(IfotttEll Iniuerstty Hibrary 
 
 i)tt;aca. S^ew ^ork 
 
 BERNARD ALBERT SINN 
 
 COLLECTION 
 
 NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 BERNARD A. SINN, 97 
 
 1919 
 
Thw 'ftp fi^owo wb»n this volume was taken. 
 
 NEXT NAVAL WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPT. S. EAEDLEY-WILMOT, E.N. 
 
 
 -jii^? 
 
 LONDON: EDWAEl) STANFOEl) 
 
 26 & 27 COCKSPUE STKEET, CPIAIMNG CEOSS, S.W. 
 
 1894 
 
 Price One Shilling 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028099962 
 
Cornell University Library 
 
 DC 53.E13 
 
 Next naval war / 
 
 3 1924 028 099 962 
 
■ One or two were in a sinking stute." — See page 62. 
 
THE 
 
 NEXT NAVAL WAE 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPT. S. EARDLEY-WILMOT, R.N. 
 
 WITH AN ILLUSTRATION BY CHEVALIER E. DE MARTINO 
 
 LONDON : EDWARD , S3:ANF0RD 
 
 26 & 27 COCKSPUE STREET, CHAEING CROSS, S.W. 
 
 1894 
 
 [^All rights resencdl 
 
445^(5 1^33 
 
 V ! H>i3V,Unf 
 
THE NEXT NAYAL WAE. 
 
 I. WAE DECLARED. 
 
 Though tlie announcement in the morning papers 
 of Marcli the 1st, 1895, that the French Ambas- 
 sador had presented to our' Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs the afternoon previously a demand for an 
 early evacuation of Egypt by our troops, came 
 upon the country like a clap of thunder, it was 
 soon evident that for some years France had been 
 secretly but energetically preparing for war. The 
 great irritation against England of recent years, 
 due to our prolonged stay in Egypt, had been 
 much increased by the Congo treaty and the 
 gradual extension of our influence north of 
 Uganda. There was no doubt a footing in Khar- 
 toum from the south would soon follow, and we 
 should thus obtain a hold upon Egypt, compared 
 with which our present position in its northern 
 portion is unimportant. 
 
 The bitter animosity against Germany now was 
 diverted to ourselves. Such questions — openly 
 
 2 
 
said the French papers — will never be satisfac- 
 torily settled till France has a navy of which Eng- 
 land is afraid. A recent inquiry had discomfited 
 all the critics and demonstrated that the French 
 fleet had never been in such an efficient condition. 
 Moreover, the people were convinced not only that 
 the appliances of modern naval warfare tended to 
 equalise the combatants, while the torpedo would 
 give additional chances to the country which had 
 developed it to the highest degree, but that their 
 past defeats were mainly due to the terrible dis- 
 organisation of their Navy which the Revolution 
 of 1789 brought about. This had been lost sight 
 of in England, or rather it had not been put for- 
 ward in any naval history until an American writer 
 had shown under what disadvantages in this 
 respect the French fought at sea in the old wars. 
 Experienced commanders were ruthlessly dismissed, 
 or fled to escape the guillotine, while their places 
 were taken by inexperienced adherents of the 
 Eepublic. To what other result than that which 
 followed could such a procedure lead ? 
 
 To my mind, seeing how much depends upon 
 the traditions and discipline of centuries in the 
 efliciency of a fleet being preserved unbroken, the 
 marvel is not that the English were able to sweep 
 the seas, but that the disorganised Navy of France 
 should have made so gallant a stand under such 
 disadvantageous circumstances. There was much 
 justification, therefore, in assuming that this 
 
inequality being removed by a united Republic, 
 the fleets would meet once more with nothing 
 specially to favour either side. 
 
 From the close of the Franco-German war, 
 when it was evident that a fleet to perform efficient 
 service must be not only strong in numbers but 
 ready to act at short notice, great labour had been 
 bestowed, and no expense spared, in France to 
 gradually build up a naval force which in some 
 respects could not be surpassed even in this 
 country. With the special gift of organisation 
 and talent for mechanical invention for which 
 France has always been famous, the establishments 
 she created for the manufacture of warlike mate- 
 rial, and the extended experiments on which every 
 step was based, gave her great advantages in the 
 marvellous development of ordnance which had 
 been going on for thirty years. In this country, 
 having starved experimental work and given the 
 cold shoulder to inventors, we were content to adopt 
 our neighbours' designs, and plod on just ten years 
 behind them in this most important branch. 
 
 The same with armour. While the rest of the 
 world had seen that steel must replace iron, we 
 had long adhered to the latter for some fanciful 
 reason that, though it let the projectiles into the 
 ship more easily, it did not crack to the same 
 extent as the harder material. It was not recog- 
 nised that if a plate kept out six shells and then 
 fell into the sea in fragments it had done more 
 
useful work than by allowing them to pass through 
 and remaining attached to the vessel. 
 
 The special preparations in France had begun 
 some seven years previously, when a thorough 
 overhaul of the dockyards had been undertaken ; 
 old stores and machinery had been removed, the 
 plant in all respects improved, and many old 
 officials replaced by others with modern ideas. At 
 the same time a change of policy in the distribu- 
 tion of the fleet took place. Formerly Brest had 
 been the principal naval port, in which a large 
 portion of the fleet was usually located ; but 
 gradually, as ships were completed here and at 
 Cherbourg, they were sent to Toulon. This passed 
 unnoticed at first, until England woke up to find 
 that in the Mediterranean there was a force equal 
 to that which she maintained in those waters and 
 in the Channel combined; while France had a 
 squadron in the north that, being always in com- 
 mission, had a great advantage over any reserve 
 which only comes together once a year. 
 
 It must not be supposed that this could be 
 achieved with a fleet numerically smaller than our 
 own, and other points remain as well guarded. 
 We had been beguiled into retaining a number of 
 slow vessels on foreign stations by observing that 
 France had followed a like policy, and hence under 
 such a condition we were not at a disadvantage. 
 But our rival pursued this system as a blind, for 
 arrangements had been made that at a given time 
 
these ancient craft were to be laid up in their 
 colonial ports, and their crews and armament trans- 
 ferred to the best vessels of the mercantile marine. 
 These had been carefully prepared for this purpose 
 during construction, so that their equipment as 
 cruisers could be completed in twenty-four hours, 
 while, as the officers and crews had all under the 
 Maritime Inscription served in the Navy, they 
 readily fell into the positions assigned to them 
 under the new regime. These vessels would then 
 be ready to swoop down upon the small craft of 
 England still retained abroad for what had been 
 vaguely termed the police of the seas ; they would 
 next make a determined attack on our commerce, 
 while their speed enabled them to run from the 
 few swift cruisers we had sent to distant stations. 
 
 The assertion which had often been made in this 
 country that the newest steamers of the Messagerie 
 Maritime carried guns below during their peaceful 
 voyages was so far incorrect, and had probably 
 arisen from observing these special preparations. 
 It was obvious that such vessels could not be 
 transformed in mid-Atlantic, but must seek a port, 
 and would require a war crew. Under these cir- 
 cumstances no benefit would arise from carrying 
 the guns as lumber in the hold. 
 
 Though it was hoped that a few auxiliary cruisers 
 of this nature would be able to effect considerable 
 damage before being brought to bay, there was no 
 intention of leaving them unsupported. It had 
 
been remarked that all the newest unarmoured 
 war ships of France had been kept in the home 
 ports. But the intention was, on the outbreak of 
 war, to despatch them in squadrons to various 
 points where they would find isolated British 
 vessels which their superior force would enable 
 them to overcome, and thus taking the enemy in 
 detail, soon diminish the numerical superiority on 
 which we had counted. There were several advan- 
 tages in this idea. The ships had all the resources 
 of the home dockyards to remedy defects and keep 
 them in the most efficient condition ; whereas it 
 had often been found that English vessels when 
 first commissioned, and at once sent abroad, spent 
 several months on arrival under repairs for what 
 should have been ascertained before leaving their 
 ports. Then the French vessels were able to leave 
 at the earliest moment for an unknown destination 
 and without trace of the route taken. Having a 
 clear start, they must arrive before reinforcements 
 could reach the point aimed at. Had they been 
 distributed abroad previously, this country would 
 • — as she always has done — have strengthened her 
 foreign station squadrons to a degree consistent 
 with a superioritj-- over any possible enemy. 
 
 All the writings of those who have commented 
 upon the failure of France in the past to acquire 
 naval supremacy, attribute it to the pursuit of a 
 false policy in first directing her aim upon terri- 
 torial attack and ignoring the opposing fleet ; or 
 
9 
 
 imposing upon lier naval commanders a defensive 
 attitude towards it as the best means of ensuring 
 success for the expedition. Though here and there 
 a temporary gain may follow, a inaval war thus 
 pursued must in the end be disastrous. 
 
 Jurien de la Graviere had proclaimed, " There is 
 but one way to avoid the danger of being half 
 conquered before the first battle ; that way is, to 
 be both active and provident, to keep line-of-battle 
 ships ready to be manned at the first signal, and 
 to threaten the enemy's coasts before he can 
 blockade ours." 
 
 Lissa showed that any other objective than the 
 enemy's fleet at the first onset is hazardous in the 
 extreme. Careful students of cause and effect, the 
 French had now determined to be first in the field, 
 and strike heavy blows before our forces could be 
 concentrated for the same purpose. To this end 
 all their recent organisation had been directed. 
 The newest ships not in commission so nearly 
 approached this condition, that all they required 
 to take the sea were a small portion of the crew, 
 and certain stores that could be shipped in a few 
 hours. The principal elements for immediate ser- 
 vice were on the spot. The first and second in 
 command had been in the ships from the begin- 
 ning, and such was the discipline maintained, that 
 both could not be absent night or day together. 
 No delay could ensue in completing the ships with 
 officers or men. In France every naval officer is 
 
10 
 
 attached to one of the naval ports, and makes that 
 his headquarters unless he has special leave to 
 reside elsewhere. Hence he is ready to embark at 
 a moment's notice. There is no half-pay. If not 
 afloat he is in barracks, though given regular leave 
 on return from foreign service. All this sounds 
 simple and natural, but it is noticed as distinct 
 from our system, in which officers on promotion 
 are given a pittance, and retire to a cottage and 
 grow cabbages until their turn comes for a com- 
 mand. All is then new to them, and the first 
 year is spent in digesting the latest regulations 
 and becoming familiar with the various advances 
 gunnery and tactics, &c. , have made in the interval. 
 As regards the men, no time could have been 
 better for obtaining an ample supply. Outside 
 the force actually serving in the Navy, the best 
 seamen of France are perhaps those who go every 
 year to the Newfoundland and Iceland fisheries in 
 great numbers. They mostly belong to the Mari- 
 time Inscription, and have served their time in the 
 fleet. To get them at any moment, they must be 
 called out before going ofi" for the summer fishing. 
 In the Crimean war transports had to be sent out 
 to Newfoundland and Iceland to bring numbers of 
 these men back to man the fleet. Hence the delay 
 which led to our fleet being first in the Baltic. At 
 all the French ports there is an agent of the 
 Maritime Inscription who keeps an account of 
 every sailor, and knows where to put his hand on 
 
11 
 
 them. These agents had been secretly warned. 
 The notices calling out the reserves up to the age 
 of thirty-five had been posted on the afternoon of 
 February 28th. The next day 10,000 men were 
 on their way by train for the chief naval port of 
 their district. Long existent arrangements with 
 the railway companies enabled this to be carried 
 out without delay or difficulty. There was some 
 resistance to the decree among certain of the coast 
 fishermen, who endeavoured to avoid service by 
 putting to sea in their fishing boats, but these 
 were in nearly all cases pursued and arrested. As 
 a choice between prison and service, they readily 
 chose the latter. 
 
 The Maritime Prefects at all the naval ports had 
 also been warned previously of what was contem- 
 plated. Without any unusual stir they saw that 
 the various stores for every ship in the reserve 
 were provided and ready for shipment, while 
 lighters were placed in convenient positions for 
 this service. When, therefore, the single word 
 " mobilise " was telegraphed from the Ministry of 
 Marine in Paris at 8 a.m. the next morning to the 
 ports, there was no confusion. The trains had 
 been coming in during the night with the reserve 
 seamen, who on arrival were marched into barracks, 
 told off to their ships, given their kit and break- 
 fast, so that when the order arrived they were at 
 once marched on board. By 2 o'clock in the 
 afternoon the port officials could report to the 
 
12 
 
 Ministry of Marine that the different squadrons 
 were ready for sea. 
 
 What in the meantime was going on in England ? 
 The Prime Minister having been informed of the 
 demand, a Cabinet Council was at once called, and 
 orders were sent for the Commander-in-Chief and 
 Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty to attend. 
 Though the French note only required that an 
 assurance that steps would be taken within twenty- 
 four hours to remove the English troops in Egypt, 
 it was felt that the situation was very serious. 
 But by the time the Cabinet had assembled it was 
 too late in the day to set the dockyards in motion. 
 Moreover, the incident had occurred at an unfor- 
 tunate time for us. The Channel fleet had just 
 returned from their winter's sojourn on the coast 
 of Spain ; the ships were refitting, while' half the 
 officers and crew were on leave. A week earlier, 
 and the squadron could have proceeded to Gibraltar 
 from Arosa Bay instead of coming home, and thus 
 strengthened our Mediterranean fleet. Doubtless 
 this fact had influenced the date at which the de- 
 mand had been put forward. However, orders were 
 at once sent to recall officers and men, and to com- 
 plete the ships for service with all despatch. To 
 each of the Port Admirals a telegram was sent : 
 " Prepare to mobilise the fleet at six o'clock to- 
 morrow morning." Then a portion of the Cabinet 
 proceeded to discuss the answer that should be 
 given to the French Ambassador, while the repre- 
 
13 
 
 sentatives of the two services sketched the opera- 
 tions to be adopted in case the result should be 
 unfavourable. This led to some curious revelations. 
 Each had a plan of campaign cut and dried for 
 such an eventuality, but it had been prepared 
 without reference to the other, and its success 
 depended on a preliminary warning of at least 
 some days. To the Army^ had been confided the 
 task of defending all the ports and our outlying 
 possessions, but it had never struck its officials to 
 inquire what the nature of the attack might be 
 coming over sea, and it was assumed that an 
 expedition could be as easily equipped for distant 
 service as for a dash at points within easy range. 
 Having been told they could expect no assistance 
 from the fieet, that is to say, ships could not be 
 permanently retained in any locality to await an 
 attack which might never come, the military 
 scheme of defence provided for resisting a large 
 fleet and the landing of a numerous body of troops. 
 Such a view entailed small armies in each place 
 for garrisons, so that in the words of a former 
 Secretary of State for War, " The garrisoning of 
 the ports and coaling stations would require the 
 services of no less than 125,000 men, in addition 
 to local levies in certain foreign stations." These 
 had not been provided, and now the Admiralty 
 were suddenly asked to provide transport and 
 convoy for the troops required to complete the 
 garrisons to full strength. It required some argu- 
 
14 
 
 ment to show that the operation, besides being one 
 of extreme danger at such a time, could not be 
 undertaken, in view of other services which the 
 fleet would be required to perform. 
 
 The Navy, on the other hand, seeing the danger 
 to which we were exposed from the French holding 
 certain commanding positions on two of our trade 
 routes, had counted upon despatching immediately 
 on the outbreak of war a combined force to occupy 
 them. But they had omitted to work this out 
 with the military authorities, and now found that 
 the organisation of the Army did not readily admit 
 of the prompt embarkation of such a force. Carried 
 away by some desire to emulate Continental 
 Powers, we had directed all our efforts to form 
 three army corps of about 35,000 men each, and 
 now could be seen the result of much hard work. 
 The Cabinet was informed with triumph that the 
 1st Army Corps could be embarked in a week's 
 time. But the Admiralty did not want a Crimean 
 expedition ; their modest demands were only for 
 5000 men, complete in all respects, and this could 
 not be done. It would dislocate the whole military 
 organisation. Why not take the marines ? That 
 was all very well, but this body was incorporated 
 as an integral part of the Navy, to assist in 
 manning the ships, and those not afloat in time of 
 peace were a portion of the reserve we counted 
 upon when additional ships were manned. It is 
 true they had been utilised on many occasions 
 
15 
 
 other than for this purpose. If a portion of Ireland 
 was turbulent the Admiralty were applied to for 
 one or more companies of marines. In small wars 
 they had been found an excellent force for doing 
 the rough preliminary work and clearing the way 
 for those who reaped the chief honour and glory. 
 But this would be— if war ensued — a struggle in 
 which the Navy could not spare a man. How had 
 we lost sigit of the fact that the best military 
 organisation for this country is one which enables 
 it to despatch expeditions with promptitude to any 
 part of the world ? Not only one, but several. 
 In 1809 we had forces operating in Walcheren, 
 Sicily and Portugal. After an unseemly wrangle, 
 it was agreed that four regiments of the line and a 
 battalion of marines should be allotted for the 
 duty. 
 
 By this time the Prime Minister and his col- 
 leagues had agreed upon an answer to the French 
 demand. It wais to the effect that while they 
 recognised their pledge to withdraw the troops 
 maintained in Egypt as soon as the condition of 
 the country warranted such a step — and it should 
 be redeemed the moment this condition had been 
 reached — this country could not consistently with 
 its dignity afford the assurance that any directions 
 would be given within the limit of time stated in 
 the French note. While all felt that no other 
 answer could be given, it seemed certain that war 
 between the two countries must inevitably follow. 
 
16 
 
 It being now considerably past midnight tbe 
 Cabinet broke up, having arranged to meet again 
 at ten to receive the answer of the French Govern- 
 ment, while the naval and military forces were to 
 be at once put on a war footing. 
 
 The next day there was an official communica- 
 tion in all the papers in the terms already stated, 
 but adding that Her Majesty's Government trusted, 
 in view of the assurance given, no rupture of our 
 friendly relations with France would ensue. This 
 however, was not to be realised, for after consider- 
 able working of the wires between London and 
 Paris, the French Ambassador handed in a note at 
 the Foreign Office at 2 p.m., which stated that, 
 failing to procure any satisfactory reply to the 
 temperate demand of his Government, he had been 
 instructed to inform the representatives of Her 
 Majesty that the chiefs of the naval and military 
 forces of the Eepublie had been directed to carry 
 out reprisals upon the dominions and subjects of 
 Her Majesty. 
 
 At 3 P.M. the same day the French fleet steamed 
 out of Toulon. 
 
17 
 
 II. STATE OF EUROPE. 
 
 Pausing now before the first act of the great 
 drama is performed, we may briefly review the state 
 of Europe at this time, and see what chances of 
 assistance there were for either from the other 
 Powers. 
 
 The Triple Alliance was practically at an end. 
 Italy had found the strain too heavy to bear, and 
 been obliged to make considerable reductions in 
 her Army and Navy. A large section of the Italian 
 nation saw that a mistaken policy had been adopted. 
 The weak point of Italy was her immense extent 
 of coast line. Consequently the danger was from 
 the sea, should she find herself opposed to a nation 
 with ports in close proximity and possessing a 
 powerful Navy. Her comparatively short land 
 frontier was easily guarded by an army based on 
 a series of strong positions, and such a defensive 
 policy did not necessitate the maintenance of a 
 large land force. On the other hand, being nearly 
 surrounded with water and possessing several 
 islands of great importance and extent, it was 
 obvious that Italy's chief requirement was a Navy 
 in proportion. This had been recognised to a great 
 extent, and large sums spent in the creation of a 
 fleet : but with an ambition that had not measured 
 its strength, a few vessels of immense size had been 
 
 B 
 
18 
 
 constructed, whereas a greater number of moderate 
 dimensions would have more effectually secured the 
 sea approaches. In calculating the chances of 
 injury from all directions it was now seen that 
 the Central Powers could afford Italy no help 
 in the direction she most needed it. The triple 
 fleets were unequal to France alone, while if 
 the latter had an ally with only a moderate 
 amount of sea power, the position was so 
 much worse. The triple armies were no doubt 
 formidable, but then, as I have said, Italy did not 
 need this support in a purely defensive attitude. 
 As for any help from this country, why should 
 this be counted upon ? Our foreign policy was 
 notoriously unstable and opposed to any binding 
 engagement. We wisely preserved an attitude of 
 neutrality, and Italy now. regretted she had not 
 done the same. As a neutral she would have had 
 more claim on our sympathy, and be more likely 
 to obtain our active support if attacked by either 
 side. In a fit of pique Italy embraced a cause in 
 which she had greatest risks. Our fantastic acqui- 
 sition of Cyprus gave France a free hand in Tunis, 
 and Italy henceforth became her enemy. We 
 gained nothing, for an island without a harbour is 
 like a dockyard without a dock, but it fulfilled a 
 long-cherished dream of Lord Beaconsfield, and 
 France became, in Bizerta, the owner of perhaps 
 the finest harbour in the world. Though naturally 
 aggrieved at such a place not falling to her lot, 
 
19 
 
 Italy had been wiser to have kept on friendly 
 terms with France, and not launched forth into 
 the expenditure her later alliance entailed. Such 
 were the arguments held forth by an influential 
 portion of the Italian press during the summer and 
 autumn of 1894. They were skilfully supported 
 by similar reasoning in the French journals, and by 
 the end of the year Italy had detached herself from 
 the Triple Alliance. 
 
 The other countries were not disposed to move 
 at present. They were too busy watching each 
 other on land to participate in what was intended 
 to be a trial of strength at sea. Eussia did not 
 want to cripple herself in the Baltic, where her 
 ironclad construction had long been designed to 
 meet the new fleet of Germany. But she was ready 
 to join France should Austria or Germany inter- 
 vene. As, however, the struggle did not affect the 
 immense armies in the east and west of Europe, 
 those countries saw little reason to assist us. In- 
 deed Germany stood to gain in any event. Many 
 had been declaring for the last few years that 
 events seemed to point to our decline in commerce 
 and the rise of Germany. Her trading ships were 
 now found in every sea, in some places more 
 numerous than our own. Wherever her sons emi- 
 grated they prospered. Had not other nations 
 dominated the ocean as we, and then dropped out 
 of the race ? Who could have foreseen the substi- 
 tution of Holland for Spain, and then the transfer 
 
 B 2 
 
20 
 
 of the world's carrying trade to this country. 
 Might we not in turn give place to Germany ? 
 England at war meant more trade to neutrals ; 
 England defeated, its commerce gone, perhaps never 
 to return. England victorious would, on the other 
 hand, weaken France, and this also was not un- 
 pleasing to Germany. The great military power 
 saw no advantage in assisting a competitor in trade. 
 Thus once more the two great rivals at sea since 
 the Dutch ceased to contest, were to strive for the 
 supremacy of the ocean. To us events during the 
 past eighty years of naval peace — for the Crimean 
 war did not tax our resources in this respect — had 
 made the retention of naval supremacy a matter of 
 life and death. To France, self-supporting, with 
 an insignificant ocean commerce, and colonies 
 which were of little strength to the mother country, 
 defeat at sea would not materially impair her 
 position. What could have been more complete 
 than her loss of sea power in 1815 ? Yet in 1840 
 she was ready to challenge the mistress of the seas, 
 and her best naval ofl&cers declared the fleet was in 
 materiel and personnel equal to our own. Victory, 
 on the other hand, would enable her to pay off an 
 old score and regain her hold upon countries which 
 she considered hers by right. It would also give 
 an impetus to that colonial expansion now ardently 
 desired. Meanwhile her strength on land would be 
 unimpaired even if an expedition or two were 
 undertaken. 
 
21 
 
 III. ORGANISATION FOB WAR. 
 
 Such was tlie general position when on the 
 afternoon of March 1st the two countries were 
 about to test those preparations which by organisa- 
 tion and manoeuvres they had striven to bring to 
 perfection. And how had each considered the 
 many points that a condition of war entails ? The 
 provision of an armed force, whether for use at sea 
 or on land, is — or should be — a separate function 
 to that of handling it when required. If a high 
 official attempts to administer all the petty details 
 in the creation and maintenance of fleets or armies, 
 he will have no time to study the strategical and 
 tactical problems in their use. This is the duty of 
 a general staff : to say first, what force is required, 
 and then prepare plans of campaign adapted to 
 every eventuality. The administrative portion of 
 the department is charged with the duty of seeing 
 that these demands are complied with. This sys- 
 tem has been brought to great perfection in Conti- 
 nental armies, and it necessarily has had consider- 
 able influence in imparting like methods to their 
 fleets. It was a wise policy which placed two 
 generals in succession at the head of the German 
 Navy, for they gave it an organisation for war, 
 equal, if not superior, to that of states which have 
 maintained a fleet for centuries. France has for 
 
22 
 
 years had a general naval staff whose work is 
 clearly defined in preparation for war. But it is 
 also supplemented by a superior Naval Council, 
 composed of the most eminent naval officers, who 
 meet periodically in Paris and report to the Minister 
 of Marine on all important subjects connected with 
 the development of attack and defence at sea. On 
 this Council are the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
 Mediterranean and northern squadrons, the Pre'fets 
 Maritimes of the five ports, and other officers of 
 experience. Created only a few years ago, its 
 formation excited no attention abroad, but it is 
 evident that such a board is well qualified to work 
 out strategical problems, and give valuable assist- 
 ance to the minister at the head of a large service. 
 This Council had been sitting as usual for two 
 months, and when the members departed to their 
 other duties a complete plan of action had been 
 drawn up. Not the least of the attaching advan- 
 tages of this Council was, that it comprised people 
 who were to carry out the operations, or on whom 
 depended for the most part a successful result. 
 They were ready to act, and when the order came, 
 first to mobilise and then to proceed in execution 
 of previous orders, no ^further inquiries were neces- 
 sary. 
 
 What was the procedure on this side of the 
 Channel ? The Board of Admiralty as an adminis- 
 trative body had a good record in the past. It 
 had brought us successfully through severe con- 
 
23 
 
 flicts, and in the war with Eussia of 1854 had 
 compared favourably with the system by which 
 our small army is organised. But the Crimean 
 war was more a question of transport, and in this 
 particular work we are unrivalled. In fact the 
 British Navy had triumphed in spite of, rather than 
 owing to, the system. There had, however, been 
 some tendency to go with the times.. In face of 
 considerable opposition on the part, not only of 
 those who resisted every increase of the naval 
 element at head-quarters, but even of admirals who 
 had never troubled to consider that a condition of 
 war was essentially different to that of peace, a 
 special department had been organised to deal with 
 intelligence of foreign navies, and provide means 
 for rapidly equipping our own force. Though 
 small it had done good work, but as our system 
 provided that the representative of the Navy in 
 the House of Commons often was a man unversed 
 in war ships, though he may have successfully 
 directed a small line of merchant ships or other 
 commercial undertaking, the new department 
 spent most of its time in preparing returns on 
 every conceivable subject to enable this gentle- 
 man to reply to the continual questions with 
 which those in the House possessing a little more 
 knowledge were able to ply him. It became the 
 fashion for everybody to fancy he was qualified 
 to make elaborate comparisons between our fleet 
 and that of other nations. This led to continual 
 
reference to the Intelligence Department, which 
 one day was directed to draw up a statement show- 
 ing our squadrons everywhere stronger than any 
 two others combined, while shortly afterwards a 
 new Government, desirous of support to a demand 
 for increased Navy estimates, had a form prepared 
 which clearly demonstrated that we had now sunk 
 to a second-rate naval power. 
 
 At last the chief of the department suggested 
 that to save time he should be given instructions 
 beforehand what it was wanted to prove, as any- 
 thing in this direction was possible with a slight 
 modification in the classification of battle-ships. 
 In the meantime the Board were eno-aged — and it 
 had occupied their time for some months — upon a 
 detail of uniform. Each branch of the service now 
 carried on its arm the emblem of its speciality. One 
 had crossed torpedoes. The seaman gunner had 
 guns in an impossible position. A shovel decorated 
 the stoker, and the carpenter was known by his 
 axe. The point now was, how should domestics be 
 distinguished. A section of the Board advocated 
 with warmth a crossed knife and fork on the left 
 arm above the elbow. Another member, a great 
 advocate for teetotalism and the abolition of rum, 
 was equally firm in desiring the emblem should 
 be a cup and saucer. They were now discussing 
 this point, and had decided to refer it to the 
 First Lord, when a message from him turned their 
 thoughts into another channel. It informed them 
 
25 
 
 of the French demand, and directed the orders to 
 be sent to the ports I mentioned at the outset, and 
 desired them to consider what were the operations 
 that should be undertaken. 
 
 Seeing what had been accomplished every 
 summer for some years past in mobilising a large 
 fleet for the annual manoeuvres, and observing that 
 with a few exceptions and breakdowns we were 
 able to practically double our squadron in home 
 waters within forty-eight hours, it was hoped on this 
 occasion there would be no difficulty in producing 
 a like result. But it was soon seen that this was 
 no true criterion of our preparedness, for on those 
 occasions, with the date well known, this evolution 
 had been the special care of the dockyards for 
 months previously. The manoeuvres over, vessels 
 that had participated in them were put aside, 
 reports of officers in command as to urgent require- 
 ments were unheeded, while all energies were 
 directed towards pushing on the new constructions, 
 so as to show how rapidly a modern battle-ship 
 could be produced. Though by dint of considerable 
 pressure on the War Office the ammunition for all 
 vessels in the reserve had been provided, it was not 
 kept in a convenient locality and had to be trans- 
 ported in lighters. A sufficient number of these 
 with due warning could be hired, and it had been a 
 novel sight in years previously to see a dozen ships 
 taking in their powder alongside the dockyard 
 simultaneously. But to send such an order without 
 
26 
 
 notice and at another time of the year, was to find 
 those responsible for this important part of naval 
 equipment quite unprepared. Indeed, when the 
 port admirals on receipt of the order to mobilise 
 sent urgent demands for powder and projectiles, 
 the ordnance store officers declared themselves 
 unable to move until proper requisitions from 
 headquarters had been received, and arrangements 
 could be made for transport. Then the anomalous 
 condition which places the most essential portion 
 of a ship's fighting capacity under military control 
 was apparent. True both services use powder, and 
 in theory a common store is economical, but why 
 should not the Navy supply boots on the same 
 reasoning to soldiers and sailors ? Anyhow, here 
 was the first cause of delay, and the red tape 
 barrier was only overcome by the energetic action 
 of one admiral, who at once sent an officer of his 
 stafi' to assume command of the depot, while 
 another was despatched to hire all the lighters in 
 the port. He remembered the procedure of Sir 
 Edmund Lyons when he had to make arrangements 
 for the landing in the Crimea, and the shock caused 
 in the official mind by his prompt dealings at 
 Constantinople with owners of necessary stores. 
 But a little irregularity on these occasions wonder- 
 fully facilitates the movement of a fleet or army. 
 It was found so now, for in a few hours twenty 
 lighters had been found, loaded and despatched 
 to the vessels fitting out. 
 
27 
 
 Then a new difficulty arose. Orders had been 
 received to fill up the crews of the coastguard ships 
 and commission every vessel in the reserve. There 
 was now found a considerable dearth of men. 
 The coastguard, a most efficient force of about 
 4000 men, could only be drawn upon to a small 
 extent, because to them was entrusted the im- 
 portant duty of working the signal stations which 
 we had established all round the coast of the 
 United Kingdom. This was an invaluable piece 
 of organisation, because it enabled the appearance 
 of any vessel to be flashed to all parts. The 
 efficiency depended, however, upon the men at 
 these places being able, not only to distinguish 
 between a merchant ship and a man-of-war, and 
 to detect the latter if disguised, but to know by 
 appearance the nationality -of an approaching 
 cruiser. The experience of the coastguard men 
 made them adepts at recognising their own vessels, 
 and being furnished with photographs of foreign 
 war vessels they could identify any hostile cruiser. 
 Clearly their places could not be taken by lands- 
 men, as had been proposed, or even seafaring 
 people without experience. Hence the coastguard 
 could not be sent afloat in any numbers. 
 
 The Naval Reserve was called out, but no one 
 knew where they were coming from, or in what 
 numbers. As they mostly belonged to the prin- 
 cipal steamers, the owners regarded with dismay 
 their vessels depleted of men. The slow steamers 
 
28 
 
 and sailing ships, which were likely to lay up in 
 war, carried few, if any, reserve men. It was seen 
 that we had been trusting to a broken reed in our 
 system for manning a large fleet at prompt notice. 
 A week had elapsed before even 5000 of these men 
 had reached the ports, and having never served in 
 a man-of-war they had not only to be instructed in 
 the most elementary routine duties, but it was a 
 week before they could find their way about the 
 ships to which they were sent. 
 
 We have, however, a force which can always be 
 relied upon. When Louis Philippe instituted 
 many years ago a parliamentary inquiry to com- 
 pare the French and English Navies, before which 
 the most distinguished ofiicers were examined, their 
 general opinion was that in personnel and matSriel 
 the Navy of their country was equal to, if not 
 superior, to that of England. But they said " that 
 country has a force which no other possesses. It is 
 unique and of inestimable value to the Navy. It 
 is the marines." When again, fifty years ago, we 
 fitted out a large experimental squadron, and 
 seamen could not be obtained, marines completed 
 the crews, and no more efficient squadron had been 
 seen afloat since the old wars. We now found once 
 more in this body the only reliable reserve we 
 possessed. In six hours from the order 6000 
 marines were embarked and settled down to their 
 places as if they had never been on shore. I may 
 remark in passing that as a result of the war the 
 
29 
 
 marines became more firmly knitted to the Navy. 
 Certain excrescences were removed. They were 
 placed entirely under the admirals at the different 
 ports, and their principal training was in gunnery 
 afloat rather than in taking part in field days 
 under the general of the district. Their uniform 
 was assimilated more to their connection with the 
 sea, and blue became its predominant colour. The 
 officers lost all desire to be considered a part 
 of the land forces, and took up their new duties 
 afloat with enthusiasm. The only difference be- 
 tween them and the naval executive was that they 
 represented a later entry into the service. 
 
 It may be imagined what excitement prevailed 
 throughout the country when it was known that 
 war had actually been declared. I shall not 
 attempt to depict the scene at the War Office and 
 Admiralty. It was simply chaos. Has it not been 
 stated of Moltke that on a similar occasion he was 
 found reading a novel, and on surprise being ex- 
 pressed at his being so engaged he said, " The great 
 work of preparation now ceases ; we have to see 
 the result of our labours ? " There was no such 
 spirit in Pall Mall or at Whitehall. Many things 
 that had been suggested as necessary, but put off, 
 had now to be taken up. One department besieged 
 the other with inquiries, demands and requisitions. 
 In addition, telegrams from the coast came pouring 
 in. The military, having been entrusted with the 
 safety of our harbours, had provided an elaborate 
 
30 
 
 system of defence by submarine mines, whidi 
 necessitated tbe greatest precaution in going m 
 and out. It bad been wittily remarked tbere 
 would be in time of war more risk to our vessels 
 entering their own harbours than in approaching 
 those of the enemy. This was now realised, for on 
 intimation from the War Office that the ports were 
 to be placed in a state of defence, mines were laid 
 in all the channels, and a dockyard tug coming into 
 Portsmouth Harbour, from a short cruise to warn 
 friendly vessels of the condition of affairs, had first 
 been diverted from her course by the persistent 
 glare of a search light, and then ran against a 
 loaded mine, which resulted in her being blown up 
 with all hands. This led to some angry discussion 
 between the admiral and general. The latter said 
 that being responsible for the safety of the port 
 he must exercise his own discretion as to when 
 and where mines were placed. Vessels should wait 
 outside until they could be conducted in by a corps 
 of pilots he was organising. It was suggested that 
 such a delay might be of value to an enterprising 
 enemy, and the admiral stated with emphasis that 
 the despatch of reinforcements to the fleet with 
 promptitude depended upon his having full control 
 of the immediate waters of the port. 
 
 There was no alternative but to refer the matter 
 to headquarters, and the attempt was made to 
 define the responsibility of each service. This, on 
 going into the matter thoroughly, was found to be 
 
31 
 
 hopeless. The First Lord plainly declared that 
 unless the admiral was supported he must ask to 
 be relieved of his office, and the Prime Minister, 
 seeing the urgency of the case, directed that the 
 supreme control should be vested in the naval au- 
 thority. This was nowhere received with greater 
 satisfaction than at the ports, for in the meantime 
 the generals in command had arrived at a sense of 
 the anomalous position in which they had been 
 placed. Men had been allotted to complete the 
 manning of the forts, but they had not the 
 slightest idea of what constituted friends or foes. 
 They could be with difficulty restrained from firing 
 at everything that approached. At the request of 
 the officers in command a naval party was sent to 
 each fort who could pronounce upon the character 
 of every craft that came near. It was found that 
 forts, lights and submarine mines could be effi- 
 ciently worked as a single organisation, but under 
 dual control it must result in chaos and probably 
 disaster. Barely a year before the French Minister 
 of War had pointed this out in the Chamber, and 
 every other nation had adopted the policy we now 
 found essential. But such a change cannot be 
 perfected in a few hours, and the enemy was not 
 blind to experience of the past, which had always 
 found us unready in the early stages of a conflict. 
 He knew that give us time and all these defects 
 would disappear. Everything depended on strik- 
 ing immediate blows. These were about to fall. 
 
IV. TORPEDO ATTACKS. 
 
 Among the various plans discussed by the great 
 Council at Paris was the sudden attack by flotillas 
 of torpedo boats at different points. Originally 
 adopted as a weapon of coast defence and to keep 
 off a blockading squadron, later developments of 
 this craft had proved that within a radius of 
 100 miles they could assume the offensive — given 
 sufficient hours of darkness to cover the distance, 
 and they had every chance of making their appear- 
 ance without warning. This view had led France 
 to acquire a great number of these boats. In the 
 north alone there were sixty capable of such service, 
 and harbours of refuge had been arranged along 
 the coast to which they could return if pressed in 
 pursuit. These refuges were up small rivers or 
 estuaries, of which the defence was their inaccessi- 
 bility to larger craft. Their existence was well 
 known in England, and a number of swift catchers 
 had been built to watch these places and destroy 
 the enemy's torpedo boats on coming in or going 
 out of them. Only a few, however, were now 
 ready. 
 
 Cherbourg, the headquarters of the northern 
 flotilla, is 110 miles from Plymouth and 70 from 
 Portsmouth. It was determined to despatch a 
 squadron of ten boats to each of these ports and 
 
33 
 
 endeavour to destroy any vessels that might be in 
 the roads or up the harbour. They had been in 
 commission for some time and all on board were 
 thoroughly trained. The plan was to leave Cher- 
 bourg at sundown, proceed along the coast to 
 prevent being observed by our cruisers or vedettes, 
 and then dash across the Channel. A commander 
 was in charge of each expedition, on board one of 
 the new 150-feet boats which had attained to a 
 speed of 28 knots. Most of the boats carried two 
 torpedo tubes, one of which could be pointed on 
 either side or both on the same side. 
 
 Not all the boats were so provided. In each 
 squadron two carried machine guns only, their 
 mission being to engage the attention of any guard 
 boats encountered, while the others were to push 
 on without stopping until the main object of the 
 operations had been effected. The plan of the 
 Portsmouth attack was for the squadron to make 
 for St. Alban's Head, then turn to the eastward 
 and proceed at moderate speed towards the 
 Needles. When some way off that end of the Isle 
 of Wight a couple of boats were to be detached 
 and make a feint as of forcing that entrance, while 
 the remainder went on to the other approach. It 
 was calculated that all attention being directed to 
 the eastern channel the main assault had a good 
 chance of passing the forts and getting up the 
 harbour. There was another reason for this 
 arrangement, which was a possibility of coming 
 
 c 
 
34 
 
 across some of the Channel fleet making their way 
 to Portland. 
 
 But this did not happen, for those ships ready 
 had left in the afternoon, while the remainder were 
 to sail next morning. It was assumed that any 
 ships lying at Spithead would have their nets out, 
 but vessels alongside the dockyard would be ex- 
 posed to torpedo attack. No hitch occurred during 
 the journey across. There was a strong westerly 
 wind blowing, but the boats easily maintained a 
 speed of 15 knots. Much attention had been paid 
 to the stoking so as to avoid sparks issuing from 
 the funnel, which has always been the first indica- 
 tion of the approach of a torpedo boat at night. 
 No lights were showing except a small one in the 
 stern of each boat. By an ingenious arrangement 
 this light was provided with a shutter, worked by 
 an electro-magnetic apparatus from the conning 
 tower, by which the light was reduced when the 
 leading boat altered speed, and obscured when her 
 engines stopped. Some warning of this sort was 
 necessary, as the flotilla maintained close order, the 
 bow of each boat close to the stern of the next 
 ahead ; but it was found in this position a collision 
 was easily avoided. By closely observing the 
 leader any alteration of course was detected with- 
 out signalling being required. 
 
 About midnight the two boats were detached to 
 make their way to the Needles, and an hour later 
 heavy firing was heard in that direction. The 
 
35 
 
 other boats were then passing Dunnose and had 
 not yet been discovered. Pushing on, they gave 
 St. Helen's Roads a wide berth, hoping to pass the 
 Horse fort undetected. But the wind had now 
 dropped and the Rattlesnake, a torpedo catcher 
 patrolling between Selsea Bill and the Isle of 
 Wight caught sight of the advancing flotilla. 
 Turning her search light on the black specks in 
 the distance the officer in command divined their 
 mission. The preconcerted signal of two rockets 
 in succession, followed by a gun, was instantly 
 given, and in a few minutes the attention of the 
 defenders, which had been drawn to the western 
 entrance, was concentrated on stopping at all 
 hazards this new attack. The critical moment for 
 the boats had arrived, but there was no hesitation 
 on the part of those in command. A single order 
 " full speed," and guided by the lights on Southsea 
 Beach, they made straight for the entrance of the 
 harbour. 
 
 Though it could not be expected that such a 
 daring operation as penetrating through the 
 defences of our principal naval arsenal could be 
 accomplished without great risk, more than one 
 cause favoured its success. The tide was then 
 nearly full flood, so there was no fear of boats 
 grounding on the shoals that at low water impede 
 free navigation. A light rain which, while it did 
 not obscure the land, placed those in the forts at 
 some disadvantage, was a meteorological condition 
 
 2 
 
36 
 
 on the side of the attack. The range and power 
 of the electric light is so diminished by fog or mist 
 as to make it practically useless at such a time. 
 This is due to its deficiency of red rays, which are 
 not absorbed by aqueous vapour to the same 
 extent as the other components of white light. 
 The smoke of guns is even more embarrassing, 
 while the difficulty of hitting a small object 
 moving at a speed of 20 knots had not hitherto 
 been appreciated. 
 
 Two causes only could be relied upon to stop 
 torpedo boats in an attack of this nature. One is a 
 fixed obstacle, as a boom which cannot be jumped, 
 and the other is to have a sufficient number of 
 small craft with speed and power to grapple the 
 boats before their object is reached. The former 
 can only be used in certain places, and there would 
 be difiiculty in applying it to the entrance of 
 Portsmouth Harbour, where the current is so swift. 
 But there is nothing to prevent an effective patrol 
 by guard boats. Unfortunately, hitherto little had 
 been done in this direction. The military had seen 
 the necessity as a protection to their mines, but 
 had not the means for carrying it out, while the 
 Navy, not having control of the local defence, did 
 not consider it their province. Alive now to the 
 risk of having no mobile defence, a few steam 
 launches had been hastily equipped, and with one 
 or two of the new catchers had been sent to patrol 
 outside Spithead. Warned by the signals of the 
 
37 
 
 Rattlesnake, these now made for the advancing 
 boats. 
 
 But the French commander had calculated on 
 such a contingency as likely to assist him in pass- 
 ing the forts. His plan was, if discovered, to get 
 mixed up with the defenders, so that any fire 
 directed on himself would be equally detrimental 
 to the other side and lead to its being stopped. 
 This actually occurred, for though at first a heavy 
 cannonade was opened it soon ceased, as through 
 the drizzling rain it was observed that all were 
 coming in together too absorbed in their mutual 
 endeavours to pay any attention to what was going 
 on elsewhere. Had there been a dozen catchers 
 like the Hornet not a single boat would have 
 escaped. She, coming from the direction of Eyde— 
 drawn there by the firing at the Needles — at a speed 
 of 26 knots, steered for the flotilla. Her commander 
 decided to ram, as she carried no torpedo tube 
 in the stem, which had been specially strengthened 
 for the purpose. The evolution is not easy, but 
 the number of antagonists assisted his movements. 
 Without a check he crashed into the engine-room 
 compartment of the last torpedo boat. There 
 was a momentary quiver, and shouts were heard 
 from the unfortunate mechanics, then as the Hornet 
 backed out the water poured into the aperture and 
 the boat almost immediately sank. Another boat 
 had been disabled in her machinery by a 6-pounder 
 shell, and, being surrounded, had to surrender. 
 
38 
 
 The Havoclc, which had also arrived on the scene, 
 was attacked by the two French guard boats. She 
 had been unable to ram, having a bow torpedo 
 tube, but did good execution with her machine guns. 
 The four remaining boats had meanwhile shaken 
 off their assailants and had passed the Spit Fort 
 without serious injury. Following the example of 
 their leader, they had diverged as little as possible 
 from their course. They now entered the harbour 
 at short intervals. Though several ships were 
 alongside the dockyard, the Inflexible was lying at 
 her buoy ready to leave the next day. She offered 
 an excellent mark, and as the leading boat passed 
 there was a plunge, and a torpedo charged with 
 200 lbs. of gun cotton sped on its way of destruc- 
 tion. From the explosion that followed there was no 
 doubt of its accuracy or effect. No modification of 
 internal construction could withstand such a blow. 
 In five minutes the ship settled on to the mud, with 
 only the superstructure showing above water. 
 
 Further on, the dockyard jetties showed almost 
 
 an unbroken line of ships that up to midnight had 
 
 been taking in their stores. Some had not yet 
 
 emptied the powder lighters that had only been 
 
 placed alongside a few hours previously. Passing 
 
 rapidly by these in succession, at a distance of 
 
 not more than 100 yards, the boats discharged 
 
 their torpedoes on that side with terrible effect. 
 
 The Repulse, just commissioned, suffered the same 
 
 fate as the Inflexible. A powder lighter alongside 
 
 a second class cruiser was struck, and the chars'e of 
 
39 
 
 the torpedo ignited the powder, causing a terrific 
 explosion, the destruction of the cruiser, and im- 
 mense damage to the dockyard as well as the town. 
 Such a scene is indescribable. The air was full of 
 portions of wood and iron that had been impelled 
 upwards and hurled in all directions. A calamity 
 like this creates an awe which imposes silence and 
 inaction on all for a brief period. Then the torpedo 
 boats, having arrived at the head of the harbour, 
 turned to make the best of their way out. It was 
 a forlorn hope, for by this time their pursuers had 
 arrived at the mouth of the harbour. The only 
 chance was to keep a straight course and trust to 
 luck. It was a case of each one for himself. 
 
 The tide had just begun to ebb, and the boats 
 came down the stream at a tremendous pace. As 
 they approached the entrance it seemed impossible 
 to get clear of all the craft that had converged on 
 this spot. The leading boat carried the commander 
 of the expedition ; he had taken the helm, as all 
 depended on careful steering. There was a gap at 
 Blockhouse Point, and for this he made. Seeing 
 his intention, a launch steered across to intercept 
 him. If she grappled he would soon be surrounded. 
 There was no alternative ; a slight touch of the 
 helm, and the sharp stem of the torpedo boat cut 
 clean through the quarter of the other, and she 
 passed on without a check. The second torpedo 
 boat had kept in his leader's wake, and also got 
 through, but the remaining two, which made for 
 the other side, were not so fortunate ; one had its 
 
40 
 
 propeller damaged by floating wreckage, while the 
 other had struck a buoy, which injured the stem 
 and impeded its progress. They were grappled 
 and taken. It only remains to say that the leader 
 and his companion managed, after several hair- 
 breadth escapes, to get away clear, and reached 
 Cherbourg in the forenoon, where they were re- 
 ceived with great enthusiasm. 
 
 Some hours later there arrived at intervals four 
 boats of the Plymouth expedition. This had 
 steered for the Start, and about five miles south of 
 Prawl Point met the second division of the Channel 
 squadron, which had left Plymouth late in the 
 evening for Portland. The boats were discovered 
 by a cruiser that had been placed two miles in 
 advance of the main body. She at once fired 
 guns, and promptly engaged the enemy. Such an 
 eventuality had been provided for by the ofiicer in 
 command of the expedition. The boats were in 
 two divisions, five in each line. Any scout or 
 cruiser was to be attacked by the two guard boats, 
 while the remainder, opening out, would endeavour 
 to pass down on each side of the squadron. The 
 ships consisted of the Emp-ess of India, Resolution, 
 Rcv-'.nge,- Narcissus, Bellona and Speedwell. The 
 four battleships were in line ahead, whUe the 
 Bellona was scouting in advance and the Speedwell 
 on the starboard beam. The latter, seeing the 
 firing, at once went full speed to the spot. This 
 movement put the boats in some disorder, and gave 
 
41 
 
 the line of ships time to have everything in 
 readiness to meet the attack. At the first intima- 
 tion of the presence of an enemy the admiral 
 quickened his speed, and as the boats, now reduced 
 to six, swept past, they were greeted with a 
 tremendous fire from the machine and quick-firing 
 guns. The leading boats suffered most, and were 
 disabled before they had reached a position to dis- 
 charge their torpedoes. Those following, swerving 
 outwards to avoid their companions, did not come 
 under such a heavy fire, but two of them had 
 their torpedo tubes so injured by the hail of shot 
 that their contents stuck fast. The last two boats, 
 partly enveloped in smoke, each managed to get off" 
 a torpedo at the third ship. This was the Revenge. 
 There are two causes which, in firing torpedoes 
 from the side of a torpedo boat against a ship in 
 motion, may produce a miss. One is, that the 
 torpedo is deflected on entering the water to an 
 angld dependent on the speed of the boat ; the 
 other is, that the object, if moving rapidly, may 
 have passed before the torpedo reaches it. An 
 allowance for each has to be made. The speed of 
 the boat being known, experiment easily demon- 
 strates the necessary allowance in this case ; but 
 the speed may be altered at the last moment, 
 when a readjustment of the torpedo is impossible. 
 Similarly, the rate of the object has to be assumed, 
 and may alter, or be estimated incorrectly. Partly 
 owing to one cause and partly to the other, of 
 
42 
 
 the two torpedoes actually fired on this occasion, 
 one passed astern, while the other struck the 
 rudder of the Revenge. In the early days of this 
 weapon, when the explosive carried by it was 
 of comparatively small amount, the effect would 
 not have been so serious. But the detonation of 
 200 lbs. of gun cotton, which modern torpedoes 
 convey — equal, perhaps, in effect to 1000 lbs. of 
 gunpowder — is irresistible. There was a tre- 
 mendous report, and the stern of the ship was 
 hurled into the air. Though all the water-tight 
 doors had been closed previous to the approach of 
 the boats, the shock to the after part of the ship 
 was so great that all the bulkheads were seriously 
 strained. An immense mass of water entered the 
 ship, and she was observed to settle down deeply 
 by the stern. 
 
 Fortunately the loss of life was not great, as 
 few were at the after end except those working the 
 machine guns on deck. Some of these were picked 
 up uninjured by the boats of the squadron, which 
 were quickly on the spot, having been precipi- 
 tated into the water by the blow, though not imme- 
 diately over the explosion. But a great many were 
 wounded, especially in the engine room, where the 
 concussion was severely felt. Of course the ship 
 was perfectly disabled, as both propellers were gone, 
 though the steam pumps were intact, and kept the 
 water down to a great extent. That she did not 
 sink was a marvel, and entirely due to the discipline 
 
43 
 
 maintained, even at such a terrible moment. No 
 panic ensued. Stations for a collision had been 
 frequently practised, and now at the bugle call 
 every one went to his allotted duty. All the 
 pumps were connected, and boats got in readiness 
 in case the ship had to be abandoned. For this 
 there was no immediate necessity, as the water- 
 tight doors had been closed previous to the attack. 
 Had the explosion taken place a few feet further 
 forward no precautions could have availed. 
 
 All depended now on the bulkheads withstanding 
 the pressure of water and preventing it extending 
 to the engine room. They leaked considerably, 
 but did not give way. The entry of water was 
 checked by putting over outside all the mats and 
 canvas, where they got sucked into the fissures. 
 This action had been most useful in the case of 
 the Howe when lifted off the rocks at Ferrol. As 
 the stern — or rather the after part — was much de- 
 pressed, while the bow was correspondingly raised, 
 so that the whole of the ram was out of water, 
 every weight that could possibly be moved was 
 transported forward. 
 
 All sign of further attack having ceased, the 
 admiral came on board. With the captain and 
 chief engineer he made an examination of the 
 injuries as far as they could be observed, and 
 decided to remove the crew to the Narcissus, which 
 should then tow the injured battleship back to 
 Plymouth. Only a small party was left on board 
 
44 
 
 the injured ship, as there was great risk of her 
 foundering in case it came on to blow hard. She, 
 however, arrived in safety about noon, while the 
 squadron went on to Portland. 
 
 There was great consternation throughout the 
 country when these events became known. We 
 had been subjected to extreme humiliation. Not- 
 withstanding the millions spent on coast defence, 
 we were not able to prevent a few torpedo boats 
 entering our principal stronghold and destroying 
 ships alongside our very dockyards. Elaborate 
 preparations existed to encounter a hostile fleet, 
 but no provision to meet this form of attack. 
 Again, while all experience'd officers had declared 
 that a squadron at sea should be attended by 
 numerous scouts to bring such assailants to bay 
 before getting within striking distance of the main 
 body, this obvious necessity had been neglected, 
 with the result just related. 
 
 True, out of twenty torpedo boats fourteen had 
 succumbed — for the two sent to the Needles, press- 
 ing the attack too close, had been disabled and 
 captured — but our fleet had been reduced by three 
 battleships and a cruiser ; a deficiency which could 
 not be made good within the probable limits of a 
 war, and was out of all proportion to the loss 
 sustained by the enemy. 
 
 There was a tremendous outcry against the War 
 Ofiice and Admiralty, and an excited mob could be 
 with difficulty restrained from acts of violence. 
 
45 
 
 Many demanded that a popular sailor should be 
 given the direction of affairs. But it was not the 
 time to swop horses, and calmer counsels prevailed. 
 Such an attitude was necessary, for the country 
 was about to sustain a far greater misfortune. 
 
 V. DEFEAT OF OUR 
 MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON. 
 
 As I have already stated, the French fleet left 
 Toulon at 3 p.m. on March 1st. The conditions 
 under which it now took the sea were very different 
 from those that prevailed at the beginning of the 
 century. The centre of interest had shifted to the 
 eastward. It had passed from the Atlantic to the 
 Mediterranean. We can hardly appreciate now 
 the eagerness with which the control of the West 
 Indian Islands was competed for in former years, 
 and the influence they exercised on naval strategy. 
 Similarly the altered conditions of the North 
 American continent have diverted the interest 
 attached to former struggles for dominion there 
 and, except in a minor degree relating to commerce, 
 would not attract great attention until other points 
 had been secured. Thus all the great naval battles 
 of the past took place in the Atlantic, whether 
 among the islands in the western portion or on 
 
46 
 
 this side. Since then the eastern hemisphere has 
 proved more attractive. Our position in India, and 
 its dependence on the sea for support from the 
 mother country, must chiefly affect naval strategy 
 of to-day. 
 
 A French writer has said, " Cast aux Indes qu'il 
 faut frapper 1' Angle terre." The shortening of the 
 route by a ditch 90 miles long across the Isthmus 
 of Suez has also added a new phase to the question. 
 Some think this neighbourhood will see the next 
 great struggle for naval supremacy. 
 
 When the veteran constructor of the canal was 
 received in the French Academy, M. Eenan, ad- 
 dressing him, said, " One Bosphorus has sufficed 
 till now to give trouble enough to the world. You 
 have created another more important than the first. 
 In case of maritime war it would be the point of 
 supreme interest ; the point for the occupation of 
 which the whole globe would make a rush. You 
 have thus fixed the spot for the great battles of the 
 future." 
 
 Whether it was to be in this immediate locality 
 or at the opposite extremity of the Mediterranean 
 would depend upon tactical rather than strategical 
 considerations. It might have been desired as of 
 old to effect a junction between the Brest and 
 Toulon fleets ; but this was no longer requisite 
 owing to the policy followed of concentrating 
 previous to war the force required for immediate 
 action. Had it been scattered in several ports, each 
 
47 
 
 was liable to destruction in detail or to sufi'er 
 blockade. By developing the resources of Toulon, 
 and collecting a fleet there considerably superior to 
 any in Mediterranean waters, it could not — in the 
 early stages of a war at least — be reduced to 
 inactivity. Of course I am aware that this measure 
 had been to a large extent influenced by the growth 
 of the Italian Navy, and the chances of hostilities 
 with the Triple Alliance. This, however, was only 
 one of many threads in a scheme which had for its 
 chief ambition a dominion of the sea. 
 
 But the greatest change of all in the strategical 
 aspect of the Mediterranean, as regards the position 
 of France and England, is the substitution of the 
 former in holding the large extent of coast formerly 
 under the authority of the Deys of Algiers and 
 Tunis. When the French sent an expedition to 
 Algiers in 1830, it was not, probably, foreseen by 
 the other Powers that this would lead to a domina- 
 tion of the coast to a point within easy range of 
 Malta. Along this coast are a series of harbours 
 either naturally good or made so artificially. Such 
 harbours afford valuable bases either for offensive 
 or defensive purposes. The most ignorant in naval 
 warfare cannot fail to see what risks in war com- 
 merce runs in passing this long sea coast, unless 
 each port is masked or the craft it harbours de- 
 stroyed. A squadron leaving Toulon need not fear 
 loss of communication and supplies with such a 
 base as Algiers open — moreover, any force going 
 
48 
 
 from Malta to Gibraltar raust pass within close 
 distance. 
 
 It was to Algiers tlie French fleet was now 
 steering with a view to intercept the English 
 squadron, which must be reinforced from England 
 before it could take the off'ensive. 
 
 The formidable nature of the Erench position in 
 the Mediterranean had been observed and pointed 
 out frequently in England for a considerable period 
 previously. Sir Geofirey Hornby had plainly said : 
 " I don't see how we can possibly hold the Medi- 
 terranean with our present force," and the Admiralty 
 had been urged to strengthen it. But the require- 
 ments of a modern fleet difl'er materially from 
 those of former times, and render it more dependent 
 on a dockyard. We have only one place in the 
 Mediterranean with the necessary plant, and Malta 
 is only just capable of supplying the wants of a 
 limited number of ironclads. Gibraltar has no 
 dock, and its naval yard is incapable of coping 
 with big repairs. Hence we could only maintain a 
 much larger fleet in this sea by sending some of 
 the ships home periodically, a course to which all 
 naval tradition was opposed. A few additional 
 cruisers had been sent out, but they did not 
 materially strengthen the squadron in the most 
 important element of sea power. 
 
 It had, however, been considered that on an 
 emergency the Channel squadron could reinforce 
 that in the Mediterranean in a few days, our home 
 
49 
 
 waters being guarded by tbe coastguard ships. 
 When, therefore, the First Lord of the Admiralty 
 was informed of the French note, a cypher telegram 
 was despatched to the admiral at Malta, informing 
 him of the position of affairs, and stating the 
 Channel fleet would join him at Gibraltar as soon 
 as possible. 
 
 This reached him at 8 p.m. on February 28th, 
 and orders were at once given to prepare for sea. 
 
 Fortunately the whole of the squadron was 
 present, except the Edgar, at Alexandria, and some 
 of the small ships cruising at the eastern end of 
 the station. The second division had lately re- 
 turned from the Levant, and all were now preparing 
 for the summer cruise. One or two of the ships 
 had portions of their machinery disconnected, but 
 these were replaced in a few hours, and at 4 a.m. 
 the next morning the squadron left Malta for the 
 westward. 
 
 A somewhat northerly course was steered, to 
 avoid the coast of Tunis and prevent information 
 of their movements reaching the enemy. It was 
 desirable to push on, to get past the narrow water 
 between Cape Bon and the western end of Sicily 
 during daylight, as there were known to be torpedo 
 boats at Bizerta. 
 
 Though war had not been declared, the previous 
 telegram had been such as to prevent little doubt 
 it might ensue at any moment. The squadron 
 therefore proceeded at a speed of 12 knots. As a 
 
50 
 
 matter of fact, it was sighted about noon by two 
 torpedo boats from Bizerta tbat bad been despatched 
 to ascertain whether the squadron had left Malta. 
 They were then off Pantellaria, and at once returned 
 to Tunis with the news, where it was transmitted 
 to France and Algiers. These boats were seen by 
 the leading English ships, and their actions looked 
 ominous, so the admiral sent the yEolus on to 
 Cagliari for intelligence, to meet him 50 miles due 
 south of that port. The appointed rendezvous 
 was reached at 5 o'clock the next morning, where 
 the cruiser was found waiting. 
 
 The captain went on board the flagship, and the 
 news he had to impart was of a serious nature. 
 War had been declared the previous afternoon and 
 the French fleet had left Toulon in great strength. 
 Its destination was unknown, but it was believed 
 to be bound for Malta. A signal to the fleet made 
 the information general, and all the captains were 
 ordered to confer with the admiral. 
 
 The consultation did not take long. All were 
 of the same opinion, that there was no alternative 
 but to push on to Gibraltar. In less than an hour 
 the squadron had resumed its course. 
 
 If the French were steering for Malta they must 
 still be a considerable distance north, and there 
 was ample time to get past them. On the other 
 hand, should the Toulon fleet make straight for 
 Gibraltar, they had a shorter distance to go by 
 300 miles than the English squadron. But the 
 
51 
 
 latter had started half-a-day earlier, during whicli 
 150 miles had been run, and it was hoped the 
 balance might be picked up by superior speed. 
 This was now increased to 14 knots. But as I 
 have said, the French destination was Algiers and 
 the squadrons were converging upon each other. 
 
 We may therefore now give a detailed list of the 
 two forces. 
 
 The French squadron comprised the following : 
 
 
 Battle-Ships. 
 
 
 \st Division. 
 
 2^1 Division. 
 
 3rd Division. 
 
 Formidable (Flag). 
 
 Marceau (Flag). 
 
 Courbet (Flag), 
 
 Jaureguiberry. 
 
 Neptune. 
 
 Caiman. 
 
 Amiral Baudin. 
 
 Hoche. 
 
 Indomptable. 
 
 „ Duperre. 
 
 Magenta. 
 
 Terrible. 
 
 Brennus. 
 
 Devastation. 
 
 Bouvines. 
 
 These three divisions were so arranged that each 
 contained ships of similar type and approximate 
 power. Manoeuvring is much facilitated where 
 this is carried out, as the revolutions of the engines 
 and the arc of turning circle being nearly uniform, 
 changes of direction and formation can be accom- 
 plished without every captain having to study the 
 idiosyncrasies of his next ahead and astern. The 
 first division was the most powerful, as the one to 
 come first into action, and composed of the finest 
 ships in the French Navy. Vice-admiral G. was in 
 supreme command, and flew his flag in the Formi- 
 dable. His early career had been a distinguished 
 one and he was considered the ablest ofiicer in the 
 
 D 2 
 
52 
 
 service. Two rear-admirals in the Marceau and 
 Courhet respectively, led the second and third 
 divisions. They had been specially promoted from 
 the captains' list, and had had much experience in 
 squadron work. 
 
 There were twelve cruisers organised as scouts 
 as follows : 
 
 \st sub-Division. 
 Cecille (Flag). 
 Cosmao, 
 
 2?irf sub-Division. 
 Tage. 
 Troude. 
 
 Srd sub-Division. 
 Dupuy de Lome. 
 Lalande. 
 
 ith sub-Division. 
 Alger. 
 Forbin. 
 
 5th sub-Division. 
 Isly. 
 Davoust. 
 
 6th sub-Division. 
 Jean Bart. 
 Suchet. 
 
 A rear-admiral was in command of this light 
 squadron. Experience in manoeuvres had shown 
 the necessity of this, especially when two opposing 
 fleets come actually in contact, as then the cruisers 
 must take care not to impede movements, and the 
 supreme chief has all his attention directed to 
 handling the battle-ships. 
 
 It will be seen the cruisers are in six sub-di- 
 visions, each consisting of two vessels. The smaller 
 acted as a satellite and as an intermediate com- 
 munication between the big cruiser, when scouting, 
 and the squadron. In addition, there was a tor- 
 pedo flotilla composed of the Wattignies, Leger 
 and Levrier torpedo catchers, and eight sea-going 
 torpedo boats. 
 
 The English squadron consisted of ten battle- 
 
53 
 
 ships, the Polyphemus and nine cruisers, as 
 
 follows : 
 
 Battle-Ships. 
 
 \st Division. 2nd Division. 
 
 Ramillies (Flag). Trafalgar (Flag). 
 
 Hood. Nile. 
 
 Camperdown. Sanspareil. 
 
 Anson. Rodney. 
 
 Howe. Collingwood. 
 Polyphemus. 
 
 The squadron was very unequal in strength, 
 because it included the five Admiral class which 
 had been sent out to the Mediterranean as more 
 suited to that sea than the rough waters of the 
 Channel. Their low freeboard forward makes 
 them very uncomfortable in bad weather, as 
 every aperture on deck has to be hermetically 
 sealed to keep the water from getting below. 
 They have good speed in smooth water, and are 
 powerfully armed, but a large area of the hull is 
 most imperfectly protected. 
 
 It was a great point with our old wooden walls 
 that they were equally at home in any sea, and 
 weathered the heaviest storms while maintaining 
 their stations in the Bay of Biscay. Few of our 
 modern constructions are capable of keeping the 
 sea for any length of time. Indeed, this is seldom 
 done ; they go from port to port, and the amount 
 of time spent in harbour is much in excess of that 
 under way. 
 
 The following cruisers accompanied the squadron ; 
 
54 
 
 Hawke. 
 
 ^olus. 
 
 Surprise. 
 
 Amphiou. 
 
 Bai'ham. 
 
 Sandfly. 
 
 Arethusa. 
 
 Scout. 
 
 Skipjack. 
 
 Spartan. 
 
 Fearless. 
 
 
 Though, as may be seen, this squadron was 
 numerically inferior to that of the French, and 
 only contained four ships of 12,000 tons and up- 
 wards, it was thoroughly well organised and in 
 splendid order. The chief command was held by 
 
 Admiral Sir Charles T , G.C.B., an officer of 
 
 great experience and energy. The Ramillies car- 
 ried his flag. Eear-admiral L was his second 
 
 in command in the Trafalgar. He had gained a 
 great reputation as a captain, and was now flying 
 his flag for the first time. 
 
 Many problems which had been exercising men's 
 minds for half a century were now within measur- 
 able distance of solution. The effect of steam 
 upon tactics ; for, with the exception of Lissa, no 
 great action under this mode of propulsion had 
 yet taken place. The fight between Tegethoff" and 
 Persano had only touched the fringe of the ques- 
 tion. Then how far we were justified in mainly 
 trusting to a few guns of great size. Would the 
 improved training of seamen and the superior pre- 
 cision of the weapon give an adequate return 
 under the different conditions of battle and prac- 
 tice ? Were we right in carrying such masses of 
 armour.? Or could it be limited to keeping out the 
 most destructive shell? What was the influence 
 
55 
 
 of submarine attack? Of the ram we had some 
 experience in peace and war. Of its terrible eflfec- 
 tiveness when successfully applied there could be 
 no doubt. Would it be brought into use early or 
 late in an action ? What was to be the record of 
 the torpedo ? All nations had been devoting great 
 attention to this weapon, but at the same time a 
 vein of contempt for its powers seemed to influence 
 naval construction. Though equally destructive 
 to large as well as small ships — for though we 
 may pile up armour to protect them from shot and 
 shell, the hull under water remains vulnerable — 
 we had not hesitated in producing vessels costing 
 a million sterling in which protection against this 
 form of attack is infinitesimal. In fact, it cannot 
 be done. As was declared long ago by an eminent 
 naval architect, when only small torpedoes were 
 used, " It might be possible to put some armour 
 on the bottom of ships, but then it would only be 
 necessary to increase the charges of the torpedoes, 
 and the armour we had applied would become 
 vulnerable. It is idle to attempt to form the 
 bottom of a ship strong enough to resist a fair 
 blow from a powerful torpedo." Prophetic words, 
 spoken eighteen years ago, for in the interval we 
 have passed from charges of 40 to 200 lbs. of gun 
 cotton. We can only lessen the danger by spread- 
 ing the risks over a greater number of ships of 
 reduced size, but this alternative we have not yet 
 accepted. 
 
56 
 
 There were many who declared the next sea 
 fight would not be won by an extra inch of 
 armour, or an additional foot in the velocity of a 
 gun. A thousand tons more or less will count 
 little in the scale when pitted against the personal 
 element. Success would be to the side which 
 handled best the weapons provided. There was 
 nothing to indicate how this would go. Each 
 country had striven to give its personnel a thorough 
 training in all that tends to excellence at sea. We 
 knew what our own Navy had done in China, New 
 Zealand, the Crimea, Egypt and those numerous 
 small wars in which we had been engaged. Our 
 neighbours had similar experiences — Admiral Far- 
 ragut had witnessed the French operations against 
 Mexico in 1838, and recorded his impressions of 
 their fleet. Writing to Commodore Barron at the 
 time, he had said : " The English and ourselves 
 may aff"ect to despise the French by sea, but depend 
 upon it they are in science far ahead of us both, 
 and when England next meets France upon the 
 ocean she will find a different enemy from that of 
 the last war." 
 
 Since then their progress has been continuous, 
 and a feeling of confidence prevailed throughout 
 the service, indicating that no endeavour would be 
 wanting to ensure success. 
 
 Such were the general conditions when, on the 
 3rd of March, in the early morning, the forces of 
 the two Powers in the Mediterranean once more 
 
57 
 
 met in battle. In fact the early part of the action 
 began before it was light, and the two fleets came 
 upon each other rather unexpectedly. The English 
 admiral would, if possible, have avoided a conflict, 
 but he had not time, and his cruisers being hard 
 pressed by superior numbers, he could only have 
 done so by a sacrifice he was unwilling to enter- 
 tain. He therefore determined to accept battle. 
 The best accounts of naval actions are those derived 
 from private sources. A man often in a letter 
 throws a light upon incidents concerning which 
 ofl&cial despatches are silent. Naval history would 
 be more interesting reading if it included matter 
 of this nature. As a rule, also, we seldom read 
 anything except what is compiled by our own 
 countrymen, and compiled with a partiality it is 
 most difficult to overcome. Actuated by such 
 ideas, I have obtained, and am permitted to pub- 
 lish, the following account of this battle from a 
 lieutenant of the Formidable to a friend in the 
 Ministry of Marine at Paris : — 
 
 " Formidable, Algiers, March ith. 
 
 " MoN CHER Louis, 
 
 "You will ere this reaches you have seen 
 Duplessis, whom the chief sent with his despatch 
 in the Troude, announcing our glorious victory of 
 yesterday. It cost us dearly, for many beloved 
 comrades gave their lives in the gallant struggle. 
 Victor, who shared your work in the Etat-Major, 
 
58 
 
 fell by my side whilst bringing me a message from 
 the admiral. He had only a short time before 
 mentioned you, and said what would you not 
 have given to have been with us. I can only give 
 you a brief account of the action, as we are all 
 hard at work getting ready for another voyage. 
 As you know, we left Toulon on Tuesday afternoon. 
 It was a scene never to be forgotten, the crowds 
 who came to bid us farewell, and how they cheered. 
 We wanted to do the same, but the admiral said, 
 ' No, wait till our return,' meaning it would depend 
 on how we had acquitted ourselves. You know 
 how impassive he is, but what there is beneath 
 that calm exterior. All felt he was a chief worthy 
 of France. 
 
 " We had no idea where we were going tUl all 
 the officers were sent for and told our destination. 
 What an inspiration ! I suppose you knew all 
 about it. But we were too busy to think much 
 even of those in the dear country. There were all 
 the stores to get below, and spare apparatus to 
 stow away. People think that ships are always 
 ready for action, but it is very different when war 
 comes in earnest. 
 
 " When we left a mistral was blowing, and there 
 was a good deal of sea outside Cape Sicie. Some of 
 the ships seemed to take in a good deal of water, 
 but the torpedo boats did not suffer. We only took 
 those of largest size, which are capital sea boats. 
 
 " Our departure had been so prompt, we did not 
 
59 
 
 think the English would leave till the next day, 
 but they must have sailed before us, for the 
 Wattignies, which had been sent on to Algiers for 
 information, came back with the news that two 
 torpedo boats from Bizerta had seen the English 
 squadron off Sicily on the morning of the 1st. We 
 therefore hastened on. It was about 3 a.m. yes- 
 terday that we first knew they were at hand. The 
 Cecille was scouting five miles ahead, when she 
 signalled a fleet in sight. The sound of guns told 
 us she had engaged. The other cruisers were then 
 directed to support her, upon which the enemy 
 drew off. At first we thought he meant to elude 
 us, but when day broke the whole of his fleet were 
 in full sight bearing down upon us. Two of his 
 cruisers had, it appeared, been disabled by the 
 Dupuy de Lome, whose melinite shells proved very 
 destructive, while her own cuirass kept out all the 
 rapid fire projectiles. Worthy ship of such a name ! 
 The disabled cruisers had been taken in tow, and 
 this hampered the movements of the enemy. 
 When I came on deck, aroused from a short sleep 
 by the call to action, the sight was magnificent. 
 In the dim light of the early morning we could see 
 on the starboard bow the massive ironclads in 
 compact order. They were in a curious formation, 
 the flagship leading and the other vessels ranged 
 on her and each other's quarter, making an isosceles 
 triangle. Thus the squadron had the shape of a 
 wedge, in which each ship's ram and bow fire were 
 
60 
 
 clear of the next ahead. Great practice must be 
 necessary to maintain this order, but for the 
 charge it is a good arrangement. 
 
 " How often, dear friend, have we argued over 
 this matter ! You think pelotons the best attack 
 formation, while I have always said line ahead is 
 the only feasible method. In peace evolutions it 
 is very well to have an officer at the compass, 
 another with the distance finder, and the com- 
 mandant with nothing else to think of but to keep 
 station. But in action it is very different. All 
 that disappears, and this last terrible experience 
 convinces me. Follow your leader, and the eye 
 judges if you are too close, or behind station. The 
 nearest approach to how you navigate is best on 
 the day of battle. Thus I was glad to see we 
 were in two divisions line ahead. There was some 
 sea, as it had been blowing fresh during the night. 
 Our ships did not move much, but one or two of 
 the enemy were rolling a good deal. 
 
 " Just then we altered course, as we were steering 
 across his bows, and the English opened fire at 
 about 400,0 yards. Several shot passed over us, 
 but I could not see if any ships were hit, as orders 
 came to commence, and I was getting on the sights 
 of my big infant forward. We were swinging 
 round at the time, which diverted the aim, but the 
 shot was not seen to strike the water, so it may 
 have hit its mark. This was the first shot from 
 our side, and it would form a fine subject for our 
 great painter. Then the firing became fast and 
 
61 
 
 furious. As we passed each other at about 2000 
 yards an enormous shell struck us amidships. It 
 created great havoc in the battery and quite dis- 
 abled the centre 37 cm. gun. The port division 
 was then nearest to the enemy and suffered 
 severely. The Marceau was much -knocked about. 
 Her projecting barbettes on the side had been put 
 out of action by the destruction of the ammunition 
 hoists, and she lost a number of men early in the 
 action. Several of the other ships had also many 
 injuries. But the enemy was as bad, if not worse. 
 Some of the English ships carried their guns so low, 
 we occasionally saw their projectiles strike the tops 
 of waves and be deflected into the air. Then 
 again, I think the rolling of their biggest ships was 
 in our favour. This probably caused the enemy to 
 decide upon closer quarters, for forming into a 
 single line he turned and made straight for us. 
 He must have been going at least 12 knots, but 
 our admiral saw the manoeuvre in time. We had 
 changed direction to port and were in two divisions 
 abreast. Turning another 90 degrees we came into 
 our first formation by simply using the rudder. 
 This brought the two admirals as sternmost ships. 
 In another minute we had enveloped the enemy. 
 The din was terrific, and the smoke so thick from 
 the heavy guns that we could only see the top of 
 the military mast of the next ahead. That guided 
 us. It is impossible, my dear Louis, to describe this 
 portion of the battle. Ships swerved on both sides, 
 as steering gear or machinery broke down. When 
 
62 
 
 we liad passed clear, several on both sides were 
 totally disabled, and one or two were in a sinking 
 state. The foremost ships had sustained the 
 hardest blows, while we in the rear were not struck 
 many times. 
 
 " But I have not time to tell you how the 
 struggle continued, the despatch will give all 
 details of losses and how the English admiral got 
 clear with five ironclads when he saw the victory 
 was practically in our hands. 
 
 " How splendidly they fought, each helping one 
 another. You remember in China how we used to 
 remark on the camaraderie of the English captains. 
 They dined together, met on shore for a walk, and 
 joked how one had got his royal yards across before 
 the other. We agreed there was not the same in 
 our Navy. Our capitaines de vaisseaux, striving 
 for promotion to contre-amiral by selection, view 
 each other askance, while theirs, being by seniority, 
 have no such thoughts. 
 
 " We return to Toulon to-morrow, taking back 
 the injured ships and to get ready for further 
 service, so au revoir. 
 
 " From your devoted 
 
 "Paul Bracket. 
 
 "P.S. — It was a misfortune not having the 
 torpedo boats with us when the enemy appeared. 
 As you know, they had been directed the day 
 before to make the best of their way to Algiers 
 owing to the weather, and only rejoined us after 
 
63 
 
 the battle. But I have always been doubtful 
 whether in a fleet action they might not be as 
 dangerous to friends as foes." 
 
 -'&'- 
 
 This letter, written hurriedly, no doubt, only 
 gives a general description of the first great battle 
 between modern fleets. Many details are wanting 
 as to the individual action of ships, which it would 
 take too long to fill in. The broad fact remains 
 that for lack of sufficient force we had sufl'ered a 
 reverse in the Mediterranean, and for some time at 
 least could not control that sea. It had been a 
 question of numbers and not size of individual 
 ships. The smaller vessels had not sufl'ered 
 especially, and as the greater proportion of the 
 shot struck at an angle, a comparatively moderate 
 thickness of armour either caused them to glance 
 ofi" or to burst harmlessly outside. The truth of 
 the old adage that the best protection against the 
 enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from your own 
 guns, was fully borne out. It was the weight of 
 metal discharged in a given time, not massive bolts 
 at intervals, that was most efl"ective.* 
 
 At a future time I will go into this action in 
 greater detail, with the lessons derived from it, but 
 at present am only concerned in showing the 
 general result of trusting to chance and past 
 success in maintaining our position at sea. 
 
 * The defective protection of the Admiral class was, how- 
 ever, very apparent. A complete belt is now considered 
 essential, though not more than 4 inches thick at the ends. — 
 S. E. W. 
 
G4 
 
 The English admiral, sore at heart when he saw 
 how his once proud squadron was reduced, had re- 
 luctantly come to the conclusion that his duty was 
 not to prolong the contest. He therefore drew off 
 with the remainder and continued on his way to 
 Gibraltar. It was a question whether he should 
 not endeavour to reach Malta, where repairs could 
 have been made good and the injured ships docked. 
 But the distance was greater, and it was most im- 
 portant to get reinforcements. He therefore de- 
 cided to carry out his original instructions. 
 Avoiding the north coast of Africa so as to be clear 
 of hostile torpedo boats, and obliged to steam at a 
 moderate speed, the squadron reached Gibraltar 
 without further mishap on the evening of the 5 th. 
 Nothing had occurred there, and the next morning 
 the Channel Fleet arrived in the Bay. 
 
 But it was now too late to retrieve the disaster, 
 for though the new arrivals gave a considerable 
 accession of strength, nearly all the ships lately in 
 action required considerable repairs, and there were 
 absolutely no resources at Gibraltar for grappling 
 with injuries of magnitude. There could be no 
 question of entering the Mediterranean again, for 
 the Governor had received information that the 
 French fleet had returned to Toulon, and that 
 several ironclads brought forward from the reserve 
 had been placed in commission. 
 
 A large expedition was preparing, the destination 
 of which was believed to be Malta or Egypt. 
 
65 
 
 There seemed no alternative l)ut to send the 
 damaged ships home, but as the French Channel 
 squadron was reported in Brest, it was considered 
 advisable that all should return together. They 
 accordingly left the next day, and a week later 
 anchored in Plymouth Sound. 
 
 VI. EFFECT OF THE DEFEAT. 
 
 Once more, therefore, we had been obliged to 
 withdraw our fleet from the Mediterranean. The 
 effect was much the same as of old. No steamers 
 from this country cleared for that sea when these 
 events became known. Those that entered the 
 Straits were warned at Gibraltar, and either re- 
 mained there or put back. There was no attempt 
 to block the Suez Canal on the part of France, 
 because she wanted to keep this way open to her 
 eastern possessions. Our commerce coming home 
 suffered terribly from hostile cruisers, which for 
 some time carried out their operations undisturbed. 
 The bogey of torpedo boats playing great havoc 
 with harmless merchant ships disappeared once and 
 for all. It had been assumed they would range up 
 alongside and consign all to destruction without 
 scruple. It had been lost sight of that a vessel's 
 nationality must first be ascertained, and if het 
 
66 
 
 destruction is decided upon, provision made for the 
 crew, and passengers if carried. Privateers were 
 often inconvenienced by tlie number of prisoners 
 they took out of a prize, but how would a torpedo 
 boat fare if so encumbered ? If the captured vessel's 
 own boats are utilised and the passengers put adrift 
 in them, humanity demands the stowage of food 
 and water. Is this likely to be adopted at any 
 distance from land ? Would not the whole civi- 
 lised world cry out at such deeds ? Might they 
 not even range themselves against the trans- 
 gressor ? On this occasion the inconveniences I 
 have mentioned soon led torpedo boats to leave 
 commerce alone. They had work more worthy of 
 their steel. 
 
 It is impossible to describe the sensation which 
 these events caused throughout the land. Though 
 for many years representatives of the people of 
 both political parties had loudly proclaimed the 
 Navy should be outside all partisan strife (but con- 
 tinued to vote steadily with their side when its 
 efficiency was questioned), all question of allegiance 
 to an individual in face of such a disaster now dis- 
 appeared. A vote of censure on the Government 
 for not putting plainly before the country our 
 naval requirements, was carried by an overwhelming 
 majority. It was a lame defence which urged fear 
 of wounding foreign susceptibilities. Why, we had 
 never uttered a murmur when other countries had 
 in twenty years spent a sum nearly equal to our 
 
67 
 
 national debt upon their armies, which were to 
 them the security our Navy is to us ! We never 
 questioned their right to put the whole population 
 under arms. How could they in turn object to 
 our maintaining a Navy— upon which our existence 
 depends — equal, if necessary, to that of the world 
 combined ? In fact such a necessity had been 
 recognised by a ruler of the country we were now 
 fighting against. Napoleon III. said once to some 
 peevish complaints we made as to his building iron- 
 clads, " Let each build what he considers the right 
 number ; you ought to have twice as many as I, for 
 they are your principal protection." 
 
 If we wished to maintain thirty ironclads in the 
 Mediterranean, why should any other question but 
 that of our own interests be considered ? 
 
 By such cogent arguments the excuses of the 
 administration were pulverised, and it fell ignomi- 
 niously. But no political change could avert dire 
 distress. It was only natural that a state of war 
 should dislocate that immense traffic over sea on 
 which we depend daily for so much food. Only the 
 year before, half a million tons of meat — indepen- 
 dent of live stock— had been received from abroad. 
 Just stop the importation of wheat for a month, 
 or reduce it by half, as now actually occurred, 
 and note the effect of a dear loaf. Successful war 
 means much misery and great expenditure. An 
 unsuccessful struggle brings horrors untold, and 
 these we soon began to experience. We had to 
 
68 
 
 pass through a fiery ordeal of trouble before the 
 good qualities of the nation asserted themselves, 
 and the bulk of the population rallied to the side 
 of law and order. 
 
 Our disasters were not limited to home waters. 
 An expedition from Brest, which left the day after 
 war was declared, captured Dominica and St. Lucia 
 in the West Indies before we had time to strengthen 
 our squadron in that part. 
 
 The Mediterranean being now abandoned by the 
 British flag, and it being evident that for a month 
 or two we could not appear there in force, an army 
 was embarked at Marseilles and landing in Aboukir 
 Bay under cover of the fleet, had no difficulty 
 in overcoming the resistance of the English force 
 of occupation, hampered as it was by the hardly 
 concealed hostility of the native officials. 
 
 In less than a month our boasted naval supre- 
 macy was in jeopardy, and Russia now seized the 
 opportunity to demand an unrestricted right of 
 way from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. 
 Turkey protested, but could get no promise of 
 support from the other Powers. An unfortunate 
 mistake in one of the forts of the Bosphorus firing 
 upon a Russian vessel proceeding to Constantinople 
 with despatches, gave the pretext needed. 
 
 Disclaiming all intention of deposing the Sultan 
 from his capital, but asserting that the channel 
 must be rendered secure, Russia embarked a force 
 of 20,000 troops at Sebastopol and Odessa. For 
 
69 
 
 years the scheme had been maturing and practised 
 on a small scale. It now only needed for success 
 that the intervening sea should be secure. Of this 
 there could be no doubt. The Eussian fleet in the 
 Black Sea had been made vastly superior to the 
 long neglected Navy of Turkey. Escorted by five 
 powerful ironclads and numerous torpedo boats, 
 the Eussian expedition left the Crimea for the 
 Bosphorus. It had often been asserted that the next 
 war between Eussia and Turkey would see a coup 
 de main on Constantinople by an expedition landed 
 at Kilios Bay, which is on the same side of the 
 Bosphorus, and a few miles north of the entrance. 
 But on this occasion a different policy was adopted 
 A foothold on the other side would be equally 
 advantageous, without having such an alarming 
 effect upon Europe. The great dream of Eussia 
 is to extend over the rich and fertile country of 
 Asia Minor. Thus the last war saw her add a 
 sensible slice, including Kars and Batoum, to her 
 dominions. With possession of the greater portion 
 of Asiatic Turkey, it would be a comparative matter 
 of indifference as to who was the actual occupant 
 of Constantinople. That would come in due course. 
 Indeed, Constantinople is practically fed from Asia 
 Minor. Eussia was thus able to give Austria an 
 assurance that she had no design upon that 
 city. 
 
 In thirty-six hours the force arrived off Kili 
 Point, which is about 20 miles from the Asiatic side 
 
70 
 
 of the mouth of the Bosphorus, The landing began 
 at seven the next morning and was effected with 
 little opposition. A small force of Turks that had 
 been hurriedly collected to oppose the disembarka- 
 tion, was repulsed by the advance guard, and by 
 ten that night the whole of the army and the 
 stores were on shore. This operation was in fact 
 a complete surprise, for the Turks had a large 
 army in readiness on the opposite side and were 
 without the means of rapidly transferring it across 
 the water. 
 
 Leaving a strongly entrenched camp at the point 
 of embarkation, a Russian flying column, 5000 
 strong, marched rapidly towards the Bosphorus, and 
 occupied without difficulty the forts on that side 
 commanding the entrance. In the meantime 
 reinforcements kept arriving from Batoum and 
 other Eussian ports. 
 
 These rapid measures practically put Turkey at 
 her mercy, and Austria grew alarmed. An appeal 
 to Germany was promptly responded to, and the 
 growing feeling in Italy that assistance should be 
 offered to England, added to the probability that 
 the whole of Europe would soon be in a blaze. 
 
 The difference between good and bad organisation 
 was then apparent. To mobilise an army on the 
 Continent may precipitate a conflict, and affects 
 the entire nation to such an extent that it is only 
 adopted as a last resort. A fleet may be equipped, 
 
71 
 
 or an existing one strengthened, without disturbing 
 to any great degree the national life. It need not 
 also awaken suspicion. 
 
 Among the many surprises which this war 
 brought was the promptitude with which a German 
 fleet was assembled at Kiel ; and the way in which 
 it afterwards carried out certain operations in the 
 Baltic was a matter of general comment. An 
 English officer, who was invited by the Emperor 
 to accompany him on his inspection of the squadron, 
 was much struck with the high state of discipline 
 maintained and the thorough manner in which 
 everything was done. There was no playing at 
 soldiers or sailors. A high standard was exacted 
 from all, and if any failed to come up to it, he was 
 at once put aside. As the Emperor laughingly 
 said to his guest, " Germany can't afford to 
 have indifferent ofiicers." 
 
 Whilst these events were taking place, our 
 immense resources and innate aptitude for naval 
 warfare had begun to bear fruit. By dint of great 
 exertions and utilising all the great private estab- 
 lishments of the country, we were collecting a fleet 
 such as the world had never seen. The nation 
 responded nobly to the call. Money and men 
 were forthcoming to any extent, but ironclads 
 could not be produced in a few months. We 
 regretted now that so little had been done to keep 
 the older ones ready for service, as the appearance 
 
72 
 
 of a second squadron of twenty ships early in 
 the war would have turned the scale. 
 
 While thus about to make a great eflFort, the 
 three central Powers interposedi with an offer to 
 negotiate, plainly intimating that they were not 
 disposed to allow the struggle to continue, and 
 remain as spectators. An armistice of three 
 months was agreed to, which led to peace being 
 arranged by a congress at Vienna. 
 
 We consented to place Egypt under international 
 control, and some other minor points were conceded. 
 The Eussian frontier in Asia was extended to 
 Sinope, while the fortifications of the Dardanelles 
 were demolished, and the waterway neutralised. 
 It was henceforth to be free to all shipping. 
 
 After all, these were trivial matters compared 
 with what we had suffered in one month from our 
 want of organisation and preparation. A battle 
 may be lost without disgrace, and though we had 
 to mourn many gallant sailors, it is what war 
 inevitably brings. It was galling to the national 
 pride, which, if it believed in anything, believed in 
 the invincibility of the British Navy, to find that 
 we had no monopoly of able officers and seamen. 
 But the feeling produced by such thoughts disap- 
 pears in the determination to improve. What 
 could not be mended w-as the check our boasted 
 commerce had received. At one time our carrying 
 trade was almost entirely stopped, the rates of 
 insurance having increased so alarmingly. Many 
 
73 
 
 vessels were sold at almost a nominal figure, and 
 after the war it was curious to see the number of 
 British built ships running under another flag. It 
 has been calculated that this brief period of war 
 cost us more than if we had added ten millions to 
 the naval estimates every year since the Crimean 
 war. 
 
 The struggle left us sensibly poorer, but chast- 
 ened in spirit. A great change came over the 
 nation. We now recognise the highest duty of 
 man is not the accumulation of wealth, but the 
 defence of country. Riches are no longer the 
 principal qualification for the upper chamber of 
 our legislature. Though trade is encouraged, the 
 nobility has a higher aim than city offices and 
 public companies. Above all, we have seriously 
 considered how the Empire should be defended, 
 and the land and sea forces organised for our 
 , special requirements. The Army underwent great 
 changes. A broad line separates the force main- 
 tained for home defence and that for foreign 
 service. All places that could be approached by 
 sea were placed under naval control, and one 
 authority has entire charge of the defences. No 
 person is now detailed to administer a great service 
 as a reward for party allegiance, and the next 
 great qualification for which, formerly, appeared to 
 be entire ignorance of the duties. It had been as- 
 sumed that any knowledge of details was unneces- 
 sary, and moreover tended to obscure the broad 
 
74 
 
 view whicli a man unembarrassed with any such 
 knowledge was likely to take upon the larger ques- 
 tions submitted to him. 
 
 Great progress has been made in the organisation 
 of our fleet for war, and if we don't muster peri- 
 odically a hundred ships for a royal inspection, we 
 can at least despatch a fifth of the number at any 
 time within a few hours, actually ready for service. 
 To ensure this, each port is ordered to mobilise the 
 reserve at different and uncertain periods of the 
 year. Instant dismissal of the responsible official 
 follows any breakdown or delay. A commis- 
 sion on manning the Navy ascertained that the 
 present system of reserves, though well adapted 
 for the time it was instituted, is quite unsuited for 
 the present conditions. Thirty years ago, little 
 was required to enable a seafaring man to perform 
 all the duties on board a man-of-war. Now he 
 must be well trained, and this is effected by enter- 
 ing men in the Navy for a shortened term of service, 
 and passing them on to the mercantile marine, 
 with an immense gain to both services. 
 
 Finally the lesson, though bitter, has been a 
 useful one, for we now should not shrink from any 
 scrutiny into our organisation for war. We have 
 paid the penalty for unreadiness, and one of the 
 comforts we have, in reflecting over the great sea 
 fight, independent of the many gallant actions it 
 produced, is that the Empire is more fixmly knit 
 together than ever. We not only feel secure at 
 
75 
 
 home, but know that at the next trumpet call 
 thousands of hands across the sea will be ready to 
 aid the old country against any future attempt 
 such as I have here endeavoured to describe. 
 
 LONDON: PttlNTED BT BDWAKD STANFORD, 
 26 AND 27 COCK3PUE STRBET, CHARING CROSS, B.yT.