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French 185 16s iSs 1 6s i8j 18s 2 IS 30s PHILO JUDAEUS OB, THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLETION, JAMES DRUMMOND, ll.d., PBINOIPAL OP MAWCHESTEK NEW COLLEGE, LONDOK. 'Siirovcaaov ouv, u> 4'^x'l' ^^°" oiKoe ycpiadai. PHILO, DE S0MNII8, I. i.i. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. WILLIAMS AND NOEGATE, 14, HENBIETTA STEBET, COVBNT GAEDEN, LONDON; AND 20, SOUTH FBEDBEICE STEEET, EDINBUEGH. 1888. lAU Sights reserved.^ A- 4^\cM^ LONDON : G. NOBMAN AND SON, PHINTERS, HART STREET, COVENT GARDEN. CONTENTS. — »$-< — VOL. II. BOOK III. {continued). Chapter IV. The existence and nature of God . 1 — 64 Chaptee V. The Divine Powers . 65 — 155 Chaptee VI. The Logos . . ... 156—273 Chapter VII. The higher Anthropology . ... 274 — 324 Index I. Subjects and Names .... 325 — 341 Index II. References to passages in Philo .342 — 353 Index III. References to passages in the Old Testament cited by Philo . 354 — 355 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092283971 PHILO JUDAEUS. BOOK III, (continued.) CHAPTER IV. The Existence and Natuee oi God. Having now inquired into the nature of manj and contemplated tlie scene amid which he is placed, we must proceed to the profounder questions which are suggested by our survey. In considering both the cosmos and man we came across traces of dependence which seemed to involve the action of an external cause J and in the human soul the faculties of reason and prefer- ential choice, though not without the limitations of dependent being, yet pointed to a supramundane source, and introduced us to a world of ideas transcending the world of sense. We must examine the validity of these intimations, and endeavour to unfold their contents in the order of consecutive thought. In inquiries about God, says Philo, there are two supreme topics which exercise the intelligence of the genuine philoso- pher ; first, whether the Divine exists ; and secondly, what it is in its essence.* This division of the subject affords a con- venient arrangement for our own exposition of his views. We proceed, then, first to the evidence of the existence of God. In constructing a philosophical system it was no more possible for Philo than it is for ourselves to take the existence of God for granted. He was met by atheistic theories more * Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216). VOL II. 1 2 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. or less pronounced, and was obliged to justify his faith upon rational grounds. Some, whom he characterizes as atheists, were content with an attitude of doubt ; but others went further, and boldly asserted that there was no God at all, and that he was merely said to exist by men who had over- shadowed the truth with mythical inyentions.* The latter were under the necessity of oifering a theory antagonistic to theism, and accordingly maintained that nothing existed but the perceptible and visible universe, which had never come into being and would never perish, but was unbegotten and incorruptible, without a guardian, a pilot, or a protector. f Since there was thus no invisible and intelligible cause outside of perceptible things,J it was assumed that everything in the cosmos was borne along by spontaneous motion, and that arts and studies, laws and customs, were due to the activity of the human mind alone. § Others, who are described as Chaldseans, embraced a pantheistic theory. They too maintained that the phenomenal world was the only existence ; but they declared either that it was itself God, or that it included God within itself as the soul of the universe. Apart from phenomena there was no cause, but the periods of the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies determined the distribution of good and ill, and thus everything was handed over to the dominion of fate and necessity. |1 To these speculations Philo opposed the doctrine of Moses, " the beholder of the invisible nature, and seer of God,"^" according to which the Divine exists, and the supreme God** is neither the cosmos nor the soul of the cosmos, nor are the heavenly bodies the prime causes ff of human events. J f The arguments for the existence of God fall into two * Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 {II. 414). t Somn., II. 43 (I. 696). { Deo. Orac, 13 (n. 190). § Leg. All., III. 9 (I. 93). II Migrat. Abr., 32 (I. 464) ; Cong. erud. gr. 9 (I. 526) ; Abr., 15 (II. 11). IT Mutat. Norn., 2 (I. 579). ** '0 ^pwrog eUe- tt T-'^ ■^piT^irara airia. ti Mund. Op., 61 (I. 41) ; Migrat. Abr., I.e. NATURE POINTS TO GOD. 3 divisions, those drawn from nature and those famished by the intuitions of the soul. The analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm lies at the root of the evidence afiforded by the contemplation of nature. The invisible mind in man occupies the same position in him as is filled by God in the universe ;* and having this example in ourselves we may easily arrive at the knowledge of God. For has not the mind in us been appointed a sovereign, whom the whole community of the body obeys and each of the senses follows ? And are we to suppose that the cosmos, the fairest and vastest and most perfect work, of which all other things are only parts, is without a king who holds it together and governs it justly ? And if he is invisible, what wonder ? For our mind, too, is unseen. If anyone will consider these things, he will know from himself and his surroundings that the cosmos is not the supreme God, but the work of the Supreme.f Appeal is also made to the analogy of human art. Things fabricated are always tokens by which the artificers are known. For who can see statues or pictures without immediately thinking of a sculptor or a painter ? Who, when he sees clothes or ships or houses, does not form a conception of a weaver and shipwright and builder ? And when one has entered a well-governed city, in which political affairs are most admirably arranged, what will he suppose but that this city is under the presidency of good rulers ? When, therefore, one has arrived at the real MegalopoUs, the cosmos, and has seen the firm-set earth, with its mountains and plains, filled with trees and fi-uits and animals of every kind, and flowing over it seas and lakes and rivers, both the perennial and those derived from wintry floods, and the pleasant temperature of winds and air, and the harmonious changes of the seasons, and, over all, the sun and moon, the * Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16). t Abr., 16 (II. 12). See also Migrat. Abr., 33 (I. 465). 1 * 4 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. sovereigns of day and night, the planets and fixed stars, and the entire heaven revolving in ranks with its own army, a veritable cosmos within the cosmos, must he not be struck with admiration, and reasonably, or rather necessarily con- ceive the notion of the Father and Creator, and conclude that beauties so great and of such surpassing order have not sprung spontaneously into being, but have been made by a world-forming artificer, and are ruled by a providence ? The cosmos is most completely a work of art, and must, there- fore, have been fabricated by some one who is excellent and most perfect in knowledge. In this way we have received our thought of the divine existence, proceeding from below upwards, and endeavouring to reach the Creator by just reason- ing from his works as by a heavenly ladder.* Intermediate between the two methods of approaching the Divine is an argument founded on the axiom of causality. In this argument we have to rely both on the observation of nature and on a mental intuition. We have already seen that the material universe fails in the marks of eternity and of efficiency. t Hence we are compelled by an intellectual law to seek, outside the visible world, for a first cause, J and for an efficient cause. § Philo unhesitatingly discovers this cause in mind. II He does not martial his reasons for coming to this conclusion ; but we can readily detect them in the views which we have previously unfolded. In rejecting the possibility of an eternal and efficient causality in matter, the only alternative was to have recourse to mind, which was the only other known entity, an entity moreover where the ideas of eternity and * Monarch., I. 4 (II. 216-17) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 414-15). t See Vol. I. p. 291 sq. and 297 sqq. } llpwTOv itiTiov, TO TrpiaPirarov mriov or rav alriiov, Conf . Ling. , 25 (I. 423) ; Somn., I. 33 (I. 649) ; § 41, p. 656 ; Fort., 7 (II. 381) ; ro avwrdru) alriov, Fort, 1.0. ; De Nobilitate 5 (II. 442). § To cpaarijptov ainov, Mundi Op., 2 (I. 2) ; to Spdv aiTiov, not said, however, ol God, Prof., 24 (I. 565) ; to irtToitiubs airiov, Conf. Ling., 21 (1. 419) ; to kivovv airiov, Prof., 2 (I. 547). II '0 Tuv oXwv vovg, Mundi Op., l.o. INTUITION OF GOD. 6 efficiency found a natural home. Again, the marks of causality im the universe were all of an intellectual order. The operation which produced the cosmos consisted of the impression of intellectual forms upon shapeless matter, and therefore the flow of cosmical change suggested the action, not of blind force, but of providential reason. And, lastly, within human experience mind alone possessed a self-determining power, and therefore could alone furnish a key to the ultimate mystery of being. Philo was thus led to the belief in a supreme Mind as the original cause of the universe. He did not, however, believe that this was the highest mode of apprehending the Divine. It had been sanctioned, indeed, by philosophers of the highest repute, who supposed that our apprehensioa of the Cause must be derived from the cosmos and its parts and their inherent powers. Those who reasoned thus perceived God through a shadow, the artificer through his works. But there was a more perfect and purified mind, initiated into the great mysteries, which did not know the Cause from what had been made, as one might know the abiding substance from its shadow, but, having over- stepped the begotten, received a clear manifestation of the Unbegotten, so as to apprehend him fromhimself. This might be illustrated by a familiar comparison. The visible sun was seen by the aid of nothing but the sun itself; and in the same way God, being his own light, was seen through himself alone, and nothing in heaven or earth co-operated or was able to co-operate in furnishing the pure apprehension of his being. Those who strove to see God from the creation were confined to conjecture ; but those pursued the truth who perceived God by means of God, light by means of light.* This faculty of spiritual discernment is the peculiar perogative of our race, and is due to the divine nature of the mind. The thought of the Creator is the limit of blessedness ; and, in order that man might not be without this, God breathed * Leg. All., III. 32-3 (I. 107) ; Praem. et Poen., 7 (II. 415). 6 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. from above of Hs own divinity, and it invisibly imprinted its own forms on the invisible soul, which thus received no longer mortal, but immortal thoughts.* We have before treated generally of the soul's power of intuition ; we have only to add that this power culminates in the apprehension of God, and as the eyes, which are compacted of corruptible matter, are able to run up from the region of earth to the vast and distant heaven, so the eyes of the soul pursue their sublime course, and, winged with great desire of beholding real Being, pass the limits of the entire cosmos, and press on to the TJnbegotten.t This high faculty, however, though represented as inherent in the very nature of the soul, is far from being invariable in its action ; and if we would enjoy its revelations, we must conform to its conditions. It was after Abraham had left "his land and his kindred and his father's house," that is the body, sensible perception, and speech, that God appeared to him ; and this shows that God is clearly manifested only to him who has put off mortal things and had recourse to the incorporeal soul. For this reason, also, Moses took his tent and pitched it outside the camp, and removed far from the bodily encampment, hoping thus alone to become a perfect suppliant and servant of God. J This detachment from bodily things is naturally sought in that solitude which has always been dear to the devout. Abraham was sent into the track- less wilderness, from which ordinary men would desire to flee, as they would think it silly to choose, for the sake of obscure benefits, acknowledged ills. Yet such is the ordinance of nature: the sweetest life is that remote from the crowd, and those who seek and desire to find God love the solitude which is dear to him, striving in this first to resemble the happy and blessed nature. § E/Ctirement is favourable to that serenity which is another condition of spiritual discernment. So long as men * Quod det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 208). f Plantat. Noe., 5 (I. 333). + Quod det. pot. ins., 44 (I. 221). § Abr., 18 (II. 14). INTUITION OF GOD. 7 are immersed in distracting affairs, and, like ships in a wintry storm, are tossed to and fro upon the waves of desire, they are naturally far from Him who is ever still, and draw near to the changeful flow of phenomenal existence. The unchangeable soul alone has access to the unchangeable God, and truly takes its stand near the divine power.* Since it is thus impossible for one who is still moved by the senses rather than the intellect to come to the investigation of real Being, and it is necessary to close the eyes and stop the ears and spend one's time in solitude and darkness, in order that the eye of the soul, by "which intelligible things are seen, may not be overshadowed by anything perceptible, he who desires to see God will turn to the consideration of himself and his constitution ; and from that knowledge of himself which is symbolized in Greek by Socrates, in Hebrew by Tharrha (the father of Abraham), he will prepare a way to the knowledge of the universal Father, who is so difficult to reach by our guesses and conjectures. This knowledge is attained by our perception of the mingled analogy and contrast between ourselves and the cosmos, on which we have already touched. But Philo just mentions a deeper thought which brings this condition of self-knowledge under our present head. "When Abraham most knew, he then most despaired of himself, that he might come to an accurate knowledge of Him who truly is. And the case is naturally so. For he who has fully apprehended has fully despaired of himself, having clearly learned the nothingness in everything created; and he who has despaired of himself knows the Self-existent.f From the conditional nature of the higher knowledge it follows that it must appear in varying proportions in different persons, and in the same person at different times. In reference to this subject we may distinguish three stages in the experience of the soul. First, it is profitable, if not for the * Post. Cain., 7-9 (I. 230-1). t Migrat. Abr., 34-5 (I. 466-7); Somn., I. 10 (I. 629-30) ; Abr., 16 (II. 12). 8 THE EXISTENCE AND NATDEE OF GOD. acquisition of perfect virtue, at least with a view to civic life, to he trained up in primeval opinions, and to pursue the ancient report of noble deeds which historians and poets have recorded. But this inherited belief is lower than our intuitive perceptions. '' When without our foresight or expectation a sudden light of self-taught wisdom flashes upon us, which, opening the closed eye of the soul, makes us seers instead of hearers of knowledge, putting in the understanding the swiftest of the senses, vision, instead of the slower hearing, it is vain to exercise the ears with words." It is God who causes these young shoots of intuition to spring up in the soul, and then the things derived from mere instruction slip away of themselves and are cancelled ; for the acquaintance or disciple of God, or whatever name we are to call him, cannot possibly put up with mortal guidance.* And yet this appre- hension is not necessarily the highest. The soul which continues in what is good is competent to perceive self-taught wisdom, but may not yet be able to see God, the sovereign of wisdom-t And even if it has attained to this supreme vision, it may still be subject to lower and higher moods. The under- standing which is engaged in self-discipline is liable to irregular movements towards fruitfulness and the contrary, and is continually, as it were, going up and down. When it is fruitful and exalted, " it is illumined by the archetypal and incorporeal beams of the rational fountain of God who brings things to their completion; but when it descends and is barren, by the images of these, immortal words, which it is customary to call angels." In other words, when the rays of God, through which are produced the clearest apprehensions of things, leave the soul, the secondary and weaker light of words, no longer of things, rises, just as in this lower world the moon, which bears the second rank, sheds, after sunset, its dimmer light upon the earth. f We shall have to recur to * SS. Ab. et Cain., 22-3 (1. 178). f Quod det. pot. ins., 9 (1. 197). J Somn., I. 19 (I. 638). INTUITION OF GOD. 9 tLese different grades of spiritual discernnient ; at present it is sufficient to mark their existence, in order to gain some in- siglat into Philo's theological method. The highest intuition is repeatedly described as seeing God ; and the attainment of this vision is the ultimate goal of philosophy. This has been symbolized in ancient story through the change of name with which Jacob was honoured. Jacob is the name of learning and progress, which are dependent upon hearing ; but Israel is the name of perfection, for it signifies the vision of God,* and what excellence could be more perfect than seeing that which really is ?t Hearing is deceitful, for it is open to falsehood as well as truth; but vision, by which realities are perceived, cannot lie; and therefore Israel, the seer of God, is higher than Ishmael, the hearer. J The knowledge of God is the end of that royal way which those who have been endowed with sight desire to tread § ; to see him is the most valuable of all possessions, and the firmest support of virtue and goodness. ]| We must add, however, that there is no guarantee that we shall ever gain this glorious prize. Whether in seeking we shall find God is uncertain; for to many he did not make himself known, but their toil was ineffectual to the last. Yet the mere search for what is beautiful is adequate of itself to give us a share of good things, and to bring us joy ; and those will obtain pity whose mental eye has been blinded, not by their voluntary choice, but by the inexorable power of necessity.^ The above account is wanting in clearness and precision. * "Opaais eeoii : elsewhere, opup ^eov. + Ebriet., 20 (I. 369). + Prof., 38 (I. 577). § Quod Deus immut., 30 (I. 294). II Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546). See also Leg. All., III. 66 (1. 124) ; Conf. Ling., 20 (I. 418) ; Quis rer. div. her., 15 (1. 483) ; Cong. erud. gr., 10 (I. 526) ; Mutat. Nom., 12 (I. 590) ; Somn., II. 26 (I. 681) ; Abr., 12 (II. 9). See too the expressions, o^iv 6tov and ^avraaidiay rtiv dyhvt]TOV, Quod det. pot. ins., 43 (I. 221) ; ^iXoetd/iwv ^vxv, Quis rer. div. her., 15 (I. 484) ; ri opariici) i o av, Ex. iii. 14. II Elvai iriipvKa, oi XsyiaSai. HIS NAMELESSNESS. 21 supremely Good is required, Moses was allowed to call God the God of Abraham^ of Isaac, and of Jacob, tliat is, tlie God of the three natures or mental characters which seek for wisdom and goodness from instruction, from nature, and from self -discipline. This, however, is not properly speaking a name ; and accordingly the Scripture adds, " this is a temporal name,"* as being found in our time,t uot in that which is before time; and "a memorial," not that which is placed beyond memory and reflection; and again "to generations," not to unbegotten natures. So unspeak- able is the self-existent Being that not even the ministering powers tell us their proper name. For after the wrestling in which Jacob engaged for the acquisition of virtue, he said to the invisible chief, " Tell me thy name ; " but he said, " Why dost thou ask my name ? " and did not tell it to him. For names are symbols of what is begotten, and are not to be sought amongst incorruptible natures. J It might seem to be a contradiction of this doctrine that Philo himself applies a rich variety of names to the Supreme Being. But the contradiction is only apparent. These names are nothing more than modes of reference adapted to the imper- fection of our faculties, and do not really express the divine nature. A name, in the full sense which Philo evidently attributes to it, is that which describes and exhausts the essence of the object to which it is applied. The term tri- angle, for instance, is a complete expression for the figure which it represents. But no equivalent title can be applied to the Divine Being, because his essence is unknown ; and accordingly even such terms as God and Lord, so far as they are significant of ideas, and not mere ciphers to denote * 'Ovofia aiwviov. The unusual meaning of aldvioe is fixed by the context. f Alwvi. % Mutat. Nom., 2 (I. 580) ; Vita Mos., 1. 14 (II. 92-3) ; Somn., I. 39-40 (I. 655) ; Abr., 10-11 (II. 8-9). In § 24, p. 19 of the last-named treatise he says that God is called in Scripture KVQiif Svo/iaTt 6 "Qv, by which he probably means a name devoted to him alone, but not one which is really exhaustive in its significance. 22 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. the unknown CausSj express, not the fulness of the divine essence, but only one of its aspects.* The same remark will readily apply to other appellations. The sacred tetra- grammaton, however, presented a real exception, which Philo was unable to explain away, and did not attempt to reconcile with his philosophy. His reluctance to admit the consequences which, as he must have perceived, flowed from this undeniable violation of his rule, is apparent in his throwing upon others the responsibility of making the four letters indicative of the divine name, as though a doubt lingered in his own mind whether this could really be the case.f At all events the name was one which only those whose ears and tongue had been purified by wisdom might hear and speak in holy places, and no one else might utter anywhere. The theologian, Moses, says that the name consisted of four letters, perhaps regarding them as symbols of the first four numbers ; for the number four contains all things — ^point, and line, and surface, and solid, which are the measures of all things — and likewise the best musical harmonies. J Beyond this vague surmise Philo does not attempt to determine the significance of this mysterious name, and in accordance with his philo- sophical principles must have viewed it as incomprehensible ; the word was revealed to the prophet, but its meaning was not for us. It was agreeable to its awful character that he who unseasonably uttered the name of the Lord of men and gods should suffer the penalty of death. Eespectful children keep in reverent silence the proper names of their parents, though they are only mortal, and use instead the terms which express their natural relation, father and mother, intimating thereby the surpassing benefits received from them, and their own thankful disposition. Shall they, then, be deemed worthy of forgiveness who indulge in unseasonable mockery, and make • This statement mil be fully illnstrated farther on. t 'E? C)v ovojia row ovtoq ipael iirjvviadat. Vita Mos. III. 14 (II. 155). X lb. § 11, p. 152. GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 23 tlie most holy and divine name a mere expletive in their talk ?* The incomprehensibility of God is immediately connected with the doctrine that he is without qualities. f "We must pay careful attention to this doctrine, because it is generally supposed that Philo here becomes involved in insoluble con- tradictions, his speculative conclusions standing in opposition to his religious necessities. A God without attributes, and known only to exist, is not one whom we can worship or love. Philo, accordingly, having, it is said, denied all attri- butes to God, nevertheless freely ascribes them to him, and thus vacillates between a negative and a positive description of the Divine in a manner which defies reconciliation. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of verbal contradiction ; but I venture to think that Philo was perfectly aware of this, and that a considerable portion of his philosophy is devoted to its solution. The proposition that God is without qualities, though not stated very frequently, is laid down with clearness and emphasis. It is great absurdity, says Philo, to suppose that God breathed through a mouth or nostrils; "for God is not only without qualities, but not even in the human form.^' f He who thinks that God has quality injures himself, and not God ; for it is necessary to suppose him to be without quality, and incorruptible and unchangeable. § And again, in a pas- sage before referred to it is said, the companions of the soul, who are able to associate with intelligible and incorporeal natures, do not compare the self-existent Being to any form || of created things, but divest him of all quality, and apprehend his existence as free from distinctive impress.^ These state- ments are suflSciently explicit, and are in perfect agreement with all that we have hitherto said regarding the divine * Vita Mos., III. 26, p. 166. t 'Attuios. } Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 50). § lb., § 15, p. 53. II Or kind, idia. II Quod Deus immut., 11 (I. 281). 24 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. essence. That essence is inscrutable and nameless, because it is destitute of all the qualities which we recognize in things around us, and is absolutely sui generis. Thus the same negative predicate is applied to both God and matter. These stand over against one another, possessing natures entirely different, and each perfectly unique. They constitute the two poles of the universe, the one being the unknown essence which forms the substratum of all material things, the other the equally unknown essence which impresses upon matter its variety, and shapes it into a cosmos. Matter is without qualities because it is beneath them, being intrinsically motionless and dead, and waiting for something higher to differentiate its dull mass ; God is without qualities because he is above them, owing nothing to them, but being himself the living source from which they emanate. That we may clearly understand this doctrine, let us fix in our minds the meaning of the expression " without qualities." It denotes strictly that which does not belong to a class, but is sui generis. Philo uses it in this, its proper logical meaning. " Quality " * is that the possession of which makes you a member of a class ; and when any quality is ascribed to you, you are to that extent placed on a level with a number of other individuals. This is explained by Philo in illustrating the categories. "I partake of sub- stance," he says, having borrowed from each of the four elements what suffices for my composition ; " I partake also of quality, by virtue of which I am a man."t It is evident from this that "quality" must be denied to anything that lies beyond the reach of classification. But it does not follow that that which stands by itself is destitute of properties or characteristic features ; for even in a class each single object has its " property " J as well as the " qualities " which bring it under a common name.§ It is a necessary consequence * riotdriiff. t Dec. Orac, 8 (II. 185). } 'llwTije. § Agr. Noe, 3 (I. 302). GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 25 that everything belonging to a class * is compound, because it has a share in a quality in which others, equally with itself, participate. It is thus dependent on something more comprehensive than itself, and, since compounds are liable to dissolution, it is destined to come to an end. Accordingly Philo says expressly that it is the nature of things belonging to a class to admit genesis and corruption, although the ideas by virtue of which they are enrolled in a class are incor- ruptible. For instance, "virginity" is always the same, but a "virgin" is changeable and mortal. f Music, the " habit "f by sharing which a man is a musician, is better than the musician, and the medical art is better than the medical man, because - the " habit " is eternal, efficient, perfect, but the member of the class is mortal, susceptible, imperfect.§ The belonging to a class, then, involves notions which are quite inconsistent with any worthy conception of God, and nothing remains but to regard him as "without qualities," or un- classified, a Being alone in his infinite perfection, and dependent on nothing more comprehensive than himself. This result, however, does not involve a denial of all pro- perties, or, in other words, of all but negative predicates to God. It is only necessary that the attributes which are ascribed to him should be regarded as "properties," || and not as " qualities." H Thus matter, although it is " without qualities," may be described as extended and impenetrable; * noioc. t Cherub., 15 (I. 148). J "Egig. § Mutat. Nom., 21 (I. 697). II 'lowrriTce. For the meaning of iSiov see Aristotle's definition, — "'ISiov B' eariv o jiri SrjXoX ixlv to tI ijv fZj/ac, fiovip d' vTrapxti Kai avTtKaTtjyopeirai tov irpdyfiaTOS, olov "iSiov avBpiiirov to ypamiaTiKrje ilvai Scktikov eiydp avOpioiroe tan, ypa/i/iaTiKris Sektlkoq iari, Kai (i ypafi/iartKrig Siktikoq iariv, avQpiifKOQ ioTiv. ovQ^iQ yap tdiov Xlyet to lvSi\6p,tvov aXKtji vTrapx^tv, olov to KaBevSitv cLvBiiivif. Organon, Top. I. v. 4. I quote this famUia/ definition that the reader may perceive clearly the force of Philo' s language. IT This is illustrated by the phrase diroiov vSmp, "pure water," which cannot be intended to deny all properties to water, but denotes that which is simply and absolutely water, and not water of a particular kind, such as salt or muddy. This example shows that the phrase may be applied without regard to the 26 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUBE OF GOD. for these predicates do not place it in a class along with other things which are not matter. They may indeed be applied to an indefinite number of particular objects^ which are thus grouped into a class ; but when they are so applied, they do not set these objects beside matter as members of the same genus, so that you could affirm that matter and certain other things are extended and impenetrable, but they only class them under matter and declare them to be material. The same reasoning will apply to the spiritual essence of God. He is "without qualities," and nevertheless we may affirm that he is eternal, self- existent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfect ; for these predicates belong to himself alone, and place him outside of every genus. If the first two might be applied to matter, we must remember that Philo never does so apply them.' If he believed in the eternity of matter, he regarded it as merely a negative reflection of the eternity of God ; and so far was he from thinking of matter as self-existent, that he regarded it rather as the non-existent. The attributes which I have mentioned are by their very nature incommunicable. They lie outside of our experience, and are discovered only by an exercise of thought. But there are other attributes which fall within our experience, which distinguish man among the animal creation, which make him a member of a class, and nevertheless are ascribed to God. God is efficient, free, and self-determining. Does he. higher genus under which the object may be included. Water in itself is a species of matter, but the water in question is airowv because it is not a species of water. Much more is the expression applicable to God, who is not only not a species of God, but is not a species of anything. Philo himseU uses the word in a similar way. Moses was desired to make a serpent. Why, then, did he make a bronze serpent, when he received no command irtpl Troidrjjroc? Perhaps because the favours of God are immaterial, ideas, and airoioi, but those of mortals are seen conjoined with matter : Leg.. AH., II. 20 (I. 80-1). Of course, a serpent can be classified as animal or reptile ; but a serpent in the abstract cannot be classified as a particular kind of serpent. So also man in the abstract is stiU a yivoe without species, and it is only the concrete human being that becomes /terexwv »roiori)roc, being man or woman: Mundi Op., 46 (I. 32). GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 27 then, belong in this respect to the same genus as man ? Not at allj for volitional power is, as we have seen, a property of God.* If therefore we find volitional power in man, it only proves that the human mind has a share of the divine essence ; and we thus discover the connection between the latter doc- trine and Philo's theology. His belief in the divinity of the human mind was necessary in order to reconcile with his doctrine that God is without qualities his ascription to him of those attributes which are demanded by the religious affections. In assigning the same predicates to God and man, he may seem at first sight to class them together, as each participating in the same essence which is more compre- hensive than either J but he really means that man has a finite share in an essence which God exhausts and trans- cends. We shall dwell farther on upon the predicates of God in detail; meanwhile we may observe that Philo does not hesitate to admit such epithets as munificent, propitious, merciful, good. But these do not draw God down from his solitary perfection. They are difi'erent aspects of bis infinite fulness, archetypal ideas, which, borrowing all from him, lay the impress of quality only on derived existences. In order to understand the above reasoning it is necessary to bear in mind that the notion of an attribute in the philo- sophy which we are considering was very difi'erent from that with which we are familiar. We may illustrate the diiSerence by a change which has taken place more recently in physical theory. It was formerly supposed that electricity and heat were subtle fluids distributed among the particles of ordinary bodies, and when an object was electrified, or hot, or cold, it was thought that there was an excess or deficiency of these fluids. Here, then, we have an instance in which the pre- dicate denoted, not, as it does to our present scientific appre- hension, a certain condition of the object itself, but the * "Idiov 6iov. 28 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. presence or absence of a substance completely different from the object. Now, if we could imagine, in connection with this hypothesis, that electricity and heat were ultimately the same substance, and were differentiated only through the modes of its manifestation, we could not properly class this substance with hot or electrical bodies j and if we ever spoke of it as hot or electrical, we should obviously use these words in a sense different from that in which they are applicable to glass and iron. The latter would have a share in heat and elec- tricity; the former would be heat and electricity, or rather would be the unknown substance which comprised them both. This furnishes, I think, a strict analogy to Philo's conception of attributes. These were not conditions affecting the minds of which they might be predicated, but were essences in which individual minds had their finite and transient share; but they were all included within God, and were summed up in the unity of his infinite being. We noticed the former of these doctrines in our remarks upon the human powers ; the latter must await its fuU development till we treat of the divine powers and the doctrine of ideas. We must now direct our attention to those passages by which, as I believe, the above exposition is established. First of all, Philo expressly places God in a genus by himself. It is not allowable, he says, to suppose that anything is better than the Cause, since nothing is even equal, or even a little inferior to him, " but everything after God is found to have descended by a whole genus." * According to this statement God is the highest genua, and may therefore be properly described as the most generic. This is done in a passage where Philo speaks of the supply of water and manna fur- nished to the Israelites in the wilderness. The rock cut away at the top t is the wisdom of God, which he cut as topmost J * SS. Ab. et Cain., 28 {I. 181). t "H axpi TOfioe irirpa. I render it in this way, in order to preserve the play upon the words. + 'Arpav Ire/iEv. GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 29 and first of all from his own powers, and from which, he gives drink to Grod-loving souls. Now when they have received drink they are fiHed also with manna, which is the most generic thing, for manna is called "'what," which is the universal genus. The allusion here is to Exodus xvi. 15, where it is related that, when the Israelites saw the manna, they said to one another, "What is this ?"* Philo proceeds : "the most generic thingt is God, and second is the Word J of God, but all other things exist in word only,§ and in reality are equivalent to the non-existent." || It seems clear that these statements cannot be accepted in their ordinary logical sense. According to this, God would be the term which included the largest number of species and individuals, which denoted more and connoted less than any other term ; and he would be "without qualities" only by being turned into an empty abstraction. That this is not Philo's meaning is apparent from the fact that the word God is not, in its highest sense, a generic term at all, but is always limited to one single being. We must therefore understand the above expressions in an ontological rather than in a logical sense. God is the most generic, not on account of his logical emptiness, but on account of his real fulness. He is the Being who includes all else within his own solitary perfection, and who alone imparts meaning and reality to all beneath. As Philo strongly expresses it, " God is full of himself and sufficient to himself, fiUing and containing all other things, which are deficient and desert and empty, but himself being contained by nothing else, as being himself one and the whole.^^^ If, then, we pass from God to the good, the beautiful, the true, it is not by an ascent of thought and by introducing greater richness of meaning into a more abstract notion, but by a descent and by a resolution of the perfect • Ti Ian tovto ; as it stands in the LXX. f To yeviKiiraTov. X Aoyoe. § A6y jiovov. || Leg. All., II. 21 (I. 82). II EIc Kai Ti wav, Leg. AU., I. 14 (I. 52). 30 THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OP GOD. unity into lower and leas significant conceptions. ^ The latter are unified and exhausted in God ; and it would therefore be more correct to say that the good is divine than to say that God is good.* It is for this reason that God is described as "the good," or "the first good/'t and the source of all that may be characterized by that epithet. He is, says Philo, "alone blessed and happy, unparticipant of all evil, J and full of perfect good,§ or rather, if one is to speak the truth, being himself the good, who showered on heaven and earth the individual things that are good."|| Again, he is the most self-sufficing, and in need of nothing created, " the first good, the most perfect, the ever-flowing fountain of prudence and righteousness and all excellence." TT Similarly he is called "the first and most perfect good, from whom, like a fountain, the cosmos and its contents are watered with the several things that are good."** The description of God as " the good "ft might seem to ■determine his essence ; but this is far from Philo's intention. God is indeed " the good," but he is much more ; and we may therefore legitimately speak of his goodness. JJ This, instead of exhausting his being, is only " the oldest of the graces," — the epithet oldest denoting, as often in Philo, that which is prior or superior in thought. It is eternal, and its exercise belongs to the divine nature. §§ The transcendence of God above goodness and every other property which we, in our limited experience, can ascribe to him is expressed several times in remarkable language. In the account of the embassy to Caius, Philo speaks of the Uncreated and Divine as "the first good and beautiful and blessed and happy, or, if one is to * Compare the statement, ovSiv yap tan tuiv koKHv o fiq Gtoii Tt koI BtXov, SS. Ab. et Cain., 17 (I. 174). ■)■ To aya96v, or to ■npSirov aya96v. X So Tisch., Philon., p. 20, instead of " evils." § 'tLyaSSiv. II Td Kara fikpoQ ayaQa. De Septenario 5 (II. 280). IT Sacrifioant., 4 (XL 254). ** Td liri fiipove ayaSa. Deo. Orac, 16 (SI, 194). -ft To ayaeov. tt 'Ayaeonjf. §§ Quod. DeuB immut., 23 (I. 288-9). GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 31 speak the trutli, that which is better than the good, and more beautiful than the beautiful, and happier than the happy, and more blessed than blessedness itself, and whatever is more perfect than these. For speech* is not able to ascend to the intangible God, but sinks back, incapable of using proper names as a ladder to the manifestation, I do not say of the Self-existent — for not even the whole heaven becoming articulate voice would be rich in exact and well-aimed words for this purpose, — but of his attendant powers, creative, and regal, and providential." f This might be taken as a mere flight of rhetoric, to convey the most exalted idea of the divine perfection ; but precisely similar language is used in calm philosophical exposition. In pointing out the necessity for both a susceptible and efficient cause in the creation of the cosmos, Philo describes the latter as most pure and unmixed mind, "better than virtue, and better than know- ledge, and better than the good itself and the beautiful itself."J And again, while insisting that though it is possible for us to know God's existence, we cannot know his essence, he says, "for that which is better than the good, and older than the unit, and purer than one, cannot possibly be dis- cerned by any other, because it is right that he should be apprehended by himself alone."§ The meaning of these expressions is at once apparent, if our previous exposition has been correct. God is superior to all our descriptive epithets, because he includes within himself the archetypal good and beautiful and blessed; and if we could know his name, we should find it comprehensive of all these and more. Our reason falters before this central unity. We can, nay must, believe in its existence ; but we can see it only through the multiplying medium of our own imperfection, through those powers or ideas in which we are allowed to participate. * "0 \6yog. t Leg. ad Cai., 1 (II. 546), slightly abridged. + Mundi Op., 2 (1. 2). § Praem. et Poen., 6 (II. 414). 32 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. and we can hold its essence neither in conception nor in speech. "We are fortunately not left without particular examples which serve to illustrate and confirm the above explanation. First we may notice a passage relating, not to God himself, but to his Logos, which shows that Philo does not hesitate to use predicates which are the best available approximation to the truth at the very moment when he contends that they fall short of the truth. In speaking of the rational soul in man, which had the divine Logos for its archetype, he says, " it is necessary that the imitation of an all-beautiful pattern should be all-beautiful. Bat the Logos of God is better even than beauty itself, that which is beauty in nature,* since it is not adorned with beauty, but is itself, to speak traly, beauty's most becoming adornment."t Similar language is used of God. " He is full of unmixed blessedness. His nature is most perfect, or rather God is himself the summit and end and boundary of blessedness, participating in nothing else for his improvement, but having communicated his own to all individuals from the fountain of the beautiful, himself. For the beautiful things in the cosmos would never have become such if they had not been made like the truly beautiful, the Unbegotten and Blessed and Incorruptible, as an archetype."! Hence it is justly said, " There is nothing beautiful which is not of God and divine." § The statement that God is older than the unit receives an explanation which * Mangey, at the suggestion of Christophorson, reads Iv ry fiaii aiadtiTtf, which is not very intelligible. Dahne, assuming that aiaBrjTcf must be retained, places it after KoXXei, thus emptying the passage of its real significance [I. p. 262, Anm. 264]. Miiller points out that the word is a mere gloss, and is not supported by any old authority [p. 370-1]. Nevertheless it must be confessed that its omission does not remove every difficulty, for the clause oircp iariv iv ry ^vaei KciKXos seems quite superfluous, unless it is intended to limit in some way the previous airov koXXouq, and this it cannot do if (pvati is to be understood, with Miiller, in quite a general sense, and not merely of perceptible nature. t Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33). { Cherub., 25 (I. 154). § SS. Ab. et Cain,, 17 (1. 174). GOD WITHOUT QUALITIES. 33 is verbally different^ but involves a similar conception. Having demonstrated the unity of God, Philo draws Ms conclusion thusj — " God, then, has been ranked according to the one and the unit ; or rather even the unit has been ranked according to the one God, for all number, like time, is younger than the cosmos, while God is older than the cosmos and its creator .''* This shows that God is not one because he participates in unity, but because the eternal simplicity of his own nature is the archetype of unity. All these illustrations may be summed up in what Philo says of the rationality of God; for the rational is with him "the best genus,"t and what is said of its subordinate relation to the Divine must apply a fortiori to inferior genera. God, then, is before and above the Logos, and is superior to all rational nature. J His relation to the rational is defined in a passage where the difference which I have endeavoured to explain between the predicates of the uncreated and of created beings is exhibited with unmistakable clearness. Bach of us, it is said, is two beings, animal and man. To each of these has been assigned a kindred power, to the one the vital, by virtue of which we live, to the other the rational, by virtue of which we have become rational. " In the vital, then, the irrational animals also participate ; but the rational, God does not indeed participate in, but rules, being the fountain of the most ancient Logos," and the " archetype of rational nature. "§ According to this statement God is rational because, as I have before expressed it, he exhausts and transcends rationality, and is the only source from which it ultimately flows, whereas man is rational because he has received a finite share of rationality, whick * Leg. All., II. 1 (I. 67). t To XoyiKov, oTTjp dpicTTov Tuv ovTiav ytvoc tari. Quod Deus immut., i (I, 275). } Fragm., II. 625, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen. II. 62. § Quod det. pot. ins., 22, 23 (I. 207). We may compare the clear statement of Origen ; — 'AXK ovS' ovtrlag ;i»£rlx£' " 8c6g. Mtrtxerai yap naWov f) nerex^C Kai litrixiTai iiTTo twv i^ovrwv irviviia 9tov. Kai o (Twrqp iifiSiv oil nirkxti /iiv itKaioavvris' SiKaioaivri Si £>v /ttrlxerai iirb Tiiv Sixaidiv. Cont. Cels., VI. 64. VOL. II. 3 34 THE EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF GOD. transcends him, and can communicate itself with unexhausted fulness to innumerable multitudes. Eationality is but one expression of God's eternal and infinite essence ; and since it reveals itself in our intelligence, it stands, as it were, between God and man, deriving from the former all its store, and imparting a tiny portion to each human soul, or rather impressing each soul with its own form. "We may sum up the discussion in words which have been preserved in the Armenian: — "If you wish to speak properly, those things which are justice and truth among men, are similitudes and forms ; but those which are so with God are original principles and prototypes or ideas."* We thus see that the doctrine of intermediate powers or ideas, instead of being an artificial resource to reconcile discordant thoughts, grows out of the very roots of Philo's theology. But we must reserve this subject for future treatment, and be content for the present with having determined the force of the statement that God is without qualities, and the general nature of what in modern times we should call the divine attributes. The mode of thought is far removed from our own ; but I hope I have succeeded not only in making it clear, but in showing how it was possible for rational men to adopt it. If the foregoing interpretation be correct, the serious and unphilosophical contradiction with which Philo is charged has been resolved ; the strictest speculative thought ministers to religious aspiration J God, instead of being an empty abstraction, contains in his infinite fulness the eternal essence of all perfect things; and, though he is too full and too perfect for us to know him as he is, he gives us, in the ideals that impress our souls, side-lights and broken gleams, which are worthy of the implicit trust and devout homage so gladly yielded by the religious heart of Philo. Having thus determined the general character of the divine * Qu. et Sol. in Gen. IV. 115. HIS ETEENITY. 35 attributeSj we must now endeavour^ though at the risk of some repetition^ to bring under one view, and exhibit in detail, the predicates which are actually applied to God by Philo. We must remember that in the philosophy under consideration God is primarily revealed as self-determining Mind, the Cause of the universe. It follows that he must be eternal;* for the belief in something eternal is a necessity of human thought, and if God were not eternal he would depend on something older and greater than himself ; in other words, he would not be God, the first and supreme Cause. We find, accordingly, that eternity is with Philo the most indispensable mark of Deity, the want of which deprives all originated gods of every just title to the name ; t and eternity and causality are naturally brought into combination in references to the Supreme Being. He is " the unbegotten and eternal and the Cause of all things,"J the "oldest and generator and maker of all things, . . . who is alone eternal, and Father of everything else, intelligible and perceptible.''§ He is " the Father of the universe, the unbegotten God, and generator of all things." || His eternity is further emphasized by resolving it into the two notions of without beginning and without end : he is " the unbegotten and incorruptible and eternal. '"If This reiteration (and other passages might be cited) shows how fundamental with Philo is the conception of God's eternity. The ascription to him, however, of eternal causality, far from endowing him with qualities and bringing him into a class, differentiates him in the most absolute way from everything else. All other things, however contrasted, have at least the fellowship of origination ; but God is not like even the best of natural objects, for the latter have come into being and are destined * 'AWiOf. f Human., 2 (II. 386), ycvtirbg ydp ovStiQ aXriBiiff BtSs, . . . . rb dvayxato- TaTOv ctf-gpiqfikvoQy aiSioTTjra. I Deo. Orae., 14 (II. 191). § NobU., 5 (II. 442). II Cherub., 13 (I. 147). ^ '0 dykvvriTog Kai a