\h/a.Soy\ 07C72: IK GmKA \ i^i^ ASIA AND . . fowcy hv ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN, Author ot '-The 'Ovei-laad' to China," "China In Transformation, " *c. LOINL)U^: P. S. KINO & 50N, Orchard House, 2 and 4 Qreat Smith Street, Westminster. TWO SHILLINGS •VS1>-I'0.6' BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME PROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF 1891 ..4.:.z.^..>?r..J/...' 2.a/^./<^.a..3. 5474 Cornell University Library DS 740.5.G7C72 The problem in China and British polic 3 1924 023 149 911 The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023149911 THE PROBLEM IN CHINA AND BRITISH POLICY. ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN, Author of " The ' Overland^ to China" " China in Transfortnatton" ^c. LONDON : P. S. KING & SON, ORCHARD HOUSE, 2 & 4 GREAT SMITH STREET, WESTMINSTER. I9CX3. A.atsu CONTENTS. PAGE Preface - - 5 Review of Position - y The "Boxers" 9 What British Policy Should be 10 Open Door or Sphere - 12 Northern China - 16 The North China Railways - 19 Political Value of Railways 22 Concessions and Counter-Concessions 26 The Yangtse Valley Sphere - 28 Britain and the Yangtse Valley - 29 South-West China - - 34 Effects of Lukewarm Policy - - 35 The Tax-Gatherer in the Yangtse Valley 36 Inland Navigation - 38 The Policy to be Pursued- 39 Britain's Trading Interest in China 45 A China League 47 China's Foreign Trade - facing 50 Map. Large Coloured Map showing Spheres of Foreign Influence and Railways at end PREFACE. Once more this country is confronted in China with a situation which was seemingly altogether unexpected. Once more the Government of the day is waiting for the " man in the street " to tell them what to do. Yet, while the precise form of the troubles which have arisen in China is somewhat novel, their character is not new, and has been clearly foreseen. They^ are merely the natural consequence, the ! sequitur, of the decadence of the Central ' Government of China. This decadence, / the result of a variety of causes, has for years past become increasingly apparent to the Chinese people, and warnings of its certain effects have appeared from time to 6 Preface. time, notably in the autumn of 1898, when the coup d'etdt was executed, and again last year when most of the Yangtse provinces were seething with revolt. I had occasion at the time, when passing through the Yangtse region, to draw atten- tion to the dangerous condition of these provinces, and in my book, " The ' Over- land ' to China," I predicted that China was on the brink of revolution, and urged in the strongest terms the adoption of steps to prepare for what was coming. It re- quired no special foresight to see that China was breaking up ; under the conditions it was inevitable. BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA. 4>»<¥- Review of Position. Let us briefly recall what has helped to bring about the recent collapse of China, ending in revolution. The incapacity of the Central Govern- ment has been slowly borne in upon the minds of the Chinese people for a long time past, but it required the action of the "foreign devils" to make it clear how powerless and unfit the Government was. The shattering of the naval and military defences of China by Japan in 1895 gave certain foreign Powers an opportunity which was at once utilised. The Russian appropriation of Manchuria was followed by that of Kiaochau by Germany, with 8 The Problem in China. control over the province of Shantung. The acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula, with Port Arthur and Talienwan, was followed by that of Wei Hai Wei and Kaulung. France acquired territorial and economic rights in the south, with per- mission to carry a railway through South- West China, thus to effect junction with the other Yangtse railways, even- tually with the Pekin-Hankau line, and so with Russian territory in the north. Japan had marked the provinces facing Formosa as her own ; Belgium, under the cover of the Franco-Russian influence, was pressing for advantageous cessions ; even Italy wanted her slice of territory. The trail of the foreigner was on the land from north to south. The Western Powers had come to stay, and the extension of these spheres of influence or interest — call them what you like — was merely a matter of time. Meanwhile the Chinese Govern- ment, although treated as alive and in full The "Boxers!' operation, was almost moribund, the or- ganism being hardly perceptible. Unable to cope with foreign aggression, it barely sufficed to keep in restraint its 350,000,000 subjects. While external forces were thus carving up the country, internal forces were making for rebellion and daily gain- ing strength, and once it was realised that no power existed to suppress them, it was evident that they would usurp in vast regions the office of government, and that the movement would spread like wildfire. The " Boxers." The Society known as the " Boxers," whose raison d'Hre was at first anti- Christian, and from that became anti-/ foreign, was used by the Empress for) her own objects, and under her protec- tion acquired power and licence. As an/ association, however, it is merely a local ejp- pression of the state of the dissatisfaction; I lo The Problem in China. have described, all over the country. Its war-cry, " Uphold the dynasty, exterminate the foreigner," attracted the lower class of Chinese throughout the northern pro- vinces, and the action of the Empress, who wished them to do her dirty work in opposing the encroachments of foreigners, which she herself had permitted, made them secure from official interference. The sequel is too well known to need description. What British Policy Should Be. In the consideration of this question it is first of all necessary to determine the r61e that Britain intends to play in Asia. It is no longer a question merely of China, but part of a problem to solve which a policy of world-wideness must be formed. The European Powers and America are now on the ground, and Great Britain must assert herself if she wishes to retain her place in the comity of nations. Is she What British Policy Should Be. 1 1 bent upon African empire-building on a g^reat scale? Is she embarked on the attempt to create there an empire such as we have already founded in India? If so, as I have more than once pointed out, let us at once and for all bid farewell to Asia. But, if we are bent merely on establishing ourselves in the white man's country of Africa (the territory south of the Zambesi), with political control of the route to the north, we can devote a fair share of our attention and resources to Asia. That is the policy which in the interests of the Empire I support, for Britain is an Asiatic Power, and upon the preservation and extension of her Empire in Asia and the safeguarding of the communications be- tween East and West, largely depends the stability of Great and Greater Britain. Provided, then, that we are to play in Asia a part commensurate with our in- terests, what should our policy be in China ? 12 The Problem in China. At the very outset it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the desirable but impossible, and the less desirable but practicable. The failures of the past need be referred to here only so far as they are necessary to establish the proper course of action. Above all, let us abandon a con- sideration of the question from the "might have been " point of view, and approach it in a clear and practical spirit. Open Door or Sphere. There have been two policies in opera- tion, policies which are diametrically op- posed to each other. Between these two Britain has wavered, using the phrase "open door" constantly, while at the same time joining in the scramble for territory, in other words adopting the "sphere" policy. The open door could only have been maintained by an alliance or working understanding be- open Door or SpJiere. 13 tween Britain and the United States, Japan, and possibly also Germany, but while in a vague sense the interests of these four countries were no doubt har- monious, the working out of the conception was found to be quite impracticable. The recent attempt made by the United States to establish the open door in China has not been successful, and it is clear that Russia and Germany are not going to commit themselves definitely and without/ recall to any such system. Nor indeed could they do so, for the spirit of their policy is entirely opposed to the open door. Russia with her closed markets in Man- churia, France with her exclusive policy in the south, Germany ready for British partnership only where British money has to be obtained, America adopting an in- dependent policy (possibly the right one for herself), Japan doing the same as America^ What hope is there in such a situation for joint-action to preserve the open door.? 14 The Problem in China. The fact is that it is only Britain, America, and Japan that are anxious to maintain the open door, and these Powers are not of one mind as to the measures to be adopted to bring about that consummation. The other Powers, Russia, France, and even Germany, are committed to the sphere policy, and although, as a matter of expedi- ency, the north will not at once be closed, yet little by little, preferential tariffs, dif- ferential treatment, and other methods familiar in the history of Russian com- mercial intercourse will creep in, and the result is not difficult to predict. If, then, the open door, the "might have been " of some years back, is impossible, let us examine the question of spheres. At one time, not long ago, the, theory of the Yangtse region was very popular in this country. The north was slipping away, and we were to fall back on the Yangtse, — the natural sphere of Britain, the upper portion close to the Indian open Door or Sphere. 15 Empire, traversed from west to east by an enormous arm of the sea, and having a net- work of navigable waterways over 3,000 miles in extent. The difficulties involved, however, in tackling the problem seem to have led the country to reconsider the whole question. The great value of Northern China as a commercial field is now again emphasised, while the fact is brought for- ward that a British sphere in the Yangtse would mean practically the policing of that basin as an open region where others would have the chief benefit, the rest of China being closed to us. The importance of Northern China is undoubted. I was one of the first to draw attention to the fact, but it is too late now to make a stand there. If we have been unsuccessful in bringing about joint-action for the open door, if we have even been unable to assert ourselves, on the alterna- tive policy, in the Yangtse region, what chance is there of Britain being able to 1 6 The Problem in China. maintain North China as an open field? None whatever. The rate at which Russia is moving is Httle understood in this country. She has already absorbed Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula, is now at Peking, and indeed, by means of the Peking- Hankau Railway, well on the way to the Yangtse. With her forces once established at Peking, Russia will never move. She is the protector of China, — the China of the Empress- Dowager, the China of the Manchu dynasty, — and the price of protection will have to be paid here, as elsewhere. Northern China. It may be well here to indicate in a few words the possibilities of the trade of North China, which has been growing at a great pace within recent years. It has at last begun to dawn upon people that this region might have been a great field for Northern China. 17 British enterprise. Years ago I en- deavoured to explain that sufficient im- portance was not attached to the Northern trade. Because foreign goods were shipped to Shanghai as a convenient centre of dis- tributioh they were considered as destined for its great hinterland, the Yangtse valley, whereas a large proportion of the imports were actually for the Northern region. It is this section of China trade — that be- tween Shanghai, Tientsin, Chefoo, and Newchwang — that has recently increased so greatly, stimulated in the last year or two by the Imperial railways in the north, especially the extension to Newchwang, and the establishment of Russia at Port Arthur with her enormous railway de- velopment in Manchuria. The success which has attended these railways in the north, both as regards passengers and goods traffic, amply justified the views on the subject which I for years held. This region, north of the Yangtse basin, and B 1 8 The Problem in China. including Manchuria, contains an area of about one million square miles, equal roughly to the European countries Eng- land, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Holland. It has a popula- tion of one hundred and twenty millions, about one-third the entire population of China. The trade is almost equal to that of the Yangtse valley. Such, then, is the North of China which has been lost to this country, and which has either passed, or is rapidly passing, into the hands of Russia, notwithstanding the fact that British capital and private enterprise have been largely expended in the development of this region. If such development has been possible in this region under adverse circumstances, how much might not be hoped for in the central region of the Yangtse ? The North China Railways. 19 The North China Railways. The North China railways, already alluded to, in extent 550 miles, of which 260 have been in successful operation for several years past, are of great importance, commercially and politically. They are now open between Newchwang and Shan- haikwan, thence vi& Tientsin to Peking, and from Peking to Paoting-fu, on the Peking-Hankau line. A section to Sin- mingting, west of Mukden, will shortly be opened. The lines have been well constructed under British en'gineers, and under British management are in effective working order. The development o^ trade and passenger traffic has been phenomenal. The passenger trains have been so full that the Chinese often crowd on to the train platforms outside the cars. The trade of Northern China, and these railways, were obviously an important asset upon which a stand could have been 20 The Problem in China. made. But this was not done, and now, I have no hesitation in saying, the country would be wasting time, and worse than that, in attempting to withstand the on- ward advance of Russia in the north. Wasted opportunities can never be re- called, but the story of the negotiations on the northern railways must be alluded to, in order to illustrate the impolicy of futile attempts to stand without a sufficient amount of force or determination to carry through the projects in hand. The giving way on this question, after a stand had been made, was far worse than making no stand at all. This, taken in conjunction with the Port Arthur incident, was a practical admission of the right of Russia to dictate terms in Northern China. If it had been the deliberate policy of Britain, after sounding the Powers whose interests were at all identical with hers, to stand in Northern China, then perhaps there could have been no better asset than The North China Railways. 21 the Peking- Newchwang Railway, In my opinion, however, it was most unwise to make British policy dependent on this question, for the reason that Britain had clearly not determined upon any line of action, and that she was still vacillating and uncertain. Two years ago (on the 1 2th August 1898) Russia was informed that her opposition to the loan for the railway was in manifest contradiction to the Treaty of Tientsin. Such a position was sound, and had it been intended to enforce the proposition all along the line, it would then have been good policy. But to advance this pretension, and then to give way, as has been said, was merely one more confirmation of the indecision and vacillation which had characterised our action in China. The original con- tract, with a mortgage on the Manchurian section of the line, was not upheld in its integrity. In conformity with Russian demands, explicitly made, the conditions 22 The Problem in China. of the loan were modified, one of the im- portant features of the new contract being an engagement by China that the railways named in the agreement were never to be alienated nor parted with to any foreign Power. The value of this agreement might seem to bring protection to the bond-holders, but otherwise was perfectly useless. Without the agreement the bond-holders would have been safe, for Russia would respect their rights. Political Value of Railways. The political value of these railways is considerable. For years past I have en- deavoured to drive home the fact that China was about to be conquered by rail- ways. The northern lines provide Russia with rapid means of communication from her own territories to Peking and to the south. Even without the connection later from Kiachta to Peking — the direct route^ Political Value of Railways. 23 they will give Russia a command of Nor- thern China which nothing can shake. Beyond all, it gives them the ground for further extension southward, for which purpose the so-called Belgian line, the Peking- Hankau Railway, now in course of construction, will be invaluable. This railway, as I predicted several years ago, will yet enable Russia to establish, herself on the Upper Yangtse ; indeed, already the suggestion is being made that the policing of the different lines should be entrusted to the Powers whose subjects financed and are constructing them. Such an arrange- ment would place the Peking- Hankau line under a Russo- French combination, and the Hankau- Canton line, which practically commands the south, would come largely under the same influence on account of a recent transfer of one-third of the under- taking to the so-called Belgian Syndicate. Finally, the control of the northern rail- ways, and through them the firmer hold 24 The Problem in China. exercised upon Peking, mean, so long as Peking is the capital, the control of what- ever there is of a Chinese Government. The control of railways by Powers like Russia and France, and possibly Germany, means the probable enforce- ment of preferential tariffs and differential treatment, or special bounties in some form or other given to imports carried in their vessels or to ports in their hands. The exclusion of British trade would follow. Politically and strategically such railways would not be available to the British or American nations. The possession of rail- ways in the northern sphere, which is altogether wanting in good waterways, is the most powerful instrument for consoli- dating the influence of any Power. The strength of these Powers, through con- trolling the railways, would grow at such a pace that within a short time even the treaty ports of the region concerned would soon become Russian or German. New- Political Value of Railways. 25 chwang is an instance of this, having already succumbed to Russian influence so greatly as to be almost a Russian port. Tientsin will follow, as soon as the northern railways system has come under the con- trol of Russia. Chefoo will follow later on. What is sketched here as occurring, or certain to occur, within a short time in Northern China is exactly what will happen elsewhere — first in Central China and finally in the South — unless Britain makes a definite stand in the Yangtse region. But, it is said, we have the engagement from the Chinese Government not to part with the northern railways. This instru- ment, like others of the same sort — notably the engagement not to alienate the Yangtse basin — is without any value whatever, indeed it is worse than valueless, for it is mischievously misleading. Under the con- ditions which have existed for the past few years, and in an increasing degree, the Chinese Government is entirely power- 26 The Problem in China. ess, especially in view of the proximity of Russia and her growing influence in Northern China, especially at Peking. For a long time past the Chinese Government has not been a free agent. Concessions and Counter-Concessions. When all the concessions and counter- concessions extorted by foreign Powers from China since the Japanese War have been balanced up, there remains to the credit of Great Britain the territorial exten- sion of the island colony of Hong Kong to the limits necessary for its effective defence ; the lease of Wei Hai Wei, — in any case a burden, if to be made tenable, a very serious burden on the British exchequer, — and finally the so-called concession of the Yangtse valley, as a sphere of influence or interest, an open market under British control for the benefit of the world at large. In cases like Kaulung and Wei Hai Wei, cessions of territory pressed for per- Concessions and Counter-Concessions. 27 sistently, there was no opportunity for Chinese evasion, but in the large class of concessions standing outside these terri- torial ones, there has been on the one hand a large scope for evasion, and on the other an absence of strength and insistence. At critical junctures the Chinese Government has been able to evade or obstruct, and the British Government has repeatedly accepted the shadow for the substance, for instance in the matters of inland naviga- tion and railway contracts in Central China. And in such cases the country has been led to believe that the so-called concessions were genuine. The failure of British diplomacy has been denied by our diplomatic agents and Government, who point to the long list of concessions obtained, in value and extent exceeding those gained by other Powers. The list is a formidable one on paper, but unfortunately the value of these concessions is extremely doubtful. 28 The Problem in China. The Yangtse Valley Sphere. Of the various concessions obtained by Britain, the Yangtse valley agreement has been claimed as the most valuable. During the session of 1898-99 the Government pledged its word to Parliament and the country that it was a valid and valuable acquisition. Nothing further from the truth could be imagined. When, in re- sponse to the demand of the public for the document, the title-deed, so to speak, of British interests in the Yangtse valley was produced, the true character of this con- cession became apparent. It turned out to be no convention or agreement solemnly signed and sealed by the Ministers of the respective Governments, not even an official declaration, but merely an off-hand reply to an inquiry of the British Minister at Peking as to whether the Chinese Govern- ment would consent to alienate the great central zone of the Empire. Britain and the Yangtse Valley. 29 The interest of Britain, then, in this region rested, and still rests, on no concrete basis whatever. Like all the other concessions the title was good and inexpugnable only on the condition of being rendered effective by action, perhaps by force. The title lay in the will and resolution of the British Government and in the enterprise of British merchants. The value of the field lay in effective occupation. Britain and the Yangtse Valley. As has been already shown, the sphere policy, which gives Britain the Yangtse basin, is but an indifferent compensation for the open door, which would have pre- served the eighteen provinces of China with her population of 350,000,000 of people, as a field for British trade — a field maintained, too, at a minimum cost. The Yangtse basin sphere involves the limita- tion of the great market to one-third of the 30 The Problem in China. whole, the cost of control, and no exclusive >■ advantage, for it must be open as a market for the whole world. One may regret, as I do, the loss of the greater, but there is a danger that, unless the situation is realised and action taken, we may find even the Yangtse basin lost, and Britain, which had opened up China, and, till the other day, had nearly three-fourths of the trade, and enjoyed the preponderance of influence, may find herself practically squeezed out altogether. Little or nothing has been done hitherto by Government or private enterprise to make good this visionary title to the Yangtse basin. It must be remembered that the rever- sionary claim to the Yangtse valley, with the acquisition of Wei Hai Wei and Kaulung, was interpreted by the whole world as meaning the abandonment of the open door, and adoption of the sphere of influence policy — in other words, a practical Britain and the Yangtse Valley. 31 adhesion to the partition of China. That being the case, there was all the more reason that the British Government should at once have set about the task of asserting its authority in the Yangtse region. The condition of the Yangtse valley at the time that I passed through it last year was such, as already indicated, as to de- mand the close attention and intervention of this country. The Central Government was paralysed, and the people of many of the provinces were on the point of revolt, while several were already in open rebellion. One of the chief causes of discontent, apart from the evident weakness of the Govern- ment, was the system always adopted by the Manchu dynasty of planting their clansmen, drones in the busy hive of Chinese workers, all over the country. These Manchus exercise authority, and, to quote the Viceroys themselves, "suck the blood out of the country," being compulsorily supported by the provincial 32 The Problem in China. authorities. " Relieve us from these Manchu bloodsuckers," is the cry of seven- tenths of the Chinese. The mass of the people are still industrious, orderly, and peace loving. The provincial authorities find their task of governing increas- ingly difficult, in view of the evident loss of power of the Central Government. Under normal conditions the right of initiative is left largely in the hands of the provincial authorities, who therefore wield enormous power, which, under present conditions, has necessarily to be more and more asserted. Under such circumstances it was an obvious measure to cultivate rela- tions with the local authorities, and to take steps for supporting them on the great water- way, which could easily have been done. Instead of this a fatuous adherence to the old diplomatic tradition was maintained. The Court of Peking, the Tsungli-Yamen, and Li Hung Chang monopolised our entire attention — all of these being more Britain and the Yangtse Valley. 33 or less completely under the influence of Russia — while the men who actually ruled two - thirds of the Empire have been ignored and neglected. So far these functionaries had not yet altogether fallen under Russian influence, and they were shrewd enough to understand that the Anglo-Saxon represented the minimum of danger to themselves, and therefore to China. These men needed guidance and enlightenment, and it should have been the policy of the British Government to in every way cultivate their sympathies and assist them to clearer views of their duty. Nothing whatever has been done in this direction. Neither by the strengthening of the Consular staff, especially by the choice of the right men — for it is not so much men that are required as a man — nor by steps for policing the waterway, have we made any advance in the last eighteen months, rather we retrograded, until the crash has come. 34 The Problem in China. South-West China. Not merely in the Yangtse basin, but throughout South- West China — provinces so much ignored, and yet so important be- cause providing access .from India to the Upper Yangtse — France has been busily at work, but Britain has been entirely apathetic and indifferent. At those points where she should be strongly represented she is not represented at all. The Consuls gazetted to these provinces arc usually either absent or are useless. Those who have read "The 'Overland' to China" will remember how, when I passed through South-West China recently, Mr Litton, the Vice-Consul at Chungking, had been removed elsewhere, leaving the entire pro- vince of Szechuan without a British repre- sentative. Nothing will ever be possible to Britain in China without a reform of the Consular service, out of which the old spirit has departed ; and this reform can Effects of Lukewarm Policy. 35 only be effected by a change in the methods of the Government which controls and at the same time paralyses that service. Effects of Lukewarm Policy. The lukewarm negative policy of Bri- tain has tended to alienate the provincial magnates of the Yangtse valley. At one time inclined to be pro-British, seeing in Britain their best hope of being saved from the domination of aggressive Powers, it would have been easy for a few really capable men to enter into arrangement with the local Viceroys which would have given Britain a footing commensurate with the importance of her interests. They were, however, left severely alone, and so far as the steps taken are concerned the Yangtse valley might have been a Spanish sphere. The leader of the provincial Viceroys, Chang Chih Tung — a man of strong character, official purity, real patriotism, and with the courage of his convictions — 36 The Problem in China. has become extremely sceptical regarding the probability of Britain asserting herself in the Yangtse valley. Unless he and his fellow-officials are persuaded once more to confide in the strength and resolution of Britain they will be compelled to follow the example of the invertebrates in Peking, and purchase safety by throwing their weight into the scale of the stronger Power. The Tax-Gatherer in the Yangtse Valley. It is not, however, merely a negative policy in the Yangtse valley that has to be deplored. Instead of attempting to win the favour of officials and people, we have actually gone out of our way to incur their aversion — as, for example, in the collection of taxes. The Chinese provinces, as is well known, had little sympathy with the Central Government in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and still less after the The Tax-Gatherer in the Yangtse. 37 pressure of taxation came. Yet the British voluntarily undertook to levy from these provinces a special contribution towards the indemnities extorted by Japan. The interest of the Anglo-German Loan was secured by a collection of Likin dues in the Yangtse valley, which the Customs had undertaken to make. The provincial authorities naturally objected to their special source of revenue being thus taken from them in order to provide what they considered to be tribute money for foreigners, but the British made a great point of these collections in the Yangtse valley being hypothecated for the service of the loan, and indeed insisted that the collection should be made through the Maritime Customs, regarded by the Chinese as a distinctively foreign institution. At the same time the British Government actually claimed of the Chinese Govern- ment that the head of the Customs Service should be of British nationality. 38 The Problem in China. It must be pronounced a short-sighted policy to thus impose special taxation not only on British trade, but on the particular provinces in which it was Britain's interest to appear rather as protector than oppressor. Inland Navigation. Intimately connected with the develop- ment of the Yangtse valley is the right to navigate the inland waters of China. But, as usual with Chinese concessions, the right has not yet received effect, nor will it become a reality unless the British Government is determined that it shall be made so. In the present state of feeling among provincial officials, in view especially of the anarchy imminent throughout China, all enterprise must be stopped unless traders are assured that the capital they invest shall not be exposed to pillage and spolia- tion. At present the concession is rendered valueless by the imposition of certain con- The Policy to be Pursued, 39 ditions. It was manifestly the business of the Chinese Government to foresee and provide for the practical difficulties, and it was our duty to see that this was done. If navigation is to be carried out anywhere in China it is in the Yangtse basin with its immense network of natural waterways. The necessary protection to traders can be given by arrangement with the provincial authorities, supported by a flotilla of light- draft gunboats. Not only was such a measure necessary to prevent the inland navigation concession becoming a dead letter, but to prevent the dissolution of the bonds binding the Chinese administration together, and which it was inevitable would some day open the door to all the forces of disorder ready to break out at any moment. The Policy to be Pursued. The immediate duty of Britain is, of course, to assist in the restoration of order 40 The Problem in China. at the capital. That once accomplished, what line is she going to take ? Is she to continue the traditional diplomacy, that is, continue to deal with a fictitious Govern- ment — in other words, the Empress- Dowager, Li Hung Chang, and a reac- tionary Tsungli Yamen — or is she going to strike out a new line? The former course, which has led from one disaster to another, is not likely to be successful now, /when the European concert has been called (into action at Peking. Under such a system Russia, who possesses the pre- ponderating influence locally, and holds strong cards in the international game played by the Powers for China, would continue to prove too powerful for Britain. She has the advantage of a firm ally on the spot in France, and a possible ally in Germany, while Britain at present stands alone, having thought it right to refuse to ally herself with Japan, and having failed to secure the co-operation of America. The Policy to be Pursued. 41 The only policy of Britain lies un- doubtedly in a frank acknowledgment of the salient facts of the situation, which are, that China has already been partly carved up by the Powers, that the north is for all ! practical purposes Russian, and will always remain a closed door. Admitting this, the clear duty of Britain is to assert herself in , the most valuable portion of what remains of China — the Yangtse valley. It is a common aspiration in this country to establish an understanding with Russia in Asia, but this is not possible under present conditions. These conditions have been already indicated. Russia, with growing influence over the Chinese Govern- ment, with little or no trade, aims at com- pleting the absorption begun in Manchuria and at building up an exclusive trade for herself, securing in China a monopoly of markets for the produce of her vast empire. Britain with about three-fourths of the trade, is anxious to check the southward march of 42 The Problem in China. Russia, and to maintain the Chinese Empire as an open market for the world. The two poHcies are diametrically opposed, and cannot be reconciled. Nor will a modus Vivendi be arrived at until Britain has clearly defined her future policy and sphere of action in China. The southward march of Russia is too concrete to be stopped by nebulous claims or indefinite spheres, backed only by paper agreements. The course to be pursued, therefore, is quite clear. While co-operating — and taking a leading part — in the restoration of order at Peking, Britain should take active steps in the Yangtse valley, establishing efficient agents, introducing British capital and enterprise, and cultivating relations with the local authorities, who should then be supported along the whole waterway by a strong police force of light gunboats, which would enforce order and facilitate commerce, and, above all, the Yangtse should be con- nected with India by railway without delay. The Policy to be Pursued. 43 Should some such policy of firm and vigorous action in a well-defined sphere — the driving, as it were, a big wedge of British influence through the heart of China — not be initiated in the immediate future, it will be too late. The Yangtse valley is already threatened, and if we do not now make a stand, will share the fate of Northern China, and Britain may then resign herself to the loss of the greatest market in the world with untold potenti- alities. And what we lose Russia gains. Such a policy would ensure the support of the United States and Japan, who would profit by the open door, and not only of these, but of all Powers who are at all honest in the wish to preserve the integrity of any part of China as a market for the world. An important point is that the mass of the Chinese people, especially in the Yangtse valley, are in favour of our claims there, and desire the development of their country, though, of course, they 44 The Problem in China. must be tactfully dealt with as regards their local government, and relieved as much as possible from taxation. The dissatisfaction with which the country is seething is the result of the absolute lack of confidence in the Central Government. ' The Empress - Dowager, (Unpopular because of the encroachment she has permitted to Russia, has en- ; deavoured to turn the tables in her own i favour by utilising a certain section of the 1 malcontents and by encouraging the cry , of extirpation of the " foreign devils." She has, however, raised a demon which it is beyond her power to lay. Under no , circumstances should she be permitted to i retain the power she has so abused. The i opportunity has arrived for clearing up the ' whole situation. The Manchu dynasty is ' doomed, indeed the whole spirit and genius of the Manchus is altogether extinct and out of date in China. The Emperor, by reason of his Chinese proclivities and as- Britain s Trading Interest. 45 pirations, or some other Chinese prince, might take up the reins, and supported by a strong and tactful Power, which would not rush matters, could carry through the schemes of reform which are far from repugnant to the better class of Chinese. Already the provincial Vice- roys, refusing to obey the mob rule of Peking, have established the foundations of a provisional Central Government, with headquarters at Nanking. The centre of gravity of what remains ot China is not Peking but the Yangtse valley, containing one-third of the popu- lation of the empire, and unequalled resources. From this centre whatever"] is possible of a reformed China should bej built up. Britain's Trading Interest in China. The accompanying analysis of the Foreign Trade Returns of the Chinese 46 The Problem in China. Imperial Maritime Customs for 1899 has been drawn up with the object of showing : — I. The Total of the Foreign interests in the Import and Export Trades of China, amounting in value to Tls.460,533,288, or in sterling (at exchange of 1899), ;!^70,000,000 (about). II. The interests of the British Empire therein, namely, 60.7 °/= of the whole, or say ;^42,500,000. III. The division of China's Foreign Trade between : — (a.) Yangtse Ports and Northern China - = 65 7 ((5.) Southern China =35 ,, IV. The shipping interests engaged in the Trade of China ; the share of Great Britain being about 60 7o, and China's share being nearly 25 7o of the remainder. A China League. 47 V. The great extent to which this shipping interest is dependent upon the Northern and Yangtse Trade of China (over T] °L of the whole). VI. The foreign population at the Ports. The vested interests at the Ports are of course another matter, and cannot be estimated, but in Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankau they are enormous. The Foreign Trade of China in- creased in 1899, as compared with the previous year, by no less than about ^14,000,000, Tls.92,000,000, of which in- crease Tls.64,000,000 is attributable to growth of trade in the Yangtze and at the Gulf Ports. A China League. The apathy of this country in matters of such vital importance to the future of the Empire as the state of affairs in China can only be attributed to ignorance, and this 48 The Problem in China. ignorance, both on the part of the people and their rulers, is mainly due to the absence of any medium for throwing light on the subject. There is no means for the propagation of information, no machinery to bring together all that is known and present it to the public in a useful and convincing manner. It is not necessary to theorise as to the usefulness of such machinery for the enlightenment of the country, for practical illustrations may be found in those bodies which success- fully urged the consideration and reform of many vital questions — the navy. South Africa, and so forth. The China Association, it may be said, should fulfil these functions ; but in the nature of things an association of mer- chants cannot be expected to be largely moved by affairs of merely national im- portance, or to countenance action which might, while securing the future, have an unfavourable effect on their interests in the A China League. 49 present. The Government exists for the conservation of these wider and higher interests, and the evil arises when the merchant usurps the functions of the statesman or the statesman adopts the short-sighted views of the merchant. When the Foreign Office, as has not in- frequently happened, shelters itself behind the uncomplaining attitude of the China Association, we have both these evils combined. The Association itself makes no pretence as to the scope of its opera- tions ; and, under the circumstances, the necessity becomes extremely obvious for an independent league, acting in co-opera- tion with the Association, but bound by no ties either to it or to the Foreign Office, and influenced by no considera- tions of personal interest. The business of such a league will be to collect in- formation from every source, and to render it accessible to the English-speaking race throughout Great and Greater Britain and 50 The Problem in China. America. This could be done through the Press, by means of propaganda of various kinds — lectures, pamphlets, and so forth — and with the education of the people we should have made the first step to- wards the education of our masters — the Government. A league embodying these and similar aims has been founded, from which those who have assisted at its inauguration hope great things. We must, however, keep a single aim in front of us, and pursue that aim single-eyed. No questions of party politics or of private interest must influence us, for our one great object is simply to awaken the country to a full understanding of our vital interests in China, interests which are far wider than even the com- mercial question, great though that be. (The Hai-kwan Tael, in which these values are Siven, averaged for 1899, 3/0J, or say 6'j Taels = /i.) CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE (Compiled from the Customs Returns for 1899). Total Value of Foreign Trade. Imports and Exports. Tls. 460,533,288. Imports, Tls. 264,748,456 Exports, Tls. 195,784,832 Tls. 460,533,288 Tls. 460,533,288 Imported from : — Great Britain and Dependencies - Tls. 188,765,649 = 71.3 ' Japan ----- 34,682,048 = 13. i United States - . - - 21,709,373 = 8.2 Russia (Batoum Oil) - - - 3,441,730 = 1.3 Other Countries (Continent of Europe, Tls. 10,172,398 = 3.870) 16,149,656 = 6.1 Tls. 264,748,456 100 7, Exported to : — Great Britain and Uependencies - Tls, 90,844, 162 = 46.4 7„ United States - - - - 21,732,117 = li.i // Russia (Tea) - - . . 18,403,774 = 9.4 n Japan 17,229,065 = 8.8 » Other Countries (Continent of Europe, Tls. 36,763,506=18.870) 47,575,714 = 24.3 Tls. 47,575.714 195,784,832 100 Tls. 460,533,288 Share of Different Countries in Total Foreign Imports and Exports. Great Britain and Dependencies - Tls. 279,609,811* = Japan Continent of Europe United States Russia Other Countries - I- J 5i.9ii,'i3 46,935.904 43.441,490 21,845,504 16,789,466 Tls. 460,533,288 ' Say ^42,500,000. 60.7 °L. 1 1.3 f. 10.2 " 9.4 ,/ 4.7 „ 3-7 " 100 7o Tls. 460,533,288 Distribution of Foreign Imports in China. Gulf of Pechili Ports 28 7^ Yangtse Ports ------ 40 » Ports South of Yangtse - - - - 32 " 100 7o Districts of Origin of Exports from China. The interest of the Yangtse and Pechili j Gulf of Pechili Ports and Vangtse Ports* - 61 7o ' Ports in the whole Foreign Trade of China is 1 Ports South of Yangtse • - - - 39 " therefore close upon Tls. 300,000,000, or / 65 7„ of the total. I ■ I ' .\s so large a quantity uf Raw ProcIuLc from tht I Pechili I'orls is txportcd to J^tianghai to be dealt with [there prior to shipment, it is impossible to accurately make an apportionment between the two districts. Tonnage. Total Clearances, Inwards and Outwards, at the Treaty Ports :— 39,268,330 tons. British - 59.4% Japanese ■ 7-2 °/„ *Chinese 23.8 Other Flags 9.6 Coast Trade— Tonnage 28,275,615. British - 5S.6 7o Japanese - 5.0 "/„ 'Chinese - 30.9 » Other Flags 5.5 " Foreign Trade — Tonnage 10,992,715. British - 61.1 7o French - 4.6 7o Japanese - 13 » 'Chinese - 5.6 n German - 8.4 it Other Flags 7.3 « (* Officered chiefly by I^ritish and Americans.) N.B.—Oi the Tls. 640,191 collected for Tonnage Dues, Tls. 497,207 (or 77.7 7J were derived from the Gulf of Pechili and Yangtse Ports. Foreign Population at the Treaty Ports- Total 17,193. British Japanese -..-.---- American --------- Russian --------- Portuguese --------- French --------- German --------- Other Countries 5.562 = 32.3 7. 2,440 = 14.2 ./ 2,33s = 13-5 " 1,621 = 9.4 „ 1.423 = 8.2 » 1,183 = 6.9 It 1,134 = 6.6 . 1,495 8.9 - 17,193 100 7o Published by P.S. King & Son, Westmii u'nst^r. Y S.Vr«5U.er,rR.G.S DEMY OCTAVO, CLOTH, 168. THE "OVERLAND" TO CHINA By ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN, Author of " China in Transjormation," S^c. &"<:. Professor R. K. Douglas, in the Morning Post, says : " Mr Colquhoun . . . is as familiar with the extreme East as the ordinary Briton is with France or Germany." " , . . Admirable book . . . could not have appeared at a more opportune moment." — Morning Post. ". . . May be included, like his (Mr Colquhoun's) earlier writings, among the leading works of reference on the politics of Eastern and Northern Asia." — Standard. " . . . Teems with well-presented facts about Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, Peking, the Yangtse Valley, South-West China, and Tonking, . . , Of extreme value . . . vital interest. . . . Although written . . . before the beginning of the present revolt, it is clear that he foresaw its imminence, and it is a thousand pities that his prevision was not shared by his countrymen both at Peking and at home." — The World. "... Contains a vast amount of important information . . , vivid glimpses of Peking . . . valuable description of the Trans-Siberian-Man- churian Railway. Mr Colquhoun can justly claim to have prophesied the present crisis." — Daily News. " . . . Delightful description of the old diplomatic life in Peking," — Daily Mail. " , . . A most opportune and invaluable contribution. . . . We strongly recommend this able work." — St fames' Gazette. " , . . Has all the interest and value which first-hand observation can give. Its value is by no means merely political." — Manchester Guardian. ". . . -Brings vividly before the reader the great movement of Muscovite expansion in Asia. . . , Essential to the intelligent understanding of the ques- tions with which the leading Powers of the world are coping." — Glasgow Herald, "A most valuable guide to what is now a world's problem." — Newcastle Chronicle. " Goes to the root of things in Asia. Vivid pen pictures of Peking . . . adequately illustrated . . . good maps. ... A remarkable book, which we trust will be widely read and deeply pondered." — Sheffield Telegraph. CL^-^ " His prophecies have been realised by recent events. . . . Excellent ^ ., account of Peking." — Birmingham Post, li*-i " Those who wish fully to appreciate the delicate situation should read 'The " "Overland" to China.' . . jf He tells of mines and counter-mines, tricks and ' -^ treaties, plots and counter-plots, intrigues and bitterness and jealousy among the ^^11- [Powers who are playing for high stakes in the Far East." — Birmingham Ganette. ^""^ ! "... Even had the author not possessed the power to make his book '' fascinating, his message is one that must command attention by its urgency and importance." — Liverpool Mercury. " . . . Valuable as is this work as ' a book of travel,' it is immeasurably more so as giving some insight, some enlightenment, as to what is happening and what will happen in China." — Graphic. ". . . As instructive as it is timely, as entertaining as it is instructive. , . . The picture is impressively unrolled, it is painted in brilliant colours and with an excellent touch." — Daily Graphic. " A most interesting and enlightening account ot what he saw under the title, ' The "Overland " to China.' He foresaw JhaLtrpuble was bre\ying,and jthat the storm would break soon. No part" of Mr Colquhoun's book is more I eaiightening than the "chapters in which he describes the ' happy family ' of (/ diplomatists at Peking." — Liverpool Post, p. S. KING & SON, Established 1819 in Parliament Street. p ut?It6ber6, ORCHARD HOUSE, - - - - 2 & 4 GREAT SMITH STREET {Opposite the Westminster Palace Hotel, Victoria Sireei), WESTMINSTER. iParltamentarg an& (general asoofegelters, aSooftblnOers anO iprlnters. 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