ; although 
 it appeared, by affidavit, that the object of the 
 parties was, that the judgment should enable the 
 annuitant to obtain a sequestration of the grantor's 
 
 (a) 54 & 55 Viot. o. 8, s. 1 (1) ; Ludlow v. Pike, [1904] 1 
 K. B. 531 ; Tuffy. Draper's Go. (1913), 82 L. J. K. B. 174. 
 
 (V) TorhsMre Bailway Wagon Go. v. Maelure, 21 Oh. D. 309 ; 
 comp. WautUer v. Wilson (1911), 27 T. L. E. 582. 
 
 (c) FligU V. Salter, 85 E. E. 413 ; Saltmarshe v. Hewett, 40 
 E. E. 436. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AGAINST EVASION. 225 
 
 living, if the annuity should fall into arrear(a). 
 The Act which required that all bills of sale of 
 personal chattels should be registered within 21 
 days from execution, on pain of being void against 
 creditors, was held not to invalidate an arrange- 
 ment by which a fresh bill of sale was to be given 
 every 21 days, and none were to be registered 
 until the debtor got into difficulties. Although 
 such an arrangement was considered to be detri- 
 mental to the interests of the revenue, and to be 
 calculated to defeat and delay creditors, and so 
 was contrary to the general policy of the Act, 
 since it left the debtor apparently the owner of 
 property which he had transferred; it was held 
 not to be prohibited by its*language, and the last 
 bill of sale, which was duly registered, was held 
 valid against an execution creditor (b). This 
 device, however, is now rendered nugatory by 
 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 9. 
 
 It has been found necessary to suffer an evasion 
 or breach of an Act, where intolerable incon- 
 venience would otherwise result. Though s. 17, 
 
 (a) Colebrooh v. Layton (1833), 2 L. J. K. B. 95 ; 38 E. E. 
 314. Comp. Doe v. Garter, 8 T. E. 300, and Jeffries v. Alexander, 
 8 H. L. Gas. 594, sup. pp. 208, 209. 
 
 (6) Smale v. Burr, 42 L. J. C. P. 20. Comjp. Exp. Cohen, 41 
 L. J. Bank. 17 ; Exp. Stevens, L. E. 20 Bq. 786 ; Bamsden v. 
 Lupton, 43 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; but see Sales Agency v. Elite Theatres, 
 [1917] 2 K. B. 164, C. A. 
 
 I.S. 15 
 
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226 INTBBPKETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97 (repealed and re-enacted 
 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 14), enacted that no 
 document which is not properly stamped should 
 be receivable in evidence, and (s. 54, now s. 38, 
 Stamp Act, 1891) that a person who received a 
 bin of exchange or cheque not duly stamped could' 
 not recover upon it, or make it available for any 
 purpose whatever ; it has been held that if the 
 cheque sued upon has a stamp sufficient on its 
 face, the fact that it was post-dated to the know- 
 ledge of the holder, and so was not sufficiently 
 stamped, did not affect its admissibility in evidence ; 
 on the ground that a different decision would have 
 introduced the greatest difficulty in the adminis- 
 tration of justice,. involving an interruption of the 
 trial by collateral inquiries as to facts accompanying 
 the giving of the instrument (a). 
 
 SECTION II. — OONSTBUCTION TO PREVENT ABUSE OF 
 POWEES. 
 
 On the same general principle, enactments which 
 confer powers are so construed as to meet all 
 attempts to abuse them, either by exercising them 
 in cases not intended by the statute, or by refusing 
 
 (a) Qatty v. Fry, 2 Ex. D. 265. See per Blackburn J., AusUn 
 V. Bunyard, 6 B. & S. 687 ; Boyal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham, 
 [1894] 2 Q. B. 715. But compare Glarhe v. Roche (1877), 3 
 Q. B. D. 170. 
 
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TO PREVENT ABUSE OP POWERS. 227 
 
 to exercise them when the occasion for their 
 exercise has arisen (a). Though the act done was 
 ostensibly in execution of the statutory power, and 
 within its letter, it would nevertheless be held not 
 to come within the power, if done otherwise than 
 honestly, and in the spirit of the enactment. For 
 instance, the power given by Bankruptcy Acts to 
 a majority of creditors to make arrangements with 
 their debtor (6) ; which were made by statute 
 binding on the non-assenting minority, would not 
 be validly exercised so as to have this binding 
 effect, if the conduct of the majority were tainted 
 with fraud; or even if, from motives of benevolence, 
 the majority had agreed to a composition dispro- 
 portioned to the assets (c). So, the creditor who 
 voted for a composition with his debtor under 
 s. 126 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act, 1869, was 
 bound to vote bond fide for the benefit of the 
 creditors ; and if it a,ppeared that he gave his vote 
 for the benefit of the debtor, and not for that 
 
 (a) See jper Turner L.J., Biddulph v. St. George's Vestry, 33 
 L. J. Oh. 411 ; and see Vernon v. St. James' Vestry (1880), 
 16 Oh. D. 449. 
 
 (6) See 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 69, s. 16. 
 ■ (c) Gowen, Exp. (1867), L. E. 2 Gh. 563. See per Lord Cairns, 
 570; Bussell, Exp., 44 L. J. Bank. 42 ; Page, Be, 45 L. J. Bank. 
 119 ; Terrell, Be, 4 Ch. D. 293 ; Aaronson, Exp., 7 Gh. D. 713 ; 
 Ball, Exp., 51 L. J. Ch. 911. As to powers of Court to approve 
 a scheme of arrangement, see Webb, In re, Board of Trade, Exp. 
 (1914), 88 L. J. K. B. 1386. 
 
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228 INTEKPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the creditors, it would have been rejected (a). 
 Malpractice by the debtor in obtaining a single 
 vote sufficed to vitiate a creditor's resolution for 
 liquidation by arrangement, under the Bankruptcy 
 Act of 1869 (b). 
 
 Where, as in a multitude of Acts, something is 
 left to be done according to the discretion of the 
 authority on whom the power of doing it is con- 
 ferred, the discretion must be exercised honestly 
 and in the spirit of the statute, otherwise the act 
 done would not fall within the statute. " Accord- 
 ing to his discretion" means, it has been said, 
 according to the rules of reason and justice, not 
 private opinion (c) ; according to law and not 
 humour ; it is to be, not arbitrary, vague and 
 fanciful, but legal and regular (d) ; to be exercised 
 not capriciously but on judicial grounds and for 
 substantial reasons (e). And it must be exercised 
 within the limits to which an honest man com- 
 petent to the discharge of his office ought to 
 
 (a) Gohh, Exp. (1873), 42 L. J. Bank. 63 ; and see McHenry, 
 Exp. (1883), 24 Ch. Div. 35, C. A. 
 
 (6) Baum, Be (1878), 7 Ch. D. 719, C. A. 
 
 (c) Boohe's Gase, 5 Eep. 100a ; Keighley's Case, 10 Eep. 140a ; 
 Lee V. Bude B. Co., L. E. 6 0. P. 580, 581, per WUles J. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Mansfield, B. v. Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. 2527; and 
 per Lord Halsbury L.O., Sliarp v. Wakefield, [1891] A. C. 179. 
 
 (e) Per Jessel M.E., Taylor, Be, 4 Ch. D. 160 ; and per Lord 
 Blackburn, Doherty v. Allman, 3 App. Cas. 728. 
 
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TO PEEVENT ABUSE OF POWERS. 229 
 
 confine himself (a) ; that is, within the limits and 
 for the objects intended by the Legislature. These 
 dicta may be summed up in the statement of Lord 
 Esher that the discretion must be exercised with- 
 out taking into account any reason which is not 
 a legal one. If people who have to exercise a 
 public duty by exercising their discretion take into 
 account matters which the Courts consider not to 
 be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then 
 in the eye of the law they have not exercised their 
 discretion (b). 
 
 Thus, it was long ago settled that the power 
 given by the 43 Eliz. to the overseers of parishes 
 to raise a poor rate by taxation of the parishioners 
 in such competent sums as they thought fit, did 
 not authorise an arbitrary rate on each parishioner, 
 but required that the rates should be equal and 
 proportionate to the means of the contributors (c). 
 So, the Highway Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, 
 which provided that if any complaint was made 
 against the road surveyor's accounts, the justices 
 at special highway sessions should hear it, and 
 
 (a) Per Lord Kenyon, Wilson v. Bastall, 4 T. E. 757 ; B. v. 
 Avdly, Salk. 526 ; B. v. Wavell, 1 Doug. 115. 
 
 (6) B. V. St. Pancras (1890), 24 Q. B. D. at p. 375. See, 
 however, B. v. Board of Education (1910), 79 L. J. K. B. 595. 
 
 (c) Earhyes Case, 2 Bulstr. 354 ; Marshall v. Pitman, 9 Bing. 
 595. See Jones v. Mersey Docks (1864), 35 L. J. M. 0. 1 ; and 
 Whitchurch V. Fulham Board (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 145. 
 
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230 INTEBPEKTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 "make such order thereon as to them should 
 seem meet," would not authorise them to allow 
 illegal expenses, such as a charge for the use of 
 the surveyor's horses, contrary to s. 46, which are 
 expressly forbidden to be incurred at all (a). So, 
 overseers, who were required by s. 2 of 3 & 4 
 Vict. c. 61 (b), to certify whether applicants for 
 beer licenses were real residents and ratepayers of 
 the parish, were not entitled to refuse the certifi- 
 cate on the ground that in their opinion there 
 were already too many public-houses, or that the 
 beer-shop was not required. They had no right 
 to shut their eyes to thq facts, and to refuse to 
 certify, when they were satisfied that the appli- 
 cant possessed the quahfioatioris required by the 
 Act(c). Under a repealed enactment which pro- 
 vided that no license should be refused by justices 
 except on one or more of four specified grounds, 
 it was held that justices, in refusing, were bound 
 to state on which of the grounds they based their 
 refusal, as otherwise they might, in abuse of 
 their powers, refuse on other grounds than those 
 to which they were limited (d). The power to 
 
 (a) Barton v. Piggott, 44 L. J. M. C. 5. 
 
 (6) Eepealed in part 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 21. . 
 
 (c) B. V. Withyham, 2 Com. Law Eep. 1657. See, however, 
 B. V.I Kensington (1847), 17 L. J. Q. B. 332, in which it was held 
 that the giving of a certificate was not compulsory. 
 
 {d) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 8 ; JB. v. Sykes, 1 Q. B. D. 52 ; Exj,, 
 
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TO PREVENT ABUSE OF POWEES. 231 
 
 take certain lands for the purpose of their under- 
 taking, given to railway and other companies, or 
 to municipalities for their public works, consti- 
 tutes them sole judges as to whether they will 
 take the lands, but they must act honA fide for 
 the purposes authorised by the Act, and not for a 
 collateral purpose (a) ; and the lands must only be 
 used for the purposes for which they were taken {b), 
 unless authoritative sanction be given to their 
 being otherwise used (c) ; and, semble, the powers 
 are not assignable (d). 
 
 Smith, 3 Q. B. D. 374. See Gorman, Exp., [1894] A. 0. 23. See 
 10 Edw.' Vn. and 1 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, Sched. 7. 
 
 (a) Stockton By. Go. v. Brown (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 246; 
 Lewis V. Weston Loc. Bd., 40 Ch. D. 55 ; Stroud v. Wandsworth 
 Board of Works, 63 L. J. M. C. 88; Tracey v. Pretty, 70 
 L. J. K. B. 234 ; and compare Goldberg v. Liverpool Corp. (1900), 
 82 L. T. 362. 
 
 (b) London County Council v. A.-G., 71 L. J. Ch. 268 ; A.-G. v. 
 Mersey, B., 76 L. J. Ch. 568 ; Ecclea Corp. v. South Lancashire 
 Tramways Co. (1910), 79 L. J. Ch. 759; A.-G. v. West 
 Gloucestershire Water Co.y 78 L. J. Oh. 746 ; A.-G. v. Leicester 
 Corp., 80 L. J. Ch. 21. 
 
 (c) A.-G. V. Hanwell (1900), 69 L. J. Ch. 626; A.-G. v. 
 Pontypridd (1905), 75 L. J. Ch. 578. 
 
 (d) Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Edinburgh (1894), 63 
 L. J. Q. B. 769; Eceles Corp. v. South Lancashire Tramways Co., 
 sup., in which case Cozens-Hardy M.E. said : " A parliamentary 
 franchise of this kind is not a bit of property which the owner 
 can dispose of just as he might a stick or a table or an acre of 
 land." 
 
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232 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Although where the discretion has been settled 
 by practice, it seems right that this should not be 
 departed from without strong reason (a) ; yet in 
 cases where a statute confers a discretionary power, 
 an exercise of it in the fetters of self-imposed rules 
 of practice, purporting to bind in all cases, would 
 not be within the Act (6). Thus, where an Act 
 gave the Court of Quarter Sessions powej, if it 
 thought fit, to give costs in every poor law appeal, 
 it would be bound to exercise a fair and honest 
 discretion in each case, and would not be entitled 
 to govern itself by a general resolution, or rule of 
 practice, to give nominal costs in aU cases (c) ; for 
 this would be in effect to repeal the provision of 
 the Act. So, a Hcensiag Act, now repealed (d), 
 which empowered justices to grant licenses to 
 innkeepers and others, to sell liquors, as in the 
 exercise of their discretion they deemed proper, 
 would not justify a general resolution to refuse 
 licenses in a certain locality (e), or to persons who 
 did not consent to take out an excise license for 
 the sale of spirits, in addition to the license for 
 
 (a) 2 Inst. 298. See B. v. Chapman (1838), 8 0. & P. 558. 
 See also Godd v. Cale (1876), 1 Ex. D. 352, 0. A. 
 
 (6) See A.-G. v. Emerson (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 56. 
 
 (c) B. V. Merioneth (1844), 6 Q. B. 163 ; B. v. Glamorganshire 
 (1850), 19 L. J. M. G. 172. 
 
 {d) See 10 Bdw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, Sched, 7. 
 
 (e) B. V. Walsall (1854), 3 Com. L. E. 100. 
 
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TO PREVENT ABUSE OP POWERS. 233 
 
 the sale of beer (a), or in consideration of the 
 grant of the license to pay a sum of money for a 
 public purpose (i). But, on the other hand, it has 
 been held that a licensing authority may in the 
 exercise of their discretion impose a condition 
 that the applicant shall not apply to another 
 authority for a different species of license (c). 
 
 So, where a similar Act, after fixing the hours 
 within which intoxicating liquors might be sold, 
 authorised the licensing justices to alter the hours 
 in any particular locality, within the district, re- 
 quiring other hours ; it was held that they had no 
 right to alter the time in every case by virtue of 
 a general resolution to which they had come(cZ). 
 And though their resolution was limited to a 
 portion of the locality, yet as this portion com- 
 prised every licensed house of the whole district, 
 the limitation was regarded as a mere attempt 
 to evade the Act. The statute required them to 
 decide, in the honest and bond, fide exercise of their 
 judgment, what particular localities required hours 
 for opening and closing other than those specified 
 by the Act ; and they were bound to satisfy them- 
 selves as to those special circumstances of the 
 
 (a) B. V. Sylvester (1862), 2 B. & S. 322 ; 31 L. J. M. G. 93 
 discussed in Sharp v. Wakefield, [1891] A. C, at p. 180. 
 (6) B. V. Bowman, [1898] 1 Q. B. 663. 
 (c) B. V. West Biding 0. C, [1896] 2 Q. B. 386. 
 {d) Macbeth v. Ashley (1874), L. E. 2 So. App. 352. 
 
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234 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 particular locality, which by taking them out of 
 the general rule laid down by Parliament, required 
 that an exception should be made (a). The statute 
 laid down a general rule, and permitted an excep- 
 tion ; but here the exception had swallowed up 
 the rule ; and that which might fairly have been 
 an exercise of discretion, became no exercise of 
 the kind of discretion meant by the Act (6). 
 
 (o) See judgment of Lord Selborne L.C., 2 Sc. App. 359. 
 (6) Per Lord Cairns L.C., Id. 357, 
 
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CHAPTEE V. 
 
 SECTION I. — PEESUMPTIONS AGAINST OUSTING ESTAB- 
 LISHED, AND CEEATING NEW, JUBISDICTIONS. 
 
 It is, perhaps, on the general presumption 
 aga;inst an intention to disturb the established state 
 of the law, or to interfere with the vested rights of 
 the subject (a), that so strong a leaning now exists 
 against construing a statute so as to oust or restrict 
 the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts ; although 
 this feeling may owe its origin to the pecuniary 
 interests of the Judges in former times, when their 
 emoluments depended mainly on fees (6). It is 
 supposed that the Legislature would not make 
 so important an innovation, without a very explicit 
 expression of its intention. It would not be in- 
 ferred, for instance, from the grant of a jurisdiction 
 to a new tribunal over certain cases, that the Legis- 
 lature intended to deprive the Superior Court of 
 
 (a) See Jacobs v. Brett, L. E. 20 Bq. 1. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Campbell, Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Gas. 811 ; 
 Oram v. Brearey (1877), 2 Ex. Div. 346. So in construing 
 contracts, Scott v. Avery; Tredwen v. Holman, 1 H. & C. 72; 
 Edwards v. Aberayron Insurance Socy., 1 Q. B, D. 563 ; Dawson 
 V. Fitzgerald, 45 L. J. Ex. 893. 
 
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236 INTERPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the jurisdiction which it already possessed over 
 the same cases. Thus, an Act which provided 
 that if any question arose upon taking a distress, 
 it should be determined by a commissioner of 
 taxes, would not thereby take away the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Superior Court to try an action for 
 an illegal distress (a). Nor would that Court be 
 ousted of its preventive jurisdiction to stop by 
 injunction the misapplication of poor rates, by 
 reason of the statutory power given to the poor 
 law commissioners to determine the propriety of 
 all such expenditure (b). Nor did it follow in either 
 case, that because authority was given to the 
 commissioners, it was taken away from the Court. 
 Acts which gives justices and other inferior 
 tribunals jurisdiction in certain cases are not only 
 generally understood, when silent on the subject, 
 not to affect the power of control and supervision 
 which the Superior Court exercises over the pro- 
 ceedings of such tribunals ; but are even strictly 
 construed when their language is doubtful. Thus 
 enactments to the effect that " no Court shall 
 intermeddle" in the cases (c), or that the case 
 
 (a) 43 Geo. III. c. 99 (repealed 43 & 44 Vict. c. 19, s. 4) ; 
 Shaftesbury v. Bussell (1823), 25 E. E. 534. See also Bochdale 
 Canal Co. v. King, 14 Q. B. 122. 
 
 (6) A.-G. V. Southampton, 17 Sim. 6. See Birley v. Chorlton, 3 
 Beav. 499 , Smith v. Whitmore, 1 Hem. & M. 576. 
 
 (c) B. V. Moreley, 2 Burr. 1041. 
 
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AGAINST OUSTING JURISDICTION. 237 
 
 shall be " heard and finally determined " below (a), 
 would not be construed as prohibiting such inter- 
 ference ; and enactments which expressly provide 
 that such proceedings shall not be removed by 
 Certiorari to the Superior Court have no applica- 
 tion when the lower tribunal has overstepped the 
 limits of its jurisdiction in making the order (b), 
 or is not duly constituted (c), or where the party 
 who obtained the order, obtained it by fraud (d), 
 for the prohibition obviously applied only to cases 
 which had been entrusted to the lower jurisdiction. 
 The saying has been attributed to Lord Mans- 
 field that nothing but express words can take away 
 the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts (e) ; but it 
 seems also it may certainly be taken away by 
 
 (a) B. V. Plowright, 3 Mod. 95; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, s. 23. 
 See Jacobs v. Brett, L. E. 20 Eq. 1 ; Chambers v. Green, Id. 552 ; 
 Haioes v. Paveley, 1 0. P. D. 418 ; Bridge v. Branch, Id. 633 ; 
 Chadwich v. Ball, 54 L. J. Q. B. 396. 
 
 (6) B. V. Derbyshire, 2 Kenyon, 299 ; B. v. Somersetshire, 5 
 B. & C. 816 ; B. v. St. Albans, 22 L. J. M. C. 142 ; B. v. Wood, 
 5 E. & B. 49 ; B. v. S. Wales B. Co. (1849), 13 Q. B. 988 ; 
 Be Penny, 7 E. & B. 660 ; B. v. Hyde, 7 E. & B. 859 n. ; 
 Bradlaugh, Exp., 3 Q. B. D. 509. 
 
 (c) B. V. Cheltenham (1841), 55 E. E. 321 ; 1 Q. B. 467 ; and 
 see Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874), 5 L. E. P. C, 
 at pp. 443, 444. 
 
 (d) B. V. Cambridge, 4 A. & E. 121, per Lord Denman ; B. v. 
 Gillyard, 12 Q. B. 527 ; Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan, 
 L. E. 5 P. C. 417. 
 
 (e) B. V. Abbot (1780), Doug. 553, 
 
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238 INTBEPEBTATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 implication (a). Thus, a provision that if any dis- 
 pute arises between a society and any of its members 
 it shall be lawful to refer it to arbitration, ousts 
 the jurisdiction of the Courts over such disputes (6). 
 It is obvious that the provision, from its nature, 
 would be superfluous and useless, if it did not 
 receive a construction which made it compulsory, 
 and not optional, to proceed by arbitration. On 
 similar grounds it was held that no action lay in 
 the Superior Courts on a County Court judgment. 
 The provisions made by the County Court Act 
 for enforcing such judgments would have been 
 defeated, if the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts 
 to entertain such an action had not been ousted (<?). 
 Where an Act vested in the trustees of a loan 
 society all its money and effects, and the right of 
 
 (a) Per Ashhurst J., Gates v. Knight, 3 T. E. 445, and Shipman 
 V. Henhest, 4 T. E. 116 ; per Jessel M.E., Jacobs v. Brett, L. E. 
 20 Bq. 6 ; per Pollock B., Oram v. Brearey, 2 Ex. D. 346. See also 
 Ghadwich v. Ball, 14 Q. B. D. 855, which overrules the last case. 
 
 (6) Grisp V. Bunhury, 34 E. E. 747. See also Marshall v. 
 Nicholls (1852), 18 Q. B. 882; Wright v. Monarch Investment 
 Socy. (1877), 46 L. J. Oh. 649 ; Hack v. London Provident Bldg. 
 Socy. (1883), 52 L. J. Ch. 541 ; Municipal Bldg. Socy. v. Kent 
 (1884), 9 App. Gas. 260. 
 
 (c) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, repealed 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 188 ; 
 BerJeeley v. Elderhin (1853), 1 B. & B. 805. See Austin v. Mills, 
 9 Ex. 288; Moreton v. Holt (1855), 10 Bx. 707. Gompare 
 Edwards v. Goombe, 41 L. J. C. P. 202. Under s, 151, County 
 Courts Act, 1888, a judgment may be removed into the High 
 Court, 
 
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AGAINST OUSTING JURISDICTION. 239 
 
 bringing and defending actions touching the pro- 
 perty and rights of the society, and, after enabling 
 them to lend money under certain circumstances, 
 and to take notes for such loans in the name of 
 their treasurer for the time being, to secure repay- 
 ment, authorised a justice, at the suit of the 
 treasurer to enforce payment by distress ; it was 
 held that the treasurer was limited to that 
 remedy (a). He had no rights but such as the 
 statute gave him, and therefore could not sue 
 except in the manner directed (6). But another 
 Court held that the trustees might sue on such 
 notes in the Superior Courts (c). Where an Act 
 imposed penalties and took away the Certiorari ; 
 and a subsequent one, after increasing the penalties 
 and extending the restrictions of the first, provided 
 that all " the powers, provisions, exemptions, 
 matters and things" contained in the earlier 
 statute should, except as they were varied, be as 
 effectual for carrying out the latter Act as if re- 
 enacted therein it ; it was held that the clause 
 which took away the Certiorari was incorporated 
 
 (a) Bundalk By. Co. v. Tapster (1841), 1 Q. B. 667. Compare 
 MulJeern T. Lord (1879), 4 App. Gas. ] 82, for limitations on the 
 proportion discussed in the text. 
 
 (&) Timms V. Williams, 11 L. J. Q. B. 210 ; Prentice v. London 
 (1875), L. K 10 C. P. 679; Willis v. Walls, [1892J 2 Q. B. 
 225 ; Palliser v. Dale, [1897] 1 Q. B. 257, 0. A. 
 
 (c) Albon V. Pyhe, 11 L. J. C. P. 266. 
 
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240 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 in the new Act, and consequently that the juris- 
 diction of the Superior Courts was ousted (a). 
 
 Where, indeed, a new duty or cause of action is 
 created by statute, and a special jurisdiction out of 
 the course of the common law is prescribed, there 
 is no ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
 Courts, for they never had any. Thus, where a 
 repealed Act (6) created penalties of £50 and J610 ; 
 and, after enacting that the former should be 
 recovered in the Superior Courts, authorised 
 justices to impose the latter, with powers of miti- 
 gation ; it was held that the Superior Courts had 
 no jurisdiction in respect of the lower penalty (c). 
 Where it was enacted, by the Metropolis Manage- 
 ment Act, 1855, that the owners of the houses 
 which formed a street should pay the vestry the 
 estimated cost of paving it, and that the amount 
 should, in case of dispute, be ascertained by, and 
 recovered before, justices ; it was held that the 
 pecuniary obligation and the mode of enforcing it 
 were so indissolubly united, that no direct action 
 lay against an owner for his contribution (d). 
 
 (a) B. V. Fell (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 380. 
 
 (6) 25 Geo. III. c. 51, repealed 2 & 3 WiU. IV. c. 120, s. 1. 
 
 (c) Gates v. Knight, 3 T. E. 442. Compare Shipman v. Menhest, 
 4 T. E. 109; Leigh v. Kent, 3 T. E. 362; Balls v. Attwood, 
 1 H. Bl. 546. 
 
 {d) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120; St. Pancras v. Batterbury (1857), 26 
 L. J. C. P. 243. See also Blackhurn v. ParUnson (1858), 28 
 L. J. M. C. 7. 
 
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AGAINST CEEATING NEW JUEISDICTION. 241 
 
 The repealed 11 & 12 Vict. o. 123 (a), which 
 enacted that if the owner of the offensive premises 
 does not remove the nuisance, the guardians may 
 do so, and that the costs and expenses incurred by 
 them shall be deemed money paid for the use of the 
 owner, and may be recovered as such by them in 
 the County Court, or before two justices, was held 
 to give exclusive jurisdiction to those tribunals (b), 
 though now by the Public Health Act, 1875, action 
 may be taken in a Superior Court. But as it is not 
 to be presumed that the Legislature would in any 
 case oust the jurisdiction of a Superior Court 
 without a distinct expression of its intention, a 
 construction which would impliedly have this effect 
 is to be avoided; especially when it would have 
 the effect of depriving the subject of his freehold, 
 or of any common law right, such as the right of 
 trial by jury, or of creating an arbitrary pro- 
 cedure (c). It has been said that the words 
 conferring such a jurisdiction must be clear and 
 unambiguous (d) ; and that an inferior Court is not to 
 
 (a) Eepealed by 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 69. 
 
 (b) Hertford Union v. Eimpton (1865), 25 L. J. M. 0. 41. 
 
 (c) Warwick v. White, Bunb. 106 ; B. v. Baines, 2 Lord 
 Eaym. 1269, cited by Lord Denman, Fletcher y. Calthrop (1845), 
 6 Q. B. 891; per Best G.J.,ia esfcioned in OuretonY. Begina 
 (1861), 30 L. J. M. C. 149; Looker v. Halcomb, 4 Bing. 188. 
 See B. V. Cotton, 1 B. & E. 203 ; Exp. Story, 3 Q. B. D. 166. 
 
 {d) Per Keating J., James v. S. W. B. Co., L. E. 7 Ex. 296. 
 I.S. 16 
 
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242 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 be construed into a jurisdiction (a). An Act, for 
 instance, which, in providing that compensation 
 should be made to all who sustained damage in 
 carrying out certain works, enacted that " in case 
 of dispute as to the amount," it should be settled 
 by arbitration, has been held to be confined strictly 
 to cases where the amount only was in dispute, 
 and would not authorise a reference to arbitration, 
 where the Kability to make any compensation was 
 in dispute (6). However, effect must of course 
 be given to the intention, where the Act, without 
 conferring jurisdiction in express terms, does so by 
 plain and necessary implication. Thus, an Act 
 which, without expressly empowering any tribunal 
 to try the offence, imposed penalties on any 
 person who exposed diseased animals for sale, 
 triiless he showed, " to the justices before whom 
 he is charged," that he was ignorant of the 
 condition of the animals, and gave him an appeal 
 if he felt aggrieved "by the adjudication of 
 justices," was construed as plainly giving justices 
 jurisdiction over the offence (c). But where a 
 statute gives a right to recover expenses in a 
 
 (a) Per Portesoue J., Pierce v. Hopper, 1 Stra. 260. 
 
 (6) B. V. Metrop. Com. Sewers, 1 B. & B. 694. But see 
 Brierley Hill Local Board v. Pearsall (1884), 54 L. J. Q. B. 25 
 (H. L.). 
 
 (c) Gullen v. TrimUe (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 416 ; Johnson v. 
 Colam, L. E. 10 Q. B. 544 ; B. v. Worcestershire, 23 L. J. M. C. 
 113. 
 
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AGAINST CREATING NEW JURISDICTION. 243 
 
 Court of summary jurisdiction from a person not 
 otherwise liable the jurisdiction of the High Court 
 is ousted except by way of appeal (a). 
 
 One enactment has been considered as granting 
 jurisdiction by implication, in a remarkable manner. 
 The 31 & 32 Vict. c. 71, after reciting that it was 
 desirable that some County Courts should have 
 Admiralty jnrisdiction, and authorising the Queen 
 in council to confer such jurisdiction on any of 
 those Courts, empowered them to try certain 
 .classes of cases over which the Court of Admiralty 
 had jurisdiction ; directing the judge to transfer 
 any case to the Admiralty, where the amount 
 claimed exceeded ^6300, and giving also to the 
 latter Court, in all cases, not only an appeal, but 
 power to transfer to itself any suit instituted in 
 the lower Court. By a supplementary Act passed 
 in the following session (32 & 33 Vict. c. 51), the 
 County Courts on which Admiralty jurisdiction 
 had been thus conferred, were further authorised 
 to try any claim arising out of any agreement 
 made in relation to the use or hire of any ship, 
 or in relation to the carriage of any goods in any 
 ship, where the claim does not exceed ^300. The 
 Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction over these 
 cases before the Act was passed, but it followed 
 that in thus giving the County Court this jurisdic- 
 tion, the statute also gave, by mere implication, 
 
 (a) Barradough v. Brown, [1897] A. G. 615. 
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244^_ - INTERPRETATIOK OF STATUTES. 
 
 to the Admiralty Court, not only appellate, but 
 original jurisdiction also ; besides introducing the 
 anomaly of dealing with small cases on different 
 principles of law from large ones ; while the 
 apparent object of the enactments was merely to 
 distribute the existing Admiralty jurisdiction (a). 
 
 SECTION II. — THE CEOWN NOT AFFECTED IF NOT NAMED. 
 
 On, probably, similar grounds rests the rule com- 
 monly stated in the form that the Crown is not 
 ■bound by a statute unless named in it. It has been 
 said that the law is primd facie presumed to be 
 made for subjects only (6) ; at all events, the Crown 
 is not reached except by express words or by neces- 
 sary implication, in any case where it would be 
 ousted of an existing prerogative or interest (c). It 
 is presumed that the Legislature does not intend 
 
 (a) See The Alina (1880), 5 Ex. D. 227 ; Everard v. Kendall, 
 L. E. 5 C. P. 428 ; Cargo, ex Argos (1873), L. E. 6 P. C. 134 ; 
 Gaudet V. Brown (1872), L. E. 5 P. C. 134, and the cases there 
 cited. See also The Zela, [1893] A. 0. 468 ; The Theta (1894), 63 
 L. J. Adm. 160 ; and note Davidsson v. Bill (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 
 788. The claims formulated in the following cases have been 
 held outside the jurisdiction, B. v. City of London Court (1) 
 (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; The Zeus (1888), 13 P. D. 188 ; B. v_ 
 City of London Court, [1892] 1 Q. B. 273 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 337. 
 
 (b) Willion V. Berkley, Plowd. 236 ; per Cur., A.-G. v. Donald- 
 son, 62 E. E. 540 
 
 (c) Inst. 191, A.-G. V. Allgood, Parker, 3 ; Bae. Ab. Prerogative 
 (B.) 5 (c); Co. Litt. 43b; Chit. Prerogative, 382; Ascough's 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AS EEGAEDS THE CROWN. 245 
 
 to deprive the Crown of any prerogative, right or 
 property, unless it expresses its intention to do so 
 in explicit terms, or makes the inference irresistible. 
 Where, therefore, the language of the statute is 
 general, and in its wide and natural sense would 
 divest or take away any prerogative or right from 
 the Crown, it is construed so as to exclude that 
 effect {a). When the King has any prerogative 
 estate, right, title, or interest, he shall not be barred 
 of them by the general words of an Act of Par- 
 Hament (6). Thus, the Land Transfer Act, 1879 
 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 65), which vests the legal estate 
 in the personal representatives of a deceased, does 
 not bind the Crown, and the legal estate in 
 escheated land does not, under s. 1, vest in the 
 Solicitor to the Treasury as the Crown's nominee (c). 
 And the compulsory clauses of Acts of Parliament, 
 which authorise the taking of lands for railway or 
 other purposes, such as are contained in the Lands 
 Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, would not apply 
 to Crown property, unless made so applicable in 
 express terms or by necessary inference {d). Nor 
 
 Case, Cro. Car. 526 ; Muggins v. Bamhridge, Willes, 241 ; B. V. 
 Wright (1834), 1 A. & E. 434 n., p. 437 ; Perry v. Barnes (1891), 
 60 L. J. Oh. 345. 
 
 (a) Bac. Ab. Prerog. (E.) 5 ; Grooke's Case, Show. 208. 
 
 (&) Magdalen College Case, 11 Eep. 74b, and see Perry v. 
 Barnes (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 345. 
 
 (c) 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65 ; Hartley, Be, 68 L. J. P. D. & A. 16. 
 
 (d) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18; Guckfield Board, Be (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 585. 
 
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246 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 would a provision in a local Act ordering that the 
 revenue of a corporation should be expended in a 
 specified vsray, and " should not be appHed for any 
 other purpose whatsoever," take away the duty of 
 paying income tax to the Crown in the absence of 
 express words to that effect (a). Again, as it is a 
 prerogative of the Crown not to pay toUs or rates, 
 or other burdens in respect of property, it was long 
 since established that the Poor Act of Elizabeth, 
 which authorises the imposition of a poor rate on 
 every " inhabitant and occupier " of property in the 
 parish, did not apply to the Crown, or to its direct 
 and immediate servants, whose occupation is for 
 the purposes of the Crown exclusively, and so is, 
 in fact, the occupation of the Crown itself (6). 
 Thus, property occupied by the servants of the 
 Crown exclusively for public purposes, as the Post 
 OflBlce (c), the Horse Guards (d), the Admiralty (e), 
 
 (a) Mersey DocJcs v. Lucas (1883), 8 App. Gas. 891 ; Paddington 
 Burial Board v. Inland Bevenue Gommissioners (1884), 53 
 L. J. Q. B. 224. 
 
 (&) 43' Eliz. c. 2. Per Lords Westbury and Cranworth, 
 Mersey Docks Go. v. Gameron (1864), 11. H. L. Gas. 443 ; Amherst 
 V. Sommers, 2 T. E. 372 ; B. v. Harrogate (1850), 15 Q. B. 1012 ; 
 JR. V. St. Martin's, L. E. 2 Q. B. 493. 
 
 (c) Smith y. Birmingham (1867), 26 L. J. M. C. 105 ; note remarks 
 oi¥ry Ia-J., in Bray V. Lancaster JJ. (1889), 58 L.J. M. G., at p. 55. 
 
 (d) Amherst v. Sommers (1788), 1 E. E. 497 ; B. v. Jay, 27 
 L. J. M. G. 25. 
 
 (e) B. V. Stewart, 27 L. J. M. G. 81. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AS EEGARDS THE CROWN. 247 
 
 by a volunteer corps (a), by a County Association 
 under Territorial and Eeserve Forces Act, 1907 (6), 
 and even by local police (c), by the judges, as 
 lodgings at the assizes (cZ), by a county court (e), 
 or for a sessions house (/), or a jail (g), or by the 
 commissioners of public works and buildings in 
 respect of a toll-bridge of which they were in 
 occupation as servants of the Crown (h), was held 
 exempt from poor rate (i). And property in the 
 
 (a) Pearson v. Holborn Union, [1893] 1 Q. B. 389 ; but a 
 volunteer drill hall is not exempt from the operation of the 
 sanitary provisions of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 : 
 Westminster Vestrij v. HosJeins, [1899] 2 Q. B. 474. 
 (6) Wixon V. Thomas, 80 L. J. K. B. 104. 
 
 (c) Lancashire v. Stretford, 27 L. J. M. 0. 209. Gomp. Showers 
 V. Chelmsford Union, [1891] 1 Q. B. 339. 
 
 (d) Hodgson v. Carlisle, 8 B. & B. 116; Goomber v. BerJcs 
 Justices, 9 App. Cas. 81. 
 
 (e) B. v. Manchester, 23 L. J. M. 0. 48. 
 
 (/) Nicholson v. Holhorn Assessment Committee, 18 Q. B. D. 
 161. But see Worcestershire C. G. v. Worcester Union, 66 L. J. 
 Q. B. 323. 
 
 {g) B. V. Shepherd, 1 Q. B. 170 ; Beds v. St. Paul, 21 L. J. 
 M. C. 224 ; Gamhier v. Lydford, 3 B. & B. 346. See judgments 
 of Blackburn J. and Lord Cranworth C, Mersey Bocks Go. v. 
 Cameron, 11 H. L. Cas. 443; Leith Comm. v. Poor Inspectors, 
 L. E. 1 Sc. Ap. 17; Tunnicliffe v. BirUale, 20 Q. B. D. 450; 
 Bray v. Lancashire Justices, 22 Q. B. D. 484 ; Durham C. G. v. 
 Ghester-le-Street, [1891] 1 Q. B. 330. 
 
 (h) B. V. McCann, L. E. 3 Q. B. 677. 
 
 (i) Compare Bute v. Grindall, 1 T. E. 338 ; B. v. Ponsonby, 
 61 E. E. 128; B. v. Shee, 62 E. E. 266; B. v. Stewart, 27 
 
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248 INTERPBBTATION OF STATDTE8. 
 
 occupation of the sovereign would, also, not be 
 liable to the common law burden of sewers rate ; 
 one reason assigned being that they could not be 
 enforced (a). So, the Eoyal Dockyards at Dept- 
 f ord were held not assessable to the land tax (b). 
 The Crown is not bound by s. 150, Public Health 
 Act, 1875, and therefore is not liable for the cost 
 of paving a street on which property in its occu- 
 pation abuts (c). But if the tax attached to the 
 land, and not to its owner or occupier, this rule 
 would not be applicable ; and land charged with 
 it in the hands of a subject would not become 
 exempted on vesting in the sovereign (d). 
 
 On the same general principle, the numerous 
 Acts of Parliament which have, at various times, 
 taken away the writ of Certiorari, have always 
 been held not to apply to the Crown (e). So, 
 s. 5, 13 Geo. II. c. 18(/), which limits the time for 
 
 L. J. M. C. 81. See Bro. Ab. Prerog. du Eoy, 112 ; B. v. Cook, 
 3 T. E. 519 ; Westover v. Perkins, 28 L. J. M. C. 227. 
 
 (a) Per Dr. Lushington, Smith v. Keats, i Hagg. 279 ; A.-G. 
 V. Donaldson, 10 M. & W. 117. 
 
 (6) A.-G. V. Hill (1836), 2 M. & W. 160. As to cases where 
 on the facts this rule does not apply, see Colchester (id.) v. 
 Kewney (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 172. 
 
 (c) 38 & 39 Vict: c. 55 ; Hornsey U. B. C. v. Hennell, [1902] 
 2 K. B. 73. 
 
 (d) Colchester (Ld.) v. Kewney (1866), 36 L. J. Ex. 172. 
 
 (e) See, for example, B. v. Cumberland, 3 B. & P. 354 ; B. v. 
 Allen, 15 East, 333 ; B. v. Boulibee, 43 E. E. 412. 
 
 (/) Eepealed S. L. E. 1888. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AS EEGARDS THE CROWN. 249 
 
 issuing that writ to six months from the date of 
 the conviction (a), and s. 5, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, 
 which authorises the Quarter Sessions to give 
 costs to the successful party in any appeal (6), do 
 not apply to the Crown (the prosecutor), but only 
 to the defendant. Although now by virtue of the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Acts a Court of Summary 
 Jurisdiction has power to award costs for or against 
 the Crown in proceedings taken by the Crown 
 under any of the Inland Eevenue Statutes (c). 
 But apparently the right of the Crown as to pro- 
 ceedings in the Exchequer touching the revenue 
 or property of the Crown is not affected by the 
 County Court, or Judicature, or Companies (1862) 
 .Acts(d!). The Statutes of Limitation (e) and 
 Bankruptcy ( / ) have always been held not to bind 
 
 (a) B. V. Farewell, 2 Stra. 1209 ; B. v. James, 1 East, 304 n. ; 
 B. V. Berkley, 1 KenyoD, 80. 
 
 (6) B. V. Beadle (1857), 26 L. J. M. 0. 111. 
 
 (c) Thomas v. Pritchard, [1903] 1 K. B. 209. 
 
 id) Mountjoy V. Wood, 1 H. & N. 58 ; A.-G. v. GonstaUe, 48 
 L. J. Ex, 455; A.-G. v. Barker, 41 L. J. Ex. 57. See also 
 Stanley v. Wild (1900), 69 L. J. Q. B. 318 ; Be Henley (1878), 9 
 Ch. D. 469. See also Oriental Bank, In re; The Grown, Exp. 
 (1884), 54 L. J. Gh. 327. 
 
 (e) 11 Eep. 68b and 74b ; Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 138, 
 6th point ; Bustomjee v. B., 1 Q. B. D. 487 ; 2 Q. B. D. 69. 
 
 (/) Bussell, Exp., 19 Yes. 163; Postmaster-Gen., Exp., 10 Oh. D. 
 595. See Be Thomas, 67 L. J. Q. B. 574. It is now, however, 
 provided by 4 & 5 Geo, V. c. 59, s. 151, that "... the provisions 
 of this Act relating to the remedies against the property of a 
 
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250 INTBEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the Crown; so, also, the Debtors Act, 1869(a), 
 and 5 & 6 Edw. VI. o. 16, against the sale of 
 offices (&). The Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 WiU. IV. 
 c. 58, was held not to apply to cases where the 
 Crown was interested (c). The provision of the 
 Statute of Frauds, which made writs of execution 
 binding on the goods' of the judgment debtor only 
 from the time of the delivery of the writ to the 
 sheriff for execution, was held not to affect the 
 earlier rule of law (which bound the goods from 
 the teste of the writ), where an extent was issued 
 at the suit of the Crown (d). The Statute of 
 Amendments of 4 Edw. III. s. 1, c. 6, which 
 provided that clerical errors in records should be 
 amended at once, without giving advantage to 
 "the party" who had challenged the misprision, 
 did not include the Crown; for, it was said, it 
 had never been named " a party " in any Act of 
 Parliament (e). The Locomotives Act, 1865, which 
 
 debtor, the. priorities of debts, the effect of a composition or 
 scheme of arrangement and the effect of discharge, shall bind 
 the Crown." 
 
 (a) Be Smith, 2 Ex. D. 47. 
 
 (6) Muggins v. Bambridge, Willes, 241. 
 
 (c) Eepealed 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49, s. 3, but see s. 7 ; Candy v. 
 Maugham, 13 L. J. 0. P. 17. 
 
 (d) JR. V. TFi/wn, Bunb. 39 ; B. v. Mann, 2 Stra. 754 ; Burden v. 
 Kennedy, 3 Atk. 739 ; Giles v. Grover, 1 01. & P. 72 ; ZTppom v. 
 Sumner, 2 W. Bl. 1251 ; B. v. Edwards (1853), 23 L. J. Ex. 42. 
 
 (e) B. V. Tuchin, 2 Lord Eaym. 1066. See also Tobin v. B., 
 32 L. J. C. P. 216, and Thomas v. B. (1874), 44 L. J. Q. B. 9. 
 
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CONSTEUOTION AS EEGAEDS THE CROWN. 251 
 
 regulates the speed of locomotives on highways, 
 does not bind the Crown (a). 
 
 The Crown, however, is sufficiently named in a 
 statute, within the meaning of the maxim, when an 
 intention to include it is manifest. For instance, 
 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, which entitles (by s. 2) either 
 party, after the hearing, by a justice, of " any 
 information or complaint " which he has power to 
 determiae, to apply for a case for the opinion of 
 one of the Superior Courts ; and after authorising 
 (by s. 4) the justice to refuse the application, if 
 he deems it frivolous, provides that it shall never 
 be refused when made by, or under the direction 
 of, the Attorney- Greneral, and directs (by s. 6) the 
 Superior Court, not only to deal with the decision 
 appealed against, but to make such order as to 
 costs as it deems fit, was held by the Queen's 
 Bench to include the Crown, and to authorise an 
 order against it for the payment of costs. The 
 language of the 2nd section was wide enough to 
 include the Crown ; and as the 4th referred to the 
 Crown as plainly as if it had spoken expressly of 
 Crown cases, the language of the 6th authorising 
 costs was construed' as applying to such cases also, 
 as weU as to oases between subject and subject (b). 
 
 (a) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 83, s. 4 ; Cooper v. HawMna, [1904] 2 
 K. B. 164. See also Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. VII. c. 36, 
 s. 16). 
 
 (6) Moore v. Smith (1869), 28 L. J. M. C. 126. See Theberge v. 
 
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252 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 A Court of Summary Jurisdiction has, by reason 
 of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, power to award 
 costs for or against the Crown in proceedings 
 taken under the Eevenue Acts (a). But, although 
 the Crown be named in some sections of a statute, 
 this does not necessarily extend to it the operation 
 of other parts thereof (h). 
 
 It is said that the rule does not apply when the 
 Act is made for the public good, the advancement 
 of religion and justice, the prevention of fraud, or 
 the suppression of injury and wrong (c) ; "for 
 religion, justice, and truth are the sure supporters 
 of the crowns and diadems of kings " (d) : but it 
 is probably more accurate to say that the Crown 
 is not excluded from the operation of a statute 
 where neither its prerogative, rights, nor property, 
 are in question. The Statute de Donis (e) ; the 
 
 Laudry, 2 App. Cas. 102, and CusMng v. Bupuy, 5 App. Cas. 
 409 ; Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A. C. 31 ; 
 Moses V. Parker, [1896] A. C. 245, 
 
 (a) 11 & 12 Vict. 0. 43, s. 18, and 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 53 ; 
 Thomas v. Pritchard, [1903] 1 K. B. 209. 
 
 (6) Exp. Postmaster-General, 10 Oh. D. 595 ; Perry v. Fames, 
 [1891] 1 Oh. 658; Wheatonv. Maple & Co., [1893] 3 Oh. 48; 
 62 L. J. Oh. 963. 
 
 (c) Case of Ecclesiastical Persons, 5 Eep. 14a ; Magdalen College 
 Case, 11 Eep. 70b-73a ; JJ. v. Armagh, [Archhp.), Stra. 516 ; Bac. 
 Ab. Prerogative (B.) 5. 
 
 {d) 5 Eep. 14b. 
 
 (e) 13 Edw. I. ; Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 223 ; 11 Eep. 72a. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION AS REGAEDS THE CROWN. 253 
 
 Statute of Merton, against usury running against 
 minors (a) ; the 52 Hen. III. c. 22 (Marlbridge), 
 against distraining freeholders to produce their 
 title deeds (6) ; the 32 Hen. VIII., concerning dis- 
 continuances (c) ; the 31 Eliz., against simony (d) ; 
 the 13 Eliz. c. 10, respecting ecclesiastical leases (e), 
 were held to apply to the Crown, though not 
 named in them (/). So, 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. 
 c. 70, which was passed for the better administra- 
 tion of justice, and enacted that writs of error 
 upon judgments given in any of the Superior 
 Courts, should be returned to the Exchequer 
 Chamber, was held to apply to a judgment on 
 an indictment (g), and on a petition of right (A) ; 
 although the Crown was not named or referred 
 to in the Act. No prerogative was effected by 
 this construction (z). Although by common law 
 the Crown has power to dismiss at pleasure a civil 
 
 (a) 20 Hen. III., repealed as to B. S. L. E., 1863, as to Ir. 
 S. L. E. (I.), 1872 ; 2 Inst. 89. 
 
 (6) Eepealed as to E. S. L. E., 1863, as to Ir. S. L. E. (I.) 
 1872 ; 2 Inst. 142. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 681. 
 
 (d) Co. Litt. 120a, note 3. 
 
 (e) 5 Eep. 14a ; 11 Eep. 68b ; B. v. Armagh {Archbp.), Stra. 
 16. 
 
 (/) See Bac. Ab. Prerog. (B) 5. 
 (g) B. V. WrigM, 1 A. & B. 434. 
 (h) Be Bode v. B., 13 Q. B. 364. 
 (i) Per Cur., Id. 379. 
 
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254 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 or military officer, a colonial statute (a) manifestly 
 intended for the benefit of officers, and inconsistent 
 with such a condition, restricts the power of the 
 Crown (b). 
 
 The Crown can direct the Treasury Solicitor to 
 act for a subject in any matter in which the Crown 
 has an interest, and if he so acts he becomes the 
 solicitor for the subject and is entitled to recover 
 any costs awarded the subject, notwithstanding 
 the fact that he has no certificate under the 
 Solicitors Act (c). 
 
 (a) New South Wales Civil Service Act, 1884. 
 
 (6) Gould V. Stuart, [1896] A. C. 575. 
 
 (e) B. V. Ganterhury (Archhp.), [1903] 1 K. B. 289; s. 12, 
 Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 68, refer- 
 ences to "attorney" in this section repealed from ".provided 
 always," S. L. E. (2), 1893. 
 
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CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 SECTION I. ^PRESUMPTION AGAINST INTENDING AN 
 
 EXCESS OF JUBISDIOTION. 
 
 Anothee general presumption is that the Legis- 
 lature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. 
 
 Primarily, the legislation of a country is terri- 
 torial. The general rule is, that extra territorium 
 jus dicenti impune non paretur ; leges extra territorium 
 non obligant (a). The laws of a nation apply to all 
 its subjects and to all things and acts within its 
 territories, including in this expression not only 
 its ports and waters which form, in England, part 
 of the adjacent country, but its ships, whether 
 armed or unarmed, and the ships of its subjects on 
 the high seas or in foreign tidal waters, and foreign 
 private ships within its ports. They apply also 
 to all foreigners within its territories (not privi- 
 leged like sovereigns and ambassadors) as regards 
 criminal (&), police, and, indeed, all other matters 
 
 (a) Dig. 2, 1, 20. 
 
 (&) So that an American committing a crime in Holland and 
 flying to England is regarded as a Dutch subject for the pur- 
 poses of extradition : B. v. Ocmz, 51 L. J. Q. B. 419. See also 
 A.-G. V. Kwoh-a-Sing, L. E. 5 P. 0. 179; The Indian Chief, 3 
 Bob. C. 12. See also Piot, Exp. (1883), 48 L. T. 120, and note 
 especially B. v. Governor Holloway Prison (1912), 76 J. P. 310. 
 
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256 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 except some questions of personal status or capacity, 
 in which, by the comity of nations, the law of their 
 own country, or the lex loci octAs or contractus, 
 applies {a). This does not, indeed, comprise the 
 whole of the legitimate jurisdiction of a State ; for 
 it has a right to impose its legislation on its sub- 
 jects natural or naturalised (6), in every part of the 
 world (c) ; and on such matters as personal status 
 or capacity it is understood always to do so {d) ; 
 
 (a) See Nihoyet v. Niboyet, 4 P. D. 1, per Brett L.J. ; San 
 Teodoro v. San Teodoro, 5 P. D. 79 ; comp. Worms v. De Valdor, 
 49 L. J. Oh. 261 ; Le Sueur v. Le Sueur, 1 P. D. 139 ; Firebrace 
 V. Firebrace, 4 P. D. 63 ; Be Goodman's Trusts, 50 L. J. Ch. 425, 
 and note Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1895), L. J. P. C. 97, dis- 
 approving Niboyet v. Niboyet, supra. 
 
 (b) Co. Litt. 129a ; Story, Confl. L. s. 21 ; Sussex Peerage, 11 
 CI. & P. 85, 146 ; Mette v. Mette, 28 L. J. P. & M. 117. 
 
 (c) Our law has at different times made treason, treason- 
 felony, burning the King's ships . and magazines, breaches of 
 the Foreign Enlistment Act, homicide, bigamy, procuration 
 (see 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 2, amended by 2 & 3 Geo. V. c. 20, 
 s. 1), and slave-dealing, punishable v^hen committed by British 
 subjects in any part of the world ; also any offences committed 
 by them on board any foreign ship to which they do not belong 
 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60) ; also, offences by them in or in relation to 
 native States in India (5 & 6 Geo. V. c. 61, ss. 124-129), in 
 Turkey, China, Siam, and Japan, and such other States as are 
 within the provisions of 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37 ; and in some parts 
 of Africa and Polynesia (34 & 35 Vict. c. 8 ; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 19 ; 
 38 & 39 Vict. c. 51). 
 
 (d) See ex. gr. Brooh v. Brooh, 27 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 9 H. L. Cas. 
 193 ; Story, Confl. L. s. 114 ; LoUey's Case, Euss. & Ey. 237. 
 
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AGAINST EXCEEDING JURISDICTION. 257 
 
 but, with that exception, in the absence of an 
 intention clearly expressed or to be inferred either 
 from its language, or from the object or subject 
 matter, or history of the enactment, the presump- 
 tion is that Parliament does not design its statutes 
 to operate on its subjects beyond the territorial 
 limits of the United Kingdom (a). They are, 
 therefore, to be read, usually, as if words to that 
 effect had been inserted in them (6). Thus, a 
 woman who married in England, and afterwards 
 married abroad during her husband's life, was 
 held not indictable under the repealed statute 
 of James I. against bigamy ; for the offence was 
 committed out of the kingdom, and the Act did 
 not in express terms extend its prohibition to 
 subjects abroad (c). But s. 57, Offences against the 
 Person Act, 1861, which enacts that " whomsoever 
 being married shall marry any other person during 
 the life of the former husband or wife, whether the 
 second marriage shall have taken place in England 
 or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony " : 
 
 See also Story, Confl. L. s. 100 et seq. ; Wheat. Blem. Internat. L., 
 pt. 2, c. 2, ss. 6, 7. 
 
 (a) Bose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241, per Marshall C.J. ; The 
 Zollverein, Swab. 96, per Dr. Lushington ; Cope v. Boherty, 4 
 K. & J. 367 ; Poll v. Bamhe, [1901] 2. K. B. 579. 
 
 (6) Per Pollock C.B., Bosseter v. Caklmann, 8 Ex. 361 ; and 
 per Cur., The Amalia, 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 471. 
 
 (c) 1 Jac. I. c. 11; 1 Hale P. C. 692; Macleod v. A.-G. for 
 N. S. Wales, [1891] A. C. 455. 
 
 I.S. 17 
 
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258 INTEHPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 extends to a second marriage celebrated beyond 
 the King's dominions (a). An act of bankruptcy 
 by a British, subject committed abroad, such as an 
 assignment by a trader of all his effects, did not 
 make him liable to the bankrupt laws until they 
 were amended by extending them expressly to 
 acts whether within the realm or elsewhere (b). 
 But the power conferred on the Court by s. 27, 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1883, now repealed and replaced 
 by s. 25 (6) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, to order 
 that any person who, if in England, would be 
 liable to be brought before it under the section, 
 shall be examined in Scotland or Ireland, " or 
 in any other place out of England," does not 
 apparently extend to places abroad which are not 
 within the jurisdiction of the British Crown (c). 
 A statute which authorised a Court to make an 
 order against a British subject after he had been 
 served with a summons, was held not to give 
 jurisdiction to make it when the service had been 
 effected abroad [d). And it has also been held that 
 a provision that service may be effected by leaving 
 
 (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 ; B. v. Bussell, [1901] A. 0. 446. 
 
 (6) Ingliss v. Grant, 5 T. E. 530 ; Norden v. James, 2 Dick. 
 533. See 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, s. 3 ; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 6 ; 
 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 4 ; and see as to existing law, 4 & 5 
 Geo. V. c. 59. 
 
 (c) Drucker, Be (No. 2), [1902] 2 K. B. 210. 
 
 {d) 7 & 8 Viet. c. 101 ; B. v. Lightfoot (1856), 25 L. J. M. C. 
 115. 
 
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AGAINST EXOEEDING JURISDICTION. 259 
 
 the summons at the " last place of abode " of the 
 person to be served, is not to be interpreted as 
 meaning that the summons may be left at his last 
 place of abode in England, where he had sub- 
 sequently obtained a place of abode abroad (a). 
 The alleged father of a bastard child who left 
 England before the child's birth and did not return 
 tUl the child was more than twelve months old, 
 was held to have "ceased to reside in England 
 within twelve months after the birth of such child," 
 so as to give the justices jurisdiction to adjudicate 
 upon a summons taken out within twelve months 
 after his return (6). 5 & 6 Will. IV. o. 63 (re- 
 pealed and re-enacted by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 49, 
 ss. 15 and 86), which prohibits the sale of liquids 
 otherwise than by imperial measure, would not be 
 considered as affecting a contract between British 
 subjects for the sale of palm oil, to be measured 
 and delivered on the coast of Africa (c). A 
 different construction would have involved the 
 absurd supposition that the Legislature intended 
 that English subjects should carry English 
 
 (a) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, S, 4; Berkeley v. Thompson, 54 
 L. J. M. 0. 57 ; B. v. Farmer, [1892] 1 Q. B. 637 ; Burbury v. 
 Jackson, [1917] 1 K. B. 16 ; Grococh v. Grococle, [1919] W. N. 
 163. But aliter where he has not obtained a place of abode 
 abroad; B. v. Webb, [1896] 1 Q. B. 487. 
 
 (6) B. V. Evans, [1896] 1 Q. B. 228. 
 
 (c) Bosseter v. CaJilmann, 8 Ex. 361. 
 
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260 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 measures abroad (a) ; besides setting aside, by a 
 side-wind, the general principle that the validity 
 of a contract is determined by the law of the place 
 of its performance. Under that general principle, 
 any statute which regulated the formalities and 
 ceremonials of marriage, would, in general, be 
 limited similarly in effect to the territorial 
 jurisdiction of Parliament (6). 
 
 But a different intention may be readily collected 
 from the nature of the enactment. The whole aim 
 and object of the Eoyal Marriages Act, 1772 (12 
 Geo. III. c. 11), for instance, which was, according 
 to the preamble, to guard against members of the 
 royal family marrying without the consent of 
 the sovereign, and which makes null and void 
 the. marriage of every descendant of George II. 
 without the consent of the reigning sovereign, 
 would have been defeated, if a marriage of such 
 a descendant in some place out of the British 
 dominions had not fallen within it. It was accord- 
 ingly held that the statute imposed an incapacity, 
 which attached to the person and followed him all 
 over the world (c) ; though the marriage were valid 
 according to the law of the country where it was 
 celebrated (d). So, the Marriage Act, 1836 (5 & 6 
 
 (a) Per Parke B., Bosseter v. OaMmann, at p. 363. 
 (&) ScrimsMre v. ScrimsMre, 2 Hagg. Cons. 395 ; Story, Gonfl. 
 L. s. 221. 
 
 (c) The Sussex Peerage, 11 01. & P. 85. 
 Id) Swift V. Kelly, 3 Knapp, 257. 
 
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AGAINST EXCEEDING JURISDICTION. 261 
 
 Will. IV. c. 64), which declared " all marriages 
 between persons within the prohibited degrees " 
 null and void, was held to create a personal in- 
 capacity in all British subjects domiciled in the 
 United Kingdom, though married in a country 
 where such marriages are valid (a). Where an 
 Englishman, after marrying an Englishwoman in 
 England, became domiciled in America, it was 
 held that he continued subject to the Matrimonial 
 Causes Act, 1857 (b). The Fatal Accidents Acts, 
 1846 and 1864, apply for the benefit of the repre- 
 sentatives of a deceased foreigner, who while on 
 the high seas in a foreign ship sustains a fatal 
 injury owing to the negligence of a British ship (c). 
 The rule of the Elementary Education Act, 1870, 
 which vacates the seat at the board of any member 
 who had been punished with imprisonment for any 
 crime, includes crimes comihitted against the 
 Crown out of England (d). 
 This wider effect has been given even to a 
 
 (a) BrooJc v. Brook, 27 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 9 H. L. Cas. 193. See 
 Story, Confl. L. s. 86, and also s. 100; 7 Bdw. VII. c. 47, vali- 
 dates marriage with a deceased wife's sister. 
 
 (6) Deck V. Beck (1860), 29 L. J. P. M. & A. 129 ; see Bond 
 r. Bond (1860), Id. 143 ; and see Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878), 
 P. D. 1, 0. A. 
 
 (c) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 ; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95 ; Davidsson v. Eill, 
 [1901] 2 K. B. 606. 
 
 (d) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 75, Sohed. II., Pt. I., r. 14 ; Gonybeare v. 
 London School Bd., [1891] 1 Q. B. 118. 
 
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262 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 criminal statute, where suoh must have been 
 manifestly its intention. The Slave Trade Act, 
 1824 (6 Geo. IV. c. 113), which made it felony for 
 " any person " to deal in slaves, or to transport 
 them, or equip vessels for their transport, was held 
 to apply to British subjects committing any such 
 offences on the coast of Africa, the notorious scene 
 of the crimes which it was the object of the Act to 
 suppress (a) ; if not in every other part of the world 
 also (6) ; though it was not in express terms 
 declared to be applicable abroad. As the Courts 
 of British Colonies were empowered by Act of 
 Parliament to punish certain offences committed 
 at sea with, among other things, transportation, 
 the Act which abolished transportation and sub- 
 stituted penal servitude, was held to extend to the 
 Colonies, though it made no mention of them (c). 
 
 SECTION II. — PRESUMPTION AGAINST A VIOLATION OF 
 INTEENATIONAL LAW. 
 
 Under the same general presumption that the 
 Legislature does not intend to exceed its juris- 
 diction, every statute is to be so interpreted and 
 
 (a) R. V. Zulueta, 1 Car. & K. 215 ; Santos v. Illidge, 28 L. J. 
 C. P. 317 ; overruled on anotber point, 29 L. J. 0. P. 348. 
 
 (6) Seeder Bramwell B., 29 L. J. 0. P. 352. 
 
 (c) 12 & 13 Viofc. c. 96 (amended 23 & 24 Vict. c. 88, s. 1) ; 
 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3 ; E. v. Mount, L. E. 6 P. C, 283. 
 
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, HARMONY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 263 
 
 applied, as far as its language admits, as not to be 
 inconsistent with the oomity of nations, or with 
 the established rules of international law (a). If, 
 therefore, it designs to effectuate any such object, 
 it must express its intention with irresistible clear- 
 ness, to induce a Court to beheve that it enter- 
 tained it ; for if any other construction is possible, 
 it would be adopted, in order to avoid imputiag 
 such an intention to the Legislature (b). All 
 general terms must be narrowed in construction 
 to avoid it (c). 
 
 For instance, although foreigners are subject to 
 the criminal law of the country in which they 
 commit any breach of it, and also, for most pur- 
 poses, to its civil jurisdiction, a foreign sovereign, 
 an ambassador, the troops of a foreign nation, and 
 its public property are, by the law of nations, not 
 subject to them (d), and statutes would be read as 
 
 (a) Per Maule J., Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801 ; Bluntschli, 
 Voelkerrecht, s. 847 ; per Dr. Lushington, The Zolherein, Swab. 
 96, and The Annapolis, Lush. 295. See also Rochefoucauld v, 
 Boustead (1896), 66 L. J. Ch. 75. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390, and Murray v. 
 Charming Betsy, Id. 118. 
 
 (c) Per Lord StoweU, Le Louis (1817), 2 Dods. 229. 
 
 (d) Wheat. Blem. Int. L., pt. 2, c. 2 ; see the oases collected 
 in The Parlement Beige (1880), 5 P. D. 197 ; The Constitution 
 (1879), 4 P. D. 39. See also The Ripon City (1897), 66 L. J. P. 
 110 ; and as to the general principle, Mighell v. Sultan of Johore 
 (1893), 63 L. J. Q. B. 593. 
 
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264 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 tacitly embodying this rule. Hence whilst the 
 ambassador of a foreign State is in this country, 
 and accredited to the sovereign, the Statute of 
 Limitation does not begin to run against his 
 creditors, as he could not be served with process 
 during that period (a). So, it is an admitted 
 principle of public law that, except as regards 
 pirates jure gentium, and, perhaps, nomadic races 
 and savages who have no political organisation (6), 
 a nation has no jurisdiction over offences com- 
 mitted by a foreigner out of its territory, including 
 its ships and waters as already mentioned (c) ; 
 and the general language of any criminal statute 
 would be so restricted in construction as not to 
 violate this principle. Thus, s. 8 of the repealed 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 31 (re-enacted by s. 10, 24 & 25 
 
 (a) 21 Jac. I. c. 16 ; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 19 ; 7 Anne, c. 12, 
 s. 3 ; Musurus Bey v. Gadban, [1894] 2 Q. B. 352 ; Repvhlic of 
 Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, In re (1914), 83 L. J. Oh. 226. 
 
 (6) See ex. gr. Ortolan, Dipl. de la Mer, i. 285. By 34 & 35 
 Vict. c. 8, offences committed within 20 miles from our West 
 African Settlements on British subjects, or residents -within 
 those settlements, by persons not the subjects of any civilised 
 power, are made cognisable by the Superior Courts of the 
 Settlements. 
 
 (c) Sup. 255. See Wheaton's Blem. Internat. L., pt. 2, c. 2, 
 s. 9 ; The Parlement Beige, 5 P. D. 197 ; B. v. Anderson, L. E. 
 1 0. C. 161 ; B. V. Seberg, Id. 264 ; B. v. Carr, 10 Q. B. D. 76 ; 
 B. V. Lopes, 27 L. J. M. C. 48; B. v. Lesley, 29 L. J. M. C. 97. 
 See as to ships, the judgment of Lindley J., B. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 
 63 ; but see Carr v. Fracis Times & Co., [1902] A. 0. 176. 
 
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HARMONY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 265 
 
 Vict. c. 100), wMoh enacted that when any person, 
 feloniously injured abroad or at sea, died in 
 England, or receiving the injury in England, 
 died at sea or abroad, the offence should be dealt 
 with in the country where the death or injury 
 occurred, would not authorise the trial of a 
 foreigner who inflicted a wound at sea in a foreign 
 ship, of which the sufferer afterwards died in 
 England (a). So, it has been repeatedly decided in 
 America that an Act of Congress which enacted 
 that any person committing robbery in " any vessel 
 on the high seas " should be guilty of piracy, 
 applied only to robbery in American vessels, and 
 not to robbery in foreign vessels even by an 
 American citizen (b). An Act of Parliament which 
 authorised the commanders of our ships of war to 
 seize and prosecute "all ships and vessels " engaged 
 in the slave trade was construed as not intended 
 to affect any right or interest of foreigners contrary 
 
 (a) B. V. Lewis, 26 L. J. M. C. 104. See also JB. v. Depardo, 
 9 E. E. 693 ; B. v. Be Mattos, 7 C. & P. 458 ; Nga Hoong v. B., 
 7 Cox, 489 ; B. v. Bjomsen, 34 L. J. M. C. 180. As to offences 
 oonmiitted -within Territorial Waters, see 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73. 
 Sec. 267 Merc. Shipping Act, 1854 (repealed by Merc. Shipping 
 Act, 1894), would seem to have been Umited to British subjects. 
 See also s. 527 ; Harris v. Franconia, 2 C. P. D. 173. 
 
 (6) U. S. V. Howard, 3 Wash. 340 ; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 
 610 ; U. S. V. Klintoch, 5 Wheat. 144 ; U. S. v. Kessler, Bald. 15, 
 cited by Cockburn C.J., B. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 172. 
 
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26f5 INTBEPBETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 to the law of nations (a). Though speaking in just 
 terms of indignation of the traffic in human beings, 
 it spoke only in the name of the British nation. 
 Its prohibition of the trade as contrary to the 
 principles of justice, humanity, and sound policy, 
 applied only to British subjects ; it did not render 
 it unlawful as regarded foreigners (6). Ifc was even 
 held that a foreigner who was not prohibited by 
 the law of his own country from carrying it on, 
 was entitled to recover in an English Court 
 damages for the seizure of a cargo of his slaves by 
 a British man-of-war ; for, our Courts being open 
 to all aliens in amity with us, and the act of the 
 man-of-war being wrongful, the only question was 
 what injury the plaintiff had sustained from it (c). 
 But a British subject resident in an enemy 
 country is not empowered by s. 6 of the repealed 
 Naturalisation Act, 1870, to become naturalised 
 in that enemy country during time of war with 
 this country, and the act of becoming naturalised 
 under such circumstances constitutes the crime of 
 high treason {d). 
 
 (a) Le Louis, 2 Dods. 214 ; St. Juan Nepomuceno, 1 Hagg. 265 ; 
 The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66. See also B. v. Serva, 1 Den. 104. 
 Compare The Amedie, 1 Aeton, 240. 
 
 (&) Per Best J., 3 B. & Aid. 358. 
 
 (c) Madrazo v. Willes, 22 E. E. 422. See also Santos v. 
 Blidge, 29 L. J. C. P. 348. Compare Forbes v. Cochrane, 22 E. E. 
 402. 
 
 (d) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14 ; practically re-enacted by 4 & 5 
 
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HARMONY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 267 
 
 Although a foreigner residing in England (a) who 
 contracts debts, eten abroad (6), and commits an 
 act of bankruptcy in England, would be liable to 
 the English bankrupt laws ; he would not fall 
 within them if he committed the act of bankruptcy 
 abroad, although the enactment made it an act of 
 bankruptcy, whether committed "in England or 
 elsewhere " (c). The Kules of Court, 1883 (now 
 cancelled), directing how writs were to be served 
 on persons sued in the name of their firm, did not 
 give jurisdiction over foreign firms whose location 
 was abroad (rf). So an EngKsh Court would have 
 
 Geo. V. c. 17. See B. v. LyncJi (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 167. 
 See also Dawson v. Meuli (1918), 16 L. G. E. 308, and Bex v. 
 Oommanding Officer Middlesex Begiment, [1917] 2 K. B. 129. 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 6 (1 d) ; repealed by 4 & 5 Geo. V. 
 c. 59, s. 168, Sched. 6 : Be Norris, 5 M. B. E. 111. 
 
 (6) JExp. Pascal, 45 L. J. Bank. 81. 
 
 (c) Cooke V. Vogeler, [1901] A. G. 102 ; Blain, Exp., 12 Oh. 
 D. 522 ; Pearson, Be, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263. See also Smith, Exp., 
 cited in Alexander v. Vaughan, 1 Cowp. 402 ; BuTkeley v. Schutz, 
 L. E. 3 P. 0. 764 ; Bateman v, Service, 6 App. Cas. 386 ; O'LogMen, 
 Exp., 40 L. J. Bank. 18 ; Davis v. Park, 42 L. J. Oh. 673 ; Exp. 
 Crispin, 42 L. J. Bank. 65. 
 
 (d) Order IX.,r.6, cancelled; seeforpresent practice Order 48 a, 
 rr. 1, 3 & 4 E. S. 0., 1891 ; Western Nat. Bank v. Perez, [1891] 
 1 Q. B. 304 ; Bussell v. Cambefort, 23 Q. B. D. 526 ; Dohson v. 
 Festi, [1891] 2 Q. B. 92 ; Grant v. Anderson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 108. 
 See also Lysaght v. Clark, [1891] 1 Q. B. 552 ; Heinemann v. 
 Hale, [1891] 2 Q. B. 83 ; St. Gdbain Co. v. Moyermann's Agency, 
 [1893] 2 Q. B. 96 ; Worcester Banking Go. v. Firbank, [1894] 
 1 Q. B. 784; Maclver v. Burns, [1895] 2 Ch. 630. 
 
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268 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 no jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company 
 having no branch in England (a). And s. 17, 
 4 & 5 G-eo. V, c. 17, replacing s. 2, Naturalisation 
 Act, 1870, which enacts that "real and personal 
 property of every description may be taken, 
 acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien in 
 the same manner in aU respects as by a natural- 
 born British subject," has been held in a case 
 decided under the earlier Act not to entitle a 
 Wni to probate here which was made by an alien 
 whose domicile of origin was English, but who 
 was domiciled abroad at the time of making such 
 WiU and of her death, the Will having been 
 executed according to the forms required by 
 English law, but not in manner required by the 
 law of the country of her domicile (b). And an 
 Act which gave the Court of Admiralty jurisdic- 
 tion over "aU claims whatsoever" relating to 
 salvage reward for saving lives has been held not 
 to extend to the salvage of life on a foreign ship 
 or the supply of necessaries when the vessel is 
 more than three marine miles from our shore (c). 
 
 (a) Lloyd Italiano, Be, 29 Ch. D. 219 ; Bulheley v. Schutz, L. E. 
 3 P. C. 764. See Colquhoun v. Heddon, 25 Q. B. D. 129. 
 
 (6) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114; Bloxamy. Favre, 53 L, J. P. D. & A. 
 26; Lyne's Settlement Trusts, Gihhs, In re, [1919] 1 Gh. 80; 
 Simpson, In re, [1916] 1 Ch. 502. 
 
 (c) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 458, 476 ; The Johannes, Lush. 
 182. But see Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), 
 s. 544 (1) ; The Pacific, [1898] P. 170, on which see Jorgensen v. 
 
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HARMONY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 269 
 
 So, as it is a rule of all systems of law that real 
 property is exclusively subject to the laws of the 
 State within whose territory it lies, any Act which 
 dealt in general terms with the real estate of a 
 bankrupt or lunatic testator, for instance, would be 
 construed as not extending to his lands abroad (a), 
 or in our Colonies, unless it clearly appeared that 
 the Act was intended to reach them (6). But a 
 statute which imposed a stamp duty on all convey- 
 ances of land executed in England would obviously 
 not be so limited in construction (c). 
 
 It being also a general principle that personal 
 property has, except for some purposes, such as 
 probate (d), no other situs than that of its owner, 
 the right and disposition of it are governed by the 
 law of the domicile of the owner, and not by the 
 law of their local situation (e). The Bankruptcy 
 
 Neptune Co., 4 Eraser, 992. See also Laws v. Smith (1883), 
 9 A. 0. 356 (P. C). 
 
 (a) Selkrig v. Davis, 2 Eose, 311 ; Cocherell v. DicJeens, 3 Moo. 
 P. 0. 133. See Sill v. Worswieh, 1 H. Bl. 665 ; Phillips v. Hunter^ 
 2 Id. 402 ; Hunter v. Potts, 2 E. E. 353 ; Blithman, Be, L. E. 2 
 Bq. 23 ; Frehe v. Garbery, L. E. 16 Bq. 461 ; Waite v. Bingley, 21 
 Ch. D. 674 ; Duncan v. Lawson, 41 Ch. D. 394 ; Hawthorne, Be, 
 23 Oh. D. 743 ; Pepin v. Bruyere (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 39 ; Story, 
 Gonfl. L. ss. 428, 551, etc. 
 
 (6) See Hewitt's Estate, Be, 6 W. E. 537. Comp. International 
 Pulp Co., Be, 45 L. J. Ch. 446. 
 
 (c) Wright, Be (1855), L. J. Bx. 49. 
 
 (d) See Hart v. Herwig, L. E. 8 Ch. 860. 
 
 (e) Story, Oonfl. L. s. 376. See ex. gr. Elliott, Be, 39 W. E. 297. 
 
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270 INTERPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Acts, therefore, which affect an assignment of 
 a bankrupt's personal property, would properly 
 be construed as applying to such property else- 
 where (a). 
 
 When an Act imposes a burden in respect of 
 personal property, it would be construed, as far as 
 its language permitted, as not intended to contra- 
 vene the general principle (&). Thus, 36 Geo. III. 
 c. 62, which imposed a duty on every legacy 
 given by any " will of any person out of his 
 personal estate," and the Succession Duty Act, 
 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 51), which imposed a duty 
 on every "disposition of property " by which " any 
 person " became " entitled to any property on the 
 death of another," were held not to apply where 
 the deceased was a foreigner, or even a British 
 subject domiciled abroad, though the property was 
 in England (c). But they would affect personal 
 property abroad, if the deceased was domiciled 
 
 (a) See Atkinson, Be, 21 Gh. D. 100. 
 
 (6) See ex. gr. Grenfell v. Inl. Bev., 45 L. J. Ex. 465. 
 
 (c) Be Bruce, 2 Or. & J. 436; Arnold v. Arnold, 39 E. E. 
 222 ; Thomson v. The Adv.-Gen. (1848), 12 Gl. & F. 1 ; discussed 
 in Lawson v. Inl. Bev. Commissioners, [1896] 2 Jr. E. 418, and 
 approved in Harding v. Queensland Commissioner of Stamps 
 (1898), 67 L. J. P. C. 144; Sully v. A.-G., 29 L. J. Ex. 464; 
 Be Atkinson, sup. Oomp. A.-G. v. Campbell, L. E. 5 H. L. 
 524 ; Be Cigala's Settlement, 7 Gh. D. 351 ; Colquhoun v. Brooks, 
 14 App. Gas. 493 ; London Bank of Mexico v. Apthorpe, [1891] 
 2 Q. B. 378 ; San Paulo By. Co. v. Garter, [1896] A. G. 31. 
 
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HARMONY WITH INTEENATIONAL LAW. 271 
 
 in England, though a foreigner (a). Foreigners 
 residing abroad but carrying on business in England 
 by agents obtaining orders in England, are liable 
 to income tax on profits so made (unless all 
 contracts for the sale and aU deliveries of the 
 merchandise to customers are made in a foreign 
 country) (b), Schedule D of 16 & 17 Vict. o. 34, 
 imposing liabihty to assessment on persons resident 
 abroad, but deriving profit from trade carried on in 
 this country. The old jurisdiction of Interpleader 
 did not empower our Courts to bar the claim of a 
 foreigner residing abroad (c). 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add, however, that if 
 the language of an Act of Parliament, unam- 
 biguously and without reasonably admitting of 
 any other meaning applies to foreigners abroad, 
 or is otherwise in conflict with any principle of 
 international law, the Courts must obey and 
 administer it as it stands, whatever may be the 
 
 (a) A.-G. V. Napier, 20 L. J. Ex. 173; Blackwood v. Beg. 
 (1882), 52 L. J. P. 0. 10. 
 
 (6) Pommery v. Apthorpe (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 155; Werle v. 
 Colqahoun, 57 L. J. Q. B. 323 ; Grainger v. Gough, [1896] A. C. 
 325. But see Kodale, Lim. v. Glarhe, 72 L. J. K. B. 369 ; Gramo- 
 phone Co. V. Stanley, 11 L. J. K. B. 834 ; Goerz v. Bell, 73 L. J. 
 K. B. 448 ; Be Beers Mines v. Hoioe, 75 L. J. K. B. 858. 
 
 (c) Patorni v. Gamplell, 13 L. J. Ex. 85 ; Lindsey v. Barron, 6 
 C. B. 291. But see Credits Gerundeuse v. Van Weede, 12 Q. B. D. 
 171, on which see Be Busfield, 55 L. J. Oh. 467, approved in 
 Dubout V. Macphereon (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 496. 
 
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272 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 responsibility incurred by the nation to foreign 
 powers in executing such a law (a) ; for the Courts 
 cannot question the authority of Parliament, or 
 assign any limits to its power (6). They could 
 not, therefore, properly put a construction upon 
 a statute diflEerent from that which they would 
 otherwise give to it, merely because its language 
 would otherwise fail to give to a foreigner the full 
 advantage of the provisions of a treaty (c). 
 
 Sec. 4, Statute of Frauds, which enacts that " no 
 action shall be brought " in respect, among others, 
 of contracts not to be performed within a year, 
 unless they be in writing, was construed literally 
 as regulating the procedure of our Courts, and, 
 therefore, as prohibiting a suit in England on a 
 contract made in France and in accordance with 
 French Law, but not in conformity with the 
 
 (a) Per Cur., The Marianna Flora, 11 "Wheat. 40 ; The Zoll- 
 verein, Swab. 96 ; The Johannes, Lush. 182 ; The Amalia, 32 
 L. J. P. M. & A. 191 ; Ellis v. McEenry (1871), 40 L. J. C. P. 
 109, 115. As to the Hovering Acts (39 & 40 Vict. c. 36, s. 179 
 (amended by 50 & 51 Vict. c. 7), embodying the 16 & 17 Vict. 
 c. 107, s. 212), see Le Louis, 2 Dods. 245 ; Church v. Huhhart, 2 
 Cranch, 187. See also 2 & 3 Vict. c. 73, repealed by Slave 
 Trade Act, 1873. 
 
 (6) Comp. Bonham's Case (1609), 8 Eep. 118a, commented on 
 in Kemp v. Neville (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 158. See also Bay v. 
 Savadge, Hob. 87 ; London {City of) v. Wood, 12 Mod. 688 ; 
 1 Kent Comm. 447. 
 
 (e) Californian Fig Syrup Go., Be, 40 Ch. D. 620. 
 
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AS TO CONFERRING RIGHTS ON FOREIGNERS. 273 
 
 formalities required by our law (a). But this con- 
 struction has been questioned (b) ; and having 
 regard to the principle under consideration, the 
 enactment might reasonably have been confined 
 to those contracts which it was within the province 
 of Parliament to regulate. 
 
 SECTION III. — HOW FAR STATUTES CONFERRING RIGHTS 
 AFFECT FOREIGNERS. 
 
 It may be added, in connection with this topic, 
 that as regards the question how far statutes which 
 confer rights or privileges are to be construed as 
 extending to foreigners abroad, the authorities are 
 less clear. It has been said, indeed, that when 
 personal rights are conferred, and persons filling 
 any character of which foreigners are capable are 
 mentioned, foreigners would be comprehended in 
 the statute (c). On the other hand, it has been laid 
 down that, in general, statutes must be understood 
 as applying to those only who owe obedience 
 
 (a) Leroux v. Brown, 22 L. J. C. P. 3, recognised by Lush and 
 Mellor JJ., Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock, 2 Q. B. D. 323. 
 
 (6) See Williams v. Wheeler, 8 0. B. N. S. 299; Gibson v. 
 Holland, L. E. 1 0. P. 8, per Willes J. ; and the notes to Birhmyr 
 V. Darnell, and Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Sm. L. 0., 12th ed., p. 699. 
 See also Story, Confl. L. s. 285 n., observing on Acebal v. Levy, 
 38 E. E. 469. 
 
 (c) Per Maule J., Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 895; 
 commented on and explained in Fairley v. Boosey (1879), 48 
 L. J. Ch. 697 ; note especially judgment of Lord Blackburn. 
 
 I.S. 18 
 
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274 INXBBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 to the Legislature which, enacts them, and whose 
 interests it is the duty of that Legislature to pro- 
 tect ; that is, its own subjects, including in that 
 expression, not only natural born and naturalised 
 subjects, but also all persons actually within its 
 territorial jurisdiction ; but that as regards aliens 
 resident abroad, the Legislature has no concern to 
 protect their interests, any more than it has a 
 legitimate power to control their rights (a). In 
 this view, it would be presumed, in interpreting a 
 statute, that the Legislature did not intend to 
 legislate either as to their rights or liabilities ; and 
 to warrant a different conclusion, the words of the 
 statute ought to be express, or the context of it 
 very clear {b). On this principle, mainly, it was 
 held that the Act of Anne, which gave a copyright 
 of fourteen years to " the author of any work," did 
 not apply to a foreign author resident abroad (c). 
 The decision would probably have been different if 
 the author had been in England when his work 
 
 (a) See per Jervis C.J., Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Gas. 946 ; 
 per Lord Oranworth, Id. 955 ; per Wood V.C., Cope v. Boherty, 
 4 K. & J. 367 ; per Lord Bsher M.E., Colquhoun v. Heddon, 25 
 Q. B. D. 135. See also Adam v. British and Foreign Steamship 
 Go. (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 844. Comp. per Lord Westbury, 
 Boutledge v. Low, L, E. 3 H. L. 119. 
 
 (6) Per Turner L.J., Cope v. Doherty (1858), 27 L. J. Oh. 
 609 ; and see B. v. Keyn (1876), 46 L, J. M. 0. 17, at p. 54. 
 
 (c) 8 Anne, c. 19 ; Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Gas. 816 ; 
 dubitante Lord Cairns, Boutledge v. Low, L. E. 3 H. L. 107. 
 
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AS TO CONPBRBING EIGHTS ON FOBBIGNEES. 275 
 
 was published (a). It is now provided by s. 35, 
 ss. 4 of the Copyright Act, 1911, that where in the 
 case of an unpublished work, the making of which 
 extended over a considerable time, the conditions 
 of the Act conferring copyright shall apply if the 
 author was during any substantial part of that 
 period a British subject or a resident within the 
 parts of His Majesty's dominions to which the Act 
 extends (6). It was held that a foreigner was 
 entitled to maintenance, and to gain a settle- 
 ment, under the poor laws(c). And it has been 
 decided that the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (9 & 10 
 Vict. c. 93), which gives a right of action to the 
 personal representative of a person killed by a 
 wrongful and actionable act or neglect, extends to 
 the representative of a foreigner who has been 
 killed on the high seas, in a foreign ship, in a 
 collision with an English vessel (d). 
 
 On the other hand, it has been held that the 
 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, which empowered the mother 
 of a natural child to sue its putative father for its 
 maintenance, did not extend to a foreign woman 
 who had become pregnant in England, but had 
 given birth to the child abroad (e). The history, 
 
 (a) Per Lord Granworth 0., Jefferys v Boosey, sup. p. 274. 
 (6) And see Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, tit. " Copyright." 
 
 (c) E. V. Eastbourne, i East, 103. 
 
 (d) Davidsson v. Hill, cited sup. p. 261. 
 
 (e) B. V. Blane, (1849), 13 Q. B. 769. 
 
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276 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 as well as the language of the enactment, showed 
 that the liability arose from the birth of the child 
 in this country (a). But, on the other hand, the 
 mere fact that the child was born abroad does not 
 prevent an order being made when it is shown the 
 status of the child is not governed by foreign 
 law (6), and in the converse case of conception 
 abroad and birth in England, the law would extend 
 to the mother (c). The benefit of those enact- 
 ments which, prior to the repealed Merchant 
 Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862(d), limited 
 the liability of shipowners for damage done (e), 
 without their own fault, by their servants, to 
 other ships, was held not to extend to foreign 
 vessels (/); one reason being that the object of 
 the Legislature, in giving such a privilege, was to 
 encourage the national shipping only, by removing 
 the terrors of a Hability commensurate with the 
 damage done (g). But they were held to protect 
 
 (a) Per Coleridge J., Id. 773. 
 
 (6) B. V. Humphreys Ward, Exp., [1914] 3 K. B. 1237. 
 
 (c) Hampton v. Bichard, 43 L. J. M. G. 133. 
 
 (d) Eepealed by 57 & 58 Viet. e. 60, s. 745. 
 
 (e) See 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 502 ; Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. 
 Lennard's Carrying Co., [1914] 1 K. B. 419, G. A. ; Ingram & 
 Boyle V. Services Maritime du Treport, [1914] 1 K. B. 541, G. A. 
 
 (/) But see now 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 503 : The Oscar II., 
 [1919] P. 171. 
 
 (g) The Carl Johann (1821), cited, 1 Hagg. Adm. 113; 
 Cope V. Doherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367. See notes on this case. 
 
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REMEDIES GOVERNED BY LEX FORT. 277 
 
 a British ship in a suit by a foreign ship, whether 
 the collision took place in British waters (a) or on 
 the high seas (b). 
 
 In the latter case, the protecting enactment 
 applied in express terms to foreign as well as 
 British shipowners ; and though it would probably 
 have been read as if the words " within British 
 jurisdiction " had been inserted (c), if the Act had 
 been considered as exceeding the legislative powers 
 of Parliament to control the natural rights of 
 foreigners, there was, in fact, no such encroach- 
 ment on its full operation. For the nature and 
 extent of legal remedies are governed by the lex 
 fori; and it is no breach of international law, 
 or any interference with the rights of foreigners, 
 to determine what redress is to be given to suitors 
 who resort to our Courts (d). A foreigner, for 
 instance, was liable to arrest in this country for 
 a debt contracted abroad, though it would have 
 
 B. y. Keyn, 46 L. J. M. C, p. 95; The Wild Banger, 32 
 L. J. P. M. & A. 49 ; The Leon (1881), 50 L. J. Adm. 59. See 
 The Saxonia, Lush. 410. 
 
 (a) General Iron Screw Go. v. Schurmanns, 29 L. J. Oh. 877. 
 
 (6) The Amalia (1863), 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 471. 
 
 (c) See The Dumfries, Swab. 63. 
 
 {d) The Amalia, sup.; The Vernon, 1 Bob. W. 316; 
 Banh of U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Peters, 361. See Jackson v. 
 Spittall, L. E. 5 C. P. 542 ; Be Haney's Trusts, L. E. 10 Ch. 
 275 ; Chartered Merc. Bk. v. Netherlands Steam Navig. Co., 10 
 Q. B. D. 521 ; Jocohs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. D. 589. 
 
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278 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 exposed him to no such peril there ; and he would 
 be barred in our Courts by our Statute of Limita- 
 tion, though he was not by the prescription of his 
 own country (a). The provisions of the Admiralty 
 Court Act, 1861 (b), which give (by ss. 4 and 5) to 
 the Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over any 
 claims, for the building of any ship, and also for 
 necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than 
 in the port to which she belongs, unless the owner 
 be domiciled in England, were at one time held to 
 be confined to British ships, on the ground of the 
 improbability that the British Parliament had 
 intended to legislate for foreigners in foreign 
 ports (c), but this no longer represents the law (d). 
 And the seamen of a ship of any nation are 
 entitled to sue for wages in the Admiralty Court, 
 under s. 10 of the same Act, which gives that 
 Court jurisdiction over any claim by a seaman of 
 any ship for wages (e). It has been held that as 
 
 (a) De la Vega v. Vianna, 35 E. E. 298 ; Don v. Lippmann, 
 5 CI. & F. 1 ; Gen. Steam Navig. Co. v. Guillou, 11 M. & W. 877 ; 
 Lopez V. Burslem, 4 Moo. P. C. 300 ; British Linen Go. v. Drum- 
 mond, 34 E. E. 595 ; Ruber v. Steiner, 43 E. E. 598 ; Fincli v. 
 Finch, 45 L. J. Ch. 816 ; Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey, 49 
 L. J. C. P. 781 ; Be Beuss Eostritz, 49 L. J. P. & M. 67 ; The 
 Leon, 6 P. D. 148. 
 
 (6) 24 Vict. c. 10. 
 
 (c) The India (1863), 32 L. J. P. M. & A. 185. 
 
 {d) The Mecca (1894), 64 L. J. P. D. & A. 40. 
 
 (e) The Nina, 37 L. J. Adm. 17. For provisions as to relief 
 
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REMEDIES GOVERNED BY LEX FORI. 279 
 
 the English sailing rules are not binding on foreign 
 ships on the high seas, a foreign ship was pre- 
 cluded, in a collision suit, from imputing to the 
 British ship with which the collision occurred, a 
 breach of any of those rules ; on the ground that 
 it had no right to the benefit of rules by which it 
 was not, itself, bound {a). 
 
 and repatriation of distressed seamen and seamen left behind 
 abroad, see 6 Bdw. VII. o. 48, ss. 28 et seq. 
 (a) The ZoUverein, Swab. 96. 
 
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CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SECTION I. — EEPUGNANCT — EEPEAL BY IMPLICATION 
 
 ACTS IN, OB INVOLVING, THE NEGATIVE. 
 
 An author must be supposed to be consistent 
 witb himself; and, therefore, if in one place he 
 has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be 
 presumed that he is still of the same mind in 
 another place, unless it clearly appears that he 
 has changed it (a). In this respect, the work of 
 the Legislature is treated in the same manner as 
 that of any other author; and the language of 
 every enactment must be construed, as far as 
 possible in accordance with the terms of every 
 other statute which it does not in express terms 
 modify or repeal (6). The law, therefore, will not 
 allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by 
 construction when the words may be capable of 
 proper operation without it (c). But it is impossible 
 to construe absolute contradictions ; consequently 
 
 (a) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 9. 
 
 (6) See sup. p. 61. As to Eepeal, see inf. p. 727 et seq. 
 
 (c) Per Bridgman C.J., Lynv. Wyn, Bridg. Eep. by feannister, 
 122, inf. p. 318. Per A. L. Smith J., Eutner v. Phillips, [1891] 
 2 Q. B. 272 ; and see Felton v. Bowers, [1900] 1 Q. B. 598. 
 
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REPUGNANT SAVING CLAUSE. 281 
 
 if the provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent 
 with, or repugnant to, those of an earlier Act 
 that the two cannot stand together (a) the earlier 
 stands impliedly repealed by the later (6). Leges 
 posterioves priores confrarias ahrogant. Ubi duse 
 eontrarise leges sunt, semper antiquse ohrogat nova (c). 
 
 A difference, indeed, has been said to exist in 
 this respect between the effect of a Saving Clause 
 or Exception, and a Proviso in a statute. When 
 the proviso appended to the enacting part is 
 repugnant to it, it unquestionably repeals the 
 enacting part [d) ; but it is said by Lord Coke 
 that when the enactment and the saving clause 
 (which reserves something which would be other- 
 wise included in the words of the enacting part (e)), 
 are repugnant — as where a statute vests a manor 
 in the King, saving the rights of all persons, or 
 vests in him the manor of A. saving the rights 
 of A. — the saving clause is to be rejected, because 
 otherwise the enactment would have been made 
 
 (a) Wegt Ham v. Fourth City Building Society, [1892] 1 Q. B. 
 654. See O'Flaherty v. McDowell (1857), 6 H. L. Oas. 142, 
 dictum of Lord St. Leonards. 
 
 (6) Co. Litt. 112 ; Shop. Touchst. 88 ; Grot. b. 2, e. 16, s. 4 ; 
 Sims V. Doughty, 5 Ves. 243 ; Constantine v. Oonstantine (1801), 6 
 Ves. 100 ; Morrall v. Sutton, 65 E. E. 434 ; Brownv. G. W. B. Co. 
 (1885), 9 Q. B. D. 753, per Field J. 
 
 (c) Livy, b. 9, c. 34. 
 
 (d) A.-G. V. Chelsea Waterworks, Pitzg. 195. 
 
 (e) Co. Litt. 47a ; Shep. Touchst. 78. 
 
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282 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 in vain (a). One authority which he cites for this 
 proposition is the case of the reversal of the 
 Duke of Norfolk's attainder, by an Act of Mary. 
 That Act declared that the earlier statute of 
 38 Hen. VIII., which had attained the Duke, was 
 no Act, but utterly void, providing, however, that 
 this reversal should not take from the grantees 
 of Henry VIII. or Edward VI. any lands of the 
 Duke which those Kings had granted to them ; 
 and this provision was held inoperative to save 
 the rights of the grantees. But this resulted, it 
 is said, not because the saving clause was re- 
 pugnant to the enacting part, but because the 
 latter in declaring the attainder void, in effect 
 established also that the lands of the Duke had 
 never vested in the Crown; that none, conse- 
 quently, had ever passed to the grantees; and 
 that there was thus no interest to be saved on 
 which the clause could operate (b). 
 
 The illustrations given by Coke are cases of 
 conveyance of land; and the rule as regards the 
 construction of repugnant passages in a convey- 
 ance by deed has always been that the earlier of 
 them prevails (c). But it may be questioned 
 
 (a) Alton Woods Case, 1 Eep. 47. See Yarmouth v. Simmons 
 (1878), 10 Gh. D. 518; aeUandY.Ker{lMB),6Iv. Eq. Eep. 35, 
 affirmed 6 Ir. Bq. Eep. 288. 
 
 (&) Walsingham's Case, Plowd. 565. See Savings Institution v. 
 MaUn, 23 Maine, 370. 
 
 (c) Go. Litt.112; Shep. Touchst. 81 ; Gather v. Merrick, B.Sivd. 
 
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REPUGNANT SAVING CLAUSE. 283 
 
 whether there is any solid ground for this distinc- 
 tion between a saving clause and a proviso in a 
 statute. The later of two passages in a statute, 
 being the expression of the later intention, should 
 prevail over the earlier ; as it unquestionably 
 would, if it were embodied in a separate Act. 
 
 It has been held that where a statute merely 
 re-enacts the provision of an earlier one, it is to be 
 read as part of the earlier statute, and not of the 
 re-enacting one, if it is in conflict with another 
 passed after the first, but before the last Act ; and 
 therefore does not repeal by implication the inter- 
 mediate one (a). Where a passage in a schedule 
 appended to a statute was repugnant to one in the 
 body of the statute, the latter was held to pre- 
 vail (6). Where (as often happens) a proviso is 
 inserted to protect persons who are unreasonably 
 apprehensive as to- the effect of an enactment 
 where there is really no question of its application 
 
 94; Furnivall v. Coomhes (1843), 63 E. E. 455; explained in 
 Williams v. Hathaway (1877), 6 Ch. D. 54=4. 
 
 (a) Morisse v. Boyal British Banh, 1 C. B. N. S. 87, per 
 Willes J., citing Wallace v. Blachwell, 3 Drew. 538. See also 
 B. V. Bove, 3 B. & Aid. 596. 
 
 (&) JB. V. Baines, 12 A. & E. 227 ; Allen v. Flicker, 10 A. & B. 
 640, jper Patteson J. ; B. v. Bussell, 18 L. J. M. C. 106; Dean 
 V. Green, 8 P. D. 79 ; Cox, Exp. (1887), 56 L. J. Q. B. 532. See 
 Clarice V. Gaut, 22 L. J. Ex. 67. As to Statutory Eules, see 
 Institute of Patent Agents v. Loclewood, [1894] A. C. 360, sup. 
 p. 93. 
 
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284 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 to their case, the enactment is not to be construed 
 against the intention of the Legislature so as to 
 impose a liability upon people who were not so 
 apprehensive (a). 
 
 When the later of two general enactments is 
 couched in negative terms, it is difficult to avoid 
 the inference that the earlier one is impliedly 
 repealed by it. For instance, if a general Act 
 exempts frojn licensing regulations the sale of a 
 certain kind of beer, and a subsequent one enacts 
 that " no beer " shall be sold without a license, 
 it would obviously be impossible to save the former 
 from the repeal implied in the latter (6). The 
 Highway Act, 1835, which enacted that " no 
 action " for anything done under it should be 
 begun after three months from the cause of 
 action, was so clearly inconsistent, as regards 
 actions against justices, with the 24 Geo. II. 
 which limited the time to six months, that it 
 necessarily repealed the latter (c). 
 
 But even when the later statute is in the 
 
 (a) West Derby Guardians v. Metropolitan Life Assurance, 
 [1897] A. C. 647. 
 
 (6) Bead v. Storey, 30 L. J. M. C. 110 ; remedied by 24 & 25 
 Vict. c. 21, s. 3, now repealed by 10 Bdw. VII. c. 8, s. 96, and 
 Sched. 6. 
 
 (c) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, s. 109 ; (repealed by 56 & 57 
 Vict. c. 61), s. 2 ; 24 Geo. II. c. 44, s. 8 ; Bix t. Barton, 
 12 A. & E. 470. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
KKPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 285 
 
 affirmative, it is often found to involve that 
 negative which makes it fatal to the earlier enact- 
 ment (a). The requirements of 3 & 4 Will. IV. 
 c. 74, s. 40, which empowered a married woman 
 to dispose by deed of land which she held in fee, 
 provided she did so with the concurrence of her 
 husband and by deed acknowledged, were impliedly 
 repealed by the Married Women's Property Act, 
 1882, which enables her in general terms to dis- 
 pose of all real property as if she were a feme 
 sole (b). If an Act requires that a juror shall have 
 £20 a year, and a new one enacts that he shall 
 have 20 marks, the latter necessarily implies, on 
 pain of being itself inoperative, that the earlier 
 quaHfication shall not be necessary, and thus 
 repeals the first Act (c). An Act empowering a 
 railway company to erect a station on any 
 scheduled lands within the limits of deviation 
 would override the provisions of the earlier 
 Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, 
 s. 75, which forbade the erection of buildings 
 beyond the general line of buildings in a street {d), 
 
 (a) Bac. Ab. Stat. (D) ; Foster's Case, 6 Eep. 59. See Lord 
 Blackburn's judgment, Garnett v. Bradley, 48 L. J. Ex. 186. 
 See, however, inf. p. 329 et seq. 
 
 (jb) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 ; and see 7 Bdw. VII. c. 18, s. 3 ; Be 
 Brummond (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 258. 
 
 (c) Jenk. 2nd Cent. Case, 73 ; 1 Bl. Comm. 89. 
 
 {d) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 75 ; s. 75 repealed by 57 & 58 
 Vict. c. ccxiii, s. 215, Sohed. 4 ; City & South London By. v. 
 
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286 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 but this rule is not necessarily of universal applica- 
 tion (a). The 53 Geo. III. c. 127, giving power 
 to two justices to enforce the payment of a church 
 rate when its validity was undisputed and the sum 
 due was under ten pounds (provided that where 
 the validity was disputed, the justices should for- 
 bear from adjudicating), entirely takes away the 
 jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts over com- 
 plaints for non-payment of church rates where the 
 amount claimed does not exceed JIO in spite of 
 the proviso that nothing in the Act should alter or 
 affect the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts 
 to decide cases touching the validity of the rate (b). 
 Sec. 16, 6 & 6 Vict. c. 22 (c), which authorised 
 the Secretary of State to remove to Bethlehem 
 Hospital any prisoner confined in the Queen's 
 prison who was of unsound mind, was held, as 
 regards such prisoners, to repeal impliedly the 
 earlier enactment of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 102, 
 which provided that a prisoner for debt of unsound 
 mind should be discharged after certain inquiries 
 
 London G. C, [1891] 2 Q, B. 513 ; London 0. C. v. London School 
 Bd., [1892] 2 Q. B. 606; UchfieU U. I>. C. v. Crowhorough 
 Water Co., [18991 2 Q- B. 664. 
 
 (a) London County Council v. Wandsworth & Putney Gas Co. 
 (1900), 82 L. T. 562. 
 
 (6) Bichards v. Byhe (1842), 3 Q. B. 256 ; Bichetts v. 
 Bodenham, 48 E. E. 384. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by S. L. E, (No. 2), 1888. 
 
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REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 287 
 
 and formalities (a). Where an Aot of Charles II. 
 enabled two justices of the peace, " whereof one to 
 be of the quorum," to remove any person likely 
 to be chargeable to the parish in which he comes 
 to inhabit ; and another, after reciting this pro- 
 vision, repealed it, and enacted that no person 
 should be removable until he became chargeable, 
 in which case "two justices of the peace" were 
 empowered to remove him ; it was held that the 
 later Act dispensed with the qualification of being 
 of the quorum (b). 
 
 The provision of 43 Bliz. which gave an appeal 
 without any limits as to time against overseers' 
 accounts, was impliedly repealed by a subsequent 
 Act, which gave power to appeal to the next 
 Quarter Sessions (c). 
 
 The repealed Nuisances Removal and Diseases 
 Prevention Act, 1848, in providing that the costs 
 of obtaining and executing an order of justices 
 under the Act against an owner of premises should 
 be recoverable in the; County Court,- imphedly re- 
 pealed, as regards such cases, the enactment of 
 the County Courts Act, that those Courts should 
 
 (a) Gore v. Grey, 32 L. J. C. P. 106. 
 
 (6) 13 Ss U Gar. 11. o. 12, aud 35 Geo. III. o. 101 ; B. v. 
 Llangian, 4 B. & S. 249, dissentiante Oookburn C.J. 
 
 (c) 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 6 (repealed in part by 81 & 32 Vict. c. 122, 
 s. 6), and 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. i; B. v. Worcestershire, 17 E. E. 
 397. 
 
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288 INTBEPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 not take cognisance of cases where title to real 
 property was in question ; for it would have been 
 inoperative if the Court could not decide the 
 question of ownership (a), and this ruKng still 
 represents the law (6). So, where justices were 
 empowered to punish summarily acts of malicious 
 damage to property, except when done " under a 
 fair and reasonable supposition " of a right, it 
 was held that this proviso impliedly repealed, 
 pro tanto, the general principle which ousts the 
 jurisdiction of justices when a bond, fide claim of 
 right is asserted; and that the justices were not 
 bound to abstain from adjudicating until satisfied 
 that the act had been done under a fair and 
 reasonable supposition of right (c). So, where 
 one Act empowered justices to enforce the pay- 
 ment of' costs given by the Queen's Bench on 
 appeal against convictions, except where the party 
 liable was under recognisances to pay such costs ; 
 and a later one authorised the Quarter Sessions to 
 give costs in " any appeal," to be recovered in the 
 manner provided by the first Act ; it was held that 
 the exception in that Act was impliedly repealed, 
 
 (a) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 123, s. 3 (repealed by 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, 
 s. 69), and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58 (repealed by 51 & 52 Vict. 
 c. 43, s. 188) ; B. v. Harden (1852), 22 L. J. Q. B. 299. 
 
 (6) Fordham v. Akers (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 67. 
 
 (c) White V. Feasl (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 353; Brooks v. 
 Hamlyn (1899), 79L. T. 734. 
 
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KEPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 289 
 
 and that a distress warrant had been properly 
 issued against the party liable, though he was 
 under reoognisances (a). An order made under 
 the authority of the Judicature Act, 1875, 
 enacting that the costs of all proceedings in 
 the High Court shall be in the discretion of the 
 Court, and that where an action is tried by a jury 
 the costs shall follow the event unless the Judge 
 at the trial, or the Court, otherwise orders, was 
 held to repeal so much of the Act of 21 Jac. I. 
 c. 16, as deprived a successful plaintiff of costs in 
 an action of slander when he did not recover as 
 much as forty shillings damages (Z»). An enact- 
 ment that the Custos Botulorum shall nominate a 
 fit person to be Clerk of the Peace quamdiu bene se 
 gesserit, impliedly repealed an earlier one which 
 authorised the appointment durante bene placito; 
 for a grant under the former would be inconsistent 
 with one under the latter of the above Acts(c), 
 Where a statute made it actionable to sell a pirated 
 copy of a work with knowledge that it was pirated, 
 
 (a) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 27 (repealed in part by 47 & 48 
 Vict. c. 43, 88. 4, 5) ; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 5 ; Freeman v. Bead, 
 30 L. J. M. 0. 123. 
 
 (6) Oarnett v. Bradley, sup. p. 285 ; Bockett v. Olippingdale, 
 [1891] 2 Q. B. 293. See also per Jessel M.E., Mersey Bochs v. 
 Lucas (1881), 51 L. J. Q. B. 116; Gardner v. Whitford, 4 
 C. B. N. S. 665. 
 
 (c) Owen V. Saimders, 1 Lord Eaym. 158. See also Be North 
 Wales Gunpowder Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 220. 
 
 I.S. 19 
 
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290 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and a subsequent Act contained a similar provision 
 but without any mention of guilty knowledge, it 
 was held that the earlier Act was so far abrogated 
 that an action was maintainable for a sale made 
 in ignorance of the piracy (a). Where one Act 
 imposed a penalty of 5s. for killing or selling a wild 
 bird between March and August, unless it was 
 proved that the bird had been brought from abroad 
 before March ; and a later one, after reciting that 
 this enactment was insufficient for the protection 
 of wild birds during the breeding season, imposed 
 a penalty of 20s. for killing or " possessing " a wild 
 bird between February and July, it was held 
 that the later Act impliedly repealed the proviso 
 of the earlier Act, which admitted the excuse that 
 the bird had been imported (6). Where an Act 
 required that a consent should be given in writing 
 attested by two witnesses, and a subsequent Act 
 made the consent valid if in writing, but made 
 no mention of witnesses, this silence was held 
 
 (a) West V. Francis, 6 B. & Aid. 737 ; Gambart v. Sumner, 29 
 L. J. Ex. 98. For disquisition on Copyright Act, 1911, see 
 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, Chap. XXI. See Mens Bea, sup. 
 p. 177. 
 
 (b) 35 & 36 Vict. 0. 78, and 39 & 40 Vict. c. 29 (repealed by 
 43 & 44 Vict. c. 35, s. 7) ; Whitehead v. Smithers, 2 C. P. D. 553. 
 See 43 & 44 Vict. c. 35 ; Earris v. Lucas, [1919] 2 K. B. 291 ; 
 and 44 & 45 Vict. c. 51 ; Taylor v. Rogers, 50 L. J. M. G. 132. 
 For later protective legislation, see. 57 & 58 Vict. c. 24;' 
 4 Edw. VII. c. 4 ; 8 Bdw. VII. c. 11, s. 2. 
 
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BEPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 291 
 
 to repeal by implication the provision whioli re- 
 quired them (a). 1 Eliz. c. 1, which empowered 
 the Queen to authorise ecclesiastical persons to 
 administer ex officio oaths to supposed offenders, 
 was impliedly repealed by 16 Car. I., which took 
 away the oaths (6). Where an Act exempted from 
 impressment all seamen employed in the Green- 
 land fisheries, and a later one exempted seamen em- 
 barked for those fisheries whose names were regis- 
 tered and who gave security, it was held that the 
 earlier was repealed fro tanto by the later Act (c). 
 
 A curious comphcation of legislation involving a 
 repeal by implication is afforded by the Judicature 
 Act, 1873, and the County Courts Acts of 1876 
 and 1888. Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s, 45, 
 which came into operation in 1875, it was enacted 
 that from a decision of a Divisional Court on 
 appeal from a County Court there should be no 
 further appeal without the leave of the Divisional 
 Court. But the County Courts Act, 1876, which 
 came into operation the following day, enacted 
 that there should be an appeal without leave from 
 the Divisional Court, if the latter " altered " the 
 
 {d) Cumberland v. Copeland, 31 L. J. Ex. 353 ; per Jervis C.J., 
 Jefferys v. Boosey, i H. L. Oas. 943 ; and per Lord Wensleydale, 
 Kyle V. Jeffreys, 3 Maoq. 611. See Hodgson v. Bell, 24 Q. B. D. 
 525 ; Derby v. Bury Commissioners, inf. p. 310. 
 
 (6) Birch v. Lake, 1 Mod. 185. 
 
 (c) Exp. Caruihers, 9 East, 44. 
 
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292 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 judgment of the County Court in an Admiralty 
 cause, and consequently pro tanto repealed s. 45 of 
 the Judicature Act. The County Courts Act, 
 1888, repealed the provision of the County Courts 
 Act, 1876, referred to, but provided that the 
 repeal should not revive any enactment not in 
 force when it was passed. This express repeal 
 consequently did not revive s. 45, Judicature Act, 
 1873, so far as it was impliedly repealed by the 
 County Courts Act, 1875 (a). 
 
 Where a statute contemplates in express terms 
 that its enactments wiU repeal earlier Acts, by 
 their inconsistency with them, the chief argument 
 or objection against repeal by implication is re- 
 moved, and the earlier Acts may be more readily 
 treated as repealed. Thus, after a local Act had 
 directed the trustees of a turnpike to keep their 
 accounts and proceedings in books to which " all 
 persons" should have access, the Turnpike Roads 
 Act, 1822, 3 Geo. IV. c. 126, which recited the 
 great importance of one uniform system being 
 adhered to in the laws regulating turnpikes, and 
 enacted that former laws should continue in force, 
 except as they were thereby varied or repealed, 
 directed that the trustees should keep their ac- 
 counts in a book to be open to the inspection of 
 
 (a) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 ; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 50, s. 10 ; 51 & 52 Vict. 
 0. 43, s. 188 ; The Bart, [1893] P. 33. See also The Delano, 
 [1896] P. 40. 
 
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EBPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 293 
 
 the trustees or creditors on the tolls, and that 
 the book of their proceedings should be open to the 
 inspection of the trustees; it was held that the 
 power of inspection of the proceedings given by 
 the first Act to " all persons " was repealed (a). 
 
 Again, if the co-existence of two sets of pro- 
 visions would be destructive of the object for 
 which the later was passed, the earHer would be 
 repealed by the later. Thus, when a local Act 
 empowered one body to name the streets, and to 
 number the houses in a town, and another local 
 Act gave the same power to another body, the 
 earlier would be superseded by the later Act ; for 
 to leave the power with both would be to defeat 
 the object of the Legislature (b). But if one Act 
 imposed a toll, payable to turnpike trustees, for 
 passing along a road, and another transferred 
 the duty of repairing the road to another body, 
 prohibiting also the trustees from repairing it, the 
 toll would not be thereby impliedly repealed (c). 
 
 A later Act which conferred a new right, would 
 repeal an earlier one, if the co-existence of the 
 
 (a) JB. V. Northleach, 5 B. & Ad. 978. 
 
 (&) Daw V. Metropolitan Board, 31 L. J. 0. P. 223. See Cortis 
 V. Kent Waterworks (1827), 7 B. & G. 314; -R. v. Middlesex, 
 2 B. & Ad. 818 ; Bates v. Winstanley, 4 M. & S. 429. 
 
 (e) Phipson v. Harvett, 1 Cr. M. & E. 473. Comp. Brown v. 
 G. W. B. Co., 51 L. J. Q. B. 529. See also Tabernacle Bldg. 
 Socy. V. Knight, [1892] A. 0. 298 ; Be Kirkleatham Local Board, 
 [1893] 1 Q. B. 375. 
 
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294 INTEBPKBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 right which it gave would be productive of incon- 
 venience ; for the just inference from such a result 
 would be that the Legislature intended to take the 
 earlier right away (a). Thus, the Country Bankers 
 Act, 1826 (7 Geo. IV. c. 46), which, besides Umit- 
 ing and varying the common law habihties of 
 members of banking companies, provided that 
 suits against such companies should and lawfully 
 might be instituted against the public officer, was 
 held to take away by implication the common law 
 right of suing the individual members (&), for from 
 the nature of the case, this must have been what 
 the Legislature intended (c). 
 
 In other circumstances, also, the inconvenience 
 or incongruity of keeping two enactments in force 
 has justified the conclusion that one impliedly 
 repealed the other, for the Legislature is presumed 
 not to intend such consequences. Thus the re- 
 pealed 9 Geo. IV. c. 61, which prohibited keeping 
 open public-houses during the hours of afternoon 
 divine service, was held repealed by implication 
 pro tanto by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 118, which prohibited 
 
 (a) See inf. Chap. VIII., Sec. I. 
 
 (6) Steward v. Greaves, 12 L. J. Ex. 109 ; Chapman v. Milvain, 
 19 L. J. Ex. 228; Davison v. Farmer, 20 L. J. Ex. 177; 
 O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 H. L. Gas. 142. See also Green v. -B., 
 1 App. Cas. 513 ; Boles v. Mosewell and Hardy v. Dern, 5 
 T. E. 538. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Cranworth, O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 H. L. Cas. 
 157. See Cowley v. Byas, 5 Oh. D. 944. 
 
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REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. 295 
 
 the sale between three and five o'clock p.m,, the 
 usual hours of afternoon divine service. If both 
 Acts had co-existed, it would have been in the 
 power of the clergyman of every parish to close 
 the public-houses for four hours instead of two, 
 by beginning the afternoon service at one or at 
 five p.m., an intention too singular to be lightly 
 attributed to the Legislature (a). So, the charges 
 contained in the Distress for Eent Eules, 1888 
 (made under s. 8, Law of Distress Amendment 
 Act, 1888, 61 & 52 Vict. c. 21), have superseded 
 the charges in the schedule to the Distress (Costs) 
 Act, 1817, 57 Geo. Ill o. 93 (h). 
 
 An intention to repeal an Act may be gathered 
 from its repugnancy to the general course of 
 subsequent legislation. Thus 7 Geo. I. c. 21, 
 which prohibited bottomry loans by BngHshmen to 
 foreigners on foreign ships engaged in the Indian 
 trade, was held to have been silently repealed by 
 the subsequent enactments which put an end to 
 the monopoly of the East India Company, and 
 
 (a) B. V. WMteley, 3 H. & N. 143 ; Whiteley v. Heaton, 27 
 L. J. M. C. 217, S. 0. See Harris v. Jenns, 30 L. J. M. C. 183 ; 
 B. V. Senior, L. & C. 401 ; B. v. Bucks, 2 E. & B. 447 ; B. v. 
 Knapp, 22 L. J. M. 0. 139, S. C. See examples of a similar 
 Hnd in Manchester [Mayor) v. Lyons, 22 Ch. D. 287, and New 
 Windsor Corporation v. Taylor, [1899] A. C. 41. The present 
 Statutory Closing Hours are those prescribed by 10 Bdw. VII. 
 1 Geo. V. c. 24, Sched. 6. 
 
 (6) Walker v. Better (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 623. 
 
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296 INTBRPBKTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 threw its trade open to foreign as well as to all 
 British ships (a). 
 
 SECTION II. — CONSISTENT APFIEMATIVE ACTS. 
 
 But repeal by implication is not favoured (6). 
 A sufficient Act ought not to be held to be repealed 
 by implication without some strong reason (c). It 
 is a reasonable presumption that the Legislature 
 did not intend to keep really contradictory enact- 
 ments on the statute-book, or, on the other hand, 
 to effect so important a measure as the repeal of 
 a law without expressing an intention to do so. 
 Such an interpretation, therefore, is not to be 
 adopted, unless it be inevitable. Any reasonable 
 construction which offers an escape from it is 
 more likely to be in consonance with the real 
 intention. 
 
 It is sometimes found that the conflict of two 
 statutes is apparent only, as their objects are 
 different, and the language of each is therefore 
 
 (a) The India (JVo. 2), 33 L. J. P. M. & A. 193. See also B. v. 
 Northleach, 5 B. & Ad. 978 ; West Ham v. Fourth Gity Building 
 Socy., [1892] 1 Q. B. 654. Gomp. per Ex. Oh., Shrewsbury v. 
 Scott, 6 0. B. N. S. 1. See other illustrations in Tearwood's 
 Trusts, Be, 5 Oh. D. 545 ; B. v. Inl. Bev., 21 Q. B. D. 669 ; B. v. 
 West Biding, [1891] 1 Q. B. 722. 
 
 (6) Foster's Gase, 11 Eep. 63a. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Bramwell, G. W. By. v. Swindon & Gheltenham By., 
 9 App. Oas., at p. 809. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 297 
 
 restricted, as pointed out in the preceding chap- 
 ter, to its own object or subject. When their 
 language is so confined, they run in parallel lines, 
 without meeting. Thus the Eeal Property Limita- 
 tion Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV. o. 27), which 
 limits the time for suing for the recovery of land 
 (which is defined to include tithes) to 20 years 
 after the right accrued, was found not to affect the 
 provision of the Act of the preceding session, 2 & 3 
 Will. IV. c. 100, which enacts that claims to 
 exemption from tithes shall be valid after non- 
 payment for thirty years ; for the former Act dealt 
 with conflicting claims to the right of receiving 
 tithes which are admittedly payable ; while the 
 latter related to the liability to pay them (a). In 
 the one case, tithe was real property ; in the other, 
 a chattel (&). 
 
 So, s. 13, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, which enacted that 
 a judgment against any person should operate as 
 a charge on "lands, rectories, advowsons, tithes," 
 and hereditaments in which the judgment debtor 
 had an interest, was held to be limited to the 
 
 (a) Ely {Dean of) v. Gash, 15 L. J. Ex. 341. 
 
 (6) Ely (Dean of) v. Bliss, 2 De G. M. & G. 459. See also B. v. 
 Everett, 1 E. & B. 273 ; Adey v. Trinity House, 22 L. J. Q. B. 3, 
 S. C. ; Hunt v. Gt. Northern By. Go., 20 L. J. Q. B. 349 ; Grant 
 V. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113 ; Manning v. Phelps, 24 L. J. Ex. 62 ; 
 Hordon v. Hesketh, 4 H. & N. 175. Gomp. B. v. Everett, sup. ; 
 Be Knight, 17 L. J. Ex. 168 ; Irish Land Gommission v. Grant 
 (1884), 10 App. Gas. 14. 
 
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298 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 property of debtors who had the power of charging 
 their property, that is, to lay rectories, advowsons, 
 and tithes, and so did not conflict with or repeal 
 by implication 13 Eliz. c. 10, which makes void' 
 all chargings of ecclesiastical property in ecclesi- 
 astical hands (a). TJie Act which provides one 
 course of proceeding for the habitual neglect to 
 send a chUd to school, does not conflict with 
 another which provides a different mode of pro- 
 ceeding for a neglect which was not habitual but 
 occasional only, and both therefore can stand (6). 
 55 Geo. III. c. 137, s. 6 (c), which imposed a penalty 
 of aBlOO, recoverable by the common informer by 
 action, on any parish officer who, for his own 
 profit, supplied goods for the use of a workhouse, 
 or for the support of the poor, was held unaffected 
 by s. 77, 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, which inflicted a 
 fine of £5, recoverable summarily, half for the 
 informer and half for the poor rates, on any such 
 officer who supplied goods for his profit to an 
 individual pauper {d). It had been decided before 
 the passing of the later Act (which, indeed, was 
 
 (a) Hawkins v. Gathercole (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 338 ; and see 
 Ashhurton (Ld.) v. JVocfow, [1915] 1 Oh. 274, 0. A. 
 
 (6) 39 & 40 Vict. e. 79, s. 11 (amended by 7 Edw. VII. c. 43, 
 s. 14 (1)); Murphy, Be (1877), 46 L. J. M. C. 193. See also 
 Attwater, Exp., 46 L. J. Bank. 41. 
 
 (c) Section repealed 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 44. 
 
 (d) BoUnson v. Emergon, 4 H. & C. 852. See, however, sup. 
 p. 98. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 299 
 
 passed in consequence of that decision), that the 
 earlier enactment applied only to a supply for 
 the poor generally, hut not to the supply of an 
 individual pauper (a). The prohibition contained 
 in the Trade Union Act, 1871, against a Court 
 entertaining any legal proceedings for the purpose 
 of enforcing an agreement for the application of 
 the funds of a trade union to provide benefits for 
 members, has been held not to be impliedly 
 repealed by the provision of the Trade Union Act 
 Amendment Act, 1876, that a member may 
 nominate any person to receive any moneys due 
 to such member from his trade union on his 
 decease, and that the trade union shall pay such 
 sum to the nominee ; the object of the later enact- 
 ment being, not to depart from the policy of the 
 earlier one, but to enable members to give away 
 small sums due to them, without incurring the 
 trouble of making a Will, or the expense of 
 probate (b). 
 
 The 56 Geo. III. c. 50 (relating to the sale of 
 farm stock in execution), in providing that no 
 assignee in bankruptcy or under a bill of sale, and 
 no purchaser of farm stock, should be entitled to 
 dispose of any stock intended for use on the land 
 
 (a) Proctor v. Manwaring, 3 B. & Aid. 145. 
 
 (J) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 31, s. 4, and 39 & 40 Vict. o. 22, a. 10 
 (extended by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 47, ss. 2, 3, etc.) ; Crocker v. 
 KnigU, [1892] 1 Q. B. 702 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 466. 
 
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300 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 in any other manner than that by which the 
 tenant ought to have disposed of it, was limited in 
 construction to the purchases from tenants ; but 
 was regarded as not affecting 2 & 3 W. & M. c. 5, 
 which imposes on the landlord the obligation of 
 selling distrained goods at the best price, and 
 therefore as not justifying him in selling under 
 the conditions of the 56 Geo. III. c. 50, s. 1 (a). 
 The later Act showed no intention to modify the 
 law of distress. 
 
 So, an Act (h) which imposed, for police purposes, 
 a penalty for retailing excisable liquors without a 
 magistrate's license, would not be affected by an 
 excise Act of later date, which, after imposing a 
 duty on persons licensed by magistrates, provided 
 that nothing contained therein should prohibit a 
 person duly licensed to retail beer, from carrying 
 on his business in a booth or tent, at a fair or 
 race (c). 1 Will. IV. c. 64, which imposed on 
 beer retailers licensed by the Excise a penalty 
 of from j610 to £20 on conviction before justices, 
 for selling beer made otherwise than of, malt and 
 
 (a) Bidgway v. Stafford (1851), 20 L. J. Ex. 226 ; Wilmot v. 
 
 Bose, 23 L. J. Q. B. 281; Hamkins v. Walrond, 1 C. P. D. 
 280. 
 
 (5) 48 Geo. III. c. 143, s. 5, repealed by S. L. E., 1872 (No. 2). 
 
 (c) B. V. Hanson (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 519 ; B. v. Downes, 3 T. E. 
 
 660. See Buckle v. WrigMson, 34 L. J. M. C. 43 ; Ash v. Lynn, 
 
 35 L. J. M. 0. 169. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 301 
 
 hops, or for mixing any drugs with it, or for 
 diluting it, was held not to affect 56 Geo. III. 
 0. 58, which punished with a penalty of ^200 
 any retailer of beer who had in his possession, or 
 put into his beer, any colouring matter or prepara- 
 tion in lieu of malt and hops ; partly because the 
 objects of the two enactments were not identical, 
 the later one having solely a sanitary object in 
 view, and the protection of the consumer; while 
 the earher was aimed as much at the repression 
 of frauds on the revenue (a). It is to be added, 
 also, that 56 G-eo. III. c. 58, was expressly kept 
 in force by 1 Will. IV. c. 51 (6), passed a week 
 before 1 Will. IV. c. 64. 
 
 Where a general intention is expressed, and also 
 a particular intention which is incompatible with 
 the general one, the particular intention is con- 
 sidered an exception to the general one (c). Even 
 when the later, or later part of the enactment is 
 in the negative, it is sometimes reconcilable with 
 the earlier one by so treating it. If, for instance, 
 an Act in one section authorised a corporation 
 to sell a particular piece of land, and in another 
 
 (a) A.-G. V. Lochwood (1842), 9 M. & W. 378. See Palmer v. 
 Thatcher, 3 Q. B. D. 346. 
 
 (6) Eepealed, except ss. 22-24, by 43 & 44 Vict. c. 20, s. 49. 
 
 (c) Per Best G.J., Ohurchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 180. See also 
 ex. gr. Pilkington v. Cooke, 17 L. J. Ex. 141 ; Taylor v. Oldham^ 
 4 Oh. D. 395. 
 
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302 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 prohibited it from selling " any land," the first 
 section would be treated not as repealed by the 
 sweeping terms of the other, but as being an 
 exception to it (a). In this manner two Acts 
 passed in 1833 were construed as reconcilable. 
 Sec. 42, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, which provided 
 that no action for rent, or for interest on money 
 charged on land, should be brought after 6 years, 
 and the 3 & 4 Will. lY- c. 42, passed three weeks 
 later, which provided that no action for rent 
 reserved by lease under seal, or for money secured 
 by bond or other specialty, should be brought 
 after 20 years (now by s. 8, Real Property Limita- 
 tion Act, 1874, 12 years), were construed as recon- 
 cilable, by holding that the later enactment was 
 an exception out of the former. And the effect of 
 the conjoined enactments (which do not repeal 
 the statute of James (6) so far as relates to simple 
 contract debts charged on land, but stand with it) 
 is, that no action to enforce a simple contract 
 debt, whether charged on land or not, shall be 
 brought after 6 years, unless interest has been 
 paid or an acknowledgment given ; and as to any 
 specialty debt, whether charged on land or not, no 
 action shall be brought after 12 years, either on a 
 covenant or for a remedy against land, unless 
 
 (a) Per Romilly M.E., Be Winton v. Brecm, 28 L. J. Oh. 
 600. 
 (6) The Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. I. c. 16). 
 
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CONSISTENT APFIEMATIVE ACTS. 303 
 
 interest has been paid or an acknowledgment 
 given (a). 
 
 It may be observed, also, that two statutes 
 expressed in negative terms may be affirmative 
 inter se, and not contradictory, though negative as 
 regards a third at which they are avowedly aimed. 
 They may make two holes in the earlier Act, 
 which can stand side by side without merging 
 into one (b). For instance, 12 Anne, st. 2, c 16 (c), 
 having made void all loans at more than 6 per 
 cent, interest, the 3 & 4 Will, IV. c. 98, enacted 
 that " no " bill or note payable at three months 
 or less should be void for usury ; and the 2 & 3 
 Vict. c. S7{d), that "no " bill or note payable at 
 12 months or less should be void on that ground, 
 but with the additional provision that the Act was 
 not to apply to loans on real security ; and it was 
 
 (a) Himter v. NocJcolds, 19 L. J. Oh. 177 (but see Suiton v. 
 Sutton, 22 Gh. D. 511, per Cotton L.J., at p. 518) ; Barnes v. 
 Glenton, [1899] 1 Q. B. 885 ; Paget v. Foley, 42 E. E. 698 ; Sims v. 
 Thomas, 12 A. & E. 536 ; Htmfrey v. Gery, 7 0. B. 567. See also 
 Fearnside v. Flint, 52 L. J. Ch. 479 ; Kirhland v. Peatfield, 72 
 L. J. K. B. 355 ; Smith, Be, [1893] 2 Oh. 1 ; Deere, Be, 44 L. J. 
 Bank. 120 ; Biehens v. Wiggens, 32 L. J. M. 0. 144. Bent is a 
 specialty debt within the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, in the administra- 
 tion of assets, Talhot v. Shrewsbury, 42 L. J. Gh. 877 ; Be 
 Hastings, 47 L. J. Gh. 137. 
 
 (6) Per Maule J., Glack v. Sainsbury, 11 G. B. 695. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by S. L. E., 1867. 
 
 {d) Id. (No. 2), 1874. 
 
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304 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 held that the last-mentioned Act did not repeal 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. The negative words, in which 
 both were expressed, had reference to the Act of 
 Anne ; but inter se, they were affirmative statutes, 
 and the proviso of the later one, therefore, did not 
 affect the short loans dealt with by the Act of 
 WiU. IV. (a). 
 
 Further, it is laid down generally, that when 
 the later enactment is worded in affirmative terms 
 only, without any negative expressed or implied, 
 it does not repeal the earlier law (5). Thus, an 
 Act which authorised the Quarter Sessions to try 
 a certain offence, would involve no inconsistency 
 with an earlier one which enacted that the offence 
 should be tried by the Queen's Bench or the 
 Assizes, and would therefore not repeal it by 
 implication (c). The statute which made it a 
 misdemeanour to carnally know a girl above twelve 
 and under thirteen, with or without her consent, 
 did not prevent a conviction for rape, under an 
 earlier enactment, upon a girl between those 
 ages {d). Sec. 4, 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 34 (e), which 
 
 (a) Clack v. Sainsbury, sup. p. 303 ; Nixon v. Phillips, 21 L. J. 
 Ex. 88 ; Exp. Warrington, 22 L. J. Bank. 33. 
 (5) Co. Litt. 115a ; Anon., Lofft, 465. 
 
 (c) Muir V. Sore (1877), 47 L. J. M. 0. 17. 
 
 (d) 24 & 26 Vict. c. 100, s. 48, and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 94, s. 4 
 (repealed, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 19) ; B. v. Batcliffe, 10 Q. B. D. 74. 
 
 (e) Still on the Statute Book. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 305 
 
 provided that when a Quaker refused to pay 
 tithe or church rates, it should be lawful for 
 two justices to order and enforce payment if the 
 sum due was under J610, was held not to repeal 
 27 Hen. VIII. c. 20 (a), which gave jurisdiction to 
 the Ecclesiastical Courts in such matters (6). Sec. 
 11, Lunacy Eegulation Act, 1862 (repealed, 53 & 54 
 Vict. c. 5, s. 342), which enabled the Lord Chan- 
 cellor to make an order for the payment of the 
 expenses incidental to the presentation of a petition 
 for an inquiry as to the sanity of an alleged lunatic, 
 and to order that such expenses be paid by the 
 parties who either present or oppose the petition, 
 or out of the estate of the alleged lunatic, did 
 not take away the right of a person to sue a 
 lunatic, so found by inquisition, and his committee, 
 for the recovery of expenses so incurred, without 
 having obtained any order (c). So, an Act which im- 
 poses a liability on certain persons to repair a road, 
 
 (a) Eepealed (with saving), S. L. E., 1887. 
 
 (6) B. V. Sanchee, 1 Lord Eaym. 323. Many of the clergy, in 
 the 18th century, persisted, in consequence, in suing Quakers 
 in the Ecclesiastical Courts for such trivial sums as is. or 5s. in 
 order to inflict heavy costs and imprisonment. Walpole tried 
 to alter the law, but the Church cried out that it would be 
 persecution to compel the clergy to recover before magistrates 
 a due of divine origin ; Lecky, Hist. Bug., in 18th Cent., vol. i. 
 p. 260. 
 
 (c) See s. 109 Lunacy Act, 1890, and Brockwell v. Bullock 
 (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 567 ; a decision under the repealed Act. 
 I.S. 20 
 
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306 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 would not be construed as impKedly exonerating 
 the parish from its common law duty to do so (a). 
 A by-law which authorised the election of " any 
 person " as Chamberlain of the City of London was 
 not deemed inconsistent with an earlier one which 
 required of the candidates a certain qualification, 
 but was limited to eligible persons (6). A local 
 Act, in directing that the chimneys of buildings 
 should be built of such materials as the Corpora- 
 tion approved, did not affect the provisions of 
 the earlier general Act (3 & 4 Vict. o. 86, s. 6), (c) 
 which required that chimneys should be built of 
 stone or brick (tZ). A by-law made under s. 74, 
 Elementary Education Act, 1870, requiring children 
 to attend school as long as it was open (which was 
 at least 30 hours in the week), did not repeal 
 the provision in the Workshop Eegulation Act, 
 1867, which requires that children under thirteen 
 employed in a workshop shall be sent to school 
 for at least 10 hours weekly (e). An Act which 
 
 (a) B. V. St. George's, Hanover Square, 13 E. E. 792 ; B. v. 
 Southampton, 21 L. J. M. 0. 201 ; Gibson v. Preston, 39 L. J. 
 Q. B. 131. 
 
 (6) Tobacco Pipe Makers v. Woodroffe (1826), 7 B. & 0. 838 ; 
 JR. V. Saddlers' Go. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 337. 
 
 (c) Eepealed as regards Metropolis by 7 & 8 Vict. e. 84, s. 1, 
 which is itself repealed by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, s. 109. 
 
 {d) Hill V. Hall (1876), 45 L. J. M. C. 153. 
 
 (e) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 146, s. 14 (repealed by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 16. 
 s. 107 ; Bury v. Cherryholm, 1 Ex. D. 457. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACfS. 30? 
 
 provided that if a person suffered bodily injury 
 from the neglect of a mill-owner to fence dangerous 
 machinery, after notice to do so from a factory 
 inspector, the mill-owner should be liable to a 
 penalty, recoverable by the inspector, and appHc- 
 able to the party injured or otherwise, as the 
 Home Secretary should determine, would not 
 affect the common law right of the injured party 
 to sue for damages for the injury (a). A bond 
 by a collector, with one surety, good under the 
 ordinary law, would not be deemed invalid because 
 the Act which required it enacted that the col- 
 lector should give good security by a joint and 
 several bond with two sureties at least (6). 
 
 The repealed 30 & 31 Vigt. c. 142, which autho- 
 rised a judge of the Superior Court in which an 
 action is brought, to send the case for trial to a 
 County Court, was construed as not impliedly 
 repealing the earlier enactment of 11 G-eo. IV. c. 70, 
 which authorised any judge of the Superior Courts 
 to transact the chamber business of the other 
 Courts as well as his own ; but the later Act was 
 read with the earlier, and the expression "judge of 
 
 (a) 7 & 8 Vict. e. 15 (repealed ; for the present law on the 
 subject, see ss. 10 and 136, Factory and Workshop Act, 1901) ; 
 Gasswell v. Worth, 25 L. J. Q. B. 121. See Amhergate By. Oo. v. 
 Midland By. Co., 23 L. J. Q. B. 17. 
 
 (6) Peppin v. Cooper (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 431. See Austen v. 
 Howard, 7 Taunt. 28, 327. 
 
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§08 liJTEBPEE'rATIOJj OP STATUTES. 
 
 the Court in which the action was brought," was 
 thus construed as equivalent to any judge of 
 any of the Superior Courts of law (a). Sec. 52, 
 65 Geo. III. c. 184(&), which directed that all 
 affidavits required- by existing or future Acts for 
 the verification of accounts should, unless when 
 otherwise expressly provided, be made before the 
 Commissioners of Stamps, was held unaffected by 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 23, s. 7, which empowered justices of 
 the peace to administer the oath in similar cases. 
 Although the later Act did " otherwise provide," 
 it 3 did not make the provision inconsistent with 
 the earlier Act{c). The Highway Act, 1835, 
 6 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, which enacted that no 
 action for anything done under it should be begun 
 until 21 days' notice of action had been given, 
 did not repeal (as regards the notice of action 
 to justices) s. 1, 24 Geo. II. c. 44 (rf), which gave 
 justices the privilege of a month's notice when 
 sued for anything done in the execution of their 
 office (e) ; though, as already mentioned, it was 
 at the same time held to repeal the provision 
 
 (a) Owens v. Jones, 37 L. J. Q. B. 159. For County Court 
 Eules in remitted cases, see Order XXXIII., Eules 1913-1918. 
 
 (&) Eepealed by 54 & 55 Vict. c. 38, s. 28, and replaced 
 by s. 24. 
 
 (c) B. V Greenland, 86 L. J. M. C. 37. 
 
 (d) Eepealed. See Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 
 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61). 
 
 (e) Bix V. Borton (1840), 12 A. & E. 470. See sup. 284. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 309 
 
 of the same Act which limited the time to six 
 months. 
 
 The 28 Hen. VIII. c. 11, which gave the curate 
 who served during a vacancy an action for his 
 stipend against the next incumbent, remained un- 
 affected by 1 & 2 Vict, c. 106, which enacted that 
 on the avoidance of a benefice, the stipend of the 
 curate during the vacancy, fixed by the bishop, 
 should be paid by the sequestrator; both Acts 
 being in the affirmative, and not so inconsistent as 
 to be incompatible with both standing (a) ; though 
 the later Act suggested ground for contending 
 that as a Court of law could not determine what 
 the salary should be, it was not competent to 
 assist the curate in recovering any (6). Where 
 one Bankruptcy Act empowered the Court to 
 make the bankrupt an allowance, and a later one 
 enacted that the creditors should determine 
 whether any and what allowance should be made 
 to him, it was held that the former power was still 
 in force when the creditors did nof exercise that 
 given them by the later Act(c). Sec. 2, 32 
 Hen. VIII. c. 9 (d), which prohibited on pain of 
 
 (a) DaMmv. Seaman (1842), 9 M. & W. 777. 
 
 (6) Per Parke B., Id. 789. 
 
 (c) Ellerton, Exp., 33 L. J. Bank. 32. As to the present law 
 on this point, see s. 58, Bankruptcy Act, 1914, and Gordon, Exp., 
 44 L. J. Bank. 97. 
 
 {d) Eepealed by 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, s. 11. 
 
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310 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 forfeiture the sale of any " pretended " rights or 
 titles to land (which included all rights of entry, 
 for these were not transferable at common law), 
 was not impliedly repealed as regards fictitious 
 rights of entry by s. 6, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, which 
 enacted that rights of entry might be disposed of 
 by deed. But it was so far repealed as to cease to 
 affect good and real rights of entry (a). 
 
 Where a power was given by a local Act to 
 commissioners to make drains through private 
 lands, after giving 28 days' public notice, with 
 power to the persons interested to appeal ; and 
 the subsequently passed Nuisances Eemoval Act 
 for England, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, ss. 21 & 
 22) (6), gave the same power to the same com- 
 missioners, without requiring notice, it was held 
 that they were at liberty to act under either 
 statute. The notice was not a right given to the 
 parties interested, but a mere restriction; and 
 there was no more inconsistency in the co- 
 existence of the two powers than in the co- 
 existence of the ordinary covenants in a lease to 
 repair simply, and to repair after a month's 
 notice (c). Where an Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 97) 
 
 (a) Jenkins v. Jones, 51 L. J. Q. B. 438. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 343, as regards 
 England (excluding London). Eepealed as regards London by 
 54 & 55 Vict. c. 76, s. 142. 
 
 (c) Derby v. Bury Commissioners (1868), 38 L. J. Ex. 100. 
 
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CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 311 
 
 imposed a duty of 35s. on the transfer of a mort- 
 gage, and a second (24 & 25 Vict. c. 91, s. 30) 
 provided that when the transfer was made by 
 several deeds, only 5s. should be charged on all 
 but the first, and a third Act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 96, 
 s. 17) repealed the first by imposing a stamp of 
 sixpence per JElOO, it was held that the second 
 Act was not impliedly repealed by the third (a). 
 
 The Thames Conservancy Act, 1857 (20 & 21 
 Vict. c. colvii), which by s. 96 makes the owner of 
 a vessel navigating the Thames responsible for 
 damage done to the Conservators' property, by 
 any of the boatmen "or other persons belonging 
 to or employed in " the vessel, was held not to 
 affect the provision of s. 388, Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1854 (repealed and re-enacted by s. 633 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), which protected 
 owners from liability, where the damage was 
 occasioned by the fault of a compulsorUy employed 
 pUot, who, therefore, was not included in the words 
 " other persons " (b). The 33 Geo. III. c. 54 (now 
 obsolete), which protected members of friendly 
 
 Comp., however, such eases as Cumberland v. Copeland, sup. 
 p. 291. 
 
 (a) Foley v. Inl. Bev., 37 L. J. Ex. 109. All these Acts are 
 repealed by 33 & 34 Vict. o. 99, and Schedule. The existing 
 duty on transfer of mortgage (except marketable securities) is 
 6d. for each £100. 
 
 (b) Thames Conservators v. Hall (1868), 37 L. J. C. P. 163. 
 
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312 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 societies from poor law removal until they became 
 actually chargeable, was not impliedly repealed by 
 35 Geo. III. c. 101, which extended that protection 
 to all poor persons ; for though the latter seemed 
 to supersede the former by making it unnecessary, 
 yet it differed from it in declaring that an 
 unmarried woman pregnant was to be deemed 
 chargeable, while under the earlier Act, the 
 pregnant daughter of a member of a friendly 
 society was not removable (a). Sec. 4, 17 Greo. II. 
 c. 38, which empowered the Quarter Sessions, upon 
 an appeal against a poor rate, to order costs to be 
 paid to the successful party, was held unrepealed 
 by s. 5, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, which, in substance, 
 empowered the Quarter Sessions to direct the 
 unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the suc- 
 cessful party to the clerk of the peace, who was 
 to pay them over to the successful party ; so that 
 the order for costs might be made in either 
 form (b). 
 
 The 43 Bliz. c. 6, 21 Jac. c. 16, and 22 & 23 
 Car. II. c. 9, having provided that a plaintiff in an 
 action for slander, who recovered less than 40s. 
 damages, was to be entitled only to as much costs 
 as the damages amounted to; the 3 & 4 Vict. 
 c. 24, after expressly repeaKng the first and third 
 
 (a) B. V. Idle (1818), 2 B. & Aid. 149. 
 
 (b) B. V. Huntley, 23 L. J. M. C. 106 ; Gay v. Matthews, 4 
 B & S. 425 ; Comv. B. v. Hellier, 21 L. J. M. C. 3. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT AFFECTED BY GENERAL ACTS. 313 
 
 of those Acts, without mentioning the second, 
 enacted that a plaintiff who, in such cases, 
 recovered less damage than 405., should not be 
 entitled to any costs, unless the presiding judge 
 certified that the slander was malicious ; and it 
 was held that this later enactment did not 
 impliedly repeal 21 Jao. o. 16, and that the effect 
 of the judge's certificate was merely to remit the 
 plaintiff to the rights which that statute gave 
 him (a). The 5 Vict. c. 27, which, after reciting 
 that it would be advantageous to ecclesiastical 
 benefices if incumbents were empowered to grant 
 leases with the consent and under the restrictions 
 mentioned in the Act, gave them power to grant, 
 with the consent of the patron, leases for 14 years 
 at the best rent, and with numerous special 
 covenants by the lessee, was held not to abridge 
 the power which every parson had at common law, 
 as modified by 13 Eliz. c. 10, to grant leases for 
 21 years or three Hves, the lease being confirmed 
 by the patron (b). 
 
 SECTION III. — GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT. 
 
 It is but a particular appKcation of the general 
 presumption against an intention to alter the law 
 
 (a) Evans v. Bees, 30 L. J. 0. P. 16 ; Marshall v. Martin, 39 
 L. J. Q. B. 85. See also Bavies v. Griffiths, 8 L. J. Ex. 70 ; 
 Wrightup v. Greenacre, 10 Q. B. 1. 
 
 (6) Green v. Jenkins, 29 L. J. Ch. 505. See other illustrations 
 in B. V. Medway Union, L. E. 3 Q. B. 383; Northwich v. St. 
 
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314 INTEEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 beyond the immediate scope of the statute (sup. 
 p. 149), to say that a general Act is to be construed 
 as not repealing a particular one, that is, one 
 directed towards a special object or a special class 
 of objects (a). A general later law does not 
 abrogate an earlier special one by mere implica- 
 tion (6). Generalia specialihus non derogant (c) ; or, 
 in other words, " where general words in a later 
 Act are capable of reasonable and sensible applica- 
 tion without extending them to subjects specially 
 dealt with by earlier legislation "... that earlier 
 and special legislation is not to be held indirectly 
 repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by 
 force of such general words, without any indica- 
 tion of a particular intention to do so " {d). In such 
 
 Paneras, 22 Q. B. D. 164 ; Mitford Union v. Wayland Union, 25 
 Q. B. D. 164 ; Pollock v. Lands Improvement Co., 37 Ch. D. 661. 
 
 (a) Per Lord Hatherley, Garnett v. Bradley, 3 App. Cas. 950. 
 
 (6) Per Page- Wood V.-C, London & Blackmail By. v. Lime- 
 house, 3 K. & J. 123 ; Thorpe v. Adams, L. E. 6 C. P. 125 ; E. v. 
 Champneys, Id. 384; Kutner v. Phillips, per A. L. Smith J., 
 [1891] 2 Q. B. 272 ; Ashton-under-Lyne v. Pugh, [1898] 1 Q. B. 
 45; Baird v. Tunhridge Wells, 64 L. J. Q. B. 151; Lodge v. 
 Huddersfield Corp. {No. 1) (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 568. See S. 0. 
 (No. 2), 67 L. J. Q. B. 571. 
 
 (c) Jenk. 3rd Cent. 41st Case. 
 
 (d) Seward v. The Vera Cruz, per Lord Selborne C, 10 App. 
 Cas., at p. 68 ; Hawkins v. Gathercole, per Turner L.J., 6 
 Do M. & G., at p. 31 ; Lyn v. Wyn, Bridg. 122, inf. p. 318, per 
 M. Smith J. ; Thames Conservators v. Hall, L. E. 3 G. P. 421, and 
 per Bramwell B., Dodds v. Shepherd, 1 Ex. D. 75. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT AFFECTED BY GENEEAL ACTS. 315 
 
 oases it is presumed to have only general cases in 
 view, and not particular cases wMcli have been 
 already otherwise provided for by the special Act, 
 or, what is the same thing, by a local custom (a). 
 Having already given its attention to the particular 
 subject, and provided for it, the Legislature is 
 reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that 
 special provision by a subsequent general enact- 
 ment, unless that intention is manifested in 
 explicit language (b), or there be something which 
 shows that the attention of the Legislature had 
 been turned to the special Act, and that the 
 general one was intended to embrace the special 
 cases provided for by the previous one (c) ; or 
 something in the nature of the general one making 
 it unlikely that an exception was intended . as 
 regards the special Act. The general statute is 
 read as silently excluding from its operation the 
 cases which have been provided for by the special 
 one. 
 
 Thus, the rules of the Supreme Court as to 
 
 (a) Go. Litt. H5a; Harhert's Case, 3 Eep. 13b, note U.; 
 Gregory's Case, 6 Eep. 19b ; B. v. Pugh, 1 Doug. 188 ; HutcMns 
 V. Player, Bridg. 272 ; Piatt v. Sheriffs of London, Plowd. 36. 
 
 (6) Per Wood V.-G., Fitzgerald v. Ohampneys, 2 Jo. & H. 54 ; 
 and per Lord Hobhouse, Barker v. Mger, [1898] A. G. 754. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Hatherley, Garnet v. Bradley, 3 App. Gas. 950. 
 See also per Gur., B. v. Poor Law Com., 6 A. & E. 48 ; and 
 see The Dragoman (1895), 11 T. L. E. 428, per Bruce J., at 
 p. 428. 
 
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316 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 costs do not operate to repeal the provisions of 
 special statutes giving special costs in particular 
 cases (a). And in Kke manner the language of the 
 Bills of Sale Acts requiring the registration of 
 agreements by which a right to a charge or 
 security on personal chattels is conferred, although 
 clearly wide enough to include debentures of a 
 joint stock company, were held not to include such 
 instruments, as the registration of them had been 
 otherwise provided for by the Companies Clauses 
 Consohdation Act, 1845, and the repealed Com- 
 panies Act, 1862 (b). Sec. 7, Admiralty Court 
 Act, 1861, which gives jurisdiction to that Court 
 " over any claim for damage done by any ship," 
 has been held not to authorise an action for 
 damages for loss of life under Fatal Accidents Act, 
 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93); actions under that 
 Act being in respect of a special class of claims 
 involving numerous and important considerations, 
 which the Legislature cannot be supposed to have 
 had in contemplation in using words of so general 
 
 (a) Beeve v. Gibson, [1891] 1 Q. B. 652 ; Hasher v. Wood 
 (1885), 54 L. J. Q. B. 419. See also Quinn v. M'Einlay, [1902] 
 2 K. B. Ir. 315. 
 
 (6) 41 & 42 Vicfc. e. 31, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, 8 & 9 Vict. e. 16, 
 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. 43 ; Be Standard Manufacturing Co., 60 
 L. J. Oh. 292. The present law as to registration of mort- 
 gages, charges, etc., is contained in s. 93 of the Companies 
 (Consolidation) Act, 1908. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT AFFECTED BY GENERAL ACTS. 317 
 
 a ohaoraoter (a), and in no case does it apply for 
 the benefit of aliens abroad, it being clear law 
 that an Act of the British Parliament is not an 
 allocution addressed urhi et orbi (b). Again, where 
 a local Act, for completing a bridge across the 
 Thames, exempted the owners of the adjoining 
 ground, which was to be embanked at their ex- 
 pense, from aU taxes and assessments whatsoever, 
 it was held that later general Acts imposing taxes 
 and rates in respect of lands and houses, did not 
 repeal that exemption (c), but this apparently is 
 no longer good law(cZ). After 13 Eliz. c. 10 
 (sup. p. 313), had declared all leases of ecclesi- 
 astical property void, other than for 21 years or 
 three lives, leases of house property in towns were 
 excepted from its operation by 14 Eliz. c. 11 ; 
 and when, 4 years later, 18 Eliz. o. 11, after 
 reciting that a practice had already begun of 
 granting reversionary leases of Church property, 
 enacted that " all leases hereafter to be made," 
 by ecclesiastics, of Church "lands, tenements 
 
 (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10 ; Seward v. The Vera Cruz (1884), 54 
 L. J. P. D. & A. 9. 
 
 (6) Adam v. British and Foreign Steamship Go. (1898), 67 
 L. J. Q. B. 844. 
 
 (c) Williams v. Pritchard and Eddington v. Borman (1790), 
 4 T. E. 2 and 4. 
 
 [d) Perchard v. Seywood, 53 E. E. 128, and Duncan v. Scottish 
 N. E. By. Co., L. E. 2 Sc. App. 20. See Sion College v. London 
 Corp. (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 369 ; [1901] 1 K. B. 617, at p. 621. 
 
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318 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 and hereditaments," should be void, if the old 
 lease was not expired or determined within 
 3 years from the grant of the new ; it was held 
 that this last Act did not apply to the property 
 dealt with by 14 Eliz. (a). So the general pro- 
 vision of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 
 which gave power to a married woman to dis- 
 pose by Will of any real or personal property in 
 the same manner as if she were a feme sole, has 
 been held not to override the special provision of 
 43 Geo. III. c. 108 (repealed as to Ireland by 14 
 & 15 Vict. c. 71), which enacts that the powers 
 conferred by that Act of making a gift by WiU for 
 the purpose of erecting a church shall not extend 
 to the case of a married woman acting without the 
 concurrence of her husband (b). 
 
 Where an Act took away the right of bringing 
 an action respecting certain disputes which were 
 referred to the summary adjudication of justices, 
 it was held that the subsequently established 
 County Courts acquired no jurisdiction to try 
 such cases, under the general authority to try 
 " aU pleas " (c). 
 
 (o) Per Sir O. Bridgman, Lyn v. Wyn, Bridg. E. by Bannister, 
 122. This ease is not reported in the original edition of Bridgman's 
 judgments, and the Court seems to have been equally divided. 
 
 (6) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1 ; SmitTi's Estate, Be, 35 Oh. D. 
 589. 
 
 (c) Payne, Exp. (1849), 18 L. J. Q. B. 197. See also Brown v. 
 L. & N. W. By. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 318. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT ArFBCTED BY GBNEEAL ACTS. 319 
 
 The provision of the Judicature Act, 1875, that 
 except where it is otherwise provided hy the Act 
 or the rules annexed to it, the judgment of the 
 Court shall be obtained by motion, was held not 
 to affect the (repealed) County Courts Act of 
 1856 (re-enacted s. 65, County Courts Act, 1888), 
 which, after authorising the Superior Courts 
 to send certain cases to the County Courts for trial, 
 had directed that the judgment might be signed in 
 accordance with the result as certified by the 
 registrar {a). The general provisions of Order LIX. , 
 rr. 9, 17, as to appeals to the Queen's Bench 
 Division from inferior Courts, do not repeal 
 the special provisions of s. S, Mayor's Court of 
 London Procedure Actj 1857, as to imposing 
 the obligation on the party appealing from that 
 Court in certain cases to give security for costs (6). 
 
 The Turnpike Eoads Act, 1822, 3 Geo. IV. 
 c. 126, which empowered turnpike trustees to 
 let the tolls, and provided that all contracts for 
 letting them should be valid, though not by deed, 
 " any Acts of Parliament or law to the contrary 
 thereof notwithstanding," was held unaffected by 
 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, which in the most general 
 
 (a) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, Order 40, r. 1 ; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, 
 s. 26 ; Scutt V. Freeman, 2 Q. B. D. 177 ; Johnson v. Wilson 
 (1882), 46 L. T. 647. 
 
 (6) 20 & 21 Vict. e. clvii, s. 8 ; Morgan v. Bowles (1893), 63 
 L. J. Q. B. 84. 
 
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320 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 terms declares that " a lease, required by law to 
 be in writing, of any tenements and heredita- 
 ments, shall be void unless made by deed." It 
 was not to be supposed that the Legislature in- 
 tended by the later Act to interfere with the 
 poKoy of the earlier one, which was emphatically 
 that a deed should not be required for turnpike 
 tolls (a), though necessary by the general law of 
 the land (b). An Act which declared all debtors 
 to be subject to the bankruptcy laws, would in- 
 clude debtors who had the privilege of Parliament 
 from personal arrest (c) ; but any provisions of 
 those Acts which authorised the arrest of bank- 
 rupts would be held inapplicable to a person 
 entitled to the privilege. Unless it expressed a 
 contrary intention plainly, it would be presumed 
 that* the Legislature did not intend to interfere 
 with it (d). 
 
 Personal Acts and local customs affecting only 
 certain persons in their rights, privileges, or 
 property, offer other illustrations of this rule, that 
 special enactments are unaffected by the general 
 words of a more general enactment. Thus, the 
 Act aboKshing Fines and Eecoveries (3 & 4 
 
 (a) Shepherd v. Hodsman (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 263. 
 (6) B. V. Salisbury (1838), 8 A. & E. 716. 
 
 (c) Eor existing law on this point, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, 
 s. 128. 
 
 (d) Newcastle v. Morris (1870), L. E. 4 H. L. 661, inf. p 546. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT AFFECTED BY GENERAL ACTS. 321 
 
 Will. IV. c. 74), which, in the most comprehensive 
 terms, authorises " every tenant in tail " to bar 
 his entail in a certain manner, does not apply to 
 the tenant in tail of property entailed by special 
 Act of Parliament, such as the Shrewsbury, Marl- 
 borough, Wellington, and other special Parlia- 
 mentary entails (a). And in the same way, 1 & 2 
 Vict. c. 110, which in general terms enacted that 
 a judgment of a Superior Court shall operate as a 
 charge on the lands of the debtor from the time of 
 its registration in the Common Pleas, was held 
 not to repeal by implication the Middlesex Eegis- 
 tration Act, which had enacted that no judgment 
 should bind lands in Middlesex, but from the time 
 of its registration in the register office for Middle- 
 sex (b). An Act which authorised " any person " 
 to sell beer, who obtained a license for the pur- 
 pose, would not be construed as repealing the 
 custom or local law of a borough which disqualified 
 aU persons who were not burgesses from selling 
 beer (c). An Act which required all persons to 
 
 (a) Per Wood V.-C, Fitzgerald v. Ghampneys, 2 Jo. & H. 54. 
 See Abergavenny v. Brace, L. B. 7 Ex. 145 ; and comp. Cuckfield 
 Board, Be, 19 Beav. 153, inf. p. 325. 
 
 (6) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 13 & 19 (partially repealed 63 & 64 
 Vict. 0. 26, s. 6, Sched. ) ; 7 Anne, o. 20, s. 18 ; Westbrook v. 
 Blythe, 23 L. J. Q. B. 386. See also Bale's Case, 6 Q. B. D. 
 376 ; Bnraght v. Ld. Penzance, 7 App. Cas. 240 ; Fritz v. Hobson 
 (1880), 14 Ch. D. 542. 
 
 (c) Leicester v. Burgess, 5 B. & Ad. 246 ; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 
 
 I.S. 21 
 
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322 INTBBPBBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 serve as jurors of the county, in general terms, 
 would not be construed as extending to a hundred, 
 when those who served as jurors in the hundred 
 were by custom exempted from service in the 
 county (a). So, the repealed 50 Geo. III. c. 41 (&), 
 which empowered licensed hawkers to set up in 
 any trade in the place where they resided, was 
 held not to give them that privilege in a borough 
 where, by custom or by-law, strangers were not 
 allowed to trade (c). Where a railway company 
 had authority, under a special Act, to take certain 
 lands in the metropolis for executing works on 
 them, it was held that its powers were unaffected 
 by the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 
 Vict. c. 120), which was passed shortly afterwards, 
 giving the same powers to a pubUc body (d). So, 
 an Act which authorised the lord of a manor and 
 his heirs to break up the pavement of the streets 
 
 Will. IV. c. 64, s. 29 ; comp. HuxTiam v. Wheeler, 33 L. J. M. C. 
 153 ; HutcMns v. Player, Bridg. 272. 
 
 (a) B. V. Pugli, Doug. 188 ; B. v.' St. James's, Westminster, 
 5 A. & B. 391 ; B. v. Johnson, 6 Gl. & F. 41. 
 
 (b) See 51 & 52 Vict. c. 33, s. 8 (this section is now repealed 
 by S. L. R, 1908). 
 
 (c)'Smson v. Moss, 2 B. & Ad. 543; Llandaff Market Co. v. 
 Lyndon, 30 L. J. M. 0. 105. 
 
 (d) London & Blachwall By. Co. v. Limehouse (1856), 26 
 L. J. Oh. 164 ; comp. Daw v. Metrop. Board, 12 C. B. N. S. 
 161, sup. p. 293. For Modern Legislation, see 62 & 63 Vict, 
 c. 14, and 3 Edw. VII. c. 39. 
 
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SPECIAL NOT AFFECTED BY GENERAL ACTS. 323 
 
 of a town, for the purpose of laying down water- 
 pipes to convey water to and through the town, 
 from his estate, would not be affected by a sub- 
 sequent Act which vested the same streets and 
 pavements in a public body, and empowered it to 
 sue any person who broke them up (a). 
 
 In all these oases, the general Act seemed in- 
 tended to apply to general cases only ; and there 
 was nothing to rebut that presumption. But if 
 there be in the Act or in its history something 
 showing that the attention of the Legislature had 
 been turned to the earlier special Act, and that it 
 intended to include the special cases within the 
 general Act, or something in the nature of either 
 Act, to render it unlikely that any exception was 
 intended in favour of the special Act, the maxim 
 under consideration ceases to be applicable. The 
 Prescription Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71), for 
 example, in giving an indefeasible right to light 
 after an enjoyment of twenty years, " notwith- 
 standing any local custom," plainly abolished the 
 custom of London which authorised the owner 
 of an ancient house to build a new one on its 
 old foundations to any height, though thereby 
 obscuring the ancient lights) of his neighbour (6). 
 
 (a) Goldson v. Buck (1812), 15 East, 372. 
 
 (6) Salters' Go. v. Jay, 11 L. J. Q- B. 173 ; B. v. London 
 {Mayor), 16 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; Merchant Taylors v. Truscott (1856), 
 25 L. J. Ex. 173. 
 
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324 INTBRPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It has been held that the Dower (a) and In- 
 closure(6) Acts apply to gavelkind lands, though 
 this local customary tenure is not expressly men- 
 tioned in either Act. 
 
 By Charters granted by King Henry II. and 
 subsequent sovereigns, confirmed by Acts of 
 Parliament, the Corporation of Exeter were en- 
 titled to receive and did receive {inter alia) the 
 Kevenue Fines imposed within their borough, but, 
 though not mentioned in the Act, that right was 
 taken away by the general enactment of &. 33 (1), 
 Inland Eevenue Eegulation Act, 1890 (53 & 54 
 Vict. c. 21), which enacted that " all Fines, Penal- 
 ties, and Forfeitures incurred under any Act 
 relating to Inland Eevenue, which are not other- 
 wise legally appropriated, shaU be applied to the 
 use of Her Majesty " (c). 
 
 Though the sheriffs of the Counties Palatine of 
 Lancaster and Durham were expressly forbidden 
 by the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 71, to arrest on 
 mesne process issuing from the Courts of West- 
 minster for less than £50, this enactment was held 
 repealed by the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3, which, 
 after abolishing generally all arrests for debt, gave 
 a judge powep, under certain circumstances, to 
 order such an arrest in every action for any sum 
 
 (a) Farley v. Bonham, sup. p. 52. 
 
 (6) Minet v. Lemcm, 24 L. J. Ch. 547. 
 
 (c) A.-Q. V. Exeter Corporation (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 636. 
 
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SPECIAL SOMETIMES AFFECTED BY GENERAL ACTS. 325 
 
 for .£20 or upwards (a). The Charitable Uses Act, 
 1735 (9 Geo. II. c. 36 (b), was held to extend to • 
 a corporate body which had been empowered by 
 an earlier Act to take land by devise and without 
 license, in mortmain (c). So, the Lands Clauses 
 ConsoKdation Act, 1845, and other Acts of a like 
 character, which authorise the compulsory taking 
 of lands for works of public utility, such as rail- 
 ways, and give corresponding powers to tenants 
 in tail or for life, to convey the lands so required, 
 would apply to tenants in taU under special 
 Parliamentary entails, such as the Abergavenny 
 entail (rf). The County Courts acquired jurisdiction, 
 under their general authority to hear " all pleas " 
 where the debt or damage did not exceed d620, to 
 enforce the payment of a rate imposed under a 
 local Act passed before those Courts were estab- 
 lished, and which had made such rates recoverable 
 
 (a) Brown v. McMillan (1846), 7 M. & W. 196; but see 
 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, now repealed, save as to pending business 
 of Insolvent Court by S. L. E. (No. 2), 1893'. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by the Mortmain Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict c. 42), 
 which see. 
 
 (c) Luckraft v. Fridham, 46 L. J. Oh. 744. See also 
 Morrison v. Genl. Steam Navig. Co., 22 L. J. Ex. 233 ; per Jessel 
 M.E., Mersey Docks v. Lucas, 51 L. J. Q. B. 116 ; Gardner v. 
 Whitford, 4 G. B. N. S. 665 ; and note Webster v. Southey, 36 
 Ch. Div. 9, at p. 22. 
 
 {d) Be Cuckfield Board (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 585; camp. 
 Fitzgerald v. Champneys, sup. p. 321. 
 
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326 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 only by action in the Superior Courts (a). A local 
 Act which provided that the prisoners of the 
 borough to which it applied, and which had a 
 separate Quarter Sessions, should be maintained 
 in the county jail on certain specified terras, was 
 held to be superseded by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 95, which 
 enacted that every borough, which had Quarter 
 Sessions, should, when its prisoners were sent to 
 the county jail, pay the county the expenses, 
 including those of repairs and improvements (6). 
 The provision in s. 129 of the Metropohs Manage- 
 ment Act, 1855 (c), that the magistrate's decision 
 on matters under that Act shaU be final and con- 
 clusive was impliedly repealed by the Summary 
 Jurisdiction Act, 1879, which authorises any person 
 questioning a decision of a Court of Summary 
 Jurisdiction to apply for a case to be stated (d). 
 
 Where a City gas company had been precluded 
 by its private Act from charging more than four 
 shillings for every thousand feet of gas of a certain 
 quality, and the Metropolis Gas Act, 1860(e), 
 
 (a) Stewart v. Jones (1852), 22 L. J. Q. B. 1. As to the 
 summary recovery of rates under the Public Health Act, 1875, 
 see 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 256. 
 
 (6) Bramston v. Colchester, 25 L. J. M. 0. 73. 
 
 (c) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, repealed by 54 & 55 Vict. c. 76. 
 
 {d) See 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 33 ; B. v. Bridge, 24 Q. B. D. 
 609 ; Goodwin v. Sheffield Corporation, [1902] 1 Q. B. 629. 
 
 (e) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 125. 
 
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SPECIAL SOMETIMES AFFECTED BY GENEBAL ACTS. 327 
 
 required the City gas companies to supply a better 
 and more expensive gas at the rate prescribed by 
 it, which might amount to five shillings and six- 
 pence (s. 40) per thousand feet ; it was held that the 
 later provision impliedly repealed the earlier pro- 
 hibition. Here, however, the general Act avowedly 
 appHed to the company ; and it would have been 
 unreasonable that the better gas which it required 
 should be supplied at the price mentioned in the 
 special Act, merely because the latter had not 
 been repealed in express terms (a). 
 
 The Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1839 
 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), s. 47, which provided that 
 penalties under existing and future Acts, which 
 should be adjudged by police magistrates, should 
 be paid to the receiver of the police district, and 
 the subsequent Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38 (against 
 gaming houses), which enacted that the penalties 
 which it inflicted should be recoverable before two 
 justices (or before a police magistrate, since he 
 has the same jurisdiction as two justices), and 
 should be paid to the overseers of the poor of 
 the parish in which the offence was committed, 
 were construed so as to be consistent with each 
 other, by limiting the application of the penalties 
 under the later Act, to cases where they were im- 
 posed by justices, and applying them in conformity 
 
 (a) Great Central Oas Go. v. Glarhe (1862), 32 L. J. 0. P. 41. 
 See also Parry v. Croydon Gas Co., 15 C. B. N. S. 568. 
 
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328 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 with, the earlier statute, where they were adjudged 
 by a police magistrate (a). 
 
 When a general Act is incorporated into a 
 special one, the provisions of the latter would 
 prevail over any of the former with which they 
 were inconsistent (b). It may be added also, that 
 when an Act on one subject, such as highways, 
 incorporates some of the provisions comprised in 
 another relating to a different subject, such as 
 poor rates, it does not thereby incorporate the 
 modifications of those provisions which are sub- 
 sequently made in the latter Act (c). 
 
 It has been said to be a rule that one private 
 Act of Parliament cannot repeal another except 
 by express enactment (d) ; but necessary imphca- 
 tion must, no doubt, be considered as involved 
 in this expression (e), if the intention of the 
 
 (a) Wray v. Ellis, 28 L. J. M. 0. 45. See also Beeeiver of 
 Police District v. Bell, 41 L. J. M. G. 153. In B. v. Titterton, 
 [1895] 2 Q. B. 61, in which Wray v. Ellis is doubted and 
 distinguished, it was held in cases of prosecutions instituted by 
 a local authority fines must be paid to the officer of such 
 authority. 
 
 (6) A.-G V. a.E. By. Co., L. E. 7 Gh. 475, L. E. 6 H. L. 367. 
 
 (c) Bird V. Adcock, 47 L. J. M. G. 123. As a result of this 
 decision it seems doubtful whether highway rates are apportion- 
 able between outgoing and incoming tenants. 
 
 (d) Per Turner L.J., BirJeenJiead Bodes v. Laird, 4 De G. M. 
 & G. 732. See ex. gr. Phipson v. Harvett, sup. p. 293. 
 
 (e) Comp. Lord Mansfield's dictum in B. v. Abbot, 2 Doug. 
 553, sup. p. 237. 
 
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IMPLIED REPEAL — ^PENAL ACTS. 329 
 
 Legislature be so manifested. If the later of the 
 two Acts be inconsistent with the continued exist- 
 ence of the earlier one, the earlier must inevitably 
 be abrogated (a). 
 
 SECTION IV. — IMPLIED EEPEAL IN PENAL ACTS. 
 
 The question whether a new Act impliedly 
 repeals an old one (see sup. p. 284 et seq.) has 
 recently arisen in construing Acts which deal 
 anew with existing ojffences without expressly 
 referring to the past legislation respecting them. 
 The problem often arises whether the manner in 
 which the matter is dealt with in the later Act 
 shows that the Legislature intended merely to 
 make an amendment or addition to the existing 
 law, or to treat the whole subject de novo, and 
 so to make a tabula rasa of the pre-existing law. 
 Of course, where the objects of the two Acts are 
 not identical, each of them being restricted to its 
 own object, no conflict takes place. Thus, an 
 Act which empowered justices to commit for a 
 month an apprentice guilty of any misconduct in 
 his service, was not repealed by a later one which 
 empowered them to compel an apprentice who 
 absented himself to make compensation for his 
 absence, and to commit him, in default, for three 
 
 (a) See ex. gr. Daw v. Metrop. Board, sup. p. 293. See Green 
 V. B., 1 App, Gas. 513, 
 
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330 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 months (a). The object of the first Act was to 
 punish the apprentice, while that of the other 
 was to compensate the master. It may be re- 
 marked that by virtue of s. 12 of the Employers 
 and Workmen Act, 1875, the summary jurisdiction 
 of justices is now confined to those apprentices 
 upon whose binding a premium not exceeding £25 
 has been paid. 
 
 It would >seem that an Act which (without 
 altering the nature of the offence, as by making 
 it felony instead of misdemeanour) imposes a new 
 kind of punishment, or provides a new course of 
 procedure for that which was already an offence, 
 at least, at common law, is usually regarded as 
 cumulative, and as not superseding the pre-exist- 
 ing law. For instance, though 9 & 10 WUl. III. 
 c. 35 (b), visits the offence of blasphemy with 
 personal incapacities and imprisonment, an offender 
 might also be indicted for the common law 
 offence (c). The repealed 2 W. & M., Sess. 2, o. 8, 
 which prohibited keeping swine in houses in London 
 on pain of the forfeiture of the swine so kept, did 
 not abolish the liability to fine and imprisonment 
 on indictment at common law for the nuisance {d). 
 
 (a) Gray v. Gookson (1812), 16 East, 13. Comp. B. v. Toule, 
 inf. p. 334. 
 
 (6) PartiaUy repealed by 53 Geo. III. c. 160. 
 
 (c) B. V. Garlile, 3 B. & Aid. 161. See also Steele v. Brannan 
 (1872), L. E. 7 G. P. 261, at p. 268. 
 
 (d) B. V. Wigg, 2 Salk. 460. 
 
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IMPLIED EEPEAL— PENAL ACTS. 331 
 
 So, 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11, s. 10, in imposing a 
 penalty of £5, recoverable summarily, on parish 
 oflScers who refused to receive a pauper removed 
 to their parish by an order of justices, was held to 
 leave those officers stiU liable to indictment for 
 the common law offence of disobeying the order, 
 which the justices had authority to make under 
 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. In such cases, it is 
 presumed that the Legislature knew that the 
 offence was punishable by indictment, and that, as 
 it did not in express terms abolish the common 
 law proceeding, it intended that the two remedies 
 should co-exist (a). At all events, the change 
 made by the new law was not of a character to 
 justify the conclusion that there was any inten- 
 tion to abrogate the old ; and in most of the 
 examples cited, the presumption against an in- 
 tention to oust the jurisdiction of the Superior 
 Courts would strengthen it. Where the Metro- 
 politan Police Act, 1839, by one section (s. 57) 
 empowered a magistrate to impose a penalty of 
 not more than 405. for an offence, and by another 
 section (s. 77) empowered him if the penalty was 
 not paid to commit the offender to prison for a 
 month, and a later statute (Metropolitan Police 
 Act, 1864) repealed the former section, and sub- 
 stituted for it one empowering the magistrate to 
 
 (a) B. V. BoUnson (1759), 2 Burr. 800, per Lord Mansfield, at 
 p. 803. 
 
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332 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 impose the same penalty or to commit to prison 
 for not more than three days, it was held that this 
 did not impliedly repeal the latter section, but it 
 was competent for the magistrate to sentence an 
 offender to pay a penalty of 40s., and in default of 
 payment to be imprisoned for a month (a). 
 
 Under s. 33, Interpretation Act, 1889 (b), where 
 an offence is punishable under more than one Act, 
 or under an Act and at common law, the offender, 
 unless the contrary intention appears, may be 
 punished under either, but shall not be punished 
 twice for the same offence. 
 
 Where a statute alters the quality and incidents 
 of an offence, as by making that which was a 
 felony merely a misdemeanour, it would be con- 
 strued as impliedly repealing the old law. Thus, 
 16 Geo. III. c. 30 (c), which imposed a pecuniary 
 penalty merely, on persons who hunted or killed 
 deer with their faces blackened, was held to have 
 repealed so much of the Black Act (9 Geo. I. c. 22), 
 as made that offence capital (d). 
 
 (a) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 55, s. 1 (repealed 
 to words " lieu thereof " by S. L. E., 1893) ; B. v. EopUns, 62 
 L. J. M. 0. 57. 
 
 (5) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1. 
 
 {d) B. V. Davis, 1 Leach, 271. See per Lord Bsher M.E., 
 Lee V. Dangar, [1892] 2 Q. B. 348 ; and see 9 Geo. I. c. ,22 
 (repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1). 
 
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IMPLIED REPEAL — PENAL ACTS. 333 
 
 Again, where the punishment or penalty is 
 altered in degree but not in kind, the later pro- 
 vision would be considered as superseding the 
 earlier one (a). Thus, 5 Geo. I. c. 27 (&), which 
 imposed a" fine of 56IOO and three months' im- 
 prisonment for a first offence, and fine at discretion 
 and twelve months' imprisonment for the second, 
 was held to be impliedly repealed by 23 Geo. II. 
 c. 13 (c), which increased the punishment for the 
 first offence to a fine of J6500 and twelve months' 
 imprisonment, and for the second to ^1,000 and 
 two years' imprisonment (d). So, it was held in 
 America that a statute which punished the rescue 
 or harbour of a fugitive slave by a penalty of 500 
 dollars, recoverable by the owner for his own 
 benefit, and reserved all rights of action for 
 damages, was repealed by a later enactment which 
 imposed for the same offences a penalty of 1,000 
 dollars on conviction, and gave the party aggrieved 
 1,000 dollars by way of damages recoverable by 
 action (e). 
 
 Indeed, it has been laid down generally, that if 
 
 (a) See per Lord Abinger, Henderson v. Sherborne, 2 M. & W. 
 236, and A.-G. v. Lochwood, 9 M. & W. 391 ; and 2)er Martin B., 
 Bobinson v. Emerson, 4 H. & C. 355 ; Gole v. Coulton, 29 L. J. 
 M. G. 125. Comp. Sims v. Pay, 58 L. J. M. 0. 39. 
 
 (6) Eepealed 5 Geo. IV. c. 97. 
 
 (c) Eepealed S. L. R., 1867. 
 
 (d) B. V. Gator, i Burr. 2026. 
 
 (e) Norris v. Crocker, 13 Howard, 429. 
 
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334 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a later statute again describes an offence created 
 by a former one, and affixes a different punishment 
 to it, varying the procedure ; giving, for instance, 
 an appeal where there was no appeal before, 
 directing something more or something' different, 
 something more comprehensive ; the earlier statute 
 is imphedly repealed by it (a). The 6 G-eo, III. 
 c. 25, which made an artificer or workman who 
 absented himself from his employment, in breach 
 of his contract, liable to three months' imprison- 
 ment, was held to be impliedly repealed by 
 4 Geo. IV. c. 34 (repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, 
 s. 17), which punished not only that offence, 
 but also that of not entering on the service, 
 after having contracted in writing to serve, 
 with three months' imprisonment, plus a pro- 
 portional abatement of wages for the time of 
 such imprisonment ; or in lieu thereof, with total 
 or partial loss of his wages and discharge from 
 service (b). So s. 11, 64 G-eo. III. c. 169, which 
 imposed a penalty of JEIO, leviable, not by distress 
 but by imprisonment, in default of immediate 
 payment, on any person throwing baUast or 
 rubbish out of a vessel into a harbouj: or river so 
 as to tend to the obstruction of the navigation, 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Michell v. Brown, 28 L. J. M. 0. 53; per 
 Bramwell B., Be Baker, 2 H. & N. 219 ; per Martin B., Toule 
 V. Mappin, 30 L. J. M. 0. 237. 
 
 (b) B. V. Youle, 6 H. & N. 753 ; Youle v. Mappin, 30 L. J. M. 0. 
 234. Comp. Owens v. Jones, sup. p. 308. 
 
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IMPLIED REPEAL — PENAL ACTS. 335 
 
 and gave an appeal, was held to repeal by implica- 
 tion the earlier Act, 19 Geo. II. o. 22, which had 
 imposed, without appeal, a penalty of not less than 
 50s. and not more than £5 for the same offence, 
 leviable by distress or imprisonment, in default of 
 distress. The preamble of the later Act, indeed, 
 recited that it was expedient to " extend " the pro- 
 visions of the earlier one, and though its implied 
 repeal seems to have been thought at variance with 
 such an intention, it may be questioned whether its 
 provisions were not "extended " by what was, in 
 effect, their re-enactment with an increased penalty 
 and a summary method of its recovery (a). Where 
 a local Act imposed on " all persons " engaged in 
 making gas, who suffered impure matter to flow 
 into any stream, a penalty of ^200, recoverable 
 by a common informer by action, and a further 
 penalty of £20 for every day the nuisance was 
 continued, payable to the informer or to the party 
 injured as the justices thought fit ; and the Gas- 
 works Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 15), 
 afterwards imposed the same penalty on the 
 " undertakers " of gasworks authorised by special 
 Act, recoverable by the party injured ; it was 
 held that the earlier Act was repealed as regarded 
 such undertakers (6). So, an Act which imposed 
 
 (a) Michell v. Brown, 28 L. J. M. 0. 53, and see Fortescue v. 
 St. Matthew Vestry, [1891] 2 Q. B., at p. 178. 
 (6) Parry v. Croydon Gas Co., 15 0. B. N. S. 568. 
 
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336 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a penalty of not less than 405. or more than 
 £5 upon any owner or occupier who did not 
 immediately remove certain projections from 
 his house upon notice to do so, was held to 
 be impliedly repealed by a later Act which imposed 
 a penalty not exceeding ^5 (without specifying 
 any minimum), and a further penalty of 40^. a 
 day for a continuance of the offence, upon any 
 owner or occupier who did not after fourteen days' 
 notice remove such projection (a). 
 
 It has been observed by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, that in the interpretation of 
 laws for the collection of revenue,the provisions of 
 which are often very complicated and numerous in 
 order to guard against frauds, it would be a strong 
 proposition to assert that the main provisions of 
 any such law were repealed, merely because in 
 subsequent laws other powers were given, and 
 other modes of proceeding were provided, to 
 ascertain whether any frauds had been attempted. 
 The more natural inference is that such new laws 
 are auxiliary to the old (b). 
 
 But little weight can attach to the argument, 
 
 (a) 57 Geo. III. c. xxix. s. 72, 18 & 19 Viet. o. 120, s. 119 ; 
 Fortescue v. St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, [1891] 2 Q. B. 170 ; 
 Summers v. Holborn Board of Works, [1893] 1 Q. B. 612. But 
 see Keep v. St. Mary's, Nemngton, [1894] 2 Q. B. 524, and comp. 
 Wyatt V. Gems, [1893] 2 Q. B. 225. 
 
 (6) Per Gur., U. S. v. Wood, 16 Peters, 342. 
 
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IMPLIED REPEAL — PENAL ACTS. 337 
 
 that because an offence falls within two distinct 
 enactments in their ordinary meaning, a secondary 
 construction is to be sought in order to exclude 
 it from one of the two. Thus, an enactment 
 which prohibited under a penalty any person 
 concerned in the administration of the poor laws 
 from supplying goods ordered for the relief of 
 any pauper, was not construed as excluding a 
 poor law guardian, merely because another pro- 
 vision expressly made such officers liable to a 
 much higher penalty for supplying the parish 
 workhouse with goods (a). Where one section 
 of an American Act enacted that no ship from a 
 foreign port should unload any of its cargo but 
 in open day, on pain of forfeiture of both goods 
 and ship ; and another prohibited the unloading 
 of any ship bound for the United States, before 
 she arrived at the proper place of discharge of 
 her cargo, on pain of forfeiture of the unladen 
 goods; it was held that a foreign ship bound 
 for New York, and unloading a part of her cargo 
 at night at an intermediate harbour in the United 
 States, did not escape from falling within the 
 former section, merely because it fell also within 
 the latter. It was observed that there was no 
 principle of law or interpretation to authorise a 
 Court to withdraw a case from the express pro- 
 hibitions of one clause, on the ground that the 
 
 (a) Davies v. Harvey, 43 L. J. M. 0. 121, inf. p. 455. 
 I.S. 22 
 
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338 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 ofience was also punished by a different penalty 
 in another. Neither could be held nugatory (a). 
 
 However, where a repealed statute by one section 
 empowered justices to order the abatement of a 
 nuisance, punishing disobedience of their order 
 with a fine of 10*. a day, and by another section 
 empowered them to prohibit the recurrence of the 
 nuisance under a penalty of 20s. a day, it was held 
 in a case where orders had been made at different 
 times TUider both sections, and two informations 
 were laid for a breach of both by a fresh act of 
 the same nuisance, that there could be only one 
 conviction (b). The general principle being that a 
 person cannot be convicted twice on the same 
 facts. 
 
 (a) The Industry, 1 Gallison, 114. 
 
 (6) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121 ; Edlestone v. Barnes (1875), 45 L. J. 
 M. C. 73. As to existing law, see for England (except London) 
 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55 ; for London 54 & 55 Vict. c. 76. 
 
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CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 SECTION I, PEESUMPTION AGAINST INTENDING WHAT 
 
 IS INCONVENIENT OH UNEEASONABLE. 
 
 In determining either the general object of the 
 Legislature, or the meaning of its language in 
 any particular passage, it is obvious that the 
 intention which appears to be most in accord 
 with convenience, reason, justice, and legal 
 principles, should, in all cases of doubtful signi- 
 ficance, be presumed to be the true one (a). An 
 argument drawn from an inconvenience, it has 
 been said, is forcible in law (h) ; and no less, but 
 rather more, force is due to any drawn from an 
 absurdity or injustice. But a Court of Law has 
 nothing to do with the reasonableness or un- 
 reasonableness of a statutory provision, except 
 so far as it may help it in interpreting what the 
 Legislature has said (c). The treaty between 
 Louis XII. and the Pope, which gave the King 
 the right of appointing to " all bishoprics vacated 
 by the death of bishops in France," was for 
 
 (a) The above passage cited by counsel, Gory v. France (1911), 
 80 L. J. K. B. 346. 
 
 (b) Oo. Litfc. 97a.' 
 
 (c) Per Lord Halsbury, CooJee v. Vogeler, [1901] A. 0. 107 
 
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340 INTERPEETATIOX OF STATUXES. 
 
 instance, properly constraed, not as giving him 
 the right of appointing to a foreign bishopric 
 whenever its incumbent happened to die in 
 France, but, more consistently with good sense 
 and convenience, as authorising him to fill the 
 bishoprics of his own kingdom, when their holders 
 died, whether at home or abroad (a). A statute 
 which gives an appeal to any person thinking 
 himself aggrieved by any order, conviction, judg- 
 ment, or determination of a justice, does not apply 
 to a prosecutor complaining of an acquittal. If 
 it did, the person acquitted would be liable to 
 be twice vexed for the same cause. Besides, the 
 prosecutor could not legitimately be considered 
 as aggrieved (6). Where there is an appeal from 
 a magistrate's decision, " when the sum adjudged 
 to be paid on conviction shall exceed two pounds," 
 the question whether the penalty only, or the 
 penalty plus the costs were intended, would be 
 decided on similar general considerations of con- 
 venience and reason. It would be thought more 
 likely that the Legislature intended to give an 
 
 (a) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 8. 
 
 (6) 5 & 6 Will. IV. e. 50, s. 105 (s. 105 partly repealed by 47 & 
 48 Vict. c. 43, s. 4) ; B. v. London Jus., 25 Q. B. D. 357. But 
 under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, and 
 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), see Stokes v. Mitcheson, [1902] 1 K. B. 
 857 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 677 ; and see Bochdale Building Society v. 
 Mayor dec. Bochdale (1886), 51 J. P. 134, 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 341 
 
 appeal only when the offence was of some gravity, 
 and not merely where the costs (which would 
 vary according to the distances to be travelled by 
 the parties and their witnesses, the number of 
 the latter, and similar accidental circumstances) 
 happened to swell the amount above the fixed 
 limit (a). 
 
 An Act regulating local rates, which gave an 
 appeal against any rate to the Quarter Sessions, 
 and provided, for enforcing its payment, that two 
 justices might issue a distress warrant against the 
 goods of the defaulter, if he did not, on being 
 summoned, "prove to them that he was not charge- 
 able with, or liable to pay such rate," would not 
 be construed as authorising the justices to enter 
 upon any inquiry into the validity of the rate, 
 if it was valid on its face; though, literally, 
 the defaulter would unquestionably prove his 
 non-liability, if he proved its invalidity. If 
 question of validity, which was left to the 
 Quarter Sessions, was also open to the justices 
 required to enforce the rate, they might decide 
 against the validity of the rate after it had been 
 adjudged yalid by the Quarter Sessions {b) ; a 
 
 (a) B. V. WarwieksMre (1856), 25 L. J. M. C. 119. And see 
 B. V. Novis (1905), 74 L. J. K. B. 633. But see s. 49, 42 & 43 
 Vict. c. 49. 
 
 (&) Birmingham v. Shaw, 18 L. J. M. 0. 89 ; Williams, Be, 2 
 B. & B. 84 ; B. v. Kingston, 27 L, J. M. 0. 199 ; B. v. Bradshaw, 
 
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342 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 conflict which could not readily be supposed to 
 have been intended. It would be otherwise, 
 indeed, if the rate bore invalidity on its face, 
 by not showing that it was made in accordance 
 with the statutory authority given for the pur- 
 pose ; for they could not be required to enforce 
 what did not profess to be a valid demand made 
 by competent authority (a). 
 
 A constable, authorised by statute at all times 
 to enter licensed premises for the purpose of 
 preventing or detecting violations of the licensing 
 laws, cannot demand admission unless he has 
 some reasonable ground for suspecting a breach 
 of the law (b). 
 
 An Act which empowered magistrates to make 
 an order that any dog found to be dangerous 
 should " be kept under proper control or de- 
 stroyed," might, on this principle, be construed 
 
 29 L. J. M. 0. 176 ; B. v. Higginson, 31 L. J. M. C. 189 ; Exp. 
 May, Id. 161; B. v. Linford, 7 E.'& B. 950; B. v. Finnis, 28 
 L. J. M. C. 201. See Walce v. Sheffield (1880), 53 L. J. M. C. 
 1. The remedy open to a person who deems himself aggrieved 
 by the decision of a local authority under the Public Health 
 Act, 1875, is set out in s. 268 of the Act ; and see Bristol Corp. 
 V. Sinnett, [1918] 1 Oh. 62, C. A. 
 
 (a) Eastern Counties By. Co., Be, 25 L. J. M. 0. 49. See B. v. 
 Crohe, 1 Cowp. 30 
 
 (h) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 49, s. 16, repealed by s. 81, Licensing Act, 
 1910 ; Duncan v. Bowding, [1897] 1 Q. B. 575 ; B. v. Dobbins, 48 
 J. P. 182. 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 343 
 
 as giviDg the magistrate the option of making 
 an absolute order for the destruction of a 
 dangerous dog; not as requiring that his order 
 should be in the alternative terms of the Act, 
 which would place the option in the hands of 
 the owner of the dog; for this would be much 
 less ef&oacious and convenient (a). 
 
 The 24 & 25 Vict. o. 98, which, after making 
 it felony to engrave without authority plates of 
 bank-notes purporting to be notes of the Bank of 
 England or of Ireland, or of any other company, 
 declared in another section that the enactment 
 should not apply to Scotland, except where it 
 was expressly so provided, was held to apply to 
 the engraving of the notes of a Scotch bank ; the 
 rational object and meaning of the excluding 
 provision being, not that forgeries against Scotch 
 banks might be committed in England with 
 impunity, but that, when committed in Scotland, 
 they should not faU within the Act (&). 
 
 Where an Act, after transferring all duties of 
 paving and lighting from existing Commissioners 
 to a Board of Works, provided that all contracts 
 
 (a) Pickering v. Marsh (1874), 43 L. J. M. 0. 143. As to the 
 meaning of the word " dangerous " in relation to a dog, see the 
 Dogs Act, 1906. 
 
 (6) B. V. Brackenridge, 37 L. J. M. 0. 86. Comp. OLogUen, 
 Be, L. E. 6 Oh. 406, and see as to existing law, Forgery Act, 
 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 27, s. 9). 
 
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344 INTEKPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 with the former should remain vaKd, that no 
 action upon them against the Commissioners 
 should ahate, and that all liabilities under such 
 contracts should be paid out of rates to be made 
 by the new Board ; it was held, on the ground 
 of its being the more convenient cpurse, than ah 
 action on a contract made with the Commissioners 
 might be brought against the Board (a). 20 & 21 
 Vict. c. 43, and 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 33, which 
 authorise a party aggrieved by a decision of 
 justices to apply within three days for a case, and 
 direct that " at the time of the application," and 
 before the case is delivered to him, he shall enter 
 into recognisances to prosecute the appeal, was, as 
 regards the earlier statute, held substantially 
 complied with if the recognisances were entered 
 into within the three days, though not at the time 
 of the application (6). The time for application is 
 now extended to seven days under rule 18, Summary 
 Jurisdiction Eules, 1886. It has been repeatedly 
 held that when an Act gives an appeal to the 
 " next " sessions, it means not necessarily the 
 next which takes place in order of time, or an 
 adjournment of it (c), but the next to which 
 it is practicable with fair diligence to carry the 
 
 (a) Sinnott v. Whitechapel (1858), 27 L. J. 0. P. 177. 
 (6) Chapman v. Bolinson (1858), 28 L. J. M. C. 30. As to 
 practice, see B. v. Kettle, [1905] 1 K. B. 212. 
 (c) B. V. Sussex, 4 E. R. 390. 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 345 
 
 appeal (a). It is obvious that a stricter construc- 
 tion would often have the effect of taking away 
 the appeal which the Legislature intended to give. 
 When an Act gave any person aggrieved (6) by an 
 order of justices, four months " for making his 
 complaint to the Quarter Sessions," it was con- 
 strued to mean, not that the complaint must be 
 heard within that time, but that the appellant 
 should have that time for notifying his intention 
 to appeal ; otherwise he might sometimes be 
 limited to a few weeks, or, if no sessions were 
 held within the four months, he would be deprived 
 of his appeal altogether (c). 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (repealed 
 by Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906), provides 
 that proceedings for the recovery of compensation 
 under the Act shall not be maintainable unless 
 notice of the accident has been given as soon as 
 practicable, and unless " the claim for compensa- 
 tion with respect to such accident has been made 
 
 (a) As to what is " next practicable " sessions, see B. v. 
 Surrey JJ. (1880), 50 L. J. M. C. 10. See also B. v. Middlesex 
 JJ. (1888), 32 Sol. J. 221. 
 
 (6) Graves' Case, L. E. 4 Q. B. 715 ; Boyee v. Eiggins, 
 23 L. J. C. P. 5 ; Exp. Learoyd, 13 Ch. D. 321 ; Exp. Thoday, 
 2 Ch. D. 229, 797 ; Verdin v. Wray, 2 Q. B. D. 608. Comp. 
 BocJifort V. Aiherley, 1 Ex. D. 511 ; Be Shaftoe's Charity, 3 App. 
 Cas. 872. 
 
 (c) B. V. Essex (1864), 34 L. J. M. 0. 41 ; B. v. Middlesex, 
 6 M. & S. 279. See also inf. p. 360. 
 
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346 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 within six months from the occurrence of the 
 'accident causing the injury." The House of 
 Lords has held "the claim for compensation " to 
 mean a notice of claim for compensation sent 
 to the employer, and not the initiation of pro- 
 ceedings (a). 
 
 An Act which authorised the Quarter Sessions 
 to give a successful appellant against a conviction, 
 costs against the party appealed against, and 
 directed that the notice of appeal should be served 
 on the convicting justice, was construed as not 
 making the latter a party to the appeal ; for it was 
 to be presumed that the Legislature did not intend 
 so great an anomaly as rendering a judicial officer 
 liable to costs for an act done bond fide in the 
 discharge of his judicial functions {b). The re- 
 spondent, in such a case, is the prosecutor before 
 the magistrate ; though this construction involves 
 the hardship of making him liable to the costs of 
 
 (a) 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, s. 2 (1) ; 6 Bdw. VII. c. 58, s. 2 (!)■ ; 
 Powell V. Main Colliery Co., [1900] A. C. 366 ; the claim need 
 not be in writing {Lowe v. Myers (1906), 75 L. J. K. B. 651 ; 
 Gomp. Bugles v. Coed Talon Co. (1910), 78 L. J. K. B. 539), nor 
 need it claim a specific sum {Thompson v. Goold, 79 L. J. K. B. 
 905). But apparently a mere notice of accident is not a claim, 
 Perry v. Clements, [1901] 49 W. E. 669. 
 
 (6) B. V. Eants, 1 B. & Ad. 654; B. v. Smith, 29 L. J. M. 0. 
 216 ; B. V. Purdey (1864), 34 L. J. M. C. 4. See B. v. Brad- 
 laugh, 2 Q. B. D. 569 ; 3 Q. B. D. 607 ; B. v. London Jus., [1895] 
 1 Q. B. 616. 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 347 
 
 a proceeding of which he has had no notice, or 
 perhaps even knowledge. 
 
 The statute which enacts that " a soHcitor may 
 make an agreement in writing with his client 
 respecting the amount and manner of his re- 
 muneration," was held to require impliedly that 
 the agreement should be signed by the client ; as 
 otherwise it would be possible for a soHcitor to 
 place a document signed by himself only, and 
 containing terms favourable to him, before his 
 client, and then contend that the latter was bound 
 to it (a). 
 
 Where one Act authorised the recovery of 
 certain claims before justices of the peace, pro- 
 ceedings before whom are limited to six months, 
 and another Act authorised their recovery, when 
 not exceeding ^20, in the County Courts, where 
 the term of limitation was six years, it was held 
 that suits for them in the latter Courts were 
 hmited to six months, to avoid imputing to the 
 Legislature the anomalous intention of allowing 
 six years for the recovery of small sums, while 
 giving only six months for large ones (b). Similarly, 
 
 (a) Lewis, Be, 1 Q. B. D. 724 ; but this case and the above- 
 stated reason therefor, were subject to adverse criticism in 
 Thompson, Be, 63 L. J. Q. B. 189, 190. See, however, Bahe v. 
 French (1905), 76 L. J. Ch. 605. 
 
 (6) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 39, repealed and re-enacted by 
 s. 196, 38 & 39 Viet, c 55 ; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 61, s. 24, repealed 
 
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348 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 on the ground (among others) that it would be 
 unreasonable to presume that the Legislature 
 intended to impose a more severe penalty on 
 a person who without malice wilfully gathered 
 uncultivated mushrooms than on one who unlaw- 
 fully and maliciously destroyed cultivated roots 
 or plants used for food, it was held that in view 
 of s. 24, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, which imposed a 
 penalty of one month's imprisonment or a fine 
 of £1 for the latter offence, whilst s. 52 of the 
 same Act, made it an offence punishable with two 
 months' imprisonment or a fine of £5 to " wilfully 
 or maliciously commit any damage, injury, or spoil 
 to or upon any real or personal property what- 
 soever for which no punishment is hereinbefore 
 provided," could not be regarded as applying to a 
 case such as the former (a). But a milk carrier 
 who damaged his master's milk, not to injure his 
 master but in order to make a profit for himself, 
 was held to be guilty of an offence under the 
 latter section (b). Upon the ground that if an act 
 
 and 're-enacted by s. 261, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55. The jurisdiction 
 of County Courts is now extended to claims not exceeding £100. 
 See County Courts Act, 1888, s. 81. Tottenham Board v. Bowell, 
 1 Ex. D. 514 ; Blackhurn {Mayor of) v. Sanderson, [1902] 1 K. B. 
 794 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 590. See also Nicholson v. Ellis, 28 L. J. 
 M. C. 238, and note especially Bolton Corp. v. Scott (1913), 77 
 J. P. 193, C. A. 
 
 {a) Gardner v. Manshridge (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 217. 
 
 (b) Boper V. Knott, [1898] 1 Q. B. 868 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 574. 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 349 
 
 be done wilfully or wantonly it raises a presump- 
 tion it is done maliciously (a) 
 
 The Bankruptcy Acts (b) which vested the future 
 as well as the present property of the bankrupt 
 in the assignee or trustee, imported the necessary 
 exception, to save him from starving, of the 
 remuneration which the bankrupt might earn by 
 his labour after his bankruptcy, and the damages 
 which he might recover for any personal injury (c) ; 
 and while establishing the right of the trustee to 
 future property as between himself and the bank- 
 rupt, did not affect the right of the latter as 
 between himself and his debtor, unless the trustee 
 interfered, to sue for a debt which accrued due 
 after the vesting of the property in the trustee ; 
 and the provision contained in the Acts that the 
 bankrupt should not have power to recover such 
 debts, was similarly limited in effect {d). And 
 generally property earned by the personal exertions 
 and skill of the bankrupt do not pass to his 
 
 (a) B. V. Welch (1875), 40 J. P. 183. 
 
 (6) The Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V.), practically 
 repeals all earlier statutes. 
 
 (c) Beckham v. Drake, 2 H. L. Gas. 579; Be Wilson (1878), 8 
 Gh. D. 364. 
 
 (d) Herbert v. Sayer, 13 L. J. Q. B. 209 ; Jackson v. Burnham, 
 22 L. J. Ex. 13 ; Jameson v. Brick Go. (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 208 ; 
 Cohen V. Mitchell, 25 Q. B. D. 262. But see Be Clark, [1894] 2 
 Q. B. 393 ; and see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 38. 
 
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350 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 trustee (a). But in order that such moneys should 
 be immune there must be an element of periodi- 
 city in the earnings (6). The Act which imposes 
 a penalty on the piracy of a dramatic work, or 
 " any part thereo'f," would not be broken unless a 
 material and substantial part was pirated. It is 
 not to be supposed that the Legislature intended 
 to punish the misappropriation of what was of no 
 value (c). 
 
 A construction which facilitated the evasion of 
 a statute would, on similar grounds of incon- 
 venience, be avoided. Thus, an Act which for- 
 bade an innkeeper to suffer any gaming "in his 
 house or premises," was construed as extending 
 to gaming by himself and his personal friends 
 in his private rooms in the licensed premises ; for 
 a construction which limited the prohibition to 
 the guests in the public rooms would have opened 
 the door to collusion and evasion (d), but apparently 
 
 (a) Shoolbred v. Boberts (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 998. 
 (6) Id. (1899), 2 Q. B., at p. 563. 
 
 (c) Chatterton v. Cave, 2 C. P. D. 42 ; 3 App. Gas. 483 ; Pihe 
 V. Nicholas, L. E. 5 Ch. 251 ; Bradbury v. Rotten, L. E. 8 Ex. 1 ; 
 PlancM V. Braham, 44 E. E. 642 ; D'Almaine v. Boosey, 41 E. E. 
 273 ; Walter v. Steinhopff, 61 L. J. Ch. 521. For an exhaustive 
 disquisition on the Copyright Act, 1911, see Clerk and Lindsell 
 
 on Torts, Chap. XXI. 
 
 (d) Patten v. BJiymer (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 189 ; Corbet v. 
 Haigh, 5 C. P. D. 50; see also per Brett L.J., Bes v. West Haiu 
 Union, 8 Q. B. D. 79. Comp. Briydenv. Heighes, 1 Q. B. D. 330; 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 351 
 
 betting upon horse races does not come within the 
 meaning of the word " gaming " (a). 
 
 And yet, a constraotion facilitating evasion 
 (see sup. p. 206 et seq.), even to the extent of de- 
 frauding the revenue, may be justified and required 
 by considerations of convenience, as in the case 
 of Stamp Acts ; where the question- whether a 
 document, produced on the hearing of a trial, is 
 sufficiently stamped, depends solely on what 
 appears on the face of the document, to the exclu- 
 sion of all extrinsic evidence to prove the con- 
 trary ; for to admit evidence to invalidate it, would 
 lead to the intolerable inconvenience of holding a 
 collateral inquiry, to the interruption of the trial 
 of the cause in which the paper was tendered (6). 
 
 Acts which impose a pecuniary penalty have 
 sometimes given rise to a question, when there 
 were two or more ofienders, whether one joint or 
 several separate penalties were intended ; and this, 
 where the Act has left it open to doubt, has been 
 said to depend on whether the offence was in its 
 
 Tassell v. Ovenden, 2 Id. 383 ; Lester v. Torrens, Id. 403 ; Bosley 
 V. Dames, 1 Id. M ; Gallagher v. Budd, [1898] 1 Q. B. 114. 
 
 (a) Keep v. Stevens (1909), 73 J. P. 112. 
 
 (6) Whistler v. Forster (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 161 ; Austin v. 
 Bunyard (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; Gatty v. Fry, 2 Ex. D. 265 
 (approved in Boyal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham, [1894] 2 
 Q. B. 715). Gomp. Clarke v. Boche, 47 L J. Q. B. 147. 
 
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52 INTERPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 nature joint or several. When the offence is one 
 in which every participator is justly punishable in 
 proportion to the part which he took in it, the in- 
 ference would obviously be that a separate penalty 
 on each was intended. In the offence of assault- 
 ing and resisting a custom-house officer, one may 
 resist, another molest, a third run away with 
 the goods; all are distinct acts, each a separate 
 offence, and each offender would be liable for his 
 own separate offence (a) ; nor does the omission to 
 prosecute one of the parties exonerate the others. 
 So, under tbe partially repealed Toleration Act 
 (1 W. & M. c. 18, confirmed by 10 Anne, c. 2), 
 which enacts that if any person or persons malici- 
 ously disturb a congregation, such *' person or 
 persons " shall, on conviction of " the said offence," 
 be liable to a penalty of ^20; it was held that 
 every person engaged in such a disturbance would 
 be liable to a separate penalty (6). 
 
 So, where two men were convicted of i an assault 
 and sentenced to pay one penalty, under 9 Geo. IV. 
 c. 31 (c), the conviction was quashed ; because a 
 penalty ought to have been imposed on each 
 offender severally, the offence being in its nature 
 
 (a) Per Lord Mansfield, B. v. Glark, 2 Cowp. 610, and see 
 B. V. LiUlecMld (1871), 40 L. J. M. C. 137. 
 
 (6) B. V. Huhe, 2 E. E. 669. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 95, s. 1 ; and see as to 
 existing law, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100. 
 
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CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 353 
 
 several («). And under s. 30, 1 & 2 Will. IV. 
 c. 32, which enacts that if " any person " shall 
 trespass in the daytime on land in search of game, 
 "such person " shall be liable to a penalty of £2, 
 every offender is liable to a separate penalty (b). 
 
 But it has been said that where the offence is 
 in its nature single, and is punished by a pecuniary 
 penalty, not one penalty can be imposed on all 
 the offenders jointly ; upon the ground that if it 
 be the offence, and not the offender, that is visited 
 with punishment by the statute, only one penalty 
 is incurred, however large may be the number of 
 persons who incurred it. Thus, under a statute 
 of Anne (c), which enacted that if any unqualified 
 " person or persons " kept or used hounds for 
 destroying game, " the person or persons " so 
 offending should forfeit £5, it was held that to 
 keep or use a greyhound for such a purpose was 
 punishable by one penalty only, whether the dog 
 was kept or used by one or by several persons. 
 Only one dog was kept, it was said, and only one 
 penalty, falling on all the offenders jointly, was 
 imposable (d). The decision has been perhaps 
 
 (a) Morgan v. Brown (1836), 42 E. E. 422 ; 5 L. J. M. 0. 77. 
 
 (6) Mayhem v. Wardley, 14 0. B. N. S. 550 ; Pratt v. Martin, 
 (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 711. 
 
 (c) 12 Anne c. 14 ; repealed by S. L. E., 1867. 
 
 {d) Eardymann v. Whitalcer, 2 East, 573 n. ; B. v. Mathews, 
 10 Mod. 26 ; B. v. Bleasdale, 4 T. E. 809. 
 
 I.S. 23 
 
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354 INTEBPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 better defended on the ground that the Act, in 
 speaking of " persons " in the plural, and providing 
 that for such "offence," in the singular, they 
 should pay £5, and not £5 "each," one joint 
 offence and penalty were contemplated (a). In an 
 old case cited in support of this construction, it 
 was held that the statute 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 12, 
 which prohibited the impounding of a distress in 
 a wrong place, " upon pain every person offending 
 should forfeit to the party grieved for every such 
 offence " a hundred shillings and treble damages, 
 gave only one penalty against three persons (b). 
 But although this decision is said to have been 
 based on the ground that the offence was one only 
 and joint, the penalty was recoverable only by the 
 party grieved, and was consequently to be regarded 
 as a compensation to him, not as a punishment on 
 the offenders (c). Viewed in this light, it is clear 
 that only one penalty could be recovered ; for the 
 injury was the same, whether it was done by one 
 or by several persons; and it could hardly have 
 been intended that the pecuniary compensation 
 
 (a) Per Alderson B., B. v. Dean, 12 M. & W. 42. As to the 
 rule against contribution between joint tort-feasors, see 
 Merryweather v. Nixon (1799), 8 T. E. 186. 
 
 (6) Partridge v. Naylor, Oro. Bliz. 480, cited in B. v. Clark 
 (1777), 2 Cowp. 610 ; B. v. King, 1 Salk. 182. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. Stevens v. Jeacoche, 17 L. J. Q. B. 163. For a 
 discussion on this case in which it was distinguished, see 
 Gorres v. Scott (1874); 43 L. J. Ex. 92. 
 
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CONVENIBNOB AND REASONABLENESS INTENDED. 355 
 
 for a wrong should vary in amount with the 
 number of persons concerned in doing it. 
 
 In referring to oases of this kind, Lord Mansfield 
 observed that if partridges were netted by night, 
 two or three or more men might draw the net, but 
 still it constituted but one offence ; and that killing 
 a hare was but one offence, whether one killed it 
 or twenty, and that it could not be killed more 
 than once (a). But however pertinent such con- 
 siderations might be in measuring the damage 
 done to the owner of the game, they seem less 
 applicable to the question of punishing, on public 
 grounds, a breach of the law. The question 
 whether the offence was joint or several evidently 
 arose, not from the nature of the offence, but from 
 the nature of the penalty. If the penalty had 
 been corporal instead of pecuniary, the distinction 
 between joint and several offences could hardly 
 have occurred ; for it would have been found 
 difficult to apply the rule of one joint penalty to 
 two offenders sentenced to five weeks' imprison- 
 ment or twenty-five lashes. It would seem that 
 the question whether the penalty is to be under- 
 stood as separate or joint, where the Act is not 
 explicit, would be better governed by the con- 
 sideration whether the penalty was intended as 
 compensation for a private wrong, or as a punish- 
 ment for an offence against public justice, 
 (a) JB. V. Clarke, sup. p. 354. 
 
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35^ INTEBPKBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that all such con- 
 siderations are immaterial where the language of 
 the Act is not open to douht. Thus, where it was 
 enacted that " every person " who assisted in 
 unshipping or conceahng prohibited goods should 
 forfeit treble their value or £100, at the election 
 of the Commissioners of Customs, it was held that 
 every person concerned in the offence was liable 
 to a separate penalty (a) ; although undoubtedly 
 the offence was as joint in its nature as in the 
 case of the wrongful removal of the distress (b). 
 
 SECTION II. — PEESUMPTION AGAINST INTENDING 
 INJUSTICE OR ABSUEDITY. 
 
 A sense of the possible injustice of an interpre- 
 tation ought not to induce judges to do violence 
 to well-settled rules of construction, but it may 
 properly lead to the selection of one rather than 
 the other of two reasonable interpretations (c). 
 Whenever the language of the Legislature admits 
 of two constructions, and if construed in one way 
 would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act 
 upon the view that such a result could not have 
 been intended, unless the intention had been 
 
 (a) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 53 (repealed 8 & 9 Vict. c. 84, s. 2) ; 
 B. V. Dean, 12 M. & W. 39. 
 
 (6) Partridge v. Naylor, sup. p. 354. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Herschell L.C., Arrow Shipping Go. v. Tyne 
 Commissioners, [1894] A. 0. 516. 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSURDITY AVOIDED. 357 
 
 manifested in express words (a). Thus, where a 
 by-law authorised the Poulters' Company to fine 
 " all " poulters in London or " within seven miles 
 round," who refused to he admitted into their 
 company, it was held that, inasmuch as no poulter 
 could legally belong to the company who was not 
 also a freeman of the City, the by-law was to be 
 construed as limited to those poulters who were 
 also freemen ; to avoid the injustice of punishing 
 men for refusing to enter into a company to which 
 they could not legally belong (b). So, in ss. 112 
 and 198, Bankrupt Law Consolidations Act, 1849, 
 which protected a bankrupt from arrest by his 
 " creditors" (c), this word was contrued as limited 
 to those creditors who had debts provable under 
 the bankruptcy, for it would have been obviously 
 
 (a) Per Lord Campbell, B. v. Sheen (1859), Bell, C. C. 97, and 
 B. V. Land Tax Com., 2 E. & B. 716 ; per Keating J., Boon v. 
 Howard, L. E. 9 C. P. 308 ; per Brett L.J., B. v. Moneh, 2 
 Q. B. D. 555 ; Smith v. G. W. B. Co., 3 App. Gas. 165 ;.per Lord 
 Blackburn, Bothes v. Kirkcaldy Commissioners, 7 App. Gas. 702 j 
 per Lord Gaims, Hill v. East & West India Bock Co., 53 L. J. Gh. 
 845 ; 9 App. Gas. 456 ; Bailton v. Wood, 15 App. Gas. 363 ; per 
 Brett M.E., Plumstead Board of Works v. Spackman, 13 Q. B. D. 
 878 ; per Lord Esher M.E., Dunn, Exp., 23 Q. B. D. 461. 
 
 (6) Poulters'' Co. v. Phillips (1840), 6 Bing. N. G. 314 ; jB. v. 
 Saddlers' Co., 32 L. J. Q. B. 337. See also Corbett, Exp., 14 
 Gh. D., per Brett L.J., at p. 129. 
 
 (c) As to present law relating to control over persons and 
 property of an insolvent debtor, see ss. 22-23, Bankruptcy Act, 
 1914. 
 
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358 INTERPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 unjust and was therefore presumably not intended, 
 that his certificate should protect a bankrupt not 
 only against those creditors who had, or might 
 have proved under the bankruptcy, but also against 
 creditors whose claims were not barred by it (a). 
 The provision in s. 2, 50 & 51 Vict. c. 66, that 
 the Court of Bankruptcy should refuse a bankrupt 
 his discharge " ia all cases " where the debtor had 
 committed an offence under the Debtors Act, 
 1869, was held to apply only to cases connected 
 with or arising out of the bankruptcy and not to 
 a misdemeanour committed subsequently to the 
 adjudication, the language used being so wide 
 that if it received its full grammatical meaning 
 it would produce injustice so enormous that the 
 Legislature could not have intended mere general 
 words to lead to such a result {b). The Public 
 Authorities Protection Act, 1893, which provides 
 that a judgment for a successful defendant in an 
 action against a public authority " shall carry 
 costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client," 
 does not take away the discretionary power vested 
 
 (a) Grace v. Bishop, 25 L. J. Ex. 58 ; Phillips v. Poland, L. E. 
 1 C. P. 204 ; Poland, Be, L. E. 1 Ch. 356 ; Williams v. Bose, 
 L. E. 3 Ex. 5, per Bramwell B. 
 
 (6) BrocMbanh, Be (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 461 ; Jones, In re 
 (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 589; affirmed 59 L. J. Q. B. 331. As to 
 present law relating to discharge of bankrupt, see s. 26, Bank- 
 ruptcy Act, 1914. 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSURDITY AVOIDED. 359 
 
 in a judge to deprive the successful defendant of his 
 costs (a). The enactment which protected magis- 
 trates in India from actions for any wrong or 
 injury done by them in the exercise of the judicial 
 office, was held to exempt them from liability only 
 when acting bond fide in cases in which, by mistake, 
 they acted without jurisdiction {b). 
 
 The Merchant Shipping Act, 1873, which enacted 
 that if, " in any case of collision," it was proved 
 that any of the regulations for preventing collisions 
 had been infringed, the ship which infringed them 
 should be deemed in fault, unless the circumstances 
 justified it, was held to apply only to cases where 
 the infringement could have contributed to the 
 collision, but not where it could not possibly have 
 done so (c) ; just as an Act {d) which imposed a 
 penalty for piloting a ship down the Thames 
 without license, was evidently limited to piloting 
 
 • (a) 56 & 57 Vicfc. c. 61 ; Bostocic v. Baimey U. B. C, [1900] 
 2 Q. B. 616. As to allocation of costs between parties, see 
 Smith V. NortMeach Rural District Council, [1902] 1 Ch. 197 ; 71 
 L. J. Ch. 8. 
 
 (6) 21 Geo. in. c. 70; repealed by 5 & 6 Geo. V. c, 61; 
 Calder v. Halket, 3 Moo. P. C. 28. 
 
 (c) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, s. 17, repealed by s. 419 (4), Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894. The Englishman, 3 P. D. 18 ; The Magnet, 
 L. E. 4 A. & E. 417 ; The Fanny Carvill (1875), 13 App. Gas. 
 .455 n. ; approved in The BuTce of Buccleuch, [1891] A. 0. 310. 
 
 {d) 5 Geo. II. c. 20 ; repealed S. L. R, 1867 ; 57 & 58 Vict. 
 ■ c. clxxxvii. is the present Thames Conservancy Act. 
 
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360 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 on a voyage, and would not apply to a person in 
 charge of a ship when merely warping from one 
 wharf to another to unload the cargo (a). An 
 imperative requirement that Assessment Sessions 
 should be held so that all appeals should be deter- 
 mined before a certain date would not operate so 
 unjustly as to deprive a person of the right of 
 appeal where, through press of business at the 
 sessions, his appeal could not be heard before that 
 date (b). Sec. 106 of 25 & 20 Vict. c. 102 (c), 
 which provided that no writ or process should issue 
 for anything done under it but after a month's 
 notice, would not apply to summary relief by 
 injunction; for if it did, the wrong might be irre- 
 mediable, which could not be intended {d). Be- 
 sides, the object of the provision was only to give 
 the defendant time to make amends before he was 
 sued (e). Nor would a similar enactment that 
 " no action " should be brought in which a certain 
 body of shipowners would be liable for any damage 
 to any ship, without a month's notice, apply to 
 proceedings in rem in the Admiralty Division, for 
 
 (a) B. V. Lamhe, 5 T. E. 76. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 67 ; B. v. London Jus. and L. C. C, [1893] 
 2 Q. B. 476. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61 
 
 (d) A.-G. V. Hachney Board (1875), L. E. 20 Eq. 626. 
 
 (e) Flower v. Low Leyton, 5 Ch. D. 347. See also Foat v. 
 Mayor of Margate, 11 Q. B. D. 299 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSUKDITY AVOIDED. 361 
 
 if such a notice were necessary the proceedings 
 might be futile, as the ship might sail away before 
 the expiration of the month and avoid seizure (a). 
 Sec. 5, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92 {b), which requires 
 "every person" who impounds an animal, or 
 causes it to be impounded or confined, to supply it 
 with food, would not apply to the keeper of the 
 pound (c). 
 
 The enactment in the Licensing Act, 1872, that 
 " every person found drunk on licensed premises " 
 should be liable to a penalty, though literally wide 
 enough to include the publican who had got drunk 
 anywhere and was found in that condition in his 
 bed after the house was closed, would be construed, 
 according to the manifest object of the Act, as 
 confined to persons found on the premises while 
 using it as a house for public resort (d). 
 
 A statute which enacts that a person who has 
 been convicted by justices of an assault, and has 
 suffered the punishment awarded for it, shall be 
 
 (a) 6 & 7 Will. IV. ch. c. (local and personal), s. 8 ; The 
 Longford, 14 P. D. 34. 
 
 (6) Eepealed and re-enacted by 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 27, s. 7. 
 
 (c) Dargan v. Davies, 46 L. J. M. C. 122. 
 
 {d) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 12 ; repealed Licensing Act, 1910 ; 
 see s. 75 ; Lester v. Torrens, 2 Q. B. D. 403 ; B. v. Petty, [1897] 
 2 Q. B. 33. See Warden v. Tye, 2 C. P. D. 74. Comp. Patten v. 
 Bhymer, sup. p. 350. For other illustrations, see AncketiU v. 
 Baylis, 52 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; B. v. Kent Jus., 24 Q. B. D. 181. 
 
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362 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 released from all other proceedings " for the same 
 cause," would not be construed as exempting him 
 from prosecution for manslaughter, if the party 
 assaulted afterwards died from the effects of the 
 assault ; such a construction would defeat the 
 ends of justice (a). An Act (b) which imposed a 
 penalty on any sheriff or bailiff who carried a 
 person arrested for debt to prison for twenty-four 
 hours, though it might render the former liable 
 for the act of the latter, his servant, as well as for 
 his own, would not be construed to admit of his 
 being sued, after the penalty had been recovered 
 from the bailiff; for this would be to give the 
 plaintiff a second penalty for the same act, after 
 he had been compensated by the first ; and would, 
 indeed, make the bailiff hable to pay twice, as he 
 would be bound by the usual bond to indemnify 
 the sheriff (c). 
 
 The same argument applies where the conse- 
 quence of adopting one of two interpretations 
 would be to lead to an absurdity. Thus s. 3 (now 
 repealed) of the Newspaper Libel and Eegistration 
 
 (a) B. V. Morris (1867), 36 L. J. M. C. 84. See Beed v. Nutt, 
 59 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; per Hawkins J., B. v. Miles (1890), 59 L. J. 
 M. C. 56 ; see also Masper v. Brown, 45 L. J. C. P. 203. 
 
 (6) 32 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 1, repealed and re-enacted by 50 & 
 51 Vict. c. 55. See ss. 14 and 39. 
 
 (c) Peshall v. Layton, 2 T. E. 712. See Wright v. London 
 General Omnibus Co., 2 Q. B. D. 271. 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSURDITY AVOIDED. 363 
 
 Act, 1881, which enacted that no Criminal Prose- 
 cution should be commenced against a news- 
 paper for libel without the fiat of the Director 
 of Public Prosecutions, was held not to apply to 
 a Criminal Information ; for to hold otherwise 
 would lead to the absurd and scandalous result 
 that that oflQcer, who was to act under the 
 superintendence of the Attorney-General, might 
 not only overrule the latter, but also the Queen's 
 Bench Division, in the exercise of their power 
 to give leave to file such information (a). The 
 provision of s. 54, Public Health Act, 1875, 
 that where a local authority " supply water " 
 within their district, they shall have certain 
 powers as to carrying mains within and without 
 that district, is not to be construed in its literal 
 sense so as to involve the absurdity of requiring 
 that the authority must have begun actually to 
 supply some water before it can take advantage 
 of the powers conferred, but is to be understood 
 as conferring those powers upon the local authority 
 as soon as it undertakes to supply water under the 
 provisions of the Act (h). Similarly, a sewer made 
 
 (a) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60; see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, ss. 2-4; 
 Tales V. B., 14 Q. B. D. 648 ; and as to the protection afforded 
 by s. 4 of the Law of Libel (Amendment) Act, 1888, see 
 Sharman v. Merritt (1916), 32 T. L. E. 360. 
 
 (6) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55 ; Jones v. Conway Water Supply, [1893] 
 2 Ch. 603. 
 
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364 INTEEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 by a landowner for the sole purpose of draining 
 houses erected by him on his own land, is not by 
 reason of its enhancing the value of the houses 
 "made for his own profit," within the meaning 
 of the exception in s. 13, Public Health Act, 1875, 
 so as not to vest in and be under the control of 
 the local authority. It would be absurd to sup- 
 pose that it was intended that the operation of 
 s. 13, the whole object of which is to vest sewers 
 in the local authority, should be thus practically 
 reduced to a nullity (a). 
 
 A repealed Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, s. 6) (b) which 
 protected a fraudulent agent from conviction, if 
 he "disclosed" his offence on oath, in any ex- 
 amination in bankruptcy, was held not to include 
 a confession made there after commitment by a 
 magistrate, and which was in substance only a 
 repetition of the facts proved before the latter ; 
 on the ground that it would have been absurd 
 and mischievous to enable a man to provide an 
 indemnity for himself, by simply making a state- 
 vaei^t of facts already known and provable aliunde, 
 
 (a) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55 ; Ferrand v. Hallas Land Co., [1893] 
 2 Q. B. 135 ; Vowles v. Calmer (1895), 64 L. J. Ch. 414 ; Croys- 
 dale V. Sunhury &C. Urban Council (1898), 67 L. J. Ch. 585. 
 Comp. Minehead Local Bd. v. iMttrell, [1894] 2 Oh. 178; 
 SyTces v. Sowerby U. D. C, [1900] 1 Q. B. 584. 
 
 (6) For existing law, see 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45 (The Factors 
 Act, 1889). 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSURDITY AVOIDED. 365 
 
 and not in any way advancing either civil or 
 criminal justice by the alleged " disclosure " (a). 
 
 Although there is no positive rule of law against 
 a retrospective rate (6), enactments which authorise 
 the imposition of rates and similar burdens on the 
 inhabitants of a locality have been repeatedly held 
 not to authorise, without express words, a retro- 
 spective charge; on the ground of the injustice 
 of throwing on one set of persons a burden which 
 ought to have been borne by another at a former 
 period (c). And where the Act (d) makes the occu- 
 pier rateable at what a tenant from year to year 
 would give for it, it would be understood, where 
 the property was subject by law to restrictions 
 
 (a) B. V. Sheen, 28 L. J. M. C. 91 ; so held by nine judges 
 against five. See Lewes v. Barnett, 6 Ch. D. 252. 
 
 (6) See Harrison v. Stickney (1847), 2 H. L. Gas. 108 ; B. v. 
 Bead, 18 L. J. M. 0. 164 ; Jones v. Johnson, 21 L. J. M. C. 102 ; 
 B. V. Maidenhead, 9 Q. B. D. 494 ; Gaistor v. N. Eelsey, 59 L. J. M. C. 
 102; Easton 8r Co. v. Nar Valley Drainage Com. (1892), 8 
 T. L. E. 649 ; B. v. Leigh, Bural Council (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 
 562, C. A. ; but see B. v. All Saints, Wigan (1874), L. E. 9 Q. B., 
 at p. 327 ; affirmed (1876), 1 App. Gas. 611. 
 
 (c) Tawny's Case, 2 Salk. 531 ; Newtonv. Young, 1 B. & P. N. E. 
 187 ; B. V. Maulden, 32 E. E. 344 ; B. v. Bursley, 5 A. & B. 
 10 ; Waddington v. London Union, 28 L. J. M. C. 113 ; B. v. 
 Stretfield, 32 L. J. M. G. 236 ; Bradford Union v. Wilts, L. E. 3 
 Q. B. 604 ; B. V. All Saints, Wigan, 1 App. Gas. 611. See also 
 B. V. Leigh B. B. C, [1898] 1 Q. B. 836. 
 
 {d) Eepealed and re-enacted by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 343, 
 Sched. v., Pt. III. 
 
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366 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 which prevented the occupier from obtaining the 
 full value, that the hypothetical tenant was 
 similarly subject to them {a). 
 
 An Act which prohibits the negligent use of 
 furnaces in such a manner as not to make them 
 consume smoke " as far as possible," means only 
 so far as the smoke can be consumed consistently 
 with the due carrying on of the business for which 
 the furnace is used, and not as far as it is 
 physically possible to consume it, without regard 
 to the detriment which the business carried on 
 would suffer; the Act not having expressed any 
 intention to interfere with it (b). Where a sewer 
 in a street (not being a highway repairable by the 
 inhabitants at large) has become vested in an 
 urban authority under s. 13, PubHo Health Act, 
 1876, the powers of the authority under s. 150 
 of that Act, where such street is not sewered to 
 their satisfaction, to require the frontagers to 
 sewer it, can be exercised by the authority once 
 only, and must be exercised within a reasonable 
 time after the sewer has become vested in them, 
 it being said that any other construction would 
 make the Act unjust and unreasonable (c). The 
 
 (a) Worcester v. Broitwich (1876), 2 Ex. D. 49. 
 
 (6) Cooper v. Woolley'{lQ&l), L. E. 2 Ex. 88. 
 
 (c) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55 ; Bonella v. Twickenham Loc. Bd. (1887), 
 20 Q. B. D. 63 ; Ferrand v. Hallas Land and Building Co. (1893), 
 62 L. J. Q. B. 479. But a local authority under s. 105 of the 
 
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INJUSTICE AND ABSURDITY AVOIDED. 367 
 
 Carriers Act, 1830 (11 Geo. IV. & 1 WiU. IV. 
 0. 68), which exempts carriers from responsibiKty 
 for the loss of certain articles worth more than 
 £10, unless their nature and value are declared, 
 also enacts that the Act shall not affect any- 
 special contract of carriage, and this proviso was 
 construed, not literally as making the Act in- 
 applicable whenever any special contract was 
 made, but only as not affecting any special con- 
 tract inconsistent with the exemption provided by 
 the Act (a). The ordinary stipulation in a bill 
 of lading, excepting liability for breakage, leakage 
 and damage, would be similarly limited in con- 
 struction, as not extending to any such injury 
 caused by the shipowner or his servants (6). So 
 
 Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), can 
 recover the cost of paving a new street from the frontagers, in 
 spite of the lapse of time since the road became a new street; 
 Simmonds v. Fulham Vestry, [1900] 2 Q. B. 188. See also St. 
 Giles, Camberwell v. Hunt (1887), 56 L. J. M. C. 65, but as to 
 what constitutes a new street, see Whitev. Fulham Fesiry (1896), 
 74 L. T. 425, and see also Wandsworth v. Golds (1910), 80 
 L. J. K. B. 126. 
 
 (a) Baxendale v. G. E. By. Co. (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 244. As 
 to the nature of evidence required by a carrier to bring him 
 within the protection of the Act, see L. & N. W. By. v. J. P. 
 Ashton, [1919] W. N. 234 ; and see as to " insurance " and 
 " special contract," Daey v. L. & N. W. By. Co., [1919] 1 K. B. 
 623. For a disquisition on the liability of carriers under this 
 Act, see Chitty on Contracts, Chap. XV., s. 2. 
 
 (b) Phillips V. Clarh, 26 L. J. C. P. 168 ; Czech v. Gen. Steam 
 
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368 INTEKPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the clause in a bill of lading of goods from Malaga 
 to Liverpool authorising the ship to call at " any 
 port or ports, in any rotation, in the Mediterranean, 
 Levant, Black Sea, or Adriatic ; or on the coasts 
 of Africa, Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, 
 and Ireland, for any purpose," would be limited 
 to ports in geographical order which were sub- 
 stantially on the course of the voyage (a). 
 
 It is to be borne in mind that the injustice and 
 hardship which the Legislature is presumed not 
 to intend is not merely such as may occur in 
 individual and exceptional cases only. Laws are 
 made ad ea quse frequentius accidunt (6) ; and 
 individual hardship not unfrequently results from 
 enactments of general advantage. The argument 
 of hardship has been said to be always a dangerous 
 one to listen to (c). It is apt to introduce bad 
 law {d) ; and has occasionally led to the erroneous 
 
 Nav. Co., L. E. 3 C. P. 14 ; jper Lindley LJ., Chartered Bank of 
 India v. Netherlands Steam Nav. Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. 230. See 
 also The Pearlmoor, [1904] P. 286. 
 
 (a) Glynn y. Margetson, [1893] 62 L. J. Q. B. 466; White v. 
 Granada S.S. Co. .(1896), 13 T. L. E. 1. As to the use of words 
 " in any order " in bill of lading, see Hadji Ali Akhar v. Anglo 
 Arabian Persian S.S. Co. (1906), 11 Comm. Gas. 219. 
 
 (b) Dig. 1. 9. 3-10. 
 
 (c) Per Cur., Munro v. Butt, 8 E. & B. 754. 
 
 (d) Per Eolfe B., Winterhottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 116 ; 
 Brand v. Hammersmith B. Co., L. E. 2 Q. B. 241 ; Adams v. 
 Graham, 33 L. .T. Q. B. 71. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIKING OBLIGATIONS. 369 
 
 interpretation of statutes (a). Court ought not 
 to be influenced or governed by any notions of 
 hardship (6). They must look hardships in the 
 face rather than break down the rules of law (c) ; 
 and if, in all cases of ordinary occurrence, the 
 law, in its natural construction, is not inconsistent, 
 or unreasonable, or unjust, that construction is not 
 to be departed from merely because it may operate 
 with hardship or injustice in some particular 
 case (d). 
 
 SECTION UI. — CONSTEUCTION AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLI- 
 GATIONS, OR PERMITTING ADVANTAGE FROM ONE's 
 OWN WRONG. ' 
 
 On the general principle of avoiding injustice, 
 and absurdity, any construction would, if possible, 
 be rejected (unless the policy and object of the Act 
 
 (a) Gomp. ex. gr., Perry v. Skinner, 2 M. & W. 471, with B, 
 V. Mill, 20 L. J. C. P. 16 ; and B. v. Shiles, 1 Q. B. 919, and Welch 
 V. Nash, 9 E. E. 478, with B. v. Phillips (1866), 35 L. J. M. C, 
 217. See Be Palmer's Trade Mark (1882), 21 Oh. D. 47. 
 
 (b) Per Lord Abinger, Bhodes v. Smethurst, 4 M. & W. 63 ; 
 per Lord Esher M.E., Be Perkins, 24 Q. B. D. 618. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Eldon, Berkeley Peerage, 4 Gamp. 419, and in 
 Jesson V. Wright, 2 Bligh, 65 ; per Jessel M.E., Ford v. Kettle, 
 9 Q. B. D. 139, and Kirk v. Todd, 21 Ch. D. 484. 
 
 (d) See Co. Litt. 97b, 152b ; per Parke B., Miller v. Salomons, 
 21 L. J. Ex. 192, and Williams v. Boherts, 7 Ex. 628 ; per Lord 
 Blackburn, Toung v. Leamington (Mayor), 8 App. Gas. 527, and 
 per Lindley L.J., S.C, 51 L, J. Q. B. 297. 
 
 I.S. 24 
 
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370 INTEEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 required it) which enabled a person to defeat or 
 impair the obligation of his contract by his own 
 act, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong : "a 
 man may not take advantage of his own wrong ; 
 he may not plead, in his own interest, a self- 
 created necessity " (a). Thus, an Act which 
 authorised justices to discharge an apprentice 
 under certain circumstances, from his indenture, 
 " on the master's appearance " before them, would 
 justify a discharge in his wilful absence. The 
 Act, it was observed, must have a reasonable con- 
 struction, so as not to permit the master to take 
 advantage of his own obstinacy. It would be very 
 hard that, supposing the master was profligate 
 and ran away, the apprentice should never be dis- 
 charged (6). For similar reasons, an Act (30 & 31 
 Vict. c. 84) which authorised a justice to summon 
 a parent " to appear with his child " before him, 
 for breach of the Vaccination Act of 1867, and 
 "upon his appearance," to order the vaccination 
 of the child, if he should find that it had not 
 already undergone that operation, was held to 
 authorise such an order without the appearance of 
 the child, when the parent refused to produce it. 
 A literal construction, making the production of 
 
 (a) Per Fletcher Moulton L.J., Kish v. Taylor, 80 L. J. K. B. 
 607. 
 
 (6) Ditton's Case, 2 Salk. 490. See Gordon v. G. W. B., 8 Q. B. D. 
 44. Comp. B. V. Bucks, and B. v. Staffordshire, sup. p. 15. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS. 371 
 
 the child a condition precedent to the making of 
 the order, would have involved the supposition 
 that the Legislature had intended to allow the 
 parent to defeat its object by disobeying the sum- 
 mons which it had ordered {a). So, a parent who 
 sent his child to the Board School without also 
 sending the school fees did not " cause the child to 
 attend the school " within the meaning of the Ele- 
 mentary Education Act, 1870, s. 74 (J). A trustee 
 in bankruptcy who has received a sum, would be 
 liable to arrest under the provision of the Debtors 
 Act, 1869, which makes a trustee liable to im- 
 prisonment for disobeying an order to pay a sum 
 "in his possession or his control," though in fact 
 he had spent it all (c). The provision of the Eeal 
 Property Limitation Act, 1874, that no action 
 
 (o) Button V. AtUm (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 373 ; B. v. Justices 
 of Ginque Ports, 17 Q. B. D. 191. Gomp. Barnardo v. Ford, 
 [1892] A. C. 326. For exemption from penalties in case of 
 parents' conscientious belief, see Vaccination Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 
 VII. c. 31, s. 1 (1)). 
 
 (6) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 75 ; London School Board v. Wright, 12 
 Q. B. D. 578 ; see also Id. v. Wood, 15 Q. B. D. 415. The obliga- 
 tion of payment under the Act of 1870 is avoided, in certain 
 cases, by 39 & 40 Vict. c. 79, s. 10. 
 
 (c) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 4 ; Middleton v. Chichester (1871), 
 L. E. 6 Gh. 152. See Lewes v. Bamett, 6 Ch. D. 252. The 
 Debtors Act, 1878, by s. 1, gives a Court or Judge discretion to 
 grant or refuse a writ of attachment under s. 4 of the earlier 
 Act. 
 
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372 INTBRPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 should be brought to recover certain sums of 
 money but within 12 years next after " a present 
 right to receive the same " shall have accrued 
 to some person capable of giving a discharge for 
 it, must be taken in its ordinary sense, and is not 
 to be interpreted as referring to " a present right 
 to sue for the same," which may be contingent 
 on the doing of some act by the person entitled 
 to receive the sum, and may be delayed by him 
 accordingly (a). 
 
 Although 9 Anne, c. 14, s. 1 (b), enacted that 
 bills and notes, founded on the consideration of 
 money lost at play, should be " utterly frustrate, 
 void, and of none effect, to all intents and purpose," 
 its operation was confined to preventing the drawer 
 (or any person claiming under him (c)) from re- 
 covering from the loser ; but it left the instrument 
 unaffected in the hands of an innocent indorsee 
 for value suing the drawer (d). The statute was 
 construed as if the words were voidable against 
 certain persons only, but were valid as regards 
 
 («) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 8 ; Hornsey Loc. Bd. v. Monarch 
 Investment BUg. Socy. (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 1 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 
 105. See for discussion on this case Oweuj In re, [1894] 3 Ch., 
 p. 225 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 749. 
 
 (&) Amended by 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 41, ss. 1 and 3. 
 
 (c) Bowyer v. Bampton, 2 Stra. 1155. 
 
 (d) Edwards v. Dick, 23 E. E. 255. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS. 373 
 
 others, and this still represents the law in the case 
 of a bond, fide holder without notice (a). 
 
 So, where an Act {b) provided that if the pur- 
 chaser at an auction refused to pay the auction 
 duty, when this was made a condition of sale, his 
 bidding should be " null and void to all intents 
 and purposes," it was held that the object of the 
 enactment was completely attained by making the 
 bidding void only at the option of the seller ; thus 
 avoiding the injustice and impolicy of enabling 
 a man to escape from the obligation of his con- 
 tract by his own wrongful act, which a literal 
 construction would have involved (c). 
 
 A special Act(d) provided that a company 
 should not issue any share, that no share should 
 vest, until one-fifth of its amount was paid up, and 
 that the shareholder who had not paid up one-fifth 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Hay v. Ayling (1851), 20 L. J. Q. B. 171, 
 p. 174. See also Woolfv. Hamilton, [1898] 2 Q. B. 337, 0. A. 
 (6) 17 Geo. III. c. 50, s. 8 (repealed 33 & 34 Vict. c. 9). 
 
 (c) Malim v. Freeman (1838), 7 L. J. 0, P. 212. So, the usual 
 stipulation in a lease that if any covenant is broken by the 
 lessee, the lease shall be void, is construed as voidable only at 
 the option of the lessor. The literal construction would enable 
 a lessee to get rid of an onerous lease by wilfully breaking a 
 covenant in it. Gomj^. Richard v. Graham, 79 L. J. Oh. 378 ; 
 Bob v. Bancks, 4 B. & Aid. 401 ; Bede v. Farr, 18 E. E. 329 ; and 
 per Lord Cairns, Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 4 App. Gas. 332. 
 
 (d) Incorporating certain sections of the Companies Clauses 
 Act, 1845. 
 
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374 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 should have no right of property in the shares 
 allotted to him, or capacity to transfer them, was 
 considered as limited in its application to the 
 protection of the public. To construe it as apply- 
 ing also to the benefit of the shareholder, would 
 have been to absolve him from liability to pay up 
 calls until he had paid the requisite proportion ; 
 or, in other words, to enable him to profit by his 
 own default ; a consequence too unjust ajid un- 
 reasonable to have been intended (a). 
 
 On similar grounds, probably, enactments which 
 avoid or abridge the effect of conveyances, con- 
 tracts, and instruments, have generally received 
 a construction more compatible with the obvious 
 object and policy of the Legislature than with the 
 natural meaning of the language. Thus, the Act 
 of Will. III., which declares void all conveyances 
 of property, " in order to multiply voices," does 
 not apply where the vendor is not privy to the 
 illegal object (b), and even where there is privity 
 it is valid and effectual as between the parties to 
 it to pass the interest (c). 
 
 (a) East GloncestersMre By. Co. v. Bartholomew, L. E. 3 Ex. 15 ; 
 McBwen v. West London Wharves &c. Co. (1871), L. E. 6 Ch. 
 655. Comjp., however, B. v. Staffordshire, 8 E. E. 668 ; Mcllraith 
 V. Dublin &c. By. Co. (1871), L. E. 7 Oh., at p. 139, and Exp. 
 Parbury, 30 L. J. Ch. 513. 
 
 (6) 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 25, s. 7 ; Marshall v. Bowen, 14 L. J. 
 C. P. 129 ; Hoyland v. Bremner, 15 L. J. C. P. 133, sup. 165. 
 
 (c) Phillpotts V, Phillpotts (1850), 20 L. J. 0. P. 11. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS. 375 
 
 . Though 13 Bliz. o. 10, made "utterly void 
 and of none effect, to all intents, constructions and 
 purposes," all leases by ecclesiastical persons and 
 bodies, other than for 21 years or three lives, 
 the prohibited leases have always been held valid 
 as against the lessor, when a corporation sole, and 
 even when a corporation aggre*gate with a head, 
 during the life of its head (a) ; probably on the 
 principle of a personal estoppel by reason of a 
 personal interest in the head of the corporation (6). 
 Where, however, there is no head, the Act neces- 
 sarily receives its primary and natural meaning; 
 and the lease is void ab initio (c) ; upon the ground 
 that if it did not make the lease altogether bad, it 
 would be altogether good (d) ; which would be con- 
 trary to every possible construction of the Act. 
 
 An Act which required that indentures for 
 binding parish apprentices should be for the term 
 of seven years at least, declaring that otherwise 
 they should be " void to all intents and purposes, 
 and not available in any court or place for any 
 purpose whatever," Was held, nevertheless, to 
 
 (a) Bishop of Salisbwry's Case, 10 Eep. 60b, Co. Litt. 45a; 
 Lincoln College Gase, 3 Eep. 60a ; Bae. Ab. Leases (H). See also 
 Boberts v. Davey, 38 E. E. 348 ; Davenport v. B., 3 App. Cas. 
 115. 
 
 (b) Per Lord CaimS, Magdalen Hasp. v. Knotts, 4 App. Gas., 
 at p. 333. 
 
 (c) Id. 324, 
 
 (d) Per CressweU J., Toung v. Billiter, 25 L. J. Q. B. 178. 
 
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376 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 make an indenture for a shorter term only void- 
 able at the option of the master or apprentice ; 
 or at all events to leave it so far valid that service 
 under it sufficed to gain a poor law settlement (a). 
 Though the Infants Eelief Act, 1874, makes aU 
 contracts for the supply to an infant of goods 
 which are not necessaries absolutely void, the 
 infant cannot recover the money he has paid for 
 them if he has used or consumed them (6). 
 
 3 Hen. VII. c. 4 (c), which declared that gifts 
 of goods and chattels in trust for the donor and 
 in fraud of his creditors should be " void and 
 of none effect," was early held to be so only as 
 to those who were prejudiced by the gift, but 
 not as between the parties (d). And 13 Eliz. c. 5, 
 would not include a bond fide conveyance for 
 valuable consideration, though made with intent 
 to defeat an execution creditor (e). Even as 
 regards the persons prejudiced, the transaction 
 
 (a) 5 Eliz. c. i (repealed |by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, s. 17) ; 
 B. V. St. Nicholas, 2 Stra. 1066, Ca. Temp. Hardw. 323 ; Gray v. 
 Coohson, 16 Bast, 13 ; B. v. St. Gregory, 2 A. & B. 107 ; Oahes v. 
 Turqumd, L, E. 2 H. L. 325 ; Burgess's Case, 15 Oh. D. 507. 
 
 (6) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 1 ; Talentini v. Ganali, 24 Q. B. D. 166. 
 
 (c) Eepealed as to E. by S. L. E., 1863, as to Ir., S. L. (1) 
 E.,1872. 
 
 (d) Bidler v. Ptmter, Oro. Eliz. 291; Bessey v. Windham, 6 
 Q. B. 166. See Phillpotts v. PMllpotts, sup. p. 165. 
 
 (e) Wood V. Dixie, 68 E. E. 590; Barvill v. Terry, 30 L. J. 
 Ex. 355. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS. 377 
 
 is not void ipso factOy but only voidable at their 
 option (a). In the repealed s. 47 of the Bank- 
 ruptcy Act, 1883, which enacted that voluntary 
 settlements made by a person who became bank- 
 rupt within two years after should be void as 
 against the trustee in bankruptcy, " void " has 
 been held to mean " voidable," so that the title 
 of a purchaser from the donee for valuable con- 
 sideration in good faith before avoidance, could 
 not afterwards be defeated by the trustee (6). 
 Sec. 137 of the repealed Bankrupt Law Consoli- 
 dation Act, 1849 (c), which enacted that a judge's 
 order to enter up judgment, made against a trader 
 with his consent, should be " null and void to 
 all intents and purposes whatever," if not filed 
 as required by the Act, was construed as making 
 the judgment void only as against his assignees, 
 but not as against himself. A literal construction 
 would have enabled the trader to treat his creditor 
 who took out execution on the judgment to which 
 he had consented, as a trespasser {d). So non- 
 comphance with the requirement of s. 27, Debtors 
 
 (a) Note the cases in Tming v. Billiter, 6 B. & B, 1, 8 H. L. 
 Gas. 682. 
 
 (6) 46 & 47 Vict. e. 52 ; Brail, Be, [1893] 2 Q. B. 381 ; Carter, 
 and Kenderdine, Be, 66 L. J. Oh. 408. As to existing law with 
 regard to fraudulent settlements, see Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 27. 
 
 (c) As to existing Bankruptcy Law, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59. 
 
 (d) Bryan v. Child, 82 E. E. 710; Green v. Gray, 1 Dowl. 350. 
 
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378 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Act, 1869, that a judge's order for judgment 
 made by consent of the defendant in a personal 
 action shall be filed in the manner prescribed 
 within 21 days after the making thereof, " other- 
 wise the order and any judgment signed or 
 entered up thereon, and any execution issued 
 or taken out on such judgment shall be void," 
 only renders such an order and judgment void 
 as against the creditors of such defendant, and 
 not as against himself (a). On the same ground, 
 a section of an Act (b) which declared a warrant of 
 attorney under certain circumstances "void to all 
 intents and purposes," was held to mean only that 
 it was void against the assignees in bankruptcy of 
 the person who had given it ; although in another 
 section the warrant was declared to be " void 
 against the assignees " if not filed. The difference 
 in the language of the two sections was considered 
 by the majority of the Court as insufficient to 
 establish any substantial difference of intention, 
 when the consequence would be to enable a person 
 to defeat his own act (c). 
 
 Though the Sunday Observance Act, 1677, has 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 ; Gowan v. Wright, 18 Q. B. D. 201 ; 
 Orawshaw v. Harrison, [1894] 1 Q. B. 79. 
 
 (6) 3 Geo. rV. c. 39, s. 4. Cognovit actionem ext. 6 & 7 Vict, 
 c. 66. Eepealed 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 28. 
 
 (c) Morris v. Mellin (1827), 6 B. & G. 446 ; Bennett v. Daniel, 
 10 B. & C. 500. See Bavis v. Bryan (1827), 6 B. & 0. 651. 
 
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AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS. 379 
 
 the effect of avoiding contracts made on Sunday 
 by and with tradesmen and other classes of 
 persons, in the course of their ordinary calHng, 
 the invalidity affects only those persons who, 
 when contracting with them, knew their calling ; 
 but those who dealt with them in ignorance of 
 it would be entitled to sue on the contract (a). 
 
 In all these cases the intention of the Legisla- 
 ture was considered as completely carried out by 
 the restricted scope given to its enactments. But 
 where, having regard to the general policy of the 
 Act as well as to the language and the structure 
 of the sentence, it would not have that effect, the 
 words abridging or avoiding the effect of instru- 
 ments, contracts, and deahngs would receive their 
 primary and natural meaning. Thus, in the Bills 
 of Sale Act of 1854, assignments not registered 
 were nuU and void in the fuU and natural sense of 
 the words (6) ; and in the later Act of 1882, the 
 provision of s. 9, which avoids a bill of sale 
 unless made in accordance with the form in the 
 schedule, has been held to avoid it in toto, and not 
 merely as regards the personal chattels comprised 
 in it ; so that a covenant contained in it for the 
 payment by the grantee of the principal and 
 
 (a) Bhxsome v. Williams, 27 E. E. 337. See also Drury v. 
 Befontaine, 1 Taunt. 131. 
 
 (6) See ex. gr., Richards v. James, 36 L. J. Q. B. 116. Comp. 
 Exp. Blaiberg, 52 L. J. Oh. 461. 
 
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380 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 interest thereby secured was said to be rendered 
 inoperative (a). So, in the case cited on an earlier 
 page, where an Act recited the mischiefs occasioned 
 by binding parish apprentices without the sanction 
 of justices, and enacted that no indenture of such 
 apprenticeships should be valid unless approved 
 by two justices, under their hands and seals ; it 
 was held that an indenture, approved under hand 
 but not under seal, was absolutely void (b). The 
 same effect was given (in an action by the trustees 
 against their lessee for rent which had been made 
 payable to them) to a local Act which provided 
 that every lease of turnpike tolls should make the 
 rent payable to the treasurer, in default of which 
 it should be " null and void " (c). 
 
 It may, probably, be said that where a statute 
 not only declares a contract void, but imposes a 
 penalty for making it, it is not voidable merely (d). 
 
 (a) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43 ; Lames v. Bees, 55 L. J. Q. B. 363. 
 But see Heseltine v. Simmons (1892), 62 L. J. Q. B. 5, in which 
 it was held that where a bill is avoided under s. 8 for an untrue 
 statement as to consideration it does not necessarily avoid the 
 covenant to repay under s. 9. See also Brandon Hill v. Lane 
 (1914), 59 S. J. 75 ; [1915] 1 K. B. 250; Bward, In re (1916), 
 58 L. J. K. B. 393. 
 
 (6) B. V. Stohe Bamerel, sup. p. 10. See also B. v. Bawbergli, 
 2 B. & 0. 222. 
 
 (c) 3 Geo. rV. c. 126 ; Pearse v. Morrice, 2 A. & E. 84. Gomp. 
 Hodson V. Sharpe, 10 E. E. 324. 
 
 (d) Gye v. Felton, 4 Taunt. 876. 
 
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BETROSPBCTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 381 
 
 The penalty makes it illegal (a). In general, how- 
 ever, it would seem that where the enactment has 
 relation only to the benefit of particular persons, 
 the word *' void " would be understood as " void- 
 able " only, at the election of the persons for 
 whose protection the enactment was made, and 
 who are capable of protecting themselves ; but 
 that when it relates to persons not capable of pro- 
 tecting themselves, or when it has some object of 
 public policy in view which requires the strict 
 construction, the word receives its natural full 
 force and effect (b). 
 
 SECTION IV. RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION. — 1. AS RE- 
 GARDS VESTED RIGHTS. 2. AS REGARDS PROCEDURE. 
 
 Upon the presumption that the Legislature does 
 not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against 
 giving certain statutes a retrospective opera- 
 tion (c). Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere 
 
 (a) But this distinction must now be understood to apply 
 only to cases where the statute enacts that an agreement or 
 deed made in violation of its provisions shall be wholly void. 
 Per Gibbs O.J., Doe v. Pitchers (1815), 6 Taunt. 359, p. 369. 
 
 (6) See per Bayley J., B. v. Mipswell, 8 B. & C. 471. See also 
 Betham v. Gregg, 38 E. E. 449, and Storie v. Winchester, 19 
 L. J. C. P. 217. See further Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and 
 Supp., tit. " Void," and see also Money Lenders Act, 1911, 
 and cases thereon, " Ohitty on Contracts," Chap. XXII,, s. 1. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 292. 
 
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382 INTEKPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 debet, non prseteritis. They are construed as opera- 
 ting only in cases or on facts which come into 
 existence after the statutes were passed (a) unless 
 a retrospective effect be clearly intended. It is a 
 fundamental rule of English law that no statute 
 shall be construed so as to have a retrospective 
 operation, unless such a construction appears very 
 clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by neces- 
 saiy and distinct implication (6) ; and the same 
 rule involves another and subordinate rule to the 
 effect that a statute is not to be construed so as 
 to have a greater retrospective operation than its 
 language renders necessary (c). Even in constru- 
 ing a section which is to a certain extent retro- 
 spective, the maxim ought to be borne in mind as 
 applicable whenever the line is reached at which 
 the words of the section cease to be plain {d). 
 
 For it is to be observed that the retrospective 
 effect of a statute may be partial in its operation. 
 
 (a) Per Erie C.J., Midland By. Co. v. Pye, 10 C. B. N. S. 
 191 ; per Cookburn O.J., B. v. Ipsmch, 2 Q. B. D. 269 ; per 
 Pollock C.B., Toung v. Hughes, 4 H. & N. 76 ; Vansittart v. 
 Taylor, 4 E. & B. 910 ; Tomg v. Adams, [1898] A. 0. 469. 
 
 (S) This statement of the fundamental rule was cited and 
 approved by Kennedy L.J., West v. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 15. 
 See further, Smith v. Callander, [1901] A. C. 297. 
 
 (c) Per Lindley L.J., Lauri v. Benad, [1892] 3 Ch. 421. 
 
 (d) Per Bowen L.J., Beid v. Beid, 31 Ch. D. 409. See also 
 Main V. Starle, 15 A. C. 388 ; Beynolds v. A.-G. Nova Scotia, 
 [1896] A. C. 240. 
 
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RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 383 
 
 Thus it has been said that s. 35, Divided Parishes 
 and Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876, which con- 
 tains a code of transmitted status in relation to 
 poor-law settlement, is to be considered as fully 
 retrospective for all purposes, except only as 
 regards adjudications made before the commence- 
 ment of the Act ; so that for the purpose of 
 determining the settlement of children born after 
 1876, it may be that their father's settlement is 
 governed by the section, even though his settle- 
 ment, for the purposes of his own removal, is not 
 affected by it (a). 
 
 It is chiefly where the enactment would pre- 
 judicially affect vested rights, or the legality 
 of past transactions, or impair contracts, that the 
 rule in question prevails. Every statute, it has 
 been said, which takes away or impairs vested 
 rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a 
 new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches 
 a new disability in respect of transactions or con- 
 siderations already past, must be presumed, out 
 of respect to the Legislature (b), to be intended 
 not to have a retrospective operation (c). ThuSj 
 
 • 
 
 (a) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 35; Bath v. JBerwic^, [1892] 1 
 Q. B. 731 ; and see also Paddington Union v. Westminster Union, 
 [1915] 2 K. B. 644. 
 
 (6) Per Chancellor Kent, Dash v. Van Kleeh, 7 Johnson, 
 602, etc. 
 
 (c) Per Story J., Socy. for Projpag. of Gospel v. Wheeler, 2 
 
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384 intbrpkbtAtion of statutes. 
 
 the provision of the Statute of Frauds, that no 
 action should be brought to charge any person on 
 any agreement made in consideration of marriage, 
 unless the agreement were in writing, was held 
 not to apply to an agreement which had been made 
 before the Act was passed (a). The Charitable 
 Uses Act, 1735 (6), in the same way, was held not 
 to apply to a devise made before it was enacted (c). 
 And the Apportionment Act, 1870, which enacts 
 that after the passing of the Act, rents are to 
 be considered as accruing from day to day, like 
 interest, and to be apportionable in respect of 
 time accordingly, would seem not to apply to a 
 Will made before the Act, though the testator 
 died after it came into operation (d). The testator 
 was presumed to have in view the state of the 
 
 Gallison, 139. See also per Chase O.J., Colder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 
 390, cited by WiUes J., Phillips v. Eyre, L. E. 6 Q. b! 1, where 
 the distinction between retrospective and ex post facto legisla- 
 tion is indicated. See further, per Lopes L.J., Be Pulborough 
 School Board Election, [1894] 1 Q. B. 737. 
 
 (a) Gilmore v. Shuter, 2 Lev. 227, 2 Mod. 310 ; Ash v. Abdy, 
 3 Swanst. 664. See also Doe v. Page, 13 L. J. Q. B. 153 ; Doe 
 V. Bold, 11 Q. B. 127. 
 
 (6) 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (repealed save part of s. 5 by 51 & 52 
 Vict. c. 42, s. 13). 
 
 (c) A.-G. V. Lloyd, 3 Atk. 551 ; Ashburnham v. Bradshaw, 2 
 Atk. 36. 
 
 (d) Jones v. Ogle, L. E. 8 Ch. 192, but see Capson v. Capson 
 (1874), 43 L, J. Ch. 677 ; Brownrigg v. Pihe (1882), 51 L. J. P. 
 29 ; Constable v. Constable (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 621. 
 
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RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 385 
 
 law when he made his Will (a). The contrary 
 presumption that the testator who left his Will 
 unaltered after the Act was passed, intended that 
 it should operate on the Will (6), would imply 
 that he knew that the law had been changed. 
 So, it was held that 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, which 
 made all wagers void, and enacted that no action 
 should be brought or maintained for a wager, 
 applied only to wagers made after the Act was 
 passed (c) ; the Gaming Act, 1892, which prevents 
 a betting agent from recovering from his employer 
 sums paid for bets, was held not to prevent such 
 recovery where the sums had been paid before the 
 passing of the, Act (d); and the Kidnapping Act 
 of 1872, which made it unlawful for a vessel to 
 carry native labourers of the Pacific Islands with- 
 out a license, did not apply to a voyage begun 
 before the Act was passed (e). Where one of the 
 ingredients of an offence had been committed 
 after the passing of the Act which created the 
 offence, but before the Act came into operation, 
 
 (a) Be March, 27 Ch. D. 166 ; but see Be Bridger, [1894] 1 
 Ch. 297 ; and Be Llanover, [1903] 2 Ch. 330. 
 
 (b) Per Jessel M.E., Haduck v. Pedley (1874), 19 Eq. 271. 
 
 (c) Moon V. Burden, 2 Ex. 22, on which see per Buckley L.J., 
 West V. Owynne, inf. p. , 393 ; Pettamberdass v. Thackoorseydass, 7 
 Moo. P. C. 239. See White, Exp., 33 L. J. Bank. 22. 
 
 (d) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 9 ; Knight v. Lee, [1893] 1 Q. B. 41. 
 
 (e) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 19 ; Burns v. Nmell (1880), 49 L. J. Q. B. 
 468. 
 
 i.s. _ 25 
 
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386 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the fact that the other ingredients were committed 
 subsequently did not make the offence one within 
 the Act (a). The Bills of Sale Act, 1882, which 
 made void bills of sale not registered within seven 
 days of their execution, was held not to apply to 
 instruments executed before the Act came into 
 operation. Compliance, it is evident, would have 
 been impossible where the deed had been executed 
 more than seven days before the Act passed (5). 
 The 20 Vict. c. 19, which declared that extra- 
 parochial places should, for poor-law and other 
 purposes, be deemed parishes, was held not retro- 
 spective, so as to confer the status of irremovability 
 on a pauper who had resided in such a place for 
 five years before the Act (c). 
 
 The enactments of the Patents, Designs, and 
 Trade Marks Acts, 1883, have been held not to 
 afi'ect any patent granted before the commence- 
 ment of the Act (d) ; and it has been decided that 
 the repealed International Copyright Act, 1886, 
 
 (a) 53 & 54 Vict. e. 71, s. 26 (repealed by 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59) ; 
 B. V. Griffiths, [1891] 2 Q. B. 145. As to offences under the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, see Part VII. of the Act. 
 
 {h) Hkhson v. Darlow, 23 Ch. D. 690. 
 
 (c) B. V. St. Sepulchre, 28 L. J. M. C. 187 ; See also B. v. 
 Ipswich Union, 2 Q. B. D. 269 ; Sunderland v. Sussex, 8 Q. B. D. 
 99 ; Barton Begis v. Liverpool, 3 Q. B. D. 295 ; Gardner v. Lucas, 
 3 App. Cas. 582. 
 
 (d) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57 ; Brandon, Be (1884), 9 App. Cas. 589. 
 See also 7 Bdw. VII. c. 29. 
 
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BETROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. ,387 
 
 was not to be construed so as to revive or re-create, 
 a right which had expired before it was passed, or 
 take away from the public the right which they had 
 acquired under previous legislation (a). The 
 Married Women's Property Act, 1882, did not 
 entitle a plaintiff, who was suing a married woman 
 upon a promissory note made by her before the 
 passing of the Act, to have judgment against her 
 in such terms as to be available against separate 
 property to which she became entitled after the 
 date of the note (6). Nor did it operate upon 
 property falling into the possession of a married 
 woman after the passing of the Act to which she 
 had acquired a title before, so as to make it her 
 separate estate (c). Even a statute which confers 
 a benefit, such as abolishing a tax, would not be 
 construed retrospectively, to relieve the persons 
 already subject to the burden before it was 
 abolished. An Act passed in August, providing 
 that on all goods captured from the enemy, and 
 made prize of war, a deduction of one-third of 
 
 (a) 49 & 50 Vict. c. 33, s. 6 ; Lauri v. Benad, [1892] 3 Ch. 
 402. The present law as to " existing " and " substituted " 
 right is set out, s. 24, and Sched. I. of the Copyright Act, 
 1911. 
 
 (h) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1 (4); Tumhull v. Forman, 15 
 Q. B. D. 234. This sub-section is repealed by 56 & 57 Vict. 
 c. 63, s. 4, which see as to cases of mere procedure under the 
 Act. See inf. p. 402. 
 
 (c) Bdd V. Beid (1886), 31 "Ch. D. 402. 
 
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388 • INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the ordinary duties should be made, was held not 
 to apply where the prize with her cargo, though 
 condemned in September, had been brought into 
 port on June, when certain duties accrued due (a). 
 The repealed Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 
 1849, which made a deed of arrangement (b) " now 
 or hereafter " entered into by a trader with six- 
 sevenths pf his creditors binding on the non-exe- 
 cuting creditors, at the expiration of three months 
 after they " should have had" notice, was held to 
 apply only to deeds executed after the passing of 
 the Act (c). To apply such an enactment to past 
 transactions, even though the property had been 
 completely distributed among the creditors who 
 had signed, would have been so unjust, that it was 
 expedient to seek any means of getting rid of the 
 apparent effect of the word "now," which was 
 accordingly understood as restricted to arrange- 
 ments not completed but yet binding in equity 
 at the time when the Act was passed. So, a 
 non-trader was held not liable to adjudication as 
 
 (a) Prince v. U. S., 2 Gallison, 204. 
 
 (6) As to existing law, see Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1914 
 (4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 47) ; as to the general principles of -which, 
 .see Wilson, In re, [1916] 1 K. B. 382. 
 
 (c) 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 ; Waugh, v. Middleton, 22 L. J. Ex. 
 Ill; Marsh v. Higgins, 19 L. J. C. P. 297; Larpent v. Bibby, 
 5 H. L. Gas. 481; Noble v. Gadban, 5 H. L. Gas. 504; Be 
 Phoenix Bessemer Co., 45 L. J. Ch. 11. See also Beed v. Wiggins, 
 32 L. J. 0. P. 131. 
 
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RETROSPECTIVii; OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 389 
 
 a bankrupt in respect of a debt contracted before 
 the enactment, which first made non-traders liable 
 to the bankruptcy laws (a). The provisions of ss. 32 
 and 34, Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which are still in 
 force, and which provide that " where a debtor 
 is adjudged bankrupt" he shall be subject to 
 certain disqualifications, were held to disqualify 
 those persons only who were made bankrupt after 
 the passing of the Act (&). 
 
 Sec. 1, 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 83 (c), which 
 empowered a patentee, with the leave of the 
 Attorney-G-eneral, to enrol a disclaimer of any part 
 of his invention (d), and declared that such dis- 
 claimer should be deemed and taken to be part of 
 his patent and specification, was construed by the 
 Court of Exchequer as enacting that the disclaimer 
 should be so taken "from thenceforth"; the 
 interpolation being deemed justifiable to avoid the 
 apparent injustice of giving a retrospective effect 
 to the disclaimer, and making a man a trespasser 
 by relation (e). But this construction was rejected 
 
 (a) Williams v. Harding, L. E. 1 H. L. 9. 
 
 (b) 46 & 47 Vict. o. 52 ; Pulborough School Board Election, Be, 
 [1894] 1 Q. B. 725 ; Thompson, In re (1919), 88 L. J. K. B. 646. 
 
 (c) For existing law, see 7 Bdw. VII. c. 29 (The Patents and 
 Designs Act, 1907). 
 
 {d) For meaning of word "disclaimer," see Owen's Patent, 
 In re (1898), 79 L. T. 458. 
 
 (e) Perry v. Skinner, 6 L. J. Ex. 124; and per Oresswell J., 
 Stocker v. Warner, 1 G. B. 167. 
 
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390 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 by the Common Pleas, on the ground that the 
 enactment really worked no injustice in operating 
 retrospectively {a). 
 
 Sec. 1, Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 
 (repealed by s. 60, Sale of Goods Act, 1893), which 
 provided that no jfi. fa. should prejudice the title to 
 goods of a bond fide purchaser for value, before 
 actual seizure under the writ, was held not to 
 apply where the writ had been delivered to the 
 sheriff before the Act was passed. As the execu- 
 tion creditor had the goods already bound by the 
 delivery of the writ, the statute, if retrospective, 
 would have divested him of a right which he had 
 acquired (&); and for the like reasons, s. 146 of 
 the (repealed) Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which enacted 
 that " the sheriff shall not under a writ of elegit 
 deliver the goods of a debtor, nor shall a writ of 
 elegit extend to goods," was held not to apply to a 
 case where the writ had been issued, and the 
 sheriff had taken possession before the Act came 
 into operation, although the issue and seizure were 
 after the passing of the Act, and the delivery after 
 it came into operation (c). 
 
 (a) B. V. Mill, 20 L. J. C. P. 16. 
 
 (6) Williams v. Smith, 28 L. J. Ex. 286. 
 
 (c) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 146; Hougl v. Windus, 53 L. J. 
 Q. B. 165. As to duties of sheriff in regard to goods taken in 
 execution under existing law, see Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 41. 
 See also Graig & Sons, In re, [1916] 2 K, B. 497. 
 
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EETROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS EBGAEDS EIGHTS. 391 
 
 Sec. 14, Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 
 which provides that a debtor shall not lose the 
 benefit of certain Statutes of Limitation by his co- 
 debtor's payment of interest, or part payment of 
 the principal, was held not to effect the efficacy of 
 such a payment made before the Act was passed (a). 
 A different decision would have deprived the 
 creditor of a right of action against one of his 
 debtors. The provision in s. 10 of the Judica- 
 ture Act, 1875, that in winding up companies 
 whose assets are insufficient, the bankruptcy rules 
 as to the rights of creditors and other matters 
 shall apply, was held not to reach back to a 
 company already in liquidation when the Act was 
 passed (b). 
 
 And generally, " no rule of construction is more 
 firmly established than this : that a retrospective 
 operation is not to be given to a statute so as to 
 impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise 
 than as regards matter of procedure, unless that 
 effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to 
 the language of the enactment. If the enact- 
 ment is expressed in language which is fairly 
 capable of either interpretation, it ought to be 
 construed as prospective only "(c). 
 
 (a) Jackson v. Woolley, 27 L. J. Q. B. 448. 
 (6) Be Suche & Co. (1875), 1 Oh. D. 48. 
 (c) AtUumney, In re, [1898] 2 Q. B. ; "Wright J., at pp. 651, 
 552. 
 
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392 INTERPKKTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Nor is a statute retrospective, in the sense 
 under consideration, because a part of the requisites 
 for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to 
 its passing (a). 
 
 Sec. 5, Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 
 which entitles a surety who pays the debt of his 
 principal, to an assignment of the securities for 
 it held by the creditor, would apply to the case 
 of a surety who had entered into the suretyship 
 before the Act, but had paid off the debt after it 
 came into operation (6). Sec. 2, Infants' Belief 
 Act, 1874, which enacts that no action shall be 
 brought on a ratification, made after majority, of^ 
 a contract made during infancy, was held to apply 
 to ratifications of contracts made before the Act 
 was passed (c). The Court of Chancery, which 
 acquired jurisdiction, under the repealed s. 4 
 of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 (d), to relieve in respect of 
 the forfeiture of a lease in consequence of a breach 
 of a covenant to insure, exercised this new juris- 
 diction where the breach occurred after, but the 
 lease had been made before the Act was passed (e). 
 
 (a) Per Lord Denman, B. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, 12 Q. B. 
 127 ; B. V. Christchurch, Id. 149. See B. v. Portaea, 7 Q. B. D. 
 384 ; Exp. Dawson, L. E. 19 Eq. 433. 
 
 (h) Be Wolfv. Lindsell, 37 L. J. Ch. 293. 
 
 (c) Kibble, Exp. (1875), 44 L. J.. Bank. 68. 
 
 {d) Ee-enacted by s. 14, Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 
 Vict. c. 41). 
 
 (e) Page v. Bennett (1855), 29 L. .J. Ch. 398. 
 
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RETBOSPEOTIVK OPEKA.TION AS RBGAEDS BIGHTS. 393 
 
 And the provision of the Conveyancing Act of 
 1881, which relieved tenants against forfeiture for 
 breach of covenant, was held to apply to a case 
 where judgment had been already given before the 
 Act was passed, and the landlord might have ob- 
 tained possession, but for a stay of proceedings to 
 give the tenant time to appeal (a). So, s. 3, Con- 
 veyancing and Law of Property Act, 1892, applies 
 to "all leases," whether executed before or after 
 the commencement of the Act ; and, in the 
 absence of express provision "to the contrary, 
 engrafts, upon every covenant against assignment 
 or underletting without consent, a proviso that 
 no fine, or sum of money in the nature of a fine, 
 shall be payable in respect of such consent (b). So, 
 s, 8, Metropolitan Water Board (Charges) Act, 
 1907 (7 Edw. VII. c. CLXXI.), is retrospective in 
 removing from the Board the duty of providing, 
 laying down, and maintaining the water com- 
 munication pipe and imposing that duty on the 
 owner or occupier of the premises supplied with 
 water (c). 
 
 So, s. 6 of the Married Women's Property 
 (Scotland) Act, 1881, applies to marriages entered 
 
 (a) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, sAi ; Qmlter v. Mapleson, 9 Q. B. D. 672. 
 
 (&) West V. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 1 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 578. 
 
 (c) Batt V. Metropolitan Water Board, [1911] 2 K. B. 965 ; 
 Mist V. Metropolitan Water Board (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 
 2041. 
 
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394 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES 
 
 into before the passing of that Act as well as to 
 those contracted subsequently {a). 
 
 In general, when the law is altered pending an 
 action, the rights of the parties are decided 
 according to the law as it existed when the action 
 was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear 
 intention to vary such rights. Thus, s, 32 of 
 the Medical Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, which, as 
 amended by subsequent statutes, enacts that no 
 person shall, aftet the 1st of January, 1859, 
 recover any charge for medical treatment " unless 
 he shall prove at the trial" that he was on the 
 Medical Eegister, was held not to apply to an 
 action for medical services, begun before that date, 
 but tried after it (ft). An administration bond 
 given to the Ordinary not being assignable until 
 the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, an action begun by the 
 assignee before that Act was passed, was held not 
 maintainable after it came into operation (c). 
 
 If a statute is in its nature a declaratory Act, 
 the argument that it must not be construed so as 
 to take away previous rights is not applicable. 
 Thus, a statute passed in 1889 declaring that the 
 provisions of a statute of 1881, with regard to the 
 
 (o) Paterson v. Poe (1883), '8 App. Cas. 678. 
 
 (6) Thistleton v. Frewer, 31 L. J. Ex. 230 ; Wright v. Green- 
 royd, 31 L. J. Q. B. 4. Comp. Leman v. Houseley, 44 L. J. 
 Q. B. 22. 
 
 (c) Toung v. Hughes, 4 H. & N. 76. 
 
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EBTROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 395 
 
 imposition of stamp duties upon personal property 
 passing under "voluntary settlements," should be 
 construed as if marriage settlements were included, 
 though until then they had not been regarded as 
 voluntary settlements, resulted in a decision that 
 the provisions of the later Act were retrospective, 
 and that the construction provided by it must be 
 applied to the description of the property sought 
 to be taxed, and this although the property passed 
 to the beneficiaries, and proceedings to recover 
 the duty were taken, before the second Act came 
 into force (a). 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add, that whenever 
 the intention is clear that the Act should have 
 a retrospective operation, it must unquestionably 
 be so construed (b), even though the consequences 
 may appear unjust and hard(c). Thus, an Act 
 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, s. 14) {d) which enacted that 
 every person "convicted of felony" should for 
 ever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail, 
 and that if any such person should take out, or 
 
 (a) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 12, s. 38, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 7, s. 11; A.-G. 
 V. Theobald (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 557; Scott v. Craig's Bepre- 
 gentatives, [1896] 24 Eettie 462. But see Toung v. Adams 
 (1898), 67 L. J. P. C. 75. 
 
 (&) See ex. gr. WUUains and Stepney, Be, [1^91] 2 Q. B. 257. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. Stead v. Carey, 14 L. J. C. P. 177 ; Bell v. 
 Bilton, 4 Bing. 615. 
 
 (d) Repealed by 10 Edw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, 
 Sched. 7, and re-enacted by s. 35 of same Act. 
 
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396 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 have taken out, a license for that purpose, it 
 should be void, was held to include a man who 
 had been convicted of felony before, and had 
 obtained a license after the Act was passed. 
 Although the expression " convicted of felony " 
 might have been limited to persons who should 
 thereafter be convicted, yet, as the object of 
 the Act was to protect the public from having 
 beerhouses kept by men of bad character, the 
 language was construed in the sense which best 
 advanced the remedy and suppressed the mischief ; 
 though giving, perhaps, a retrospective operation 
 to the enactment (a). The Summary Jurisdiction 
 (Married Women) Act, 1895, s. 4, which enacts 
 {inter alia) that " any married woman whose 
 husband shall have been guilty of persistent 
 cruelty to her, and by such cruelty have caused 
 her to leave and Hve separately and apart from 
 him, may apply to any Court of summary juris- 
 diction for an order under the Act," is retro- 
 spective in its operation, and applies to acts of 
 cruelty committed before the Act came into 
 
 (a) Hitchcock v. Way, 45 E. E. 653 ; B. v. Tine, L. E. 10 Q. B. 
 195, diss. Lush J., considered in JJe Pulborough School Board, 
 [1894] 1 Q. B. 725 ; Chappell v. Purday, 13 L. J. Ex. 7. A 
 bare verdict of guilty without penalty constitutes a conviction, 
 B. V. Blaby, [1894] 2 Q. B. 170; 63 L. J. M. C. 133. As to the effect 
 of pardon in removing the disqualification, see Hay v. Tower Jus., 
 [1898] 24 Q B. D. 561. 
 
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EETKOSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS 397 
 
 operation (a). After the passing of the Statute of 
 Frauds Amendment Act, 1828 (9 Geo. IV. c. 14), 
 which enacted that in actions grounded upon 
 simple contracts, no verbal promise should be 
 " deemed sufficient evidence " of a new contract 
 to bar the Statute of Limitation, it was held that 
 such a promise given before the Act, and which 
 was then sufficient to bar the statute, could not 
 be received in evidence in an action begun before, 
 but not tried till after the passing of the Act (b). 
 This decision has been supported on the ground 
 that the time for deciding what is or is not 
 evidence, is when the trial takes place ; and that 
 when the Act told the judge what was and was 
 not then to be evidence, he was bound to decide 
 in obedience to it(c). But some stress is also to 
 be laid on the circumstance that the Act did not 
 come into operation until eight months after its 
 passing ; for the concession of this interval seemed 
 to show that the hardship in question had been 
 in the contemplation of the Legislature, and had 
 been thus provided for (d). So, an Act which was 
 
 (a) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39 ; Lane v. Lane, [1896] P. 133 ; 65 
 L. J. P. 63. 
 
 (h) Hilliard v. Lenard, Moo. & M. 297 ; Towler v. Ohatterton, 
 31 E. E. 411. 
 
 (c) Per CresBwell J., Marsh, v. Eiggins, 9 C. B. 551. But 
 eomjp. sup. p. 394. 
 
 (d) Per Park J., 6 Bing. 264. 
 
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398 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 passed in August, but was not to come into opera- 
 tion till October, making non-traders liable to 
 bankruptcy, applied to a person who contracted a 
 debt and committed an act of bankruptcy between 
 those dates. It was considered that no injustice 
 was done, since the Act had told him what would 
 be the consequence of contracting the debt, before 
 he contracted it (a). On this ground, also, it was 
 held that s. 11, 11 & 12 Vict. o. 43(5), which 
 limits the time for taking summary proceedings 
 before justices to six months from the time when 
 the matter complained of arose, was held fatal to 
 proceedings begun after the passing of the Act in 
 respect of a matter which had arisen more than 
 six months before it was passed (c) ; though the 
 interval between the passing of the Act and its 
 • coming into operation was only six weeks. If the 
 Act had come into immediate operation, it was 
 observed, the hardship would have been so great, 
 that the inference might have been against an 
 intention to give it a retrospective operation ; but 
 
 (a) BasUeigh, Exp. (1875), 2 Oh. D. 9 ; 45 L. J. Bk. 29, C. A. 
 Comp. Williams v. Harding, (1866), L. E. 1 H. L. 9 ; 35 L. J. 
 Bk. 25. 
 
 (6) Explained as to proceedings by Auditors, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 
 103, s. 9. 
 
 (c) B. V. Leeds By. Co., 21 L. J. M. 0. 193 (overruled on 
 another point in B. v. Edwards, 53 L. J. M. C. 149). See per 
 Bovill C.J., Ings v. London & S. W. By. Co., L. E. 4 C. P. 19. 
 
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RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS RIGHTS. 399 
 
 the provision suspending its operation, for how- 
 ever short a time, was to be taken as an intimation 
 that the Legislature had provided it as the period 
 within which proceedings respecting antecedent 
 matters might be taken {a). 
 
 In the same way s. 10, Mercantile Law 
 Amendment Act, 1856 (6), which enacted that no 
 person should be entitled to commence an action 
 after the time limited, by reason of his being 
 abroad or in prison, was held to apply to causes 
 of action which had accrued before the Act was 
 passed. But some weight was due to the circum- 
 stance that another section of the same Act kept 
 alive in express terms a cause of action already 
 accrued, and thus afforded the inference that no 
 such intention had been entertained, as none was 
 expressed, as regards cases under s. 10 (c). 
 
 In both of the above cases, however, the con- 
 struction, though fatal to the enforcement of a 
 vested right, by shortening the time for enforcing 
 it, did not in terms take away any such right ; and 
 in both it seems to fall within the general principle 
 that the presumption against a retrospective con- 
 struction has no application to enactments which 
 affect only the procedure and practice of the 
 
 (a) Per Lord Campbell, B. v. Leeds By. Co., 18 Q. B. 346. 
 
 (b) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97. 
 
 (c) Cornill V. Hudson (1857), 27 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; Pardo v. Bing- 
 ham (1869), 39 L. J. Ch. 170. 
 
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400 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Courts (a), even where the alteration which the 
 statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of 
 the parties. Although to make a law for punishing 
 that which, at the time when it was done, was not 
 punishable, is contrary to sound principle ; a law 
 which merely alters the procedure may, with perfect 
 propriety, be made applicable to past as well as 
 future transactions (b) ; and no secondary meaning 
 is to be sought for an enactment of such a kind. 
 No person has a vested right in any course of 
 procedure (c). He has only the right of prosecution 
 or defence in the manner prescribed for the time 
 being, by or for the Court in which he sues ; and 
 if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of pro- 
 cedure, he has no other right than to proceed 
 according to the altered mode (d). The remedy 
 does not alter the contract or the tort; it takes 
 away no vested right, for the defaulter can have 
 no vested right in a state of the law which left the 
 injured party without, or with only a defective, 
 remedy. If the time for pleading were shortened, 
 or new powers of amending were given, it would 
 
 (a) Wright v. Hale (1860), 30 L. J. Ex. 40; The Tdun, [1899] 
 P. 236; A.-G. v. Theobald (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 557, at p. 560. 
 (6) Maeaulay's Hist. Eng., vol. iii. p. 715, and vol. v. p. 43. 
 
 (c) Per Mellish L.J., Costa Mica v. Erlanger, 3 Ch. D. 69. 
 See ex. gr. The Dumfries and other cases, sup. pp. 277 279. 
 
 (d) See judgments of Wilde B., Wright v. Hale, 30 L. J. Ex. 43, 
 and of Lord Wensleydale, A.-G. v. Sillem, 10 H. L. Gas. 704,' 
 and per James L.J., Warner v. Murdoch, 4 Ch. D. 752. 
 
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KETROSPBOTIVE OPERATION AS BEGAEDS PEOCEDUEE. 401 
 
 not be open to the parties to gainsay such a change ; 
 the only right thus interfered with being that of 
 delaying or defeating justice ; a right little worthy 
 of respect (a). 
 
 The general principle, indeed, seems to be that 
 alterations in the procedure are always retrospec- 
 tive, unless there be some good reason against it (b). 
 Where, for instance, the defendant pleaded to an 
 action for a small sum, that the jurisdiction of the 
 Court had been taken away by a Court of Bequests 
 Act, and that Act was repealed after the plea but 
 before the trial ; it was held that the plaintiff was 
 entitled to judgment (c). When the Legislature 
 gave a new remedy by the Admiralty Acts of 1840 
 and 1861 (d), for enforcing rights in the Admiralty, 
 those Acts were held to extend to rights which 
 had accrued before the new remedy had been 
 provided (e). 
 
 So, the provision of the repealed s. 128, Common 
 Law Procedure Act, 1852 (/), that the plaintiff 
 
 (a) See ex. gr. Cornish v. Hocking, 22 L. J. Q. B. 142 ; Dash v. 
 Van Kleeh, 7 Johns. 503 ; The People v. Tibbetts, 4 Cowen, 392. 
 
 (&) See per Lord Blackburn, Gardner v. Lucas, 3 App. Cas. 
 603, and Kimbray v. Draper, L. E. 3 Q. B. 160. 
 
 (c) Warne v. Beresford, 6 L. J. Ex. 192. 
 
 (d) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6, and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10, ss. 6, 35. 
 
 (e) The Alexander Larsen (1841), 1 Rob. W. 288. See The 
 Ironsides, 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 129. 
 
 (/) 15 & 16 Vict. 0. 76 (s. 128 is repealed by 46 & 47 Vict. 
 0, 49, s. 3). 
 
 I.S. 26 
 
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402 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 might issue execution within six years from the 
 recovery of a judgment, without revival of the 
 judgment, was held to apply to a judgment which 
 had been recovered more than a year and a day 
 before the Act was passed, and which therefore 
 could not have been put in force under the 
 previous state of the law without revival (a) ; and 
 the power given to a married woman by the 
 Married Women's Property Act, 1882, of suing 
 in all respects as if she were a feme sole, was held 
 to enable her to so sue in respect of torts or 
 breaches of contract committed before the passing 
 of the Act (5). Sec. 37, Solicitors Act, 1843 
 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73) (c), which made solicitors* bills 
 taxable, for work done, out of Court, and which 
 also provided that, from the passing of the Act, 
 no solicitor should bring an action for costs until 
 a month after he had delivered his bill, was held 
 to apply to costs incurred before the passing of 
 the Act (d). 
 
 On this principle, it was held that s. 81, 3 & 4 
 
 (a) Boodle v. Bavis, 22 L. J. Ex. 69. 
 
 (6) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1 (2) ; Weldon v. Winslow, 13 
 Q. B. D. 784. See also Weldon v. Be Bathe, 14 Q. B. D. 339 ; 
 Lowe V. Fox, 15 Q. B. D. 667. Comp. Lumley, Be, [1894] 
 3 Ch. 135. 
 
 (c) Last proviso of s. 37 is repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 79, s. 2. 
 
 (d) Binns v. Hey, 13 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; Broois v. BocJeett, 9 
 Q. B. 847 ; Scadding v. Eyles, Id. 858. 
 
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KETROSPECTIVE OP^KATION AS REGAEDS PKOOEDUKE. 403 
 
 Will. IV. 0. 42 (a), which provides that in actions 
 brought by executors, the plaintiff shall be liable 
 for costs, was applicable to an action begun before 
 the Act came into operation (b); and though Little- 
 dale J. (c), and afterwards Parke B. (d), disapproved 
 of the decision, it appears to have been generally 
 concurred in by the Courts (e). So, the Common 
 Law Procedure Act of 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 126, 
 s. 34) (/), which deprives a plaintiff, in an action for 
 a wrong, of costs, if he recovers by verdict less 
 than £5, unless the judge certifies in his favour, 
 was held to apply to actions begun before the Act 
 had come into operation, but tried after (^); and 
 a similar effect was given to 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, 
 as regards giving security for costs in the County 
 Courts (h). The provision which extended the 
 time for making decrees nisi absolute from three 
 
 (a) Sec. 31, repealed by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, coupled with 46 & 
 47 Vict. c. 49, s. 4 (with saving for local or personal actions). 
 
 (6) Freeman v. Moyes, 1 A. & B. 338 ; Pickup v. Wharton, 2 
 C. & M. 405 ; Grant v. Kewp, Id. 636 ; Exp. Dawson, L. E. 
 19 Bq. 433. 
 
 (c) 1 A. & B. 341. 
 
 (d) In Pinhom v. Sonster, 8 Ex. 138. 
 
 (e) Per ChanneU B., WrigU v. Hale, 30 L. J. Ex. 43 ; pqr 
 Wood V.-C, Be Lord, 1 K. & J. 90. 
 
 (/) Eepealed by 30 & 31 Vict., Sched. (C), 
 (g) Wright v. Hale (1860), 30 L.J. Ex. 40. 
 (7i) Kimbray v. Draper (1868), L. K. 3 Q. B. 160; 37 L. J, 
 Q. B. 80. 
 
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404 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 to six months, applied to suits pending when the 
 Act came into operation (a). 
 
 But a new procedure would be presumably 
 inapplicable, where its application would prejudice 
 rights established under the old (6) ; or would in- 
 volve a breach of faith between the. parties. For 
 this reason, those provisions of the repealed s. 32, 
 Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (c), which 
 permitted error to be brought on a judgment upon 
 a special case, and gave an appeal upon a point 
 reserved at the trial, were held not to apply where 
 the special case was agreed to, and the point was 
 reserved, before the Act came into operation (d) . 
 
 Where a special demurrer stood for argument 
 before the passing of the first Common Law Pro- 
 cedure Act, it was held that the judgment was not 
 to be affected by that Act, which abolished special 
 demurrers, but must be governed by the earlier 
 law (e). The judgment was, in strictness, due 
 before the Act, and the delay of the Court ought 
 not to affect it. 
 
 In considering whether a statute was intended 
 
 o 
 
 (a) Watlon v. Wattaii, 35 L. J. P. & M. 95. 
 
 (6) Phoenix Bessemer Co., Exp., 45 L. J. Ch. 11. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49, s. 3. 
 
 (d) Hughes v. Lumley, 24 L. J. Q. B. 29 ; Vansittart v. Taylor, 
 4 B. & B. 910. 
 
 (e) Pinhorn v. Sonster, 21 L. J. Ex. 336. See also B. v. Growan, 
 19 L. .1. M. C. 20 ; Hobson v. Neale, 22 L. J. Ex. 175. 
 
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BBTEOSPECTIVE OPERATION AS REGARDS PROCEDURE. 405 
 
 to be retrospective in its operation, reference has 
 been made to prescribed forms appended to rules 
 made under the statute, and to the fact that their 
 being headed "the day of , 189 ," 
 
 indicated that they were not intended to apply to 
 a period before 1890 (a). 
 
 (a) 53 & 64 Vict. o. 71, s. 25; section repealed by 4 & 5 
 Geo. V. c. 47, and replaced by s. 13 of that Act ; Norman, Be, 
 [1893] 2 Q. B. 369. 
 
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CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 SECTION I. — ^MODIFICATION OP THE LANGUAGE TO MEET 
 THE INTENTION. 
 
 Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary 
 meaning and grammatical construction, leads to 
 a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose 
 of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or 
 absurdity hardship or injustice, presumably not in- 
 tended, a construction may be put upon it which 
 modifies the meaning of the words, and even the 
 structure of the sentence (a). This may be done 
 by departing from the rules of grammar ; by giving 
 an unusual meaning to particular words ; by alter- 
 ing their collocation ; by rejecting them altogether ; 
 or by interpolating other words ; under the in- 
 fluence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction, that 
 the Legislature could not possibly have intended 
 
 (a) See per Alderson B., A.-G. v. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 398, 
 and Miller v. Salomons, 7 Ex. 475 ; per Lord Denman, Juhh v. 
 Hull Dock Co., 9 Q. B. 443 ; per Lord Campbell, Wigton v. Snaith, 
 16 Q. B. 503 ; per Parke B., Beche v. Smith, 2 M. & W. 195, 
 Wright v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 99, and Hollingworth v. Palmer, 
 18 L. J. Ex. 409, 414 ; per James L.J., Bashleigh, Exp., 2 Oh. D. 
 13 ; Grot, de B. & P. b. 2, c. 16, s. 12 (4). See also per counsel, 
 Cory V. France (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 346. 
 
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MODIFICATION OP THE LANGUAGE, 407 
 
 what its words signify, and that the modifica- 
 tions thus made are mere corrections of careless 
 language, and really give the true meaning. Where 
 the main object and intention of a statute are 
 clear, it miist not be reduced to a nullity by the 
 draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, 
 except in a case of necessity, or the absolute in- 
 tractabihty of the language used (a). The rules of 
 grammar yield readily in such cases to those of 
 common sense. 
 
 In a case already mentioned where a Colonial 
 ordinance, passed to give effect to the treaty 
 between this country and China, authorised the 
 extradition to the Chinese Government of any of 
 its subjects charged with having committed " any 
 crime or offence against the laws of China," the 
 Privy Council construed these words as limited to 
 those crimes and offences which are punishable by 
 the laws of all civilised nations ; and as not includ- 
 ing acts which, though against the laws of China, 
 would be innocent in Europe (6). As the literal 
 meaning of the words was wide enough to include 
 political offences against the law of a foreign State, 
 an English Court might feel bound to think it 
 impossible that they could have been used in that 
 sense. But it might be doubted whether the other 
 
 (o) Salmon v. Buncombe (1886), 11 App. Gas. 627 ; 55 L. J. P. 0. 
 69 ; and see Bose v. Bose, [1897] 1 Ir. E. 9, at pp. 39-42. 
 (6) A.-0. V. Ewok-a-Sing, sup. p. 45. 
 
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408 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 party to the treaty understood our stipulation in 
 the same narrow sense ; or, indeed, whether it did 
 not understand it as including, above all others, 
 those crimes which all Governments are most 
 desirous to punish, viz., those against them- 
 selves (a). Where the clearly expressed intention 
 of a Colonial ordinance was to give to any subject 
 of the Queen resident in the colony the power of 
 disposing by Will according to English law of 
 property both real and personal,' which otherwise 
 would devolve according to the law of the colony, 
 and where a section of the ordinance was operative 
 for that purpose, except that it concluded with 
 the provision "as if such subject resided in Eng- 
 land," the effect of which would be to leave both 
 the lex situs and the lex domicilii in operation, thus 
 reducing the section to a nulUty, it was held that 
 the concluding words ought not to be so construed 
 as to destroy all that had gone before, and there- 
 fore should be treated as immaterial, the powers 
 conferred not being affected by the question of 
 residence in England (&). When it was settled 
 that the Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. I. c. 16), 
 applied to India (c), it was necessary to construe, 
 for that purpose, the expression "beyond the 
 
 (o) The same wide expressions are used in the 34 & 35 Vict. 
 c. 8, and m the 37 & 38 Vict. c. 38. 
 
 (6) Salmon v. Buncombe (1886), 11 App. Gas. 627. 
 (c) East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. 0. 85. 
 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE. 409 
 
 seas," as meaning out of the territories (a). The 
 same statute, which, after limiting the time for 
 suing, gave a further period to persons abroad 
 "after they returned," was construed as giving 
 that extended time to the executor of a person 
 who never returned, but died abroad (6). In the 
 provision of s. 5, Arbitration Act, 1889, that where 
 a submission provides that the reference shall be 
 to a single arbitrator, and aU parties do not concur 
 in the appointment of an arbitrator, any party may 
 serve the other parties with a written notice to 
 " appoint " an arbitrator, " appoint " must be read 
 as " concur in appointing," as it could not be sup- 
 posed that the intention was that the party who 
 would not concur in an appointment should have 
 the appointment in his own hands (c). 
 
 An Act which made it penal " to be in possession 
 of game after the last day " allowed for shooting, 
 would, if construed literally, include cases where 
 the possession had begun before the last day, and 
 therefore lawfully ; and to avoid this injustice, it 
 was construed as applying only where the possession 
 did not begin until after the close of the season ; 
 that is, the words "to begin" were interpolated 
 
 (a) Buckmciboye v. Lulloobhoy, 8 Mod. P. 0. 4. 
 
 (6) Tomisend v. Beacon, 18 L. J. Ex. 298. See also Forbes v. 
 Smith, 24 L. J. Ex. 299. 
 
 (c) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49 ; Eyre and Leicester Corp., Be, [1892] 
 1 Q. B. 136, inf. p. 428. 
 
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410 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 before "to be in possession " (a). Under the 
 Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, which prohibibed 
 the use of an underground bakehouse unless it 
 was " so used at the commencement of the Act," 
 it was held that an old-established bakehouse 
 which was vacant at the commencement of the 
 Act, but whose owner was seeking a tenant, was 
 within the exemption (b). When one section 
 enacted that if the plaintiff recovered a sum " not 
 exceeding" ,£5 he should have no costs, and 
 another, that if he recovered " less than " £5, 
 and the judge certified, he should have his costs ; 
 the literal meaning of the last clause leaving it 
 inoperative where the sum recovered was exactly 
 £5, it was held, to avoid imputing so incongruous 
 and improbable an intention to the Legislature, 
 that the words "less than," should be read as 
 equivalent to "not exceeding," the general principle 
 being that " Acts of Parliament should be construed 
 with a candid mind and with an intention to under- 
 stand them " (c). Sec. 32, 7 Geo. IV. c. 57 {d), 
 
 (a) 2 Geo. III. c. 19, 39 Geo. III. c. 34 ; both Acts repealed 
 as to England by 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 1 ; Simpson v. Untoin, 
 37 E. E. 359. 
 
 (6) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 37, s. 27 (3), repealed and replaced by 
 s. 101 (1), Factory and Workshop Act, 1901 ; Schwerzerhof v. 
 WilUns, [1898] 1 Q. B. 640. 
 
 (c) Garby v. Harris (1852), 21 L. J. Ex. 160. 
 
 (d) Eepealed S. L. E., 1873. 
 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE. 411 
 
 which invalidated voluntary conveyances made by 
 insolvents " within three months before the com- 
 mencement of the imprisonment," which, literally, 
 would exclude the time of imprisonment, was con- 
 strued as if the words had been " within a period 
 commencing three months before the imprison- 
 ment." The literal construction, in leaving un- 
 invalidated voluntary conveyances made after the 
 imprisonment had begun/would have led to an 
 incongruity which the Legislature could not be 
 supposed to have intended (a). Sec. 65, County 
 Courts Act, 1888, which provides that, where the 
 claim in an action of contract does not exceed 
 ^100,. a Judge of the High Court may order the 
 action to be tried in any County Court " in which 
 the action might have been commenced," was con- 
 strued with the addition of the words " if it had been 
 a County Court action," as otherwise the enact- 
 mentwould have been insensible and inoperative (&). 
 The Bankruptcy Act, 1869, providing that all 
 the property acquired by the bankrupt " during 
 the continuance " of the bankruptcy should be 
 
 (a) Becke v. Smith, 6 L. J. Ex. 54. 
 
 (6) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43 ; Curtis v. Stovin, 22 Q. B. D. 513. See 
 also Burhill v. Thomas, [1892] 1 Q. B. 312. By s. 3 of 3 
 Edw. Vn. c. 42, the jurisdiction of a County Court is extended 
 to claims not exceeding £100. Demands may not be divided 
 for the purpose of bringing two or more actions. See s. 81, 
 County Court Act, 1888. 
 
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412 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 divisible among his creditors, and providing also 
 that he might obtain his discharge not only at the 
 close, but during the continuance of his bank- 
 ruptcy (a), it was held that the earlier passage 
 must be read in substance as meaning that the 
 future property which was to be divisible, was that 
 acquired either during the continuance of the 
 bankruptcy or the earlier discharge of the bank- 
 rupt (b). This construction was deemed necessary 
 to avoid leaving the bankrupt incapable of acquir- 
 ing property after he had given up everything to 
 his creditors, simply because the property had not 
 been realised, and consequently the bankruptcy 
 not closed (c). 
 
 It is obvious that the provisions in numerous 
 statutes which limit the time and regulate the 
 procedure for legal proceedings for compensation 
 for acts done in the execution of his office by a 
 justice or other person, or "under" or "by 
 virtue," or " in pursuance " of his authority, do 
 not mean what the words, in their plain and 
 unequivocal sense, convey ; since an act done in 
 
 (a) As to what will disentitle a. bankrupt to discharge, see 
 Smith, In re (1919), L. J. K. B. 113. 
 
 (6) See as to this point, Hill v. Settle, [1917] 1 Oh. 319, C. A. 
 
 (c) 32 & 33 Viet. c. 71, ss. 15 and 48 repealed. As to similar 
 provisions in existing Act, see ss. 26 and 38, Bankruptcy Act, 1914; 
 Ebbs V. Boulnois (1875), L. E. 10 Oh. 479 ; and see Cholmeley 
 School V. Sewell (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 820. 
 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE. 413 
 
 accordance with law is not actionable, and there- 
 fore needs no special statutory protection (a). Such 
 provisions are obviously intended to protect, under 
 certain circumstances, acts which are not legal or 
 justifiable (b) ; and the meaning given to them by 
 a great number of decisions seems, in the result, 
 to be that they give protection in all cases where 
 the defendant did, or neglected (c), what is com- 
 plained of, under colour of the statute (d) ; that 
 is, being within the general purview of it, and 
 with the honest intention of acting as it authorised, 
 though he might be ignorant of the existence of 
 
 (a) Per Our., Hughes v. BucUand (1846), 15 L. J. Ex. 233. 
 Cf. The PabUo Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict, 
 c. 61), where the words are, " Where . . . any action ... is 
 commenced . . . against any person for any act done in pur- 
 suance or execution, or intended execution, of any Act of 
 Parliament, or of any public duty or authority." 
 
 (6) See ex. gr. Warne v. Varley, 6 T. E. 443 ; Lea v. Facey 
 (1887), 19 Q. B. D., Bsher M.E., at p. 354. 
 
 (c) Wilson V. Halifax (1868), L. E. 3 Ex. 114 ; Newton v. Mis, 
 24 L. J. Q. B. 337. 
 
 (d) Thus the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, has 
 been held to extend its protection to municipal bodies in the 
 execution of duties in connection with commercial enterprises 
 undertaken under statutory authority ; The Tdun, [1899] P. 236 ; 
 Parker v. London C. C, [1904] 2 K. B. 501. But see Lyles v. 
 Southend-on-Sea, 74 L. J. K. B. 484 ; per Buckley J., National 
 Telephone Go. v. Kingston-upon-Hull, 89 L. T. 291 ; Sharpington 
 V. Fulham (1904), 73 L. J. Oh. 777 ; Myers v. Bradford Corpora- 
 tion (1915), L. J. K. B. 306. 
 
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414 INTBRPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 the Act ; and actually, whether reasonably or not, 
 believing in the existence of such facts or state 
 of things as would, if really existing, have justified 
 his conduct (a). Thus, if an Act authorised the 
 arrest of a person who entered the dwelling-house 
 of another at night with intent to commit a felony 
 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 51), an arrest made in the 
 honest and not unreasonable, but mistaken, belief 
 that the person arrested had entered with that 
 intent, would be protected. Apparently, how- 
 ever, there would be no protection if the arrest 
 were made under a misconception, not of the facts, 
 but of the law ; as, for instance, if the person making 
 the arrest beheved that the prisoner had only 
 
 (a) See, among many other authorities, Greenway v. Hurd, 4 
 T. E. 653 ; Boherts v. Orchard, 33 L. J. Ex. 65 ; Booth v. Olive, 
 20 L. J. G. P. 151 ; Garpue v. London & Brighton Ry. Co., 13 
 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; Tarrant v. Baker, 23 L. J. C. P. 21 ; Burling 
 V. Barley, 27 L. J. Ex. 258 ; Kine v. Evershed, 16 L. J. Q. B. 
 271 ; Hermann v. Seneschal, 32 L. J. C. P. 43 ; Downing v. Gapel, 
 L. E. 2 0. P. 461 ; Leete v. Hart, L. E. 3 C. P. 322 ; Chamberlain 
 V. King, L. E. 6 C. P. 474 ; Selmes v. Judge, L. E. 6 Q. B. 724 ; 
 Midland By. v. Withington ■Loc. Bd., 11 Q. B. D. 788 ; Mason v. 
 Aird, 51 L. J. Q. B. 244 ; Denny v. Thwaites, 46 L. J. M. C. 141 ; 
 Cree v. St. Pancras Vestry, [1899] 1 Q. B. 693 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 
 389. In the following cases the Act has been held inapplicable : 
 Gierke v. St. Helen's Corp., 85 L. J. K. B. 17, C. A. ; Myers v. 
 Bradford Corp., (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 306 ; Fry v. Cheltenham 
 Corp., 81 L. J. K. B. 41 ; Hart v. Marylehone Borough Council, 76 
 J. P. 257 ; A.-G. v. Lewes Corp. (1911), 81 L. J. Gh. 40 ; li. 
 V. Hertford Union, 111 L. T. 716. 
 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE. 415 
 
 attempted to enter ; a different offence, for which 
 the enactment in question does not authorise 
 arrest ; or if, where the law justified an immediate 
 apprehension, an arrest was made which was not 
 immediate (a). As a general proposition, however, 
 unreasonableness of belief is immaterial, if the 
 belief be honest; though it is an important 
 element in determining the question of honesty (b). 
 A repealed Act (26 & 27 Vict. c. 29) (c), which 
 enacted by s. 7 (d) that no witness before an 
 election inquiry should be excused from answer- 
 ing seH-criminating questions relating to corrupt 
 practices at the election under inquiry, and entitled 
 him, when he answered every question relating to 
 those matters, to a certificate of indemnity declar- 
 ing that he had answered all such criminating 
 questions, was held to apply only where the witness 
 answered " truly in the opinion of the com- 
 missioners " ; for it was not to be supposed that 
 any answer, however false or contemptuous, was 
 equally intended (e). It is observable that this 
 interpolation was made in the Act, notwithstanding 
 that it repealed an earlier enactment which had 
 
 (a) Griffith v. Taylor (1876), 2 C P. D. 194 ; Morgan v. Palmer, 
 2 L. J. (O: S.) K. B. 145. 
 
 (6) See Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by Corrupt and Illegal Practioes Prevention 
 Act, 1883. 
 
 {d) See s. 59 of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51. 
 
 (e) E. V. Hvlme, L. E. 6 Q. B. 377 ; B. v. Boll, 7 Q B. D. 575. 
 
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416 INTEEPKBXATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 protected the witness only when he made " true " 
 discovery. 
 
 Sec. 374, of the long since repealed Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1854, which enacted that no license 
 granted by the Trinity House to pilots " shall con- 
 tinue in force beyond the 31st of January," after 
 its date, but that " the same may be renewed on 
 such 31st of January in every year, or any subse- 
 quent day," was construed as meaning, not that 
 the renewed licenses must be issued on or after 
 that day, but that they should take effect from the 
 31st of January. This departure from the strict 
 letter was justified by the great inconvenience 
 which would have resulted from a rigid adherence 
 to it, since it would have left the whole district 
 for a certain period, probably days, possibly weeks, 
 without qualified pilots (a). 
 
 In s. 7, Kailway and Canal Trafl&c Act, 1854, 
 which enacts that railway and canal companies 
 shall be liable for the loss or any injury done to 
 " any horses, cattle, or other animals " (which 
 would include a dog) intrusted to them for car- 
 riage, with the proviso that no greater damage 
 
 (o) The Beta, 3 Moo. P. 0. N. S. 23. It is now provided by 
 s. 599 (4) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, that " A pilotage 
 certificate . . . shall not be in force for more than the period of 
 one year from its date, but may be renewed from year to 
 year. . . ." As to the grant of pilotage certificates to masters 
 and mates, sea s. 23, Pilotage Act, 1913 (2 & 3 Geo. V. c. 31). 
 
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MODIFICATION OP THE LANGUAGE. 417 
 
 should be recovered for the loss of, or injury 
 done to, " any of such animals " beyond the sums 
 thereinafter mentioned — specifying certain sums 
 for horses, neat cattle, sheep and pigs, but making 
 no mention of dogs — the proviso was read, in order 
 to reconcile it with the enacting part, as dealing 
 only with " any of the following of such animals " (a). 
 "Where a railway company was made liable to make 
 good the deficiency in the parochial rates arising 
 from their having taken rateable property, " until 
 its works were completed and liable to assess- 
 ment," the House of Lords held that the intention 
 was that the liability should cease as regards 
 any one parish, as soon as that portion of the 
 line which ran through it was completed ; in 
 other words, that the Act was to be read as fixing 
 .the liability when "its works in the parish were 
 completed " (6). 
 
 A case in the Queen's Bench may be cited as 
 furnishing a remarkable example of judicial modifi- 
 cation for the purpose of supplying an apparent 
 case of omission, and avoiding an injustice and 
 absurdity, such as the Legislature was presumed 
 
 (a) Harrison v. London and Brighton By. Co., 29 L. J. Q. B. 
 209 ; reversed on another point (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; B. v. 
 Strachan, L. E. 7 Q. B. 463. See another instance of inter- 
 polation in Perry v. Skinner, sup. p. 389. 
 
 (6) East London By. Co. v. Whitechureh (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 
 159, sup. p. 32. 
 
 I.S. 27 
 
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418 INTERPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 not to have intended. Under 1 & 2 Vict. o. 110 (a), 
 an insolvent prisoner for debt might be discharged 
 from imprisonment, either upon his own petition, 
 or upon the petition of any of his creditors. 
 10 & 11 Vict. c. 102 {b), in abolishing the circuits 
 of the Insolvent Commissioners, and transferring 
 their jurisdiction to the County Courts, provided 
 that "if an insolvent petitions," the Insolvent 
 Court should refer his petition to the Court of the 
 district where he was imprisoned ; but it omitted 
 all mention of cases where the petitioner was a 
 creditor. The Court, however, considered that an 
 intention to include the latter suflBciently appeared. 
 To confine the section to its literal meaning would 
 have involved the unjust result that, though a 
 vesting order might be made, and the debtor be 
 deprived of his property, he would remain im- 
 prisoned. The words " if an insolvent petitions " 
 were accordingly understood to have merely put 
 that case as an example of the more general 
 intention, viz., " if a petition be presented." For 
 the purposes of the Legislature, it was immaterial 
 whether the petition was the insolvent's or the 
 creditor's (c). 
 
 Again, notwithstanding the general rule that 
 full effect must be given to every word, yet if no 
 
 (a) Sec. 36. (6) Sec. 10. 
 
 (c) B. V. Bowling (1857), 8 B. & B. 605, npm. Greenwood, Exj)., 
 27 L. J. Q. B. 28. 
 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE. 419 
 
 sensible meaning can be given to a word or phrase, 
 or if it would defeat the real object of the enact- 
 ment, it may, or rather it should, be eliminated (a). 
 The words of a statute must be construed so as 
 to give a sensible meaning to them if possible. 
 They ought to be construed ut res magis valeat 
 quam pereat (b). 
 
 The Carriers Act, 1830 (1 Will. IV. c. 68), which 
 enacts that a carrier shall not be responsible for 
 the loss of certain articles delivered for carriage, 
 unless the sender declares their value and nature, 
 at the time of delivery, " at the office " of the 
 carrier, was held to protect the carrier, where the 
 parcel had been delivered to his servant elsewhere 
 thajj at the office, and no declaration had been 
 made either there or elsewhere ; the fair meaning 
 of the statute, and the paramount object of the 
 Legislature being that the carrier should in every 
 case be apprised of the nature and value of the 
 article entrusted to him, wh-ether it was delivered 
 at the office or elsewhere (c). 
 
 (a) Per Lord Abinger, Lyde v. Barnard, 1 M. & W. 115 ; per 
 Brett J., Stone v. Yeovil, 1 0. P. D. 701, though in that case 
 the elimination was not necessary, 2 C. P. D. 99, and where 
 elimination is unnecessary there is no power to delete. See also 
 Plant V. Potts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 256, and Hurcwm v. Eilleary, [1894] 
 1 Q. B. 579, C. A. 
 
 (6) Per Bowen L.J., Curtis v. Stovin, 22 Q. B. D. 513 ; and 
 per Lindley L.J., The Duke of Buccleuch, 15 P. D. 86. 
 
 (c) Baxendale v. Eart (1852), 21 L. J. Ex. 123. 
 
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420 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 An Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 114) which authorised 
 constables to search any person whom they sus- 
 pected of coming from any land in unlawful pursuit 
 of game, and, if any game was found upon him, to 
 detain and summon him, was held to authorise 
 a constable to summon a man whom he saw on 
 a footway, with a gun in his hand, picking up a 
 rabbit thrown from an adjoining enclosure, just 
 after the report of a gun, but whom he did not 
 search. There was nothing in the general object 
 of the Act to lead to the supposition that " the 
 enormous absurdity " of requiring an actual bodily 
 search under such circumstances was intended ; 
 and such a departure from the language of the 
 Act was therefore considered as really meeting the 
 true intention (a). The Extradition Act, 1870, 
 which authorises the "apprehension" of a person 
 on warrant, includes the detention of one already 
 in custody, though arrested without a warrant (b). 
 So, the 35 Geo. III. c. 101, s. 2, which empowered 
 justices to suspend, in case of sickness, the order 
 of removal of any pauper who should be " brought 
 before them for the purpose of being removed," 
 
 (a) Hall V. Knox (1863), 33 L. J. M. C. 1 ; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 14 
 Q. B. D. 725, -which discusses Clarhe v. Crowder, L. E. 4 C. P. 
 638, and Turner v. Morgan, L. E. 10 C. P. 587, where the 
 statute was construed strictly. See also sup. p. 381. Comp. 
 Vinter v. Mvnd, 10 Q. B. D. 63. 
 
 (b) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, s. 8; B. v. Weil, 53 L. J. M. C. 74. 
 
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"OR" AND "AND." 421 
 
 was construed as authorising such suspension with- 
 out the actual bringing up of the pauper before 
 the justices ; as the literal construction would have 
 defeated the humane object of the enactment (a). 
 And to prevent the enormous injustice which 
 would result from a literal interpretation of the 
 enactment that the Court of Bankruptcy should 
 refuse a bankrupt his discharge in all cases where 
 the debtor had committed an offence " under the 
 Debtors Act, 1869," it was held that the words 
 " connected with or arising out of the bankruptcy " 
 must be added to qualify the general words (b). 
 This interpretation, with amplifications, is in- 
 corporated in s. 26 (2), second paragraph, of the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1914. 
 
 To carry out the intention of the Legislature, 
 it is occasionally found necessary to read the 
 conjunctions " or " and " and " one for the other. 
 The 43 Eliz. c. 3 (c), for instance, which speaks of 
 property to be employed for the maintenance of 
 " sick and maimed soldiers," referred to soldiers 
 who were either the one " or " the other, and not 
 only to those who were both (d). 
 
 (a) B. V. Everdon, 9 Bast, 101. Sec. 2 is repealed in part by 
 S. L. R., 1871. 
 
 (6) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 66, s. 2 ; Be Brockelbank, sup. p. 358. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by S. L. E., 1863. 
 
 (d) Duke, Charit. Uses, 127. 
 
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422 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 . The 1 Jac. I. o. 15 (a), whioli made it an act of 
 bankruptcy for a trader to leave his dwelling-house 
 " to the intent, or, whereby his creditors might be 
 defeated or delayed," if construed literally, would 
 have exposed to bankruptcy every trader who left 
 his home even for an hour, if a creditor called during 
 his absence for payment. This absurd conse- 
 quence was avoided, and the real intention of the 
 Legislature beyond reasonable doubt effected, by 
 reading " or " as " and " ; so that an absence from 
 home was an act of bankruptcy only when coupled 
 with the design of delayingor defeating creditors (b). 
 The converse change was made in a Turnpike Act 
 which imposed one toll on every carriage drawn by 
 four horses, and another on every horse, laden or not 
 laden, but not drawing ; and provided that not more 
 than one toll should be demanded for repassing on 
 the same day " with the same horses and carriages." 
 It was held that the real intention of the Legislature 
 required that this " and " should be read as " or," 
 and that a carriage repassing with different horses 
 was not Hable to a second toll. The toll was imposed 
 on the carriage ; and it was immaterial whether 
 it was drawn by the same or different horses (c). 
 In the provision of the Metropolis Management 
 
 (a) Repealed 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, s. 1. 
 
 (b) Fowler v. Padget (1798), 7 T. E. 509 ; 4 E. E. 511. See 
 also B. V. Mortlalce, 6 East, 397. 
 
 (c) Waterhouse v. Keen (1825), 40 E. E. 858, wrongly reported 
 n the marginal note in 4 B. & C. 200. 
 
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"OK" AND "AND." 423 
 
 Amendment Act, 1862, that no road shall be formed 
 as a street for carriage traffic unless widened to 
 40 feet, or unless such street shall be open at 
 both ends, the word " or " was read "nor," for the 
 manifest intention was not that one of the two, but 
 that both conditions should be complied with ; that 
 is, that the street should not only be 40 feet wide, 
 but also be open at both ends {a). 
 
 This substitution of conjunctions, however, has 
 been sometimes made without sufficient reason ; 
 and it has been doubted whether some of the cases 
 of turning " or " into " and," and vice versd, have 
 not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation (&). 
 It may be questioned, for instance, whether the 
 judges who " were at the making " of the statute 
 2 Hen. V. c. 3, which required that jurors to try an 
 action when the debt " or " damages amounted to 
 forty marks, should have land worth forty shillings, 
 were justified in construing it "by equity," and 
 converting the disjunctive " or " into " and " (c). 
 
 (a) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 98 ; section repealed s. 215, 4th 
 Sched., London Building Act, 1894. Metrop. Board v. Steed, 
 8 Q. B. D. 445 ; Dau} v. London G. C, 59 L. J. M. 0. 112. 
 For existing provisions as to roads, see ss. 11 & 12 London 
 Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.). 
 
 (6) Per Lord Halsbury L.O., Mersey Docks v. Henderson, 13 
 App. Gas. 603. For a full collection of the cases hereon, see 
 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and Supp. tit.. Ok read as And, 
 AND Vice Veesa. 
 
 (c) Co. Litt. 272a. 
 
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424 INTBEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 The Court of Queen's Bench, on one occasion (now 
 overruled) held that the power given to justices by 
 the Highway Act, 1835 (6 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50 (a)), to 
 order the diversion of a highway, when it appeared 
 " nearer or more commodious to the public," was 
 limited to cases where the new road was both 
 nearer and more commodious (6) ; but the same 
 Court more recently held that the power was 
 exercisable when the new road was either the one 
 or the other (c). 
 
 Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for 
 the benefit of others, or, as it is sometimes said, for 
 the public good or the advancement of justice, have 
 often given rise to controversy when conferring the 
 authority in terms simply enabling and not manda- 
 tory. In enacting that they " may," or " shall, if 
 they think fit," or, " shall have power," or that 
 " it shall be lawful " for them to do such acts, a 
 statute appears to use the language of mere per- 
 mission ; but it has been so often decided as to 
 have become an axiom that in such cases, such 
 
 (a) Sees. 85, 91. 
 
 (6) JR. V. SMles (1841), 1 Q. B. 919. 
 
 (c) B. V. PTiillips (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 217 ; WrigU v. Frant 
 32 L. J. M. C. 204. See Harrington v. Bamaay, 22 L. J. Ex. 
 326 ; Oldfield v. Bodd, Id. 144. As to what constitutes " a good 
 notice " of intention to apply for justices order, see B. v. 
 Berhy JJ., [1917] 2 K. B. 802. 
 
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"MAY" AND "MUST." 425 
 
 expressions may have — to say the least — a com- 
 pulsory force (a), and so would seem to be modified 
 by judicial exposition. On the other hand, in some 
 cases, the authorised person is invested -with a dis- 
 cretion, and then those expressions seem divested 
 of that compulsory force, and, probably, that is the 
 primd facie meaning. 
 
 In an early case, where it was contended that 
 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12, s. 18 (6), in enacting that 
 the churchwardens and overseers " shall have 
 power and authority " to make a rate to reimburse 
 parish constables certain expenses, left it optional 
 with them to make it or not, the Court held that 
 it was obligatory on them to make it, whenever 
 disbursements had been made and not been paid. 
 " May be done," it was observed, is always under- 
 stood, in such cases of public or private right, as 
 " must be done " (c). So, where a statute directed 
 that churchwardens should deliver their accounts 
 to justices, and enacted that the latter " shall and 
 they are hereby authorised and empowered, if they 
 shall so think fit," to examine the accounts, and 
 disallow unfounded charges, it was held that the 
 justices could not decline to enter upon the 
 
 (a) Per Cur., JB. v. Tithe Commrs., 80 E. E. 271. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by 35 & 36 Vict. c. 92, s. 13, and replaced by 
 s. 4 of that Act. 
 
 (c) B. V. Barlow (1693), Garth. 293 ; B. v. Derby, Skin. 370. 
 
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426 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 examination (a), or be at liberty to allow charges 
 not sanctioned by law (6). Again the Weights 
 and Measures Act, 1889, which provides that an 
 inspector " may take in respect of the verification 
 and stamping of weights, measures, and weighing 
 instruments the fees specified," is obligatory and 
 imposes on the inspector a duty to take the fees 
 in all cases (c). Though s. 9, 11 & 12 Vict. 
 0. 42, enacts that justices " may " issue a summons 
 on an information laid before them, only, " if they 
 shall think fit," it was held that they were not at 
 liberty to refuse it on any extraneous considera- 
 tions, such as that the prosecution was inexpedient, 
 or that the law would operate unjustly in the 
 particular case (d). A charter which granted to 
 the -steward and suitors of a manor "power and 
 authority " to hold a Court to hear civil suits, 
 was held to make it obligatory to hold it when 
 
 (a) JJ. V. Cambridge, 8 Dowl. 89 ; per Bramwell L.J., B. v. 
 Oxford (Bp.), 4 Q. B. D., at p. 545. Gomp. B. v. Norfolk, i 
 B. & Ad. 238. 
 
 (6) Barton v. Piggott, 44 L. J. M. G. 5. 
 
 (c) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 21, s. 13. Section repealed by Sched. 
 II. of 4 Edw. VII. c. 28, and re-enacted cum var by s. 9 of that 
 Act. B. V. Boherts, [1901], 2 K. B. 177. 
 
 {d) B. V. Adamson (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 201 ; B. v. Fawcett, 11 
 Cox C. C. 305 ; JExp. Lewis, 21 Q. B. D. 191 ; JJ. v. Byrde, 60 
 L. J. M. 0. 17 ; and see B. v. Mead (1916), 80 J. P. 332. A very 
 instructive case on this point. 
 
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"MAY" AND "MUST." 427 
 
 necessary (a). Again, s. 7, Tithe Act, .1842 (5 & 6 
 Vict. c. 64), which enacts that if any agreement 
 for the commutation of tithes made before the Act, 
 which was not of legal validity, should appear to 
 the Tithe Commissioners to give a fair equivalent 
 for the tithe, they " shall be empowered " to con- 
 firm it, or, if unfair, to confirm it nevertheless, and 
 to award such a rent-charge as would make it a 
 proper equivalent, and to extinguish the tithe ; it 
 was considered that the Commissioners were bound 
 to make any such agreement between the parties 
 the basis of their own settlement, and were not 
 at liberty to throw it wholly aside in carrying 
 out the general policy of the Act, viz., tithe 
 extinction (6). 
 
 So, in BackweU's Case, Lord Keeper North held, 
 and of the same opinion were all the judges, that 
 the statute which enacted that the Chancellor 
 " should have full power " to issue a commission 
 of bankruptcy against a bankrupt trader, on the 
 petition of his creditors, imperatively required 
 its issue; declaring that "may" was in effect 
 
 (a) B. V. Havering-atte-Bower, 5 B. & Aid. 691 ; B. v. Hastings, 
 Id. 692 n., both better reported in 2 D. &E. 176 n., and 1 D. & E. 
 148. 
 
 (6) B. V. Tithe Commrs., 14 Q. B. 474. And see Julius v. 
 Oxford {Bp.) (1880), 5 App. Cas. 214 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 577 ; 
 note especially dicta Cairns L.C., at p. 224, and Penzance Ld., 
 p. 229, inf. pp. 432, 433. 
 
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428 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 " must " (a). Under s. 13, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61(6), 
 which enacted that the Superior Court "may" 
 give the plaintiff the costs of his action, if he lived 
 more than 20 miles from the defendant, it was 
 held that the Court was bound to give them in 
 every case in which the plaintiff and defendant 
 dwelt more than that distance apart (c). Under 
 the provision of s. 5, Arbitration Act, 1889, that 
 where a submission provides that the reference 
 shall be to a single arbitrator, and all parties do 
 not concur in appointing an arbitrator, any party 
 may serve the other parties with a written notice 
 to appoint, and if the appointment is not made in 
 seven clear days the Court " may," on the appli- 
 cation of the party who gave the notice, appoint 
 an arbitrator, it is obligatory on the Court to 
 make an appointment if applied to (d). An Act 
 which made it "lawful" for a Court to stay 
 proceedings in actions against companies under 
 liquidation until proof of the plaintiff's debt (e) ; 
 
 (a) 13 EUz. c. 7 ; 1 Jac, c. 15 ; BackwelVs Case, 1 Vem. 152. 
 (6) Eepealed by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43; s. 188. 
 
 (c) McDougall v. Paterson (1851), 21 L. J. C. P. 27 ; ace. 
 Crake v. Powell, 21 L. J. Q. B. 183, overruling Jones v. Harrison 
 20 L. J. Ex. 166. 
 
 (d) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, s. 5 ; Eyre and Leicester Corp., Be, 
 [1892] 1 Q. B. 136. 
 
 (e) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, s. 73, now repealed. Marson V. Lmid 
 (1849), 13 Q. B. 664. For similar provisions in Companies (Con- 
 solidation) Act, 1908, see s. 140. 
 
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"IT SHALL BE LAWFUL." 429 
 
 and a bankruptcy rule which provided that where 
 the Court has given no directions as to the dis- 
 allowance of the costs of improper or unnecessary 
 proceedings, the taxing-master " may " look into 
 the question, were held equally imperative (a). 
 So, the provision of s. 56, Corrupt and Illegal 
 Practices Prevention Act, 1883, that certain juris- 
 diction conferred by the Act " may " be exercised 
 by one of the judges for the time being on the rota 
 for the trial of election petitions, is to be read 
 as equivalent to " must," and the jurisdiction 
 cannot be exercised by any other judge (b). An 
 Act which empowered a vestry to make a paving 
 rate, and provided that when it appeared to the 
 vestry that the rate was not incurred for the equal 
 benefit of the whole parish, it " might " exempt 
 the party not benefited, was held to impose a 
 duty and not merely to confer a power on the 
 vestry, to apportion the burden when the case 
 arose (c). 
 
 On the other hand, where it was enacted that 
 " it should be lawful " for the Superior Courts to 
 issue commissions to examine witnesses abroad, it 
 
 (a) Baines v. Wormaley (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 844. 
 
 (h) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51 ; Shaw v. BecMtt, [1893] 1 Q. B. 779. 
 
 (c) Howell V. London Bock Co. (1858), 27 L. J. M. 0. 177. For 
 comments on this case, which was an anomalous one, see 
 B. V. G. W. Bij. (1858), 28 L. J. M. C. 59. See also Bormont 
 V. Furness By. Co., 11 Q. B. D. 496. 
 
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430 INTEEPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 was held that the Court was not bound to issue 
 such a commission simply on proof that the per- 
 sons whose evidence was required were abroad, but 
 that it was in the discretion of the Court to deter- 
 mine upon the special circumstances of each case, 
 whether it was advisable in the interests of justice 
 to issue it or not {a). So, under a statute which 
 enacted that where a county bridge is narrow, 
 " it shall and may be lawful " for the Quarter 
 Sessions to order it to be widened, it was held 
 (having regard to the nature of the Court entrusted 
 with the power, and to the subject matter which 
 might involve other considerations besides the 
 width of the bridge, such as the cost of the pro- 
 posed work and its possible disproportion to any 
 public benefit likely to be derived from it) that 
 it was discretionary to make the order or not (6). 
 But " may," where used in s. 9 of 38 & 39 Vict. c. 
 86, is imperative (c). Again, the enactment that if 
 part of the consideration for an annuity were 
 returned, or paid in goods, or retained on any 
 
 (a) 1 Will. rV. c. 22, s. 4 ; Castelli v. Groom (1852), 21 
 L. J. Q. B. 308. See Armour v. Walker, 25 Ch. D. 673; 
 Lawson v. Vacuum Brake Co. (1884), 27 Ch. D. 137. This latter 
 case explained in Coeh v. Allcaick (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 1; 
 affirmed 57 L. J. Q. B. 489. 
 
 (6) 43 Geo. III. c. 59, s. 2 ; Ee Newport Bridge (1859), 29 
 L. J. M, C. 52. 
 
 (c) B. V. Mitchell, Livesey, Exp. (1913), 77 J. P. 148 ; 82 
 L. J. K. B. 153. 
 
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"IT SHALL BE LAWFUL." 431 
 
 pretence, " it should be lawful" for the Court to 
 cancel the annuity deed, if it should appear that 
 " any such practices," had been used ; the Court 
 considered that this last expression limited the 
 enactment to cases where any of the forbidden 
 acts had been done malo animo, and held that it 
 was in their discretion to set the deed aside or 
 not (a). The Church Discipline Act, 1840, which 
 enacts that in every case of a clergyman charged 
 with an ecclesiastical offence, or concerning whom 
 a scandal may. exist of having committed such an 
 offence, "it shall be lawful " for the bishop, on the 
 application of any person complaining of it, or if 
 he thinks fit, on his own motion, to appoint a 
 commission to examine witnesses, to ascertain if 
 there be sufficient prima facie ground for instituting 
 further proceedings, was held to leave it discre- 
 tionary with the bishop to appoint a commission on 
 receiving such a complaint. Having regard to 
 the pre-existing state of the law and the character 
 of the bishop's office, it was considered that it was 
 his duty, before issuing the commission, to 
 determine on the expediency of instituting the 
 prosecution, taking into his consideration the 
 nature, credibility, or importance of the charge, 
 and the status, solvency, and religious character of 
 
 (a) 53 Geo. HI. o. 141, s. 6 ; repealed by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90 ; 
 Barler v. Gamson (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 281 ; Girdlestone v. Allan, 
 1 B. & C. 61. 
 
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432 INTEBPRKTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the complainant, as well as the general interests of 
 the Church (a). 
 
 This subject underwent much discussion in B. 
 V. Oxford (Bp.), and elicited various views. The 
 Queen's Bench held that it was imperative to 
 issue the commission where a complaint had 
 been made of an ecclesiastical offence (b), but the 
 Court of Appeal reversed this decision (c), and this 
 reversal was upheld on appeal to the House of 
 Lords, who were practically unanimous in their 
 view. 
 
 According to Lord Cairns, such words as " it 
 shall be lawful " are always simply permissive (d) 
 or enabling. They confer a power, and do not, of 
 themselves, do more. But there may be some- 
 thing in the nature of the thing empowered to be 
 done, something in the object for which it is to be 
 done, something in the conditions under which it 
 is to be done, something in the title of the persons 
 for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, 
 which may couple the power with a duty, and 
 make it the duty of the person in whom the power 
 
 (o) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, practically repealed by 55 & 56 Vict, 
 c. 32 (Clergy Discipline Act, 1892) ; B. v. Oxford (Bp.), 4 Q. B. D. 
 525 ; Julius v. Oxford [Bp.), 5 App. Gas. 214 ; Alloroft v. London 
 {Bp.), [1891] A. C. 666; B. v. Chichester (Bp.), 2 E. & E. 209. 
 
 (b) B. V. Oxford (Bp.), 4 Q. B. D. 245. 
 
 (c) 4 Q. B. D., p> 525. 
 
 (d) S. C, 5 App. Gas., p. 222. 
 
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"IT SHALL BE LAWFUL." 433 
 
 is reposed to exercise it when called upon to do 
 so ; it lies on those who contend that an obliga- 
 tion exists to exercise the power, to show in the 
 circumstances of the case something which, accord- 
 ing to the above principles, created that obligation ; 
 and the cases decide only that where a power is 
 deposited with a public officer for the purpose of 
 being used for the benefit of persons who are 
 specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom 
 a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the 
 conditions upon which they are entitled to call for 
 its exercise, that power ought to be exercised, and 
 the Court will require it to be exercised (a). Lord 
 Penzance said that the words " it shall be lawful " 
 are distinctly words of permission only, and the 
 true question is, not whether, they mean something 
 different, but whether, having regard to all the 
 circumstances — to the person enabled, to the 
 general object of the statute, and to the persons 
 for whose benefit the power may have been in- 
 tended to be conferred — they do or do not create 
 a duty in the person on whom it is conferred to 
 exercise it. It is not enough that the thing 
 empowered to be done should be for the public 
 benefit in order to make it imperative to exercise 
 that power on all occasions falling within the 
 statute. It may be assumed that all powers 
 conferred by statute on individuals in general 
 
 (a) 5 App. Gas., p. 225. 
 I.S. 
 
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 28 
 
434 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Public Acts are for the public benefit, or they 
 would not have been conferred. He could find 
 no specific authority for the proposition that in 
 a certain class of statutes such words as "it shall 
 be lawful " import primd facie, not permission but 
 obligation. The effect of the cases in which the 
 exercise of the power conferred was held to be 
 obligatory was that, though the statutes concerned 
 had in terms only conferred a power, the circum- 
 stances were such as to create a duty, to show 
 that the exercise of any discretion by the person 
 empowered could not have been intended (a). 
 Lord Selborne's view was that words such as "it 
 shall be lawful '•' are not ambiguous and susceptible 
 either of a discretionary or an obKgatory sense, 
 but their meaning is the same, whether there is or 
 is not a duty or obligation to use the power which 
 they confer. They are potential, and never (in 
 themselves) significant of any obligation. The 
 question whether a judge or public officer, to 
 whom a power is given by such words, is bound to 
 use it upon any particular occasion, or in any 
 particular manner, must be solved aliunde, and in 
 general it is to be solved from the context, from 
 the particular provisions, or from the general 
 scope and objects, of the enactment conferring 
 the power (6). Lord Blackburn's opinion was that 
 
 (a) 5 App. Gas., p. 228. 
 
 (b) Id., p. 235. 
 
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"MAY" AND "SHALL." 435 
 
 the enabling words gave a power which prima facie 
 might be exercised or not ; but if the object for 
 which the power is conferred is for the purpose of 
 enforcing a right, whether public or private, there 
 may be a duty cast upon the donee of the power 
 to exercise it for the benefit of those who have 
 that right, when required on their behalf. Where 
 there is such a duty, it is not inaccurate to say 
 that the words conferring the power are equivalent 
 to saying that the donee must exercise it (a). But 
 he could not agree with the view that whenever 
 the statute is for the public good, and of general 
 interest and concern, powers conferred by enabling 
 words are primci facie to be considered powers 
 which must be exercised (6). 
 
 More recently the Court of Appeal, in consider- 
 ing the provision of s. 126 (4), Bankruptcy Act, 
 1883 (repealed and replaced with certain alterations 
 by s. 130, Bankruptcy Act, 1914), that any Court 
 in which proceedings have been commenced for 
 the administration of a deceased debtor's estate 
 " may," on the appHcation of any creditor, and 
 on proof that the estate is insolvent, transfer the 
 administration to the Court exercising jurisdiction 
 in bankruptcy, decided that there was not enough 
 in the statute to show that the power conferred must 
 
 (a) 5 App. Cas., p. 241, and see B. y. Mitchell (1913), 82 
 L. J. KB. 153, at p. 157. 
 (6) 5 App. Cas., p. 245. 
 
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436 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 be exercised whenever the estate is shown to be 
 insolvent, and it was consequently a discretionary 
 power which the Court might refuse to use. 
 Following the decision of the House of Lords in 
 the preceding case it was said that from the 
 nature of the English language the word " may " 
 can never mean " must," that it is only potential, 
 and when it is employed there is another question 
 to be decided, viz., whether there is anything that 
 makes it the duty of the person on whom the power 
 is conferred to exercise that power. If not, the 
 exercise is discretionary. But when the power is 
 coupled with a duty of the person to whom it is 
 given to exercise it, then it is imperative (a). 
 
 Accordingly, when a statute enacts that a 
 candidate at an election " may" be present at the 
 polling place, ot that a clergyman accused of an 
 ecclesiastical offence "may" attend the proceed- 
 ings of the commission appointed to inquire into 
 the accusation, or that a company "may" con- 
 struct a railway (6), or that a plaintiff " may " sue 
 in one action for injury done to his wife as well 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52 ; Baker, Be, 44 Oh. D. 262 ; Johannia- 
 berg Co., Be, [1892] 1 Ch. 583 ; and see B. v. Mitchell (1913), 
 82 L. J. K. B. 153. 
 
 (b) York & N. Midland By. Go. v. JR., 22 L. J. Q. B. 225 ; B. 
 V. G. W. By. Co., Id. 263 ; Barlaston Loc. Bd. v. L. & N. W. By. 
 Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 694. See also NicMl v. Allen, 31 L. J. 
 Q. B. 283. 
 
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"MAY" AND "SHALL," 437 
 
 as himself (a), cases in which the donee of the 
 power has only his own interests or convenience 
 to consult, the word "may" is plainly permissive 
 only, and a mere privilege or license is conferred 
 which he may exercise or not at pleasure. But 
 an enactment that churchwardens " may " make a 
 rate for the reimbursement of constables, or the 
 Chancellor " may " issue a commission in a case of 
 bankruptcy, or one conferring power on the Courts 
 to direct that a person entitled to costs should 
 recover them, is no mere permission to do such 
 acts, with a corresponding liberty to abstain from 
 doing them. A duty is at the same time cast 
 upon the persons empowered. For these are cases 
 where a power is deposited with public ofl&cers, 
 for the purpose of being used for the benefit of 
 persons having rights in the matter. So, when- 
 ever a statute confers an authority to do a judicial 
 act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so 
 authorised to exercise the authority when the case 
 arises, and its exercise is duly applied for by a 
 party interested and having a right to make the 
 application ; and the exercise depends, not on the 
 discretion of the Courts or judges, but upon proof 
 of the particular case out of which the power 
 arises (6). If a statute empowered justices to 
 
 (a) BroManh v. Whitehaven By. Co., 31 L. J. Ex. 349. 
 (6) McDougal v. Paterson, 11 C. B. 755. See also Burton & 
 BlinUorn, Be, [1903] 2 K. B. 300, where it was held that s. 32, 
 
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438 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 adjudicate in certain cases, that is, to impose a 
 certain penalty on persons whom they should find 
 guilty of a certain offence, it is incontestable that 
 they would have no option to decline jurisdiction 
 because the statute used only the word "may" 
 instead of " shall " There would be here such a 
 right in the public as to make it the duty of 
 the justices to exercise the power. Whether the 
 language was facultative only or mandatory, it 
 would be equally obligatory on them to hear and 
 determine the complaint, to decide, one way or 
 the other, whether the accused was guilty, and to 
 impose the penalty if he was (a). The Supreme 
 Court of the United States similarly laid it down 
 that what public officers are empowered to do for 
 a third person, the law requires shall be done 
 whenever the public interest of individual rights 
 
 Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), which enacts that a 
 solicitor " shall and may be " struck off the rolls for certain 
 offences, does not give the Court a discretion to impose any less 
 punishment. (As to re-instatement, see 62 Vict. c. 4, s. 1). In 
 some cases, this rule seems to have been overlooked, and the 
 word "may" construed as simply permissive. See ex. gr. 
 B. V. Eye, 4 B. & Aid. 271 ; Jones v. Harrison, 20 L, J. Ex. 
 166 ; Bell V. Grane, L. E. 8 Q. B. 481 ; JR. v. South Weald, 
 33 L. J. M. C. 193 ; Be Beamoir v. Welch, 7 B. & 0. 266. See, 
 however, B. v. Norfolk, 4 B. & Ad. 238 ; Kelly, Be, 64 L. J. Q. B. 
 129, followed and qualified in Newson, Be, 53 Sol. J. 342. 
 
 (a) Per Lord Blackburn, Julius v. Oxford (Bp.), 5 App. Gas. 
 244 ; B. V. Cumberland, 4 A. & E. 695, 
 
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"IF THEY SHALL THINK FIT." 439 
 
 call for the exercise of the power ; since the latter 
 is given not for their benefit, but for his, and is 
 placed with the depositary to meet the demands 
 of right and prevent the failure of justice. In all 
 such cases, the Court observed, the intent of the 
 Legislature, which is the test, is, not to grant 
 a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and 
 absolute duty (a). 
 
 Nor is the power made less imperative in any 
 such cases by express references to the discretion 
 of the authorised person. The duty of issuing a 
 summons (6), or of examining the churchwarden's 
 accounts (c), was as obligatory under the statute 
 which empowered the justices to issue it or to 
 examine them, " if they should so think fit," as 
 it would have been if this expression had been 
 omitted. Where the judgment creditor of a com- 
 pany "might" have execution against any indi- 
 vidual shareholder of it, if he failed after due 
 diligence to obtain satisfaction of his debt from 
 the company, it was held by the Common Pleas 
 
 (a) Supervisors v. U. S., 4 Wallace, 446. See s. 32, Interpreta- 
 tion Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), which provides that, in future, 
 when an Act confers a power or imposes a duty, the power may 
 be exercised, and the duty shall be performed from time to time 
 as the occasion requires, and by the holder for the time being of 
 the office on which the power is conferred or the duty imposed. 
 
 (b) B. V. Adamson, sup. p. 426. See also B. v. Evans (1890), 
 54 J. P. 471. 
 
 (c) B. V. Cambridge, sup. p. 426. 
 
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440 IlfTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 that there was no discretion to withhold this 
 remedy from him in any case in which the Court 
 was satisfied that the specific facts indicated by 
 the statute existed — viz., that the debt was un- 
 paid, that due endeavours had been made, and 
 had failed, to put in force the execution against 
 the company (a), and, it may be added, that the 
 creditor had done nothing to disentitle him to 
 execution against the shareholder (6) ; although 
 the statute not only directed that the leave of the 
 Court was to be asked for the execution, but pro- 
 vided that it "should be lawful" for the Court 
 to grant or refuse the application for it, and " to 
 make such order as it might see fit." \ Another 
 familiar instance may be found in the case of a 
 distress warrant to enforce a poor rate. It is well 
 known that in every case where certain specific 
 facts are proved, viz., that a rate, valid on its face, 
 was made by a competent authority, that the rated 
 land is in the district and in the occupation of the 
 defaulter, and that the latter has been summoned 
 and has not paid, the justices have no option to 
 
 (a) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 (repealed ; for existing law, see 8 Edw. VII. 
 c. 69) ; Morisse v. Boyal British Bank, 26 L. J. C. P. 62 ; Hill 
 V. London & County Insur. Co., 26 L. J. Ex. 89. Comp, 
 Shrimpton v. Sidmouth &c. By. Co., L. E. 3 C. P. 80, decided on 
 8 & 9 Vict. 0. 16 ; discussed, without approval, in Lee v. Bude 
 and Torrington Jumtion By. Co. (1871), 6 L. E. C. P. 576, at 
 p. 581. 
 
 {b) Scott V. Uxbridge By. Co., L. E. 1 C. P. 596. 
 
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"IF THEY SHALL THINK FIT." 441 
 
 refuse the warrant, though the statute says only 
 that they " may " issue it " if they think fit " (a). 
 In all such cases they must exercise the power ; 
 they must " think fit " to do so whenever the 
 occasion for it has arisen. In America, where it 
 was enacted that city councils " might, if deemed 
 advisable " (b), or even " might, if they believed 
 that the public good and the best interests of 
 the city required it " (c), levy a special tax to be 
 expended in the liquidation of their debts, the 
 Supreme Court issued a mandamus to levy the 
 tax where it was proved that a debt existed, 
 and that there were no other means in pos- 
 session or prospect for their payment; holding 
 that the discretion of the town councils was 
 limited by their duty, and could not, consistently 
 with the rules of law(d), "be resolved in the 
 negative." 
 
 It is important here to notice the distinction 
 between a discretion to exercise a power, and a 
 discretion to determine only whether the occasion 
 for it has arisen. This is illustrated by the con- 
 struction of the enactment that justices may, if 
 
 (a) B. V. Finnis, 28 L. J. M. C. 201 ; B. v. Boteler, 33 L. J. 
 M. C. 101. See also B. v. Cambridge, and B. v. Adarmon, sup. 
 p. 426. 
 
 (b) Supervisorg v. U. S„ 4 Wallace, 446. 
 
 (c) Galena v. Amy, 5 Wallace, 705. 
 
 (d) Adverting to B. v. Barlow, sup. p. 425. 
 
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442 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 they think fit, issue a summons upon an informa- 
 tion laid before them. Here the power is so far 
 discretionary, that they may grant or refuse the 
 summons according as they judge, in -the honest 
 exercise of their discretion (a), that a primd facie 
 credible case is shown for it ; but its exercise is 
 imperative, in the sense that they are bound 
 to form an opinion, and if their opinion is that 
 such a case is shown, it is not competent to them 
 to refuse to exercise in on extraneous grounds, 
 such as that the prosecution is unadvisable (6). 
 An arbitrary or capricious exercise of a discretion 
 would be no exercise at all (c). Again, as regards 
 the power to order the examination of witnesses 
 abroad (d), the power was discretionary, not because 
 the language was merely enabling, but because 
 the Legislature did not intend that the power 
 should be exercised where injustice would result ; 
 and the decision of the Court that no such con- 
 sequence was likely to ensue was a fact essential 
 to make the exercise of the power a duty. So, in 
 the Bishop of Oxford's Case, though the power was 
 widely discretionary as regards the question 
 whether the occasion for its exercise arose, the 
 
 (a) See sup. pp. 232-234. 
 
 (6) B. V. Adamson, and B. v. Fawcett, sup. p. 426. 
 
 (c) Per Lopes L.J., B. v. London (Bp.), 24 Q. B. D. 243 ; and 
 per Lord Bsher M.E., B. v. St. Pancras, 24 Q. B. D. 375. 
 
 (d) Castelli v. Groom, sup. p. 430. 
 
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OMISSIONS MAY BE SUPPLIED. 443 
 
 Bishop could not have declined to hear the com- 
 plaint (a) ; nor, if his own judicial discretion, un- 
 influenced by considerations foreign to his duty, 
 had decided that the occasion for it had arisen, 
 could he, consistently with the intention of the 
 Legislature, have refused to issue the com- 
 mission (b). 
 
 An omission which the context shows with 
 reasonable certainty to have been unintended 
 may be supplied, at least in enactments which 
 are construed beneficially, as distinguished from 
 strictly. Thus, when s. 33, Fines and Eecoveries 
 Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74), in providing 
 that if the protector of a settlement should be 
 (1) a lunatic, or (2) convicted of felony, or (3) an 
 infant, the Court of Chancery should be the 
 protector in lieu of the lunatic or the infant, 
 omitted the case of the convict of felony, it was 
 held by Lord Lyndhurst that the omission might 
 be supplied, in order to give effect to the manifest 
 intention. Without it, the mention of the case 
 of felony, in the first part of the sentence, was 
 
 (a) Per Lord Blackburn, 5 App. Oas. 241. See also per Lindley 
 L.J., B. V. London (Bp.), 24 Q. B. D. 240. 
 
 (b) See the concluding remarks of Lord Justice Bram well's 
 judgment in 4 Q. B. D. 555. 
 
 j^ote : — For the cases on, " It shall be Lawful," " May,'" 
 " Must," " Shall," " Shall and Lawfully May," see those 
 titles in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and Supp. 
 
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444 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 insensible, and it necessarily implied the missing 
 words (a). Although no original limit of time is 
 specially mentioned in the Public Health Act, 
 1875, within which an umpire must make his 
 award, yet inasmuch as there is an express pro- 
 vision that the time for making an award by an 
 umpire under the Act shall not in any case be 
 extended beyond two months from the reference 
 to him, — a provision which implies the existence 
 of an original limit, — it has been held that by 
 analogy to the original limit fixed in the case 
 of arbitrators, an original limit of 21 days from 
 the date of the reference to him must be inferred 
 to have been fixed in his case also (b). So, where 
 a statute enacted that suits " against" an associa- 
 tion should be brought in the district where it 
 was established, without making any provision for 
 suits " by " the association ; but an earlier Act 
 had in a similar clause provided for suits both by 
 and against; the Supreme Court of the United 
 States held that the omission was accidental, and 
 
 (a) Be Wainewright, 1 Phil. 258. See also in Deeds, Dent v. 
 Clayton, 33 L, J. Ch, 603 ; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H. L. Cas. 40 ; 
 and in Wills, Greenwood v. Greenwood, 5 Ch. D. 954 ; Be Bedfem, 
 6 Ch. D. 133. 
 
 (6) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 180 (9) ; Teadm Loc. Bd.w. Yeadon 
 Waterworks, 41 Ch. D. 52. As for the time prescribed by the 
 Act for the appointment of an arbitrator, see Stoher v. Morpeth 
 Corp., [1915] 2 K. B. 511. 
 
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OMISSIONS MAY BE SUPPLIED. 445 
 
 might be;^supplied (a). Sec. 6, Statute of Frauds 
 Amendment Act, 1828 (9 Geo. IV. c. 14), furnishes 
 another example of clerical neglect which was 
 treated in the same spirit. It enacts that no 
 action shall he brought in respect of a representa- 
 tion made by one person concerning the conduct 
 or credit of another, to the intent that the latter 
 "may obtain credit, goods, or money upon," . . . 
 unless the representation was in writing. The 
 text is clearly imperfect. Lord Abinger, while 
 deeming any conjectural transposition of the 
 words inadmissible, held that the word "upon" 
 must be rejected as nonsensical ; but Baron Parke 
 considered that the Court was at liberty either, 
 by transposition, to read the passage " may obtain 
 goods or money on credit," or to interpolate after 
 "upon" the words "such representations " (6). 
 By s. 58, London Building Act, 1894, a wall built 
 as, or becoming, a party wall in any part, " shall 
 be deemed a party wall for such part of its 
 length as is so used " ; that means (though not so 
 expressed) height as well as length, so that only 
 
 * 
 
 (a) Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wallace, 498. Comp. Hancocks v. 
 Lablaehe, 3 G. P. D. 197. This latter case, since the passing of 
 the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, is no longer good 
 law. 
 
 (6) Lyde v. Barnard, 1 M. & W. 101^ 115. See also United 
 Alkali Co. v. Simpson, per Lord Coleridge O.J., [1894] 2 Q. B. 
 121. 
 
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446 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 SO much of the height as well as only so much 
 of the length of wall which had been used as a 
 party wall is to be deemed a party wall within the 
 section (a). 
 
 The reference in s. 6, Intestates' Estates Act, 
 1890, to the " testamentary " expenses of an intes- 
 tate, being obviously a slip in drafting, has been read 
 as referring to the expenses of obtaining letters of 
 administration and of administration generally (6). 
 
 In statutes governed by the principle of strict con- 
 struction, such emendations have been refused (c). 
 
 Clerical errors may be read as amended; as 
 where, for instance, an Act refers to another by 
 title and date, and mistakes the latter (d). 
 
 It has been asserted that no modification of the 
 language of a statute is ever allowable in construc- 
 tion except to avoid an absurdity which appears to 
 be so, not to the mind of the expositor merely, but 
 to that of the Legislature ; that is, when it takes 
 the form of a repugnancy (e). In this case, the 
 
 (a) London dec. Dairy Co. v. Morley d Lanceley (1911), 80 
 L. J. K. B. 908. 
 
 (6) 53 & 54 Vict.j3. 29, s. 6 ; Twigg's Estate, Be, [1892] 1 Oh. 
 579. 
 
 (c) See Underhill v. Longridge, 29 L. J. M. 0. 65, inf. 
 p. 482. 
 
 (d) 2 Inst. 290 ; Anon., Skinn. 110 ; B. v. Wilcoeh, 14 L. J, 
 M, 0. 104 ; Boothroyd, Be, 15 L. J. M. C. 57, 
 
 (e) Per Willes J., Motteram v. E. C. B. Co., 7 0. B. N. S. 58 ; 
 in Bell Cose v. Hakes, 15 App. Gas. 542, Lord Field, accepting 
 
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EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION. 447 
 
 Legislature shows in one passage that it did not 
 mean what its words signify in another ; and a 
 modification is therefore called for, and sanctioned 
 beforehand, as it were, by the author. But the 
 authorities do not appear to support this restricted 
 view. They would seem rather to establish that 
 the judicial interpreter may deal with careless and 
 inaccurate words and phrases in the same spirit as 
 a critic deals with an obscure or corrupt text, 
 when satisfied, on solid grounds (a), from the 
 context or history of the enactment, or from 
 the injustice, inconvenience, or absurdity of 
 the consequences to which it would lead, that the 
 language thus treated does not really express the 
 intention, and that his amendment probably does. 
 
 SECTION U. EQUITABLE CONSTEUCTION. 
 
 The practice of modifying the language, and 
 controlling the operation of enactments, however, 
 was formerly carried to still greater lengths. It 
 used to be laid down that a remedial statute 
 should receive an equitable construction ; so that 
 cases out of its letter should, if within the general 
 
 Willes J.'s dictum, adds " absurdity " ; Abel v. Lee, L. E. 6 C. P. 
 365 ; Chriatopherson v. Lotinga, 15 C. B. N. S. 809 ; per Brett J., 
 Boon V. Howard, L. E. 9 C. P. 305. 
 
 (a) Comp. Green v. Wood, sup. p. 35, and cases cited 
 pp. 29-31. 
 
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448 INTEKPRBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 object or mischief of the Act, be brought within 
 the remedy which it provided {a). The extremely 
 wide construction given to the expression " charit- 
 able " use or trust in the 43 Eliz. c. 4(6), is a re- 
 markable example of this construction ; the Court 
 of Chancery including in that phrase a number 
 of subjects which undoubtedly no one outside the 
 Court of Chancery would have supposed to be 
 comprehended within it (c). 
 
 It is to be observed, indeed, that the expression 
 " equitable " is often used in the older authorities 
 in diverse senses. Lord Mansfield said that 
 equity was synonymous with the intention of the 
 Legislature (d) ; and in this sense an equitable 
 construction is free from objection. Thus the 
 " equitable " construction, which included uses 
 within the Statute De Donis, though that enact- 
 ment spoke only of " lands and tenements," and 
 may have originally contemplated only common 
 law estates (e), and which applied 2 Hen. V. 
 (stat. 2) (1414) (/) (requiring that a juror should 
 
 (a) Co. Litt. 24b ; Bac. Ab. Statute (I.) 6 ; Com. Dig. Parlia- 
 ment, B. 13. 
 
 (b) Bepealed by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 42, s. 13, which see. 
 
 (c) Per Lotd Halsbmy L.C., Income Tax Commrs. v. Pemsel, 
 [1891] A. 0. 542. See Foveaiix, Be, [1895] 2 Ch. 501. 
 
 (d) B. V. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93. 
 
 (e) Corbet's Case, 1 Eep. 88. 
 
 (/) Eepealed as to England by S. L. E , 1863. 
 
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EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION. 449 
 
 have " lands " worth 40 shilUngs), to the cestui que 
 use, and not to the feoffee, when the legal estate 
 was in the latter (a), would seem to fall within the 
 now recognised ordinary rules of construction. 
 The 4 Edw. III. c. 7, which gave executors an 
 action against trespassers for a wrong done to 
 their testator, was said to have given them also 
 an action on the case, by "the equity" of the 
 statute (b) ; but the decision was strictly on the 
 letter of the Act. It turned on the construction 
 of the word " trespass," which was held to mean 
 a wrong done generally, and of "trespassers," 
 which was held to mean wrongdoers (c). The 
 decision that the Statute of Gloucester, c. 5 (which 
 gives the action of waste against lessees for life, 
 or "for years," to recover the wasted place and 
 treble damages), reached "by equity" a tenant 
 for one year and even for half a year, was 
 
 (a) Co. Litt. 272b. 
 
 (6) Russell V. Prat, 1 Leon. 193 ; Mutland v. Rutland, Cro. 
 Bliz., 377. 
 
 (c) Per Lord EUenborough, Wilson v. Enubley, 7 East, 133. 
 It was held to extend to all torts except those relating to the 
 testator's freehold, or where the injury was of a purely personal 
 nature. See Williams v. Gary, 4 Mod. 403 ; 12 Mod. 71 ; Berwick 
 V. Andrews, 2 Lord Eaym. 971 ; Bradshaw v. Lane. & York By. 
 Co., L. E. 10 0. P. 189 ; Leggott v. Gt. Northern By. Co., 1 Q. B. D. 
 599. See also per Bramwell L. J., Twycross v. Grant, 4 C. P. D. 
 40, and Pulling v. Gt. Eastern By. Go. (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 110, at 
 p. 112. 
 
 i.s. 29 
 
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450 INTERPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 apparently of a similar character (a). So, when it 
 is said that it is on "the equity," or "equitable 
 construction " of the statute 2 W. & M. c. 5 (which 
 empowers a landlord to sell for the best price the 
 goods which he has distrained for arrears of rent, 
 if the tenant does not replevy in five days), that 
 an action lies against the landlord who sells after 
 impounding but before the expiration of five 
 days (6), or after a tender of the rent and expenses 
 within that time (c), or for less than the best 
 price (d), it has been held, however, trover wUl not 
 lie. No more apparently being meant than that a 
 cause of action was given by implication (e) against 
 a landlord who thus abused the power of sale 
 thereby conferred on him. 
 
 Byles J., in his terse way, summed up the view 
 he held by saying that " ' within the Equity ' means 
 the same thing as ' within the mischief ' of a 
 statute "(/). 
 
 But the expression has been more generally 
 used in. other senses. In the construction of old 
 
 (o) Co. Litt. 53a ; 2 Inst. 302. 
 
 (6) Wallace v. King, 1 H. Bl. 13. See also Pitt v. Shew, 4 B. 
 & Aid. 208 ; Earper v. Taswell, 6 0. & P. 166. 
 
 (c) Johnson v. Upham, 28 L. J. Q. B. 252. See B. v. Cox, 2 
 Burr. 785 ; B. v. Toimger, 5 T. E. 449. 
 
 (d) Com. Dig. Distress (D.), 8 ; Farwell on Powers, c. 17. 
 
 (e) See Chap. XII, Sec. II. 
 
 (/) Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 19 G. B. N. S. 703. 
 
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EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION. 451 
 
 statutes, it has been understood as extending to 
 general cases the application of an enactment 
 which, UteraUy, was limited to a special case. 
 Thus, the Statute of Westminster 1 (3 Edw. I. 
 0. 4), which enacted that a vessel should not be 
 adjudged a wreck, if a man, a dog, or a cat escaped 
 from it, was regarded as exempting a vessel from 
 such adjudication, by an equitable construction, 
 if any other animal escaped, those named being 
 put only for example (a). The 46th chapter of the 
 same statute, which directed the judges of the 
 King's Bench to hear their causes in due order, 
 was extended, on the same principle, to the judges 
 of the other Courts (6) ; and the Statute of West- 
 minster 2, c. 31, which gave the bill of exceptions 
 to the ruling of the judges of the Common Pleas, 
 was similarly held applicable, not only to the 
 other judges of the Superior Courts, but to those 
 of the County Courts, the Hundred, and the Courts 
 Baron ; their judges being still more likely to err (c). 
 The 5 Hen. IV. c. 10, which forbade justices of 
 the peace to commit to any other than the common 
 jail, was held to be equally imperative on aU other 
 judicial functionaries (d). The Statute of 1 Eich. II. 
 c. 12, which forbade the Warden of the Fleet to 
 
 (a) 2 Inst. 167 ; 5 Bep. 107. 
 
 (6) 2 Inst. 256. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 426 ; Strother v. Hutchinson, 4 Bing. N. 0. 83. 
 
 {d) 2 Inst. 43. 
 
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452 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 suffer his prisoners for judgment debts to go at 
 large, until they had satisfied their debts, was held 
 to include all jailers (a). The Statute of Gloucester 
 (6 Edw. I.), 0. 11, in speaking of London, was 
 considered as intending to include all cities and 
 boroughs equally ; the capital having been named 
 alone for excellency (6). The statute, or writ De 
 Circumspecte Agatis (13 Ed. I.), which directs the 
 judges not to interfere with the Bishop of Norwich 
 or his clergy in spiritual suits, was construed as 
 protecting aU other prelates and ecclesiastics, 
 the Bishop of Norwich being put but for an 
 example (c). 
 
 This kind of construction, which would not be 
 tolerated now {d), was said to have been given 
 to ancient statutes in consequence of the concise- 
 ness with which they were drawn (c) ; though the 
 specific expressions used can hardly be considered 
 more concise than the more abstract terms for 
 which they were, possibly, substituted. It has 
 been explained, also, on the ground that language 
 was used with no great precision in early times 
 and that Acts were framed in harmony with the 
 
 (a) Piatt V. Lock, Plowd. 35. 
 
 (b) 2 Inst. 322. 
 
 (c) Id. 487. 
 
 (d) Per Pollock G.B., Miller v. Salomons, 21 L. J. Ex. 197. 
 
 (e) 2 Inst. 401 ; 10 Eep. 30b ; per Lord Brougham, Gwynne 
 V. Burnell, 6 Bing. N. G. 561. 
 
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EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION. 453 
 
 lax method of interpretation contemporaneously 
 prevalent (a). It has also been accounted for by 
 the fact that in those times the dividing line 
 between the legislative and judicial functions was 
 feebly drawn, and the importance of the separation 
 imperfectly understood (6). The ancient practice 
 of having the statutes drawn by the judges from 
 the petitions of the Commons and the answers of 
 the King (c) may also account for the latitude of 
 their interpretation. The judges would be disposed 
 to construe the language with freedom, knowing, 
 like Chief Justice Hengham and Lord Nottingham, 
 what they meant when framing them (d). 
 
 But an equitable construction has been applied 
 also to more modern statutes, and in a sense 
 departing still more widely from the language. 
 Thus, although s. 3, 21 Jac. c. 16, enacted tbat 
 certain actions should be brought within six years 
 after the cause of action accrued, " and not after," 
 it was nevertheless held, notwithstanding these 
 negative terms, that where an action was brought 
 within six years, but abated by the death of either 
 party, a reasonable time — that is, a year, com- 
 puted, not from the death, but from the grant of 
 « 
 
 (a) Per Lord EUenborough, Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, 134. 
 
 (6) Sedg. Infcerp. Stat. 311. See per Lord Selborne, Bradlaugh 
 V. Clarke, 8 App. Gas. 368. 
 
 (c) Co. Litt. 272a; sup. p. 78. 
 
 (d) Sup. p. 49. 
 
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454 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 administration — was to be allowed, by an equitable 
 construction of the statute, beyond the period 
 given, to bring a fresh action by or against the 
 personal representatives of the deceased (a). 
 
 The provision of the Statute of Frauds, which 
 prohibits the enforcement of agreements for the 
 purchase of lands, unless they be in writing, was 
 held not to prevent the Court of Chancery from 
 decreeing the specific performance of such agree- 
 ments, though not in writing, where they had been 
 partly performed by the party seeking to enforce 
 the contract. On all questions on that statute, it 
 was said, the end and purport for which it was 
 made — namely, to prevent frauds and perjuries — 
 was to be considered ; and any agreement in which 
 there was no danger of either, was considered as 
 out of the statute (b). The statute was not made 
 to protect or be the means of fraud (c) ; and as it 
 
 (o) Hodsden v. Harridge, 2 Wms. Saund. 64;a ; Gmiewis v. 
 Mornington, 26 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; Swindell v. Bulkeley, 56 L. J. 
 Q. B. 613. See also Piggott v. Bush, 4 A. & E. 912 ; Atkinson v. 
 Bradford Bldg. Sac, 25 Q. B. D. 377 ; Tidd, Be, [1893] 3 Ch. 
 154. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Hardwicke, A.-O. v. Day, 1 Ves. senr. 221. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Mansfield, Carter v. Boehiff,, 3 Burr. 1918 ; per 
 Turner, L.J., Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16; Haigh v. Kaye, 
 L. E. 7 Ch. 469 ; Williams v. Evans, L. E. 19 Eq. 547 ; Ungley 
 V. Ungley, 5 Ch. D. 887 ; Be Buhe of Marlborough, [1894] 2 Ch. 
 133. Sv., per Lord Selbome L.C, Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App 
 Gas. 474 
 
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EQUITABLE OONSTRTJCTION. 455 
 
 would be a fraud on one of the parties if a partly- 
 performed contract were not completely performed, 
 the Court of Chancery compelled its performance 
 in contradiction to the positive enactment of the 
 statute (a). And upon this principle an attorney's 
 undertaking to pay his client's debt and costs has 
 been enforced on motion of the Court of which he 
 was an attorney, although void by the statute (b). 
 The general doctrine cited above, however, was 
 said by Eyre C.B., to raise the very mischief which 
 the statute intended to prevent (c), and would 
 probably have found no more favour at a later 
 period in Equity (d), than it did in the Courts of 
 Common Law where it was never recognised (e). 
 
 (a) Per Lord Eedesdale, Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 433. 
 See also A.-G. v. Bay, 1 Ves. senr. 221; Lester v. Foxcroft, 
 Oolles, 108, and 1 White & Tudor's Eq. Ca. 881, where the 
 later authorities are collected ; 2 Story Eq. Jur. s. 752 et seq. ; 
 Webster v. Webster, 27 L. J. Ch. 115 ; Wilson v. West Hartlepool 
 Co., 34 L. J. Oh. 241 ; Nwnn v. Fabian, L. E. 1 Ch. 35. See per 
 Grant M.E., Frame v. Dawson, 14 Ves. 387, applied in Dickinson 
 V. Barrau), 73 L. J. Ch. 701, and in which latter case Gaton v. 
 Gaton, 35 L. J. Ch. 292, and McManus v. Gooke, 56 L. J. Ch. 662, 
 were commented on : Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467 ; 
 Humphreys v. Green, 10 Q. B. D. 148 ; Britain v. Bossiter, 11 
 Q. B. D. 123 ; McManus v. Gooke, sup. 
 
 (&) Evans v. Duncan (1831), 1 Tyrw. 283. 
 
 (c) O'Beilly v. Thompson, 2 Cox Eq. Ca. 273. 
 
 (d) See ex. gr. Hughes v. Morris, 21 L. J. Ch. 761. 
 
 (e) Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142, 159 ; Gocking\v. Ward, 
 15 L. J. C. P. 245. 
 
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456 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Similar considerations affected the construction 
 which was put upon the Middlesex Registry Act, 
 1708 (7 Anne, c. 20) {a), which, after reciting that 
 frauds were committed by means of secret con- 
 veyances, enacted that deeds and wills affecting 
 lands, either at law or in equity, should be adjudged 
 fraudulent and void against subsequent purchasers, 
 unless a memorial of them were registered. It was 
 nevertheless held that such instruments, though 
 unregistered, were valid against subsequent pur- 
 chasers who had notice of them (b). It has been 
 doubted whether the efficacy of the Act was not 
 materially impaired by such a departure from its 
 letter (c). 
 
 On similar grounds, it would seem, although 
 the various Acts of Parliament which created 
 stocks since the beginning of the reign of George I. 
 provided that no method of assigning or trans- 
 ferring the stock, except that provided by the Act, 
 should be valid or available in law, and directed 
 that 'the owner of stock might devise it by wiU, 
 attested by two witnesses, it was established by 
 repeated decisions (before the WUls Act, 1837) 
 that, notwithstanding such express terms, stock 
 
 (a) Sec. 18. 
 
 (fe) Le Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436 ; Davis v. Strathmore (1809), 
 16 Ves. 419; Willis v. Broim, 10 Sim. 127. 
 
 (c) Per Sir W. Grant, Wyatt v. Barwell, 19 Ves. 439. See 
 also Boe v. Alhop, 5 B. & Aid. 142. 
 
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EQUITABLE CONSTEUOTION. 457 
 
 might be disposed of by an unattested Will ; it 
 being held that, if not valid as a devise, the Will 
 nevertheless bound the executor as a direction for 
 the disposition of the stock (a). 
 
 This principle of Equitable Construction has, 
 however, fallen into discredit, though sometimes 
 sought to be revived under the new name of 
 Legislation by Construction (&). It was con- 
 demned, indeed, by Lord Bacon, who delared 
 that non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae reeedit a 
 literd (c) ; Lord Tenderden lamented it {d), and 
 pronounced it dangerous (e) ; and it may now be 
 considered as altogether discarded as regards the 
 construction of most modern statutes ( / ). Statutes 
 are now to be considered as framed with a view 
 to equitable as well as legal doctrines (g). For 
 instance, the fact that an execution creditor had 
 notice, when his debt was contracted, that his 
 
 (a) Bipley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 440; Franklin v. Bank of 
 England, 32 E. E. 611. 
 
 (6) Per Williams J., Be English, Scottish & Australian Bank, 
 62 L. J. Ch. 828. 
 
 (c) Adv. of Learning. 
 
 \d) B. V. Turvey, 2 B. & Aid. 520. 
 
 (e) Brandling v. Barrington, 6 B. & C. 475. 
 
 (/) See per Jessel M.E., Walton, Exp. (1881), 17 Ch. D. 750. 
 See also Hill y. West India Bock Co. (1884), 9 A. C, Cairns Ld., 
 at p. 456 ; and Irish Land Commission v. Brown, [1904] 2 Ir. E. 
 200, at p. 211. 
 
 {g) Per James L.J. and Hellish L.J., 2 Ch. D. 296, 297. 
 
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458 INTBRPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 debtor had given a bill of sale to another person 
 wbich was not registered, was held not to prevent 
 the execution creditor from availing himself of the 
 non-registration (a). 
 
 Where, indeed, a modern statute is strictly (b) 
 in pari materid with one which has already received 
 an equitable construction, that construction is 
 extended to it on the general principle that they 
 form together one body of law, and are to be con- 
 strued together (c). Thus, s. 3, 3 & 4 WiU. IV. 
 c. 42, which limits the time for bringing actions 
 on bonds and other specialties to 20 years (now 12 
 years) {d), in language identical with that used in 
 s. 3, 21 Jac. c. 16, respecting simple contract 
 debts, received the same equitable construction as 
 had been given to the last-named Act ; and the 
 administrator of the obligor of a bond which had 
 been put in suit in 1831, in which year the action 
 abated by the death of the obligor, was held to be 
 liable to be sued in 1858, within a year from the 
 grant of letters of administration (e). 
 
 It may not be out of place to mention here that 
 
 (a) Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Gh. D. 291. 
 
 (6) Gomp. Adam v. Inhalitants of Bristol, 2 A. & E. 389. 
 
 (c) Sup. p. 54 et seq. 
 
 (d) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. 
 
 (e) Sturgis v. Darell, 29 L. J. Ex. 572 ; and see as to when 
 time, under the statute, begins to run, Wakefield ^c. Bank v. 
 Tates, [1916] 1 Oh. 452. 
 
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STATUTES CONTRARY TO EQUITY OR REASON. 459 
 
 the expression " the Equity of a Statute " is some- 
 times used as meaning the principle or ground 
 of a rule adopted from analogy to a statute. For 
 instance, 6 Bich. 11. (a), which provided that a writ 
 should abate, if the declaration showed that the 
 contract sued upon was made in a different county 
 from that mentioned in the writ, is said to have 
 led (by the equity of that statute, or the analogy 
 which it furnished) to the introduction by the 
 judges, in the reign of James I., of the practice of 
 changing the venue on motion, where there was 
 no variance between the writ and declaration as 
 to the place where the cause of action arose (6). 
 
 It was formerly asserted that a statute contrary 
 to natural equity or reason (such as one which 
 made a man a judge in his own case), or contrary 
 to Magna Charta, was void ; for, it was said, jura 
 naturse sunt immutabilia ; they are leges legum ; and 
 an Act of Parliament can do no wrong (c). But 
 such dicta cannot be supported. They stand as a 
 
 (a) Eepealed 42 & 43 Vict. c. 69. 
 
 (6) Knight v. Famdby, 2 Salk. 670 ; Graft v. Boite, 1 Saund. 
 247; Tidd. Pr. c. 24. 
 
 (c) BanTiam's Case, 8 Eep. 118a ; City of London v. Wood, 12 
 Mod. 687 ; Day v. Sa/vadge, Hob. 87 ; Mercer's Go. v. Bowker, 1 
 Stra. 639 ; 3 Inst. 111. So enacted as to Magna Charta by 42 
 Edw. III. c. 1, Co. Litt. 81a. As to taking away the Eoyal power, 
 see per Pinch C.J., B. v. Hampden (Ship Money), 3 State Trials 
 1235. 
 
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460 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 beacon to be avoided, rather than as an authority 
 to be followed (a). 
 
 The law on this subject cannot be better laid 
 down than in the following words of a great 
 American authority : " It is a principle in the 
 English law that an Act of Parliament, delivered 
 in clear and intelligible terms, cannot be ques- 
 tioned, or its authority controlled, in any court of 
 justice. ' It is,' says Sir W. Blackstone, ' the 
 exercise of the highest authority that the kingdom 
 acknowledges upon earth.' When it is said in the 
 books that a statute contrary to natural equity 
 and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per- 
 formed, is void, the cases are understood to mean 
 that the Courts are to give the statute a reason- 
 able construction. They will not readily presume, 
 out of respect and duty to the lawgiver, that any 
 very unjust or absurd consequence was within the 
 contemplation of the law. But if it should happen 
 to be too palpable in its direction to admit of but 
 one construction, there is no doubt, in the English 
 law, as to the binding efficacy of the statute. The 
 will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the 
 land, and demands perfect obedience. 
 
 " But while we admit this conclusion of the 
 English law, we cannot but admire the intrepidity 
 and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke, 
 
 (a) See :per Willes, J., Lee v. Bude B. Go. (1871), L. E. 6 C. P. 
 582. 
 
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STATUTES OONTRAEY TO EQUITY OB REASON. 461 
 
 when CMef Justice of the King's Bench, to declare, 
 as he did in Doctor Bonham's Case, that the Com- 
 mon Law doth control Acts of Parliament, and 
 adjudges them void when against common right 
 and reason. The same sense of justice and 
 freedom of opinion led Lord Chief Justice Hobart, 
 in Day v. Savadge, to insist that an Act of Parlia- 
 ment made against natural equity, as to make a 
 man judge in his own case, was void ; and induced 
 Lord Chief Justice Holt to say in the case of the 
 City of London v. Wood, that the observation of 
 Lord Coke was not extravagant, but was a very 
 reasonable and true saying. Perhaps what Lord 
 Coke said in his reports on this point may have 
 been one of the many things that King James 
 alluded to, when he said that in Coke's reports 
 there were many dangerous conceits of his own 
 uttered for law, to the prejudice of the Crown, 
 Parliament, and subjects " (a). 
 
 {a) 1 Kent, Oomm. 447. 
 
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CHAPTEE X. 
 
 SECTION I. — CONSTEUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 
 
 The rule which requires that penal and some 
 other statutes shall be construed strictly was more 
 rigorously applied in former times, when the 
 number of capital offences was very large (a) ; 
 when it was stiU punishable with death to out 
 down a cherry-tree in an orchard, or to be seen 
 for a month in the company of gipsies (b), or for a 
 soldier or sailor to beg and wander without a pass. 
 Invoked in the majority of cases in favorem vitae, 
 it has lost much of its force and importance in 
 recent times, and it is now recognised that the 
 paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to 
 
 (a) " Previous to the Eevolution, the number on the Statute 
 Book is said not to have exceeded 50. During the reign of 
 George 11., 63 new ones were added. In 1770 the number 
 was estimated in Parliament at 154 (Cavendish Debates ii. 12), 
 but by Blackstone (Oomm. iv. 18) at 160; and Eomilly, in 
 a pamphlet which he wrote in 1786 (Observations on a late 
 pubUoation entitled 'Thoughts on Executive Government,' 
 London), observed that in the sixteen years since the appear- 
 ance of Blackstone's Commentaries it had considerably in- 
 creased." Lecky, History of England, vi. 246. 
 
 (6) 4 Bl. Comm. 4. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OP PENAL LAWS. 463 
 
 put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly 
 and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning, and 
 to promote its object. "I cannot concur in the 
 contention that because these Acts (against 
 adulteration) impose penalties, therefore their 
 construction should, necessarily, be strict. I think 
 that neither greater nor less strictness should be 
 applied to those than to other statutes " (a). 
 
 It was founded, however, on the tenderness of 
 the law for the rights of individuals, and on the 
 sound principle that it is for the Legislature, 
 not the Court, to define a crime and ordain its 
 punishment {b). It is unquestionably a reasonable 
 expectation that, when the former intends the 
 infliction of suffering, or an encroachment on 
 natural liberty or rights, or the grant of excep- 
 tional exemptions, powers, and privileges, it will 
 not leave its intention to be gathered, by mere 
 doubtful inference, or convey it in " cloudy and 
 dark words" only(c), but will manifest it with 
 reasonable clearness. The rule of strict construc- 
 tion does not, indeed, require or sanction that 
 suspicious scrutiny of the wordg, or those hostile 
 conclusions from their ambiguity or from what is 
 left unexpressed, which characterise the judicial 
 interpretation of affidavits in support of ex parte 
 
 (a) Per Day J., Newhf v. Sims (1894)i 63 L. J. M. 0. 229. 
 (6) U. S. V. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95. 
 {c) 4 Inst. 332. 
 
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464 INTEBPRBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 applications (a), or of magistrates' convictions, 
 where the ambiguity goes to the jurisdiction (6). 
 Nor does it allow the imposition of a restricted 
 meaning on the words, wherever any doubt can 
 be suggested, for the purpose of withdrawing from 
 the operation of the statute a case which falls 
 both within its scope and the fair sense of its 
 language. This would be to defeat, not to 
 promote, the object of the Legislature (c) ; to 
 misread the statute and misunderstand its pur- 
 pose (d). A Court is not at liberty to put limita- 
 tions on general words which are not called for 
 by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of 
 the enactment (e) ; and no construction is admis- 
 sible which would sanction a fraudulent evasion 
 of an Act (/ ). But the rule of strict construction 
 
 (a) See ex gr. Peris v. Severn, 7 Basfc, 194 ; Fricke v. Poole, 9 
 B. & C. 543. 
 
 (6) See B. v. Davis, 39 E. R. 563 ; B. v. Jones, 12 A. & B. 684 ; 
 per Coleridge J., B. v. Tolee, 8 A. & E. 227 ; per Cur., Lindsay 
 V. Leigh, 17 L. J. M. C. 50 ; B. v. Stainforth, 17 L. J. M. C. 25 ; 
 Fletcher v. Calthrop (1845), 14 L. J. M. C. 49. Note B. v. 
 Western (1868), J. P. 390, as to extent of power of amendment 
 in cases where the variance is not material. 
 
 (c) Bac. Al). Stat. (I.) 9 ; B.v. Modnett, 1 1. E. 101. 
 
 (d) Per Martin B., Nicholson v. Fields, 31 L. J. Ex. 236, and 
 Bramwell B., Foleif v. Fletcher, 3 H. & N. 781. 
 
 (e) U. S. V. Goomhs, 12 Peters, 80. 
 
 (/) Com. Dig. Pari. (E.) 28 ; Bac. Ab. Stat. (I.) 9 ; Britton v. 
 Ward, 2 Eol. 127. Per Cur., U. S. v. Wiltherger, 5 Wheat. 95 ; 
 U. S. V. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460 ; Americcm Fur Co. v. U. S„ 2 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 465 
 
 requires that the language shall be so construed 
 that no cases shall be held to fall within it which 
 do not fall both within the reasonable meaning of 
 its terms and within the spirit and scope of the 
 enactment (a). Where an enactment may entail 
 penal consequences, no violence must be done to 
 its language in order to bring people within it, but 
 rather care must be taken that no one is brought 
 within it who is not within its express language (6). 
 To determine that a case is within the intention of 
 a statute, its language must authorise the Court 
 to say so; but it is not admissible to carry the 
 principle that a case which is within the mischief 
 of a statute is within its provisions, so far as 
 to punish a crime not specified in the statute, 
 because it is of equal atrocity or of a kindred 
 character with those which are enumerated (c). 
 If the Legislature has not used words sufficiently 
 comprehensive to include within its prohibition 
 
 Peters, 367 ; U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 80 ; U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 
 WaUace, 395. See sup. Chap. IV. 
 
 (a) Per Best O.J., Fletcher v. Sondes, 3 Bing. 580 ; Braey's 
 Case, 1 Salk. 348 ; B,. v. Harvey, 1 Wils. 164 ; Dawes v. Painter, 
 Freem. K. B. 175 ; Scott v. Pacquet, 36 L. J. P. C. 65 ; Ellis v. 
 M'Gormich, L. E. 4 Q. B. 271 ; The Gauntlet, L. E. 4 P. C. 191, 
 per James L.J. ; per Lord Alverstone C.J., B. v. South Shields 
 Licensing Justices (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 810. 
 
 (6) Per Wright J., London C. G. v. Aylesbury Co., [1898] 1 
 Q. B. 106. 
 
 (c) U. S. V. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 96. 
 
 I.S. 30 
 
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466 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 all the cases which fall within the mischief in- 
 tended to be prevented, it is not competent to 
 a Court to extend them {a). It is immaterial, for 
 this purpose, whether the proceeding prescribed 
 for the enforcement of the penal law be criminal 
 or civil (b). 
 
 The degree of strictness applied to the con- 
 struction of a penal statute depended in great 
 measure on the severity of the statute. When it 
 merely imposed a pecuniary penalty, it was con- 
 strued less strictly than where the rule was 
 invoked in favor em vitce. Formerly, an indictment 
 for the capital felony of assaulting a person at a 
 certain time and place, and feloniously cutting or 
 feloniously robbing him, was fatally bad, because 
 it did not allege that the cutting or the robbing 
 was done " then and there " ; while a similar 
 omission in an indictment for the misdemeanour 
 of a common assault was considered immaterial (c). 
 Lord Hale mentions that a statute of Edward VI., 
 
 (a) Per Lord Tenterden, Proctor v. Manwaring (1819), 3 B. & 
 Aid. 145 ; and see Bohinson v. Emerson (1866), 4 H. & 0. 352, at 
 p. 356. 
 
 (6) Henderson v. Sherborne, 2 M. & W. 236 ; Nicholson v. 
 fields, 31 L. J. Ex. 236 ; Fletcher v. Hudson, 7 Q. B. D. 611 ; 
 The Bolina, 1 Gallison, 83, per Story J. 
 
 (c) 2 Hale, 178 ; B. v. Baude, Ore. Jac. 41 ; B. v. Francis, 2 
 Stra. 1015. See B. v. Thomas (1878), 44 L. J. M. 0. 42, which 
 shows that save by express statutory provision an indictment 
 for felony will not support a conviction for misdemeanoiu:. 
 
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OONSTKUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 467 
 
 which made the stealing of horses, in the plural,, 
 a capital offence, gave rise to a doubt, which it 
 was thought necessary to remove by enactment 
 in the following session of Parliament, whether 
 it included the theft of one horse only ; the doubt 
 resting on the slender foundation that an earlier 
 Act spoke of stealing " any horse," in the singular 
 number (a). Perhaps the same spirit may be 
 found in the more modern decisions, that a Court 
 was not bound to know that a colt was a horse, 
 in an Act against horse-stealing (6) ; or that a 
 pig was a " hog " in an Act against hog-steal- 
 ing (c) ; and that an enactment which made it 
 a felony to " stab, cut, or wound," did not reach 
 the case of biting off a nose or a finger, because 
 the injury thus inflicted was not caused by an 
 instrument (d) ; nor that of breaking a collar-bone, 
 when the skin was not also broken (e). 
 A strict construction requires, at least, that no 
 
 (a) 2 Hale, 365, inf. pp. 570-571; 1 Bdw. VI. c. 12. Comp. 
 B. V. Rowlands, 8 Q. B. D. 530, as to defrauding " creditors " 
 •when one only is defrauded. 
 
 (6) B. V. Beaney, Euss. & Ey. 416. Comp. B. v. Wetland, 
 Euss. & Ey. 494. 
 
 (c) U. S. V. McLain, 2 Brev. 443 (Tennessee). 
 
 (d) B. v. Stevens, 1 Moo. G. G. 409 ; B. v. Harris, 7 G. & P. 
 446 ; B. V. Jeans, 1 C. & K. 539. Comp. B. v. Shadbolt, 5 G. 
 & P. 504 ; B. V. Elmsly, 2 Lew. 126 ; B. v. Waltham, 3 Gox G. 0. 
 442 ; B. V. Owens, 1 Moo. G. G. 205. 
 
 (e) R. V. Wood, 4 G. & P. 381. 
 
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468 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 case shall fall within a penal statute which does 
 not comprise all the elements which, whether 
 morally material or not, are in fact made to con- 
 stitute the offence as defined by the statute. 
 Thus, the Coventry Act, 22 & 23 Car. II. (repealed 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 31), which made capital the inflic- 
 tion, with malice aforethought "and by lying in 
 wait," of a variety of disfiguring or disabling bodily 
 injuries, was held not to include any such outrage, 
 however maHcious and deliberate, when not pre- 
 ceded by a lying-in-wait with the intent of com- 
 mitting it {a). And it was much doubted whether 
 a person who inflicted such injuries with intent to 
 murder, and not merely to maim and disfigure, fell 
 within the Act (b). If a pirate attacks a vessel, 
 but, instead of taking her, extorts from her master 
 a promise to pay a sum for her redemption, no 
 piracy would be committed, for there was no 
 taking (c). The Eiot Act, 1 Geo. I. Stat. 2, 
 c. 5, s. 1, which makes it felony for rioters to 
 remain assembled for more than an hour after 
 the proclamation set forth in the Act has been 
 
 (a) 1 East, P. C. 398 ; B. v. Child, 4 C. & P. 442. Comp. sup. 
 p. 364. 
 
 (6) So heldjjej- Lord King and Yates J. in B. v. Cohe,l East, 
 P. C. 400 ; duhit. Willes J. and Eyre B. See also R. v. Williams, 
 Id. 424. 
 
 (c) MoUoy, 64, s. 18. For a definition of this offence, see 
 A.-G. {Hong Kong) v. Kwok-a-Sing, 42 L. J. P. C. 64. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OP PENAL LAWS. 469 
 
 made, failed of efieot if the proclamation was not 
 made fully and accurately ; as if, for example, the 
 final words, " God save the King," were omitted (a). 
 A person cannot be convicted of perjury if the 
 oath was administered by one who had not legal 
 authority to administer it, as in the case of an 
 affidavit in the Admiralty sworn before a Master 
 in Chancery, though the Admiralty was in the 
 habit of admitting affidavits so sworn (b). The 
 statute which imposes a penalty where sacks of 
 coal upon being weighed shall be found deficient 
 in weight of coal, and prescribes that, in the 
 weighing, the sacks are to be weighed both with 
 and without the coals therein, is not complied 
 with by putting the full sacks successively into 
 one scale, and an empty sack with the weights 
 which the coal in each should weigh in the other, 
 and consequently the penalty has been held not 
 recoverable by the buyer in such a case (c) ; the 
 precise procedure indicated by the statute not 
 having been followed. 
 
 An enactment which made it a misdemeanour 
 on the part of a bankrupt to commit certain acts 
 within four months next before " the presentation 
 
 (a) B. V. Child (1830), 4 C. & P. 442. See B. v. Woolcock, 5 
 C. & P. 516. 
 
 (6) B. V. Stone, 23 L. J. M. C. 14. 
 
 (e) 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. Ixxvi. s. 67 ; Meredith v. Holman (1847), 
 16 L. J. Ex. 126 ; Smith v. Wood (1889), 59 L. J. Q. B. 5. 
 
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470 INTEEPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of a bankruptcy petition against him," did not 
 have that effect where the petition was presented 
 by the bankrupt himself (a). An Act which made 
 it penal to personate " any person entitled to 
 vote " would not be violated by personating a 
 dead voter (6). A penalty imposed on a man who 
 ran away, leaving his wife and children chargeable, 
 or whereby they became chargeable, would not 
 be incurred by his simple desertion, without the 
 intent that his family should become chargeable 
 to the parish (c). Nor was at one time a husband 
 liable to conviction for refusing to maintain his 
 wife, when she refused to live with him, though 
 her refusal was owing to his ill-treatment {d). A 
 gamekeeper who kills wild rabbits in his master's 
 woods which it was his duty to protect, and takes 
 them away at once and sells them, is not guilty of 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 11 ; Be Burden, 21 Q. B. D. 24. 
 But see now 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 154, which increases the 
 period to six months. 
 
 (6) Whiteley v. GhappeU, 38 L. J. M. C. 51. See also B. v. 
 Brown, 2 East, P. C. 1007. As to existing law, see Corrupt 
 Practices Act, 1883, s. 3, and Ballot Act, 1872, s. 24, which 
 avoids this anomaly. 
 
 (c) Beeve v. Teates (1862), 31 L. J. M. C. 241 ; Sweeney v. 
 Spooner (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 82. See also Heath v. Heape, 26 
 L. J. M. C. 49. 
 
 {d) Flannigan v. Bishopwearmoutli, 27 L. J. M. C. 46. See 
 Pape V. Pape, 20 Q. B. D. 76. But see Summary Jurisdiction 
 (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39). 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 471 
 
 embezzling the rabbits, for he did not get posses- 
 sion of them " for or on account of" his master (a). 
 A statute which imposed a penalty on an un- 
 qualified person who, either in his own or another's 
 name, did any act appertaining to the office of 
 proctor for fee or reward, would not apply to mere 
 agents, or to acts which, though usually performed 
 by proctors, were not of strict right incident to 
 their office ; such as preparing the documents 
 necessary for obtaining letters of administration, 
 where there was no contest (6). An Act which 
 punishes the obtaining, with intent to defraud, any 
 " chattel, money, or valuable security " by a false 
 pretence is not violated by obtaining " credit on 
 account," by a false pretence (c) ; nor by obtaining 
 a dog by a false pretence, for a dog is not a chattel 
 which is the subject of larceny at common law (d). 
 
 (a) a. V. Bead (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 131 ; 47 L. J. M. 0. 50. 
 (6) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 26 (1) ; Stephenson v. Higginaon 
 (1851), 3 H. L. Cas. 638 ; Law Socy. v. Shaw (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 1. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 88 ; B. v. Wavell, 1 Moo. C. C. 224. 
 Probably, however, the offender would come within the mis- 
 chief of s. 13 of 32 & 33 Vict. o. 62. See Beg. v. Jones (1897), 
 67 L. J. Q. B. 41. 
 
 (d) B. V. Bohinaon, 28 L. J. M. 0. 58. But " chattels " includes 
 choses in action, such as shares in a joint-stock company, 
 Bobinson v. Jenkins, 24 Q. B. D. 275 ; and a dog may be " goods," 
 B. V. Slade, 21 Q. B. D. 433. By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 18, 
 dog stealing is made a criminal offence. See " Chattels," and 
 " Goods and Chattels," Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and Supp. 
 
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472 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 An agent entrusted with money to invest on mort- 
 gage is not liable to conviction for embezzling it, 
 as entrusted to him " for safe custody " (a). The 
 forging of an indorsement on a document in the 
 form of a bill of exchange, but having no drawer's 
 name thereon, would not be a forging of an 
 indorsement on a bill of exchange (6). 
 
 Obtaining from the correspondent of a banker a 
 sum of money on a cheque drawn in favour of the 
 correspondent on the banker, on whom the drawer 
 falsely pretended he had authority to draw, would 
 not be an attempt to obtain money from the, 
 banker by false pretences. If the correspondent 
 were to obtaiu the money from the banker, it 
 would not be obtained by the authority of the 
 drawer of the cheque; nor, presumably, by his 
 wish, for he would gain nothing by it(c). It 
 might, however, constitute a misdemeanour within 
 the meaning of- 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 13 (1) (d). 
 See also Larceny Act, 1916. The provision of the 
 Sheriff's Act, 1887, which imposes a penalty on 
 any sheriff's officer who "takes or demands any 
 money or reward under any pretext whatever," 
 other than the fees or sums allowed by that or any 
 
 (o) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 76 ; B. v. Newman, 8 Q. B. D. 706. 
 (5) B. V. Harper, 7 Q. B. D. 78. Clomp. B. v. Bowerman, 
 [1891] 1 Q. B. 112. 
 
 (c) B. V. Garrett, 23 L. J. M. C. 20. 
 
 (d) And see s. 32 of the Larceny Act, 1916. 
 
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CONSTBUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 473 
 
 other Act, would not apply to a claim for charges 
 disallowed on taxation; as the claim must be 
 taken to have been a demand for such items of 
 the charges as should be allowed on taxation {a). 
 Moreover, the penalty is inflicted for the doing 
 of an act in the nature of a criminal offence, and 
 to constitute such an offence there should be 
 mens rea, and consequently, he is not liable to a 
 penalty for a mere mistake {b). 
 
 The Act which punishes the administration of a 
 noxious drug would not include a substance which 
 is not in itself poisonous but noxious only when 
 given in excess, as cantharides (c). A provision 
 which prohibits unloading coal across a footway 
 does not apply to coke {d). 
 
 It was held that the Act which imposes a penalty 
 for " baiting " -animals did not apply to setting 
 dogs in pursuit of rabbits in a small enclosed 
 space of 3 or 4 acres, from which the rabbits 
 could not escape; the word "baiting" being, if 
 not etymologically at least popularly, confined to 
 
 (a) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 55, s. 29 (2 h) ; Woolfor^s Trustee v. Levy,' 
 [1892] 1 Q. B. 7-72, 
 
 (6) Lee v. Dangar, [1892] 2 Q. B. 337. Aa to mens rea, see 
 sup. p. 177 et seq. 
 
 (c) B. V. Mennah (1877), 13 Cox C 0. 547. Comp. B. v. 
 Wilson, inf. p. 490. 
 
 (d) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 134, 9. 5 ; Fletcher v. Fields, [1891] 1 
 Q.B. 790. 
 
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474 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 attacks on animals tied to a stake (a). Probably, 
 however, it might come within the mischief con- 
 templated by 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 27. Again, it has 
 been held that a person is not guilty of "fre- 
 quenting " a street with intent to commit a felony, 
 in the absence of evidence that he had been there 
 more than once (6). Also it has been decided that 
 a person charged under 65 Geo. III. c. 194, s. 20, 
 with acting and practising as an apothecary is not 
 amenable to more than one penalty although it 
 was proved he had supplied medicine to several 
 persons on the same day (c). An article kept ready 
 for use in a back room or cellar is not " exposed 
 for sale" within s. 6, Margarine Act, 1887 (cZ). A 
 
 (a) Pitts V. Millar, L. E. 9 Q. B. 380. As to "domestic 
 animal " under the Cruelty to Animals Acts, 1849 and 1854 (12 
 & 13 Viet. c. 92 and 17 & 18 Viot. c. 60), see Tates v. Higgins, 
 65 L. J. M. G. 31, and cases therein cited. See further, Bridge v. 
 Parsons, 32 L. J. M. 0. 95 ; Allen v. Small, [1904] 2 1. E. 705 ; but 
 see Johnstone v. Abercrombie, 30 Sc. L. E. 260. See also Swan v. 
 Sanders, 50 L. J. M. G. 67 ; Filburn v. People's Palace Go., 59 
 L. J. Q. B. 471. 
 
 (&) 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4 (amended by 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, 
 s. 15) ; Olarh v. B., 14 Q. B. D. 92 ; but see Lang v. Walker, AQ 
 Sc. L. E. 284 ; Bavis v. Jeans, 41 Sc. L. E. 426 ; and see Pointmi 
 V. Sill, 12 Q. B. D. 306, as to " wandering abroad to beg and 
 gather alms " within s. 3 of same Act. 
 
 (f) Apothecaries Go. v. Janes, [1893] 1 Q. B. 89. See also 
 Greig v. Bendeno, sup. p. 81. 
 
 {d) 50 & 51 Viet. c. 29, modified by 62 & 63 Vict. s. 27, and 
 Schedule, and see 7 Edw. VII. c. 21 ; Grane v. Lawrence (1890), 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 475 
 
 person found on premises for an immoral purpose 
 involving no breach of the criminal law, does not 
 fall under the penalty imposed for being found 
 on premises "for an unlawful purpose "(«). Nor 
 would a man who obtained a license to retail 
 beer, by means of a certificate that he was "a 
 person of good character," be Kable to conviction 
 for using a certificate which he knew to be false, 
 merely because he cohabited with a woman with- 
 out being married to her (b). 
 
 The MetropoHs Management Amendment Act, 
 1862, in incorporating the powers for the " sup- 
 pression" of nuisances, conferred by an earher 
 local Act, which contained, besides several pro- 
 visions for getting rid of existing nuisances, a 
 prohibition against keeping pigs, was held not 
 to have comprised this last provision, as the effect 
 of it was, not to " suppress," but to prevent the 
 creation of nuisances (c). Where a local Act, after 
 
 59 L. J. M. 0. 110. Gomp. Wheat v. Brown (1892), 61 L. J. M. C. 
 94. See also Barlow v. Terrett, 60 L. J. M. C. 104, followed in 
 Firth V. McPhail, 74 L. J. K. B. 458. See further, Hobhs v. 
 Winchester, 79 L. J. K. B. 1123. Apparently selling margarine 
 spread on bread in an eating house is not " exposing for sale " 
 within the meaning of the Act, Moore v. Pearce's Dining &c. 
 Booms (1895), 65 L. J. M. C. 7. 
 
 (a) 5 Geo. IV. c. 83 ; Hayes v. Stevenson, 3 L. T. N. S. 296. 
 
 (6) Leader v. Tell, 33 L. J. M. C. 231. 
 
 (c) Chelsea Vestry v. King, 34 L. J. M. C. 9. See G. W. By. Co. 
 V. Bishop (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 550; 41 L. J. M. C. 120. 
 
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476 INTEEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 providing, by one section, that any structure, built 
 or rebuilt, except on the site of a former dwelling, 
 should not be "used" as a dwelling, unless there 
 was an open space of 20 feet in front of it, without 
 the previous consent of the local board, imposed, 
 by another, a penalty if any building or work were 
 "made or suffered to continue" contrary to the 
 provisions of the Act; the Court refused to 
 construe the latter section as including the 
 offences prohibited in the former, though the 
 effect of the decision was to leave them without 
 specific provision for their punishment {a). 
 
 On the ground that an enactment giving a 
 power of committal for non-payment of a debt 
 is a highly penal one, it was held that s. 5 (2), 
 Debtors Act, 1869, which gives such a power in 
 the case of default made by any person in pay- 
 ment of any " debt due from him" in pursuance 
 of a judgment, did not apply to the case of a 
 judgment debt with execution limited to the 
 separate property of a married woman, which 
 could not properly be described as a " debt due 
 from her," upon the strict construction which 
 such a section required (6). And it has been held 
 
 (a) Pearson v. Eull (1865), 35 L. J. M. C. 36, diss. Martin B. 
 Sea another example in Miott v. Majendie (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 
 429. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62; Scott v. Morley, 20 Q. B. D. 120. 
 
 See also Gardiner, Be, 20 Q. B. D. 249. But see as to who is 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 477 
 
 that a garnishee order absolute is not a " final 
 judgment " against the garnishee within s. 4 (1 g), 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (repealed and re-enacted 
 by s. 1 {g), 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59) ; for the words 
 " final judgment " have a proper professional 
 meaning, and when found in a section of an Act 
 which is defining acts of bankruptcy should be 
 construed as strictly as if they occurred in a section 
 defining a misdemeanour, because the commission 
 of an act of bankruptcy entails disabilities on the 
 person who commits it (a). 
 
 Again, as illustrative of the rule of strict con- 
 struction, it has been said that while remedial 
 laws may extend to new things not in esse at the 
 time of making the statute (6), penal laws may 
 not. Thus, the 31 Eliz. c. 12 (repealed by 7 & 8 
 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1), which took away the benefit 
 of clergy from accessories after, as well as before, 
 the fact was held not to extend to accessories 
 made by subsequent enactment. The receiver, 
 therefore, of a stolen horse, who was made an 
 
 " a debtor " within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 
 s. 1 (2) of that statute. 
 
 (a) Ghinery, Exp., 12 Q. B. D. 342. See also Schmitz, Exp., 
 12 Q. B. D. 511 ; Wkinney, Exp., 13 Q. B. D. 476 ; Henderson, 
 Be, 57 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; Lester, Exp., 62 L. J. Q. B. 372. 
 
 (b) 2 Inst. 35 ; per Cur., Dawes v. Painter, Ereeman K. B. 
 175. Sup. pp. 464, 465. 
 
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478 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 accessory by a later statute, was held not ousted (a). 
 Where one Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91) (6), 
 made it felony to receive, with guilty knowledge, 
 a chattel, the stealing of which was felony either 
 at common law or under that Act ; and a sub- 
 sequent one made a partner who stole partnership 
 property liable to conviction for the stealing, as 
 though he had not been a partner; it was held 
 that to receive such stolen property was not an 
 offence under the earlier Act (c). 
 
 The Act to prevent Stock Jobbing, which, after 
 referring, in the preamble, to the great incon- 
 veniences which had arisen, and daily arose, by 
 the wicked practice of stock jobbing — diverting 
 men from their ordinary pursuits, ruining families, 
 discouraging industry, and injuring commerce — 
 declared void all such contracts "in any public 
 or joint stock, or other public securities what- 
 soever," was held, notwithstanding the mischief 
 in view, and the wide terms used, not to apply 
 to transactions in foreign funds (d) or in railway 
 
 (a) Post. Cr. L. 372. 
 
 (6) Sec. 91 repealed by 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50, s. 48 and Sched. 
 
 (c) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1 (repealed by s. 48 and Sched., 
 6 & 7 Geo. V. 50, which see) ; B. v. Smith, 39 L. J. M. G. 112; 
 B. V. Streeter, [1900] 2 Q. B. 601. 
 
 (d) 7 Geo. II. c. 8, repealed by 23 & 24 Vict. o. 28 ; Henderson 
 V. Bise, 3 Stark. 158; Wells v. Porter, 2 Bing. N. C. 722. 
 Comp. Smith, v. Linda, 27 L. J. 0. P. 196, 335. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS. 479 
 
 shares (a), on the ground that the former were 
 not dealt in, and the latter were not known, in 
 England, when the Act was passed. 
 
 But this degree of strictness may be regarded 
 as extreme. It could hardly be contended that 
 printing a treasonable pamphlet was not an offence 
 against the statute of Edw. III., because printing 
 was not invented until a century after it was 
 passed ; or that it would not be treason to shoot 
 the King with a pistol, or poison him with an 
 American drug (6). Sec. 2, 66 Geo. III. c. 58 (c), 
 which enacted that no brewer or dealer in beer 
 shall have, or put into beer, any liquor for darken- 
 ing its colour, or use molasses or any preparation 
 in lieu of malt and hops, under a penalty of £200, 
 was held not to be confined to such dealers as 
 were known at the time when the Act was passed, 
 viz., licensed victuallers, licensed by a magistrate 
 under the Act of 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 25 ; but to 
 include the retailer of beer furnished with an excise 
 license, who first came into legal existence under 
 the 1 WiU. IV. c. 64 (d). So s. 18, Game Act, 
 1831 (1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32), authorising justices 
 to license any householder to sell game, who is 
 
 (a) Hewitt v. Price, 11 L. J. C. P. 292. Comp. Gopeland, 
 Bxp., inf. p. 494. 
 (6) Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 15. ■ 
 
 (c) Eepealed 48 & 49 Vict. c. 51, s. 10. 
 
 (d) A.-G. V. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 378. 
 
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480 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 not licensed to sell beer by retail, includes not 
 only householders licensed under 1 Will. IV. c. 64, 
 but also those who hold an " additional " license 
 under s. 1, Eevenue Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. 
 C. 33) (a). The 8 Anne, c. 7, which enacted that 
 if any sort of prohibited goods should be landed 
 without payment of duty, the offender should 
 forfeit treble value, was held to extend to gloves, 
 which were not prohibited until the 6 G-eo. III. (6). 
 A market Act which prohibited the sale of pro- 
 visions in any part of the town but the market- 
 place, would extend to parts of the town built 
 after the Act was passed on what were then 
 fields (c), and this rule applies in cases where the 
 old market provides insufficient accommodation (d). 
 It was held that the repealed (e) Engraving 
 Copyright Act, 1734 (8 Geo. II. c. 13), which im- 
 posed a penalty for piratically engraving, etching, 
 
 (a) Shoolhred v. St. Pancras Jus. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 346 ; 
 59 L. J. M. C. 63. With regard to the disputed point as to 
 whether or not a person owning several shops and selling beer 
 in one of them could hold a license to sell game, see B. v. 
 Bird and Others (1898), 42 Sol. J. 397. 
 
 (6) A.-G. V. Saggers, 1 Price, 182. 
 
 (c) Collier v. Worth, 1 Ex. D. 464. See -B. v. Cottle, 20 L. J. 
 M. 0. 162, and Milton v. Faversham, 10 B. & S. 548 n. 
 
 {d) Gt. Eastern By. Co. v. Goldsmid (1884), 9 App. Gas. 927. 
 
 (e) For existing law of Copyright, see 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46, 
 and for a disquisition thereon, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 
 Chap. XXI. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OP PENAL LAWS, 481 
 
 or otherwise, or " in any other manner," copy- 
 ing prints and engravings, applied to . copying hy 
 photography, though that process was not in- 
 vented till more than a century after the Act was 
 passed (a). Bicycles were held to be ** carriages " 
 within the provision of the Highway Act, 1835, 
 against furious driving, though not so held for 
 taxing purposes (b), and tricyles propelled by 
 steam to be "locomotives" within the Loco- 
 motives Act, 1865, though not invented when 
 those Acts were passed (c). Under an Act which 
 imposed a penalty for selling bread otherwise than 
 by weight, except bread " usually sold " under 
 the denomination of fancy bread, it was held 
 penal to sell bread which would have fallen 
 within the exception at the time when the Act 
 was passed, but which has since ceased to be 
 sold under the denomination of fancy bread (d). 
 
 (a) Gambart v. Ball, U 0. B. N. S. 306, sup. p. 146 d., 
 Graves v. Ashford, L. E. 2 C. P. 410. Catalogues and lists of 
 articles for sale are books or "literary works," Gollis v. Cater 
 (1898), 78 L. T. 613; Aliter a copy made by a pattern for 
 woolwork, Dicks v. Brooks, 49 L. J. Ch. 812. Gomp. Beal, 
 Exp., inf. p. 491. 
 
 (6) Williams v. Ellis (1880), 49 L. J. M. 0. 47. 
 
 (c) Taylor v. Goodwin (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 228; 48 L. J. M. C. 
 104 ; see an interesting disquisition on this case in Simpson v. 
 Teignmouth, £o.. Bridge Co. (1903), 72 L. J. K. B. 204 ; Parkyns 
 V. Preist (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 313 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 648. 
 
 (d) B. V. Wood, L. E. 4. Q. B. 559. Comp. Aerated Bread 
 L8. 31 
 
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482 INTBRPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 The general principle now under consideration 
 is well exemplified by comparing the manner in 
 which an omission which, it was inferable from 
 the text, was the result of accident, has been 
 generally dealt with in penal and in remedial Acts.. 
 Thus, where the owner of mines was required, 
 under a penalty, in case (1) of loss of life in the 
 mine by accident, or (2) of personal injury arising 
 from explosion, to send notice of such accident 
 to an inspector within 24 hours "from the loss 
 of life" (omitting the case of personal injury), 
 the Court refused to supply, in order to make the 
 defendant Kable to a conviction, the obvious omis- 
 sion in the latter branch of the sentence, and held 
 that notice was not necessary when personal injury 
 from explosion, short of loss of life, had occurred ; 
 although the mention of such injury in the earlier 
 part of the sentence was idle and insensible with- 
 out such an interpolation {a). Sec. 28, 6 & 6 
 Will. IV. c. 63, which empowered inspectors to 
 examine " weights, measures, and scales," in shops, 
 and if upon examination it appeared that " the 
 said weights or measures " (omitting scales) were 
 
 Co. V. Gregg (1873), L. E. 8 Q. B. 355, in which a conviction by 
 justices was upheld, and see also V. V. Bread Go. v. Stuhhs (1896), 
 74 L. T. 704. 
 
 (a) Underhill v. Longridge, 29 L. J. M. C. 65. Comp. 
 Williams v. Evans, inf. p. 497. 
 
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CONSTEUCriON OF PENAL LAWS. 483 
 
 light or unjust, to seize them, was held not to 
 authorise a seizure of scales (a) (but this decision 
 is no longer good law (b)). The repealed Act of 
 William lY- relating to Municipal Corporations, 
 after empowering the borough justices to appoint 
 a clerk to the justices, provided that it should not 
 be lawful to appoint to that office any alderman or 
 councillor, and provided that the clerk should not 
 prosecute any offender committed for trial, enacted 
 that any person " being an alderman or councillor " 
 who should act as clerk to the justices, or " shall 
 otherwise offend in the premises," should forfeit 
 £100, recoverable by action. This clearly did not 
 reach a clerk who prosecuted offenders committed 
 by the justices, if he were not an alderman or 
 councillor ; and yet the manifest intention seemed 
 to be that he should be subject to the penalty for 
 either or both offences, of acting if disqualified, 
 and of prosecuting. But to effectuate this inten- 
 tion, it would have been necessary to interpolate 
 the words " any person who " before " shall other- 
 wise offend " ; and this the Court refused to do 
 for the purpose of bringing a person within the 
 penal enactment (c) ; though also relieving him 
 
 (a) Thomas v. Stephenson, 22 L. J, Q. B. 258. 
 
 (b) See 41 & 42 Vict. c. 49, s. 48. 
 
 (c) Coev. Lawrance (1853), 22 L. J. Q. B. 140. As to existing 
 law, see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 159. 
 
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484 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 from indictment (a). So, the Court refused to 
 supply a casus omissus under the Vaccination 
 Act, 1871, as it was an enactment creating an 
 offence (&). If the statutes, in these cases, had 
 been remedial, the omission would probably have 
 been supplied (c). 
 
 The rule of strict construction, however, when- 
 ever invoked, comes attended with qualifications 
 and other rules no less important ; and it is by 
 the light which each contributes that the meaning 
 must be determined {d). Among them is the rule 
 that that sense of the words is to be adopted 
 which best harmonises with the context, and 
 promotes in the fullest manner the policy and 
 object of the Legislature. The paramount object, 
 in construing penal as well as other statutes, is to 
 ascertain the legislative intent; and the rule of 
 strict construction is not violated by permitting 
 the words to have their full meaning, or the more 
 extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating 
 the intention (e). They are, indeed, frequently 
 
 (a) Per Coleridge J. See also B. v. Davis, L. E. 1 C. C. E. 
 272. See National Merc. Bank, Etcp., 15 Oh. D. 42, sup. p. 31. 
 (6) Broadhead v Holdsworth, 2 Ex. D. 321. 
 
 (c) Be Wainewright, 1 Phil. 258, sup. p. 444. 
 
 (d) Per Cur., U. S. v. Eartwell, 6 Wallace, 395. 
 
 (e) Id. 396. 
 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE RULE. 485 
 
 taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a 
 sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is 
 popularly attached to them, in order to carry out 
 eflfeotually the legislative intent, or, to use Lord 
 Coke's words, to suppress the mischief and advance 
 the remedy (a). 
 
 Thus, the Act which makes it felony to set fire 
 to or damage a ship or vessel (b) has been construed 
 as including an open boat of 18 feet in length (c). 
 Under the statute which makes it a misdemeanour 
 knowingly to utter counterfeit coin is included a 
 genuine coin from which the milling has been filed 
 and replaced by another (d), but, on the other hand, 
 where there was no evidence of intention to utter 
 a counterfeit coin made up of two genuine coins 
 split and soldered together so as to constitute a 
 double headed piece, the statute was held inappli- 
 cable (e). The possession of a die for making a 
 false stamp, known to be such by its possessor, is, 
 however innocent his intention, a possession 
 "without lawful excuse" within the Post Office 
 
 (a) Heydon's Case, sup. p. 123. 
 
 (6) The term "vessel" includes any ship or boat, or any 
 other description of vessel used in navigation : 57 & 58 Vict. 
 c. 60, s. 742. 
 
 (c) Semble per Patteson J., B. v. Bowyer, 4 0. & P. 559. 
 Comp. Ferguson and Hutchinson, Exp., 40 L. J. Q. B. 105 ; sup. 
 p. 131. 
 
 (d) B. V. Hermann (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 284. 
 
 (e) B. V. McWahon (1894), 15 N. S. W. (Law Reports), 131. 
 
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486 INTBKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 (Protection) Act, 1884(a). Although the Act 
 which punishes a man for running away from his 
 wife and " children," thereby leaving them charge- 
 able to the parish, applies only to the desertion of 
 legitimate children, this rests, not on any indis- 
 position to depart from the strict and^ narrow 
 meaning of the word, but on the ground that 
 the object of the Legislature was limited to the 
 enforcement of the man's legal obligation, which 
 did not extend to the support of his illegitimate 
 children (b). But the statute which made it a 
 criminal offence to take an unmarried girl from 
 the possession and against the will of her father 
 or mother, was held to apply to the case of a 
 natural daughter taken from her putative father (c) ; 
 for the wider construction obviously carried out 
 more fully the aim and policy of the enactment. 
 The "taking from the possession " again, in the 
 
 (a) 47 & 48 Vict. c. 76, s. 7 (c), repealed by 8 Edw. VII. c. 48, 
 and re-enacted by s. 65 (c) of that Act. As to the law relating 
 to the possession of certain specified forged dies and seals, 
 see 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 27 : Dickens v. Gill, [1896] 2 Q. B. 310. 
 
 (h) B. V. Maude (1842), 11 L. J. M. C. 120, on which see per 
 Williams L.J,, Woolwich v. Fulham, 75 L. J. K. B. 680, 681 ; 
 Westminster y. Gerard, 2 Bulst. 346. As to whether or not a man 
 who runs away from his wife and children, one or more of 
 whom is illegitimate, is not guilty of an offence under 5 Geo. IV. 
 c. 83, s. 3, see 20 J. P., p. 364. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 55 ; B. v. Cornforth, 2 Stra. 1162. 
 See also B. v. Eodnett, 1 T. E. 96. 
 
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WIDE MEANING GIVEN TO WORDS. 487 
 
 same enactment, is construed in the widest sense, 
 implying neither actual nor constructive force, and 
 extending to voluntary and temporary elopements 
 made with the active concurrence of the ^rl (a). 
 
 Lord Coke thought that burglary might be 
 committed in a church, because a church is the 
 mansion of God; but Lord Hale thought this 
 opinion only a quaint turn without any argu- 
 ment (b). It is now, however, provided by s. 27 
 of the Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 60), 
 that to break and enter a place of divine worship 
 is a felony exactly analogous in character to the 
 breakiag and entering of a dwelling-house. The 
 "breaking" required to constitute burglary in- 
 cludes acts which would not be so designed in 
 popular language; such as lifting the flap of a 
 cellar (c), or puUing down the sash of a window (d), 
 or raising a latch (e), or even descending a chimney, 
 for that is as much closed as the nature of things 
 permits (/ ). Lord Hale, who doubted whether the 
 
 (a) B. V. Bobins, 1 0. & K. 456 ; B. v. Kipps, 4 Cox 0. 0. 167 ; 
 B. V. Biswell, 2 Gox 0. 0. 279 ; B. v. ManUeloio, 22 L. J. M. C. 
 115 ; E. V. Timmins (1860), 30 L. J. M. C. 45. 
 
 (6) 1 Hale, 556. See Folkestone Corp. v. Woodward (1872), 
 L. E. 15 Bq. 159 ; WrigM v. Ingle, 16 Q B. D. 379. 
 
 (c) Brown's Case, 2 Bast, P. C. 487 ; R. v. Bussell, 1 Moo. C. 0. 
 377. Gowp. B. V. Laterence, 4 C. & P. 231. 
 
 (d) B. V. Haines, Euss. & Ey. 451. 
 
 (e) B. V. Jordan, 7 C. & P. 432. 
 
 (/) 1 Hawk. c. 38, s. 4; B. v. Brice, Euss. & Ey. 450. 
 
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488 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 latter act was a breaking, was relieved from deciding 
 the point in the case before him, as it was elicited 
 that some bricks had been loosened in the thief's 
 descent, which sufficed to constitute a breaking (a). 
 Indeed, the burglar "breaks" into a house if he 
 gets admittance by inducing the inmate to open 
 the door by a trick, as by a pretence of business, 
 or by raising an alarm of fire (6). 
 
 A threatening letter is "sent" when it is 
 dropped in the way of the person for whom it 
 is destined, so that he may pick it up (c) ; or is 
 sent by A. that he may deliver it to B. (d) ; or 
 is affixed in some place where he would be likely 
 to see it (e) ; or is placed on a public road near 
 his house, so that it may, however indirectly, 
 reach him, which it eventually does after passing 
 through several hands (/); or perhaps even if it 
 does not reach the person addressed (g) ; although 
 in none of these cases would the paper be popularly 
 said to have been " sent." A person who writes 
 
 (a) 1 Hale, 552. 
 
 (b) 2 East, P. G. 485. 
 
 (c) B. V. Jepson, and B. v. Lloyd (1767), 2 East, P. C. 1115, 
 1122 ; B. V. Wagstaff, Euss. & Ey. 398. 
 
 (d) B. V. Paddle (1822), E. & E. 484. 
 
 (e) B. V. Williams, 1 Cox C. C. 16. 
 
 (/) B. V. Grimwade, 1 Den. 30. See also B. v. Jones, 5 Cox 
 C. C. 226. 
 
 {g) B. V. Adams, 22 Q. B. D. 66. 
 
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WIDE MEANING GIVEN TO WOBDS. 489 
 
 and publishes an article in a newspaper, intending 
 to encourage the murder of another person any- 
 where, is guilty of encouraging a person to 
 murder, though the article is not addressed to 
 any particular person (a). 
 
 To make false signals, and thereby to bring 
 a train to a stand on a railway, was held to be 
 within the enactment which made it an offence 
 to " obstruct " a railway (6) ; and an enactment 
 which makes it a misdemeanour to do anything 
 to obstruct an engine or carriage using a railway, 
 was held to include railways not yet open to 
 public traffic, and to apply though no engine 
 or carriage was obstructed (c). 
 
 The collection of alms on false and fraudulent 
 pretehces is an " immoral act " within the meaning 
 of the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892 {d), as is also 
 habitual swearing and ribaldry (e). 
 
 A person "suffers" gaming to go on in his 
 house who purposely abstains from ascertaining, 
 
 {a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 4 ; B. v. Most (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 
 244 ; 50 L. J. M. 0. 113 ,• B. v. AntonelU (1906), 70 J. P. 4. 
 
 (6) B. V. Hadfield, L. E. 1 C. G. E. 253 ; B. v. Hardy, Id. 278. 
 Comp. Walker v. Horner, 1 Q. B. D. 4 ; Bastable v. Little, 
 76 L. J. K. B. 77, with Betts v. Stevens, 79 L. J. K. B. 17. See 
 Gully V. Smith, 12 Q. B. D. 121. 
 
 (c) B. V. Bradford, 29 L. J. M. G. 171. 
 
 {d) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 32, s. 2 ; Fitzmaurice v. Hesketh, [1904] 
 A. G. 266. See also Beneficed aerk v. Lee, [1897] A. 0. 226. 
 
 (e) Moore v. Oxford (Bp.), [1904] A. C. 283. 
 
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490 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 or purposely goes out of reach of seeing or 
 hearing it (a) ; and he uses an instrument for the 
 destruction of game on a Sunday, who sets a 
 snare on Saturday, and leaves it till Monday (6). 
 
 An Act which makes it penal to " administer," 
 or "to cause to be taken," a noxious drug to 
 procure abortion, would be violated by one who 
 supplied such a drug to a woman, and explained 
 to her how it was to be taken, and she after- 
 wards took it accordingly, in his absence (c). 
 And a man supplies such a drug, "knowing it 
 to be intended" to procure abortion, if he so 
 intended it, though the woman did not (d). To 
 supply beer at a public-house to a drunken man 
 would be to " sell " the liquor to him, although it 
 was ordered and paid for by a sober companion (e). 
 
 (a) 36 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 17, repealed by s. 79, LicenBing 
 (Consolidation) Act, 1910 ; Bedgate v. Haynes, 1 Q. B. D. 89. 
 See Bond v. Evans, 21 Q. B. D. 249 ; and comp. Somerset v. Hart, 
 12 Q. B. D. 360, and Somerset v. Wade, [1894] 1 Q. B. 574 ; 
 Massey v. Morriss, [1894] 2 Q. B. 412. 
 
 (6) Allen v. Thompson, L. E. 5 Q. B. 336. See also Buther 
 V. Harris, 1 Ex. D. 97. 
 
 (c) B. V. Wilson, 26 L. J. M. 0. 18 ; B. v. Farrow, D. & B. 164. 
 Camp. B. V. Henndh, sup. p. 473. 
 
 (d) B. V. Hillman, 33 L. J. M. C. 60. Gomp. B. v. Fretwell, 
 31 L. J. M. C. 145. 
 
 (e) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 13, repealed s. 75, Licensing (Con- 
 solidation) Act, 1910; Scatchard v. Johnson, sup. p. 125. See 
 Pletts V. Campbell, [1895] 2 Q. B. 229, and Badford v. Williams 
 (1914), 78 J. P. 90. 
 
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WIDE MEANING GIVEN TO WOKDS. 491 
 
 A repealed Act (a) which prohibited under a penalty 
 "the copying of a painting" without the owner's 
 leave was held to reach a photograph of an engrav- 
 ing which the proprietor of the painting had made 
 from it (6). 
 
 A servant receives money " for or in the name 
 or on account of his master" within the Act 
 against embezzlement, who, having a cheque 
 given to him in his own name for his master, 
 gets it cashed by a person ignorant of the circum- 
 stances ; for though that person did not pay the 
 money on account of the master, it was enough 
 that it was received on his account (c). The Sale 
 of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, which makes it 
 penal to sell an adulterated article "to the 
 prejudice of the purchaser," would include a sale 
 to an officer who makes the purchase, not with 
 his own money or for his own use, but with the 
 public money and for the purpose of analysis (d). 
 
 A man who fires from a highway at game, has 
 
 (a) For existing law, see Copyright Act, 1911, and for a dis- 
 quisition thereon. Clerk and LindseU on Torts, Chap. XXI. 
 
 (6) Beal, Exp., L. E. 3 Q. B 387. Comp. Oamhart v. Ball, 
 sup. p. 481. 
 
 (c) B. V. Gale (1876), 2 Q. B. D. 141. Comp. B. v. Bead, 
 sup. p. 471 ; and see for definition of Larceny, 6 & 7 Geo. V. 
 c. 50. 
 
 (d) Eoyle v. Eitchman, 4 Q. B. D. 233. See the numerous 
 cases on this phrase, sub " Prejudice of Pubchasee," in 
 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and Supp. 
 
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492 INTBKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 trespassed on the land of the owner of the soil 
 on which the highway runs ; for the right of 
 way over the road is only an easement, and if 
 a man uses it for an unlawful purpose, he becomes 
 a trespasser (a). If he walks with a gun with 
 intent to kiU game, he "uses " the gun for that 
 purpose without firing, within the statute which 
 makes using a gun with that intent penal (b) ; and 
 the offence of " taking " game is complete when 
 the game is snared, though neither killed nor 
 removed (c). A "public place," too, has received 
 a very wide meaning in cases of nuisance (d), and 
 a workhouse has been held to be a "pubUc 
 building" within the Factory and Workshop Act, 
 1891 (e). 
 
 A person who pays for goods by a cheque 
 on a bank where he has no assets is guilty of 
 " obtaining goods by false pretences " ; for in 
 
 (a) Mayhew v. Wardley, 14 0. B. N. S. 550; B. v. Pratt, 
 4 B. & B. 860 ; Harrison v. Butland (Duke), [1893] 1 Q. B. 142 ; 
 inf. pp. 546, 647. 
 
 (6) 6 Anne c. 14, s. 4, repealed by 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 1, 
 and see s. 23 of this latter Act ; B. v. King, 1 Sess. Ca. 88. 
 See also U. S. v. Morris, 14 Peters, 464. 
 
 (c) 5 Geo. III. c. 14, repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 27 ; B. 
 V. Glover, Euss. & Ey. 269. 
 
 (d) See B. V. Thallman, 33 L. J. M. C. 58. See Golding v. 
 Stocking, L. E. 4 Q. B. 516 ; Langrisli v. Archer, 10 Q. B. D. 44. 
 
 (e) 1 Bdw. VII. c. 22, s. 149 (1), Sched. VI., Part 1, clause 
 20 ; Mile End Guardians v. Hoare, [1903] 2 K. B. 483. 
 
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WIDE MEANING GIVEN TO WORDS. 493 
 
 giving the cheque he impliedly represents that 
 he has authority from the bank to draw it, and 
 that it is a good and valid order for payment of 
 the amount (a). If, however, a person at the time 
 he gives the cheque beKeves that it will be paid 
 on presentation he cannot be convicted of a false 
 pretence (&). But, on the other hand, if a person 
 promise to give (say) J6100 on the signature of a 
 note, there is a. representation of an existing fact, 
 viz., that the money was ready on the delivery of 
 the note (c). 
 
 A repealed Act (d) which imposed a penalty on 
 corn-dealers for omitting to make a return of every 
 parcel of corn bought from them would be broken, 
 though the unreturned sales were not evidenced 
 in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds, 
 and therefore were not enforceable in a Court of 
 Justice (e). 
 
 The enactment which punished with transporta- 
 tion for Kfe every person, whether employed by 
 the Postmaster-General, or by " any person under 
 him, or on behalf of the post-office," who stole 
 
 (a) B. V. Hazelton, 44 L. J. M. C. 11 ; B. v. Parker, 7 G. & P. 
 829. Oomp. B. v. Benson, 77 L. J. K. B. 644. 
 
 (6) B. V. Walne (1879), 11 Gox 647, C. 0. E. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 90 ; s. 90 repealed by 6 & 7 Geo. V. 
 e. 50, s. 48 and Sched. ; B. v. Gordon, 23 Q. B. D. 354. 
 
 {d) 9 Geo. IV. e. 60, repealed by 5 & 6 Viet. c. 14, s. 1. 
 
 (e) B. V. Townrow, 1 B. & Ad. 465. 
 
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494 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a letter with money in it, was held to include 
 a person who gratuitously assisted a postmaster, 
 at his request, in sorting the letters (a). The 
 Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, which 
 disentitled a bankrupt to his certificate, if he had, 
 within a year of his bankruptcy, lost ^6200 by " any 
 contract " for the purchase or sale of Government 
 or other " stock," was held to apply to one who 
 had lost that amount in the purchase of railway 
 " shares," and by several contracts (&). The 
 employment of an English steam tug in towing a 
 prize to the captor's waters is a breach of the 
 provision of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 
 against " dispatching a ship to be employed in the 
 military or naval service of a foreign state " (c). 
 Where an Act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 15) {d) provided that 
 if any accident occurred in a factory, causing an 
 injury to any person employed there, of such a 
 nature as to prevent his return to work at a.m. 
 on the next day, it must, under a penalty, be 
 reported by the occupier of the factory to the 
 
 (a) B. V. Beason, 23 L. J. M. C. 11 ; B. v. Foulhes, 44 L. J. 
 M. C. 65. Gomp. Martin v. Ford, 5 T. E. 101, and Bennett v. 
 Edwards, 6th point, 7 B. & C. 586. Transportation is abolished, 
 see sup. p. 262. 
 
 (6) Gopeland, Exp., 22 L. J. Bank. 17, sup. p. 479. Comp. 
 Hewitt V. Price, sup. p. 479. 
 
 (c) Dyhe v. Elliott (1872), L. E. 4 P. C. 184 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 65 
 
 [d] Eepealed 41 & 42 Vict. c. 16, s. 107. 
 
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WIDE MEANING GIVEN TO WORDS 495 
 
 district surgeon and the sab-inspeotor ; it was 
 held that the Act applied to all accidents, whether 
 caused by the machinery of the factory or other- 
 wise ; and that the sufferel' was prevented from 
 " returning to his work " next day, within the 
 meaning of the Act, although he did return for 
 that purpose, but was unable to work (a). 
 
 Certain repealed sections of the Corrupt Practices 
 Prevention Act, 1854, which declared that who- 
 ever, " directly or indirectly," makes a gift to a 
 person to induce him to " endeavour to procure 
 the return " of any person to Parliament shall be 
 deemed guilty of bribery, were held to extend to 
 a gift made to induce its recipient to vote for the 
 giver at a preliminary test ballot, held for the 
 purpose of selecting one of three candidates to be 
 proposed when the election came. In voting for 
 the giver at the test ballot, the voter indirectly 
 " endeavoured to procure " his return at the 
 election (6). 
 
 An enactment which prohibited any officer con- 
 cerned in the administration of the poor laws 
 from " supplying for his own profit " any goods 
 "ordered" to be "given" in parochial relief to 
 any person, was held to reach a guardian whose 
 partner had, with knowledge of the facts, sold a 
 
 (a) Lakeman v. Stephenson, L. E. 3 Q. B. 192. 
 (6) Britt V. Bobinson (1870), L. E. 5 C. P. 503. Certain sections 
 repealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 56 ; note ss. 1, 2 and 3 of this Act. 
 
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496 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 bedstead to the relieving officer on behalf of the 
 parish for delivery to a pauper; although the 
 guardian was ignorant of the transaction, the bed- 
 stead had not been " ordered " by the guardians (a), 
 and it was only lent,, not "given" in parochial 
 relief (6). An officer of a local board, who was a 
 shareholder in a company having a contract with 
 the board, was held to be " interested in a bargain 
 or contract " with the board, within the meaning 
 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and liable to the 
 penalty imposed by that statute (c). 
 
 Sec. 78, Highway Act, 1835, which enacted that 
 if any person (1) riding a horse, or (2) driving a 
 carriage, rode or drove furiously, "every person so 
 offending " should be liable on conviction before 
 a magistrate to forfeit £5, if " the driver " was not 
 the owner of the carriage, and £10 if " the driver " 
 was the owner (not mentioning the rider), was 
 construed as making tjie rider, who was not the 
 owner of the horse, as well as the driver, liable ; 
 
 (a) Greenhow v. Parker, 31 L. J. Ex. 4. See Woolley v. Kay, 
 25 L. J. Ex. 351. 
 
 (6) Bavies v. Harvey, sup. p. 337 ; Stanley v. Dodd, 1 D. & E. 
 397. Gomp. Proctor v. Manwaring, sup. p. 299. 
 
 (c) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 193 ; Todd v. BoUnson, 14 Q. B. D. 
 739; Nutton v. Wilson, 22 Q. B. D. 744; Barnacle v. Clark, 
 [1900] 1 Q. B. 279. See further, Burgess v. Glark, 14 Q. B. D. 
 735 ; Whiteley v. Barley, 57 L. J. Q. B. 643 ; B. v. Whiteley, 58 
 L. J. M. 0. 164 ; Gox V. Ambrose, 60 L. J. Q. B. 114. Gomp. 
 Morris, App., Howden, Eesp., [1897] 1 Q. B. 378. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL ACTS, 497 
 
 as providing, in other words, that while the owner 
 of a carriage was liable to a penalty of ^10, the 
 offender in all the other cases mentioned was liable 
 to £5 (a). 
 
 An Act (6) which made it felony riotously to de- 
 molish, pull down, or destroy, or begin to demolish, 
 pull down, or destroy, a church or dwelling, would 
 not reach a case where the demolition had not 
 gone beyond movable shutters not attached to 
 the freehold ; for whatever might have been the 
 intent of the rioters, this was not a beginning of 
 the demolition of the house to which the shutters 
 belonged (c) ; nor would a partial demolition of the 
 building be a " beginning to demolish " within the 
 Act, if not done with the intention of completing 
 it {d). But if the structure were in all substantial 
 respects destroyed, the offence would be included in 
 the Act, although some portion, as, for instance, a 
 chimney, had been suffered to remain uninjured (e). 
 Nor would it be considered as beyond the operation 
 
 (a) Williams v. Evans (1876), 1 Ex. D. 277, ovemding B. v. 
 Bacon, 11 Oox 0. 0. 540 ; Chatterton v. Parker (1914), 78 J. P. 
 339. Comp. UnderMll v. Longridge, sup. p. 482. 
 
 (6) 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 30 (repealed by 24 & 25 Yiot. c. 95). As 
 to existing law, see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s 11. 
 
 (c) B. V. Howell (1839), 9 C. & P. 437 ; Pilcher v. Stafford, 33 
 L. J. M. C. 113 ; Edleston v. Barnes, 45 L. J. M. 0. 73. 
 
 {d) B. V. Thomas, 4 G. & P. 237, per Littledale J. ; B. v. Price, 
 5 C. & P. 510, per Tindal O.J. ; Drahe v. Footitt, 7 Q. B. D. 201. 
 
 (e) B. V. Langford, Car. & M. 602. 
 
 QO 
 I.S. "^^ 
 
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498 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the Act, if the demolition had been effected by 
 fire; although arson is a distinct felony provided 
 for by a different enactment (a). 
 
 Some of the decisions relative to the theft of 
 writings seem to convey a fair impression of the 
 spirit in which criminal statutes have been con- 
 strued. As neither land nor mere rights were 
 capable of being stolen, it was early established 
 that title deeds relating to lands, and written con- 
 tracts, which were mere rights or the evidences 
 of rights, were not the subjects of larceny. To 
 steal a skin worth a shilling was felony ; but when 
 it had ^610,000 added to its value by what was 
 written on it, it was no offence at common law 
 to take it away; and a person who broke into 
 a house at night with the intention of stealing a 
 mortgage deed would not have been guilty of 
 felony, for the theft was not a felony, but a misde- 
 meanour only (6). Most of these anomalies have, 
 however, been removed by the Larceny Act, 1916. 
 But even before the passing of this Act a paper 
 Hke a pawnbroker's ticket, indicating not a mere 
 right of action, but a right to a specific personal 
 chattel of which the holder of the ticket may be 
 regarded as in possession (for the possession of the 
 
 (a) B. V. Harris, and B. v. Simpson, 0. & M. 661, 669. 
 
 (6) Arg. in B. v. Westheer, 2 Stra. 1133 ; B. v. Pooley, Euss. 
 & Ey. 12 ; B. v. Poioell, 21 L. J. M. C. 78. See 6 & 7 Geo. V. 
 0. 50, s. 7. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL ACTS. 499 
 
 pawnor is his possession for the purpose of an 
 indictment), would be the subject of larceny (a). 
 And a like rule obtained in the case of a railway 
 ticket, obtained by false pretences. The ticket 
 being evidence of a right to be carried on the 
 railway (b). But an Act which punished an agent 
 who, in violation of good faith, and contrary to 
 the purpose of his trust, sold, negotiated, trans- 
 ferred, pledged, or in any manner converted to 
 his own use " any chattel or valuable security " 
 with which he was entrusted, would not include a 
 policy of insurance entrusted to him for collection ; 
 for it is neither a chattel capable of sale or barter, 
 nor yet a valuable security, for this implies that 
 money is payable irrespectively of any contingency ; 
 and it is not capable of being sold, negotiated, 
 transferred, or pledged (c). 
 
 The tendency of modern decisions, upon the 
 whole, is to narrow materially the difference 
 between what is called a strict and a beneficial 
 construction. All statutes are now construed 
 
 (a) B. V. Morrison, 28 L. J. M. 0. 210. See B. v. FitcMe, 26 
 L. J. M. C. 90. 
 
 (h) B. V. Boulton, 19 L. J. M. 0. 67 ; B. v. Beeeham, 5 Cox 
 C. C. 181. See Marha v. Benjamin, 9 L. J. M. C. 20. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75, repealed by 1 Edw. VII. c. 10, 
 which is now repealed by 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50, which see. B. v. 
 Tatloch, 2 Q. B. D. 167 ; but in this case there was a remarkable 
 division of opinion of the judges. 
 
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500 INTEEPJBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 with a more attentive regard to the language, and 
 criminal statutes with a more rational regard to 
 the aim and intention of the Legislature, than 
 formerly. It is unquestionably right that the dis- 
 tinction should not be altogether erased from the 
 judicial mind (a) ; for it is required by the spirit 
 of our free institutions that the interpretation 
 of all statutes should be favourable to personal 
 liberty (&) ; and this tendency is still evinced in a 
 certain reluctance to supply the defects of language, 
 or to eke out the meaning of an obscure passage by 
 strained or doubtful inferences (c). The effect of 
 the rule of strict construction might almost be 
 summed up in the remark, that where an equivocal 
 word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable 
 doubt of its meaning which the canons of interpre- 
 tation fail to solve, the benefit of the doubt should 
 be given to the subject, and against the Legis- 
 lature which has failed to explain itself {d). But 
 it yields to the paramount rule that every statute 
 
 (a) Per Pollock C.B., Nicholson v. Fields, 31 L. J. Ex. 233. 
 (6) Per Lord Abinger, Henderson v. Sherborne, 2 M. & W. 239. 
 
 (c) Per Story J., The Industry, 1 Gall. 117. 
 
 (d) See Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 36 E. E. 459 ; per Pollock 
 C. B., Nicholson v. Fields, sup. ; and per Bramwell B., Foley v. 
 Fletcher, 28 L. J. Ex. 106; Puff L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 5, Barb, 
 n. 4; Leiois v. Carr, 1 Ex. D. 484; Secretary of State for India v. 
 Scohle, [1903] A. G. 299 ; East Indian By. Go. v. Secretary of 
 State for India, [1905] 2 K. B. 413, C. A. Gomp. Ghadwick v. 
 Pearl Life Insurance Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 507. 
 
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STATUTES ENCROACHING ON EIGHTS. 501 
 
 is to be expounded according to its expressed or 
 manifest intention (a) ; and that all oases within 
 the mischiefs aimed at are, if the language permits, 
 to be held to fall within its remedial influence {h). 
 
 SECTION II. STATUTES ENCROACHING ON EIGHTS, OE 
 
 IMPOSING BUEDENS. 
 
 Statutes which encroach on the rights of the 
 subject, whether as regards person or property, are 
 similarly subject to a strict construction in the 
 sense before explained. It is a recognised rule 
 that they should be interpreted, if possible, so as 
 to respect such rights (c). It is presumed, where 
 the objects of the Act do not obviously imply such 
 an intention, that the Legislature does not desire 
 to confiscate the property, or to encroach upon the 
 right of persons ; and it is therefore expected 
 that if such be its intention, it will manifest it 
 plainly, if not in express words, at least by clear 
 implication, and beyond reasonable doubt (d). It 
 
 (a) 4 Inst. 330 ; The Sussex' Peerage, 11 01. & F. 143. 
 
 (6) Fennell v. Biddler, 4 L. J. (O. S.) K. B. 207 ; The Industry, 
 sup. p. 500. See ex. gr. B. v. Charretie, 13 Q. B. 447 ; Wynne v. 
 Middleton, 1 Wils. 126 ; Archer v. James, 2 B. & S. 61 ; Smith v. 
 Walton, 3 0. P. D. 109 ; May v. G. W. By. Co., L. E. 7 Q. B. 
 384, per Gockburn C.J. ; B. v. Adams, 22 Q. B. D. 66. 
 
 (c) Per Bowen L.J., Hough v. Windus, 12 Q. B. D. 224. 
 
 {d) Western Counties By. Co. v. Windsor and Annapolis By. Co., 
 7 App. Cas., at p. 188 ; Commissioners of Public Works v. Logan, 
 
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502 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 is a proper rule of construction not to construe an 
 Act of Parliament as interfering with or injuring 
 persons' rights, without compensation, unless one 
 is obHged so to construe it (a). 
 
 A local Harbour Act, which imposed a penalty 
 on " any person " who placed articles " on any 
 quay, wharf, or landing place, within 10 feet of 
 the quay head, or on any space of ground immedi- 
 ately adjoining the said haven, within 10 feet 
 from high- water mark," so as to obstruct the free 
 passage over it, was held to apply only to ground 
 over which there was already a pubHo right of way, 
 but not to private property not subject to any such 
 right, and in the occupation of the person who 
 placed the obstruction on it (6). Notwithstanding 
 the comprehensive nature of the general terms 
 used, it was not to be inferred that the Legislature 
 contemplated such an interference with the rights 
 
 [1903] A. C. 355. See also jjer Bramwell L. J., Wells v. London & 
 Tilbury By. Co., 5 Oh. D. 130 ; per MeUish L.J., Lundy Co., Be, 
 L. E. 6 Gh. 467 ; per James L.J., Jones, Exp., L. E. 10 Ch. 663 ; 
 per Cur., Bandolph v. Milman, L. E. 4 C.,P. 113; Green v. B., 
 1 App. Gas. 513 ; Sheil, Exp., 4 Gh. D. 789 ; per Bowen L.J., 
 Bendall v. Blair, 45 Gh. D. 153 ; per Lord Esher M.E., Buhe of 
 Devonshire v. O'Connor, 24 Q. B. D. 473, referring to the judgment 
 of Cockburn G.J., Sowerhy v. Smith, L. E. 9 0. P. 524. 
 
 (a) Per Brett M.E., A.-G. v. Horner, 14 Q. B. D. 257. 
 
 (6) Harrod v. Worship, 30 L. J. M. G. 165, diss. Wightman J. 
 See also Wells v. London & Tilbury By. Co., sup. Yarmouth v. 
 Simmons, 10 Gh. D. 518. 
 
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STATUTES IMPOSING BURDENS. 503 
 
 of property as would have resulted from construing 
 the words as creating a right of way. The Partner- 
 ship Act of 1865(a), which provided that when 
 a loan to a trader bore interest varying with the 
 profits of the trade, the leader should not, if 
 the trader became bankrupt, "recover" until 
 the claims of the other creditors were satisfied, 
 did not deprive the creditor of any rights acquired 
 by mortgage. Though he could not recover, he 
 was entitled to retain (b). 
 
 On this ground, it would seem. Statutes of 
 Limitation are to be construed strictly. The 
 defence of lapse of time against a just demand is 
 not to be extended to cases which are not clearly 
 within the enactment; while provisions which 
 give exceptions to the operation of such enact- 
 ments are to be construed hberally (c). 
 
 Statutes which impose pecuniary burdens, also, 
 are subject to the same rule of strict construction. 
 It is a well-settled rule of law that all charges 
 upon the subject must be imposed by clear and 
 
 (a) 28 & 29 Viofc. c. 88, ss. 1, 5. Ee-enaeted by ss. 2 (d), 3, 
 Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 3. Applied to 
 limited partnerships by 7 Edw. VII. c. 24, s. 7. 
 
 (6) Slieil, Exp., 46 L. J. Bank. 62. 
 
 (c) See the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Boddam v. Morley, 
 1 De G. & J. 1. 
 
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504 INTEBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 unambiguous language, because in some degree 
 they operate as penalties (a). The subject is not 
 to be taxed unless the language of the statute 
 clearly imposes the obligation (6). A construc- 
 tion, for example, which would have the effect of 
 making a person liable to pay the same tax twice 
 in respect of the same subject matter would not 
 be adopted unless the words were very clear and 
 precise to that effect (c). In a case of reasonable 
 doubt the construction most beneficial to the 
 subject is to be adopted {d). Thus, in estimating 
 a bank manager's " total income from all sources," 
 for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is 
 entitled to partial relief from income tax, the 
 
 (a) Per Bayley J., Derm v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 243 ; per Park J., 
 Doe V. Snaith, 8 Bing. 152; per Parke B., Harris v. Birch, 9 
 M. & W. 594 ; Sneezum v. Marshall, 7 M. & W. 419 ; per Meld J., 
 B. V. Barclay, 8 Q. B. D. 306 ; Partington v. A.-G., L. E. 4 H. L. 
 100, applied by Hamilton J. in Northumberland (Duke') v. Inl. 
 Bev., 80 L. J. K. B. 875, reversed on appeal (1911), 81 L. J. K. B. 
 240, C. A. ; Oriental Bank v. Wright, 5 App. Cas. 842 ; Ird. Bev. v. 
 Angus, 23 Q. B. D. 579 ; per Hamilton J., Lanston Monotype 
 Corp. V. Anderson, 80 L. J. K. B. 951. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, sup. p. 500; per 
 Pollock C.B., Nicholson v. Fields, sup. p. 500 ; Parry v. Croydon 
 Gas Co., 11 G. B. N. S. 579 ; 15 Id. 568. 
 
 (c) Carr v. Fowle, [1893] 1 Q. B. 251. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Lyndhurst, Stockton By. Co. v. Barrett, 11 01. & 
 P. 602 ; per Parke B., Micklethwait, Be, 11 Ex. 456 ; per Lindley 
 L.J., Thorley, Be, [1891] 2 Ch. 613; Pryce v. Monmouthshire 
 Canal Co., 4 App. Cas. 197. 
 
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STATUTES IMPOSING BURDENS. 505 
 
 yearly value of his free residence in the bank 
 premises, where he is bound to reside, is not to be 
 taken into account as " income " (a). The pro- 
 vision of 3. 32, Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 
 1881, that if it shall be discovered that the personal 
 estate of a deceased person was undervalued at the 
 time of probate, " the person acting in the ad- 
 ministration of the estate shall deliver a farther 
 affidavit with an account duly stamped, with the 
 amount of excess duty which ought to have been 
 paid in the first instance," does not apply to 
 persons who have completed the duties of adminis- 
 tration (b). Where land employed as the site of 
 an almshouse was, on that account, declared by 
 two successive statutes to be exempt from land 
 tax, the fact that other land had since been applied 
 to the same charitable purpose, and the original 
 land had been, by order of the Court of Chancery, 
 directed to be held by the trustees of the charity 
 to their own use, free from its charitable trusts, did 
 not render it liable, even in the hands of a tenant, 
 to the taxation from which it had been previously 
 
 (a) Tennant v. i^mith, [1892] A. 0. 150. See also Secretary of 
 Slate for India v. Scohle, [1903] A. C. 299, on which see East 
 India By. v. Secretary for India, 74 L. J. K. B. 779, and Ghadwich 
 V. Pearl Life Assurance, 74 L. J. K. B. 671 ; A.-O. of British 
 Columbia v. Ostrum, [1904] A. C. 144. 
 
 (fc) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 12, s. 32; A.-6. v. Smith (1892), 62 
 L. J. Q. B. 288; Nmn's Estate, In re, [1894] 1 Ir. E. 252, 
 
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506 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 exempt (a). So, an Act which imposed a stamp 
 on every writing given on the payment of money, 
 "whereby any sum, debt, or demand" was "ac- 
 knowledged to have been paid, settled, balanced, 
 or otherwise discharged " was held not to extend 
 to a receipt given on the occasion of a sum being 
 deposited (6). If one instrument be incorporated, 
 by reference, in another, its words would not be 
 counted as part of the incorporating deed for the 
 purpose of stamp duty, under an Act imposing a 
 duty according to its length on the instrument, 
 " together with every schedule, receipt, or other 
 matter put or endorsed thereon, or annexed 
 thereto " (c). Where an Act (c?) imposed a stamp 
 duty on newspapers, and defined a newspaper as 
 comprising " any paper containing public news, in- 
 telligence, or occurrences . . . to be dispersed and 
 made public," and also " any paper containing any 
 public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any 
 
 (a) Cox V. Babbits, 3 App. Cas. 473 ; St. Thomas's Hospital v. 
 Hudgell (1900), 70 L. J. K. B. 115. 
 
 (6) Tomkins v. Aslby (1827), 6 B. & C. 541. See also 
 Wroughton v. Turtle, 13 L. J. Ex. 57 ; Mullett v. Huchison or 
 Hutchinson (1828), 7 B. & C. 639. 
 
 (c) Fishmongers^ Co. v. Dimsdale, 12 C. B. 557. The stamp 
 duty for length (in addition to ad. vol. duty, and called " pro- 
 gressive duty ") was imposed by 55 Geo. III. c. 184, and was 
 continued by the subsequent Stamp Acts until the Stamp Act, 
 1870. 
 
 (d) 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, repealed by 33 & 34 Vict, c 99. 
 
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STATUTES IMPOSING BURDENS. 507 
 
 remarks or observations thereon . . . published 
 periodically or in parts or numbers, at intervals not 
 exceeding 26 days," and not exceeding a certain 
 size ; it was held that a publication, the main object 
 of which was to give news, but was published at 
 intervals of more than 26 days, was not liable to 
 the stamp duty as a newspaper (a). An Act which 
 imposes a stamp duty on "every charter-party, 
 or memorandum, or other writing between the 
 captain or owner of a vessel and any other 
 person relating to the freight or conveyance of 
 goods on board," does not extend to a guarantee 
 for the due performance of a charter-party (b). 
 And yet, where an Act, (c) after imposing a stamp 
 on contracts, exempted those which were made 
 relative to the sale of goods, a guarantee for the 
 payment of the price on such a sale was held 
 included in the exemption (d) ; the same words 
 being susceptible of meaning different things when 
 used to impose a tax, or to exonerate from it (e). 
 The Act, 6 cfe 7 Vict. c. 36 (/), which exempts from 
 
 (a) A.-G. V. Bradbury (1851), 21 L, J. Ex. 12. 
 (6) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 79, s. 2 and Sohed. ; Bein v. Lane (1867), 
 L. E. 2 Q. B. 144. 
 
 (c) 23 Geo. III. c. 58, s. 4, repealed S. L. E., 1861. 
 
 (d) Warrington v. Furhor (1807), 8 East, 242. 
 
 (e) Per Blackburn J., L. E. 2 Q. B. 147, citing Curry v. Eden- 
 SOT, 3 T. E. 527, and Warrington v. Furhor, sup. See also Army- 
 tage v. Wilkinson, 3 App. Gas. 355. 
 
 (/) Amended by 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25, ss. 2-4. 
 
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508 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 rating the buildings of certain societies, provided 
 they are supported wholly or in part by " voluntary 
 contributions," applies only where the payments 
 are a gratuitous offering for the benefit of others, 
 and are not the price of an advantage purchased 
 by the contributor {a) ; the payments must be 
 "a gift made from disinterested motives for the 
 benefit of others " (b). Lord Ellenborough re- 
 marked that the cases to which a duty attached 
 ought to be fairly marked out, and that a liberal 
 construction ought to be given to words of exception 
 confining the operation of the duty (c). It is to be 
 observed, however, that all exemptions from taxa- 
 tion increase the burden on other members of the 
 community, and should therefore be deprecated (d). 
 At the same time, such Acts, Hke penal Acts, 
 are not to be so jconstrued as to furnish a chance 
 of escape and a means of evasion (e). The Stamp 
 Act, 1870, which imposed (s. 3 and Schedule) an 
 ad valorem duty on Settlements by which " any 
 
 (o) Per Lord Hersohell, Savoy (Overseers) v. Art Union of 
 London, [1896] A. C. 296. See also A.-G. v. Ellis (1895), 64 
 L. J. Q. B. 813. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Campbell 0. J., Bussell Institution v. St. Giles and 
 St. George, Bloomsbury, 23 L. J. M. C. 65. 
 
 (c) Warrington v. Furhor, sup. p. 507. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Halsbury L.C., Inl. Bev. v. Forrest, 15 App. 
 Gas. 334. 
 
 (e) U. S. V. Thirty-six Barrels of Wine, 7 Blatchf. 459. A.-G. 
 V. Furness By. Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 267. 
 
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STATUTES IMPOSING BURDENS. 509 
 
 definite and certain amount of stock is settled," 
 obviously applied although the interests in the 
 stock were contingent and defeasible, where the 
 amount of the stock was definite and certain {a). 
 Indeed, as in criminal statutes, the widest mean- 
 ing is given to the language when needful to 
 eJBfectuate the intention of the Legislature. For 
 instance, in one of the Church Building Acts, 
 which enacted that the "repairs" of district 
 churches might be provided for by a rate on the 
 district, the word "repairs" was construed as 
 comprising not only reparation of the structure, 
 but all incidental matters necessary for the due 
 performance of service, such as lighting, cleaning, 
 stationery, and organist's salary (6). In America, 
 revenue laws are not regarded as penal laws in 
 the sense that requires them to be construed with 
 strictness in favour of the defendant. They are 
 regarded rather in their remedial character ; as in- 
 tended to prevent fraud, suppress public wrong, and 
 promote the public good ; and are so construed as 
 to most effectually accomplish those objects (c). 
 
 (a) 33 & 34 Viot. c. 97 ; repealed 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 123 j 
 Onslow V. Inl. Bev., [1891] 1 Q. B. 239 ; Inl. Bev. v. Oliver 
 (1909), 78 L. J. P. 0. 146; Massereene (Viscount) v. Inl. Bev., 
 [1900] 2 Ir. E. 138. 
 
 (6) B. V. Consistory Court, 31 L. J. Q. B. 106. See B. v. War- 
 wick, 15 L. J. Q. B. 306, sup. p. 127 ; A.-G. v. L. & N. W. By., 
 6 Q. B. D. 216; Thorley, Be, [1891] 2 Ch. 613. 
 
 (c) Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wallace, 145. 
 
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510 INTEBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It has been said that all statutes which inflict 
 costs are to be construed strictly, on the ground 
 that such costs are a kind of penalty (a). There 
 is little authority in support of the proposition. 
 On the other hand, the power of ordering the 
 payment of costs had been sometimes construed 
 on the principle of beneficial and liberal construc- 
 tion; as where, for instance, they have been 
 imposed on persons who were strangers to an 
 action of ejectment, but at whose instance it was 
 brought or defended (b). 
 
 Enactments, also, which impose forms and 
 solemnities on contracts on pain of invalidity, 
 are construed so as to be as little restrictive as 
 possible of the natural liberty of contracting. It 
 
 (a) Coney. Bowles, ISaik. 205. BeeperMellov J., Cohb v. Mid- 
 Wales By. Co., L. E. 1 Q. B. 351. There has been no strictness 
 in the interpretation of s. 1 (6), PubUc Authorities Protection 
 Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), which gives costs, as between 
 solicitor and client, to a successful defendant in an action for an 
 act done in pursuance of a statutory or other public duty or 
 authority. See Fielden v. Morley, 69 L. J. Ch. 314 ; Harrop v 
 Ossett, 67 L. J. Ch. 347 ; Toms v. Clacton, 78 L. T. 712 ; North 
 Metrop. Tramways Co. v. London Co. Co., 67 L. J. Ch. 449; 
 Chamberlain v. Bradford, 88 L. T. 518; Lyles v. Southend-on-Sea, 
 74 L. J. K. B. 484 ; Gilbert v. Gosport and Alverstohe U. D. C, 
 [1916] 2 Ch. 587. 
 
 (6) Hutchinson v. Greenwood, 24 L. J. Q. B. 2 ; Mohhs v. Van- 
 denhrande, 33 L. J. Q. B. 177. Comp: Evans v. Bees, 9 C. B 
 N. S. 391 ; Anstey v. Edwards, 16 C. B. 212 ; Hayioardv. Giffard, 
 7 L. J. Ex. 256. See also B. v. Pemhridge, sup. p. 45. 
 
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STATUTES REGULATING INSTRUMENTS. 511 
 
 was in allusion to the Statute of Frauds that Lord 
 Nottingham said that all Acts which restrain the 
 common law, that is, apparently, which impose 
 restrictions unknown to the common law, ought 
 themselves to be restrained in exposition (a). The 
 Statute of Frauds, which enacts that no action 
 shaU be brought on contracts (s. 4), or that the 
 contracts shall not be good (s. 17) (6), unless 
 "the agreement or some note or memorandum 
 thereof shall be in writing and signed by the 
 party to be charged therewith, or some other 
 person thereunto by him lawfully authorised," 
 has given rise to many decisions, apparently in 
 this spirit. Thus, although it is unquestionably 
 necessary that aU the essential elements of the 
 contract shall appear in writing, such as the 
 subject matter (c), the consideration {d), and 
 the parties (e), it has been held that it is not 
 
 (a) Ash V. Ahdy, 3 Swanst. 664. 
 
 (6) Now, the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), 
 s. 4, where the words are, " shall not be enforceable by action." 
 
 (c) SJiardlow V. CoUerell (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90; Vale of Neath 
 Colliery v. Furness, 45 L. J. Oh. 276 ; Marshall v. Berridge, 19 
 Ch. D. 238. 
 
 {d) Wain V. Warltera (1864), 7 R. E. 645 ; Frost, In re (1898), 
 67 L. J. Ch. 691. 
 
 (e) Williams v. Lake, 29 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; Williams v. Byrnes, 1 
 Moo. P. C. N. S. 154 ; Williams v. Jordan, 6 Ch. D. 517 ; Beer 
 V. London and Paris Hotel Co., L. E. 20 Eq. 412. See under 
 s. 7, 30 Vict. c. 23 (repealed 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, and practically 
 
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512 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 necessary that they should be contained in any 
 formal document (a), A note or letter, by the 
 party to be charged, stating the material par- 
 ticulars, verbally accepted, sufl&ces (&). The statute 
 is satisfied, also, by a number of letters or other 
 documents connected either physically, by being 
 fastened together (c), or by their own internal 
 evidence, if all the elements of the contract may 
 be collected from the whole correspondence (c?). 
 An envelope shown by evidence to have enclosed 
 a letter relating to the contract, can supply 
 
 re-enacted by s. 93 of this Act) ; Arthur Average Assoc, Be, L. E. 
 10 Gh. 542. Comp. Edwards v. Aberayron Socy., 1 Q. B. D. 563. 
 rSo) Gray v. Smith, 43 Oh. D. 208; Barkworth v. Young, 26 
 L. J. Oh. 153, on which see per Jessel M.E., Trowell v. Shenton, 
 8 Oh. D. 324; Hoyle, Be, 62 L.J. Ch. 182; Jones v. Victoria 
 Dock Co., inf. p. 515. 
 
 (6) Coleman v. TTpcot, 5 Vin. Ab. 527, pi. 17; Welford v. 
 Beazely, 3 Atk. 503 ; Bill v. Bament, 11 L. J. Ex. 81 ; Bishton v. 
 Whatmore, 8 Ch. D. 467; Munday v. Asprey, 13 Ch. D. 855; 
 Gave V. Eastings, 7 Q. B. D. 125. 
 
 (c) Kenworthy v. Schofield, 26 E. E. 600. 
 
 (d) Shorfrede v. Cheek, 40 E. E. 258 ; Boydell v. Drummond, 
 10 E. E. 450; Dolell v. Hutchinson, 42 E. E. 408; Watts v. 
 Ainsworih, 31 L. J. Ex. 448 ; Morris v. Wilson, 5 Jur. N. S. 168 ; 
 Crane v. Powell, L. E. 4 0. P 123 ; Bonnewell v. Jenkins, 8 Ch. D. 
 70 ; Gommins v. Scott, L. E. 20 Eq. 11 ; Kronheim v. Johnson, 
 7 Ch. D. 60 ; Beckwith v. Talbot, 5 Otto, 289 (U. S.). See Bidg- 
 way V. Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238, cited in Jones v. Victoria Bock 
 Co., sup.; Studds v. Watson, 28 Oh. D. 305; Hussey v. Home- 
 Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311 ; Bristol Aerated Bread Co. v. Maggs, 44 
 Ch. D. 616 ; Bellamy v. Debenham, 45 Ch. D. 481. 
 
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STATUTES REGULATING INSTRUMENTS. 513 
 
 the name of a party to the memorandum in 
 writing (a). A letter from the purchaser addressed 
 to a third person, stating the terms of the con- 
 tract (6), and one from the purchaser to the 
 seller, which after setting forth its terms re- 
 pudiated the contract, have been held sufficient 
 notes or memoranda of the bargain to satisfy the 
 statute (c). It has been said that the cases have 
 gone very far in putting the correspondence of 
 parties together, to constitute a memorandum 
 to satisfy the statute (c?). Indeed, as it becomes 
 necessary, in such a case, to inquire what the 
 contract really was, in order to determine whether 
 the informal papers constitute a written note of 
 it, it may be said that the very evil is let in 
 against which the statute aimed (e). 
 
 So although it is necessary that the parties 
 to the contract should be sufficiently described 
 to admit of their identification (/), it is not 
 
 (a) Pearce v. Gardner, [1897] 1 Q. B. 688. 
 
 (6) Gibsm v. Hollmd, L. E. 1 C. P. 1. Sugd. V. & P. 139, 
 14th ed. See also Hoyle, Be, [1893] 1 Oh. 84 ; Hollmd, In re 
 (1902), 71 L. J. Oh. 518. 
 
 (c) Bailey v. Sweeting, 30 L. J. G. P. 150 ; Wilkinson v. Evans, 
 35 L. J. C. P. 224 ; Buxton v. Bust, 41 L. J. Ex. 1, 173. 
 
 {d) Per Pollock C.B., McLean v. Nicoll, 7 Jur. N. S. 999. 
 
 (e) Per Channell B., Id. See ex. gr. BisUon v. Whatmore, 
 8 Oh. D. 467. 
 
 (/) Gharlewood v. Bedford, 1 Atk. 497 ; Champion v. Plimmer 
 (1805), 8 E. E. 795 ; Jones Bros. v. Joyner (1900), 82 L. T. 768 ; 
 Williams v. Lake, sup. p. 511. 
 
 I.S. 33 
 
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514 INTEEPBETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 necessary that they should be described by name. 
 It has been held, for instance, that a contract 
 of sale signed by the auctioneer, as " the agent 
 of the proprietor," or of "the trustee for the 
 sale " of the property sold, sufficiently described 
 the seller (a) ; though a contract similarly " signed 
 by the agent of the vendor " has been held not to 
 suffice (6) ; for a mere assertion that the person 
 who sells is the seUer, is obviously not a description 
 of the seller, nor tends to his identification. But 
 in view of more recent decisions this proposition is 
 somewhat open to question (c). 
 
 Again, as regards the signing or subscribing an 
 instrument as party or witness, the enactments 
 which require these formalities have been con- 
 strued with similar indulgence. The testator who 
 wrote his will with his own hand, and began by 
 declaring that it was his will, setting forth his 
 name, was deemed to have thereby sufficiently 
 " signed " his WUl (d) ; and an attesting witness 
 who wrote his name on the Will, elsewhere than 
 
 (a) Sale v. Lambert (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 470 ; Catling v. King, 
 5 Ch. D. 660 ; Bossiter v. Miller (1877), 3 App. Gas. 1124. See 
 also Hood V. Barrington, L. E. 6 Eq. 218. 
 
 (b) Potter Y. Buffield, L. E. 18 Eq. 4 ; jper Kay J., Jarrett v. 
 Eunter, 56 L. J. Ch. 141. 
 
 (c) Commins v. Scott (1875;, 44 L. J. Oh. 563 ; Filby v. Homsell, 
 [1896], 2 Ch. 737. 
 
 {d) 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 5, repealed, 7 Will IV. and 1 Vict. c. 
 26 ; Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1. 
 
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STATUTES REGULATING INSTRUMENTS. 515 
 
 at the end of it, was deemed to have sufficiently 
 " subscribed" it, within the Statute of Frauds (a). 
 A letter, beginning " Messrs. H. & Co., Gentle- 
 men," drawn up by their clerk by their authority, 
 and presented by him to B. for signature, has been 
 held to be sufficiently signed by a person authorised 
 by H. & Co., so as to entitle E., who had signed it, 
 to sue them for breach of the contract contained 
 in the letter (6). An agreement, too, has been 
 held to be sufficiently signed by a corporate body, 
 within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, 
 where a resolution ordering its engrossment and 
 execution was passed by the body and signed by 
 the chairman (c). 
 
 Acts which establish monopolies (d), or confer 
 exceptional exemptions and privileges, correlatively 
 trenching on general rights, are subject to the 
 same principle of strict construction (e). The Act 
 21 Edw. I., De Malefactoribus in Parcis (/), which 
 
 (a) Bdberts v. Phillips, 24 L. J. Q. B. 171 ; Streatley, in the 
 goods of, [1891] P. 172 ; 60 L. J. P. 56. 
 (5) Evans v. Eoare, [1892] 1 Q. B. 593. 
 
 (c) Jones V. Victoria Bock Co., 46 L. J. Q. B. 219; Daniels v. 
 Trefusis, [1914] 1 Oh. 788. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Campbell, Beedv. Ingham, 3 E. & B. 899; 
 Direct U. S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Co., 2 App. Gas. 394. 
 
 (e) See ex. gr. E. v. Hull Dock Co., 3 B. & G. 516 ; Brunskill 
 V. Watson, L. E. 3 Q. B. 418. 
 
 (/) Eepealed 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1. 
 
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516 INTBKPBETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 authorised a parker to kill trespassers whom he 
 found in his park, and who refused to yield to 
 him, was construed as strictly limited to a legal 
 park (a) — ^that is, one established by prescription 
 or Eoyal Charter, and not merely one by reputa- 
 tion (6). The enactment (c) that shipowners 
 should not be liable for damage done by their ships 
 without their default, beyond "the value of the 
 ship " and its " freight," was held to include, in 
 this value, everything belonging to her owners that 
 was on board for the performance of her adventure, 
 such as the fishing stores of a vessel employed in 
 the Greenland fishery ; although they would not 
 have been covered by a policy on " the ship and 
 freight," and the phrase, " the value of the ship 
 and her appurtenances " had been used ten times 
 in other parts of the Act (d). This decision rested 
 on the ground that the enactment abridged the 
 common law right of the injured person ; and that 
 the shipowner was not entitled to more than the 
 meaning of the words strictly imported (e). So, 
 the enactments ( /) which exonerate a shipowner 
 
 (a) 1 Hale, 491 ; 3 Dyer, 326b ; Com. Dig. Pari. (E.) 20. 
 
 (b) Co. Litt. 233a; 2 Blaekstone's Com. 38, 416. 
 
 (c) 53 Geo. III. c. 159, s. 1 (repealed 17 & 18 Viet. c. 120, s. 4). 
 (i) Gale V. Laurie (1826), 29 E. E. 199 ; and see Smith v. 
 
 Eirhy (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 131. 
 
 (e) As to existing limitations of liability, see ss. 502-505, 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 
 
 (/) For existing limitations of liability, see s. 633, Merchant 
 
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NEW JDEISDICTIONS. 517 
 
 from liability for damage caused by his ship through 
 the default of a compulsorily employed pilot, are 
 restricted to cases where the pilot was the sole 
 cause of the damage, without any default on the 
 part of the master or crew (a). 
 
 The same principle of construction is applied 
 to enactments which create new jurisdictions, or 
 delegate subordinate legislative or other powers (b). 
 As the Government of India is precluded from legis- 
 lating directly as to the sovereignty or dominion 
 of the Crown over any part of its territories in 
 India, an enactment by the Indian Legislative 
 Council making a notification in the Gazette con- 
 clusive evidence of a cession of territory, was 
 held inoperative to prevent a Court in India from 
 inquiring into the nature and lawfulness of the 
 cession (c). A general Order made by the judges 
 of the Court of Chancery, under Parliamentary 
 
 Shipping Act, 1894 ; and sea also Pilotage Act, 1913 (2 & 3 
 Geo. V. c. 31). 
 
 (a) The Protector, 1 Eob. W. 45 ; The Diana, 4 Moo. P. C. 11 ; 
 The lona, L. E. 1 P. C. 426, discussed by Lord Chelmsford in 
 Clyde Navigation Go. v. Barclay (1877), 1 App. Cas. 790. Gomp. 
 The Warhworth (1889), 9 P. D. 145, and see Canada Ship- 
 ping Co. V. British Shipowners' Association (1889), 58 L. J. 
 Q. B. 462. 
 
 (6) See ex. gr. per James L.J., Flower v. Lloyd, 6 Ch. D. 
 301 ; Biss v. AUrich, 2 Q. B. D. 179. 
 
 (c) Damodhar v. Beoram, 1 App. Cas. 332. 
 
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518 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 authority to regulate tlie procedure of that Court, 
 and wMcli directed how a defendant " in any suit " 
 might be served with process abroad (a) was held 
 by Lord Westbury(6) limited to those suits in 
 which service abroad had been provided for by law, 
 viz., suits relating to land and public stock by the 
 2 Wm. IV. 0. 33 (c) and 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 82 (c). 
 If the Order had been construed literally as appli- 
 cable to all suits, it would, while professedly only 
 regulating the procedure, have, in effect, extended 
 the jurisdiction of the Court ; an object foreign to 
 the Act which conferred the power of regulation. 
 This decision, indeed, was afterwards overruled ; 
 but it was on the ground that the jurisdiction of 
 the Court had always existed, though there was no 
 power of enforcing it ; and that the Order, there- 
 fore, did not extend the jurisdiction (d). 
 
 The power given to a County Court judge "in 
 every case, if he shall think just, to order a new 
 trial," is exercisable only where such reasons exist 
 as would lead the Supreme Court to grant a new 
 
 (a) See E. S. C, Order XI., for Eules as to service out of the 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 (6) Gookney v. Anderson, 1 De G. J. & Sm. 365. See also 
 Lanman v. Audley, 6 L. J. Ex. 136 ; Great Australian Co. v. 
 Martin, 5 Ch. D. 1 ; Fowler v. Barstow, 20 Oh. D. 240. 
 
 (c) Eepealed S. L. E., 1890. 
 
 (d) Drummond v. Drummond, L. E. 2 Oh. 32 ; Mope v. Hope, 
 23 L. J. Oh. 682. See also Be Busfield, 32 Oh. D. 123. 
 
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STATUTES CONPBREING POWERS. 519 
 
 trial (a). And under a power to regulate the 
 practice of their Courts, it is more than doubtful 
 whether the County Court judges have authority 
 to make a rule empowering a judge to appoint a 
 deputy registrar, if the registrar is absent at the 
 sitting of the Court (6). 22 & 23 Vict. c. 21, 
 s. 26 (c), which empowered the Barons of the 
 Exchequer to make rules as to the process, practice, 
 and pleading, of their Court in revenue cases, was 
 held not to authorise them to make rules granting 
 an appeal to the Exchequer Chamber and House 
 of Lords (d). A different construction would, in 
 effect, have given the Barons authority to confer 
 jurisdiction on two Superior Courts, and to impose 
 on them the duty of hearing an appeal against its 
 decisions (e). A power given to the Court, subject 
 to the restrictions of the Act, to authorise the 
 grant of leases, followed by a proviso that any 
 person entitled to the possession of settled estates 
 
 (a) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 93 ; Murtagh v. Barry, 24 Q. B. D. 
 632 ; How V. L. & N. W. By. Go. (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 368, and 
 a like rule applies in case of refusal to order new trial ; Pole v. 
 Bright (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 139. Gomp. Johnson v. Johnson, 
 sup. p. 152. 
 
 (6) WetheriieU v. Nelson (1869), 38 L. J. 0. P. 220. As to 
 references to the official referee, Longmany. Bast, 3 0. P. D. 142. 
 
 (c) Eepealed 44 & 45 Vict. c. 59, s. 3, and Sched. 
 
 (d) A.-G. V. Sillem (1864), 10 H. L. Gas. 704. Gomp. Hann, 
 Be, 18 Q. B. D. 393. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Kingsdown, 10 H. L. Oas. 775. 
 
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520 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 might apply to the Court for the exercise of the 
 power, was held not exercisable except on the 
 application of such a person (a). When com- 
 missioners were authorised, at the same time that 
 they awarded compensation, to apportion the pay- 
 ment among those benefited, an apportionment 
 made at a subsequent time was held invalid (&). 
 
 The Licensing Act, 1872, enacting that where 
 justices have ordered a distress in default of pay- 
 ment of a penalty, they may order, in default of 
 its payment, imprisonment for six months, was 
 held not to authorise imprisonment where (in con- 
 sequence of the defendant admitting his inability 
 to pay the fine) no order of distress had been 
 made. It would, indeed, have been idle to issue 
 a distress; but the words were express and 
 positive (c). So, where an Act gives an appeal 
 to the next Quarter Sessions, that Court cannot, 
 under a general power to regulate its procedure, 
 
 (a) Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Oh. D. 426 ; 3 Id. 145. 
 
 (6) Mayor of Montreal v. Stevens, 3 App. Cas. 605. 
 
 (c) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 51, repealed s. 99, Licensing (Con- 
 solidation) Act, 1910 ; Brown, Be, 3 Q. B. D. 545 ; per Cock- 
 burn C.J., dubit. Mellor J. See otber illustrations, in the 
 construction of the powers given to the railway commissioners, 
 G. W. By. Go. V. By. Gommrs., 50 L. J. Q. B. 483 ; Toomer v. 
 London, Gh. & D. By. Go. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 450, discussed in 
 Warwick Ganal Go. v. Birmingham Ganal Go. (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 
 550 ; S. E. By. Go. v. By. Gommrs. (1881), 60 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 
 West Ham Gorp. v. G. E. By. Go. (1895), 64 L. J. Q. B. 340. 
 
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STATUTES CONPEEEING POWERS. 521 
 
 reject it on the ground of non-compliance with 
 certain regulations not prescribed by the Act such 
 as failure to file appeal (a), failure to give notices 
 not required by the statute (6), or failure to lodge 
 the appeal a specified number of days before the 
 Sessions (c). It might perhaps, unless the statute 
 required that the appeal should be decided at the 
 same Sessions (d), lawfully postpone the hearing 
 of an appeal not complying with those conditions 
 within such time ; but to reject it altogether would 
 be to refuse the appellant the privilege given by 
 the Act, by imposing conditions which the Legis- 
 lature had not imposed. Where the judge of the 
 Court of Arches was required, under the Public 
 Worship Eegulation Act, 1874 (e), to hear a cause 
 in London or Westminster, it was held that he 
 had no power to hear it elsewhere in the province 
 of Canterbury, and that all his proceedings there 
 were void{/). 
 
 The power given by 43 Eliz, c. 2, to justices 
 to appoint "four, three, or two substantial house- 
 holders," as parish overseers, is not well executed 
 
 (a) B. V. West Biding (1842), 2 Q. B. 705. 
 (6) B. V. West Biding, 5 B. & Ad. 667 ; B. v. Norfolk, 39 E. E. 
 713 ; B. V. Surrey, 6 D. & L. 735 ; B. v. Blues, 5 B. & B. 291. 
 
 (c) B. V. Pawlett, L. E. 8 Q. B. 491 ; B. v. Staffordshire, 4 
 A. & E. 842. 
 
 (d) B. V. Belton, 17 L. J. M. 0. 70. 
 
 (e) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 85, amended 38 & 39 Viet. c. 76. 
 (/) Hudson V. Tooth (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 46. 
 
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522 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 by appointing more than four (a) ; or by appointing 
 a single one, even when he is the only householder 
 in the parish (&). Sec. 355 of the repealed Mer- 
 chant Shipping Act, 1854 (c), which empowered 
 the Board of Trade to give the master of a ship 
 a certificate to pilot " any ships belonging to 
 the same owner," was construed as requiring that 
 the name of the owner should be mentioned in the 
 certificate ; and a certificate representing another 
 person as the owner was held not granted in com- 
 pliance with the statute (d). 
 
 Where trustees, who were authorised to borrow 
 ^30,000 for building a chapel, and to levy the 
 amount, with interest, by a rate, borrowed J632,000, 
 and made a rate to pay the interest on the whole 
 of that sum, it was held, not only that they had 
 exceeded their power, but that the rate was bad 
 in toto, and a distress to recover it unwarranted (e). 
 
 (a) B. V. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445. See B. v. All Saints, Derby, 
 13 East, 143. 
 
 (6) B. V. Goueins, 33 L. J. M. 0. 87 ; B. v. Clifton, 2 East, 168. 
 Comp. Preece v. Pulley, 49 L. J. C. P. 686, and comp. under s. 32, 
 Trustee Act, 1850, Shipperdson's Trusts, 49 L. J. Oh. 619; 
 Stokes' Trusts, L. E. 13 Eq. 333 ; Harford's Trusts, 13 Ch. D. 
 135 ; but see Golyer, Be, 50 L. J. Ch. 79. 
 
 (c) See s. 23 of PUotage Act, 1913 (2 & 3 Geo. 5), for grant 
 of pilotage certificates to masters and mates. 
 
 (d) The Earl of Auchland (1861), 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 121, 127. 
 See also The Bristol City (1901), 71 L. J. P. 5. 
 
 (e) Bitcher v. Hughes (1824), 26 E. E. 424 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 61. 
 
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STATUTES CONFEBRING POWERS. 523 
 
 A corporate body, constituted by statute for 
 certain purposes, is regarded as so entirely tbe 
 creature of the statute, that acts done by it 
 without the prescribed formalities, or for objects 
 foreign to those for which it was formed, would 
 be, in general, null and void {a). 
 
 Rules and by-laws made under statutory powers 
 enforceable by penalties are constrfled like other 
 provisions encroaching on the ordinary rights 
 of persons. They must, on pain of invaUdity, be 
 not unreasonable, nor in excess of the statutory 
 power authorising them, nor repugnant to that 
 statute or to the general principles of law (&). 
 
 A municipal power of regulation or of making 
 by-laws for good government, without express 
 
 (a) Chambers v. Manchester &e. By. Co., 33 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 
 Payne v. Corlc Co., Ltd., [1900] 1 Oh. 308 ; 69 L. J. Gh. 
 
 (6) See HacUng v. Lee, 29 L. J. Q. B. 204 ; Davis, Exp., L. E. 
 7 Ch. 526 ; Bentham v Hoyle, 3 Q. B. D. 289 ; Johnson v. Croydon, 
 16 Q. B. D. 708; Dick v. Badart, 10 Q.B. D. 387; Strickland v. 
 Hayes, [1896] 1 Q. B. 290 ; Burnett v. Berry, [1896] 1 Q. B. 
 641 ; Mantle v. Jordan, [1897] 1 Q. B. 248 ; Erme v. Johnson (a 
 leading case), [1898] 2 Q. B. 91 ; Kitson v. Ashe, [1899] 1 Q. B. 
 425; White v. Morley, [1899] 2 Q. B. 34; Gentely. Bapps, [1902] 
 1 K. B. 160 ; Thomas v. Sutlers, [1900] 1 Ch. 10 ; Walker v. 
 Stretton, 44 W. E. 525 ; Simmons v. Mailing, 66 L. J. Q. B. 585 ; 
 Gray v. Sylvester, 61 J. P. 807 ; Godwin v. Walker, 12 Times 
 Eep. 367 ; Brovmscombe v. Johnson, 78 L. T. 265 ; Scott v. Glas- 
 gow, 68 L. J. P. C. 98 ; London & S. W. By. v. Eills, 75 L. J. 
 K. B. 340 ; Slowey v. Threshie, 38 Sc. L. E. 799 ; Nash v. Finlay 
 (1902) 85 L. T. 682. 
 
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524 INTERPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 words of prohibition, does not authorise the making 
 it unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a lawful 
 manner. Moreover a power to regulate and govern 
 seems to imply the continued existence of that 
 which is to be regulated and governed (a). But 
 there is a "well-recognised principle that where 
 there is a competent Authority to which an Act of 
 Parliament entrusts the power of making regula- 
 tions, it is for that Authority to decide what 
 regulations are necessary ; and any regulations 
 which they may decide to make should be sup- 
 ported, unless they are manifestly unreasonable or 
 unfair " (6). 
 
 A by-law can be divided, if on part being omitted, 
 the rest of the by-law reads grammatically, and 
 when it can thus be divided, one part may be re- 
 jected as bad, whUe the rest may be held good (c). 
 
 In determining the validity of by-laws made 
 by pubKc representative bodies under statutory 
 powers, their consideration is approached from a 
 different standpoint from by-laws of railway or 
 other Kke companies, which carry on business for 
 their own profit, although incidentally for the 
 advantage of the public. Courts of justice are 
 
 (a) Per Lord Davey, Toronto v. Virgo, [1896] A. 0. 88 ; A.-G. 
 {Ontario) v. A.-G. Dominion of Canada (1896), 65 L. J. P. C. 26. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Alverstone C.J., London County Council v. Ber- 
 mondsey Bioscope Co., 80 L. J. K. B. 144. 
 
 (c) Per Lindley L. J., Strickland v. Hayes, sup. p. 523. 
 
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STATUTES CONFERRING POWERS. 525 
 
 slow to condemn municipal by-laws as invalid, 
 on the supposed ground of unreasonableness, 
 and support them if possible by a "benevolent" 
 interpretation, and credit those who have to 
 administer them with an intention to do so in a 
 reasonable manner (a). But, on the other hand, 
 if a by-law necessarily involves that which is 
 unreasonable, it is the duty of the Court to declare 
 it to be invalid (b). 
 
 A local Act which authorised a navigation com- 
 pany to make by-laws for the orderly using of 
 the navigation, and for the governing of the boat- 
 men carrying merchandise on it, was held not to 
 authorise a by-law which closed the navigation 
 on Sundays, and prohibited the use of any boat on 
 it, except for going to church (c). Where a charter, 
 
 (a) Kritse v. Johnson, sup. p. 523. See also per Channell J., 
 Salt V. Scott-Hall, [1903] 2 K. B. 245 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 627, who 
 points out that where proceedings are taken under the Sum- 
 mary Jurisdiction Acts, the justices can treat exceptional cases 
 under s. 16 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (now 
 repealed and replaced by s. 1 (1), Probation of Offenders Act, 
 1907), by dismissing the information or imposing a nominal 
 penalty, notwithstanding that a breach of a by-law has in fact 
 been committed. See further, inf. pp. 529, 530, and cases in 
 note to p. 530. 
 
 (&) Per Lord Alverstone C.J., Stiles v. GalinsM, [1904] 1 K. B. 
 
 621. 
 
 (c) Colder and Eelhle Nav. Go. v. Pilling (1845), 14 L. J. Ex. 
 223, distinguished in Thomas v. Sutlers (1900), 1 Oh. 10. 
 
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526 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 which founded a school, empowered the governors 
 to remove the master at their discretion, and also 
 authorised them to make by-laws ; it was held 
 that a by-law ordaining that the master should 
 not be removed unless suflScient cause was ex- 
 hibited in writing against him, signed by the 
 governors, and declared by them to be sufficient, 
 was void; for the power to make by-laws did 
 not authorise the making of one which restrained 
 and limited the powers originally given to the 
 governors by the founder. This was in effect to 
 alter the constitution of the school (a). 
 
 Where, however, the statute conferring the 
 power to make by-laws enacts that any such laws 
 consistent with the provisions of the statute, and 
 not repugnant to any other law in force, shall 
 have the force of law when confirmed by the 
 Executive, it is doubtful whether a Court would 
 not be precluded from questioning the reason- 
 ableness of such by-laws or whether they are 
 
 (a) B. V. Darlington School, 14 L. J. Q. B. 67, questioned by 
 Lord Hatherley in Dean v. Bennett, 40 L. J. Ch. 452. See also 
 B. V. Cuthush, 4 Bizrr. 2204 ; Chilton v. London & Croydon By. Co., 
 16 L. J. Ex. 89 ; WUliams v. G. W. By. Co., 10 Ex. 16 ; B. v. 
 iJose, 24 L. J. M. 0. 130 ; Bostock v. Staffordshire By. Co., 25 
 L J. Ch. 325 ; Foster v. L. C. d D. By., [1895] 1 Q. B. 711 ; 64 
 L. J. Q. B. 65 ; United Land Co. v. G. K By. Co., L. E. 10 Ch. 
 586 ; JSTorton v. London & N. W. By. Co., 9 Ch. D. 623 ; 13 Id. 
 268 ; Shillito v. Thompson, 1 Q. B. D. 12. Comp. Bonner v. 
 G. W. By., 24 Ch. D. 1. 
 
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PRIVATE ACTS GIVING POWERS OR PRIVILEGES. 527 
 
 ultra vires, unless it be in some very extreme 
 case (a). 
 
 As regards enactments of a local or personal 
 character, which confer any exceptional exemp- 
 tion from a common burden (h), or invest private 
 persons or bodies, for their own benefit and profit, 
 with privileges and powers ^ interfering with the 
 property or rights of others, they are construed 
 against those persons or bodies more strictly, 
 perhaps, than any other kind of enactment. Any 
 person whose property is interfered with has a 
 right to require that those who interfere shall 
 comply with the letter of the enactment so far 
 as it makes provision on his behalf (c). The 
 Courts take notice that they are obtained on 
 the petitions framed by their promoters; and 
 in construing them, regard them, as they are 
 
 (a) Slattery v. Naylor, 13 App. Cas, 446. See Institute of 
 Patent Agents v. Lochwood, [1894] A. C. 347 ; JDevonport Corp. v. 
 Tezor (1902), 71 L. J. Oh. 754. See also A.-G. v. Dorin (1912), 
 81 L. J. Ch. 225. 
 
 (6) Ex. gr. Acts which exempt lands from "all taxes and 
 assessments whatsoever" are construed as applying only to 
 then existing taxes and assessments; Williams v.Pritchard (1790), 
 2 E. E. 4 Term Eepts. 310; Perchard v. Eeywood (1800), 
 53 E. E. 128 ; 8 Term Eepts. 468 ; Sion College v. London {Mayor), 
 [1901] 1 K.B. 617; 70 L. J. K B. 369, distinguished in Nether- 
 lands Steamboat Co. v. London Corp. (1904), 68 J. P. 377, C. A. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Macnaghten, Eerron v. Bathmines Improvement 
 Commssioners, [1892] A. C. 523. 
 
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528 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 in effect, contracts (a) between those persons, 
 or those whom they represent, and the Legis- 
 lature on behalf of the public and for the public 
 good (b). Their language is therefore treated 
 as the language of their promoters, who asked 
 the Legislature for them ; and when doubt arises 
 as to the construction of that language, the 
 maxim (ordinarily inappKcable to the interpreta- 
 tion of statutes) that verba cartarum fortius acci- 
 piuntur contra proferentem, or that words are to be 
 understood most strongly against him who uses 
 them, is justly applied. The benefit of the doubt 
 is to be given to those who might be prejudiced 
 by the exercise of the powers which the enactment 
 grants, and against those who claim to exercise 
 them (c). Indeed, if words in a local or personal 
 
 (a) See observationB of Lord Solbome, Milnes v. Mayor of 
 Huddersfield, 11 App. Cas. 523. See, however, sup. p. 53. 
 
 (h) On this ground a contract by such a body never to use 
 a power given by Parliament was held void ; Ayr Harbour v. 
 Oswald, 8 App. Cas. 623. 
 
 (c) See among many authorities, B. v. Croie,l Cowp. 26 ; 
 Gildart v. Gladstone, 11 East, 685 ; Hull Bock Go. v. Browne, 
 2 B. & Ad. 58 ; per Patteson J., B. v. Cumberworth, 4 A. & E. 
 741; Blahemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 36 E. E. 289; 
 Webb V. Manchester By. Co., 48 E. E. 28 ; Stockton 8f Darlington 
 By. Co. V. Barrett, 11 CI. & P. 590 ; Scales v. Pickering, 4 Bing. 
 448 ; Parker v. G. W. By. Co., 13 L. J. 0. P. 105 ; Eversfield v. 
 Mid-Sussex By. Co., 3 De G. & J. 286; Simpson v. S. Staffordshire 
 Waterworks, 34 L. J. Ch. 380; B. v. Wycombe, L. E. 2 Q. B. 
 310 ; Morgan v. Metropolitan By. Co., L. E. 4 C. P. 97 ; Fenwick 
 
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PRIVATE ACTS GIVING POWERS OR PRIVILEGES. 529 
 
 Act seemed to express an intention to enact 
 something unconnected with the purpose of the 
 promoters, and which the committee, if they had 
 done their duty, would not have allowed to be 
 introduced, almost any construction, it has been 
 said, would seem justifiable to prevent them from 
 having that effect (a). 
 
 Even if such statutes were not regarded in the 
 light of contracts (b), they would seem to be subject 
 to strict construction on the same ground as grants 
 from the Crown, to which they are analogous, are 
 subject to it. As the latter are construed strictly 
 against the grantee, on the ground that pre- 
 rogatives, rights, and emoluments are conferred 
 on the Crown for great purposes and for the 
 public use, and are therefore not to be under- 
 stood as diminished by any grant beyond what 
 it takes away by necessary and unavoidable con- 
 struction (c) ; so the Legislature, in granting 
 
 V. East London By. Co., L. E. 20 Eq. 544 ; per Oockburn O.J., 
 Miphins V. Birminriham Gas Co., 6 H. & N. 250 ; A.-O. v. Furness 
 By. Co., 47 L. J. Ch. 776; Lamb v. N. London By. Co., L. E. 4 
 Gh. 522; Clowes v. Staffordshire Potteries, L. E. 8 Gh. 125; 
 Altrinckam v. Cheshire Lines Committee (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 597 ; 
 and see Dewsbwy Waterworks Board v. Penistone Union (1885), 
 16 Q. B. D. 585. 
 
 (a) Per Lord Blackburn, Biver Wear Commrs. v. Adamson, 2 
 App. Gas. 743. 
 
 (&) See B. V. York Jt N. Midland By. Co., 22 L. J. Q. B. 41. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Stowell, The Beheckah, 1 Bob. G. 230. 
 I.S. 34 
 
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530 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 away, in effect, the ordinary rights of the sub- 
 ject, should be understood as granting no more 
 than actually passes by necessary and unavoidable 
 construction. 
 
 The principle of strict construction is less 
 applicable where the powers are conferred on 
 public representative bodies for essentially public 
 purposes (a). 
 
 (a) Per Wood V.-C, N. London By. Co. v. Metrop. Bd. of Works 
 (1859), Johns. 405. See Lewis v. Weston-super-Mare Local 
 Board (1888), 58 L. J. Ch. 39. See also Pallister v. Gravesend, 
 9 C. B. 774 ; Galloway v. London (Mayor), L. E. 1 H. L. 34 ; 
 Quinton v. Bristol (Mayor), L. E. 17 Eq. 524 ; A.-G. v. Cambridge, 
 L. E. 6 H. L. 303 ; Bichmond v. N. London By. Co., L. E. 3 Ch. 
 679 ; Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 1 App. Gas. 662 ; Venour's Case, 
 2 Oh. D. 522. See pp. 523-526, sup. 
 
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CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 SECTION I. SOME SUBORDINATE PRINCIPLES — EFFECT 
 
 OP USAGE. 
 
 It is said that the best exposition of a statute or 
 any other document is that which it has received 
 from contemporary authority. Optima est legum 
 mterpres consuetudo (a). Contemporanea expositio est 
 optima et fortissima in lege{b). Where this has 
 been given by enactment or judicial decision, it 
 is of course to be accepted as conclusive (c). But, 
 further, the meaning publicly given by contem- 
 porary, or long professional, usage, is presumed to 
 be the true one, even when the language has 
 etymologicaUy or popularly a different meaning. 
 It is obvious that the language of a statute must 
 be understood in the sense in which it was under- 
 stood when it was passed {d) ; and those who lived 
 at or near the time when it was passed, may 
 reasonably be supposed to be better acquainted 
 
 (a) Dig. i. 3, 37. 
 
 (6) 2 Inst. 11. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. per Hullock B., Booth v. Ibhotson, 1 Yo. & J. 
 360 ; per Tindal C.J., Bank of England v. Anderson, 3 Bing. N. 0. 
 666 ; per Parke B., Doe v. Owens, 10 M. & W. 521 ; Curlewis v. 
 Mornington, 26 L. J. Q. B. 181. 
 
 {d) Sup. p. 108. 
 
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532 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 than their descendants with the oiroumstanoes 
 to which it had relation, as well as with the sense 
 then attached to legislative expressions (a) ; more- 
 over, the long acquiescence of the Legislature 
 in the interpretation put upon its enactment by 
 notorious practice, may, perhaps, be regarded as 
 some sanction and approval of it (b). It often 
 becomes, therefore, material to inquire what has 
 been done under an Act; this being of more or 
 less cogency, according to circumstances, for deter- 
 mining the meaning given by contemporaneous 
 exposition (c). 
 
 It has been sometimes said, indeed, that usage 
 is only the interpreter of an obscure law, but 
 cannot control the language of a plain one : and 
 that if it has put a wrong meaning on unambiguous 
 
 (a) Co. Litt. 8b ; 2 Inst. 18, 282 ; Bac. Ab. Stat. (I.) 5 ; 2 
 Hawk. c. 9, s. 3 ; per Lord Mansfield, JB. v. Varlo, 1 Gowp. 250 ; 
 per Lord Kenyon, Leigh v. Kent, 3 T. E. 364, Blankley v. 
 Winstanley, Id. 286, and B. v. Scoi, Id. 604 ; per Buller J., B. v. 
 Wallis, 5 T. E. 380 ; per Lord EUenborough, Kitchen v. Bartsch, 
 7 East, 53 ; per Best, C.J., Stewart v. Lawton, 1 Bing. 377 ; per 
 Lord Hardwioke, A.-6. v. Parker, 3 Atk. 576 ; per Lord Bldon, 
 A.-G. V. Forster, 10 Ves. 338; JB. v. Mashiter, 6 A. & E. 
 153; iJ.v.DaOT'e, Id. 374; Newcastle v. A.-G., 12 01. & P. 402; 
 Smith V. Undo, 27 L. J. 0. P. 196, 335 ; B. v. Herford, 29 
 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; A.-G. v. Jones, 33 L. J. Ex. 249 ; Marshall v. 
 Exeter (Bp.), 31 L. J. G. P. 262 ; Montrose Peerage, 1 Macq. H. L. 
 401. 
 
 (6) Seeder James L.J., The Anna (1876), 1 P. D. 253. 
 
 (c) B. V. Canterbury (Archlp.), 11 Q. B. 581, per Goleridge J. 
 
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USAGE. 533 
 
 language, it is rather an oppression of those con- 
 cerned than an exposition of the Act, and must be 
 corrected (a). It may, indeed, well be the rule, 
 as Lord Eldon laid it down in a case of a breach 
 of trust of charity property, that if the enjoyment 
 of property had been clearly a continued breach 
 for even two centuries, of a trust created by a 
 deed or wiU, it would be just and right to dis- 
 turb it (b). But it seems different where the 
 Legislature has stood by and sanctioned by its 
 non-interposition the construction put upon its own 
 language by long and notorious usage; and the 
 proposition above stated certainly falls short of 
 the full effect which has been often given to 
 usage. Authorities are not wanting to show that 
 where the usage has been of an authoritative and 
 pubKc character, its interpretation has materially 
 modified the meaning of apparently unequivocal 
 language. 
 
 Thus, the statute 1 Westm. c. 10, for instance, 
 which enacts that coroners shall be chosen of the 
 most legal and wise knights, has been understood 
 to admit of the election of coroners who are not 
 
 (a) Sheppard v. Oomold, Vaugh. 170; per Lord Brougham, 
 Dunbar v. Boxburghe, 3 01. & F. 354 ; per Grose J., B. v. Hogg, 
 1 E. E. 375 ; per Pollock, C.B., Gwyn v. Hardmcke (1856), 
 1 H. & N. 53 ; and see Esher Urban Council v. Marks (1902), 
 71 L. J. K. B. 309. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Eldon, A.-6. v. Bristol, 2 Jac. & W. 321, 
 
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534 INTEEPEKTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 knights, if they possessed land enough to qualify 
 them for knighthood (a) ; though in one case a 
 merchant appears to have been removed from a 
 coronership for that he was communis mer color (6). 
 So, a power given by 6 Hen. VIII. c. 6, to the 
 judges of the Queen's Bench, to issue a writ of 
 Procedendo^ was held, from the course of practice, 
 to be exercisable by a single judge at chambers (c). 
 Although the 31 Bliz. c. 5 [d) — which limited the 
 time for bringing actions on penal statutes to two 
 years, when the action was brought for the Queen, 
 and to one year, when brought as well for the 
 Queen as for the informer — was silent as to actions 
 brought for the informer alone ; it was held, partly 
 on the ground of long professional understanding, 
 that the last-mentioned actions were limited to 
 one year (e). Though 15 Eich. II. enacted that 
 the. Admiralty should have no jurisdiction over 
 contracts made in the bodies of counties, never- 
 theless seamen engaging in England have always 
 beeh admitted to sue for wages in that Court (/), 
 
 (a) E. N. B. 164. 
 (6) 2 Inst. 32. 
 
 (c) B. V. Scaife, 20 L. J. M. C. 229. See Leigh v. Kent, 3 
 T. E. 862. 
 
 (d) Eepealed in part by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 36. 
 
 (e) Dyer v. Best (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. 152. 
 
 (/) Smith V. Tilly, 1 Keb. 712. As to relief and repatriation 
 of distressed seamen and seamen left abroad, see 6 Edw. VII. 
 c. 48, Merchant Shipping Act, 1906. 
 
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USAGE. 535 
 
 where the remedy is easier and better than in the 
 Common Law Courts ; on the ground, it has been 
 said {a), that communis error facit jus ; or rather, 
 as was observed by Lord Kenyon(6), not com- 
 munis error, but uniform and unbroken usage, 
 facit jus. " Were the language obscure," said 
 Lord Campbell in a celebrated case, " instead of 
 being clear, we should not be justified in differing 
 from the construction put upon it by oontem- 
 poraneous'and long-continued usage. There would 
 be no safety for property or liberty if it could be 
 successfully contended that all lawyers and states- 
 men have been mistaken as to the true meaning 
 of an old Act of Parliament " (c). If we find a 
 uniform interpretation of a statute materially 
 affecting property and perpetually recurring, and 
 which has been adhered to without interruption, 
 it would be impossible to introduce the precedent 
 of disregarding that interpretation (d). 
 
 The principle of construction would seem to 
 be applicable to an ecclesiastical case of much 
 celebrity. The rubric of the first Prayer Book 
 of Edward VI. (1549) ordered that clergymen 
 
 (a) Per Lord Holt, Olay v. Sudgrave, 1 Salk. 33. 
 
 (6) In B. V. Essex, 4 T. E. 594. 
 
 (c) Gorham v. JExeter (Bp.), 15 Q. B. 73. See also per Cur., 
 Hebbert v. Pwrchas, L. E. 3 P. 0. 650. 
 
 {d) Per Lord Westbury, Morgan v. Grawshay, L. E. 5 H. L. 
 304, 320. 
 
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536 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 should wear albs and copes while administering 
 the Communion. The second Prayer Book, with 
 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 1, prohibited those vestments 
 and substituted surplices. These last dresses were 
 again ordered, by the conjoined effect of 1 Eliz. 
 0. 2, and the Advertisements or Orders issued in 
 pursuance of it ; and the former soon disappeared, 
 the surplice becoming the sole officiating vestment 
 until the Eestoration. The rubric of the Prayer 
 Book of 1662, however, with 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4 
 (which confirmed 1 Eliz. c. 2), directed that the 
 vestments used under the book of 1549 "should 
 be retained and be in use " (a) ; but the surplice 
 alone continued to be worn for nearly two 
 centuries. When the right or duty of wearing 
 the old vestments was asserted, the Privy Council 
 held that the last rubric (which has the force of 
 a statute) did not repeal the Act and Advertise- 
 ments of Elizabeth, and must be read as if both 
 were inserted in it (6). This construction, which 
 was not reconcilable with the meaning of the 
 
 (a) Whether through disingenuousness or negligence ? Per 
 Dean Stanley in his Christian Institutions, p. 167. Semhle, it 
 was done advisedly ; for the attention of the bishops had been 
 called to the possibility of a return to vestments as the result 
 of the wording; Eebhert v. Purchas (1871), L. E. 3 P. C. 605, 
 at p. 64:3 ; See sup. p. 50. 
 
 (6) Bidsdale v. Glifton, 2 P. D. 276 ; Kelly C.B. and two 
 other members of the Council dissenting. See letter to Lord 
 Chancellor Cairns by Chief Baron Kelly, 1878, p. 14. 
 
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USAGE. 537 
 
 words of the rubric, nor, perhaps, in harmony 
 with the ordinary principles of interpretation, was, 
 however, the construction which had been put 
 upon it by long and general usage. Any other, 
 indeed, it was remarked, would have been 
 oppressive and unjust, by subjecting every clergy- 
 man who had failed to use the garments of the 
 first book, to heavy penalties {a). ' 
 
 The Court of Queen's Bench was influenced in 
 its construction of a statute of Anne (6) by the 
 fact that it was -that which had been generally 
 considered the true one for one hundred and sixty 
 years (c). Even a modern Act has received an 
 interpretation from authoritative usage which 
 could hardly have been otherwise given to it. 
 The Central Criminal Court Act, 1834 (4 & 5 
 Will IV. c. 36), which empowers the judges of 
 that 'Court, or any "two or more" of them, to 
 try all offences which might be tried under a 
 commission of Oyer and Terminer for London 
 or Middlesex, was construed to , authorise a single 
 judge to try; such having been the universal 
 practice of other superior courts of criminal 
 judicature held under commissions of Oyer and 
 
 (a) Bidsdale v. Clifton, 2 P. D. 308, and Eehbert v. Purchas 
 (1871), L. E. 3 P. C. 605, at p. 647. 
 
 (6) 8 Anne, c. 14, s. 1, restricted by 51 & 52 Viot. c. 43, 
 s. 60, and 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 37, s. 18 (2). 
 
 (c) Cox V. Leigh (1874), L. B. 9 Q. B. 333. 
 
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538 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Terminer, as well as the established practice of 
 the Central Criminal Court for the thirty-six years 
 since the passing of the Act (a). 
 
 When the question arose whether a person 
 convicted at one time of several offences could 
 be considered, at the time of the adjudication, 
 as "in prison undergoing imprisonment," within 
 s. 25, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (which authorises the 
 convicting justice, in that case, to make the 
 period of imprisonment for the second offence 
 begin from the expiration of that of the first), 
 it was decided in the affirmative, partly, indeed, 
 in conformity with the construction put on the 
 analogous enactment in 7 & 8 G-eo. IV. c. 28, but 
 partly also in consequence of the practice of the 
 judges for forty years (6). 
 
 In aU these cases, a contrary resolution would, 
 to use the words of Parker C.J. (c), have 'been 
 an overturning of the justice of the nation for 
 years past. The understanding which is accepted 
 as authoritative on such questions, however, is 
 not that which has been speculative merely, or 
 
 (a) Leverson v. B., L. E. 4 Q. B. 394. Gomp., however, 
 Glow V. Harper, 3 Ex. D. 198. See also per Lords Blackburn 
 and Watson, Clyde Navigation v. Laird, 8 App. Gas. 658. 
 
 (6) B. V. Gutbush, L. E. 2 Q. B. 379. See also Buccleuch 
 (Duke) V. Metrop. Bd. of Works, L. E. 5 Ex. 251 ; considered and 
 distinguished in Becker v. iV. British. & Mercantile Insurance Go. 
 (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1813. 
 
 (c) In B. V. Bewdley, 1 P. Wms. 223. 
 
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USAGE. 539 
 
 floating in the minds of professional men ; it must 
 have been long acted on in general practice (a), 
 and publicly, A mere general practice, for instance, 
 which had grown up in a long series of years, 
 on the part of the officers of the Crown, of not 
 using patented inventions without remuneration 
 to the patentee, under the impression that the 
 Crown was precluded from using them without 
 his license, was held ineffectual to control the true 
 construction or true state of the law ; which was 
 that the Crown was not excluded from their use (b). 
 It is, however, settled law that a petition of right 
 will lie for damages resulting from a breach of 
 contract by the Crown (c). 
 
 Some, however, of the cases cited — e.g. R. v. 
 Lever son, sup. p. 538 — may well be doubted, for 
 " Contemporanea Expositio has no application to 
 a modern Act, and I adopt Lord Watson's state- 
 ment in Clyde Navigation v. Laird {d), as the 
 Court of Appeal did in Goldsmiths Co. v. Wyatt (e). 
 What Lord Watson said was this, — ' When there 
 
 (a) Per Lord Ellenborough, Isherwood v. Oldinow, 3 M. & S. 
 396 ; per Lord Oottenham, Waterford Peerage, 6 CI. & F. 173 ; 
 per James L.J., Ford and Hill, Be (1879), 10 Ch. D. 370 ; 48 
 L. J. Ch. 327. 
 
 (6) Feather v. B., 35 L. J. Q. B. 200. 
 
 (c) Windsor & Annapolis By. v. B. (1886), 11 A. C. 607, P. C. ; 
 55 L. J. P. 0.41. 
 
 (d) 8 App. Oas. 673. 
 
 (e) 76 L. J. K. B. 166. 
 
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540 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 are ambiguous expressions in an Act passed one 
 or two centuries ago, it may be legitimate to refer 
 to the construction put upon these expressions 
 throughout a long course of years by the unanimous 
 consent of aU parties interested, as evidencing 
 what must presumably have been the intention 
 of the Legislature at that remote period. But 
 I feel bound to construe a recent statute accord- 
 ing to its own terms, when these are brought into 
 controversy, and not according to the views 
 which interested parties may have hitherto 
 taken ' " {a). 
 
 A universal law cannot receive different interpre- 
 tations in different towns (6). A mere local usage 
 cannot be invoked to construe a general enact- 
 ment, even for the locality (c). A fortiori is this 
 the case, when the local custom is manifestly 
 at variance with the object of the Act ; as, for 
 instance, a custom for departing from the standard 
 of weights and measures, which the Legislature 
 plainly desires to make obligatory on aU and 
 everywhere {d). 
 
 (a) Per Farwell L.J., Sadler v. Whiteman (1910), 79 L. J. K. B. 
 786, at p. 800. See, however, per Lord Blackburn, Clyde Navi- 
 gation V. Laird, 8 App. Gas. 670. 
 
 (6) Per Grose J., B. v. Hogg, 1 T. E. 728; approved in 
 Income Tax Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, at p. 548 ; 
 61 L. J. Q. B. 265. 
 
 (c) B. V. Saltren, Cald. 444. 
 
 (d) Noble V. Durell, 3 T. E. 271. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION IMPOSED BY STATUTES. 541 
 
 Usage, ancient and modern, if certain, invariable, 
 and not unreasonable, has often been admitted to 
 throw light on the construction of old deeds, 
 charters, and other documents (a). 
 
 SECTION II. — CONSTRUCTION IMPOSED BY STATUTES. 
 
 When the Legislature puts a construction on 
 an Act, a subsequent Cognate enactment in the 
 same terms would, prima facie, be understood in 
 the same sense. Thus, as s. 125, 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, 
 which made void securities given by a bankrupt 
 to creditors, as a consideration for signing the 
 bankrupt's certificate, was stated in the preamble 
 of 5 & 6 WiU. IV. c. 41, to have had the effect 
 of making such securities void even in the 
 hands of innocent holders for value, and was 
 by the latter Act modified so ;as to make them 
 valid in such hands ; it was considered, when 
 the Act of Geo. IV. was repealed, and its 126th 
 section was re-enacted in its original terms in 
 the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, that 
 the renewed enactment ought to receive the con- 
 struction which the preamble of 5 & 6 WiU. IV. 
 
 (a) See ex. gr. Wiihnell v. Gartham, 6 T. E. 388 ; Doe v. Bies, 
 8 Bing. 181, per Tindal O.J. ; Wadley v. Bayliss, 15 E. E. 645 ; 
 Becmfort v. Swansea, 3 Ex. 413 ; Bradley v. Newcastle, 23 L. J. 
 ,Q. B. 35. 
 
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542 INTEBPEETATION OP STATDTES, 
 
 0. 41, had put on the earlier one (a). The expres- 
 sion " taxed cart," in a local Act, was held to 
 mean a vehicle which had been defined as a taxed 
 cart by 43 Geo. III. o. 161 (6). 
 
 "Where it is gathered, from a later Act, that 
 the Legislature attached a particular meaning to 
 certain words in an earlier cognate one, this would 
 be taken as a legislative declaration of its meaning 
 there (c). 
 
 It may be taken for granted that the Legisla- 
 ture is acquainted with the actual state of the 
 law(rf). Therefore, when the words of an old 
 statute are either incorporated in, or by reference 
 made part of, a new statute, this is understood 
 to be done with the object of adopting any legal 
 interpretation which has been put on them by 
 the Courts (e). So, the same words appearing iu 
 
 (a) Ooldsmid v. Hampton (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 286. For 
 " iindue preference " in bankruptcy under existing law, see 
 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 26 (3) (»). 
 
 (h) Williams v. Lear, L. E. 7 Q. B. 285, overruling Purdy v. 
 Smith, 28 L. J. M. G. 150. See also Ward v. Beck, 32 L. J. G. P. 
 113. 
 
 (c) B. V. Smith, 4 T. E. 419 ; Morris v. Mellin, 6 B. & 0. 454, 
 sup. p. 378. 
 
 {d) Per Lord Blackburn, Young v. Leamington (Mayor"), 8 
 App. Gas. 526 ; Kent G. C, Exp., [1891] 1 Q. B. 725. 
 
 (e) Per James L.J., Dale's Case, 6 Q. B. D. 453, and in 
 Oreaves v. Tofield, 14 Gh. D. 571 ; per Mathew J., Clarh v. 
 Wallond, 52 L. J . Q. B. 322 ; Jay v. Johnstone, [1893] 1 Q. B. 25 
 189. As to Consolidation Acts, see sup. p. 109. 
 
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CONSTRUCTION IMPOSED BY STATUTES. 543 
 
 a subsequent Act in pari materid, the presumption 
 arises that they are used in the meaning which 
 had been judicially put on them ; and unless 
 there be something to rebut that presumption, the 
 new statute is to be construed as the old one 
 was (a). One reason, for instance, for holding 
 that s, 504, Merchant Shipping Act, 1864 (which 
 limited the liability of shipowners, and is replaced 
 by s. 503, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), did not 
 extend to foreign ships, was that the enactment 
 was taken from 63 Geo. III. c. 149, which had 
 received that construction judicially (b). On similar 
 grounds. Order XXXI. of the Judicature Act, 1876, 
 r. 11 (c), received the same construction as had been 
 given to the earlier enactment from which it was 
 copied (d). 
 
 And it has also been held that the limitation of 
 liability afforded by s. 603 to a private shipowner 
 
 (a) Mansell y. B., 27 L. J. M. C. 4 ; per Blackburn J., Jones v. 
 Mersey Docks Go., 11 H. L. Gas. 480 ; Exp. Thorne, 3 Oh. D. 457 ; 
 Attwater, Exp., 5 Ch. D. 27 ; per James L.J., Exp. Gampbell, 
 L. E. 5 Oh. 706 ; per Lord Coleridge C.J., Barlow v. Teal, 15 
 Q. B. D. 405; per Fry L.J., Awry v. Wood, [1891] 3 Ch. 118; 
 and per Lindley L.J., Colonial Bank v. Wkinney, 30 Ch. D. 285. 
 Comp. the remarks of Byles J., St. Losky v. Green, 9 C. B. N. S. 
 370. See also ex. gr. Sturgis v. Barell, sup. p. 458. 
 
 (6) Per Turner L.J., Cope v. Boherty, 27 L. J. Ch. 610. 
 
 (c) Now E. S. C, Ord. XXXI. r. 14, which see. 
 
 (d) Bustros V. White (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 642. See also 
 Anderson v. Bank of Columbia (1876), 2 Ch. D., pp. 654, 656. 
 
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544 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 does not extend to the Procurator-General who 
 under Prize Court Eules, 1914, is substituted for 
 the actual captor of a ship alleged to contain 
 contraband of war (a). 
 
 Even where the Acts are not in pari materid, the 
 meaning notoriously given to expressions in the 
 earlier, may be taken to be that in which they 
 are used in the later, Act. Thus the Income Tax 
 Act, 1842, which exempts from charge property 
 applicable to " charitable purposes," was held to 
 use this expression in the wide sense of what is a 
 Charity within 43 Ehz. c. 4 (b). 
 
 But an Act of Parliament does not alter the 
 law by merely betraying an erroneous opinion 
 of it(c). For instance, 7 Jac. I. c. 12, which 
 enacted that shop books should not be evidence 
 above a year before action, did not make them 
 evidence within the year ; though the enactment 
 was obviously passed under the impression, not 
 improbably confirmed by the practice of the 
 Courts in those days, that they were admissible 
 in evidence (d). So, an Act of Edw. VI., continuing 
 till the end of the then next session an Act of 
 
 (a) The Oscar II. (1919), P. 171. 
 
 (5) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, s. 61 ; Income Tax Commissioners v. 
 Pemsel, 61 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; Inl. Bev. v. Scott, 68 L. J. Q. B. 432. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. per Ashurst J., Bore v. Gray, 1 R. R. 494 ; 
 Lloyd, Exp., 1 Sim. N. S. 248, per Shadwell V.-G. 
 
 (d) Pitman v. Maddox, 2 Salk. 690. See also Bore v. 
 Ghray, sup. 
 
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EBBOR OF PACT OR LAW IN A STATUTE. 545 
 
 Hen. VIII. (a), which was not limited in duration, 
 was considered to be idle in that respect, and 
 not to abrogate it (6). An Act which provided 
 that no more than M. in the & should be paid 
 for appraisement, in cases of distress for rent, 
 "whether by one broker or more," did not alter 
 the earlier law, which required that goods dis- 
 trained for rent should be appraised by two 
 brokers (c). 
 
 A passage in an Act which showed that the 
 Legislature assumed that a certain kind of beer 
 might be lawfully sold without a license, could 
 not be treated as an enactment that such beer 
 might be so sold, when the law imposed a penalty 
 on every unlicensed person who sold any beer {d). 
 Sec. 27, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, which provided that 
 s. 149, Public Health Act, 1875, which vests the 
 " streets " of a town in its local authority, should 
 not be construed to pass minerals to the local 
 authority, was considered not to afford the infer- 
 ence that the soil and freehold of the streets 
 vested in all other respects (e). Earlier bankrupt 
 
 (a) 28 Hen. VIII. o. 14, repealed S. L. R., 1863. 
 
 (b) The Prices of Wine, Hob. 215. 
 
 (c) Allen V. Flicker, 10 A. & B. 640. 
 
 (<r) Bead v. Storey, 30 L. J. M. C. 110. See 24 & 25 Vict. c. 21, 
 s. 3, repealed 10 Edw. VII. c. 8, Sched. 6. 
 
 (e) Coverdale v. Charlton, 4 Q. B. D. 116 ; Wandsworth Bd. of 
 Works V. United Telephone Co., 13 Q. B. D. 904 ; Bolls v. St. 
 George Southwarh, 14 Ch. D. 785; Tunbridge Wells v. Baird, 
 
 1.8. 35 
 
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546 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Acts, in making traders having the privilege of 
 Parliament liable to be made bankrupts, had 
 expressly provided that they should be exempted 
 from arrest ; but when the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, 
 enacted that all debtors should be liable to bank- 
 ruptcy, without making any similar provision on 
 behalf of peers and members of Parliament, it was 
 held that they were nevertheless protected by the 
 privilege (a). 
 
 It is now, however, provided by s. 128 of the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, that "if a person having 
 privilege of Parliament commit an act of bank- 
 ruptcy he may be dealt with under this Act in 
 like manner as if he had not such privilege." 
 
 Many enclosure Acts were passed under the once 
 prevalent opinion that the lord of a manor had 
 a seignorial right of sporting over every part of 
 the manor ; whereas he had only a right of sporting 
 over the waste, as incident to the ownership of the 
 land (6). When those Acts divested the freehold 
 out of him, and vested it in the tenants, among 
 whom they allotted it, but reserved to the lord all 
 the rights of sporting which had been enjoyed by 
 himself and his predecessors, a conflict of opinion 
 
 [1896] A. C. 434 ; Finclley Electric Light Go. v. Finchley Urban 
 District Council, [1903] 1 Oh. 437, C. A. 
 
 (a) Newcastle v. Morris. L. E. 4 H. L. 661. 
 
 (6) Pickering v. Noyes (1826), 28 E. E. 430 ; Sowerby v. ^mitl 
 (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 290. 
 
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ERROR OP FACT OE LAW IN A STATUTE. 547 
 
 arose as to whether this reservation entitled the 
 lord to the right of shooting over the enclosures (a). 
 The 7 & 8 Vict. c. 29, in reciting that the 
 9 G-eo. IV. c. 69, which punishes night poaching 
 on " land, whether open or enclosed," had been 
 evaded by the destruction of game, not on open 
 and enclosed lands as described in that Act, but 
 upon public roads and paths, and in making pro- 
 vision to meet the evasion, proceeded on an 
 erroneous view of the law; for public roads and 
 paths are "lands" within the meaning of the 
 earlier Act ; and the person who kills game while 
 standing on them is a trespasser, not being there 
 in the exercise of the right of way which alone 
 justified his presence, but for the purpose of un- 
 lawfully seeking game (b). 
 
 Provisions sometimes found in statutes enacting 
 imperfectly or for particular cases only that which 
 was already and more widely the law, have occa- 
 sionally furnished ground for the contention that 
 an intention to alter the general law was to be 
 inferred from the partial or limited enactment ; 
 
 (a) See Greathead v. Morley, 10 L. J. 0. P. 246 ; Ewart v. 
 Graham,, 7 H. L. Cas. 331 ; Sowerby v. Smith, L. E. 9 G. P. 524 ; 
 Devonshire (Duke) v. O'Connor, 24 Q. B. D. 468; Ecroyd v. 
 Cmlthard (1898), 67 L. J. Ch. 458. 
 
 (6) B. V. Pratt (1855), 24 L. J. M. 0. 113 ; Harrison v. 
 Butland (Duke) (1892), 62 L. J. Q. B. 117 ; Mayhem v. Wardley, 
 14 C. B. N. S. 550; sup. p. 492. 
 
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548 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 resting on the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio 
 alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such 
 cases. The only inference which a Court can 
 draw from such superfluous provisions (which 
 generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded 
 objections and idle doubts), is that the Legislature 
 was either ignorant or unmindful of the real state 
 of the law, or that it acted under the influence 
 of excessive caution ; and if the law be different 
 from what the Legislature supposed it to be, the 
 implication arising from the statute, it has been 
 said, cannot operate as a negation of its exist- 
 ence {a) ; and any legislation founded on such 
 a mistake has not the effect of making that law 
 which the Legislature erroneously assumed to be 
 so. Thus, when in contending that debts due by 
 corporate bodies were subject to foreign attach- 
 ment in the Mayor's Court, the express statutory 
 exemptions of the East India Company and of 
 the Bank of England were cited as supplying 
 the inference that corporate bodies were deemed 
 by the Legislature to be subject to that process, 
 the judicial answer was that it was more reason- 
 able to hold that the two great corporations pre- 
 vailed on Parliament to prevent all questions as 
 to themselves by direct enactment, than to hold 
 that Parliament by such special enactment meant 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Mollwo v. Court of Wards, L. E. 4 P. C. 419, 437. 
 See also per Cockburn C.J., Shrewsbury v. Scott, 6. C. B. N. S. 1. 
 
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ERROB OF FACT OR LAW IN A STATUTE. 549 
 
 to determine the question in all other cases 
 adversely to corporations (a). A local Act which, 
 in imposing wharfage dues for the maintenance of 
 a harbour on certain articles, expressly exempted 
 the Crown from liability in respect of coals im- 
 ported for the use of royal packets, and the 
 provisions in turnpike Acts (b), which exempted 
 from toll carriages and horses attending the Queen, 
 or going or returning from such attendance ; were 
 not suffered to affect the more extensive exemp- 
 tions which the Crown enjoys by virtue of its 
 prerogative (c). 
 
 On the other hand it has been laid down that 
 where a statute confers powers upon a company, 
 which the company as owner of property could 
 have exercised without statutory power, the powers 
 expressly given must be treated either as super- 
 fluous, or as purposely inserted in order to define, 
 that is limit, the right conferred, and as implying 
 a prohibition of the exercise of the more extensive 
 rights which the company might have by virtue 
 of its ownership of property, and that it cannot 
 
 (a) London Joint Stock Bank v. London (Mayor), 1 0. P. D. 17 ; 
 affirmed sub nom. London Corp. v. London Joint Stock Bank 
 (1881), 60 L. J. Q. B. 594, H. L. 
 
 (6) 3 Geo. IV. e. 126, s. 32, and 4 Geo. IV. c. 95, s. 24. 
 
 (c) Weymouth v. Nugent (1865), 34 L. J. M. 0. 81. See 
 Hornsey Urban District Council v. Hennell, [1902] 2 K. B. 73 ; 
 Westover v. Perkins, 28 L. J. M. 0. 227 ; Smithett v. Blythe, 35 
 E. E. 358. See p. 285 sup. 
 
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550 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 be doubted that the latter, i.e. the restrictive 
 interpretation, is the true mode of regarding 
 statutory powers conferred on bodies created for 
 pubKc purposes, and authorised to acquire land for 
 such purposes (a). 
 
 A mere recital in an Act, whether of fact or of 
 law, is not conclusive, but Courts are at liberty 
 to consider the fact or the law to be different from 
 the statement in the recital ; unless, indeed, it 
 be clear that the Legislature intended that the 
 law should be, or the fact should be regarded to 
 be (b), as recited. If, for instance, a road was 
 stated in an Act to be in a certain township, 
 or a town to be a corporate borough, the state- 
 ment, though some evidence of the fact alleged, 
 would be open to contradiction (c). Sec. 3, 36 & 37 
 Vict. c. 60 (d), would hardly, by merely reciting 
 that " an accessory after the fact " is " by English 
 
 (a) London Assoc, of Shipowners v. London & India Docks, 
 [1892] 2 Oh. 242 ; and see Barraclough v. Brovm, [1897] A. 0. 
 615 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 672. 
 
 (&) The 34 Geo. III. c. 54 (repealed S. L. E., 1871), reciting 
 that a conspiracy had been formed for subverting the laws and 
 constitution, and for introducing the anarchy prevalent in 
 France ; this recital was relied on as proof of the conspiracy in 
 the treason trials of 1794, peJ^Eyre C.J. in addressing the Grand 
 Jury in Hardy's Case, 24 State Trials, 200. 
 
 (c) B. V. EaugTiton, 22 L. J. M. C. 89 ; JR. v. Greene. 6 A. & B. 
 548. 
 
 {d) Amended 58 & 59 Vict. c. 33. 
 
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EKROR OF FACT OR LAW IN A STATUTE. 551 
 
 law liable to be punished as if he were the principal 
 offender," be understood as making so important 
 a change of the law. 
 
 In all these cases, no inference necessarily arose 
 that the Legislature intended to alter the law, 
 and to make it as it was alleged to be. A different 
 effect, however, would be given to an Act which 
 showed, whether by recital or enactment, that it 
 intended to effect a change. If the mistake is 
 manifested in words competent to make the law 
 in future, there is no principle which can' deny 
 them this effect (a). Such was the effect of 
 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48 (&), which enacted that municipal 
 corporations should be rateable in respect of their 
 property, as though it were not corporate property ; 
 but that such property, when lying wholly within 
 a borough the poor of which were relieved by one 
 entire poor rate, should continue exempt from 
 rateability "as if the Act had not passed." 
 When the Act was passed, the general opinion 
 was that such property was exempt; but later 
 decisions settled that it was not. It was held 
 that the above enactment exempted them, not- 
 withstanding the final words, which were con- 
 sidered as not conveying a different intention (c). 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Postmaster-General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 148. 
 
 (b) Eepealed 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 5. 
 
 (c) B. V. Oldham Corjj., L. E. 3 Q. B. 474. 
 
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552 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 One ground on which the Exchequer Chamber 
 held that the attesting words, "on the true faith 
 of a Christian," of the abjuration oath were 
 essential parts of the oath, was that Parliament 
 had put that construction on them, when allowing 
 the Jews, a few years after enacting the oath, 
 to omit those words when the oath was tendered 
 to them ex officio (a). 
 
 A statute of the United States enacted that the 
 district court should, in certain cases, have con- 
 current jurisdiction with the state and circuit 
 courts, as if (contrary to the fact) the district 
 court had not already, and the circuit court had, 
 jurisdiction. But though the language plainly 
 indicated only the opinion that the jurisdiction 
 existed in the circuit court, and not an intention 
 to confer it, this effect was nevertheless given to 
 the Act, to prevent its being inoperative, and to 
 carry out what was the obvious object of the 
 Act (h). The district court could not have had 
 concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, 
 unless the latter could take cognisance of the 
 same suits. 
 
 (a) 1 Geo. I. St. 2, c. 13 (repealed by 34 & 35 Vict. c. 48), 
 10 Geo. I. c. 4 (repealed, S. L. E., 1867) ; Salomons v. Miller, 8 
 Ex. 778 ; Miller v. Salomons, sup. p. 20. 
 
 (6) Postmaster- General v. Early, sup. p. 551. 
 
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WORDS CONSTRUED IN BONAM PARTEM. 553 
 
 9 
 
 SECTION III. — CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS IN BONAM 
 
 PARTEM — EFFECT OF MULTIPLICITY OP WORDS 
 
 OF VABL&.TION OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 It is said, and in a certain and limited sense 
 truly, that words must be taken in a lawful and 
 rightful sense (a). When an Act, for instance, gave 
 a certain eflBlcacy to a fine levied of land, it meant 
 only a fine lawfully levied (b). The provision that 
 a judgment in the Lord Mayor's Court, when 
 removed to the Superior Court, shall have the 
 same effect as a judgment of the latter, would not 
 apply to a judgment which the inferior tribunal 
 had no jurisdiction to pronounce (c). The land- 
 lord's claim to recover arrears of rent out of goods 
 seized in execution by the bailiff of a County Court, 
 under the County Courts Act, 1888, depends upon 
 whether the seizure was lawful. If the goods did 
 not belong to the debtor, and the seizure was 
 tjonsequently unlawful, the claim under the section 
 could not arise (d). A rule of a building society 
 
 (a) See, e.g. B. v. Hulme (1870), L. E. 5 Q. B. 377. 
 (6) Co. Litt. 381b ; 2 Inst. 590. 
 
 (c) Bridge v. Branch, 1 C. P. D. 633. 
 
 (d) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 160 (amended by 3 & 4 Geo. V. 
 c. 34, s. 18 (2), which, in case of bankruptcy, limits the right of 
 the landlord to six months' rent) ; Sughes v. Smallwood, 25 
 Q. B. D. 306. Gomp. Beard v. Knight, 27 L. J. Q. B. 359 ; 
 Foulgar v. Taylor, 29 L. J. Ex. 154. 
 
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554 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 authorising a director to reimburse himself for 
 any loss incurred in executing the powers given 
 him by the rules, does not apply to acts ultra 
 vires and beyond the powers the society could 
 confer (a). So, an Act which requires the pay- 
 ment of rates as a condition precedent to the 
 exercise of the franchise would not be construed 
 as excluding from it a person who refused to pay 
 a rate which was illegal, though so far valid that 
 it had not been quashed or appealed against (6), 
 and this requirement is now apparently entirely 
 dispensed with under the provisions of the 
 Eepresentation of the People Act, 1918. A 
 covenant by a tenant to pay all parliamentary 
 taxes is construed to include only such as he 
 may lawfolly pay, but not the landlord's property 
 tax, which it would be illegal for hinj to engage 
 to pay(c). A statutory authority to abate nui- 
 sances would not justify an order to abate one 
 when it could not be obeyed without committing* 
 a trespass {d). 
 
 (a) Cullerne v. London Bldg. Socy. (1890), 59 L. J. Q. B. 525. 
 (6) B. V. Windsor (Mayor), 13 L. J. Q. B. 337. See also 
 Bruyeres v. Halcomh, 3 A. & B. 381. 
 
 (c) GasJcell v. King, 11 Bast, 165. See Edgeware Highway 
 Board v. Harrmv Gas Co., L. E. 10 Q. B. 92 ; Owen v. Body, 
 5 A. & B. 28. 
 
 (d) PubHc Health Act, 1875 (38 i- 39 Vict. c. 55) ; Scarborough 
 (Mayor) v. Rural Authority of Scarborough, 1 Ex. D. 344 ; but see 
 
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WOEDS CONSTRUED IN BONAM PAETEM. 555 
 
 A highway surveyor, who is required by the 
 Highway Act, 1862, to "conform in all respects 
 to the orders >of the board in the execution of 
 his duties," is, like the clergyman who had sworn 
 canonical obedience to his bishop (a), bound to 
 obey only lawful orders, which his superior has 
 authority to give ; so that he is personally liable 
 for his act, if the board h£|,d no jurisdiction to 
 make the order under which he did it (b). Sec. 199, 
 Companies Act, 1862 (repealed, ss. 267, 268, Com- 
 panies (Consolidation) Act, 1908), providing for 
 the winding-up of companies of more than seven 
 members not registered under the Act, applies 
 only to companies which may be lawfully formed 
 without registration, but not to those which are 
 prohibited unless registered (c). But money 
 earned in an unlawful " vocation " is properly 
 assessed to the income tax (d). 
 
 Where analogous words are used, each may 
 be presumed to be susceptible of a separate and 
 distinct meaning ; for the Legislature is not 
 
 Parier v. Inge, 17 Q. B. D. 584; and Broadbent v. Sliepherd, 
 [1901] 2 K. B. 274. 
 
 (a) Long v. Gray, 1 Moo. P. 0. N. S. 411. 
 
 (6) Mill V. HawJcer, L.E. 10 Ex. 92; comp. Beios v. Biley, 
 11 C. B. 434. 
 
 (c) Padstow dec. Assoc, Be, 20 Ch. D. 137 ; Shaw v. Benson, 
 11 Q. B. D. 563. 
 
 (d) 5 & 6 Vict. 0. 35, Sched. D ; per Denman J., Partridge v. 
 Mallandaine {imO), 56 L. J. Q. B. 251. 
 
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556 INTBEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 supposed to use words without a meaning (a). But 
 the use of tautologous expressions is not uncom- 
 mon in statutes, and there is no such presumption 
 against fulness, or even superfluity of expression, in 
 statutes, or other written instruments, as amounts 
 to a rule of interpretation, controlling what might 
 otherwise be their proper construction (b). 
 
 It has been justly remarked that, when precision 
 is required, no safer rule can be followed than 
 always to call the same thing by the same name (c). 
 It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the 
 same meaning is implied by the use of the same 
 expression in every part of an Act (d). Accordingly, 
 in ascertaining the meaning to be attached to a 
 particular word in a section of an Act, though the 
 
 (a) See ex. gr. the distinction between " rights " and 
 "interests " in the International Copyright Act, 1886 (49 & 50 
 Vict. c. 33), s. 6 (repealed and replaced by Part II., Copyright 
 Act, 1911) ; Moul v. Groenings, [1891] 2 Q. B. 443 : between 
 moneys paid " under" and " in respect of " a gaming contract, 
 Taiham v. Beeve, 62 L. J. Q. B. 30, approved in Saffery v. 
 Mayer, 70 L. J. K. B. 145. See also another example in 
 Brighton Guardians v. Strand Guardians, [1891] 2 Q. B. 156. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Selbourne L.G., Hough v. Windus, 12 Q. B. D. 
 229. 
 
 (c) Sir G. C. Lewis, Obs. and Eeas. in Polit., vol. i. p. 91. 
 
 (d) Gourtauld v. Legh, L. E. 4 Ex. 130, per Cleasby B. ; B. v. 
 Poor Law Gommrs., 6 A. & B. 68,per Lord Denman ; Be Kirkstall 
 Brewery, 5 Ch. D. 535. Camp, the judgments of Cockburn C.J. 
 in Smith v. Brown, L. E. 6 Q. B. 731, and of Baggallay L.J. in 
 The Franconia, 2 P. D. 174. 
 
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TAUTOLOGOUS EXPRESSIONS. 557 
 
 proper course would seem to be to ascertain that 
 meaning if possible from a consideration of the 
 section itself; yet, if the meaning cannot be so 
 ascertained, then, on the principle that, as a general 
 rule, a word is to be considered as used throughout 
 an Act in the same sense, other sections may be 
 looked at to fix the sense in which the word is 
 there used (a). 
 
 But the presumption is not of much weight. 
 In 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96, for instance, which makes 
 any " person " in a British possession charged 
 with any crime at sea liable to be tried in the 
 colony, and provides that where the offence is 
 murder or manslaughter of any " person " who dies 
 in the colony of an injury feloniously inflicted at 
 sea, the offence shall be considered as having been 
 committed wholly at sea; the word "person" 
 would include any human being, when relating to 
 the sufferer, but would, as regards the offender, 
 include only those persons who, on general prin- 
 ciples of law, are subject to the jurisdiction of 
 our Legislature, and responsible for their acts (b). 
 In the enactment which makes it felony for any 
 one, "being married," to "marry" again while 
 the former marriage is in force, the same word 
 
 (a) Per Jessel M.E., Spencer v. Metrop. Bd. of Worhs, 22 
 Ch. D. 142. 
 
 (6) See U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 631 ; See also B. v. Lewis 
 (1857), Dears & B. 182, and other cases cited, sup. p. 262 et seq. 
 
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558 INTEEPRBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 has obviously two different meanings, necessarily 
 implying the validity of the marriage in the one 
 case, and as necessarily excluding it in the other (a). 
 And though by s. 27 (2), Metropolitan Building 
 Act, 1855, separate sets of chambers in large build- 
 ings are to be deemed to be " separate buildings," 
 and to be separated by proper party- walls, etc., 
 accordingly, yet it has been held that they are 
 not " separate buildings " within the meaning of 
 Schedule II. Part I. of the same Act, under which 
 the district surveyor is entitled to charge a fee 
 in respect of "every" new "building" surveyed 
 by him (6). So, the word "made" is used in 
 different senses in the London Government Act, 
 1899 (c). 
 
 The case of Forth v. Chapnan {d) furnishes a 
 
 (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57; B. v. Allen (1872), 41 
 L. J. M. C, at p. 98. For another illustration, see Pharmcbceutical 
 Socy. V. Piper, [1893], 1 Q. B. 686 (approved in PJiarmaceutical 
 Socy. V. Armson, [1894] 2 Q. B. 720), where the word " article " 
 is said to have different meanings in different parts of s. 17 
 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 121). So " otherwise" is. used in differing 
 senses in the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 ; Tidswell, 
 Be, 56 L. J. Q. B. 548. 
 
 (6) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122 (repealed, 57 & 58 Vict. c. cexiii., 
 s. 215, and Sched. 4 ; note s. 74 of this Act) ; Moir v. Williams, 
 [1892] 1 Q. B. 264. 
 
 (c) Per Warrington J., Parrish v. Hackney Corp., 55 S. J. 670- 
 
 {d) 1 P. Wms. 663 ; Groohe v. Be Vandes, 9 Ves. 208, per 
 Lord Eldon. 
 
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VAEIATION OP INTBRPEETATION. 559 
 
 well-known instance of a single passage in a Will 
 receiving two different interpretations, according 
 to the nature of the property to which it was 
 appHed ; a devise of freehold and leasehold property 
 to a person, with remainder over if he died " with- 
 out issue," being construed to mean, as regarded 
 the freehold, failure of issue at any future time, 
 but as regarded the leasehold, a failure of issue at 
 the death of the devisee. But this construction, 
 which Lord Kenyon (a) considered hardly illustra- 
 tive of the saying that lex plus laudatiir quando 
 ratione probatur, and which has since been partially 
 set aside by the Wills Act, 1837 (6), was attributable 
 to the different principles of interpretation adopted 
 by the Common Law and Ecclesiastical Courts, 
 under whose cognisance Wills of the two kinds of 
 property respectively and exclusively fell (c). 
 
 So, it seems to have been once thought that 
 in s. 2, 9 Anne, c. 14 (d), which gave the loser at 
 play a right to recover by action his losses' above 
 £10, when lost at a single sitting, and gave an 
 informer the right to recover them, and treble 
 value besides, if the loser did not take proceedings 
 
 (a) Porter v. Bradley, 1 E. E. 675. 
 
 (6) 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 29 ; Bence, Be, [1891] 
 3 Oh. 242. 
 
 (c) Feame, Oont. Eem. 476. Sep Wingfield v. Wingfield, 9 
 Oh. D. 658, and the oases there cited. 
 
 (d) Eepealed by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15. 
 
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560 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 in time, the expression " a single sitting " might 
 receive two different meanings, according as the 
 plaintiff was the loser, or an informer: that is, 
 that a sitting suspended for dinner should be 
 held single and continuous when the loser sued, 
 but be broken into two sittings when the action 
 was brought by the informer ; on the ground that 
 in the one case the Act was remedial, and there- 
 fore entitled to a beneficial • construction, while 
 in the latter it was penal, and therefore was to 
 be construed strictly {a). But unquestionably the 
 interpreter is bound, in general, to disclaim the 
 right to assign different meanings to the same 
 words on the ground of a supposed general 
 intention of the Legislature {h). 
 
 As the same expression is as a general rule 
 to be presumed to be used in the same sense 
 throughout an Act, or a series of cognate Acts, 
 a change of language, probably, suggests the 
 presumption of change of intention (c) ; and as 
 has been seen, the change of language in the 
 later of two statutes on the same subject has 
 often the effect of repealing the earlier provision 
 by implication {d). Where a limited interpretation 
 
 {a) Bones v. Booth, 2 W. Bl. 1226. 
 
 (fe) Per Lord Denman, B. v. Poor Law Gommrs. (1838), 6 
 A. & B. 56, at p. 68. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Tenterden, B. v. Great Bolton, 8 B. & C. 74 ; 
 Bicket V. Met. By. Co., L. E. 2 H. L. 207. 
 
 [d) See cases cited sup. pp. 285-295. 
 
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VARIA.TION OF INTERPRETATION. 561 
 
 has been placed upon prior Acts of Parliament, 
 and the words of an amending Act have been 
 enlarged, the inference is that the enlargement 
 must have been intentional on the part of the 
 Legislature (a). So where by earlier enactments, 
 penalties on members of Parliament for sitting 
 and voting before being sworn were expressly 
 recoverable by common informers, and by a 
 repealing Act the penalties were made recoverable 
 by action, without saying by whom, it was held 
 that the common informer could not sue, but 
 only the Crown (6). And it has been held that 
 where section after section of an Act relating 
 to the winding up of companies is limited to 
 winding up by the Court, the absence of any 
 such limitation in another section which contains 
 provisions as to procedure " if the winding up of a 
 company is not concluded within a year after its 
 commencement," indicates an intention on the 
 part of the Legislature that the latter section shaU 
 also apply to cases of voluntary winding up (c). 
 Where one section of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 74 (cZ), 
 
 (a) Hurlhatt v. Barnett, [1893] 1 Q. B. 77. 
 (h) 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, s. 5 ; Bradlaugh, v. Clarke, 8 App. 
 Gas. 354. 
 
 (c) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 63, s. 15 ; repealed 8 Bdw. VII. c. 59, 
 s. 286, Sched. 6, pt. I. As to existing law relating to winding up 
 of Companies, see ss. 182 et seq., 8 Edw. VII. c. 59 ; StocJc & 
 Share Auction & BanJcing Co., Be, [1894] 1 Oh. 736. 
 
 (d) Eepealed, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 1, which see. 
 I.S. 36 
 
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562 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 imposed a penalty for selling, as unadulterated, 
 articles of food which were adulterated ; and 
 another provided that the seller of an article of 
 food, who, knowing that it was mixed with a 
 foreign substance to increase its bulk or weight, 
 did not declare the admixture to the purchaser, 
 should be deemed to have sold an adulterated 
 article ; the former section would reach a seller 
 who was ignorant of the adulteration; since, 
 where knowledge was intended to be an element 
 in an offence under the Act, the Legislature had 
 conveyed its intention in express terms (a). 
 
 "Where an Act recited and repealed an earlier 
 one, which had authorised two justices, " whereof 
 one to be of the quorum," to remove any person 
 "likely to be" chargeable to the parish, and 
 enacted that no person should be removed until 
 " actually " chargeable, when " two justices " 
 (omitting all mention of either being of the 
 quorum) might remove him ; it was held that this 
 qualification was not necessary under the later 
 Act {b). 
 
 A man who sends his servants or his dogs on 
 the land of another, would be, in law, as much 
 a trespasser as if he had entered on the land in 
 
 (a) Fitzpatrich v. Kelly, 42 L. J. M. C. 132, sup. p. 58. See 
 Pope V. Tearle (1874), 43 L. J. M. C 129 ; Boberts v. Egertvn, 
 43 L. J. M. 0. 135. See further, sup. p. 186. 
 
 (b) B. V. Llangian, diss. Gockburu G.J., sup. p.. 287. 
 
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VAEIATION OF INTERPRETATION. 563 
 
 person (a) ; but an Act which imposed a penalty 
 for committing a trespass " by entering or being " 
 upon land, would be construed as limiting, by 
 these superadded words, the trespass to a personal 
 entrance (b). 
 
 Sec. 59, 6 Geo. IV. c. 125, which exempted 
 from compulsory pilotage any ship whatever 
 which " is " within the limits of the port to which 
 she belongs, was construed as exempting from 
 compulsory pilotage a London vessel while within 
 the port of London, though on a voyage from 
 Bordeaux ; but she would not have been exempted 
 under s. 379, Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 
 (repealed, s. 625, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), 
 which exempted ships "navigating" within the 
 limits of the port to which they belong (c). In an 
 Act (59 Geo. III. c. 50) (d), which provided that 
 no person should acquire a settlement in a parish 
 by a 40 days' residence in a tenement rented 
 by him, unless, if a house, it was "held," and 
 if land, it was "occupied" by him for a year, 
 
 (a) Baker v. Berkeley, 3 0. & P. 32 ; Dimmock v. Allenby, cited 
 2 Marsh. 582. See further, sup. p. 492. 
 
 (&) B. V. Pratt (1855), 24 L. J. M. G. 113, sup. p. 547. But 
 see Bead v. Edwards, 84 L. J. 0. P. 31. 
 
 (c) The Stettin, Br. & Lush. 199. See also Hickman v. Maisey, 
 [1900] 1 Q. B. 752, and Getil. Steam Nav. Co. v. Brit. Colon. 
 Steam Nav. Co., 38 L. J. Ex. 97. 
 
 {d) Eepealed 6 Geo. IV. e. 57) s. 1, which section is itself 
 repealed by S. L. E., 1873. 
 
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564 INTEEPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 effect was given to the two different words as 
 expressing different ideas, by holding that a 
 house need not be " occupied " for the purpose 
 of acquiring a settlement (a) ; though, it was 
 observed, this was probably not really intended 
 by the Legislature (b). 
 
 But just as the presumption that the same 
 meaning is intended for the same expression in 
 every part of an Act is, as we have seen, not of 
 much weight, so the presumption of a change of 
 intention from a change of language (of no great 
 weight in the construction of any documents) 
 seems entitled to less weight in the construction of 
 a statute than in any other case ; for the variation 
 is sometimes to be accounted for by a mere desire 
 to avoid the repeated use of the same words (c), 
 and often from the circumstance that the Act has 
 been compiled from different sources ; and further, 
 
 (a) B. V. North, Gollingham, 1 B. & 0. 578; B. v. Great Bolton, 
 8 B. & 0. 71. 
 
 (6) Per Best J., B. v. North Gollingham, sup. See other 
 illustrations in Lawrence v. King, 37 L. J. M; 0. 78 ; Gorely, 
 Exp., 34 L. J. Bank. 1; Gale v. Laurie, 29 E. E. 199; 
 Cornill V. Hudson, 27 L. J. Q. B. 8; Wiley v. Crawford, 30 
 L.J. Q. B. 319. 
 
 (c) Per Blackburn J., Hadley v. Perks, L. E. 1 Q. B. 444 ; per 
 Lord Abinger, B. v. Frost, 9 C. & P. 129 ; per Lindley L.J., 
 Brace v. Ahercarn Colliery Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 705. As to 
 accidental omissions, see sup. pp. 443-445. 
 
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VARIATION OF LANGUAGE. 565 
 
 from the alterations and additions from various 
 hands which Acts undergo in their progress 
 through Parliament. Though the statute is the 
 language of the three estates of the realm, it 
 seems legitimate, in construing it, to take into 
 consideration that it may have been the pro- 
 duction of many minds ; and that this may better 
 account for the variety of style and phraseology 
 which is found, than a desire to convey a different 
 intention. Even where the variation occurs in 
 different statutes, the change is often not in- 
 dicative of a change of intention. Thus there 
 is no difference between a " stream " and a 
 "river" in ss. 27, 28, 24 & 25:,Vict. c. 109(a); 
 and " ordinary luggage " in an Act, and " personal 
 luggage " in a by-law made under it, have been 
 construed as meaning the same thing (6). So, 
 there can be no material difference between 
 "suffering" and "knowingly suffering" persons 
 to gamble in a public- house (c). To " turn cattle 
 loose" on a public thoroughfare, which is subject 
 to a penalty by s. 54, Metropolitan Police Act, 
 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), is substantially identical 
 
 (a) Bolle V. Whyte, 37 L. J. Q. B. 118. 
 
 (&) Eudston V. Midland By. Co. ClSeg), 38 L. J. Q. B. 213 ; 
 discussed in Macrow v. G. W. By. (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 300. 
 
 (c) 9 Geo. IV. c. 61 ; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, repealed s. 79, 
 Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910; Bosley v. Barnes, 1 
 Q. B. D. 84. 
 
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566 INTEEPEETA.TION OF STATUTES. 
 
 with "leaving cattle" there "without a keeper," 
 contrary to s. 74, Highway Act, 1835(a) ; and the 
 definition in 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 2, of a hackney 
 carriage, as a carriage plying for hire in "any 
 public place," is identical in meaning with the 
 earlier Act, 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 22, which defined 
 it as plying for hire in any "street or road "(6). 
 It may be questioned whether ^oo much import- 
 ance has not sometimes been attached to a varia- 
 tion of language (c). 
 
 An Act which enacted that " it shall and may 
 be lawful" for a justice to hear a certain class of 
 cases under £50, and that penalties above that 
 sum " shall " (d) be sued for in the Superior Courts, 
 was held equally imperative in both cases, even 
 though the effect was to oust the jurisdiction 
 of the Superior Courts in the former (e). So, 
 though one section of 3 G-eo. IV. c. 39, made a 
 
 (a) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50 (s. 74 of which is repealed and re- 
 enacted with variations by 27 & 28 Vict. e. 101, s. 25). See 
 Sherhorn v. Wells, 32 L. J. M. C. 179. 
 
 (6) Skinner v. Usher, L. E. 7 Q. B. 423. See also Ourtis v. 
 Emhery, L. E. 7 Ex. 369. 
 
 (c) See ex. gr. B. v. South Weald, 33 L.J. M. C. 192 ; Jarman, 
 Exp., 4 Ch. D. 835. 
 
 (<?) 25 Geo. III. c. 51 (repealed 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 120, s. 1, 
 which Act is repealed by S. L. E., 1874). See ex. gr. Haldane v. 
 Beauclerk, 18 L. J. Ex. 227 ; Montague v. Smith, 21 L. J. Q. B. 
 73. See also sup. pp. 424-429. 
 
 (e) Gates v. Knight, sup. pp. 238-240. 
 
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VARIATION OF LANGUAGE, 567 
 
 warrant of attorney to confess judgment, if not 
 filed within 21 days, " fraudulent and void against 
 the assignees" in bankruptcy of the debtor, and 
 another made it " void to all intents and purposes," 
 if the defeasance was not written on the same 
 paper as the warrant, it was held, notwithstanding 
 the dissimilarity of the language, that the latter 
 section was not more extensive than the former, 
 but made the warrant of attorney void only as 
 against the assignees (a). Sec. 137, Bankrupt Law 
 Consolidation Act, 1849 (ft), which made judges' 
 orders, given by consent by a "trader," null and 
 void to " all intents and purposes," unless filed, 
 was held to have no more extensive meaning than 
 the provision just cited of the 3 Geo. IV. c. 39, and 
 was therefore valid against a solvent trader. The 
 word "trader" which is used in the same and 
 the preceding sections, was held to be confined to 
 traders who afterwards became bankrupt ; though 
 the word "bankrupt" was used in all the other 
 sections relating to the subject. AU of them, 
 however, were prefaced by the preamble that they 
 related to " transactions with the bankrupt " (c). 
 
 (a) Morris v. Mellin, 6 B. & 0. 446; Bennett v. Daniel, 10 
 B. & C. 500, diss. Parke J. ; and Eolfe B., Bryan v. Ghild, 1 
 L. M. & P. 437. See also Myers v. Veitch, L. E. 4 Q. B. 649 ; 
 B. V. Tone, 1 B. & Ad. 561. 
 
 (b) Eepealed 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, s. 20. 
 
 (e) Bryan v. Child (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 429 ; discussed in 
 Gowan v. Wright (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 131. 
 
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568 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Where under earlier bankruptcy statutes certain 
 voluntary settlements could be avoided by an order 
 for sale by a trustee in bankruptcy, and were thus 
 voidable only, the enactment in s. 47, Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1883, that such settlements should be "void" 
 as against the trustee was construed as also merely 
 rendering them voidable ; the object of the Legis- 
 lature being conceived to be unchanged, and the 
 purpose of the alteration to be merely convenience 
 in drafting (a). 
 
 A change of language effected by the omission 
 in a later statute of words which occurred in an 
 earlier one would make no difference in the sense, 
 when the omitted words of the earlier enactment 
 were unnecessary. Thus, where the first Act, after 
 enacting that in an " indictment " for murder the 
 manner or means of death need not be stated, 
 superfluously provided that the term " indictment " 
 should include "inquisition" (which it did ex vi 
 termini, without any such provision (6)), and a sub- 
 sequent consolidation Act repealed and re-enacted 
 the same enactment, omitting the unnecessary 
 interpretation clause ; it was held that the word 
 
 (a) 46 & 47 Viet. c. 52 (repealed, 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 168, 
 and Sched. 6, which see); Be Brail, [1893] 2 Q. B. 381; 
 approved by Ct. of Ap., Be Carter and Kenderdine, 66 L. J. Ch. 
 408. 
 
 (&) 2 Hale, 155*; WitU^ole's Case, Cro. Car. 134. Aliter, 
 " information," B. v. Slator, 8 Q. B. D. 267. See also Tales v. 
 B., 14 Q. B. D. 648 ; A.-G. v. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. 667. 
 
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VARIATION OF LANGUAGE. 569 
 
 " indictment " was to be read in its full and estab- 
 lished meaning, and not in the restricted sense 
 in which the Legislature apparently understood 
 it in the earlier statute (a). So, the Merchant 
 Shipping Act of 1854, which required (following 
 an earlier Act) that the transfer of ships should be 
 registered, but omitted the proviso of the earlier, 
 which declared that a transfer not registered 
 should not be valid for any purpose whatever, was 
 construed as making such a transfer void, not- 
 withstanding the omission of the proviso (b). The 
 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, which, after repealing a similar 
 enactment of the preceding session, made certain 
 leases void when not made by deed, was construed 
 as leaving the unsealed document valid as an 
 agreement ; although the repealed Act had an 
 express provision to that effect, which the repeal- 
 ing one omitted (c). 
 
 Even where the omitted words were material 
 to the sense, but might be implied, the omission 
 would not, in itself, be considered material, if 
 leading to consequences not likely to be intended. 
 
 (a) B. V. Ingham, 33 L. J. Q. B. 183. 
 
 (6) Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 30 L. J. Ch. 379. See 
 also Ballhyany v. Bouch (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 421, and ss. 24-26, 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 
 
 (c) Bond V. Bosling (1860), 30 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; Parher v. 
 Taswell, 27 L. J. Ch. 812 ; per Byles J., Tidey v. Mollett, 16 
 C.B.N. S. 298. See, however, Walsh v. Lonsdale, 52 L. J. Ch. 2, 
 on which see Coataworth v. Johnson, 55 L. J. Q. B. 220. 
 
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570 * INTERPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Thus, although the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, in 
 making an assignment by a debtor of all his 
 property an act of bankruptcy, omitted the words 
 " with intent to defeat or delay his creditors " 
 which Jiad been in former Acts, it was held that 
 no alteration had been made in the law ; for those 
 words had been really superfluous and mislead- 
 ing (a). A statute which required witnesses before 
 an election commission to answer self- criminating 
 questions, and indemnified them against prosecu- 
 tion for the offences confessed, if the commissioners 
 certified that they had answered the questions, 
 was held not to differ substantially from an earlier 
 one, which gave the indemnity only when it was 
 certified that the answers were true. The Court 
 shrank from inferring, from the mere dissimilarity 
 of the terms of the two Acts, though the omitted 
 words were material, the improbable intention, 
 in the later one, to protect a witness who had 
 answered, indeed, in point of fact, but had answered 
 falsely or contemptuously (b). 
 
 It has, indeed, been said that, generally, statutes 
 
 (ffl) Wood, Be, L. E. 7 Ch. 302. See Earn v. Ion, 4 B. & Ad. 
 78. See also Cojpeland, Exp., 22 L. J. Bank. 17 ; and note a 
 similar omission in s. 1 of Bankruptcy Act, 1914. 
 
 (6) B. V. Eulme, sup. p. 416. See Duncan v. Tindal, 22 L. J. 
 C. P. 137 ; Hughes v. Morris, 2 De Q. M. & G. 349 ; McCalmont 
 V. Banhin, Id. 403; Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wallace, 498. See 
 sup. p. 445. 
 
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ASSOCIATED WORDS OF THE SAME KIND. 571 
 
 in pari inaterid ought to receive a uniform con- 
 struction, notwithstanding any shght variations of 
 phrase ; the ohject and intention being the same (a). 
 And it has been frequently laid down in America, 
 that the mere change of phraseology is not to be 
 deemed to alter the law (6). It would be difficult, 
 at the present time, to give countenance to the 
 doubt whether an Act which made it felony to 
 steal "horses," in the plural, applied to the steal- 
 ing of one horse, in consequence of an earlier Act 
 having made it felony to steal " any horse " in the 
 singular (c). The general language of a statute 
 which repealed one of limited operation, and re- 
 enacted its provisions in an amended form, would 
 be construed as equally limited in operation, unless 
 an intention to extend it clearly appeared (d). 
 
 SECTION IV. — ASSOCIATED WOEDS UNDEESTOOD IN A 
 COMMON SENSE. 
 
 When two words or expressions are coupled 
 together, one of which generally includes the 
 other, it is obvious that the more general term 
 is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Murray v. K I. Go., 24 E. E. 325, referring to 
 the Statutes of Limitation. 
 
 (6) Sedg. Interp. Stat. 234, 428. 
 
 (c) 2 Hale, 365 ; sup. p. 467. 
 
 (d) Per Our., Brown v. McLaeUan, L. E. 4 P. C. 543. 
 
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572 INTEBPKETATTON OF STATUTES. 
 
 Though the words "cows," " sheep," and " horses," 
 for example, standing alone, comprehend heifers, 
 lambs, and ponies respectively, they would be 
 understood as excluding them if the latter words 
 were coupled with them (a). The word " land," 
 which in its ordinary legal acceptation includes 
 buildings standing upon it, is evidently used as 
 excluding them, when it is coupled with the word 
 " buildings " (b). If after imposing a rate on 
 houses, buildings, works, tenements, and heredita- 
 ments, an Act exempted "land," this word would be 
 restricted to land unburthened with houses, build- 
 ings, or works ; which would otherwise have been 
 unnecessarily enumerated (c). In 43 Eliz. c. 2, 
 s. 1, which imposed a poor rate on the occupiers 
 of " lands," houses, tithes, and ** coal-mines," the 
 same word was similarly limited in meaning as not 
 including mines other than coal-mines (c?). The 
 
 (a) B. V. Cook, 2 East, P. C. 616 ; B. v. Loom, 1 Moo. 
 C. C. 160. 
 
 (6) See ex. gr. Bewhurst v. Feilden, 66 E. E. 696 ; Peio v. 
 West Ham, 28 L. J. M. C. 240 ; discussed and questioned by 
 Blackburn J. in B. v. Midland By. (1875), 44 L. J. M. C. 137. 
 
 (c) B. V. Midland By. Co., 4 E. & B. 958 ; Crayford v. Butter, 
 [1897] 1 Q. B. 650. 
 
 (c^) Lead Smelting Co. v. Bichardson (1762), 3 Burr. 1341 ; B. v. 
 Sedgley, 2 B. & Ad. 65 ; B. v. Cunningham, 5 East, 478 ; Morgan 
 V. Crawshay (1871), L. E. 5 H. L. 304 ; Thursby v. Briercliffe, 
 [1894] 2 Q. B. 11, [1895] A. C. 32. Comj>. Smithwark dc. 
 Water Co. v. Hampton Urban Council (1898), 68 L. J. Q. B. 207. 
 
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ASSOCIATED WORDS OF THE SAME KIND. 573 
 
 mention of one kind of mine shows that the Legis- 
 lature understood the word " land," which in law 
 comprehends all mines, as not including any. 
 
 In the same way, although the word " per- 
 son," in the abstract, includes artificial persons, 
 that is, corporations (a), the Statute of Uses 
 (27 Hen. VIII. c. 10), which enacts that when a 
 " person " stands seised of tenements to the use 
 of another " person or body corporate," the latter 
 " person or body " shall be deemed to be seised of 
 them, is understood as using the word " person " in 
 the former part of the sentence as not including a 
 body corporate. Consequently, the statute does 
 not apply where the legal seisin is in a corpora- 
 tion (b). The same construction was given, for the 
 same reason, to the same word in the Charitable 
 Uses Act, 1735, 9 Geo. II. c. 36(c). 
 
 It is in this sense that the maxim, occasionally 
 misapplied in argument (d), expressio unius est 
 exclusio alterius, finds its true application. 
 
 (a) 2 Inst. 722. See, however, Weavers Co. v. Forrest, 1 Stra. 
 1241 ; Harrisons Case, 1 Leach, 180 ; St. Leonards v. Franklin, 
 3 0. P. D. 377 ; PJiarmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial 
 Supply Assoc, 49 L. J. Q. B. 736. As to foreign corporations, 
 Ingate v. Austrian Lloyd's, 27 L. J. 0. P. 323 ; Scott v. Boyal Wax 
 Co., 1 Q. B. D. 404 ; Boyal Mail Co. v. Braham, 2 App. Gas. 381. 
 
 (6) Bao. Beading Stat. Uses, 43, 57. 
 
 (c) Eepealed except s. 5 (in part) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 42, s. 13 ; 
 Walker v. Bichardson, 6 L. J. Ex. 229. 
 
 (d) Sup. p. 548. See Feather v. B., 6 B. & S. 257 ; Eastern 
 
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574 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 When two or more words, susceptible of analo- 
 gous meaning, are coupled together, noscuntur a 
 sociis ; they are understood to be used in their cog- 
 nate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from 
 each other ; that is, the more general is restricted 
 to a sense analogous to the less general. The 
 expression, for instance, of " places of public 
 resort," assumes a very different meaning when 
 coupled with " roads and streets," from that which 
 it would have if the accompanying expression was 
 " houses " (a). In an enactment (s. 6, 23 & 24 Vict, 
 c. 27 (b)) respecting houses " for public refresh- 
 ment, resort and entertainment," the last word was 
 understood, not as a theatrical or musical or other 
 similar performance, but as something contribut- 
 ing to bodily, not mental, gratification (c). An 
 
 Archipelago Co. v. B.,1 E. & B. 310, per Cresswell J. ; London 
 Joint Stock Bank v. London {Mayor), 1 C. P. D. 117. 
 
 (as) See ex. gr. Jones, Be, 21 L. J. M. 0. 116 ; B. v. Brown, 21 
 L. J. M. C. 113 ; Freestone, Exp., 25 L. J. M. 0. 121 ; Davys v. 
 Douglas, 28 L. J. M. C. 193 ; Sewell v. Tarjlor, 29 L. J. M. G. 
 50; Case v. Storey, 38 L. J. M. C. 113; Skinner v. Usher, 41 
 L. J. M. C. 158. See also B. v. Gharlesworth, 2 L. M. & P. 
 117 ; Wilson v. Halifax, 37 L. J. Ex. 44 ; Eippins, Exp., 66 
 L. J. Q. B. 95. 
 
 (&) Sec. 6 amended 24 & 25 Vict. c. 91, ss. 8, 10. 
 
 (c) Muir V. Keay, 44 L. J. M. 0. 143. See Taylor v. Oram, 31 
 L. J. M. G. 252 ; Howes v. Ird. Bev., 45 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 46 Id. 
 15 ; but with another context " entertainment " may easily have 
 another connotation, ex. gr. See B. v. Tucker, 46 L. J. M. 0. 
 197 ; Terry v. Brighton Aquarium Co., 44 L. J. M. 0. 173 ; Beid 
 
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ASSOCIATED WOBDS OF THE SAME KIND. 575 
 
 Act (a) which exempted "magnates and noblemen" 
 from tithes, was held, on this ground, not to extend 
 to an ecclesiastical magnate, such as a dean, but 
 to apply only to magnates of a " noble " kind (6). 
 
 In the same way, s. 17, Statute of Frauds, 
 which required that contracts for the sale of 
 " goods, wares, and merchandise " for dElO or 
 upwards, should be in writing, and the Factors 
 Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39 (c), which protected certain 
 dealings of agents entrusted with the documents 
 of title of " goods and merchandise," did not 
 extend to shares or stock in companies (d), or to 
 the certificates of them (e). In each of these 
 cases, the meaning of the more general word is in 
 
 V. Wilson, 64 L. J. M. 0. 60 ; Baxter v. Langley, 38 L. J. M. C. 
 1 ; Lee v. Simpson, 16 L. J. G. P. 105 ; Lamb v. Stott, 36 So. 
 L. R. 913. 
 
 (a) 37 Hen. VIII. c. 12. 
 
 (6) Warden v. Bean of St. Paul's (1817), 4 Price, 65. 
 
 (c) Now the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, 
 s.' 4, sup. p. 511, and the Factors Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. 
 0. 45. 
 
 (d) Tempest V. Kilner, 3 C..B. 249; £owlby v. Bell, 16 L. J. 
 C. P. 18 ; Humble v.- Mitchell, 9 L. J. Q. B. 29 ; Heseltine v. 
 Siggers, 18 L. J. Ex. 166. 
 
 (e) Freeman v. Appleyard, 32 L. J. Ex. 175 See, however, 
 Evans v. Bavies, [1893] 2 Ch. 216, where shares were held to be 
 within the words " goods, wares, or merchandise " of E. S. C, 
 1883, Ord. 50, r. 2. No reference appears, however, to have 
 been made to the principle under consideration, or to the fore- 
 going authorities. 
 
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576 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a measure derived from, or at least limited by, 
 the more specific one with which it is associated. 
 The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849(a), 
 which made a fraudulent "gift, delivery, or 
 transfer " of property an act of bankruptcy (b) 
 included only such deliveries or transfers as were 
 of the nature of a gift; that is, such only as 
 alt'er the ownership of the property; but it did 
 ' not include a delivery to a bailee for safe 
 custody (c). 
 
 In the provision of the repealed Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1869, which authorised the Court to order 
 a bankrupt to set aside a sum out of his " salary 
 or income " towards payment of his debts, the 
 latter word was held to mean income of the nature 
 of salary, such as periodical payments under a 
 contract for a theatrical engagement (d), or the 
 earnings of a commercial traveller employed at 
 so much a year, terminable at a week's notice (e) ; 
 but would not apply to wages {/) ; or earnings of ^ 
 
 (a) Eepealed 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, s. 20. 
 (6) Gomp. 4 & 6 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 1 (&). 
 
 (c) Cotton V. James (1830), 35 R. E. 244;; 8 L. J. K. B. 345 ; 
 Isitt V. Beeston (1869), 38 L. J. Ex. 89. 
 
 (d) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 90 (as to existing Law, see 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 51 (2)) ; Shine, Exp., 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 253 ; Re Graydon, [1896] 1 Q. B. 417. 
 
 (e) Brindle, Exp., 56 L. T. 498. 
 
 (/) LUyd, Exp., [1891] 2 Q. B. 231. See further, Be Jones 
 inf. p. 579. 
 
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ASSOCIATED WORDS OF THE SAME KIND. 577 
 
 professional man (a). These latter statements are, 
 however, much qualified by the decision of the 
 Court of Appeal in Roberts, In re (b). 
 
 The receipt of " parochial reUef or other alms," 
 which disqualifies for the municipal franchise 
 (5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, s, 9), is confined to other 
 parochial alms, and does not include alms received 
 from a charitable institution (c). And it is now 
 provided by 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 64, s. 9 (1), that 
 " A person shall not be disqualified from being 
 registered or from voting as a parliamentary or 
 local government elector by reason that he or 
 some person for whose maintenance he is respon- 
 sible has received poor relief or other alms." The 
 ordinary marine policy which ensures against 
 arrest of "kings, princes, and people," refers, 
 under the last word, not to any collection of 
 persons, but to the governing power of a country 
 not included in the other terms with which it is 
 associated (d). 
 
 (a) Benwell, Exp., 54 L. J. Q. B. 59. See Bogers, Be, [1894] 
 1 Q. B. 425. 
 
 (6) Boberts, In re, [1900] 1 Q. B., Lindley M.E., at p. 129 ; 
 (1899), 69 L. J. Q. B. 19. 
 
 (c) B. V. Lichfield, 2 Q. B. 693. See Harrison v. Garter, 2 
 C. P. D. 26, and Cowen v. Kingston-upon-Eull, [1897] 1 Q. B. 
 273, and the cases collected therein. 
 
 (d) Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 T. E. 783. See Johnson v. Hogg, 
 10 Q. B. D. 432. See also Davidson V. Burnand, L. E. 4 C. P. 
 117 ; Ashbury Carriage Co. v. Biche, L. E. 7 H. L. 673 ; Chartered 
 
 i.s. 37 
 
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578 INTEBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 In the Thames Conservancy Act, 1857, which, 
 after empowering the conservators to license 'the 
 construction of jetties in the river, provided that 
 this should not take away any "right," claim, 
 privilege, franchise, or immunity to which the 
 occupiers of land on the banks were entitled, the 
 word "right " was limited by the associated words 
 to vested rights of property, and did not include 
 the right of navigation which the occupiers enjoyed 
 not otherwise than the public generally (a). In 
 s. 1, Prescription Act, 1832, the expression " any 
 right of common " is similarly restricted by the 
 succeeding words, " or other profit or benefit to be 
 taken and enjoyed from or upon any land," so as 
 not to include rights in gross, but only those 
 usual rights of common and profit d prendre which 
 are in some way appurtenant to the land, and 
 limited to the wants of a dominant tenement (6). 
 And in s. 2 of the same Act, relating to claims 
 by custom, prescription or grant, " to any way 
 or other easement," the only easements included 
 are those analogous to a right of way, that is, 
 rights of utility and benefit, and not merely of 
 
 Mere. Bank v. Wilson, 3 Ex. D. 108 ; Woodward v. London & N. 
 W.By. Co., Id. 121 ; Williams v. Ellis, 5 Q. B. D. 175. 
 
 (a) 20 & 21 Viet. c. cxlvii. s. 53 ; Kearns v. Gordwainers Co., 
 (1859), 28 L. J. 0. P. 285 ; discussed in Lyon v. Fishmongers Co. 
 (1876), 46 L. J. Ch. 68, at p. 75. 
 
 (6) 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71 (extended to Ireland, 21 & 22 Viet. c. 
 42) ; Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 34 L. J. C. P. 309. 
 
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ASSOCIATED WOEDS OF THE SAME KIND. 579 
 
 recreation, and amusement (a). An Act (b) which 
 made it felony to break and enter into a " dwelling, 
 shop, warehouse, or counting-house," would not 
 include a workshop, but only that kind of shop 
 which had some analogy with a warehouse ; that 
 is, one for the sale of goods (c). And a statutory 
 prohibition for the conveyance of gunpowder into a 
 mine except in a " case or canister " would prevent 
 the use of a case, such as a linen bag, which is not 
 of the same solid and substantial description as a 
 canister (d). Debentures of a company are not 
 " stock or shares " within s. 14, Judgments Act (e), 
 1838 (/), and the wages of a collier are not within 
 the meaning of the words " salary or income " of 
 s. 53 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (^), as they are 
 not " income" ejusdem generis with " salary " (h). 
 
 (a) Moumey v. Ismay, 34 L. J. Ex. 52. See Webb v. Bird, 10 
 0. B. N. S. 268 ; 13 Id. 841. 
 
 (6) 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29 (repealed 24 & 25 Vict. c. 95, 
 which see). 
 
 (e) B. V. Scmders (1839), 9 C. & P. 79. 
 
 {d) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 77, s. 23 (2) ; Foster v. DipTiwys Casson 
 Slate Go., 56 L. J. M. 0. 21. 
 
 (e) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (as to s. 14, see 57 & 58 Vict. c. 16, 
 s. 5, and Sched.). 
 
 (/) Sellar v. Bright & Go. (1904), 73 L. J. K. B. 643. 
 
 [3) Eepealed by Bankruptcy Act, 1914, as to appropriation 
 of portion of pay or salary to creditors under this latter Act, 
 see s. 51 (2). 
 
 (A) Be Jones, [1891] 2 Q. B. 231. See further, Bxp. Lloyd, 
 
 sup. p. 576, 
 
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580 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 The County Courts Act (see now s. 74, County- 
 Courts Act, 1888), in making a person subject 
 to the jurisdiction of the Court of the dis- 
 trict within which he " dwells or carries on his 
 business," included under the latter expression 
 not only a personal carrying on of business, but 
 cases where it was carried on altogether by an 
 agent (a). Sec. 6, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10, which 
 gave the Admiralty jurisdiction, when the ship- 
 owner is not domiciled in England, over any claim 
 of the owner of goods carried into any English 
 port, for damage done to them by the negligence 
 or misconduct of, or for " any breach of duty or of 
 contract " by the shipowner, master, or crew, 
 seems confined to breaches of duty or contract 
 having some analogy to what is provided in the 
 earlier part of the section ; and was therefore held 
 not to apply to the wrongful refusal of a master 
 to take a cargo to a port abroad (b). 
 
 On the same principle, an Act which prohibits 
 the "taking or destroying" the spawn of fish 
 would not include a " taking " of spawn for the 
 purpose of removing it to another bed; for the 
 word " destroying," with which " taking " is 
 associated, indicates that the taking which is 
 
 (a) Minor v. London & N. W. By. Go., 26 L. J. G. P. 39 ; 
 Shields v. Bait, 18 L. J. G. P. 120. Oomp. Be Norris, 5 
 M. B. E. 111. 
 
 (fc) The Dannehrog (1874), L. E. 4 A. & E. 386. 
 
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ASSOCIATED WOEDS OF THE SAME KIND. 581 
 
 prohibited is dishonest or mischievous {a). And 
 in an Act which made it penal to " take or kill " 
 fish without the leave of the owners of the fishery, 
 the same kind of " taking " was similarly held to 
 have been intended (6), An Act which prohibits 
 the " having or keeping " gunpowder, does not 
 apply to a person who "has" gunpowder for a 
 merely temporary purpose, as a carrier, the kind of 
 " having " intended by the Act being explained by 
 the word " keeping " with which it is associated (c). 
 So, where an Act punishes the "having in his 
 possession or conveying " anything suspected of 
 being stolen and not satisfactorily accounted for, 
 the former expression is limited by the latter, and 
 does not, therefore, apply to possession in a 
 house {d). An Act which made it felony to " cast 
 away or destroy " a ship was held not to apply to 
 a case where a ship was run aground or stranded 
 upon a rock, but was afterwards got off in a 
 
 (o) 3 Jao. I. c. 12 (repealed M & 25 Viet. e. 109, s. 39) 
 Bridger v. Bichardson, 15 R. R. 355. 
 
 (6) 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 25 (repealed 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 1) 
 B. V. MalUnson, 2 Burr. 679. 
 
 (c) 12 Geo. III. c. 61 (repealed 23 & 24 Vict. c. 139, s. 1) 
 Biggs v. Mitohell, 31 L. J. M. C. 163. See B. v. Strugnell (1865), 
 35 L. J. M. 0. 78. But see Shelley v. Bethell (1883), 12 
 Q. B. D. 11 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 16. 
 
 (d) 2 & 3 Vict. 0. 71, s. 24 ; this section is supplemental only 
 to 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, 3. 66, and is qualified thereby ; Hadley v. 
 Perks (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 444. 
 
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582 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 condition capable of being refitted (a). This rule 
 was applied to the construction of the repealed 
 Act, 1 Vict. c. 85, which made it felony " to shoot, 
 cut, stab, or wound " ; for the latter term was held 
 to be restricted, by the verbs which preceded it, 
 to injuries inflicted by an instrument ; and conse- 
 quently to bite off a finger or a nose, or to burn 
 the face with vitriol, was not to wound within the 
 meaning of the Act (6). 
 
 One phrase or clause, in the same way, some- 
 times materially limits the effect of another with 
 which it is similarly associated. Thus, an Act 
 which disgavelled lands " to all intents and 
 purposes," and then went on to make them 
 " descendible as lands at common law," was held to 
 disgavel them only for the purposes of descent (c). 
 The section of 17 Geo. III. c. 26 {d), which excepted 
 from the general provisions of the enactment any 
 " voluntary annuity granted without regard to 
 pecuniary consideration," was construed as using 
 the word " voluntary," not in its usual legal sense, 
 as without consideration, but as without pecuniary 
 consideration {e). 
 
 (a) De Londo's Case (1765), 2 East, P. C. 1098. 
 
 (b) B. V. Harris, 7 C. & P. 446; B. v. Stevens, 1 Moo. C. G. 
 409 ; B. V. Murrovi, Id. 456 ; B. v. Jenning's Case, 2 Lewin C. C. 
 130. See B. v. Waudby (1895), 64 L. J. M. C. 251. 
 
 (c) Wiseman v. Cotton, 1 Lev. 79. 
 
 (d) Eepealed by S. L. E., 1861. 
 
 (e) Grespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. E. 790. See Blake v. Attersoll, 
 2 B. & C. 875 ; Evatt v. Hunt, 22 L. J. Q. B. 348. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WORDS. 583 
 
 SECTION V. — GENERIC WORDS FOLLOWING MORE 
 SPECIFIC. 
 
 It is, however, the use of a general word follow- 
 ing (a) one or more less general terms ejusdem 
 generis, which affords the most frequent illustration 
 of the rule under consideration. Generi per speciem 
 derogatur. In the abstract, general words, like all 
 others, receive their full and natural meaning 
 though they should not be extended so as to 
 confine matters to which they are obviously not 
 germane. Thus, as an example of the above 
 general proposition, s. 3, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, 
 which limits the time for suing " upon any bond or 
 other specialty," comprehends under the last expres- 
 sion every kind of specialty, including a statute {b). 
 In such and cognate cases, the general principle 
 applies, that the terms are to receive their plain 
 and ordinary meaning ; and Courts are not at 
 liberty to impose on them limitations not called 
 for by the sense, or the objects or mischief of the 
 enactment (c). 
 
 But the general word which follows particular 
 and specific words of the same nature as itself 
 
 (o) Not preceding. See ex. gr. King v. Oeorge, 5 Oh. D. 627. 
 
 (6) Gorh & Bandon By. Co. v. Goode, 22 L. J. C. P. 198; 
 discussed and distinguished in Thomson v. Glanmorris (Lord) 
 (1900), 69 L. J. Oh. 337. 
 
 (c) Per Cur., U. S. v. Goombs, 12 Peters, 80. 
 
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584 INTERPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to 
 be restricted to the same genus as those words (a) : 
 or, in other words, as comprehending only things 
 of the same kind as those designated by them; 
 unless, of course, there be something to show that 
 a wider sense was intended. 
 
 Thus s. 43 of the Customs Laws Consolidation 
 Act, 1876, which provides that "the importation 
 of arms, ammunition, gunpowder or any other 
 goods may be prohibited by proclamation in Order 
 in Council," obviously relates only to goods of a 
 like character or description to those specifically 
 mentioned — and not to other things of an entirely 
 different description. 
 
 The Sunday Observance Act, 1677 (29 Car. II. 
 c. 7), which enacts that " no tradesman, artificer, 
 workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever, 
 shaU do or exercise any labour, business, or 
 work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's 
 Day," has been held not to iaclude a coach 
 proprietor (6), a farmer (c), a barber (d), and possibly 
 a solicitor (e) ; the word " person " being confined 
 to followers of callings like those specified by 
 
 (a) See per Willes J., Fenwich v. Sehmah, L. E. 3 C. P. 313. 
 (6) Sandiman v. Breach, 31 E. E. 169. 
 
 (c) B. V. Cleworth, 4 B. & S. 927, nom. B. v. Silvester, 33 
 L. J. M. 0. 79. 
 
 (d) Palmer v. Snow, [1900] 1 Q. B. 725. 
 
 (e) Peate v. Dickin, 4 L. J. Ex. 28. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WOEDS. 585 
 
 the preceding words. For a similar reason, the 
 20 G-eo. II. 0. 19 (a), which empowered justices to 
 determine differences between masters and " ser- 
 vants in husbandry, artificers, handicraftsmen," 
 and persons in some other specific employments, 
 and " all other labourers," did not include a 
 domestic servant (b), or a man employed to take 
 care of goods seized under a writ (c) ; for though 
 in the abstract they may be " labourers " their 
 employments have no analogy with those specified. 
 It would include, however, a man who contracted 
 to work by the piece, not by the day, provided the 
 relation of master and servant existed (d). 
 
 The Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (e), which 
 entitled a district surveyor " or other person," to 
 a month's notice of action for anything done under 
 the Act, was held, on this principle, not to give 
 that privilege to every person sued, but to give 
 
 (a) Eepealed, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, s. 17. 
 
 {&) Kitchen v. Shaw, 6 A. & B. 729. Comp. Exp. Hughes, 28 
 L. J. M. C. 138 ; Dmies v. Berwick, 30 L. J. M. C. 84 ; Morgan, 
 V. London Gen. Omnibus Co., 13 Q. B. D. 842. See, however, the 
 concluding observations of Fry L.J. in Bound v. Lawrence, 
 [1892] 1 Q. B. 226. See also Gooh v. North Metrop. Tramways 
 Co., 18 Q. B. D. 683. 
 
 (c) Branwell v. Pennech, 7 B. & C. 536. 
 
 (d) iow<Aerv.i?ad«or, 8, East, 113; comp. Lancaster v. Greaves, 
 9 B. & 0. 628; Exp. Johnson, 7 Dowl. 702; B. v. Heywood, 
 1 M. & S. 624. See also Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. D. 45. 
 
 (e) Eepealed, 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii., s. 215, Sched. 4. 
 
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586 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 it only to persons ejusdem generis with a district 
 surveyor ; that is, having an official duty {a). An 
 Act which empowers Quarter Sessions to order 
 the treasurer of "the county, riding, division, or 
 place" to pay costs, only applies to a "place" 
 ejusdem generis with " county, riding, division," 
 that is a place having a separate Court of Quarter 
 Sessions (i). And s. 75, Larceny Act, 1861 (now 
 ss. 19-22, Larceny Act, 1916), which made it a 
 misdemeanour for any "hanker, merchant, broker, 
 attorney, or other agent " to convert to his own 
 use any valuable security entrusted to him for 
 any special purpose, was held not under the words 
 " or other agent " to include any ordinary agent 
 who may from time to time be entrusted with 
 valuable securities, but only persons whose occupa- 
 tion is similar to those specifically enumerated (c). 
 
 (a) Williams v. Golding, L. E. 1 0. P. 69. Comp. Newton v. 
 Mlis, 24 L. J. Q. B. 337. See contra Driffield Go. v. Waterloo 
 Co., 31 Oh. D. 638. As to the existmg law relating " to notice," 
 see Public Authorities Protection Actj 1893, and see s. 216 of 
 57 & 58 Vict. c. coxiii. as to continuance of provisions in 
 preceding London Buildings Acts until specifically revoked. 
 
 (6) Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 9. So much of 
 this section as relates to costs is repealed by 8 Edw. VII. c. 15, 
 s. 10, and Sched. As to existing law, see s. 3, Costs in Criminal 
 Cases Act, 1908 ; B. v. West Biding JJ., [1900] 1 Q. B. 291. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75 of the Larceny Act, 1861, is 
 repealed and re-enacted in an amplified form by 1 Edw. VII. 
 c. 10 ; B. V. Portugal, 16 Q. B. D. 487 ; B. v. Prince, 2 0. & P. 
 517 ; B. V. Kane, 70 L. J. K. B. 143. 
 
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GENBKIO POLLOWma SPECIFIC WORDS. 587 
 
 In an Act imposing a penalty on unqualified 
 persons navigating " any wherry, lighter, or other 
 craft," the last word would include only vessels 
 of the same kind as wherries and Ughters, not 
 steam tugs which carried neither passengers nor 
 goods (a). But the same word would be more 
 comprehensive if it had followed " boats and 
 vessels " (b). A prohibition against deducting from 
 an artificer's wages any part of them " for frame 
 rent and standing, or other charges," would not 
 include, under the last word, a fine incurred for 
 breach of agreement (c). 
 
 The Distress for Eent Act, 1737 (11 Geo. II. 
 0. 19), which by s. 8 authorises the distress for rent 
 of " corn, grass, or other product " growing on the 
 demised lands, includes only products similar to 
 grass and corn ; but not young trees, which, though 
 unquestionably products of the land, are of a 
 different character from the products specified by 
 the earher terms (d). For the same reason, young 
 trees are not included in the Act which punishes 
 
 (a) 7 & 8 Geo. IV. o. Ixxv., s. 37 ; Seed v. Ingham (1854), 23 
 L. J. M. 0. 156. The words "any Cathedral, Collegiate, 
 Chapter, or other Schools " in the proviso at the end of s. 62 of 
 the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 137 (partly 
 repealed by S. L. E., 1875), were similarly construed in StoeJe- 
 ■port Schools, Be (1898), 68 L. J. Ch. 41. 
 
 (6) Tisdell v. Gombe, 7 A. & B. 788. 
 
 (c) Willis V. Thorp, 44 L. J. Q. B. 137. 
 
 (d) Clark V. Oaskarth (1818), 8 Taunt. 431. 
 
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588 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the stealing of " any plant, root, fruit, or vegetable 
 production growing in a garden, orchard, nursery- 
 ground, hothouse or conservatory " (a). 
 
 An Act which prohibited playing or betting in 
 the streets "at or with any table or instrument of 
 gaming," would not include, under the last general 
 words, half-pence used for tossing for money (&). 
 A by-law which imposed a penalty for causing an 
 obstruction in the street in various specified ways, 
 all of a temporary character, or otherwise causing 
 or committing " any other obstruction, nuisance, 
 or annoyance " in any of the streets, was held not 
 to include, under the latter words, any obstruction 
 which was not of a temporary character (c). 
 
 The enactment which prohibited the establish- 
 ment, without license, of " the business of a blood 
 boiler, bone boiler, feUmonger, slaughterer of cattle, 
 horses, or animals of any description, soap boiler, 
 tallow melter, tripe boiler, or other noxious or 
 offensive business, trade, or manufacture," was 
 held not to include under the final general terms 
 any employments not connected, as aU the specified 
 
 (a) B. V. Eodges, 1 Moo. & IM. 341. See BadmrsUre Bd. 
 V. EvauB, 32 L. J. M. C. 100 ; Smith v. Barnham, 1 Ex. D. 419. 
 
 (6) Watson v. Martin, 34 L. J. M. 0. 50, rectified by 36 & 37 
 Vict. c. 38, s. 3 ; Eirst v. Moleshury, L. E. 6 Q. B. 130. Comp. 
 B. V. O'Connor, 15 Cox C. C. 3. See further, Toilet v. Thomas, 
 24 L. T. 608. 
 
 (c) B. V. Dickenson, 26 L. J. M. 0. 204. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPBOIPIO WOBDS. 589 
 
 trades were, with animal matter ; and so did not 
 reacli brick-making (a), nor a small-pox hospital (6). 
 
 A fishing net with an illegally small mesh is not 
 an " instrument " within the Salmon Fishery Acts, 
 which prohibit the use of " any otter lath, or jack, 
 wire or snare, spear, gaff, strokehall, snatch, or 
 other like instrument for the purpose of catching 
 salmon "(c). 
 
 A bill of sale, by the yearly tenant of a dwelling- 
 house, of all the household goods, furniture, and 
 other household effects in and about the dwelling- 
 house, " and all other the personal estate whatso- 
 ever," of the assignor, was held not to pass his 
 term or interest in the house (d). So, a Will, 
 which, after enumerating in a bequest furniture, 
 plate, linen, china, and pictures, added " aU other 
 goods, chattels, and effects which shall be in the 
 house " at the time of the testator's death, did 
 not include a sum of money then in the house (e). 
 
 (a) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 64, repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, 
 s. 343, Sched. V., pt. III. ; Wanstead Board v. Hill (1863), 32 
 L. J. M. C. 135. 
 
 (h) 38 & 39 Vict. e. 55, s. 112 ; WitUngton L. Bd. v. Manchester 
 Corp. (1893), 62 L. J. Ch. 393. Gomp. Metropolitan Asylums 
 District v. Eill, 50 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; Passey v. Oxford, 43 J. P. 622. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, s. 8 ; amended by 36 & 37 Vict. c. 
 71, S. 18 ; Jones v. Barnes, 67 L. J. Q. B. 294. 
 
 (d) Harrison v. Blackburn, 34 L. J. C. P. 109. Camp. 
 Binger v. Cann, 7 L. J. Ex. 108. 
 
 (e) Gibbs v. Lawrence (1860), 30 L. J. Ch. 170. Discussed in 
 
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590 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 And the rules of an industrial society, established 
 to carry on the business of general dealers, farmers, 
 and manufacturers, which provided that the profits 
 of the business should be applied either to increase 
 the capital, reserve fund, or business of the society, 
 " or to any lawful purpose," and that the remainder, 
 less any grant that might be made for educational 
 purposes, should be divided among the members, 
 have been held not to authorise a subscription to 
 a strike fund, that not being a lawful purpose 
 ^usdem generis with increasing the capital, reserve 
 fund, or business of the society (a). 
 
 An Act (h) which gives a vote to the occupier of 
 a "house, warehouse, counting-house, shop, or 
 other building," includes, in the latter term, 
 only buildings which, Kke those specifically men- 
 tioned, are of some permanence and utility, and 
 contribute to the beneficial occupation of the 
 land, increasing thereby its value (c). The words 
 
 MacPhail v. Phillips, [1904] 1 Ir. E., at p. 159 ; Bridgeman v. 
 Fitzgerald, 50 L. J. Oh. 9. See also Manton v. Tdbois, 54 L. J. Oh. 
 1008. See, however, Anderson v. Anderson, 64 L. J. Q. B. 457. 
 
 (a) Warhurton v. Huddersfield Industrial Socy., [1892] 1 Q. B. 
 817. As to obligatory Eules and Amendments, see 56 & 57 
 Vict. c. 39, s. 10, and Sched. II. 
 
 (6) 2 & 3 Will. rV. c. 45, s. 27, repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. V. 
 c. 64, s. 47, and Sched. VIII., which Act see. 
 
 (c) Powell V. Boraston (1864), 34 L. J. 0. P. 73. See also 
 Morish v. Harris, L. E. 1 C. P. 155. Gomp. Hodgson v. Jex, 
 2 Oh. D. 122 ; Chapman v. Chapman, 4 Id. 800. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WORDS. 591 
 
 "tenements and hereditaments," which, in their 
 technical sense, embrace not only every species of 
 right connected with land, such as rents, tithe, 
 rights of common, seignorial rights, but also offices, 
 have been confined to habitable structures, when 
 coupled with and following such words as " houses, 
 warehouses, and shops " (a). Where an Act (b) 
 authorised the poUce to enter any house or room 
 used for stage plays, and imposed a penalty for 
 keeping any house or other " tenement " as an 
 unlicensed theatre ; it was held that the word 
 " tenement " was confined in meaning to some- 
 thing of the same character as " house " or 
 " room," and so did not include a portable booth, 
 consisting of two waggons joined together, and 
 used as a theatre by strolling players (c). 
 
 Sec. 33, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 90, which enacted 
 that the owners of " houses, buildings, and property 
 other than land," rateable to the poor, should be 
 rated at thrice the rate imposed on the owners of 
 land, was held confined to that kind of " property 
 other than land," which was ejusdem generis with 
 " houses and buildings," and that a railway, a 
 
 (o) B. V. Manchester Waterworks Co., 1 B. & 0. 630 ; B. v. 
 East London Waterworks Co., 21 L. J. M. 0. 49. See also Chelsea 
 Waterworks v. Bowley, 20 L. J. Q. B. 520 ; Metrop. By. v. Fowler, 
 [1893] A. G. 416; B. v. Neville, 15 L. J. M. G. 33. 
 
 (6) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 46. 
 
 (c) Fredericks v. Howie (1862), 31 L. J. M. G. 249 ; Bay v. 
 Simpson (1865), 34 L. J. M. G. 149, sup. p. 211. 
 
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592 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 canal, with its towing-paths, and a dry dock lined 
 with masonry, which were its accessories, were not 
 comprised in the expression, but were rateable as 
 land (a). On the same principle, s. 79, Companies 
 Act 1862 (repealed by s. 129, Companies (ConsoKda- 
 tion) Act, 1908), which provides that a company 
 may be wound up by the Court of Chancery when 
 the company passes a resolution in favour of that 
 course, or does not begin business within a year, 
 or its members are reduced to less than seven, 
 or when the Court thinks a windiag-up "just 
 and equitable," empowers the Court by these 
 last general words to wind up only when it is 
 just and equitable on grounds analogous to those 
 preoedingly stated (6). 
 
 Of course, the restricted meaning, which primarily 
 attaches to the general word in such circumstances, 
 is rejected when there are adequate grounds to 
 
 (a) B. V. Neath, (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 707 ; B. v. Midland By. 
 Co. (1875), 44 L. J. M. C. 137. Gomp. B. v. Midland By. Co. 
 (1855), 4 E. & B. 958. 
 
 (6) Spademan's Case (1849), 1 McN. & G. 170 ; Anglo-Oreeh 
 Steam Co., Be (1866), L. E. 2 Eq. 1 ; Langham Bink Co., Be, 46 
 L. J. Ch. 345. See, however, inter alia, Suburban Hotel Co., Be 
 (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 710; German Bate Coffee Co., Be, 51 
 L. J. Ch. 564 ; CMc Urn, Be, 74 L. J. Ch. 597 ; Melson, Be, 75 
 L. J. Ch. 509 ; Crigglestone Co., Be, 75 L. J. Ch. 662 ; Stephens 
 V. Mysore Beefs Mining Co. (1902), 71 L. J. Ch. 295 ; Symington, 
 Be, 43 Sc. L. E. 157. See under the Apportionment Act, 1870, 
 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, Cox's Trusts, Be, 47 L. J. Ch. 735. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WOEDS. 593 
 
 show that it was not used in the limited order of 
 ideas to which its predecessors belong. . If it 
 can be seen from a wider inspection of the scope 
 of the legislation that the general words, notwith- 
 standing that they follow particular words, are 
 nevertheless to be construed generally, effect 
 must be given to the intention of the Legislature 
 as gathered from the larger survey. Upon this 
 principle it has been held that, having regard to 
 the object of s. 32, Patents, Designs, and Trade 
 Marks Act, 1883 (repealed, s. 36, Patents and 
 Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII. c. 29), as seen on a 
 consideration of the whole section, and the law 
 existing at the time of its enactment, in construing 
 the reference to threats of legal proceedings " by 
 circulars, advertisements, or otherwise," which it 
 contains, the words " or otherwise " are not to be 
 restricted to threats by measures ejusdem generis 
 with circulars or advertisements, but are to be 
 regarded as extending the previous words, so as 
 absolutely to prohibit any threats whatever of 
 legal proceedings by a patentee for the infringe- 
 ment of his patent, unless they are followed up 
 speedily by an action (a). And where an inspector 
 
 (a) Skirmer & Go. v. Shew & Go. (1892), 62 L. J. Ch. 196, 
 distinguished in Beven v. Welshach Incandescent Gas Light Go., 
 [1902] 20 E. P. C. 69, p. 73. As to what constitutes a threat of 
 proceedings, see Diamond Goal Gutter Go. v. Mining Appliances Go., 
 [1915] W. N. 340. 
 
 LS. 38 
 
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594 INTBRPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of nuisances was authorised to inspect articles of 
 food jieposited in " any place " for sale, and a 
 penalty was imposed on persons who prevented 
 him from entering any " slaughter-house, shop, 
 building, market, or other place," where any 
 carcase was deposited for sale ; it was held that 
 the latter word was not confined to places ejusdem 
 generis with those which preceded it. The earlier 
 passage, giving authority to enter " any place," 
 obviously required that the same word should 
 receive an equally extensive meaning in the sub- 
 sequent passage {a). Sec. 53, Public Health Act, 
 1848(6), which imposed a penalty for making 
 any " sewer, drain, privy, 'cesspool, ashpit, build- 
 ing, or other work, contrary to the provisions of 
 the Act," included, under the word " building," 
 not only constructions of a character similar to 
 those previously mentioned, but also dwelling- 
 houses (c). And where a special Act passed in 
 1767 authorised the owner of a bridge to take 
 a toll on " every coach, chariot, berlin, hearse, 
 chaise, chair, cabash, wagon, wain, dray, cart, 
 car, or other carriage whatsoever," the ejusdem 
 generis principle was not applied, and, on the ground 
 
 (a) Young v. Orattridge, L. E. 4 Q. B. 166. See also Harris v. 
 Jenns, 30 L. J. M. C. 183. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 343, Sehed. V., pt. 3. 
 ' (c) Pearson v. Kingston (1865), 35 L. J. M. 0. 36. See 
 Moriih V. Harris, 35 L. J. 0. P. 101. 
 
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GBNERIO FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WORDS. 595 
 
 that the Legislature intended every vehicle passing 
 over the bridge to pay toll, a bicycle was held to 
 be a " carriage " within the Act (a). 
 
 When justices, empowered to prepare a standard 
 for an equal county rate, were authorised for this 
 purpose to direct overseers, assessors of rates, and 
 other persons having the management of the rates 
 or valuations, to make returns of the annual value 
 of the property in the parish, and to require " the 
 said overseers, assessors, collectors, and any other 
 persons whomsoever," to produce parochial and 
 other rates and valuations, " and other documents 
 in their custody or power," the context showed 
 that the final generic expression was not confined 
 to official, but extended to private, persons (b). 
 So, where an Act imposed a rate on a variety 
 of tenements and buildings which were enume- 
 rated, and on " other buildings and hereditaments, 
 meadow and pasture excepted," the exception 
 appended to the concluding general words showed 
 that the latter were used in their widest sense, 
 and were not limited in meaning by the particular 
 terms which preceded them (c). 
 
 (a) Carman v. Abingdon (1900), 69 L. J. Q. B. 517. Gomp. 
 Plymouth Tramway Co. v. General Tolls Go., 75 L. T. 467. But 
 see Simpson v. Teignmouth Bridge Go., 72 L. J. K. B. 204 ; Smith 
 V. Kynnersley, 72 L. J. K. B. 357. 
 
 (&) B. V. Douhleday, 3 B. & B. 601. 
 
 (c) B. y. Shrewsbury Gas Go., 1 L. J. M. G. 18. 
 
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596 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Further, the general principle in question applies 
 only where the specific words are all of the same 
 nature. Where they are of different genera, the 
 meaning of the general word remains unaffected 
 by its connection with them. Thus, where an 
 Act made it penal to convey to a prisoner, in 
 order to facilitate his escape, " any mask, dress, or 
 disguise, or any letter, or any other article or 
 thing," it was held that the last general terms 
 were to be understood in their primary and wide 
 meaning, and as including any article or thing 
 whatsoever which could in any manner facilitate 
 the escape of a prisoner, such as a crowbar (a). 
 Here, the several particular words " disguise " 
 and " letter," exhausted the whole genera ; and 
 the last general words must be understood, there- 
 fore, as referring to other genera. 
 
 The general object of the Act, also, sometimes 
 requires that the final generic word shall not be 
 restricted in meaning by its predecessors. Thus, 
 17 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 10, which, after reciting that 
 stolen materials used in certain manufactures 
 were often concealed in the possession of persons 
 who had received them with guilty knowledge, 
 and that the discovery and conviction of the 
 offenders was in consequence difficult, proceeded 
 to authorise justices to issue search warrants for 
 
 (a) B. V. Payne, 35 L. J. M. C. 170. See also ShUlito v. 
 Thompson, 1 Q. B. D. 12. 
 
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GENERIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WOEDS. 597 
 
 purloined materials suspected to be concealed "in 
 any dweUing-house, outhouse, yard, garden, or 
 other place," was held to include, under the last 
 word, a warehouse which was a mile and a half 
 from the dwelling-house (a). Though such a 
 warehouse would probably not be usually con- 
 sidered as ejusdem generis with a " dwelling-house," 
 coupled with its enumerated dependencies, it was 
 reasonable, having regard to the preamble and 
 the general object of the statute, to think that 
 the warehouse was within the contemplation of the 
 Legislatm-e, as it was a very likely place for the 
 concealment against which the enactment was 
 directed ; and a narrower construction would have 
 restricted the effect, instead of promoting the 
 object of the Act. The requirement of s. 32, 
 
 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76(&), that municipal voting 
 papers should be signed by the voter, and state 
 the name of the " street, lane, or place," in which 
 the property was situated in respect of which he 
 claimed to vote, was considered satisfied by a 
 statement of the parish where the property lay; 
 the object of the provision being, apparently, the 
 identification of the voter (c). 
 
 Several decisions on a recent enactment are 
 
 (a) B. V. Edmundson (1859), 28 L. J. M. 0. 213. 
 
 (6) Eepealed by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 5. 
 
 (c) Per Lord Campbell and Grompton J., B. v. Spratley, 
 
 6 E. & B. 363. See Lowiher v. Beniinck, L. E. 19 Bq. 166. 
 
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598 INTBRPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 instructive examples of the application of the 
 above-mentioned rules, as to the effect of words of 
 analogous meaning on each other, and of specific 
 words on the more general one, which closes the 
 enumeration of them ; as well as of their subordi- 
 nation to the more general principle of gathering 
 the intention from a review of the whole enact- 
 ment, and giving effect to its paramount object. 
 The 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 6, after reciting that a 
 kind of gaming had lately sprung up, to the de- 
 moralisation of improvident persons, by opening 
 places called betting-houses or offices, enacts, for 
 the better suppression of them, that any person who, 
 being " the owner or occupier of any house, office, 
 room, or place," should " open, keep, or use," or 
 " knowingly permit " it to be used for the purposes 
 of betting, should be liable to a penalty of £50, and 
 to an action for the recovery of any deposit made 
 with him in respect of the bet. The Exchequer 
 Chamber held that a man who habitually resorted 
 to a certain spot under a tree in Hyde Park, and 
 there made bets, was not the "occupier" of the 
 place within the meaning of the Act, as that 
 expression derived a meaning from the one with 
 which it was coupled, which implied some legal 
 and exclusive title to the place (a). Again, where 
 the owners of a racecourse knowingly permitted the 
 
 (o) Doggett v. Catterns (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 159. See also 
 Thwaites v. Ooulthwaite (1896), 65 L. J. Oh. 238. 
 
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GENEBIC FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WOBDS. 599 
 
 public, on the payment of an entrance fee, to enter 
 an uncovered enclosure adjacent to a racecourse 
 "where race meetings "wer.e held, most of whom 
 went for the purpose of backing horses with book- 
 makers, who were admitted on the same terms as 
 the public, and had no special rights in the 
 enclosure, the House of Lords held that the 
 enclosure so used was not " a place opened, kept 
 or used for betting with persons resorting thereto " 
 within the Act (a). But a temporary wooden 
 structure, erected on a piece of ground rented by 
 the person who used it for betting purposes, though 
 unroofed and not fixed to the soil, was held to 
 be a " place " within the Act (b) ; and in another 
 case, a man who carried on the same business, 
 standing on a stool sheltered under a large um- 
 brella on which was printed an indication of the 
 business, was held to be the "occupier of a 
 place " within the Act ; as he had in fact appro- 
 priated it for his proceedings, though he paid 
 no rent and had no greater right to stand on 
 the spot than any others of the public who were 
 admitted (c). In order that a case may come 
 
 (a) Powell V. Kempton Bacecourse Co. (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 392. 
 
 (6) Shaw V. Morley, 37 L. J. M. C. 105. 
 
 (c) Bows V. Fenwick (1874), 43 L. J. M. 0. 107, approved 
 in Powell v. Kempton Bacecourse Go., sup. ; and applied in 
 Thwaites v. Cmlthwaite (1896), 65 L. J. Oh. 238. See similar 
 
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600 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 within s. 1 of this Act, it is not necessary that 
 the receipt of the money should take place at 
 the house, or oflSce, or even within the United 
 Kingdom (a). 
 
 Analogous to the rules above considered is 
 another, that when words descriptive of the rank 
 of persons or things are used in a descending order 
 according to rank, the general words superadded 
 to them do not include (though standing alone 
 they would do so) persons or things of a higher 
 rank or importance than the highest named, if 
 there be any lower species to which they can apply. 
 In such a case, the general word is taken not as 
 generic, but as including only what is lower in 
 the genus than the lowest specified. Thus, s. 3, 
 13 Eliz. c. 10, which avoided conveyances by 
 masters and fellows of colleges, deans and chapters 
 
 cases Galloway v. Maries, 51 L. J. M. 0. 53, criticised in Powell 
 V. Kempton Bacecourse Co., sup. p. 599 ; Liddell v. Lofthouse, '65 
 L. J. M. G. 64; M'Inany v. Hildreth, 66 L. J. Q. B. 376 ; B. v. 
 Humphreys, 67 L. J. Q. B. 534 ; Brown v. Patch, [1899] 1 Q. B. 
 892 ; Belton v. Bushy, 68 L. J. Q. B. 859 ; Tromans v. Eodhinson, 
 72 L. J. K. B. 21 ; B. v. Deaville, Id. 272. See also, in con- 
 nection with similar enactments, Langrish v. Archer, 52 L. J. 
 M. 0. 47 ; Taylor v. Smetten, 52 L. J. M. C. 101. 
 
 (a) Lennox v. Stoddart (1902), 71 L. J. K. B. 747. It should 
 be noted that s. 5 of the Betting Act, 1853, is not impliedly 
 repealed by s. 1 of the Gaming Act, 1892. See Lennox v. 
 Stoddart. 
 
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WORDS OP RANK IN DESCENDING ORDER. 601 
 
 of cathedrals, parsons, vicars, and " others having 
 any spiritual or ecclesiastical living," does not 
 include bishops {a). 
 
 Chap. 28, Statutes of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III., 
 which gave a right of action in certain cases to 
 " abbots, priors, and other prelates of the Church," 
 did not, according to Lord Coke, include bishops ; 
 because, among other reasons, the bishop is of a 
 higher degree than an abbot (b). It may be pre- 
 sumed that there were prelates of a lower degree 
 than abbots and priors, otherwise the generic 
 expression so construed would have been without 
 effect. To avoid this the rule in question would 
 be rejected, and the general term would receive 
 its fuU and natural meaning, and include the 
 higher denominations (c). Duties imposed, under 
 the general head of " metals " upon " copper, 
 brass, pewter, and tin, and on all other metals not 
 enumerated," would not include the higher metals 
 of gold or silver, which are commonly known as 
 precious metals (d). 
 
 The 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 25 (e), which empowered 
 the lords of " manors and other royalties " to 
 
 (a) ArcKbp. of Canterbury's Case, 2 Eep. 46b; Copland v. 
 Powell, 1 Bing. 373 ; Cope v. Barber, L. E. 7 0. P. 393. - 
 
 (b) 2 Inst. 151, 457, 478 ; 2 Eep. 46b. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 137. 
 
 {d) Casher v. Eolmes (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 692, per Parke J. 
 (e) Eepealed by 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 1. 
 
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602 INTBEPRBTATION OF 'STATUTES. 
 
 grant a deputation to a gamekeeper, was limited to 
 the lords of such royalties as are inferior to manors ; 
 for if a royalty of a higher nature had been meant, 
 it would have preceded the term "manor" (a). 
 
 2 Westm. c. 47, which prohibited salmon-fish- 
 ing from Lady-day to St. Martin's, in "the waters 
 of the Humber, Owse, Trent, Done, Arre, Dere- 
 went, Wherfe, Nid, Yore, Swale, Tese, Tine, 
 Eden, and all other waters wherein salmons be 
 taken," was considered as including, in the final 
 general expression, only rivers inferior to those 
 enumerated, and therefore as not comprising nobile 
 illud fiiimen, the Thames {h). It does not appear 
 whether the rivers specified were named in order 
 of descending importance. An Act (since repealed) 
 which punished cruelty to any " horse, mare, 
 gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, sheep, or other 
 cattle," was held not to include a bull (c). 
 
 It was, indeed, once thought that in 14 Geo. II. 
 c. 6(c?), which made it a capital felony to steal 
 sheep or "other cattle," this last expression was 
 " much too loose " to include any other cattle 
 than those already specified, viz,, sheep, but this 
 
 (a) Aileshury v. Pattison, 1 Doug. 28. See also Evans v. 
 Stevens (1791), 4. T. E. 224, 469. 
 (5) 2 Inst. 478. 
 
 (c) 3 Geo. rv. c. 71; Hill, Hxp. (1827), 33 E. E. 664; 3 
 Car. & P. 225. 
 
 (d) Eepealed 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1. 
 
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WORDS OP RANK IN DESCENDING ORDER. 603 
 
 extreme strictness of construction may be, perhaps, 
 best attributed to the excessive severity of the 
 law in question {a). 
 
 A statute which spoke of indictments before 
 justices of the peace and "others having power 
 to take indictments," was understood, on the 
 general ground under consideration, as not apply- 
 ing to the Superior Courts (&). But 11 & 12 Vict. 
 c. 42 (c), which authorises justices of the peace to 
 inquire into indictable offences committed on the 
 high seas or abroad, and to bind the witnesses to 
 appear at the next " court of Oyer and Terminer, 
 or jail delivery, or superior court of a County 
 Palatine, or the Quarter Sessions," would authorise 
 a justice to hold an inquiry into an offence com- 
 mitted by a Colonial Governor in his colony, 
 which is triable by the Queen's Bench. That 
 court was included in the words, " court of Oyer 
 and Terminer " (d). 
 
 SECTION VI. MEANING OF SOME PARTICULAR 
 
 EXPRESSIONS. 
 
 It may be convenient to mention, in conclusion, 
 the meaning in which a few words and expressions 
 
 (o) 1 Bl. Coram. 88. Comp. Child v. Hearn, L. B. 9 Ex. 
 176 ; Fletcher v. Sondes, 30 E. E. 32 ; B. v. Paty, 2 W. Bl. 721 ; 
 Wright V. Pearson, L. E. 4 Q. B. 682. 
 
 (6) 2 Eep. 46b. (c) Sees. 1 (1) and 2. 
 
 {d) B. V. Eyre (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 487. 
 
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604 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 in frequent use in statutes are, in general, under- 
 stood. 
 
 Unless the contrary intention appears, in 
 statutes passed after 1850, words importing the 
 masculine gender include females, the singular 
 includes the plural, and the plural the singular; 
 the expression " person " a " body corporate " (a) ; 
 the word " county " means also county of a town 
 or of a city ; the word " land " includes messuages, 
 tenements, and hereditaments, houses, and build- 
 ings of any tenure ; the words " oath," " swear," 
 and " affidavit," include affirmation, declaration, 
 affirming and declaring, in the case of persons 
 by law allowed to declare or affirm, instead of 
 swearing ; and the word " month " means calendar 
 month (6). But "six months" may sometimes 
 mean the period between two feast days, as 
 between Michaelmas and Lady-day (c). Half a 
 year consists of 182, and a quarter of a year of 91, 
 days (d). 
 
 Expressions of time in an Act of Parliament 
 mean (unless it is otherwise specifically stated) 
 
 (a) Mouselly. L. & N. W. By. Co., [1917] 2 K. B., at p. 842. 
 (6) Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. e. 63, ss. 1, 3, 4. 
 
 (c) See Morgan v. Davies, 3 C. P. D. 260. See, however, 
 generally. Walker v. Constable, 8 Wils. 25 ; Sogers v. Hull Dock 
 Co., 34 L. J. Oh. 165 ; Wilkinson v. Calvert, 47 L. J. C. P. 679 ; 
 Barlow v. Teal, 54 L. J. Q. B. 400. 
 
 (d) Co. Litt. 135b ; 6 Eep. 61b ; Cro. Jac. 167. 
 
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COMPUTATION OF TIME. 605 
 
 in Great Britain, Greenwich mean time, and in 
 Ireland, Dublin mean time (a). But " statutory 
 time " in summer is one hour in advance of 
 Greenwich mean time (6). In the computation 
 of time, distinctions haye been made by the 
 Courts which were founded chiefly on considera- 
 tions of convenience and justice. The general 
 rule, anciently, seems to have been that both terms 
 or endings of the period given for doing or suffering 
 something were included ; but when a penalty or 
 forfeiture was involved in non-compliance with 
 a condition within the given time, the time was 
 reckoned by including one and excluding the 
 other of the terminal days (c). A distinction was 
 afterwards made, depending on whether the point 
 from which the computation was to be made was 
 an act to which the person against whom the time 
 ran, was privy or not. Thus, if the time ran 
 " from " when he was arrested, or received a 
 notice of action, it might justly be computed as 
 including the day of that event ; but not so, if it 
 ran from the death of another person (d) ; a fact 
 
 (a) 43 & 4i Vict. c. 9. 
 
 (&) 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 14 ; 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 45. These pro- 
 visions as to time have been extended by Order in Council to 
 the Isle of Man. 
 
 (c) De Morgan, Oomp. Aim. cited in Sir G. 0. Lewis' Obs. 
 and Eeas. in Politics, vol. I. 387 n. 
 
 (d) Per Sir W. Grant, Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 253 ; per 
 Parke B., Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 53 ; Newman v. HardwicJce, 
 
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606 INTEBPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of which he would not, as in the previous cases, 
 necessarily be cognisant, or, in other words, in such 
 and cognate cases the exact meaning is signified by 
 the phrase " from and after " (a). But it has also 
 been laid down that when a period of time allowed 
 to a person is included between the dates of two 
 acts to be done by another person, as where it is 
 enacted that no action shall be brought against a 
 justice until notice of the intention .to bring it has 
 been given to him a month before the writ is 
 issued, both the terminal days are to be excluded (6). 
 The notice having been given on the 28th of April, 
 the action, it was held, was rightly brought on the 
 29th of May ; what was requisite was that two 
 days of the same number should not be comprised 
 in the computation (c). An Act which received 
 
 3 Nev. & P. 368. Insurance against accidents for twelve 
 months " from " Nov. 24th, 1887, covers an accident occurring 
 on Nov. 24th, 1888; South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. The 
 Sickness & Accident Assurance Association (1890), 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 47, to the contrary Glassington v. Rawlins (1800), 3 East, 407 ; 
 applied Migotti v. Gohill (1878), 48 L. J. M. C. 48. 
 
 (a) Sheffield Corp. V. Sheffield Electric Light Co., [1898] 1 Oh., 
 at p. 209. 
 
 (&) 24 Geo. II. c. 44, s. 1. Per Alderson B., Young w.JSiggon 
 (1840), 6 M. & W. 54. See Pellew v. Wonford, 9 B. & 0. 134 ; 
 Blunt V. Heslop, 47 E. E. 664 ; B. v. West Biding, 23 E. E .421 ; 
 Weeks v. Wray, L. E. 3 Q. B. 212. 
 
 (c) Freeman v. Bead, 30 L. J. M. C. 123. See also Wehh v. 
 Fairmaner, 7 L. J. Ex. 140 ; B. v. Price, 8 Moo. P. C. 203 ; 
 Migotti v. Golvill, 4 C. P. D. 233 ; Southam, Be, 51 L. J. Oh. 207. 
 
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COMPUTATION OP TIME. 607 
 
 the Royal assent on August 9, 1899, gave a 
 company power to take lands, which was to cease 
 after three years from the passing of the Act. 
 The company served a notice to treat for the 
 purchase of lands on August 9, 1902 ; it was held 
 that the notice was served in time, it being now a 
 well-established rule that where a particular time 
 is given, from a certain date, within which an 
 act is to be done, the day of the date is to be 
 excluded (a). 
 
 Again, when so many "clear days " (6), or so 
 many days " at least " (c) are given to do an act, 
 or " not less than " so many days are to intervene, 
 both the terminal days are excluded from the 
 computation ((^). In other cases, it would seem, 
 the rule is to exclude the first and include the last 
 day (e). In order to satisfy the provision of s. 1, 
 
 (a) Goldsmiths Go. v. West Metrop. By., 72 L. J. K. B. 931. 
 
 (6) B. V. Herefordshire Jus., 3 B. & Aid. 681 ; Liffin v. Pitcher, 
 6 Jur. 537. See Walker v. Crystal Palace Gas Co., 60 |L. J. 
 Q. B. 781. Dissented from in The Courier (1891), 61 L. J. P. 
 11 ; ffHara v. Elliott (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B. 317. 
 
 (c) Zouch V. Empsey, 4 B. & Aid. 522 ; B. v. Salop, 8 A. & E. 
 173. 
 
 {d) Baihoay Sleepers Co., Be, 29 Oh. D. 204 ; Bobinson v. 
 Waddington, 18 L. J. Q. B. 250 ; McQueen v. JaeHson, 72 L. J. 
 K. B. 606 ; Emmerson v. Oliver, 43 Sc. L. E. 291. 
 
 (e) See Archb. Pr. p. 66, 25th ed. ; Badcliffe v. Bartholomew, 
 [1892] 1 Q. B. 161 ; 61 L. J. M. G. 63 ; Williams v. Burgess, 12 
 A. & E. 635. Sundays have been held included in computation 
 
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608 INTERPRETATION OF STATnTBS. 
 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1890 (now s. 1, Bankruptcy Act, 
 1914), which enacts that a debtor commits an act 
 of bankruptcy if execution has been levied by 
 seizure of his goods and the sheriff has held them 
 for 21 days — it is necessary that the sheriff should 
 hold the goods for 21 whole days, excluding the 
 day of seizure (a). 
 
 When a statute requires that something shall 
 be done "forthwith," or "immediately," or even 
 " instantly," it would, probably, be understood as 
 allowing a reasonable time for doing it (b): An 
 appUcation to deprive a plaintiff of costs, which 
 must be made " at the trial," was deemed made in 
 time, when made an hour after the trial was over, 
 and the judge was trying another cause (c). 
 
 lonless expressly excepted, B. v. Middlesex JJ. (1843), 2 Dowl. 
 (N. S.), at p. 724. But see E. S. C, Ord. LXIV. r. 2 ; and 
 Milch V. Franhau, [1909] 2 K. B. 100. 
 
 (a) Be North, [1895] 2 Q. B. 264. 
 
 (6) See Toms v. Wilson, 32 L. J. Q. B. 382; Brighty v. Norton, 
 Id. 38 ; Forsdike v. Stone, L. E. 3 C. P. 607 ; per Cockbum C.J., 
 Griffith V. Taylor, 2 C. P. D. 202 ; Massey v. Sladen, L. E. 4 Ex. 
 13 ; B. V. Aston, 19 L. J. M. G. 236 ; Hancock v. Somes, 28 L. J. 
 M. 0. 196 ; Gostar v. Heiherington, Id. 198 ; per Eolfe B., 
 Thompson v. Gibson, 10 L. J. Ex. 243 ; per Cockburn C.J., B. v. 
 Berkshire Jus., 48 L. J. M. C. 137. Comp. Exp. Sillence, 47 
 L. J. Bank. 87 ; Gibbs v. Stead, 8 B. & C. 533 ; Tennant v. Bell, 
 16 L. J. M. 0. 31; Lowe v. Fox, 16 Q. B. D. 667. See 
 further, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, tit. " Forthwith " and 
 " Immediately." 
 
 (c) Order LXV.E.S.C; EynastonY.Mackinder,iTL.J.Q.B. 
 
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COMPUTATION OF TIME. 609 
 
 If the statute require some act to be done 
 periodically and recurrently once in a certain 
 space of time, as, for instance, the inspection of 
 the boilers of steamers once in six months, it 
 would probably be understood to mean that not 
 more than six months should elapse between the 
 two acts. It would not be satisfied by dividing 
 the year into two equal periods, and doing the 
 act once in the beginning of the first, and once 
 at the end of the second period (a). A repealed 
 Act which imposed a penalty for absence for more 
 than a certain time in any one year, means not a 
 calendar year computed from the 1st of January, 
 but a year computed back from the day when the 
 action for the penalty was brought (b). 
 
 It used to be laid down as a general rule that 
 Courts refused to take notice of the fraction of a 
 day, for the uncertainty, which is always the 
 mother of confusion and contention (c) : and in 
 civil cases, a judicial act, such as a judgment, is 
 taken conclusively to have been done at the first 
 
 76. See also Page v. Pearce, 10 L. J. Ex. 434. Gomp. B. v. 
 Berks, 4 Q. B. D. 469. 
 
 (a) Virginia & Maryland St. Nav. Co. v. V. S., Taney & Camp- 
 bell's Maryland Eep. 418. 
 
 (6) 43 Geo. III. c. 84, repealed and re-enacted with 
 restrictions as to non-residence by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 32 ; 
 Cathcart v. Hardy (1814), 2 M. & S. 534. 
 
 (c) Clayton's Case, 5 Eep. lb. 
 
 i.s. 39 
 
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610 IJTTBEPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 moment of the day (a). But as regards the acts 
 of parties, including in this expression acts which, 
 though in form judicial, are in reality the acts of 
 parties, the Courts do notice such fractions, when- 
 ever it is necessary to decide which of two events 
 first happened (b). Thus, they will notice the 
 hour when a party issued a writ of summons, or 
 filed a bill, or delivered a declaration, or the 
 sheriff seized goods (c). A person who was keep- 
 ing a dog at noon without a license would not 
 escape from conviction by procuring a license at 
 one p.m. (d). Where the title of the Crown and 
 of the subject accrue on the same day, the title of 
 the Crown is preferred (e). 
 
 Sundays are' included in computations of time, 
 except when the time limited is less than six days, 
 
 (a) Shelley's Case, 1 Eep. 93b ; Wright v. Mills, 28 L. J. Ex. 
 223. See also Be North, [1895] 2 Q B. 264. 
 
 (6) Per Grove J., Campbell v. Strangeways, 8 G. P. D. 107 ; 
 per Lord Mansfield, Comhe v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1434 ; per Patteson J., 
 Chick V. Smith, 8 Dowl. 340 ; per Gut., B. v. Edwards (1853), 
 23 L. J. Ex. 42 ; Marshall v. James (1874), 43 L. J. G. P. 281 ; 
 Migotti V. Colville (1878), 48 L. J. M. G. 48 ; Tomlinson v. 
 Bulloch, 4 Q. B. D. 230 ; Clarice v. Bradlaugh, 8 Q. B. D. 63. 
 See further, p. 739, inf. 
 
 (c) 2 Lev. 141, 176 ; and per Gur., JR. v. Edwards, sup. 
 
 (d) Campbell v. Strangeways, 3 C. P. D. 107. 
 
 (e) A.-G. V. Capell, 2 Show. 636; B. v. Giles, 8 Price, 293; 
 Giles V. Graver, 36 E. E. 27 ; -B. v. Edwards (1853), 23 L. J. 
 Ex. 42. 
 
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COMPUTATION OF TIME. 611 
 
 in which case the Sunday is excluded (a). It has 
 been held, however, that where an Act making no 
 mention of Sunday required that a recognisance 
 should be entered into in two days after notice 
 of appeal, and the notice was given on a Friday, 
 recognisances on the following Monday were too 
 late ; though Sunday was the last day, and they 
 could not be entered into then (b). " Daily " 
 includes Sundays (c). Of course, when an Act 
 expressly excludes Sunday, the days given for 
 doing an act are working days only (d). 
 
 A continuing act, such as trespass or imprison- 
 ment, dates, in the computation of the time 
 allowed for bringing an action in respect of 
 it, from the day of its termination (e). So, a 
 
 (a) R. S. C, Ord. LXIV., r. 2. 
 
 (&) Simpkin, Exp. (1859), 29 L. J. M. 0. 23 ; Peacock v. B., 
 27 L. J. C. P. 224. 
 
 (c) London G. C. v. S. Metropolitan Gas Co., 73 L. J. Ch. 136. 
 
 {d) Pease v. Norwood, L. E. 4 C. P. 235 ; Micks, Exp., L. R. 
 20 Eq. 143. 
 
 (e) Massey v. Johnson, 12 Bast, 67 ; Hardy v. Byle, 9 B. & C. 
 603 ; Collins v. Bose, 8 L. J. Ex. 273 ; Pease v. Ghaytor, 32 
 L. J. M. 0. 121 ; Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 30 L. J. 0. P. 305. As 
 to Subsidence, see Barley Main Colliery Go. v. Mitchell, 11 App. 
 Cas. 127 ; Crumbie v. Wallsend Loc. £tZ., [1891] 1 Q. B. 503. See, 
 however, Wallace v. Blaekwell, 25 L. J. Ch. 644 ; Eggington v. 
 Lichfield, 24 L. J. Q. B. 360. As to Continuing Nuisance, 
 see cases in Bathishill v. Beed, 25 L. J. C. P. 290, and 
 Whitehouse v. Fellowes, sup. As to Encroachment, Coggins v. 
 
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612 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 bankrupt , remaining abroad with intent to defeat 
 his creditors commits a fresh act of bankruptcy 
 every day (a). 
 
 Distances were formerly measured by the nearest 
 and most usual road or way (b) ; and this is 
 undoubtedly the popular manner of measuring 
 them (c). But if the nearest practicable mode of 
 access were adopted, should it be a carriage-way, 
 or a bridle-path, or a footpath ? If the way were 
 by a tidal river, the distance might vary every 
 hour of the day (d). Unless a contrary intention 
 appears, distances will, " for the purposes of any 
 Act passed after " 1st January, 1890, be measured 
 in a straight line on a horizontal plane (e) ; indeed, 
 without enactment, that would seem a universal 
 rule for all Acts, without distinction (/). 
 
 In the Interpretation Act, 1889, and every sub- 
 
 Bennett, 2 C. P. D. 568 ; Bumball v. Schmidt, 8 Q. B. D. 603 ; 
 Welsh V. West Ham {Mayor), [1900] 1 Q. B. 324. 
 
 (a) Bunny, Exp., 26 L. J. Bank. 83. 
 
 (6) 1 Hawk. 54. Comp. 23 L. J. C. P. 144 n. 
 
 (c) Per Coleridge J., Lahe v. Butler, 5 E. & B. 97. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Campbell, Lake v. Butler, sup. See Stokes v. 
 Grissell, 14 C. B. 678 ; Jewell v. Stead, 25 L. J. Q. B. 294 ; 
 B. V. Saffron Walden, 15 L. J. M. C. 115 ; Buignan v. Walker, 
 28 L. J. Ch. 867 ; Mouflet v. Cole, L. E. 8 Ex. 32 ; Coulbert v. 
 Troke, 1 Q. B. D. 1. 
 
 (e) 52 & 53Vict. c. 63, s. 34. 
 
 (/) Lake v. Butler, 5 E. & B. 97; Jewell v. Stead, 25 
 L. J. Q. B. 294. As to the general measurement of distance, 
 see Mouflet v. Oole, 42 L. J. Ex. 8. 
 
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DISTANCES— PARTICULAR EXPRESSIONS. 618 
 
 sequent Act, the expression "person," unless the 
 contrary intention appears, includes any body of 
 persons corporate dr unincorporate (a), and the 
 same expression includes any body corporate in 
 the construction of any previous enactment relat- 
 ing to an offence punishable on indictment or 
 summary conviction (6). 
 
 In every Act expressions referring to writing, 
 unless the contrary intention appears, are to be 
 construed as including references to printing, 
 lithography, photography, and other modes of 
 representing or reproducing words in a visible 
 form (c). 
 
 In every Act subsequent to 1866, unless the 
 contrary intention appears, the word " parish " 
 means, as regards England and Wales, a place for 
 which a separate poor rate is or can be made, or a 
 separate overseer appointed (d). 
 
 An offence made punishable, in the language of 
 our old statutes, by "judgment of life or member," 
 is thereby made a felony (e) ; but when the judg- 
 ment is " forfeiture of body and goods," or to be 
 
 (o) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 19. And see Mousell Bros. v. L. & 
 N. W. By. (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 82. 
 (&) 52 & 53 Vict. 0. 63, s. 2 (1). 
 (c) Id. s. 20. 
 {d) Id. s. 5. 
 (e) 1 Hawk. 305. 
 
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614 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 at the King's will for body, lands, and goods, 
 the offence is a misdemeanour only (a). When 
 a " second offence " is the subject of distinct 
 punishment, it is an offence committed after con- 
 viction of a first (b). When a case is made triable, 
 or a penalty recoverable in " a Court of Eecord," 
 the Supreme Court of Judicature alone,' but not 
 the Quarter Sessions, is intended (c). The punish- 
 ment of " fine and ransom " is a single pecuniary 
 penalty ((Z), and when to be imposed "at the 
 King's pleasure," this is to be done in his Courts 
 and by his justices (e). When imprisonment is 
 provided, immediate imprisonment is generally 
 understood (/), and " forfeiture " means forfeiture 
 to the Crown, except when it is imposed for 
 wrongful detention or dispossession; in which 
 cases the forfeiture goes to the benefit of the party 
 wronged (y). 
 
 (a) Co. Litt. 391 ; 3 Inst. 145. 
 
 (6) 2 Inst. 468, which was relied on and applied in B. v. South 
 Shields Licensing Jus. (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 809. 
 
 (c) 6 Eep. 19b, 2 Hale, 29 ; Jenk. Cent. 228. 
 
 (d) 1 Inst. 127a. 
 
 (e) 1 Hale, 375. 
 
 (/) 8 Eep. 119b ; comp. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 25. 
 (gr) 1 Inst. 159a, 11 Eep. 60b. 
 
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CHAPTEE XIL 
 
 SECTION I. — IMPLIED ENACTMENTS — NECESSAEY 
 INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES. 
 
 Passing from the interpretation of the language 
 of statutes, it remains to consider what intentions 
 are to be attributed to the Legislature, where it 
 has expressed none, on questions necessarily arising 
 out of its enactments. 
 
 Although, as already stated (p. 148), the Legis- 
 lature is presumed to intend no alteration in the 
 law beyond the immediate and specific purposes 
 of the Act, these are considered as including all 
 the incidents or consequences strictly resulting 
 from the enactment. Thus, when the Legisla- 
 ture imposes upon the promoters of a railway or 
 other undertaking an obligation to construct and 
 maintain works, it necessarily follows that they 
 must bear the cost of construction and mainten- 
 ance, unless there be an express or plainly implied 
 provision to the contrary (a). An Act (5) which 
 
 (a) West India Improvement Co. v. A.-G. of Jamaica, [1894] 
 A. C, 243. 
 
 (&) 9 Geo. I. c. 22 (The Black Act), repealed by 7 & 8 
 Geo. IV. c. 27, s. 1. 
 
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616 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 declared an oilence felony would impliedly give it 
 all the incidents of felony ; and it would make it 
 an offence to be an accessory before or after it {a). 
 Where an Act directs that a new offence which it 
 creates shall be tried by an inferior Court accord- 
 ing to the course of the common law, the inferior 
 Court tries it as a Common Law Court, subject 
 to aU the incidents of common law proceedings, 
 and subject therefore to removal by writs of 
 error, habeas corpus, and certiorari {b). Where 
 the widow of a copyholder became entitled to 
 dower by custom, it was held that she became 
 entitled to all the incidents of dower, such as, 
 among others, to damages, under the Statute of 
 Merton, when deforced of her dower (c), and to 
 the same right of thirds in her husband's copy- 
 holds as, at common law, she had in his freeholds, 
 so that her thirds in his copyholds would be 
 unaffected by any alienation by him (d). Where 
 trustees were appointed by statute to perform 
 duties which would, of necessity, continue with- 
 out limit of time, it was held that from the nature 
 
 (a) 1 Hale, 632, 704 ; Ooalheavers' Cage (1768), 1 Leach, 66. 
 See also B. v. Beyce (1767), 4 Burr., at p. 2075. 
 
 (b) Per Lord Mansfield, Hartley v. Hooker (1777), 2 Cowp. 
 524. 
 
 (c) 20 Hen. III. ; Shaw v. Thomj)8on, 4 Eep. 30b. 
 
 (d) Boe d. Bidden v. Gwinnell, 10 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; Powdrell 
 V. Jones, 24 L. J. Ch. 123. 
 
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IMPLIED ENACTMENTS— LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. 617 
 
 of the powers given to them, they were impliedly 
 made a corporation (a). When a local authority 
 had statutory powers to "recover" expenses, it 
 was thereby also impliedly empowered not only to 
 sue for them, but to sue in its collective designa- 
 tion, although not incorporated (6). The right 
 of shareholders to "inspect" and "peruse" a 
 register of debenture stock, impliedly carries with 
 it the right to take copies. The enactment might 
 otherwise confer a mere illusory right (c). The 
 Bankruptcy Acts, in requiring a bankrupt to 
 answer self-criminating questions relative to his 
 trade and affairs, made his answers subject to the 
 general rules of the law of evidence, and conse- 
 
 (a) Newport Trustees, Exp., 16 Sim. 346 ; Comp. Williams v. 
 Lords of Admiralty, 11 C. B. 420 ; Biversv. Adams, 3 Ex. D. 361. 
 See also Tone Conservators v. Ash, 10 B. & 0. 349, and Jeffreys v. 
 Gurr, 36 E. E. 769, where incorporation was implied from the 
 circumstance that there would otherwise be no means of 
 enforcing the rights given by the statute. Gomp. Salford 
 (Mayor) v. Lancashire G. G. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 384; 59 
 L. J. Q. B. 676. 
 
 (6) Mills V. Scott, L. E. 8 Q. B. 496. 
 
 (c) 26 & 27 Vict. c. 118, s. 28 ; Mutter v. Eastern & Midlands 
 By., 57 L. J. Ch. 615 ; Nelson v. Anglo-American Land Go., 66 
 L. J. Gh. 112 ; Perkins v. London & N. W. By., 1 Ey. & Can. 
 Traffic Cas. 327; Ormerod v. St. George's Iron Works, [1908] 
 1 Ch. 505, C. A. ; but this implied right to take copies is 
 negatived by an express provision as to mode of obtaining 
 copies, Balagh&t Gold Go., Be, 70 L. J. K. B. 866. See also 
 E. 27 (18) Ord. LXV., E. S. C, 1883. 
 
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618 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 quently admissible .in evidence against him, even 
 in criminal proceedings. To hold otherwise would 
 have been, in effect, to suppose that the Legisla- 
 ture, in expressly changing the law which had 
 hitherto protected him from answering, intended 
 also to make the further change, by mere implica- 
 tion, of suspending, pro tanto, the ordinary rule 
 as regards the admissibility of self-prejudicing 
 statements [a). 
 
 The Judgments Extension Act, 1868 (31 & 32 
 Vict. b. 45), which provided for the execution, in 
 Scotland and Ireland, of judgments recovered in 
 England, was considered as having impliedly 
 abohshed the rule of procedure which required 
 that a plaintiff residing out of the jurisdiction 
 should give security for costs ; the logical reason 
 for the rule (which was, that if the verdict were 
 against the plaintiff, he would not be within the 
 reach of the process of the Court for costs) having 
 been swept away by the enactment (b). 
 
 So, the owner or master of a ship is tacitly 
 relieved from liability for the injuries done by the 
 ship through the acts or neglect of a pilot, where 
 
 (o) JB. V. Scott (1866), 25 L. J. M. C. 128 ; B. v. Widdop 
 (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 9; B. v. Erdheim (1896), 65 L. J. M. C. 
 176 ; Sankey, Be, 59 L. J. K. B. 238. 
 
 (6) Baehurn v. Andrew (1874), 43 L. J. Q. B. 73. Principle 
 not applied Howe Machine Co., In re (1889), 41 Ch. D. 118 (but 
 order subsequently discharged). 
 
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INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES. 619 
 
 the employment of the latter is compulsory by 
 law; the pilot performing a duty imposed by 
 statute, and being neither appointed by nor under 
 the control of the owner or master (a). 
 
 An Act which simply creates a corporation, 
 impliedly gives it the general legal attributes of 
 one, among which is an ordinary power to make 
 contracts (b) ; but, speaking generally, its powers 
 are only those which are expressly conferred, or 
 which, by necessary imphcation, are included in 
 the express powers ; whilst under the Companies 
 Acts, 1862 and 1867, replaced by Companies (Con- 
 soKdation) Act, 1908, the powers of a Company 
 are further restricted by its Memorandum of Asso- 
 ciation (c). A contract entered into by a Company 
 beyond its competency could not be ratified even 
 by the unanimous assent of the shareholders, 
 
 (a) Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 16 E. E. 392 ; The Maria, 1 Eob. 
 W. 95 ; 27te Agricola, 2 Eob. W. 10 ; Lucey v. Ingram, 9 L. J. 
 Ex. 196; The Clan Gordon, 7 P. D. 190; Comp. The China, 
 7 Wallace, 67. As to General Law of Pilotage, see 2 & 3 
 Geo. V. 0. 31. 
 
 (b) See Ashbury &c. Co. v. MicM, 44 L. J. Ex. 185 ; Broughton 
 v. Manchester Waterworks, 22 E. E. 278 ; Shears v. Jacob, L. E. 
 1 0. P. 513, and the cases collected in S. of Ireland Colliery v. 
 Waddle, L. E. 3 C. P. 463 ; 4 Id. 617. 
 
 (c) Id. See also London C. C. v. A.-G. (1902), 71 L. J. Oh. 
 268 ; East Anglian By. Co. v. Eastern Counties By. Co., 21 
 L. J. 0. P. 23 ; South Torhshire By. Co. v. Great N. By. Co., 22 
 L. J. Ex. 305 ; A.-G. v. G. E. By., 48 L. J. Oh. 428 ; A.-G. v. 
 Mersey By., 76 L. J. Oh. 568. 
 
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620 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 for this would be an attempt to do what the Act 
 of Parliament prohibits (a). 
 
 "The difference between a Statutory Corpora- 
 tion and a Corporation incorporated by Royal 
 Charter is well settled. The former can do such 
 acts ouIt/ as are authorised, directly or indirectly, 
 by the statute creating it; the latter, speaking 
 generally, can do everything that an ordinary 
 individual can do. If, however, the Corporation 
 by Charter be a Municipal Corporation, then they 
 are subject to the restrictions imposed by the 
 Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, and will be 
 restrained from applying their borough fund to 
 purposes not authorised by that Act (6). 
 
 Where an Act provided that the costs and 
 expenses incidental to passing it, should be paid 
 by the Metropolitan Board, but did not state to 
 whom they should be paid, it was held that 
 they were payable to the promoters only, and 
 
 (a) Per Lord Cairns, Ashbury &c. Go. v. EicM, L. E. 7 H. L. 
 672 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 197. 
 
 (&) A.-G. V. Newcastle-upon-Tyne and N. E. By., 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 558, 560; 23 Q. B. D. 492, 497; A.-G. v. Tynemouth Corp. 
 (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 489 ; A.-G. v. L. G. G. (1901), 70 L. J. Ch. 
 367, C. A. Per Harwell J., A.-G. v. Manchester, 75 L. J. Ch. 
 334; see also per Swinfen Eady J., British S. Africa Go. v. 
 Be Beers Mines, 79 L. J. Ch. 345, affirmed 80 L. J. Ch. 65 ; 
 reversed in H. L. (without affecting the above dictum), W. N. 
 (1911), 245. 
 
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INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES. 621 
 
 not to agents and other persons employed by 
 them (a). 
 
 A private Act which, after annexing a rectory 
 to the deanery of Windsor, recited that the dean's 
 residence at the latter place would oblige his 
 frequent absence from the rectory, and required 
 him to appoint a curate to reside there, was 
 deemed to give him, by implication, an exemption 
 from residence {b). 
 
 But this extention of an enactment is confined 
 to its strictly necessary incidents or logical con- 
 sequences. "When, for instance, a statute requires 
 the performance of a service, it implies no pro- 
 vision that the person performing it shall be re- 
 munerated (e). An Act which empowered justices 
 to discharge an apprentice from his apprenticeship, 
 if ill-treated by his master, would not inferentially 
 empower them to order a return of the premium ; 
 for however just it might be that such a return 
 should be made, and convenient that it should be 
 ordered by the tribunal which cancelled the inden- 
 ture, such a power was not the logical or necessary 
 
 (a) Wyatt v. Metrop. Bd. of Works (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 217. 
 Distinguished in Haddon's (Ld.) Estate Act, W. N. (1889), 
 96, C. A. 
 
 (6) Wright V. Legge, 6 Taunt. 48. 
 
 (e) Per Lord Abinger, Jones v. Carmarthen (1841), 8 M. & W. 
 605 ; B. V. Hull, 22 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; B. v, Allday, 26 L. J. Q. B. 
 292. See also Alresford v. Scott, 7 Q. B. D. 210. 
 
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622 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 incident or result of that which was expressly 
 conferred (a). Money received by the treasurer of 
 a trading club on account of the club is none the 
 less the property of the members as beneficial 
 owners, because the club was formed in contra- 
 vention of s, 4, Companies Act, 1862, and has 
 consequently no legal existence as a company, 
 association, or co-partnership (6). Where a gas 
 company is required by statute to supply gas to 
 the pubKc lamps in a town from sunset to sunrise 
 at a fixed annual sum per lamp, the burners to 
 consume not less than a certain amount of gas per 
 hour, there is no implied provision that on failure 
 of the supply on certain days it is only to be 
 entitled to a smaller sum (c). The Tithe Act, 1836, 
 which authorised a tenant who paid the tithe 
 rent-charge to deduct the amount from the rent 
 next due, gave a tenant no implied right to sue the 
 landlord for the payment, the landlord not being 
 liable to pay the tithe (d). And s. 13, Stannaries 
 Act, 1869 (e), which gives power to a cost-book 
 
 (a) B. V. Vandeleer, 1 Stra. 69 ; East v. Pell, 8 L. J. M. C. 33. 
 (6) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, repealed s. 1, Companies (Con- 
 solidation) Act, 1908 ; B. v. Tankard, [1894] 1 Q. B. 548. 
 
 (c) Bichmond Gas Go. v. Bickmond Corp., [1893] 1 Q. B. 56. 
 
 (d) 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 71, s. 80 ; Dawes v. Thomas, [1892] 
 1 Q. B. 414. As to land tax, see Andrew v. Handcock (1819), 
 21 E. E. 569 ; 1 Brod. & Bing. 37. As to when payable by 
 tenant, Parish v. Sleeman (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 96 ; Manning v. 
 Lunn (1846), 2 Car. & K. 13. (e) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 19. 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 623 
 
 miuing company to bring an' action against a share- 
 holder for unpaid calls, in the name of their purser, 
 does not consequently authorise the purser to 
 preseht a bankruptcy petition in his own name on 
 behalf of the company against a shareholder in 
 respect of a judgment recovered by him in such 
 action (a). A County Council incorporated under 
 the Local Government Act, 1888, is a purely 
 statutory body, and has not the powers of a munici- 
 pal or common law corporation, and therefore the 
 possession of statutory powers to purchase and 
 work tramways does not empower it to work 
 omnibuses in connection with the tramways (b). 
 
 Where a statute requires a thing to be done, 
 but does not impose a specific fine for not doing it, 
 it is not for the Court inferentially to draw the 
 conclusion that a penalty is incurred (c). 
 
 SECTION II. — IMPLIED POWERS AND OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly 
 grants, also, the power of doing all such acts, or 
 employing such means, as are essentially neces- 
 sary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea 
 
 (a) Nance, Be, [1893] 1 Q. B. 590. See Guthrie v. Fish, 3 
 B. & 0. 178 ; Sunderland Bd. v. Frankland, L. E. 8 Q. B. 18. 
 
 (6) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41 ; London C. G. v. A.-O. (1902), 71 
 L. J. Oh. 268. 
 
 (c) Hammond v, Puhford, [1895] 1 Q. B. 223. 
 
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624 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio 
 explicari non potuit{a). Thus, an Act which 
 empowers justices to require persons to take an 
 oath as special constables, or give them jurisdic- 
 tion to inquire into an offence, impliedly empowers 
 them to apprehend the persons who unlawfully 
 fail to attend before them for those purposes ; 
 otherwise the jurisdiction could not be effectually 
 exercised (5). So, where an inferior Court is 
 empowered to grant an injunction, the power of 
 punishing disobedience to it by commitment is 
 impliedly conveyed by the enactment ; for the 
 power would be. useless if it could not be en- 
 forced (c). And it is laid down that where a 
 statute empowers a justice to bind a person over, 
 or to cause him to do something, and the person, 
 in his presence, refuses, the justice has impliedly 
 authority to commit him to jail till he complies {d). 
 An Act which authorises the making of by-laws, 
 impliedly authorises the annexation of a reasonable 
 
 (a) Dig. 2, 1, 2. 
 
 (6) Oath before Justices, 12 Eep. 131 ; 2 Hawk. c. 13, s. 15 ; 
 Bane v. Methuen, 27 E. E. 546. Comp. B. v. Twyford, 5 
 A. & B. 430. See also Eawe v. Planner, 1 Saund. 10 ; Burton v. 
 Benson, 11 L. J. Ex. 348. See also Statutes relating to Special 
 Constables, 1 & 2 WUl. IV. c. 41 ; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50 ; 4 & 5 
 Geo. V. c. 61 ; and see Commissioner of Metrop. Pplice v. 
 Hancoch, [1916] 1 K. B. 190. 
 
 (c) Martin, Exp. (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 212, 491. 
 
 (d) 2 Hawk. c. 16, s. 2. 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 625 
 
 pecuniary penalty for their infringement, recover- 
 able (in the absence of other provision) by action 
 or distress (a). 
 
 The enactment that at the election of poor 
 law guardians the votes should, be taken and 
 returned as the Commissioners should direct, 
 impliedly authorised the appointment of a return- 
 ing ofl&cer (6). An Act which, after empowering 
 the parishioners to elect an assistant overseer, 
 provided that this power should cease where an 
 assistant overseer had been appointed by the Poor 
 Law Commissioners (who had previously no power 
 to make such an appointment), and while their 
 order of appointment remained in force, would 
 seem to have given the Commissioners that power 
 by implication (c). Where a judgment was re- 
 covered in a County Court against its bailiff, a 
 power to appoint a special baihff to levy execution 
 in that case was held to be necessarily incident to 
 the Court (d). 
 
 So it was held that when a duty was imposed 
 
 {a) 5 Eep. 63a; 2 Kyi Corp. 156 ; Hall v. Nixon, L. E. 10 
 Q. B. 152 ; B. v. Sankey, 3 Q. B. D. 379. See 32 & 53 Vict. o. 
 63, s. 32. 
 
 (6) 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 40 (repealed in part ; see 7 & 8 
 Vict. c. 101) ; B. V. Oldham, 16 L. J. M. 0. 110. 
 
 (c) B. V. Greene, 21 L. J. M. C. 137. See Cullen v. Trimble, 
 sup. p. 242. 
 
 {d) Bellamy v. Hoyle (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 220. 
 
 I.S. . 40 
 
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626 INTBBPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 on a county, and costs necessarily arose in ques- 
 tioning the propriety of an act done to enforce 
 that .duty — as, for instance, in disputing the 
 liability of a fine imposed on the county for 
 neglect to repair the county jail — the justices, 
 who had the superintendence of the county purse, 
 had impliedly a right to defray such costs out 
 of it (a). 
 
 In the same way, when powers, privileges, or 
 property are granted by statute, everything indis- 
 pensable to their exercise or enjoyment is im- 
 pHedly granted also, as it would be in a grant 
 between private persons. Thus, as by a private 
 grant or reservation of trees, the power of enter- 
 ing on the land where they stand, and of cutting 
 them down and carrying them away, is impliedly 
 given or reserved ; and by the grant of mines, the 
 power to dig them (b) ; so, under a Parliamentary 
 authority to build a bridge on a stranger's land, 
 the grantee tacitly acquires the right of erecting, 
 
 (a) JB. V, Essex, 4 T. E. 591, per Lord Kenyon; B. v. White, 
 U Q. B. D. 358. See A.-G. v. Brecon, 10 Oh. D. 204 ; Leith 
 Council V. Leiih Harbour Commissioners, [1899] A. C. 508 ; Brooks, 
 Jenkins & Co. v. Torquay Corp., [1902] 1 K. B. 601 ; (1901), 71 
 L. J. E. B. 109. See also as to the implied right of a trading 
 company to borrow, General Auction Go. v. Smith, 60 L. J. Oh. 
 723; per Buckley J., Mansel v. Cohham, 74 L. J. Oh. 327 
 Hinds V. Buenos Ayres Tramways Co., 76 L. J. Oh. 17. 
 
 (h) Shep. Touchst. 89 ; Eoll. Ab. Incidents, A. 
 
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IMPLIED POWEES AND DUTIES. 627 
 
 on the land, the temporary scaffolding which is 
 essential to the execution of the work {a). Where 
 an express statutory 'right is given to make and 
 maintain something requiring support, the statute, 
 in the absence of a controlling context, must be 
 taken to mean that the right of support shall 
 accompany the right to make and maintain. If 
 the Act does not provide any means of obtaining 
 compensation for the loss occasioned to the land- 
 owner by his having to leave support, this is an 
 argument against the Legislature having intended 
 to give such right ; but if it contains provisions 
 under which compensation can be obtained, it 
 needs a strong context to show that the right of 
 support is not given (b). 
 
 So, if the Legislature authorises the construction 
 
 (o) Clarence By. Co. v. G. N. of England By. Co., 12 L. J. 
 Q. B. 145. 
 
 (6) L. & N. W. By. Co. v. Evans, 62 L. J. Ch. 1, approved in 
 Clippem Oil Co. v. Edinburgh Water Trustees, 73 L. J. P. C. 32. 
 Comp. Buabon Co. v. (?. W. By., [1893] 1 Ch. 427 ; Bell v. Earl 
 of Dudley, 64 L. J. Ch. 291. As to the construction of Acts, ex. 
 gr. Inclosure Acts, involving, or relating to, a severance of the 
 Surface from the Subjacent Minerals, see per Lord Blackburn, 
 JDavis V. Treharne, 50 L. J. Q. B. 667, cited by Lord Selborne 
 L.C., Love V. Bell, 53 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; Dixon v. Wlite, 8 App. 
 Gas. 833 ; Bank of Scotland v. Stewart, 28 Sc. L. E. 735 ; Neio 
 Sharlston Collieries v. Westmorland, 73 L. J. Ch. 341 n. ; Butter- 
 hnowle Colliery Co. v. Bishop Avjcldand Co-operative Socy., 75 L. J. 
 Ch. 541. 
 
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628 INTBRPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of a work or the use of la particular thing for 
 a particular purpose, the permission carries with 
 it impliedly an exemption from responsibility for 
 any damage arising from the use, without negli- 
 gence {i.e., the neglect of some care which one is 
 bound by law to exercise towards somebody (a)) ; 
 as, for instance, when haystacks are fired by 
 locomotive engines running on railways (b). But 
 to the general rule, that statutory authority 
 absolves from responsibility where no negligence 
 is shown, see the Eailway Fires Act, 1905 
 (5 Bdw. VII. oil). Where, however, trustees and 
 oflScial persons are authorised to execute a work, 
 such as to raise a road, to lower a hill, or to 
 make a drain, they are impliedly authorised, if 
 necessary for the due execution of their task, to 
 
 (a) Per Bowen L.J., Thomas v. Quartermaine (1887), 18 
 Q. B. D., at p. 694. This case considered and explained in 
 Atnos V. Duffy (1890), 6 T. L. E. 339, C. A. 
 
 (6) B. V. Pease, 38 E. E. 207 ; Vaughan v. Taff Vale By. Co., 
 29 L. J. Ex. 247 (questioned by Bramwell L.J. in Powell v. 
 Fall, 5 Q. B. D. 601) ; Freemantle v. London & N. W. By. Co., 
 31 L. J. C. P. 12 ; Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 25 L. J. 
 Ex. 212 ; Dunn v. Birmingham Canal Co., L. E. 8 Q. B. 42 ; 
 Hammersmith By. Co. v. Brand, L. E. 4 H. L. 171; A.-G. v, 
 Metrop. By. Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 384; Cracknell v. Thetford, 
 L. E. 4 0. P. 629; Geddis v. Bann Co., 3 App. Oas. 454, per 
 Lord Blackburn ; National Telephone Co. v. Baher, [1893] 2 Oh. 
 186 ; Stretton's Derhy Brewery Co. v. Derhy {Mayor), [1894] 1 Ch. 
 431 ; Canadian Pac. By. Co. v. Boy, [1902] A. C. 220. 
 
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IMPLIED POWEES AND DUTIES. 629 
 
 prejudice the rights, or injure the property of third 
 persons without liability for action provided they 
 do no more than the statute under which they 
 are acting authorises and requires them to do (a). 
 But in like circumstances a private individual or 
 corporation would be liable whether he were guilty 
 of negligence or not (6). Where Commissioners 
 have to construct works, and may levy rates to 
 pay for their construction, there is an implication, 
 unless it be clearly negatived by something in the 
 Act to the contrary, that it is within their power 
 to levy a rate to provide for a liability incurred 
 through the work being done negligently by their 
 servants (c). And a statute which authorises a 
 Local Authority to employ a proper number of 
 persons to act as firemen, impliedly authorises 
 such firemen to preserve order during a fire, 
 and to exclude such persons from the burning 
 premises as it may be necessary to exclude, so as 
 to prevent the inconvenience which would arise 
 
 (a) Per Williams J., Whitehouse v. FeUowes (1861), 10 
 0. B. N. S., at p. 780; 30 L. J. C. P. 305. 
 
 (6) Taff Vale By. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 
 [1901] A. 0. 426; Earwell J., at p. 432. 
 
 (c) Galhworfhy v. Selhij Commissioners, [1892] 1 Q. B. 348 ; 
 Mersey Docks v. Gibhs (1866), L. E. 1 H. L. 93 ; Southampton 
 Bridge Co. v. Southampton Local Board, 28 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; B. 
 V. Williams (1884), 9 App. Gas. 418 ; 53 L. J. P. 0. 64 ; B. v. 
 Selby Dam Drainage Commissioners (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 372. 
 
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630 INTBBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 from overcrowding or interference with their 
 work (a). 
 
 But when an Act confers such powers, it also 
 impliedly requires that they shall be exercised 
 only for the purposes for which they were given, 
 and subject to the conditions which it pi'escribes, 
 and also with due skill and diligence, and in a way 
 to prevent a needless mischief or injury (5), A 
 power, for instance, to establish asylums for the 
 sick would not authorise the establishment of a 
 small-pox hospital in such a place or circumstances 
 as to be a common nuisance (c). 
 
 Again, a grant of fish in a pond does not carry 
 with it an authority to dig a trench to let the 
 
 (a) Carter v. Thomas, [1893] 1 Q. B. 673. 
 
 (6) Jones v. Bird, 24 E. E. 579; Grocers' Co. v. Bonne, 43 
 E. E. 591 ; Clothier v. Webster, 31 L. J. C. P. 316 ; Trower v. 
 Chadwick, 43 E. E. 659 ; Lawrence v. G. N. By. Co., 20 L. J. Q. B. 
 293 ; Collins v. Middle Level Commrs., L. E. 4 C. P. 279 ; Geddis 
 V. Bann Co. (1878), 3 App. Gas. 430 ; Canadian Pac. By. Co. v. 
 Boij (1901), 71 L. J. P. C. 51. But see Southwarh Water Co. v. 
 Wandsworth Board, [1898] 2 Oh. 603 ; and East Fremantle 
 Corp. V. Annois (1901), 71 L. J. P. C. 39. 
 
 (c) 30 Vict. c. 6, s. 5 (extended 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, ss. 40, 41) ; 
 Metrop. Asylums District v. Hill (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; 
 Canadian Pac. By. Co. v. Parke, 68 L. J. P. C. 89, which last 
 two cases were cited and applied by Joyce J. in Metrop. Water 
 Board v. Solomon, 77 L. J. Gh. 520. See also Bapier v. London 
 Tramways Co., [1893] 2 Ch. 588 ; Vernon v. St. James's Vestry, 
 16 Gh. D. 449. Comp. L. B. & S. C. By. v. Truman, 11 App. 
 Gas. 45 and Jordeson v. Sutton &c. Gas Co., [1899] 2 Ch. 217. 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 631 
 
 water out to take the fish, since they can be taken 
 by nets or other devices, without doing such 
 damage (a) ; and, in like manner, a statute does 
 not give by implication any powers not absolutely 
 essential to the privilege or property granted. An 
 authority to construct a sewer on the land of 
 another, for instance, would not carry with it the 
 right to lateral support from the land, if it was 
 possible to construct an adequate sewer indepen- 
 dent of such support (6). An Act of Parliament 
 does not, by authorising persons to repair and 
 cleanse a navigable river, impliedly authorise them 
 to dig, in the bed of the river (the soil of which is 
 vested in the owner of a several fishery) a canal 
 or passage to a new wharf, for the convenience of 
 their barges, to the prejudice of the fishery (c). 
 Authority given to make a railway for the passage 
 of waggons, engines and other carriages, does not 
 impliedly give power to use locomotives on it ; as 
 other means of traction may be employed. There- 
 fore, if injury arises from the use of a locomotive, 
 under such circumstances, the general rule of law 
 implies, that a person who uses a dangerous thing 
 is liable to an action for any injury which he does 
 
 (a) Finch's Disc, on Law, 63 ; Gearns v. Baker, L. E. 10 
 Ch. 355. 
 
 (6) Metrop. Board v. Metrop. By. Co., 38 L. J. C. P. 172 ; 
 Boderick v. Aston Local Board, 5 Ch. D. 328. ' 
 
 (c) Parfheriche v. Mason, 2 Chit. 658. 
 
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632 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 by it (a). Ordinary railway, gas, and mining com- 
 panies, on this principle, have no implied power 
 to draw, accept, or indorse bills or notes ; for this 
 is not essential to their business (b). So, it has 
 been held that a Colonial legislative body has, 
 impliedly granted to it by the Act or charter 
 which constitutes it, the power of removing and 
 keeping excluded from the chamber where it carries 
 on its deliberations, all persons who interrupt its 
 proceedings ; for such a power is absolutely indis- 
 pensable for the proper exercise of its functions . 
 But a power of punishing such offenders for their 
 contempt of its authority is not necessary for this 
 purpose, and so is not granted by implication (c). 
 
 If land is vested by Act of Parliament in persons 
 for public purposes, a power of conveying away 
 any part of it would not be impliedly granted (d) 
 
 (a) Jones v. Festiniog By. Co. (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 733 
 Guardians Armagh, Union v. Bell, [1900] 2 Ir. E. 871 (affirmed 
 on appeal); B. v. Bradford Navigation, 84 L. J. Q. B. 191 
 Powell V. Fall, 5 Q. B. D. 597 ; Gas Light & Cole Co.\. St. Mary 
 Abbott's, 15 Q. B. D. 1. See Bylands v. Fletcher, L. E. 3 H. L. 
 330. 
 
 (6) Bateman v. Mid-Wales By. Co., L. E. 1 0. P. 499, and the 
 cases collected there. 
 
 (c) Keilley v. Carson, 4 Moo. P. C. 63 ; Fenton v. Hampton^ 11 
 Id. 347 ; Brown, Be, 33 L. J. Q. B. 198 ; Boyley. Falconer, L. E. 
 1 P. C. 328 ; Barton v Taylor (1886) 55 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 11 
 App. Cas., at p. 203. See Spilsbury v. Micklethwaite, 9 E. E. 
 717 ; and comp. Fielding v. Thomas (1896), 65 L. J. P. C. 103. 
 
 (d) Wadmore v. Dear (1871), L. E. 7 C. P. 212 ; Tepper v. 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 633 
 
 " a paxliamentary franchise of this kind is not a 
 bit of property which the owner can dispose of 
 just as he might a stick or a table or an acre of 
 land; it is nothing of the kind "(a). So, where 
 a statute prohibited bathing on the shore except 
 from bathing machines, which the local authori- 
 ties were empowered to license, that power did 
 not entitle a licensed person to place a bathing 
 machine on the shore without the consent of the 
 owner of the shore (h). 
 
 The concession of privileges or powers often 
 carries with it implied obligations. For instance, 
 an Act which gives a power to dig up the soil of 
 streets for a particular purpose, such as making 
 a drain, impKedly casts on those thus empowered 
 the duty of filling up the ground again, and of 
 restoring the street to its original condition (c). 
 
 Nichols (1864), 34 L. J. C. P. 61 ; Mulliner v. Midland By. Co. 
 (1879), 11 Oh. D. 611 ; Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald (1883), 
 8 App. Gas. 623 ; G. W. By. v. Solihull Bural Council (1902), 86 
 L. J. 852, 0. A. ; Stretford Union Council v. Manchester &c. By. 
 (1903), 1 L. G. E. 683. 
 
 (a) Per Cozens-Hardy M.E., Eccles Corp. v. South Lancashire 
 Tramways Co., 79 L. J. Oh. 765, in support of which dictum the 
 learned judge cites from the judgment of Lord Hersehell L.C. 
 in Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Edinburgh, 63 L. J. Q. B. 771. 
 
 (6) Mace v. Fhilcox, 33 L. J. 0. P. 124. 
 
 (c) Gray v. Pullen (1864), 34 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; Bower v. Peate 
 (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 446 ; Groves v. Wimborne {Ld.) (1898), 67 
 L. J. Q. B. 862. 
 
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634 INTBEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 If it imposed a liability on one person to keep in 
 repair a work in the possession of another, it 
 would be understood as impliedly imposing on 
 the latter the obligation of giving notice of the 
 needed repair to the party liable (a). 
 
 A public body, authorised to make a bridge or 
 tow-path and to take tolls for its use, is impliedly 
 bound to keep it in proper repair, as long' as it 
 takes the tolls and invites the pubKc to use the 
 work ; or at least, to give those whom they invite 
 to use it, due warning of the defect which makes 
 it unfit for use {b). 
 
 If statutory authority is given to persons, 
 primarily for their own benefit and profit rather 
 than for any advantage which the public may 
 incidentally derive, such as to cut through a high- 
 way and throw a bridge over the cutting, or to 
 substitute a new road for the old one ; the burden 
 of maintaining the new work in repair would be 
 impliedly cast on them, and not on the county 
 or parish (c). Another duty which would also be 
 
 (a) London & S. W. By. Co. v. Flower, 1 G. P. D. 77 ; Mahin v. 
 WatMmon, L. E. 6 Ex. 25. See Scaltoch v. Harston, 1 C. P. D. 
 106 ; Brown v. G. E. By. Co., 2 Q. B. D. 406. 
 
 (6) Winch v. Thames Conservators, L. E. 9 C. P. 378 ; Nicholl 
 V. Allen, 31 L. J. Q. B. 283 ; Forbes v. Lee Cons. Board, i Ex. 
 D. 116. Comp. Ching v. Surrey C. C, 78 L. J. K. B. 927, affd. 79 
 L. J. K. B. 481 ; Morris v. Carnarvon C. C, 79 L. J. K. B. 670 ; 
 Gillow V. Durham C. C, 80 L. J. K. B. 880. 
 
 (c) B. V. Kent, 12 E. E. 330; B. v. Lindsey, 12 E. E. 529; 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 635 
 
 impliedly imposed on them by such an enactment 
 would be that of protecting the public from any 
 danger attending the use of the new work. If it 
 was a swing bridge, for instance, they would be 
 bound to take due precautions to prevent persons 
 from attempting to cross it, while it was open (a). 
 If the work was a railway, crossing a highway on 
 a level, they would be impliedly bound to keep 
 the crossing in a proper state to admit of the use 
 of the highway by carriages, without damage to 
 them (b). 
 
 And this implied obligation would not be 
 excluded on the principle expressum facit cessare 
 taciturn, by the fact that certain duties are expressly 
 imposed by statute on railway companies who 
 make such crossings ; ex. gr., to erect and 
 maintain gates where the public road crosses the 
 railway, and to employ men to open and shut them, 
 and to keep them closed except when carriages 
 have to cross (c). So, notwithstanding all such 
 
 B. V. Kerrison, 14 E. E. 491 ; B. v. Ely (1850), 19 L. J. M. G. 
 223 ; HertfardsMre C. C. v. New Biver Co. (1904), 74 L. J. Oh. 
 49 ; North Staffordshire By. Co. v. Bale, 27 L. J. M. 0. 147 ; 
 Leech V. North Staffordshire By. Co., 29 L. J. M. C. 150; 
 Lancashire & Yorkshire By. Co. v. Bury, 14 App. Gas. 417. 
 
 (a) Manley v. St. Helen's Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 159. 
 
 (6) Oliver v. N. E. By. Co. (1874), L. E. 9 Q. B. 409. See 
 Jenner v. S. E. By., 55 S. J. 553. 
 
 (c) Oliver v. N. E. By. Co. (1874), sup. ; iV. E. By. Co. v. Wanless, 
 L. E. 7 H. L. 12. See also Wyatt v. 0. W. By. (1865), 34 
 
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636 INTEEPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 express provisions, the company would be bound, 
 by implication, to prevent all passage along the 
 portion of the highway thus intersected, when it 
 was dangerous to cross (a). 
 
 But power to pull down the wall of a house with- 
 out causing unnecessary inconvenience would not 
 impliedly involve the obligation of putting up a 
 hoarding for the protection of the rooms exposed 
 by the demolition (h). A statutory obligation so to 
 do is, however, imposed by the London Building 
 Act, 1894(c). 
 
 Sometimes the express imposition of one diity 
 impliedly imposes another. Thus, when it was 
 enacted that no license for the sale by retail of 
 beer, cider or wine, not to be consumed on the 
 premises, should be refused except on one or more 
 of four specified grounds, the obligation was 
 imposed by implication on the justices, of stating 
 on which of the specified grounds they based their 
 refusal (c?). The Ballot Act, 1872, which imposes, 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 204 ; distinguished in Gorman v. Waterford dc. By., 
 [1900] 2 Ir. E. 341, see p. 348. 
 
 (a) Lunt V. London & N. W. By. Co., L. E. 1 Q. B. 277. 
 
 (6) Thompson v. Hill (1870), L. E. 5 C. P. 564. 
 
 (c) 57 & 68 Vict. c. cexiii., s. 90 (2). 
 
 (d) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 8 (repealed, 10 Bdw. VII. and 1 
 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, Sched. 7) ; B. v. Syhes (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 
 52 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 39 ; Smith, Exp., 3 Q. B. D. 374 ; B. v. 
 Chertsey JJ. (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 104. 
 
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IMPLIED POWERS AND DUTIES. 637 
 
 in express terms, certain specific duties on the 
 presiding ofiicers at polling stations, casts also on 
 those officers, by implication, the duty of being 
 present at their stations during an election, and of 
 providing the voters with voting papers bearing 
 the official mark required by thp Act {a). 
 
 A duty or right imposed or given to one, may 
 also cast by implication a corresponding burthen 
 on another, as in the case of the proviso in the 
 Commission of the Peace, requiring the Quarter 
 Sessions not to give judgment in cases of difficulty 
 unless in the presence of one of the Judges of 
 Assize ; which impliedly requires the judge to give 
 his opinion (b). So, the Charitable Trusts Amend- 
 ment Act, 1855(6-), which enacts that it shall. not 
 be lawful for the trustees of a charity to make any 
 grant otherwise than (among other things) with 
 the approval of the Charity Commissioners, was 
 considered as requiring the Commissioners to give 
 their approval in a case where "the grant was made 
 before the Act was passed (d). 
 
 The grant of a privilege or of property to one, 
 may sometimes impliedly give a right to another 
 
 (a) Pickering v. James (1873); L. E. 8 0. P. 489 ; considered 
 in Ackets v. Howard (1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 273. 
 (6) Per Cur., B. v. Chantrell, L. E. 10 Q. B. 587. 
 
 (c) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 124, s. 29 (repealed in part, 23 & 24 Vict. 
 c. 136, s. i;. 
 
 (d) Moore V. Glench (1875), 1 Ch. D. 447 ; 45 L. J. Cli. 80. 
 
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638 INTERPBETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 person. Thus, an Act which empowered a hospital 
 to take and hold lands by will, gift, or purchase, 
 without incurring the penalties of the Mortmain 
 Acts, was held to empower persons to devise or 
 convey lands to it; it being considered that the 
 Act would otherwise be nugatory (a). But power 
 given to a corporation to take lands only avoided 
 the necessity of obtaining a license to hold in mort- 
 main, and did not affect the disability of the 
 grantor (b). And an Act which gave one railway 
 company power to purchase certain lands and to 
 construct a railway according to the deposited 
 plans and books of reference, would not give by 
 impHcation to another company the correlative 
 power to sell any of those lands to it (c). 
 
 Again, in giving judicial powers to affect prejudi- 
 cially the rights of person or property, a statute is 
 understood as silently implying, when it does not 
 expressly provide, the condition or qualification 
 that the power is to be exercised in accordance 
 with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure, 
 such, for instance, as that which requires that, 
 before its exercise, the person sought to be 
 
 (a) Perring v. Trail (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 775 ; comp. NetJiersole 
 V. Indigent Blind, 40 L. J. Ch. 26. 
 
 (6) Mogg v. Hodges, 2 Ves. sen. 52, cited in Webster v. Southeij 
 (1887), 36 Ch. D. 9. 
 
 (c) B. V. S. Wales By. Co., 19 L. J. Q. B. 272. 
 
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IMPLIED JUDICIAL DUTIES. 639 
 
 prejudicially affected shall have an opportunity of 
 defending himself (a). 
 
 On this ground, under the Poor Law Amend- 
 ment Act, 1834, 4 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, s. 27(6), 
 which authorises justices " at their just and proper 
 discretion " to order out-door relief to an aged or 
 infirm pauper who is unable to work, no such 
 order could be made without summoning those on 
 whom the order was to be made(c). So, where 
 an Act authorised justices, where it appeared that 
 the appointment of special constables had been 
 occasioned by the behaviour of persons employed 
 by railway or other companies, in executing public 
 works, to make an order on the treasurer of the 
 company to pay the Special constables for their 
 services, which order, if allowed by a Secretary of 
 State, should be binding on the company ; it was 
 held that no such order could be validly made 
 without giving the company notice, and an 
 
 (a) Bagg's Case, 11 Eep. 99 ; JB. v. Univ. of Cambridge, Stra. 
 657 ; Emerson v. Newfoundland, 8 Moo. P. 0. 157 ; Exp. Bamshay, 
 21 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; Thorburn v. Barnes, L. E. 2 0. P. 384 ; 
 Be Pollard, L. E. 2 P. C. 106 ; B. v. Jenkins, 32 L. J. M. C. 1. 
 " Neque Scythas neque Sarmatee ita unquam judicarunt, 
 judicium ab unS, parte ferentes, absenti eo qui accusatur 
 neque recusanti judicium." — Ohrysostom, Epist. ad Innocen- 
 
 tem. 
 
 (6) Eepealed S. L. E., 1874. 
 
 (,_■) B. V. Totnes Union (1845), 14 L. J. M. C. 148. 
 
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640 INTEEPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 opportunity of being heard against it {a). So an 
 Act which gives a constable power to seize pirated 
 copies of music, and provides that on the seizure 
 of any such copies, a Court of summary juris- 
 diction shall, on proof that they are infringe- 
 ments of copyright, order them to be forfeited or 
 destroyed, gives the Court no power in the absence 
 of a summons duly served on the person from 
 whom the music was seized (6). Again, where a 
 Colonial enactment authorised the Governor to 
 declare a lease forfeited, if it was proved to the 
 satisfaction of a Commissioner that the lessee had 
 failed to reside on the demised land, the Commis- 
 sioner could not lawfully be satisfied without sum- 
 moning the lessee and holding a judicial inquiry (c). 
 The Metropolis Management Act, 1855, which 
 required that before laying the foundations of a 
 building a seven days' notice should be given to 
 the district board, and authorised that board to 
 order the demolition of any building erected with- 
 out such notice, was construed as impliedly im- 
 posing on the board the condition of either giving 
 the presumed defaulter a hearing before making 
 the order, or notice that the order had been made, 
 
 (a) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 80 ; B. v. Cheshire Lines Committee, L. E. 8 
 Q. B. 344. 
 
 (6) 2 Edw. VII. c. 15. See 6 Bdw. VII. c. 36 ; Francis, Exp., 
 [1903] 1 K. B. 275. 
 
 (c) Smith V. B.,3 App. Cas. 614. 
 
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IMPLIED JUDICIAL DUTIES. 641 
 
 SO that he might remonstrate, or appeal, before 
 proceeding to the demolition of his building ; and 
 a district board, which had confined itself to the 
 letter pf the Act, and had demolished a building 
 respecting which it had received no notice, with- 
 out first calling on the owner to show cause against 
 its order for doing so, was held liable in an action, 
 as a wrong-doer (a). A statute which required 
 justices to issue a distress warrant to enforce a 
 rate or other charge, even though it directed them 
 to issue it " on proof of demand and non-payment," 
 would nevertheless be construed as impliedly 
 requiring that they should not do so, without 
 first summoning the party against whom it was 
 demanded, and giving him a hearing against the 
 step proposed to be taken against him (6). 
 
 An Act which empowered a bishop, when it 
 appeared to his satisfaction, either from his own 
 knowledge or from proof laid before him, that the 
 duties of a benefice were inadequately performed, to 
 require the incumbent to appoint and pay a curate ; 
 and if he failed to comply within three months, 
 
 (a) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 76 (amended 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102) ; 
 Cooper V. Wandsworth Board (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 185; 
 Clerhenwell Vestry v. Feary, 24 Q. B. D. 703 ; HopJcins v. 
 Smeihwick Local Board, 24 Q. B. D. 712 ; A.-G. v. Hooper, 
 [1893] 8 Gh. 484. 
 
 (6) See Harper v. Carr, 4 E. E. 440 ; B. v. Hughes, 3 A. & B. 
 425 ; Painter v. Liverpool Gas Co., Id. 433. 
 
 i.s. 41 
 
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642 INTERPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 himself to make the appointment and to fix the 
 stipend ; was considered as importing the same 
 condition of giving a hearing before exercising the 
 power; and, therefore, as not authorising the 
 bishop, even when acting on his own personal 
 knowledge, to issue the requisition (which was in 
 the nature of a judgment) without having given 
 the holder of the benefice an opportunity of being 
 heard (a). 
 
 A power to remove a person from his oflSce or 
 employment for lawful cause only, would, on the 
 same principle, involve the condition that it was 
 to be exercisable only after a due hearing, or the 
 opportunity of being heard, had been given to the 
 person' proposed to be removed (6). But it would, 
 of course, be different if the person was remov- 
 able arbitrarily and without any cause being 
 assigned (c). 
 
 It is obvious that where an Act which creates a 
 new jurisdiction, gives any person dissatisfied with 
 
 (a) Capel v. Child (1832), 37 E. E. 761 ; 1 L. J. Ex. 205, 
 questioned by Alderson B. in Hammersmith Bent Charge, Be 
 (1849), 4 Ex. 94. See Bonaher v. Eeans, 20 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 
 Bartlett v. Kirwood, 23 L. J. Q. B. 9. Comp. Marquis of 
 Abergavenny v. Llandaff (Bp.) (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 460; 57 
 L. J. Q. B. 233. 
 
 (6) B. V. Smith, 13 L. J. Q. B. 166. 
 
 (c) Teather, Exp., 19 L. J. M. C. 70; B. v. Darlington School, 
 14 L. J. Q. B. 67; B. v. Bayly, [1898] 2 Ir. E. 335, 347; 
 Sandys, Exp., 4 B. & Ad. 863. 
 
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IMPLIED JUDICIAL DUTIES. 643 
 
 its decision an appeal to another judicial authority, 
 which is empowered to confirm or annul the deci- 
 sion, as to it shall appear just and proper, the right 
 of being heard in support of his appeal is impliedly 
 given to the appellant (a). 
 
 Under the provision of the first County Court 
 Act (9 & 10 Vicfc. c. 95) (b), which empowered the 
 judge, if satisfied on the hearing of a judgment 
 debtor's summons that the judgment debtor had 
 the means of paying his debt, to order him to 
 pay it either in one sum or by instalments, and if 
 he failed to obey, to commit him to jail ; it was 
 held that an order to pay by future instalments, 
 and in default of paying any of them to be com- 
 mitted, was invalid ; for it made the debtor liable 
 to imprisonment for not making a payment at a 
 future time, without then having an opportunity 
 of defending himself. As the language of the Act 
 was not inconsistent with the general principle 
 that a person ought not to be punished without 
 having had an opportunity of being heard, it was 
 construed as tacitly embodying it. The judge 
 could not properly exercise any discretion until 
 the time of commitment (c). 
 
 (a) B. V. Canterbury (Archbp.), 28 L. J. Q. B. 154. See other 
 instances, Phillips' Charity, Be, 9 Jur. 959 ; Fremington School, 
 Be, 10 Jur. 512 ; Davenport v. B., 3 App. Cas. 115. 
 
 (6) Eepealed 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 188. 
 
 (c) See Kinning's Case, lOQ. B. 730 ; Kinning v. Buchanan, 
 
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644 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 It would be different where the statute gave a 
 power of immediate commitment in default of im- 
 mediate payment (a). And again, if the opportunity 
 of defence was provided at another stage, there 
 would be no adequate ground for thus implying 
 the condition in question. For instance, when a 
 statute provided that if a rent-charge was in arrear, 
 it might be levied by distress, and that if it 
 remained in arrear for 40 days and there was 
 no distress, a judge, upon an affidavit of these 
 facts, might order the sheriff to summon a jury 
 to assess the arrears unpaid; it was held that 
 such an order might well be made ex parte. The 
 party subject to prejudice had his opportunity of 
 defence before the sheriff (i). So, where an Act 
 authorised justices to inquire and adjudge the 
 settlement of a pauper lunatic, and to make an 
 order on his parish to pay for his maintenance, 
 and empowered the parish to appeal against any 
 such order; it was held that the order might 
 be made without giving the parish sought to be 
 affected notice of the intended inquiries (c). And 
 
 8 C. B. 271 ; Alley v. Dale, 10 C. B. 62. See also Eesketh v. 
 Atherton, L. E. 9 Q. B. 4 ; Lovering v. Dawson, L. E. 10 G. P. 
 711. Gomp. Stonor v. Fowle (1887), 57 L. J. Q. B. 387; 
 Watson, In re (1892), 62 L. J. Q. B. 85. 
 
 (a) Arnold v. Dimsdale, 22 L. J. M. C. 161. 
 
 (i) Hammersmith Bent Charge, Be (1849), 19 L. J. Ex. 66. 
 
 {c)MonUeigh, Exp., 5 D. & L. 404. 
 
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IMPLIED JUDICIAL DUTIES. 645 
 
 an application to the Court by a trustee in bank- 
 ruptcy for leave to prosecute a bankrupt for an 
 offence under certain repealed sections of the 
 Debtors Act, 1869 (a), was properly made ex parte 
 and without notice to the bankrupt (b). 
 
 An Act which empowers two or more justices, or 
 other persons (c), to do any act of a judicial, as 
 distinguished from a ministerial, nature impliedly 
 requires that they should all be personally present 
 and acting together in its performance, whether to 
 hear the evidence, or to view when they are to act 
 on personal inspection (d) ; to consult together, and 
 form their judgment (e) ; and in the case of justices 
 authorised to try offences summarily, to abstain 
 from exercising their jurisdiction when it appears 
 that a bond fide claim of right or title is set up (/). 
 
 (a) See 8 Bdw. VII. c. 15, s. 10 (1), and 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, 
 s. 168, Sohed. 6. 
 
 (6) Marsden, Exp. (1876), 2 Ch. D. 786. 
 
 (c) So, directors of companies, D'Arcy v. Tamar By. Co. 
 (1866), L. E. 2 Ex. 158 ; Haycraft Gold Beduction & Mining Co., 
 In re (1900), 69 L. J. Ch. 497. But see Duck v. Tower 
 Galvanising Co. (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 625. 
 
 {d) B. V. Cambridgeshire, 4 A. & E. 111. 
 
 (e) Billings v. Prinn, 2 "W. Bl. 1017 ; B. v. Hamstall Bidware, 
 3 T. E. 380; B. v. Forrest, Id. 38; B. v. Winwich, 8. T. E. 
 454 ; Battye v. Greeley, 8 East, 319 ; Grindley v. Barker, 4 E. E. 
 787 ; Cook v. Loveland, 5 E. E. 533 ; B. v. Mils, 2 B. & Ad. 
 578 ; B. V. Totnes, 18 L. J. M. 0. 46 ; B. v. Aldborough, 18 
 L. J. M. C. 81. 
 (/) Per Blackburn J., White v. Feast (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 
 
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646 INTEEPEBTATION OF STATUTES 
 
 When the act to be performed is ministerial, it is 
 not necessary, on general principles, that the per- 
 sons authorised to do it should meet together for 
 the purpose; and the statute which gave such 
 authority would therefore not be construed as 
 impliedly requiring it (a). 
 
 When a new jurisdiction is given to an existing 
 Court to deal with new matter in a different mode 
 and a different procedure, it is understood, unless 
 the contrary be expressed or plainly implied, to be 
 intended to be exercised according to the general 
 inherent powers of the Court (6). 
 
 It has been already mentioned that when a power 
 is conferred to do some act of a judicial nature, or 
 of public concern and interest, there is implied an 
 obligation to exercise it, when the occasion for it 
 arises (c). This implied obligation is usually said 
 to modify the language creating the power, when 
 permissive, by making it imperative ; but it seems 
 to be a matter of implied enactment, rather than 
 of verbal interpretation. 
 
 358 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 81 ; Birnie v. Marshall (1876), 35 L. T. 
 373 ; BrooJcs v. Eamlyn (1899) 79 L. T. 734. 
 
 (a) Hopper, Be (1867), L. E. 2 Q. B. 367. Explained in 
 Bawdy, In re (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 426 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 474. 
 
 (6) Bale's Case (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 376. 
 
 (c) Sup. pp. 424-443. 
 
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IMPEEATIVE OE DIKEOTOEY, 647 
 
 SECTION lU.— IMPEEATIVB OE DIEEOTORT. 
 
 When a statute requires that something shall 
 be done, or done in a particular manner or form, 
 without expressly declaring what shall be the 
 consequence of non-compliance, the question often 
 arises, what intention is to be attributed by infer- 
 ence to the Legislature ? Where, indeed, the 
 whole aim and object of the Legislature would 
 be plainly defeated if the command to do the 
 thing in a particular manner did not imply a 
 prohibition to do it in any other, no doubt can be 
 entertained as to the intention. The enactment, 
 for instance, of the Metropolitan Building Act, 
 1855 (a), that the walls of buildings should be 
 constructed of brick, stone, or other incombustible 
 material, though containing no prohibitory words, 
 obviously prohibited by implication and made 
 illegal their construction with any other (b). So, 
 the directions in the rubrics of the Prayer Book 
 for the performance of the rites and ceremonies 
 of the Church, are equally imperative in prohibit- 
 ing all omissions and additions (c). Again, where 
 
 (a) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, s. 12 (repealed, 57 & 58 Vict, 
 c. ccxiii., s. 215, Sched. 4). 
 
 (6) Stevens v. Gourley, 29 L. J. C. P. 1. 
 
 (c) Westerton v. Liddell (1857), reported by Moore, p. 187 ; 
 Martin v. MaconocMe (1868), L. R. 2 P. C. 365 ; 38 L. J. Ecc. 
 187. 
 
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648 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 compliance is made, in terms, a condition prece- 
 dent, to the validity or legality of what is done ; 
 as when, for example, the deed of a married woman 
 was to take effect " when " the certificate of her 
 acknowledgment of it was filed (a); or where in 
 bankruptcy it was provided that no appeal should 
 be entertained "unless" certain rules were com- 
 plied with (b) ; the neglect of the statutory 
 requisites would obviously be fatal. It is now, 
 however, enacted by s. 147 (1) of the Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1914, that no formal defect shall invalidate 
 proceedings. 
 
 The reports are full of cases without any 
 indications of intention ; in some of which the con- 
 ditions, forms, or other attendant circumstances, 
 prescribed by the statute have been regarded as 
 essential to the act or things regulated by it, and 
 their omission has been held fatal to its validity ; 
 while in others, such prescriptions have been con- 
 sidered as merely directory, the neglect of which 
 did not affect its validity, or involve any other 
 consequence than a liabihty to a penalty, if any 
 were imposed, for breach of the enactment (c). 
 The propriety, indeed, of ever treating the pro- 
 
 (a) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, s. 86 (repealed, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 39, 
 s. 7) ; Jolly v. Hancock, 22 L. J. Ex. 38. 
 
 (6) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 (repealed, 46 & 47 Viot. c. 52, s. 169) ; 
 Dickinson, Be (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 736. 
 
 (c) Gomp. sup. p. 424 et seq. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OK DIEECrORY. 649 
 
 visions of any statute in the latter manner has 
 been sometimes questioned (a) ; but it is justifiable 
 in principle as well as abundantly established by 
 numerous authorities. 
 
 It has been said that no rule can be laid down 
 for determining whether the command is to be con- 
 sidered as a mere direction or instruction involving 
 no invalidating consequence in its disregard, or as 
 imperative, with an implied nullification for dis- 
 obedience, beyond the fundamental one that it 
 depends on the scope and object of the enact- 
 ment (J). It may, perhaps, be found generally 
 correct to say that nulHfication is the natural and 
 usual consequence of disobedience; but the ques- 
 tion is in the main governed by considerations of 
 convenience and justice (c), and when that result 
 would involve general inconvenience or injustice 
 to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty 
 of the neglect, without promoting the real aim 
 and object of the enactment, such an intention 
 is not to be attributed to the Legislature. 
 
 In the first place, a strong line of distinction 
 may be drawn between cases where the prescriptions 
 
 (a) Per Martin B., Bowman v. Blyth, 7 E. & B. 47 ; Sedgwick 
 on Interp. of Stats., p. 375. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Campbell, Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 2 
 De G. P. & J. 507 ; per Lord Penzance, Howard v. Bodington, 2 
 P. D. 211. 
 
 (c) See per Lush J., B. v. Ingall, 2 Q. B. D. 208. 
 
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650 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the Act affect the performance of a duty, 
 and where they relate to a privilege or power (a). 
 Where powers or rights are granted, with a direc- 
 tion that certain regulations or formalities shall be 
 compUed with, it seems neither unjust nor incon- 
 venient to exact a rigorous observance of them 
 as essential to the acquisition of the right or 
 authority conferred : and it is therefore probable 
 that such was the intention of the Legislature. 
 But when a public duty is imposed, and the 
 statute requires that it shall be performed in a 
 certain manlaer, or within a certain time, or under 
 other specified conditions, such prescriptions may 
 well be regarded as intended to be directory only 
 in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others 
 who have no control over those exercising the 
 duty would result if such requirements were 
 essential and imperative. 
 
 Taking the former class of cases, it seems that 
 when a statute cohfers a right, privilege, or 
 immunity, the regulations, forms, or conditions 
 which it prescribes for its acquisition are impera- 
 tive, in the sense that non-observance of any of 
 them is fatal. Thus, where the repealed Engrav- 
 ing Copyright Act, 1734, gave to the designers 
 of prints the sole right of printing them for 14 
 years after the day of publication, adding, " which 
 (day) shall be truly engraved, with the name of 
 
 (a) See per Denman J., Caldow v. Pixel!,, 2 C. P. D. 562. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OE DIEBOTOBY. 651 
 
 the proprietor, on each plate " ; it was held that 
 the neglect to comply with this provision was 
 fatal to the copyright (a). So, under the repealed 
 Copyright Act, 1842, that no proprietor of copy- 
 right in a hook should be entitled to sue for its 
 infringement unless he had made an entry at 
 Stationers' Hall of the title and time of the first 
 publication of the book, and the name and abode 
 of the publisher, it was held that a suit was not 
 maintainable, where the day of publication was 
 not stated truly, or only the month was stated; 
 or the publishers were not described correctly, 
 that is, neither by the style of the firm, nor by 
 the names of the individual partners (b). The 
 innkeeper whose common law liability for the 
 goods of his guests is limited, if he posts up a 
 notice as required by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, does not 
 obtain the exoneration, if his notice is inaccurate 
 in any material particular (c). So it was held 
 
 (a) 8 Geo. II. c. 13, repealed 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46, s. 36, 
 Sched. 2 ; Newton v. Goioie, 29 E. E. 541 ; Brooks v. Gock, 42 
 E. E. 348 ; Avanzo v. Mudie, 10 Ex. 203. 
 
 (6) 5 & 6 Vict, e. 45 (repealed 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46, s. 36, 
 Sched. 2). See also 7- & 8 Vict. c. 12 (repealed 1 & 2 Geo. V. 
 c. 46, s. 36, Sched. 2). For a disquisition on the Copyright 
 Act, 1911, which consoKdates the law of Copyright, see Clerk and 
 Lindsell on Torts, Chap. XXI. ; Low v. Boutledge, 33 L. J. Ch. 
 717 ; Wood v. Boosey, L. E. 2. Q. B. 340 ; Mathieson v. Harrod, 
 L. E. 7 Bq. 270 ; Henderson v. Maxwell, 5 Ch. D. 892. 
 
 (c) Spice'v. Bacon (1877), 2 Ex. D. 463. See Gregson v. 
 Potter, 4 Ex. D. 142 ; Mather v. Brown, 1 0. P. D. 596. 
 
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652 INTERPBBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 that a declaration made by a lodger under the 
 repealed Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871 (a), 
 must rigidly comply with the provisions of that 
 Act, which was made for the benefit of the land- 
 lord as well as the lodger, and consequently a 
 declaration made at the time of levying one dis- 
 tress would not protect the lodger against a 
 subsequent distress, but he must make a fresh 
 declaration {b). A repealed Act which, in authoris- 
 ing ^the confinement of lunatics, prohibited their 
 reception in asylums without medical certificates 
 in a given form, setting forth several particulars, 
 and among them, the street and number of the 
 house where the supposed lunatic was examined, 
 made a strict compliance with those provisions 
 imperative ; so that a certificate which omitted 
 the street and number of the house where the 
 examination took place, was held insufficient to 
 justify the detention of the lunatic {c). Where it 
 
 (a) Bepealed by 8 Edw. VII. c. 53, s. 8. 
 
 (6) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 79, s. 1 ; Thwaites v. Wilding, 52 L. J. 
 Q. B. 734 ; Godlonton v. Fulham & Hampstead Property Co., 74 
 L J. K. B. 242. The following are decisions under the Law 
 of Distress Amendment Act, 1908 : Jarvis v. Hemmings.{No. 1), 
 [1912] 1 Ch. 462 ; Sogers, Eungllut & Co. v. Martin (1910), 26 
 T. L. E. 459 ; affirmed, [1911] 1 K. B. 19, G. A. As to goods com- 
 prised in a hire purchase agreement, see London Furnishing Co. v. 
 Solomon (1912), 28 T. L. E. 265 ; Jay's Furnishing Co. v. Brand & 
 Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 132; affirmed, [1915] 1 K. B. 458; but 
 see Eaekney Furnishing Go. v. Watts (1912), 28 T. L. "E. 417. 
 
 (c) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96. The care and treatment of lunatics 
 
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IMPEEATIVE OE DIRECTORY. 653 
 
 was enacted that a person who objected to a voter's 
 qualification might be heard in support of his objec- 
 tion, if he had given notice to the voter ; and it 
 was provided that, besides the ordinary way of 
 serving it, the notice might be sent by post, 
 addressed to' his place of abode " as described " in 
 the Hst of voters prepared by the clerk of the peace ; 
 it was held that to send by post a notice, not to the 
 address so given, which was incorrect, but to the 
 true address, was not a compliance with the Act, 
 and therefore that the objector could not be heard 
 on mere proof of posting the notice (a). 
 
 Sec. 55, Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (repealed, 
 s. 24, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), which 
 enacted that ships should be transferred by an 
 instrument in a form containing certain par- 
 ticulars, and executed with certain formalities, 
 and registered, was deemed to render an unregis- 
 tered mortgage of a ship inoperative (b); although 
 
 is now regtilated by 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5. As to cases of mental 
 deficiency, see 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 28 ; B. v. Finder, 24 L. J. Q. B. 
 148. Comp. Shuttleworih, Be, 16 L. J. M. C. 18. 
 
 (a) Noseworihy v. Buchland, 43 L. J. C. P. 27. See Gifford 
 V. St. Luke's, Chelsea (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 141 (not followed in 
 Gage v. M'Daid, [1898] W. N. 104) ; Smith v. Huggett, 31 L. J. 
 C. P. 38 ; Hinhs v. Safety Lighting Co., 4 Ch. D. 607. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Campbell, Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 30 
 L. J. Ch. 379. Comp. Ward v. Beck, 32 L. J. C. P. 113; 
 Siapleton v. Haymen, 33 L. J. Ex. 170. See The Andalusian 
 (1878), 3 P. D. 182 ; Chasteauneuf v. Capeyron, 7 App. Cas. 127. 
 
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654 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 there was no express declaration, as in the earlier 
 and repealed Act in pari materid, that transfers in 
 any other form should be null and void (a). So, it 
 was held in one case, that s. 97 of the Com- 
 panies Clauses Consolidation «Act, 1845, 'which 
 prescribes the form in which contracts " may " be 
 entered into on behalf of companies, was impera- 
 tive (b) ; but in another it was thought that, being 
 in the affirmative, they did not take away pre- 
 existing rights and powers, and that a contract, 
 not complying with its provisions, but partly 
 performed (c), might be enforced (d). When a 
 company or public body is incorporated or estab- 
 lished by statute for special purposes only, and is 
 altogether the creature of statute law, the prescrip- 
 tions for its acts and contracts are imperative and 
 essential to their validity (e). If its articles of 
 
 (a) Comp. Le Feuvre v. Miller, 26 L. J. M. 0. 175 ; as to 
 mortgages of ships sold to foreigners, see s. 52, 6 & 7 Bdw. VII. 
 c. 48 (Merchant Shipping Act, 1906). 
 
 (&) Leominster Canal Go. v. Shrewsbury &c. By. Co. (1857), 26 
 L. J. Oh. 764. 
 
 (c) See sup. p. 464 et seq. 
 
 (d) Wilson V. West Hartlepool Co., 34 L. J. Gh. 241. See Green 
 V. JenMns, 29 L. J. Oh. 505. 
 
 (e) Cope V. Thames Haven &c. Co., 18 L. J. Ex. 345 ; Biggie 
 V. London & Blachwall By. Co., 19 L. J. Ex. 308 ; Frend v. 
 Bennett, 27 L. J. 0. P. 314. See also Cornwall Mining Co. v. 
 Bennett, 29 L. J. Ex. 157 ; Irish Peat Co. v. Phillips, 30 L. J. 
 Q. B. 363 ; Young v. Leamington (Mayor), 8 App. Gas. 517 ; 
 Bottomley's Case, 16 Oh, D. 681. See further, sup. pp. 618, 619. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OE DIRECTORY. 655 
 
 association prescribed the attestation of proxies 
 the omission of this formality would vitiate them (a). 
 Such a company, empowered to borrow by mort- 
 gage, under certain circumstances, not more than 
 a given sum, to be appUed in carrying out the Act, 
 would be limited to its statutory power, and all 
 borrowing not so expressly authorised would be 
 invalid as regarded the company (6). 
 
 So, enactments regulating the procedure in Courts 
 seem usually to be imperative and not merely direc- 
 tory (c). If, for instance, an appeal from a decision 
 be given, with provisions requiring the fulfilment of 
 certain conditions, such as giving notice of appeal 
 and entering into recognisances, or transmitting 
 documents within a certain time, a strict com- 
 pliance would be imperative, and non-compliance 
 would be fatal to the appeal (d). The 57 Geo. III. 
 
 (a) Harhen v. Phillips, 23 Oh. D. 14 ; distinguished in Browne 
 V. La Trinidad (1887), 37 Gh. Div. 1, 
 
 (6) WenlocJc v. Biver Dee Go. (1885), 10 A. C. 354, 
 H. L. (E.) ; South Torhshire By. Go, v. Great N. By. Go., sup. 
 p. 619 ; Chambers v. Manchester &c. By. Go., 33 L. J. Q. B. 268. 
 Comp. Gork and Toughal By. Co., Be L. E., 4 Ch. 748. See 
 Goltman, Be, 19 Ch. D. 64. As to an implied right to borrow, 
 see General Auction Estate and Monetary Co. v. Smith, [1891] 
 3 Gh. 432, and sup. p. 626 n. 
 
 (c) See, however, inf. p. 672 et seq. 
 
 {d) B. V. Oxfordshire, 1 M, & S. 446 ; B. v. Carnarvon, 22 
 E. E. 636; B. v. Bond, 6 A. & B. 906; B. v. Lancashire, 27 
 L. J. M. C. 161 ; Morgan v. Edwards, 29 L. J. M. 0. 108 ; Wood- 
 house V. Woods, 29 L. J. M. C. 149; Fox v. Wallis, 2 0, P. D.' 
 
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656 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 c. 99 (a), which required that no action should be 
 brought against a clergyman for any penalty 
 incurred under it, until notice had been delivered 
 to him, and also to the bishop "by leaving the 
 same at the registry of his diocese," was held, 
 with perhaps extreme rigour, not complied with by 
 a delivery to the deputy registrar at the house of 
 the latter, who carried it next day to the registry (b). 
 The County Court rule, which required that in 
 actions to recover land the summons should be 
 delivered to the bailiff 40 days at least before 
 the return day, and be served within 35 days 
 before that day, was similarly held imperative; 
 so that if the summons were not delivered to the 
 bailiff in due time, though the latter should serve 
 it in the prescribed time, the judge would have no 
 jurisdiction to try the cause (c). 
 
 The provision of the Public Health Act, 1875, 
 that " every appointment of an arbitrator under 
 the Act when made on behalf of the local authority 
 
 45; B. V. Anglesey Jus., [1892] 2 Q. B. 29; Peacock v. The 
 Queen, 27 L. J. C. P. 224 ; Aspinall v. Sutton, 63 L. J. M. C. 
 205 ; Simpkin, Exp., 29 L. J. M. C. 23. 
 
 (a) Eepealed, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 1. 
 
 Qx) Vaux V Vollans, 38 E. E. 305 ; 4 B. & Ad. 525 ; referred 
 to in Howard v. Bodington (1877), 2 P. D., at p. 211. 
 
 (c) Barker v. Palmer, 8 Q. B. D. 9. The rule was amended 
 in 1883 so as to meet the point raised in this case. See also 
 Brown v. Shaiv, 1 Ex. D. 425 ; Tennant v. BawUngs, 4 C. P. D. 
 133 ; Williamg y. Swansea Canal Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 158. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OE DIRECTORY. 657 
 
 shall be tinder their common seal, and on behalf of 
 any other party under his hand," has similarly 
 been held to be mandatory (a). 
 
 The same imperative effect seems, in general, 
 presumed to be intended, even where the obser- 
 vance of the formalities is not a condition exacted 
 from the party seeking the benefit given by the 
 statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public 
 officer in the exercise of the power conferred on 
 him; when no general inconvenience or injustice 
 caUs for a different construction. The 5 Bliz. c. 23, 
 requiring that the writ Be Contumace Capiendo 
 shall be brought into the Queen's Bench, and be 
 there opened in the presence of the judges, the 
 omission of this apparently idle ceremony was 
 deemed fatal to the validity of an arrest made in 
 pursuance of the writ, though it had been enrolled 
 in the Crown Office (5). An enactment which 
 provided that every warrant issued by a Court 
 should be under its seal, was equally imperative, 
 and not only was a commitment under an unsealed 
 warrant invalid, but the person who had obtained 
 it without taking care that the Court performed 
 
 (a) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 180 ; Gifford and Bury, Be, 57 
 L. J. Q. B. 181. As to jurisdiction of an arbitrator when one 
 of the parties has withdrawn his notice disputing apportion- 
 ment, see Stoker v. Morpeth Corp., [1915] 2 K. B. 511. 
 
 (b) Bale's Case (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 376 ; note pp. 402, 403, as 
 to repeal by necessary implication of the Act of Elizabeth. 
 
 I.S. 42 
 
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658 INTEEPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 its duty of sealing it, was held liable in damages to 
 the person arrested under it (a). This was hard on 
 the former, but it was essential for the latter that 
 the warrant should be duly authenticated. So, the 
 strict observance of the Provision in the Pubhc 
 Worship Regulation Act, 1874, requiring that the 
 bishop shall send to the inculpated clergyman a 
 copy of the representation of the illegal acts 
 imputed to him, within 21 days, was held essen-i 
 tial to the validity of the proceedings subsequently 
 taken against him ; so that those proceedings were 
 void where the copy had not been sent till after the 
 prescribed time (b). If commissioners, authorised 
 to fix the boundaries of a parish, were required by 
 the Act to advertise the boundaries which theyfixed, 
 and to insert them in their award, and the Act 
 declared that the boundaries " so fixed " should be 
 conclusive ; a variation between the boundaries set 
 forth in the award and those advertised would 
 vitiate the award, as the requisites of the Act would 
 not have been complied with (c). Where a statute 
 enacts that convictions or orders shall be in a 
 
 (a) Van Sandau, Exp., De G. 303. So, a rate under 11 & 12 
 Viet. c. 63, s. 149 (repealed, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 343, Sched. V., 
 pt. III.) ; B. V. WorTcsop Board, 34 L. J. M. C. 220 ; discussed 
 Smith V. Southampton Corp., [1902] 2 K. B., at p. 250. 
 
 (la) Howard v. Bodington (1877), 2 P. D. 203. 
 
 (c) B. V. Washbrook, 4 B. & C. 732; B. v. Arkwrigkt, 18 
 L. J. Q. B. 26. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OE DIEECTOEY. 659 
 
 certain form, it is peremptory and not merely 
 directory (a). The provision of the Union Assess- 
 ment Committee Act, 1862 (repealed in part as to 
 London, 32 & 33 Yict. c. 67, ss. 74, 77), regarding 
 the deposit of the valuation list for inspection was 
 held obviously imperative : for the omission 
 would have left persons aggrieved by any altera- 
 tions, without a timely opportunity for appealing (a). 
 On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a 
 statute relate to the performance of a pubKc duty ; 
 and to invalidate acts done in neglect of them 
 would work serious general inconvenience or in- 
 justice to persons who have no control over those 
 intrusted with the duty, without promoting the 
 essential aims of the Legislature ; such prescrip- 
 tions seem to be generally understood as mere 
 instructions for the guidance and government of 
 those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other 
 words, as directory only. The neglect of them 
 may be penal (6), indeed, but it does not affect 
 the validity of the act done in disregard of them. 
 It has often been held, for instance, when an Act 
 ordered a thing to be done by a public body or 
 public officers, and pointed out the specific time 
 when it was to be done, that the Act was direc- 
 tory only, and might be complied with after the 
 
 (a) B. V. Chorlton Union, L. E. 8 Q. B. 5 ; B. v. Ingall, 2 
 Q. B. D. 199. 
 
 (b) See ex. gr. Clarke v. Gant, 22 L. J. Ex. 67. 
 
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660 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 prescribed time (a). Thus, the 13 Hen. IV. c. 7, 
 which required justices to try rioters " within a 
 month" after the riot, was held not to limit the 
 authority of the justices to that space of time, but 
 only to render them liable to a penalty for 
 neglect (b). To hold that an Act which required 
 an officer to prepare and deUver to another ofl&cer 
 a list of voters, on or before a certain day, under 
 a penalty, made a list not delivered till a later day 
 invalid, would, in effect, put it in the power of the 
 person charged with the duty of preparing it, to 
 disfranchise the electors ; a conclusion too un- 
 reasonable for acceptance (c). 
 
 The Poor Law Ameridment Act, 1834 (tZ), in 
 providing that the Commissioners should direct the 
 elections of one or more guardians for each parish 
 included in the Union, did not make the constitu- 
 tion of the Board of Guardians invalid because 
 one parish refused to elect a guardian (e). The 
 enactment in the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act, 
 
 (a) Per Littledale J., Smith v. Jones, 1 B. & Ad. 334. 
 (6) E. V. Ingram, 2 Salk. 593. 
 
 (c) 5 & 6 WiU. IV. c. 76 (repealed, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 5) ; 
 B. V. Rochester (1851), 7 B. & B. 910; Hunt v. Hihhs, 29 L. J. 
 Ex. 222 ; Morgan v. Parry, 25 L. J. 0. P. 141 ; Bmmfitt v. 
 Bremner, 30 L. J. C. P. 33 ; B. v. Lofthouse, L. E. 1 Q. B. 433 ; 
 B. V. ingall, 2 Q. B. D. 199. 
 
 (d) 4 & 5 Will. IV. o. 76 
 
 (e) B. V. Todmorden (1841), 1 Q. B. 185. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OE DIRECTORY. 661 
 
 1871 (a), which provides that within three months 
 of the avoidance of a benefice, the bishop shall 
 direct the surveyor to report the sum required to 
 make good the dilapidations, is directory only, as 
 to the time ; for it was a duty, not a privilege, 
 which the statute imposed on the bishop ; and his 
 neglect would otherwise have defeated the object 
 of the statute by rendering the estate of the late 
 incumbent exempt from liability for his dilapida- 
 tions (&). 5 Geo. IV. c. 84, having enacted that 
 when any convict adjudged to transportation by 
 any British Court out of the United Kingdom was 
 brought to England to be transported, it should 
 be lawful to imprison him in any place of confine- 
 ment provided under the Act, ifc was held that if 
 the place in which a prisoner was confined was 
 not one of the appointed places, the officers 
 concerned might be liable to censure, but the 
 detention was not unlawful so as to entitle the 
 prisoner to be discharged (c). 
 
 It is no impediment to this construction, that 
 there is no remedy for non-compliance with the 
 direction. 2 Hen. V. c. 4(c?), which requires 
 
 (a) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 43 (amended 35 & 36 Vict. c. 96, and 
 44 & 45 Vict. c. 25). 
 
 (6) Per Denman J., Caldow v. Pixell, 2 C. P. D. 566 ; Gleaves 
 V. Marriner (1876), 1 Ex. D. 107. 
 
 (c) Brenan's Case, 16 L. J. Q. B. 285. Transportation 
 abolished. See sup. p. 262. 
 
 (d) Eepealed as to England by S. L. E., 1863, save s. 2. 
 
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662 INTEBPEBTA.T10N OF STATUTES. 
 
 justices to hold their sessions in the first week 
 after Michaelmas, Epiphany, Easter, and the 
 translation of St. Thomas the Martyr, has always 
 been held to be merely directory (a). So, 6 
 Eich. II. c. 5, which requires the justices to hold 
 their sessions in the principal towns of their 
 county, was held to be directory, not coercive (b). 
 And yet it would be difficult to say that there 
 would be any remedy against justices for appoint- 
 ing their sessions on other days or places than 
 those prescribed by the statute (c). 
 
 The same construction was put on 54 Geo. III. 
 c. 84, which enacted that the Michaelmas sessions 
 should be held in the week after the 11th of 
 October, instead of the time then appointed {d) ; 
 though such a construction would seem to have 
 left the earlier law substantially unaltered, an 
 intention not lightly to be imputed to the Legis- 
 lature. 
 
 Though 43 Eliz. c. 2 requires that overseers of 
 the poor shall be appointed yearly in Easter week, 
 they may lawfully be appointed at any other time of 
 the year (e). In the same way, enactments fixing 
 the time for the election of churchwardens and 
 
 (a) 2 Hale, P. C. 50. 
 (6) Id. 39. 
 
 (c) Per Parke B., Owynne v. Burnell, 2 Bing. N. C. 39. 
 
 (d) B. V. Leicester, 7 B. & C. 6. 
 
 (e) p. V. Sparrow, 2 Stra. 1123. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OR DIRECTORY. 663 
 
 other parochial and municipal officers, have been 
 held to be directory only (a); or, at all events, 
 if imperative, they would not be construed as 
 depriving by implication the Court of Queen's 
 Bench of the power of ordering an election at 
 a different time from that prescribed, where there 
 had been a wrongful omission to hold it at the 
 proper time, and public inconvenience resulted 
 from the omission (6). 
 
 So, the regulations for the conduct of elections 
 under the Ballot Act, 1872 (c), are so far directory 
 only, that an election is not invalidated by the 
 non-observance of them, unless the non-observance 
 was of a character contrary to the principle of the 
 Act, or might have affected the result of the 
 election (d) ; and, under the same Act, the require- 
 ment that the presiding officer shall stamp his 
 mark on the face of each ballot paper delivered 
 to a voter is directory, whilst a like requirement 
 as regards the mark on the back of the ballot 
 paper is, without doubt, imperative (e). 
 
 (o) Anon., 1 Ventr. 267 ; B. v. Oorfe Mullen, 1 B. & Ad. 211 ; 
 B. V. DenhysUre, 4 East, 142 ; B. v. Norwich, 1 B. & Ad. 310 ; 
 B. V. Sneyd, 61 E. E. 843. 
 
 (6) B. V. Sparrow, 2 Stra. 1123 ; B. v. Bochester, 7 E. & B. 
 910. 
 
 (c) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33. 
 
 (d) Woodward v. Sarsons, L. E. 10 0. P. 733; Phillips v. Goff, 
 17 Q. B. D. 805. 
 
 (e) Akers v. Howard, 55 L. J. Q. B. 273. 
 
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664 mTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 The 26 Geo. II. c. 14 (a), which " required " the 
 justices of the peace in England to settle a table 
 of fees at their quarter sessions " held next after 
 the 24th of June, 1753," and, such table being 
 approved by the justices " at the next succeeding 
 general quarter sessions," to lay it before the 
 judges at the next assize for confirmation, was 
 held imperative as to the requirement that a table 
 settled at one sessions should be confirmed at 
 the next ; so that one which had been submitted 
 for confirmation at the next, but had not been 
 confirmed till a later sessions, to which its con- 
 sideration had been adjourned, was invalid (6). 
 But, prior to the passing of the Criminal Justice 
 Administration Act, 1914, which alters the law, it 
 would have been competent to the justices at 
 quarter sessions to settle a table at a subsequent 
 date to that prescribed, though the statute required 
 them to do it in 1763. It was a duty which they 
 might be compelled to perform ; and in this 
 respect the statute was directory (c). 
 
 The usual provision in the commission of the 
 peace that no justice named in it shall be capable 
 of acting or authorised to act unless he shall have 
 
 (o) Eepealed, 4 & 5 Geo. V. e. 58, s. 44, Sched. 4. As to existing 
 scale of fees, see s. 6 and Sched. 1, Criminal Justice Administra- 
 tion Act, 1914. 
 
 (b) Bowman v. Blyth, 26 L. J. M. C. 57. See also Williams v. 
 Swansea Nav., It. E. 3 Ex. 158. 
 
 (c) Lewis V. Dames, L. E. 10 Ex. 86. 
 
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IMPBBATIVE OR DIRECTORY. 665 
 
 taken the oaths required by law, would lead to 
 intolerable inconvenience and injustice if it were 
 imperative, and struck with invalidity every act of 
 an unqualified justice. If his acts were held void, 
 it was pointed out by the King's Bench, all persons 
 who acted in the execution of a warrant issued 
 by him, would act without authority ; a constable 
 who arrested, and a gaoler who received the 
 arrested person, under it, would be trespassers. 
 Resistance to them would be lawful ; everything 
 done by them would be unlawful ; and a constable, 
 and the persons aiding him might become amen- 
 able even to a charge of murder, for acting under 
 an authority which they reasonably considered 
 themselves bound to obey, and of the invalidity 
 of which they were wholly ignorant (a). Such 
 consequences could not reasonably be supposed 
 to have been intended ; the interest of the public 
 required that the acts should be sustained ; and 
 the just conclusion was that the Legislature in- 
 tended by the prohibition only to impose a penalty 
 for its infringement. 
 
 On the same general ground, the acts of alder- 
 men who had been in office for several years 
 
 (a) 18 Geo. II. c. 20 (repealed, 6 Edw. VII. c. 16, s. 5 (2), 
 Sched., which see for existing qualifications) ; 51 Geo. III. c. 36 
 (repealed as to certain places, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 48, s. 5) ; Margate 
 Pier Go. v. Hannam, 3 B. & Aid. 266. Comp. B. v. Vereht, 14 
 E. E. 775. 
 
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666 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 without re-election, were held valid until their 
 successors were appointed ; the provision that 
 they should he elected annually being regarded 
 as directory only {a). 
 
 The provision in s. 55, of the Act relating to 
 Mutiny, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 5 (repealed, s. 80, Army 
 Act, 1881, modified by subsequent legislation), 
 that a recruit shall, on enKstment, be asked certain 
 questions touching his personal history was con- 
 sidered merely directory, and the omission to ask 
 them did not invalidate the enlistment (b) ; for 
 another section provided that every person who 
 received enlisting money should be deemed an 
 enlisted soldier. The Parochial Assessments Act, 
 1836 (6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 96), after requiring that 
 every poor rate should set forth a number of 
 particulars given in a form, respecting the persons 
 and properties rated, and that the churchwardens 
 and overseers should sign a declaration at the foot 
 of the form, added that " otherwise the rate shall 
 be of no force " (c) ; it was held that these last 
 words were confined to the signatures, and did not ~ 
 affect the validity of the rate when the other 
 
 (a) Foot V. Truro, 1 Stra. 625. See also Scadding v. Lorant, 
 13 Q. B. 687, and Holgate v. Slight, 21 L. J. Q. B. 74. See B. 
 V. Corfe Mullen, 1 B. & Ad. 211. 
 
 (6) Walton v. Gavin, 20 L. J. Q. B. 73. 
 
 (c) This provision is repealed as regards the Metropolis by 
 32 & 33 Vict. e. 67, s. 77. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OR DIRECTORY. 667 
 
 requisites were negleoted; because a different 
 construction would have led to inconveniences 
 which the Legislature must be presumed not to 
 have intended (a). The Public Health Act, 1848, 
 in requiring that rates made under it should be 
 published like a poor rate, was also held directory 
 only; on the ground of the great inconvenience 
 which would result from nullifying a rate whenever 
 any of the particulars and forms required were not 
 accurately given and followed (b). The latter Act, 
 indeed, omitted the nullifying words which the 
 former contained ; and the omission was considered 
 to show an intention that such an inconvenience 
 should not follow (c). 
 
 The Act which enacted that no copy of a bill 
 of sale should be filed in any Court unless the 
 original was produced to the officer duly stamped, 
 did not invalidate the registration if the bill was 
 not duly stamped when so produced. The object 
 of the enactment was to protect the revenue ; and 
 this .was thought sufficiently attained if the deed 
 was afterwards duly stamped, without going bo 
 the extreme of holding the registration void (d). 
 
 (a) B. V. Fordham, 11 A. & B. 73. See Gole v. Greene, 13 
 L. J. C. P. 30. 
 
 (6) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63 (repealed, 38 & 39 Viet, c, 55, s. 343, 
 Sched. V. pt. III.) ; Le Femre v. Miller, 26 L. J. M. G. 175. 
 
 (c) See sup. pp. 560-561. Comp. Liverpool Borough Bank v. 
 Turner &c., sup. p. 649. 
 
 {d) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 91. s. 34 (repealed, 33 & 34 Viet. c. 99) ; 
 
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668 INTERPEETATION OF STATUTES. , 
 
 The provision of 7 Geo. IV. c, 57, which required 
 the Court to cause notice of the filing of an 
 insolvent's position to be given to the creditors, 
 was held to be merely a direction to the Court, 
 and compliance with it not a condition precedent 
 to the validity of the discharge (a). 
 ^ So, an Act (12 Geo. II. c, 29) which empowered 
 the Quarter Sessions to appoint treasurers, "first 
 giving security to be accountable," was held 
 directory as regards this provision, and as not 
 affecting the validity of the appointment, which 
 was held complete though no security was 
 given (b). 
 
 It has been held that the neglect of mere 
 formal requisites in keeping the register of the 
 shareholders of a joint stock company, however 
 fatal for some purposes, is immaterial as regards 
 others. Thus, the provision that the register 
 should be sealed, though essential to its being 
 producible in evidence, is immaterial as regards 
 making a person a shareholder, if there be in fact 
 a book bond fide intended to be a register. But 
 the neglect to number and appropriate the shares 
 
 Bellamy v. Saull, 32 L. J. Q. B. 366. As to existing law, see 
 54 & 55 Vict. e. 39, s. 41. 
 
 (a) Eepealed, S. L. E., 1783 ; Reid v. Croft, 5 Bing. N. C. 
 68. So, as to sales of real estate (1 & 2 Viet. c. 110, s. 47), 
 Wriglit V. Maunder, 4 Beav. 512. 
 (6) B. V. Batteson (1832), 38 E. E. 191 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 33. 
 
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IMPEBATIVE OB DIEBCTORY, 669 
 
 would be fatal (a). And the provisions in the 
 Companies Act, 1862 (repealed, s. 93, Companies 
 (Consolidation) Act, 1908), directing that a register 
 shall be kept of all mortgages and charges on 
 the property of the company, to be open to the 
 inspection of creditors, and imposing penalties 
 on any of the company's officers who contravene 
 them, are directory, so that they do not affect 
 the validity of unregistered mortgages (b). 
 
 Where an Act (c) provided that no beer license 
 should be granted to any person who was not a 
 "resident occupier" of the premises sought to 
 be licensed, under the penalty of the license being 
 null and void; and it required, further, that the 
 applicant should produce to the licensing officer 
 a certificate from the overseer of the parish, that 
 he was such resident occupier; the latter pro- 
 vision was considered to be only directory, and 
 a license obtained without the certificate good. 
 The omission, from the later passage, of the 
 nullifying words which were appended to the 
 
 (a) Per Cur., Henderson v. Boyal British Bank, 26 L. J. Q. B. 
 112; Wolverhampton Waterworks Co. v. HawJesford (1859), 31 
 L. J. 0. P. 184; Vallance v. Fall (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 459. 
 
 (6) Wright v. Horton (1887), 12 App. Gas. 371 ; Bandall, Ltd. 
 V. British & American Shoe Go. (1902), 71 L. J. Oh. 683 ; Marine 
 Mansions Co., Be, L. E. 4 Eq. 601 ; comp. Patent Bread Co., 
 Be, L. E. 7 Oh. 289. See another illustration in Bosanquet v. 
 Woodford, 13 L. J. Q. B. 93. 
 
 (c) 3 & 4 Vict G. 61, s. 1. 
 
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670 INTERPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 former was some indication of a difference of 
 intention ; besides, though it was reasonable that 
 a license to a person not properly qualified should 
 be void, it would hardly be reasonable that it 
 should be void, if the holder was duly qualified, 
 merely because the licensing officer had not been 
 satisfied of the qualification by the particular 
 means provided by the Act ; which might have 
 been wrongfully withheld by the overseer (a). And 
 it is now provided by 10 Edw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. 
 c. 35, s. 2, that " a person shall not be disquaHfied 
 for receiving a beer retailer's license by reason 
 only that the premises in respect of which he 
 applies for a license are not a dwelling-house, or 
 that he is not the real resident owner and occupier 
 of the premises." . . . Again, a provision (6) that 
 convictions for sporting without a certificate 
 should be registered with the commissioners of 
 taxes was held directory only, so that the omission 
 to register it did not affect the validity of the 
 conviction (c). 
 
 The Public Health Act, 1848, in empowering 
 the Local Board of Health to enter into all con- 
 tracts necessary for carrying the Act into execu- 
 tion, contained two provisions which may be taken 
 
 (a) Thompson v. Harvey (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 163. 
 (6) 52 Geo. III. c. 93 (repealed, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 39 
 which see). 
 
 (c) Mason v. Barker (1843), 1 C. & K. 100. 
 
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IMPERATIVE OK DIEBCTOEY. 671 
 
 as illustrating the distinction under consideration. 
 It enacted that contracts exceeding J610 in value 
 should be sealed with the seal of the board ; that 
 they should contain certain particulars ; and that 
 "every contract so entered into shall be binding; 
 provided always . , . that before contracting for 
 the execution of any work, the board shall obtain 
 from the surveyor a written estimate of the pro- 
 bable expense of executing it and keeping it in 
 repair." The first of these requisites was decided 
 to be imperative, and a contract unsealed was 
 consequently held inoperative against the board 
 and the rates. The power to contract so as to 
 bind the rates could not have been exercised if 
 it had not been given by the Act; and, being 
 entirely the creature of the statute, it could not 
 be exercised in any other manner than that pre- 
 scribed by the statute (a). But the provision 
 which required an estimate was held to be merely 
 a direction or instruction for the guidance of the 
 
 (a) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 85, repealed and re-enacted in sub- 
 stance by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, ss. 178, 174 ; Frend v. Bennett, 
 27 L. J. C. P. 314 ; Eunt v. Wimbledon Loc. Bd., 48 L. J. C. P. 
 207 ; Ashbury v. Biche, L. E. 7 H. L. 653 ; Eaton v. Basker, 7 
 Q. B. D. 529 ; Young v. Boyal Leamington Spa (1883), 52 
 L. J. Q. B. 713 ; Tunhridge Wells Improvement Commissioners v, 
 Smthhorough Loc. Board (1888), 60 L. T. 172; Brooks v. 
 Torquay, 71 L. J. K, B. 109 ; British Insulated Wire Go. v. Prescot 
 U. D. a, [1895] 2 Q. B, 463. Comp. Cole v. Green, 13 
 L, J. C. P. 30; Melliss v. Shirley. Loo.. Bd., 16 Q. B. D. 446. 
 
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672 INTERPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 board, and not a condition precedent the per- 
 formance of "wliich was essential to the validity 
 of the contract (a). It was remarked that in the 
 former case the party contracted with knew, or 
 had the means of knowing, what forms were 
 required by the Act, and could see to their 
 observance; while in the latter, he had. not, it 
 was said, the same facihty for acertaining whether 
 the board had consulted their surveyor. The non- 
 observance of the latter provision would, however, 
 probably impose on the board the penalty of 
 having no remedy against their constituents for 
 reimbursement (b). 
 
 It has been said that there is no such exact 
 division of sections in Acts of Parliament into 
 those that are directory and those that are impera- 
 tive as is ordinarily assumed to be a categorical 
 division which exhausts every possible class of 
 section. A section may be imperative as regards 
 the voluntary action of parties, but not so where 
 such events happen that its provision cannot be 
 attended to. The provision, therefore, of s. 42 (IS) 
 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 
 
 (a) Nowell v. Worcester (Mayor), 23 L. J. Ex. 139 ; Bonar v. 
 Mitchell, 19 L. J. Ex. 302. 
 
 (6) Per Parke B., Nowell v. Worcester, sup. See East 
 Anglian By. v. E. G. By., 21 L. J. C. P. 23 ; McGregor v. Deal 
 <jcc. By. Co., 22 L. J. Q. B. 69; Boyal British Bank v. 
 Turquand, 24 L. J. Q. B. 327 ; Nugent v. Smith, 1 0. P. D. 423. 
 
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OBSERVANCE EXCUSED. 673 
 
 Vict. c. 67), that the assessment sessions shall be 
 held after February 1st, but so that all appeals shall 
 be determined before March 31st, while imperatively 
 requiring that the Court shall do aU in its power 
 to obey its mandate, would not operate so as to 
 prevent a continuance of the sessions after March 
 30th, where, through necessity or default of the 
 Court itself, whether culpable or not, the business 
 was not then concluded. Parties who have done 
 all that the statute requires of them are not to 
 lose their right of appeal because the final hour 
 was struck on March 30th. The enactment must 
 be read, as all enactments are, subject to their not 
 being made absurd by matters which never could 
 have been within the calculation or consideration 
 of the Legislature (a). 
 
 SECTION IV. — LEX NON COGIT AD IMPOSSIBILIA — CUILIBET 
 LICET RBNUNTIARE JURI PRO SE INTRODUCTO. 
 
 Enactments which impose duties on conditions 
 are, when these are not conditions precedent to 
 the exercise of a jurisdiction, subject to the maxim 
 that lex non cogit ad impossibilia aut inutilia. They 
 are understood as dispensing with the performance 
 of what is prescribed, when performance is idle or 
 impossible {b). 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. o. 67 ; iJ. v. London Jus. and London C. G., 
 [1893] 2 Q. B. 476. 
 (h) As to performance, where the duty has not been imposed 
 I.S. 43 
 
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674 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Thus, where an Act provided that an appellant 
 should send notice to the respondent of his having 
 entered into a recognisance, in default of which 
 the appeal should not be allowed, it was held that 
 the death of the respondent before service was 
 not fatal to the appeal, but dispensed with the 
 service (a). In the same way, the provision of 
 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, which similarly makes 
 the transmission by the appellant, of a case stated 
 by justices to the Superior Courts, within three 
 days from receiving it, a condition precedent to 
 the hearing of the appeal {b), was held dispensed 
 with, when the Court was closed during the three 
 days ; since compliance was impossible (c). 
 
 by superior authority, but has been voluntarily assumed, see 
 Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26, and the cases cited in Hall v. 
 Wright, 29 L. J. Q. B. 43. See also Taylor v. Caldwell, 32 
 L. J. Q. B. 164 ; Boast v. Firth, L. E. 4 C. P. 1 ; Appleby v. 
 Myers, L. E. 1 0. P. 615 ; 2 Id. 651 ; Qifford v. Watts, L. E. 5 
 C. P. 577; Howell v. Goupland, 1 Q. B. D. 258; Nichols v. 
 Marsland, 2 Ex. D. 1 ; Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. D. 
 589. 
 
 (o) B. V. Leicestershire, 19 L. J. M. 0. 209. See also Brumfitt 
 V. Boberts, sup. p. 169. 
 
 (6) Morgan v. Edwards (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 108 ; Woodhouse 
 V. Woods, 29 L. J. M. 0. 149; Stone v. Dean, 27 L. J. Q. B. 
 319 ; Norris v. Carrington, 16 0. B. N. S. 10 ; Harrison, Exp., 2 
 De G. & J. 229. See, however, inf. pp. 683-684. 
 
 (c) Mayer v. Harding, L. E. 2 Q. B. 410. See B. v. Allan, 33 
 L. J. M. C. 98 ; B. v. Bloomsbury County Court Judge, 17 Q. B. D. 
 788. See also B. v. London Jus. and London C. C, sup. p. 673. 
 
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OBSERVANCE EXCUSED. 675 
 
 In such cases, the provision or condition is dis- 
 pensed with, when compliance is impossible in the 
 nature of things. It would seem to be sometimes 
 equally so where compliance was, though not im- 
 possible in this sense, yet impracticable, without 
 any default on the part of the person on whom 
 the duty was thrown. An Act, for instance, which 
 made actual payment of the rent, as well as the 
 renting of a tenement, essential to the acquisi- 
 tion of a settlement, would probably be complied 
 with, if the rent was tendered, though it was not 
 accepted (a). If the respondent in an appeal kept 
 out of the way to avoid service of the notice of 
 appeal, or at all events could not be found after 
 due diligence in searching for him, the service 
 required by the statute would probably be dis- 
 pensed with (b). So, if the appellant was entitled 
 to appeal, subject to the condition of giving 
 security for costs within a certain time, he would 
 be held to have complied with the condition, if he 
 
 As to when notice of appeal to respondent's solicitor satisfies 
 the Act, see Godman v. Grofton, [1914] 3 K. B. 803. A technical 
 omission to serve justices, with notice of appeal, in time does 
 not necessarily oust jurisdiction, Simmonds v. Elliott, [1917] 2 
 K. B. 894. As to what is such a determination by justices as 
 will justify an appeal, Oaten v. Auty, [1919] 2 K. B. 278. 
 
 (a) Per Bayley J., B. v. AmptMll, 2 B. & 0. 847. 
 
 (6) Per Our., Morgan v. Edwards, and per Orompton and 
 Hill JJ., Woodhouse v. Woods, sup. p. 674. See also Syred v. 
 Carruthers, 27 L. J. M. 0. 273. 
 
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676 INTEBPKETATION OF STATUTES, 
 
 offered and was ready to complete the security 
 within the limited time, though it was, owing to 
 the act of the Court, or of the respondent, not 
 completed tiU long after (a). Indeed, the Courts 
 will sometimes exercise a discretion in extending 
 time (when not going to the jurisdiction) where the 
 non-compliance arose from excusable mistake (b). 
 
 Where, however, the act or thing required by 
 the statute is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction 
 of the tribunal, compliance cannot be dispensed 
 with ; and if it be impossible, the jurisdiction fails. 
 It would not be competent to a Court to dispense 
 with what the Legislature had made the indis- 
 pensable foundation of its jurisdiction. Thus, the 
 Act which enacts that justices, at the hearing of a 
 bastardy summons, " shall hear the evidence " of 
 the mother, and such other evidence as she may 
 adduce; and which authorises them to make an 
 affiliation order "if the mother's evidence be 
 corroborated in some material particular by other 
 testimony," makes the evidence of the mother so 
 essential to the jurisdiction that no order could be 
 made without it, although the woman died before 
 the hearing (c). But an appeal may be heard 
 
 (a) Waierton v. Baker, L. E. 3 Q. B. 173. See also B. v. 
 Aston, 19 L. J. M. C236. 
 
 (6) Ousach V. L. k N. W. By. Co., [1891] 1 Q. B. 347. 
 
 (c) B. V. Annitage (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 773 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 
 15. Comp. Bitton's Case, 2 Salk, 490, sup. p. 370. 
 
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OBSERVANCE EXCUSED. 677 
 
 although the mother be dead (a). So, under the 
 (repealed) County Courts Act, 1875, which em- 
 powered a party to move the appellate Court or a 
 judge at chambers for a new trial " within eight 
 days after the decision," the time could not be ex- 
 tended by either "Court or judge (6). Under s. 13, 
 Admiralty Court Act, 1861(c), which gave the Court 
 of Admiralty the same powers, when a vessel or 
 its proceeds was under arrest, as the Court of 
 Chancery had under the Merchant Shipping Act, 
 1854 (now Merchant Shipping Act, 1894) (d), over 
 suits for limiting the liability of shipowners, no 
 jurisdiction could be exercised by the former 
 Court, when the ship was lost. The jurisdiction 
 of the Court depended on the ship, or the pro- 
 ceeds of its sale, being under arrest ; and the 
 shipowner could not give it jurisdiction by paying 
 
 (o) B. y. Leicestershire JJ. (1850), 19 L. J. M. C. 209. 
 
 (6) 38 & 39 Vict. e. 50. As to present procedure on appeals, 
 see s. 120, County Courts Act, 1888. Brown v. Shaw (1876), 
 1 Ex. D. 425 ; Tennant v. BawUngs, i C. P. D. 133. See also 
 B. V. Salop, 6 Q. B. D. 669; Ahier v. AMer, 10 P. D. 110; 
 Ashdown v. Curtis, 31 L. J. M. C. 216 ; Edwards v. Boberts, 
 [1891] 1 Q. B. 302. 
 
 (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10, s. 13. 
 
 (d) As to when the hmitation does not apply, see ss. 502-509. 
 Asiatic Petroleum Go. v. Lennard's Carrying Co., [1914] 1 K. B. 
 419 ; but see Ingram and Boyle v. Services Maritimes due Treport, 
 [1914] 1 K. B. 541, C. A. As to when a substituted authority 
 is liable for negligence, The Oscar II., [1919] P. 171. 
 
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678 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 into Court a sum equivalent to its value or pro- 
 ceeds (a). 
 
 Another maxim -whioli sanctions the non-ohser- 
 vance of a statutory provision, is that, cuilibet 
 licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. Every one 
 has a right to waive, and to agree to waive the 
 advantage of a law or rule made solely for the 
 benefit and protection of the individual, in his 
 private capacity (6), and which may be dispensed 
 with without infringing on any public right or 
 public policy. Thus a person may agree to waive 
 the benefit of a Statute of Limitation (c). The 
 trustees of a turnpike road may, in demising the 
 tolls, waive the provision of the Act which requires 
 that the demise shall be signed by the sureties 
 of the lessee (cZ). A passenger may waive the 
 benefit of an enactment which entitles him to 
 carry so many pounds of luggage with him ; and 
 he does so, it may be added, by taking a ticket 
 with the express condition that he shall carry 
 no luggage (e). The only person intended to be 
 
 (a) James v. S. W. By. Go. (1872) L. E. 7 Ex. 287. See also 
 B. V. Belton, 17 L. J. M. C. 70 ; B. v. Shurmer, 17 Q. B. D. 323. 
 
 (6) McAllister v. Bochester {Bp.), 5 0. P. D. 194. 
 
 (c) E. I. Go. V. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. 85 ; Lade v. Trill, 6 Jur. 
 272, per Knight Brace V.-C. 
 
 {d) Marhham v. Stanford, 14 C. B. N. S. 376. 
 
 (e) Bumsey v. A". E. By. Go. (1863), 14 C. B N. S. 641 ; 32 
 L. J. C. P. 244 ; discussed and distinguished in Mercantile Bank 
 V. Gladstone (1868), L. E. 3 Ex. 233 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 130. 
 
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WHEN OBSERVANCE MAY BE WAIVED. 679 
 
 benefited by such an enactment is, obviously, tbe 
 passenger himself ; and no consideration of public 
 policy is involved in it (a). A statute authorising 
 a trading company to levy tolls within a specified 
 maximum does not bind them to enact uniform 
 toUs from all persons alike ; but they are entitled, 
 in the absence of an express provision requiring 
 equality, to remit any part of the tolls to particular 
 persons, at their discretion (6). 
 
 When a person does waive the. benefit of any 
 such law, he cannot recall the concession, after it 
 has been acted on, and insist on the right which 
 the rule gave him, A tenant, for instance, whose 
 goods had been distrained, might waive the enact- 
 ment (s. 1, 2 WiU. & Mary, c. 5), which required 
 an appraisement before the sale of the goods ; and 
 he could not, after the sale, be heard to complain 
 that no appraisement had been made (c). Where 
 a question between two railway companies has 
 been tried on the merits without either party 
 raising the point that the matter ought to be 
 referred to arbitration, it is too late on the hearing 
 
 (a) Mercantile Bank v. Gladstone, sup. p. 678 ; per Willes J. 
 
 (6) Bungerford Market Go. v. City Steamboat Go. (1860), 30 
 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; Northampton Gorp. v. Ellen (1904), 70 L. J. K. B. 
 329. 
 
 (c) Bishop V. Bryant, 6 0. & P. 484. See also Aihins v. Kilhy, 
 11 A. & E. 777. By s. 5, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, appraisement 
 before sale is now unnecessary, except where the tenant, or 
 owner of the goods, requires it by writing. 
 
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680 INTBRPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of an appeal to insist that the case should be so 
 referred (a). 
 
 The regulations concerning the procedure and 
 practice of Civil Courts may in the same way, 
 when not going to the jurisdiction, be waived by 
 those of whose protection they were intended. 
 Thus, s. 14, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61 (6), which gave an 
 appeal from a County Court, provided the appel- 
 lant, within ten days, gave notice of appeal and 
 security for costs ; and after directing that the 
 appeal should be in the form of a case, enacted 
 that no judgment of a County Court Judge should 
 be removed into any other Court, except in the 
 manner and under the provisions above men- 
 tioned ; it was held that the want of due notice 
 and security might be waived. The provision was 
 intended for the benefit of the respondent, and 
 was not a matter of public concern (c). So, a 
 defendant in an action in a County Court which 
 has jurisdiction over the case subject to leave 
 
 (a) L. 0. (i B. By. v. S. E. By., 40 Ch. D. 100. 
 
 (6) See County Courts Act, 1888, s. 120. 
 
 (c) Parle Gate Iron Go. v. Goates (1870), L. E. 5 C. P. 634 ; 
 Waterton v. Baker (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 65. See also B. v. 
 Long, 1 Q. B. 740 ; Tyerman v. Smith, 25 L. J. Q. B. 359 ; 
 Freeman v. Bead, 30 L. J. M. G. 123 ; Palmer v. Metrop. By. Go., 
 31 L. J. Q. B. 259 ; Begent V. S. Stores, Be, 8 Ch. D. 75. 
 Application to the County Court Judge to take a note of point 
 of law raised is not a condition precedent to appeal, Abrahams v. 
 Bimmoch, [1914] W. N. 449. 
 
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WHEN OBSERVANCE MAY BE WAIVED. 681 
 
 being given, may waive want of leave (a) ; and 
 a defendant, even in a criminal case before 
 justices if the subject matter be within their 
 jurisdiction, may waive any irregularity in the 
 summons, or indeed dispense with the summons 
 altogether; and he does so in such cases not, 
 indeed, by appearing merely (6), but by appearing 
 and entering on the case on its merits. The 
 tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter, he 
 would not be allowed to take his chance of pre- 
 vailing on the merits, and to reserve his objections 
 to a mere preliminary irregularity (c). So where 
 a statute requires justices to make known to a 
 party his right to appeal, and the steps necessary 
 to carry out this right, such as giving notice of 
 appeal and entering into recognisances, the party 
 may waive this provision (d). 
 But when public policy requires the observance 
 
 (a) Moore v. Gamgee (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 244 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 
 505. And see Alderson v. Palliser (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 935. 
 
 (6) B. V. Carnarvon, 5 Nev. & M. 364; B. v. Shaw, 34 
 L. J. M. C. 169 ; B. v. Hughes, 4 Q. B. D. 614. Camp. Dixon 
 y. Wells, 25 Q. B. D. 249. 
 
 (c) B. V. Barret, 1 Salk. 383; B. v. Johnson, 1 Stra. 261; 
 B. V. Aikin, 3 Burr. 1785 ; B. v. Stone, 1 East, 639 ; B. v. Berry 
 (1859), 28 L. J. M. G. 86; B. v. Fletcher, L. E. 1 C. G. E. 320; 
 B. V. Smith, Id. 110 ; B. v. Widdop, L. E. 2 G. G. E. 8 ; Bolton 
 V. Bolton, 2 Gh. D. 217. 
 
 (d) B. V. Torkshire, 3 M. & S. 493 ; and does so by declaring 
 that he does not intend to appeal. 
 
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682 INTEBPRETATIOK OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the provision, it cannot be waived by an 
 individual. Privatorum conventio juri pvblico non 
 derogat{a). Private compacts are not permitted 
 either to render that sufficient, between them- 
 selves, which the law declares essentially insuffi- 
 cient ; or to impair the integrity of a rule necessary 
 for the common welfare; such, for instance, as 
 the enactment which requires the attestation of 
 WiUs(5). Thus, the invalidity of the service of 
 a writ on a Sunday cannot be waived ; for it is 
 a matter of public policy that no such proceeding 
 should take place on Sunday (c). It has been held 
 that the maxim volenti non fit injuria is not to be 
 applied to cases of injury occasioned by the breach 
 of a statutory duty imposed for the benefit of 
 others as well as the injured party (rf). On the 
 same principle a public body, such as a local 
 authority, which is authorised to make by-laws, 
 cannot dispense with them in particular cases, the 
 by-laws not being for its benefit but for that of the 
 public (e). It is said to be a general understanding 
 
 (a) Dig. 50, 17, 45. 
 
 (6) Per Wilson J., Habergham v. Vincent (1793), 2 Ves. jun. 
 227 ; Croker v. Hertford (Marquis) (1844), 4 Moore P. C. 339, 
 366. See New York Civ. Code, Art. 1968, n. 2. 
 
 (c) Taylor v. Phillips, 6 E. E. 575. 
 
 (d) Baddeley v. Earl Granville, 19 Q. B. D. 423 ; Thomas v. 
 Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685. 
 
 (e) Mcintosh, Be, 61 L. J. Q. B. 161. S3e, howaver, G. E By. 
 
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WHEN OBSERVANCE MAY NOT BE WAIVED. 683 
 
 in the profession that a prisoner can consent to 
 nothing ; at least, in the course of his trial (a). In 
 criminal matters, a person cannot waive what the 
 law requires (6). Where, upon a trial for felony, 
 the jury was discharged, and, at the new trial, 
 some of the witnesses, after being sworn, had their 
 evidence read over to them by the judge from 
 his notes, and the counsel for the Crown and 
 the prisoner had afterwards liberty to examine 
 and cross-examine them, it was held that this 
 course of proceeding vitiated the trial, and that 
 the consent or acquiescence of the prisoner did 
 not cure the irregularity (c). The object of a 
 criminal trial, it was observed, was the adminis- 
 tration of justice in a course as free from doubt or 
 chance of miscarriage as human administration 
 of it can be ; not the interests of either party. 
 Consent cannot give jurisdiction (d) ; and there- 
 
 V. Goldsmid, 54 L. J. Ch. 162, on which see Haynes v. Ford, 80 
 L. J. Ch. 234. 
 
 (a) Per Cur., B. v. Bertrand (1867), L. E. 1 P. C. 520. 
 
 (b) Per M. Smith J., Park Gate Iron Co. v. Ooates (1870), 
 L. E. 5 G. P. 639. 
 
 (c) B. V. Bertrand, sup. See also B. v. Bloxham, 6 Q. B. 
 528 ; ^er Pollock C.B. and AldersomB., Graham v. Inglehy, 1 Ex. 
 651. Gomp. B. v. Thornhill, 8 C. & P. 575; B. v. Moneon 
 (1903) (The Veronica Case), 67 J. P. 267; B. v. Lawrence 
 (1909), 25 T. L. E. 374. See Best, Exp., 18 Ch. D. 488. 
 
 {d) Lawrence v. Wilcock, 11 A. & B. 941 ; Lismore v. Beadle, 
 1 Dowl. N. S. 566 ; Exp. Bohertson, 44 L. J. Bank. 99 ; Jackson 
 V. Beaumont, 24 L. J. Ex. 301. 
 
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684 INTEBPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 fore any statutory objection which goes to the 
 jurisdiction does not admit of waiver. Thus, s. 33, 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, which empowers 
 either party, after the determination of an infor- 
 mation by justices to apply to the Court to state 
 a case, requires that the application should be 
 made to all who heard it, and the objection that 
 the case was stated by some only of them cannot 
 be waived, because it goes to the jurisdiction (a) ; 
 and the provision of 20 & 21 Vict, c, 48, s. 2, which 
 requires the appellant from a decision of justices 
 to transmit the case in three days to the Court 
 of Appeal, could not be waived by the respondent, 
 on the ground either that it went to the jurisdic- 
 tion, or that it related to a criminal case, or that 
 the justices had an interest in the observance of 
 the rule (b). So, a provision that a summons 
 shall be served within a certain time goes to the 
 jurisdiction, and must be observed (c). 
 
 (a) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49 ; Westmore v. Paine, [1891] 1 Q. B. 
 482. This provision does not apply to an adjudication by 
 justices on a matter within s. 164 of the Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1894, Wells V. McSherry, [1914] 1 K. B. 616. 
 
 (6) Morgan v. Edwards (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 108 ; Peacock 
 V. B., 27 L. J. C. P. 224. Comp. Peters v. Sheehan, 12 L. J. Ex. 
 177 ; Great N. Committee v. Inett, 2 Q. B. D. 284 ; B. v. Hughes, 
 4 Q. B. D. 614. See the remarks in Parle Gate Iron Go. v. 
 Ooates, L. E. 5 C. P. 634, dubit. Keating J. ; Bennett v. Athins, 
 4 C. P. D. 80. 
 
 (c) Dixon V. Wells, 25 Q. B. D. 249. 
 
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CONTRACTS MADE NON-PBBFORMABLE. 685 
 
 It may be added here, that a person is some- 
 times estopped by his own conduct from availing 
 himself of legislative provisions intended for his 
 benefit. For instance, a prisoner for debt, repre- 
 senting a person to be an attorney, to attest a 
 warrant of attorney, who did not belong to that 
 profession, could not afterwards be allowed to 
 impeach the warrant on the ground of inadequate 
 attestation (a) ; and the grantee of an annuity, on 
 whom the duty is cast of enrolling the deed of 
 grant, would be estopped from taking any advantage 
 from his neglect to enrol it (6). 
 
 Where an Act of Parliament compels a breach 
 of a private contract, the contract is impliedly 
 repealed by the Act, so far as the latter extends ; 
 or the breach is excused, or is considered as not 
 falling within the contract (c). The interyention 
 of the Legislature, in altering the situation of 
 the contracting parties, is analogous to a con- 
 vulsion of nature, against which they, no doubt, 
 may provide; but if they have not provided, it 
 
 (a) Jeyes v. Booth, 1 B. & P. 97; Cox y. Cannon, 4 Bing. 
 N. C. 453. 
 
 (6) Molton V. Camroux, 18 L. J. Ex. 356 ; Turner v. Browne, 
 15 L. J. 0. P. 223. See also Be Cannon, 20 Q. B. D. 690 ; JITms- 
 grove, Bxp., 3 M. D. & D. 386, and Greener, Exp., 15 Ch. D. 457. 
 
 (c) Per Cur., Brewster v. Kitchell or Kitchin (1697), 1 Salk. 
 198- discussed and applied, Austerherry v. Oldham Corp. (1885), 
 29 Oh. D. 760, C. A. 
 
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686 INTEEPRBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 is generally to be considered as excepted out of 
 the contract (a). Thus, where land was leased to 
 certain persons, who covenanted to build a work- 
 house on it, and not to use the house or land 
 for any other purpose than the support of the 
 poor of the parish ; and the Poor Law Commis- 
 sioners, under 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, incorporated 
 the parish in a Union, and removed the paupers 
 to the Union workhouse, whereupon the house 
 was shut up and the land was let at a rack rent 
 which was applied in aid of the rates ; it was held, 
 that the covenant had not been broken, or, alter- 
 natively, that the breach was excused by legislative 
 compulsion (b). 
 
 And a like rule applies where urgent national 
 stress or danger precludes a contractor from carry- 
 ing out certain clauses of contractual obligations (c). 
 
 If a man covenants not to do a thing which 
 was unlawful at the time of the covenant, and an 
 Act subsequently makes it lawful only, but not 
 imperative, to do it; the covenant is unaffected 
 by the Act (d). Where a lessee covenanted, for 
 himself and his " assigns," that he would not build 
 on the demised premises ; and he was afterwards 
 
 (a) Per Pollock O.B., Berwick v. Oswald, 3 E. & B. 678. 
 (6) Doe V. Bugeley (1844), 13 L. J. M. C. 137. See Devonshire 
 {Duke) V. Barrow Steel Co., 2 Q. B. D. 286. 
 (c) 7 & 8 Geo. V. c. 25. 
 {d) Per Gur., Brewster \. Kitchell or Kitchin, 1 Salk. 198. 
 
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CONTRACTS MADE NON-PEEFOEMABLE. 687 
 
 compelled, under an Act of Parliament, to sell the 
 land to a railway company, who built on it ; it was 
 held that the company was not an " assign " within 
 the meaning of the covenant. The Legislature, 
 it was considered, had, in compelling the sale, 
 created a kind of assign not contemplated by 
 either lessor or lessee when the contract was 
 entered into ; and so, the lessee could not justly 
 be held responsible for the acts of such an assign. 
 It was not reasonable to impute to the Legislature 
 the intention that he should remain liable for 
 the non-performance of that which it had, itself, 
 prevented him from performing (a). 
 
 (a) Baily v. Be Crespigny (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 180. See 
 also Wadham v. Postmaster-General, 40 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; Brown 
 V. London (Mayor), 30 L. J. C. P. 225 ; Newington v. Cotttngham, 
 48 L. J. Ch. 226. But see Long Eaton Becreation Grounds 
 Co. V. Midland By. (1902), 71 L. J. K. B. 837. 
 
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CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 SECTION I. — CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH ILLEGAL ACTS. 
 
 It is, and has always been, an established rule 
 of law that no action can be maintained on a 
 contract made for or about any matter or thing 
 which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute. 
 Such a contract is void (a). What has been 
 done in contravention of an Act of Parliament 
 cannot be made the subject of an action (b). Thus, 
 as the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, 18 & 19 
 Vict. c. 122 (c), prohibits the use of combustible 
 materials for building walls in the metropolis, the 
 builder of any such walls could not maintain an 
 action for the price of erecting them (d). As s. 14 
 55 Geo. III. c. 194, forbids medical practice by 
 unqualified persons, a contract made between 
 
 (a) Bartlett v. Yinor, Carth. 252 ; per Bowen L. J., Melliss v. 
 SUrley, 16 Q. B. D. 453. 
 
 (6) Per Lord Ellenborough, Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593. 
 
 (c) Eepealed by 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii., s. 215, Sched. 4 
 which Act see. 
 
 (d) Stevens v. Gourley (1859), 29 L. J. C. P. 1. Eecognised 
 but distinguished, Harris v. de Pinna (1886), 33 Ch. Div. 238 
 p. 248. 
 
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PENALTY MAKES AN ACT ILLEGAL. 689 
 
 such a person and a duly qualified medical prac- 
 titioner, that the latter should assist the former 
 in carrying on a medical practice, would be void 
 for illegality (a). And in like manner although 
 s. 2 of the Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 1908, adds 
 to the category of persons who may sell poisons, 
 persons licensed by a local authority under the 
 section, it does not confer upon an unlicensed 
 assistant of such a licensed person the right to sell 
 a poisonous substance on behalf of his employer (6). 
 It would seem, however, that this would not be so 
 if the unqualified person did not himself practise, 
 but merely employed a duly qualified assistant to 
 do so, and a Kke rule applies to a corporation (c). 
 A waterman being prohibited by a local statute 
 from taking an apprentice, unless he was the 
 occupier of a tenement wherein to lodge him ; it 
 was held that no settlement was gained by service 
 under an indenture of apprenticeship made con- 
 trary to this provision (d). 
 
 When a penalty is imposed for doing or omitting 
 an act, the act or omission is thereby prohibited 
 
 (a) Davies v. Makuna (1885), 29 Oh. D. 596; 64 L. J. Ch. 
 1148. 
 
 (6) Pharmaceutical Society v. Nash (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 416 ; 
 Pharmaceutical Society v. Jacks (1911), 80 L. J. K. B. 767. 
 
 (c) Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply 
 Association, 49 L. J. Q. B. 736 ; 5 App. Gas. 857, H. L. (E.). 
 
 (d) 10 Geo. II. c. 31 ; repealed 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. Ixxv., s. 1 ; 
 B. V. Gravesend, 3 B. & Ad. 240. 
 
 LS. 44 
 
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690 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and made unlawful ; for a statute would not inflict 
 a penalty on what was lawful (a). Consequently, 
 when the thing in respect of which the penalty 
 is imposed is a contract, it is illegal and void. 
 In the case cited above, the Act had declared 
 that it should not be lawful to take the apprentice, 
 and imposed a penalty for doing so (b) ; and in 
 another, where service under an indenture of 
 apprenticeship as a sweep was similarly treated, 
 the statute had not only declared the apprentice- 
 ship "void," but imposed a penalty on the 
 master (c). Sec. 24 of the repealed 7 & 8 Vict. 
 c. 110, in enacting that every promoter of a joint 
 stock company concerned in making contracts on 
 its behalf before its provisional registration, should 
 be subject to a penalty of ^25, impliedly rendered 
 every such contract illegal and therefore void (d). 
 So, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, in enacting that no com- 
 pany of more than 20 persons should be formed for 
 carrying on any business for gain unless it were 
 registered, rendered illegal and void all contracts 
 
 (a) Per Lord Holt, Bartlett v. Vinor, sup, .p. 688 ; per Lord 
 Hatherley, Cork &g. By. Co., Be, L. E. 4 Ch. 748. 
 (6) B. V. Gravfisend, sup. p. 689. 
 
 (c) 28 Geo. III. c. 48 (repealed S. L. E., 1871) ; B. y. Hips- 
 well, 8 B. & 0. 466. 
 
 (d) Bull V. Chapman, 22 L. J. Ex. 257. See also Ahbott v. 
 Bogers, 24 L. J. C. P. 158. As to restrictions on commencing 
 business under Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, see s. 87 
 of that Act. 
 
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PENALTY MAKES AN ACT ILLEGAL. 691 
 
 for carrying on its business if the company was 
 not registered (a). The Act which imposes a 
 penalty on certain classes of persons for exercising 
 their ordinary callings on Sunday, not only sub- 
 jects the offender to the penalty, but invalidates 
 every contract made in the course of any such 
 prohibited exercise, so far as the right of the 
 offender, and of any person with whom he con- 
 tracted if privy to what made it illegal, are 
 concerned (b). 
 
 Sec. 46, Highway Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. IV. 
 c. 50), in imposing a penalty of JIO on a road 
 surveyor who had any share in a contract for 
 supplying work or materials, or horse labour, for 
 any of his highways, without the written license 
 of two justices, was equally fatal to his recovering 
 any payment for such supplies or services (c). Sec. 
 50, Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (repealed, s. 15, 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), which enacted that 
 the certificate of a ship's registry shall be used 
 only in relation to the navigation of the ship, and 
 imposed a penalty on any person, in possession of 
 
 (a) Padstow Assur. Assoc, Be, 20 Oh. D. 137 ; Jennings v. 
 Eammond, 2 Q. B. D. 225 ; Shaw v. Benson, 11 Q. B. D. 563. 
 In the case of Banks the number of persons is now reduced to 
 10. See s. 1 (1), Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908. 
 
 (6) Fennell v. Bidler (1826), 5 B. & C. 406 ; Smith v. Sparrow 
 (1827), 29 B. E. 514 ; Bloxsome v. Williams (1824), 27 E. E. 
 337. 
 
 (c) Barton v. Piggott (1874), L. E. 10 Q. B. 86. 
 
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692 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 it, who refused to give it up to the person entitled 
 to its custody for the purposes of navigation, 
 impliedly prohibited its use for any other purpose ; 
 and rendered a pledge of it illegal and void, and 
 giving no right to detain it even against the 
 pledgor, if the right of possession and property 
 had vested in him (a). 
 
 Further, any contract connected with or grow- 
 ing out of an act which is illegal is also invalid. 
 Thus, a contract to dance at a theatre not duly 
 licensed cannot be enforced by action (b). It being 
 unlawful for any agent at an election, except 
 the expense agent, to make any payments on 
 behalf of a candidate, even for current expenses, 
 a sub-agent who made any such payments could 
 not, for this reason, recover the amount from his 
 principal (c). So, a contract to make bets (which 
 are, by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, irrecoverable) cannot 
 be enforced (c?). It is a contract to make void 
 contracts. But as a betting contract is void only 
 and not illegal, when a bet has been received by 
 an agent the principal may recover it from him (e). 
 
 (a) Wiley v. Crawford, 30 L. J. Q. B. 319. 
 
 (6) Gallini ,v. Lahorie, 2 E. E. 581. See also Be Begnis v. 
 ^rmisiead, 38 E. E. 406 ; Levy V lates, 8 A. & E. 129 ; Elliott v. 
 Bichardaon, L. E. 5 0. P. 744. 
 
 (c) 26 & 27 Vict. 0. 29 (repealed and re-enaoted, 46 & 47 
 Vict. c. 51, s. 28) ; Parker, Be, 52 L.^J. Ch. 159. 
 
 (d) Oohen v. Kittell, 58 L. J. Q. B. 241. 
 
 (e) Bridger v. Savage, 54 L. J. Q. B. 464. See, however, 
 
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CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH ILLEGAL ACTS 693 
 
 . As 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 99 (a), required that for 
 the better manifesting by whom the business of 
 a pawnbroker was carried on, every person who 
 carried it on should cause his name to be painted 
 over the shop ; an agreement for a partnership in 
 that business, which included a stipulation that 
 the name of one of the partners should not be 
 painted up, was illegal and void (6). And so would 
 be an agreement to let premises to a person, with 
 the object of enabling him to sell spirituous 
 liquors there without a license (c), or to use it 
 as a brothel (c?), or to be used by a "kept" 
 woman for the purpose of receiving her one 
 paramour (e). 
 
 Where an Act provided that before a ship 
 
 Bosewarne v. Billing, 33 L. J. 0. P. 55 ; Bead v. Anderson, 52 
 L. J. Q. B. 219, on which see 55 & 56 Vict. c. 9, considered in 
 De Mattos v. Benjamin, 63 L. J. Q. B. 248, Tatam v. Beeve, 62 
 L. J. Q. B. 30, Levy v. Warhurton, 70 L. J. K. B. 708, and 
 Saffery v. Mayer, Id. 145. 
 
 (a) Repealed and replaced, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, which by s. 13 
 requires that the names of all persons carrying on the business 
 of a pawnbroker shall be legibly painted over the door of the 
 place of business. 
 
 (6) Armstrong v. Lewis (1834), 41 E. R. 10 ; 3 L. J. Ch. 101 ; 
 Warner v. Armstrong, 3 M. & K. 45; Gordon v. Howden, 12 
 01. & F. 237 ; Fraser v. Hill, 1 Macq. H. L. 0. 392. 
 
 (c) Bitehie v. Smith, 18 L. J. C. P. 9. 
 
 (d) Crisp V, GhvrcMll, cited 1 B. & P. 340 ; Smith v. White, 35 
 L. J. Ch. 454. 
 
 (e) Uffill V. Wright, 80 L. J. K. B. 254. 
 
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694 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 sailed, the master should obtain the clearing 
 officer's certificate that the whole cargo was below 
 deck, and forbade him, under a penalty, to sail 
 without the certificate or to place any cargo on 
 deck; a voyage in contravention of these pro- 
 visions would be illegal, and a policy of insurance 
 on the cargo effected by its owner, who was privy 
 to the transaction, void (a). 
 
 Where a statute prohibited brewers from using 
 any ingredients but malt and hops in brewing 
 beer, it was held that a druggist who sold drugs 
 to a brewer with the knowledge that they were 
 to be used in making beer, contrary to the Act, , 
 and under circumstances which made him a 
 participator in the illegal transaction, could not 
 recover the price of the drugs (b). 
 
 But mere knowledge of the purposed illegality, 
 
 (a) See the two cases of Gunard v. Byde (1858), 2 E. & E. 1, 
 and E. B. & E. 670; Wilson v. Banhin, L. E. 1 Q. B. 162; 
 Dudgeon v. Pembroke (1874), L. E. 9 Q. B. ,581; West India 
 Tele. Go. V. Some & Golonial Marine Insurance Go. (1896), 65 
 L. J. Q. B. 616. 
 
 (b) See Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341 ; Abbott v. Sogers, 
 24 L. J. 0. P. 158 ; Langton v. Hughes (1855), 14 E. E. 531 ; 
 Hodgson v. Temple, Id. 738 ; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East, 408 ; 
 Gaslight Go. v. Turner, 54 E. E. 808. See also Fisher v. Bridges, 
 23 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; Geere v. Mare, 83 L. J. Ex. 50 ; aay v. 
 Bay, 17 C. B. N. S. 188 ; Hobbs v. Henning, 34 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 
 Beeston V. Beeston, 1 Ex. D. 13 ; Brooher v. Wood, 5 B. 4; Ad. 
 1052. 
 
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CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH ILLEGALITY. 695 
 
 without actual participation or privity in it, would 
 not affect the contract. Thus, a sale of goods 
 in a foreign country, with the knowledge that 
 the purchaser intended to smuggle them into 
 England, but without any participation in the 
 transaction, would not be invalid {a). 
 
 The question has frequently arisen, when an Act 
 prescribes regulations, forms, or other attendant 
 circumstances, more or less immediately con- 
 nected with contracts, either with or without 
 penalties for non-compliance, whether a contract 
 entered into in disregard of any of them is thereby 
 prohibited, *and so illegal, or whether the object 
 of the Act is not sufficiently attained by the 
 imposition of the penalty ; and the chief test for 
 its decision seems to be whether the provisions 
 have, or have not, some object of general policy, 
 which requires that the contract should be 
 invalidated. 
 
 Thus, it has been held that enactments which 
 required, under penalties, that all bricks made 
 for sale should be of at least certain specified 
 dimensions {b) ; or that persons who sold corn, 
 except by certain measures, should be liable to 
 
 (a) Rolman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341 ; Gomjp. Waymell v. Bead, 
 2 E. E. 675 ; LigUfoot v. tenant, 4 E. E. 735. See Hdbbs v. 
 Henning, 34 L. J. 0. P. 117. 
 
 (V) Law V. Hodson, 10 E. E. 518. 
 
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696 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 a penalty (a) ; or that vendors of coals should, 
 under a penalty, deliver, with the coals sold, a 
 ticket setting forth their weight and the number 
 of sacks in which they are contained (b) ; or that 
 farmers and others should sell butter in firkins 
 of a certain size, branded with their own and the 
 makers' names (c) ; prohibited all contracts made 
 in disregard of such provisions, and made them 
 void, so that no action could be maintained for 
 the price of the goods sold. On the same ground, 
 where printers were required to af&x their names 
 to the books which they printed, it was held that 
 a printer could not maintain an action for his 
 work and materials in printing a booTs: in which 
 he had omitted to comply with this statutory pro- 
 vision (d). The policy of these Acts was to prevent 
 all such dealings ; and it would have been im- 
 perfectly attained, if the sellers had been merely 
 subjected to a penalty, while the purchasers 
 remained liable to be sued. 
 
 The same stringent effect has been given to 
 enactments which imposed, under a penalty, regu- 
 lations relating to personal qualification. Thus, 
 
 (a) Tyson v. Thomas, McOl. & Yo. 119. 
 
 (6) Little V. Poole, 9 B. & 0. 192 ; Oundell v. Dawson, 17 
 L. J. C. P. 311. 
 
 (c) Forster v. Taylor, 39 E. E. 698. 
 
 (d) Bensley v. Bignold, 24 E. E. 401. See also Stephens v. 
 BoUnson, 2 C. & J. 209. 
 
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CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH ILLEGALITY. 697 
 
 an Act which imposed a penalty on an unqualified 
 person who drew conveyances for reward, would 
 invalidate any contract with him for such a pur- 
 pose (a). So, a local Act which imposed penalties 
 on persons for acting as brokers in the City of 
 London, who had not been admitted and paid 
 certain fees for the benefit of the City (inasmuch 
 as its object was, not the enrichment of the citizens 
 of London, but the protection of the public by pre- 
 venting improper persons from acting as brokers), 
 was held to invalidate the dealings of an unqualfied 
 broker, so far as to prevent him from recover- 
 ing payment for his services in that capacity (b). 
 But it would not affect his right to recover 
 from his employer money paid on his behalf 
 to complete the irregular purchase ; for this 
 was a transaction distinct from his character of 
 broker (c). It has been held that an enact- 
 ment, which provided that no person interested 
 in a contract with a company should be capable 
 of being a director, and that if a director of 
 a company were concerned in any contract 
 
 (a) 4:4: Geo. III. c. 98, s. 14; Taylor v. Growland Oas Co. 
 (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 254. 
 
 (b) 6 Anne, c. 16, s. 4 (2), altered as to amount of penalty by 
 57 Geo. III. c. 60; Cope v. Bowlands (1836), 6 L. J. Ex. 63. 
 Observations appUed, Melliss v. Shirley Local Board (1885), 55 
 L. J. Q. B. 143. 
 
 (c) Smith V. Linda, 27 L. J. 0. P. 196, 335. Comp. Steel v. 
 Henley, 1 0. & P. 574 ; Latham v. Hyde, 1 0. & M. 128. 
 
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698 INTEEPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 "with the company, he should cease to be a 
 director, did not, at law, invalidate such a 
 contract (a) ; probably, in equity the contract 
 would be void (b). If, however, the company or the 
 directors, after full disclosure of the interest of the 
 contracting du'eotors, chose to affirm the contract 
 it would probably be binding on the company 
 even in equity (c). 
 
 But where the object of the Act is sufficiently 
 attained without giving the prohibition so stringent 
 an effect, and where it is also collateral to or inde- 
 pendent of the contract, the statute is understood 
 as not affecting the validity of the contract. 
 
 Thus it has been held by the House of Lords 
 that the provision of s. 43, Companies Act, 1862, 
 wbich imposed a penalty of ^50 upon every officer 
 of a limited company "who knowingly and wilfully 
 authorised or permitted the non-registration of 
 mortgages, or charges specifically affecting the 
 property of a company, was not to be construed as 
 also invalidating debentures issued to a director, 
 because he had omitted to register them (d). 
 
 (a) Foster v. Oxford dc. By. Go. (1853), 22 L. J. C. P. 99. 
 Oomp. Barton v. Port Jackson Co., 17 Barbour, New York E. 
 397. 
 
 (fc) Aberdeen By. Go. v. Blaikie (1854), 1 Macq. H. L 0. 461. 
 
 (c) Murray v. Epsom Local Board (1896), 66 L. J. Oh. 107, 
 at p. 109. 
 
 (d) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. 43, repealed, s. 100 (2), Oompanies 
 (Consolidation) Act, 1908 ; Wright v. Eorton, 12 App. Gas. 371. 
 
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CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH ILLEGALITY. 699 
 
 And where an Act subjected every licensed dis- 
 tiller to a penalty of d6200, if he sold spirits by 
 retail, or even wholesale, anywhere within two miles 
 of the distillery, and required that every license 
 should state the name and abode of every person 
 licensed ; it was held that the omission, in the 
 license, of the name and abode of one of the 
 five partners in a distillery, and the retailing of 
 spirits by him, did not affect the sale, so as 
 to prevent the partnership from recovering the 
 price (a). So, the provisions of an Act which im- 
 posed penalties on every dealer in tobacco who 
 omitted to paint his name over the entrance 
 of his premises, or who dealt in tobacco without 
 a license, were understood as not affecting the 
 validity of a contract by a tobacconist who had 
 neglected to comply with them. They were mere 
 fiscal regulations, the breach of which was uncon- 
 nected with the contract; their object was to 
 protect the revenue, and this was completely 
 attained by the enforcement of the penalty {b). 
 On the same ground it has been held that the 
 omission of a broker to send to his principal a 
 stamped contract note in respect of a sale of 
 
 (a) Brown v. Duncan (1829), 6 Man. & Ey. 114 ; Hodgson v. 
 Temple, 14 E. E 738; Johnson v. Hudson, 10 E. E. 465; 
 Wetherell v. Jones, 3 B. & Ad. 221 ; Bailey v. Harris, 18 L. J. 
 Q. B. 115. 
 
 (6) Smith V. Mawhood. 15 L. J. Ex. 149. 
 
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700 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 stock on the Stock Exoliange, as required by 
 s. 17 (1), Eevenue Act, 1888, though subjecting 
 the former to a penalty of ^620 does not prevent 
 him from recovering from the latter his com- 
 mission on such sale (a). 
 
 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 99 (b), already referred to 
 (p. 693), affords an illustration of the two classes of 
 cases. It required a pawnbroker to paint his 
 name and business over his door : and it also 
 required that before he made any advance on a 
 pledge, he should make certain inquiries of the 
 pledger as to his name, abode, and condition in 
 life, and should enter the results of them in his 
 books and on the duplicate. A breach of the 
 former provision would not affect the validity 
 of a pledge ; but a breach of the latter would do 
 so, for they are directly and immediately con- 
 nected with the contract (c), and generally a 
 contract entered into in contravention of a 
 statutory duty, whether the prohibition is express 
 or is implied from the imposition of a penalty, wiU 
 
 (a) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 8, repealed, 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 123, 
 for re-imposition of duty, see ss. 52-53 ; Learoyd v. Bracken, 
 [1894] 1 Q. B. 114. Eor definition of " Contract note," see s. 77 
 (3), Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910. 
 
 (6) Eepealed, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 4. 
 
 j^c) Fergusson v. Norman (1838), 50 E. E. 613. See also 
 Victorian Baylesford Syndicate, Ltd. v. Dott, [1905] 2 Oh. 
 624. 
 
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WHETHER WHOLE OE PART OF CONTRAOT IS VOID. 701 
 
 not support an action (a). And d fortiori this is the 
 case where a statute with the view of affording 
 protection to the public imposes a penalty for 
 doing some particular act (ft). The object of the 
 Legislature by imposing such regulations, being to 
 guard against abuses, and this object would be 
 but imperfectly attained if the contract were held 
 good. 
 
 It was once considered a rigid rule that when 
 the bad part of a contract was made illegal or 
 void by statute, the whole instrument was invaU- 
 dated ; while, if the invalid part was void at 
 common law, the remainder of the instrument 
 was valid ; a statute being, it was said, strict law, 
 while the common law divided according to 
 common reason (c) ; or again, the former like a 
 tyrant making all void ; the latter, like a nursing 
 father making void only the part where the fault 
 is, but preserving the rest {d). But this is not 
 the true test. The question whether the whole 
 instrument, or only the invalid part is void, 
 depends on the more rational ground whether the 
 
 (a) Gundell v. Damon (1847), 17 L. J. 0. P. 311; Forster v. 
 Taylor (1834), 3 B. & Adol. 887. 
 (6) D'Allax V. Jones (1854), 26 L. J. Ex. 79. 
 
 (c) Norton v. Simmes, Hob. 12. 
 
 (d) Maleverer V. Bedshaw, 1 Mod. 35 ; Mosdel v. Middleton, 
 1 Ventr. 237. 
 
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702 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 vitiated part be severable from the rest, or not. 
 If the one cannot be severed from the other part, 
 the whole is void ; but if it be severable, whether 
 the illegality was created by statute or by the 
 common law, the bad part may be rejected, and 
 the good retained (a). Thus, though some of the 
 rules of a Trade Union may be illegal and void, 
 yet it does not follow that the whole of the rules 
 are unenforceable (6). If a deed was made on a 
 consideration, part of ■v^hich was illegal, the 
 whole instrument would be void, for every part 
 of it would be affected by the illegal considera- 
 tion (c) ; and a contract of which the considera- 
 tion is in any part illegal cannot be enforced. 
 But it would be otherwise if only some of the 
 promises which constituted the consideration, 
 
 (a) See per Willes J., Pickering v. Ufracomhe By. Co., L. E. 3 
 C. P. 250; ]per Turner L.J., Jortin v. S. E. By., 6 De 
 G. M. & G. 275 ; Biddell v. Leeder, 1 B. & C. 327 ; Browning, 
 Exp., L. E. 9 Oh. 583. See also Baker v. Hedgecoch (1888), 39 Ch. 
 Div. 520, per Chitty J., and the cases there cited; Byrne, Exp., 
 Burden, In re (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 310, 0. A. ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 263 ; Isaacson, In re. Mason, Exp. (1894), 64 L. J. Q. B. 191 ; 
 
 Continental Tyre & Bubher Co. v. Heath (1913), 29 T. L. E. 
 308. 
 
 (b) Osborne v. Amalgamated Socy. of Bailway Servants, 80 
 L. J. Oh. 315. Comp. Swaine v. Wilson, inf. p. 704. 
 
 (c) Per Tindal G.J., Walte v. Jones, 1 Bing. N. 0. 662, and 
 Shackell v. Bosier, 2 Bing. N* C. 646 ; Collins v. Gwynne, 51 
 E. E. 43. 
 
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WHETHER WHOLE OR PART OP CONTRACT IS VOID. 703 
 
 were illegal, and the illegality did not taint the 
 rest. Thus, although a rent-charge on a living 
 was invalidated by a statute, which declared all 
 chargings of benefices with pensions utterly 
 void ; a covenant in the deed which created such 
 a charge, to pay it, was held good and was 
 enforced (a). Where a bill of sale comprised real 
 as well as personal chattels, it was held void as 
 regards the latter, because not in accordance with 
 the statutory form (b). But it was valid as 
 regards the real chattels, because the legal and 
 illegal portions of the deed were severable (c). 
 So though a bill of sale transferring a ship by 
 way of mortgage was void, in consequence of the 
 omission to recite the certificate of registry, a 
 similar covenant, by the mortgagor, to repay the 
 money advanced, and secured by the same deed, 
 was held valid and binding [d). So, a tenant may 
 be sued on his covenant to pay his rent clear of 
 all taxes, although in another part of the lease he 
 covenants to pay the landlord's property tax ; an 
 
 (a) Mouys v. Leaie, 8 T. E. 411, approved by Lord Ellen- 
 borough C.J., Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, 234. 
 
 (&) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, s. 9 ; Cochrane v. Entwistle, 25 Q. B. D. 
 116 ; Brandon Hill v. Lamh (1914), 59 S. J. 75 ; Lester v. 
 Hickling, [1916] 2 K. B. 302. 
 
 (c) Byrne, Exp., Burdett, Be, 57 L. J. Q. B. 2i63. See also 
 Mumford v. Collier, 25 Q. B. D. 279 ; Isaacson, Be. (1894), 64 
 L. J. Q. B. 191. 
 
 (d) Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, 234. 
 
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704 INTBRPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 engagement which was penal and void (a). Where 
 a miner entered into a contract of employment 
 with the owners of a colliery, by which he agreed 
 not to leave his employment without giving 
 fourteen days' notice, and further agreed that 
 deductions in contravention of s. 12, Coal Mines 
 Kegulation Act, 1887, might be made from 
 his wages, it was held that the whole contract 
 of employment was not rendered illegal by the 
 latter agreement, but he was liable to pay 
 damages to the colliery owners for leaving with- 
 out notice (b). And a friendly society or corporate 
 body is not disabled from suing by reason of some 
 of its rules being in restraint of trade and 
 so illegal (c). 
 
 On the same principle, a by-law which is 
 partly good and partly bad is valid as to the 
 former part, if the latter is distinct and separable 
 from it {d) ; and orders of justices and of other 
 
 (a) See GasJcell v. King (1809), 11 Bast, 165 ; Howe v. Synge, 
 15 Bast, 440 ; Beadshaw v. Balders, 4 Taunt. 57 ; Greenwood v. 
 London (Bp.), 5 Taunt. 727 ; Pallister v. Gravesend (1850), 9 
 C. B. 774 ; The Buchhurst Peerage, 2 App. Gas. 1. 
 
 (b) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 58 ; Kearney v. Whitehaven Colliery Co., 
 [1893] 1 Q. B. 700. See also Chell v. Hall (1896), 12 T. L. E. 
 408. 
 
 (c) Swaine v. Wilson, 24 Q. B. D. 252. Camp. Osborne v. 
 Amalgamated Socy. of Bailway Servants, sup. p. 702. 
 
 {d) B. V. Faversham, 8 T. E. 352 ; B. v. Lmdie, 31 L. J. M. C. 
 157 ; per Quain J., Hall v. Nixon, L. E. 10 Q. B. 160 ; per 
 
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REMEDIES. 705 
 
 authorities, and the award of arbitrators are 
 similarly treated (a). 
 
 SECTION II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REMEDIES. 
 
 When a statute creates a new obligation, or 
 makes unlawful that which was lawful before, a 
 corresponding right is thereby impliedly given, 
 either to the public, or to the individual injured 
 by the breach of the enactment ; and sometimes 
 to both. Again, if the Legislature gives to an 
 association of individuals (e.g. a Trade Union) 
 which is neither a corporation nor a partnership 
 nor an individual, a capacity for owning property 
 ■ and acting by agents, such capacity in the absence 
 of express enactment to the contrary involves the 
 necessary correlative of liability to the extent of 
 such property, for the acts and defaults of such 
 agents (b). 
 
 Bayley J., Clark v. Denton, 1 B & Ad. 95 ; Brown v. Holyhead, 
 1 H. & C. 601. See p. 523, sup. 
 
 (a) B. V. Stoke Bliss (1844), 13 L. J. M. C. 151 ; B. v. Oxley, 
 6 Q. B. 256; B. v. Bobinson, 17 Q. B. 466; B. v. Green, 20 
 L. J. M. C. 168 ; Goddard, Be, 19 L. J. Q. B. 305. 
 
 (6) Per Parwell J. (affirmed by the House of Lords) in Taff 
 Vale Bailway v. Amalgamated Society of Bailway Servants, 70 
 L. J. K. B. 905. That decision caused a labour agitation 
 resulting in the passing of the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, which 
 unfortunate Act legalised breaches of contract and interferences 
 if done " in contemplation or furtherance of a Trade Dispute," 
 and prohibited actions of tort against a Trade Union. 
 I.S. 45 
 
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706 INTEBPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 Where a statute creates an offence and specifies 
 certain persons as those by whom the provisions 
 of the Act shall be enforced, no other person can 
 prosecute for the offence (a). Where a penalty 
 is imposed nothing being said as to who 'may 
 recover it, nor is it enacted for the benefit of 
 a party aggrieved, the offence not being against 
 an individual, the penalty belongs to the Crown, 
 and the Crown alone can maintain a suit for it (6). 
 
 If a statute prohibits a matter of public 
 grievance (c), or commands a matter of public 
 convenience (cZ), all acts and omissions contrary 
 to its injunctions are misdemeanours ; and if it 
 omits to provide any procedure or punishment 
 for such act or default, the common law method 
 of redress is impliedly given; that is, the pro- 
 cedure by indictment, and punishment by fine 
 or imprisonment without hard labour, or both. 
 The Court may also require the defendant to 
 find sureties to keep the peace and be of good 
 behaviour (e). Thus, s. 7, 43 EHz. c. 2, in 
 
 (a) R. V. CuUtt, 22 Q. B. D. 623 ; Anderson v. Hamlin, 25 
 Q. B. D. 221. 
 
 (b) 29 & 30 Yict. c. 19, s. 5 ; Bradlaugh, v. Glarhe, 8 App. Cas. 
 354. Comp. A.-G. v. Exeter Corporation, sup. p. 324. 
 
 (c) jB. v. Sainshury, 2 E. E. 433. 
 
 (d) B. V. Davis, Say. 133 ; B. v. Price, 11 A. & B. 727. 
 
 (e) 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 4 ; and see the cases collected in 
 Euro's J. Office 11, 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 707 
 
 empowering justices to order the father or other 
 relation of a pauper to pay for his maintenance, 
 impliedly provided for the enforcement of the 
 order by indictment (a). Churchwardens and over- 
 seers were indictable for not making a rate to 
 reimburse constables as directed by 14 Car. II. 
 0. 12, the word " may " in a statute being the 
 same as " shall " in acts relating to justice or 
 the public weal (6). So, refusal or neglect by 
 the father of a child to furnish the registrar of 
 births, when requested, the particulars required 
 by 6 & 7 Will IV. c. 86, s. 20, is an indictable 
 misdemeanour (c). Where it was enacted under 
 the repealed Quarantine Acts (d) that aU persons 
 coming from a place infected by the plague should 
 obey such orders as the King in council shoiild 
 make ; the disobedience of any such order, being 
 a disobedience of the Act, would be indictable, 
 and punishable by fine and imprisonment (e). 
 
 But the matter must be strictly of public con- 
 cern. If the statute extends only to particular 
 persons, or to matters of a private nature, as 
 
 (a) B. V. Bobinson, 2 Burr. 799 ; B. v. Balme, 2 Cowp 648 ; 
 B. V. Ferrall, 2 Den. C. C. 51. 
 
 (b) B. V. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609. 
 
 (c) B. V. Price, 11 A. & B.,727. 
 
 (d) See the PubHc Health Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 19). 
 
 (e) B. V. Harris, 2 E. E. 358 ; B. v. Haigh, 3 T. E. 637 ; B. y. 
 Walker, L. B. 10 Q. B. 855. 
 
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708 INTEBPEBTATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 those relatiBg to distresses by lords on their 
 tenants, disobedience would not be indictable (a). 
 Where the burden of repairing a private road 
 for the use of the owners and occupiers of tene- 
 ments in nine parishes, was thrown upon the 
 owners and occupiers in six of those parishes; 
 the latter were held not indictable for the non- 
 repair of the road, because the duty did not 
 concern the public, but only the individuals who 
 had a right to use the private road (b). 
 
 If the statute which creates the obligation, 
 whether private or public, provides in the same 
 section or passage a specific means or procedure 
 for enforcing it, no other method than that thus 
 provided can be resorted to for that purpose (c). 
 Thus, where the Land Tax Eedemption Act directed 
 that the tax should be added to the rent in all 
 
 (a) 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 4. 
 
 (h) B. V. Bichards, 5 E. E. 489. See also B. v. Storr, 3 Burr. 
 1698, and B. v. Aikins, Id. 1706. 
 
 (c) Per Stirling J., Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton 
 U. C, 67 L. J. Oh. 610, fully cited and applied by Eve J. 
 in Merrick v. Liverpool Corp., 79 L. J. Oh. 756, 757. See per 
 Lord Tenterden, Doe v. Bridges, 1 B. & Ad. 859 ; per Lord 
 Denman, B. v. Buchanan, 8 Q. B. 887; per Lord Bsher M.E., 
 A.-G. V. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. 667; Lamplmgh v. Norton, 
 22 Q. B. D. 457 ; Wake v. Sheffield (Mayor), 12 Q. B. D. 145 ; 
 B. V. County Court Judge of Essex, 18 Q. B. D. 707. This does 
 not apply to the equitable remedy by Injunction. See ex. gr. 
 Cooper V. Whittingham, 49 L. J. Ch. 752, followed in Carlton 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 709 
 
 future bishops' leases, and should be recoverable 
 in the same way as the rent, it was held not 
 recoverable by any other means (a). A breach of 
 5 & 6 Bdw. VI. c. 25 (b), which enacted that no 
 person should keep an ale-house, but such who 
 should be admitted thereunto and allowed in open 
 sessions, or by two justices, under the penalty of 
 summary commitment by justices for three days, 
 was not subject to prosecution by indictment (c). 
 The 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13 (d), having enacted that 
 no spiritual person should take lands to farm, on 
 pain of forfeiting ^610, it was held that an offender 
 could not be indicted for a breach of this enact- 
 ment, but could only be sued for the penalty (e). 
 Similarly, no indictment will lie against an over- 
 seer of a parish for wilfully inserting the names 
 of unqualified persons in the voters' list, or for 
 
 Illmtrators v. Coleman, 60 L. J. K, B. 510; Hayward v. East 
 London Waterworks, 28 Oh. D. 138; A.-G. v. Basingstoke, 45 
 L. J. Gh. 726. Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle U. D. C, [1898] 
 A. C. 387. Distinguished in B. v. Stepney Corp. (1901), 71 
 L. J. K. B. 238 ; [1902] 1 K. B. 317. 
 
 (a) Doe V. Bridges, 95 E. E. 483. Cojjip. Scottish Widows' 
 Fund V. Graig (1882), 51 L. J. Oh. 363. See also Bailey v. 
 Badham (1885), 54 L. J. Oh. 1067 ; 30 Oh. D. 84 ; Tthymney By. 
 Go. V. Bhymney Iron Go., 25 Q. B. D. 146. 
 
 (b) Eepealed, 9 Geo. IV. c. 61, s. 35. 
 
 (c) B. V. Harriot, 4 Mod. 144 ; B. v. Buck, 2 Stra. 679. 
 {d) Eepealed, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 1. 
 
 (e) 2 Hale, P. 0. 171 ; B. v. Wright, 1 Burr. 543. See also 
 per Gur., Gouch v. Steel, 23 L. J. Q. B. 121. 
 
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710 INTEEPEBTATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 any other of tlie offences specified in s. 51, 
 Parliamentary Voters Eegistration Act, 1843, as 
 the section specifies a particular penalty for the 
 offences created, and thereby excludes all others (a). 
 Where an Act which, requiring shareholders to pay, 
 calls on their shares, provided that in case of 
 default the company might sue them in the courts 
 in Dublin ; it was held that an action would not 
 lie in England (6). 
 
 If the newly-created duty is simply an obligation 
 to pay money for a public purpose, the general 
 rule would seem to be that the payment cannot 
 be enforced in any other manner than that 
 provided by the Act ; though the provision be 
 not contained, as in the above cases, in the same 
 section as that in which the duty was created. 
 Thus, 43 Bliz. c, 2, which, by s. 2, authorised the 
 imposition of a poor rate, and, by s. 4, empowered 
 the parochial officers to levy by distress the 
 arrears from those who refused to pay, Hmited the 
 officers to this remedy, and gave no right of 
 action for a poor rate (c). Similarly, where high- 
 
 (a) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18 (repealed, 7 & 8 Geo. V. o. 64, s. 47, 
 Sched. 8) ; B. v. Hall, [1891] 1 Q. B. 747. 
 
 (6) Dmdalk By. Go. v. Taj>8ter, 1 Q. B. 667. See also B. v. 
 County Court Judge of Essex, 18 Q. B. D. 704 ; B. v. Judge of 
 City of London Court, 14 Q. B. D. 905. 
 
 (c) Stevens v. Evans (1761), 2 Burr. 1157, per Denison J. 
 Discussed in Danhy v. Watson (1877), 46 L. J. M. C, at p. 181. 
 
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IMPLIED EEMBDIES. 711 
 
 way rates were made payable under a statute 
 which prescribed a particular procedure for their 
 recovery, it was held that that method only could 
 be pursued, and that no action lay (a). 
 
 It is, however, a general rule, that where an 
 Act of Parliament creates an obligation to pay 
 money, the money may be recovered by action, 
 unless some other specific provision is contained 
 in the Act (6) ; that is, unless an exclusive remedy 
 be given (c) ; and the question may arise whether 
 the particular remedy given by the Act is cumula- 
 tive or substitutional for this right of action. 
 Where a harbour Act required the master of a 
 ship to pay certain duties to the trustees of the 
 harbour; and besides empowering the latter to 
 distrain for them, enacted that any master who 
 eluded payment should stand liable for the pay- 
 ment of them, and that they should be levied in 
 the same manner as penalties were directed by the 
 Act to be levied (that is, by action or distress), it 
 was held that the latter remedy was cumulative, 
 
 (a) Underhill V. ElUcomhe, Model. & Yo. 450. See also 
 London B. & S. 0. By. Co. v. Watson, 4 G. P. D. 118 ; and sup. 
 Chap. V. Sect. I. p. 235. 
 
 (6) Per Parke B., Shepherd v. Hills, 11 Ex. 55. See also 
 ex. gr. Steinson v. Heath, 3 Lev. 400 ; Pelham v. Pichersgill, 1 
 K. E. 348 ; Maurice v. Marsden, 19 L. J. 0. P. 152 ; Bait v. 
 Price, 1 Q. B. D. 264 ; Booth v. Trail, 12 Q. B. D. 8. 
 
 (c) Per Martin B., Hitchinson v. Gillespie, 25 L. J. Ex. 109 ; 
 B. V. Hull & Selhy By. Co., 13 L. J. Q. B. 257. 
 
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712 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 and that as the Act had made the master liable 
 to pay the dues, an action lay for them (a). This 
 decision is said to have been based on the ground 
 that the particular remedy given by the Act did 
 not cover the whole right (6). But where a by- 
 law required a traveller without a ticket to pay 
 the fare from the station whence the train first 
 started to the end of his journey, and by s. 145, 
 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, penalties for forfeitures imposed 
 by the by-laws were recoverable before justices; 
 it was held that the by-law did not create a debt 
 recoverable in a Court of civil jurisdiction (c). 
 
 Where an injunction of a statute ,is general, 
 and is not contained in a clause specifying only 
 particular remedies for the breach of such injunc- 
 tion, such breach may be subject to the common 
 law procedure and punishment, though there be 
 afterwards a particular remedy given (c?). Thus, 
 under 10 & 11 Will. III. c. 17, which declared, in 
 
 (o) Shepherd v. Hills (1855), 11 Ex. 55; 25 L. J. Ex. 6; 
 distinguished in St. Pancras Vestry v. Battenhury (1857), 26 
 L. J. C. P. 243. 
 
 (6) Per Williams J., St. Pancras Vestry v. Battenhv/ry, 2 0. B. 
 N. S. 487. 
 
 (c) London B. & S. C. By. Co. v. Watson, 4 C. P. D. 118 ; dis- 
 tinguished in G. N. By. v. Winder, [1892] 2 Q. B. 595 ; 61 
 L. J. Q. B. 608. 
 
 {d) Per Lord Denman C.J., B. v. Buchanan, 8 Q. B. 883, 
 citing B. V. Wright, 1 Burr. 543. See sup. 330. JB. v. Davis, 
 Say. 133 ; B. v. Gould, 1 Salk. 381. 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 713 
 
 the 1st section, that keeping a lottery was a 
 public nuisance, and, by the 2nd, made the keeper 
 of one liable to a penalty recoverable by penal 
 action, it was held that the offender was also in- 
 dictable (a). 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73 (b) having enacted, 
 in one section, that no person should act as an 
 attorney or solicitor who was not duly admitted 
 and enrolled; and in another, that a breach of 
 this prohibition should be deemed a contempt of 
 Court; it was held that the offence was also 
 indictable (c). So, where a statute prohibited the 
 erection or maintenance of a building within 
 ten feet of a road, declaring such an erection 
 a common nuisance; and, in another section, 
 authorised two justices to convict the proprietor, 
 and to remove the structure ; it was held that an 
 indictment, also, lay for the nuisance {d). 
 
 The underlying principle being — as already 
 stated — that where a statute renders acts punish- 
 able for the first time, if the statute contain no 
 general prohibition, the acts are not punishable 
 
 (a) B. V. Crawshaw, 30 L. J. M. C. 58. 
 
 (6) Partially repealed, S. L. E. {No. 2), 1874, and see 
 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 26. 
 
 (c) B. V. Buchanan (1846), 15 L. J. Q. B. 227. The offender 
 is a criminal, Osborne v. Milman, 18 Q. B. D. 471. But a 
 solicitor struck off the rolls for allowing an unqualified person 
 to use his name is not : Be Eede, 59 L. J. Q. B. 376. 
 
 [d) B. V. Gregory, 5 B. & Ad. 555. 
 
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714 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 by indictment but only in the manner prescribed 
 by the statute (a). 
 
 The same principle applies when tbe duty is 
 a private one. Thus, the Distress for Eent Act, 
 1737 (11 Geo. II. c. 19), which, after (by s. 1) 
 authorising ilandlords to seize the goods of their 
 tenants, when fraudulently and clandestinely 
 removed to elude a distress, gives them, by 
 s. 4 (5), a summary remedy before justices, for re- 
 overing double the value of the goods removed, 
 against a tenant, or any person who assisted 
 him ; was held to give them also, by implication, 
 the right of suing for damages for the fraudulent 
 or clandestine removal (c). 
 
 Where churchwardens refuse to allow an in- 
 spection of their accounts, the Court would not 
 refuse a mandamus to enforce the performance of 
 that duty, if advisable, on public grounds, merely 
 because a pecuniary penalty, applicable to the use 
 of the poor of the parish, was imposed for the 
 refusal (d). 
 
 (a) B. V. Hall, [1891] 1 Q. B. 747, at p. 751. 
 
 (6) Sec. 4 is partially repealed by 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43, s. 4. 
 
 (c) Bromley v. Eolden, 31 E. D. 727 ; Horsfall v. Davy, 1 
 Stark, 169. See also ColUnson v. Newcastle By. Co., 1 C. & K. 
 546 ; Boss v. Bugge-Price, 1 Ex. D. 269 ; discussed in Pulsford 
 V. Devenish, [1903] 2 Ch., at p. 634. See also Brain v. Thomas, 
 50 L. J. C. P. 662 ; and the cases collected in the note to Ashby 
 V. White, 1 Sm. L. C. 266, 12th ed. 
 
 (d) B. V. Clear, 28 E. E. 498. See also Liclifield v. Simpson, 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 715 
 
 When a statute imposes a ministerial, as dis- 
 tinguished from a judicial, duty, for the benefit 
 of particular individuals, any of these, if directly 
 injured by the breach of the duty, has impliedly 
 a right to recover, from the person on whom the 
 duty is cast, satisfaction for the injury done to 
 him contrary to the statute (a), unless, of course, 
 a different intention is to be collected from the 
 Act. Thus, an incorporated vestry, which refused 
 to perform the statutory duty of removing dirt 
 and ashes, was held liable in an action by the 
 party aggrieved, for the expenses incurred from 
 the refusal (6). Although in a later case it was 
 decided that a statutory breach of duty by a 
 corporation to remove street refuse from the 
 streets within its district did not give a right of 
 action to a person suffering special damage by 
 reason of such breach (c). But, on the other 
 hand, an unsuccessful candidate at an election is 
 entitled to sue the returning officer for compensa- 
 tion, if the loss of the election was owing to the 
 
 15 L. J. Q. B. 78, and see Gt Northern Fishing Co. v. Edgehill 
 (1883), 11 Q. B. D., at p. 226. 
 
 (a) 2 Westmr. 13 Edw. I. c. 60 ; 1 Inst. 56a ; Anon., 6 Mod. 
 27 ; per Gur., Couch v. Steel (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; approved 
 in Bobertson v. Amazon Tug & Lighterage Co. (1881), 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 68, at p. 72 ; questioned Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Water- 
 works Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 776. 
 
 (6) Bolborn Union v. St. Leonard, 2 Q. B. D. 145. 
 
 (c) Saunders v. Holborn District Bd. of oris, [1894] 1 Q. B. 64. 
 
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716 INTEBPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 oflScer's neglect of the prescriptions of the Ballot 
 Act, 1872, upon the ground that such duties were 
 merely ministerial {a). An action was held main- 
 tainable by the party wronged against a deputy 
 postmaster, for not delivering a letter according 
 to his duty under the repealed 9 Anne, c. 10, 
 s. 2 ; though he was also liable, under the same 
 Act, to a penalty for detaining letters, recoverable 
 by a common informer (6). Under the repealed 
 8 Anne, c. 19, which gave authors the sole right 
 of printing their works for fourteen years, and 
 provided that if any other person printed them 
 without consent, he should forfeit the printed 
 matter to the proprietor, and a further penny for 
 every sheet, one half to the Queen, and the other 
 half to the informer, the author was also entitled 
 to sue for damages (c). If a railway company 
 were prohibited, for the protection of the owner 
 of one ferry, from making a line to another ferry, 
 an action would lie for breach of the prohibition, 
 without special damage {d). 
 
 {a) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33 ; Pickering v. James (1873), L. E. 8 
 0. P. 489. See also Fotherhy v. Meirop. By. Co., L. E. 2 0. P. 188. 
 
 (6) Bowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906. For existing law, see 
 8 Edw. VII. c. 48, ss. 53 and 57 (/). 
 
 (c) Beckford v. Hood, 4 E. E. 527. See also Novella v. 
 Ludlow, 21 L. J. 0. P. 169. For existing law, see Copyright 
 Act, 1911, and a disquisition thereonin Clerk and Lindsell on 
 Torts, Chap. XXI, 
 
 (d) Chamherlaine v. Chester By. Co., 18 L. J. Ex. 494. 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 717 
 
 See. 38, Companies Act, 1867 (repealed s. 80, 
 Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908), which, after 
 requiring that every prospectus and notice of a 
 joint-stock company, inviting persons to subscribe 
 for shares shall specify the dates and names of the 
 parties to contracts entered into by the company 
 or its promoters before the issue of the prospectus 
 or notice, declares that every prospectus which 
 does not comply with this provision shall be deemed 
 fraudulent on the part of those who knowingly 
 issued it, as regards those who take shares on 
 the faith of such prospectus, and in ignorance of 
 the unmentioned contract, was held to give by 
 implication to such shareholders a cause of action 
 against every such issuer of the prospectus (a). 
 
 If, indeed, the breach of the new duty is made 
 by the Act subject to a pecuniary penalty recover- 
 able only by the party aggrieved, the inference 
 would seem to be that this penalty was intended 
 as a compensation for the private injury, as weU 
 as a punishment for the public wrong ; and there 
 would be no other remedy for either the one or 
 the other (6). Thus, where an Act provided that 
 
 (a) Charlton v. Bay, 31 Law Times, 437. See Goner's Case, 
 1 Oh. D. 182, per James L.J. and Bramwell B. ; Twycross v. 
 Grant, 46 L. J. C. P. 686 ; Shepheard v. Broome, 73 L. J. Ch. 
 608 ; per Lord Lindley, Calthorpe v. Trenchman (1904), 75 
 L. J. Oh. 92. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., Couch, v. Steel, sup. p. 716. See Partridge v. 
 
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718 INTEEPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 if one fishing-boat interfered with another under 
 certain circumstances, the party interfering should 
 forfeit a penalty, recoverable summarily before 
 justices to whom powers were given of enforcing 
 their decisions by distress and imprisonment ; it 
 was held that no action for special damage was 
 maintainable, but that the party injured was 
 limited to the remedy given by the statute (a). 
 It has been observed, indeed, respecting this 
 case, that no duty was imposed on the defendant 
 by the Act ; that he was only prohibited, under 
 a penalty, from exercising- the right of fishing 
 to the extent that he had it at common law; 
 that he was not bound to perform any particular 
 duty created by the Act, but only to forbear to 
 do that which, but for the Act, he might have 
 done (6). But it may be doubted whether the 
 suggested distinction is substantial. If, for the 
 protection of particular persons, an Act prohibited 
 a railway company from making a line in a certain 
 direction, the company would seem liable to an 
 action by those persons for damages sustained 
 from a breach of the enactment (c). At all events, 
 the only duty created, if any, was one to the party 
 
 Naylor, Cro. Eliz. 480 ; sup. pp. 354, 356 ; B. v. Hicks, 24 L. J. 
 M. C. 94 ; Anderson v. Hamlin, 25 Q. B. D. 221. 
 
 (a) Stevens v. Jeacocke, 17 L. J. Q. B. 163. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., Couch v. Steel, sup. p. 715. 
 
 (c) See Ghamberlaine v. Chester By. Co., sup. p. 716. 
 
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IMPLIED EEMEDIES. 719 
 
 injured; and as the Act, in expressly creating 
 that duty, also provided a special remedy for its 
 breach, none other can be implied. 
 
 The right of action, where it exists, is strictly 
 limited to those who are directly and immediately 
 within the scope of the enactment. The Con- 
 tagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 
 Vict. c. 70, s. 57), for example, in imposing a 
 penalty on those who send animals to market 
 with infectious diseases, may give a right of 
 action to the owner of an animal in the market, 
 which caught the disease from the infected animal 
 of the offender, the object of the Act being to 
 protect those who expose animals for sale there ; 
 but it would not give a right of action to the 
 purchaser of the diseased animals which had been 
 wrongfully exposed, for the Act did not aim at 
 the protection of buyers in the market (a). So, 
 an Act which requires a railway company to fence 
 their line, may give the adjoining landowner an 
 action for a breach of the enactment, if his cattle 
 are injured by getting on the Hne in conse- 
 quence; but a passenger injured by an accident 
 caused by such cattle getting on the line, would 
 
 (a) Ward v. Hohhs (1878), 48 L. J. Q. B. 281. As to existing 
 law, see 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57, s. 22 (IX.), and see as to.Clause 12 
 of the Animals (Transit and General) Order, 1912, and offences 
 thereunder, North Staffordshire By. v. Waters (1913), L. G. E. 
 289. 
 
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720 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 not be entitled to an action for the neglect to 
 fence (a). 
 
 The general principle was formerly considered 
 of wider application ; for it was deemed that 
 whenever a statutory duty was created, any 
 person who could show that he had sustained an 
 injury from the non-performance of it, had a 
 right of action for damages against the person on 
 whom the duty was imposed. Accordingly, where 
 an Act (repealed and replaced by 67 & 58 Vict. 
 c. 60, s. 200) required the owner of a ship to 
 keep on board a sufficient supply of medicines, 
 under a penalty of £20 recoverable at the suit 
 of any person and divisible between him and the 
 Seamen's Hospital, it was held that the owner 
 was liable also to an action by a seaman, for 
 compensation for the special damage which he 
 had! sustained from a neglect to supply the ship 
 with medicines, as required by the Act (6). But 
 this proposition cannot be now regarded as law. 
 Whether any such 'right of action arises by im- 
 
 (a) Buxton v. N. E. By. Co. (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 549 ; 37 
 L. J. Q B. 258. Discussed and applied, Thomas v. Bhymney By. 
 (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 141. 
 
 (6) Couch V. Steel, sup. p. 715 ; Holmes v. Clarke, 39 L. J. Ex. 
 135. As to expenses of medical attendance in case of injury or 
 illness to seamen, see 6 Edw. VII. c. 48, s. 34. For Medical 
 Provisions in ease of Emigrant Ships, see 57 & 58 Viet. c. 60, 
 s. 303. 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 721 
 
 plication must depend on the purview of the 
 Act (a). 
 
 Where it was enacted that a waterworks com- 
 pany should (1) fix and maintain fire-plugs; (2) 
 furnish water for haths, wash-houses, and sewers ; 
 (3) keep the pipes always charged at a certain 
 pressure, allowing all persons to use the water 
 for extinguishing fires, without compensation; 
 and (4) supply the owners and occupiers of houses 
 with water for domestic purposes; subject to a 
 penalty of ^10 for any breach of any of those 
 duties, recoverable by the common informer, and 
 to a further penalty of forty shillings a day for 
 breaches of the second and fourth duties, recover- 
 able by any ratepayer ; it was held that the owner 
 of a house burnt down through the company's 
 neglect to keep their pipes duly charged, had 
 no right of action under the statute against the 
 company. It was improbable that Parliament 
 would impose, or the company would have con- 
 sented to undertake, not only the duty of supply- 
 ing gratuitously water for extinguishing fires, but, 
 in addition, the Hability of compensating every 
 householder injured, as well as of paying the 
 penalties attached to the neglect of their duty. 
 Besides, the circumstance that penalties for breach 
 
 (a) See Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441, 
 per Lord Cairns, Oockburn O.J., and Brett L.J. ; Johnston v. 
 Consumers' Gas Go. of Toronto, 67 L. J. P. C. 33. 
 
 i.s. 46 
 
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722 INTEBPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 of the second and fourth duties were recoverable 
 by the ratepayers, raised the inference that the 
 other obligations were intended for the public 
 benefit only (a). So where a duty was for the first 
 time imposed by statute (17 & 18 Vict. o. 104) (b) 
 on the master of a ship, subject to a penalty of 
 JBIO, to give a seaman a certificate of discharge, 
 it was held that an action for damages for breach 
 of this duty was not maintainable (c). 
 
 Where, however, no penalty is provided by an 
 Act for the contravention of its provisions, a 
 person injured by a breach of an absolute and 
 unqualified duty imposed by an Act, has an 
 undoubted cause of action ; and where a penalty 
 is imposed, the cause of action remains, unless 
 it appears from the whole purview of the Act, 
 that the Legislature intended that the only 
 remedy should be by proceeding for the recovery 
 of the penalty (d). 
 . The true principle is, that where the public 
 
 (a) Athinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 
 775 ; Johnston v. Consumers^ Gas Go. of Toronto, [1898] A. C. 
 447, P. C. 
 
 (6) Eepealed, 67 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 745, and see 6 Bdw. VII. 
 c. 48, Bs. 31 and 33. 
 
 (c) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 172 ; Yallance v. Falle, 18 Q. B. D. 
 109. See also G. N. Steamship Co. v. Edgehill (1883), 11 
 Q. B. D. 225. Discussed in Sharp v. Bettie (1884), 11 Ot. of 
 Sess. Cas. (4th ser.), 745. 
 
 {d) Groves V. Wimhorne, [1898] 2 Q. B. 402. 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. 723 
 
 duty imposed by the Act is not intended for 
 the benefit of any particular class of persons, but 
 for that of the public generally, no right of action 
 accrues by implication to any person who suffers 
 no more injury from its breach than the rest 
 of the public. Where a specific remedy is pro- 
 vided by statute, proceedings must be taken to 
 enforce it, and if no specific remedy is so provided 
 the proper course is to proceed by indictment. A 
 public injury is indictable ; but it is not actionable, 
 unless the sufferer from its breach has sustained 
 some direct and substantial private and particular 
 damage beyond and in excess of that suffered in 
 common with the rest of the public (a). If A. 
 digs a trench across the highway, he is indictable 
 only ; but if B. falls into it, A. is liable to an 
 action by B. for the particular injury sustained (6). 
 It has been held that the obstruction of a navi- 
 gable river becomes a private injury as well as a 
 public nuisance, if access is thereby prevented to 
 the inn of the plaintiff, who loses customers in 
 
 (a) Iveson v. Moore, 1 Salk. 15 ; B. v. Bussell, 8 E. E. 506 ; 
 B. V. Bristol Bock Go., 11 E. E. 440 ; per Cur., Chamberlaine v. 
 Cheater &c. By. Co., sup. p. 716 ; Glossop v. Heston Loc. Bd., 12 
 Oh. D. 102, distinguished in Jones v. Llanrwst U. C, 80 L. J. Oh. 
 145; Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle U. B. C, [1898] A. 0. 387. 
 Per WiUs J., Clegg v. Earby Gas Co., [1896] 1 Q. B. 592. 
 ' (6) Gould V. BirJcenhead Corp. (1910), 8 L. E. G. 395. And 
 see Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 6th ed. Chap. I., pp. 33 et seq. 
 
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724 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 consequence (a) ; but it is now established that a 
 person injured in respect of goodwill by a tem- 
 porary obstruction created under statutory powers 
 has no remedy by action (b). Where, however, 
 the public duty of repairing a sea-wall was imposed 
 on a municipal corporation, it was held that an 
 individual whose house was damaged by the sea, 
 in consequence of the neglect of this duty to 
 keep the wall in repair, was entitled to sue the 
 corporation for compensation (c). But the injury 
 must be the proximate, necessary, or natural result 
 of the infringement of the duty ; the infringement 
 being the cama causans, and not merely a causa 
 sine qud non, of the special damage (d). 
 
 Nor does any right of action arise where the 
 duty has been imposed by the Legislature for a 
 purpose altogether foreign to individual interests. 
 
 (a) Bose v. Groves, 12 L. J. C. P. 251 ; Wilkes v. Hungerford 
 Market Co. (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 281 ; Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 
 1 App. Cas. 662 ; Marshall v. Ulleswater Co., L. E. 7 Q. B. 171, 
 per Blackburn J. ; Beckett v. Midland By. (1867), L. E. 3 C. P. 
 82, at p. 96. 
 
 (5) Bicket's Case (1867), L. E. 2 H. L. 175. 
 
 (c) Lyme Begis v. Henley, 37 E. E. 125 ; Buck v. Williams, 
 sup. p. 173. See Nitrophosphate Co. v. St. Eatherine Docks Co., 9 
 Ch. D. 503. See also per Brett L.J., Olossop v. Heston Loc. Bd., 
 12 Ch. D., at p. 121. 
 
 (cT) Benjamin v. Storr, L. E. 9 0. P. 400 ; Colchester v. Brooke, 
 15 L. J. Q. B. 59; Walker v. Goe, 3 H. & N. 395 ; 4 Id. 350; 
 Bomney Marsh v. Trinity House, L. E. 5 Ex.204 ; 7 Id. 247. 
 
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IMPLIED REMEDIES. .725 
 
 Thus, although shipowners were required, under 
 the repealed Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 
 1869, to provide pens and footholds for cattle on 
 board, no action lies against them under the Act 
 by the owners of cattle which are washed over- 
 board, owing solely to the neglect to provide those 
 appliances ; for the Legislature, in providing or 
 authorising such regulations, did not contemplate 
 the protection of proprietary rights, but had in 
 view solely the sanitary purpose of preventing 
 the communication of infectious disease to cattle 
 in sea transit (a). 
 
 So, although the parish surveyor of highways is 
 subject to penalties under the Highway Act, 1835, 
 for any neglect of his duties regarding the main- 
 tenance of the parish roads, he does not thereby, 
 become liable to an action at the suit of a private 
 person who has suffered special damage from their 
 non-repair, or from an obstruction to which the 
 surveyor was, personally, no party. The duties 
 thus imposed on him are duties to his parish, not 
 to the public ; the Act having been passed, not 
 to create a new liability either in the parish or in 
 other persons, but to provide for the fulfilment of 
 the surveyor's duty to the parish (&). The duty 
 
 (a) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 70 ; Gorris v. Scott (1874), L. E. 9 Ex. 126, 
 discussed in Groves v. Wimhorne (Lord), [1898] 2 Q. B., at p. 407. 
 
 (6) Toung v. Bavig (1862), 7 H & N. 760 ; 2 H. & C 197 ; 
 McKinnon v. Penson (1853), 23 L. J. M. C. 97 ; Foreman v. 
 
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726 INTBKPEETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 of keeping the roads in repair, as regards the 
 puhKc, lay on the parish ; and though a parish, 
 like a county, could not be sued civilly, as it was 
 not a corporate body, and could not be compelled 
 to appear in Court (a), this furnished no logical 
 ground for making, under the above circum- 
 stances, their officer liable to an action (6) for 
 non-feasance merely, and not misfeasance (c). The 
 liabiKty of a local authority is not more exten- 
 sive (d). 
 
 And it must now be taken as settled law that a 
 transfer to a public corporation of the obligation 
 to repair does not of itself render such corpora- 
 tion liable to an action in respect of mere non- 
 feasance (e). 
 
 Canterbury, L. E. 6 Q. B. 214 ; Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. E. 9 
 Q. B. 487 ; Gibson v. Preston, L. E. 5 Q. B. 218 ; White v. 
 Hindley Loc. Bd., L. E. 10 Q. B. 219 ; M. v. Poole {Mayor), 19 
 Q. B. D. 602. 
 
 (a) Bussell v. Men of Devon, 1 E. E. 585. Comp. Hartnall v. 
 Hyde Commissioners, 33 L. J. Q. B. 39. 
 
 (6) Per Cur., 2 H. & G. 198. Camp. Blaekmore v. Mile End 
 Vestry, 9 Q. B. D. 451. 
 
 (c) Pendlebury v. Greenhalgh, 1 Q. B. D. 36. 
 
 {d) Cowley v. Newmarlcet Loc. Bd., [1892] A. C. 354; 
 Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bourhe, [1895] A. C, 433 ; Pictou 
 V. Geldert, [1893] A. C. 524 ; Moore v. Lambeth W. W. Co., 17 
 Q. B. D. 462 ; Thompson v. Brighton (Mayor), [1894] 1 Q. B. 
 332 ; Steel v. Dartford Loc. Bd., 60 L. J. Q. B. 256 ; Saunders 
 V. Eolborn Bd. of Worhs, [1895] 1 Q. B. 64. 
 
 (e) Short v. Hammersmith Corp. (1911), 104 L. T. 70. 
 
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REPEAL. 727 
 
 Where a person imported cards contrary to 
 3 Edw. IV. c. 4 (a), which provided that the cards 
 so imported should be forfeited ; it was held that 
 he was not liable to an action at the suit of one 
 to whom the King had granted a license to import 
 cards, paying rent to the King, and who alleged 
 that he was thereby disabled from paying his 
 rent ; for the prohibition did not seem to have 
 been intended for the benefit of the person to 
 whom the license was granted. But besides, the 
 damage may have been considered too remote (b). 
 
 SECTION III. — REPEAL — REVIVAL — COMMENCEMENT. 
 
 Where an Act is repealed, and the repealing 
 enactment is repealed by another, which manifests 
 no intention that the first shall | continue repealed, 
 the common law rule was that the repeal of the 
 second Act revived the first ; and revived it, too, 
 ab initio, and not merely from the passing of the 
 reviving Act(c). But this rule does not apply 
 to repealing Acts passed since 1850. Where an 
 
 (a) Eepealed as to England, S. L. E., 1863. 
 
 (6) EoU. Ab. Action sur case, M. 16, p. 106, cited in the 
 judgment in Gouch, v. Steel, 3 B. & B. 402. 
 
 (c) 2 Inst. 686 ; 4 Inst. 325 ; Case of Bishops, 12 Eep. 7 ; 
 Phillips V. Hopwood, 10 B. & 0. 39 ; Tattle v. Grimuoood, 3 Bing. 
 496, per Best O.J. ; Fuller v. Bedman, 29 L. J. Oh. 324 ; and see 
 Kemp V. Waddingham (1866), L. E. 1 Q. B., at p. 358. 
 
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728 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 Act repealing, in whole or in part,- a former Act, 
 is itself repealed, the last repeal does not now 
 revive the Act or provisions before repealed, unless 
 words be added reviving them (a). It is doubtful 
 whether this rule applies to a repeal by implica- 
 tion (see sup. pp. 285-295) ; but it seems not to 
 apply where the first Act was only modified by 
 the second, by the addition of conditions, and 
 the enactment which imposed these was, itself, 
 afterwards repealed (6). Semble, in such a case, 
 the original enactment would revive. 
 
 Where an Act expired or was repealed, it was 
 formerly regarded, in the absence of provision 
 to the contrary, as having never existed, except 
 as to matters and transactions past and closed (c). 
 Where, therefore, a penal law was broken, the 
 offender could not be punished under it, if it 
 expired before he was convicted, although the 
 
 (a) 52 & 53 Viet. c. 63, s. 11. 
 
 (6) Mount V. Taylor, L. E. 3 C. P. 6^5. See also Levi v. 
 Sanderson, L. E. i Q. B. 332 ; Mirfin v. Attwood, L. E. 4 Q. B. 
 330. 
 
 (c) For a discussion on this proposition, see Bennett v. Tatton, 
 [1918] W. N. 291, and as to the general rule, see per Lord 
 Tenterden, Surtees v. Ellison, 9 B. & C. 752 ; Churchill v. Crease, 
 5 Bing. 177. See also Kay v. Goodwin, 6 Bing. 582, per 
 Tindal C.J. ; A.-G. v. Lamplugh (1878), 8 Ex. Div., at p. 217 ; 
 Morgan v. Thorn, 10 L. J. Ex. 125 ; Steavenson v. Oliver, 10 
 L. J. Ex. 338 ; Simpson v. Beady, 11 M. & W. 346, per Parke B. 
 Comp. B. V. West Biding, 1 Q. B. D. 200. 
 
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REPEAL. 729 
 
 prosecution was begun while the Act was still 
 in force (a). An offence committed against it, 
 while it was still in force, could not be tried 
 after it ceased to be in force. Thus 10 & 11 
 Will. III. c. 23, which made larceny above five 
 shillings a capital offence, having been repealed 
 on the 20th of July, 1820, by 1 Geo. IV. c. 117, 
 an offence against the earher Act committed on the 
 11th of July, could not be punished in the following 
 September ; under the new Act, for it was not in 
 force when the theft was committed, nor under 
 the old one, for it was not in force at the time of 
 the trial (6). In an action for less than forty 
 shillings, the defendant pleaded that the debt ought 
 to have been sued for in a local Court of Bequests. 
 But the Act establishing that Court having been 
 repealed after the plea but before the trial, the 
 plea failed (c). Where an Act which authorised 
 the laying of rails on a road was repealed, it was 
 doubted whether the rails could lawfully remain {d). 
 Where a plaintiff got a verdict for one shilling, 
 
 (a) 1 Hale, P. C. 291, 309 ; Miller's Case, 1 W. Bl. 451 ; 
 M. V. London Jus., 3 Burr. 1456 ; Charrington v. Meatheringham, 
 2 M. & W. 228 ; B. v. Mawgan, 8 A. & E. 496 ; B. v. Denton, 
 21 L. J. M. C. 207 ; B. v. Swan, 4 Cox, 108 ; U.S. v. The Helen, 
 6 Cranch, 203. 
 
 (b) B. V. McKenzie, Euss. & E. 429. 
 
 (c) Warne v. Beresford, sup. p. 401. 
 
 (d) B. V. Morris, 1 B. & Ad. 441. 
 
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730 INTEKPEETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 in June, 1840, and tlie judge did not grant a 
 certificate to deprive him of costs under 43 Bliz. 
 c. 6, until the following month, by which time 
 that Act was repealed by 3 & 4 Vict.- c. 24 ; it 
 was held that the power of certifying could not 
 be exercised, in such a case, after the repeal, 
 and that the certificate was void (a). Sp, where 
 an action was brought and judgment recovered 
 in 1867, in a case where title was in question, 
 and the plaintiff would then have had his costs, 
 either by the presiding judge's certificate, under 
 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, or by a judge's order, to 
 which he would have been entitled ex debito justitise 
 under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, but he obtained neither 
 until after the 1st of January, 1868, when both 
 of those Acts stood repealed by 30 & 31 Vict. 
 c. 142 (which is itself repealed by 51 & 62 Vict. 
 c. 43) ; it was held that the powers under those 
 Acts had ceased to exist, and could not be 
 exercised in the plaintiff's favour (b). 
 Under earlier friendly societies Acts, claims 
 
 (a) Morgan v. Thorn (1841), 10 L. J. Ex. 125 ; Butcher v. 
 Henderson (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 335. 
 
 (6) Butcher v. Henderson (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 335, dissenting 
 from Hestall v. London & S. W. By. Go., L. E. 3 Ex. 141, where 
 Morgan v. Thorn, sup., was not cited. See also Wood v. Biley, 
 L. E. 3 C. P. 26; Doe v. Holt, 21 L. J. Ex. 335; Levi v. 
 Sanderson (1869), 38 L. J. Q. B. 135 (explaining Butcher v. 
 Henderson^ Gamp. Doe v. Boe, 22 L. J. Ex, 17 ; Hobson v. Neale, 
 22 Id. 175. 
 
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REPEAL. 731 
 
 against a society could be enforced only by suing 
 its officers. The 25 & 26 Vict. c. 87 (a), repealing 
 those Acts, provided for the incorporation of the 
 societies, and provided also that all legal proceed- 
 ings then pending against an officer on account 
 of a society might be prosecuted by or against 
 the society in its registered name, without abate- 
 ment. But the Act made no provision respecting 
 the recovery of claims which were then pending, 
 but which had not been sued for. It was held 
 that neither the officers (6), nor the society itself, 
 in its new corporate capacity (c), could be sued 
 in respect of such claims ; but that the individual 
 members of the society were liable to be sued for 
 them (d). 
 
 Now, under the provisions of s. 38 (2), Interpre- 
 tation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), any repeal 
 by that Act or any subsequent Act, unless the 
 contrary intention appears, does not 
 
 (a) revive anything not in force, or existing 
 
 at the time at which the repeal takes 
 
 effect; or 
 {b) affect the previous operation of any enact- 
 
 (o) Eepealed by 39 & 40 Vict. c. 45, which is itself repealed 
 by 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39. 
 
 (6) Toutill V. Douglas, 33 L. J. Q. B. 66. 
 
 (c) Linton v. Blakeney Go-op. Socy., 34 L. J. Ex. 211. 
 
 {d) Dean v. Mellurd (1863), 32 L. J. 0. P. 282, distinguished 
 in Queensland Industrial Society v. Pickles (1865), 35 L. J. Ex. 1. 
 
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732 INTERPKETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 ment so repealed or anything duly done 
 or buffered under any enactment so re- 
 pealed; or 
 
 (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or 
 
 liability acquired, accrued, or incurred 
 under any enactment so repealed (a) ; or 
 
 (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punish- 
 
 ment incurred in respect of any offence 
 committed against any enactment so re- 
 pealed (b) ; or 
 
 (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding, 
 
 or remedy in respect of any such right, 
 privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, 
 forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ; 
 and any such investigation, legal proceeding, or 
 remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, 
 and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment 
 may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not 
 been passed (c). 
 
 If a contract was illegal when it was entered 
 into, and the statute which made it so is after- 
 wards repealed, the repeal will not give validity 
 to the contract, unless it appears that the repeal- 
 ing enactment was intended to have a retrospective 
 
 (a) Lewis v. Hughes, [1916] 1 K. B. 831, 0. A. 
 
 (6) See as to effect on Statutory Order, Bennett v. Tatton, 
 [1918] W. N. 292. 
 
 (c) See Gicynne v. Drewitt, [1894] 2 Ch. 616 ; 63 L. J. Oh. 
 870. And see Traill v. McAllister (1890), 25 L. E. (Ir.) 524. 
 
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REPEAL. 733 
 
 operation, and thus to vary the relation of the 
 parties to each other (a). 
 
 An enactment that offenders should be prose- 
 cuted and punished for past offences, as if the 
 Act against which they had offended had not 
 been repealed, was held to create no fresh power 
 to punish, but only to preserve that which before 
 existed ; and not to authorise punishment after the 
 Act which created the offence had ceased to exist (J). 
 
 Sec. 11, Interpretation Act, 1889, declares that 
 when any Act passed after 1850 repeals another 
 in whole or part, and substitutes some provision 
 or provisions in lieu of the provision or provisions 
 repealed, the latter remain in force until the 
 substituted provision or provisions come into 
 operation by force of the last-made Act. This 
 provision is only declaratory of the common law 
 rule (c). When the Interpretation Act, 1889, or 
 any Act passed after its commencement repeals 
 and re-enacts, with or without modification, any 
 provisions of a former Act, references in any other 
 Act to the provisions so repealed are, unless the 
 contrary intention appears, to be construed as 
 references to the provisions so.re-enacted (d). 
 
 (a) Jaques V. Withy, 1 H. Bl. 65 ; Hitchcock v. Way, 45 B. E. 
 653. Comp. HodgJcinson v. Wyatt, 13 L. J. Q. B. 54. 
 
 (6) The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551. Gomp. B. v. Smith, 31 
 L. J. M. C. 105. 
 
 (c) Per Our., Butcher v. Henderson, L, E. 3 Q. B. 335. 
 
 (d) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 38 (1). 
 
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734 INTEKPBETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 If a temporary Act be continued by a sub- 
 sequent one, or an expired Act be revived by a 
 later one, all infringements of the provisions con- 
 tained in it are breaches of it rather than of the 
 renewing or reviving statute (a). 
 
 Where the provisions of one statute are, by 
 reference, incorporated in another, and the earlier 
 statute is afterwards repealed, the provisions so 
 incorporated obviously continue in force, so far 
 as they form part of the second enactment (b). 
 Thus, when 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27 (c), enacted that 
 certain provisions as to appeals to Quarter 
 Sessions comprised in the 9 Geo. IV.. c. 61, should 
 have effect respecting the grant of certificates 
 under the new Act, and 35 & 36 Vict.' c. 94, 
 repealed the Act of G-eo. IV., it was held that 
 those provisions remained in full force, so far as 
 they formed part of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27 (d). 
 
 Sec. 54, 9 Geo. IV. c. 40, empowered two justices 
 of the county where a prisoner was detained in 
 custody, who had been acquitted of felony on 
 the ground of insanity, to determine his settle- 
 
 (a) B. V. Morgan, 2 Stra. 1066 ; Shipman v. Henbest, i T. E. 
 • 109 ; Dinghy v. Moor, Cro. Eliz. 760. 
 
 (6) B. V. Stoch, 8 A. & E. 405; B. v. Merionethshire, 6 Q. B. 334. 
 
 (c) Eepealed, 10 Bdw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. c. 24, s. 112, 
 Sched. VII. 
 
 {d) B. V. Smith (1873), L. E. 8 Q. B. 146. Comp. Bird v. 
 Adcooh (1878), 47 L. J. M. 0. 123. 
 
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OBSOLETE STATUTES. 735 
 
 ment, and to order his parish to pay such a sum 
 as a Secretary of State should direct, for his 
 maintenance ; and the Act contained also pro- 
 visions with reference to appeals from such orders. 
 Sec. 7, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54 (a), after reciting the ahove 
 section, repealed so much of it as related to the 
 Secretary of State, and enacted that the justices 
 should order the payment of such sum as they 
 should, themselves, direct. Five years later, the 
 Act of Geo. IV. was totally repealed. It was 
 held that the justices had authority to make the 
 order under the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. (6), and that 
 perhaps even the right of appeal had been impliedly 
 preserved (c). 
 
 A law is not repealed by becoming obsolete (d). 
 Thus, trial by battle, — with its oaths denying resort 
 to enchantment, sorcery, or witchcraft, by which 
 
 (a) Eepealed, 47 & 48 Vict. c. 64, s. 17. 
 (&) B. V. Stepney, L. E. 9 Q. B. 383. 
 
 (c) Per Blackburn J., Id. 395. See JR. v. Lewes Prison, L. E. 
 10 Q. B. 579, 
 
 (d) White V. Boot, 2 T. E. 274 ; per Hullock B., Tyson v. 
 Thomas, McGl. & Y. 126, jper Lord Kenyon, Leigh v. Kent, 
 3 T. E. 362 ; B. v. Wells, 4 Dowl. 562 ; The India {No. 2), 33 
 L. J. P. M. & A. 193 ; Eebbert v. Purchas (1871), L. E. 3 P. C. 
 650. The reasoning in this case is disapproved in Bead v. Bp. 
 of Lincoln, [1892] A. C. 644. Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
 may become repealed by " desuetude " ; Hoggan v. Wood, 
 [1889] 16 Eetfcie (Justiciary), 96. 
 
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736 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. 
 
 the law of God might be depressed and the law 
 of the devil exalted (a), though the trial by grand 
 assize, introduced in the time of Henry II., had 
 practically superseded it for centuries, — was stiU 
 in force in 1819 (b). The writ of attaint against 
 jurors for a false verdict was not abolished until 
 1825(c). Until 1789, the sentence on women 
 for treason and husband-murder was burning 
 alive; though in practice ladies of distinction 
 were usually beheaded, while those of inferior 
 rank were strangled before the fire reached 
 them (d). Drawing and quartering was stiU part 
 of the sentence for treason until 1870. UntU 
 1844, it was an indictable offence to sell corn 
 in the sheaf before it had been thrashed out and 
 measured (e) ; an Irish Act (28 EHz. c. 2), against 
 witchcraft, was stiU in force in 1821 (/); and, as 
 late as 1836, insolvents in Scotland were bound to 
 wear a coat and cap half yellow and half brown (g). 
 So, at common law eavesdroppers, or such as 
 
 (a) 2 Hale, P. 0. 233 ; 3 Bl. Comm. 337. 
 
 (6) 59 Geo. til. c. 46. Ashford v. Thornton (1818), 19 E. E. 349 ; 
 1 B & Aid. 405 ; discussed in Cobbett v. Grey (1850), 19 L. J. Ex. 
 137 ; 4 Ex. 729. 
 
 (c) 6 Geo. rV. c. 50, s. 60. 
 
 (d) 3 Inst. 211 ; Post. Or. L. 268. 
 
 (e) 3 Inst. 197 ; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24. 
 
 (/) 1 & 2 Geo. rV. c. 18. For the English Acts relating to 
 Witchcraft, see p. 632, Supp. to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary. 
 {g) 6&1 Willi IV. c. 56, s. 18. 
 
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OBSOLETE STATUTES. 737 
 
 listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a 
 house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon 
 to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are 
 still liable to fine (a) ; and a common scold seems 
 still subject (after conviction upon indictment) to 
 be placed in a certain engine of correction called 
 the trebucket or cucking-stool, or ducking-stool, 
 and, when placed therein, to be plunged in water 
 for her punishment (b). To destroy any of the 
 King's victualling stores seems to be still a capital 
 offence (c). It is still a temporal and indictable 
 offence to deny the being or providence of the 
 Almighty, or, if the offender was educated in, 
 or ever professed the Christian religion, to deny 
 its truth, or the divine authority of the Holy 
 Scriptures (d). An Act of 1786| is still in force 
 which imposes the penalty of flogging upon 
 persons who slaughter horses or cattle without 
 a license, or at unlicensed hours (e). Suffragan 
 
 (a) 2 Hawk. c. 10, s. 58, 4 Bl. Comm. 169; Bum's J, 
 Eavesdroppers. 
 
 (6) 1 Hawk. c. 75, s. 14; 4 Bl. Oomm. 169; Burn's J. 
 Nuisance, s. 4. 
 
 (c) Sec. 1, 12 Geo. III. c. 24, Dockyards &c. Protection 
 Act, 1772. " So far as related to Scotland," this death penalty 
 was repealed by the Statute Law Eevision Act, 1892, 
 
 {d) 9 Will. III. c. 35, amended by 53 Geo. III. c. 160, as 
 regards the Holy Trinity. See also Mr. Justice Stephen's Hist- 
 Grim. L., Vol. 2, pp. 459, 488, 493. 
 
 (e) Sec. 8, 26 Geo. III. c. 71, the Knackers Act, 1786, 
 
 I.S. 47 
 
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738 INTEEPEETATIOK OF STATUTES. 
 
 bishops are now appointed under 26 Hen. VIII. 
 c. 14, although the Act had not been put into 
 force for four hundred years (a) ; and at the present 
 day s. 43 of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, 
 has been so strained in its interpretation as to 
 include numerous articles obviously never within 
 the contemplation of the framers of the section. 
 
 But as usage is a good interpreter of law (see sup. 
 pp. 631 et seq.), so non-usage lays an antiquated 
 Act open to any construction, weakening, or even 
 nullifying its effect (6). And penal laws, if they 
 have been sleepers of long time, or if they be 
 grown unfit for present use, should be, by wise 
 judges, confined in the execution (c). 
 
 Down to the reign of Henry VII., the statutes 
 passed in a session were sent to the sheriff of 
 every county with a writ, requiring him to pro- 
 claim them throughout his bailiwick, and to see 
 to their observance. Some Acts (the Triennial 
 Act of 1641, for example) contained a section 
 requiring that they should be read yearly at 
 sessions and assizes. But proclamation, or any 
 other form of promulgation, was never necessary 
 
 repealed, as regards London, by s. 142 and Sched. V. Public 
 Health (London) Aot, 1891, 54 & 55 Vict. c. 76. 
 
 (a) 26 Hen. VIII. c. 14, was extended by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 56, 
 and explained by 61 & 62 Vict. c. 11. 
 
 (b) See ex. gr. Leigh v. Kent (1789), 3 T. E. 364. 
 
 (c) Lord Bacon, Essay on Judicature. 
 
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COMMENCEMENT OP OPERATIONS. 73& 
 
 to their operation (a). Every one is bound to 
 take notice of that which is done in Parliament. 
 As soon as the Parhament has concluded any- 
 thing, the law presumes that every person has 
 notice of it; for the Parliament represents the 
 body of the whole realm, and therefore it never 
 was requisite that any proclamation should be 
 made ; the statute took effect before (b). 
 
 A statute takes effect from the first moment 
 of the day (c) on which it is passed, unless 
 another day be expressly named, in which case it 
 comes into operation immediately on the expira- 
 tion of the previous day (d). By a fiction of law, 
 the whole session was formerly supposed to be 
 held on its first ^day, and to last only that one 
 day ; and every Act, if no other day was expressly 
 fixed for the beginning of its operation, took 
 
 (a) In Prance, a law took effect only from the date of its 
 insertion in the Bulletin des Lois. In ancient Borne, a Senatua 
 ComuUum had no force till deposited in the Temple of Saturn ; 
 Livy, 39, 4. See Suet. Aug. 94. 
 
 (&) Per Thorpe G.J. (39 Edw. III.), cited in i Inst. 26. 
 
 (c) In a case decided early in 1882, the Supreme Court of the 
 United States took notice of the hour when an Act was passed, 
 for the purpose of determining whether it affected the validity 
 of bonds issued by the town of Louisville. The bonds were 
 issued early on the 2nd of July ; the Act prohibiting their issue 
 was passed later on the same day ; and the bonds were held 
 valid. 
 
 (d) Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 36 (2). 
 
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740 INTERPRETATION OP STATUTES. 
 
 effect, by relation, from the first day of the 
 session. It followed that if a statute, passed on 
 the last day of the session, made a previously 
 innocent act criminal or even capital (a), all who 
 had been doing it during the session, while it 
 was stiU innocent and inoffensive, were liable to 
 suffer the punishment prescribed by the statute (6). 
 But to abolish a fiction so flatly absurd and 
 unjust (c), 33 Geo. III. c. 13 enacted that the 
 Clerk of Parliaments should indorse on every Act, 
 immediately after his title, the date of its passing 
 and receiving the Eoyal assent (d). This indorse- 
 ment is part of the Act, and is the date of its 
 commencement, when no other time is provided. 
 But where a particular day is named for its com- 
 mencement, but the Eoyal assent is not given till 
 a later day, the Act would come into operation 
 only on the later day (e). 
 
 («) See ex. gr. B. v. Thurston, 1 Lev. 91 ; B. v. Bailey, Euss. 
 &E. 1. 
 
 (6) 4 Inst. 25 ; 1 Bl. Oomm. 70, note by Christian; A.-G. v. 
 Banter, 6 Bro. P. 0. 486 ; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. E. 660 ; and 
 the authorities cited in 1 Plowd. 79a. See The Brig Ann, 
 1 Gallison, 62. 
 
 (c) 1 Bl. Comm., 70 n. 
 
 Id) Sup. pp. 72-77. 
 
 (e) Burn v. Garvalho (1834), 4 Nev. & M. 893. See. 9, 
 Newspaper Libel and Eegistration Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, 
 required printers to make certain returns before the 31st of July, 
 1881, yet it was not passed till the following 27th of August. 
 
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COMMENCEMENT OF OPEEATIONS. 741 
 
 When a Bill to continue an Act which is to 
 expire in the same session does not receive the 
 Royal assent until the Act has expired, the con- 
 tinuing Act takes effect from the date of the 
 expiration; except that it does not aflfect any 
 person with any punishment for any breach of the 
 Act between the expiration of the earlier and the 
 passing of the later Act (a). 
 
 Every statute passed since 1850 is a public Act 
 and judicially noticed, unless a contrary intention 
 appears in the statute (6). 
 
 « ■ 
 
 (a) 48 Geo. III. e. 106. 
 
 (6) Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 9. 
 
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INDEX 
 
 ABBOTS, PRIORS, AND OTHER PRELATES, meaning of, 601 
 
 ABJURATION OATH, 
 construction of, 20 
 time for taking, 14 
 
 ABSENCE, 
 
 beyond the seas, affidavit on behalf of one, 24 
 limitation of actions, effect on, 29 
 service, from, meaning of, 176 
 summons on absent party, 22 
 
 ABSOLUTA 8ENTENTIA EXPOSITOBE NON INDIOET, 
 application of, 6 
 
 ABSURDITY, 
 
 construction to avoid, 4, 406, 446 
 presumption against, 356, 362-369 
 
 ABUSE OF POWERS, construction to prevent, 226-284 
 
 ACCEPT, meaning of, 97 
 
 ACCESSORY, meaning of, 477, 616 
 
 ACCOUNT, " on account of," meaning of, 471, 491 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT, meaning of, 68, 69, 138 
 
 ACT OF GOD, exception on account of, 175 
 
 ACT OF PARLIAMENT, 
 
 ancient times, in, form of, 452, 453 
 
 construction and interpretation of. See Construction ; Intee- 
 
 prbtation; Statute. 
 continued by Act passed after its expiration, effect of, 741 
 knowledge of, presumption of, 789 
 private. See Peivatb Act. 
 public. See Public Act. 
 repeal of. See Repeal. 
 title of. See Title. 
 ti/rbi ei orbi, not addressed, 317 
 
 ACTING OR P RACTISING, apothecary, as, 474 
 
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744 INDEX. 
 
 ACTION, 
 
 fit to be tried, what is, 171 
 
 limitations on statutory right of, 284, 708-710, 716 
 
 meaning of, 104, 108, 147, 240, 360, 411 
 
 new form of, effect of creation of, 240, 705 
 
 statute repealed during pendency of, effect of, 730 
 
 statutory duty, for breach of, 705 
 
 ACTS DONE UNDER STATUTE, provisions protecting, 412, 413 
 
 ACTUAL MILITABT SEEVICE, meaning of, 127 
 
 ACTUAL POSSESSION, meaning of, 63 
 
 ACTUALLY PRESENT, meaning of, 102 
 
 ADAPTATION, of meaning of words to the subject, 109 
 
 ADDITION, 
 
 clerical omission, supply of, 25, 444 
 when not permissible, 25 
 
 ADDRESS, meaning of, 118 
 
 ADJACENT, meaning of, 124 
 
 ADJUDGED BANKRUPT, meaning of, 389 
 
 ADMINISTER, 
 
 drugs, meaning of, 473, 490 
 illegal oath, meaning of, 85 
 
 ADMIRALTY, jurisdiction of court of, 33, 34, 62, 243, 278, 316, 401 
 
 ADULTERATION, 
 meaning of, 90, 186 
 mens rea in case of, 58, 195 
 purchaser's predjudice, to, 491 
 unadulterated, selling as, 562 
 
 ADVANTAGE, 
 
 one's own wrong, of, avoidance of, 374 
 rule of law to one's, waiver of, 678 
 
 ADVOWSON, meaning of, 297, 298 
 
 AFFIDAVIT, 
 
 absent party, on behalf of, 24 
 Bills of Sale Act, 1878, under, 15 
 meaning of, 136, 141, 604 
 
 AFFIRMATIVE STATUTE, later often invalidates earlier, 284, 285 
 
 AGAINST, meaning of, 444, 470 
 
 AGENT, 
 
 or other, meaning of, 586 
 
 principal, as representing, 134-140, 162, 471, 493, 494 
 
 AGGRIEVED PERSON, meaning of, 13, 340, 345, 854 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 745 
 
 AGREEMENT, 
 
 violation of statute, in, effect of, 686-705 
 writing, in, meaning of, 347 
 
 ALL, meaning of, 393 
 
 ALL CLAIMS WHATSOEVER, meaning of, 268, 278 
 
 ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, meaning of, 582 
 
 ALL OTHER, meaning of, 68, 585, 602 
 
 ALLOTMENT, meaning of, 169 
 
 ALL PERSONS, meaning of, 156, 292, 357 
 
 ALL PRACTICABLE SPEED, meaning of, 182 
 
 ALMS, meaning of, 577 
 
 ALMSHOUSE, meaning of, 99 n. 
 
 ALTERATION, 
 
 erroneous expression in statute does not effect, 544 
 presumption against, 149, 159, 160, 235-244 
 retrospective operation of, 381-405 
 
 AMBIGUITY, 
 
 construction in case of, 36-39, 356 
 
 unambiguous language to be strictly followed, 356 
 
 AMERICAN STATUTE, 
 
 jurisdiction, conferring, construction of, 552 
 revenue laws in, construction of, 509 
 
 AMOUNT, jurisdiction according to, 243 
 
 ANALOGOUS ACTS, consideration in construing a statute of, 68, 
 542. 
 
 ANCIENT STATUTES, become obsolete, treatment of, 735-738 
 
 AND, equivalent to or, when, 421-424 
 
 ANIMAL, meaning of, 416, 417, 474 n. 
 
 ANNOYANCE, meaning of, 588 
 
 ANOMALY, construction so as to avoid, 346 
 
 ANY, meaning of, 150, 417, 502 
 
 ANY ACT OR THING WHATSOEVER, meaning of, 158 
 
 ANY AGENT, meaning of, 161 
 
 ANY COURT, meaning of, 150 
 
 ANY DWELLING-HOUSE, ETC., meaning of, 598 
 
 ANY ' JUDGMENT OR ORDER, meaning of, 165 
 
 ANY JUSTICE, meaning of, 150 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
746 INDEX. 
 
 ANY OFFICER, meaning of, 62 
 
 ANY OBDEE, meaning of, 80 
 
 ANY OTHER ARTICLE OR THING, meaning of, 596 
 
 ANY OTHER MANNER, meaning of, 146, 481 
 
 ANY PART OF A DRAMATIC WORK, meaning of, 350 
 
 ANY PERSON, meaning of, 62, 502 
 
 ANY PLACE, meaning of, 566, 594 
 
 ANY QUAY OR WHARF, meaning of, 502 
 
 ANY QUESTION ARISING, meaning of, 163 
 
 ANY RIGHT OP COMMON, meaning of, 578 
 
 ANY WILL, meaning of, 81 
 
 ANYTHING DONE, meaning of, 27 
 
 APOLOGY, publication of, requisites to, 211 
 
 APOTHECARY, acting and practising as, meaning of, 474 
 
 APPARENT POSSESSION, meaning of, 121 
 
 APPEAL, 
 
 meaning of, 104, 165 
 notice of, reasonable, 19 
 time for, bow fixed, 13 
 
 APPEARANCE, meaning of, 370 . 
 
 APPOINT, meaning of, 409 
 
 APPREHENSION, meaning of, 420 
 
 ARBITRATION, enlargement of time for, construction of, 142 
 
 ARISING, question, meaning of, 163, 164 
 
 ARTICLE, meaning of, 558, 596 
 
 AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, meaning of, 366 
 
 ASSEMBLE, meaning of, 81 
 
 ASSIGNMENT, meaning of, 213, 456 
 
 ASSIGNS, wbo are, 686, 687 
 
 ASSOCIATED WORDS, construction of, 571-582 
 
 ASSURE, meaning of, 97 
 
 AT LEAST» of time, meaning of, 607 
 
 AT THE KING'S PLEASURE, meaning of, 613, 614 
 
 AT THE OFFICE OF, meaning of, 419 
 
 AT THE TIME OF APPLICATION, meaning of, 344 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 747 
 
 AT THE TRIAL, meaning of, 608 
 
 AUTHOR, consent of, what is, 135 
 
 AUTHORITY, vmder or in pursuance of, construction of, 412-415 
 
 AUTHORISED AND EMPOWERED, meaning of, 425 
 
 BAILIFF, proceedings against, 28 
 
 BAITING, meaning of, 473 
 
 BALLOT ACT^ 1872, construction of, 60, 636 
 
 BANKINa, 
 
 Acts, construction of, 294 
 operations, limitation of, 212, 213 
 
 BANKRUPTCY, 
 
 adjudged bankruptcy, meaning of, 389 
 discharge in, effect of, 19, 32 
 offence under Debtors' Act, 1869, meaning of, 421 
 seizure of goods under elegit, power of, 31 
 warrant of attorney in case of, 34, 35 
 
 BANKRUPTCY ACTS, 
 
 bankrupt's rights and powers imder, 349, 411, 412, 567, 568, 570, 
 
 576 
 construction of, generally, 541, 576 
 creditors' powers under, 227 
 Crown, not binding on, 249 
 evasion of, 223 
 jurisdiction under, 258,'_267, 270 
 
 BARRATRY, meaning of, 196, 200 
 
 BASTARDY, 
 
 Acts, construction of, 259, 275 
 summons, issue and service of, 17, 22 
 
 BEDDING, meaning of, 180 
 
 BEERHOUSE, meaning of, 107 n. 
 
 BEGGAR, meaning of, 96 
 
 BEGINNING TO DEMOLISH, meaning of, 497 
 
 BEING MARRIED, meaning of, 557 
 
 BELIEF, erroneous, effect of, 178 
 
 BELONGING TO THE SOCIETY, meaning of, 133 
 
 BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION, 
 
 limitations on, 131, 132, 138, 139, 147, 501-503 
 preference to be given to, 123-147 
 
 BENEFIT, rale or law for individual, waiver of, 678-687 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
.748 INDEX. 
 
 BETTING, legality of, 692 
 
 BEYOND THE SEAS, meaning of, 29, 30, 409 
 
 BICYCLE, as a carriage, 71, 481 
 
 BIGAMY, 
 
 Acts against, construction of, 257 
 mens rea in case of, 178 
 
 BILL, PAELIAMENTAEY, 
 
 continuing an Act which expires before passing of it, 741 
 
 engrossment of, 75 
 
 originally a mere petition to the King, 72 
 
 BILLS OP EXCHANGE ACT, 1882, construction of, 25, 48 
 
 BILLS OP SALE ACTS, construction of, 15, 31, 135, 168, 173, 197, 
 198, 210, 212, 225, 316, 379, 886, 667 
 
 BOATS AND VESSELS, meaning of, 587 
 
 BODY AND GOODS, forfeiture of, 613 
 
 BOHEA TEA, meaning of, 107 
 
 BOILEE, meaning of, 131 n. 
 
 BONA FIDE, 
 
 acts so done, contrary to statute, effect of, 178, 346, 415 
 statutory discretion or power, necessary to exercise of, 227, 359, 
 
 ' 413. See also Mens Bba. 
 
 BONAM PARTEM, IN, construction in, 553-556 
 
 BOND OE OTHEE SPECIALITY, meaning of, 583 
 
 BOOK, meaning of, 131 n. 
 
 BOOTH, not a house or other tenement, 591 
 
 BOEEOW, 
 
 borrow, owe, or take up money, meaning of, 213 
 power to, 522, 626 n., 655 
 
 BEEAKAGE, LEAKAGE AND DAMAGE, meaning of , 367 
 
 BEEAKING, 
 
 burglarious, what is, 487 
 prison, meaning of, 176 
 
 BEIDGE, meaning of, 98, 130 
 
 BEITISH SHIPS, meaning of, 158 
 
 BEOKEE, meaning of, 64 
 
 BEOUGHT BEPOEE THEM, meaning of, 420, 421 
 
 BUILDING, 
 
 erection of, powers as to, 57, 113 
 meaning of, 57, 112, 113, 127, 558, 591 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 749 
 
 BURDENS, ACT IMPOSING, 
 
 American revenue laws, construction of, 509 
 
 construction of, generally, 501-515 
 
 costs, with reference to, 510 
 
 forms and solemnities in contract, with reference to, 510-515 
 
 Imutation of actions, with reference to, 503 
 
 taxation, with reference to, 504-508 
 
 BURGLAEY, interpretation of the term, 487 
 
 BUSINESS, 
 
 carrying on, meaning of, 580 
 meaning of, 584 
 
 BY-LAW, 
 
 local authority, of, construction of, 185, 523-530 
 partly good and partly bad, validity of, 523-524, 526, 704 
 penalty for infringement of, power to annex, 624, 625 
 statutory, construction of, 523-527 
 
 BY VIETUE OF, meaning of, 412, 413 
 
 CAPITAL OFFENCE, what is, 737 
 
 CAKBIAGE, meaning of, 71, 481 
 
 CAEEIEE, liability pf, 23 
 
 CAEEY ON BUSINESS, meaning of, 118, 580 
 
 CASE, 
 
 (instance), meaning of, 358-360 
 (receptacle), meaning of, 127, 579 
 
 CASH IN, meaning of, 129 
 
 CAST AWAY OE DESTEOY, meaning of, 581 
 
 CASUS OMISSUS, not within canons of interpretation, 29 
 
 CATTLE, meanmg of, 602 
 
 CAUSE TO ATTEND SCHOOL, meaning of, 371 
 
 CEASED TO EESlfiE, meaning of, 259 
 
 CERTIOEAEI, removal of conviction to High Court by, 18 
 
 CES8ANTE BATIONE CESSAT LEX, appHcation of, 81, 82 
 
 CHAMBEES, when a " house," 71 
 
 CHANGE OF LANGUAGE, as change of intention, 66, 565 
 
 CHAEGEABLE TO THE PAEISH, meaning of, 67 ^ 
 
 CHAEGES, 
 
 retrospective, when authorised, 365 
 
 statutes imposing, how construed, 503-510, 588 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
750 INDEX. 
 
 CHARITABLE PUBPOSES, meaning of, 544 
 
 CHAEITABLE TRUST, meaning of, 448 
 
 CHARITABLE USES ACT, 1735, oonstniotion of, 52, 214-216, 
 325, 384 
 
 CHARTER PARTY, 
 
 breach of, jurisdiction as to, 83 
 construction of, 41 
 stamp on, 507 
 
 CHATTEL, 
 
 meaning of, 145, 471 
 
 personal, meaning of, 173 
 
 valuable security, or, meaning of, 471 
 
 CHILDREN, meaning of, 106, 486 
 
 CIRCULARS, OR OTHERWISE, meaning of, 593 
 
 CLAIM, 
 
 compensation, for, meaning of, 345 
 right, of, justification of, 178 
 
 CLEAR DAYS, meaning of, 607 
 
 CLEAR YEARLY VALUE, meaning of, 70 
 
 CLERICAL ERROR, emendation of, 446 
 
 CLERK OF PARLIAMENTS, indorsation on Act by, 740 
 
 COAL, meaning of, 473 
 
 CODIFYINa ACT, construction of, 47 
 
 COIN, payment in, meaning of, 201 
 
 COKE (LORD), rules for interpretation of, 89, 485 
 
 COMMENCEMENT OP ACT OP PARLIAMENT, when, 739, 740 
 
 COMMITTEE, proceeding before, reference to, 51—58 
 
 COMMON, right of, meaning of, 578 
 
 COMMON LAW, statute re-enacting, effect of, 8 
 
 COMMON LODGINa-HOUSE, meaning of, 132 
 
 COMMUNIS EBROB FACIT JUS, application of, 585 
 
 COMPANIES ACTS, construction of, 48, 59 
 
 COMPANY, 
 
 created for special purpose, powers of, 654 
 
 dwelling-place of, 118-120 
 
 incorporated by Act of Parliament, meaning of, 107 
 
 member of, meaning of, 180 
 
 powers and duties impliedly conferred on, 626 
 
 public, what is, 147 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 751 
 
 COMPENSATION, 
 
 Parliamentary powers, under, 172 
 penalty as, 717 
 
 COMPETENT TO DISPOSE, meaning of, 97 
 
 COMPULSOEY POWERS. See Powers. 
 
 COMPUTATION OP TIME, 
 generally, 604 
 
 special oases, in, 11, 12, 344, 659-663, 680 
 See also Time. 
 
 CONDITION, 
 
 meaning of, 140 
 
 statutory duty imposed under, effect of, 647, 648 
 
 CONDUCT, estoppel by, from statutory benefit, 685 
 
 CONFERRING RIGHTS, statute, ? how far affecting foreigners, 
 273-279 i 
 
 CONFISCATION, presumption against, 501 
 
 CONFLICT. See Ebphgnancy. 
 
 CONJECTURAL CONSTRUCTION, admissibility of , 21, 35 
 
 CONJUNCTION, substitution of, 421-424 
 
 CONSENT, JURISDICTION BY, power to give, 683, 684 
 
 CONSEQUENCES of construction, how far to be considered, 6, 35, 
 148, 294, 615 
 
 CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS, effect of, 296-313 
 
 CONSOLIDATION ACT, construction of, 48, 109 
 
 CONSTRUCTION, 
 
 absurd, avoidance of, 356-369 
 
 abuse of powers, to prevent, 226-234 
 
 all terms of statute to be regarded, 33, 40, 54 
 
 alteration of law, how far presumed, 148-177 
 
 beneficial, adoption of, 123-147, 504 
 
 burdens imposed, where, 501-530 
 
 conflicting provisions, in case of, 142, 143 
 
 consequences not contemplated, effect of, 6, 33, 34, 294 
 
 when to be considered, 35, 148-205, 615 
 contemporaneous circumstances, by reference to, 43, 45, 46, 50, 
 
 51, 531 
 criminal statute, of, 462-501 
 Crown, as affecting, 244-254 
 earlier statute, by reference to, 61, 62 
 equitable, when allowable, 447-461 
 equivocation, causing, effect of, 36, 37 
 evasion, to prevent, 206-226 
 extension of meaning, when allowable, 83, 123, 144, 145 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
752 INDEX. 
 
 CONSTBUCTION— con^irewed. 
 
 external oiroumstanoes, reference to, 47, 53 
 
 grammatioal, modification of, 36, 406 
 
 imperative or directory statute, of, 647-673 
 
 implication, by, 615-646 
 
 impossibility, not to create, 673-678 
 
 in hona/m partem, 553-555 
 
 in favorem vitce, 462, 466 
 
 inconvenience to be avoided, 839-356 
 
 intention of legislature, according to, 36, 406-447, 484 
 
 interference with obligations to be avoided, 369-381 
 
 limited, when, 197-205 
 
 literal, when not followed, 36, 37 
 
 when to be followed, 36, 38 
 
 omission, power to supply, 443-446 
 
 oversight in statute, effect of, 33 
 
 penal law, of, 462-501 
 
 preamble, by reference to, 77-92 
 
 reasonable, to be, 339-356 
 
 rights encroached upon, where, 501-530 
 
 statute, imposed by, effect of, 541-552 
 
 strict, in general to be followed, 94 
 
 tautological expressions, of, 556 
 
 technical language, of, 34 
 
 title of Act as modifying, 74, 75 
 
 unjust, to be avoided, 356-369 
 
 unreasonableness to be avoided, 339-356 
 
 usage, by reference to, 531-541 
 
 variation of language, in case of, 564-571 . 
 
 whole, as a, 33, 40, 54 
 
 conteMpobanea expositio jest optima et fob- 
 
 TISSIMA IN LEGE, application of, 531 
 
 CONTEXT, 
 
 earlier Act, reference to, 61, 64, 542, 544 
 
 examination of, 35, 54-65 
 
 expired and repealed Acts, reference to, 66 
 
 in pari materia, Acts not, reference to, 70, 544 
 
 later Act, construction of, use of, 64 
 
 rules and orders, use of, 65 
 
 similar Acts, reference to, 68 
 
 CONTINUING ACT, taking effect of, 741 
 
 CONTEACT, 
 
 forms and solemnities, Act imposing, construction of, 510, 653- 
 
 655, 695 
 illegal acts, connected with, avoidance of, 688-705, 732 
 interference with, to be avoided, 369-381, 685 
 repeal of statute making illegal, effect of, 732 
 void by statute, effect of, 380, 881, 685-705 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 753 
 
 CONTRAEY TO NATUBAL EQUITY, STATUTE, effect of, 459 
 
 CONTEAVENTION OF STATUTE, right of action, how affected 
 by, 688, 698, 701, 705-727 
 
 CONTKOL, 
 
 possession or control, meaning of, 371 
 proper control, meaning of, 342 
 
 CONVENIENCE, 
 
 presvunption in favour of, 339-356 
 
 statute commanding matters of public, construction of, 706 
 
 CONVEYING, meaning of, 581 
 
 CONVICTION, 
 
 eyidence, as, 30 
 
 felony, of, meaning of, 396 
 
 CO-PAKTNEESHIP, meaning of, 114 
 
 COPYING, meaning of, 481, 491, 617 n. 
 
 CORN, GRASS, OR OTHER PRODUCT, meanmg of, 587 
 
 CORPORATION, 
 
 affidavit by, how made, 141 
 
 certain purposes, for, acts of, 523, 654 
 
 corporate building, meaning of, 127 
 
 examination of debtor who is, 24 
 
 meaning of, 617, 619, 620, 654 
 
 person, as a, 110, 156, 573 
 
 powers of, construction of, 523, 619, 654 
 
 recognisance on appeal by, 143 
 
 residence of, 115, 119 
 
 COSTS, 
 
 Crown, against, 249, 252 
 
 executor, against, 403 
 
 if thought fit, meaning of, 232 
 
 in discretion of Court, meaning of, 151, 289 
 
 may give, meaning of, 428 
 
 not exceeding and less than £5, 403, 410 
 
 private Act, of obtaining, to whom payable, 620 
 
 repealed statute, under, where action pending, 730 
 
 solicitor's action for, 402 
 
 statute allowing, construction of, 45, 510 
 
 COUNTERFEIT COIN, meaning of, 485 
 
 COUNTY, meaning of, 604 
 
 COUNTY COUNCIL, statutory powers of, 623 
 
 COUNTY COURT, admiralty jurisdiction of, 33, 243 
 
 COUNTY, RIDING, DIVISION, meaning of, 586 
 
 LS. 48 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
754 INDEX. 
 
 COUET, 
 
 discretion of, meaning of, 151 
 
 jurisdiction of, statutory provisions as to, 45, 235-244 
 
 open, what is, 15 
 
 COUET OF EECOED, meaning of, 614 
 
 COWS, meaning of, 572 
 
 CEAFT (WHEEEY OE), meaning of, 587 
 
 GEEDIT, obtaining, meaning of, 196, 197 
 
 CEEDITOE, meaning of, 113, 158, 357, 418 
 
 CEIMINAL CAUSE OE MATTEE, meaning of, 134 n. 
 
 CEIMINAL STATUTE, 
 
 construction of, 176, 261-263, 462-501 
 waiver of, 684 
 
 CEOWN, 
 
 exclusion of, implied, 244-254, 549 
 inclusion of, when, 251-253 
 officers of, position of, 253, 254 
 penalty generally payable to, 3 
 
 CVI JUmSDICTIO DATA EST, EA QUOQUE CONCESSA 
 ESSE VIDENTUB, SINE QUIBV8 JVBI8DICTI0 
 EXPLICABI NON POTVIT, application of, 623, 624 
 
 CUILIBET LICET BENUNTIABE JUBI PBO SE INTBO- 
 DUCTO, application of, 678-687 
 
 CUMULATIVE PENALTIES, when given, 351-356 
 
 CUMULATIVE EEMEDIES, provision for, 711 
 
 CUSTOM, 
 
 effect of, 531-541 
 
 how far affected by statute, 315, 320-323 
 
 CUSTOMS ACTS, 
 
 commodities mentioned in, how construed, 107 
 construction of, 480, 503-509 
 evasion of, to be avoided, 508 
 prohibited goods, landing of, 480 
 United States, in, construction of, 509 
 
 CUTTING, indictment for, 466 
 
 DAILY, includes Sunday, 611 
 
 DAMAGE, 
 
 collision, by, meaning of, 113 
 making good, meaning of, 174, 175 
 meaning of, 63 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 755 
 
 DANGEROUS ARTICLES, conveyance of, 182 
 DATE, as part of Act, 77, 739, 740 
 
 DAY, 
 
 clear, not less than, at least, 60.7 
 
 lawful, presumption in favour of, 152, 153 
 
 DEATH, 
 
 order made by deceased magistrate, discharge of, 26 
 penalty of, infliction of, 736, 737 
 
 DEBENTURE, statutory provisions as to, 61, 579 
 
 DEBT, meaning of, 89, 100, 101, 476 
 
 DECLARATORY ACT, restrospeotive operation of, 394, 3^5 
 
 DEFAULT, wilful, meaning of, 64, 199 
 
 DEFECT, 
 
 intended to be remedied, ascertainment of, 43 
 presumption of contemporaneous existence of, 46 
 
 DEFENDANT, as successful party, costs to, 249 
 
 DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AMOUNT OF STOCK, meaning of, 
 508, 509 
 
 DELIVERY, 
 
 gift, delivery or transfer, meaning of, 576 
 of&oe, at the, meaning of, 419 
 
 DEMOLISH, meaning of, 497 
 
 DEPENDING, meaning of, 101 
 
 DEPOSIT RECEIPT, stamp duty in respect of, 506" 
 
 DESERTION, meaning of, 177 
 
 DESUETUDE, Soots Acts repealed by, 735 n. 
 
 DETENTION, in charter party, meaning of, 41 
 
 DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY, meaning of, 495 
 
 DIRECTORY, enactments imperative or, effect of, 647-673 
 
 DISCLAIM, meaning of, 203, 389 n. 
 
 DISCLOSED, meaning of, 364 
 
 DISCRETION, 
 
 court, of, meaning of, 151 
 
 judicial, provision for, 228, 232, 358, 434, 439, 441-443 
 
 meaning of, 228, 232, 434 
 DISPENSATION, with performance, when permissible, 673-687 
 DISPUTE, meaning of, 163, 242 
 DISTANCE, measurement of, construction of, 612 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
756 INDEX. 
 
 DISTRESS, meaning of, 151, 162 
 
 DOCKETING, abolition of, 29 
 
 DOCUMENT, meaning of, 472 
 
 DOMESTIC ANIMAL, meaning of, 474 n. 
 
 DOMICIL, foreign, exclusion of, 268, 275 
 
 DONE, meaning of, 184 
 
 DOWER ACT, 1833, construction of 52, 55 
 
 DRAFTSMAN, errors of, correction of, 38, 49, 149, 407, 447 
 
 DRIVER, meaning of, 496 
 
 DRUNKENNESS. See Mens Eba. 
 
 DUEINa, meaning of, 392, 411 
 
 DUTY, 
 
 Acts imposing, how construed, 501-515 
 implied, when, 623-646 
 power coupled with, 424-443 
 
 prescriptions affecting performance of a, distinguished from those 
 relating to a privilege or power, 648-673 
 
 DWELLING, meanmg'of, 119, 579 
 
 DWELLS OR CARRIES ON BUSINESS, meaning of, 580 
 
 DYING WITHOUT ISSUE, meaning of, 559 
 
 EA QVM FEEQVENTIUS AOCIDUNT, laws made with a 
 view to, 368 
 
 EARLIER ACT, reference to, 61 
 
 EASEMENT, meaning of, 55, 128 n. 
 
 EJUSDEM GENERIS, words and expressions, 571-608 
 
 ELECTION, candidate's pow.ers at, 21 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT, meaning of, 472, 491 
 
 EMPLOYED, meaning of, 493 
 
 EMPLOYMENT, in or about a shop, meaning of, 125 
 
 EMPOWERED, meaning of, 425 
 
 ENABLING statutes, when compulsory, 424-443 
 
 ENCLOSURE ACTS, construction of, 59, 546 
 
 ENCOURAGING, meaning of, 489 
 
 ENDEAVOURING TO PROCURE, meaning of, 495 
 
 ENGLAND OR ELSEWHERE, meaning of, 267 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 757 
 
 ENGLISH SUBJECTS ABEOAD, application of statute to, 256 n. 
 
 ENaEOSSMENT of Bill in Parliament, 75, 76, 738, 739 
 
 ENLAEGEMENT OP TIME, for award, meaning of, 142 
 
 ENTEEING OE BEING, meaning of, 563 
 
 ENTEETAINMENT, meaning of, 574 
 
 EQUITY, 
 
 equitable construction of statute, 447-461 
 statute contrary to, effect of, 459-461 
 ■within the, meaning of, 450, 458, 459 
 
 EQUIVALENT TO VEEDICT OF A JUEY, meaning of, 201 
 
 EQUIVOCATION, words or phrases, of, effect of, 36-39 
 
 EEEONEOUS BELIEF, how ;far to be considered in statutory 
 offence, 181 
 
 EEEOE, law, or fact, of, in statute, effect of, 544-547 
 
 ESTOPPEL, from benefit of enactment, 678-685 
 
 EVASION, 
 
 construction to prevent, 206-226, 350, 508 
 evade, meaning of, 206, 218-225 
 sometimes allowed, 225, 340 
 
 EVEEY, 
 
 conveyance, matter, etc., meaning of, 157, 163 
 
 new building, meaning of, 558 
 
 person, inhabitant, etc., meaning of, 121, 154, 321, 361 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 fresh, meaning of, 152 
 satisfactory, meaning of, 157 
 truly given, meaning of, 415 
 
 EXCEPTION, or saving clause, construction of, 281 
 
 EXCESS OF JUEISDICTION, presumption against, 255 
 
 EXCLUSION, of class of persons, construction of, 168 
 
 EXECUTION OF OFFICE, meaning of, 164, 165 
 
 EXEMPTION, statute granting, construction of, 507, 508, 515-517 
 
 EXPIEED ACT, 
 
 in pari materid, consideration of, 47, 65, 66 
 operation of, 727-738 
 
 EXPOSED FOE SALE, meaning of, 474 
 
 EXPBESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTEBIUS, applica- 
 tion of, 548, 573 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
758 INDEX. 
 
 EXPBESSUM FACIT CESSABE T^CITtrjlf, application of , 635 
 EXTEENAL CIECUMSTANCES, consideration of, 40-47 
 EXTRA TEBSITOBIUM JUS DICENTI IMPUNE NON 
 PABETUB, application of, 255 
 
 EXTEAOTINa SPIEITS, meaning of, 185 
 
 EXTEADITION, construction of Acts relating to, 44, 45, 407, 420 
 
 FAIE PBICE, meaning of, 129 
 
 FALSE PEETENCES, meaning of, 492, 493 
 
 FALSE SIGNALS, obstruction by making, 489 
 
 FANCY BEEAD, meaning of, 481 
 
 FATAL ACCIDENTS ACTS, construction of, 261, 275, 316 
 
 FEE SIMPLE, meaning of, 105, 169-171 
 
 FEMININE, included in masculine, 604 
 
 FINAL JUDGMENT, meaning of, 97 n., 477 
 
 FINE, 
 
 imposition by implication of, 706 
 meaning of, 614 
 
 FINE AETS COPYEIGHT ACT, 1862, construction of, 60 
 
 FIT, 
 
 think, meaning of, 424, 439-441 
 to be tried, meaning of, 171 
 
 FIXTUEES, meaning of, 173 
 
 FOOD, adulteration of, meaning of, 58, 186 
 
 FOE OE IN NAME OF, meaning of, 471, 491, 
 
 FOE SAFE CUSTODY, meaning of, 472 
 
 FOEEIGN ATTACHMENT, appUoation of provisions for, 65 
 
 FOEEIGN ENLISTMENT ACTS, construction of, 44, 494 
 
 FOEEIGNEE, statute how far applicable to, 110, 111, 263-279, 407, 
 408 
 
 FOEPEITUEE, judgment of, meaning of, 613, 614 
 
 FOEGED INSTEUMENT, meaning of, 146 
 
 FOEM, STATUTOEY, 
 
 interpretation by reference to, 65 
 interpretation of, 66, 510 
 observance of. See Formalities. 
 
 FOEMALITIES, statutory, observance of, 14-16, 162, 163, 272, 273, 
 645, 646, 695, 696 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 75& 
 
 FORMED, partnership, meaning of, 103 
 
 FORTHWITH, meaning of, 608 
 
 FOUR, THREE, OR TWO HOUSEHOLDERS, meaning of, 521 
 522 
 
 FRACTION OP A DAY, notice of, 609 
 
 FRAME RENT, deduction for, construction of, 587 
 
 FRAUD, meaning of, 195 
 
 FREQUENTING, meaning of, 474 
 
 FRESH EVIDENCE, meaning of, 152 
 
 FROM, 
 
 loss of life, notice as from, 482 
 meaning of, generally, 606 
 thenceforth, meaning of, 389 
 
 FRUSTRATE, void and of none effect, meaning of, 372 
 
 FURIOUS, riding or driving, what is, 496 
 
 GAME, 
 
 qualification for killing, 20 
 taking, meaning of, 490, 492 
 unlawful pursuit of, what is, 420 
 
 GAMING, suffering to go On, meaning of, 489 
 
 GAS, meaning of, 107 
 
 GENDER, masculine includes feminine, 604 
 
 GENERAL ACT, construction of, 313-829 
 
 GENERAL ALTERATIONS, presumption against, 149 
 
 GENERAL RULES, consideration of, 65, 315, 510 
 
 GENERAL WORDS, interpretation of, 38, 56, 109, 149, 315, 464, 
 583-603 
 
 QENEBALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEBOGANT, application 
 of, 301, 313-329 
 
 GENEBI FEB SPECIEM BEBOOATUB, a,-pi£ilioa.tion oi, 588 
 
 GENERIC WORDS, following more specific, effect of, 583-603 
 
 GENUS, statute dealing with, application of, 145, 301, 314-329 
 
 GIFT, DELIVERY, OR TRANSFER, meaning of, 576 
 
 GIN, meaning of, 107 n. 
 
 GIVEN, 
 
 notice, sufficiency of, 54 
 
 relief ordered to be, application of, 495 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
760 INDEX. 
 
 GOOD CHARACTER, meaning of, 475 
 
 GOOD FAITH, 
 
 act done in, contrary to statute, effect of, 178, 415 
 statutory discretion or power, in case of, 227, 359, 413 
 
 GOODS, meaning of, 70, 112, 127, 145, 198, 575, 589 
 
 GRAIN, meaning of, 107 n. 
 
 GRAMMAR, construction according to, 3, 36, 95, 406 
 
 GROSS, rights in, in relation to rights of common, 578 
 
 GUILTY MIND. See Mens Rba. 
 
 GUN, USING, what is, 492 
 
 GUNPOWDE R, carriage by railway of, 182 
 
 HACKNEY CARRIAGE, meaning of, 566 
 
 HALF A YEAR, meaning of, 604 
 
 HARDSHIP, not to influence interpretation, 7, 10, 11, 356-369, 
 395-401 
 
 HAVING, 
 
 or conveying, meaning of, 581 
 or keeping, meaning of, 581 
 
 HEADING, of section, importance of, 92 
 
 HEARD AND FINALLY DETERMINED, meaning of, 237 
 
 HELD, of a house, meaning of, 563 
 
 HEREDITAMENT, meaning of, 591 
 
 HIGHWAY, 
 
 cattle on, provision as to, 67 
 passing upon, meaning of, 125 
 
 HIMSELF, meaning of, 139, 140 
 
 HISTORY, of statute, to be considered, 38-47 
 
 HOG, meaning of, 467 
 
 HORSE, meaning of, 467, 571, 572 
 
 HOSPITAL, meanmg of, 99 
 
 HOUSE, 
 
 chambers as a, 71 
 inhabited, meaning of, 71, 597 
 place, as a, 574, 597 
 unlicensed theatre, as a, 591 
 
 HOVERING ACTS, reference to, 272 n. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 761 
 
 IDIOT, non-responsibility of, 177 
 
 IF THEY THINK FIT, meaning of, 424, 425, 439-441 
 
 IGNOEANCE, of iUegality, effect of, 181, 739 
 
 ILLEGALITY, 
 
 covenant lawful at the time, effect of, 686 
 illegal acts contracted for, effect of, 688-705 
 
 IMMEDIATELY, meaning of, 608 
 IMMOEAL ACT, meaning of, 489 
 IMMUNITY, how far implied, 648 
 
 IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS, construction to avoid, 369-381, 
 685-687 
 
 IMPEEATIVE STATUTES, construction of, 647-673 
 
 IMPLIED DUTIES, 
 
 duty imposed by statute, where, 236, 636, 637 
 
 jurisdiction, la connection with execution of, 236, 240, 623, 638, 
 
 646 
 justices, of, 236, 239, 241, 603, 624, 639, 641, 644-646 
 privileges or powers conceded, where, 633-636 
 
 IMPLIED ENACTMENTS, deemed mcidental to statute, 615-623 
 
 IMPLIED JUEISDICTION, when granted, 236-244, 623-646 
 
 IMPLIED POWEES, deemed to be granted, 623-646 
 
 IMPLIED EEMEDIES, where new obligation created, 705-727 
 
 IMPLIED EEPEAL, 
 
 operative, when, 281-296, 728, 731, 732 
 
 penal statute, in, 329-338 
 
 repugnant enactment, in case of, 281, 283, 295 
 
 IMPOSING BUEDENS, statute, how construed, 501-510 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITY, of performance, construction in case of, 673-678 
 
 IMPRISONMENT, meaning of, 614 
 
 IMPEOPEE NAVIGATION, meamng of, 124 
 
 IN ANY OTHEE MANNEE, meanmg of, 146 
 
 IN BONAM PABTEM, construction of words, 553-555 
 
 INCAPACITATED PEESON, presumption against inclusion of, 
 
 153, 156, 166, 177 
 IN CASH, meaning of, 129 
 IN DISPUTE, meaning of, 163 
 IN FAULT, meaning of, 65 
 IN FAVOREM VITJE, construction, 462, 466 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
762 . INDEX. 
 
 INFBAUDSM LEGIS FACIT, QUI SALVIS VERBIS LEGIS, 
 SENTENTIAM EJUS CIBCUMVENIT, application of, 
 208 
 
 IN GOOD FAITH. See Bon! Fide. 
 
 IN OE ABOUT A SHOP, meaning of, 125 
 
 IN PARI MATERIA, construction of statute which is, 62, 458, 
 571 
 
 IN RESPECT OF, meaning of, 556 n. 
 
 IN SERVICE, SOLDIER, meaning of, 127 
 
 IN WRITING, meaning of, 347 
 
 INCIDENTS, necessary, inclusion in statute of, 621, 626 
 
 INCLOSURE ACTS, construction of, 546, 627 n. 
 
 INCOME, meaning of, 505, 579 
 
 INCONSISTENCY, construction to avoid, 4, 280-284. See also 
 
 EBPUGNANCy. 
 
 INCONVENIENCE, 
 
 modification of language to avoid, 406 
 
 presumption against construction producing, 339-356, 665 
 
 INCORPORATION, 
 
 Act of Parliament, by, meaning of, 107 
 
 body, of a, by implication, 617, 619 
 
 general Act, of, into special one, 315, 320, 323, 330 
 
 statute on one subject, by, of provisions of another, 314, 320 
 
 INCORRECT WEIGHT, UabiUty in respect of, 196 
 
 INDEFEASIBLE, meaning of, 16 
 
 INDICTMENT, 
 
 information not included in, 27 
 meaning of, generally, 569 
 
 INDIRECTLY, meaning of, 495 
 
 INDORSEMENT, meaning of, 138, 189 
 
 INELIGIBILITY, of officer, construction of, 152 
 
 INFANT, capacity of, 153, 156, 166 
 
 INFERIOR COURT, statute giving jurisdiction to, 235-244 
 
 INFORMATION, 
 
 indictment not included in, 27 
 meaning of, generally, 251, 568 n. 
 
 INHABITANT, meaning of, 114^117, 121, 122, 246 
 
 INHABITED DWELLING-HOUSE, meaning of, 116 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 763 
 
 INJUEIOUSLY AFFECTED, meaning of, 171, 172 n. 
 
 INJUSTICE, 
 
 construction involving, effect of, 7, 16, 19, 356-369 
 modification of language to avoid, 406 
 presumption against, 356-362, 366-369 
 
 INSPECT, meaning of, 617 
 
 INSTANTLY, meaning of, 608 
 
 INSTITUTED, meaning of, 101 n., 102 n. 
 
 INSTRUMENT, 
 
 gaming, of, meaning of, 588 
 
 salmon catching, for, meaning of, 589 
 
 INSTRUMENTS, statute regulating, construction of, 510-515 
 
 INTENTION, 
 
 change or variation of language, in case of, 564-571 
 consequences not intended, exclusion of, 9, 10, 148 
 expression of, importance of, 2, 10 
 legislature, of, to be followed, 36, 48, 49, 93, 110, 123, 152, 164, 
 
 165, 484, 571 
 modification of language to meet, 148, 406-447 
 none expressed, interpretation where, 2, 13, 25 
 words going beyond, how to be treated, 7, 9, 10, 20, 148 
 
 INTENTS TO ALL, meaning of, 582 
 
 INTERESTED IN A CONTRACT, meanmg of, 496 
 
 INTERESTS, as distinguished from rights, 556 n. 
 
 INTERMEDDLE, meaning of, 236 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW, presumption against violation of, 262- 
 273, 407 
 
 INTERPLEADER ACT, held not to bind the Crown, 250 
 
 INTERPOLATION, 
 
 penal Act, in case of, 482 
 
 words, of, how far permissible, 406, 409, 410, 443 
 
 INTERPRETATION, 
 
 associated words, of, 571-582 
 
 ejusdem generis, 583-603 
 
 fundamental rule of, 1, 4, 11 
 
 general words, of, 38, 56, 583-603 
 
 in bonam pa/rtem, 553-555 
 
 incidental matters, of, 3 
 
 making law as distinguished from, 11 
 
 natural and ordinary sense primarily to be taken, 1, 3-8, 13 
 
 object of, 1, 11 
 
 statute, of. See Construction ; Statute. 
 
 words of statute, of, generally. See Words. 
 
 imposed by statute, effect of, 542 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
764, INDEX. 
 
 INTEEPEETATION ACT, 1889. 
 
 See 52 & 53 Vict. o. 63 in the Table of Statutes. 
 
 INTOXICATING LIQUOR, sale of, 23 
 
 IS WITHIN THE LIMITS, meaning of, 563 
 
 ISSUE, meaning of, 97 
 
 ISSUE, WITHOUT, meaning of, 559 
 
 IT SHALL BE LAWFUL, construction of, 429-435, 443 n. 
 
 JEWISH DISABILITY, construction of, 20, 552 
 
 JOINT PENALTY, infliction of^ 352-355 
 
 JUDGE, meaning of, 308 
 
 JUDGMENT, 
 
 final, meaning of, 97 n. 
 life or member, of, 613 
 order, or, meaning of, 165 
 
 JUDICATURE ACT, 1875, oonstruotioii of, 49, 289, 319 
 
 JUDICIAL DUTIES, statute giving, construction of, 638 
 
 JUDICIAL POWERS, 
 
 Act giving, effect of, 437-443, 623-646 
 
 prejudicially affecting person or property, exercise of, 358, 638. 
 
 See aho Jurisdiction. 
 
 JURISDICTION, 
 
 alteration of, effect of, 235-244 
 
 condition, precedent to, observance of, 673-687j 
 
 consent cannot give, 683 
 
 creation of new, construction in case of, 240-244, 517-522 
 
 established, presumption against interference with, 235-240 
 
 excess of, presumption against intention towards, 255-262 
 
 impliedly conferred, when, 623-646 
 
 taken away, when, 237-240 
 Judgments Extension Act, 1868, under, 618 
 legislative, extent of, 255 
 statute conferring, construction of, 307, 318, 515-530, 623-646 
 
 JUST AND CONVENIENT, meaning of, 151 
 
 JUST AND EQUITABLE, meaning of, 592 
 
 JUSTICE. See Injustice. 
 
 JUSTICES, 
 
 any or the nearest, meaning of, 150 
 
 inquiry into indictable offences by, 603 
 
 statute empowering, construction of, 236, 239, 241, 603, 624, 639, 
 
 641, 644-646 
 two or more, meaning of, 645 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 765 
 
 KEEPING OUT OF THE WAY, of debtor, meaning of , 133 
 
 KING'S PLEASUEE, punishment, at, meaning of, 614 
 
 KING'S PEINTER, record of statutes printed by, 76 
 
 KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 guilty. See Mens Eba. 
 
 knowingly, interpretation of, 197, 490, 565, 598 
 
 servant's, as that of master, 137 
 
 statutory provisions, of, presumption of, 739 
 
 LABOUE, meaning of, 584 
 
 LABOUREE, meaning of, 584, 585 
 
 LAND, meaning of, 55, 56, 547, 572, 604 
 
 LAND TAX, liability for, 622 n. 
 
 LANGUAGE, 
 
 ambiguity of, construction of, 36-39 
 interpretation with reference to subject-matter of, 95-123 
 unambiguous, may be determined by usage, 531 
 variation of, effect of, 553-571 
 
 LAST PLACE OF ABODE, meaning of, 259 
 
 LATER ACTS, in pari materia, examination of, 64 
 
 LAWFUL, 
 
 cause, necessity of, 642 
 
 excuse, what is, 485 
 
 it shall be, construction of, 424, 429-435, 440, 443 n. 
 
 purpose, meaning of, 590 
 
 sense, words to be understood in, 553-556 
 
 LAY HANDS, on a priest, meaning of, 36 
 
 LEAVING CATTLE, meaning of, 566 
 
 LEGES EXTBA TEBBITOBIUM NON OBLIGANT, applica- 
 tion of, 255 
 
 LEGES POSTEEIOBES PBIOBES CONTBABIAS ABBO- 
 GANT, application of, 281 
 
 LEGISLATURE, 
 
 excess of jurisdiction by, presumption against, 255-262 
 jurisdiction of, extent of, 255 
 
 LESS THAN, meaning of, 410, 607 
 
 LETTEE, 
 
 nieaning of, 596 
 threatening, sending of, 488 
 
 LEVEL CEOSSING, keeping of, 636 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
766 INDEX. 
 
 LEX NON OOGIT AD IMPOSSIBILIA, application. of, 673-678 
 
 LEX PLUS LAUDATUB QUANDO RATIONE PBOBATUB, 
 application of, 559 
 
 LIABILITY, implication of, 705-727 
 
 LIFE OE MEMBEE, JUDGMENT OF, meaning of, 613 
 
 LIGHT AND UNJUST, of scales, meaning of, 167 
 
 LIKELY TO BE, chargeable, meaning of, 562 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 
 
 absence beyond the seas and, 29 
 
 ambassador, in case of, 264 
 
 Crown, in case of, 249 
 
 foreigner, as affecting, 278 
 
 statutes as to, contraction of, 11, 12, 264, 347, 408, 503 
 
 strict construction in case of, 503 
 
 waiver of benefit of, 678 
 
 LOAN, 
 
 meaning of, 224 
 parochial relief, of, 496 
 
 LOCAL ACT, construction of, 72, 293, 310, 527-530 
 
 LOCAL LAW, 
 
 interpretation by reference to, 540, 541 
 modification by statute of, 323 
 
 LOCOMOTIVE, meaning of, 481 
 
 LODGES, meaning of, 121 n. 
 
 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES, implied enactments as to, 615, 619, 
 621-623 
 
 LOP, trees, meaning of, 100 
 
 LOEDS, exemption of, 145 
 
 LUGGAGE, interpretation of, 565 
 
 LUNACY, 
 
 mens rea in case of lunatic, 134 n., 177 
 removal of lunatic to hospital, authority for, 26 
 service on lunatic, failure to provide for, 28 
 virill of lunatic, validity of, 156 
 
 MADE, 
 
 continue, to, meaning of, 476 
 meaning of, generally, 55 n., 558 
 
 MAGISTEATE, 
 
 order of deceased, discharge of, 26 
 qualification for, 21. See also Justices. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 767 
 
 MAGNA CHAETA, construction of, 64, 145 
 MAGNATES AND NOBLEMEN, who are, 575 
 MAIMED SOLDIERS, meaning of, 421 
 MAKE A REVOLT IN A SHIP, meaning of, 176 
 MAKING GOOD DAMAGE, meaning of, 174, 175 
 MANDATORY ENACTMENTS, construction of, 647-673 
 MANOR, > ^ 
 
 map, as evidence, 157 
 
 royalty, in combination with, 602 * 
 
 MARGINAL NOTE, importance of, 76 
 
 MARKET ACT, application to town built after passing of, 480 
 
 MARRIAGE ACT, 1835, construction of, 261 
 
 MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT, meaning of, 130 
 
 MARRIED, meaning of, 557 
 
 MARRIED WOMAN, 
 
 action by and against, 80, 126, 163 
 capacity of, 154, 163 
 meaning of, 126, 257 
 
 MARRY, construed in two senses in same section, 557, 558 
 
 MASCULINE, includes feminine, 604 
 
 MASTER, liability for acts of servant of, 137 
 
 MAY, 
 
 cases on, 443 n. 
 must, as, 424-429 
 shall, as, 435-439, 707 
 
 MEASURE, 
 
 distance, of, rule as to, 612 
 
 enactments as to sale by, application of, 259 
 
 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, meaning of, 130 
 MEETING, meaning of, 81, 155 
 MEMBER, meaning of, 130 
 
 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, intentions of, not to be con- 
 sidered, 49 
 
 MENS BEA, 
 
 absence of, interpretation with reference to, 193-197 
 
 bigamy, in case of, 178 
 
 bond fide, effect of, 178-181, 185, 193-197 
 
 criminality of act notwithstanding absence of, 185-188 
 
 defined, 177, 195 
 
 drunkard, in case of, 178 
 
 guilty mind, importance in criminal law of, 177 
 
 incapacitated person, in case of, 177 
 
 offence, as ingredient of, 177-197 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
768 INDEX. 
 
 MERCANTILE AGENT, meaning of, 161, 162 
 
 METALS, meaning of, 601 
 
 MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE, meaning of, 494 
 
 MINES AND MINERALS, 
 
 lead mines not included in lands and coal mines, 572 
 reservation of minerals, construction of, 170 
 working of, restriction on, 59 
 
 MINISTERIAL TDUTIES, statute imposing, construction of, 437, 
 645, 715 , 
 
 MISAPPREHENSION, legislature, by, of law or fact, effect of, 544 
 
 MISCHIEF, 
 
 statute, of, within, meaniag of, 450, 466, 478 
 statutory powers to be exercised so as to avoid, 630 
 
 MISDEMEANOUR, what breaches of statute constitute a, 706, 723, 
 724. 
 
 MISTAKE, 
 
 statute, in, construction in case of, 544, 548 
 effect of, 33-35 
 emendation of, 446 
 
 MODIFICATION, 
 
 language of statute, of, how far permissible, 406-443 
 mistake of legislature, in case of. See Mistake. 
 omissions, by supplying, 443-447, 482 
 
 MONEY, meaning of, 588, 589 
 
 MONOPOLY, 
 
 Bank of England, of, protection of, 212, 213 
 statute establishing, construction of, 515 
 value, meaning of, 101, 102 
 
 MONTH, meaning of, 102, 604, 606 
 
 MOTIVE, guUty, absence of, effect of, 195 
 
 MULTIPLICITY OF WORDS, construction in case of, 556-560 
 
 MULTIPLY VOICES, conveyance to, effect of, 374 
 
 MUST, may as, 424-429 
 
 NAVIGATION, 
 
 by-laws as to, what authorised, 525 
 
 improper, what is, 124 
 
 navigating within limits of port, meaning of, 563 
 
 NEAREST, 
 
 justice, who is, 150 
 way, what is, 612 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
' INDEX. 769 
 
 NECESSARY INCIDENTS, attachment to statute of, 615-623 
 
 NEEDLESS MISCHIEF, powers granted by statute not to encourage, 
 630 
 
 NEGATIVE ACTS, statute involving, 285 
 
 NEGLIGENCE, meaning of, 124 
 
 NEW JURISDICTION, 
 
 enactment creating, to be construed strictly, 517-530 
 presumption against creating, 235-244 
 
 NEW STREET, what constitutes a, 367 n. 
 
 NEW THINGS, extension of statutes to, 144, 477-484 
 
 NEW TRIAL, in County Court, power to order, 518 
 
 NEWSPAPER, 
 
 meaning of, 506 
 
 publication encouraging to murder in, 489 
 
 NEXT, 
 
 appointed, meaning of, 14 
 sessions, meaning of, 344, 664 
 
 NO ACTION SHALL BE BROUGHT, meaning of, 272, 360 
 
 NOBLEMAN, who is, 575 
 
 NON EST INTEBPBETATIO, SED DIVINATIO, QU^ 
 BE CEBIT A iirSB^, application of, 457 
 
 NON-OBSERVANCE, 
 
 forms and conditions prescribed, of, effect of, 649-673 
 statutory provisions, of, when excused, 673-687 
 
 NON -PERFORMANCE, of statutory duty, remedy in case of, 705-727 
 
 NON-USAGE, effect of, 735-738 
 
 NOSCUNTUB A SOCIIS, application of, 574 
 
 NOT LESS THAN, meaning of, 607 
 
 NOTICE, 
 
 meaning of, 54 
 validity of, 135, 136, 138 
 
 NOVA CONSTITVTIO FUTUBI8 FOB MAM IMPONEBE 
 DEBET, NON PiJ^r^iJITIS, application of, 881, 382 
 
 NOW OR HEREAFTER, meaning of, 388 
 
 NOXIOUS, 
 
 drug, meaning of, 473, 490 
 trade, what is, 588 
 
 NULL AND VOID, meaning of, 372 
 
 I.S. 49 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
770 INDEX. 
 
 OATH, 
 
 abjuration. See Abjoeation Oath. 
 meaning of, 604 
 
 OBJECT OP ACT, 
 
 consideration of, 148 
 
 presumption against alteration of law beyond, 149 
 
 OBLIGATION, 
 
 implied from concession of privileges, when, 633-637 
 presumption against interference with, 869-381 
 
 OBSCENE, meaning of, 195 
 
 OBSEEVANCE, of conditions, when excused, 673-687 
 
 OBSOLETE STATUTE, effect of, 735-738 
 
 OBSTEUCTION, meaning of, 177, 489, 588 
 
 OCCASIONED BY NEaLECT OB DEFAULT, meaning of , 46 
 
 OCCUPIED, meaning of, 121, 563 
 
 OCCUPIER, meaning of, 116, 120, 121, 128, 129, 246, 598 
 
 OFFENCE, 
 
 meaning of, 852 
 
 offender, meaning of, 551 
 
 same, meaning of, 159 
 
 two or more offenders, imposition of penalties in case of, 351-356 
 
 OFFENSIVE BUSINESS, ETC., interpretation of, 588 
 
 OFFICER, 
 
 eligibility presumed to appointment of, 62 
 special powers conceded to, 164 
 
 OMISSION, 
 
 accidental, in. statute, effect of, 482 
 
 act done, included in, 134 
 
 meaningless and repugnant words, of, 419 
 
 non-incorporation of earlier Act, effect of, 30, 568 
 
 penal statute, in, effect of, 482 
 
 proclamation, in, effect of, 469 
 
 statute, in, how dealt with, 26, 29-31 
 
 power to supply, 407, 443^46, 482 
 
 ON ACCOUNT OF, meaning of, 491 
 
 ON THE MASTER'S APPEARANCE, meaning of, 370 
 
 ON THE TRUE FAITH" OF A CHRISTIAN, oath, construction 
 of, 552 
 
 ONCE IN SIX MONTHS, meaning of, 609 
 
 OPEN, 
 
 court, meaning of, 16 
 inspection, for, meaning of, 164 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 771 
 
 OPENED, KEPT OR USED FOR BETTINO. meaning of, 599 
 
 OPTIMA EST LEGUM INTEBPBES CONSUETUDO, appli- 
 cation of, 531 
 
 OR, when equivalent to and, 35, 421-424 
 
 ORDER, meaning of, 80, 368 n. 
 
 ORDERED, meaning of, 496 
 
 ORDINARY LUGGAaE, meaning of, 565 
 
 OTHER, 
 
 agent, meaning of, 586 
 article or thing, meaning of, 596 
 building, meaning of, 590, 595 
 business, meaning of, 588 
 cattle, meaning of, 602 
 charges, meaning of, 587 
 craft, meaning of, 587 
 instrument, meaning of, 589 
 labourer, meaning of, 585 
 manner, meaning of, 481 
 metals, meaning of, 601 
 obstruction, meaning of, 588 
 person, meaning of, 311, 584, 585 
 personal estate, meaning of, 589 
 place, meaning of, 597 
 prelate, meaning of, 601 
 product, meaning of, 587 
 royalty, meaning of, 601, 602 
 school, meaning of, 587 n. 
 specialty, meaning of, 90 
 than land, meaning of, 591 
 water, meaning of, 602 
 work, meaning of, 594 
 
 OTHERS, 
 
 having any spiritual, etc., liviiig, meaning of, 60 
 having power to take indictments, meaning of, 603 
 
 OTHERWISE, meaning of, 558 n. 
 
 OUSTING JURISDICTION, presumption against, 235-240 
 
 OUT OP ENGLAND, meaning of, 258 
 
 OVERSIGHT IN STATUTE. See Mistake ; Omission, 
 
 OWN PROFIT, meaning of, 364 
 
 OWN WRONG, liability for, 367 
 
 OWNER, meaning of, 129 
 
 OYER AND TERMINER, COURT OF, meaning of, 603 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
772 INDEX. 
 
 PAPIST, taking of abjuration oath by, 14, 20 
 
 PABI MATEBIA, construction of statute m, 62, 458, 571 
 
 PARISH, meaning of, 613 
 
 PABISH OFFIOEB, supplying goods, 337, 495 
 
 PARK, trespassing on, 516 
 
 PAELIAMENT, 
 
 biU in, history of, 72, 73, 738, 740 
 
 clerk of, duty of, 740 
 
 court cannot question authority of, 272 
 
 everybody presumed to have knowledge of act of, 739 
 
 oath by member of, 20 
 
 rolls, entry on, 72, 73 
 
 session of, duration of, 739 
 
 PAEOCHIAL RELIEF, meaning of, 577 
 
 PART, 
 
 meaning of, 350 
 
 repeal of part of statute, 728 
 
 statute partly exceeding jurisdiction of legislature, effect of, 257 
 
 PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT, specific performance 
 of, 454, 654 
 
 PARTICULAR EXPRESSIONS, meaning of some, 603-614 
 
 PARTNERSHIP, Companies Act, 1862, and, 103 
 
 PARTY, 
 
 chargeable, meaning of, 68, 511, 512 
 meaning of, generally, 105, 250 
 
 PASSING, 
 
 Act of, date of, 77, 739 
 
 proclamation of, 738 
 highway, upon, meaning of, 125 
 
 PAST OFFENCES. See Rbteospective Operation. 
 
 PAYMENT OF MONEY, 
 
 enforcement of statutory duty as to, 711 
 
 PENAL ACT, 
 
 act excusable, operation where, 176 
 construction of, generally, 462-501 
 expiry before conviction of, effect of, 728 
 implied repeal in, 329-338 
 limitation of actions under, 534 
 mens rea in case of, 177-197 
 non-usage, effect of, 738 
 repeal of, pending proceedings, 728-732 
 
 PENAL LIABILITY, for act of servant, 137, 187-193 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 773 
 
 PENALTY, 
 
 construction of, 167, 300, 307, 328-338, 340, 848, 351, 353, 362, 
 
 465,696 
 contract, attached to making of, effect of, 380, 689, 690 
 Crown's right to, 3 
 
 implied repeal when penalty altered in later statute, 332 
 joint or several, when, 351-356 
 
 PENDING SUIT, 
 
 effect of alteration of law on, 394j 729-732 
 meaning of, 101 
 
 PEOPLE, KINGS, PRINCES, AND, meanmg of, 577 
 
 PERFORMANCE, 
 
 condition imposed by statute, of, when excused, 673-687 
 prescriptions as to public duties, of, when directory, 659 
 
 PERIODICAL PERFORMANCE, statute imposing, construction 
 of, 609 
 
 PERMISSIVE WORDS, effect of, 424-429 
 
 PERSISTENT CRUELTY, meaning of, 396 
 
 PERSON, 
 
 all persons, meaning of, 156 
 
 corporation as, 110, 573, 613 
 
 every, meaning of, 154, 361 
 
 good character, of, meaning of, 475 
 
 meaning of, generally, 105, 110, 111, 164, 217, 321, 379, 471, 557, 
 
 604 
 other, meaning of, 585 
 so offending, meaning of, 483, 496 
 
 PERSONAL ACT, construction of, 320, 527-530 
 
 PERSONAL CHATTELS, meaning of, 173, 589 
 
 PERSONAL ESTATE, meaning of, 56, 589 
 
 PERSONAL LUGGAGE, meaning of, 565 
 
 PERUSE, meaning of, 617 
 
 PETITION, presenting of, meaning of, 418 
 
 PEW, allotment of, 169 
 
 PILOT, qualification for, 18 
 
 PIRACY, meaning of, 96, 122, 468, 480, 481 
 
 PLACE, 
 
 meaning of, generally, 586, 599 
 place for betting, meaning of, 599 
 place of abode, meaning of, 117, 118, 259 
 place out of England, meanin| of, 258 
 public, meaning of, 492, 574 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
774 INDEX. 
 
 PLANT, meaning of, 588 
 
 PLEADING, form of, construction of, 55 
 
 PLUBAL, singular and, 604 
 
 POLICY OF IN8UEANCE, 
 
 chattel or valuable security, whether, 499 
 construction of, 516 
 
 POLICY, PUBLIC. See. Public Policy. 
 
 POOE LAW, 
 
 Acts relating to, construction of, 337 
 
 settlement, construction of, 216 
 
 suspension of order for removal, meaning of, 420 
 
 POPULAE MEANING, interpretation according to, 3, 98 
 
 POSSESSION, 
 
 land, of, meaning of, 63 
 
 meaning of, generally, 138, 290, 371, 409, 485-487, 581 
 
 servant, by, 212 
 
 taking from, what is, 486 
 
 POST OFFICE, " on behalf of the," meaning of, 493, 494 
 
 POWEE, shall have, meaning of, 426 
 
 POWEES, 
 
 abuse of, construction to avoid, 226-234 
 compulsory, construction of, 517 
 implied, wherein, 623-646 
 statutory, construction of, 517-530, 626 
 
 PRACTICABLE SPEED, meaning of, 182 
 
 PEACTICE. See Procedueb. 
 
 PEAYEB BOOK, construction of, 50, 535-537, 647 
 
 PEEAMBLE, of statute, importance of, 77-92 
 
 PEEFEEEED, indictment, meaning of, 103 
 
 PEEJUDICE OP PUECHASEE, meaning of, 491 
 
 PEEMISES, meaning of, 222 
 
 PEEEOGATIVE EOYAL, statutes understood not to affect, 244-254 
 
 PEESENCE, 
 
 meaning of, 14, 21 
 meeting, at, meaning of, 155 
 
 PEESENT EIGHT, meaning of, 372 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 775 
 
 PRESUMPTION, 
 
 absurdity, against, 356-369 
 
 abuse of powers conferred, against, 226-234 
 
 alteration of previous law, against, 149, 235-244, 280 
 
 change of language, from, 66 
 
 consistency of statute, in favour of, 280 
 
 contemporaneous defects, that legislation dealt with, 45, 46 
 
 creation of new jurisdiction, against, 241-244 ^ 
 
 Crown, inclusion of, against, 244-254 
 
 encroachment on rights, against, 501-530 
 
 evasion, against intention to allow, 206, 350 
 
 excess of jurisdiction, against intention to create, 255-262 
 
 impairing of obligations, against, 369-381 
 
 inconsistency, against, 280 
 
 inconvenience, against, 339-356 
 
 injustice, against, 356-369 
 
 international law, violation of, against, 262-273 
 
 ouster of old jurisdiction, against, 235-238 
 
 principles of general application, against overriding of, 149, 157 
 
 repugnancy, against, 280 
 
 retrospective operation, against, 365, 381-383 
 
 same sense attached to same language, that, 66, 556, 560 
 
 taking advantage of own wrong, against, 370 
 
 unreasonableness, against, 339-356 
 
 PEICE, fair, what is, 129 
 
 PRIEST, wounding in street of, 36 
 
 PRISON, in, meaning of, 538 
 
 PRIVATE ACT, 
 
 construction of, 72, 231, 527, 615 
 parliamentary history of, reference to, 51, 529 
 powers given by, construction of, 230, 231, 527-530 
 public Act incorporated in, repeal of, 26 
 repeal by, effect of, 328 
 
 PRIVATE REMEDIES, implication of, 705-727 
 
 PBIVATOBUM CONVENTIO JVBI PUBLICO NON DEBO- 
 GAT, application of, 682 
 
 PRIVILEGES, 
 
 Act conferring, how construed, 515-517, 626-646 
 obligations impliedly accompanying, when, 633-646 
 
 PROCEDURE, 
 
 alteration of, effect of, 400 
 
 Crown, as affecting, 252, 253 
 
 foreigner, as affecting, 273-279 
 
 retrospective operation on, 397-405 
 
 rules of, power to make, construction of, 517-521 
 
 waiver of, 680 
 statutorily prescribed, adherence to, 616, 708 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
776 INDEX. 
 
 PBOCEEDING INSTITUTED, meaning of, 101 n, 
 
 PROCLAMATION OF STATUTE, in ancient times, 738 
 
 PEOCUBE, endeavouring to, meaning of, 495 
 
 PBODUCT, meaning of, 587, 588 
 
 PROHIBITED GOODS, what are, 480 
 
 PBOHIBITION, by statute, effect on contract of, 685 
 
 PBOMULGATION OP STATUTE, never necessary, 738, 739 
 
 PBOPEETY, 
 
 grant by statute of, effect of, 626 
 meaning of, generally, 128, 270 
 suit respecting, -what is, 24 
 recovered, meaning of, 24 
 
 PEOPEIETOB, agent of, meaning of, 514 
 
 PBOSECUTION INSTITUTED, meaning of, 101 n. 
 
 PEOTECTION, of act done under statute, 413 
 
 PBOVISIONS, meaning of, 96 
 
 PBOVISO, construction of, 281, 283 
 
 PUBLIC ACT, 
 
 incorporated in private Act, effect of, 26 
 what is, 741 
 
 PUBLIC BENEFIT, accord with, as governing interpretation of 
 statute, 2 
 
 PUBLIC BUILDING, meaning of, 492 
 
 PUBLIC COMPANY, meaning of, 147 
 
 PUBLIC DUTY, 
 
 breach of, remedies for, 705-727 
 performance of, statutory prescription of, 659 
 
 PUBLIC GRIEVANCE, prohibition by statute of, effect of, 706 
 
 PUBLIC PLACE, meaning of, 492, 566 
 
 PUBLIC POLICY, statute passed on grounds of, construction of, 
 681, 706 
 
 PUBLIC PURPOSES, priva,te statute giving powers for, construction 
 of, 527 
 
 PUBLIC REFRESHMENT, meaning of, 574 
 
 PUBLIC REMEDIES, provisions conferring, 705-727 
 
 PUBLIC RESORT, PLACE OF, meaning of, 574 
 
 PUBLICATION, 
 rate of, 28 
 statute, of, not necessary, 738, 739 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 777 
 
 PUNCTUATION, importance of, 75, 76 
 
 PUNISHMENT, change ot, effect of, 330. See also Public Ebmbdies . 
 
 PUKCHASER, who is, 491 
 
 PURSUANCE OF, IN, meaning of, 412 
 
 QUANDO ALIQUID PBOHIBETUB, PBOHIBETUB ET 
 OMNE FEB QUOD DEVENITUB AD ILLVD, appli- 
 cation of, 208 
 
 QUARTER SESSIONS, appeal from one to another, 83 
 
 QUAY, ANY, meaning of, 502 
 
 QUI FACIT FEB ALIUM FACIT FEB SE, 
 prmoipal and agent, 134-140, 162, 471, 493, 494 
 statutory recognition of the maximum, 137 
 
 QUORUM, provision for, 287, 562 
 
 RAILWAY, 
 
 Act, construction of, 72, 631 
 
 construction of words affecting liability of, 417 
 
 obstructing, what amounts to, 489 
 
 rating of, 32 
 
 ticket obtained by false pretences, 499 
 
 tolls of, cases as to, 97 n 
 
 RANK, words of, in descending order, 601 , 
 
 RATE, 
 
 Crown, how far applicable to, 247, 248 
 publication of, 28 
 railway, in case of, 32 
 retrospective operation of, 365 
 unoccupied premises, in respect of, 17 
 water, cases as to, 97 n. 
 
 READING WORDS INTO STATUTE, power as to, 26, 29-31, 407, 
 443-446, 482 
 
 REAL ESTATE ABROAD, power over, 268-271 
 
 REASON, 
 
 reason to believe, meaning of, 57 
 statute contrary to, effect of, 459 
 
 REASONABLE, construction to be, 339, 559 
 
 REASONABLE NOTIQE, of appeal, what is, 19 
 
 RECITAL, in statute, effect of, 550, 551. 
 
 RECORD, COURT OF, meaning of, 614 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
778 INDEX. 
 
 BECOED OF STATUTES, keeping of, 72, 73, 741 
 
 RECOVER, meaning of, 503, 617 
 
 RECOVERED, meaning of, 24, 103, 104 
 
 RECTORY, 
 
 charging of, 298 
 
 exemption from residence at, 621 
 
 REFRESHMENT, house for, meaning of, 574 
 
 REFUSING TO QUIT, meaning of, 194 
 
 REGULATIONS, 
 
 fiscal, effect of, 699-701 
 
 power to make, construction of, 517, 518, 523, 524 
 prescribed by statute, when imperative, 648, 695 
 relating to personal qualification, effect of, 696 
 
 REMAINDERMAN, statute rela,ting to, 21 
 
 REMEDIAL STATUTE, 
 
 application of, 141, 144-146 
 
 different meaning to same words when penal or remedial, 560 
 
 REMEDIES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, 
 governed by lex fori, 277 
 implied grant of, 705-727 
 
 REMUNERATION, in case of statutory service, 621 
 
 RENT, meaning of, 97 
 
 RENUNCIATION, of rights, what is, 25 
 
 REPAIRS, meaning of, 509 
 
 REPEAL, 
 
 effect of, generally, 8, 727-735 
 
 implied, when, 281-296, 326, 329-338 
 
 negatived, when deemed, 296-313 
 
 part of Act, of, interpretation by reference to, 67 
 
 penal statute, in case of, 329-338 
 
 private Act, by, extent of, 328 
 
 public Act, of, effect on private Act of, 26 
 
 repealed Act, interpretation by reference to, 66, 68-71 
 
 repealing statute, repeal of, effect of, 727 
 
 REPUGNANCY, 
 avoidance of, 4 
 generaUy, 280-296 
 modification in case of, 406-447 
 
 REQUIRED, meanmg of, 664 
 
 RESIDENCE, 
 
 ceased to reside, meaning of, 259 
 
 meaning of, generally, 78, 118-120, 217, 259 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® . 
 
INDEX. 779 
 
 EESIDENT, 
 
 occupier, meaning of, 669 
 meaning of, generally, 116-120 
 
 RESTRICTION, 
 
 fitness of matter, to, 95 
 
 operation of Act, of, to its scope and object, 148 
 
 RETARD, meaning of, 177 
 
 RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION, 
 rate, of, 365 
 statute, of, 365, 381-405, 733 
 
 RETURN, 
 
 from abroad, meaning of, 409 
 
 procure the return to Parliament, meaning of, 495 
 
 returning to work, meaning of, 494, 495 
 
 BEVENUE LAWS, construction of, 336. See also Customs Acts. 
 
 REVIVAL, of repealed statute, provisions as to, 727-732 
 
 REVOLT, ■>» ship, meaning of, 176 
 
 RIGHT, meaniag of, 578 
 
 RIGHTS, 
 
 interests, as distinguished from, 556 n. 
 meaning of, generally, 128, 578 
 statute conferring, effect of, 650 
 
 foreigners when included in, 273-279 
 encroaching on, construction of, 501-510, 578 
 
 RIVER, meaning of, 565 
 
 ROADS AND STREETS, meaning of, 574 
 
 ROLLS OF PARLIAMENT, entry of statute on, 72, 73, 76 
 
 ROOT, meaning of, 588 
 
 ROTATION, of ports, meaning of, 368 
 
 ROYAL ASSENT TO ACT, 607, 741 
 
 ROYAL MARRIAGES ACT, 1772, construction of, 260 
 
 ROYALTIES, MANORS AND OTHER, meaning of, 601, 602 
 
 RUBRICS, construction of, 50, 535-537, 647 
 
 RULES, STATUTORY, 
 
 interpretation by reference to, 65 
 
 of, 66, 93, 283 n., 523 
 power to make, construction of, 517, 518 
 
 RUNNING AWAY, meaning of, 67, 470, 486 
 
 SAFE CUSTODY, meaning of, 472 
 
 SAILOR, absent beyond the seas, summons on, 22 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
780 ' INDEX. 
 
 SALARY OR INCOME, meaning of, 576, 579 
 
 SALE, 
 
 exposed for, meaning of, 474 
 meaning of, generally, 490, 491 
 usual, what is, 481 
 
 SALE OF GOODS ACT, 1893, construction of, 48, 70 
 
 SALMON, illegal possession of, 184 n. 
 
 SAME, 
 
 cause, meaning of, 362 
 offence, meaning of, 159 
 
 SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE, meaning of, 157 
 
 SAVING CLAUSE, construction of, 281, 282 
 
 SCALES, 
 
 light and unjust, when, 167 
 meaning of, 482, 483 
 
 SCHEDULE, repugnant, construction of, 283 
 
 SCHOOL, 
 
 attendance, meaning of, 371 
 Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, in, 587 n, 
 
 SCOPE OF ACT, construction by reference to, 39, 83, 95, 161, 406 
 
 SEAL, requirement of, 15, 27, 657, 668, 671 
 
 SEAMAN, 
 
 meaning of, 168 n. 
 desertion of, meaning of, 177 
 
 SEARCH, meaning of, 426 
 
 SECOND OFFENCE, meaning of, 614 
 
 SECTION, heading of, importance of, 92 
 
 SECURITY, VALUABLE, meaning of, 471, 499 
 
 SEISED IN FEE, meaning of, 105 
 
 SELL, meanmg of, 125, 140, 143, 490 
 
 SELLER, who is, 614 
 
 SEND, meaning of, 488 
 
 SEPARATE BUILDING, meaning of, 558 
 
 SERVANT, 
 
 absenting himself, meaning of, 176 
 act of, as that of master, 134-140, 189-193, 471 
 knowledge of, construed as master's, 137 
 meaning of, 585 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 781 
 
 SETTLEMENT, 
 mesming of, 97 
 poor law, oonstruotion of, 216, 220 
 
 SEVEBANCE OF SUBPACB, statute involving, caseg on, 627 n. 
 
 SEX, distinction not recognised, 154, 604 
 
 SHALL, 
 
 and lawfully may, 443 n. 
 
 be empowered, 427 
 
 be lawful, 429-435 
 
 have been resident, 78 
 
 interpretation of, generally, 435-441, 443 n., 566 
 
 SHAKES, 
 
 goods and merchandise, whether, 575 
 stock, included in, 494 
 
 SHEEP, meaning of, 572 
 
 SHEEIFF, officer of, taking unlawful fees by, 472 
 
 SHIP, 
 
 British, meaning of, 158 
 casting away, what is, 581, 582 
 damage done by, liability for, 175 
 dangerous, detention of, 57 
 destroying, what is, 581 
 meaning of, 131,485, 494 
 revolt in, meaning of, 176 
 
 SHOOT, CUT, STAB, OB WOUND, meaning of, 582 
 
 SHOP, meaning of, 125 
 
 SHOBT TITLE, provision for, 73 
 
 SHOULD HAVE HAD NOTICE, effect of, 388 
 
 SIGNATUEE, 
 
 meaning of, 514 
 
 provision for, meaning of, 138 
 
 sufficiency of, 69 
 
 SINGLE SITTING, what is, 559, 560 
 
 SINGLE WOMAN, meanuig of, 125, 126 
 
 SINGULAB, includes plural, 604 
 
 SLAUGHTEB-HOUSE, meaning of, 594 
 
 SLAVE TEADE, abolition of, construction of Acts for, 44, 256 n., 266 
 
 SOLDIEB, 
 
 in actual service, meaning of, 127 
 sick and tnaimed, meaning of, 421 
 
 SOVEIIEIGN, foreign, not affected by criminal law, 263 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
782 • INDKX. 
 
 SPECIAL AND GENERAL ACTS, compared, 72, 313-329 
 
 SPECIFIC WORDS, preceded by general, effect of, 583-603 
 
 SPIRITS, meaning of, 107 n. 
 
 STAB, CUT, OR WOUND, meaning of, 467 
 
 STAMP ACTS, 
 
 construction of, 204, 226, 351, 395, 506-509 
 evasion of, when justified, 225, 226 
 
 STANDING, charge for, meaning of, 587 
 
 STATE. See Crown. 
 
 STATUTE, 
 
 abuse of powers, construction to prevent, 226-234 
 
 adding terms to, not justifiable, 25 
 
 aim of, to be considered, 39 
 
 ancient proclamation of, 738 
 
 beneficial construction of, 123-147, 504 
 
 ease not provided for in, how to be dealt with, 26 
 
 clerical error in, emendation of, 446 
 
 codifying, construction of, 47 
 
 common law re-enacted by, effect of, 8 
 
 conflict in provisions of, effect of, 142, 143 
 
 construction imposed by, effect of, 541-552 
 
 of, generally. See Constkuction. 
 costs, inflicting, construction of, 510 
 criminal, construction of, 261, 262, 462-501 
 date of passing of, 77 
 defined, 1 
 earher legislation, effect on, 8 
 
 statute to be construed as one with, 61 
 effectual, when, 739, 740 
 
 encroaching on rights, etc., construction of, 501-530 
 equitable construction of, 447-461 
 evasion, construction to avoid, 206-226 
 exclusion of class of persons in, effect of, 168 
 extension of meaning of, not allowable, 83 
 foreigners, applicability to, 263-279 
 general, effect on particular of, 314, 328 
 imperative or directory, construction of, 647-673 
 implied enactments in, 615-646 
 imposing burdens, construction of, 501-530 
 inpa/ri materia, construction of, 62, 458, 571 
 incorporation in later statute of, 26, 30 
 intention of, importance of, 406-447 
 interpretation of incidental matters in, 3 
 
 words in. See Intekprbtation ; Word§. 
 limited construction of, when, 197-205 
 local, construction of, 527-530 
 restriction of, 263-279 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 783 
 
 STATUTE— coniiMMet?. 
 
 marginal note on, importance of, 76 
 
 ministerial duty imposed by, enforcement of, 715 
 
 monopoly, establishing, construction of, 515 
 
 negative terms of, construction of, 303 
 
 non-mention of earlier, effect of, 30 
 
 non-observance of, when excused, 673-687 
 
 obsolete, how dealt with, 735-738 
 
 official record of, 76 
 
 omission in, power to supply, 443-446 
 ^ particular, how affected by general, 314, 323, 328 
 ' penal, construction of, 462-501 
 implied repeal in, 329-338 
 
 personal, construction of, 320, 527-530 
 
 plain language to be followed, 11, 13, 25 
 
 preamble of, importance of, 77-92 
 
 previous law to be considered, 39, 43 
 
 procedure prescribed by, to be followed, 708 
 
 proclamation in former times of, 738 
 
 proviso in, construction of, 281 
 
 public, what is, 741 
 
 pimotuation of, importance of, 75, 76 
 
 recital in, effect of, 550, 551 
 
 remedial, construction of, 447, 477 
 
 remedies prescribed by, enforcement of, 705-727 
 
 repeal of. See Repeal. 
 
 repealed, interpretation by reference to, 66-68 
 
 repugnancy between, construction where, 280-296 
 
 retrospective operation of, 9, 365, 381-405 
 
 revival after repeal of, 727 
 
 scope of, to be considered, 39, 83, 95, 161, 406 
 
 section of earlier Act introduced into later, construction of, 61 
 
 subtraction from terms of, not justifiable, 25 
 
 superfluous provisions in, effect of, 548-550 
 
 tautology in, effect of, 556 
 
 temporary, effect of continuance of, 734 
 
 title of, importance of, 73-75 
 
 variation of language in, effect of, 564-571 
 
 vested rights, affecting, 9 
 
 whole, to be construed as, 40 
 
 STATUTE OF FEAUDS, construction of, 49, 70,250,272,454, 511- 
 515, 575 
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATION. See Limitation of Actions. 
 
 STATUTORY POWERS, land acquired under, how to be used, 631 
 
 STEP IN PROCEEDINGS, meaning of, 46 
 
 STOCK, 
 
 debentures, distinguished from, 579 
 goods and merchandise, whether, 575 
 shares, whether inclusive of, 494 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
784 INDEX. 
 
 STOCK JOBBING, statute to prevent, 478 
 
 STREAM, meaning of, 565 
 
 STREET, meaning of, 170, 545, 566, 597 
 
 STBICT CONSTEUOTION, 
 
 local and personal Acts, of, 527 
 penal statute, of, 462-501 
 statute creating new jurisdiction, of, 517-530 
 encroaching on rights, etc., of, 501-510 
 establishing monopolies,' of, 515-517 
 regulating forms and solemnities, of, 510-515 
 STRUCTUBE, meaning of, 113 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER, words to be understood according to, 95-123 
 SUBSCRIBED, meaning of, 515 
 
 SUFFERING AND SUFFERED, meaning of, 188, 190, 192, 476, 
 489, 565 
 
 SUFFICIENT, 
 
 evidence, meaning of, 397 
 signature, what is, 515 
 
 SUIT, meaning of, 518 
 
 SUM ADJUDGED, meaning of, 340 
 
 SUMMONS, 
 
 absent party, on, 22 
 bastardy, issue of, 17 
 
 service of, 22 
 sailor beyond the seas, on, 22 
 
 SUNDAY, 
 
 by-law closing canal on, validity of, 525 
 computation of time, when included in, 611 
 contract made on, validity of, 378, 379, 691 
 election on, validity of, 153 
 meaning of, 147, 153, 490, 611 
 service of writ on, validity of, 682 ■ 
 
 SUNDAY OBSERVANCE ACT, 1677, class of persons to whom 
 applicsible, 2, 379 
 
 SUPERFLUOUS ENACTMENTS, effect of, 548-550 
 
 SUPPRESSION, of nuisance, meaning of, 475 
 
 SUSPENSION, of removal of pauper, meaning of, 420 
 
 SWEAR, meaning of, 604 
 
 TAKING, 
 
 fish, meaning of, 580, 581 
 game, meaning of, 492 
 money, meaning of, 471-473 
 possession, from the, meaning of, 486 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 785 
 
 TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ONE'S OWN WEONG, construction 
 against, 370 
 
 TAUTOLOGY, construction in case of, 556 
 
 TAX, Act abolishing, construction of, 387 
 
 TAXED CART, meaning of, 542 
 
 TAXING ACTS, construction of, 223, 248, 504 
 
 TECHNICAL WORDS, interpretation of, 3, 104 
 
 TELEGRAM, an instrument within Forgery Act, 146 
 
 TELEGRAPH, includes telephone, 146 
 
 TEMPORARY ACT, effect of continuance of, 734 
 
 TENANT, rate payable by, 17 
 
 TENANT IN PEE SIMPLE, meaning of, 105 
 
 TENANT IN TAIL, meaning of, 325 
 
 TENEMENT, meaning of, 591 
 
 TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, statute jprima/aMe limited to, 255 
 
 THEN AND THERE, meaning of, 466 
 
 THINK FIT, meaning of, 424, 439-441 
 
 THINK JUST, meaning of, 518 
 
 THREAT, prohibition of, 593 
 
 TIME, 
 
 abjuration oath, for taking, 14 
 appeal, for, how fixed, 13, 346, 659 
 application of, meaning of, 344 
 compliance after, validity of, 659 
 computation of, rule as to, 604 
 estimation of, when none fixed, 29 
 
 where period fixed, 11-14, 604 
 Greenwich, implication of, 605 
 lawful day, presumption in favour of, 152, 153 
 limited, construction of, 345, 411, 416, 453, 604-612 
 next appointed, meaning of, 14 
 Quarter Sessions, for complaint to, 13, 345 
 reasonable, when implied, 29 
 statute takes effect at what, 739, 740 
 statutory, meaning of, 605 
 
 TITLE, 
 
 construction by reference to, 74, 75 
 part of statute, as, 73-75 
 
 I.S. 50 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
786 INDEX. 
 
 TOLL, 
 
 avoiding turnpike, when no evasion, 222 
 
 duty implied from power to exact, 634 
 
 exemption of Crown from, 247 
 
 Eailway Act, in, cases on, 97 n. 
 
 waiver of power to demand maximuic, 678 
 
 TOPPINa OF TREES, power as to, 100 
 
 TOTAL INCOME, meaning of, 504 
 
 TOWN, meaning of, 480 
 
 TRADE UNION, rules of, validity of, 702 
 
 TRADER, meaning of, 78, 79, 567 
 
 TRADESMEN, ARTIFICER, ETC., meaning of, 584 
 
 TRAMWAY, grant of right to work, etc., 633 n. 
 
 TRANSFER, meaning of,'576 
 
 TRANSPORTATION, abolition of, 262 
 
 TRAVELLER, meaning of, 121 n. 
 
 TREATY, reference in construing statute to, 45 
 
 TRESPASS, meaning of, 449, 491, 563 
 
 TRESPASSER, meaning of, 449, 492 
 
 TRIAL BY JURY, new trial after, 147 
 
 TROOPS, foreign, not subject to criminal law, 263 
 
 TRUE FAITH OF A CHRISTIAN, meaning of, 552 
 
 TRUSTEE FOR SALE, meaning of, 514 
 
 TURN LOOSE, meaning of, 565 
 
 TWO OR MORE, judges, meaning of, 537 
 
 VBI DVM CONTBABIM LEOES SUNT, SEMPER ANTI- 
 QUE ABBOGAT NOVA, application of, 281 
 
 UNDER, 
 
 authority, meaning of, 412 
 
 distinguished from " in respect " of, 556 n. 
 
 UNIFORMITY ACT, Construction of, 50 
 
 UNITED KINGDOM, words having different meanings in different 
 parts of, interpretation of, 107, 108, 162 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 revenue laws of, construction of, 509 
 statute conferring jurisdiction, construction of, 552 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 787 
 
 UNJUST WEIGHT, meaning of, 167, 196 
 
 UNLAWFUL, 
 
 act, meaning of, 166. 
 
 purpose, meaning of, 475 i 
 
 UNLAWFULLY, meaning of, 166, 167, 180 
 
 UNLESS, effect of the term, 648 
 
 UNBEASONABLENESS, presumption against, 339-356 
 
 UNTIL COMPLETED, meaning of, 417 
 
 USAGE, 
 
 effect of, in construction of statute, 531-541 
 local, not affected by general statute, 320 
 non-usage, effect of, 738 
 
 USE, 
 
 dwelling, etc., as, 410, 476 
 gun, of, meaning of, 492 
 navigation, in, meaning of, 131, 132 
 workhouse, for, meaning of, 98 
 
 USUALLY SOLD, meaning of, 481 
 
 USURY ACTS, construction of, 209 
 
 VT BBS MAOIS VALEAT QUAM PESEAT, application of, 
 419 
 
 UTI LOQUITUB VULGUS, application of, 98, 108 
 
 UTTERLY PKUSTEATE, VOID, AND DF NONE EFFECT, 
 meaning of, 372 
 
 VAGABOND, meaning of, 96 
 
 VALID, meaning of, 157, 163 
 
 VALUABLE SECURITY, meaning of, 471, 499 
 
 VALUE, 
 
 clear yearly, meaning of, 70 
 ship, of, naeaning of, 516 
 
 VARIATION, 
 
 interpretation, of, 559 
 language, of, effect of, 564 
 
 VEGETABLE PRODUCTION, meaning of, 588 
 
 VEBBA CABTABUM F0BTIV8 ACCIPIUNTUB CONTBA 
 PBOFEBENTEM, application of, 528 
 
 VESSEL USED IN NAVIGATION, meaning of, 132 
 
 VEST, meaning of, 170 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
788 INDEX. 
 
 VESTED EIGHT, 
 
 no one has, in a course of procedure, 400 
 statute affecting, operation of, 9, 383-401 
 
 VOCATION, money earned in unlawful, assessment of, 555 
 
 VOID, meaning of, 66, 165, 202, 372, 373, 375-378, 380, 381, 567 
 
 VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA, application of, 682 
 
 VOLUNTAEY, 
 
 annuity, meaning of, 582 
 contribution, meaning of, 508 
 meaning of, generally, 582 
 settlement, meaning of, ,395 
 
 VOTE, entitled to, construction of, 470 
 
 WAGERING, Acts against, construction of, 198, 199, 210 
 
 WAIVER, of benefit of, statutory provisions, power as to, 678-687 
 
 WANDERING ABROAD, meaning of, 474 n. 
 
 WAREHOUSE, meaning of, 579, 597 
 
 WARRANT OP ATTORNEY, 
 bankruptcy, effect of, on, 34, 35 
 void, when, 213, 214, 224 
 
 WATER RATE, cases on, 97 n. 
 
 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, 
 examination of, 482 
 light and unjust, 196, 259, 483 
 
 WHARF, ANY, meaning of, 502 
 
 WHATSOEVER, meaning of, 158, 159 , 
 
 WHEN, meaning of, 648 
 
 WHENEVER REQUIRED, meaning of, 16 
 
 WHERRY, LIGHTER, OR OTHER CRAFT, meaning of, 587 
 
 WIDOW, included in " single woman," when, 126 
 
 WILFUL, 
 
 act, meaning of, 167 
 default, meaning of, 64, 199 
 meaning of, generally, 167, 194, 199 
 wilfully, meaning of, 166, 180, 194 
 
 WILL, 
 
 interpretation of, general rule as to, 4, 13 
 presence of witnesses at signing, meaning of, 14 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX. 789 
 
 WITH, 
 
 all practicable speed, meaning of, 182 
 intent to defeat creditors, meaning of, 570 
 same horses and carriages, meaning of, 422 
 
 WITHIN, 
 
 British jurisdiction, meaning of, 277 
 limits of port, meaning of, 563 
 month, a, meaning of, 660 
 
 WITHOUT A KEEPER, meaning of, 67, 566 
 
 WITHOUT ISSUE, used in two senses in same will, 559 
 
 WITHOUT LAWFUL EXCUSE, meaning of, 485 
 
 WOODEN STEUCTURE, meaning of, 113 
 
 WORDS, 
 
 absurdity, interpretation in case of, 406 
 
 analogous, interpretation of, 555 
 
 associated, interpretation of, 571-582 
 
 beneficial, interpretation of, 123-147 
 
 change of meaning in course of time, effect of, 108 
 
 collocation of, power to alter, 406 
 
 consequences, interpreted by reference to, 148 
 
 coupled together, interpretation of, 574 
 
 different meanings, with, interpretation of, 96, 107, 108, 656-564 
 
 ejusdem generis, interpretation of, 583-603 
 
 extended meaning given to, when, 123 
 
 general, mterpretation of, 38, 56, 109, 149, 464, 583-603 
 
 generic, following more specific, 583-603 
 
 grammatical construction of, 3, 95, 406, 485 
 
 implied restricted meaning of, 55 
 
 in bonam partem, to be interpreted, 553 « 
 
 interpolation of, power as to, 406, 409, 410 
 
 meaning imposed by legislature, effect of, 542 
 
 multiplicity of, effect of, 555, 556 
 
 natural ordinary sense to be taken, 1, 4 
 
 particular, interpretation of, 418 
 
 plain meaning of, to be taken, 5-8, 20 
 
 popular use of, reference to, 95, 98, 101, 107, 108 
 
 primary meaning of, to be taken, 375 
 
 rank, denoting, interpretation of, 600 
 
 reading into statute of, not justifiable, 25 
 
 rejection of, power as to, 406 
 
 rules as to interpretation of, 95-147 
 
 technical, interpretation of, 3 
 
 WORK, meaning of, 584 
 
 WORKHOUSE, meaning of, 98 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS, construction of, 124, 345 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
790 INDEX. 
 
 WOUND, meaning of, 467, 682 
 
 WEIT, lost, procedure in case of, 27 
 
 WRITING, 
 
 meaning of, 613 
 requirement of, 511 
 
 YEAR, 
 
 half a, and a quarter of a, 604 
 meaning of, 609 
 
 YOUNG OF SALMON, meaning of, 184 m. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 PEIKTED IB OREAT BBITAIN BT WILLIAM CLOWES AMD BOMB, LIMITED 
 LOMDOH AMD BBCCLBB. ' 
 
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