CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GIVEN IN 1 89 1 BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE The original of tiiis bool< is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://archive.org/details/cu31924088045657 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIOE^AL DEVELOPMENT OP EUROPE Volume III. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AGE OF ABSOLUTISM A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE BY DAVID JAYNE HILL, LL.D. Volume I. The Struggle for Universal Empire. Maps and Tables, pp. xxiii + 481 Volume II. The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty. Maps and Tables, pp. xxv + 663 Volume III. The Diplomacy of the Age of Abso- lutism. Maps and Tables, pp. xxvi + 706 LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE BT DAVID JAYNE HILL, LL.D. Volume III. THE DIPLOMACY OP THE AGE OP ABSOLUTISM WITH MAPS AND TABLES LO]^GMANS, GEEEIS^, AI^D CO. FOUETH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK LONDON, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA 1914 VI PREFACE subordinated to racial, traditional, sentimental, and dynas- tic considerations. The main causes in the historic process are dominant beliefs. If this statement be true as regards national progress, it is more obviously so regarding international develop- ment. Here the personal note becomes predominant. All international relations are based upon the judgments and decisions of sovereigns and statesmen. These policies may be good or bad, wise or unwise, but they are essentially products of reflection. The reasons on which they are based may be dynastic or national, and may owe their origin to any of the conditions that influence' human action; but the action that results from them is the outcome of the thought and feeling of the time as manifested in those who direct public policy. Regarded from this point of view, history has a new mean- ing and a new value. We are no longer invited to take an interest in a succession of events without relation to the great problems of existence, or even to one another; such as the sequence of dynasties, the fatalities of battles, and mere series of dates that serve only to place occurrences in a definite chronological order. History becomes to us, in- stead, the explanation of progress or retrogression, as the case may be, in the attainment of purposes that affect the condition of man and society. But if policies and the means employed for their reahza- tion constitute the true essence of history, the thought and feehng by which these poUcies were generated become es- sential to historical interpretation. There is, no doubt, a certain dramatic interest in the movement and engage- ment of armies in the fascinating game of war; but far greater enhghtenment may be derived from the knowledge of why wars were begun, why battles were fought, and what effect they produced upon national aims and inter- national development; and the plot-interest of diplomacy, which lies nearer to the mainsprings of action, is not less dramatic than that of military strategy. The hfe of nations is as little capable of isolated develop- PREFACE Vh ment along the lines of their own aims and purposes as the life of individuals. It is, therefore, impossible to compre- hend the history of any nation without considering the influence upon it of the international environment. One of the chief problems of every people has been, and con- tinues to be, how to maintain its existence and accom- plish its national destiny in the midst of its neighbors and competitors. A great part of its activities is, in conse- quence, imposed upon it by the aims and policies of other nations. The first general solution of this problem attempted in Europe was based upon the theory of the essential unity of all civilized peoples and the possibility of obtaining their submission to the moral restraint of one central authority; but the contest for the sole possession of that authority — "The Struggle for Universal Empire" — ended in the failure to solve the problem in this way. The next solution was the formation of national dynasties, omnipotent within their respective jurisdictions, and to- gether constituting a system of sovereign states entirely independent of one another, but formally bound by a solemn compact to respect one another's authority within the prescribed limits, resulting in "The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty." Such was the situation of Europe in 1648 at the conclu- sion of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years ' War. For the first time the European nations seemed to have discovered a common ground on which they could peaceably coexist. But the Treaties of Westphalia were far more the products of armed force than the voluntary recognition of any inherent rights. They were the result of a bargain between sovereign rulers, made for the sake of peace, which was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of their fighting energies. Thus the Treaties of Westphalia, while ending imperial pretensions for the time by recognizing the absolute char- acter of territorial sovereignty, opened a new era in the pohtical development of Europe; but, as they were the vni PREFACE result so also they were the consecration of force. They imposed peace, not as a legal or moral duty, but because there was no longer profit in war. They contained solemn promises to accept and to guarantee certain definite stipu- lations; but, while they formed a code of honor for the sov- ereigns who signed them, they were in no sense based upon a recognition of the inherent rights of the State as a moral entity, or of peoples as forming the substance of the State. Still, the foundations of a European system had been laid; and, so long as the balance of forces that was expressed in the terms of the treaties continued, peace among the signatories would endure. The task of diplomacy was to perpetuate the system thus created. The difficulty of raising money for carrying on ex- tensive wars, the internal troubles of France, the exhaustion of Spain, the feebleness of Portugal, the commercial interests of the United Provinces, the limited resources of Sweden and of the German princes, and the substitution of the Com- monwealth for the Stuart dynasty in England for a time rendered great military movements impossible; but the renewal of the struggle for preponderance was certain to occur, and it was France that was first able, through the complete triumph of the monarchy over dissentient elements and the appearance of an ambitious sovereign in the person of Louis XIV, to adopt and execute an aggressive policy. With the reign of Louis XIV begin those vast European combinations in which were utilized all the knowledge, all the influence, and all the resources that ingenious minds could employ to obtain dynastic aggrandizement. In these great enterprises all Europe was to some extent involved, and it is only when studied from an international point of view that their full significance can be understood. In self- defence every princehng was obliged to organize a diplo- matic establishment, and to enter in some capacity into the plots and counterplots in which the greater powers involved the lesser; and it is interesting to observe how, chiefly by shrewd bargaining, several of them in less than a century ele- vated their families to the eminence of recognized royalty. PREFACE IX As a result of the improved organization of diplomatic methods, no period of history is furnished with more com- plete documentation. Before the time of Mazarin each minister of state in France and each diplomatic agent con- sidered the official documents in his possession as his own private property, and they were disposed of accordingly. Even the Cardinal, instead of committing his papers to public archives, bequeathed them to Colbert, who trans- mitted them to his son; but they were afterward in great part recovered for the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organized in 1680, then already enriched with the papers of De Lionne, — confiscated by Louis XIV, — and also those of Pomponne. From this time forward these archives became the depository for France of all political correspondence, memoirs, and other documents, forming a vast collection of detailed information which, with other similar archives organized about the same time in other countries, enables the historian to follow the course of in- ternational events almost day by day. The extraction of what is important to the international development of Europe from this voluminous mass of documents is a labor of such vast extent as to be beyond the capacity of any single investigator in the course of a life- time. Happily, the task of selection and publication, so conscientiously performed by qualified scholars in all the chief countries of Europe, renders possible a general synthesis, which is undertaken in this work, with only such further occasional reference to the archives as may be necessary for filling in lacunae or the verification of doubt- ful or disputed points. To the great company of investigators whose patient toil has made possible a work of this character the author feels a deep sense of obligation, which he believes he can best express by citing their names and the titles of their publications among the authorities at the end of each chapter and in special notes wherever reference to them is likely to be specially useful to the reader. DAVID JAYNE HILL. Paris, October 1, 1913. CONTENTS OF VOLUME III CHAPTER I. — THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE Page The state of Europe after the Peace of WestphaUa . . . 1 I. The Diplomacy of Mazabin The triumph of monarchy in France . . . .3 The national rivalries ... 4 Mazarin's scheme for a Bourbon-Stuart-Orange coalition . 6 Negotiations of England with the Netherlands .... . 7 The incompatibility of the two republics 7 The Navigation Act . .... 9 Character of the Anglo-Dutch conflict . .... 10 The treaty of the Dutch with Denmark 11 The policies of Cromwell and De Witt 12 The Anglo-Swedish negotiations . . 13 The triumphant peace of Cromwell . . 14 Mazarin's desire for an English alliance . 16 Premonitions of a Protestant league . . . 17 Negotiations of Mazarin with Holland and Portugal . 18 The Anglo-French rapprochement . 20 The attitude of Cromwell toward Spain ... 21 Secret negotiations of Mazarin with Spain . .... 22 The Anglo-French alliance . . . 23 Cromwell's imperial conception and his death 24 II. The Pretensions op Louis XIV "L'Stat, c'est moi" . ... 25 A comedy of precedence .... 26 The embarrassment of the Emperor 27 The situation in the North . . . 27 The Treaty of Konigsberg of 1656 . .... 29 The critical position of Brandenburg . . 29 The diplomacy of Lisola for Austria . . . 30 The vacancy in the Empire . . ... 31 xu CONTENTS The candidacy of Leopold of Austria The attitude of Europe toward Leopold's candidacy The candidacy of Louis XIV . . . . ... The secret appeal to the Archbishop of Mainz . . . The opposition of Mazarin to Leopold's election . The diplomacy of the "Great Elector" The election of Leopold I . . . Mazarin's dissimulation of his defeat The origin of the League of the Rhine . . . The adhesion of France to the League of the Rhine . The utihty to France of Mazarin's policy in Germany The relations of France and Spain The royal comedy at Lyons . . . . The preliminary treaty of Paris Negotiations in the Isle of Pheasants The Peace of the Pyrenees . . The crisis in the North The rescue of Denmark The intervention of France and England The pacification of the North completed The achievements and death of Mazarin . . . Page 31 32 34 36 36 37 38 38 39 40 41 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 47 50 50 III. The Designs op France upon the Netherlands The personal government of Louis XIV The foreign service of France The royal instructions The French diplomatists . . Advantages of the French diplomacy The international influence of the Stuart restoration The affair of D'Estrades and De Watteville Concession of precedence to France by Spain . . . ^ The aims of Louis XIV in Europe The secret aid of Portugal by France The activities of Louis XIV against the Emperor Negotiations and alliance of France with the Elector of Branden- burg The alliance of France with Saxony . The embrogUo of Louis XIV and Pope Alexander VII '' The pressure of Louis XIV upon the Pope ^ The new policies of France ... The progress of the United Netherlands The system of John De Witt ... The rivalry of Spain and France for the Dutch alliance The idea of a barrier state . The Anglo-Dutch war of 1664 61 62 52 53 56 66 56 57 58 59 60 62 63 64 66 67 68 68 69 70 71 CONTENTS XIU Page French mediation and the Peace of Breda . . ... .72 The theory of "devolution" ... . 73 The isolation of Spain . . . . 75 The Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ... 77 The resentment of Louis XIV toward Holland 79 The exposed position of Holland . 80 The secret Treaty of Dover ... . 81 Authorities . . 82 CHAPTER II. — THE PERIL AND THE RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC The Netherlands in 1670 88 I. The Appeal to the House op Ohange The diplomatic efforts of De Witt 89 The illusions of De Witt 90 The preparations of William of Orange ... .... 92 The ambition of the Prince . . 93 The embarrassments of the Prince ... 95 Foreign advances to the Prince 96 England openly arrayed against Holland 97 The completion of Louis XIV's circle of alliances 98 The double declaration of war against Holland 99 The motives of Louis XIV 100 The Republic in extremis 102 The search for aid against France ... . 103 The attitude of the Emperor . 103 The Austro-French rivalry at Vienna 105 The Emperor's perils in the East ... 105 The isolation of the Emperor in the North . ... 107 The Emperor's alarm for the Empire 108 The change of feeling in Germany . . .... 109 The position and policy of the Elector of Brandenburg . . . 110 The hesitation of Brandenburg . . . . Ill The aUiance of Brandenburg and the United Provinces .... 113 The dismay at the invasion of the Republic 114 Negotiations for peace and assault on the De Witts 115 The Prince of Orange chosen Stadtholder 116 II. The Coalition of The Hague The rupture of negotiations with France . 117 Negotiations with the King of England 118 The hopes and uncertainties of the Dutch Republic 120 xiv CONTENTS Page Efforts of William III to detach England from France 121 The conflict of parties in Holland 122 De Witt's conception of public policy 124 The defects of De Witt's system in relation to his time .... 125 The mm-der of the De Witts 126 The new policies of Holland 127 The awakening of Europe 127 The influence of Louis XIV in Spain and Italy 128 The tardiness of the allies 129 The trials of Frederick William 130 The deUnquency of Spain . . 131 The defection of Brandenburg 132 The formation of a general alUance . . 133 Changed character of the war and defection of England . . 134 The adhesions to the new alliance ... .... 135 Sobieski's election as King of Poland 136 ' The diplomacy of Louis XIV in the East . 137 The war of Sweden and Brandenburg 138 III. The Peace op Nymwbgen and the Pacific Conquests op France The changed relations of the powers . ... 139 The effects of the war with Sweden 140 The situation in France . 141 Charles II's proposal of mediation . . . . . . 141 The secret agreement of Charles II and Louis XIV . . . 142 The significance of this bargain for Louis XIV . . 143 Arlington's scheme of marriage for William III . . . 144 The desire of the Papacy to mediate . . 145 The dispositions of the powers . ... 146 The conflict between the States General and William III . 148 The marriage of William III and its effects . . 149 Louis XIV's renewed activity .... . 150 The separate peace between France and Holland . 151 Louis XIV's double r61e in England 152 The dissolution of the coalition . . 1,54 The disappointment of Brandenburg . 155 Results of the Peace of Nymwegen . . . 157 The new pretensions of Louis XIV . . 158 The Chamhres de Reunion . . . 159 The reversal of relations in the North 160 The diplomatic paralysis of Europe . 162 The effort of Louis XIV to win the Prince of Orange . 163 The siege of Vienna , . . . . ... 164 The renewal of war with Spain ... 165 CONTENTS XV Page The Truce of Regensburg . . . 166 Authorities . ..... 167 CHAPTER III. — THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE ^ The broader ambitions of Louis XIV .... 170 I. The Revival of the Counter Refokmation Louis XIV's championship of religious unity . . 172 The hostility of Louis XIV to the Pope 174 Louis XIV's interest in disunion ... . . 175 The alarm concerning the influence of France 176 The revival of Catholicism by James II . . . . 177 The efforts of WiUiam III for equilibrium . 179 Brandenburg's revulsion from the French alliance 180 The complete alienation of Brandenburg from France . 181 Rapprochement of Brandenburg and the Emperor . . 182 The reconciliation of Brandenburg and Sweden . 183 The alliance of Holland and Brandenburg . 183 The new exaction of Louis XIV . . . 184 The revocation of the Edict of Nantes . . ... . 184 The motives of Louis XIV in signing the Revocation . 185 The role of Charlemagne .... ... 186 The indignation of Frederick Wilham . . 186 ^The preparations for resisting Louis XIV 187 The relations of William III and James II 188 The inclination of James II toward France 189 The new aspirations of Leopold I ... . 190 Louis XIV's opposition to the arrangements of Leopold I 191 The contentions of France and Austria at Madrid . 192 The League of Augsburg . 193 II. The International Significance of the English Revolution The absolutism of the Stuarts . . ... 194 The spirit of revolt against absolutism . 196 The illusion of royal pretensions . . . . 197 The fears for the fate of Protestantism . . 197 The visit of Frederick William to Cleve . . 198 The meeting of the Elector and William III . .... 199 The importance attached to the attitude of England . . 200 The defeat of the Turks and new aggressions of Louis XIV 200 The question of "immunities" at Rome 201 XVI CONTENTS The insubordination of Louis XIV to Rome The efforts of James II to re-establish Romanism The birth of a prince in England The attitude of William III on toleration The preparations of William III and recall of British troops James II accepts aid from Louis XIV The invitation to William III to bring an army to England The success of William III with the States General The activities of Louis XIV on the Rhine . . . The accusations of Louis XIV against the Pope The relations of Louis XIV with James II The ambiguity of James II's attitude . .... The antagonism of dynastic and national policies The attitude of Europe toward the English Revolution . The subordination of religious motives . . The conciliatory efforts of James II . ... The descent of William III upon England . . . Page 203 203 205 205 206 207 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 III. The Diplomact of William of Orange to the Peac.is op Ryswick The significance of the King's flight The aims of WUliam III . . The relation of the Revolution to the conflict with Louis XIV The precautions of William III for the safety of Holland Louis XIV's decision to sustain James II ... Louis XIV forces war upon England The prudent policy of William III Louis XIV's belief in the weakness of England . . The attitude of Ireland and Scotland The completion of the Grand Alliance . . . The progress of the war on the continent The war for the recovery of Ireland . .... The return of William III to Holland . . . The Congress of the Grand Alhance at The Hague William III before the Congress . . . The indecisive character of the conflict The plans for a descent upon England . . . Dissensions of the allies The proposed mediation of Sweden The reconciliation of Louis XIV with the Papacy . , The separate peace of France with the Duke of Savoy Secret negotiations between France and Holland The hesitation of Leopold I . The Congress of Ryswick The private negotiations of William III with Louis XIV 218 218 220 220 222 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 241 242 243 CONTENTS XVU Page The terms of the Peace of Ryswick 244 Authorities . ... . . . ... 246 CHAPTER IV. — THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION The balance of gain and loss at Ryswick . . . 249 I. The Tseaties of Partition The Spanish monarchy . .... 250 The decadence of Spain . . . . .... 251 The extravagance of the Court . ... 252 Decay of the army and navy 254 The political weakness of Spain 255 The intrigues of the Spanish Court 256 The candidacy of the Archduke Charles . .... 257 The renunciations . 258 The crisis in the system of divine right 259 The necessity for compromise 260 The failure of Von Harrach's mission 261 The influence of the Marquis d'Harcourt 262 The revival of the idea of partition 263 The effect of the situation in the East . 265 Louis XIV's return to the idea of partition 266 Conditions favoring the Bavarian candidacy 267 Negotiations of Louis XIV and William III 268 The progress of Plarcourt at Madrid . 270 The Partition Treaty of October 11, 1698 270 The second will of Charles II and death of Joseph Ferdinand 272 The continuation of the policy of partition . . 274 The Partition Treaty of March 25, 1700 274 II. The Reaction of Europe against the Union of France and Spain Acceptance of the throne of Spain for Philip of France . . 276 The double r61e of French diplomacy . 277 The abandonment of the partition treaty . 278 The new instructions to Harcourt 280 The acquiescence of Europe . . . 281 The revived ambition of Louis XIV . 282 Louis XIV's efforts at reassurance . 283 The changed sentiment in England . 284 The revival of the coalition against France . 285 The rupture of diplomatic relations with France .... 286 The death of WilKam III ... 287 XVlll CONTENTS Page The isolation of France and Spain 289 Louis XIV's interest in the North and East 290 The ambitions of Peter the Great .... 291 The coalition against Sweden . . . 292 The victories of Charles XII . . ... .293 The efforts of the West to mediate . . 294 The Franco-Russian attempts at negotiation . . 295 The situation in the North and in the West 296 The effort of Louis XIV to secure the alliance of Charles XII . 298 The decision of Charles XII to invade Russia . . 299 The effects of Charles XII's defeat . .... 300 III. The Peace op Utrecht ,' Conditions favorable to peace in 1710 . . . . 302 The Union of England and Scotland . . . 303 The disunion of the allies . . . . . 304 The diplomatic efforts of Marlborough 305 Holland dicates the terms of peace . 307 The Anglo-Dutch Barrier Treaty . 308 Effects of these negotiations on the alliance . . . 309 The secret reports of Petkum and Florisson . . . 310 The conferences at Gertruydenberg . ... 312 The rejection of the French offers . . . . 313 Secret negotiations between England and France . . 313 The death of Joseph I and its consequences .... . 314 Progress of the Anglo-French negotiations . . 316 The preponderance of the peace party in England ... . 317 The instructions of Manager . . 318 sj The conclusion of the preliminaries . . ... 319 The necessity of leading the allies . . . . 320 The relations of England and Holland ... . . 322 ^, Opening of the Congress at Utrecht ... . . . 323 The instructions of England . .... 324 The instructions of France 325 The instructions of the Emperor . . ... 326 The question of separating France and Spain 326 The renunciation of Philip V ... 328 The "Restraining Orders" . . . 329 Bolingbroke's mission to France . . 330 Execution of the renunciations 33I ■'• The provisions of the Peace of Utrecht . 332 The end of the war of the Spanish succession 334 Authorities . . 335 CONTENTS XIX CHAPTER V. — THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY Page The principle of equOibrium accepted . 338 I. The Peril of Sweden and the Battle fob the Baltic The exile of Charles XII .... 340 The defects of Charles XII's policy 342 The condition of Sweden in 1715 344 The impediments to action by Western Europe 345 The dual relations of George I ... 347 The growth of British hostility to Sweden 349 The regency in France and the Abb6 Dubois . . . . 349 The plans of Alberoni . . ... . 351 The secret negotiations of George I with Peter the Great . 352 The reaction against Russian intrusion . . . . 354 The Triple Alliance of 1717 . . 354 Effects of the Triple Alliance of 1717 . . . 357 British approval of Stanhope's diplomacy . . 358 The designs of Gortz ... . . . 360 The negotiations of Gortz at The Hague 361 The Jacobite intrigue . ... 363 The Czar's attempt to secure a French alliance . 364 The negotiations of France and Russia . 366 The Treaty of Amsterdam ... 368 II. The Quadruple Alliance and the Peace of Ntstad Dubois' policy of general pacification 369 The schemes of Gortz and Alberoni 371 The precipitation of the conflict . . 372 The embarrassments of Dubois and Stanhope . . . 373 Dubois' visit to London . . . 373 The double check to Dubois' policy . . . 375 The turning of the tide against Alberoni 376 The schemes of Alberoni for the overthrow of the Regent . 377 Dubois' methods and motives . 378 The attitude of Charles VI . . 379 The Aland conferences . 381 The collision of the two systems . . .... . 382 -J The Quadruple Alliance . 383 The triumph and disappointment of Gortz 384 Alberoni's activity in Italy . . . . 385 The conspiracy of Cellamare 386 XX CONTENTS Paob The triumph of Dubois 387 Alberoni's efforts of resistance 388 The proposals of Philip V 389 The last intrigues and fall of Alberoni . . 391 Adhesion of Philip V to the Quadruple Alliance 392 The reconciliation of Sweden and Hanover 393 The pacifioation of the Nort^h 394 III. The Readjustment of Disturbed Relations The results of the general pacifioation 395 Dissolution of the Quadruple Alliance 396 The peace policy of England . . . 397 Dubois' ambition for the cardinalate 398 The alliance of France, England, and Spain 399 The Spanish marriages . 400 The triumph of Dubois . . . . 401 The maritime ambitions of Charles VI . . 402 The Pragmatic Sanction 403 Dubois' obstruction of the Congress of Cambray . 404 The scheme of Dubois for Bourbon predominance 405 The Cardinal's last negotiation . 406 Dubois' plan of alliance between France, England, and Russia 408 Dubois' hesitation and death ... . 409 The foreign policy of the Duke of Orleans 410 The Duke of Bourbon's reversal of the Orleans policy 411 The Congress of Cambray . . . . . 411 The Treaty of Vienna and the mission of Ripperda 413 The secret instructions of Ripperda . . 414 The secret understanding of the Queen and Ripperda 415 Ripperda's negotiations at Vienna .... 416 The deliberations at Vienna . . 418 The apparent triumph of Ripperda . 419 Illusory character of the Treaties of Vienna . . . 420 The reaction of Europe ... 421 The Treaty of Hanover . . . 422 The success of Ripperda's diplomacy . . . 423 Ripperda prime minister of Spain . . 424 Ripperda's equivocal policies . . . 425 The failure of Ripperda's administration . . 426 The fall of Ripperda . ... 427 War between England and Spain . . , . . . 429 The Congress of Soissons 431 The Treaty of Seville 432 England's completion of the general peace . . . 433 Authorities .... . 434 CONTENTS xxi CHAPTER VI. — THE RIVALRY FOR EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY Page The new array of the powers . . . . . . . 438 I. The Diplomacy of the Austbian Succession The War of the Polish Succession . 439 The first Pacte de famille and England's neutrality . 441 England's abstention from the war . . . .... 442 The Peace of Vienna .... . . 442 The diplomacy of France in the Orient . . . 444 The War of Jenkins' Ear . . 446 Beginning of the world-struggle for commerce and colonies . . 447 The death of Charles VI and its efieots . . 448 The attitude of the powers toward Austria 449 The ideas and purposes of Frederick II 451 The motives of Frederick II . . 453 The Austrian rejection of Frederick II's proposals . 453 The deliberate character of Frederick II's plans ... . 454 The resistance of Austria . ... 455 Frederick II's position of advantage 456 Effect of Frederick II's action upon England 457 The intervention of France . . . ... . . 458 Effects of the French intervention in England and Germany . 460 The pro- Austrian policy of Carteret 462 The effects of the English intervention 463 Renewal of hostilities by Prussia . ... 464 The divergence of English and Austrian policies 466 The system of D'Argenson 468 The defection of Frederick II from France 469 The Treaties of Dresden ... 470 The advantage of the peace for Frederick II . . 470 The rupture between France and Russia . . .... 471 The faUiore of France to enlist the Turks 472 The Austro-Russian aUianoe . . . . . 472 The Congress of Aix-la-ChapeUe . ... 473 , The Anglo-French preliminaries . . 474 ] The Peace of Aix-la-ChapeUe of 1748 476 II. The Contest fgk Colonial Sttpbbmact The colonial rivalry of France and England . ... 477 The beginnings of Eastern trade . 478 The development of rival trading companies . 480 XXll CONTENTS The transformation of the companies into States The poHtical state of India ... The designs and diplomacy of Dupleix Dupleix's defence of Pondieherry . The capture of Madras ... Restoration of the balance in India Alliances with the native princes . . . The victories of Clive The French possessions in America ... The disputed territories . . ... The development of hostilities in America Open conflict between France and England War in America rendered inevitable The delicacy of the European situation . . . Page 481 482 483 485 486 487 488 489 492 493 494 496 498 499 III. The Reversal op the Alliances The secret diplomacy of Louis XV . The mechanism of the secret diplomacy .... The interest of Louis XV in Poland . . Results of Louis XV's diplomacy in 1755 The alignment of the powers in 1755 The Anglo- Austrian impasse The Anglo-Russian alliance The position of Frederick II . The designs of Maria Theresa . .... The mission of Kaunitz to France . . . The inflexibility of Maria Theresa . . ... The frailty of the Franco-Prussian alliance The determination of Louis XV to renew relations with Russia The legend of Mademoiselle de Beaumont . . . The Anglo-Prussian negotiations . The cautions of Knyphausen . . . . The alliance of England and Prussia The explanation to the powers . ... The conferences at La Babiole . . . The Treaty of Versailles . . The strained relations of Austria and England . The relations of the maritime powers . . The attitude of Russia toward England . . . The relations of Russia and Austria . ... The second mission of Douglas to St. Petersburg . The change in Louis XV's secret diplomacy The status of the Franco-Russian negotiations The beginning of the Seven Years' War Authorities . 500 501 502 504 504 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 514 516 517 518 519 520 521 523 524 525 526 527 528 530 531 532 533 CONTENTS XXUl CHAPTER VII. — THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR Pagh The aggressions of Frederick II . . . 537 I. The Coalition against Prussia The CoaHtion rendered inevitable 539 The conduct of Frederick II in Saxony . . 541 The efforts of Frederick II to explain his position 542 The plans of Kaunitz for completing the Coalition 543 The embarrassments in the negotiations between France and Russia 544 Louis XV's repudiation of Douglas' secret concession .... 545 Completion of the Coalition against Prussia . . 546 The discouragement of England . . 547 The disappearance of European equilibrium . 548 The perilous position of Frederick II . 550 Prussia's place in Europe 551 The lack of cohesion in the Coalition 552 The retreat of Frederick II and the invasion of Prussia .... 553 The colonial war and the action of England . . 554 The victories of Frederick II at Rossbach and Leuthen .... 556 The strengthening of the Anglo-Prussian alliance 557 The fall of Bestusheff 558 The new alliance of the Catholic powers 558 The beginning of Choiseul's diplomacy 560 The military results of 1758 . 561 The pohcies of Pitt 562 The results of Pitt's policies 563 Progress of the war between France and England 564 The effects of England's sea policy on the maritime powers . . 565 The renewed animosity of Spain toward England 568 Choiseul's efforts to obtain the mediation of Spain 567 Failure of Choiseul's tactics 568 The changed attitude of France 569 II. The Obstacles to a European Peace The drift toward peace . . 570 The attitude of Austria toward France . . . 571 Impediments to a continental peace . . 571 The Anglo-Prussian proposal of a general congress . . 573 The attitude of the Coalition toward the congress . 574 Reply of the Coalition to the Anglo-Prussian proposal 575 The secret diplomacy of Frederick II . 577 The results of Frederick II's secret diplomacy . . . . 578 XXIV CONTENTS Page End of the pourparlers for peace in 1760 . .... 579 The altered relations of the allies ... . .... 580 The revival of Louis XV' s secret diplomacy . . 582 The dilemma of France regarding Russia 583 The secret instructions to Breteuil . .... 585 The divergent aims of Louis XV and Choiseul . . . . 586 The fluctuations of Russia . . • 687 The policies of France and Russia . . 588 Louis XVs mistrust of Russia . . . 590 The tension between France and Austria . . . . 591 III. The Peace of Paeis and of HuBEETUSBURa The renewal of negotiations with England . . . 591 The EngUsh conditions and the relations of France with Spain . . 593 The intervention of Austria . . . 594 The Franco-Spanish Facte de famille . . . 595 The substance of the Franco-Spanish compact . .... 596 The resignation of Pitt . . 597 England's declaration of war with Spain 598 The accession of Peter III to the throne of Russia . . . 599 The alliance of Russia and Prussia . . . 601 The character and purposes of Peter III 601 Assassination of Peter III and accession of Catherine II . . 603 The situation of the powers . ... 604 Renewal of negotiations for peace between England and France 605 Opposition to peace in England and Spain . 606 Louis XVs effort to influence Spain 607 Peace accepted by the English Parliament 608 The Peace of Paris ... . 609 The Peace of Hubertusburg . 610 Authorities . .... . . 612 CHAPTER VIII. — THE DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION Consequences of the Seven Years' War . ... 614 I. The Subordination of France The comparative status of the powers ... 616 The dependence of France upon Austria . . . . . . 617 The servitude of France to Austria . . . , 617 The passivity of France . . 619 The secret designs of Russia and Prussia 620 The ambition of Catherine II 621 CONTENTS The condition of Poland . . The divisions of Poland . . The intervention of Catherine II . The attitude of France and Austria The attitude of the Sultan . . The declaration of Louis XV . The menaces of Russia . The election of Poniatowski The appeal to Turkey .... Recognition of Stanislas II by France and Austria Choiseul's attempt to incite the Turks . . The immobility of the Porte . . . The system of the North Frederick IPs suspicions of the system The intervention of Russia for religious equality The civil war in Poland ... The situation in Great Britain . Pitt's return to power . . . . The renewal of Pitt's diplomacy The secret diplomacy of Louis XV at The Hague . The ineffectual Tapyrochement of France and Prussia XXV Page 622 623 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 634 635 636 636 637 638 639 641 642 643 644 II. The Crisis in the East and the Pastition of Poland The Sultan's declaration of war on Russia The attitude of Frederick II . . The attitude of Austria ... Plans for an Austro-Prussian rapprochement The tactics of Frederick II Frederick II's plan of conciliation . . . Frederick II's proposal to partition Poland The obstructions to a triple alhance The effort for an Austro-Prussian entente The results of the conference at Neisse The divergence of the powers The fortunes of war in the East . . . The meeting at Neustadt and its result . The fall of Choiseul The accession of Gustavus III in Sweden The abandonment of the East to the three powers . . The principle of partition accepted . . The Austrian counterplot The urgency of Frederick II for the partition of Poland The Austrian resistance to Frederick II's plans . The Austro-Turkish alliance Frederick II's check to the plans of Kaunitz . ... 646 647 648 649 650 651 653 654 655 657 658 660 661 662 663 663 664 665 666 667 669 670 XXVI CONTENTS Page The triumph of the policy of partition . . .... 671 The scruples of Maria Theresa . . . • 672 The relation of the Partition to Public Law . . . . 673 The Acts of Partition . ... 674 The end of the crisis in the North • 676 The end of the Russo-Turkish war . . ... 677 Effects of the Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji . . ... 678 The abasement of the monarchy in France . . . 679 The new conception of monarchy . . . 680 Premonitions of the Revolutionary Era . . . . 681 Authorities 681 TABLES I. A List of Popes, Emperors, and Ottoman Sultans from 1648 to 1775 . . 684 II. Rulers of France, England, and Scotland from 1648 to 1775 685 III. Rulers of Spain, Portugal, and the House of Savoy from 1648 to 1775 . . . 686 IV. Rulers of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, Poland, and Russia from 1648 to 1775 ... .687 V. Rulers of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and Brandenburg-Prussia from 1648 to 1775 . .... 689 VI. Showing the Claims to the Spanish Succession . 690 VII. Showing the Claimants to the Austrian Succession .... 691 INDEX 693 MAPS AT END OF VOLUME I. Europe at the Peace of Westphalia. II. Acquisitions of France in the North under Louis XIV. III. Europe after the Peace of Nystad. IV. North America during the Anglo-French Wars. V. The Partitions of Poland. I CHAPTER I THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE T was a new Europe that emerged from the fiery crucible The state of of the Thirty Years' War. In the devastation of that ^""p^ '''*" .„ ^ ^ ^ n M 1- <■ the Peace of terrmc struggle had fanally disappeared most of the mediae- WestphaUa val ideals. Among these, that of chief importance for the future development of Europe was the venerable tradi- tion of the moral unity of Christendom. With its dis- appearance went also much of the fervor of faith and zeal for principles which had imparted at least an appearance of moral purpose to the Wars of Religion. From this time forward the raison d'Etat becomes the controlling motive in public action, and marks the period from the Peace of Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era as a reign of Machiavellianism. All the influences of the preceding age had tended toward the firm establishment of monarchy, and the throne had become nearly everjrwhere the focal point of general interest. So absolute was the authority attributed to the Crown in France, that, notwith- standing the united opposition of powerful princes and accomplished jurists. Cardinal Mazarin, although of Ital- ian origin and acting under a queen-regent of Spanish birth, by adhering to the principle of royal supremacy as the guarantee of national unity was able to overcome the Fronde, and ultimately, in the name of the young king, to exercise the royal prerogative. Even in England the mass of the nation never ceased to be at heart monarchical; and if for a time the dynasty was overwhelmed by the Parliament, it was on accoimt of the resentment felt against the treachery of Charles I, and not because of opposition to the principle of royalty itself. VOL. in. — 1 2 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I There were, indeed, in parts of Europe, immediately ^•°- after the Peace of Westphalia many signs of unrest and 1648-1670 tnrhnlence. In Russia, and to a still more marked degree in Poland, the aristocratic element was in a state of hos- tility to the royal authority. In Italy, the domination of the Spanish king was bitterly resented, and a revolt at Naples nearly ended in an act of independence. In the Nether- lands a nominal republic, under the administration of a stadtholder, had appeared to be the best form of govern- ment for that country; but jealousy of the House of Orange- had already been displayed, and its union with the House of Stuart by the marriage of William II with Mary, daughter of Charles I of England, created a strong party of opposi- tion, which gained in influence when, on January 30, 1649, Charles I was beheaded, and England passed under the temporary rule of the Commonwealth. In France Mazarin was for a time confronted with an opposition that threatened to disintegrate the kingdom. The Parliament of Paris refused to register the edicts for new taxes; and the discontent of members of the royal family, like the Prince of Conde, the Duke of Orleans, and the Duchess of Longueville, led to open war, and resulted in their alhance with the Spaniards; while the hostility of such able generals as Tureime, and such popular eccle- siastics as Paul de Gondi, afterwards Cardinal de Retz, menaced the very existence of the regency and even threat- ened the unity of France. Yet, notwithstanding all these perils, in every European state, the throne soon became the unshaken seat of power, and nowhere was it more firmly established than in France. Sustained by all the sanctity of religion, and defended with all the ingenuity of philosophy, it became irresistible and undisputed. Service to the monarch soon proved to be the only pathway to distinction, and dynastic advantage the only active force in European politics.' ' A contemporary writer says : " It is customary to respect the qual- ity of princes, not their real merits; the wisest men have esteemed it better to obey the most vicious rather than to disturb that beautiful THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 3 I. The Diplomacy of Mazaein Chap, i A. D. Under these conditions, diplomacy rose to the eminence 1648-1670 of a recognized profession. As in Italy after the decay of the Empire in the thirteenth century, so now in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia, diplomatic activity was more than The triumph, ever essential to the preservation of the existing political P' '^o^^^^^y order. As in that earlier period, but upon a far grander scale, it assumed the form of intrigue, secret negotiation, and conspiracy. In the whole of Europe there existed at that time no greater master of all these arts than Giulio Mazzarini, the disciple and successor of Cardinal Richelieu. The secret of Cardinal Mazarin's power can be expressed in a simple formula, — the superiority of centrally directed influence over ill-organized and sporadic resistance. Te- nacious in purpose, crafty in method, supple in activity, and unscrupulous in the use of means, he unceasingly ap- pealed to the instinct of unity in the French nation, placing his enemies in the light of rebels and traitors to France, — a role which their impetuous selfishness and political inepti- tude led them to play with a fidelity that confirmed his pre- tensions and proved fatal to their schemes. When the devastation of civil war had once more con- vinced the nation that a strong central goverrunent was the only remedy for perpetual anarchy in France, on October 21, 1652, after a year's exile, young Louis XIV, under Mazarin's guidance, re-entered Paris amidst the wild enthusiasm of the people. On the following day, the King held a lit de justice in which he forbade the Parlia- ment to take any further part in the affairs of state or the administration of the finances. The members were compelled to bow in mute submission, and France was order, that excellent harmony, which God has established among men for the general good of the world, in order to maintain peace and keep consciences at rest. To promote that trust, God has surrounded the throne of kings with so much glory and majesty, with the purpose of making us understand that they are his Uving images," etc. — Les veritez JranQoises, Paris, 1643, p. 5. A.D. 1648-1670 4 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I gradually reorganized for that proud pre-eniinence in Europe which Cardinal Mazarin's diplomacy was about to confer upon it. Sustained by the unwavering support of the Queen Re- gent, Anne of Austria, — to whom, if not secretly married, he stood in relations of exceptional intimacy and affection, even in exile, during the stormy period of the Fronde, this subtle Itahan had been able to become the master of France through his appeal to the popular belief in the national need of the monarchy. In the person of the young king, the nation had felt, were locked up the destinies of France. From the moment of his birth there was in Louis XIV something that appealed to the popular mind. His extraor- dinary vigor of will and the strength of his appetite were manifest from his earliest infancy. When' he was only a few months old, Grotius, at that time ambassador of Sweden to France, wrote of him: "His frightful and precocious avidity is a bad omen for the neighboring peoples; for he is at present on his ninth nurse, whom he is rending and murdering as he has the others. " It was, in truth, a young lion that the Cardinal was training for the rule of France. The discipline imposed upon him by Mazarin was not wasted on the stronger and bolder nature of the King; and under this tuition, in which craft was grafted upon strength, a new type of sovereign was forming, destined to combine with the pride and authority of a monarch the skill and adroitness of a thoroughly schooled diplomatist. "^ The national It was in the field of international diplomacy that the nvaines Cardinal was to find an arena for the display of his own ex- 1 One of the pamphlets of the time, Le Calechisme de la Cow, Paris, 1652, gives the credo of Mazarin thus : "Jecrois . . au Mazarin . . ., qui a 6t6 congu de Fesprit de Machiavel . . ." Another pamphlet of a later date, L' Alcoran de Louis XIV, says the following Unes had to be learned by the King: "My son, in whom do you beheve? — In Nicholas Machiavelli. — Who was this Nicholas MachiavelU? — The father of politicians, and the one who has taught princes the art of reigning," etc. The relations between Louis XIV and Mazarin are discussed by Lacour- Gayet in the Revue Historique, LXVIII, (1898) pp. 225, 257. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 5 traordinary powers, and the time was ripe for their active Chap. i exercise. *. d. In establishing beyond question the supremacy of his sovereign in his own realm, Mazarin was laying the founda- tion of the King's future greatness. His ultimate aim was to extend the royal authority over the widest possible area of territory. Not content with maintaining their national independence, all the European states were at that time eager to expand their borders and to include within their dominions neighboring and even distant populations. Al- though the course of events had imposed upon Europe a state system in which theory demanded equahty of rights between the members composing it, no power was willing to concede them, and the lust for aggrandizement was universal. Until the colonial question carried this rivalry beyond the ocean, as it was soon to do, the only path of ex- pansion was the despoiling of neighbors; and this became the principal object of international pohtics. Spain, iso- lated and exhausted, was bent on the recovery of the ground lost by the independence of the United Provinces. There, in turn, the Stadtholder was ambitious to conquer a part at least of the Spanish Netherlands; while France was eager to push her borders to the Rhine, and to counterbalance Spain in Italy. While the German princes were coveting the ecclesiastical estates, the Emperor was seeking to compensate his loss of prestige by enlarging his domains in the East; Sweden was aiming to continue as the predomi- nant power in the North and become the mistress of the Baltic; Denmark was resenting every encroachment, and preparing to oppose the preponderance of Sweden; Russia was soon to enter the field of contest with unmeasiu-ed force and keen ambitions for westward expansion; and Eng- land, imder the Commonwealth, envious of the commercial supremacy which the Dutch had acquired on the ocean, was ready to overwh.elm her most natiu-al ally with her superior resources. So long as he was crippled at home by the activities of the Fronde, Cardinal Mazarin had not been able to carry M 6 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I OH the war with Spain with his former energy, and his A- o. efforts to secure alhes against his enemy were for a consider- 1648-1670 ^-^^^ ^.^g doomed to disappointment. Until the death of the Stadtholder WilHam II,- in 1650, the Cardinal had hoped through his influence to induce the States General of the United Provinces to annul their treaty with Spain and join with France in the conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands. On October 20, 1650, the project of a treaty had been prepared, by the terms of which the azann s scheme for a gtadtholdcr and the King of France, on May 1, 1651, were Bourbon- i n • i Stuart-Orange to uiutc m & jomt attack upon the bpamsh possessions, en- coaiition deavor to restore the House of Stuart to the throne of England, and to form with Charles Stuart a decisive coali- tion against Spain; but within a month, and before Wil- Ham II had signed the treaty, the plan was suddenly frus- trated by his death. Had the scheme succeeded, it is not impossible that William II might have added to the terri- tory of the United Provinces a portion of the Spanish Neth- erlands, combined them in an independent kingdom, and secured its stabiHty by an alliance with the Bourbon and Stuart dynasties.^ This combination was intended by Mazarin to extinguish republicanism, which he bitterly condemned, both in Eng- land and the Netherlands, to enforce a peace upon Spain, and to obtain at one bound the preponderance of France in Europe; but its miscarriage left him without an effective ally. In the meantime he dallied with a project to form an alliance with the Commonwealth. In August, 1652, D'Es- trades was directed to sound the Protector; but Cromwell would not hsten to his proposals. In the following December, however, the Cardinal decided formally to recognize the ' Sirtema de Grovestins, Histoire des luttes et rivaliles politiques, I, pp. 77, 80, regards the document of October 20, 1650, as more than a "project," and considers it a "convention," intended to'place William II in full possession of the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Groen van Prinsterer, on the other hand, Archives, ou correspondance incite de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, IV, pp. cxix, cxxvi, absolves the Prince from this imputation. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 7 Conunonwealth, and sent Antoine de Bordeaux to London Chap, i to prepare the way for more intimate relations. ^- ^■ If Mazarin had reahzed the value of an alliance with the Netherlands against Spain, the Commonwealth also did not fail to appreciate the utility of Dutch friendship. In the spring of 1651, Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland Negotiations had been sent as ambassadors to the States General, to °^. ^"^'"""^ witli the propose "a more strict and intimate alliance and imion, " Netherlands whereby there might be a "more mutual interest of each in the other than hitherto hath been, for the good of both." It seemed a reasonable proposition; for both govern- ments were nominally republican and Protestant, both had struggled for religious toleration, and as maritime powers had important interests to conciliate. So long as the Stadt- holder William II had lived, his family coimection with the House of Stuart rendered a rapprochement with the Com- monwealth quite impossible; but now that the House of Orange was represented only by a posthumous infant, and a republican reaction against the stadtholderate had set in, a imion of the two republics no longer seemed impracticable. It was only in appearance, however, that the interests The incom- of the two peoples were compatible. The Commonwealth ^^f^^'^^ °^ was a military despotism, antimonarchical only in name, and repubUos rapidly tending toward a personal autocracy under the dictatorship of Ohver Cromwell. The Dutch Republic, on the other hand, was a loose federation of seven sovereign provinces, partly maritime and partly agricultural, in which Holland by its greater wealth and commercial su- premacy enjoyed preponderance. But the incompatibility of the two nations was deeper than the differences in their forms of govermnent. Between the English and the Dutch had developed a sharp rivalry for the carrying trade of the world, which by the enterprise of the Dutch merchants and sailors had become almost a monopoly of the United Provinces. To this rivalry there were but two possible solutions, — a pacific union based / 8 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I on co-operation and reciprocity on the one hand, or open AD. war on the other. 1648-1670 rpj^g impediments to a union were serious. The chief of these was the unwillingness of the Netherlands to take a secondary place in the system the Commonwealth was endeavoring to create; and a military power that had just overturned the throne of England, conquered Ireland, and subdued Scotland was not hkely to respect too highly the national feehngs of its Dutch neighbors. The United Prov- inces, on the other hand, with intense sentiments of in- dependence, were not organized for unity of action in the realm of poKcy.^ A federation of separately feeble commu- nities, bound together chiefly by fear of aggression, and divided into conflicting parties, whose decisions could be obtained only by the slow concessions of general debate and free deUberation, was not to be easily brought into submission to the will of a foreign power. From March 30 until July 1, 1651, the EngUsh ambas- sadors, St. John and Strickland, had labored at The Hague to obtain an "intimate alliance and union," but in vain. Among the reasons for the approaches of the Commonwealth to the Netherlands was the wish to prevent the further machinations of the Stuarts on the continent, for which The Hague had been an active centre. During the residence of the English ambassadors in Holland, the Princess Royal of England and her brother, the Duke of York, who were living at The Hague, with great ostentation daily rode past the house occupied by the ambassadors, staring at it in a manner to excite the spirit of insult against the inmates on the part of the rabble that followed in their train. At length a warning was received by the ambassadors that the royalists were planning to murder them. Quite naturally, the expulsion of the royal refugees and of all rebels against the existing government of England from the territory of ' A diplomatist of the time said of the United Provinces: "C'est une imperfection dans cet 6tat qu'il y ait tant de membres; chaque membre est une t§te, et il faut que ees tStes soient en un chapeau avant qu'aucune chose se fassel" — Thurloe, State Papers, III, p. 21. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE the Netherlands was immediately demanded by the Com- Chap, i monwealth; but this proposition the Dutch negotiators ,g4t'_jgr.(, would not accept. "We cannot," they replied, "banish from our soil all persons who are banished out of England. Our country is a refuge for the exiles of all nations. " The penalty for this attitude of independence was the The Naviga- Navigation Act of October 9, 1651. ^ Its purpose was to inflict a crushing blow upon Holland by destroying its com- mercial supremacy; for, being unable to absorb its rival by diplomacy, the Commonwealth was now resolved to in- capacitate it by force. The chief provisions of the act are: (1) that "no goods or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America, ... or of any islands belonging to them," should be brought into England, Ireland, or other possessions of the Commonwealth, in any other ships than those owned, com- manded, and chiefly manned by Englishmen, under penalty of forfeiture of the ship and its cargo; (2) that no European commodities should be brought from any country in any ship not owned by the people of the Commonwealth, or the people of the country in which the merchandise was produced, under the same penalty. Of this measure an English historian writes: "The Navigation Act, which remained substantially in force for nearly two hundred years, is the great legislative monu- ment of the Commonwealth. It was the first manifestation of the newly awakened consciousness of the commimity, the act which laid the foundation of the English commercial empire. . . . By excluding the Dutch from the carrying trade of English commodities we now took into our own hands the whole work of conunerce, to which our nation was henceforth mainly to devote itself. But by the same act we struck a deadly blow at the very state to which, but a few months before, we had offered almost an incor- porating union. If that state in her long struggle with Spain had displayed such prodigious vitahty and energy, For the text, see Reich, Select Documents, pp. 538, 541. 10 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I this was because the Spaniard had never known how to A"- strike her in her vital part. Her near neighbor, the other 1648-1670 Protestant state, the other trading state, found out this vital part at once. The Netherlands lived by the carrying trade of the world; ... and thus, though Dutch greatness was to last another half century, its decline commences here. The Navigation Act of 1651 is the first nail in its coffin."! Character of The Severity of this attitude, — which a Dutch embassy the Anglo- ^ ^ London in December, 1651, headed by the venerable Dutch con- T 1 /^ fliot Grand Pensionary of Holland, the poet Jacob Lats, was unable to mollify, — followed by the seizure of seventy Dutch vessels, soon led to open war. Admiral Tromp was directed to protect Dutch merchant ships from search and capture, and Blake was ordered to enforce the EngUsh claim to sovereignty in the narrow seas by compelling foreign ves- sels to salute the English flag; and thus it came to blows upon the Channel, which for a time, after first suffering a series of defeats, the Dutch admiral swept with a broom nailed to the mast-head of his ship as a symbol of his vic- tories. But this arrogance was soon avenged. The wealth of Holland was in her ships and cargoes, while that of England was for the most part safe on land. Every ship and cargo captured enriched the Commonwealth and weakened its victim, until the security of what remained necessitated concessions and submission. Two things in this conflict are worthy of remark. One is that the cause of the quarrel is different from those with which we have hitherto been concerned. It is no longer the personal rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, the zealous antagonism of Protestant and Catholic, nor yet the recur- rent conflict of territorial sovereignty with the imperial tradition; it is a contest for primacy in commerce. The other observation is that Europe is beginning to look beyond the narrow circle of the old Empire, away from Italy and its intrigues, away from Germany with its ecclesiastical spoils Seeley, The Growth of British Policy, II, pp. 25, 26. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 11 and the secularizing appetities of its princes, away even Chap. i from the question of national frontiers and the appropria- ■*^''- tion of passive or resistant populations. We witness the beginnings of world politics, of the struggle for sea-power, and the premonitions of colonial wars. But even in the nar- rower circle the spirit of interstate relations had undergone a change. For a long period ambition had masked itself behind rehgious sentiment and pretended virtues, but now the age of chivalry in international pohcy had passed away. A rude realism, based frankly on national interest, had boldly entered the arena. Only the thin textures of courtly cour- tesy, often too scantily, and sometimes without pretence of decency, concealed the sordid and piratical designs that mustered armies and created navies. Thitherto great wars had sprung in some manner from private or merely dynastic interests. It now became evident that the fuel for the flames of battle was not alone the passions of monarchs, but the egoism of republics also. It was by its intelligence rather than by its force that the The treaty of Dutch republic could hope, if at all, to resist its powerful ^th^enmark antagonist, now more potent than it had ever been before both on land and sea. In one respect the Commonwealth, hke the United Provinces, was dependent upon its imports for its naval strength. The materials for ships — timber, tar, and hemp — were products of the Baltic countries. To cut off the English from this supply was to sever their growing marine from its very roots. A glance at the map discloses the power possessed by Denmark to block the path of commerce between the North Sea and the Baltic by clos- ing the Sound to its enemies and opening it only to its friends. In the rivalry for the mastery of the Baltic between Denmark and Sweden, in which Russia was soon to participate, the Danish kingdom was in need of friends, and of friends pos- sessing power on the sea. Another fact tending to facih- tate an alliance with the Dutch against the Commonwealth was that the Danish dynasty was in sympathy with the Stuarts. When, therefore, the Dutch found themselves in command of the Channel and the North Sea, their next 12 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I step was to Seek an ally against the English at the Danish ^- D- Court. 1648-1670 ^j^g danger of being cut off from the Baltic trade had of Cromwell and De Witt caused great concern in England, and the preservation of it by alliance with the Dutch had been one of the leading motives for the proposed union.^ That alliance having proved impossible, on February 8, 1653, a treaty was con- cluded in which Frederick III of Denmark agreed to close the Soimd to English ships and maintain a fleet to enforce the prohibition; and in exchange for this service the United Provinces promised financial aid and the protection of their ally from any hostihties that might be incurred as a conse- quence of these engagements.^ The poUcieB Cromwell had taken no personal part in the steps that led to the war with Holland; but, on December 16, 1653, the imperiaUsm of the Commonwealth ended in the establish- ment of the Protectorate, the "Barebone's Parhament" was dissolved, and Cromwell, as Lord Protector, became the absolute head of the state. In the preceding July, John De Witt had been chosen Grand Pensionary of Holland, and entered upon that long course of public activity which was to rank him in influence with the sovereigns of Europe. Being sincerely and first of all a Protestant, Cromwell desired to perform the task which no previous ruler of Eng- land had ever been bold enough to attempt, the formation of a great Protestant international union. To him, there- fore, it seemed that the United Provinces should now accept consohdation with Great Britain, as Scotland had already done. Knowing that the Netherlands were divided into two parties, the adherents of the House of Orange and the advanced Republicans, he aimed, as he had done in Scot- land, to destroy the one by his protection of the other. ' See the instructions printed from the MS. Order Book of the Coun- cil of State of May 9, 1651, by Geddes, Administration of John De Witt, p. 176, where fear is expressed that the Baltic trade might be wholly lost to the English. ^ See Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, Amsterdam and The Hague, 1726-1731, VI, Part II, pp. 40, 46. A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 13 In this wish to abase the Stuart-Orange party he had a Chap. i natural ally in John De Witt; but the Grand Pensionary had no intention of subjecting his country to foreign domina- tion on the one hand, or of too much strengthening its formal imity on the other. Far better than Cromwell, he understood that too strong a pressure from without could only result in a revival of the stadtholderate in the House of Orange; whereas his own aim was to continue the loose federation of the Provinces under the leadership of Holland. There was before him, therefore, the delicate task of re- sisting the domination of Cromwell from without, and at the same time of preventing a popular demand for a regency in the name of the infant WiUiam III within the Netherlands. As an English historian has well said, it was "a miraculous performance on the tightrope" that was required of him; which, with consummate skill and equipoise, he executed in the presence of the wondering powers of Europe for nearly twenty years. As an offset to the alliance of the Dutch with Denmark, The Angio- in November, 1653, Bulstrode Whitelocke was sent by the ^^^^ "^^"^ Commonwealth as ambassador to Queen Christina of Sweden, for the purpose of negotiating an offensive and defensive alliance with that power. His reception by the Queen at Upsala was cordial; but both Queen Christina and her vener- able Chancellor, Oxenstiern, had doubted the stability of the Commonwealth. The news of Cromwell's assumption of the protectorate, which reached Sweden on January 12, 1654, although Oxenstiern characterized it as an "election by the sword," gave great satisfaction at Upsala; for it was considered as an assurance of the permanence of the British government. When, however, Whitelocke received new credentials from Cromwell signed "Oliverius P" in analogy with the former "Carolus R, " the Queen, who had already predicted that Cromwell would be "king of England in conclusion," inquired, "Is your new government by a protector different from what it was before as to monarchy?" Then, not satisfied with Whitelocke 's answer, she added: "Why is the title 'Protector,' when the power is kingly? 14 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I ... New titles, with sovereign power, proved prejudicial ^■^- to the state of Rome.''^ 1648-1670 -g^^ recalling that her own ancestor, Gustavus Vasa, had risen to the throne from the ranks of the army, she was even the better prepared to negotiate not, indeed, for an offensive and defensive alliance, — which seemed to the prudent Oxenstiern an imsafe venture while England was still at war and Sweden was at peace, — but for the forma- tion of a more effective coalition. Secretly a Catholic, and even then intending to renounce her throne, Christina could have no sympathy with Cromwell's league of Prot- estants; and proposed that, since the United Provinces were known to be looking anxiously for support from France,^ the possible combination of that kingdom with the Netherlands and Denmark might be counterpoised by another "trinity" of powers, to be composed of Sweden, England, and Spain.' Thus, within a decade of the Peace of Westphalia, a complete reversal of the alliances on which that settlement was founded was proposed, in which the only principle of combination was the preservation of European equilibrium, without any distinction of religion or form of government. The trium- But Cromwell's negotiations did not enable him to cromiren'"^°^ imposc his own terms upon the Netherlands. Instead of a union with that republic founded on community of religion, which he desired, he was obliged to accept a peace based on the pledge to maintain republicanism. He demanded and obtained from the Grand Pensionary a promise of the permanent exclusion of the House of Orange from office in the Netherlands, but not with the ratification of the States General. In the treaty of April 5, 1654, it is provided that whoever might hold the office of " Stadtholder " or "Captain General " should be required to accept this engagement.* ' Whitelooke's Journal, I, p. 274. - For these negotiations, see Waddington, La Mpuhlique des Pro- vinces-Unies, la France et Us Pays-Bas espagnols, and Lefevre-Pontalis, Jean de Wilt, I, 160, 161. ' Whitelocke's Journal, I, p. 275. ^ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 74. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 15 In a secret declaration of May 4, 1654, however, the States chap. i of Holland solemnly pledged their word that they would '^■^■ not choose the Prince of Orange for any public ofHce.' 16^8-1670 Little was it dreamed that the infant scion of the Houses of Stuart and Orange, whose hereditary privileges were thus denied, would one day, as William III, become not only Stadtholder of Holland but King of England. With great sagacity, but in the face of strenuous oppo- sition, De Witt succeeded in preserving the Republic from self-effacement under the too powerful pressure of the Pro- tector's mailed fist, and at the same time secured through alliance with him a new guarantee of its continued exist- ence.^ On the other hand, although Cromwell failed to obtain the "closer union," he was able to impose impor- tant concessions upon the United Provinces. Influenced by the changed conditions resulting from the peace of the Netherlands with England and Cromwell's commercial treaty with Sweden, Dermiark also found it expedient to make a treaty with him, signed at Westminster, on Septem- ber 15, 1654, by which Frederick III agreed to reopen the Sound to English ships, and to pay an indemnity for the seizure of vessels and cargoes; and the Netherlands, in loyal recognition of their previous treaty obligations, aided Denmark in the payments that were demanded.^ Great Britain had now become, under the guidance of Cromwell, the foremost military state in Europe, and had ' The divided state of the United Provinces at this time is well illus- trated by the selection of the commissioners who were sent to London to negotiate peace with Cromwell. De Witt devised the plan of sending a cipher code to his friends, enjoining upon them to use it in their cor- respondence without the knowledge of his opponents in the commission. See Leffivre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt, I, p. 181, and p. 185. For the Declaration of May 4, 1654, see Dumont, VI, Part II, pp. 85, 88. ' For the defence of De Witt from the charge of duplicity with Cromwell, see LefSvre-PontaUs, Jean de Witt, I, pp. 177, 178. ' Among the other indirect losses of the Netherlands in connection with the war was the recovery of Brazil by Portugal in 1654, the Dutch having taken it in 1640 during the war with Spain. On July 10, 1654, Cromwell made a commercial treaty with Portugal also. For the treaty of the Commonwealth with Denmark, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 92. 16 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A. D. 1648-1670 Mazarin'a desire for an English alliance established relations of amity and commerce with the three most important Protestant powers. When in January, 1653, Mazarin had returned to Paris from exile, Guy Patin had said of him: "His Eminence is as powerful as God the Father at the commencement of the world"; but at that time the hyperbole of the French physician applied only to Mazarin 's influence in the capital. In the South of France open rebellion continued, and the Spaniards were still in possession of French soil. It is not surprising, therefore, that in January, 1654, the Cardinal was ready to offer Dunkirk, if captured, to Cromwell, first with twelve hundred thousand hvres, then with a much greater sum, if he would aid in the conquest of Flanders from the Spanish. On July 16, 1654, Antoine de Bordeaux was instructed to offer, if an alliance could not be obtained, as high as sixty thousand pistoles for a mere treaty of peace and commerce. The reasons for this anxiety to obtain the friendship of Cromwell were manifold. The Commonwealth had al- ready treated the French merchantmen with a rude hand, and when in 1652 Spain had appealed to England for aid in taking Dunkirk, Blake had even seized French ships. There was in England considerable hostility to France, wrote De Bordeaux, and would be "so long as it was gov- erned by His Eminence, or a man of his profession, who are pillars of the Pope." In the hope of profiting by this antip- athy to the Cardinal the French Protestants were in- stinctively turning toward Cromwell, and the rebellious Prince of Condi's agents were seeldng his support. The royal family of England had sought an asylum in France and, much to the displeasure of the Protector, had received there friendly hospitality. Should Cromwell ally himself with Spain, France — isolated and surrounded with enemies — would be exposed to extreme peril. If, however, not- withstanding these adverse circumstances, Mazarin could secure the friendship of Cromwell, the mere spectacle of military co-operation between France and England would go far to intimidate Spain and end the conflict with her. THE ASCENDENCY OF PRANCE 17 While Mazarin was thus soliciting the aid of Cromwell, Chap. i the Protector was still absorbed in his great project of or- a. d. ganizing a Protestant union, without any immediate pur- ^^^^~^^™ pose of either siding with France on the one hand or Spain on the other, or of aggressive measures against either. Yielding to his dominant religious impulse, his aim was to be Premonitiona the Protector of the whole Protestant world, as well as Lord "^ " p™'*'"- tant league Protector of England. Smcerely beheving in toleration as a principle, without imposing his own faith upon others, he meant to stand for it everywhere, as he had stood for the cause of the Independents against Charles I. In England there was much excited apprehension of a strong revival of the Counter-Reformation. Emissaries were sent to the Protestant cantons of Switzerland to me- diate between them in the adjustment of their difficulties, with instructions to oppose the efforts of France to renew its treaty with the cantons. With equal solicitude, the Protector was readj'' to guard the interests of the Hugue- nots in France, the Waldenses in Savoy, and all imperilled Protestants everywhere. Still, beyond extensive naval preparations, which foreshadowed some great but unknown movement upon the sea, there was no sign of any definite plan of action on Cromwell 's part. A sudden change in the govermnent of Sweden seemed for the moment to be significant for the activity of the Prot- estant powers. On June 6, 1654, at the castle of Upsala, Christina, Queen of Sweden, weary of her throne, voluntarily abdicated in favor of her cousin, Charles Augustus, who as- sumed the crown as Charles X. In this ambitious soldier and able politician Sweden seemed to have found a leader capable of realizing all the traditional hopes of that kingdom; who, in union with Cromwell, might make Protestantism preponderant in Europe. At London, the Protector had chosen the Swedish ambassador as his most intimate com- panion. As a contemporary writes, "He never caressed any man so much, nor sought the friendship of any so much as the King of Sweden. " But Charles X had no notion of be- coming a partner in Cromwell 's protectorate of rehgion. Be- voL. ni. — 2 18 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A.D. 1648-1670 NegotiatioDB of Mazarin with Holland aad Portugal fore him lay Poland, feeble, divided, and an easy prey to conquest, either by Sweden on the one side or by Russia . on the other. To the conquest of Poland, therefore, Charles X bent all his energies; but this soon involved him in war with Denmark and excited the apprehensions of the Emperor Ferdinand III and the Great Elector, Frederick William, Margrave of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, who was thus menaced with being made a vassal of Sweden in place of an almost independent holder of a great fief under the nominal suzerainty of the less potent King of Poland.' Although by these preoccupations of Charles X Crom- well was deprived of his support in maintaining a Protestant preponderance on the continent, the anxiety for peace in Germany enforced upon the Emperor Ferdinand III the pledge of neutrality by which he was bound not to afford assistance to the Spanish branch of the House of Hapsburg. In a very real sense, therefore, the Protector became the arbiter of Western Europe, and all the more effectually because of the difficulties that beset Mazarin 's negotiations with his two other possible allies, the Dutch Republic and Portugal. At The Hague, the French resident, Chanut, was in- structed to press the Grand Pensionary to sever the offen- sive relations of the RepubHc with Spain, which had been established by the separate Peace of 1648,^ and to unite in action against her. To enforce this policy upon the Hollanders, frequent seizures had been made of Dutch vessels carrying Spanish goods; and the States General had vainly striven to renew their treaties with France on the principle that the neutral flag covers the merchandise. Determined not to be thus forced into an uimecessary war with Spain, the Republic resolved, on the contrary, to meet the imperious insistence of France with increased arma- ments for the protection of its commerce. • For the secret mission of Friesendorf, sent by Charles X in 1657 to obtain aid from England, for which possessions on the continent were offered, see Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, I, pp. 284, 285. 2 See Volume II of this work, p. 605. A.D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF PRANCE 19 The negotiations with Portugal had not proved more Chap. i satisfactory to France. King John IV had resented the refusal of Mazarin, — in nominal alliance with whom he was carrying on war against Spain, — to make a formal pledge that France would insist upon the independence of Portu- gal when peace should finally be made. To increase the activily of King John, early in 1655 the Chevalier de Jant was sent by Mazarin to Lisbon with instructions to begin his mission by inquiring (1) how John IV proposed to in- demnify Louis XIV for past expenses in the war which, it was alleged, his ambassador had promised would be repaid; and (2) in what manner he intended to execute the clause of the treaty which obliged Portugal to act "continually" against the King of Spain, and to "attack him by land and sea.'" The object of the mission being to bully the King of Portugal into action, De Jant did not hesitate to tell John IV to his face that he was "a prince abandoned and without resources," and insulted him by saying that he would be "the victim of a tragedy — the reunion of Portugal with Spain — not less easy to accomplish than its dismemberment by the acclamation of Your Majesty. " The King replied with dignity, and was firm in rejecting any new engagement with France that did not take the form of the desired league. In July, therefore, De Jant departed; but, hearing that Spain had offered a truce to Portugal, he returned to Lisbon. Confronted with the ques- tion, "Will you conclude a league, or will you not?" the envoy vacillated; then, on September 7, 1655, signed a treaty binding both signatories not to make a separate peace with Spain. Before De Jant 's return to Paris with the treaty, however, other events had occurred which brought its ratification into question. In vain the Chevalier by citing examples from Roman history excused the fact that he had ex- ceeded his instructions, pleading that his work was the logical ' See Tessier, Le chevalier Jant, Paris, 1877; and Saint-Aymour, Recueil des instructions, III, Portugal, pp. 11, 25. 20 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I Completion of the plans of Eichelieu.i But Mazarin A-D- was resolved not to complicate the future peace with Spain 1648-1670 ^^ ^^^ obligation to secure his kingdom to John IV, and firmly declined to ratify the treaty. The Anglo- It was upou the co-operation of Cromwell, therefore, French rappro- ^^^^ Mazarfn was at last forced to depend for the effective ally of whom he was in quest; but to an alliance with the Protector there were serious impediments. When, in order to promote ah entente, in February, 1654, Mazarin raised the rank of the French envoy, De Bordeaux, to that of an ambassador accredited personally to Cromwell, a question of etiquette arose not unmingled with royal sentiment. After the execution of Charles I, the Cardinal 's loyalty to monarchy had not restrained him from sending a secret representative to make purchases at the sale of the late king's belongings; but he foimd it embarrassing to permit the King of France to address the regicide as Mon frere, and Cromwell refused to be called Mon cousin. A satisfactory compromise was foimd, however, in the title "Monsieur le Protedeur." But this mere formality was the least of the obstacles to an understanding. Cromwell required the expulsion of the Stuart family from France, where the widow of Charles I, Henriette Marie, and her children had sought asylum; and, in addition, he demanded the protection of Protestants and the right of worship for subjects of England travelling or sojourning in France. Upon the latter point, Mazarin was ready to make every concession. The Edict of Nantes still afforded toleration to the Huguenots, and the Cardinal was willing to guarantee in a special article the immunity and privileges of English subjects. The expulsion of the Stuarts was a more delicate ques- tion. The elder prince, the future Charles II, offended with the sending of De Bordeaux to London, had departed from France and taken up his residence at Koln. His next 1 Richelieu had, however, in fact also refused to guarantee the inde- pendence of Portugal. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 21 younger brother, James, Duke of York, had become an ofBcer Chap. i in the French army, and could easily be kept out of France. ^■°- But the third son of Charles I, Henry, the young Duke of ~ Gloucester, who was then only fourteen years old, could not be exiled from France without creating a scandal. The re- sources of the Cardinal were, however, equal to the emer- gency. It furnished an occasion for reciprocity in excluding enemies of the State, and thereby an opportunity for pro- curing the expulsion of Conde's agents from England. It was decided, therefore, that, by a secret treaty, each govern- ment should agree to expel certain refugees from the terri- tory of the other; and in the list figured the names of the three sons of Charles I; but, on account of his youth, the expulsion of the Duke of Gloucester was not to become effec- tive for ten years. The last difficulty to be encountered was the claim of the Protector to be named in the treaty as having the same rank as Louis XIV. Mazarin was for a time disconcerted by this pretension, then suggested that the Protector should first assume the title of king. This Cromwell would prob- ably have done when the royal title was offered to him in the "Petition and Advice" by the Parliament, had it not been for the known opposition of the army.' In the Treaty of Westminster, concluded with France on November 3, 1655, Cromwell figures as " Serenissimus Potentissimusque Domi- nus Protector Reipublicae Angliae, Scotiae, et Hiberniae."^ It was, after all, only to obligations of amity and com- The attitude merce, not to a political alliance, that the Lord Protector to^ardXlin pledged his country in the treaty of 1655. There was in it no mention of a league against Spain, nor was there any secret understanding upon that subject. Still, the Treaty of Westminster was a great victory for Mazarin; for it gave Louis XIV the prestige of friendship with England's power- ful ruler, who was soon forced by events into a closer rela- ' For proof that Cromwell would gladly have assumed the crown, see the famous conversation with Whitelocke, Memorials, III, pp. 468, 474. 2 See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 121. 22 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I tion with France. In Spain, the most intolerant of the ^■^- Cathohc nations, in which the hated Inquisition was an 1648-1670 ggi^abiigtjefj institution, antagonism to England, even when latent, was still inherent. But it was the exclusive pre- tensions of Spain to America that were most irritating to Cromwell, who saw no justice in claims extending over a great portion of two vast continents based primarily on titles of possession derived from decrees of Pope Alexander VI. ^ The Protector had complained that, in contravention of the Treaty of 1630, "the English were treated by the Spaniards as enemies wherever they were met with in America, though sailing to and from their own plantations. " He had demanded, too, that English merchants in Spain might be permitted to possess and use English Bibles and other religious books. In reply the Spanish ambassador, Don Alonso de Cardenas, had declared, that to demand free sailing in the West Indies and exemption from the In- quisition in Spain was "to ask for his master's two eyes," and the demands certainly could not be granted. Thus, peace with Spain became in Cromwell's mind im- possible, and depredations on Spanish commerce and colo- nies, which in Queen Ehzabeth 's time were construed as acts for which the government was not responsible, now became its deliberate policy. Even before concluding the treaty with France, Cromwell had ordered an attack on San Do- mingo; which, though unsuccessful, was soon followed by the capture of Jamaica. It was only gradually, however, that he evinced a disposition to abandon his attitude of holding the balance of power; and it was not until 1657 that he was ready to seek a political alliance with France against Spain. Secret nego- In the meantime, Mazarin had profited by his relations Malarin°with ^^ amity with Cromwell to attempt direct negotiations Spain of peace with Spain. In reality exhausted and decadent, governed by a monarch with whom temporization had be- come a habit, and attacked by the vigorous navy of Eng- land, Spain appeared to be already doomed to ultimate defeat. See Volume II of this work, pp. 186, 187. A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 23 The brother of the Emperor Ferdinand III, Archduke Chap. i Leopold of Austria, who since 1646 had governed the Spanish Netherlands, at once perceived the necessity of peace for Spain, and despatched Don Gaspard Bonifaz to urge it upon the Court of Madrid. On his journey, Don Gaspard visited Paris, and had a conversation with Cardinal Mazarin and the King, who informed him that they were ready to open secret negotiations of peace with Philip IV. At Madrid, the proposition was favorably received by the King and his chief minister, Don Luis de Haro; and on June 10, 1656, armed with full powers written by Louis XIV with his own hand, Hugues de Lionne, under cover of the most ab- solute secrecy, set out for Spain. The negotiations at Madrid, in the midst of whose stormy scenes De Lionne evinced the poise and skill in argument that always marked his methods, were not successful; for, although each side was disposed to make concessions, De Haro demanded for the Prince of Cond6 the restoration not only of all his lands and titles but of all his offices in the government. To this De Lionne could not consent; and, at the end of September, after refusing a costly present from the King of Spain, he returned to France without results.' Defeated in his attempt to make a secret arrangement The Angio- with Spain, Mazarin had, nevertheless, by his reserve during fj^^^^ the course of these negotiations rendered Cromwell more eager than ever for a French alliance; but the revival of the war and the success of Cond6 against Turenne at Val- enciennes now made this union far more necessary for France than for the Protector. Accordingly, on March 23, 1657, a defensive and offensive treaty was signed at Paris for a joint attack on Spain. England was to furnish six thousand soldiers and a fleet, and as her share of the spoils, was to be put in possession of Dunkirk.^ It was, in truth, a war of aggression upon which the Pro- tector had now embarked. What, then, were Cromwell's ' For the negotiations of De Lionne and De Haro, see Valfrey, Hiigues de Lionne, ses ambassades, etc., pp. 1, 63. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 224. 24 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A.D, 1648-1670 Cromweira im- perial concep- tion and his death motives? Since the loss of Calais in 1558, England had pos- sessed no territory on the continent. In thus reversing the foreign policy of a century by asldng for Dunkirk, did the Protector aim merely to prevent Charles Stuart from using Flanders as a base for attacking England; did he in- tend only to hold Dunkirk as a check on the future designs of France; or did he have in mind some larger enterprise against the Netherlands? It is certain that the possession of a foothold on the continent was deemed by him of great importance; for it had been a question whether to acquire Dunkirk by joining France, or Calais by joining Spain. In June, 1658, Dunkirk was captured by the French and loyally delivered to the English; but Oliver Cromwell's death on September 3 of the same year and the succession of his incapable son Richard put an end to the plans which the Protector may have entertained. It was soon after- wards declared that, contrary to the interest of England, he had made an unjust war with Spain and an impolitic league with France, thereby destroying the balance of power which England had possessed when those two countries were at war.^ It would, perhaps, be more just to say that his in- tention was to establish England's maritime supremacy throughout the world, first by destroying the ■ colonial pre- ponderance of Spain and then by commanding the Channel on both sides, in order to hold in check both France and the Netherlands. It was, indeed, France, not England, that was to profit by his policy; not because it was ill conceived, but on account of the abrupt failure of his system through his death. That policy was, no doubt, "the deeply planned aggression of a conqueror."^ It was, in substance, the imperial policy of Great Britain's later history, the germ thought of that Empire of the Sea whose development in- volved the overthrow of Spain, the restraint of France, and the subordination of the Netherlands. It was, however, Mazarin who was to gather the fruits of that fateful alliance, 1 Bethell, The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, London, 1668, p. 4. • ' Seeley, The Growth of British Policy, II, p. 74. THE ASCENDENCY OF PRANCE 25 and France that was to acquire in Europe that ascendency Chap. I which Cromwell would gladly have conferred upon England; ■*■"• but Cromwell had touched the keys of a far deeper and more ' lasting conception of greatness, — an empire built on trade and colonies, law and tolerance, thrift and enterprise, open- ing new paths upon the sea, and finally encircling the earth. With him was arrested for a time the new greatness of Eng- land; but the protection to trade, order, and religion which inspired the dictatorship of OHver Cromwell — not, indeed, without its hardness and its hand of iron — became in time the chief problem of the race from which he sprang. In Asia, in America, and in the great continental islands of the Pacific, the war of Cromwell was to be continued for the conquest of the globe. His task ended in immediate fail- ure, but the spirit of the Lord Protector — a conqueror in the name of righteousness, without always employing the most righteous means — has created an empire far greater than that of which he could have dreamed. II. The Pretensions of Louis XIV In small things as in great, it had already been made "L'stat, c'est manifest that the young king of France intended to be, ™°'" what by common consent he was soon to be entitled, the "Grand Monarque." On April 13, 1655, this youth of seventeen years, holding a lit de justice in his hunting cos- tume, prohibited the assembling of the Parliament of Paris, and all deliberation upon his decrees. The famous words, "L'etat, c'est moi," although not actually employed by him, are a faithful resume of his discourse upon that occasion, and of his attitude throughout his reign. They accurately epitomize the theory of the royal of&ce held by Mazarin, and express the central thought of the King's famous "Memoires, " written long afterward, for the instruction of the Dauphin. In that exposition of the royal prerogatives the doctrine is summarized in this sentence: "It is a perver- sion of the natural order of things to attribute resolutions to subjects and deference to the sovereign; for only the head has the right of deliberation and resolution, and the functions 26 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I of the other members consist solely in executing the com- A-D. mandments given to them." 1648-1670 ^g^ ^p^j^ ^-^jg theory, the sovereign has no equal within the State, he can have no superior outside of it. In inter- A comedy of national affairs this attitude was certain to provoke con- preoedence fiicts, for Other powers were also jealous of their prerogatives. At Paris, the envoy of the United Provinces, William Boreel, resenting the confiscation of Dutch vessels by the French as a means of driving the Republic into an al- hance with France against Spain, had spoken, Mazarin declared, "as no ambassador at that court before." The Cardinal was, however, eager if possible to make friends of the Netherlands; and, therefore, patiently endured the plainness of speech of the Dutch ambassador, and in April, 1657, sent De Thou to The Hague to appease the States General and secure at least their neutrality in the war with Spain. But before the ambassador had delivered the letter in which the King finally promised that the embargo against Dutch vessels should be raised, an incident occurred which narrowly missed ending in acts of violence. De Thou had been formally instructed to expose himself to any risk rather than yield precedence to the ambassador of Spain;! -^yhen, on August 11, 1657, returning from a visit to the Princess Dowager in her new palace in the wood, he and the Spanish ambassador, Don Esteban de Gamarra, about six o'clock in the evening, entered one of the alleys of the Voorhout at the same time. The carriage of the French ambassador, drawn by six horses, and that of the Spaniard, drawn by two, having to pass in the narrow alley one at a time, the driver of each demanded precedence, and neither would give way to the other. Their servants were ready to tear each other from their seats; and the crowd that soon gathered, irritated with the treatment the Dutch vessels had received from France, was disposed to take the part of the ambassador of Spain. The Grand Pensionary • The instruction previously given to Chanut was: "De s'exposer a, toute extr^mit^ plut6t que de cdder." — Archives des Affaires Etran- glres, December 10, 1653. A.D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF TRANCE 27 and several members of the States General hastened to the Chap. i scene to prevent a riot; but for three hours the situation remained unchanged, and neither ambassador would permit the other to have the right of way. Finally, when the pros- pect was that the night would pass without any solution of the problem, the diplomatist Beverningk proposed the happy expedient of removing the barriers that confined the way, thus suffering both to depart at the same time. The Spanish ambassador afterwards claimed the victory, on the ground that his carriage occupied a position on the right of the thoroughfare. The French ambassador, on the contrary, maintained that he had won his point, because he had passed on without giving way to his rival. ^ But the relative importance of France among the powers The embarrass- of Europe was being subjected to a more convincing test in ™™' ^^^ a larger field. Since 1654, when the elder son of the Emperor Ferdinand III died, the Emperor had been anxiously plan- ning for the succession of his younger son, Leopold, to the Empire; but there was a strong disposition to end the Haps- burg succession, and Mazarin did not fail to encourage this sentiment among the electors and other German princes. As early as October 12, 1654, the Court of Vienna was warned of the opposition that was brewing, and informed that France favored the choice of the young Elector of Bavaria, Ferdinand Maria; and if he were not disposed to accept an election, Louis XIV might himself be a candidate.^ It was, however, the situation in the North that most The situation seriously complicated the preparations for an election. '° *''® ^°'^^ Charles X of Sweden was at that time in the flood tide of his career of conquest, and the attitude of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, later known as the "Great Elector," was, therefore, of vital consequence to the Emperor. Fer- dinand III had hoped to secure a close alliance with him; but, although Count Stahremberg was sent to Berlin in ' The incident is reported by Leffevre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt, I, p. 245; and also by Chappuzeau, L'Ewope Vivanle, II, p. 305, who claims to have been an eye-witness of the scene. ^ See Pribram, Zur Wahl Leopold, I, p. 9 et seq. 1648-1670 28 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I October, 1655, for that purpose, his mission was unfruitful. . 1648-1670 Negotiations in the Isle of Pheasants showered upon the head of the unhappy ambassador, who was even declared deserving of decapitation for having thus . betrayed the honor of his master. Still, in the hope that further negotiations between the chief ministers might smooth away the difficulties, toward the end of June the ratification of the treaty was sent to Paris. Peace being thus rendered practically certain, the Cardi- nal deemed it opportune before his departure for his final negotiations with Don Luis de Haro at the Franco-Spanish frontier, to dispel the illusions of the Duchess of Savoy regarding the marriage of her daughter. This he did by vmgraciously insinuating that the Duchess had been guilty of intrigues with Spain, against which she energetically pro- tested; but, fearing lest the interests of Savoy might suffer if she offered reproaches, she humbly besought the favor of the King without complaining of Mazarin's conduct, and was rewarded by the restitution to the Duke of Savoy of the castle of Vercelli. In the middle of the Bidassoa, on a little neutrahzed island known as the Isle of Pheasants, the two ministers were to meet for the completion of the peace. There, from August 13 to November 7, 1659, twenty-four conferences were held by Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro in the pavilion, constructed for the purpose. The programme of procedure was carefully arranged in advance, but it was modified to suit the views of the two negotiators, to whose personal skill in treating with each other the interests of both kingdoms were now intrusted. The future of Conde continued to be the central problem. De Haro obstinately insisted on the restoration of his rank and offices. Mazarin was firm in demanding his absolute submission to the King as a condition of pardon. It was finally agreed that the office of "Grand Mattre de France" should be exercised by his son, the Duke of Enghien; and that the Prince of Cond4, having made known to Cardinal Mazarin his sorrow for his hostility, his request for grace, and his promise of obedience for the future, should be par- doned and restored to the free possession of all his goods, THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 45 honors, and privileges as a prince of the blood, with the Chap. i government of Burgundy and Bresse. -*°- In view of the possibility of the death of the Infante Philip, the Court of Spain insisted upon an absolute renunciation of the rights of Maria Theresa to the Spanish throne. This, it was recalled, had been required of Anne of Austria upon her marriage to Louis XIII. In reply, Don Luis was re- minded that that princess had received a wedding portion of five hundred thousand ecus. It was agreed, therefore, that the renimciation should be made and the dowry given; but the impoverished condition of Spain made it necessary that this should be only promised, not immediately paid. The occasion was thus presented for De Lionne to make the ingenious stipulation — destined to afford an apparent justification of future pretensions to the crown of Spain — that the renunciation of rights to the throne should be con- ditional upon the pajonent of the wedding portion within the period named in the treaty. The last difficulty was the delimitation of the Nether- lands frontier. The extensive restitutions to Spain did not meet the expectation of the French generals who had made such large conquests in the Netherlands, but Mazarin had designs for the future. On the side of the Pyrenees, however, France reached its "natural limit" through the cession by Spain of Roussillon and Cerdagne. The French conquests in Catalonia and Italy were abandoned by France to Spain, Dunkirk was confirmed to England, and Jiilich assiired to the Duke of Neuburg. Portugal was offered French mediation; but left, unaided, to fight for her own independence. On November 7, 1659, the last conference was held in the The Peace of Isle of Pheasants and the peace was signed.' While the ^^^ Pyeneea Peace of the Pyrenees is generally regarded as the greatest monvunent to the diplomacy of Mazarin, he has been re- proached for frustrating by it the French conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, which seemed so imminent. Amidst the Cardinal 's labors to conclude the treaty, fresh ' The best text of the treaty, with admirable introduction and com- ments, is found in Vast, Les grands iraites, I, pp. 93, 107. 1648-1670 46 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I efforts had been necessary to induce his young monarch to ■^^_^ forget the charms of Maria Mancini and consent to accept the Infanta. Only the most resolute determination on the part of Mazarin in urging the raison d'Mat finally pre- vailed over the King's infatuation. It was not, however, imtil the Cardinal threatened to retire from his service and abandon the coimtry, that Louis XIV decided to give up the fair Italian for the peace of France.' When, in June, 1660, the marriage had been solemnized and the royal pair proceeded on their journey to Paris, the nation could not repress its joy at having so glorious a monarch, and the progress of the King and Queen through France resembled a march of triumph. The Peace of the Pyrenees not only marks the victory of Mazarin over the civil dissensions which attended his advent to power but of the theory of government he had striven to impose on France. The Eng was greeted at his capital as a "young god," the rightful repository of omni- potence in his realm, who could do no wrong. The erisifl in One of the articles of the Peace of the Pyrenees provided for the North ^j^g jqjq^; efforts of France and Spain to secure the pacifica- tion of the North, where the war between Sweden and the coalition of Austria, Poland, Denmark, and Brandenburg had reached a crisis. In the winter of 1658, by wonderful marches over the ice, Charles X had almost without resistance crossed the Little and the Great Belt and threatened Copenhagen. Denmark was thus at the mercy of the conqueror, who by the Peace of Roskilde of February 26, 1658, obtained the cession of Scania, the island of Bornholm, and the Norwegian provinces of Badhus and Trondhjem; the transfer of four thousand soldiers to Sweden; the renunciation of all anti- Swedish alliances; the exclusion of all hostile war-ships from passing through the Sound and the Belts; the exemption of Swedish vessels from tolls; and the restoration to his estates of the traitor Korfits Ulfeld. But the peace had proved only transitory. After friendly intercourse between ' See Valfrey, Hugues de Lionne, pp. 280, 285. A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 47 Charles X and Frederick III at the castle of Frederiksborg, Chap. I celebrated with sumptuous banquets, the King of Sweden made fresh demands. When these were reluctantly con- ceded, the conqueror, still unsatisfied, resolved to renew his attack and efface Denmark from the map of Europe. '^ "I will die in my own nest," was the answer of Fred- The rescue of erick III to those who counselled flight from his kingdom; '^'^'^^ and his people, animated by his example, prepared for the defence of their capital. But all Europe was now interested in the struggle. The United Provinces were filled with anx- iety at the thought of the annihilation of their ally and the control of the Sound by Sweden. The States General promptly sent to the Baltic a powerful fleet, and a naval combat followed in which Dutch heroism reached its climax, with the result that provisions and reinforcements were furnished to Copenhagen, and Charles X was compelled to raise the siege. In the ceded territories, the Danes rose to recover their nationality; the Swedish possessions in Prussia were invaded by a force of Poles, Austrians, and Brandenburgers under Frederick William and Montecuccoli; another army under Czarniecki swept over Holstein and drove the Swedish troops from Jutland; and by January, 1659, Charles X was struggling to maintain his foothold in the Danish islands. Exposed to the vengeance of the coal- ition of the North, the future fate of the recent conqueror had suddenly become an object of solicitude to France and England. Either the unlimited preponderance or the total defeat of The interven- the King of Sweden was seen to involve a danger for the 3°^ England"^ ' The Chevalier de Terlon, French ambassador to Sweden, thus re- ports in his Memoires the intentions of Charles X confided to himself: "I shall destroy Copenhagen; . . . then I shall transfer the privileges of that city to Malmo, or to Landscrona in Scania, and make my resi- dence in that province, which will become the centre of the State. After that, I shall render myself absolute master of the Baltic, and for that purpose I shall have a fleet of a hundred war-ships. . . . The conquest of Norway will follow that of Denmark. . . . Finally, I wish to go to Italy with a powerful army and navy, Uke a second Alaric, to place the city of Rome once more under the power of the Goths." 48 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I System of equilibrium in Europe. The successful establish- ^- ^- ment of the Baltic empire he was aiming to create im- . plied the extinction of Denmark, the absorption of Poland, the exclusion of Russia from the Baltic, the subordination of Austria, the appropriation of Brandenburg and other German territories, and the prohibition of cormnerce with the North except on such terms as Sweden might be disposed to dictate. The ruin of the Swedish state, on the other hand, would involve the preponderance of Austria in the Empire, the probable development of Brandenburg in Northern Germany, and the undisputed control of the Soimd by Den- mark. For France and England, therefore, the integrity of Sweden was of supreme importance; and, as the Netherlands had opposed the extinction of Denmark, so now those powers were anxious to prevent the entire defeat of Sweden. Accordingly, in January, 1659, an agreement had been made between France and the Protector, Richard Cromwell, for the purpose of securing peace in the North. In pur- suance of this object, on May 21, 1659, was signed at The Hague by France, England, and the Netherlands a compact, known as the "First Hague Concert," to endeavor by their mediation to terminate the war between Denmark and Sweden on the terms contained in the Treaty of Roskilde. On the twenty-fourth of the following July, was signed the "Second Hague Concert," by which England and the Netherlands agreed to employ their fleets, then in the Baltic, to compel a peace upon the basis already indicated within a fortnight; but Mazarin, who knew the obstinacy of his ally and was unwilling to use force against him, refused to accede to this proposal. Before the mediation at The Hague had reached any decisive result, however, the victory of the coahtion of the North over the small Swedish army in Denmark on Novem- ber 24, 1659, at Nyborg, broke the power of Charles X; who, after endeavoring to renew the war by offering the United Provinces a portion of the spoils, on February 13, 1660, suddenly died, worn out with his exertions. Before the death of Charles X — who was succeeded by 1 Diplomatic relations between Austria and France had not existed since 1648, and Leopold I had not notified Louis XIV of his election to the Empire. Referring to the Emperor, whom he could not recognize until duly notified, Louis XIV always used the expression, "La Cour de Vienne." See Sorel, Recueil des instructions, I, Autriche, pp. 41, 64. 2 A list of the plenipotentiaries and a full account of the proceedings may be found in Waddington, Le Grand Electeur, I, pp. 464, 478. ^ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 303 et seq.; for the negotiations, Friese, Ueber den dusseren Gang der Verhandlungen beim Frieden von Oliva. VOL. III. — 4 A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FKANCE 49 his four-year-old son, Charles XI, under a regency — a con- Chap. i gress had been arranged to assemble in the monastery of Oliva near Danzig. There, in January, 1660, the plenipoten- tiaries of the Emperor, Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg met for the purpose of negotiating a peace. In the course of the negotiations, representatives of Holland, Denmark, and Courland arrived at the Congress, but took only a secondary place. The mediation of the French ambassador to Poland, Antoine de Lumbres, was accepted by all except the Emperor, who refused to recognize the French. ^ The eclat of the occasion may be judged by the fact that weeks were required to arrange the ceremonial, and even the dele- gation of Brandenburg contained sixty-five persons, with thirty-five horses.^ On May 3, 1660, was signed the Peace of Oliva, in which the King of Poland, John Casimir, renoimced his heredi- tary claims to the Swedish crown; Livonia was assigned to Sweden, and the quarrel between that kingdom and Poland was thus ended.' The most significant provision of the peace for the future of Europe, however, was the confirmation of the Duchy of Prussia to the Elector of Brandenburg in full sovereignty; for Frederick William was thus permanently rendered a figure of consequence beyond the limits of the Germanic world, and in his person a Hohenzollern entered the family of recognized sovereign rulers. His temporary conquests in Swedish Pomerania he was obhged to re- linquish; but he had won his place — more by astute diplom- acy than by war — among the great founders of modern Europe. 50 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I 1648-1670 The pacifica- tion of the North com- pleted The achieve- ments and death of Mazarin Abandoned by his allies, who had concluded the Peace of Oliva without safeguarding the interests of Denmark, . Frederick III was disposed to restore the integrity of his kingdom by continuing war with Sweden; but the United Provinces, fearful of the consequences of further war, made a treaty with Sweden and employed their fleet to impose peace upon Denmark by immobilizing the Danish army. On Jime 6, 1660, a peace was signed at Copenhagen, whereby Trondhjem and Bornhohn were recovered; but the rich prov- inces of Scania were lost. Denmark retained, however, the right to admit foreign fleets to the Baltic and to collect the Soimd tolls as before; but the ships of Swed,en were to be allowed free passage.' Only one other step was necessary to complete the paci- fication of the North. On July 1, 1661, was concluded the Treaty of Kardis, by which the Czar Alexis restored to Sweden all the places he had taken in Livonia, and granted to the Swedes the privilege of free commerce with Russia and the right of worship according to their creed.^ Like the League of the Rhine, the pacification of the North has figured in French history as one of the trophies of Mazarin 's diplomacy. That it was so in a certain sense caimot be denied, but the success of his mediation was de- pendent almost entirely upon the decisive action of the Netherlands, the exhaustion of Sweden, the desire of Poland for repose, the weariness of the Emperor with the whole enterprise, and the willingness of the Great Elector to accept full sovereignty in his Prussian duchy. One fact is, however, incontestable, — upon his death on March 9, 1661, Mazarin left France the first power in Europe. That supremacy was not the result of any single triumph, but of a multitude of successful applications of one line of policy, — the exaltation of the French monarchy by consolidation within the State, and the persistent extension of the influence of France in every part of Europe in pur- suance of the plans of Richelieu. In the struggle for position, 1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 319 et seq. 2 For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 363 et seq. THE ASCENDENCY OF FEANCE 51 the death of Ohver Cromwell had ended the temporary as- Chap. i cendency of England ; the division of the Hapsburg power had ^- ^■ reduced both Austria and Spain to a secondary rank; and ~^^ ° Sweden, though still a great kingdom, had failed to estab- hsh her empire on the Baltic. The United Provinces by their vigorous diplomacy, supported by their naval and commer- cial prestige, had acquired a prominence never before pos- sessed by so small a country; but France, ruled by a sover- eign who was completely master in his own realm, had attained a primacy which no other power could dispute. Mazarin had failed in his ambition to place upon the head of his young king the diadem of the Caesars, but he had succeeded in making him far more potent in reality than the Emperor who wore it. III. The Designs of France upon the Netherlands The cruel trials which civil war had inflicted upon France The personal had powerfully promoted that deference for the royal ^j™™™™' prerogatives upon which the rule of Cardinal Mazarin re- posed; and, under his inspiration, the "culte du red" had become for France almost what the apotheosis of the Roman emperors had been for the Empire in the days of the "Pax Romana. " "The seat of Your Majesty represents the throne of the living God," Omer Talon had declared in the lit de justice when the regency of Anne of Austria was proclaimed. "This company regards you as the living image of divinity, " the scrupulous Lamoignon had said to Louis XIV in the presence of the Parliament of Paris. A short time after- wards, Bossuet, in a subtle argument drawn from the Holy Scriptures, was to write: "The royal throne is not the throne of a man, but the throne of God himself. . . . The prince should render to no one an account for what he does. . . . Without that absolute authority, he can neither accomplish what is good nor repress that which is evil. " ' A king by divine right, in his own behef and in that of his people, Loiiis XIV naturally became the incarnation ' Bossuet, Poliiique iiree des propres paroles de I'Scriture-Sainte, 1709. 52 A HISTOBY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. I A. D. 1648-1670 Tbe foreign service of France The royal instructions of the pride, the power, and the imperial aspirations of the French nation. For him and for his people, Versailles was . hke a second Rome; whence he was divinely ordained to extend the power of France, and diffuse its riper civilization throughout the world. Of this high responsibihty the King had a clear con- ception. " It is by toil that a sovereign rules, and it is for this that he reigns," he afterwards wrote; and history has ac- corded to him the praise he coveted of "doing conscien- tiously the business of a king." With unhmited confi- dence in his own powers, with which the tuition of Mazarin had inspired him, he resolved to gather into his own hands the entire administration of the state, to improve its organ- ization, and to be his own prime minister. Immediately after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, at seven o'clock in the morning, a council was assembled, and the King said to the Chancellor, the venerable Pierre Siguier: "I have called you with my ministers and secretaries of state, to inform you that imtil the present I have been pleased to leave the direction of my affairs to the Cardinal; it is now time that I govern myself. You will aid me with your counsels, when I shall ask for them." Then, turning to De Lionne, "You are assured of my affection; I am con- tent with your services. You, Brienne, will act in concert with him in foreign affairs, and you will send to my ambas- sadors all that he shall authorize on my part, without a new order from me. The face of things has changed. I shall have other principles in the government of my estate, in the regulation of my finances, and in foreign negotiations than those of the late Cardinal. You know my wishes; it is for you now, gentlemen, to execute them." Not even his most trusted minister was permitted to form a policy or instruct an ambassador without the direc- tion of the King. After his hne of action had been ascer- tained by conversation, the formal written instructions to ambassadors were usually prepared by the chief of the de- partment; but these documents were always read aloud to the King, and were often annotated and revised by him with THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 53 his own hand. Many of them have been recently pub- Chap. i lished; and they are, in general, models of clear, direct, ^•i>- and systematic style and method.^ They contain elaborate analyses of the political conditions of the time and indicate not only the aims and policy of France, but those of other coimtries which were to be frustrated or promoted according to the interests of the monarchy. Supplemented by the correspondence addressed to ambassadors already at their posts, they not only reveal the motives of the French Court, but disclose the whole mechanism of European pol- itics as seen from the French point of view. But Louis XIV was not content with these merely formal expositions of his political system, or that the foreign repre- sentatives of France should be the best informed in Europe. Every ambassador, before his departure for his post, was called into the presence of the King and impressed with the real aim and significance of his mission by a few words from the monarch's own lips. He was thus sent forth as an apostle of French prestige rather than as a mere public functionary; and the foreign service of France, which Richelieu and Mazarin had raised to the dignity of a pro- fession, under the personal rule of Louis XIV acquired al- most the character of a priesthood. Chosen chiefly from a class of men likely to prove per- The French sonally loyal to the King, and rarely from the ranks of diplomatists ecclesiastics, — whose dual relations rendered their devotion less certain, — the diplomatic agents of Louis XIV were followed and directed in the field with incessant oversight. To secure strict obedience to the King's orders, every am- bassador was closely watched. Everything coming under his observation affecting the pohtical, military, or commercial interests of France he was expected to report. By this means, the monarch became the best informed person in Europe. He was famihar with all the parties and factions of every coimtry, and all the intrigues of every court were known to ' See Becv£il des Instructions donnSes aux Amhassadeurs el ,Minis- tres de France depuis les TraitSs de Westphalie jiisqu'a la Revolution Frangaise. 1648-1670 54 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I him. Even the characters, the weaknesses, and the dis- • !>■ positions of his fellow sovereigns and of their ministers were of interest to him; for they were all considered useful items of knowledge in suggesting the means by which his ends might be accomplished. Under the exacting administration of the King, the labors of the diplomatic agents of France, as shown by the existing archives, were often enormous. Every ambassador was expected to be well informed of the state of affairs in every European country. For this purpose a lively cor- respondence was kept up by the ambassadors with one another. As many of these communications were sent in cipher, diplomacy became a serious industry. The long distances to be ■traversed, the slowness of communication, and the frequent necessity of prompt action often rendered imperative on the part of ambassadors a bold initiative, and the responsibility was great. The expenses of representa- tion were sometimes immense. Journeys lasting weeks and months, with extensive trains of servants and baggage, were necessary incidents of diplomatic life. Frequently the sov- ereign to whom an ambassador was accredited had to be followed on long marches, and even on the field of battle. Thus Charles X was accompanied across the belts of the Baltic on the ice by the French ambassador, and Colbert de Croissy at a later time had an audience of Charles XII in the trenches while bullets were flying through the air. For all this service and exposure, the ambassador received but meagre pay, usually much in arrears. FeuquiSres had thirty horses and eighty persons to maintain on an income of thirty-six thousand livres. It was not unusual for an ambassador to pawn or sell his silver, and even ruin his private fortune, in order to sustain the dignity of his king. And yet the ambassadors of France handled for their sovereign vast sums of money, bribing and pensioning min- isters and princes, and sometimes even kings. The chief rewards for so much sacrifice and responsibility were usually a word of praise from the monarch, the order of St. Louis, or a post of increased honor and importance. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 55 The missionary zeal of the French diplomatists is the Chap, i more necessary to comprehend because it was through the •*■■ ^• machinery of this system that the King of France was to ~ complete his ascendency in Europe, and because its organi- zation was soon to be imitated by every European country. Advantages of Other monarchs were not wanting in able diplomatists, who *'''' ^'■"■"''^ diplomacy in devotion and intelligence were equal to the French. No more skilful or more loyal service could be imagined than that of Franz von Lisola to the House of Austria, and Spain was served with equal fidelity by Esteban de Gamarra and many others; but in the perfection of its organization the diplomatic service of France was without an equal. Another advantage was the central position of Paris. The distance which separated Madrid from Vienna, and both from the field of influence and expansion of France on and near the Rhine, gave to the French the benefit of more swift intelli- gence and more rapid action. At London, Portugal could be secretly aided in its struggle with Spain almost with- out suspicion; and The Hague, only a short journey from Paris, had become the chief centre of diplomacy, while from these points it usually required three weeks for a courier to reach Madrid, and two months for an exchange of notes. When to this it is added that Louis XIV never failed promptly and energetically to sustain his representatives, while Spain and Austria were lethargic in action and even divided in counsel, it is easy to comprehend the superior effectiveness of French diplomacy. But there was still another reason for the growing ascen- dency of France. All her rivals were passing through a period of transition and confusion. In March, 1660, General Monk had reorganized the The intema- British Parhament; on April 14, Charles Stuart had issued *f°°h^ stllrt"' the conciliatory Declaration of Breda; and on May 25, he had restoration landed at Dover, amidst the applause of a nation weary of military rule and always monarchical at heart. But Charles II had not returned to England as a friend of France, nor was the French alhance made by Cromwell popular with his subjects. One of the first steps of the new king was a 56 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I 1648-1670 The affair of D'Estradea and De Watte ville notice to the French ambassador, De Bordeaux, to quit the country; and he left England on July 7, 1660. It was . toward Spain that Enghsh sentiment was at that time turn- ing, not only for commercial reasons, but because it was judicious for two weak nations in the presence of a stronger to unite in resisting its aggressive policy. The return of Dun- kirk to Spain and a Spanish marriage for Charles II were seriously discussed in the summer of 1660; but it was soon made to appear that it was for the interest of the Crown in its struggle with the nation to possess a powerful rather than a feeble ally, and the mihtant diplomacy of Louis XIV soon turned the tide in favor of France. Thus England, against its will, was soon condemned by Charles II to assume the position of a mere satellite in the system of French preponderance. An incident connected with this transition is too sig- nificant of the temper of the time to be passed over without notice. In August, 1661, the contention of France and Spain over the question of precedence induced Charles II to exclude all foreign ministers from the public escort of the Venetian embassy then arriving at London. Louis XIV was incensed with his cousin for denying to his ambassador, the Count D'Estrades, the precedence claimed by him over the Spanish ambassador, De Watteville, who thus seemed to be placed on an equaUty with his French colleague; and D'Estrades was not only rebuked for submitting to the order, but instructed to seize the first occasion to repair the indignity to his master. Accordingly, on October 10, at the entry of the Swedish ambasador. Count Brahe, into London, the carriages of the two rivals were sent to join the procession, when a bloody encounter occurred between their servants, the hamstrings of the horses attached to the car- riage of Count D'Estrades were cut, several of his servants were killed and others wounded, and the Spaniards, aided by the populace, alone secured a place in the escort.^ 1 According to De Martens' account, Causes c&MrreB, I, p. 353, the number of armed people on the side of Spain was 2,000. The French side was sustained by 500, so that the conflict took the form of a pitched battle. THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 57 Charles II escaped the wrath of the King of France by Chap. i immediately expressing his regrets and chastising his own *. d. subjects who were connected with the affair, but the indig- nation of Louis XIV toward Spain was unboimded. On the day after the news reached him at Fontainebleau, the Spanish ambassador, Count Fuensaldana, was ordered to leave France immediately; the Marquis de la Fuente, who was then on his way to supersede him, was warned not to continue his journey; the Marquis de Caracena, a former governor of the Spanish Netherlands, who had been ac- corded permission to pass through France, was ordered not to appear on French soil ; and the Baron du Vouldy was despatched to Madrid to inform the French ambassador to Spain, La Feuillade, Archbishop of Embnm, of the incident and to demand instant reparation for the insult. The time was an especially trying one for the Spanish concession of Court; for on November 1 the Infante Philip Prosper p'^^"^"_^™°^ *" died, and the attitude of Louis XIV on the question of Spain succession was a matter of deep concern. After a long discussion with Don Luis de Haro, it was agreed that De Watteville 's letter of recall should be placed in the hands of Du Vouldy, accompanied with an order to appear at Madrid and give an account of his conduct; and at the same time a letter of credence was sent for the new Spanish minister, La Fuente, who at his first audience was to pledge the King 's word that the Spanish ambassadors would hence- forth abstain from demanding precedence in England. But Louis XIV was not satisfied with these concessions. He sent M. de Nantia to express to Philip IV his condolence on the death of the Infante, but charged him to direct the French ambassador at Madrid to demand not only that the King of Spain should include his declaration in the text of the new letter of credence sent for La Fuente, or express it in some equally public and unquestionable form, but also that the renunciation of precedence in favor of France, which had been confined to England, should be extended to all other countries. During the controversy, Don Luis de Haro died, and 58 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A. D. 1648-1670 The aims of Louia XIV in Europe the Infante Charles — the future Charles II of Spain — was born. It was not, therefore, until January 6, 1662, that, after much difficulty, the final modifications were accorded. On March 24, La Fuente, in the presence of the papal nuncio and all the ambassadors, was received by the King of France in solemn audience and read a declaration expressing the regrets of His Most Cathohc Majesty.* Then, after La Fuente had withdrawn, the King addressed the other envoys in these words: "You have heard the declaration which the ambassador of Spain has made to me. I pray you to write to your masters, in order that they may know that the Cathohc King has given orders to all his ambassa- dors to yield precedence to mine upon all occasions.^ At Court there was an organized conspiracy to plunge the young king into an abyss of sensuous pleasure, in the hope that, by the influence of mistresses and preoccupa- tion in amusements, others might rule in his place. For a time the illusion prevailed that these intrigues would prove successful. The King was entertained with ballets, fetes, hunting parties, and theatrical representations, in which Mohere's own troupe presented the plays of that master. But in the midst of all this frivohty Louis XIV never for a moment neglected his metier de roi, and De Lioime was required to write despatches in the presence of the King, article by article, which His Majesty corrected when his minister did not exactly express his thought. Exposed to no danger from any of his neighbors, the pohcy of Louis XIV in foreign affairs was, from the moment of Cardinal Mazarin's death, clear, comprehensive, and aggressive. "Immoderately desirous of glory and of establish- ' The text may be found in Diimont, VI, Part II, p. 405. In order to perpetuate the memory of that event, says De Martens, Louis XIV caused a medal to be engraved on which he was represented on the steps of his throne and the Spanish ambassador in the posture of making an apology in the presence of the papal nuncio and other ministers. The legend on its face was: Jus praecedendi assertum; the reverse, Hispanorum accusatio coram XXX Legatis principum. ' The best account is found in Recueil des Instructions, XI, Espagne, pp. 164, 170. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 59 ing his reputation in the world," as Jean Baptiste Colbert Chap. i has described him, he entertained no illusions, and perfectly understood what he wished to accomplish. Mazarin had . extended France to the Pyrenees. Louis XIV wished to extend it to the Rhine and the Alps. Thus would be realized those "natural limits" which had belonged to ancient Gaul. Beyond this hovered indistinctly the future succession to the throne of Spain. Even the crown of the Empire was not yet excluded from his dreams; for, as we shall have occasion to observe, he was repeatedly recurring to plans for the gratification of this ambition. The first step to the realization of this vast programme of French expansion was, however, the possession of the Netherlands; and it was toward this end that all his energies were directed. With a broader knowledge of the complex relations of the The secret aid European powers than any sovereign had ever yet possessed, ^1 Franrar" Louis XIV comprehended that his diplomacy must be secret, systematic, and all-pervasive. Spain and Austria were not only to be kept apart, but both were to be rendered powerless in order that the territories West of the Rhine, partly Spanish and partly Imperial, might be left without defence. In order to weaken Spain, it was desirable that Portugal should be sustained. Many years afterward, in his " M6- moires " the King thus described his evasion of his treaty obhgations not to aid that kingdom in its war with Spain: "I saw that the Portuguese, if they were deprived of my as- sistance, would not be able to resist alone the forces of the House of Austria. I did not doubt that the Spaniards, having vanquished that domestic foe, would more easily imdertake to oppose the establishments I was mediating for the good of my state; and yet I had a scruple about aid- ing Portugal openly, on account of the Treaty of the Pyre- nees. The most natural exi)edient for relieving myself of that embarrassment was to place the King of England in a position to permit that, in his name, I should give to Portu- gal all the assistance necessary." In pursuance of this expedient, La Bastide de la Croix 60 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A. D. 1648-1670 The activities of Louis XIV against the Emperor was secretly sent to London to promote the marriage of Charles II with Catherine, the Infanta of Portugal. Under the . pretext of buying lead in England for the roofs of the royal palace, La Bastide carried letters of credit for five himdred thousand livres, and Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clar- endon, Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor of Charles II, was won for France. Notwithstanding the lively oppo- sition of the Spanish ambassador, on June 23, 1661, the marriage was arranged, and the King of England promised to furnish Portugal with three thousand men and eight frigates for the war with Spain. By a secret contract, Louis XIV bore the whole expense; and Portugal was thus enabled to continue its resistance to Spain. ^ With the King of England thus actually in the service of France, and the King of Spain intimidated by the arro- gance of his haughty son-in-law, who now disavowed the validity of the renunciation of the right of succession to the Spanish throne on the part of Maria Theresa, there was no monarch in Europe who could contest the primacy of this young sovereign, still in his twenty-fourth year. Racine did not greatly exaggerate when in the dedication of his "Alexandre," employing the words used of the great Mace- donian in the Scriptures, he exalted Louis XIV as a prince "before whom all the people of the earth are silent. " Beside the superb independence of the King of France, the Emperor Leopold I seemed the victim of a perpetual con- spiracy against his imperial pretensions. Gravel had la- bored incessantly to extend the League of the Rhine and fortify French influence in Germany. Through his efforts the French party constantly grew in numbers and strength of organization; while the Austrian party, at first the stronger, gradually became enfeebled.^ The principal aims of Louis XIV in his opposition to Leopold I were to dissolve the Austro-Pohsh alliance, dictate the Polish succession, win 1 In 1662, Charles II sold Dunkirk to France for £200,000, quite against the popular will in England. ' On the state of the two parties in Germany in 1660, see Pag^s, Le Grand Elecleur et Louis XIV, p. 35 et seq. A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY Or TRANCE 61 over the adhesion of the Elector of Brandenburg, and Chap. i confirm the predominance of Sweden in the North; thus stripping the Emperor of all external support, and leaving him impotent in international affairs. The question of the Polish succession offered a point d'appui for the influence of France. The Queen, Louise Marie, who has been described as the "veritable King of Poland," was weary of the Austrian alliance, and eager to secure the crown to the Duke of Enghien, son of the Great Conde, who was to marry her niece and become the successor of her childless husband, John Casimir. Until the Peace of the Pyrenees, Mazarin had opposed this idea; but, after the reconciliation of Conde, the project had been seriously en- tertained, and Louis XIV now joined his influence with that of the Polish queen to promote the election of the French prince. In this contest, in which the ingenuity of the French minister, De Lumbres, was opposed by the astuteness and perspicacity of Lisola, the Elector of Brandenburg was the secret opponent of both; for Frederick William perceived in the success of France the triumph of a power in alliance with his enemies, and was opposed to any increase of prestige for the House of Austria. The truth is, Frederick William himself — as is now clearly proved — secretly aspired to the kingship of Poland; and with such ardor that he was even willing if necessary to abandon rights which he had acquired for Brandenburg, in order to obtain it.'^ Entirely ignorant of the Elector's ambition in respect to Poland, Louis XIV, needing his support in the execution of his own designs, attempted to bring him into the circle of his alliances, first by the mediation of Abraham Wicque- fort, — half diplomatist and half adventurer, and author of the famous work "The Ambassador," who had passed from the service of Brandenburg, into the Bastille as a prisoner of Louis XIV, and from the Bastille into the secret service of France, — and afterwird b'" the more formal negotiations 1 See Waddington, Le Grand Elecieur, II, p. 84. 1648-1670 62 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I of De Lesseins, who in November, 1661, was sent to Berlin ■ !>■ _ to enroll Frederick William among the allies of France. The attitude of the Elector, whose chief desire was to maintain his own independence and to incur no obligations, Negotiations was cxprcsscd in his declaration that he was "neither and alliance Austrian nor Spanish, neither French nor Swedish; but of France with . .^^ ^ the Elector of purely and solely German. " The instructions of De Lesseins Brandenburg reviewed the former relations of France and Brandenburg, asserted that the interests of both in the Empire were the same, emphasized the danger to the Elector of an Austrian king of Poland, who would covet Prussia, promised security to Frederick Wilham if a French prince were chosen, and in exchange for this demanded two things,^ adhesion to the League of the Rhine, and a loyal support of the candidature of the Duke of Enghien.^ The reception of the French envoy was apparently cor- dial; but Frederick William, as usual, was coy and wary. The health of the King, the Queen, and the new-born Dau- phin was drunk at the Elector's table, and all the cannon in Berlin were fired in salute; but the designs of France were too evident; and, in February, 1662, the negotiations were suspended, then resumed, and in April — after an illusory revival of hopes — terminated by the departure of Lesseins. It was now the Elector's turn to seek the protection of France. Sweden was rumored to be entering into the plans of France and the Queen of Poland; reports of a bar- gain with the Duke of Neuburg, — the rival and enemy of Frederick Wilham, — by which France was to give him rewards in Poland in exchange for the duchies of JiiUch and Berg, reached the ears of the Elector; and, menaced by these intrigues, he began to tremble for the security of Prussia and of his Rhenish possessions. In November, his agent, Kapsar von Blumenthal, was sent as special ambassador to Stockholm and Paris; but little was accompUshed in Sweden, and nothing in France. It was Louis XIV who was now dic- tating the terms of alUances; and, in the midst of universal dissimulation, Frederick Wilham, although unequalled as ' For the instructions, see Recxieil, XVI, Prusse, p. 69 et seq. A. D. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 63 a subtle and astute dissembler, was disquieted with the fear Chap. i that he might have no refuge but "slavery to France;" to which, as he alleged, he would prefer the "protection of the Turks!" The desperate battle of intrigue, temporization, and equivocation ended, however, in a nominal alliance between Louis XIV and Frederick William. The Elector entered the League of the Rhine; but he was not pledged to promote the designs of France in Poland, or to renounce his relations with Austria. Based neither upon common interests nor mutual confidence, the treaty was almost as ambiguous as the negotiations had been insincere; yet it was, in appearance at least, a triumph for the diplomacy of France, and a new symptom of French predominance in Europe.' The negotiations with the Elector of Brandenburg had The alliance of France v ' Saxony not remained a secret, and John George II of Saxony had '^'^^'^^^ been much perturbed in mind by the progress of French in- fluence in Germany. Originally a loyal friend of Austria, his ardor for the Hapsburgs had been cooled by the refusal of the Emperor to marry his daughter; and, not wishing to be isolated, he was disposed to secure his interests by an entente with Louis XIV. Accordingly, one of his chamberlains, Kaspar von Clengel, who was hostile to Austria, in January, 1664, was secretly sent to Paris to seek a subvention and to promise in return that Saxony would aid no one who re- sisted the interests of France. At Paris, Clengel did not hesitate to reveal the enfeebled position of his master, — whose possession of the electorate was threatened by family quarrels, and whose independence of action was hampered by the rivalries of his ministers, — frankly admitting the need of money to operate a coup d'tStai by which the authority of the Elector might be re- gained. Having, in truth, nothing of value to offer, he was naturally accorded nothing in return. In February, the probable adhesion of the Elector of Brandenburg to the ■ For the negotiations, see the elaborate account in Pagis, Le Grand Elecleur et Louis XIV; for the treaty, dated March 6, 1664, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 129 et seq. A. D. 1648-1670 64 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I League of the Rhine became known at Paris, and John George II grew alarmed at his own exposed position. When, soon, afterward, he gave an audience to Gravel in the pres- ence of his ministers, he clasped the French envoy warmly by the hand and whispered in his ear; "I beg you to rec- ommend me to the good graces of the King your master, I will have more to say on the subject one of these days." To De Lionne and Gravel it was amusing to negotiate with such an easy prey, who seemed satisfied with the pleasure of feehng himself able to conclude a treaty with so powerful a protector. Practically without negotiations, on April 6, 1664, the Treaty of Regensburg, drawn up by Gravel "in terms not disadvantageous for the Elector," as he blandly promised the Saxon plenipotentiary, was signed between Louis XIV and John George 11.^ The Elector was bound to aid the King against anyone who should attempt to oppose him "in the enjoyment of his rights" in the Empire; and the King agreed to protect the Elector in the possession of his electorate. The secret articles were more exphcit. Louis XIV would supply the Electoral Prince with an "annual gratification," the amount of which was left to "the generosity of His Majesty;" and, in return, John George II would vote in the assemblies of the Empire "conformably to the good intentions of the King!"^ If Louis XIV should become a candidate for the imperial throne, the Elector of Saxony was thus pledged to vote for him. The embrogiio There remained in Europe only two powers whose oppo- Md^pt^^^^ sition the King of France had cause to dread, — the Pope Alexander VII and Holland. The one he hoped to concihate; the other he intended first to beguile and isolate, then finally to crush. Pope Alexander VII — that Fabio Chigi who as papal nuncio had aided in mediating the Peace of Westphalia — had bitterly hated Cardinal Mazarin, who had opposed ' For the details, see Auerbaoh, La diplomatie frangaise et la cour de Saxe, pp. 117, 148; for the treaty, Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 7 et seq. ^ The secret articles have been published by Vast in the Revue Historique, LXV, pp. 20, 21. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 65 his election, resented his protection of the recalcitrant Car- chap. i dinal de Retz, and described the Pope as possessing neither a. d. "knowledge nor solid virtues," with a "head filled with 1648-1670 false maxims touching the affairs of the world and the in- terests of Christian princes." The pretensions of Louis XIV and the adulations of France towards the King, which threatened to subordinate the papal authority to the culte du rot, had excited in Alexander VII an almost equally- intense animosity. From the beginning of his independent rule, the King of France had endeavored to propitiate the Pope; but the Spanish and imperial influences were strong at Rome, and although there was a French party among the cardinals, up to the arrival of the Duke of Crequi as ambas- sador of France in June, 1662, no progress toward a reconcil- iation had been made. This bellicose diplomatist, described by a contemporary as a "proud man whose face did not belie his character," . . . who "needed to humanize himself," . . . and "who be- came more disdainful after he was clothed with the quahty of ambassador," was ill adapted for a work of peace. His audiences of the Pope were mutually imsatisfactory, and the tension between the ambassador and the papal court was strained. In these circtmistances on the evening of August 20, the Farnese Palace, in which the French embassy was lodged, was made the object of a violent attack by Cor- sican soldiers of the papal guard. The outrage originated from a quarrel between the Corsicans and domestics belong- ing to the embassy, in which innocent persons were killed and woimded, leading to a terrific battle in the streets, and ending in an assault upon the carriage of the Duchess of Crequi, the death of one of her pages by a musket shot, the exposure of her life amidst a shower of bullets, and a siege of the palace itself so furious as for a time to prevent her approach and to imperil the safety of the ambassador.' The recriminations growing out of this occurrence not The pressure of only for the time put an end to all hope of an entente between "^the^ope ' The incident is exhaustively related by Mouy, L'ambassade du diic de Crequi. VOL. III. — 5 66 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I France and the Holy See, but excited Europe with the A- E- dread of a conflict that might change the whole course of ^^ European politics. The Duke of Crequi proceeded to fortify his palace like a fortress, with the intention, he al- leged, of preventing such insults in the future. The papal court, on the other hand, complained that the arrogance of the French and their preparations for resistance were responsible for the occurrence. The French charged the officials of Rome with complicity in the assault, and charac- terized it as a "papal conspiracy." Finally, after various attempts to adjust the matter, further negotiations became impossible, and the ambassador left Rome, which hastened to put itself in a state of defence against the indignation of the King of France. The wrath of Louis XIV was equal to the papal expecta- tion. The King wrote bitterly to the Pope of the "aversion" which the Holy See had for his person and his crown, to the cardinals of the "consequences" which the affair might entail, and to his charge d'affaires of the "amends" he would require. In the draft of his letter to the Pope, he wrote on the margin that it was needless for the copyist to insert the usual closing formula, "Je prie Dieu de Vous tenir en sa sainte garde." The nuncio at Paris was dismissed and at once conducted to the frontier, without being al- lowed to see his confessor or hear mass before his departure. When the Venetian and the Spanish ambassadors pro- tested to the ministers against such rigorous treatment of the representative of the Holy See, they were informed that the orders given to the soldiers did not concern foreign envoys. But Louis XIV did not confine himself to mere diplo- matic reprisals. Refusing all mediation, and demanding that reparation should be made to him only through the Duke of Crequi, in whose person he had been wronged, he gave meaning to his attitude by immediately occupying Avignon and the County of Venaissin. On July 26, 1663, the County was declared by the Parliament of Provence imited with France. As the Pope did not show himself THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 67 sufficiently humble, the King ostentatiously began prepara- chap. i tions for the invasion of Italy, and by the commencement ad- of 1664, French troops were quartered at Parma and Modena. In February the negotiations were resumed with a more lively interest, and on the twelfth of that month was signed the Treaty of Pisa, in which Pope Alexander VII agreed to require of his ministers "to show to the ambassador of His Majesty the respect which is due to him who represents the person of so great a king, the eldest son of the Church," to exclude forever the Corsican race from the pontifical ser- vice in every ecclesiastical state, and to erect at Rome an expiatory pyramid as a memorial of his humihation. In return, Louis XIV consented to evacuate Italy, and to restore to the Holy See Avignon and the Coimty of Ven- aissin, but the pontifical garrison of Avignon was to be sup- pressed.' The Duke of Cr^qui returned to Rome, and the appearance of friendly relations was resumed; but, in truth, the reconciliation was illusory. Alexander VII had vainly endeavored to form a coalition against France, and had yielded only to force majeure. He could forgive the trium- phant monarch neither his pretensions nor his victory, and it was discerned that, imder the guise of a faithful son, the King of France was for the Holy See a formidable rival and a dangerous foe. It was not enough for Louis XIV to subordinate England The new pou- and Spain, to frustrate the Emperor's designs in Germany, <='e3 of Franca and to humiliate the Pope; his real plans were constructive rather than competitive, and all his vast international machinery, all his insistence upon primacy in ranlc were in- tended to support the material expansion and predominance of France. To extend his territories to the Rhine by the annexation and incorporation of the Netherlands, Franche- Comt^, Lorraine, and Alsace; and to raise France, thus augmented, to the height of a great industrial, commercial, and colonial power, thereby making it the richest and most dominant of civilized states, — such was the ambition of the King. Before his vision opened a great world of develop- ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 1 et seq. 68 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I ment such as had never entered into the thoughts of Riche- A.D. lieu or Mazarin. Child of a new age, and heir of a recon- 1648-1670 g^itu^g(j France, Louis XIV dreamed, indeed, of the Empire and of the Spanish succession, as any one of his ambitious predecessors might have dreamed; but, unlike them, he realized the value and sig-nificance of the economic ele- ments of national greatness. He was the first of the French kings to found his state upon the principles of political economy. His army, his navy, his finances, and his internal administration were all reorganized with this end in view. With this purpose also, under the inspiration of his great minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, and in imitation of the Dutch, in 1664, he fomided the East and West India Com- panies, and began that quest of colonial empire which was to give a new direction to the course of history. ' The progreaa It was the Dutch Rcpublic that had thus far best repre- NetherUn^'* scnted the new forces which were to shape the future of the world. Like Venice in the mediaeval period, the United Provinces, as the result of their commercial enterprise, had developed a vast colonial system, and their population had become the most prosperous then existing. Within the confederation, Holland, representing the mari- time power and the chief wealth of the Republic, controlled its administration, and dictated its foreign pohcy. Two par- ties continued to exist within the State. The adherents of the House of Orange desired the restoration of the stadt- holderate, and through it a revival of mihtary strength, which, with the aid of England, it was believed, would guarantee the integrity of the country against the designs of France. The republicans, who were strongest in Holland, and particularly in Amsterdam, found their chief interest in the prosecution of trade, in which England was their rival, and feared the effect of a strong central and mihtary authority upon their commerce and their liberties. The system Under the leadership of the Grand Pensionary, John De of John De w^jtt, the repubficans were still in power; but, forced by his 1 See Sottas, Histoire de la Compagnie Royale des Indes orientales, Paris, 190.5, p. 5. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 69 position to negotiate with the States General as well as with Chap. i foreign potentates, he had cause to realize the relative weak- ^- ^- 1 ftAQ 1 ftYn ness of a form of government in which so many "High Might- inesses" had to be consulted.^ All the sovereigns of Europe courted the favor of Holland, but only for the purpose of prof- iting by its resources in the advancement of their schemes; and to maintain with any one of them a relation of close friendship without provoking a counterbalancing enmity, required the utmost skill. Amidst dangers that arose almost as much from the choice of friends as from the designs of enemies, De Witt sought to preserve good relations with all, to substitute in- telligence for force, and by a dexterous counterpoise of all the powers to obtain for the Republic peace, security, and prosperity. In an age when glory and dominion were almost universal passions, and war was the chief argiunent of rulers, he was charged with the task of preserving the independence of a state in which trade, industry, science, and literature were regarded as the normal pursuits of mankind. To foster them, Holland had become the chief emporium of Europe, the asylum of religious and intellectual hberty, and the only country where a free press, exempt from official oversight and censure, sent forth in various languages books and gazettes, elsewhere prohibited, which fornid their way by mysterious avenues to every European country. If in governmental theory De Witt was an idealist in The rivalry of an age of political realism, in his diplomatic negotiations |jan°eTot the he was not less astute than the most expert of his antagon- Dutch aiuanoe ists. In the life and death struggle of Spain with France he was forced to choose between them. At the time when Dunkirk was sold to France, the Spanish ambassador, Gamarra, pointed out that it was far better for Holland that this stronghold should return to Spain, which was less able to use it against the interests of the Republic; but at that time the ambitious designs of Louis XIV were not as ap- ' For the manner in which De Witt manipulated, — and sometimes deceived, — the States General, see LefSvre-Pontahs, Jean de Witt, I, pp. 329, 330. 1648-1670 70 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I parent as they afterward became, and the favorable treaty '^•°- of alliance, commerce, and navigation made by Holland . with France on April 17, 1662, seemed a sufficient compensa- tion for the sanction of the bargain which France had then made with England regarding Dunkirk. To win Holland away from this alliance, Gamarra offered to place the Grand Pensionary in the council of finance for the Spanish Netherlands, by which he would be in possession of the secret plans of Spain; but De Witt dechned this prop- osition. At that time he was disposed to solve the problem of the Netherlands by allowing France to annex a portion I of the Spanish provinces, the Republic taking also a certain portion, on condition that a federal republic, hke that of the Swiss Cantons, be formed of the remainder as a barrier between that kingdom and the United Provinces; but this project, which had been first suggested by Richelieu, was invested with pecuhar difficulties.^ On the one hand, the King of France hesitated to limit in this manner his field of future expansion; and, on the other, the merchants of Am- sterdam were resolved not to tolerate the revival of Antwerp. At the same time, Gamarra, who was not ignorant of the plans for the total expulsion of Spain from the Netherlands, on five separate occasions urged upon the Grand Pensionary a close league with Spain as the only expedient for resisting the designs of France. The idea of a The anxiety of De Witt for the future of the Spanish Neth- barner state erlands was increased by the reports of the contemplated marriage of the Emperor Leopold I with Margaret, the second Spanish Infanta, to whom, it was feared, the Spanish Netherlands might be given as a dowry, whereby the old Hapsburg union would be restored and both France and the United Provinces exposed to a revival of the old danger.^ If such a restoration of Hapsburg power were realized, even if the United Provinces were not recovered by Spain, the ' See Mignet, N&godalions relatives & la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV, I, p. 199 et seq. 2 The marriage contract had been signed at Madrid on December 18, 1663. See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 283 et seq. 1648-1670 THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 71 stadtholderate might be restored and the repubhcan party Chap, i doomed to extinction. ^• As the case presented itself to his mind, there was no . possible chance of preserving the Dutch Republic by an alliance with Spain. In March, 1664, he described that power as a "skeleton whose parts are attached, not with nerves, but with wires, so that no confidence can be placed in its friendship or its ability to succor." His estimate of the aid that might be obtained from the Emperor, or from the princes of the Empire, so largely under the influence of France, was equally low. While, therefore, he clearly saw that danger to the Republic might come from France, he be- heved that there was no way to avert it except to yield to Louis XIV a part of what he claimed. This, with great in- genuity, he attempted to do; but it had not fully dawned upon him how insatiable the King of France would be. Determined to share his prey with no one, Louis XIV was from first to last negotiating with De Witt only to prevent his forming a league with Spain; and, if for a time he seemed to favor the idea of partition and the erection of a barrier state, it was with the purpose of first weakening the power of Spanish resistance, in order that his triumph might be the easier when he should advance his claims to the Spanish crown. These were already in process of elaboration, and it was because Holland would not formally acknowledge his pretended rights of inheritance that in April, 1664, he suddenly broke off the negotiations, and left the Republic to be weakened by its war with England.^ If England had envied the prosperity of the Dutch in the The Angio- time of Cromwell, there was additional reason for doing so ^"j^''" in the time of Charles II. Dutch commerce had again re- vived and the Dutch colonies were flourishing. In addition, Charles II was hostile to the Republic as such, both on account of its treatment of the House of Orange and its atti- tude toward himself in the time of Cromwell. No pains were taken on his part, therefore, to prevent insults to the Dutch 1 For these negotiations, see Legrelle, La diplomatie frangaise et la succession d'Espagne, I, pp. 67, 100. 1648-1670 72 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I flag and violence to the Dutch colonies on the part of his • i^- _^ naval officers, which the Dutch admiral Ruyter was ordered . to resent; and thus, without a declaration of war, the conflict broke out once more, first in Africa, then in America, and the King's brother, the Duke of York, assumed command at sea. At the moment of the Stuart restoration, De Witt had seen that the English monarchy must be propitiated, and had attempted to concihate Charles II. On September 29, 1660, therefore, the act of exclusion against the House of Orange had been revoked by the States General, on the groimd that it had been forcibly exacted by Cromwell; but the concession had proved unavailing. Charles II was not only disposed to maintain the rights of his nephew, the future WiHiam III, he was determined to abase the power of Holland. He especially needed at that time the influence and support at home which only a foreign war could evoke, and at the moment there was no foe to face with whom battle would create so much enthusiasm as the Dutch. Accord- ingly, in April, 1664, a fleet of four war vessels was sent to New Amsterdam, and in September that city and the Hud- son river were surrendered to the English before war had been formally declared. In December, Parliament voted large subsidies to drive Dutch commerce from the ocean, and for the first time Charles II discovered the secret of how to obtain money from a reluctant people. French media- Bouud by the Treaty of 1662 to aid the Republic in re- tion and the gigting this aggression, Louis XIV nevertheless complained Breda becausc Van Beuningen, who had negotiated the treaty, was sent to Paris to press its execution. Unable to deny his ob- hgation, he pleaded his right to four months' preparation before offering active aid; and endeavored to evade the de- mand for immediate support by claiming that he had prom- ised assistance only in case the States General were attacked "in Europe." In order, however, to prevent the United Provinces from falling under the power of England or seek- ing an aUiance with Spain, he finally decided, after permitting the Republic to be weakened, to propose mediation. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 73 But it was not to his interposition that the Repubhc owed Chap, r its salvation. While negotiations for peace were dragging ^■"■ on unsuccessfully, in July, 1667, a Dutch fleet under Ruyter entered the mouth of the unprotected Thames and sailed up the Medway, capturing the "Royal Charles," burning the dockyards where new ships were building at Chatham, and blockaded London for several weeks. As a consequence, the Peace of Breda, signed on July 31, 1667, closed the war, leaving each belligerent in possession of what had been taken before May 20 of that year.^ Surinam thus fell to the Dutch, and New Amsterdam to the English, who renamed it in honor of the Duke of York. The Navigation Act was not annulled, but it was so modified as to permit Dutch vessels to convey to England the commerce of the Rhine. To De Witt the victory gave a new lease of power, but the net was already gathering about his feet. For England the chief gains of the war were the elimination of Holland as a rival in North America, and the establishment of a closer territorial bond between the col- onies of New England and Virginia; but the mismanage- ment of the war had the further consequence of causing the downfall of the Clarendon ministry and the beginning of the reaction against Charles II. The death of Philip IV of Spain on September 17, 1665, The theory of had furnished the occasion for an action long contemplated '*'''"''"'"'" by the King of France. From the begiiming, he had con- sidered the renunciation of the Spanish crown on behalf of Maria Theresa an invalid act; and had never ceased his efforts to obtain from the King of Spain an acknowledg- ment of that view.^ By his last will and testament, dated three days before his death, Phihp IV had bequeathed the Spanish monarchy and all its possessions, in case the child Charles II — who was born November 6, 1661, three days ' See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 44 et seq. ' Since August, 1661, these negotiations were pursued at Madrid by Feuillade. See his instruotions, Recueil, Espagne, XI, p. 161. An ex- cellent digest of the negotiations is given by Vast, Les grands traites, II, pp. 1, 10. 74 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I after the death of Philip Prosper — should die without heirs, A- ^- to his second daughter, Margaret, affianced to the Emperor 1648-16 jp„pr,if] ji jjj tijjg document the renunciation of Maria Theresa's claims was not only declared to be valid, but the incompatibihty of a union of the two crowns of France and Spain was declared to be a "fundamental law." Notwithstanding the terms of this testament, Louis XIV had no thought of abandoning the ultimate claims of the Queen of France to the throne of Spain. On the contrary, he was not even wilhng to await the death of the infant king before asserting a part of the claims in her behalf. Franche- Comte, Luxemburg, Hainault, Cambray, Aire, and Saint- Omer he demanded immediately, on the ground of a local custom of certain Spanish provinces, particularly of Brabant, by which a daughter of a first marriage was preferred to a son by a second marriage in the inheritance of real estate. The territories just named, it was pretended, had thus " devolved" upon Maria Theresa before her marriage. They could not, therefore, belong to Charles II, who was born afterwards. Such was the droit de devolution by which the King of France claimed in the name of his queen immediate possession of the lands in question. The Spanish jurisconsults argued that the custom referred only to private property, and could not be applied as a doctrine of public law to the inheritance of political rights; and, further, that it was opposed to the Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles V, which made the Netherlands indivisible.^ But Louis XIV was not disposed to listen to objections. He caused a manifesto to be prepared and printed in Latin, French, and Spanish, in which his jurisconsults attempted to prove the illegality of the renunciation imposed on the Queen of France, and to set forth her rights. The renuncia- tion was claimed to be invalid (1) because it is contrary to ' See Mignet, Negociations, etc., I, p. 382. ^ For the arguments of the Spanish and Imperialist jurisconsults, see Lonchay, La rivaliU de la France et de I'Espagne aux Pays-Bos, pp. 226, 227. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 75 natural and civil law, and rests only on a decretal of Pope Chap. i Boniface VIII having no application to sovereign kingdoms; a. d. (2) the King of Spain in reality gave nothing to his daughter, 1648-1670 for even the five hundred thousand ecus promised and not paid were only a legitimate inheritance from her mother, who had brought that stun to her husband; (3) the renun- ciation did not apply to future successors, and by the death of her mother and her brother, Maria Theresa was, at the moment of her marriage, heiress by full right; (4) the renunciation of a minor is not valid ; and (5) a king cannot change the order of succession without consultation with the councils established in his states, which Philip IV had not done.^ The rights of the Queen were then fully recited, with the reasons for demanding their execution in each case.^ As Spain would neither admit the invalidity of the renun- The isolation ciation nor the right of "devolution," Louis XIV resolved °' ®''^"' to assert his claims by force of arms. Only a few dexterous strokes were necessary to complete the isolation of Spain and render her an easy victim. The first was a new offensive and defensive treaty with Portugal, signed on March 31, 1667, with the intention of keeping Spain occupied in the Iberian peninsula while the French army invaded Flanders.^ The second was the master stroke of securing the non-inter- vention of the Emperor. As early as 1664, the idea was suggested that the best solution of the Spanish succession, when the male line became extinct, would be to divide the heritage of Spain between France and Austria. The Archbishops of Mainz and Koln had favored such a solution as a possible means of ending the rivalry between the Emperor and the King of France; thus securing the peace of Europe, and rendering ' Don Luis de Haro, who had negotiated the treaty for Spain, waa obhged to admit that such a renunciation did not set aside the Spanish constitution, which recognized the right of females to the throne. ' The Traite des droits de la reine is a volume of 270 quarto pages printed in 1667. RepUes were pubUshed by Lisola, Bouclier d'Stal et de Justice, and Ramos del Manzano. Respuesta de Espana. For the litera- ture, see Vast, Les grands traites, II, p. 4, note. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 27 et seq. A. D. 1648-1670 76 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I Catholicism once more predominant by the fraternal union of these two sovereigns. After unsuccessful attempts by the two archbishops to interest the Court of Vienna in this scheme, the idea was taken up by De Lionne and with the approbation of Louis XIV intrusted to the skilful hands of the French ambassa- dor, the Chevalier de Gr^monville.^ After long negotiations with Prince Auersperg, — who was ambitious to possess the red hat of a cardinal, — Gr6- monville succeeded not only in winning over the minister to the plan of partition, but obtained from him concessions that were no doubt surprising to the ambassador himself. The transaction was conducted with such secrecy that false instructions were employed to deceive the officers of the great seal of France; and Gremonville's interviews with Auersperg were held at night, the ambassador visiting him on foot to prevent suspicions by his own servants. At these midnight meetings these two men, each striving to outdo the other, divided between France and Austria the whole heritage of Spain. Throughout this extraordinary comedy, the "red hat" for "the cardinal of peace" was from time to time shaken when Gr^monville was not satisfied with the course of the negotiations; and, at one of the heated points of the controversy it was suggested that it was not worth while "to quarrel about such a little matter as the Kingdom of Naples," whichever way it went! Finally, at two o'clock in the morning, on January 20, 1668, the secret treaty was signed; in which it was agreed that, if Charles II of Spain died without children, Leopold I was to have Spain, Milan, and most of the Spanish colonies; while France was to take all that Spain yet possessed in the Netherlands, with Franche-Comt^, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, and the Philippines.^ ' An objection first raised at Vienna to the idea of partition was that the marriage of Leopold I and the Spanish Infanta Margaret had not yet been celebrated. The marriage having taken place on April 26, 1666, this objection was now removed. ^ Details of the negotiation are given by Legrelle, La diplomatie frangaise el la succession d'Espagne, I, pp. 101, 148; and Mignet THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 77 By this astonishing compact, the monarch who had the Chap. i best reason to dispute the pretensions of Louis XIV was ^- °- made a clandestine partner with him in the project of dis- membering the heritage of Spain. While all Europe was being thus bound to the chariot wheels of Louis XIV or mystified by his sophisms/ and sovereigns and statesmen were reading the famous "Traite des Droits de la Reine, " without a declaration of war, in June, 1667, the King of France had silently occupied with his troops the cities of Flanders, which were almost defenceless, in order to execute his plan of immediate expropriation. While Gravel was quieting apprehensions among the The Triple Germans at Regensburg, and Count d'Estrades was allay- ^"'^™^j°'^f ing irritation at The Hague, the Marquis de Ruvigny was Aix-ia- despatched to London to prevent opposition in England. ^''^'^ " Although the English Parliament was suspicious of the de- signs of France, and the prime minister, the Earl of Arling- ton, was inclined toward a Spanish alliance, Louis XIV was hopeful of gaining the ear of Charles II by promises of money and the prospect of securing some colonies from Spain. In Holland, De Witt had become alarmed at the preten- sions of France, and the Dutch ambassador Van Beuningen was instructed to demand of the King how far he intended to carry his plans of annexation. The answer did not allay the feeling of uneasiness, and for the first time De Witt fully Negociations, etc., II, pp. 342, 441. The treaty, being secret, was not published until recent times, but was seen by Voltaire, who says of it : "Leopold had no sooner signed it than he repented of his act. He de- manded at least that no other court should know of its existence; that a double copy be not made according to custom; and that the unique instrument be enclosed in a metal casket, of which the Emperor should possess one key and the King the other." — SihAe de Louis XIV, p. 141. The precautions mentioned were not in reality carried out, but the ex- istence of the treaty was first pubUcly revealed by Torcy in his Me- moires, I, p. 36, published in 1756. ' For the details of the diplomatic web woven by De Lionne under the direction of Louis XIV between 1662 and 1667, by which all Europe seemed to be arrayed against Spain, see Vast, Les grands traites, II, pp. 6, 6. 78 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I realized the peril to which the Republic might in the future A. D- be exposed. 1648-1670 -g^^ ^j^g danger foreshadowed by the dominance of France had already begun to be felt in other quarters. The Elector of Brandenburg had long been alarmed by the French influence in Poland, and in order to hold him to his alUance Louis XIV had been obliged to promise new concessions. Sweden, already disturbed on account of the attitude of Louis XIV regarding the throne of Poland, had shown signs of jealousy because of the protection France was offering to Denmark, and began to realize that the King was becoming too powerful in the Empire. In January, 1666, the Marquis de Pompoime had been sent to Stockholm to strengthen the relaxing bonds of the Swedish alliance, and especially to prevent the possibility of the partition of Poland by the Emperor, Russia, and the Elector of Brandenburg after the death of John Casimir.^ But De Pomponne had not been successful in this mission; and as early as August, 1667, that ambassador had an- nounced to Louis XIV the possible formation of a general league against France in which Sweden might take a part. At The Hague, the Swedish ambassador. Count Dohna, sug- gested that, in concert with Holland and England, Sweden might agree to a joint mediation, and thus enforce a recon- ciliation of Louis XIV with Spain. Thus was sounded the first note of the Triple Alliance ~ of Holland, England, and Sweden; which, with the help of Sir Wifliam Temple, whom Arlington sent to The Hague on special mission in December, 1667, in co-operation with De Witt and Coimt Dohna, soon took effective form. On January 23, 1668, England and Holland agreed to unite in a coalition, to which Sweden adhered in the following May, for the purpose of enforcing upon Spain the conditions demanded by Louis XIV, and thereby arresting his am- ' This appears to be the first clear indication of what the fate of Poland was finally to be. See Mignet, Nigociations, etc. II, p. 303 et seq. THE ASCENDENCY OF FBANCE 79 bitious designs. 1 At the same time, Spain was relieved of Chap. i the war with Portugal; which, through the mediation ^■^■ of England, received from Spain on February 13, 1668, the ^^^^-^^70 recognition of its independence.^ On April 15, at Saint- Germain-en-Laye, the Triple Alliance laid down the condi- tions which it was proposed to enforce as the basis of peace; and, on May 2, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed, in which Spain agreed to recognize all the conquests thus far made by France, and Louis XIV consented to restore Franche-Comte, which had been occupied in the previous February, together with Cambray, Aire, and Saint-Omer. Thus ended the "WMLJ)iJievolution.''^ But the interven- tion of the Triple Alliance had aroused in Louis XIV a re- sentment for which Holland was to pay a heavy penalty. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Triple Alliance was to The resent- enforce upon Spain the acceptance of the demands made ™''°.' "1 by the King of France, and thus terminate the war; but, in toward reality, it was intended to present a pOTmanent barrier to 2°"™"! further pretensions by Louis XIV. The whole significance of the coahtion lay in the secret articles, and especially the third; which was to the effect that, if the "Roi Tres Chretien" had intentions that could induce him to refuse to sign the treaty of peace when the Spaniards consented to cede to him the places taken by him in the last campaign, or their equivalent, or rejected the guarantees to be required of him, then the three powers were bound to unite with the King of Spain in enforcing these conditions upon the ' King of France. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle imposed no restriction upon the will of Louis XIV, but simply required that he should loyally execute what he himself had already pro- posed.^ But this was a serious cause of offence to him. Having secured by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle all that ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 66 et seq. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 70 et seq. ' For the treaty, see Vast, Les grands traites, II, pp. 14, 22. ' See the Memorandum of November 18, 1667, in Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 69. 80 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I A. u. 1648-1670 The exposed position of Holland he had at the time demanded, and having obtained through his secret treaty of January 20, 1668, with the Emperor an - agreement to his eventual possession of the entire Spanish Netherlands, he had really obtained in principle all he could hope to gain from Spain by continuation of the war. He, therefore, resolved to conceal his indignation, dissolve the coalition, and in time wreak his vengeance upon the chief offender, the Dutch Republic' But the attitude of Holland was hardly less resented in other quarters. Spain felt deeply wounded by the exactions imposed upon her, and the Papacy was incidentally aggrieved. The new pope, Clement IX, had been anxious to restore the international influence of the Holy See by acting as media- tor at Aix-la-Chapelle, and for this distinction all the resources of Rome had been brought into action; but it was a Dutch burgomaster. Van Beuningen, who had really settled the essential conditions of the peace, and at Aix-la- Chapelle the only role left for the papal nuncio was to be, as Voltaire has expressed it, "a phantom of an arbitrator among phantoms of plenipotentiaries." The treaty there ratified with so much solemnity had been already written at Saint-Germain. Deliberately and sagaciously, Louis XIV now planned the total annihilation of the Republic. The first step was to be its complete isolation. The task was not difficult, for Spain, forced to make a disadvantageous peace, was much en- feebled, the Emperor and many of the chief princes of the 1 In a memorandum found by Rousset in the archives of the War Department at Paris we have these words from the King himself re- garding the Hollanders: "J'avoue que leur insolence me piqua au vif, au risque de ce qui pourrait arriver de mes conquetes, de tourner toutes mes forces contre cette altifire et ingrate nation. Mais ayant appel6 la prudence k mon secours et consid^re que je n'avais ni le nombre des troupes, ni la quality des allies requis pour une pareille entreprise, je dissimulai, je conclus la paix k des conditions honorables, risolu de remettre la punition de cette perfidie a un autre temps." — Rousset, Hisloire de Louvois, I, p. 233. Louis XIV was especially irritated by a medal struck in Holland representing Van Beuningen as Joshua arrest- ing the sun (Louis XIV) in his course. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 81 Empire were already in league with France, and only Chap, i England and Sweden were in alliance with Holland. With *• °- 1 fiAQ 1 (VTCl prompt insight Louis XIV perceived that the Triple Alliance —^ was in reahty a mere rope of sand. The Stuarts needed his support, and the English people could be made to feel hostile to the Dutch by reviving the quarrels of the past. Sir Wilham Temple's diplomacy might not receive the sustained approval necessary to make it of permanent importance; for the memory of past defeats, joined with the prospect of obtaining spoils from the Dutch commerce and colonies, could be made to counteract it, and ^vith the desertion of England the coalition would be practically dissolved. To the Machiavellian mind of Charles II the overthrow The secret of the Dutch Republic appeared a profitable scheme, and "^^l^ °^ he easily yielded to the influence of the King of France. In September, 1670, Temple was recalled from The Hague, to find a cold reception at the English Court. Colbert de Croissy, who had been sent to London in 1668, had quietly done his work; the King was fully committed to the designs of Louis XIV against Holland; Arlington found it to his interest to give way; and the negotiator of the Triple Alhance retired to the tranquilhty of private life, writing soon after- ward to Wicquefort that the fruits of his garden seemed to him "to have the quality of preserving themselves better than the fruits of his embassies." While De Witt was unmindful of the plot that was forming, Lisola, who had been sent as Imperial ambassador at The Hague, tried to induce the Emperor to join the Triple Al- liance; and that inconstant sovereign — of who^n Gre- monville once said that he was "Hke a clock that always needed winding" — wrote to Charles II offering his adhe- sion.i He applied too late. The King of England had al- ready made a new compact with Louis XIV, and decUned ' The Emperor's decision to enter the Triple AUiance was brought about by the counsels of Lisola, the urgency of Malagon, Spanish am- bassador at Vienna, and the purchased assent of Auersperg and Lob- kowitz. See Legrelle, La diplomalie fran(aise, etc., pp. 178, 180. VOL. III. — 6 A. D. 1648-1670 82 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACT Chap. I to admit the Emperor to a coalition which he had in fact deserted. The conspiracy which De Croissy had begun had been completed bythe Princess Henriette of Orleans. Charles II had received his sister at Dover; and, on June 1, 1670, Arlington and De Croissy had signed a secret treaty of offensive alliance against Holland. By the secret Treaty of Dover, Charles II was to receive two milHon livres to be employed in defending his royal authority and making England Catholic; and in return he was to furnish six thousand soldiers and fifty vessels of war for an attack upon the United Provinces. When the country was conquered England was promised Walcheren, the mouths of the Scheldt, and the island of Cadsandt, as her share of the spoils.^ Arhngton was offered eight thousand crowns for his comphcity, which the King authorized him to accept. The Triple Alliance being thus secretly disrupted, it only remained to dissolve it openly. After the Dutch Re- public had been completely isolated, the united forces of France and England were to attack it by land and sea. AUTHORITIES Documents The opening of the archives of aU the European governments relating to foreign affairs to historical research has within the last half century thrown a flood of Ught upon the history of international relations. Prac- tically all the documents of first importance have been published either in full, in the form of digests, or by definite citation of the facts which they record. There remains, however, a great mass of detail which is of value for the perfect understanding of special questions but is of com- paratively little significance for the general student of history. ' The Treaty of Dover, being secret, was not known to Dumont, and therefore does not appear in his collection of treaties. The text may be found in Mignet, Negociaiions, etc.. Ill, p. 187. To give it effect and follow it up with advantage to France, a beautiful Breton girl, Louise de K&ouaUe, maid of honor to the Princess Henriette, having pleased the fancy of Charles II, was sent to England, where she became the King's mistress and under the title of the Duchess of Portsmouth exercised a powerful influence over his foreign policy. See Fomeron, Louise de Kirotialle, Paris, 1886. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 83 For those who wish to make independent investigations in the ar- Chap. I chives, the following works may be useful: Bar, Leitfaden fur Archiv- ^^ j, benutzer, Leipzig, 1896; Burohhardt, Hand- und AdresshiLch der 1648-1670 deutschen Archive, Leipzig, 1887; Basohet, Histoire du depdt des Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, 1875; Inveniaire sommaire des Archives des Affaires Strangeres, Paris, 1896; Rye, Records and Record Searching, London, 1888; Mazzatinti, Gli archivi della storia d' Italia, Rocca S. Casciano, 1897; Flammermont, Rap-port sur les correspondances des agents diplomatiques etrangers en France avant la revolution conservees dans les Archives de Berlin, Dresde, Genhoe, Turin, Gines, Florence, Naples, Simancas, Lisbonne, Londres, La Haye et Vienne, Paris, 1896. On the value and use of diplomatic documents some useful sugges- tions may be found in Uhnann, i}ber den Wert diplomatischer Depeschen als Geschichtsquellen, Leipzig, 1874; and Schiemann, Einige Gedanken uber die Benutzung diplomatischer Depeschen, in Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXIII. The most important printed collections of public documents for the present chapter are: Leonard, Recueil des traites de paix, Paris, 1693, containing only treaties of which the kings of France were signatories; Leibnitz, Codex juris gentium diplomaticus, Hanover, 1693-1700; Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, Amsterdam, 1726-1731, the most complete for the period and usually cited; Saint-Prest, Histoire des traites de paix du XVII" siecle, Amsterdam, 1725; Ouroussow, Resume historique des prindpaux traites de paix, Evreux, 1884, with brief in- troductory notes. For the present chapter the best authority on the treaties of a general character is Vast, Les grands traites du rhgne de Louis XIV, Paris, 1893. Public documents relating to England are found in Thurloe, State Papers (1638-1661), London, 1742. Thurloe was Secretary of State under Oliver and Richard Cromwell. Documents relating to the Netherlands may be found in Aitzema, Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorlog, The Hague, 1658; Kluit, Historia foederum, Leyden, 1790; and Codex Diplomaticus Neer- landicus, Utrecht, 1851-1860. For Brandenburg and Prussian documents, see in Urkunden und AktenstUcke zur Oeschichte des Kurfilrsien Friedrich Wilhelm von Bran- denburg, Auswartige Akten, Bd. II, Simson, Frankreich, 1640-1667; Bd. Ill; Peter, Niederlande 1640-1688; Bd. XIV, 1, Pribram, Oster- reich, 1640-1675; Berhn, 1864 et seq. Also Morner, Kurhrandenburgs Staatsvertrage von 1601-1700, BerUn, 1867. The Austrian Staatsvertrage are being prepared by the Commission for the Modem History of Austria. One volume, Pribram, England (1526-1748), Innsbruck, 1907, has appeared. Others are to follow for France, Netherlands, etc. In finding the place of pubKcation of treaties Tetot, Repertoire des 84 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I traii&s de paix, de commerce, d'alliance, etc., — Partie chronologiquo, A. D. Paris, 1866, and Partie alphab^tique, Paris, 1867 — is useful. 1648-1670 Koch and Scholl, Hisloire dbrege des traiUs de paix, Brussels, 1837; and De Garden, Histoire Generale des traiUs de paix, . Paris, 1848-1859, whicti is in great part a reproduction of it, are antiquated. The most complete collection of diplomatic instructions yet published is Becueil des instnu:lions donnies aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traites de Westphalie jiLsqu'a la revolution frangaise, Paris, 1884 et seq., comprising: I Sorel, Autriche; II Geffrey, Suede; III Saiut-Aymour, Portugal; IV and V Farges, Polognc; VI Hanotaux, Rome; VII Lebon, Bavihe, Palatinat, et Deux-Ponts; VIII and IX Rambaud, Russie; X Reinach, Naples et Parme; XI Morel-Fatio and L^onardon, Espagne, Tome I (1649-1750), XII and Xllbis Tome II and III (1750-1789); XIII Geffroy, Danemark; XIV and XVBeau- caire, Savoie-Mantoue; XVI Waddington, A., Prusse. The instructions were, however, often soon modified; so that they do not constitute a complete source. The introductions are valuable, being frequently based on a further study of the archives. Of contemporary memoirs and letters, the following are the most important for the present chapter: Ch^ruel, Lettres du cardinal Mazarin, Paris, 1872; Mimoires de Terlon, Paris, 1681; Dreyss, Memoires de Louis XIV, Paris, 1860; Louis XIV, Memoires pour Vinstruction du Dauphin, Paris, 1806; and Lettres aux princes de V Europe, Paris, 1755; Patin, Gui, Lettres, Paris, 1846; Whitelock, Journal of the Swedish Ambassy in the Years 1653 and 1654: from the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, London, 1772; and Memorials of the English Affairs (1625-1661), Oxford, 1853; Jean de Witt, Lettres et n&godations, Amsterdam, 1725; and new edition in Dutch by Fruin and Kernkamp, Amsterdam, 1906-1909; the M&moires of Gramont, Gourville, and Temple, in the collections of Petitot and Michaud et Poujoulat; Tem- ple's Letters (1665-1679) have been published in English, London, 1698 and 1703, and also his Memoirs (1672-1680), London, 1691 and 1709; see also his complete works, London, 1770; Arlington, Letters (1664- 1674), London, 1701; and D'Estrades, Lettres et negociations, Amster- dam, 1719. Lady Fanshaw's Memoirs, London, 1909, contain an account of Lord Fanshaw's mission to Portugal to arrange the marriage of Charles II. Other contemporary documents of the period covered in the present chapter are the following: Barozzi and Berchet, Relazioni degli stali europei, Venice, 1861; Fiedler, Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs uber Deutschland und Osterreich in siehzehnten Jahrhundert, Vienna, 1867; Pribram, Venezianische Depeschen v. Kaiserhofe, I, Abt. 2 (1657- 1661), Vienna, 1902; Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou correspondance inidite de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, II Series, V (1650-1688). Utrecht, 1867; Levinson, Die Nuntiatureberichle des Petrus Victoris iiber den nord- ' ischen Krieg, 1655-1658, Vienna, 1906; Mignet, Nigodations relatives d. THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 85 la succession d'Espagne,Paxis, 1835-1842; Cooper, Savile Correspondence Chap. I (1661-1689), Camden Society, 1858, being the letters of Henry Savile, a, d. English ambassador in Paris. The MSS. of Heathcote, Reports of 1648-1670 the Historical Manuscripts Commission, London, 1899, contain the Fanshaw Papers relating to the marriage of Charles II and relar tions of England to Spain and Portugal down to 1666. Gardner and Atkinson have published letters and papers regarding the first Anglo-Dutch war in vol. XXX of PubUcations of the Navy Records Society. It is impossible to name here more than a few of the works dealing Literature with the international relations of this period. Of the general histories the most useful to consult are: for France, Voltaire, Siecle de Louis XIV, Bourgeois' edition, Paris, 1905; Lavisse, Histoire de France, VII, 2, Paris, 1907; for Germany, Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Oeschichte, I, Berhn, 1892; for England, Burnet, History of His Own Time, London, 1724; Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, Lon- don, 1903; Lingard, History of England, London, 1849; Klopp, Der Fall des Hau^es Stuart, Vienna, 1875-1879, the latter partisan in tone but containing valuable documents printed for the first time; and Seeley Growth of British Policy, I, Cambridge, 1895; for Holland, Blok, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk, V, (1648-1702), Groningen, 1896, and the translation into Enghsh by Ruth Putnam, New York and London, 1900; Vreede, Inleiding tot eene geschiedenis der N ederlandscM diplomatie, Utrecht, 1856; Hora Siccama, Schets van de diplomatieke betrekingen tusschen Nederland en Brandenburg (1596-1678), Utrecht, 1867; for Sweden, Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, Gotha, 1875; Bain, Scandinavia, a Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Cam- bridge, 1905, and Christina, Queen of Sweden,"London, 1890. Of general works on diplomacy the following may be named: Wicque- fort, M4moires tou/:hant les ambassadeurs et les ministres publics, The Hague, 1677; Flassan, Histoire generate et raisonnee de la diplomatie frangaise. III, Paris, 1811; De Barral, Stude sur Vhistoire diplomatique de I'Europe, I, Paris, 1880; D'Alta Rupe, Abrege de I'Histoire diplo- matique de I'Europe (1648-1885), Vienna, 1888; Malet, Histoire diplo- matique de I'Europe aux XVI" et XVIII' sihcles, Paris, 1894; Bourgeois, E., Manuel historiqve de politique etrangbre, I, Paris, 1897. More specific histories are : Valfrey, Hu^ues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en AUemagne, la Paix des Pyrenees, Paris, 1881 ; Auerbach, La diplomatie frangaise et la cour de Saxe (1648-1680), Paris, 1887; Ch^ruel, La politique extirieure de Louis XIV au debut de son gouverne- ment personnel, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, IV, 1890; Carutti, Storia delta diplomazia delle corte di Savoia, III Turin, 1897 ; Wadding- ton, La RSpublique des Provinces-Unies la France et les Pays-Bays espagnols de 1630 a. 1650, Paris, 1895-1897. In addition to the literature on Mazarin cited in Volume II of this work, see Gualdo-Priorato, Historia del ministerio cardinale Giulio 86 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. I Mazarino, Koln, 1662, and after; with translations into French, Koln, A. D. 1662; German, Frankfort, 1665; and English, London, 1669. 1648-1670 Por Ohver Cromwell, see the biographies by Forster, London, 1860; Honig, BerUn, 1887; Harrison, London, 1888; Palgrave, London, 1890; Church, New York and London, 1899; Gardiner, London, 1899; Firth, London, 1900; Morley, London, 1900; Roosevelt, New York, 1900; Michael, Berlin, 1907; Catterall, Some Recent Literature on Oliver Cromwell, Chicago, 1901; and Jones, The Diplomatic Relations between Cromwell and Charles X of Sweden, London, 1897. For the relations of France, Spain, and the United Provinces and the question of the Spanish Netherlands, see Lef^vre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt, Utrecht, 1882; Lonchay, La rivalite de la France et de I'Espagm auxPays-Bas (1635-1700), Brussels, 1896; and Molsbergen, Frankrijk en de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden (1648-1662), Rotterdam, 1902. For the imperial idea in legend and prophecy, see Kampers, Die deutsche Kaiseridee in Prophetic und Saga, Munich, 1896; and Chauf- fard, Propheties anciennes ou modernes et considerations historiques et philosophigues sur la France et son prochain relbvement, Paris, 1886. On the imperial election of 1658, see Pribram, Zw Wahl Leopold I (1654- 1658), Vienna, 1888; Vast, Les tentalives de Louis XIV pour arriver a I' Empire, in Revue Historique, LXV (1897); and Preuss, Mazarin und die Bewerbung Ludwigs XIV um die deutsche Kaiserkrone, in His- torische Vierteljahrschrift, October, 1904. On the role of French money in Germany under Louis XIV, see Pagds, Contributions aVhis- toire de la politique frangaise en Allemagne sous Louis XIV, Paris, 1905. On the development of the League of the Rhine, see Joachim, Die Entwickelung des Rheinbundes vom Jahre, 1658, Leipzig, 1886; Pribram, Beilrag zur Geschichte des Rheinbundes vom 1658, Vienna, 1888; and Mentz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, Jena, 1896. For the diplomacy of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, see Bosse, Zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Konigsberger Vertrages (1654-1661), Berlin, 1887; Philippson, Der Grosse Kurfilrst, Berlin, 1897, 1903; Pag^s, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV, Paris, 1905; Waddington, A., Le Grand Electeur Frederic Guillaume de Brandenbourg: sa poli- tique exterieure, I, Paris, 1905; FehUng, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Allianzvertrage des Grossen Kurfiirslen mit Ludwig XIV, Leipzig, 1906. For the Austrian diplomacy of the period, see Pribram, Die Berichte des Kaiserlichen Gesandten Franz von Lisola aus den Jahren, 1655-1660, Vienna, 1887; Pribram, Franz von Lisola und die Politik seiner Zeit, Leipzig, 1894; and WoK, Fiirst Wenzel Lobkowitz, erster Geh. Rat Kaiser Leopolds I (1609-1677), Vienna, 1869. For the crisis in the North and the Peace of OUva, see Vauciennes, Mitnoires de ce qui s'est passi en Suede, etc. (1649-1652), Koln, 1677, which treats of the embassy of Chanut in Sweden; Lhomel, Relations d'Antoine Lumbres touchant ses nAgociations et ambassades, Paris, 1911, THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 87 particularly for Poland; Hirsch, Der osterreichische Diplomat Franz Chap. I von Lisola und seine Tatigheit wdhrend des nordischen Krieges (1655- a. d. 1660), in Historische Zeitschrift, N. F. XXIV (1888); Haumant, La 1648-1670 guerre du Nord et la paix d'Oliva, Paris, 1893; Friese, Uber den diisseren Gang der Verhandlungen heim Frieden von Oliva (1659-1661), Kiel, 1890. The relations of Louis XIV with Rome are treated of in Moiiy, L'am- bassade du due de Crequi, Paris, 1893 ; Chantelauze, Le cardinal de Retz et ses missions diplomatiques, Paris, 1899; and Cappelli, L'ambasceria del duca di Crequi, Florence, 1900. In addition to the works already referred to the following are useful for the formation of the Triple AUiance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Cha^ peUe: Courtenay, The Life, Works and Correspondence of Sir William Temple, London, 1836, which gave rise to Macaulay's essay on Sir William Temple in the Edinburgh Review (1838), repubhshed in his Critical and Historical Essays; Grossman, Der Kaiserliche Gesandte Franz von Lisola im Haag, in Archiv fUr osterreichische Geschichte, LI, (1873); Emerton, Sir William Temple und die Tripleallianz vom Jahre 1668, Berlin, 1877; and Bulard, Les traites de Saint-Germain, Paris, 1898. Jusserand, A French Ambassador at the Court of Charles II; le Comte de Cominge, London, 1892, gives an interesting picture of the English court in 1663. CHAPTER II THE PERIL AND THE RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC The Nether- A LTHOUGH a century of civil liberty had produced lands in 1670 Xjl in the United Provinces a social organization more modern both in form and spirit than any other then existing in Europe, the peril to which the Republic was exposed was, perhaps chiefly for , that reason, extremely great. Com- pelled by its military weakness and its geographic situation to depend upon foreign alliances for the maintenance of its independence, it was as a consequence obliged to incur the enmity of those from whose friendship it was ahenated by its relations with other powers. Possessing valuable ports, an extensive mercantile marine, rich colonies, and great accumulated wealth, the United Provinces — and especially Holland — were naturally objects of envy to their less favored neighbors, and presented particularly at- tractive spoils to the eyes of France. The form of government being neither monarchical nor democratic but in effect a federal oligarchy, the rulers of the country were fettered by the organization of the State, which required a constant reference to local decisions. Notwithstanding this embarrassment, John De Witt, by his patriotism, probity, and sagacity, had for nearly twenty years maintained and promoted the prestige of the Republic. He had, in truth, acquired an influence far in excess of the material resources of his country, and the day of reckoning was now at hand. The triumph of the Triple Alliance in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been celebrated by striking a memorial medal symbohcal of hberty united with power, and bearing the inscription in Latin: "After having reconciled Icings, re-estabUshed hberty on the sea, caused peace to reign on earth by the force of arms, and 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 89 conferred upon Europe a stable repose, the States of the Chap. ii United Provinces caused this medal to be made in 1668." ^■^■ It was a presumptuous boast. Relying too much upon the . support of other powers, and fearing the restoration of the House of Orange through the army, the Grand Pensionary had discouraged the strengthening and organization of the land forces, while building up the navy in the belief that the chief danger to Holland was the commercial rivalry of •England. De Witt was not blind to the ambitions of Louis XIV; but, so far as the Netherlands were concerned, he expected to defeat them by the skill of his diplomacy. His success at Aix-la-Chapelle led him to regard Holland as the arbiter of Europe, able to protect itself on every side by balancing the powers against one another. He had failed to foresee that the day would come when his circle of alliances would be broken; and the Republic, completely isolated, would have to preserve its existence by its own force. That horn- had arrived, but the Grand Pensionary was imable to meet its requirements. They demanded a different policy and a stronger hand. I. The Appeal to the House of Orange The Grand Pensionary had the merit of faith in his policy, The dipio- and negotiated desperately until the foe had crossed the ^^ ^?^ frontier. A full treasury, the result of wise fiscal adminis- tration, gave him the advantage of abundant ready money. The diplomatic agents of the Republic were provided for with a munificence which excited the envy even of the am- bassadors of France.. Count d 'Estradas wrote, that he would be happy to be treated as well as the Dutch am- bassadors, who were well supplied at the expense of the States, while he was obhged to expend far more than he received. No opportunity was neglected to make diplomatic rep- resentation effective through the agents chosen to serve the interests of the Republic. There was no court of im- 1670-1684 90 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II portance where they were not present. They were received J'- with the pomp and consideration accorded to the represen- . tatives of sovereign monarchs, held their heads high, and their success was often remarkable. The Sultan guaran- teed to the Dutch ships free navigation in the Mediterran- ean, where they were menaced by the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers. Denmark and Sweden were long rivals for good relations with the Repubhc. The Swiss were heavily subventioned by Louis XIV; but Colbert's economies led to the mission of Frangois de Bonstetten to The Hague to propose the employment of Swiss mercenaries; to which De Witt was favorably inchned by the probabihty that they would not be subservient to the House of Orange. The Grand Pensionary had never placed much reliance upon aid from Germany. The only German princes whose assistance might possibly be counted upon were the Duke of Brunswick-Liineburg and the Elector of Brandenburg, with whom alhances had been made in 1666; but De Witt had always regarded Frederick William with suspicion and dis- Hke because of his connection with the House of Orange- Nassau. The relations of the Republic with the Scandinavian states were extremely uncertain. The members of the Triple Alliance had guaranteed to Spain the protection of the Spanish Netherlands; and, in return, Spain had agreed, with the guarantee of England and the United Provinces, to pay to Sweden four hundred and eighty thousand 6cus for the maintenance of the army.^ When England aban- doned the coalition Sweden clamored for the fulfilment of the agreement; but, since one of the guarantors of the subsidy had withdrawn, the Republic threw the burden en- tirely upon Spain, which was not prepared to offer pay- ment. The iiiuaiona De Witt never ceased to entertain the hope that, by some of De Witt fortunate combination of circumstances, it would be pos- sible to transform the Spanish Netherlands into an in- dependent state; thus conceding to France the security of » For the treaty of May 7, 1669, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 107. 1670-1684 PEKIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 91 her frontier, and at the same time erecting a barrier between Chap. ii France and the United Provinces. Such an arrangement would, if acceded to, have rendered possible a continu- . ation of the traditional relations of friendship between France and the United Provinces, and thereby have given repose to Europe. To facilitate this result, De Witt was ready to permit France to profit by the partition of the other Spanish possessions upon the death of the King of Spain; but Louis XIV, feeling confident of finally obtain- ing all that was assured to him by the secret treaty of partition with the Emperor, had resolved to crush the power of Holland, and thus leave all his aspirations im- opposed. Acting in conformity with this idea, in Febru- ary, 1670, he resolved to discontinue all negotiations with De Witt and to treat the States General as a negligible quantity. From this time forward, the Grand Pensionary had no other recourse than to seek the grace of the King of France; which he did by sending Admiral Van Obdam in the follow- ing April on a special mission, to assure the King of the "continued affection of the Republic"; but the ambassador was received with cold politeness, and reconciliation was found to be impossible. The dispossession of Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, and the appropriation of his duchy by the King of France in August, 1670, without a declaration of war, might have opened the eyes of De Witt to the danger that threatened Holland; but, unintimidated, the States General took up the cause of the Duke so far as to inquire what reasons the King had for his action, and proposed that the duchy might be restored to the legitimate heir. Without directly discussing the subject, Louis XIV accused the Duke of having negotiated with the Grand Pensionary for the protection of his estates, with the intention of placing his forces at the disposal of Spain. When afterward the Emperor sent Count Gottheb von Windischgratz to the King of France to remind him that Lorraine was a constituent part of the Empire, the im- perial ambassador was told by the King, "That duchy 92 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II belongs to me, and no one today has a better right to it ^■_i>- than I."i Notwithstanding all these premonitions, it was not until December, 1670, when the Grand Pensionary was in- formed by the Dutch ambassador to France that he had learned through private sources of the conclusion of the secret alliance of France and England, that he began to reahze the real intentions of Louis XIV. Theprepara- The adherents of the House of Orange had long been tions of wii- hostile to the Grand Pensionary and the policies he represen- uam of Orange ^ ir r- ted. The "Perpetual Edict" of January 12, 1668, which prohibited the revival of the stadtholderate in the province of Holland, had been bitterly resented by the believers in a strong central government, who recalled with pride and gratitude the splendid services rendered by the Orange princes in the early days of the Republic. It was not un- natural for those who had been excluded from office in the State by the repubhcan oligarchy to wish for the overthrow of the existing regime and the restoration of the princely family to the position of which it had been, as many felt, unjustly deprived. Some of the provinces had retained the stadtholderate after Holland had rejected it. Friesland and Groningen were firm in their loyalty to the past; and Zee- land, as a rival of Holland for leadership in the federation, was ready to utilize the latent sentiment for the House of Orange throughout the country. While these influences were indirectly acting against the existing form of administration, they were specially con- centrated against John De Witt, who had gathered into his own hands the chief direction of affairs, and had become practically the ruler of the country. In addition to the personal animosity felt toward the Grand Pensionary, there was a lively interest in the person of the young prince, — the posthumous son of the last stadt- holder, WilUam II, — left motherless at the age of ten by the death of the Princess Mary, sister of Charles II, King of England. As a child, his misfortunes had taken a strong ' Mignet, Nigocialions, etc., Ill, pp. 494, 498. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 93 hold on popular sympathies; and as he approached manhood Chap, ii his person, his talents, and his known aspirations appealed '^•"• with equal strength to the imagination of the people. Unit- =— ing in himself the lineage of the House of Orange and the blood of the House of Stuart, what might he not yet become to the httle country in which he stood out as a unique per- sonality? Cromwell, who had persecuted him in his infancy, had not been insensible to the possibihties of his future; and had said of him to the Dutch ambassador Bevemingk, "This Wilham, bom of the daughter of the dead king, will grow with increasing greatness!" Physically delicate, yet endowed with a restless energy of body as well as of mind, the young prince was conscious of his royal origin and almost consumed with ambition. Grave, retiring, sober, and industrious, fond of open-air exercise, and full of courage, in spite of fears regarding his health which followed him all his life, he was clearly born for action, and rejoiced in combat. Without pretending to great intellectual attainments, he was at the age of twenty well versed in current pohtics and an excellent lin- guist, speaking Dutch, French, English, and German, with a fair knowledge of Spanish, Italian, and Latin. Under the stem discipline of De Witt he had learned that intelhgence is often more than a match for power. He knew how to fix his aim, keep his own counsel, and bide his time for action. It was to the Dutch rather than to the English side of his ancestry that the Prince looked for the principles and the inspiration by which he intended to shape his Hfe. A Protestant in religion and a hberal in politics, he was yet a royalist at heart; beheving in the royal prerogatives as essential to the unity and efficiency of the State, and in royal responsibility as necessary to its peace and prosperity. D'Estrades' judgment of him, formed when he was yet a youth, was- that his ancestors, William the Silent, Maurice, and Frederick Henry, would live and act again through him. In 1668, at the age of eighteen, Wilham of Orange re- The ambition solved to reclaim the heritage of his ancestors. Excluded °' * " from this hope in Holland by the "Perpetual Edict," he 94 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACT Chap. II decided to vindicate his claims in Zealand, where eight ^■'°- years before he had been declared by the States "First 1670-1684 i^ , , „ Noble. " Eluding the watchful Grand Pensionary and profiting by the absence of his tutor, he proceeded to Breda, and from there to Berg-op-Zoom, where a waiting yacht transported him to Zeeland; and, having previously announced his com- ing, on September 23, he arrived at Middleburg, where the States of Zeeland were in session. Amidst the plaudits of the populace he rode on horseback to the ancient palace of the House of Orange, where a deputation of the States came to offer their fehcitations. On the following day he was received in the hall of the States of Zeeland, and delivered an address, which he terminated by saying that he in- tended to walk in the footsteps of his ancestors, "to whom no sacrifice had been too great for the preservation of liberty and the reformed religion." The cabal against De Witt, promoted by influential former associates, marched apace with the growing con- centration of public attention upon the Prince of Orange, in whom the Grand Pensionary now discovered earher than he had expected a popular pretender to power; and when the Princess Dowager resolved immediately to proclaim the majority of the Prince, and thus prepare him at once for a public career, it became evident that a new political force had entered upon the scene. In the midst of the increasing signs of meditated aggression from without, indications multiplied of a revolution brewing within the Republic. De Witt was suddenly called upon to give an account of certain secret funds which had been con- fided to his discretion. Suspicions were aroused that his pohcy was too subservient to the interests of France, and that he was in secret relations with the King, whose attitude was menacing. The States General became more difiicult to control; and while he acted with moderation toward those who opposed him, he considered it necessary to take effective measures against the procedure of the Prince. Fearing that the "First Noble" of Zeeland might soon PEKIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 95 be elected stadtholder of that province, if steps were not Chap. II taken to prevent it, the Grand Pensionary induced the States ^- "• of Holland to charge their representatives in the States . I General to urge the adoption of an instruction to the Council of State excluding all provincial stadtholders from member- ship in that body. Friesland and Groningen opposed this step, as an encroachment upon their constitutional right to make a free choice of their representatives; but the States of Holland replied, that they would not permit any stadt- holder to sit in the Council without the previous consent of the confederate provinces. Thus excluded by the preponderating power of Holland from sitting as a stadtholder, it was still possible for his sup- porters to offer the Prince a seat in the Council without possessing the title which he claimed; but to this — although it was advised by his uncle, Charles II, and urged by the Princess Dowager — the proud youth objected that it was a disparagement of his dignity to enter the Council at the price of renouncing the right to all civil and military ofHces, which the statutes required of him. Finally, however, see- ing the force of the remark, that, "in order to mount a horse, it is necessary first to place a foot in the stirrup," he consented to pursue this course. The impediments thrown in the way of Wilham 's advance- The embar- ment, while no doubt resulting from honest convictions on ■■aaamenta of . the Prince the part of De Witt, caused the Grand Pensionary's conduct to seem equivocal, and greatly increased the opposition of the Orangist party. Finally, a change in the feelings of the deputies of Amster- dam, inspired partly by their suspicions of De Witt, caused a marked transition in the States of Holland in favor of the Prince. De Witt was obliged to accept a compromise; and on May 31, 1670, William was solemnly conducted before the States General of the Republic, took the oath of office, and received his commission as a member of the Great Council with the right to cast a vote. He had placed his foot in the stirrup by which he was finally to mount to power. De Witt was one of the first to 96 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 Foreign ad- vances to the Prince recognize the fact; and soon afterward, wrote: "I fear, to my regret, we have laid the first stone of an edifice which . threatens our liberty. " Presently, communications to the Council began to be addressed to "His Highness and the Council," — the form used in the time of the stadtholders. Not long afterward, taking advantage of a temporary absence of the Grand Pensionary, the adherents of the Prince supported his claim to a place in the States General, on the ground that his commission, which contained the identical formula used in that of his father, permitted him to sit in that body. Six provinces sustained this contention, but the deputies of Hol- land opposed it; and De Witt, hastening to the scene, de- nounced the attempt as an "impertinence." It was not unnatural for the partisans of the House of Orange to beHeve that the blood relationship existing between the Prince and Charles II of England would en- able the Prince to effect a reconcihation between that monarch and the United Provinces, obtain the King's mediation with Louis XIV, and procure at the same time the overthrow of De Witt and the estabhshment of the Prince in the stadtholderate. Pleased with the growing disunion of the political parties in Holland, Louis XIV offered to the Prince the assurance of his friendship, and congratulated him upon the success he had already achieved and the prospect of "another still greater," — "the establishment of the same authority as his fathers had possessed in the State." Charles II also manifested a sudden interest in the for- tunes of his nephew, and invited him to visit England. De Witt, solicitous regarding the possible consequences of such a journey, strongly opposed it; but, having been eman- cipated from his tutelage, the Prince disregarded this oppo- sition; and, in the autumn of 1670, attended by a numerous suite, accepted the invitation. Cordially welcomed by Charles II, who in the hope of winning his confidence flattered him with lavish entertain- ments and conferred upon him the Order of the Garter, he A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 97 was also honored with an address by the Lord Mayor and Chap. Ii aldermen of London, and received the degree of Doctor of Laws at Oxford. But the phlegmatic nature of the Prince did not respond to the seductions of his uncle. Serious and reserved in his manners, he took little pleasure in the diver- sions offered to him; — an attitude which won him the respect of sober Englishmen, who were critical of the levity of the King. The impression made upon Charles II was not favorable. He found the Prince, as Colbert de Croissy wrote to his sovereign, "too Dutch and too Protestant" for the encour- agement of his hopes. The information led Louis XIV to dissuade Charles II from taking the young man into his confidence, on the ground that his extreme youth might lead him to indiscretion, and he thought his true sentiments were too uncertain to be trusted. It was prudent of Charles II not to reveal to his visitor the terms of the secret treaty of Dover, in which he had joined in a conspiracy to subjugate and partition the coimtry of William the Silent. De Witt, who had suspected the existence of this conspir- England openly acy without knowing its terms, had kept up his courage in ^^^^ against the belief that the English Parliament — which was not un- friendly to the Dutch, and had lately voted for an increase of armaments with the object of restraining the designs of Louis XIV — would remain loyal to the Triple Alliance, whatever might be the engagements of Charles II with the King of France. Unfortunately for the Republic, but most conveniently for the secret schemes of the King, it was easy to find a cause of offence in the too frequent indul- gence on the part of Holland in the spirit of boastfulness. In 1667 the Dutch had successfully bombarded Chatham; and, in continued celebration of this heroic action, they had printed books, painted pictures, and struck medals designed to perpetuate the memory of this victory over the English. At Dordrecht there had been hung in the town-hall a paint- ing representing Cornelius De Witt, — commissioner of the Dutch fleet, and brother of the Grand Pensionary — crowned 98 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The comple- tion of Louis XlV'a circle of alliancep^ by victory in the presence of the Enghsh ships burnt at Chatham; and the "Royal Charles," which had been cap- tured from the English, was anchored at the mouth of the Maas as a permanent public exhibition. The Grand Pen- sionary, when complaint was made of these alleged insults, did all in his power to offer satisfaction; but Charles II, seeking a quarrel, made the most of them in arousing hostile sentiment in England. The secret treaty of Dover, which was in reahty directed quite as much against the English Protestants as against the Dutch, had been negotiated with the knowledge and connivance of Catholics only. Gradually, however, the Protestant advisers of the King were skilfully drawn into the plan of a war with Holland; and on December 10, 1670, while the Prince of Orange was still in England, was signed the Treaty of Whitehall, by which it was pledged that England and France should together attack the Republic' The circle of Louis XIV 's diplomatic activities for the iso- lation of Holland was now rapidly rounding to its close. On December 31, 1669, he had procured from the Elector of Brandenburg a secret alliance for four hundred thousand thalers, to be paid in ten annual instalments, together with a promise of money for his troops in case they should be called upon, and the prospect of sovereignty in portions of Gelderland, if France should acquire the Spanish Netherlands either by war or diplomacy.^ On February 17, 1670, a treaty of alliance was signed at Munich with the Elector of Bavaria; who for five hundred thousand florins promised to prevent the Reichstag from supporting the Emperor, and to help elect Louis XIV, if the imperial office became vacant.' 1 For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, Histoire des traiUs de paix, I, p. 284 et seq. 2 The treaty was signed on January 4, 1670. It remained secret until the nineteenth century, and was first printed in full by Moemer, Kur- brandenhurgs Staaisvertr&ge, BerUn, 1867, pp. 335, 337. For digest and comments, see Waddington, Le Grand Slecteur, II, pp. 211, 213. ' The text is printed by Legrelle, La diphmatie frangaise, etc., I, p. 230. In a second treaty, of November 28, Louis XIV agrees, in case A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 99 The Elector of Koln, by a treaty of July 11, 1671, promised Chap, ii neutrality, and gave permission to the French army to pass through his territories.^ The Duke of Brunswick-Liine- burg and the Bishops of Miinster, Osnabriick, and Pader- born were soon added to the Hst of allies, with the privilege of using their possessions for a base in making the attack on the United Provinces. Thus, one after another, Louis XIV had drawn into his system of paid alUances some of the most powerful princes of the Empire. On November 1, 1671, the Emperor himself, compelled by his poverty and menaced with the prospect of French aid being offered to the Turks and his own Hun- garian rebels if he refused, upon the understanding that the war with Holland would be carried on entirely outside of Germany, signed with the King of France a treaty of al- liance and mutual surety.^ There remained only Sweden to be added to the list. Early in 1671, Pomponne had been sent to Stockholm to give the final coup de grdce to the Triple Alliance. Before the end of November, the Chancellor, Magnus de la Gardie, under the pressure of Sweden's financial needs and the dim prospect of obtaining money from Spain, had yielded to the ambassador's seductions; and, although Pomponne was recalled to succeed De Lioime, — who had died in September, — in the direction of the foreign affairs of France, his successor, Honore Courtin, on April 14, 1672, concluded the treaty with Sweden. By its terms, France promised an annual subsidy of six hundred thousand crowns in ex- change for the services of sixteen thousand Swedish soldiers to prevent the sending of aid to Holland from Germany.' On January 4, 1672, in response to the pleadings of the The double Dutch ambassador, Peter De Groot, against a rupture be- ^^^ ^ ^.^^j. declaration of war agaii Holland Leopold I should die without leaving male offspring, to furnish the Elector with means for the conquest of Bohemia. • For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, Histoire des traiUs de paix, I, pp. 470, 472. 2 For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 154 et seq. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 171 et seq. 100 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II tween France and the Republic, Louis XIV coolly informed ^- °- him that, having begun his armaments, he would complete them, and would then take the course dictated by his "glory and his interests." Two days later, he terminated a de- spatch to the States General with the words: "We shall augment our armament by land and by sea, . . . and we shall make the use of it which we judge suitable to our dignity, of which we owe accoimt to no one."^ Following close upon this announcement, Charles II sent a message to the States General by a special envoy, "the most overbearing of diplomatists," George Downing, demanding for the English Crown recognition of the sov- ereignty of the seas.2 On March 29, 1672, war with Holland was publicly declared at London,' and on April 6 at Ver- sailles. An army of one himdred and fifty thousand men commanded by Cond6, Turenne, and Luxembourg was sent to invade the United Provinces; while fifty English and thirty French war-vessels combined to destroy the commerce and capture the ships of the Republic. In Jime the army had • A few clear-sighted thinkers had abeady begun to realize the peril to which the power and ambition of Louis XIV were now exposing Europe and to wonder how it might be averted. Among these the phi- losopher Leibnitz was the foremost. He sought by a carefully drawn plan to divert the King's attention from his designs upon the Nether- lands to the conquest of Egypt and the control of the Mediterranean, which he represented as a vastly more profitable and magnificent enter- prise. Both the Elector of Mainz and Frederick WiUiam of Branden- burg used such influence as they could in favor of a diversion that would absorb the energies of the French monarch in a distant part of the world. This scheme, however, which later appealed so powerfuOy to the imagi- nation of Bonaparte, did not beguile the practical intelhgence of the Grand Monarch, who preferred at the same time to gratify his ven- geance and pursue his poUtical interests in a nearer field. For the text of the Consilium Aegypticum, see Testa, Recueil des traiUs, etc., I, p. 525. ° Downing's instructions were, not to obtain satisfaction, but so to embroil the relations with the Republic that the English would wish to sustain the war. See the despatch of Colbert de Croissy, of November 5, 1671, cited by Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV, II, p. 289. ' The English ships had, however, already attacked the Dutch com- merce without a declaration of war. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 101 crossed the Rhine and taken possession of Wesel, Emmerich, Chap, ii and other places. Holland seemed doomed to certain sub- '^'^' ^ 1670-1684 jugation. Thus, within less than a quarter of a century, the Treaties The motives of Westphalia, which all the signatories were solemnly °' ^"""^ -^^^ bound to defend, were completely set at nought, and a great --^ part of Europe was in collusion with the King of France in forcing upon a friendly nation a war of conquest. What were the motives that led to such a wanton exhibi- tion of power? Louis XIV has himself given us the answer. He informs us, "I had resolved to place this people in a posi- tion where they could not oppose my designs, "i What then were his designs? The ultimate object was to secure unopposed possession of the heritage of Spain. A more immediate purpose was to destroy Dutch rivalry to French commerce on the sea. The keys to both these enterprises were to be sought at The Hague. The Dutch Republic had opposed, and already partially frustrated, the King's designs. It had created the Triple Alliance for the purpose of preserving to Spain the Spanish Neth- erlands, and it had thus far maintained its own supremacy over the French on the sea. It would, if permitted to hve and prosper, hold the balance of power in Western Europe, and thus at every point endanger the success of the King's ulterior plans of expansion. Therefore, Batavia delenda est. Five months before the declaration of war, Louvois wrote to the Prince of Cond6, "The effective means of accomphsh- ing the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands is to abase the Hollanders; and, if possible, to destroy them. "^ For this violation of sovereign rights, Louis XIV could plead neither the urgency of his people nor the exigency of his state. While the French nation might rejoice in the glory of their monarch and the extension of the monarchy, they had no just casus belli against the Republic, and none was alleged. Although the Hollanders were successful competi- ' Unpublished memoir of Louis XIV cited by Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, I, p. 323, from the Archives du D^p6t de la Guerre. * See Mignet, Nigocialiona, etc., Ill, p. 665. 102 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II The Republic in extremis tors in commerce, they had deprived the French of none of their rights.' From every point of view, the war was a ■ personal one, prompted by a spirit of vengeance and executed by all means that were available. Almost a fourth of the French army was made up of mercenary troops, twenty thousand Swiss and about twelve thousand adventurers gathered from England, Germany, and Italy, — profes- sional fighting men, ready to serve the one who paid them best. Nor were the aims upon which Louis XIV was bending his energies the real interests of France. In December, 1671, De Witt offered^ to yield to the King of France all the concessions he had demanded; but, suddenly, as if seeking to raise impassable barriers to peace, Louis XIV proposed the restoration of Catholicism in Holland, with the obligation to furnish the population with Catholic churches and to pay the priests from the public funds. Not content with the offer of Nymwegen, Gelderland, and the island of Bommel as the price of peace, he required that the Hollanders should recognize their perpetual vassalage to him by sending annually to Versailles a gold medal attest- ing their dependence upon him! To defend their coimtry, there was, indeed, one last resort, — to open the sluices and convert it into a lake. When Gr^monville, the French ambassador at Vienna, heard of this intention, he could not pardon the use of such an obstacle to the power of his royal master, and said to the Emperor's ministers: "If they can only use such an un- faithful element as water, it would seem that they must presently submit to the yoke; but the obstinate rage of that rabble shows that they evidently see God intends to punish them; and, in place of humbling themselves, they become the more churlish, and prefer to ruin and destroy theu" country, and expose themselves to be drowned, rather than to submit to such a glorious and triumphant conqueror!" ' In the long list of reasons for Loms XIV's hostility to the Dutch given by Legrelle, La diplomatie frangaise, I, pp. 201, 208, there is no instance mentioned of violated right. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 103 The "glorious and triumphant conqueror" took a different Chap. II view, and afterward wrote in his memoir on the Dutch war: '^- '°- "The resolution to put the country under water was indeed rather violent; but what will one not do to escape foreign domination?" Inundation could arrest the progress of a French army, The search for but it could not save the Republic. Frt^e^"" But whence could succor for the Republic be expected, since Louis XIV held a great part of Europe in his pay, or subject to the fear of his hostility? The States General knocked at every door for assistance, but in vain. The appeal to Denmark met with an apparently favorable response, and ten thousand men were at one time promised, but their arrival was indefinitely postponed. The Protestant cantons of Switzerland were incUned to assist the Republic, and the Catholic cantons were urged to do so by Spain; but, to reach the seat of war, it was necessary to pass through the states of the Empire, and the Imperial Diet was not disposed to offend the King of France, the Swiss were themselves not prepared to forego the subsidies they were already receiving from him, and the effort ended merely in an order to the Swiss officers in the French army not to take an active part in the campaign against the United Provinces. The Prince of Cond6 made short work of this decision by surroimding the Swiss contingent with other troops and menacing them with death if they did not obey. It was necessary, therefore, finally to turn to Spain; but no great activity could be expected in that quarter. After urgent negotiations, however, on December 17, 1671, the Republic had succeeded in inducing the Queen-Regent to join in a "declaration" for mutual defence;' but, even if better disposed, the financial condition of Spain was not such as to render its support decisive in a war with France. There remained the hope that the Emperor, with the The attitude support of some of the princes of the Empire, seeing the °^^^^^^ perilous condition in which Europe was placed by the ambi- tions of Louis XIV, would absolve himself from his treaty ' For the declaration, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 155. 104 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II engagements with him, and come to the rescue of the ^- ^- Republic. 1670-1684 The Treaty of November 1, 1671, had in reahty been ex- torted from Leopold I more by intimidation than through any positive advantage to be gained from it for Austria or the Empire. Its third article had expressly provided for the case of war with Holland; and Louis XIV had frankly informed the Emperor that he intended "to deprive the Hollanders once for all of the power to oppose his designs."' It had been stipulated that the interests of the Empire were not to be affected, and that hostilities were not to be car- ried on within its limits. But there were always at Vienna suspicions of the ulterior intentions of Louis XIV. In truth, the greed and duplicity of Louis XIV in plotting the dismemberment of Spain during the life-time of the King had rendered Leopold I suspicious of all his acts. Unhappily for the Emperor, there were two influences which alternated in obtaining ascendency over his wavering will: that of Lisola, an honest man, who was determined to defeat the schemes of Louis XIV; and that of Prince Auersperg, Leopold's Chief Minister of State, who never ceased longing for the hat of a cardinal and hoped to profit by French favor in obtaining it. Between them was the venal courtier, Prince Lobkowitz, eager to obtain prefer- ment by any means. With such counsellors to bend his phant will; with two camps of princely interests in the Em- pire, one favorable to the Emperor and the other in league with France; and deriving all his real strength from his resources as an Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian mon- arch, the head of the Germanic body found constancy a virtue difficult of cultivation. As Prince Lobkowitz is reported to have said of him, Leopold I was "like a statue which one carries where one wishes, and replaces at pleasure." Before the negotiation of the Treaty of November 1, 1671, Prince Auersperg, accused at Rome of being the crea- ture of France, had not only been refused the coveted red ' See Legrelle, La diplomatie franiaise, etc., I, p. 164. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 105 hat but had been exiled to his estates in Styria; and Prince Chap, ii Lobkowitz had come to power as first minister. "Seeking to make his pot boil," as he himself expressed it, he did not hesitate openly to ask for gratuities from France. Realizing the great value of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle The Austro- for the further security of Spain, the Spanish ambassador, f^'^vtenna^^''^ Malagon, had urged upon the Emperor the duty of becom- ing one of its guarantors; and in the autumn of 1670 Lisola, joining his efforts with those of the ambassador of Spain, had obtained from Leopold I a promise to oppose France, if Louis XIV made an attack on the United Provinces. But Gr6monville, who was aware of this proceeding, had by Louis XIV 's instructions, informed the Emperor that if, in violation of his engagements with the King of France, he undertook to aid those who were against him, the King would reserve to himself a like liberty to take advantage wherever he could. To balance the menace conveyed in this message, Spain had no counterweight to offer. Leopold I had not forgotten that, in 1666, before negotiating the treaty of partition, Louis XIV had aided the Hungarian rebels. It was weU known that the King was in secret correspondence with the Hungarian magnate. Count Zrinyi, who had already proved a dangerous foe; and it was certain that Louis XIV would repay interference in Holland with new incitement to re- bellion in Hungary. Caring nothing for the Dutch Republic, Leopold I, under the influence of Gr^monville 's skilful diplomacy, had decided to leave it to the tender mercies of the King, reserving the right to intervene in behalf of the Empire, in case its interests were impaired. Exposed to the recurring assaults of the Turks upon his The Emperor's Eastern dominions, and embarrassed by the rebellious ^™J.^ " spirit of his Hungarian subjects, whom he was persecuting on account of their religion, the Emperor's position was always critical. The Ottoman pressure upon Europe engaged his constant attention to the eastward, and com- pelled him to bear the brunt of invasions which, though inter- the 106 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap, ii mittent, were often serious. The German princes, who had J|;°' practically won their autonomy by the Treaties of West- phaUa, were able to combine among themselves for their own protection, and responded with hesitation to calls for aid in repelling dangers to the Empire so distant as Ottoman inroads into Hungary; but both as King of Hungary and as head of the Germanic body, it was the duty of the Emperor to defend the frontiers of Christendom. In 1656, under the energetic Sultan, Mohammed IV, a long period of Turkish lethargy had come to an end; and, fired by a new spirit of conquest, the Turks were making a desperate struggle to secure predominance in the Medi- terranean, and to extend their rule on the Danube, which they already controlled as far North as Buda. The Venetians, single-handed, had long valiantly de- fended their possessions; and, after the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle, had besought from France the aid which the Em- peror was unable to afford them. Pope Clement IX had called earnestly for a general crusade; but with the decline of the faith that had once inspired it the crusading spirit had passed away, and there were only feeble responses. As the " Roi Tres Chretien" and the eldest son of the Church, it was especially the duty of Louis XIV to obey the summons of the Pope; but the King, engrossed with his schemes of conquest, offered no assistance, and merely permitted French officers to fight against the Turks on condition that they did not fly the French flag. The secret of the indifference of the King of France to the defence of Christendom is to be found in his private rela- tions with the Sultan. Following the example of Francis I, he had negotiated treaties of amity with him, partly to hold the Emperor in check, and partly to advance the commercial interests of France in the Orient and the Medi- terranean; and, although the commerce of France had some- times suffered from the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers, it was no part of his policy to offend the Sultan. The experience of the Emperor had taught him that op- position to the will of Louis XIV was liable at any time to PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 107 involve him in hostilities on the side where he was most Chap, ii exposed. Even as an ally Louis XIV had proved to be a ■*• °- source of danger. When, in 1663, Pope Alexander VII had ordered a crusade against the Infidel, who was invading Hungary, the "R&i Tres Chretien" had manifested to the world his devotion to the Church by sending some troops with those of the German princes; but had taken pains to inform the Sultan by a special envoy that he had done this only in fulfilment of his obligations as a member of the League of the Rhine, and not as the King of France! But it was not from the East alone that the Emperor The isolation feared new dangers. Louis XIV was now once more in "''oj^j^^J^g close alliance with Sweden. The long foreign wars had North drained that kingdom of its manhood to an extent that left it with increased territories but weakened force. Never- theless, although it was no longer the formidable power that it had been during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, it was still able to furnish a hardy soldiery; and the financial needs of the coimtry made it possible for its participation in any profitable military venture to be bought. It appeared quite practicable, therefore, for the King of France to con- tinue to neutralize through his subsidies to Sweden any effective intervention of the Emperor in the affairs of Hol- land by threatening him with a Swedish invasion. To balance these restraints upon his action, the Emperor had no ally in the North upon whom he could depend for immediate support. Since the Peace of Oliva, France had shown a constant interest in maintaining the pacification of the North, with the purpose of leaving Sweden free to use its forces in promoting the French designs. During the wars be- tween Sweden and Poland, the Emperor, on the other hand, had supported the latter; and it was natural that he should expect in return the friendship of the Poles. But even without the constant efforts of French diplomacy to alien- ate Poland from the Emperor, no great amount of effec- tive support could be looked for from that country, whose great geographical extent exposed it to the peril of becoming a prey to the rapacity of its neighbors, while its defective 108 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACT Chap. II political organization and the rivalries of its nobles seriously A.D. impaired its powers of self-defence. The mutual hostilities of the nobles had rendered it difficult even to select any Pole as King of Poland, and before every election had caused the creation of conflicting parties as numerous as the for- eign interests they were created to subserve. An influential French party had been formed to secure the crown upon the death of John Casimir for someone acceptable to France; and, although in 1669 Michael Koributh Wiesnowski, a native Pole, had been elected King, and was friendly to the Emperor, a strong French faction continued to exist, and it was not to be expected that any material aid could be obtained by the Emperor from Poland. Russia, which was beginning to be regarded as a factor in European politics, and was eager to obtain a foothold upon the Baltic, — from which it had been excluded by the Peace of Kardis, — was the only power in the North that would be able to render important aid to Leopold I. For the time, however, the active interest of Russia lay in the direction of subjugating the wild tribes of the Volga and extending its dominions to the Black Sea. The Emperor's Thus, on evcry side, Leopold I seemed powerless, even Em^e°' * i^ disposed, to intervene for the rescue of the Dutch Re- public. All Europe seemed to have fallen imder the spell of the Grand Monarch. But the more this fact was con- templated the more it became evident that there were causes of alarm in the projects of Louis XIV. Had he not already dispossessed the Duke of Lorraine, a member of the Empire? Had he not pursued a policy of constant intrusion into the affairs of the Empire itself, claiming to be the defender of the Germanic liberties in allying himself with the princes for the purpose of rendering them independent of the Emperor? And now came the report that he was intending to cause himself to be elected "King of the Romans," in order to be promoted to the imperial office at the next elec- tion; and, in confirmation of this suspicion, it was rumored from Paris that the King had already prepared jewelled ornaments — particularly a sword decorated with precious A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 109 stones at a cost of three hundred thousand hvres — for Chap, ii that occasion; which was taken to signify "that His Majesty had other designs than those upon Holland." True or false, these speculations were diligently used against him. Lisola, the implacable enemy of Louis XIV, had neglected no opportunity to magnify the dangers with which he believed Germany to be threatened. His insistence that after subduing the United Provinces the insatiable ambition of the victorious monarch would lead him on, not only to appropriate the entire Spanish heritage, but to make himself master of the Rhine and to lay down the law to the Electoral College of the Empire, could not fail to make a deep impression upon the Emperor. His only remedy against complete isolation andr^Tlal humiliation in the Empire itself, Lisola contended, was an alliance with Spain for the preservation of the Dutch Republic. These importunities did not fail to bear fruit in preparing The change of the way for a new order of things. Leopold I, usually imde- q^^ "° cided, and always timid, was finally so far convinced by Lisola 's arguments as cautiously to inquire into the disposi- tions of the German princes regarding the attack on the RepubUc. Among the electors, three were in general incUned to sustain the Emperor: the Archbishop of Trier, the Elector of Saxony, and the Count Palatine; while two — the Arch- bishop of Koln and the Duke of Bavaria — were in com- plete dependence upon the King of France. The Arch- bishop of Mainz was a member of the League of the Rhine, but he did not wish to render Louis XIV in any sense master in Germany. His aim was merely to use his influence as a means of assuring the autonomy of the German princes and maintaining the Treaties of Westphaha. Since 1668, he had witnessed with anxiety the growth of Louis XIV's preponderance in Europe, and had striven to counteract it by forming an independent defensive league composed solely of German princes;' and he did not hesitate to in- ' See Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 210 et seq. The date October 10, 1672, should be January 10, 1672. no A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The position and policy of the Elector of Brandenburg form the Marquis de Feuquieres that his master was running the risk of making himself suspected throughout Europe - of designs that would eventually, if he did not cease his con- quests, array it against him. Although Frederick William of Brandenburg was still in alliance with Louis XIV by the Treaty of 1669, together with the Archbishop of Mainz he had become disquieted by the military preparations of his ally. The position of the Elector of Brandenburg in Germany was unique. He had for a long time withstood the seduc- tions of France and held aloof from the League of the Rhine, where he knew his accession would at any time be welcome, imtil it suited his convenience to enter it as a caution to the Emperor. Of all the German princes, Frederick William was the one who had a clearly outlined forward policy of his own; and his flexible mind did not hesitate to make any changes in his foreign relations which the success of this pohcy seemed to demand. Keenly aUve to the interests of Brandenburg, he was also a stalwart Protestant and intensely German. As an uncle of the Prince of Orange, it was to be expected that he would have some interest in the fate of Holland; and it was in fact the Elector of Brandenburg who was to turn the tide in Germany. When in January, 1672, the Dutch envoy, Baron Van Amerongen, arrived in Berlin, he found much sympathy with his cause among the officers of the Brandenburg army, but only one of the Elector's ministers was in favor of intervention. All the others were firm for the French al- liance, in which they had a personal interest; for, as the French ambassador, Saint-G^ran, reported, the French ^cus were very acceptable at Berlin. In the midst of opposing counsels, Frederick WilUam at first manifested little sympathy for the Republic. He detested its form of government, personally disliked De Witt, was irritated by the arrogance of these proud repub- licans, whom he despised as a race of merchants and money- changers, and bitterly resented the occupation of his duchy of Cleve by Dutch garrisons to secure the payment of a PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 111 local debt. But, on the other hand, the Hollanders were Chap. II his co-religionists, and the Great Elector was sincerely „_t|_''j,j,. religious; they were also of Teutonic blood, and above all they were at this moment the protagonists of the Germanic liberties. What might happen to him, and to his growing power in Germany, if the King of France became omnipo- tent? His stake was great in the destinies of the Rhine; for there were situated, in close proximity to the United Provinces, some of his richest possessions. A glance at the map of Europe as it was in 1672 reveals the nature of the Great Elector's solicitude. His terri- tories, which were scattered from the Duchy of Prussia on the Baltic to the Duchies of Cleve and Mark on the Rhine, spanned a distance greater than the entire width of Germany. He could travel from the Vistula to the Maas almost on his own lands, without passing more than a night or two out of his own jurisdiction. To bind these scattered possessions together, and to give them tmity and security, required of Brandenburg an expansive poUcy \, which would be impossible of execution without great mil- itary force and sagacious statesmanship. Frederick William had resolved to create in Germany, by connecting and enlarging these fragments of a future kingdom, a state powerful enough to maintain its own independence and to play a large r61e in the politics of Europe. The time was now approaching when Frederick William The hesitation must make a decision. In the spring of 1672 it was no " '*° ™ "'^ longer a question whether the Elector should keep his en- gagements with France. The Triple AUiance, which in 1669 appeared able to protect the Republic from harm, and there- fore permitted Brandenburg to drive a good bargain with- out really endangering the existence of the United Prov- inces, had disappeared; Louis XIV had associated both England and Sweden with his plans; and a Protestant state was in immediate danger of being removed from the map. In these circumstances active aid to France was not to be seriously considered by the Elector of Brandenburg. Coun- sels were still divided, but the parties had shifted their A. D. 1670-1684 112 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II grounds, and the Elector was face to face with two alter- natives, — intervention or neutrality. The loss of the prom- ised subsidies from France, the exposure of the Rhenish provinces to the vengeance of Louis XIV, the sacrifice of a share in the spoils of the apparently doomed Republic, - — these were serious considerations for a little state like Brandenburg. The voice of the raison d'Stat was clearly for neutrality at least. But, on the other hand, the thought of the total effacement of the asylum of Protestantism, where he himself had passed his youth, for the advantages to be gained by the Electorate moved the Elector's personal feelings to their depths. It was fortunate, perhaps, for his mission that the Dutch envoy, Amerongen, belonged to the Orangist party and rep- resented the States General, with which he corresponded directly and not with De Witt. He had come to Branden- burg to seek "twelve or sixteen thousand men for the pro- tection of the Republic," for whose services proportional subsidies would be paid. Saint-Geran was there to thwart him, insisting that the war was inevitable; that opposition to the King of France would be unavailing; and that the prudent course for the Elector would be to continue the alliance, for which he would be well paid; and, if active aid from him were not needed, he should at least remain neutral. During the months of February and March, the diplo- matic duel had been hard fought, but without result. Al- though Amerongen spent sixteen hundred florins in presents when the Elector's new son was born, and had the honor of representing the States General as godfather at the bap- tism, — to which Saint-G6ran was not even invited, — the States General were so bhnd to their interests and main- tained such a lofty tone in their negotiations, that in spite of his cordial reception and the evident good will of the Elector, he was unable to obtain an alliance. With Den- mark neutral, Sweden under bonds to France, and England actually hostile, it seemed as if the Protestant world had abandoned Holland to its fate. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND KESCTJE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 113 Too prudent to undertake single-handed a campaign for Chap, ii the United Provinces with such enormous odds against him, Frederick William had, nevertheless, the perspicacity to realize the danger to Germany that would result from the destruction of the RepubUc; and, during his negotia- The alliance tions with Amerongen and Saint-G^ran, he was in active °' ^'■'""^''°''"« J *j.i. i.^ /~i • 1 ^^'^ *^® United correspondence with the German princes, whom he openly Provincea warned of the consequences of their indifference. To the Archbishop of Mainz he sent a special envoy, to persuade him of the impending danger; but John Philip von Schon- born was not inclined to intervene so long as the Empire was not attacked, and expressed his reliance on his new protective league, which he invited Frederick William to join. On every side the Elector met with indifference or in- decision; but, on April 13, alone and unsupported, he re- solved to accept the terms offered by the States General and form an alliance with the Republic.^ On May 6, 1672, the treaty was signed, in which the Elector agreed to provide an army of twenty thousand men for the defence of the United Provinces in case they were invaded; for which the States General were to pay five hundred and fifty thousand florins and half the expenses of maintenance. The troops were to be ready in two months, and to march toward Westphalia under the command of the Elector himself, if his health permitted him to conduct the army.^ It was a bold step for Frederick William to take, and at once raised Brandenburg to a position of importance in European politics. In the middle of May the Elector opened active negotiations at Vienna to procure the support of Leopold I; and, as the result of persistent efforts, on June 23, 1672, a treaty of alhance was obtained from the Emperor for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, the pro- tection of the Empire, and the defence of the treaties of ' It is rare for a diplomatist to attribute his success to another than himself; but Amerongen wrote to one of his friends: "Here is the work of the Saviour, and it is a miracle in the eyes of men!" ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 194 et seq. VOL. III. — 8 114 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II the Pyrenees and of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Emperor and the '^■°' Elector were each to furnish twelve thousand men, to execute this agreement; and the Elector undertook the task of soliciting the adhesion of Denmark and the Dukes of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel. The dismay at There was great rejoicing at Beriin, but it was soon the invasion of dampened by the news from Holland. At the time when the Republio ^ •' the treaty with the Emperor was signed, the army of Louis XIV had already crossed the Rhine, and was advancing almost without resistance into the territories of the Re- pubhc. "The King is perfectly happy," wrote Madame de S6vign^ on June 13, "that he will have only to say what he wishes in Europe, without taking the trouble to go to the head of his army. They will be happy to give it to him. I assure you, he will pass the Yssel as easily as the Seine. The joy of the courtesans is a good augury. Terror is pre- paring an easy submission everywhere." The power and vengeance of the invader were soon to be felt by the unfortunate Amerongen. After the occupation of Utrecht by the French army, Louis XIV demanded his recall as a subject of that province; but this ardent patriot dared to remain at Berlin, where his presence was still necessary to the complete success of his cause. As a con- sequence, he was condemned to make a heavy contribution to the invader's war chest. Being unable to pay it, his es- tates were seized, his house and gardens destroyed, and he was left so impoverished that his children were almost without bread. With heroic devotion, and at the risk of his life, he remained at his post and continued his activity. The party in power in the United Provmces had been so absorbed in defending their liberties against the House of Orange that they had neglected the defence of the country against the real enemy, who was now within their gates. In order to prevent the army from rallying round Prince WiUiam and proclaiming him stadtholder, many of the troops had been disbanded, the chief military posts were in the hands of mere civilians, and the feeble garrisons PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 115 of the cities approached by the French army had opened Chap. II their gates ahnost without resistance. But, as the people ,„Jt,'°' . , ii»ii' r 1 1670—1684 became convinced of their peril and of the designs of the • ■ invader, religious zeal kindled their patriotism, all the memories of their glorious past mingled with their fear and humiliation, and the old cry of "Oranje boven!" soon began to be heard upon the streets. Encouraged by the prospect of deliverance, De Witt, Negotiations who had attempted to reopen negotiations with Louis XIV |^ga''uit"'on °^e and Charles II, now sent a commission to ask for conditions De witts i of peace. Pomponne and Louvois inquired what terms they had to offer; to which the commissioners modestly replied that, out of respect to the King of France, they had come to seek rather than to propose conditions. They were then informed that, until they came with full powers to conclude a peace, the King refused to negotiate with them; adding that, if the States General wished to avoid "complete ruin," they should hasten to end the war. While the States General were dehberating upon what course they would pursue, in the night of June 21 three armed assassins made an attempt on the life of the Grand Pensionary, who received in his struggle with his assail- ants such serious wounds that he was thereafter incapable of attending to public business.^ Four days afterward his brother, Cornelius DeWitt, who had been recalled from the fleet, also narrowly escaped assassination. It was evident that the revolution which had been pre- paring was now at hand. Rumors had been set afloat that the Prince of Orange was dead; and the excited popu- lace, misled by these reports, were ready to wreak their vengeance on those who had opposed him. On June 27, De Groot carried to the camp of Louis XIV at Zeist an offer of ten miUion hvres and the cession of all the principal places of the "Generality, " — a broad band of territory situated half in Brabant and half in Flanders, and constituting a province belonging to the Republic as a ■ The account of this attack is fully given by Leffevre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt, II, pp. 395, 400. 116 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II whole, much as the "Reichsland" now belongs to the Ger- ^■^- man Empire, ^ — if the King would make peace; but Louis I would not listen to it. The offer involved the surrender of all that the United Provinces had conquered in their long wars with Spain, and would have left them powerless before him in the future; but Louvois would not hear of it, and the King resolved to bring the RepubHc to a still deeper humihation. The Prince of The day for the triumph of the Orange party had arrived. StedthoWeT^" "^^ *^® masses of the people, it appeared that the country was on the verge of destruction because of the need of a strong hand and a military policy. The inundations had only checked the advance of the invader, and the promised help from abroad had not arrived and might never come. The Prince had already, under the most difficult circum- stances, displayed his qualities in the field; and his friends were pointing to him as the foreordained saviour of the Republic. The first general demonstration of the popular feeling was in the village of Ter Veere, in Zeeland, where the Prince of Orange had estates. The inhabitants demanded of the Council that he be proclaimed stadtholder; and the authori- ties, intimidated by their fury, were forced to yield. The movement spread like a conflagration. At Dord- recht, the home of the De Witts, the deputies to the States General had favored peace, and it was believed that they were ready to negotiate the capitulation of the town. The presence of the Prince was demanded; and, after excuses that he was too much occupied at the front, he came. His conduct was modest and irreproachable. He argued against their wish to make him stadtholder that he had taken an oath to respect the "Perpetual Edict." The pastors of the place solemnly undertook to absolve him from this obligation, and to this he finally yielded. The only attempt at resistance came from Cornelius De Witt. The crowd forced its way into his house and dele- gates surrounded his bed, imploring him to sign the act of the local authorities. A tragic scene ensued. After long PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 117 resistance, subdued by the tears and pleadings of his wife, Chap, ii he finally signed the act of Revocation of the Edict; but, to '^•"■ show that he did so only by order of the authorities, he added his title as "Pensionary of Dordrecht"; which his wife, in her fear for his life, secretly erased. The example of Dordrecht was the tocsin of the revolu- tion. On July 3, 1672, the States of Holland abrogated the "Perpetual Edict"; on July 4, under the title of WiUiam III, the Prince of Orange was proclaimed " Stadtholder, Captain, and Admiral General of Holland;" and, on July 8, the States General took the same action for the United Provinces, bestowing upon the Prince these titles and their preroga- tives for life. II. The Coalition of the Hague In the midst of the commotion that placed the Prince The rupture of Orange at the head of the United Provinces, De Groot °/o^*^'t^ returned to The Hague from the camp of Louis XIV bear- France ing the King's conditions of peace. They were so onerous as to involve the complete vassalage of the provinces, and the excitement was intense. The word "treason" had been already whispered, and it was proposed to associate Van Beuningen with De Groot in the subsequent negotiations; but, peremptorily refusing to participate in this mission. Van Beimingen, on July 7, — the day before the Prince was chosen stadtholder by the States General, — in an eloquent address before that body, denounced the continuation of negotiations, pointed out their unfavorable effect upon the activity of the allies, and terminated his discourse with a peroration which contained the whole programme of action of the Orangist party. As seen by the adherents of the House of Orange, the woes and humihation of the Republic were the results of the poUcies pursued by the repubhcan oUgarchy under the direction of John De Witt. A change of attitude would rescue the country. The King and the Parliament of Eng- land, it was alleged, had a high regard for the Prince of 118 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II Orange. For his sake and in his interest, they would cease ifi7n-Tfi84 ^^^^^ attack on the Repubhc; and the King of England would mediate a peace with the King of France. The oc- casion, Van Beuningen concluded, called for a stout resistance and the conduct of all fiu-ther negotiations by the Prince of Orange. This discourse made a deep impression; and, on the fol- lowing day, having elevated the Prince to the high position of his ancestors, it was decided to ask his opinion regarding the conditions of peace. Without hesitation William III expressed his conviction that the conditions were impos- sible, and that the independence of the Republic could still be maintained without such humiliating sacrifices. The States General thereupon decided to name a colleague to accompany De Groot upon his return to the French camp, with the reply that the "insupportable hardness" of the terms of peace made it impossible to accept them; but De Groot, convinced that his usefulness was at an end, and alarmed by the fear of assassination, — which he had nar- rowly escaped at Rotterdam, — decided to abandon his mission. Negotiations It was a heavy responsibility for a young man of twenty- rrEngiaiid ""^ two to advisc the continuation of resistance, but the Prince was firm in his resolution. Feeling the great importance of detaching the King of England from his alliance with Louis XIV, he had, upon his own authority, privately sent a trusted friend, Gabriel Sylvius, to open negotiations with Charles II. * Far from being discouraged by the indispo- sition of his uncle to change his attitude, the Prince de- spatched a second emissary, Frederick Reede, to renew the appeal; but Charles II took no action, except to send to The Hague a commission, composed of Lord Halifax, a mem- ber of his privy council, the Duke of Buckingham, and Arlington; at the same time informing Louis XIV that the object of this embassy was merely "to delude the 1 For further details concerning Sylvius and his mission, see Siccama, Sir Gabriel de Sylvius, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV, 1901, p. 109 et seq. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 119 public with the hope of peace" and prevent the acquisition Chap, ii of support by Holland. His commissioners were, however, ,„^^"°'^, secretly instructed to sound the intentions of the Prince, • and ascertain if he was disposed to become an accomplice with the two Kings in the humiliation of the United Provinces. Assured of pacific intentions by the Duke of Buckingham, the States General appointed a committee — of which Van Beuningen, Beverningk, and two others were members — to negotiate with the commissioners under the direction of the Prince, with instructions to cede no territories; but to make, if possible, an advantageous use of money. Having received the commissioners in his camp at Bode- grave, the Prince was asked what conditions of peace they could communicate to Louis XIV; but, instead of transmitting his resolute reply, which they evidently thought useless, they embraced the opportunity, on July 16, to make a new treaty with the King of France. In this convention it was stipulated that, in addition to all the concessions demanded through De Groot or contained in the previous treaty between France and England, peace should not be made by either power without the consent of the other; the Dutch flag must be lowered in presence of the English, even on the coasts of Holland and Zeeland; a milhon pounds sterling must be paid to England as a war indemnity; Surinam must be ceded to England; and a pre- mium of ten thousand pounds sterling must be paid for the right to catch herring on the English coasts.^ The sixth article of the treaty provided that "the sov- ereignty of what remained of the United Provinces after the parts detached by the two Kings and their allies, " should be accorded to the Prince of Orange; "or at least the perpetuity of the stadtholderate in his family." This last-named provision profoundly touched the honor of the Prince, for it was of a nature to compromise him fatally in the eyes of his people. He, therefore, hastened to lay the treaty, which had been sent to him, before the States General. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 208 at seq. A. D. 1670-1684 120 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II He emphasized its ruinous consequences for the state, and declared: "To sign it, is to be lost; even to discuss it is dangerous; but if the majority of this assembly decides otherwise, there remains only one course for the friends of Protestantism and liberty; that is, to withdraw to the East India colonies, and there create a new country, where their consciences and their persons will have shelter from tyranny and despotism."^ He then pointed out that the cause of the Republic was the cause of all Europe, and that the English Parhament would soon perceive the pernicious consequences of an al- liance with the King of France and the attempt to ruin the Republic, and would upon its next convocation put an end to that poUcy. The arrival of the German troops on the Rhine would, he declared, be the signal for a change in the situation, and the retreat of the enemy. The hopes The Prfnce had rightly interpreted the spirit and the tdltieToTthe ^^^*^ °^ ^^^ people. The new terms of peace imposed by Dutch Re- the Anglo-French alliance were, on July 21, tersely but firmly pubiio rejected by the States General. The announcement, to- gether with the proposed conditions themselves, placarded throughout Holland, inspired the whole population with new courage and resolution. On July 13, Baron Van Amerongen, accompanied by General von Pollnitz, governor of Berlin, after a journey of two weeks, had arrived at The Hague. They reported the ardent activity of Frederick William, who had every- where urged support from the German princes, and was preparing to lead his troops to the rescue. The news, no doubt, greatly influenced the hopes and determination of WiUiam III in circumstances that were extremely disheart- ening. The visitors found the province of Holland inun- dated with water by the act of its inhabitants, who were con- fined within the cities as if they were besieged. Everywhere else, except in the islands of Zeeland and parts of Fries- land and Groningen, the French troops were already in ' Sirtema de Gro vesting, Guillaume III ei Louis XIV, II, p. 382. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 121 possession of the country; but the people were full of hope, Chap, ii and the authority of the stadtholder was incontestable. J^' "" At Beriin, Louis XIV, indefatigable in his efforts to maintain the isolation of the Repubhc, was again endeavor- ing through his new envoy, Count de la Vauguyon, to dis- courage the Elector from rendering assistance to the Repubhc and to win him over to a policy of neutrality. In order to elude his insistence, Frederick William professed that he was interested only in the maintenance of the Treaties of West- phaha, and in the safety of his duchy of Cleve, already oc- cupied by the French troops. The French diplomatist was not deceived; but took pains to inform himself regarding the condition and activities of the Elector's army up to the moment of its westward march, when he took his departure from Beriin without having accomphshed the purpose of his mission. On July 25, 1672, through the efforts of Lisola, a treaty of alliance was signed at The Hague between the Repubhc and the Emperor;' but, like so many of the engagements of Leopold I, it was devoid of sincerity. Gremonville was assured by Lobkowitz that it was merely a diplomatic diversion, and, like the Austrian treaty with Brandenburg, not to be taken seriously. He had explained the engage- ments with the Elector by saying, that for the good of the Empire Frederick William had to be treated hke a "wild horse that needed to be harnessed with a tamer one." If, he now stated, the King of France could only see the secret instructions given to Montecuccoh, who commanded the Austrian troops, he would reahze that the treaty with the Repubhc was only a sham.^ Having repudiated with indignation the personal offers 5.5^^3 of made to him by the Kings of France and England, Wilham wiiuam in III — notwithstanding the endeavors of the commissioners ^"ngiand from of Charles II as they passed through Brussels to induce France Spain to desert the Republic — persisted in his determina- ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 208. ' See Waddington, Le Grand Slecleur, II, p. 270. 122 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The conflict of parties in Holland tion to detach the King of England from the alliance with France. A private letter from Charles II, dated July 28, — only- three days after the signature of the new Anglo-French con- vention, — fully justified high hopes on the part of the Prince; but he was yet to learn that the pretended friendship of that Machiavellian monarch was intended only to win his confidence and bring him into complicity with the enemy.' William III has been accused of exceeding his powers in his private correspondence with Charles II, and even of aiming to obtain for himself hereditary royal rights in the United Provinces, under the protection of England and France;^ but the evidence for the truth of this accusation is not convincing.' The conduct of the Prince is a sufficient proof of its unfairness. Instead of yielding to the solicita- tions of Charles II to aid in obtaining from the Republic the concessions demanded, — which would have meant the virtual dismemberment of the United Provinces, — he declined to be a traitor to his country; energetically con- tinued his measures for defence; and awaited the assembling of the English Parliament, to which he now looked for the means of forcing the King to terminate the alliance with France. But Charles II also foresaw this possibility; and to prevent it prorogued the Parliament — which was to meet on October 30, 1672 — until the month of February in the following year. In the midst of external dangers to the RepubUc that threatened to destroy its existence, the strife of parties now assumed a tragic intensity which added greatly to its perils. The adherents of the Orangist party believed that the sal- vation of the country depended upon the unqualified resto- ration of the power and prerogatives formerly enjoyed by the stadtholders, the exclusion of the existing republican administration from all public authority, and the appoint- 1 See Bosnage, Annales des Provinces-Unies, II, p. 331. 2 See Leftvre-Pontalis, Jean de Wilt, II, p. 437. ' These accusations rest entirely on the alleged correspondence published by Costerus, which is believed to be apocryphal. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 123 ment of new public officials by the Prince. The party of Chap. II De Witt, on the other hand, regarded the centralization of '^' "*■ power in the hands of WiUiam III and the transfer of au thority from themselves to him and his subordinates as a vio- lation of the republican constitution of the country, and full of danger to the hberties of the people, which the represen- tative and federal theory of the government was intended to preserve. Since they felt themselves too weak in a military sense to overwhelm and expel the invader, the republicans were anxious to make peace; for only upon that condition could they expect to continue in power. The Orangists, on the other hand, found it to their interest to continue the war as long as possible; for its evils could be urged as a constant ground of reproach to those who were alleged to have oc- casioned it without themselves being capable of defending the country, and its duration afforded an opportunity for continuing the concentration of power in the hands of the stadtholder, to whom the Orangists now looked for defence and the negotiation of a peace based on the capacity for self-protection. In addition to these differences, the cry of "usurpation" on the part of the republicans was answered by the cry of "treason" on the part of the Orangists. The calumnies incident to this quarrel have been to a certain extent re-echoed in the histories which have been inspired by these opposing points of view. On the one side, John De Witt is charged with being a wily politician, selfish, ambitious, incompetent, and at heart a traitor, who carried on secret correspondence with the enemy of his country, in order to purchase by ceding a part of its territories the privilege of continuing in power.' On the other side, DeWitt is glorified as the embodiment of all human virtues and excellences, an upright and unselfish patriot, and a martyr to the principles of popular liberty; while William III is represented as a self-seeking usurper of power, aiming to obtain for himself a royal crown by ' Sirtema de Gro vesting, Guillaume III et Louis XIV. 124 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II collusion with conspirators against the very existence of the ^o-t^'^o Republic.! 1670-1684 T . • ,. , It IS m no respect necessary for the purpose we have in view to enter upon the controversy regarding the personal De witt'a characters of these two great men, or even to estimate the "uMk^'oHc"^ inherent merits of the systems of government of which they were the champions. Our task is concerned only with the international effects of their conduct and policies, which cannot be justly appreciated without considering the age in which they lived and acted. De Witt 's conception of statecraft was controlled by the idea of material prosperity as the end for which the State exists, and in that respect he was thoroughly modem. The freedom in which he believed was the privilege of every citizen to exercise his powers in his own way and for his own profit, with only such restraint as might be necessary for the maintenance of good order and pubhc security. To preserve this freedom was for him the purpose of the Re- public, and all his pohcies grew out of this conception. Seeing a great field of enterprise for Holland in foreign trade, he had aimed to develop it, protect it, and retain it; and, for that purpose, he had favored the maintenance of a navy strong enough to overmatch the strength of other maritime powers, particularly that of England. For the same reason he dreaded the creation of a royal dynasty in the Netherlands; for such a dynasty would tend toward mili- tary adventures upon the continent and ignore maritime enterprise, upon which the prosperity of Holland had been erected. If the stadtholderate were continued and put in possession of military force, it would, he believed, even- tually transform itself — as it had threatened to do under the last stadtholder, William II — into a royal dynasty; and thus, in the end, result in the extinction of the Republic, and with it the decline of prosperity. In this belief he had proposed and defended the "Perpetual Edict," and had thereby brought upon himself the hatred of the Orangist Leffevre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 125 party, which regarded his policy as designed merely for the Chap, ii purpose of retaining power in his own hands. In his foreign poUcy also De Witt was inspired by his conception of the purpose of the Republic. He feared the power of England, and was determined as far as possible to resist it on the sea. On the continent he relied upon his diplomatic skill to counteract the waning influence of Spain by invoking the aid of France. He had not fully realized the inordinate appetite for territory and the spirit of depredation which the ally on whom he had most de- pended had now developed. Above all, he had not, until it was too late, suspected the resentment provoked by the formation of the Triple AUiance and the limits the Republic had endeavored to set to the ambition of Louis XIV. In the modern constitutional era the result of De Witt 's The defects of policies might have been different. They would at least have ^"^ ^'"'* Byatem m the benefit of such support as may be derived from the relation to nominal acceptance of some principles of international ""^ *™® justice. But it was an age in which no principles had a chance of prevailing unless supported by armed force, and in which armed force was seldom controlled by just prin- ciples. In such a time political idealism was certain to be misunderstood, and the instinct of national self-preser- vation turned toward the centrahzation of political authority and the development of mihtary force as the sole guarantees of independence. Of these tendencies William III was the natural beneficiary, and he was certainly not the most unworthy. DeWitt had incurred the hostility of Louis XIV, and the Repubhc appeared to be at his mercy. It is unnecessary to speak of other faults than those of judgment as the cause of the peril in which the Republic was thus placed, but it is not surprising that other faults were imputed. We now have reason to believe that De Witt honorably and heroically did all in his power to defend and to save his country, but the diAnsion of parties and the slow moving machinery of the federal administration rendered his efforts futile. In a time when political power was so little subjected to regulative principles, either in the constitution 126 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The murder of the De Witts of the State or in its international relations, the unstable equilibrium of a federative system was an inadequate con- ■ struction. In such a time a free people, working out the problem of its own interests by the slow process of public debate, and finding its chief security in the balance of foreign powers, was an anachronism; and of this anachronism De Witt was destined to be the victim. It was unfortunate for him that just at the moment when the salvation of the Republic demanded unity of action the State was torn and enfeebled by conflicting factions. For the immediate past De Witt was held to be almost solely responsible; and for the future WilHam III, glorified by the sacred memories of a remoter and still more tragic past, was believed by many to be the only hope. On a charge that Cornelius De Witt had attempted to employ an obscure man of proved criminal character to assassinate the Prince, — a charge supported only by this ruffian's own testimony, but which posterity has refused to credit, — that ardent patriot was arrested and imprisoned at The Hague. The Grand Pensionary resigned his office and devoted himself to establishing his brother's innocence; but, un- happily for them, the populace was persuaded that both were traitors, and resolved upon summary vengeance. Cornelius De Witt was sentenced to perpetual banishment, but another fate was in store for him. While John De Witt was visiting his brother in prison preparatory to his exile, on August 20, 1672, the infuriated populace, crying "Kill the traitors, " broke into the building, dragged both brothers into the street, and after brutally murdering them hung their mutilated bodies in the public square. It is due to the memory of John De Witt to record the fact that the commission appointed to examine all his papers, private as well as official, — in which it was im- agined some evidence of treason might be found, — in answer to the question what had been discovered, reported to the States General: "Nothing but honor and virtue." After this sad tragedy, which sealed the unity of the A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 127 United Pro\dnces with the blood of martyrdom, the Re- Chap, ii public set itself with renewed vigor to the task of its deliv- erance. The murderers of John and Cornelius De Witt ■ were not punished; for they were not regarded by public opinion as criminals, but as the mere instruments of a The new pou- political revolution, — the irresponsible perpetrators of "'''^ °* Holland violence exercised in the name of the raison d'Etat, that veiled divinity whose most atrocious enormities are habitu- ally excused on the ground that they are intended for the public good. The new Grand Pensionary of Holland, Gaspard Fagel, gave himself unreservedly to the execution of the orders of the stadtholder. From the moment when his domination began William III made opposition to French expansion the mainspring of all his vigorous and sometimes complex diplomacy, and with consequences to the ascendency of France in Europe which at the beginning of his career it would have been difficult to imagine. Thenceforth, during the remainder of his life, William III became the champion of the balance of power in Europe, and he fulfilled his mission with a zeal inspired by the union of political expediency with the ardor of religious faith. It was in one respect a propitious moment for William III The awaken- to begin the great task to which he devoted the remainder ^^ °' ^"''°p'= of his existence. Louis XIV had not concealed his contempt for the "cheese-mongers, herringfishers and spice-peddlers" of Holland, nor for the purely mercantile conceptions of De Witt's diplomacy. To him it seemed an unpardonable impertinence that a race of mere tradesmen should dare to oppose his sovereign will. And the sentiment of the princes of Europe in general was not widely different from that of the King regarding the pretensions of the Dutch Repubhc. Its independence, commercialism, and especially the new forms of power which had been developed by the industry and economy of these self-governing people, were antipathetic — in so far as they were intelligible — to the tastes, the ideas, and the caste prejudices of all who adhered 128 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II 1670-1684 The influence of Louis XIV in Spain and Italy to a system of absolute rule. Upstarts in government and heretics in religion, the Dutch burghers had no friends in aristocratic circles anywhere. But when by a political revolution a prince of royal blood, whose lineage inspired respect, was strugghng to defend his country from annihilation, the scene was changed, and all Europe became interested in the spectacle. Then at last it was understood that Holland was the bulwark not only of the Germanic liberties but of the political equi- librium of Europe. If Louis XIV held Holland in his grasp he would soon be in possession of the Spanish Netherlands; the Rhine would then present no formidable obstacle to his advance; and with such augmented power even the Alps could not restrain him. Already it was apparent that there was no single power in Europe that could successfully op- pose him. The ease with which in a few weeks Louis XIV had made himself master of all that part of the United Provinces that was not protected by the inundations proved with what rapidity he was able to make conquests. It had not seemed so serious a matter to take money in exchange for mere neutrahty, but now even the princes who were in the King's pay began to feel that they had become conspirators in an enterprise that had gone far beyond their expectations; and they began to wonder who among themselves might be the next victim, and who indeed would be the last. The wider the circle of observation was extended the more ominous appeared the preparations of Louis XIV for the establishment of a universal monarchy. Undoubtedly, the alarm would have been greatly augmented had the secret treaty of partition with the Emperor been suspected, But enough was known to excite general apprehension. Not only had Germany manifested an apathy which showed how completely the princes were already in the hands of Louis XIV, but there was an influential French party in Spain which had nearly succeeded in preventing the defensive alliance of that country with the Repubhc in 1671, and was even then actively engaged in striving to render it ineffectual; A. D. 1670-1684 PEKIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 129 for it had been ingeniously suggested at Madrid that, after Chap, ii all, the Dutch Republic was nothing but a revolted province of Spain that should be punished for its past rebelUon, and that Spain might profit by recovering something from its dismemberment.' And when attention was turned toward Italy, the pre- dominance which Louis XIV had already acquired in the peninsula seemed alarming. Through the influence of the French princesses who had married into the House of Savoy; that duchy — the gateway of France to Italy — was completely gallicized; and Charles Emmanuel had become ahnost a vassal of the King of France. Cosimo III, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was seeking to obtain the favor of Louis XIV, of whose hostility he stood in awe; Venice and Genoa were too much reduced to resist him; and the friend- ship of Parma and Modena had been won by his good offices in reconciling their differences with Pope Alexander VII. Finally, Clement X, who at the time occupied the Holy See, would have been pleased to see all Christendom united under the Emperor and the Most Christian King, if only they would carry out his wish to join in a crusade against the Turks and drive them out of Europe. Nowhere in Italy, as it appeared, was there any effectual barrier to the advance of Louis XIV if after his conquest of Holland he should be inspired by the idea of restoring the Empire in its ancient seat of power by subordinating the petty Italian princes and some day demanding the imperial crown at the hands of the, Pope at Rome. Much of this alarm was no doubt unjustified, but it is The tardiness greatly to the credit of WiUiam III that, beyond any other °' ""^ ^'"^ ruler of his generation, he was able to appreciate the peril to Europe. It was not in his power, with the resources at his command, to save his country by force of arms; but he perceived the possibiKty of saving it by the organization of Europe against his foe. When on September 24, 1672, the junction was at last See Lecestre, La Mission de Gourville en Espagne. VOL. III. — 9 130 A HISTOEY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The trials of Frederick WiJIiam effected between the troops of Austria and Brandenburg in the valley of the Leine near Hildesheim, the strenuous efforts of Frederick William to form a coalition of the German princes for the protection of the Empire had resulted in little more than timid promises; but the situation had be- come clear. On the twenty-second, a purely defensive alliance, after long debates, had been signed at Brunswick for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia by represen- tatives of the Emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, the Dukes of Celle and Wolfenbiittel, and the Landgrave of Hesse; but there was as yet no rupture with Louis XIV on the part of the Germans. The alliance was merely precautionary, but troops were present to give it emphasis. The war with Holland was threatening to become a European war. The problem now was how to bring these forces into action, without which there could be no real aid to the United Provinces. The march toward the Weser and afterward toward the Rhine was painfully slow; and Amerongen, who accompanied the Elector, watched it with deep anxiety. Frederick William wished earnestly to hasten the deliver- ance of Holland, but Montecuccoli knew the reluctance of the Emperor to break with Louis XIV, and tried to temporize. Obstructed by the pacific aims of the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier, the Elector of Brandenburg found it difficult to advance. After three months of wandering, the allies had brought no effective aid to Holland; and Fagel, the Grand Pensionary, compared their peregrinations to those of the children of Israel in the desert. The Republic would have already ceased to exist if it had not been for the inundar tions. In the meantime, the Prince of Orange was sturdily defending the points where the approach of the enemy was possible, but he had seen that more vigorous diplomacy was needed. Frederick William's position was extremely hazardous to his interests; for, while he was the life of the German opposition to Louis XIV, his duchy of Cleve was already occupied by French troops, he was cut off from his own territory, the Emperor — who had again fallen under the PERIL AND EESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 131 influence of Gr^monville and Lobkowitz — was only half- Chap, il hearted, and the other German princes, undecided what ^■"■ course to take, were disposed to wait and see what would happen before disclosing their growing apprehensions. At the same time, Holland, which had paid for service which it was not receiving, was uttering loud complaints and threatening to withhold the subsidies. Almost deserted on the continent, where everyone was wiUing to profit by his action and disinclined to risk coming to his aid, the Elector sent his trusted representative Lorenz von Crockow to the King of England to press upon him the interests of Protestantism and represent the peril to which the Republic was exposed, at the same time offering his services as a mediator. It was a vain appeal. Charles II received the Elector's envoy coldly, announced his firm resolution to continue the war, and insinuated that Freder- ick William should not speak of "religion" when he was him- self allied with so good a Catholic as Leopold I. Ill provided with means, his soldiers drenched by the autumn rains, himself scolded by the States General for his tardy movements, his duchy at the mercy of Louis XIV, the cold of winter approaching, Poland invaded by the Turks and calling for his assistance, Frederick William found his loyalty as an ally and his faith as a Protestant put to a trying test. It was not to be wondered at that he began to consider seriously the idea of a separate peace with France. Unfortunately for the Dutch Republic, neither Spain nor The deiin- Austria intended to do more than defend their own interests; g™°^^ °^ and both were indisposed to bring on a final rupture with France. For the salvation of Holland, on the other hand, it was desirable that the conflict should as quickly as possible take on a European character. With this in view William III was urgently pressing for a prompt junction of the allied armies with his own troops, and at the same time carrying on active negotiations^ at The Hague with Spain and Austria in the hope of stimulating more decisive action. Although the Spanish government had issued a "declara- tion" that it would defend the Republic, no aid had thus A. D. 1670-1684 132 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. II far been furnished by its authority. Count Monterey, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, without orders from Madrid, had promptly put himself at the head of his troops; but in Spain public opinion was still divided, and there was little disposition to take risks for the sake of the Hollanders. Adrien Paets, who was sent by the States General as am- bassador to Madrid, had experienced great difficulty in awakening Spanish interest; while Manuel de Lira, the am- bassador of Spain at The Hague, complained of the tenacity of the States General in trying to dictate the course of con- duct to be taken by their ally. The Dutch insisted that the true solution was for Spain to take the "Generality," and offer an equivalent to France in Flanders or Hainault, which would give to France a better frontier and at the same time separate French terri- tory from that of the Republic; on the principle that it was desirable to have France as a friend but not as a neigh- bor. But De Lira would not listen to such a suggestion. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the negotiation, it was evident that Spain could not totally abandon the Republic. This was made even more clear by the exaggerated demands of Louis XIV, at a short-lived congress convoked at Koln in May, 1673, for the purpose of negotiating a general peace. No one of the alternatives proposed by him was acceptable either to Holland or to Spain, and it was made apparent that united resistance was the only course remaining. The defection Until March, 1673, it appeared possible that the menace of Brandenburg ^f g^ coalitiou would chauge the mind of Louis XIV; but by that time the ultimate defection of Frederick William was deemed certain. On June 21, discouraged by the ob- stacles he had encountered and the failure of the Republic to pay the subsidies, the Elector signed with Louis XIV the Treaty of Vossem, in which he agreed "not to give aid in the future to the enemies of His Majesty," and to keep his army on the farther side of the Weser. In return, the King of France promised to forget the past and restore to the Elector the places occupied by the French troops. It was a great victory for the King's diplomacy, by which A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 133 the Republic was deprived of its only important ally. As Chap, ii an inducement Louis XIV had promised to sustain the Elector 's claim for the unpaid subsidies due from the States General, and in additional to pay him three hundred thou- sand livres when the ratifications were exchanged, and one hundred thousand yearly for five years, beginning with July 1, 1674.1 The defection of Brandenburg was bitterly condemned in The formation Holland, but it proved a benefit to the cause of the Republic ^LT^"''^ by placing it temporarily entirely at the mercy of Louis XIV. Turenne, sent to prevent the approach of the allied armies, had already done his work too well; for he had not only prevented their advance, he had followed them in their retreat, and had invaded the Empire. It was the moment for which William III and Lisola had anxiously waited. Unless the Emperor was prepared to lose all prestige, it was now necessary for him to show his hand. Spain was at last ready for action, and her ambas- sador at Vienna, Don Pedro Ronquillo, informed the Em- peror that the purpose of Louis XIV was not merely to ruin the Republic, but to take possession of the Spanish Netherlands also, as a step to the establishment of a univer- sal monarchy.^ The reign of the Chevalier Gremonville and Prince Lobkowitz was at an end. The former soon left Vienna, where for nine years he had beguiled Leopold I, and Prince Lobkowitz was soon overthrown. On August 28, 1673, Austria and Spain united for their mutual protection; and, on August 30, was signed at The Hague an alliance between the Republic, Austria, Spain, and the Duke of Lorraine.' It was the triumph of the persistent efforts of Lisola 1 The treaty was antedated June 6, 1673. The complete text is given by Pufendorf, De rebus gesHs Friderici Wilhelmi Magni, Berlin, 1695; the pubUshed part by Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 234 et seq. ^ For the instructions, see Lonchay, La rivalitS de la France et de I'Espagne aux Pays-Bas, p. 264. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 240. A. D. 1670-1684 134 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II and the final defeat of Gr^monville in the long diplomatic duel in which they had been engaged. The secret treaty of partition was now at last mere waste paper. Hapsburg and Bourbon were again at war, and the two branches of the House of Austria were again united by a solemn bond in a common cause, — the rescue of the Dutch Republic. Changed char- With such a coalition arrayed against him, it appeared aoter of the j^j, ^ moment probable that Louis XIV would confine his war and defec- tion of England attention to the United Provinces, and thus avoid a general European war. It was clearly possible for him to insist upon the terms which had been already offered him by the Re- pubhc, — namely, the cession of the "Generality," — which would have sufiiciently humiliated the United Provinces without destroying them, and at the same time would have removed the raison d'etre of the new alliance. But the rescue of Holland was only the ostensible object of the coalition, and this was soon apparent to Louis XIV. Its real purpose was, like that of the Triple Alliance, to put an end to his policy of expansion; and Spain now enter- tained the hope of winning back all that had been lost by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was, therefore, too late for the King of France to conceal his real intention, which was to obtain by force the coveted Spanish Netherlands. At Aix-la-Chapelle he could well afford to make terms which disarmed the coalition, for at that time he felt sure of ultimately attaining his end by means of the treaty of partition with the Emperor; but, now that he and the Emperor were at war, that agreement had no longer any existence. Compelled, therefore, to continue the war or abandon all he had so far gained by it, Louis XIV found the centre of hostilities suddenly changed. The struggle was no longer that of the Dutch Republic against the vengeance of the invader, it was a renewal of the old conflict between the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynasties for supremacy in Europe. A French army was already in possession of cities of the Empire, the Spanish Netherlands had again become a battle- ground, and hostilities had spread as far as Sicily. The war PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 135 had in fact become European, and William III had little Chap, ii difficulty in developing the coalition of The Hague into a ^^^^ still more formidable array of powers. In England public opinion had at last found expression. The marriage of the King's brother James, Duke of York, with a Catholic princess, Mary of Modena, had produced great excitement; and it was believed that the troops which Charles II was preparing to send to Zeeland for the Dutch war were really intended to be employed in destroying rehgious freedom in England and imposing Catholicism upon the country. Sir William Coventry violently attacked the French alliance in Parhament, demanded peace with the Republic, and carried a resolution refusing supphes until an eifort to make peace had been made and failed. The contents of the secret treaty of Dover were more than suspected, and Charles II was finally compelled against his will to discontinue the war. Sir William Temple, through the mediation of the Spanish ambassador, found it easy to negotiate the Treaty of Westminster,' which the Re- pubHc was eager to conclude, and it was signed on Feb- ruary 9, 1674, thus ending the Anglo-French alhance.^ After the tardy awakening of the Emperor, the German The adhesions princes — even some of those most closely allied with Louis '"""^ '"^'' XIV — began to take courage, and resolved to oppose him. In June, 1674, the Diet of Regensburg declared war on the King of France in the name of the Empire. Then followed a long procession of adhesions. On June 20, the Duke of Brunswick-Liineburg; on July 1, the Elector of Brandenburg; on July 10, the King of Denmark; on Janu- ary 26, 1675, the Bishop of Osnabriick, and on August 16, 1675, the Bishop of Miinster abandoned Louis XIV and joined the coalition. It appeared for a time as if all Europe had united to stay the advance of the conqueror. The desertion of the Republic by the Elector of Bran- 1 For the details of the negotiation of peace between the United Provinces and England, see Siccama, Sir Gabriel de Sylvius, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV, pp. 113, 116. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 253. 136 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 Sobieski'a election as King of Poland denburg and the renewal of his treaty with Louis XIV, followed so quickly by his adhesion to the new alliance, is explained in part by conditions in the East. Events in Poland had revived the Elector's interest in that kingdom and renewed his aspirations to the Polish throne. On October 18, 1672, King Michael, unable to with- stand the assaults of the Turks and threatened with a revolt of the nobles, had signed a humiliating peace with the Sultan. The resentment felt throughout Poland, seconded by the influence of Pope Clement X, — who sent money from Rome to renew the war, — brought to the front a heroic figure in the person of John Sobieski, who threw him- self passionately into the cause, and led a new attack upon the Turks which resulted in a series of brilliant victories. The death of King Michael on November 10, 1673, rendered necessary a new election to the throne of Poland, and even before his last illness the customary intrigues at Warsaw to secure or control the succession had recom- menced. It was in expectation of the King's death that Frederick William had abandoned his campaign and returned to Berlin, for he was once more hopeful that either he or his son might be the successful candidate. But his hopes were once more frustrated; and, as he no doubt beheved, largely through the influence of Louis XIV. Sobieski, who had been brought up in France and had married a French woman, was on May 21, 1674, chosen King of Poland. He was, no doubt, primarily indebted for this elevation to the popu- larity he had won by his heroic deeds; but he was known to be devoted to French interests, and his election had re- ceived French support. Neither the Elector of Brandenburg nor the Emperor could forgive the interference of France in this election, in which the hopes of both had been bitterly disappointed. Leo- pold I had a twofold cause for resentment; for Sobieski 's election had not only resulted in the defeat of the Emperor's candidate, — Prince Charles of Lorraine, — it had elevated to the throne of Poland an enemy who had been in collu- PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 137 sion with rebels against his authority in Hungary, where Chap, ii Sobieski was so popular that it had been at one time pro- ^'^' At. T 4.1,- TT- 1670-1684 posed to elect him King. Even during the period of his neutrality, Frederick The diplomacy William never ceased to feel a sincere interest in the rescue ?' ^°^^ 5'^ m the hjBst of Holland; and, after his recent disappointment, he hardly needed the urgency of the Emperor to induce him to join the new alliance. He had, indeed, suffered from the parsi- mony of the Dutch Repubhc regarding the subsidies, and from the apathy of the Emperor in the previous campaign; but he now had a new cause of offence on the part of Louis XIV, which he regarded as sufficient to absolve him from his recent treaty obligations. Having succeeded in putting upon the throne of Poland a king of whom the French ambassador at Warsaw wrote that he was as zealous for Louis XIV "as if he had the honor of being born his subject, " the King of France had exercised all his influence to bring about a peace between Poland and the Turks, in order that Sobieski might be free to turn his forces against the Emperor and the Elector of Branden- burg, and thus cripple their activities on the Rhine by keep- ing them occupied at home. To the Emperor, Sobieski 's interference might mean the loss of Hungary; to Frederick William, the loss of Prussia, — which he had once held as a vassal to Poland, — and which the King of Poland might now endeavor to reclaim. But this ingenious move on the part of Louis XIV was doomed to failure. Clement X persistently inspired the patriotism and religious zeal of the Poles in their fierce struggle with the Turks; and the King of France was obliged to content himself with promoting turbulence among the Hungarian rebels, and the more promising prospect of pro- voking an attack on Brandenburg by the Swedes. Temporarily relieved of anxiety regarding the East, Frederick Wilham, with renewed promises of subsidies from Holland and Spain, again placed himself at the head of his army, and marched to the defence of the Count Palatine of the Rhine, whose territories Turenne, with the purpose 138 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II of preventing a German advance for the defence of Franche- *•"• Cornt^, was then devastating. . But Louis XIV required only a short time to create a situ- ation in the North that recalled the Elector of Branden- Thewarof burg for the protection of his own domain. The bitter iTandeDbur povcrty of Sweden rendered it easy for the King of France to turn the hungry troops of that nursery of mercenary soldiers toward the spoils of Brandenburg. Swedish credit had fallen so low that the young king, Charles XI, who had just begun his reign, was not able to equip the necessary ships for the protection of Swedish commerce, or even to pay the expenses of an embassy which he wished to send to Russia. In these circumstances the mere threat of the French envoy that the subsidies would be no longer paid if the Swedes did not make war on Brandenburg, was sufficient to set that impecunious government in motion. Frederick William was thereby rendered innocuous to Louis XIV so far as activity on the Rhine was concerned, and obliged to face a new enemy in the North. After personal interviews with William III, in March and May, 1675, at Cleve and at The Hague, with a' view to en- gaging the sea power of Holland in an attack upon Bremen, — which, with the bishopric of Verden, had fallen to Sweden by the Peace of Westphalia, — the Elector succeeded in obtaining an agreement, signed on May 15 by the Prince of Orange, the deputies of the States General, the represen- tatives of the Emperor, and those of Spain and the three Dukes of Brunswick, whereby these allies were bound to urge upon the King of Deiunark an attack on Sweden in the region of Bremen, to unite in opposing all who in any way aided the King of France, and on June 15 unitedly to declare war on the Swedes. The Swedish army had already invaded Brandenburg; but, on June 28, 1675, at Fehrbellin, Frederick William routed the enemy with such brilliant success as to win for himself the surname of the "Great Elector"; and it is from this victory that, in the opinion of one of its most illus- PERIL AND EESCTJE OF THE DUTCH RBPTJBLIC 139 trious representatives, the House of Hohenzollem dates Chap, ii its success in laying the foundations of its future greatness. A. D. 1670-1684 III. The Peace op Ntmwegen and the Pacific Con- quests OF France The community of interest which had awakened Europe The changed relations of the powers from its lethargy and inspired the Coalition of The Hague "''''*'°°'' °' was now disappearing in the conflict of particular interests which were not only inharmonious but incompatible. The success which had attended the efforts of the Prince of Orange in Holland placed him at once in the front rank of the military commanders and diplomatists of his time. He had already so far rescued his country from the destruc- tion with which it had been threatened as to expel the in- vader from Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel. In truth, even at the beginning of 1674, Holland was practically saved; and the Hollanders were ready to recognize the change as the work of William III. On February 2, 1674, the States of Holland had declared the stadtholderate hereditary in the male line of the House of Orange-Nassau, the States of Zeeland had promptly followed their example, and on April 20, 1674, the States General had ratified this action. But since the formation of the Coalition of The Hague great changes had taken place in the relations of the powers. The war for the repression of the ambitions of Louis XIV was passing into a conflict of particular interests that carried it beyond all central control. Even in Holland, for whose res- cue the war had begun, now that the danger-point was passed there was strong desire for peace upon such terms as it might in the changed conditions be possible to obtain. In truth, the main object of continuing the conflict was the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands to Spain; yet the promises of military and financial aid from Madrid were either unfulfilled or performed in a dilatory manner that rendered them ineffectual. The Dutch burghers, particu- larly those of Amsterdam, were growing weary of a war in which Holland was exhausting its resources without A. D. 1670-1684 140 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II making perceptible progress toward the conclusion of a favorable peace; and certain others of the allies were de- sirous of ending a war from which they were to derive no direct benefit. The effects o£ With the attack of Sweden on Brandenburg the conflict Sweden ^'"^ had passcd into a new phase of its development; for, while this assault was an immediate outgrowth of the previous conditions, it was in reality not only a separate engagement but one involving entirely new motives and consequences. Holland had embarked in the war with Sweden in order to prevent the union of the Swedish forces with those of France on the Rhine; but now that this junction had been prevented there was no particular advantage to be gained by the Republic in continuing the war, which was seriously affecting the commercial interests of the Dutch merchants and shipowners. After so much cost and suffering, a strictly foreign war seemed to them a burden which they were not called upon to bear. On July 17, 1675, the Elector of Brandenburg had obtamed from the Imperial Diet a formal declaration of war upon Sweden; but now that it had been shown that Louis XIV could not completely paralyze the energies of the Empire by calling in the Swedes, the purpose of that declaration seemed to the Germans to have been in the main accom- plished. On the other hand, the vigor exhibited by Freder- ick William, who was loudly demanding "satisfaction" in the form of territorial concessions, had become alarming. If he should annex Western Pomerania, — which had been acquired by Sweden through the Peace of Westphalia, — it would seriously disturb the equilibrium of Germany. Not wishing Sweden expelled from the Empire for the sole profit of the Elector of Brandenburg, there was no enthusiasm on the part of the other German princes in the further prose- cution of the war. Only Christian V of Denmark, the Bishop of Miinster, and the Dukes of Brunswick, who hoped to receive some of the spoils stripped from Denmark's hereditary enemy, were anxious to impose a crushing defeat on Sweden. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 141 On the other hand, Louis XIV and Charles XI were un- Chap, il ceasingly active in preparing new embarrassments for '^•"' the Elector. In Poland the Marquis of Bethune, brother in-law of Sobieski, had induced the King to sign with Louis XIV, on June 11, 1675, the secret treaty of Jaworow; in which he promised, for two hundred thousand 4cus, to attack Frederick William in the Duchy of Prussia as soon as peace with the Turks should be concluded.' The campaigns of 1675 were not so favorable to France The situation as they had promised to. be at the beginning of the year. '° ^'''"""^ A revolt against Spanish rule at Messina had resulted in an invitation to Louis XIV to intervene and take possession of that city; but the diversion had not borne the expected fruits. The population, once free from Spanish rule, left to the French the trouble of protecting the independence of the city, without rendering any aid in return. Sicily did not rise in revolt, as had been expected, while Naples and the other Spanish possessions in Italy displayed no desire for a substitution of French rule. The only result of the enter- prise advantageous to France was the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Roussillon, which was in consequence surrendered to the French. On the Rhine Montecuccoli showed himself an equal match for Tureime, who was killed in battle, while Marshal Crequi was taken prisoner, with no substantial gains to balance these misfortunes. In Germany the energetic movements of Frederick William against the Swedes had produced a bewildering effect upon the allies of France. The tradition of Swedish invincibility had been rudely shattered by the check given to the Swedes in their march toward the Rhine and their expulsion from Brandenburg. Immediately after the withdrawal from the alliance charies ii's with France and his separate peace with the Dutch Republic, ^"^^^^ ^0^° ' Charles II had regarded the occasion as favorable for win- ning personal glory as the arbiter of Europe, conciliating ' This treaty, which remained secret until the nineteenth century, may be found in Moemer, Staatsvertrage, pp. 701, 704. A. D. 1670-1684 142 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II public opinion in England, and incidentally rendering some service to Louis XIV, of whom he secretly remained a friend and even a paid dependent. He had, therefore, promptly offered to mediate between Louis XIV and the coalition, and proposed the assembling of a congress for peace at Nymwegen. Although official negotiations regarding the Congress were opened early in 1675, there was no serious thought of meeting until January, 1676. D'Estrades, Colbert de Croissy, and D ' Avaux — whom Louis XIV named as his representatives — were among the first to arrive at Nymwegen, which they reached in the following June; but the policy of the King of France being to negotiate a separate peace with each of the members of the coalition, and these being indisposed to be thus separated in detail, the negotiations did not begin effectively imtil 1677. In truth, William III not only from the first distrusted the mediation of Charles II, but he had no inclination to end the war; partly because he wished further to consoli- date his own authority in the United Provinces by contin- uing the struggle to a point where he could make his own terms and become the virtual master, as well as the saviour, of the Republic; and partly because he was unwilling to abandon his allies. The time had passed when the Prince, who had once hoped to save his country through the in- fluence of Charles II with Louis XIV, was willing to accept his mediation, which he now felt would be prejudicial to the interests of the Repubhc. The secret In his suspicion of the real purposes of Charles II the o^ariTs^n °and P^incc displayed a keen penetration. When the King Louie XIV of England abandoned the French alliance, Ruvigny — who had replaced Colbert de Croissy as French ambassador at London — was inclined to abuse him for his perfidy; but he soon received instructions from Louis XIV to continue good relations with Charles II, and to offer him the same subsidy for England's neutrality as had been given for the alliance. For years Louis XIV had paid Charles II an annual pension of one hundred thousand pounds sterling. 1670-1684 PERIL AND EESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 143 He was now ready to continue the pension in exchange for Chap. Ii the King's clandestine assistance. Charles II did not dare to entrust this transaction to his responsible ministers; ■ but, on February 26, 1676, he personally transcribed, signed, and sealed with his own hand the secret treaty which Ru- vigny laid before him.' In this manner Charles II received from the King of France the money he coveted but could not obtain from Parliament for his own private purposes, and Louis XIV received from him all the assurance such a shameful transaction could give that England would not range herself with his enemies, as he feared might otherwise be the case. Ruvigny was able to write trium- phantly to his royal master : " The King of Great Britain has engaged not to conclude a treaty without the consent of the King of France, and to prorogue or dissolve Parliament, if that be necessary." Charles II had "upon his honor as a King" placed the foreign policy of his kingdom, and even the meeting of its Parliament, in the hands of the King of France. In making this secret bargain with Charles II Louis XIV The signifi- fully realized the immense value of the neutrality of England ^^nce of thia '' . bargain for and of the personal friendship of the King in the execution of Louia xiv his designs. He perceived that the character of the war on the continent had been radically altered by the alliance of Spain and the Emperor with the Republic. It was now on his part in reality a war for the reduction of the combined power of the Hapsburgs, and no longer merely a question of humiliating or further weakening the Dutch Republic, the complete overthrow of which had been found impos- sible. What the King of France now aimed at was the. immediate conquest or cession to himself of Franche- Comt^ and as much as possible of the Spanish Netherlands. The coalition, on the other hand, was fighting to prevent any gains by France, and hoped to recover from her the acquisitions made by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to restore ' For the treaty, see Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV, II, pp. 539, 540. 144 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II 1670-1684 Arlington's scheme of marriage for WUliam III to the Duke of Lorraine his lost duchy, and to reconquer Alsace for Austria. In these circumstances, if Louis XIV could not have the alliance of England, his next best advantage was in possess- ing its neutrality. This was difficult to secure; for public opinion in England was opposed to France, and the King and the Parliament were in perpetual conflict. As there was little hope of winning the Parliament, he had pursued the more practicable course of retaining the good offices of the King, which might prove sufficient for his purpose in keep- ing England neutral through the King's prerogative of pro- roguing or dissolving Parliament. The most important step to be taken in the dissolution of the Coalition of The Hague was to secure, if possible, the immediate separation of the Dutch Republic from its allies; but the chief impediment to this act of desertion was the firm resistance of William III. As a means of over- coming the opposition of the Prince of Orange, after Sir William Temple 's failure to enter into private negotiations with him on that subject, Arlington, — who hoped by some good fortune to recover his former position at Court, — with the idea that William III might thus be brought under Eng- lish influence, had devised and urged the scheme of offering to the Prince in marriage his cousin Mary, eldest daughter of James, Duke of York; and, in spite of the misgivings of Ru- vigny, who feared that such a marriage might be prejudicial to the interests of his master, Arlington was sent to The Hague to make the proposal.^ As grandson of Charles I, William of Orange stood next to the daughters of the Duke of York in the succession to the English throne; and by his marriage with Mary the re- lationship to the House of Stuart — which a few years later was to make him king of England — would have received an added bond. But the Prince of Orange suspected the inten- tions of Arlington, whom he felt he had reason to distrust; and, alleging as his reason the youth of the Princess, who ' On the visit of Arlington to The Hague, see Siccama, Sir Gabriel de Sylvius, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV, pp. 118, 119. PEKIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 145 was then only thirteen years old, he declined the offer. Chap, ii His purpose was to remain loyal to the allies of the Repub- '^' "■ lie, to obtain for it a peace that would leave its possessions and its integrity unaffected, and above all to guarantee the future security of the United Provinces and of Europe against the ambitious designs of the King of France. While William III was seeking to evade the mediation The desire ot of Charles II, Louis XIV was anxious, for reasons already ^ediate""^ '" stated, to avoid any other outside influence. Pope Clement X had desired to mediate between the Catholic powers, and in a letter to the Emperor had offered his good offices. He had expressed his wish that a congress should not be held in a Protestant city, as had been proposed, on the ground that he could not send his nuncios into a heretical country. His plan was for the negotiations to be managed by three representatives of the Holy See, who should be stationed respectively at Versailles, Vienna, and Madrid. This ar- rangement, which entirely ignored the Protestant powers, was, however, pleasing neither to Louis XIV nor to the Emperor; for the former expected to be supported by Eng- land, and the latter by the Dutch Republic and the Protes- tant princes of Germany. The proposals of the Pope were, therefore, rejected. Offended on account of the disregard of his wishes by the Catholic sovereigns, Clement X had decided to take no part in the Congress; especially since Nymwegen, a Prot- estant town, had been designated as the place of meeting. But Clement X having died while the negotiations were in progress. Innocent XI — who was chosen Pope on Septem- ber 21, 1676 — decided to pursue a different course, and appointed the papal nuncio at Vienna, Bevilacqua, to rep- resent him at Nymwegen. Although the papal nuncio displayed an impartial spirit, — which he carried so far as even to select his dwelling at a point equidistant between those of the French and the Spanish plenipotentiaries, — and visited and received with the same cordiality both Catholic and Protestant delegates, he was not able to overcome the prejudices of Louis XIV, VOL. in. — 10 146 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The disposi- tions of the powers who from the beginning resented his presence, as if it were directed against himself. In preparing the credentials of - Bevilacqua the papal chancellery had used the expression "utrumque regem," thus placing the King of France and the King of Spain on the same level. Louis XIV considered this an offence to his dignity and complained of it as an insult. The struggle in England between Charles II and the Par- liament seriously complicated his functions as mediator, and nearly paralyzed his efforts to serve the interests of Louis XIV. To conduct the mediation at Nymwegen he had chosen Lord Berkeley, Sir William Temple, and Sir Leoline Jenkins, — the latter a "typical royalist," who had formerly served as Secretary of State. It was, how- ever, upon Sir William Temple that the responsibility of the mission principally rested. "Our counsels and our conduct," writes Sir WiUiam, speaking of the Congress, "resemble those floating islands which wind and sea chase hither and thither." Without effective organization, impeded by vexatious contentions regarding precedence and ceremony, like the Congress of Westphalia, the Congress of Nymwegen drifted on with small results. In the meantime the war was briskly waged on all sides, in the hope that a victory in the field would have its effect upon the councils of the various powers. But, in truth, the peace which finally emerged from the negotia- tions was not decided either by arms or by an appeal to definite principles of settlement; it was the work of the per- sistent diplomatic activity of Louis XIV, who controlled the proceedings of the Congress through the mediation of Charles II, and at the same time prosecuted his private negotiations with the separate powers with the purpose of making a good bargain with each of them. The bond of union between the allies most difficult to sever was that which united the Emperor and Spain. Leo- pold I wished to effect a settlement on the basis of the Peace of Westphalia. His plenipotentiaries proposed that the King of France should restore to the Emperor and the PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 147 other allies all that had been taken from them, with in- Chap, ii demnity for the damages they had suffered. Spain took '^•°- for its base the Treaty of the Pyrenees. "His Most Catholic '^^^^^ Majesty," ran the Spanish note, "demands the restitution of all that which has been taken from the kingdoms of Spain since 1655; all the ruins, demolitions, and conflagra- tions should be made good." The Elector of Brandenburg and the King of Denmark wished to continue the war until the Swedes should be driven out of Germany. The Elector would thus keep and extend his conquests in Pomerania, and Christian V would claim the recovery of what had been taken from Denmark by Sweden through the Treaty of Copenhagen of 1660. Since these powers were disposed to prolong the struggle until their objects were accomplished, it was necessary either (1) to accede to their demands, (2) continue the conflict, or (3) detach them one after another from the coalition. There was at the Court of France a strong disposition to end the war, which had become a heavy burden. The people were murmuring under their load of taxation; deputies of Bordeaux, whose trade had been greatly injured, had secretly visited the Prince of Orange in the hope of peace; and in Brittany and Normandy discontent had reached the point of open revolt. Colbert's able administration of the finances had not been adequate to the growing needs of the war; and, while Louvois was urging its continuance, Col- bert was pointing out the ruin that might follow from its longer duration.* Determined not to yield to the Hapsburg demands, and at the same time wishing to end the cost of the war, Louis XIV resolved first to win the friendship of the United Provinces ' From 1670 to 1679 the annual expenses of the kingdom had in- creased from 77 million to 128 million hvres. The country had been impoverished by the war, and Colbert resorted to every expedient to increase the revenues. See Lavisse, Hisioire de France, Tome VII, p. 377. 148 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II by his moderation, and then to deal with the other members *-^- of the coahtion one by one.' For a time it seemed as if it would be impossible to make a separate peace with the Dutch Republic on account The conflict of the stout resistance of William III. When Colbert de between the Cj-oissy Opened this subject with Sir William Temple, the and wiuiam III reply showed plainly that the Prince of Orange would oppose all plans to substitute private arrangements for a general peace. "As to the Prince," said Sir William, "his good faith and his loyalty are too well known to me to permit me to suppose that he would sacrifice the interests of the allies for advantages personal to himself." And when Sir WilHam spoke of the subject directly to the Prince, his reply was, "It is necessary above everything else to satisfy Spain, and my particular interest will never prevail in a negotiation with which the future of Europe is intimately connected." But legally the States General possessed the right to make peace and to declare war, and the Prince of Orange had not yet so firmly established his authority in the RepubHc as to bend that body entirely to his will. Even Fagel, the Grand Pensionary, who was devoted to the cause of the Prince, was convinced that, after such a long and trying struggle, peace was indispensable to the Republic; and he confided to Sir William Temple that it was inevitable, since there was "not a single person in Holland who was not in favor of it." In July, 1677, as a result of the intrigues of the French agents at The Hague, the peace party, headed by the city of Amsterdam, was ready and eager to make a separate treaty with France. The Prince, however, remained un- shaken in his position; but the tide was too strong for him to resist. • The little consideration that Louis XIV had for the loss of Ufe by continuing the war is shown in the following sentence of a letter to his ambassador, Courtin, written on July 3, 1677: "Whatever the loss of men which the continual action of arms may cause, I am always easily able to complete the troops which I oppose with so much success to my enemies." See Mignet, N^gociations, etc., IV, p. 4S7. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 149 The situation was now different from that which existed Chap. II three years before, when William III had decided to hold aloof from English influence. The Coalition of The Hague was morally disintegrated, since the Republic, which had inspired it, was about to desert it. The Prince, therefore, The marriage decided to go to London and use his influence with Charles II. °' ^'"■"•m i" ... , . , , . and its effects In the previous year the subject of the English marriage had been reopened by Sir William Temple, and William III had given it new consideration. He was now impressed with the idea that this union might have great advantages; and that, instead of subjecting himself to other influences by an English marriage, his own influence might perhaps dominate the situation. In June, 1677, therefore, one of the Prince's favorite chamberlains, Bentinck, was sent to Lon- don to prepare for his visit to England, which followed in October. With a frankness and promptitude that astonished his uncles, William III urgently asked for the hand of Mary. The King and the Duke of York wished first to speak of in- ternational politics, and took the groimd that peace should come first and marriage afterwards. But the Prince in- sisted upon the marriage as a preUminary to any discussion of affairs whatever; and on November 4, 1677, the marriage ceremony was performed. Before the end of November William III had returned with his bride to Holland, but not without having proved his quality in England. Charles II and the Duke of York had proposed terms for a general peace which would be acceptable to Louis XIV and retain his good will toward the Stuart dynasty; but William III, aided by the King's first minister, Danby, who knew the temper of Parliament and wished to end the influence of the King of France over Charles II, recommended terms which it was certain would not be accepted without compulsion. In the end, however, a compromise was agreed to, according to which Louis XIV was to keep Franche-Comte, but to restore Lorraine to the son of Charles III, and all conquests in the Spanish Nether- lands to Spain, except Maestricht, which was to be re- 150 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 Louis XIV's renewed activity turned to Holland. Seven "barrier" cities also were to be surrendered to Spain. Charles II was of the opinion that Louis XIV would be content with this arrangement, and the Earl of Feversham was sent to France to submit these proposals; but, as the Prince had hoped and believed, they were promptly rejected. This was a decided triumph for William III. Under the influence of Danby, who urged Charles II to resent the rebuff implied in the rejection of his proposals, on December 31, 1677, a treaty of alliance was concluded between England and Holland, for the purpose of enforcing peace on the terms previously proposed.^ To give this new alhance effect, the English troops that had been in the service of France were recalled, and an army of twelve thousand soldiers and a fleet of thirty ships were ordered to be fitted out for the aid of the coalition. Thus, in the course of a few months, Louis XIV found his royal proteg^, under the influence of William III, not only dictating to him an inacceptable peace, but actually in aUiance with Holland and apparently arming to attack him. What seemed worst of all, the King of England had sum- moned Parliament — which by previous agreement had been adjourned until the following April — to meet on January 28, 1678.2 Holding William of Orange responsible for the changed situation, Louis XIV now resolved that he would at any price make a separate peace with Holland. Taking advan- tage of the fears among the Dutch republicans that the raat- rimonial alliance of William III with the House of Stuart would too greatly increase the power of the stadtholder, he used every means to revive the republican party in Holland; and the strong desire for peace among the Dutch ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 341 et seq. 2 In December, 1677, Charles II had accepted two million livres after long bargaining as the price of his promise, at the same time re- proaching the King of France with risking nothing but his money, while he was risking his crown "in opposing the universal desire of his subjects." See Mignet, N^gociations, etc., IV, p. 499. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 151 burghers, combined with the mtrigues of the French agi- Chap, ii tators, finally determined the States General, in opposition ^- °- to the wishes of the stadtholder, to conclude a separate ^^^""^^^^ peace. To force the issue, Louis XIV announced that, unless an agreement were reached before August 10, hostilities would be resumed. The negotiations suddenly displayed new life; but on August 9, when the Dutch were disposed to conclude a treaty, the French plenipotentiaries insisted upon two new requirements: (1) that Holland should cause the conquests made from Sweden by Denmark to be im- mediately restored; and (2) that the Republic should send an embassy to Louis XIV to compliment him on the con- clusion of the peace. On the morning of August 10, 1678, while the allies were rejoicing that the negotiations had been broken off and the negotiators were preparing for their departure, D'Es- trades, Colbert de Croissy, and D'Avaux visited the Dutch delegation, and complained that the obstinacy of its members was preventing peace. Beverningk objected that the last requirements could not be conceded. "You hold then only to that? and, that obstruction removed, you are willing at once to sign a peace?" "Yes," replied the Dutch delegates; and within five hours, at a single sitting, the treaty was finished and the separate peace was signed.! The Prince of Orange, considering that it was dishonorable The separate to abandon the allies, continued fighting after the treaty was S.^""" ''«'^««'> signed, apparently in the hope that it would not be ratified Holland at The Hague,^ — yet the treaty was in substance a com- plete triumph for the Republic. By its terms France re- stored to Holland all that had been conquered, including Maestricht; the King promised to return to the Prince of Orange all his estates, which he had appropriated; a favorable treaty of commerce was concluded; the droit '■ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 350 et seq. ^ In a letter of August 15 to Fagel, William III declared that it waa only on that day that he had heard that the peace was signed. He had, however, already learned that it would be signed. 152 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 Louis XlV'a double role in England d'aubaine was abolished; and full liberty of trade was ac- corded to the Dutch ships, even with the enemies of France. But, from another point of view, the treaty was also a triumph for the King of France. He had by the long war inflicted a heavy punishment on the Republic for its part in the Triple Alliance, and by the separate peace he had begun the dissolution of the coalition. Besides, the new treaty of peace with France rendered nugatory the Anglo- Dutch alliance for the enforcement of a peace with Spain and the Emperor. He was now free to deal with each of them in the manner most advantageous to himself. But Louis XIV had not trusted to this separate peace alone to repair his relations with England. Uncertain whether he could ultimately depend upon Charles II, he had adopted new tactics with him. Through BariUon, his new ambassar dor in London, he had offered Charles II two hundred thousand pounds sterling, and had consented to cede to Spain three of the seven barrier cities, if the King would prorogue Parliament. When, however, through the op- position of Danby, this offer was declined, he had provided the ambassador with funds to induce Parliament to refuse to vote money for the war, on the plea that the King did not really mean to prosecute it, but was intending to employ the money in raising troops for the restoration of Catholi- cism and the suppression of Protestantism in England. The hostile relations of the King and the Parhament had rendered easy the secret control of England in the matter of neutrality. So long as the King was able and willing to carry out his private engagements with Louis XIV, the King of France was ready to pay him for his complicity; but, the moment he failed in this, he found it not difficult to alarm the Parliament regarding the purposes of the King — who was more than suspected of treasonable intentions — and thus to cut off his supplies of men and money. Although pubHc opinion in England was in favor of a Dutch alliance and a war with France, the King did not enjoy sufficient public confidence to obtain a favorable re- sponse to his demands. To his announcement that, "in 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 153 accordance with the wishes of the country, " he had made Chap. Ii an aUiance with the Dutch Repubhc, in order to defend Flanders from falling to Louis XIV, the House of Com- mons had replied, that he must begin by insisting upon the reduction of the French conquests to a point which would restore the conditions which existed at the Peace of the Pyrenees. As Charles II had no intention of going so far as this, and was merely aiming to increase his supplies of money either from the Parliament or from Louis XIV, he was greatly irritated at this venture of the Parliament to control his foreign policy, and decided to resume his pecuniary relations with his royal patron of France. Accordingly, Montagu, the English ambassador at Versailles, was in- structed to offer, for six million livres yearly, to be paid for three years, the renewed support of England in bringing the coalition to terms; but Louis XIV, who perfectly under- stood why the offer was made, and knew the inability of Charles II to do what he proposed, considered the bribe too high and declined to pay it. At a later time, when Par- liament in its urgency for immediate intervention seemed to be beyond his secret control, Louis XIV decided as a last resort to comply with the demands of Charles II; but, although a new private treaty to this effect had been drawn up on May 17, 1678, the separate peace of France with the Republic in August rendered its execution unnec- essary to Louis XIV; and, there being no service rendered, the money was never paid. Finally, the Parliament, fearing that the unpaid troops the King had already raised might be used by him against the Protestants, voted the sum necessary to pay them off, on the condition that they be at once disbanded; and thus war with France was finally averted.^ ^ On account of his hostility to Danby, — the minister of Charles II who wrote the letter of March 25, 1678, instructing Montagu to demand money of Louis XIV, — the ambassador revealed to Parhament the whole transaction, which reflected on the King and caused Danby's faU. 154 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II The Anglo-Dutch menace being now practically removed, r7n Tfi«4 Louis XIV next turned his attention to a peace with Spain. ■ In the preceding April he had drawn up in his negotiations with Holland a list of demands and concessions.' It em- The disaoiu- bodied what he considered indispensable to the defence of co^t/on''^ France. It is true that, when the war was begun, France was not threatened; but now that it was to be closed, it was not unreasonable, and not without advantage to the peace of Europe, that the frontiers of France should be fixed at such a remove from the capital as to increase the safety of the kingdom from invasion. To Spain, however, the new exactions, which threw upon that monarchy the whole burden of loss occasioned by the war, while the Dutch Republic came out of it without losing any territory, seemed insupportable. Exhausted, and almost ruined, as the country was, Spain was indisposed to make the required sacrifice.^ At The Hague, both William III and Sir William Temple were active in postponing the ratification of the treaty of August 10; and the difficulties of effecting a reconcifiation between France and Spain were put forward as an excuse for delay. The Spanish ambassador, De Lira, urged that Spain could not possibly give up Bouvines and Beaumont, and implored the States General to aid in obtaining their release. The mediation thus undertaken proved successful, and on September 17, 1678, a treaty of peace was signed at Nymwegen by the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries, by which the King of France returned to Spain nine places, — including Charleroi, Ghent, and Limburg, — but kept Franche-Comte, Valenciennes, Cambrai, Conde, Bouchain, Aire, Saint-Omer, Cassel, Ypres, Mauberge and other towns, thus considerably extending the frontiers of France. 1 For details, see Lonchay, La rivaliti de la France et de VEspagne aux Pays-Bos, pp. 286, 287. ^ The relations between the French and the Spanish ambassadors at The Hague had become so strained that, on August 2, 1678, the people of the French embassy were attacked with pistols by those of the Spanish embassy; and two Frenchmen were wounded. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 155 Spain having been thus separated from the coalition, on Chap. II February 5, 1679, the Emperor also abandoned it. The '^■"• Treaty of Mlinster was renewed; Freiburg in the Breisgau was ceded to France; Philipsburg having fallen into the hands of the Imperials, the previous right of the French to garrison it was renounced; and the Duchy of Lorraine was to be restored to the young duke, Charles IV; but, on accoimt of his refusal to accept the conditions, this last stipulation did not become effective. Separate treaties were soon negotiated with the Dukes of Brunswick also, at Zell, on February 5, 1679, and with the Bishop of Miinster, at Nymwegen, on March 29, 1679, by which their portions of the conquests from the Swedes in Bremen and Verden were restored to Sweden. For a time it appeared as if the Elector of Brandenburg The djBap- would be the favorite of fortune in the war. He had not p°i"tf ™t "' Brandenburg only expelled the Swedes entirely from Western Pomera- nia; but when, in December, 1678, Charles XI invaded the Duchy of Prussia and proposed to restore it to Poland, the Elector, hastening to the rescue on the ice of the Frisches Haff, nearly annihilated the Swedish army, and in the fol- lowing February drove the remnant of it into Livonia. Abandoned by the Emperor, who had made his peace with Louis XIV without recognizing his obligations to his ally, Frederick Wilham, elated with his victories, deter- mined not merely to retain his conquests but to punish the . Emperor for deserting him, and seized the occasion to revive and assert the ancient claims of the Hohenzollerns to a good part of Silesia.' But permanent victory does not consist merely in winning battles. A triiunphant conqueror in the field, Frederick William was vanquished at Nymwegen. His plenipoten- tiaries at the Congress, William von Blaspeil and Christopher von Somnitz,^ had been instructed to insist on Brandenburg being considered not merely as a member of the Empire but ' For the nature of these claims, see Himly, Hisioire de la formation territoriale des Stats de I'Europe centrale, II, pp. 49, 50. ' A part of the time Otto von Schwerin. 156 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II as a belligerent power on its own account, and as such de- A.D manding "satisfaction" in the form of the cession of Pom- erania and the complete exclusion of Sweden from Germany. This, the Elector contended, was necessary both for the security of Brandenburg and for the peace of the Empire. In March, 1679, however, after all the strenuous ef- forts of his representatives at Nymwegen and the ineffec- tual importunities of Schwerin with Charles II at London to intervene in behalf of Brandenburg, Frederick William found himself isolated, with no friend in Europe except the King of Denmark. The situation was rendered more embarrassing by the fact that, even before the separate peace between France and Holland, the Elector's minister, Meinders, had been furnished with elaborate instructions ' for privately negotiating a peace between Brandenburg and France; which made it impossible for Frederick William to justify his loud and bitter complaints of desertion by his allies. It is needless to follow the long and sinuous course of the negotiations for peace with France. Louis XIV, whom Frederick William had so many times deceived, was re- solved this time to inflict upon him a humiliation and a punishment that would be deeply felt. The Rhenish prov- inces of Brandenburg were at his mercy, and it hardly needed a military menace to bring the Elector to terms. Accordingly, on Jime 29, 1679, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, a treaty of peace was signed by the Elector with France and Sweden, by which the Treaties of Westphalia were recognized as "the most solid and most assured foundation of the tranquillity of the Empire"; and Brandenburg re- stored to Sweden all the conquests in Pomerania, with a slight rectification of the frontier.' On October 12, at Nymwegen, the Swedes made peace with Holland also, and on November 27, at Fontainebleau, Denmark concluded a treaty by which Wismar and the island of Rtigen were restored to Sweden. On November 15 was concluded at Saint-Germain-en- » For the treat}', see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 408. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUCTH REPUBLIC 157 Laye a new treaty of alliance with Saxony, by which another Chap, ii elector was added to the influence of Louis XIV. '^- "• This general pacification, which in its totality is known as ^^™~^^^ . the "Peace of Nymwegen," was a bitter disappointment to Frederick William and Christian V of Denmark, whose Results of the brilhant military exploits were made entirely unavailing ^"'^^ "' through the dissolution of the coalition without their ob- ^*™''^*™ taining "satisfaction" from Sweden. On the other hand, Louis XIV seemed for the moment to have won the firm allegiance of his Swedish ally by insisting upon the return of the conquered provinces. As for the Emperor, if he made no gains he at least suffered no great loss, except the diminished prestige of having waged war without important results. The one clear inference from the terms of the Peace of Nymwegen was that Louis XIV had no one to fear. He had not only accomplished practically all that he intended at that time, but he had prepared for free action in the future. He had shown his moderation — one might say almost his generosity — in his treatment of Holland, which had come out of the war not only without the loss of terri- tory but with a highly advantageous treaty of commerce. He had demonstrated his military power in resisting single- handed a European coalition in a war fought entirely on foreign soil. He had displayed his diplomatic skill in promptly dissolving the coalition which he had successfully opposed in the field, and in dictating his own terms to every one of the allies. He had besides this considerably in- creased the territories and strengthened the frontiers of France at the expense of Spain, which was compelled to yield to all of his demands. The Peace of Nymwegen was, therefore, from every point of view a triumph for Louis XIV; but it was not of a nature to give tranquillity to Europe, and contained the seeds of future strife. The King of France had not negotiated as an equal, but as a master.' ' The negotiations of the Peace of Nymwegen are recorded in full in the series of M4moires et Documents, in the Archives des Affaires 158 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The new pre- tensions of Louis XIV But the triumph of Louis XIV did not end with the sig- nature of the treaties. He had discovered a way to make new • conquests in a time of peace. As a memorial of his achieve- ments and a prelude to his further pretensions, he caused a medal to be made at Paris which bore the inscription: "Pace in leges suas confecta" — "Peace made in accordance with his own laws." Like the Emperor Frederick I in 1158 at the Diet of Ron- caglia/ and Philip IV of France in expropriating the English possessions in Guyenne,^ Louis XIV laid claim in the name of the law to that which he had, through the subtle phrase- ology of the treaties, acquired indirectly by the sword. The French jurists were now set to work to discover what rights had been conveyed to France by such expres- sions in the treaties as "leurs bailliages, chastellenies, gouvernances, prevostez, territoires, domaines, seigneuries, appartenances, dependances, et annexes," — which included everything possessed, or to which there was an ancient claim, by any of the cities or overlordships that had come under his dominion, "by whatever name they might be called." The first indication of this procedure grew out of the trouble vnth Spain, in December, 1679, over the title "Duke of Burgundy" employed in the full powers of the Spanish plenipotentiary. Baron de Christin. The French coun- cillors Pelletier and De Worden refused to accept his cre- dentials, on the ground that this title did not belong to the King of Spain. In the Spanish reply of May, 1680, a modi- fication of the full powers was refused. Louis XIV then announced that if by the following July 15 — afterward extended to September 15 — the title was not renoimced, he would "take possession of all that he believed belonged to him by virtue of the Treaty of Nymwegen." The King of Spain under this pressure renounced the title of Duke of Burgundy; but the military executions previously ordered Etrangferes at Paris. A good general risumi may be found in Vast, Les grands traiUs, II, pp. 23, 46. ' See Volume I of this work, pp. 287, 289. ' See Volume II of this work, pp. 4, 5. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 159 were not countermanded, and French soldiers proceeded to Chap. II occupy some twenty-odd places, which rendered the ■,(.■^^^'(,04 King of France practically master of the entire Duchy of ■ Luxemburg. In order to give a form of legality to this novel procedure The chambres in the interpretation of treaties, Colbert de Croissy in- ''" ^^""'»" stituted a judicial examination of the titles acquired by France through the treaties with Spain and the Emperor, including the disputed territories which had been com- prised in the Treaty of Miinster at the Peace of West- phaUa. In taking this course Louis XIV was not entirely without justification, since the Empire had itself raised ques- tions of interpretation, based on certain ambiguities of the text, in the case of the cessions in Alsace; the Germans con- tending that the feudal and imperial privileges of certain cities and princes under the Empire still belonged to the Empire and were not absorbed by the cession of these terri- tories in the sovereignty of the King of France, while the French jurists maintained that not only were these privileges entirely transferred to the sovereignty of the King, but also all the dependencies of every kind of which these cities and princes were the suzerains. To settle these points, Louis XIV organized the cele- brated Chambres de Reunion, — one at Metz in 1679, the other at Breisach in 1680. The duty of these chambers was to examine into the fiefs in Alsace and in the three Bishoprics of Verdun, Metz, and Toul which might thus be claimed by the King of France as ultimate possessor of all the feudal rights of his subjects. The Parliament of Besan5on also was charged with similar duties for Franche- Comte. Thus by the application of the principles of feudal law as understood by his own jurists, in a period of peace, Louis XIV adjudged to himself, and afterward occupied by force wherever there was resistance, some eighty fiefs which were not, it was held, intended to be included in the cessions. The policy of the reunions, while professing to be legal, of relations in the North 160 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II gave no opportunity for legal defence on the part of those ^■^- who were dispossessed. The avidity with which the pro- cedure was conducted and the remorseless cruelty with which the decrees were executed soon completely destroyed the confidence in the good faith of the King which had been inspired by his comparative moderation in negotiating the treaties. Not only the cities and princes whose preroga- tives were thus absorbed by the sovereign, but all the coun- tries of Europe were astonished if not enraged by this summary procedure. It was undoubtedly one of the greatest errors of the Grand Monarch's reign. The reversal As regards the technical legality of the reunions, opinions have differed widely; and it is no part of our purpose to dis- cuss it here. But practically and historically the benefits to France were more than overbalanced by the bitter hos- tility to Louis XIV which this course created. The worst mistake of all, perhaps, was the aimexation of the Duchy of Zweibriicken, which was then claimed through inheri- tance by the King of Sweden. Louis XIV coolly informed his faithful ally, Charles XI, that he must do homage to him as suzerain for Zweibriicken, or the duchy would be united directly with the crown of France. The King of Sweden of course refused, and Louis XIV, as a consequence, lost the good will of the only ally who had remained faith- ful to him throughout his war with the Coalition of The Hague. It is true that at this time Frederick William had re- turned to his alliance with Louis XIV, from whom he was again receiving a subsidy of ten thousand livres per annum, and had pledged his vote as Elector to the King of France in case of a vacancy in the Empire ;* but the alliance was, as it had always been, in reality an enforced relation; for the Elector had great need of the French subsidies, and entertained the hope that the detachment of Sweden from France might render Louis XIV less disposed to sustain the Swedish cause in Germany. ' See the treaty of October 25, 1679, in Moerner, Staatsvertrdge, pp. 704, 708. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 161 And yet, even for such equivocal friendship as Frederick Chap, ii William showed to France Louis XIV was willing to pay the price so welcome to the empty pockets of Brandenburg. In the four years from 1680 to 1684, the French envoy R^benac disbursed in presents alone a hundred and sixty thousand livres, of which forty-seven thousand went to Meinders, the Elector's Secretary of State, and thirty- two thousand to Paul Fuchs, an influential privy councillor. The wife of the Elector, Dorothea, was loaded with presents, and promised to cultivate the "perfect friendship" of her husband with the King of France. Even the Elector him- self was not forgotten, and at one time he received as an "exceptional present" the sum of one hundred thousand livres."^ Notwithstanding all these evidences of personal favor, Frederick William, who was German to the core, winced under the encroachments upon the Empire occasioned by the reunions; but when R^benac pointed out that these were merely the legal consequences of the Treaties of Nymwegen, the Elector, who deeply resented the desertion of himself by the Emperor in his separate peace with France, was in- clined to consider them as judgments visited upon the Empire for which he was not responsible. With this feeling, on January 11, 1681, he gave his practical sanction to the rhmions by signing a new treaty with Louis XIV in which he promised his aid to France without reserve. The capture of Strasburg in a time of peace, however, deeply touched the pride and affections of Frederick Wil- liam; but the annexation of Zweibrticken was welcome to him, and served to hold in check his feelings of resentment. Believing that he would now have an opportunity to chase the Swedes out of Germany with French approval, on Jan- uary 22, 1682, he signed still another treaty with France, in which Louis XIV promised to end his aggressions upon the Empire with the appropriation of Strasburg, at the same time increasing his annual subsidy to four hundred thousand livres, while the Elector on his part agreed to ' For details, see Waddington, Le Grand Eledeur, II, pp. 468, 469. VOL. in. — 11 162 A HISTOEY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. II sanction all the results of the reunions that had been so far 1670^1684 accomplished.! Unfortunately for the repose of Europe, the Peace of Westphalia had left the fate of Strasburg and the ten im- The diplomatic peiial cities Quite uncertain; for, although Upper and Lower ErJi™"' Alsace and the Sundgau, with the "prefecture" of the ten cities had been ceded in full sovereignty by the Treaty of Miinster, the eighty-seventh article of that treaty had introduced a qualification that enveloped the cession in a veil of obscurity. Mazarin had left the question un- settled, and in the early part of his reign Louis XIV himself had treated the city of Strasburg as an independent city- republic under the protection of France. Since the Treaty of Nymwegen, however, Louis XIV considered the discussion regarding the meaning of the Treaty of Miinster as permanently closed; for, although restitution of the Alsatian cities had been xirged by the Emperor's plenipotentiaries, their claims had been re- jected.^ At all events, Strasburg having through the astute audacity of Louvois, on September 30, 1681, capitu- lated, he enjoyed the advantage of full possession. The Emperor having shown his inability to protect the Empire, the Elector of Mainz had suggested that "a new emperor" was necessary; and the proposal was put forth that, as a preliminary, the Dauphin be at once chosen King of the Romans, with the understanding that Alsace be re- stored to the Empire, and that a united effort be made to expel the Turks from Europe. Leopold I, at last alive to the peril of his dynasty, was in the meantime earnestly endeavoring to reconcile the Hun- garians by treating them with greater liberality, and to maintain peace with the Turks; but Louis XIV, deter- mined to keep him preoccupied in the East, had brought ' For the treaty, see Moerner, Slaatsvertrdge, p. 715 et seq. ' For the terms proposed and refused regarding the question of Alsace at Nymwegen, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 382; also Vast, Les grands Iraitis, note to p. 117; and the fuU discussion by Legrelle, Louts XIV et Strasbourg. A. D. 1670-1684 PERIL AND KESCTJB OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 163 his impalpable and mysterious influence over the Oriental Chap. II enemies of the Empire to the height of its efficiency. Tekeli, the chief of the Hungarian rebels, was receiving subsidies from France, and the Grand Vizier, Kara-Mustapha, was started on the road to Vienna. Contemplating still further inroads upon both the Empire The effort of and the Spanish Netherlands, Louis XIV was desirous of ^^^t Jm*°« securing at least the neutrality, and if possible the support, of Orange of the United Provinces; but the hostility of William III seemed to be unconquerable. Unable to destroy the influence of the stadtholder by sowing the seeds of opposition among the remnants of the De Witt administration, and accus- tomed to the bribery of sovereigns, the King resolved to obtain the Prince 's favor by secret purchase. Count D 'Avaux, who knew the character of William III, was convinced beforehand of the uselessness of such an undertaking; but, in obedience to the commands of his royal master, he ventured to approach the Grand Pension- ary Fagel with an offer of two million livres, if he could dispose the Prince to unite with France; proposing as an inducement to the Prince the title of Count of Holland, the rank of generalissimo in the French army, and several millions in cash. Fagel, amazed at this audacity, repelled the offer with indignation, and declined to offend the Prince by even addressing him upon the subject. Incapable of compre- hending how any one could spurn his "generosity," Louis XIV next resolved to accomplish his end by the use of compulsion. The Principality of Orange, a small enclave in the heart of France, which gave the title of "Prince" to its sovereign rulers, the Counts of Nassau, had long been an asylum for French adherents of the Calvinistic faith, and especially since the guarantees accorded them by the Edict of Nantes had been so openly and violently disregarded. In order to constrain the Prince, the King decreed first that French stu- dents should no longer be permitted to attend the Cal- vinist College; then that all French subjects within the limits 164 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II of the principality must leave its territory; then that its T^' ^' o walls and fortifications be destroyed; and finally, in 1682, he 1 670— 1684 appropriated it altogether. Although Holland was not in a position to aid the Em- The siege of peror in the defence of his capital against the attack of Vienna ^j^^ Turks, the Prince of Orange and the States General urged him to make terms with Tekeli; for they realized how powerless Europe was to resist the aggressions of Louis XIV so long as the whole force of the Empire was directed toward the East. In May, 1683, the Sultan's army was at Belgrade, and on July 17 began the siege of Vienna. Resistance to French aggressions on the Rhine was for the moment impossible. While the Pope was straining every nerve to encourage activity against the Infidel in Poland, the French diplo- matists were using all their powers of dissuasion; but So- bieski had passed completely from under French influence and took pleasure in showing his independence. As an elective king, he had been refused the honor of the title "Majesty," and had been forced to content himself with the lower rank of "Serene Highness"; and the Queen of Poland, who had planned a triumphant visit to her native France, having been informed that, not being an equal, she would not be accorded the hand of the Queen, had abandoned her journey. Urged on by the Pope, Poland plunged actively into the fray under the energetic leadership of Sobieski; and most of the princes of the Empire, both Protestant and Catholic, with the conspicuous exception of the Elector of Brandenburg, offered aid. But Louis XIV forbade his subjects to join in the struggle against the Turks, resumed the work of the reunions, and assembled an army in Alsace. In September, 1683, when the danger at Vienna was at its height, he again invaded the Spanish Netherlands with thirty-five thousand men.^ • Willie Vienna was besieged, Louis XIV was preparing, In case it fell, to assert himself as the saviour of the Empire, and thus establish his complete predominance. For this purpose, says Voltaire, "He had an army on the frontiers of the Empire ready to defend it against the PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 165 Too proud, even in a state of debility and prostration, Chap. Ii to submit without resistance to the process of vivisection ij^y^'JUo. so exasperatingly carried on by the reunions, Spain, which under the influence of Don John had been vainly seeking the friendship of France, resolved to declare war. On September 12, 1683, the united armies of Germany The renewal and Poland defeated the Turks. Vienna was saved and "^^H' "**'' the pursuit of the invaders began. But the conflict between Spain and France, begun on December 11, came too quickly for the Empire to render assistance. Aid was sought by Spain at every court in Europe, but none was prepared to offer effective intervention. Leo- pold I had, in 1682, negotiated with Sweden,' with Holland,^ and even with England for a new alliance against Louis XIV, and William of Orange had done all in his power to revive the coalition; but the Prince was still embarrassed by the republican traditions, and was rendered powerless to act by the peaceful inclinations of the rich traders and shipowners, no longer distrustful of the monarch who had in the Peace of Nymwegen treated them with unexpected moderation and restored their commercial privileges. In England Charles II was still the pensioner of Louis XIV, and so entirely at odds with the Parliament that both were incapable of effective action. In vain was help implored by Spain. All the powers proved unresponsive, and resistance only increased the suffering of the beleaguered towns, subjected to a merciless bombard- ment in which women and children perished by hundreds in their homes. Of the six hundred houses which com- posed the city of Luxemburg, seventy-seven were entirely destroyed by jSre, ninety-seven were left in complete ruins, one hundred and seventy-three were partly demolished, and ninety-five were found roofless when the city, on June 4, 1684, capitulated. Turks whom his previous negotiations had brought there." — Siicle de Louis XIV, p. 234. 1 See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 37. ' See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 19. 166 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II A. D. 1670-1684 The Truce of Regenaburg Under the influence of William of Orange^ Holland finally proposed a diplomatic inquiry; and in June, 1684, - a conference was held at The Hague to discuss the preten- sions of Louis XIV. The threat of the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis de Moncayo, to abandon the Spanish Nether- lands to France revived for a time the fears of the Hollanders, who dreaded the complete loss of equilibrium in Europe, in which they had found their safety; but, once more, Louis XIV outwitted the powers by treating separately with the States General. By a treaty signed at The Hague on June 29, 1684, France was allowed to retain Luxemburg, Chimai, Beaimiont, and Bouvines, restoring to Spain only Dixmund and Courtrai,' with the promise of a truce of twenty years, which the States General agreed to enforce upon the King of Spain.^ In the meantime Louis XIV had offered a similar truce of twenty years to the Empire also. At the Imperial Diet held at Regensburg, with the aid of his German allies and the persuasion of the French ambassador, Verjus de Cr^cy, — who was liberal in subsidies and prodigal in assurances,— all the pretensions of the King of France were recognized, and on August 15, 1684, the truce was signed. It left France in possession of Strasburg with full sovereignty, and in peaceable occupation of all the cities and seigneuries awarded to the King by his Chambres de Reunion? Spain, which had authorized Leopold I to negotiate in her behalf at Regensburg, soon afterward accepted the conditions recommended by the Emperor; and thus was completed the diplomatic triumph of "Louis le Grand" — as the municipality of Paris had entitled the King — by the Truce of Regensburg, which was the crown and conclusion of the Treaties of Nymwegen. ' For the seizures of territory in the Spanish Netherlands through the reunions, see Lonchay, La rivaliU de la France et de I'Espagne ow Pays-Bas, p. 297 et seq. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 79 et seq. ' For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 81 et seq. PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 167 AUTHORITIES Chap. II A. D. In addition to the collections cited in the previous chapter, — par- 1670-1684 ticularly Dumont, Vast, Morner, and the contemporary correspond- ' ence, — see Memoire inedit de Louis XIV relatif a, la campagne de Documents 1672, published in the appendix to Rousset, L'Histoire de Louvois, I, Paris, 1872; Boyer, Histoire de Guillaume III, Amsterdam, 1692, is a biography by a contemporary and contains important information; Sanderson, Original Letters from King William III, then Prince of Orange, to King Charles II, Lord Arlington, etc., London, 1704. Mavi- dal, Memoires du marquis de Pomponne, Paris, 1861, is useful but in- complete; an unpublished MS. containing Correspondance politique du Marquis de Pomponne (MS. fr. 7133 et acq. fr. 3646-8) exists in the Bibliothfeque Nationale in Paris, and there is also an unpublished Tableau des Stats de VEurope en 1679 in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, France, Memoires et documents, vol. 417, on Pomponne's embassy to Sweden. For the treaties of France and other powers with the Sultan of Turkey, see Testa, Recueil des traites de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances Urangh-es, Paris 1864-1896. B^snage, Annates des Promnces-Unies, Rotterdam, 1716, contains much contemporary material; also The Essex Papers, I (1672-1679), published by the Camden Society, 1890. Other contemporary documents are Comte d'Avaux, Negociations en Hollande (1670-1684), Paris, 1752-1753; D'Estrades, Lettres, memoires et negociations, London, 1743 (reviewed in part by GoU in Revue His- torique, III (1877), with reference to authenticity; Lettres et negocia- tions de MM. le marechal d'Estrades, Colbert marquis de Croissy, el comte d'Avaux . . . et les reponses et instructions du Roi et de M. de Pomponne (1676-1677), The Hague, 1710; Gallois, Lettres inedites de Feuquiires, Paris, 1846; Curren, The Correspondence of an English Diplomatic Agent in Paris, 1669-1677, in the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, XV (1901); letters by and to Lord Preston, EngUsh ambassador in France (1682-1685), under title of The Graham Papers, in Report of the Historical MS. Com m ission, VII (1879); Michaud, Innocent XI, sa politique generate et ses intrigues centre la France, Paris, 1882-1883, considered a one-sided presentation of facts; Saint-Didier, Histoire des negociations de Nimbgue, Paris, 1680; Moetjens, Actes et memoires des negociations de la paix de Ni- migue, Amsterdam and Nymwegen, 1679-1680; Mignet, Negociations, etc., previously cited, is, however, the best single authority on the nego- tiations preceding the Peace of Nymwegen. In addition to some of the literature cited for the previous chapter, Literature the following works are useful for the period 1672-1684: Immich, Geschichte des europaischen Staatensystems von 1660 bis 168 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. II 1789, Munich, 1905, containing exhaustive bibliography; Michels, Zur A. D. Vorgeschichte von Ludivigs XIV Einfall in Holland, Halle, 1900; Sirtema 1670-1684 (jg Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV: histoire des Ivites el rivalites politiques entre les puissances maritimes et la France, Paris, 1868. On the secret diplomacy of Charles II, see Akerman, Secret Service Expenses of Charles II and James II, Camden Society, London, 1851. For the Dutch diplomacy of the time, see Bylandt, Het diplomatish beleid von Hieronymus van Beverningk (1672-1678), Leyden, 1863; Kramer, De nederlandsche-spaansche diplomatie, Utrecht, 1872; and Hora Siocama, Sir Gabriel de Sylvius (1660-1696), in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIV (1900) and XV (1901) ; Van Sypestem, Nederland en Brandenburg (1672-1673), The Hague, 1863; MuUer, Nederhnds eerste betrekkingen met Oostenrijk, Amsterdam, 1870. The biographies of William III of Orange by Harris, Dublin, 1749; Trevor, London, 1835; and Trail, London, 1902, are aU inadequate and imsatisfactory so far as continental affairs are concerned. A definitive life of WiUiam III is still a desideratum. On the situation of the German states, see Vehse, Geschichte des osterreichischen Hofs und Adels und der osterreichischen Diplomatie, Hamburg, 1852; and Geschichte der deutschen Hofe seit der Reformation, Hamburg, 1854-1860, for much curious but not very important informa- tion. For the state of opinion in Germany regarding the aims of Louis XIV, see Dieffenbach, Der franzosische Einjluss in Deutschland unter Ludwig XIV, Dresden, 1889; and Haller, Deutsche Publizistik in den Jahren 1668-1674: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Raubkriege Ludmgs XIV, Heidelberg, 1892. For the plans and proposals of Leibnitz, see Fabre, La diplomatie de Leibnitz, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIX (1905), XX (1906), and XXI (1907). For the pohcy of Branden- burg, see in addition to Pages and Waddington, previously cited, Droy- sen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, Berhn, 1855-1886, whose theory that the policy of the Great Elector was a national German policy rather than mainly Brandenburgian is, however, now generally abandoned. The best single work on the policy of Louis XIV during this period is Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et mili taire, Paris, 1874; documents relating to Pomponne are to be found in the appendix to Delavand, Le marquis de Pomponne, Paris, 1911. The relations of Louis XIV to Rome are discussed by PetruceUi della Gattina, Histoire diplomatique des conclaves. III, Paris, 1865; G&in, Louis XIV et le Saint-Siige, Paris, 1894, and Le pape Innocent XI et le siige de Vienna en 1683, in Revue de Questions Hiatoriques, XXXIX (1886); and Immich, Papsi Innocenz XI, Berlin, 1900. On the negotiations at Nymwegen, see Temple, Complete Works, London, 1720; and Wynne, Life and Letters of Sir Leoline Jenkins, London, 1724. On the appropriations of territory made by Louis XIV through the Chambres de Reunion, in addition to the literature cited in Volume II, PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 169 Chapter V, pp. 610, 611 of this work regarding the Alsaoian question, Chap. II see Legrelle, Louis XIV et Strasbourg, Paris, 1881; Bourgeois, E. Col- a. d. lert de Croissy et les Chamhres de Reunion, in Revue Historique, XXXIV 1670-1684 (1887); Pfister, Les reunions en Alsace, in Revue d'Alsace, 1895; Holscher, Die offentliche Meinung in Deutschland liber den Fall Strass- iurgs, Munich, 1896; Bardot, La prefecture des dix miles libres imperiales d'Alsace, Lyons, 1899; and Kaufmann, Die Reunionskammer zu Melz, Metz, 1900. For the relations of Louis XIV with the Ottoman Empire, see Van- dal, Les voyages du marquis de Nointel (1670-1680), Paris, 1900; Soheffer, Memoire historique sur I'ambassade de France a Constanti- nople par le marquis de Bonnac, Paris, 1894. For the state of morals at the Court of Charles II of England, see Forneron, Louise de Keroualle, duchesse de Portsmouth (1649-1734), Paris, 1886. The CHAPTER III THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE broader 'T~^HE outlook of Louis XIV f or a vast extension of per- iTu^' xTv°^ sonal power in Europe was never so brilliant as in the years immediately following the Peace of Nymwegen. In the long duel between Bourbons and Hapsburgs the advan- tage of the kings of France had never been so great. The larger part of the great heritage of Charles the Bold had now passed from the House of Hapsburg, and the last war had shown that Louis XIV was capable of resisting the combined power of the two branches of that dynasty. Three great fields of conquest now seemed to offer to the vision of the triiunphant king the glory of increased dominion. Of these the first was the dream of the Spanish succession. Charles II, King of Spain, — who had lived on his nurses until he was five years old, and was such an imperfect sketch of a human being that he was not expected to outlive his prolonged infancy, — had in defiance of all expectation reached a marriageable age, and immediately after the Peace of Nymwegen had married Marie-Louise of Orleans, a niece of the King of France; but six unfruitful years had practically proved the marital incapacity of the King, and left the question of succession always open. Notwithstanding the ancient theory of "natural limits," which assigned to the Kingdom of France all the territory between the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine, those limits had never been fully reached. Pursuant to the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, — the classic standard of French diplomacy, — even should the dream of the Spanish suc- cession come true, there might be still further territorial acqmsitions from the Empire. The complete appropriation A. D. 1684-1697 THE FOEMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 171 of Alsace by the reunions and the recent capitulation of Chap. Ill Strasburg were long steps in this direction, but further en- croachments upon the Empire would still be necessary for the rounding out of the kingdom if the aspiration for a re- united Gaul was to be fully satisfied.^ But the "natural limits" of France in the direction of the Empire were not the boundaries of Louis XIV's ambition. If Leopold I should die, what was to prevent the election of the King of France to the throne of the Caesars? And even if Leopold continued to live, what was there to hinder the election of the Dauphin as "King of the Romans"? It is true that, to appease the Germans, Aubrey had been sent for a short time to the Bastille for writing his book on "Les Justes Pretentions du Roi sur I'Empire " in which he vindicated the historic claims of Louis XIV to the crown of the Empire. But this was merely because the publication was considered untimely and impolitic; and Bossuet, with entire approval, in 1685, in his fimeral oration on Le Tellier, did not hesitate to refer to Louis XIV as "ce nouveau Con- stantin" and "ce nouveau Charlemagne." Nor were these expressions mere figures of rhetoric employed by a court preacher for the purpose of flattering the vanity of a sov- ereign. Directly after the Peace of Nymwegen the King had secretly negotiated with three Electors at once for the con- trol of their votes, in case the imperial throne should be- come vacant; and at one time he seemed to have all the suffrages in hand except that of Bohemia.^ But it was not in Germany alone that he intended to become a new Charlemagne. He had already displayed his power at Rome; and, outside of the Papacy, Italy presented no formidable obstacle to his domination. The Venetians had become mere observers of the political drama of Europe. The Spanish possessions in Italy were as helpless as were those in the Netherlands. The Dukes of Modena, Mantua, and Savoy were counted and treated as "mere valets of a powerful master." Of the two keys of Northern Italy, ' See Volume I of this work, p. 601. ' See Vast, Revue Historique, LXV, p. 23 et seq. 172 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 Pinerolo and Casale, the former had been in the possession of the French since 1631, and the latter, to the surprise of ■ Europe, had been occupied by French troops in 1681.^ Thus far, with the exception of the attempt to crush Hol- land, the policy of Louis XIV had been, in the main, in some sense a national policy. He had aimed to extend and to strengthen the frontiers of France, and this was the continu- ation of the system of Richelieu and Mazarin. But after the Peace of Nymwegen, a new period opens in the history of France and of Europe; for the broader designs of the King, hitherto concealed, were now becoming manifest. Not con- tent with the security of France, he was now thinking of winning for himself other kingdoms, and even dreaming of imperial dominion. "All-powerful in the Mediterranean, heir of the Crown of Spain, holding England at his discre- tion, he believed he had succeeded in infeodating Germany. Emperor and King, he would have governed directly the half of Europe. . . . He would have become the sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, the judge of crowned heads, the providence of peoples, the pacificator of the world." ^ Loui8 XIV's championship of religious unity I. The Revival of the Counter-Refoemation It is interesting to note with what unanimity great mon- archs have sought support for their political aspirations in the realm of religion. Nearly all of the great organizers of empire have become the apostles of some form of religious faith, to which they have sought to make the rest of the world ' Casale was occupied on the same day as the capitulation of Stras- burg, and the incident gave to the power of Louis XIV an appearance of omnipresence that frightened Italy as the reunions had frightened the Empire. The negotiations for this citadel had been conducted with the dissipated Duke of Mantua, Charles III, to whom it belonged, through Count Mattioli, who sold the secret to the Spaniards. The occupation was, however, afterward forced on the Duke of Mantua, and Mattioli strangely disappeared. He is supposed to be the "Man with the Iron Mask," the mysterious prisoner who died in the Bastille in 1703. See Funck-Brentano, L'homme au masque de velours noir dit U masque defer, Paris, 1894. ' Vast, Revue Historique, LXV, p. 44. 1684-1697 THE rORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 173 conform. So far as their personal lives were concerned, Chap, hi neither Constantine nor Charlemagne was a very consistent Christian, but they were strenuous champions of religion, - and foimd advantage in its unity. It is true also that this championship assumed a new intensity, and even a new ferocity, at the moment when they reahzed that the conquest of nations was greatly facilitated by a previous conquest of souls. For nearly a century the Edict of Nantes, which had made an end of the internal religious wars of France by securing toleration to the Huguenots and opening to them on equal terms all offices in the State, had stood as a monument to the wisdom of Henry IV. The austerity of life habitual among the Calvinists and the increasing worldliness of the Court had practically kept them in the background, and so far as the peace of France was concerned there was no new reason for opposing them. But for the King a new motive for crushing out heresy had come into being. If he wished to renew the glories of the reign of Charlemagne, it would be necessary to discover some form of human interest more universal than merely personal devotion to which appeal might be made. Like other imperial rulers, he perceived that, in order to dominate Europe, he must become the champion of rehg- ious unity. In 1681, in the midst of the reunions, Louis XIV suddenly commanded the Court to be religious; and, forthwith, every courtier became a missionary. The intendants in the prov- inces occupied by Huguenots were instructed to make "con- verts," not of the ungodly but of the Calvinists, and immense zeal was displayed in the work of "conversion." From the moment it was understood that piety was esteemed at Court, and that blasphemy, libertinage, and indifference would obstruct preferment, religion suddenly became the fashion. Not being adepts in theological argument, the intendants resorted to more palpable forms of persuasion and invented the dragonnades. Priests and soldiers were quartered in pairs in the houses of the Huguenots; the former to show 174 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 The hostility of Louia XIV to the Pope them the way of life, and the latter to supply sufficient motives for pursuing it. If Louis XIV could not tolerate any authority but his own within the State, it was even harder to accept the exist- ence of a superior power outside of it. Throughout the whole of his reign he had been at variance with every occupant of the Holy See. During the persecution of the Huguenots, up to the moment of the total suppression of their rights in France, the Pope had never been consulted. When at last his judgment was expressed. Innocent XI declared that the methods adopted were against the true interest of the Roman Catholic Church.^ Apparently more Catholic than the Pope, the King was nevertheless perpetually at war with Rome. The reason for this anomaly is obvious. He regarded himself as the head of the Church in France. The truth is, Louis XIV was not a Roman Catholic in the ordinary sense; but an advocate of the independent rights of national churches, presided over in each case by the ruling monarch. For him religion was an appanage of royalty. When, in 1677, the papal nuncio, by direction of Innocent XI, urged Louis XIV to request the Kings of England and Sweden to mollify the laws concerning Catholicism in their kingdoms, he declined to take any action, on the ground that the King, "as their master," had a right "to impose on his subjects whatever laws were pleasing to him." ^ The nature and education of Louis XIV completely un- fitted him for any form of obedience. He had no sense of the sacredness of obligations, whether in law, religion, or morals. It seems never to have occurred to his mind that the Edict of Nantes was a solemn compact, expressly declaring itself to be " perpetual," which he himself had sworn to observe. His inordinate personal vanity and egoism beclouded and 1 "Le pape ne re5oit pas fort bien les nouvelles de toutea les conver- sions qui se font en France, et a mSrae dit qu'on se relevait d'une erreur pour retomber dans une autre." — G6rin, Recherches, p. 319. 2 The King to the Duke d'Estr(5ea, January 8, 1677, Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, "Rome," vol. 250. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 175 distorted every human relation. He never considered him- Chap, hi self bomid by a treaty, and in his " M^moires " he assures his ^- ''• son that "treaties" have no more serious significance than 'compliments"! His conduct was as contradictory as his principles were arbitrary. Exterminating Calvinism at home, he promoted it in Hungary; holding that kings rule by divine right, he nevertheless encouraged their subjects to revolt against them; establishing Catholicism in France as the sole form of tolerated faith, he conspired with the Sultan to wage a murderous war with Christendom; and having failed to accomplish his purposes by bribing the King of England, he rendered him impotent by bribing Parliament. Had Louis XIV been capable of seriously considering any Louis xivs large human interest beyond art and literature, — which he "J*^'®.^' '° encouraged because they reflected glory upon his reign, — Europe might have entered upon an era of legal and relig- ious development that would have changed the course of all subsequent history. It was at this time that the philos- opher Leibnitz, whose great intellect had grasped the need of applying reason to the problems of existence, was engaged in forming a plan for reconciling and reimiting the Catholic and Protestant princes of Germany by a larger spirit of toleration and the recognition of fundamental truths that were held in common. Innocent XI, who earnestly and sin- cerely desired to restore the unity of Christendom, and was devoting his energies to policies of conciliation, with the support of the Sacred College, expressed his approbation of the plan in writing. The Emperor and fourteen Protestant princes of Germany had shown themselves favorable to it; but "Louis XIV, not content with enfeebUng the Pope in his own State, . . . traversed his policy even in Rome, and opposed with all his power, through his ambassador, the success of the project of union." ^ For the unity of Christendom as a whole, or the progress of justice and mutual confidence among princes, Louis XIV had no sympathy. He preferred a divided Europe. To him force was the highest court of appeal, and apart from force ' Foucault, Memoires, II, p. 245. 176 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 The alarm concerning the infiuence of France he had no conception of authority. The root of his antipathy to Innocent XI was not a mere difference of personal opin- -ions or interests, it was a contradiction of fundamental principles. He practically denied the authority of the Pope altogether, and instructed his ambassador at Rome to say to Iimocent XI: "I am absolute master of my subjects, ecclesiastic as well as laic, and no one whatever has the right to interfere with what I think fit to command them." ' The attitude of Louis XIV toward the Papacy explains the practical impossibility of reviving Roman Catholicism as a universal religion in Europe. The national monarchies were in rebellion against it. The absolutism of the Church was opposed by the absolutism of the State, and the "di- vine right" to command was equally claimed by both. The terrors of another world and the terrors of this world were in conflict. As an aspirant to imperial power Louis XIV had need of the Pope, but he was unwilling to yield to his authority. For this reason he was anxious to seem more religious than Iimocent XI; for, as the Abbe Legendre well said, "When princes are in bad relations with Rome it is precisely then that they testify the most zeal for religion, for fear that the people, seeing them embroiled with the Pope, will accuse them of having no religion whatever." ^ The efforts of Louis XIV to place himself at the head of Christendom did not, however, appeal to those who were loyal to the Roman Church. It was too evident that he regarded religion not as a matter of conviction and obliga- tion but as merely an instrument of power, and his zeal de- prived him of the confidence and sympathy of the Catholic world almost as completely as of that of the Protestants. While the Protestants — particularly in Holland and Eng- land — regarded him as the chief protagonist of Romanism, and therefore a dangerous enemy of their faith, Romanists perceived on the other hand that he was not a loyal servant ' The King to the Duke d'Estr^es, September 27, 1685, Archives des Affaires Etrangferes, "Rome," vol. 296. ' Legendre, Memoires, Paris, 1683. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 177 of the Roman Church and that he really took no part in Chap, hi the great forward movement for the revival of Catholicism '^' "■ . _ 1684-1697 m Europe. As a result of this equivocal position the influence of France was dreaded on every side. In the eyes of faithful Cathohcs Louis XIV was regarded as disloyal to Rome, an ally of the Sultan, and an organizer of rebellion on the part of here- tics against a Catholic ruler who was endeavoring to repress heresy and defend Christendom. On the other hand, Protestants were convinced that he intended their total destruction. Daniel Cosnac, Bishop of Valence, did not hesitate to say before the Assembly of the French Clergy that Protestantism must be everywhere exterminated. In Holland and in England this announce- ment awakened a feeling of terror regarding the intentions of Louis XIV. In England, the designs of France had long been suspected. The negotiations of Louis XIV with Charles II had not remained an absolute secret, and even the exist- ence of the Treaty of Dover and the personal subsidies paid to the King of England were fully known to a few and partly understood by many. The idea that Roman Catholicism was through French aid to be revived in England had as a consequence become a kind of popular obsession, and behind the scenes the influence of the King of France was generally believed to be working in the dark. The story of Titus Gates regarding the alleged "popish plot" had not only created among English Protestants needless panic at the time, it had excited the popular imagination to such a degree that French influence in every form had come to be detested. Until his death, on February 6, 1685, Charles II was se- The revival cretly in the pay and under the influence of Louis XIV as ^^ jamea n" regards the foreign policy of England; but, in reality, the interest of the King of France did not extend far beyond the wish to maintain the neutrality of England, in order that he might be free to carry out his schemes upon the conti- nent. The power of England, if left free to act according to the wishes of the nation, would have been exercised against these schemes. It was necessary, therefore, to paralyze VOL. III. — 12 A. D. 1684-1697 178 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill the action of Parliament by controlling the policy of the King. Under cover of furnishing funds for the promotion of Roman Catholicism, which served Charles II also as a reason for receiving them, the independence of England had been sold to France. By seeming to comply with the wishes of the country during the last years of his life, Charles II had been able to govern without Parliament, which, he privately informed Barillon, he intended never again to assemble. Selfish and corrupt as his existence was, his purposes had never been so far carried into effect as to produce revolt; and his rule, which was at least nominally Protestant, had seemed more acceptable than that which was expected upon his death, when his brother James, Duke of York, an avowed Roman Catholic, would come to the throne. On the second Sunday after the accession of James II, it became evident that Roman Catholicism was to be actively revived in England, for the Queen's chapel was at once opened and the celebration of mass made public. The Prot- estant preachers of London were loud in their denunciations, but the King showed no signs of concealing his religious faith. It was soon clear that James II desired and expected the continuance of the French subsidies; but, as he had promptly summoned Parliament, — for the suppression of which Louis XIV had been paying, — he had nothing to offer, and pay- ment was accordingly withheld.^ Thus, at the beginning of the reign of James II, instead of still more intimate relations with the Court of France, which had been expected, all the signs of the time pointed to a new foreign policy from which French influence was to be eliminated. The treaties with Holland were renewed, the centre of French intrigue was broken up by sending the Duchess of Portsmouth back to France, and the Austrian ambassador. Count Thun, wrote a jubilant despatch to the Emperor rejoicing in the prospects of the new reign. ' At the beginning of his reign James II received five hundred thou- sand livres from Louis XIV, for which he expressed his lasting gratitude; but there being no further need, the payments were discontinued. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 179 But the obstinate sincerity of James II in contending for Chap, hi what he esteemed his royal prerogatives soon brought him ^"^' into conflict with the English nation. Parliament was • promptly dismissed, never to meet again while James II occupied the throne, and an open campaign for the revival of Roman CathoUcism in England was begun. The revo- lution, which had long been preparing, was becoming a fact; and Louis XIV, who cared more for the neutrality of Eng- land than for the fate of the English Catholics, obtained without subsidies all that he desired, — the continued im- potence of England for effective international action. The mantle of distinction for active negotiation which The efforts of Louis XIV had so long borne was now to fall upon other and ^'^Jfbri.^^ '" younger shoulders. Since the Peace of Nymwegen William of Orange had never ceased his efforts to form a new coali- tion for the purpose of restraining the further ambitions of the King of France. Unable to interest the thrifty burghers of Amsterdam in any ventures likely to bring upon them the vengeance of Louis XIV, and therefore not fully master of the decisions of the States General, he could not carry on strictly official negotiations; but this did not prevent his employment of his trusted friend, George Frederick, Coimt of Waldeck, in sounding and inspiring the German princes. The controlling idea of William Ill's policy was the re- estabhshment of European equilibriiun, which had been destroyed by the predominance of Louis XIV and the dis- solution of the coalition against him by the Peace of Nym- wegen; but in the conditions which then existed the task seemed one of superhmnan magnitude. On October 10, 1681, an "Association" with Sweden had been formed by Holland for the purpose of maintaining the treaties of West- phaha and Nymwegen,' to which the Emperor had adhered on February 28, 1682, and Spain on May 2 of the same year; but the compact was purely defensive and of little real sig- nificance, except as the beginning of a wider union. ' See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 15 et seq. 180 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill More modest, and yet more practical, were Waldeck's ,r.^.'\„^ efforts mider the personal direction of William III to form 1684-1697 ... 11 /-I a military combination among the smaller German princes for the defence of the Empire. Gradually augmented by accessions of greater importance, this union was joined by the Emperor on June 10, 1682, in what is known as the "Laxenburg Recess," or "Waldeck's Alliance," in which the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria agreed to place twenty thousand men on the Upper Rhine, the Allies twenty thousand on the Middle Rhine, and the Duke of Brunswick- Ltineburg was urged to place twenty thousand on the Lower Rhine, for the defence of the Empire.^ Thus, through the quiet but persistent activity of William III and Waldeck, the protection of the Empire from French invasion had been prepared for when the siege of Vienna by the Turks attracted the attention of Europe toward the East. Brandenburg's In Spite of all efforts to win his allegiance to the union, the the'p'rench™" prince most important to its effectiveness, the Elector of alliance Brandcnburg, had remained firm in his alliance with the King of France. In strained relations with Leopold I, on account of his desertion at Nymwegen and his disregard of Frederick William's claims in Silesia, and with the United Provinces on account of the unpaid subsidies, in January, 1685, the Elector still belonged among the clients of France in the Empire. But the accession of the Duke of York to the throne of England, combined with the persecution of the Huguenots in France, made a deep impression upon Freder- ick William, who perceived in these events a heavy blow to Protestantism in Europe. Soon afterward followed a visit from the Brandenburg General Spaen to the Prince of Orange at The Hague. His frequent conversations with William III and Fagel excited the suspicions of the wary Count d'Avaux, always on the watch for any defection from his royal master; and the arrival of Amerongen "as if to report upon some matter which he could not trust to the pen" confirmed the appre- hensions of the French ambassador. 1 For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 23 et seq. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 181 These visits were in reality the prelude of a new entente Chap, hi between the United Provinces and Brandenburg. Encour- '^•^• aged by the confidences of Spaen and the report of Ameron- gen, the Prince sent a Huguenot pastor, Gaultier de Saint- Blancard, as a secret emissary to Berlin to sound the feelings of the Elector regarding the dangers to Protestantism. The mission was opportune, for Frederick William, whose mind was already filled with the idea that a powerful league existed for the total extermination of Protestantism, was eager to discuss the subject with the ardent Huguenot. The result of the discussion was that Frederick Diest, the Bran- denburg envoy at The Hague, was instructed to propose a coalition of the Protestant countries for their mutual pro- tection. But the zeal of the Elector did not stop with this proposal. Upon his return to The Hague in March, Saint- Blancard reported to the Prince of Orange that Frederick WiUiam counselled him to dispute the right of James II to the throne of England, and to effect a landing for this pur- pose on the English coast with ten thousand men.' As evidence of his interest in the Protestant cause, his own well-advanced plans for the conquest of Swedish Pomerania were at once abandoned, on the ground that all the Prot- estant nations should stand together and that the support of Sweden was necessary in the coming conflict. A succession of events now served to widen the chasm The complete that had opened between the Elector and his French ally. Brandenburg On May 26, 1685, the death of the Elector Palatine Charles from France opened the way for the accession of a Catholic prince, Philip William of Neuburg, to the Palatinate of the Rhine, thus leaving the Electoral College of the Empire with only two Protestant electors against six Catholics. The change was so important that the French diplomatist Cheverny ex- claimed, "Adieu! le parti protestant!" To the mind of Frederick William, the one who most in- tended to profit by the destruction of Protestantism without being subject to the restraints imposed by the Papacy was ' See Erman et Reclam, Memoires pour servir a I'histaire des refugies fransais, I, 366. 182 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 Rapproche- Tnenl of Bran- denburg and the Emperor his own powerful ally, the head and front of militant Cathol- icism in Europe, Louis XIV. When, therefore, the King of . France, in the name of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte of Orl6ans, only daughter of the Elector Charles, advanced pretensions to a large portion of the Palatine inheritance, Frederick William — although Philip William of Neuburg was a rival and a Catholic — firmly supported his cause against the French claims. According to French law, these claims may have had some foundation; but, according to the German laws, as under- stood by Frederick William, and by which he contended the case should be governed, they had none; and his envoy, Spanheim, was instructed to present strongly at Versailles the judicial arguments in favor of Philip William. The opposition of Brandenburg was further shown by the fact that, although the French ambassador at Berlin, Count Rebenac, was furnished with credentials from Louis XIV authorizing him to be present when the last testament of Charles was examined, it was read in the Privy Council without notice to the ambassador. On the next day, Fred- erick William publicly announced his decision to support the claims of Neuburg and counselled rejection of an arbi- tration by the Pope, which Louis XIV had proposed. At the same time, to reinforce the Protestants in the Electoral College, it was suggested that a ninth electorate be estab- lished to be filled by Ernest Augustus, Duke of Hanover, of the House of Brunswick-Llineburg. As usual the volte-face of Frederick William was in appear- ance not abrupt; but a steady trend toward reconciliation with the enemies of Louis XIV showed plainly that he was once more about to reverse his alliances. His relations with Austria were still tensely strained, es- pecially as regards his Silesian claims; for Leopold I had de- cided that it was not possible to permit a Protestant prince to establish himself in Silesia. Nevertheless, Meinders and Fuchs were charged to discuss with the Emperor's envoy, Baron von Fridag, the means of settling that question; and, to win the friendship of Leopold I, the Elector resolved to Chap . Ill A. D. 1684- ■1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 183 send a contingent of five thousand troops to aid him in his war with the Turks. At the same time, his relations with R^benac, who was aware of the secret defection from France, became so unpleasant that in the heat of his passion the Elector at one time so far forgot himself as to threaten to have the ambassador thrown out of the window. The same motives that inspired the Elector to cultivate The reconciiia- closer relations with the Emperor impelled him to a change ''™ "^ ^■''*°" ^ denburg and in his policy toward Sweden. Animated by his ardor for the Sweden cause of Protestantism, which now took entire possession of him, he instructed his envoy, Pierre Falaiseau, sent on spe- cial mission to Stockholm, to urge upon the Swedish Court the formation of a great Protestant coalition to oppose the designs of France, and furnished him with a secret memoir in which were set forth the perils to which the Protestant countries, Lutheran and Calvinist alike, were exposed by the Roman Catholic revival. Assured of the co-operation of Charles XI in opposing the The alliance designs of France, Frederick William next turned his at- ?f ^°"^f ^■"' ° ' ^ ^ Brandenburg tention to Holland, and sent his most trusted privy council- lor, Paul Fuchs, to The Hague to lay foundations for united action. R6benac, who suspected his intention, endeavored to prevent the journey, but his efforts were unavailing. In truth, the Prince of Orange was even more anxious for an understanding than Frederick William himself, and his influence was steadily growing in Holland. The dragonnades with which Louis XIV was pursuing the Huguenots in France and the accession of James II to the throne of England had filled even the stolid merchants of Amsterdam with alarm. Calvinist dominies and French refugees at The Hague seemed to divine the meaning of Fuchs' mission, and in- creased effect was given to it by their indefatigable appeals to the religious sentiments of the burghers, always ending with the question, "Is not the Elector of Brandenburg the true protector of our faith?" Having thoroughly sounded the feelings of the country, Fuchs fiinally disclosed his instructions to the States Gen- eral; and, on August 23, 1685, a treaty of amity was signed. 184 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill 1684-1697 The new exaction of Louis XIV The revooa- tion of the Edict of Nantes in which a compromise was effected regarding the overdue subsidies, indemnity was offered and accepted for the cap- ture of a Brandenburg vessel by the Dutch in Guinea, and the defensive alliance of 1678 was renewed until 1700. ^ The most important article of the treaty was the fourth, which provided that, in case of new troubles in Christendom, the contractants would unite upon the measures to be taken for their common defence. D'Avaux, who day by day had kept a close watch on the movements of Fuchs, was appre- hensive that there was a transaction taking place prejudicial to his royal master, but found it difficult to penetrate the secret. R^benac had been promised the privilege of seeing all the official correspondence, but it was so arranged that this should be of a merely perfunctory character, and that the real negotiations should be reported to Berlin only in private letters addressed directly to the Elector, so that even his Secretary of State, Meinders, did not, know their contents. In spite of this well-guarded secrecy, D'Avaux, a few days after the treaty was signed, managed to secure a copy of it, which he hastened to communicate to Louis XIV. The King's action was prompt and vigorous. Rdbenac was ordered in the following October to obtain from Fred- erick William a written declaration promising that he would inviolably observe all his previous engagements with the King of France, and binding himself to take no future steps with any other power that would in any respect enfeeble the force of the treaties he had previously concluded with him, — a statement which, if shown to the States General by D'Avaux, would deprive the new alliance of all its value and place the Elector in a position of complete vassalage to the King of France. His reply was, that, having already given His Majesty all necessary assurances, any further declarar tion would be not only superfluous but in a sense "outra- geous," as implying a lack of confidence on the part of the King. It was in these acute circumstances that a blow fell upon Europe which filled every Protestant country with dismay. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. Ill et seq. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 185 In January, 1685, the Huguenots, finding their position Chap, hi intolerable, had complained to the King that the Edict of Nantes, which had afforded them a peaceful refuge, "seemed to have lost its protecting leaves and branches, and that nothing remained of it to offer them shelter from persecu- tion except the decaying trunk." On October 18, 1685, their humble petition was answered by the revocation of the Edict. By this one act the hand was turned back on the dial of French history more than a hundred years. As a conse- quence of it, more than two hundred thousand of the most earnest, industrious, and skilful subjects of the King were moved to emigrate to countries where they were permitted to worship in their own way; thereby depriving France almost entirely of certain branches of profitable industry, which were transplanted to England, Holland, Prussia, and Amer- ica. But the economic loss to France was small compared with the blow to the moral prestige of the King and the bitter hostility created against him in every Protestant country. It has been generally represented that Louis XIV signed The motives the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes as an act of religious °^ ^°™^ '^}7 " m signing ^ne devotion under the influence of Madame de Maintenon and Revocation his indulgent confessor, Pere La Chaise. It is true, that between the Peace of Nymwegen and the Revocation of the Edict the King had passed through a distinct change in his interior life, but it does not fully account for this complete alteration in his policy. He had been an ardent lover of a succession of women; and, outside of wedlock, there had been born to him eleven children, whom he publicly ac- knowledged as entitled to the recognition of the "dignity of their birth." But the procession of beauties capable of pro- foundly touching his now waning passions had alreadypassed. The last of them, Madame de Maintenon, the "pious" widow of the crippled Scarron, had dared to appeal to the King's conscience, on account of his double adultery with Madame de Montespan, had induced his return to his mari- tal duties to the Queen while she lived, and soon after the Queen's death in 1683, had been clandestinely married to him. In 1681, Madame de Maintenon wrote: "The King begins 186 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY A. D. 1684-1697 The role of Charlemagne Chap, m to think seriousIy of his salvation." And a few weeks after the Queen's death she wrote again: "P6re La Chaise in- spires the King to great things. All his subjects will soon serve God in spirit and in truth." * There were, however, deeper reasons for the King's act than Madame de Maintenon suggested, and the deepest of them all was certainly not a state of penitence for a sinful life.2 Beginning with the reunions, Louis XIV seriously re- garded himself as the "new Charlemagne," and aspired to conform to the traditions of his prototype. With the idea that he was destined to be the continuator of the Holy Roman Empire, a new motive took possession of his mind. It was easier now to direct his action, and Pere La Chaise had an easy task. Charlemagne had not been embarrassed by Calvinism. The Protestant heresies not only divided belief, they profoundly affected its character. They recog- nized an authority superior to that of the King. As La Bruyere well said, Calvinism was a "culte ennemi de la souverainte." It was the parent of independence, personal and national. It respected the individual, and laid the foun- dations of the State on the rights of the individual as its only logical basis. Protestantism must, therefore, be rooted out. An influence so powerful as religion must be solely at the service and command of the King. Considered merely as an act of internal administration, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes would no doubt have awakened strong feelings of revulsion among the co-reli- gionists of the Huguenots everjrwhere; but this blow, struck by the hand of the professed protector of the Germanic liberties, at the height of his power and at the moment of his violent encroachments upon the Empire, made a far deeper impression. Frederick William, already exasperated, The indigna- tion of Fred- erick William ' Lavisse, Hisloire de France, Tome VII, II, p. 61. ^ "La question religieuse eut si peu de poids dana les decisions du gouvernement que le clergS et les catholiques firent entendre S, maintes reprises de gln^reuses protestations." — De Roohas, Note sur quelques documents inedits relatifs d la revocation, Paris, 1880, p. 31. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FOKMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 187 notwithstanding his customary prudence, could not suppress Chap, hi his indignation. On November 8, the Elector replied with his celebrated Edict of Potsdam, in which he deplored the "persecutions" directed against the Protestants in France and promised them an inviolable asylum in his own terri- tories, even marking out the route to be followed under the protection of his ministers resident, and offering to the refugees exemption from taxes for ten years. It was a noble act, which did equal credit to the Elector's humanity and his judgment, for it resulted in bringing a valuable accession to the population of Brandenburg and the Rhenish provinces afterward forming the Kingdom of Prussia. But it was also an act of bravery, for the King of France challenged the word "persecution" as if it were meant as an insult. Frederick William replied that he had as much right to call the King's action "persecution," as His Majesty had to characterize Protestantism as "heresy," Calvinism being the Elector's own religion. In his zeal he placed an interdict on the "papal cult," and even forbade under pain of corporal punishment attendance upon mass by his own subjects in the Roman Catholic embassies, where some hundreds were accustomed to worship at Berlin. But, having made this display of righteous indignation, which had carried him beyond the rule of tolerance, he did not really execute his prohibitions; and, in the following De- cember, acting in the interest of peace, he gave new assur- ances of loyalty to his treaty engagements with France. It was not, however, in Brandenburg alone that the Revo- The prepara- cation excited deep animosity against Louis XIV. In ^°°lo^"xiv' Holland it had the effect of finally reconciling the merchants of Amsterdam with the stadtholder, and rendered popular the alhance with Brandenburg, which proved the wisdom and foresight of William III. In all the Protestant countries of Europe the sentiment excited by the Revocation became at once a bond of mutual sympathy between them, and the common wish to resist the designs of Louis XIV served to unite them as participants in a common cause. A few days after the news of the Revocation was received 188 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 The relations of William III and James II at The Hague, it was reported by the French charg6, Saint- D^dier, that the Prince of Orange had said he could not be- -heve that the King acted in that matter "from pure zeal for the Catholic religion, nor from his hatred of Protestant- ism," but that "His Majesty's whole policy was by this means to range all Catholic princes by his side"; and that "it was time for the Protestants to see what they had to do, since that which had been begun in France was the com- mencement of a general conspiracy against the Protestants."' Two steps must, therefore, be taken in opposition to this movement : first, the Protestant states must be combined in a powerful league for their common defence; and, second, the Hapsburg powers must be united for the protection of Spaia and the Empire from the encroachments of Louis XIV. A third step, which in the mind of William III was daily assuming increasing importance, was to prevent an active alliance between France and England; and, if possible, to throw the weight of England, essentially a Protestant power, into the opposite scale of the balance, and thus redress the lost equilibrium of Europe. The realization of this last-mentioned purpose by means of direct influence over James II was obviously impossible. Always imbued with an exaggerated notion of royal au- thority, since he had ascended the throne he had become the impersonation of the most intense spirit of absolutism. So long as he was merely Duke of York, his relations with his son-in-law, the Prince of Orange, had been friendly and even amiable; but, as King of England, he demanded instant and unqualified obedience to his commands, and treated his son- in-law as merely a junior member of his family. For every reason, — personal, religious,' and political, — the aims and activities of these two members of the House of Stuart were certain to come into collision. One of the first demands of James II had been that the illegitimate son of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth, who was in exile at The Hague, be required to leave Holland, and this request ' Archives des Affaires Etranglres, November 8, 1685, " Holland," 143. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 189 was granted. The son of the late King by Lucy Walters, — Chap, hi a mistress who had subsequently become infamous for her lewd hfe, — the Duke aspired to the Crown of England; and, declaring himself a Protestant, endeavored by this means to displace his Catholic uncle. Several attempts had been made to induce Charles II to declare the legitimacy of the Duke of Monmouth; but, although he could pardon him for many irregularities, it was well known that the Duke was not recognized by his father as entitled to the throne, and James II had no serious difficulty in suppressing the Monmouth rebellion, which ended on July 15, 1685, with the execution of the presumptuous duke. The success of James II in crushing the revolt of Mon- The mcima- mouth exalted his sense of power, but it also excited his ap- *'™ °^ ■'''™^ 1 . fir ml . . II toward prehensions for the future. The growing importance of France William of Orange, who was already regarded by many as the most serious and capable champion of Protestantism, was beginning to be felt in England as well as upon the con- tinent; and it was not unnatural that James II should see in him, the grandson of Charles I and the husband of the legiti- mate successor to the throne, a more dangerous rival than the enemy of whom he had disposed by the execution of Monmouth. Had James II been willing to accept a line of action per- mitting the free expression of the national will, there would have been nothing for him to fear from the Prince of Orange. He would in that case have won his friendship and at the same time have removed every ground of hostility on the part of the nation. But James II distrusted Parliament and was not sincere in his relations with the United Provinces. He wished to restore Roman Catholicism, abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, establish a close alliance with France, and by means of a centralized political administration govern Eng- land as an absolute ruler. On July 16, 1685, James II assured Barillon that "he had been educated in France and eaten the bread of His Majesty, and his heart was still French." And yet he did not have the steadiness of character to avail himself of the benefits 190 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill which a frank and loyal friendship with France might have ^' ^' a- afforded him. Resolute only in his absolutism, he wholly neglected the means by which he could make his will effec- tual. With all his professions of friendship, Louis XIV could not trust him, and Barillon was again instructed to resort to his old tactics of keeping King and Parliament divided; but the indiscretions of the King rendered the task superfluous. The new aapi- Abandoning the prospect of obtaining any immediate aid "*'°™ "' from England in his plans for resisting the dictatorship of Louis XIV in Europe, William of Orange became all the more active on the continent. The Protestant powers alone were not strong enough to resist the ambitions of Louis XIV; and Waldeck — now raised by the Emperor to the rank of a prince — was, therefore, set to the task of uniting the Hapsburgs with the Protestant princes in opposition to Louis XIV. Everything, so far as Leopold I was concerned, seemed favorable for such a union. The marriage of Charles II of Spain with Marie-Louise of Orleans had suggested a possible solution of the Spanish succession; but, several years having passed without the birth of an heir, the previous situation had not been essentially changed. Leopold I, who regarded himself as the rightful head of the House of Hapsburg, had been more fortunate than the King of Spain in maintaining the family line. By his mar- riage with the Spanish Infanta Margaret, who had died in 1673, he possessed an advantage in the game of the Spanish succession in the person of a marriageable daughter, Maria Antonia. By his second wife, Eleanor of Neuburg, who had in 1678 borne him a son, the Archduke Joseph, he was likely to have still other children, and one was soon expected. By a judicious distribution of family claims the Emperor now hoped eventually to absorb the whole of the Spanish inheritance. Maria Antonia was to be married to Max Emmanuel, the young elector of Bavaria, whom Leopold I hoped by this means to attach to the fortunes of his House by securing for him, even during the lifetime of the King A.D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 191 of Spain, the viceroyalty of the Netherlands. Joseph would, Chap, hi of course, succeed to the Empire; and Maria Antonia was required to sign a renunciation, to be ratified by her hus- band, of the right to succeed to the throne of Spain, which would thus be reserved for a son who might be born to him. It remained, however, for the Emperor to render his de- Louis xivs vices acceptable to the Court of Madrid, where the marriage °pp°^'*'o° *° , . , 1 TV T -n 1.1 *^^ arrange- contract with Max Emmanuel might meet with opposition, ments of and would certainly be regarded as hostile by Louis XIV. In ^"p"'** i spite of the attempt at secrecy, the King of France was not long kept in ignorance of the fact that his previous co-partner in partitioning the spoils of Spain was scheming to outwit him; and the Marquis de Feuquieres was speedily despatched to Madrid to defend the interests of his royal master. Intending to keep the renunciation on the part of Maria Antonia entirely secret, Leopold I requested the King of Spain to approve the marriage, but failed to communicate the marriage contract. When this document was asked for at Madrid, not daring to furnish it, the announcement was made by the Court of Vienna that the courier to whom it was entrusted had fallen into the hands of corsairs. When Feuquieres arrived at Madrid at the end of March, 1685, he found the Court uninformed of the terms and con- ditions of the proposed marriage, and not altogether favor- able to it; and he was at once able to thwart the most important part of the Emperor's scheme. He had been in- structed by every means to oppose making Max Emmanuel Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, and he promptly placed in the hands of Charles II a memoir which in substance threatened him with war if he should decide to establish the Elector of Bavaria in the Spanish provinces.' The excitement at Madrid was intense, and for the first time in his life Charles II attended in person a meeting of his council. His reply was conciliatory but indefinite. The Queen urged him to make an explicit promise for the sake ' The instructions of Feuquieres are printed by Morel-Fatio, Recueil des Instructions, XI, Espagne, I, p. 341. 1684-1697 192 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill of peace; but, feeble and inexperienced as he was, the King repHed that he "would rather die" than yield to the threats of Feuqui^res. Not being able to extort a more satisfactory answer than he had already received, Louis XIV decided to treat it as if it were a complete compliance with his wishes. At the same time it was pointed out that any change in the Spanish Netherlands would be regarded as a violation of the peace. At The Hague Count d'Avaux represented that the alleged plan of Leopold I was a "pure chimera." But on July 15, 1685, the marriage of Max Emmanuel and Maria Antonia was celebrated with great pomp at Vienna. In the following October the Empress Eleanor presented Leopold I with a second son, Charles, — the expected candidate for the throne of Spain. The oonten- It was a dccisivc momeut for the plans of Wilham of Ind AltriTT Orange. A collision between Louis XIV and Leopold I, Madrid which the Prince of Orange above all desired, now seemed inevitable. An important element in the situation was the attitude of Madrid, and a heated diplomatic battle was begun at the Spanish Court. Undoubtedly the Queen had great influ- ence with the feeble Charles II, and it was vigorously exer- cised in the interest of France; but the Queen-Mother, Maria of Austria, was a more experienced antagonist. With her powerful aid the Austrian ambassador, Coimt von Mansfeld, was using every effort to destroy French influence in Spain. It was perhaps, he intimated, the Queen's fault that Charles II had no children. It was even proposed to put the ques- tion to a test by giving the King a mistress; with the inten- tion, if the supposition proved correct, of applying to Rome for a divorce. Max Emmanuel already enjoyed a great reputation in Spain because of the valor he was displaying in the war with the Infidel, and the Queen-Mother was strongly in- clined toward the Elector's young bride, her granddaughter, Maria Antonia, as a possible future Queen of Spain. Every day the French ambassador grew more unpopular at Madrid, THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 193 until at last he was insulted and his people were stoned in Chap, hi the streets. 1684-1697 Abandoning for the moment the claims of the Dauphin, Louis XIV suggested that, in case Charles II should have no direct heir, the Kingdom of Spain might go to the Dauphin's second son, Philip, Duke of Artois; and thus the imion of France and Spain imder one crown might be avoided. But this proposal did not appease the wounded feelings of the Spanish nobles, who preferred to choose their own sovereign rather than to have one forced upon them. Nor did Leopold I succeed better in his plans for his sec- ond son, — called "Charles" to flatter the King whose heir he was intended to become, — with the intention of sending him to Spain, there to grow up as a Spanish prince. When at last the enforced "renunciation" of Maria Antonia be- came known at Madrid, the Spaniards would not hear of it, and thus were repudiated all the foreign schemes. In the meantime, the Elector of Brandenburg and the The League Prince of Orange were busily engaged in weaving a network ° "^^ "* of alliances by which the Protestant and Catholic powers were to be combined against Louis XIV. In spite of the opposition of Rebenac, on January 4, 1686, a treaty between Brandenburg and Austria was concluded, by which the Elec- tor, who felt the necessity of awaiting the end of the war in the East before an open rupture with France, pledged him- self to aid Leopold I by furnishing seven thousand men for the protection of Hungary.' On January 12, the United Provinces renewed the defensive treaties with Sweden. On February 10 a similar compact was concluded between Swe- den and Brandenburg, and on April 1, the Elector con- cluded with the Emperor a defensive alliance for twenty years.2 But the notable single achievement of the year was the formation of the League of Augsburg, of July 9, 1686, be- tween the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, and the German princes of the circles of Bavaria, Suabia, and ' For the text, see Londorp, XII, p. 255. ' Moerner, Staatsverlrdge, p. 750 et aeq. VOL. m. — 13 194 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill Franconia for the defence of the Treaties of Westphalia and ^- ^- Nymwegen, to which the Elector Palatine and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp adhered in the following September.' Although the precise origin of this league is veiled in con- siderable obscurity, it is probable that Prince Waldeck, at the instigation of William of Orange, had no small part in promoting it. It is evident from the absence of records, however, that the negotiations were conducted with great secrecy, and it is probable that Waldeck's part in them was chiefly oral.^ It is known that its final conclusion was due chiefly to the activity of Count Gustave von Hohenlohe, the Emperor's representative in Franconia.' Neither Branden- burg nor the United Provinces were, in fact, signatories of this treaty, and the practical importance of it was long greatly exaggerated, particularly in France, where it was considered as an act of aggression.^ The abstention of the United Provinces and of Brandenburg from participation in this league, which they had certainly favored and promoted, seems at first remarkable; but it ceases to be so in the light of the greater enterprise which they were then considering. That enterprise, for which they wished to be untrammelled, was of a far bolder nature. The League of Augsburg was intended merely to hold Louis XIV in check upon the conti- nent; but the Prince of Orange, supported by the Elector of Brandenburg, perceived that the key to the security of Protestantism and the maintenance of European equilibrium was to be sought in the control of the power of England. II. The International Significance of the English Revolution The absolutism During the reign of Charles II, England had witnessed a of the Stuarts gyccession of intrigues and conspiracies in which the King himself was the central figure and the most culpable partici- 1 Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 122 et seq. ' See MiiUer, Wilhelm III von Oranien und George Friedrich von Wair deck, II, p. 12, 13. ' Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Gesckichte, I, p. 717. * Fester, Die Augsburger Allianz von 1686. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 195 pant. Under James II there was a momentary promise of Chap, hi better things, but the fanatical nature of the monarch, sup- ^' "■ ported by his serene sense of absolute authority, soon de stroyed all hopes of improvement. The fimdamental vice of the Stuart dynasty had always been an exaggerated conception of the rights of the Crown, wholly excluding any solemn sense of obligation to admin- ister the affairs of England in conformity with the laws of Parliament. Not only the practice of the dynasty but the theory in- vented by servile scholars and ecclesiastics to support its unmeasured pretensions had aroused dissent among thought- ful men. "The royal power," says Sir Robert Filmer in his "Patriarcha," "exists by the law of God; there is no inferior power that can limit it. The father of a family governs with- out other law than his own will, not by the laws and wishes of his sons or his servants. . . . No man can say that there is a law for the King. . . . General laws, made by Parliament, can for reasons known to the King, and by his authority, be mitigated or suspended as he alone may judge advisable; and by his oath of coronation he is bound to observe only good laws, of which he is the judge." ^ The Parliament of England, the same writer declares, is only an imitation of the States General of France, which have no other power than to present requests to the King. In his " Jus Regium," George Mackenzie, Lord Advocate of Scotland, declares that "monarchy by its nature is abso- lute; and consequently all pretended limitations are contrary to the nature of monarchy." ^ Thomas Hobbes, in his "Leviathan," notwithstanding the fact that he bases monarchy upon an alleged "contract" be- tween king and people, maintains that the will of the prince is the touchstone of good and evil, and that "every subject should be willing to profess Popery, Mohammedanism, or Paganism, if the King ordains it." ^ ' Fihner, Patriarcha, London, 1680. * Mackenzie, Jus Regium, London, 1684. ' Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1651. 196 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 The spirit of revolt against absolutism On July 21, 1683, the University of Oxford in solemn con- vocation commended the principles of absolutism in a man- - ner so positive that Hallam was provoked to regard its action as "covering the University with shame." The decree de- nounced all the liberal literature of the time as "destructive to the sacred persons of princes"; but this decision was afterward the subject of repentance when James II imperi- ously dictated his will to Magdalen College, and in 1709 the decree was publicly burned by order of the House of Lords. There was never a moment even during the reign of the Stuarts when beneath the surface there was not among the English people a spirit of revolt against absolute govern- ment. There were always those who felt with Algernon Sydney, — who dared to say it, — that "what is not just is not law"; although it seemed for a time that those who expressed that sentiment would follow him to the scaffold. John Locke, who became the accepted theorist of the Revo- lution of 1688, sought safety in exile, and remained in Hol- land until the tide turned against the King. The subse- quent popularity of his writings proves how completely he expressed what was already vaguely in the minds of the people, — a revolt of convictions that preceded the revolt under arms. It is true, that in its first expression this revolt was reli- gious rather than political; but this fact only proves how in- timately associated are forms of religious feeling and types of government. As a general rule, revolutions have their birth in some form of violence done to the consciences of men; and empires have been founded and destroyed by mutations of religious faith. In England the bond of association between the monarchy and Protestantism was extremely strong, for it was through the religious independence of the kingdom that its political independence had been developed and maintained.' When, therefore, Protestantism was menaced by the behavior of James II, and the future of England seemed in danger ' See Volume II of this work, pp. 416, 417. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 197 through alliance with a dominant Catholic power on the Chap, hi continent, the national existence was believed by many '^•"■ Englishmen to be at stake, and revolution was regarded as a ^^^^'' sacred obligation. It is an instructive commentary on the theory of absolute The illusion of monarchy to note that those who have most profited by it ''P^"' p™'^"- . jr ./ siona have almost mvanably disregarded in others the prerogatives they have claimed for themselves. We have seen how, in his anxiety to take advantage of the neutrality of England by rendering it impotent for action on the continent, Louis XIV continually thwarted the efforts of Charles II in rela- tion to Parliament. Acting by "divine right," as his own theory of royal prerogatives maintained, it probably never occurred to Louis XIV that it was shameful for one king to frustrate the will of another, since his opponent was, upon his own theory, equally with himself the medium of the divine will upon the earth. But the treatment of Charles II by Louis XIV was in no respect an exceptional instance. He had acted in a similar maimer with every other monarch, including the Pope, ex- cept the Sultan. When James II found that the former subsidies from France were not continued, in spite of his assurances to Barillon that "his heart was still French," he had passed for a time entirely from under the influence of Louis XIV. However much the King of France may have desired the re- establishment of Roman Catholicism in England, which he continued to urge upon James II as a sacred obligation, he instructed his ambassador to let it be known by the leaders of the party in opposition to the King that they need enter- tain no fear of France in case they made trouble for their sovereign in Parliament. Upon one point, however, notwithstanding the intima- The fears for tions of the French ambassador to the contrary, there was prote*tantism general agreement in England. It was the xmiversal con- viction that the two kings were secretly in league to destroy Protestantism; and a report received at The Hague early in August, 1686, from the Dutch envoy at London, Van Citters, 198 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill contained forebodings of an Anglo-French alliance for the ^- "■ purpose of an attack on the Republic. 1684-1697 ^ Although it is not credible that James II intended at that time to undertake the responsibilities of an unpopular for- eign war, it is certain that he regarded with little favor his Protestant nephew, who was so clearly eligible to the throne of England; and that Louis XIV resented both the attitude and the growing influence of William of Orange, whose negotiations on the continent had not escaped his attention. In the meantime, while Europe was seeking means to defend itself against the aggressions of Louis XIV, William of Orange made no secret of his personal hostility to him, and openly declared that a union of France and England under the direction of the monarch who had revoked the Edict of Nantes would signify the ruin of Protestantism, the subjection of the United Provinces, and the permanent impossibility of restoring the political equilibrium of Europe. Believing himself designated by Providence to prevent that catastrophe, he resolved that, cost what it might, such a union should never be accomplished. The viait of It was in these circumstances, that the Elector of Branden- Fredencfc burg, in the summer of 1686, made his famous visit to Cleve William to . Cleve to meet in person the Prince of Orange. The journey was planned long before it occurred, and had ' given great disquietude to Rebenac, who fully understood its purpose. Frederick William had been deeply stirred by the anti-Protestant attitude of Louis XIV; and his own fail- ing health, which had several times interrupted the plans for the journey, had caused him to brood over the persecution of his co-religionists and his own duty regarding them. Hesitating, in his condition of health, to break openly his alliance with the King of France, he could not repress an unconquerable hostility toward him. While the League of Augsburg was forming, he had with his own gouty fingers prepared a military plan which he had hoped might be adopted by the allies, in which he coimselled the raising of a hundred and forty-two thousand men by the Emperor, the Empire, and Spain, to operate in two corps from Lorraine 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 199 and Burgundy, leaving Sweden to hold back Denmark, Chap, hi while he himself with the Prince of Orange should lead fifty- seven thousand Brandenburgers and Hollanders " directly - upon Paris" I^ A few months later, although strongly pressed to join the League of Augsburg, distrusting the policy of a combination against Louis XIV that was wanting both in aggressive pur- pose and sufficiency of means, he declined to do so; but wrote that he regarded it as "conformed to the interests of the Empire," and promised to promote it. It was to the Prince of Orange rather than to the ill-organized League of Augs- burg that he turned for the realization of his hopes. Having arrived at Cleve at the end of July, 1686, between The meeting the fourth and the seventh of August the Elector held long °^f ^fu"^"" conversations with the Prince of Orange, and on the four- in teenth attended a review of the Dutch troops on the plain of Mookerheide, near Nymwegen, where in 1574 Louis and Henry of Nassau fell in battle with the Spaniards. All the memories that clustered round the scene of that struggle for religious freedom and all the circumstances of the time in which they met combined to fix their attention upon the dangers that then confronted Protestantism. The presence of leading Huguenot refugees at Cleve, among them the celebrated pastor Claude, — who is mentioned in a letter as visiting the Elector on August 9, — and the ar- rival of the despatch of Van Citters regarding the alleged Anglo-French designs on Holland in the midst of these con- versations render it certain that the resistance of the Prot- estant powers to the policy of Louis XIV was one of the subjects seriously discussed. For a long time historians gave credit to the story of Pu- fendorf, that the invasion of England by William III for the purpose of constraining James II was one of the propo- sitions discussed by the Elector and the Stadtholder; but since Von Ranke dismissed it as a legend, because ex- Marshal Schomberg, who was said to have been present, is proved to have been at the time in Portugal, Pufendorf has ' See Fester, Die Augsburger Allianz, pp. 71, 72. 1684-1697 200 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill been treated as the inventor of a fable. But the absence of Schomberg by no means proves that an ultimate invasion of England by William III for the purpose of constraining James II to conform to the will of the nation may not have been discussed in these interviews, as Pufendorf, a well- informed contemporary and an experienced historian, re- ported: first, because such a course of action had been sug- gested to the Prince of Orange by Frederick William himself at the time of James II's accession; and, second, because it is known from the letters of Schomberg that he encouraged an alliance for this purpose between the Stadtholder and the Elector through his fellow-countryman and co-religionist, pastor Claude, who was present at Cleve.' Theimpor- There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the substantial toXattittde tr^th of Pufendorf 's report that plans of action against of England James II of England were discussed at Cleve, and became from that time forward the basis of the policies of the Prmce of Orange and Frederick William upon the continent. The time was not then ripe for the invasion of England, nor for any aggressive action against Louis XIV. The League of Augsburg was, therefore, to be encouraged, but restrained from becoming prematurely aggressive. Until the Emperor could be liberated from preoccupation in the East by a de- cisive victory over the Turks, there was little chance of success in an open conflict with Louis XIV; nor would it be prudent to provoke him to action so long as there was danger of a union between France and England. The key to the future security of Protestantism was to be found in changing the attitude of England toward Holland and the Protestant cause on the continent; for if, as in 1672, France and England were again to make war on the Dutch Republic, the old danger of the dismemberment of the United Provinces would be revived. The defeat of Before the Elector had returned to Potsdam an event of the Turks and jj^mense importance for the future of the Empire had oc- new aggres- ^ ^ eions of Louis curred. On September 2, 1686, Buda was taken by assault by XIV 1 See Pages, Le Grand Electeur el Louis XIV, pp. 573, 574; and Wad- dington, Le Grand Electeur, II, pp. 567, 568. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 201 the Imperial army, and the capital of Hungary, after remain- Chap, hi ing for nearly a hundred and fifty years in the hands of the Infidel, was at last once more occupied by the Hapsburgs. The victories of the Emperor in the East revealed to Louis XIV the necessity of prompt action if he wished to profit by the preoccupations of Leopold I, for the end of the war against the Infidel would permit the Emperor to demand the restoration of the territories annexed to France through the reunions. In September, 1686, therefore, Louis XIV re- sumed his aggressions, hoping thereby to transform the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent recognition of his terri- torial acquisitions, upon the condition that they were not to be extended. As a justification for violating the truce, the King of France complained that he was menaced by the League of Augs- burg, — a compact which, as we have seen, was in no sense aggressive, — and in December, 1686, he demanded of the Emperor and the Empire the conclusion of a peace on the basis of the Truce of Regensburg, by which all his expro- priations would be recognized, setting as a limit of time for these concessions March 31, 1687. This demand created in Germany a great commotion, and the Elector of Brandenburg in particular was highly exasperated; but, realizing how inopportime a conflict at that time would be, he did everything in his power to avert it. Intent upon his war with the Turks, Leopold I also was disposed, if possible, to avoid a conflict on the Rhine. Innocent XI gave assurance of the Emperor's intention to adhere to the truce, even if the war in the East were ended; and Louis XIV, satisfied for the moment with the tacit recognition of his right to erect new fortifications at Hiiningen and Giesenheun, in April, 1687, abandoned his demand for the definitive recognition of his annexations. Although the time for contesting the claims of Louis XIV The question of " imm uni- ties" at Rome had not arrived, and the intention to continue the observ- °^ ''™'i™- ance of the truce was sincere, the tension of feeling in Europe was still great. On every side the pretensions of the Grand Monarch kept alive a spirit of opposition to him. 202 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill With incomprehensible obstinacy he had disputed the ^- "• sovereign rights of the Pope within the city of Rome. The 1684r-1697 • immunity granted to foreign embassies had there been carried to an excess not only abusive but intolerable. The practice had grown up of ejctending exemption from the mxmicipal laws to persons and to houses having no connec- tion with the families or palaces of the foreign ambassadors. In this way, whole streets had been filled with thieves, lewd women, counterfeiters, and professional assassins, who were beyond the reach of the courts of justice, because the arms of a foreign power were placed over the doors of their domi- ciles, or because they bore a lettre de familiarite attesting their dependence upon some ambassador. These privileges were openly sold by the majordomos of the embassies, thus affording to them a source of income and a means of exer- cising authority in their neighborhoods. Under cover of this protection every form of crime was practised, and whole quarters of the city — at one time amounting to nearly a third — were thus withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the police.^ The Holy See had long resented and endeavored to sup- press this evil, but had encountered great difficulties in the attempt. Most of the powers had, however, respected the earnest wish of Innocent XI to abolish it, but Louis XIV per- sistently maintained the right of his ambassador to accord these "immunities." Soon after his accession. Innocent XI had announced that he would receive no diplomatic officer who would not pre- viously consent to abandon this practice; and with the death of the French ambassador, D'Estr^es, in January, 1687, an opportunity was presented for testing this decision. Disputing the Pope's right to lay down conditions to his representative, Louis XIV instructed the new envoy, Lavar- din, to enter Rome with an escort of a thousand soldiers and demand an audience of the Pope. Innocent XI not only refused to receive Lavardin, he promptly excommunicated him, and placed the church in which he was to take the com- ' See Revue des Questions Historiques, XXIII, pp. 20, 21. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 203 munion under interdict. In response, the King caused an Chap, hi edict to be registered by his pariiament declaring the Pope's bull invalid, and threatened to confiscate the papal estates if it was not withdrawn; but his opposition was unavailing. Whatever profit Louis XIV had expected to derive from The inBubor- his strenuous Catholicism was completely neutralized by his f °^™° °f . jr ./ J Lom3 XIV unfortunate relations with the Pope, whose authority he to Rome could not tolerate. Not only in the matter of the appoint- ment of ecclesiastics in his own kingdom, — where he dis- puted the supremacy of the Holy See over the bishops, — but everywhere he found himself in conflict with the policies of Rome. All of the Catholic princes of Germany had been gradually alienated from him, and even Victor Amadeus, the gallant young duke of Savoy, had finally dared to disobey him. Much against his inclination, in 1686, the Duke, afraid of his powerful neighbor, had at his command inflicted a bloody persecution upon the feeble sect of Waldenses; but, in 1687, so strong was the influence of the papal interest in the war with the Turks, that he ventured to disobey the King by answering the call of Innocent XI to take part in the war against the Infidel, and undertook the forbidden journey to Venice. The effort of Louis XIV to secure for his devoted follower, William von Fiirstenberg, the post of coadjutor to the Arch- bishop of Koln, cum futura successione, supported as it was by the use of French money and the menace of French arms, created in the Empire a universal irritation; for it was not only an unwarranted encroachment upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it plainly had for its object the military subordi- nation of the archbishopric to France. Leopold I urged the Pope to annul the proceedings; but Innocent XI, who did not wish unnecessarily to arouse the King of France, suspended action until a later time.' In England, the re-establishment of Roman Cathohcism The efforts of was moving forward at a rapid rate. In June, 1687, James jHrtlbiiBh II insisted upon a public reception to the papal nuncio, and Romaniam in the following January three apostolic vicars arrived from ' See Revue des Questions Historiques, XXX, pp. 76, 127. 204 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill Rome to aid in reorganizing the Catholic hierarchy in the ^•"- kingdom. A month later, the King's illegal attack upon 1684-1697 ^ ,00 f ^ ■ Magdalen College at Oxford ended in the installation of one of these vicars as the head of that ancient foundation, which was then transformed into a Roman Catholic seminary. Had it not been for the King's obvious intention to restore the Roman religion by the exercise of his absolute authority, it would have been difficult, perhaps, to place James II in the wrong. The Declaration of Indulgence of April 27, 1688, in principle, appeared to be most just and reasonable. All dissenters from the Established Church were treated by it with equal liberality; and Quakers, Anabaptists, and Inde- pendents, equally with Roman Catholics, rejoiced in the freedom it accorded them. William Penn, who was believed by many to be the chief author of the Declaration, appeared at the head of a deputation to thank the King for this act of religious toleration; and grateful addresses were presented by all the previously proscribed bodies. But even the non- conformist Protestants recoiled before the obvious deter- mination of James II to re-establish Roman Catholicism as a dominant religion. To them this meant the ultimate loss of both religious and political liberty. What they desired was a form of toleration which would respect the rights of conscience in the individual without the risk of placing Ro- manists in control of the State. Had James II been willing to govern England as a con- stitutional monarch, his efforts for the relief of the Roman Catholics from their religious disabilities might have proved effectual. The laws forbidding them the right of public worship were in fact unjust, but the nation did not have faith in the King's sincerity. If, like Louis XIV, he had managed to have a genuine quarrel with the Pope, it would no doubt have rendered him more popular in England; but his differences with Innocent XI over appointments, while they alienated from him the sympathies and confidence of Rome, were not of a nature to win for him the popular support. The advantage of this situation to the Prince of Orange A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 205 was soon to become apparent. The alleged, but disputed, Chap, hi birth of a son to the Queen of England, on June 10, 1688, after six years had passed without a sign of maternity, proved to be the turning-point in the tide of English senti- ment. Until this unexpected event occurred the succession The birth of to the throne seemed secure to Mary of Orange, but with t^^'^^l '" it suddenly ended the prospect of a Protestant sovereign as the successor of James II. The popular disappointment led to scandals of a kind that thoroughly agitated the nation. The suddenness of the birth had prevented the presence of the dignitaries whose testimony is usual on such occasions, and a charge of fraud was invented and circulated. Persons highly placed in the kingdom reported, and many were led to believe, that the child presented as the lawful heir to the throne had been foisted on the country by being introduced into the Queen's bed in a warming-pan. The trial of seven Protestant bishops, including the Arch- bishop of Canterbury, for petitioning the King to withdraw his second declaration of indulgence, coming in close connec- tion with the appearance of the Catholic heir to the throne, — as it was assumed the supposititious child of Mary of Modena was intended to be, — created a feverish popular excitement, accompanied by public rejoicing when the jury in the case of the bishops finally returned its verdict of not guilty. This combination of occurrences rendered inevitable the revolution that had long been preparing. The King had now completely lost public confidence. Fear existed that, in addition to the foreign troops already at his command, French aid would be invoked; and behind all these suspicions was the gratuitous supposition of a "popish plot." For this extraordinary situation William of Orange was The attitude of already prepared. He had long beheved that, in order to ^'"'o,",^™^ restrain England from a future alliance with France, it was necessary to detach the English people from the policies of James II. Since England was a Protestant country, it should be made to count as a Protestant force in the equilib- rium of Europe, where it was needed as a counterweight to 206 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A.D. 1684-16D7 The prepara- tions of Wil- liam III and recall of Brit- ish troopa the predominance of France. With this conviction he had calmly awaited the occasion when he would be called upon - to intervene for this purpose by force of arms. That oc- casion had now arrived. Fully and accurately informed regarding the state of pub- lic feeling in England through the reports of Dykvelt,' who in 1687 had been sent to London for the purpose of entering into confidential relations with the English Protestants, William III had advocated granting religious toleration, but he had refused to express his sanction of the revocation of the Test Act, which excluded Roman Catholics from public office. On November 4, 1687, this decision had been made in the form of a public declaration widely circulated both in England and on the continent.^ James II had not only proposed, he had insisted upon toleration; but it was believed that he intended eventually by the exercise of his royal prerogative to make England an exclusively Roman Catholic country. William III, on the other hand, was believed to be sincere in his love of tolera- tion, limited only by the determination to prevent Romanism from dominating the State. In advocating the principle of toleration so far as the rights of conscience are concerned, while opposing the abolition of the Test Act, the Prince of Orange had found the formula which expressed the desire of the English nation. As a result of the mission of Dykvelt and the later reports of another confidential agent, Zuylestein, an understanding was finally reached that, if military action should at any time become advisable, the Prince of Orange should be consulted and should assmne the leadership. In these nego- tiations with political personages in London, the Prince seems not to have contemplated the complete overthrow of James II, much less the substitution of himself as King of England. At The Hague prayers continued to be offered ' Everard van Weede, Lord of Dykvelt. ^ Over forty-five thousand copies of Fagel's letter containing the declaration of the Prince of Orange regarding toleration are said to have been sold in England before 1688. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FOKMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 207 for the royal family of England, including the infant prince Chap, hi now regarded as the probable heir to the throne, and out wardly there was every sign of friendship. The aim of Wil- liam III was the control of the foreign policy of England by the friends of Holland and of Protestantism, and the frus- tration of the designs of Louis XIV. Such was the attitude of William III when a series of events occurred which seemed to render necessary some decisive action. After the end of Monmouth's rebellion, the six regiments of English and Scotch troops which had been recalled from Holland had been returned. The demand of James II that they be placed under Roman Catholic officers had, however, excited suspicion. This demand had been refused by the States General, and their peremptory recall early in 1688, — which it was believed had been ordered under the influence of Barillon, — was taken as a signal of alarm; for it was at this moment that Louis XIV was disclosing his designs upon Koln, and his attitude toward the United Provinces was considered menacing. When the release of the troops was refused, James II did not conceal his indignation, and in March he ordered all British subjects engaged in foreign service to return to England. Taking advantage of the state of feeling between James II James ii and the United Provinces, Louis XIV advised the King to f "o^^Lom's intimidate the Dutch by making a show of hostility against xiv them; and James II had the weakness to accept the advice. On April 19, 1688, an agreement was concluded with Louis XIV by which the King of France promised to contribute five hundred thousand livres for fitting out an English fleet, and also to pay for the maintenance of two regiments of the British troops recalled from Holland. This action confirmed the truth of Van Citters' reports The invita- that there was collusion between James II and Louis XIV, fi°^*j°ii^o" and gave color to the supposition of their intended co-opera- bring an amy tion in continental affairs. In May, William III had reached '° ^°«'*'"* the conclusion that, unless there was armed opposition, James II would attach England to the policies of Louis XIV, A. D. 1684-1697 208 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill with the result that the conditions of 1672 would be repeated, and the United Provinces would be again left without de- fence. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say to Edward Russell, that, if he should receive an invitation from impor- tant persons in England, he was disposed to bring an army to their aid in settling the affairs of the kingdom. The message did not long remain unanswered. On June 30, 1688, a letter to the Prince of Orange was signed by seven of the most influential statesmen in England, extending to him an invitation to land there with an armed force before the end of the year.' Admiral Herbert, an eminent ofiBcer who had been displaced because of his opposition to the repeal of the Test Act, in the guise of a common sailor, carried this extraordinary invitation to Holland and delivered it to the Prince. So bold a step could probably never have been taken by men of high intelligence had it not been for the peculiar cir- cumstances of the moment; but it was not doubted that the Prince of Orange, representing the deepest convictions of the English nation, would have a far different reception from that which had been accorded to the Duke of Monmouth. The suoceas of From the point of view of William III the enterprise ne- wiiham III cessarily assumed a serious character. He was not an ab- with the ■' statea General solute monarch, ruling over a people accustomed to obey his will and ready to follow him wherever he might lead. His people were republicans, accustomed to consider care- fully all that they imdertook, and little disposed to embark upon a sea of military adventure. Without their support he would be entirely helpless, and there was in the United Provinces a party certain to obstruct and if possible to thwart his plans. Even if he should win the assent of the States General to his enterprise and with their aid be provided with troops and a fleet to transport them to England, the with- drawal of these forces would leave the United Provinces ex- posed to invasion by Louis XIV. While the Prince was conscious of all the impediments to 1 The signers were Lords Shrewsbury, Devonshire, Danby, and Lumley, Bishop Compton, Edward Russell, and Henry Sidney. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 209 the success of his plan, he was not for a moment inclined to Chap, hi abandon it as chimerical. He had solicited the invitation ^' "■ to come to England, and he was not disposed to disappoint • those who had imperilled their lives in a cause which he felt was his as well as theirs. Opposition in the United Provinces was, however, soon overcome. Count d'Avaux labored incessantly to revive and embolden the anti-Orange party, but his efforts were unavailing. Since the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes there had been awakened among the Dutch burghers a bitter feeling of resentment toward Louis XIV. Against this sen- timent of sympathy with the outraged Huguenots, Count d'Avaux, who was already persona non grata to the Prince, was powerless. The recall of the British troops by James II had produced a double effect upon the Hollanders; it de- prived them of a valued means for their own defence, and it suggested their use in England as an instrument for the re- pression of Protestantism. When to this state of feeling was added evidence that a secret imderstanding existed between James II and Louis XIV, the Prince of Orange had com- pletely won his cause in the States General. To the imag- ination of the time the only alternative to the success of the expedition was another humiliation and probable defeat of Holland through an Anglo-French alliance.^ The policy of Louis XIV in this critical situation was The activitiea peculiarly complicated. It would have been easy for him °^^ thrRhino to check the plans of William III by preventing his leaving the continent, but he had other interests to consider. If he could not force England into an active alliance with himself, which he found difficult, he could at least keep the English occupied, and thus render them powerless on the continent as he had so long succeeded in doing, by leaving James II to contend with his- domestic troubles. His own interest seemed to him to lie in preparing for the inevitable contest over the Spanish succession by rendering the fron- tiers of France as strong as possible on the Rhine; for he ' See Sirtema de Gro vesting, Guillaume III el Louis XIV, V, pp. 462, 466. VOL. m. — 14 A. D. 1684^1697 210 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill would there ultimately have to face the combined forces of the Empire, which was already organizing to resist his plans with regard to Spain. With the progress of the war in the East, it was becoming evident that this resistance would be more formidable than it had ever been. By the beginning of 1688, Hungary had not only been redeemed from occupa- tion by the Turks, but the crown of that kingdom had been declared hereditary in the male line of the House of Hapsburg, and the eldest son of Leopold I, Joseph, had been crowned king with the assent of the nation. The death of Maximilian Hem-y, Archbishop of Koln, in June, 1688, finally opened the question of succession to the archbishopric; and Louis XIV, determined to force the elec- tion of Ftirstenberg, prepared to occupy the principality with his troops. The election did not result in a choice; and the final selection, therefore, fell to the Holy See. Innocent XI submitted the question to the College of Cardinals, who, on August 26, named the rival candidate, Joseph Clemens of Bavaria; and the Pope confirmed their choice. Louis XIV was enraged, and resolved to make an exhibition of his power. The time was not propitious for engaging in a general war, for France was not in a financial condition to resist the whole of Europe; and the fall of Belgrade, on September 6, 1688, foreshadowed a speedy termination of the conflict with the Turks, by which the Emperor and the German princes would be released for the defence of the Empire in the West. If, however, the King of France could quickly strike a few telling blows, he might be able to force an early peace, by which he could confirm his previous conquests. On September 24, 1688, therefore, he issued a declaration of war, and two armies crossed the German frontier. The Dauphin with the main body of troops began the siege of Philipsburg, another division invaded the Palat- inate, and to intimidate the Pope Avignon was occupied. The accusa- To justify his actiou, Louis XIV complained of the exist- XIV a°'aitT^ ^^^^ °^ *^^ League of Augsburg, — which really had no the Pope aggressive intention, — and claimed that the entrance of his troops into the archbishopric of Koln had for its main THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 211 object to retain the Prince of Orange upon the continent and Chap, hi save England. ^- ^■ In a spirit of rather inconsequent accusation, Louis XIV further declared that the real cause of the war was the con- duct of Innocent XI. To his ambassador at Rome he wrote: "The cessation of the war which is still progressing advan- tageously to Christendom in Hungary can be imputed only to the Pope, as well as the disadvantages which our religion may suffer from the divisions which His Holiness is fomenting among all the Catholic princes." At the same time he wrote to his ambassador at Constantinople: "I have de- cided to give protection to Cardinal Fiirstenberg, . . . and to garrison my troops at Bonn and Kaiserwerth to prevent those of the Emperor from taking possession of those places; but I shall send a greater number into the Palatinate." He then added, that, as he was about to attack the Emperor and compel him to withdraw his troops from Hungary in order to employ them on the Rhine and in Italy, " the am- bassador is authorized to let these intentions be known at Constantinople, with the purpose of showing how weak the Court of Vienna really is, and how easily the Turks could re- gain all they have lost in the last campaigns, if they took advantage of the present state of affairs in Europe." "I do not doubt," he says, in a despatch of October 18, 1688, "that the Turks are profiting from the terror which my arms have carried into the entire Empire." * It is from these side-lights upon the policy of Louis XIV The relations that we are able to comprehend his inactivity regarding the °^jtt°jrme3 n expedition of the Prince of Orange to England. At the price of a soUd alliance with England, Louis XIV would perhaps have endeavored to prevent the departure of the Prince from Holland; but the comparative indifference of James II and his own immediate interests made it convenient for him to remain passive. He had, in fact, previously offered to aid in preventing the embarkation of the Prince and his army; but James II, not wishing to seem dependent upon him ' See the citations in Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXIII, pp. 119, 127. 212 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill for protection against invasion, refused to accept the offer. .^^.'^.'.^^ In fact, it was not believed at the English Court until it l004— IbJ? lit r XTT'lf TTT was too late that the armament of William III was really intended for the invasion of England. From the beginning of his reign the foreign policy of James II had been undecided; but indecision at this critical moment was certain to prove fatal. His attitude on the subject of defence against the Prince of Orange was to Louis XIV so inconsiderate that at one moment the King of France made an effort to save him in spite of himself. The English am- bassador at Versailles, Bevil Skelton, becoming alarmed by the preparations of the Prince of Orange for his expedition, requested Louis XIV to instruct Count d'Avaux to inform the States General that he, the King, was imder obligation to regard any hostile movement against James II as a rup- ture with France; and, believing that this statement would check the plans of William III, this instruction was author- ized. Had James II supported this representation, it is not improbable that the States General would have considered it inexpedient to provoke the hostility of Louis XIV; but when Van Citters inquired of the King if it was true that he had a secret treaty with France, he declared that he had no such treaty, that he was no "Ftirstenberg requiring the protection of a patron," and that the King of France had no authority to act for him. To emphasize the indignation of James II with this transaction, Skelton was recalled from France and committed to the Tower. The ambigmty It was difficult for Louis XIV to iusist upon an under- attit™r^'' standing of which James II denied the existence, and in fact there was no formal treaty. While Van Citters refused to believe the truth of the King's reply, Louis XIV was too much offended by the tone of it to attempt any further assistance, and decided to permit James II to work out his own problem of defence. The importation of troops into England from Ireland and Scotland without a frank and clear declaration of the use to be made of them served to augment the suspicion with which the King was regarded, and the fact that the new additions A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 213 to the army were largely composed of Roman Catholic Chap, hi troops commanded by Roman Catholic officers gave to these preparations a sinister appearance. There were two courses open to James II, either of which might have prevented his fall; a firm alliance with France on the one hand, or an alliance with Holland on the other. By the first he might at least have secured the active inter- vention of Louis XIV to occupy William III in Holland and prevent his expedition to England; and by the second, which would have made the Prince of Orange a supporter rather than a foe, he might have re-established himself in the con- fidence of his people. Unhappily for him, he was indisposed to accept either alternative; and, in consequence, he at the same time incurred the hostility of the Prince and lost the protection of the King of France. It was this blindness to the importance of a wise and con- The antago- sistent foreign policy that led to the final overthrow of James "^""fdynastio ^ and national II. While his conduct in domestic matters was exasperating policies to the English people, this alone would probably not have proved fatal to him. It is true, that he was not trusted by the nation; but the cause of distrust was not merely that the King was a Roman Catholic in his religious convictions. He might have been avowedly a Catholic king, so far as his personal faith was concerned, and still have retained the confidence of the nation had his public policy been truly national. What alienated confidence from the King was that his policy was strictly dynastic, and in opposition to the will of the nation. It was never forgotten that he was half-French by lineage and wholly French in his ideas and sympathies, a Bourbon of the Bourbons. As such he was an absolutist in feeling, and aimed at establishing absolut- ism as a system. Like his brother, Charles II, he was be- lieved to be in secret relations with Louis XIV; and since the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV, always regarded with aversion in England, was universally detested. In spite of his denials, judged by every practical test, James II was in sympathy with the most atrocious acts of Louis XIV. In 1686 he had caused to be burned by the A. D. 1684-1697 214 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill public executioner the book of the Huguenot pastor Claude, in which he recounted the persecutions to which his church had been subjected; and had prevented by an arbitrary de- cision the charity of the English people in behalf of the suf- fering refugees, requiring that, in order to be eligible to obtain it, they must first receive the sacrament in the Angli- can church. No previous king of England had ever so dis- regarded the feeling of the nation concerning the dominance of France upon the continent. Even Charles II had been compelled by Parliament to abandon his open treaty re- lations with Louis XIV for the subjugation of Holland, and was forced by the will of the nation to make peace with the United Provinces. The conflict between the national and the dynastic policies had in 1688 become so tense that the King did not dare to call a parUament to abrogate the Test Act, knowing that it would with practical imanimity vote for resistance to the aggressions of France. The attitude of It is, in fact, impossible to comprehend the English Revo- tt/EngiLr"'^ lution of 1688 without an understanding of the European Eevoiution Situation which rendered it inevitable. The conflict between the dynastic and the national policies in England was in reality not only a local but a European issue. Locally, the question was whether the personal will of the sovereign or the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament should prevail. But, even locally considered, that issue was vitally related to the European situation, because it practically determined the part England was to play in the course of events in Europe. The same conflict that was agitating England was divid- ing Europe also, and the English Revolution was only part of a greater movement of resistance. In England, James II was disputing the authority of the laws of Parhament; on the continent, Louis XIV was violating the treaties which constituted the public law of Europe. In both cases the aggressions were actuated by the same spirit and defended by the same theory, — the non-existence of legal restrictions upon the will of the sovereign.' ' This was clearly seen by the Huguenot pamphleteers in Holkndi THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 215 The Catholic princes of Europe, and even the Pope, could. Chap, hi therefore, passively look on while the Protestant Prince of j-.g'V^^q^ Orange crossed the North Sea with an army and dethroned a Catholic king; for as much as the Protestants of England needed William of Orange to help them in resisting the ab- The subor- solutism of James II, the sovereigns of Europe needed the •^'°''*'°° °' aid of England in overcoming the absolutism of Louis XIV. motives In the eyes of the Pope, the Emperor, and all the princes of the Empire, William of Orange had a better right to invade England than Louis XIV had to take possession of the arch- bishopric of Koln and to subjugate the Palatinate. It is impossible to deny that considerations of religion played a certain role in causing the English Revolution of 1688, but an analysis of the motives immediately operative in the minds of the principal actors in that extraordinary drama shows that it was not caused by differences of reli- gious faith alone. It is true, no doubt, that without the ex- citement produced over questions of religion the English Revolution of 1688 would not have occurred, or at least would not have occurred in the way it did. The strong undercurrent of feeling that led to the revolution was the terror of the English and the Dutch Protestants, produced by the foreboding that, if not resisted, a reign of absolutism like that which had crushed the Huguenots in France would in time overwhelm and destroy them also. They were, therefore, they believed, compelled to resist in order to pre- serve their existence. But, when it came to the time of action, the danger to liberty of conscience was not so great as it had seemed. In England, in spite of the popular cry of "No popery!" the Pope was not arrayed among the ene- mies of the English nation; and Louis XIV was openly ac- cusing him of encouraging the expedition of the Prince of who produced a quantity of literature against royal absolutism. The chief of these writings was the series of memoirs by Jurien, Les soupirs de la France esclave qui aspire apres la liberie, pubhshed in 1688, and fol- lowed by many others. The State, Jurien argues, ought to be reformed, for states are depositories of sovereignty superior to that of kings. See Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV, V, pp. 424, 427. 216 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY A. u. 1684-1697 Chap. Ill Orange.* In Holland, the King of France, although he had said there would be a diplomatic rupture with France if the States General moved against James II, was not threatening an invasion of the country. In the Empire, there was no alignment of Catholics against Protestants, and the aggres- sions of Louis XIV at that moment were all directed against Catholics; — against the Pope in Avignon, against the de- cision of the College of Cardinals in Koln, and against a Catholic Elector in the Palatinate. His only ally, who was soon to desert him, was the Protestant King of Denmark, while included in the League of Augsburg were the Emperor and the King of Spain. Outside of England, there was nowhere any strictly re- ligious question in controversy, and even in England there was no doctrinal debate. It was the political aspect of re- ligion only that was anywhere at issue, — the right of the sovereign to dictate in matters of a religious nature and to abolish laws and guarantees already in existence. The fears in which the spirit of revolt had its origin no doubt in part persisted, but the revolt itself was not to be suppressed by removing immediate apprehensions. A resolution had been reached to dispute the pretensions of the King as being in principle dangerous, and a conflict had thus become inevitable. When at last, in September, 1688, James II became con- vinced that William of Orange was really intending to in- yade England with an army, he sought to regain popular favor by making concessions; but it was too late. On Sep- tember 21 his minister at The Hague was authorized to deny the existence of any treaty with France, and to offer as a proof of it to unite with the Dutch in maintaining the Treaty of Nymwegen and the Truce of Regensburg. But these concessions and assurances made no serious im- pression. The English attributed the King's conciliatory spirit to his fear of the Prince of Orange, to whom alone they felt indebted for the concessions granted; while the Dutch The concilia- tory efforts of James II ' See the letter to Cardinal d'Estrges, in Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 167. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 217 accepted the explanation of Van Citters, who affirmed that Chap, hi the King's professions of amity were intended only to arrest '^- °- the preparations of the Prince. The only practical effect, therefore, was to complete the alienation of Louis XIV, who had already violated the treaties which James II offered to aid in defending. When afterward James II implored the assistance previously offered and refused, Louis XIV coolly informed him that he was not at that time prepared to fur- nish any aid. Thus delivered from the fear of an attack upon Holland, The descent the Prince of Orange was ready in October for his descent °' ^•'J'™ "| ° -' ^ upon England upon England. The "papist wind," as the unfavorable breeze from the West was called, which had prevented his sailing, having ceased on the nineteenth, he set sail from Helvoetsluis with about fifty vessels of war and a fleet of transports bearing an army of more than twelve thousand men; but a storm dispersed his fleet in the middle of the North Sea, and he was obliged to return. On November 1, without the loss of a ship, he was again ready to set sail; and, four days later, after eluding the English fleet which lay at Harwich, William III, accompanied by ex-Marshal Schomberg, with his entire armament entered the bay of Torbay, where he landed without opposition. The banners of the Prince of Orange bore the legend: PRO EELIGIONE PEOTESTANTE PRO LIBEEO PAELAMENTO JE MAINTIENDEAI To the intense disappointment of the Prince there was no popular demonstration in his favor, and the foreign army seemed for a time to be an object of aversion. Had the King shown wisdom and courage, the Prince of Orange would no doubt soon have foimd himself without support in England; but from the first James II had entertained the idea of flight and prepared for it. The alternatives before him were the acceptance of a free parliament and submission to its con- clusions on the one hand, or a temporary asylum with Louis XIV and the hope of full restoration with the aid of France 218 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 1684-1697 Chap. Ill on the other. He decided to seek refuge in France, and after some mishaps, on December 22, succeeded in leaving England. Unwilling to use force unnecessarily, the Prince of Orange had quietly waited, in conference with his English friends, with the intention of finally imposing conditions upon the King; but the flight of James II left England without a monarch. On December 24 the Peers invited the Prince to summon a Parliament, and on the twenty-sixth the Commoners made a similar request. Parliament having as- sembled, on February 6, 1689, the throne was declared va- cant by the Peers, and the Prince of Orange and the Princess Mary were declared King and Queen of England. The two Houses confirmed the act, and on the thirteenth "William III and Mary II were formally proclaimed the sovereigns. III. The Diplomacy of William of Okange to the Peace of Ryswick The signifi- cance of the King's flight The aims of WUUam III The flight of James II to France confirmed in the minds of the English people the convictions they had formed re- garding the King's secret intentions. If he had been willing to call a parliament and conform to its decisions, there was no reason why he should resort to flight at all; and, if his object was simply to avoid bloodshed by temporary with- drawal, he might have retired to Scotland or Ireland in his own dominions. The fact that the fugitive king took refuge in France was an open confession that, as he had assured Barillon, "his heart was still French," and that it was upon French support that he intended to rely in his extremity. Although the Prince of Orange was a foreigner by birth and personally cold, reserved, and unsympathetic, he had rightly interpreted the national sentiment regarding the attitude of the King, and the flight to France was proof that even in the King's own judgment it was William of Orange and not himself who represented the will of the nation. William III had, indeed, come to England to contend for a free parliament and the Protestant religion; but it was not the internal interests of the EngUsh nation that had A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 219 brought him there with a Dutch army. The expedition Chap. hi could never have received the support of the States General and the people of the United Provinces if its purpose had been merely to place the Prince upon the throne of England, much less if it had been only to settle certain constitutional questions for the benefit of Englishmen. The invasion of England by the Prince of Orange was in- tended by him as an indirect attack upon the policies of Louis XIV. This was the understanding in Holland, and without it participation in the expedition by the Dutch army and navy would have been impossible. The interest of the United Provinces in this bold and dangerous adventure grew out of the fear of ultimate extinction as a Protestant nation in case there should be an eventual alliance between Louis XIV and the King of England. From this point of view their salvation depended upon success in changing the attitude of England toward the struggle with France. So long as England continued to be held in a state of neutrality by the controversies between King and Parliament, the Grand Monarch would have a free hand upon the continent. To the imagination of the time this signified that he would gradually encroach upon the Empire until he was master of its destinies, then annex the Spanish Netherlands and absorb the United Provinces, and finally unite the crowns of France and Spain; thus establishing a practically universal monarchy in which Catholicism would be the official reli- gion, and every form of dissent would ultimately be exter- minated. If, as was feared, England should fall so completely under the control of James II that he would be able to form an open alliance with Louis XIV for the annihilation of Protestantism, the destruction of the Republic and the subju- gation of Europe would be even more speedily accomplished. To prevent this catastrophe, England must be ranged with the United Provinces and the other Protestant powers of Europe in their conflict with the King of France. This then was the chief purpose of the bold enterprise of William III in invading England. Louis XIV perfectly understood it, and had for that reason offered his aid to 220 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 Tho relation of the Revolu- tion to the con- flict with Louia XIV The precau- tiona of WUUam III for the safety of Holland James II to prevent it. James II understood it also, but it was only after William III had actually landed in England that he became fully aware that he had to choose between submission to the will of the nation and the abandonment of his kingdom. The way was still open to him to retain his throne. There was no attempt to force his abdication. He still had the opportunity to abandon his dynastic policies and accept the will of the nation. Had he embraced that opportunity, he would have received the support of his people, the Prince of Orange and his army would have quietly withdrawn from England, the United Provinces would have been satisfied, all the continental powers, including the Pope, would have approved his action, and his rule would have continued. The alternative was an appeal to Louis XIV to compel the English nation to restore him to his throne and sustain his prerogatives as an absolute monarch. In Eng- land, therefore, after the King's flight, the conflict was not so much with James II as with the power that since the Treaty of Dover had frustrated the will of the nation in international affairs. Seen in its wider relations, the English Revolution of 1688 was merely an act in a more comprehensive drama, — the conflict of Europe with the plans and pretensions of Louis XIV. Had it not been for the interest of Holland in that conflict and the relations believed to exist between the Kings of France and England, the Revolution might never have occurred. From the first, William of Orange and Frederick William of Brandenburg had comprehended the wider import of the opposition to James II that had been preparing in England; and together they had labored to fortify resistance to Louis XIV on every side. The Great Elector did not live to witness the invasion of England, but he was deeply interested in it, and to the last encouraged the Prince of Orange to carry out the plan he had proposed at the time of James II's accession to challenge his tenure of the throne. In preparing for his expedition to England William III had taken care not to leave the United Provinces unprotected. When in 1687 the Prince of Wales was born, the Elector had A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 221 been deeply moved. At his court was a noted Huguenot Chap, hi refugee, the French ex-Marshal Schomberg, whom he had taken into his service and made the generalissimo of his armies. That experienced officer, who bitterly resented the persecution of his co-religionists in France, was devoted to the Prince of Orange, and accompanied him on his voyage of invasion. In February, 1688, General Spaen had been sent to The Hague; and, according to Count d'Avaux, the Elector then promised to place nine thousand Brandenburg troops in the Duchy of Cleve to cover the defence of Holland on the lower Rhine, while the Prince was absent in England.^ With characteristic finesse, Frederick William denied the report; but after his death, which occurred on May 9, 1688, the promised troops were furnished by his son, Frederick III, who succeeded him as Elector.^ In June of that year a new and closer alliance with Bran- denburg had been concluded, and Frederick III, — as zealous for the common cause as his father, the Great Elector, — had in July united with the Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector of Saxony, the King of Sweden, the Bishop of Miinster, the Elector Palatine, and the princes of the Circle of Westphalia to resist an attack by Louis XIV.' A few weeks before his embarkation, WilUam of Orange and Frederick III held a conference at which the last military agreements were made; and soon afterward Brandenburg troops took possession of Koln to prevent a sudden sally of the French, and the prom- ised army for protecting the United Provinces was sent to Cleve.* On October 22, Ernest Augustus of Hanover joined the other confederates in the Magdeburg Concert,^ and ' See Waddington, Le Grand Ehcteur, II, pp. 585, 586. ^ To the last moment of his hfe Frederick William was deeply inter- ested in the invasion of England. Only a few days before his death the password given out to the garrison at Potsdam was "London and Amsterdam." ' See Moerner, Staatsverlrdge, p. 500 et seq. * Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, I, p. 728. ' Although the Magdeburg Concert is far less referred to by histo- rians than the League of Augsburg, it was vastly more important. It 222 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 Louis XIV's decision to sustain James II Louis "XIV forces war upon England twenty-two thousand men were stationed on the middle and lower Rhine. The ability of William III to accomplish his main pur- pose of throwing the weight of England into the balance of Europe depended upon the action of Louis XIV. It seemed quite certain that the new ruler of England, surrounded on every side by domestic problems, would soon suffer from a reaction by which he would be kept fully occupied in Eng- land; and that the English nation, once rid of its absolute monarch and confronted with constitutional questions, would have little inclination to plunge into a foreign war in which the national interests were not seriously at stake. In that case, Louis XIV would still have the advantage of England's neutrality, while the United Provinces would remain weakened by the absence of the stadtholder, its chief military commander, together with a great portion of its army. If, therefore, the King of France, without making a show of hostility, should leave England to reckon alone with her new sovereign, his own position on the continent would for some time at least remain essentially unaltered, leaving him free to employ all his resources against his continental foes. But Louis XIV had already decided this question. He had resolved that he would never passively submit to the loss of control in England. The decision of Louis XIV to take up the cause of the fu- gitive king and compel his restoration enabled WiUiam III to attain the chief object he had in view in the invasion, namely, to enlist all the forces of England against the Grand Monarch. Without Louis XIV's open hostility, the whole theory underlying the Revolution might soon have been discredited. Opposition to James II was chiefly based on the supposition that he was acting in collusion with France, and that Louis XIV was in reality the deus ex machina of his dynastic policies. Had the King of France not interfered in the conflict between James II and his people, the pre- was aggressive in character, whereas the League of Augsburg was only defensive. See Moerner, Staaisvertrage, pp. 505 and 772. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 223 ponderant influence of Louis XIV over the last two sovereigns Chap, hi might soon have been forgotten, and William of Orange might j^o'^L'^pQ- have been made to appear as the hated foreigner and usurper. In fact, William III was not received in England with enthusiasm, and he did not possess the personal qualities to make himself liked on his own account. He had come and had been accepted as a political necessity. But in the ab- sence of manifest hostility on the part of Louis XIV, William III could not easily have drawn England into a war with France. It is true, that English sympathies were against the persecutions and English interests were adverse to the aggressions of the King of France; but there were too many domestic problems to be solved in England to allow a for- eign war in which no great material advantage was to be gained to become popular. The most that William III could have done without an open challenge from Louis XIV would have been to throw the moral weight of England against the policies of the King of France. But, to the great delight of William III, his antagonist without hesitation espoused the cause of James II and at- tempted to enforce his restoration to the throne; and from that moment the die was cast. It was thereafter indisput- able that, as an English historian has expressed it, in taking refuge in France the fugitive king had simply "gone home." The whole theory of the Revolution was thereby justified. England had no choice. If the struggle of constitutionalism against absolutism was to be maintained, England must join the continental powers in resisting the predominance of France. The circimastances in which William of Orange came to The prudent England presented many serious obstacles to the realiza- '^^^{'^^ m tion of his purpose. There was in England a strong party attached to the fortunes of James II and expecting to derive advantage from his policies. Violence on the part of the stranger who had brought a foreign army to the soil of a proud and independent nation would instantly have turned the popular sentiment against him. The proposal on his part to involve England in a continental war for the defence 224 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill of Holland would have alienated a large portion of the nation ,00"*.' ^^r,^ from him. But it was a characteristic of William III to do loo4— lo97 Til nothing to force public opinion. In the matter dearest to him he did nothing even to hasten its development. The English nation desired to re-establish its constitution, and the Parliament was its normal instrument for the ascertain- ment and expression of the national will. It was to its free decisions that he owed his accession to the throne, and it was only through its free deliberations that he could hope to retain it. As regards religion, although the Queen was an Anglican and he was a Calvinist, thus representing together the con- victions of the greater part of the nation, he did nothmg to embarrass or exasperate the Roman Catholics.' Havmg announced the broad principle of toleration, in spite of op- position he remained true to its spirit. His high intelligence as a statesman was soon made evi- dent by his abstention from every form of arbitrary action. While maintaining the authority of the Crown, he recognized that the source of its power was the will of the nation. He did not even try to impose upon Parliament his own ideas. The time came when he found it necessary to silence its dissensions, but not until the nation realized the danger of its internal conflicts. Since the time of Elizabeth England had never been so free to follow in the way marked out by the national will. When at last it found itself engaged in war because of French aggression, instead of reproaches for having caused the conflict William III received the loyal support of the nation he had come to save, and to which he was more than ever indispensable. Louis xiv'3 If William III was chiefly indebted for his success to his weakne83*of ^''^^ sclf-coutrol and moderation, he owed it in part also to England Louis XIV's scnsc of his own omnipotence. Accustomed to think lightly of England's power of resistance, Louis XIV ' Parliament, however, was not so lenient. A statute was passed expelling Roman Catholics from London and Westminster. Subse- quently they were deprived of arms and forbidden to possess a horse worth more than five pounds. THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 225 did not realize the immensity of the task that was before Chap, hi him. Since the Treaty of Dover he had regarded England ^- "• as a mere dependency. Had the national will been entirely free to express itself, there would have been no attempt to humiliate the United Provinces, no dictation by him of the Treaties of Nymwegen, no confiscations by the Chambres de Reunion, no appropriation of Luxemburg and Strasburg, and perhaps no Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The efface- ment of England's international influence by means of sub- sidies had proved a comparatively easy undertaking, and Louis XIV believed that a few heavy blows on his part would still ruin the cause of WiUiam III and restore the coimtry to James II. As a naval power, France was still superior to England; and with Ireland anti-Orangist, Scot- land still doubtful, and the loyalty of the army to the new sovereign as yet untried, it seemed probable that the Revo- lution might end in failure. It was, however, necessary to strike quickly. On Novem- ber 26, 1688, soon after the landing of the Dutch army in England, Louis XIV declared war on the United Provinces. Receiving with cordiality James II and his family upon their arrival in France, without a formal declaration of war with England he immediately began preparations for the restora- tion of the fugitive king. The prospects of success were greatly heightened by the The attitude situation in Ireland, which at once declared for James II. "J ^if^^ *"'' ' bcotlana On March 12, 1689,. James II, in response to an invitation to come to Ireland, arrived at Kinsale with a fleet fitted out by Louis XIV at Brest, well supplied with money, arms, munitions, and a body of French oflBcers, accompanied by Count d'Avaux as political adviser. The plan of James II was, after organizing the undisci- plined and ill-armed Irish forces numbering some fifty thou- sand men, to drive the adherents of William III from the North of Ireland, then to proceed to Scotland, where a ris- ing in the highlands in favor of James II was expected, and finally to descend into England for the recovery of the throne. In Scotland there had been a period of indecision growing VOL. III. — 15 226 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill A. D. 1684-1697 The comple- tion of tbe Grand Alliance out of the conflict of parties; but soon after the arrival of James II in Ireland, on March 26, a convention assembled at Edinburgh decided that he had "forfeited the crown" and a commission was sent to London to offer it to William and Mary. Without waiting for their acceptance, the new rulers were publicly proclaimed in Scotland. On May 4, after Ireland was in full revolt with the sup- port of France, William III published a manifesto setting forth the manner in which Louis XIV was supporting James II, and on the seventeenth followed it with a declaration of war. England was now at last, with its full consent, brought into open hostility with Louis XIV, but it still remained uncertain who would profit by this conflict; for, although William III was now permitted to employ the forces of England against the King of France, it was certain that he would be for some time occupied with the revolt of Ireland and prevented from acting freely on the continent. Diplomatic action on the part of William III was, however, now greatly facilitated. He had resolved from the first to retain in his own hands as a royal prerogative the direction of foreign policy, but to act in harmony with the prevailing desires of the nation. The preliminaries for the Grand Alliance — as the offensive union for the war with France was afterward called — had been already arranged at The Hague. The attack of Louis XIV upon the Empire and his declaration of war upon Holland had made their union nec- essary, and on May 12, 1689, the treaty of offensive alliance was signed at Vienna. ' With the progress of the revolution in England the tide had turned on the continent, and the intimidations of Louis XIV were answered with defiance. Continued victories over the Turks had inspired new courage in the Empire and permitted resistance to the new aggressions of France. At Madrid French influence had received a blow by the death of the Queen, and Charles II was more closely drawn to the Court of Vienna through his marriage with Maria of Neu- 1 See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 229 at seq. A. D. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 227 burg, a sister of the Empress. The purely defensive League Chap, hi of Augsburg was being rapidly transformed into a network of aggressive alliances inspired with new confidence by the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne of England. Before the end of the year, on December 20, after having previously concluded compacts with the United Provinces for aggressive action in the war with France/ William III added England to the Grand Alliance, with the announced purpose of reinstating the conditions prescribed by the Treaties of Westphalia and the Treaty of the Pyrenees.^ All Europe was now leagued against France.^ In place of the vast diplomatic combination by which The progress Louis XIV had isolated the United Provinces in 1672, the °l '^^ T °° ' the contment Prince of Orange had gradually built up a coalition greater than any which had previously existed in Europe, by which in turn Louis XIV was left in complete isolation. Diplomacy had reached its limit, and for the next four years there are few diplomatic changes or negotiations to record. William III had succeeded in uniting Europe so completely that little remained for him to do; and the Grand Monarch, cut off from regular diplomatic intercourse by the dismissal of his ambassadors from most of the foreign courts, was reduced to secret operations through obscure agencies, mostly of an ecclesiastical character.* Since the autumn of 1688, when Louis XIV began his open attack on the Empire, he had taken possession of Phil- ipsburg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, and had devastated the Palatinate with fire and sword, burning Heidelberg, Speyer, Worms, and many other cities. He had created a feeling of horror throughout Germany by re-enacting the ' For the treaties with the United Provinces, of August, 1689, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 236 et seq. 2 See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 241. Spain acceded to the Grand Alliance on June 6, 1690. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 267. ' Denmark had formed an alliance with England on August 15, 1689. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 237. ' BariUon had been immediately sent away from England on the ac- cession of William III, and R^benac left Madrid on March 25, 1689, after the failure of his mission. 228 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY A. D. 1684r-1697 The war for the recovery of Ireland Chap. Ill scenes of the Thirty Years' War. But these cruelties were a sign of weakness rather than of strength. Fully compre- hending that in the end he could not overcome the powerful coalition that confronted him, Louis XIV wished as quickly as possible by his excesses to strike terror into the hearts of his enemies, and thus force upon them an early peace. The area of the conflict was, however, rapidly widening; and, while the Brandenburg troops drove the French out of the electorate of Koln, occupied Kaiserswerth and besieged Boim, the Prince of Waldeck, as generalissimo of the United Prov- inces, under the orders of William III, led the Dutch forces augmented by Spanish and English auxiliaries under Marl- borough into Brabant, and the Duke of Lorraine with sixty thousand men invested Mainz. Driven back from the Rhine, the French, under the command of Luxemburg, — the ablest disciple of Conde in the art of war, — soon made the Span- ish Netherlands the principal seat of hostilities, which by concentration changed the character of the conflict in both a military and a political sense; for the German princes, xmited for the defence of their country, presently showed signs of weakening when the struggle was diverted from the Rhine and centred upon Brabant and Flanders.^ In the meantime, William III was preoccupied with the war in Ireland. The island had suffered much from the stern domination of England, and had never forgotten that it was subject to a conqueror. Cherishing fondly the tradition of its independence, it had never ceased to struggle under the yoke imposed upon it. Devotedly Roman Cathohc in re- ligion, the majority of the population had long suffered a cruel deprivation of religious freedom, which had been partly restored during the latter part of the rule of James II. The welcome accorded to him was, therefore, fervent and the de- votion of the people manifest, but from the first there was a contradiction of purposes fatal to the perfect concord of the fugitive king and the Irish patriots. James II's idea in coming to Ireland with the aid of the ' The military movements are well outlined by Lonchay, La rwdM de la France et de I'Espagne, pp. 311, 322. 1684-1697 THE FORMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 229 King of France was to use the island as a stepping-stone for Chap, hi remounting the throne of England. The aim of the Irish, on the contrary, — with the exception of the Protestants, who ■ were greatly in the minority, — was to secure the entire in- dependence of the kingdom, and to make Roman Catholicism the official religion to the exclusion of every other. The harsh and arbitrary measures resulting from the at- tempt of James II to rule the coimtry, with whose sentiments his own policies were in conflict, together with the poverty from which it suffered, rendered his short reign an unhappy one for all. The heroic defence of Londonderry by its Prot- estant population, the sending of Schomberg to Ireland with an inadequate army, and the efforts of William III to rouse the English Parliament to the serious character of the situa- tion produced no change. It was not until William III, dis- com'aged with the quarrels of Whigs and Tories, dissolved the Parhament which had placed him upon the throne and called a new one, that he was able to embark for Ireland. On Jime 14, 1690, William III landed with his army at Carrickfergus. At the battle of the Boyne, fought on July 1, in which William III was wounded and Schomberg was killed, the forces of James II were so completely routed and demoralized that he fled at once to Dublin, and soon after- ward to France. The war in Ireland had still to be continued, but the battle of the Boyne was the turning point. In assert- ing that this brief conflict decided the future of Europe as well as of Ireland, as a historian has done,^ there may seem at first to be some exaggeration, for it is by the combination of events, and not by any single action, that the course of history is determined; but the reconquest of Ireland, which followed as a result of this battle, established beyond ques- tion the position of William III in England, which in turn was decisive for the success of the Revolution of 1688 and for the fate of Europe in the struggle on the continent. Returning to England in the following September, Wil- The retum of Ham III, though received as a hero, was encompassed with serious parliamentary problems. The English navy had ' Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV, VI, p. 205. William III to Holland 230 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. Ill suffered a damaging defeat by the French, on June 30, in ,« > ) "", ■ James Edward issued a proclamation charging Queen Anne with being a "usurper," promising amnesty to those who offered no resistance, and attempting to disarm the fears of the Presbyterians and Episcopalians regarding religion with equivocal promises of toleration; but the expedition ended in failure. The sole result of this misguided enterprise was to arouse and confirm the patriotism of England. With greater unity of purpose and more intense enthusiasm than before, the English people resolved to support the war with France. The disunion Notwithstanding the new stimulation of warlike feeling of the aiues j^^ England, the tide of influences tending toward peace had considerably increased. The exhaustion of France, empha- sized by the victories of Marlborough in the Netherlands in 1708-1709, pressed Louis XIV toward negotiation; but, urgent as peace had become for the Grand Monarch, he was not blind to the divisions of his foes. . It had become clear to all that in the relations of the allies particular interests were prevailing over the common cause. In 1708 Louis XIV had obtained possession of a copy of a secret treaty which James Stanhope had forced upon the Archduke Charles, in which it was agreed that during the continuance of the war and after the conclusion of peace English merchants were to enjoy the exclusive privilege of sending ten ships yearly to trade with the Spanish colonies in America. The King of France lost no time in sending this document to the States General, who were thus made acquainted with the march their ally was stealing upon them. While this clandestine act tended to alienate the States General from England and prepared the way for secret negotiations on their part with France, the Emperor was widening the gulf between himself and the princes of the Empire, who bitterly complained of his course. At Vienna Catholic influence was powerful, and in court circles the question began to be asked if it would not be better for THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 305 Joseph I to make peace with the Most Christian King and Chap, iv cease his alliance with heretics against him. The Emperor himself had gradually come more and more under Roman A. D. 1697-1715 Catholic influence, but he was inflexible in his resolution to continue the war. The religious attitude of Joseph I did not, however, win for him the favor of the Pope, who was using all his power to aid France and defeat the allies. Joseph I was forbidden to demand taxes in Parma and Piacenza for the prosecution of the war, and Clement XI threatened with excommunication all who paid them. Charles III, as the Archduke now styled himself, as King of Spain demanded recognition in Naples, but the Pope refused it. When the Emperor replied by making reprisals in the papal terri- tories, Clement XI, having failed to curb him with ecclesias- tical anathemas, resorted to arms in defence of his rights; but, receiving no support from Louis XIV, the Pope was soon obhged to make a formal peace with his antagonist. The drift of Joseph I toward Rome in religion, while it did not prevent opposition to the Pope in temporal affairs, occasioned serious personal defections among the Prot- estant princes of Germany, who feared a revival of the Hapsburg pretensions to sovereign authority in the Empire based upon the idea of religious imity. In addition to the defections from the Emperor's cause in Germany, the maritime powers regarded with distrust the growing power of Joseph I in Italy, while he gave so little support to the military operations in Spain. The Duke of Savoy was dissatisfied with the limited lot which the Emperor assigned him in the Italian peninsula, and was at the same time jealous of the progress England was making in the Mediterranean, where Gibraltar and Port Mahon were retained as military and naval bases for the sole bene- fit of the British Empire. Finally, Portugal, deriving Uttle profit from the war, was seeking a private understanding with France. No man of his time combined in equal degree the military The diplomatic genius and the conciliatory temper of the Duke of Marl- ^^°^'|'^J^^i^ borough. Almost equally great in war and diplomacy, the VOL. m. — 20 306 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap, iv hero of Blenheim clearly comprehended the dissolution of ^- °- the Grand Alliance that was impending, and foresaw the 1697—1715 consequences that would follow to the advantage of Louis XIV.i The desertion of the common cause by the United Prov- inces would have been a deathblow to the coalition, and of this there was real danger; for Heinsius had been for some time in secret communication with Versailles through Pet- kum, the resident minister of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp at The Hague.^ To prevent this desertion, in March, 1709, Marlborough Was appointed a commissioner to negotiate with Holland a treaty by which England would secure Dutch support in the matter of the Protestant succession in exchange for the aid of England in obtaining for the Republic the coveted "barrier" against France. The need for a new agreement between England and Holland had become imperative; for Louis XIV had almost incessantly endeavored to make approaches to Heinsius for the purpose of a private understanding. Nothing but the firmness of the Grand Pensionary had stood in the way of his success. The inclinations of the commercial classes, who had suffered much from the war, were as usual pacific; but, as one of the French emissaries remarked, "C'etait un opera d'approcher ce ministre!" On March 5, 1709, Rouille, President of the Parliament of Paris, was sent by Louis XIV to Holland to offer the abandonment of the whole Spanish monarchy by Philip V, with the exception of Naples and Sicily, and the cession of Ypres and Menin to the Dutch as a barrier, if the States General would make peace. The Dutch agents who met him were, however, not disposed to accept this bait. Later ' Since 1703 Marlborough had been secretly endeavoring to negotiate a peace advantageous to England through correspondence with Ber- wick, a natural son of James II, who had married Marlborough's sister, Arabella Churchill, and entered into the military service of France. For the correspondence, which extended over five years but came to nothing, see LegreUe, La diplomatiefrangaise, etc., V, pp. 664, 680. 2 The correspondence of Petkum is printed in Appendix V of the Fourteenth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission, pp. 317, 366. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 307 even larger concessions were offered. It seemed as if the Chap, iv Grand Monarch were at last upon his knees begging for ^- ^' peace with the Dutch Republic' On May 18, Marlborough arrived at The Hague, where the French minister of foreign affairs had already been sent by Louis XIV to reinforce the persuasion of RouilM. We have from the hand of Torcy himself striking portraits of his two antagonists: Marlborough, elegant in manner, fascinating in speech, apologetic for the attitude of his country, in- sinuating and captivating, appealing to noble and lofty sentiments, and carefully concealing the advantages he hoped to win; on the other hand, Heinsius, direct and straightforward, simple in speech, and sturdy in support- ing the right of the Republic to adequate means of defence. Believing that every man has his price, Louis XIV en- deavored to use bribes, offering two million livres each for the concession of Naples, the retention of Strasburg, and the maintenance of the fortifications at Dunkirk. But Marl- borough, whose character was in his time bitterly attacked, and who was certainly not faultless, as well as Heinsius, re- fused to be bought. On the other hand, the zeal of Torcy had revealed the weakness of France and the discourage- ment of the hmnbled king, who with his own hand had written his approval on his minister's instructions.^ Marlborough won a victory for England in holding the Holland dio- United Provinces to the alliance, but he had in reality over- j^*^g*Qf* shot the mark. It was Heinsius who now, in the name of peace the Repubhc, drew up a series of preliminaries to a peace, forty in number, which treated Louis XIV as an utterly pros- trate foe. For England this docmnent demanded the rec- ognition of the Protestant succession, the destruction of Dunkirk, the cession of Newfoundland, the expulsion of the Pretender from France, and a favorable treaty of commerce. For itself the Republic demanded of France the cession out- right of seven towns, including Lille. All the places which ' For the details of the negotiations, see Legrelle, La diplomatie fran- (aise, etc., V, pp. 446, 465. * The details are fully given by Torcy, in his Memoires, I. 308 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY A. D. 1697-1715 Chap. IV had been taken from the Spanish Netherlands were to be surrendered, and either to be occupied as barriers or delivered to Charles III as King of Spain. A part of Spanish Gelder- land was to be annexed by the Republic, and the reduc- tions of the French tariff of 1664 on Dutch goods were to be restored. French trade with the West Indies was to be pro- hibited, and such additional concessions were to be granted to the other allies as might be determined by a congress to be called for the conclusion of a general peace. The King of France was to obtain the entire abandonment of the Spanish monarchy by Philip V to Charles III within two months from June 1, 1709. The thirty-seventh article even required Louis XIV, in case of resistance, to furnish the allies with French troops for the purpose of enforcing these conditions upon Spain. As might have been foreseen, these drastic demands, handed to the French plenipotentiaries on May 22, 1709, awakened deep resentment in France. On June 2 RouilI6 was ordered to leave The Hague, whence Torcy had already departed, and all of Louis XIV's offers wete recalled. Marlborough 's success in reviving the interest of Holland in the Grand Alliance had been procured by the promise of aid in obtaining the barrier cities for the protection of the Republic, but it was not without reluctance on the part of England that this concession had been made; for the Dutch, once masters of the frontiers of the Spanish Nether- lands, might easily close them to British trade. English policy was, therefore, to restrict their number as far as possible; while Dutch policy, on the other hand, was to obtain the greatest available increase of protection for the Republic. Charles Townshend, whom Marlborough left at The Hague to complete the Barrier Treaty, had, therefore, a difficult task before him; for, in addition to the disclosure regarding the secret commercial treaty of England with the Archduke Charles, already referred to, it was discovered that, in August, 1709, another secret treaty had been forced upon the Arch- duke, by which the island of Minorca had been formally The Anglo- Dutch Barrier Treaty A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 309 ceded to Great Britain. Heinsius denounced this second Chap, iv treaty as a grave violation of the terms of the Grand Alliance, and accused England of bad faith. While Marlborough was declaring that he would never sign a treaty which accorded all that the Dutch demanded in their claims for a barrier, Heinsius was so deeply offended by the secret negotiations with Spain that Townshend was compelled to make new concessions in order to appease him; with the result that the Barrier Treaty of October 29, 1709, between Great Britain and the United Provinces granted to the Dutch the right to occupy and fortify some twenty bor- der towns in the Spanish Netherlands, and to close the Scheldt, — to the great injury of British commerce, as well as to that of Flanders, — together with the promise of Eng- lish support of the Dutch claims in Spanish Gelderland, and other important advantages. In return England obtained no benefit, except the promise of the Republic to require as a condition of peace that Louis XIV should recognize the rightful title of Queen Anne and the Protestant succes- sion, which was really no concession but an almost nec- essary part of Dutch policy.^ Townshend had, in fact, under the pressure of circum- stances, exceeded his instructions; and at first the council of British ministers refused to ratify the treaty. But Hein- sius, who believed he had obtained by it the predominant influence of Holland in the future settlement with France, was firm in his insistence; and, in the face of violent denun- ciation in England, the treaty was ratified. The success of Holland in forcing upon England dispro- Effects of portionate concessions, Uke that of England in securing *^^^l on^thr by secret treaties exclusive advantages from Spain, illus- aiuance trates the impolitic character of such short-sighted pro- cedure; for no treaty of this kind is likely to be of substantial and lasting benefit unless it creates mutual satisfaction. The evil consequences of all these separate agreements were soon apparent. Instead of drawing England and Holland closer together, the Barrier Treaty, being unequal, drove ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 243 et seq. 310 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV them farther apart; for the British ministry at once began j„Q^_"'_^, to think of establishing a better balance by demanding ■ concessions in other matters to compensate the private bene- fits afforded to their ally. On the other hand, the apparently closer intimacy of the two maritime powers, each of which seemed to be acquiring special advantages with the conni- vance of the other, awakened the jealousy of the other mem- bers of the Grand Alliance, who seemed to be left out of the bargain. Prussia resented the action of England in favoring the Dutch acquisition of Spanish Gelderland, which Fred- erick I coveted; the other German princes saw no prospect of corresponding benefits; and Portugal was alarmed by the progress of the two rival sea powers, especially England's strong foothold in the Mediterranean. When, in addition to the Anglo-Dutch arrangements between themselves, the demands made of Louis XIV by the two powers in the forty articles were made known, all the allies, perceiving to what extent their private expectations had been disap- pointed, relaxed their interest in the contest. At the end of 1709 the bond between the maritime powers was, there- fore, far less strong than it seemed, and the Grand Alliance as a whole had suffered a serious relapse. The secret re- At the beginning of 1710 the only obstacle to an early porta of Pet- pg^ce was the mistaken idea that it could be concluded kum and Flo- i-i,. i-. -ii risaon upon the terms dictated m the forty prelunmary articles al- ready mentioned. Although Louis XIV had rejected these demands and recalled his plenipotentiaries from The Hague, he abandoned the negotiations with reluctance. The defeat of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltawa had ended all hope of aid from the North, and he was prepared to make all reasonable sacrifices. Pleinsius was fully aware of the Grand Monarch's extreme exhaustion, and the situation of France was further affected by the evident disposition of Philip V to make a separate peace with the aUies.' Notwithstanding the poverty of his treasury, the harsh terms imposed upon him, and the danger of isolation by the desertion of Spain, Louis XIV bravely resisted the effort ' See Legrelle, La diplomatie fran<;aise, etc., V, p. 479. A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 311 to administer to him the humiliation proposed by the thirty- Chap, iv seventh article of the Anglo-Dutch demands. He negotiated with the Jewish money lenders, sent the ornaments of the - palace to the mint, and prepared to pawn the jewels of the crown to meet the expenses of further resistance.^ In the meantime diplomacy, which after the rupture at The Hague could no longer operate openly, continued to seek for better conditions of peace through secret and subterranean channels. Use was again made of the obscure but indefati- gable Petkum, who oscillated more or less in the shadow between Heinsius and Torcy. The French minister was prepared for almost any concession, if Heinsius would only retract the demand that the King of France should turn his arms against his grandson to expel him from the throne of Spain, in opposition to the wishes of the Spanish people, and enforce the succession of the Archduke Charles. This was a humiliation to which the King, no matter what the consequences, could never give his consent. Notwithstanding the stolid insistence of Heinsius and the States General that the preliminaries dictated at The Hague be accepted as the basis of peace, on January 3, 1710, Torcy sent from Versailles, with the approval of the King and his Council, a counter-project composed of five articles. In the meantime, further soundings of the disposition of the Republic toward peace were taken by the interme- diation of a merchant of Ypres named Florisson, whose Dutch origin commended him for such a secret mission. Florisson was received by Heinsius with coolness; but through this medium it was learned at Versailles that five of the provinces had not approved of the demands so deeply humiliating to Louis XIV, and that article thirty-seven might be open to revision. On January 27, however, Petkum reported that nothing could be changed in the preliminaries of May 22, except perhaps the demand that Louis XIV should promise, if necessary, to use force against his grand- ' Discontent in France was at this time so great that bread riots were frequent, and the statues of the King were plastered with insulting placards; while his life was threatened in anonymous letters. 312 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV A. D. 1697-1715 The confer- ences at Ger- truydenberg son; adding that in this sense the negotiations might be resumed. The situation of France was now desperate. The kingdom, in spite of all the sacrifices made and new taxes imposed, possessed neither money nor credit. The army was in a condition of distress, and Villars was regarded as the only general capable of commanding it. Unless an unexpected victory could be won in the field, France was at the mercy of her enemies. In these circumstances the Abb6 de Polignac, a suave and persuasive ecclesiastic, and Marshal d'Huxelles, a taciturn but imposing soldier, were chosen as plenipoten- tiaries to open negotiations for peace. On February 15, it was learned at Versailles that all the articles except the thirty-seventh must be accepted as final before further negotiations could begin. It was, therefore, "to treat of article thirty-seven" that the pleni- potentiaries started on their journey to meet the Dutch agents, Buys and Van der Dussen, on March 9, 1710, in the little village of Gertruydenberg near Dordrecht. The discussion between the four plenipotentiaries began with the assumption on the part of the Dutch representa- tives that, since Louis XIV possessed absolutely no right to the Spanish succession, he was responsible for all the cost and inconvenience that had resulted from his deter- mination to exclude the rightful heir, Charles III ; to which the French envoys replied that, since the United Provinces had signed two partition treaties which recognized the rights of the House of Bourbon, it was too late to consider the asser- tion that Louis XIV possessed no right whatever in the mat- ter of the Spanish succession. At this point, Buys asserted that it was useless to discuss article thirty-seven; since it was substantially implied in article four of the prehminaries, to which the King of France had already assented. To this the French envoys answered, that, since they had met to discuss and modify article thirty-seven, it was impossible to admit that it had already been substantially accepted; or even any part of the preliminaries, which were to serve as A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 313 a basis of peace only upon condition that an agreement Chap, iv should be reached regarding the form of the article in dispute. It is unnecessary to follow in detail the long and tedious negotiations in which a determination to impose upon France the humiliation of expelling the grandson of Louis XIV — The rejection who had already been recognized by the United Provinces °g*^^ ^^™°'' as the legitimate king of Spain — was met by the moral impossibility of accepting such a task. The French pleni- potentiaries offered to renounce all compensation on the part of France, and finally Torcy went to the extreme length of proposing the grant of liberal subsidies to the allies to enable them, in case of resistance, to compel the abdication of Philip V. The King and the Dauphin assented to it; and on June 5, the King of France wrote personally to his envoys, instructing them as a last resort, in order to re- store peace to Europe, to present this offer to the Dutch deputies. On June 23, the deputies still showing no signs of re- lenting, Louis XIV sent to his envoys their final instructions. The monthly subsidy offered to aid the allies in dethroning Philip V was raised from five hundred thousand to a million livres; Valenciennes would be ceded to Holland, if the Dutch would renounce further demands in behalf of their allies; Alsace, with the exception of Belfort, should be given to the Duke of Lorraine, on condition that the fortifications were to be destroyed; every claim of compensation to Philip V was abandoned; only the restoration of their estates to the Electors of Koln and Bavaria was required. These conditions were stubbornly declined. The deputies insisted imperatively on the execution of article thirty-seven within two months, and on July 25 Polignac and Huxelles returned to France. The Dutch burghers seemed for the moment to be having secret negotia- their revenge for the humihation of 1672, and peace appeared e°°^^^°i'^^7 to be farther off than ever. By the end of 1710 the vie- France tories of Vendome in Spain and the political changes in England had, however, completely altered the situation. The battle of Villaviciosa, fought on December 10, 1710, 314 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV proved that it was not in the power of the allies to expel legT-i?!"; P^ilip V from Spain; while the weakening of Marlborough's ■ influence at court, the dismissal of his relatives Godolphin and Sunderland from the government, and the ascendency of the Tories over the Whigs in the English elections revealed a situation advantageous to the interests of France. After being for twenty-two years in the minority, the Tories, who had opposed the war, were again supreme in England; and the Duchess of Marlborough no longer enjoyed the intimacy and confidence of the Queen. The time had come when England could be approached by Louis XIV in the hope of tempering the harsh terms that Marlborough and Heinsius had imposed upon him. Although the new ministry under Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, was eager to end the war and have an understand- ing with France, the situation in England did not permit of the summary dismissal of a popular hero hke Marlborough or of a sudden defection from the Grand Alliance. By means of an obscure person, the Abbe Gaultier, who had been as a priest attached to the French embassy during the mission of Tallard in London, communications were opened be- tween the Earl of Jersey and other members of the Cathohc party in England and Torcy, by which the French minister was assured of Harley 's disposition to make peace with France.' The role of mediation in the pacification of Europe thus passed from The Hague to London; and, on January 21, 1711, Gaultier was able to present to Torcy at Versailles the suggestion of a plan for peace with England which, he represented, would undermine and destroy the Grand Alliance.^ The death of On April 17, 1711, occurrcd an event which altered Joseph I and ^^^ entire situation regarding the Spanish succession. The Its conflequences o o x- death of the Emperor, Joseph I, gave the throne of the '■ Gaultier's first secret despatch to Torcy is dated December 18, 1710. ^ The outline of the plan originated in England, but was made to appear to come from France. See Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht, pp- 32, 34; and Couroy, La coalition de 1701, I, pp. 269, 273. A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 315 Hapsburgs to the Archduke Charles. From that moment Chap, iv insistence upon the Austrian right to the crown of Spain would be equivalent to a demand for the reconstitution of the Hapsburg predominance in Europe. This was almost as objectionable as the complete union of France and Spain. In the name of European equilibrium, therefore, a change of pohcy was now justifiable. While the death of Joseph I thus withdrew from the Archduke Charles the support which the maritime powers had given him in his aspiration for the throne of Spain, it gave occasion to Louis XIV to oppose his accession to the Empire. To prevent the perpetuation of the Hapsburg dynasty in the imperial office, the Grand Monarch declared himself in favor of Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, as the successor of Joseph I. To promote this candidacy, and in the hope of making himself a mediator in securing the pacification of the North and the rehabilitation of Sweden, Louis XIV entered into negotiations with Peter the Great, at the same time send- ing an envoy to Warsaw to offer his support in the imperial election to the King of Poland. In July, 1710, at the instigation of Louis XIV, the Sul- tan had declared war on Russia; and the knowledge of this fact had so offended the Czar that he had ignored the direct and indirect approaches of France.' But at this time Peter the Great was anxious to secure French mediation Avith Turkey; and, in June, 1711, Gregor Volkoff was sent to Paris to request this service. Louis XIV was ready to offer it, but upon terms which the Czar could not accept: (1) Russian aid to the Hungarians; (2) the Czar's opposition to the election of the Archduke Charles and his support of the Kmg of Poland; and (3) intervention to obtain the recall of the Danish and Saxon troops serving as mercena- ries to the allies. In addition to these demands, Louis XIV was eager to restore Charles XII, then a fugitive at Bender, to his kingdom, and to make peace between him and Peter ' See the account of the missions of Baluze and VetS in Vassileff, Rusdsch-franzosische Politik, pp. 49, 52. A. D. 1697-1715 316 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. IV the Great. But all these enterprises failed. On July 21, 1711, the Czar signed a peace with Turkey without the aid of French mediation, and Volkoff was recalled. Frederick Augustus did not bestir himself for the mediation with the Grand Alliance which Louis XIV expected of him; and, on October 12, 1711, the Archduke was elected Emperor to succeed his brother, with the title of Charles VI. ^ Progresa of the In the meantime the secret negotiations between Louis Motiata'ons'' ^^^ ^^^ England were making astonishing progress. Through the correspondence between Gaultier and Torcy it was known at Versailles that England was ready to make peace, if Louis XIV would erect a barrier satisfactory to Hol- land and the Empire; invest the Duke of Savoy with the places the allies had promised him; recognize Queen Anne as the legitimate sovereign of Great Britain, and accept the Protestant succession; demolish the port and fortifica- tions of Dunkirk; concede to England the permanent pos- session of Gibraltar, Port Mahon, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay, with most favored nation treatment by Spain; and renounce the "Asiento, "^ or French monopoly of the slave-trade. Owing to the illness of Harley, at the end of July, 1711, the negotiations fell into the hands of Henry St. John, — afterward created Viscount Bolingbroke, — then secretary of state for the Northern Department, a man of quick intelligence, astute character, and undeveloped conscience, who was destined to play the leading part in the conclusion of peace.' Matthew Prior, who had been secretly sent to Paris to 1 See Recueil des instructions, VIII, Russia, p. 128; and Pologne, I, p. LXIV. 2 The word "Asiento" is the Spanish for "treaty," but applies spe- cifically to the slave-trade, of which France had been given a monopoly. ^ There was in England no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the proper sense until March 27, 1782. Foreign pohcy was practically in the hands of the Prime Minister, the details being carried out since 1539 by two Secretaries of State, at the head of the Northern and the Southern Departments, as they were called, and usually jealous of each other. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 317 explain the English demands to Torcy, after an animated Chap, iv discussion of the terms of peace, in the beginning of August, ^- ''• 1711, returned to London with the assurance of an entente. ^^^^~^^^^ ... From this time on the negotiations assiuned a more open and official character, and Nicolas Menager, deputy of Rouen in the Council of Conmaerce, on account of his ex- pert knowledge of commercial affairs, having assisted at Gertruydenberg, was sent with Gaultier to London to arrange preliminaries. In England the question was now gravely asked. For The prepon- what had the war been carried on with so much sacrifice? ^''^^^'^ °' *'^« peace party in The nation had spent a hundred million pounds sterling England in battling with France. St. John answered: "To win the Spanish inheritance for the Hapsburgers; to conquer a pro- tecting barrier against France for the States General; and to secure English commerce." Stated in this manner, the folly of longer continuing the war was self-evident; for it was known that there was no ad- vantage to England in placing the Archduke Charles on the throne of Spain, if he were to be likewise Emperor, that a satisfactory barrier could be secured for the Dutch, and that English commerce and colonies were not at the time greatly endangered by France. St. John's statement was meant as an argument for peace and as a reproach to the Whigs, who, he claimed, had carried on the war in their own commercial and financial interest. But so summary an answer did not quite truly state the case. England had been menaced by the prospect of a close union between France and Spain, by consequent exclusion from the conunerce of the world, and by the disturbance of that balance between the powers of Europe upon which the safety, and even the independence, of England depended. Opposition to Louis XIV's dynastic ambitions had, there- fore, been a necessary policy for the welfare of the EngUsh people. But the time had now come when war seemed no longer advantageous, and peace was earnestly desired. It was felt in England that the preliminary articles in which Heinsius 318 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV had dictated the terms of peace were too severe. In seek- ^■^- ing to modify them, therefore, the Tory govermnent was ■ undoubtedly acting in what it beheved to be the best interest of the country. As for the allies, circumstances had changed; and all of them were either accused or suspected of making private arrangements with France to their own advantage.^ The mstruo- The coucessious which Louis XIV was at this time ready tions of ^Q make were already well known by the English ministry. They were of&cially and formally stated in the instructions to Manager of August 3, 1711. First of all, the recognition of Philip V as King of Spain would be required. The Treaty of Ryswick would form the basis of an understanding with the Empire; Breisach and Kehl would be surrendered by France, and the Rhine would become the frontier; the electors of Bavaria and Koln would be re-established in their possessions; France would retain Lille, Tournai, Aire, B^thune, Douai, Ypres, and Cond^; the Emperor Charles VI would have Sar- dinia, Sicily, and Naples; the Duke of Savoy would be assigned Milan. The question regarding the demolition of Dunkirk was to be postponed as long as possible, but Eng- land would receive Gibraltar, with entire freedom of com- merce in all Spanish ports and the privilege of the " Asiento"; Newfoimdland, if necessary, would be ceded, with the reservation of a French right to catch and dry fish upon its shores, but not Nova Scotia. At the end of August, Menager and Gaultier were in the full tide of bargaining with the English negotiators at London, consisting of Harley, — who had then become Lord Oxford, — Shrewsbury, St. John, Dartmouth, and Jersey, with Matthew Prior as secretary. To block the proceedings, the Whigs, who, although no longer in power, wished to urge the further prosecution of the war, started the tale that the negotiations were at bottom intended to secure the royal succession to the Pre- tender; and that even Queen Anne, who had long counte- nanced the idea that James Edward 's birth was illegitimate, ' See a summary of these accusations in Sichel, Bolinghroke and Hii Times, I, pp. 330, 335. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 319 had developed an affection for him and secretly hoped for Chap, iv his final recognition. The participation of Jersey, an ar- t,"°' dent Jacobite, in the negotiations for peace, gave color to this construction; and certain misguided adherents of the Pretender undoubtedly expected that peace with France would be followed by the desired restoration.^ Upon one point the mind of Louis XIV was now fixed. The conciu- — Philip V must remain King of Spain. At Gertruyden- p°°ii^narie3 berg he had been ready to abandon his grandson, even to furnish financial aid in forcing his abdication; but the strong desire of England for peace had revived his hopes, and he was no longer willing to make sacrifices without compen- sating concessions. So far as the English commissioners were concerned, it was St. John who was the soul of the negotiations. His one constant thought was to obtain commercial advantage and colonial expansion for England; for it was only by ma- terial gains in this direction that he could hope to justify the Tory leadership in concluding a peace with France. As for the allies, their interests would be considered in the congress that would be called when the Anglo-French preliminaries were concluded; and beyond mere prelim- inaries neither St. John nor Menager intended at that time to go. When St. John for strategic effect declared that the Queen was unwilhng to make peace with a power that harbored the Pretender, the French agent replied, that they were not negotiating a peace, but merely the condi- tions of a peace to be determined by a future congress in which such questions could be properly regulated; and this reply was accepted.^ On October 8, after the preliminaries had been elab- orated, altered, rejected, and finally under the pressure of St. John accepted, three documents were signed: the first containing the special advantages to be secured by Eng- land; the second a general article regarding the treatment ' See Sichel, Bolingbroke and His Times, I, pp. 335, 356. ' With the death of Lord Jersey on September 6, the influence oper- ating in the interest of James Edward seems to have disappeared. A. u. 1697-1715 320 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV to be accorded to the allies; and the third relating to the Duke of Savoy. ^ The first document, kept strictly secret, bound the King of France to make the concessions which England had de- manded as conditions of peace; and, to deceive the Whigs, specifically declared that the initiative in the negotiations had been taken by the King of France. Manager, after passing by "deserted staircases under the guidance of dis- creet servitors," was received in private audience by the Queen and assured by her of her personal interest in con- cluding peace; and on the fourteenth returned to France with the preliminaries duly signed, leaving Gaultier in London. The second and third documents alone were intended to be shown to the allies. Lord Strafford was sent to Hol- land to explain the situation; but the States General mani- fested their discontent with the indefinite character of the satisfaction proposed for the Republic and for the other members of the Grand Alliance. The necessity The problem uow was to induce the States General, the aiiilT"^'"^ ""^ I^u^^e °^ Savoy, the King of Prussia, and the Elector of Hanover to participate in a congress for concluding peace. Torcy was rather pleased than otherwise with the dissatis- faction of the States General; for he now hoped to be able to conclude a separate peace with England, and on Novem- ber 2 made a proposal to this effect. But the English ministry were not prepared to face the country with the total abandonment of their allies. The Imperial ambassa- dor, Count Gallas, had already indignantly withdrawn from the court; the friendship of the Dutch, of the German princes, and of the Duke of Savoy was too valuable to be thrown away; and even the further offer on the part of Louis XIV to demolish the port and fortifications of Dunkirk without compensation was not sufficient to induce a total desertion of the allies. Without their assent it was in- expedient to recognize Philip V as King of Spain, and at this ' For the details of the negotiation, see Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht, pp. 45, 58. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 321 price accept the concessions offered to England. Peace chap. iv for England was to be desired, but consideration for the •*-d- allies was also necessary. The question was how far that ^^^^"^^15 consideration should go and what form it should take. St. John's hatred of Austria, his fear of the commercial rivahy of Holland, and his indifference to the fortunes of the German princes rendered it certain that this con- sideration would go no farther than necessity required. As early as April, 1711, St. John had instructed the English ambassador at The Hague to inform Heinsius that the English ministers were engaged in trying to arrange pre- liminaries of peace with France; but the interests of the Republic, it was assured, would be carefully considered, and the Grand Pensionary was given to understand that Holland must trust to the Queen's loyalty and follow in England's wake. The adherence of Holland to England's programme was, in fact, necessary to its success. The constant endeavor to secure it, while stoutly asserting that no private and special advantages were being sought, sufficiently proves how essential the English ministry regarded it. But the , desire to go forward with the assent, if not with the inward ' approval, of Holland was not inspired by the sense of com- plete solidarity between the two coimtries that had pre- vailed in the last years of William III. In truth, they had become rivals rather than partners. Dutch policy was en- tirely actuated by the exigencies of commerce; and, as has been said, "varied according to the most profitable direction ia which to ship barrels of herring and sacks of coffee." If the English deceived the Dutch with regard to the advan- tages they were secretly obtaining from France, the Dutch statesmen were equally anxious to resume secret negotia- ^ tions for their own benefit with Louis XIV. In fact, the coalition was dissolving, as all coalitions in the end dissolve, because it was believed to be no longer advantageous to continue it. The chief interest of Holland lay in the execution of the Barrier Treaty of 1709 with England, but St. John VOL. m. — 21 322 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV contended that circumstances had changed since it was ^- "• concluded, and that so extensive a barrier as had then been promised would be prejudicial to the other allies. Still, ran the correspondence, Holland should have her barrier; The relations but to get it she must make peace upon terms agreeable of England ^^ England. The congress would be held in any one of four and Holland ° ?v , i • i -i-i • i Cities, two of them Dutch, which France might prefer;' but it must be held quickly, or the war would have to go on, in which England could not longer bear the principal burden. When, on December 22, 1711, the treaty of friendship and alliance was renewed between England and the United Provinces, its omissions marked the coolness which had developed between them. There was no confirmation of the Barrier Treaty of 1709. The alliance was, indeed, nominally renewed; but it was no longer really cordial. England had taken the Republic in tow, and the period of Holland's subordination had begun. The date for the opening of the peace congress was fixed for January 12, 1712, at Utrecht, and accepted by France, On December 17 the Parliament assembled, and the Queen, in high state, in her address from the throne announced her continued adherence to the Grand Alliance, her inten- tion to obtain "reasonable satisfaction" for the allies or to continue the war, and the arrival of the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht; she then left the House of Lords, in which the Parliament was assembled, returning immediately after- ward incognito to hear the debate, in which Lord Notting- ham declared that "no peace could be secure and honorable which left Spain and the Indies to the Bourbons!" The effect was electric. The preliminaries, although they had not specifically pledged the ministry to the continuance of Philip V as King of Spain, were really based upon that assumption. As a counterpoise, resolutions were passed by the min- istry in the House of Commons denouncing in turn the short- comings of each of the allies, condemning the Barrier Treaty 1 The four cities proposed were Nymwegen, Utrecht, Liege, and Aix-la-Chapelle. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 323 of 1709 as "destructive to the trade and interests of Great Chap, iv Britain," and flaying Townshend and the ministry that had ^- "■ negotiated the treaty as "enemies of the Kingdom." 1697-1715^ The Congress for the conclusion of peace at Utrecht, after ten days spent in fixing the ceremonial, opened on opening of January 29, 1712. England was represented by Dr. John 'fu^recir' Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, who had resided thirty-six years at the Scandinavian courts and had mediated peace between Sweden and Denmark; and Lord Strafford, ambas- sador at The Hague, described by St. John as "un seigneur propre d brusquer une entreprise comme un colonel de dragons." Prior was named as third plenipotentiary, but was retained at Paris. For France appeared Marshal d'Huxelles, the Abbe Polignac, and Menager. Each of the seven States of the United Provinces had one representative, — except Holland, which had two, — of whom Van der Dussen and Buys were the best known and most prominent in the conferences. The Emperor had declared that, until he was assured that the preliminaries arranged in London were not binding, and were not prejudicial to the allies, he could not participate in the Congress. The Portuguese envoy at The Hague announced that he had received no mandate regarding the conclusion of peace. The repre- sentatives of Prussia and Savoy said the same, but added that they would probably soon receive orders to go to Utrecht. The resident ministers of Saxony, Hesse, and the other German princes asserted that they must wait upon the decision of the Emperor. Thus the conferences began at Utrecht with only two members of the Grand Alliance represented; but, it having been agreed in the first session that the London prelimina- ries were binding only upon France, and not upon the allies, early in February Zinzendorf, the Imperial ambassador at The Hague, and his colleague. Von Consbruch, together with the representatives of the German princes, appeared at Utrecht.i ' A full list of the plenipotentiaries is given by Vast, Les grands traites, III, pp. 44, 45. 1697-1715 324 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV The ceremonial had already been agreed upon, and such momentous questions as the kind of carriage, the number of horses, and the staff of servants to be allowed to each pleni- potentiary having been settled, it was decided that all were to enter the conference room at the same time, and seat themselves without distinction. But Zinzendorf, who had come more with the intention of hindering than promoting an understanding, insisted that, as the represent- ative of the Emperor, he must have precedence over all, and that Charles VI should at once be formally recognized as Emperor. To this the French would not listen. The English and the Dutch also felt scandalized by such pre- tensions. In the meantime all further proceedings were blocked, until it was agreed that the allies should be re- ferred to only in general terms until the question of the Emperor's title was determined. The instruo- The positious of the powers in the Congress and the ■uons of aims and motives of their representatives can be best under- Kngland stood by a brief summary of their official instructions. The English ministry desired an immediate conclusion of a general peace that would afford to Great Britain the advantages which France had agreed to accord in the pre- liminaries. Robinson and Strafford were, therefore, directed to win the support of the United Provinces by promising them a satisfactory barrier against France and certain ad- vantages to their commerce. The English plenipotentiaries were to maintain the obligations of the preliminaries so far as the concessions to England by France were concerned against all opposition. As regards the crown of Spain, it must not be united with the crown of France; but, this point settled, there was no obligation either to maintain Philip V on the throne of Spain or to remove him from it. As re- gards the allies generally, it was intended to carry out the promise of the Queen and secure for them a "reason- able satisfaction." Strasburg should be restored to the Empire as a free city; Kehl and Breisach also should be returned; in Alsace the provisions of the Treaty of West- phalia should be observed; Landau should be returned to the A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 325 Empire, the fortifications between Basel and Philipsburg Chap, iv destroyed, and Rheinfels delivered to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; the Elector of Brandenburg must be recog- nized as King of Prussia, and put in possession of Neuchtitel; the Elector of Hanover must be recognized as a ninth elector of the Empire; the Principality of Orange and other estates of WiUiam III within the Umits of France should be re- stored to their rightful owners; Portugal was to be treated as the engagements in the English treaties required; the Duke of Savoy was to recover Nice and all other territories taken from him by France, with certain towns as a barrier. But most of these terms were subject to modification, and certainly did not reveal the full intentions of the ministry, which were not confided to Robinson and Strafford. In the French instructions it was pointed out that there The instrac- existed in England both popular and official reasons for de- F°°n„f siring peace, which would no doubt be concluded by the English government mainly with a view to the interests of England rather than with regard to the benefit of Europe as a whole. As a consequence, preliminaries had been agreed upon which were substantially equivalent to a private assur- ance of peace. This friendly relation was to be recognized and maiatained throughout the conferences, with the ex- pectation and belief that England also would adhere to it, and thus the two powers would practically act together in constraining the others to an acceptance of the terms which they would agree upon. The King of Spain was to be as- sured of his throne and retain the Indies, but a partition of the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Netherlands might be necessary to satisfy the demands of the allies. The Spanish Netherlands might, for the sake of peace, be given to a foreign prince; the Duke of Savoy might be pro- pitiated with Milan; as the Dutch would be separated from France by the disposal to be made of the Spanish Nether- lands, a limited barrier would suffice for them, and this would be accorded. The Elector of Bavaria, Max Emman- uel, must be restored to his electorate and indemnified for his losses. If the Spanish Netherlands were not given 326 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. IV A. D. 1697-1715 The instruc- tions of the Emperor The question of separating France and Spain to him, and he were not restored to his hereditary estates, then he should be given the Kingdom of Naples, to which - the King of Spain would add Sicily. The King of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover would be recognized as right- fully possessing these titles; but, as to the Orange possessions, it was contrary to French interest to deliver them to a for- eign and above all a Protestant prince. As for the demands of Austria, the King of France was not disposed to make concessions; and the restoration of Strasburg and the sur- render of sovereignty in the ten Alsatian cities could not be considered. As regards the order of procedure, the fate of the Spanish monarchy should have the first place; next, the satisfaction of the Electors of Bavaria and Koln; then, questions of commerce; and, finally, the barriers for Holland and the Empire.^ The one enemy to whom Louis XIV had no concession to make, and against whom all his wrath continued to burn, was the Emperor. This was perfectly imderstood by Charles VI. He was aware that the Congress of Utrecht was about to decide the question of the Spanish succession, that England and France had substantially come to a separate agreement, and that the Dutch Republic would be obliged to follow the lead of England. Expecting no benefit from the Congress, the Emperor's pohcy was, if possible, to prevent it; if not, to obstruct and finally dissolve it without permitting it to reach any positive result. The results of the Congress were determined more by events occurring outside of its walls than by any of its deliberations. The Marshal d'Huxelles, in accordance with his instructions, presented proposals which reserved for Phihp V the retention of Spain and the Indies. The concessions to England were faithfully adhered to, but the other allies were treated as if France were the victor and entitled to dictate the terms of peace. Not one of the allies • Details are fully given by Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht, pp. 175, 190, where the disposition of Louia XIV toward the North and the Italian princes is also stated. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 327 outside of England was disposed to accept them, and Chap, iv even in England loud and indignant protests were uttered by the opposition, which advocated continuing the war. The effect of protest was simply to drive the French and the English negotiators closer together by giving them a new soUdarity of interests. They had initiated the peace conferences, and they must not fail; but it was not at Utrecht that they could be made to succeed. St. John was prepared to grant to Philip V the whole kingdom of Spain and the Indies, as the French required; but on February 8, 1712, the Duke of Burgundy, who had become the Dauphin, died, and on March 8 his eldest son, the Duke of Brittany, passed away, leaving only one frail and sickly child of two years as heir to the crown of France. Nothing but the doubtful chance of this child's survival, it now appeared, could prevent the ultimate union of the crowns of France and Spain in the person of Philip V. The question of the Spanish succession had reached its most menacing stage. A renunciation of the French crown by Philip V might solve the problem; but the French jurists declared that, even if procured, the renunciation would not be valid. An individual act could not set aside a constitutional right imposed by a higher power. While the situation thus created was a delicate one for France it was equally difficult for England. Marlborough had been recalled and deprived of office, Halifax was thunder- ing against the conspiracy of the ministry with the French, and the Pretender was believed by the Whigs to be in some way mixed up with the course of events. The unwillingness of Philip V either to surrender the Kingdom of Spain or to renounce the throne of France for the moment completelyparalyzed the proceedings at Utrecht. But it was not an easy task, even if Philip V were wiUing to renounce the throne of France, to make Europe beheve that a renunciation previously declared to be legally in- valid could secure the permanent separation of the two monarchies, and it was certain that their union could never be accepted. 1697-1715 328 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV The real problem now was to settle the question of suc- cession in such a manner as to satisfy the demands of Europe regarding its future security. As matters stood, if Philip V made no decision, he was by the letters patent registered The renun- in the Parliament of Paris, while still King of Spain, sep- Pha^^v arated from the throne of France by only one fragile barrier, the life of a feeble infant. How, in these circumstances, could satisfactory guarantees against a union of the two monarchies be obtained? The pressure of Oxford and Bolingbroke was insistent that such absolute renunciations be furnished as would satisfy the European powers that the two crowns would never be united. To Englishmen, who had already rejected that doctrine, the dogma of "divine right" made no appeal. The French plea of the invalidity of a royal renunciation based upon this principle was, therefore, wholly inaccept- able; and Louis XIV was made to understand that with- out the assurance of a permanent separation of the two crowns, the English ministry was powerless to conclude a peace. It thus became necessary for the Grand Monarch to choose between the abandonment of Spain or France by Philip V, and to press this choice upon his grandson. It was for the aged king a hard struggle. On April 18 he wrote to Philip: "Every day increases the necessity for peace; and, the means of continuing the war being exhausted, I shall find myself obhged to treat upon conditions equally dis- agreeable for me and for Your Majesty." Philip V remained for a time immovable. He was un- willing to renounce his rights in France and determined not to abdicate the Spanish throne. The correspondence of Louis XIV with his grandson during this period is pathetic in its pleadings and its despair.^ Not until every argument had been exhausted, after the most strenuous efforts of • See for the correspondence, Courcy, Renonciation des Bourbons d'Espagne au trdne de France, pp. 121, 141. Also Baudrillart, Philippe Y et la Cour de France, I, pp. 449, 501 . A. D. 1697-171E THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 329 the French ambassador at Madrid, Bonnac/ with the aid Chap, iv of the powerful Princess des Ursins, who ruled the King through her dominating influence over the Queen, did Philip V finally, on May 29, choose between the alternatives of abandoning Spain with the promise of an Italian kingdom composed of Savoy and Sicily, or retaining Spain by re- nouncing France. His preference was to remain King of Spain, but the decision had to be forced upon him. As a last resort, to compel action by Philip V, Bonnac had been furnished with an autograph letter from Louis XIV in which he said to the King of Spain: "After having given to Your Majesty all possible marks of the tenderness which I have for you, it is just that I think of my kingdom, and that I end the war which it is no longer able to continue. You will not be astonished then if I sign the peace without you, on the conditions which my enemies propose to me. "^ But it was not necessary to deliver the letter; and it was returned, as directed, unopened to the writer. The re- nunciation was now but a question of time. The decision of Louis XIV to end the war was already The "Ee- known by the English ministry. St. John, who could not =*''^''™8 Orders hasten peace at the council board at Utrecht, now resolved to enforce it in the field. Without any other authority than his own decision, on May 10, he took the dangerous step —for which the ministry was afterward impeached — of send- ing to the Duke of Ormond, who had taken Marlborough's place as captain-general of the British troops, a secret order forbidding him to engage in battle with the enemy, at the same time communicating this order to the Court of France. Ormond obeyed the order and tried to keep the secret, but it reached the ear of Prince Eugene, who by proposing a battle obtained the open admission that the Duke was under orders not to participate further in the war. Smce May, 1712, England had been in reality, though not officially, at peace with France; and the Grand Alliance was ' The instructions of Bonnac may be found in Revue Diplomatique, XI, p. 102. * See Courcy, Benonciation, etc., p. 113. A. D. 1697-1715 miaaion to France 330 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV thus substantially at an end. The withdrawal of the Eng- lish forces from the conflict left the French preponderant in the field, with the result that after the battle of Denaia of July 24, important fortresses fell into their hands, and the campaign which Marlborough believed would end with the occupation of Paris terminated in the strengthening of France.^ Thus, at Utrecht, Louis XIV was able to treat the members of the Grand Alliance, with the exception of England, as if they, and not he, were the vanquished. Boiingbroke's The defection of England from the Grand Alliance was now virtually complete. St. John — who on July 7 was created Viscount Bolingbroke — was sent to France, for it was at London and Paris, and not at Utrecht, that England was to demand the reward of her services. To relieve the ministry as far as possible of responsibility, the legality of the renimciations was referred to the learned doctors of the University of Oxford; and to them the drafts of these documents were accordingly sent. In the meantime, Bolingbroke endeavored to obtain from Louis XIV the highest price for the advantages accorded to France. Graciously received by the King at Fontainebleau on August 20, he charmed the Grand Monarch with his courteous maimers, his alert intelligence, and his excellent French. The Duke of Savoy was regarded as a traitor to France, but was esteemed by Queen Anne as her most loyal friend. To obtain for him a satisfactory barrier and the cession of Sicily by Philip V was the chief mission of Bolingbroke. Returning to London laden with rare gifts from the King of France, and elated with the success of his mission, Bolingbroke bore a letter in which the King commended him to the Queen as "un ministre le plus capable d'abreger et d'aplanir les difficultes de la negodation." It was too much for the jealousy of Lord Oxford, who ' After the battle of Denain, Louis XIV wrote, on July 27, 1712: "Rien n'est plus capable de favoriser et d'avancer les n^gociations de la paix . . . que de reprendre oette superiority que mes troupes avaient sue pendant si longtemps et qu'elles avaient mallieureusement perdue depuis quelques ann^es." A. D. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 331 for a time placed the negotiations in the hands of Lord Chap, iv Dartmouth; but in his care they prospered so indifferently that they were afterwards again intrusted to Bolingbroke, who may be regarded as the responsible author of the Peace of Utrecht. On November 5, 1712, at Madrid, in the presence of the Execution of Spanish Cortes, the grandson of Louis XIV, with his right ^tonr"™*^' hand on the Gospel, swore that he, for himself and his de- scendants, solemnly renounced the throne of France. The document signed by him had been carefully prepared and approved by the jurists of Oxford as well as by those of the two kingdoms.' On the nineteenth and twenty-fourth of the same month were executed corresponding renuncia- tions of the crown of Spain by the Duke of Berry and the Duke of Orl6ans.^ These renunciations, with the cancel- lation of the letters patent of 1700 by which Philip V re- tained his rights in France, were ratified, and on March 15, 1713, duly registered, in that kingdom. What, then, had become of the "divine right" on which Louis XIV had built his hfe and his reign? It had been nullified and solemnly set aside in the interest of political expediency. The system of absolutism did not fall with it, but its logical foundation was swept away. Another "in- violable law" had been substituted for it, — a contract between princes dictated by the interests of their peoples. And this new principle of public law, thus solemnly recognized, had made possible what the doctrine of legit- imacy, under the conception of droit divin as the basis of human government, had not been able to secure, namely, the peace of Europe. At the end of the ceremonies of March 15, Lord Shrews- bury, the new English ambassador to France, despatched two couriers, one to London and one to Utrecht, to announce that the stone of stumbling had been removed. The bitter, ' See Bonnao's account of the ceremony in Courcy, Renonciation, etc., pp. 211, 224. See also the text of the Act, pp. 230, 239. Also in Vast, Les grands traiUs, III, pp. 50, 54. * See the text in Courcy, as before, pp. 240, 242. A. D. 1697-1715 332 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV costly strife that had for twelve years agitated Europe, ruined France, exhausted Spain, and drained the resources of all the powers engaged, could now be terminated. We need not return to Utrecht, except to record the terms upon which peace was concluded, for it was not made pos- sible by anything that had happened there.' The Queen The provisions of England declared that, if the allies did not promptly ofutrechr" accept the conditions offered them, she would negotiate a separate peace with the King of France. That peace had, in fact, already been assured by the renunciations; and was rendered certain by the signature, on January 30, 1713, of a treaty between Great Britain and Holland recogniziag the Protestant succession and promising the barrier.^ On April 11, 1713, seven treaties were signed at Utrecht between France and Great Britain, the United Provinces, Prussia, Portugal, and the Duke of Savoy.' Only the Emperor and certain princes of the Empire refused to ac- cept the conditions offered by France and resolved to continue the war. The results of the peace, so far as the general interests of Europe are concerned, were as follows : • A complete history of the negotiations is found in Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht. 2 For the text, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 314. ' These seven treaties included a treaty of peace and friendship and a commercial treaty with Great Britain (see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 339 and p. 345; and Vast, III, p. 68 and p. 87, with valuable notes); a treaty of peace and friendship and a treaty of commerce with the United Provinces (see Dumont aa above, p. 336 and p. 377; and Vast, p. 141); a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Prussia (see Dumont, p. 356, and Vast, p. 120); a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Portugal (see Dumont, p. 353, and Vast, p. 112); and a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with the Duke of Savoy (see Dumont, as above, p. 362, and Vast, p. 129). As the interests of Spain were in the hands of Louis XIV, there was no Spanish plenipotentiary at Utrecht, and no treaties were at that time signed by Spain. On March 26, 1713, however, the "Asiento" had been transferred to Great Britain at Madrid. See Calvo, Recueil des TraMs, II, p. 78. All the treaties of Utrecht were, however, afterward confirmed there by Span- ish plenipotentiaries, those with England and Savoy on July 13, 1713; that with Holland on June 26, 1714. A. D. 1097-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 333 Queen Anne and the Protestant succession in Great Chap, iv Britain were recognized by France; contested possessions ia America, — ^ Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland with Nova Scotia,! ai^fj g^ Christopher, — besides Gibraltar and Mi- norca, were ceded to England, together with the exclusive monopoly of the slave trade, or rights of the "Asiento"; freedom of trade with the colonies and a moderate tariff were likewise accorded; and the port and fortifications of Dunkirk were to be destroyed. These colonial and commercial gains, although not suffi- cient in the eyes of the Whigs, who insisted upon further advantages, marked an immense advance in the develop- ment of the British Empire, and popular joy in England expressed itself in public celebrations of the peace. The United Provinces were allowed to retain certain cities of the Spanish Netherlands until the Emperor was ready to make peace; when, it was agreed, they would be delivered to him, with suitable barriers to be occupied by Dutch troops, and a part of Upper Gelderland would be permanently aimexed to the Republic. Portugal was recognized as sovereign on both banks of the Amazon, but obtained no other advantage. Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, already recog- nized as king by the Emperor as Frederick I of Prussia, who had been succeeded by his son Frederick William on Feb- ruary 25, 1713, was now formally recognized as the first king of Prussia, and King Frederick William I was accorded a part of Upper Gelderland and the Principality of Neu- chatel, but renoimced all claim to the Orange possessions in France. The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II, was ceded Sicily, with Savoy and Nice restored to him, and in addi- tion permitted to retain the territories in Italy given him by the Emperor Joseph I, and granted the title of King; thus lajdng the foundation of an important Italian monarchy, destined in the course of time to extend to the entire ' With regard to the French fishing rights, see the valuable histori- cal note in Vast, Les grands iraites, III, pp. 79, 81. 334 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV peninsula. He was besides accorded the right of future ^- '^- succession in Spain, in case the Bourbon dynasty should 1697-1715 1 , • , 1 become extinct/ Thus isolated, Charles VI could not vindicate the claims The end of his plenipotentiaries had made for him at Utrecht. In the thes^^lh following August, Villars took possession of Landau, and euceession in Novcmbcr of Freiburg and Breisgau. On November 26, negotiations between the Emperor and France were opened at Rastadt. On December 4, it was agreed that peace should be concluded between them on the basis of the treaties of Ryswick; and, on March 6, 1714, the Treaty of Rastadt was signed by the Emperor. At Baden in Aargau, on Sep- tember 7, the princes of the Empire adhered to the Treaty of Rastadt. France retained Strasburg and Alsace, with Landau in addition. The Emperor acquired the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Tuscany, Naples, and Sardinia, in full sovereignty.^ Breisach, Kehl, and Freiburg were also re- stored to the Empire. In return the Emperor re-established the Electors of Bavaria and Koln in their electorates. On November 15, 1715, at Antwerp, the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands from Spain to Austria was consum- mated, and the promised barrier for the United Provinces was erected with the guarantee of Great Britain.' Thus were finally liquidated the problems of the Spanish succession. It was also the end of the long struggle between the forces brought into collision by the dynastic ambitions of Louis XIV and the determination of William of Orange to defeat them. The victory was on the side of the Sovereign State System established by the Peace of Westphalia, which France had done so much to create and Louis XIV so much to endanger. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, like the Treaties of Westphalia, mark the close 1 For an account of the Aulo Accordaio, changing the Spanish law of Buccession, see Courcy, Benonciation, etc., pp. 243, 252, and 294. ^ The details of the negotiation of the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, are given by Courcy, La coalition de 1701, II, pp. 101, 353. Also a very fuU account of the treaties between Spain, Savoy, England, Holland and Portugal on pp. 357, 517, with important documents. * For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 458 et aeq. 1697-1715 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 335 of a conflict between abstract rights in which the spirit of Chap, iv imperialism suffered defeat; and even more decisively than in 1648 the principle of diffused and balanced power had been asserted. But the year 1715 also marked the end of an epoch by the disappearance from the scene of many of the personages who had given it character. On June 8 the Electress- dowager Sophia of Hanover passed away, chagrined that at the age of eighty-four she must die without having become Queen of England, leaving her son, George Lewis, heir to the throne. On August 1 Queen Anne followed her, and George I was proclaimed King of England, — a change which ended Bolingbroke 's diplomacy with France and Spain, and drove him and the Tory party from ofHce. On September 1 the Grand Monarch also ended his career. With the exception of Charles VI and Philip V, the contestants in the war of the Spanish succession were now at peace; but new problems had arisen and were pressing for solution. New actors also had come upon the scene, and the centre of interest was transferred to another field. It was the North and the struggle for the Baltic that now engaged the chief attention of statesmen and threatened radical changes in the map of Europe. AUTHORITIES For this chapter, besides Dumont, Vast, and Grimblot, the volumes Documents of the Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs relating to Spain, Aus- tria, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, and Bavaria are specially important. For Anglo-Dutch relations, see Vreede, Correspondance diplomatique et militaire du due de Marlborough, du grand-pensionaire Heinsius, et du Irhorier-gfyfieral des Provinces-Unies, Jacques Hop, Amsterdam, 1850; Coxe, Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough, with his Original Cor- respondence, London, 1820. Additional collections of treaties relating to this period are: De Brosses, Recueil des traites et conventions diplo- matigues amcernant I'Autriche et I'ltalie (1703-1859), Paris, 1859; and Del Castillo, Tratados e conventos de la casa de Borbon, Madrid, 1843. The most important memoirs of the time are those of Marquis de Torcy (1687-1713), Paris, 1850; LouviUe, Memoires secrets sur I'etablisse- ment de la maison de Bourbon en Espagne, Paris, 1818; Masson, Journal inedit de Torcy, Paris, 1884; De la Torre, Memoires et negociations 336 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. IV secrhtes de Ferdinand Bonaveniura, Comte d'Harrach, The Hague, 1720 A. D. (is not entirely trustworthy) ; Gadeke, Das Tagehuch des Graf en Ferdi- 1697-1715 nand Bonaventura von Harrach, etc., in Archiv fiir Osterreichische Geschichte, XLVIII (1872) ; Vogti^, Memoires du mar^chal de ViUars, Paris, 1885; Saint-Simon, Memoires pour servir a Vhistoire des nego- dations depuis le traile de Ryswick jusqu' a la paix d' Utrecht, Paris, 1717; Saint-PhiUppe, Memoires touchant les guerres et negociations pour la suo- cession de la monarchie espagnole, Paris, 1752. The despatches of Harcourt are reprinted in Hippeau, L'avbie- ment des Bourbons au trdne d'Espagne, Paris, 1879; Girardot, Corre- spondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, Paris, 1864, throws hght on the relations of France with Portugal; and Stanhope, Spain under Charles II, London, 1844, contains extracts from the correspondence of the EngUsh ambassador at Madrid in 1690-1699. For the negotiations and results of the Peace of Utrecht and the sup- plementary treaties of Rastadt and Baden, see Actes, m4moires, et autres piices authentiques concernant la paix d' Utrecht, 2d ed., Utrecht, 1714; Parke, Letters and Correspondence . . . of Bolingbroke while Secretary of State, London, 1778; and Freschot, Histoire du congrh et de la paix d' Utrecht comme aussi de celle de Rastadt et de Bade, Utrecht, 1716. Literature Besides the general histories aheady mentioned, see Topin, L'Europe et les Bourbons sous Louis XIV, Paris, 1868; Courcy, La coalition de 1701 contre la France, Paris, 1886; but especially BaudriUart, Philif Y et la cour de France de 1700-1715, Paris, 1889 et seq., based on a careful study of the archives, including those of Spain. The Uterature of the Spanish succession is especially rich. The work of Mignet, aheady cited, ends with 1679. The definitive treatment of the subject so far as research is concerned may be found in Legrelle, La diplomatie frangaise et la succession d'Espagne (1659-1725), Braine-le- Comte, 1895-1899, of which Pag6s says: "II n'y a plus k refaire aprte lui." While the book is a valuable magazine of facts and extremely well written, the point of view and the innuendos conveyed through its trenchant style render it a systematic apology for the procedure of Louis XIV. Earher works of value are Gadeke, Die Politik Osterreichs in der spanischen Erbfolgefrage, Leipzig, 1877, based on a thorough exam- ination of the Austrian archives; Renauld, Succession d'Espagne: Louis XIV et Guillaume III, Paris, 1883, based on the unpublished correspondence of Louis XIV and WilUam III. On the r61e of the Princess Orsini at Madrid, see Combes, La Priwesse des Ursins, Paris, 1858; and Du Bled, Une femme premier ministre: la princesse des Ursins, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XI (1897). The attitude of Brandenburg-Prussia to the Spanish succession is stated by Von Noorden, Europ&ische Geschichte im 18 Jahrhundert, Leipzig, 1870-1882, Abteilung I, "Der spanische Erbfolgekrieg," and Die preussische Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege, in Historische THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 337 Zeitschrift, XVIII (1867), in which he criticizes the views of Droysen Chap. IV expressed in his Geschichte der preussischen Politik, IV. a. d. The formation of the kingdom of Prussia is discussed by A. Wad- 1697-171.5 dington, L'acquisition de la couronne royale de Prusse par les Hohen- zoUem, Paris, 1888; Zwiedeneck-Sudenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Grundung des preussischen Konigtums, Stuttgart, 1887-1894; and Bemer, Die auswarlige Politik des Kurfiirsten Friedrich von Bran- denburg, Konig Friedrich I von Preussen, in HohenzoUem-Jahrbuch, IV (1901). The part played by Bavaria and Savoy in the Spanish succession may be studied in Heigel, Kurprinz Ferdinand-Joseph von Bayern und die sfanische Erbfolge, Mtmich, 1879; Preuss, Osierreich, Frankreich, und Baiem in der spanischen Erbfolgefrage (1685-1689), in Historische Vier- teljahrschrift, IV (1901) ; and Wilhelm HI von England und das Haus Wittelsbach im Zeitalter der spanischen Erbfolgefrage, Breslau, 1904; Parri, Vittorio Amadeo II ed Eugenia di Savoia nelle guerre della suc- cessione spagnuola, Milan, 1888; Costa de Beauregard, Relazioni diplo- matiche della monarchia di Savoia (1559-1814), Turin, 1890; and Ameth, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, Vienna, 1859. For the affairs of the North, see Voltaire, Histoire de Charles XII, Rouen and London, 1727-1728, and later in numerous editions at Paris, still valuable because of knowledge obtained from contemporaries; Combes, Histoire de la diplomatie slave et scandinave, Paris, 1858; Le Glay, Les origines de I' alliance franco-russe: jusqu'au traite d' Amsterdam, Paris, 1897; Vassileff, Russisch-franzosisch Politik, 1698-1717, Gotha, 1902, based on Russian archives; Bain, Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire (1682-1719), London and New York, 1895; Syve- ton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XII (1898) ; Au camp d' Altrandstadt: Besenval et Marlborough (1707), in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XII (1898); Une hypotUse sur Charles XII, in Revue Historique, LXIV (1897); and Louis XIV et Charles XII, Paris, 1900. The hterature relating to Peter the Great is more conveniently given at the end of the following chapter. The negotiations preceding the Treaty of Utrecht are discussed from a French point of view by Giraud, Le traite d' Utrecht, Paris, 1847; and Courcy, Renonciation des Bourbons d'Espagne au trbne de France, Paris, 1889; but the most exhaustive treatment, based on the archives of England, France, Austria, and the United Provinces, is found in Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht, Gotha, 1891. The part played by BolLngbroke in the Peace of Utrecht is fully stated in Sichel, Bolingbroke and His Times, London, 1901. VOL. ui. — 22 CHAPTER V THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY The principle ' I ^HE Peace of Utrecht appeared for the moment to have of equilibrium X restored to Europe the equilibrium that had been so long disturbed by the ambitions of France. Not only the importance of balanced power among the nations but a deeper and broader view of international obligation was now again brought home to the thoughts of men. Knowing how much both France and the rest of Europe had suffered from the ambitions of Louis XIV, F^nelon, in a dissertation presented before the Congress of Utrecht, wrote: "Neighboring states are not only under obligation to treat one another according to the rules of justice and good faith; they ought in addition, for their own safety, as well as for the common interest, to form a kind of general society and republic." He then proceeds to point out that, the passions of men and the ambitions of rulers being what they are, "each nation is on this account under the necessity of inces- sant watchfulness to prevent the excessive aggrandizement of each one of its neighbors, . . . for the aggrandizement of a nation beyond a certain limit changes the general system of all the nations that have relation to it. . . . Everything which changes or alters this general system of Europe is dangerous and entails infinite evils."* The principle thus enunciated is as old as international diplomacy,^ and it had at length come to be distinctly recog- nized by the statesmen of Europe as the foundation of public security.' Louis XIV, who had done more than any other 1 (Euvres de Fenelon, Paris, 1872, IV, p. 360. ' See Volume I of this work, p. 361. ' See Dupuis, Le principe d'iquilibre el le Concert Europien, pp. 25, 31. ' See Giraud, Le traiti d' Utrecht, p. 124. ^ Note the formal recognition of the principle of equilibrium in Art. 11 of the treaty between Spain and England of July 13, 1713. ' Emile Bourgeois lays emphasis upon the fact that after 1713 the ideas of Locke not only superseded those of Bossuet even in France, but became recognized as principles of international law. Manuel Usiorique de politique Urangire, I, p. 249. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 339 sovereign of his time to violate it, had at last not only ac- Chap cepted but had openly appealed to it, and in the phrasing of the renunciations distinctly avowed it. In them it was formally stated that their purpose was "to estabhsh an equilibrium between the powers of such a kind as to prevent the union of many in a single one, so that the balance of equality, which it is desired to assure, could not incline to the advantage of one of these powers to the risk and injury of the others." ^ In fact, the great problem at Utrecht was how best to set the equilibrium of the European states against the private interests of the dynasties. The result was, in effect, the crea- tion of a dynastic deadlock in which the ambition of sover- eigns to absorb one another's possessions might thenceforth be rendered impotent.^ In this sense the Peace of Utrecht was a protest against absolutism, and especially against the idea that nations are, like private properties, transmissible by inheritance. It was the vindication and the triumph of the constitutional ideas of William III over the absolutist ideas of Louis XIV.' But this was not the only result of the long and ruinous war of the Spanish succession. It had also furnished an impulse to constructive thought. The Abb4 de Saint-Pierre, impressed by the miseries inflicted upon France and the hol- lowness of the glory attributed to Louis XIV, not only re- fused to accord to him the title "Le Grand," but boldly laid down the doctrine that "great power cannot make a great man." Starting with the idea of the moral and legal equality of sovereign states, Saint-Pierre wrote his essay on the "Pro jet de la Paix Perpetuelle," published at Utrecht in 1713, dur- 340 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 ing the conferences of the Congress, in which he pointed out the causes of the misfortunes that had befallen Europe, and ■ elaborated a plan for avoiding them in the future. Founded primarily on the conceptions of Emeric Cruc6 in the "Nouveau Cyn^e''^ and of Sully in the "Great Design,"^ the plan of Saint-Pierre comprised the formation of a uni- versal aUiance of sovereigns to secure themselves against the misfortunes of war by abolishing the separate use of force, perfecting their laws, and submitting their differences to judicial decision; with the understanding that, in case of refusal to execute treaties or to obey the rules and judg- ments imposed, the other members of the alliance should compel a refractory sovereign to comply by arming unitedly against him, and charging to his account the expense of this forcible restraint.' Admirable as the aims of the excellent Abbe were, they overlooked certain elements of human nature which two cen- turies of further development have not entirely eliminated from the life of nations. It was in the name of real, as dis- tinguished from merely ideal, equality, and for the rule of justice as men saw it from their own point of view, that inter- national strife was yet to continue. Prevented, or at least postponed, by the exhaustion and domestic troubles of the powers that had made their peace at Utrecht, war was soon again to agitate Europe by the renewal of the conflict that was still smouldering in the North. The exile of Chturlea XII I. The Peril of Sweden and the Battle for the Baltic In 1709, the alliance between Denmark, Poland, and Russia against Sweden had been renewed, and Pope Clement XI had absolved the Poles from their allegiance to King Stanislas. Proj ects for the partition of Poland were made and ' See Volume II of this work, p. 574. ' See Volume II of this work, pp. 550, 552. ' See Molinari, L'Abbd de Saint-Pierre, Paris, 1857; and Pascal, Let ■projets de l'abb6 Saint-Pierre, Paris, 1900. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 341 discussed, but Frederick Augustus of Saxony, after offering Chap, v to divide Poland with King Stanislas, repudiated the pro- ^^^^ ^;, posals of Prussia for a partition and decided to maintain the integrity of the kingdom and permit Sweden to furnish the spoils of war. In order to prevent the commotion in the North from in- fluencing the war of the Spanish succession, the Emperor, England, and Holland had, on March 31, 1710, signed a treaty neutralizing the Empire, which had had the effect of holding the two conflicts apart, but did not obtain the ad- hesion of Charles XII. ' Since his flight from Poltawa, that headstrong and impracticable monarch had remained at the Turkish fortress of Bender on the Dniester. Early in 1711 the Grand Vizier had offered at the head of a hundred thou- sand Turks "to carve a way home for the King of Sweden in whichever direction he liked best"; but Charles XII chose to remain in his asylum in the vain belief that he might even- tually lead a Turkish armyinto Poland; and, on July21, 1711, ,^p'eace was concluded between the Czar and the Sultan at the Pruth. Broken soon afterward at the instigation of Charles XII, peace was again renewed by the mediation of England and Holland on April 15, 1712,^ and finally confirmed at Adrianople on June 5, 1713. In the meantime Charles XII had abused the Turkish hospitality, diverted the money that had been given him to pay the expenses of his departure, refused to leave Bender, and at last, when force was resorted to, engaged in a pitched battle with his hosts, in which he was twice wounded and with only forty adherents kept at bay twelve thousand men until the house in which he had taken refuge was burned down and he was overpowered and captured by the Janissaries.' ' See Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 249. A congress of the neutral Ger- man powers was assembled at Bnmswick in December, 1712, for the purpose of enforcing neutrality, but ended in March, 1713, without producing any result. It was reassembled in 1714, but bore no fruit. ' Sir Robert Sutton, the British ambassador, was, however, recalled for his activity in promoting the peace. ' See the graphic account in Bain, Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, pp. 212, 217. 342 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The defects of Charles XII's pohoy While astonished Europe compared his heroism to that of Achilles and Hercules, and a medal was struck to commemo- - rate the event, Peter the Great and Frederick Augustus I i rejoiced in his quarrel with his only effective ally.^ A turn in the tide of feeling toward Russia brought his assailants into disgrace and the King found himself for a time again in favor at Stamboul, but the Peace of Utrecht had in the mean- time changed the situation in Europe; and the treaty of June 5, 1713, ended the Russo-Turkish conflict.^ Although Charles XII then decided to return to Sweden, it was not. until November 11, 1714, that the exiled king, after an absence of fifteen years from his kingdom, arrived at Stralsund. During this long absence, Sweden had fallen into a des- perate condition. Its resources exhausted, its throne prac- tically vacant, many of its possessions lost or imperilled, the kingdom which Gustavus Adolphus had expanded to a vast empire, appeared at the mercy of its foes. At first glance it seems unaccountable that a warrior so impetuous as Charles XII could have been content to remain so long in a foreign land while his kingdom was falling into vdecay. The explanation is to be found in the fact that, f comprehending the limitations of his own resources,,iie enter- tained the chimerical idea of overpowering Russia by stimu- lating the Turks to exhaust the resources of the Czar. By this expedient he believed he was seriously crippling his most powerful enemy without expense to his own kingdom, and making the Sultan fight his battles for him. In order to estimate correctly the value of Charles XII's policy, it is, however, necessary to recall what had occurred during the years of his exile and the condition of his country upon his return. ' In the hope of drawing Charles XII into the war of the Spanish succession, Louis XIV had, on September 1, 1712, made an alliance with him at Bender; but, apart from the subsidies then promised and afterward paid, Charles XII derived no benefit from the alliance, and none was received by Prance. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, Supplement II, Part II, p. 110. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 343 The battle of Poltawa was by no means a final defeat of Chap. v Sweden, but merely the temporary relief of Russia. It was, indeed, the end of Charles XII's mad scheme of a Swedish invasion into the heart of that vast empire, but it would not have prevented the further defence of the territories of Swe- den, or even further aggression upon Russia, if Charles XII had promptly returned to his kingdom; while he might have accomplished through diplomatic representatives all the results effected by his presence in Turkey. The absence of the King, who insisted upon regulating the minutest affairs from a distance, was disastrous to his king- dom, which suffered much from division of counsels but chiefly by delay. In November, 1709, the Danes, disregard- ing the Peace of Travendal, made an attack upon Scania which ended in their establishing a foothold there; and only the splendid generalship of Stenbock in 1710 had held the enemy at bay. In the meantime, all of Sweden's Baltic provinces had fallen into the possession of the Czar, who had also successfully invaded Finland. As a consequence, Po- land had been evacuated by the Swedes and the army with- drawn to Swedish Pomerania, with King Stanislas as a refugee in the Swedish camp. Although without the possibility of obtaining effective allies during the war of the Spanish succession, Charles XII might nevertheless have profited from it by adhering to the compact of neutrality of March 31, 1710, which would have secured the safety of his German possessions without cost to him; but, believing that the maritime powers, in spite of their absorption in a costly war, would aid him against Denmark, on November 30, 1710, he had, against the advice of his friends, formally repudiated the offer of neutrality. ! Thus, the security of the Swedish possessions was made to depend solely upon their own defensive powers against all his enemies at once, while he awaited the uncertain fortunes of the Russo-Turkish conflict. With this opportunity of aggression, the Danes in 1712 had invaded and occupied the Duchy of Bremen, while the coali- tion against Sweden worked its will on the Baltic. It is true 344 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V that the Peace of the Pruth was broken and war with Russia ,_,^' "l„^ resumed by the Turks at the instigation of Charles XII; but this was of no direct profit to Sweden, and even if the war had not soon ended with the Peace of Adrianople, it is diffi- cult to see how the conflict between Turkey and Russia could ever have been more than a diversion of the attack upon Sweden. Whatever the personal influence of Charles XII at Bender may for a time have been, it is certain that his re- turn to Sweden was too long delayed, and that his separa- tion from Stockholm by a distance of seven hundred miles rendered impossible the needed unity and promptness of counsel regarding pubhc policy between him and the Swedish Senate. The condition There was rejoicing in Sweden when it was learned that 1715""*^° "* the King had arrived at Stralsund; but, instead of returnmg to his capital, where confusion and despair were almost universal, he remained in his Pomeranian fortress, ordering troops to be sent to him, and at the same time opposing by . his royal authority all the measures for the salvation of the kingdom suggested by the Senate and the Riksdag. Fred- erick I of Prussia had at one time been ready to promise him aid, and the Emperor Charles VI had also been favor- ably disposed toward him; but the time had now passed when an alliance with either would have been possible upon any terms that Charles XII was inclined to consider. Frederick William I, having become King of Prussia, was endeavoring to expel the Swedes from Germany, and the Emperor, of- fended by the obstinacy and discourtesy of Charles XII, had lost all sympathy with him. At this moment of Sweden's helplessness Prussia had already acquired possession of Stettin in sequestration,' and the Elector of Hanover, long considered by Charles XII as his "best friend," had occu- pied Verden and was coveting Bremen, then in possession of the Danes, who were willing to sell it to Hanover. ' This was by agreement of Prussia with Russia and Poland in the Treaty of Schwedt, of October 6, 1713; see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 407. Droysen regards this treaty as one of the most important in the history of Prussia, it being the decisive step in Prussia's Baltic policy. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 345 Frederick William I would have been ready to aid Sweden Chap, v in opposing Russia in exchange for Swedish possessions in ^yt' Pomerania; but, finding Charles XII utterly intractable, on June 12, 1714, Prussia had formed an alliance with Russia, and in the spring of 1715 declared war on Sweden.^ # The Elector of Hanover soon afterward also declared war,^ and before the autumn of 1715, Sweden was confronted by a formidable confederacy of foes, consisting of Russia, Saxony, Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover, who had formed a compact to divide among themselves the spoils of the Swedish empire now steadily crumbling to pieces. • At this critical moment Sweden was internally plunged in the depths of the most bitter poverty. Her last army had been dispersed, and only half the number of troops neces- sary to defend the frontiers of the kingdom could be raised. The taxes, which had long been on a war basis, did not fur- nish a third of the funds needed for defence. The bells of the churches were sold, and the cannons captured in former wars were sent to the mint to be coined into money. Nothing but the firm statesmanship of Count Horn prevented revolu- tion and the dethronement of Charles XII. With unfailing courage and a tranquillity of mind that re- vealed the invincible quality of his nature, the King gathered about him seventeen thousand men to defend Stralsund against the united forces of his enemies; but, on December 12, 1715, the battered remains of the fortress had to be aban- doned, and Charles XII, after narrowly escaping capture by the Danish ships, landed from a small boat on the shores of Sweden. Had events not radically altered the traditional relations The impedi- of Sweden and France, there might have been a last hope ^™*^y*^e^ ern Europe ' For the treaty, see P. Martens, Recueil des Traites, V, " AUemagne," p. 112. * The Elector's treaty with the Czar was signed on October 28, 1715, at Greifswald. It may be found in Stork, Das Greifswalder Bund- nis, where a history of the negotiations is given. It guaranteed to Hanover Bremen and Verden, and to Russia Ingria, CareUa, and Esthonia; but not Livonia, as Ranke erroneously states. 346 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. V for Charles XII in a Franco-Swedish alliance; but the entire ,_,^" "■ international situation was in a state of transition that ren- dered France for the moment powerless to offer aid. The accession of the Elector of Hanover to the throne of England as George I had not only reversed the English ministry, it had vitally affected the whole system of England's foreign policy, and particularly the recent frieiidship with France. The Whigs, who had just come into power, were making political capital of the entente with their ancient enemy and bitterly condemning the Peace of Utrecht. Marlborough had been replaced at the head of the army, Bolingbroke and Ormond were accused of treason and had sought refuge in France, and Oxford was impeached and sent to the Tower. Townshend, who had been commended to George I, was made the head of the new ministry with the duties of secretary of the Northern Department, and James Stanhope, a distin- guished soldier and an able diplomatist, was placed in charge of the Southern Department for the conduct of foreign affairs. At Paris, Lord Stair had accused Louis XIV just before his death of violating the treaty of peace because so little progress was made with the demolition of Dunkirk, and es- pecially because of the construction of an immense canal at Mardyk; which, it was alleged, was designed to create a new port to take the place of Dunkirk. One of the last acts of Louis XIV was to refuse to discontinue this construction; which, it was alleged, was intended only for the necessary drainage of the country. In the meantime the Pretender, who had been compelled, as the treaty required, to leave France and had taken refuge in Lorraine, issued a proclamation, claiming the succession to the Enghsh throne. The conduct of Louis XIV regarding the Pretender had been entirely correct; but the Protestant succession was believed in England to be seriously threatened, and the intentions of France were regarded with distrust.' ' Count de Croissy, a brother of Torcy, who in May, 1715, had been sent to Berlin to arrange a peace for Sweden, had urged Charlea XII to make peace in the North and send troops against England to aid the "Pretender." See Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 77, 78. A. D. 1716-1731 SUPBBMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 347 Philip V had perforce submitted to the demand for the Chap. renunciations, but with wounded dignity, and had secretly aimed at securing for himself the regency during the minority of the infant Louis XV. He was openly favorable to the Pretender, and a strong party inclined to support him was believed to exist in France. In these circumstances, there was small hope of active intervention in the affairs of the North on the part of France, which was too much absorbed in repairing its own fortunes to indulge in needless foreign complications. In truth, the effort to obtain equilibrium in Western Europe had created a condition that seriously impeded further international action.' Even England, notwithstanding the interests of George I as Elector of Hanover, had no inclination at the moment to undertake a new foreign war, or to embark pre- cipitately in the affairs of the North. The only real interest of Great Britain in the Baltic was for the safety of her com- merce; ^ but the policy of Hanover was not without in- fluence upon the action of the British ministry. As for the Dutch Republic, its chief preoccupation was the execution of the Barrier Treaty. With a depleted treasury, and solicitous chiefly for its commercial interests, there was little likelihood that it would waste much substance in the North. While as King of England the policy prescribed for George The dual I was one of moderation, with a general interest in maintain- Qgo*'°°j °^ ing a state of equilibrium in the North, as Elector of Hanover he was called upon to play a different and even to some ex- tent a conflicting role ; for it was greatly to the advantage of the electorate to round out its territory by retaining Verden and acquiring Bremen, which involved complicity with the enemies of Sweden. With any reasonable degree of skill and caution on the ' In 1714, while still at Bender, Charles XII had received subsidies from Louis XIV, who also offered his mediation. See Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 76, 80, for the futile mission of De Croissy. ' Interesting statistics regarding the amount of British trade in the North are given by Chance, George I and the Northern War, p. 6. 348 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V part of Charles XII, the existing treaties between England ,„,^^1„. and Sweden and the indisposition of the English people to be made the tool of Hanover would have prevented hostile action against him by Great Britain; but Charles XII scorned anything that savored of diplomacy. George I had become King of England not because of any preference for his person or any design to form a closer union with the House of Brunswick, but because he was a Protestant and main- tained the Protestant succession. Had James Edward been - willing to change his religion, he would have been far more acceptable; for he had personal charms and graces, as well as accomplishments, which the German prince entirely lacked. Ignorant of the English language, laws, and sentiments; coarse in person, low in morals, and cold iu his manners, George I was ill adapted for winning the hearts of English- men. Being, as he was, merely a political necessity, there was for him and the suite of foreign courtiers and advisers who accompanied him to England, and whose dictatorial pretensions were offensive, no affection and no enthusiasm. Any wish or policy that was merely personal to the King or suggested by his Hanoverian entourage was quite certain to awaken English opposition. When, therefore. Count Gyllenborg came to London as the ambassador of Charles XII to plead for the friendship of England, the circumstances would not have been unfavorable to his cause had it not been for the blind obstinacy of the Swedish King, whose ships were at the time preying upon British commerce in the Baltic. The Privateering Ordinance of February 8, 1715, author- ized commissions to be issued not only to Swedish but to foreign privateers to capture and condenm as prize enemy or neutral ships under conditions that seriously hampered all commerce in the Baltic; and many English as well as Dutch vessels had been condemned without reasonable warning. The result was, that, without the least intention to aid the predatory designs of George I as Elector of Han- over, a British fleet was sent to the Baltic to compel the re- spect of the Swedes for the rights of British commerce; and A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 349 George I was thus enabled to engage privately with the Chap. V King of Prussia that it should be used "in support of the operations in Pomerania against Sweden." The continued indifference of the King of Sweden to the British complamts regarding the injury to neutral commerce The growth not unnaturally justified the ministry in treating Sweden as °' ^"*"'' , ., 1111 hoatihty to an enemy; while, on the other hand, the course of George I Sweden in appropriating Bremen and Verden led Charles XII to • consider him his most treacherous foe. Between the King of England and the Elector of Hanover the Swedish King made no distinction, with the result that he was less and less disposed to make terms with a power that might have been of great utility to him at the moment of his extremity. Great Britain, whose interest it was to maintain political equihbrium in the North and to prevent the preponderant intrusion of Russia upon the Baltic, was thus insensibly led into hostility to Sweden and made the accomplice of Hano- verian expansion upon the continent. Without doubt, it was to the (advantage of England to have so important a port as Bremen in the possession of Hanover; and, when Sweden was so blindly and incorrigibly unfriendly, it was almost inevitable that England should prefer relations with the Czar, whose mastery of the Baltic did not at the moment appear to be a conspicuous danger. A not less important transformation than that which had The Regency in taken place in England had occurred in France. Determined t^e^b^ that his influence should survive himself, and resolved to Dubois transmit his power to no single individual, Louis XIV had refused to appoint Philip V Regent during the minority of the child Louis XV, and had put the government of France in commission. The Council of Regency established by the will of the Grand Monarch was composed of the Duke of Orleans, the Duke of Bourbon, the Duke of Maine, and the Count of Toulouse, with Marshal Villeroy, Huxelles, Tallard, and Harcourt, and the existing ministry. Thus, by a singu- lar inconsequence, Louis XIV, the inaugurator of absolute monarchy, at his death transferred his authority to a select A. D. 1715-1731 350 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V oligarchy composed of widely differing elements, with a prescribed division of powers.^ As constituted by Louis XIV, the regency included two conflicting parties: the first, an old court party, headed by the Duke of Maine and closely associated with Spain, Ultra- montane influence, and Madame de Maintenon; the other, headed by the Duke of Orleans, inclining toward association with the Jansenists, the Parliament, and the younger and less satisfied forces in the nation. The "Regent" himself, — as Philip of Orleans was soon entitled, — intelligent, accomplished, devoid of conscience, and dissipated in his habits, was without marked personal ambition; but, under the influence of the Abb6 Dubois, who had been his preceptor, and other advisers, he resolved to form his own council and to undertake the command of the military household, which together with the tutelage of the young king had been left by the will to the Duke of Maine On September 12, 1715, the will of Louis XIV was substan- tially set aside, the Duke of Orleans was duly legalized as Regent, and the Abbe Dubois became at first the confi- dential, and soon afterward the official, chief counsellor of the regency. The son of a country physician, Dubois had been educated at Paris, at thirty-four had become the preceptor of the Duke of Orleans, — at that time the Duke of Chartres, — and had obtained a powerful influence over him, which he had not ceased to exert. As a secretary of Tallard in London, in 1698, he had acquired a taste for diplomacy and some ex- perience in it. He had also accompanied the Duke of Or- leans during his military campaign in Spain in 1708, when the Duke incurred the undying hatred of Philip V on account of the popularity he had won, which led to the suspicion on the part of the King that the Duke aspired to be a compromise candidate for the Spanish throne. Upon Dubois' experience in England, and especially the friendships that had been formed there, — which included an acquaintance with James Stanhope, — and upon the ' See Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII, Part II, p. 2. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 351 alienation between Philip V and the Regent, the future of Chap, v France and of Europe were soon in great measure to turn; for Dubois was deeply impressed with the value for the re- gency of an alliance with England, since the Regent, as head of a party, was compelled to pursue a policy of his own in opposition to the aims of Philip V. Although at first occupying only a modest position as a councillor in ecclesiastical affairs, Dubois soon became the secret director of the foreign relations of France. The system adopted by him was entirely different from that of Louis XIV; for the stability of the regency, menaced by the machinations of the Spanish Court and its French adherents, seemed to him to require a new international alignment. Compelled, as he had been, by Louis XIV to renounce the The plana of throne of France, Philip V had not relinquished the idea of -^be™"" obtaining the regency; and, in case of the death of the infant Louis XV, he hoped to place one of his own sons upon the French throne. In these plans he was inspired by his second wife, Elizabeth Famese, — niece of Francis Duke of Parma, and Cosmos, Grand Duke of Tuscany, — who was ambitious for her sons, and by the Abbe Alberoni, his adventurous prime minister. An Italian, like the Queen, whose marriage he had brought about, Alberoni, the son of a Parmesan gardener, had been brought to Spain by Vend6me as a humble but talented ec- clesiastic, had won the favor of the all-powerful Princess Orsini,' had thereby gained the confidence of Philip V, and had risen to the highest place of power in the kingdom. With marvellous insight into the needs of the decayed monarchy, he had repaired its finances, reorganized its army and navy, and cherished the hope of restoring its ancient predominance in Europe. ' This remarkable woman, known in France as the Princesse des Ursins, during the period of her power at Madrid may be said to have almost governed Spain. The arrival of Elizabeth Famese as Queen was, however, the end of her domination and was immediately followed by her public disgrace. 352 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The secret negotiations of George I with Pet«r the Great To accomplish his purpose, Alberoni aimed at destroying Austrian influence and expelling the Austrians from Italy, — - which he intended to reconquer for Spain, — overthrowing the regency in France, and eventually placing one of the sons of Elizabeth Farnese upon the French throne. With Italy recovered and France in close alliance with Spain, that mon- archy, reinvigorated and reorganized within, would possess more than its ancient grandeur. The task which Alberoni had set for himself rendered de- sirable the friendship of England, which he studiously en- deavored to gain; and, on December 14, 1715, Philip V, in spite of his aversion to heretics, signed a treaty of commerce with England which was intended to supplement the Treaties of Utrecht. 1 There was, however, a serious obstacle in the way of a close intimacy on the part of England with Spain, which was still at war with the Emperor; for George I, who desired the support of Charles VI for his claims to the throne of England, — to which there was strong opposition in Vienna, — and also the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, was not disposed to incur the Emperor's disfavor by too close an entente with Spain. On the other hand, Charles VI, who was seriously menaced by Spain in Italy, was greatly in need of the naval support of England. A rapprochement between them was thereby facilitated which soon resulted in their reciprocal guarantee of their possessions.'' Debarred by this alliance from the close relations with England desired by Alberoni, Philip V, already in strained relations with France on account of his hostility to the Regent, was placed in a position of practical isolation. While George I was anxious to obtain from Sweden the cession of Bremen and Verden for Hanover, he was even more solicitous regarding his security upon the throne of England; for since his accession the Pretender had been actively plot- ting to supplant him, and rebellion aided by conspiracies in England was brewing in Scotland, while France was covertly 1 For the treaty, see Martens, A., Supplement I, p. 111. " See the treaty of June 5, 1716, in Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 476. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 353 and Spain more openly encouraging James Edward by fur- Chap, v nishing him with funds to promote invasion. In his anger with George I on accoimt of his wish to ap- propriate Bremen and Verden, Charles XII, it was reported, intended to furnish military aid to the Pretender; and, in fact, liberal offers had been made to the King of Sweden to induce him to furnish troops for the invasion of England, but he had refused to accept them. To guard against the international conspiracy that was forming to accomplish his dethronement, George I was negotiating on all sides for recognition and support. He had succeeded in winning the Emperor, the United Provinces, and Denmark, but Prussia had declined to take any risks. At London, in March, 1716, the Russian ambassador, Kurakin, was informed by Townshend that, if the Czar would guarantee the Hanoverian succession, George I would, as King of England, guarantee the Russian conquests; but, on account of the long friendship of England and Sweden, it would be necessary first to negotiate with Russia a treaty of commerce favorable to English trade in the Baltic, which would then render possible a political alliance. England, Townshend assured the ambassador, would furnish twelve or fifteen war-ships, if Russia would furnish eight or ten thousand men, for the purpose of forcing immediate peace upon Sweden on terms advantageous to themselves. Drafts of treaties were prepared, and England was about to embark in open war with her ancient ally; but during the delays in completing the negotiations, in August, 1716, the Jacobite rebellion was ended, so that the guarantee of the Hanoverian succession had ceased to be of first importance. With the argument that the aid of Russia was needed against Swedish support of the Pretender swept away, there was no sufficient ground on which an offensive alliance with Russia agamst Sweden could be defended before the Parliament; and thus England was saved from plunging openly into the Northern war. It was not long, however, before George I comprehended what a misfortune it would have been if he had committed VOL. III.— 23 354 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The reaction against Kns- eian intrusion The Triple Alliance of 1717 England to the support of the Czar against Sweden. The capture of Wismar and the occupation of Mecklenburg by - Russian troops filled him, as it did also other German princes, with alarm; and the marriage of the Czar's daughter Anna to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and his niece with the Duke of Mecklenburg, celebrated at Dantzig in the midst of Rus- sian troops, added to the fear that Peter the Great had the intention of making permanent conquests on the German coast of the Baltic.^ At London Gyllenborg protested that his master, Charles XII, was not in league with the Pretender, that the Privateer- ing Ordinance was only meant for Sweden's legitimate pro- tection, that satisfaction would be given for damages to England's trade, and intimated that Charles XII might be induced, in exchange for England's support against Russia, to cede Bremen and Verden to Hanover. For a time it seemed as if the fear of Russian designs in the Baltic would turn the tide in favor of Sweden; but, as usual, Charles XII showed no disposition to accept the advice of his ambassador, and the negotiations had no result except to temper the instruc- tions to Admiral Norris, in command of the Baltic fleet, who was directed to send a memorial to the King of Sweden be- fore making any attack. As imperturbable as ever, Charles XII sent the document back unopened. In Hanover the retention of Russian troops in Mecklen- burg created a feeling of violent antagonism to the Czar; and Bernstorff, George I's Hanoverian minister, is said to have proposed the seizure of the Russian ships, and even the person of Peter the Great, until his soldiers had evacuated Germany. In order to deal with such a delicate situation at closer range, in spite of objections from his English miaisters, George I, accompanied by Stanhope, in July, 1716, left London for his electorate. He came with a firm determina- 1 See Ward, Great Britain and Hanover, Oxford, 1899, pp. 95, 96. Also the diplomatic correspondence between England and Russia pub- lished in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, XIV (1900). STJPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 355 tion not to enter into closer relations with the Czar, whom he Chap, v was beginning to regard as a greater menace to the peace of "^^ "" Germany and to the equilibrium of the North than the King of Sweden, then braving the attack of a powerful coalition. To all of Peter the Great's proposals, therefore, he resolved to turn a deaf ear until the Russian troops were withdrawn from Germany. In the meantime, the affairs of England had taken on a new form. In 1715, nothing had appeared more improbable than an alliance between England and France. French public opinion and the influence of the old court party were undoubtedly favorable to the Pretender, while the blood and treasure so freely expended by France to secure the establishment of Philip V on the throne of Spain rendered logical a warm sjonpathy between those two monarchies. The ambition of Philip V to become the Regent of France and to control the succession in the interest of one of his sons in the event of the young king's death, and the existence of a strong party in France in favor of Philip V's designs seri- ously compHcated the relations of the Duke of Orleans with Spain. To overcome the opposition to himself as Regent, it was necessary for him either to yield to the wishes of Philip V regarding the succession or to counterbalance his influence by some new form of policy. In the situation then existing George I and the Regent each needed external support; the former to secure his suc- cession against the ambitions of the Pretender, the latter to protect the regency against the opposition of Philip V. An alliance between George I and the Regent would have the effect, on the one hand, of preventing France from uniting with Spain to sustain the claims of the Pretender, and on the other, of affording to the Duke of Orleans a means of neu- tralizing the hostility of the King of Spain to the regency. Although this policy was the reverse of that which had become traditional, it commended itself to the Abb6 Dubois as possessing a practical advantage for the Regent; and he, therefore, urged its adoption. As England and the United Provinces were already in close aUiance, and Holland fur- 1715-1731 356 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V nished a convenient avenue of approach, it was decided that a Franco-Dutch entente should be the first step to be takea - in the new direction. Accordingly, the French ambassador at The Hague, Chateauneuf, in May, 1716, was instructed to open with the Grand Pensionary negotiations upon the subject of an alliance, and at the same time to pay court to the merchants of Amsterdam; while Dubois renewed his acquaintance with James Stanhope by opening a friendly correspondence with him. When it was learned at Versailles that George I and Stan- hope would pass through The Hague on their way to Han- over, in July, 1716, Dubois, travelling under the disguise of a private collector of rare books and manuscripts, under- took a secret mission to The Hague, where as if by accident he intercepted Stanhope, with whom he had a number of personal interviews, at last leading up to the subject of an Anglo-French alliance.^ Stanhope's first demand, before entering upon negotiations, was that the Pretender should be expelled from France, whither he had returned since the failure of his cause in Scotland. He also pointed out that it would be difficult for the King of England to accept the Treaty of Utrecht as a basis for a future alliance, since George I was already the ally of Charles VI, who had never recognized that treaty. Undeterred by these obstacles, Dubois succeeded in ob- taining the assent of Stanhope and of the King to a further discussion. In the following August, furnished with full powers to negotiate, he proceeded to Hanover; and there lodging in the same house with Stanhope in relations of closest intimacy, the terms of a Franco-English alliance were, after an interesting diplomatic battle, finally agreed upon. At the price of abandoning the Pretender and demolishing Mardyk, Dubois obtained on October 10, 1716, the confir- mation by England of the Treaties of Utrecht; thus securing for the Regent England's guarantee of the exclusion of the Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France, which prac- ' See the full account of these interviews and of the succeeding nego- tiations in Bourgeois, Le secret du Rigent, p. 95 et seq. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 357 tically assured the succession to the Duke of Orleans in case Chap, v of the death of the infant king. On the other hand, the treaty procured for George I the French support of the Hanoverian succession against the Stuart pretensions, and thereby a free hand in pursuing his interests in his electorate.^ Returning to The Hague, on January 4, 1717, Dubois obtauied from the States General their adherence to the treaty signed at Hanover, thus creating the Triple Alliance of England, France, and the United Provinces.^ , If the Triple Alliance of 1717 served the purpose of the ECfecta ot Regent in creating for him a formidable defence against the ^i^j^^^of designs of Philip V and Alberoni, it was still more useful to nn George I and his Hanoverian ambitions. With the support » of the Emperor, secured in the previous summer, and that of France and Holland, England was now free from anxiety regarding the succession, and George I could bring pressure upon Prussia in his opposition to Peter the Great. In truth, the Triple Alliance of 1717 was Stanhope's triumph, making England the virtual arbiter of Europe, and placing in the hands of George I the(^balance of power in the North.) » Hostile as the Whigs had been to the Treaties of Utrecht, they now began to perceive their value to England. They had not only accomplished the main object of the long and costly war to prevent the union of France and Spain, they had incidentally secured the Protestant succession, improved the commercial position of Great Britain, and made George I predominant on the continent. It was in vain, therefore, that the extreme Whigs, under the lead of Townshend, de- nounced Stanhope's diplomacy as Hanoverian rather than English. Whatever its leading motive, it placed the King of England in the ascendency and gave that country the first place in international influence. In France the effect was different. While the Triple Alli- ance secured allies for the Regent, it did not satisfy the pre- vailing sentiment of the French nation, which was strongly Jacobite and favorable to close relations with Spain. To ' For the text, see Lamberty, IX, p. 560. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 484. 358 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 British ap- proval of Stanhope's diplomacy the French public the alliance seemed mysterious and in- comprehensible; but by the few who knew of the secret mis- - sion of Louville to Spain for the purpose of sounding and if possible conciliating Philip V, which had resulted in igno- minious failure, the new alliance was understood to be a necessary part of the Regent's system of self-defence.' In a certain sense, the policy initiated by the alliance with England was personal and secret, primarily conceived in the private interest of the Regent. His position in France was new and peculiar. Under Louis XIV the foreign policy of France was openly and frankly dynastic, for the interest of the nation was assumed to be, as the absolutist theory of government required, the interest of the sovereign, who re- garded the kingdom as his property. But the regency was merely a public office, and the Regent himself only the first servant of the State. Still, aspiring to the throne, and tem- porarily representing it, he had need of power and prestige, which without a personal pohcy it was impossible for him to obtain. Hence the development of a secret diplomacy alongside the public and official diplomacy, which it aimed covertly and indirectly either to guide and direct or clandes- tinely to obstruct and render abortive. While Marshal d'Huxelles, who had displaced Torcy at the head of the coun- cil for foreign affairs, prepared the official instructions, it was henceforth Dubois who saw to it that they were executed as he and the Regent personally desired. The opposition of Townshend and of his brother-in-law, Horace Walpole, at that time British charg^ d'affaires at The Hague, to the Triple Alliance was based on the assump- tion that Stanhope's diplomacy was merely personal to George I rather than national. "That war of the North," Townshend had exclaimed, "will be our ruin"; and Horace Walpole had declared, "I do not see why the whole system of Europe should be turned upside down on account of Meck- lenburg." But the King was firm in his decision, and the eiforts to arouse opposition had no result, except to dis- ' For an account of Louville's mission, see Bourgeois, Le secret dit Regent, p. 64 et seq. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 359 credit Stanhope's opponents.^ In Holland Heinsius had Chap, v offered a like resistance; but public opinion had overwhelmed him, and the commercial advantages which it secured to the Republic placed the seal of approval upon the Triple Alliance. The participation of Holland in the new combination of powers served to mask the personal character of Stan- hope's and Dubois' negotiations; for, on the one hand, it prevented the Whigs from asserting that George I was being subordinated by France as Charles II had been by Louis XIV; and, on the other, it enabled the Regent to point to the Triple Alliance as a safeguard to European peace. In the middle of January, 1717, George I returned to Lon- don, and early in February public feeling was set ablaze by the startling armouncement that the Swedish ambassador, Count Gyllenborg, had been arrested in London and his papers seized. A short time afterward Baron Gortz, the chief adviser of Charles XII, was by order of the States General at the request of George I detained and imprisoned at Arn- heim, while on his way from Holland to Germany, and his papers also were taken from him.^ Such a double violation of the law of nations caused a great commotion, which was not diminished when it was dis- covered that the correspondence related to a plot on the part of Gyllenborg, Gortz, and Sparre, the Swedish ambassador in Paris, to support the cause of the Pretender by landing in Scotland twelve thousand Swedish soldiers; and it was reported that Charles XII was already preparing ships for their transportation.' The menace of foreign invasion caused liberal appropria- tions to be made by the Parliament for the national defence ' Townshend was soon afterward dismissed from the Northern De- partment and Paul Methuen took his place. ' Notwithstanding much urgency, the papers were not sent to Eng- land but placed under seal and retained in Holland. ' Some knowledge of the plot had long been possessed by the British government, the correspondence having been systematically opened and ejcamined. 360 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The designs of Gortz and silenced for the time the criticism of Stanhope's diplo- macy. It was imdeniable that Great Britain was being drawn - into the operations against Sweden through Hanover's ac- quisition of Bremen and Verden, but this was now offset by the exposure of what was denounced as an attack on English liberty. "How can the King of Sweden better secure him- self the recovery and possession of his duchy," Gortz had written in a letter to Gyllenborg, "than by reducing King George to be nothing more than an elector of the Empire?" The Swedish opposition to George I had, indeed, been pro- voked by his conduct as Elector of Hanover; but it was now, as it appeared, acting against him as King of England, and had assumed the form of an assault upon the Protestant succession. There was both truth and error in the conclusions of the English people regarding the disclosures made by the inter- cepted correspondence of Gortz and Gyllenborg. George Henry Baron von Gortz, descended from a noble Franconian family, had ^t the beginning of the century, entered into the service of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, by whom he was held in great esteem. But the little duchy offered too limited a field for the abilities and ambitions of this extraordinary man, who greatly admired Charles XII; and, at the time of Sweden's lowest estate, Gortz passed into his service. Feared and hated by the Swedish people as a meddling foreigner, Gortz nevertheless enjoyed from the first the com- plete confidence of Charles XII, and became so powerful in the State, although nominally in the employ of the Duke of Holstein, that he was called in Sweden the King's "Grand Vizier." Perceiving that, with the sea-power of Great Britain and the land-power of Russia combined against her, Sweden must eventually be completely at their mercy, Gortz had resolved to eliminate either Peter the Great or George I from the coalition against Sweden, and then to turn all the force of the kingdom against the remaining enemy. Of the two antagonists Peter the Great seemed the more A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 361 likely to make terms which Charles XII would accept. The Chap, v Czar had been seriously offended with the demand of George I that the Russian troops be driven out of Germany; and it was beheved that in return for some concessions to Russia on the Baltic he would be inclined to permit Sweden to compensate herself for her losses there by the annexation of Norway at the expense of Denmark. To carry out his scheme of making terms with one or the other of the chief antagonists of Sweden, and also in the hope of raising a loan of money, in the month of July, 1716, — • about the same time as Dubois' first interviews with Stan- hope, — Gortz had established himself at The Hague.* In choosing The Hague as the scene of his efforts to save The negotia- Sweden from ruin Gortz merely followed the example of all *'°°^ °' ^°^^ . -r-y <• • ** '^^ Hague who wished to survey Europe from its political centre; for Holland was at that time not only the seat of publicity, where gazettes were published and the news of the world first made known, but The Hague was then considered the most important diplomatic post in Europe, from which all the great capitals were easily accessible, and where all the powers were in the habit of sending their most mature and sagacious diplomatists.^ Upon his arrival at The Hague Gortz had made his first visit to Chateauneuf, the veteran representative of France, to whom he proposed that the Regent should mediate a peace between Sweden and Russia. It was the moment when the Triple Alliance was forming, and the Regent was disinclined to intervene, on the ground that it would "give umbrage to the alUes of the North." At the same time the Russian ambassador, Kurakin, had appUed to Chateauneuf to conclude an alliance between France) Russia, Prussia, and Frederick Augustus I of Poland, "or such other princes of the Empire as the Regent might ' For the endeavors of Gortz to obtain loans of money in Holland for Sweden, see Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 157, 162. ' The Hague in the eighteenth century has been justly described as "Le rendez-vous des ambitions, la foire des nouvelles, I'auberge de I'Europe politique et poMtiquante.'' 362 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V judge good." But the Regent did not wish to be drawn into i-i't'^Loi the Northern war, and Kurakin had received the answer — that France was wilhng to negotiate with Russia a treaty of commerce, but was not disposed to form any new political relations. The truth was, that the regency had in fact abandoned Sweden to its fate, and was aligning itself with the Anglo- German interests. On September 17, 1716, a secret treaty with Prussia had committed France to support the surrender by Sweden of Stettin, Usedom, and Wollin to Frederick William I,' and the Triple Alliance had soon afterward bound the regency to defend the claims of Hanover against Sweden. Thus debarred from obtaining the mediation of France, Gortz decided upon a double negotiation with Russia and England, in which he hoped to play off the one against the other, in order to make peace with the one that would accept the terms least disadvantageous to Charles XII. In this decision Gortz displayed his prudence, for these were the only really dangerous antagonists of Sweden, being the centres of two groups of powers whose interests were dif- ferent and even opposed: first, Denmark and Hanover, which had drawn England into the fray; and, second, Russia, Prussia, and Poland. The first group was interested in se- curing the Baltic and North Sea ports; the second, in strip- ping Sweden of the Baltic provinces. But neither Denmark and Hanover on the one hand, nor Prussia and Poland on the other, would by themselves constitute a serious menace to Sweden. While Gyllenborg had been striving to conciliate the Eng- lish ministry at London, Gortz had used every effort to open negotiations with Peter the Great. Already in possession of Livonia, Ingria, Carelia, and a part of Finland, with a fleet of thirty vessels at his command, the Czar was in fact al- ready master of the Baltic. By making peace with him Gortz hoped to save the Swedish possessions in Germany. To promote his plan Gortz boldly gave out that he was 1 The secret treaty is printed by Droysen, Geschichie der preus- sischen Politik, IV, 2, I, p. 179. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 363 already in negotiation with the Czar's agents; but, in fact, Chap, v up to the time of his arrest and the loss of his papers he had ^- "■ ^ ^ 171 ^ 1 7*^1 received no other encouragement than mere rumors that '■ — Peter the Great was disposed toward peace and would grant him an audience when he came to Holland on his approach- ing visit to Western Europe. For the moment Gortz had been placed in great embarrass- The Jacobite ment. He had expected to raise a loan of money in Holland, '"'"sue to procm-e French mediation with Russia, and through Gyllenborg to carry on negotiations with England; but all his plans had ended in failure. Hemmed in by his enemies on the Baltic, Charles XII had made a bold dash to master Norway, then held by the Danes; for thus he hoped, if com- pelled to suffer losses on the inland sea, to open for his kingdom a greater future on the Atlantic. The lack of means had compelled his retreat, but the movement had the advantage of indicating to the Czar that Charles XII had turned from the defence of his Baltic provinces to obtain compensation ' from Denmark, and that freedom to pursue that enterprise , might be bought by peace with Russia. For Charles XII money had now become a pressing ne- cessity, and Gortz in his desperation began to think of ob- taining it from the adherents of the Pretender, who were numerous in France and Scotland and by no means entirely discouraged even in England itself. To promote this scheme, Sparre at Paris and Gyllenborg at London were directed by Gortz to sound the disposition of the Jacobites. The Pre- tender himself was known to be actively plotting at Avignon, where under papal protection he was holding his little court as "James III, King of Great Britain and Ireland." On October 23, 1716, Gyllenborg sent word to Gortz that Sweden i taust renounce Bremen and Verden or overthrow the Hano- verian dynasty; which, on account of the general dissatis- faction with the government, could, he represented, be easily accomplished. Ten thousand Swedish troops with arms for fifteen or twenty thousand English and Scotch revolutionists, would be sufficient to overthrow George I and establish James Edward in the kingdom. A few days later he informed Gortz 364 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The Czar'a attempt to secure a French aUianoa that he had conferred with the Jacobite leaders in London, who were ready to send to The Hague or to Sweden, as might - be preferred, sixty thousand pounds sterling for the expedi- tion, if they could have a word from Charles XII promising his aid. Similar assurances were soon afterward received by Gortz through Sparre from Avignon. In the meantime Gortz had obtained from Charles XII his written permission to make "a loan of money from any source, and upon any conditions, that would be for the ser- vice and interest of his master"; but Charles XII had in no way entered into the conspiracy regarding the Pretender, and Gortz dared not in the King's name undertake to sign or promise a contract of the kind demanded. When, therefore, the English government apprehended Gyllenborg, although the correspondence with the Jacobitea disclosed a Swedish intention to borrow money and a Jacobite intention to purchase Swedish aid for the Pretender, it did not convict the King of Sweden of personal complicity with the Jacobites. On the contrary, the correspondence itself showed plainly, as was the fact, that pains had been taken to conceal from Charles XII the real nature of the transaction Gortz was endeavoring to negotiate. It was iatended by the conspirators, if England were actually to be iavaded by Swedish troops, to employ some other motive for the inva- sion, in order to obtain the King's consent.' In December, 1716, Peter the Great had arrived at Am- sterdam and remained in Holland until the following April, engaged in securing artisans and sailors and in trying to borrow money to complete his navy. Between Russia, which was threatening to absorb or control the Baltic trade, and England, which was now convinced that Sweden was conspiring with the Pretender to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty, the position of Charles XII was, indeed, desperate.' 1 See for the complot, Chance, as before, pp. 167, 184; Syveton, Uerreur de Gortz in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, IX (1895) and X (1906) ; and Lemontey, Histoire de la Rigence, II, p. 386. ' Although war had not been formally declared upon Sweden by England, on April 2, 1717, a British fleet had sailed for the Baltic under command of Sir George Byng, with orders "to join in all opera- 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 365 If British commerce could have been protected, Gortz and Chap, v Gyllenborg disavowed, and Bremen ceded to Hanover, the treaties of friendship between England and Sweden might have been renewed and the navy of England employed for the recovery of the Swedish provmces, the possession of which by the Czar was a menace to Great Britain's Baltic trade. It was the fear of such an agreement that made Peter the Great anxious for a French alliance; but Charles XII was too much blinded by resentment toward George I, and by his determination to yield to no one, to seek or accept con- ciliation with England. On the contrary, he demanded the immediate surrender of Gyllenborg; and Jackson, the English minister at Stockholm, was at once arrested, to be held until the Swedish minister was delivered to Charles XII. It was in these circumstances that Peter the Great made his famous visit to Paris in April, 1717. The Regent would have preferred that he remain in Holland, for he had no desire to enter into political relations with the enemy of George I, nor, in fact, to take any part in the northern embroglio.* But courtesy to so powerful a sovereign could not be prudently withheld, and the Czar was received at Paris with marked civility, f^ted and banqueted, with his numerous suite, who bore away the most vivid impressions of the charms and delights of Parisian hospitality.^ It was not, however, for pleasure that the Czar had come tions with the Danes aa may most effectually annoy the Swedish fleet and prevent their country from being suppUed with provisions." If the Russians asked his help, he was to reply, that the friendship of His Majesty with the Emperor would not permit aiding them while Russian troops remained in the Empire. See Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 214, 215. ' The Czar also had been suspected of compUcity in the Jacobite conspiracy against George I, but although this suspicion had been removed (see the correspondence in Guichen, Pierre le Grand et le pre- mier traite Franco-Russe, pp. 103, 127), the relations between George I and Peter the Great continued to be unfriendly on account of the reten- tion of Russian troops in Mecklenburg. ' For a detailed account of his reception, see Le Glay, Les origines Mstoriques de ralliance frangaise, p. 221 et seq.; and Guichen, Pierre fe Grand, p. 165 et seq. 366 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V to Paris. He had been successful in the war with Sweden, ^- "• » and he was seeking an ally who would help him to retain the 1715-1731 a J f ■ spoils he had won. In the possession of these he felt himself to be far from secure; for England and Hanover were hostile to Russia, the Emperor was in alliance with England, Den- mark was as much opposed to Russia as to Swedei^^ and since the presence of Russian troops in Germany Frederick Augustus I of Poland had mistrusted the Czar's designs and had been seeking closer relations with George I. Thus, Peter the Great foimd himself in danger of complete isolation in the North, with the chance of a strong combination against him. Before his arrest and imprisonment, Gortz had visited Paris and laid siege to the Regent to obtain his mediation with Russia, but in vain. At an earlier period the Regent, fearing the Czar's possible union with the Hapsburgs, had endeavored to approach him with a view to an understand- ing, and Prussia had used good offices to promote this end; ' but since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in the previous January the situation had entirely changed. Up to the moment of this last event, the regency had been deeply interested in the prospect of an alliance with Russia, even though it might involve the ruin of Sweden. Subsidies had, indeed, been continually supplied by France to Charles XII ; ^ but the weakness of Sweden had greatly diminished the value of that kingdom as a foil to be used against the Emperor, and it was hoped that Russia and Prussia might in future serve the purpose for which the Swedes, along with the Turks and Hmigarians, had been employed by Louis XIV. The Triple Alliance had, however, rendered this plan impracticable. The ncgo- The approaches of France to Russia had already so far FrMc^Md committed the Regent before the Triple Alliance was con- Ruseia cluded that the blank refusal of an entente would have given • For these negotiations, see Vassileff, Russisch-framosische Politik, pp. 63, 71. 2 These subsidies had been promised to Charles XII at Bender by a treaty of September 1, 1712. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 367 offence to Peter the Great; and the Regent was, therefore, Chap, v disposed to act with caution. Huxelles had strongly favored ^^f-; ^; close political relations with Russia and was opposed to the • Triple Alliance, which he disliked and would have been pleased to destroy. Dubois, on the contrary, was determined that no political alliance should be made with the Czar which would be offensive to George I; maintaining that Russia was a distant power, whose predominance in the North, even if it could be made useful to France, was not certain to be continued when Peter the Great should pass away and his impromising son should succeed him. In this contest between the of&cial and the secret diplo- macies of France, it was Dubois who bore off the palm of victory. To him the one important matter was to maintain intact the Treaties of Utrecht, which barred the Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France; and the Anglo-Dutch alliance was for this purpose the mainstay of the regency. It was from this point of view that the negotiations with Russia were to be conducted. Since it was necessary for France to take a position regarding the crisis in the North, Dubois was resolved that it must be taken for the benefit of the Triple Alliance, or at least in such a manner as not to disturb that corner-stone of the Regent's system. It was between Sweden and England, therefore, rather than between Sweden and Russia that France was now most anxious to make peace. ^ When negotiations were resumed by Peter the Great in person at Paris, his zeal for an alliance with France became from day to day more and more manifest. Russia was ready, he said, in all respects, to be to France more than Sweden had ever been; and, in fact, since that empire had fallen, to take its place in the Frenchsystem. He asked nothingfrom France that had not already been accorded to Sweden. The subsi- ' See the instructions to La Marck, the French ambassador to Sweden, who, on March 7, 1717, was ordered to urge Charles XII to make peace. Geffroy, Instructions aux ambassadeurs, etc., II, Suede, p. 283. A. D. 1715-1731 368 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V dies France had paid to Charles XII had brought no return; but if paid to Russia, he argued, they would procure the friendly and efficient co-operation of a really powerful ally in the North, great commercial advantages, and in addition the support of Prussia and Poland, already allied with Russia. But it was not a question of what Russia could or would do for France. The iutention of the regency was fixed and unalterable, — • nothing could be imdertaken that would in the least endanger the Triple Alliance. The Treaty of Without the intention of forming any political compact, Amaterdam ^^^ merely with a view of retaining his friendship, after the Czar's departure from Paris the Regent directed Chdteau- neuf to reopen negotiations with him at Amsterdam, but to make no haste in reaching a conclusion. Much time was spent in wrangling over purely ceremonial questions, — the French firmly refusing to accord to Peter the Great the title "Majeste Czarienne" proposed by Kura- kin; — but a treaty was finally concluded on August 15, 1717, in behalf of France, Russia, and Prussia,^ which was in reality neither one of alliance nor even of commerce. No binding future obligations were Imdertaken, except that by the secret articles Russia was to guarantee the Treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and France was to guarantee the peace that should be made ia the North, but only after it should have been concluded by the previous agreement of the powers. In brief, the compact was, as it was intended by Dubois that it should be, entirely illusory. It was of such a nature ^ that even the secret articles could be at once shown to Eng- land and Holland without giving the slightest occasion for offence; and this disclosure appears to have been promptly made, much to the disgust of Peter the Great, who upon learning of it declared that until he knew in what manner the contents of the treaty had been divulged he could enter into no further negotiations with France.^ ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 490. ' Campredon to Dubois, in Sbomik, XL, p. 410. A. D. 1715-17.31 STJPKEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 369 Thus, Russia, except for the alliance of Prussia, was left Chap, v in isolation, while confronted by the growing hostility of her former allies in the North. These had been rendered dis- trustful by the Franco-Russian negotiations, for they feared that France might be secretly furnishing to Russia financial aid that would seriously affect them; but they were soon re- assured upon this point. The true nature of the Treaty of Amsterdam was not difl&cult to infer when, soon after its terms were settled, the Czar withdrew his troops from Mecklenburg. The aggressive period of the coalition against Sweden was now ended, and the failure of Peter the Great to obtain from France the support he desired may be con- sidered the first decisive step toward the pacification of the North.i II. The Quadruple Alliance and the Peace of Nystad In the negotiations of France with Peter the Great, Dubois, Dubois- having already become a member of the Council for Foreign ^3^°^^°' Affairs, had gained another triumph. The chief need of pacification France at the time was repose; and the r61e of the regency, if it was to render the Regent in the eyes of Europe the most eligible ruler of that monarchy, was that of a general peacemaker. This, then, was the policy which Dubois intended to pur- sue: in conjunction with England and the United Provinces to render permanent the Peace of Utrecht; and to complete it by composing the affairs of the North through French mediation, and those of Italy through the reconciliation by England of Charles VI and Philip V upon the basis of the existing treaties. Personal as it was in its leading motive, the end sought was not imworthy of high statesmanship. It was intended to prove to Europe that France imder the regency was to be no longer a disturber of the public peace, but the most unselfish and beneficent of peacemakers. The ' Although the Treaty of Amsterdam gave Peter the Great little satisfaction, it marked the beginning of permanent diplomatic relations between France and Russia. VOL. m. — 24 370 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V effect of such a policy, it was calculated, would be to render ^- ^- the Duke of Orleans in the eyes of all the nations necessary to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. What then were the obstacles to the execution of this mag- nificent programme? First of all, the hostility of Charles VI and Philip V; and second, the desire of the powers of the North to appropriate the spoils of Sweden. The two ob- structions to Dubois' pacific policy, though far removed in space, were intimately connected in the realm of action; and, in fact, so closely interlaced as to present one complex Euro- pean problem. The future of the Baltic and the future of the Mediterranean were linked together in a manner that rendered them inseparable. The bond of union between the questions relating to the Baltic and the Mediterranean was the identification of the interests of the regency and of England. The hopes of the Regent h\mg upon the exclusion of the Spanish branch of the House of Bourbon from the throne of France. For this purpose the Treaties of Utrecht, which guaranteed the re- nunciation of Philip V, must be maintained; and for this the alliance with England was necessary. It was, therefore, the secret intention of the Regent to maintain the Triple Alliance, which was possible only by serving the English interests. In the North the interest of England was to secure its commerce in the Baltic both against Swedish depredations and Russian domination; but the interest of George I was also, as Elector of Hanover, to obtain permanent possession of Bremen and Verden for his electorate; and to acquire this advantage for Hanover all the influence of Great Britain was likely to be drawn into the conflict. In the Mediterranean the interest of England was, first of all, to retain Gibraltar and Port Mahon, taken from Spain; and second, to maintain a balance between the claims of the Emperor Charles VI and Philip V in Italy. Thus far neither of these contestants had abated any part of his pretensions. Charles VI had not recognized Philip V as King of Spain, and demanded as a condition new aggran- dizements in Italy, — Sicily, the sovereignty of Parma and A. L>. 1715-1731 StrPEEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 371 Tuscany, dear to the heart of Elizabeth Farnese, and the Chap, v cession of Montferrat and a part of the Duchy of Milan for the Duke of Savoy. Philip V, on the other hand, would yield to none of these demands. Two valiant and capable diplomatists were pitted against The schemes Dubois and Stanhope in this battle for peace. In the North Ai^er^.d'""' Gortz, liberated from captivity, conceived the bold idea of a reconciliation between Sweden and the Czar by sacrificing the Baltic provinces then in his possession, in order with his support to turn all the force of Sweden toward the conquest of Norway, thus making Sweden an Atlantic rather than merely a Baltic state, with the wide ocean for its horizon.^ In the South Alberoni was busy with the regeneration of Spain. The army and navy were undergoing reorganization and the finances had been placed upon a sound foundation. His policy was to rehabilitate and extend the entire Spanish monarchy, which with all its vast colonial interests was not only to be kept intact, but the disposal made of the Spanish possessions in Italy by the Treaties of Utrecht was to be challenged, and the treaties themselves were to be nullified by force of arms. While the regency had prepared the way through its treaty with Peter the Great for mediating a peace in the North that would serve the interest of England, Stanhope had in return undertaken to promote a reconciliation between the Emperor and the King of Spain, which by leaving Philip V secure on his Spanish throne would prevent his eligibility for that of France. For this task England was in a favorable position, for the alliance with the Emperor opened the door for such media- tion at Vienna, and the desire of Alberoni to win or neutralize the influence of England rendered intimacy with the British representative welcome at Madrid. He was instructed to urge upon Alberoni the importance of reconciliation with the Emperor, proposing to Philip V for one of his sons the ' There were in the meantime inconsequential negotiations con- ducted by the Holstein-Gottorp minister, Fabrice, for which see Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 240, 251. 372 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, if he would abandon France •*■ "• to the Regent and Italy to the Emperor; and at the same time the ambassador at Vienna was directed to induce Charles tion of the eonflict VI to recognize Philip V. At Madrid the British proposal was coldly received. Dubois would have added Sardinia to the bribe; but Stan- hope opposed this, on the ground that, if the Emperor took Sicily, as he demanded, Sardinia must be reserved as com- pensation to the Duke of Savoy, who would by this transac- tion be divested of Sicily, already in his possession. The precipita- The project of a general peace was now menaced by re- newed preparations for war. Relations between the Emperor and Philip V had been recently strained anew by the arrest and imprisonment at Milan of Molines, the Grand Inquisitor of Spain, while travelling with a passport from the Pope, and the seizure of his papers by the Imperialists. Urged on by Elizabeth Farnese, Philip V thought the occasion ripe for the recovery of Italy, and in August, 1717, Spanish forces occupied Sardinia, which Philip V refused to evacuate. War being thus actively renewed, the attitude of the powers was soon defined. England was already bound by the treaty with the Emperor to defend his claims in Italy. Spain must, therefore, be opposed; and Alberoni, whose policy was to destroy the Treaties of Utrecht, must be vanquished.' Would France also take sides with the Emperor against Philip V? That would be a complete inversion of the policy of Louis XIV; and, in effect, a revival with the aid of France itself of the Grand Alliance which had opposed the attempt to place Philip V upon the Spanish throne. In France the government of the Regent was beset with serious difficulties. Neither the economies suggested by Noailles nor the credit promised by the Scotch adventurer John Law, had saved his administration from vigorous cen- sure. In addition there were religious difficulties growing out of strained relations with Rome. Behind all was the ' For the contention that the alliance with the Emperor wag itself a violation of the neutrality of Italy on the part of England, see Bour- geois, Le secret du R&gent, p. 203. SUPKEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 373 antagonism of those who condemned the Triple AlUance as Chap. V a surrender to England. There was, however, but one way ^- °- to overcome this opposition, namely, to move straight for ward and insist upon the policy of pacification in the face of all obstacles. To retreat was now impossible, and to ad- vance in any direction without England was equally so. To abandon the Triple Alhance was to surrender the Treaties of Utrecht, and the abrogation of those treaties would be a death-blow to the hopes of the regency. If war must come, the Regent determined to place France in opposition to the ambitions of Elizabeth Famese and Alberoni, and to compel Philip V to recede from his pretensions. Fortunately for the prospects of the peace policy, the war The embar- in Italy was not yet in the full tide of activity, for the Em- Dubmrand^ peror had not taken the steps he would be obliged to take stanhope if peace could not be obtained by mutual concession. In the North there was also a lull in the conflict; for, upon re- gaining his liberty, Gortz had met the Czar in Holland, had offered him large concessions for the sake of peace with Rus- sia, and to Frederick William I the cession of Stettin, if Prussia would aid Sweden in regaining Bremen and Verden. Both Peter the Great and the King of Prussia had listened with interest to the seductions of Gortz, and conferences were soon to be held for the purpose of negotiating a peace between Sweden, Russia, and Prussia. There was still a chance, therefore, for a general pacifica- tion; but it was rendered difficult by Alberoni's warlike operations in the South and Gortz's peace proposals in the North. Stanhope, not less than Dubois, was seriously embarrassed by the situation; for while he had failed to reconcile the Emperor and Philip V, Dubois had proved equally powerless to disengage England from the embroglio in the Baltic, and the Hanoverian policy of Stanhope was creating an amount of criticism in England which threatened to wreck the ministry. Through his influence with the Regent Dubois' policy of Dubois' visit peace had now become official in France, but for this reason *° ^""^o" 374 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V it threw upon him an enormous responsibility. The old court A. D. party, represented in the foreign office by Marshal d'Huxelles, inspired by a different order of ideas, was secretly impeding the success of Dubois' programme of action. With the Eari of Peterborough, — a disappointed Whig who had turned Jacobite and hated the Emperor bitterly because of personal slights received from him, — secretly serving the interest of the Duke of Parma, and traversing Europe with a plan of his own to form a league of the Bourbons and the princes of Italy against the Emperor, upon the understanding that Philip V should renounce the throne of France to the Ee- gent; and with Huxelles, who was more interested in the suc- cess of Peterborough's scheme than in Dubois' peace policy, instructing the French agents. La Marck at Stockholm and Rottembourg at Berlin, in a sense opposed to the plan of pacification agreed upon, the Abbe required all of his skill and patience to preserve his hold upon the Regent.^ If his plan of action was to be carried through, there was no time to be lost; and, on September 20th, 1717, Dubois set out for London, where he and Stanhope could take counsel together. To watch the situation in his absence and to pre- vent his adversaries from gaining the ear of the Regent, a capable spy, Nancr6, commandant of the Swiss guards, was left on duty at Paris, with whom Dubois carried on a close correspondence. In addition Chavigny, a keen diplomatist attached to the foreign office, was charged with the task of watching Huxelles and reporting his actions.^ Received in special audience by George I, Dubois explained his mission as aiming to obtain a reconciliation between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and to ascertain the views and expectations of His Majesty regarding peace in the North. With Stanhope his relations were friendly and intimate, and even the painful knowledge of the prevailing hostility to the Regent in France was not concealed from him. So 1 See Bourgeois, Le secret du Regent, pp. 228, 234. ^ For an account of Dubois' preparations and journey, see Bliard, Cardinal Dubois, I, p. 282. SUPKEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 375 impressed was Dubois by the feeling of cordiality and sym- Chap, v pathy in London for the regency, that in October he wrote ^- "■ to his master the assurance that he was better served by his friends in England than by his own ministers. In the midst of constant festivities, the conversations went on daily, Dubois insisting that if the Emperor were not mod- erate in his demands the Regent could not support his claims, and Stanhope insinuating in reply that indifference to the rights of Charles VI would render the King of Spain, the Regent's "chief enemy," more confident and obstinate than ever. By November 1 the conclusion was reached that, if the The double Emperor would surrender his claim to the throne of Spain ^'^^V," and recognize Philip V as King, England and France would policy miite in urging upon Philip V the abandonment of his pre- tensions in Italy in exchange for the estates of Parma and Tuscany for one of his sons. If the two sovereigns should agree to these terms, peace between them might be happily concluded. If the Emperor consented and Philip V refused, the Triple Alliance should array itself against Spain and secure peace by enforcing these conditions. The arrival of the Emperor's plenipotentiary, Pendten- riedter, sent to London to negotiate on the subject, sud- denly arrested these plans for peace by his blank refusal to entertain for a moment the idea of his master's surrender of his right to the crown of Spain when he was able to send an army of fifty thousand men into Italy to maintain it without making any renimciation whatever. Unless Philip V im- mediately evacuated Sardinia, it would be impossible, he affirmed, to begin any negotiation at Vierma. The grave assurance of this solemn and formal physical giant — who was more than seven feet high — was at first imposing; for he had acquired the conviction that George I, as a prince of the Empire, would in all circumstances main- tain the cause of Charles VI without regard to the attitude of France. It required the best argiunents of Stanhope to con- vince him that the interests of England and those of Hanover, while closely allied, were not in all respects identical. 376 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The turning of the tide against Alboroni But an impediment to the progress of the negotiations more serious than Pendtenriedter's stolid self-complacency - was unexpectedly discovered in disturbing rumors from Paris and the official silence and indifference that followed them. The Regent had in Dubois' absence been won over to Peter- borough's scheme of a Bourbon alliance with the Italian princes against the Emperor. Alberoni had offered the Duke of Orleans the recognition of his eventual right to the crown of France in exchange for his support of the claims of Philip V in Italy. Alberoni appeared to have triumphed, and Dubois seemed to himself abandoned. The skill and coolness with which the disappointed envoy returned to the conflict reveal his indomitable will and his inexhaustible self-confidence. But, happily for his plans, an accidental occurrence had already changed the Regent's determination. The ill health of Philip V had apparently endangered his life; and, at the instigation of Alberoni and the Duke of Parma he had made a will in favor of Elizabeth Farnese, by which, in the event of his death or madness, she should assume the regency of Spain. With this knowledge the Regent was again eager to resume the negotiations with England, and on December 8 Dubois wrote to Stanhope that he would soon return to London authorized to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, Alberoni's eagerness to promote the Farnese ambitions had overshot the mark, and from this time forward the Regent was resolved to overthrow the Italian influence at Madrid. On December 25, after the Regent had refused to partici- pate with Spain in an expedition against Charles VI, even with the annexation of Flanders as a reward, Dubois re- turned to London carrying full powers to conclude a treaty with the Emperor in conjunction with England and Holland; and Nancre was despatched soon afterward to Madrid to procure, if possible, the adhesion of Philip V to a general agreement for peace. It was Alberoni who was now to be treated as the real enemy of the regency in Spain. This ambitious Italian, having obtained the rank of a cardinal, had, with the con- SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 377 nivance and support of the Queen, to whose family interests Chap, v he was entirely committed, become in reality the master in J^j°- the kingdom. To thwart his purposes, destroy his influence, drive him from power, and save Spain from war by promoting a revolt against the rule of the Italians had become in De- cember, 1717, the settled policy of both France and England. But a minister like Alberoni was scarcely less formidable The schemes than a sovereign. Fully entrenched in power through the for'thTovCT services he was rendering, acting in the interest of a queen throw of the whose influence over her husband was unlimited, Alberoni ^^s^"* had already given to Spain forces of resistance such as that country had not possessed for a century, and these forces were practically altogether at his own command. Diplomatically Spain was isolated, but Alberoni was not long in discovering a way to repair this deficiency. The Triple Alliance, whose formation had for its result the iso- lation of Spain, was weak in two directions. In France it was based upon the personal interest of the Regent and did not conform to the traditions, sympathies, and affinities of the French nation. In England it was more soUdly founded upon the national interest, but here too it was at least open to attack on the ground that it existed for the benefit of George I as Elector of Hanover rather than in the interest of Great Britain. For Alberoni, therefore, it was easily possible to oppose the Regent of France and the King of England by aiding or exciting rebellion in those coimtries. For this purpose he espoused the cause of the Pretender, invited him to Spain, and offered him money and troops for the invasion of Scotland. At the same time a junta was formed in Paris , to overthrow the regency of the Duke of Orleans, and the Spanish ambassador, Cellamare, was instructed to furnish all possible aid and encouragement to this revolt. In the North Gortz was laboring with equal assiduity to prevent Bremen from falling to Hanover, and to thwart every effort for an understanding between George I and Peter the Great. While Gortz was urging upon the Czar peace with Sweden and war with Hanover, Frederick William I of 378 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Dubois* methoda and motiTeB Prussia was declining all proposals by George I, openly avowing fear of Russia; and Charles XII, relying upon ■ an arrangement with the Czar, — still uncompleted, — in January, 1718, confidently resumed hostilities against the Danes with an army of thirty-five thousand men in Norway. Discerning the community of interest between Sweden, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, Alberoni conceived the plan of a coalition of these powers for the purpose of first reconciling Russia and Sweden, and then uniting their forces to over- throw George I and establish the Pretender in England; in- tending thus to destroy the Triple Alliance and force a change in the regency of France. Such a combination was in com- plete harmony with the plans of Gortz, and it was almost inevitable that their schemes should be brought into such connection as to form one vast conspiracy.' But nothing of all this was hidden from Dubois. At the same time that Alberoni was plotting in France, the Regent was equally active in Spain. The overthrow of Alberoni and the expulsion of Italian influence from power had become the necessary condition of Dubois' success. While his two ad-' versaries were urging on their masters upon the path of con- quest, the one in Italy, the other in Norway, Dubois had the advantage of working for a great cause, the peace of Europe; and, if war became necessary, he could justly claim that it was because the antagonists would not listen to reason and make due concessions in the interest of peace. In conjunction with Torcy, the most experienced diplo- matist of his time in France, he took counsel of the highest French authorities in the law of nations and the history of events. The learning of Saint-Prest, the historiographer of treaties; the opinions of Saint-Pierre, the theorist of peace; the expert information of cartographers and genealogists ^ The statements of Voltaire regarding the perfection of an inter- national plot at the time of Gyllenborg's arrest, Histoire de Charles XII, Livre VIII, are not only without documentary basis but are anachro- nisms. See Syveton, L'erreur de Gortz, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, X (1896), pp. 522, 526. SUPEEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 379 were solicited and studied with a view to a final formulation Chap, v of terms that could be openly defended. ■*• "• ■*■ '^ 171^1 17*^1 As for the motive underlying this procedure, it was, no — doubt, primarily to serve the Regent, his master; but, if peace, a righteous peace, could be imposed upon the belli- gerents, would not this policy serve France and Europe also better than the wars of conquest proposed by Gortz and Alberoni? It is true that the idea of alliance with the Hapsburgs was a reversal of the traditional policy of France, that an entente with the Emperor to force the hand of Philip V may have seemed to Frenchmen like an act of violence to the in- stincts of their race, and it is certain that the official ambas- sadors of the time were not appropriate instruments for negotiations in this sense; so that a new diplomatic organism, a secret diplomacy in respect to its agents as well as its ob- jects, had to be improvised by Dubois. But, judged either by the customs of his time or by the standards of to-day, the efforts of Dubois to serve his master and to pacify Europe, in spite of the censure to which he has been subjected, are not entirely unworthy of respect, while his skill, energy, and constancy in circumstances of great difficulty display his extraordinary adaptation to his task. The Emperor Charles VI not less than George I had oc- The attitude casion to feel disturbed by the growing power of Russia and °^ charieB vi the inclination of Peter the Great to gain a foothold in Ger- many. If George I, as Elector of Hanover, was anxious to secure the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, Charles VI was not less interested in retaining the friendship of a prince who was not only of importance in the Empire but also the King of England. In 1716 the Emperor had come to the rescue of the Vene- tians against the Turks, and a bitter struggle had followed. Thus preoccupied in the East, and possessing no fleet with which to resist the attack of Spain upon Sardinia, Charles VI had not been able to offer a prompt resistance to Albe- roni's warlike measures, which, on July 1, 1718, included the occupation of Sicily; but on July 21, as the consequence 380 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V of Prince Eugene's victories over the Turks at Peterwardein ,-,"^■^■,,0. tlie Peace of Passarowitz ended the war which the Emperor 1715— 17ol ixr-il 1- ii->ti and Venice had waged against the Sultan, and Charies VI was thus at last free to concentrate all his energies upon the war with Spain.^ If the Emperor was to maintain his supremacy in Italy, he still needed all his resources; and the Enghsh alliance, which alone could render him important aid at sea, was in the existing circumstances more than ever necessary to him. Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, fiefs of the Empire, were hereditary estates of the Famese and Medici famihes, and Elizabeth Farnese was urging the recognition of the right of her sons to the succession when the childless Duke and Grand Duke should pass away; while the suzerainty over them was also claimed by the Pope. Sicily and Sardinia were already in the possession of Spain, and the Austrian dominar tion at Naples was not too well secured. In addition, the Duke of Savoy, nominally King of Sicily, but in fact dispos- sessed by Spain, was coveting Milan as compensation. It is not astonishing that in this extremity Charles VI, who still pretended to be King of Spain, and was surrounded by a group of Spaniards who for reasons of their own were hostile to the Bourbon dynasty, should welcome aid from England and France against the ambitions of Philip V. Notwithstanding the lofty assumptions of Pendtenriedter, Stanhope had long known that Charles VI was not unap- proachable with regard to the renunciation of his pretended rights to the Spanish throne. As the warlike intentions of Alberoni became more manifest, the readiness of Charles VI to accept the joint alliance of England and France for the purpose of imposing conditions of peace upon Philip V was much accelerated; and as early as April 4, 1718, Count Zin- zendorf had communicated to Stanhope the Emperor's de- ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 524 et seq. The peace gave the Morea to Turkey and left to Venice only the Ionian and a few other islands. For Austria, however, an advanced and impreg- nable position at Belgrade had been gained. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 381 cision to participate in the treaty which the Enghsh and Chap. V French negotiators were preparing at London. •*■■"• While Stanhope and Dubois were elaborating the plan of pacification and endeavoring to induce the Emperor to make the renunciations demanded of him, Gortz was busy in the The Aland island of Lofo, one of the Aland group, negotiating with the o""^^"""" Russian commissioners a separate peace with Sweden. From May 23, 1718, when Gortz arrived in Lofo, "the eyes of all Europe were anxiously fixed upon this rocky islet in the Gulf of Bothnia where the peace of the North was about to be decided." So large and optimistic were the pretensions of Gortz that the Russian commissioners never suspected the extreme ex- haustion of Sweden. The courage of the King, the devotion of the army, and the pretence that Hanover and Denmark were on the point of concluding a treaty with Charles XII were all skilfully exploited by this shrewd diplomatist to cast a glamour over the miserable weakness of the kingdom. In the meantime Gortz took occasion to spread the belief that peace with Russia was already assured. George I, alarmed by the prospect of a Russo-Swedish alliance, hastened to offer to Charles XII a million rix-dollars and the friendly good offices of England if he would permit Hanover to aimex Bremen and Verden; and Prussia, fearful of being abandoned by the Czar, became anxious for an understanding. To the proposal of George I Charles XII returned an ab- solute refusal; but suggested that, if England would supply Sweden with twelve battle-ships, he would permit Bremen to be retained by Hanover until the money paid for that duchy to Denmark had been repaid, — a proposition which the English government could of course not accept. With a show of superiority and condescension that stupe- fied the Russian negotiators, Gortz, with everything at stake, continued his desperate game at Lofo until he had obtained with the sanction of the Czar an offer to restore Finland, Livonia, and Esthonia to Sweden, on condition that Ingria, with Narva, St. Petersburg, and a part of Carelia, were ceded to Russia. An alternative offer was that, if Ingria, Livonia, 382 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The collimon of the two eystems and Esthonia were ceded to him, the Czar would restore Finland to Sweden and aid Charles XII to recover his Ger- man possessions and conquer Norway. When Gortz pre- sented these terms to his master at Gothenburg, the King, with his characteristic independence, declared that these terms were "too high-flying," and sent the diplomatist back to Lofo to obtain better conditions.' The time had now arrived when the two groups that had been working in opposition should at last come into open collision. In March, 1718, Alberoni had instructed the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Beretti-Landi, to form a union with Sweden; and negotiations had at once been opened with an agent in the confidence of Charles XII. At the same time Beretti-Landi received offers of aid from the Russian envoy at The Hague, Golowkin; and the Russian ambassador at Paris, Baron Schleinitz, was directed to in- form the Regent that, if he continued to pursue the negoti- ations with England for the restraint of Spain, he would soon be confronted with a coalition of the powers of the North against France. The intention of this announcement was by intimidating the Regent, to detach him from England; thus weakening the support of George I, and as a result isolating the Emperor. For this purpose Spain was ready to furnish Charles XII with money; Sweden was to conclude peace with Russia; and these two powers, uniting, were to restore the Swedes to their pos- sessions in Germany, establish the Russians in Mecklenburg, and thus prevent the possibility of the Emperor's action in Italy. Alberoni had thoroughly spun his web. In France the Regent was to be overthrown by a domestic revolt, and in England the Elector of Hanover was to be driven from the throne by the Pretender. The Duke of Maine was to be es- tablished in the regency, and the Pretender was to be recog- nized and enthroned in England. In France the Spanish ' For a full account of the Aland conferences, see Bacmeister and Arndt, Beytrdge zur Geschichte Peters des Grossen, Riga, 1774-1784, III, Appendix. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 383 ambassador, Cellamare, under the orders of Alberoni, be- Chap. V came the centre of a vast conspiracy operating from Paris. Nancr^ at Madrid was so fully won over to the Farnese point of view that he advised the Regent to abandon the negotia- tions with England. Huxelles, holding the same views, se- cretly and at last openly strove to ruin the projects of Dubois. Since May, 1718, the Abbe, left practically without other sup- port than his friends in England and the English ambassador at Paris, had no ground for hope except his personal influ- ence with the Regent, who was harassed on every side by secret and open enemies. In June, notwithstanding these embarrassments. Stan- hope and Dubois agreed upon four points: (1) Charles VI should renounce the throne of Spain and recognize Philip V; (2) Sardinia should be restored to Charles VI, who would cede it to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily; (3) the succession of Parma and Tuscany should be guaranteed to the sons of Elizabeth Farnese; (4) Charles VI and Philip V should have four months in which to accept these conditions. In case of refusal, England and France would imite to en- force their acceptance. In order to render these conditions effective, on June 15, Sir George Byng sailed to the Medi- terranean with twenty ships of the line, under orders to compel the Spaniards to abandon hostilities. The earnestness with which England had entered into these The Quadruple negotiations is evident from the sacrifices the ministry was ■*^"'^°<=^ prepared to make in order to render them successful. Stan- hope, who in person visited Spain for the purpose, offered to restore Gibraltar,' if Philip V would accept the conditions proposed, which in substance had been presented to him before Admiral Byng arrived in the Mediterranean; but Alberoni, who was already in possession of both Sardinia and Sicily, relying upon the success of his military prepara- tions for the invasion of Italy, rejected all offers aiming at a peaceful settlement. ' Stanhope did not, however, fuUy appreciate the value of Gibral- tar to Great Britain, and has been censured for his willingness to sacrifice it. 384 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The triumph and disap- pointment of Gortz On July 17, the Regent laid the conditions agreed upon by Stanhope and Dubois before the Council of Regency. The Duke of Maine opposed the idea of an alliance with England to enforce them; but the next day the preliminaries were signed at Paris, and on August 2 Dubois and Stanhope concluded the definitive treaty at London.' The adhesion of the Emperor two weeks later rendered the Quadruple Alliance a certainty; for, although the United Provinces did not openly join this coalition until more than a year after- ward, the union of the four powers to impose peace upon Spain was already practically assured. In the meantime the opposition had not been idle. At the end of July Gortz had returned to his "enchanted island," as Lofo was called by him, to resume negotiations for peace between Sweden and Russia. The Russian commissioners had anxiously awaited his reappearance, but the delay finally coimted in his favor and had the effect of accelerating the negotiations. On August 26, at Abo, the Czar signed a treaty by which, in consideration of the cession to him of the Baltic provinces, he promised to aid Sweden to obtain compensation from Denmark and Hanover. Gortz in joyful triumph sought the signature of his master, but encountered the same obstinacy that had always char- acterized that imperturbable monarch. Charles XII, de- claring that he would not surrender realities in return for illusory promises, firmly refused to approve the treaty. The refusal was to Gortz a crushing blow, for it was only by the most strenuous exertions that he had raised money to equip the army, improve the navy, and impart to the king- dom the deceptive appearance of strength with which by skilful exaggeration he had imposed upon the credulity of the Russian commissioners. The obstinate King paid little attention to the protests and arguments of his minister, and Gortz returned to what seemed a hopeless task at Lofo. In doing so he was fully conscious of the grave danger in which he was personally placed, for he was in reality not a regular minister of state ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 531 et seq. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 385 in the Swedish kingdom, but a jealously regarded alien whose Ceap. V only authority grew out of his personal relation to the sov- ereign who had clothed him with almost supreme power in matters of administration. In his effort to serve his master he had incurred the resentment of the people, and in stand- ing for the succession of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp as the legitimate heii to the throne he was exposed to powerful opposition by the court faction which favored the candidacy of the Princess Ulrica as more likely than the young prince to restore peace to the realm when the tempestuous Charles XII should pass away. Between the fear that the King's death might suddenly destroy all his hopes for the future of Sweden and the obstacles which while living the monarch was placing in his way, Gortz began to realize the helpless- ness of his situation; for, while Charles XII intrusted him with almost arbitrary administrative power, he treated his diplomatic endeavors with contempt, and refused to strengthen his hands by himself determining the question of the succession. Thus paralyzed by the failure of the negotiations of Gortz Aiberom's m the North, the coalition which Alberoni had hoped to form j°*J'"*'' " was menaced in the South by the Quadruple Alliance, which was bent upon his overthrow. He, however, had not been idle. Fully aware of the real significance of the alliance, he perceived that the Emperor's adhesion was the pivotal point in the treaty; for, without his renunciation of his claims to the Spanish throne, the Regent's motive would be destroyed, and without the Regent's support the Quadruple Alliance would fall to pieces. Alberoni's aim was, therefore, to overpower the Emperor by creating an alliance against him in Italy, and to weaken the Regent in France by raising a storm of dissent from his policies. Of the Duke of Parma he was sure, but the resources of Parma and Piacenza were inconsiderable. But other Italian prmces might be induced to respond to the cry, "Let us drive the Germans out of Italy!" The Duke of Savoy was offered a defensive and offensive alliance and the service of VOL. III. — 25 386 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Spanish troops, paid from the revenues of Sicily, for tha '^- "• conquest of Milan. But the expulsion of the Germans from ■ Italy was not an easy task. The Italians might well have re- sented their intrusion, but their imion was impossible. The sense of national unity did not exist. The proposals of Spain were regarded with suspicion, the princes were jealous of one another, and Alberoni's scheme of imiting Italy against the Emperor proved impracticable. It was Spain, not the Emperor, that was soon to be placed on the defensive. The conspiracy The efforts to Overthrow the Regent by creating revolution of CeUamare j^^ Frauce Were equally ineffectual. Inflammable materials were by no means wanting. The adherents^of the Pretender were scattered about Europe and particularly numerous in France, breathing forth enmity to the Hanoverian djmasty because it was Protestant, German, and, as was alleged, "anti-English," and especially condemnatory of the close relations of the regency with George I. In France the in- fluence of the old court party had always been exerted to promote the cause of the Jacobites, and never more earnestly than since the advent of the regency. The Spanish ambas- sador, Cellamare, had long before received formal orders from Alberoni to enter into close relations with these mal- contents and to give them every encouragement. The question has been much discussed by contemporaries and by historians whether this opposition to the Regent was in fact more than mere rhetorical censure, and how far it was a real peril to the regency. Argenson in his "Memoires" represents that his father, by unearthing the conspiracy against the Regent, "saved his authority, his honor, and perhaps his liberty and his life," at a moment when he was "betrayed and on the verge of a revolution." ' Lemontey, on the contrary, refers to the cabal against the Regent as merely a "conspiration de grammairiens," and declares with one of the conspirators, Boisdavy, "It is not in the Bastille, but in an asylum for the feeble-minded, that such visionaries should be placed." '^ The truth is, that there were four or, ^ Argenson, Mimoires, I, p. 39. 2 Lemontey, Histoire de la Rigence, II, p. 411. A.D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 387 five factions whose antipathies, for different reasons, were Chap, v strongly excited against the Regent and his policies; but there was no strong leader, no heroic purpose, and no spirit of personal sacrifice sufficient to create a real revolution and produce a civil war. As Saint-Simon has well expressed it, inanition was at that time the great evil in France. The ab- solutism of the previous reign had destroyed all personal ini- tiative. "No harmony, no courage, except at the fireside, a servile habit which ruled everywhere, and which, at the least lifting of the eyebrow, made every one tremble, those who were capable of figuring in the first or second place even more than the others." ' Had Phifip V appeared in France with an army, the regency might have passed into his hands. In another quarter diplomacy had already given place to The triumph action. The occupation of Sicily by the Spanish troops had °' °"''"" driven the Duke of Savoy into the arms of the Quadruple Alliance, and on August 22 Admiral Byng under orders to preserve the neutrality of Italy pending the acceptance of the terms imposed by the allies, incited to battle by the action of the Spanish fleet, had destroyed it off Cape Passaro on the coast of Sicily. Decisive events now followed rapidly. On September 24 all the councils of the regency, except that of finance, were suppressed, and Dubois was named secretary of state for foreign affairs. His policy had now become openly and for- mally official, and the Quadruple Alliance represented the deliberate purpose of France. In England the nomination was celebrated as a victory. In France he now possessed the authority of a minister who had won his place and was able to hold it firmly. There was still time for Alberoni to accept the terms of the Quadruple Alhance, but neither he nor Philip V was inclined to do so. On the contrary, irritated by the course pursued by the Regent, on December 10, the King ordered the French ambassador, Saint-Aignan, charged with conspiracy, to leave his dominions withui twelve days. Unwilling to create a rupture, the ambassador refused to depart unless dismissed ' Samt-Simon, Memoires, IX, p. 314. 388 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V in writing. The ministers hesitated, but on the eleventh the „ ■*■ °lo written order of expulsion was placed in his hands, and the 1715-1731 ■ following day, at seven o'clock in the morning, an armed de- tachment of troops entered the hotel of the embassy, the ambassador and his wife were compelled to dress in haste, and were then hustled into a carriage to be driven to the frontier. In the meantime Dubois had become aware of the conduct of Cellamare, and on December 5 his couriers had been ar- rested and his papers seized. Upon the ambassador's request they were returned to him, but twenty-four hours later they were confiscated and carried to the Louvre, among them the correspondence with Alberoni and the evidence of his con- spiracy. On December 13 he was sent to Blois under arrest, and when later he was conducted to the frontier it was ne- cessary to protect him from the indignation of the populace. The conduct of Spain, and particularly the efforts of Al- beroni to excite revolt against the government of France placed the policy of the Regent and the influence of Dubois in a new light. Aiberoni'fl On December 25, 1718, Philip V published a declaration reSstonw ^ which he solemnly arraigned the Regent as a "private person" who, in the name of the King of France, had "trod- den under foot the most sacred rights and had broken the imion which had cost the life of a million men, and for which Louis XIV had risked everything, even to his own State." Stigmatizing the Regent as "a rebel to the Most Christian King and a traitor to his country," he appealed to the French army to unite with the Spaniards to defeat their common foes. Alberoni, while endeavoring to justify himself to the Re- gent, on the ground that it was the King who was respon- sible for the non-acceptance of the terms required by the Quadruple Alliance, was, nevertheless, ceaseless in his activ- ity to strengthen his means of resistance. The utter failure of Gortz to obtain at Lofo terms of peace with Russia left Spain without the desired aid in the North. It had been expected that Sweden, Russia, and Prussia would A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 389 before the winter be able to place forty thousand troops in Chap, v Germany, who would occupy Brunswick-Luneburg, and by taking possession of Holstein force Denmark to make peace and support the Russians. Hanover would then be at the mercy of the Northern allies, and an attack on Scotland would so completely preoccupy England that there would be no disposition to carry on war in Germany for the defence of the electorate. The British fleet would be required at home; and would, therefore, be obhged to leave the Medi- terranean and thereby withdraw English support from the Emperor in Italy. But the hope of "something considerable from that quarter" was now dispelled. The death of Charles XII, who was killed on December 11, by a shot in the head while in the trenches before Frederikshald ended all possibility of a Swedish attack in Scotland. It was fatal also to the plans of Gortz. Arrested immediately after the death of the King, he was thrown into prison, which he left to ascend the scaffold in expiation of his acts under the condemnation of hostile judges. It was only to Russia that Alberoni could now look for The proposals aid; but, although Peter the Great was in correspondence "' ^^"^p ^ with Beretti-Landi, and large subsidies were promised for Russian help, nothing practical resulted from the appeal. Still undaunted, Alberoni persisted in fitting out an armada for the invasion of Scotland under the command of Ormond; but the ships were dispersed by storms, and the expedition ended in total failure. Practically delivered from apprehension of a serious con- flict with Sweden, in December, 1718, England formally declared war upon Spain; France followed in January, 1719; and by the following April the French army had invaded the kingdom of Philip V. On June 12, 1719, Philip V informed the Prince of Conti that he had engaged in war with France only through love for his native country in the hope of de- livering it from what he had believed to be an imwelcome rule; but that, since France seemed content with the exist- ing government, he was disposed to unite with the Regent in restoring peace. To this end he was ready to yield to the 390 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Emperor Sicily and Sardinia, if his eldest son by Elizabeth ^■^- Farnese could be established in the estates of Parma and 1715-1731 ■ Tuscany; he would also make a suitable arrangement with the Duke of Savoy, conclude peace with England on condi- tion that Gibraltar and Port Mahon were surrendered and indemnity paid for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and renounce for himself and his successors the crown of France, except that the Infante Don Philip, his second son, should succeed to the throne of France in case of the death of Louis XV, with the understanding that the two crowns should never be united. In order to manifest the "love" which had been inspired in him by "the great qualities and wise govern- ment" of the Regent, he would agree to procure from the Three Estates of France consent that the French Nether- lands and Burgundy should be ceded to the Duke of Orleans with the title of King; and that Alsace should be restored to the Emperor, whose daughter should marry the Duke's son, the Duke of Chartres, with the Austrian Netherlands as a marriage portion. This extraordinary programme terminated with the pro- posal that France, Spain, and the Emperor should unite to reduce the pride of George I, "who acted as if he were the arbiter of Europe, dividing its kingdoms to suit his fancy, with the purpose of raising himself above the sovereigns of Germany, and even the Emperor, by means of the power of Great Britain." To limit this power, it should be divided. England should be given to George I, if he accepted these terms of peace; Scotland and Ireland to James III, "the legitimate king, who, being a powerful claimant to the Eng- lish crown, would keep King George within his proper limits." ' To this proposal the Regent made no reply. It was too chimerical for serious consideration; but it well illustrates how completely the foundations of the absolutist theory of the State had been swept away. The grandson of Louis XIV would dispose of kingdoms as if they were mere family orna- 1 For the full text, see Baudrillart, Philip V el la cour de France, II, pp. 367, 370. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 391 ments, but legitimacy was no longer the basis of distribution. Chap, v George I, although to the Bourbon mind only an interloper, "*■• "■ might have England, if he would only be peaceable, and the • "legitimate kmg" should be content with Scotland and Ireland! Resistance to the Quadruple Alliance had become for The last in- Alberoni a measure of self-preservation. In September, *"if™/ ™'* 1719, his hopes of success appear to have been still unex- Aiberoni tinguished. It was intended that a fleet, under the com- mand of Ormond, should sail from Santander to Brittany; but a rebellion of the ofScers prevented its departure, and like the other ill-organized ventures of Aiberoni this one also failed. Astute and resourceful as the Cardinal was, his schemes were too complicated to be practically fruitful. Although not lacking either in courage or ingenuity, he was wanting in energetic and consecutive action; and his plans, magnificent ia conception, ended in disaster. With great practical insight, Stanhope perceived that Philip V could be brought to accept the Quadruple Alliance only through the disgrace and dismissal of Aiberoni. Dubois joined with him in this conviction. On November 18, therefore, an agreement was concluded at The Hague be- tween France, Great Britain, and the Emperor, granting to Philip V three months in which to accept the terms of the Quadruple AUiance, and announcing that in default of ad- hesion to the treaty within that time the sons of Elizabeth Farnese would be ipso facto forever excluded from the heri- tage of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. At the same time the war was vigorously prosecuted in Catalonia, which was always eager for revolt. But one additional stroke was necessary to decide the fate of Aiberoni. Regarded by Philip V as blameworthy for hav- ing pretended that Spain was capable not only of self-defence but of successful aggression, and abandoned by Elizabeth Farnese as incapable of securing the Italian heritage for her children, the unfortunate minister was soon made the scapegoat of all the sins of the court, and held responsible 392 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V 1715-1731 Adhesion of Philip V to the Quadruple Alliance for all the misfortunes of the kingdom. Even the nurses of the royal children dared to vent their petty spite upon him. ■ But the coup de grace was reserved for the Duke of Parma whose subject he was by his birth. The agents of the Quad- ruple Alliance had long been in negotiation with the Duke to procure his influence for the disgrace of the Cardinal, and France and England now urged that course upon him as the only means of escape from the vengeance of the Emperor. Before the end of November, the Marquis di Scotti was sent to Madrid with personal letters from the Duke of Parma for the King and the Queen, in which Alberoni was represented as the chief obstacle to the peace of Europe, and accused of asserting in his private letters that the real cause of trouble was the passion for power of his royal master. This accusation, which was not entirely without founda- tion, was decisive. The King issued a decree forbidding the Cardinal to take part in any public business, to present him- self in the palace, or to appear before any member of the royal family. He was at the same time ordered to leave Madrid within eight days, and Spanish territory within three weeks. In bitter anger, and with imprecations against his late master, Alberoni, after being accused of carrying off the will of Charles II, left the kingdom in disguise, never to return, and sought a secret asylum in a convent near Bologna. The announcement of his fall was received with joy at London and Paris, where it was regarded as a prelude of peace. But in this Stanhope and Dubois were mistaken. There was truth in Alberoni's accusation that the real obstacle to peace was the determination of Philip V to resist the terms that had been imposed upon him. Having dismissed the offensive minister, Philip V still hoped to recover Gibraltar and Mi- norca, to retain Sardinia, receive indemnity for the loss of his fleet, obtain the restoration of all that had been taken ia : the war, and to enforce the recognition of his sons' rights to ; the Italian heritage without an Imperial investiture. For a time Stanhope feared that the Regent would be - satisfied with the disgrace of Alberoni and conclude a sep- : A. D. 1715-1731 SUPKEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 393 arate peace with Spain. But the desires of Philip V were Chap, v thwarted by the excess of his demands. The Regent was firm in his support of the terms imposed by the Quadruple Alliance. Elizabeth Farnese was fearful that her sons would be excluded from Italy, and on January 26, 1720, Philip V issued a royal decree declaring that, in order to restore the peace of Europe, he would sacrifice his personal interests and those of his kingdom and adhere to the Quadruple Alli- ance. On February 16, Beretti-Landi deposited with the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, the King of France, and the Kiag of England the formal act of adhesion; and, on May 20, this adhesion was officially ratified. Thus was finally confirmed and renewed the renunciation of the crown of France by Philip V; while the evacuation of Sicily, the abandonment to the Emperor of the former Span- ish possessions in Italy, the recognition of the Farnese claims to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and the restoration of Sardinia, — immediately transferred by the Emperor to the Duke of Savoy as compensation for the loss of Sicily, which the Emperor retained, — completed the work of the Quad- ruple Alliance. In the North the death of Charles XII had suddenly The reoon- changed the entire situation and rendered possible negotia- <='iiation of X ri 1 1 •!•/-* Sweden and tions for peace. In Sweden the execution of Gortz was Hanover followed by the triumph of the nobles, who had been held in check during the King's lifetime, and the country fell under the influence of an oligarchy that excluded the Duke of Holstein from the throne, secured the succession to the Princess Ulrica, — whose husband, Frederick of Hesse, soon became by her abdication the recognized ruler, — under the leadership of the so-called "party of freedom and parlia- mentary government." With the death of Charles XII absolute monarchy in his kingdom had come to an end. Although Sweden was strongly disposed toward peace, a general pacification presented a difficult problem; for Rus- sia, Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover were all demanding territorial concessions which in their aggregate amounted to a wholesale dismemberment of the former Swedish empire. 394 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The pacifica- tion of the North The only hope for the rescue of Sweden from destruction lay in the mutual jealousies and hostilities of these rival - powers. As a means of preserving a foothold in Germany, the Swedish ministers would have been pleased to make peace first of all with Russia, in order to obtain support in resist- ing the claims of Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover; but Peter the Great was too exacting. Beheving the kingdom to be defenceless, he arrogantly claimed possession of all his conquests. In order to withstand the wholesale demands of the Czar, which if granted would have left him absolute master of the Baltic, the Swedes were obliged to make generous terms with the other groups of claimants. In preparation for this opportunity, George I had, on August 14, 1719, made an agreement with Prussia by which their interests were to be mutually secured in the settlement with Sweden. On No- vember 20 Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover for a million crowns, and George I, as King of England, under- took the mediation of a general peace. ^ After long and tryiag negotiations, through the mediation of England, on January 21, 1720, Prussia concluded a sep- arate peace with Sweden by which, in return for the cession of Stettin, Western Pomerania, Usedom and WoUin, the alliance of Frederick Wilham I with the Czar was aban- doned;^ and on the same day Great Britain and Sweden formed a defensive alliance.^ On June 3 Sweden concluded peace with Denmark at the expense of the Duke of Holstein- Gottorp, from whom Schleswig was taken and restored to Denmark under the guarantee of England and France.* Frederick Augustus I of Poland had already signed an armistice with Sweden, which later was followed by a definitive peace. Thus Russia, completely isolated, remained the only power hostile to the Swedish kingdom. Encouraged by England, ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 15 et seq. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 21. " For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 18. * For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 29. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 395 whose fleet was sent to the Baltic for Sweden's protection, Chap, v the ministers still resisted the demands of Peter the Great ^•"- for the surrender to him of all the conquests he had made on the Baltic. But, although England would gladly have employed means to restrain the ambitions of the Czar and prevent the surrender of the Swedish provinces, their re- covery seemed too great a task to be attempted. In Febru- ary, 1721, Stanhope, the master mind in Enghsh diplomacy, who had been raised to the peerage as Viscount Mahon and Earl Stanhope, passed away, and the failure of John Law's Mississippi scheme and the bursting of the South Sea bubble had created a financial crisis in both England and France. On August 30, 1721, with the advice of both governments, and through the mediation of France, the Peace of Nystad ended the conflict between Sweden and the Czar.i Peter the Great, who declared that he did "not wish to see from his windows the grounds of his neighbor," obtained the ces- sion of Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and a part of Carelia, but was induced to restore Finland, and paid an indemnity of two million rix-doUars. It was a small price for the mastery of the Baltic.^ III. The Readjustment of Disturbed Relations The triumph of the Quadruple Alliance and the Peace of The results Nystad afforded to Europe a short period of tranquillity. pacVof^o" The problems of the Spanish succession and the future of the Baltic had at last found what promised to be a permanent solution, but it was a solution which introduced into the system of European states two anomalies: a Bourbon dynasty in possession of the thrones of France and Spain, and a monarchy more Asiatic than European in virtual command of the Baltic. Both of these results could not fail to be dis- turbing elements in the European system; for, if the two Bourbon monarchies should ever really unite in a common ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 36. * Aa excellent detailed account of the negotiations is given by Chance, George I and the Northern War, p. 444 et seq. 396 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Dissolution of the Quad' Tuple Alliance policy, they would possess a greater preponderance than had ever been enjoyed by any single power of Western Europe; - and if the Russian Empire, invigorated by the infusion of Western ideas and fully armed with the weapons of a more highly developed civilization, should make use of its newly acquired power. Northeastern Europe would be almost at its mercy. A certain period of repose was, however, assured to Eu- rope by the exhaustion of all the contestants after such long and costly wars, and by the fact that there was no vigorous personality to form and execute new poHcies, since Peter the Great, now approaching the end of his career, had at- tained the main object of his ambition in the North. As usual in such circumstances, diplomacy, having no very clear and distinct aims to direct its activities, was reduced to a series of experiments and readjustments by which it was believed some slight advantage might be obtained, but with- out any definite common purpose or far-reaching plan. The definite end for which the Quadruple AUiance had been formed having been accomplished, it was natural that it should be superseded by other combinations; and espe- cially as strong reasons for a new adjustment had already come into existence. Among these reasons was the disap- pointment of Spain in not securing the restoration of Gib- raltar, a growing coolness between France and England now that their common interests had been served, and a disposi- tion on the part of all three to prevent the too great develop- ment of Hapsburg power, immensely augmented by the concessions wrung from Spain. Besides the actual execution of the settlement provided for by the Quadruple Alliance, there were many outstanding questions between Charles VI and Philip V which it had been agreed should be considered and settled by a congress, in which England and France should act as mediators. After long discussions the place where it was to assemble had been decided upon, and the plenipotentiaries had been invited to meet on October 15, 1720, at Cambray; but the desire of the powers to determine in advance certain matters pertaining A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 397 to themselves prevented its assembling until more than three Chap, v years had elapsed. The most important of the differences between Spain and England was the question of Gibraltar. The Regent re- garded himseK as in honor bound to aid Spain in securing its restoration; but, although Stanhope had at one time of- fered to surrender it, the occasion had passed, and English sentiment was opposed to the idea of restoring it to Spain. In June, 1720, in a personal letter to Philip V, George I had promised that, as soon as he could obtain the consent of Par- liament, he would return the fortress. The Spaniards were not satisfied with this uncertainty, and refused until Gib- raltar was actually restored to deliver the cedulae for the ships which by the terms of the "Asiento" the English were entitled to send to America for carrying on the slave-trade. Another difficulty arose from the sudden refusal of Philip V to submit his renunciation of his claim to the throne of France to the ratification of the Spanish Cortes, unless Charles VI would at the same time submit his renunciation of the throne of Spain to the ratification of the Austrian Landtag; and it was not until September 27, 1721, that a guarantee signed by England and France was accepted in place of these ratifications. But even then the strife was not ended, for Charles VI had in his renunciation assumed the title "King of Spain," and Phihp V that of "Archduke of Austria"; and it required two months of negotiation be- fore the form of the documents could be rendered mutually acceptable. In April, 1721, a change in the ministry in England brought The peace Robert Walpole to power, with Townshend as secretary of ^^^°^ state for the Northern and Lord Carteret for the Southern Department.^ Under this administration domestic policy, guided by Walpole and based firmly on the idea of peace, was devoted to repairing the shattered finances and extending foreign trade, while external relations were completely sub- ordinated to it, in spite of Carteret's ambitious designs, which 1 For Carteret's able services in the pacification of the North, see Chance, George I and the Northern War, p. 333 et aeq. 398 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Ghap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Dubois* am- bition for the oardiniilate were restrained by the less adventurous spirit of Townshend and the King's substantial common sense.' The success of this pacific policy, however, required a good understanding with Spain; which, chiefly on account of Gibraltar and the refusal to grant the cedulae for the slave- ships, it was difficult to obtain, until the personal ambition of Dubois finally came to the rescue. Since 1720 Dubois' strongest desire was to obtain the hat of a cardinal. As it was the custom of the papal court in conferring this honor upon a subject of any one of the three great Catholic powers, — France, Spain, and Austria, — to consult the wishes of the others, Dubois was anxious to win the favor of the Emperor and of Philip V; which, on account of their differences, was not an easy task. Before the death of Stanhope, George I, at his suggestion, had written a personal letter to the Regent asking him to reward his faithful minister by securing for him the cov- eted honor; and much French gold, sent to Rome for this purpose, is said to have poured into the coffers of Clement XI. But the Pope declined to bestow the cardinalate, and it soon became evident that without the assent of Austria and Spain success was not to be expected. The situation in the North gave Dubois an opportunity to please the Emperor, who already had some reason to be well disposed toward him; but in seeking the favor of Philip V more serious obstacles had to be overcome, for there was at the Spanish court a strong antipathy to him as the chief adviser of the Regent, and even the aid of the Duke of Parma was not sufficient to remove it. At Madrid the vulnerable point was, however, the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese for her sons; for since the fall of Alberoni she had been in need of foreign support for the accomplishment of her plans in Italy. Dubois was not long in finding a means of conciliation. ' Carteret is reported to have aaid to Henry Fox, " I want to instill a noble ambition into you; to make you knock the heads of the kings of Europe together, and jumble something out of it that may be of service to this country." See also Morley, Walpole, pp. 68, 69. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 399 It was the offer of a defensive alliance between France and Chap, v Spain, with the prospect of a future triple coalition in which Spain, France, and England would secretly unite to enforce upon the Emperor the wishes of Elizabeth Farnese regarding the establishment of her children in Italy. Although desirous of a good understanding with Spain, The aiuance of the Enghsh ministry was suspicious of a close alliance between ,^^7°®'/°*' Spain and France. When, however, it was learned that, on spaia March 27, 1721, such an aUiance had actually been concluded at Madrid, 1 and England was invited to unite with these two powers in a treaty of friendship, the suggestion was favorably considered. The draft of a treaty presented at London by the French ambassador proposed that France and England should guarantee to the sons of EUzabeth Farnese the immediate recognition by the Emperor of their hereditary right of suc- cession to the estates of the Duke of Parma, with a promise to support the interests of Spain at the Congress of Cambray. In reply it was declared that this engagement could be ac- cepted only on condition that Philip V would recognize the Hanoverian succession in England, and would agree to England's retention of Gibraltar. It was also demanded from France that she would never wage war against the Austrian Netherlands, and would even defend them from attack by any other power. By removing in this manner the chronic causes of conflict between the three powers, Walpole hoped to render permanent their peace and amity. ^ Spanish honor was deeply involved in the return of Gib- raltar, but the advantage to be gained by the English alliance was now urged as a reason for accepting the promise of George I to submit the question to the English Parliament with an agreement to restore the fortress if permission were granted. It was by no means probable that Parliament would ever freely consent to the surrender of the Key to the Mediter- ranean; yet, for the sake of the children of Elizabeth Farnese, ' For the treaty, see Martens, Recueil, A, Supplement I, p. 449. ' The negotiations are fully detailed by Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, pp. 262, 290. 400 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Philip V agreed to recognize the Protestant succession and ^•^- to renew the "Asiento." The proposal for the practical neutralization of the Aus- trian Netherlands by France met with less favor. If these provinces could have been erected into a separate state, as was done a century later by the creation of the Belgian mon- archy, and neutralized by all the powers together, it would have been the means of avoiding many future conflicts; but the question was not at that time of a European guarantee, and it was unreasonable that France alone should undertake to maintain the neutrality of territory belongiag to a rival power like Austria. Although this concession was refused by France, so strong was the British interest in peace with Spain, that, on June 13, 1721, a secret treaty of defensive alliance was concluded between the three powers at Madrid, by which the estates of Parma and Piacenza were guaranteed to the Famese chil- dren, and the signatories undertook to urge upon the Em- peror the demands of Spain in the Congress of Cambray.' The Spanisii As f or the treaty itself, whatever may be said of the mo- tives that inspired it, all the contractants were on the whole satisfied; ^ but it was Philip V who, in spite of the sacrifice of Gibraltar for the future of the children of EHzabeth Farnese, was most happy over the alliance. Spain had at last emerged from her isolation among the great powers, the allies of the Emperor had been transferred to himself, and the Italian inJheritance had been guaranteed to the children of the Queen. But this was not the full measure of the joy felt at the Spanish court. A few weeks after the signature of the new treaty of alliance between Spain, France, and England, marriages were arranged between Louis XV and the only daughter of Philip V, Maria Anna Victoria; and also between Don Louis, heir to the Spanish throne, and a daughter of the marriages 1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 34; for the negotiar tions, Bourgeois, Le secret de Dvhois, pp. 262, 290. 2 Townshend had bitterly opposed the treaty, but the King had insisted upon it and Walpole supported it. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 401 Regent, Mademoiselle de Montpensier. The only obstacle Chap, v in the way of the arrangement was the difficulty in obtaining ^- °- the assent of the yomig king of France. The eleven-years-old ^^^^~^^^^ lad is said to have wept bitterly when he was informed that he was to marry a child of three; but, with a choking voice, when told it was his duty, his assent was given. The exchange of the future royal brides was carried out with solemn ceremonies on the Isle of Pheasants in the Bi- dassoa, where Mazarin had made the peace of France and Spain when Louis XIV brought Maria Theresa to Paris amid the national rejoicing, and both nations now acclaimed with equal fervor the new pledges of peace and friendship. The triumph of Dubois was soon rendered complete by The triumph his success at Rome. To the last, in spite of large sums of °^ D"^""^ money paid and influence brought to bear, in which the Pope's favorite nephew, Albani, and even the Pretender were used as instruments, Clement XI had declined to accord the purple to the ambitious minister, who by the favor of the Regent had already become Archbishop of Cambray; but the death of the Pope and the election of his successor af- forded to Dubois a better opportunity. By the adroitness of Cardinal Rohan a written promise was obtained from Cardinal de Conti that, if he were elected pope, Dubois should be made a cardinal; but when Cardinal de Conti had become Innocent XIII he was not willing to confer the prom- ised honor until Cardinal Rohan threatened that, if the i-ed hat were not immediately bestowed, he would disclose the written agreement and the circumstances under which it had been made. Finally, on June 16, 1721, the coveted distinc- tion was accorded to the Archbishop of Cambray, and the document which had compelled it was surrendered to His Holiness. A week later the Regent presented the new cardinal to Louis XV as "a prelate whom the Pope had been pleased to honor for his great services in upholding the throne of His Majesty and preventing a schism in the Church!"! ' The popular impression was quite different. "Tout le monde est indign^, et cela fait bien du tort h la reMgion, de voir placer dans una VOL. in. — -26 402 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. L). 1715-1731 The maritime ambitions of Charles VI The alliance of France and England with Spain placed Charles VI in a position similar to that in which the Quad- ■ ruple Alliance had placed Philip V; since, like that compact, it was a combination formed with the purpose of enforcing certain concessions from a reluctant monarch. It promised to be equally effective; for Charles VI was already confronted by a powerful enemy in the North. Peter the Great had made his peace with Sweden and held Poland almost as a subject province, whose crown he had offered to bestow upon a French prince if he would marry his daughter. Fred- erick Augustus I of Saxony remained the nominal Polish king, but his tenure of the throne depended upon the will of the Czar, who was able to dethrone him. Moreover, Charles VI was initiating a commercial policy which made it seem to the advantage of Great Britaia to hold firmly to the alliance with France and Spain. During his Spanish campaigns Charles VI, who had wit- nessed the prosperity of the seaport towns of Spain, had beea inspired with the advantage that might accrue to Austria if proper use were made of the opportunities offered for the extension of foreign commerce. On the Adriatic, since by the Peace of Passarowitz Austria had secured the privilege of commerce with the whole of the Ottoman Empire, Trieste promised to become an important emporium of trade with the Levant; while the ports recently acquired by the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands to Austria presented an opportunity for extended commerce on the Atlantic. The possession of Naples and Sicily opened a field for commercial expansion in the Western Mediter- ranean; and the decline of Venice, whose power both on land and sea had been much reduced by the wars with the Turks, created an opportunity for the development of the Emperor's maritime projects in the East. While so many conditions were favorable to Austria's becoming a great sea-power, it was certain that both on the des premieres places de I'figlise un homme connu pour 6tre sans foi et sans religion." — Barbier, Journal hisiorique, 1, p. 141. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 403 Mediterranean and the North Sea opposition would arise. Chap, v In 1722 the Emperor founded the Ostend Commercial Com- pany, with glowing prospects of success ;i but Holland, whose pohcy had always been to stifle the maritime enterprise of the Spanish Netherlands and to control their commerce, now appealed to the previous concessions to Dutch ships and the prohibition of participation in the Indian trade imposed upon the ports of the Spanish Netherlands by the treaties of West- phalia and subsequent conventions with the Kings of Spain, which they held to be binding upon their Austrian succes- sors.^ England, aiming at the empire of the sea, and fearing the appearance of a new competitor, supported the claims of Holland, and the Ostend Company soon foimd itself the object of international contention. The opposition of the maritime powers to the Austrian The Pragmatic sea-policy was rendered more effective by the fact that ^^■"=*'°° Charles VI was at the time and during the remainder of his life preoccupied with the question of the Austrian succes- sion, ■ — a preoccupation which affected not only his domestic policies, but also his foreign diplomacy. After the death of his infant son, it appeared not improb- able that the male line of the House of Austria would become extinct with the death of Charles VI. In order to secure the possession of the Austrian estates to his own descendants, as head of the House of Hapsburg he issued a decree setting aside all collateral claims and confirming the entire succes- sion to Maria Theresa, the eldest of his daughters, in case no son should be bom to him. This decree, being only a household law, required the recognition of the hereditary estates; and, to give it complete security, that of the Empire and the foreign powers also. The "Pragmatic Sanction," as this new rule was called, being of great importance to Charles VI, assent to it became an item of value in the negotiations of foreign powers, and until the end of his life played a role in all international bargains in which the Em- peror was concerned far in excess of its importance to the ' See Rousset, Rectteil historiqv^, II, pp. 5, 42. ' See Rousset, Recueil historique, II, pp. 43, 76. 404 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Dubois' ob- struction of the Congress of Cambray peoples whose interests were bartered for it, only to prove illusory in the end. With the Austrian estates themselves no great difficulties were encountered; but with some of the princes of the Empire, and especially with Prussia, a different fortune was experi- enced. Like his brother Joseph I, Charles VI was ambitious to render the House of Hapsburg really dominant in the Empire. To this ambition the greater princes of Germany were opposed. So strenuous was the hostility to the Emperor's pretensions, and particularly to the Pragmatic Sanction, that diplomatic relations between Prussia and Austria were for a time broken off; while Bavaria and Saxony, having direct claims to the whole or a part of the succession, through marriage with descendants of Leopold I and Joseph I, were indisposed to abandon their rights of inheritance, even when they had been formally renounced.^ Would Europe sustain the Pragmatic Sanction? That was the question which for twenty years dominated all others in the mind of Charles VI and kept him the constant prey of anxiety. His supremacy in Italy, the maritime interests of the Austrian possessions, and every other consideration within and outside of the Empire were subordinated to that dearest dream of the Emperor's life, the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction. In ignorance of the secret engagements of France and England with Spain, Charles VI wondered why the mediators did not meet his plenipotentiaries at Cambray, where his differences with Spain were to be ended, as he supposed, with the aid of his friends in the Quadruple Alliance. Philip V and especially Elizabeth Farnese were also eager for their secret allies to redeem their promises, and secure from the Emperor the recognition of their claims in Italy; but neither France nor England was urgent ui beginning the busmess of the Congress. This hesitation on the part of Dubois was owing to his desire to render more effective the union of France and Spain ' The order of descent from Leopold I as shown in Table VII at the end of this volume. A.D. 1715-1731 SXTPKEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 405 in carrying out the traditional Bourbon policy of opposition Chap. V to the House of Austria. "It was more important," he said, "to care for the perfection of the treaty than to hasten its conclusion; and the presence of a few plenipotentiaries at Cambray could accomplish nothing." England, on the other hand, was in no haste to execute a treaty from which all the real advantages had already been derived, or to reconcile Spain with the Emperor, against whom a united opposition might be useful in frustrating his maritime policy. The system created by Dubois and Stanhope had already borne its fruits so far as France and England were concerned. Walpole appeared to have no interest in foreign affairs, ex- cept to promote British commerce; and it was not forgotten by Dubois that Townshend had in the beginning not only opposed the Anglo-French alliance which Stanhope had cre- ated, but also the alliance of England with France and Spain, whose promises were yet to be fulfilled or frustrated at Cam- bray. The Congress, if assembled, might afford an oppor- tunity for George I to show himself the arbiter of Europe. He was a prince of the Empire, and might find it to his in- terest to side with the Emperor for advantages in return. In that event the alliance of France, England, and Spain would prove a disappointment, and the whole house of cards would fall in ruins. It would be far better, Dubois thought, to hold fast to the English alliance without exposing it to any new risk, and at the same time privately to strengthen the bonds between France and Spain. In January, 1722, it appeared probable that Dubois would The Boheme no longer be able to postpone the work of the Congress. Bouibon'^jre- Elizabeth Famese was becoming anxious about the Italian dominance inheritance promised to her children, and the advisers of Charles VI were more than ever resolved to force the powers to declare their intentions. But Dubois had discovered a reason for delay that could be rendered plausible to the Court of Spain. The strife over the Austrian succession was comparable in importance to that which had involved all Europe in the war of the Span- ish succession. In March, 1722, he wrote to his confidant, 406 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Chavigny, at Madrid: "The Emperor may die without a ^- "• male heir, and that death may open the splendid opportunity to extend the succession of Don Carlos to almost the whole of Italy. In place of exposing oneself to f ailm-e in little enter- prises, it is preferable to form only great ones, and to combine everything in such a manner as to assure success." Chavigny, who had been sent to Spain to dissuade the Spanish court from precipitation in urging on the work of the Congress, was instructed to convince Elizabeth Famese that it was not for the highest interest of Don Carlos to demand the immediate investiture of his future heritage. By delaying action a far more brilliant future might await him, for the Austrian possessions in Italy could not be trans- mitted by the Emperor to his daughters, Don Carlos would have indisputable rights to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and his claims could in future be extended to all the Italian territories that had once belonged to Spain. In May, Philip V was so far convinced as to agree to accept the Cardinal's larger plan, but the rapacity of the Queen could not submit to postponement. Chavigny's advice was rejected, his influence resented, and his recall demanded. To reconcile the Regent to an immediate invasion of Italy in behalf of Don Carlos, his marriage with Mademoiselle de Beaujolais, the Regent's daughter, was proposed by Philip V. As the proposal promised to bind still more closely the two monarchies in opposition to the House of Hapsburg, the marriage was arranged, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais was sent to Madrid. The CardiDai's The Famese ambitions having thus suddenly become those last negotiation ^f ^jjg Regent also, the problem now was how to create an effective coalition against the Emperor. At the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad, Dubois had been disposed for a time to form an alliance between France and Russia, which Peter the Great had earnestly desired. Russia, the Czar had long before contended, would gladly perform the task which Sweden had performed for France in holding the House of Austria in check in the North, thus preoccupy- ing the Emperor at home. Peter the Great, it was thought, Chap. V A. D. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 407 for the sake of a French alliance, might even be induced to guarantee the permanent possession by France of the prov- inces of which the Hapsburgs had been divested in former I7i5-i73i wars. By thus rendering the Czar "the arbiter of the Em- pire," the Emperor would be made powerless in the rest of Europe, and France and Spain could impose their will in Italy. The inexpediency of such an alliance at the time of the Peace of Nystad, in spite of its apparent advantages, had grown out of the existence of the Quadruple Alliance, in which the Emperor was a partner; and especially the danger of alienating George I, a prince of the Empire, who at that time required the Emperor's favor in regard to Hanover, and was bitterly hostile to the Czar. It might, however, now be possible, Dubois thought, imder the changed conditions, to reconcile George I to the admission of Russia into the triple alliance of France, Spain, and England; or at least to obtain his sanction of a close entente between France and Russia. After the Peace of Nystad the "Emperor of all the Rus- sias," as Peter the Great now styled himself, had made war on Persia, and at the end of 1722 had returned in triumph to St. Petersburg, having added to his possessions some of the Shah's richest provinces on the Caspian Sea. With war against the Emperor imminent in Italy, the Russian alliance which in 1721 had seemed so advantageous to France appeared in 1722 almost necessary. Negotiations were, therefore, promptly resumed; and, in October, the French ambassador, Campredon, was instructed to let it be known at St. Petersburg that a marriage between the Regent's son, the Duke of Chartres, and the Princess Eliza- beth might perhaps be arranged. The essential condition, however, would be the previous election of the Duke of Chartres to the throne of Poland, which distinction would be accepted as the dower of the Princess.' The instructions to Campredon place in the foregroimd the securing of the Polish throne for the Regent's eldest son ' See Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 53. 408 A HISTORY or DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Dubois' plan of alliance be- tween France, England, and Hussia as a precondition absolutely essential to the celebration of the marriage; for, it is plainly stated in the instruction, so eligible - a prince as the Duke of Chartres would otherwise certainly not seek in marriage the Princess Elizabeth, who was said to have retained "quelques traces de la rudesse de sa nation." The Czar, on the other hand, it was argued, should be "exceedingly happy" to form "the most distinguished alli- ance he could have in Europe"; while this relation, without the occupation of the throne of Poland by a French prince, would be of no solid value to France, since the Russian mon- archy after the death of Peter the Great "might easily fall back into the obscurity from which he had drawn it." The advantages which France was expected to derive from the alliance with Russia, were, in fact, far greater than the instructions to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg revealed. The Czar, according to Dubois' plan for a treaty, was to guarantee the European system already established by the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, Baden, London, and The Hague. On the other hand, France, with England, — if England's participation could be obtained, — would guar- antee the conquests of Peter the Great on the Baltic. The three powers would agree mutually to defend one another from attack, with the exception of any difference that might arise between Russia and Turkey; for Dubois had no inten- tion to sacrifice the Ottoman Empire to Moscovite ambition, or to renounce the means of constraint upon the new ally by abandoning a traditional friendship that had so often proved advantageous to France.' But there were still other benefits in view. The Russian Empire opened a vast field for the extension of the growing industry and commerce of France, with outlets into fertile and imdeveloped provinces not yet ' The desire to place a French prince on the throne of Poland was not new, and was a part of the system by which France aimed at holding in check the House of Austria. This system consisted in maintaining alliances with Sweden and Turkey, by which the Hapsburg power could be counterbalanced. Poland, situated between these allies, if under the influence of France, would complete the Eastern line of pos- sible attack, which would thus be extended almost unbroken from Stockholm to Constantinople. SUPKEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 409 m contact with Western civilization, to be approached by Chap. V the Caspian and the Black Seas, the routes to Persia and ^- ^■ unknown Central Asia. To secure the participation of England in the new alliance, Dubois conceived the idea of offering to act as mediator be- tween George I and Peter the Great. After long insistence, early in 1723, the Czar yielded to the wishes of France so far as to promise not to intrude upon Lower Germany, with special reference to reassuring George I regarding the safety of Hanover; but all the efforts of Chavigny, — who was sent on a special mission to obtain the assent of England to join in a triple alliance, — including the promise of a heavy bribe to the King's mistress, the Countess von Platen, were with- out result. Two reasons weighed with the Cardinal in hesitating to Dubois' heai- sign a separate treaty with Russia : the difficulty of securing ^^*^°° ^""^ for the Duke of Chartres the assurance of the Polish succes- sion until the marriage with the Princess had been actually celebrated, and his preoccupation in securing his own con- tinuance in power after the approaching majority of Louis XV. For months Campredon was left without a word from the foreign office. Daring no longer to show himself at the imperial palace, and reduced to the extremity of borrowing money to pay the postage on his letters, the wretched am- bassador was at last compelled to take to his bed and give out word that he was ill. Dubois has been accused of lightening his own labors, when his table became too heavily freighted with diplomatic despatches, by throwing them unread into the fire, to avoid the trouble of answering them. Whatever truth there may be in this story, he received fifteen couriers from Campredon before acknowledging one of his despatches; and then in- formed him that in no case would France consent to the mar- riage until after the election of the Duke of Chartres to the throne of Poland. As for the treaty of alliance, it would have to await further negotiations with England. But the Cardinal never signed the despatch. Since Au- gust, 1722, he had been prime minister of France; and when, 410 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V on February 16, 1723, the regency came to an end with the ■*■•"• legal majority of Louis XV, the King had continued him in this office. Received as a member of the French Academy, he had been hailed as another Richelieu. Having attained the highest honors that could be awarded to a Frenchman, he had returned to the traditional policy of France, — op- position to the House of Hapsburg. His overtures to Peter the Great were intended to aid in restoring this system, in which he was anxious to include Great Britain. His aim was the complete isolation of the Emperor. What might have hap- pened if the negotiations with Russia had continued under Dubois is imcertain; for on August 10, 1723, the Cardinal's career suddenly ended with his death. The foreign The Duke of Orleans, who succeeded Dubois as prime policy of the minister of France, with Count Morville as minister of for- Duke of ^ . ' Ori6ana cign affairs, favored the Russian alliance with Peter the Great, and in October, 1723, success seemed probable; for the Czar had expressed his willingness to have an understand- ing with England. Chavigny was instructed to impress upon Hanover the advantages of an English alliance with Russia, to urge opposition to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to propose a plan — said to have been suggested by Dubois — for abolishing the Imperial dignity altogether and transforming the Empire into a system of separate States.^ The maritime ambitions of Charles VI seemed to furnish an effective argu- ment; for an alliance with the Czar, it was contended, would impose an effective restraint upon the action of the Emperor. But the bad relations of George I and Peter the Great ren- dered illusory all hope of an alliance between them. On October 12, 1723, the King of England signed a family com- pact with his son-in-law, Frederick William I of Prussia, which the Czar believed to be directed against himself; and, as a retort, he received a Jacobite agent at St. Petersburg, with a proposal to unite with France and aid the Pretender. In the midst of the negotiations between France and Rus- sia, on December 2, 1723, the death of the Duke of Orleans put an end to his plans, and the accession of the Duke of ' See Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, p. 374. STJPKEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 411 Bourbon to the position of prime minister brought in a rad- Chap. V ical change in the foreign policy of France. His aim was to ^- ^■ undo the work of Dubois in promoting the interests of the House of Orleans, to disregard the influence of Elizabeth Famese, and to maintain intact the friendship of France The Duke of and England, which an alliance with Russia would jeopardize, ^"'"■b™'^ TTTi -r» \^ r-i 1 i(» •> ^ reversal of the When Peter the Great learned of the change of government Orleans poUcy in France, he promptly abandoned the project of marrying his daughter into the House of Orleans, but continued his efforts for a political alliance. These were, however, finally rendered fruitless by the demand of the Duke of Bourbon that England be included in the treaty. The Czar declared his willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Great Britain and Hanover; but to pass at once from a condition of open hostility to one of alliance was in his eyes impossible. Till the end of his life, however, he clung to the hope of ar- rangiag a French marriage for the Princess Elizabeth. In October, 1724, he suggested the substitution of the Duke of Bourbon for the Duke of Chartres, with the expectation of the Polish crown; but a definite answer was not returned. If we may trust a well supported tradition, Peter the Great never entirely lost hope of a French alliance, and the draft of a treaty with France was foim.d upon his table at the time of his death.i On January 26, 1724, in the quaint old town of Cambray, The Congress — where in 1508 the Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of "' ^^'^''^^ France, and Ferdinand the Catholic had formed their league against Venice, and where twenty-one years later the Em- peror Charles V and Francis I were reconciled by the famous "Paix des Dames," — the long postponed congress was as- sembled to reconcile the differences between Spain and the Emperor. But the Congress had come too late. New conditions had supervened which made its work more or less of an anach- ronism. The maritime powers had become irritated by the Emperor's creation of the Ostend Company, the French sup- port of the Famese interests had weakened, and the Duke of ' See Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 78. 412 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Bourbon was determined that the future of France should A. D. j^Q^ pg^gg jj^^Q ^jjg keeping of the House of Orleans. Still other events not less important had occurred to change the situation. On January 10 Philip V, debilitated and verg- ing upon madness, had abdicated the throne of Spain, in order to end his days in religious devotion; and his son Don Louis had succeeded him. In the midst of the Congress, on August 31, the young king died; and Philip V resumed the crown. Coxmt Monteleone, a Sicilian in the service of Spain, was sent to Paris and London to revive interest in the for- tunes of the Farnese princes, and even to urge in their behalf immediate war upon the Emperor; but to the indisposi- tion of the Court of France was added the indignation of England when the ambassador reminded George I of his imfulfilled promise to ask Parliament for permission to re- store Gibraltar, and even menaced him with the loss of commercial privileges if the fortress were not promptly surrendered.^ In these circumstances negotiation marched slowly at Cambray. Without real sympathy with Spain, and in a state of estrangement from the Emperor, both France and England offered only a cold and formal mediation which gave no promise of early fruits, when a blow fell which aroused a storm of fury at Madrid. On October 29, 1724, the French Council of State secretly resolved that the Spanish Infanta, who had been brought to France for her education as the wife of Louis XV, should he sent back to Spain.^ 1 For an account of the negotiations at Cambray, and Monteleone's mission, see Syveton, Revue d' Histoire Diplomatique, VIII, pp. 176, 189. ''■ The reason for this decision, which was kept secret until the fol- lowing March, was the strong desire of the Duke of Bourbon and his Council to prevent the possible transfer of the crown to the Duke of Orleans in case of the death of Louis XV without an heir. It was, therefore, decided that the young king should marry immediately; but, as the Infanta of Spain was only nine years old, immediate marriage necessitated the choice of another princess. On August 15, 1725, Louis XV was married at Strasburg to Maria Leszczinska, daughter of Stan- islas, former King of Poland. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 413 When, on March 9, 1725, the announcement of this de- Chap, v cision was made at Madrid by the Abbe Livry, who was sent as a special ambassador for the purpose, Philip V in his rage cried out, "Ah the traitor!" and returned to the trembling shh6 the still unopened letter of the Duke of Bourbon. Diplomatic relations were at once broken off, all French con- suls were expelled from Spain, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais, the fiancee of Don Carlos, was indignantly despatched to Paris.i Thus came to nothing the ill-starred mediation of France and England in the Congress of Cambray. The shock produced by the rupture between France and The Treaty Spain on account of the repudiation of the Spanish marriages °^ Vienna and the mission of was soon followed by an event of even deeper import. On Eipperda April 30, 1725, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was signed at Vienna between Spain and Austria by which the whole system of European politics was thrown iato confusion. In November, 1724, as soon as it was perceived that Monte- leone's mission to Paris and London was certain to end in failure, a new programme of action had been decided upon at Madrid. Since France and England would not make war upon the Emperor, in order to force him to accept all that Spain had demanded in Italy, there remained the alternative of trying to secure the objects aimed at by direct negotiations with Charles VI. The fertile brain of Elizabeth Farnese now conceived the scheme of a double union with the House of Austria. The Emperor should be asked to give the hand of the Arch- duchess Maria Theresa, who by the Pragmatic Sanction was to inherit all the Austrian possessions, to Don Carlos, who should then be chosen King of the Romans. His younger brother, Don Philip, should be proposed for the younger Austrian archduchess, Maria Anna, who should be provided for ia Italy. The two monarchies should then unite to de- fend and enforce all these family interests, obtain the restora- tion of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, and secure to Charles VI the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction and the pro- ' For details, see Villars, MSmoires, p. 307. 414 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V tection of the Ostend Company; which, as an extra induce- I7i5-°73i ^^^^> should be accorded exceptional commercial privileges with the Spanish colonies. In order to make these advances to Charles VI with due secrecy and reserve, it was necessary to send to Vienna a man of diplomatic skill and experience; yet he must be suflS- ciently obscure to escape public observation, and furnished with such credentials as would permit, if the proposals were rejected, of a complete disavowal of his authority to negotiate. Such an emissary was available in Baron Ripperda, an adventurer of Dutch birth but descended from parents of Spanish origin, who in 1718 had been sent to Madrid by Holland with the title of ambassador, but had been recalled and dismissed on the charge that he was more subservient to Spain than to the country by which he was accredited. Of insinuating maimers, adventurous spirit, and an excellent linguist, he had been serviceable to Alberoni as a diplomatic spy; and through this association had been held in esteem at court umtil Alberoni's fall, when, having lost credit, he had dropped into comparative obscurity at Madrid, where he continued to reside. Not having any official character, yet possessing the desired qualifications f 6r this delicate mission, without the knowledge of Grimaldo, the head of the Spanish foreign office, Ripperda was selected to negotiate a private understanding with the Emperor. The secret in- Qu November 22, 1724, without exciting the slightest Ri^perfT ° suspicion, Ripperda's formal instructions had been secretly prepared by the King, Elizabeth Famese, and Orendayn, who from a clerk in the foreign office under Grimaldo had risen through the favor and influence of the Queen to be a minister of state, and since the fall of Alberoni was the person most in her confidence. If the idea of the proposed marriages were regarded with favor at Vienna, Maria Theresa should receive as a dowry, to be enjoyed after the Emperor's death, all the hereditary estates of Austria in Germany; while Maria Anna should inherit those in Italy, to which Parma, Piacenza, and Tus- StrPKEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 415 cany would be added by Don Carlos' renunciation. Thus all Chap, v the Austrian possessions in Germany and Italy were ulti- ^•'^• mately to be divided between Elizabeth Farnese's two ^^^^^''^^ sons. As for the Austrian Netherlands, they should be restored to Spain. If that could not be, then they were to be given to the younger son, Don Philip, and Maria Anna, to be re- turned to Spain in case the pair should die without heirs. If the marriages were agreed upon, Spain would promise to recognize and aid in enforcing the Pragmatic Sanction, and to protect and promote the Austrian plans for maritime and commercial development. Upon this basis the Emperor might be assured of a lasting peace and union with Spain, and through this alliance obtain a guarantee for the inheri- tance by his daughters of all the Austrian possessions in Germany and Italy. In return the Emperor should promise active aid in se- curing the restoration to Spain of Gibraltar and Minorca. In case of a refusal by George I to surrender them to Spain, the two powers would unite in a war to exclude him from the throne of England, and give their support to the Pretender. Finally, united, the two powers would work everywhere for the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic faith. Although the instructions as a whole were secret, Ripperda The secret was intrusted by the Queen with a secret more sacred still, "°deratandmg •' ^ _ 'of the Queen which was not contained in the written document. As a and Ripperda ruling monarch Philip V, and as a public minister Orendayn, were under obligations to have some consideration for the interests of the Spanish Kingdom; but Elizabeth Farnese, the real author of the proposal to form an alliance with the Emperor, was chiefly interested in providing a brilliant future for her sons. Ripperda was, therefore, orally informed by the Queen that the principal aim of his mission was to secure the marriages. If that could be accomplished, all else might be modified. But Ripperda also had his secret. The mission with which he was intrusted could, if successful, lift him to greater heights than those from which Alberoni had fallen. The satisfaction 416 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Ripperda's negotiations at Vienna of Elizabeth Farnese's dearest ambition would make him prime minister of Spain. Having arrived at Vienna in January, 1725, Ripperda made no attempt to conceal his true name at the octroi of the city, and openly announced that he was charged by Philip V with a mission to Peter the Great at Moscow! As an authorized envoy he possessed the right to visit the Chan- cellor of the Empire, Count Zinzendorf , whom otherwise it might have been difScult to see. Recalling his acquaintance with the Count in Holland, at the first interview he disclosed his real object, namely, to negotiate a treaty of peace and alliance between Spain and Austria, on condition of marriages between Don Carlos and Don Philip and the Austrian arch- duchesses. In proof of his assertion, he handed the Chancellor the credentials given him by the King of Spain, which com- mended him to the Emperor, and requested to be allowed to present immediately his proposals to an authorized minister. Although Charles VI was astonished, he charged Zinzendorf to hear what Ripperda had to propose, and the pourparkrs began at once.^ Without the least hesitation or embarrassment Ripperda represented that he was an important personage at Madrid, that he enjoyed the entire confidence of the Court, and that he was destined upon his return to be prime minister of Spain! He declared that he himself was the original author of the idea of a direct rapprochement with Austria; — a plan which, he alleged, as a good Catholic and a true Spaniard, he had long had in his mind, and which had been only recently accepted by the King. The occasion for this change of policy on the part of Philip V, he affirmed, had been the proposal by the Duke of Bourbon to conquer for him the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Sicily and Naples — • possessions of Charles VI — were to be attacked by French and Spanish troops; while the Czar of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey, by arrangement with France, were to invade Silesia and Himgary, and thus en- ' For a detailed account, see Syveton, Revue d'Histoire Diplo- matique, VIII (1894), p. 365 et seq. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 417 gage the Emperor at home. PhiHp V had rejected with scorn Chap, v this infamous proposal; and the Queen, who was a bitter enemy of France, and had long wished to recall her daughter from Paris and marry her to the Infante of Portugal, had profited by the occasion to carry out the idea of a family alHance with the House of Austria! These ingenious falsehoods, the figments of Ripperda's fertile fancy, appealed to the secret fears and suspicions of the Emperor, and received in the subsequent rejection of the Spanish Infanta by France an apparent confirmation. The Duke of Bourbon had, in fact, not only not proposed the con- quest of Sicily, but had positively refused to aid in the in- vasion of Italy which Monteleone had urged upon him, and Elizabeth Farnese had at the time no suspicion that the marriage of the Infanta with Louis XV would be repudiated at Versailles. Even more effective than Ripperda's impudent fictions was the manner in which the proposal of the marriages was pre- sented. The Spanish court, Ripperda explained, had every hope that the Emperor would yet be blessed with a son, who would succeed him in the Empire. The sons of Elizabeth Farnese also had the most brilliant prospects. Of the children of Philip V by his first marriage, Don Louis was already dead, and Don Ferdinand was so frail that he would in all proba- bility never wear the crown. Don Carlos would almost cer- tainly become King of Spain, while Don Philip would inherit the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. When, therefore, the future son of Charles VI became Emperor, the archduchesses would be well provided for, and the Austro- Spanish alliance would be continued with Maria Theresa as Queen of Spain, while both monarchies would enjoy perfect security and unite in giving peace to Italy. If, on the other hand, the Emperor should have no son, and Maria Theresa should inherit all the Austrian posses- sions, Don Carlos would, in that case, renounce the throne of Spain to his brother Don Philip, the husband of Maria Anna, and assume the rule of the Austrian estates. In order that he might be fitted for this contingency, Don Carlos VOL. m. — 27 418 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V would be at once sent to Vienna to be educated at the Im- 1715-^731 ^^^^^ Court. Eager as the Emperor was to have peace and friendly re- lations with Spain, the marriages, which were in Ripperda's The deiibera- proposals the preconditions of a rapprochement, were from tions at Vienna ^^^ Austrian point of view of doubtful expediency. "What was to be done regarding the existing French engagements?" the Chancellor had asked of Ripperda; who in confusion had replied: "They would be broken!" "What, then, would be the value of the engagements you propose, since all the princes and princesses in question are still very young? These might also in time be broken!" The Austrian Council argued that although the arguments for a Spanish alliance were good, those for the marriages were open to question. Ripperda had quietly treated Don Ferdi- nand as practically non-existent; and yet, so far as was known, he might live, marry Mademoiselle Beaujolais, and thus place a French Queen upon the throne of Spain. What then would become of Don Carlos? In smnmarily despatch- ing the heir to the Spanish throne, in order to make the pros- pects of the Farnese princes appear more brilliant, Ripperda had raised a difficult question. But the Austrian analysis of the situation revealed other grounds for hesitation. If the Emperor gave two of his daughters to Don Carlos and Don Philip, the union of Aus- tria and Spain would excite the jealousy of all the other courts of Europe; and, if a son should be born to the Em- peror before the marriages were actually celebrated, Spain, disappointed in losing the expected heritage, would probably abandon Austria in the midst of danger. On the other hand, if Don Carlos as husband of Maria Theresa should upon the Emperor's death claim all the Aus- trian possessions, there would undoubtedly be opposition from the maritime powers to a Bourbon supremacy so pre- dominant; a war of succession would follow; and dismem- berment would probably occur. Spain, unable to preserve the whole Austrian monarchy for the Bourbon princes, would be satisfied with securing for each of them a portion, 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 419 perhaps in Italy, while Austria might fail to the lot of Ba- Chap, v varia, Bohemia to Saxony, and Himgary might become an independent kingdom. When the Hapsburg heritage was • thus weakened by division, France and Holland would per- haps divide the Austrian Netherlands between them, and the Turks would try to reclaim what they had lost. Ripperda perceived that, if he could entirely isolate the The apparent Emperor from all other alliances and attach him closely to *'^"™p'' °f Spain, he could then take advantage of his helplessness and unpose the marriages as a necessity growing out of the de- pendent position in which Austria would then be placed. Leaving almost everyiihing to Zinzendorf to formulate, except the question of who should be Grand Master of the Order of the Golden Fleece, — which both the Emperor and Philip V had hotly disputed, — • and a few other points upon which his master was sensitive, — and which were, therefore, left out of the negotiation, — Ripperda sent to Madrid for approval the drafts of two treaties, one of peace and one of alliance. It was at this moment that the annoimcement of the re- jection of the Infanta at Paris reached Madrid and awakened a frenzy of indignation against France. The mediation of Louis XV and George I at Cambray was scornfully rejected, and Ripperda was informed that, with slight modifications, the treaties would be accepted. All engagements with France were considered as annulled; and in his wrath Philip V in- vited Charles VI to unite with him in war upon France for the recovery of the provinces taken from Spain and the Em- pire by Louis XIV, the assertion of the right of succession to the throne of France by the Spanish princes, and the annihilation of French and English commerce. With regard to the marriages, Ripperda was doomed to disappointment; for the utmost concession he could wring from the Austrian Council of State was, that the Emperor would consent that one or the other of his three daughters, when of suitable age, should marry one or the other of the sons of Philip V. Having obtained this general promise, which he intended to insist should be made more definite 420 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Illusory char- acter of the Treaties of Vienna in the future, on April 30, 1725, Ripperda signed with the Emperor two treaties, one of peace between Spain and Austria and one of defensive alliance. On May 1, a treaty of commerce also was signed.' In appearance Ripperda had won a great diplomatic bat- tle, for he had made peace, and even an alliance, between Spain and the Emperor, and rendered apparently needless the mediation of France and England at Cambray; but in reality he had yielded every advantage to Austria and ac- quired practically nothing for Spain. The Emperor had merely bound himself to accept the friendship of his former enemy, and to offer his own in return; but Philip V had prom- ised large sums of money together with naval protection for Austrian commerce, and had loaded Spain with new responsi- bilities. The important points in dispute before the Congress of Cambray were left unsettled, the Italian duchies still re- mained fiefs of the Empire, and the Farnese marriages were as far as ever from realization. Spain had placed herself virtually at the mercy of the Emperor, so far as the treaties were concerned. It was for Philip V a complete surrender. The Spanish court had, indeed, surprised Europe by a dexterous move in the moment of its humiliation; but why did Ripperda, a man of keen intelligence, sign such an un- equal compact? His main object was to secure the Farnese marriages. The only way was first to separate Austria from other alli- ances, to arouse the jealousy of Europe, and especially of the German princes, to bind the Emperor to Spain as his only friend, and then to extort from him what he would not otherwise bestow, his consent to the desired marriages. If Ripperda was false to the real interests of Spain, he was at least true to Elizabeth Farnese, whose secret agent he really was; for his own fortune was linked with her suc- cess. Aside from this, Spain and Europe were nothing to him. Although the treaties were in reality hollow, the mere fact ' For the treaties, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 106 et seq., and for a full account of the negotiations, Syveton, Revue d'Histoire Diplo- matique, VIII (1894), pp. 364, 394. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 421 that a secret alliance between Spain and the Emperor had Chap. V been concluded at the moment of the French rebuff was suf- ^- "• £ • , J . ■ 1715-1731 ficient for his purpose. Grimaldo, who was opposed to the whole procedure, was ordered to publish the treaties of peace and commerce; but the treaty of alliance was kept secret. Its chief value for the purposes of Ripperda was in letting Europe imagine it more dangerous than it really was. Gradually the conviction spread that the marriage of Maria Theresa and Don Carlos was stipulated in one of the secret articles. It was the effect Ripperda had desired to produce. Don Carlos might some day, it appeared, like the Emperor Charles V, become the master of Germany, Italy, and perhaps Spain. What then would become of the equilibrium of Europe? While the secret treaty of alliance excited the imagina- The reaction of tion, those of peace and commerce offered sufficient evi- ^"^"P" dence that the negotiations had been conceived in a spirit of hostility to England as well as to France. It is true that the peace between Spain and Austria formally confirmed the Quadruple Alliance; but in substance it was its epitaph, and called forth from Count Morville and the Duke of Bourbon the exclamation, " Cette paix monstrueuse! " But it was the treaty of commerce that most excited London and Amster- dam, for they saw in it a declaration of war directed against their attitude toward Austria's maritime enterprises: while France experienced the strange sensation of picturing a Bour- bon prince — for such Don Carlos was — as the future heir of the whole Hapsburg heritage arrayed in hostility to France. Reaction against the Treaties of Vienna was not long de- layed. France and England promptly renewed their inti- macy. In Jime George I and Townshend set out for Hanover, accompanied by the French ambassador at London, Count de Broglie, for the purpose of forming a league to force the Emperor to abandon his new relations with Spain. In Germany the idea of a marriage between Don Carlos and Maria Theresa had been received with much appre- hension. For Prussia the Austro-Spanish aUiance was almost a menace; and, in August, Frederick William I entered into 422 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 The Treaty of Hanover the negotiations for the formation of a league to oppose it. At the same time efforts were made at Madrid through the - aid of Grimaldo to produce a rupture with the Emperor, but these were doomed to failure. Orendayn, sustained by Eliz- abeth Farnese, was accorded new honors, the English am- bassador was informed that friendship with George I de- pended upon the immediate restoration of Gibraltar, and Ripperda was named ambassador plenipotentiary at Vienna with the title of Duke. Ripperda now openly declared that he would soon return to Madrid as prime minister, treated with contempt the new French ambassador, to whom he refused precedence,— which France had insisted upon and enjoyed for more than sixty years, — ■ and publicly announced that Spain would soon make war on England for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca. The purpose of this bravado was to force the hand of the Emperor regarding the Spanish marriages; which, he frankly avowed, were the only cause of his remaining in Vienna. Chiefly in order to hasten his departure, Zinzen- dorf was in favor of yielding to his importunities; but the Council was divided in opinion. Then, suddenly, on Sep- tember 3, 1725, at the castle of Heerenhausen, in Hanover, a treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Prussia which ensured the success of Ripperda.' The real meaning of the Treaty of Hanover was well un- derstood at Vienna, and Ripperda lost no time in giving it emphasis. The signatories mutually guaranteed not only all their possessions but all their rights, and stipulated the number of armed forces they would furnish to defend them. These rights were so defined as to include resistance to any possible injury to any one of the allies, and thus was pre- sented a solid front to the whole line of the Austro-Spanish intentions. In order to make the new league appear as formidable as possible, the signatories bound themselves to enter into no 1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 127 et seq.; for the Begotiations, Syveton, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, VIII, pp. 414, 418. A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 423 separate negotiations with other powers, by which they meant Chap, v to destroy the hope of detaching any one of the allies in the interest of either Spain or Austria; and at the same time pro- vided for future accessions to the treaty. The maritime interests of Holland rendered it probable that the Dutch Re- public would join in the aUiance, and the expUcit confirma- tion of the Treaties of Westphalia and of Oliva indicated a purpose to associate not only the princes of the Empire but all the powers of the North to maintain the equilibrium of Europe. The effect produced was precisely what Ripperda had an- ticipated. Charles VI found himself isolated and even men- aced. His only refuge seemed to be in a still closer compact with Spain. Ripperda was prompt in pressing his advantage. More The aucoesa of furiously than ever he now returned to the question of the R'pp'"''''''' -m • 1 x-i 1 diplomacy marriages. Flattering the Empress, making costly presents to the Imperial ministers, closeted in private audience with the Emperor, to whom his high official position now gave him personal access, he urged the cause of Elizabeth Farnese, from whose gratitude he had everything to expect; and on November 5, 1725, he succeeded in obtaining from Charles VI a new secret alliance in which the marriages were dis- tmctly promised.^ The new treaty did not, indeed, accord to Spain all that Ripperda had desired; but in it Charles VI promised, with- out more definite specification, that "two of his daughters," when they became marriageable, should be married to Don Carlos and Don Philip. As an additional concession to Eliza-, beth Farnese, in a later article the heiress of the Austrian monarchy, Maria Theresa, was by name promised to Don Carlos, "in case the Emperor should die before she became marriageable"; but it was further stipulated that in no case should the crowns of Spain, Austria, and France, or any two of them, ever be united. The treaty of political alliance was now made complete. ' For the secret treaty, see Revue Historique, CIV (1894), pp. 90, 95; and Del Cantillo, Tratados de Paz, Madrid, 1843, p. 231. paia 424 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Each contractant engaged to defend the other in case he was 1715^^31 attacked on land or sea. As Charles VI possessed only three or four seaworthy ships and Philip V had developed a con- siderable navy, the Emperor seemed to have acquired a val- uable ally for the protection of his foreign commerce. On the other hand, if George I did not peaceably surrender Gib- raltar and Minorca, Charles VI promised to aid Spain in re- conquering the fortress. The first enterprise, however, was to be the dismemberment of France.^ Ripperda prime His work at Vienna having been accomplished, Ripperda minister of hastened to seek his reward in Spain. Within two weeks after his return to Madrid he was prime minister. Person- ally the King had not intended, and did not desire, this promotion. It was obtained through Ripperda's false and impudent assurance that Charles VI could feel complete confidence in the success of the alliance only on condition that the negotiator who was responsible for it should be intrusted with power to execute it, and had requested his elevation to the highest position in the monarchy! Elizabeth Farnese, determined not to displease the Emperor, and recalling what she owed to Ripperda in behalf of her sons, sustained this plea, and Philip V, as was his habit, yielded to her persua- sion. But Ripperda was not content with being placed over all the other ministers of the King, and insisted upon being "Universal Minister," — an expression of his own invention. All the business of all the departments of government was submitted to his personal direction, and Grimaldo, as well as the other ministers, were practically displaced or reduced to the position of mere clerks to their arrogant master. But his deception did not end with his accession to power. Alleging that it was the Emperor's desire, Ripperda induced the King to name his son, then a youth of nineteen, ambassar dor of Spain at Vienna; and then, representing that it would be gratifying to the Court of Spain, he obtained for the young man from the Emperor the title of Prince of the Empire. ' Regarding the value of the treaty to each of the signatories, see an excellent analysis by Syveton, as before, pp. 423, 428. STJPREMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 425 Having obtained by fraud the possession of almost ab- Chap, v solute power in Spain, Ripperda managed for a time to main- ^- ^■ tain it by mingled mendacity and bravado. Through a secret agent he informed the Duke of Bourbon that he would endeavor to reconcile Philip V with France, if Louis XV would repudiate the alliance with England and Prussia. At the same time he informed the English ambassador that his policy was directed solely against France, and that all the complaints of Spain against England and Holland could be easily satisfied between them. To prevent the accession of Holland to the Treaty of Hanover, he secretly offered to extend to the Dutch merchants all the privileges that had been granted to the Emperor. But all these fictions were neutralized by his boisterous declarations unguardedly made in his conversations at Madrid. At first, intoxicated by his rapid rise to power, Ripperda seems to have deceived himself even more than others. Since the fall of Alberoni Spain had lost the vitality his ad- ministration had inspired. The army was disorganized, the navy out of repair, the fortresses were in ruins, the supplies exhausted, and the finances in a deplorable condition. All these deficiencies, as they were forced upon his attention, Ripperda believed he could speedily repair; but he was so completely the victim of his imagination that he identified the formation of plans and the issuance of orders with the realization of the needed reforms. The only solid ground under the feet of Ripperda was the Ripperda's enforced support of Elizabeth Famese. If that should fail pg^^^™"^ him, he would be lost. But the plans of the Queen required war, and it could not be long postponed; for war alone could solidify the Austro-Spanish alliance, and thus fully secure the dependence of Charles VI upon Spain, which was neces- sary for the Farnese policy. Unfortmiately for Ripperda, Spain was in no respect pre- pared for war. The imperative demand of the Emperor in March, 1726, for one million ecus with which to equip his army, purchase the alliance of Sweden and Poland, and prevent the States General from declaring the adhesion of 426 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V Holland to the Hanover alliance, fell upon Ripperda like a ■*■• °- thunderbolt. Unable to find the funds necessary to put Spain on a war footing, how could a million ecus be sent to Charles VI? The only hope was in the arrival of the annual galleon laden with gold and silver from America. This was not yet due, and might never come ; for the counter-alliance was making warlike preparations, and the treasure-ship might fall into the hands of the English or Dutch on its way to Spain. Ripperda argued against the necessity of sending money to Germany. It would not be needed, he said, until war actually broke out. As for the German princes, it would be foolish and improvident to place money in their hands to be spent on their favorites and mistresses. But, it was replied, the princes of the Empire would not remain neutral. If they did not obtain money from Vienna, they would seek it at London. Opposed by England, France, Prussia, Hanover, and the other powers that might be added to the league against the Austro-Spanish alliance, Charles VI would soon be rendered helpless. Suddenly Ripperda discovered that the hatreds and men- aces he had so recklessly scattered throughout Europe were about to burst out in flame. Philip V and Elizabeth Famese ordered the minister to insist that the Emperor should im- mediately begin war with France, and to urge him to send Field-Marshal Stahremberg to take command of the Span- ish forces. They had taken the "Universal Minister," who seemed omnipotent, at his word: and war, which Ripperda had so recklessly invoked, now seemed to have become inev- itable. All the efforts to divide the allies had failed. The rebuilding of the navy, which Ripperda had ordered, had to be stopped for want of funds, and the Emperor refused to move until he was supplied with the promised subsidies. The failure of DrivGU to dcsperation, Ripperda, who had secretly in- Ripperda's trigucd to effect a reconciliation with France, in the hope of averting the storm, was now trembling lest Philip V might discover his perfidy. At one moment he assured the Austrian ambassador that there was plenty of money in sight. The A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 427 shipload of silver from Peru would soon arrive. He was con- Chap, v fiscating valuable cargoes of the enemy. In the next moment he confessed that two or three years were necessary to or- ganize Spain for the coming war. To Ripperda's incoherence Vienna replied that the war which had been provoked now seemed imminent, and the million 6cus must be sent at once. At the same time modera- tion on the part of Spain was strongly counselled. At Madrid the minister's incoherence was equally mani- fest and even more disastrous. The King and the Queen began to notice the contradictions in his conversations, his assurance one day of the complete preparation of Spain for any eventuality, and on the next his declaration that hos- tilities must be postponed. The Queen was particularly anxious for war, and Ripperda's inconsequence of ideas was not only a constant disappointment, it was beginning to shake confidence in his judgment. The fate of the kingdom had been placed in his hands, for his control of affairs was absolute. Finally his change of moods became seriously dis- quieting, for his incoherence was not confined to his utter- ances, it was bringing confusion into his administration. By taking everything upon himself, the "Universal Minis- ter" was introducing disorder into all the departments of the monarchy. In these circumstances, the enemies of Ripperda lost no The faii of time in combining against him. Although he had become '^'pp^'''*^ odious to the entire nation, — and, as a contemporary said of him, had "wrought the miracle of making French all the Spaniards who had been Austrian," — relyiag on his power over the Queen, he sought to persuade her that the Emperor would be pleased if Grimaldo were expelled from court and confined in a fortress, and others sent into exile. But even the Queen, over whom he sought to exercise his tyranny as the keeper of her secret, fearing that his conduct might force the abdication of the King, refused to defend him. Nothing then remained to prolong his power but the thought that the dismissal of Ripperda might weaken the alliance with the Emperor. A private conference between the King, the Queen, 428 A HISTORY or DIPLOMACY Chap. V and the Austrian ambassador, Konigsegg, ended this delu- A- 1>. giojj^ and it was decided that Ripperda must be dismissed from office. But, as the possessor of so many of the royal secrets, he was not to be rudely discharged. A disagreement with the King over the nature of his duties led to his retire- ment with a pension, and apparently upon his own volition; but his rage at the loss of power led him to a course of extreme imprudence. When it became clear to him that his influence with the King and Queen was ended, Ripperda sought asylum in the English embassy, under the pretext that this course was necessary as a protection from his enemies, and from this retreat demanded of Philip V a passport that would permit him to retire to Holland, with permission for his son to join him there "with a few thousand pistoles that had been sent to him at Vienna." In the meantime, the ambassador. Stanhope, returning to Madrid from a journey at night, foimd the ex-minister installed in his embassy as a self-in- vited guest. Ripperda in his anger disclosed to him all the secret contents of the Austro-Spanish treaties, assuring him that Don Carlos and Don Philip were to marry the two elder archduchesses, and affirming that Philip V and Charles VI had agreed to support the Pretender, recapture Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and recover from France Alsace, Franche- Comte, the Duchy of Burgundy, Navarre and Rousillon. Stanhope explained to the King that, since the Dulce of Ripperda was not accused of any crime, he had accorded him protection in his embassy. The King requested that the fugitive be not permitted to escape; and the next day. La Paz, who had succeeded him, demanded of Ripperda his papers, especially the secret correspondence with the King and Queen. Ripperda replied that all his correspondence, as belonging to the embassy, had been left with his son at Vienna. When asked to explain his disbursements of money, he could give no clear account of them, but insisted excitedly upon his passport and his liberty, together with the retention of his pension. This insistence excited suspicions of Ripperda's past con- duct. To avoid the violation of diplomatic immunity, A. D. 1715-1731 SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 429 Stanhope, having no wish to retain his guest, endeavored to Chap, v arrange for his transfer to a convent, — a plan which the other ambassadors approved and tried to urge upon the King; but Philip V, annoyed by the incident, demanded that he be surrendered. The Council of Castile issued a judgment that Ripperda, being guilty of lese-majeste, was not entitled to the right of asylum; and, on May 24, ui spite of Stanhope's protestations, soldiers entered the embassy building and by force took possession of Ripperda, who was escorted to the castle of Segovia, the prison where Francis I had been confined. The misconduct of Ripperda was soon fully exposed, and no time was lost in seeking out and recalling his secret agents. The younger Ripperda and his secretary were arrested by the Emperor at the request of Philip V, and seals were placed by Zinzendorf on the archives and private papers in the em- bassy. When these were examined it was discovered that a private agent had placed in a bank at Vienna in the name of the Duke of Ripperda some two million and a half florins.^ The fall and exposure of Ripperda contributed greatly to war between the solution of the grave problems which complicated the ^°«'™d and Ti • • 1 • 1 . Spam European situation, but not without serious consequences as the result of his secret diplomacy. His fall left two hostile groups of powers of European magnitude confronting each other without the settlement of any of the differences that had divided them; but the dis- grace of the Duke of Bourbon on June 11, 1726, and the ac- cession to power of Cardinal Fleury, the former preceptor ' Fearing the publicity of the secret relations of himself and the Queen with Ripperda, the King never brought the Duke to trial for his misbe- havior. After two years of imprisonment he escaped from his prison by bribing the persons having charge of him, leaving his faithful ser- vant to occupy his bed, so that his flight was not discovered for twenty- four hours. Returning to The Hague, he fell in with an adventurer of liis own stamp who represented the Sultan of Morocco, whom he accom- panied to that country, where after some adventures, which legend has greatly exaggerated, he died in 1737. For details regarding the end of Ripperda's career, see Syveton, as before, pp. 568, 583. 430 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V of Louis XV, were soon to alter the international relations „ t^^l,„ of France, and thus lead to a new grouping of the powers. The relations between Spain and England were, however, too strained to be easily adjusted. Stanhope, enlightened by Ripperda's disclosures, obtained possession of an elabo- rate project for the invasion of England by the Pretender with the support of Spain. In order to cut off supplies, a British fleet was sent to intercept the Spanish treasure ex- pected at Cadiz. Philip V, irritated by the attitude of Eng- land, broke off diplomatic relations with George I and began the siege of Gibraltar. In 1727 the two countries were at war. Philip V now urgently demanded of the Emperor the aid he had promised in the last treaty of Vienna. Already pro- voked by the attitude of George I, who accused him of being in secret agreement with Spain to support the Pretender, Charles VI indignantly recalled his ambassador from London and dismissed the English ambassador at Vienna; ' but, fearing to imperil his maritime interests by engaging in a struggle that promised him no profit, on the pretext that Philip V had not fulfilled his obligations, he remained inactive. In the meantime the two coalitions had greatly increased their strength. That of Hanover had on August 9, 1726, obtained the adhesion of Holland, and on March 14, 1727, that of Sweden.^ On the other hand, on August 6, 1726, the Emperor had formed a defensive alliance with Catherine I of Russia,' had obtained the support of the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Trier, and by the Treaty of Wusterhausen, of October 12, 1726, had regained the friendship of Prussia.* In this treaty the Emperor and King Frederick William I had mutually guaranteed their possessions, and Prussia ' For the Emperor's provocation, see Hofler, Der Congress von Sois- sons, I, p. xl. 2 See Dumont, VIII, Part II, pp. 133 and 142. » See Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 135. * Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 139, prints the treaty, but treats it as apocryphal. For the authenticity of it, and the reasons for concluding it, see Erdmannsdorifer, Deutsche Geschichte, II, p. 425 et seq. SUPKEMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 431 agreed to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction on condition Chap. V that Maria Theresa should be given in marriage to a German ^•_"- and not to a Spanish or French prince.^ Had the Emperor complied with the demands of Philip V, all Europe would have been plunged uito war; but his pru- The congress dance restrained him, and Cardiual Fleury, who was already °^ Soisaona in secret relations with Spain, with the aid of Walpole, sought to avoid a general conflict. On May 31, 1727, the prelimi- naries of a general peace were signed at Paris. By secretly promising to Philip V succession to the crown of France in case Louis XV should die without the birth of a dauphin,^ Fleury induced Spain also to accede to the preliminaries, and a congress for the settlement of all outstanding differences was agreed upon, to meet in the following year. Before the assembling of the congress important changes had taken place in Europe. In May, 1727, Catherine I of Russia had died, leaving a mere child, Peter II, as her suc- cessor. In June George I, on his way from Hanover to Osna- brtick, had been stricken with paralysis, leaving the throne of England to his son, George II, to whom he had not spoken a word for many years.^ On June 14, 1728, the congress was opened at Soissons with a discourse by Zinzendorf and a reply by Fleury. In France the opinion prevailed — which we now know to have been unfounded — that Zinzendorf's object was to gain time for the arrival of the Spanish treasure-ship; when, it was thought, he, together with Russia, Prussia, and Poland, would ' For the secret mission of the Abb6 de Montgon to France, see BaudriUart, Philip V et la cow de France, III, p. 279 et seq., where the instructions are fully given in which Phihp V, notwithstanding his re- peated renunciations, declares, "Je dois et veux succ&der a la couronne de mes ancitres." ' See BaudriUart, as before. III, p. 305 et seq. ' It was now that Robert Walpole, whom it was expected George II would promptly dismiss, for the first time came into complete control of foreign affairs. " The friendship of Queen Caroline now gave him the same pre-eminence in the counsels of the King as Townshend had in the previous reign enjoyed by his favor with the Duchess of Kendal." See Morley, Walpole, pp. 101, 102. A. D. 1715-1731 432 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V openly come to the aid of Spain.^ Fleury, on the other hand, although sincerely desiring peace, feebly permitted Chauve- ■ lin, to whom he had intrusted the conduct of foreign affairs, to revive the anti-Hapsburg tradition. In November Zin- zendorf returned to Vienna without having accomplished any result, and the Congress of Soissons, like that of Cam- bray, made no progress. The Treaty of It was at Versailles, London, Madrid, and Vienna far more Seville ^jjg^j^ ^^ Soissons that the problems of Europe were to receive a solution. Elizabeth Famese, having nothing to gain from the Congress, insisted upon a more definite understanding with the Emperor regarding the Austrian marriages. Charles VI replied that it was necessary to obtain the assent of France; and, with the expectation that Fleury, by opposmg the union of the archduchesses with the Spanish princes, would furnish an excuse for refusing, Zinzendorf was in- structed to open the subject at Versailles. But the Cardinal was too adroit to fall into the trap of being made responsible for obstructing the wishes of the Queen of Spain. Instead, he refused to manifest the least objection, thus leaving Charles VI to explain his own reluctance the best he could, at the same time preparing the way for a better understanding between France and Spain. The expedient was entirely successful. Elizabeth Famese perceived that she had nothing to hope for from the Em- peror, not even the possession of the Italian duchies by her sons. Both Spain and Austria began in secret to approach France and England; Spain to secure with their aid the Ital- ian duchies for the Famese princes, and Austria to obtain their guarantee to the Pragmatic Sanction. The refusal of Charles VI to make a declaration regarding his intentions determined Elizabeth Famese, who thought thus to isolate him, to abandon the Emperor and enter a new combination. By the Treaty of Seville, of November 9, 1729, between Spain, France, England, and Holland, Philip V restored to the French, English, and Dutch com- merce the privileges which had been withdrawn by the 1 See Villars, Mdmoires, p. 356. SUPREMACY IN THE NOETH AND IN ITALY 433 Treaties of Vienna, and in return Elizabeth Famese was Chap, v accorded the permission of the three powers to send six '^•"• thousand Spanish soldiers to Italy to take possession of ^'^^^^'^^^ Parma and Piacenza, without recognizing the Emperor's right of iavestiture.' Fleury had, however, missed his opportunity to become England's the "arbiter of Europe," which Villars declared him to be; completion of for his anti-Hapsburg policy in frustrating the Congress of ptLT""''' Soissons and isolating the Emperor at Seville, — a policy at first imposed upon him against his will by Chauvelin, — ■ had left the Emperor and his allies without the pale. It was reserved for England to complete the peace. Just as war was about to break out in Italy, in January, 1731, the Duke of Parma died. Imperial troops at once took possession of the duchy, while Spain protested. In the meantime, anx- ious for the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles VI had modified his pretensions regarding the Ostend Com- pany;2 and England, perceiving in this concession a basis for a general peace, together with Holland, on March 16, 1731, signed with the Emperor a treaty of peace and alliance, in which he admitted the right of the Spanish garrisons to oc- cupy the duchies. It was specified in the treaty that Eng- land and Holland would guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and that the Emperor would not give Maria Theresa in marriage to a Bourbon prince.' Thus, by the sacrifice of his maritime policy, Charles VI obtained from England and Holland the sanction of his plan ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 158. The question of surrendering Gibraltar had been raised; but, though it was sub- mitted to Parliament, the proposal was voted down. Ehzabeth Far- nese considered it of far less importance than EngKsh support for her sons' ambitions in Italy. ' The Emperor was ready to abandon the Ostend Company, with the understanding that the Austrian Netherlands should send only two ships each year to the East Indies, and offered England and Hol- land a favorable tariff, — an arrangement agreed upon in the following treaty. ' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 213. And for two secret articles, Syveton, Revue Historique, LIV (1894), pp. 96, 97. VOL. III. — 28 434 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V A. D. 1715-1731 Documents for the Austrian succession, and freed himself from the de- pendence upon Spain into which the ambition of Elizabeth - Farnese and the wiles of Ripperda had lured him. Even after the treaty of March, 1731, was signed a Spanish envoy arrived in Vienna to press the project of the Austrian mar- riages; but it was too late. The death of the youngest of Charles VI's three daughters had nullified the right of choice which he had reserved in the last treaty of Vienna with Spain; and it had never been intended that Maria Theresa should be given to Don Carlos. Since Elizabeth Farnese now had no other means of ac- complishing her purpose in Italy, on July 22, 1731, by the Queen's advice, Spain adhered to the treaty signed at Vienna on March 16 by the Emperor, England, and Holland; and, escorted by an English fleet, Don Carlos entered upon the peaceable possession of his heritage of Parma and Piacenza. In France a dauphin had already been born, which ended the pretensions of the Spanish Bourbons to the French throne. At last a general peace had been attained; and, the purely private purposes for which treaties had been made and broken and all the powers filled with alarm having been temporarily accomplished, Europe seemed likely to enjoy a period of repose. AUTHORITIES For this chapter, in addition to the documents previously mentioned, see Rousset, Recueil historique d'actes, negodations, mSmoires el traiUs depuis la paix d' Ulrechl jus'qu' a 1748, The Hague, 1718-1752, the most important general collection for the period; Liinig, Das Teulsche Reichs- archiv, Leipzig, 1710-1722; Ghillany, Diplomalisches Handbuch, Nord- lingen, 1855; Lamberty, MSmoires pour servir A I'histoire du XVIII sibcle, etc., — "vaste repertoire historique," — The Hague, 1714^1740; Sbornik, Colleclion of the Imperial Russian Historical Society (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1868 et seq., XI-XXIV, contains correspondence of Peter the Great with foreign diplomatic agents; Martens, F., Reeueil des traites et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances etran- geres, St. Petersburg, 1874 et seq.; Handlingen rorande Skandinamens Hisioria, Stoclchohn, 1818 et seq., contains the correspondence of Gortz, Spaare, Gyllenborg, etc.; HofHer, Der Congress von Soissons, nach den Instructionen des kaiserlichen Cabinetes und den Berichten des kaiserl. Bolschafters Stefan Grafen Kinsley, Vienna, 1871-1876; Del SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 435 Maro, Relazioni sulla Corle di Spagna, Turin, 1860, relates to the early Chap. V years of Alberoni's ministry. Bourgeois, Leltres intimes du Cardinal a. d. Alberoni, Paris, 1892. 1715-1731 The most important published memoirs of the time are: Dubois, Mimoires secrets et correspondance inedile, Paris, 1815, requiring to be controlled; Walpole, H., Memoirs of the Last Ten Years of George II, London, 1848-1851; and Letters, Loudon, 1880; Saint-Simon, Lettres et dApeches sur I'ambassade d'Espagne (1721, 1722), Paris, 1880; Peter- borough, Memoirs, London, 1853; Montgon, Memoires et negociations en France, Espagne, et Portugal (1725-1731), Lausanne, 1750-1752. Campredon, Memoires sur les negociations du Nord (1698-1721), Paris, 1859; to which may be added Graham, The Stair Annals, Edinburgh and London, 1785. On the Abb6 Saint-Pierre's scheme for peace, see Castel, Abb6 de Literature Saint-Pierre, Annates politiqiies, London, 1757, which contains the text of his plan; Molinari, L'abbe de Saint-Pierre, sa vie et ses oeuvres, Paris, 1857; Pascal, Les projets de l'abbe Saint-Pierre, Paris, 1900; and Drouet, L'abbe de Saint-Pierre, Paris, 1912, containing the text of the Annates politiques. A work of importance regarding the general status of the powers in this period is Rousset, Les interets presens des puissances de I'Europe, The Hague, 1733. For the conception of diplomacy, see Pequet, L'art de negocier avec les souverains, The Hague, 1738. For the state of Sweden and the adventures of Charles XII, see Carlson, Om Fredsunderhandlingarne dren 1709-1718, Stockholm, 1857; Beskow, Karl der Tolfte, Stockholm, 1868; Bain, Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire; and Larsson, Grefve Gyllenborg i Lon- don dren 1715-1717, Gothenburg, 1891. For the condition of Russia and the poKcies of Peter the Great, see Briiokner, Die Europaisierung Rmslands, Gotha, 1888; Geschichte Russlands bis zum Ende des 18 Jahrhunderts, Gotha, 1896; and Peter der Grosse, Berhn, 1888; also Schuyler, Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia, London, 1884; Wah- Bzewski, Pierre le Grand, Paris, 1897; MorfiU, A History of Russia from the Birth of Peter the Great to the Death of Alexander II, London, 1902. The so-called "Testament de Pierre le Grand" is an apocryphal invention of Lesur, written to please Napoleon I in 1812. The so-called "Journal" of Peter the Great, Berhn, 1773, and the "Extraits des d^peches" of English and French ambassadors (1725-1783), Leipzig, 1860, require to be controlled. Rou.x, Politique exterieure de Pierre le Grand (1699- 1721), in Revue d'Histou-e Diplomatique XVIII (1903), presents a general view of Russian pohcy in this period. For the attempts of Peter the Great to enter into treaty relations with France and the nego- tiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Guichen, Pierre le Grand et le premier traite franco-russe (1682-1717), Paris, 1908; Le Glay, Les engines historiques de V alliance franco-russe, Paris, 1897; and Vassileff, Russisch-franzosische Politik (1683-1717), Gotha, 1902. 436 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. V I A.D. 1715-1731 For Cardinal Dubois, and the Regent, the earher works, De Seillao, L'AhM Dubois, Paris, 1862; BUard, Dubois, cardinal et premier ministre (1656-1723), Paris, n. d.; and Wiesener, Le Regent, I'abbe Dubois et les anglais, are practically superseded by the exhaustive original researches of Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, and Le secret du Regent, Paris, 1909. An interesting collateral study is Boutry, Une creature du cardinal Dubois (Tenoin), Paris, 1902. For Cardinal Alberoni and the pohcies of Spain during his min- istry, in addition to BaudriUart, already cited, see Bersani, Storia dd Cardinale Giulio Alberoni, Piacenza, 1861; Professione, Alberoni, Padua and Turin, 1890-1897; and Vatout, La conspiration de Cellamare, Paris, 1832; but especiaOy Bourgeois, Le secret des Famkse, Philippe V et la politique d' Alberoni, Paris, 1909. For England and Hanover, in addition to the general histories, especially Lord Mahon's History of England from the Peace of Utrecht, London, 1858, containing the Stanhope correspondence, see particu- larly Chance, George I and the Northern War, London, 1909; also Ward, The Eleciress Sophia and the Hanoverian Succession, London, 1909; and Grote, Britain and Hanover, Oxford, 1899; Droysen, Die Wiener Alliam vom 5 Januar, 1719, Leipzig, 1876; Schilling, Der Zwist Preus- sens und Hannavers (1729-1730), HaUe, 1912. Regarding Gortz and his negotiations, see Beskow, Friherre Georg Henrik von Gortz, statman och slatsoffer, Stockholm, 1868; Syveton, L'erreur de Gortz in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, LX (1895), and X (1896); also, for the arrest of Gortz, Martens, C, Causes CMbbres, Leipzig, 1858. For the Quadruple Alliance, besides BaudriUart, Bourgeois, etc., Weber, Die Quadrupel-AUianz vom Jahre 1718, Vienna, 1887; and Bothmar, Menrunien des Graf en von Bothmar iiber die Quadrupel-AUianz, Gottingen, 1886. For the Baltic situation, see especially Seraphim, Geschichte Liv- Esth- und Kurlands, Reval, 1903; and Baltische Geschichte im Grundriss, Reval, 1908. On the "Asiento," see SceUe, La traite negrikre aux Indes de CastiUe, Paris, 1906, an exhaustive study from original sources. For Robert Walpole and his policies, see Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir R. Walpole, London, 1778, containing corre- spondence; Morley, Walpole, London, 1903; also Sir H. Walpole's mission to France in BaiUon, Walpole d, la cour de France, Paris, 1867. The questions concerning the Spanish Netherlands are discussed in Hubert, Stude d'histoire politique et diplomatique, Brussels, 1902, on the "Barriers"; DoUot, Les origines de la neutralite de la Belgigue el U syslhne de la Barriire (1609-1830), Paris, 1902; and Huisman, La BeU gique commerciale sous I'empereur Charles VI: la Compagnie d'Oslsnde, Paris, 1902. SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 437 For the relations between France and Russia under Louis XV, see Chap. V Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Paris, 1882. a. d. For Ripperda and his negotiations, see Massuet, La vie du due de 1715-1731 Ripperda, Amsterdam, 1739, a contemporary biography commended by Barbier; but especially the thorough study in Syveton, Vne cour et un aoenturier au XVIIP sibcle: le baron de Ripperda, pubUshed in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, VIII (1894) et seq. Also Bahn, Die Veranlas- mng der Wiener Vertrdge vom Jahre 1725, Berlin, 1885. For the reversal of the policy of Dubois and the Regent by the Duke of Bourbon, see Dureng, Le due de Bourbon et I'Angleterre (1723-1726), Paris, 1911. CHAPTER VI THE RIVALRY FOR EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY The new array ' I ^HE peace of 1731 was for England not only a diplomatic of the powers J_ triumph, it secured immense advantages to English commerce. By the Treaty of Seville England had regained all the commercial privileges of which Spain had sought to deprive her by the Treaties of Vienna, and by the new al- liance with the Emperor Austrian rivalry at sea had been eliminated through the recognition of the Emperor's plans for the Austrian succession. For France the peace had another aspect. It not only left England in the coveted position of a successful arbiter, but it was based upon a foundation which, in the opinion of Louis XV 's advisers, could not be accepted, — the guar- antee of the Pragmatic Sanction. Diplomatic relations had been resumed between France and Spain, but it could not be readily forgotten that the late Austro-Spanish alliance had not only been directed against France, but it had even contemplated the partial dismemberment of that kingdom by restoring to the Em- pire the conquests made by Louis XIV. In refusing to promise the hand of Maria Theresa to Don Carlos, Charles VI had been actuated by an imperial as well as a dynastic motive; for he intended to marry his eldest daughter to Francis of Lorraine; thus closely uniting with the Hapsburg family that duchy, which Louis XIV had once proudly declared belonged to him more than to any other. To Chauvelin, who was intrusted with foreign relations, the true policy of France seemed to be a return to the system of Richelieu and Mazarin by creating a new league of Ger- man princes under French protection and forming aUiances to check the Hapsburg influence in the North and East. A. D. 1731-1756 EUKOPEAN AND COLONIAL STJPREMACT 439 In the formation of a new Fiirstenbund progress had been Chap, vi already made; but it had been without the support of Eng- land, which was not inclined to encourage the further in- crease of French influence in Germany.^ The return of England to the alliance with the Emperor had destroyed the intimacy with France, and Fleury did not hesitate to call the English "traitors."^ Displeased because he could not draw England into his schemes for opposing Charles VI, the Car- dinal held more closely to Spain, and complained that, after obtaining from the Treaty of Seville "the lion's share," — ■ the restitution of commercial privileges, and silence regard- ing Gibraltar, — George II had deserted Louis XV. Since nothing but the influence of England at Madrid now held the Imperial and Spanish courts together, it was only a question of time when the Austro-Spanish entente would come to an end. It was clear that a new array of the powers was imminent, in which France and Spain would be pitted against the Emperor and England. It was chiefly owing to the good sense and moderation of Walpole that the European explosion did not occur sooner than it did. I. The Diplomacy ov the Austrian Stjccession. In February, 1733, the death of Frederick Augustus I of The war of Poland necessitated the election of a successor. The young gy^^^^^ electoral prince of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, who offered himself as a candidate for the throne left vacant by his father, awakened no enthusiasm either within or without the Polish kingdom; for the Poles preferred a prince of their own nation, and neither Russia, Austria, nor Prussia had at that time any interest in perpetuating the Saxon dynasty. The Polish nobles were favorable to the exiled king, Stanislas Leszczinski, father-in-law of Louis XV, who was vigorously urged upon the Poles by France. The three neigh- ' See Slothouver, Un effort pour la formation d'un Furstenbund en 1728, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIII (1899), pp. 188, 198. ' Hofler, Der Congress von Soissons, II, p. xxiii. 440 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI boring powers, fearing the predominance of French influence A.D. jj^ Poland, were, however, bitterly opposed to his restora- 1731-1756 ' ' ■ tion; but, in September, Stanislas appeared in Poland and was again chosen king by the acclamation of the nobles. Russia immediately sent troops to Warsaw, and before France could come to the King's assistance Stanislas found himself once more a refugee in Dantzig.^ In the meantime Prince Frederick Augustus had won the support of Russia by promising Courland to Count Biren, a favorite of the Czarina Anna, — who had succeeded the short-lived Peter II on the Russian throne, — and had procured the friendship of the Emperor by recognizing the Pragmatic Sanction. Having promised these two powers "an eternal alliance," Frederick Augustus, through the double influence of Russian troops and Saxon gold, was chosen King by a new electoral assembly, and in October was proclaimed as Frederick Augustus II. Although Fleury had little real interest in the Polish kingdom, Louis XV regarded it as a point of honor to sus- tain his father-in-law and place him if possible upon the throne to which he had been elected by the magnates; and Chauvelin's policy of hostility to the Hapsburgs was thus greatly promoted by the family pride of the King and the enthusiastic support of the French nation. Although Charles VI had played only a secondary part in the substi- tution of the Electoral Prince for King Stanislas, he was re- garded as the instigator, and war with him was immediately declared.^ By stimulating the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese with the idea of new conquests for Don Carlos in Italy, and that of Charles Emmanuel III, — who in 1730 had suc- ceeded Victor Amadeus II as King of Sardinia, — with the promise of conquering Milan, France induced Spain and Sardinia to embark with her upon a war with the Emperor. ^ On the situation in Poland in general and the French interest in the succession, see the interesting article by Waliszewski in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, II (1888), p. 41. ^ On August 6, 1726, Austria and Russia had pledged themselves to act together in Poland. See Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 131. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 441 The most immediate effect of tlie war of the Polish sue- Chap, vi cession was the signature of the first Pade de famille, — a /^--o- _ secret aUiance made at the Escurial, on November 7, 1733, in which the two Bourbon monarchies pledged to each other "eternal and irrevocable union," guaranteed each other's The first Podo territories, and united in a war of conquest in Italy; to ^^^^^^l"^^'^'^ be followed eventually, if occasion required, with an attack neutrality upon England for the recovery of Gibraltar. Both contrac- tants solemnly bound themselves not to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction, not to permit the election of Francis of Lorraine as King of the Romans, and not to lay down their arms without common consent.^ The reason for this compact was primarily the necessity of a close alliance in prosecuting the war with Charles VI; but it was, in fact, directed almost as much against England as against Austria, for Spain was irritated by the retention of Gibraltar and the constant encroachments of illicit English commerce, and France was dissatisfied with the neutrality of England in the war of the Polish succession. It was not until 1734 that the existence of the Facte de famille was known in England; but when its import was understood Walpole's difficulty in maintaining England's neutral attitude was greatly increased. The sympathies of both the King and the Queen were strongly German, and both disliked the French. Standing almost alone in the midst of a bitter parliamentary opposition, and with the majority of the ministry inclined toward war, Walpole's only hope of peace at one time seemed to consist in his powerful personal influence with Queen Caroline, who knew how to control the King. But in 1734 this nearly failed him. At a- moment when the pressure was strongest and the national honor, as well as loyalty to the Emperor, seemed to demand intervention, Walpole, in answer to the Queen's arguments for war, replied: "Madame, there are fifty thousand men slain this year in Europe, and not one Englishman!" It was clearly inexpedient for England to permit France ' For the treaty, see Del Cantillo, Tradados de Paz, p. 277. 442 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-175G England's abstention from the war The Peace of Vienna and Spain to destroy the balance of Europe by conquests in Italy and on the Rhine, and yet it was an advantage for - English commercial and colonial progress to avoid as far as possible a waste of life and money while England's rivals were draining their resources and exhausting their energies in making a few territorial conquests of doubtful per- manence. But the cause of the Emperor was not one to arouse great moral enthusiasm. He was hard, selfish, and unyielding. Aid from England and Holland would only render him less tractable, and prolong a war which might otherwise be more easily terminated. To maintain the neutrahty of the maritime powers, to convince the Emperor that England and Holland would sacrifice nothing merely to sustain the pride of the Empire, and by diplomacy to separate France and Spain — this was Walpole's policy. Fleury, quite as much as Walpole, was theoretically a friend of peace; but the forces with which he had been compelled to deal, — the personal pride and sense of family honor of Louis XV and the resentment of the French nation on account of the dethronement of King Stanislas, — had been for him irresistible. Walpole, through his brother Horace, then ambassador at Paris, with whom he was in constant private as well as official communication, took pains to impress upon the Cardinal the possibility that the Emperor, in order to save himself, might secretly come to a separate agreement with Spain by yielding to Elizabeth Farnese's ambition and promising Maria Theresa to Don Carlos. In that case, he urged, France would be isolated, and the Austro-Spanish union would dominate Europe. To prevent such an eventuafity, Fleury entered into pri- vate communication with Vieima. His proposal was that Lorraine be accorded to King Stanislas during his life-time, with eventual transfer to France, and compensation to Duke Francis in Italy. In return France would assent to the marriage of Maria Theresa and the Duke of Lorraine and accept the Pragmatic Sanction. On October 3, 1735, preliminaries of peace were secretly EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SXTPRBMACT 443 arranged between France and Austria at Vienna.^ Austria Chap, vi was to abandon Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos : the Kine ^- °- 1731—1756 of Sardinia was to receive Tortona and Novara, with the Imperial fiefs of Langhe and Montferrat; Stanislas Lesz- czinski was to occupy the Duchies of Lorraine and Bar dur- mg his life, and upon his death they were to pass in full sovereignty to France; Francis of Lorraine was to be affianced to Maria Theresa, and to be indemnified for the loss of Lor- raine by the transfer to hiln of Tuscany upon the death of the reigning duke, who had no posterity; Austria was to recover the parts of Lombatdy which had been conquered by the allies; and France was to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction. Whatever may be said of a method of adjustment by which territories and their inhabitants were freely traded away without their knowledge or consent, as an expedient for peace the transaction was at least ingenious. France secured by it, with the consent of the Emperor, Imperial territory of great value in rounding out the national do- main; Don Carlos became the ruler of an important king- dom; Charles Emmanuel, although not entirely satisfied, also received at least a douceur; and the Emperor recovered a part of what he had lost in the war, in addition to acquir- ing from France that which he most desired, and had long supposed it impossible to obtain, — the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction. There were much delay and serious friction before these preliminaries were carried into effect. The Emperor quib- bled over the details of the transfer of Lorraine, and had to be menaced with further losses before, on November 18, 1738, the peace between France and Austria was finally signed;^ and it was not until April 21, 1739, that Spain, after much irritation, at last adhered to the treaty of peace.^ In the meantime Duke Francis had ceded Lorraine and Bar ' For the protocol of the prehminaries, see Dumont, Supplement II, Part II, p. 546. ' For the treaty, see Wenck, Codex juris gentium, I, p. 1. ' For the treaty, see Del CantiUo, Tradadoa de Paz, p. 303. 444 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI to King Stanislas/ who formally renounced the crown of 7-f'°_ ,, Poland in exchange for the duchies. The King of Sardinia also finally acceded to the treaty of peace upon the terms required of him.^ The diplomacy Although the pacific policy of Walpole had exempted tbe'oHeni" England from loss in the war of the Polish succession, and had eventually brought about peace, it permitted France and Spain to gather valuable fruits from their participa- tion in the war with Austria. The primacy in Europe had now reverted to Louis XV, who was regarded as the "master and arbiter," while Fleury passed for the first European statesman of his time. The Bourbon compact, though temporarily strained by Fleury 's secret negotiations with Austria, had established that dynasty firmly in Italy and greatly enhanced the prestige of France. But the Cardinal's success was not confined to Italy and the practical acquisition of Lorraine for France. He had also won a great diplomatic victory in the East. In 1736 a Russian army had been sent to Azoff for the purpose of gaining for Russia access to the Black Sea, on which the Russian right of navigation had been successfully contested by the Turks. War had followed, and Austria, in secret alliance with Russia, hoping to find compensation in the Balkan peninsula for the recent losses in Italy, offered media- tion, with the intention of thereby aiding her ally and at the same time serving her own purposes. Wholly ignorant of the Austro-Russian alliance, the Sultan accepted the Emperor's mediation, only to find that Russia demanded the annexation of the whole country skirting the Black Sea on the North as far as the Caucasus, the right of free navigation on the Black Sea, and the indepen- dence of Moldavia and Wallachia. Charles VI, as mediator, declared that this demand was only moderate; while, in recompense for his good offices, he claimed for Austria the district of Novi Bazar. The Sultan indignantly refused these ' For the treaty, see Koch, Recueil de traiUs, I, p. 318. ' For the treaty, see TraiUs 'publics de la maison royale de Savoie, II, p. 517. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 445 conditions. The Emperor then invaded Servia, took Chap, vi possession of Nisch, and declared war on Turkey. Since the time of Francis I, France had enjoyed a prac- ■ tical monopoly of the Levant trade, with the special privi- lege of protecting all persons of the Roman Cathohc faith within the dominions of the Sultan. The preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had thus be- come, and long continued to be, a dogma of French diplo- macy. Now that it was menaced by two great powers, Fleury enibraced his opportunity to intervene. The French ambassador at Constantinople, Villeneuve, a man of re- markable energy, aided by French officers in the Turkish army, succeeded in restoring the courage of the Turks, with the result that Nisch was retaken and siege laid to Bel- grade. The Austrian general, Neipperg, took refuge with Villeneuve, who had accompanied the Sultan in the field, and was soon persuaded by him to ask for full powers to treat for peace. Through the mediation of Villeneuve, by the Treaty of Belgrade, signed on September 10, 1739, the Emperor returned to the Sultan Servia, Western Wallachia, and Bel- grade itself, which the Turks had not captured. ^ On the eighteenth Russia also signed a peace, having gained by the war only a narrow strip of territory between the Dnieper and the Bug, without having reached the Black Sea, which still remained a Turkish lake.^ In the following year the Sultan, as a reward for Villeneuve 's services, renewed and enlarged the "Capitulations," which rendered Turkey for commercial purposes almost the same to France as a vast colonial empire.^ As a further safeguard of French in- terests in the East, on July 19, 1740, Villeneuve procured a treaty of mutual defence between Turkey and Sweden. ' For the treaty, which fixed the hmits of Austria in the Balkan peninsula down to 1878, see Wenck, I, p. 326. ^ For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 388. ' For the Capitulations of 1740, which are still the law for the French in the Ottoman Empire, — although many of the privileges then ac- corded to France have since been granted to other nations, — see Wenck, I, p. 638, and Testa, I, p. 186. A. D. 1731-1756 446 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI While France was thus exercising a preponderating in- fluence upon the course of events, the peace poHcy of Wal- ■ pole was becoming every day more difficult to maintain. Walpole 's interest in peace was not inspired by any of those The War ot moral ideals which in more recent times have been invoked Jenkins Ear ^^ ghow the inherent wickedness of war. His political philosophy was frankly utilitarian. The aim of England, he held, should be to grow rich and strong by building up commerce and developing colonies. If others desired to exhaust themselves in unprofitable quarrels, England should simply leave them to their devices, and not drain the public treasury and shed the blood of Englishmen for purely imaginary benefits. But the time had come when the parliamentary opposi- tion saw its chance to force a change of policy, or at least to utilize an attack upon Walpole 's administration as a means for accomplishing his overthrow. The Treaty of Utrecht authorized only a single British ship each year to trade with the Spanish colonies in America; but, under cover of this legal privilege, an extensive illicit trade had been carried on. Indignant with these violations of treaty rights, the Spanish government had frequently searched and captured British ships engaged in these en- croachments, and this procedure had often been executed with a rigor as harsh as the provocations were exasperating. Terrible tales of cruelty and suffering had been told by re- turning sea captains. Letters were read in the House of Commons reporting that seventy British sailors were dying in chains in Spanish dungeons. There was no serious investigation of the truth of these stories, or any attempt to learn what provocation there might have been for capture and imprisonment. The famous Captain Jenkins informed Parliament how, seven years before, his ship had been searched by a Spanish guarda- costa and his ear torn off, with the taunt that he might carry it home to his king. When asked what he thought when he was thus treated, he replied in a beautifully balanced sentence that had probably been prepared before- A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 447 hand, "I commended my soul to my God and my cause to Chap, vi my country!" The piety and patriotism of Captain Jenkins formed a telling background for the stories of Spanish cruelty, and the honor of England seemed to call for war. Walpole admitted that the conduct of the Spanish captains had sometimes been excessive, and arranged for plenipotentiaries to regulate the future relations of English and Spanish trade in a friendly conference. But the parliamentary opposi- tion would not listen to such a solution. In vain Walpole declared that in case of war France would unite with Spain, and that England could not hope for aid from Holland, Sweden, or the Emperor. In May, 1739, the plenipoten- tiaries met, but the public discussions had aroused the anger of both countries. England demanded the abolition of the right of search. Spain was determined not to sur- render "a right which was her only defence against British buccaneers." Denunciation on both sides fanned public feeling to a flame, and in spite of Walpole's resistance, in October, 1739, war was declared, amidst the cries of the populace at the doors of the Houses of Parliament, "A free sea or war!" Although Walpole declared that the war was "unjust, Beemningof impolitic, and dishonorable," he did not at once resign his gj^'^^'^ff^j office. His adversaries contended that he would try to end commerce the war by surrendering the right of British ships to navi- """^ ^'oi^es gate freely in American waters, — a right they were resolved not to yield. His fall was, therefore, predetermined; for the British nation was behind the hostility to Spain. In fact, the moment had arrived when a world-struggle for commerce and colonies was to begin in earnest. Hitherto the great conflicts had been European, and chiefly dynas- tic. But now, with the exception of the Austrian suc- cession, the great dynastic problems appeared to have been solved. The House of Hanover was firmly established in England, and the Pretender had become an itinerant in- triguer whose cause seemed hopeless. The separation of the crowns of France and Spain was also assured. The pre- 448 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI dominance of the House of Bourbon, now represented in A. D Italy by Don Carlos, foreboded, indeed, future dangers for Europe; and, if it continued to be united by the Facte de famille, would certainly present a formidable obstruction to Great Britain's policy of commercial and colonial expansion. National interests had already engendered a conflict between England and Spain, and it was probable that they would soon produce a similar antagonism between England and France; for, on account of the rivalry of the French and English colonies in North America and the competition for supremacy in India, it was in France rather than in Spain that British policies were likely to find their most powerful opponent. It created no great surprise, therefore, when in September, 1740, Fleury, fearing that if France did not support Spain in the war with England, Philip V would throw himself into the arms of the Emperor, urged on by public opinion in France, decided to send a fleet to America to aid the Spaniards. But to the end Walpole stoutly resisted the parhamentary opposition; and, while carrying on the colonial war with Spain and sending a fleet to the West Indies to check the naval operations of the French, resolutely sought to main- tain the peace of Europe, now disturbed by changes of a different character. The death of By the death of the Emperor Charles VI on October 20, andfte eSeots ^^^> ^^^ vajue of the Pragmatic Sanction was put to a prac- tical test. To the neglect of his army, his finances, and the substantial interests of his people, and against the advice of his ablest counsellors, who like Prince Eugene had warned hun of the weakness of mere paper guarantees, he had placed his faith in the assurances for which he had so dearly paid. It was a necessary consequence of the purely dynastic growth of the chief European states that their coherence was centred almost entirely in the person of the monarch. Aside from the imperial office, which was in fact an adminis- tration rather than a sovereignty,^ Charles VI was King of ' For the opinions of the time, see Koser, Historische Zeitschrift, LXI (1889), pp. 276, 277. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 449 Hungary and Bohemia with their numerous dependencies, Chap, vi and as Duke of Austria ruler over Styria, Carinthia, Carni- ola, and the Tyrol, — lands belonging to Austria by conquest and inheritance, — with possessions regarded as personal to the House of Austria in Italy and the Netherlands. After continuous occupation of the Imperial throne for more than three hundred years the German Empire as a whole seemed in some sense to be a hereditary appanage of the Hapsburg dynasty; and the other Imperial princes, even the most powerful, were looked upon at Vienna as rightfully subordinate to the Emperor. Had Charles VI prepared for the succession of Francis of Lorraine, — who on February 12, 1736, had married Maria Theresa, — by at once causing him to be elected King of the Romans, and thus securing to him the imperial power upon his own death, the chances for preserving the Haps- burg inheritance intact would have been greatly increased. But the Emperor had been too weak for such a cowp d '6tat. * Within the Empire the mediaeval idea of local independence had survived its disappearance in the great centralized monarchies. Since the Peace of Westphalia the princes had exercised a recognized sovereignty within their own do- minions, and in Brandenburg-Prussia royal power had been established. In purchasing guarantees for the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles VI had yielded Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos, Lorraine to France, and a part of Lombardy to the King of Sardinia, and had abandoned in the interest of England and Holland the Ostend Company; but he had not satisfied his immediate neighbors, upon whose good will and support it was necessary to depend. Among the former allies of Austria there was not one The attitude upon whom firm reliance could be placed for the active °^*®^''°^J^^ enforcement of the Pragmatic Sanction. Prussia, under Frederick William I, had been on the whole loyal to the Emperor; who in return had shown little favor to his ally. But the last days of Frederick William I, who had died in May, 1740, were embittered by the feeling that Charles VI had disregarded his rights in the succession of Berg and VOL. ra. — 29 A. D. 1731-1756 450 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI Jiilich. Through his prudence and economy the late king had greatly increased the resources of Prussia, leaving to his brilliant son and successor, Frederick II, - — who was soon to acquire the surname "the Great," — a well filled war chest, a thoroughly disciplined army, and the ambition to round out the monarchy by conquest and make it a great and powerful military state. As Elector of Hanover, George II had been a true Im- perialist; but, as King of England, he had been obliged to resist the Emperor's maritime policy, and Walpole, while appreciating the value of the Empire as a balance to Bour- bon ambitions, was opposed to sacrifices on the part of England in the interest of the House of Hapsburg. The Elector of Bavaria, Charles Albert, had been friendly so long as the plan for his son's marriage with the Arch- duchess Maria Anna was under consideration, but when that was abandoned he had resumed his attitude of hostility and announced his candidature for the imperial office. The Elector of Saxony, in whose behalf the war of the Po- lish succession had been undertaken, was by every consider- ation of honor under obligation to the House of Hapsburg, to which he largely owed his elevation to the throne of Poland; but Frederick Augustus II had no inclination to forego his own advantage out of gratitude to Austria. In Italy there was no prospect of support for the Haps- burg interests; for the King of Sardinia, recalling the epi- gram of his ancestor, that Lombardy was "an artichoke to be eaten leaf by leaf," was hoping to increase his do- minions at the expense of Austria; and Elizabeth Farnese, who was now through Don Carlos all powerful in Naples and Sicily as well as in Spain, desired to recover Parma, which had been yielded to Charles VI, or to create a new principality, for her second son, Don Philip. Much, therefore, depended upon the action of France. If the love of peace had really been the controlhng motive of Fleury's diplomacy, he might have averted war by imposing a mutual restraint upon the poweis; but the opportunity to crush the House of Hapsburg seemed to EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 451 have arrived, and Marshal Belle-Isle, appealing to the Chap, vi traditional French hostility to Austria, urged upon the '^■''• aged cardinal a far-reaching plan of dismemberment, by ^^^^-^^^ which Maria Theresa would be left little more than the Kingdom of Hungary, while the Imperial throne was to be filled by the Elector of Bavaria under the tutelage of France. In March, 1739, Frederick Wilham I had concluded The ideas and with Fleury a secret engagement by which France had ^^"^'ck'ir recognized the Prussian claim to the greater part of the Duchy of Berg, and when the news of the death of Charles VI reached him, Frederick II was preparing to take posses- sion. In reply to the circular letter announcing to the courts of Europe the succession of Maria Theresa, he, with the other sovereigns, — except Louis XV, — ex- pressed his intention to keep the engagements with the late t emperor which the existing treaties required. Soon after- ' ward, however, it was claimed that the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the King of Prussia had been given upon condition that the Emperor would guarantee the Prussian succession to the Duchy of Berg; and, since Charles VI had failed to keep that engagement, the entire treaty was invaKd. It was a surprise to Europe that the high-minded yoimg philosopher and moralist who a few years before, in the calm of his seclusion at Rheinsberg, had written the "Anti- Machiavel," in which the great Florentine was pilloried as a pervert, and the highest ideals of political virtue were eulogized, was disposed, for purely political reasons, to take advantage of a helpless woman's weakness. But the exigencies of kingship in an age of low political morality present temptations even to an intelligence ca- pable of the noblest reflections upon the duties of a prince. Voltaire, for whose keen intellect the young king had a sincere reverence, had filled his mind with a passionate love of ideas, but had not inspired him with any fundamental principles.* ' The influence of Voltaire upon Frederick II had been to stimulate iis ecepticism regarding accepted ideas and doctrines rather than to impart to his mind any positive direction. While in a complimentary 452 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI As absolute as Louis XIV in his conception of his missioa ^•^- as a king,i Frederick II was not, like the Grand Monarch, governed by a sense of his own personal omnipotence. He perfectly comprehended the mechanism of the State, his own limitations, the necessity of action, and of actioa in terms of force. Where Louis XIV would have looked for success in vast and complicated combinations, Fred- erick II sought it in the instruments he could positively command, and not in those which were liable to miscarry or prove illusory. He was the foxmder of a different school of statesmanship from that which Louis XIV had estab- lished. He, too, was a keen and far-sighted diplomatist; but his diplomacy was primarily based upon the concep- tions of Realpolitik, — the superiority of a strong army and a full treasury to a formidable net-work of intrigues and promises. At a glance the young king perceived that his king- dom lacked territorial completeness. He perceived also that the position in which the House of Hapsburg was placed presented an opportunity for the immediate expan- sion of Prussia, and that the foresight and parsimony of '- his prudent father had provided him with the means of realizing this enlargement. To give effect to his thought, he promptly exhumed the ancient claims to Silesia which the Great Elector had not been able to press; and, on December 16, 1740, he marched a Prussian army into that province, at the same time instructing his envoy at Vienna to de- mand its immediate cession. In return for this he offered to guarantee the Austrian possessions in Germany and to support Francis of Lorraine for the imperial office, with Maria Theresa as co-regent. way he had commended the Anti-Machiavel as a work "worthy of a prince" and fit to be "the catechism of kings and their ministers," he had dissuaded the young enthusiast from the study of Wolf's Jus Gen- tium, a work which placed international obHgations upon the groimd that States, Mke persons, have inherent rights and are bound by corre- sponding duties. '■ Frederick II called Prussia "un pays despotique et monarchique." EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 453 In this procedure Frederick II entertained no bitterness of Chap, vi feeling toward Austria or Maria Theresa. He felt that ^73^ "yrg Charles VI had failed to sustain the rights of Prussia to Berg, that the annexation of Silesia was a political necessity, and that it must be promptly secured. His demand was The motives Eot one of sentiment but of pure political calculation. °' ^'^«^''"<='' " He would gladly have avoided war and spared his army and treasury, if he could have accomplished his end in another way. He was, in fact, disposed to revert to the system of WiUiam III of Orange and the Great Elector in opposing the ambitions of the House of Bourbon, and formally proposed to Vienna the formation of a coalition for that purpose, to be composed of Prussia, Austria, Russia, Eng- land, and Holland. As a condition of this combination, however, he demanded the inmiediate cession to Prussia of the whole of Silesia. In spite of the hesitating and uncertain answer of Fleury The Austrian to the circular letter recalling the promise of France regard- prederick^ii's ing the Pragmatic Sanction, it was believed at Vienna that proposals the sacrifice of Lorraine had fully appeased the Bourbon ambitions so far as France was concerned, and that the coalition proposed by Frederick II would only unite more closely the interests of France and Spain and thus occa- sion new losses in Italy; and the scheme was, therefore, rejected. But Frederick II was not to be turned from his purpose. As firmly as Louis XIV, the King of Prussia claimed to rule by divine right; but he had a more coherent view of divine participation in the upbuilding of the Prussian monarchy than the Grand Monarch had ever expounded regarding the development of France. For what reason had his provident father gathered treasure and disciplined troops, without ever using them to make the will of Prussia's King respected in the world? Obviously because Divine Providence, watch- ing over the kingdom, had given Frederick William I this wisdom, in order that he, the son, coming to power at this auspicious moment, should use these resources for the aug- mentation of the State! And so, with a logic which found A. D. 1731-1756 454 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI acceptance in Prussia, the young king convinced himself, and also his subjects, that he was divinely appointed to give to the monarchy which his ancestors had pieced together from the heritage of Brandenburg and the spoils of Sweden, Poland, and other enfeebled powers, like a great mosaic whose complete pattern Heaven had not yet fully revealed, the consummate glory which in the Councils of Eternity had been wisely planned. Absolutism had made a distinct advance since the time of Mazarin. It was no longer in Bossuet's stately but dogmatic fashion supporting its claims by its interpretation of the Scriptures, it was in the spirit of inductive philosophy adducing proofs of the divine sanction from the opportunities which Providence was fur- nishing to Prussia. Frederick II was profiting doubly by ruling over a pious people and by his pupilage to Voltaire. The deliberate As early as 1731 Frederick II had determined that when character of j^g came to the thronc he would round out the scattered Frederick II 3 plana domimons of Prussia.^ It required no further mtimation of the designs of Providence to indicate to him the addi- tions needed to complete the royal domain and redeem it from its hybrid condition of "intermediateness between an electorate and a Idngdom. "^ A glance at a map of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1731 shows that the transforma- tion of the Hohenzollem state into a compact kingdom required much aggressive work. The Prince might easily mark out for future conquest not only Berg and Jiihch to strengthen Cleve and Mark, as well as Silesia, but Meck- lenburg, the remainder of Western Pomerania, — then still possessed by Sweden, — and especially Polish Prussia, needed to connect East Prussia with Eastern Pomerania and to exclude Poland entirely from the shores of the Baltic. All these the young prince had mentioned as future conquests necessary to the greatness of Prussia. In constructing this new map of the Prussian kingdom ' See the Denkschrift of 1731 in the works of Frederick the Great, XVI. ' "Zwitterwesen zwisohen Kurfurstentum und Konigreich." EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL STJPKEMACY 455 juristic considerations had no weight.' Assuming the Chap, vi divine right of a ruler to build a kingdom, such discussions ^■''■ seemed to him superfluous; for the accomplished fact would ^'^^^~^'^^ in time be a sufiicient indication of the divine iatention, and both the claims of others and the preferences of peoples might then pass unnoticed. What had passive populations to say regarding the political system of which they should form a part? Who but sovereigns could decide such ques- tions? And how could sovereigns decide them, except as a Higher Power, whose instruments they were, gave them the strength to accomplish their purposes? If, therefore, the occupation of the possessions of a help- less woman with the purpose of appropriating them with- out an appeal to any principle of law seems to our age unworthy of the author of the "Anti-Machiavel, " it is but fair to consider that Frederick II, although professing to be a philosopher, merely followed the practice and applied the political philosophy of his time. All that renders his act exceptional is that he had assumed the r61e of an apostle of ideas rather than that of a champion of brute force. The judgment at Vienna was less charitable. To Maria The resietanoe Theresa and her advisers Frederick II 's action appeared "^ *"*'"* unmanly, perfidious, and unworthy of a king. Without giving notice he had taken possession of Austrian territory by armed force, and then dictated terms which he would not have thought of suggesting had he believed Maria Theresa capable of defending her rights. It is characteristic of the new king of Prussia that he entered the contest with Austria without elaborate diplo- matic preparations; but this does not indicate that he set ' The motives that actuated Frederick II are frankly stated by himself. See his Histoire de mon temps, I, p. 117. As for the question of right, when his Minister, Podewils, timidly reminded him that whatever right to Silesia Prussia may once have possessed was renounced by subsequent treaties, he repUed: "The matter of right is an affair of the ministers; that is, your affair. It is time to work in secret, for the orders to the troops have been given." — Politische Korrespondenz, I, p. 90. 456 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 Frederick Il'a position of advantage little value upon alliances.^ Knowing perfectly that the storm would soon break, that Austria was not only weak from a military and financial point of view but also without loyal allies, Frederick II was certain that he could obtain possession of Silesia without help from others, and that when the province was once in his power Austria could not expel him from it. But we may safely credit Frederick II with a still more penetrating comprehension of his opportimity. Not re- quiring allies for his immediate designs, there was no reason why he should embarrass himself with engagements to ex- ecute purposes ulterior to his own, and perhaps in conflict with his interests. Once in possession of Silesia, he could perhaps without the cost of a conflict retain a considerable part of it, and still be free to choose his future allies. The occupation of Silesia was, however, in itself a diplo- matic advantage, not only in further negotiations with Austria, but with the other German princes also. Of these the Elector of Bavaria was the most ambitious. Denying the validity of the renimciation of his wife, the younger daughter of Joseph I, Charles Albert not only aspired to the Imperial throne, but claimed a right of succession to the entire Austrian heritage.^ Frederick Augustus II, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, advanced similar claims, and filed a protest against Maria Theresa's inheritance of the crown of Bohemia. Nothing could be more certain than that Frederick II could, if he desired, without great cost to himself, obtain their support in a general scheme of spoliation. But Prussia now possessed a still greater advantage. The relations of France and Spain, England and Holland, ren- dered it probable that if one of these groups should ally itself with Austria, the other would seek an alliance with • On December 16, 1740, Frederick II made a treaty of defensive alliance with Russia, but it was of no value to him. See Wenck, I, p. 529. ^ See p. 404 of this volume, and also Heigel, Der Osterreickische Erbfolgestreit und die Kaiserwahl Karls VII. A.D. 1731-1756 ETJKOPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 457 Frederick II. France was only awaiting developments in Chap, vi Germany to enter the contest for the destruction of the House of Hapsburg, while Spain was preparing to join in the scheme of dismemberment by appropriating Parma and Piacenza. The victory of Frederick II over the Austrian forces at Effect of MoUwitz, on April 10, 1741, gave to these possibilities an Frederick iva ... __, action upon immediate precipitation. The Kmg of Prussia suddenly England found himself of European importance, and instead of needing to seek allies they were flocking to him. It now seemed evident that Austria was an easy prey, aud that without great risk something might be gained for each. In fact, by the seizure of Silesia, Frederick II had disturbed the equilibrium not only of Germany but of Europe as well, and held in his own hand the balance of power. With Russia practically eliminated on account of internal disorders, and counterbalanced by Sweden, which was aiming to recover the provinces which Peter the Great had taken away, there were two nearly equal groups of powers confronting each other: Austria, England, and Holland on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other. As between these combinations, Prussia, victorious in the field and fully prepared for a bitter war, could ap- parently give success to whichever side Frederick II might incline. He had suddenly taken in Europe a position similar to that which Charles XII of Sweden had occupied at the time of the war of the Spanish succession, but in the exer- cise of his power he was to manifest a far more skilful hand. The attitude of England regarding the action of Frederick II had been weak and vacillating, because English opinion was divided. The reasons for this were twofold: first, the double, and far from identical, interests of George II as King of England and as Elector of Hanover; and, second, the parhamentary struggle then being carried on to accom- phsh the overthrow of Walpole.' ' For a very full account of the contest, see Wiese, Die englische par- lammtarische Opposition und ihre Stellung zur auswartigen PoUtik, etc., (1740-1744). 458 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI George II regarded the young king of Prussia as a danger- , i7o'^l'^7rf, ons neighbor for his Hanoverian electorate, and looked • ■ with little favor upon the augmentation of his power in Germany. Moreover, it was a tradition of British di- plomacy to sustain Austria as a balance to French prepon- .. derance; and at that moment, when the House of Bourbon had become formidable by the Facte de famille, when Eng- land was already at war with Spain and war with France seemed imminent, this policy was more imperative than ever. Still, while popular feeling in England was S3rm- pathetic with Maria Theresa, war with so important a power as Prussia in behalf of purely Austrian interests had seemed to Walpole ill advised. While the King would have been glad to form a coalition with Holland, Denmark, Russia, Saxony, and Hesse to avert the annexation of Silesia by Frederick II, and for a time hoped to succeed in such a plan, without strong support, which was not avail- able, the English government was not disposed to offer warlike resistance to the designs of Prussia; and the Eng- lish ambassador at Vienna, Robinson, was, therefore, in- structed to urge upon Maria Theresa the cession of a part ; of Silesia as a condition of peace with Prussia in exchange for Frederick 's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. The interven- Howcver crucl the wouud to Hapsburg pride might have tion of France ^^^^^ j^ ^^^^j^ ^^ ^^^-^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^g^^. ^^ f^^^OW Wal- pole's advice; but Maria Theresa and her advisers were not aware of all the dangers to which her patrimony was exposed, and the counsel of England was rejected. With the faith of youth and inexperience Maria Theresa, umtil she was cruelly xmdeceived, placed absolute confidence in the professed friendship of France for Austria; but the peaceful inclinations of Cardinal Fleury, who was nearly ninety years old, were overruled by the vigorous insistence of Belle-Isle and the anti-Hapsburg party; and after the victory of Frederick II at Mollwitz Belle-Isle was sent on a secret mission to rouse the opposition of the German princes to the pretensions of Austria. Notwithstanding the offer of an alliance, Frederick II was not willing to 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 459 accept it until Louis XV was ready to promise military aid; * Chap, vi but when it had become certain that the English mediation ^^^'^'^^ must fail, and that Austria would make no concession, with ■ the understanding that a French army would be sent to Ger- many to support the Elector of Bavaria, on June 4, 1741, Frederick II signed a secret treaty with France.' In this treaty Louis XV guaranteed to the King of Prussia the re- tention of Lower Silesia, and promised that Russia, which was then inclined to aid Austria, should be kept occupied by a war with Sweden for the recovery of the provinces ceded to Russia by the Peace of Nystad. In return, Fred- erick II renounced his claims to the duchies of Jiilich and Berg, and agreed to cast his electoral vote for the candi- date most acceptable to France. On May 28, Belle-Isle had secured the conclusion of a treaty between Spain and Bavaria at Nymphenburg, guaranteed by Louis XV, who since November, 1740, had been paying subsidies to the Elector.^ The truth could not much longer be concealed, for on August 15 a French army had crossed the Rhine. By the intervention of France the war of the Austrian succession had suddenly become European. In the at- tempt to disguise the fact of French aggression, it was repre- sented that the troops sent to Germany were not acting in the name of France, nor against Austria, but were merely (loaned for the defence of Bavaria, in accordance with pre- vious treaty obligations. The forty thousand French troops were, however, commanded by Belle-Isle, who was also at the same time accredited by Louis XV as his am- ' For the negotiations, see Koser, Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen, I, pp. 329, 337. * The treaty here referred to is printed by Martens, Recueil, N, Supplement I, p. 721, and by Del Cantillo, Tradados, p. 346. There has been much discussion over an alleged treaty of Nymphenburg, said to have been signed between France and Bavaria on May 18, or 22, 1741. This is represented by Heigel and Droysen as a falsification, although Ranke, after seeing their argument, considered the treaty genuine. See Heigel, Zur Geschichte des sog. Nymphenburger Traktats, Munich, 1884; also De Garden, Histoire generale de traitSs de paix, III, pp. 254, 255. 460 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 Effects of the French inter- vention in England and Germany bassador to the Imperial Diet at Frankfort, which was about to elect a new emperor. When denial would no longer - serve his purpose, the Cardinal endeavored to excuse the hostile attitude of France by pretending that the French guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction implied the quali- fication, "save the rights of another"; and in fact denied the validity of the entire treaty, on the ground that Charles VI had neglected to procure the ratification by the States of the Empire of the definitive peace signed at Vienna be- tween France and the Emperor; which proved, if anything, that France and Austria had never legally ceased to be at war! The reaction of England against the French intervention in Germany was delayed by Walpole's disinclination for war and his hope of inducing Maria Theresa to appease Frederick II by ceding to him a portion at least of Silesia. English public opinion, however, was strongly on the side of immediate intervention to counteract French influence in Germany. It was for England a point of honor, Wal- pole's enemies contended, to defend the Pragmatic Sanc- tion; and the hesitation of the ministry, it was declared, was owing to the shameful sacrifice of British interests to -those of Hanover. When in September, 1741, George II, who, in spite of Walpole's dissuasion, had gone to Hanover, negotiated a treaty of neutrality for the electorate with Prussia, Walpole was made the object of a bitter public attack.^ When it became known that the King, as Elector of Hanover, intended to vote for the French candidatQ/for the imperial oSice, the hour for Walpole's fall had arrived, and there was a belief that he might even end his Ufe in the Tower. On January 24, 1742, Charles Albert of Bavaria was elected Emperor as Charles VII; ^ but, although events in ' The pamphlet literature of the time is described by Wiese, Die englische parlamentarische Opposition. " For a detailed and extremely graphic account of the election of Charles VII, see the extract from the Memoires of the Prince de Croy in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, VIII (1894), p. 592. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 461 Germany exercised an influence, it was not they alone that Chap, vi determined Walpole's fall. The war with Spain had not ,^^;''^„, brought victory to Great Britain, either in the West Indies or the Mediterranean. So fierce was the opposition on this accomit that the prime minister on January 31 decided to resign. On February 9 the King created him Earl of Orford, and two days later he abandoned office. The French intervention had produced even more de- cisive results in Germany. On September 19, 1741, Bavaria and Saxony had formed an alliance to divide the Austrian heritage.^ All of the electors had deserted the House of Hapsburg. Sweden, inspired by France, had declared war upon Russia; but this had little practical bearing upon the situation, since the revolution of December, 1741, in Russia had brought the Czarina Elizabeth, a daughter of Peter the Great, to the throne, and made an end of German ■ mfluence at St. Petersburg. "La France est id en benedic- tion," wrote the French ambassador, La Chetardie, one of the chief conspirators in the revolution; and the English ambassador reported, "The ambassador of France is the real prime minister."^ Abandoned on every side, Maria Theresa, when she found herself deserted by Russia as well as by England, in order to reduce the number of her assailants, upon the urgent advice of her ministers, on October 9, 1741, had made a strictly secret compact with Frederick II at Kleinschnel- lendorf, in which Austria agreed to surrender the important town of( Neisse to Frederick II, and subsequently to cede to him Lower Silesia, on condition that he would release her army for use elsewhere; but, after the fall of Prag, on November 26, he had resumed hostilities. On the day when Charles Albert was crowned at Frankfort, however, the Austrians, inspired by Maria Theresa's courage and determination, had invaded Bavaria; and in February, 1742, were in possession of his capital. ' See Karge, Die russisch-osterreichische Allianz von 17^6 und ihre Yorgeschichte, pp. 6, 19. ' See Vandal, Louis XIV el Elisabeth de Russie, pp. 163, 165. 462 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI In England the fall of Walpole was followed by the mm- ^^'^'„ istry of John Carteret, a brilliant diplomatist, who chose for his portfolio the administration of foreign affairs in the Northern Department. The first fruit of his ministry was The pro- the Treaty of Breslau of June 11, 1742, between Frederick rfcrrtereT""" ^^ ^^'^ ^^ria Theresa, which prepared the way for the Peace of Berlin, of July 28, by which Silesia and the County of % Glatz were ceded to Prussia, under the guarantee of Great » Britain and the United Provinces.^ In the meantime Spain had acquired an ascendency in Italy dangerous to the King of Sardinia; and on February 1, 1742, Charles Emmanuel had broken off his alliance with France and Spain and signed a convention with Austria for the defence of Lombardy against the Spaniards.^ English co-operation in protecting the Austrian Nether- lands against the French met with only a partial success, but Carteret finally succeeded in obtaining not only troops but subsidies from the States General, and England's intervention eventually served to neutralize the aggression of France. By a treaty of defensive alliance of November 18, 1742, with Frederick II, who, having obtained the cession of Silesia, was content for the time being to remain neutral, Carteret was able to protect Hanover from a French invasion.^ ■^ In fact, the Treaty of Breslau proved a turning point in the rescue of Austria. By temporarily eliminating Prussia from the conflict, Maria Theresa was able to place the French in a perilous position; for Belle-Isle's army was suddenly left isolated at Prag. Fleury, who was approaching his end, hastened to make overtures for peace, in which he threw the responsibility for the war entirely upon Belle-Isle; but Maria Theresa refused to negotiate, published his letter, and sent a stinging reply, in which she declared she would receive no project of peace from the Cardinal. In con- sequence, Belle-Isle was ordered to retreat from Prag, and ' For these treaties, see Wenck, I, p. 734 and p. 739. ' For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 672. ' For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 640. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SXJPEEMACY 463 Maria Theresa soon afterward celebrated the restoration Chap, vi of her Bohemian domains by her coronation there as Queen ^- °- of Bohemia. ^^^^-^^^^ The intervention of England had produced such a marked effect in the fortunes of Maria Theresa, that she hoped to The effects of drive the Bourbons from Italy; but the maritime powers were ^^^ ^'^^^'^ ,. , , ,T • 1 intervention not disposed to support this adventurous undertaking. England's main purpose was the mastery of the sea, and subsidiary to this the weakening of the Bourbon dynasty. In Russia the influence of France had proved of short duration. The Czarina Elizabeth, having secured firm possession of the throne, had determined not to intervene in the affairs of Europe, but to guard against the loss of the provinces taken by Peter the Great. On December 11, 1742, Great Britain secured the neutrality of Russia; ^ and, through the anti-French influence of the Chancellor, Bestusheff, the plans of La Chetardie to render Russia subservient to France were doomed to disappointment. From Vienna, Constantinople, Paris, and London reports were soon afterward received at St. Petersburg that France was in- triguing to arm Turkey and Denmark against Russia, and to secure advantages for Sweden. Finally a despatch from Amelot to Count de Castellane, the French ambassador at Constantinople, was intercepted by the Russian Chan- cellor, Bestusheff, who was in the pay of England, and shown by the Austrian ambassador, Botta, to the Czar- ina. In this document the French minister of foreign affairs had stated that the accession of Elizabeth "was destined to reduce Russia to nothing," and that the Porte should profit by the occasion to act with Sweden and regain ascendency!^ In May and June, 1743, the "Pragmatic Army" — ^com- posed of English, Hanoverian, and Hessian troops — over- ran Bavaria, and with the Austrian forces took possession of nearly the entire electorate; and, on June 27, prac- ' For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 645. ' See WaUszewski, La dernihe des Romanov, pp. 287, 318. 464 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 Renewal of hostilities by Prussia tically deserted by the French, Charles VII was compelled to sign a capitulation by which the remaining Bavarian troops - were neutralized. On August 18 negotiations between Russia and Sweden resulted in a treaty of peace by which Russia acquired the Eastern part of Finland, and had thus once more become of importance in the contest. The spell which La Chetardie had exercised over the Czarina was, however, now entirely broken; and it was in vain that Frederick II authorized his envoy, Mardefeld, "to throw money out of the window" in his effort to destroy the influence of Bestusheff and establish the prestige of Prussia. In the following September, by the Treaty of Worms, the King of Sardinia joined with Great Britain and Austria in a defensive alliance, in which he promised Maria Theresa to furnish troops for the security of her estates in Lom- bardy, "in order that she might act more vigorously in Germany. "1 Thus, the English intervention had finally placed Maria Theresa in a position to concentrate her forces upon resistance to France. But it was not mainly against France that Maria Theresa wished to direct her energies. She had already become an apt pupil in that school of Realpolitik of which Frederick II was the founder and consummate master. It was Fred- erick II who, even under the cloak of neutrality, was her real adversary; and she was only awaiting her opportunity to recover Silesia. It did not require the open intimation of her intention "to act more vigorously in Germany," expressed in the Treaty of Worms, to arouse the apprehensions of Frederick II. "The views of Austria, which are known to me," he said to one of his ministers, "render it my duty to crown my work in Silesia and assure it." With this purpose, on May 22, 1744, he concluded a new treaty of alliance with the Emperor Charles VII, the Elector Palatine, and the Landgrave of Hesse at Frankfort,^ to which France acceded ' For the treaty of September 13, 1743, see Wenck, I, p. 677. 2 For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 163. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 465 on June 6; and, making the intention of Austria to renew Chap, vi the war his excuse, in the following September he invaded ,^^;^/^ Bohemia, captured Prag, and forced the Austrian troops to ■ withdraw from Bavaria. Then, having shown his ability to retain one conquest by making another, and fearing to excite a general coahtion against himself, his sense of pru- dence restrained him. His caution was fully justified, for Maria Theresa on January 8, 1745, formed a new alliance at Warsaw with Great Britain, Holland, and Poland-Saxony.' Charles VII, having only just regained his capital, which he was barely able to retain, died on January 20, 1745, and his son, Max- imilian III, who succeeded him as Elector of Bavaria, was not inclined to play the role of his ambitious father. On April 22, by the Treaty of Fiissen, the Elector renounced all pretension to the estates of the House of Austria, and in return for full re-establishment in his electorate agreed to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction and cast his vote m the imperial election for the Archduke Francis, husband of Maria Theresa.^ The situation was thus completely changed.^ Frederick Augustus II, though suggested by France as a desirable candidate for the Empire, was not acceptable to Frederick II; for he had, by the quadruple alliance of January 8, 1745, bound himself to defend Bohemia, and by a separate agree- ment with Austria to aid in securing the restoration of Silesia. Nor could Frederick II hope to win for himself the support of the electors. There was, indeed, no available ' For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 171. ' For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 180. For the negotiations, see Preuas, Der Friede von Fiissen, Munich, 1894. ' After the death of Charles VII, on January 31, Frederick II wrote to Louis XV: "Monsieiir mon frere, depuis que I'empereur est mort il me semble qu'il y a un changement si prodigieux dans lea affaires d'AIlemagne qu'il faut songer k de nouveHes mesures k prendre." The reply of Louis XV offered no aid in Germany, but exhorted Frederick II to seek the friendship of the Elector of Saxony and support his elec- tion as Emperor. VOL. HI.— 30 A.D. 1731-1756 466 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI candidate for the Empire about whom the enemies of the House of Hapsburg could rally. Since his private reconciliation with Austria at Breslau, Frederick II had derived no profit from his alliance with France. Soon after Cardinal Fleury's failure to negotiate a separate peace with Austria, on January 29, 1743, the aged minister had died; and in the following October, when Louis XV was himself directing foreign affairs, a second secret Facte de famille had been concluded between France and Spain, with the design of opposing Austria in the Netherlands and in Italy rather than in Germany. Thus, practically isolated in Germany, and confronted by a strong coalition, Frederick II, even when his victorious army was at the gates of Dresden, was not averse to peace. The divergence The divergence of the aims and policies of Maria Theresa Amtn^^'' """* ^^'^ George II was, however, soon to produce its effect at poUoies Vienna. While Austria sought to concentrate the force of the allies upon the recovery of Silesia, England wished to direct it chiefly against France.^ Opposition to Frederick II had at London never been more than half-hearted, and the main object of English diplomacy had been to render Prussia content with the possession of Silesia, reconcile Austria to this sacrifice, and unite the whole of Germany against the Bourbons. Indignant as Maria Theresa was with France and Spain, she had never ceased to perceive in Frederick II her really dangerous foe. The repeated efforts of George II through his ambassador at Vienna to end the conflict between Austria and Prussia had always been dis- pleasing to her, and she was often on the point of appealiag to the generosity of France, her open enemy, rather than endure the reproaches of an indifferent friend. On August 26, 1745, this divergence in the interests of the allies reached a stage that was critical. George II, who was at Hanover, had entered into negotiations with Frederick II with a view to the conclusion of peace between Prussia • In May, 1745, at Fontenoy and elsewhere the Pragmatic Army had suffered severe defeats and a great part of the Austrian Netherlands was in the hands of the French. A. D. 1731-1756 EUBOPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 467 and Austria, and had brought strong pressure at Vienna Chap, vi to secure acceptance of the preliminaries.'^ All arguments were in vain. Maria Theresa refused to withdraw the troops that were set to watch the further moves of Prussia. Reluctant as he was to sign a separate agreement, George II felt at last compelled to do so. The Young Pre- tender, Charles Edward, aided and abetted by France, had announced his intention to invade England, had even at- tempted to execute it, and in April, 1744, war had been form- ally declared upon France, whose fleet had been prevented from an attack upon England only by the storm which had dispersed it. Carteret, who by the King 's favor had become Earl Granville, had been driven from power by parliamen- tary opposition based on his alleged excessive interest in Hanover, his inability to separate Prussia from France, and his failure to obtain from the States General the fulfilment of their obligations in the war. A new ministry and the disturbed state of the country imperatively demanded the King's presence in England. Without waiting for Austria's assent to the preliminaries, therefore, George II made a separate peace with Frederick II, in which he guaranteed Silesia to Prussia, threatening Maria Theresa with the withdrawal of all British support if she did not accede to the terms contained in the preliminaries of Hanover.^ Although Maria Theresa was unable to drive Frederick II from Silesia, the presence of Austrian troops at Frankfort sustained the Hapsburg interests in the imperial election; and, against the protest of the Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector Palatine, on October 4, 1745, the Archduke was elected Emperor under the title of Francis I.' Strengthened by her husband's election to the Empire, Maria Theresa continued to resist the pressure of England to enforce the preliminaries of Hanover, and even opened ' For the preliminaries of Hanover, see Wenck, II, p. 191. ' For details, see Borkowsky, Die englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre njfi, Berlin, 1884. " For the negotiations of France and Prussia to prevent the election, see Zevort, he marquis d'Argenson, p. 138 et seq. A. D. 1731-1756 468 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI negotiations with France. Her indignation with George II was still more deeply stirred when the pillaging of Frederick . H's camp brought into her possession the secret correspond- ence of her English ally with the King of Prussia. Had it not been for the strong anti-Hapsburg prejudice of the Marquis d'Argenson, who in November, 1744, had been intrusted with the conduct of the foreign affairs of France, and the lack of expedition in the exchange of views with Louis XV, it is probable that she might have succeeded by the use of these disclosures in negotiating a peace with him.^ The system of A doctriuaire in international politics, the Marquis D'Aigenson d'Argenson was theoretically favorable to the cause of Prussia, without being able to give his preference much practical effect. His ministerial programme rested upon the proposition that France was "alone able to exercise efficiently an armed arbitrament which should assure the repose of Europe."^ The role of France, "favored with a wise king and ministry, and needing inothing additional for her own welfare," he said, should be to maintain the equilibrium of Europe for the benefit of mankind. The four powers necessary to be restrained were Austria, Russia, Spain, and England; any two of which, being in close accord with each other, would create a danger for the rest. The means to be employed to force these powers "to become happy, " were: (1) to unite the princes of the Empire against Austria, elevate a new dynasty to the imperial throne in place of the House of Hapsburg, and expel the Germans and the Spaniards also from Italy; (2) to regain the friendship of Russia by sending to her French emissaries, artists of all kinds, and subsidies, and to re- strain her military action by leaguing Denmark and Sweden ' From June, 1744, when Amelot left the foreign office, until November, 1744, when D'Argenson assumed office, Louis XV undertooli: to be his own minister of foreign affairs, but was not equal to it. See Baschet, Histoire du D&p6t des Archives des Affaires tHranghres, p. 254, ^ His TraiU de politique, composed in 1737, is analyzed by Zevort,| Le marquis d'Argenson, p. 3 et seq. f A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 469 against her; (3) to repress the chimerical designs of Spain; Chap. vi and (4) to keep England preoccupied at home, in order to prevent the use of her force and wealth in making war and disturbing the balance of Europe. For this purpose France should possess a navy worthy of her dignity as a peacemaker, so that she might protect Holland from the commercial rivalry of England and the Spanish colonies from her contraband trade. To accomplish this task, France had no need of fixed allies, but should depend upon Europe as a whole, since her role as the defender of civilization would always sufficiently justify her conduct and secure to her general recognition as a universal arbiter! Such was the system of ideas now to be brought into The defection competition with the Realpolitik of Prussia and Austria and "^0^'^^^ ™(^ ^^ the expansive policies of England. The first test of its coherence was the pressing demand of Frederick II for effective aid in the war with Austria. On June 21 he had said to Valory, Louis XV 's minister at Berlin: "Hope is the kind of money with which you have for a long time sought to pay me, and which affords me no relief; I declare to you that I wish no more of it, I require deeds." On July 22, he said to the minister, who had followed him to his camp and complained that he was treated like the valets and women who accompanied the army, "If you find yourself ill at ease here, I can give you no other advice than to return to Berlin, where the other ministers are. Moreover, I think there is nothing of im- ■ portance for you to negotiate here, inasmuch as France to this moment has turned a deaf ear to the subject of subsi- dies, so that I have no great cause to be content. " A month later, without the knowledge of France, the pre- liminaries of Hanover had been concluded by Frederick II, George II, and the States General. On September 5 Fred- erick II even refused the little subsidy then offered to him, as "fit only for a Landgrave of Darmstadt"; and informed Valory that he hoped to find in himself "resources that would take the place of ungrateful friends." Believing in the possibility of making terms with France 470 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI and maintaining a coalition against Prussia, Maria Theresa ^■^- not only refused to accept the terms which the English ambassador, Robinson, urged upon her, but showed him a new draft of the Treaty of Warsaw in which she pledged The Treaties hcrself to protect Saxouy against the designs of Frederick of Dresden jj^ ^^^ ^-^^ Czarina Elizabeth so far emerged from her neutrality as to declare that a further attack on Saxony would call twelve thousand Russian troops into Germany for its defence.^ But Maria Theresa was not able to expel the Prussian troops from Silesia, and was obliged to accept the pre- liminaries of Hanover. Frederick II, feeling himself prac- tically abandoned by France, and fearing the intervention of Russia, was now ready to make a profitable bargain; and on December 25, 1745, he signed at Dresden two treaties of peace: in the first he restored to Frederick Augustus II, as Elector of Saxony, all his conquests in that electorate, in return for one million 6cus and the renunciation by the Queen of Poland, daughter of Joseph I, of aU her rights in the estates ceded to himself in the Treaty of Breslau; in the second treaty Maria Theresa again renounced to him Silesia and the Coimty of Glatz in exchange for his recognition of Francis I as Emperor.^ The advantage Thus France was left to continue alone a conflict which of the peace involved neither the honor nor a single essential interest for Fredenok II " of the French nation. Left without real support, Frederick II had skilfully maintained the conquest of Silesia by surrendering what did not belong to him. When he was urged to make himself " the pacificator of Europe, " he smiled, and answered: "The role is too dangerous! . . . If fortune had not favored me, I should have been a monarch without a throne. ... I am now assured tranquillity for about a dozen years, and I shall henceforth not attack even a cat, > For the negotiations with the Czarina, and the differences of view of her ministers, see Karge, Die russisch-dsterreickische AUianz von 1H6, p. 56 et seq. * For the treaties, see Wenok, II, p. 194 and p. 207. ETJROPEAN AND COLONIAL StTPREMACT 471 except to defend myself; I would not stir if Prince Charles Chap, vi of Lorraine were at the gates of Paris. "^ '*^"- With wonderful perspicacity Frederick II comprehended the advantage of peace to Prussia; and there was something almost preternatural in his accurate prediction of the "dozen years" of growth, repose, and economy that he had secured without real cost to his kingdom. In June, 1744, La Chetardie, the French ambassador The rupture who at the beginning of Elizabeth 's reign had been re- p^j^^elnd garded as her real "prime minister," had received peremp- Ruaaia tory orders to leave Moscow, where the Court then was, within twenty-four hours. In his attempt to overthrow Bestusheff, and to draw Russia into the Franco-Prussian alliance against Austria, he had been defeated and exposed. His correspondence had been perlustree in the official cham- bre noire, deciphered by the expert Goldbach, and the most odious passages had been exhibited to the Czarina; wherein her "vanity," her "light-mindedness, " her "giddi- ness," and her "deplorable conduct" were assigned as reasons why she was "incapable of serious negotiation."^ Argenson still clung to the belief that the friendship of Russia could be recovered. La Chetardie was disgraced and banished from court, and a successor, Allion, was sent to St. Petersburg to repair the breach; but the case was hope- less and the choice unfortunate. In vain was Allion ordered to flatter the Czarina by conceding to her the title of "Em- press," which France had so long refused; and Louis XV's attempt to regain Elizabeth's confidence by a personal letter, almost sycophantic in its tone, was not more success- ful. Argenson had sought to recover the good graces of the "Empress" by the present of a writing desk "with pigeon- holes, a clock in the centre, all in violet wood, with compart- ments garnished with bronze ornaments," at the cost of seven thousand livres; and, failing m this, tried to bribe her min- ' Prince Charles of Lorraine, brother of the Emperor Francis I and leading Austrian general. ' For the details, see Zevort, Le marquis d' Argenson, p. 175; and Waliszewski, La dernitre des Romanov, p. 342. 472 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 The failure of France to enlist the Turks The Auatro- Kussian alliance isters. But he afterward regretted the "beau bureau," and the "argent perdu" given to the wife of the Chancellor.' -Allien remained for some time at St. Petersburg, but his presence made no impression. Confidence between the two governments had come to an end. The lack of skill in the conduct of the foreign policy of France in this period resulted not only in the loss of Russian friendship, but in a coolness on the part of the Ottoman Empire at a moment when its support was much needed. The attitude of France toward Turkey had always been that of a superior toward a useful subordinate whose services had often proved valuable, but with whom it was not ex- pedient to make a binding engagement. It was to a French renegade, Bonneval, who had become a Mussulman hnd had taken the name Achmet-Pacha, that the Turks owed a full realization of the manner in which they had been treated when, after having been invited by Louis XIV to take up arms against Austria, he had signed the Peace of Ryswick without consulting them, leaving them to feel the whole weight of the German Empire. When, therefore, the French ambassador, Castellane, in 1745, endeavored to incite the Turks to keep Russia occupied and prevent the Czarina from coming to the aid of Maria Theresa, he was politely informed that Turkey was at peace with the enemies of France, and that he was attempting a task as difficult as "digging a well with a needle. "^ Soon afterward thirty thousand Russians were assembled on the shores of the Baltic waiting to be transported in Eng- lish ships to fight the battles of Austria in the Netherlands. With the loss of French support, Prussia had been left without a friend at St. Petersburg. All the efforts of Freder- ick II to corrupt the ministers had proved ineffectual. The Czarina had reached the conclusion that, as she herself expressed it, "the increase of the power of the King of Prussia was not only imendurable but dangerous." ' See Zevort, as before, pp. 175, 178. ^ As the war of Turkey with Persia did not end until October, 1746, immediate action on the part of Turkey was not to be expected. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 473 A few days before the signature of the Peace of Dresden, Chap, vi a Prussian courier on his way to St. Petersburg with de- '^■^- spatches from Frederick II to his minister, Mardefeld, had ■ been arrested by the Russian police, his letters opened and deciphered, and the discovery made that Frederick II was in secret negotiations for peace with Saxony and Austria. Both the Czarina and her ministers were convinced that the security of Courland and Livonia now depended upon an alliance of Russia with Austria and Denmark.^ Before the public confirmation of the peace reached St. Petersburg she had ordered her ministers to open pourparlers for al- liances at Vienna and Copenhagen. On May 22, 1746, a treaty of defensive alliance, with a plan for the mobiliza- tion of troops contained in secret clauses was concluded between Russia and Austria; and on Jime 10, a similar alliance between Russia and Deimiark.^ Finding himself vmable to tempt the venality of Bes- tusheff, — who had just received six thousand ducats for his participation in the Austro-Russian treaty, and was soon to claim ten thousand pounds sterling from the English negotiators,^ — Frederick II recalled his minister from St. Petersburg after the Czarina had ordered her ministers not to treat with him.* Although the Peace of Dresden ended the conflict between The congress Austria and Prussia, a state of war still existed between cht^eiie' Austria and England on the one side, and France and Spain on the other; with Sardinia hovering between the contest- ants in nominal alliance with Austria. In England a decided change of public opinion had oc- ' See Karge, as before, p. 65. ^ Fpr the treaties, see Martens, A, Supplement I, p. 292; and Koch, Recueil de Traitis, I, p. 432. ' Lord Chesterfield, speaking of the Enghsh negotiations referred to at St. Petersburg, remarked: "One cannot call that negotiation, but dealing with usurers and extortioners who knew neither reason nor measure." * The final and permanent rupture between the two courts did not occur until 1750. See Wahszewski, La dernih-e des Romanov, p. 387. A. D. 1731-1756 474 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI curred. The Young Pretender, Charles Edward, defeated at Culloden on April 15, 1746, had become a hopeless fugi- tive. The menace to the existence of the Hanoverian dynasty had passed. The war with France had brought important victories in America, and the colonists were in- clined to pursue it; but on the continent the losses had been heavy, the Dutch allies were clamoring for peace, and an enormous public debt stared the taxpayers in the face.' By June, 1747, a general desire for peace prevailed both in France and England; and on September 30, 1747, Lord Sandwich intimated to the Marquis de Puysieux, who in the preceding January had succeeded Argenson as minister of foreign affairs in France, that George II was ready to send plenipotentiaries to a congress for peace to be held at Aix-la-Chapelle. In France peace was even more desired than in England. The burden of taxation had been sorely felt, and the ori- ginal purpose of the war had been almost forgotten. In the Netherlands French arms had been victorious under the great general, Maurice of Saxony; but his attack upon the United Provinces, like that of Louis XIV in the previous century, had produced a revival of the Stadtholderate; and, on May 1, 1747, the Republic had chosen William IV of Orange to lead its forces and preserve its integrity.^ In accordance with the wishes of the three powers, France, England, and Holland, a congress was invited to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle in January, 1748; but it did not really as- semble until the following April. The Anglo- So far as France and Austria were concerned, it was French pre- Argenson and his "system" that were responsible for the uminanea ^ ^ continuance of the war. Louis XV readily yielded to the popular pressure for peace, and declared that he intended to negotiate "like a king and not like a merchant." The chief obstructions to a general peace lay in the 1 A peace conference had already been held at Breda on September 30, 1746; but it came to nothing. ^ William IV was descended from John William Friao, of Nassau- Orange, whom William III had made his heir. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 475 conflict between the interests of France and England. Of Chap, vi these the question of the restoration of Dunkirk presented the greatest difficulty, since it lay nearest to the heart of the - French. There were also reclamations for France in the Netherlands. Then came the momentous questions regard- ing the North American, West Indian, and East Indian pos- sessions, which vitally touched the future development of world-empire. It is needless for our purposes to follow the long, involved, and complex negotiations which, after weeks spent in dis- cussing trivial matters, such as passes, couriers, precedence, and the neutrality of the place of meeting, preoccupied the plenipotentiaries who conducted them.' The main pro- cedure and the final results alone are of importance. The first step was the draft of preliminaries by Lord Sand- wich, who represented England, and St. Severin, who repre- sented France. Austria and Spain were held aloof by them for later consideration. On April 30 an agreement was reached for the mutual restoration of the conquests of England and France in Europe and America, and the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Germany and Italy. In accordance with the first part of this understanding, France regained Cape Breton and Louisbourg, — which had been taken by the English, — but lost all the conquests made by her armies in Europe. In addition, Louis XV, as required by the Treaty of Utrecht, consented to abandon the Pretender. In com- pliance with the second part, Austria would cede Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip, the second son of Elizabeth Farnese, and grant to the King of Sardinia a great part of the Duchy of Milan. Silesia was to be formally abandoned to Prussia. In return Austria should be guaranteed the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction, and Francis I should be recognized as Emperor. If these conditions were not accepted, England and France were to make a separate peace. ' A full account of these negotiations may be found in Beer, Zur Geschwhte des Friedens von Aachen im Jahre 1748- 476 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI When Maria Theresa's plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Cha- ^- "• pelle, Count Kaunitz, learned the terms of the preliminaries agreed upon between England and France, he was deeply- disturbed, for he too had been in private negotiation with The Peace of Versailles. He had believed that, if Silesia were to be of 1748^''^^''"'' mentioned in the treaty, it would be only as a guarantee to the Treaty of Dresden; that, if Parma and Piacenza were to be given to Don Philip, it would be with a future reversioa to Austria; and that France would show no particular in- terest in the increase of Sardinia. The Empress demurred to the sacrifices demanded of her; but, as she had nothing to offer to France without still greater renunciations, she was compelled to accept these terms. Still, she had emerged from a long and bitter struggle in full possession of nearly the whole of her inheritance. On the other hand, the gains of England were not great in consideration of the immense sums expended. Those of France were of no real importance, notwithstanding the fact that her navy had been nearly annihilated during the war; while the conquests freely surrendered in the Nether- lands were considerable. Spain, under Frederick VI since the death of Philip V on July 11, 1746, had shown little aggressive spirit; yet Elizabeth Farnese had won a new triumph in establishing her second son in a principality. The Dutch Republic, which had been again almost at the mercy of France, had come out of the war without loss of territory, and serenely claimed the restoration of the right to fortify the barrier cities which had been taken during the war. It was Frederick II, who had already enjoyed three years of armed peace, who had emerged from the conflict with the greatest gain. The area of new territory which he had added to Prussia was greater than all the conquests of Sweden at the Peace of Westphalia after eighteen years of warfare; greater even than the extent of the whole of Alsace and Lorraine combined, and almost equal to all the territory won by the kings of France in Europe by the battles of a hundred years. On May 31, 1748, Sardinia, with a show of reluctance, EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 477 acceded to the preliminaries of April 30, and Spain followed Chap. vi on June 28. On October 18 the final treaty of peace was ^■^■ signed at Aix-la-Chapelle by France, Great Britain, anH I73i-i756 Holland, on October 13 by Spain, on October 23 by Austria, and on November 7 by Sardinia. On December 4, at Nice, the protocol for the restitutions and evacuations was ratified by all these powers, and the Peace of Aix-Ia- Chapelle was thus consummated. ' II. The Contest for Colonial Suphemact. In concluding the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle it was Eng- The colonial land that Louis XV had wished to appease; for in America ""a'^yof and on the sea England had proved a dangerous foe, while England Spain had shown herself a weak ally. Since the Peace of Utrecht both France and England had made great advances in their colonial and commercial enterprises. This progress had been made in great part because of the temporary cessation of their traditional an- tagonism, their alUance under the regency, and the prudence exercised by Walpole and Fleury. But the time had now arrived when the ancient rivalry was to break out afresh and to be pursued with a vigor and tenacity hitherto unknown. The conflict between England and Spain, in which France had gradually permitted herself to become involved, had its origin in questions concerning contraband trade, and had no relation to territorial possessions. To strip Spain of her colonies in South and Central America had never been a part of British policy. In North America the physical contact between the colonies of England and Spain was but slight; being first established in 1732, when the settlement of Georgia carried the English colonial frontier as far south as Florida, then a Spanish possession. But the contacts and rivalries of England and France were territorial rather than merely commercial. In North ' For the final treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 337. 478 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI America the area actually held by France in 1713 was twice as great as that occupied by England, while the territories , in dispute between them at that time were as extensive as 1731-1756 the whole of the French possessions. By the Peace of Utrecht, England had obtained Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the great area south of Hudson's Bay, but be- tween her Atlantic colonies and this last named accession lay the great mass of the French possessions, including all of Southern Canada and the region of the Great Lakes. In addition, a chain of French fortresses extended the whole length of the Mississippi valley to Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico. In 1748 France was the preponderant power in North America, possessing the heart of the entire con- tinent, while England occupied little more than a narrow strip of sea-coast on the Atlantic. In the West Indies the two powers were about equally balanced. In 1660, thirty-five years after the first permanent settlements were made, they had agreed to divide the West India islands, and to unite in a common poUcy to sup- press the natives, who had proved troublesome. France was confirmed in the possession of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Grenada, and some smaller islands; while England's share included Barbadoes, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and several others of smaller size, St. Christopher being reserved for use in common. The natives of these islands were in great part driven out to San Domingo, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent; which for a time were in dispute, but in 1748 were declared to be neutral. Cuba and Porto Rico were held by Spain; St. Eustatia, Oruba, and Curasao by the Dutch; and St. Thomas by Denmark. Since 1655, when it was taken by the English at the command of Cromwell, Jamaica had always remained a possession of England. The beginnings Not Only in North America and the West Indies, but in the Far East also, France and England had long been engaged in an enterprise of conquest which had brought them face to face in India. The Portuguese, whose maritime discoveries had gradually led them to the Far East, were the first to establish them- of Eastern trade A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 479 selves in India.^ The first viceroy, Almeida, was sent out Chap, vi to Calicut in 1505; but it was to Albuquerque, who a few years later became master of the fine harbor of Goa on the Malabar coast, that Portugal owed the immense develop- ment of her East Indian trade. The just and humane ad- ministration of Albuquerque, whose conquests were in spirit more commercial than military, was followed by a graspmg and narrow-minded policy which alienated the native princes. The trade of the Far East, however, in- cluding that with the rich Malay islands and China as well as India, for a long time remained a Portuguese monopoly; but migrations from Portugal to the East, so extensive as to threaten to depopulate the httle kingdom, finally centred the chief interest of the Portuguese upon the profitable coast- wise traffic, and left the field open for the Dutch, who, in 1595, entered vigorously upon it, made permanent settlements, and soon acquired the greater part of the Eastern trade. Where the Portuguese had made enemies the Dutch made friends; and, in 1602, the various Dutch companies which had been formed for mercantile adventure were consolidated by the States General in the East India Company, — the first great stock company for the exploitation of the Oriental trade, which it extended as far as Japan. The establish- ment of Batavia and the control of Java, together with the adjacent islands, in 1618 gave to the Dutch Company a supremacy in the Eastern trade. The English lost no time in following the example of the Dutch, whose success had been largely owing to their confining their efforts to such conquests as were commer- cially most profitable. In 1599 an English company had been chartered for the development of the East India trade in-imitation of the Dutch companies; but the consolidation of these gave Holland for a long time the lead in the race for colonial empire, which the possession of the best ports enabled them to maintain. The rivalry soon led to open ' For the rivalry of the Portuguese and the Venetians and the reason for the success of Portugal, see Volume II of this work, pp. 267, 269. 480 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY VI Chap. A. D. 1731-1756 The develoj)- ment of rival trading com- panies violence, and although Holland was the smaller and weaker power, the Dutch were able to stir up opposition among the ■ natives which rendered difficult the progress of their Eng- lish competitors. Notwithstanding the obstacles to be overcome, the Lon- don East India Company made great progress. The Dutch company had at times earned an annual dividend of sixty per cent, but the London company sometimes attained to one or even two hundred per cent of profit in a single year. In 1640, when the company acquired its great factory at Madras, it was obliged to make vast extensions to its Lon- don dockyards, which themselves yielded an immense re- turn; for the company built its own ships, made its own masts, yards, sails, cordage, gunpowder, casks, and even baked the bread for its sailors, thus greatly augmenting its profits. The business was so remunerative that Wilham III, after the example of the Dutch, imposed a tax of five per cent upon the company's stock. In 1698, the enterprise was so successful that another company was formed; but in 1702 they were combined in one great association under the name the United Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies, with a capital six times as great as that of the original enterprise. Spain had been excluded from the East Indian trade by the concessions made to the Dutch Republic in the Treaty of Miinster of 1648, when all the conquests made from Portugal during the time it belonged to Spain were surrendered; and the colonial ambitions of the Spaniards, although in possession of the Philippines, were mainly cen- tred upon the Western Hemisphere.^ In France the traders of Brittany and Normandy had long endeavored, but with no great success, to extend their commerce to India. The founding of the French East India Company by Colbert in 1664, followed by a settlement at Surat — one of the finest ports of the Mogul Empire — in 1668, was the beginning of the rivalry with England, which 1 The trade of Manila was chiefly with Mexico, the voyage to Acapulco requiring five months. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 481 already had a factory there. Soon afterward the French Chap. vi company obtained Pondicherry, on the Eastern coast of ^.d. the peninsula, captured by the Dutch in 1693 but restored ^^^^-^^56 by the Peace of Ryswick. It was here that the chief centre of French influence in the East was estabhshed by a succession of able and far- sighted administrators. The possession of a considerable territory acquired by the company, together with the right to coin money, enabled the governor, Dumas, to obtain nearly all the trade of the Carnatic. In 1720 Mauritius, having been abandoned by the Dutch, was occupied by the French imder the name the Isle of France, furnishing an important port of call on the route to India, which developed into a valuable and thriving colony. It was inevitable that Madras and Pondicherry should The tramfor- become serious competitors in the struggle for supremacy in ™^*'°° °^ *''« ^ °° '^ •' companies into India, for colonial control had now come to be regarded as statea essential to cormnercial prosperity. It was the necessary basis of exclusive privilege, and monopoly was considered by the economists of the age as the easiest and most certain path to wealth. To possess the sources of supplies was to control the volume and direction of trade, which thus be- came practically a private possession. The Spaniards and the Portuguese strictly prohibited strangers from setthng or even visiting in their colonies. The French and the Dutch were not so exclusive, but they also restricted trade with their colonies as far as possible to their own ships; and the EngUsh navigation laws, directed expressly in the first instance against the Dutch, confined imports from British colonies to British vessels. The rights of commerce were bought and sold as special privileges even among competitors of the same nation. The Stuart dynasty had no real interest in colonies, and apparently no conception of their value, except as sources of revenue by the sale of char- ters to the highest bidders. William III, whose ideas had been formed in Holland, was the first after Cromwell to perceive in commerce and colonies an inexhaustible source of national wealth for England. Encouraged by him the VOL. III. — 31 482 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VI Whigs, in opposition to the Tory landowners, developed the ^•°- sea-ports, founded companies for trade, and fostered the colonies as new avenues to the riches they could not extract from the soil, already in the hands of others. The govern- ment in England, unlike that of France, until the middle of the eighteenth century, had left the colonies to private enter- prise; but a new epoch had already dawned. The clash of private interests had invoked the interest of governments, the value of colonies was beginning to be understood, and a des- perate struggle for supremacy was impending. The periods of discovery and occupation were passing into that of mil- itary expansion and defence. Europe had at last traversed the oceans and had set out upon a course of universal dom- ination. A new imperialism had taken possession of men's thoughts, new frontiers were to be established where maps had not yet been made, and in the name of conflicting nations the battles of kings were to be fought beyond distant seas upon the soil of unexplored continents. However inert the European courts might be regarding colonial develop- ment, in India private interests were gradually assimiing political importance; for the colonies had already developed into armed and fortified camps, the nuclei of future states about to become the fecund seeds of empire. Action upon the native princes by the colonists with a view to promoting their own interests and impeding the progress of their com- petitors could have no other issue, and France under the vigorous administration of Dumas had already established a foothold in Indian politics which rendered necessary a similar course on the part of England. The political The great Mogul monarchy, founded in the sixteenth state of India ^eutury by the hordes of Moslems under Babar, had extended over the whole of India. The empire was too vast to be ruled with vigor from Delhi, but was kept in subjection first by the migratory movements of the sovereign in a manner which recalls the restless energy of Charles the Great, and afterward by a settled system of local administration by means of officers intrusted with goverrmient within their assigned districts, subadars (viceroys) and nawabs, or nabobs EXJKOPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 483 (governors), who were chosen by them. These were at Chap, vi first mere collectors of taxes for the padishah, or Grand ^-^^ Mogul, at Delhi, who had made the rajahs, or local heredi- ■ tary princes, subject to tribute. As it passed on from the ryot who cultivated the land to the zamindar who owned it, to the jagirs who collected the tribute, and then to the nabobs, the amount constantly diminished, a portion of it remaining in the hands of the collectors. Gradually rising to a position of wealth and power truly royal by means of extortions which the system favored, the nabobs at length became the virtual rulers of the country, and when in 1707 the merciless administration of the last of the really capable Grand Moguls, Aurungzebe, ended with his death, his duphcity and intolerance left the Empire a prey to discord which the apathy of his successors failed to remove. In place of the strong central government which had once dom- mated the whole of India from Delhi, there came into exist- ence a loose Asiatic feudalism in which corruption, rivalry, and at times even anarchy, prevailed. The prize of empire was thus ready to be seized by any hand strong enough to grasp and retain it. The nabobs were engaged in perpetual war with one another, each striving to enlarge the extent of his domain; the native Hindoo rajahs, who regarded the Mongol viceroys as intruders, were in constant rebellion against them, in the effort to regain their original authority; and the fierce Mahrattas, hardy native horsemen bent on conquest, did not cease to ravage the country with fire and sword. Such was the condition of India when Dupleix, a dreamy The designs youth whom his father had sent to India as a means of o^Dup/"^'"^ discipline, having amassed a fortune and won distinction as an organizer »mder the French East India Company, in 1730 was intrusted with the government of the French set- tlement at Chandemagor. So efficient were his methods that by bringing European products instead of coin to his Indian colony he soon turned the tide of threatened financial ruin into a great success. Pushing always farther into the interior and opening communications with the native mer- A. D . 1731-1756 484 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI chants, he made Chandernagor rich by the extension of its commerce, which in rivalry with the Dutch he pushed beyond Hindostan to China and Japan. In 1741, after the resignation of Dumas, who had rendered Pondicherry the most important of all the French factories, Dupleix was invited by the company to become his successor. He at once perceived that the field offered unlimited oppor- tunities, but that it would require both war and diplomacy to win the first place in India. The directorate at Paris regarded the enterprise solely from the point of view 'of immediate commercial profit, but Dupleix after twenty- five years of experience with the native princes perceived that they were ripe for subordination to a protectorate which might in time render India a French possession. Fully aware of the opposition to be expected from the English, Dupleix believed it possible to forestall and outwit them. His plan was by claiming authority from the Grand Mogul to overcome the pride and haughtiness of the native princes in dealing with mere merchants; to show them that France, and France alone, was able and willing to protect them and give them peace and riches; and thus, by gradually acquiring an ascendency over them, to render them subser- vient to French interests and finally with their aid drive all competitors from the covmtry. In Dumas' archives at Pondicherry Dupleix found docu- ments from Delhi which, imused by that viceroy, gave him the right to claim a rank and make a display as great as that of the neighboring princes. He understood the superiority of European soldiers and tactics in comparison with the rudimentary military knowledge and discipline that imderlay the show and superficial splendor of Oriental power. He resolved, at first in the face of ridicule on the part of his French associates, to surpass in outward mag- nificence all his neighbors; and with such success that the splendor of his person an.d his f^tes completely dazzled the native princes, who recognized his superiority as Nabob of Pondicherry, and rendered homage to him as vassals. Grad- ually this prestige extended throughout a, great part of EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 485 India, and Dupleix could without exaggeration imagiae Chap, vi a time when a French viceroy would revive and wield a ^■°- power more real than that of the Grand Mogul. I73i-i756 The next step in the execution of his plan was the creation of a real military force, to give substance to these preten- Dupieix-a sions; not with the purpose of using it against the natives, defence of , 1 J 1 • , , Pondicherry whom he proposed to rule equitably through their pruices, but to maintain this prestige and to employ it against the English. To this end he reorganized and strengthened his little army of some four hundred men, fortified Pondi- cherry, and quietly prepared for the struggle which he knew was sure to come. With meagre resources from the Com- pany, without aid or interest on the part of its directors or the Crown, out of his own private purse he carried forward his plans for the protection and expansion of the colony. In September, 1743, he suddenly received orders from Paris: "Reduce absolutely all expenses one half, and suspend all work on fortifications." The command fell upon him as a heavy blow, accom- panied as it was with the announcement that the effort to prevent the Hapsburg succession would probably involve France in war with England. In view of this event he was coolly directed to make a treaty with the English at Madras, by which the trade of both countries might be peacefully carried on; and he was at the same time informed that La Bourdonnais would visit Pondicherry with a French fleet. The French fleet did not arrive; and Morse, the English governor of Madras, scornfully refused to treat with Du- pleix, adding that he had been instructed by his government to regard the French as enemies. The war soon followed; and Pondicherry, whose fortifications were still unfinished, was exposed to the risk of capture or destruction. While begging military and naval support from Paris, notwith- standing the orders to the contrary, Dupleix proceeded to complete the defence of the town, voluntarily lending to the company half a million livres. The French governor was well aware of his peril, and, distrusting his powers of resistance, resolved to avert 486 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI it by diplomacy. On the Coromandel coast, at Arcot, ^■^- between Pondicherry and Madras, Anwar-ud-din Kahn, a soldier of experience and great courage, then ruled over the whole of the Camatic. It was to him that Dupleix now turned for an ally. The past services which Dumas had rendered to the Nabob had won his sjonpathies for the French and rendered him easily accessible. He yielded read- ily to Dupleix 's solicitations and informed Morse that he would permit no attack by the English on the French pos- sessions, or by the French on the English, since both Pondi- cherry and Madras were enclaves within his territories. Thus Pondicherry was saved; but it was by the temporary loss of French prestige. Dupleix, whose policy was to render the Indian princes dependent upon France, to his great hu- miliation had foxmd himself dependent?f or the safety of the colony upon an Indian nabob. ^ The capture The future uow tumed chiefly upon which power could of Madras gj.g^ obtain the command of the Indian seas. If the urgent appeals of Dupleix had received attention at Paris, the French would at once have become masters of the situation in India. It was, however, an English fleet imder Commodore Barnett that first reached Madras in 1745; but Morse requested its commander to confine his operations to the sea, and it was not until July, 1746, that the French fleet imder La Bourdonnais arrived at Pondi- cherry. An engagement then took place in which the French were in fact worsted; but Commodore Peyton, who had succeeded to the command of the English fleet, believing he had lost the battle, sailed away, leaving La Bourdonnais the victor. With this advantage Dupleix advised an im- mediate attack upon Madras; and, on September 21, La Bourdormais finally consented to make it. In the mean- time Morse had sought the promised protection of the Nabob but he had neglected to send him the customary gift expected when a favor was requested, and Dupleix obtained his non- intervention by promising him possession of Madras after ' See the detailed account of the negotiations in Hamont, DupJeiXi pp. 1, 27. A. D. 1731-1756 EUKOPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 487 the French should have taken it. Thus the town was com- Chap, vi palled to surrender, the English were made prisoners of war, and all the property of the East India Company passed into the possession of the French. It was a master stroke for the prestige of France in India, but it was soon to be followed by another even more effec- tive. Anwar-ud-din promptly demanded the delivery of Madras to himself; but La Bourdoimais, without consul- tation with Dupleix, had signed a treaty with Morse by which he agreed to restore the town to the English at the price of a heavy ransom, of which he personally was to re- ceive a considerable share. Dupleix disputed his right to make this convention, and resolved not to execute it. In the meantime, Anwar-ud-din sent an army of ten thousand natives to enforce possession; but Dupleix organized an ener- getic resistance, and with a handful of European troops and a contingent of seven hundred sepoys defeated the Indian army. La Bourdonnais, after a bitter personal quarrel with the governor, having suffered much damage to his vessels by a storm, abandoned Pondicherry and left Dupleix to make the most of his victory. ^ Having demonstrated the superiority of European troops Restoration and tactics over those of the Indian princes, Dupleix now f J^^^ ™'* proclaimed himself, in the name of the King of France, "Governor General of India"; but his supremacy was of short duration. During the winter of 1747 he made repeated attacks upon St. David, where two hundred Englishmen had fortified themselves; but, although he succeeded in ne- gotiating a treaty of peace and amity with the Nabob, his forces were not sufficient to dislodge the English. On August 11, 1748, Admiral Boscawen arrived with an Eng- lish squadron of overwhelming force, and English prepon- derance was for a time restored. The siege of Pondicherry, however, proved ineffectual; and, on October 17, after im- mense losses, the attempt to capture the town was aban- doned. In December news arrived of the peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle; and, in conformity with its terms, in the ' For the details, see Hamont, Dupleix, pp. 51, 69. 488 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A.D. 1731-1756 Alliances with the native princes following August Madras was restored to Admiral Boscawen. Although Dupleix had won a great name as a heroic leader, both in India and Europe, the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle undid his work, and the balance between the contestants in India was restored. The causes of conflict were, however,, in no respect diminished, and the embers of hostility still glowed hotly in the rival colonies. A new period in the struggle for supremacy in India was soon to open, for England had awakened to a consciousness of the true nature of her colonial rivalry with France. England and France were now nominally at peace, but the presence of two bodies of armed men representing conflicting interests in a part of the world remote from the control of their respective governments was certain to impart to their rivalry a military character. It was the dream of Dupleix to rule the Carnatic, and eventually the whole of India, by placing in power native princes who would be subservient to French control. An opportunity for the execution of this policy was soon afforded by the ambition of Muzuffar Jung, who in 1748 aspired to the position of Subadar of the Deccan, and that of Chunda Sahib, who desired to become Nabob of the Carnatic. With the aid of Dupleix, who offered them money and counsel, they overcame Anwar-ud-din, who was killed in battle. Arcot was occupied, and Muzuffar Jung, after being proclaimed Subadar, made Chunda Sahib, who had proved himself a vigorous warrior. Nabob of the Carnatic. The only remaining obstacle to the complete conquest of the province was the presence of Admiral Boscawen at Madras. At first the Admiral was disposed to support Chunda Sahib; but when it became laiown that he was in close alliance with Dupleix, to whom he chiefly owed his success, it was thought expedient to join forces with Nasir Jung and Mohammed Ali, the rivals and opponents of the new suba- dar and the new nabob. With the aid of French officers on the one side and English officers on the other, a bitter war was waged between these native chiefs, in which Nasir EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL STJPEEMACY 489 Jung was killed, and Muzuffar Jung was confirmed in Chap, vi the rulership of the Deccan. Immense treasure fell into the ^- ^• hands of the French, and war proved more profitable than ^^^^"^^^^ commerce. At Pondicherry the spoils were divided, Du- pleix being appointed governor of all the territories south of the river Kistna, with fortresses and a salary of ten thousand pounds sterling; fifty thousand poimds were distributed among the French soldiers; the same sum, with land yield- ing forty thousand pounds a year, was presented to the French Company; and Chunda Sahib was made Nabob of the Carnatic under the French governor. Thus the modest merchants who only a few decades pre- viously had humbly sought the favor and protection of secondary native chiefs were now the virtual lords of a vast area whose wealth had become proverbial. Dupleix assumed all the state and ceremony of an Oriental prince, holding splendid durbars at which, magnificently attired in colored silks and sparkling with costly jewels, he suffered himself to be approached only on bended loaee. His dream of empire seemed in 1751 almost fulfilled. The lesson of this brilliant and sudden success was not The victories lost upon the English, whose prestige with the natives had °' '^^^^ steadily suffered from the defeats which had overwhelmed their unfortimate native allies. Among those who had been made prisoners of war at Madras was a young Englishman, Robert Clive, who, like Dupleix, had come to India to seek his fortime, and in 1744 had been appointed a writer in the service of the East India Company. Like the great Frenchman with whom he was to contest the possession of an empire, he was at school held in small esteem by his masters; but his love of initia- tive, his imperious temper, his fearlessness, and his aversion to control, united with a vigorous intelligence, marked him as a youth bom to be a leader. Without other military training than that derived from actual fighting, Clive was soon in the front rank of the little band of soldiers at Madras and soon reached the grade of Captain. Able to bring his magnetic influence to 490 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI bear upon the natives by his knowledge of their language, •^■^- he was quick to grasp the principles upon which Dupleix ■ had won success, and perceived that the way to the con- quest of India was a judiciously chosen alliance with the Indian princes, that native armies were unable to resist European tactics and organization, and that these forces under European leadership could be made effective. It was clear that unless the French were resisted by the same means they had adopted, they would soon be supreme in India and the English could no longer maintain an exist- ence there. The fortress of Trichinopoly, which commanded the district of Tan] ore, whose waters could be cut off by its occupants, was the objective of a French attack. The knowledge of this fact brought the Rajah of Tanjore into alliance with the English, and it was determined that the possession of this point of vantage by the French must be prevented. The English Governor, Saunders, resolved to hold this point, and Clive thus found his opportunity to win distinction. The English having taken possession of the town, it was promptly laid imder siege by the French; but, in order to entice away a part of the investing force, Clive planned and executed a successful attack upon Arcot, the capital of Chunda Sahib. The expedient proved effective; and, as the result of heroism hardly paralleled in the history of war- fare, the prestige of England in India was fully redeemed. By pursuing Dupleix 's methods with even greater personal vigor and courage, Clive saved the English Company from ultimate expulsion from the field where it was destined finally to create an undisputed empire. The bold capture and defence of Arcot, followed by the death of Chimda Sahib, was the turning-point of English fortunes ia India; but without the example set by Dupleix, who had con- ceived the plan of ultimate conquest, it is doubtful if even the valor and energy of Clive would have borne such unex- pected fruits.^ ' For the Ufe and activities of Clive, see the admirable biography by Wilson, Lord Clive, London, 1911. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 491 The relations of France and England in India had been Chap, vi exasperating, but it was a quarrel that arose in the soli- ^-^^ tudes of North America that was soon to precipitate a long and sanguinary conflict in which the greater part of Europe would be involved. The English colonies, stretching along the Atlantic sea- The English coast from the Penobscot river on the North to the Spanish p°'^^^='°.'^ , 1^ Amenca possession of Florida on the South, formed a narrow rim of sparsely populated territory extending about two hundred miles into the interior. This strip of territory, composed of a continuous row of colonies under the sovereignty of the King of England, was populated by emigrants from differ- ent European nations, — England, Scotland, Ireland, Hol- land, Sweden, and various states of Germany,^ — differing in religious beliefs, in family traditions, in types of co- lonial government, in the purposes for which they had left their European homes, and in the nature of the soil and modes of cultivation of the areas they inhabited. Pilgrims and Puritans, fleeing from the Anglican persecution and mostly of English blood, occupied New Hampshire, Massa- chusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, which together formed New England. The population of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware was more composite, comprising Dutch Calvinists, Swedish and German Luther- ans, strict Anglicans, Quakers, and Scotch Presbjrterians. Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia were peopled with inhabitants chiefly of English blood, but with a mixture of other races, mainly Catholic in Maryland, and largely Anglican farther South. The natural conditions were as varied as the human ele- ments composing these settlements. In New England the soil was difficult to cultivate and the climate severe, necessi- tating a laborious and frugal life on the part of a hardy race. The middle colonies possessed a more fertile country, yield- ing more bountiful crops of fruits and cereals, with the ad- ' On the German immigrations, see the valuable introduction in Learned, Guide to the MS. Materials Relating to American History in the German State Archives, Washington, 1912. A. D. 1731-1756 492 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI vantage of bays and rivers penetrating more deeply into the interior and affording conditions of life more diversified and more responsive to human effort. The southern colonies possessed many of these physical advantages vdth a milder climate and still more fertile fields, adapted to the cultiva- tion of sugar-cane, cotton, and tobacco, — products that; en- couraged slave labor on the plantations ' and were more in demand for exportation to Europe than those of the less generous North. ^ The entire population of the English colonies, thus diver- gent in respect to race, religion, interests, sentiments, and conditions of existence, numbered in the middle of the eighteenth century about one million two himdred thousand souls. The French The French possessions in America were of a different poasessions character. They were of vast extent, stretching from the in Amenca ^ ' ° Gulf of St. Lawrence to Lake Superior, encompassing all the other inland seas, and connecting the rivers uniting to form the Mississippi, whose banks La Salle in the name of Louis XIV had in 1682 claimed for France. In all respects these territories were in striking contrast with the more compact body of the thirteen English colonies. Vast forests and prairies, marvellously traversed and coimected by nat- ural waterways, gave to the French control of the still un- explored recesses of the continent, whose real extent was then but vaguely known. But this immense empire was for the most part unpopulated. The white inhabitants of Canada, chiefly confined to the province of Quebec, numbered only about sixty thousand, composed entirely of t^rench col- onists. At Detroit there was a settlement of a thousand or twelve hundred. At New Orleans a similar colony existed. The remainder of the white population occupied a chain of military posts, held by small garrisons of regular soldiers and surrounded by groups of friendly Indians, extending westward to Lake Winnepeg; eastward to the St. Lawrence • The Hudson's Bay Region, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland were very thinly populated, and the delimitation of Nova Scotia was in dispute. EUROPEAN ANB COLONIAL SUPREMACY 493 including the southern extremity of Lake Champlain, Chap. vi where Fort Saint-Fr6deric, or Crown Point, then formed ^•»- the frontier fortress of "New France," regarded by -il^^I^!^ the colonists of New England and the Hudson river as a constant menace; and south westward, reaching out toward the Mississippi, along the great waterways, such as the Illinois, Maumee, and Wabash rivers, thus cutting off the westward expansion of the English colonies by this vast but as yet unpopulated domain claimed by France. Thus were brought face to face on the one hand the ex- The disputed pansive pressure of a virile, vigorous, and growing popula- *«™*°™^ tion that strongly resented opposition, and on the other a territorial claim on the part of a foreign and frequently hos- tile power, supported only by military occupation and the sparse settlements of a different race. For the most part the French and English settlements were separated by wide stretches of primeval forest and high moxmtains, peopled only by the Indian tribes who were their only inhabitajits. The colonies of New York and Pennsylvania had not attained more than half their present westward extension, and the same was true of other colonies to the south. The intermediate country, rich, fertile, and well watered, was of necessity a debatable land. Largely oc- cupied by the Confederation of the Five Nations, over which George II by the Treaty of Utrecht claimed the right of a protectorate, it was natural that the English colonists should regard it as their legitimate field of westward expansion; but the erection of a fort by the English at Oswego so irri- tated the Governor of Canada that he protested against it, to which the Governor of New York replied with bitter complaints against the establishment of the French fort Saint-Frederic on the southern extremity of Lake Champlain. To these causes of friction was added the dispute regarding the frontiers of Nova Scotia. The French pretended that when the cession of "Acadie" was made to England in the Treaty of Utrecht only the southern part of the peninsula east of the Bay of Fimdy, including Annapolis, was intended to be conveyed; while the English claimed the whole country 494 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI south of the river and gulf of St. Lawrence, comprising what ■*• "• is now known as New Brunswick and the northern part of 1731-1756 Maine. This whole region, as far west as Lake Champlain and Lake George, France insisted upon retaining; and even in what was conceded to be "Acadie," the French peasants who had made their homes there were reluctant to pass under the rule of the English, "whose language was strange to them and whose religion they detested." In the struggle in America, as in India, the natives were a factor not to be entirely ignored. In the North, wherever the French had come in contact with them, they had won their friendship, especially at Quebec and Montreal. "These Indians," as a French historian has said, "converted to Catholicism, much attached to religious rites which, thanks to the tolerance of the missionaries, were not irrecon- cilable with their barbarous customs in time of peace and their habitual cruelties in time of war, were always ready to take the tomahawk against the English. They fur- nished to the French expeditions excellent scouts, guides of the first order, and frequently served as intermediaries in the negotiations carried on with the wild tribes of the in- terior." 1 The Iroquois, on the other hand, — who occupied the region lying between Lake Champlain, the Saint Law- rence, the Great Lakes, and the Ohio, — while nominally in alliance with the English, were weakened by the long con- flict with Canada and not always firm in their devotion to a race but little considerate of their welfare. West of Pennsyl- vania the majority of the Indians, as a result of the more generous treatment they had received under the influence of William Penn, were loyal to the English and hostile to the French.^ The develop- As early as 1750 the French had resolved to maintain ment of hostui- ^jjgjj. ground in the disputed parts of "Acadie," to drive the tiea iQ America . , . V i ^ • ^ English from their posts on Lake Ontario, and to outstrip ' Waddington, Louis XV et le renversemeni des alliances, p. 8. ' The French explorations and settlements and the early Indian wars resulting from them are brilliantly and authoritatively treated in numerous works by Francis Paxkman. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 495 them in the region of the Ohio river. Open attacks by French Chap. VI soldiers could not well be made in time of peace; but by official instructions sent from Paris on April 15, 1750, La Jonquiere, the French governor, was authorized to incite the Indians agamst the English settlers.^ To enable him to render aggression still more effective, Acadians were disguised as Indians. Thus, under the cover of peaceful relations, hostilities of a barbaric nature were continually carried on with the English colonists by the orders of the Roi Tres-Chretien. The English, on the other hand, believing in their right to occupy "Acadie," did not hesitate to em- ploy military measures, even in a time of nominal peace; and Fort Lawrence was erected at the head of the Bay of Fundy, in spite of an active resistance by the Acadians in the course of which many lives were lost. The arrival of Duquesne as governor of Quebec in 1752 was the signal for a vigorous attempt on the part of France to obtain command of the Ohio valley. An English com- pany, composed chiefly of merchants and bankers of Virginia and Maryland, having obtained large landed concessions on the banks of the Ohio, as well as a monopoly of the trade with the Indians in that region, aided by the governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania, determined to oppose the French advance. In the winter of 1753-1754 a young officer of militia, George Washington, then only twenty-two years of age, was sent by Governor Dinwiddle of Virginia to re- monstrate with the French officers, who were establishing forts on Lake Erie, and at other points in the disputed region. Young Washington was politely received and was promised that his letter would be sent to Canada, but his mission was fruitless. Whether or not the lands watered by the Ohio river had been, as alleged, bought by the English from the Indians under a treaty said to have been made at Lancaster in 1744, and whether these lands really belonged to Pennsylvania, or, as it was claimed, to Virginia, are questions of small ' See the evidence cited by Waddington, Louis XV, etc., pp. 15, 16. 496 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 Open conflict between France and England present importance; it seemed clear to the English colonists that this unexplored and imoccupied region at least did not . by any title whatever belong to France. Dinwiddle, there- fore, in January, 1754, announced to London his purpose of taking possession of the region by military force, obtained an appropriation of ten thousand pounds sterling from the Virginia assembly, and decided to erect a fort at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers where they unite to form the Ohio, — now the site of Pittsburg. During the construction of this fort the French appeared upon the scene; and, on April 17, the Virginians were ordered to desist and to retire. The French, having superior numbers, took possession of the place, completed the un- finished fort, and in honor of their governor named it Fort Duquesne. Although obliged to retreat, Washington, with a hundred and fifty Virginians, had not receded far when a small de- tachment of French soldiers, under the command of De Jumonville, was sent out to order the Virginians to leave the contested territory. The two bodies met, and De Jumon- ville was killed by an Indian. The French commander, Contrecceur, promptly organized a strong body of French soldiers, Canadian militia, and Indians, and open war began. It is not within the scope of this work to narrate the military operations which followed, and which gave rise to recriminations that long obscured the real nature of the events. Bad faith in reporting the circumstances of this conflict was charged on both sides; the French commander of the expedition sent to avenge the death of Jumonville, De Villiers, pretending that the band attacked by the Vir- ginians was composed of mere "parlemeniaires," whose ob- ject was to make a peaceable communication, and that Jumonville was basely "assassinated" before he could make his mission known; Governor Dinwiddle, on the con- trary, claiming that, by the language of Contrecceur 's instructions, the detachment was "a body of soldiers sent to enforce the retirement of the Virginians," suddenly transformed, after the fact of their defeat and capture, 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 497 into "ambassadors" by "les beaux discours" of the French. Chap, vi It is due to the good name of Washington to record his solemn assertion that, although by the terms of the - capitulation of Fort Necessity signed by him, — but written in the French language, which he did not imderstand, — ■ Jumonville was declared to have been "assassinated," he did not even know of Jumonville 's existence; was not aware of the quality attributed to his detachment; and that, in the document referred to, he was deceived by the interpreter.! It is difficult in such border warfare to apply with rigor the ethical or even the legal principles which confessedly ought to govern military action. In this battle for suprem- acy the savage instincts of the native tribes were secretly and afterward openly appealed to, and both contestants set a price on the lives of their enemies by offering a reward for their scalps, no matter how taken.^ It is, however, greatly to the credit of the Indians that, on more than one occasion, they expressed their preference to remain neutral, and declined the inducements offered to them to participate in the war. The noble response of the Five Nations of the Iroquois, made on October 12, 1754, in answer to Duquesne's invitation to join in an attack upon the English settlements, is a document that deserves to be permanently recorded. "We of the Five Nations, " runs this reply, "labor constantly for good relations, while our French Father and our English Brothers, both equally ambitious, dispute over lands that belong to no one but ourselves. We are surprised that you who are given to prayer have no fear of chastisement. Let the Crowns of France and England make their decision, ' See Waddington, Louis XV et le renversement des alliances, pp. 26, 33; also Parkman, Montcalm and Wolf, Boston, 1888; and Dussieux, Le Canada setts la domination frangaise, Paris, 1855, who gives the text of the capitulation. ^ On August 14, 1753, Prevost reports to the French government the payment of 1800 Kvres for 18 scalps taken from the EngUsh "dans les diff&entes courses"; and Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, on December 24, 1755, instructs Major Johnson to ofifer a premium for every scalp taken from the enemy. VOL. m. — 32 498 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI or at least compose their quarrels between you French and ,~^'^'- English by yourselves, without involving the savages as X / OX — 17 oo ■ you do in such a fashion that we find ourselves enclosed between these two brothers, who both seem to wish to drive us to the centre of the earth. We pray you, our Father, by this token to be pleased to act with mildness in this enter- prise, in order that we may remain tranquil on our lands."' War in It is necessary to remember that the opposing forces ia Amenoa ^jjjg coutcst Were not personal but imperial interests. It is inevitable truc, that the English colonists in America were not disposed to yield to a foreign and unfriendly power the possession of the vast Hinterland that bounded their settlements on the West, or to remain exposed to future invasion from the North. But the contest was in reality a war between governments rather than a conflict of races. It is freely admitted that "the perfidious conduct of La Jonqui&re and Duquesne was in obedience to the injunctions of their Court and the suggestions of their minister. "^ And the same may be said of the English governors. As early as 1750 Shirley and Lawrence had been secretly authorized to act together in the North to expel the French from their positions. On both sides during the deceptive conversations between the French minister of foreign affairs, Rouill^, and the English ambassador, Lord Albemarle, at Paris, secret military instructions were given to the colonial governors authorizing their aggressions. In the autumn of 1754, without notice to France, it was decided that Braddock was to be sent to America to attack the French at four points: Braddock himself was to lead two regiments of regulars against Fort Duquesne; two regiments of colonials under Shirley were to be sent against Fort Niagara; New England militia were to seize Crown Point, the key of Lake Champlain; and another body of New Englanders under Lawrence was to take Fort Beausdjour. Soon afterward in April, 1755, a French expedition under Baron Dieskau ' From the report of a council of the Five Nations at Montreal, in the " Correspondance du Canada," Archives des Colonies, Paris. • Waddington," Louis XV et le renversement des alliances, p. 43. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 499 was sent to Canada with three thousand troops; and in the Chap, vi following summer, without a declaration of war, and with- ■*■•''• out a serious effort on the part of the two governments to avert a conflict, hostilities on a large scale were opened, under cover of friendly intentions, which resulted in Brad- dock's defeat and death and the capture of Dieskau during his attempt to invade the, valley of the Hudson river. By the fatality of their conflicting purposes in India and America, France and England had at length become involved in a contest for colonial expansion that could not end until one or the other of the contestants had been driven from the field. During the entire period between the Peace of Aix-la- The deiioaoy Chapelle and the defeat of Braddock there had been op- European portunity for a friendly adjustment of the issues in India situation and America, but there was no serious intention of com- promise on either side.^ In truth, the Peace was regarded by both governments as a temporary truce, and both were only waiting for the moment when it might be to their advantage to renew the contest. Each had secretly hoped to obtain from the course of events in Europe some advan- tage without prematurely exposing its intentions, but it was impossible that a fiction so palpable should continue longer. The profit to be drawn by either side from the state of Europe was extremely doubtful. The relations of England and Spain had been readjusted by a treaty signed at Madrid on October 5, 1750, in which the rights possessed by the South Sea Company regarding the Asiento had been aban- doned in return for a hundred thousand pounds sterHng;^' but the Fade de famille between France and Spain still bound the two monarchies to a common pohcy in case Prance should become involved in war. The Austro-Prussian situation remained practically un- changed: England and Russia in alliance with Austria, and Prance in nominal alhance with Prussia; but Prussia and ' For the details of the very tedious negotiations, see Waddington, Louis XV, etc., pp. 51, 113. ' For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 464; Del Cantillo, p. 400. 500 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI England were less friendly than before. In fact, since 1750 ,^^'^'~j diplomatic relations had been broken off. Frederick II had given offence in England by withholding the payment of in- stalments due on the debt secured by the revenues of Silesia, which he had assumed at the time of its annexation, and George II had been further displeased on account of Fred- erick's coquetting with the Jacobites. Although the general relations of the powers in July, 1755, remained unchanged, it was certain that the Anglo- French conflict would in some way affect the European situation as a whole ; for each side would seek some new ad- justment for its own advantage by which the existing equilibrium would be disturbed. The changes about to occur were, however, of such a radical character that no statesman in Europe would have been able to predict them, or even to believe that they were possible. In order to comprehend them, it is necessary to consider the forces which had been silently, and in great part secretly, operating in Europe during the period from 1748 to 1755. III. The Reversal of the Alliances The secret In 1744, after the death of Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV dipiomacy of j^g^^j £qj, about five months undertaken to be his own min- Louie XV ister of foreign affairs; but, although he had a profound sense of his metier de roi, and wished to be, like his great- grandfather, Louis XIV, an absolute master, such was his timidity — his "pusillanimity" even — that, "after having carefully sought out the right course, and being clear in his own mind, he almost always decided, although with regret, for the wrong one when it was proposed by his ministers or by his mistresses."^ Thus, while persuaded "that an honest man would not remain at his court," after strenuous exertions to make a wise decision, in spite of his desire to be independent, Louis XV usually found himself overruled by his own weakness • Boutaric, Correspondance secrete, 1, p. 3. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL StTPREMACY 501 and finally compelled to do that which he himself did not Chap, vi approve.^ Constantly suspecting the conduct and motives of others, and cherishing a private opinion that there was value in his own ideas which might be vindicated if they were properly carried out, alongside the official diplomacy of the regular ministry the King had organized a secret diplomacy, con- ducted by himself, which was inspired by purposes that not only differed from those of the orders which he himself publicly authorized, but were sometimes even intended to frustrate them. Such was the pitiable outcome of the ad- vice given to Louis XV by the Duke de Noailles after the death of Fleury, which for a few months the timid king had conscientiously tried to follow: "Do not allow yourself to be governed, be the master. Never have a favorite nor a prime minister. Listen to and consult your Council, but de- cide. God, who has made you a king, will give you all the necessary fight, so long as you have good intentions. " While the Duke de Noailles, who in 1744 was named The mecha- minister without a portfolio, was still at his side to make "^^ °^}^^ ' secret diplo- suggestions, Louis XV had foimd himself able to maintain macy a quasi-independence; although Argenson had complained of the Duke's presence in the Council, on the ground that, without the responsibility of a prime minister, he was "un inspecteur inopportun," who mixed himself up with every- thing, yet was master of nothing. When this resource finally failed the King, the courage with which the Duke had inspired him had not proved sufficient, and the secret diplomacy was organized; perhaps in the hope that in some mysterious way his private illumination would be divinely guided to a good result. The mechanism of this esoteric venture was as perfect ' "Quand il avait pris une r&olution importante," says Boutaric, "il ne savait comment I'ex^outer; sa timidity lui faisait mSme jouer un r61e odieux." Toward the end of his Hfe, his then mistress, Du Barry, having insisted on the disgrace of a minister of war in whom he had confidence, the King said bitterly: "II faudra bien qu'il tombe, car il n'y a que moi qui le soutienne." 602 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI as it was complicated, amounting to an organized con- ^■^- spiracy against the King's own official diplomacy, over 1731-1756 . which he himself presided in person. He had his own chambre noire in which to perlustrer the official despatches, and his own secret cipher code for the conduct of correspondence with his private agents. At Paris the first clerk of the foreign office, Tercier, was also the secret secretary of the King. In various parts of Europe certain ambassadors, ministers, and secretaries of embassy, supplemented by special correspondents who had no connection with the official diplomatic service, were in the King 's private employ and paid out of his private purse, so that not infrequently one policy was pursued officially and another — often the contrary — by the monarch's personal direction.^ As a consequence an ambassador's secretary was sometimes in the confidence of the King, received private instructions from him, and in obeying them checkmated the negotiations of his superior, without the least suspicion on his part of the disloyalty practiced upon him. At first the Prince de Conti, and afterward the Count de Broglie, served as the secret ministers, or, as they were happily called, "ks vizirs de poche," of the King in the administration of this curious system. Tercier received and transmitted the instructions and despatches, the valet de chambre Lebel conveyed them to and from the monarch, and it was not until 1753 that the existence of this surreptitious corre- spondence appears to have been suspected by the official world.^ The interest The first objoct toward which the secret diplomacy of Louis XV q£ Louis XV had been directed was the succession to the m Jroiand crown of Poland. As son-in-law of the dethroned king Stanislas Leszczinski, he had never ceased to feel a deep in- terest in that kingdom. He had bitterly resented the inter- ' Among the King's confidants, besides the Prince de Conti and Count de Broglie, were such eminent men as Breteuil, Vergennes, Saint-Priest, AUeurs, D'Havrincourt, and La Touche. ^ For a full account, see De Broglie, Le secret du Roi; correspondance secrUe de Louis XV avec ses agents diplomatiques, 1752-177^, Paris, 1879. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 503 ference of Austria and Russia in its affairs, and the first Chap, vi phase of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV had been, there- fore, to arrange for the election of a French prince to the Polish throne, when it should again become vacant.^ In 1745 a number of Polish magnates had visited Paris with the purpose of ending the anarchy of the ancient re- public by offering the throne at the next election to a French prince, and had thought of the Prince de Conti, a grandson of the Prince de Conti who had been a candidate for the Polish throne in the time of Louis XIV, but had been ex- cluded by the choice of the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony.^ Louis XV had approved of this new proposal and had immediately entered into secret collusion with the Prince to obtain for him the coveted crown. A Pole named Blan- dowski, a secret agent of the Prince, had presented the matter to Argenson, then in charge of foreign affairs, affirming that the King had authorized the project; but Argenson had re- fused to believe the agent, although his brother had advised him that there might be truth in his representations, and counselled him to speak of the matter to the King. This Argenson dared not do; but, to test the King's attitude, he addressed to Issarts, then French minister to Poland, an instruction in the contrary sense. The King signed it, and Argenson felt assured, without directly consulting him, that his royal master did not approve of the project. He deceived himself, however; for Issarts was one of the King's secret agents, and knew that the official instruction was not to be obeyed! The King's private design had gradually widened out to a really great conception, nothing less than a league between France, Sweden, Poland, Prussia, and Turkey for ' The Near Eastern Question appears to have appealed much more strongly to Louis XV's imagination than the fate of India or of America, which did not greatly arouse his interest except as it touched his royal pride to be beaten in a struggle for colonies. ^ The Prince de Conti had in 1742 vainly aspired to the hand of the Czarina EUzabeth, and was still aspiring to a throne. See Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, pp. 229, 232. 604 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 Results of Louis XV's diplomacy in 1755 The alignment of the powers in 1755 the purpose of restricting the power of Austria and Russia; and his secret agents had been busy at Stockholm, Warsaw, - Berlin, and Constantinople to carry out his designs. In pursuing this plan Louis XV had found it necessary to revert to the idea of close alliance with the Sultan, from which Noailles had dissuaded him.^ In 1748 Des AUeurs had, therefore, been sent to Constantinople to re-establish good relations with Turkey. The invasion of Finland by Russia in 1750 had rekindled the patriotism of the Swedes, previously divided by the quarrels of the "Caps," who were paid by Russia, and the "Hats," who were under the influence of France. The menace of an attack by the Turks, under the incitement of France, had caused the Czarma to recede from her project of annexing Finland. The acces- sion of the new king of Sweden, Adolphus Frederick, had strengthened French influence in the North, and Broglie had won a brilliant success in Poland in opposing the intrigues of Russia. Thus, at Constantinople, at Stockholm, and at Warsaw the secret policy of the King had already borne promising fruit. In 1755 this work was crowned by the mission of the Chevalier de Vergemies to Constantinople. In order to induce the Turks to menace Russia with a new invasion, Vergennes carried with him twenty thousand livres worth of presents for the Turkish officials, and was authorized, it necessary, to spend a million.^ As a result of his activities he was soon able to report the imminence of a Tartar inva- sion that would have kept St. Petersburg preoccupied until the Ottoman armies were on the march. Only a signal from Versailles was wanting, but this signal did not come. The reason for this change of policy was a new situation which had resulted from the activities of England; and soon afterward produced a relation between France, Austria, and Russia which could not have been predicted. When in 1755 the events in America rendered inevitable » See p. 501. * For a detailed account of Vergennes' mission, see De Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade a Constantinople, Paris, 1894. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN ANB COLONIAL SUPREMACY 505 the long impending war between France and England, the Chap, vi alignment of the powers still continued as it was at the time of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle: England, the United Proviaces, Austria, and Russia forming one group, France, Spain, and Prussia the other; but, while the association of these powers remained unbroken, important changes had occurred in their relations to one another. In the first group England and Austria, although still in nominal alliance, were no longer in quite cordial rela- tions. Maria Theresa had never forgiven the failure of George II to support her rights in Silesia. The United Provinces no longer occupied an independent position, being wholly under the influence of England, a too predominant partner who had kept the Stadtholder in a relation of tute- lage not always acceptable to the States General,^ and there had been friction over the execution of the Barrier Treaty somewhat irritating to Austria. With Russia the relations of England were excellent, and those of Russia and Austria were intimate and cordial, all three of these powers being at the time united in their distrust of Frederick 11. In the second group France was still in alliance with Spain, but the indifference of Louis XV to the Farnese iaterests at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had created a coolness which the Bourbon relationship and the Facte de famille had not entirely overcome. This alienation had manifested itself on the part of Spain in approaches to Austria and in improved relations with England not entirely favored at Versailles. The relations of France and Prussia remained unbroken, and the treaty of 1741, by which France maintained German troops in the service of Prussia, was still in force; but Frederick II was resentful of the patronizing spirit of Louis XV, toward whom he felt a personal antipathy that was not always concealed, and in return the King of France personally regarded his ally as "an exigent person," never content with the subsidies ' The wife of William IV was Anne, a daughter of George II, who after 1751 acted as regent diiring the minority of her son, William V. 506 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI granted him, — mainly in his own interest, — whose phi- ■*• ^- losophy was unbecoming in a king and whose irreligion was a scandal. The Franco-Prussian alliance had, in fact, be- come an anachronism, maintained by France only in def- erence to the anti-Austrian tradition, and by Prussia to escape the alternative of isolation. The Anglo- The real character of all the alliances was soon to be put Austnan ^q ^jjg ^gg^_ 'j'jie issue of the moment was, which of the two impasse , i i t • i contestants for world-empire could obtam the most aid from the European situation. In order to render the Austrian alHance of practical value to England, it was necessary that Austria should threaten France by throwing a strong military force into the Nether- lands. Would Maria Theresa weaken her home defences to serve the interests of England? That was the question to which the English ambassador, Keith, was to obtain an answer at Vienna. But the regard of Maria Theresa was fixed upon Frederick II. He was to her always the real enemy. Why should she turn her arms against the French, whose aid she hoped in time to secure for the recovery of Silesia? Would George II, in return for services in the Netherlands, help her to recover her lost province? The occasion was opportune for discussing the griefs of Austria regarding the past conduct of England, and Kau- nitz, who had become the chief adviser of Maria Theresa, did not hesitate to improve it. In a note verbale of June 15, 1755, to Keith, after reminding him that Great Britain could not expect more decisively to dispose of the troops of the Empress if they were in the pay of George II, Kaunitz bitterly exposes the proposterous character of the British demands. As for the past services rendered to Austria by England, they had been amply repaid by the blood and ruin of Her Majesty's subjects, while her allies prospered and opened for themselves new avenues to wealth and com- merce. And what sacrifices did England now propose? Her Majesty, Kaunitz continues, had included Hanover in the casus foederis, but the King of England promises nothing in his quality of elector. Nevertheless, while comprehending EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 507 "the difference between a treaty promised and a treaty con- Chap, vi eluded, " the Empress is willing to comply with the principal ^- ■'• part of England's request upon certain conditions; the -i^^^I^I^ most important of which is "that His Britannic Majesty engage to conclude as soon as possible the subsidiary treaties which he has already declared himself willing to make, and to employ for the defence of the Empress against the King of Prussia the Russians who will pass to the pay of England. "1 Plainly, the two governments had reached the parting of the ways, because their interests were no longer identical. For England the main object was to oppose France; for Austria, to oppose Prussia. To place a great Austrian army in the Netherlands, Maria Theresa must deplete her force of resistance to Prussia. To meet the demands of Austria in the matter of subsidies, George II must raise the money in England. This was intrinsically difficult; and the violent opposition of William Pitt,^ whose oratory commanded the House of Commons, soon rendered it impossible. The min- istry, he thundered, was not English. In fact, it was not a ministry. When treaties with Russia and Hesse were laid before Parliament, Pitt opposed them, as he did a grant for the maintenance of the troops of Hanover.' In August, 1755, the Anglo-Austrian alliance had reached an impasse. But the loss of Austrian support was not the only mis- The Angio- fortune for England. The United Provinces, exposed to a k™^''''' . . alliance French attack, were anxious for their own safety, and the States General were disposed to neutrality. Thus in August, 1755, England was practically isolated, with the prospect of a formidable opposition on the continent. ' For the full text, see Waddington, as before, pp. 136, 139. * William Pitt, the elder, afterward Lord Chatham, and destined to play a great r61e in the affairs of England, wished to pursue energeti- cally the war with France for the colonies, but opposed the costly de- fence of Hanover as a royal rather than a national policy. ' The subsidies were afterward voted by the Parhament, but too late to cement the alliance with Austria. 508 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VI In this emergency negotiations were opened at St. Peters- 17^1-^7 w ^^^S for a new treaty with Russia; and, on September 30, a treaty was signed by which, in exchange for large subsidies in money, thirty-five thousand Russian troops were to be placed at the disposal of England.' For what purpose were these troops to be used? On October 30, 1750, England had adhered to the Austro- Russian treaty of alliance of 1746, excepting certain secret articles directed expressly against Frederick II, of which England was not aware. The treaty was, therefore, in the eyes of Russia a continued adherence to the combination of Russia, Austria, and England against the Franco-Prussian alliance; but the opposite intentions of the signatories were soon to be made evident. The purpose of England was to defend Hanover from an attack by France. The purpose of Russia was to strengthen the combination against Prussia. When the test came, the isolation of England would have been as complete as it was before, had it not been for a new alliance on the part of England which shattered all previous combinations and destroyed the European equilibrium. The position The Conflict between France and England placed Hanover of Frederick II jjj g^jj exposed position; for, so long as France and Prussia were in alliance and Austria distrustful of England, that electorate was not only in danger of being made a pawn in some possible transaction on the part of the continental powers, but liable to invasion. There was, therefore, after the im- passe with Austria had been reached, a strong motive for George II to secure the safety of the electorate by a defen- sive alliance with Frederick II. There was also on the Prussian side a new reason for seek- mg the protection of England. In January, 1753, Frederick II had obtained possession of a copy of certain secret articles between Austria and Russia, exchanged on June 2, 1746, for the recovery of Silesia and the partition of Prussia. Although this compact had not begun to be carried into effect, and was not likely to be speedily executed, the existence of a conspiracy on the part of Austria and Russia 1 For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 75. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 509 for a future attack upon Prussia was regarded by Frederick Chap. VI II as evident. It was well known that Maria Theresa had ^- ^■ never ceased to resent the loss of one of her richest provinces, ^^^^'^^^e and she had never fully recovered from the humiliation of surrendering it which had been forced upon her by her allies. Determined to be strong through her own might, she had resolved to reorganize her army, fill her treasury, confide her affairs to younger and more efficient ministers; and thus, by imitating the vigor and intelligence of her for- midable rival, redeem the past, and abolish the traces of mediaevahsm that had been a source of weakness to her predecessors. In this spirit she had undertaken great in- ternal reforms. When they were completed, and when, as she herself tersely expressed it, "Providence had relieved her by death of councillors too prejudiced to give useful advice, but too respectable and meritorious to be dismissed," she mtended to recover what in the time of her weakness and adversity she had lost. It does not lie within the scope of our narrative to describe The designs of the radical internal reforms which, by the advice of Count ^^"^ Theresa Haugwitz, the Empress adopted in her own estates; re- sulting in the remodelling of the army, and the reorgan- ization of the treasury, the system of taxation, and the administration of justice. ^ With equal ability Count Kaunitz, who had represented Austria in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, had proposed a reform in foreign affairs. Belonging to the high no- bility, originally intended for the Church, and a student of jurisprudence, Kaimitz had acquired in his diplomatic missions a thorough knowledge of the European situation. The idea of a reform in the foreign relations of Austria proposed by Kaunitz was new, and at first seemed imprac- ticable. An unalterable fate seemed to have condemned the House of Hapsburg to suffer the relentless opposition of the House of Bourbon. The experience of centuries ap- peared to confirm the belief that this rivalry must be per- ' The subject of these domestic reforms is well treated by Bright, Maria Theresa, pp. 64, 84. 510 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI petual; but Kaunitz thought otherwise. Alliances, he con- ,»„^'°i,, tended, should not be based upon preconceived principles when the facts of experience and the emergence of new in- terests indicate the expediency of a change. England and Holland were mainly interested in their own affairs, Russia and Saxony could not be depended upon, and Austria was thus left without a trustworthy friend. Austria and France were not of necessity irreconcilable opponents. On the contrary, he contended, both France and Spain had many interests in common with Austria. The old system of opposition had proved unprofitable for both. Without the consent of France Silesia could never be recovered. The Empress herself had become convinced of this, and had assented to Kaunitz 's idea of making a great effort to secure if not the friendship at least the neutrality of France in the hope of recovering Silesia.^ Themiasion Without disturbing existing relations with other powers, from 1750 to 1753, Kaunitz, as ambassador to France, had labored steadily to acquire the friendship of Louis XV and to undermine the relations of France and Prussia.^ At the end of Kaunitz 's mission to Paris, although no great dependence was placed upon the friendship of the maritime powers, the wisdom of still retaining it had been apparent; of Kaunitz to France ' For details, see Striedler, Kritische Forschungen zur oslerreichischm Politik (1748-1756), pp. 7, 26. Over the point whether or not Maria Theresa approved the proposal of Kaunitz as a means of regaining Silesia a Uvely controversy has originated. Von Ameth, in his Ge- schichte Maria Theresias, IV, stated that the Empress fully accepted Kaunitz's plan to win the friendship of France with the purpose of isolating Prussia and regaining Silesia. Beer, on the contrary, in his Aufzeichnungen des Grafen William Bentinck iiher Maria Theresia, contends that Maria Theresa absolutely rejected this proposal, and in this has been followed by Ranke, Sohafer, Danielson, Dove, Koser, and others. The literature on both sides is given by Striedler, as above, pp. 10, 11; who concludes in the light of new documentary evidence that the plan of Kaunitz was accepted by Maria Theresa when it was fiiBt presented in 1749 as a means of regaining Silesia. ' Ranke, Ursprung des siehenj&hrigen Krieges, p. 76, makes the curious statement that Kaunitz was sent to France "um ihn von seiner Vorliebe fur die Franzosen abzubringen!" EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 511 for, while the ambassador had been kindly received, and had Chap, vi constantly displayed a spirit of amity for France, no osten- ^- °- sible progress had been made in the essentials of his mission. ^^^^"^^^^ At its beginning Kaunitz had expected much of the French minister Puysieux, who set less value upon the alhance of France with Prussia than his predecessor, Argenson, had; but that statesman was misled by his behef that the for- eign poUcy of the Empress was confidentially influenced, if not directly inspired, by England. In his anxiety not to be made the dupe of English designs, Puysieux had imcon- sciously fallen a victim to his own groundless suspicions, and Kaunitz made his overtures in vain.' As early as April, 1751, the ambassador was convinced that the alliance with France had no hope of success imless new motives could be applied. In spite of all the influence he could bring to bear France still held to the alliance with Prussia, and so he was obliged to inform the Empress; to whom he even advised entering into closer relations with Frederick II, not apparently with a serious purpose, but for strategical effect at Versailles. If France could be made to believe that England, for reasons of her own, was trying to induce Austria to be entirely reconciled with Prussia regardless of Silesia, it would seem evident that the past attitude of France in holding aloof from Austria had only furthered England's design! It was thus that, in his ex- tremity, Kaunitz hoped to influence Puysieux by utilizing his self-deception regarding the policy of George II and his supposed influence with Austria. The intensity of Maria Theresa's indignation with Fred- Theinflen- erick II was, however, such that, although she perfectly ^^*^^°^ understood the intention of Kaunitz, she caused him to be Theresa informed that she would under no circxmistances compromise the future by taking the step he had suggested; and his mis- sion ended with no result, except to lay foundations for future action by gaining the favor of the King's mistress, Madame de Pompadour, then all powerful at Versailles. When, therefore, in January, 1753, Kaunitz was recalled ' See Striedler, as before, pp. 47, 48. 512 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 The frailty of tte Franco- Pniasian alliance from France to become the Austrian Chancellor of State, the prospect of an Austro-French alhance was no longer - seriously entertained. In the instructions given to Stahrem- berg, his successor, there is no sign of hope that the aid of France for the recovery of Silesia could ever be obtained. Unsatisfactory as they were, the alliances with England and the United Provinces had still to be maintained. In one respect only had a change in the situation favorable to Austria occurred. On June 14, 1752, a treaty had been concluded by Austria with Spain at Aranjuez in which the affairs of Italy had been settled upon the basis of a mutual guarantee of the territorial status quo} Thus, in Jime, 1755, no definite readjustment of the al- liances had occurred. England, as we have seen, was prac- tically isolated. France, on the other hand, was equally so, unless reliance could be placed on the support of Prussia, which would enable Louis XV to attack Hanover, and thus cause George II to understand that war with France ia America and on the sea might involve the loss of his German electorate. As early as March, 1755, the probable superiority of England on the sea had suggested to France the idea of a vigorous "diversion on land," beginning with an attack on the Austrian Netherlands; but an occasion for it was difficult to find, since the Empress had declared through Stahrem- berg her "extreme regret" at the prospect of a rupture between France and England, and this attitude of Vienna rendered such an invasion open to the reproach of being unjust and violent.^ At that time the solidarity of England and Austria was presupposed in France, and the combined menace of a landing in England with the aid of the Pre- tender, the invasion of Hanover, the occupation of the Netherlands, and the incitement of the Turks to attack 1 For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 707; Del Cantillo, p. 412. ^ See Waddington, as before, pp. 157, 159. Frederick II advised calling on Austria to execute her engagements as guarantor of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and in case of refusal to invade the Netherlands and to hold them as an equivalent for Canada. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPEEMACY 513 Hungary was seriously considered. But, in fact, all plans of Chap, vi action were merely tentative. The aversion of the Court ^-^^ to a European war, for which France was ill prepared, the indolence and timidity of Louis XV, the incapacity of the ministry for initiative, and Madame de Pompadour's fear of losing her hold on the King, if he were absent on military duty, all combined to impose inaction. By a strange infatuation, Louis XV had refused to beheve that events in America would lead to war with England.^ Frederick II, more clairvoyant, clearly discerned the in- evitable consequences of the course pursued, and coun- selled prompt action against Hanover. To this Rouille, the new minister of foreign affairs, answered, that Frederick II might himself easily undertake that project; adding that he "would find in the electorate wherewith to indemnify himself amply for the expenses which the war would require." But the wily king, on May 6, 1755, reminded the minister that he had to face "every summer sixty thousand Russians in Courland, on the confines of Prussia, " and that the Saxons had already made engagements with England.^ He also availed himself of the occasion to make the gentle insinua- tion that in 1745, notwithstanding the treaty of alliance with France, his states were menaced with an invasion of the Austrian and Saxon armies. Thoroughly informed by his active and intelligent rep- resentative at Paris, Knyphausen, Frederick II was aston- ished and disheartened by the indecision and indifference of the French Court, which seemed to treat him as a convenient ally but disregarded all his counsels. Antici- pating a possible attack upon Prussia by Austria and ' In the autumn of 1755, after diplomatic intercourse had been suspended, secret negotiations were continued between France and England through private persons in the hope of an armistice. See Waddington, as before, pp. 185, 186. ' For the question whether or not Frederick II, as stated by Bemis, at this time offered to invade Bohemia with forty thousand men if Prance would invade the Austrian Netherlands, see Masson, M4moires et kttres du Cardinal de Bemis, I, p. 210, and Broglie, Histoire et diplo- mtie, pp. 28, 32. VOL. m. — 33 514 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI Russia, and placing little confidence in the disposition of ^■^- France to offer him efficient aid in case of an invasion, -l'7q-l T'7f\fi Frederick II had no inclination to attack Hanover, or to emerge from a state of neutrality in the quarrel with Eng- land. Since the ministry of France had no "fixed system," and offered him no sure support, anticipating the co-opera- tion France might soon demand of him, on August 9, 1755, he informed Knyphausen that his treaty with France "bound him to defend French territory in Europe, hut not in America"! Thus France, as well as England, was m fact practically deserted by her most trusted ally at the critical moment of a conflict already engaged.* The deter- The Only practical result of the advice of Frederick II L^^a'xv'to ^^' apparently, to turn the attention of Louis XV toward renew relations Russia, against whose influence in Poland he had been for wi ussia several years directing his secret diplomacy, culminatiag in the mission of Vergennes to Constantinople and the attempt to incite the Turks to attack the Czarina. It was in 1755 more than ten years since diplomatic re- lations between France and Russia had been practically broken off; for, after the summary dismissal of La Ch6tardie in 1744, AUion, the envoy of lower rank who succeeded him, had never been able to win the good graces of the Czarina, and had been himself recalled in October, 1747.^ Apart from the fact that Frederick II had alleged his fear of Russia as an excuse for not wishing to attack Hanover, there were many reasons for renewing, if possible, the rela- tions of France with Russia.' England was known at the time to be engaged in important negotiations at St. Peters- ' The dilatory attitude of France in regard to renewing the Treaty of 1741 with Prussia illustrates the ineptitude of French diplomacy at that time. ' Not in 1746, as stated by Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Bussie, p. 204; but in 1747, as stated by WaHszewski, La dernibre des Romanov, p. 397. ' Russia had been refused admission to the Congress of Aix-la- Chapelle, and had not signed the treaty of peace. "If we admit here the mercenary powers," Saint-Severin, the French plenipotentiary, had loftily remarked, "we shall never end." 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 515 burg.* Was it possible to prevent their success? At all Chap, vi events it would at least be interesting to know the real atti- ^,;^- tude of Russia; and the secret diplomacy of Louis XV was - now set in motion to ascertain the intentions of the Czarina. French historians have made much of the alleged personal predilection of the Czarina Elizabeth for France and her secret sentiment for Louis XV. The evidence for this in- ference regarding the daughter of Peter the Great is not overwhelming, and the long rupture of friendly relations between Russia and France can hardly be explained by the devotion of Bestusheff to the English and the Czarina's tacit submission to the domination of her chancellor. It is true, that the vice-chancellor, Woronzoff, who was not in perfect harmony with his chief and was seeking to supplant him, was not favorable to the English alliance and might easily be won for the French. It was through him, therefore, that advances were possible, and it was by his assistance that they were about to be made." In order to prepare the way for the renewal of relations with Russia, on June 1, 1755, a Scotch Jacobite, one Mac- kenzie Douglas, who had served the cause of the Pretender and was then a refugee in France, was sent by Louis XV on a secret mission to St. Petersburg. The primary object of his visit was to ascertain the condition of the country, the disposition of the Court, and the exact state of the Anglo- Russian negotiations. His instructions, concealed in a tor- toise-shell snuff-box provided with a false bottom, minutely prescribed the route by which he should travel, which re- quired him to enter Germany by Suabia and to visit on his way Bohemia, Saxony, and Prussia, passing through Cour- land and Livonia to St. Petersburg. He was furnished vsdth a secret code, in which renard noir stood for the British am- ' The proposed subsidies to Russia had akeady been openly dis- cussed in Parliament. ' Vandal represents that the Czarina, first in 1753, and again in 1755, had, through private channels, revealed her personal desire for the renewal of diplomatic relations with France. Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Bussie, pp. 258, 259. 516 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI bassador; le renard etait cher signified that English infiu- ^■^- ence was still predominant; I'hermine en voque, that the old 1731-1756 Russian party was triumphing; and les martres nbelines sont en baisse, the diminishing credit of Bestusheff.' This secrecy was considered necessary in view of the fate that had befallen a French spy named Valcroissant, who in 1754 had been captured by the Russian police and imprisoned in a fortress. To avoid a similar fate, Douglas travelled in the guise of an English gentleman interested in mineralogy. His nationality, it was thought, would not only preserve him from suspicion but enable him to approach Sir Hanbury Williams, in whose negotiations Louis XV was interested, but perhaps make it possible also to secure a personal presentation at court, and thus find an opportunity to converse with the Czarina. In this re- spect the French emissary was doomed to disappointment. Williams at once suspected him as a Scotchman and a Catholic, and not only refused to introduce him but ren- dered his presentation at court impossible. The legend of According to a story often retold and long believed, Mademoiselle Douglas was accompauied on this mission by a person whom he presented as his niece, under the name Mademoiselle Lia de Beaumont. Compelled to leave St. Petersburg on account of the intrigues of Williams and Bestusheff, Doug- las — so runs the tale — had presented the young lady to Woronzoff. The vice-chancellor obligingly procured for her an introduction to the court, and even a place among the young maids of honor in the palace of Her Majesty the Czarina, who graciously received her, and assigned her an apartment, which she shared with a young princess. Thus brought into close intimacy with the Czarina, Lia de Beaumont is said to have ascertained the willingness of Her Majesty to receive a regular diplomatic representative from the Court of France. In explanation of suggestive whispers which did not escape the ears of her imperial hostess, Lia finally confessed that she was in reality the 1 For the instructions, and the code, see Boutaric, Correspondance secrite, I, pp. 203, 209. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 517 Chevalier Eon de Beaumont, the secretary of Douglas, and Chap. vi had resorted to this disguise for the purpose of delivering ^.d. to Her Majesty a letter from the King of France. i73i-i756 The Czarina, the story runs, far from being offended by this romantic adventure, was pleased with the impos- ture, and authorized the reception of an official repre- sentative of Louis XV.' Careful investigation has discredited this interesting fable, rendered plausible by the fact that the slender figure, beard- less face, and effeminate appearance generally of the Cheva- lier Eon long made the question of his sex a matter of public curiosity, never satisfactorily determined until after his death. Sober history is, therefore, reduced to the prosaic state- ment, that, after the departure of Douglas, through a French merchant resident in Russia, named Michel, it was learned that the Czarina would receive a regular diplomatic representative, on condition that Louis XV was disposed to enter into a declared alliance with Russia.^ The war in America, which was the primary cause of the The Angio- testiag of the alliances, was, in truth, a matter that might ^™^^'^'^ "^ ° . . gotiations have been settled without involving all Europe in the quarrel. A strict and imiversal neutrality would have compelled the contestants to adopt some plan of conciliation, or measure their strength against each other without disturbing their neighbors. It cannot be said that either of the two adversaries deliberately intended to provoke a general war. Each was seeking, and England the more actively, to protect itself from aggression by other powers. War had not yet been formally declared, although it was already in operation. Until George II could secure the safety of Hanover, he was reluctant to enter formally upon a war with France. ' The story is told by Gallardet, Memoires de la Chevali'ere d'Eon, Paris, 1836, which is untrustworthy and confessedly "romanesque." — Historisohe Zeitung, XLI (1879), p. 403. A more serious account is found in Homberg and Joussehn, Le Chevalier d'Eon, Paris, 1904. * See Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 268. 518 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI As early as September, 1755, rumors of a rapprochement ^- ^- between England and Prussia were afloat, and Frederick II I instructed Knyphausen to let it be known by the French minister of foreign affairs that "rather singular and impor- tant overtures" had been made to him. Rouille was at first incredulous; but the insinuations of Stahremberg, who was laboring to win France for Austria, finally im- pressed him. The result was that in November the depar- ture of the Duke de Nivernais, already designated as the new ambassador to Prussia, was hastened, in order to pre- vent if possible an entente between Prussia and England. On the second of December Frederick II directed Knjp- hausen to deny that he was being drawn to the side of England, and to assure Rouill6 that all the rumors that had come to him were "only malicious insinuations" invented by his enemies, who intended to alienate him from France; that "there was not a word of truth in them"; and that he had made "no engagement with England or signed any treaty with the Court of London." On the nineteenth Knyphausen informed his master that he "could not suffi- ciently express the joy afforded to the Sieur Rouill6 and his colleagues" by the explanation he had just transmitted; and that he had been authorized to say in reply, "The King had never placed faith in the malicious insinuations made by the enemies of Frederick II, whose assurance was received with sincere gratitude as a new pledge of friendship. " The cautiona of The error of Frederick II in concealing his secret nego- Knyphauaen ^iations with England, instead of frankly confidmg his in- tentions to his ally, was pointed out by Knyphausen. "The Kingdom of France, " he says in a despatch of January 21, 1756, "is governed by a prince wholly given up to dissi- pation and little sensible to glory, who dreads war as a ca- lamity which would considerably increase a burden that he feels himself incapable of bearing. " He then speaks of the ministry as "but slightly enlightened regarding the true interests of the kingdom, divided in counsel, and incapable of resolution " ; and of Madame de Pompadour as a woman "who has a particular interest in the maintenance of peace, EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 519 and who cannot fail to have the greatest repugnance for Chap. vi whatever could interrupt the pleasures and inaction of the ^•''■ King, upon which are based her credit and existence at -^^^il^I^ court." For these reasons France would willingly consent to respect German territory, would not press Frederick II to attack Hanover, and would concentrate effort against England alone, if confidence in Prussia's loyalty to the al- liance could still be retained. On the other hand, if the attitude of Prussia gave warrant for the mference that there was ''a secret imderstanding with England" regarding future action, "the King of France would not only be humiliated by this lack of confidence in him, but would sus- pect that this treaty contained mysteries dangerous for France, and there would result from it a leaven of bitter- ness that would produce continual fermentations. " This frank and loyal advice was without result. On Jan- The aiiianoe of uary 27, 1756, Frederick II mformed the Duke de Nivemais, '=°'^''''"' ^""^ . Prussia lately appomted French ambassador to Prussia, who had arrived at Berlin on the twelfth, that a treaty with England had already been signed at London on the sixteenth. The "Treaty of Westminster, " or more properly of White Hall, between England and Prussia regulated the pending differ- ences between them regarding the Silesian debt; and con- tained an agreement by the two governments to resist any foreign invasion of Germany.' Although it was called a treaty of "neutralization," its effect was to guarantee on the part of Prussia the security of Hanover from a French attack, and on the part of England a defence of Prussia, including Silesia, from aggression by Russia. As seen at ' For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 84. On September 1, 1755, Frederick II, in response to advances made from Hanover, had caused the attention of England to be called through the Duke of Brunswick to the fact that the treaty between Prussia and France would expire in the following spring, and that negotiations with England might be found convenient. Regarding the date of this treaty see an important note by Broglie, Histoire et diphmatie, p. 47. On December 7 Frederick II had decided to conclude the treaty with England. See Koser, Geschichte Priedrichs des Grossen, II, pp. 341, 342; and for the details of the nego- tiation Waddington, as before, pp. 197, 223. 1731-1756 520 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VI St. Petersburg, the new treaty registered the substantial .o'^";^^ defection of England from the Anglo-Russian alliance. As ■ viewed from Paris, it was the practical abandonment by Prussia of the alliance with France; and at Vienna it was evident that, while Prussia enjoyed the guarantee of Eng- land against invasion by Russia, Frederick II was left entirely free to attack the Austrian possessions whenever he pleased, without restraint on the part of England. Theexpiana- The Earl of Holdemess, the English secretary of state tion to the £qj, ^.j^g Northern Department, who had superintended the powers ^ -n • negotiation of the treaty with Russia, and also that with Prussia, attempted to justify the action of England in making the compact with Frederick II, on the ground that "it was the accord with Russia that had determined the King of Prussia to unite himself with England"; and that "the Czarina Elizabeth might, therefore, take to herself all the glory of having assured the peace of Europe by one stroke of the pen. " This explanation did not satisfy the Russian Court; which insisted that, although no adversary had been dis- tinctly named, the "common enemy" intended in the recent treaty of Russia with England was no other than Frederick II, with whom they had solemnly bound themselves not to negotiate without previous confidential communication with each other. Nor did Frederick II find it easier to explain his action in uniting with the enemy of Louis XV. The news that the Treaty of Westminster had been signed without con- sultation with France, and in the face of all denials that negotiations were taking place, produced in France an explo- sion of indignation. The treaty was interpreted by Freder- ick II as merely an agreement for the "neutralization of Germany," rendered necessary by the danger to which Prussia was exposed from Austria and Russia, in case of a French invasion of Hanover; and Frederick II even reproached the French ministry with a course of conduct "which obliged the allies of France to think of their own security." EUROPEAN ^ND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 521 Innocent as the Anglo-Prussian alliance might seem Chap, vi when considered merely as a declaration of neutrality, its '*-°- evident effect was to identify, to a certam degree, the in- ^^^^"^^^^ terests of England and Prussia on the one hand, and those of Austria, Russia, and France on the other. Considered from The confer- the point of view of royal susceptibilities, Maria Theresa, «■"=<'« a*!* the Czarina Elizabeth, and Louis XV, for the first time, seemed to have a common grievance. Each had lost con- fidence in a former ally, and these two former allies were still engaged in secret negotiations with each other. During the Anglo-Prussian approaches, in spite of Fred- erick II's assurance of their non-existence, Stahremberg had neglected no opportimity to ridicule the pretensions of loyalty with which the King of Prussia was endeavoring to solace the anxiety of Louis XV. In August, 1755, at the very beginning of the rapproche- ment between George II and Frederick II, Kaunitz, who appears to have been well informed, had instructed Stah- remberg to request Louis XV to appoint some confidential person to receive a commimication from Austria designed to open an important negotiation. Already sure of the favor of Madame de Pompadour, Stahremberg had encountered no difficulty in obtaining a favorable reply.^ At her suggestion the Abbe de Bernis, afterward Cardinal, had been named by the King to enter into secret negotiations with Vienna.^ ' The story that Madame de Pompadour had been won by a flatter- ing letter from the Empress, in which she was addressed as "Ma chhre amine," though repeated by respectable historians, is apparently a table. De Broglie risks the statement, "C'est une pure invention de FrM^ric." Hisioire et diplomatie, p. 66. ' Bernis was by no means the mere courtier which his enemies have represented him to be. He was an excellent scholar and a man of intel- lectual resources, although his admission to the French Academy at the age of twenty-nine is said to have been due to the favor of Madame de Pompadour rather than to his literary merits. When he besought a benefice from Fleury, the Cardinal refused him, saying, "You have noth- ing to hope for while I live." To which he coolly rephed: "Well, Mon- seigneur, I shall wait!" From 1751 to 1755 he was ambassador at Venice. 522 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI On September 1, 1755, the first interview between Stah- ^•^- remberg and Bernis had taken place at La Babiole, a little country-house of Madame de Pompadour near Meudon, not far from Paris, in the presence of the hostess, all others being excluded. Here, at first in silence, and not without astonishment, Bernis and Madame de Pompadour had listened, with care- fully guarded expressions, to Stahremberg's instructions from Kaunitz.' The proposal on the part of Austria was of rather a start- ling nature. It was nothing less than a project for a secret league between Austria, Saxony, and other German states to attack Prussia with two hundred thousand men and reduce the Prussian possessions to the limits of the Elec- torate of Brandenburg before the Thirty Years' War. The price offered for the neutrality of France was the establish- ment of the son-in-law of Louis XV, Don Philip, in the Netherlands, in exchange for the duchies of Parma, Pia- cenza, and Guastalla, which were to be returned to Austria, and the support of the Empress in securing the succession to the crown of Poland for the Prince de Conti. Silesia and the County of Glatz were to be recovered for Austria. The proposal was treated very adroitly by Bernis.'' For the insinuations against the loyalty of Frederick II proof was demanded, but no engagement was made. The negotiations were, however, continued. The satisfaction of Louis XV wixh regard to the proposed concessions in the Netherlands was evident, yet it was not imtil the news of the Anglo-Prussian treaty of January 16, 1756, was received at Paris that any decided change had occurred in the atti- tude of France. From that moment Bernis entirely altered his tone. Believing that the Anglo-Prussian treaty con- tained secret articles of the greatest consequence, "since without a great interest Frederick II would not risk losing the alliance with France," it appeared to him. ' See Arneth, Oeschichte Maria Theresias, IV, p. 390. ' For the details, see Waddington, as before, pp. 296, 311; also Mas- son, Mimoires el letires du Cardinal de Bernis, I. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 523 as it did to Louis XV, that the situation was entirely Chap, vi altered. a. d. The indisposition of Frederick II to renew the treaty with ^^^^'^^^^ France about to expire, the possibility that Austria, if re- pulsed, might unite with England in attacking France from the Netherlands, and the necessity in that case of facing two wars instead of one combined to give the ap- proaches of Austria a new significance. Although Bemis was thus substantially won over to The Treaty the views of Austria, so far as the neutrality of France was °^ ^"^^^^^^ concerned, indecision still marked the attitude of the French ministry of foreign affairs. It required all the in- fluence of Madame de Pompadour, joined to the personal inclination of the King, over whose decision she presided, to tilt the balance to the Austrian side. In the end, the really decisive argument was the fear that Austria, in case the neu- trality of France could not be procured, would resume ne- gotiations with England,— which the reported arrival of an important instruction to the English ambassador, Keith, at Vienna tended to strengthen; — and that thus, through the defection of Prussia, France would be isolated, and a new combination might be formed against her in which English influence would prevail. In the course of the negotiations something more than mere neutrality had been demanded of France. It had now become a question of mutual defence and guarantee by France and Austria of their European possessions. The aim of Kaunitz, not at first clearly apprehended at Paris, was to draw Louis XV into the coming conflict with Prussia. In a note of April 19, 1756, Stahremberg stated that, in default of the signature of the proposed treaties of de- fence and guarantee by France, "the Empress, equally exposed on the side of Prussia and the Court of London, whose measures she had refused to adopt, would for her security be obliged to renew her treaties with her ancient allies." This was, in fact, in the nature of an ultimatum, and it produced the desired effect. On May 1, 1756, two conventions were signed: one of neutrality on the part of A. D. 1731-1756 524 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI Austria regarding the war in America, and on the part of France in relation to the Netherlands; the other a mutual guarantee for the protection of their possessions in Europe, for which each promised, in case of need, a force of twenty- four thousand men, or an equivalent in subsidies.' The atramed By the treaties of Westminster and Versailles England A^riTa^d ^^^ become the ally of Prussia, and France of Austria. England This transformation has been justly described as being for Europe "the most profound, and by its consequences the most grave, of the diplomatic revolutions of the eighteenth century"; and yet, so far, these new engagements were sup- posed to mean nothing more than the neutralization of Prussia and Austria in the conflict between France and England. It did not require a long time, however, to make it evident that, if Austria and Prussia should become involved in war, all Europe would almost inevitably be drawn into the conflict. As the Treaty of Westminster had caused deep indig- nation in France, so the Treaty of Versailles produced great irritation in England. In order to restrain French action against Hanover, George II had hoped to confront France with a league composed of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The Treaty of Versailles dispelled this illusion. On May 13 Keith in a private audience politely informed Maria Theresa that the new treaty would be considered in England as a rupture of past relations, and implored her so to modify it as to prevent that disaster. In reply Her Majesty assured him that, if this result followed, it would not be owing to any fault of hers, since it was the Court of London which had abandoned the old system by entering into close relations with the King of Prussia; the news of which, she affirmed, had fallen upon her "like a paralytic stroke." ' For the conventions, together forming the so-called "Treaty of Versailles," but in reality signed at the country-house of RouiU6 at Jouy-en-Josas, see Wenck, III, pp. 139, 140. There were also five secret articles, having relation chiefly to the other powers, intended to strengthen the defensive aUiance. See De Garden, Histoire gSnerale des IraiUs de paix, IV, p. 19; and Koch, II, p. 11. EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 525 The old alliance, she declared, in spite of her fidelity to Chap, vi it, she now considered dead, as she had been obliged to look ^- ^■ for her security elsewhere. She could not comprehend how ^'^^^'^^^^ England was surprised to see her make engagements with France, when she was only following the example of England in uniting with Prussia. In vain Keith, appealing to the Empress on the ground of his deference for her noble qualities, attempted to im- press her with the danger of rejecting the friendship of George II, who had supported her father in his extremity, and who had displayed his devotion to her in her hour of danger when she came to the throne. In a last effort to storm the citadel of her feehngs, he declared his inabiUty to believe that the Empress and Archduchess of Austria would "humiliate herself to the point of throwing herself into the arms of France." "Not into the arms, but to the side of France," she replied with vivacity; pointing out that she had but two real enemies, the King of Prussia and the Sultan of Turkey, and that, since England had aban- doned her and left her in isolation, she had sought new friends for the protection of her hereditary possessions. With the good understanding she had with the Czarina Elizabeth, "the world would see that the two empresses were in a condition to defend themselves, and would not have to be afraid of their enemies, however powerful the latter might be." While the former friendship between Austria and England The relations was thus gradually lapsing into hostility, a similar revul- "[^^ maritime sion of feeling was developing among the maritime powers. Since the Treaty of Utrecht England and the United Prov- inces had been substantially united in their foreign policy, for English influence had been predominant; but the moment had arrived to test the meaning of the treaty of February 6, 1716, which pledged the services of six thousand men upon England's requisition. The English ships had al- ready arrived at Helvoetsluys to embark the troops, and the Provincial States had under consideration the question of delivering them, when the news of the Treaty of Versailles 526 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 The attitude of Russia toward England reached Holland. As soon as it became known that the majority of the States had arrived at the conclusion that the ■ casus foederis did not call for the aid demanded, the English government attempted to intimidate the Republic by seizing Dutch merchant vessels, under the pretext that they were carrying contraband of war. Resenting this form of per- suasion, although exposed to the hostilities of both France and England, the States General decided, without prejudice to their treaty obhgations, to maintain a strict neutrality. Louis XV formally recognized this decision, but George II refused to do so; and the neutrality of the RepubUc re- vealed a divergence of interests that practically ended the long period of harmony between the two maritime powers. Emboldened by the example of Holland, Denmark and Sweden, on July 12, 1756, united in the formation of a mari- time imion, and armed a squadron for the protection of their commerce against the attempt of England to cut off all trade with France by sea.^ It was the beginning of a long contest for freedom on the ocean against the arbitrary laws of war which Great Britain, in her struggle for trade and colonies, attempted to impose upon her commercial rivals.^ The Treaty of Westminster, in which George II had prom- ised to defend Frederick II from foreign invasion, had created both embarrassment and indignation at St. Petersburg. How was this last engagement of England to be reconciled with the Anglo-Russian treaty of September 30, 1755, which, after long consideration, the Czarina had ratified only two days before under strong pressure on the part of England? The Czarina saw plainly that she had been juggled with by her English ally, who had promised her heavy subsidies for thirty-five thousand troops to be used in Germany, and had afterward promised Frederick II to protect him from foreign invasion! Against whom, then, were these troops ' For the Maritime Union of Stockholm, see Wenck, III, p. 148. ' After the decision of the United Provinces to remain neutral, Eng- land declared all Dutch ships bound for French ports liable to capture as prizes of war. ETJKOPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 527 to be used? Was not Frederick II the "common enemy" Chap, vi referred to in the treaty? a.d. With fine ingenuity, wishing still to retain a nominal ^^^^^^^I^ friendship with England, Elizabeth proposed, "in order to leave no room for later interpretation and to prevent all misunderstanding," to add to the treaty of September, 1755, a secret clause to the effect that her engagement bound her to act "only in case the King of Prussia should attack the possessions of His Majesty the King of Great Britaua, or those of his allies. " This qualification completely annulled the treaty as it was understood and intended by George II, and rendered nugatory, so far as Russia was concerned, the entire nego- tiation; for, since Frederick II was bound to protect Hanover from invasion, the contingency of his attacking it was prac- tically excluded from calculation. The British ambassador. Sir Hanbury Williams, after months of labor to secure the treaty, was stupefied by the result, and refused at first even to receive the explanatory clause. Compelled either to receive it or to admit that all his efforts had been in vain, he forwarded the document to London, with the comment that it would at least oblige Frederick II to keep his promise regarding Hanover, since if he did not Russia was ready to attack him with a greater army than the treaty called for; but Holderness declined to accept the Russian interpretation, and demanded that the original agreement be adhered to, by which Russia was to aid England against any adversary, whoever he might be. In. boasting that "the two empresses were able to defend The relations themselves," Maria Theresa had not made a miscalcula- °/ ^"'"''^ ='°'^ ' Austna tion, and the whole drift of events was bringing them closer together. Both had long been hostile to Frederick II and had entertained designs upon his territories. Now both were in strained relations with George II and felt that they had suffered from his infidelity. In these circumstances it was not difficult for the Austrian ambassador. Count Esterhazy, to widen the breach that had already opened between the Russian and the English courts. 528 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 The second misaion of Douglas to St. Petersburg For this purpose he possessed a powerful ally in Woron- zoff, whose personal ambition had set him at variance with - the protagonist of the British alliance, Bestusheff, who as chancellor had long sustained and promoted EngUsh in- fluence at St. Petersburg. On April 10 the secret negotiations had proceeded so far that the draft of a new treaty between Russia and Austria had been prepared, in which it was provided that each signa- tory should furnish an army of eighty thousand men for a simultaneous attack upon Prussia, to be continued until Austria had recovered Silesia and Glatz, and Russia had acquired the former Polish province of Prussia, to be re- joined to Poland in exchange for Courland and Samogitia, which were to pass to Russia. Sweden and Saxony were to be invited to join the league, the former with the promise of Prussian Pomerania, the latter with that of the city and district of Magdeburg. But the zeal of Esterhazy and the haste of Russia were not in harmony with the policy of Kaunitz, who did not wish to precipitate an attack upon Prussia before the Austro-French aUiance had been com- pletely consolidated and rendered effective for united action. The new relations between France and Austria introduced a new element into the diplomacy of Louis XV. Since Austria and Russia were now united in their aims, the attack upon Russia by the Turks, which Vergennes had been sent to Constantinople to incite, had become of doubt- ful expediency, and a rapprochement between France and Russia became a matter of serious interest. Accordingly, in the spring of 1756, Douglas was sent on a second mission to St. Petersburg, and this time the Che- valier d'Eon was designated as his secretary.' As the mission was not yet strictly official, and the manner of their reception could not be foreseen, the pair appear to have travelled separately. Upon their arrival Douglas is said to have taken his lodg- ings in the house of the French merchant, Michel, — al- ' At the same time a Russian secret agent was sent to France. See Waliszewski, La demihre des Romanov, p. 416. A. D. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 529 ready referred to, — in the guise of a clerk of that obliging Chap, vi trader, while Eon was domiciled with Woronzoff, ostensibly to look after his private Hbrary, — which consisted of a single shelf full of books, — until the vice-chancellor could arrange for the official recognition and establishment of the mission. 1 Through the haze of this rather grotesque situation two clear purposes on the part of France stand out: (1) to com- plete the alienation of Russia and England, and (2) to pro- mote Louis XVs secret plan for the advancement of the Prince de Conti. For the first object Douglas, with the aid of Woronzoff; and the Austrian ambassador, Count Ester- hazy, were to labor with the Russian Council, while Eon was to secure the interest of the Czarina either in the candidacy of the Prince de Conti for the crown of Poland or the still more ambitious project of obtaining for the Prince Her Majesty's hand in marriage.^ For this purpose Eon is said to have borne a personal letter from Louis XV to the Czarina, carefully concealed m the binding of a handsome copy of Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois," together with secret codes for use in correspondence with himself or the Prince de Conti, should the "Empress" be disposed to communicate directly with them.^ Elizabeth accepted the letter from the King of France, but declined to receive the secret code. It is reported, however, that she consented so far to amuse herself with the secret diplomacy as to receive Eon in private audiences, in order to discuss with him the desires of the King of France; and it is not impossible that, in order to render these visits less open to observation, the Chevaher was permitted to enter her palace in the feminine disguise to which he was peculiarly adapted and sometimes assimied.* ' See Homberg and Jousselin, Le Chevalier d'Eon, the latest work on the subject, which gives the authorities for the statements in the text. ' Homberg and Jousselin, as before, p. 23. ' WaUszewski, La dernihre des Romanov, p. 433, wholly ehminates Eon in this connection and makes Douglas the bearer of the letter and cipher. * See Homberg and JousseUn, as before, p. 24, note. VOL. III. — 34 530 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI A. D. 1731-1756 The change in Louis XV'a secret diplomacy It soon became evident that an alliance with Russia would impose upon France no inconsiderable sacrifices; for, while - the Czarina would enter into no compact that would involve her in the quarrel between France and England, she insisted upon a treaty in which the casus foederis would include the obligation of Louis XV to aid her against all her enemies. Thus France, whose chief interest in Europe was peace, could procure an alliance with Russia only at the price of a possible war in which the French nation had no direct interest. Not only must the future of Poland be left in abeyance, but the negotiations of Vergennes at Constanti- nople must be abandoned and even reversed. In short, the whole aim of Louis XV's secret diplomacy must be modified. So far as the Prince de Conti was concerned, a change was rendered necessary by another cause. The nomination of Broglie as Louis XV's ambassador to Poland, in 1752, had surprised and mystified the French Court. Madame de Pompadour had not rested until she had found the explana- tion in the King's purpose to advance the interest of the Prince de Conti. This personage, who had attempted to counteract her influence with the King, was the object of her particular hatred, and Louis XV was soon induced to abandon all thought of the candidature of the Priace, and soon afterward transferred the direction of his secret diplomacy to the Count de Broglie. The King's secret purpose now became "an indissoluble alliance with Austria, and entire liberty for the Poles in the choice of their King. " With the new interest of France in the policy of Austria new sympathies had been created. "Madame de Pompadour," wrote Stahremberg after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, "is enchanted with the conclusion of that which she regards as her work, and has assured me that she will do her best in order that we may not halt upon a road so beautiful." To facihtate progress along this seductive path, she promised that whenever he wished personally to converse with the King upon any subject she would prepare the way by procuring for him EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 531 a private audience. The King had been completely drawn Chap, vi into the Austrian net; and, while Europe was filled with ^•"- "stupefaction," and even "consternation," at the reversal of French pohcy, Louis XV had never seemed more happy than he appeared after the treaty with Austria was signed.' Bernis, who was proud of his success and wished to go on with his work, was even more enthusiastic. As the tide in favor of Austria rose at court, even the ministers who had demurred gave their adhesion to the fait accompli. Would Louis XV, who had so completely changed his The status of policy with respect to Austria, make the great sacrifices ^us^ln^n"". demanded of him in order to obtain an alliance with Russia? gotiationa There was no national interest at stake that made it necessary for him to do so. Russia could offer him no aid in his con- flict with England. To obtain even a defensive treaty with Russia applying only to Europe he must undo all that he had accomplished by his secret and official diplomacy combined. Not only this, but he must engage to defend the Czarina, as well as the Empress, against any power that might attack them. And what service would he have from them in return? Simply their promise to protect France in Europe at a moment when it was practically safe from serious attack on the continent. It was, therefore, extremely doubtful in the early part of 1756 if France and Russia would reach an understanding. There was but one influence that could accompHsh that result, the effort of Austria. Stahremberg at Versailles and Esterhazy at St. Petersburg labored steadily to unite the two allies of Austria in a triple alliance, but without success. Broglie, who had made progress with his work in Poland, hated Austria, and was intensely displeased with the new order of things; and before the end of the year the Kmg found it necessary to write to him: "I have seen by all your letters. Count de Broglie, that you have trouble in accepting the new system which I have adopted; you are not the only one, but such is my will, it is necessary that ' See Bemis, Mhnoires, I, p. 272. 1731-1756 532 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI you concur." And later, in words that must have tried his representative's faith in his master's memory, the King wrote: "Having always had in view the intimate union with Vienna, it is my work; I believe it good, and I wish to maintain it. "^ And yet, although Louis XV was wholly committed to the defensive alliance with Austria, in June, 1756, no prog- ress had been made toward an alliance with Russia, — not to speak of an aggressive compact; — audit required many months of subsequent negotiation and a new European situation before even an entente was reached. The begiiming In the meantime England had placed Hanover under the Ye*are'w"r° protcction of Frederick II, and was, therefore, without fear of loss upon the continent. But neither France nor Eng- land possessed an ally capable of vitally affecting the struggle already engaged in the colonies and upon the ocean. So far as the colonial war was concerned, Europe appeared to have been practically neutralized. For more than a year the battle for colonial supremacy had been waged spasmodically without a declaration of war on either side. In India the situation had been somewhat more under control than in America. In 1753 it had been agreed that the two governors, Dupleix and Saunders, should be re- called, and that two commissioners should be appointed to compel the trading companies to Hve in peace "so long as the two governments are in that relation. " In 1754 Dupleix had been obliged to renounce his splendid dream of empire. It was the end of French predominance in India, a calamity which the French historians have never ceased to lament.^ It was also the beginning of English ascendency. In America the conflict had long since become irrepressible. The permanent possession of a vast continent was at stake, — a white man 's continent as yet in great part unpop- ulated, except by a few tribes of savages, and whose im- ^ See Boutaric, Correspondance secrhte, I, pp. 214 and 216. ' See the touching description of Dupleix's disgrace in Hamont, Dupleix, pp. 208, 278. 1731-1756 EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 533 mense natural resources were of more value, as they were Chap, vi also of greater extent, than those of the whole of Europe. Military operations in the colonial conflict had already been considerable, both on land and sea, and the English government had fully made up its mind regarding the course to be pursued. Its responsible head, the Duke of Newcastle, had some time before exclaimed: "All North America will be lost, if we tolerate such proceedings; no war could be worse for our coimtry than to endure such conduct. The truth is, the French claim possession of the whole of North America, except the shore-line, within which they would compress our colonies; but we cannot and will not suffer it." On May 18, 1756, England formally declared war upon France, and on June 9 the challenge was accepted. But on August 29 Europe was startled by a far more exciting announcement. Frederick II had become con- vinced of the existence of a conspiracy for his overthrow and the dismemberment of the Prussian monarchy. Be- lieving that the impending peril was inevitable, but that the moment for his enemies to strike had not yet arrived, he had resolved to invade Saxony, and the Seven Years' War had begun. AUTHORITIES In addition to the collections of treaties already cited, Wenck, Codex Dooumenta juris gentium recentissimi (1735-1772), Leipzig, 1781-1795, and Koch, Reaieil de traites et d'acles diplomatiques qui n'ont pas encore vu le jour, Basel, 1802, become important. Lowe, Preussens Staatvertrage av^ der Begierungszeit Konig Friedrich Wilhelms I, Leipzig, 1913, gives impor- tant additions. Much important correspondence of the time is found in Ameth, Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs vher Deutschland und Osterreich im ISten Jahrhundert, Vienna, 1863; Boutaric, Correspondance secrkte inedite de Louis XV sur la politique etrangere, Paris, 1866; Correspon- dance de Louis XV et du marechal de Noailles, Paris, 1865; Schlitter, Cor- resyondance entre le comte A. W. Kaunitz-Rietberg . . . et le baron Ignaz de Koch (1750-1752), Paris, 1899; Lippert, Kaiserin Maria Theresia und Kurfiirstin Maria Antonia von Sachsen, Leipzig, 1912; Van Hoey, Lettres et negociations, London, 1746, by the Dutch ambassa- dor to France; La Rochefoucauld, Correspondance (1744-1748), Nantes, 534 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI 1871, by the French ambassador at Rome; Raumer, Konig Friedrich A. D. II und seine Zeit (1740-1769), nach den gesandtschaftlichen Berichten 1731-1756 i^ Britischen Museum und ReichsarcMv, Leipzig, 1836; Koser, Brief- wechsel Friedrich des Grossen mit Grumbkow und Maupertuis (1731-1759) Leipzig, 1898; Frederick the Great, Politische Korrespondenz, a monu- mental work in thirty odd volumes, including the (Euvres, in which ia found also the Histoire de mon temps, Berlin, 1879 et seq.; Bussemaker, Archives ou correspondance inMite de la maison d' Orange-Nassau (1747- 1755), Leyden, 1908 et seq.; Heigel, Das Tagehuch Kaiser VII etc., Munich, 1883. Important memoirs of the time are Argenson, Journal et mimoires, Paris, 1861-1868; Villeneuve, Histoire des negotiations de la paix de Belgrade de 1739, Paris, 1768; Valori, Memoires et negociations d la cour de Fridiric-le-Grand, Paris, 1820; Montgon, Memoires, Lausanne, 1756; Spon, Memoires (1740-1748), Amsterdam, 1749; Masson, Me- moires et letires du cardinal Bernis, Paris, 1878. The unpubhshed M^ moires of Chavigny may be found in the Archives des Affaires fitran- g&res at Paris, Mem. et Docs., France, tome 457. Literature A work of importance on the status of the powers at this time, re- garded from the point of view of their treaty relations, is Mably, Le droit public de V Europe, fonde sur les traitis, Geneva, 1748, and in subse- quent editions. Very interesting general views of this period are presented by Praet, Essais sur I'histoire politique des derniers sihcles, Brussels, 1884; and Broglie, Histoire et diplomatic, Paris, 1889; and Filon, De la diplomatie frangaise sous Louis XV, Paris, 1853. For the War of the Pohsh Succession, see Boy6, Stanislas LeszczynsU et le 3' traiti de Vienne, Paris, 1898; Deybeck, Die Politik Bayems in der Zeit des polnischen Erbfolgekrieges (1733-1735), Munich, 1887; Soulange-Bodin, La diplomatie de Louis XV et la pacte defamille, Paris, 1894; Broglie, Le cardinal de Fleury et la Sanction Pragmatique, in Revue Historique, XX (1882); Brunner, Zur Geschichte der europaischen Politik im Jahre 1736, in Historische Monatsschrift, I (1900). On the diplomacy of France in the Orient, Vandal, Vne ambassade frangaise en Orient sov^ Louis XV: la mission du marquis de Villeneuve (1728-1740), Paris, 1887; Wahszewski, Les relations diplomatiques entre la Pologne et la France au 17'^ sihde, Paris, 1889; and L' Evolution de la politique en Orient (1734-1771), in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIX (1906). On the War of the Austrian Succession, see Heigel, Der Osierreich- ische Erbfolgestreit und die Kaiserwahl Karls VII, NordUngen, 1877; Koser, Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen, Stuttgart and Berhn, 1912 et seq.; Klopp, Der Konig Friedrich II von Preussen und seine Politik, Schaffhausen, 1867; Bourdeau, Le grand Fr6d6ric, Paris, 1902; Du- bois, Fridiric le Grand, d'aprhs sa correspondance politique, Paris, 1910; Carlyle, History of Frederick II of Prussia, London, 1858 et seq.; Ar- EUEOPBAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY 535 neth, GeschicMe Maria Theresias, Vienna, 1863-1879; Bright, Maria Chap VI Theresa, London, 1897; Wolf and Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst, Osterreich a.d. unter Maria Theresia, Joseph II, und Leopold II, BerUn, 1884; Heigel, 1731-1756 Zur Geschichte des sag. Nymphenburger Traklats vom 2Z Mai 17 Al Munich, 1684. On the relation of England to the Succession, see Wiese, Die englische parlamentarische Opposition und ihre Slellung zur auswartigen Politik des hritanischen Cabinets (1740-1744), Waldenburg, 1883; and Borow- sky. Die englische Friedensvermilllung in Jahre 1745, BerUn, 1884, con- taining the secret diplomacy of George II, founded on the archives of Hanover. On the Peace of Fussen, Preuss, Der Friede von Fusscn, 17 4S, Munich, 1894; and Seelander, Graf Seckendorff und die Publizistik zum Frieden von 1745, Gotha, 1883. On the system of the Marquis d'Argenson, see Zevort, Le marquis d'Argenson et son ministere des affaires etranghres (1744-1747), Paris, 1880. On the Russo-Austrian aUiance, see Karge, Die russisch-osterreichische Allianz von 1746 und ihre Vorgeschichte, Gottingen, 1887. On the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748, see Beer, Zur Geschichte des Friedens von Aachen im Jahre 1748, Vienna, 1871; and De Cisternes, Le due de Richelieu, son action aux conferences d' Aix-la-Chapelle, Paris, 1898. On the struggle for colonial supremacy between England, Spain, and France, see Supan, Die territoriale Entwickelung der europdischen Kolonien, Gotha, 1906; Edgerton, The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies, introduction to Lucas, Historical Geography of the British Colonies, Oxford, 1903; Cultru, Dupleix, ses plans politiques, sa disgrdce, Paris, 1901; Nazelle, Dupleix et la defense de Pondich&ry, Paris, 1908; Hamont, Dupleix: la fin d'un empire frangais aux Indes sous Louis XV, Paris, 1887; Wilson, Clive, London, 1911; the works of Parkman; and Waddington, Louis XV et le renversement des alliances, Paris, 1896. For the reversal of the aUiances, see, in addition to Waddington, Broglie, V alliance autrichienne, Paris, 1895 ; Boutry, L' alliance autrichi- enne et la diplomatic secrkte, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XXI (1905); and Striedler, Kriiische Forschungen zur osterreichischen Poli- tik (1748-1756), Leipzig, 1911. On the relations of France, Austria, and Russia, and the secret diplomacy of Louis, besides Boutaric, already cited, see Broghe, Le secret du roi (1752-1774), Paris, 1879; Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Paris, 1882; Wahszewski, La dernihe des Romanov, Paris, 1902; Bain, The Daughter of Peter the Great: a History of Russian Diplomacy, etc. (1741-1762), London, 1899; Larivifere, La France et la Russie au 18^' sihde, Paris, 1909; Homberg and Jousselin, Le chevalier d'Eon, Paris, 1904; Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade d, Constantinople, Paris, 1894. 536 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VI The relations of France with the North and with Holland are dis- A. D. cuased in BarthSlemy, Histoire des relations de la France et du Danemark 1731-1756 sous le ministbre du comte de Bernstorff (1751-1770), Copenhagen, 1882; CoqueUe, V alliance Franco-Hollandaise conire I'Angleterre, Paris, 1902; and L'abbe Delaville, ministre de France d la Haye (1743-1745) in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIII (1899). For Pitt, see Harrison, Chatham, London, 1905; RuviUe, WiUiam Pitt, Graf von Chatham, Stuttgart, 1905; and Williams, The Life of William Pitt, London, 1913. CHAPTER VII THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR ON August 28, 1756, Frederick II, in the presence of the The aggressiona English ambassador at Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, °' ^'^''erick ii had mounted his horse at the head of his army before the castle at Potsdam, and set out for the invasion of Saxony. On the twenty-ninth he had crossed the Saxon frontier with a previously prepared declaration, written with his own hand, m which it was stated that, "in the inevitable war with Aus- tria," he possessed proofs of the complicity of Saxony in a conspiracy against Prussia; but this manifesto was not pub- lished, and another declaration of a more colorless nature was given out. From a purely military point of view his action may have been a stroke of genius; but conceived and executed, as it was, in a state of mental exaltation produced by the tension of an anxious situation, it placed him in an unenviable light in the eyes of his contemporaries. He had coimted first of all upon proving by the 'capture of the Saxon archives at , Dresden that a coalition had been formed against Prussia in which Saxony was a guilty partner, and then upon dissolving the hostile league by the force and rapidity of his military ' action. In both respects he was doomed to disappointment. On September 9 the Prussian troops entered Dresden, and against the almost bodily resistance of Maria Josepha, the wife of the Elector-King, the door of the ministerial chancellery was broken open, and three sacksful of suspected diplomatic despatches were sent to Berlin for examination. Unfortu- nately for Frederick II, the captured documents did not justify his action. The policy of Saxony had, in fact, been peaceful and conservative, aiming to secure the safety of 538 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII the electorate by a defensive alliance with England on the ,»J^^L.„„ one hand and Austria on the other, but without the subser- viency to the latter which the King had supposed he would be able to prove. ^ As the event showed, it was not the hos- tility but the neutrality of Saxony which Frederick II had wished to forestall by incorporating the entire Saxon army, against its will, in his own aggressive force; thus permitting his unobstructed advance into Bohemia without leaving a * possible enemy in his rear. Frederick II was equally disappointed in his second expec- tation. He had hoped by his cowp de main to become at once master of the military situation, as he had in his attack upon Silesia; but he soon found himself confronted with an opposition so powerful as to imperil the existence of his kingdom. Relying upon the ability of England to restrain Russia, he had believed that France would remain practically neu- tral, thus leaving Austria isolated and unprepared for his attack. "Are you sure of the Russians?" he had asked Sir Andrew Mitchell on May 12. "The King, my master, thinks so," the British ambassador had replied.^ That was the critical moment in the development of Frederick II's poHcy. On July 26 the Prussian minister at Vienna, Klinggraffen, by command of Frederick II, demanded of the Empress in private audience an explanation of the movements of the Austrian troops. The reply was, that, in the existing cir- cumstances, she was obliged to consider her own security and that of her allies; but that no injury to any one was intended. Frederick II did not believe this. Pointing to a picture of the Empress which adorned his apartment, he had said to 1 That Count Brtihl, the Saxon prime miniater, hated Frederick 11, and that the Saxon government distrusted the designs of Prussia, the captured documents clearly proved; but not the hostile engagements of Saxony. 2 Frederick had steadily maintained that, so long as he was in accord with England, he had nothing to fear from the Russians. See Politische Korrespondenz, VI, p. 27. DIPLOMACY OP THE SEVEN TEAKS' WAR 539 Sir Andrew Mitchell, "This lady wishes war; she shall soon Chap, vil have it." a. d. The King of Prussia had then insisted upon a more de- "^^"^^ cisive statement. "Peace or war," he wrote to his minister at Vienna; " the Empress must decide." Impatiently he had awaited the answer, every day becoming more irascible in his feelings toward his minister and the Empress on account of the delay. On August 25 the answer had come; but Maria Theresa, while giving positive assurance that no offensive alliance against Prussia then existed, had declined to promise ' that she would never in the future make war upon Frederick II. Within three days he had led his army into Saxony. "Was his secret purpose one of defence or one of conquest? Historians of high authority have given different answers, and it is difficult to decide between their arguments; for in- tentions, even when openly avowed, are often difficult to verify. That Frederick II desired ultimately to round out and connect his possessions by new conquests, does not appear doubtful; but his immediate purpose in the sudden invasion of Saxony remains a subject of debate.' I. The Coalition against Prussia At the moment when Frederick II crossed the Saxon fron- The coaution tier the coalition against him had not been completed. He r'^'"^^'^'^ inevitable had long been aware of the Austro-Russian secret articles of 1746; but they were signed before the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle, and years had passed without aggressive action. Still, Frederick II was not in error regarding the unfriendly attitude of Austria and Russia. Maria Theresa had never ' Klopp, Der Konig Friedrich II von Preussen, 1867, maintained that Frederick's design was to make new conquests; but Arneth, Beer, and Ranke, in the light of further investigation, rejected this conclusion. Later, Max Lehmann, Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprung des sie- benjahrigen Krieges, 1894, revived the contention that Frederick II's motive was aggressive rather than defensive; and many other modern German historians have favored this view. Naud6, Beitrdge zur Ent- stehungsgeschichte des siebenjdhrigen Krieges, 1896, on the other hand rejects it. Chap. VII A. D. 1756- -1763 540 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY forgiven him for robbing her of Silesia; and Kaunitz was planning, with the aid of Russia, the recovery of the lost province. Bestusheff had been charged by the Czarina with the examination of a secret plan of action against Prus- sia communicated by Esterhazy in behalf of the Empress. In his report the Chancellor had called attention to the fact that Frederick II had increased his army from eighty thou- sand to two hundred thousand men, and filled his war-chest "with the revenues of Silesia and the millions levied upon Saxony." 1 The King of Prussia, he had declared, "coveted Hanover on the one side and Courland on the other, and had become the most dangerous of neighbors." Austria, however, wished no action until the negotiations with France could be made more definite, and no entente between France and Russia had yet been concluded. The statement of Maria Theresa was, therefore, strictly truth- ful; and there was, perhaps, an opportunity for Frederick II to counteract the hostile intentions of his neighbors. His aggression upon Saxony wholly changed the situation. Before that act France entertained no intention of joining in an attack upon Prussia; and it is hardly credible that Louis XV without new reasons would have been so imprudent as to plunge his kingdom into a European war, in which France had little or nothing to gain, at a moment when peace in Europe was so important to him in his conflict with England. But when a Prussian army had taken possession of Saxony, with whose court the Bourbon dynasty was connected by the marriage of the Dauphin with Maria Josepha, daughter of the Elector and King of Poland, the case was different. When, a few days later, Bohemia was invaded by two Prus- sian armies, one from Saxony and one from Silesia, the clauses of guarantee and defence in the Treaty of Versailles had sud- denly come into automatic operation, and France was under obligation to aid Austria in repelling the Prussian attack. Thus, the coalition which Austria had been endeavoring 1 The exact military strength of Prussia in 1756 is stated by Koser, Geschichle Friedrichs des Grossen, II, pp. 396, 399. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 541 to form against Prussia, but had not succeeded in complet- Chap, vil ing, was suddenly rendered inevitable. a. d. It was not merely the invasion of Saxony and Bohemia ^^^^~^^^^ without a casus belli that excited Europe and stimulated the formation of a general coalition against Prussia. The fur- The conduct ther disregard of the rights of sovereignty on the part of ?^ Frederick ii Frederick II made his conduct seem intolerable. "^ saxony The Saxon army had been concentrated in a fortified camp at Pirna. The ministers of Frederick Augustus II, the Elector-King, who had personally desired to withdraw his forces into Poland, advised that, if neutrality on the part of Saxony were refused, all further negotiation should be abandoned, and the country defended to the last man; but his generals, in view of their wide separation from the help of Austria, changed his mind. On September 12, therefore, Frederick Augustus II offered to deliver to Prussia Pirna, Wittenberg, and Torgau, with hostages, for the duration of the war, as security for the neu- traUty of the Saxon army. On September 13 Frederick II repUed to this offer, "Your fate must be made inseparable from mine"; and a messenger was sent to demand that the army and administration of Saxony be transferred to himself, to be used against Austria. On the next day he wrote to Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, "They will soon all be Prussians." The control of the Saxon army was not, however, so easy as Frederick II had supposed; for Frederick Augustus II was not willing to comply with his demand. When General von Amim came to his camp to expostulate, Frederick II said to him : " Saxony must share my lot and the same danger as my kingdom. If I am fortunate, the King of Poland will not only be indemnified, but I shall consider his interest as my own. ... I must have the troops, otherwise there is no security. I am playing a great game.^ . . . There is no other way, the army must march with me and take an oath of allegiance to me!" When Von Arnim objected that history furnished no pre- ' "Ich spiele ein grosses Spiel." 542 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The efforts of Frederick II to explain his position cedent for such procedure, Frederick II replied, "Yes, it does, but perhaps you do not know that I take some pride in being ■ original." Day after day the King of Prussia impatiently awaited the complete surrender of his brother elector and king to his demand. In the meantime plans for storming the camp at Pirna were formed and approved by Frederick II; but his generals were doubtful of their success. From the first Maria Theresa had regarded the invasion of Saxony as an attack upon Austria, and had not awaited the appearance of a Prussian army upon her own territories before setting her armies in motion. While Frederick II was impatiently waiting for hunger to do its work in the camp of Pirna, the Austrian approach forced his army to advance to meet it, and, instead of pursuing the siege of Pirna, to engage in the battle of Lobositz; in which, on October 1, nearly equal forces suffered nearly equal losses without any ad- vantage on the Prussian side. On October 15, however, Frederick II's generals succeeded in forcing the capitulation of the Saxon army; which, under Prussian officers, was then incorporated in that of Prussia. As a German historian has expressed it, "Their bodies were in his power, and their souls must deliver to him their oath of allegiance." The King's generals protested that the captives should not be forced into unwilling service, but he insisted that the army was in his possession, and it must obey his will.' When Frederick II realized the hostility he had awakened, he sought to make his apologies to Europe and to stay the storm of reprobation which his conduct had caused. The resentment in Poland was intense, and the Polish Reichstag at Grodno for a time menacing; but the anarchy of the Republic rendered it impossible for it to take any action. In France Frederick II vainly attempted to counteract the Austrian and Saxon influence by giving assurance that he intended no permanent tenure of Saxon soil, and called For details, see Koser, as before, pp. 409, 424. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' "WAR 543 attention to the fact that Louis XIV had treated Sardinia Chap. Vll much as he was treating Saxony. ^ ^•''• In the United Provinces a different course was followed. ^^^'^"^^^^ There Frederick II attempted to evoke the spectre of a CathoUc league, to be headed, it was said, by Austria and France, for the purpose of abolishing the Protestant faith; but the Dutch burghers were not much affected by the efforts of the disciple of Voltaire to pass himself off as the protagonist of the sanctity of religion. To the Dutch, who set so high a value upon their own rights as neutrals, the violation of Saxon neutrahty seemed the last enormity. What was to become of the smaller and weaker states, and eventually of Europe, if a strong mihtary power, carving out for itself an empire in the midst of civilized communities, could by sudden conquest appropriate whole nations bodily, take pos- session of their revenues by a word of command, and force foreign armies to participate in the process of further con- quest? If this theory were legalized by consent, what might in future become of the Dutch Republic? The terror and indignation which the violence of Frederick The plans of II had produced in Europe now greatly facilitated the forma- K"™;'*^. f" ^ - ^ ^ ^ o ./ completing tion of a coalition to restrain him. Russia was not only ready the coaution and willing to participate, but it had been necessary to re- strain her zeal. France, on the other hand, had only after long negotiation been induced to sign a defensive treaty with Austria; for Louis XV had wished to have peace on the continent during his struggle with Great Britain. The system of Kaunitz's diplomacy just before the inva- sion of Saxony had been to restrain Russia and stimulate France, to the end that the three monarchies might be united in a common assault upon Prussia when the favorable mo- ment should arrive. The aggression of Frederick II precipitated action both at Versailles and at St. Petersburg. Russia and France, it was decided, must be at once associated by the adhesion of the former to the Treaty of Versailles. This triple compact having been concluded, France must then be urged on to the ' See p. 203 of this volume. 544 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII 1756-1763 The embar- rassments in the negotia- tions between France and Russia utmost possible degree of active participation in the war with Prussia. It was, in fact, only through the mediation of Austria that the rapprochement between France and Russia was pos- sible. The aims of the two governments were widely differ- ent, but sufficiently compatible to permit Austria to influence both of them. The interest of France was to alienate Russia entirely from England; that of Russia to involve France in the war with Prussia. Kaunitz aimed to accomplish both these results by the union of the two powers in a common cause with Maria Theresa. It was, therefore, Esterhazy who played the grand r61e in the French negotiations at St. Petersburg, which his firmly established position enabled him to do; while Douglas, really under his protection rather than an independent nego- tiator, was forced to follow the Austrian lead. In order to conclude a treaty with Russia, it was necessary for France to sacrifice Poland. To this Louis XV had become reconciled, but the Russian basis for a treaty required the sacrifice of Turkey also. In June, 1756, the direction of Vergennes' diplomacy at Constantinople had, therefore, been suddenly changed, and he had been informed that it Was the intention of the King of France, "in order to deprive England of the aid which the Czarina could give," to form an alliance with Russia.^ In conformity with this new policy, Vergennes had with much address informed the Porte that, owing to the war in which France was involved with England, Louis XV had been constrained to change his system of alliances; but that this arrangement, occasioned by an imperative necessity, was only provisional, and that when the crisis was past France would return to her former policy. The effect had been that the Porte had ingeniously suggested that, since France had found it necessary to ally herself with a power more or less hostile to the Ottoman Empire, it might be expedient for the Porte also to make some new alliances, which had long been sought, and which ' See the instruction in Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes, I, p. 344. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 545 France had formerly commended; for example, with Prussia Chap, vii and Denmark! a.d. If the situation was embarrassing for Vergennes, it was ^'^^^^'^^^ rendered much more so for Douglas by the fact that the Czarina would listen to no project of a treaty with France in which the casus foederis did not include the contingency of a war between Russia and Turkey. At first this obstacle seemed to be insurmountable, and Douglas found himself m an impasse; for he did not dare to include Turkey openly in the casus foederis, and he could make no progress without this concession. Esterhazy, who would have been pleased to destroy permanently the friendly relations between France and Turkey, felt no scruples in urging acceptance of the Czarina's terms, but Douglas hesi- tated. While a despatch was on its way to St. Petersburg positively forbidding the inclusion of Turkey among the powers against which France was willing to pledge assist- ance to Russia in case of a war between them, Douglas was induced, under the pressure of Esterhazy's counsel, to sign a declaration secretissime by which France promised Russia, if war with Turkey should occur, to furnish aid to Russia in money, but not in troops! This compromising act, — which placed it in the power Louis xvs re- ef Russia to destroy in the future the friendly relations be- p"ciiation of tween France and Turkey, and which might, if suspected, concesaion even drive the Porte into alliance with Prussia and Den- mark, — was promptly repudiated at Versailles, and brought upon Douglas a violent denunciation for his imprudence. Rouille hastened to disavow the act at Constantinople also, as a step taken without the knowledge of the King or his ministers, and which had provoked their indignation.^ At St. Petersburg Louis XV came at once to the rescue with a personal letter to the Czarina, in which he besought her to annul the declaration; and, as an act of favor to the King, Ehzabeth complied with his request. The offensive ' Vergennes was instructed to explain to the Porte in case there was the least suspicion of the secret arrangement. As there was none, Ver- gennes remained silent. See Marsangy, as before, II, p. 12. VOL. III. — 35 546 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY the Coalition against Prussia Chap. VII document was torn up in the presence of Douglas, and thus j„^tl^-(., the only serious obstacle to obtaining the adherence of Russia to the Treaty of Versailles was removed. On December 31, 1756, by the adherence of Russia to Completion of the Austro-Freuch treaty of defensive alliance of the previous May, the policy of Kaunitz made a decided step in advance.' In February, 1757, after much wrangling over the amount of the subsidies to be paid to Russia by Austria, an agreement was reached by which each of the contractants was to place eighty thousand men in the field against the King of Prussia, and Russia was also to act with a fleet of from fifteen to twenty vessels of the line and at least forty galleys. On March 21, a treaty was signed at Stockholm by which Sweden joined the Coalition with Austria and France.^ On May 1, just a year after the first treaty of Versailles, a second treaty was signed, also at Versailles, between France and Austria. By this new convention France passed en- tirely into the hands of Austria, the signatories expressly pledging themselves "to reduce the power of the King of Prussia to such limits that it would no longer be possible for him in the future to trouble the public tranquillity." Besides the twenty-four thousand auxiliaries promised in the first treaty, France engaged to pay six thousand soldiers to be furnished by Wiirttemberg and four thousand to be furnished by Bavaria, to act in Germany with an army of one hundred and five thousand French and mercenary troops, to grant Maria Theresa an annual subsidy of twelve million florins, and to continue the war until she had recovered Silesia. In return, the Empress promised to Louis XV full sovereignty in a half dozen cities of the Austrian Netherlands, the remainder with Luxemburg to pass to Don Philip in exchange for Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, when these last were returned to Austria.' The triumph of the diplomacy of Kaunitz was thus ren- dered complete, and the influence of Bernis was at its height. ' See Martens, Recueil A, Supplement III, p. 33. ^ For the treaty, see Koch, II, p. 29. ' For the treaty, see Koch, II, p. 43. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 547 He had in reality, in close sympathy with Madame de Chap, vii Pompadour and with the full confidence of the King, for ^■°- more than a year controlled the foreign policy of France, in ^^^^"^^^^ which Rouille was a mere figurehead. In January, 1757, he had been named a minister without portfolio, and in June he became minister of foreign affairs in a government com- pletely dominated by the pro-Austrian party, with Belle-Isle, who had now become a fervent sympathizer with Austria, as minister of war. The invasion of Saxony had completely turned the tide in France and crowned with success the in- trigues of Stahremberg. At Versailles "la cause de la Dauphine" had become the ruling passion of the day, beside which the war with England over distant colonies seemed an adventure of secondary importance. It was fortunate for England that this diversion of the The discour- thought and energies of France had occurred, for up to this ^ ™™d °^ point the fortunes of war had been discouraging to the Eng- lish ministry. The defeat of Braddock on the Monongahela had been followed by the loss of Minorca, and the defence of England from threatened invasion had left Hanover ex- posed to attack. "All the independent powers," Newcastle wrote, "should be alarmejd by that alliance against nature, above all the Protestant courts, since it is against them that it is directly and almost openly made." "We have hardly a vessel to add to our fleets or a battalion to send to America or to the Mediterranean," he had written in a confidential letter in June, 1756. It was plain that a counter-coalition would have to be organized, or England would have to "abandon Europe to France and sustain alone, during many years, an imequal struggle against that power." But where could allies be f otmd to oppose France in Europe? Sir Hanbury Williams had labored desperately to prevent the union of Russia with Austria and the reconciliation with France. Money had been freely spent, and Bestusheff had been heavily bribed, but Esterhazy had triumphed at St. Petersburg. Sweden, Saxony, and Bavaria had for a time been counted upon; but the Swedes had now joined the coali- tion against Prussia in the hope of recovering Pomerania, 548 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The disap- pearance of European equilibrium Saxony was incapable of action, and Bavaria on July 31, 1757, had made treaties with France to furnish more than six thousand men to aid in attacking Prussia. ' The United Provinces, then under the regency of Anne, widow of the Stadtholder William IV, were, in spite of strong English influence and her devotion to the cause of her father, George II, determined to maintain their neutrality. Spain and Portugal were at the time in friendly relations with England, but in the circumstances nothing could be expected of them. In this situation nothing appeared more probable than the eventual loss of Hanover by George II. Frederick II had by the Treaty of Westminster promised to protect the elec- torate; but, confronted by three great powers, the value of his promised protection was not great. On the other hand, England had by the same treaty agreed to protect Prussia from foreign aggression; but, with Hanover threatened with invasion from France, and lacking in resources for carrying on a colonial war in which the destinies of two continents and the stake of world empire were involved, it was difficult for George II to offer effective aid to Prussia. But, in truth, Frederick II had never imagined that his pledges would involve military action on his part in the in- terest of England. What he had had in mind was the re- straint of Russia by English influence. Nor had George II and his ministers supposed that the attempts at "neutraliza- tion" would ever involve England in war with Russia. What he had aimed at was the protection of Hanover from the French. But both were soon to discover what a guarantee of neutralization might mean when the status quo is disturbed. In less than two years by the reversal of alliances the equi- librium of Europe had been completely destroyed. It is, perhaps, worth while at this point to reflect for a moment upon the manner in which that calamity had come to pass. The colonial war was on all sides distinctly recognized as in no respect an affair of any of the powers, except the two that were directly engaged in it. The purpose of England ' For the treaty, see Martens, Recueil N, Supplement II, p. 620. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 549 had been to hold Europe aloof from the colonial quarrel. Chap, vii The intention of France had been the same. The Anglo- *•"• Prussian treaty of Westminster was not of a nature to pro- ^^^^"^^^^ voke a war. It was, in principle, merely a compact for mutual defence in Europe. But even the first treaty of Versailles was not in itself of a nature to provoke a war, for it also was only a defensive compact of the same character as the Anglo- Prussian treaty. All that rendered it extraordinary was that it unplied the reconcihation of two monarchies that had long been hostile. In fact, Louis XV had no real occasion to sign it, except so far as England was concerned; for he had nothing to fear from Frederick II. On the other hand, Frederick II had in reality nothing to fear from Louis XV, whose interest was peace. The dis- turbing cause was the determination of Maria Theresa to draw Louis XV into a war for the recovery of Silesia; but that purpose might never have been realized if Frederick II had not become a second time aggressive, and would not have existed if it had not been for the forcible annexation of Silesia. The Seven Years' War, so far as the participation of Europe was concerned, was, in the final analysis, a reper- cussion of Frederick II's conquest of Silesia and invasion of Saxony. The author of "Anti-Machiavel" had appealed to force as the arbiter of nations, and thereby rendered his own political philosophy an anachronism in the history of ideas. Notwithstanding the sacrifices it would involve on the part of the Prussian people to save his kingdom from destruction, he had a second time exposed it to the wrath of Europe. He had believed France preoccupied, Russia incapable, the German princes indifferent, and Austria really formidable only through her own newly acquired strength. It is not until we turn aside from the inconsistencies and illusions of Frederick II, and see him bravely expiating his fault, dedicating his whole being to the salvation of his state in the moment of supreme danger; in skill, fortitude, and indomitable persistence the greatest military commander of his time; that we comprehend how his contemporaries came 550 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII to regard him as an almost superhuman being, and why all ,^ t' ''l Dieii have united in calling him, without reserve, "Frederick 1756—1763 the Great." At the time when the last links of the Coalition against him The perilous Were being forged, the King of Prussia had taken up his Frederiok"!! winter quarters in Dresden, in the palace of Count Bruhl, whose papers he had confiscated. There, almost in solitude, he brooded upon his situation, and formed his plans for military action in the spring. He expected no serious mili- tary help from any foreign power. For a long time he had constantly received from Sir Hanbury Williams, through Sir Andrew Mitchell, words of hope that English influence might prevail in favor of Prussia at St. Petersburg, and that Russia might be induced to postpone or abandon action against him; but that encouragement had proved illusory. He had fancied that the indolence and incapacity of Louis XV and the preoccupations of France in the war with Eng- land would render the French alliance of as little practical value to Austria as it had formerly been to himself. "In the spring it will be seen what Prussia is," he wrote to the Queen; "and that we, through our strength and discipline, shall come through with the number of the Austrians, the impetu- osity of the French, the fierceness of the Russians, the masses of the Hungarians, and with all that will be opposed to us." From Germany itself Frederick II looked for no active aid. The Emperor Francis I had in January, 1757, proposed that the military contingents of the Imperial circles be increased threefold and be placed at his own disposal. Frederick II, on the other hand, had requested his electoral colleagues to provide protection for his states; at the same time giving assurance that he sought no conquests, and that so soon as they could be evacuated with safety to his own pos- sessions the Saxon territories would be restored. The princes had shown themselves indisposed to take up the cause of Brandenburg, only twenty-six out of eighty-six voices favoring the proposal of Frederick II. For the Imperial execution proposed by Austria there were sixty votes; but Frederick II, who knew the limitations upon united Imperial DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR 551 action, had no fear in this quarter. "I scoff at the Chap, vil Reichstag and all its resolutions," wrote the King, when ^■°- he learned of the conclusions reached, and exercised freely ^^^^~^^^^ his exceptional powers of sarcasm at the expense of the Emperor. And yet Frederick II was not unmindful of his danger. His own death, his possible capture and imprisonment, as well as the defeat of his armies, were gravely considered by him. "Should such a misfortune as capture befall me," he wrote in an instruction to the Court at Berlin, "I shall sacrifice myself for the State, and my brother must then be obeyed; who, with all my ministers and generals, shall an- swer to me for it with his head that neither a province nor a ransom be offered for me, but the war be continued and its advantages followed up exactly as if I had never existed." Such heroic utterances, supported by equally heroic action, Prussia's place go far toward causing us to forget that it was really Frederick *" ^"'■°p'' II himself who had been the disturber of the peace of Europe. The Electorate of Brandenburg had in three generations grown from a small principality to a powerful military mon- archy, in which conquest was the law of its development. Since the Peace of Westphalia, — which had, in theory at least, recognized the existence of a system of legally co-equal and independent sovereign states, which all were solemnly bound to respect, — ■ Europe had repeatedly been convulsed with wars of conquest that threatened to destroy that system. No consideration of race, of religion, of natural boundaries, of popular preference, of public peace, or even of dynastic right had restrained the ambition of those who had sought to enlarge their borders by the power of the sword. In the school of dynastic domination Brandenburg had been an apt pupil. There, more than anywhere else in Europe since the time of Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden, frugal living, rigorous economy. Spartan discipline, and military rule had combined to build up the State. The very name of the Prussian monarchy was derived from the Pohsh duchy which Frederick William I of Brandenburg had raised to a 1756-1763 552 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII sovereign state just a hundred years before.' By thrift in war and diplomacy the House of Hohenzollern, descended ■ from a Suabian family through Frederick, Burggrave of Nuremberg, who in 1414 had obtained Brandenburg from the Emperor Sigismund, partly as a gift and partly in pay- ment of a debt, had already become a dangerous rival to the ancient House of Hapsburg.^ How dangerous it was, the Seven Years' War was to dem- onstrate. But the aggressor had already been brought to bay, and stood before the judgment bar of Europe awaiting the verdict of the sword, to which he had so confidently appealed. The situation was tragic, but it was the logical denouement of the drama of which the first act had been the attempt to dismember the Hapsburg monarchy when the head of that house had fallen and left to its heiress a heritage of uncertain promises and rapacious foes. The lack of Had the Coalition against Frederick II acted with imity, cohesionin promptuess, and force, he would have been completely the Coahtion ret i r j crushed in the first campaign; but the conditions for such action did not exist. In theory the Coalition had agreed to a concerted attack upon Prussia, but in practice the plans for its execution proved to be immature. They were wanting in unity of conception because there was a lack of cohesion among the powers themselves. Although Russia and France were expected to co-operate with Austria in bringing Frederick II to terms, the relations between these two auxiliaries were of the loosest character. After Douglas had secured the adhesion of the Czarina to the Treaty of Versailles, the Marquis de L'Hopital, attended by a suite of some eighty persons, was sent by France as am- bassador to St. Petersburg. The embassy had been fitted out with great extravagance, with the expectation of making a deep impression at the Russian capital; but nothing of the kind occurred. The aged marquis, though a lieutenant- general, took no personal interest in the plan of campaign • See p. 30 of this volume. 2 See Volume II of this work, p. 63. DIPLOMACY OP THE SEVEN YEARs' WAR 553 of the Russian forces, which acted without relation to the Chap, vil other armies of the coalition. a. d. Even at St. Petersburg the presence of L'Hopital was of "^^''^'^^^ little consequence. There were, in fact, two courts in that capital with which contact was important, but the ambassa- dor of France appears to have obtained no intimacy with either. Beside the court of the Czarina Elizabeth, which formed an extremely exclusive circle to which strangers were admitted only on formal occasions, the Grand Duchess Catherine, wife of Peter, heir to the throne, who was destined to play such a leading role in the future of Russia, held court in her own independent fashion and created a centre of polit- ical influence. The coolness of the Czarina for France is evident from the fact that she kept Louis XV two years waiting for an answer to a personal letter. Even the sumptuousness of L'Hopital's style of representation reacted against him; for, beholding such evidences of wealth on the part of the King's ambassador, the Czarina and her ministers were rendered eager for large subsidies, and finally for a loan of money, from France; and, failing to obtain them, interpreted the failure as a sign of indiffer- ence or distrust. Frederick II had planned in the campaign of 1757 to The retreat of let the enemy take the initiative. The Austrians were '^''^''f"''!' " ^ and the mva- expected to advance first, then the Russians, and finally sion of Prussia the French. He hoped to meet them singly in succession, and then by penetrating into Bohemia to force Austria to make peace. In April, however, he decided to surprise the Austrians by invading Bohemia at once, and succeeded in forcing them back to Prag, which he then besieged. On May 6 he won a victory in the field, but could not drive the Austrians from the Bohemian capital; and, after enormous losses, at Kolin, on June 18 he suffered a severe defeat, and was obliged to evacuate Bohemia. On August 30 the Russians won a sweeping victory over the Prussian army under Lehwaldt at Gross- Jagersdorf; on September 7 Frederick's ablest gen- 554 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The colonial war and the action of England eral, Winterfeldt, was killed near Gorlitz; and on September 13 the Swedes, as well as the Austrians and Russians, were ■ on Prussian soil.' Added to these misfortunes was the inactivity of Prussia's only ally, George II. Frederick II had urged the organiza- tion of an Anglo-Hanoverian army in Northwestern Germany and the sending of a fleet to the Baltic against the Swedes and Russians, but no action had been taken. At London the state of political parties was such that a mixed ministry held the places of power, and could agree upon nothing re- lating to the war on the continent. A strong popular feeling opposed the shedding of English blood over the fate of Cour- land, Prussia, or even Hanover, and the commercial classes were indisposed to disturb the trade relations with Russia by sending a fleet to the Baltic. The war in Germany was, therefore, so far as England was concerned, left to the inade- quate action of the Hanoverian and mercenary troops. On July 26, near Hastenbeck, in Hanover, the Duke of Cumberland, who commanded this force, had been severely defeated by the French; and, on September 8, furnished with full powers by George II, the Duke negotiated at Kloster Zeven a convention by which the occupation of Hanover was surrendered to the French, the mercenary troops were dis- banded, and the Hanoverian troops confined within pre- scribed limits. Would England endure this humiliation? The sacrifice seemed enormous, but circumstances were strongly against resistance. Not only was the government enfeebled by di- vided counsels, but the misfortunes of the colonial war had increased. In the Far East thrilling events had occurred. In April, 1756, the strong rule of Ali Vardi, who had made himself master of Bengal and suppressed the Mahratta in- cursions, had come to an end; and a less efficient and capri- ' Regarding the inexplicable retreat of the Russian army under Apraxine, see Wahszewski, La dernihre des Romanov, p. 449, who attrib- utes it to an expectation that, owibg to the illness of the Czarina Elizar bath, the accession of the Grand Duke Peter, a friend of Frederick II, would reverse the policy of Russia. A.D. 1756-1763 DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 555 cious prince, Surajah Dowlah, had succeeded him as Nabob Chap, vii of Bengal. The enormities of this ruler had rendered him so odious that Chve, who had returned to India, had been ordered to expel him from Calcutta, which the Nabob had taken from the English. The capture of the fortress had been followed by the murder of a hundred and twenty-three Eng- lishmen who were driven into the fatal "Black Hole." ' After the place had been retaken by the English, at the out- break of the war between France and England, Surajah Dowlah had appealed for aid to the French, who were anxious to continue the existing agreement of neutrality; but the exigencies of the situation had resulted in hostihties and the capture of Chandernagor by the English. Thus war had been renewed in India, with the result that, by the battle of Plassey, — fought on June 23, 1757, — England had won a victory that was in the end to give India to the English by opening "a career of conquest which made a small island in the western seas the greatest Mohammedan power in the world." Although this event was, in its effect, one of the most momentous in the history of the eighteenth century, it had practically no influence upon the opinions or the decisions of the time. The losses in America were esteemed at London to be of far greater importance. Fort William Henry, on Lake George, had been taken by the French, an expedition against Louisbourg had failed through a storm which had damaged and scattered the English fleet, and the outlook for the cause of England in the colonies was extremely gloomy. Pitt, who was to become the great leader in the expansion of England, had been a member of the Newcastle ministry, and since November, 1756, had himself been prime minister; but even he had not yet perceived that the conquest of Amer- ica was to be made in Europe, and was hampered by his indisposition to waste the substance of England on the preser- vation of Hanover. Still, neither pubUc sentiment nor the inclination of George II favored the surrender of the elec- ' For the circumstances of the incident, see Wilson, Lord Clive, p. 70. A.D. 175fr-1763 556 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII torate to the French or the total abandonment of Frederick II. The position of England, then engaged in war upon four continents, made resistance difficult; but so extreme was the desire to regain the ground lost that Pitt was ready, in order to obtain the help of Spain, to surrender Gibraltar, but the offer was declined. To send English troops for the defence of Hanover was at the time impossible; but ratification of the convention of Kloster Zeven was refused, direct and indirect subsidies to the amount of two and a half million pounds sterling were voted by Parliament, and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was placed at the disposal of Frederick II for the reorgani- zation of the army in Northwestern Germany. The victories In Ms extremity Frederick II had sought to renew rela- "! ^'^''t"°^ " tions with France. At Paris opinions with regard to the flit Xv033D3.CIl and Leuthen valuc of the Austrian alliance and the expediency of totally crushing Prussia were known to be divided. Louis XV was, however, personally firm in his opposition to Frederick II, organized a fresh army to be sent against him, and declared his determination not to negotiate with him apart from Austria. The answer was received by the King of Prussia on the very day when the Austrians, having taken possession of a great part of Silesia, had already reached his capital, with the French supported by the Imperial army of execution previously summoned by Francis I about to advance upon Prussian soil. But a few weeks entirely changed the situation. On November 5, at Rossbach, in Saxony, Frederick II defeated the French and Imperial troops; on December 5 he destroyed the principal force of the Austrians at Leuthen, in Silesia; while, in the meantime, Ferdinand of Brunswick, with a re- organized force, including the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, prevented a union of the French with the Swedes, who, through the retreat of the Russians, were left unsupported. Thus, at the end of 1757, notwithstanding the exposure to which his kingdom had been subjected, Frederick II found himself in a position of temporary safety, which he en- DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 557 deavored to make permanent by overtures to France. Bernis Chap, vii had become alarmed at the consequences of the Austrian ^•"• alliance, and wrote to the French ambassador at Vienna, ^''^^"^^^'^ "I give my voice for peace"; but both Louis XV and Kaunitz considered that, while their anti-Prussian policy had suffered a check, it had by no means met with a defeat, and prepara- tions for a new campaign were at once actively begun. The year 1758, both in a diplomatic and a military sense, The strength- added vigor to the war. In London the successes of Frederick ^'^'"^ °* *'''' Anglo-Prusaian II m the field awakened great enthusiasm, and it began to aihanoe be perceived that the fortunes of England were closely con- nected with the fate of Prussia; for the success of France upon the continent would greatly embarrass England in the colonies. New subsidies were offered, but Frederick II, who de- manded military and naval aid, at first refused to receive them. "I prefer," he said, "not to mix up money in the affair." Sir Andrew Mitchell was astonished at this position, which he could not comprehend; for, with half his territories oc- cupied by foreign troops, and in the midst of a costly cam- paign, Frederick II was evidently in need of money. The real reason for his refusal, we now know from his subsequent instructions to his ambassador at London, was his wish to force England to send to Germany troops rather than money, in order that English hostility to Austria and Russia, which he suspected George II of wishing to conceal, might be made more evident. The persistence of Frederick II in forcing that issue so excited the irascibility of Pitt, who had firmly resolved not to send English soldiers to Germany, that Sir Andrew Mitchell was unjustly charged by him with favoring the Prussian system, and was summarily recalled; but, at length, when England promised to assume the support of a large increase of mercenaries in the army of Ferdinand of Brunswick, on April 11, 1758, a new treaty of alliance which provided new subsidies was signed.^ ' For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 173. 558 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY A. D. 1756-1763 The fall of Beatusheff Chap. VII So long as Bestusheff remained in power at St. Petersburg there existed a channel of information and a means of influ- ence from which England had not ceased to profit, and Fred- erick II was not in error in believing that George II did not desire too openly to reveal the hostility of England to Russia. So intense was the French opposition to the Chan- cellor that in January, 1758, Bernis proposed to the allied courts a combined effort either to force his resignation or to compel him to adopt without reserve an acceptable pol- icy; but Kaunitz was not disposed to proceed to this extrem- ity, and French influence had not been sufficiently strong to carry out the project. In February, however, the intrigues of Bestusheff's ene- mies resulted in accomplishing his overthrow. The precise manner in which his fall was occasioned still remains ob- scure, for the documents relating to it appear to have been destroyed; but in some way his arrest, dismissal, and exile were connected with his relations to the secret designs of the Grand Duchess Catherine and the retreat of the Russian army under Apraxine. Whatever the cause may have been, at about the same time the Chancellor, the Archduchess, and the General were all three publicly disgraced, and the Czar- ina manifested a new zeal in the prosecution of the war against Frederick II. With Woronzoff as chancellor, the secret code which Eon had carried to St. Petersburg was brought to light, and an active private correspondence between the Czarina and Louis XV, whose letters had long remained unanswered, was finally begun. A letter of Pope Clement XIII, dated August 19, 1758, by which the title of "Majeste Apostolique" was conferred upon Maria Theresa, was intended by the Holy See to rally the Catholic princes to the side of the Empress, but had an effect quite different from that which was designed.^ This interference excited the indignation of the Protestant princes, who saw in it an attempt to revive the opposition to Protest- antism. As a consequence Frederick II now seemed to The new al- liance of the Catholic powers ' SeeWenck,III,p. 178. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 559 be charged with the role of defending the freedom of religion."^ So far as France was concerned, some new impulse of this kind was needed to revive interest in the war. The spirit of the French people was never at a lower ebb. The follies and extravagances of the Court had debauched the public life of France, and the population took little real interest in the effort to suppress Frederick II, whose heroic resistance had even awakened admiration and respect.^ The war had brought no gain or glory to France. The treasury was low, and the army was dispirited, sadly disorganized, and scat- tered in little groups over a wide area which destroyed its efficiency. The generals were in great part court favorites sent out to win laurels, but incapable of earning them. Hanover had been evacuated and a disastrous retreat of the French army had followed. The English were sending ex- peditions against the French coasts and preparing to strike a telling blow in America, where Montcalm was bravely fighting to defend Canada. In a memorial to the King Bernis expressed the opinion that peace should be made, but Louis XV would listen to no project of that kind. To mark his personal esteem for Bernis, however, he caused the minister to be made a cardi- nal, and October 9 accepted his resignation.^ In September Bernis had written to the French ambassa- dor at Vieima, Count Stainville, — who in recognition of his services had in the previous August been made Duke de Chap, . vir A. D. 1756- -1763 ' It is, however, impossible to consider Frederick II as the pro- tagonist of Protestantism. Protestant as well as CathoUc powera were in the Coalition against him, and no reUgious issue was at stake. " On April 7, 1758, Bernis wrote to Stainville, the French ambassador at Vienna: "Notre nation est plus indign^e que jamais de la guerre. On aime iei le roi de Prusse k la fohe parce qu'on aime toujours ceux qui font bien leurs afiFaires; on d^teste la cour de Vienne parce qu'on la regarde comme la sangsue de I'fitat, et Ton se soucie fort peu de son aggrandissement et du n6tre." ' On the situation and disposition of the powers at the time, see Fleys, Louis XV, Marie-Th&r^e et la paix de I'Europe en 1758, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XI (1879), p. 28. 560 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII Choiseul/ — that he should "make efforts with the Court of ^- ^- Vienna to the end that it might decide to sacrifice its ideas of vengeance," since "there is no solid hope, and on the con- of Choiaeul'a diplomacy trary many well founded fears, for the continuation of the war"; but these efforts had no other result than to open a discussion regarding "a new base for the alliance of the two crowns." When in November Choiseul arrived in Paris to succeed Bernis in charge of foreign affairs, there was no longer any thought of peace. The new minister was enthusiastically Austrian in his sjonpathies and owed his influence with the King largely to the favor of Madame de Pompadour, who had come to regard Bernis as too much disposed to consider " les fantaisies du public," as she was pleased to describe the wishes of the French- people for peace. The beginning Although Choiseul was a firm partisan of the alUance with Austria, he clearly perceived that the only dangerous enemy of France was England. He aimed, therefore, so to modify the engagement with Austria as to enable France to concentrate more attention upon her real antagonist. His first official act was intended to be in this direction, but its effect was to renew the Austro-French alliance upon a basis that disregarded the only reason of state that had ever ex- isted for wasting the energies of France in Germany. The promised cession of the Austrian Netherlands to Don Philip was eliminated, the Empress abandoned the right to recover Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, and the obligation to aid Maria Theresa in recovering Silesia was balanced only by the slight prospective recompense of occupying Ostend and Nieuport. The other important modifications of the alli- ance were the payment to Austria of two hundred and eighty thousand florins a month, the withdrawal of the obligation to maintain twenty-four thousand soldiers in Bohemia, and the engagement to keep a hundred thousand men on the Rhine. By restricting the participation of France to the ' His special service at Vienna had been to arrange a marriage be- tween the future Louis XVI and the Archduchess Marie Antoinette of Austria. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 561' West of Germany, Choiseul hoped to be able to concentrate Chap, vii more force upon the war with England. The practical result ^- ^■ was that the military operations of France in Germany were ^''^^~^^°'^ only a slight embarrassment to Frederick II, of small utiUty to Maria Theresa, and entirely without value to the interests or prestige of France, whose treasury was drained, and whose blood was shed on foreign battlefields, with no appreciable benefit.* It is no part of our task to follow the extremely interesting The military military operations of the Seven Years' War, which can be "™'*^ °* ^'^^^ understood and appreciated only when studied in detail.^ It is sufficient to state that, at the end of 1758, the gains of the coalition, notwithstanding severe fighting, were inappre- ciable. Although an enormous sacrifice of life and money had been made, the status quo remained essentially unchanged. The Russians had penetrated to the very heart of Frederick II's possessions, had entirely occupied East Prussia, and had ruined a part of his territory with fire and sword; but they had gained no permanent advantage. As for the Swedes, they had simply made an ineffectual parade in Pomerania. The French, driven from North Germany, beaten at Crefeld, and compelled to retreat in order to find safe winter quar- ters, had nothing to show for their hard campaign. The Austrians were scarcely more successful. They had prevented the Prussian advance into Moravia, but they had acquired no territory from the enemy; and, after winning nominally victorious battles, had retired within their own borders. On the other hand, Frederick II, although successful in forcing the enemy to evacuate his possessions, had made no positive gains. He had displayed all his admirable qualities as a leader in the face of overwhelming numbers, but the res- cue of his kingdom and the continued existence of his armies were due even more to the ineptitude of the generals who opposed him than to his own inherent force of attack and resistance. 1 For the Treaty of December 30, 1758, see Wenek, III, p. 185. * The military details are given with great clearness and complete- ness ia Waddington, La guerre de sept ans, Paris, 1899-1908. VOL. III. — 36 562 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII Through the energetic action of Pitt the year had brought ^•'^- forth for England results of a more decided character. In ■ previous administrations, when in opposition, Pitt had been of Ktt the most bitter opponent of the policy of sacrificing English The policies interests to those of Hanover. He had stormed more tem- pestuously against the subsidies proposed for the defence of the electorate than any other orator in the House of Com- mons, but when it came to the point of choosing between the extinction of Prussia by the coalition and the defeat of France on the continent, Pitt had seen that nothing could so weaken and exhaust the resources of Louis XV as the prosecution of that fatal conflict in which the King of Prussia was so bravely withstanding a world in arms. From that moment Pitt became the advocate of heavy subsidies to oppose France on the continent, and saw that the costly preoccupation of France in Germany signified the future impotence of Eng- land's enemy in that great struggle for world empire in which the two rivals were then engaged. It was, however, from the point of view of victory on the sea, in America, and in India, that Pitt's foreign pohcy re- ceived its entire orientation. For the continent, in itself, he cared nothing, except to keep it busy with its own concerns. It was this far-seeing minister, — a man without wealth, great lineage, or social position, and whose political status depended entirely upon his own personal force, — who now inspired the energies of England, and the effect was momen- tous. Hated by the King, he yet exercised a complete do- minion over his decisions. "I gave him no orders to treat," George II said, when his son sent him for ratification the convention of Kloster Zeven. "No, Sir," replied Pitt, "but you gave him very full powers!" It was this splendid fearlessness, combined with his de- votion to the imperial interests of Great Britain, that made this courageous commoner the great Englishman of his time. His plans were simple but grand. They included the ab- sorption of the interest and energies of France in Europe, the harassing of the French ports and destruction of French commerce, the sending of strong reinforcements to Clive in DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' "WAR 563 India, and the speedy overthrow of French power in America, Chap, vii to be followed by the annexation of Canada to the English ^- ^■ colonies and the mastery of the great interior waterways of ^^^^'^^'^^ the American continent, the St. Lawrence, the Ohio, and the Mississippi. All these great schemes were successfully carried forward. The results The cost was enormous. For the year 1758 more than ten °^ ^"'^ miUion pounds sterling were appropriated, of which nearly a fifth was expended in foreign subsidies. The navy re- ceived an unprecedented development. Seven ships were detailed to blockade the French ports on the channel, and expeditions were sent to bombard them, which Fox, who thought the operation useless, said was "like breaking win- dows with guineas"; but Pitt, believing that France would not yield until the war was brought home to the French people, aimed at terrorizing them into submission. Fifteen ships were ordered to stop French commerce in the Mediter- ranean and put the Spanish ports out of business, while forty-one ships were sent to reinforce the fleet at Halifax, and sixty thousand English seamen swarmed over the seas to annihilate the trade and destroy the power of France. Young and courageous men were everywhere placed in com- mand. As a result, Louisbourg fell in July. Expeditions were directed against Canada. Fort Frontenac was taken, giving Lake Ontario to the British as a base, with the French fleet as a prize of war. Soon afterward Fort Du- quesne, abandoned by the French when their supplies were cut off in the North, fell into the hands of the British, who renamed it in honor of Pitt. And thus the command of the Ohio, and as a sequel that of the Mississippi, passed from the brave French pioneers and martyrs of empire who had striven to claim it for their distant and incapable king, by whom they were left to struggle on with inadequate de- fence while he was dissipating the resources of his people in an illusory adventure in Germany.^ ' Louis XV was at the time paying out annually in subsidies to the Empress and to the German mercenary princes fifty million Hvres, be- sides the expense of his own army. 564 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 Progress of the war be- tween France and England Although Choiseul was aware that the struggle with Eng- land would be a long one, he did not doubt that the resources of France would in the end prove superior. In January, 1759, he wrote to Kaunitz: "As to peace with England, the King thinks that it is by pursuing the war against that power that we shall enfeeble the King of Prussia. We shall support that opinion at the risk of losing our colonies, but this danger alHicts us without frightening us, and we hope that in 1760 the resources of England, notwithstanding her success, will be exhausted, and that we shall be in a condition then to put forth the efforts that will render her reasonable." The events of the year revealed the illusory character of these expectations. A brave general, but devoid of aptitude for the peculiar duties to which he was assigned, Lally ToUendal, had been sent, to use his own expression, "to drive the English out of India." His motto, which he declared to be "sacramental," was: "No Englishman in the peninsula." But the fortunes of war led to a quite different result. The siege of Madras in January, 1759, after heavy losses, resulted in the retreat of the French. The capture of Masulipatam in March proved an unprofitable victory, for it was soon afterward through a treaty with the Viceroy of the Deccan recovered by the English. The naval encounters brought no advantage to the French. To this were added the bitter personal quar- rel of Lally Tollendal with the Marquis de Bussy, second in command; the lamentable relations of the French governor with the native chiefs; and, finally, the revolt of the Lorraine regiment, which the government that had so bountifully subsidized the armies of Austria, had left for ten months entirely unpaid. The year 1759 did not witness the isolation and fall of Pondicherry, which soon followed, but with such leadership disaster was foredoomed.^ The situation in America was not more favorable to France, but it was not through the fault of the able and heroic Mont- ' For the administration of the French interests and the end of the French domination in India, see Hamont, Lally-Tollendal, Paris, 1887. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 565 calm, who was sacrificed by a government unworthy of his Chap, vii devotion. In January Bougainville had arrived in France to ^- "■ report the exposed condition in which Canada was placed, ^^^^'^^^^ but it seemed too late to repair the damage of previous neg- lect. The war on the ocean had rendered the French navy incapable of offering the necessary aid, and it was only a question of sending munitions and provisions to enable Canada, now abandoned to its own powers of resistance, to meet the attack of the English.^ In April Montcalm clearly foresaw the coming defeat of France in Canada. His last hope was the defence of Quebec, and he gallantly prepared to defend that stronghold until some unexpected change in the course of events might occur. The story of that memorable siege has a conspicuous place in the annals of both the contending nations, for it recounts a struggle of almost imparalleled heroism on both sides, in which the prize was the greatest ever contended for by rival powers, the ultimate mastery of a dominion surpassing in extent many times over the whole of Europe. Begun early in July, the siege did not end until September 13, when the English under General Wolfe had under cover of night scaled the heights of Abraham. In the battle which ensued upon the open plain Montcalm was mortally wounded while rallying his little army, which was soon thrown into confusion. The death of Wolfe at the moment of victory for a time paralyzed the further action of the English; but the field was already won, and with that victory the suprem- acy of the English in Canada. Montreal still remained in possession of the French, and a really great effort on the part of the Court of Versailles might still have changed the final result; but there was nothing to hope for from a govern- ment more influenced by illusions than by realities. On the continent the year brought forth many changes, The eSects ot but none profoundly affecting the balance of forces. The p^if^^on^^T death of Anne, Regent of the United Provinces, in January, maritime produced no change in the relations with England. Before p°^"^ ' For the situation in Canada, see Waddington, La guerre de sept ans, III, p. 252. 566 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The renewed animosity of Spain toward England her death the Princess of Orange had implored her father to end the arbitrary treatment of the Dutch shipping; but, although George II replied with conciliatory assurances, the vessels of the Republic were captured and condemned by the English prize courts on the plea of illicit commerce with the belligerents. The Danish ships were exposed to the same vexations. "No navigator of any country," wrote the Danish prime minister, Bernstorff, "however innocent may be his busi- ness, has ever obtained a just sentence before these Doctors Commons, whose name will descend with horror to pos- terity." The indictment was vigorous, but not without jus- tification, and the arrogance of Great Britain upon the sea was to be dearly paid for in the following decades. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the neutrality of Holland was maintained. In his letters to Count d'Affry, the French ambassador at The Hague, Choiseul urged him "to sound the tocsin of the sea against the English." The idea of a neutral league of the maritime powers occurred to him, and he endeavored to realize it at Stockholm as well as at The Hague.^ Under the strong pressure of the maritime powers. Parlia- ment found it expedient to pass a law, bitterly opposed by the proprietors of privateering vessels, who had gathered a rich harvest from their spoils, permitting the owners of the ships seized to obtain their liberation by depositing a sum of money. A commission of Dutch delegates visited London to negotiate an arrangement; but its purpose was frustrated by delay, and the sacrifices passively endured became the seeds of permanent estrangement between England and the United Provinces.^ During the life-time of Ferdinand VI of Spain, under the ministry of Richard Wall, an Irishman who had passed into the service of Spain and enjoyed the entire confidence of the King, the relations of that monarchy with England had not • See Bourguet, Le due de Choiseul en Hollande, Revue Historique, LXXIX (1902), p. 298. * See Coquelle, L'alliance franco-hollandaise, p. 53 et seq. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN TEARS' WAR 567 been unfriendly, while French influence at Madrid had been Chap, vil relegated to a secondary role. The confirmed melancholia ^■"■ which darkened the last years of Ferdinand VI threw the ^^^^^^^^ whole responsibility for the conduct of affairs upon the min- istry, and in his few lucid moments the King approved the proposals laid before him by Wall, to whom all foreign affairs were intrusted. But the death of Ferdinand VI in August, 1759, brought to the throne the Farnese prince who since 1735 had ruled at Naples, and with him a change in the policy of Spain, which with the other maritime powers had suffered much from the capture of its merchant ships by England. Notwithstanding the existing relations of nominal friend- liness between England and Spain, there had been abundant cause of complaint during the last years of Ferdinand VI. Even Wall had loudly remonstrated with the British min- istry, and had said in a note to the Spanish ambassador in London, "If they wish to live in accord with us, they have many occasions for manifesting their friendship in place of the fine phrases in which they are so prodigal, by returning to us the great number of ships which they detain in their ports to the great detriment of our nationals." The policy of Pitt had been at any cost to cut France off from all external commerce. As for the rights of neutrality, it was clear that they must suffer from this system; but war must pursue its end, the destruction of the power of the en- emy. Determined to isolate France completely, he refused to renounce his method, and all remonstrance was in vain. The accession of Charles III to the throne of Spain seemed choiseura a favorable occasion for renewing the former close relations ^btdn the between the Bourbon monarchies. As early as January, mediation 1759, Choiseul, through the French ambassador at Naples, °* ^p"™ the Marquis d'Ossun, had endeavored to interest Don Carlos in checking the development of England's maritime. power; but, as King of Naples, Charles III did not feel prepared to risk the interests of his kingdom by taking decided action. In September, 1759, Ossun, — who at the request of Don Carlos accompanied him to Spain, — in response to the offer of the new king to mediate between France and England, Chap. . VII A. L). 1756- -1763 568 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY presented to him a note containing the conditions upon which Louis XV was prepared to negotiate. The design of this note was, of course, to convince Charles III of the value of a close relation with France. England was represented as an "insatiable monster," which must be restrained, unless Spain was prepared to sacrifice her com- merce and lose her colonies. Don Carlos, through his Neapolitan minister at London, San Severino, communicated with Pitt his readiness to me- diate; but Pitt, who did not desire Spanish mediation, af- firmed that it was not the intention of England to retain all her conquests, and promised to send to Lord Bristol, the British ambassador at Madrid, instructions which would enable him to confer with the minister of His Catholic Majesty. The French note had contained a sentence pointing out how "essential it was to Spain that the equilibrium of pos- sessions established by the Treaty of Utrecht be not altered"; and, in a communication prepared without the knowledge of Wall, and made through the Spanish ambassador, Abreu, at London, Charles III had the indiscretion to say, " The King cannot regard with indifference the derangement which these conquests involve for the equilibrium established by the Treaty of Utrecht." To this insinuation Pitt made no re- sponse, for its menacing character rendered necessary an explanation at Madrid. Failure of So loug as Charles III was under the influence of Ossun, choiseui's j^jg sympathies were strong for France. When he was in- formed of the fall of Quebec, he declared "the news had frozen his blood." But when he discussed the subject with Wall, who assured him that England would never conclude a treaty with France in which Prussia did not participate, and that the friendship of Prussia, whose presence in Ger- many was necessary as a check to the ambitions of Austria in Italy, was of great value to Spain, the idea of mediation appeared less attractive; for an offensive alliance with France — at which Choiseul was aiming — would probably be the consequence of insistence, and for this he was not prepared. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 569 The failure of Choiseul to procure Spanish intervention Chap, vri rendered more evident the embarrassment of France. ^- °- In December, 1759, the French minister had reached a ^^^^^'^^'^,„ turning-point in his European pohcy. In a memorandum sent to Madrid on December 24, he wrote: "The superiority The changed of land forces is doubtless of great importance; but, since t**'*""^^ "' ^ ' ' France commerce has become the object of all the powers, it is dem- onstrated by events that the preponderance is on the side of that one which has the empire of the sea." The two Latin powers, standing firmly together, could, he thought, prevent the maritime supremacy of England. There was another reason in the mind of Choiseul why Spain should join with France in immediately restoring the disturbed equilibrium of the powers. "We know," he wrote, "that the Court of Vienna has no other object, no other thought, no other urgency than that of crushing the King of Prussia; and that it would tranquilly sacrifice for that pur- pose all the possessions of the allies. We apprehend that, after the war, the King of Prussia, being crushed, the House of Austria might resume its relations with England and a tone with the European powers which would be as little agreeable to us as to Spain. In accordance with these re- flections, ... we recognize that the King of Prussia is suf- ficiently abased, and that it is not to our interest for this prince to be totally destroyed." Evidently the whole attitude of France had changed. As the war had progressed the inexpediency of uniting with Austria and Russia to crush and partition Prussia had be- come apparent. The colonies having already been practi- cally lost, France was beginning to realize the error of conducting two wars at a time when she was in need of all her energies to face her great antagonist on the sea. Eliminating the question of the colonies, what was to be the state of Europe when Austria and Russia were trium- phant, Poland sacrificed, the Sultan alienated, and Prussia effaced from the map, if indeed that achievement should in the end prove possible? To remedy the evils already produced, or in the way of 570 A HISTORY or DIPLOMACY Chap. VII accomplishment, Austria and Prussia must be reconciled '^^ '^^ before the destruction of the latter should be made complete. To render this possible, a separate peace between France and England must first be obtained. Then, by the union of France, Spain, and England together, pressure could be brought to bear upon Austria and Prussia in a general congress, and thus the peace of Europe could be restored. But how, in the circumstances, could France hope to ob- tain acceptable terms from England? That was the problem to which Choiseul was now to address himself, and with this new direction in the policy of France the Seven Years' War entered upon a new phase of its development. II. The Obstacles to a European Peace The drift After nearly four years of bitter warfare no one of the toward peace continental powers had made any great gain. All were anx- ious for peace, but not in the same degree. In the great duel for maritime and colonial supremacy France had already lost. England also, burdened with the heavy expenses of the war, possessed a numerous peace party; but the inflexible resolution of Pitt not to con- clude the struggle until France was completely stripped of her colonies and not to sacrifice Prussia to the Coali- tion rendered it extremely difficult for overtures of peace to be made. Toward the close of 1759 Choiseul had not hesitated to let the Empress understand that France was reduced to an extremity which demanded a separate peace with England. "We shall not make peace on land without her," he wrote to his cousin. Count de Choiseul, then French ambassador at Vienna; "we destroy ourselves from year to year in her behalf; but it is necessary to recognize in advance that we shall be compelled by circumstances to make our peace with England as soon as possible; and as to the war, ... it is not everything to have courage, it is needful to have the DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEAKS' WAR 571 means of sustaining it; and not to speak clearly of our situ- Chap, vii ation would be to deceive our allies." ^ ^- °- To this frank confession Kaunitz made no reply, except ~— to observe that Louis XV might abandon the maritime war, at the same time informing Spain that France was no longer The attitude able to defend her colonies, and assure Spain that unless she °^ "^"j*'!" ^ toward France was ready to defend them for her she was in danger of losing her own. In reporting this advice, the ambassador did not fail to add: "He has not appeared much frightened by our calamities." The cold indifference of the Austrian Court to the sacri- fices of France was as evident as the growing alienation of Choiseul. At Vienna the dominant sentiment was hatred of Frederick II, and this was the standard by which friends were measured. "You hate the English intensely," Maria Theresa remarked one day to the French ambassador; "I wish that you would hate still more the King of Prussia." All who did so were yersonae gratissimae at the Court of Austria. Madame de Pompadour, whom Stahremberg re- ported to be of the opinion that "there could be no hope of a sure and durable peace without the decrease of the King of Prussia"; and whose "hatred for this prince," he said, "equals her sincere attachment to our court," was made the object of special attentions. Her devotion was recognized by the gift of a work-table adorned with a portrait of Her Majesty set in diamonds, and costing nearly eighty thousand livres. The King was present when it was delivered, and expressed his satisfaction with the honors bestowed by the Empress upon his mistress. These affabilities had become the more necessary as impediments Choiseul's waning interest in the war had become apparent. *°,'* ^ontmen- Stahremberg's influence at Versailles had from the beginning been founded primarily upon Madame de Pompadour's pro- Austrian sentiments, and so long as these remained unaltered France would continue to make sacrifices. No other course ' In 1759 the total expenses of the monarchy amounted to five hun- dred million livres, and the revenues to three hundred million, leaving a deficit of two hundred million. 572 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII was open to Choiseul, for his own status as minister depended --.'t^^L upon the favor of the potent enchantress who held the affec- tions of the King. Stahremberg, on the other hand, was pow- erless to oppose the minister, whose credit with her had been skilfully maintained; for, as the ambassador reported to Kaunitz, "outside of the essential base of our political sys- tem, she understands nothing, and he could represent mat- ters to her in such a maimer as to confuse or deceive her completely." Adherence, at least in form, to the Austrian alliance was, therefore, necessary until a European peace could be en- forced upon Maria Theresa; but the condition of the French finances did not justify the continuance of two wars, and Choiseul was more than ever anxious to conclude a separate peace with England. Some months earlier, even before his endeavor to obtain the intervention of Charles III, Choiseul had written to L'Udpital: "I believe it would be possible to terminate this war honorably and promptly, if we were not engaged — England and ourselves — in the quarrel of our allies; but our engagements are different from those of the English, since the allies of England would be satisfied if they could be left as they were before the war, while we have agreed with ours to procure for them indemnities and conquests. That is the real impediment to peace." It was evident that the Austrian alliance, which had cost France so much, would in the end prove wholly valueless unless the permanent friendship of Austria could be secured by the recovery of Silesia. Loyalty to this alliance on the part of France was, therefore, necessary; for otherwise Aus- tria, which would continue to be a great power even without the recovery of that province, might become once more an enemy. Could not Russia, which had "nothing to fear and little to hopefrom Austria," continued the minister, "imder- take the task of mediating a peace between Maria Theresa and Frederick II?" But the Czarina had no inclination to play the ingeniously devised role that Choiseul had suggested. On the contrary, DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEAHs' WAR 573 her pretensions fully justified his theory of the real obstacle Chap, vil in the way of peace, — the expectation of territorial acqui- a- ^■ sitions by the allies; for Russia not only coveted, but even ^^^^^^^^ openly demanded, the cession of Eastern Prussia, the domain upon which rested the royal title of the Elector of Branden- burg. Without conceding Prussia to Elizabeth and Silesia to Maria Theresa there was no prospect of a continental peace. In the previous summer Knyphausen, then Prussian am- The Angio- bassador at London, in view of the dissensions in the English ^^^^ p^o- cabiaet and the peace policy of Newcastle, who wished to erTlongreT' destroy the influence of Pitt by terminating the war, had proposed to Frederick II the idea of a congress of all the powers for the negotiation of a general peace. His chief argument in favor of it was that a separate peace between England and France would deprive Prussia of her ally and leave her at the mercy of the Coalition. The proposal of a general pacification, on the contrary, if accepted, would prevent Prussia from being deserted in the negotiations for peace; and, if declined, would throw upon the allies the moral responsibility for the continuation of the war. Frederick II had comprehended the value of this sugges- tion, and had written a letter to George II in which, "in the name of humanity and for the good of the human race," he proposed that the courts of London and Berlin should de- clare to the powers of the Coalition that they were disposed to favor the opening of a congress, in order to end a "bur- densome and sanguinary war" and establish an honorable peace. George II, desirous of territorial compensations for Han- over, had at first signified his wish that success in the field might furnish the occasion for a peace that would cause his "subjects to forget their misfortunes"; but the sentiment for peace was so strong in England that even Pitt seemed to favor pacific overtures. The Prussian defeat at Kunersdorf had increased the de- sire of Frederick II for the termination of the war, and the evident design of Choiseul to make a separate arrangement, 574 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. £). 1756-1763 The attitude of the Coalition toward the congreas if possible, with England had considerably strengthened it. On October 29, 1759, a declaration had been prepared at London in which it was stated that the two kings, "touched with compassion for the misfortunes which the war had caused and would continue to occasion, were prepared to send their plenipotentiaries to a place that might be found most convenient, in order there to treat conjointly of a solid and general peace." Duke Lewis of Brunswick, then acting as regent for the young stadtholder William V of the Netherlands, had been requested to deliver copies to the ambassadors of France and Russia and to the minister of Austria at The Hague.' In November he had accepted the mission; but Frederick II, reanimated by the more favorable course of the war and be- lieving the Coalition about to dissolve, then considered his situation less desperate than it had been after the battle of Kunersdorf, and was less inclined to convoke a general congress. Although Choiseul would have preferred a separate peace with England, he had not opposed the idea of a general pa- cification; taking pains, however, to make it plain that the negotiations were to deal with two entirely separate conflicts, which must be considered as altogether distinct. At The Hague the French ambassador. Count d'Affry, in December had long conversations with the English ambassador. Gen- eral York, in which the possibility of peace was discussed; but their interviews served only to make it clear that while France intended "to keep the two wars separate," the Eng- lish would participate in no negotiations in which Prussia was not included.^ The attitude of Austria and Russia was more belligerent. In their replies there was no note of peace. After a long delay Austria offered a counter-declaration, in which it was stated that the allies were disposed "to terminate the wars ' On the conferences at The Hague, see Coquelle, L'alliance franco- hoUandaise, p. 120. ' For these conversations, see Bourguet, Le due de Choiseul et V Angleterre, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVII (1903), p. 456 et seq. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 575 which had already for some years subsisted between England Chap, vii and France on the one side, and His Majesty of Prussia, the a- ^■ House of Austria, and Her Majesty the Empress of Russia ^^^^-1763 on the other," and were ready to send plenipotentiaries to the congress "on condition that hostilities should not be sus- pended durmg the continuance of the negotiations." "After all," said Kaunitz, "a congress is not a peace; a congress has been known to break up!" Repulsed by England in the matter of the Spanish medi- ation, incapable of making a separate peace for France, and bound to the Coalition by ulterior interests, yet not wishing to see Prussia entirely crushed, Choiseul treated the sugges- tion of a congress as a "comedy" which could not be frankly accepted, nor yet openly repudiated. Even if the congress were convoked, the war would go on; if it were opposed by France, how could Choiseul hope to induce Pitt to a separate agreement? But there was still another embarrassment. Sweden and Poland, through which France might hope to have some influence in controlling the action of the congress, had not been included in the Anglo-Prussian invitation. With them excluded, if France opposed the wishes of Austria and Russia, she would be left to the mercy of England. If she accepted them, England, as Prussia's ally, would make her pay dearly for consenting to the dismemberment of Prus- sia; and who would defend her against the English demands? The situation was accurately described by Stahremberg in a despatch to Kaunitz, in which he said of Choiseul: "If the negotiations for peace are submitted to a congress, he will not remain the master; and it is much to be feared that the other ministers, who with all the public here long for peace, may force his hand." Choiseul did not wish a general pacification of Europe Reply of the until he had first made use of all the advantages the alliances Coalition to the Anglo-Fruaaian of France might afford in concluding peace with England, proposal His aim was, therefore, to frustrate the convoking of a gen- eral congress; and it was not until the middle of January, 1760, that the views of the allies were sufficiently harmonized to permit of a final reply to the Anglo-Prussian proposal; 576 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII and not until April 3 that it was presented to Duke Lewis of ^- °- Brunswick. Its purport was: (1) that, since the Anglo-French war had nothing to do with the war of the allies against the King of Prussia, the King of France was ready to treat of his per- sonal peace with the King of England by the mediation of the King of Spain; and (2) that, with regard to the war with the King of Prussia, the allies were disposed to assent to the idea of a congress; but, as they were bound by their treaties not to make peace except conjointly, it would be necessary, in order that they might be able to have an under- standing upon this subject, that invitations be extended to all the powers engaged in this war, including the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, and the King of Sweden. The reasons that had prevailed with the Coalition in for- mulating this reply were equally potent for considering it unsatisfactory. The elimination of England from the situ- ation by a separate peace with France would leave Prussia without defence in the congress; with the result either that there would be no general peace, which was most probable, or that Prussia would be practically effaced from the map. The mediation, or "interlocution," of Spain, — as San Seve- rino had called it, — was objectionable to England, whereas a settlement of Anglo-French affairs in a general congress would avoid not only such interference by Spain but also giving unnecessary offence to Charles III by finally reject- ing his mediation. Further, the difficulties with France once removed by a separate treaty of peace, there would be no argument for inducing Parliament to continue the subsidies for Prussia, which would be equivalent to a total abandon- ment of Frederick II. In January the British cabinet had been confidentially informed that, with the army of Fred- erick II reduced one-half, the best officers either killed or made prisoners, his remaining troops worn out with hard service and discouraged by lost battles, and his kingdom partly occupied by the enemy, he could not imaided sustain the assault of the combined powers. Although favorable to a general congress, except when DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 577 temporarily encouraged by a new ray of hope for his army, Chap. VII Frederick II was by no means averse to an understanding ^-^i between France and England, provided he could be included ^^^^"""'"^^ in it. In the conferences between the diplomatic represen- tatives at The Hague, the Prussian minister, Hellen, assured The aecret Affry that, "if France wished to make proposals to England diplomacy of 1 • 1 XT- -a/r ■ , I- -w^ . . Frederick II in which His Majesty of Prussia was included, they would be heard"; and this was in agreement with the expressions of York, who was officially instructed that if — in addition to Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick — Prussia could be included in the negotiations, George II would be ready to negotiate for a separate peace with France. At London Knyphausen was directed to urge this course as the most likely to be effective; and, in fact, as strictly necessary to the salvation of Prussia. In his extremity the lively imagination of the King was fertile in schemes for the promotion of peace at the expense of his neighbors. Austria, it was suggested by him, might find compensation for Silesia in Bavaria; and he at one time fancied that Russia might be reconciled by the offer of the city and territory of Erfurt, which belonged to the Elector of Mainz, as compen- sation to the King of Poland. To facilitate the rapprochement of England and France, Frederick II attempted privately to reach the ear of Choiseul, and through him of Louis XV, first by letters addressed to Voltaire with the understanding that they were to be shown to the minister, and afterward by a secret emissary. Baron Edelsheim of Gotha. "France," he wrote confidentially to a friend in Paris, the Bailli de Froullay, "can withdraw with honor from the sad situation in which she is placed, if she desires a separate peace with us, England, and our allies. If France consents to maintain the equilibrium of Germany, and to oblige her allies to subscribe to this by making common cause with England, she can expect to obtain conditions much more favorable than she will be able to have in any other case." "Only a few strokes of the pen," he considers, would be needed "to end a discord so fatal for Europe." The letter to the Bailli de Froullay, carried to Paris by VOL. III. — 37 578 A HISTOKY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A.D. 1756-1763 The results of Frederick II's secret diplomacy Edelsheim, was read by Louis XV, discussed with Choiseul, and answered in a friendly tone in a report made by Froullay. ■ The separate peace between France and England was in- sisted upon as the best means for securing the general peace, but Frederick II was assured in the report that France had no intention to derange the equilibrium of Germany or to exhaust the King of Prussia. France was ready either to receive or to offer proposals, if England was ready to nego- tiate. For the rest, an explicit explanation was not consid- ered timely; but Choiseul's remark, "You know very well that it is not I who made the treaty with Vienna," addressed to Froullay and reported by him, afforded a ground of hope to Frederick II. The whole correspondence was forwarded to Knyphausen with instructions to lay it before the British ministry, and especially to speak of it to Pitt. "You see," observed Fred- erick II in his despatch, "that France is resolved to make peace with England, in order to have occasion not to make another campaign. If the British ministry finds it possible to agree with France on the preliminaries, I believe the mat- ter could be settled and soon concluded. As to my fate, I would place it in the hands of England, . . . being per- suaded that I could not put it in better hands, and that she would take the necessary precautions that France should not dupe us in regard to me." In thus confiding his interests to England Frederick II beheved that England would either insist upon including him in a peace with France, or require France to remain neutral for the duration of the war on the continent; while, in either case, England would continue to aid him in resisting Austria and Russia. In his expectation that France would accept this arrange- ment, Frederick II was doomed to disappointment. On April 14 Affry, under instructions from Choiseul, made it clear to York, who reported it to London, that, while France was ready to include Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick in the separate negotiations with England, it would be abso- lutely impossible to include the King of Prussia. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN TEARS' WAR 579 And yet it was true, as we now know from a part of Choi- Chap, vil seul's instruction to his representative at The Hague which ^- °- could not be communicated to the British ambassador, that ^^^'^"^^^^ it was not against the interest of Frederick II that France was now acting. "We cannot be useful to the salvation of the King of Prussia," he writes, " without the separation of the two wars and the conclusion of our private peace. Every other means is useless to attempt in the face of allies as furious as ours for the total abasement of the House of Brandenburg." But on this point it was impossible to speak clearly to England, for fear she might "communicate these confidences relative to the King of Prussia to the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna." To save Prussia, France must have a free hand, and be able to meet her allies in the general congress without the embarrassment of an unsettled conflict with the ally of Frederick II. Such at least was Choiseul's theory. But the main object of the French minister was not to End of the rescue Prussia. As Affry stated in his reply of April 15, p<""'p<;'''"'^ for . . "^ '^ •' Jr- ; peace m 1760 Choiseul was placmg the British ministry in a position which he believed highly advantageous to France. Convinced that public sentiment in England was strongly for peace, he intended to force George II for the sake of his Hanoverian interests to accept a direct understanding with France or to submit to the mediation of Spain, whose conception of what was reasonable would then have to be respected unless England was prepared, as Choiseul believed was not the case, to risk driving that power into making common cause with France in the colonial war. Arrangements had been agreed upon for a person in the confidence of the French government to proceed to London to discuss secretly the preliminaries of peace; but on April 25 York was directed to inform the French ministry through his colleague at The Hague that this would be unnecessary, since England would enter upon no negotiations in which the King of Prussia was not formally included. This ultimatum was chiefly owing to the influence of Pitt; who, in reality, was not yet ready for peace, and considered 580 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The altered relations of the allies that the French proposal was designed only to separate England from her ally, while France retained her own alli- ance with Austria and Russia. When England had been thus isolated, he argued, France would refuse to abandon the colonies that had been taken from her, would then break off the negotiations, and attempt to influence public opinion by complaining of England's excessive cupidity, and by holding the British ministry responsible for the fail- ure to make peace. As a result of this procedure, Prussia would resent the bad faith of England in deserting her, the British ministry would lose caste both at home and abroad, the war would not be ended, and England would have gained nothing by this proposed perfidy to her allies. Thus ended for the time the efforts for peace. France, boimd to her allies by the fear of complete isolation if she did not adhere to them, insisted upon considering the two wars as entirely distinct; while England, on the other hand, would take part in no negotiations in which Prussia was not included. It was now a question of how most energetically to prose- cute the war. Frederick II, whose situation was still extremely grave, had not been idle. The hope of exciting the Turks against Austria and Russia had long been entertained at Berlin, and the reports of Rexin, the Prussian secret agent at Constanti- nople, now promised the early conclusion of a treaty with the Sultan and the invasion of Hungary by a Turkish army. These expectations were illusory, but they served to rekindle the enthusiasm of Frederick II, whose condition had been desperate. The immense losses sustained by his army had reduced it to less than a hundred thousand men. With such a force, confronted by two hundred and thirty thousand Austrians, Russians, Swedes, and Imperials — not counting the French — he was forced to act strictly upon the defensive. The war had become for him a battle for existence. Nothing but indecision or lack of co-operation on the part of the allies could possibly save him from complete ruin; DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAB 581 but, fortunately for him, dissension had already entered Chap, vii their cabinets. a. o. Choiseul had been perfectly loyal in advising Kaunitz of his attempt to open separate negotiations with England, but this candor had not preserved the Austrian chancellor from mistrust of France. The relations between Austria and Russia had been strained by the demand of the Czarina for the guarantee of her claims to East Prussia, a pretension that seemed at Vienna to possess quite a different character from the Aus- trian right to Silesia. Maria Theresa and Kaimitz were an- noyed by the exigence of an ally who found it necessary to assert a claim which seemed to imply distrust of the Em- press; and it was not imtil late in May, after Woronzoff had refused to permit the Russian troops to march unless the guarantee was given, that the treaty, reluctantly signed on April 1, 1760, was finally ratified under this compulsion. ^ Although Austria was imder formal obligation to make no engagement without the knowledge of France, this secret guarantee was for a long time unknown at Versailles. But there was another secret article which it would have been even more inconvenient to communicate to Louis XV, — a positive agreement with regard to a future war with Turkey, by which Austria was boimd to aid her ally in case Russia should demand it. This second engagement was closely connected with the first, for Russia had no intention of retaining East Prussia. It was, in part at least, to be returned to Poland, of which it had been a feudatory before it became independent under the Great Elector; ^ and, in exchange, Poland was to be required to cede to Russia the Polish rights in the Ukraine, thus bringing that territory into the possession of a strong power instead of a weak one. Such a menace to the Ottoman frontier would in all probability involve Russia in a war ' For the new treaty, which contained the guarantee in a secret article, see Martens, Recueil, A, Supplement III, p. 60. * See p. 29 of this volume. 582 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 1756-1763 The revival of Louis XV'a secret diplomacy Chap. VII with Turkey, and Austria had engaged to support the Czar- ina against the Sultan. Although these agreements still remained secret, the de- signs of Russia regarding Prussia were well understood at Versailles; for, even before the secret conventions were signed, Woronzoff had informed the French ambassador at St. Petersburg that, "if the Empress and the King of France M^ould consent," it was the intention of the Czarina to ex- change Prussia for the Ukraine. L'Hdpital had raised no objection, merely saying that it would first be necessary to obtain the consent of Austria, and the King could then con- sider the matter. Stahremberg also had, by instructions from Vienna, opened the subject to Choiseul, who, having lost all hope of a separate peace with England, was resolved to continue the war, and confidentially assented to overlook the intentions of Russia, provided that France be in no way connected with the matter. But when Esterhazy impru- dently revealed this compliance, Choiseul retracted his as- sent, demanded that Esterhazy withdraw his statement, and claimed the right of Louis XV to examine the agreement before pronouncing his decision. Soon afterward L'Hopital was recalled, and Baron de Breteuil was substituted in his place. 1 Clearly, although the secret engagement regarding Turkey still remained unknown in France, a decided contretemps had occurred in the Franco-Russian relations. The situation had become extremely embarrassing for France. It was necessary to continue the war; and, therefore, to remain in close alliance with Russia. On the other hand, it was not desired at Versailles that Prussia should be to- tally destroyed, or that Russia should greatly increase her predominance either by acquiring additional territory on the Baltic, as was feared, or by further encroaching upon, and thereby disabling the Ottoman Empire, as was proposed. What, then, was to be done to prevent one or another of these consequences? 1 L'Hopital still remained for some time at St. Petersburg, and diiring this time Breteuil had only the rank of a minister plenipotentiary. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 583 At this point the secret diplomacy of Louis XV again Chap. vii comes into action. The King, perceiving the error that had a. d. been committed by abandoning the traditional French pol- ^^56-1763 icy of maintaining a line of aUies in the East to restrain the House of Hapsburg, to whose chariot of triumph France was now chained by the Treaties of Versailles, began to recoil from the consequences of that alliance. Must he tacitly assent to the predominant partnership of Austria and Russia, continue without reward to help fight their battles, and passively witness the division of the spoils between them? Officially that was precisely the attitude imposed upon him, but personally and secretly he revolted against it. The official instructions directed the new ambassador to derive all possible benefit from the alliance with Russia for the con- tinuation of the war and the making of peace; but the secret instructions authorized him, as far as possible, to obstruct the designs of Russia, and even to retard the action of the Russian armies! The dilemma in which France was now placed by the agree- The dilemma ment of Austria and Russia for the dismemberment of Prussia °^ ^"""^ . . , regarding opened a long vista mto the future. Was it reasonable to Euaaia believe that those two powers would unite in partitioning Prussia, which was strong, and not combine in the future for the division of Poland, which was weak? Sweden had long ago ceased to be the great power she was at the Peace of Westphalia. Turkey, with Austria and Russia united against her, was doomed to gradual division by the complicity of her two Northern neighbors. If Po- land were effaced, the entire Eastern line of restraint on the House of Hapsburg would be swept away. What then could save France from the preponderating pressure of the Em- pire upon the Rhine? Evidently, there was the alternative of chnging closely to the Russian alliance, of being more Russian than Austria herself, and of awaiting the day when Austria and Russia would find their interests conflicting, when the Empire of the Czars might take the place of the former Eastern line of allies, — Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, — as Peter the Great 584 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII had once proposed, and in moments of danger keep the Em- ^■^- pire of the Hapsburgs under discipHne in the East.' • It was, in fact, this "duel of opinions" that now brought the secret diplomacy of Louis XV again into play, while the official diplomacy continued loyal to the anti-Prussian Coali- tion. How far the King alone stood for the one view and Choiseul for the other is a matter of dispute, and there are many reasons for believing that the two contradictory Unes of action were merely the results of indecision, growing out of the difficulty of totally abandoning the Russian alliance on the one hand and of preventing the execution of the designs of Russia on the other. ^ It was, in truth, a decisive moment in the history of Eu- rope, a turning-point the far-reaching significance of which was not sufficiently appreciated either by the King or by his minister; and yet it had been very clearly pointed out by Bernstorff, the foreign minister of Denmark, in a private letter to Choiseul. "The war of Germany," wrote the min- ister, "was kindled, not merely for a mediocre or a passing reason, — for some little provinces or places more or less, — but for the existence of the new monarchy which the King of Prussia has erected with an art and a promptitude which have surprised a part of Europe and deceived the other; it was started because the question was to be decided, if that new monarchy, — composed of different pieces which have not yet all the connection nor all the extent which are neces- sary to them, but which is entirely mihtary, and which still has all the vigor, all the agility, and all the cupidity of young and meagre bodies, — should continue to exist, and if the Empire should have two chiefs, and its Northern part a prince who, having made of his states an armed camp and of his people an army, if allowed a little leisure to round out and ' Something analogous to this has now happened in the existing Franco-Russian aUiance. ' Vandal regards the secret diplomacy as directly in conflict with the official. See Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 364 et seq. Waliszewski, on the contrary, regards Choiseul as really adhering to the principles of the secret diplomacy. See WaUszewski, La demibre des Romanov, p. 500 et seq. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 585 establish his power, might become the arbiter of the great Chap, vii affairs of Europe and the .make-weight in the balance of the ^- °- powers." 1 ^^^^-^^^^ The opportunity had arisen for reducing to impotence the menacing greatness of the Prussian monarchy. For that purpose France had for three years, at enormous cost, armed more than a hundred thousand men and fought six great battles. Now that the time had arrived when apparently nothing remained but for Russia to give the coup de grace to the enemy, the conclusion was arrived at that the whole effort had been of doubtful expediency. Plainly there were two distinct policies between which The secret in- to choose : either to withdraw from the war and throw the =*™<=*'°'^ to Breteml influence of France boldly and forcibly on the side of main- taining the old system and preserving for Frederick II a sufficient basis to make his alliance of future value to France; or to trust and support the Russian alliance, accomplish the purpose for which the war was begun, and rely upon a close friendship with Russia to restrain the too great preponderance of Austria. In fact, neither of these policies was adopted, but a com- promise between them, which left France eventually without any firm and loyal friend in the East. Choiseul had chosen Breteuil as the new ambassador to Russia in the hope that he, with his youth, his personal at- tractions, and his greater vigor, not only might influence more effectively than L'Hopital had done the personal in- clinations of the Czarina, but win for France the friendship of the Princess Catherine, whose future importance the min- ister of France had the discernment thus early to appreciate. It was, in a sense, a shrewdly conceived idea of saluting the » rising sun; for Elizabeth's end was likely to be near, and Catherine, who held different views, as wife of the next Czar, Peter III, would have a great role to play.^ ' Correspondance entre Bernslorff et Choiseul (1758-1766), p. 112. ' According to Vandal, it was the intention of Choiseul to employ the young ambassador for the purpose of gaining the affections of Catherine in a manner not permitted by a strict code of morals. 586 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII The King, with a more definite purpose, lost no time in A. D. grafting upon the official policy his own secret diplomacy, by issuing to the young ambassador a private instruction, the aim of which was to destroy Russian and re-establish French infiuence in Poland.' This document, which placed Breteuil in possession of a negotiation which the King declared was "unknown to all his ministers," but was to modify all the official instructions, expressed the desire of Louis XV "to protect the liberties of the constitution of the Republic of Poland, preserve it from all danger to subjection on the part of neighboring powers, . . . and to see that the Republic should choose to govern it a prince who would be agreeable to His Majesty." The prince whom the King had in mind was Xavier of Saxony, third son of Frederick Augustus II, — whose life was expected to be of short duration, — and the favorite brother of the wife of the Dauphin, whose influence it was expected would be advantageous to France. Russia's part in the war must, if possible, be so restricted that her power to dictate the ^ terms of peace would be limited. Jn brief, Breteuil was to destroy the idea of the cession of Prussia with the intention of an exchange for the Ukraine; to labor to obtain instead an indemnity in money from Prussia or England; and "to relax, if circumstances permit, the operations of the Russians, in order that they may not put their services and their suc- cess at too high a price; and that, on the contrary, the arms of His Majesty may secure to him the principal part in the negotiation of the peace!" The divergent Louls XV profouudly dlstrusted Russia, whose domination ^msof Loms ^^Qyer Poland he resented. Choiseul was of a different mind. XV and Choiseul To him the main interest of France was the early conclusion of the war with England. The divergence of views between the King and his minister is rendered unquestionable by the secret instructions sent to Breteuil. In order to prevent as far as possible the embarrassment of contrary instructions from the French foreign office, he was explicitly directed to ^ For the terms of the secret instruction to Breteuil, see Vandal, aa before, p. 373 et seq. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 587 color his reports to Choiseul in such a manner as to impress Chap, vii htm with the danger that would arise from the aggrandize- ^- "■ ment of Russia, and thus to elicit from the minister orders ^^^^^^^^ compatible with the private views of the King.i In brief, * '-- the ambassador was charged to aid his royal master in pro- curing official instructions from the King's own minister in harmony with the secret diplomacy, which aimed at limiting as much as possible the activity of Russia in the war! This was at the moment when the fortunes of Frederick II were at their lowest ebb. " I am at the end of my resources," he had written on January 1, 1760; "the continuation of the war means for me utter ruin." On March 19 he confessed in private correspondence, "I tremble as I look forward to the next campaign." In May the same discouragement prevailed. "I have already wrought miracles, but the worst of modern miracles is that they have to be done all over again." And yet at the end of that year, in spite of new reverses, the condition of Frederick II's affairs, even from a military point of view, were considerably improved. The Russian generals hardly needed the restraining action The fluctua- of Louis XV's ambassador to prevent their crushing Frederick *'™^ °* ^"^"'^ 11.^ Their own lack of initiative and of co-operation with Austria seemed for a time to assure their want of success, and Frederick II held them at bay until the imperative orders of the Czarina, who was impatient with their inaction, urged them on to Berlin, which they entered on October 9, 1760.' The news of this blow rendered the King of Prussia almost desperate, and Europe believed his cause was lost. Although his capital was soon evacuated, Frederick II found himself enclosed between the Russians and the Austrians in a terri- tory of less extent than that of the electorate of Branden- ' Vandal, as before, p. 377. ^ Saltuikoff's plan of campaign was, "an ingenious method of avoid- ing a general engagement at aD hazards, and keeping out of harm's way as much as possible." ' The Russians profited by their occupation of BerUn to exact a contribution of a miUion five hundred thousand thalers and two hun- dred thousand thalers as douceurs for the troop. 588 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The policies of France 3Bd Russia burg. But on November 3, at Torgau, the Austrians were forced to retreat, after heavy losses; and the Russians, learn- ■ ing of this reverse, retired into Poland. It is difficult to judge to what extent the interests of Prus- sia were indirectly favored by the secret diplomacy of Louis XV. It is known that Breteuil was furnished by the King with a million livres "to divide among the members of the ministry as he will judge necessary to seduce them." ' While the proof is not positive, it is at least highly probable, that the renunciation of the Russian plan to occupy Dantzig as a military base was owing to Breteuil's appeal to Woron- zoff. Louis XV had previously loaned the chancellor a hundred and fifty thousand 6cus; and on January 3, 1761, sent a secret instruction to Breteuil in which he said: "Cause Count Woronzoff to understand, that, if he is as truly at- tached as he assures me, he would act in a manner in conflict with his professions, not only if he supported such a design, but even if he did not hinder it. Should the remittance of the debt he owes me have the effect of preventing this blow, I should consider the money well used." ^ Although the ministers and generals of the Czarina were not unapproachable by foreign influences, nothing could alter the inflexible determination of Elizabeth herself to crush "the disturber of the peace of Europe," as she never ceased to regard the King of Prussia. Frederick II himself, believ- ing that the Russian court was venal, offered large sums to the favorite courtiers of the Czarina, in the hope of turning her purpose; but while she might be thwarted in the field or in the council chamber in matters of detail, no one dared to oppose her fixed resolution to destroy the King of Prussia. The negotiations opened between Woronzoff and Breteuil in February, 1761, having borne no fruits and indicating no real change of purpose, constitute an almost negligible epi- sode.^ They serve, however, to reveal the conflicting pur- * Quoted by Waddington, La guerre de sept ans, IV, p. 465. 2 See the full text of the letter in Vandal, as before, pp. 387, 389. ' See the criticisms of Vandal's account of them in Waliszewski, as before, pp. 508, 524. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARs' WAB 589 poses which at that time paralyzed action on the part of Chap, vii France. ^- ^^ In Choiseul's opinion peace with England had now become imperative. The situation in America and India was des- perate, and French commerce was almost driven from the sea. The attempt of the French to recapture Quebec had ended in failure, Montreal had fallen, and Pondicherry was on the point of capitulation. On the Russian side the support of France for the dis- memberment of Prussia and the acquisition of the Ukraine provinces by the Czarina was necessary to counteract the opposition of Austria to Russian aggrandizement. This support, it was believed at St. Petersburg, could be ob- tained from Choiseul by Russia's offering to mediate a peace between France and England. By this offer, it was thought, France might be drawn into supporting the terri- torial claims of the Czarina; and, if she should succeed in procuring a separate peace between the two maritime powers, France would be better able and more disposed to throw her force into the continental war, and thus aid in accomplishing Russia's purposes. The new path of negotiation with England through Rus- sian mediation opened for a time seductively before Choiseul, for the cession of the Ukraine to Russia at the expense of Poland seemed to him a small price to pay for the good offices of Russia in concluding the colonial and maritime war with England. The Czarina was ready to sign with France a new treaty by which the interests of the two countries would be separately secured without the inclusion of Austria. Russia might thus in time become the needed ally of France in the East, — as Peter the Great had often urged. The fate of Poland would then be of subordinate importance, since the great empire of the Czars might become a substitute for that comphcated system of alliances in the North and East which had been so costly to maintain and so uncertain of contiauance. It was with joy, therefore, that in April, 1761, Choiseul was assured by Breteuil, "The keenest desire of Russia is 1756-1763 590 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII to obtain aggrandizement on the side of the Ukraine at the expense of Poland, and we can and should derive from this a great gain. . . . The Poles will not be content with it, and the Turks may very likely be offended; but, without doubt, these considerations can yield to the advantage of assur- ing, or at least facilitating, the return of our possessions in ' America." Louis xv's (While Choiseul, personally, would have been pleased to ^*™'* °^ strengthen the ties with Russia and to accept the hand of friendship the Czarina was offering, Louis_XV, who cared little for his colonies but thought much of French influence in~Toland, was as imperative in obstructing peace as his minister was solicitous of promoting it. At St. Petersburg Breteuil had completely fallen in with the plan of a close alliance with Russia, the cession by Poland of a portion of the Ukraine, and the Russian mediation between France and England. On June 8, 1761, his royal master administered to him a sharp reproof, informing him that he had gone too far in his overtures with the Russians, from whom the King " expected no advantage," except to prevent their treat- ing with his enemies. "I have reason to believe," he added, "that my authorizing the Russians to take possession of the Ukraine would only increase the coolness of the Turks with regard to me. I would in this case pay too dearly for an al- liance contracted with a stat^where intrigue acquires a new force every day, even to the extent of rendering fruitless the explicit orders of the sovereign, ' and where the imcer- tainty of the succession does not admit of reliance upon even the most solemn engagements." With naive frankness the King concludes his secret orders by saying: "I am aware of the difficulty of reconciling the instructions which I send you with those which you receive from the Duke de Choiseul; but I require of you that you use every effort to recall my minister to principles more favorable to Poland than those by which he appears to be guided, but without exciting him too much or rendering him suspicious!" Thus, wholly apart from the intrinsic difficulties of a DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN TEARS' WAR 591 Russian mediation, its success was thwarted by the King's Chap, vil secret opposition. a. d. Parallel with the futile negotiations with St. Petersburg, ^^^^"^^^-^ Choiseul carried on a long correspondence with Vienna. After a full exchange of views, in which it was made clear to The tension Kaunitz that France was extremely anxious for the conclu- between France , . aiicl Austna sion of the war, Choiseul, in his instructions to his cousin at Vienna, in February, 1761, openly accused the Austrian chancellor of opposing the idea of peace; and made the sig- nificant statement that, "after having made the advances of friendship and imion which Austria had treated so lightly," the King of France considered that "he would not failLn performing his duty to his allies if he should pursue the course which he esteemed most suitable to the interests of his king- dom." ^ Without intending to abandon the Austrian alli- ance, Choiseul had now resolutely determined to pursue the policy of a separate peace between France and England. III. The Peace of Paris and of Hubertusburg It is needless for our purposes to follow in detail either The renewal the conversations of Galitzin, the Russian ambassador at ^ ™|°^^^^°°° London, with the English ministry, or the more direct ap- proaches of Choiseul through his emissary, Bussy, and the English agent, Stanley, which occupied the months from April to October, 1761. ^ The constant and insurmountable obstacle to peace with England, except upon terms which France could not accept without humiliation, had not been removed. On October 25, 1760, George II had died, and George III had succeeded him; but, although the policies of the new king — whose chief aim was to establish his personal authority rather than to extend his colonial empire — were opposed to those of Pitt, the time had not come for the Great Commoner to ' See Waddington, as before, IV, pp. 465, 481. 2 For the details of these negotiations, see Waddington, as before, IV, pp. 494, 601. 1756-1763 592 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII abdicate; and Galitzin was soon made to understand that England denied the right of powers possessing neither fleets nor colonies to intervene in a war purely maritime and colonial. It was Pitt who prepared the instructions of Stanley; and there was, therefore, little prospect of success by direct ne- gotiation. Since the King of Prussia had receded from his objections to a separate peace between France and England, there was, however, no obstacle to overcome in this respect. Choiseul had, in fact, made the principle of uti possidetis the basis of the negotiation; but without fixing the date when it would come into effect. Pitt at once perceived that France would claim the restitution of the English conquests in the colonies in compensation for the restoration of the con- quests made by France from the allies of England, the Land- grave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick. But, as he remarked to Galitzin, he did not mean that England should sacrifice her maritime empire to the demands of France on the continent. "France," he declared, "must not flatter herself that Hanover will serve as a road for her to America and India." Stanley was, therefore, instructed to receive suggestions regarding acquisitions and compensations only ad referendum. On June 14, 1761, the little island on the coast of Brittany called Belle-Isle was occupied by a British force. It was the first time during the war that France had lost territory of her own in Europe. Would Belle-Isle also fall under the principle of uti possi- detis? Could any condition of distress force upon the French the acceptance of such a loss? But, if not, the principle of possession would have to be abandoned, and England could name the terms of exchange. At first it was thought the island would be surrendered; but when Bussy demanded that it be immediately evacuated, Pitt coolly replied: "You may be assured that we have no wish to retain Belle-Isle, but it will have to be taken into account." It is not surpris- ing, therefore, that soon afterward Bussy reported to Choi- seul: "It appears certain, Monseigneur, that this minister A. D. 1756-1763 DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 593 is determined to continue the war or make us purchase peace Chap. Vll at an unreasonable price." When Choiseul laid down the principle of uti possidetis as the basis of negotiation and announced that "the States of the allies of Great Britain in Germany" were to be in- The EngUah eluded, he furnished Pitt the opportunity to present through "^f jettionf Stanley, on June 29, the following conditions of peace : the ot France cession of the whole of Canada and all the islands in the river ^''^ ®'""° and gulf of St. Lawrence, with exclusively English rights of fishing in those waters; the cession of Senegal and the island of Goree on the west coast of Africa; the demolition as re- quired by the Treaty of Utrecht of the fortifications recon- structed at Dunkirk; the equal division of the neutral Antilles; the restitution of Minorca; and the immediate evacuation of all the French conquests in Germany, in- cluding Wesel.' The questions of Dimkirk and the restoration of the French fishing rights lay nearest to Choiseul's heart. "Give us the fisheries and save for us the point of honor regarding Dun- kirk, and the peace is made," Choiseul is reported to have exclaimed to Stanley; but this was not meant as final. The Council had yet to consider the subject. In his subsequent instructions to Bussy the minister of France named three points for discussion: Cape Breton, with the right of France to catch fish in the Canadian waters; Dunkirk, which was considered a point of honor; and Senegal, which was necessary for the slave trade. Pitt was firm on all these points. When incidentally Bussy declared regarding the neutral Antilles, "We could treat of that subject only conjointly with Spain, on account of the pretensions of His CathoUc Majesty," Pitt exclaimed, • "Spain has nothing to do with the negotiation between the ^ two crowns, and England will never permit that she be admitted." It was precisely here that the last hope of France was to be sought. By joining the grievances of Spain in the same 1 A possession of the King of Prussia on the Rhine, then occupied in the name of Austria. VOL. lU. — 38 594 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 1756-1763 Chap. VII negotiation with the interests of France Choiseul hoped that the fear of being compelled to face a war with both monar- chies would turn the balance, and that even Pitt would make concessions. To justify the introduction of the Spanish grievances,' Choiseul announced the previous agreement of France to. employ good offices in the affairs of Charles III. The nego- tiations between Louis XV and the King of Spain had, how- ever, in reality contemplated the union of their forces against England; but Choiseul was sincere in his desire for peace, and on July 7 wrote to Ossun to admit this openly at Madrid. "It is not the war properly considered which causes the King to desire peace," he said to the ambassador; "it would, perhaps, be advantageous to continue the war, but we have interior troubles which fatigue the King to excess, which introduce bitterness into his life, and which only peace can suppress." The negotiations for an offensive alliance which was under consideration were, therefore, to be suspended, in the hope that peace with England and a pacific settlement of the Spanish grievances might be concluded. It is evident that in July, 1761, the separate peace between France and England, though involving enormous conces- sions by France, was by no means impossible. But in addi- tion to the large demands of Pitt another impediment now made its appearance. Stahremberg had been permitted by Choiseul's loyalty to the Austrian alliance to follow closely the course of the correspondence between Paris and London. Suspecting that the result of the negotiations would be the final withdrawal of France from the Austrian alliance, Stah- remberg recalled to Choiseul the obligation undertaken m. the treaties to submit the arrangements for peace to the ap- proval of the Empress. In brief, perceiving the probability of success in arranging a separate peace with England, Stahremberg now resolved to impede it by introducing the reserves of Austria. The interven- tioQ of Austria ' These were chiefly three in number: U) the seizure ot Spanish ships; (2) exclusion from the Newfoundland fisheries; and (3) British settlements in Honduras to cut logwood. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN TEARS' WAR 595 In giving consent to the separate negotiations with Eng- Chap. Vll land, Austria had demanded that all the possessions taken ^•"■ from Prussia be retained; and that the King of England, ^^^^^^^^ both as king and as elector, should agree to furnish no fur- ther aid, either in troops or in money, to the King of Prussia, and to engage that the troops of Hanover, Brunswick, and / Hesse be not permitted to afford such aid. These conditions were communicated to Pitt; and, to embroil the matter further, Kaunitz presented through Stahrem,berg a memorandiun which, if adhered to by France, would (^questionably terminate the Anglo-French negotia- tions through the refusal of England to comply with its terms. y Choiseul, while afiirming the loyalty of France to the Austrian alliance, maintained the essential and absolute separation of the two wars; but the attempt to introduce the ' affairs of Spain into the negotiations, combined with the reserves and restrictions imposed by Austria, evoked a reply from Pitt which rendered further efforts for peace almost hopeless. He insisted upon the immediate evacuation of the places taken by France on the continent, including Wesel, expressed his intention to continue the support of Frederick H to the end, and declined to discuss any questions relating to Spain. Although the conversations dragged on for two months longer, it was practically certain at the end of July that a separate peace between France and England was im- possible of realization. It was, in fact, only in order to confront the English min- The Franco- istry with a solid offensive alliance between France and ^^^I'^f ""'^ Spain before the war was renewed that Choiseul protracted the negotiations; and, on July 30, he announced to Ossun that the war was about to be resumed, and with more fury than ever. It was now the aim of Choiseul to reanimate the desire of Charles III for a union of the two monarchies against Eng- land, which during the negotiations for peace he had been endeavoring to repress. Unfortunately for the success of his revived intention to excite anew the warlike feelings of ' See Waddington, as before, IV, p. 557. 596 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. 1). 1756-1763 The substance of the Franco- Spanish compact Spain, he had consented in the later stages of the negotiation with Pitt to conclude peace with England without further reference to the Spanish grievances. Choiseul had now to overcome first of all the prejudice he had thus created. When, therefore, in August, Ossun insinuated to His Catholic Majesty that, "if he could declare himself before the approaching autumn, that would deliver a decisive blow to the commerce of England," Charles III, resenting Choi- seul's indifference to the interests of Spain in his solicitude to make peace for France, declared that there remained im- portant measures for him to take both in the Indies and in Europe before he would be in a condition to act with efficiency. But this reserve was of short duration; for, the attempt to settle directly the differences between Spain and England having failed, there remained no other alternative than a imion with France, and on August 15, 1761, was signed at Paris and ratified at St. Ildefonse on the twenty-fifth the famous Facte de famille, by which Louis XV and Charles III contracted "to perpetuate in their posterity the senti- ments of Louis XIV, their common ancestor, and to cause to subsist forever a solemn monument of the reciprocal in- terest which should be the basis of the desires of their hearts and of the prosperity of their royal families." ^ By the terms of this family compact between the two branches of the House of Bourbon every enemy of either became the "common enemy of both." The new treaty made definite provision for the sea and land forces to be furnished by Spain. Regarding the opera- tions of war and the conditions of peace, "the two monarchies of France and Spain, in the entire extent of their domination, will be regarded and will act as if they formed one single power." The droit d'aubaine was reciprocally abolished throughout both kingdoms, including the Two Sicilies, and subjects of both nations were empowered to dispose freely of all their possessions either by testament, gift, or otherwise, and their heirs had equal rights with native subjects. On For the text, see Wenok, III, p. 278; and Del Cantillo, p. 468. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 597 both sides privileges of trade were accorded, with no higher Chap, vii customs duties than were required of natives. a- »■ On the same day a secret convention was signed, by which ^^^^"^^^3 Spain engaged to declare war on England on May 1, 1762, if peace were not concluded before that date with full recogni- tion of the Spanish grievances. The restoration of Minorca to Spain was stipulated, "if God should so bless the united forces that they would not be obliged to surrender it." By another article the contractants affirmed their intention to require Portugal, even by force, to espouse their cause. A few days after the final ratification of the treaty the negotiations between France and England were definitely broken off. Instead of being intimidated by the union of the Bourbon monarchies, Pitt took prompt occasion, on September 18, to present to the British cabinet a resolution terminating with a declaration of war against Spain. The suave assurance of Wall, reported from Madrid through Lord Bristol, that "the Catholic King had never been more desirous of maintaining good relations with His Britannic Majesty than in the existing circumstances," had jarred upon the tense sensibilities of the minister as discordant with the truth; and his frank, bold nature answered it, as he felt that it deserved to be answered, with a firm acceptance of the challenge which the family compact had insinuated and yet had not dared to utter openly.^ But the answer of Pitt did not express the views of the The resigna- Cabuiet or of the King. On October 5 his resignation was *'°° °* ^'" offered and accepted. Lord Granville, who presided, re- marked: "I perceive that the gentleman is determined to leave us; I am not sorry, for otherwise it is we who would be obliged to leave him." The opinions of Lord Bute, Newcastle, and others who formed the majority had prevailed, leaving Pitt unsupported except by his brother-in-law, Temple, who resigned with him; and yet, although King, Council, and even Parliament 1 The intercepted letters of Fuentea, Spanish ambassador at London, and Grimaldi, Spanish ambassador at Paris, had proved that the Facte defamille had been signed on August 15. A. D. 1756-1763 598 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII were against him, it was Pitt who represented the temper and spirit of the British nation. England, vmder his vigorous and imperious leadership, had carried to a successful issue the most stupendous conflict undertaken up to that time by any modern nation; a conflict in which, as Burke expressed it, "the British island seemed to struggle with equal arms against the rest of Europe." The war had begun under what had seemed to be adverse conditions, and had by Pitt's imfailing resolution resulted in British supremacy in America, in Asia, and on the sea. The pride of Englishmen had never been so heightened, the power of England had never seemed so great. The humility of Pitt in the presence of George III, when the King accepted his resignation and offered him for his services "any form of liberality in his power to accord," his tears, his recognition of the royal "benevolence," his accept- ance of a pension of three thousand pounds sterling, all seem in strange contrast with his firm, fearless, almost defiant power during the years when he had controlled the destinies of his country as an uncrowned king. But neither his con- temporaries nor posterity have failed to admire his ardent patriotism, his devotion to duty as he discerned it, and the clearness of his vision as the founder of a world empire. His faults and his foibles were too evident to be denied, the energy of his character was more conspicuous than his sense of equity, and the complete realization of his dreams might have proved a fatal misfortune even to his own country; and yet it must be admitted that, more than any other Englishman of his time, he was the incarnation of the charac- ter and aspirations of the people of England, who regarded his fall as a public calamity, and continued after his retire- ment to express for him every manifestation of admiration. England's Lord Egrcmout, who succeeded Pitt in the Southern De- orwar^titii partment of foreign affairs, and the Earl of Bute, who suc- Spain ceeded Holdemess, followed for a time the same policy as the former administration, but in a different spirit. To the fictitious pretence of friendly feeling which had aroused Pitt's indignation, Egremont replied with studied politeness DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN TEARS' WAR 599 that "the King of England, confident in the friendly assur- Chap, vii ances of Spain so often repeated, refused to believe that a ■*^-°- treaty emanating from that power could contain anything prejudicial to Great Britain," but the rumors spread abroad of the warlike intentions of Spain obliged him to ask for explanations. The reply was not long retarded. Wall had in the mean- time informed Lord Bristol at Madrid that the rejection of Choiseul's reasonable proposals indicated the intention of England to complete the ruin of France and then to attack the possessions of Spain in America, adding that he had ad- vised Charles III to defend his rights. This information produced much excitement in the Eng- lish cabinet, and Lord Bristol was ordered to demand a categorical reply to the question regarding Spain's intentions; and, in case it were refused, to state that this refusal was equivalent to a declaration of war. This order was promptly executed, with the result that, on December 10, the purpose of Charles III was expressed in the words of his minister: "Your Excellency may retire when and in whatever maimer he finds most convenient. This is the only reply which, without detaining you. His Majesty has commanded me to make to you." Having been delayed through the refusal of post-horses, Bristol was unable to leave Madrid for a week; and it was not until his arrival in Portugal that he could forward copies of the correspondence. The rupture with Spain being thus com- plete, the English cabinet declared war on January 2, 1762. In the meantime, the family compact had been published, and it was known that the friendly professions of Spain had been made only for the purpose of permitting the treasure- ships to arrive from America. The resignation of Pitt had been to Frederick II a heavy The acoesaion blow. Not to speak of the sympathy between the two men °^ f^f^roL as types of character in which a bold, firm grasp of interests of Russia and a heroic temper were united, each had received substan- tial benefit from the aims and loyalty of the other. Frederick II had aided Pitt by draining the resources of France m the 1756-1763 600 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII continental war, and Pitt had aided the King of Prussia by furnishing him with substantial subsidies. Would England ■ pursue this policy when Pitt's strong hand was removed from the conduct of affairs, and especially when England had to face two enemies instead of one? Frederick II had many reasons to doubt it. At the end of 1761 Frederick II was iu a desperate situa- tion. He had been vainly hoping for the intervention of the Sultan, with whom lq the previous March he had made a treaty of friendship and commerce.' In December he was ready to hire an army of Tartar horsemen to ravage the hered- itary estates of Austria; but, although his emissaries were endeavoring to conclude a bargain with the Tartar khan, these auxiliaries were not at his disposal, and in the presence of a himdred and thirty thousand Austrian and Russian troops he could only muster about fifty thousand. In the first days of January, 1762, he wrote to a friend: "It seems to me that we ought now to think of preserving for my nephew, by way of negotiation, whatever fragments of my possessions we can snatch from the avidity of my enemies. Be persuaded that if I saw a gleam of hope — even by running the greatest risks — of re-establishing the State on its ancient founda- tions, I would not use such language; but I am convinced that, morally and physically, it is impossible." On January 5, the day before Frederick II wrote these words, an event had occurred at St. Petersburg which not only opened for him a way of rescue, but by its ultimate re- sults changed the entire political situation and, in great meas- ure, determined the future destiny of Europe. The daughter of Peter the Great, the Czarina Elizabeth, had passed away; and the Archduke Peter, husband of Catherine of Anhalt- Zerbst, her bitter enemy, had succeeded her.^ The first act of Peter III, who entertained for Frederick II an almost servile admiration, was to despatch messengers to 1 For the treaty of March 22, 1761, between Prussia and Turkey, see Wenck, III, p. 270. ^ The Russian succession from Peter I is shown in Table VIII, at the end of this volume. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 601 the Russian generals to forbid further hostilities, and to the Chap, vii King of Prussia to announce to him the Czar's sentiments of ^- "■ loyal friendship. ^^^'^'^^^'^ Frederick II had hoped, in the event of the Archduke's accession to the throne, only for his neutrality; and as soon The alliance as he learned of the event he sent a courier to express his °^ f-T'^ . ,. . . ^ and Prussia congratulations and to solicit peace, for which he was even ready to sacrifice Eastern Prussia. To his amazement, Peter III not only made no demand for territory but freely offered him his alliance. On May 5, 1762, peace was formally signed between the two monarchies, and on June 8 they formed an offensive and defensive alliance.' The Russian troops together with the Austrian, still occupied Silesia, and twenty thousand men were thus by a stroke of the pen transferred from one side of the contest to the other. Not only were Austria and France thus suddenly deserted, but Prussia from a crushed and almost extinguished monarchy unexpectedly sprang into the place of leadership in Europe. More German than Russian, the main thought of Peter III was for his ancestral duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, still held by Denmark. To him the vast empire of which he had become the sovereign was of importance chiefly as an instrument for the recovery of his hereditary duchy. After his alliance with Frederick II, — of whom in his excess of adulation he said, "I hope that my master will not discharge me; if he orders it I shall go to make war in hell with all my empire," — Peter Ill's next step was preparation for an invasion of Denmark. Together with his "master" this young enthu- siast, — whose impetuous nature and undisciplined mentality were from the first recognized as a danger to the interests of the Moscovite empire — dreamed of remodelling the map of Europe upon some harebrained plan of his own conception. Although Peter III was full of deference for the genius of The character Frederick II, he was in all other relations arbitrary and im- ^"p^^t^Ji^in*^ perious. His life with Catherine of Anhalt had been for her a constant torture, and after his accession she trembled lest ' For the treaty, see Wenok, III, p. 209. 602 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII she should be divorced and sent to a convent, or subjected ^■^- to a fate even worse. In self-defence she felt compelled to seek her husband's ruin. The hostility of the Czar for every- thing Russian, his contempt for religion, his disdain of coun- sel and his frequent fits of intoxication soon made his rule unbearable to the court, the clergy, and the army; while the patience, devotion, and intelligence of Catherine drew to her side all the controlling forces of the empire. The Czar's attitude toward the allies of Russia was un- endurably insolent. A prince of Holstein having visited St. Petersburg, the Czar demanded that the foreign ambassadors should make the first call upon him. Count Mercy-Argen- teau, who had succeeded Esterhazy as the ambassador of Austria at St. Petersburg, announced that his official char- acter did not permit of his showing this honor to a secondary prince. Breteuil, whose credentials classed him only as a minister plenipotentiary, did not decline to make the first visit, but demanded that the prince should first notify him of his arrival. This personage having refused either to call upon the ambassador or to notify the minister, Woronzoff was instructed to inform them that they could not present their credentials to the new czar or have an audience of him unless they had satisfied the pretences of the priace. In return Louis XV, resenting this indignity, declared that "it would be unfitting that the ambassador of Russia accredited to him should be received at court while his minister was denied access to the Czar." The questions of local ceremony were resolved after the departure of the prince, but the injury to the royal sensi- bilities remained, and a violent correspondence followed, in which Peter III claimed his right to the title of "Emperor"; which France declined to accord, although Elizabeth had, as a concession ad hoc, been addressed during the latter part of her reign as "Empress of Russia." The foreign policy of the Czar was even more disquieting to the former allies of Russia than his ceremonial preten- sions. His purpose to take possession of Dantzig and to re- claim from Denmark Holstein and Schleswig, which France DIPLOMACY OP THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 603 had guaranteed, disquieted Versailles; while his requirement Chap. Vll as a condition of peace that all the possessions of Prussia '^•^• conquered during the war be restored, created alarm at ■ Vienna. Finally, the probability that he would completely affirm his mastery in Poland, the fact that the Russians had already taken possession of Pomerania in the interest of Frederick II, and that the King of Prussia had, on May 22, made peace with the Swedes, ' who after expending eight million thalers had gained nothing by the war, augured the complete predominance of the Russo-Prussian alliance. But the feeble hold which Peter III had upon his own Assassination people — more Oriental than European in their habits and °*J''*^''^" r r- XT and accession conceptions — rendered easy the consummation of his fall, of Catherine ii On July 9, 1762, on the eve of his departure to take command of his army of sixty thousand men in Pomerania, the Czar was arrested by the order of Catherine, — supported by her intimate favorites the Orloff brothers, — and forced to ab- dicate in favor of their son, the Grand Duke Paul, a child of eight years; and, a week later, imder circumstances which are not precisely known, the Czar was assassinated while a prisoner in the castle of Ropcha.^ The fall of Peter III once more changed the face of affairs at St. Petersburg. The ambitious German princess whom Elizabeth had disgraced, whose father had served as a Prus- sian general, and whose marriage with the Archduke Peter had been arranged by no less a personage than Frederick II, was at once proclaimed by the troops and endorsed by the clergy as "Empress of all the Russias" under the name of Catherine II. Although Catherine II was obliged to repudiate the pol- icies of her murdered husband, and in her first public mani- festo referred to Frederick II as "a disturber of the public peace," she did not revert to the policy of the Czaruia Elizabeth. The Russian troops that had been placed at the 1 For the Treaty of Hamburg, of May 22, 1762, see Wenck, III, p. 307. ^ See Waliszewski, Le roman d'une imperatrice, p. 159, who says: "L'histoire de la conspiration de 1762 est encore k faire." 604 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 "The situation of the powers disposal of Frederick II were recalled, but the former rela- tions with Austria and France were not renewed. The result of this attitude was to leave Austria in practical isolation. In France, then fully absorbed in the renewed war with England, the secret diplomacy of Louis XV had defi- nitely shaped the attitude of that monarchy toward Russia for many years to come. In September the King wrote to Breteuil: "You know already, and I repeat it here very clearly, that the aim of my policy with Russia is to remove her as far as possible from the affairs of Europe. . . . Every- thing that can plunge her into chaos and cause her to enter into obscurity is advantageous to my mterests." In har- mony with this declaration, the representatives of France at Stockholm, Constantinople, and Warsaw were directed to do all in their power to diminish and oppose the influence of Russia. The two great conflicts which had so strangely inter- mingled in the "Seven Years' War" had now in the course of its development become practically separated. Russia, which had been united with Austria and France in the coalition against Prussia, had now passed into a state of neutrality; and, with the recall of Bestusheff as Chancellor by Cath- erine II, good relations with England were re-established. On the other hand, Spain, which had long remained neutral, was fully launched upon the maritime and colonial struggle into which she had been drawn by France. In the Austro-Prussian conflict, Frederick II, who had so long despaired of peace, was now in a position to impose it; for Austria, whose star had seemed for several years to be in the ascendant, was reduced to a merely defensive position, and her allies had all substantially abandoned her; while in August, 1762, Frederick II was again master of Silesia. On the sea — for the war had practically terminated in America and India by the defeat of France — the conflict had been renewed with vigor, and heavy losses had been inflicted on the French and the Spaniards. In February Martinique had been taken, thus depriving France of her seat of government and principal naval base ia the West DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 605 Indies; and, on August 12, Havana, with immense booty, Chap. Vll was captured by the English. On September 25 an expedition ^•''• that had sailed from Madras landed at Manila and took the ^^^^^^^^ town by storm; thus obtaming the key to the Philippmes. Immense exactions in money were made from the inhabitants of the captured cities, and it was not only proved that war could be made a source of pecuniary profit, but the necessity of possessing a powerful fleet for the defence of distant colonies was demonstrated. ^ In spite of the success of British arms, Lord Bute — who Renewal of was the chief favorite of the King — and a great majority '"'«°*if '°™ '■"■ . ° ° J J peace between of the Cabmet, mcludmg Newcastle, who was its nominal England and head, desired peace. This was not unnatural, for all the ^''*°'* British successes were ascribed to the policies of Pitt, whose * predictions had been justified. Even before the capture of Havana the preliminary ne- gotiations for peace between England and France, which had been broken off by Pitt, had been resumed by Bute at London. In September the Duke of Bedford was sent to Paris to conduct the negotiations there, but the object of his mission was so impopular in England that he was hooted in the streets as he set out upon his journey. While the preliminaries were being arranged at Paris be- tween Bedford and Count Choiseul, — whom the Duke de Choiseul had recalled from Vienna to take charge of the for- eign office while he occupied himself chiefly with the army and navy, — the Duke de Nivemais was sent to London to negotiate directly with Bute.^ The strategic points of the negotiation had already been placed in evidence by Choiseul and Pitt; and, in view of the complete supremacy of England on the sea and in the colonies, there was little opportimity for a diplomatic battle. The negotiators were in no respect able to change these fatal circumstances. Nivemais, who was accompanied to ' The prizes of the British fleet in the Pacific amounted to about eight miUion dollars in one month. ^ For an account of his activities, see Perey, Le due de Nivemais (1754-1789), Paris, 1891. 606 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII London by the Chevalier d'Eon, upon whom he rehed for -*■■ "■ most of the labor of the mission, is represented by his de- ■ voted secretary as appearing, even in the midst of the most trying circumstances, "like Anacreon crowned with roses," and so little sensible to the ordinary feelings of mankind that, "though separated from his wife, he did her no harm," and "though he had a mistress, he did her no good." A man "with no disquietude in his head and no wrinkles on his brow" was certainly well adapted to submit to the renuncia- tion of an empire. Bedford, on the other hand, though sent on a mission of peace, was a man of "obstinacy and proverbial avarice," of "no great capacity, but haughty and difficult," who went to Paris with the purpose of ending the war by dictating to' France the terms of the future treaty. Opposition to In England an immediate peace was not desired by the TT'ds"^" greater part of the nation. The hatred of Spain was intense, and the people felt that if Pitt were in power the war would not end until all the desirable French and Spanish colonies were in the possession of Great Britain; for on the high tide of success it was not realized what perpetual enmities such a sweeping victory would engender. To induce the Parlia- ment to favor the idea of peace and to quell the opposition to the government in urging it, Bute employed Henry Fox to bribe the members; and as much as twenty-five thousand pounds sterling is said to have been paid out in a single day. Frederick II, to whom Bute had refused to pay the subsidies which Pitt had accorded, instructed his ambassador to excite public discontent with the government; and a lively cam- paign of pamphlets attacking and defending the ministry for its peace policy was prosecuted. Honors and offices, as well as money, were employed to prepare for the acceptance of the preliminaries when they should be laid before Parha- ment, and a solid cohort known as "the King's friends" was thus organized. In France the chief impediment to peace was the attitude of Spain. The Spanish ambassador at Paris, Grimaldi, was not inclined to yield to Bedford's imperative demands, and DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 607 believed that, if the struggle were continued, Spanish valor Chap, vii might yet retrieve the fortunes of war. ^- »■ The cession of Louisiana to England had been demanded, ^^^^^^^^ and France was disposed to accord it; but Charles III op- posed this concession, on the ground that the Spanish col- onies would be directly confronted by the English on the Northwest as well as the Northeast, and the Gulf of Mexico would be open to English trade, which thus far had never been permitted, all English commerce in those waters being contraband. A line, he suggested, might be drawn from the western extremity of Georgia to the Mississippi; the territory lying south of that line and east of the Mississippi, as far as Florida, to be considered neutral in the sense of be- ing abandoned to the savage tribes from which all Europeans would be excluded. This scheme of creating a barrier between the Spanish and the English colonies Choiseul rejected as wanting in efficacy, since Florida could more easily be invaded from Georgia, already an English colony; but Charles III refused for a time to accede to the preliminaries. As an alternative, he endeavored through Abertini, the representative of Na- ples at London, to obtain a separate peace with England, only to learn that he could procure no better terms. To overcome the hesitation of Charles III, on October 6, Louis xva Louis XV, upon Choiseul' s advice, wrote to him: "I would f^^^^g^'^ wish with all my heart that Spain should not suffer from a war which the personal tenderness of Your Majesty for me has caused you to undertake. If New Orleans and Louisiana can be useful to Your Majesty for the restitution of Havana, or to indemnify you for the compensations which you would give to the English, I offer the possession of them to you." The free gift of the whole of North America west of the Mississippi seems at the present time a generous proposal; but it had been already declined by the English, to whom it had been offered in exchange for Havana, and the King of Spain was not greatly moved by such benevolence. Although Choiseul had informed Ossun, for the benefit of Charles III, that the colony was "the most beautiful and the most fertile 608 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII as to soil of all those which France possesses in America," ^■"- he confidentially expressed the opinion that it was a "bur- densome possession, which cost France eight thousand livres a year, without bringing in an ecu." For a time it appeared as if the negotiations would be rendered entirely fruitless by the obstinacy of Spain. On both the French and the English side, however, so far as the governments were concerned, the wish for peace was strong. But both Choiseul and Bute dreaded the assembling of Par- liament, where Pitt was certain to appear and exercise a powerful influence, which might overthrow the ministry. The opening had been fixed for November 8, but the prelim- inaries were not nearly ready for signature. Time must be gained; but, although Bute proposed postponement, his colleagues objected. Nivemais was well aware of the storm that would break when Parliament was assembled, and that imless that body could be presented with preliminaries al- ready signed it would be the end of the negotiations. By the ruse of writing a note explaining his views to one of his colleagues, with the understanding that it should be shown to the ministry, a postponement of the meeting of Parliament until November 25 was obtained. In the meantime, by means of great exertions, Choiseul had procured the reluctant assent of Charles III to the preliminaries of peace, which were signed at Fontainebleau, on November 3, 1762. Peace accepted Butc was thus able to present to the English Parliament, by the English ^pQj^ which evcry variety of royal pressure had been previ- ously exercised, the outline of a treaty already agreed upon. When the debate opened, Pitt, who was ill, was not expected to be present; but, to the surprise of all, accompanied to the doors of the House of Commons by a shouting multitude, he was borne in on the arms of his servants, pale and ema- ciated, his face rendered the more ghastly by his black vel- vet costume, his legs wrapped in flannel and his shoulders supported by a crutch. For three hours and a half he de- nounced those who had "sacrificed the public faith by an abandonment of the allies." The concessions made to France would restore her maritime power. None of the French or A. D. 1756-1763 DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEAKS' "WAR 609 Spanish colonies should be returned. Why were Martinique Chap, vii and Havana taken, if they were not meant to be retained? * Arrogant as this plea for absolute British supremacy was, - it voiced the prevailing sentiments of the nation. It was an age of conquest and expansion. The cost of the war and the sacrifices made had been enormous. Why should their legitimate fruits be thrown away? Such were the feelings and reasonings of the time. Lord Bute did not dare show himself on the streets of London without his body-guard of hired boxers. Mud was thrown at his carriage, and every form of public insult was offered to his person. But the treaty was adopted by three hundred and nineteen votes. The sixty-five members who voted against the treaty, Horace Walpole said, "were not bribed!" The victory for the Court was complete, the Whig party was substantially destroyed, and the Princess-Dowager could with reason exclaim, "Now my son is King of England!" On February 10, 1763, the treaty between England, France, The Peace and Spain was signed at Paris.i By its terms Great Britain °^ ^''™ made an incalculable advance in her imperial development, France was ruined as a colonial and maritime competitor, and Spain was reduced to a subordinate position. France ceded to Great Britain Canada, with all the dis- puted territory east of the Mississippi River, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton; and agreed to evacuate the territories of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, and Prussia, to restore Minorca to the English, and to dismantle Dunkirk. England, in ex- change, granted to France the right of fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on the coast of Newfoundland, together with the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon as shelters and places on which to dry fish, on condition that they should not be fortified; restored Belle-Isle, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Lucia in the West Indies, retainuig Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago; returned to France Gor^e, ' For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 329; and Martens, Recueil, 1st ed., VI, 5, B, I, p. 173. For the negotiations, see Bedford, Corre- i-pmdew^e', II and III; Perey, Le due de Nivernais, and Barth^emy, Le traUe de Paris, in Revue des Questions Historiques, XLIII (1888). VOL. III. — 39 610 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VII A. D. 1756-1763 The Peace of Hubertuabuig but retained Senegal in Africa; and in India required France to abandon all her conquests since 1749, thus leaving her ■ only a few trading posts. Spain yielded on all three of the grievances against Eng- land, surrendering the claim to the Newfoundland fishiag rights, consenting that all disputes regarding prizes be settled by the British courts, and conceding the right of the English to cut logwood in Honduras. In order to recover Havana and Manila, Florida was ceded to Great Britain; and, to com- pensate Spain for this loss, Louisiana was ceded by France to Spain. Portugal, which had been occupied by Spain during the war, was evacuated. Sweeping as the gains of Great Britain were, even greater concessions might have been obtained; for, although Great Britain had doubled her national debt by the expenses of the war, she was not at the end of her resources.^ Unpopu- lar in England, because Pitt's policy was not followed in re- taining all the islands and denying to the French a share in the fisheries, the Peace of Paris was resented as a deep humil- iation by France, and especially by Spain. Almost equally bitter against England were the feelings of Frederick II, who considered himself unfairly deserted by his ally. Fortunately for him, however, the defection from Austria had been even more embarrassing to his prin- cipal adversary. On November 24, 1762, an armistice between Austria and Prussia had been signed which left the Prussian forces fa- vorably placed in the field for continuing the war with the Imperial contingent allied to Austria. Frederick II, on the ground that the Imperial princes were not included in the armistice, did not cease hostilities with them; and, after having made great sacrifices for the Austrian cause, they found themselves deserted by their ally. As a result, when, on December 30, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Saxony met to make peace in the castle of Hubertus- burg, between Dresden and Leipzig, Frederick II was in a 1 The national debt in 1762 was about £133,000,000. 1756-1763 DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 611 position to recover all that had been lost in the course of Chap, vii the war.i » ^ Not less than Maria Theresa and Frederick Augustus II, ■ — who during these years had remained in Poland a helpless spectator of the war, — Frederick II, after six years of des- perate fighting in which more than a million lives had been lost, was anxious to end hostilities. As he himself has con- fessed, "The army was rumed and too degenerate for brilliant exploits to be expected of it. . . . The old officers had per- ished, . . . the young were of an age that did not promise great services, . . . and the troops were in a condition that did not justify the confidence of those who commanded them." The state of all Germany was deplorable. "Whole dis- tricts, which before the war could have been counted among the most prosperous, were transformed into a wilderness; numberless villages lay in ashes, or were abandoned by their inhabitants; the fields lay fallow because everything was wanting with which to cultivate them, and misery and lam- entation, the true satellites of the fury of war, reigned in every direction." ^ At Hubertusburg questions of ceremony were quickly re- solved. The proceedings were conducted in writing, the Saxon plenipotentiary, Fritsch, serving as intermediary. On January 23, 1763, the Prussian representative, Hertzberg, reported, "All I fear is that Herr von Callenbach — the Aus- trian plenipotentiary — will delay the negotiation too long by his slowness and excessive circumspection." But the battle over details, though stubborn and tedious, was not of long duration. The main point of controversy had already been conceded by Maria Theresa. Silesia was to be renoimced to Frederick II. On February 15, 1763, in the morning, — for, as Frederick ' The castle of Hubertusburg, built by Frederick Augustus II of Saxony in 1721, had fallen into decay during the Seven Years' War, having been stripped of its costly furniture and ornaments, so that nothing fit to be occupied was left but the chapel and the servants' quarter. See BeauHeu-Marconnay, Der Hvhertusburger Friede, nach archivalischen Qtiellen, Leipzig, 1871. 612 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VII II laughingly said, "A treaty ought not to be signed in the ^■^- evening, but when fasting, as when vows are taken!" — the Peace of Hubertusburg was signed between Prussia on the one side and Austria and Saxony on the other. ^ The Empress- Queen of Austria renoimced all the territories ceded to the King of Prussia by the Treaties of Breslau and Berlin, and m addition the County of Glatz, which Austria had occupied before the war. The King of Prussia restored to the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, all the territories which the former had occupied belonging to the latter. Frederick II agreed to give his vote for the Archduke Joseph at the next imperial election. Finally, all previous treaties not contrary to these provisions were confirmed. Thus ended the Seven Years' War, from which Frederick II, though chastened and exhausted, emerged as a victor. His kingdom was less prosperous than when he began his reign but he was thankful for deliverance from complete de- struction. AUTHORITIES Documenta Martens, Reciteil des principaux traiUs, etc., I (from 1761 to 1778), Gottingen, 1791, now becomes useful. See also Faber, Neue europaische Staats-Cansley, Ubn, Frankfort, and Leipzig, 1761-1782; Koser and Erauske, PretLSsische Staatsschriften aus der Regierungszeit Kimig Friedrichs II, Berlin, 1877-1892; Volz and Ktlnzel, Akten zur Vorge- schichte des siebenjdhrigen Krieges, Leipzig, 1899. Of the contemporary correspondence the most important is found in Arneth, Maria Theresia und Joseph II, ihre Correspondenz (1761-1780), Vienna, 1867; Taylor and Pringle, The Chatham Correspondence, Lon- don, 1840; Kimball, Correspondence of W. Pitt with Colonial Governors, New York, 1906; Correspondance entre comte Bernstorff et le due de Choiseul (1758-1766), Copenhagen, 1871; Friis, Bernstorffsche Papiere, Copenhagen, 1901, containing the negotiations relating to Denmark; Bedford, Correspondence, London, 1846. There are in the British Museum papers of Newcastle and Pitt still unpublished. The detailed claims of France and England in the settlement of 1756 may be found in Mimoires des commissaires de France et d'Angleterre sur les droits des deux couronnes en AmArique, Amsterdam, 1756. > For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 368. Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, the Palatinate, and the princes of the Suabian and Franconian circles had already signed conventions of neutrality. DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEAKS' WAR 613 The most important memoirs not already cited are Choiseul, Me- Chap. VII moires, Paris, 1904; Bisset, Memoirs of Sir Andrew Mitchell, London, a. d. 1850; and Galitzin, Memoires inedites sur les r'egnes de Pierre le Grand, 17S6-1763 Catherine I, et Pierre II, Paris, 1863. ' An important work on the pohtical institutions and conceptions of Literature the time is BieKeld, Institutions politiques, The Hague, 1760. On the colonial policy of the time, besides Supan, Zimmermann, Die europa- ischen Kolonien, Berhn, 1896, 1903, for Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, and the Netherlands; Beer, Bnlish Colonial Policy, New York, 1907- and Edgerton, A History of British Colonial Policy, London, 1912. On the causes and progress of the Seven Years' War, see Ranke, Dec Ursprung des siebenjahrigen Krieges, Leipzig, 1871; Schafer, Ge- schichte des siebenjahrigen Krieges, Berhn, 1867-1874; Lehmann, Frie- drich der Grosse und der Ursprung des siebenjahrigen Krieges, Leipzig, 1894; Naude, Beitrage zur Entstehungsgeschichte des siebenjahrigen Krieges, Leipzig, 1896; Waddington, La guerre de sept ans, Paris, 1899 et seq.; Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, London, 1908, of great importance for the comprehension of the naval aspects of the war and the effect of naval action upon land; Oncken, Das Zeitalter Frie- drichs des Grossen, Berhn, 1880-1882; Dove, Das Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen, Gotha, 1883; Fleys, Louis XV, Maria-Therese et la paix de I'Europe en 1768, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XI (1897). On Choiseul, Filon, L'ambassade de Choiseul a Vienne (1757-1758), Paris, 1872; Bajer, Les entrevues de Martin Huber avec le due de Choiseul en 1769, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVIII (1904) ; Bourguet, Eludes sur la politiques etrangere du due de Choiseul, Paris, 1907; Dau- bigny, Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer, Paris, 1892; Bourguet, Choiseul et V alliance espagnole, Paris, 1906; Le due de Choiseul et V Angleterre, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVII (1903). On the relations with Spain and Naples, see also Rousseau, Regne de Charles III d'Espagne (1759-1788), Paris, 1907; and Schipa, II regno di Napoli al tempo de Carlos di Borbone, Naples, 1904. On relations with Holland and the North, see, in addition to CoqueUe, as already cited, Le cabinet secret de Louis XV en Hollande, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV (1901); and Fleys, Une page d'histoire politique du Danemark pendant la guerre de sept ans, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, X (1897). On the relations of France with Russia and the Orient, see further, besides the works already cited, WaUszewski, Le roman d'une impera- trice: Catherine II de Russie, Paris, 1893; and Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes, son ambassade a Constantinople (1752-1768), Paris, 1894. On the Peace of Paris and the Peace of Hubertusburg, see Beauheu- Marconnay, Der Hubertusburger Friede, Leipzig, 1871 ; Perey, Le due de Nivernais (1754^1789), Paris, 1891; and Grant, La mission de M. de Bussy a Londres en 1761, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XX (1906). of the Seven Years' War CHAPTER VIII THE DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION Consequences 'TpHE Seven Years' War was a period not only of enormous A sacrifice but of deep humiliation for all the continental nations, not excepting Prussia. To the rulers of Europe the struggle had disclosed not only their own weakness, but the loss of prestige which the system of political absolu- tism had suffered. For the leading statesmen, particularly in France, the war had brought discredit and reproof. Al- though the masses had suffered in silence, they were not unconscious of the spoliation to which they had been sub- jected. Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Spain also had laid their wealth and their lives upon the altar of the god of war, but had derived no benefit; while France had been humbled by defeat and divested of her richest colonies. Patriotism, in any high and reasonable sense, had not been in any way involved in the continental struggle, which was merely a contest between alien combatants for the possession of certain disputed territories. The inhab- itants of Silesia, about whose destiny the war was primarily waged, had had no voice in deciding who should be their master; and Saxony had been ruined by invasion without the slightest consideration of its rights. Although they were helpless in the sphere of outward action, these passive populations, whose resources were consumed in devastating one another, were by no means in- active in the realm of thought. A new conception of Ufa, of society, and of human rights was in process of formation. A few were beginning to think about public questions, and even about the true nature of the State. The ideas of Montesquieu, of Voltaire, of the writers of the "Encyclo- p^die, " and of Rousseau were agitating the minds of men. A. D. 1763-1775 DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PAKTITION 615 The words "happiness," "liberty," and "law" were often Chap, vill heard in private conversation. "If the laws are good, man- ners are good," Diderot had said; and Helvetius, "The vices of a people are concealed in its legislation. " The feel- mg of unrest was general, particularly in France, — the most advanced in civilization of all the continental nations. The question of taxes was a pressing one, and books and pamphlets were appearing on that subject. The "Contrat Social" of Rousseau, which was published in 1762, openly proclaimed "the principle of appeal to the people and of popular sovereignty, and made of government a sort of commission revocable at the will of the country." ^ The theory of royal absolutism was not, however, at once endangered by such reflections, but it was profoundly inodified in the mind of every one who gave it consideration. The culte du roi that was popular during a great part of the reign of Louis XIV in the reign of Louis XV had become impossible. The dogma which claimed for the king divine preroga- tives and clothed him with absolute hereditary authority had ceased to be regarded as a sufficient support for the institution of monarchy. Frederick II had been intelli- gent enough to discern this; and it was he, the hero of the Seven Years' War, who now became the accepted model of royalty. He, at least, had shown himself a capable ruler, and had successfully protected his possessions. He had very early announced his theory of the royal fimction; which was not expressed by the formula, "L'etat, c'est moi," but in the aphorism, "The King is the chief servant of the State." 2 With the younger monarchs a new conception of public poUcy, not less dynastic but far more enlightened, — a "benevolent despotism," as it came to be called, — began to be applied in practice. Chastened, if not contrite, all the ' For the thought of the time, see Rocquain, L'esprit revolutionnaire want la revolution, p. 235 et seq. ' See, for the development of the absolutist theory, Koser, His- torische Zeitschrift, LXI (1889), p. 246. 616 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII rulers of Europe for the time dreaded war; yet all the ^■^- motives which had formerly led to it still existed. The 1763-1775 ■ result was an effort for aggrandizement by conciliation and mutual compensation not less disturbing to the equi- librium of Europe than the wars of conquest. I. The Subordination of France The compara- Both in prestigc and in strength France, as a result of tive status of ^^g SeYeu Years' War, had fallen to the rank of a third- the powers rate power. In a conflict m which all the participants had t endured heavy losses [France had suffered most. V'lt is singular," wrote Bernis; "that all of the courts have failed of their objects in that war. The King of Prussia iatended to work a great revolution in Europe, to render the Empire alternative between the Protestants and the Catholics, to barter States, and to take those which were most to his liking. He has acquired much glory by dominatiag the courts of Europe, but he will leave to his successor a power possessing little solidity. He has ruined his peoples, ex- hausted his treasury, depopulated his States. The Empress has increased the idea entertained of her courage, of her power, and of the excellence of her troops; but she has ac- complished none of the objects she had intended. Russia has shown to Europe the (most invincible soldiery led in the worst possible manner. The Swedes have played without utility a role subaltern and obscure. Ours has been extrava- gant and shameful." The Cardinal's generalizations afford an impressive sum- mary of the parts played by the various participants in the war; and it is with justice that he assigns the least envi- able one to France, whose conduct was unredeemed by ele- vation of purpose, military success, or fruitful diplomatic action. The first among the continental powers had been reduced by the war to a position of inferiority to all the rest with which it had been engaged, whether as an ally or as an adversary. The causes of this abasement of France are to be found DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 617 not only in the conflict with England, which resulted in the Chap, viii destruction of her navy and the loss of her colonies, but even « ^- ^• to a greater extent in the obligations assumed in the treaties ^'^^^'"'^^ with Austria. The maritime and colonial losses would have proved a serious blow to France, but they alone would The dependence not have lowered her rank among the continental powers, "f France upon This last misfortune was the result of the exhaustion of her resources in a continental war in which she had no vital interest, and of her continued abandonment of her policies to the influence of Austria. Since the Treaty of Versailles of May 1, 1756, France had ceased to have a constructive policy. Boimd to Austria, and for a time to Russia, she had sacrificed her own interests to their demands. When peace was finally made, France had no ally in Germany except Austria, and no ally in the North except Sweden, at that time isolated and impotent. Compelled to rely exclusively upon Austria, or to seek a new combination of the powers, Choiseul, with the approval of Louis XV, clung to an alliance which was already a dependence, and was soon to be rendered a subjection. Having deliberately designed to save Prussia from destruc- tion^ would have been logical for Choiseul to have entered promptly into friendly relations with Frederick II. "•■ Hav- ing secretly opposed the designs of Russia upon Poland and Turkey, it would have been timely for him to obtain new assurances of their security. But no step was taken in either of these directions. The art of negotiation seemed suddenly to have been entirely lost in France, or at least con- fined to the devious devices of the King 's secret diplomacy. The traditional system of keeping a check on the predom- inance of the House of Hapsburg was entirely abandoned, and France became almost completely infeodated in the Hapsburg system. Unfortunately for France her obligations to Austria The servitude did not cease with the conclusion of the war. The secret fjj^^"" *° treaty of December 30, 1758, boimd France to a strict sub- servience long after peace with Prussia had been proclaimed. Article III of that treaty had stipulated, instead of a con- A. D. 1763-1775 618 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII tingent of twenty-four thousand men to serve in Bohemia, as had been promised in the original Treaty of Versailles, ■ a sum of money equivalent to three million, three hundred and sixty-odd thousand florins, to be paid annually during the war. The heavy drafts upon the French treasury, which caused a large annual deficit, had rendered impossible the payment of these subsidies to Austria during the last four years of the war. As a result, in 1763, when peace was established, France owed Austria about thirty-four million livres, the payment of which was then by agreement dis- tributed over the next seven years, extending the final term for liquidating the debt to 1769. Thus, while France was pinched with poverty to pay off a debt incurred by a past war, Austria foimd herself in a better financial condition than she had ever before enjoyed; establishing her credit on the ruin of that of France, and practically obtaining from her ally a war indemnity after the war was concluded which enabled her to pay her own debts, increase her armament, and promote her prosper- ity in every sense.'- While Austria very quickly receovered from the exhaus- tion caused by the Seven Years' War, France continued to be enfeebled by the drain upon her resources. The chicanery by which this was accomplished indicates how complete the subjection to Austria had become. As France was under obligation to aid Austria if again attacked by Frederick II, the constant possibility of renewed war with Prussia was a matter of lively interest at Versailles; and this menace was employed with a skill as expert as its pretexts were plausible. So long as the King of Prussia remained armed the Empress must also be prepared for war, for only thus could the casus foederis between France and Austria be kept from becoming operative. Thus France was made to believe that peace depended upon the strength of her ally rather than upon her own strength; and year after year while France remained stationary, or even receded, in ' See the famous " V Conjectures raisonnies" prepared by Favier, in S^gui, Politique de tous les cabinets de I'Europe, I, p. 217. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PAKTITION 619 armed efficiency, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were all re- Chap. Vlii covering and advancing their military power. a. d. In these circumstances it is not strange that no European ^^^^"^^^ nation sought the alliance of France, whose friendship * had become of slight practical value. The position of The pa«rivity France was, therefore, no doubt, one of security; but the°^^"""=^ price paid for it was complete subserviency to Austria. As long as that contmued, peace could, apparently, be counted upon; and that was sufficient for the ministers of Louis XV. Nothing seemed to them so desirable as tranquillity. But each year France was sinking mto debt, becoming more and more defenceless, more and more dependent upon the traditional enemy, more and more a negligible quantity in the affairs of Europe. Austria, however, seemed to acquire day by day a new vigor, and a new degree of consideration and of credit. Sought for by the Turks, caressed by the King of Prussia, skiKully handled by Russia, implored by Poland, she had only to choose between them.' .A In fact, Austria, having assumed the place of protectrice to France, had also become the residuary legatee of her prestige; for she, and she alone, could determine what in particular circumstances France would do. As soon as the preliminaries of peace between France and England had been signed, the Count de Choiseul — who as a reward for this service had been raised to the peer- age as Duke de Praslin — wrote to Vergennes: "The King will remain faithfully united to his old allies, and particu- larly to the Court of Vienna. You have then to change neither your language nor your conduct in regard to what may interest Their Imperial Majesties, and you should continue to live in the most perfect harmony with their mtaister at Constantinople. As to Russia, we do not yet know with sufficient precision what are its sentiments and relations to be able to fix our judgment upon the degree of intelligence and confidence which will be established between our court and that of St. Petersburg." ' See, as before, the analysis of the situation made by Favier. Chap. VIII A.D. 1763-1775 The secret designs of Russia and Prussia 620 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY The misgivings with regard to Russia were not gromidless. On the day before the preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau, Catherine II had concluded with Fred- erick II a secret treaty of "perpetual peace and alliance," in which they mutually promised to sustain each other with troops and money. If Prussia should be at war with France or with England, instead of troops Russia would fur- nish six hundred thousand roubles for the expenses of the war; and, if Russia should be at war with Persia or Turkey, Prussia would furnish the same aid. Russia guaranteed to Frederick II all his possessions, conformably to the treaties of Dresden and of Breslau, and above all "irrevocably and forever" Silesia and the County of Glatz; and, in return, the King of Prussia guaranteed to Russia all the territories she actually possessed. - In separate secret articles the two contractants undertook engagements regarding Denmark, Courland, and Poland of the greatest significance for the future. The King of Prussia promised to use his good offices with Denmark concerning the claims to Holstein; and, "in case Russia should be obliged to make war on Denmark in order to pro- cure the satisfaction which is due," he agreed to furnish fifteen thousand men to facilitate that enterprise. The Duchy of Courland, belonging to Poland, was ruled by Prince Charles, — son of Frederick Augustus II, — who had been elected by the imanimous vote of the magnates, and to whom the duchy had been guaranteed by the Czarina Elizabeth. 1 Catherine II desired to restore her favorite, the Duke de Biren, and Frederick II, in consideration of the cession to him of the "seigneurie of Wiirtemberg," agreed to displace Prince Charles and establish the Duke de Biren in his place; thus combining to exercise their authority in Courland as, in the terms of the treaty, "the interests of the two powers required." With regard to Poland as a whole, "it being very advantageous to Russia and Prussia that Poland should have its own king, " it was agreed that, after the death of the reigning king, they would "try to 1 See Heyking, Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen, p. 14. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 621 place upon the throne a Piast/ and would employ all pos- Chap. Vlli sible means to support him on it."^ a.d. Thus, even before the Peace of Hubertusburg, Prussia ^^"^^"^^^^ and Russia had formed that imderstanding which was to The ambition prove so fateful for Poland and the future of Europe. °* Catherine ii Although ui the recoil from the policies of Peter III Catherine II had found it expedient at the time to re- pudiate the alliance with Frederick II, and had even de- clared him to be an "enemy," she quickly perceived that he was weary of war, and that their common interests might be served by an alliance. Together, without the cost of war, they might work their will in Eastern Europe. But in this 1 co-operative enterprise Russia must be the leader, and she » the superior.^ Peter the Great had coveted the title "Emperor of all the Russias"; Elizabeth, as a matter of courtesy, had personally been accorded this honor, even by France; and Catherine II now not only formally claimed it, but deter- mined to enforce upon Europe the recognition of her claim. In January, 1763, the Czarina distributed to the foreign ambassadors at St. Petersburg and published in the court gazette a circular in which she declared her intention to exact in the correspondence of her court the imperial title. Louis XV, who, following the example of the Grand Mon- arch, was jealous in matters of precedence, could not look with favor upon this "usurpation" of a title superior to his own, which, he considered, carried an attaint to the pre- 1 A native Polish noble who would be dependent upon Russia and Prussia and under their influence. In their treaty of alliance of June 8, 1762, Frederick II and Peter III had already agreed to prevent Poland from ever becoming a hereditary monarchy. See Angeberg, Recueil, p. 1. 2 This treaty of November 2, 1762, is not mentioned by Tetot, and is not found in the collections. It is cited by Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes, son anibassade A Constantinople, II, p. 214, and is in the Archives des Affaires Etrangtees at Paris, "Turkey," vol. 139. ' The famous "Testament of Peter the Great," so long regarded as an authentic outUne of the poUey of Russia in this period, is now rejected as a forgery. See the interesting comparison of the different texts by .Breslau in Historische Zeitschrift, LXI, 1879, p. 385. 622 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII rogatives of his dynasty. An acrimonious exchange of notes ^•^- followed, in which he said: "Titles are nothing in them- selves; they have reality only as they are recognized, . . . Sovereigns themselves cannot attribute to themselves titles of their choice; the assent of their subjects does not suffice; that of other sovereigns is necessary; and each crown, free to recognize or to refuse a new title, can also adopt it with the modifications and conditions which it deems suitable." Only upon condition that it "should carry no prejudice to the customary ceremonial," would France recognize the imperial title of the Czarina. Eliza- beth, it was asserted, had subscribed to that condition, and had formally avowed that the "complaisance du Roi was very agreeable to her. " But Catherine II was of another mind. She would accept no condition and no other title. Breteuil was soon afterward transferred to Stockholm, and an "inconnu" was sent to succeed him at St. Petersburg, where he was coldly received. The two courts through the entire reign of the offended empress were in latent hostility. "As a German, as a princess, as a rival, and above all as a woman," a French charge d'affaires wrote long afterward, "she hates us with all the hates"; and Choiseul stated to Kaunitz, "The distance between our states is the only thing that hin- ders our reciprocal enmity from making a startling sensation." The condition The real reason for this mutual animosity was not merely of Poland ^j^g pride of a king and the wounded sensibilities of an empress. It was the future destiny of Poland. In 1763 the ancient republic was territorially — Russia alone excepted ^^ the most extensive state in Europe; greater in geographical extent than all the states of Germany put together. ■> Its name signifies "the plain," — a broad unbroken expanse of country, without natural frontiers or means of defence, except for the Carpathian mountains on the south-west. The population consisted of some fifteen or sixteen million souls, spread xmequally, and in parts sparsely, over this vast area. While called a "republic," it was, in fact, an elective monarchy; including a score of DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 623 local governments, subsisting under the Crown, and the Chap, vili Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Ethnographically and re- ^■"• ligiously — considered as a whole — Poland was wanting ^^5^1^^^ in unity, as it was politically; consistuig of Poles proper, Lith- uanians, and Germans. The Poles in general were Catholics in religion; but the population contained also Lutherans, Orthodox Russians, and many Jews, the latter chiefly in the cities. Dissidents, including the Orthodox Rus- sians as well as Protestants and Jews, were often subjected to severe repression and entirely excluded from certain employments. While the neighboring states were imder a strong central authority which affirmed and enforced their political unity, Poland was characterized by local freedom and a certain equality between the nobles, great or small. The land- owners held their estates for the most part allodially, and not feudally, having little subordination to one another or to the king. They formed "fraternities," or "confederations," among themselves, which were / practically self-governing, j As a result of this free organization, it was the Diet, com-/ posed of the representatives of the nobles, rather than the Crown, which made the laws and governed the country. Even the ministers of the king were irremovable by him, and held their positions for life. The liberum veto, or right of an individual member of the Diet to refuse assent to a law, and the elective royalty, which enabled the electors by pacta conventa to obtain from the king new concessions at each election, completed the anarchical condition of a kingdom in which no one was obliged to obey the king. That which tended most to render difficult the central- The dmsiona ization of power in the hands of the kings of Poland was °^ ^"''^'^ the absence of a middle class, — a genuine bourgeoisie, — which the king could employ for the control of the great nobles. Between those of noble pretensions, great or small, and the peasants, who were helpless, there were no efficient constituents of the State. A few great families practically ruled the immense areas covered by their estates and filled the great public offices, such as that of chancellor, treas- 624 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII urer, marshal ol the court, hetman, or general of the army, ^■"- and the governorships of provinces. These by agreement determined the public policies; to which the king, who was practically powerless, was obliged to submit. Below them were the "confederations," constituting an organized op- position to all central authority, and aiming solely at the protection of their local liberties. A patriotic party had always existed which sought to strengthen the central authority as the only means of securing the permanent independence and unity of the Polish nation; but counsels had been divided, and Poland had long been regarded as a probable victim of ultimate dismemberment. "^ Foreign intervention had become habitual. Since the Crown had, in 1668,,_with the death of John Cas- imir, ceased to be hereditary, every royal election had been *f- an international crisis. France, Sweden, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had supported their favorite candidates, some- times with menaces, sometimes with money, and sometimes with armed force. Europe had come to dread a Polish elec- tion as a public calamity that might easily engender another war of succession. Foreign nations had long had permanent clienteles among the Polish nobles. Of the great families, the Potocki and Branicki were in general favorable to French influence; and had, accordingly, adhered latterly to the Saxon party. The Czartoryski, on the other hand, placed their faith in Russia. Both factions claimed to be intensely patriotic, — the one fearing the influence of Russia as tending to the subjection and ultimate absorption of Poland, the other seeking in Russia the protector of its own policies and the safeguard of Polish unity. Each of these parties possessed armies to support their views. On October 3, 1763, the death of King Frederick Augustus II again opened the question of the succession and brought these opposing forces into collision. 1 The partition of Poland had often been proposed. In 1749 King Stanislas I said: "We shall be the prey of some famous conqueror; perhaps the neighboring powers wiU agree to share our States." DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PAKTITION 625 Catherine II and Frederick II had, as we have seen, Chap, viii prepared for this eventuahty; and they now acted in ac- ""■"■ cordance with their agreement. On October 26 Catherine II ^^'^^""'^^^ informed her ambassador at Warsaw that the new election was of "the greatest importance for the real interest of the The interven- Russian Empire ... and to the special advantages which *'^/ii'^''*" result from its direct influence in the political system of all ^""^ Europe." He was instructed to secure the acceptance of the imperial title by the Polish government, the solemn recognition and confirmation of the new duke of Courland, the protection of the Russian Church in the kingdom, the maintenance of the liberum veto in the Diet, the non-aug- mentation of the armed force of Poland, the election of Coimt Poniatowski, — a former lover of Catherine II, whom » she had "resolved to elevate to the throne of Poland," ■ — and, finally, a vote of the Diet, asking for the "solemn guarantee of the fundamental laws, constitutions, privileges, and liberties of the Republic" by Russia. As a means for the accomplishment of these ends the ambassador was ordered to work faithfully with the trusty Count Keyser- ling and the Princess Czartoryska, " who are devoted to us. " He was provided with a hundred thousand roubles, in the form of a draft on Amsterdam, and informed that, "al- though we have ordered all the preparations for war, and although a great part of our military forces already massed on the frontiers are ready to cross them upon the first notice, it is nevertheless important to our glory and that of our empire to show to the world that Russia, in all the most important matters, knows how to negotiate and to act alone, . . . and that her physical forces are sufficient to support them effectively in case of need. " ^ Undoubtedly, a new and powerful force had entered the field of European politics. Frederick II's preparations were not so comprehensive; but, as a partner in the enterprise of imposing upon Poland a king who would reign in the interest of the Russo-Prussian alliance, it was his uiten- tion that his subjects should not furnish any aid to the 1 For the full instruction, see Angeberg, Recueil, p. 3. VOL. III. — 40 626 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Polish patriots. Accordingly, on November 5, he issued a ^■^- proclamation forbidding all Prussians near the Polish frontier to take any action, during the vacancy of the throne, by which the attitude of Prussia would be compromised.^ On January 24, 1764, however, he thought it necessary to publish at Warsaw a declaration, in which he said: "The false reports which are spread abroad, and which the enemies of public tranquillity do not cease to propagate, that the Courts of Prussia and Russia wish to profit by the present circumstances to dismember Poland or Lithuania . . . have induced the undersigned to deny them"; to which he added: "Far from wishing to aggrandize himself. His Majesty the King of Prussia labors, and will constantly continue to labor, only to maintain the states of the Republic in their entirety. " The attitude Although the union of Russia and Prussia in their design of France and ^q coutpol the Toyal election in Poland was not positively known in France and Austria, it was more than suspected. Relying entirely upon Austria, Choiseul had taken no active measures to influence the election, and was personally indisposed to intervene in any manner; preferring that the Poles should be left free to choose their own king. Maria Theresa made the same profession; and, on March 16, 1764, following the example of Frederick II, she also made a public declaration at Warsaw, in which she stated in the most solemn manner that she considered the Republic of Poland "a sovereign and independent state, whose right, assured by the laws and constitutions of the country, to choose a king with full liberty of suffrage cannot be in any way restrained. " Two weeks' later Catherine II and Frederick II sealed their previous compact by an additional secret article, in which they solemnly agreed not only to hinder the kingdom of Poland from becoming "hereditary and absolute," but "to prevent and destroy by all possible means, and with 1 See Angeberg, as before, p. 13. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 627 common accord, all views and designs which could lead to Chap, viii that result. "1 a.d. In the previous October, immediately after the vacancy ^^^^"^'''^^ of the Polish throne had occurred, Vergermes had been instructed to soimd the disposition of the Sultan regarding The attitude the affairs of Poland, with the suggestion that the vigilance "' *^^ ^"'*'"' of the Turks should be exercised, since it was "quite gen- erally thought that the Czarina and the King of Prussia intended to profit by the interregnum in Poland to assure for themselves certain parts of the kingdom to which they form pretensions or which are to their advantage. " Vergennes was directed to call the attention of the Porte to the fact that Russia already had introduced troops into Lithuania, and that the King of Prussia had increased the number he ordinarily maintained in ducal Prussia; but he was not to urge action. As regards candidates for the Pohsh throne, he was informed of Louis XV's preference for the young elector of Saxony, but was not to propose inter- vention in behalf of any person, or to make any accusations against St. Petersburg or Berlin.^ The instruction reveals at the same time the desire and the weakness of the King of France. He suspected the concerted action of Russia and Prussia for the ultimate dis- memberment of Poland, and he was anxious to oppose their designs and to promote the candidacy of the Elector ' of Saxony; but he was not prepared even to propose the co-operation of the Turks in support of his wishes. A change in the office of Grand Vizier rendered impossible for Vergennes the immediate execution of his orders to sound the intentions of the Porte. To his surprise, he was finally informed, that "the Sublime Porte had no other intentions than to do honor to the privileges of Pohsh liberty. " This attitude — ostensibly perfectly correct — was sub- stantially that of Frederick II; for it soon appeared that 1 For this article, signed on April 11, 1764, see Wenck, III, p. 481; and Angeberg, p. 17. 2 See Marsangy, Le chevalier de Vergennes, II, p. 226. 1763-1775 628 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII the Porte was opposed to the election of any foreigner, and desired the election of "such a Pole as the electors thought . suitable. " Vergennes, the most astute of the French diplo- matists of his generation, could find no fault with this reply, and even expressed his "gratitude" for it; and yet, in effect, it was a frustration of the policy of France. Vergeimes was incredulous of the real intentions of the Porte until the course of the negotiations clearly showed that the entrance of Russian troops into Poland was a matter of indifference to Constantinople. On April 13, 1764, a large body of the most eminent Polish patriots addressed an appeal to the Sultan, Mustafa III, urging him to intervene in their behalf; but their prayer was in vain. The Ottoman ministry took the ground, that a protest ad- dressed to Russia in behalf of Poland would itself be "an infraction of the rights of Polish liberty. " Nothing, then, was to be expected of the Turks. Berlin and St. Petersburg had been active at Constantinople, and T France had lost her traditional ally. The Porte had con- j eluded that Prussia and Russia were strong, and that France had become weak; and the Ottoman defection afforded another proof of the abasement and subordination of the monarchy which under Louis XIV had been able to move the armies of the Sultan almost at the word of command. The declaration Left thus without any resource for enforcing his policy, of Loms XV Louis XV was compelled to accept the situation as it was. In order to place himself in the most favorable light before Europe, and particularly before Poland, he issued a declara- tion which, as a statement of principles, does him great honor, and would do him greater honor still if the principles were those in which he really believed, rather than those which circumstances forced him to accept. The declaration affirmed in the most precise and solemn manner that "he considered upon that occasion only the advantages of the Republic; that he entertained no other wish or desire than to see the Polish nation maintained in all its rights, in all its possessions, in all its liberties, and DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 629 especially in the most precious of its prerogatives, that Chap. Vlll of giving itself a king by a free election and a voluntary ^•''• choice. ... It is for the nation itself to determme its -i^^^^I^l choice by consulting its own advantage, without regard to foreign influences; and His Majesty will recognize as King of Poland and as an ally of his crown, and will even , sustain and protect, whoever shall be elected by the free !" choice of the nation and conformably to the laws and con- "~ stitutions of the country. "^ -^ The historic significance of this document does not consist mainly in the light it throws upon the position of France regarding the Polish election. It is a statement of importance in the development of the fundamental law of Europe. It was, as compared with the pretences of absolutism, a new doctrine; and at the same time a doctrine practically recog- nized by all the great powers. It had long been contested by the adversaries of England, but now it was universally admitted; not, indeed, as applying to all nations, but to those which chose to apply it. All were solemnly bound by their declarations and agreements to do the same thing, namely, to promote the independence of Poland. A preliminary convocation of the Diet preparatory to the The menaces royal election at Warsaw convinced Catherine II and Freder- °' ^"^™* ick II that the patriotic party would oppose their attempt to influence the choice of a king of Poland. In order to prevent that opposition and strengthen the party infeodated with Russia, under the pretext of co-operating in maintain- ing order, Catherine II sent an army into Polish territory, while forty thousand Prussian troops were stationed near the frontier. On April 14, 1764, a group of fifteen senators issued an energetic protest against the violation of Polish freedom by the presence of a Russian army; but it was disregarded. Determined to enthrone her favorite, Poniatowski, the Czarina ordered her troops to enter the Polish capital and surround the castle where the Diet was in session. For the fuU text, see Marsangy, as before, p. 254. 630 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Many senators and nuntii — as the members of the •*■ "'• lower chamber were called — refused to appear in the Diet. "You cannot open the assembly in the presence of the •Russians and so many soldiers who usurp the places of our brothers; I stop the activity of the Diet," Andre Makro- nowski is reported to have cried. At these words sabres were drawn. "Strike," proudly exclaimed the nuntius, "strike, I shall die free and for liberty. " Determined not to submit to the Russian intervention, Makronowski is said to have hastened to Berlin to appeal to Frederick II, who, after a long conversation, said to him, "You are the most feeble; it is necessary to yield. " "Sire, " replied his visitor, "that is not the example Your Majesty has given us; alone, you have resisted Europe." "Without a certain occurrence, I was lost," said Frederick. "But it happened, and the talents of Your Majesty gave fortune time to act," the Pole retorted. "You are accustomed," urged Frederick, "to receive your kings from Russia." "She has given us one," answered the nuntius, "and we will have no more from her hand; but Your Majesty will never appear in our country except to play a secondary r61e. . . . Play the role that befits your glory; give us your brother. Prince Henry, as a king. " But Frederick II had no thought of interfering with the plans of his powerful ally, although for a moment he seemed to dread the possible consequences of her success. "What is this rumor so widely circulated regarding the marriage of the Empress with Poniatowski? " he asked anxiously, as he imagined what might happen in such a case. "I have written to both of them not to commit that folly."' The election of The presence of the Russians had provoked a civil war. Poniatowski Poniatowski — whose mother was a Czartoryska and said to have been a descendant of the House of Jagellon^ — openly defended the presence of the Russian troops and proposed to send a message to the Czarina, "to thank that ' The conversations are reported by Rulhifere, Histoire de I'anarchie de Pologne, II. ' See Volume II of this work, p. 52. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 631 august, virtuous, and magnanimous princess for the ser- Chap. Viil vices which she is rendering to the Republic." Under the ^■''• presidency of the Prince Primate, Archbishop Guesne, the J^^^Z^^!i_ Diet was obedient to the will of the Russian party, and while the Branicki and the Potocki, deprived of their offices, were compelled by the presence of foreign troops to seek safety on their estates, a fraction of the Diet, on September 7, elected Poniatowski King of Poland, under the title Stanislas II; voted new laws which increased the royal revenues; placed the army under his command; and, in direct viola- tion of the agreement with Frederick II that the King of Poland should not be made "absolute," conferred upon him by new pacta conventa powers which no king of Poland had ever before possessed. Louis XV, on the ground that soldiers had taken the place of diplomats, and that "acts of violence were to be substituted for peaceable negotiation" in Poland, directed his ambassador at Warsaw, the Marquis de Paulmy, to leave the country. The scene of his final audience with the Prince Primate, to whom he presented his letter of recall, was made as humiliating as possible for France. The usual courte- sies were omitted; and the ambassador, left standing, was told to "say what he had to say." Paulmy drew from his pocket the letter of recall, which stated the reason for his departure. "You cease, then, to recognize the Republic?" demanded the archbishop. "I recognize," replied Paulmy, "the Re- public divided and the city of Warsaw delivered to foreign troops." "Well," replied the archbishop, "since you do not recognize the Republic, you and all the ministers of France, you may go and seek it where you please. We no longer recognize an ambassador: I salute the Marquis de Paulmy." "Serviteur, Monsieur I'Archeveque de Guesne," replied the Marquis; and left the room without being at- tended, or receiving the customary military honors. In thus endeavoring to eliminate France from the affairs The appeal of Poland, the archbishop perfectly understood his role. '° '^"'"'^ The helplessness of Louis XV was at once demonstrated. 632 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII No one of the powers was disposed of itself to challenge the » ■^' "77 dictation of Russia in forcing the election of Stanislas II. Austria had no desire to engage in another war against two united adversaries like Russia and Prussia. Sweden was reduced to practical impotence in the affairs of Europe. England was indifferent to the fate of Poland and desirous of securing Russian trade, which the financial troubles of Holland were obliging her merchants to surrender to an active competitor. There remained only the Ottoman Empire, and Vergennes did all in his power to excite the apprehensions of the Porte. "The new king of Poland," he said to the Reis Effendi, "forced by system and convenience to become the oppressor of his country, when he should be its deliverer, will be re- duced, in order to maintain himself, to be the slave of Russia. " "It will be Russia, then, who will govern the Poles?" asked the Reis Effendi. "No; she will leave to the King the appearance of authority, she will even furnish him the means to enslave his subjects; but, at the same time, she will hold him in such complete dependence that he will be exactly in the same relation to her as a khan to the Ottoman Empire. The Porte having a capital interest in not suffering Poland to be reduced to the condition of a Russian province, it is for Turkey to estab- lish the ancient constitution in all the points which have been changed. She ought on this point to exercise foresight; and, if she would assert herself with the tone of authority which is proper for her, I would almost dare to be responsible for her success." The Reis Effendi manifested indignation at the conduct of Russia, but the conversation had no other result than to raise the question of the attitude to be taken regarding the recognition of the new king of Poland. Recognition of Maria Theresa had offered no resistance to the activities brFrmoe" °^ Russia hi Poland. When it came to the question of and Austria formally recognizing the new king, she expressed her inten- tion to conform to the decision of Versailles. In striking DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PAKTITION 633 contrast to the bold initiative to which France had in the Chap, vni past long been accustomed, Louis XV referred the matter ^•''• to the Sultan. "The King," the Duke de Praslin wrote to ^^^^'^^^^ Vergennes, "has sought from the commencement of the interregnum to harmonize his course with that of the Otto- man Court, which has refused our advances. To-day it is seeking us, and His Majesty, who has not wavered in his principles, will gladly lend himself to this concert, which it has been the first to propose, . . . and will suspend the recognition of the King of Poland imtil your reply is received. " The attitude of the Porte was undecided. A firm protest by the three powers united might have prevented Poland from becoming a Russian province; but during the delay Stanislas II, a man of intelligence and not wholly devoid of patriotism, was daily employing the extraordinary powers with which he was invested to subdue opposition within his kingdom, and one by one the Polish magnates were accepting his authority. In the meantime the new Polish ambassador to Turkey, Alexandrowitz, was kept waiting on the frontier. After more than a year of hesitation, during which the Porte took no decisive action and was negotiating with Warsaw regarding the terms on which the ambassador might be received, the courts of Austria and France finally became reconciled to the election of Stanislas II, and at the end of the year 1765 it was decided that he should be formally » recognized by them. As conditions of this recognition Louis XV required that the archbishop should offer an apology for his treatment of Paulmy; that the Polish magnates who had been de- voted to the cause of France should be restored to their offices and their estates; and that certain favors be shown to the sons of the late king, Frederick Augustus. These conditions having been accepted, recognition was finally accorded by both France and Austria; and, in April, 1766, diplomatic relations with the new king were established. The death of the Emperor Francis I on August 18, 1765, brought to the throne of the Empire the eldest son of Maria 634 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 1/Dd-l^/O Choiseul's attempt to incite the Turks Chap. VIII Theresa, Joseph II, who was also named by his mother as Co-regent of Austria; while the fatal illness of the Dauphin ■ of France in the following December opened the succession to the crown to the Duke de Berry, , already designated as the future husband of the Emperor's sister, Marie Antoi- nette. Thus was added to the Austro-French alliance a new bond of sentiment; while the return of the Duke de Choiseul to the French foreign oiEce, in April, 1766, to supersede the Duke de Praslin, marked a more vigorous activity in behalf of Poland. Choiseul's first despatch upon resuming that office, addressed to Vergennes, shows clearly that the minister was fully conscious of the position in which France had been placed by the alliance between Russia and Prussia. "Den- mark," he says, "from fear of Russia, and in the illusory hope of acquiring the part of Holstein belonging to the Grand Duke, surrenders herself with humility to the wishes of the Czarina. Sweden, through extraordinary circum- stances, deliberates and acts only by the orders of the Mos- covites. The King of Prussia is managed, and supports all the operations of St Petersburg. England sees with pleasure the consolidation of that alliance of the North with foresight that, if a rupture with France should occur, it would embar- rass us, in spite of our allies, with a formidable war. Although I foresee no fear of war for several years, . . . I perceive with pain that a league is preparing in the North . which will become, perhaps, some day formidable for France. " He frankly admits that France had little ability to prevent that misfortune, and the conclusion at which he arrives is: "It is, then, Russia that we should attack." The means for this attack, he continues, is to excite a war on the part of Turkey which may, perhaps, "hurl from the throne she has usurped the Empress Catherine." "The King has charged me, " he continues, "thus to present to you the exist- ing situation, in order that you may know the desire His Majesty has that the Porte should engage in war with Russia. There is no longer a question of occupying yourself DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 635 solely with the little current affairs of the embassy, it is war Chap. viii with the Turks which should be the only object of your ^■"• labor and your meditations. " 1763-1775 Vergennes, thoroughly familiar with the disposition and actual condition of the Ottoman Empire, while agreeing The immobility with Choiseul that Russia was the principal enemy of °' ^^^ ^°''*'' France, and should be resisted as far as possible, perceived the absolute inutility of dependence upon the Turks, whose inefficiency he portrays in a vivid manner. The Sultan, Mustafa III, he describes as the victim of twenty-seven years of captivity before he came to the throne, "delivered over to uncertainty and a fluctuation of resolutions little indicative of force"; the Grand Vizier as "animated by a sincere spirit of equity and of rectitude, but without any knowledge of the interests of the state which he governed"; and the Reis Effendi, as "an honest man, dis- ,creet and impartial, not wanting ia spirit or in judgment, but overwhelmed by the current of business, and not profit- ing by the reflections which experience could furnish him. " As for the Turks in general, he says, "enervated, and still more abased, war is repugnant to them." Although "the pride and ambition of Russia or other circumstances may triumph over their inertia, provoke them, and drive them into that which they seem so anxious to avoid, ... I hope for nothing at present; still," he concludes, "I shall never despair of the Turks, because they are so little regu- lated in their ideas and views, that that which appears impossible at one time may become possible at another." The effect of this description upon Choiseul was to call forth from him an instruction to act with energy in reanimat- ing the hostility of the Turks to Russia. The prestige of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, he declares, having been lost, should immediately be regauied. The deplorable state into which it had fallen was the best possible reason for a foreign war, the classic remedy for mternal feebleness or dis- order. Russia was adjusting the frontiers of Poland so as to facilitate an attack on Turkey. The Empress Catherine, "a little German princess who has mounted on steps of 636 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY A. D. 1763-1775 Chap. VIII crime to a throne which is a rival to that of the Grand Seigneur, if the Turks do not take care, will render that throne superior. " Vergennes was, therefore, to inflame the Turks against Russia; being careful, however, to take no step that would compromise France. "His Majesty," the minister concludes in his despatch of June 19, 1766, "in order to suc- ceed in his design, puts no limits to the expense, and author- izes you to employ in the execution of it the money which you deem necessary. " The system of In his apprehensions of Russia's designs Choiseul was in the North ^^ rcspcct misled. The new Russian minister of state, Panin, who fully enjoyed the confidence of Catherine II and was thoroughly familiar with the affairs of Denmark and Sweden, where he had been ambassador, had formed a plan for a great coalition of the North, to be composed of Prussia, England, Sweden, Denmark, the United Provinces, and the Protestant princes of Germany, to serve as an instrument of Russian aggrandizement and to thwart the purposes of the Catholic powers, Austria, France, and Spain. In August, 1765, Russian influence had won a complete victory in Sweden, and the friends of France were over- whelmed. On February 5, 1766, England entered into a treaty of alliance and commerce with Sweden : ^ and this was followed, on June 20, by a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navi- gation between England and Russia.^ The "system of the North " was making rapid progress, and Russia was acquir- ing a free hand for the prosecution of her ulterior purposes, which included the gradual appropriation of Poland, the establishment of Russian predominance on the Black Sea, and the final occupation of Constantinople, from which the Turks were to be expelled. These far-reaching ambitions were not unknown to Frederick II, who perceived in the formidable coalition at which Catherine II was aiming a serious peril for Prussia; Frederick Il'a suapicions of the system ' For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 515. 2 For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 572. DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 637 for this system might at some time by isolating Prussia Chap, vill leave him at the mercy of his ally. When an attempt was ^- "• made to draw Saxony mto the Russian combination, — a ^^^^"^^^^ state so necessary to him in case war with Austria should be renewed, — while showing every mark of friendship to Catherine II, he considered the expediency of securing his position by a rapprochement to Austria, in the belief that Joseph II would be more peacefully inclined than the Empress Maria Theresa; but her influence still prevailed, a proposed meeting between the two monarchs at Torgau had to be abandoned, and the opposition of the Austrian and the Prussian policies regarding Poland presented a barrier to the reconciliation which Frederick II desired. The Polish question had itself already assumed a form The interven- which rendered difficult the relations of Frederick II and *'°° "' R^^ia for religious Catherine II. A German and a Lutheran by birth, the Em- equality press of Russia had comprehended the r61e played by religion in her great empire, in which the chief bond of unity was the Greek Church, and she had early in her career adopted the Orthodox faith, of which she had now become the titular protector. Not only within the Russian Empire, but outside of it, wherever adherents of the Greek Church existed, the influence of the Empress had a powerful hold upon its confessors, who were numerous both in Poland and in the Ottoman Empire. Fully appreciating the advantage thus afforded her in compelling these countries to respect her power, Catherine II employed it with skill and energy in supporting her political policies. Virtually the creature of Russia, Stanislas II was com- pelled to urge upon the Polish Diet the removal of the restrictions which excluded dissidents from office, and to de- mand equality of treatment in all respects for the adherents of Greek orthodoxy; but his efforts had proved ineffectual, and the Catholic Poles, who were in power, in November, 1766, refused to make concessions, and the King found him- self in the embarrassing position of being obliged to repudiate the will of the power that had placed him on the throne, or to enter into open conflict with the nation over which he ruled. 1763-1775 638 A HISTORT OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII The determination of Catherine II to execute her pur- pose was in no respect frustrated by the helplessness of the King. She invited the formation of confederations of dissi- dents, to whom she offered her support, and plxmged Poland into civil war. Austria, whose sympathies were with the Catholics, was deeply perturbed, but not prepared to engage in war with Russia over the question. Frederick II did not approve of this intervention in the name of religion, but he was under solemn treaty obligations to support Russia. His anxiety was greatly increased lest the Polish question should be made by Austria the occasion for the declaration of a war in which Prussia would be the sufferer; and, in order to derive all possible advantage from a conflict, in case it should prove inevitable, in April, 1767, he had a new understanding with Catherine II, by which it was provided that his services, if called for, should be rewarded with a new augmentation of Prussian territory. But war did not occur. The Catholic powers remained inactive, while Repnin, the Russian ambassador in Poland, brutally executed the orders of the Czarina. Charged with the crime of challenging "the purity of the salutary, dis- interested, and friendly intentions of Her Majesty the Empress of Russia, " the Bishop of Cracow and many other high personages, including senators, were exiled to Siberia; and the Diet, "being under the protection of Her Imperial Majesty," in February, 1768, granted perfect equality to the religious dissidents and accepted the guarantee by Russia to the Republic of "all its actual possessions, as well as its laws, its form of government, and the prerogatives of everyone. " ' The civil war In appearance, the victory of Catherine II was a triumph m Poland q£ religious liberty; but, in reality, it was the enslavement of Poland to Russia. Two parties were thenceforth in conflict within the Republic : the pro-Russian party, headed by the Czartoryski; and the Catholic party, hostile to foreign intervention and determined to resist it. Both ' For the text of the declaration of Repnin of October 14, 1763, ac- cepted by the Diet, see Angeberg, Recueil, p. 29. DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 639 were armed to defend their position, and Poland was de- Chap, viii livered over to a sanguinary civil war. -*^- ^■ The so-called "Patriots" assembled at Bar, in Podolia, ^''*^3-i775 and united in a "confederation," taking for their device "Pro religione et libertate"; liberty being used in the sense of the old Polish regime of liberum veto. Deputies were sent to Vienna, Versailles, and Dresden, to awaken interest in the Polish cause and to procure aid in resisting Russia. The governments were sympathetic with the confederates, but took no effective steps to aid them. The Moscovite troops attacked the "Patriots"; and, after a succession of massacres, compelled the dissolution of the Confederation of Bar. The conflict was. continued by the Confederation of Teschen, and both Austria and France sent sufficient aid ia money and officers to signalize their attitude, but not enough to resist the Russian aggression; which, conducted openly by the ambassadors of Russia and Prussia, was ^ finally triumphant. The causes of the ruin of Poland, outside of the Russo- Prussian intervention, are evident. The Republic was a feudal state without national imity surrounded by power- ful centralized monarchies in a time of general political unification, — an example of arrested development, in which the conditions of the eleventh aentury continued to prevail. The royal power was feeble, the great magnates were hostile to one another, religious tolerance did not exist, and there was no solid middle class on which the political structure could rest. An anachronism on the polit- ical side and a prey to anarchy on the social side, possess- ing no organized infantry or effective artillery, but subject to the quarrels of the nobles who formed its only means of de- fence, this mediaeval survival was exposed to every kind of misfortune to which a brave and chivalrous people could be subjected. The interest of Great Britain in all this commotion in the The situation North and East was but slight. Hated and envied by the '^°'^^^ other maritime powers because of the immense gains made in the Seven Years' War, the British Empire had reached 640 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII the culmination of its development in the eighteenth cen- ^•^- tury, and occupied, relatively to other states, the highest ■ position of power which it has at any time attained. From the Peace of Paris until 1766, George III and his ministries were engaged in the endeavor to fortify the royal predominance, and foreign affairs received practically no attention. The important problem of the time for Great Britain was the organization of the great empire which had come under her dominion, in order to secure its reten- tion and future development. The debt incurred by the Seven Years' War was heavy and the prospective cost of ' defending the colonies as imperial possessions promised to be considerable, although the anticipated expenses at present seem trivial, — a sum of only one hundred thousand pounds sterling being necessary for the maintenance of twenty thousand soldiers in America. Bute's ministry having ended in failure, imder that of Grenville, on March 22, 1765, a resolution was carried to impose certain stamp duties upon the American colonies. Hitherto the colonies had, through their own assemblies, contributed liberally for their own defence, and felt dis- posed to do so in the future; but they were unwilling, after their voluntary contribution to the war with France, to accept the Stamp Act, a measure dictated by the Parlia- '**' ment of England, in which they were in no way represented; and, as a consequence, a constitutional question of profoimd significance was thereby raised. It was to discuss this issue that Pitt, who had long been absent from Parliament, in January, 1766, imder Lord Rockingham's ministry, made his reappearance ia the House of Commons. To his keen political intuition the Stamp Act, which had already produced a disturbed condi- tion in the Colonies, was not only a capital error but a vio- lation of a fimdamental principle of the British constitution. Declaring it to be "a subject of greater importance than ever •< engaged the attention of this House," he denied the right of the kingdom to lay a tax upon the colonies. "I rejoice," he exclaimed, "that America has resisted." "The Com- DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 641 moners of America," he affirmed, "represented in their Chap, viii several assemblies, have ever been in possession of the ^-i^- exercise of this their constitutional right of giving and grant- ^'^63-1775 ing their own money. At the same time this kmgdom, as the supreme governmg and legislating power, has always bound the colonies by her laws, by her regulations and restric- tions of trade, in navigation, in manufactures — in every- thing except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent." All Englishmen, everywhere, he contended, possessed, and must be per- mitted to enjoy, equal rights and be held to equal duties. As a result of the examination of this constitutional Pitt-s retum question, on March 18, 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed; topo'"^' and the King, comprehending the magic of Pitt's name, in July urged him to form a ministry. Enfeebled by illness in both mind and body, the "Great Commoner" accepted the task; but it was far beyond his diminished powers to thwart the policies of George III, and incompatible with his ideals and principles to render them triumphant. Had he been in perfect health, or twenty years yoimger, this one man might have materially altered the course of history. In becoming Earl Chatham, and withdrawing his influence from the branch of the British legislature which he had so long been able to dominate through his power to inter- pret the thought and will of the nation, he lost the influence he had formerly possessed; and, as an English historian has said, his ministry produced "a fatal and melancholy record." As Lord Chesterfield wittily said of him, "he had fallen upstairs, " and could never afterward stand independently before the people. ' But the principle of which Pitt made himself the chief exponent possessed a vitality which was wanting to his broken body and failing faculties. The absolutism which he boldly challenged and the constitutionalism which he as bravely defended had entered upon a conflict which could not end imtil one or the other was defeated. ' He had par- ticipated in a debate which was to create a new epoch in VOL. in. — 41 A. D. 1763-1775 642 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY Chap, viii history, and end in the complete overthrow of the principles which had long dominated Europe. In order to prevent a recurrence of the conflict with France and Spain, and the possible loss of the colonies he had The renewal prcservcd and won for Great Britain, Pitt's first move in di fomao foreign policy was an attempt to form a continental al- liance that would place a permanent restraint upon those powers, in whose family compact he discerned a future danger to the British Empire. His aim was to unite with Russia and Prussia, with the support of Sweden, Denmark, >, Holland, and all the available German princes, in a strong continental coalition to balance the combination of France, Spain, and Austria. Special envoys were promptly des- patched to St. Petersburg and Berlin, "to establish a firm and solid system for the maintenance of the public tranquillity. " The attempt indicates the clearness of Pitt's discern- ment. Choiseul and Grimaldi were planning the means to restore what had been lost to France and Spain by the Peace of Paris. France was seriously engaged in rebuilding j her ruined navy in expectation of making an attack upon >■ England in conjunction with Spain when the favorable ; moment should arrive. The discontent in America, Pitt foresaw, might easily furnish such an occasion. Their emissaries were believed to be already at work in stimulat- ing the opposition of the colonies. If England could be isolated, — and all the maritime powers were at this time re- senting the treatment their commerce had received from England in the last war, — with Austria bound to protect France from invasion by land on the side of the Netherlands, the successes of Great Britain in the previous conflict might conceivably all be reversed. The entente with Russia, for commercial and defensive purposes, presented no difficulty; but Frederick II was not disposed, even with Pitt at the head of the British gov- ernment, to resume his former alliance. His desire was to repair within his kingdom the devastations of war, to build up his army, and to await his opportunity, in close association with Russia, to profit by the weakness of Poland, DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 643 whose province of West Prussia intervened between his Chap, viii Prussian and Brandenburg possessions, and presented a ^•''• barrier to free communication between them. The proba- ^^^^"^^^^ , bility of a new conflict between England and France, in which , ^ he had no interest, made it expedient for him to avoid being drawn into an improfitable alliance, and he skilfully avoided it- While Pitt was anxious to establish a balance of power on the continent favorable to England, it was only for^ defensive purposes. His principal object was to secure the conquests already made. India he considered "the greatest of all objects"; and his design of claiming the conquests in India as possessions of the Crown, and not permitting them to be treated as the private property of a chartered com- pany, was statesmanlike. Had the reforms he proposed with a view to giving a "just and beneficent government to the people of India" been executed, and not thwarted by selfish intrigues, colonial history would, perhaps, have been spared some of its darkest pages. ^ It was the irony of fate that, on June 14, 1767, during the ilhiess and absence of Pitt, Charles Townshend, without consultation, proposed the import duties on goods enter- ing the American colonies which finally produced the irreparable estrangement between them and the mother- coimtry. Helpless and half paralyzed, the great miaister lingered on in office until October, 1768, in such a pitiable state of incapacity that he could not endure an audience of the King or speak of politics; and his final public appearance before his death, ten years later, appeared to his con- temporaries like a resurrection from the grave. The temporary return of Pitt to power had produced a The secret deep impression in France. Choiseul redoubled his activi- ^^^""xv at ties in constant expectation of a renewal of the war with The Hague England. Louis XV was personally much agitated by the possibility of another encoimter with the great minister. For twenty-five years he had considered The Hague as one 1 During Pitt's last ministry several important treaties were negoti- ated between Great Britain and the Princes of India. 644 A HISTOEY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII of the principal stations of his secret diplomacy, for here everything was eventually and usually very promptly known, and the diminished importance of the United A. D. 1763-1775 Provinces in the affairs of Europe rendered it all the more convenient as a watch-tower for observing the other nations. For many years the French ambassador to The Hague, the Marquis d 'Havrincourt, was an active agent of the King's secret cabinet, and played a large r61e in furnishing infor- mation regarding the Polish question. With Pitt's accession to power the intentions of England became the chief object of interest at Versailles, and the future of America largely occupied the mind of the King. Fear was entertained that England would not only enter into a coalition with Russia and Prussia, but force Sweden to do the same, and even that Joseph II, upon the death of Maria Theresa, would be de- tached from France, tempted perhaps by a share in the spoils of Poland. After the death of Havrincourt in 1767, Breteuil, who was well versed in the diplomacy of the North by his missions in St. Petersburg and Stockholm, was sent to The Hague to succeed him; while Broglie took the place of Tercier at Paris, upon the death of this confidant of the King in the same year, as the director of the secret cabinet. It was in this period that Louis XV, in his zeal to keep a close watch upon his foreign ofhce, directed that copies of all of&cial in- .structions sent out to those who were in the secret should 5 be made and sent to him for his private archives. His pas- sion for secret oversight and direction — inconsequential in effect — had with advancing years become a complete obsession. The ineffectual The possibility of a future estrangement on the part of rapprochemmt Austria had increased the desire of Louis XV to renew of France and Prussia diplomatic relations, so long suspended, with Prussia; and, at the end of October, 1768, the preliminary negotiations resulted in the appointment of the Count de Guines as French ambassador at Berlin, and of Baron von Goltz as Prussian ambassador at Paris. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 645 The principal recommendations of the Count de Guines, Chap, viii who was a soldier and not a diplomatist, were his personal '*■•''■ elegance, his courtesy, and his accomplishments in music and ^^^^~^^^^ conversation, which were intended to charm and win the King of Prussia; whom Choiseul described in his instructions to the ambassador as "an ardent genius seeking every kind of glory, who receives eulogies with complacency, and even adulation when seasoned with intelligence. " The principal inducement to be offered to Frederick II to resume intimate relations with France was a favorable treaty of commerce, of which it was esteemed Prussia stood in need; but neither this proposal nor the solemn warning Guines was instructed to impress upon the King of the essential antagonism between Prussia and Russia was sufS- cient to win the friendship of Frederick II, who had formed a plan of his own in which Russia was to play an important « part. The French ambassador was instructed to insinuate that in guaranteeing to the Empress of Russia the safe pos- session of all her estates and in pledging himself to defend them against Turkey, who was his natural ally, he had exposed Prussia to the danger of a new Austro-Russian com- ' bination, or even to the more probable peril of a new attack by Austria, in case Russia should be preoccupied in a con- . flict with the Ottoman Empire. To his surprise Guines found a cool reception at Berlin. "There exists nowhere a court Hke this," he wrote to Choi- seul. "They pay no more attention to the diplomatic corps than if it did not exist," he continues. "When the King gives us an audience it is in the last room of his apartment. We have no place marked. We present no strangers of our nation who appear at the court. If a minister of state has anything to communicate to us, he sends a lackey to seek us, and the same custom is observed for audiences of the King and the Queen. When she has fetes, at supper- time we go home; with permission to return when they have risen from the table!" The Russian ambassador, Guuies noticed, was quite dif- ferently treated; so much so, indeed, that the Count was 646 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII moved to raise an issue regarding the question of prece- ^■^- dence; which, however, did not end to his satisfaction. The truth was that Frederick II was only trifling with France, from which he expected nothing of solid advantage, while he was at the time engaged in serious negotiations with Russia and Austria. Choiseul, whom Catherine II referred to as "le souffleur de Mustapha," had at last suc- ceeded in arousing the Turks, and Frederick II was planning either to end the war before Prussia should be involved ili it, or to derive from it new territorial advantages. II. The Crisis in the East and the Partition op Poland The Sultan's The civil War in Poland had opened the eyes of Choiseul declaration of ^^ ^^le loss of French prestige and the increased power of war on Kussia x o ^ x- Russia. To offset, and if possible to terminate, the humilia- tion of France in seeing Poland delivered over to Russian domination, the minister had resolved to redouble his efforts to arouse the Ottoman Empire to opposition by awaken- ing fear of Russia's progress; and the course of events had finally rendered the mission of Vergennes at Constanti- nople a complete success. On October 6, 1768, the violation of the Turkish frontier at Balta and the taking of Cracow by the Russians had turned the scale in favor of war, and it was on that day tempestuously declared. Obreskoff, the Russian resident at Constantinople, was summoned to the presence of the Grand Vizier. "Have you not engaged with us to leave in Poland only for a short time seven thousand men? And how many are there to-day?" "About twenty-five thousand," was the reply. "Well, traitor, well, perjurer," exclaimed the Grand Vizier, "you yourself avow your infidelity. You do not blush before God or men at the excesses and horrors which, to the shame of humanity, your troops have committed, and still commit, in a country that does not be- long to you. ... I aimounce to you that the Most August, Most Powerful, Most Formidable and Invincible Emperor, my master, whose glory and triumphs God perpetuates, DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 647 finds himself in the necessity of declaring war upon you. Chap, viii Go then, and wait in the next room for his orders!" ■^•^- 1 'TOO 1 '7'7C Escorted by a guard of janissaries, the unhappy resi- dent was conducted to the Palace of Seven Towers, where, in accordance with Turkish custom, he was detained as a prisoner of state. Upon Vergennes' advice, a manifesto was addressed to the powers of Europe, in which it was declared that "Russia has dared to destroy the liberties of Poland; has forced the Poles to recognize as king a person not of royal blood, nor designated by the will of the people; and has caused those who were unwilling to recognize him to be massacred, and their goods and estates to be pillaged and devastated. " Thus, Turkey answered Russia's intervention in the name of religious liberty by claiming the championship of political liberty. Vergennes, who had inspired this de- cision, could write some time afterward: "I have executed the will of the King; but I bring back the three millions sent to me for this purpose. I have not needed them. " The gage of battle had been thrown down by the Sultan; The attitude but no one of the powers, not even Turkey herself, was °' ^^edenck u prepared for war. The position of Frederick II was peculiarly embarrassing. Russia had been taken by surprise; and, fully preoccupied with Poland, in November the Czarina appealed to the King of Prussia for an assurance of his iidelity to the aUiance. While Frederick II was not oblivious of the advantages that might accrue to Prussia from a serious conflict between his too predominant partner and the Ottoman Empire, he perceived the danger that might result from Prussia's bemg drawn into it; which would, perhaps, leave him unable to prevent Austria's recovery of Silesia. It was, therefore, for him a moment of serious reflection; and it was at this tune, in the tranquillity of Sans Souci, that he meditated upon "the historical mission of Prussia," and m this i same month of November wrote his famous "Testament » Politique." Starting from the prmciple that the raison d'Etat ought 38 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY Chap. I A.D. 1648-1670 The election of Leopold I Mazarin's dis- simulation of his defeat On March 19, 1658, the electors began to arrive at Frank- fort. The Archbishop of Mainz had labored assiduously _ for peace between France and Spain, but neither side was inclined to accept his mediation. Upon one point only were the electors disposed to act favorably to France. All had a common interest in limiting the power of the new emperor; and to this end, on May 15, Gramont and De Lionne were able to secure the adoption of a conclusum by which the Emperor was forbidden to furnish aid to the Spaniards against the French or their allies. The Spanish ambassador Penaranda offered a hundred thousand crowns for the suppression of the two words "foederatos Galliae," but without success. Thus, the only profitable result of the mission of Gramont and De Lionne, so far as the election was concerned, was to impose upon Leopold I a capitulation which restrained his liberty of action. This the Archbishop of Mainz had repeatedly offered, but up to the last moment De Lionne had indignantly rejected it. The French case was, nevertheless, astutely handled, and Gramont, De Liornie, and Gravel did all that was possible for France; still the result accomphshed by so much labor, so much gold, and so many sumptuous din- ners and "longues buveries" can hardly be considered a signally triumphal achievement." On July 18, 1658, the Austrian minister Count Isaac Volmar could boast of a more decisive victory in the election of Leopold I as Emperor. With admirable tact. Cardinal Mazarin had prepared for this adverse result. On November 28, 1657, the birth of a male heir to the throne of Spain had been announced at Madrid. The occurrence afforded to Mazarin an occasion for writing to his ambassadors soon afterward, that the birth of the Spanish Infante Philip "might furnish an honorable pretext, since the infidelity of Mainz has reduced us to the state of not being able to do better, — to relax a little our opposition.'"^ When, therefore, the final disap- 1 Mazarin to Gramont, January 10, 1658. Archives dea Affaires Etrang^res, "AUemagne," vol. 140. 648 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII to be the sole guide for the conduct of a sovereign, Frederick' *•"• II fixed his attention upon the future development of his 1763-1775 ^ kingdom. "One of the principal aims of Prussia should be," he wrote, "the occupation of certain places on the Vistula, which would enable Prussia to defend Eastern Prussia against Russia. " In brief, Prussia must acquire the Polish province of West Prussia, and thus connect East Prussia with Eastern Pomerania and the main body of what had become the Kingdom of Prussia. By what means was this result to be accomplished? It might be achieved by continuing the alliance with Russia and obtaining the support of Catherine II; but that support might involve the necessity of active partici- pation in the war against the Turks, thus affording to Austria an opportunity to recover Silesia. On the other hand, if Maria Theresa should be dis- posed to forget the past, the desired result might be ac- complished through the wish of Austria to prevent Frederick II from aiding in the aggrandizement of Russia. At all events, it was in the interest of Prussia, if possible, to pre- serve the peace; and, accordingly, on November 9, Frederick II ordered his minister at Constantinople, Zegelin, to offer his mediation to the Porte. The attitude In desiring a continuation of peace, the policies of Prussia and of Austria were identical; for neither Maria Theresa, nor Joseph II, nor Kaunitz, was at the time inclined to array their country either with Russia, whose further aggrandize- ment was dreaded, or with Turkey, the traditional foe of Christendom. The activity of Choiseul in exciting the Turks against Russia not only failed to obtain approbation at Vienna, but constituted a point of divergence between the French and Austrian policies that furnished to Austria a substantial reason for a rapprochement with Prussia. Frederick II, as we have seen, had already, in 1766, sought to approach the Court of Vienna through a personal interview with Joseph II. The occasion now seemed op- portune to revive this project. Accordingly, by the advice of Austria DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 649 of Kaunitz, who succeeded in overcoming the scruples of Chap, vm Maria Theresa, the Austrian minister at Berhn, Nugent, ^■^■ had been, on October 14, 1768, instructed to declare that ^'''63-1775 Austria had forever abandoned the idea of trying to recover Silesia, and to propose to the King of Prussia that the two monarchies work together to preserve the neutrality of Germany; and it was suggested that negotiations in this sense might be opened in a personal interview between the King and the Emperor. Frederick II gladly accepted this proposal. "We are Germans," he said. "What matters it to us, if the English and the French fight over Canada and the islands of America, ... or that the Turks and the Russians take to their horses? . . . The Empress and I have a long time endured ruinous wars: what do we finally gain by it?" Both monarchies, it was admitted, would be endangered \ by the further aggrandizement of Russia in Europe. "Your Majesty is more exposed than we," observed Nugent. "It is true," replied the King. "Let the Russians extend their domains as far as they please toward the Black Sea and its surroimdings, . . . but on the side of Europe. ..." His sentence was not finished, and the conversation turned on the Emperor, who was known to be an admirer of the King of Prussia; but his meaning was understood. Both monarchs had an interest in arresting the westward expansion of Russia.^ But in spite of the identity of interests on the part of Hans for the two German powers, the vexed question of Silesia p"^^™^"' still remained to disconcert their understanding. Re- rapprochement luctant as he was to embark in a war against the Turks in order to retain the friendship of Catherine II, Frederick II, on December 15, assured her of his loyal intentions and his readiness to prolong their treaty engagements; but he never intended to send troops to aid her against Turkey, if he could arrange to secure equal advantages from Austria. Kaunitz, on the other hand, was eager to separate Fred- erick II from his Russian ally. To this end, m December, ' See Arneth, Geschichte Maria Theresias, VIII, p. 562. A. D. 1763-1775 650 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII he submitted to his sovereigns an elaborate memorial, in which he explained the ambition of Russia to absorb Poland and to re-establish the Greek Empire by the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and dwelt upon the danger to Austria of such a powerful rival. By an alliance with Prussia, he suggested, this end might be averted, and Silesia might be recovered. Prussia could be given Courland and the greater part of Polish Prussia in exchange for Silesia. Thus, the recovery of the lost proviace might be effected at the ex- ' pense of Poland, and the progress of Russia might be blocked. To this scheme — which shows that in December, 1768, Kaunitz was not averse to the dismemberment of Poland - — ^both Maria Theresa and Joseph II stoutly objected. Neither believed that Frederick II would ever consent to surrender Silesia, and the Empress at least had scruples against the spoliation of the Republic. Vergennes, whose clear intelligence had already grasped the ultimate outcome of the crisis in the East, — though in ignorance of Kaunitz 's readiness to appease the appetite of Prussia, — in a report to Louis XV on the Russo-Turkish war, asked the significant question, "Who knows if the dis- memberment of Poland might not become the seal of rec- onciliation between the two contending parties?" But, although it was at this time distinctly placed before them, the Austrian monarchs were not in favor of that solu- tion. A friendly interview between the Emperor and the King of Prussia was, however, arranged, to occur at Neisse, in August of the following year. The tactics of In the meantime, Frederick II was carrying on his dila- Fredenck II ^^j.^ negotiations ^vith Guines at Berlin; rendering him as jealous as possible of Russia, and at the same time exciting the misgivings of both Russia and Austria, through whose suspicions he expected to enhance the value of his aUiance by giving the impression that his friendship was sought on every side. Choiseul, whose pohcies were severely criti- cised by the court favorites at Paris, left without reinforce- ment at Vienna, was becoming discouraged; and, at the moment when the Porte most needed to be sustained, Ver- DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 651 gennes was ordered back to France. Thus, at last, the Chap. viil secret diplomacy of Louis XV, which had spasmodically, ^■^■ but not coherently, been made official, was doomed tr. 1763-1775 complete failure; and the influence of France, violently * opposed at St. Petersburg, disregarded at Vienna, enfeebled at Constantmople, and trifled with at Berlin, ended m * impotence and abject humiliation. Frederick II, receiving no solid satisfaction from Vienna, was extremely anxious to end the war in the East by me- diating between the Sultan and the Czarina; but in the meantime was obliged to cling to the Russian alliance. This, however, the Czarina refused to renew, except upon condi- tion that Prussia make coromon cause with Russia in the war with Turkey. Although embarrassed, Frederick II was by no means helpless. By a few dexterous turns he might even make himself the arbiter in the Eastern Question. By his alliance with Russia he might be able to force the hand of Austria; and, by holding himself open for negotiations with the Emperor, he would be able to restrain at the proper moment the too extravagant exactions of his powerful ally. The situation was difficult, but he was determined to be its master and not its victim. Dreading war as a possible cause of ruin to his monarchy, he had resolved to improve his fortunes by astute diplomacy. Although Frederick II was strongly inclined toward a Frederick ii's renewal of the Russian alliance, he was fully conscious of p.'™ .°* °™' the great danger to which the Prussian monarchy was ex- posed by the aggrandizement of Russia. In March, 1769, he wrote to his brother Henry: "It is a terrible power, which in half a century will make all Europe tremble. Sprung from those Huns and Gepides who destroyed the Empire of the East, they may soon attack the Empire of the West, and cause the Austrians emotions of pain and penitence that, by a mistaken policy, they have called that barbarous nation into Germany, and have instructed it in the art of war. I see no other remedy than by forming in time a league of the greatest sovereigns to resist this dangerous torrent." 652 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Entertaining tliis opinion of his ally, it is easy to compre- „„'t'"»~^ hend his readiness to negotiate with Austria. Happily for ■ our comprehension of his motives in conducting these ne- gotiations, the King of Prussia, without the least reserve regarding his intentions, has been so obliging as to explain them for the benefit of posterity in his own admirably clear and forcible language. "I have read," he says ia his "M^- moires, " "the beautiful allegory of Boiardo;' I seized then by the hair the occasion which presented itself; and, by force of negotiation and intrigue, I succeeded in indemnify- ing our monarchy for its past losses by incorporating Polish Prussia Tvith my older provinces. " The process by which this design was realized has been so minutely detailed by Frederick II himself, and by others who have supplemented his narrative with information from other sources, that it would be a work of superero- gation to repeat here all the particulars of that transaction.^ It is sufficient to indicate the principal turning-points in the long and complicated negotiations by which the result was accomplished. No ground has so far been discovered for disputing the claim of Frederick II to the parentage of the project for reconciling the interests of Prussia, Russia, and Austria by despoiling Poland. "The object of this partition," he informs us, "consisted in permitting Russia to continue tranquilly the war with the Turks, without fearing to be arrested in her enterprise by a diversion which the Empress- Queen was in a position to make," thus exempting Prussia from being drawn into a conflict between these two powers. With Poland as an ample field of compensation for all three monarchies, why, he suggested, should they any longer im- poverish their subjects with destructive wars? Why not amicably bury their differences, and console themselves in a reasonable way at the expense of their powerless neighbor? The practical difficulty which confronted the King of ' In the Orlando Inamorato. 2 See the text of the Mimoires; and Dun&ker, Aus der Zeit Frie- drichs des Grossen, Leipzig, 1876. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 653 Prussia was how to present this proposal so as to render Chap, viii it effective. Catherine II might not receive with appro- ^■''■ bation a suggestion to divide with her neighbor what was ^^^^""^^^^ practically already almost her own possession; and Maria Theresa might not be disposed to enter into the scheme Frederick ifs at all, or to be satisfied with anything less than the restora- p''°p™=''. » ^,, . to partition tlOn 01 iSlleSia. Poland In approaching Catherine II, Frederick II employed the ruse ofj attributing the idea of partition to the (Count , von Lynar, who had come to Berlin to attend his daughter's wedding. This personage, the King of Prussia, on February 2, 1769, informed Solms, his minister at St. Petersburg, had conceived "une idee assez singuliere," namely, that the face of the affairs of Europe might be changed by one stroke, if Russia would offer to the Court of Vienna for its assistance against the Turks, say, the city of Lemberg and its environs and the Zips, — a district of Poland that had once belonged to Hungary, — at the same time assigning to Prussia the Polish province of West Prussia, with the bish- opric of Ermeland, — an enclave of East Prussia, — and the right of protecting Dantzig; while Russia herself, as an indemnity for the expenses of the Turkish war, might take such a part of Poland as she would consider suitable. In that case, there being no longer any jealousy between Austria and Prussia, they could unite in aiding Russia against the Turks. The plan, the King informed his minister, appeared to him "seducing," but perhaps more "brilliant than solid," and he might use his judgment about communicating it^ of course not as Frederick II's own proposal, but as an out- side suggestion — to the Czarina's minister of foreign affairs, Count Panin. After some misgivings, Solms finally decided to present to the Russian minister this so-called "Memoire du Comte Lynar, " as "the ingenious theory of a speculative German. " To his g;ratification, as well as his surprise, as Solms informed his master on March 3, 1769, Panin — also in a purely speculative sense — freely discussed the question, 654 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII and Seemed ready to make concessions both to Prussia and ^■'°- Austria; not, however, for aid in merely driving the Turks beyond the Dniester, but for uniting to expel them from Europe, and thus assuring "the repose of Christendom, which they had so long disturbed"! The obstruc- Among the obstacles to a triple alliance between Austria, aium^ " *"^'^ Prussia, and Russia, was the existing relation of Austria with France. So far as Prussia was concerned, the aim was simply to eliminate France from all consideration; and, in March, 1769, the recall of the French ambassador from Berlin was a first step in this direction. It now remained to separate if possible Austria and France. The settlement of the Eastern Question would then be confined to an agreement between the three East- ern powers. Two possible victims of such a combination were in view, ., — Poland and Turkey. The fundamental question was simply, what would the mutual jealousies of the powers per- mit? Russia, the youngest of the European monarchies, might enlarge her borders in both directions, and Austria could do the same; but Prussia could expand only by ap- propriating a part of Poland. Neither Prussia nor Austria could regard with complacency a wholesale appropriation of the Ottoman Empire by Russia; for Austria also had ter- ritorial aspirations in the East, and Prussia might at any time be in need of an ally able to hold in respect both Russia and Austria. From Frederick II 's point of view, therefore, all the signs pointed toward Poland as the future victim of the new triple alliance. The reception given by Count Panin to the suggestion of partition was not encouraging for the plans of Frederick II. Russia demanded, as conditions of continuing the exist- ing alliance, that it be prolonged to eight years; that Prussia should join with Denmark in defending the liberal constitu- tion of Sweden, which rendered that monarchy compara- tively powerless; that Saxony should be attacked in case an effort were made to overthrow King Stanislas; that Prussia should join with Russia in defending the dissidents DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 655 in Poland and at the same time furnish aid against Turkey. Chap, viii In return, Russia would guarantee the Brandenburg sue- ^•"• cession in Ansbach and Bayreuth, under the laws of the ^^^^""^^^^ Empire. Jt was a heavy price for Prussia to pay. Frederick II resolved not to pay it; land leisurely continuing the nego- * tiations with Russia turned toward Austria. In this direction the outlook for the formation of a triple alliance was less brilliant still, but it furnished the condition that made Frederick II appear for the moment master of the situation. In order to prevent possible in- vasion by Russia on the one hand or Turkey on the other, Austria had massed troops upon her frontiers, had even ad- vanced them beyond the legal Hmits upon both Polish and Turkish soil, and had drawn a line beyond which, it was an- nounced, the belligerents must not pass. Included in the territory thus occupied by Austria, was precisely that moun- tainous region known as the Zips, mentioned in the so-called "Memoire du Comte Lynar. " There were, indeed, ancient rights to justify this occupation; but the act was, nevertheless, though in form a purely "pacific penetration," apparently based upon the principle of aggression. Disquieted by the attitude of Austria, in May, 1769, The eSort for the Russian ambassador at Vierma demanded if the treaty !,° ^"^*™" ^ rrussian between Austria and Russia of June 16, 1753, — in which mterue the two powers had united against the Turks,— was re- garded as still in force. ^ The answer was that the Empress considered the treaty annulled by the Russo-Prussian al- liance of 1762; that Austria had a treaty of perpetual peace with Turkey; and that she would observe it as long as the Turks remained faithful to it. Although Austria professed that no aggression was in- tended, the occupation of the Zips at the same time that Prussia was proposing a partition of Poland in which this very district was mentioned was subject to the interpre- tation that a rapprochement between Austria and Prussia ' For the treaty, see Martens, Traites de la Rmsie avec I'Aulriche, I, p. 185. 656 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII was contemplated; particularly as the Austrian Court had ^"•^ declared that "future action would depend upon that of 1763—1775 -r-. 'IT Prussia. Preoccupied with the war with the Sultan, the Czarina, though suspicious, at the time offered no objection to Aus- tria's attitude; for the Turkish army in the summer of 1769 was already defeated and driven to the Danube, leaving Moldavia and Wallachia open to the Russian advance. On August 25, the appointed meeting of Frederick II and Joseph II, who came as Count von Falkenstein, took place at Neisse, in Silesia. The two sovereigns met in the most intimate fashion, spending three days together, dining at the same table. Frederick II was voluble and seductive. Joseph II, armed beforehand with precautions furnished by Kaunitz, was on his guard, but irresistibly fascinated by the personal charm of his brilliant host, whose conversation enchanted the young emperor. Kaunitz was declared by the King to be "la premiere tete de V Europe." Everything Austrian was praised, everything French decried. When he was young, the philosopher of Sans Souci confessed, he was ambitious; but, having become old, he had become the ^apostle of abstinence and virtue. The predominating note was the peace, tranquillity, and future prosperity of Ger- many; which, it was agreed, both sovereigns ought to pro- mote by their friendship and neutrality. With regard to Russia, opinions were freely exchanged. "So long as you do not have us, that alliance with Russia is necessary to you," said the Emperor; "but it costs dearly and is often inconvenient for you." "That is very true," replied the King. When the Emperor had dwelt upon the danger arising from the aggrandizement of Russia, which, he represented, Prussia and Sweden ought to resist, the King replied: "In time neither you nor I, but all Europe, will be required to restrain those people. The Turks are nothing compared * with them! ... In twenty years an alliance will be neces- sary against Russian despotism." Toward the close of the interview an exchange of notes DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 657 between the two sovereigns was begun, but it did not go Chap, viii beyond effusive compliments and vague assurances. The ^■''• really strategic points — the future of Poland, the contin- ^'^'^^'^^^^ uation or transformation of the existing alliances, the ques- tion of mediation in the Russo-Turkish war — were passed The results of over almost in silence. The indifference of Austria to the *'"' """f"™"" desires of France and the suspicions of Prussia regarding the *■ designs of Russia were clearly disclosed, and the assurance that neither of the two German powers wished for war pre- pared the way for a better understanding.^ Apart from this meagre outcome the conference bore no fruits. The impres- sions formed of each other by the two sovereigns are, how- ever, worth recording. "He is devoured with ambition," Frederick II wrote soon afterward of the Emperor. "It is certain that the old mistrust is still in his soul, and even more in his character, " Joseph II wrote of the King. The most important result of the royal meeting at Neisse was the effect of this mysterious interview upon St. Peters- burg. In the light of the apparent rapprochement between Prussia and Austria, the Czarina believed she might have cause to fear for the permanence of her recent conquests in the East, possibly for the continuation of her influence in Poland, and certainly for the constancy of her ally. As a consequence, the Russian conditions for the prolongation of the alliance with Prussia were considerably reduced; and Frederick II, on October 12, 1769, renewed the treaty with Catherine II without being drawn into the Russo- Turkish war. In truth, he was now disquieted by a different form of anxiety. By the middle of November the Russians had occupied Bucharest, and all Europe was watching with interest the triumphant advance of the Czarina's armies. 1 Although no formal treaty was concluded, by an exchange of notes it was declared, "Foi de roi et parole d'honnete homme, si jamais le feu de la guerre se rallume entre I'Angleterre et la maison de Bourbon, ils maintiendront la paix. ..." It was equally promised that if any other war occurred, they would observe exact neutraUty regarding their pos- sessions. It was the complete renunciation of Silesia by Austria. VOL. III. — 42 658 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII More than ever, therefore, there was need of an entente ^■^- between Prussia a,nd Austria. It appeared to be the only ■ means of restraining the ambition of Catherine II, now em- boldened by her sweeping victories in the East. In this situation Frederick II urged Austria to offer her mediation between the Turks and Russia. Kaunitz at first hesitated to intervene, and the attitude of France made it difficult for him to do so ; for it was at this moment, in December, 1769, that Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador to France, returned to Vienna to arrange the details of the approaching marriage of the Archduchess Marie Antoinette with the Dauphin of France, bringing with him a memorial from Choiseul strongly urging the policy of continuing the Russo-Turkish war as long as possible. Dis- turbed by the interview at Neisse, which had awakened at Paris suspicions of Austria's secret defection from France, Choiseul wished to strengthen the bonds with Austria, to keep Russia occupied in the East, and to leave Frederick II in danger of being ultimately drawn into the Russo-Turkish conflict. Thus, it was hoped, the subjection of Poland might at least be postponed. But, in February, 1770, Kaunitz offered to the Turks the mediation of Austria, if they desired it, and informed Choiseul that Austria's pol- icy was to end the war as soon as possible. It was a * clear signal that Austria was drifting toward an imder- standing with Frederick II. The divergence A deep line of cleavage had now appeared in the policies of the powers ^f France and Austria; and, indeed, a sharp division of Europe into two groups of powers, those of the East and those of the West, which were assuming the character of two distinct systems. The influence of France in the East had been sacrificed by the inconsequence of her policy; that of England by her voluntary inactivity. After her splendid victories of the Seven Years' War, England's foreign policy was comparatively neglected; displaced from public interest by internal controversies, parliamentary conflicts, and ministerial disputes over the DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 659 regulation of the vast empire which Great Britain had won Chap, vili by that war. a. d. The only foreign powers from which England had any- ^^^^"^^^^ thing to fear were France and Spain; but Louis XV was opposed to a renewal of the war, Choiseul had not yet completed the rehabilitation of the French navy, and Spain alone was not able to dispute British supremacy on the sea. Still, occasions for friction were not wanting. In 1769 the annexation by France of Corsica, bought from Genoa during a period of insurrection which the Genoese were unable to suppress, greatly stirred the war spirit in England, as being a menace to the British position in the Mediter-* ranean; and a quarrel with France and Spain over the Falk- land islands nearly involved the three powers in war.i The real danger for England — although its magnitude was not then apparent — was the growing revolt in America. » Blood had already been shed in Boston, and the colonists had opened a constitutional debate which the political con- dition of England at that time rendered it difficult to ter- minate. I^The King's attempt to restore royal absolutism by the control of Parliament was undermining the British Con- stitution at the moment when the growth of the empire de- pended upon a liberal conception of imperial administration. ] With Chatham in power, the course of events might have been different; but a servile ministry gave free scope to the royal predominance, with the result that Ireland and Amer- ica were on the point of open insurrection. In the East, the interests of Great Britain were com- mercial rather than political; and the fate of Poland, even the fate of Turkey, was at that time indifferent to English statesmen. The time had not arrived when Great Britain felt that the Russian advance was a menace either to her Mediterranean interests or to her Indian empire. The open enemy of France, Russia, which furnished a rich supply of raw materials and a profitable market for • For the declarations of Great Britain and Spain on this subject, see Wenck, III, p. 815. 660 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII the manufactures and colonial products of Great Britain, ^•"- seemed at the time to be England's natural friend. Even 1 'TO o 1 77ri the conquest of the Black Sea ports and the possible exten- sion of Russian commerce to the Mediterranean offered at that time no apparent disadvantage to British trade; which, by means of a better merchant marine, it was believed, would profit in the South, as it was already profiting in the North, by Russia's approaches to the sea. While, therefore, England and France — which was still by the Facte de famille closely allied with Spain — regarded each other with jealous eyes, and were looking forward to a time when war between them might be resumed, Austria, Prussia, and Russia formed a group by themselves, practically detached from Western Europe, — although the nominal alliance of Austria with France and Spain was still in force, — and thus were able to settle the Eastern Question in their own way and to their own advantage. The fortunes of The Turks, although they were dispossessed of Molda- war in the East ^^^ ^^^ Wallachia, had no thought of accepting the media- tion which Austria offered them. Pursuing her purpose of driving the Turks from Europe, and re-establishing the Byzantine Empire, the Czarina had sent her favorites, the two Orloff brothers, to arouse the Greeks and aid them to throw off the Turkish yoke. Two Russian fleets, one com- manded by Spiritoff and the other by Elphinston, an Eng- lish admiral, were sent to the Mediterranean to support the insurrection ;i but the Greeks did not respond as had been expected, the insurrection ended ingloriously, and the ex- pedition completely failed. Thus, partially favored by the fortunes of war, the Sultan was seeking allies rather than mediation; which Frederick II, through Zegelin, was urging upon the SubUme Porte. Although he had begun the war in defence of the liberties of Poland, in March, 1770, Mustafa III was, never- theless, ready to make an alliance with Austria at the ex- ' This waa the first time a Russian fleet had ever appeared in the Mediterranean . DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 661 pense of the Republic. In April, Kaunitz declined the Chap, viii proposal, and urged the Sultan to seek friendly intervention, n '^•"• Frederick II — who in May had inferred from a conver ■ sation with the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, that the Court of Vienna, if satisfied with sufficient compensations, would not consider his own pretensions regarding Poland as excessive — continued to press the idea of ending the war, and offered to open negotiations with St. Petersburg in behalf of the Sultan. To render mediation acceptable to Catherine II, however, it was necessary to impress her with the idea that Austria was plarming hostilities; and to give verisimilitude to this impression, it was expedient to exaggerate as much as possible the offensive preparations at Vienna. In the meantime, the campaign resulted in brilliant victo- ries for the Russian fleet, which, on July 5, 1770, destroyed the Turkish fleet; and the Russian army, which was in possession of the Danube provinces, was everywhere triumphant. As a consequence, on August 12, 1770, the Turks, urged on by Zegelin, asked officially for Austrian mediation. When, therefore, on September 3, Frederick II and The meeting Joseph II had their second interview, this time at ^*]^ft3''*g^3u*t Neustadt, in Moravia, the situation was more favorable for an entente. In the meantime, Austria, having unearthed historic claims to the Zips, had advanced her hnes of occupation into territory unquestionably belonging to Poland; and this encroachment strengthened the hands of Frederick II in pressing the Czarina to accept mediation as an alternative « to war with Austria. At Neustadt the part played by Joseph II in person was rendered subordinate by the presence of Kaunitz, who took entire charge of the serious conversations. If Russia should pass the Danube, urged Frederick II, Austria could not reasonably refrain from war. Kaunitz, formal and argu- mentative, was forced to yield to the superior mental agility of the King, and was so far influenced by him as to permit 662 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Frederick II to press mediation at St. Petersburg upon 1763-^775 ^^^^ ground.i In a visit to the Russian Court, Prince Henry, furnished with this weapon, in October and November labored for the acceptance of mediation; but the victorious Czarina preferred to make peace directly with the Turks, hoping thereby to retain all her conquests. Panin offered the suggestion of a triple alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but, as this proposal contemplated no compensa- tions, it met with no favor at Berlin. The fall of In the conversations at Neustadt, Kaunitz had spoken choiseui p£ ^YxQ co-operation of France in forcing upon Russia the acceptance of mediation; for Choiseui still remained a faith- ful adherent of the Austrian alliance, and the marriage of the Dauphin with Marie Antoinette, in April, 1770, was an additional bond between the two courts. But Choiseui, who had enjoyed the protection of Madame de Pompadour, had a bitter enemy in her successor, Madame du Barry, and the moment had arrived to accomplish his overthrow. More than any other Frenchman of his time, Choiseui ^ had, in spite of his errors, rendered distinguished services to France. Upon the death of Stanislas Leszczinski, in 1766, he had accomplished without friction th^incorporation of Lorraine. ) He had desired a more effectual r61e for France in the Orient. He had rebuilt the French navy and made extensive preparations for recovering from England the lost colonies. His popularity was great, and his ability un- questioned. But the King, who feared a renewal of war with England, did not desire a vigorous minister, liable to derange the quiet and the pleasures of the court; and, on December 21, 1770, Choiseui was dismissed and retired to Chanteloup. The fall of the " Roi-Choiseul " was the complete abdica- tion of France as an efficient force in the international ' Kaunitz had prepared a long "Catechism," containing ten points elaborately presented; but Frederick II disarmed him by praising it and begging for a copy for futvure direction, without really discussing it. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 663 affairs of Europe. England was left free to follow her own Chap, viii policies in America. Poland was entirely abandoned to ^■''■ her fate. The Ottoman Empire was left without support. ^^^^"^^^^ . The Duke d'Aiguillon, who assumed charge of the foreign affairs of France, had no large conception of policy. The secret diplomacy of the King fell by neglect to a still lower level of inconsistency; and, undirected and unrestrained by any master hand, ambassadors and ministers sought their own pleasures while acting at cross purposes. i Until it was redeemed by Vergennes, French diplomacy was in a condi- tion of anarchy. In one direction only was the influence of France worth The acoesaion mentioning. The condition of Sweden had for a long °* ^^^^'^^J^^ time been almost as confused as that of Poland. Under the existing constitution the royal authority had been greatly reduced; and Prussia, which coveted Swedish Pomerania, and Russia, which intended the annexation of Finland, had agreed to maintain this condition, with the intention of profiting by the helplessness of the kingdom. The death of Adolphus Frederick, in 1771, brought to the throne his brilliant son, Gustavus III, at that time resid- ing in Paris. The young king, whose popularity was uni- versal, had no difficulty in obtaining from France subsidies for the re-establishment of the royal authority in Sweden, and Vergennes was sent to strengthen the Franco-Swedish alliance and aid the King in his undertaking. With this support Gustavus III was able by a coup d'etat to re- cover his royal prerogatives and to save his country from dismemberment.^ Although France was thus able to frustrate the designs The abandon- of Prussia and Russia in Sweden, and through the skilful ™™* °M''^ ° East to the diplomacy of Vergennes temporarily even to reconcile three powers Sweden and Denmark, in the East the field was completely ' The French Embassy at Vienna was left vacant from May, 1770, to January, 1772, when it was filled by a mere roue, Prince Louis de Rohan. * For details, see Marsangy, Le comte de Vergennes, son ambassade en Suede, Paris, 1898. 664 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII abandoned to the three powers, Austria, Prussia, and „/■ ^'„ Russia. On January 5, 1771, Frederipk II took a decisive step by writing to the Czarina that, if she wished to avoid war « with Austria, ishe would content herself with the annexa- tion of Azoff and Kabardia, with the right of navigation on the Black Sea, and renounce Moldavia and Wallachia. Would Austria actually join with the Turks in resisting the Russians? That was now the momentous question both at Berlin and St. Petersburg. At Vienna, the main question was, on the other hand, would Prussia join with Austria in forcing mediation upon Russia, or was Frederick II pushmg^Austria on to resistance without intending to support her action with armed force? Kaunitz was ready to purchase Prussia's offensive alliance by permitting the annexation of Courland, on condition that Austria should retain the Zips; but Maria Theresa would not listen to it. She would have neither war nor parti- tion. ( Kaunitz, on the contrary, wished to avoid war by means of partition. Russia would certainly yield, he thought, when confronted by two powers united against her; and, as for the partition, it would be but a slight affair. Courland was at best only a fief of Poland, and the Zips had once be- longed to Hungary. If Poland could be induced to assent, Russia could not well oppose. The fall of Choiseul removed a serious obstacle to the closer rapprochement of Austria and Prussia, and incidentally also to an entente with Russia; for the French alliance had rendered both those powers suspicious of Austria, while at the same time it had made it necessary for her to hold aloof from them. But now that the influence of France had been practically eliminated, a triple alliance of the Eastern powers with compensations was daily becoming more acceptable. Frederick II 's secret purpose of basing peace on an alliance of the three rival powers, at the expense of Poland, was now in a fair way to be consummated; for Austria was dis- posed to force the Czarina's hand, and an impression was The prinoiple of partition accepted DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 665 beginniag to be made at St. Petersburg. In a conversation Chap, viii with Prince Henry, who still remained at the Russian Court, ^- ''■ on January 8, 1771, the Czarina casually let drop the question, ^^^^"^^^^ . which the so-called "Memoire du Comte Ljoiar" had inge- niously suggested, "Why should not everyone take something?" " ?• A few days later Frederick II received from his brother a report of this conversation. "This proposal is d propos," he wrote in his "Memoires"; "for, after having examined everything, it was the only means which remained of avoid- ing new troubles and of contenting everyone." The principle of mutual compensations being thus virtually accepted, it only remained to work out the details. Since all wereif disposed to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others, there was no longer any obstruction to actual par- tition, except agreement regarding the lines on which the spoils should be divided. ' By conceding largely to others Prussia would gain the more, for the balance of the powers would have to be retained. But if Russia were to take large gains from Turkey and Poland were left for the future, only slight accessions of territory from the Republic could be expected. Nothing short of a serious crisis could justify a wholesale depredation. The occupation of the Zips was a precedent of dismemberment, but it was comparatively insignificant. On January 24, Frederick II wrote to his brother at St. Petersburg: "The Austrians will never consent to the abasement of the Porte. What you have held out to view, Ermeland," — the compensation suggested at St. Petersburg for Prussia, — "is not worth the expense of six sous" . . . "I shall await more favorable events for making some acquisition. " The alliance of Austria with the Turks, while Prussia The Austrian remained uncommitted, would furnish that occasion, for '=°™<*'p'°* Frederick II would then become the virtual arbiter of the Eastern Question. Of this possibility Joseph II was well aware; and, to prevent it, he desired to draw Frederick II into an alliance against Russia. By proposing to the Sul- tan the alliance of Austria, on condition that Prussia join 666 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap, vhi with them in opposing Russia, the Emperor thought, he ■^- °- ocould either forcdJFrederick II to abandon Russia/or ruin his credit in the East by his failure to support the Turks, whom he had always caressed as the natural enemies of Austria. In the midst of all this chicanery, in which the lives and destinies of great populations were mere pawns in the sport of sovereigns, one noble figure rises above their conspiracies in a spirit of rebuke. Maria Theresa, writing to the Em- peror, placed on record her unswerving devotion to princi- ples of rectitude. Believing Russia unjustly attacked, she would not side with the Sultan; nor, on the other hand, was she willing to destroy the Turks. "Honesty and candor," she wrote, formed her accepted maxim. "My decision will be considered feeble and timid, I confess; but I do not possess the force to decide upon a war which I believe to be unjust, and thus against my conscience. " ' Although opposed to Austria's participation in the Russo-Turkish war, Maria Theresa's confidence in Kaunitz rendered her conscientious scruples ineffectual; and both the Sultan and Frederick were officially informed that Austria was prepared to enter into an alliance with Turkey against Russia, on condition that Prussia would do the same. The urgency ' But Frederick II was too astute to be drawn into the of Fredenck II Austrian net. While maintaining that his treaties with the lor the parti- ^ ^ tion of Poland Czarina only required him to sustain her in Poland, he evaded the proposal of Austria to enter into the Turkish quarrel, on the ground that the Court of St. Petersburg was already * weakening, and that peace might soon be concluded^ Perceiving clearly that his advantage lay in complete neutrality, while exaggerating the dangers resulting from a continuation of the war, Frederick II firmly resolved to maintain his ground. In February Prince Henry returned to Potsdam with full information regarding the position of the Czarina. The project of partition was no longer a chimera. ' See for the entire text, Ameth, Maria Theresia und Joseph II: ihre Correspondenz, I, p. 326. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 667 From this moment the policy of Frederick II assumed Chap, vni an aggressive form. Austria, he declared, had already begun ^- "• the dismemberment of Poland by the occupation of the Zips, ^^^^"^^^^ and was prepared to sustain her action by war. Since it was now impossible to preserve the territorial integrity of the Republic, he argued, it was necessary to maintain the balance of the powers. No other method was open than to imitate the action of Austria; and, in the language of the Czarina, for "everyone to take something." Russia could abandon the left bank of the Danube, and make good the loss in Poland, at the same time offering the Republic in return portions of Moldavia and Wallachia.^ In March, 1771, exhaustive researches in the archives of Prussia were undertaken with the intention of finding something to match the historic claim of Hungary to the Zips. The results were meagre, but "pretensions relating to Poland," based on ancient rights, were soon talked of and made subjects of negotiation. Panin, who regarded Poland as already a vassal state of Russia, and understood how flimsy were the alleged "ancient rights" of Prussia, was opposed to partition; but Catherine II, who was not averse to a definite augmentation of her realm with the 'free consent of all who were able to oppose) » it, was favorably disposed toward the idea of a pacific arrangement. The hour was approaching when action was to give The Austrian place to speculation. In April, 1771, it was believed in the Frederick ii-s diplomatic circle at Berlin that it was already near. On plans the second of that month, the minister of Sweden said to his colleague of France, who reported it to Paris, "The King of Prussia has arranged everything, and peace will be signed in less than four months. Poland will be the sole victim. " The prediction would, no doubt, have proved correct, had it not been for the attitude of the Court of Vienna, where the purposes of Frederick II were well known and a new policy had been adopted. Since Prussia would not join ' See the confidential despatch of Frederick II to Count Solms, of March 2, 1771, in Angeberg, Recueil, p. 85. 668 A HISTOEY or DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII with Austria in opposing Russia, Austria would join with A. D. 1763-1775 A.D. Turkey in placing a limit to Russia's ambitions; and, when the proper moment had arrived, Austria and Russia would make their peace with each other at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, leaving Prussia out in the cold! With the aid of France, such a plan might have been successful; but France was no longer at Austria's command. "It is a piece of good fortune," remarked Frederick II to his minister, Finckenstein, " that France is in the state of ex- haustion in which she is at present; the Austrians, deprived of French aid, will be more tractable and mild. " It was, however, by no means certain that Austria and Russia might not come to a private understanding which would induce the Czarina to desert her ally, and reserve for herself the whole of Poland. This was, in fact, the policy of Panin. Mistrusting the good faith of Frederick II, he opened direct negotiations with Vienna; intimating to the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lobkowitz, that, in order to retain the friendship of Austria, the Czarina might be williag to sacrifice that of Prussia; at the same time declaring that Frederick II was the sole author of the scheme to dismember Poland, and that Austria might eventually obtain Moldavia and Wallachia without the trouble of fighting for them. When this was reported to Vienna, the Emperor wrote to his brother Leopold, "It is clear that the King of Prussia lied to us in proposing the dismemberment of Poland as coming from St. Petersburg." ^ In reply to Panin 's proposals, Lobkowitz informed him that Austria could not reconcile with her interests the sepa- ration of Moldavia and Wallachia from the Ottoman Empire; and, in order to force Prussia and Russia apart, and exclude Frederick II from any territorial aggrandizement, on May 7, Kaunitz instructed the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, Swieten, to repudiate any scheme of partition, declaring that Maria Theresa was ready to renounce her occupation of the Polish provinces, if everyone would do the same. ' For the entire text, see Arneth, as before, I, p. 342. DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 669 At Vienna it was believed that Frederick II had been Chap. Vlli unmasked, and that all that was needed to destroy the Russo- ^- °' Prussian alliance, or at least to disappoint Prussia's plans for aggrandizement, was a demonstration on the part of, Austria which would prove to Russia the value of Austrian The Auatro- friendship and the worthlessness of Prussia's support. "^^^^ With this intent, on July 6, 1771, a secret treaty was signed with Mustafa III, in which Austria united with Turkey, "to deliver from the hands of Russia, by means of negotiation or by means of arms, " the possessions of the Sublime Porte then occupied by the Russian armies.^ Thus, Kaunitz beheved, he would at the proper moment be able to reveal to Catherine II the power of Austria to nullify all her victories over the Turks, and at the same time demonstrate to her the insincerity of Frederick II; who, it was thought, would offer to his ally no substantial aid. If the Austro-Turkish alliance had itself been a work of sincerity, the course of events might have been affected by it; but, m truth, it was simply a device on the part of Joseph II and Kaimitz to force the hand of Russia, and to secure for Austria a larger share in the spoils of Poland. For the assistance rendered the Sultan was to pay in subsidies eleven million two hundred and fifty thousand florins; \ Austria was to be accorded the most favored nation treat- ment; frontier questions were to be settled to the satisfac- tion of Vienna; and, finally, the' part of the territory of Wallachia mcluded between Transylvania, Temesvar, the Danube, and the Aluta, was to be ceded to Austria. Assent to these provisions was obtained from the Empress Maria Theresa, on the ground that they would enable Austria to defeat any scheme of partition which Frederick II might propose. Resort to arms was not contemplated, unless the Russians insisted on retaining their conquests. Although the terms of the treaty between Austria and 1 For the treaty, see Angeberg, Uecxiea, p. 92; and Wenck, III, p. 820. A. D. 1763-1775 670 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Turkey were secret, the fact of an understanding was soon made public by the military preparations; but the effect was different from what Kaunitz had anticipated, Prussia and Russia were driven closer together. The hostile in- Frederiok ii's tentions of Vienna were the very arguments advanced by check to the Frederick II to urge the Czarina on to a settlement with plans of Kaunitz Turkey in which "everyone would take something"; and Lthe menaces of Austria only made the alliance with Prussia seem the more necessary at St. Petersburg. J Invited by the Czarina to endeavor to induce the Court of Vienna to accept the idea of partition which the two allies were now freely discussing, Frederick II, in a long audience, on August 13, said to Swieten: "I am sorry that my proj- ect has not met with the approbation of Their Imperial Majesties. It was the basis of an understanding which came to me, and which I proposed because I wished to find a means to terminate an affair which could go too far. I shall still seek for twenty other ideas, if I can, and propose them to you; perhaps you can find one which you can make your own. Look here, I am old, my brain is used up; so only hol- low ideas come to me, but you should examine and judge them. Moreover, in politics I am only a novice in compari- son with Prince Kaunitz." But all this ingenious badinage and subtle flattery, by which the King of Prussia was wont to disarm his antagonists in negotiation, seemed at the time to be unavailing. With- out desiring war, he was compelled to prepare for it ; thereby meeting, though with reluctance, the attempt of Kaunitz to prove to Catherine II the insincerity of her ally with new evidence of his loyalty. On September 5, in a private conversation with the Prussian minister at Vienna, Rohd, Maria Theresa allowed her personal views to afford a glimpse beneath the mask of Kaunitz 's diplomacy. Her wish was, she said, only to find a means of avoiding recourse to arms, and she was ready to accept any reasonable expedient. vThe Turks were unreason- *" able, and only the King of Prussia could bring them to reason. She was willing to let the Russians make them- DIPLOMACY OP CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 671 selves the masters in the Crimea, but not of Moldavia and Chap, viii Wallachia. a. d. This frankness on the part of the Empress revealed -i^^^I^^ to Frederick II the fact that the menace of war with Russia was mauily an expedient of Kaunitz to increase the share of Austria in the spoils of Poland. He could, therefore, safely show himself belligerent. He would thereby obtam the best possible terms from Russia; and Austria, when the right time came, would accept the situation. Treating the idea of Russia's surrender of the two prov- mces, Moldavia and Wallachia, as an Austrian ultimatum, . he proceeded on October 1 to send to the Czarina a definite plan for the partition of Poland, urging her to abandon the two Turkish provinces, and promising on this condi- tion to furnish military aid against Austria. The observation of Maria Theresa that the decisions of The triumph of the Turks depended largely on the action of the King of ^^^J"^"^ °' Prussia had not escaped Frederick II's attention. Ac- cordingly, Zegelin was instructed to indicate plainly to the Sublime Porte how little dependence was to be placed upon Austria, and to urge direct negotiation with Russia.* While the Russian armies had been occupied in the war with Turkey, Russian authority in Poland had been weak- ened, and Frederick II was besought by the Czarina to send Prussian soldiers there. On October 30 he replied, that he was ready to occupy the Palatinate of Posen, but only on condition that Russia would sign the treaty of partition. "I shall not cause a cat to march," he wrote to Solms, "before the treaty is signed"; and again, on November 6, "Pas de partage, pas de Prussiens!" Victorious but exhausted, the Russians were obliged to yield. On December 25 Frederick addressed to the Czarina a memorial on the most favorable moment for dismember- ing Poland between Prussia and Russia, "without concert with Austria. " " It is best, " runs this interesting document, "that possession be taken before any negotiation with the Turks is begun, because it will make them swallow the pill gently, if they are informed that it is an equivalent for A. D. 1763-1775 672 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII which Wallachia and Moldavia are restored to them; and further by causing them to see that the Austrians, on their side, have given us the example by acting the same. As for the Poles, we must expect them to cry aloud, . . . for that nation, vain and intriguing, cries out about every- thing; but the army on the Vistula will cause these clamors to cease; and, after the conclusion of peace with the Turks, it will pacify Poland. " ^ Although Frederick II was quite ready to exclude Aus- tria altogether from the partition, Catherine II wished to make Austria's participation in it the condition of peace with the Sultan.i On January 27, 1772, the Russian ambas- sador at Vienna, Galitzin, presented to Kaunitz the Czarina's conditions. Contrary to his habit, the ambassador reports, Kaunitz was "all ears," and the conversation ended with his admission that the demands of Russia regarding Turkey were entirely just! On the next day he gave to the ambas- sador his formal consent in writing to the Russian proposals. Austria, he declared, would prefer that there be no parti- tion of Poland; but, if there was to be one, she could not remain indifferent to the destruction of equilibrium by the aggrandizement of her neighbors, and, was, therefore, ready to enter into negotiations regarding the division. A declara- tion signed at Vienna on February 19, at Berlin on February 28, and at St. Petersburg on March 5, 1772, on the basis of equality in the division of the spoils, formally adopted the policy of the partition of Poland, and laid the foundation of * the Triple Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The scruples of There is little of permanent interest in the efforts of the Maria Theresa ^jjpgg participants in this process of dismemberment to overreach one another; and it is, therefore, needless to relate them here.^ In the division Frederick II showed himself as astute in claiming for Prussia the provinces he most coveted as he had been in enforcing the principle of partition. In all these negotiations his was the master 1 For the full text, see Angeberg, Recueil, p. 95. ' A detailed account may be found in Sorel, La question d'Orient au XVIII' sihcle. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 673 hand, and no pains were taken to conceal the motives by Chap. Vlii which he was actuated. '^■°- At Vienna the conscience of the Empress, though ineffec tual in its influence upon the course of events, at least en- tered its protest upon the record. For this there was a moral necessity, since the part played by Austria was the most perfidious of all. J In the treaty with Turkey "to restore to the Porte by means of negotiations or by means of arms" the territories invaded by Russia, Austria had solenanly promised that peace would finally be concluded "without the independence and liberties of Poland suffering the least attaint"; and two million, florins had been already received from Turkey in accordance with its terms. It is not without reason, therefore, that Maria Theresa, finding herself the victim of circumstances which she could not control, lamented the necessity by which she was bound. "The too menacing tone with the Russians, our mysterious con- duct with our allies as well as with our adversaries," she wrote, "all this has resulted from seeking to profit by the . war between the Porte and Russia in order to extend our frontiers and to win advantages of which we did not dream before the war. We wished to act a la prussienne, and at the same time to maintain the appearance of honesty. . . . Although events should enable us to gain the district of Wallachia, and even Belgrade, I should always regard them as too dearly bought at the cost of honor, of the glory of the monarchy, of our good faith, and our religion. . . . We have by our moderation and fidehty to our engagements acquired the confidence, I may even venture to say the ad- miration of Europe, and the respect and veneration of our enemies. One year has lost it all. I confess, it is difiicult to endure it, and that nothing m the world has cost me more than the loss of our good name. Unfortunately, I must ad- mit that we have deserved it. " * The century and a quarter that separated the Partition The relation of Poland from the Peace of Westphalia marked a con- °^ 'p^ J;^'*,^'^'™ stant decline in the regard for the principles of intema- 1 See for the entire text, Arneth, as before, I, pp. 362, 363. VOL. III. — 43 674 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII tional justice, and the faith of nations. In the treaties of A.D. Miinster and Osnabriick, the doctrine of territorial sover- eignty was formally consecrated as the foundation of the « public law of Europe. During this period it had suffered many infractions, but it had never before been openly defied and repudiated. Now force and conspiracy were un- blushingly substituted for the idea of law in the relations of sovereign, states. Without regard to race, language, re- ligion, or any criterion of national existence, fa nation that menaced no one was subjected to a process of vivisection in the interest of conspiring sovereigns and their ministers. 7 The Treaties of Westphalia endeavored to impose upon Europe the principle of 'equality between sovereign states,j) and by implication a principle of (justice as their rulejoi action; but they had neglected to define and to limit the principle of sovereignty itself. By deriving the idea of law from the will of the sovereign, the Age of Absolu- tism had planted the seeds of international anarchy; and it had only brought forth its natural and inevitable fruit. The conscience of Maria Theresa revolted against it, but it was Frederick II and Catherine II who had logic on their side; for, if the will of the prince is law, the prince who possesses the most power — that is, the one who commands the most effective forces — becomes the legitimate lawgiver. The Acta of On July 25, 1772, in the name of the "Holy Trinity," Partition .(.j^g Treaties of Partition were formally concluded by Austria, Prussia, and Russia; ^ and, on September 18, 1773, many of the magnates of Poland, bought up with foreign gold, signed agreements with each of the three powers by which the Acts of Partition received their assent. In the meantime. King Stanislas II had appealed to Louis XV and George III to intervene in behalf of the Republic and save it from dis- memberment. In a diplomatic note of protest addressed to the representatives of the other powers resident in Warsaw, the royal ministry declared that it plainly appeared from the terms of the treaties of partition themselves that "the only 1 For the texts, signed on August 5, see Angeberg, Recueil, pp. 97, 103. 1763-1775 DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 675 motive of the enterprise of the dismemberment of Poland Chap, viii was the force of these powers," and sounded a note of ,^„*°„ warning regarding the possible consequences to the other - monarchs, if they passed over in silence this act of aggres- sion; but no aid was proffered from any quarter. In his reply to the appeal of King Stanislas II, George III wrote to his "Good Brother": "Justice ought to be the invariable guide of sovereigns. ... I fear, however, misfortunes have reached the point where redress can be had from the hand of the Almighty alone, and I see no other intervention that can afford a remedy. " Louis XV, who was represented by Frederick II as "infinitely displeased," did not even reply to the King of Poland's appeal. The reason for this ap- parent indifference was correctly stated by the same shrewd observer to be, "the total exhaustion of finances, on ac- count of which the Crown of France was not in a condition openly to oppose." In fact, although the plunder of a recognized monarchy by three royal confederates awakened [throughout Europe a feeling of surprise and a sentiment of jcondemnation, no formal complaint was expressed by any {government. It was not until Frederick II laid claims to the port of Dantzig, thus directly menacing EngUsh commerce in the Baltic, that any sign of interference was manifested; but even this opposition was withdrawn when, by the Edict of May, 1774, England was guaranteed all the commercial rights she had formerly possessed in Polish Prussia. Thus, without a single act of armed resistance,^ terri- tory measuring more than twenty-five thousand square miles, containing a- population of nearly five million inhab- itants, was under protest severed from the Republic of Poland. To Prussia went the long-coveted Polish Prussia,— including Ermeland,— except Thorn and Dantzig, with the northern districts of Great Poland, with about six hundred thousand inhabitants; to Austria, the Zips and almost all of 1 Frederick II boasted in his Memoires that the partition of Po- land was "the first example in history of a pacific partition between three powers." 1763-1775 676 A HISTORY or DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII Red Russia, with Lemberg, forming the kingdom of Ga- hcia, and the southern portion of Little Poland, contain- ing in all about two million six hundred thousand inhabitants; to Russia, a great part of the country drained by the Diina and the Dnieper, and extending nearly to the Desna, with one million six hundred thousand souls. But these were only the first-fruits of the conspiracy against Poland. The policy of partition once tacitly ad- mitted, Poland was destined to become the involuntary peace-offering for the settlement of every controversy between the three allies, until the Republic was reduced to a mere geographical expression. ' The end of the A Collateral influence in persuading Catherine II to share crisis in the ^^j^ jjgj, ^^q neighbors in the spoils of Poland was the re- North ° ■* habilitation of Sweden under her energetic regenerator, Gus- tavus III. Even the urgent counsels of his uncle, Frederick II, had not deterred the young king from the determination to restore the influence of his kingdom and control its destiny. His coup d'etat proved entirely successful, and Sweden once more became a power in the North. With the intention of keeping Russia fully occupied in the South, Gustavus III had urged the Turks to continue the war, at the same time entering into an alliance with France for the support of the Sultan. At last stirred to action, in 1773, France fitted out a fleet with the intention of aiding the Turks, which led England to send to the Mediterranean an opposing naval force. The Congress of Bucharest, which since November, 1772, had been endeavoring to end the Russo-Turkish war, dissolved without accomplishing any result; Russia insisting upon the "independence" of the Tartars and the possession of strongholds in the Crimea, which the Turks on religious grounds refused to concede. ' The Triple Alliance, Frederick II wrote to his brother Henry, "will unite the three religions, Greek, Cathohc, and Calvinist; for we would take our communion from the same consecrated body, which is Poland; and if this is not for the good of our souls, it will surely be a great object for the good of our States." — Letter to Prince Henry of April 9, 1772. DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 677 In March, 1773, it seemed possible that the crisis in the Chap, viii North, joined with the crisis in the East, might lead to ^•^■ a general European war; but Catherine II, yielding to the ^^^^~^^^^ persuasion of England and Prussia, decided to recognize the changed situation in Sweden, and the cession of Holstein to Denmark, in July, 1773, by the Grand Duke Paul, in exchange for Oldenburg, which was then assigned to the cadet line of the ducal house of Holstein-Gottorp, amicably removed the causes of disturbed relations in the North. Although the termination of the crisis in the North The end of enabled Catherine II to concentrate her attention upon ""^ ^"^^°" ,, .,-, . 1 rn 1 1 t 1 Turkish war the war with the Turks, the ground lost nearly turned the scale in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian fleet was no longer effective, and the army, weakened by the massing of troops on the Swedish frontier and in Poland, was driven back over the Danube; the Tartars, soon weary of their subordination to Russia, revolted from their so-called "liberator"; and the Cossack pretender, Pugatscheff, taking advantage of the popular belief that Peter III still lived, impersonated the murdered Czar, and menaced the Czarina with a revolution intended to drive her from the throne. It was the moment for the Sublime Porte to make an advantageous peace; but the new Sultan, Abdul-Hamid, who in January, 1774, succeeded Mustafa III, became the tool of the war party, and the occasion was lost. The temporary embarrassments of Catherine II were, how- ever, of short duration; and, on July 21, 1774, the Turks were forced to sign a treaty of peace at Kutchuk-Kainardji. This epoch-making treaty secured for Russia the "inde- pendence" of the Tartars, the strongholds of the Crimea,, the possession of Azoff and Kobardia, amnesty and religious liberty for the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, the right of Russian subjects to visit Jerusalem and practise in the Holy City the rites of their religion, free navigation for Russian ships on Turkish waters and the use of Turkish har--' bors, and a substantial indemnity for the costs of the war.' 1 For the treaty, see Martens, Recvsil, A, I, p. 507; A, IV, p. 607; B, II, p. 286. 678 A HISTOEY OF DIPLOMACY Chap. VIII A. D. 1763-1775 Effects of the Peace of Kutcliuk- Kainardji The peace between Russia and Turkey gave to the Eastern Question an entirely new aspect. By according to Russia • a perpetual right of intervention as the guardian of the religious interests of the Orthodox Greek Church, the Sub- lime Porte exposed the Ottoman Empire to unending embar- rassments. "The nation is predestined to destruction," wrote Kaunitz, "and a small but efficient army could at any time expel the Turks from Europe. " This was, in fact, the general opinion at the time; but it left out of account the jealousies of the powers. No one of them was willing that the coup de grace should be ad- ministered by any other; and a hundred and forty years of continued effort have not concluded what then seemed an easy task. The attempt to accomplish it has proved a long and cruel tragedy, the last act of which Europe is still awaiting. The presence of a decadent empire destined to ultimate dismemberment was to exercise a baleful influence upon the future international development of the whole of Europe. Austria could not permit the re-establishment of the Greek Empire by Russia through the conquest of Constantinople, and Russia could not allow the German Empire to extend its sway over the Balkan peninsula. Nor could the other powers calmly contemplate the disturbance of European equilib- rium Iby the division of Turkey between these rival aspir- ants for southward expansion, which impHed the ultimate command of the Aegean islands and the virtual supremacy in the Mediterranean of either St. Petersburg or Vienna. Joseph II did not long hesitate to demand of Catherine II territorial indemnity to balance the Russian gains in Turkey, but the spirit of compromise that had yielded a portion of Poland was not extended to the far more coveted spoil that marked the road to empire on the sea. By a revival of ancient rights, however, Austria laid immediate claim to the dis- trict of Bukovina; and the Turks, not being able to dispute it, by a treaty of May 7, 1775, permitted it to be annexed to Austria as a part of Galicia, and Russia did not oppose. While in the East passive populations were still subjected A.D. 1763-1775 DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 679 to the arbitrary will of absolute sovereigns, in the West of Chap, viii Europe a radical political transformation was preparing. In France the monarchy had brought the nation to depths of humiliation in violent contrast with the proud ascendency it had enjoyed under Louis XIV. The American colonies The abasement had been lost, the French empire in India had not become a ""p;™""'''''' reality, the influence of France in the East had been trans- ferred to Russia. Within, the Idngdom, exhausted by long and unprofitable wars, was financially impoverished and badly administered. A corrupt court, a bankrupt treasury, an oppressed population, — these were the heritage which Absolutism had bequeathed to the most advanced nation of Europe. , ; On May 10, 1774, Louis XV, devoured by a loathsome disease, ended his career. During his last illness, Besenval wrote of him, "No one manifested the least interest in him, so completely had he lost the respect of the people."^ During the passage of his body on the way to the grave, the cortege was saluted with cries of " Voild le plaisir des dairies!" But the hostility to Louis XV was not owing merely to his personal vices. "With Louis XV," justly observes a French historian, "disappeared the prestige of royalty. It was never to return. The monarchy of 'droit divin' was henceforth condemned. " It was condemned precisely because of its pretensions, which were no longer supportable. Four years before his death Louis XV had destroyed the "Parhament" of Paris and exiled its members; declaring that he "held his crown from God alone," and that the prerogative of legislation belonged only to him, "sans dependance et sans partage." "That period of four years, in which a Du Barry was seen to reign by the side of a monarch degraded by debauch, in which rogues and mis- creants alone remained upon the scene, in which there were only disorders, injustices, and violences; in which principles, morals, duties, all were forgotten,— that brief and shameful period brought to fruition that which the whole reign of 1 BesenvaL Mimoires, I, p. 292. Chap. VIII A. D. 1763- -1775 680 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Louis XV had been preparing. " ^ To the last the King had clung to his royal supremacy. When he received the sacrament he bade the Cardinal Roche-Aymon to say for him that he asked pardon of the people for the scandal his life had caused, even though, he added, he owed "an account for his conduct to God alone." The new con- Although the monarchy had fallen so low, new hope was eeption of inspired by the prospect of a new king. When the young Duke de Berry learned that by the death of his grandfather he had become King of France he fell upon his knees and lost consciousness, so overwhelming did the task appear to him. When he had regained his senses he embraced his young wife and cried out, "What a burden! but you will help me to bear it"; and again, overcome with stupor, rubbing his eyes as if to see clearly, "What a burden !■ at my age! . . i and they have taught me nothing! "y It was upon the heads of this young pair that the errors of a mistaken theory of the State were to be expiated. And yet, in 1774, there were no signs of such a revolution as fifteen years later was to shake the whole of Europe to its founda- tions and set in movement great armies for the rescue of tottering thrones.^ A change in the conception of the State had undoubtedly taken place, but it was not a change which then menaced the existence of royalty. At that time the most advanced form of public opinion did not demand more than the re- form of the monarchy; but, in France at least, a reform had become imperative. The attack upon Absolutism had already begun. Did sovereignty reside in a single individual, or in the entire body of the nation? That was the question which men were asking and answering. It was denied that • kings derive their authority from God alone; and yet, as the symbol of national unity, the king was still considered indispensable. It was, in fact, the complete triumph of William III of 1 See for a detailed account of this period, Rocquain, L'esprit Hvo- lutionnaire avanl la rdvolution, pp. 281, 314. ^ See Wahl, Vorgeschichle der franzosischen Revolution, I, p. 188. A. D. 1763-1775 DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 681 Orange over the Grand Monarch that now confronted Chap, viii Louis XVI. All the most coherent thought of the time was inspired by the English Constitution and the Revolu- tion of 1688. " By the expulsion of a king, who had violated his oath," ran one of the most popular pamphlets of the day, "the great and true principles of society were for the first time propoxmded. . . . All these principles of passive obe- dience, of divine right, of indestructible power, — that scaf- folding of false notions upon which until that time royalty was sustained, — all that was overthrown. " We are accustomed to think of the French Revolution Premonitions as the beginning of that general disturbance by which the f^^l ^"^Eia whole of Europe was swept into the maelstrom of war; but, in truth, the causes of that gigantic conflict were not con- fined to France. The revolt in America against the recru- descence of Absolutism, the awakened civic consciousness in the Austrian Netherlands and in the Dutch Republic, and the reaffirmation of long forgotten privileges in France, were all symptoms of a great and irresistible movement of thought, the recoil from political dogmas which were no longer acceptable to enlightened minds. After all that Europe had endured since sovereign will had been substituted for principles of imiversal obligation, it was a logical necessity that the Age of Absolutism should be followed by the Revolutionary Era. AUTHORITIES In addition to works already cited, Neumann, Recueil des traiUs de Documents I'Auiriche depuis 176Sjusqu'a nos jours, Leipzig and Vienna, 1855, 1903; and especially Angeberg, Recueil des traites, conventions et acles diplo- maliques concernant la Pologne (1762-1862), Paris, 1862. Farges, Pologne, in the Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambas- sadeurs et ministres de France, contains a valuable study of the Polish question from the French point of view. An important contemporary document is the Memoire de Favier, which, with the correspondence of Monsieur de BrogUe, is contained in S^gur, Politique de tous les cabinets de l' Europe, Paris, 1801. Brunner, Der Humor in der Diplomatie und Regierungskunde des 18ten Jahrhunderts, Vienna, 1872, contains extracts from original docu- ments taken from German sources. Chap. VIII A. D. 1763- -1775 682 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Besides correspondence already referred to, Mofiy, Correspondance inedite du red Stanislas-Augusle PoniatowsM et Madame Oeoffrin, (1764- 1777), Paris, 1895; Harris (Lord Malmesbury), Diaries and Corre- spondence, London, 1845, containing an account of his missions at the Court of Madrid, to Frederick the Great, Catherine II, and at The Hague; Arneth, Joseph II und Katharina von Russland, ihr Brief- wechsel (1774-1790), Vienna, 1869; and Brunner, Correspondances intimes de V Empereur Joseph II avec Cobenzl et Kaunitz, Mainz, 1871. Literature The changes in the form of absolutism have been discussed by Koser, Die Epochen der absoluten Monarchie in der neueren Geschichte, in Historisohe Zeitschrift LXI (1889). The alHance of Frederick II and Catherine II is reviewed by Rei- mann. Das preussisch-russisch Bundnis vom Jahre 1764, ii Zeitschrift fiir Preussische Geschichte, XIV (1877). On the general conditions in the Orient, the Russo-Prussian relations, and the partition of Poland, see Sorel, La question d'Orient au XVIIP sihcle: les origines de la Triple Alliance, Paris, 1878, and later editions; Driault, La question d'Orient, Paris, 1900; Saint-Priest, Tableau des negocialions qui ont amene le demembrement de la Pologne, contained in Etudes diplomatiques et litteraires, I, Paris, 1850; Beer, Die erste Teilung Polens (1772), Vienna, 1873; Reimann, Neuere Oeschichte des preus- sischen Staates vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum Wiener Kongress, Gotlia, 1882; Bain, The Last King of Poland and His Contemporaries, London, 1909; Bright, Joseph II, in Foreign Statesmen Series, London, 1905; Heyking, Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen (1752-1796), Berlin, 1895; and the third volume of the fifth edition of Koser, Ge- schichte Friedrichs des Grossen, Berhn, 1913. On the meetings of Frederick II and Joseph II, see Ktintzel, Ueber den Plan einer Begegnung Friedrichs des Grossen und Josephs zu Torgau (1766), in Forsohungen zur Brandenbm-gischen und Preussisohen Ge- schichte, XV (1903) ; Beer, Die Zusammenkiinfle Josephs II und Frie- drichs II zu Neisse und Neustadt, in Archiv f tir osterreiohische Geschichte, XLVII (1871); Reimaim, Die Zusammenkunft Friedrichs II und Josephs II in Neisse, in Zeitschrift des Vereins fiir Geschichte und Altertum Sohlesiens, XIV (1879) ; and Krause, Der Bericht eines Augen- zeugen ilber die Zusammenkunjt Friedrichs des Grosses und Josephs II in Neisse (1769), Konigsberg, 1902. On the foreign policy of France during the period, see Hammond, Mission du comte de Guines a Berlin en 1769, in Revue Historique, XXXVII (1888); Coquelle, Le cabinet secret de Louis XV en Hollande, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV (1901); Boutry, L' alliance autrichienne et la diplomatie secrete (1766-1772), in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIX (1905); Roux, La politique frangaise en Egypte a la fin du XVI IP siecle (1768-1769), in Revue Historique, LV (1906); Aubigny, La chute de Choiseul, in Annales de I'Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, V (1890); Marsangy, Le comte de Vergennes: son ambassade DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION 683 en Sukde (1771-1774), Paris, 1898; and Doniol, La ministere des affaires elranghres de France soiis le comie de Vergennes, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, VII (1893). On the development of opposition to absolutism, see Rooquain, L'esprit r&oolutionnaire avant la revolution (1715-1789), Paris, 1878; Wahl, Yorgeschichte der franzosischen Revolution, Tubingen, 1905 et seq.; Glagau, Reformversuche und Sturz des Ahsolutismus (1774r-1788), Mu- nich and Berlin, 1908 ; Struck, Zur Genesis der franzosischen Revolution, Stralsund, 1911; and S6gur, Au couchant de la monarchie, Paris, 1913. Chap. VIII A. D. 1763- -1775 684 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY TABLE I A List op Popes, Emperohs, and Ottoman Sttltans from 1648 TO 1775 Year of Acces- Popes Emperora Ottoman Sultans sion 1648 237. Innocent X Ferdinand III since Mohammed IV since 1644 1637 1655 238. Alexander VII 1658 Leopold I 1667 239. Clement IX 1670 240. Clement X 1676 241. Innocent XI 1687 SoljTnan II 1689 242. Alexander VIII 1691 243. Innocent XII Ahmed II 1695 Mustafa II 1700 244. Clement XI 1703 Ahmed III 1705 Joseph I 1711 Charles VI 1721 245. Innocent XIII 1724 246. Benedict XIII 1730 247. Clement XII Mahmud I 1740 248. Benedict XIV 1742 Charles VII, of Ba- varia 1745 Francis I, of Lor- raine 1754 Osman III 1757 Mustafa III 1758 249. Clement XIII 1765 Joseph II 1769 250. Clement XIV 1774 Abdul-Hamid I 1775 251. Pius VI TABLE II 685 TABLE II Rulers op Prance, England, and Scotland prom 1648 to 1775 Year of Acces- sion France England Scotland 1648 Louis XIV, from Charles I, since Charles I, since 1643 to 1651 1625; executed 1625 under the regency January 30, 1649 of Anne of Austria 1649 The Commonwealth Charles II 1661 The Common- wealth 1653 Oliver Cromwell, as Lord Protector 1658 Richard Cromwell, as Lord Protector 1660 Charles II Charles II 1685 James II James II 1689 WilUam III and William III and Mary; William Mary; WiUiam alone from 1694 alone from 1694 1702 Anne Anne 1707 Formal Union of England and Scotland as Great Britain Anne 1714 George I 1715 Louis XV 1727 George II 1760 George III 1774 Louis XVI 686 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY TABLE III Rtxlehs of Spain, Portugal, and the House of Savoy from 1648 to 1775 Year of Accea- Spain Portugal Savoy eion 1648 Philip rV, since 1621 John IV, since 1640 Charles Emman- uel II, Duke of Savoy, since 1638 1656 Alfonso VI 1665 Charles II 1667 Peter II, as regent 1675 Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy 1683 House of Bourbon Peter II, as king 1700 Philip V 1706 JohnV 1713 Victor Amadeus II becomes King of Sicily 1720 Victor Amadeus II becomes King of Sardinia 1724 Louis I, for seven months 1724 Philip V, a second time 1730 Charles Emman- uel III, King of Sardinia 1746 Ferdinand "VI 1750 Joseph 1759 Charles III 1773 Victor Amadeus III, King of Sar- dinia TABLE IV 687 TABLE IV RtTLEEB OF THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS, PoLAND, AND RUSSIA FHOM 1648 TO 1775 Year of Aocea- Sweden 1648 1654 1660 1669 1670 1674 1676 1682 1689 1697 1699 1704 1709 1719 1720 1725 1727 1730 Christina, Queen since 1632 Charles X Charles XI Denmark Poland Frederick III Charles XII, till 1718 Christian V Ulrica Eleanora, elected queen Frederick I, elected king Frederick IV Christian VI John II, Casi- mir,till 1668 Michael Kor- ibuth Wies- nowski John III, So- bieski Frederick Au- gustus I (Augustus II of Saxony) Stanislas Leszczinski Frederick Au- gustus I, a second time Husaia Alexis, of the House of Ro- manoff, since 1645 Feodor III Peter and Ivan, under the regency of Sophia Peter I, the Great Catherine I Peter II Anna 688 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY Year of Acces- Sweden Denmark Poland Ruaaia sion 1733 Frederick Au- gustus 11 (Augustus III of Sax- ony) 1740 Ivan VI 1741 Elizabeth 1746 Frederick V 1751 Adolphus Fred- erick 1762 Peter III 1762 Catherine II 1764 Stanislas II, Poniatow- ski 1766 Christian VII 1771 Gustavus III TABLE V 689 TABLE V The Rulers of the United Peovinces or the Netherlands and Brandenbdbq-Prussia prom 1648 to 1775 Year of Acces- sion The Netherlands I Brandenburg-Prussia 1648 William II, of Orange, Stadt- Frederick WiUiam, Elector of holder, since 1647 Brandenburg since 1640, and Duke of Prussia since 1657, the "Great Elector" 1650 Suspension of the Stadthold- erate 1653 John De Witt chosen Grand Pensionary of Holland 1672 William III, of Orange, chosen Stadtholder 1688 Frederick III, Elector of Bran- denburg and Duke of Prussia 1701 Frederick III recognized by the Emperor "King of Prussia" aa Frederick I 1702 Second suspension of the Stadtholderate; Heinsius Grand Pensionary till 1720 1713 Frederick WilUam I, who is recognized by the Congress of Utrecht as "King of Prussia" 1740 Frederick II, King of Prussia, called "the Great" 1747 William IV, of Orange, chosen Stadtholder 1751 William V, Stadtholder, till 1759 under the regency of Anne, daughter of George II of England 1 The previous stadtholders of the United Provinces were: (1) Wil- liam I, of Orange, the "SUent," 1559-1584; (2) Maurice, 1584-1625; (3) Frederick-Henry, 1625-1647. VOL. III. — 44 690 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 1— 1 > w H h-1 n w H < g H vA U o w o3 o 'T3 a a &H I s a a ^ w n o CQ ■^ p, ■s o l-l 02 CO fi3 - 9 03 g Tdfe >o I— I CO — :3 '—I w 1-^ O 2^ H|2; ~ o3 O -a o ■Oh o § a 3 ^ ^ ^ ;=! S30 ^^ I— I o 6s -■3 o 63 ^-S S •r-l 03 g ',3 a, 3 O T3 a o 1^ a ■3 TABLE VII 691 :3 s S3 .O O ' -id 0) te K 1 CI ^ o ^ 'U r-K O! caS H rJ^lr^ 8 o^ o3 S 02 S Ig Ja ;3 H KM I-H (S I-H § 1— 1 1— 1 ^ ^ > a 1 ilhelmma of unswick- ineburg g !a i-i>o H o 1 ■2° ^, 57 hH <:3 m oo iok us II my t o i-H reder: ugust ■ Saxo •| f^-<^ 1I( 1 < o3 <3 03 '3^ II rt cs y ^ 9° H Is W W ^ 692 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY -a life (Jr-l 1- o CD Ph -1 II. ScD EcD **M T-t