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 No. -./.i2.2< 
 
ESSAYS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 Constitution of the United States, 
 
 PUBLISHED DURING 
 
 ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 
 
 1 787-1 788. 
 
 Edited 
 PAUL LEICESTER FORD. 
 
 BROOKLYN, N. Y. : 
 
 HISTORICAL PRINTING CLUB. 
 1892. 
 
A. 705-17 
 TK 
 
 n\ 
 
 ^ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In 1888 the editor selected from the pamphlet arguments pub- 
 lished during the discussion of the Constitution of the United 
 States, prior to its ratification by the States, a collection of four- 
 teen tracts, and printed them in a volume under the title of 
 Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States. The reception 
 given that collection clearly proved that these writings were only 
 neglected because of their rarity and inaccessibility, and has in- 
 duced the editor to collect another, though largely similar class 
 of writings, which he believes of equal value and equally un- 
 known. 
 
 In the great discussion which took place in the years 1787 
 and 1788 of the adoption or rejection of the Constitution of the 
 United States, one of the important methods of influencing 
 public opinion, resorted to by the partisans and enemies of the 
 , proposed frame of government, was the contribution of essays to 
 the press of the period. The newspapers were filled with anony- 
 mous articles on this question, usually the product of the great 
 statesmen and writers of that period. Often of marked ability, 
 and valuable as the personal views of the writers,, the dispersion 
 and destruction of the papers that contained them have resulted 
 in their almost entire neglect as historical or legal writings, and 
 the difiSculty of their proper use has been further increased by 
 their anonymous character, which largely destroyed the author- 
 ity and weight they would have carried, had their true writers 
 been known. 
 
 (V) 
 
VI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 From an examination of over forty files of newspapers and 
 many thousand separate issues, scattered in various public and 
 private libraries, from Boston to Charleston, the editor has 
 selected a series of these essays, and reprinted them in this 
 volume. From various sources he has obtained the name of the 
 writer of each. All here reprinted are the work of well-known 
 men. Five of the writers were Signers of the Declaration of In- 
 dependence; seven were members of the Federal Convention; 
 many were members of the State Conventions, and there dis- 
 cussed the Constitution. All had had a wide experience in law 
 and government. Their arguments are valuable, not merely for 
 their reasoning, but from their statement of facts. New light is 
 thrown upon the proceedings in the Federal Convention, so large 
 a part of which is yet veiled in mystery; and personal motives, 
 and state interests, are mercilessly laid bare, furnishing clues of 
 both the support of and opposition to the Constitution. Subse- 
 quently most of the writers were prominent in administering this 
 Constitution or opposing its development, and were largely re- 
 sponsible for the resulting tendencies of our government. 
 
 Paul Leicester Ford. 
 Brooklyn, N. K, April, iSgs, 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Sullivan, James. 
 
 The Letters of " Cassius." i 
 
 WiNTHROP, James. 
 
 The Letters-of " Agrippa." 49 
 
 Gerky, Elbridge. 
 
 Replies to " A Landholder." 123 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver. 
 
 Letters of "A Landholder." 135 
 
 Williams. William. 
 
 A Letter to " A Landholder." 202 
 
 Sherman, Roger. 
 
 The Letters of "A Countryman." 211 
 
 Sherman, Roger. 
 
 Letters of " A Citizen of New Haven." 229 
 
 Clinton, George. 
 
 The Letters of " Cato." 241 
 
 HAIH^I^g^l^fXANDER. fO'^ ' 
 
 ^ The Letters of " Caesar." 279 
 
 Yates, Robert, f ; 
 
 The Letters of " Sydney." 293 
 
 Brackenridge, Hugh Henrv. 
 
 Cursory Remarks on the Constitution 315 
 
 Chase, Samuel. 
 
 A Letter of " Caution." 323 
 
 (vii) 
 
VIU CONTENTS. 
 
 FAGR 
 
 Carroll, Daniel. 
 
 A Letter of "A Friend to the Constitution." 328 
 
 Martin, Luther. 
 
 Letters of 337 
 
 Roane, Spencer. 
 
 A Letter of " A Hain Dealer." 385 
 
 Williamson, Hugh. 
 
 Remarks on the Constitution 395 
 
 PiNCKNEY, Charles. 
 
 A Letter of " A Steady and Open Republican." 408 
 
 Bibliography 417 
 
 Index 419 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 CAS S lU S 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 JAMES SULLIVAN, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 September— December, 
 
 1787. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The letters signed Cassius were, at the time of publication, 
 generally accredited to the pen of James Sullivan, and this opin- 
 ion is adopted in Amory's Life of James Sullivan. The letters 
 themselves bear out this opinion, being clearly written by a par- 
 tisan of the Hancock faction, of whom Sullivan was a warm 
 adherent, and constant newspaper essayist. 
 
 The first two letters were printed before the promulgation of 
 the proposed Constitution in Massachusetts, and chiefly relate to 
 the differences between the two parties headed by John Han- 
 cock and James Bowdoin ; but are included here to complete the 
 series. The letters are of particular value as giving the position 
 of Hancock, of whom Sullivan was the particular mouthpiece, 
 proving him to be a supporter of the adoption of the Consti- 
 tution, though the contrary has often been asserted. The early 
 letters were commented upon by " Old Fog," in the Massa- 
 chusetts Centinel of Sept. 22 and Oct. 6, 1787. 
 
CASSIUS, I. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (IfTinaber 367) 
 
 Tuesday, September i8, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 It is a ^reat pity that such an able writer as Numa* should 
 take up the pen to distribute sentiments, which have a tendency 
 to create uneasiness in the minds of the misinformed and weak, 
 (for none other will be influenced by them) especially at this time 
 when the state is hardly recovered from those convulsions,t it 
 has so recently experienced. 
 
 The real well-wisher to peace and good government cannot 
 but execrate many of the ideas which that would be- disturber of 
 tranquillity has lately proclaimed to the publick, through the 
 channels of the Hampshire Gazette, and Independent Chronicle.J 
 The man of sense, the true lover of his country, would, if a change 
 of ofKcers was to take place in the government to which he was 
 subject, and men be placed in power, whom he thought not so 
 capable of the task as those who preceded them, endeavour, all 
 in his power, to extenuate the evil, and none but the ruthless in- 
 cendiary, or the disappointed tool, would, at such a period, con- 
 duct in a manner the reverse. 
 
 It is well known, that there is a party in this state whose 
 sentiments are in favour of aristocracy; who wish to see the con- 
 stitution dissolved, and another, which shall be more arbitrary 
 
 *A writer then attacking, the Hancock party. See The Independent Chronicle for 
 Aug. 23, and Sept. 15, 20, 1787. Ed. 
 \ Shay's Rebellion. Ed. 
 
 \ Massachusetts newspapers published in Northampton and Boston. Ed. 
 
 (5) 
 
6 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 and tyrannical, established on its ruins. Perhaps a few of this 
 , description were members of the last ad . . . st . . . n.* If so, 
 most happy for the commonwealth, they are now hurled from 
 seats of power, and unable to carry into effect plans laid for sub- 
 verting the liberties of the people. — Checked at once in their 
 horrid career — all those hopes blasted which they entertained of 
 concerting measures which would "afford them matter for de- 
 rision at a future day," — they now put on the garb of hypocrisy, 
 and seem to weep for the terrible misfortunes which they pretend 
 are hovering around us. Such characters are, it is hoped, forever 
 banished from places of trust. Some of them pretend to be 
 mighty politicians, — they display a vast knowledge of ancient 
 times — and by their harangues about the conduct of Greece, 
 Rome and Athens, show their acquaintance with the pages of 
 antiquity. In some few instances, however, perhaps they are 
 a little mistaken. The learned Numa says, "the degenerate 
 Romans banished Cicero for saving the commonwealth." Rome 
 did not banish Cicero — a faction, who wished to triumph over the 
 liberties of Rome, exiled that immortal orator ; and to that, or a 
 similiar one, he at last fell a sacrifice. If a faction can be styled 
 the people, with great propriety do the disappointed aristocra- 
 ticks, and their tools, in our day, style themselves, the great ma- 
 jority of the people. 
 
 If Numa, and others of the like stamp, are politicians, they are 
 very short-sighted ones. If our government is weak, is it policy 
 to weaken it still more by false suggestions, and by a scandalous 
 abuse of our rulers? by endeavouring to spread a spirit of discon- 
 tent among the people, and prejudicing their minds against those 
 whom, by their suffrages, they have chosen to take the helm of 
 affairs ? If this is policy, Numa is, indeed, an accomplished poli- 
 tician. 
 
 But the time of triumph for the aristocratick clan is now over. 
 The people have seen their folly in listening too much to them 
 already. Their conduct has involved the state in confusion; but 
 it is hoped, a conduct the reverse will place matters again upon a 
 right footing. The secret machinations, which were harboured 
 * The administration of Governor Bowdoin. Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 7 
 
 in the breasts of those aristocratick dupes, have been laid open to 
 publick inspection — their plans thoroughly investigated — and the 
 horrid tendency of them, had they taken effect, been fully mani- 
 fested. 
 
 They may weep, crocodile-like, till the source of their tears is 
 dried up, they never will get the prey into their jaws, which they 
 hoped to devour. The sting of remorse, it may be hoped, will 
 bring them to a sense of their guilt, and an upright conduct make 
 some amends for their high-handed offences. Should this take 
 place, an injured people may forgive, though they never can for- 
 get them. 
 
 Let Numa reflect, that we now have, at the head of govern- 
 ment, those men who were the first to step forth in the great 
 cause of liberty — who risked their all to acquire the blessings of 
 freedom; though that freedom, through the influence of such 
 characters as himself, has been oft^n abused. 
 
 The people know their rulers, and have confidence in them : 
 and can it be supposed, that they would have confidence in those, 
 whose dastardly souls, in time of danger, shrunk back from the 
 scene of action, and kept secure in their strong holds? and when 
 peace and independence had crowned the exertions of far more 
 noble souls, they groped out of darkness and obscurity, and in- 
 truded themselves into places of power and trust? 
 
 Can it be expected, that the people should have confidence in 
 such men, or feel themselves secure under their government? 
 By no means. The bandage is taken from their eyes — they see 
 and detest them. They have displaced them, that they may re- 
 turn to their former obscurity, and pass the remainder of their 
 days in philosophizing upon their conduct. Numa and his coad- 
 jutors may exert themselves all in their power; but they cannot 
 again stir up sedition and rebellion. 
 
 The people now have too much penetration to be led away by 
 their falsehoods and scandal : they will, it is hoped, ere long, reap 
 the blessings of good government, under the direction of a wise 
 administration, and treat in a manner they deserve, every incen- 
 diary attempt against their peace and happiness. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, II. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 ('N'-a.m.'ber 371) 
 
 Tuesday, October 2, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To Numa's long list of evils, which he says, in some of his 
 productions, are prevalent in the commonwealth, he might have 
 added, that when priests became Jesuits, the hberties of the peo- 
 ple were in danger — in almost all countries, we shall find, that 
 when sedition and discontent were brewing. Political Jesuits were 
 often at the bottom of the affair. 
 
 Unhappily for Numa, the citizens of Massachusetts are not so 
 blinded by ignorance, nor so devoted to prejudice and supersti- 
 tion, as the common people in those arbitrary and despotick gov- 
 ernments, where clerical imposition reigns paramount almost to 
 everything else; where the freedom of speech is suppressed, and 
 the liberty of the people, with regard to examining for themselves, 
 totally restrained. 
 
 It is, however, the case that, even in this country, the weak 
 and ignorant are often led too implicitly to put th«ir faith wholly 
 upon what their spiritual teachers think proper to inform them, 
 and precipitately imbibe sentiments from them, which, if their 
 teacher is a designing knave, may prove detrimental to society. 
 The Jesuit will, however, find it very difficult, notwithstanding 
 many circumstances may seem to favor his views, to carry the 
 point of altering a free government to one more arbitrary, in such 
 a country as this. 
 
 The cloak of religion too often answers to promote plans detri- 
 
 (8) 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 9 
 
 mental to the peace and happiness of mankind. The priests, who 
 accompanied the Spaniards when they fi/rst invaded the kingdoms 
 of Mexico and Peru, urged on those blood-hounds to perpetrate 
 scenes of cruelty and horror (at the bare recital of which human 
 nature shudders), with assurances that it would tend to promote 
 the cause of the Christian religion, if they effected the conquest 
 of those unhappy people, and that any conduct was justifiable to 
 bring infidels to a sense of their duty. 
 
 The teacher of the benign and peaceable doctrine of the 
 Saviour of mankind, often thinks he can, with greater security, 
 on account of his profession, disseminate the seeds of sedition and 
 discontent, without being suspected. This thought no doubt oc- 
 curred to Numa before he exhibited his designing productions to 
 the publick. Sheltered under the sacred wing of religion, how 
 many an impious wretch stalks secure from^ publick justice, 
 
 " Whose mem'ries ought, and will perhaps yet live, 
 In all the glare which infamy can give." 
 
 Numa indicates that he means to prepare the minds of the 
 people for the reception of that government which the Federal 
 Convention shall think most proper for them to adopt. In the 
 name of common sense, what can that scribbler mean by this as- 
 sertion ? Is a scandalous abuse of our rulers — the propagation 
 of sentiments which are calculated to set the publick mind in a 
 ferment — if they are so far attended to as to have any influence 
 among the people — a fit preparation for such a measure ? Surely, 
 by no means, and every thinking mind, will discover that the pro- 
 ductions of Numa are either intended to effect secret purposes, or 
 that they are merely effusions of the fanatick brain of that Quix- 
 ote of the day. 
 
 Instead of vile insinuations and falsehoods being spread among 
 the people, in regard to their rulers, in order to prepare their 
 minds for the reception of that form of government which the 
 Federal Convention may propose, sentiments the very reverse 
 ought to be propagated. The people ought to be inspired with 
 the highest confidence in those who preside over the affairs of the 
 state. It ought to be implanted in their minds, that their rulers 
 are men fit to conduct every plan which might be proposed, to 
 
lO LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 promote the general welfare of the people; and this with truth 
 may be asserted. But Numa has no more intention of preparing 
 the minds of the people for the government which the Federal 
 Convention may propose, than Queen Catharine has of abdicating 
 the throne of Russia. 
 
 The people of Massachusetts ought to be cautioned, above 
 everything, to be on their guard with respect to the conduct of 
 Political Jesuits. They have generally been the curse of almost 
 every country that has cherished ; they have often been the pro- 
 moters of revolution and bloodshed. A set of infernal fiends, let 
 loose from the dreary mansions of Beelzebub, cannot be more 
 detrimental to the place and happiness of society, than a band of 
 Political Jesuits. 
 
 Citizens of Massachusetts ! those men who now preside over 
 you are, and ever have been, the patrons of freedom and inde- 
 pendence ! men whose exertions have been unceasing to promote 
 and secure to you the blessings of a free government; whose 
 grand stimulus to act is the advancement of your welfare and 
 happiness ! — men whose conduct is not stinted by the narrow con- 
 cerns of self, and who, " when their country calls, can yield their 
 treasure up, and know no wish beyond the publick good." Such 
 are the men who now wield the affairs of state, and whose deeds 
 will, when those of that vile clan of calumniators who exist in this 
 state are rotting in the tomb of oblivion, conspicuously adorn the 
 brightest pages of the American revolution. 
 
 Numa* and his band, the calumniators of true worth, may 
 bustle away for a while; but they will ere long be obliged to 
 retire from the bright flashes of patriotism and merit; and, after 
 finding their endeavours fruitless, to sully The Character of the 
 Brightest Luminary that ever Adorned the Hemisphere of Mass- 
 achusetts,t and many other illustrious patriots, who compose 
 the present administration, they will retire to gnash their teeth in 
 anguish and disappointment, in the caverns of obscurity — a pun- 
 ishment their conduct inost justly merits. Cassius. 
 
 * The author of the productions under the signature of Numa, it is said, is a gentle- 
 man of the cloth, in one of the Western counties, 
 fjohn Hancock. Ed. 
 
CASSIUS, III. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (irrimTaer 383) 
 
 Friday, November i6, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 It was the saying of an eminent legislator, that if we had 
 angels to govern us, we should quarrel with them. The conduct 
 of some among us has repeatedly evinced, beyond a doubt, that 
 this would actually be the case ; we have proof of this in a more 
 particular manner in the opposition now made by some (but I 
 sincerely hope the number is few) to the form of government 
 agreed upon by the late federal Convention. I firmly believe, if 
 a form of government was proposed to some of the inhabitants of 
 the United States by the great Author of Nature himself, founded 
 on the basis of eternal rectitude, and sanctioned in the courts 
 above, that they would object to it. 
 
 It is a happy circumstance for the citizens of the United States 
 that they are acquainted with the motives which actuate the 
 present opposers to the plan of federal government ; as they now, 
 instead of listening with candour to the dictates of mad frenzy 
 and wild ambition, will treat with the deserved contempt all their 
 productions. 
 
 The opposers to the plan of federal government, are composed 
 
 of such as are either deeply in debt and know not how to extricate 
 
 themselves, should a strict administration of law and justice take 
 
 place, or those who are determined not to be contented under any 
 
 form of government, or of such as mean to " owe their greatness 
 
 to their country's ruin." — ^Are such fit men to point out objections 
 
 (II) 
 
12 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 to a government, proposed by the first characters in the universe, 
 after a long and candid discussion of the subject? — Are such fit 
 characters to propose a government for ruling a free and enlight- 
 ened people? — Can those who are known to be divested of 
 honour, justice and integrity, expect to propagate sentiments that 
 will outweigh those of men whose character as true republicans 
 and wise statesmen, are known from pole to pole — men, whose 
 wisdom and firmness have emancipated the United States from 
 the yoke of bondage, arid laid the foundation of an empire, which 
 (if the people will still follow their precepts) will last till time 
 shall be swallowed up in the " wasteless ages of eternity ? " — Can 
 scribblers whose fame is but of a day, think to influence the 
 citizens of the United States so far as to cause them to respect a 
 form of government calculated to diffuse the blessings of civil 
 society far and wide?^ — If they can harbour ideas of such a nature, 
 I pity their weakness and despise their villainy. 
 
 Some writers in Pennsylvania, New York and Massachusetts, 
 have displayed their scribbling talents in opposition to the plan 
 of federal government ; but it is easy to perceive by their argu- 
 ments, that they are men who are fearful of not being noticed in 
 a federal government, or are some of the stamp before mentioned. 
 Their arguments are without weight, and their assertions and 
 insinuations as foreign to the real state of facts as anything pos- 
 sibly can bte: they anticipate evils, which, in the nature of things, 
 it is almost impossible should ever happen, and, for the most part, 
 their reasoning (if it is not a degradation to reason to call such 
 jargon by its name) is incoherent, nonsensical and absurd. 
 
 Some writers in Massachusetts have discovered such weakness, 
 inconsistency and folly in their productions, that it discovers 
 them to be entirely ignorant of the subject they pretend to dis- 
 cuss, and totally unacquainted with the plan of government pro- 
 posed by the federal convention. Among this number, is a 
 scribbler under the signature of Vox Populi ;* whose signature, to 
 have been consistent with his productions, should have been Vox 
 Insania. This pompous and very learned scribbler, goes on to 
 harrangue the public about the danger, hazard, terrour and de- 
 
 * A writer in the Massachusetts Gazette, Oct 30, Nov. 6, 13, i6, and 23. Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF CASSItlS. 33 
 
 struction -which will attend the adoption of fhe federal Constitu- 
 tion. He pleads, in a mournful strain, much about woful experi- 
 ence. From this circumstance, I am induced to suppose Vox 
 Populi was an adherent of the celebrated Shays, in his xmfortu- 
 mate expedition the last winter, and wofuUy experienced the mis- 
 fisrtune attendant on the insurgents, through the energy of gov- 
 ernment. However, the inhabitants of Massachusetts may be 
 assured, that they will have Woful Experience witlj a witness, if 
 they sufiTer themselves to be led away by such ignorant, knavish 
 and designing numbbeads as Vox Populi and his clan, so far as 
 to reject the plan of federal government proposed by the Conven- 
 tion. Vox Populi complains that our source for taxes is ex- 
 hausted, and says we must have a new system for taxation : but 
 he must consider, that if the federal government is adopted, we 
 shall not have occasion to employ the legislature so great a part 
 of the year as we are now obliged to do ; of consequence, govern- 
 ment will be able to apply their money to better uses than pay- 
 ing anti-federalists, while they are spreading their poisonous va- 
 pours through the already too much infected atmosphere. 
 
 Mr. Vox Populi remarks, that some people are already taxed 
 more than their estates are worth ; in this instance I sincerely be- 
 lieve he speaks the truth. But what is the occasion of their be- 
 ing thus taxed ? — It is because they make a show as though they 
 have property, though in fact it belongs to another; they live 
 sumptuously, and riot in the property' of their unfortunate credit- 
 ors. Perhaps Mr. Vox Populi is one of this class, and has wo- 
 fully experienced a taxation more than his whole estate is worth: 
 if he is, I would advise him, instead of employing his time in 
 belching out his " de factos, plene proofs " and other chit-chat of 
 the like kind, and disseminating his execrable "ideas," to go 
 about adjusting his affairs, as it will tend more to his honour, 
 and perhaps be the means of saving him from the woful experi- 
 ence of confinement in a place much more fit for him than that 
 in which he now is. 
 
 I pity Mr. Vox Populi's weakness and conceit, in thinking he 
 and others of his class have accents not less majestick than thun- 
 der, as I really think he is very singular in his opinion. Instead 
 
14 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 of his "accents" being majestick as thunder, they are as harmless 
 and insignificant as the feeble breeze. 
 
 Citizens of Massachusetts, look well about you ; you are beset 
 by harpies, knaves and blockheads, who are employing every 
 artifice and falsehood to effect your ruin. The plan of federal 
 government is fraught with every thing favourable to your hap- 
 piness, your freedom and your future welfare : if you reject it, 
 posterity will execrate your memories, and ceaselessly insult 
 your ashes : if you adopt it, they will revere your departed 
 shades, and offer up libations of gratitude on your tombs. 
 
 May that wisdom which is profitable to direct guide your 
 judgments — and may you, by adopting the federal government, 
 secure to yourselves and your posterity every social and relig- 
 ious advantage, and every national blessing. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, IV. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (I^"iimTDei" 385) 
 
 Friday, November 23, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette, 
 
 Anarchy, with her haggard cheeks and extended jaws, stands 
 ready, and all allow that unless some efficient form of govern- 
 ment is adopted she will soon swallow us. The opposers to the 
 plan of government lately agreed upon by the federal convention 
 have not spared their censures upon it: they have stigmatized it 
 with every odious appellation that can be named ; but amidst all 
 their railing, have not so much as hinted at a form of government 
 that would be proper for us to adopt : and even if they had, it 
 would have remained for us to examine, whether they were men 
 of more honesty, greater abilities, and firmer patriots and friend 
 to their country, than the members of the late convention ; ant 
 whether the form of government, which they might propose, was 
 better adapted to our situation and circumstances, and freer from 
 imperfections, than the one which has already been proposed to 
 us. But it is not the intention of the opposers to the plan of fed- 
 eral government, founded on firm and truly republican principles ; 
 as, in that case, their aims would be entirely defeated, as it would 
 put it out of their power to stir up sedition and discontent; and 
 they would be lost in obscurity, or move in a most contemptible 
 sphere. 
 
 I have before hinted, that the opposers of the plan of federal 
 government are composed of knaves, harpies and debtors ; and, I 
 
 (IS) 
 
1 6 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 trust, it will soon appear, what I have said is not a bare assertion 
 only, but a matter of fact. 
 
 I shall now proceed to make a few remarks on the conclusion 
 of " Vox Populi's," or rather Vox Insania's, production which ap- 
 peared in last Friday's paper. 
 
 Vox Populi requests the inhabitants of Massachusetts "to pay 
 that attention to the federal constitution which the importance of 
 its nature demands;" and informs them, that they " have hazarded 
 their lives and fortunes (by the way, a wonderful piece of news) 
 to establish a government founded on the principles of genuine 
 civil liberty," &c. I join with him in his request. And am con- 
 fident if that attention which is requisite is paid to the proposed 
 plan of federal government, that it will meet with the hearty ap- 
 probation of every well wisher to the freedom and happiness of 
 his country. It is true, that the inhabitants of America have 
 hazarded their lives and fortunes to establish a free and efficient 
 government; but will Vox Populi, that moon-light prophet, pre- 
 tend to say that such a government is at present established? 
 Vox Populi goes on to inform us, that, by adopting the new plan 
 of government, we shall make inroads on the constitution of this 
 State, which he seems to think will be sacrilegious. His narrow 
 and contracted ideas, his weak, absurd, and contemptible argu- 
 ments, discover him to be possessed of a mind clouded with the 
 gloom of ignorance, and thick with the grossest absurdity. 
 Strange it is, that that babbler should suppose it unjustifiable for 
 the people to alter or amend, or even entirely abolish, what they 
 themselves have established. But says Vox Populi, perhaps the 
 new plan will not have the same number to approbate it, that the 
 constitution of this State had. Perhaps Vox Populi will be hung 
 for high treason. There is, in my opinion, as much probability 
 in the latter perhaps, as in the former. Pray, Mr. Vox Populi, if 
 I may be so bold, what reason have you to judge that there will 
 not be so many for adopting the constitution proposed by the 
 convention, as there were for adopting the constitution of this 
 State some years ago ? Do you suppose the inhabitants of Mas- 
 sachusetts have depreciated in their understanding? or do you 
 suppose that the sublimity of your jargon has blinded them with 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 1 7 
 
 respect to their best interests? If you suppose the former, I 
 think you have not been much conversant with them of late, or 
 that your intellects are something defective. If you suppose the 
 latter, in my opinion, you are no better than a downright Fool. 
 
 Vox Populi sets out to touch the consciences of men in office, 
 in representing the solemnity of an oath. It seems almost im- 
 possible that any one should be so stupidly blinded to every dic- 
 tate of reason and common sense, as to start such things as have 
 been mentioned by Vox Populi, to deter men from using their 
 influence to effect the adoption of the new plan of government. 
 
 Can that shallow-pated scribbler suppose that an oath taken 
 by rulers to stand by a form of government, adopted by the peo- 
 ple, can be of any force or consideration if the people choose to 
 change that form of government for another more agreeable to 
 their wishes? 
 
 But (in order without doubt to strike a greater dread upon 
 their minds) Vox Populi says, "the oath is registered in Heaven." 
 Pray, Mr. Vox Populi, when was you there? and did you really 
 see the oath registered? The constitution of this state was 
 formed, and officers appointed under it, long since the awful bat- 
 tle was fought in Heaven, between Michael and the Prince of 
 Darkness, and I cannot conceive of your admittance there in any 
 other way than under the banners of his Satanick Majesty, who 
 might suppose that such an unparelleled phenomenon would have 
 an effect on the archangel that would be favourable to his cause. 
 
 Vox Populi asserts that the General Court* acted merely offic- 
 ially in laying the proposed plan of government before the people. 
 No man of candour, sense and foresight, Mr. Vox Populi, will 
 ask the reason of the General Court's laying the plan of govern- 
 ment proposed by the federal constiution before the people, as 
 their own minds will suggest to them the true reason for it, and 
 none but those who are as stupid and ignorant as yourself, would 
 suppose that the General Court acted merely officially in doing 
 as they did. The General Court were undoubtedly influenced by 
 motives of the best kind in what they did. 
 
 They without doubt were anxious that the people should have 
 * The Legislature of Massachusetts was then so styled. Ed. 
 
1 8 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 the new plan of government to consider of in due time, and, con- 
 sidering the importance of it, and the tendency it had to promote 
 their happiness, liberty and security, took the first opportunity to 
 present it to them. 'Tis true, Mr. Vox Po{)uli, that you are a 
 member of the legislature ; it is also true that you are possessed 
 of a mind as emaciated as the mass of corrupt matter that encir- 
 cles it. But although you belong to the house of representatives, 
 I trust you are not the mouth of that honourable body; and, if 
 not, pray who authorised you to inform the publick of the motives 
 for their conduct? Did they in an official manner make their 
 motives known to you, and request you to lay them before the 
 publick? Indeed, Mr. Vox Populi, you seem to put on very as- 
 suming airs, but I think you had better humble yourself, as your 
 station may, ere long, be lowered. 
 
 A writer under the signature of Examiner,* has several times 
 pointed out the fallacy of the writings of Vox Populi, and re- 
 quested that ghost-like scribbler to lay a form of government be- 
 fore the publick in lieu of that which he has taken upon him to 
 condemn ; and has informed him, that if he does not, and still 
 continues scribbling, his modesty will be called in question. 
 
 The Examiner is entirely unacquainted with the babbler he 
 justly reproves, or he would not have mentioned anything to him 
 respecting modesty ; as he must be sensible that screech-owls are 
 entirely divested of modesty, and he may be assured that Vox 
 Populi is one of those midnight squallers. 
 
 Inhabitants of Massachusetts ! be constantly on the watch — It 
 requires almost the eyes of an Argus to penetrate into all the 
 schemes of those designing wretches, who are waiting to see you 
 reject the federal system of government, and involve yourselves 
 in all the horrours of anarchy, then to riot with pleasure on your 
 miseries. Disappoint their expectations — adopt the proposed 
 plan of federal government — it will secure to you every blessing 
 which a free and enlightened people can expect to enjoy. 
 
 Some, who are now in office, but expect soon to leave it, and 
 bid adieu to power, unless they can effect the establishment of a 
 government which shall 
 
 * In the Massachusetts Gazette, for Nov. 2, 9, and 20, 17S7. Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 1 9 
 
 " Cause treason, rapine, sacrilege and crimes, 
 To blot the annals of these western climes," 
 
 are busy in spreading every false and malicious insinuation in 
 their power, to prejudice the people against the new plan of gov- 
 ernment ; but it is hoped they will see through their designs, and 
 treat them with contempt — and wisely agree to embrace the new 
 plan of government, which is favourable to every sentiment of re- 
 publicanism, and replete with every thing beneficial to their wel- 
 fare. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, V. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (NumTDer 386) 
 
 Tuesday, November 27, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 " Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present 
 themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them. 
 
 "And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou ? Then 
 Satan answered the Lord, and said, From going to and fro in the 
 earth, and from walking up and down in it. 
 
 "And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my ser- 
 vant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and 
 an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil ?" &c., 
 &c. 
 
 Citizens of Massachusetts! like the sons of God have the 
 members of the late federal convention assembled together ; like 
 them too, have they been infested with the presence of Satan, or 
 such as were influenced by Satanick principles, and who wish to 
 thwart every design that has a tendency to promote the general 
 good of the United States. 
 
 Let us take a short view of the characters who composed the 
 late federal convention. Are they not men who, from their in- 
 fancy, have been nurtured in the principles of liberty, and taught 
 to pay a sacred regard to the rights of human nature ? Are they 
 not men who, when the poisonous breath of tyranny would have 
 blasted the flower of Independence in its bud, and veiled every 
 ray of freedom in the clouds of lawless despotism, nobly stepped 
 forth in defence of their injured country's rights, and through the 
 
 (20) 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 21 
 
 influence of whose exertions, favoured by the protection of an 
 over-ruling Power, the thick fog of despotism vanished hke the 
 early dew before the powerful rays of the resplendent luminary of 
 the universe? Are they not honest, upright and just men, who 
 fear God and eschew evil ? 
 
 With few exceptions, they are mostly men of this character; 
 and. Citizens of Massachusetts, they have formed a government 
 adequate to the maintaining and supporting the rank and dignity 
 of America in the scale of nations ; a government which, if adop- 
 ted, will protect your trade and commerce, and cause business of 
 every kind rapidly to increase and flourish ; it is a government 
 which wants only a candid perusal and due attention paid to it, 
 to recommend it to every well-wisher to his country. 
 
 Brethren and citizens, hearken to the voice of men who have 
 dictated only for your and posterity's good ; men who ever 
 
 " Have made the publick good their only aim, 
 And on that basis mean to build their fame." 
 
 Listen not to the insinuations of those who will glory only in 
 your destruction, but wisely persevere in the paths of rectitude. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, VI. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (TsTiamTaer 387) 
 
 Friday, November 30, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 Mr. Allen : 
 
 Through the channel of your Paper, I beg leave to offer one or 
 two short remarks on a production which appeared in your last, 
 under the signature of Agrippa.* 
 
 Without saying anything concerning the justness of the learned 
 Agrippa's observations on past events, I shall confine myself 
 chiefly to a small part of his uncommonly ingenious essay. 
 
 Agrippa says, " the attempt has been made to deprive us," &c., 
 " by exalting characters on the one side, and vilifying them on 
 the other." And goes on, " I wish to say nothing of the merits 
 or demerits of individuals, such arguments always do hurt." Im- 
 mediately after this he insinuates that the members of the late 
 federal convention have, " from their cradles, been incapable of 
 comprehending any other principles of government than those of 
 absolute power, and who have, in this instance (meaning the form 
 of government proposed by them) attempted to deprive the people 
 of their constitutional liberty by a pitiful trick." Thus the ig- 
 norant loggerhead blunders directly into the very same thing 
 which he himself, just before, takes upon him to censure. Per- 
 haps Agrippa thinks that excusable in anti-federalists, which in a 
 federalist he beholds as criminal; justly thinking, without doubt, 
 
 * See the letters of Agrippa in this work. Ed. 
 
 (22) 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 23 
 
 that as absurdity, knavery and falsehood, is the general charac- 
 teristick of anti-federalists, he might indulge himself in either of 
 them, without meriting censure. 
 
 I apprehend, that Agrippa has a new budget of political ideas, 
 centered in his pericranium, which he will, in his own due time, 
 lay before the publick; for he insinuates, that the members of the 
 late federal convention are incapable of comprehending any other 
 principles of government than those of absolute power. Was it 
 the dictates of absolute power, that inspired the immortal Wash- 
 ington to lead forth a band of freemen to oppose the inroads of 
 despotism, and establish the independence of his country ? Was 
 it the dictates of arbitrary power, that induced the celebrated 
 Franklin to cross the wide Atlantick to procurer succours for his 
 injured countrymen and citizens? 
 
 Blush and tremble, Agrippa ! thou ungrateful monster ! — Char- 
 on's boat now waits on the borders of the Styx, to convey you to 
 . those mansions where guilt of conscience will prey upon your in- 
 tellects, at least for a season ! 
 
 " Is there not some chosen curse, 
 Some hidden thunder in the stores of heaven. 
 Red with uncommon wrath, to blast " the wretch, 
 Who dares pollute such names 
 So sacred, and so much belov'd ? 
 Methinks I hear each freeman cry. 
 Most certainly there is. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, VII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (aSTumTaer 387) 
 
 Friday, November 30, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 I believe it may be asserted for fact, that since the foundations 
 of the universe were laid, there has no kind of government been 
 formed, without opposition being made to it, from one quarter or 
 another. 
 
 There always has been, and ever will be, in every country, men 
 who have no other aim in view than to be in direct opposition to 
 every thing which takes place, or which is proposed to be adopt- 
 ed. — This class of beings always wish to make themselves im- 
 portant, and to incur notice ; and, conscious of their inability to 
 obtain that notice which is bestowed on the patriot and the just 
 man, they put up (because they cannot help it) with being no- 
 ticed only for their absurdity and folly. When you hear this 
 class of Would Be's engaged in condemning any form of govern- 
 ment, or any thing else, ask them this simple question — What do 
 you think would be better than that which you condemn ? — O ! 
 that is quite another matter, would most probably be the answer; 
 we are not adequate to the task of fabricating a government, we 
 leave that to wiser heads — but, they will continue, it is easy for 
 any one to discover the imperfections in this form of government 
 we are condemning. Strange absurdity ! — inadequate to the task 
 of constructing, yet capable of criticizing upon, and pointing out 
 the defects of, anything which is constructed. Well may we say, 
 in the words of another — 
 
 (24) ■ 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 2$ 
 
 " Some are bewilder'd in the maze of schools, 
 And some made criticks Nature meant but fools : 
 In search of wit these lose their common sense, 
 And then turn critics in their own defence." 
 
 There is not, in the extensive circle of human nature, objects 
 more completely despicable than those who take upon them to 
 censure and condemn a work, without being able to substitute 
 any thing preferable in lieu of it. 
 
 In those objects, last mentioned, this country considerably 
 abounds, as the newspaporial pages fully evince. They have 
 been busily employed of late, in finding fault with the plan of 
 government proposed by the federal convention ; they have almost 
 exhausted their folly, knavery, absurdity, and ridiculous, incon- 
 clusive, non-applicable arguments on the subject; and, in my 
 opinion, was this question asked them. What do you mean by all 
 your learned farrago about this matter? they could not give any 
 other reasonable answer, than that their intent was, to exhibit 
 specimens of their scribbling talents. — But I will dismiss this sub- 
 ject for the present, in order to make a few remarks on the con- 
 duct of some others, since the proposed form of government made 
 its appearance. 
 
 In some assemblies, where the necessity of calling a state con- 
 vention to consider of the merits of the new constitution has been 
 debated, some gentlemen, who were opposed to the plan of fed- 
 eral government, while they reprobated it, at the same time de- 
 clared that none were more truly federal than themselves. — What 
 a pity it is, for these patriots in theory, that actions speak louder 
 than words — and that the people are so incredulous as not to be- 
 lieve a thing which they know to be directly the reverse of 
 truth. — 
 
 It ever prejudices people against arguments, even if they should 
 happen to be just, if they are prefaced by a glaring falsehood — 
 this, sharpers do not always consider, when they are attempting 
 to carry their favourite points. — It is something to be wondered 
 at, that a certain theoretical patriot,* instead of saying he would 
 
 * Probably Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts to the Federal Conven- 
 tion. £ii. 
 
26 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 sooner have lost his hand than subscribed his name to the plan of 
 federal government, had not have declared, that he would sooner 
 have lost his head, and the amazing fund of federal wisdom it 
 contains, before he would have been guilty of so horrid an act 
 
 Look around you, inhabitants of America! and see of what char- 
 acters the anti-federal junto are composed. — Are any of them 
 men of that class, who, in the late war, made bare their arms and 
 girded on the helmet in your defence ? — few, very few indeed, of 
 the antifederalists, are men of this character. But who are they 
 that are supporters of that grand republican fabrick, the Federal 
 Constitution ? — Are they not the men who were among the first 
 to assert the rights of freemen, and put a check to the invasions 
 of tyranny ? Are they not, many of them, men who have fought 
 and bled under the banners of liberty ? — Most certainly this is the 
 case. — Will you then, countrymen and fellow-citizens, give heed 
 to these infamous, anti-federal slanderers, who, in censuring the 
 proposed plan of federal government, have dared, basely dared to 
 treat even the characters of a Washington and a Franklin with 
 reproach ? — Surely you will not. Your good sense and discern- 
 ment will lead you to treat with abhorrence and contempt every 
 artifice which is put in practice to sap the confidence you have in 
 men who are the boast of their country, and an honour to human 
 nature. You certainly cannot harbour an idea so derogatory to 
 reason and the nature of things, as that men, who, for eight years, 
 have fought and struggled, to obtain and secure to you freedom 
 and independence, should now be engaged in a design to subvert 
 your liberties and reduce you to a state of servitude. Reason re- 
 volts at the thought, . . . and none but the infamous incendiary, 
 or the unprincipled monster, would insinuate a thing so vile. 
 
 Cassius. 
 
CASSIUS, VIII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 {N'TimTaer 391) 
 
 Friday, December 14, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of this State: 
 
 In some former publications, I have confined myself chiefly to 
 pointing out the views of the opposers to the plan of federal 
 government; the reason why I did not enter particularly into the 
 merits of the new constitution is, that I conceived if it was can- 
 didly read, and properly attended to, that alone would be suf- 
 ficient to recommend it to the acceptance of every rational and 
 thinking mind that was interested in the happiness of the United 
 States of America. Some babblers of the opposition junto have, 
 however, complained that nothing has been said, except in gen- 
 eral terms, in favour of the federal constitution; in consequence 
 of this, incompetent as I am to the undertaking, I have been in- 
 duced to lay the following remarks before the publick. 
 
 Sect, first, of the new constitution, says, 
 
 " All legislative powers Herein Granted shall be vested in a 
 congress of the United States." 
 
 I beg the reader to pay particular attention to the words herein 
 granted, as perhaps there may be occasion for me to recur to 
 liiem more than once in the course of my observations. 
 
 The second section of the federal constitution says, that the 
 members of the house of representatives shall be chosen every 
 
 (27) 
 
28 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 second year, and the electors shall have the qualifications requi- 
 site for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legis- 
 lature. Some have made objections to the time for which the 
 representatives are to be chosen ; but it is to be considered, that 
 the convention, in this particular, meant to accommodate the time 
 for which the representatives should stand elected, to the consti- 
 tutions of the different states. If it had been provided, that the 
 time should have been of shorter duration, would not a citizen of 
 Maryland or South-Carolina had reason to murmur ? 
 
 The weakness the auti-federalists discover in insinuating that 
 the federal government will have it in their power to establish a 
 despotick government, must be obvious to every one; for the 
 time for which they are elected is so short, as almost to preclude 
 the possibility of their effecting plans for enslaving so vast an 
 empire as the United States of America, even if they were so 
 base as to hope for anything of the kind. The representatives of 
 the people would also be conscious, that their good conduct 
 alone, would be the only thing which could influence a free 
 people to continue to bestow on them their suffrages: the repre- 
 sentatives of the people would not, moreover, dare to act con- 
 trary to the instructions of their constituents; and if any one can 
 suppose that they would, I would ask them, why such clamour is 
 made about a bill of rights, for securing the liberties of the sub- 
 ject? for if the delegates dared to act contrary to their instruc- 
 tions, would they be afraid to encroach upon a bill of rights ? If 
 they determined among themselves to use their efforts to effect 
 the establishment of an aristocratical or despotick government, 
 would a bill of rights be any obstacle to their proceedings? If 
 they were guilty of a breach of trust in one instance, they would 
 be so in another. 
 
 The second section also says, no person shall be elected a re- 
 presentative who shall not have been seven years an inhabitant 
 of the United States. This clause effectually confounds all the 
 assertions of the anti-federalists, respecting the representatives not 
 being sufficiently acquainted with the different local interests of 
 their constituents ; for a representative, qualified as the constitu- 
 tion directs, must be a greater numbskull than a Vox Populi or 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 29 
 
 an Agrippa,* not to have a knowledge of the different concerns 
 of the Confederation. 
 
 The objection that the representation will not be sufficient, is 
 weak in the highest degree. It is supposed, that there are suffi- 
 cient inhabitants in the state of Massachusetts to warrant the 
 sending of six delegates, at least, to the new Congress — To sup- 
 pose that three gentlemen, of the first characters and abilities, 
 were inadequate to represent the concerns of this state in a just 
 manner, would be absurd in the highest degree, and contradic- 
 tory to reason and common sense. The weakness of the anti- 
 federalists, in regard to the point just mentioned, sufficiently 
 shews their delinquency with respect to rational argument. 
 They have done nothing more than barely to assert, that the re- 
 presentation would not be sufficient: it is a true saying, that 
 assertions are often the very reverse of facts. 
 
 Sect, third, of the new constitution, says, each state shall 
 choose two senators, &c. The liberalty of this clause is suffi- 
 cient, any reasonable person would suppose, to damp all opposi- 
 tion. 
 
 Can any thing be more consistent with the strictest principles 
 of republicanism? 
 
 Each state is here upon an equal footing; for the house of rep- 
 resentatives can of themselvdS do nothing without the concur- 
 rence of the senate. 
 
 The third section further provides, that the senate shall choose 
 their own officers. This is so congenial with the constitution of 
 our own state, that I need not advance any argument to induce 
 the free citizens of Massachusetts to approbate it. And those 
 who oppose this part of the federal plan, act in direct opposition 
 to what the anti-federalists often profess, for the excellency of 
 our constitution has been their favourite theme. 
 
 The third section also provides, that the senate shall have the 
 sole power to try all impeachments. This clause seems to be 
 peculiarly obnoxious to anti-federal sycophants. 
 
 They have declared it to be arbitrary and tyrannical in the 
 highest degree. But, fellow-citizens, your own good sense will 
 * Anti-federal scribblers in the Mass. Gazette. 
 
30 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 lead you to see the folly and weakness contained in such asser- 
 tions. You have experienced the tyranny of such a government; 
 that under which you now live is an exact model of it. In Mas- 
 sachusetts, the house of representatives impeach, and the senate 
 try, the offender. 
 
 That part of the proposed form of government, which is to be 
 styled the senate, will not have it in their power to try any per- 
 son, without the consent of two-thirds of the members. 
 
 In this respect, therefore, the new constitution is not more 
 arbitrary than the constitution of this state. This clause does 
 not, therefore, savour in the least of any thing more arbitrary 
 than what has already been experienced: so that the horrours 
 the anti-federal junto pretend to anticipate on that head, must 
 sink into nothing. Besides, when the house of representatives 
 have impeached, and the senate tried any one, and found him 
 guilty of the offence for which he is impeached, they can only 
 disqualify him from holding any ofiBce of power and trust in the 
 United States; and after that he comes within the jurisdiction of 
 the law of the land. 
 
 How such a proceeding can be called arbitrary, or thought 
 improper, I cannot conceive. I leave it to the gentlemen in op- 
 position to point out the tyranny of such conduct, and explain 
 the horrid tendency it will have, for the government of the 
 United States to determine whether any one or more of their own 
 body are worthy to continue in the station to which they were 
 elected. 
 
 Another clause, which the anti-federal junto labour to prove 
 to be arbitrary and tyrannical, is contained in the fourth section, 
 which provides, that the time and place for electing senators and 
 representatives shall be appointed by the different state legislar 
 tures, except Congress shall at any time make a law to alter such 
 regulation in regard to the place of choosing representatives. 
 The former part of this clause, gives not the least opportunity for 
 a display of anti-federal scandal, and the latter, only by misrep- 
 resentation, and false construction, is by them made a handle of. 
 What is intended, by saying that Congress shall have power to 
 appoint the place for electing representatives, is, only to have a 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 3 1 
 
 check upon the legislature of any state, if they should happen to 
 be composed of villains and knaves, as is the case in a sister 
 state ; * and should take upon themselves to appoint a place for 
 choosing delegates to send to Congress ; which place might be 
 the most inconvenient in the whole state ; and for that reason be 
 appointed by the legislature, in order to create a disgust in the 
 minds of the people against the federal government, if they them- 
 selves should dislike it. The weakness of their arguments on 
 this head, must therefore be obvious to every attentive mind. 
 
 There is one thing, however, which I might mention, as a 
 reason why the opposition junto dread the clause a forementioned 
 — they may suppose, that Congress, when the people are assem- 
 bled for the choice of their rulers, in the place they have ap- 
 pointed, will send their terrible standing army (which I shall 
 speak of in its place) and, Cesar Borgia like, massacre the whole, 
 in order to render themselves absolute. This is so similar to 
 many of the apprehensions they have expressed, that I could not 
 pass it by unnoticed. Indeed the chief of their productions 
 abound with improbabilities and absurdities of the like kind ; for 
 having nothing reasonable to alledge against a government 
 founded on the principles of staunch republicanism, and which, if 
 well supported, will establish the glory and happiness of our 
 country. They resort to things the most strange and fallacious, 
 in order to blind the eyes of the unsuspecting and misinformed. 
 
 CassIus. 
 
 * Referring to Rhode Island. Ed. 
 
 {To be continued^ 
 
CASSIUS, IX. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE. 
 
 (N"vimTDer 393) 
 
 Tuesday, December i8, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of this State. 
 
 (^Continued from our last.) 
 Section 5, of the new constitution, says, Each house shall be a 
 judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own mem- 
 bers — a majority shall constitute a quorum, and be authorized to 
 compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and 
 under such penalties as the law may provide. Each house shall 
 determine the rules of its proceedings — punish its members for 
 disorderly behaviour — and with the consent of two-thirds, expel 
 a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, 
 and from time to time publish the same, &c. No one, who pro- 
 fesses to be governed by reason, will dispute the propriety of any 
 assembly's being the judge of the qualifications requisite to con- 
 stitute a member of their own body. That part of the fifth sec- 
 tion which says a majority shall constitute a quorum, has been 
 an object against which many anti- federal shafts have been lev- 
 elled. It has been asserted by some, that this clause empowers 
 a majority of members present, to transact any business relating 
 to the affairs of the United States, and that eight or ten members 
 of the house of representatives, and an equal number of the sen- 
 ate, might pass a law which would benefit themselves, and injure 
 the community at large. The fallacy of such assertions is suffi- 
 
 (32) 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 33 
 
 ciently conspicuous to render them ridiculous and contemptible 
 in the eyes of every unprejudiced mind — ^for the section further 
 expresses, That a smaller number than a quorum may adjourn 
 from day to day, and be authorised to compel attendance of ab- 
 sent members. This is all the power that is vested in a smaller 
 number than the majority. It is therefore evident, that when it 
 says a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business, it means 
 a majority of the whole number of members that belong to either 
 house. 
 
 Sect. 5, further provides. That each house shall keep a journal 
 of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. 
 This clause is so openly marked with every feature of republican- 
 ism, and expressed in such liberal and comprehensive terms, that 
 it needs no comment to render it acceptable to the enlightened 
 citizens of Massachusetts. 
 
 Sect. 6, provides, That the senators and representatives shall 
 receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by 
 law — they shall, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of 
 peace, be privileged from arrest during their session. — The neces- 
 sity of such regulations must appear plain to every one; the 
 inhabitants of Massachusetts, fully convinced of the justness of 
 such provision, made it in the constitution of this state. The 6th 
 section further says, No member shall be called to account for 
 sentiments delivered in either house, at any other place. In this 
 clause, the freedom of debate, so essential to the preservation of 
 liberty and the support of a republican form of government, is 
 amply provided for. Impeded by no obstacle whatever, the pa- 
 triot may here proclaim every sentiment that glows within his 
 breast. How far despotism can encroach upon such a govern- 
 ment I leave the antifederal junto to declare. 
 
 The 6th section further provides, that no senator or representa- 
 tive shall, during the time he is in office, be elected or appointed 
 to any office • under the United States — nor shall any person, 
 holding any office under the government, be elected a member 
 of either house during his continuance in that station. 
 
 This clause at once confutes every assertion of the antifederal- 
 ists respecting the new congress being able to secure to them- 
 
34 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 selves all offices of power, profit and trust This section is even 
 more rigidly republican than the constitution of this common- 
 wealth ; for in the general assembly of Massachusetts, a civil offi- 
 cer is not excluded a seat; whereas the new constitution expressly 
 asserts that no person in civil office under the United States shall 
 be eligible to a seat in either house. 
 
 Sect. 7 provides that all bills for raising revenues shall originate 
 in the house of representatives. Here again must the anti-feder- 
 ists appear weak and contemptible in their assertions that the 
 senate will have it in their power to establish themselves a com- 
 plete aristocratick body; for this clause fully evinces that if their 
 inclinations were ever so great to effect such an establishment, it 
 would answer no end, for being unable to levy taxes, or collect a 
 revenue, is a sufficient check upon every attempt of such a nature. 
 
 The 7th section further provides. That every bill which passes 
 the house of representatives and the senate, before it becomes a 
 law, shall be presented to the president of the United States; if he 
 objects to it the sense of both houses will be again taken on the 
 subject, and if two-thirds of the members are in favour of the bill, 
 it passes into a law. 
 
 Much clamour has been made about the power of the presi- 
 dent ; it has been asserted that his influence would be such as to 
 enable him to continue in office during life. 
 
 Such insinuations are founded on a very slender basis. If the 
 president opposes the sense of both houses, without sufficient 
 reasons for his conduct, he will soon become obnoxious, and his 
 influence vanish like the fleeting smoke; and his objection to 
 anything which the house and senate may think calculated for 
 the promotion of the publick good, will be of no effect. 
 
 Sect. 8 provides. That Congress shall have power to lay and 
 collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises, &c. — to pay debts, to pro- 
 vide for the common defence and general welfare of the United 
 States — that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform 
 throughout the Union — they shall have power to coin money, 
 and to fix the value thereof, &c. — The impotericy of the present 
 Congress sufficiently indicates the necessity of granting greater 
 powers to a federal head ; and it is highly requisite such a head 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 35 
 
 should be enabled to establish a fund adequate to the exigencies 
 of the Union. 
 
 The propriety of all duties and imposts being uniform through- 
 out the states, cannot be disputed. It is also highly requisite 
 that Congress should be enabled to establish a coin which shall 
 circulate the same throughout all the states. The necessity of 
 such arrangements is certainly very obvious. For other particu- 
 lars contained in the 8th section, I must refer my readers to the 
 Constitution, and am confident they will find it replete with noth- 
 ing more than what is absolutely necessary should be vested in 
 the guardians of a free country. 
 
 Can, then, those murmuring sycophants, who oppose the plan 
 of federal government, wish for anything more liberal than what 
 is contained in the aforementioned section ? If the powers of a 
 federal head were to be established on as weak a frame as that on 
 which the present confederation is founded, what effect would 
 any constitution have in giving energy to measures designed to 
 promote the glory of the Union, and for establishing its honour 
 and credit? One great object of the federal Convention was, to 
 give more power to future Assemblies of the States. In this they 
 have done liberally, without partiallity to the interests of the 
 states individually; and their intentions were known before the 
 honourable body was dissolved. And now that a form of govern- 
 ment, every way adequate to the purposes of the Union, has been 
 proposed by them, in which proper powers are to be vested in 
 the supreme head, a hue and cry is raised by the sons of sedition 
 and dishonesty, as though an army of uncircumcised Philistines 
 were upon us! 
 
 They are bellowing about, that tyranny will inevitably follow 
 the adoption of the proposed constitution. It is, however, an old 
 saying, that the greatest rogue is apt to cry rogue first. This we 
 may rely upon, that if we follow perfidious counsels, as those 
 are, I dare affirm, of the anti-federalists, every evil which that 
 sapp brood anticipates, will befall us. Besides, foreign creditors 
 will not be cheated out of their property ; nor will the creditors 
 of our own country be tame spectators of the sacrifice of their 
 interest at the shrine of villainy. 
 
36 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 Section 9th says, The writ of habeus corpus shall not be sus- 
 pended, unless in case of rebellion, or the invasion of the publick 
 safetj' may require it. It has been asserted by some, that a per- 
 son accused of a crime, would be obliged to ruin himself, in order 
 to prove his innocence ; as he would be obliged to repair to the 
 seat of federal government, in order to have his cause tried before 
 a federal court, and be liable to pay all expenses which might be 
 incurred in the undertaking. But the section beforementioned 
 proves that assertion to be futile and false, as it expressly pro- 
 vides for securing the right of the subjects, in regard to his being 
 tried in his own state. 
 
 The 9th section further provides, that a regular statement and 
 account of the receipts and expenditures of all publick monies, 
 shall be published from time to time. Thus the people will have 
 it in their power to examine the appropriations made of the 
 revenues and taxes collected by Congress ; and if they are not 
 satisfied in regard to the conduct of their rulers in this respect, 
 they will be able to effect a change agreeable to their wishes. 
 
 The last section of this article provides, that no state shall enter 
 into any treaty, alliance, &c., coin money, emit bills of credit, 
 make any other but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of 
 debts — all laws respecting imposts, duties, and excises, shall be 
 subject to the revision and controul of Congress. 
 
 The absolute necessity of powers of this nature being vested in 
 a federal head is indisputable. 
 
 For want of such a power, what vile proceedings have of late 
 disgraced almost every legislative measure of Rhode Island ! 
 For want of such a power, some honest creditors in Massachu- 
 setts have been paid in old horses and enormous rocks, in return 
 for money loaned upon interest. With respect to the controul of 
 Congress over laws of the afore-mentioned description, it is 
 highly requisite that it should take place : nor have the people 
 any thing to fear from such a proceeding; for their contiroul 
 cannot be extended farther than the powers granted in the new 
 constitution; the words of ■which are, "all powers Herein 
 Granted." If any act originates contrary to thiij, it will be of no 
 effect, and a mere nullity. 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 37 
 
 Section one, of article second, provides that the executive 
 power shall be vested in a president of the United States. The 
 necessity of such a provision must appear reasonable to any one; 
 and further remarks, therefore, on this head will be needless. 
 
 In the same section it is provided, (among other things which 
 to argue upon would be unnecessary, as they are founded on the 
 firmest principles of republicanism) that Congress shall determine 
 the time for choosing electors^ and the day of election shall be the 
 same throughout the Union. Can anything more strongly mark 
 a liberal and free government thart this clause? No one state will 
 in the least be influenced in their choice by that of another ; and 
 Congress cannot have the least controul in regard to the appoint- 
 ment of any particular men for electors. This, among other 
 things, proves that all requisite power will still remain in the 
 hands of the people, and any insinuation to the contrary, must be 
 a mere chicane to blind the judgments of the misinformed. 
 
 Cassius. 
 [To be continued^ 
 
CASSIUS, X. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (TTuirLber 393) 
 
 Friday, December 21, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of this State. 
 
 (^Continued from our last.) 
 
 Section i, of article II. further provides, That the president 
 shall, previous to his entering upon the duties of his office, take 
 the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or af- 
 firm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the 
 United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, pro- 
 tect, and defend the constitution of the United States. Thus we 
 see that instead of the president's being vested with all the powers 
 of a monarch, as has been asserted, that he is under the immedi- 
 ate controul of the constitution, which if he should presume to 
 deviate from, he would be immediately arrested in his career and 
 summoned to answer for his conduct before a federal court, where 
 strict justice and equity would undoubtedly preside. 
 
 Section 3, of article II. provides. That the president of the Uni- 
 ted States shall, from time to time, give Congress information of 
 the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such 
 measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient — he may, on 
 extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or either of them, 
 and adjourn them to such time as he may think proper— he shall 
 take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commis- 
 sion all officers of the United States. 
 
 (38) 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 39 
 
 Very little more power is granted to the president of the United 
 States, by the above section, than what is vested in the govern- 
 ours of the different states. The propriety of vesting such powers 
 in a supreme executive cannot be doubted. What would it sig- 
 nify to appoint an executive officer, and immediately after to 
 make laws which would be a, barrier to the execution of his com- 
 mission ? 
 
 It would answer the same end that the nomin?il power which 
 is vested in the different states, answers, that is, it would answer 
 the end of paying for the support of a shaddow, without reaping 
 the benefit of the substance. 
 
 It is certainly requisite that proper powers should be vested in 
 an executive (and certainly no more than necessary powers are 
 vested in the executive of the United States by the new constitu- 
 tion) or else the establishment of such a branch is needless. 
 
 Section 4, of article II. says, The president, vice-president, and 
 all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office 
 on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other 
 high crimes and misdemeanors. — Thus we see that no office, how- 
 ever exalted, can protect the miscreant, who dares invade the liber- 
 ties of his country, or countenance in his crimes the impious villain 
 who sacrilegiously attempts to trample upon the rights of freemen. 
 
 Who will be absurd enough to affirm, that the section alluded 
 to, does not sufficiently prove that the federal convention have 
 formed a government which provides that we shall be ruled by 
 laws and not by men? None, surely, but an anti-federalist — and 
 from them falsehood receives constant hornage; for it is on the 
 basis of falsehood and the summit of ignorance, that all opposi- 
 tion to the federal government is fo.unded. 
 
 Section i, of article III. provides, That the judicial power of 
 the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in 
 such inferiour courts as Congress may froni time to time appoint. 
 — It has been asserted, that a federal court would be an engine of 
 partiality in the government, a source of oppression and injustice 
 to the poorer part of the community ; but how far consistency in- 
 fluenced the conduct of the authors of such assertions, the pub- 
 lick must determine. The anti-federa,lists have said, that if a 
 
40 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 cause should come before one of state judicial courts, and judg- 
 ment be given against the person who possessed most interest, 
 that he would immediately appeal to the federal court, whose resi- 
 dence would be at the seat of government, and consequently at 
 so great a distance that an inhabitant of the state of Georgia or 
 New-Hampshire, if he was in low circumstances, would not be 
 able to carry his cause before the federal court, and would, there- 
 fore, be obliged to give it up to his wealthier antagonist. The 
 glaring improbability with which such insinuations abound, must 
 be obvious to every one. 
 
 Can it be supposed, that any person would be so inconsistent, 
 after a cause was given against him, in a court where judges pre- 
 sided whose characters, as honest and just men, were unrivalled, 
 as to attempt to have the cause re-heard before the federal court? 
 
 Indeed if such a thing was to take place, the man in low circum- 
 stances would have nothing to fear, as the payment of all charges 
 would fall upon the person who lost the cause, and there is not the 
 shadow of a doubt, with respect to the person's losing the cause, 
 who had lost it before in a court of justice in either of the states. 
 
 In regard to the equal administration of justice in all the states, 
 a rattle brained anti-federalist, in the last Mass. Gazette, under 
 the signature of Agrippa,* has asserted, that the inequality of the 
 administration of justice throughout the states, was a favourite 
 argument in support of the new constitution — an assertion founded 
 on as impudent and barefaced a falsehood as ever was uttered, 
 for the very reverse is the case. The equality of the administra- 
 tion of justice in the different states, has ever been dwelt upon as 
 recommendatory of the new plan of government. I am induced 
 to think that Agrippa is non compos, and this might proceed 
 from his close application to study, while the library of a cele- 
 brated university was under his caref — he seems to be one of 
 those whom Pope describes when he says, 
 
 " Some are bewilder'd in the maze of schools," &c. 
 I hope my readers will forgive this digression, when they con- 
 
 * Harvard University Library, of which James Winthrop v?as librarian. — Ed. 
 I Said to be by James Winthrop. See the letters, printed herein. — Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 4 1 
 
 sider that such scandalous lies, absurdities, and misrepresenta- 
 tions as the productions of Agrippa, that political Quixote, 
 abound with, may have a tendency to prejudice the minds of 
 the misinformed against the new constitution, unless they are 
 properly noticed. 
 
 Section 2, of Article III. provides, among other things, that 
 the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be 
 by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the crime 
 shall have been committed ; but when not committed within any 
 state, the trial shall be at such place or places, as Congress may 
 by law have directed. It has been frequently asserted that the new 
 constitution deprived the subject of the right of trial by jury; on 
 what grounds such an assertion could be founded, is to me a 
 mystery ; for the constitution expressly says, that the trial shall 
 be by jury, except in cases of impeachment. In our own state, if a 
 civil officer is impeached he will not be tried by a jury, but by 
 that branch of our legislature styled the senate. Tired, no doubt, 
 with a repetition of arguments, upon parts of the constitution 
 which did not appear quite plain till investigated and rightly 
 construed, the anti-federalists have taken upon them to assert 
 things which the proposed system does not afford them the least 
 grounds for. Presumptuous, indeed, must they be in the highest 
 degree, if they suppose any will be so blind as to listen to the 
 most palpable falsehoods, uttered by them. Their conduct seems 
 to evince, that they harbour sentiments similar to those of the 
 Romish priests, in countries where the common people have 
 scarcely any knowledge of things wherein their interests are in- 
 superably connected, and imbibe their principles wholly from 
 what the priests think proper to inform them. But such artifices 
 will not avail to practice upon the inhabitants of America; for 
 here, almost all have some knowledge of government, derived 
 from their own study and experience ; and very few are so stu- 
 pidly ignorant as to believe all that is circulated by minions and 
 miscreants. 
 
 Section 3, of article III. provides, that Congress shall have 
 power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of 
 treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except 
 
42 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 during the life of the person attainted. — This section is truly re- 
 publican in every sense of the expression, and is of itself fully 
 adequate to proving that the members of the federal convention 
 were actuated by principles the most liberal and free — this single 
 section alone is sufificient to enroll their proceedings on the re- 
 cords of immortal fame. 
 
 Contrast this section with the laws of England, in regard to 
 treason, and, notwithstanding the boasted rights of the subject in 
 that isle, we shall find our own in this, as well as almost every 
 other particular, far to exceed them. 
 
 Section i, of article IV. says, full faith and credit shall be given 
 in each state, to the publick acts, records and judicial proceeds 
 ings of every other state. The benefit to be derived from such a 
 regulation must be great, especially to those who are sometimes 
 obliged to have recourse to law, for the settlement of their affairs. 
 
 Section 2, of article IV. provides, that the citizens of each state 
 shall be intitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
 the several states. This section must also be a source of much 
 advantage to the inhabitants of the different states, who may have 
 business 'to transact in various parts of the continent, as being 
 equally intitled to the rights of citizenship in one as well as an- 
 other. 
 
 They will find less difficulty in pursuing their various concerns 
 than if it were otherwise. 
 
 In the same article, section 3, it is provided. That new states 
 may be admitted into the Union ; but no new state shall be 
 formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor 
 any states be formed by the sanction of two or more states, or 
 parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states 
 concerned, as well as of Congress. This section can be opposed 
 by none who have the peace and happiness of the states at heart ; 
 for, by this section, the designs of those who wish to effect the 
 disunion of the states, in order to get themselves established in 
 posts of honour and profit, are entirely defeated. The majority 
 of the citizens of Massachusetts, in particular, will see the good 
 effects to be derived from such a regulation. Cassius. 
 
 {To be Continued}) 
 
CASSIUS, XI. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (Nuraber 304) 
 
 Tuesday." December 25, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusptts Gazette. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of this State. 
 
 (^Concluded from our last.) 
 
 The 3d section, in article IV. also provides, that Congress shall 
 have power to dispose of and make all needful rules arid regula- 
 tions respecting the territory or other property of the United 
 States; and nothing in this constitution shall be construed as a 
 prejudice to the claims of the United States, or any particular 
 state. 
 
 There is not, certainly, anything contained in the aforemen- 
 tioned clause, which can be opposed on reasonable grounds. It 
 is certainly necessary that Congress should have power to make 
 all needful rules and regulations respecting the concerns of the 
 Union; and if they exceed what is necessary, their regulations 
 will be of no effect; for whatever is done by them, which the 
 constitution does not warrant, is null and void, and can be no 
 more binding on the inhabitants of America, than the edicts of 
 the grand signior of Turkey. 
 
 You will remember, my countrymen, that the words of the 
 constitution are, "All Powers Herein Granted." 
 
 Section 4, of article IV. says. The United States shall guar- 
 antee to every state in the Union a Republican Form of Govern- 
 
 (43) 
 
44 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 ment; and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on 
 application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legis- 
 lature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. — At the 
 perusal of this clause, anti-federalism must blush, and opposition 
 hide its head. Could anything have more openly, or more 
 plainly evinced to the world, the noble motives which influenced 
 the conduct of the delegates of America, than the clause afore- 
 mentioned? it provides, that a republican form of government 
 shall be guaranteed to each state in the Union. The inhabit- 
 ants of America are surely acquainted with the principles of re- 
 publicanism, and will certainly demand the establishment of them, 
 in their fullest extent. 
 
 The section just mentioned, secures to us the full enjoyment 
 of every thing which freemen hold dear, and provides for protect- 
 ing us against every thing which they can dread. 
 
 This article, my countrymen, is sufficient to convince you of 
 the excellency of that constitution which the federal convention 
 have formed ; a constitution founded on the broad basis of liberty, 
 and, should the citizens of America happily concur in adopting 
 it, its pillars may be as fixed as the foundations of created nature. 
 
 Say, ye mighty cavillers, ye inconsistent opposers of the new 
 plan of government, of what avail, to the thinking part of the 
 community, do you suppose will be all your clamours about a 
 bill of rights? Does not the abovementioned section provide for 
 the establishment of a free government in all the states? and if 
 that freedom is encroached upon, will not the constitution be vio- 
 lated? It certainly will; and its violators be hurled from the 
 seat of power, and arraigned before a tribunal where impartial 
 justice will no doubt preside, to answer for their high-handed 
 crime. 
 
 Article V. of the new constitution, says. That Congress, when- 
 ever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro- 
 pose amendments to this constitution; or on the application of 
 the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, shall call a convention 
 for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to 
 all intents and purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified 
 by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by conven- 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 45 
 
 tions in three-fourths thereof; as one or the other modes of rati- 
 fication may be proposed by Congress ; provided that no amend- 
 ments which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight 
 hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth 
 clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no state, 
 without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
 senate. — 
 
 On what grounds can the opposers to the new plan found their 
 assertions that Congress will have it in their power to make what 
 laws they please, and what alterations they think proper in the 
 constitution, after the people have adopted it ? The constitution 
 expressly says, that any alterations in the constitution must be 
 ratified by three-fourths of the states. The 5th article also pro- 
 vides, that the states may propose any alterations which they see 
 fit, and that Congress shall take measures for having them carried 
 into effect. 
 
 If this article does not clearly demonstrate that all power is in 
 the hands of the people, then the language by which we convey 
 our ideas, is shockingly inadequate to its intended purposes, and 
 as little to be understood by us, as Hebrew to the most illiterate. 
 
 The 6th section provides, that this constitution, and the laws 
 which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, 
 or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, under the authority 
 of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the 
 judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
 constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 This is the article, my countrymen, which knaves and block- 
 heads have so often dressed up in false colours, and requested 
 your attention to the construction of it. Adopt not a constitu- 
 tion, say they, which stipulates that the laws of Congress shall 
 be the supreme law of the land — or, in other words, they request 
 of you not to obey laws of your own making. This is; the. article 
 which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical, that unless you 
 have a bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined forever. 
 
 But in the name of common sense I would ask, of what use 
 wo.uld be a bill of rights, in the present case ? . . It can oraly he 
 to resort to when it is supposed that Congress have infringed the 
 
46 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 unalienable rights of the people: but would it not be much easier 
 to resort to the federal constitution, to see if therein power is 
 given to Congress to make the law in question ? If such power 
 is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and the people will not 
 be bound thereby. For let it be remembered, that such laws, 
 and such only, as are founded_on this constitution, are to be the 
 supreme law of the land; — and it would be absurd indeed, if the 
 laws which are granted in the constitution, were not to be, with- 
 out reserve, the supreme law of the land. To give Congress 
 power to make laws for the Union, and then to say they should 
 not have force throughout the Union, would be glaringly incon- 
 sistent : — Such an inconsistency, however, has hitherto been the 
 evil which the whole continent have complained of, and which 
 the new constitution is designed to remedy. — Let us reverse the 
 proposition, and see how it will then stand. — This constitution, 
 and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu- 
 ance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under 
 their authority, shall not be the supreme law of the land — and 
 the judges in the several states shall not be bound thereby. — 
 This is exactly what the anti-federalists wish to be the case ; this, 
 and in this alone would they glory. — But, fellow citizens, you 
 will discern the excellency of the aforementioned clause ; you 
 will perceive that it is calculated, wisely calculated, to support 
 the dignity of this mighty empire, to restore publick and private 
 credit, and national confidence. 
 
 Article IV. further provides. That the senators and representa- 
 tives before mentioned, and the members of the several state leg- 
 islatures and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United 
 States and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirm- 
 ation, to support this constitution ; but no religious test shall ever 
 be required as a qualification to any office or publick trust under 
 the United States. 
 
 Thus, my fellow-citizens, we see that our rulers are to be 
 bound by the most sacred ties, to support our rights and liberties, 
 to secure to us the full enjoyment of every privilege which we 
 can wish for; they are bound by the constitution to guarantee to 
 us a republican form of government in its fullest extent; and 
 what is there more that we can wish for? 
 
LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 47 
 
 Thus the ppople of the United States, " in order to form a more 
 perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestick tranquillity, 
 provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, 
 and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," 
 have appointed a federal convention to " ordain and establish," 
 with the concurrence of the people, a constitution for the United 
 States of America. That federal convention have assembled to- 
 gether, and after a full investigation of the different concerns of 
 the Union, have proposed a form of government, calculated to 
 support, and transmit, inviolate, to the latest posterity, all the 
 blessings of civil and religious liberty. 
 
 Citizens of Massachusetts! consider, O consider well, these im- 
 portant matters, and weigh them deliberately in the scale of rea- 
 son ! Consider at what a vast expense of toil, difficulty, treasure 
 and blood, you have emancipated yourselves from the yoke of 
 bondage, and established yourselves an independent people ! 
 Consider that those immortal characters, who first planned the 
 event of the revolution, and with arms in their hands stepped 
 forth in the glorious cause of human nature, have now devised a 
 plan for supporting your freedom, and increasing your strength, 
 your power and happiness. 
 
 Will you then, O my countrymen ! listen to the mad dictates 
 of men, who are aiming, by every artifice and falsehood, which 
 the emissaries of hell can invent, to effect your total destruction 
 and overthrow ? who wish to ascend the chariot of anarchy, and 
 ride triumphant over your smoking ruins, which they hope to 
 effect, by their more than hellish arts: in your misery they hope 
 to glory, and establish their own greatness "on their country's 
 ruin." 
 
 If they can effect this, they will laugh at your calamity, and 
 mock your misfortunes — the language of each brother in iniquity, 
 when they meet, will be, " hail damn'd associates," see our high 
 
 success 
 
 Think, O my countrymen ! think, before it is too late ! — The 
 important moment approaches, when these states must, by the 
 most wise of all conduct, forever establish their glory and happi- 
 ness, on the firmest basis, by adopting the constitution, or by the 
 
48 LETTERS OF CASSIUS. 
 
 most foolish and inconsistent of all conduct, in rejecting it, entail 
 on themselves and on their posterity, endless infemy. 
 
 "There is a tide in the affairs of men, 
 Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ; 
 Omitted, all the voyage of their life 
 Is bound in shallowness.*' ^ — 
 
 If you embrace not the golden moment now before you, and 
 refuse to receive that which only can establish the dignity of your 
 towering Eagle, this and generations yet unborn, will curse, with 
 an anathema, your dying fame, and breathe, with imprecations 
 and just indignation, vengeance and insults on your sleeping 
 ashes ! But should you, on the contrary, with energy and vig- 
 our, push your fortune, and, with earnestness and gratitude, clasp 
 to your arms this great blessing which Heaven has pointed to 
 your view, posterity, made happy by your wisdom and exertions, 
 will honour and revere your memories. Secure in their prosper- 
 ity, they will weep for joy, that Heaven had given them — Fath- 
 ers ! Cassius. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 A G R I P P A. 
 
 ACCREDITED TO 
 
 JAMES WINTHROP, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 November, 1787— January, 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The letters of Agrippa were the ablest anti-federal publications 
 printed in Massachusetts, and showed especial ability in arguing 
 the dangers and defects of a plan of government which was both 
 so peculiarly needed, and so specially advantageous to the State 
 of Massachusetts, that its adoption was only endangered by cer- 
 tain questions of local politics, which could not even enter into 
 the discussion. They were noticed, or replied to, in the Massa- 
 chusetts Gazette, Dec. 21, 1787, by "Charles James Fox;" Dec. 
 28, 1787, and Jan. 4, 1788, by "Kempis O'Flanagan," Jan. 22, 
 and 25, 1788, by '"Junius," and in the letters of Cassius, printed 
 in this volume. 
 
 At the time of publication they were accredited to the pen of 
 James Winthrop, of Cambridge, and he was repeatedly attacked 
 as the author, without denying it ; while his supposed author- 
 ship and general opposition to the Constitution contributed to 
 defeat his election by Cambridge to the Massachusetts Conven- 
 tion for considering the proposed government, receiving only one 
 vote in the whole town. On the contrary, the writer, in his 
 tenth letter, states that the surmises as to the authorship are not 
 correct, and in the Massachusetts Gazette of Dec. 21, 1787, the 
 following appeared: 
 
 " I feel myself greatly hurt at the liberties lately taken by cer- 
 tain scribblers with the characters of the hon. E. Gerry and James 
 Winthrop, esquire, of Cambridge, two gentlemen, no less dis- 
 tinguished for their honesty, patriotism, and extensive abilities, than 
 a Washington or a Franklin. 
 
 * * * In regard to J. Winthrop, esquire, (of said Cambridge) 
 it has been insinuated, that that gentleman is the author of the 
 pieces in the Massachusetts Gazette, signed Agrippa — but every 
 one who can boast the pleasure of his acquaintance, must know 
 that insinuation is grounded on falsehood. 
 3 (SO 
 
52 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA, 
 
 The heterogenous compound of nonsense and absurdity with 
 which the compositions of Agrippa are so replete, are certainly 
 not the productions of a man so celebrated for his superior knowl- 
 edge and understanding. 
 
 In short, mr. Printer, I hope you and your brother typograph- 
 ers will be very careful how you are guilty of exposing such ex- 
 alted characters in future. OcRico. 
 
AGRIPPA, I. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE. 
 
 (Nwjii'bier 385) 
 
 Friday, NoviEMBER 23, 17-87. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 Many inconveniences and difficulties in the new plan of gov- 
 ernment have been mentioned by different writers on that subject. 
 Mr. Gerry has given the publick his, objections against it, with a 
 manly freedom.* The seceding niembers from the Pennsylvania 
 Assembly also published, theirs.f Various anonymous writers 
 have mentioned reasons of great weight. Among the many objec- 
 tions have been stated the uiilimited right of taxation — a standing 
 army — an inadequate representation of the people — a right to de- 
 stroy the constitution of the separate states, and all the barriers 
 that have been set up in defence of liberty — the right to try 
 causes between private persons, ip mapy cases without a jury; 
 without trying in. the vicinity of either party; and witho.utany 
 limitation o(the v^ilue.which is |,o be tried. To none of these or 
 any other objections has lany answer been given, but' such ,as have 
 acknowledged the truth of the objection while they insulted the 
 objector. This conduct has mijch t;he appearance of , trying to 
 force a general sentiment ypon the people. / 
 
 The ideapf promoting the happiness of the people by opposing (^ 
 
 * Printed in Elliot,!, 492.— £</. 
 
 f " An Address of the. subscribers, .members ,pf the late Houses of Representatives 
 of .the Commonwealth of Pennsylyapja, to theii; constituents," printed in the Pennsyl- 
 vania Packet, Oct. 4, 1787. — Ed. 
 
 (S3) 
 
54 LETTERS OF ARGIPPA. 
 
 all their habits of business, and by subverting the laws to which 
 they are habituated, appears to me to be at least a mistaken pro- 
 ceeding. If to this we add the limitations of trade, restraints on 
 its freedom, and the alteration of its course, and transfer of the 
 market, all under the pretence of regulation ior federal purposes, 
 we shall not find any additional reason to be pleased with the 
 plan. 
 
 It is now conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil 
 causes were never better executed than at present. It is con- 
 fessed by a warm federalist in answer to Mr. Gerry's sensible 
 letter, that the courts are so arranged at present that no incon- 
 venience is found, and that if the new plan takes place great diffi- 
 culties may arise. With this confession before him, can any 
 reasonable man doubt whether he shall exchange a system, found 
 by experience to be convenient, for one that is in many respects 
 inconvenient and dangerous ? The expense of the new plan is 
 terrifying, if there was no other objection. But they are multi- 
 plied. Let us consider that of the representation. 
 
 There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand 
 people. Boston would nearly send one, but with regard to an- 
 other there is hardly a county in the state which would have 
 one. The representatives are to be chosen for two years. In 
 this space, when it is considered that their residence is from two 
 hundred to five hundred miles from their constituents, it is diffi- 
 cult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the 
 welfare of the people. They will have an army to support them, 
 and may bid defiance to the clamours of their subjects. Should 
 the people cry aloud the representative may avail himself of the 
 right to alter the time of election and postpone it for another 
 year. In truth, the question before the people is, whether they 
 ■will have a limited government or an absolute one? 
 
 It is a fact justified by the experience of all mankind from the 
 earliest antiquity down to the present time, that freedom is neces- 
 sary to industry. We accordingly find that in absolute govern- 
 ments, the people, be the climate what it may, are general [sic] 
 lazy, cowardly, turbulent, and vicious to an extreme. On the 
 other hand, in free countries are found in general, activity, indus- 
 try, arts, courage, generosity, and all the manly virtues. 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 55 
 
 Can there be any doubt which to choose? He that Hesitates 
 must be base indeed. 
 
 A favourite objection against a free government is drawn from 
 the irregularities of the Greek and Roman republicks. But it is 
 to be considered that war was the employment which they con- "3 
 sidered as most becoming freemen. Agriculture, arts, and most 
 domestick employment were committed chiefly to slaves. But 
 Carthage, the great commercial republick of antiquity, though 
 resembling Rome in the form of its government, and her rival for 
 power, retained her freedom longer than Rome, and was never 
 disturbed by sedition during the long period of her duration. 
 This is a striking proof that the fault of the Greek and Roman 
 republicks was not owing to the form of their government, and 
 that the spirit of commerce is the great bond of union among 
 citizens. This furnishes employment for their activity, supplies 
 their mutual wants, defends the rights of property, and producing 
 reciprocal dependencies, renders the whole system harmonious 
 and energetick. Our great object therefore ought to be to en- 
 courage this spirit. If we examine the present state of the world 
 we shall find that most of the business is done in the freest states, 
 and that industry decreases in proportion to the rigour of gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, IT. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETT-E, 
 
 dSTTimber 386) 
 
 Tuesday, November 27, 178,7. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People of Massachusetts. 
 
 In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state 
 of other countries and the experience of mankind, that free 
 countries are most friendly to commerce and to the rights of 
 property. This produces greater internal tranquility. For every 
 man, finding sufficient employment for his active powers in the 
 way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no disposition 
 to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which 
 protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. Of the truth 
 of these positions we have abundant evidence in the history of 
 our own country. Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, 
 and its formation into a commonwealth, in the earlier part of the 
 last century, there was a sedition at Hingham and Weymouth. 
 The governour passing by at that time with his guard, seized 
 some of the mutineers and imprisoned them. This was com- 
 plained of as a violation of their rights, and the governour lost 
 his election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored 
 and continued to be re-elected for several years. The govern- 
 ment does not appear to have been disturbed again till the revo- 
 cation of the charter in 1686, being a period of about half a 
 century. 
 
 Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has 
 
 (56) 
 
iETl'ERS DF AGRIPPA. S7 
 
 continued uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this 
 time. 
 
 During the last year,* we had decisive evidences of the vigour 
 of this kind of government. In Connecticut, the treason was re- 
 strained while lit. existed only in the form of conspiracy. In Ver- 
 mont, the conspirators assembled in arms, but were suppressed 
 by the exertions ofthe militia, underthe direction of their sheriffs. 
 In .'New-Hampshire, the;attack was made on the legislature, but 
 the insurrection was in a very few hours suppressed, and has 
 never:been renewed. In Massachusetts,'the danger was by delay 
 suffered to increase. One judicial court after another was stopped, 
 and even the capital trembled. Still, however.iwhen the supreme 
 executive gave the signal, a force xjf many thousands of active, 
 resolute, men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and 
 ■everydifificulty vanished before them. Since that time we have 
 ■ been continually coalescing. The people have applied with dili- 
 gence to their several occupations, and the whole country wears 
 one face of improvement. Agriculture has been improved, man- 
 ^ufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged. These are 
 the advantages of freedom in a growing country. While our 
 resources have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set 
 in every part of the commonwealth, without any guard to defend 
 them; have tried causes of every kind, whether civil or criminal, 
 and the sheriffs, have in no case been interrupted in the execution 
 of their office. In those cases indeed, where the government was 
 more particularly interested, mercy has been extended; but in 
 civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law has been 
 punctually executed. Damage done to individuals, during the 
 tumults, has been repaired, by judgment ofthe courts of law, and 
 the award has been carried into effect. This is the present state 
 of affairs, when we are asked to relinquish that freedom which 
 produces such happy effects. 
 
 The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial 
 system, and to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally 
 alarming our fears, exalting certain characters on one side, and 
 villifying them on the other. I wish to say nothing of the merits 
 
 * Referring to Shay's rebellion. — £:/. 
 
58 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 or demerits of individuals ; such arguments always do hurt. But 
 assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to consider and determine 
 who are the most worthy of confidence in a business of this mag- 
 nitude. 
 
 Whether they will trust persons, who have from their cradles 
 been incapable of comprehending any other principles of govern- 
 ment, than those of absolute power, and who have, in this very 
 affair, tried to deprive them of their constitutional liberty, by a 
 pitiful trick. They cannot avoid prefering those who have uni- 
 formly exerted themselves to establish a limited government, and 
 to secure to individuals all the liberty that is consistent with jus- 
 tice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the smiles of 
 Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid 
 success. After the treatment we have received, we have a right to 
 be jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strict- 
 est care. It is the right of the people to judge, and they will do 
 wisely to give an explicit instruction to their delegates in the pro- 
 posed convention, not to agree to any proposition that will in 
 any degree militate with that happy system of government under 
 which Heaven has placed them. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
 November 2^, 178'/. 
 
AGRIPPA, III. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (N"viml>er 387) 
 
 Friday, November 30, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 It has been proved from the clearest evidence, in two former 
 papers, that a free government, I mean one in which the power 
 frequently returns to the body of the people, is in principle the . 
 most stable and e fficien t of any kind ; that such a government 
 affords the most ready and effectual remedy for all injuries done 
 to persons and the rights of property. It is true we have had a 
 tender act.* But what government has not some law in favour ' 
 of debtors ? The difficulty consists in finding one that is not more 
 unfriendly to the creditors than ours. I am far from justifying 
 such things. On the contrary, I believe that it is universally 
 true, that acts made to favour a part of the community are wrong 
 in principle. All that is now intended is, to remark that we are 
 not worse than other people in that respect which we most con- 
 demn. Probably the inquiry will be made, whence the com- 
 plaints arise. This is easily answered. Let any man look round 
 his own neighbourhood, and see if the people are not, with a very 
 few exceptions, peaceable and attached to the government ; if the 
 country had ever within their knowledge more appearance of in- 
 dustry, improvement and tranquillity; if there was ever more of 
 
 * Act of 1786, providing that executions issued for private debt may be satisfied by 
 articles particularly enumerated, at an appraised value from impartial vien.-—iB(i. 
 
 (59) 
 
6o LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 the produce of all kinds together for the market ; if their stock 
 does not rapidly increase ; if there was ever a more ready vent 
 for their surplus; and if the average of prices is not about as high 
 as was usual in a plentiful year before the war. These circum- 
 stances all denote a general prosperity. Some classes of citizens 
 indeed suffer greatly. Two descriptions I at present recollect. 
 The publick creditors form the first of these classes, and they 
 ought to, and will be provided for. 
 
 Let us for a moment consider their -situation and prospects. 
 The embarrassments consequent upon a war, and the usual re- 
 duction of prices immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned 
 a want of punctuality in publick payments. Still, however, the 
 publick debt has been very considerably reduced, not by the dirty 
 and delusive scheme of depreciation, but the nominal sum. Ap- 
 plications are continually making for purchases in our eastern 
 and western lands. Great exertions are making for clearing, off 
 the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the certificates* for in- 
 terest on the state debt have considerably increased in value. 
 This is a certain indication of returning credit. Congress this 
 year disposed of a large tract of their lands towards paying the 
 principal of their debt.f Pennsylvania has discharged the whole 
 of their part of the continental debt. New York has nearly 
 cleared its state debt, and has located a large part of their new 
 lands towards paying the continental demands.J Other states 
 have made considerable payments. Every day from these con- 
 siderations the publick ability and inclination to satisfy their 
 creditors increases. The exertions of last winter were as much 
 to support public as private credit. The prospect therefore of 
 the publick creditors is. brightening under the present system. If 
 the new system should take effect without amendments, v/hi^ 
 however is hardly .probiible, the increase of expense will be deatji 
 
 *No attempt had been made by Massachusetts for several years to pay the interest 
 on its debt, except by the State Treasurer's issuing " consohdated notes " or " certifi- 
 cates'" of indebtedness, bearing 6 per cent; interest. Though these were by law re- 
 ceivable for taxes, they had sold as low as 4/ in the pound. — St^. 
 
 f The sales to the Ohio Company. — £d. 
 
 f By Act of July 5, 1786.— £</. 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPi'A. 6 1 
 
 to the hopes of all creditors, both of the continental and of the 
 State. With respect, however, to our publick delaysof payment 
 we have' the precedent of the best established countries in. 
 Euirope. 
 
 The other class of citizens to which I alluded' was the ship- 
 carpenters. All agree that their business is dull ; but as nobody- 
 objects against a system of commercial regulations for the whole 
 Continent, that business may be relieved without subverting all 
 the ancient foundations and laws which have the respect of the? 
 people. It is a very serious question whether giving to Congress' 
 tlie unlimited right to regulate trade would not injure them still 
 further. It is- evidently for the interest of the state to encourage; 
 our own trade as much as possible. But in a very large empire, 
 as the whole states consolidated must be, there will always be a 
 desire of the government to increase the trade of the capital, and 
 to weaken the extremes. We should in that case be one of the 
 extremes, and should feel all the impoverishment incident to that 
 situation. Besides, a jealousy of our enterprising spirit, would 
 always be an inducement to cramp our exertions. We must then 
 be impoverished or we must rebel. The alternative is dreadful. 
 
 At present this state is one of the most respectable and one of 
 the most influential in the union. If we alone should object to 
 receiving the system without amendments, there is no doubt but 
 it would be amended. But the case is not quite so bad. New- 
 York appears to have no disposition even to call a convention. 
 If they should neglect, are we to lend our assistance to compel 
 them by arms, and thus to kindle a civil war without any provo- 
 cation on their part ? Virginia has put off their convention till 
 May, and appears to have no disposition to receive the new plan 
 without amendments. Pennsylvania does not seem to be dis- 
 posed to receive it as it is. The same objections are made in all 
 the states, that the civil government which they have adopted 
 and which secures their rights will be subverted. All the de- 
 fenders of this system undertake to prove that the rights of the 
 states and of the citizens are kept safe. The opposers of it agree 
 that they will receive the least burdensome system which shall 
 defend those rights. 
 
62 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 Both parties therefore found their arguments on the idea that 
 these rights ought to be held sacred. With this disposition is it 
 not in every man's mind better to recommit it to a new conven- 
 tion, or to Congress, which is a regular convention for the 
 purpose, and to instruct our delegates to confine the system to 
 the general purposes of the union, than the endeavour to force 
 it through in its present form, and with so many opposers as 
 it must have in every state on the continent ? The case is not 
 of such pressing necessity as some have represented. Europe 
 is engaged, and we are tranquil. Never therefore was an happier 
 time for deliberation. The supporters of the measure are by no 
 means afraid of insurrections taking place, but they are afraid 
 that the present government will prove superiour to their as- 
 saults. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, IV. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (NTimTDer 388) 
 
 Tuesday, December 3, 1787. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 Having considered some of the principal advantages of the 
 happy form of government under which it is our peculiar good 
 fortune to live, we find by experience, that it is the best calcu- 
 lated of any form hitherto invented, to secure to us the rights of 
 our persons and of our property, and that the general circum- 
 stances of the people shew an advanced state of improvement 
 never before known. We have found the shock given by the 
 war, in a great measure obliterated, and the public debt con- 
 tracted at that time to be considerably reduced in the nominal 
 sum. The Congress lands are full adequate to the redemptior 
 of the principal of their debt, and are selling and populating very 
 fast. The lands of this state, at the west, are, at the moderate 
 price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a million 
 pounds in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick 
 as possible. An application was made lately for a large tract at 
 that price, and continual applications are made for other lands in 
 the eastern part of the state. Our resources are daily augment- 
 ing. 
 
 We find, then, that after the experience of near two centuries 
 our separate governments are in full vigor. They discover, for 
 all the purposes of internal regulation, every symptom of strength, 
 and none of decay. The new system is, therefore, for such pur- 
 poses, useless and burdensome. 
 
 (63) 
 
 -3 
 
64 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 Let US now consider how far it is practicable consistent with 
 the happiness of the people and their freedom. It is the opinion 
 of the ablest writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can 
 be governed upon republican principles, and that such a govern- 
 ment will degenerate to a despotism, unless it be made up of a 
 confederacy of smaller states, each having the full powers of in- 
 ternal regulation. This is precisely the principle which has hith- 
 erto preserved our freedom. Na instance can be found of any 
 free government of considerable extent which has been supported 
 upon any other plan. Large and' consolidated empires may in- 
 deed dazzle the eyes of a distant spectator with their splendour, 
 but if examined more nearly are always found to be full of misery. 
 The reason is obvious. In large states the same principles of 
 legislation will not apply to all the parts. The inhabitants of 
 warmer climates are more dissolute in their manners, and less 
 industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of severity is,, 
 therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the spirit of the 
 other. We accordingly find that the very great empires have, 
 always been despotick. They have indeed tried to remedy the 
 inconveniences to which the people were exposed by local regu- 
 lations; but these contrivances have never answered the end.. 
 The laws not being made by the people, who felt the inconveni- 
 ences, did not suit theiVcircumstances. It is under such tyranny 
 that the Spanish provinces languish, and such would be our mis- 
 fortune and degradation, if we should submit to have the concerns; 
 of the whole empire managed by one legislature. To promote 
 the happiness of the people it is necessary that there should be, 
 local laws ; and it is necessary that those laws should be made by 
 the representatives of those who are immediately subject to the 
 want of them. By endeavouring to suit both extremes, both are 
 injured. 
 
 It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and 
 Massachusetts. They must, therefore, legislate for themselves. 
 Yet there is, I believe, not one point of legislation that is not 
 surrendered in the proposed plan. Questions of every kind 
 respecting property are determinable in a continental court, and 
 so are all kinds of criminal causes. The continental legislature 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 65 
 
 has, therefore, a right to make rules in all cases by which their 
 judicial courts shall proceed and decide causes. No rights are 
 reserved to the citizens. The laws of Congress are in all cases 
 to be the supreme Jaw of the land, and paramount to the con- 
 stitutions of the individual states. The Congress may institute 
 what modes of trial they please, and no plea drawn from the con- 
 stitution of any state can avail. This new system is, therefore, a 
 consolidation of all the states into one large mass, however diverse 
 the parts may be of which it is to be composed. The idea of an 
 uncompounded republick, on an average one thousand miles in 
 length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six millions 
 of white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals, 
 of habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to 
 the whole experience of mankind. The attempt made by Great 
 Britain to introduce such a system, struck us with horrour, and 
 when it was proposed by some theorist that we should be rep- 
 resented in parliament, we uniformly declared that one legislature 
 could not represent so many different interests for the purposes of 
 legislation and taxation. This was the leading principle of the 
 revolution, and makes an essential article in our creed. All that 
 part, therefore, of the new system, which relates to the internal 
 government of the states, ought at once to be rejected. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, V. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE. 
 
 (Nrxiiihev 390) 
 
 Tuesday, December ii, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 In the course of inquiry it has appeared, that for the purposes 
 of internal regulation and domestick tranquillity, our small and 
 separate governments are not only admirably suited in theory, 
 but have been remarkably successful in practice. It is also 
 found, that the direct tendency of the proposed system, is to con^ 
 solidate the whole empire into one mass, and, like the tyrant's 
 bed, to reduce all to one standard. Though this idea has beerf 
 started in different parts of the continent, and is the most impor- 
 tant trait of this draft, the reasoning ought to be extensively" 
 understood. I therefore hope to be indulged in a particular 
 statement of it. 
 
 Causes of all kinds, between citizens of different states, are to 
 be tried before a continental court. This court is not bound to 
 try it according to the local laws where the controversies happen; 
 for in that case it may as well be tried in a state court. The 
 rule which is to govern the new courts, must, therefore, be made 
 by the court itself, or by its employers, the Congress. If by the 
 former, the legislative and judicial departments will be blended; 
 and if by the Congress, though these departments will be kept 
 separate, still the power of legislation departs from the state in all 
 those cases. The Congress, therefore, have the right to make 
 rules for trying all kinds of questions relating to property between 
 
 (66) 
 
LETTERS OF A6RIPPA. 67 
 
 eitizens of different states. The sixth article of the new constitu- 
 tion provides, that the continental laws shall be the supreme law 
 of the land, and that all judges in the separate states shall be bound 
 thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the 
 contrary notwithstanding. All the state officers are also bound 
 by oath to support this constitution. The.se provisions cannot be 
 understood otherwise than as binding the state judges and other 
 officers, to execute the continental laws in their own proper de-r 
 partments within the state. For all questions, other than those 
 between citizens of the same state, are at once put within the juris- 
 diction of the continental courts. As no authority remains to the 
 state judges, but to decide questions between citizens of the same 
 ptate, and those judges are to be bound by the laws of Congress, 
 it clearly follows, that all questions between citizens of the same 
 state are to be decided by the general laws and not by the local 
 ones. 
 
 Authority is also given to the continental courts, to try all 
 causes between a state and its own citizens. A question of pro- 
 perty between these parties rarely occurs. But if such questions 
 were more frequent than they are, the proper process is not to 
 sue the state before an higher authority ; but to apply to the su- 
 preme authority of the state, by way of petition. This is the 
 universal practice of all states, and any other mode of redress de- 
 stroys the sov€rdgnty of the state over its own subjects. The 
 only case of the kind in which the state would probably be sued, 
 would be upon the state notes. The endless confusion that 
 would arise from making the estates of individuals answerable, 
 must be obvious to every one. 
 
 There is another sense in which the clause relating to causes 
 between the state and individuals is to be understood, and it is 
 more probable than the other, as it will be eternal in its duration, 
 and increasing in its extent. This is the whole branch of the law 
 relating to criminal prosecutions. In all such cases, the state is 
 plaintiff, and the person accused is defendant. The process, 
 therefore, will be, for the attorney-general of the state to com- 
 mence his suit before a continental court. Considering the state 
 as a party, the cause must be tried in another, and all the expense 
 
68 LRTTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 of transporting witnesses incurred. The individual is to take 
 his trial among strangers, friendless and unsupported, without 
 its being known whether he is habitually a good or a bad man; 
 and consequently with one essential circumstance wanting by 
 which to determine whether the action was performed maliciously 
 or accidentally. All these inconveniences are avoided by the 
 present important restriction, that the cause shall be tried by a 
 jury of the vicinity, and tried in the county where the offence was 
 committed. But by the proposed derangement, I can call it by 
 no softer name, a man must be ruined to prove his innocence. 
 This is far from being a forced construction of the proposed form. 
 The words appear to me not intelligible, upon the idea that it is 
 to be a system of government, unless the construction now given, 
 both for civil and criminal processes, be admitted. I do not say 
 that it is intended that all these changes should take place within 
 one year, but they probably will in the course of half a dozen 
 years, if this system is adopted. In the meantime we shall be 
 subject to all the horrors of a divided sovereignty, not knowing 
 whether to obey the Congress or the State. We shall find it im- 
 possible to please two masters. In such a state frequent broils 
 will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popular commotion, 
 and even the venerable forms of the state be done away, while the 
 new system will be enforced in its utmost rigour by an army. — I 
 am the more apprehensive of a standing army, on account of a 
 clause in the new constitution which empowers Congress to keep 
 one at all times ; but this constitution is evidently such that it 
 cannot stand any considerable time without an army. Upon this 
 principle one is very wisely provided. Our present government 
 knows of no such thing. Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, VI. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE. 
 
 (N"uraber 391) 
 
 Friday, December 14, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 To prevent any mistakes, or misapprehensions of the argument, 
 stated in my last paper, to prove that the proposed constitution is 
 an actual consolidation of the separate states into one extensive 
 commonwealth, the reader is desired to observe, that in the course 
 of the argument, the new plan is considered as an entire system. 
 It is not dependent on any other book for an explanation, and 
 contains no references to any other book. All the defences of it, 
 therefore, so far as they are drawn from the state constitutions, 
 or from maxims of the common law, are foreign to the purpose. 
 It is only by comparing the different parts of it together, that the 
 meaning of the whole is to be understood. For instance — 
 
 We find in it, that there is to be a legislative assembly, with 
 authority to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil 
 causes, between citizens of different states. The right to appoint 
 such courts necessarily involves in it the right of defining their 
 powers, and determining the rules by which their judgment shall 
 be regulated; and the grant of the former of those rights is nu- 
 gatory without the latter. It is vain to tell us, that a maxim of 
 common law requires contracts to be determined by the law ex- 
 isting where the contract was made : for it is also a maxim, that 
 the legislature has a right to alter the common law. Such a 
 power forms an essential part of legislation. Here, then, a de- 
 
 (69} 
 
70 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 claration of rights is of inestimable value. It contains those 
 principles which the government never can invade without an 
 open violation of the compact between them and the citizens. 
 Such a declaration ought to have come to the new constitution 
 in favour of the legislative rights of the several states, by which 
 their sovereignty over their own citizens within the state should 
 be secured. Without such an express declaration the states are 
 annihilated in reality upon receiving this constitution — the forms 
 will be preserved only during the pleasure of Congress. 
 
 The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given 
 to regulate trade. Though this power under certain limitations 
 would be a proper one for the department of Congress; it is in 
 this system carried much too far, and much farther than is neces- 
 sary. This is, without exception, the most commercial state 
 upon the continent. Our extensive coasts, cold climate, small 
 estates, and equality of rights, with a variety of subordinate and 
 concurring circumstances, place us in this respect at the head of 
 the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a point which so 
 nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new con- 
 stitution not only prohibits vessels, bound from one state to an^ 
 other, from paying any duties, but even from entering and clear- 
 ing. The only use of such a regulation is, to keep each state in 
 complete ignorance of its own resources. It certainly is no hard- 
 ship to enter and clear at the custom house, and the expense is 
 too small to be an object. 
 
 The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of 
 granting exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is con- 
 sidered as one principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly 
 a country in Europe which has not felt the ill effects of such a 
 power. Holland has carried the exercise of it farther than any 
 other state, and the reason why that country has felt less evil 
 from it is, that the territory is very small, and they have drawn 
 large revenues from their colonies in the East and West Indies. 
 In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a trad- 
 ing company, having exclusive privileges. The colonies are 
 large in proportion to the parent state ; so that, Upon the whole> 
 the latter may gain by such a system. We are also to take into 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 7 1 
 
 consideration the industry which the genius of a free government 
 inspires. But in the British islands all these circumstances to- 
 gether have not prevented them from being injured by the mono- 
 polies created there. Individuals have been enriched, but the 
 country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches ol 
 trade being granted to companies, who transact their business 
 in London, that city is, perhaps, the place of the greatest trade in 
 the world. But Ireland, under such influence, suffers exceed- 
 ingly, and is impoverished ; and Scotland is a mere bye-word. 
 Brisjtol, the second city in England, ranks not much above this 
 town in population. These things mu"st be accounted for by the 
 incorporation of trading companies; and if they are felt so se- 
 verely in countries of small extent, they will operate with ten- 
 fold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense tract ; and living 
 towards .one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, 
 without retaining that influence in government, which may en- 
 able us to procure redress. There ought, then, to have been in- 
 serted a restraining clause which might prevent the Congress 
 from making any such grant, because they consequentially 
 defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious to the 
 general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that 
 rivalship which is the great stimulus to industry. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, VII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (ISr-amTDer 393) 
 
 Tuesday, December i8, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this conti- 
 nent remains free, the activity of our countrymen will secure 
 their full share. All the estimates for the present year, let them 
 be made by what party they may, suppose the balance of trade 
 to be largely in our favour. The credit of our merchants is, 
 therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This is a suiifi- 
 cient proof, that when business is un.shackled, it will find out that 
 channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, there- 
 fore, to be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. 
 Every day produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immedi- 
 ate pressure of difficulties, do not, at first glance, discover the 
 proper relief. The last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments 
 induced many honest people to agree to a tender act, and many 
 others, of a different description, to obstruct the courts of justice. 
 Both these methods only increased the evil they were intended to 
 cure. Experience has since shown that, instead of trying to lessen 
 an evil by altering the present course of things, that every endeavor 
 should have been applied to facilitate the course of law, and thus 
 to encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which in- 
 creases the resources of them all, and renders easy the payment of 
 debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of . 
 another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the 
 
 (72) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 73 
 
 States. Pennsylvania, with one port and a large territory, is less 
 favourably situated for trade than the Massachusetts, which has 
 an extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Ac- 
 cordingly a much larger proportion of our people are engaged in 
 maritime affairs. We ought therefore to be particularly attentive 
 to securing so great an interest. It is vain to tell us that we 
 ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local 
 concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved. No man 
 when he enters into society does it from a view to promote the 
 good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men hav- 
 ing the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of 
 the whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local inter- 
 ests must be disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more 
 than another, and is subverting the foundation of a free govern- 
 ment. The Philadelphians would be shocked with a proposition 
 to place the seat of general government and the unlimited right 
 to regulate trade in the Massachusetts. There can be no greater 
 reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such sacri- 
 fices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, 
 always originate in folly, and not in generosity. 
 
 Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual 
 state of publick credit, that we may see whether it has not been 
 as much misrepresented as the state of our trade. 
 
 At the beginning of the present year, the whole continental 
 debt was about twelve millions of pounds in our money. About 
 one-quarter part of this sum was due to our foreign creditors. 
 Of these France was the principal, and called for the arrears of 
 interest. A new loan of one hundred and twenty thousand 
 pounds was negotiated in Holland, at five per cent., to pay the 
 arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of 
 bad economy, and has been used for the villainous purpose of 
 disafTecting the people. But in the course of this same year. 
 Congress have negotiated the sale of as much of their western 
 lands on the Ohio and Mississippi, as amount nearly to the whole 
 sum of the foreign debt; and instead of a dead loss by borrowing 
 money at five per cent, to the amount of an hundred and twenty 
 thousand pounds in one sum, they make a saving of the interest 
 
74 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 at six per cent, on three millions of their domestick debt, which 
 is an annual saving of an hundred and eighty thousand pounds. 
 It is easy to see how such an immense fund as the western terri- 
 tory may be applied to the payment of the foreign debt. Pur- 
 chasers of the land would as willingly procure any kind of the 
 produce of the United States as they would buy loan office cer- 
 tificates to pay for the land. The produce thus procured would 
 easily be negotiated for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do 
 not mean to insinuate that no other provision should be made for 
 our creditors, but only to shew that our credit is not so bad in 
 other countries as has been represented, and that our resources 
 are fully equal to the pressure. 
 
 The perfection of government depends oh the equality of its 
 operation, as far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the 
 empire, and upon all the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will 
 necessarily take place. One man will be obliged to travel a few 
 miles further than another man to procure justice. But when he 
 has travelled, the poor man ought to have the same measure of 
 justice as the rich one. Small enqualities [sic] may be easily 
 compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the 
 law itself, and the government ought to have the same authority 
 in one place as in another. Evident as this truth is, the most 
 plausible argument in favour of the new plan is drawn from the 
 inequality of its operation in different states. In Connecticut, 
 they have been told that the bulk of the revenue will be raised 
 by impost and excise, and, therefore, they need not be afraid to 
 trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at pleasure. 
 New York and Massachusetts are both more commercial states 
 than Connecticut. The latter, therefore, hopes that the other two 
 will pay the bulk of the continental expense. The argument is, 
 in itself, delusive. If the trade is not over-taxed, the consumer 
 pays it. If the trade is over-taxed, it languishes, and by the ruin 
 of trade the farmer loses his market. The farmer has, in truth, 
 no other advantage from imposts than that they save him the 
 trouble of collecting money for the government. He neither gets 
 nor loses money by changing the mode of taxation. The govern- 
 ment indeed finds it the easiest way to raise the revenue; and the 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 7S 
 
 reason is that the tax is by this means collected where the money 
 circulates most freely. But if the argument was not delusive, it 
 ought to conclude against the plan, because it would prove the 
 unequal operation of it ; and if any saving is to be made by the 
 mode of taxing, the saving should be applied towards our own 
 debt, and not 'to the payment of that part of the continental 
 burden which Connecticut ought to discharge. It would be im- 
 possible to refute in writing all the delusions made use of to force 
 this system through. Those respecting the publick debt, and 
 the benefit of imposts, are the most important, and these I have 
 taken pains to explain. In one instance, indeed, the impost does 
 raise money at the direct expense of the seaports. This is when 
 goods are imported subject to a duty, and re-exported without a 
 drawback. Whatever benefit is derived from this source, surely 
 should not be transferred to another state, at least till our own 
 debts are cleared. 
 
 Another instance df unequal operation is, that it establishes 
 different degrees of authority in different states, and thus creates 
 different interests. The lands in New Hampshire having been 
 formerly granted by this state, and afterwards by that state, to 
 private persons, the whole authority of trying titles becomes 
 vested in a continental court, and that state loses a branch of au- 
 thority, which the others retain, over their own citizens. 
 
 I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have 
 proved the efficiency of the state governments for internal regula- 
 tion, and the disadvantages of the new system, at least some of 
 the principal. The argument has been much longer than I at 
 first apprehended, or possibly I should have been deterred from 
 it. The importance of the question has, however, prevented me 
 from relinquishing it. Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, VIII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (ITiamTDer 394) 
 
 Tuesday, December 25, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not 
 the grand principle of union among the parts of a very extensive 
 empire ; and that when this principle is pushed beyond the de- 
 gree necessary for rendering justice between man and man, it de- 
 bases the character of individuals, and renders them less secure in 
 their persons and property. Civil liberty consists in the conscious- 
 ness of that security, and is best guarded by political liberty, 
 which is the share that every citizen has in the government. 
 Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires which 
 are commonly called despotick, and which comprehend by far the 
 greatest part of the world, the government is most fluctuating, and 
 property least secure. In those countries insults are borne by the 
 sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governours, would fill 
 us with horrour, and we should think the government dissolving. 
 
 The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly 
 unfair one, that we must then separate, and form distinct confed- 
 eracies. This would be true if there was no principle to substi- 
 tute in the room of power. Fortunately there is one. This is 
 commerce. All the states have local advantages, and in a con- 
 siderable degree separate interests. They are, therefore, in a sit- 
 uation to supply each other's wants. Carolina, for instance, is 
 inhabited by planters, while the Massachusetts is more engaged 
 
 (76) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 7/ 
 
 in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of de- 
 ciding their differences. The most friendly intercourse may 
 therefore be estabhshed between them. A diversity of produce, 
 wants and interests, produces commerce ; and commerce, where 
 there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, pro- 
 duces friendship. 
 
 The same principles apply to the connection with the new set- 
 tlers in the west. Many supplies they want for which they must 
 look to the older settlements, and the greatness of their crops en- 
 ables them to make payments. Here, then, we have a bond of 
 union which applies to all parts of the empire, and would continue 
 to operate if the empire comprehended all America. 
 
 We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal repub- 
 lick. Each part has within its own limits the sovereignty over 
 its citizens, while some of the general concerns are committed to 
 Congress. The complaints of the deficiency of the Congressional 
 powers are confined to two articles. They are not able to raise a 
 revenue by taxation, and they have not a complete regulation of 
 the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each of these 
 complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify the 
 clamour which has been raised. Congress, it is true, owes a debt 
 which ought to be paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. 
 Our share of what remains would annually amount to about sixty 
 or seventy thousand pounds. If, therefore, Congress were put in 
 possession of such branches of the impost as would raise this 
 sum in our state, we should fairly be considered as having done 
 our part towards their debt ; and our remaining resources, whether 
 arising from impost, excise, or dry tax, might be applied to the 
 reduction of our own debt. The principal of this last amounts to 
 about thirteen hundred thousand pounds, and the interest to be- 
 tween seventy or eighty thousand. This is, surely, too much 
 property to be sacrificed ; and it is as reasonable that it should be 
 paid as the continental debt. But if the new system should be 
 adopted, the whole impost, with an unlimited claim to excise 
 and dry tax, will be given to Congress. There will remain no 
 adequate found for the state debt, and the state will still be sub- 
 ject to be sued on their notes. This is, then, an article which 
 
78 LETTERS OP AGRIPPA. 
 
 ought to be limited. We can, without difficulty, pay as much 
 annually as shall clear the interest of our state debt, and our share 
 of the interest on the continental one. But if we surrender the 
 impost, we shall still, by this new constitution, be held to pay our 
 full proportion of the remaining debt, as if nothing had been 
 done. The impost will not be considered as being paid by this 
 state, but by the continent. The federalists, indeed, tell us that 
 the state debts will all be incorporated with the continental debt, 
 and all paid out of one fund. In this as in all other instances, they 
 endeavour to support their scheme of consolidation by delusion. 
 Not one word is said in the book in favour of such a scheme, and 
 there is no reason to think it true. Assurances of that sort are 
 easily given, and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in for- 
 getting what is false. No man can expect town debts to be unir 
 ted with that of the state; and there will be as little reason to 
 expect that the state and continental debts will be united together. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, IX. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE. 
 
 (NnmTaer 395) 
 
 Friday, December 28, 1787. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 We come now to the second and last article of complaint 
 against the present confederation, which is, that Congress has 
 not the sole power to regulate the intercourse between us and 
 foreigners. Such a power extends not only to war and peace, 
 but to trade and naturalization. This last article ought never to 
 be given them; for though most of the states may be willing for 
 certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons of 
 equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, 
 to keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive 
 ^11 that would come there. Let any indifferent person judge 
 whether that state in point of morals, education, energy is equal 
 to any of the eastern states ; the small state of Rhode Island only 
 excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a century has acquired 
 her present extent and population at the expense of religion and 
 good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate frorn 
 the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the 
 course of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion 
 and morals. They have also preserved that manly virtue which 
 is equally fitted for rendering them respectable in war, and indusr 
 trious in peace. 
 
 The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be 
 safely enough lodged with Congress under some limitations. 
 
 (79) 
 
8o LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 Three restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to 
 preserve that equality of rights to the states, which it is the object 
 of the state governments to secure to each citizen. 1st. It ought 
 not to be in the power of Congress, either by treaty or otherwise, 
 to alienate part of any state without the consent of the legisla- 
 ture. 2d. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to 
 give any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They 
 ought to be restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps 
 others may propose different regulations and restrictions. One 
 of these is to be found in the old confederation, and another in 
 the newly proposed plan. The third scenes [sic] to be equally 
 necessary. 
 
 After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on 
 the difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it 
 adequate to national purposes, it does not appear that any thing 
 more was necessary to be done, than framing two new articles. 
 By one a limited revenue would be given to Congress with a 
 right to collect it, and by the other a limited right to regulate 
 our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an addition we 
 should have preserved to each state its power to defend the 
 rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of 
 expanding and receiving additions without altering its former 
 constitution. Congress, at the same time, by the extent of their 
 jurisdiction, and the number of their officers, would have ac- 
 quired more respectability at home, and a sufficient influence 
 abroad. If any state was in such a case to invade the rights of 
 the Union, the other states would join in defence of those rights, 
 and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the national 
 force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of Con- 
 gress over the citizens should be small in proportion as the 
 empire is extended; that, in order to preserve the balance, each 
 state may supply by energy what is wanting in numbers. Con- 
 gress would be able by such a system as we have proposed to 
 regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as should effectually 
 give the preference to the produce and manufactures of our own 
 country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established 
 between the states, upon the principles of mutual interest. A 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 8 1 
 
 moderate duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to 
 our own people, while it would avoid all the disadvantages arising 
 from a prohibition, and the consequent deficiency of vessels to 
 transport the produce of the southern states. 
 
 Our country is at present upon an average a thousand miles 
 long from north to south, and eight hundred broad from the Mis- 
 sissippi to the Ocean. We have at least six millions of white in- 
 habitants, and the annual increase is about two hundred and fifty 
 thousand souls, exclusive of emigrants from Europe. The greater 
 part of our increase is employed in settling the new lands, while 
 the older settlements are entering largely into manufactures of 
 various kinds. It is probable that the extraordinary exertions of 
 this state in the way of industry for the present year only, exceed 
 in value five hundred thousand pounds. The new settlements, if 
 all made in the same tract of country, would form a large state 
 annually; and the time seems to be literally accomplished when 
 a nation shall be born in a day. Such an immense country is not 
 only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe, but actually 
 does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials. The 
 restrictions on our trade in Europe, necessarily oblige us to make 
 use of those materials, and the high price of labour operates as an 
 encouragement to mechanical improvements. In this way we 
 daily make rapid advancements towards independence in re- 
 sources as well as in empire. If we adopt the new system of 
 government we shall, by one rash vote, lose the fruit of the toil 
 and expense of thirteen years, at the time when the benefits of 
 that toil and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the imposts 
 of Congress on foreign trade may tend to encourage manufactures, 
 the excise and dry tax will destroy all the beneficial effects of the 
 impost, at the same time that they diminish our capital. Be care- 
 ful then to give only a limited revenue, and the limited power of 
 managing foreign concerns. Once surrender the rights of inter- 
 nal legislation and taxation, and instead of being respected 
 abroad, foreigners will laugh at us, and posterity will lament our 
 folly. Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, X. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (Nunaber 396) 
 
 Tuesday, January i, 1788.. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 Friends and Brethren, 
 
 It is a duty incumbent on every man, who has had opportun- 
 ities for inquiry, to lay the result of his researches on any matter 
 of publick importance before the publick eye. No further 
 apology will be necessary with the generality of my readers, for- 
 having so often appeared before them on the subject of the lately 
 proposed form of government. It has been treated with that 
 freedom which is necessary for the investigation of truth, and 
 with no greater freedom. On such a subject, extensive in its 
 nature, and important in its consequences, the examination has 
 necessarily been long, and the topicks treated of have been- 
 various. We have been obliged to take a cursory, but not inac- 
 curate view of the circumstances of mankind under the different' 
 forms of government to support the different parts of our argu- 
 ment. Permit me now to bring into one view the principal pro-- 
 positions on which the reasoning depends. 
 
 It is shewn from the example of the most commercial repub- 
 lick of antiquity, which was never disturbed by a sedition for 
 above seven hundred years, and at last yielded after a violent 
 struggle to a foreign enemy, as well as from the experience of 
 our own country for a century and an half, that the republican, 
 
 (82) 
 
EETTERS OF AGRIPPAi Sj 
 
 liiore than any other fofrti of governmenif: is rtiade of durable 
 materials. It is shewfl from a variety of proof, that oiie consoli- ^ 
 dated government is inapplicable to a great extent of country; is ' 
 unfriendly to the right's^ both of persons and property, which -^^ 
 rights always adhere together; and that being contrary to the in- ^ ) 
 terest of the extreme of an empire, such a government can be 
 supported only by power, and- that commerce is the true bond of 
 union for a free state. It is shewn from a comparison- of the 
 different parts of the proposed plan, that it is such A consolidated 
 government. 
 
 By article 5, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint? 
 courts with authority to try civil causes of every kind-, and even 
 offences against particular states. By the last clause of Article i, 
 section 8, which defines their legislative powers, they are author- 
 ised to make laws for Carrying into execution all the " powers 
 vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, 
 or in afiy department or officer thereof;" and by article 6, the 
 judges in every state are to be bound by the laws of Congress. 
 It is therefore a complete consolidation of all the states into one, 
 however diverse the parts of it may be. It is also shewn that it 
 will operate unequally in the' different states, taking from some of 
 them a greater share of wealth ; that in this last respect it will' 
 operate more to the injury of this commonwealth than of any* 
 state in the union ; and that by reason of its inequality it is sub-- 
 versive Of the principles of a free government, which requires 
 every part to contribute an equal proportion. For all these 
 reasons this system ought to be rejected, even if no better plan- 
 Was proposed in the room of it. In case of a rejection' we must 
 remain as we are, with trade extending, resources opening, settle- 
 ments enlarging', manufactures increasing, aild publick debts 
 diminishing' by fair payment. These are mighty blessings, arid' 
 flo't to be lost by the hasty adoption of a new system'. But great' 
 as these benefits are, which we derive from our present system; 
 it-has been shewn, that they may be increased by giving Congress 
 a hmited power to regulate trade, and assigning fo them those 
 branches of the impost on our foreign tradfe Only, which shall be 
 equal to our'proportioh of their present ailhual demands. While 
 
84 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our lands in a very 
 few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of the 
 state will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the 
 continental tax is regulated by the extent of landed property in 
 each state. By this rule the Massachusetts [sic] has to pay one 
 eighth. If we adopt the new system, we shall surrender the 
 whole of our impost and excise, which probably amount to a 
 third of those duties of the whole continent, and must come in 
 for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we 
 shall be deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our 
 loans to the continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just de- 
 mands on the state. Under the limitations of revenue and com- 
 mercial regulation contained in these papers, the balance will be 
 largely in our favour ; the importance of the great states will be 
 preserved, and the publick creditors both of the continent and 
 state will be satisfied without burdening the people. For a more 
 concise view of my proposal, I have thrown it into the form of a 
 resolve, supposed to be passed by the convention which is shortly 
 to set in this town. 
 
 " Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Resolved, That the form 
 of government lately proposed by a federal convention, held in 
 the city of Philadelphia, is so far injurious to the interests of this 
 commonwealth, that we are constrained by fidelity to our consti- 
 tuents to reject it ; and we do hereby reject the said proposed 
 form and every part thereof But in order that the union of these 
 states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the federal busi- 
 ness as little obstructed as may be, we do agree on the part of this 
 commonwealth, that the following addition be made to the pres- 
 ent articles of confederation : 
 
 " XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate the in- 
 tercourse between these states and foreign dominions,' under the 
 following restrictions ; viz.: ist. No treaty, ordinance, or law shall 
 alienate the whole or part of any state, without the consent of the 
 legislature of such state. 2d. The United States shall not by 
 treaty or otherwise give a preference to the ports of one state over 
 those of another ; nor, 3d, create any monopolies or exclusive 
 companies ; nor, 4th, extend the privileges of citizenship to any 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 8$ 
 
 foreigner. And for the more convenient exercise of the powers 
 hereby and by the former articles given, the United States shall 
 have authority to constitute judicatories, whether supreme or 
 subordinate, with power to try all piracies and felonies done on 
 the high seas, and also all civil causes in which a foreign state, or 
 subject thereof, actually resident in a foreign country and not be- 
 ing British absentees, shall be one of the parties. They shall also 
 have authority to try all causes in which ambassadors shall be 
 concerned. All these trials shall be by jury and in some sea-port 
 town. All imposts levied by Congress on trade shall be confined 
 to foreign produce or foreign manufactures imported, and to for- 
 eign ships trading in our harbours, and all their absolute prohibi- 
 tions shall be confined to the same articles. All imposts and 
 confiscations shall be to the use of the state in which they shall 
 accrue, excepting in such branches as shall be assigned by any 
 state as a fund for defraying their proportion of the continental. 
 And no powers shall be exercised by Congress but such as are 
 expressly given by this and the former articles. And we hereby 
 authorize our delegates in Congress to sign and ratify an article 
 in the foregoing form and words, without any further act of this 
 state for that purpose, provided the other s.tates shall accede to 
 this proposition on their part on or before the first day of Janu- 
 ary, which will be in the year of our Lord 1790. All matters of 
 revenue being under the controul of the legislature, we recom- 
 mend to the general court of this commonwealth, to devise, as 
 early as may be, such funds arising froni such branches of foreign 
 commerce, as shall be equal to our part of the current charges of 
 the continent, and to put Congress in possession of the revenue 
 arising therefrom, with a right to collect it, during such term as 
 shall appear to be necessa:ry for the payment of the principal of 
 their debt, by the sale of the western lands."* 
 
 By such an explicit declaration of the powers given to Con 
 gress, we shall provide for all federal purposes, and shall at the 
 same time secure our rights. It is easier to amend the old con- 
 federation, defective as it has been represented, than it is to cor- 
 
 * Probably an allusion to the Phelps and Gorham purchase. — Ed. 
 
86 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 rect the new fortn. For with whatever view it was framed^ 
 truth constrains me to say, that it is insidious in its form, 
 and ruinous in its tendency. Under the pretence of differeijjt 
 Jjranches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen 
 from the same general description of citizens. The advantages 
 of a check will be lost, while we shall be continually exposed to 
 the cabals and corruption of a British election. Th^re canjjot be 
 a more eligible mode than the present, for appointing members oif 
 Congress, nor more effectual checks provided than our separate 
 state governments, nor any system so littje expensive, in case of 
 our adopting the resolve just stated, or even continuing as we 
 are. We shall in that case avoid all the inconvenience of conciir' 
 ;rent jurisdictiops, we shall avoid the expensive and useless estab- 
 Jishments of the Philadelphia proposition, we shall preserve our 
 constitution and liberty, and we shall provide for all such institu- 
 tions as will be useful. Surely then you cannot hesitate, whether 
 you will chuse freedom or servitude. The object is i>ow well de- 
 fined. By adopting the form proposed by the convention, yoij 
 will have the derision of foreigners, internal misery, and the 
 anathemas of posterity. By amending the present confederation^ 
 and granting limited powers to Congress, you secure the a,dmira- 
 tion of strangers, internal happiness, and the blessings and pros^ 
 perity of all succeeding generations. Be wise, then, and by pre- 
 serving your freedom, prove, that Heaven bestowed it not in 
 vain. Many will be the efforts to delude the convention. The 
 mode of judging is itself suspicious, as being contrary to the 
 gntient and established usage of the conimonwealth. But since 
 the mode is adopted, we trusty that the members of that venerable 
 assembly will not so much regard the greatness of their power^ 
 as the sense and interest of their constituents. And they will do 
 well to remember that even a mistake in adopting it, will be de- 
 structive, while no evils can arise from a total, and much less, 
 probably, from such a partial rejection as we have proposed. 
 
 I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous 
 subject, and have stated the facts and deductions from thep, which 
 you will verify for yourselves. Personal interest was not my ob- 
 ject, or I should have pursued a different line of conduct. Though 
 
LETTERS OF ARGIPPA. 8/ 
 
 I conceived that a man who owes allegiance to the state is bound, 
 on all important occasions, to propose such inquiries as tend to 
 promote the publick good ; yet I did not imagine it to be any 
 part of my duty to present myself to the fury of those who appear 
 to have other ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I 
 have chosen a feigned signature. At present all the reports con- 
 cerning the writer of these papers are merely conjectural. I 
 should have been ashamed of my system if it had needed such 
 feeble support as the character of individuals. It stands on the 
 firm ground of the experience of mankind. I cannot conclude 
 this long disquisition better than with a caution derived from the 
 words of inspiration — Discern the things of your peace now in the 
 days thereof, before they be hidden from your eyes. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, XI. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (TT-u-mber 398) 
 
 Tuesday, January 8, 1788. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 To THE People. 
 
 My last address contained the outlines of a system fully ade- 
 quate to all the useful purposes of the union. Its object is to 
 raise a sufficient revenue from the foreign trade, and the sale of 
 our publick lands, to satisfy all the publick exigencies, and to en- 
 courage, at the same time, our internal industry and manufactures. 
 It also secures each state in its own separate rights, while the 
 continental concerns are thrown into the general department. 
 The only deficiencies that I have been able to discover in the 
 plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great ones, are, 
 that it does not allow the interference of Congress in the domes- 
 tick concerns of the state, and that it does not render our national 
 councils so liable to foreign influence. The first of these articles 
 tends to guard us from that infinite multiplication of officers 
 which the report of the Convention of Philadelphia proposes. 
 With regard to the second, it is evidently not of much importance 
 to any foreign nation to purchase, at a very high price, a major- 
 ity of votes in an assembly, whose members are continually ex- 
 posed to a recall. But give those members a right to sit six, or 
 even two years, with such extensive powers as the new system 
 proposes, and their friendship will be well worth a purchase. 
 This is the only sense in which the Philadelphia system will ren- 
 
 (88) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 89 
 
 der us more respectable in the eyes of foreigners. In every other 
 view they lose their respect for us, as it will render us more like 
 their own degraded models. It is a maxim with them, that every 
 man has his price. If, therefore, we were to judge of what passes 
 in the hearts of the federalists when they urge us, as they con- 
 tinually do, to be like other nations, and when they assign merce- 
 nary motives to the opposers of their plan, we should conclude very 
 fairly they themselves wish to be provided for at the publick ex- 
 pense. However that may be, if we look upon the men we shall 
 find some of their leaders to have formed pretty strong attach- 
 ments to foreign nations. Whether those attachments arose from 
 their being educated under a royal government, from a former 
 unfortunate mistake in politicks, or from the agencies for foreign- 
 ers, or any other cause, is not in my province to determine. But 
 certain it is that some of the principal fomenters of this plan have 
 never shown themselves capable of that generous system of policy 
 which is founded in the affections of freemen. Power and high 
 life are their idols, and national funds are necessary to support 
 them. 
 
 Some of the principal powers of Europe have already entered 
 into treaties with us, and that some of the rest have not done it, is 
 not owing, as is falsely pretended, to the want of power in Con- 
 gress. Holland never found any difficulty of this kind from the 
 multitude of sovereignties in that country, which must all be con- 
 sulted on such an occasion. The resentment of Great Britain for 
 our victories in the late war has induced that power to restrain 
 our intercourse with their subjects. Probably an hope, the only 
 solace of the wretched, that their affairs would take a more favour- 
 able turn on this continent, has had some influence on their pro- 
 ceedings. All their restrictions have answered the end of secur- 
 ing our independence, by driving us into many valuable manu- 
 factures. Their own colonies in the mean time have languished 
 for want of an intercourse with these states. The new settlement 
 in Nova Scotia has miserably decayed, and the West India Is- 
 lands have suffered for want of our supplies, and by the loss of 
 our market. This has affected the revenue; and, however con- 
 temptuously some men may affect to speak of our trade, the sup- 
 
■go LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 p]y of six millions of people is an obJEct worth the attention of 
 any nation upon earth. Interest in such a nation as Britain wil'l 
 surmount their resentment. However their pride may be stung, 
 they will pursue after wealth. Increase of revenue to a nation 
 overwhelmed with a debt of near iwo hundred and ninety millions 
 sterling is an object to which little piques must give way; and 
 there is no doubt that their interest jconsists in securing as muda 
 of our trade as they can. 
 
 These are the topicks from which are drawn some of the most 
 plausible reasons that have been given by the federalists in favour 
 of their plan, as derived from the sentiments of foreigners. We 
 have weighed them and found them wanting- That they had not 
 themselves full confidence in their own reasons at Philadelphia is 
 evident from the method they took to bias the State Convention. 
 Messrs, Wilson and M'Kean, two Scottish names, were repeatedly 
 worsted in the argument. To make amends for their own inca- 
 pacity, the gallery was filled with a rabble,* who shouted their 
 applause, and these heroes of aristocracy were not ashamed, 
 though modesty is their national virtue, to vindicate such a vio- 
 lation of decency. Means not less criminal, but not so flagrantly 
 indecent, have been frequently mentioned among us to secure a 
 majority. But those who vote for a price can never sanctify 
 wrong, and treason will still retain its deformity. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
 * An allusion to the proceedings in the Convention of Pennsylvania Ed. 
 
AGRIPPA, XII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (liTujaaTjer 389) 
 
 Friday, January ii, 1788. 
 
 For the Massachusetts Gacette- 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 Suffer an individual to Jay before you his contemplations on 
 the great- subject that now engages your attention. To you it 
 belongs, and may Heaven direct your judgment to decide on the 
 Jiappiness of all future generations, as well as the present. 
 
 It is universally agreed that th e object of every just govern^ 
 roent is to render the ppnple h ^ j ^pBj^ bv «!priin'np thH'" p^i-^^rag ^x^A 
 possessions from wrong. To this end it is necessary that there 
 should be Jpcal laws and institutio ns;; for a peopl e inhabitin g 
 y arious cUmates will unavoidably have local habits ajid di fferenit 
 tjnodes of life, aip^d th ese must be consulted in a iakingL- ^e laws. 
 It is much easier to adapt the laws to the manners of the p eople. 
 than to make mafflOfirg opinform to laws . The idle and dissolute 
 inhabitants of the soHth require 3 different regimen from the 
 sober and active people of the north. Hence, among other reas- 
 ons, is derived the necessity of local govenjmejjts.ivho may enact, 
 repeal, or alter regulations as the circumstances of each part of 
 the empire may require. This would be the case, even if a very 
 great state was to be settled at once. But it becomes still mor e 
 needf ul when the local manners a re formed, and usages sanctified , 
 by the practice of a century and a halfc In such a case, to at- 
 tempt to reduce all to one standard is absurd in itself and cannot 
 
 (91) 
 

 92 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 be done but upon the principle of power, which debases the peo- 
 ple and renders them unhappy till all dignity of character is put 
 away. Many circumstances render us an essentially different 
 people from the inhabitants of the southern states. The unequal 
 distribution of property, the toleration of slavery, the ignorance 
 and poverty of the lower classes, the softness of the climate and 
 dissoluteness of manners, mark their character. Among us, the 
 care that is taken of education, small and nearly equal estates, 
 equality of rights, and the severity of the climate, renders the 
 people active, industrious and sober. Attention to religion and 
 good morals is a distinguishing trait in our character. JtiS-Blain, 
 tliprpfnre, that we require for our reg^ulation laws which will n ot 
 suit the circumstances of our southern brethren, and that laws 
 made for them would not apply to us . UnE^ ffiTness wou ld be 
 t he uniform pro duct of such laws; for no state can be ^E appy 
 when the lawscontradict the general habits of the peo ple, nor can 
 any state r etain its freedom while there is a power to make and 
 e nforce ._such law s. We may go further, and say, that it is mi- 
 possible for any single legislature so fully to comprehend the 
 circumstances of the different parts of a very extensive dominion 
 as to make laws adapted to those circumstances. 
 
 Hence arises in most nations of extensive territory, the necessity 
 of armies, to cure the defect of the laws. It is actually under the 
 pressure of such an absurd government, that the Spanish pro- 
 vinces have groaned for near three centuries ; and such will be 
 our misfortune and degradation, if we ever submit to have all the 
 business of the empire done by one legislature. The contrary 
 principle of local legislation by the representatives of the people, 
 who alone are to be governed by the laws, has raised us to our 
 present greatness ; and an attempt on the part of Great Britain ,to 
 invade this right, brought on the revolution, which gave us a sep- 
 arate rank among the nations. We even declared, that we would 
 not be represented in the national legislature, because one as- 
 sembly was not adequate to the purposes of internal legislation 
 and taxation. Agrippa. 
 
 {Remainder next Tuesday. '\ 
 
AGRIPPA, XIII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (N'nm'ber 400) 
 
 Tuesday, January 14, 1788. 
 
 (^Concluded from our last.') 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 Gentlemen, 
 The question then arises, what is the kind of government best 
 adapted to the object of securing our persons and possessions 
 from violence ? I answer, a Federal Republick. By this kind of 
 government each st ate reserves to itself the right of making an d 
 altering its laws for internal r egulation, alid^the rightjjfjgxecuting 
 t hose laws without any exter nal restraint, while the^general__con- 
 cerns oL.tJl£_gigE£g. ^'"^ committ ed to an assembly of dele gates , 
 e ach accountable to his own constituent s. This is the happy 
 form under which we live, and which seems to mark us out as a 
 people chosen of God. No instance can be produced of any 
 other kind of government so stable and energetick as the repub- 
 lican. The objection drawn from the Greek and Roman states 
 does not apply to the question. Republicanism appears there in 
 its most disadvantageous form. Arts and domestic employments 
 were generally committed to slaves, while war was almost the 
 only business worthy of a citizen. Hence arose their internal 
 dissensions. Still they exhibited proofs of legislative wisdom 
 and judicial integrity hardly to be found among their monarchick 
 neighbors. On the other hand we find Carthage cultivating 
 commerce, and extending her dominions for the long space of 
 seven centuries, during which term the internal tranquillity was 
 
 (93) 
 
94 LETTERS OF AGRIFPA. 
 
 never disturbed by her citizens. Her national power was so re- 
 spectable, that for a long time it was doubtful whether Carthage 
 or Rome should rule. In the form of their government they 
 bore a strong resemblance to each other. Rome might be reck- 
 oned a free state for about four hundred and fifty years. We 
 have then the true line of distinction between those two nations, 
 and a strong proof of the hardy materials which compose a re- 
 publican government. If there was no other proof, we might 
 with impartial judges risk the issue upon this alone. But our 
 proof rests not here. The . present state of Europe, and the 
 vigour and tranquillity of our own governments, after experienc- 
 ing this form for a century and an half, are decided proofs in 
 favour of those governments which encourage commerce. A 
 comparison of our own country, first with Europe and then with 
 the other parts of the world, will prove,. beyond a doubt, that the 
 greatest share of freedom is enjoyed by the citizens, so much 
 more does- commerce flourish. The reason is, that every citizen 
 has an influence in making the laws, and thus they are conformed 
 to the general interests of the state ; but in every other kind of 
 government they are frequently made in favour of a part of the 
 community at the expense of the rest. 
 
 The argument against republicks, as it is derived from the 
 Greek and Roman states, is unfair. It goes on the idea that no. 
 other government is subject to be disturbed. As well might we 
 conclude, that a limited monarchy is unstable, because that 
 under the feudal system the nobles frequently made war upon; 
 their king, and disturbed the publick peace. We find, however, 
 in practice, that limited monarchy is more friendly to commerce,; 
 because more friendly to the rights of the subject, than an abso- 
 lute government; and that it is more liable. to be disturbed tham 
 a republick, because less friendly to trade and the rights of indi- 
 viduals. There cannot, from the history of mankind, be produced, 
 an instance of rapid growth in extent, in numbers, in arts, and in. 
 trade, that will bear any comparison with our country. This is- 
 owing to what the friends of the new system, and the enemies of 
 the revolution, for I take them to be nearly the same, would, term 
 aur exiretne liberty. Already, have our ships= visited every part of 
 
LETTERS. QE iSGRIPPA. 95 
 
 the world, and brought us their commodities in greater perfec- 
 tion, and at a more moderate price, than we eyer before, experi- 
 enced. The ships of other nations crowd to; our ports, seeking' 
 an intercourse with us. All the estimates of every party make 
 the balance of trade for the present year to be largely in our 
 favour. Already have some very useful, and some elegant man- 
 ufactures got established among us, so that, our country every 
 day is becoming independent in her resources. Two-thirds of 
 the continental debt has been paid since the. war, and we are in 
 alliance with some of the most respectable powers of Europe. 
 The western lands, won from Britain by the sword, are an ample 
 fund for the principal of all our public debts ; and every new sale 
 excites that manly pride which is essential to national virtue. 
 All this happiness arises from; the freedom of our institutions and 
 the limited nature of our government; a government that is re- 
 spected from, principles of affection,, and obeyed with alacrity. 
 The sovereigns of the old world are frequently, though sur- 
 rounded with armies, treated with insult; and thedespotick mon- 
 archies of the east, are the most fluctuating, oppressive and 
 uncertain governments of any form hitherto invented. These, 
 considerations are sufficient to establish the excellence of our 
 own form, and the goodness of our prospects. 
 
 Let us now consider the probable effects of a consolidation of 
 the separate states into one mass ; for the new system extends so. 
 far. Many ingenious explanations have been given of it ; but 
 there is this defect, that they are drawn from maxims of the com- 
 mon law, while the system itself cannot be bound by any such 
 maxims. A legislative assembly has an inherent right to alter 
 the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which are 
 not particularly guarded in the constitution. Any system there- 
 fore which appoints a legislature, without any reservation of the 
 rights of individuals, surrenders all power in every branch of legis- 
 lation to the government. The universal practice of every gov- 
 ernment proves the justness of this remark;;, for in every doubtful 
 case it is an established rule to decide in. favour of authority.. 
 The new system is, therefore, in one respect at least, essentially 
 inferior to our state constitutions. There is no billi of rights, and 
 
96 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 consequently a continental law may controul any of those prin- 
 ciples, which we consider at present as sacred ; while not one of 
 those points, in which it is said that the separate governments 
 misapply their power, is guarded. Tender acts and the coinage 
 of money stand on' the same footing of a consolidation of power. 
 It is a mere fallacy, invented by the deceptive powers of Mr. 
 Wilson, that what rights are not given are reserved. The con- 
 trary has already been shewn. ■ But to put this matter of legisla- 
 tion out of all doubt, let us compare together some parts of the 
 book ; for being an independent system, this is the only way to 
 ascertain its meaning. 
 
 In article III, section 2, it is declared, that "the judicial power 
 shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this con- 
 stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or 
 which shall be made under their authority." Among the cases 
 arising under this new constitution are reckoned, " all controver- 
 sies between citizens of different states," which include all kinds 
 of civil causes between those parties. The giving Congress a 
 power to appoint courts for such a purpose is as much, there 
 being no stipulation to the contrary, giving them power to legis- 
 late for such causes, as giving them a right to raise an army, is 
 giving them a right to direct the operations of the army when 
 raised. But it is not left to implication. The last clause of article 
 I, section 8, expressly gives them power "to make all laws 
 which shall be needful and proper for carrying into execution 
 the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this consti- 
 tution in the government of the United States, or in any depart- 
 ment or officer thereof" It is, therefore, as plain as words can 
 make it, that they have a right by this proposed form to legislate 
 for all kinds of causes respecting property between citizens of 
 different states. That this power extends to all cases between 
 citizens of the same state, is evident from the sixth article, which 
 declares all continental laws and treaties to be the supreme law 
 of the land, and that all state judges are bound thereby, "anything 
 in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand- 
 ing!' If this is not binding the judges of the separate states in 
 their own office, by continental rules, it is perfect nonsense. 
 
LEfTERS OF A&RIPPA. ^7 
 
 There is then a complete consolidation of the legislative powers 
 in all cases respecting propertj>-. This power extends to all cases 
 between a state and citizens of another stafe. Hence a citizeii, 
 possessed of the notes of another state, miay bring his action, and 
 there is no limitation that the execution shall be levied on the 
 publick property of the state ; but the property of individuals is 
 liable. This is a foundation for endless confusion and discord. 
 This- right to try causes between a state and citizens of anolhtef 
 state, involves in it all criminal causes; arid a man who has acci- 
 dentally transgressed the laws of another state, must be trans^ 
 ported, with all his witnesses, to a third state, to be tried. He 
 must be ruined to prove his' innocence. These are necessary 
 parts of the new system, and it will never be complete till they 
 are reduced to practice. They effectually prove a consolidation 
 of the states, and we have before shewn the ruinous tendency of 
 such a measure. 
 
 By sect. 8 of article r. Congress are to have the unlimited right 
 to regulate commerce, external and internal, and may therefore 
 create monopolies which have been universally injurious to all 
 the subjects of the countries that have adopted them, excepting 
 the monopolists themselves. They have also the unlimited right 
 to imposts and all kinds of taxes, as well to levy as to collect 
 them. They have indeed very nearly the same powers claimed 
 formerly by the British parliament. Can we have so soon forgot 
 our glorious struggle with that power, as to think a moment of 
 surrendering it now? It makes no difference in principle whe- 
 ther the national assembly was elected for seven years or for six. 
 In both cases we should vote tO great disadvantage, and therefore 
 ought never to agree to such an' article. Let us make provision 
 for the payment of the interest of our part of the debt, and we 
 shall be fairly acquitted. Let the fund be an impost on our for^ 
 eign trade, and we shall encourage our manufactures. But if we 
 surrender the unlimited right to- regulate trade, and levy taxes, 
 imposts will oppress our foreign trade for the benefit of other 
 states, while excises and taxes will discourage our internal in- 
 dustry. The right to regulate trade-, without any limitations, 
 will, as certainly as it is grarit'ed, traiisfei' thfe trade of this state 
 
98 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 to Pennsylvania. That will be the seat of business and of wealth, 
 while the extremes of the empire will, like Ireland and Scotland, 
 be drained to fatten an overgrown capital. Under our present 
 equal advantages, the citizens of this state come in for their full 
 share of commercial profits. Surrender the rights of taxation 
 and commercial regulation, and the landed states at the south- 
 ward will all be interested in draining our resources ; for what- 
 ever can be got by impost on our trade and excises on our 
 manufactures, will be considered as so much saved to a state in- 
 habited by planters. All savings of this sort ought surely to be 
 made in favour of our own state; and we ought never to surren- 
 der the unlimited powers of revenue and trade to uncommercial 
 people. If we do, the glory of the state from that moment de- 
 parts, never to return. 
 
 The safety of our constitutional rights consists in having the 
 business of governments lodged in different departments, and in 
 having each part well defined. By this means each branch is 
 kept within the constitutional limits. Never was a fairer line of 
 distinction than what may be easily drawn between the continen- 
 tal and state governments. The latter provide for all cases, 
 whether civil or criminal, that can happen ashore, because all 
 such causes must arise within the limits of some state. Transac- 
 tions between citizens may all be fairly included in this idea, even 
 although they should arise in passing by water from one state to 
 another. But the intercourse between us and foreign nations 
 properly forms the department of Congress. They should have 
 the power of regulating trade under such limitations as should 
 render their laws equal. They should have the right of war and 
 peace, saving the equality of rights, and the territory of each 
 state. But the power of naturalization and internal regulation 
 should not be given them. To give my scheme a more system- 
 atick appearance, I have thrown it into the form of a resolve, 
 which is submitted to your wisdom for amendment, but not as 
 being perfect. 
 
 " Resolved, that the form of government proposed by the fed- 
 eral convention, lately held in Philadelphia, be rejected on the 
 part of this commonwealth; and that our delegates in Congress 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 99 
 
 are hereby authorised to propose on the part of this common- 
 wealth, and, if the other states for themselves agree thereto, to 
 sign an article of confederation, as an addition to the present 
 articles, in the form following, provided such agreement be made 
 on or before the first day of January, which will be in the year of 
 our Lord 1790; the said article shall have the same force and 
 effect as if it had been inserted in the original confederation, and 
 is to be construed consistently with the clause in the former 
 articles, which restrains the United States from exercising such 
 powers as are not expressly given. 
 
 " XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate, whe- 
 ther by treaty, ordinance or law, the intercourse between these 
 states and foreign dominions and countries, under the following 
 restrictions. No treaty, ordinance, or law shall give a preference 
 to the ports of one state over those of another ; nor 2d. impair the 
 territory or internal authority of any state ; nor 3d. create any 
 monopolies or exclusive companies; nor 4th. naturalize any for- 
 eigners. All their imposts and prohibitions shall be confined to 
 foreign produce and manufactures imported, and to foreign ships 
 trading in our harbours. All imposts and confiscations shall be 
 to the use of the state where they shall accrue, excepting only 
 such branches of impost as shall be assigned by the separate 
 states to Congress for a fund to defray the interest of their debt, 
 and their current charges. In order the more effectually to exe- 
 cute this and the former articles. Congress shall have authority 
 to appoint courts, supreme and subordinate, with power to try all 
 crimes, not relating to state securities, between any foreign state, 
 or subject of such state, actually residing in a foreign country, 
 and not being an absentee or person who has alienated himself 
 from these states on the one part, and any of the United States or 
 citizens thereof on the other part ; also all causes in which foreign 
 ambassadours or other foreign ministers resident here shall be 
 immediately concerned, respecting the jurisdiction or immunities 
 only. And the Congress shall have authority to execute the 
 judgment of such courts by their own affairs. Piracies and fel- 
 onies committed on the high seas shall also belong to the depart- 
 ment of Congress for them to define, try, and punish, in the same 
 
100 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 manner as the other causes shall be defined, tried, and deter- 
 mined. All the before-mentioned causes shall be tried by jury 
 and in some sea-port town. And it is recommended to the gen- 
 eral court at their next meeting to provide and put Congress in 
 possession of funds arising from foreign imports and ships suffi- 
 cient to defray our share of the present annual expenses of the 
 continent."* 
 
 Such a resolve, explicitly limiting the powers granted, is the 
 farthest we can proceed with safety. The scheme of accepting 
 the report of the Convention, and amending it afterwards, is 
 merely delusive. There is no intention among those who make 
 the proposition to amend it at all. Besides, if they have influence 
 enough to get it accepted in its present form, there is no proba- 
 bility that they will consent to an alteration when possessed of an 
 unlimited revenue. It is an excellence in our present confedera- 
 tion, that it is extremely difficult to alter it. An unanimous vote 
 of the states is required. But this newly proposed form is 
 founded in injustice, as it proposes that a fictitious consent of 
 only nine states shall be sufficient to establish it. Nobody can 
 suppose that the consent of a state is any thing more than a fic- 
 tion, in the view of the federalists, after the mobbish influence 
 used over the Pennsylvania convention. The two great leaders 
 of the plan, with a modesty of Scotsmen, placed a rabble in the 
 gallery to applaud their speeches, and thus supplied their want of 
 capacity in the argument. Repeatedly were Wilson and M'Kean 
 ^'orfitrd in thft nrrnrapnt h)!- thft plnin goij d^ sense of F indly and 
 ^nilie^ . But reasoning or knowledge had little to do with the 
 federal party. Votes were all they wanted, by whatever means 
 obtained. Means not less criminal have been mentioned among 
 us. But votes that are bought can never justify a treasonable 
 conspiracy. Better, far better, would it be to reject the whole, 
 and remain in possession of present advantages. The authority 
 of Congress to decide disputes between states is sufficient to pre- 
 vent their recurring to hostility: and their different situation,i 
 wants and produce is a sufficient foundation for the most friendly 
 intercourse. All the arts of delusion and legal chicanery will be 
 
 * Cf. with page 85 Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. lOI 
 
 used to elude your vigilance, and obtain a majority. But keep- 
 ing the constitution of the state and the publick interest in view, 
 will be your safety. 
 
 [We are obliged, contrary to our intention, to postpone the re- 
 mainder of Agrippa till our next.] 
 
AGRIPPA, XIV. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 Friday, January i8, 1788. 
 
 ' ( Concluded from our last.) 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 Gentlemen, | 
 To tell us Aat we ought to look beyond local interests, and 
 judge for the good of the empire, is sapping the foundation of a 
 free state. ! The first principle of a just government is, that it shall 
 operate equally. The report of the convention is extremely un- 
 equal. It takes a larger share of power from some, and from 
 others, a larger share of wealth. The Massachusetts will be 
 obliged to pay near three times their present proportion 
 towards continental charges. The proportion is now ascertained 
 by the quantity of landed property, then it will be by the number 
 of persons. After taking the whole of our standing revenue, by 
 impost and excise, we must still be held to pay a sixth part of the 
 remaining debt. It is evidently a contrivance to help the other 
 states at our expense. Let us then be upon our guard, and do 
 no more than the present confederation obliges. While we make 
 that our beacon we are safe. It was framed by men of extensive 
 knowledge and enlarged ability, at a time when some of the fram- 
 ers of the new plan were hiding in the forests to secure their 
 precious persons. It was framed by men who were always in 
 favor of a limited government, and whose endeavours Heaven has 
 crowned with success. It was framed by men whose idols were 
 
 (102) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. IO3 
 
 not power and high life, but industry and constitutional liberty, 
 and who are now in opposition to this new scheme of oppression. 
 Let us then cherish the old confederation like the apple of our eye. 
 Let us confirm it by such limited powers to Congress, and such 
 an enlarged intercourse, founded on commercial and mutual want, 
 with the other states, that our union shall outlast time itself It 
 is easier to prevent an evil than to cure it. We ought therefore 
 to be cautious of innovations. The intrigues of interested politic- 
 ians will be used to seduce even the elect. If the vote passes in 
 favour of the plan, the constitutional liberty of our country is gone 
 forever. If the plan should be rejected, we always have it in our 
 power, by a fair vote of the people at large, to extend the au- 
 thority of Congress. This ought to have been the mode pursued. 
 But our antagonists were afraid to risk it. They knew that the 
 plan would not bear examining. Hence we have seen them in- 
 sulting all who were in opposition to it, and answering argu- 
 ments only with abuse. They have threatened and they have in- 
 sulted the body of the people. But I may venture to appeal to 
 any man of unbiassed judgment, whether his feelings tell him, 
 that there is any danger at all in rejecting the plan. I ask not 
 the palsied or the jaundiced, nor men troubled with bilious or 
 nervous affections, for they can see danger in every thing. But 
 I apply to men who have no personal expectations from a change, 
 and to men in full health. The answer of all such men will be,. 
 that never was a better time for deliberation. Let us then, while 
 we have it in our power, secure the happiness and freedom of the 
 present and future ages. To accept of the report of the conven- 
 tion, under the idea that we can alter it when we please, will be 
 sporting with fire-brands, arrows and death. It is a system which 
 must have an army to support it, and there can be no redress but 
 by a civil war. If, as the federalists say, there is a necessity of 
 our receiving it, for heaven's sake let our liberties go without our 
 making a formal surrender. Let us at least have the satisfaction 
 of protesting against it, that our own hearts may not reproach us 
 for the meanness of deserting our dearest interests. 
 
 Our present system is attended with the inestimable advantage 
 of preventing unnecessary wars. Foreign influence is assuredly 
 
104 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA, 
 
 smaller in our publick pouncils, in proportion as the members 
 are subject to be recalled, /it present, their right to sit continues 
 no longer than their endeavours to secure the publick intere.s.t 
 It is therefore not an object for any foreign power to give a large 
 price for the friendship of a delegate in Congress. If we adopt 
 the new system, every member will depend upon thirty thousand 
 people, mostly scattered ovar a large extent of country, for his 
 election. Their distance from the seat of government will make 
 it extremely difficult for the electors to get inforrnation of his 
 conduct. If he is faithful to his constituents, his conduct will be 
 misrepresented, in order to defeat his influence at home. Of this 
 we have a recent instance, in the treatment of the dissenting 
 members of the late federal convention.* Their fidelity to their 
 constituents was their whole fault. We may reasonably expect 
 similar conduct to be adopted, when we shall have rendered the 
 friendship of the members valuable to foreign powers, by giving 
 them a secure seat in Congress. We shall too have all the in- 
 trigues, cabals and bribery practiced, which are usual at elect?' 
 ions in Great Britain. We shall see and lament the want of pub- 
 lick virtue ; and we shall see ourselves bought at a publick ihar- 
 ket, in order to be sold again to the highest bidder. We must 
 be involved in all the quarrels of European powers, and oppressed 
 with expense, merely for the sake of being like the nations round 
 about us. Let us then, with the spirit of freemen, reject the 
 offered system, and treat as it deserves the proposition of men 
 who have departed from their commission; and let us deliver to 
 the rising generation the liberty purchased with our blood. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
 * Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., Luther Martin, James Francis Mercer, Edmund 
 Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry. — £d. 
 
AGRIPPA,XV. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (N'lim'ber 403) 
 
 Tuesday, January 22, 1788. 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 Ge7itlemen, 
 Truly deplorable, in point of argument, must be that cause, 
 in whose defence persons of acknowledged learning and ability 
 can say nothing pertinent. When they undertake to prove that 
 the person elected is the safest person in the world to control the 
 exercise of the elective powers of his constituents, we know what 
 dependence is to be had upon their reasonings. Yet we have 
 seen attempts to shew, that the fourth section of the proposed con- 
 stitution is an additional security to our rights. It may be such 
 in the view of a Rhode Island family (I think that state is quoted) 
 who have been of some time in the minority : but it is extraordi- 
 nary that an enlightened character* in the Massachusetts [conven- 
 tion] should undertake to prove; that, from a single instance of 
 abuse in one state, another state ought to resign its liberty. Can 
 an [sic] man, in the free exercise of his reason, suppose, that he is 
 perfectly represented in the legislature, when that legislature may 
 at pleasure alter the time, manner and place of election ? By 
 altering the time they may continue a representive during his 
 whole life ; by altering the manner, they may fill up the vacancies 
 by their own votes without the consent of the people ; and by al- 
 tering the place, all the elections may be made at the seat of the 
 federal government. Of all the powers of government perhaps 
 *The speech of Caleb Strong in the State Convention, Jan. i6, 1788. — Ed. 
 
 Cos) 
 
V 
 
 I06 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 this is the most improper to be surrendered. Such an article at 
 once destroys the whole check which the constituents have upon 
 their rulers. I should be less zealous upon this subject, if the 
 power had not been often abused. The senate of Venice, the 
 regencies of Holland, and the British Parliament have all abused 
 it. The last have not yet perpetuated themselves ; but they have 
 availed themselves repeatedly of popular commotions to continue 
 in power. Even at this day we find attempts to vindicate the usur- 
 pation by which they continued themselves from three to seven 
 years. All the attempts, and many have been made, to return to 
 triennial elections, have proved abortive. These instances are 
 abundantly sufficient to shew with what jealousy this right ought 
 to be guarded. No sovereign on earth need be afraid to declare 
 his crown elective, while the possessor has the right to regulate 
 the time, manner, and place of election. 
 
 It is vain to tell us, that the proposed government guarantees , 
 
 to each state a republican form. Republicks are divided ihto~.„^^ j 
 democraticks, and aristocraticks. The establishment of an order 
 of nobles, in whom should reside all the power of the state, would 
 be an aristocratick republick. Such has been for five centuries 
 V the government of Venice, in which all the energies of govern- 
 ment, as well as of individuals, have been cramped by a distress- 
 ing jealousy that the rulers have of each other. There is nothing 
 of that generous, manly confidence that we see in the democrat- 
 ick republicks of our own country. It is a government of force, 
 attended with perpetual fear of that force. In Great Britain, since 
 the lengthening of parliaments,. all our accounts agree, that their 
 elections are a continued scene of bribery, riot and tumult ; often 
 a scene of murder. These are the consequences of choosing 
 seldom, and or extensive districts. When the term is short 
 nobody will give an high price for a seat. It is an insufficient 
 answer to these objections to say, that there is no power of gov- 
 ernment but may sometimes be applied to bad purposes. Such 
 a power is of no value unless it is applied to a bad purpose. It 
 ought always to remain with the people. The framers of our 
 state constitution were so jealous of this right, that they fixed the 
 days for election, meeting and dissolving of the legislature, and 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. IO7 
 
 of the other officers of government. In the proposed constitu- 
 tion not one of these points is guarded, though more numerous 
 and extensive powers are given them than to any state legislature 
 upon the continent. For Congress is at present possessed of the 
 direction of the national force, and most other national powers, 
 and in addition to them are to be vested with all the powers of 
 the individual states, unrestrained by any declarations of right. 
 If these things are for the security of our constitutional liberty, 
 I trust we shall soon see an attempt to prove that the government 
 by an army will be more friendly to liberty than a system founded 
 in consent, and that five states will make a majority of thirteen. 
 The powers of controuling electidns, of creating exclusive com- 
 panies in trade, of internal legislation and taxations ought, upon 
 no account, to be surrendered. I know it is a common com- 
 plaint, that Congress want more power. But where is the lim- 
 itted government that does not want it? Ambition is in a 
 governour what money is to a misar [sic] — .... he can never 
 accumulate enough. But it is as true in politicks as in morals, he 
 that is unfaithful in little, will be unfaithful also in much. He 
 who will not exercise the powers he has, will never properly use 
 more extensive powers. The framing entirely new systems, is a 
 work that requires vast attention ; and it is much easier to guard ^ 
 an old one. It is infinitely better to reject one that is unfriendly 
 to liberty, and rest for a while satisfied with a system that is in 
 some measure defective, than to set up a government unfriendly 
 to the rights of states, and to the rights of individuals — one that 
 is undefined in its powers and operations. Such is the govern- 
 ment proposed by the federal convention, and such, we trust, you 
 will have the wisdom and firmness to reject. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, XV. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (N"Taml>er 403) 
 
 Friday, January 25, 1788. 
 
 To The Massachusetts Convention, 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 That the new system, proposed for your adoption, is not 
 founded in argument, but in party spirit, is evident from the 
 whole behaviour of that party, who favour it. The following is 
 a short, but genuine specimen of their reasoning. The South 
 Carolina legislature have established an unequal representation, 
 and will not alter it : therefore Congress should be invested with 
 an unrestrained power to alter the time, manner and place of 
 electing members into that body. Directly the contrary position 
 should have been inferred. An elected assembly made an im- 
 proper use of their right to controul elections, therefore such a 
 right ought not to be lodged with them. It will be abused in ten 
 instances, for one in which it will serve any valuable purpose. It 
 is said also that the Rhode Island assembly intend to abuse their 
 power in this respect, therefore we should put Congress in a situ- 
 ation to abuse theirs. Surely this is not a kind of reasoning that, 
 in the opinion of any indifferent person, can vindicate the fourth 
 section. Yet we have heard it publickly advanced as being con- 
 clusive. 
 
 The unlimited power over trade, domestick as well as foreign, 
 is another power that will more probably be applied to a bad 
 than to a good purpose. That our trade was for the last year 
 much in favour of the commonwealth is agreed by all parties. 
 
 (108) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. IO9 
 
 The freedom that every man, whether his capital is large or 
 small, enjoys of entering into any branch that pleases him, 
 rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to com- 
 merce. It prevents that stagnation of business which generally 
 precedes publick commotions. Nothing ought to be done to 
 restrain this spirit. The unlimited power over trade, however, 
 is exceedingly apt to injure it. 
 
 In most countries of Europe, trade has been more confined by 
 exclusive charters. Exclusive companies are, in trade, pretty 
 much like an aristocracy in government, and produce nearly as 
 bad effects. An instance of it we have ourselves experienced. 
 Before^ the Revolution, we carried on no direct trade to India. 
 The goods imported from that country came to us through the 
 medium of an exclusive company. Our trade in that quarter is 
 now respectable, and we receive several kinds of their goods at 
 about half the former price. But the evil of such companies does 
 not terminate there. They always, by the greatness of their capi- 
 tal, have an undue influence on the government. 
 
 In a republick, we ought to guard, as much as possible, against 
 the predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of 
 government to protect them all. When commerce is left to take 
 its own course, the advantage of every class will be nearly equal. 
 But when exclusive privileges are given to any class, it will 
 operate to the weakening of some other class connected with 
 them. Agrifpa. 
 
 {Remainder next Tuesday") 
 
AGRIPPA, XVII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 d^Tina.'ber 404) 
 
 Tuesday, January 20, 1788. 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 Gentlemen, 
 As it is essentially necessary to the happiness of a free people, 
 that the constitution of government should be established in 
 principles of truth, I have endeavoured, in a series of papers, to 
 discuss the proposed form with that degree of freedom which be- 
 comes a faithful citizen of the commonwealth. It must be obvious 
 to the most careless observer that the friends of the new plan 
 appear to have nothing more in view than to establish it by a 
 popular current, without any regard to the truth of its principles. 
 Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly advanced 
 to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but 
 in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind. We 
 are told that a constitution is in itself a bill of rights ; that all 
 power not expressly given, is reserved ; that no powers are given 
 to the new government which are not already vested in the state 
 governments, and that it is for the security of liberty that the per- 
 sons elected should have the absolute controul over the time, 
 manner and place of election. These, and an hundred other 
 things of a like kind, though they have gained the hasty assent 
 of men, respectable for learning and ability, are false in themselves 
 and invented merely to serve a present purpose. This will, I 
 
 trust, clearly appear from the following considerations : 
 
 (no) 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. Ill 
 
 It is common to consider man at first as in a state of nature, 
 separate from all society. The only historical evidence, that the 
 human species ever actually existed in this state, is derived from 
 the book of Gen. There it is said, that Adam remained a 
 while alone. While the whole species was comprehended in his 
 person was the only instance in which this supposed state of 
 nature really existed. Ever since the completion of the first 
 pair, mankind appear as natural to associate with their own 
 species, as animals of any other kind herd together. Wherever 
 we meet with their settlements, they are found in clans. We are 
 therefore justified in saying, that a state of society is the natural 
 state of man. Wherever we find a settlement of men, we find 
 also some appearance of government. The state of government 
 is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of society. Govern- 
 ment and society appear to be co-eval. The most rude and art- 
 less form of goverment is probably the most ancient. This we 
 find to be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With 
 them the whole authority of government is vested in the whole 
 tribe. Individuals depend upon their reputation of valour and 
 wisdom to give them influence. Their government is genuinely 
 democratical. This was probably the first kind of government 
 among mankind, as we meet with no mention of any other kind, 
 till royalty was introduced in the person of Nimrod. Immedi- 
 ately after that time, the Asiatick nations seem to have departed 
 from the simple democracy, which is still retained by their 
 American brethren, and universally adopted the kingly form. 
 We do indeed meet with some vague rumors of an aristocracy 
 in India so late as the time of Alexander the Great. But such 
 stories are altogether uncertain and improbable. For in the time 
 of Abraham, who lived about sixteen hundred years before 
 Alexander, all the little nations mentioned in the Mosaick history 
 appear to be governed by kings. It does not appear from any 
 accounts of the Asiatick kingdoms that they have practised at 
 all upon the idea of a limited monarchy. The whole power of 
 society has been delegated to the kings; and though they may 
 be said to have constitutions of government, because the suc- 
 cession to the crown is limited by certain rules, yet the people 
 
112 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 are not benefitted by their constitutions, and enjoy no share of 
 civil liberty. The first attempt to reduce republicanism to a sys- 
 tem, appears to be made by Moses when he led the Israelites out 
 of Egypt. This government stood a considerable time, about 
 five centuries, till in a frenzy the people demanded a king, that 
 they might resemble the nations about them. They -were dis- 
 satisfied with their judges, and instead of changing the adminis- 
 tration, they madly changed their constitution. However they 
 might flatter themselves with the idea, that an high-spirited peo- 
 ple could get the power back again when they pleased; they 
 never did get it back, and they fared like the nations about them. 
 Their kings tyrannized over them for some centuries, till they 
 fell under a foreign yoke. This is the history of that nation. 
 With a change of names, it describes the progress of political 
 changes in other countries. The people are dazzled with the 
 splendour of distant monarchies, and a desire to share their glory 
 induces them to sacrifice their domestick happiness. 
 
 From this general view of the state of mankind it appears that 
 all the powers of government originally reside in the body of the 
 people; and that when they appoint certain persons to administer 
 the government, they delegate all the powers of government not 
 expressly reserved. Hence it appears that a constitution does 
 not in itself imply any more than a declaration of the relation 
 which the different parts of the government bear to each other, 
 but does not in any degree imply security to the rights of individ- 
 uals. This has been the uniform practice. In all doubtful cases 
 the decision is in favour of the government. It is therefore im- 
 pertinent to ask by what right government exercises powers not 
 expressly delegated. Mr. Wilson, the great oracle of federalism, 
 acknowledges, in his speech to the Philadelphians,* the truth of 
 these remarks, as they respect the state governments, but attempts 
 to set up a distinction between them and the continental govern- 
 ment. To anybody who will be at the trouble to read the new 
 system, it is evidently in the same situation as the state constitu- 
 tions now possess. It is a compact among the people for the pur- 
 
 * Delivered Oct. 6, 1787. Printed in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, p. ISS- 
 —Ed. 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. II3 
 
 poses of government, and not a compact between states. It begins 
 in the name of the people, and not of the states. 
 
 It has been shown in the course of this paper, that when peo- 
 ple institute government, they of course delegate all rights not 2 
 expressly reserved. In our state constitution the bill of rights 
 consists of thirty articles. It is evident therefore that the new 
 constitution proposes to delegate greater powers than are granted 
 to our own government, sanguine as the person was who denied 
 it. The complaints against the separate governments, even by 
 the friends of the new plan, are not that they have not power 
 enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what 
 power they have. Surely then they reason badly, when they 
 purpose to set up a government possess'd of much more exten- 
 sive powers than the present, and subject to much smaller checks. 
 
 Bills of rights, reserved by authority of the people, are, I be- 
 lieve, peculiar to America. A careful observance of the abuse 
 practised in other countries has had its just effect by inducing 
 our people to guard against them. We find the happiest conse- 
 quences to flow from it. The separate governments know their 
 powers, their objects, and operations. We are therefore not per- 
 petually tormented with new experiments. For a single instance 
 of abuse among us there are thousands in other countries. On 
 the other hand, the people know their rights, and feel happy in 
 the possession of their freedom, both civil and political. Active 
 industry is the consequence of their security, and within one year 
 the circumstances of the state and of individuals have improved 
 to a degree never before known in this commonwealth. Though 
 our bill of rights does not, perhaps, contain all the cases in which 
 power might be safely reserved, yet it affords a protection to the 
 persons and possessions of individuals not known in any foreign 
 country. In some respects the power of government is a little 
 too confined. In many other countries we find the people resist- 
 ing their governours for exercising their power in an unaccus- 
 tomed mode. But for want of a bill of rights the resistance is 
 always, by the principles of their government, a rebellion which 
 nothing but success can justify. In our constitution we have 
 aimed at delegating the necessary powers of government and 
 
114 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 confining their operation to beneficial purposes. At present we 
 appear to have come very near the truth. Let us therefore have 
 wisdom and virtue enough to preserve it inviolate. It is a stale 
 contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make 
 them sacrifice their liberty. Repentance always comes, but it 
 comes too late. Let us not flatter ourselves that we shall always 
 have good men to govern us. If we endeavour to be like other 
 nations we shall have more bad men than good ones to exercise 
 extensive powers. That circumstance alone will corrupt them. 
 While they fancy themselves the viceregents of God, they will 
 resemble him only in power, but will always depart from his 
 wisdom and goodness. Agrippa. 
 
AGRIPPA, XVIII. 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, 
 
 (N'-u.m'ber 4t06) 
 
 Tuesday, February 5, 1788. 
 
 To THE Massachusetts Convention. 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 In my last address I ascertained, from historical records, the 
 following principles : that, in the original state of government, the 
 whole power resides in the whole body of the nation, that when 
 a people appoint certain persons to govern them, they delegate 
 their whole power ; that a constitution is not in itself a bill of . 
 rights ; and that, whatever is the form of government, a bill of 
 rights is essential to the security of the persons and property of 
 the people. It is an idea favourable to the interest of mankind 
 at large, that government is founded in compact. Several instan- 
 ces may be produced of it, but none is more remarkable than our 
 own. In general, I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in 
 the reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly con- 
 fined myself to examples drawn from the history of our own 
 country, and to the Old Testament. It is in the power of every 
 reader to verify examples thus substantiated. Even in the re- 
 markable arguments on the fourth section, relative to the power 
 over election I was far from stating the worst of it, as it respects 
 the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many points, 
 but more especially for his systematick and perspicuous reason- 
 ing in his profession, has repeatedly stated to the Convention, 
 among his reasons in favour of that section, that the Rhode Island ' 
 assembly have for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their 
 
Il6 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 table for altering the manner of elections for representatives in that 
 state* He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who be- 
 lieved his argument to be a good. one. But sur&Xy a. bill lying 
 on a table can never be considered as any more than an intention 
 to pass it, and nobody pretends that it ever actually did pass. It 
 is in strictness only the intention of a part of the assembly, for 
 nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I write not with an in- 
 tention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be stated 
 fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in 
 shewing that side of the argument in favor of the proposed consti- 
 tution, but it ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere 
 verbal explanations, we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to 
 the knowledge of every one, if it does not frequently happen, 
 that a law is interpreted in practice very differently from the in- 
 tention of the legislature. Hence arises the necessity of acts to 
 amend and explain former acts. This is not an inconvenience in 
 the common and ordinary business of legislation, but is a great 
 one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the 
 whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, 
 otherwise we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctu- 
 ation of government. We should be in the same situation as 
 under absolute government, sometimes exposed to the pressure of 
 greater, and sometimes unprotected by the weaker power in the 
 sovereign. 
 
 It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the 
 people that the powers of the government should be lodged in 
 different branches. By this means publick business will go on 
 when they all agree, and stop when they disagree. The advan- 
 tage of checks in government is thus manifested where the con- 
 currence of different branches is necessary to the same act, but 
 the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in other 
 respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary 
 to suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to 
 the businsss. All human capacities are limitted to a narrow 
 space, and as no individval is capable of practising a great variety 
 of trades, no single legislature is capable of managing all the 
 
 * No record of this is given in the Debates in the Massachusetts Convention. — Ed, 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 11/ 
 
 variety of national and state concerns. Even if a legislature was 
 capable of it, the business of the judicial department must, from 
 the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence arises the necessity of 
 a division of the business into national and local. Each depart- 
 ment ought to have all the powers necessary for executing its 
 own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us from 
 any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is 
 often asked against whom in a government by representation is a 
 bill of rights to secure us ? I answer, that such a government is 
 indeed a government by ourselves ; but as a just government pro- 
 tects all alike, it is necessary that the sober and industrious part 
 of the community should be defended from the rapacity and vio- 
 lence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights, therefore, ought to 
 set forth the purposes for which the compact is made, and serves 
 to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the 
 majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor 
 Adams, in his learned defence of the American constitutions that 
 unbridled passions produce the same effect, whether in a king, 
 nobility, or a mob. The experience of all mankind has proved 
 the prevalence of a disposition to use power wantonly. It is 
 therefore as necessary to defend an individual against the majority 
 in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our state con- 
 stitution has wisely guarded this point. The present confedera- 
 tion has also done it. 
 
 I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not 
 amending the confederation, though I have weighed the argu- 
 ment with candour; I think it would be much easier to amend it 
 than the new constitution. But this is a point on which men of 
 very respectable character differ. There is another point in 
 which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution 
 would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. 
 Here the question is not so much what the amendments ought 
 to be, as in what manner they shall be made; whether they 
 shall be made as conditions of our accepting the constitution, or 
 whether we shall first accept it, and then try to amend it. I can 
 hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a question. If 
 the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands, be 
 
Il8 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction 
 remains that amendments are necessary ; the next question will 
 be, what amendments shall be made ? Here permit an individ- 
 ual, who glories in being a citizen of Massachusetts, and who is 
 anxious that her character may remain undiminished, to propose 
 such articles as appear to him necessary for preserving the rights 
 of the state. He means not to retract anything with regard to 
 the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting 
 the new one totally ; but only to make a proposition which he 
 thinks comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new 
 constitution means no more than the friends of it acknowledge, 
 they certainly can have no objection to affixing a declaration in 
 favor of the rights of states and of citizens, especially as a major- 
 ity of the states have not yet voted upon it. 
 
 " Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United 
 States be received only upon the following conditions : 
 
 " I. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or 
 manner of elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise 
 than by fining such state as shall neglect to send its representa- 
 tives or senators, a sum not exceeding the expense of supporting 
 its representatives or senators one year. 
 
 " 2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the inter- 
 course between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or 
 estates, or any excise. 
 
 " 3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a 
 state and citizens of another state, nor between citizens of differ- 
 ent states; nor to make any laws relative to the transfer of prop- 
 erty between those parties, nor any other matter which shall 
 originate in the body of any state. 
 
 "4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own 
 laws, except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be made 
 at all. 
 
 " 5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor 
 alienate the territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or 
 law of the United States shall be valid for these purposes. 
 
 "6. Each state shall have the command of its own mihtia. 
 
 "7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. II9 
 
 State, Other than garrison to guard the publick stores, without 
 the consent of such states in time of peace. 
 
 " 8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but 
 one year, and shall be chosen successively from the different 
 states, changing every year. 
 
 "9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which 
 ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, 
 to offences committed upon the high seas, to the capture of 
 prizes, and to cases in which a foreigner residing in some foreign 
 country shall be a party, and an American state or citizen shall 
 be the other party, provided no suit shall be brought upon a state 
 note. 
 
 " 10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them 
 a tender, and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, accord- 
 ing to the continental standard. 
 
 "II. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the presi- 
 dent but such as are expressly given by this constitution and not 
 excepted against by this declaration. And any officer of the 
 United States offending against an individual state shall be held 
 accountable to such state, as any other citizen would be. 
 
 " 12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt 
 [but] by authority of the state in which the debt shall be due. 
 
 " 1 3. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any 
 state of the benefit of the bill of rights established by the consti- 
 tution of the state in which he shall reside, and such bill of rights 
 shall be considered as valid in any court of the United States 
 where they shall be pleaded. 
 
 " 14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental 
 courts, the trial by jury shall be held sacred." 
 
 These at present appear to me the most important points to be 
 guarded. I have mentioned a reservation of excise to the sepa- 
 rate states, because it is necessary, that they should have some 
 way to discharge their own debts, and because it is placing them 
 in an humiliating & disgraceful situation to depute them to trans- 
 act the business of international government without the means 
 to carry it on. It is necessary also, as a check on the national 
 government, for it has hardly been known that any government 
 
I20 LETTERS OF , AGRIPPA. 
 
 having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to en- 
 gage in needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this 
 kind is therefore necessary to preserve the importance of the state 
 governments : without this the extremes of the empire will in a 
 very short time sink into the same degradation and contempt 
 with respect to the middle state as Ireland, Scotland, & Wales, 
 are in with regard to England. All the men of genius and wealth 
 will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of reve- 
 nue, and of business, which the extremes will be drained to 
 supply. 
 
 This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of 
 things. We shall, therefore, if we neglect the present opportu- 
 nity to secure ourselves, only increase the number of proofs al- 
 ready too many, that mankind are incapable of enjoying their 
 liberty. I have been the more particular in stating the amend- 
 ments to be made, because many gentlemen think it would be 
 preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I have 
 by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shown 
 several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is 
 agreed, at least professedly, on all sides, that those rights should 
 be guarded, it is among the inferior questions in what manner it 
 is done, provided it is absolutely and effectually done. For my 
 own part, I am fully of opinion that it would be best to reject 
 this plan, and pass an explicit resolve, defining the powers of 
 Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and foreign na- 
 tions, under such restrictions as shall render their regulations 
 equal in all parts of the empire. The impost, if well collected, 
 would be fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the 
 current charges of the national government. It is evidently for 
 our interest that the charges should be as small as possible. It is 
 also for our interest that the western lands should, as fast as pos- 
 sible, be applied to the purpose of paying the home debt. Inter- 
 nal taxation and that fund have already paid two- thirds of the 
 whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at the end 
 of a war. 
 
 We are now rising fast above our difficulties ; everything at 
 home has the appearance of improvement, government is well 
 
LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 121 
 
 established, manufactures increasing rapidly, and trade expand- 
 ing. Till since the peace we never sent a ship to India, and the 
 present year, it is said, sends above a dozen vessels from this state 
 only, to the countries round the Indian ocean. Vast quantities 
 of our produce are exported to those countries. It has been so 
 much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch of 
 trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The 
 manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million 
 pounds for the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamen- 
 tal fabricks are established. There is great danger of these im- 
 provements being injured unless we practice extreme caution at 
 setting out. It will always be for the interest of the southern 
 states to raise a revenue from the more commercial ones. It is 
 said that the consumer pays it. But does not a commercial state 
 consume more foreign goods than a landed one ? The people 
 are more crowded, and of consequence the land is less able to 
 support them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise 
 the money where it is. But the money is to be expended at an- 
 other place, and is therefore so much withdrawn annually from 
 our stock. This is a single instance of the difference of interest ; 
 it would be very easy to produce others. Innumerable as the 
 differences of manners, and these produce differences in the laws. 
 Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in reli- 
 gion. Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think 
 it necessary that the president should beheve that there is a God, 
 although they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew 
 the propriety of a general declaration upon that subject. But this 
 paper is already extended to so far [sic]. 
 
 Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be 
 made, was to shew how nearly those who are for admitting the 
 system with the necessary alterations, agree with those who are 
 for rejecting this system and amending the confederation. In 
 point of convenience, the confederation amended would be infin- 
 itely preferable to the proposed constitution. In amending the 
 former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no per- 
 plexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively 
 intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It 
 
122 LETTERS OF AGRIPPA. 
 
 is to be remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with elo- 
 quence, and misled by fair representations and charitable con- 
 structions, as to adopt an undefined system, there will be no say- 
 ing afterwards that you were mistaken, and wish to correct it. 
 // will then be the constitution of our country, and entitled to de- 
 fence. If Congress should chuse to avail themselves of a popu- 
 lar commotion to continue in being, as the fourth section justifies, 
 and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the only an- 
 swer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the 
 people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly crit- 
 ical. Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the 
 same resolve ought to contain the whole system of amendment. 
 If it is rejected, the resolve should contain the amendations of the 
 old system; and if accepted, it should contain the corrections of 
 the new one. Agrippa. 
 
 A writer in the Gazette of 2gth January, under the signature of Captain 
 M' Daniel, having with cimlity and apparent candour, called for an explanation 
 of what was said in one of my former papers, I have chosen to mention him with 
 respect, as the only one of my reviewers who deserves an answer. 
 
REPLIES TO THE STRICTURES 
 
 OF 
 
 A LANDHOLDER 
 
 BY 
 
 ELBRIDGE GERRY, 
 
 PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS CENTINEL 
 
 AND 
 
 THE AMERICAN HERALD, 
 
 JANUARY— April, 
 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The refusal of Gerry to sign or support the Constitution, being 
 the only northern member of the federal convention to do so, 
 made him the general target of attack by the federal writers of 
 New England. To most of these Gerry paid no attention, but 
 the charges of "A Landholder" were so positive, and so evidently 
 written by a fellow member of the federal convention, that an 
 answer was necessary. 
 
 To neither of the two pieces here printed did Gerry put his 
 name, but the subject and internal evidence are both conclusive 
 that they were written by him. Not being able to find a copy of 
 the American Herald, I have been compelled to reprint the 
 second article from the New York Journal. For more on this 
 subject see the letters of A Landholder and of Luther Martin in 
 this collection. 
 
REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER, L 
 
 THE MASSACHUSETTS CENTINEL, 
 
 (STumber 3S of "Volinne ~V"III) 
 
 Saturday, January 5, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Russell: 
 
 You are desired to inform the publick from good authority, 
 that Mr. Gerry, by giving his dissent to the proposed Consti- 
 tution, could have no motives for preserving an office, for he 
 holds none under the United States, or any of them ; that he has 
 not, as has been asserted, exchanged Continental for State Secu- 
 rities, and if he had, it would have been for his interest to have 
 supported the new system, because thereby the states are re- 
 strained from impairing the obligation of contracts, and by a 
 transfer of such securities, they may be recovered in the new 
 federal court; that he never heard, in the Convention, a motion 
 made, much less did make any, " for the redemption of the old 
 continental money;" but that he proposed the public debt should 
 be made neither better nor worse by the new system, but stand 
 precisely on the same ground by the Articles of Confederation ; 
 that had there been such a motion, he was not interested in it, as 
 he did not then, neither does he now, own the value of ten pounds 
 in continental money ; that he neither was called on for his rea- 
 sons for not signing, but stated them fully in the progress of the 
 business. His objections are chiefly contained in his letter to the 
 Legislature; that he believes his colleagues men of too much 
 honour to assert what is not truth ; that his reasons in the Con- 
 vention " were totally different from those which he published," 
 that his only motive for dissenting from the Constitution, was a 
 
 (127) 
 
128 REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 firm persuasion that it would endanger the liberties of America; 
 that if the people are of a different opinion, they have a right to 
 adopt; but he was not authorized to an act, which appeared to 
 him was a surrender of their liberties; that a representative of a 
 free state, he was bound in honour to vote according to his idea 
 of her true interest, and that he should do the same in similar 
 circumstances. 
 
 Cambridge, January 3, 1788. 
 
REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER, II. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, 
 
 (N'um'be-r 3383) 
 
 Wednesday, April 30, 1788. 
 
 From the American Herald, printed at Boston. 
 
 Mr. Greenleaf, 
 
 As the Connecticut Landholder's publications are dispersed 
 throughout the state, it will be useful for the sake of truth to 
 publish the following. 
 
 To THE Public. 
 
 An elegant writer, under the signature of "A Landholder," 
 having in a series of publications, with a modesty and delicacy 
 peculiar to himself, undertaken to instruct members of legisla- 
 tures, executives, and conventions, in their duty respecting the 
 new constitution, is, in stating facts, unfortunate, in being repeat- 
 edly detected in errors ; but his perseverance therein does honor 
 "to his magnanimity," and reminds me of Dr. Sangerado (in Gil 
 Bias) who being advised to alter his practice, as it was founded 
 on false principles and destructive to his patients, firmly deter- 
 mined to pursue it, because he had written a book in support of 
 it. Had our learned author, the modern Sangerado, confined 
 himself to facts and to reasoning on the constitution, he might 
 have continued to write without interruption from its opposers, 
 until by instructing others, he had obtained that instruction which 
 he seems to need, or a temporary relief from the inenviable mal- 
 ady, the cacoethes scribendi ; but his frequent misrepresentations 
 having exposed him to suspicions that as a disciple of Mande- 
 
 (129) 
 
130 REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 ville he was an advocate for vice, or that to correct his curiosity 
 some humourist has palmed on him a spurious history of the 
 proceedings of the federal convention, and exhibited his credulity 
 as a subject of ridicule, it is proper to set him right in facts, 
 which, in almost every instance he has mistated. 
 
 In a late address to the honorable Luther Martin, Esquire, the 
 Landholder has asserted, that Mr. Gerry " uniformly opposed Mr. 
 Martin's principles," but this is a circumstance wholly unknown 
 to Mr. Gerry, until he was informed of it by the Conneticut 
 Landholder; indeed Mr. Gerry from the first acquaintance with 
 Mr. Martin, has " uniformly had a friendship for him." 
 
 This writer has also asserted, " that the day Mr. Martin took 
 his seat in convention, without requesting information, or to be 
 let into the reasons of the adoption of what he might not ap- 
 prove, he opened against them in a speech which held during 
 two days." But the facts are, that Mr. Martin had been a consid- 
 able time in convention before he spoke; that when he entered 
 into the debates he appeared not to need " information," as he 
 was fully possessed of the subject; and that his speech, if pub- 
 lished, would do him great honor. 
 
 Another assertion of this famous writer is, that Mr. Gerty in 
 " a sarcastical reply, admired the strength of Mr. Martin's lungs, 
 and his profound knowledge in the first principles of govern- 
 ment;" that "this reply" " left him a prey to the most humiliating 
 reflections; but these did not teach him to bound his future 
 speeches by the lines of moderation ; for the very next day he ex- 
 hibited, without a blush, another specimen of eternal volubility." 
 This is so remote from the truth, that no such reply was made by 
 Mr. Gerry to Mr. Martin, or to any member of the convention ; 
 on the contrary, Mr. Martin, on the first day he spoke, about the 
 time of adjournment, signified to the convention that the heat of 
 the season, and his indisposition prevented his proceeding, and 
 the house adjourned without further debate, or a reply to Mr. 
 Martin from any member whatever. 
 
 Again, the Landholder has asserted that Mr. Martin voted " an 
 appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States 
 for the correction of all errors both in law and fact," and " agreed 
 
REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER. I3I 
 
 to the clause that declares nine states to be sufficient to put the 
 government in motion:" and in a note says, "Mr. Gerry agreed 
 with Mr. Martin on these questions." Whether there is any truth 
 in the assertions as they relate to Mr. Martin, he can best deter- 
 mine ; but as they respect Mr. Gerry, they reverse the facts ; for 
 he not only voted against the first proposition (which is not stated 
 by the Landholder, with the accuracy requisite for a writer on gov- 
 ernment) but contended for jury trials in civil cases, and declared 
 his opinion, that a federal judiciary with the powers above men- 
 tioned, would be as oppressive and dangerous, as the establish- 
 ment of a star-chamber, and as to the clause that " declares nine 
 states to be sufficient to put the government in motion," Mr. 
 Gerry was so much opposed to it, as to vote against it in the first 
 instance, and afterwards to move for a reconsideration of it. 
 
 The Landholder having in a former publication asserted " that 
 Mr. Gerry introduced a motion, respecting the redemption of old 
 continental money" and the public having been informed by a 
 paragraph in the Massachusetts Centinel, No. 32, of vol. 8, as 
 well as by the honorable Mr. Martin, that neither Mr. Gerry, or 
 any other member, had introduced such a proposition, the Land- 
 holder now says that "out of 126 days, Mr. Martin attended only 
 66," and then enquires " whether it is to be presumed that Mr. 
 Martin could have been minutely informed, of all that happened 
 in convention, and committees of convention, during the sixty 
 days of absence ?" and " Why is it that we do not see Mr. Mc- 
 Henry's verification of his assertion, who was of the committee 
 for considering a provision for the debts of the union ?" But if 
 these enquiries were intended for subterfuges, unfortunately for 
 the Landholder, they will not avail him : for, had Mr. Martin not 
 been present at the debates on this subject, the fact is, that Mr. 
 Gerry was not on a committee with Mr. McHenry, or with any 
 other person, for considering a provision for the debts of the 
 union, or any provision that related to the subject of old conti-^ 
 nental money ; neither did he make any proposition, in conven- 
 tion, committee, or on any occasion, to any member of conven- 
 vention or other person, respecting the redemption of such money; 
 and the assertions of the Landholder to the contrary, are alto- 
 gether destitute of the shadow of truth. 
 
132 REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 The Landholder addressing Mr. Martin, further says, "Your- 
 reply to my second charge against Mr. Gerry, may be soon dis- 
 missed : compare his letter to the legislature of his state, with 
 your defence, and you will find, that you have put into his mouth, 
 objections different from anything it contains, so that if your re- 
 presentation be true, his must be false." The objections referred 
 to, are those mentioned by Mr. Martin, as. being made by Mr. 
 Gerry, against the supreme power of Congress over the militia. 
 Mr. Gerry, in his letter to the legislature, states as an objection, 
 " That some of the powers of the federal legislature are ambigu- 
 ous, and others (meaning the unlimited power of Congress, to 
 keep up a standing army, in time of peace, and their entire con- 
 troul of the militia) are indefinite and dangerous." Against both 
 these did Mr. Gerry warmly contend, and why his representa- 
 tions must be false, if Mr. Martin's are true, which particularized 
 what Mr. Gerry's stated generally, can only be discovered by 
 such a profound reasoner, as the Connecticut Landholder. 
 
 The vanity of this writer, in supposing that his charges would 
 be the subject of constitutional investigation, can only be equalled 
 by his impertinence, in interfering with the politics of other states, 
 or by his ignorance, in supposing a state convention could take 
 cognizance of such matters as he calls charges, and that Mr. 
 Gerry required a formal defence, or the assistance of his col- 
 leagues, to defeat the unprovoked and libellous attacks of the 
 Landholder, or any other unprincipled revilei; 
 
 The landholder says: "That Mr. Martin thought the deputy 
 attorney- general of the United States, for the state of Maryland, 
 destined for a different character, and that inspired him with the 
 hope that he might derive from a desperate opposition, what he 
 saw no'prospect of gaining by a contrary conduct; but the land- 
 holder ventures to predict, that though Mr. Martin was to double 
 his efforts he would fail in his object." By this we may form 
 some estimate of the patriotism of the landholder, for, whilst he 
 'so readily resolves Mr. Martin's conduct into a manoeuvre for 
 office, he gives too much reason to suppose, that he himself has 
 no idea of any other motive in conducting politicks. But how 
 can the landholder ascertain, that "Mr. Martin thought" the 
 
REPLY TO A LANDHOLDER. 133 
 
 office mentioned " destined for a different character?" Was the 
 landholder present at the destination? If so, it was natural for 
 him, knowing there was a combination against Mr. Martin (how- 
 ever remote this gentleman was from discovering it) to suppose 
 his accidental opposition to the complotters, proceeded from a 
 discovery of the plot. Surely the landholder must have some 
 reason for his conjecture respecting the motives of Mr. Martin's 
 conduct, or to be subject to the charge of publishing calumny, 
 knowing it to be such. If then, this great statesman was in a 
 secret, which has been long impenetrable, he is now entitled to 
 the honor of giving the public the most important information 
 they have received, concerning the origin of the new constitution, 
 and having candidly informed them who is not, he ought to in- 
 form who is to fill that office, and all others of the new federal 
 government. It may then, in some measure be ascertained, what 
 individuals have supported the constitution on principles of pat- 
 riotism, and who under this guise have been only squabbling for 
 office. Perhaps we shall find that the landholder is to have the 
 contract for supplying the standing army under the new govern- 
 ment, and that many others, who have recurred to abuse on this 
 occasion, have some such happy prospects; indeed the land- 
 holder puts it beyond a doubt, if we can believe him, that it was 
 determined in the privy council of this federal convention, that 
 however Mr. Martin might advocate the new constitutiqn, he 
 should not have the office mentioned; for if this was not the case, 
 how can the landholder so roundly assert that Mr. Martin could 
 have no prospect by a contrary conduct of gaining the office, and 
 so remarkably sanguine is the landholder, that the members of 
 the privy council would be senators of the new Congress, in 
 which case the elections would undoubtedly be made according 
 to the conventional list of nominations, as that he ventures to 
 predict, though Mr. Martin was to double his efforts, he would 
 fail in his object. Thus whilst this blazing star of federalism is 
 taking great pains to hold up Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, as hav- 
 ing held private meetings " to aggrandize old Massachusetts and 
 the antient dominion" he has confessed enough to shew that his 
 private meetings were solely to aggrandize himself. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 A LANDHOLDER 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 OLIVER ELLSWORTH, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT 
 
 AND 
 
 THE AMERICAN MERCURY, 
 
 November, 1787— March, 1788. 
 
NOTE 
 
 The letters of a Landholder were so obviously written by a' 
 a member of the federal convention, that their authorship could 
 not long remain a secret. They were published simultaniously in 
 the Connecticut Courant at Hartford and the American Mercury 
 at Litchfield, and this so clearly indicated Oliver Ellsworth as 
 the writer that they were at once credited to his pen. 
 
 The letters had a very wide circulation, numbers being re- 
 printed as far north as New Hampshire, and as far south as 
 Maryland. They called out several replies, three of which, by 
 Gerry, Williams and Martin, are printed in this collection. 
 
 (137) 
 
A LANDHOLDER, I. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 dsTiamber 11S9) 
 
 Monday, November 5, 1787. 
 
 To THE Holders and Tillers of Land. 
 
 The writer of the following passed the first part of his life in 
 mercantile employments, and by industry and economy acquired 
 a sufficient sum on retiring from trade to purchase and stock a 
 decent plantation, on which he now lives in the state of a farmer. 
 By his present employment he is interested in the prosperity of 
 agriculture, and those who derive a support from cultivating the 
 ^rth. An acquaintance with business has freed him from many 
 prejudices and jealousies, which he sees in his neighbors, who 
 have not intermingled with mankind, nor learned by experience 
 the method of managing an extensive circulating property. Con- 
 scious of an honest intention he wishes to address his brethren 
 on some political subjects which now engage the public attention, 
 and will in the sequel greatly influence the value of landed prop- 
 erty. The new constitution for the United States is now before 
 the public, the people are to determine, and the people at large 
 generally determine right, when they have had means of inform- 
 ation. 
 
 It proves the honesty and patriotism of the gentlemen who 
 composed the general Convention, that they chose to submit their, 
 system to the people rather than the legislatures, whose decisions 
 are often influenced by men in the higher departments of govern- 
 ment, who have provided well for themselves and dread any 
 change least they should be injured by its operation. I would 
 
 (139) 
 
140 A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 not wish to exclude from a State Convention those gentlemen who 
 compose the higher branches of the assemblies in the several 
 states, but choose to see them stand on an even floor with their 
 brethren, where the artifice of a small number cannot negative a 
 vast majority of the people. 
 
 This danger was foreseen by the Federal Convention, and they 
 have wisely avoided it by appealing directly to the people. The 
 landholders and farmers are more than any other men concerned 
 in the present decision whether the proposed alteration is best 
 they are to determine; but that an alteration is necessary an 
 individual may assert. It may be assumed as a fixed truth that 
 the prosperity and riches of the farmer must depend on the pros- 
 perity, and good national regulation of trade. Artful men may 
 insinuate the contrary — tell you let trade take care of itself, and 
 excite your jealousy against the merchant because his business 
 leads him to wear a gayer coat, than your economy directs. 
 But let your own experience refute such insinuations. Your 
 property and riches depend on a ready demand and generous 
 price for the produce you can annually spare. When and where 
 do you find this ? Is it not where trade flourishes, and when the 
 merchant can freely export the produce of the country to such 
 parts of the world as will bring the richest return? When the 
 merchant doth not purchase, your produce is low, finds a dull 
 market — in vexation you call the trader a jocky, and curse the 
 men whom you ought to pity. A desire of gain is common to 
 mankind, and the general motive to business and industry. You 
 cannot expect many purchases when trade is restricted, and your 
 merchants are shut out from nine-tenths of the ports in the world. 
 While you depend on the mercy of foreign nations, you are the 
 first persons who will be humbled. Confined to a few foreign 
 ports they must sell low, or not at all ; and can you expect they 
 will greedily buy in at a high price, the very articles which they 
 .must sell under every restriction. 
 
 Every foreign prohibition on American trade is aimed in the 
 most deadly manner against the holders and tillers of the land, 
 and they are the men made poor. Your only remedy is such a 
 national government as will make the country respectable; such 
 
A LANDHOLDER. I4I 
 
 a supreme government as can boldly meet the supremacy of 
 proud and self-interested nations. The regulation of trade ever 
 was and ever will be a national matter. A single state in the 
 American union cannot direct much less control it. This must 
 be a work of the whole, and requires all the wisdom and force of 
 the continent, and untill it is eiTected our commerce may be in- 
 sulted by every overgrown merchant in Europe. Think not the 
 evil will rest on your merchants alone; it may distress them, but 
 it will destroy those who cultivate the earth. Their produce will 
 bear a low price, and require bad pay ; the laborer will not find 
 employment; the value of lands will fall, and the landholder be- 
 come poor. 
 
 While our shipping rots at home by being prohibited from 
 ports abroad, foreigners will bring you such articles and at such 
 price as they please. Even the necessary article of salt has the 
 present year, been chiefly imported in foreign bottoms, and you 
 already feel the consequence, your flax-seed in barter has not re- 
 turned you more than two-thirds of the usual quantity. From 
 this beginning learn what is to come. 
 
 Blame not our merchants, the fault is not in them but in the 
 public. A Federal , government of energy is the only means 
 which will deliver us, and now or never is your opportunity to 
 establish it, on such a basis as will preserve your liberty and 
 riches. Think not that time without your own exertions will 
 remedy the disorder. Other nations will be pleased with your 
 poverty; they know the advantage of commanding trade, and 
 carrying in their own bottoms. By these means they can gov- 
 ern prices and breed up a hardy race of seamen, to man their 
 ships of war when they wish again to conquer you by arms. It 
 is strange the holders and tillers of the land have had patience so 
 long. They are men of resolution as well as patience, and will 
 I presume be no longer deluded by British emissaries, and those 
 men who think their own offices will be hazarded by any change 
 in the constitution. Having opportunity, they will cooly demand 
 a government which can protect what they have bravely de- 
 fended in war. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
A LANDHOLDER, II. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (N^Tiinber 1190) 
 
 Monday, November 12, 1787. 
 
 To THE Holder and Tillers of Land. 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 You were told in the late war that peace and Independence 
 would reward your toil, and that riches would accompany the 
 establishment of your liberties, by opening a wider market, and 
 consequently raising the price of such commodities as America 
 produces for exportation. 
 
 Such a conclusion appeared just and natural. We had been 
 restrained by the British to trade only with themselves, who often 
 re-exported to other nations, at a high advance, the raw materials- 
 they have procured from us. This advance we designed to 
 realize, but our expectation has been disappointed. The produce 
 of the country is in general down to the old price, and bids fair 
 to fall much lower. It is time for those who till the earth in the 
 sweat of their brow to enquire the cause. And we shall find it 
 neither in the merchant or farmer, but in a bad system of policy 
 and government, or rather in having no system at all. When we 
 call ourselves an independent nation it is false, we are neither a 
 nation, nor are we independent. Like thirteen contentious neigh- 
 bors we devour and take every advantage of each other, and are 
 without that system of policy which gives safety and strength, 
 and constitutes a national structure. Once we were dependent 
 
 only on Great-Britain, now we are dependent on every petty state 
 
 (142) 
 
A LANDHOLDER. 143 
 
 in the world and on every custom house officer of foreign ports. 
 If the injured apply for redress to the assemblies of the several 
 states, it is in vain, for they are not, and cannot be known abroad. 
 If they apply to Congress, it is also vain, for however wise and 
 good that body may be, they have not power to vindicate either 
 themselves or their subjects. 
 
 Do not my countrymen fall into a passion on hearing these 
 truths, nor think your treatment unexampled. From the begin- 
 ning it hath been the case that people without policy will find 
 enough to take advantage of their weakness, and you are not the 
 first who have been devoured by their wiser neighbours, but per- 
 haps it is not too late for a remedy, we ought at least to make a 
 trial, and if we still die shall have this consolation in our last 
 hours, that we tried to live. 
 
 I can foresee that several classes of men will try to alarm your 
 fears, and however selfish their motives, we may expect that lib- 
 erty, the encroachments of power, and the inestimable privileges 
 of dear posterity will with them be fruitful topicks of argument. 
 As holy scripture is used in the exorcisms of Romish priests to 
 expel imaginary demons; so the most sacred words will be con- 
 jured together to oppose evils which have no existence in the 
 new constitution, and which no man dare attempt to carry into 
 execution, among a people of so free a spirit as the Americans. 
 The first to oppose a federal government will be the old friends 
 Great Britain, who in their hearts cursed the prosperity of your 
 arms, and have ever, since delighted in the perplexity of your 
 councils. Many of these men are still among us, and for several 
 years their hopes of a reunion with Britain have been high. 
 They rightly judge that nothing will so soon effect their wishes 
 as the deranged state we are now in, if it should continue. They 
 see that the merchant is weary of a government which cannot 
 protect his property, and that the farmer finding no benefit from 
 the revolution, begins to dread much evil; and they hope the 
 people will soon supplicate the protection of their old masters. 
 We may therefore expect that all the policy of these men will 
 center in defeating those measures which will protect the people, 
 and give system and force to American councils. I was lately 
 
144 
 
 A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 in a circle where the new constitution was discussed. All but 
 one man approved. He was full of trembling for the liberties of 
 poor America. It was strange! It was wondorous strange to 
 see his concern ! After several of his arguments had been refuted 
 by an ingenious farmer in the company, but, says he, it is against 
 the treaty of peace, we received independence from Great Britain 
 on condition of our keeping the old constitution. Here the man 
 came out ! We had beat the British with a bad frame of govern- 
 ment, and with a good one he feared we should eat them up. 
 Debtors in desperate circumstances, who have not resolution to 
 be either honest or industrious, will be the next men to take the 
 alarm. They have long been upheld by the property of their 
 creditors and the mercy of the public, and daily destroy a thous- 
 and honest men who are unsuspicious. Paper money and tender 
 acts, is the only atmosphere in which they can breath, and live. 
 This is now so generally known that by being a friend to such 
 measures a man eifectually advertises himself as a bankrupt. 
 The opposition of these we expect, but for the sake of all honest 
 and industrious debtors, we most earnestly wish the proposed 
 constitution may pass, for whatever gives a new spring to busi- 
 ness will extricate them from their difficulties. 
 
 There is another kind of people will be found in the opposition. 
 Men of much self importance and supposed skill in politics, who 
 are' not of sufficient consequence to obtain public employment, 
 but can spread jealousies in the little districts of country where 
 they are placed. These are always jealous of men in place and 
 of public measures, and aim at making themselves consequential 
 by distrusting every one in the higher offices of society. 
 
 It is a strange madness of some persons, immediately to dis- 
 trust those who are raised by the free suffi-ages of the people, to 
 sustain powers which are absolutely necessary for public safety. 
 Why were they elevated but for a general reputation of wisdom 
 and integrity ; and why should they be distru.sted, untill by ignor- 
 ance or some base action they have forfeited a right to our confi- 
 dence? 
 
 To fear a general government or energetic principles least it 
 should create tyrants, when without such a government all have 
 
A LANDHOLDER. 145 
 
 an opportunity to become tyrants and avoid punishment, is fear- 
 ing the possibihty of one act of oppression, more than the real 
 exercise of a thousand. But in the present case, men who have 
 lucrative and influential state offices, if they act from principles of 
 self-interest, will be tempted to oppose an alteration, which would 
 doubtless be beneficial to the people. To sink from a control- 
 ment of finance, or any other great department of the state, thro' 
 want of ability or opportunity to act a part in the federal system, 
 must be a terrifying consideration. Believe not those who insin- 
 uate that this is a scheme of great men to grasp more power. 
 The temptation is on the other side. Those in great offices never 
 wish to hazard their places by such a change. This is the 
 scheme of the people, and those high and worthy characters who 
 in obedience to the public voice offer the proposed amendment 
 of ouF federal constitution thus esteemed it, or they would have 
 determined state Conventions as the tribunal of ultimate decision. 
 This is the last opportunity you may have to adopt a government 
 which gives all protection to personal liberty, and at the same 
 time promises fair to afford you all the advantages of a sovereign 
 empire. While you deliberate with coolness, be not duped by 
 the artful surmises of such as from their own interest or preju- 
 dice are blind to the public good. A Landholder. 
 
A LANDHOLDER, III. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT. 
 
 (Number 1191) 
 
 Monday, NovexMber 19, 1787. 
 
 To THE Holders and Tillers of Land. 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 When we rushed to arms for preventing British usurpation, lib- 
 erty was the argument of every tongue. 
 
 This word would open all the resources of the country and 
 draw out a brigade of militia rapidly as the most decisive orders 
 of a despotic government. Liberty is a word which, according 
 as it is used, comprehends the most good and the most evil of 
 any in the world. Justly understood it is sacred next to those 
 which we appropiate in divine adoration ; but in the mouths of 
 some it means anything, which enervate a necessary government ; 
 excite a jealousy of the rulers who are our own choice, and keep 
 society in confusion for want of a power sufficiently concentered to 
 promote its good. It is not strange that the licentious should tell 
 us a government of energy is inconsistent with liberty, for being 
 inconsistent with their wishes and their vices, they would have us 
 think it contrary to human happiness. In the state this country 
 was left by the war, with want of experience in sovereignty, and 
 the feelings which the people then had ; nothing but the scene 
 we had passed thro' could give a general conviction that an in- 
 ternal government of strength is the only means of repressing ex- 
 ternal violence, and preserving the national rights of the people 
 against the injustice of their own brethren. Even the common 
 duties of humanity will gradually go out of use, when the consti- 
 
 ( 146 > 
 
A LANDHOLDER. 147 
 
 tution and laws of a country do not insure justice from the pub- 
 lic and between individuals. American experience, in our pres- 
 ent deranged state, hath again proved these great truths, which 
 have been verified in every age since men were made and be- 
 came sufficiently numerous to form into public bodies. A gov- 
 ernment capable of controling the whole, and bringing its force to 
 a point, is one of the prerequisites for national liberty. We com- 
 bine in society, with an expectation to have our persons and 
 properties defended against unreasonable exactions either at home 
 or abroad. If the public are unable to protest against the unjust 
 impositions of foreigners, in this case we do not enjoy our nat- 
 ural rights, and a weakness of government is the cause. If we 
 mean to have our natural rights and properties protected, we 
 must first create a power which is able to do it, and in our case 
 there is no want of resources, but a civil constitution which may 
 draw them out and point their force. 
 
 The present question is, shall we have such a constitution or 
 not? We allow it to be a creation of power; but power when 
 necessary for our good is as much to be desired as the food we 
 eat or the air we breathe. Some men are mightily afraid of giv- 
 ing power lest it should be improved for oppression ; this is doubt- 
 less possible, but where is the probability. The same objection 
 may be made against the constitution of every state in the union, 
 and against every possible mode of government; because a 
 power of doing good always implies a power to do evil if the 
 person or party be disposed. 
 
 The right of the legislature to ordain laws binding on the 
 people, gives them a power to make bad laws. 
 
 The right of the judge to inflict punishment, gives him both 
 power and opportunity to oppress the innocent; yet none but 
 crazy men will from thence determine that it is best to have 
 neither a legislature nor judges. 
 
 If a power to promote the best interest of the people, necessar- 
 ily implies a power to do evil, we must never expect such a con- 
 stitution in theory as will not be open in some respects to the ob- 
 jections of carping and jealous men. The new Constitution is 
 perhaps more cautiously guarded than any other in the world. 
 
148 A LANDHOLDER. 
 
 and at the same time creates a power which will be able to pro- 
 tect the subject ; yet doubtless objections may be raised, and so 
 they may against the constitution of each state in the union. In 
 Connecticut the laws are the constitution by which the people 
 are governed, and it is generally allowed to be the most free and 
 popular in the thirteen states. As this is the state in which I live 
 and write, I will instance several things which with a proper col- 
 oring and a spice of jealousy appear most dangerous to the nat- 
 ural rights of the people, yet they have never been dangerous in 
 practice, and are absolutely necessary at some times to prevent 
 much greater evil. 
 
 The right of taxation or of assessing and collecting money out of 
 the people, is one of those powers which may prove dangerous 
 in the exercise, and which by the new constitution is vested solely 
 in representatives chosen for that purpose. But by the laws of 
 Connecticut, this power called so dangerous may be exercised by 
 selectmen of each town, and this not only without their consent 
 but against their express will, where they have considered the 
 matter, and judge it improper. This power they may exercise 
 when and so often as they judge necessary ! Three justices of the 
 quorum may tax a whole county in such sums as they think 
 meet, against the express will of all the inhabitants. Here we see 
 the dangerous power of taxation vested in the justices of the 
 quorum and even in selectmen, men whom we should suppose as 
 likely to err and tyrannize as the representatives of three millions 
 of people in solemn deliberation, and amenable to the vengeance of 
 their constitutents, for every act of injustice. The same town offi- 
 cers have equal authority where personal liberty is concerned, in 
 a matter more sacred than all the property in the world, the dis- 
 posal of your children. When they judge fit, with the advice of 
 one justice of the peace, they may tear them from the parent's em- 
 brace, and place them under the absolute control of such masters 
 as they please; and if the parent's reluctance excites their resent- 
 ment,, they may place him and his property under overseers. 
 Fifty other instances fearfuU as these might be collected from the 
 laws of the state, but I will not repeat them lest my readers 
 should be alarmed where there is no danger. These regulations 
 
A LANDHOLDER. I49 
 
 ' afe doubtless best ; we have seen much good and no evil come 
 from them. 1 adduce these instances to shew, that the most free 
 constitution when made the subject of criticism may be exhibited 
 in frightful colors, and such attempts we must expect against that 
 now proposed. If, my countrymen, you wait for a constitution 
 which absolutely bars a power of doing evil, you must wait long, 
 and when obtained it will have no power of doing good. I allow 
 you are oppressed, but not from the quarter that jealous and 
 wrongheaded men would insinuate. You are oppressed by the 
 men, who to serve their own purposes would prefer the shadow 
 of government to the reality. You are oppressed for the want of 
 power which can protect commerce, encourage business, and cre- 
 ate a ready demand for the productions of your farms. You are 
 become poor ; oppression continued will make wise men mad. 
 The landholders and farniers have long borne this oppression, we 
 have been patient and groaned in secret, but can promise for our- 
 selves no longer; unless relieved, madn>ess may excite us to ac- 
 tions we now dread. A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, IV. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 2. 
 
 (NTiinber 119S) 
 
 Monday, November 26, 1787. 
 
 Remarks on the objections made by the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, to 
 the new Constitution* 
 
 To THE Landholders and Farmers. 
 
 To censure a man for an opinion in which he declares himself 
 honest, and in a matter of which all men have a right to judge, is 
 highly injurious ; at the same time, when the opinions even of 
 honorable men are submitted to the people, a tribunal before 
 which the meanest citizen hath a right to speak, they must abide 
 the consequence of public stricture. We are ignorant whether 
 the honorable gentlemen possesses state dignities or emoluments 
 which will be endangered by the new system, or hath motives of 
 personality to prejudice his mind and throw him into the oppo- 
 sition; or if it be so, do not wish to evade the objections by such 
 a charge. As a member of the General Convention, and deputy 
 from a great state, this honorable person hath a right to speak 
 and be heard. It gives pleasure to know the extent of what may 
 be objected or even surmised, by one whose situation was the 
 best to espy danger, and mark the defective parts of the constitu- 
 tion if any such there be. Mr. Gerry, tho' in the character of an 
 objector, tells us " he was fully convinced that to preserve the 
 union an efficient government was indispensibly necessary, and 
 that it would be difficult to make proper amendments to the old 
 
 * Printed in Elliot, I, 492. — Ed. 
 
 (•5°) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. IS I 
 
 articles of confederation," therefore by his own confession there was 
 an indispensible necessity of a system, in many particulars entirely 
 new. He tell, us further " that if the people reject this altogether, 
 anarchy may ensue," and what situation can be pictured more 
 awful than a total dissolution of all government? Many defects 
 in the constitution had better be risked than to fall back into that 
 state of rude violence, in which every man's hand is against his 
 neighbor, and there is no judge to decide between them, or 
 power of justice to control. But we hope to shew that there are 
 no alarming defects in the proposed structure of government, and 
 that while a public force is created, the liberties of the people 
 have every possible guard. 
 
 Several of the honourable Gentlemen's objections are expressed 
 in such vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the 
 name of insinuations, and we know not against what particular 
 parts of the system they are pointed. Others are explicit, and if 
 real deserve serious attention. His first objection is " that there 
 is no adequate provision for representation of the people." This 
 must have respect either to the number of representatives, or to 
 the manner in which they are chosen. The proper number to 
 constitute a safe representation is a matter of judgment, in which 
 honest and wise men often disagree. Were it possible for all the 
 people to convene and give their personal assent, some would 
 think this the best mode of making laws, but in the present in- 
 stance it is impracticable. In towns and smaller districts where 
 all the people may meet conveniently and without expense this is 
 doubtless preferable. The state representation is composed of 
 one or two from every town and district, which composes an as- 
 sembly not so large as to be unwieldy in acting, nor so expen- 
 sive as to burden the people. But if so numerous a representa- 
 tion were made from every part of the United States, with our 
 present population, the new Congress would consist of three 
 thousand men ; ' with the population of Great Britain, to which we 
 may arrive in half a century, of ten thousand; and with the pop- 
 ulation of France, which we shall probably equal in a century 
 and a half, of thirty thousand. 
 
 Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country 
 
152 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 in case of foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense 
 to support them would equal the whole national revenue. By 
 the proposed constitution the new Congress will consist of nearly 
 one hundred men ; when our population is equal to Great Brit- 
 ain of three hundred men, and when equal to France of nine hun- 
 dred. Plenty of Lawgivers ! why any gentlemen should wish for 
 more is not conceivable. 
 
 Considering the immense territory of America, the objection 
 with many will be on the other side ; that when the whole is 
 populated it will constitute a legislature unmanageable by its 
 numbers. Convention foreseeing this danger, have so worded 
 the article, that if the people should at any future time judge 
 necessary, they may diminish the representation. 
 
 As the state legislatures have to regulate the internal policy of 
 every town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have 
 one or two men, particularly acquainted with every small district 
 of country, its interests, parties and passions. But the federal 
 legislature can take cognizance only of national questions and in- 
 terests which in their very nature are general, and for this pur- 
 pose five or ten honest and wise men chosen from each state; 
 men who have had previous experience in state legislation, will 
 be more competent than an hundred. From an acquaintance 
 with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense 
 of the people at large, and the expense of supporting such a 
 number will be as much as we ought to incur. 
 
 If the Hon. gentleman, in saying " there is not adequate pro- 
 vision for the representation of the people, " refers to the manner 
 of choosing them, a reply to this is naturally blended with its 
 second objection, that "they would have no security for the right 
 of election." It is impossible to conceive what greater security 
 can be given, by any form of words, than we here find. 
 
 The federal representatives are to be chosen by the votes of the 
 people. Every freeman is an elector. The same qualification 
 which enables you to vote for state representatives, gives you a 
 federal voice. It is a right you cannot lose, unless you first 
 annihilate the state legislature, and declare yourself incapable of 
 electing, which is a degree of infatuation improbable as a second 
 deluge to drown the world. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. I S3 
 
 Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this 
 choice, and unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed. 
 But perhaps it may be said. Congress have a power to control 
 this formality as to the time and places of electing, and we allow 
 they have : but this objection which at first looks frightful was 
 designed as a guard to the privileges of the electors. Even state 
 assemblies may have their fits of madness and passion, this tho' 
 not probable is possible. 
 
 We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where 
 a desperate junto are governing contrary to the sense of a great 
 majority of the people. It may be the case in any other state, 
 and should it happen, that the ignorance or rashness of the state 
 assemblies, in a fit of jealousy, should deny you this sacred right, 
 the deliberate justice of the continent is enabled to interpose and 
 restore you a federal voice. This right is therefore more inviol- 
 ably guarded than it can be by the government of your state, for 
 it is guaranteed by the whole empire. Tho' out of the order in 
 which the Hon. gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to 
 notice some questions which he makes. The proposed plan 
 among others he tells us involves these questions: " Whether the 
 several state governments, shall be so altered as in effect to be 
 dissolved ? Whether in lieu of the state governments the national 
 constitution now proposed shall be substituted ?" I wish for saga- 
 city to see on what these questions are founded. No alteration 
 in the state governments is even now proposed, but they are to 
 remain identically the same that they are now. Some powers are 
 to be given into the hands of your federal representatives, but 
 these powers are all in their nature general, such as must be ex- 
 ercised by the whole or not at all, and such as are absolutely 
 necessary; or your commerce, the price of your commodities, 
 your riches and your safety, will be the sport of every foreign ad- 
 venturer. Why are we told of the dissolution of our state gov- 
 ernments, when by this plan they are indissolubly linked ? They 
 must stand or fall, live or die together. The national legislature 
 consists of two houses, a senate and house of representatives. 
 The senate is to be chosen by the assemblies of the particular 
 states ; so that if the assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves 
 
154 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 with them. The national representatives are to be chosen by the 
 same electors, and under the same qualifications, as choose the 
 state representatives ; so that if the state representation be dis- 
 solved, the national representation is gone of course. 
 
 State representation and government is the very basis of the 
 congressional power proposed. This is the most valuable link in 
 the chain of connection, and affords double security for the rights 
 of the people. Your liberties are pledged to you by your own 
 state, and by the power of the whole empire. You have a voice 
 in the government of your own state, and in the government of 
 the whole, Were not the gentleman on whom the remarks are 
 made very honorable, and by the eminence of office raised above 
 a suspicion of cunning, we should think he had, in this instance, 
 insinuated merely to alarm the fears of the people. His other 
 objections will be mentioned in some future number of the 
 
 Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, V. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT. 
 
 Monday, December 3, 1787. 
 
 Continuation of Remarks on the Hon. Elbridge Gerry's Objections 
 to the new Constitution. 
 
 To THE Landholders and Farmers. 
 
 It is unhappy both for Mr. Gerry and the public, that he was 
 not more exphcit in publishing his doubts. Certainly this must 
 have been from inattention, and not thro' any want of ability ; as 
 all his honorable friends allow him to be a politician even of met- 
 aphysical nicety. 
 
 In a question of such magnitude, every candid man will con- 
 sent to discuss objections, which are stated with perspicuity ; but to 
 follow the honorable writer into the field of conjecture, and com- 
 bat phantoms, uncertain whether or not they are the same which 
 terrified him, is a task too laborious for patience itself. Such 
 must be the writer's situation in replying to the next objection, 
 " that some of the powers of the legislature are ambiguous, and 
 others indefinite and dangerous." There are many powers given 
 to the legislature ; if any of them are dangerous, the people have 
 a right to know which they are, and how they will operate, that 
 we may guard against the evil. The charge of being ambiguous 
 and indefinite may be brought against every human composition, 
 and necessarily arises from the imperfection of language. Perhaps 
 no two men will express the same sentiment in the same manner, 
 and by the same words ; neither do they connect precisely the 
 same ideas with the same words. From hence arises an ambigu- 
 
IS6 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 ity in all language, with which the most perspicuous and precise 
 writers are in a degree chargeable. Some persons never attain to 
 the happy art of perspicuous expression, and it is equally true 
 that some persons thro' a mental defect of their own, will judge 
 the most correct and certain language of others to be indefinite 
 and ambiguous. As Mr. Gerry is the first and only man who has 
 charged the new Constitution with ambiguousness, is there not 
 room to suspect that his understanding is different from other 
 men's, and whether it be better of worse, the Landholder pre- 
 sumes not to decide. 
 
 It is an excellency of this Constitution that it is expressed with 
 brevicy, and in the plain, common language of mankind. 
 
 Had it swelled into the magnitude of a volume, there would 
 have been more room to entrap the unwary, and the people who 
 are to be its j udges would have had neither patience nor opportunity 
 to understand it. Had it been expressed in the scientific lan- 
 guage of law, or those terms of art which we often find in political 
 compositions, to the honorable gentleman it might have appeared 
 more definite and less ambiguous ; but to the great body of the 
 people altogether obscure, and to accept it they must leap into 
 the dark. 
 
 The people to whom in this case the great appeal is made, best 
 understand those compositions which are concise and in their 
 own language. Had the powers given to the legislature been 
 loaded with provisos, and such qualifications as a lawyer who is 
 so cunning as even to suspect himself, would probably have inter- 
 mingled ; there would have been much more of a deception in the 
 case. It would not be difficult to shew that every power given 
 to the legislature is necessary for national defence and justice, and 
 to protect the rights of the people who create this authority for 
 their own advantage; but to consider each one particularly would 
 exceed the limits of my design. 
 
 I shall, therefore, select two powers given them, which have 
 been more abused to oppress and enslave mankind, than all the 
 
 others with which this or any legislature on earth is cloathed 
 
 the right of taxation or of collecting money from the people; 
 and of raising and supporting armies. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 157 
 
 These are the powers which enable tyrants to scourge their 
 subjects ; and they are also the very powers by which good rulers 
 protect the people against the violence of wicked and overgrown 
 citizens, and invasion by the rest of mankind. Judge candidly 
 what a wretched figure the American empire will exhibit in the 
 eye of other nations, without a power to array and support a 
 military force for its own protection. Half a dozen regiments 
 from Canada or New-Spain, might lay whole provinces under 
 contribution, while we were disputing who has power to pay and 
 raise an army. This power is also necessary to re.strain the vio- 
 lence of seditious citizens. A concurrence of circumstances fre- 
 quently enables a few disaffected persons to make great revolu- 
 tions, unless government is vested with the most extensive powers 
 of self-defence. Had Shays, the malecontent of Massachussetts, 
 been a man of genius, fortune and address, he might have con- 
 quered that state, and by the aid of a little sedition in the other 
 states, and an army proud by victory, become the monarch and 
 tyrant of America. Fortunately he was checked; but should 
 jealousy prevent vesting these powers in the hands of men 
 chosen by yourselves, and who are under every constitutional 
 restraint, accident or design will in all probability raise up some 
 future Shays to be the tyrant of your children. 
 
 A people cannot long retain their freedom, whose government 
 is incapable of protecting them. 
 
 The power of collecting money from the people, is not to be 
 rejected because it has sometimes been oppressive. 
 
 Public credit is as necessary for the prosperity of a nation as 
 private credit is for the support and wealth of a family. 
 
 We are this day many millions poorer than we should have 
 been had a well arranged government taken place at the conclu- 
 sion of the war. All have shared in this loss, but none in so great 
 proportion as the landholders and farmers. 
 
 The public must be served in various departments. Who 
 will serve them without a meet recompense? Who will 
 go to war and pay the charges of his own warfare ? What man 
 will any longer take empty promises of reward from those, who 
 have no constitutional power to reward or means of fulfilling 
 
158 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 them ? Promises have done their utmost, more than they ever 
 did in any other age or country. The delusive bubble has broke, 
 and in breaking has beggared thousands, and left you an unpro- 
 tected people ; numerous without force, and full of resources but 
 unable to command one of them. For these purposes there 
 must be a general treasury, with a power to replenish it as often 
 as necessity requires. And where can this power be more safely 
 vested, than in the common legislature, men chosen by your- 
 selves from every part of the union, and who have the confidence 
 of their several states ; men who must share in the burdens they 
 impose on others ; men who by a seat in Congress are incapable 
 of holding any office under the states, which might prove a 
 temptation to spoil the people for increasing their own income? 
 
 We find another objection to be " that the executive is blended 
 with and will have an undue influence over the legislature.'' On 
 examination you will find this objection unfounded. The su- 
 preme executive is vested in a President of the United States; 
 every bill that hath passed the senate and representatives, must 
 be presented to the president, and if he approve it becomes law. 
 If he disapproves, but makes no return within ten days, it still 
 becomes law. If he returns the bill with his objections, the sen-* 
 ate and representatives consider it a second time, and if two- 
 thirds of them adhere to the first resolution it becomes law not- 
 withstanding the president's dissent. We allow the president 
 hath an influence, tho' strictly speaking he hath not a legislative 
 voice; and think such an influence must be salutary. In the 
 president all the executive departments meet, and he will be a 
 channel of communication between those who make and those 
 who execute the laws. Many things look fair in theory which in 
 practice are impossible. If lawmakers, in every instance, before 
 their final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute 
 them, it would prevent a thousand absurd ordinances, which are 
 solemnly made, only to be repealed, and lessen the dignity of 
 legi-'lation in the eyes of mankind. 
 
 The vice-president is not an executive officer while the presi- 
 dent is in discharge of his duty, and when he is called to preside 
 his legislative voice ceases. In no other instance is there even 
 the shadow of blending or influence between the two departments. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. IS9 
 
 We are further told " that the judicial departments, or those 
 courts of law, to be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive." 
 We allow it to be possible, but from whence arises the probability 
 of this event? State judges may be corrupt, and juries may be 
 prejudiced and ignorant, but these instances are not common; 
 and why shall we suppose they will be more frequent under a 
 national appointment and influence, when the eyes of a whole 
 empire are watching for their detection ? 
 
 Their courts are not to intermeddle with your internal policy, 
 and will have cognizance only of those subjects which are placed 
 under the control of a national legislature. It is as necessary 
 there should be courts of law and executive officers, to carry into 
 effect the laws of the nation, as that there be courts and officers to 
 execute the laws made by your state assemblies. There are many 
 reasons why their decisions ought not to be left to courts insti- 
 tuted by particular states. 
 
 A perfect uniformity must be observed thro' the whole union, 
 or jealousy and unrighteousness will take place ; and for a uni- 
 formity one judiciary must pervade the whole. The inhabitants 
 of one state will not have confidence in judges appointed by the 
 legislature of another state, in which they have no voice. Judges\ 
 who owe their appointment and support to one state, will be un- 1 
 duly influenced, and not reverence the laws of the union. It will \ 
 at any time be in the power of the smallest state, by interdicting | 
 their own judiciary, to defeat the measures, defraud the revenue, / 
 and annul the mo.st sacred laws of the wbole empire. A legisla-/ 
 tive power, without a judicial and executive under their own con- 
 trol, is in the nature of things a nullity. Congress under the old 
 confederation had power to ordain and resolve, but having no 
 judicial or executive of their own, their most solemn resolves 
 were totally disregarded. The little state of Rhode Island was 
 purposely left by Heaven to its present madness, for a general 
 conviction in the other states, that such a system as is now pro- 
 posed is our only preservation from ruin. What respect can any 
 one think would be paid to national laws, by judicial and executive 
 officers who are amenable only to the present assembly of Rhode 
 Island ? The rebellion of Shays and the present measures of 
 
l6o THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 Rhode Island ought to convince us that a national legislature, 
 judiciary and executive, must be united, or the whole is but a 
 name ; and that we must have these, or soon be hewers of wood 
 and drawers of water for all other people. 
 
 In all these matters and powers given to Congress, their ordi- 
 nances must be the supreme law of the land, or they are nothing. 
 They must have authority to enact any laws for executing their 
 own powers, or those powers will be evaded by the artful and 
 unjust, and the dishonest trader will defraud the public of its rev- 
 enue. As we have every reason to think this system was hon- 
 estly planned, we ought to hope it may be honestly and justly 
 executed. I am sensible that speculation is always liable to 
 error. If there be any capital defects in this constitution, it is 
 most probable that experience alone will discover them. Pro- 
 vision is made for an alteration if, on trial, it be found necessary. 
 
 When your children see the candor and greatness of mind, 
 with which you lay the foundation, they will be inspired with 
 equity to furnish and adorn the superstructure. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, VI. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (N"timber 1194) 
 
 Monday, December io, 1787. 
 
 He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbor Cometh and search- 
 eth him. 
 
 To THE Landholders and Farmers : 
 
 The publication of Col. Mason's* reasons for not signing the 
 new Constitution, has extorted some truths that would otherwise 
 in all probability have remained unknown to us all. His reasons, 
 like Mr. Gerry's, are most of them ex post facto, have been revised 
 in New Y — k by R. H. L.f and by him brought into their pres- 
 ent artful and insidious form. The factious spirit of R. H. L., his 
 implacable hatred to General Washington, his well-known in- 
 trigues against him in the late war, his attempts to displace him 
 and give the command of the American army to General Lee, is 
 so recent in your minds it is not necessary to repeat them. He 
 is supposed to be the author of most of the scurrility poured out 
 in the New- York papers against the new constitution. 
 
 Just at the close of the Convention, whose proceedings in gen- 
 eral were zealously supported by Mr. Mason, he moved for a 
 clause that no navigation act should ever be passed but with the 
 consent of two -thirds of both branches; J urging that a navigation 
 act might otherwise be passed excluding foreign bottoms from 
 
 « Printed in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, p. 327. 
 f Richard Henry Lee. 
 
 \ Saturday, September 15. See Papers of James Madison, III., 1593. 
 
 (161) 
 
1 62 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 carrying American produce to market, and . throw a monopoly of 
 the carrying business into the hands of the eastern states who 
 attend to navigation, and that such an exclusion of foreigners 
 would raise the freight of the produce of the southern states, and 
 for these reasons Mr. Mason would have it in the power of the 
 southern states to prevent any navigation act. This clause, as 
 unequal and partial in the extreme to the southern states, was 
 rejected; because it ought to be left on the same footing with 
 other national concerns, and because no state would have a right 
 to complain of a navigation act which should leave the carrying 
 business equally open to them all. Those who preferred cultivat- 
 ing their lands would do so ; those who chose to navigate and 
 become carriers would do that. The loss of this question deter- 
 mined Mr. Mason against the signing the doings of the conven- 
 tion, and is undoubtedly among his reasons as drawn for the 
 southern states ; but for the eastern states this reason would not 
 do.* It would convince us that Mr. Mason preferred the subjects 
 of every foreign power to the subjects of the United States who 
 live in New-England; even the British who lately ravaged Vir- 
 ginia — that Virginia, my countrymen, where your relations lav- 
 ished their blood — where your sons laid down their lives to se- 
 cure to her and us the freedom and independence in which we 
 now rejoice, and which can only be continued to us by a firm, 
 equal and effective union. But do not believe that the people of 
 Virginia are all thus selfish : No, there is a Washington, a Blair, 
 a Madison and a Lee, (not R. H. L.) and I am persuaded there is 
 a majority of liberal, just and federal men in Virginia, who, what- 
 ever their sentiments may be of the new constitution, will despise 
 the artful injustice contained in Col. Mason's reasons as published 
 in the Connecticut papers. 
 
 The President of the United States has no council, etc., says Col. 
 Mason. His proposed council f would have been expensive — 
 
 * The paragraph containing Mason's objection to the mere majority power of Con- 
 gress to regulate commerce, was included in all the southern papers, but omitted in 
 copies furnished to the papers north of Maryland. — Ed. 
 
 \ Mason proposed in the convention that the President should have a privy council 
 of six. — Ed. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 63 
 
 they must constantly attend the president, because the president 
 constantly acts. This council must have been composed of great 
 characters, who could not be kept attending without great sal- 
 aries, and if their opinions were binding on the president his re- 
 sponsibility would be destroyed — if divided, prevent vigor and 
 dispatch — if not binding, they would be no security. The states 
 who have had such councils have found them useless, and com- 
 plain of them as a dead weight. In others, as in England, the 
 supreme executive advises when and with whom he pleases ; if 
 any information is wanted, the heads of the departments who are 
 always at hand can best give it, and from the manner of their ap- 
 pointment will be trustworthy. Secrecy, vigor, dispatch and re- 
 sponsibility, require that the supreme executive should be one 
 person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to exe- 
 cute. 
 
 There is no Declaration of Rights. Bills of Rights were intro- 
 duced in England when its kings claimed all power and jurisdic- 
 tion, and were considered by them as grants to the people. They 
 are insignificant since government is considered as originating 
 from the people, and all the power government now has is a 
 grant from the people. The constitution they establish with 
 powers limited and defined,. becomes now to the legislator and 
 magistrate, what originally a bill of rights was to the people. To 
 have inserted in this constitution a bill of rights for the states, 
 would suppose them to derive and hold their rights from the fed- 
 eral government, when the reverse is the case. 
 
 There is to be no ex post facto laws. This was moved by Mr. 
 Gerry and supported by Mr. Mason,* and is exceptional only as 
 being unnecessary ; for it ought not to be presumed that gov- 
 ernment will be so tyranical, and opposed to the sense of all mod- 
 ern civilians, as to pass such laws : if they should, they would be 
 void. 
 
 The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further 
 importation of slaves for twenty odd years. But every state legis- 
 lature may restrain its own subjects; but if they should not, shall 
 
 * This is an error. It was moved by Mason and seconded by Gerry. Cf . Papers 
 ofjfames Madison, III., 1578. 
 
164 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 we refuse to confederate with them ? their consciences are their 
 own, tho' their wealth and strength are blended with ours. Mr. 
 Mason has himself about three hundred slaves, and lives in Vir- 
 ginia, where it is found by prudent management they can breed 
 and raise slaves faster than they want them for their own use, and 
 could supply the deficiency in Georgia and South Carolina ; and 
 perhaps Col. Mason may suppose it more humane to breed than 
 import slaves — those imported having been bred and born free, 
 may not so tamely bear slavery as those born slaves, and from 
 their infancy inured to it ; but his objections are not on the side 
 of freedom, nor in compassion to the human race who are slaves, 
 but that such importations render the United States weaker, 
 more vulnerable, and less capable of defence. To this I readily 
 agree, and all good men wish the entire abolition of slavery, as 
 soon as it can take place with safety to the public, and for the 
 lasting good of the present wretched race of slaves. The only 
 possible step that could be taken towards it by the convention 
 was to fix a period after which they should not be imported. 
 
 There is no declaration of any kind to^ preserve the liberty of the 
 press, etc. Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of 
 burial of the dead ; it is enough that congress have no power to 
 prohibit either, and can have no temptation. This objection is 
 answered in that the states have all the power originally, and 
 congress have only what the states grant them. 
 
 The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended 
 as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states ; 
 thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and jus- 
 tice as unattainable by a great part of the community, as in Eng- 
 land ; and enable the rich to oppress and ruin the poor. It extends 
 only to objects and cases specified, and wherein the national peace 
 or rights, or the harmony of the states is concerned, and not to 
 controversies between citizens of the same state (except where 
 they claim under grants of different states) ; and nothing hinders 
 but the supreme federal court may be held in different districts, 
 or in all the states, and that all the cases, except the few in which 
 it has original and not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first in- 
 stance be had in the state courts and those trials be final except 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 16$ 
 
 in cases of great magnitude; and the trials be by jury also in\ 
 most or all the causes which were wont to be tried by them, as I 
 congress shall provide, whose appointment is security enough for' 
 their attention to the wishes and convenience of the people. In 
 chancery courts juries are never used, nor are they proper in ad- 
 miralty courts, which proceed not by municipal laws, which they 
 may be supposed to understand, but by the civil law and law of 
 nations. 
 
 Mr. Mason deems the president and senate's power to make 
 treaties dangerous, because they become laws of the land. If the 
 president and his proposed council had this power, or the presi- 
 dent alone, as in England and other nations is the case, could the 
 danger be less ? — or is the representative branch suited to the mak- 
 ing of treaties, which are often intricate, and require much nego- 
 tiation and secrecy? The senate is objected to as having too 
 much power, and bold unfounded assertions that they will de- 
 stroy any balance in the government, and accomplish what usur- 
 pation they please upon the rights and liberties of the people ; to 
 which it may be answered, they are elective and rotative, to the 
 mass of the people ; the populace can as well balance the senator- 
 ial branch there as in the states, and much better than [in Eng- 
 land, where the lords are hereditary, and yet the commons pre- 
 serve their weight ; but the state governments on which the con- 
 stitution is built will forever be security enough to the people 
 against aristocratic usurpations : — The danger of the constitution 
 is not aristrocracy or monarchy, but anarchy. 
 
 I intreat you, my fellow citizens, to read and examine the 
 new constitution with candor — examine it for yourselves : you 
 are, most of you, as learned as the objector, and certainly as 
 able to judge of its virtues or vices as he is. To make the 
 objections the more plausible, they are called The objections of 
 the Hon. George Mason, etc. — They may possibly be his, but be 
 assured they were not those made in convention, and being 
 directly against what he there supported in one instance ought 
 to caution you against giving any credit to the rest; his violent 
 opposition to the powers given congress to regulate trade, was an 
 open decided preference of all the world to you. A man gov- 
 
1 66 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 erned by such narrow views and local prejudices, can never be 
 trusted ; and his pompous declaration in the House of Delegates 
 in Virginia that no man was more federal than himself, amounts 
 to no more than this, " Make a federal government that will se- 
 cure Virginia all her natural advantages, promote all her interests 
 regardless of every disadvantage to the other states, and I will 
 subscribe to it." 
 
 It may be asked how I came by my .information respecting 
 Col. Mason's conduct in convention, as the doors were shut ? To 
 this I answer, no delegate of the late convention will contradict 
 my assertions, as I have repeatedly heard them made by others 
 in presence of several of them, who could not deny their truth. 
 Whether the constitution in question will be adopted by the 
 United States in our day is uncertain ; but it is neither aristocracy 
 or monarchy can grow out of it, so long as the present descent of 
 landed estates last, and the mass of the people have, as at present, 
 a tolerable education; and were it ever so perfect a scheme of 
 freedom, when we become ignorant, vicious, idle, and regardless 
 of the education of our children, our liberties will be lost — we 
 shall be fitted for slavery, and it will be an easy business to reduce 
 us to obey one or more tyrants. A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, VH. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (Ntiinber 1195) 
 
 Monday, December 17, 1787. 
 
 To THE Landholders and Farmers. 
 
 I have often admired the spirit of candour, hberality, and just- 
 ice, with which the Convention began and completed the import- 
 ant object of their mission. " In all our deliberation on this 
 subject," say they, " we kept steadily in our view, that which ap- 
 " pears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the 
 " consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, 
 ''felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important 
 " consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led 
 " each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of in- 
 " ferior magnitude, than might otherwise have been expected ; 
 " and thus the Constitution which we now present, is the result of 
 " a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession, 
 " which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indis- 
 "pensible." 
 
 Let us, my fellow citizens, take up this constitution with the 
 same spirit of candour and liberality ; consider it in all its parts ; 
 consider the important advantages which may be derived from 
 it; let us obtain full information on the subject, and then weigh 
 these objections in the balance of cool impartial reason. Let us 
 see if they be not wholly groundless ; but if upon the whole they 
 appear to have some weight, let us consider well, whether they be 
 so important, that we ought on account of them to reject the 
 whole constitution. Perfection is not the lot of human institu- 
 
 (167) 
 
1 68 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 tions ; that which has the most excellencies and fewest faults, is 
 the best that we can expect. 
 
 Some very worthy persons, who have riot had great advan- 
 tages for information, have objected against that clause in the 
 constitution which provides, that no religious test shall ever be re- 
 quired as a qualification to any office or public trust under the 
 United States.* They have been afraid that this clause is unfav- 
 orable to religion. But my countrymen, the sole purpose and effect 
 of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the important 
 right of religious liberty. We are almost the only people in the 
 world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of 
 human nature. In our country eyery man has a right to worship 
 God in that way which is most agreeable to his conscience. If 
 he be a good and peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or 
 incapacities on account of his religious sentiments ; or in other 
 words, he is no subject to persecution. 
 
 But in other parts of the world, it has been, and still is, far dif- 
 ferent. Systems of religious error have been adopted, in times of 
 ignorance. It has been the interest of tyrannical kings, popes, 
 and prelates, to maintain these errors. When the clouds of ig- 
 norance began to vanish, and the people grew more enlightened, 
 there was no other way to keep them in error, but to prohibit 
 their altering their religious opinions by severe persecuting laws. 
 In this way persecution became general throughout Europe. It 
 was the universal opinion that one religion must be established 
 by law; and that all who differed in their religious opinions, 
 must suffer the vengeance of persecution. In pursuance of this 
 opinion, when popery was abolished in England, and the Church 
 of England was established in its stead, severe penalties were in- 
 flicted upon all who dissented from the established church. In 
 the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles I., the presby- 
 terians got the upper hand, and inflicted legal penalties upon all 
 who differed from them in their sentiments respecting religious 
 doctrines and discipline. When Charles II. was restored, the 
 Church of England was likewise restored, and the presbyterians 
 and other dissenters were laid under legal penalties and inca- 
 
 * See letter of William Williams in this collection. — Ed. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 169 
 
 pacities. It was in this reign, that a religious test was estab- 
 lished as a qualification for office; that is, a law was made re- 
 quiring all officers civil and military (among other things) to 
 receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the 
 usage of the Church of England, written [within ?] six months 
 after their admission to office under the penalty of 500;^ and dis- 
 ability to hold the office. And by another statute of the same 
 reign, no person was capable of being elected to any office relat- 
 ing to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within 
 a twelvemonth before, he had received the sacrament according 
 to the rites of the Church of England. The pretence for making 
 these severe laws, by which all but churchmen were made inca- 
 pable of any office civil or military, was to exclude the papists ; 
 but the real design was to exclude the protestant dissenters. 
 From this account of test-laws, there arises an unfavorable pre- 
 sumption against them. But if we consider the nature of them 
 and the effects which they are calculated to produce, we shall 
 find that they are useless, tyrannical, and peculiarly unfit for the 
 people of this country. 
 
 A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, 
 relating to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according 
 to certain rites and forms, or declaring one's belief of certain doc- 
 trines,) for the purpose of determining whether his religious 
 opinions are such, that he is admissable to a publick office. A 
 test in favour of any one denomination of Christians would be to 
 the last degree absurd in the United States. If it were in favour 
 of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalions, baptists, 
 or quakers, it would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the 
 American citizens for any publick office ; and thus degrade them 
 from the rank of freemen. There need no argument to prove that 
 the majority of our citizens would never submit to this indignity. 
 
 If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable 
 would be one, requiring all persons appointed to office to declare, 
 at the time of their admission, their belief in the being of a God, 
 and in the divine authority of the scriptures. In favour of such a 
 test, it may be said, that one who believes these great truths, will 
 not be so likely to violate his obligations to his country, as one 
 
170 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 who disbelieves them; we may have greater confidence in his 
 integrity. But I answer: His making a declaration of such a 
 belief is no security at all. For suppose him to be an unprin- 
 cipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God ; 
 and to be governed merely by selfish motives ; how easy is it for 
 him to dissemble ! how easy is it for him to make a public decla- 
 ration of his belief in the creed which the law prescribes ; and ex- 
 cuse himself by calling it a mere formality. This is the case 
 with the test-laws and creeds in England. The most abandoned 
 characters partake of the sacrament, in order to qualify them- 
 selves for public employments. The clergy are obliged by law to 
 administer the ordinance unto them, and thus prostitute the most 
 sacred office of religion, for it is a civil right in the party to re- 
 ceive the sacrament. In that country, subscribing to the thirty- 
 nine articles is a test for administration into holy orders. And it 
 is a fact, that many of the clergy do this, when at the same time 
 they totally disbelieve several of the doctrines contained in them. 
 In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual : they are no security at 
 all ; because men of loose principles will, by an external compli- 
 ance, evade them. If they exclude any persons, it will be honest 
 men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury, than act 
 contrary to the dictates of their consciences. If we mean to have 
 those appointed to public offices, who are sincere friends to re- 
 ligion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to choose 
 such characters ; and not rely upon such cob- web barriers as test- 
 laws are. 
 
 But to come to the true principle by which this question ought 
 to be determined : The business of a civil government is to pro- 
 tect the citizen in his rights, to defend the community from hos- 
 tile powers, and to promote the general welfare. Civil govern- 
 ment has no business to meddle with the private opinions of 
 the people. If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am account- 
 able, not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I 
 embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme being. 
 If such had been the universal sentiments of mankind, and they 
 had acted accordingly, persecution, the bane of truth and nurse 
 of error, with her bloody axe and flaming hand, would never 
 have turned so great a part of the world into a field of blood. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. I/I 
 
 But while I assert the rights of religious liberty, I would not 
 deny that the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere 
 in matters of religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish 
 gross immoralities and impieties ; because the open practice of 
 these is of evil example and detriment. For this reason, I 
 heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness, profane swear- 
 ing, blasphemy, and professed atheism. But in this state, we 
 have never thought it expedient to adopt a test-law ; and yet I 
 sincerely believe we have as great a proportion of religion and 
 morality, as they have in England, where every person who holds 
 a public office, must either be a saint by law, or a hypocrite by 
 practice. A test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the off- 
 spring of error and the spirit of persecution. Legislatures have 
 no right to set up an inquisition, and examine into the private 
 opinions of men. Test-laws are useless and ineffectual, unjust 
 and tyrannical ; therefore the Convention have done wisely in 
 excluding this engine of persecution, and providing that no re- 
 ligious test shall ever be required. A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, VHI. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT. 
 
 (Nuraber 1196) 
 
 Monday, December 24, 1787. 
 
 To THE Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esquire. 
 Sir, 
 
 When a man in public life first deviates from the line of truth 
 and rectitude, an uncommon degree of art and attention becomes 
 necessary to secure him from detection. Duplicity of conduct in 
 him requires more than double caution, a caution which his 
 former habits of simplicity have never furnished him the means 
 of calculating ; and his first leap into the region of treachery and 
 falsehood is often as fatal to himself as it was designed to be to 
 his country. Whether you and Mr. Mason may be ranked in 
 this class of transgressors I pretend not to determine. Certain it 
 is, that both your management and his for a short time before 
 and after the rising of the foederal convention impress us with a 
 favorable opinion, that you are great novices in the arts of dis- 
 simulation. A small degree of forethought would have taught 
 you both a much more successful method of directing the rage 
 of resentment which you caught at the close of the business at 
 Philadelphia, than the one you took. You ought to have con- 
 sidered that you reside in regions very distant from each other, 
 where different parts were to be acted, and then made your cast 
 accordingly. 
 
 Mr. Mason was certainly wrong in telling the world that he 
 acted a double part — he ought not to have published two setts of 
 reasons for his dissent to the constitution. His New England 
 
 ('72) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 173 
 
 reasons would have come better from you. He ought to have 
 contented himself with haranguing in the southern states, that it 
 was too popular, and was calculated too much for the advantage 
 of the eastern states. At the same time you might have come 
 on, and in the Coffee-House at New York you might have found 
 an excellent sett of objections ready made to your hand, a sett 
 that with very little alteration would have exactly suited the lati- 
 tude of New England, the whole of which district ought most 
 clearly to have been submitted to your protection and patronage. 
 A Lamb, a Willet, a Smith, a Clinton, a Yates,* or any other 
 gentleman whose salary is paid by the state impost, as they had 
 six months the start of you in considering the subject, would 
 have furnished you with a good discourse upon the " liberty of 
 the press," the " bill of rights," the " blending of the executive and 
 legislative," " internal taxation," or any other topic which you 
 did not happen to think of while in convention. 
 
 It is evident that this mode of proceeding would have been 
 well calculated for the security of Mr. Mason ; he there might 
 have vented his antient enmity against the independence of 
 America, and his sore mortification for the loss of his favorite 
 motion respecting the navigation act, and all under the mask of 
 sentiments, which with a proper caution in expressing them, 
 might have gained many adherents in his own state. But, 
 although Mr. Mason's conduct might have been easily guarded 
 in this particular, your character would not have been entirely 
 safe even with the precaution above mentioned. Your policy, 
 Sir, ought to have led you one step farther back. You have been 
 so precipitate and unwary in your proceedings, that it will be im- 
 possible to set you right, even in idea, without recurring to 
 previous transactions and recalling to your view the whole his- 
 tory of your conduct in the convention, as well as the subsequent 
 display of patriotism contained in your publication. I undertake 
 this business, not that I think it possible to help you out of your 
 present embarassments ; but, as those transactions have evidently 
 slipt your memory, the recollection of the blunder into which 
 
 *John Lamb, Marinus Willetts, Melancthon Smith, George Clinton and Robert 
 or Abraham Yates, the principal anti-federalists of New York. — Ed. 
 
174 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 your inexperience has betrayed you, may'be of eminent service 
 in forming future schemes of popularity, should the public ever 
 give you another opportunity to traduce and deceive them. 
 
 You will doubtless recollect the following state of facts — if you 
 do not, every member of the convention will attest them — that 
 almost the whole time during the setting of the convention, and 
 until the constitution had received its present form, no man was 
 more plausible and conciliating upon every subject than Mr. 
 Gerr>- — he was willing to sacrifice every private feeling and opin- 
 ion — to concede every state interest that should be in the least 
 incompatible with the most substantial and permanent system 
 of general government — that mutual concession and unanimity 
 were the whole burden of his song ; and although he originated 
 no idea himself, yet there was nothing in the system as it now 
 stands to which he had the least objection — indeed, Mr. Gerry's 
 conduct was agreeably surprising to all his acquaintance, and 
 very unlike that turbulent obstinacy of spirit which they had 
 formerly affixed to his character. Thus stood Mr. Gerry, till 
 toward the close of the business, he introduced a motion respect- 
 ing the redemption of the old Continental Money — that it should 
 be placed upon a footing with other liquidated securities of the 
 Uuited States.* As Mr. Gerry was supposed to be possessed of 
 large quantities of this species of paper, his motion appeared to be 
 founded in such barefaced selfishness and injustice, that it at once 
 accounted for all his former plausibility and concession, while the 
 rejection of it by the convention inspired its author with the ut- 
 most rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system he had 
 formerly praised. His resentment could no more than embarrass 
 and delay the completion of the business for a few days ; when he 
 refused signing the constitution and was called upon for his reas- 
 ons. These reasons were committed to writing by one of his 
 colleagues and likewise by the Secretary, as Mr. Gerry delivered 
 them.f These reasons were totally different from those which 
 he has published, neither was a single objection which is con- 
 
 * See counter-statements of Gerry and Martin in their answers. — Ed. 
 fCf. Papers of James Madison, III, 1595. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 75 
 
 tained in his letter to the legislature of Massachusetts ever 
 offered by him in convention. 
 
 Now, Mr. Gerry, as this is generally known to be the state of 
 facts, and as neither the reasons which you publish nor those re- 
 tained on the Secretary's files can be supposed to have the least 
 affinity to truth, or to contain the real motives which induced 
 you to withold your name from the constitution, it appears to me 
 that your plan was not judiciously contrived. When we act 
 without principle, we ought to be prepared against embarrass- 
 ments. You might have expected some difficulties in realizing 
 your continental money; indeed the chance was rather against 
 your motion, even in the most artful shape in which it could have 
 been proposed. An experienced hand would therefore have laid 
 the whole plan beforehand, and have guarded against a disap- 
 pointment. You should have begun the business with doubts, 
 and expressed your sentiments with great ambiguity upon every 
 subject as it passed. This method would have secured you 
 many advantages. Your doubts and ambiguities, if artfully man- 
 aged, might have passed, like those of the Delphic Oracle, for 
 wisdom and deliberation ; and at the close of the business you 
 might have acted either for or against the constitution, according 
 to the success of your motion, without appearing dishonest or in- 
 consistent with yourself One farther precaution would have 
 brought you off clear. 
 
 Instead of waiting till the convention rose, before you con- 
 sulted your friends at New York, you ought to have applied 
 to them at an earlier period, to know what objections you should 
 make. They could have instructed you as well in August as 
 October. 
 
 With these advantages you might have past for a complete 
 politician, and your duplicity might never have been detected. 
 The enemies of America have always been extremely unfortu- 
 nate in concerting their measures. They haye generally be- 
 trayed great ignorance of the true spirit and feeling of the coun- 
 try, and they have failed to act in concert with each other. This 
 is uniformly conspicuous, from the first Bute Parliament in Lon- 
 don to the last Shays Parliament at Pelham. 
 
176 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 The conduct of the enemies of the new constitution compares 
 with that of the other enemies above mentioned only in two par- 
 ticulars, its object and its tendency. 
 
 Its object was self interest built on the ruins of the country, 
 and its tendency is the disgrace of its authors and the final pros- 
 perity of the same country they meant to depress. Whether the 
 constitution will be adopted at the first trial in the conventions 
 of nine states is at present doubtful. It is certain, however, that 
 its enemies have great difficulties to encounter arising from their 
 disunion : in the different states where the opposition rages the 
 most, their principles are totally opposite to each other, and their 
 objections discordant and irreconcilable, so that no regular sys- 
 tem can be formed among you, and you will betray each other's 
 motives. 
 
 In Massachusetts the opposition began with you, and from 
 motives most pitifully selfish and despicable, you addressed your- 
 self to the feelings of the Shays faction, and that faction will be 
 your only support. In New York the opposition is not to this 
 constitution in particular, but to the federal impost, it is con- 
 fined wholly to salary-men and their connections, men whose sal- 
 ary is paid by the state impost. This class of citizens are en- 
 deavoring to convince the ignorant part of the community that 
 an annual income of fifty thousand pounds, extorted from the 
 citizens of Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, is a great 
 blessing to the state of New York. And although the regula- 
 lation of trade and other advantages of a federal government 
 would secure more than five times that sum to the people of that 
 state, yet, as this would not come through the same hands, these 
 men find fault with the constitution. In Pennsylvania the old 
 quarrel respecting their state constitution has thrown the state 
 into parties for a number of years. One of these parties hap- 
 pened to declare for the new federal constitution, and this was 
 a sufficient motive for the other to oppose it ; the dispute there is 
 not upon the merits of the subject, but it is their old warfare car- 
 ried on with different weapons, and it was an even chance that 
 the parties had taken different sides from what they have taken, 
 for there is no doubt but either party would sacrifice the whole 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 177 
 
 country to the destruction of their enemies. In Virginia the op- 
 position wholly originated in two principles; the madness of 
 Mason, and the enemity of the Lee faction to General Washing- 
 ton. Had the General not attended the convention nor given his 
 sentiments respecting the constitution, the Lee party would un- 
 doubtedly have supported it, and Col. Mason would have vented 
 his rage to his own negroes and to the winds. In Connecticut, 
 our wrongheads are few in number and feeble in their influence. 
 The opposition here is not one-half so great to the federal gov- 
 ernment as it was three years ago to the federal impost, and the 
 faction, such as it is, is from the same blindfold party. 
 
 I thought it my duty to give you these articles of information, 
 for the reasons above mentioned. Wishing you more caution 
 and better success in your future manoeuvers, I have the honor 
 to be. Sir, with great respect, your very humble servant. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, IX. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (NiiinTaer 1197) 
 
 Monday, December 31, 1787. 
 
 To THE Hon. Gentlemen chosen to serve in the State Con- 
 vention.* 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 When the deputies of a free people are met to dehberate on a 
 constitution for their country; they must find themselves in a 
 solemn situation. Few persons realize the greatness of this busi- 
 ness, and none can certainly determine how it will terminate. A 
 love of liberty in which we have all been educated, and which 
 your country expects on you to preserve sacred, will doubtless 
 make you careful not to lay such foundations as will terminate 
 in despotism. Oppression and a loss of liberty arise from very 
 different causes, and which at first blush appear totally different 
 from another. 
 
 If you had only to guard against vesting an undue power in 
 certain great officers of state your work would be comparatively 
 easy. This some times occasions a loss of liberty, but the 
 history of nations teacheth us that for one instance from this 
 cause, there are ten from the contrary, a want of necessary power 
 in some public department to protect and to preserve the true 
 interests of the people. America is at this moment in ten -fold 
 greater danger of slavery than ever she was from the coun- 
 cils of a British monarchy, or the triumph of British arms. She 
 
 *The Convention of Connecticut, which was to meet Jan. 4. — Ed 
 
 (178) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 79 
 
 is in danger from herself and her own citizens, not from giving 
 too much, but from denying all power to her rulers — not from a 
 constitution on despotic principles, but from having no constitu- 
 tion at all. Should this great effort to organize the empire prove 
 abortive, heaven only knows the situation in which we shall find 
 ourselves ; but there is reason to fear it will be troublesome enough. 
 It is awful to meet the passions of a people who not only believe 
 but feel themselves uncontrouled— who not finding from govern- 
 ment the expected protection of their interests, tho' otherwise 
 honest, become desperate, each man determining to share by the 
 spoils of anarchy, what he would wish to acquire by industry un- 
 der an efficient national protection. It becomes the deputies of 
 the people to consider what will be the consequence of a miscar- 
 riage in this business. Ardent expectation is waiting for its 
 issue — all allow something is necessary — thousands of sufferers 
 have stifled their rights in reverence to the public effort — the in- 
 dustrious classes of men are waiting with patience for better 
 times, and should that be rejected on which they make depend- 
 ance, will not the public convulsion be great ? Or if the civil 
 state should survive the first effects of disappointment, what will 
 be the consequences of slower operations? The men who have 
 done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and gloom- 
 ily determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the 
 deluded — the men who oppose, tho' they may claim a temporary 
 triumph, will find themselves totally unable to propose, and much 
 less to adopt a better system; the narrowness of policy that they 
 have pursued will instantly appear more ridiculous than at pres- 
 ent, and the triumph will spoil that importance, which nature de- 
 signed them to receive not by succeeding, but by impeding 
 national councils. These men cannot, therefore, be the saviours 
 of their country. While those who have been foremost in the 
 political contention disappear either thro' despondence or neglect, 
 every man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand 
 will be against his neighbor — industry will cease — the states will 
 be filled with jealousy — some opposing and others endeavoring 
 to retaliate — a thousand existing factions, and acts of public in- 
 justice, thro' the temporary influence of parties, will prepare the 
 
l80 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 way for chance to erect a government, which might now be es- 
 tablished by dehberate wisdom. When government thus arises, 
 it carries an iron hand. 
 
 Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient prin- 
 ciples, there needs but some daring genius to step forth, and 
 impose an authority which future deliberation never can correct. 
 Anarchy, or a want of such government as can protect the inter- 
 ests of the subjects against foreign and domestic injustice, is the 
 worst of all conditions. It is a condition which mankind will 
 not long endure. To avoid its distress they will resort to any 
 standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a 
 messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people. We must 
 not depend too much on the enlightened state of the country; in 
 deliberation this may preserve us, but when deliberation proves 
 abortive, we are immediately to calculate on other principles, and 
 enquire to what may the passions of men lead them, when they 
 have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience, and been foiled 
 in every measure, by a set of men who think their emoluments 
 more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards 
 the national good. 
 
 Politics ought to be free from passion — we ought to have 
 patience for a certain time with those who oppose a federal sys- 
 tem. But have they not been indulged until the state is on the 
 brink of ruin, and they appear stubborn in error ? Have they 
 not been our scourge and the perplexers of our councils for 
 many years ? Is it not thro' their policy that the state of New 
 York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the 
 citizens of Connecticut? Is it not by their means that our for- 
 eign trade is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just 
 price for his commodities ? The enlightened part of the people 
 have long seen their measures to be destructive, and it is only 
 the ignorant and jealous who give them support. The men who 
 oppose this constitution are the same who have been unfederal 
 from the beginning. They were as unfriendly to the old confed- 
 ation as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more pa- 
 tience because it was wholly inefficacious. They talk of amend- 
 ments — of dangerous articles which must be corrected — that 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. l8l 
 
 they will heartily join in a safe plan of federal government ; 
 but when we look on their past conduct can we think them sin- 
 cere? Doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and by this 
 carry their own measures ; but the artifice must not succeed. 
 The people are now ripe for a government which will do justice 
 to their interests, and if the honourable convention deny them, 
 they will despair of help. They have shewn a noble spirit in ap- 
 pointing their first citizens for this business — when convened 
 you will constitute the most august assembly that were ever col- 
 lected in the State, and your duty is the greatest that can be ex- 
 pected from men, the salvation of your country. If coolness and 
 magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little objec- 
 tions will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your 
 political wisdom than they were by the victory of your arms. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, X. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 (NiamTDer 1016) 
 
 Friday, February 29, 1788. 
 
 For the Maryland Journal, etc. 
 
 To THE Honourable Luther Martin, Esq,* 
 
 Sir, 
 I have just met with your performance in favour of the Hon- 
 ourable Mr. Gerry, pubhshed in the Maryland Journal of the i8th 
 January, 1788. As the Public may be ignorant of the Sacrifice 
 you have made of your resentments on this occasion, you will 
 excuse me for communicating what your fextreme modesty must 
 have induced you to conceal. You, no doubt, remember that 
 you and Mr. Gerry never voted alike in Convention, except in 
 the instances I shall hereafter enumerate. He uniformly opposed 
 your principles, and so far did you carry your abhorrence of his 
 politics, as to inform certain members to be on their guard 
 against his wiles, so that, he and Mr. Mason held private meet- 
 ings, where plans were concerted " to aggrandise, at the expence 
 of the small States, Old Massachusetts and the Ancient Domin- 
 ion." After having thus opposed him and accused him, to ap- 
 pear his Champion and intimate acquaintance, has placed you 
 beyond the reach of ordinary panegyric. Having done this jus- 
 
 * The Landholder, IV — VIII, were reprinted in The Maryland yournal, and the 
 attack on Gerry in them, drew from Luther Martin a defence of that gentleman, 
 which is printed in this collection. To that the Landholder replied as above, but 
 this one of the series was not printed in The Connecticut Courant, its place being 
 taken by the number X., printed immediately after this letter. — Ed. 
 
 (182) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 83 
 
 tice to your magnanimity, I cannot resist drawing the veil of the 
 Convention a little farther aside ; not, I assure you, with any in- 
 tention to give pain to your Constituents, but merely to induce 
 them to pity you for the many piercing mortifications you met 
 with in the discharge of your duty. The day you took your 
 seat * must be long remembered by those who were present ; nor 
 will it be possible for you to forget the astonishment your be- 
 haviour almost instantaneously produced. You had scarcely 
 time to read the propositions which had been agreed to after the 
 fullest investigation, when, without requesting information, or to 
 be let into the reasons of the adoption of what you might not ap- 
 prove, you opened against them in a speech which held during 
 two days, and which might have continued two months, but for 
 those marks of fatigue and disgust you saw strongly expressed 
 on whichever side of the house you turned your mortified eyes. 
 There needed no other display to fix your character and the rank 
 of your abilities, which the Convention would have confirmed by 
 the most distinguished silence, had not a certain similarity in 
 genius provoked a sarcastic reply from the pleasant Mr. Gerry; 
 in which he admired the strength of your lungs and your pro- 
 found knowledge in the first principles of government ; mixing 
 and illustrating his little remarks with a profusion of those hems, 
 that never fail to lengthen out and enliven his oratory. This 
 reply (from your intimate acquaintance), the match being so equal 
 and the contrast so comic, had the happy effect to put the house 
 in good humor, and leave you a prey to the most humiliating re- 
 flections. But this did not teach you to bound your future 
 speeches by the lines of moderation ; for the very next day you 
 exhibited without a blush another specimen of eternal volubility. 
 It was not, however, to the duration of your speeches you owed 
 the perfection of your reputation. You, alone,, advocated the po- 
 litical heresy, that the people ought not to be trusted with the 
 election of representatives.! You held the jargon, that notwith- 
 
 *June 9. — Ed. 
 
 \ This is a misstatement. The motion to elect representatives as the state legisla- 
 ture should direct was made by C. C. Pinckney, was seconded by Martin, and ap- 
 proved of by Sherman, and on being put to a vote was favored by Connecticut, New 
 Jersey, Delaware and South Carolina. Of. Papers of James Madison, II., 925.— £aC. 
 
184 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 standing each state had an equal number of votes in the Senate, 
 yet the states were unequally represented in the Senate. You 
 espoused the tyrannic principle, that where a State refused to 
 comply with a requisition of Congress for money, that an army 
 should be marched into its bowels, to fall indiscriminately upon 
 the property of the innocent and the guilty, instead of having it 
 collected as the Constitution proposed, by the mild and equal 
 operation of laws. One hour you sported the opinion that Con- 
 gress, afraid of the militia resisting their measures, would neither 
 arm nor organize them, and the next, as if men required no time 
 to breathe between such contradictions, that they would harass 
 them by long and unnecessary marches, till they wore down their 
 spirit and rendered them fit subjects for despotism. You, too, 
 contended that the powers and authorities of the new Constitu- 
 tion must destroy the liberties of the people; but that the same 
 powers and authorities might be safely trusted with the Old Con- 
 gress. You cannot have forgotten, that by such ignorance in 
 politics and contradictory opinions, you exhausted the politeness 
 of the Convention, which at length prepared to slumber when 
 you rose to speak ; nor can you have forgotten, you were only 
 twice appointed a member of a Committee, or that these appoint- 
 ments were made merely to avoid your endless garrulity, and if 
 possible, lead you to reason, by the easy road of familiar conver- 
 sation. But lest you should say that I am a record only of the 
 bad, I . shall faithfully recognize whatever occurred to your ad- 
 vantage. You originated that clause in the Constitution which 
 enacts, that " This Constitution and the laws of the United States 
 which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made 
 or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
 shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every 
 State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or the 
 law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." You voted 
 that an appeal should lay to the Supreme Judiciary of the United 
 States, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact. You 
 also agreed to the clause that declares nine States to be sufficient 
 to put the government in motion.* These are among the greater 
 * Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. I85 
 
 positive virtues you exhibited in the Convention ; but it would 
 be doing you injustice were I to omit those of a negative nature. 
 Since the publication of the Constitution, every topic of vulgar 
 declamation has been employed to persuade the people, that it 
 will destroy the trial by jury, and is defective for being without a 
 bill of rights. You, sir, had more candour in the Convention 
 than we can allow to those declaimers out of it; there you never 
 signified by any motion or expression whatever, that it stood in 
 need of a bill of rights, or in any wise endangered the trial by 
 jury. In these respects the Constitution met your entire appro- 
 bation ; for had you believed it defective in these essentials, you 
 ought to have mentioned it in Convention, or had you thought it 
 wanted further guards, it was your indispensable duty to have 
 proposed them. I hope to hear that the same candour that in- 
 fluenced you on this occasion, has induced you to obviate any 
 improper impressions such publications may have excited in 
 your constituents, when you had the honor to appear before the 
 General Assembly.* From such high instances of your appro- 
 bation (for every member, like you, had made objections to parts 
 of the Constitution) the Convention were led to conclude that 
 you would have honored it with your signature, had you not 
 been called to Maryland upon some indispensable business ; nor 
 ought it to be withheld from you, that your colleagues informed 
 many Gentlemen of the House, that you told them you intended 
 to return before its completion. Durst I proceed beyond these 
 facts, to which the whole Convention can witness, I would ask 
 you why you changed your opinion of the Constitution after 
 leaving Philadelphia. I have it from good authority that you 
 complained to an intimate acquaintance, that nothing grieved 
 you so much as the apprehension of being detained in Maryland 
 longer than you could wish ; for that you had rather lose one 
 hundred guineas, than not have your name appear to the Consti- 
 tution. But as this circumstance seems to have been overlooked 
 when you composed your defence of Mr. Gerry, you may have 
 
 * By direction of the General Assembly of Maryland, Martin reported the pro- 
 ceedings of the federal Convention to them, and this was afterwards printed in pam- 
 phlet form under the title of Genuine Information. — Ed. 
 
1 86 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 your recollection of it revived by applying to Mr. Young, of 
 Spruce street, Philadelphia, to whom you made your complaint. 
 But leaving this curious piece of human vanity to such further 
 investigation as you may think it deserves, let us come to those 
 matters more particularly between us. You have said, that you 
 " never heard Mr. Gerry, or any other member, introduce a pro- 
 position for the redemption of Continental money according to 
 its nominal or any other value ; nor did you ever hear that such 
 a proposition had been offered to the Convention, or had been 
 thought of." That the Public may clearly comprehend what de- 
 gree of credit ought to be given to this kind of evidence, they 
 should know the time you were absent from the Convention, as 
 well as the time you attended. If it should appear that you were 
 only a few days absent, when unimportant business was the 
 object, they will conclude in your favour, provided they entertain 
 a good opinion of your veracity ; on the other hand, should it 
 appear that you were absent nearly half the session, however 
 your veracity may be esteemed, they must reject your evidence. 
 As you have not stated this necessary information, I shall do it 
 for you. The Session of Convention commenced the 14th of 
 May, and ended the 17th of September, which makes 126 days. 
 You took your seat the loth of June, * and left it the 4th of Sep- 
 tember, of which period you were absent at Baltimore ten days, 
 and as many at New York, so that you attended only 66 days 
 out of 126. Now, sir, is it to be presumed that you could have 
 been minutely informed of all that happened in Convention, and 
 committees of Convention, during the 60 days of your absence ? 
 or does it follow by any rule of reasoning or logic, that because 
 a thing did not happen in the 66 days you were present, that it 
 did not happen in the 60 days which you did not attend ? Is it 
 anywise likely that you could have heard what passed, especially 
 during the last 13 days, within which period the Landholder has 
 fixed the apostacy of Mr. Gerry ? or if it is likely that your par- 
 ticular intimacy with Mr. Gerry would stimulate to inquiries re- 
 specting his conduct, why is it that we do not see Mr. Mc- 
 
 * June 9, according to Madison, the Journal and Martin's Genuine Information. 
 —Ed. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 8/ 
 
 Henry's verification of your assertion, who was of the Committee 
 for considering a proposition for the debts of the union ? Your 
 reply to my second charge against this gentleman may be soon 
 dismissed. Compare his letter to the Legislature of his State 
 with your defence, and you will find that you have put into his 
 mouth objections different from anything it contains, so that if 
 your representation be true, his must be false. But there is 
 another circumstance which militates against your new friend. 
 Though he was face to face with his colleagues at the State Con- 
 vention of Massachusetts,* he has not ventured to call upon them 
 to clear him either of this charge, or that respecting the Conti- 
 nental money. But as the Public seemed to require that some- 
 thing should be said on this occasion, an anonymous writer 
 denies that he made such a motion, and endeavours to abate the 
 force of my second allegation, merely by supposing that " his 
 colleagues were men of too much honor to assert that his reasons 
 in Convention were totally different from those which he has pub- 
 lished." 
 
 But alas, his colleagues would not acquit hira in this way, and 
 he was of too proud a spirit to ask them to do it in person.f 
 Hence the charge remains on its original grounds, while you, for 
 want of proper concert, have joined his accusers and reduced him 
 to the humiliating necessity of endeavouring to stifle your justifi- 
 cation. These points being dismissed, it remains only to recon- 
 cile the contradictory parts you have acted on the great political 
 stage. You entered the convention without a sufficient knowl- 
 
 * Gerry, though defeated in an election to the Massachusetts Convention, was in- 
 vited by them to attend, in order to furnish information to the members. — Ed. 
 
 f To prevent any misconstruction the following is the publication entire : 
 
 [This note is by the Landholder, and is followed by the article already printed at 
 p. 127. It therefore seems unnecessary to add it here. — Ed.l 
 
 I will not say this writer makes a distinction between a thing done in convention 
 and a thing done in committee. Be this as it may, he confesses more than Mr. Martin ; 
 for it seems that Mr. Gerry proposed that " the public debt should stand on the same 
 ground it now stands on by the articles of confederation." He might have subjoined 
 that Mr. Gerry prefaced this motion by observing that it was the same in substance as 
 his first, in as much as it included his first. But notwithstanding this motion was 
 readily agreed to without his explanation being contradicted, yet he never afterwards 
 favoured the convention with a look of peace, or a word of reconcilement. 
 
1 88 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 edge in the science of government, where you committed a suc- 
 cession of memorable blunders, as the work advanced. Some 
 rays of light penetrated your understanding, and enabled you (as 
 has been shown) to assist in raising some of its pillars, when the 
 desire of having your name enrolled with the other laborers 
 drew from you that remarkable complaint so expressive of vanity 
 and conviction. But self-interest soon gained the ascendant, 
 you quickly comprehended the delicacy of your situation, and 
 this restored your first impressions in all their original force. 
 You thought the Deputy Attorney General of the United States 
 for the state of Maryland, destined for a different character, and 
 that inspired you with the hope that you might derive from a 
 desperate opposition what you saw no prospect of gaining by a 
 contrary conduct. But I will venture to predict, that though 
 you were to double your efforts, you would fail in your object. 
 I leave you now to your own reflections, under a promise, how- 
 ever, to give my name to the public, should you be able to pro- 
 cure any indifferent testimony to contradict a single fact I have 
 stated. 
 
 February, 1788. A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER,* X. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT. 
 
 (Number 1S06) 
 
 Monday, March 3, 1788. 
 
 To THE Citizens of New HAMPSHiRE.f 
 
 The opposition in your state to the new federal constitution, is 
 an event surprising to your New England brethren, yet we are 
 not disposed to criminate a people, which made such gallant 
 efforts in the establishment of the American Empire. It is the 
 prerogative of freemen to determine their own form of govern- 
 ment, and if this constitution is not addressed to your interest, 
 if it is not calculated to preserve your freedom and make you 
 glorious, we wish you not to accept it. We have fought by your 
 side, we have long been connected in interest, and with many of 
 you by consanguinity, and wish that you may share with us in all 
 the benefits of a great and free empire. Brethren who differ in 
 their opinions how a common interest may be best governed, 
 ought to deliberate with coolness, and not wantonly accuse each 
 other, either of folly or design. Massachusetts and Connecticut 
 have decidedly judged the new government well calculated not 
 only for the whole but for the northern states. Either you or 
 these states have judged wrong. Your interests are similar to 
 theirs, and cannot be separated from them without counteracting 
 nature. 
 
 * This number duplicates the preceding one, for an explanation of which see the 
 foot-note to the first Number X. — Ed. 
 
 f The convention of New Hampshire had met on the 13 of June, and after a discus- 
 sion of seven days, had adjourned without voting upon the constitution.— iV. 
 
 (189) 
 
I go THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 If there be any one state more interested than the others in 
 the adoption of this system, it is New Hampshire. Your local 
 situation, which can never be altered, is a solemn argument in its 
 favor. Tho' separated from the government of Britain at no less 
 price than the blood of your bravest sons, you border on her do- 
 minions. She is your enemy, and wishes nothing more than your 
 submission to her laws, and to the will of her proud servants. 
 
 Her force may easily be pointed thro' your whole territory 
 and a few regiments would effectually banish resistance. New 
 Hampshire, tho' growing in population, and amongst the first 
 states in personal bravery, cannot yet stand alone. Should a dis- 
 union of the states tempt Britain to make another effort for re- 
 covering her former greatness, you will be the first to fall under 
 her sway. In such case you will have nothing to expect from 
 the other states. Dispirited with a fruitless attempt to unite in 
 some plan of general government and protection, they will say, 
 let the dissenting states abide the consequence of their own false 
 opinions. Though such a reply might not be wise, it would be 
 exactly comfortable to what we have ever found in human nature ; 
 and nature will have its course, let policy be what it may. You 
 are the northern barrier of the United States, and by your situa- 
 tion, must first meet any hostile animosity from that quarter de- 
 signed against any part of them. It is certainly for the interest 
 of a barrier country, to have a general government on such effi- 
 cient principles, as can point the force of the whole for its relief 
 when attacked. The old constitution could not do this ; that now 
 under consideration, if accepted, we trust will produce a circula- 
 tion of riches and the powers of protection to the most extreme 
 parts of the body. On these principles it has generally been 
 said that New Hampshire and Georgia would be amongst the 
 first in adopting. Georgia has done it, not, perhaps, because 
 they were more wise than New Hampshire, but being pressed 
 with a dangerous war in the very moment of decision, they felt 
 its necessity ; and feeling is an argument none can resist. Trust 
 not to any complaisance of those British provinces on your 
 northern borders, or those artful men who govern them, who 
 were selected on purpose to beguile your politicks, and divide and 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. I9I 
 
 weaken the union. When the hour for a permanent connection 
 between the states is past, the teeth of the lion will be again 
 made bare, and you must be either devoured, or become its 
 jackal to hunt for prey in the other states. 
 
 We believe those among you who are opposed to the system, 
 as honest and brave as any part of the community, and cannot 
 suspect them of any design against American Independence ; but 
 such persons ought to consider what will be the probable conse- 
 quence of their dissent ; and whether this is not the only hour in 
 which this community can be saved from a condition, which 
 is, on all hands, allowed to be dangerous and unhappy. There 
 are certain critical periods in which nations, as well as individuals, 
 who have fallen into perplexity, by a wise exertion may save 
 themselves and be glorious. Such is the present era in American 
 policy, but if we do not see the hour of our salvation, there is no 
 reason to expect that heaven will repeat it. The unexpected har- 
 mony of the federal Convention — their mutual condescension in 
 the reconcilement of jarring interests and opposing claims between 
 the several States — the formation of a system so efficient in ap- 
 pearance, at the same time so well guarded against an oppression 
 of the subject — the concurring sentiments of avast majority thro' 
 the United States, of those persons who have been most exper- 
 ienced in policy, and most eminent in wisdom and virtue ; are 
 events which must be attributed to the special influence of heaven. 
 
 To be jealous of our liberties is lawful, but jealously in excess 
 is a deliriam [sic] of the imagination, by no means favourable to 
 liberty. If you would be free and happy a power must be cre- 
 ated to protect your persons and properties ; otherwise you are 
 slaves to all mankind. Your British neighbors have long known 
 these truths, and will not fail by their emissaries to seminate such 
 jealousies as favor their own designs. 
 
 To prophesy evil is ungrateful business ; but forgive me when 
 I predict, that the adoption of this Constitution is the only prob- 
 able means of saving the greatest part of your State from becom- 
 ing an appendage of Canada or Nova Scotia. In some future 
 paper I shall assign other reasons why New Hampshire, more 
 than any other State, is interested in this event. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, XI. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT. 
 
 (KTuniTaer 1S07) 
 
 Monday, March io, 1788. 
 
 To THE Citizens of New Hampshire. 
 
 Those who wish to enjoy the blessings of society must be will- 
 ing to suffer some restraint of personal liberty, and devote some 
 part of their property to the public that the remainder may be 
 secured and protected. The cheapest form of government is not 
 always best, for parsimony, though it spends little, generally gains 
 nothing. Neither is that the best government which imposes the 
 least restraint on its subjects ; for the benefit of having others re- 
 strained may be greater than the disadvantage of being restrained 
 ourselves. That is the best form of government which returns 
 the greatest number of advantages in proportion to the disad- 
 vantages with which it is attended. 
 
 Measured by this rule, the state of New Hampshire cannot ex- 
 pect a Constitution preferable to that now proposed for the union. 
 In point of defence it gives you the whole force of the empire, so 
 arranged as to act speedily and in concert, which is an article of 
 greatest importance to the frontier states. With the present 
 generation of men, national interest is the measure by which war 
 or peace are determined ; and when we see the British nation, by 
 a late treaty, paying an enormous annual subsidy to the little 
 principality of Hesse- Cassel for the purpose of retaining her in 
 military alliance, it should teach us the necessity of those parts in 
 the Constitution which enable the efficient force of the whole to 
 be opposed to an invasion of any part. 
 
 (192) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 193 
 
 A national revenue and the manner of collecting it is another 
 very interesting matter, and here the citizens of New Hampshire 
 have better terms olTered them, than their local situation can ever 
 enable them to demand or enforce. Impost and duties on trade, 
 which must be collected in the great importing towns, are the 
 means by which an American revenue will be principally, and 
 perhaps wholly raised. But a point of your state comes near the 
 sea, and that point so situated that it never can collect commerce, 
 and become an emporium for the whole state. Nineteen parts in 
 twenty of New Hampshire are greatly inland, so that local situ- 
 ation necessitates you to be an agricultural people ; and this is 
 not a hard necessity, if you now form such a political connection 
 with other states, as will entitle you to a just share in that revenue 
 they raise on comnierce. New York, the trading towns on Con- 
 necticut River, and Boston, are the sources from which a great 
 part of your foreign supplies will be obtained, and where your 
 produce will be exposed for market. 
 
 In all these places an impost is collected, of which, as consum- 
 ers, you pay a share without deriving any public benefit. You 
 cannot expect any alteration in the private systems of these 
 states, unless effected by the proposed governments, neither to 
 remedy the evil can you command trade from the natural chan- 
 nels, but must sit down contented under the burden, if the pres- 
 ent hour of deliverance be not accepted. This argument alone, 
 if there were no other, ought to decide you in favour of adoption. 
 
 It has been said that you object to the number of inhabitants 
 being a ratio to determine your proportion of the national ex- 
 pence — that your lands are poor, but the climate favourable to 
 population, which will draw a share of expence beyond your abil- 
 ity to pay. I do not think this objection well founded. Long 
 experience hath taught that the number of industrious inhabi- 
 tants in any climate is not only the strength, but the wealth of a 
 state, and very justly measures their ability of defraying public 
 expences, without encroaching on the necessary support of life. 
 
 If a great proportion of your lands are barren, you ought like- 
 wise to remember another rule of nature ; that the population 
 and fertility in many tracts of country will be proportioned to 
 
194 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 each other. Accidental causes for a short time may interrupt 
 the rule, but they cannot be of dangerous continuance. Force 
 may controul a despotic government, and commerce may inter- 
 rupt it in an advantageous situation for trade ; but from the first 
 of these causes you have no reason to fear, and the last, should it 
 happen, will increase wealth with numbers. 
 
 The fishery is a source of wealth and an object of immense 
 consequence to all the eastern coasts. The jealousy of Euro- 
 pean nations ought to teach us its value. So far as you become 
 a navigating people, the fishery should be an object of your first 
 attention. It cannot flourish until patronized and protected by 
 the general government. All the interests of navigation and 
 commerce must be protected by the union or come to ruin, and 
 in our present system where is the power to do it ? 
 
 When Americans are debarred the fishery, as will soon be the 
 case unless a remedy is provided, all the eastern shores will be- 
 come miserably poor. 
 
 Your forests embosom an immense quantity of timber for ship- 
 building and the lumber trade, but of how little value at present 
 you cannot be ignorant, and the value cannot increase until 
 American navigation and commerce are placed on a respectable 
 footing, which no single state can do for itself The embarrass- 
 ments of trade lower the price of your produce, which with the 
 distance of transportation almost absorbs the value ; and when by 
 a long journey we have arrived at the place of market, even the 
 finest of your grain will not command cash, at that season of the 
 year most convenient for you to transport. Hence arises that 
 scarcity of specie of which you complain. Your interest is in- 
 timately connected with that of the most commercial states, and 
 you cannot separate it. When trade is embarrassed the mer- 
 chant is the first to complain, but the farmer in event bears more 
 than his share of the loss. 
 
 Let the citizens of New Hampshire candidly consider these 
 facts, and they must be convinced that no other state is so much 
 interested in adopting that system of government now under con- 
 sideration. A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. I9S 
 
 The Landholder presents his most respectful compliments to 
 Hon W. Williams,* and begs leave to remind him that many dis- 
 pensations in this world, which have the appearance of judgment, 
 are designed in goodness. Such was the short address to you, 
 and though at first it might excite an exquisite sensibility of in- 
 jury, will in its consequence prove to your advantage, by giving 
 you an honorable opportunity to come out and declare your sen- 
 timents to the people. It had been represented in several parts 
 of the state, to the great surprise of your friends, that you wished 
 some religious test as an introduction to office, but as you have 
 explained the matter, it is only a religious preamble which you 
 wish — against preambles we have no animosity. Every man 
 hath a sovereign right to use words in his own sense, and when 
 he hath explained himself, it ought to be believed that he uses 
 them conscientiously. The Landholder, for the sake of his hon- 
 ourable friend, regrets that he denies his having used his name 
 publicly as a writer, for, though the honourable gentleman doubt- 
 less asserts the truth, there are a great number of those odd peo- 
 ple who really think they were present on that occasion, and 
 have such a strong habit of believing their senses, that they will 
 not be convinced even by evidence which is superior to all sense. 
 But it must be so in this imperfect world. 
 
 P. S. The Landholder begs his honourable friend not to be 
 surprised at his former address, as he can assure him most ser- 
 iously, that he does not even conjecture by whom it was written. 
 
 * Ses Letter of William Williams in this Collection. — Ed. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, XH. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (Nnma'ber 1308) 
 
 Monday, March 17, 1788. 
 
 To THE Rhode Island Friends of Paper Money, Tender Acts 
 AND Anti-federalism. 
 The singular system of policy adopted by your state, no 
 longer excites either the surprise or indignation of mankind. 
 There are certain extremes of iniquity, which are beheld with pa- 
 tience, from a fixed conviction that the transgressor is inveterate, 
 and that his example from its great injustice hath no longer a 
 seducing influence. Milton's lapse of the angels and their expul- 
 sion from Heaven, produces deeper regret in a benevolent mind 
 than all the evil tricks they have played or torments they have 
 suffered since the bottomless pit became their proper home. 
 Something similar to this is excited in beholding the progress of 
 hnman depravity. Our minds cannot bear to be always pained; 
 the Creator hath, therefore wisely provided that our tender senti- 
 ments should subside, in those desperate cases where there is no 
 longer a probability that any effort to which we may be excited, 
 will have a power to reclaim. But though our benevolence is no 
 longer distressed with the injustice of your measures, as philoso- 
 phers above the feelings of passion, we can speculate on them to 
 our advantage. The sentiment throvv^n out by some of our ad- 
 venturous divines, that the permission of sin is the highest dis- 
 play of supreme wisdom, and the greatest blessing to the uni- 
 verse, is most successfully illustrated by the effects of your gen- 
 eral policy. 
 
 (196) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, 197 
 
 In point of magnitude, your little state bears much the same 
 proportion to the united American empire, as the little world 
 doth to the immense intelligent universe ; and if the apostacy of 
 man hath conveyed such solemn warning and instruction to the 
 whole, as your councils have to every part of the union, no one 
 will doubt the usefulness of Adam's fall. At the commencement, 
 of peace, America was placed in a singular situation. Fear of a 
 common danger could no longer bind us together ; patriotism 
 had done its best and was wearied with exertion rewarded only 
 by ingratitude — our federal system was inadequate for national 
 government and justice, and from inexperience the great body 
 of the people were ignorant what consequences should flow from 
 the want of them. Experiments in public credit, though ruin- 
 ous to thousands, and a disregard to the promises of government 
 had been pardoned in the moment of extreme necessity, and 
 many honest men did not realize that a repetition of them in an 
 hour less critical would shake the existence of society. Men 
 full of evil and desperate fortune were ready to propose every 
 method of public fraud that can be effected by a violation of pub- 
 lic faith and depreciating promises. This poison of the com- 
 munity was their only preservation from deferred poverty, and 
 from prisons appointed to be the reward of indolence and 
 knavery. An easement of the poor and necessitous was plead as 
 a reason for measures which have reduced them to more extreme 
 necessity. Most of the states have had their prejudices against 
 an efficient and just government, and have made their experi- 
 ments in a false policy ; but it was done with a timorous mind, 
 and seeing the evil they have receded. A sense of subordination 
 and moral right was their check. Most of the people were con- 
 vinced, and but few remained who wished to establish iniquity by 
 law. To silence such opposition as might be made to the new 
 constitution, it was fit that public injustice should be exhibited in 
 its greatest degree and most extreme effects. For this end 
 Heaven permitted your apostacy from all the principles of good 
 and just government. By your system we see unrighteousness in 
 the essence, in effects, and in its native miseries. The rogues ot 
 every other state blush at the exhibition, and say you have be- 
 
Ig8 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 trayed them by carrying the matter too far. The very naming of 
 your measures is a complete refutation of anti-federalism, paper 
 money and tender acts, for no man chooses such company in ar- 
 gument. 
 
 The distress to which many of your best citizens are reduced 
 — the groans of ruined creditors, of widows and orphans, demon- 
 strates that unhappiness follows vice by the unalterable laws of 
 nature and society. I did not mention the stings of conscience, 
 but the authors of public distress ought to remember that there 
 is a world where conscience will not sleep. 
 
 Is it now at length time to consider. The great end for which 
 your infatuation was permitted is now become complete. The 
 whole union has seen and fears, and while history gives true in- 
 formation, no other people will ever repeat the studied process of 
 fraud. You may again shew the distorted features of injustice, 
 but never in more lively colors, or by more able hands than has 
 been done already. As virtue and good government has derived all 
 possible advantage from your experiment, and every other state 
 thanks you for putting their own rogues and fools out of count- 
 enance, begin to have mercy on yourselves. You may not ex- 
 pect to exist in this course any longer than is necessary for pub- 
 lic good ; and there is no need that such a kind of warning as 
 you set before us should be eternal. Secure as you may feel in 
 prosecuting what all the rest of mankind condemn, the hour of 
 your political revolution is at hand. The cause is within to 
 yourselves, and needs but the permission of your neighbors to take 
 its full effect. Every moral and social law calls for a review, and 
 a volume of penal statutes cannot prevent it. They are in the first 
 instance nullified by injustice, and five years hence not a man in 
 your territories will presume their vindication. Passion and ob- 
 stinacy, which were called in to aid injustice, have had their 
 reign, and can support you no longer. By a change of policy 
 give us evidence that you are returned to manhood and honour. 
 The inventors of such councils can never be forgiven in this 
 world, but the people at large who acted by their guidance may 
 break from the connection and restore themselves to virtue. 
 
 There are among you legislators eminent, through the union 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 1 99 
 
 lor their wisdom and integrity. Penetrated with grief and aston- 
 ishment they stand in silence, waiting the return of your reason. 
 They are the only men who can remove the impassable gulph 
 that is between you and the rest of mankind. In your situ- 
 ation there must be some sacrifice. It is required by the neces- 
 sity of the case, and for the dignity of government. You have 
 guilty victims enough for whom even benevolence will not 
 plead ; let them make the atonement and save your state. The 
 large body of a people are rarely guilty of any crime greater than 
 indiscretion, in following those who have no qualification to lead 
 but an unblushing assurance infraud. Acknowledge the indiscre- 
 tion, and leave those whom you have followed into the quicksands 
 of death to the infamy prepared for them, and from which they 
 cannot be reserved. Your situation admits no compounding of 
 opposite systems, or halving with justice, but to make the cure 
 there must be an entire change of measures. The Creator of 
 nature and its laws made justice as necessary for nations as for 
 individuals, and this necessity hath been sealed by the fate of all 
 obstinate offenders. If you will not hear your own groans, nor 
 feel the pangs of your own torture, it must continue until removed 
 by a political annihilation. Such as do not pity themselves can- 
 not be long be pitied. 
 
 Determined that our feelings shall be no longer wounded by 
 any thing to which despair may lead you, with philosophic cool- 
 ness we wait to continue our speculations on the event. 
 
 A Landholder. 
 
THE LANDHOLDER, XHI. 
 
 THE CONNECTICUT COURANT, 
 
 (NumTaer i309) 
 
 Monday, March 24, 1788. 
 
 The attempt to amend our federal Constitution, which for some 
 time past hath engrossed the public regard, is doubtless become 
 an old and unwelcome topic to many readers, whose opinions are 
 fixed, or who are concerned for the event. There are other sub- 
 jects which claim a share of attention, both from the public and 
 from private citizens. It is good government which secures the 
 fruits of industry and virtue ; but the best system of government 
 cannot produce general happiness unless the people are virtu- 
 ous, industrious and economical. 
 
 The love of wealth is a passion common to men, and when 
 justly regulated it is conducive to human happiness. Industry 
 may be encouraged by good laws ; wealth may be protected by 
 civil regulations ; but we are not to depend on these to create it 
 lor us, while we are indolent and luxui'ious. Industry is most 
 favourable to the moral virtue of the world ; it is therefore wisely 
 ordered by the Author of Nature, that the blessings of this world 
 should be acquired by our own application in some business use- 
 ful to society ; so that \ve have no reason to expect any climate 
 or soil will be found, or any age take place, in which plenty and 
 wealth will be spontaneously produced. The industry and 
 labour of a people furnish a general rule to measure their wealth, 
 and if we use the means we may promise ourselves the reward. 
 The present state of America will limit the greatest part of its in- 
 habitants to agriculture ; for as the art of tilling the earth is 
 easily acquired, the price of land low, and the produce immedi- 
 
 ( 200) 
 
THE LANDHOLDER. 201 
 
 diately necessary for life, greater encouragement to this is offered 
 here than in any country on earth. But still suffer me to enquire 
 whether we are not happily circumstanced and actually able to 
 manage some principal manufactories with success, and increase 
 our wealth by increasing the labour of the people, and saving the 
 surplus of our earnings for a better purpose than to purchase the 
 labour of the European nations. It is a remark often made, and 
 generally believed, that in a country so new as this, where the 
 price of land is low and the price of labour high, manufactories 
 cannot be conducted with profit. This may be true of some man- 
 ufactures, but of others it is grossly false. It is now in the power 
 of New England to make itself more formidable to Great Britain 
 by rivaling some of her principal manufactures, than ever it was 
 by separating from her government. Woolen cloaths, the princi- 
 pal English manufacture, may more easily be rivaled than any 
 other. Purchasing all the materials and labour at the common 
 price of the country, cloths of three-quarters width, may be fabri- 
 cated for six shillings per yard, of fineness and beauty equal to 
 English cloths of six quarters width, which fell at twenty shill- 
 ings. The cost of our own manufacture is little more than half 
 of the imported, and for service it is allowed to be much prefera- 
 ble. It is found that our wool is of equal quality with the Eng- 
 lish, and that what we once supposed the defect in our wool, is 
 only a deficiency in cleaning, sorting and dressing it. 
 
 It gives me pleasure to hear that a number of gentlemen in 
 Hartford and the neighboring towns are forming a fund for the 
 establishment of a great woolen manufactory. The plan will 
 doubtless succeed; and be more profitable to the stockholders 
 that money deposited in trade. As the manufacture of cloths is 
 introduced, the raising of wool and flax, the raw materials, will 
 become' an object of the farmer's attention. 
 
 Sheep are the most profitable part of our stock, and the breed 
 is much sooner multiplied than horses or cattle. Why do not 
 our opulent farmers avail themselves of the profit ? An experi- 
 ence would soon convince them there is no better method of ad- 
 vancing property, and their country would thank them for the 
 trial. Sheep are found to thrive and the wool tcf be of good 
 
202 THE LANDHOLDER. 
 
 quality in every part of New England, but as this animal delights 
 in grazing, and is made healthy by coming often to the earth, 
 our sea-coasts with the adjacent country, where snow is of short 
 continuance, are particularly favourable to their propagation. 
 Our hilly coasts were designed by nature for this, and every part 
 of the country that abounds in hills ought to make an experi- 
 ment by which they will be enriched. 
 
 In Connecticut, the eastern and southern counties, with the 
 highlands on Connecticut river towards the sea, ought to pro- 
 duce more wool than would cloath the inhabitants of the state. 
 At present the quantity falls short of what is needed by our own 
 consumption ; if a surplusage could be produced, it would find a 
 ready market and the best pay. 
 
 The culture of flax, another principal material for manufactur- 
 ing, affords great profit to the farmer. The seed of this crop 
 when it succeeds will pay the husbandman for his labour, and re- 
 turn a better ground-rent than many other crops which are culti- 
 vated. The seed is one of our best articles for remittance and 
 exportation abroad. Dressing and preparing the flax for use is 
 done in the most leisure part of the year, when labour is cheap, 
 and we had better work for sixpence a day and become wealthy, 
 than to be idle and poor. 
 
 It is not probable the market can be overstocked, or if it should 
 chance for a single season to be the case, no article is more 
 meliorated by time, or will better pay for keeping by an increase 
 of quality. A large flax crop is one most certain sign of a thrifty 
 husbandman. The present method of agriculture in a course of 
 different crops is well calculated to give the husbandman a suffi- 
 cieny of flax ground, as it is well known that this vegetable will 
 not thrive when sown successively in the same place. 
 
 The nail manufacture might be another source of wealth to 
 the northern states. Why should we twice transport our own 
 iron, and pay other nations for labour which our boys might per- 
 form as well ? The art of nail-making is easily acquired. Remit- 
 tances have actually been made from some parts of the state in 
 this article ; the example is laudable, and ought to be imitated. 
 The sources of wealth are open to us, and there needs but indus- 
 try to become as rich as we are free. A Landholder. 
 
A LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 THE LANDHOLDER 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM WILLIAMS, 
 
 PRINTED IN 
 
 THE AMERICAN MERCURY, 
 
 February, 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 This letter was occasioned by the following communication, 
 which was printed in the Connecticut Courant for Monday, Feb- 
 ruary 4, 1788, (number 1202): 
 
 To THE Hon. William Williams, Esq. 
 
 Sir: — Whenever one man makes a charge against another, 
 reason and justice require that he should be able to support the 
 charge. In some late publications, I have offered my sentiments 
 on the new constitution, have adduced some arguments in favour 
 of it, and answered objections to it. I did not wish to enter into 
 a controversy with any man. But I am unwilling to have accu- 
 sations publickly thrown out against me, without an opportunity 
 to answer them. In the late convention, when a religious test was 
 the subject of debate, you took the liberty of saying that the 
 Landholder (in treating of the same subject) ^a^ missed the point ; 
 that he had raised up a man of straw, and kicked it over again. 
 Now, Sir, I wish this matter may be fairly cleared up. I wish to 
 know, what is the real point? Who and what the real man is? 
 Or in other words, what a religious test is ? I certainly have a 
 right to expect that you will answer these questions, and let me 
 know wherein I am in the wrong. Perhaps you may show that 
 my ideas on the subject are erroneous. In order to do this, it 
 would not be amiss to offer a few reasons and arguYnents. You 
 doubtless had such as were convincing, at least to yourself, 
 though you happen to omit them at the time of the debate. If 
 you will shew that I am in the wrong, I will candidly acknowl- 
 edge my mistake. If on the contrary you should be unable to 
 prove your assertions, the public will judge, whether you or I 
 have missed the point ; and which of us has committed the crime of 
 making a man of straw. 
 
 Not doubting but you will have the candour to come to an ex- 
 planation on this subject, 
 
 I am. Sir, your humble servant. 
 
 The Landholder. 
 
 From The Landholder's statement printed at page 195 of this 
 
 volume, it appears that this signature was employed by another 
 
 man, in this instance. 
 
 (20s) 
 
LETTER OF WILLIAM WILLIAMS. 
 
 THE AMERICAN MERCURY, 
 
 (N'-u.m'ber 88) 
 
 Monday, February iith, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Babcock : 
 
 Since the Federal Constitution has had so calm, dispassionate 
 and so happy an issue, in the late worthy Convention of this 
 State ; I did not expect any members of that hon. body to be 
 challenged in a News-paper, and especially by name, and by 
 anonymous writers, on account of their opinion, or decently ex- 
 pressing their sentiments relative to the great subject then under 
 consideration, or any part of it. Nor do I yet see the propriety, 
 or happy issue of such a proceeding. However as a gentleman 
 in your Paper feels uneasy, that every sentiment contained in his 
 publications, (tho' in general they are well written) is not re- 
 ceived with perfect acquiescence and submission, I will endea- 
 vour to satisfy him, or the candid reader, by the same channel, 
 that I am not so reprehensible as he supposes, in the matter 
 refer'd to. When the clause in the 6th article, which pro- 
 vides that " no religious test should ever be required as a 
 qualification to any office or trust, &c." came under considera- 
 tion, I observed I should have chose that sentence and anything 
 relating to a religious test, had been totally omitted rather than 
 stand as it did, but still more wished something of the kind 
 should have been inserted, but with a reverse sense, so far as to 
 require an explicit acknowledgment of the being of a God, his 
 perfections and his providence, and to have been prefixed to, and 
 stand as, the first introductory words of the Constitution, in the 
 
 (207) 
 
2o8 LETTER OF WILLIAM WILLIAMS. 
 
 following or similar terms, viz. We the people of the United 
 States, in a firm belief of the being and perfections of the one living 
 and true God, the creator and supreme Governour of the world, in 
 his universal providence and the authority of his laws ; that he will 
 require of all moral agents an account of their conduct; that all 
 rightful powers among men are ordained of, and mediately derived 
 from God; therefore in a dependence on his blessing and acknowl- 
 edgment of his efficient protection in establishing our Independence, 
 whereby it is become necessary to agree upon and settle a Constitu- 
 tion of federal government for ourselves, and in order to form a 
 more perfect union &c., as it is expressed in the present introduc- 
 tion, do ordain &c., and instead of none, that no other religious 
 test should ever be required &c., and that supposing, but not 
 granting, this would be no security at all, that it would make 
 hypocrites, &c. yet this would not be a sufficient reason against 
 it ; as it would be a public declaration against, and disapproba- 
 tion of men, who did not, even with smcerity, make such a pro- 
 fession, and they must be left to the searcher of hearts ; that it 
 would however, be the voice of the great body of the people, and 
 an acknowledgment proper and highly becoming them to express 
 on this great and only occasion, and according to the course of 
 Providence, one mean of obtaining blessings from the most high. 
 But that since it was not, and so difficult and dubious to get in- 
 serted, I would not wish to make it a capital objection ; that I 
 had no more idea of a religious test, which should restrain of- 
 fices to any particular sect, class, or denomination of men or 
 Christians in the long list of diversity, than to regulate their be- 
 stowments by the stature or dress of the candidate, nor did I 
 believe one sensible catholic man in the state wished for such a 
 limitation ; and that therefore the News-Paper observations, and 
 reasonings (I named no author) against a test, in favour of any 
 one denomination of Christians, and the sacrilegious injunctions 
 of the test laws of England &c., combatted objections which did 
 not exist, and was building up a man of straw and knocking him 
 down again. These are the same and only ideas and sentiments 
 I endeavoured to communicate on that subject, tho' perhaps not 
 precisely in the same terms ; as I had not written, nor precon- 
 
LETTER OF WILLIAM WILLIAMS. 2O9 
 
 ceived them, except the proposed test, and whether there is any 
 reason in them or not, I submit to the public. 
 
 I freely confess such a test and acknowledgment would have 
 given me great additional satisfaction ; and I conceive the argu- 
 ments against it, on the score of hypocrisy, would apply with 
 equal force against requiring an oath from any officer of the 
 united or individual states ; and with little abatement, to any oath 
 in any case whatever ; but divine and human wisdom, with uni- 
 versal experience, have approved and established them as useful, 
 and a security to mankind. 
 
 I thought it was my duty to make the observations, in this be- 
 half, which I did, and to bear my testimony for God ; and that 
 it was also my duty to say the Constitution, with this, and some 
 other faults of another kind, was yet too wise and too necessary 
 to be rejected. W. Williams. 
 
 P. S. — I could not have suspected the Landholder (if I know 
 him) to be the author of the piece referred to ; but if he or any 
 other is pleased to reply, without the signature of his proper 
 name, he will receive no further answer or notice from me. 
 
 Feb. 2d, 1788. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 A COUNTRYMAN. 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 ROGER SHERiVlAN, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, 
 
 November-December, 
 1787. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 In the file of The New Haven Gazette formerly owned by 
 Simeon Baldwin, an intimate friend, and afterwards executor of 
 Roger Sherman, it is noted by the former that the essays of A 
 Countryman were written by the latter. 
 
 Following this series are two essays written by Sherman under 
 a different signature, after the adoption of the Constitution, which 
 are an interesting contrast to these. It will be noted in the first 
 of these, that Sherman alludes to what he " had endeavored to 
 show in a former piece." 
 
 (2»3) 
 
A COUNTRYMAN, I. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, 
 
 (N"nmT3er 39) 
 
 Thursday, November 14, 1787. 
 
 To THE People of Connecticut. 
 
 You are now called on to make important alterations in your 
 government, by ratifying the new federal constitution. 
 
 There are, undoubtedly, such advantages to be expected from 
 this measure, as will be sufficient inducement to adopt the pro- 
 posal, provided it can be done without sacrificing more important 
 advantages, which we now do or may possess. By a wise pro- 
 vision in the constitution of man, whenever a proposal is made 
 to change any present habit or practice, he much more minutely 
 considers what he is to lose by the alterations, what effect it is to 
 have on what he at present possesses, than what is to be hoped 
 for in the proposed expedient. 
 
 Thus people are justly cautious how they exchange present 
 advantages for the hope of others in a system not yet experi- 
 enced. 
 
 Hence all large states have dreaded a division into smaller 
 parts, as being nearly the same thing as ruin ; and all smaller 
 states have predicted endless embarrassment from every attempt 
 to unite them into larger. It is no more than probable that if 
 any corner of this State of ten miles square, was now, and long 
 had been independent of the residue of the State, that they would 
 consider a proposal to unite them to the other parts of the State, 
 as a violent attempt to wrest from them the only security for their 
 persons or property. They would lament how little security they 
 
2l6 A COUNTRYMAN. 
 
 should derive from sending one or two members to the legislature 
 at Hartford & New Haven, and all the evils that the Scots pre- 
 dicted from the proposed union with England, in the beginning 
 of the present century, would be thundered with all the vehemence 
 of American politics, from the little ten miles district. But surely 
 no man believes that the inhabitants of this district would be less 
 secure when united to the residue of the State, than when inde- 
 pendent. Does any person suppose that the people would be 
 more safe, more happy, or more respectable, if every town in this 
 State was independent, and had no State government? 
 
 Is it not certain that government would be weak and irregular, 
 and that the people would be poor and contemptible? And still 
 it must be allowed, that each town would entirely surrender its 
 boasted independence if they should unite in State government, 
 and would retain only about one-eightieth part of the administra- 
 tion of their own affairs. 
 
 Has it ever been found, that people's property or persons were 
 less regarded and less protected in large states than in small? 
 
 Have not the Legistature in large states been as careful not to 
 over-burden the people with taxes as in small ? But still it must 
 be admitted, that a single town in a small state holds a greater 
 proportion of the authority than in a large. 
 
 If the United States were one single government, provided the 
 constitution of this extensive government was as good as the 
 constitution of this State now is, would this part of it be really in 
 greater danger of oppression or tyranny, than at present? It is 
 true that many people who are great men because they go to 
 Hartford to make laws for us once or twice in a year, would then 
 be no greater than their neighbours, as much fewer representa- 
 tives would be chosen. But would not the people be as safe, 
 governed by their representatives assembled in New York or 
 Philadelphia, as by their representatives assembled in Hartford 
 or New Haven? Many instances can be quoted, where people 
 have been unsafe, poor and contemptible, because they were gov- 
 erned only in small bodies; but can any instance be found where 
 they were less safe for uniting? Has not every instance proved 
 somewhat similar to the so much dreaded union between Eng- 
 
A COUNTRYMAN. 217 
 
 land and Scotland, where the Scots, instead of becoming a poor, 
 despicable, dependent people, have become much more secure, 
 happy, and respectable? If then, the constitution is a good one, 
 why should we be afraid of uniting, even if the Union was to be 
 much more complete and entire th£in is proposed? 
 
A COUNTRYMAN, II. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 (N'um'ber 40) 
 
 Thursday, November 22, 1787. 
 
 To THE People of Connecticut. 
 
 It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that 
 torrent of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper poli- 
 ticians have over whelmed many parts of our country. 
 
 It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has 
 seriously urged, that we should adopt the New Constitution be- 
 cause it has been approved by Washington and Franklin: and the 
 other, with all the solemnity of apostolic address to Men, Brethren, 
 Fathers, Friends and Countryman, have urged that we should 
 reject, as dangerous, every clause thereof, because that Washing- 
 ton is more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as a 
 politician — Franklin is old, others are young — and Wilson is 
 haughty* You are too well informed to decide by the opinion of 
 others, and too independent to need a caution against undue in- 
 fluence. 
 
 Of a very different nature, tho' only one degree better than the 
 other reasoning, is all that sublimity of nonsense and alarm, that 
 has been thundered against it in every shape of metaphoric terror, 
 on the subject of a bill of rights, the liberty of the press, rights of 
 conscience, rights of taxation and election, trials in the vicinity , free- 
 dom of speech, trial by jury, and a standing army. These last are 
 
 * This is a paraphrase of the arguments of " The Centinel " in The Independent 
 Gazetteer. — Ed. 
 
 (218) 
 
A COUNTRYMAN. 2I9 
 
 undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on 
 mere paper protection. For, guard such privileges by the strong- 
 est expressions, still if you leave the legislative and executive 
 power in the hands of those who are or may be disposed to de- 
 prive you of them — you are but slaves. Make an absolute mon- 
 arch — give him the supreme authority, and guard as much as 
 you will by bills of rights, your liberty of the press, and trial by 
 jury; — he will find means either to take them from you, or to 
 render theni useless. 
 
 The only real security that you can have for all your import- 
 ant rights must be in the nature of your government. If you 
 suffer any man to govern you who is not strongly interested in 
 supporting your privileges, you will certainly lose them. If you 
 are about to trust your liberties with people whom it is necessary 
 to bind by stipulation, that they shall not keep a standing army, 
 your stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing. No 
 bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the 
 honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were inter- 
 ested in preserving the rights ; and in that case they have always 
 been ready enough to declare the rights, and to preserve them 
 when they were declared — The famous English Magna Charta 
 is but an act of parliament, which every subsequent parliament 
 has had just as much constitutional power to repeal and annul, 
 as the parliament which made it had to pass it at first. But the 
 security of the nation has always been, that their government was 
 so formed, that at least oru branch of their legislature must be 
 strongly interested to preserve the rights of the nation. 
 
 You have a bill of rights, in Connecticut (i. e.) your legislature 
 many years since enacted that the subjects of this state should 
 enjoy certain privileges. Every assembly since that time, could, 
 by the same authority, enact that the subjects should enjoy none 
 of those privileges; and the only reason that it has not long since 
 been so enacted, is that your legislature were as strongly inter- 
 ested in preserving those rights as any of the subjects; and this 
 is your only security that it shall not be so enacted at the next 
 session of assembly: and it is security enough. 
 
 Your General Assembly under your present constitution are 
 
220 A COUNTRYMAN. 
 
 supreme. They may keep troops on foot in the most profound 
 peace, if they think proper. They have heretofore abridged the 
 trial by jury in some cases, and they can again in all. They can 
 restrain the press, and may lay the most burdensome taxes if they 
 please, and who can forbid? But still the people are perfectly 
 safe that not one of these events shall take place so long as the 
 members of the General Assembly are as much interested, and in- 
 terested in the same manner, as the other subjects. 
 
 On examining the new proposed constitution, there can be no 
 question but that there is authority enough lodged in the pro- 
 posed Federal Congress, if abused, to do the greatest injury. 
 And it is perfectly idle to object to it, that there is no bill of 
 rights, or to propose to add to it a provision that a trial by jury 
 shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it up by adding a stipu- 
 lation in favor of the press, or to guard it by removing the paltry 
 objection to the right of Congress to regulate the time and man- 
 ner of elections. 
 
 If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the in- 
 terest of the rulers, that this authority will not be abused, or at 
 least that those powers are not more likely to be abused by the 
 Congress, than by those who now have the same powers, you 
 must by no means adopt the constitution : — No, not with all the 
 bills of rights and with all the stipulations in favor of the people 
 that can be made. 
 
 But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you 
 and I are, and just as the members of our present legislatures are 
 interested, we shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if 
 that were granted) in Congress, as in the General Assembly. If 
 the members of Congress can take no improper step which will 
 not affect them as much as it does us, we need not apprehend 
 that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure that 
 society of which they are a part. 
 
 The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and 
 oppression is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? 
 how far have you a control over them? Decide this, and then 
 all the questions about their power may be dismissed for the 
 amusement of those politicians whose business it is to catch flies, 
 
A COUNTRYMAN. 221 
 
 or may occasionally furnish subjects for George Bryan's Pom- 
 posity, or the declamations of Cato — An Old Whig — Son of Lib- 
 erty — Brutus — Brutus junior — An Officer of the Continental Army, 
 — ^the more contemptible Timoleon, and the residue of that rabble 
 of writers. 
 
A COUNTRYMAN, III. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 Thursday, November 29, 1787. 
 
 To THE People of Connecticut. 
 
 The same thing once more — I am a plain man, of few words; 
 for this reason perhaps it is, that when I have said a thing I love 
 to repeat it. Last week I endeavored to evince, that the only 
 surety you could have for your liberties must be in the nature of 
 your government]; that you could derive no security from bills of 
 rights, or stipulations, on the subject of a standing army, the lib- 
 erty of the press, trial by jury, or on any other subject. Did you 
 ever hear of an absolute monarchy, where those rights which are 
 proposed by the pigmy politicians of this day, to be secured by 
 stipulation, were ever preserved? Would it not be mere trifling 
 to make any such stipulations, in any absolute monarchy? 
 
 On the other hand, if your interest and that of your rulers are 
 the same, your liberties are abundantly secure. Perhaps the 
 most secure when their power is most complete. Perhaps a pro- 
 vision that they should never raise troops in time of peace, might 
 at some period embarrass the public concerns and endanger the 
 liberties of the people. It is possible that in the infinite variety 
 of events, it might become improper strictly to adhere to any one 
 provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated. At all 
 events, the people have always been perfectly safe without any 
 stipulation of the kind, when the rulers were interested to make 
 them safe; and never otherwise. 
 
 No people can be more secure against any oppression in their 
 
 (222) 
 
A COUNTRYMAN. 223 
 
 rulers than you are at present ; and no rulers can have more su- 
 preme and unlimited authority than your general assembly have. 
 When you consult on the subject of adopting the new consti- 
 tution, you do not enquire whether the powers therein contained 
 can be safely lodged in any hands whatever. For not only those 
 very powers, but all other powers, are already in the general as- 
 sembly. The enquiry is, whether Congress is by this new 
 
 constitution so formed that a part of the power now in the gen- 
 eral assembly would be as well lodged in Congress. Or, as was 
 before said, it depends on how far the members are under your 
 control ; and how far their interest and yours are the same ; to 
 which careful attention must be given. 
 
A COUNTRYMAN, IV. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 (N'um.'ber 43) 
 
 Thursday, December 6, 1787, 
 
 To THE People of Connecticut. 
 
 If the propriety of trusting your government in the hands of 
 your representatives was now a perfectly new question, the ex- 
 pediency of the measure might be doubted. A very great por- 
 tion of the objections which we daily find made against 
 adopting the new constitution (and which are just as weighty 
 objections against our present government, or against any gov- 
 ernment in existence) would doubtless have their influence; and 
 perhaps would determine you against trusting the powers of 
 sovereignty out of your own hands. 
 
 The best theory, the best philosophy on the subject, would be 
 too uncertain for you to hazard your freedom upon. 
 
 But your freedom, in that sense of the expression (if it could be 
 called sense), is already totally gone. Your Legislature is not 
 only supreme in the usual sense of the word, but they have liter- 
 ally, all the powers of society. Can you — can you possibly grant 
 anything new? Have you any power which is not already 
 granted to your General Assembly ? You are indeed called on to 
 say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the General 
 Assembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And 
 it is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should 
 experience those powers than that they should continue in the 
 General Assembly, provided you can trust Congress as safely as 
 the General Assembly. 
 
 (224) 
 
A COUNTRYMAN. 225 
 
 What forms your security under the General Assembly? 
 Nothing save that the interest of the members is the same as 
 yours. Will it be the same with Congress? There are essenti- 
 ally only two differences between the formation of Congress and 
 
 of your General Assembly. One is, that Congress are to 
 
 govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater num- 
 ber of people, consequently your proportion of the government 
 will be much smaller than at present. The other difference is 
 - - - that the members of Congress when elected, hold their 
 places for two, four and six years, and the members of Assembly 
 only six and twelve months. 
 
 The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the 
 first number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on 
 the subject), and has all the force as an objection against the pow- 
 ers of Congress, that it would have if applied to a proposal to 
 give up the sovereignty of the several towns of the state, (if such 
 sovereignty had existed,) and unite in state government. 
 
 It would be only a repetition to enter into a consideration of 
 this difference between Congress and your Assembly. 
 
 It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we 
 shall send to Congress will be men of property, who can little 
 feel any burthens they may lay on society. How far is this idea 
 supported by experience? As the members are to pay their 
 proportion, will they not be as careful of laying too great burth- 
 ens as poorer people ? Are they less careful of their money than 
 the poor? This objection would be much stronger against 
 trusting the power out of your hands at all. If the several towns 
 were now independent, this objection would be much more forci- 
 ble against uniting in state government, and sending one or two 
 of your most wealthy men to Hartford or New Haven, to vote 
 away your money. But this you have tried, and found that as- 
 semblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money 
 than even their constituents. An individual of any tolerable econ- 
 omy, pays all his debts, and perhaps has money beforehand. A 
 small school district, or a small parish, will see what sum they 
 want, and usually provide sufficiently for their wants, and often 
 have a little money at interest. 
 
22.6 A COUNTKYMAN. 
 
 Town voters are partly representatives, i. e. many peopk pay 
 town taxes who have no right to vote, but the money they vote 
 away is principally their own. , The towns in this state tax them- 
 selves less wijhngly than smaller bodies. They generally however 
 tax themselves sufficiently to nearly pay the demands against 
 them within the year, very seldom raise money beforehand by 
 taxes. The Generally Assembly of this state could never be in- 
 duced to attempt to do more than pay the annual interest of what 
 they owe, and occasionally sink very small parts of the principal, 
 and they never in fact did thus much, and we are all witnesses 
 that they are full as careful of the public money as we can wishs 
 It never was a complaint that they were too ready to allow indi- 
 viduals large sums. A man who has a claim against a town, 
 and applies to a town-meeting., is very likely to obtain justice: 
 but he who has a claim against the state, and applies to the Gen- 
 eral Assembly, stands but a poor chance to obtain justice. Some 
 rule will be found to exclude his claim, — or to lessen it, — or he 
 will be paid in a security - - not worth half the money. 
 
 You have uniformly experienced that your representatives are 
 as careful, if not more so, of your money, than you yourselves 
 are in your town-meetings; but still your representatives are 
 generally men of property, and those of them who are most in- 
 dependent, and those whom you have sent to Congress, have not 
 been hy any means the Jeast careful. 
 
A COUNTRYMAN, V. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 (IN'jain'ber i4=4r) 
 
 Tuesday, December 20, 1787. 
 
 To THE People of Connecticut, 
 
 You do not hate tp read Newspaper Essays on the new consti- 
 tution, more than I hate to write them. Then we wUl be short 
 - - which I have often found the best expression in a dull ser- 
 mpn, except the last. 
 
 Whether the mode of election pointed out iji the proposed con- 
 stitution is well calculated to support the principles which were 
 designed to be established in the different branches of the legisla- 
 ture, may perhaps be justly doubted; — and may perhaps in gome 
 future day be discussed. 
 
 The design undoubtedly was, that the house of representatives 
 should be a popular assembly, — that the senate should, in its na- 
 ture, be somewhat more permanent, and that the two houses 
 should be completely independent of each othej". Th.^^^ princi- 
 ples are right. — for the present we will suppose they will be sup- 
 ported — there then remains to be considered no considerable dif- 
 ference between the constitutional government which is proposed, 
 and your present government, except that the time for which you 
 choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and 
 the time for which you are to choose your continental rulers is 
 for two, four and six years. 
 
 The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should 
 lessen the evils of tumultuous elections by making elections less 
 frequent. But are your liberties endangered by this measure? 
 
 (227) 
 
228 A COUNTRYMAN. 
 
 Philosophy may mislead you. Ask experience. Are not the 
 liberties of the people of England as safe as yours? — They are 
 not as free as yours, because much of their government is in the 
 hands of hereditary majesty and nobility. But is not that part of 
 the government which is under the control of the commons ex- 
 ceedingly well guarded? But still the house of commons is only 
 a third branch — the only branch who are appointed by the people 
 — and they are chosen but once in seven years. Is there then any 
 danger to be apprehended from the length of time that your rul- 
 ers are to serve? when none are to serve more than six years 
 
 one whole house but two years, and your President but 
 
 four. 
 
 The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of 
 Britain has spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the 
 commons would sacrifice the liberties of the people to the money 
 or influence of the crown : but the influence of a powerful here- 
 ditary monarch, with the national Treasury — ^Army — and fleet at 
 his command — and the whole executive government - - and 
 one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly operating on a 
 house of commons, whose duration is never less than seven years, 
 unless this same monarch should end it, (which he can do in an 
 hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house 
 of commons which has taken from the people the liberty of the 
 press, - - - trial by jury, - - the rights of conscience, or of pri- 
 vate property. 
 
 Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny 
 from the too great duration of the power of your rulers? 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 ROGER SHERMAN, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, 
 
 December, 
 
 1789. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 These letters are ascribed to Sherman on the authority men- 
 tioned at page 213. 
 
 In a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, {Cor- 
 respondence, I, 63), he says : 
 
 On the subject of amendments, nothing has been publickly, 
 and very little privately, said. Such as I am known to have es- 
 poused will, as far as I can gather, be attainable from the federal- 
 ists, who sufficiently predominate in both branches, though with 
 some the concurrence will proceed from a spirit of conciliation 
 rather than conviction. Connecticut is least inclined, though I 
 presume not inflexibly opposed, to a moderate revision. A paper, 
 which will probably be republished in the Virginia gazettes, 
 under the signature of a citizen of New Haven, unfolds Mr. Sher- 
 man's opinions. 
 
 In the Writings of John Adams, (vi, 427), is a correspondence 
 between Adams and Sherman, produced by these articles, which 
 should be studied in connection with them. 
 
 (Z31) 
 
A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, I. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 Thursday, December 4, 1 788. 
 
 Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the 
 new Federal Constitution. 
 
 Six of the states have adopted the new constitution without 
 proposing any alteration, and the most of those proposed by the 
 conventions of other states may be provided for by congress in a 
 code of laws without altering the constitution. If congress may 
 be safely trusted with the affairs of the Union, and have suiHcient 
 powers for that purpose, and possess no powers but such as re- 
 spect the common interest of the states (as I have endeavored to 
 show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be regulated 
 by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will in- 
 clude all that I have noticed except the following, which I think 
 on due consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary. 
 
 1. It is proposed that the consent of two- thirds or three-fourths 
 of the members present in this branch of the congress shall be 
 required for passing certain acts. 
 
 On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in 
 congress power to contrpul the majority, joined with the concur- 
 rent voice of the president, for if the president dissents, no act can 
 pass without the consent of two-thirds of the members in each 
 branch of congress ; and would not that be contrary to the general 
 principles of republican government ? 
 
 2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or 
 not by the senate alone. 
 
 (233) 
 
234 A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 
 
 But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not 
 the most proper tribunal for that purpose? The members are to 
 be chosen by the legislatures of the several states, who will doubt- 
 less appoint persons of wisdom and probity, and from their office 
 can have no interested motives to partiality. The house of peers 
 in Great Britian try impeachments and are also a branch of the 
 legislature. 
 
 3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to 
 grant pardons in cases of high treason, but the congress. 
 
 It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the 
 exercise of this power by the president (though perhaps it might 
 as well have been lodged in congress). The president cannot 
 pardon in case of impeachment, so that such offenders may be 
 excluded from office notwithstanding his pardon. 
 
 4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineli- 
 gible to any other office during the time for which they are elected 
 members of that body. 
 
 This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to 
 be said on both sides, and it was settled in convention on full dis- 
 cussion and deliberation. There are some offices which a member 
 of congress may be best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of 
 public affairs acquired by being a member, such as minister to 
 foreign courts, &c., and on accepting any other office his seat in 
 congress will be vacated, and no member is eligible to any office 
 that shall have been instituted or the emoluments increased while 
 he was a member. 
 
 5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible 
 after certain periods. 
 
 But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove 
 one great motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable 
 of serving in offices, on account of their experience, which wouU 
 best qualify them for usefulness in office — but if their services are 
 not acceptable they may be left out at any new election. 
 
 6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made 
 without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession 
 of territory, right of navigation or fishery, without the consent of 
 three-fourths of the members present in each branch of congress. 
 
A CITIZEN OF idteW HAVEN. 235 
 
 It is provided by the constitution that no commercial treaty 
 shall be made by the president without th'e conSent of two-thirds 
 of the senators present, and a& each ^tate has aW equal represen- 
 tation and siiffrage in the senate, the rights of the state Will be as 
 well secured tinder the new consfitlition as undef the old ; and it 
 is not probable that they would ever rtake a cession 6f territory 
 or any important national right without the consent of congress. 
 The king of Great Britian has by the constitution a power to make 
 treaties, yet in rtiatters of great itnportance he consults the par- 
 liament. 
 
 7. There is one amendment prdptosSd by the convention of 
 South Cai'olina respecting religious tests, by inserting the worcf 
 atker, between the words «<? and retigioies in that article, which is 
 an ingenious thought, and had that w^ord' been inserted, it would 
 probably have prevented an]^' objection on that head. But it may 
 be considered as a clerical' ofnission and be inserted without cal- 
 ling a convention; as it no*r st'ittds the efifect will' be the same. 
 
 Oh the whole it is hoped' that all' the spates will Cbttseht to makS 
 a lair trial of the constitution before they attempt to alter it ; ex- 
 perience will best sh'o# whether' it is d'eficent or not, on trial it 
 rtiay appear that the alterations that have beett pl'oposed' are not 
 necessary, or that others not yet thought of may be necessaryj 
 everything that tends to distiriiori> Ougli'f to be avoided. Insta- 
 bility in government and laws tend's to Weaken a state and rendei* 
 the rights of the people prescaribus. 
 
 If another convention should be called to revise the constitu- 
 tion, 'tis not likely they WCald be more unanimous than the former; 
 they might judge differently in some things, but is it certain that 
 they would judge better? When experience has convinced the 
 states and people in general that alterations are necessary, they 
 may be easily made, but attempting it at present may be detri- 
 mental if not fatal to the union of the states. 
 
 The judiciary department is perhaps the most difificult to be 
 precisely limited by the constitution, but congress have full power 
 to regulate it by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the re- 
 gulations at different times as circumstances may differ. 
 
 Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct 
 
236 A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 
 
 taxation, if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisi- 
 tions be made and some states comply and others not, the non- 
 complying states must be considered and treated as delinquents, 
 which will tend to excite disaffection and disunion among the 
 states, besides occasioning delay ; but if congress lay the taxes in 
 the first instance these evils will be prevented, and they will doubt- 
 less accommodate the taxes to the customs and convenience of the 
 several states. 
 
 Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I 
 think it is in the power of congress to make it too large, but I be- 
 lieve that it may be safely trusted with them. Great Britian con- 
 tains about three times the number of the inhabitants in the United 
 States, and according to Burgh's account in his political disqui- 
 sitions, the members of parliament in that kingdom do not exceed 
 131, and if 69 more be added from the principal cities and towns 
 the number would be 200; and strike off those who are elected by 
 the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the con- 
 stitution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would 
 be more equally and better represented than at present ; and if 
 that would be a sufficient number for their national legislature, 
 one-third of that number will be more than sufficient for our 
 federal legislature who will have few general matters to trans- 
 act. But these and other objections have been considered in a 
 former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore conclude this 
 with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace, liberty and 
 union of these states. 
 
 A Citizen of New Haven. 
 
A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, II. 
 
 THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE. 
 
 (Nfxm.'beT 51) 
 
 Thursday, December 25, 1788. 
 
 Observations on the New Federal Constitution. 
 
 In order to form a good Constitution of Government, the legis- 
 lature should be properly organized, and be vested with plenary- 
 powers for all the purposes for which the government was insti- 
 tuted, to be exercised for the public good as occasion may re- 
 quire. 
 
 The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment 
 of their rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind 
 them nor any taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by 
 representatives of their own chusing, who will participate with 
 them in the public burthens and benefits ; this was the great point 
 contended for in our controversy with Great Britain, and this will 
 be fully secured to us by the new constitution. The rights of 
 the people will be secured by a representation in proportion to 
 their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the rights of 
 the particular states by their equal representation in the other 
 branch. 
 
 The President and Vice-President as well as the members of 
 Congress will be eligible for fixed periods, and may be re-elected 
 as often as the electors shall think fit, which will be a great se- 
 curity for their fidelity in office, and give greater stability and 
 energ3' to government than an exclusion by rotation, and will be 
 an operative and effectual security against arbitrary government, 
 either monarchial or aristocratic. 
 
 (237) 
 
238 A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 
 
 The immediate security of the civil and domestic rights of the 
 people will be in the government of the particular states. And 
 as the different states have different local interests and customs 
 which can be best regulated by their own laws, it should not be 
 expedient to admit the federal government to interfere with them, 
 any farther than may be necessary for the good of the whole. 
 The great end of the federal governrnent is to protect the several 
 states in the enjoyment of those rights, against foreign invasion, 
 and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among them- 
 selves; and to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign 
 nations. 
 
 These were not sufficiently provided for by the former articles 
 of confederation, which was the occasion of calling the late Con- 
 vention to make amendments. This they have done by forming 
 a new constitution containing the powers vested in the federal 
 government, under the former, with such additional powers as 
 tjjey deemed necessary to attain the ends the states had in view, 
 in their appoiiitment. And to carry those powers into effect, 
 they thought it necessary to make some alterations in the organ- 
 ization of the government : this they supposed to be warranted by 
 their commissiop. 
 
 The powers vested in the federal government are clearly de- 
 ^ed, so that each state still retain its sovereignty in what con- 
 cerns its own internal government, and a right to exercise eveiy 
 power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to the gov- 
 ernment of the United States. The new powers vested in the 
 United States, are, to regulate commerce ; provide for a uniform 
 practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies, and organizing, 
 Sirming and training the militia ; and for the punishment of cer- 
 tain crimes against the United States ; and for promoting the pro^ 
 gress of science in the mode therein pointed put. There are 
 some other matters yvhich Congress has power under the present 
 confederation to require to be done by the particular states, which 
 tbey will be authorized to carry into effect themselves under the 
 new constitution; these powers appear to be necessary for the 
 common benefit of the states, and could not be effectually pro-T 
 vided for by the particular states. 
 
A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 239 
 
 The objects of expenditure will be the same under the new 
 constitution, as under the old; nor need the administration of 
 government be more expensive; the number of members of Con- 
 gress will be the same, nor will it be necessary to increase the 
 number of officers in the executive department or their salaries; 
 the supreme executive will be in a single person, who must have 
 an honourable support; which perhaps will not exceed the present 
 allowance to the President of Congress, and the expence of sup- 
 porting a committee of the states in the recess of Congress. 
 
 It is not probable that Congress will have occasien to sit longer 
 than two or three months in a year, after the first session, which 
 may perhaps be something longer. Nor will it be necessary for 
 the Senate to sit longer than the other branch. The appointment 
 of officers may be made during the session of Congress, and trials 
 on impeachment will not often occur, and will require but little 
 time to attend to them. The security against keeping up armies 
 in time of peace will be greater under the new constitution than 
 under the present, because it can't be done without the concur- 
 rence of two branches of the legislature, nor can any appropria- 
 tion of money for that purpose be in force more than two years; 
 whereas there is no restriction under the present confederation. 
 
 The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is 
 not put under the direction of the new government. 
 
 If the federal government keeps within its proper jurisdiction^ 
 it will be the interest of the state legislatures to support it, and 
 they will be a powerful and effectual check to its interfering with 
 their jurisdiction. But the objects of federal government will be 
 so obvious that there will be no great daiiger of any interference. 
 
 The principal sources of revenue will be imposts on goods im- 
 ported, and sale of the western lands, which will probably be suf- 
 ficient to pay the debts and expences of the United States while 
 peace continues ; but if there should be occasion to resort to direct 
 taxation, each state's quota will be ascertained according to a rule 
 which has been approved by the legislatures of eleven of the states, 
 and should any state neglect to furnish its quota. Congress may 
 raise it in the same manner that the state ought to have done; 
 and what remedy more easy and equitable could be devised, to 
 obtain the supplies from a delinquent state ? 
 
24C A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 
 
 Some object, that the representation will be too small; but the 
 states have not thought fit to keep half the number of representa- 
 tives in Congress that they are entitled to under the present con- 
 federation ; and of what advantage can it be to have a large as- 
 sembly to transact the few general matters that will come under 
 the direction of Congress. — The regulating of time, place and 
 manner of elections seems to be as well secured as possible; the 
 legislature of each state may do it, and if they neglect to do it in 
 the best manner, it may be done by Congress;' — and what motive 
 can either have to injure the people in the exercise of that right? 
 the qualifications of the electors are to remain as fixed by the 
 constitutions and laws of the several states. 
 
 It is by some objected, that the executive is blended with the 
 legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct 
 and unconnected, but is not this a gross error in pohtics ? The 
 united wisdom and various interests of a nation should be com- 
 bined in framing the laws. But the execution of them should not 
 be in the whole legislature ; that would be too troublesome and 
 expensive; but it will not thence follow that the executive should 
 have no voice or influence in legislation. The executive in Great 
 Britian is one branch of the legislature, and has a negative on all 
 laws ; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a republic, 
 but the partial negative vested in the President by the new Con- 
 stitution on the acts of Congress and the subsequent revision, 
 may be very useful to prevent laws being passed Without mature 
 deliberation 
 
 The Vice-President while he acts as President of the Senate 
 will have nothing to do in the executive department ; his being 
 elected by all the states will incline him to regard the interests of 
 the whole, and when the members of the senate are equally di- 
 vided on any question, who so proper to give a casting vote as 
 one who represents all the states ? 
 
 The power of the President to grant pardons extends only to 
 offences committed against the United States, which can't be pro- 
 ductive of much mischief, especially as those on Impeachment 
 are excepted, which will exclude offenders from office. 
 
 It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws 
 
A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. 24 1 
 
 \ 
 
 of the Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among \ 
 the states, to extend the judicial powers of the United States to ; 
 the enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such ex- | 
 ceptions as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce ■. 
 them to cases of such magnitude and importance as cannot safely 1 
 be trusted to the final decision of the courts of particular states; / 
 and the constitution does not make it necessary that any inferior 
 tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done if found neces- 
 sary ; 'tis probable that the courts of particular states will be auth- 
 orized by the laws of the union, as has been heretofore done in 
 cases of piracy, &c., and the Supreme Court may have a circuit 
 to make trials as convenient, and as little expensive as possible 
 to the parties ; nor is there anything in the constitution to deprive 
 them of trial by jury in cases where that mode of trial has been 
 heretofore used. All cases in the courts of common law between 
 citizens of the same state, except those claiming lands under 
 grants of different states, must be finally decided by courts of the 
 state to which they belong, so that it is not probable that more 
 than one citizen to a thousand will ever have a cause that can 
 come before a federal court. 
 
 Every department and officer of the federal government will be 
 subject to the regulation and control of the laws, and the people 
 will have all possible securities against oppression. Upon the 
 whole, the constitution appears to be well framed to secure the 
 rights and liberties of the people and for preserving the govern- 
 ments of the individual states, and if well administered, to restore 
 and secure public and private credit, and to give respectability to 
 the states both abroad and at home. Perhaps a more perfect one 
 could not be formed on mere speculation ; and if upon experience 
 it shall be found deficient, it provides an easy and peaceable mode 
 to make amendments. Is it not much better to adopt it than to 
 continue in present circumstances ? Its being agreed to by all 
 the states present in Convention, is a circumstance in its favour, 
 so far as any respect is due to their opinions. 
 
 A Citizen of New Haven. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 CATO, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 GEORGE CLINTON, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, 
 
 September-January, 
 
 1787-8. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 These letters were commonly ascribed to the pen of George 
 Clinton in the press of the day, and that this ascription was right 
 seems to be proved by the following letter. Though signed by 
 Hamilton, it is in the handwriting of John Lamb, a leading anti- 
 federalist of New York, and is in the George Clinton MSS. in the 
 New York State Library. It thus seems apparent thatnt is a 
 copy secured in some way by Hamilton's political opponents : 
 
 October i8, 1787. 
 Dear Sir ; 
 
 Since my last the chief of the state party has declared his op- 
 position to the government proposed, both in private conversation 
 and in print. That you may judge of the reason and fairness of 
 his views, I send you the two essays, with a reply by Caesar. On 
 further consideration it was concluded to abandon this personal 
 form, and to take up the principles of the whole subject. These 
 will be sent you as published, and might with advantage be re- 
 published in your gazettes." * * * * 
 
 A. Hamilton. 
 
 This copy, so obtained, seems to have been the basis of the 
 following note in the New York journal: 
 
 "A writer in the state of New- York, under the signature of 
 Cesar, came forward against the patriotic Cato and endeavoured 
 to frighten him from starting any objections and threatened that 
 'Cato would be followed by Cesar in all his marches;' but we find 
 that as soon as ever Cato came freely to discuss the merit of the 
 constitution Cesar retreated and disappeared : and since that a 
 publication under the signature of Publius . . . has appeared in 
 that state." 
 
 Another evidence in confirmation is, that the last of this series 
 was printed on January 3, 1788, and the New York Assembly 
 met on the 9th of the same month, after which Governor Clinton 
 was probably too occupied to write more, though no conclusion 
 was announced in the last essay, and it is probable no such ter- 
 mination was intended. Following these are the two essays of 
 CcBsar mentioned above. 
 
 (24s) 
 
CATO, I. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 dsriambor 3134) 
 
 Thursday, September 27, 1787. 
 
 For the New York Journal. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York: 
 
 The Convention, who sat at Philadelphia, have at last delivered 
 to Congress that system of general government, which they have 
 declared best calculated to promote your safety and happiBess as 
 citizens of the United States. This system, though not handed 
 to you formally by the authority of government, has obtained an 
 introduction through divers channels ; and the minds of you all, 
 to whose observation it has come, have no doubt been contem- 
 plating it ; and alternate joy, hope, or fear have preponderated, as 
 it conformed to, or differed from, your various ideas of just gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Government, to an American, is the science of his political 
 safety ; this then is a moment to you the most important — and 
 that in various points — to your reputation as members of a great 
 nation — to your immediate safety, and to that of your posterity. 
 In your private concerns and affairs of life you deliberate with 
 caution, and act with prudence;, your public concerns require a 
 caution and prudence, in a ratio suited to the difference and dig- 
 nity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation, and of your 
 lives and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm, 
 or the sale of a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent 
 or inactive, the ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their 
 toils, and bind you with the cord of power from which you, and 
 
 f 247> 
 
248 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 your posterity may never be freed ; and if the possibility should 
 exist, it carries along with it consequences that will make your 
 community totter to its center: in the latter, it is the mere loss of 
 a little property, which more circumspection or assiduity may 
 repair. 
 
 Without directly engaging as an advocate for this new form of 
 national government, or as an opponent — let me conjure you to 
 consider this a very important crisis of your safety and character. 
 You have already, in common with the rest of your countrymen, 
 the citizens of the other states, given to the world astonishing evi- 
 dence of your greatness — you have fought under peculiar circum- 
 stances, and were successful against a powerful nation on a specu- 
 lative question, you have established an original compact between 
 you and your governors, a fact heretofore unknown in the forma- 
 tion of the governments of the World; your experience has in- 
 formed you, that there are defects in the federal system, and, to 
 the astonishment of mankind, your legislatures have concerted 
 measures for an alteration, with as much ease as an individual 
 Tyould make a disposition of his ordinary domestic affairs : this 
 alteration now lies before yoii, for your consideration ; but beware 
 hov^ you determine — do not, because you admit that something 
 must be done, adopt anything — teach the members of that con- 
 -vention that ye are capable of a supervision of their conduct, 
 The samd medium that gave you this system, if it is erroneous, 
 while the door is now open, can make amendments, or give you 
 another, if it is required. Your fate, and that of your posterity, 
 depends on your present conduct; do not give the latter reason to 
 curse you, nor yourselves cause of reprehension ; as individuals 
 you are ambitious of leaving behind you a good name, and it is 
 the reflection that you have done right in this life, that blunts the 
 sharpness of death ; the same principles would be a consolation 
 to you, as patriots, in the hour of dissolution, that you would 
 leave to your children a fair political inheritance, untouched by 
 the vultures of power, which you had acquired by an unshaken 
 perseverance in the cause of liberty ; but how miserable the alter- 
 native — you would deprecate the ruin you had brought upon 
 yourselves, be the curse of posterity, and the scorn and scoff of 
 nations. 
 

 LETTERS OF CATO. 249 
 
 I Deliberate, therefore, on this new national government with 
 
 coolness ; analize it with criticism ; and reflect on it with candor : 
 
 \ if you find that the influence of a powerful few, or the exercise 
 
 iOf a standing army, will always be directed and exerted for your 
 
 Welfare alone, and not to the aggrandizement of themselves, and 
 
 pat it will secure to you and your posterity happiness at home, 
 
 d national dignity and respect from abroad, adopt it ; if it will 
 
 |3t, reject it with indignation — better to be where you are for the 
 
 pVesent, than insecure forever afterwards. Turn your eyes to the 
 
 Uhited Netherlands, at this moment, and view their situation ; 
 
 coi.apare it with what yours may be, under a government substan- 
 
 tialy similar to theirs. 
 
 Beware of those who wish to influence your passions, and to 
 mak^ you dupes to their resentments and little interests — personal 
 invectives can never persuade, but they always fix prejudices, 
 whic\i candor might have removed — those who deal in them have 
 not yi>ur happiness at heart. Attach yourselves to measures, 
 not to, men. 
 
 This form of government is handed to you by the recpmmen- 
 dations of a man who merits the confidence of the public ; but 
 you ouiht to recollect that the wisest and best of men may err, 
 and their errors, if adopted, may be fatal to the community ; 
 therefore, in principles of politics, as well as in religious faith, 
 every mar, ought to think for himself. 
 
 Hereafl^r, when it will be necessary, I shall make such obser- 
 vations ot) this new constitution as will tend to promote youj 
 welfare an4 be justified by reason and truth. Cato. 
 
 Sept. 26\i'j8t. 
 
CATO, II. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (N"Taraber S136) 
 
 Thursday, October ii, 1787. 
 
 For the New York Journal. 
 
 To the Citizens of the State of New York : 
 
 "Remember, my friends I the laws, the rights, 
 " The generous plan of power deliver' d down, 
 "By your renown' d Forefathers ; 
 "So dearly bought, the price of so much blood! 
 "O let it never perish m your hands ! 
 "But piously transmit it to your children'.' 
 The object of my last address to you was to engage/your dis- 
 passionate consideration of the new Federal governmerit'; to cau- 
 tion you against precipitancy in the adoption of it ; to recommend 
 a correction of its errors, if it contained any; to hint to you the 
 danger of an easy perversion of some of its powers; to solicit you 
 to separate yourselves from party, and to be independent of and 
 uninfluenced by any in your principles of politics ; and that ad- 
 dress was closed with a promise of future observations on the 
 same subject, which should be justified by reason and iruth. Here 
 I intended to have rested the introduction; but a writer under the 
 signature of C./ESAR, in Mr. Child's paper of the is/ instant, who 
 treats you with passion, insult, and threat, has anticipated those 
 observations which would otherwise have remained in silence 
 until a future period. It would be criminal in me to hesitate a 
 moment to appear as your advocate in so interestng a cause, and 
 to resist the influence of such doctrines as this Caesar holds. I 
 
 (350) 
 
 \ / 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 2$ I 
 
 shall take no other cognizance of his remarks on the questionable 
 shape of my future, or the equivocal appearance of my past reflec- 
 tions, than to declare, that in my past, I did not mean to be mis- 
 Tinderstood (for Caesar himself declares that it is obviously the 
 language of distrust), and that in my future there will not be the 
 semblance of doubt. But what is the language of Caesar — he 
 ridicules your prerogative, power, and majesty — he talks of this 
 proffered constitution as the tender mercy of a benevolent sov- 
 ereign to deluded subjects, or, as his tyrant name-sake, of his prof- 
 fered grace to the virtuous Cato: — he shuts the door of free de- 
 liberation and discussion, and declares that you must receive this 
 government in manner and fortn as it is proffered — that you can- 
 not revise or amend it, and lastly, to close the scene, he insinu- 
 ates that it will be more healthy for you that the American 
 Fabius should be induced to accept of the presidency of this new 
 government than that, in case you do not acquiesce, he should be 
 solicited to command an army to impose it on you. Is not your 
 indignation roused at this absolute, imperious style? For what 
 did you open the veins of your citizens and expend their treasure? 
 For what did you throw off the yoke of Britain and call your- 
 selves independent? Was it from a disposition fond of change, 
 or to procure new masters? — if those were your motives, you 
 have reward before you — go, retire into silent obscurity, and kiss 
 the rod that scourges you, bury the prospects you had in store, 
 that you and your posterity would participate in the blessings of 
 freedom, and the employments of yoiir country— let the rich and 
 insolent alone be your rulers. Perhaps you are designed by 
 providence as an emphatic evidence of the mutability of human 
 affairs, to have the show of happiness only, that your misery may 
 seem the sharper, and if so, you must submit. But if you had 
 nobler views, and you are not designed by heaven as an example 
 — are you now to be derided and insulted? Is the power of 
 thinking, on the only subject importajat to you, to be taken away? 
 and . if per chance you should happen to differ from Caesar, are 
 you to have Caesar's principles crammed down your throats with 
 an army ? God forbid ! 
 
 In democratic republics the people collectively are considered 
 
252 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 as the sovereign — all legislative, judicial, and executive power, is 
 inherent in and derived from them. As a people, your power 
 and authority have sanctioned and established the present gov- 
 ernment — your executive, legislative, and judicial acknowledge it 
 by their public acts — you are again solicited to sanction and 
 establish the future one — yet this Caesar mocks your dignity and 
 laughs at the majesty of the people. Caesar, with his usual dog- 
 matism, enquires, if I had talents to throw light on the subject of 
 legislation, why did I not offer them when the Convention was in 
 session ? He is answered in a moment — I thought with him and 
 you, that the wisdom of America, in that Convention, was drawn 
 as it were to a Focus. I placed an unbounded confidence in some 
 of the characters who were members of it, from the services they 
 had rendered their country, without adverting to the ambitious 
 and interested views of others. I was willingly led to expect a 
 model of perfection and security that would have astonished the 
 world. Therefore to have offered observation, on the subject of 
 legislation, under these impressions, would have discovered no 
 less arrogance than Caesar. The Convention, too, when in session, 
 shut their doors to the observations of the community, and their 
 members were under an obligation of secrecy. Nothing trans- 
 pired. To have suggested remarks on unknown and anticipated 
 principles would have been like a man groping in the dark, and 
 folly in the extreme. I confess, however, I have been disap- 
 pointed, and Caesar is candid enough to make the same declara- 
 tion, for he thinks it might have been more perfect. 
 
 But to call in dispute, at this time, and in the manner Caesar 
 does, the right of free deliberation on this subject, is like a man's 
 propounding a question to another, and telling him at the same 
 that if he does not answer agreeable to the opinion of the pro- 
 pounder, he will exert force to make him of the same sentiment : 
 to exemplify this, it will be necessary to give you a short history 
 of the rise and progress of the Convention, and the conduct of 
 Congress thereon. The states in Congress suggested, that the 
 articles of confederation had provided for making alterations in 
 the confederation — that there were defects therein, and as a means 
 to remedy which, a Convention of delegates, appointed by the 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 253 
 
 different states, was resolved expedient to be held for the sole and 
 express purpose of revising it, and reporting to Congress and the 
 different legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 
 should (when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the several 
 states) render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies 
 of government. This resolution is sent to the different states, and 
 the legislature of this state, with others, appoint, in conformity 
 thereto, delegates for the purpose, and in the words mentioned in 
 that resolve, as by the resolution of Congress, and the concurrent 
 resolutions of the senate and assembly of this state, subjoined, will 
 appear. For the sole and express purpose aforesaid a Conven- 
 tion of delegates is formed at Philadelphia: what have they done? 
 Have they revised the confederation, and has Congress agreed to 
 their report ? — neither is the fact. This Convention have exceeded 
 the authority given to them, and have transmitted to Congress a 
 new political fabric, essentially and fundamentally distinct and 
 different from it, in which the different states do not retain sepa- 
 rately their sovereignty and independency, united by a confeder- 
 ate league — but one entire sovereignty, a consolidation of them 
 into one government — in which new provisions and powers are 
 not made and vested in Congress, but in an assembly, senate, and 
 president, who are not known in the articles of confederation. 
 Congress, without agreeing to, or approving of, this system prof- 
 fered by the Convention, have sent it to the different legislatures, 
 not for their confirmation, but to submit it to the people ; not in 
 conformity to their own resolution, but in conformity to the reso- 
 lution of the Convention made and provided in that case.* Was 
 it, then, from the face of the foregoing facts, the intention of Con- 
 gress, and of this and the other states, that the essence of our 
 present national government should be annihilated, or that it 
 should be retained and only have an increase of substantial neces- 
 sary powers ? Congress, sensible of this latter principle, and that 
 
 * An attempt had been made in Congress, by the friends of the new government, 
 for Congress to recommend its acceptance, but this produced protest from those op- 
 posed to it, and threats of an appeal to the people, so in order to prevent such action 
 a compromise vfas eventually made, by which it was merely unanimously " transmit- 
 ted to the several legislatures." — Ed. 
 
254 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 the Convention had taken on themselves a power which neither 
 they nor the other states had a right to delegate to them, and 
 that they could not agree to and approve of this consolidated 
 system, nor the states confirm it — have been silent on its charac- 
 ter ; and although many have dwelt on their unanimity, it is no 
 less than the unanimity of opinion that it originated in an assump- 
 tion of power, which your voice alone can sanctify. This new 
 government, therefore, founded in usurpation, is referred to your 
 opinion as the origin of power not heretofore delegated, and, to 
 this end, the exercise of the prerogative of free examination is 
 essentially necessary; and yet you are unhesitatingly to acquiesce, 
 and if you do not, the American Fabius, if we may believe Caesar 
 is to command an army to impose it. It is not my view to rouse 
 your passions. I only wish to excite you to, and assist you in, a 
 cool and deliberate discussion of the subject, to urge you to be- 
 have like sensible freemen. Think, speak, act, and assert your 
 opinions and rights — let the same good sense govern you with 
 respect to the adoption of a future system for the administration 
 of your public affairs that influenced you in the formation of the 
 present. Hereafter I do not intend to be diverted by Caesar, or 
 any other. My object is to take up this new form of national 
 government — compare it with the experience and opinions of the 
 most sensible and approved political authors — and to show that 
 its principles, and the exercise of them, will be dangerous to your 
 liberty and happiness. Cato. 
 
CATO, III. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, 
 
 (T<rTiinl)er 3138> 
 
 Thursday, October 25, 1787. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York : 
 
 In the close of my last introductory address, I told you that 
 my object in the future would be to take up this new form of 
 national government, to compare it with the experience and opin- 
 ions of the most sensible and approved political authors, and to 
 show you that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be 
 dangerous to your liberty and happiness. 
 
 Although I am conscious that this is an arduous undertaking, 
 yet I will perform it to the best of my ability. 
 
 The freedom, equality and independence which you enjoyed by 
 nature, induced you to consent to a political power. The same 
 principles led you to examine the errors and vices of a British 
 superintendence, to divest yourselves of it, and to reassume a new 
 political shape. It is acknowledged that there are defects in this, 
 and another is tendered to you for acceptance ; the great question 
 then, that arises on this new political principle, is, whether it will 
 answer the ends for which it is said to be offered to you, and for 
 which all men engage in political society, to wit, the preservation 
 of their lives, liberties, and estates. 
 
 The recital, or premises on which the new form of government 
 is erected, declares a consolidation or union of all the thirteen 
 parts, or states, into one great whole, under the firm of the United 
 States, for all the various and important purposes therein set 
 forth. But whoever seriously considers the immense extent ot 
 
 (2SS) 
 
2S6 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, 
 together'with the variety of its chmates, productions, and com- 
 merce, the difference of extent, and number of inhabitants in all ; 
 the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics, in almost every 
 one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated re- 
 publican form of government therein, can never form, a perfect 
 union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the gen- 
 eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your 
 posterity, for to these objects it must be directed : this unkindred 
 legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimi- 
 lar in their nature, will in its exercise, emphatically be like a 
 house divided against itself. 
 
 The governments of Europe have taken their limits and form 
 from adventitious circumstances, and nothing can be argued on 
 the motive of agreement from them ; but these adventitious po- 
 litical principles, have nevertheless produced effects that have 
 attracted the attention of philosophy, which have established 
 axioms in the science of politics therefrom, as irrefragable as any 
 in Euclid. It is natural, says Montesquieu, to a republic to have 
 only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist : in a large 
 one, there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less mod- 
 eration ; there are too great deposits to trust in the hands of a sin- 
 gle subject; an ambitious person soon becomes sensible that he may 
 be happy, great, and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens, and 
 that he might raise himself to grandeur, on the ruins of his country. 
 In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; 
 in a small one, the interest of the public is easily perceived, better 
 understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have 
 a less extent, and of course are less protected — he also shows you, 
 that the duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to its hav- 
 ing continued with the same extent of territory after all its wars ; 
 and that the ambition of Athens and Lacedemon to command and 
 direct the union, lost them their liberties, and gave them a mon- 
 archy. 
 
 From this picture, what can you promise yourselves, on the 
 score of consolidation of the United States into one government? 
 Impracticability in the just exercise of it, your freedom insecure, 
 
LETTERS OF'CATO. 257 
 
 even this form of government limited in its continuance, the em- 
 ployments of your country disposed of to the opulent, to whose 
 contumely you will continually be an object — you must risk 
 much, by indispensably placing trusts of the greatest magnitude, 
 into the hands of individuals whose ambition for power, and 
 aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you — where from the vast 
 extent of your territory, and the complication of interests, the 
 science of government will become intricate and perplexed, and 
 too mysterious for you to understand and observe ; and by which 
 you are to be conducted into a monarchy, either limited or des- 
 potic; the latter, Mr. Locke remarks, is a government derived 
 from neither nature nor compact. 
 
 Political liberty, the great Montesquieu again observes, consists 
 in security, or at least in the opinion we have of security ; and this 
 security, therefore, or the opinion, is best obtained in moderate 
 governments, where the mildness of the laws, and the equality of 
 the manners, beget a confidence in the people, which produces 
 this security, or the opinion. This moderation in governments 
 depends in a great measure on their limits, connected with their 
 political distribution. 
 
 The extent of many of the states of the Union, is at this time 
 almost too great for the superintendence of a republican form of 
 government, and must one day or other revolve into more vigor- 
 ous ones, or by separation be reduced into smaller and more use- 
 ful, as well as moderate ones. You have already observed the 
 feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their insurgents ; with .what 
 difficulty did they quell that insurrection ; and is not the prov- 
 ince of Maine at this moment on the eve of separation from her ? 
 The reason of these things is, that for the security of the property 
 of the community, in which expressive term Mr. Locke makes 
 life, libert}-, and estate, to consist — the wheels of a republic are 
 necessarily slow in their operation; hence in large free republics, 
 the evil sometimes is not only begun, but almost completed, be- 
 fore they are in a situation to turn the current into a contrary 
 progression: the extremes are also too remote from the usual seat 
 of government, and the laws, therefore, too feeble to afford pro- 
 tection to all its parts, and insure domestic tranquility without the 
 
258 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 aid of another principle. If, therefore, this state, and that of North 
 Carolina, had an army under their control, they never would have 
 lost Vermont, and Frankland, nor the state of Massachusetts suf- 
 fer an insurrection, or the dismemberment of her fairest district, but 
 the exercise of a principle which would have prevented these 
 things, if we may believe the experience of ages, would have 
 ended in the destruction of their liberties. 
 
 Will this consolidated republic, if established, in its exercise 
 beget such confidence and compliance, among the citizens of these 
 states, as to do without the aid of a standing army ? I deny that 
 it will. The malcontents in each state, who will not be a few, 
 nor the least important, will be exciting factions against it — the 
 fear of a dismemberment of some of its parts, and the necessity to 
 enforce the execution of revenue laws (a fruitful source of op- 
 pression) on the extremes and in the other districts of the gov- 
 ernment, will incidentally and necessarily require a permanent 
 force, to be kept on foot: will not political security, and even the 
 opinion of it, be extinguished? Can mildness and moderation 
 exist in a government where the primary incident in its exercise 
 must be force? Will not violence destroy confidence, and can 
 equality subsist where the extent, policy, and practice of it will 
 naturally lead to make odious distinctions among citizens ? 
 
 The people who may compose this national legislature from 
 the southern states, in which, from the mildness of the cli^nate, 
 the fertility of the soil, and the value of its productions, wealith is 
 rapidly acquired, and where the same causes naturally lead to 
 luxury, dissipation, and a passion for aristocratic distinction; 
 where slavery is encouraged, and liberty of course less respected 
 and protected ; who know not what it is to acquire property by 
 their own toil, nor to economize with the savings of industry — 
 will these men, therefore, be as tenacious of the liberties and in- 
 terests of the more northern states, where freedom, independence, 
 industry, equality and frugality are natural to the climate and 
 soil, as men who are your own citizens, legislating in your own 
 state, under your inspection, and whose manners and fortunes 
 bear a more equal resemblance to your own? . 
 
 It may be suggested, in answer to this, that whoever is a citi- 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 259 
 
 zen of one state is a citizen of each, and that therefore he will be 
 as interested in the happiness and interest of all, as the one he is 
 delegated from ; but the argument is fallacious, and, whoever has 
 attended to the history of mankind, and the principles which bind 
 them together as parents, citizens, or men, will readily perceive 
 it. These principles are, in their exercise, like a pebble cast on 
 the calm surface of a river — the circles begin in the center, and 
 are small, active, and forcible, but as they depart from that point, 
 they lose their force, and vanish into calmness. 
 
 The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic 
 walls. The ties of the parent exceed that of any other; as we 
 depart from home, the next general principle of union is amongst 
 citizens of the same state, where acquaintance, habits, and for- 
 tunes, nourish affection, and attachment ; enlarge the circle still 
 further, and, as citizens of different states, though we acknowledge 
 the same national denomination, we lose in the ties of acquaint- 
 ance, habits, and fortunes, and thus by degrees we lessen in our 
 attachments, till, at length, we no more than acknowledge a same- 
 ness of species. Is it, therefore, from certainty like this, reason- 
 able to believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, or New Hampshire, 
 will have the same obligations towards you as your own, and 
 preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care 
 and attachment ? Intuitive reason answers in the negative. 
 
 In the course of my examination of the principles of consolida- 
 tion of the states into one general government, many other reas- 
 ons against it have occurred, but I flatter myself, from those 
 herein offered to your consideration, I have convinced you that 
 it is both presumptuous and impracticable, consistent with your 
 safety. To detain you with further remarks would be useless. I 
 shall, however, continue in my following numbers to analyse this 
 new government, pursuant to my promise. Cato. 
 
CATO, IV. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, 
 
 (]Sr-anQ.T3er 3140) 
 
 Thursday, Novembers, 1787. 
 
 For the New York Journal. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York : 
 
 Admitting, however, that the vast extent of America, to- 
 gether with the various other reasons which I offered you in 
 my last number, against the practicabihty of the just exercise 
 of the new government are insufficient to convince; still it is 
 an undesirable truth, that its several parts are either possessed 
 of principles, which you have heretofore considered as ruinous 
 and that others are omitted which you have established as funda- 
 mental to your political security, and must in their operation, I 
 will venture to assert, fetter your tongues and minds, enchain 
 your bodies, and ultimately extinguish all that is great and noble 
 in man. 
 
 In pursuance of my plan I shall begin with observations on the 
 executive branch of this new system ; and though it is not the 
 first in order, as arranged therein, yet being the chief, is perhaps 
 entitled by the rules of rank to the first consideration. The ex- 
 ecutive power as described in the 2d article, consists of a presi- 
 dent and vice-president, who are to hold their offices during the 
 term of four years; the same article has marked the manner and 
 time of their election, and established the qualifications of the 
 president ; it also provides against the removal, death, or inability 
 of the president and vice-president — regulates the salary of the 
 
 ( 260 ) 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 26 1 
 
 president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly, declares 
 the causes for which the president and vice-president shall be re- 
 moved from office. 
 
 Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentle- 
 men who composed the convention, it may be here remarked with 
 deference, that the construction of the first paragraph of the first 
 section of the second article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves 
 the mind in doubt as to the election of a president and vice-presi- 
 dent, after the expiration of the election for the first term of four 
 years ; in every other case, the election of these great officers Is 
 expressly provided for; but there is no explicit provision for thfeit 
 election in case of expiration of their offices, subsequent to the 
 election which is to set this political machine in motion ; no cer- 
 tain and express terms as in your state constitution, that statedly 
 once in every four years, and as often as these offices shall be- 
 come vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed, 
 an election shall be held as follows, &c., this inexplicitness pef- 
 
 |; haps may lead to an establishment for life. 
 
 ^ It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that in 
 kll magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated 
 ijKihe brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year 
 Would be dangerous. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelli- 
 gent mind to account why great power in the hands of a magis*- 
 trate, and that power connected with considerable duration, may 
 be dangerous to the liberties of a republic, the deposit of vast 
 trusts in the hands of a single magistrate, enables him in their 
 exercise to create a numerous train of dependents ; this tempts 
 his ambition, which in a republican magistrate is also remarked, to 
 be pernicious, and the duration of his office for any considerable 
 time favors his views, gives him the means and time to perfect 
 and execute his designs, he therefore fancies that he may be great 
 and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens, and raising himself 
 to permanent grandeur on the niins of his country. And here it 
 may be necessary to compare the vast and important powers of 
 the president, together with his continuance in office, with the 
 foregoing doctrine — his eminent magisterial situation will attach 
 many adherents to him, and he will be surrounded by expectants 
 
262 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 and courtiers, his power of nomination and influence on all ap- 
 pointments, the strong posts in each state comprised within his 
 superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his direction, his 
 control over the army, militia, and navy, the unrestrained power 
 of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen 
 from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to 
 commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own 
 guilt, his duration in office for four years: these, and various other 
 principles evidently prove the truth of the position, that if the 
 president is possessed of ambition, he has power and time suffic- 
 ient to ruin his country. 
 
 Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is 
 assisted by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional council 
 in their recess ; he will therefore be unsupported by proper in- 
 formation and advice, and will generally be directed by minions 
 and favorites, or a council of state will grow out of the principal 
 officers of the great departments, the most dangerous council in 
 a free country. 
 
 The ten miles square, which is to become the seat of govern- 
 ment, will of course be the place of residence for the president 
 and the great officers of state; the same observations of a great 
 man will apply to the court of a president possessing the powers 
 of a monarch, that is observed of that of a monarch — ambition 
 with idleness — baseness with pride — the thirst of riches without 
 labor — aversion to truth— flattery — treason — perfidy — violation of 
 engagements — contempt of civil duties — hope from the magistrates 
 weakness ; but above all, the perpetual ridicule of virtue — these, he 
 remarks, are the characteristics by which the courts in all ages 
 have been distinguished. 
 
 The language and the manners of this court will be what dis- 
 tinguishes them from the rest of the community, not what as- 
 similates them to it ; and in being remarked for a behavior that 
 shows they are not meanly born, and in adulation to people of 
 fortune and power. 
 
 The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is 
 dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is made 
 president of the senate, thereby blending the executive and legis- 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 263 
 
 lative powers, besides always giving to some one state, from 
 which he is to come, an unjust pre-eminence. 
 
 It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people 
 should be of their immediate choice ; but by the manner in which 
 the president is chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth or 
 fifth hand, nor does the highest vote, in the way he is elected, 
 determine the choice, for it is only necessary that he should be 
 taken from the highest of five, who may have a plurality of votes. 
 
 Compare your past opinions and sentiments with the present 
 proposed establishment, and you will find, that if you adopt it, 
 that it will lead you into a system which you heretofore repro- 
 bated as odious. Every American Whig, not long since, bore 
 his emphatic testimony against a monarchical government, 
 though limited, because of the dangerous inequality that it 
 created among citizens as relative to their rights and property; 
 and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and 
 prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain 
 (save as to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial in- 
 cidents, the offspring of absurdity and locality). The direct pre- 
 rogatives of the president, as springing from his political charac- 
 ter, are among the following : It is necessary, in order to distin- 
 guish him from the rest of the community, and enable him to 
 keep, and maintain his court, that the compensation for his ser- 
 vices, or in other words, his revenue, should be such as to enable 
 him to appear with the splendor of a prince; he has the 
 power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on 
 their appointments to foreign courts ; as also to make treaties, 
 leagues, and alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, 
 which when made become the supreme law of land : he is a con- 
 stituent part of the legislative power, for every bill which shall 
 pass the House of Representatives and Senate is to be pre- , 
 sented to him for approbation ; if he approves of it he is to sign 
 it, if he disapproves he is to return it with objections, which in 
 many cases will amount to a complete negative; and in this view 
 he will have a great share in the power of making peace, coin- 
 ing money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, ex- 
 pressed or implied in this Constitution : for though it may be as- 
 
264 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 serted that the king of Great Britain has the express power of 
 making peace or war, yet he never thinks it prudent to do so 
 without the advice of his Parliament, from whom he is to derive 
 his support, and therefore these powers, in both president and 
 king, are substantially the same : he is the generalissimo of the 
 nation, and of course has the command and control of the army, 
 navy and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of 
 the union — he may pardon all offences, except in cases of im- 
 peachment, and the principal fountain of all offices and employ- 
 ments. Will not the exercise of these powers therefore tend 
 either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy or 
 monarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on 
 the share or proportion they have in the government ; but experi- 
 ence ought to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an 
 elective government invested with great powers, and interested 
 in his re-election, in what circle appointments will be made; by 
 which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering on monarchy 
 may be established. 
 
 You must, however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates 
 of this new system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance 
 between it and your own state government which you so much 
 prize; and, if you examine, you will perceive that the chief mag- 
 istrate of this state is your immediate choice, controlled and 
 checked by a just and full representation of the people, divested 
 of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making treaties, 
 receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing 
 armies and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, 
 and will be convinced that this government is no more like a true 
 picture of your own than an Angel of Darkness resembles an 
 Angel of Light. Cato. 
 
CATO, V. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (NumlDer S145) 
 
 Thursday, November 22, 1787. 
 
 I For the New York Journal, &c. 
 
 To the Citizens of the State o/N-evt York. 
 
 In my last number I endeavored to prove that the language of 
 the article relative to the establishment of the executive of this 
 new government was vague and inexplicit; that the great powers 
 of the president, connected with his duration in office, would lead 
 to oppression and ruin ; that he would be governed by favorites 
 and flatterers, or that a dangerous council would be collected 
 from the great officers of state ; that the ten miles square, if the 
 remarks of one of the wisest men, drawn from the experience of 
 mankind, may be credited, would be the asylum of the base, idle, 
 avaricious and ambitious, and that the court would possess a 
 language and manners different from yours ; that a vice-president 
 is as unnecessary as he is dangerous in his influence; that the 
 president cannot represent you because he is not of your own im- 
 mediate choice ; that if you adopt this government you will in- 
 cline to an arbitrary and odious aristocracy or monarchy; that 
 the president, possessed of the power given him by this frame of 
 government, differs but very immaterially from the establishment 
 of monarchy in Great Britain; and I warned you to beware of the 
 fallacious resemblance that is held out to you by the advocates 
 of this new system between it and your own state governments, 
 
 And here I cannot help remarking that inexplicitness seems to 
 pervade this whole political fabric; certainly in political compacts, 
 
 { 265 ) 
 
256 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 which Mr. Coke calls the mother and nurse of repose and quietness 
 the want of which induced men to engage in political society, 
 has ever been held by a wise and free people as essential to their 
 security ; as on the one hand it fixes barriers which the ambitious 
 and tyrannically disposed magistrate dare not overleap, and on 
 the other, becomes a wall of safety to the community — otherwise 
 stipulations between the governors and governed are nugatory; 
 and you might as well deposit the important powers of legisla- 
 tion and execution in one or a few and permit them to govern 
 according to their disposition and will ; but the world is too full 
 of examples, which prove that to live by one maris will, became 
 the cause of all men's misery. Before the existence of express 
 political compacts it was reasonably implied that the niagistrate 
 should govern with wisdom and justice; but mere implication was 
 too feeble to restrain the unbridled ambition of a bad man, or af- 
 ford security against negligence, cruelty or any other defect of 
 mind. It is alleged that the opinions and manners of the people 
 of America are capable to resist and prevent an extension of pre- 
 rogative or oppression, but you must recollect that opinion and 
 manners are mutable, and ma};- not always be a permanent ob- 
 struction against the encroachments of government; that the 
 progress of a commercial society begets luxury, the parent of 
 inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy to restraint ; and that 
 ambition and voluptuousness, aided by flattery, will teach magis- 
 trates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have separate and 
 distinct interests from the people ; besides, it will not be denied 
 that government assimilates the manners and opinions of the 
 community to it. Therefore, a general presumption that rulers 
 will govern well is not a sufficient security. You are then under 
 a sacred obligation to provide for the safety of your posterity, 
 and would you now basely desert their interests, when by a small 
 share of prudence you may transmit to them a beautiful political 
 patrimony, which will prevent the necessity of their travelling 
 through seas of blood to obtain that which your wisdom might 
 have secured ? It is a duty you owe likewise to your own repu- 
 tation, for you have a great name to lose; you are characterized 
 as cautious, prudent and jealous in politics; whence is it there- 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 26/ 
 
 fore that you about to precipitate yourselves into a sea of uncer- 
 tainty, and adopt a system so vague, and which has discarded so 
 many of your valuable rights? Is it because you do not believe 
 that an American can be a tyrant? If this be the case, you rest 
 on a weak basis : Americans are like other men in similar situa- 
 tions, when the manners and opinions of the community are 
 changed by the causes I mentioned before ; and your political 
 compact inexplicit, your posterity will find that great power con- 
 nected with ambition, luxury and flattery, will as readily produce 
 a Caesar, Caligula, Nero and Domitain in America, as the same 
 causes did in the Ronian Empire. 
 
 But the next thing to be considered, in conformity to my plan, 
 is the first article of this new government, which comprises the 
 erection of the house of representatives and the senate, and pre- 
 scribes their various powers and objects of legislation. The most 
 general objections to the first article, that biennial elections for 
 representatives are a departure from the safe democratic principles 
 of annual ones — that the number of representatives are too few ; 
 that the apportionment and principles of increase are unjust; 
 that no attention has been paid to either the numbers or property 
 in each state in forming the senate ; that the mode in which they 
 "are appointed and their duration will lead to the establishment of 
 an aristocracy ;^at the senate and president are improperly con- 
 nected, both as to appointments and the making of treaties, which 
 are to become the supreme law of the land; that the judicial, in 
 some measure, to wit, as to the trial of impeachments, is placed 
 in the senate, a branch of the legislative, and sometimes a branch 
 of the executive; that Congress have the improper power of 
 making or altering the regulations prescribed by the different 
 legislatures, respecting the time, place and manner of holding 
 elections for representatives, and the time and manner of chosing 
 senators; that standing armies may be established, and appro- 
 priation of money made for their support for two years ; that the 
 militia of the most remote state may be marched into those states 
 situated at the opposite extreme of this continent; that the slave 
 trade is, to all intents and purposes, permanently established, 
 and a slavish capitation or poll-tax may at any time be levied ; 
 
268 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 these are some of the many evils that will attend the adoption of 
 this government. 
 
 But, with respect to the first objection, it may be remarked that 
 a well-digested democracy has this advantage over all others, to 
 wit : that it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to 
 the supreme command, and the honors they thereby enjoy fill 
 them with a desire of rendering themselves worthy of them; 
 hence this desire becomes part of their education, is matured in 
 manhood, and produces an ardent afifection for their country, and 
 it is the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu that this 
 is, in a great measure, produced by annual election of magistrates. 
 
 If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learn- 
 ing and information to become more prevalent, you never would 
 want men to execute whatever you could design. Sidney ob- 
 serves that a well-gover7ied state is as fruitful to all good purposes 
 as the seven-headed serpent is said to have been in evil; when one 
 head is cut off, many rise up in the place of it. He remarks further 
 that it was also thought that free cities, by frequent election of mag- 
 istrates, became nurseries of great and able men, every man en- 
 deavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the honor 
 he had no other title to, than what anight arise from his merit or 
 reputation; but the framers of this perfect government, as it is 
 called, have departed fram this democratical principle, and estab- , 
 lished biennial elections for the house of representatives, who are 
 to be chosen by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who 
 are to be chosen by the legislatures of the different states, and 
 have given to the executive the unprecedented power of making 
 temporary senators, in case of vacancies by resignation or other- 
 wise, and so far forth establishing a precedent for virtual repre- 
 sentation (though, in fact, their original appointment is virtual), 
 thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they should 
 not be so complaisant as to conform to his appointment, offence 
 will be given to the executive, and the temporary members will 
 appear ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during 
 his time of appointment, will of course act by a power derived 
 from the executive, and for, and under his immediate influence. 
 
 It is a very important objection to this government, that the 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 269 
 
 representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence 
 of corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which 
 all governments ought to take precautions — how guarded you 
 have been on this head, in your own state constitution, and yet 
 the number of senators and representatives proposed for this vast 
 continent does not equal those of your own state; how great the 
 disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in the 
 United States. The history of representation in England, from 
 which we have taken our model of legislation, is briefly this : be- 
 fore the institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part 
 of the community usually met for that purpose; when this be- 
 came impossible, by the increase of numbers, the community was 
 divided into districts, from each of which was sent such a number 
 of deputies as was a complete representation of the various num- 
 bers and orders of citizens within them; but can it be asserted 
 with truth, that six men can be a complete and full representa- 
 tion of the numbers and various orders of the people in this 
 state? Another thing that may be suggested against the small 
 number of representatives is, that but few of you will have a 
 chance of sharing even in this branch of the legislature; and that 
 the choice will be confined to a very few. The more complete it 
 is, the better will your interests be preserved, and the greater the 
 opportunity you will have to participate in government, one of 
 the principal securities of a free people; but this subject has been 
 so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature of 
 Brutus,* that I shall content myself with referring you to him 
 thereon, reserving further observations on the other objections 
 I have mentioned, for my future numbers. Cato. 
 
 * A series of articles in the New York Journal, written by Robert Yates. — Ed. 
 
CATO, VI. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (lirnmlDer 3163) 
 
 Thursday, December i6, 1787. 
 
 For the New York Journal, &c. 
 
 To the People of the State of New York. 
 
 The next objection that arises against this proffered constitu- 
 tion is, that the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes 
 are unjust. The words, as expressed in this article, are " repre- 
 sentatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
 states which may be included in this union, according to their 
 respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
 whole number of free persons, including those bound to service 
 for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths 
 of all other persons." In order to elucidate this, it will be neces- 
 sary to repeat the remark in my last number, that the mode of 
 legislation in the infancy of free communities was by the collective 
 body, and this consisted of free persons, or those whose age ad- 
 mitted them to the right of mankind and citizenship, whose sex 
 made them capable of protecting the state, and whose birth may 
 be denominated Free Born ; and no traces can be found that ever 
 women, children, and slaves, or those who were not sui juris, in 
 the early days of legislation, meeting with the free members of 
 the community to deliberate on public measures; hence is de- 
 rived this maxim in free governments, that representation ought 
 to bear a proportion to the number of free inhabitants in a com- 
 munity ; this principle your own state constitution, and others, 
 have observed in the establishment of a future census, in order to 
 
 (270) 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 2/ 1 
 
 apportion the representatives, and to increase or diminish the 
 representation to the ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. 
 But, what aid can the community derive from the assistance of 
 women, infants and slaves, in their deliberation, or in their de- 
 fence? and what motives, therefore, could the convention have in 
 departing from the just and rational principle of representation, 
 which is the governing principle of this state and of all America? 
 The doctrine of taxation is a very important one, and nothing 
 requires more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that 
 portion, which is taken from, and of that which is left to the 
 subject — and if you anticipate What will be the enormous ex- 
 pense of this new government added also to your own, little will 
 that portion be which will be left to you. I know there are poli- 
 ticians who believe that you should be loaded with taxes, in 
 order to make you industrious, and, perhaps, there are some of 
 this opinion in the convention, but it is an erroneous principle. 
 For, what can inspire you with industry, if the greatest measure 
 of your labors are to be swallowed up in taxes? The advocates 
 for this new system hold out an idea, that you will have but little 
 to pay, for that the revenues will be so managed as to be almost 
 wholly drawn from the source of trade or duties on imports, but 
 this is delusive — for this government to discharge all its inci- 
 dental expenses, besides paying the interest on the home and 
 foreign debts, will require more money than its commerce can 
 afford; and if you reflect one moment, you will find, that if heavy 
 duties are laid on merchandise, as must be the case if govern- 
 ment intends to make this the prime medium to lighten the peo- 
 ple of taxes, that the price of the commodities, useful as well as 
 luxurious, must be increased; the consumers will be fewer; the 
 merchants must import less; trade will languish, and this source 
 of revenue in a great measure be dried up; but if you examine 
 this a little further you will find that this revenue, managed in this 
 way, will come out of you, and be a very heavy and ruinous one, 
 at least. The merchant no more than advances the money for 
 you to the public and will not, nor cannot pay any part of it him- 
 self; and if he pays more duties, he will sell his commodities 
 at a price portionably raised. Thus the laborer, mechanic, and 
 
272 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 farmer must feel it in the purchase of their utensils and clothing 
 — wages, etc., must rise with the price of things or they must be 
 ruined; and that must be the case with the farmer, whose produce 
 will not increase, in the ratio, with labor, utensils and clothing; 
 for that he must sell at the usual price or lower perhaps, caused 
 by the decrease of trade ; the consequence will be that he must 
 mortgage his farm, and then comes inevitable bankruptcy. 
 
 In what manner then will you be eased, if the expenses of gov- 
 ernment are to be raised solely out of the commerce of this 
 country ; do you not readily apprehend the fallacy of this argu- 
 ment? But government will find that to press so heavily on 
 commerce will not do, and therefore must have recourse to other 
 objects; these will be a capitation or poll-tax, window lights, etc., 
 etc, and a long train of impositions which their ingenuity will 
 suggest ; but will you submit to be numbered like the slaves of an 
 arbitrary despot ; and what will be your reflections when the tax- 
 master thunders at your door for the duty on that light which is 
 the bounty of heaven. It will be the policy of the great land- 
 holders who will chiefly compose this senate, and perhaps a 
 majority of this house of representatives, to keep their lands 
 free from taxes ; and this is confirmed by the failure of every at- 
 tempt to lay a land-tax in this state; hence recourse must and 
 will be had to the sources I mentioned before. The burdens on 
 you will be insupportable — your complaints will be inefficacious 
 — this will beget public disturbances ; and I will venture to pre- 
 dict, without the spirit of prophecy, that you and the govern- 
 ment, if it is adopted, will one day be at issue on this point. 
 The force of government will be exerted, this will call for an in- 
 crease of revenue, and will add fuel to the fire. The result will 
 be that either you will revolve to some other form, or that gov- 
 ernment will give peace to the country by destroying the opposi- 
 tion. If government therefore can, notwithstanding every op- 
 position, raise a revenue on such things as are odious and bur- 
 densome to you, they can do anything. 
 
 But why should the number of individuals be the principle to 
 apportion the taxes in each state, and to include in that number 
 women, children and slaves? The most natural and equitable 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 2/3 
 
 principle of apportioning taxes would be in a ratio to their prop- 
 erty, and a reasonable impost in a ratio to their trade ; but you 
 are told to look for the reason of these things in accommodation ; 
 but this much-admired principle, when stripped of its mystery, 
 will in this case appear to be no less than a basis for an odious 
 poll-tax — the offspring of despotic governments, a thing so de- 
 testable that the state of Maryland, in their bill of rights, declares 
 " that the levying taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, 
 and ought to be abolished." A poll-tax is at all times oppressive 
 to the poor, and their greatest misfortune will consist in having 
 more prolific wives than the rich. 
 
 In every civilized community, even in those of the most demo- 
 cratic kind, there are principles which lead to an aristocracy — 
 these are superior talents, fortunes and public employments. But 
 in free governments the influence of the two former is resisted by 
 the equality of the laws, and the latter by the frequency of elec- 
 tions, and the chance that every one has in sharing in public 
 business ; but when this natural and artificial eminence is assisted 
 by principles interwoven in this government; when the senate, so 
 important a branch of the legislature, is so far removed from the 
 people as to have little or no connection with them ; when their 
 duration in oflRce is such as to have the resemblance to perpetuity; 
 when they are connected with the executive, by the appointment 
 of all officers, and also to become a judiciary for the trial of ofifi- 
 cers of their own appointments ; added to all this, when none but 
 men of opulence will hold a seat, what is there left to resist and 
 repel this host of influence and power ? Will the feeble efforts of 
 the house of representatives, in whom your security ought to 
 subsist, consisting of about seventy-three, be able to hold the 
 balance against them, when, from the fewness of members in this 
 house, the senate will have in their power to poison even a ma- 
 jority of that body by douceurs of ofifice for themselves or friends ? 
 From causes hke this both Montesquieu and Hume have pre- 
 dicted the decline of the British government into that of an abso- 
 lute one; but the liberties of this country, it is probable, if this 
 system is adopted, will be strangled in their birth ; for whenever 
 the executive and senate can destroy the independence of the 
 
274 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 majority in the house of representatives, then where is your se- 
 curity? They are so intimately connected, that their interests 
 will be one and the same ; and will the slow increase of numbers 
 be able to afford a repelling principle? But you are told to 
 adopt this government first, and you will always be able to alter 
 it afterwards ; this would first he submitting to be slaves and then 
 taking care of your liberty; and when your chains are on, then to 
 act like freemen. 
 
 Complete acts of legislation, which are to become the supreme 
 law of the land, ought to be the united act of all the branches of 
 government; but there is one of the most important duties may 
 be managed by the Senate and executive alone, and to have all 
 the force of the law paramount without the aid or interference of 
 the House of Representatives; that is the power of making 
 treaties. This power is a very important one, and may be exer- 
 cised in various ways, so as to affect your person and property, 
 and even the domain of the nation. By treaties you may defal- 
 cate part of the empire ; engagements may be made to raise an 
 army, and you may be transported to Europe, to fight the wars 
 of ambitious princes; money may be contracted for, and you 
 must pay it ; and a thousand other obligations may be entered 
 into ; all which will become the supreme law of the land, and you 
 are bound by it. If treaties are erroneously or wickedly made who 
 is there to punish, — the executive can always cover himself with 
 the plea that he was advised by the senate, and the senate being 
 a collective body are not easily made accountable for mal-admin- 
 istration. On this account we are in a worse situation than 
 Great Britain, where they have secured by a ridiculous fiction, 
 the king from accountability, by declaring that he can do no 
 wrong, by which means the nation can have redress against his 
 minister; but with us infallibility pervades every part of the sys- 
 tem, and neither the executive nor his council, who are a collec- 
 tive body, and his advisers, can be brought to punishment for 
 rnal-administration. Cato. 
 
CATO, VII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (TiTiimTDer S181) 
 
 Thursday, January 3, 1788. 
 
 For the New York Journal, &c. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York. 
 
 That the president and senate are further improperly connected 
 will appear, if it is considered that their dependence on each other 
 will prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must 
 act in concert, and whether the power and influence of the one 
 or the other is to prevail, will depend on the character and abili- 
 ties of the men who hold those offices at the time. The senate 
 is vested with such a proportion of the executive that it would be 
 found necessary that they should be constantly sitting. This 
 circumstance did not escape the convention, and they have pro- 
 vided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares that the 
 executive may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or 
 either of them. No occasion can exist for calling the assembly 
 without the senate ; the words or either of them must have been 
 intended to apply only to the senate. Their wages are already 
 provided for, and it will be therefore readily observed that the 
 partition between a perpetuation of their sessions, and a perpetu- 
 ation of offices in the progress of the government, will be found 
 to be but thin and feeble. Besides, the senate, who have the sole 
 power to try all impeachments, in case of the impeachment of the 
 president are to determine, as judges, the propriety of the advice 
 they gave him as senators. Can the senate in this, therefore, be 
 
 (27s) 
 
276 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 an impartial judicature? And will they not rather serve as a 
 screen to great public defaulters? 
 
 Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new sys- 
 tem of government is that of congress having the power of mak- 
 ing or altering the regulations prescribed by the different legisla- 
 tures respecting the time, place and manner of holding elections 
 for representatives, and the time and manner of choosing senators. 
 If it is enquired in what manner this regulation may be exercised 
 to your injury, the answer is easy. By the first article the house 
 of representatives shall consist of members, chosen every second 
 year by the people of the several states who are qualified to vote 
 for members of their several state assemblies ; it can therefore 
 readily be believed, that the different state legislatures, provided 
 such can exist after the adoption of this government, will con- 
 tinue those easy and convenient modes for the election of repre- 
 sentatives for the national legislature that are in use for the elec- 
 tion of members of assembly for their own states; but the 
 congress have, by the constitution, a power to make other regu- 
 lations or alter those in practice, prescribed by your own state 
 legislatures; hence, instead of having the places of elections in 
 the precincts and brought home almost lo your own doors, con- 
 gress may establish a place, or places, at either the extremes, 
 center or outer parts of the states; at a time and season, too, 
 when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these means 
 destroy the rights of election. But in opposition to this reasoning, 
 it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might 
 omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the ex- 
 istence of that branch of the government ; this is what logicians 
 call argtimentum absurdum; for the different states, if they will 
 have any security at all in this government, will find it in the 
 house of representatives, and they, therefore, would be very ready 
 to eradicate a principle in which it dwells, or involve their country 
 in an instantaneous revolution. Besides, if this was the appre- 
 hension of the framers, and the ground of that provision, why did 
 not they extend this controlling power to the other duties of the 
 several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states are to 
 appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president ; but the 
 
LETTERS OF CATO. 277 
 
 time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they 
 were to omit the appointment of senators and electors, though 
 congress was to appoint the time, which might well be appre- 
 hended, as the omission of regulations for the election of mem- 
 bers of the house of representatives, provided they had that 
 power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of course, the 
 government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this motive 
 or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties en- 
 tirely in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihi- 
 lated them, which they in fact have done by leaving them with- 
 out the means of support, or at least resting on their bounty.- To 
 this the advocates for this system oppose the common, empty 
 declamation, that there is no danger that congress will abuse this 
 power ; but such language, as relative to so important a subject, 
 is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in their power, 
 however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to 
 you ? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in 
 their sense. It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, 
 to suppose that what may be done will be; therefore, in consider- 
 ing this subject, you are to suppose that in the exercise of this 
 government, a regulation of congress will be made for holding an 
 election for the whole state at Pou'gnkeepsie, at New York, or, 
 perhaps, at Fort Stanwix ; who will then be the actual electors 
 for the house of representatives ? You ought certainly to have 
 as much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these 
 powers by congress, than congress ought to have with respect to 
 the exercise of those duties which ought to be entrusted to the 
 several states, because over them congress can have a legislative 
 controlling power. 
 
 Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their 
 duties by positive restrictions ; if the cord has been drawn too 
 tight, loosen it to the necessary extent, but do not entirely un- 
 bind them. I am no enemy to placing a reasonable confidence 
 in them, but such an unbounded one as the advocates and framers 
 of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous to your 
 liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be 
 yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal power. Unlimited power 
 
278 LETTERS OF CATO. 
 
 in governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of de- 
 ception. What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Mace- 
 don and caused the ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence 
 in their statesmen and rulers? Such improper confidence De- 
 mosthenes was so well convinced had ruined his country, that iii 
 his second Philippic oration he remarks " that there is one com- 
 mon bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, 
 the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, 
 against the assaults of tyrants. What is this ? Distrust. Of this 
 be mindful ; to this adhere ; preserve this carefully, and no calam- 
 ity can affect you." Montesquieu observes that " the course of 
 government is attended with an insensible descent to evil, and 
 there is no reascending to good without very great efforts." The 
 plain influence from this doctrine is, that rulers in all governments 
 will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a 
 tendency to enslave them, There ■ is, therefore, no other way of 
 interrupting this insensible descent and warding off the evil as 
 long as possible, than by establishing principles of distrust on 
 your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among your- 
 selves. But let me inquire of you, my countrymen, whether the 
 freedom and independence of elections is a point of magnitude ? 
 If it is, what kind of a spirit of amity, deference and concession 
 is that which has put in the power of congress, at one stroke, to 
 prevent your interference in government, and do away your liber- 
 ties forever? Does either the situation or circumstances of things 
 warrant it ? Cato. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 C^SAR, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE DAILY ADVERTISER, 
 
 October, 
 
 1787. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 These letters, from what has already been quoted on page 245, 
 were evid ently written by Alexander Hamilton. He had just 
 finished a newspaper controversy of a very acrimonious character 
 with George Clinton, which probably caused these letters to be 
 an attack on the writer of Caio, rather than a defense of the new 
 government. They are further evidence of the great want of 
 political tact and sympathy with the masses, of which Hamilton 
 gave so many specimens in his short life, and which alone pre- 
 vented his political success. That he himself realized this mis- 
 take is shown by his prompt abandonment of Ccesar and his be- 
 ginning again anew in JJie Federalist; the latter being a singular 
 and interesting contrast in both tone and argument to these 
 earlier writings, which, it should be also considered, were un- 
 doubtedly written in great haste. 
 
 (281) 
 
C^SAR, I. 
 
 THE DAILY ADVERTISER, 
 
 (NTimlDer 813) 
 
 Monday, October i, 1787. 
 
 The citizens of the State of New York have received yesterday, 
 from Cato (an ally o{ Pompey, no doubt), an introductory discourse 
 on the appearance of the new system for the government of the 
 United States : this, we are told, will be followed by such obser- 
 vations, on the constitution proposed to the union, "as will pro- 
 mote our welfare and be justified by reason and truth." There 
 is, in this preparatory lecture, little that is necessary to be dwelt 
 on just now; and if Cato had not possessed his future investiga- 
 tions in such terms as wore a questionable shape, they should 
 have passed unheeded. 
 
 Cato tells us that he will not directly engage as an advocate for 
 this new forttl of government, or as ail opponent. Here Cato, 
 without any dispute, acts prudently. It will be wise in him to 
 fest awhile; since he has giveri z. preface, which, With small ad- 
 dress, carl easily be made to Work Oil dther side. When the 
 sentiments of the confederate states come to be geftefally known it 
 will be time enough tO proceed. Cato will then start fair. A littlfe 
 Caution, however, he thinks necessary to be given the meantime. 
 " Do not," Says this prudent censor, in addressiilg the citizens, 
 "because you will admit that something must be done, adopt 
 anything." What, in the hame of common sense, does this in- 
 junction import? I appeal to men of understanding, whether it 
 is not obviously the lahguage of distrust, calculated, as far as 
 such a thing can influence, to prejudice the public opinion 
 
 (283) 
 
284 LETTERS OF CAESAR. 
 
 against the new constitution ; and, in effect, by a periphrastic 
 mode of speech, recommending the rejection of it? " Teach the 
 members of the Convention (Cato very modestly goes on) that 
 you are capable of supervison of their conduct; the same medium 
 that gave you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is 
 now open, can make amendments or give you anpther!' O ex- 
 cellent thought, and happily advised! Be clamorous, my friends 
 — be discontented — assert your prerogative — forever assert the 
 power and majesty of the people. I am not willing "to suspect 
 any man's intentions, when they aim at giving information; but 
 when they come abroad, couched in such magisterial terms, I 
 own I feel some indignation. If this demagogue had talents to 
 throw light on the subject of legislation, why did he not offer 
 them when the Convention was in session? If they had been 
 judged useful, no doubt they would have been attended to. But 
 is this now a time for such insinuations? Has not the wisdom of 
 America been drawn, as it were, into a focus, and the proffered 
 constitution sent forth with a unanimity that is unequalled in 
 ancient or modern story? And shall we now wrangle and find 
 ,. fault with the excellent whole, because, perhaps some of its parts 
 might have been more perfect? There is neither virtue or patriot- 
 ism in such conduct. Besides, how can Cato say, "that the 
 door is now open to receive any amendments, or give us another 
 constitution, if required ?" I believe he has advanced this without 
 proper authority. I am inclined to believe that the door of re- 
 commendation is shut and cannot be opened by the same men ; that 
 the Convention, in one word, is dissolved ; if so we must reject in 
 TOTO, or vice versa; just take it as it is and be thankful. I deny 
 the similarity betwixt the present constitution and that of the 
 United Netherlands. Cato would have drawn a very melancholy 
 picture, but it won't apply. In my most humble opinion, it has 
 a much greater affinity with the government, which, in all human 
 probability, will remain when the history of the Seven Provinces 
 shall be forgotten. Cato tells us (what all America knows by 
 this time) that the new constitution comes sanctioned with the 
 approbation of General Washington ; and, though he appears to 
 have some reverence for that great patriot chief, yet he very 
 
LETTERS OF C^SAR. 285 
 
 sagaciously observes, that the best and wisest man may err; and 
 thence asserts, that every man in politics, as well as in religion, 
 ought to judge for himself. This paragraph needs no comment, 
 and, for that reason, I shall not touch it; but with all deference 
 to Cato's penetration, I would recommend to him, instead of en- 
 tering into fruitless discussion of what has come from so many 
 clear heads and good hearts, to join his fellow-citizens, and en- 
 deavor to reconcile this excellent constitution to the weak, the sus- 
 picious, and the interested, who will be chiefly opposed to it, as 
 soon as possible. I would also advise him to give his vote (as he 
 will probably be one of the Electors) to the American Fabius ; it 
 will be more healthy for this country, and this state, that he 
 should be induced to accept of the presidency of the new govern- 
 ment, than that he should be , solicited again to accept of the 
 command of an army. 
 
 Cato, it appears, intends to adventure on perilous graunds ; it 
 will therefore become him to be cautious on what terms he takes 
 the field. " He advises us to attach ourselves to measures, and 
 not to men." In this instance he advises well ; and I heartily 
 recommend it to himself, and not to forget the force of that im- 
 portant admonition; for Cato, in his future marches, will very 
 probably h& followed by Caesar. 
 
 Friday. 
 
C^SAR, 11. 
 
 THE DAILY ADVERTISER, 
 
 (Niamber 826) 
 
 Wednesday, October 17, 1787. 
 
 For the Daily Advertiser. 
 
 " The great source of all the evils which afflict Republics, is, that the people are too 
 apt to make choice of rulers, who are either Politicians without being Patriots, or 
 Patriots without being Politicians." 
 
 Mr. Childs: 
 
 When I took notice of Cato's prefatory address to the Citizens 
 of the State of New York, in your paper of the first instant, I had 
 no serious intention of becoming a controversial defendant of the 
 new constitution. Indeed, if the system required defence, I was 
 neither so weak nor so vain as to suppose myself competent to 
 the task. To obviate difficulties which may arise, when such 
 weighty affairs as the principles of legislation are under discus- 
 cussion, I am sensible requires talents far beyond my limited 
 abilities. When I offered a few remarks on Cato's introduction, 
 I was strongly impressed with the idea that even the most sub- 
 stantial criticisms, promulgated by the most influential avowed 
 Citizens, could have no good tendency at this time. I viewed the 
 public mind as wound up to a great pitch of dissatisfaction, by 
 the inadequacy of the powers of the present Congress to the gen- 
 eral good and conversation of the union. I believed then, as I 
 do now, that the people were determined and prepared for a 
 change. I conceived, therefore, that the wish of every good man 
 would be, that this change might be peaceably effected. With this 
 view I opposed myself to Cato. I asserted, in my last, that the 
 
 (286) 
 
LETTERS OF CiESAR, 287 
 
 door of recommendation was shut, and cannot be opened by the 
 same men — that the Convention was djssolved. If I am wrong, it 
 will be of great importance to Gate's future remarks that he make 
 it appear. If he lyill declare from sufficient authority, that the 
 members of the late Convention have only adjourned to giye time 
 to hear the sentiments of every political disputant, that after the 
 numerous presses of America have groaned with the heavy pro- 
 ductions of speculative politicians, they will again meet, weigh 
 their respective inerits, and accommodate accordingly — I say, if 
 Cato can do this;, I make no hesitation ii;i acknowledging the util- 
 ity of his plan. In the mean time, I positively deny having any, 
 the most distant desire of shutting the door of free discussion, on 
 any subject which may benefit the people ; but I maintain (until 
 Cato's better information refutes me) that the door, as far as re- 
 lates to this subject, is already shut, not by me, but by the highest 
 possible authority which the case admits, even by those great 
 Patriots who were delegated by the people of the United Stateg 
 to open such a door, as might enable them to escape from irapend- 
 ding calamities and political shipwreck. This distinction is clear, 
 I conceive, and ought to have some weight even with Cato, as 
 well as those for whom he writes. I am jiot.cmfi_fif those who 
 
 gain an influence by cajoling the unt hinking mass (tho ' I pity 
 the]£_ikliisions), and ringing in their ears the gracious sound of 
 their absolute Sovereignty. I despise the trick of such dirty pol- 
 k^ I know there are Citizens, wlio, to gain their own private 
 ends, enflame the minds of the well-meaning, tho' less intelligent 
 parts of the community, by sating their YanH^^wfth that cordial 
 and unfailing specific, that all potver is seated in the people. For 
 my part, I am not much attached to the majesty of the mult itude, 
 and therefore waive all pretensions^ounded on such conduct), to 
 their countenance. I consider them in general as very ill quali- 
 fied to judge for themselves wha±.gpjiernmeiiL-will-best suit their 
 peculiar situations; nor is thisto be wondered^at. The science 
 of government is not easily uhderstbdd. Cato will admit, I pre- 
 sume, that men of good education and deep reflection, only, are 
 judges oi\!a&form of a government; whether it is constituted on 
 such principles, as will restrain arbitrary power, on the one hand. 
 
288 LETTERS OF C^SAR. 
 
 and equal to the exclusion of corruption and the destruction of 
 licentiousness on the other; whether the New Constitution, ii 
 adopted, will prove adequate to such desirable ends, time, the 
 mother of events, will show. For my own part. I sincerely es- 
 teem it a system, which, without the finger of God, never could 
 have been suggested and agreed upon by such a diversity of in- 
 terests. I will not presume to say that a more perfect system 
 might not have been fabricated ; but who expects perfection at 
 once ? And it may be asked, who are judges of it ? Few, I be- 
 lieve, who have leisure to study the nature of Government scien- 
 tifically, but will frequently disagree about the quantum of power 
 to be delegated to Rulers, and the different modifications of it. 
 Ingenious men will give every plausible, and, it may be, pretty 
 substantial reasons, for the adoption of two plans of Government, 
 which shall be fundamentally different in their construction, and 
 not less so in their operation ; yet both, if honestly administered, 
 might operate with safety and advantage. When a new form of 
 ~^ government is fabricated, it lies with the people at large to receive 
 or reject it — that is, their inherent rights. Now, I would ask 
 (without intending to triumph over the weaknesses or follies of 
 any men), how are the people to profit by this inherent right ? 
 By what conduct do they discover that they are sensible of their 
 own interests in this situation ? Is it by the exercise of a well- 
 disciplined reason, and a correspondent education? I believe not. 
 How then ? As I humbly conceive, by a tractable and docile 
 disposition, and by honest men endeavoring to keep their minds 
 easy, while others, of the same disposition, with the advantages 
 of genius and learning, are constructing the bark that may, by the 
 blessing of Heaven, carry them to the port of rest and happiness, 
 if they will embark without diffidence and proceed without mutiny. 
 I know this is blunt and ungracious reasoning; it is the best, how- 
 ever, which I am prepared to offer on this momentous business ; 
 and, since my own heart does not reproach me, I shall not be very 
 solicitous about its reception. If truth, then, is permitted to 
 speak, the mass of the people of America (any more than the 
 mass of other countries) camiot judge with any degree of precision 
 j / concerning the fitness of this New Constitution to the peculiar 
 
LETTERS OF CiESAR. 289 
 
 situation of America ; they have, however, done wisely in dele- 
 gating the power of framing a government to those every way 
 worthy and well-qualified; and, if this Government is snatched, 
 untasted, from them, it may not be amiss to inquire into the 
 causes which will probably occasion their disappointment. Out 
 of several, which present to my mind, I shall venture to select 
 one, baneful enough, in my opinion, to work this dreadful evil. 
 There are always men in society of some talents, but more am- /^ 
 bition, in quest of that which it would be impossible for them to'^^j^^ 
 obtain in any other way than by working on the passions and 
 prejudices of the less discerning classes of citizens and yeomanry. 
 It is the plan of men of this stamp to frighten the people with 
 ideal bugbears, in order to mould them to their own purpose 
 The unceasing cry of these designing croakers is, My friends, 
 your libeTty4s~iHvaded ! Have you thrown off the yoke of one 
 tyrant to mvest^ourselves with that of another? Have you 
 fought, bled and conquered for such a change f If you have — go 
 — retire into silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that scourges you. 
 
 To be serious : These state empirics leave no species of deceit 
 untried to convince the unthinking people that they have power 
 to do — what ? Why truly to do much mischief, and to occasion 
 anarchy and wild uproar. And for what reason do these politi- 
 cal jugglers incite the peaceably disposed to such extravagant 
 commotions ? Because until the people really discover that they 
 have power, by some outrageous act, they never can become of 
 any importance. The mis^uided_people never reflect during this 
 frenzy, that the moment they become riotous, they renounce, 
 from that moment, their independence, and commence vassals 
 to their ambitious leaders, who instantly, and with a high hand, 
 rob them of their consequence, and apply it to their own present 
 or future aggrandisement ; nor will these tyrants over the people 
 stick at sacrificing their good, if an advantageous compromise 
 can be effected for themselves. 
 
 Before I conclude, I cannot refrain from observing that Cato 
 states very disingenuously the manner in which the Federal Sys- 
 tem came abroad. He tells us, Congress were sensible that the 
 late Convention exercised a power which no authority could 
 
290 LETTERS OF CiESAR. 
 
 delegate to them. The Convention, says Cato, have taken upon 
 them to make a perfectly new system, which by its operations 
 will absorb the sovereignties of the iadividual States; this new 
 government founded on usurpation, (Cato, this expression is very 
 indecent — but I will rouse no passions against you) this consoli- 
 dated system Congress did not approve and therefore have been 
 silent on its character. That Congress was silent on its charac- 
 ter is true, but could Cato find no other reason for their silence 
 than that of disapprobation? I believe Congress were by no 
 means dissatisfied with the freedom the Convention took with 
 the Articles of Confederation ; I believe further that with very 
 few exceptions, that honorable body approves of the New Consti- 
 tution; and that they did not accompany it to the States with a 
 recommendatory capitation or circular letter, proceeded from a 
 delicate attention to the members of the late Convention, to a few 
 of their own body, and to the people of America at large. That 
 the Convention went so earnesly into the business committed to 
 their care ought, instead of being matter of chagrin, to occasion 
 the liveliest expressions of approbation and gratitude — as matters 
 stand just now. I think it may be fairly said, that no generous 
 plan of government for the United States has ever been con- 
 structed, (the plan only excepted which is under consideration) 
 so that it seems quite unnecessary in Cato to disturb the peace ot 
 society by a bombast appeal to their feelings, on the generous 
 plan of power delivered down by their renowned forefathers. I 
 venerate the memory of the slaughtered patriots of America, and 
 rejoice as much as Cato that they did not bleed in vain, but I 
 would have America profit by their death in a different manner 
 from him. I beliefVe they sought to obtain liberty for no par- 
 ticular State, but for the whole Union, indissolubly connected 
 under one controlling and supreme head. 
 
 Cato complains of my anticipating parts of his subject which he 
 intended for future periods. I shall break in no more upon his 
 arrangements. All he can say against the New Constitution has 
 been already disseminated in a neighboring State by the glorious 
 defenders of Shayism. I shall therefore leave Cato to the wicked 
 influences of his own heart, in the fullest persuasion that all good 
 
LETTERS OF C^SAR. 29! 
 
 citizens will combine their influence to establish the fair fabric of 
 American liberty beyond the reach of suspicion, violence, anarchy, 
 and tyranny. When this glorious work is accomplished, what 
 may America not hope to arrive at? I will venture to prophesy 
 that the day on which the Union under the new government shall 
 be ratified by the American States, that that day will begin an era 
 which will be recorded and observed by future ages as a day 
 which the Americans had marked by their wisdom in circum- 
 scribing the power and ascertaining the decUne of the ancient 
 nations in Christendom. CiESAR. 
 
 October 15. 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 SYDNEY, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 ROBERT YATES, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, 
 
 June, 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 Sydney was a favorite pseudonym of Robert Yates, and was so 
 well known as his pen name by his contemporaries that it was 
 hardly intended as a mask. He had already contributed to the 
 New York Journal a very able series of papers on the Constitu- 
 tion over the signature of Brutus, written to influence the people, 
 but the elections had taken place before the appearance of Sydney, 
 which were therefore intended for the delegates to the State Con- 
 vention, soon to assemble. A year later, when Yates was nomi- 
 nated for governor by the Federalists, quotation from these arti- 
 cles was one of the favorite modes of attacking him used by the 
 anti-federalists. 
 
 (29S) 
 
SYDNEY, I. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (NvLTtiber S3SO) 
 
 Friday, June 13, 1788. 
 
 For the Daily Patriotic Register. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York. 
 
 Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution 
 for the government of the United States have been laid before the 
 public by men of the best abilities, 1 am led to believe that rep- 
 resenting it in a point of view which has escaped their observa- 
 tion may be of use, that is, by comparing it with the constitution 
 of the State of New York. 
 
 The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to 
 show in what instances the powers of the state government will 
 be either totally or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine 
 whether the remaining powers will, from those kind of pillars, be 
 capable of supporting the mutilated fabric of a government, which 
 even the advocates for the new constitution admit excels " the 
 boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those of all other nations, 
 in having precisely marked out the power of the government and 
 the rights of the people." 
 
 It may be proper to premise that the pressure of. necessity and 
 distress (and not corruption) had a principal tendency to induce 
 the adoption of the state constitutions and the existing confedera- 
 tion, that power was even then vested in the rulers with the great- 
 est caution, and that, as from every circumstance we have reason 
 to infer that the new constitution does not originate from a pure 
 source, we ought deliberately to trace the extent and tendency of 
 
 (297) 
 
298 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 the trust we are about to repose, under the conviction that a re- 
 assumption of that trust will at least be difficult, if not impracti- 
 cable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of Con- 
 gress who have their secret journals, the conduct of their officers, 
 at home and abroad, acting under an oath of secrecy, as well as 
 of individuals who were intimately connected with them, from the 
 year 1780 to the last convention, who also acted under an injunc- 
 tion of secrecy (and whose journals have not been published even 
 to this day, but will no doubt continue buried in the dark womb 
 of suspicious secrecy), we can scarcely entertain a doubt but that 
 a plan has long since been framed to subvert the confederation ; 
 that that plan has been matured with the most persevering indus- 
 try and unremitted attention, and that the objects expressed in 
 the preamble to the constitution, that is " to promote the general 
 welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
 posterity," were merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of 
 its framers. That necessity and danger have been the moving 
 causes to the establishment of the confederation will appear from 
 the words of Congress recommending its formation to the several 
 legislatures which are " under a conviction of the absolute neces- 
 sity of uniting all our councils and all our strength to maintain 
 our common liberties. Let them be examined with liberality be- 
 coming brethren and fellow-citizens, surrounded by the same imi- 
 nent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply 
 interested in being forever bound and connected together by the 
 ties the most intimate and indissoluble." 
 
 That these principles equally applied to the formation of our 
 state constitution no person can seriously doubt who recollects 
 the rapid progress of the British troops in this state and in Jersey 
 in the year 1776, and the despondence which prevailed among 
 the people on that occasion. The convention of this state, about 
 that period, in explaining to the people the justice of the Ameri- 
 can cause, addressed them as follows : " You and all men were 
 created free and authorised to establish civil government for the 
 preservation of our rights against civil oppression, and the secur- 
 ity of that freedom which God had given you, against the rapa- 
 cious hand of tyranny and lawless power. If then God hath given 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 299 
 
 as freedom, are we not responsible to him for that as well as other 
 talents ? If it is our birth-right, let us not sell it for a mess of 
 pottage, nor suffer it to be torn from us by the hand of violence." 
 
 The omission of a bill of rights in this State has given occasion 
 to an inference that the omission was equally warrantable in the 
 constitution for the United States. On this it may be necessary 
 to observe that while the constitution of this State was in agita- 
 tion, there appeared doubts upon the propriety of the measure, 
 from the peculiar situation in which the country then was ; our 
 connection with Britain dissolved, and her government formally 
 renounced — no substitute devised — all the powers of government 
 avowedly temporary, and solely calculated for defence; it was 
 urged by those in favor of a bill of rights that the power of the 
 rulers ought to be circumscribed, the better to protect the people 
 at large from the oppression and usurpation of their rulers. The 
 English petition of rights, in the reign of Charles the First, and 
 the bill of rights in the reign of king William, were mentioned as 
 examples to support their opinions. Those in opposition ad- 
 mitted that in established governments, which had an implied 
 constitution, a declaration of rights might be necessary to pre- 
 vent the usurpation of ambitious men, but that was not our 
 situation, for upon the declaration of independence it had be- 
 come necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority 
 " under the former government should be totally suppressed, and 
 all the power of government exerted under the authority of the 
 people of the colonies ;" that we could not suppose that we had 
 an existing constitution or form of government, express or im- 
 plied, and therefore our situation resembled a people in a state of 
 nature, who are preparing "to institute a government, laying its 
 foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such 
 form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and 
 happiness," and as such, the constitution to be formed would ope- 
 rate as a bill of rights. 
 
 These and the like considerations operated to induce the con- 
 vention of New York to dismiss the idea of a bill of rights, and 
 the more especially as the legislative state officers being elected 
 by the people at short periods, and thereby rendered from time to 
 
300 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 time liable to be displaced in case of mal-conduct. But these 
 reasons will not apply to the general government, because it will 
 appear in the sequel that the state governments are considered in 
 it as mere dependencies, existing solely by its toleration, and pos- 
 sessing powers of which they maybe deprived whenever the gen- 
 eral government is disposed so to do. If then the powers of the 
 state governments are to be totally absorbed, in which all agree, 
 and only differ as to the mode, whether it will be effected by a 
 rapid progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations : what 
 is to limit the oppression of the general government ? Where 
 are 'the rights, which are declared to be incapable of violation ? 
 And what security have people against the wanton oppression of 
 unprincipled governors? No constitutional redress is pointed out, 
 and no express declaration is contained in it, to limit the bounda- 
 ries of their rulers ; beside which the mode and period of their 
 being elected tends to take away their responsibility to the people 
 over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the sword, 
 domineer at discretion ; nor is there a power on earth to tell them, 
 What dost thou ? or. Why dost thou so ? 
 
 I shall now proceed to compare the constitution of the state of 
 New York with the proposed federal government, distinguishing 
 the paragraphs in the former, which are rendered nugatory by the 
 latter ; those which are in a great measure enervated, and such as 
 are in the discretion of the general government to permit or not. 
 
 The 1st and 37th paragraphs of the constitution of the state 
 of New York. 
 
 The 1st " Ordains, determines, and declares that no authority 
 shall on any pretence whatever be exercised over the people or 
 members of this State, but such as shall be derived from and 
 granted by them." 
 
 The 37th, " That no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands 
 with or of the Indians within the limits of this state, shall be 
 binding on the Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the 
 authority and with the consent of the legislature of this state.'' 
 
 I beg here to observe that the whole history of this spurious 
 constitution for the government of the United States, from its 
 origin to the present day, and the measures taken by Congress 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 3OI 
 
 respecting the Indian affairs in this state, are a series of violations 
 of these paragraphs, and of the 1 3th article of the confederation. 
 
 It was a violation of the state constitution for the senate and 
 assembly, on the 19th of February, 1787, to instruct their mem- 
 bers to move in Congress for an act recommending a convention ; 
 and it was also a violation of the 1 3th article of the confederation 
 for Congress, on the 21st day February, to recommend a conven- 
 tion to the several legislatures. It was a further violation of the 
 constitution of this state, by the senate and assembly, on the 27th 
 day of March, to join and to appoint delegates to meet in conven- 
 tion, and it being done in that hasty, if not surreptitious manner, 
 by joint resolutions, when acts of the least consequence, even for 
 the yoking of hogs, require to be passed under the formalities of 
 a law, makes it more glaringly so. 
 
 It was an outrageous violation in the convention on the 17th 
 of September, 1787, to attempt a. consolidation of the union, and 
 utterly destroy the confederation and the sovereignty of particu- 
 lar states, when their powers were restricted " to the sole and 
 express purpose of revising and amending the confederation." 
 
 It was again an infringement of the 1 3th article in the confed- 
 eration, for Congress, on the 28th of September, not to arrest and 
 prevent its being transmitted to the several legislatures ; nor was 
 the legislature of this state less culpable, in the beginning of Feb- 
 ruary, 1788, who, in the course of three hours, took up and 
 concluded the measure of calling a convention without apprising 
 their constituents of the danger. 
 
 It is notorious that the right of regulating Indian affairs, espe- 
 cially with the five nations, has been in the colony of New York 
 since the year 1664, and before that period, from the year 1614, 
 whilst it was called New Nederland under the Dutch. That by 
 the confederation, although Congress are invested with the power 
 of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, 
 that they are restricted to those Indians " not members of any of 
 the states, and a special proviso that the legislative rights of any 
 state within its own limits be not infringed or violated." It there- 
 fore was a violation of the confederation and of the rights of the 
 state for the congressional commissioners of Indian affairs to 
 
302 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 treat, at fort Stanwix, with and thereat to make a purchase from 
 the five nations without the authority or consent of the legisla- 
 ture of this state. It was an infraction of the rights of the citizens 
 of this state, and an insult on their government, for those commis- 
 sioners to wrest private property from individuals, imprison their 
 persons, set at defiance the civil authority of the county of Mont- 
 gomery, and violently to resist the execution of legal process. 
 Nor was the ordinance of the /th of August, 1786, for the regu- 
 lation of Indian affairs, less so, namely, that " the Indian depart- 
 ment be divided into two districts, viz.: the southern, which shall 
 comprehend within its limits all the nations in the territory of 
 the United States, who reside to the southward of the Ohio ; and 
 the northern, which shall comprehend all the nations within the 
 said territory, and westward, not of lake Ontario, but of Hudson's 
 river; that a superintendent for the northern districts shall have 
 authority to appoint two deputies to reside in such places as 
 shall best facilitate the regulation of the Indian trade; that no 
 person, citizen or other, under the penalty of five hundred dollars, 
 shall reside among or trade with any Indian or Indian nations 
 within the territory of the United States, without a licence for that 
 purpose first obtained from the superintendent of the district, or 
 of one of the deputies, who is hereby directed to give such licence 
 to every person who shall produce from the supreme executive of 
 any state a certificate under the seal of the state, that he is of good 
 character and suitably qualified and provided for that employ- 
 ment, for which licence he shall pay for one year the sum of fifty 
 dollars to the said superintendent for the use of the United 
 States." If this was the conduct of Congress and their officers, 
 when possessed of powers which were declared by them to be 
 insufficient for the purposes of government, what have we reason- 
 ; ably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of the 
 I powers " to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among 
 I the several states, and with the Indian tribes," when they are 
 armed with legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their 
 laws the supreme laws of the land — and when the states are pro- 
 hibited, without the consent of Congress, to lay any " imposts or 
 duties on imports," and if they do they shall be for the use of the 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 3O3 
 
 treasury of the United States — and all such laws subject to the 
 revision and controul of Congress. 
 
 It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new gov- 
 ernment, will enervate their legislative rights, and totally surren- 
 der into the hands of Congress the management and regulation 
 of the Indian trade to an improper government, and the traders 
 to be fleeced by iniquitous impositions, operating at one and the 
 same time as a monopoly and a poll-tax. The deputy by the 
 above ordinance, has a right to exact yearly fifty .dollars from 
 every trader, which Congress may increase to any amount, and 
 give it all the operation of a monopoly ; fifty dollars on a cargo . 
 of 10,000 dollars' value will be inconsiderable, on a cargo of lOOO 
 dollars burthensome, but on a cargo of lOO dollars will be intoler- 
 able, and amount to a total prohibition, as to small adventurers. 
 
 II, III, IX, XII, AND XXXI. 
 
 The second paragraph provides " that the supreme legislative 
 power within this state shall be vested in two separate and dis- 
 tinct bodies of men, the one to be called the assembly, and the 
 other to be called the senate of the state of New York, who to- 
 gether shall form" the legislature." 
 
 The ninth provides " that the assembly shall be the judge of 
 their own members, and enjoy the same privileges, and proceed 
 in doing business in like manner as the assembly of the colony of 
 New York of right formerly did." 
 
 The twelfth paragraph provides "' that the senate shall, in like 
 manner, be judges of their own members/' etc. 
 
 The 31st describes even the stile of laws — that the stile of all 
 laws shall be as follows : " Be it enacted by the people of the 
 state of New York represented in senate and assembly," and that 
 all writs and proceedings shall run in the name of the people of 
 the state of New York, and tested in the name of the chancellor 
 or the chief judge from whence they shall issue. 
 
 The third provides against laws that may be hastily and inad- 
 vertently passed, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution 
 and the public good, and that "the governor, the chancellor 
 and judges of the supreme court, shall revise all bills about to be 
 passed into laws, by the legislature." 
 
 iV-i 
 
304 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these par- 
 agraphs will be weakened, for the proposed new government de- 
 clares that " all legislative powers therein granted shall be vested 
 in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a seriate 
 and a house of representatives," and it further prescribes, that 
 " this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall 
 be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which 
 shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be 
 the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall 
 be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any 
 state to the contrary notwithstanding ; and the members of the 
 several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, 
 both of the United States arid of the several states, shall be bound 
 by oath or affirmation to support this constitution." 
 
 Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words in pursu- 
 ance thereof are restrictive, but if they reflect a moment and take 
 into consideration the comprehensive expressions of the instru- 
 ment, they will find that their restrictive construction is unavail- 
 ing, and this is evinced by 1st art., 8 sect., where this government 
 has a power " to lay and collect all taxes, duties, imposts and ex- 
 cises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and 
 general welfare of the United States," and also " to make all laws 
 which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
 foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government 
 of the United States, or in any department or office thereof" 
 
 Art 1st, sect. 7, provides a qualified negative, that is, that 
 " every bill which shall be passed [by] the house of represen- 
 tatives and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented 
 to the president of the United States." 
 
 To conclude my observations on this head, it appears to me as 
 impossible that these powers in the state constitution and those 
 in the general government can exist and operate together, as it 
 would be for a man to serve two masters whose interests clash, 
 and secure the approbation of both. Can there at the same 
 time and place be and operate two supreme legislatures, execu- 
 tives, and judicials ? Will a " guarantee of a republican form of 
 government to "every state in the union" be of any avail, or secure 
 the establishment and retention of state rights ? 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 305 
 
 If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the 
 committee of the whole house, to wit, ..." that a republican con- 
 stitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each 
 state by the United States," it would have been substantial ; but 
 the changing the word constitution into the word form bears no 
 favorable appearance. 
 
 IV, V, XII, XVI. 
 
 The fourth provides, "that the assembly of the state of New 
 York shall consist of at least seventy members, to be annually 
 chosen in the several counties in certain proportions." The 5th, 
 1 2th and l6th, declare that a census shall be taken every seven 
 years, to regulate the augmentation of the number seventy, so as 
 not to exceed three hundred. Here seventy members are di- 
 vided among the several counties, and consequently into at least 
 as many poles and sets of members to be annually chosen. If 
 this is contrasted with the constitution for the federal government 
 — the constitutional assembly or house of representatives will be 
 found to consist of sixty-five members divided among thirteen 
 states, to be chosen every second year. Six for the state of New 
 York ; not distributed among the counties, but by all the coun- 
 ties. And, although " the times, places and manner of holding 
 elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in 
 each state by the legislature thereof," yet, as it provides that 
 " Congress may at any time by law,, make or alter those regula- 
 tions, except as to places of chusing senators" — the power in the 
 state government to prescribe rules in those cases will be super- 
 seded by the executive of the general government, perhaps to the 
 great inconvenience of the people. 
 
 FROM THE VITH TO THE XIITH. 
 
 The sixth paragraph recites that " an opinion hath long pre- 
 vailed among divers of the good people of this state that the vot- 
 ing at the election by ballot would tend more to preserve the lib- 
 erty and equal freedom of the people than voting viva voce ; to 
 the end, therefore, that a fair experiment be made which of these 
 two methods of voting is to be preferred, it declares that after the 
 war elections shall be by ballot. 
 
306 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 The seventh and eighth regulate the freeholds, and what prop- 
 erty shall entitle a man to vote ; the ninth, the mode of conduct- 
 ing business in the assembly, and their privileges ; the tenth, 
 eleventh, and twelfth, the number of the senate, and how and by 
 whom they shall be elected. 
 
 As these clauses regulate the mode of elections and qualifica- 
 tions of the voters of senate and assembly, a relation of what gave 
 rise to the provisions for voting by ballot and that of the value of 
 the freehold, will help to unravel what otherwise may appear 
 mysterious. 
 
 In respect to the first it may be necessary to observe that under 
 the colonial government there existed violent parties, not known 
 by the name of whig or tory — republicans and aristocrats. Those 
 who were in the employments of government, or the ins, were for 
 extending the prerogative of the crown, while the outs were checks 
 to it. Many of the leaders on both sides were under strong ex- 
 pectations that sooner or later that branch of colonial government 
 called the king's council would be erected into a hereditary house 
 of lords. The ins being nearest to the disposition of the offices 
 of honor and profit, and in the way of obtaining patents for va- 
 cant lands, and being from time to time joined by other crown 
 officers and dependents, who flocked to and settled in this colony 
 since the year 1763, had the means of making use of undue influ- 
 ence to retain their situations, which made the outs at last dispair 
 of ever having a turn, unless the elections were by ballot. This 
 opinion was propagated in every part of the colony before and at 
 the time of the revolution, and so strongly did it operate upon the 
 committee that were ordered to consider of and report the consti- 
 tution, that at one time they had the whole system interwoven in 
 the draft; but either because it would have made it too lengthy, or 
 that one of the parties were then reduced, and not likely to rise 
 again into importance, about the time the draft was reported, 
 it was struck out and was left by the constitution to the legisla- 
 ture to decide, as experience on the exercise of both principles 
 should suggest. Sydney. 
 
SYDNEY, II. 
 
 THE NEW YORK JOURNAL. 
 
 (H'umlDer S331) 
 
 Saturday, June 14, 1788. 
 
 For the Daily Patriotic Register. 
 
 To THE Citizens of the State of New York. 
 
 (Concluded from yesterday's paper.) 
 
 As to the value of the freeholds, there has been great diversity 
 of opinions, for notwithstanding all agreed that the rights and lib- 
 erties of a country were ever in danger from the rich and poor, 
 and their safety in the middle sort or yeomanry of the country, 
 still the difficulty occurred in establishing the mean. 
 
 While the convention, in 1776, was setting at Harlem, the out- 
 lines of a constitution were handed about, to try, it was supposed, 
 the temper of the members, in which it was proposed to have a gov- 
 ernor, lieutenant governor, senate, and assembly j the qualification 
 of the governor, lieutenant governor, and senate, to be that each 
 should possess real estate to the value of 10,000 pounds, and to be 
 elected by freeholders possessing freeholds to the value of i,ooo 
 pounds. Although this was not attended with bad effects, yet the 
 qualifications of the electors gave rise to various arguments, and, 
 among others, that as taxation and representation ought to go 
 together, so the right of electing shall be in proportion to the 
 value of each man's estate. To exemplify this, a man of ;^ioo 
 estate had one vote ; a man of ;^iooo should have ten, and a man 
 of ten thousand pounds a hundred, and so on in the same ratio. 
 
 (307) 
 
308 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 Others on the contrary supposed that there ought to be no other 
 criterion than the age of twenty-one, a citizen born and resident 
 in this country ; out of the two extremes was produced the pres- 
 ent system of election and qualification, both admitted to be as 
 secure and consistent rights as any that have been contrived. 
 
 It is apprehended, from the duplicity in the wording of 1st 
 art, 4th sec, that seemingly to leave in the power of the re- 
 spective legislatures to regulate the elections, and still, that Con- 
 gress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations ; 
 and the undesigned wording of the sixth article, that the con- 
 stitution and laws of the United States which shall be made in 
 pursuance thereof shall be the law of the land, anything in the 
 constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, 
 will render the whole system ineffectual, if not nugatory, and a 
 new system as destructive to the liberties of the citizens as that 
 of the ratio of voices to the ratio of property introduced. Be- 
 sides being liable to have the whole State erected into one dis- 
 trict, and consequently may give rise to the inconveniences I 
 mentioned before. 
 
 VII, SEC. 6; viii, SEC. 6; ix, sec. 6; x, section 6; xi, sec. 6; xii, 
 SEC. 2, 6 ; xvi, sec. 6 ; xiii, xxxv, xli. 
 
 By the 13th paragraph "no member of this State shall be dis- 
 franchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured 
 to the subjects of the State by this constitution, unless by the law 
 of the land, or judgment of its peers." 
 
 The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, 
 the common law of England, the statute law of England and 
 Great Britain, and the acts of the legislature of the colony, which 
 together formed the law on the 19th of April, 1775. 
 
 'The 41st provides " that the trial by jury remain inviolate for- 
 ever; that no acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature 
 of this State for crimes other than those committed before the 
 termination of the present war. And that the legislature shall at 
 no time hereafter institute any new courts but such as shall pro- 
 ceed according to the course of the common law. 
 
 There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 3O9 
 
 in all its latitude, every one of these paragraphs will become a 
 dead letter : nor will it solve any difificulties, if the United States 
 guarantee " to every state in the union a republican form of gov- 
 ernment;" we ma)' be allowed the form and not the substance, and 
 that it was so intended will appear from the changing the word 
 constitution to the word form and the omission of the words, and 
 its existing laws. And I do not even think it uncharitable to sup- 
 pose that it was designedly done ; but whether it was so or not, by 
 leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left to 
 the mercy of the new government. By ist art., 8th sec, ist clause, 
 " The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, - 
 imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the com- 
 mon defence and general welfare of the United States." 
 
 By the 9th clause of the same section, " To constitute tribunals 
 inferior to the court." 
 
 By the i8th clause, "To make all laws which shall be neces- 
 sary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, 
 and all other powers vested by this constitution in the govern- 
 ment of the United States, or in any department thereof." 
 
 The 3d art., ist sec, " The judicial power of the United States 
 shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts 
 as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.!' 
 
 By sec. 2nd, " The judicial power shall extend to all cases in 
 law and equity." To have in various instances an original and 
 exclusive, in others a concurrent jurisdiction, and the supreme 
 court in many cases an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
 fact. It provides, indeed, that the trial for crimes shall be by 
 jury, but has left the trial in civil matters to the mercy of con- 
 struction and their own legislative sovereign will and pleasure. 
 
 By the 3d art., 3d sec, " The Congress shall have power to de- 
 clare the punishment of treason, but no attainder shall work a 
 corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the 
 person attainted. By ist art., 9th sec, 3d clause, " No bill of at- 
 tainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." 
 
 XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XL. 
 
 The 17th orders " That the supreme executive power and au- 
 
3IO LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 thority of this State shall be vested in a governor." By the i8th 
 he is commander-in-chief of the militia and admiral of the navy 
 of the State; may grant pardons to all persons convicted of 
 crimes ; he may suspend the execution of the sentence in treason 
 or murder. 
 
 By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolu- 
 tions of the legislature be faithfully executed. 
 
 By the 27th he is president of the council of appointment, and 
 has a casting vote and the commissioning of all officers. 
 
 The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on 
 the death, resignation, removal from office, or impeachment of 
 the governor, all the powers of a governor. 
 
 The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in 
 peace and war, shall be armed and disciplined, and kept in readi- 
 ness ; in what manner the Quakers shall be excused; and that a 
 magazine of warlike stores be forever kept at the expence of the 
 State, and by act of the legislature, established, maintained, and 
 continued in every county in the State. 
 
 Whoever considers the following powers vested in the govern- 
 ment, and compares them with the above, must readily perceive 
 they are either all enervated or annihilated. 
 
 By the ist art, 8th sec, 15th, i6th and 17th clauses, Congress 
 will be empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of 
 the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions ; to provide 
 for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, for the gov- 
 erning such part of them as may be employed in the service of 
 the United States, and for the erection of forts, magazines, etc. 
 
 And by the 2nd art, 2d sec, " The president shall be com- 
 mander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and 
 of the militia of the several States when called into actual service 
 of the United States, except in cases of impeachment." 
 
 And by the 6th art., " The members of the several state legisla- 
 tures, and all the executive and judicial officers; both of the 
 United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath 
 or affirmation to support the constitution." Can this oath be taken 
 by those who have already taken one under the constitution of 
 this state ? 
 
LETl'ERS OF SYDNEY. 3II 
 
 XVIII, SEC. 17 ; XIX, SEC. 17 ; xx. sec. 17 ; xxi, sec. 17 ; xxiii, sec. 
 17 ; XXII TO XXX inclusive. 
 
 These paragraphs regulate the election, appointment, con- 
 struction and duration of all the state, county and district officers, 
 including the delegates to Congress, and how they severally are 
 to be created and commissioned. 
 
 The 22d directs that the treasurer shall be appointed by act of 
 the legislature to originate with the assembly. The 23d estab- 
 li.shes a council to appoint the officers. 
 
 The 24th directs that the military officers shall be, during the 
 pleasure of the council, the chancellor, judges of the supreme 
 court, the first judge in every county until the age of 60. 
 
 Twenty-five and 28, which offices are incompatible, and the 
 tenure and duration of such officers. 
 
 Twenty-six, that sheriffs and coroners be annually appointed, 
 and shall not continue more than four years. 
 
 Twenty-seven, that the officers of the court be appointed by 
 the respective courts, except the attorneys, by the first judge of 
 every court. 
 
 Twenty-nine, provides that town clerks, supervisors, assessors, 
 constables and collectors, and all other officers heretofore ele- 
 gible by the people, shall always continue to be so elegible. 
 
 Thirty, directs the mode how the delegates to represent this 
 state in the general Congress of the United States shall be elected. 
 
 I apprehend that the paragraphs aforesaid will be cpmpleatly 
 rendered unoperative by the following articles in the new consti- 
 tution : 
 
 Second article, second section, second clause, the president 
 " shall have power, and by and with the advice and consent of the 
 Senate, shall appoint embassadors, other public ministers and 
 consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all officers of the United 
 States where appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, 
 and which shall be established by law ; but the Congress may by 
 law vest the power of such inferior officers as they think proper, 
 in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of de- 
 partments." By the ist art, 8 section, 9, 18 clauses. Congress 
 have power " to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, 
 
312 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
 into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested 
 by this constitution in the government of the United States, or 
 in any department or officer thereof" 
 
 By the third article, 2d section, there is an extensive federal 
 power as above-mentioned. 
 
 By the 2d article, 2d section, the president " shall take care 
 that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the 
 officers of the United States." 
 
 From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested 
 in the states, it is clear that there must be a government within a 
 government, two legislative, executive and judicial powers. The 
 power of raising an army in time of peace, and to command 
 the militia, will give the president ample means to enforce the 
 Supreme laws of the land. 
 
 XXIII, SEC. 21 ; XXIV, SEC. 21 ; XXV, SEC. 21 ; XXVI, SEC. 21 ; XXVII, 
 
 SEC. 21 ; XXVIII, SEC. 21 ; XXIX, SEC. 21 ; XXX, SEC. 21 ; 
 
 XXXI, SEC. 2 ; XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV. 
 
 The 32d paragraph orders, " That a court shall be instituted 
 for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors under 
 the regulations which shall be established by the legislature, and 
 to consist of the president of the senate for the time being, and 
 the senators, chancellors and judges of the supreme court." 
 
 The 33d vests the power of impeaching all officers of the state 
 for mal and corrupt practice in the representatives of the people 
 in assembly. 
 
 The 34th allows the parties impeached or indicted for crimes 
 and misdemeanors to have counsel. 
 
 This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 
 6th and 7th clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have 
 the trial and judgment on all impeachments. 
 
 By 3d art., 2d sec, 3d clause, the trial of all crimes is regu- 
 lated. 
 
 By the 3d art., 3d sec, it is defined what shall be treason, the 
 proof required, the punishment, and how the judgment in attain- 
 der shall operate. 
 
LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 3I3 
 
 XXXIII, SEC. 32; XXXIV, SEC. 32 ; XXXV, SEC. 13; XXXVII, 
 
 SEC. I ; XXXVIII, XXXIX. 
 
 The 38th paragraph provides " that the free exercise and en- 
 joyment of religious procession and worship, without discrimina- 
 tion or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this 
 State to all mankind, provided that the .liberty of conscience 
 hereby granted shall not excuse acts of licentiousness or justify 
 practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State." 
 
 The 39th provides that '• no minister of the gospel, or priest of 
 any denomination whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, under 
 any pretence or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of 
 holding any civil or military office or place within this state." 
 
 The first of those articles protects us from persecution in re- 
 ligious matters. The other excludes the clergy from enjoying 
 any office, civil or military. Two provisions passed by in silence 
 by the framers of the new constitution ; and although possibly 
 the leaders in both have been equally averse to a democratic 
 system, and have had the same object, the ruin of state govern- 
 ment, in view. 
 
 XLII. 
 
 This paragraph provides " that it shall be in the discretion of 
 the legislature to naturalize all such persons and in such manner 
 as they shall think proper." 
 
 The 1st .art, 8 sec, 4th clause, give to the new government 
 power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 
 
 And by the 4th art., 2d sec, " the citizens of each state shall 
 be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
 several states," whereby the clause is rendered entirely nugatory. 
 
 From this contrast it appears that the general government, 
 when compleatly organized, will absorb all those powers of the 
 state which the framers of its constitution had declared should 
 be only exercised by the representatives of the people of the 
 state ; that the burthens and expence of supporting a state estab- 
 lishment will be perpetuated; but its operations to ensure or 
 contribute to any essential measures promotive of the happiness 
 of the people may be totally prostrated, the general government 
 
314 LETTERS OF SYDNEY. 
 
 arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most minute 
 objects of internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns 
 of every state, by possessing a power of passing laws " to provide 
 for the general welfare of the United States," which may affect 
 life, liberty and property in every modification they may think 
 expedient, unchecked by cautionary reservations, and unre- 
 strained by a declaration of any of those rights which the wisdom 
 and prudence of America in the year 1776 held ought to be at 
 all events protected from violation. 
 
 In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve 
 all the power of the several state legislatures, and destroy the 
 rights and liberties of the people ; for the power of the first will 
 be all in all, and of the latter a mere shadow and form without 
 substance, and if adopted we may (in imitation of the Cartha- 
 genians) say, Delenda vit Americae. Sydney. 
 
CURSORY REMARKS 
 
 BY 
 
 HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE. 
 
 PRINTED IN 
 
 THE AMERICAN MUSEUM, 
 
 April, 
 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 This article first appeared in The Pittsburgh Gazette, but as I 
 have not been able to find a file of that paper, I have been com- 
 pelled to reprint it fi-om The American Museum. It was ano- 
 nymous, but its authorship is settled by its republication in Brack- 
 enridge's " Gazette Publications" printed in book form in 1806. 
 
 (3i7> 
 
CURSORY REMARKS. 
 
 THE AMERICAN MUSEUM. 
 
 April, 1788. 
 
 It is not my intention to enter largely into a consideration of 
 this plan of government, but to suggest some ideas in addition 
 to, and of the same nature with, those already made, showing the 
 imperfections and the danger of it. 
 
 The first thing that strikes a diligent observer, is the want of 
 precaution with regard to the sex of the president. Is it pro- 
 vided that he shall be of the male gender? The Salii, a tribe of 
 the Burgundians, in the nth century, excluded females from the 
 sovereignty. Without a similar exclusion, what shall we think, 
 if, in progress of time, we should come to have an old woman at 
 the head of our affairs ? But what security have we that he shall 
 be a white man? What would be the national disgrace if he 
 should be elected from one of the southern states, and a vile negro 
 should come to rule over us ? Treaties would then be formed with 
 the tribes of Congo and Loango, instead of the civilized nations 
 of Europe. But is there any security that he shall be 2. freeman? 
 Who knows but the electors at a future period, in days of cor- 
 ruption, may pick up a man-servant, a convict perhaps, and give 
 him the dominion ? Is any care taken that he shall be of perfect 
 parts? Shall we, in affairs of a civil nature, leave a door open to 
 lame men, bastards, eunuchs, and the devil knows what? 
 
 A senate is the next great constituent part of the government ; 
 and yet there is not a word said with regard to the ancestry of 
 any of them ; whether they should be altogether Irish, or only 
 
 (319) 
 
320 CURSORY REMARKS. 
 
 Scots Irish. If any of them have been in the war of the White 
 Boys, the Heart of Oak, or the like, they may overturn all 
 authority, and make Shilelah the supreme law of the land. 
 
 The house of representatives is to be so large, that it can never 
 be built. They may begin it, but it can never be finished. Ten 
 miles square! Babylon itself, unless the suburbs are taken into 
 view, was not of greater extent. 
 
 But what avails it to dwell on these things? The want of a 
 bill of rights is the great evil. There was no occasion for a bill 
 of wrongs; for there will be wrongs enough. But oh ! a bill of 
 rights! What is the nature of a bill of rights? " It is a schedule 
 or inventory of those powers which Congress do not possess." 
 But if it is clearly ascertained what powers they have, what need 
 of a catalogue of those powers they have not? Ah ! there is the 
 mistake. A minister preaching, undertook, first, to show what 
 was in his text; second, what was not in it. When it is specified 
 what powers are given, why not also what powers are not given ? 
 A bill of rights is wanting, and all those things which are usually 
 secured under it — 
 
 1. The rights of conscience are swept away. The Confession 
 of Faith, the Prayer-Book, the Manual and Pilgrim's Progress 
 are to go. The psalms of Watts, I am told, are the only thing 
 of the kind that is to have any quarter at all. 
 
 2. The liberty of the press — that is gone at the first stroke. 
 Not so much as an advertisement for a stray horse, or a runaway 
 negro, can be put in any of the gazettes. 
 
 3. The trial by jury — that is knocked in the head, and all that 
 worthy class of men, the lawyers, who live by haranguing and 
 bending the juries, are demolished. 
 
 I would submit it to any candid man, if in this constitution 
 there is the least provision for the privilege of shaving the beard? 
 or is there any mode laid down to take the measure of a pair of 
 breeches? Whence is it then, that men of learning seem so 
 much to approve, while the ignorant are against it ? The cause 
 is perfectly apparent, viz., that reason is an erring guide, while 
 instinct, which is the governing principle of the untaught, is cer- 
 tain. Put a pig in a poke, carry it half a day's journey through 
 
CURSORY REMARKS, 321 
 
 woods and by-ways, let it out, and it will run home without de- 
 viation. Could Dr. Franklin do this? What reason have we 
 then to suppose that his judgment, or that of Washington, could 
 be equal to that of Mr. Smilie * in state affairs ? 
 
 Were it not on this principle that we are able to account for it, 
 it might be thought strange that old Livingston.f of the Jersies, 
 could be so hoodwinked as to give his sanction to such a diabol- 
 ical scheme of tyranny amongst men — a constitution which may 
 well be called hell-born. For if all the devils in Pandemonium 
 had been employed about it, they could not have made a worse. 
 
 Neil MacLaughlin, a neighbor of mine, who has been talking 
 with Mr. Findley, says that under this constitution all weavers 
 are to be put to death. What have these innocent manufacturers 
 done that they should be proscribed ? 
 
 Let other states think what they will of it, there is one reason 
 why every Pennsylvanian should execrate this imposition upon 
 mankind. It will make his state most probably the seat of gov- 
 ernment, and bring all the officers, and cause a great part of the 
 revenue to be expended here. This must make the people rich, 
 enable them to pay their debts, and corrupt their morals. Any 
 citizen, therefore, on the Delaware and Susquehannah waters, 
 ought to be hanged and quartered, that would give it coun- 
 tenance. 
 
 I shall content myself at present with these strictures, but shall 
 continue them from time to time as occasion may require. 
 
 * John Smilie, a prominent Anti- Federalist. — Ed. 
 f William Livingston. — Ed, 
 
LETTER 
 
 OF 
 
 CAUTION, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 SAMUEL CHASE, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, 
 
 October, 
 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The authorship of this essay is fixed upon Chase by a letter of 
 Daniel Carroll, who in writing to Madison, alludes to both this, 
 and his reply, printed post. Chase was the leader of the Anti- 
 Federalists in Maryland, but was at first compelled by popular 
 feeling to temporize, as is shown by the following extracts, taken 
 from the Maryland Journal for September 28, 1787: 
 
 The following is the conclusion of the speech of Samuel Chase, Esq., delivered this 
 day, at the Court House, before a numerous and respectable body of citizens. 
 (Published by request of many electors of Baltimore Town.) 
 The Constitution proposed by the late Convention, for the 
 United States, will alter, and in some instances, abolish our Bill 
 of Rights and Form of Government. The Legislature of this 
 State have no right to alter our Form of Government, but in the 
 mode prescribed by the Constitution. The only question for the 
 General Assembly to determine is this, whether they will recom- 
 mend to the people to elect delegates to meet in convention, to 
 consider and decide on the plan proposed, I have always main- 
 tained the Union, and the increase of powers in Congress. I 
 think the Federal Government must be greatly altered. I have 
 not formed my opinion, whether the plan proposed ought to be 
 accepted as it stands, without any amendment or alteration. The 
 subject is very momentous, and involves the greatest conse- 
 quences. If elected, I will vote for, and use my endeavours to 
 procure a recommendation by the Legislature to call a conven- 
 tion, as soon as it can conveniently be done, unless otherways 
 directed by this town. 
 
 Stphmber 26, IJ87. 
 
 Having been informed that my engagements of yesterday, to 
 the meeting at the Court House, " to vote for, and use my en- 
 deavours to procure a recommendation by the Legislature, to call 
 a convention as soon as it can conveniently be done," is not un- 
 derstood ; from a desire, if possible, to remove all misunderstand- 
 ing, I take the liberty to declare, that by the promise I meant to 
 engage, and therefore do promise, if elected, that I will use my 
 endeavours to procure, at the next session of Assembly, and as 
 
 (325) 
 
326 LETTER OF CAUTION. 
 
 soon in the session as the necessary business of the State will 
 permit, a recommendation by the General Assembly to call a 
 convention, to consider and decide on the Constitution proposed 
 by the late Convention for the United States, and to appoint the 
 election of delegates to the Convention as soon as the convenience 
 of the people will permit. I further beg leave to add as my 
 opinion, that the election of delegates to the Convention ought 
 to be as early in the spring as may be. Samuel Chase. 
 
 Baltimore, Seftemier zy, ijSj. 
 
 There are attacks on Chase, by " Steady " in the Maryland 
 Journal of September 28, 1787, and by "Spectator," in the Mary- 
 land Journal of October 9, 1787. 
 
CAUTION. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, 
 
 (NiainTDer 976) 
 
 Friday, October 12, 1787. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of Baltimore Town. 
 
 An attempt to surprise you into any /wMV measure, ought to 
 meet your indignation and contempt. When violence or cun- 
 ning is substituted for argument and reason, suspicion should 
 take the alarm, and prudence should dictate the propriety of de- 
 liberation. Questions of consequence in private life ought not to 
 be hastily decided, and with greater reason, determinations that 
 involve the future felicity of a whole people, ought not to be 
 taken before the most mature and deliberate consideration, and a * 
 free and full examination of the subject and all its consequences. 
 These reflections occurred on being informed that some gentle- 
 men of this Town employ themselves in carrying about and 
 soliciting subscribers to a petition, addressed to the General 
 Assembly, requesting them to call a Convention to ratify the new 
 system of government, proposed for the United States by the late 
 Convention at Philadelphia. If this petition contained no more, 
 it would not have been worthy of notice ; but it publishes to the 
 world your entire approbation of the New Federal Government, 
 and your desire that it should be adopted and confirmed by this 
 State, as it stands, without any amendment or alteration. 
 
 The ostensible cause for offering you the petition to sign is, 
 that you may express your sentiments to the legislature, that 
 they ought to call a Convention to ratify the new form of gov- 
 ernment for the United States ; but the real design of the pro- 
 
 (327) 
 
328 LETTER OF CAUTION. 
 
 moters of the petition is to draw you into a declaration in favour 
 of the whole system, and to bind you hereafter to support it, 
 which you must do, or allege deception and surprise, if, on fur- 
 ther reflection, you should discover that you rashly gave an 
 opinion against your real interests. If the real intention of the 
 promoters and carriers of this petition was only to obtain your 
 opinion in favour of calling a Convention, it might have been ex- 
 pressed in -a. few lines ; and no one would oppose such a petition, 
 although improper and unnecessary, because your Delegates will 
 certainly move for, and exert themselves to procure, the calling 
 a Convention ; and no member of the General Assembly will 
 deny that, in so doing, your Delegates speak your sentiments. 
 
 In my opinion, it is not necessary or proper for you, at this 
 time, to express your approbation, or disapprobation, of the new 
 constitution for the United States, for the following reasons : 
 
 First — because the" decision, /b^ or against the plan, is of the 
 greatest consequence, as it involves no less than the happiness or 
 misery of you and all your posterity forever; and therefore, I 
 think, requires your dispassionate and most deliberate considera- 
 tion. Secondly — because you want information, and have not 
 had time yourselves to examine the proposed system, and to 
 consider the consequences that may flow from rejecting or adopt- 
 ing it. Thirdly — because time is not given for your countrymen 
 in this, and the other States, to consider the subject, and to lay 
 their sentiments and reasons for or against the measure before 
 you. Fourthly — because you ought to hear both sides, as the 
 man who determines on hearing one part only, will almost always 
 be mistaken in his judgment. He may be in the right, but it will 
 be by chance and not by reason. Fifthly — because you are not 
 pressed in point of time to determine on the subject ; you have 
 at least three months for deliberation; to decide, therefore, in a 
 few days will be rashness and folly. Sixthly — when men urge 
 you to determine in haste, on so momentuous a subject, it is not 
 unreasonable to require their motives; and it is not uncharitable 
 to suspect that they are improper; and no possible mischief or 
 inconvenience can happen from delay. 
 
 October ii, 1787. Caution. 
 
LETTER 
 
 OF 
 
 A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 DANIEL CARROLL, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, 
 
 October, 
 
 1787. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 Daniel Carroll wrote Madison that he had replied to Chase's 
 " Caution," and as this is the only direct reply to that article I 
 have been able to find, I have ventured to ascribe this to him. 
 The letter is in the Madison Papers in the Department of State, 
 which at present are restricted from use, so I am unable to print 
 it here. 
 
 (331) 
 
A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 (WumlDer 977) 
 
 Tuesday, October i6, 1787. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of Baltimore Town. 
 
 You have been addressed in the last Friday's paper, by a 
 writer under the signature of Caution, who would persuade you 
 that you ought to withhold your approbation, at this time, from 
 the Federal Constitution recommended by the Convention. 
 
 This writer may have the best intentions in the world towards 
 the public welfare, and the prosperity of Baltimore ; but every one 
 must perceive that he is an enemy to the proposed Constitution, 
 and wishes to prevent you from expressing yourselves in its 
 favour, not only at this time, but at any future time. 
 
 Mr. C is said to be the author of this admonition ; but 
 
 that this is a malicious insinuation, aimed at his sincerity, will ap- 
 pear by considering his recent promise on this subject, signed and 
 published by himself, in reference with the resolution of the Con- 
 vention, upon which that promise is founded. I shall state both 
 the resolution and promise, that you may judge for yourselves. 
 
 The resolve of the Convention declares, that the Constitution 
 should be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each 
 State by the people, under the recommendation of its legislature, 
 for their assent and ratification. 
 
 Mr. C being called upon, before his election, to declare 
 
 himself on this point, promises to the people, " that he will use 
 his endeavours, if elected, to call a Convention." 
 
 I would just observe on this resolve and promise: First — that 
 
 C333) 
 
334 A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the resolve makes it an absolute condition that the legislature 
 recommend a Convention to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution. 
 
 Secondly— that the promise made by Mr. C is obligatory 
 
 upon him, to use his endeavors to procure a Convention for this 
 purpose. 
 
 Another remark, which occurs on this occasion, is, that Mr. 
 
 C could not mean that a Convention ought to be called for 
 
 any other purpose than to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution ; 
 for it is absurd to suppose he meant the Convention should be 
 authorized by the legislature to propose amendments or altera- 
 tions, that being contrary to the declared intention of the resolu- 
 tion, and the sense which his friends entertained of his engage- 
 ment at the time he entered into it. Mr. C , therefore (with- 
 out presuming him capable of doing the greatest violence to his 
 promise), cannot be considered as the author of Caution, who 
 argues strenuously, though indirectly, against adopting the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 From this brief view of the nature and intention of the resolve, 
 I think it is evident that the people ought, without delay, to sig- 
 nifj'' their approbation of the Constitution by a petition to the 
 legislature, to the end that the legislature, which is called upon 
 by the Convention and Congress to recommend to the people to 
 choose Delegates to ratify it, may have the authority of the largest 
 and most promising commercial and manufacturing Town in the 
 State to countenance so important a recommendation. But Cau- 
 tion thinks a petition improper and unnecessary ; because, says he, 
 "your Delegates will move for, and exert themselves to procure, 
 the calling a Convention." Admitting your Delegates to move 
 to have a Convention called, does it follow that they will add to 
 their motion these essential words, to confirm and ratify the Con- 
 stitution? Does it not rather appear, from the tenor of this 
 writer's remarks, that your Delegates ought to leave these words 
 out of their motion? But the propriety and necessity of a petition 
 does not depend on what your Delegates may, or may not do. 
 It is proper at this time, because the Constitution meets your ap- 
 probation. It is necessary at this time, because wanted as an in- 
 ducement to the legislature to call upon the people to appoint a 
 
A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION. 335 
 
 Convention to carry into effect the object of the resolution. In 
 other words, as the recommendation for a Convention involves 
 the legislature in a complete approbation of the Constitution, there 
 is the greatest propriety and necessity for your telling the legisla- 
 ture that it meets your approbation. 
 
 I am sorry to find, by Caution's publication and insinuations, 
 which I am told are circulated with great industry, that an oppo- 
 sition is opened against the Constitution. I did not, I confess, 
 expect to see it adopted without some opposition ; but I could 
 not bring myself to believe, that this opposition could have orig- 
 inated in Baltimore, which is so peculiarly interested in its speedy 
 adoption. But what I intended to say on this point, is so well 
 expressed in a late speech of Mr. Wilson, to the people of Phila- 
 delphia, previous to their election for representatives, that I shall 
 take the liberty of closing with it. 
 
 " After all, my fellow-citizens, (says this excellent politician) it 
 is neither extraordinary nor unexpected, that the Constitution 
 offered to your consideration should meet with opposition. It is 
 the nature of man to pursue his own interest in preference to the 
 public good; and I do not mean to make any personal reflection, 
 when I add, that it is the interest of a very numerous, pozverful and 
 respectable body to counteract and destroy the excellent work pro- 
 duced by the late Convention. All the offices of government, and 
 all the appointments for the administration of justice, and the 
 collection of the public revenue, which are transferred from the 
 individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will neces- 
 sarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new 
 channel. Every person, therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to 
 enjoy, a place of profit under the present establishment, will object 
 to the proposed innovations, not, in truth, because it is injurious to 
 the liberties of his country ; but because it affects his schemes of 
 wealth and consequence. I will confess, indeed, that I am not a 
 blind admirer of this plan of government, and that there are some 
 parts of it, which, if my wish had prevailed, would certainly have 
 been altered. But, when I reflect how widely men differ in their 
 opinions, and that every man (and the observation applies like- 
 wise to every state) has an equal pretension to assert his own, I 
 
336 A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 am satisfied that anything nearer to perfection could not have been 
 accomplished. If there are errors, it should be remembered, that 
 the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself, and the con- 
 currence of two-thirds of the Congress may, at any time, introduce 
 alterations and amendments. Regarding it, then, in every point 
 of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, 
 that is the best form of government which has ever been offered to 
 the world!' 
 
 A Friend to the Constitution. 
 
 Baltimore, October 13, 1787, 
 
THE LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 LUTHER MARTIN 
 
 PRINTED IN 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, 
 
 January-March, 
 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 Luther Martin, afterwards nick-named the " bull-dog of fed- 
 eralism," was at this time the leading Anti-federalist in Maryland. 
 From his pen came the pamphlet entitled Genuine Information 
 . . . Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention; and 
 when the "Landholder," (see Ante, page 135), attacked Elbridge 
 Gerry, he began this series of articles in defense of that gentle- 
 man, but eventually, by the replies, was compelled to continue 
 the series as a personal vindication. According to a letter of 
 Daniel Carrol, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer replied in the news- 
 papers to Martin, but I have not been able to identify this. 
 
 In the New York journal for June 17, 1788, is a comparison 
 of the constitution as agreed upon early in the convention, with 
 that finally framed, which was probably written by Martin. 
 
 (339) 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, 1. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 (N'u.iiaTaer 1004) 
 
 Friday, January i8, 1788. 
 
 Mr. William Goddard : 
 Sir, 
 As the Publication under the Signature of the Connecticut 
 Landholder is circulating remote from the place of Mr. Gerry's 
 residence, and is calculated not only to injure the honourable 
 gentleman in his private character, but also to weaken the effect 
 of his opposition to the government proposed by the late conven- 
 tion, and thereby promote the adoption of a System which I con- 
 sider destructive of the rights and liberties of the respective states 
 and of their citizens, I beg leave, through the channel of your 
 Paper, to declare to the Public that from the time I took my seat 
 in convention, which was early in June, until the fourth day of 
 September, when I left Philadelphia, I am satisfied I was not 
 ten minutes absent from convention while sitting (excepting only 
 five days in the beginning of August, immediately after the com- 
 mittee of detail had reported, during which but little business was 
 done). That during my attendance I never heard Mr. Gerry or 
 any other member introduce a proposition for the redemption of 
 continental money according to its nominal or any other value, 
 nor did I ever hear that such a proposition had been offered to 
 consideration or had been thought of I was intimate with Mr. 
 Gerry, and never heard him express, in private conversation or 
 otherwise, a wish for the redemption of continental money, or 
 assign the want of such a provision as a defect. Nor did I ever 
 
 (341) 
 
342 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 hear in Convention, or anywhere else, such a motive of conduct 
 attributed to Mr. Gerry. I also declare to the Public that a con- 
 siderable time before I left the convention Mr. Gerry's opposition 
 to the System was warm and decided ; that in a particular man- 
 ner he strenuously opposed that provision by which the power 
 and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and 
 given to the general government; that in the debate he declared 
 if that measure was adopted it would be the most convincing 
 proof that the destruction of the State governments and the in- 
 troduction of a king was designed, and that no declarations to 
 the contrary ought to be credited, since it was giving the states 
 the last coup de grace by taking from them the only means of 
 self preservation. The conduct of the advocates and framers of 
 this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it was 
 designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after 
 power to the general government, which could not but end in 
 their slavery, he compared to the conduct of a number of jockeys 
 who had thirteen young colts to break ; they begin with the ap- 
 pearance of kindness, giving them a lock of hay, or a handful of 
 oats, and stroaking them while they eat, until being rendered suf- 
 ficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put round their necks ; 
 obtaining a further degree of their confidence, the jockeys slip a 
 curb bridle on their heads and the bit into their mouths, after 
 which the saddle follows of course, and well booted and spurred, 
 with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at 
 their pleasure, and although they may kick and flounce a little at 
 first, nor being able to get rid of their riders, they soon become 
 as tame and passive as their masters could wish them. In the 
 course of public debate in the convention Mr. Gerry applied to 
 the system of government, as then under discussion, the words of 
 Pope with respect to vice, "that it was a monster of such horrid 
 mien, as to be hated need but to be seen." And some time be- 
 fore I left Philadelphia, he in the same public manner declared in 
 convention that he should consider himself a traitor to his coun- 
 try if he did not oppose the system there, and also when he left 
 the convention. These, sir, are facts which I do not fear being 
 contradicted by any member of the convention, and will, I appre- 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 343 
 
 hend, satisfactorily shew that Mr. Gerry's opposition proceeded 
 from a conviction in his own mind that the government, if 
 adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States and in 
 the introduction of a kingly government. 
 
 I am, sir, your very obedient servant, 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, January ij, 1788. 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, II. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 (NumTDer X018) 
 
 Friday, March 7, 1788. 
 
 iViR. Goddard: 
 Sir, 
 In consequence of the justice I did Mr. Gerry, on a former oc- 
 casion, I find myself complimented with an Address in your last 
 Paper. Whether the Landholder of the Connecticut Courant, 
 and of the Maryland Journal,* is the same person, or different, is 
 not very material ; I however incline to the former opinion, as I 
 hope for the honour of human nature, it would be difficult to find 
 more than one individual who could be capable of so total a dis- 
 regard to the principles of truth and honour. After having made 
 the most unjust and illiberal attack on Mr. Gerry, and stigma- 
 tized him as an enemy to his country, and the basest of mankind 
 for no other reason than a firm and conscientious discharge of an 
 important trust reposed in that gentleman, had I not come in for 
 a share of his censure, I confess I should have been both disap- 
 pointed and mortified. It would have had at least the appear- 
 ance, that the Landholder had discovered something in my prin- 
 ciples, which he considered congenial with his own. However 
 great may be my political sins, to be cursed with his approba- 
 tion and applause, would be a punishment much beyond their 
 demerit. But, Sir, at present I mean to confine myself to the ori- 
 ginal subject of controversy, the injustice of the charges made 
 against Mr. Gerry. That my veracity will not be questioned 
 
 * See Ante, pages 182 and 189. — Ed. 
 (344) 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 345 
 
 when giving my negative to anonymous slander, I have the full- 
 est confidence. I have equal confidence that it will be as little 
 questioned by any who know me, even should the Landholder 
 vouchsafe to give the Public his name — a respectable name I am 
 sure it cannot be. His absolute want of truth and candour in 
 assertions meant to injure the reputation of individuals, whose 
 names are given to the public, and to hold them up to the indig- 
 nation of their fellow citizens, will ever justify this assertion, even 
 should the name belong to one decorated with wealth, or digni- 
 fied by station. But the Landholder wishes it to be supposed, 
 that though my veracity should not be doubted, yet my evidence 
 ought to be rejected, and observes, that to comprehend what 
 credit ought to be given to it, by which I suppose he means its 
 sufficiency if credited, it ought to be known how long I was ab- 
 sent from Convention, as well as the time I attended. I believe 
 Sir, whoever will read my former publication will in a moment 
 perceive, that I there " stated " all the " information " on this 
 subject that was necessary or material, and that I left no defect 
 for the Landholder to supply. I there mentioned that " I took> 
 my seat early in Jiine, that I left Philadelphia on the fourth oft 
 September, and during that period was not absent from the con- 
 vention while sitting, except only five days in the beginning 06 
 August, immediately after the Committee of Detail had reported." 
 I did not state the precise day of June when I took my seat — it 
 was the ninth, not the tenth — a very inconsiderable mistake ofi 
 the Landholder. But between that day and the fourth of Seg-- 
 tember he says that I was absent ten days at Baltimore, and as 
 many at New York, and thereby insinuates that an absence of 
 twenty days from the Convention intervened during that period, 
 in which time Mr. Gerry might have made and failed in his mo- 
 tion concerning continental money. A short state of facts is all 
 that is necessary to shew the disingenuity of the Landholder, and 
 that it is very possible to convey a falsehood, or something very 
 much like it, almost in the words of truth. On the twenty-fifth 
 of July the Convention adjourned, to meet again on the sixth of 
 August. I embraced that opportunity to come to Baltimore, and 
 left Philadelphia on the twenty-seventh ; I returned on the fourth 
 
346 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 of August, and on the sixth attended the Convention, with such 
 members as were in town, at which time the Committee of Detail 
 made their report, and many of the members being yet absent, 
 we adjourned to the next day. Mr. Gerry left Philadelphia to go 
 to New York the day before I left there to come to Baltimore ; 
 he had not returned on Tuesday, the seventh of August, when I 
 set out for New York, from whence I returned and took my seat 
 in Convention on Monday, the thirteenth. It is true that from 
 the twenty-fifth of July to the thirteenth of August eighteen (not 
 twenty) days had elapsed, but on one of those days I attended, 
 and on twelve of them the Convention did not meet. I was, 
 therefore, perfectly correct in my original statement that from 
 early in June to the fourth of September I was absent but five 
 days from the Convention while sitting, and in that statement 
 omitted no " necessary information." It is also true that of those 
 eighteen days Mr. Gerry was absent twelve or thirteen, and that 
 one of those days when he was not absent was Sunday, on which 
 day the Convention did not meet. Thus, Sir, by relating facts as 
 they really occurred, we find the only time between early in June 
 ^nd the fourth of September when such a motion could have been 
 .made by Mr. Gerry without my being present is narrowed down 
 :to four, or at most five days, as I originally stated it, although 
 Landholder wishes it should be supposed there were twenty days 
 during that period when it might have taken place without my 
 knowledge, to wit, ten while I was at Baltimore, and as many 
 more while at New York. The Landholder also states that the 
 Convention commenced the fourteenth day of May, and that I did 
 not take my seat till the tenth day of June, by which, if he means 
 anything, I presume he means to insinuate that within that portion 
 .of time Mr. Gerry's motion might have been made and rejected. 
 He is here. Sir, equally unfortunate and disingenuous. Though 
 the Convention was to have met by appointment on the four- 
 teenth of May, yet no material business was entered upon till on 
 or about the thirtieth of that month. It was on that day that the 
 ■Convention, having had certain propositions laid before them by 
 the Honourable Governor of Virginia, resolved to go into a con- 
 sideration of these propositions. In this fact I am confident I am 
 
tElTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 347 
 
 not mistaken, as I stdte the day not merely from my own recol- 
 lection but from minutes which I believe to be very correct, in my 
 possession, of the information given by the Honourable Mr. Mc- 
 Henry to the assembly. The truth is, Sir, that very little pro- 
 gress had been made by the Convention before I arrived, and 
 that they had not been more than ten days, or about that time, 
 seriously engaged in business. The first thing I did after I took 
 my seat was carefully to examine 'the journals for information of 
 what had already been done or proposed. I was also furnished 
 with notes of the -debates which had taken place, and can with 
 truth say that I made myself " minutely informed " of what had 
 happened before that period. In the same manner, after my re- 
 turn from New York, I consulted the journals (for we were per- 
 mitted to read them, although we were not always permitted to 
 take copies). If the motion attributed to Mr. Gerry had been 
 made and rejected, either before I first took my seat or while at 
 New York, it would have there appeared, and that no such mo- 
 tion was made and rejected during either of these periods I ap- 
 peal to the highest possible authority. I appeal to those very 
 journals, -which ought to have been published, and which we are 
 informed are placed in the possession of our late Honourable 
 President. But why. Sir, should I appeal to these journals, or to 
 any other authority ? Let the Landholder turn to his eighth num- 
 ber, addressed to the Honourable Mr. Gerry; let him blush, unless 
 incapable of that sensation, while he reads the following passage : 
 "Almost the whole time during the sitting of the Convention, and 
 until the Constitution had received its present form, no man was 
 more plausible and conciliating on every subject than Mr. Gerry," 
 &c. Thus stood Mr. Gerry, till towards the close of the busi- 
 ness he introduced a motion respecting the redemption of paper 
 money. The whole time of the sitting of the Convention was 
 not almost past. The Constitution had not received its present 
 form, nor was the business drawing towards a close, until long 
 after I took my seat in Convention. It is therefore proved by 
 the Landholder himself that Mr. Gerry did not make this motion 
 at any time before the ninth day of June. Nay more, in the 
 paper now before me he acknowledges that in his eighth num- 
 
348 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 ber he meant (and surely no one ought to know his meaning 
 better than himself) to fix Mr. Gerry's apostacy to a period 
 within the last thirteen days. Why then all this misrepresen- 
 tation of my absence at Baltimore and New York? Why the 
 attempt to induce a belief that the Convention had been engaged 
 in business from the fourteenth of May, and the insinuation that 
 it might have happened in those periods ? And why the charge 
 that in not stating those facts I had withheld from the pubHc in- 
 formation necessary to its forming a right judgment of the credit 
 which ought to be given to my evidence. But, Sir, I am really at 
 a loss which most to admire — the depravitj' of this writer's heart 
 or the weakness of his head. Is it possible he should not per- 
 ceive that the moment he fixes the time of Mr. Gerry's motion to 
 the last thirteen days of the Convention, he proves incontestably 
 the falsehood and malice of his charges against that gentleman — 
 for he has expressly stated that this motion and the rejection it 
 received was the cause, and the sole cause, of his apostacy ; that 
 " before, there was nothing in the system, as it now stands, to 
 which he had any objection, but that afterwards he was inspired 
 with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole 
 system he had formerly praised ;" whereas I have shown to the 
 clearest demonstration, that a considerable time before the last 
 thirteen days, Mr. Gerry had given the most decided opposition 
 to the system. I have shown this by recital of facts, which if cred- 
 ited, incontestibly prove it — facts which, I again repeat, will never 
 be contradicted by any member of the Convention. I ground 
 this assertion upon the fullest conviction that it is impossible to 
 find a single person in that number so wicked, as publicly and de- 
 liberately to prostitute his name in support of falsehood, and at the 
 same time so weak as to do this when he must be sure of detec- 
 tion. But the Landholder is willing to have it supposed that Mr. 
 Gerry might have made the motion in a " committee," and that 
 there it might have happened without my knowledge ; to such 
 wretched subterfuges is he driven. This evasion, however, will 
 be equally unavailing. The business of the committees were not 
 of a secret nature, nor were they conducted in a secret manner; 
 I mean as to the members of the Convention. I am satisfied that 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 349 
 
 there was no committee while I was there, of whose proceedings 
 I was not at least " so minutely informed," that an attempt of so 
 extraordinary a nature as that attributed to Mr. Gerry, and at- 
 tended with such an immediate and remarkable revolution in his 
 conduct, could not have taken place without my having heard 
 something concerning it. The non-adoption of a measure by a 
 committee did not preclude its being proposed to the Convention, 
 and being there adopted. Can it be presumed that a question in 
 which Mr. Gerry is represented to have been so deeply interested, 
 and by the fate of which his conduct was entirely influenced, 
 would for want of success in a committee have been totally re- 
 linquished by him, without a single effort to carry it in Conven- 
 tion ! If any other proof is wanting, I appeal again to the Land- 
 holder himself In his eighth number he states that the motion 
 was rejected " by the Convention." Let it be remembered also, 
 as I have before observed, in the paper now before me, he de- 
 clares it was his intention in that number to fix Mr. Gerry's apos- 
 tacy to a period within the last thirteen days ; and in the same 
 number he observes that Mr. Gerry's resentment could only em- 
 barrass and delay the completion of the business for a few days ; 
 all which equally militate against every idea of the motion being 
 made before he left Philadelphia, whether in Committee or in 
 Convention. The Landholder hath also asserted, that I have 
 "put into Mr. Gerry's mouth, objections different from any thing 
 his letter to the legislature of his State contains, so that if my re- 
 presentation is true, his must be false." In this charge he is just 
 as well founded as in those I have already noticed. Mr. Gerry 
 has more than once published to the world, under the sanction of 
 his name, that he opposed the system from a firm persuasion that it 
 would endanger the liberties of America, and destroy the freedom 
 of the States and their citizens. Every word which I have stated 
 as coming from his mouth, so far from being inconsistent with 
 those declarations, are perfectly correspondent thereto and direct 
 proofs of their truth. When the Landholder informed us that 
 Mr. Gerry was " face to face with his colleagues in the Conven- 
 tion of Massachusetts," why did he not, unless he wished to mis- 
 lead the public, also inform us for what purpose he was there ? 
 
3 so LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 that it was only to answer questions; that might be proposed to 
 him, not himself to ask questions that he could not consistently 
 interfere in any manner in the debates, and that he was even pro- 
 hibited an opportunity of explaining such pacts of his conduct as 
 were censured in his presence? By the anonymous publication 
 alluded to by the Landholder, and inserted in the note, Mr. Gerry's 
 colleagues are not called upon to acquit him: it only declares 
 "that he believes them to be men of too much honour to assert 
 that his reasons in Convention were totally different from those he 
 published ;" and in this I presume he was not disappointed for the 
 Landholder otherwise would have published it with triumph ;. but 
 if Mr. Gerry, as it is insinuated, was only prevented by pride, 
 from, in person, requesting them to acquit him, it amounts to a 
 proof of his consciousness that, as men of honour, they could not 
 have refused it, had he made the request. No person who views 
 the absurdities and inconsistencies of the Landholder, can I think, 
 have a very respectable opinion of his understanding, but I who 
 am not much prejudiced in his favour, could scarcely have con- 
 ceived him so superlatively weak as to expect to deceive the 
 public and obtain credit to himself by asking " if charges against 
 Mr. Gerry are not true why do not his colleagues contradict 
 them?" and " why is it that we do not see Mr. McHenry's verifi- 
 cation of your assertions?" If these Gentlemen were to do Mr. 
 Gerry that justice, he might as well inquire " why is it we do not 
 also see the verification of A, B, C and D and so on to the last 
 letter of the Conventional alphabet. When the Landholder in 
 his eighth number addressed himself to Mr, Gerry he introduces 
 his charges by saying " you doubtless will recollect the following 
 state of facts ; if you do not every member of the Convention will 
 attest them." One member of the Convention has had firmness 
 sufficient to contradict them with his name, although he was well 
 apprised that he thereby exposed himself as a mark for the ar- 
 rows of his political adversaries, and as to some of thennt, he was 
 not unacquainted with what kind of men he had to deal. But of 
 all the members who composed that body, not one has yet stepped 
 forward to make good the Landholder's prediction ; nor has one 
 been found to " attest " his statement of facts. Many reasons 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 35 1 
 
 may be assigned why the members of the Convention should not 
 think themselves under a moral obligations of involving them- 
 selves in controversy by giving their names in vindication 
 of Mr. Gerry; and I do not believe any of those who 
 signed the proposed Constitution would consider themselves 
 bound to do this by any political obligation : But, Sir I can hardly 
 suppose that Mr. Gerry is so perfectly esteemed and respected by 
 every person who had a seat in that body, that not a single in- 
 dividual could possibly be procured to give his sanction to the 
 Landholder's charges, if it could be done with justice and as to 
 myself, I much question whether it would be easy to convince 
 any person, who was present at our information to the assembly,* 
 that every one of my honourable colleagues, (to each of whose 
 merit I cordially subscribe, though compelled to differ from them 
 in political sentiments) would be prevented by motives of personal 
 delicacy to myself, from contradicting the facts I have stated re- 
 lative to Mr. Gerry, if it could be done consistent with truth. If 
 the Landholder was a member of the Convention, to facilitate the 
 adoption of a favourite system, or to gratify his resentment against 
 its opposers, he has originally invented and is now labouring to 
 support, charges the most unjust and ungenerous, contrary to his 
 own knowledge of facts. If he was not a member, he is acting 
 the same part, without any knowledge of the subject, and in this 
 has the merit of either following his own invention, of dealing out 
 the information he receives from some person of whom he is the 
 wretched tool and dupe, at the same time expressing himself with 
 a decision, and making such professions of being perfectly in 
 every secret, as naturally tends, unless contradicted, to deceive 
 and delude the unsuspecting multitude. In one of these predica- 
 ments the Landholder must stand, he is welcome to take his 
 choice, in either case he only wants to be known to be despised. 
 Now sir, let the Landholder come forward and give his name to 
 the public. It is the only thing necessary to finish his character, 
 and to convince the world that he is as dead to shame, as he is 
 
 * The Maryland Delegates to the Federal Convention were required by the legis- 
 lature to report the proceedings of that body to them, and it was in this connection 
 that Martin's Genuine Information was prepared. — Ed. 
 
352 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 lost to truth and destitute of honour. If I sir, can be instru- 
 mental in procuring him to disclose himself; even in this I shall 
 consider myself as rendering a service to my country. I flatter 
 myself for the dignity of human kind, there are few such char- 
 acters ; but there is no situation in life, in which they may not 
 prove the bane and curse of society ; they therefore ought to be 
 known, that they may be guarded against. 
 
 I am, sir, your very humble servant, 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, March 3, ifSS. 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, III. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 (Number 1031) 
 
 Tuesday, March i8, 1788.. 
 
 Number I. . 
 
 To THE Citizens of Maryland. 
 
 To you my fellow citizens, I hold myself in-a particular man' 
 ner accountable for every part of ray conduct in the exercise of a- 
 trust reposed in me by you, and should consider myself highly- 
 culpable if I was to withhold from you- any information in my- 
 possession, the knowledge of which may be material to enable- 
 you to form a right judgment on questions wherein the happiness^ 
 of yourselves and your posterity are involved. Nor shall I ever 
 consider it an act of condescention when' impeached in my public 
 conduct, or character, to vindicate myself at your bar, and to sub- 
 mit myself to your decision. In conformity to.-these sentiments; 
 which have regulated my conduct since my returm from the €on*^ 
 vention, and which will be the rule of my actions in the sequel, I 
 shall at this time beg your indulgence, while I make some obser- 
 vations on a publication which the Landholder has done me the 
 honour to address to me, in the Maryland Journal of the 2gth of 
 February last. In my controversy with that writer, on the subject 
 of Mr. Gerry, I have already enabled you to decide, without diffi- 
 culty, on the credit which ought to be given to his most positive 
 assertions and should scarce think it worth my time to notice his 
 charges against myself, was it not for the opportunity it affords 
 me of stating certain "facts and transactions, of which you ought 
 to be informed, some of which were undesignedly omitted by me 
 
 (353) 
 
354 LETl'ERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 when I had the honour of being called before the House of Dele- 
 gates. No " extreme modesty" on my part was requisite to in- 
 duce me to conceal the " sacrifice of resentments " against Mr. 
 Gerry, since no such sacrifice had ever been made, nor had any 
 such resentments ever existed. The principal opposition in senti- 
 ment between Mr. Gerry and myself, was on the subject of repre- 
 sentation; but eyen on that subject, he was much more conceding 
 than his colleagues, two of whom obstinately persisted in voting 
 against the equality of representation in the senate, when the 
 question was taken in Convention upon the adoption of the con- 
 ciliatory propositions, on the fate of which depended, I believe, 
 the continuance of the Convention. In many important questions 
 we perfectly harmonized in opinion, and where we differed, it 
 never was attended with warmth or animosity, nor did it in any 
 respect interfere with a friendly intercourse and interchange of at- 
 tention and civilities. We both opposed the extraordinary powers 
 over the militia, given to the general government We were both 
 against the re-eligibility of the president. We both concurred in 
 ;the attempt to prevent members of each branch of the legislature 
 I from being appointable to offices, and in many other in- 
 •stances, although the Landholder, with his usual regard to 
 fctruth and his usual imposing effrontery, tells me, that I " doubt- 
 iless must remember Mr. Gerry and myself never voted alike, 
 except in the instances " he has mentioned. As little foundar 
 tion is there in his assertion, that I " cautioned certain members 
 to be on their guard against his wiles, for that he and Mr. 
 Mason held private meetings, where the plans were concerted 
 to aggrandize, at the expence of the small States, old Massa- 
 .chusetts and the ancient dominion." I need only state facts 
 to refute the assertion. Some time in the month of August, a 
 number of members who considered the system, as then under 
 consideration and likely to be adopted, extremely exception- 
 able, and of a tendency to destroy the rights and liberties of the 
 United States, thought it advisable to meet together in the even- 
 ings, in order to have a communication of sentiments, and to 
 concert a plan of conventional opposition to, and amendment of 
 that system, so as, if possible, to render it less dangerous. Mr. 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 355 
 
 Gerry was the first who proposed this measure to me, and that 
 before any meeting had taken place, and wished we might assem- 
 ble at my lodgings, but not having a room convenient, we fixed 
 upon another place. There Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason did hold 
 meetings, but with them also met the Delegates from New Jersey 
 and Connecticut, a part of the Delegation from Delaware, an 
 honorable member from South Carolina, one other from Georgia, 
 and myself. These were the only "private meetings" that ever 
 I knew or heard to be held by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, meet- 
 ings at which I myself attended until I left the Convention, and 
 of which the sole object was not to aggrandize the great at the 
 expense of the small, but to protect and preserve, if possible, the 
 existence and essential rights of all the states, and the liberty and 
 freedom of their citizens. Thus, my fellow citizens, I am obliged, 
 unless I could accept the compliment at an expence of truth 
 equal to the Landholder's, to give up all claim to being " placed 
 beyond the reach of ordinary panegyrick," and to that " magna- 
 nimity " which he was so solicitous to bestow upon me, that he has 
 wandered [into] the regions of falsehood to seek the occasion. 
 When we find such disregard of truth, even in the introduction, 
 while only on the threshold, we may form judgment what respect 
 is to be paid to the information he shall give us of what passed in 
 the Convention when he " draws aside the veil," a veil which was 
 interposed between our proceedings and the Public, in my opin- 
 ion, for the most dangerous of purposes, and which was never de- 
 signed by the advocates of the system to be drawn aside, or if it 
 was, not till it should be too late for any beneficial purpose, 
 which as far as it is done, or pretended to be done, on the present 
 occasion ,is only for the purpose of deception and misrepresenta- 
 tion. It was on Saturday that I first took my seat. I obtained 
 that day a copy of the propositions that had been laid before the 
 Convention, and which were then the subject of discussion in a 
 committee of the whole. The Secretary was so polite as, at my 
 request, to wait upon me at the State House the next day (being 
 Sunday), and there gave me an opportunity of examining the 
 journals and making myself acquainted with the little that had 
 been done before my arrival. I was not a little surprised at the 
 
356 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 system brought forward, and was solicitous to learn the reasons 
 which had been assigned in its support ; for this purpose the 
 journals could be of no service ; I therefore conversed on the sub- 
 ject with different members of the Convention, and was favoured 
 with minutes of the debates which had taken place before my ar- 
 rival. I applied to history for what lights it could afford me, 
 and I procured everything the most valuable I could find in 
 Philadelphia on the subject of governments in general, and on 
 the American revolution and governments in particular. I de- 
 voted my whole time and attention to the business in which 
 we were engaged, and made use of all the opportunities I 
 had, and abilities I possessed, conscientiously to decide what part 
 I ought to adopt in the discharge of that sacred duty I owed 
 to my country, in the exercise of the trust you had reposed in me. 
 I attended the Convention many days without taking any share 
 in the debates, listening in silence to the eloquence of others, and 
 offering no other proof that I possessed the powers of speech, 
 than giving my yea or nay when a question was taken, and not- 
 withstanding my propensity to " endless garrulity," should have 
 been extremely happy if I could have continued that line of con- 
 duct, without making a sacrifice of your rights and political hap- 
 piness. The committee of the whole house had made but small 
 progress, at the time I arrived, in the discussion of the proposi- 
 tions which had been referred to them ; they completed that dis- 
 cussion, and made their report. The propositions of the minor- 
 ity were then brought forward and rejected. The Conven- 
 tion had resumed the report of the committee, and had employed 
 some days in its consideration. Thirty days, I believe, or more, 
 had clasped from my taking my seat before in the language of the 
 Landholder, I " opened in a speech which held during two days." 
 Such, my fellow citizens, is the true state of the conduct I pur- 
 sued when I took my seat in Convention, and which the Land- 
 holder, to whom falsehood appears more familiar than truth, with 
 his usual effrontery, has misrepresented by a positive declaration, 
 that without obtaining or endeavouring to obtain any informa- 
 tion on the subject, I hastily and insolently obtruded my senti- 
 ments on the Convention, and to the astonishment of every mem- 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 357 
 
 ber present, on the very day I took my seat, began a speech, 
 which continued two days, in opposition to those measures which, 
 on mature deHberation, had been adopted by the Convention. 
 But I " alone advocated the political heresy, that the people ought 
 not to be trusted with the election of representatives." On this 
 subject, as I would wish to be on every other, my fellow citizens, 
 1 have been perfectly explicit in the information I gave to the 
 House of Delegates, and which has since been published. In a 
 state government, I consider all power flowing immediately from 
 the people in their individual capacity, and that the people, in 
 their individual capacity, have, and ever ought to have the right 
 of choosing delegates in a state legislature, the business of which 
 is to make laws, regulating their concerns, as individuals, and 
 operating upon them as such ; but in a federal government, formed 
 over free states, the power flows from the people, and the right of 
 choosing delegates belongs to them only mediately through their 
 respective state governments which are the members composing 
 the federal government, and from whom all its power immediately 
 proceeds ; to which state governments, the choice of the federal 
 delegates immediately belongs. I should blush indeed for my 
 ignorance of the first elements of government, was 1 to entertain dif- 
 ferent sentiments on the subject; and if this is "political heresy," 
 I have no ambition to be ranked with those who are orthodox. 
 Let me here, my fellow citizens, by way of caution, add an obser- 
 vation, which will prove to be founded in truth: those who are 
 the most liberal in complimenting you with powers which do not 
 belong to you, act commonly from improper and interested 
 motives, and most generally have in view thereby to prepare the 
 way for depriving you of those rights to which you are justly en- 
 titled. Every thing that weakens and impairs the bands of legiti- 
 mate authority smooths the road of ambition ; nor can there be 
 a surer method of supporting and preserving the just rights of 
 the people, than by supporting and protecting the just rights of 
 government. As to the "jargon " attributed to me of maintaining 
 that " notwithstanding each state had an equal number of votes in 
 the senate, yet the states were unequally represented in the sen- 
 ate," the Landholder has all the merit of its absurdity ; nor can 
 
35 8 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 I conceive what sentiment it is that I ever have expressed, to 
 which he, with his usual perversion and misrepresentation, could 
 give such a colouring. That I ever suggested the idea of letting 
 loose an army indiscriminately on the innocent and guilty, in a 
 state refusing to comply with the requisitions of Congress, or that 
 such an idea ever had place in my mind, is a falsehood so ground- 
 less, so base and malignant, that it could only have originated or 
 been devised by a heart which would dishonour the midnight as- 
 sassin. My sentiments on this subject are well known ; it was 
 only in the case where a state refused to comply with the requisi- 
 tions of Congress, that I was willing to grant the general govern- 
 ment those powers which the proposed constitution gives it in 
 every ca.se.* Had I been a greater friend to a standmg army, 
 and not quite so averse to expose your liberties to a soldiery, I 
 do not believe the Landholder would have chose me for the ob^ 
 ject on. whom to expend his artillery of falsehood. 
 
 That a system may enable government wantonly to exercise 
 power over the militia, to call out an unreasonable number from 
 any particular state without its permission, and to march them 
 upon, and continue them in, remote and improper services ; that 
 the same system should enable the government totally to discard, 
 render useless, and even disarm, the militia, when it would remove 
 them out of the way of opposing its ambitious views, is by no 
 means inconsistent, and is really the case in the proposed consti- 
 tution. In both these respects it is, in my opinion, highly faulty, 
 and ought to be amended. In the proposed system the general 
 government has a power not only without the consent, but con- 
 trary to the will of the state government, to call out the whole of 
 
 * According to this idea, I endeavored to obtain as an amendment to the system the 
 following clause: " And whenever the legislature of the United States shall find it 
 necessary that revenue shall be raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the same 
 by the above rule, requisitions shall be made of the respective states to pay into the 
 continental treasury their respective quotas within a time in the said requisition to be 
 specified, and in case of any of the states faiUng to comply with such requisition, then, 
 and then only, to have power to devise and pass acts directing the mode, and au- 
 thorizing the same in the state failing therein." This was rejected, and that power, 
 which I wished to have given the government only in this particular instance, is given 
 to it without any restraint or limitation in every case. 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 359 
 
 its militia, without regard to religious scruples, or any other con- 
 sideration, and to continue them in service as long as it pleases, 
 thereby subjecting the freemen of a whole state to martial law and 
 reducing them tq the situation of slaves. It has also, by another 
 clause, the powers by which only the militia can be organized and 
 armed, and by the neglect of which they may be rendered utterly 
 useless and insignificant, when it suits the ambitious purposes ot 
 government. Nor is the suggestion unreasonable, even if it had 
 been made, that the government might improperly oppress and 
 harass the militia, the better to reconcile them to the idea of reg- 
 ular troops, who might relieve them from the burthen, and to ren- 
 der them less opposed to the measures it might be disposed to adopt 
 for the purpose of reducing them to that state of insignificancy and 
 uselessness. When the Landholder declared that " I contended 
 the powers and authorities of the new constitution must destroy 
 the liberties of the people," he for once stumbled on the truth, 
 but even this he could not avoid coupling with an assertion 
 utterly false. I never suggested that " the same powers could be 
 safely entrusted to the old Congress ; " on the contrary, I opposed 
 many of the powers as being of that nature that, in my opinion, 
 they could not be entrusted to any government whatever con- 
 sistent with the freedom of the states and their citizens, and I 
 earnestly recommended, what I wish my fellow citizens deeply 
 to impress on your minds, that in altering or amending our fed- 
 eral government no greater powers ought to be given than expe- 
 rience has shown to be necessary, since it will be easy to delegate 
 further power when time shall dictate the expediency or neces- 
 sity, but powers once bestowed upon a government, should they 
 be found ever so dangerous or destructive to freedom, cannot be 
 resumed or wrested from government but by another revolution. 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, March 14, 17S8. 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, IV. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 Friday, March 21, 1788. 
 
 (N"TainlDer lOSS) 
 
 Number II. 
 
 To THE Citizens of Maryland. 
 
 In the recognition which the Landholder professes to make 
 " of what occurred to my advantage," he equally deals in the arts 
 of misrepresentation, as while he was " only the record of the 
 bad," and I am equally obliged from a regard to truth to disclaim 
 his pretended approbation as his avowed censure. He declares 
 that I originated the clause which enacts that " this Constitution 
 and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursu- 
 ance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
 the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
 the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
 any thing in the Constitution or the laws of any state to the con- 
 trary notwithstanding." To place this matter in a proper point 
 of view, it will be necessary to state, that as the propositions were 
 reported by the committee of the whole house, a power was given 
 to the general government to negative the laws passed by the 
 state legislatures, a power which I considered as totally inadmis- 
 sible; in substitution of this I proposed the following clause, 
 which you will find very materially different from the clause 
 adopted by the Constitution, " that the legislative acts of the 
 United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of 
 the union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority 
 
 (360) 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 36 1 
 
 of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective 
 states, so far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states 
 or their citizens, and that the judiciaries of the several states shall 
 be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective 
 laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding." 
 When this clause was introduced, it was not established that in- 
 ferior continental courts should be appointed for trial of all ques- 
 tions arising on treaties and on the laws of the general govern- 
 ment, and it was my wish and hope that every question of that 
 kind would have been determined in the first instance in the 
 courts of the respective states ; had this been the case, the pro- 
 priety and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified, and 
 the laws of the general government, should be binding on the 
 state judiciaries which were to decide upon them, must be evi- 
 dent to every capacity, while at the same time, if such treaties or 
 laws were inconsistent with our constitution and bill of rights, 
 the judiciaries of this state would be bound to reject the first and 
 abide by the last, since in the form I introduced the clause, not- 
 withstanding treaties and the laws of the general government 
 were intended to be superior to the laws of our state government, 
 where they should be opposed to each other, yet that they were 
 not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and 
 bill of rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can 
 be called an amendment) to the form in which it stands in the 
 system now published, and as inferior continental, and not state 
 courts, are originally to decide on those questions, it is now 
 worse than useless, for being so altered as to render the treaties 
 and laws made under the general government superior to our 
 constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount to a total and 
 unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of 
 this state, of every right and privilege secured to them by our 
 constitution, and an express compact and stipulation with the 
 general government that it may, at its discretion, make laws in 
 direct violation of those rights. But on this subject I shall en- 
 large in a future number. 
 
 That I "voted an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary 
 of the United States, for the correction of all errors both in law 
 
362 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 and fact," in rendering judgment is most true, and it is equally 
 true that if it had been so ordained by the Constitution, the su- 
 preme judiciary would only have had an appellate jurisdiction, of 
 the same nature with that possessed by our high court of appeals, 
 and could not in any respect intermeddle with any fact decided by 
 a jury; but as the clause now stands, an appeal being given in gen- 
 eral terms from the inferior courts, both as to law and fact, it not 
 only doth, but is avowedly intended, to give a power very differ- 
 ent from what our court of appeals, or any court of appeals in the 
 United States or in England enjoys, a power of the most danger- 
 ous and alarming nature, that of setting at nought the verdict of 
 a jury, and having the same facts which they had determined, 
 without any regard or respect to their determination, examined 
 and ultimately decided by the judges themselves, and that by 
 judges immediately appointed by the government. But the Land- 
 holder also says that " I agreed to the clause that declares nine 
 states to be sufificient to put the government in motion." I can- 
 not take to myself the merit even of this without too great a sac- 
 rifice of truth. It was proposed that if seven states agreed that 
 should be sufficient; by a rule of Convention in filling up blanks, 
 if different numbers were mentioned, the question was always 
 to be taken on the highest, ut was my opinion, that to agree 
 upon a ratification of the constitution by any less number than 
 the whole thirteen states, is so directly repugnant to our pres- 
 ent articles of confederation, and the mode therein prescribed 
 for their alteration, and such a violation of the compact which 
 the states, in the most solemn manner, have entered into with 
 each other, that those who could advocate a contrary propo- 
 sition, ought never to be confided in, and entrusted in public 
 life. I availed myself of this rule, and had the question taken 
 on thirteen, which was rejected. Twelve, eleven, ten and nine 
 were proposed in succession ; the last was adopted by a majority 
 of the members. I voted successively for each of these members, 
 to prevent a less number being agreed on. Kad nine not been 
 adopted, I should on the same principle have voted for eight] 
 But so far was I from giving my approbation that the assent of 
 a less number of states than thirteen should be sufficient to put 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 363 
 
 the government in motion, that I most explicitly expressed my 
 sentiments to the contrary, and always intended, had I been pres- 
 ent when the ultimate vote was taken on the constitution, to have 
 given it my decided negative, accompanied with a solemn protest 
 against it, assigning this reason among others for my dissent. 
 Thus, my fellow citizens, that candour with which I have con- 
 ducted myself through the whole of this business obliges me, 
 however reluctantly, and however " mortifying it may be to my 
 vanity," to disavow all "those greater positive virtues" which the 
 Landholder has so obligingly attributed to me in Convention, and 
 which he was so desirous of conferring upon me as to consider the 
 guilt of misrepresentation and falsehood but a trifling sacrifice for 
 that purpose, and to increase my mortification, you will find I am 
 equally compelled to yield up every pretence even to those of a 
 negative nature, which a regard to justice has, as he says, obliged 
 him not to omit. These consist, as he tells us, in giving my 
 entire approbation to the system as to those parts which are 
 said to endanger a trial by jury, and as to its want of a bill of 
 rights, and in having too much candour there to signify that I 
 thought it deficient in either of these respects. But how, I pray, 
 can the Landholder be certain that I deserve this encomium ? Is 
 it not possible, as I so frequently exhausted the politeness of the 
 Convention, that some of those marks of fatigue and disgust, with 
 which he intimates I was mortified as oft as I attempted to speak, 
 might at that time have taken place, and have been of such a 
 nature as to attract his attention; or, perhaps, as the Convention 
 was prepared to slumber whenever I rose, the Landholder, among 
 others, might have sunk into sleep, and at that very moment 
 might have been feasting his imagination with the completion of 
 his ambitious views, and dreams of future greatness. But sup- 
 posing I never did declare in Convention that I thought the sys- 
 tem defective in those essential points, will it amount to a positive 
 proof that I approved the system in those respects, or that I cul- 
 pably neglected an indispensable duty? Is it not possible, what- 
 ever might have been my insolence and assurance when I first 
 took my seat, and however fond I might be at that time of ob- 
 truding my sentiments, that the many rebuffs with which I met. 
 
364 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 the repeated mortifications I experienced, the marks of fatigue 
 and disgust with which my eyes were sure to be assailed wherever 
 I turned them — one gaping here, another yawning there, a third 
 slumbering in this place, and a fourth snoring in that — might so 
 effectually have put to flight all my original arrogance, that, as 
 we are apt to run into extremes, having at length become con- 
 vinced of my comparative nothingness, in so august an assembly 
 and one in which the science of government was so perfectly un- 
 derstood, I might sink into such a state of modesty and diffi- 
 dence as not to be able to muster up resolution enough to break 
 the seal of silence and open my lips even after the rays of light 
 had begun to penetrate my understanding, and in some measure 
 to chase away those clouds of error and ignorance in which it 
 was enveloped on my first arrival ? Perhaps had I been treated 
 with a more forbearing indulgence while committing those mem- 
 orable blunders, for a want of a sufificient knowledge in the 
 science of government, I might, afler the rays of light had illumi- 
 nated my mind, have rendered my country much more important 
 services, and not only assisted in raising some of the pillars, but 
 have furnished the edifice with a new roof of my own construc- 
 tion, rather better calculated for the convenience and security of 
 those who might wish to take shelter beneath it, than that which 
 it at present enjoys. Or even admitting I was not mortified, as I 
 certainly ought to have been, from the Landholder's account of 
 the matter, into a total loss of speech, was it in me, who consid- 
 ered the system, for a variety of reasons, absolutely inconsistent 
 with your political welfare and happiness, a culpable neglect of 
 duty in not endeavouring, and that against every chance of suc- 
 cess, to remove one or two defects, when I had before ineffectu- 
 ally endeavoured to clear it of the others, which therefore, I knew 
 must remain? But to be serious, as to what relates to the appel- 
 late jurisdiction in the extent given by the system proposed, I am 
 positive there were objections made to it, and as far as my mem- 
 ory will serve me, I think I was in the number of those who 
 actually objected ; but I am sure that the objections met with my 
 approbation. With respect to a bill of rights, had the govern^ 
 ment been formed upon principles truly federal, as I wished it, ' ' ' ' 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 3^5^ 
 
 legislating over and acting upon the states only in their collect- 
 ive or political capacity, and not on individuals, there would have 
 been no need of a bill of rights, as far as related to the rights of 
 individuals, but only as to the rights of states. But the proposed 
 constitution being intended and empowered to act not only on 
 states, but also immediately on individuals, it renders a recog- 
 nition and a stipulation in favour of the rights both of states and 
 of men, not only proper, but in my opinion absolutely necessary. 
 I endeavoured to obtain a restraint on the powers of the gen- 
 eral government, as to standing armies, but it was rejected. It 
 was my wish that the general government should not have the 
 power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as 
 it appears to me altogether unnecessary, and that the power 
 given to it may and will be used as a dangerous engine of op- 
 pression, but I could not succeed. An honorable member from 
 South Carolina most anxiously sought to have a clause inserted 
 securing the liberty of the Press, and repeatedly brought this sub- 
 ject before the Convention, but could not obtain it. I am almost 
 positive he made the same attempt to have a stipulation in favour 
 of liberty of conscience, but in vain. The more the system ad- 
 vanced the more was I impressed with the necessity of not 
 merely attempting to secure a few rights, but of digesting and 
 forming a complete bill of rights, including those of states and of 
 individuals, which should be assented to, and prefixed to the Con- 
 stitution, to serve as a barrier between the general government 
 and the respective states and their citizens ; because the more the 
 system advanced the more clearly it appeared to me that the 
 framers of it did not consider that either states or men had any 
 rights at all, or that they meant to secure the enjoyment of any to 
 either the one or the other; accordingly, I devoted a part of my 
 time to the actually preparing and draughting such a bill of 
 rights, and had it in readiness before I left the Convention, to have 
 laid it before a committee. I conversed with several members on 
 the subject ; they agreed with me on the propriety of the meas- 
 ure, but at the same time expressed their sentiments that it would 
 be impossible to procure its adoption if attempted. A very few 
 days before I left the Convention, I shewed to an honorable mem- 
 
366 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 ber sitting by me a proposition, which I then had in my hand, 
 couched in the following words : " Resolved that a committee 
 be appointed to prepare and report a bill of rights, to be prefixed 
 to the proposed Constitution," and I then would instantly have 
 moved for the appointment of a committee for that purpose, if he 
 would have agreed to second the motion, to do which he hesi- 
 tated, not as I understand from any objection to the measure, but 
 from a conviction in his own mind that the motion would be in 
 vain. 
 
 Thus my fellow citizens, you see that so far from having no 
 objections to the system on this account, while I was at Conven- 
 tion, I not only then thought a bill of rights necessary, but I 
 took some pains to have the subject brought forward, which 
 would have been done, had it not been for the difficulties I have 
 stated. At the same time I declare that when I drew up the mo- 
 tion, and was about to have proposed it to the Convention, I had 
 not the most distant hope it would meet with success. The re- 
 jection of the clauses attempted in favour of particular rights, and 
 to check and restrain the dangerous and exorbitant powers of the 
 general government from being abused, had sufficiently taught me 
 what to expect. And from the best judgment I could form while 
 in Convention, I then was, and yet remained, decidedly of the 
 opinion that ambition and interest had so far blinded the under- 
 standing of some of the principal framers of the Constitution, that 
 while they were labouring to erect a fabrick by which they them- 
 selves might be exalted and benefited, they were rendered insensi- 
 ble to the sacrifice of the freedom and happiness of the states and 
 their citizens, which must, inevitably be the consequence. I most 
 sacredly believe their object is the total abolition and destruction 
 of all state governments, and the erection on their ruins of one 
 great and extensive empire, calculated to aggrandize and elevate 
 its rulers and chief officers far above the common herd of mankind, 
 to enrich them with wealth, and to encircle them with honours and 
 glory, and which according to my judgment on the maturest re- 
 flection, must inevitably be attended with the most humiliating 
 and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by the sweat of whose 
 brows, and by the toil of whose bodies, it can only be effected. 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 367 
 
 And SO anxious were its zealous promoters to hasten to a birth 
 this misshapened heterogenous monster of ambition and interest, 
 that, for some time before the Convention rose, upon the least at- 
 tempt to alter its form, or modify its powers, the most fretful im- 
 patience was shown, such as would not have done much honour to 
 a State Assembly, had they been sitting as long a time, and their 
 treasury empty ; while it was repeatedly urged on the contrary, 
 but urged in vain, that in so momentous an undertaking, in form- 
 ing a system for such an extensive continent, on which the politi- 
 cal happiness of so many millions, even to the latest ages, ■ may 
 depend, no time could be too long — no thoughts and reflections 
 too great — and that if by continuing six months, or even as many 
 years, we could free the system from all its errors and defects, it 
 would be the best use to which we could possibly devote our 
 time. Thus my fellow citizens am I under necessity of resigning 
 again into the hands of the Landholder, all those virtues both of 
 a positive and negative kind, which from an excess of goodness 
 he bestowed upon me, and give him my full permission to dispose 
 of them hereafter in favour of some other person, who may be 
 more deserving, and to whom they will be more acceptable : at 
 the same time, I must frankly acknowledge, however it may op- 
 erate as a proof of my dullness and stupidity, that the "ignorance 
 in the science of government" under which I laboured at first 
 was not removed by more than two months close application un- 
 der those august and enlightened masters of the science with 
 which the Convention abounded, nor was I able to discover dur- 
 ing that time, either by my own researches, or by any light bor- 
 rowed from those luminaries, anything in the history of mankind 
 or in the sentiments of those who have favoured the world with 
 their ideas on government, to warrant or countenance the motley 
 mixture of a system proposed : a system which is an innovation 
 in government of the most extraordinary kind ; a system neither 
 wholly federal, nor wholly national — but a strange hotch-potch of 
 both — just so much federal in appearance as to give its advocates 
 in some measure, an opportunity of passing it as such upon the 
 unsuspecting multitude, before they had time and opportunity to 
 examine it, and yet so predominantly national as to put it in the 
 
368 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 power of its movers, whenever the machine shall be set agoing, 
 to strike out every part that has the appearance of being federal, 
 and to render it wholly and entirely a national government: 
 And if the framing and approving the Constitution now offered 
 to our acceptance, is a proof of knowledge in the science of gov- 
 ernment, I not only admit, but I glory in my ignorance; and if 
 my rising to speak had such a somnific influence on the Conven- 
 tion as the Landhplder represents, I have no doubt the time will 
 come, should this system be adopted, when my countrymen will 
 ardently wish I had never left the Convention, but remained there 
 to the last, daily administering to my associates the salutary 
 opiate. Happy, thrice happy, would it have been for my country, 
 if the whole of that time had been devoted to sleep, or been a 
 blank in our lives, rather than employed in forging its chains. 
 As I fully intended to have returned to the Convention before 
 the completion of its business, my colleagues very probably 
 might, and were certainly well warranted to, give that informa- 
 tion the Landholder mentions; but whether the Convention was 
 led to conclude that I "would have honoured the Constitution 
 with my signature had not indispensable business called me 
 away," may be easily determined after stating a few facts. The 
 Landholder admits I was at first against the system — when the 
 compromise took place on the subject of representation, I in the 
 most explicit manner declared in Convention, that though I had 
 concurred in the report, so far as to consent to proceed upon it that 
 we might see what kind of a system might be formed, yet I dis- 
 claimed every idea of being bound to give it my assent, but re- 
 served to myself the full liberty of finally giving it my negative, if 
 it appeared to me inconsistent with the happiness of my country. 
 In a desultory conversation which long after took place in Con- 
 vention, one morning before our honourable president took the 
 chair, he was observing how unhappy it would be should there 
 be such a diversity of sentiment as to cause any of the members 
 to oppose the system when they returned to their states; on 
 that occasion I replied that I was confident no state in the union 
 would more readily accede to a proper system of government 
 than Maryland, but that the system under consideration was of 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 3.69 
 
 such a nature, that I never could recommend it for acceptance ; 
 that I thought the state never ought to adopt it, and expressed 
 my firm belief that it never would. 
 
 An honourable member from Pennsylvania objected against 
 that part of the sixth article which requires an oath to be taken 
 by the persons there mentioned, in support of the constitution, 
 observing (as he justly might from the conduct the conven- 
 tion was then pursuing) how little such oaths were regarded. I 
 immediately joined in the objection, but declared my reason to be, 
 that I thought it such a constitution as no friend of his country 
 ought to bind himself to support. And not more than two days 
 before I left Philadelphia, another honourable member from the 
 same state urged most strenuously that the Convention ought to 
 hasten their deliberations to a conclusion, assigning as a reason 
 that the Assembly of Pennsylvania was just then about to meet, 
 and that it would be of the greatest importance to bring the sys- 
 tem before that session of the legislature,. in order that a Conven- 
 tion of the State might be immediately called, to ratify it, before, 
 the enemies of the system should have an. opportunity of making, 
 the people acquainted with their objections, at the same time de- 
 claring that if the matter should be delayed and the people have- 
 time to hear the variety of objections which would he made to it. 
 by its opposers, he thought it doubtful whether that state or any, 
 other state in the union would adopt it* As soon as the hon^- 
 ourable member took his seat, I rose and observed,. that I was 
 precisely of the same opinion, that the people of America neven 
 would, nor did I think they ought to, adopt the system,, if fehey 
 had time to consider and understand it; whereas a proneness for 
 novelty and change — a conviction that some alteration was neces- 
 sary, and a confidence in the members who composed the Con- 
 vention — might possibly procure its adoption, if brought hastily 
 before them, but that these sentiments induced me to wish that a 
 very different line of conduct should be pursued from that recom- 
 mended by the honourable member. I wished the people to have 
 
 * How exactly agreeable to the sentiments of that honourable member has been 
 the conduct of the friends of the Constitution in Pennsylvania and some other states, 
 I need not mention. 
 
370 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 every opportunity of information, as I thought it much preferable 
 that a bad system should be rejected at first, than hastily adopted 
 and afterwards be unavailingly repented of If these were instances 
 of my " high approbation," I gave them in abundance as all the 
 Convention can testify, and continued so to do till I left them. 
 That I expressed great regret at being obliged to leave Philadel- 
 phia, and a fixed determination to return if possible before the 
 Convention rose, is certain. That I might declare that I had 
 rather lose an hundred guineas than not to be there at the close 
 of the business is very probable — and it is possible that some who 
 heard me say this, not knowing my reasons, which could not be 
 expressed without a breach of that secrecy to which we were en- 
 joined, might erroneously have concluded that my motive was 
 the gratification of vanity, in having my name enrolled with those 
 of a Franklin and a Washington. As to the first, I cordially join 
 in the tribute of praise so justly paid to the enlightened philoso- 
 pher and statesman, while the polite, friendly and affectionate 
 itreatment myself and my family received from that venerable 
 :.«age and the worthy family in which he is embosomed, will ever 
 ■ endear him to my heart. The name of Washington is far above 
 rmy praise. I would to Heaven that on this occasion one 
 '.more wreath had been added to the number of those which 
 are twined around his amiable brow — that those with which it is 
 already surrounded may flourish with immortal verdure, nor 
 wither or fade till time shall be no more, is my fervent prayer, and 
 may that glory which encircles his head ever shine with undimin- 
 ished rays. To find myself under the necessity of opposing such 
 , illustrious characters, whom I venerated and loved, filled me with 
 .regret; but viewing the system in the light I then did, and yet 
 . do view it, to have hesitated would have been criminal ; complai- 
 sance would have been guilt. If it was the idea of my state that 
 whatever a Washington or Franklin approved, was to be blindly 
 adopted, she ought to have spared herself the expence of sending 
 any members to the Convention, or to have instructed them im- 
 ^ plicitly to follow where they led the way. It was not to have my 
 " name enrolled with the other labourers," that I wished to return 
 to Philadelphia — that sacrifice which I must have made of my 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 37 1 
 
 principles by putting my name to the Constitution, could not 
 have been effaced by any derivative lustre it could possibly re- 
 ceive from the bright constellation with which it would have 
 been surrounded. My object was in truth the very reverse ; as I 
 had uniformly opposed the system in its progress, I wished to 
 have been present at the conclusion, to have then given it my sol- 
 emn negative, which I certainly should have done, even had I stood 
 single and alone, being perfectly willing to leave it to the cool and 
 impartial investigation both of the present and of future ages to de- 
 cide who best understood the science of government — who best 
 knew the rights of men and of states, who best consulted the 
 true interest of America, and who most faithfully discharged 
 the trust reposed in them, those who agreed to or those who 
 opposed the new Constitution — and so fully have I made up 
 my own mind on this subject, that as long as the history of man- 
 kind shall record the appointment of the late Convention, and the 
 system which has been proposed by them, it is my highest am- 
 bition that my name may also be recorded as one who considered 
 the system injurious to my country, and as such opposed it. 
 Having shown that I did not " alter my opinion afler I left Phila- 
 delphia," and that I acted no " contradictory parts on the great 
 political stage," and therefore that there are none such to recon- 
 cile, the reason assigned by the Landholder for that purpose doth 
 not deserve my notice, except only to observe that he shrewdly 
 intimates there is already a Junto established, who are to share in 
 and deal out the offices of this new government at their will and 
 pleasure, and that they have already fixed upon the character who 
 is to be " Deputy Attorney General of the United States for the 
 State of Maryland." If this is true, it is worth while to inquire of 
 whom this Junto consists, as it might lead to a discovery of the 
 persons for thq gratification of whose ambition and interest this 
 system is prepared, and is, if possible, to be enforced, and from 
 the disposition of offices already allotted in the various and nu- 
 merous departments, we possibly might discover whence proceeds 
 the conviction and zeal of some of its advocates. 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, March ig, ij88. 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, V. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 Friday, March 28, 1788. 
 
 (NninTDer 1024) 
 
 Number III. 
 
 To THE Citizens of Maryland. 
 
 There is, my fellow citizens, scarcely an individual of common 
 understanding, I believe, in this state, who is any ways acquainted 
 with the proposed Constitution, who doth not allow it to be, in 
 many instances, extremely censurable, and that a variety of alter- 
 ations and amendments are essentially requisite, to render it con- 
 sistent with a reasonable security for the liberty of the respective 
 states, and their citizens. Aristides,* it is true, is an exception 
 from this observation ; he declares, that " if the whole matter was 
 left to his discretion, he would not change any part of the pro- 
 posed Constitution," whether he meant this declaration as a proof 
 of his discretion, I will not say ; it will however, readily be ad- 
 mitted, by most, as a proof of his enthusiastic zeal in favour of the 
 system. But it would be injustice to that writer not to observe, 
 that if he is as much mistaken in the other parts of the Constitu- 
 tion, as in that which relates to the judicial department, the Con- 
 stitution which he is so earnestly recommending to his coun- 
 trymen, and on which he is lavishing so liberally his commenda- 
 tions, is a thing of his own creation and totally different from that 
 which is offered for your acceptance. — He has given us an 
 
 * A reference to Alexander Contee Hanson's pamphlet, written under the pseu- 
 donym of Aristides. It is reprinted inTord's Pamphlets on the Constitution. — Ed. 
 
 (372) 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 373 
 
 explanation of the original and appellate jurisdiction of the judici- 
 ary of the general government, and of the manner in which he 
 supposes it is to operate — an explanation so inconsistent with the 
 intention of its framers, and so different from its true construction 
 and from the effect which it will have, should the system be 
 adopted, that I could scarce restrain my astonishment at the er- 
 ror, although I was in some measure prepared for it, by his pre- 
 vious acknowledgment that he- did not very well understand that 
 part of the system ; a circumstance I apprehended he did not re- 
 collect at the time when he was bestowing upon it his dying ben- 
 ediction. And if one of our judges, possessed of no common 
 share of understanding, and of extensive acquired knowledge, who, 
 as he informs us, has long made the science of government his 
 peculiar study, so little understands the true import and construc- 
 tion of this Constitution, and that too in a part more particularly 
 within his own province, can it be wondered at that the people 
 in general, whose knowledge in subjects of this nature is much 
 more limited and circumscribed, should but imperfectly compre- 
 hend the extent, operation and consequences of so complex and 
 intricate a system; and is not this of itself a strong proof of the 
 necessity that it should be corrected and amended, at least so as 
 to render it more clear and comprehensible to those who are to 
 decide upon it, or to be affected by it. But although almost 
 every one agrees the Constitution, as it is, to be both defective 
 and dangerous, we are not wanting in characters who earnestly 
 advise us to adopt it, in its present form, with all its faults, and 
 assure us we may safely rely on obtaining hereafter the amend- 
 ments that are necessary. But why, I pray you, my fellow citi- 
 zens, should we not insist upon the necessary amendments being 
 made now, while we have the liberty of acting for ourselves, be- 
 fore the Constitution becomes binding upon us by our assent, as 
 every principle of reason, common sense and safety would dic- 
 tate? Because) say they, the sentiments of men are so different, 
 and the interests of the different states are so jarring and disso- 
 nant, that there is no probability they would agree if alterations and 
 amendments were attempted. Thus with one breath they tell us 
 that the obstacles to any alterations and amendments being agreed 
 
374 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 to by the states are so insuperable, that it is vain to make the ex- 
 periment, while in the next they would persuade us it is so certain 
 the states will accede to those which shall be necessary, and that 
 they may be procured even after the system shall be ratified, that 
 we need not hesitate swallowing the poison, from the ease and se- 
 curity of instantly obtaining the antidote — and they seem to think 
 it astonishing that any person should find a difficulty in reconciling 
 the absurdity and contradiction. If it is easy to obtain proper 
 amendments, do not let us sacrifice everything that ought to be 
 dear to freemen, for want of insisting upon its being done, while we 
 have the power. If the obtaining them will be difficult and im- 
 probable, for God's sake do not accept of such a form of govern- 
 ment as without amendments cannot fail of rendering you mere 
 beasts of burthen, and reducing you to a level with your own slaves, 
 with this aggravating distinction, that you once tasted the blessings 
 of freedom. Those who would wish you to believe that the faults 
 in the system proposed are wholly or principally owing to the 
 difference of state interests, and proceed from that cause, are 
 either imposed upon themselves, or mean to impose upon you. 
 The principal questions, in which the state interests had any 
 material effect, were those which related to representation, and 
 the number in each branch of the legislature, whose concurrence 
 should be necessary for passing navigation acts, or making com- 
 mercial regulations. But what state is there in the union whose 
 interest would prompt it to give the general government the ex- 
 tensive and unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legis- 
 lative and judicial departments, together with the powers over the 
 militia, and the liberty of establishing a standing army without 
 any restriction? What state in the union considers it advan- 
 tageous to its interest that the President should be re eligible — 
 the members of both houses appointable to offices — the judges 
 capable of holding other offices at the will and pleasure of the 
 government, and that there should be no real responsibility either 
 in the President or in the members of either branch of the Legis- 
 lature? Or what state is there that would have been averse to a 
 bill of rights, or that would have wished for the destruction of 
 jury trial in a great variety of cases, and in a particular manner in 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 3/5 
 
 every case without exception where the government itself is in- 
 terested ? These parts of the system, so far from promoting the 
 interest of any state, or states, have an immediate tendency to 
 annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to sub- 
 vert their rights and the rights of their citizens. To oppose 
 these, and to procure their alteration, is equally the interest 
 of every state in the union. The introduction of these parts 
 of the system must not be attributed to the jarring interests 
 of states, but to a very different source, the pride, the ambition 
 and the interest of individuals. This being the case, we may 
 be enabled to form some judgment of the probability of obtain- 
 ing a safe and proper system, should we have firmness and wis- 
 'dom to reject that which is now offered; and also of the great 
 improbability of procuring any amendments to the present sys- 
 tem, if we should weakly and inconsiderately adopt it. The bold 
 and daring attempt that has been made to use, for the total anni- 
 hilation of the states, that power that was delegated for their 
 preservation, will put the different states on their guard. The 
 votaries of ambition and interest being totally defeated in their 
 attempt to establish themselves on the ruins of the States, which 
 they will be if this Constitution is rejected, an attempt in which 
 they had more probability of success from the total want of sus- 
 picion in their countrymen than they can have hereafter, they 
 will not hazard a second attempt of the same nature, in which 
 they will have much less chance of success; besides, being once 
 discovered they will not be confided in. The true interest and 
 happiness of the states and their citizens will, therefore, most 
 probably be the object which will be principally sought for by a 
 second Convention, should a second be appointed, which if really 
 aimed at, I cannot think very difficult to accomplish, by giving to 
 the federal government sufficient power for every salutary purpose, 
 while the rights of the states and their citizens should be secure 
 from any imminent danger. But if the arts and influence of am- 
 bitious and interested men, even in their present situation, while 
 more on a level with yourselves, and unarmed with any extraor- 
 dinary powers, should procure you to adopt this system, danger- 
 ous as it is admitted to be to your rights, I will appeal to the un- 
 
376 LETTERS OF L0THER MARTIN. 
 
 derstanding of every one of you, who will on this occasion give 
 his reason fair play, whether there is not every cause to be- 
 lieve they will, should this government be adopted, with that ad- 
 ditional power, consequence and influence it will give them, most 
 easily prevent the necessary alterations which might be wished 
 for, the purpose of which would be directly opposite to their 
 views, and defeat every attempt to procure them. Be assured, 
 whatever obstacles or difficulties may be at this time in the way 
 of obtaining a proper system of government, they will be in- 
 creased an hundred fold after this system is adopted. Reflect 
 also, I entreat you, my fellow citizens, that the alterations and 
 amendments which are wanted in the present system are of siich 
 a nature as to diminish and lessen, to check and restrain the 
 powers of the general government, not to increase and enlarge 
 those powers. If they were of the last kind, we might safely adopt 
 it, and trust to giving greater powers hereafter, like a physician 
 who administers an emetic ex re nata, giving a moderate dose at 
 first, and increasing it afterwards as the constitution of the patient 
 may require. But I appeal to the history of mankind for this truth, 
 that when once power and authority are delegated to a govern- 
 ment, it knows how to keep it, and is sufficiently and successfully 
 fertile in expedients for that purpose. Nay more, the whole his- 
 tory of mankind proves that so far from parting with the powers 
 actually delegated to it, government is constantly encroaching on 
 the small pittance of rights reserved by the people to themselves, 
 and gradually wresting them out of their hands until it either ter- 
 minates in their slavery or forces them to arms, and brings about 
 a revolution. From these observations it appears to me, my fel- 
 low citizens, that nothing can be more weak and absurd than to 
 accept of a system that is admitted to stand in need of immediate 
 amendments to render your rights secure — for remember, if you 
 fail in obtaining them, you cannot free yourselves from the yoke 
 you will have placed on your necks, and servitude must, therefore, 
 be your portion. Let me ask you my fellow citizens what you 
 would think of a physician who, because you were slightly indis- 
 posed, should bring you a dose which properly corrected with 
 other ingredients might be a salutary remedy, but of itself was a 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 377 
 
 deadly poison, and with great appearance of friendship and zeal, 
 should advise you to swallow it immediately, and trust to acci- 
 dent for those requisites necessary to qualify its malignity, and 
 prevent its destructive effects ? Would not you reject the advice, 
 in however friendly a manner it might appear to be given, with 
 indignation, and insist that he should first procure, and properly 
 attempt, the necessary ingredients, since after the fatal draught 
 was once received into your bowels, it would be too late should 
 the antidote prove unattainable, and death must ensue. With the 
 same indignation ought you, my fellow citizens, to reject the ad- 
 vice of those political quacks, who under pretence of healing the 
 disorders of our present government, would urge you rashly to 
 gulp down a constitution, which in its present form, unaltered 
 and unamended, would be as certain death to your liberty, as ar- 
 senic could be to your bodies. 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, March zj, 1788, 
 
LUTHER MARTIN, VI. 
 
 THE MARYLAND JOURNAL. 
 
 Friday, April 4, 1 788. 
 
 (Nurater 10S6) 
 
 Number IV. 
 To THE Citizens of Maryland. 
 
 If those, my fellow citizens, to whom the administration of our 
 government was about to be committed, had sufficient wisdom 
 never to err, and sufficient goodness always to consult the true 
 interest of the governed, and if we could have a proper security 
 that their successors should to the end of time be possessed of 
 the same qualifications, it would be impossible that power could 
 be lavished upon them with too liberal a hand. Power absolute 
 and unlimited, united with unerring wisdom and unbounded good- 
 ness, is the government of the Deity of the universe. But re- 
 member, my fellow citizens, that the persons to whom you are 
 about to delegate authority are and will be weak, erring mortals, 
 subject to the same passions, prejudices and infirmities with your- 
 selves ; and let it be deeply engraven on your hearts, that from 
 the first history of government to the present time, if we begin 
 with Nimrod and trace down the rulers of nations to -those who 
 are now invested with supreme power, we shall find few, very 
 few, who have made the beneficent Governor of the universe the 
 model of their conduct, while many are they who, on the con- 
 trary, have imitated the demons of the darkness. We have no 
 right to expect that our rulers will be more wise, more virtuous, 
 or more perfect than those of other nations have been, or that 
 
 (378) 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 379 
 
 they will not be equally under the influence of ambition, avarice 
 and all that train of baleful passions, which have so generally 
 proved the curse of our unhappy race. We must consider man- 
 kind such as they really are, — such as experience has shown them 
 to be heretofore, and bids us expect to find them hereafter, — and 
 not suffer ourselves to be misled by interested deceivers or en- 
 thusiastick visionaries ; and therefore in forming a system of gov- 
 ernment, to delegate no greater power than is clearly and cer- 
 tainly necessary, ought to be the first principle with every people 
 who are influenced by reason and a regard for their safety, and in 
 doing this, they ought most solicitously to endeavour so to qual- 
 ify even that power, by such checks and restraints, as to produce 
 a perfect responsibility in those who are to exercise it, and pre- 
 vent them from its abuse with a chance of impunity; — since such 
 is the nature- of man, that he has a propensity to abuse authority 
 and to tyrannize over the rights of his fellowmen ; — and to whom- 
 soever power is given, not content with the actual deposit, they 
 will ever strive to obtain an increase. Those who would wish to 
 excite and keep awake your jealousy and distrust are your truest 
 friends ; while they who speak peace to you when there is no 
 peace — who would lull you into security, and wish you to repose 
 blind confidence in your future governors — are your most danger- 
 ous enemies ; jealousy and distrust are the guardian angels who 
 watch over liberty — security and confidence are the forerunners 
 of slavery. But the advocates of the system tell you that we who 
 oppose it, endeavour to terrify you with mere possibilities which 
 may never be realized, that all our objections consist in saying 
 government may do this, and government may do that. — I will 
 for argument sake admit the justice of this remark, and yet main- 
 tain that the objections are insurmountable. I consider it an in- 
 controvertible truth, that whatever by the constitution government 
 even may do, if it relates to the abuse of power by acts tyrannical 
 and oppressive, it some time or other will do. Such is the ambition 
 of man, and his lust for domination, that no power less than that 
 which fixed its bounds to the ocean can say to them, "Thus far 
 shall ye go and no farther." Ascertain the limits of the may 
 with ever so much precision, and let them be as extensive as you 
 
380 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 please, government will speedily reach their utmost verge ; nor 
 • will it stop there, but soon will overleap those boundaries, and 
 roam at large into the regions of the may not. Those who tell 
 you the government by this constitution may keep up a standing 
 army, abolish the trial by jury, oppress the citizens of the states 
 by its powers over the militia, destroy the freedom of the press, 
 infringe the liberty of conscience, and do a number of other acts 
 injurious and destructive of your rights, yet that it never will do 
 so ; and that you safely may accept such a constitution and be 
 perfectly at ease and secure that your rulers will always be so 
 good, so wise, and so virtuous — such emanations of the Deity — 
 that they will never use their power but for your interest and 
 your happiness, contradict the uniform experience of ages, and 
 betray a total ignorance of human nature, or a total want of in- 
 genuity. Look back, my fellow citizens, to your conduct but a 
 few years past, and let that instruct you what ought to be your 
 conduct at this time. Great Britain then claimed the right to 
 pass laws to bind you in all cases whatever. You were then 
 told in all the soft insinuating language of the present day, and 
 with all the appearance of disinterested friendship now used, that 
 those who insisted this claim of power might be abused, only 
 wandered in the regions of fancy — that you need not be uneasy, 
 but might safely acquiesce in the claim — that you might have 
 the utmost possible confidence in your rulers, that they never 
 would use that power to your injury; but distrustful of govern- 
 ment, and jealous of your liberty, you rejected such counsel with 
 disdain ; the bare possibility that Britain might abuse it, if once 
 conceded, kindled a flame from one end of this continent to the 
 other, and roused you to arms. Weak and defenseless as you 
 were, unused to military exertions, and unsupplied with warlike 
 stores, you , braved the strength of a nation the most powerful 
 and best provided — you chose to risk your lives and property 
 rather than to risque the possibility that the power claimed by 
 the British government should be exercised to your injury — a 
 possibility which the minions of power at that time, with as much 
 corifidence as those of the present day, declared to be absolutely 
 visionary. Heaven wrought a miracle in your favour, and your 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 38 1 
 
 efforts were crowned with success. You are not now called upon 
 to make an equal sacrifice, you are not now requested to beat your 
 ploughshares into swords, or your pruning hooks into spears, to 
 leave your peaceful habitations, and exchange domestic tranquillity 
 for the horrors of war; peaceably, quietly and orderly to give this 
 system of slavery your negative, is all that is asked by the advo- 
 cates of freedom — to pronounce the single monosyllable no, is all 
 they entreat. Shall they entreat you in vain ? when by this it is to 
 be determined, whether our independence, for obtaining which we 
 have been accustomed to bow the knee with reverential gratitude to 
 Heaven, shall be our greatest curse ; and when on this it depends 
 whether we shall be subject to a government, of which the little 
 finger will be thicker than the loins of that of Great Britain. But 
 there are also persons who pretend that your situation is at pres- 
 ent so bad that it cannot be worse, and urge that as an argument 
 why we should embrace any remedy proposed, however desperate 
 it may appear. Thus do the poor erring children of mortality, suf- 
 fering under the presence of real or imaginary evils, have re- 
 course to a pistol or halter for relief, and rashly launch into the 
 untried regions of eternity — nor wake from this delusion, until 
 they wake in endless woe. Should the citizens of America, in a fit 
 desperation, be induced to commit this fatal act of political suicide, 
 to which by such arguments they are stimulated, the day will 
 come when laboring under more than Egyptian bondage ; com- 
 pelled to finish their quota of brick, though destitute of straw and 
 of mortar; galled with your chains, and worn down by oppression, 
 you will, by sad experience, be convinced (when that conviction 
 shall be too late), that there is a difference in evils, and that the 
 buzzing of gnats is more supportable than the sting of a serpent. 
 From the wisdom of antiquity we might obtain excellent instruc- 
 tion, if we were not too proud to profit by it. .^sop has furn- 
 ished us with a history of a nation of frogs, between which and 
 our own there is a striking resemblance — whether the catastrophe 
 be the same, rests with ourselves. Jupiter out of pure good 
 nature, wishing to do them as little injury as possible, on being 
 asked for a king, had thrown down into their pond a log to rule 
 over them; — under whose government, had they been wise 
 
382 LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 
 
 enough to know their own interest and to pursue it, they might 
 to this day, have remained happy and prosperous. Terrified 
 with the noise, and affrighted by the violent undulations of the 
 water, they for some time kept an awful distance, and regarded 
 their monarch with reverence ; but the first impression being in 
 some measure worn off, and perceiving him to be of a tame and 
 peaceable disposition, they approached him with familiarity, and 
 soon entertained for him the utmost contempt. In a little time 
 were seen the leaders of the frogs croaking to their respective 
 circles on the weakness and feebleness of the government at 
 home, and of its want of dignity and respect abroad, till the sen- 
 timent being caught by their auditors, the whole pond resounded 
 with " Oh Jupiter, good Jupiter, hear our prayers ! take away 
 from us this vile log, and give us a ruler who shall know how to 
 support the dignity and splendor of government! give us any 
 government you please, only let it be energetic and efficient." 
 The Thunderer, in his wrath, setit them a crane. With what 
 delight did they gaze on their monarch, as he came majesti- 
 cally floating on the wings of the wind. They admired his 
 uncommon shape — it was such as they had never before seen — 
 his deformities were, in their eyes, the greatest of beauties, and 
 they -were heard like Aristides to declare that, were they on the 
 verge of eternity, they would not wish a single alteration in his 
 form. His monstrous beak, his long neck, and his enormous poke, 
 even these, the future means of their destruction, were subjects of 
 their warm approbation. He took possessian of his new dominions, 
 and instantly began to swallow down his subjects, and it is said 
 that those who had been the warmest zealots for crane administra- 
 tion, fared no better than the rest. The poor wretches were now 
 much more dissatisfied than before, and with all possible humility 
 applied to Jupiter again for his aid, but in vain — he dismissed them 
 with this reproof, " that the evil of which they complained they 
 had foolishly brought upon themselves, and that they had no 
 other remedy now, but to submit with patience." Thus forsaken 
 by the god, and left to the mercy of the crane, they sought to 
 escape his cruelty by flight ; but pursuing them to every place of 
 retreat, and thrusting his long neck through the water to the 
 
LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. 383 
 
 bottom, he drew them out with his beak from their most secret 
 hiding-places, and served them up as a regale for his ravenous 
 appetite. The present federal government is, my fellow citizens, 
 the log of the fable — the crane is the sy.stem now offered to your 
 acceptance — I wish you not to remain under the governrrient of 
 the one, nor to become subjected to the tyranny of the other. If 
 either of these events take place, it must arise from your being 
 greatly deficient to yourselves — from your being, liKe the nation of 
 Frogs, " a discontented, variable race, weary of liberty and fond 
 of change." At the same time I have no hesitation in declaring, 
 that if the one or the other|must be our fate, I think the harmless, 
 inoffensive, though contemptible Log, infinitely to be preferred to 
 the powerful, the efficient, but all-devouring Crane. 
 
 Luther Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, March zg, ij88. 
 
LETTER 
 
 OF 
 
 A PLAIN DEALER 
 
 ACCREDITED TO 
 
 SPENCER ROANE, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE. 
 
 February, 
 1788. 
 
. NOTE. 
 
 In October, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph, delegate to 
 the Federal Convention form Virginia, addressed to the Speaker 
 of the House of Delegates a letter on the Federal Constitution. 
 This was published in December, 1787, in both The Virginia Ga- 
 zette and The Virginia Independent Chronicle, as well as in pamphlet 
 form at the time, and recently in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitu- 
 tion. Randolph had declined to give his assent to the Constitution 
 in the Convention, but had so far altered his views in the interven- 
 ing period as to make his letter on the whole an argument in favor 
 of rather than against its adoption. Uncertain in exactly what light 
 to regard his utterances, it was one of the few writings of the 
 time which did not receive replies from one party or the other. 
 
 The essay of " A Plain Dealer " is the only notice I have found 
 of this letter, and deals rather more with the inconsistencies of 
 Randolph's views, than with the arguments advanced in the lat- 
 ter. Of the author, Randolph himself gives us a clue in his letter 
 to Madison, of February 29, 1788, where he writes : 
 
 A writer calling himself Plain Dealer, who is bitter in princi- 
 ple vs. the Constitution, has attacked me in the paper. I suspect 
 the author to be Mr. Spencer Roane; and the importunities of 
 some to me in public and private are designed to throw me une- 
 quivocally and without condition into the opposition. 
 
 (387) 
 
A PLAIN DEALER. 
 
 THE VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRON- 
 ICLE, 
 
 {HTumber S3) 
 
 Wednesday, February 13, 1788. 
 
 Mans parturiens et etce na&diur mux. 
 After a long and general expectancy of some dissertation on the 
 subject of the proposed Foederal Constitution, worthy the first 
 magistrate of the respectable state of Virginia, a letter of his Ex- 
 cellency Governor Randolph, of Oct. 10, 1787, is at length pre- 
 sented to the public. Previous to the appearance of this letter, 
 various opinions were prevailing in different parts of this country 
 respecting that gentleman's real opinion on the subject of the 
 said Constitution; and it became difficult for many to conjecture 
 how his Excellency would devise a middle course, so as to catch 
 the spirit of all his countrymen, and to reconcile himself to all 
 parties. It was not known to me, at least, that his Excellency 
 felt an " unwillingness to disturb the harmony of the legislature " 
 on this important subject; nor could I conceive that the senti- 
 ments of even the ablest man among us could " excite a contest 
 unfavorable " to the fairest discussion of the question. On the 
 other hand, I thought it right that the adversaries of the Consti- 
 stitution, as well as its framers, should candidly avow their real 
 sentiments as early and decidedly as possible, for the information 
 of those who are to determine. It is true, his Excellency was 
 prevented declaring his opinion sooner, " by motives of delicacy 
 arising from two questions depending before the General Assem- 
 bly, one respecting the Constitution, the other respecting him- 
 
 (389) 
 
390 LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER. 
 
 self;" but I am of opinion that during the pendency of a question 
 concerning the Constitution, every information on that subject is 
 most properly to be adduced ; and I did not know that the being 
 or not being Governor of Virginia, (an office in a great degree 
 nominal) was sufficient to deter a real patriot from speaking 
 the warning voice of opposition, in behalf of the liberties of his 
 country. 
 
 The letter above-mentioned can derive no aid from panegyric, 
 as to the brilliancy and elegance of its stile, for unlike the thread- 
 bare discourses of other statesmen on thexiry subject of govern- 
 ment, it amuses us with a number of fine words. But how shall 
 I express my dislike of the ultimatum of his Excellency's letter, 
 wherein he declares " that if after our best efforts for amendments, 
 they cannot be obtained, he will adopt the Constitution as it is." 
 How is this declaration reconcilable to a former opinion of his 
 Excellency's, expressed to the Honorable Richard Henry Lee, and 
 repeated by the latter gentleman in his letter,* as printed in the 
 public papers, " that either a monarchy or an aristocracy will be 
 generated from the proposed Constitution." Good God! how 
 can the first Magistrate and Father of a free republican govern- 
 ment, after a feeble parade of opposition, and before his desired 
 plan of amendments has been determined upon, declare that he 
 will accept a Constitution which is to beget a monarchy or an 
 aristocracy ? How can such a determination be reconcileable to 
 the feelings of Virginia, and to the principles which have pre- 
 vailed in almost every legislature of the union, who looked no 
 farther than the amendment of our present republican confed- 
 eration? I have charity to believe that the respectable charac- 
 ters who signed this Constitution did so, thinking that neither 
 a monarchy nor an aristocracy would ensue, but that they 
 should thereby preserve and ameliorate the republic of America ; 
 but never until now, that his Excellency has let the cat out 
 of the bag, did I suppose that any member of the Con- 
 vention, at least from the republican state of Virginia, would 
 accept a Constitution, whereby the republic of his constitu- 
 
 * Printed in Elliot, i, 503 . — Ed. 
 
LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER. 39 1 
 
 ents is to be sacrificed in its infancy, and before it has had a 
 fair trial. But his Excellency will adopt this Constitution, "be- 
 cause HE WOULD regulate HIMSELF BY THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA." 
 
 But is his Excellency a prophet as well as a politician — can he 
 foretell future events? How else can he at this time discover what 
 the spirit of America is? But admitting his infallibility for a mo- 
 ment, how far will his principle carry him ? — why, that if the do- 
 minion of Shays, instead of that of the new Constitution, should 
 be generally accepted, and become the spirit of America, his Ex- 
 cellency, too,- would turn Shayite! — and yet this question of the 
 Constitution, is " one on which the fate of thousands yet un- 
 born DEPENDS." It is his Excellency's opinion, as expressed in 
 the aforesaid letter, that the powers which are acknowledged 
 necessary for supporting the Union, cannot safely be entrusted to 
 our Congress as at present constituted ; and his vain objection is 
 " that the representation of the states bears no proportion to their 
 importance." This is literally true; but is equally true of the 
 Senate of the proposed Constitution, which is to be an essential 
 part of the legislature ; and yet his Excellency will accept the lat- 
 ter, and not agree to invest the necessary powers in the former, 
 although the above objection equally applies to both. Nay, I am 
 inclined to believe that the injurious consequences of this unequal 
 representation will operate more strongly under the new govern- 
 ment — for under the present confederation the members of Con- 
 gress are removable at the pleasure of their constituents ; — whereas 
 under the proposed Constitution, the only method of removing 
 a wicked, unskilful or treacherous senator, will be by impeach- 
 ment before the senate itself, of which he is a member. 
 
 These, Mr. Printer, are some of the inconsistencies which even 
 a slight observation of the above letter will suggest. It is not my 
 purpose to oppose now, or to investigate, the merits of the Con- 
 stitution. This I leave to abler pens, and to the common sense of 
 my countrymen. The science of government is in itself simple 
 and plain ; and if in the history of mankind no perfect government 
 can be found, let it be attributed to the chicane, perfidy and am- 
 bition of those who fabricate them ; and who are more or less, in 
 common with all mankind, infected with a lust of power. It is, 
 
392 LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER. 
 
 however, certainly not consistent with sound sense to accept a 
 Constitution, knowing it to be imperfect; and his Excellency 
 acknowledges the proposed one to have radical objections. A 
 Constitution ought to be like Caesar's wife, not only good, but 
 unsuspected, since it is the highest compact which men are cap- 
 able of forming, and involves the dearest rights of life, liberty and 
 property. I fear his Excellency has done no service to his favor- 
 ite scheme of amendments (and he too seems to be of the same 
 opinion) by his very candid declaration at the end of his letter. 
 Subtlety and chicane in politics, are equally odious and dishonor- 
 able; but when it is considered that the present is not the golden 
 age — the epoch of virtue, candor and integrity — that the views of 
 ambitious and designing men are continually working to their 
 own aggrandizement and to the overthrow of liberty, and that the 
 discordant interests of thirteen different commonwealths are to be 
 reconciled and promoted by one general government; common 
 reason will teach us that the utmost caution, secrecy, and politi- 
 cal sagacity is requisite to secure to each the important blessings 
 of a good government. 
 
 I shall now take my leave of his Excellency and the above- 
 mentioned letter, declaring my highest veneration for his charac- 
 ter and abilities; and it can be no impeachment of the talents of 
 any man who has not served a regular apprenticeship to politics, 
 to say, that his opinions on an intricate political question are 
 erroneous. For if, as the celebrated Dr. Blackstone observes, 
 " in every art, occupation, or science, commercial or mechanical, 
 some method of instruction or apprenticeship is held necessary, 
 how much more requisite will such apprenticeship be found to 
 be, in the science of government, the noblest and most difificult of 
 any!" A Plain Dealer. 
 
REiVlARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, 
 
 BY 
 
 HUGH WILLIAMSON, 
 
 PRINTED IN 
 
 THE STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA. 
 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 No file of the State Gazette of North Carolina is now known to 
 exist, so the date of publication of this essay is in doubt. It is 
 printed from a clipping from that paper, preserved by Williamson 
 himself, which is in the library of the New York Historical So- 
 ciety. A note states that : 
 
 " The following remarks on the new Plan of Government are 
 handed us as the substance of Dr. Williamson's Address to the 
 freemen of Edenton and the County of Chowan when assembled 
 to instruct their representatives. 
 
 (395) 
 
REMARKS. 
 
 STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA. 
 
 Though I am conscious that a subject of the greatest magni- 
 tude must suffer in the hands of such an advocate, I cannot refuse, 
 at the request of my fellow-citizens, to make some observations 
 on the new plan of government. 
 
 It seems to be generally admitted, that the system of govern - 
 meiit which has been proposed by the late convention, is well 
 calculated to relieve us from many of the grievances under which 
 we have been laboring. If I might express my particular senti- 
 ments on this subject, I should describe it as more free and more 
 perfect than any form of government that has ever been adopted 
 by any nation ; but I would not say it has no faults. Imperfection 
 is inseparable from every device. Several objections were made 
 to this system by two or three very respectable characters in the 
 convention, which have been the subject of much conversation; 
 and other objections, by citizens of this state, have lately reached 
 our ears. It is proper you should consider of these objections. 
 They are of two kinds ; they respect the things that are in the 
 system, and the things that are not in it. We are told that there 
 should have been a section for securing the trial by Jury in civil 
 cases, and the liberty of the press : that there should also have 
 been a declaration of rights. In the new system, it is provided, 
 that " the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall 
 be by jury" but this provision could not possibly be extended to 
 all civil cases. For it is well known that the trial by jury is not 
 general and uniform throughout the United States, either in cases 
 of admiralty or of chancery; hence it becomes necessary to sub^ 
 mit the question to the general Legislature, who might accommo- 
 
 (397; 
 
398 REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 date their laws on this occasion to the desires and habits of the 
 nation. Surely there is no prohibition in a case that is un- 
 touched. 
 
 We have been told that the liberty of the press is not secured 
 by the new Constitution. Be pleased to examine the Plan, and 
 you will find that the liberty of the press and the laws of Ma- 
 homet are equally affected by iti The new government is to 
 have the power of protecting literary property; the very power 
 which you have by a special act delegated to the present con- 
 gress. There was a time in England, when neither book, pam- 
 phlet, nor paper could be published without a license from gov- 
 ernment. That restraint was finally removed in the year 1694 : 
 and, by such removal, their press became perfectly free, for it is 
 not under the restraint of any license. Certainly the new govern- 
 ment can have no power to impose restraints. The citizens of 
 the United States have no more occasion for a second declaration 
 of rights, than they have for a section in favour of the press. 
 Their rights, in the several states, have long since been explained 
 and secured by particular declarations, which make a part of 
 their several constitutions. It is granted, and perfectly under- 
 stood, that under the government of the assemblies of the states, 
 and under the government of the congress, every right is reserved 
 to the individual which he has not expressly delegated to this, or 
 that legislature. The other objections that have been made to 
 the new plan of government, are : That it absorbs the powers of 
 the several states; that the national judiciary is too extensive; 
 that a standing army is permitted ; that congress is allowed to 
 regulate trade ; that the several states are prevented from taxing 
 exports for their own benefit. 
 
 When Gentlemen are pleased to complain, that little power is 
 left in the hands of the separate states, they should be advised to 
 cast an eye upon the large code of laws, which have passed in 
 this state since the peace. Let them consider how few of those 
 laws have been framed for the general benefit of the nation. Nine 
 out often of them are domestic; calculated for the sole use of this 
 state or of particular citizens. There must still be use for such 
 laws, though you should enable the congress to collect a revenue 
 
REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 399 
 
 for national purposes; and the collection of that revenue includes 
 the chief of the new powers, which are now to be committed to 
 the congress. 
 
 Hitherto you have delegated certain powers to the Congress^ 
 and other powers to the Assemblies of the states. The portion 
 that you have delegated to Congress, is found to have been 
 useless, because it is too small: and the powers that are com- 
 mitted to the Assemblies of the several states are also found 
 to be absolutely ineffectual for national purposes, because 
 they can never be so managed as to operate in concert. Of 
 what use is that small portion of reserve powers? It neither 
 makes you respectable nor powerful. The consequence of such 
 reservation is national contempt abroad, and a state of dangerous 
 weakness at home. What avails the claim of power, which ap- 
 pears to be nothing better than the empty whistling of a name ? 
 The Congress will be chosen by yourselves, as your members of 
 Assembly are. They will be creatures of your hands, and subject 
 to your advice. Protected and cherished by the small addition 
 of power which you shall put into their hands, you may become 
 a great and respectable nation. 
 
 It is complained that the powers of the national judiciary are 
 too extensive. This objection appears to have the greatest 
 weight in the eyes of gentlemen who have not carefully compared 
 the powers which are to be delegated, with those that had been 
 formerly delegated to Congress. The powers now to be com- 
 mitted to the national legislature, as they are detailed in the 8th 
 section of the first article, have already been chiefly delegated 
 to the Congress, under one form or another, except those which 
 are contained in the first paragraph of that section. And the 
 objects that are now to be submitted to the supreme judiciary, or 
 to the inferipr courts, are those which naturally arise from the 
 constitutional laws of Congress. If there is a single new case 
 that can be exceptional, it is that between a Foreigner and a 
 Citizen, or that between the Citizens of different States. These 
 cases may come up by appeal. It is provided in this system, 
 that there shall be no fraudulent tender in the payments of debts. 
 Foreigners with whom we have treaties will trust our citizens on 
 
400 REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 the faith of this engagement ; and the citizens of different states 
 will do the same. If the Congress had a negative on the laws of 
 the several states, they would certainly prevent all such laws as 
 might endanger the honor or peace of the nation, by making a 
 tender of base money ; but they have no such power, and it is at 
 least possible that some state may be found in this union, dis- 
 posed to break the constitution, and abolish private debts by such 
 tenders. In these cases the courts of the offending state would 
 probably decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would 
 complain, and the nation might be involved in war for the sup- 
 port of such dishonest measures. Is it not better to have a court 
 of appeals in which the judges can only be determined by the 
 laws of the nation? This court is equally to be desired by the 
 citizens of different states. But we are told that justice will be 
 delayed, and the poor will be drawn away by the rich to a distant 
 court. The authors of this remark have not fully considered the 
 question, else they must have recollected that the poor of this 
 country have little to do with foreigners or with the citizens of 
 distant states. They do not consider that there may be an in- 
 ferior court in every state; nor have they recollected that the ap- 
 peals being wich such exceptions, and under such regulations as 
 Congress shall make, will never be permitted for trifling sums or 
 under trivial pretences, unless we can suppose that the national 
 legislature shall be composed of knaves and fools. The line that 
 separates the powers of the national legislature from those of the 
 several states is clearly drawn. The several states reserve every 
 power that can be exercised for the particular use and comfort of 
 the state. They do not yield a single power which is not abso- 
 lutely necessary to the safety and prosperity of the nation, nor 
 one that could be employed to any effect in the hands of particu- 
 lar states. The powers of judiciary naturally arise from those of 
 the legislature. Questions that are of a national concern, and 
 those cases which are determinable by the general laws of the 
 nation, are to be referred to the national judiciary; but they have 
 not anything to do with a single case either civil or criminal 
 which respects the private and particular concerns of a state or 
 its citizens. 
 
REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 4OI 
 
 The possibility of keeping regular troops in the public service, 
 has been urged as another objection against the new constitution. 
 It is very remarkable that the same objection has not been made 
 against the original confederation, in which the same grievance 
 obtains without the same guards. It is now provided, that no 
 appropriation of money for the use of the army shall be for a 
 longer time than two years. Provision is also made for having 
 a powerful militia, in which there never can be occasion for many 
 regular troops. 
 
 It has been objected in some of the southern states, that the 
 Congress, by a majority of votes, is to have the power to regulate 
 trade. It is universally admitted that Congress ought to have 
 this power, else our commerce, which is nearly ruined, can never 
 be restored ; but some gentlemen think that the concurrence of 
 two-thirds of the votes in Congress should have been required. 
 By the sundry regulations of commerce; it will be in the power 
 of government not only to collect a vast revenue for the general 
 benefit of the nation, but to secure the carrying trade in the hands 
 of citizens in preference to strangers. It has been alleged that 
 there are few ships belonging to the southern states ; and that the 
 price of freight must rise in consequence of our excluding many 
 foreign vessels : but when we have not vessels of our own, it is 
 certainly proper that we should hire those of citizens in preference 
 to strangers; and though the price of freight should rise for two 
 or three years, this advantage is fully due to our brethren in the 
 eastern and middle states, who, with great and exemplary can- 
 dour, have given us equal advantages in return. A small increase 
 in the price of freight would operate greatly in favour of the south- 
 ern states : it would promote the spirit of ship-building ; it would 
 promote a nursery for native seamen, and would afford support to 
 the poor who live near the sea coast; it would increase the value 
 of their lands, and, at the same time, it would reduce their taxes. 
 
 It has finally been objected that the several states are not per- 
 mitted to tax their exports for the benefit of their particular 
 treasuries. This strange objection has been occasionally repeated 
 by citizens of this state. They must have transplanted it from 
 another state, for it could not have been the growth of North 
 Carolina. 
 
402 REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Such have been the objections against the new constitution. 
 
 Whilst the honest patriot who guards with jealous eye the 
 liberties of his country, and apprehends danger under every form 
 — the placeman in every state, who fears lest his office should pass 
 into other hands — the idle, the fractious, and the dishonest, who 
 live by plunder or speculation on the miseries of their country — 
 while these, assisted by a numerous body of secret enemies, who 
 never have been reconciled to our independence, are seeking for 
 objections to this constitution — it is a remarkable circumstance, 
 and a very high encomium on the plan, that nothing more plaus- 
 ible has been offered against it; for it is an easy matter to find 
 faults. 
 
 Let us turn our eyes to a more fruitful subject; let us consider 
 the present condition of the United States, and the particular ben- 
 efits that North Carolina must reap by the proposed form of gov- 
 ernment. Without money no government can be supported; and 
 Congress can raise no money under the present constitution. 
 They have not the power to make commercial treaties, because 
 they cannot preserve them when made. Hence it- is, that we 
 are the prey of every nation. We are indulged in such foreign 
 commerce as must be hurtful to us; we are prohibited from that 
 which might be profitable ; and we are accordingly told, that in 
 the last two years, the thirteen states have hardly paid into the 
 treasury as much as should have been paid by a single state. 
 Intestine commotions in some of the states — paper money in 
 others — a want of inclination in some, and a general suspicion 
 throughout the union that the burden is unequally laid — added 
 to the general loss of trade — have produced a general bankruptcy, 
 and loss of honor. We have borrowed money of Spain — she 
 demands the principal, but we cannot pay the interest. It is a 
 circumstance perfectly humiliating, that we should remain under 
 obligations to that nation. We are considerably indebted ,to 
 France; but she is too generous to insist upon what she knows 
 we cannot pay, either the principal or interest. In the hour of 
 distress, we borrowed money in Holland; not from the govern- 
 ment but from private citizens. Those who were called the 
 patriots, were our friends, and they are oppressed in their turn by 
 
REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 403 
 
 hosts of enemies. They will soon have need of money. At 
 this hour, we are not able to pay the interest of their loan. 
 What is to be done? Will you borrow money again from other 
 citizens of that oppressed republic, to pay the interest of what 
 you borrowed from their brethren? This would a painful ex- 
 pedient: but our want of government may render it necessary. 
 You have two or three ministers abroad ; they must soon return 
 home, for they cannot be supported. You have four or five hun- 
 dred troops scattered along the Ohio to protect the frontier in- 
 habitants, and give some value to your lands; those troops are 
 ill paid, and in a fair way for being disbanded. There is hardly a 
 circumstance remaining — hardly one external mark — by which 
 you can deserve to be called a nation. You are not in a condi- 
 tion to resist the most contemptuous enemy. What is there to 
 prevent an Algerine pirate from landing on your coast, and carry- 
 ing your citizens into slavery? You have not a single sloop of 
 war. Does one of the states attempt to raise a little money by 
 imposts or other commercial regulations ? A neighbouring state 
 immediately alters her laws, and defeats the revenue by throw- 
 ing the trade into a different channel. Instead of supporting or 
 assisting, we are uniformly taking the advantage of one another. 
 Such an assemblage of people are not a nation. Like a dark 
 cloud, without cohesion or firmness, we are ready to be torn 
 asunder, and scattered abroad by every bree/e of external vio- 
 lence, or internal commotion. 
 
 Is there a man in this state, who believes it possible for us to 
 continue under such a government? Let us suppose but for a 
 minute, that such a measure should be attempted. Let us sup- 
 pose that the several states shall be required and obliged to pay 
 their several quotas according to the original plan. You know 
 that North Carolina, in the last four years, has not paid one dollar 
 into the treasury for eight dollars that she ought to have paid 
 We must increase our taxes exceedingly, and those taxes must 
 be of the most grievous kind; they must be taxes on land and 
 heads, taxes that cannot fail to grind the face of the poor ; for it 
 is clear that we can raise little by imports and exports. Some 
 foreign goods are imported by water from the northern states : 
 
404 REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 such goods pay a duty for the benefit of those states, which is 
 seldom drawn back. This operates as a tax upon our citizens. 
 On this side, Virginia promotes her revenue to the amount of 
 twenty-five thousand dollars every year, by a tax on our tobacco 
 that she exports. South Carolina, on the other side, may avail 
 herself of similar opportunities. Two- thirds of foreign goods that 
 are consumed in this state, are imported by land from Virginia 
 or South Carolina. Such goods pay a certain impost for the 
 benefit of the importing states, but our treasury is not profited 
 by this commerce. By such means our citizens are taxed more 
 than one hundred thousand dollars every year; but the state 
 does not receive credit for a shilling of that money. Like a pa- 
 tient that is bleeding at, both arms, North Carolina must soon ex- 
 pire under such wasteful operations. Unless I am greatly mis- 
 taken, we have seen enough of the state of the union, and of 
 North Carolina in particular, to be assured that another form of 
 government is become necessary. Is the form of government 
 now proposed well calculated to give relief? To this we must 
 answer in the affirmative. All foreign goods that shall be im- 
 ported into these states, are to pay a duty for the use of the na- 
 tion. All the states will be on a footing, whether they have bad 
 ports or good ones. No duties will be laid on exports ; hence 
 the planter will receive the true value for his produce, wherever 
 it may be shipped. If excises are laid on wine, spirits, or other 
 luxuries, they must be uniform throughout the states. By a 
 careful management of imposts and excises, the national ex- 
 penses may be discharged without any other species of tax ; but 
 if a poll tax or land tax shall ever become necessary, the weight 
 must press equally on every part of the union. For in all cases 
 such taxes must be according to the number of inhabitants. Is 
 it not a pleasing consideration that North Carolina, under all her 
 natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of paying her 
 share of the public debt, as the most favoured, or the most fortu- 
 nate state ? She gains no advantage by this plan, but she re- 
 covers from her misfortunes. She stands on the same footing 
 with her sisters, a^id they are too generous to desire that she 
 should stand on lower ground. When you consider those parts 
 
REMARK^ ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMEMT. 405 
 
 of the new system which are of the greatest import— those which 
 respect the general question of liberty and safety — you will re- 
 collect that the states in convention were unanimous ; and you 
 must remember, that some of the members of that body have 
 risqued their lives in defence of liberty : but the system does not 
 require the help of such arguments ; it will bear the most scrupu- 
 lous examination. 
 
 When you refer the proposed system to the particular circum- 
 stances of North Carolina, and consider how she is to be affected 
 by this plan, you must find the utmost reason to rejoice in the 
 prospect of better times. This is a sentiment that I have ventured 
 with the greater confidence, because it is the general opinion of 
 my late honourable colleagues,* and I have the utmost reliance 
 in their superior abilities. But if our constituents shall discover 
 faults where we could not see any — or if they shall suppose that 
 a plan is formed for abridging their liberties, when we imagined 
 that we had been securing both liberty and property on a more 
 stable foundation — if they perceive that they are to suffer a loss, 
 where we thought they must rise from a misfortune — they will, 
 at least do us the justice to charge those errors to the head, and 
 not to the heart. 
 
 The proposed system is now in your hands, and with it the 
 fate of your country. We have a common interest for we are 
 embarked in the same vessel. At present she is in a sea of 
 trouble, without sails, oars, or pilot ; ready to be dashed to pieces 
 by every flaw of wind. You may secure a port, unless you think 
 it better to remain at sea. If there is any man among you that 
 wishes for troubled times and fluctuating measures, that he may 
 live by speculations, and thrive by the calamities of the state, this 
 government is not for him. 
 
 If there is any man who envies the prosperity of a native citizen 
 — who wishes that we should remain without native merchants 
 or seamen, without shipping, without manufactures, without com- 
 merce — poor and contemptible, the tributaries of a sovereign 
 country — this government is not for him. 
 
 * Williamson was a member of the Federal Convention. — Ed. 
 
406 REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 And if there is any man who has never been reconciled to our 
 independence, who wishes to see us degraded and insulted abroad, 
 oppressed by anarchy at home, and torn into pieces by factions — 
 incapable of resistance, and ready to become a prey to the first 
 invader — this government is not for him. 
 
 But it is a government, unless I am greatly mistaken, that gives 
 the fairest promise of being firm and honourable; safe from foreign 
 invasion or domestic sedition — a government by which our com- 
 merce must be protected and enlarged; the value of our produce 
 and of our lands must be increased; the labourer and the 
 mechanic must be encouraged and supported. It is a form of 
 government that is perfectly fitted for protecting liberty and 
 property, and for cherishing the good citizen and honest man. 
 
LETTER 
 
 OF 
 
 A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN, 
 
 WRITTEN BY 
 
 -CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
 
 AND PRINTED IN 
 
 THE STATE GAZETTE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
 
 May, 
 1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 In the file of the State Gazette of South Carolina in the pos- 
 session of the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, a slip is inserted 
 opposite this essay, on which is writing contemporay with the 
 paper, stating that it was written by Charles Pinckney. It is al- 
 most the only essay on this subject contained in the file, which is 
 not merely extracted from some northern paper ; and Pinckney 
 was, indeed, almost the only South Carolinian who had given any 
 attention to the subject involved, or who wrote for the press. 
 
 (409) 
 
A REPUBLICAN. 
 
 THE STATE GAZETTE OF SOUTH 
 CAROLINA. 
 
 (liTTiinTaer 3610) 
 
 Monday, May 5, 1788. 
 
 Mrs. Timothy : 
 
 The enclosed,* copied from a paper sent me by a friend, seems 
 so peculiarly adapted to our present situation, that I cannot for- 
 bear selecting it from the crowd of publications since the appear- 
 ance of the proposed Federal Constitution, and recommending it, 
 thro' your paper, to the most serious attention of all our fellow- 
 citizens ; but previously a few HINTS, by way of introduction, 
 will not, I hope, be impertinent. 
 
 New Hampshire and Georgia are the two extreme barriers of 
 the United States, if the latter can with any propriety be called a 
 barrier without this state in conjunction ; and both together, we 
 know, are not, in point of force, ready for any sudden emergency, 
 to be compared to New Hampshire. 
 
 It cannot be doubted that Great Britain has her busy emissar- 
 ies throughout the states, and not a few amongst us ; and should 
 the Constitution be rejected, how long can we flatter ourselves to 
 be free from Indian cruelties and depredations, some time since 
 begun in Georgia, and if at this moment warded off from us, 'tis 
 principally owing to the dread of an efficacious union of the states 
 by the adoption of the Federal Constitution, The three southern 
 states particularly, we have had for several years past, good 
 
 * Following this article was an essay from a New York paper. — Ed. 
 (4") 
 
412 LETTER OF A REPUBLICAN. 
 
 grounds to think Great Britain wishes to separate from the rest, 
 and to have reverted to her if possible. 
 
 Mr. Martin's* long mischievous detail of the opinions and 
 proceedings of the late general convention, (already occupying a 
 large space in six of your Gazettes, and still unfinished,) with all 
 his colourings and uncandid insinuations, in regard to General 
 Washington and Doct. Franklin, may suit the short-sighted self- 
 ish wishes of an individual of a state situated almost in the cen- 
 tre of the rest, and much safer by that means from sudden alarms. 
 But the generous, manly and truly federal sentiments of Maryland 
 are well known, and 'tis not doubted will be unequivocally shewn 
 at her convention very shortly to be held — and that New Hamp- 
 shire, early in her first meeting on that important subject, has 
 only by consent taken farther time to consider of it, and will at 
 her next meeting adopt it, is the general opinion. 
 
 What pity the salutary caution of Doct. Franklin, just previous 
 to his signing the constitution recommended by the convention, 
 had not been strictly attended to! If we split, it will in all prob- 
 ability happen in running headlong on the dangerous rock he so 
 prophetically (as it were) warned us from, " That the opinions of 
 the errors of the constitution born within the walls of the conven- 
 tion, should die there, and not a syllable be whispered abroad." 
 This Hint is full of that foresight and penetration the Doctor has 
 always been remarkable for. 
 
 When the general convention met, no citizen of the United 
 States could expect less from it than I did, so many jarring in- 
 terests and prejudices to reconcile ! The variety of pressing 
 dangers at our doors, even during the war, were barely sufficient • 
 to force us to act in concert, and necessarily give way at times to 
 each other. But when the great work was done and published, 
 I was not only most agreeably disappointed, but struck with 
 amazement. Nothing less than that superintending hand of 
 Providence, that so miraculously carried us through the war (in my 
 humble opinion), could have brought it about so complete, upon 
 the whole. 
 
 * See page 339. — Ed. 
 
LETTER OF A REPUBLICAN. 413 
 
 The constitution recommended, in all respects, takes its rise 
 where it ought, from the people; its President, Senate, and 
 House of Representatives, are sufficient and wholesome checks 
 on each other, and at proper periods are dissolved again into the 
 common mass of the people : longer periods would probably have 
 produced danger; shorter, tumult, instability and inefficacy. 
 Every article of these and other essentials to a republican gov- 
 ernment, are, in my opinion, well secured ; were it otherwise, not 
 a citizen of the United States would have been more alarmed, 
 or more early in opposition to it, than 
 
 A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN. 
 Charleston, May zd, 1788. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY." 
 
 Brackenridge, Hugh Henry, 
 
 Pittsburg Gazette. 
 
 Bryan, Samuel. 
 
 Independent Gazetteer. 
 
 Carroll, Daniel. 
 
 Maryland Journal 
 
 Chase, Samuel. 
 
 Maryland Journal. 
 
 Clinton, De Witt. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 Clinton, George. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 Coxe, Tench. 
 
 Pennsylvania Gazette. 
 
 Coxe, Tench. 
 
 Independent Gazetteer. 
 
 Coxe, Tench. 
 
 Pennsylvania Gazette. 
 
 Duer, William. 
 
 Daily Advertiser. 
 
 Davie, William Richardson. 
 
 North Carolina State Gazette. 
 
 Dickinson, John. 
 
 Humphrey's Mercury. 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver. 
 
 Connecticut Courant. 
 
 Findley, William. " An 
 
 Independent Gazetteer. 
 
 " Centinel." 
 
 " A Friend to the Constitution." 
 
 " Caution," 
 
 " A Countryman." 
 
 " Cato." 
 
 " A Freeman." 
 
 "An American." 
 
 " A Pennsylvanian." 
 
 " Philo-Publius." 
 
 " Publicola." 
 
 " Fabius." 
 
 "A Landholder." 
 
 Officer of the Continental Army," 
 
 * This list is only of those essays to which some clue of authorship has been found. 
 When written over a pen name the pseudonym is added. — £d. 
 
 (415) 
 
4i6 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 " Publius." 
 
 " Caesar." 
 
 " Aristides.*' 
 
 " A. B." 
 
 " Marcus." 
 
 " Publius." 
 
 " Conciliator." 
 
 " The Examiner." 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge. 
 
 Massachusetts Centinel. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge. 
 
 American Herald. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander. 
 Various papers. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander. 
 Daily Advertiser. 
 
 Hanson, Alexander Contee. 
 Maryland Journal. 
 
 Hopkinson, Francis. 
 
 Independent Gazetteer. 
 
 Iredell, James. 
 
 North Carolina State Gazette. 
 
 Jay, John. 
 
 Various papers. 
 
 Lamb, John. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 McKnight, Dr. Charles. 
 Daily Advertiser. 
 
 Martin, Luther. 
 
 Maryland Journal. 
 
 Madison, James. " Publius." 
 
 Various papers. 
 
 Nicholas, John. " Decius." 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle. 
 
 Pinckney, Charles. " A Steady and Open Republican." 
 
 State Gazette of South Carolina. 
 
 Randolph, Thomas Mann. 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle. 
 
 Roane, Spencer. 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle. 
 
 Sherman, Roger. 
 
 New Haven Gazette. 
 
 Sherman, Roger. 
 
 New Haven Gazette. 
 
 Sullivan, James. 
 
 Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 " A Republican Federalist." 
 " A Plain Dealer." 
 " A Countryman." 
 
 " A Citizen of New Haven." 
 " Cassius." 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Tucker, St. George. 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle. 
 
 Williams, William. 
 
 American Mercury. 
 
 Williamson, Hugh. 
 
 North Carolina State Gazette. 
 
 Winthrop, James. 
 
 Massachusetts Gazette. 
 
 Workman, Benjamin. 
 
 Independent Gazetteer. 
 
 Yates, Robert. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 Yates, Robert. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 "A State Soldier." 
 
 " Agrippa." 
 
 " Philadelphiensis." 
 
 " Brutus." 
 
 "Sydney." 
 
INDEX. 
 
 " A. B.," pseudonym of, 416. 
 
 Adams, John, 117, 231. 
 
 " Agrippa," pseudonym of, 22, 29, 49, 417. 
 
 " American," pseudonym of, 415. 
 
 American Herald, 123, 416. 
 
 American Mercury, 417. 
 
 American Museum, 315. 
 
 Anarchy, danger of, 15, 165; predicted, 18. 
 
 Anti-Federalists, character of, 25. 
 
 "Aristides," pseudonym of, 372, 416. 
 
 Aristocracy, favorers of, 5 ; small danger 
 of, 165; southern, 258; causes of, 298; 
 tendencies to, 723. 
 
 Articles of Confederation, 238; advan- 
 tages of, 77; amendment of, 80, 98; 
 defects in, 255 ; ease of amendment of, 
 117; proposed amendment to, 84. 
 
 Baldwin, Simeon, 213, 
 
 Ballot, 305. 
 
 Baltimore, 327, 333. 
 • BiU of rights, 28^95, 113, 117, 11^, 163, 
 2I9, 299, 320, 325, 364. 
 
 Blair, John, 162. 
 
 Bowdoin, James, 3, 6. 
 
 Brackenridge, H. H., 315, 415. 
 
 " Brutus," pseudonym of, 269, 295, 417. 
 
 Bryan, Geprge, 221. 
 
 Bryan, Samuel, 415, 
 
 "Csesar," pseudonym of, 245, 250, 279, 416. 
 
 Canada, 191 ; dangers from, 157. 
 
 Capital, 262; place for, 73, 321. 
 
 Capitation tax, 272. 
 
 "Capt. M'Daniel," pseudonym of, 122. 
 
 Carroll, Daniel, 325, 329, 415. 
 
 Carthage, 93. 
 
 "Cassius," pseudonym of, i, 51, 416. 
 
 "Cato," pseudonym of, 243, 281, 413. 
 
 (41 
 
 " Caution," pseudonym of, 323, 415. 
 
 " Centinel, The," pseudonym of, 218, 415. 
 
 " Charles James Fox," pseudonym of, 51. 
 
 Chase, Samuel, 323, 415; promises of; 
 333 ; speech of, 325. 
 
 Childs, Francis, 250. 
 
 " Citizen of New Haven," pseudonym of, 
 229, 416. -^ 
 
 Citizenship, 270 ; rights of, 42, 
 
 Clinton, De Witt, 415. 
 
 Clinton, George, 173, 243, 281, 415. 
 
 Coinage, uniformity of, 35. 
 
 Coke, 266. 
 
 Commerce of America, 95; inter-state, 
 congressional power over, 118; regula- 
 tion of, 97. 
 
 Commercial treaties, power to make, 234. 
 
 " Conciliator," pseudonym of, 416. 
 
 Congress, Continental, action on the Con- 
 stitution, 253, 289; letrospective view 
 of, 298 ; inadequate powers of, 34. 
 
 Congress, difference between state legisla- 
 ture and, 224; length of session of, 
 239; members of, 225; character of, 
 227; character from South, 258; elec- 
 tion of, 86; privileges of, 33; restriction 
 on, 234; interest of, 220; journal of, 
 33 ; nature of, 267 j powers of, 27, 32, 
 34, 41, 98; to alienate territory, 80; 
 to coerce the states, 184; over delin- 
 quent states, 358; over citizens, 80; 
 over elections, 30, 37, 118, 276; over 
 inter-state commerce, 118; over judi- 
 ciary, 66; over militia, 184; law-making 
 powers of, 45 ; of taxation, 235 ; over 
 territories, 43; over trade, 61 ; represen- 
 tation in, 151. 
 9) 
 
420 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Connecticut, 183, 355; address to, 215; 
 constitution of, 148; Courant, 135,415; 
 convention, 178, ^07; legislature of, 
 219; manufactures of, 202; taxation in, 
 74, 148; tribute to New York from, 180. 
 
 Constituents, instructions from, 28. 
 
 Constitution, a creation of power, 145, 
 147 ; adequacy of, 35 ; adopting clause 
 of, 131, 184, 362; advantages of, 21; 
 amendment of, 44, 100, 1 18, 200, 233, 
 251, 284, 334; attempts to surprise the 
 people with, 327 ; character of opposers 
 of, II, 143; comparison of, 339; with 
 constitution of N. Y., 297; with Eng- 
 lish, 381 ; consolidating tendencies of, 
 6Si 69> 70, 158, 258, 297; construction 
 of, 43; objections to, 25, 53, 132, 151 ; 
 definition of, 1 16; despotic power of, 
 28 ; effect of, 95 ; excellence of lan- 
 guage of, 156 ; expense of, 60 ; general 
 clauses of, 83, 96, 119; importance of, 
 248 ; judicial power under, 39 ; laws 
 made under, 360 ; merits of, 27 ; new 
 powers granted by, 238 ; powers under, 
 153, 156, 163, 220; opposition to, 39; 
 preamble of, 208 ; reasons for not sub- 
 mitting to state legislature, 139; recep- 
 tion of, 9 ; rejection of, 100 ; remarks 
 on, 237, 395 ; supreme law of the land, 
 184; want of explicitness in, 155, 260, 
 265 ; should be tried before amending, 
 235 ; writers against, 12. 
 
 Convention, Federal, 238, 247, 284, 287 ; 
 appeals to the people, 140 ; character of 
 the members of, 20 ; committees of, 348; 
 dissenting members of, 104; harmony 
 of, 191 ; ignorance of the members of, 
 22; illegal action of, 104; irritated con- 
 dition of, 367; journals of, 347; large 
 vs. small states in, 355 ; meetings of, 
 345 ; meetings of members of, 355 ; 
 object of, 35 ; powers of, 252, 290; pro- 
 ceedings in, 130, 174, 183, 341 ; secrecy 
 of, 252, 298 ; spirit of, 167 ; wisdom of, 
 252. 
 
 Convention, second, 62, 235, 375. 
 
 Council, lack of, 162. 
 
 "Countryman, A," pseudonym of, 211, 
 
 415, 416. 
 Courts, Federal, 36, 40, 83. 
 Courts, State, 54. 
 Coxe, Tench, 415. 
 Credit, public, 73, 197. 
 Creditors, public, 60 ; justice to, 35. 
 Criminal prosecution, laws for, 67. 
 Daily Advertiser, 250, 279, 415, 416. 
 Davie, William Richardson, 415. 
 Debt, Continental, 60, 73, 77, 95, 97, 127. 
 Debtors, opposition of, to constitution, 144, 
 " Decius," pseudonym of, 416. 
 Delaware, 163, 355. 
 Dickinson, John, 415. 
 Duer, William, 415. 
 Duties, 77 ; Massachusetts' share of, 84 ; 
 
 paid by consumers, 271; uniformity of, 
 
 35- 
 
 Eastern states, carrying trade of, 162. 
 
 Elections, 116; frequency of, 227; power 
 of Congress over, 30, 118, 276; provis. 
 ions for, 37. 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver, 135, 415. 
 
 England, laws of, against treason, 42 ; re- 
 ligious freedom in, 168. 
 
 Europe, governments of, 256; treaties 
 with, 89. 
 
 "Examiner," pseudonym of, 18, 416. 
 
 Excise forbidden, 118. 
 
 Executive, 158, 260, 310; advice of, 38; 
 blended with legislative, 240, 275 ; coun- 
 cil for, 163; impeachment of, 39; in- 
 eligible, after service, 234 ; may be a 
 woman, 319 ; method of electing, 263 ; 
 not specified, 319; objections to, 162; 
 powers of, 39, 261 ; power over pardon, 
 234, 240 ; power to convene Congress, 
 275 ; re-eligibility of, 354, 374 ; to be 
 elected annually, 119; under constitu- 
 tion, 37 ; vote of, 38 ; veto power of, 34. 
 
 Ex post facto law, 163. 
 
 " Fabius," pseudonym of, 415. 
 
 Federal Government, necessity for, 141. 
 
 Federalists, aristocratic tendencies of, 89. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 421 
 
 Findley, William, 100, 321, 415. 
 
 Fisheries, 194 ; power over, 234. 
 
 Flax, 202. 
 
 Foreign influence, 103. 
 
 Foreign nations, intercourse with, 80. 
 
 Forests, value of, 194. 
 
 France, public debt to, 73. 
 
 Franchise, 226. 
 
 Frankland, 258. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, 23, 26, 218, 321, 370. 
 
 " Freeman," pseudonym of, 415. 
 
 " Friend to the Constitution," 329, 415. 
 
 Georgia, 164, 190, 259, 355. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge, 25, 51, 53, 104, 123, 127, 
 130, 137, 161, 172, 182, 186, 339, 341, 
 350, 416 ; conciliating conduct of, 174; 
 hypocrisy of, 174; objections to consti- 
 tutions, 132; remarks on, 150. 
 
 Goddard, William, 341. • 
 
 Government, divisions of, 116; encroach- 
 ing tendencies of, 376; General and 
 State linked, 153 ; Greek and Roman, 
 55 ; importance, 247 ; necessity of, to 
 society. III; opposition to, 24 ; a strong 
 one necessary for liberty, 147. 
 
 Great Britian, dangers from, 190 ; resent- 
 ment of, 89. 
 
 Habeas corpus, suspension of, 36. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 245, 279, 416. 
 
 Hampshire Gazette, 5. 
 
 Hancock, John, 3, 5, 10. 
 
 Hanson, Alexander Contee, 372, 416. 
 
 Hartford, 216. 
 
 Harvard College Library, 40.. 
 
 Holland, public debt due, 73. 
 
 Hopkinson, Francis, 416. 
 
 Humphrey's Mercury, 415. 
 
 Impeachment, 39, 233, 312, 391; in Mas- 
 sachusetts, 41 ; methods of, 30; powers 
 of Senate in, 29. 
 
 Independent Chronicle, 5. 
 
 Independent Gazetteer, 218,415, 416, 417. 
 
 India, trade with, 109. 
 
 Indian affairs, 301 ; lands, 300. 
 
 Iredell, James, 416. 
 
 Jay, John, 416. 
 
 Judiciary, 54, 159, 235, 241 ; appeals to, 
 130, 184, 361; appointment of, 69; 
 dangers from, 66, 164; federal, 83; 
 limits of, 67, I iS ; national, 309 ; op- 
 pressiveness of, 159; powers of, 96; 
 restrictions on federal, 119; state, 241, 
 
 "Junius," pseudonym of, 51. 
 
 Jury, trial by, 41, 131, 308. 
 
 " Kempis, O'Flanagan," pseudonym of, 51. 
 
 Lamb, John, 173, 245, 416. 
 
 " Landholder, A," 129, 135, 205, 339, 344, 
 415; replies to, 123. 
 
 Land grants, power of courts over, 75. 
 
 Lands, western, 60, 63, 73. 
 
 Lansing, John, Jr., 104. 
 
 Lee, Gen. Charles, 161. 
 
 Lee, Henry, 162. 
 
 Lee, Richard Henry, 161, 177, 390. 
 
 Liberty of the press, 365. 
 
 Locke, 257. 
 
 Loyalists, opposition of, to constitution, 
 143- 
 
 M'Henry, James, 131, 187, 347, 350. 
 
 McKean, Thomas, 90, 100. 
 
 McKnight, Dr. Charles, 416. 
 
 MacLaughlin, Neil, 321. 
 
 Madison, 162, 231, 325, 387, 416. 
 
 Magna Charta, 219. ' 
 
 Maine, secession of, 257. 
 
 Manufactures in America, 201. 
 
 " Marcus," pseudonym of, 416. 
 
 Martin, Luther, 104, 130, 137, 182, 185, 
 337. 416. 
 
 Maryland, 188; convention, 327 ; Legisla- 
 ture, petition to, 334. 
 
 Maryland Journal, 182, 323, 329, 337, 
 415, 416. 
 
 Mason, George, 104, 161, 164, 165, 172, 
 
 355- 
 Massachusetts, 258; Constitution of, 16; 
 convention, 105, 187, 349; proposed 
 resolution for, 84 ; debt of, 60 ; delegates 
 from, 29 ; disadvantages of government 
 for, 102; early history of, 56; feeble- 
 ness of, 257 ; impeachment in, 30, 41 ; 
 Legislature, action on constitution of. 
 
422 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 17 ; means of taxation of, 13 ; origin of 
 opposition in, 176 ; plan to aggrandize, 
 182; position of, 61; public lands of, 
 63 ; share of the Continental debt, 77 ; 
 taxation in, 74; tender law of, 36, 59; 
 warning to, 10, 
 
 Massachusetts Centinel, 3, 123, 416. 
 
 Massachusetts Gazette, I, 12, 18, 49, 51, 
 416, 417. 
 
 Mercer, James Francis, 104. 
 
 Militia, 358; powers of Congress over, 
 184; power over, 342, 354; State con- 
 trol of, 1 18. 
 
 Minority, powers of, 33. 
 
 Monarchy, small danger of, 165. 
 
 Money, receipts and expenditures of pub- 
 lic, 36. 
 
 Monopolies, power of Congress to create, 
 70 ; prevention of, 80. 
 
 Montesquieu, 256, 261. 
 
 Kails, manufacture of, 202. 
 
 Naturalization, 313; powers of Congress 
 over, 79. 
 
 Navigation act, 161 ; motion against, 173; 
 right to make, 234. 
 
 Netherlands, condition of, 249. 
 
 New England, manufactures of, 201. 
 
 New Hampshire, 189, 259; interest of, 
 190, 192 ; lands in, 75. 
 
 New Haven, 216. 
 
 New Haven Gazette, 211, 229, 416. 
 
 New Jersey, 183, 355. 
 
 New Spain, dangers from, 157. 
 
 Newspapers, scribblers in, 25. 
 
 New York against constitution, 61 ; As- 
 sembly, 245 ; colonial parties, 306 ; con- 
 stitution of, 297, 299; violation of, 301 ; 
 draft of a constitution for, 307 ; impost 
 of, 173; opposition in, 176; proposed 
 property qualification in, 307 ; State 
 convention of 1776, 298 ; State debt of, 
 60; Executive, 310 ; taxation in, 74; 
 tribute from Connecticut to, 180. 
 
 New York Journal, 125, 243, 269, 293, 
 415, 416, 417. 
 
 Nicholas, John, 416. 
 
 North Carolina, 258. 
 
 North Carolina, State Gazette of, 395, 
 
 415, 416, 417. 
 Northern States, character of people of, 92. 
 Nova Scotia, 191 ; condition of, 89. 
 " Numa," pseudonym of, 5, 10. 
 Oath, 207, 369; character of, 17, 168; of 
 
 President, 38. 
 " Ocrico," pseudonym of, 52. 
 Officers, federal, privileges of, 1 19. 
 OSice holders, 145 ; multiplication of, 88. 
 " Officer of the Continental Army," pseu- 
 donym of, 415. 
 " Old Fog," pseudonym of, 3. 
 Paper money, 127, 131, 196, 341, 348; 
 
 motion to redeem, 174, 186; states to 
 
 emit, 119. 
 Parties, colonial, 306. 
 People, dangers from, 179; not to elect 
 
 representatives, 183; rights of, 115. 
 Pennsylvania, 369; Assembly, 53, 369; 
 
 Convention of, 90, 100; future seat of 
 
 government, 98 ; naturalization in, 79 ; 
 
 opposition In, 176. 
 Pennsylvania Gazette, 415. 
 " Pennsylvanian," pseudonym of, 415. 
 " Philadelphiensis," pseudonym of, 417. 
 " Philo-Publius," pseudonym of, 415. 
 Pinckney, C. C, 183. 
 Pinckney, Charles, 416. 
 Pittsburg Gazette, 317, 415. 
 " Plain Dealer, A," pseudonym of, 385, 416. 
 Poll tax, 272; forbidden, 118. 
 Population, destiny of, 193. 
 Press, liberty of, 164, 239. 
 Prices, depressed state of, 142. 
 Private opinion, freedom of, 170. 
 " Publicola," pseudonym of, 415. 
 " Publius," pseudonym of, 145, 416. 
 Quorum, dangers from, 32; powers of, 33. 
 Randolph, Edmund, 104, 231, 346, 387. 
 Randolph, Thomas Mann, 416. 
 Religion, freedom of, 168, 313; misuse 
 
 of, 8. 
 Religious test, 207, 235 ; nature of, 169 ; 
 
 necessity of, 168. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 423 
 
 Representation, 54,269,391; best- mode 
 of, 151 ; difference of opinion concern- 
 i"S> 354; smallness of, 236, 240 ; want 
 of, 151. 
 
 Representatives, House of, 54; electors 
 of, 28; insufficiency of, 29; length of 
 residence necessary, 28; method of 
 choosing, 152 ; method of electing, 27, 
 357 ; people should not elect, 183 ; 
 term of, 28; weakness of, 273. 
 
 Republics, Greek and Roman, 94. 
 
 "Republican Federalist," pseudonym of, 
 416. 
 
 Republican government, guarantee of, 43, 
 106. 
 
 Revenue bills, origination of, 34. 
 
 Revenue, method of collecting, 193; Mas- 
 sachusetts' share of, 102 ; sources of, 239. 
 
 Revolution, the American, 146. 
 
 Rhode Island, 105, 108, .115, 159, 196; 
 junto in, 153 ; legislature of, 31, 36. 
 
 Rights, delegated, 113, 
 
 Roane, Spencer, 385, 416. 
 
 Russell, Benjamin, 127. 
 
 Scotland, union with England, 216. 
 
 Senate, 29, 273 ; blended with Executive, 
 275; method of choosing, 153; officers 
 of, 29 ; powers of impeachment, 29 ; 
 treaty power of, 165, 274 ; unspecified 
 character of, 319. 
 
 Shay's RebeUion, 5, 13, 57, 72, 157, 159, 
 
 257. 39'- 
 Sheep raising, 201. 
 Sherman, Roger, 183, 211, 229, 416. 
 Shipbuilding, 61, 194; carpenters, 61. 
 Slavery, 258 ; responsibility for, 163. 
 Slaves, importation of, 163. 
 Smilie, John, 100, 321. 
 Smith, Melancthon, 173. 
 South Carolina, 164, 183, 265, 355; 
 
 amendment of, 235 ; representation in, 
 
 108. 
 Southern States, character of people of, 
 
 92; objections to commercial powers, 
 
 162. 
 " Spectator," pseudonym of, 326. 
 
 States, coercion of, 184; influences, 297; 
 courts, 54, 159; absorption of, 297; 
 dangers to, 153; destruction of, 342; 
 powers of, 98 ; negative on laws, 360 ; 
 legislatures, action of, on constitution, 
 25; Congress a check on, 31; dif- 
 ferences between Congress and, 224; 
 powers of, 152; power over elections, 
 31; representation in, 152; officers, 
 dangers from, 289 ; restrictions on, 36 ; 
 rights, 68, 113, 118, 147, 184; admis- 
 sion of new, 42 ; advantages of, 66 ; 
 bills of right valid in federal courts, 
 119; consolidation of, 97, 255 ; destruc- 
 tion of, 375 ; disputes between, 64, 100 ; 
 equality of, in Senate, 29 ; interest of, 
 215 ; large vs. small, 216, 355 ; number 
 to organize government, 184 ; rights to 
 enforce laws of, 118. 
 
 State Gazette of North Carolina, 395. 
 
 State Gazette of South Carolina, 416. 
 
 State house, 355. 
 
 « State Soldier," pseudonym of, 417. 
 
 " Steady and Open Republican," pseu- 
 donym of, 416. 
 
 " Steady," pseudonym of, 326. 
 
 Strong, Caleb, 105. 
 
 Sullivan, James, i, 416. 
 
 " Sydney," pseudonym of, 269, 293, 417. 
 
 Tax, poll, 273. 
 
 Taxation, 156, 193; dangers of, 81; 
 direct, 235, 270; importance of, 271; 
 in Connecticut, 148, 226; method of, 
 77, 358 ; powers of Congress over, 97, 
 118; ratio of, 723. 
 
 Tender acts, 36, S9> 196- 
 
 Territory, right to alienate, 80, 118, 234. 
 
 Test law, 169, 171, 207, 235. 
 
 Town meetings, 226. 
 
 Trade, 61; condition of, 140; congres- 
 sional control over, 161; foreign, 95; 
 limitations of, 54; Massachusetts' ad- 
 vantage for, 73; powers of Congress 
 over, 79 ; regulation of, 70. 
 
 Trading companies, 70, 109 ; forbidden, 
 118. 
 
424 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Treason, punishment of, 41. 
 
 Treaty power, dangers from, 165. 
 
 Treaties, law of the land, 724; with 
 Europe, 89. 
 
 Tucker, St. George, 417. 
 
 United States, an agricultural country, 
 200; condition of, 81, 121, 158; dangers 
 to, 178; differences between the inhab- 
 itants of, 91 ; too large for government, 
 257; tranquillity of, 59. 
 
 Vermont, 258. 
 
 Vice-president, 240, 263 ; duties of, 158. 
 
 Virginia, 162, 390; house of delegates of, 
 166; plan to aggrandize, 182; qualifi- 
 cations of, 306; method of, 305 ; oppo- 
 sition in, 176, 
 
 Virginia Gazette, 387. 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle, 385, 416, 
 
 417- 
 "Vox Populi," pseudonym of, 12, 16, 18. 
 Washington, George, 23, 26, 161, 177, 
 
 218, 251, 254, 285, 321, 347, 370. 
 West Indies, condition of, 89. 
 Western territory, 239. 
 Willetts, Marinus, 173. 
 Williams, William, 137, i6S, 195, 202, 
 
 417. 
 Williamson, Hugh, 395, 417. 
 Wilson, James, 90, 96, lOO, 112, 218, 335. 
 Winthrop, James, 40, 49, 417. 
 Woolen manufactures, 201. 
 Workman, Benjamin, 417. 
 Yates, Robert, 104, 173, 269, 293, 417.