Pi 2 (Jflrn? II ICam irlinol IGihtaty CORNELL UNIV l:]! . ( MAY 18 mo LAW LIBEAEY. Cornell University Library KF6785.P13 V.I A treatise on the law of taxation by loc 3 1924 020 035 451 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020035451 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF Taxation by Local and Special Assessments INCLUDING Assessments for Streets, Sidewalks, Alleys, Sewers and all other City Improvements, as well as Assessments for all Rural Im- provements, such as Roads, Ditches, Drains, Bridges, Viaducts,Water Systems and Irrigation BY WM. HERBERT PAGE of the Coluffibiia, Ohio, Bar, Author of Page on Wills and Page on Contracts AND PAUL JONES of the Columbus, Ohio, Bar, formerly City Solicitor, Columbus, Ohio IN TWO VOLUMES Vol. I CINCINNATI THE W. H. ANDERSON COMPANY 1909 lA/(.ASI Copyright 1909 BY THE W. H. ANDERSON CO. PREFACE. In this work, the authors have attempted, to do what has never been done before — to cover the whole field of what is properly the law of Taxation by Local and Special Assessment in a thorough and exhaustive manner. They have given an analysis of the substantive law of Assessments in a way never approached in any other work — and they have.arso discussed with especial care and detail the practical questions of the method by which the public corporations may enforce Assessments and the meth- ods whereby the property owner may seek relief. Great care and study has been given to the subject of Rights and Remedies, iiieluding Pleading, Parties, Evidence and Procedure. The subject of Taxation by Assessment has become a very important one, occupying the attention of Courts and Attorneys in a great number of eases. This work has been in preparation for a number of years, and every effort has been made to make it as valuable to the busy lawyer as possible. The Table of Contents is a minute analysis of the whole subject. It not only gives a comprehensive scope of the subject, but also enables the reader readily to turn to the particular section in which any given point is treated. The index is very full and complete. The citation of authorities is very exhaustive, and parallel references to other than the official reports are given. The date of the lead- ing case is always specified, and cases are cited down to final revision of page proof. The present treatise is the result of an attempt to gather to- gether and state in connected form, the principles of the law of Taxation by Local and Special Assessments, established by ad- 11 PREF^CK judications as they have been worked out in detail in the courts, for it is thus that the law grows and will continue to grow, not- withstanding all attempts at generalization and condensation. The arrangement and text are the work of Mr. Wm. Herbert Page. Wm. Herbeet Page. » Paul Jones. Columbus, Ohio, January 10, 1909. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Nature of Assessment and Place in Law. SECTION. page. 1. Derivation of assessment 1 2. Technical meaning of assessment outside of taxation 1 3. Technical meaning of assessment in general taxation 3 4. Meaning of assessment as here discussed — Assessment based . on benefits 4 5. Assessment for performance of legal duty 5 6. Assessment for property furnished at request 7 7. Definition of assessment 11 8. Assessment for benefits a form of taxation 13 9. Assessment for legal duty not taxation 15 10. Assessment for goods furnished not taxation 16 11. Theory underlying doctrine of assessment for benefits 16 12. Divergent theories of assessments for benefits 22 13. Theory underlying doctrine of assessment for legal duty 26 14. Theory underlying doctrine of assessment for goods furnished at re- quest 28 15. Assessment for benefits not based on contract 29 16. Theory of contract invoked in assessment 31 17. Special contract to pay assessment .'..,. 33 18. Assessment not based on quasi-contract 35 19. Assessment for legal duty not based on contract 39 20. Assessment for goods furnished based on contract 39 CHAPTER II. HiSTOEY OF Local Assessments. SECTION. PAGE. 21. Early analogies to local assessment — Feudal exactions 41 22. Work on roads 42 23. Origin of assessments in drainage ." 43 24. StatBte, 23 Hen, VIII. c. 5 43 25. Efi'eet of statutory assessment on prescriptive duties 46 26. Questions arising under early statute 47 27. Assessment extended to street improvements 48 28. Early colonial legislation — ^Pennsylvania 49 iii IV CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 29. New York 51 30. South Carolina 52 31. Other colonial and state legislation 53 32. Assessment not recognized by common law 54 33. Statutory assessment held valid 54 34. Development of constitutional restraints 56 CHAPTEI^ III. Relation Between Assessment and General Taxation. section. page. 35. General distinction between tax and assessment 59 36. Exaction on political unit according to value held tax 63 37. Exaction on assessment district according to benefits, frontage or area held assessment 63 38. Exaction on assessment district according to valuation 64 39. Term "tax" prima facie excludes local assessment 67 40. Essential nature of charge controls , 68 41. Term "tax" as including assessment 69 42. Assessment not tax within provisions for exemption.. 70 43. Assessment not tax within provisions for equality and uniformity. . 74 44. Special views of certain states 76 45. Assessment as tax within provisions for collection 78 46. Assessment as tax within jurisdictional provisions 80 47. Assessment as tax under restrictions on taxation 81 48. Assessment as tax under other provisions 82 49. Assessment as tax in conveyances 83 50. Special tax 86 51. Special taxation in Illinois 87 CHAPTER IV. Form of Exaction in Assessment. section. page. '52. Option to owner to construct improvement 91 53. Power and duty to grant option 92 54. Option to do work in assessment for benefits 95 55. Option to do work in performance of legal duty 96 56. Primary duty upon city 98 57. Repairs 99 58. Removal of ice and snow " .- 100 59. Lighting 103 60. Liability of street railway company for paving between tracks 104 6L Apportionment of expense between public corporations 106 62. Deduction of benefits from damages an indirect form ■ ■ ■ 702 464. Reconstruction 705 CHAPTER X. Specific Items Included in Assessment. SECTION. page. 465. Necessity of statutory authority to include items in assessment. . . 708 466. Assessment limited to cost of improvement and incidental items. . . 709 467. Credit for material used by contractor 710 468. Compensation of surveyor and engineer 711 469. Expense of levying assessment 713 470. Printing 715 471. Advertisement and notice 716 472. Cost of ■■collection , 717 473. Penalties for delinquency ; 719 474. Excess charges due to failure to pay cash 719 475. Interest 721 476. Damages 728 477. Cost of defective prior assessment 728 478. Contingent expenses 729 479. Effect of including improper items 729 480. Immaterial errors in including items 733 CHAPTER XI. The Improvement Conteact. section. page. 481. Power to let contract 736 482. Necessity of letting contract 737 483. Necessity of valid contract 739 484. Effect of fraud 741 XVI CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 485. Nature of fraud ., 743 486. Constructive fraud ' 747 487. Certiacate of freedom from fraud 749 488. Mistake 750 489. Form of contract 751 490. Incorporation of document in the contract 751 491. Time within which contract must be entered into 753 492. Execution of contract .^ 754 493. Vote necessary to validity of contract 755 494. Parties to contract 757 495. Letting contract on competitive bidding 759 496. Advertising for bids 766 497. Discretionary power to determine bidder 768 498. Form and contents of bid 769 499. Method of awarding contract 770 500. ' Method of giving notice for bids 772 501. Contents of notice for bids 776 502. Proof of publication for bids 778 503. Effect of failure to give notice for bids 778 504. Power to order or to dispense with advertisement for bids 780 505. Statutes requiring appropriation or sufficient funds in treasury. ... 781 506. Necessity of collecting assessment in advance of contract 782 507. Constitutional or statutory limit of indebtedness 783 508. Other restrictions on indebtedness 785 509. Necessity of contractor's giving bond or security 785 510. Contract must conform to resolution or ordinance 787 511. Substantial compliance sufficient 792 512. Effect of invalid terms ■ 796 513. Terms fixed by law 797 514. Provisions with reference to labor 797 515. Patented or monopolized articles 801 516. Covenant for maintenance of improvement— Effect of specific statu- tory provisions 804 517. Covenant for maintenance construed as guaranty 805 518. Illustrations of covenant for maintenance construed as guaranties. . 807 519. Covenants for maintenance construed as covenants to repair 809 520. Restrictions on contract price. . . . .' 812 521. Option to property owner to do work or to select contractor or materials 813 522. Time of performance 817 523. Separation and combination of contracts 818 524. Effect of provision for liquidated damages ., 819 525. Necessity of completion of improvement 820 526. Assessment upon basis of estimated cost 826 527. Necessity and nature of substantial performance 830 528. Excuses for failure to perform 836 529. Amount of recovery in case of defective performance 838 530. Quasi contractual rights in case of defective performance 839 CONTENTS. XVll SECTION. ■ PAGE< 531. Acceptance by public corporation conclusive 840 532. Effect on rights of property owner of acceptance by public corpo- ration 842 533. Acceptance by public corporation final unless different improve- ment constructed 843 534. Acceptance induced by fraud or mistake 846 535.. Acceptance by public corporation not final 847 536. Acceptance or rejection of work as affecting contractor 847 537. Official certificate of performance 847 538. Necessity of performance within time limited 852 539. Remedies for defective performance if assessment held valid 860 540. Effect of abandonment of prior contract 861 541. Modification of contract 863 542. Extras 867 543. Impassibility 869 544. Assignment of improvement contract 869 CHAPTER XII. Pbopbkty Subject to Assessment. SECTION. pace. 545. Corporeal real property 871 646. Easements ; 873 547. Interest of owner in land subject to public easement 874 648. Personal property 875 549. Property benefited subject to assessment in absence of statutory restrictions 879 550. The assessment district 884 551. Description of assessment district 888 552. Legislative discretion in laying out assessment district 891 653. Power of legislature to determine what lands are benefited 892 654. Legislative determination conclusive as to subordinate officials .... 898 555. Delegation of power to public corporation 902 55i6. Grant of power to public officers or boards 905 557. Grant of power to commissioners or jury 907 558. Method of reviewing determination as to land benefited 909 659. By whom correctness of determination can be questioned 910 560. Assessment district consisting of property benefited in fact 911 661. Land benefited by street 913 562. Land benefited by sidewalk 916 583. Land benefited by sewer ■. 916 564. Land benefited by ditch or drain 923 565. Land benefited by water pipes 929 666. Land benefited by levees 929 667. Land benefited by other improvements 930 568. land benefited by combination of improvements 931 669. Combination of streets 932 XyiH CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 570. Combination of parts of entire street improvement 935 571. Sidewalks 938 572. Sewers , 939 573. Other improvements 941 574. Separation of improvement 942 575. Lateral division of improvement 945 570. Property on part of improvement for which assessment is not levied 948 577. Improvement of varying width and cost 949 578. Peculiar use of land as affecting binefits 950 579. Land belonging to United States 954 580. Public property not belonging to United States 954 581. Property belonging to state 957 582. Property belonging to county 959 583. Property belonging to township 961 584. Property belonging to city 961 685. Assessment of city for benefit received as a whole 964 586. Public school property 965 587. Streets and roads 967 588. Property owned by religious bodies 971 589. Property owned by charitable organizations 974 590. Property belonging to educational " institutions 976 591. Property used for fairs and exhibitions 977 592. Cemetery property 977 593. Property of public service corporations 979 594. Railroad property 980 595. Effect of use to which railroad property is put — Eight of way 983 596. Property other than right of way 986 597. Effect of interest held by railroad in land 990 598. Specific type of improvement as affecting assessment of right of way 991 599. Exaction against street railway based on charter provisions 996 600. Statutory duty of street railway to pave 998 601. Assessment upon street railway based on benefits 999 602. Contractual liability of street railway 1002 603. Construction of liability of street railway 1003 604. Liability of street railway enures to benefit of property owners. . . .1007 605. Method of enforcing liability of street railway 1010 606. Street railway property other than right of way 1010 607. Homestead 1011 608. Vacant laud 1012 609. Unplatted land 1013 610. Agricultural property IOI.5 611. Power of legislature to exempt from assessment 1017 612. Necessity of express exemption 1019 613. Effect of exemption from taxation 1020 614. Construction of exemptions 1025 615. Power of legislature to authorize contracts for exemption 1028 616. Necessity of statutory authority for exemption contracts 1029 CONTENTS. XIX SECTION. PAOE. 617. Construction of contracts for exemption 1031 618. Construction of special statutes for exemption and commutation. . .1033 619. Property not in physical contact with improvement 1034 620. Abutting property 1036 621. Adjoining property 1046 622. Adjacent property 1048 623. Contiguous property 1050 624. Property fronting on improvement 10,53 625. Effect of assessment according to frontage 1057 626. Bordering, bounding and binding property, and property in neigli- borhood of improvement 1059 627. Other methods of describing property 1062 628. Assessment district consisting of blocks or parts of blocks 1064 629. Assessment district consisting of land within certain distance of improvement 1071 630. Meaning of lot 1075 631. Effect of platted lines 1077 632. Assessment of strips of land 1081 633. Property benefited by future improvement 1083 634-. Land on which improvement is not located ' 1083 635. Condition of property when proceedings are begun controls 1084 636. Improvement outside of taxing district 1085 637. Property ovitside of public corporation which levies assessment .... 1088 638. Land in two or more assessment districts 1091 639. Unauthorized omission of land benefited 1093 640. Omission to impose proper charge on street railway 1096 641. • Omission of land not subject to assessment 1097 642. Omission by legislative determination 1099 643. Presumption of propriety of omission 1099 644. Omission not operative if not prejudicial 1100 645. Remedies'ior improper omission 1102 646. Effect of construction of improvement by property owner 1104 647. Property on which owner has paid invalid assessment 1106 648. Land already assessed for similar improvement 1106 649. Title not involved 1108 650. Change of statute pending assessment proceedings 1109 CHAPTER XIII. Apportionment. sbctio». page. 651. Theory of apportionment 1111 652. Nature of benefit 1113 653. Increase in price as test of benefit 1113 654. General and special benefits 1117 655. Special use as affecting benefits 1 119 656. Benefits from combination of improvement or division thereof. . . . 1120 XX CONTENTS. SECTION.. PACE. 657. Benefits enuring from street improvement 1121 658. Benefits enuring from sewer 1124 659. Benefits enuring from drains 1125 660. Benefits enuring from levee 1126 661. Damages caused by public improvements 1126 662. Option to assess or tax for local improvement 1 129 663. Apportionment between public corporation and property owners. . 1131 664. Apportionment between different public corporations 1138 665. Benefits as theoretical limit of assesament and basis of apportion- ment 1139 6'66. Power of legislature to determine existence and amount of benefits 1144 667. Legislative determination held ineffective 1153 668. Legislative determination held final if no injustice results there- from 1154 669. Legislative determination made subject to review 1155 670. Determination by public corporation of existence and amount of benefits 1156 671. Power of public boards to determine existence and amount of benefits 1 160 672. Determination by commissioners of existence and amount of benefits 1161 673. Determination by court of existence and amount of benefits 1162 674. Prima facie validity of apportionment 1162 675. Power of court to review existence and amount of benefits 1164 676. Jury trial as to existence and amount of benefits 1166 677. Assessment limited to benefits in fact 1167 678. Value of land as limit of assessment 1170 679. Restrictions on amount of assessment 1171 680. Restrictions based on actual value of property 1173 681. Restrictions based on tax valuation ". 1175 682. Combination and division of tracts with reference to restriction on assessment 1177 683. Effect of limiting lien to certain depth 1178 684. Division of improvement or of payments 1178 685. Waiver of statutory restrictions 1179 686. Effect of exceeding statutory limit' 1180 687. Change of statutory restriction 1182 688. Necessity of apportionment 1183 689. Apportionment a mere approximation 1184 690. Apportionment according to benefits in fact 1185 691. Construction of statutes as to apportionment on basis of benefits. 1188 692. Construction of assessment as to apportionment on basis of benefits 1192 693. Compliance with statute requiring apportionment on basis of bene- fits — Assessment according to frontage 1193 694. Assessments upon other bases of apportionment 1195 695. Apportionment on a "proportionate" basis 1197 696. Apportionment on a "just and equitable" basis 1198 697. Apportionment according to value 1200 698. Apportionment according to frontage held valid 1202 CONTENTS. XXI SECTION. PAQF. 699. Apportionment according to frontage held valid if limited by statute to benefits 1206 700. Apportionment according to frontage held invalid if not in excess of benefits in specific case 1210 701. Apportionment according to frontage held invalid 1211 702. Apportionment according to frontage as affected by Norwood v. Baker 1212 703. Frontage as affected by varying depth or value 1216 704. Frontage in case of corner lots 1217 705. Frontage as affected by irregular shape of lots 1218 706. Use of land as affecting apportionment according to frontage 1219 707. Construction and application of statutes requiring apportionment according to frontage , 1220 708. Assessment of fixed sum per front foot 1222 709. Entire cost of improvement apportioned according to frontage. . . 1223 710. Apportionment by squares or blocks 1229 711. Apportionment according to area 1230 712. Apportionment by combination of frontage and area 1233 713. Apportionment according to work done in front of each lot 1233 714. Effect of statutes requiring other forms of apportionment 1236 715. Apportionment of special assessment or special ta.xation in Illinois 1237 716. Apportionment of cost of street intersections 1241 717. Apportionment of assessment for performance of legal duty 1241 718. Apportionment of charges for voluntary use of public improve- ment or for goods furnished 1244 719. Duplication of assessment 1246 720. Credit for work done 1248 721. Credit for land donated 1250 722. Credit for payment of prior assessment 1250 723. Who can complain of defective apportionment 1251 724. Effect of statutory provisions for method of objecting to appor- tionment 1256 725. Change of statute with reference to apportionment.' 1257 CHAPTER XIV. Notice, section. page. 726. Constitutional necessity of notice 1259 727. No constitutional right to notice of each step in levy of assessment 1261 728. Notice and hearing in case of legislative determination 1261 729. Notice and hearing if question not one of legislative determination 1265 730. What constitutes sufficient notice 1266 731. Necessity of hearing upon amount of assessment 1266 732. Effect of giving notice in fact 1269 733. Necessity of notice in case of charge for legal duty 1270 734. Necessity of notice in case of charge for goods furnished 1271 XXH CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 735. Effect of statutory provisions with reference to notice 1271 736. Construction of statutory provisions concerning notice 1274 737. Notice of option to property owner to do work 1274 738. SufRcieney of notice of commencement of improvement proceeding. 1276 739. Notice of improvement 1278 740. Notice of resolution of intention 1280 741. Notice of ordinance 1282 742. Notice of contract 1283 743. Notice of hearing to determine assesmient district 1283 744. Notice of other proceedings in assessment 1284 745. Notice of hearing after levy of assessment 1285 746. Notice of collection 1287 747. Time for which notice must be given 1288 748. To whom notice must be given 1292 749. By whom notice must be ordered * 1295 750. Form and contents of notice 1295 751. To whom notice to be addressed 1298 752. By whom notice must be signed 1299 753. Time and place of hearing in notice 1299 754. Description of improvement in notice 1300 755. Description in notice of land assessed ; . 1302 756. Method of service of notice 1303 757. Personal service ." 1303 758. Service by mailing notice '. 1304 759. Service by posting notice or by leaving notice on premises 1305 760. Service by publication 1306 761. In what newspaper publication may be had 1308 762. Official newspaper 1309 763. Time and number of publications necessary 1312 764. Proof of service of notice 1316 765. Necessity that service of notice appear of record 1320 766. Presumption of sufficiency of notice 1321 767. Change of statute as affecting pending proceedings 1322 768. Who can complain of want of notice 1323 769. Effect of notice 1324 770. Effect of want of proper notice 1324 771. Waiver of insufficiency of notice 1325 772. Determination of public official as to sufficiency of notice 1327 773. Action, appeal and injunction as substitutes for notice 1329 774. Knowledge as substitute for notice 1330 CHAPTER XV. Method of Levying Assessment. bkotion. page. 775. Necessity of statutory authority for power to levy assessment... 1331 776. General rules of statutory construction 1333 CONTENTS. XXUl SECTION. PAGE. 777. Degree of compliance with statutes necessary 1338 778. Assessment not resting on theory of quasi contract 1342 779. Consent of property owners not necessary in absence of statute. . . 1342 780. Consent of property owners necessary by statute 1345 781. Necessity of petition of property owners 1346 782. Specific provisions as to effect of omitting petition 1349 783. Petition as alternative method 1349 784. Necessity of petition in certain classes of improvements 1351 785. Classes of persons eligible as petitioners. . . . : 1353 786. Who may sign petition — Owner 1356 787. Agent 1358 788. Executor, administrator and guardian 1360 789. Number of persons by whom petition must be signed 1361 790. Combination of improvements 1362 791. Methods of estimating majority 1363 792. Signatures obtained by fraud or mistake 1365 793. Form of signature 1366 794. Withdrawal from petition 1366 795. Determination of sufBciency of petition 1366 796. Form of petition 1369 797. Filing of petition 1370 798. Contents of petition 1370 799. Necessity that petition appear of record 1371 800. Petition as restricting kind of improvement 1372 801. Acting upon petition • 1375 802. Bond 1376 803. Remonstrance of property owners 1376 804. By whom remonstrance may be signed 1378 805. Number of remonstrants necessary -1379 806. Withdrawal from remonstrance 1380 807. Form of remonstrance 1381 808. Filing remonstrance 1381 809. Time for presenting remonstrance 1382 810. Effect of remonstrance 1383 811. Determination of suificiency of remonstrance 1385 812. Effect of failure to remonstrate 1386 813. Necessity of estimate 1386 814. By whom estimate to be made 1390 815. When estimate must be made 1391 816. Contents of estimate 1392 817. Estimate must refer to specific improvement 1394 818. Presumption of sufficiency of estimate 1395 819. Effect of estimate 1396 820. Estimate as part of record of resolution 1398 821. Necessity of plans 1398 822. Sufficiency and effect of plans '. 1400 823. Specifications 1401 824. Diagrams and plats 1403 XXIV _ CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 825. Determination of amount of benefits 1405 826. Determination of cost of improvement 1406 827. Necessity of ordinance or resolution 1407 828. Recommendation of improvement by public oflBcial 1408 829. Option to property owners to construct improvement 1409 830. Eesolution of intention 1410 831. Contents of resolution — Description of improvement 1412 832. Declaration of necessity 1416 833. Other questions as to contents of re^lution 1417 834. Record of resolution 1419 835. Method of enacting resolution 1420 836. Publication of resolution 1421 837. Necessity of ordinance .• 1424 838. Effect of resolution instead of ordinance .- 1427 839. Conformity of ordinance to preliminary resolution or to general ordinance 1428 840. Improvement must conform to resolution or ordinance 1430 841. At what session ordinance may be passed 1432 842. Necessity of quorum : 1434 843. Vote necessary to passage of ordinance 1435 844. Time of enacting ordinance 1437 845. Effect of violation of rules of parliamentary law 1441 846. Reconsideration 1442 847. Approval of ordinance by mayor 1442 848. Publication of ordinance . . . » 1443 849. Incorporation in ordinance 1446 850. Amendment oi ordinance 1446 851. Repeal of ordinance 1447 852. EflFect of. repeal ' 1448 853. Record of ordinance 1449 854. Caption and subject of ordinance 1450 855. General plan of improvements 1451 856. Description of improvement in ordinance 1452 857. Ordinance must describe improvement with sufficient certainty. . . 1454 858. Description in resolution 1459 859. Location of improvement 1460 860. "Construction of improvement where necessary 1463 861. Construction of improvement where not in existence 1465 862. Necessity of fixing grade 1465 863. Ordinance fixing grade of street 1469 864. Description of material 1470 865. Dimensions of improvement 1480 866. Waiver of objections 1482 867. Delegation of authority to inferior agent 1483 868. Ratification of act of inferior agent 1489 869. Construction as to description of improvement 1489 870. Combination of improvements in ordinance 1490 871. Necessity of fixing time of performance by ordinance 14r,0 CONTENTS. XXV SECTION. PAGE. 872. Determination of necessity and benefits by ordinance 1490 873. Determination to proceed on assessment plan 1492 874. Determination of assessment district 1493 875. Other matters as to wliich ordinance is necessary 1494 876. Other questions which may be determined by ordinance 1495 877. Assessment ordinance 1495 878. Time within which assessment may be levied 1497 879. Levy of assessment as dependent upon construction of improvement 1498 880. Assessment to be in writing 1499 881. Caption of assessment 1500 882. Date of assessment 1500 883. Statement in assessment of amount assessed 1500 884. Report must show compliance with statute and ordinance 1501 885. Contents of report as to benefits and land benefited 1503 886. Description of land 1505 887. Necessity of stating name of owner 1512 888. Who is to be regarded as owner 1513 889. Assessment to unknown owners 1515 890. Assessment against deceased owner 1516 891. Error in name of owner 1516 892. Necessity of finding as to value of property 1518 893. Report must show principle on which assessment is made 1518 894. Necessity of showing apportionment prescribed by law 1519 895. Apportionment of assessment among different tracts 1521 896. What constitutes entire tract 1524 897. Objection to assessment as entire tract 1526 898. Necessity of exercise of judgment by commissioners 1526 899. Necessity of actual view of premises 1527 900. Necessity of joint action of commissioners 1528 901. Necessity of unanimous action of commissioners 1529 902. Signature of report 1530 903. Signature as indicating identity of commissioners 1531 904. Certificate 1532 905. Affidavit 1532 906. Filing report 1532 907. Necessity of record 1534 908. Loss or destruction of assessment roll or ordinance 1537 909. Amendment of assessment 1537 910. Nature and necessity of confirmation 1542 911. By what body confirmation may be had 1543 912. Parties and procedure in confirmation 1545 913. Notice of confirmation 1549 914. Proof of publication 1552 915. Objections '. 1553 916. Time of making objections 1555 917. Form and contents of objections 1556 918. Failure to object as waiver , 1558 919. To whom objections must be presented 1503 XXVI CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 920. Issue at confirmation 1564 921. Hearing at confirmation 1566 922. Evidence at confirmation 1568 923. Burden of proof 1572 924. Charge, finding and verdict 15Y4 925. Judgment or decree of confirmation 1576 926. Power to amend or set aside judgment 1579 927. Effect of confirmation 1580 928. Jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional ^defects 1585 929. Defective ordinance 1585 930. Defective notice 1587 931. Defects in petition 1588 932. Defects in estimate 1588 933. Objections to amount of assessment 1589 934. Objection to apportionment 1589 935. Objections to commissioners 1590 936. Objections to assessment roll 1590 937. Objections to nature of improvement 1591 938. Errors in description of property. 1591 939. Efi'ect of judgment in eminent domain 1592 940. Defects in performance 1592 941. Other defects prior to confirmation 1593 942. Defects in confirmation proceedings 1594 943. Judgmeiit of confirmation conclusive against public corporation. . 1594 944. Confirmation binding only upon parties 1595 945. Confirmation not operative as to facts not before the court 1595 946. Statutory provisions as to efi'ect of confirmation 1597 947. Effect of decree of confirmation as against direct attack 1597 948. Conclusive effect of other steps in assessment 1599 949. Bill of costs . 1600 950. Effect of change of statute 1601 951. Presumption as to regularity of assessment proceedings 1605 CHAPTER XVI. Supplemental and Pboportional Assessments. SECTION. page. 952. Power to levy supplenjental assessment dependent on statute. . . . 1608 953. Supplemental assessment levied only in case of deficiency 1610 954. Effect of original assessment 1611 955. Method of levying supplemental assessment 1612 CHAPTER XVII. Re-assessment. section. page. 956. Power of legislature to provide for . re-assessment 1615 957. Re-assesament statute must itself be constitutional 1617 CONTENTS. XXVll SECTION. PAGE. 958. Power to re-assess dependent on statute 1618 959. Retroactive effect of re-assessment statutes 1619 960. Necessity of invalidity of original assessment 1621 961. Original assessment unconstitutional 1622 962. Original assessment in violation of statutory provisions 1623 963. Change of statute pending re-assessment 1626 964. By what body re-assessment may be levied 1627 965. Necessity and eft'eet of judgment of invalidity 1628 966. Effect of judgment in original proceeding 1631 967. Effect of payment of original invalid assessment 1632 968. Adjustment of arrears 1635 969. Method of levying re-assessment 1636 970. Re-assessment not limited to property originally assessed 1638 971. Effect of conveyance to bona fide grantee . 1639 972. Time at which re-assessment may be levied 1640 973. Whether assessment is entire or severable 1641 974. For whose benefit reiassessment may be had 1642 975. Items for which re assessment may be levied 1643 976. Effect of re assessment 1644 977. Power of court to fix amount of assessment 1644 978. Correction and reformation of defective proceedings 1647 CHAPTER XVIII. Curative Statutes. section. page. 979. Power of legislature to prescribe effect of irregularities 1649 980. Curative act must be constitutional 1650 981. Construction and application of curative statute 1651 982. Curative statutes not applicable in case of fraud 1654 983. Retroactive effect of curative statutes 1655 984. Curative ordinances and resolutions 1661 CHAPTER XIX. Estoppel. A. Estoppel Til) Deed. SECTION. PAGE. 985. Estoppel by deed in assessment proceedings 1662 B. Estoppel of Record. 986. Adjudication of court as estoppel 1664 987. Adjudication conclusive as to all facts which might have been submitted 1668 XXVlll CONTENTS. SECTION. PACK. 988. Adjudication not conclusive as to facts upon which court refused to pass 1668 989. Adjudication not conclusive as to facts upon which court could not pass 1669 990. Adjudication in original assessment as affecting re-assessment. . 1671 991. Adjudication in original assessment as affecting supplemental assessment 1671 992. Adjudication not conclusive if court has no jurisdiction 1672 993. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction 1673 994. Effect of reversal 1674 995. Parties as to whom adjudication is conclusive 1675 996. Questions as to which adjudication is conclusive. . : 1677 997. Judgment in eminent domain as estoppel 1G80 908. Conclusive effect of judgment in proceeding to enforce assessment 1681 999. Election of remedies 1684 1000. Distinction between direct and collateral attack 1684 1001. Doctrine of stare decisis 1685 1002. Conclusive effect of admissions of record - 1686 1003. Legislative determination not subject to collateral attack 1687 1004. Conclusive effect of confirmation by administrative body 1688 1005. Conclusive or prima facie effect of determination of administra- tive oflScers 1689 1006. Necessity of jurisdiction to make finding of public officials oper- ative 1691 1007. Illustrations of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects. . . . 1691 1008. Collateral attack upon existence of public corporation 1693 1009. Collateral attack upon right to public office 1695 C. Estoppel in Pais. 1010. Operation of doctrine of estoppel in pais 1695 1011. Estoppel against owner who causes improvement on assessment plan 1697 1012. Estoppel against petitioner 1698 1013. Petitioner not estopped to set up subsequent irregularities 1701 1014. Estoppel by acting in official capacity 1703 1015. Estoppel by acquiescence 1703 1016. Delay as laches 1707 1017. Estoppel by acquiescence in case of want of jurisdiction or fraud 1708 1018. Estoppel by acquiescence in case of irregularities 1709 1019. Estoppel as to constitutionality of statute 1709 1020. Estoppel to attack validity of ordinance 1710 1021. Estoppel as to notice 1710 1022. Estoppel as to validity of contract and performance 1711 1023. Estoppel as to other defects 1712 1024. Effect of protest or objection 1712 1025. Estoppel at law and in equity. 1713 CONTENTS. XXIX SECTION. PAGE. 1026. Failure to file objections 1714 1027. Failure to object in manner prescribed by statute as estoppel or waiver 1715 1028. Circumstances under which failure to object is not waiver 1716 1029. Objection on specified grounds as waiver of other grounds 1718 1030. Failure to appeal as waiver 1720 1031. Failure 'to appeal not waiver of jurisdictional defects 1722 1032. Use of improvement as waiver 1723 1033. Waiver or estoppel by express contract 1724 1034. Waiver by entering into improvement contract 1726 1035. Payment of installment as waiver 1726 1036. Formal certificate as waiver or estoppel 1728 1037. Estoppel against public corporation 1729 1038. Necessity of pleading estoppel 1730 CHAPTER XX. Naujee of Liability Ceeated by Assessment. section. page. 1039. Theory that personal liability cannot be imposed for benefits. . . 1731 1040. Special theories as to validity of personal liability 1733 1041. Theory that personal liability can be imposed 1734 1042. Compromise theories of validity of personal liability 1735 1043. Personal liability on special contract 1736 1044. Personal liability for assessments under police power 1738 1045. Personal liability for goods sold 1738 1046. Personal liability as afl'ected by federal constitution 1739 1047. Personal liability non-existent in absence of statute 1739 1048. Personal liability as affected by statutory construction 1740 1049. Validity of statutes imposing lien 1741 1050. Lien non-existent in absence of statute 1743 1051. Liens of sub-contractors and materialmen 1744 1052. Invalid assessment not lien 1744 1053. Upon whose interest an assessment is a lien — Heir and executor. 1745 1054. Interest of lessor and lessee 1746 1055. Interest of particular tenant and remainder-man 1753 1056. Interest of co-tenants 1757 1057. Equitable interests ". . . , 1758 1058. Interest of vendee 1760 1059. Assessment a lien upon separate lots 1760 1060. Assessment both personal liability and lien 1762 1061. Statute controls as to method of acquiring lien 1763 1062. Certificate of engineer 1763 1063. Filing claim 1764 1064. Filing assessment 1767 1065. Other methods of acquiring lien 1767 1066. Statute controls as to time when lien attaches 1768 XXX CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1067. When lien attaches — Specific provisions . 1768 1068. Priority between lien of assessment and liens of other classes. . 1770 1069. Priority between assessment lien and tax lien 1773 1070. Priority between different assessment liens ^ 1773 1071. Priority between assessment and homestead 177? 1072. Priority as between assessment and subsequent grantee or vendee 1774 1073. Liens upon special classes of property — Enforcement of assess- ment against United States property 1781 1074. Enforcement of assessment against p^perty of state 1782 1075,. Property of public corporation 1783 1076. Highways 1784 1077. School property 1784 1078. Eallroads 1785 1079. Homesteads 1786 1080. Other special interests 1786 1081. Change of statute as affecting liens and personal liability 1786 1082. Loss of lien 1788 1083. Invalid assessment not discharge 1788 1084. Assignment for benefit of creditors 1788 CHAPTER XXI. Payment and Delinquency of Assessment. SECTION. page. 1085. Payment in installments 1789 1086. Medium of payment 1796 1087. Payment as discharge 1797 1088. Payment by third person 17j)7 1089. Payment by city 1709 1090. Payment by set-off 1799 1091. To whom payment can be made 1799 1092. Effect of satisfaction of record 1800 1093. Payment of part of assessment 1800 1094. Application of over-payments 1801 1095. Application of proceeds of assessment 1801 1096. Presumption of payment 1801 1097. Commutation of payment 1802 1098. Effect of payment as to right in improvement 1802 1099. Payment as affecting property rights ■ 1802 1100. Payment as estoppel 1803 1101. When assessment becomes, due ' 1804 1102. When assessment becomes delinquent 1805 1103. Interest determined by statute 1806 1104. Interest upon installments j808 1105. Interest on defective assessments 1808 1 106. From what time interest runs I809 CONTENTS. XXXI SECTION. PAGE. 1107. Interest on judgments 1810 1108. Costs 1810 1109. Penalties 1811 1110. Attorney's fees 1812 1111. Commissions 1813 CHAPTER XXII. Collection and Enforcement of Assessment, section. page. 1112. Power of legislature over method of collection 1814 1113. Change of statute as to collection 1814 1114. Construction of statutes with reference to collection 1816 1115. Provisions concerning collection of taxes not applicable to assess- ments '. 1817 1116. Adoption of provisions concerning collection of taxes 1817 1117. Necessity of uniform methods of collection 1819 1118. Collection dependent on validity of assessment 1819 1119. Who may collect assessments 1819 1120. Diversity of statutory provisions concerning collection 1820 1121. Public corporation must order collection 1820 1122. Power of city to provide means of collection 1820 1123. Power to collect assessments under the police power 1821 1124. Provisions in franchise concerning collection 1822 1125. Putting assessment on tax duplicate 1822 1126. Return and publication of delinquent assessments 1823 1127. Collection by execution 1825 1128. Collection by warrant 1825 1129. Parties to warrant 1826 1130. Contents of warrant 1826 1131. Return of warrant 1827 1132. Certificate of assessment roll 1828 1133. Nature of tax bill 1828 1134. Who may issue tax bill 1829 1135. Prima facie validity of bill or certificate 1829 1136. Time and method of issuing tax bill 1830 1137. Contents 1830 1138. New or amended tax bill 1832 1139. Alteration of tax bill 1832 1140. Collection of bill 1832 1141. Collection of assessment by action or suit 1832 1142. Collection by action at law 1834 1143. Distress ^ 1834 1144. Nature of proceedings in equity to collect assessment 1835 1145. Collection by proceedings in equity ] 1835 1146. Suit foreclosing other lien 1836 1147. Venue of action : , 1837 XXXll CONTENTS. SECTION. , PAGE. 1148. Court in which action or suit may be brought 1838 1149. Notice of proceeding to enforce assessment 1838 1150. Necessity of demand 1839 1151. By whom demand may be made . 1840 1152. Compensation for serving notices 1840 1153. ' Method of making demand 1840 1154. Affidavit of demand 1842 1155. Amount for which demand should be made 1842 1156. Method of trial ^ 1843 1157. Endorsement by scire facias 1843 1158. Defenses 1844 1159. Affidavit of defense 1845 1160. Service and return of writ 1846 1161. Attachment and deduction from award 1847 1162. Mandamus and mandatory injunction. , J847 1163. Period of limitations fixed by statute 1848 1164. Period of limitations as fixed by implication 1849 1165. Period of limitations as fixed by special statute 1851 1166. Construction of statutes applicable to limitations. . .' 1851 1167. Waiver of limitations 1852 1168. When period of limitations begins to run 1852 1169. Effect of bringing suit on statute of limitations 1853 1170. Special statutory provisions. 1854 1171. Effect of lapse of period of limitations 1854 1172. Change of statutes of limitations 1854 1173. Power to sell to satisfy lien of assessment 1855 1174. Compliance with statutory provisions necessary 1856 1175. Amount of laud subject to sale 1856 1176. By whom sale is to be made 1857 1177. Time and place of sale 1857 1178. Notice of sale 1857 1179. Public corporation as purchaser at sale 1858 1180. Amount for wliich land is to be sold 1859 1181. Certificate of sale 1859 1182. Form of judgment or decree of sale 1860 1183. Application for judgment of sale 1862 1184. Notice of application for judgment of sale 1864 1185. Who may apply for judgment 1866 1186. Form of application 1867 1187. Form of objections 1807 1188. Term of court 1S03 1189. Rendition of judgment , 1808 1190. Summary sale 1870 1191. Precept for sale 1870 1192. Affidavit for precept 1871 1193. Notice of summary sale 1871 1 104. Sale as discharge of lien 1872 1195. Effect of sale upon title to realty 1873 CONTENTS. XXXlll SECTION. PAGE. 1196. Effect of sale if assessment invalid 1874 1197. Eight of redemption 1875 1198. Method of redeeming 1876 1199. Amount payable on redemption 1876 1200. Notice of expiration of redemption 1877 1201. Notice of application for deed 1878 1202. Deed given on sale for assessment 1878 1203. Property rights of vendee at judicial sale 1879 1204. Property rights of vendee at summary sale 1881 1205. Evidence in ejectment 1882 1206. Right of vendee at void sale to recover payment from public corporation 1882 1207. Right of purchaser at invalid sale as against owner of realty . . . 1885 CHAPTER XXIV. Pakties, Pleading and Peooeddee in Enpoecement of Assessment. section. page. 1208. statutory provision conclusive as to plaintiff 1887 1209. State as plaintiff 1887 1210. City 1888 1211. City to use of contractor 1888 1212. County 1889 1213. Assessment district 1889 1214. Special officer 1890 1215. Contractor 1890 1216. Assignee of contractor. 1891 1217. Bond-holders 1893 1218. Holder of improvement certificate 1893 1219. Owner of property as defendant 1893 1220. Co-owners 1894 1221. Representatives of deceased or insane owner 1894 1222. Dower, homestead and community interests 1895 1223. Mortgagees 1895 1224. City as defendant 1895 1225. Effect of proceedings upon one not party thereto 1896 1226. Joinder of causes of action 1897 1227. Necessity of formal pleadings 1898 1228. Necessity of filing pleadings 1898 1229. Contents of complaint 1898 1230. Allegation of facts which are presumed 1899 1231. Method of stating facts 1900 1232. Averments as to plaintiff 1901 1233. Averments as to defendant 1901 1234. Averments as to improvement 1902 1235. Averments as to contract 1902 XXXIV CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1236. Averments as to performance . 1904 1237. Averments as to notice 1904 ,1238. Averments as to apportionment 1905 1239. Averments as to property assessed 1906 1240. Averments as to demand and notice of payment 1907 1241. Averment of special contract to pay assessment 1908 1242. Other averments 1908 1243. Statutory provisions as to contents of complaint 1909 1244. Exhibits » 1909 1245. Amendment 1910 1246. Prayer ..'. 1911 1247. Averments as to petition for improvement. 1911 1248. Averments as to order or resolution 1912 1249. Averments as to ordinance 1912 1250. Averments as to procedure 1913 1251. Averments as to making assessment 1914 1252. Kecessity of answer 1915 1253. Method of averring facts 1915 1254. Answer not setting up valid defense 1916 1255. General denial 1917 1256. Nul tiel record 1917 1257. Special denials 1918 1258. Admissions 1918 1259. Plea of payment 1919 1260. Verification [ 1919 1261. Cross-petition 1919 1262. Reply : . . . 1919 1263. Demurrer 1920 1264. Demurrer does not lie if pleading equivocal 1920 1265. Demurrer lies if pleading clearly defective 1921 1266. Demurrer as admission 1922 1267. Effect of subsequent facts on right to demur 1922 1268. Motions 1922 1269. Motions for new trial, to set aside judgment and to set aside stipulation 1923 1270. Continuances 1924 CHAPTER XXV. Evidence in Actions to Enfobce Assessment, section. page. 1271. Evidence must correspond to pleadings 1925 1272. Evidence must be confined to issue 1926 1273. Evidence must support issue on part of party oifering it 1927 1274. Necessity of offering evidence 1928 1275. Who may offer evidence 1928 1276. Competency and interest of witnesses 1928 CONTENTS. XXXV SECTION. PAGE. 1277. Burden of proof 1929 1278. Failure of proof 1933 1279. Presumption as to propriety of official action 1934 1280. Presumption as to validity of ordinance 1935 1281. Presumption as to validity of assessment 1936 1282. What presumption as to validity of assessment includes 1938 1283. Presumption as to validity of report 1939 1284. Presumption as to validity of tax bill 1940 1285. Presumption as to action of courts 1941 1286. Presumption as to appointment of commissioners 1942 1287. Presumption as to order of steps in assessment 1942 1288. Presumption as to re-assessment 1942 1289. Presumption as to action of board 1943 1290. Presumption as to contract 1943 1291. Presumption as to location of improvement 1944 1292. Presumption as to notice and hearing 1944 1293. Return of demand for payment as prima facie evidence 1945 1294. Presumptions as to description and ownership of land 1946 1295. Improvement certificate 1946 1296. Delinquent tax list 1946 1297. Tax deed or certificate of sale as presumptive evidence 1947 1298. Presumption as to omission of land from assessment 1947 1299. Admissibility of certificate 1948 1300. Admissibility of affidavit 1950 1301. Statutes as evidence of facts recited therein 1951 1302. Ordinance as evidence of facts recited therein 1951 1303. Admissibility of record to prove truth of statements contained therein 1951 1304. Necessity of record 1953 1305. Evidence explaining record 1955 1306. Evidence contradicting record 1956 1307. Admissibility of record of court . . 1957 1308. Primary evidence 1958 1309. Lost and destroyed records 1958 1310. Evidence as to necessity of improvement 1954 1311. Evidence as to existence of contract 1959 1312. Evidence as to performance of contract 1960 1313. Evidence as to benefits I960 1314. Evidence as to apportionment 1962 1315. Evidence as to execution of protest 16ii2 1316. Evidence as to interest of officials 1962 1317 Judicial notice 1962 1318. Opinions 1963 1319. Admissions 1964 1320. Declarations 1965 1321. Hearsay 1965 1322. View of premises 1965 1323. Order of introducing evidence and repetition 1966 XXXVl CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1324. Sufficiency of evidence 1966 1325. Weight of evidence • • . • 1968 1326. Cross-examination / 1968 1327. Rebuttal 1968 1328. Instructions 1969 1329. Form of verdict 1970 CHAPTER XXVI. Remedies of Peopebtt Owneks in Resisting Assessment. A. Defenses. section. page. 1330. Who may object to assessment 1971 1331. Defenses to assessment 1972 1332. Contract and performance: 1973 1333. Benefit to property and apportionment 1974 1334. Notice , 1975 1335. Methods of ordering improvement and levying assessment 1976 1336. Defenses precluded by statute 1977 1337. Defenses not made at stage required by statute 1978 1338. Defenses precluded by determination of public officers 1984 1339. Defenses precluded by former adjudication 1985 1340. Defenses precluded by decree of confirmation 1986 1341. Effect of want of jurisdiction to confirm 1987 1342. Facts subsequent to judgment of confirmation 1988 1343. Judgment for installment precluding defenses 1989 1344. Judgment in eminent domain as precluding defenses 1989 1345. Defenses precluded by express waiver 1989 1346. Set-off 1989 B. Appeal. 1347. Appeal dependent on statutory provisions 1992 1348. Parties to appeal 1994 1349. Joint and several appeals 1995, 1350. Issue on appeal 1995 1351. Trial de novo on appeal iggg 1352. Hearing limited to certain issues 1997 1353. Time of taking appeal 1998 1354. To what body appeal to be taken iggg 1355. Notice of appeal jggg 1356. Method of taking appeal 2000 CONTENTS. XXXVU - SECTION. ■ PAGE. 1357. Dismissal of appeal .■ 2001 1358. Necessity of appeal 2002 1359. Cases in which appeal not necessary to preserve rights 2003 1360. Effect of appeal 2005 1361. Power of appellate tribunal to modify assessment 2005 1362. Evidence 2006 1363. Method of trial: 2007 1364. Costs 2007 1365. Revision 2007 1366. Judgment on appeal 2008 C. Error. 1367. Nature of error proceedings 2009 1368. Eight to prosecute error dependent on statute 2010 1369. Jurisdiction in error with reference to assessments 2012 1370. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of United States with reference to error 2014 1371. Order to which error will lie 2016 1372. Presumption as to error 2018 1373. Materiality of error 2019 1374. Of what record consists 2022 1375. Necessity of objections and exceptions 2022 1376. Form of bill of exceptions 2025 1377. Necessity of bill of exceptions 2026 1378. Necessity and form of findings of fact 2027 1379. Effect of findings of fact 2028 1380. Conclusions of law 2030 1381. Reversal not granted if evidence conflicting 2030 1382. Reversible error 2031 1383. Error in form of judgment 2032 1384. Parties to error proceedings 2033 1385. Pleadings in error 2034 1386. Necessity of brief 2035 1387. Notice of proceedings in error 2035 1388. Time of bringing error proceedings 2036 1389. Nature of judgment of reversal 2036 1390. Effect of reversal and affirmance 2038 1391. Several nature of error proceedings 2040 1392. Waiver of right to prosecute error 2041 D. Certiorari. 1393. Nature of certiorari 2041 1394. Certiorari as a remedy in assessment 2042 XXXVIU CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1395. Scope of certiorari with reference to assessments 2043 1396. Certiorari lies where jurisdiction is wanting 2044 1397. Discretionary nature of writ 2045 1398. Who may have writ 2045 1399. Against whom writ may issue 2046 1400. Pleading 2047 1401. Assignment of error 2047 1402. Contents of record and return 2047 1403. Certiorari granted only in cases of substantial injustice 2048 1404. Defects for which proceedings will be quashed 2049 1405. Defects for which proceedings can not be quashed 2050 1406. Effect of record and return 2051 1407. Incomplete record 2053 1408. Effect of laches 2053 1409. Statute of limitations 2055 1410. Judgment 2056 E. Equitable Relief. 1411. Equitable relief given only if no adequate remedy at law 2057 1412. Opportunity to defend as preventing equitable relief 2058 1413. Eight to sue at law as preventing equitable relief 2059 1414. Eight of appeal as precluding equitable relief 2059 1415. Eight to bring certiorari as affecting equitable relief 2061 1416. Eight to bring error as affecting equitable relief 2062 1417. Eight to bring quo warranto as affecting equitable relief 2062 1418. Effect of payment and right to recover payment 2063 1419. Discretionary nature of injunction 2063 1420. Equitable relief generally available against invalid assessments. . 2064 1421. Injunction as regular method of testing validity of tax 2064 1422. Effect of statutoty provisions 2064 1423. Equitable relief refused except on special grounds 2065 1424. Multiplicity of suits and irreparable injuries 2066 1425. Assessment as cloud on title 2066 1426. Equitable relief granted if cloud on title exists 2068 1427. Nature of cloud on title 2069 1428. Statutes affecting the right to sue to quiet title 2071 1429. Doctrine of collateral attack as precluding suit to quiet title... 2072 1430. Exercise of discretion of public officers as affecting equitable relief 2073 1431. Comparative effect of jurisdictional defects and technical irregu- larities 2074 1432. Specific defects 2075 1433. Defective performance of improvement contract 2081 1434. Effect of curative statutes 2083 1435. Necessity of tendering amount fairly due 2083 1436. At what stage of improvement proceedings injunction can be had — Effect of delay till performance 2086 CONTENTS. XXXIX SECTION. PAGE. 1437. Eight to sue before assessment is levied 2088 1438. Effect of eonflrmation 2090 1439. Estoppel by decree 2090 1440. Limitations 2091 1441. Laches 2092 1442. Parties plaintiff 2092 1443. Parties defendant 2095 1444. Pleadings— Bill 2097 1445. Answer and other pleadings ; 2101 1446. Jurisdiction and conditions precedent 2103 1447. Decree 2103 1448. Procedure 2104 1449. Power to compel performance 2104 1450. Evidence 2105 F. * statutory Suits to_ Vacate assessment. 1451. Nature and scope of statutory provisions for suits to vacate assessments 2107 1452. Legal irregularity 2108 1453. Substantial error 2109 1454. Fraud 2110 1455. Specific facts authorizing vacation 2111 1456. Vacation of assessments for repaving 2112 1457. Effect of confirmation upon proceedings to vacate 2113 1458. Reduction of assessment 2113 1459.' In what court action to be brought 2114 1460. Parties to suit to vacate 2115 1461. Time within which suit is to be brought 2116 1462: Effect of payment 2116 1463. Pleadings 2117 i464. Notice 2118 1465. Procedure 2118 1466. Evidence 2119 1467. Nature and effect of decree 2120 G. 1468. Nature and scope of mandamus 2120 1469. Cases in which mandamus is granted 2121 1470. Necessity of judgment at law 2124 1471. Cases in which mandamus is not granted 2124 1472. Mandamus not means of controlling discretion 2126 1473. Parties in mandamus 2126 1474. Pleadings 2128 1475. Statute of limitations 2128 1476. Procedure 2129 Xl CONTENTS. H. Quo Warranto. SECTION. PAGE. 1477. Quo Warranto 2129 I. Recovery of Payment of Assessment. 1478. General principles applicable to recovery of payment 2131 1479. Recovery not allowed for technical irregularities 2132 1480. Recovery not allowed where property owner has waived legal rights 2133 1481. Statutory provisions limiting right to vacate assessment 2134 1482. Eflfect of statutory provision for repayment 2134 1483. Voluntary repayment of voluntary payment 2135 1484. Recovery of payment under duress — What constitutes duress. . . 2135 1485. Doctrine of necessity* of cloud on title 2138 1486. Necessity of vacating assesstoent 2139 1487. What constitutes vacation of assessment 2140 1488. Payment under mistake 2141 1489. Paymeiit induced by fraud 2142 1490. Recovery on theory of failure of consideration 2142 1491. Recovery of deposit under special contract 2144 1492. Statute of limitations 2144 1493. Laches 2146 1494. Who may recover payment 2146 1495. Who is liable to refund 2147 1496. Pleadings ; 2148 1497. Evidence 2149 CHAPTER XXVI. Liability of Public Cobporation ob Officer Arising out of Assessment Proceedings, section. page. 1498. Liability of public corporation upon contract in absence of con- tractual or statutory restriction 2151 1499. Liability if contract invalid 2153 1500. Liability for improvement not required by contract 2154 1501. Liability in case of non-performance 2155 1502. Liability upon bonds 2156 1503. Liability of public corporation on warrants 2158 1504. Restrictions on indebtedness of public corporation 2160 1505. Statutory provisions against personal liability 2162 1506. Contractual provisions against personal liability 2164 1507. Effect of provisions for payment of contractor by assessments. . . , .2167 CONTENTS. xli SECTION. PAGE. 1508. Liability for failure to exercise power to levy asaessraent 2168 1509. Liability for levying invalid assessment 2170 1510. Liability for delay in levying assessment 2.171 1511. Liability for failure to collect assessments 2172 1512. Liability of city for assessments paid in 2173 1513. Liability as affected by power to re-assess 2175 1514. Change of statute as to liability of city 2175 1515. Amount of recovery 2176 1510. Assignment by contractor 2177 1517. Liability to sub-contractors 2177 1518. Mandamus as remedy for failure to levy assessment 2178 1519. Liability of public corporation for property appropriated.... 217D 1520. Liability of city to public ofScers 2183 1521. Liability for sale of property to pay void assessment 2184 1522. Liability of public officers 2184 1523. Liability of abstractor 2185 1524. Parties 2185 1525. Pleadings 2186 1526. Limitations 2187 TABLE OF CASES. t References are to sections.] Abascal v. Bouny (37 La. Ann. 538 [1885]), 248, 270, 637, 665, 666. Abbott V. Inhabitants of Cottage City (143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325 [1887]), 64, 65, 70, 309, 575, 654. Abbott V. Koss (9 App. D. C. 289 [1896]); 86, 119, 244, 308, 419, 425, 553, 556, 657, 663, 672, 709, 1066. Aberdeen, City of v. Lucas (37 Wash. 190, 75 Pac. 632 [1905]), 301, 747, 927, 930, 1004, 1012, 1145, 1337. Abernethy v. Town of Medical Lake (9 Wash. 112, 37 Pac. 306 [1894]), 246, 301, 414, 983, 1501, 1518. Abney v. Texarkana, Shreveport & Natchez Railroad Company ( 105 La. 446, 29 So. 890 [1901]), 71. Abraham v. City of Louisville (Ky. ) (23 Ky. Law R. 375, 62 S. W. 1041 [1901]), 86, 352. Acklin V. Parker (29 Ohio C. C. 625 [1907]), 451, 839. Acord V. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (113 Mo. App. 84, 87 S. W. 537), 363. Adams, Ih the Matter of the Peti- tion of (13 Hun (N. Y.) 355 [1878]), 679. Adams v. City of Ashland ( — Ky. , 80 S. W. 1105, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 184 [1904]), 462. Adams v. Bay City, 78 Mich. 211, 44 N. W. 138 [1889]), 690, 692, 894, 1484. Adams v. City of Beloit ( 105 'Wis. 363, 47 L. R. A. 441, 81 N. W. 869 [1900]), 191, 219, 373, 374, 380, 381, 464. Adams v. Fisher (75 Tex. 657, 6 S. W. 772 [1890]), 113, 118, 293, 373, 381, 670, 702. Adams v. Fisher (63 Tex. 651 [1885]), 5, 18, 93, 95, 120, 147, 314, 420, 713, 726, 728, 737, .746, 779, 819, 1178. Adams v. Green (74 Mo. App. 125 [1898]), 666, 698, 709, 714. Adams v. Joyner (^ N. C. , 60 S. E. 725 [1908]), 737, 894, ll49. Adams v. Lewellen (117 Mo. App. 319, 93 S. W. 874 [1906]), 1092. Adams v. Lindell (72 Mo. 198 [1880]), 43, 147, 148. Adams v. Lindell, (5 Mo. App. 197 [1878]), 43, 147, 148, 263. Adams v. County of Piscataquis (87 Me. 503, 33 Atl. 12) 245. Adams v. City of Shelbyville ( 154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899]), 3, 108, 113, 118, 247, 248, 250, 305, 314, 315, 431, 553, 570, 620, 663, 665, 66«, 670, 677, 691, 699, 709, 726, 731, 732, Adams v. St. Johnsbury & Lake Champlain R. R. Co. (57 Vt. 240, 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 172 [1884]), 70. Adams v. Wisher (75 Tex. 657, 6 S. W. 772 [1890]), 374. xliii xliw TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to sections,] Adams v. City of Roanoke (102 Va. 53, 45 S. E. 881 [1903]), 115, 123, 125. Adams, County of v. City of Quiucy, ( 130 111. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155, 22 N. E. 624 [1889]), 8, 35, 42, 51, 314, 432, 568, 580, 582, 612, 613, 623, 670, 715, 813, 856, 859, 865, 907. Adcock V. City of Chicago (172 111. 24, 49 N. E. 1008 [1898]), 323, 912, 956, 969, 1274. Adeock v. City of Chicago (160 111. 611, 43 N. E. 589 -[1896]), 900, 912, Adden v. White Mts. N. H. Railroad (55 N. H. 413, 20 Am. Rep. 220 [1875]), 66, 70. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. City of Corry (197 Pa. St. 41, 80 Am. St. Rep. 812, 46 Atl. 1035 [1900]), 415, 507, 1498, 1504. Adkins v. Case (81 Mo. App. 104 [1899]), 1043, 1067, 1167. Adkins v. Quest (79 Mo. App. 36 [1898]), 886, 1137, 1229. Adkins V. Toledo (27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 417 [1905]), 81, 423, 468, 471, 775. Adler t. Whitbeek (44 0. S. 539, 564, 9 N. E. 672 [1886]), 7. Adriance v. McCafferty (25 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. (2 Robertson) 153 [1864]), 750, 762, 777, 1174, 1204. Affeld V. City of Detroit (112 Mich. 560, 71 N. W. 151 [1897]), 1505. Ager V. State ex rel. Heaston ( 162 Ind. 538, 70 N. E. 808 [1903]), 340, 886, 909, 978, 1002, 1319. Agnew, In the Matter of (4 Hun. 435 [1875]), 740, 770, 982, 1452. Ahern v. Board of Improvement Dis- trict No. 3 of Texarkana (69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901]), 103, 151, 245, 249, 580, 588, 593, 596, 607, 653, 691, 697, 786, 788, 791, 1337. Aherns v. City of Seattle (39 Wash. 168, 81 Pac. 558 [1905]), 1347, 1351, 1362. Akers v. Kolkemeyer & Co. (97 Mo. App. 520, 71 S. W. 536 [1902]), 267, 276, 324, 401, 444, 445, 447, 837, 867. Alameda Macadamizing Co. v. Huff (57 Cal. 331 [1881]), 500, 763. Alameda Macadamizing- Co. v. Prin- gle (130 Cal. 226, 80 Am. St. Rep. 124, 52 L. R. A. 264, 62 Pac. 394 [1900]), 519. Alameda Macadamizing Co. v. Will- iams (70 Cal. 534, 12 Pac. 530 • [1886]), 437, 523, 568, 1153, 1303, 1372. Alameda, City of v. Cohen (133 Cal. 5, 65 Pac. 127 [1901]), 1330, 1519. Albany Street, In the Matter of (11 Wend. 149, 25 Am. Dec. 618 [1834]), 677, 885. Alberger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (64 Md. 1, 20 Atl. 988 [1885]), 380, 381, 501, 525, 568, 663, 666, 698, 699, 709. Albertson v. Town of Cicero (21 N. E. 815 [1890]), 280, 281, 329, 636, 776. Albertson v. State ex rel. Wells (95 Ind. 370 [1883]), 340, 916, 918, 1237, 1250, 1281. Albrecht v. City of St. Paul (47 Minn. 531, 50 N. W. 608 [1891]), 1411, 1412, 1445. Albuquerque, Town of v. Zeiger (5 N. M. 674, 27 Pac. 315 [1891]), 301, 777, 1118, 1426. Alcorn v. Hamer (38 Miss. 652, [I860]), 37, 147, 225, 248, 343, 407, 408, 711. Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia (112 Pa. St. 494, 4 Atl. 185 [1886]), 382, 383, 462. Alden v. City of Springfield (121 Mass. 27 [1876]), 656, 657, 1365. Aldis V. South Park Commissioners (171 111. 424, 49 N. E. 565 [1898]), 308, 405, 467, 525, 763, 772, 918, 923, 1291. Aldridge v. Essex Public Road Board (46 N. J. L. (17 Vr.) 126 [1884]), 1408. Alexander v. Baker (74 O. S. 258, 78 N. E. 366 [1906]), 781, 785, 789. Alexander v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (5 Gill. (Md.) 383, 46 Am, Dec. 630 [1847] ) , 86, 147. Alexander v. Dennison (2 McArthur (D. C.) 562 [1876]), 223, 1426. TABLE OF CASES. xlv [References are to sections.] Alexander v. City of Duluth (77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623), 185, 237. Alexander v. City of Tacoiua (35 Wash. 366, 77 Pac. 686 [1904]), 519, 666, 670, 690, 693, 699, 738, 812, 911. Alexandria, Ma^r and Commonalty of V. Hunter (16 Va. (2 Munf.) 228 [1811]), 314, 1178, 1193, 1278. Alfalfa Irrigation District, Directors of V. Collins (46 Neb. 411, 64 N. W. 1086), 147, 355. Alkire v. Timmons Ditcliing Co. (51 Ind. 71 [1875]), 1244, 1251. Allegheny, City of v. Black's Heirs (99 Pa. St. 152 [1881]), 65, 70, 653, 657. Allegheny City v. Blair (74 Pa. St. (24 P. F. Smith) 225 [1873]), 541, 570. Allegheny City v. West Penna. R. Co. (138 Pa. 375, 21 Atl. 763 [1890]), 578, 597, 598, 665, 1078. Allen V. City of Buflfalo (39 N. Y. 386 [1868]), 1425, 1427. Allen V. City of Charlestown ( 109 Mass. 243 [1872]), 65, 76, 284. Allen V. City of Chicago (176 111. 113, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]), 278,279, 396, 557, 912, 923, 1283, 1379. Allen V. City of Chicago (57 111. 264 [1870]), 745, 763, 764, 1299. Allen V. Davenpoi*, City of (132 Fed. 209, 65 C. C. A. 641' [1904]), IS. 778, 981. Allen V. City of Davenport ( 107 la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]), 12, 18, 118, 301, 610, 614, 438, 465, 475, 479, 507, 517, 518, 677, 837, «47, 853, 862, 1026, 1280, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1504, 1505, 1512. Allen V. Drew (44 Vt. 174 [1872]), 8, 11, 78, 86, 89, 100, 110, 347, 353, 354, 608, 606, 668, 670, 677, 680, 700, 708, 709, 1041, 1143, 1282. Allen V. Galveston (51 Tex. 302 [1879]), 43, 45, 147, 148, 223, 234, 713, 777, 1112, 1115, 1141, 1173, 1190. Allen V. City of Janesville (35 Wis. ' 403 [1874]), 228, 238, 775. Allen V. Krenning (23 Mo. App. 561 [1886]), 50, 561, 679, 684. Allen v. La Force (95 Mo. App. 324, 66 S. W. 1057 [1902]), 522, 538. Allen V. Labsap ( 188 Mo. 692, 87 S. W. 926 [1905]), 538. Allen V. McKay & Co. ( 120 Cal. 332, 52 Pac. 828 [1898]), 3 Allen V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (4 E. D. Smith (N. Y. C. P.) ^04 [1855]), 1488, 1497. Allen V. Rogers (20 Mo. App. 290 [1886]), 495, 542, 841, 867. Allen V. City of Portland (35 Or. 420. 58 Pac. 509 [1899]), 223, 234, 777. Allen Co., Board of Commissioners ot V. Silvers (22 Ind. 491 [1864]), 324, 444, 837, 1350, 1352. Allentown, City- of v. Adams ( 5 Sad- ler (Pa.) 253, 8 Atl. 430 [1887]), 349, 610, 706. Allentown v. Henry (73 Pa. St. 404 [1873]), 37, 255, 347, 549, 696. Allentown, City of v. Hower (93 Pa. St. (12 Norria) 332 [1880]), 347, 670, 708, 886, 1063, 1157. Allerton v. Monona County (111 Ta. 560, 82 N. W. 922), 142. Alley V. City of Lebanon (146 Ind. 125, 44 N. E. 1003 [1896]), 263, 324, 327, 444, 483, 825, 1414. Alley V. Lyon (14 D. C. (3 Mackey) 457 [1885]), 570, 880, 907, 1037-, 1067. Allison Land Company, Pros. v. May- or and Council of Borough of Ten- afly (69 N. j. l. (40 Vr.) 587, 55 Atl. 39 [1902]), 619, 696, 1015. Allison Land Co. v. Borough of Tena- fly (68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 205, 52 AtL 231 [1902]), 619, 696, 1015. Allman v. District of Columbia (3 App. D. C. 8 [1894]), 11, 111, 119, 223, 234, 244, 323, 441, 549, 620, 726, 729, 777, 780, 1396. Allum V. Dickinson (9 Q. B. D. 632 [1882]), 1054. Alpers V. Saif Francisco (32 Fed. 503), 372. Alpin V. Fisher (84 Mich. 128, 47 N. W. Rep. 574 [1890]), 786, 788. xlvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to eections.l AlspaugK V. Ben Franklin Draining Association (51 Ind. 271 [1875]), 1.251. Alstad V. Sim (15 N. D. 629, 109 N. W. 66 [1906]), 340, 525, 556, 670, 801, 1015, 1431. Alter V. Bader (56 O. S. 718, 47 N. E. 564 [1897]), 1418. Alter V. City of Cincinnati (56 0. S. 47, 35 L. R. A. 737, 46 N. E. 69 [1897]), 124, 353. Altheimer v. Plum Bayou Levee Dist. (79 Ark. 229, 95 S. W. 140 [1906.]), 343, 1502. Alton, City of v. Foster (207 III. 150, 69 N. E. 783 [1904]), 1518. Alton V. Foster (106 111. App. 475 [1902]), 1518 Alton, City of v. Foster ( 74 111. App. 511 [1897]), 413, 424, 837, 873, 962, 1506, 1513. Alton, City of v. Middleton's Heirs, (158 III. 442, 41 N. E. 926 [1895]), 837, 849, 856, 857, 866. Alvey V. City of Asheville ( — N. C. , 59 S. E. 999 [1907]), 301, 569, 663. Alvord V. City of Syracuse (163 N. Y. 158, 57 N. E. 310 [1900]), 347, 451, 717, 837, 1181, 1202, 1426, 1427. Amberson Ave., Appeal of Childs (179 Pa. St. 634, 35 Atl. 354 [1897]), 323, 382, 464, 466, 770, 983, 1271, 1272. American Brevfing Co. v. St. Louis (— Mo. , 108 S. W. 1 [1907, 1908]), 6, 353, 1491. American Brewing Co. v. St. Louis (187 Mo. 367, 86 S. W. 129), 1491. American Hide & Leather Co. v. City of Chicago (203 111. 451, 67 N. E. 979 [1903]), 60, 604, 640, 723, 909, 1390. American Steel Dredge Works v. Board of Commissioners of Putnam County (—Ind. , 85 N. E. 1 [1908]), 1384. Amery v. City of KeoIfTik (72 la. 701, 30 N. W. 780 [1887]), 119, 123, 437, 620, 728. Amsterdam, In the Matter of the Common Council of ( 126 N. Y. 158, 27 N. E. 272 [1891]), 121, 549, 560, 730, 731. Amsterdam, In the Matter of the Common Council of the City of (55 Hun 270, 8 N. Y. Supp. 234 [1889]), 119, 136, 137, 619, 729, 748. Anderson, In the Matter of the Peti- ♦ tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (109 N. Y. 554 [1888]), 16, 977. Anderson, In the Matter of ( 60 N. Y. 457 [1875]), 740, 762, 1453. Anderson, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of (47 Hun (N. Y.) 203 [1888]), 495. Anderson, In the Matter of (60 Barb. (N. Y.) 375 [1§71]), 467, 693, 714, 895. Anderson, In the Matter of (48 How- ard, 279 [1874]), 762. Anderson, In the Matter of ( 39 How- ard (N. Y.) 184 [1870]), 467, 672, 693, 895. Anderson v. Caldwell (91 Ind. 451, 46 Am. Eep. 613), 202. Anderson v. Ctaman ( 123 Ind. 471, 24 ^. E. 175 [1889]), 266, 270, 1030, 1360, 1430. Anderson v. Cortelyou ( — N. J. L. , 68 Atl. 118 [1907]), 173, 322, 626, 776, 950. Anderson v. De Urioste (96 Cal. 404, 31 Pac. 266 [1892]), 324, 538, 747, 763, 1216. Anderson v. Endicott (101 Ind. 539 [1884]), 1008. Anderson v. Fuller (51 Fla. 380, 41 So. 684 [1906]), 483, 495. Anderson v. Grand Valley Irrigation District, 35 Colo. 525, 85 Pac. 313 [1906]), 194, 195, 355. Anderson v. Hill (54 Mich. 477, 20 N. W. 549 [1884]), 80, 116, 224. Anderson v. Holland (40 Mo. 600 [1867]), 1067. Anderson v. Hubble (93 Ind. 570, 47 Am. Rep. 394 [1883]), 1015. Anderson v. Lower Merion Township (217 Pa. St. 369, 66 Atl. 1115 [1907]), 147, 245, 279, 400, 706. Anderson v. Messenger ( 158 Fed. 250 [1907]), 119, 726. TABLE OF CASKS. .xlvii [References are to sections.] Anderson v. Turbeville (6 Cold. (46 Tenn.) 150 [1868]), 117. Anderson v. Wharton County (27 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 65 S. W. 643 [1901]), 1318. Anderson, City of v. Bain ( 120 Ind. 254, 22 N. E. 323 [1889]), 1519. Andrew v. Settle (5 Ohio N. P. 394 [1897]), 1017. Andrews v. City of Chicago (57 111. 239 [1870]), 860. Andrews v. Love (50 Kan. 701, 31 Pac. 1094 [1893]), 1437. . Andrews v. People ex rel. Kochers- perger (173 111. 123, 50 N. E. 335 [1898]), 244, 775, 1085. Andrews v. People ex rel. Kochers- perger (16.4 III. 581, 45 N. E. 965 [1897]), 1085. Andrews v. People ex rel. Miller (83 111. 529 [1876]), 996. Andrews v. People ex rel. Rumsey (84 111. 28 [1876]), 70, 71, 308, 426, 429, 520, 763, 952, 955. Andrews v. People ex rel. Rumsey, 83 111. 529 [1876]), 219, 259, 305, 308, 356, 429, 763, 927, 933, 986, 1184. Angell V. Cortright (111 Mich. 223, 69 N. W. 486 [1896]), 375, 461, 527, 840. Angus V. City of Hartford (74 Conn. 27, 49 Atl. 192 [1901]), 223, 234, 244, 739, 754, 776. Ankeny v. Hennigsen (54 la. 29, 6 N. W. 65 [1880]), 223, 229, 1109, 1116. Ankeny v. Palmer (20 Minn. 477 [1874]), 464, 466, 708, 1426. Anketell v. Hayward (119 Mich. 525, 78 N. W. 557 [1899]), 340, 477, 978. Annapolis, Mayor, Recorder and Al- dermen of the City of v. Har- wood and Wife (32 Md. 471, 3 Am. Ren. 151 [1870]), 231, 232, 626, 1306, 1447. Annie Wright Seminary v. City of Tacoma (23 Wash. 109, 62 Pai. 444 [1900]), 408, 465, 473, 475, 479, 670, 677, 724, 918, 927, 933, 1004, 1026, 1141, 1145, 1337, 1435. Anselm v. Barnard (2 Keb. 675 (Trin. 22 Car. II), 26, 504. Anthony Avenue, In re (95 N. Y. S. 77, 46 Misc. Rep. 525 [1905]), 593, 603. Appleby to Vacate an Assessment, In the Matter of (26 Hun. (N. Y.) 427 [1882]), 604, 723. Appleton v. County Commissioners (80 Me. 284, 14 Atl. 284 [188S]), 844. Arbuckle-Ryan Co. v. Grand Lpilgf- (122 Mich. 491, 81 N. W. 358), 1015. Archbishop (Roman Catholic) of San Francisco v. Shipman (79 Cal. 288, 21 Pac. 830 [1889]), 1225. 1432. Arctic Ditchers v. Coon (47 Ind. 201 [1874]), 1252, 1263. Ardrey v. City of Dallas (13 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 35 S. W. 726 [1896]), 223, 234, 495, 725, 777, 813, 815, 950, 1013, 1015, 1435. Arends v. City of Kansas City (57 Kan. 350, 46 Pac. 702), 141. Argenti v. City of San Francisco ( 16 Cal. 256 [I860]), 486. Argentine, City of v. Simmons (54 Kan. 699, 38 Pac. 181), 141. Argo V. Barthand (80 Ind. 63 [1881]), 1000, 1431. Armstrong v. Auger (21 Ont. 98 [1891]), 1072. Armstrong v. City of Chicago (61 111. 352 [1871]), 764, 1299. Armstrong v. Police Jury of Madison (6 La. Ann. 177 [1851]), 1508- 1509. Armstrong v. Ogden City ( 12 Utah, 476, 43 Pac. 119 [1895]), 314, 584, 739, 750, 760, 805, 806, 811, 836, 1006, 1007, 1415, 1418, 1432. Armstrong v. Ogden City (9 Utah ■ 255, 34 Pac. 53 [1893]), 1415. Armstrong v. City of St. Paul (30 Minn. 299, 15 N. W. 174 [1883]), 316, 432v Arndt v. City of Cullman (132 Ala. 540, 90 Am. St. Rep. 922, 31 So. 478), 419-420. Arnold, In the Matter of (60 N. Y. 26 [1875]), 570-1451. xlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Arnold v. City of Cambridge (106 Mass. 352 [1871]), 571. Arnold v. Decatur (29 Mich. 77 [1874]), 825. Arnold v. City of Fort Dodge, Iowa (111 La. 152, 82 N. W. 495 [1900]), 121, 528, 570, 742, 754, 763, 766, 1011, 1015, 1292. Arnold v. Mayor and Aldermen of Knoxville (115 Tenn. 195, 220, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837, 90 S. W. 469 [1905]), 44, 78, 86, 118, 160, 690, 698, 1425. Arnott V. City of Spokane (6 Wash. 442, 33 Pac. 1063 [[1893]), 489. Asberry v. City of Roanoke (91 Va. 562, 42 L. R. A. 636, 22 S. E. 360 [1895]), 11, 118, 161, 701, 1039, 1040. Asheville, City of v. Wachovia Loan & Trust Co. (143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 800 [1906]), 11, 63, 229, 232, 245, 435, 466, 550, 555, 639, 665, 666, 674, 709. Asheville, Commissioners of v. John- ston (71 N. C. 398 [1874]), 66-70. Ashton V. Ellsworth (48 111. 299 [1868]), 838. Ashton V. City of Rochester (60 Hun. 372, 14 N. Y. Sup. 855 [1891]), 846=1468. Asphalt & Granitoid Const. Co. v. Hauesaler (201 Mo. 400, 100 S. W. 14 [1907]), 301, 629, 683. Asphalt & Granitoid Const. Co. v. Hauessler ( — Mo. App. , 80 S. W. 5 [1904]), 301, 629, 683. Assessment of School Property. (See School Property) . Assesssor of Taxes of Town of Green- burg V. . (See Greenburg.) Astor, In the Matter of (53 N. Y. 617 [1873]), 381, 982-1456. Astor, In the Matter of (50 N. Y. 363 [1872]), 194, 195, 762. Astor, Petition of (2 Sup. Ct. (T. & C.)' 488 [1874]), 462, 1456. Astor V. Miller (2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 68 [1830]), 1054. Astor V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (62 N. Y. 567 [1875]), 259-271- 901. Astor V. The Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty of the City of New York (62 N. Y. 580 [1875]), 279, 280. 308, 309, 570, 927, 935, 982, 1451, 1455. Astor V. Mayor, etc. of New York (39 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 120 [1875]), 759-1422. Altor V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. (5 J. & S.) 539 [1874]), 8, 89, 236, 279, 394, 414, 553, 666, 744, 745, 770, 900, 910, 911, 927, 983, 986, 1425, 1427, 1429, 1432. Astoria Heights Land Company v. City of New York ( 179 N. Y. 579, 72 N. E. 1139 [1904]), 251, 525, 539, 1433, 1498. Astoria Heights Land Co. v. City of New York (89 App. Div. 512, 86 N. Y. S. 651 [1903]), 251, 525, 539, 1433, 1498. Atchison, City of v. Bartholow (4 Kan. 124, 141 [1866]), 79, 1450. Atchison, City of v. Byrnes (22 Kan. 65 [1879]), 1508, 1375. Atchison, City of v. Leu (48 Kan. 138, 29 Pac. 467 [1892]), 416, 423, 1498. Atchison, City of v. Price (45 Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605 [1891]), 387, 416, 423, 468, 550, 551, 554, 555, 563, 635, 803, 895, 896. Atchison Board of Education v. De Kay ( 148 U. S. 591, 37 L. 573, 13 S. 706 [1893]), 838. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail- road Co. V. Peterson (5 Kan. App. 103, 48 Pac. 877 [1897]), 42, 553, 557, 596, 613, 1041, 1078. Atkins V. City of Boston (188 Mass. 77, 74 N. E. 292 [1905]), 324, 329, 444, 560, 563. Atkinson v. City of Great Falls (16 Mont. 372, 40 Pac. 877 [1895]), 1504. Atlanta, Mayor and Council of the City of v. Central Railroad & Banking Company (53 Ga. 120 [1874]), 69, 71. Atlanta, City of v. First Presbyter- ian Church (86 Ga. 730, 12 L. R. TABLE OF CASES. xlix lIljrerenceK are to sections.] A. 852, 13 S. E. 252 [1890]), 42, 570, 588, 613, 1478. Atlanta, City of v. Gabbett (93 6a. 266, 20 S. E. 306 [1893]), 632, 848. Atlanta, City of v. Green ( 67 Ga. 386 [1881]), 69. Atlanta, City of v. Hamlein (96 Ga. 381, 23 S. E. 408 [1895]), 11, 118, 632, 666, 668, 689, 705, 709. Atlanta, City of v. Hamlein ( 101 Ga. «97, 29 S. E. 14 [1897]), 632, 651, 653. 665, 666, 705, 709. Atlanta, City of v. Smitli (99 Ga. 462, -27 S. E. Rep. 696 [1896]), 785, 786, 789. Atlanta Consolidated Street Railway Company v. City of Atlanta (111 Ga. 255, 36 S. E. 667 [1900]), 602. Atlanta First Methodist Episcopal Church V. Atlanta (76 Ga. 181), 145. Attorney General on the Relation of Cook V. City of Detroit (26 Mich. 263 [1872]), 314, 495, 742, 864. Attorney General v. McClear (146 Mich. 45, 109 N. W. 27 [1906]), 251, 266, 340. Atwell V. Barnes (109 Mich. 10, 66 N. W. 583 [1896]), 1015, 1436. Auburn, City of v. Paul (84 Me. 212, 24 Atl. 817 [1892]), 11, 43, 147, 324, 651, 653, 677, 747, 771. Auburn, City of v. State e^ rel. First National Bank ( — Ind. , 83 N. E. 997 [1908].), 530, 1471. Auchmuty, In the Matter of the Pe- tition of (90 N. Y. 685 [1882]), 479, 1458. Auchmuty, In the Matter of (18 Hun. 324 [1879]), 271, 465, 479, 645, 646, 977, 1458. Auchmuty, In the Matter of (11 Hun. (N. y.) 76 [1877]), 487, 570, 646. Auditor General v. Chase (132 Mich. 630, 94 N. W. 178 [1903]), 380, 381, 784, 819, 833. Auditor General v. Crane ( — Mich. , 115 N. W. 1041), 1000, 1337. Auditor General v. Hoffman ( 132 Mich. 198, 93 N. W. 250 [1903]), 130, 135, 730, 732, 745, 835, 910, 951, 1292. Auditor General v. Stoddard ( 147 Mich. 329, 110 N. W. 944 [1907]), 541, 840, 1024. Augusta, City of v. McKibben ( — Ky. , 60 S. W. 291, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1224), 443, 862. Augusta, City Council of v. Murphy 79 Ga. 101, 3 S. E. 326 [1887]), 40, 232. Aumann v. Black (15 W. Va. 773 [1879]), 353, 1479. Aurora, Town of v. Chicago, Burling- ton & Quincy Railroad (19 111. App. 360 [1885]), 1512. Austin V. City of Seattle (2 Wash. 667, 27 Pac. 557 [1891]), 147, 148, 301, 698, 1502. Averill v. City of Boston (193 Mass. 488, 80 N. E. 583 [1907]), 73, 1519. Ayars, Appeal of (122 Pa. St. 266, 2 L. R. A. 577, 16 Atl. 356 [1888]), 190, 961. Ayer v. City of Chicago (149 111. 262, 37 N. E. 57), 74, 394, 616. Ayer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Somerville ( 143 Mass. '585, 10 N. E. 457 [1887]), 563, 620, 723. Ayers Asphalt Paving Co., In re (118 La. 640, 43 So. 262 [1907]), 485. Ayers v. Adair Co. (61 .la. 728), 1146. Ayers v. Schmohl (86 Mo. App. 349 [1900]), 522, 538, 871. Ayers v. Toledo (26 Ohio C. C. 767 [1904]), 680, 1304. B Babbitt v. Woolley (66 Ky. (3 Bush.) 703 [1868]), 352, 1249, 1269. Babcock, In the Matter of (23 How- ard 118 [1862]), 1466. Bacas v. Adler (112 La. 806, 36 So. 739 [1904]), 89, 314. 503, 540, 517, 519, 780, 1012, 1015,- 1022, 1033, 1035, 1047, 1049, 1166, 1337. TABLE OP CASES. [References are to eectionB.] Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah (105 Ga. 62, 31 S. E. 127 [1898]), 175, 475, 587, 654, 723, 967, 978, 1103, 1104. Bacon >r. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah (91 Ga. 500, 17 S. E. 749 [1893]), 245, 620, 632, 663, 707, 713, 777, 1277, 1328, 1382. Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah (86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. ■ 580 [1890]), 118, 437, 552, 570, 577, 856, 1127, 1193, 1331. Bacon v. City of Seattle (15 Wash- ington 701, 47 Pac. 1102), 408. Badger v. Inlet Drainage District (141 111. 540, 31 N. E. 170 [1893]), 223, 249, 258, 271, 424, 506, 665, 666, 676, 677, 731, 739, 745, 813, 995, 1032, 1271, 1273, 1347, 1351, 1505. Baffnet v. Gough (36 Cal. 104 [1868]), 1039. Bagg V. City of Detroit (5 Mich. 336 [1858]), 306, 390, 397, 431, 1442. Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York (3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 [1842]), 251. Bailey v.. People of the State of Illi- nois (158 111. 52, 41 N. E. 784 [1895]), 1086. Bailey v. Rinker (146 Ind. 129, 45 N. E. 38), 1444. Bailey v. City of Zanesville (20 Ohio C. C. 236 [1900]), 106, 609, 683, 700, 776, 956, 964. Baily v. City of Sioux City (133 Iowa 276, 110 N. W. 839 [1907]), 686. Baird v. Monroe (150 Cal. 560, 89 Pac. 352 [1907]), 1174. Baisch v. City of Grand Rapids (84 Mich. 666, 48 N. W. 176 [1891]), 275, 494, 823, 1015. Baker v. Arctic Ditchers (54 Ind. 310 [1876]), 1227, 1252. Baker v. French (18 Ohio C. C. 420 [1899]), 473, 1049, 1080, 1084, 1109. Baker v. Gartside (86 Pa. St. (5 Norris) 498), 347, 565, 620. Baker v. Meacham (18 Wash. .319, 51 Pac. 404 [1897]), 1085, 1095. Baker v. Village of Norwood (74 Fed. 997 [1896]), 11, 112, 118, 119, 308, 426, 430, 702. Baker v. Schott (10 Ohio C. C. 81 [1894]), 561, 625, 685, 704, 783, 1012, 1013. Baker v. City of Seattle (2 Wash. 576, 27 Pac. 462 [1891]), 1504, «1519. Baker v. Selvage (7 Ky. L. R. 838), 628, 710. Baker v. Tobin (40 Ind. 310 [1872]), 783, 843. Baker v. City of Utica ( 19 N. Y. 326 [1859]), 1520. Bakman, Pros. v. Hackensaek Im- provement Commission (70 N. J. L. (41 Vr.) 499, 57 Atl. 141 [1904]), 271, 950. Baldwin v. City of Buffalo (29 Barb. (N. Y.) 396 [1859]), 1425, 1427. Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth (42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 11, 6 Atl. 2T5 [1886]), 968, 1428. Baldwin v. City of Newark (38 N. J, L. (9 Vr.) 158 [1875]), 70, 73, 166, 167, 1113. Baldwin v. City of Oswego (2 Keyes (N. Y. Ct. App.) 132 [1865]), 47, 679, 1509. Balfe V. Bell (40 Ind. 337 [1872]), 559, 644, 723. Balfe V. Johnson (40 Ind. 23.5 [1872]), 631, 895. Balfe V. Lammers (109 Ind. 347, 10 N. E. 92 [1886]), 526, 650, ' 818, 843, 886, 927, 986, 996, 1015, 1017, 1020, 1030, 1414, 1432. Ball V. Balfe (41 Ind. 221 [1872]), 301, 649. Ball V. City of Yonkers (78 JIun. 196, 28 N. Y. S. 947 [1894]), 751. Ballard v. City of Appleton (26 Wis. 67 [1870]), 503, 1026, 1437. Ballard v. Hunter (204 U. S. 241, 51 L. 461, 27 S. 261 [1907]), 121, 747, 760, 773, 887, 1182, 1370. Ballard v. Hunter (74 Ark. 174, 85 S. W. "252 [1905]), 119, 121, 747, 760, 773, 887. Ballard, City of v. Ross (38 Wash. 209j 80 Pac. 439 [1905]), 1069. TABLE OP CASES. [Rufcroi ces arc to sections.] Ballard, City of v. Way (34 Wash. 116, 101 Am. St. Rep. 993, 74 Pac. 1067 '[1904]), 1194. Ballard, City of v. West Coast Im- provement Co. (15 Wash. 572, 46 Pae. 1055), 244, 246, 1002, 1164. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Boyd (64 Md. 10, 20 Atl. 1028 [1885]), 786, 788. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Clunet (23 Md. 449 [1865]), 219, 244, 867, 1354. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Eschbach (18 Md. 276 [1861]), 781, 789, 1499. Baltimore, The Mayor of v. The Grand lodge of Maryland of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows (44 Md. 436 [1875]), 735, 754, 770, 848, 1030, 1427, 1431. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Proprietors Green Mount Cemetery (7 Md. 517 [1855]), 110. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council cf V. Hook (62 Md. 371 [1884]), 393, 396, Baltimore, Mayor and Common Coun- cil of V. Horn (26 Md. 194 [1866]), 4-14, 965, 983. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Hughes' Adm'r. (1 Gill. & J. (Md.) 480, 19 Am. Dec. 243 [1829]), 11, 18, 86, 314, 437, 553, 652, 657, 670, 677, 1333. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Johns Hopkins Hospital (56 Md, 1 [1880]), 8, 86, 89, 100, 244, 245, 274, 292, 381, 553, 555, 626, 663, 666, 675, 677, 698, 699, 726, 1333. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Johnson (62 Md. 225 [1884]), 496, 500, 1420, 1432. Baltimore, .Mayor and City Council of V. Little Sisters of the Poor (56 Md. 400 [1881]), 308, 739, 747, 754, 763, 844. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Moore & Johnson (6 Harris & Johnson 375 (Md.) [1825]), 11, 89, 223, 234, 314, 437, 553, 657. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Porter (18 Md. 284, 79 Am. Dec. 686 [1861]), 234, 426, 433, 1420, 1431. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of v. Eaymo ( 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. 383 [1888]), 437, 511, 527, 532, 538. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Smith & Schwartz Brick Com- pany (80 Md. 458, 31 Atl. 423 [1894]), 651, 653, 657, 1277, 1303, 1313, 1318, 1350. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Stewart (92 Md. 535, 48 Atl. 165 [1901]), 666, '698, 699, 709. Baltimore, Mayor and City Council of V. Ulman (79 Md. 469, 30 'Atl. 43 [1894]), 118, 119, 134, 244, 414, 626, 641, 647, 648, 666, 690, 767, 959, 962, 967, 1122. Baltimore County, County Commis- sioners of V. Board of Managers of the Maryland Hospital for the Insane (62 Md. 127 [1884]), 580, 581, 612. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. City of Bellaire (60 0. S. 301, 54 N. E. 263 [1899]), 264, 629, 1156, 1367. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Daegling (30 Ind. App. 180, 65 N. E. 761 [1902]), 1244, 1386. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitts- burgh, Wheeling & Kentucky R. R. Co. (17 W. Va. 812 [1881]), 119, 135, 732. Baltimore & 0. and C. Ry. Co. v. Ke- tring ( 122 Ind. 5, 23 N. E. 527 ) , 202. Baltimore & 0. & C. R. R. Co. v. North (103 Ind. 486, 3 N. E. 144), 1444. Bambrick v. Campbell (37 Mo. App. 460 [1889]), 504, 817, 875, 1216, 1324. Banaz v. Smith (133 Cal. 102, 65 Pac. 309 [1901]), 16, 82, 207, 553, 606, 824, 830, 831, 832, 867, 1215. Bancroft v. City of Boston ( ] 15 Mass. 377 [1874]), 76, 308, 309, 657, 719. Bank of Montreal v. Fox (6 Practice Rep. (Out.) 217 [1875]), 1072. Bank of- Commonwealth v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (43 N. Y. 184 [1870]), 1486. lii T2VBLE OP CASES. [References are to sections,] Bank of Columbia v. Portland (84 Ark. 390, 105 S. W. 867 [1907]), 103, 225, 779. Craig V. Heis (30 0. S. 550 [1876]), 322, 1067, 1072. Craig V. People ex rel. Gannaway (193 111. 199, 61 N. E. 1072 [1901]), 525, -862, 1065, 1101, 1102. Craig V. City of Philadelphia (89 Pa. at. (8 Norris) 265 [1879]), 118, 304, 610, 665, 666, 706, 1157, 1158, 1310. Craighill v. Van Riswick (8 App, D. C. 185 [1896]), 86, 243, 356, 1420, 1425. Cram, In the Matter of the Petition of, to Vacate an Assessment (69 N. Y. 452 [1877]), 479, 679, 686. Cram v. City of Chicago (139 111. 265, 28 N.. E. 758 [1893]), 313, 380, 386, 631, 920. Cram v. Munro (1 Ed. Oh. (N. Y.) 123 [1831]), 1054. Cramer v. City of Charleston (176 111. 507, 52 X. E. 73 [1898]), 314, 670, 698, 715, 772, 862, 947, 1377. Crandell v. City of Taunton (110 Mass. 421 [1872]), 309, 918, 920, 921, 1002, 1348, 1365. Crane v. Cummingg (137. Cal. 201, 69 Pae. 984 [1902]), 301, 998, 1141, 1145, 1165, 1171, 1176, 1429. Crane v. Forth (95 Cal. 88, 30 Pac. 193 [1892]), 1258, 1372, 1377. Crane v. French (50 Mo. App. 367 [1892]), 624. Crane v. Mallinckrodt [9 Mo. App. 316), 1137, 1377. Crane v. Siloam Springs (67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]), 86, 103, 105, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 256, 351, 684. Crane v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (163 111. 348, 26 L. R. A. 311, 38 N. E. 943 [1894]), 291 377, 461. Cratty v. City of Chicago (217 111. 453, 75 N. E. 343 [1905]), 475, 922, 925, 963, 1002, 1103. Craw V. Village of Tolono (96 III. 255, 36 Am. Rep. 143 [1880]), 153, 295, 323, 1039, 1144, 1432. Crawford's Estate (14 Phila (Pa.) 323), 347, 608. Crawford v. Hedrick (9 Ind. App. 356, 36 N. E. 771 [1893]), 171, 375, 1113. Crawford v. Mason ( 123 la. 301, 98 N. W. 795 [1904]), 18, 51, 527, 837, 974, 1501, 1518. Ixxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections,] Crawford v. The People ex rel. Rum- aey (83 111. 557 [1876]), 263, 266, 278, 556, 665, 666, 670, 677, 872. Crawford v. Taylor (27 Ohio C. C. 245 [1905]), 93, 119, 373, 375, 860. Crawfordsville Music Hall Associa- tion V. Clements (12 Ind. App. 464, 39 N. E. 540, 40 N. E. 742 [1894]), 693. Creamer v. Allen (3 Mo. App. 545 [1877]), 50, 147, 148, 324, 400, 711, 1137. Creamer v. Bates (49 Mo. 523 [1S72]), 527, 529, 698, 714. Creamer v. McCune 7 Mo. App. 91 [1879.]), 546, 632, 645. Creed v. MoCombs (146 Cal. 449, 80 Pac. 679 [1905]), 531, 956, 1355, 1356, 1361, 1366. Creighton v. Manson (27 Cal. 614 [1865]), 43, 79, 101, 113, 223, 234, 549, 654, 777, 835, 838, 1039, 1049, 1050. Creighton v. Pragg (21 Cal. 115 [llfe62]), 1113, 1215. Creighton v. Board of Supervisors of trie City and County of San Francisco- (42 Cal. 448 [1871]), 1514. Creighton v. Scott (14 0. S. 43S [1863]), 301, 313, 317, 440, 552, 574, 576, 620. Creighton v. City of Toledo (18 0. S. 447 [1869]), 1506, 1507, 1511. Creote v. City of Chicago ( 56 III. 422 [1870]), 410, 424, 701, 939, 1187, 1314, 1331, 1333. Crescent Hotel Co. v. Bradley (81 Ark. 286, 98 S. W. 971 [1906]), 248, 636, 813, 1324, 1495. Cribbs v. Benedict (64 Ark. 555, 44 S. W. 707 [1897]), 39, 87, 97, 101, 108, 111, 145, 164, 256, 340, 549, 560, 564, 619, 651, 654, 666, 690, 691. Crist V. State ex rel Whitmore (97 Ind. 389 [1884])', 270, 278, 637, 1244. Croft V. Chicago Great Western Ey. Co. (72 Minn. 47, 74 N. W. 898, 80 N. W. '628 (1898]), 363. Orofut V. City of Danbury ( 65 Oonn. 294, 32 Atl. 365), 223, 229, 234. Cronan v. Municipality No. 1 (5 La. Ann. 537 [1850]), 1498. Cronin, Pros. v. Mayor and Alder- men of Jersey City (38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 410 [1876]), 860. Crosby v. Brattleboro (68 Vt. 484, •35 Atl 430 [1896]), 1356. Cross V. County of Plymouth (125 Mass. 557 [1878]), 64, 65, 66. Cross V. Zane (47 Cal. 602 [1874]), 860, 867. Crossley v. City of Findlay ( 10 Ohio C. C. 286 [1895]), 681. Crowe V. Corporation of Charlestown (— W. Va. . 57 S. E. 330 [1907]), 73, 661. Crowell V. Jaqua (114 Ind. 246, 15 N. E. 242), 1112, 1113, 1191. Crowley v. Copley (2 La. Ann. 329 [1847]), 38, 42, 54, 343, 612, 613. Cruger, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (84 N. Y. 619 [1881]), 557, 661, 1453. Cruikshanks v. City Council ( 1 Mc- Cord (S. C.) 360 [1821]), 118, 223, 275. Crume v. Wilson (104 Ind. 583, 4 N. E. 169 [1885]), 794. Culbertson v. City of Cincinnati (16 Ohio, 574 [1847]), 223, 234, 777, 911, 1431. Culbertson v. Knight (152 Ind. 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898]), 549, 560, 564, 619, 659. Cullen, Matter of (119 N. Y. 628, 23 N. E. 1144), 407. Cullen, In the Matter of (53 Hun (N. Y.) 534, 6 N. Y. S. 625 [1889]), 407. Cullen V. Strauz (124 Ind. 340, 24 N. E. 883 [1890]), 1101, 1102, 1203. Culver V. City of Chicago (171 111. 399, 49 N. E. 573 1898]), 308, 549, 569, 643, 723, 856, 872, 921. Culver V. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City (45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 256 [1883]). TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv [References ai*e to sections.] Culver V. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (161 111. 89, 43 N. E. Rep. 812 (1896]), 305, 837, 927. 940, 959, 1085, 1113, 1341, 1381. Cumberland v. Kearns (18 Ont. 151 [1889]), 1072. Cuming v. Gleason (140 Mich. 195, 103 N. W. 537 [1905]), 52, 53, 65, 828. Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids (46 Mieli. 150, 9 N. W. 141 [1881]), 266, 275, 301, 468, 470, 490, 569, S16, 831, 1377, 1379, 1444, 1450. Cummings v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of Brooklyn (11 Paiges' Chan. Rep. 596 [1845]), 1508, 1509. Cummings v. City of Chicago ( 144 111. 563, 33 N. E. 854 [1893]), 181, 1085. Cummings v. Hyatt (54 Neb. 35, 74 N. W. 411 [1898]), 355. Cummings v. Kearney (141 Cal. 156, 74 Pae. 759 [1903]), 301, 1026, 1414, 1436. Cummings v. People ex rel. Han- berg (213 111. 443, 72 N. E. 1094 [1904]), 1116, 1119, 1172; 1186, 1189. Cummings v. West Chicago Park Commissioners (181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941 [1899]), 51, 305, 314, 407, 414, 431, 546, 569, 715, 795, 800, 956, 959, 962, 1302, 1370. Cummings v. City of Williamsport 84 Pa. St. 472 [1877]), 308, 1348, 1360. Cunningham v. City of Peoria ( 157 111. 499, 41 N. E. 1014 [1895]), 587, 630, 723. Curnen v. Mayor, Aldermen and ■Commonalty , of the City of New York (79 N. Y. 511 [1880]), 1036, 1037. Curnen v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (7 Daly (N. Y.) 544 [1878]), 1036. Currie v. School District (35 Minn. 163, 27 N. W. 922 [1861[), 486. Curtice v. Schmidt (202 Mo. 703, 101 S. W. 61 [1907]), 324, 514,' 515. Curtis V. Pierce (115 Mass. 180 [1874]), 49, 1054. Cushing V. City of Boston 144 Mass. 317, 11 N. E. 93 [1887]), 661. Cushing V. Powell ( — Mo. App. , 109 S. W. 1054 [1908]), 1255. Cushman v. Smith (34 Me. 247 [1852]), 71. Cypress Pond Draining Company v. Hooper (2 Mete. (59 Ky.) 350 . [1859]), 89, 111, 255. D D, In re Avenue, in City of New York (— N. Y. , 84 N. E. 956 [1908]), 680. D, In re Avenue, in City of New York (106 N. Y. S. 889 [1907]), 679, 680, 1372. Dahlman v. City of Milwaukee (131 Wis. 427, 110 N. W. 479, 111 >!. W. 675 [1907]), 96.0, 1422, 1443, 1503. Daiber v. Toledo (7 Ohio N. P. 389 [1900]), 625, 704. Daily v. Swope (47 Miss. 367 [1872]), 40, 43. 86, 147, 148, 343, 549, 613, 665, 666, 697. Dallas, City of v. Brown (10 Tex. Oiv. App. 612, 31 S. W. 298 [1895]), 1512. Dallas, City of v. Ellison (10 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 30 S. W. 1128 [-895]), 169, 223, 234, 725, 813, 815, 950, 1013. Dallas, Cdty of v. Kahn (9 Tex. Civ. App. 19, 29 S. W. 98 [1894]), 65, 66, 651, 655. Dallas, City of v. Kruegel (95 Tex. 43, 64 S. W. 922 [1901]), 1492. Dalrymple v. City of Milwaukee (53 Wis. 178, 10 N. W. 141 [1881]), 41, 163, 1337. Dalton V. City of Poplar Bluff (173 Mo. 39, 72 S. W. 1068 [1902]), 1506. Daly V. Gubbins ( — Ind. , 82 N. E. 659 [1907]), 301, 983, 1234, 1240, 1254, 1336, 1337, 1340. Ixxxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Daly V. Gubbins (35 Ind. App. 86, 73 N. E. 833 [1904]), 735, 745. 772, 1229, 1334, 1375. ■ Daly V. Morgan ( 69 Md. 460, 1 L. E. A. 757 [1888]), 7, 11. Daly V. City and County of San Francisco (72 Cal. 154, 13 Pae. 321 [1887]), 777, 1499. Damkoehler v. City of Milwaukee (124 Wis. 144. 101 N. W. 706 [1905]), 620, 624. Dampe v. Town of Dane (29 Wis. 419 [1872]), 781. Dancer v. Town of Mannington (S'O W. Va. 322, 40 S. E. 475 [1901]), 118, 314, 663, 781, 791. Dancy Drainage Dist., In re ( 129 Wis. 129, 108 N. W. 202 [1906]), 340, 449. Danenhower v. District of Columbia (7 Mackey (D. C.) 99 [1889]), 952, 967. Danforth v. Village of Hinsdale (177 111. 579, 52 N. E. 877 [1899]), 526, 819, 1085. Daniels v. Keeler (10 0. S. 169 [1859]), 86, 553. Daniels v. Smith, 38 Mich. 660 [1878]), 735, 739, 1396, 1404. Daniels v. Tearney (102 U. S. 415, 1012, Dann v. Woodruff (51 Conn. 203 [1883]), 545, 555, 651, 654, 674, 724, 872, 1055, 1067, 1163, 1358. Darlington v. Commonwealth to Use of City of Allegheny (41 Pa. St. (5 Wright) 68 [1861]), 395, 467, 485, 748, 1304. Darnell v. Keller (18 Ind. App. 103, 45 N. E. 676 [1897]), 73, 323, 531, 532, 1005, 1019, 1047, 1236, 1337, 1346. Darst V. Griffin (31 Neb. 668, 48 X. W. 819 [1891]), 51, 103, 105, 245, 261, 777, 781, 802, 1431, 1435, 1436. Dasey v. Skinner (33 N. Y. State R. 15, 11 N. Y. Supp. 821 [1890]), 347, 354, 678, 608. Dashiell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Use of Hax (45 Md. ■615 [1876]), 244, 314, 394, 405, 472, 511, 527, 532, 543, 649, 771, 776, 795, 850, 1042, 1211, 1277, 1358. Dassler, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (35 Kan. 678, 12 Pac. 130 [1886]), 40. Daugherty v. Brown (91 Mo. 26, 3 S. W. 210 [1886]), 70. Dftvenport, City of v. Allen (120 Fed. 172 [1903]), 18, 314, 530, 990. Davenport, City of v. Boyd ( 109 la. 248, 77 Am. St. Eep. 536, 80 N. W. 314 [1899]), 1037. Davidson v. City of Chicago ( 178 111. 582, 53 N. E. 367 [1899]), 864. Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]), 108, 112, 115, 119, 122, 127, 140, 142, 340, 587, 719, 952, 1046, 1083. Davidson v. Wight (16 D. C. App. 371 [1900]), 86, 243, 310, 663, 666, «90, 702, 709, 760, 1010, 1011. Davie's Executors v. City of Gal- veston (16 Tex. Civ. App. 13, 41 S. W. 145 [1897]), 818, 830, 1279, 1287, 1478, 1484. Davies v. City of Grand Rapids (105 Mich. 529, 63 N. W. 530 [1895]), 822. Davies v. City of Los Angeles (86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]), 118, 119, 121, 134, 195, 207, 250, 308, 525, 526, 553, 570, 639, 666, 674,. 723, 750. Davies v. City of Saginaw (87 Mich. 439, 49 N. W. 667 [1891]), 500, 555, 831, 845, 857, 868, 927. Davis V. Cincinnati (36 0. S. 24 [1880]), 1041, 1043, 1054. Davis V. City of Des Moines (71 la. 500, 32 N. W. 470), 1504. Davis V. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. (114 Ind. 364, 16 N. E. 639 [1887]), 735, 996, 986, 1015, 1019, 1030, 1431, 1436, 1443. Davis V. City of Litchfield (155 111. 384, 40 N. E. Rep. 354 [1895]), 259, 271, 279, 413, 424, 555, 670, 676, 722, 723, 850, 967, 1085. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvi [References are to sections.] Davis V. City of Litchfield (145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]), 103, 105, 153, 173, 179, 223, 234. 245, 247, 256, 258, 266, 295, 323, 343, 466, 469, 472, 555, 571, 577, 623, 639, 648, 666, 714, 715, 776, 777. Davis V. City of Lynchburg (84 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 [1888]), 43, 86, 119, 120, 135, 161, 301, 314, 698, 728. Davis V. Mayor and Common Coun- cil <3f the City of Newark (54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 [1892]), 61, 71, 313, 416, 425, 465, 479, 554, 559. Davis V. City of Newark (54 N. J. 1.. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 [1891]), 313, 475, 547, 603, 644, 723, 986, 996, 997, 1281, 1368. Davis V. Northwestern Elevated Railroad Company (170 111. 595, 48 N. E. 1058 [1897]), 71. Davis V. City and County of San Francisco (115 Cal. 67, 46 Pac. 863 [1896]), 1482. Davis V. Silverton (47 Ore. 171, 82 Pac. 16 [1905]), 313, 398, -1432. Davison v. Campbell ( 28 - Ind. App. 688, 63 N. E. 779 [1901]), 57, 375, 735, 829. Dawson v. City of Pittsburg ( 159 Pa. St. 317, 27 Atl. 951 [1893]), 653. Day V. Town of New Lots (107 N. Y. 148, 13 N. E. 915 [1887]), 1072, 1088, 1146,' 1494. Day V. Town of New Lots ( 36 Hun, 263), 1494. Dayton, City of v. Bauman ('66 0. S. 379, 64 N. E. 433 [1902]), 90, 113. 118, 308, 314, 426, 430. Dayton v. Drainage Commissioners 128 111. 271, 21 N. E. 198 [1890]), 564. Dayton v. City of Lincoln (39 Neb. 74, 67 N. W. 754 [1894]), 66. Dayton v. Quigley (29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stewart) 77), 1072. Dayton, City of v. Taylor's Adminis- trators (62 0. S. 11, 56 N. E. 480), 449, 638. Dawley v. City of Antigo (120 Wis. 302, 97 N. W. 1119 [1904]), 191, 370, 781. Dawson v. Pittsburg (159 Pa. St. 317, 27 Atl. 951 [1893]), 654. De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company (167 111. 215, 47 N. E. 367 [1897]), 11, 35, 49, 665, 1054. De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (66 111. App. 596 [1896]), 35, 49, 1072. De Grilleau v. Frawley (48 La. Ann. 184, 19 So. 151 [1896]), 393, 396, 431. De Haven v. Berendes, 135 Cal. 178, 67 Pac. 786 [1901]), 410, 413, 424, 720, 1031, 1337, 1372, 1379, 1380. De Koven v. Lake View (131 111. 541, 23 N. B. 240 [1890]), 920, 923, 1283. DeKoven v. City of Lake View (129 111. 399, 21 N. E. 813 [1890]), 547, 587, 631, 674, 896. De Las Casas, Petitioner ( 178 Mass. ' 213, 59 N. E. 664 [1901]), 356, 664. De Montcaulnin v. Mayor, Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of New York (46 Hun, 188 [1887]), 1481. DePeyster, In the Matter of (80 N. Y. 565 [1880]), 121, 266, 324,760. De Peyster v. Murphy (66 N. Y. 622 [1876]), 1067, 1072. De Peyster v. Murphy (39 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 255 [1875]), 912, 1041, 1049, 1066, 1067, 1150. DePierris, In the Matter of (82 N. Y. 243 [1880]), 740, 836, 844. DePuy V. City of Wabash ( 133 Ind. 336, 32 N. E. 1016 [1892]), 795. 986, 1005, 1007, 1015, 1019, 1430, 1436. De Soto, City of v. Showman (100 Mo. App. 323, 73 S. W. 257 [1903]), 367, 813, 819. Deady v. Townsend (57 Cal. 298 [1881]), 437, 479, 831, 857, 1293, 1337. Dean v. Borchsenius (30 Wis. 236 [1872]), 103, 106, 223, 234, 314, 437, 439, 465, 479, 483, 496, 515, 679, 956, 961, 962, 964, 1196, 1426. Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Bectlons.] Dean v. Charlton 27 Wis. 522 [1871]), 199, 414, 495, 515, 956, 960. Dean v. Charlton (23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205 [1869]), 408, 962. Dean v. City of Madison (9 Wis. 402 [1859]), 781, 1426, 1427. Dean v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Paterson (68 N. J. L. (39 •Vr.) 664, 54 Atl. 836 [1902]), 690, 1368, 1379, 1381. Dean v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Paterson (67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 199, 50 Atl. 620 [1901]), 601, 643, 883. Dean v. Treasurer of Clinton Coun- ty (146 Mich. 645, 109 N. W. 1131 [1906]), 340, 414, 461, 550, 952, 1503. Deane v. Indiana Macadam & Con- struction Company (161 Ind. 371, 68 -N. E. 686 [1903]), 118. 142, 143, 276, 301, 620, 669, 670, 699, 709, 731, 745, 1234, 1237, 1347, 1368, 1375, 1377. Dear v. Varnum (80 Cal. 86, 22 Pac. 76 [1889]), 1478. Deblois v. Barker (4 E. I. 445), 323, 420, 713. Dederer v. Voorhies (81 N". Y. 154 [1880]), 982, 1009, 1116, 1277, 1426, 1427, 1429, 1432, 1438. Deegan v. State for use of Stoddard, 108 Ind. 155, 9 N. E. 148 [1886]). 340, 927, 1247, 1427. Deer v. Sheraden Borough {^- Pa. St. , 69 Atl. 814 [1908]), 862. Deerfield, Township of v. Harper (115 Mich. 678, 74 X. W. 207 [1898]), 1271. Deering, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (93 N. Y. 361 [1883]), 283, 313, 436, 465, 479, 480, 1373. Deering, In the Matter of (85 N. Y. 1 [1881]), 266, 433, 1467. Deering, In the Matter of (55 How. (N. Y.) 298 [1878]), 356, 475, 853, 1067, 1106, 1455. Deering In the Matter of (14 Daly (N. Y.) 89 [1886]), 475, 878, 950, 982. Deering v. Peterson (75 Minn. 118, 77 N. W. 568), 410. Dehail v. Morford (95 Cal. 457, 30 Pac. 593 [1892]), 551, 777, 833, 1024, 1031, 1432. Deisner v. Simpson (72 Ind. 435 [1880]), 1068, 1225. Delamater v. City of Chicago ( 158 * 111. 675, 42 N. E. Rep. 444 [1895] ), 244, 775, 857, 925, 1375. Delaney, In the Matter of (52 K Y. 80 [1873]), 1454, 1460, 1467. Delaney v. Gault (30 Pa. St. (6 Casey) 63 [1858]), 995, 1063, 1088, 1144, 1159, 1488. Delano v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (32 Hun (N. Y.) 144 [1884]), «04, 723, 1486. Delaware and Hudson Canal C!o., Mattel-' of ( 129 N. Y. 105, 29 N. E. 237 [1891]), 1458. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., In the Matter of the (60 Hun 204, 14 N. Y. Supp. 585 [1891]), 241, 485, 495, 983. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., President, Managers and Company of the V. Atkins, Collector ( 121 N. Y. 246, 24 N. E. 319), 276, 724, 1411, 1413, 1415. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. V. City of BuflFalo (167 N. Y. 589, 60 N. E. 1119 [1901]), 360. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v. City of Buffalo (39 App. Div. (N. . Y.) 333, 56 N". Y. Sup. 976), 360. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v. Von Storch, 196 Pa. St. 102, 46 Atl. 375 [1900]), 49, 1054. Delker v. Owensboro (Ky.) (98 S. W. 1031, 30 Ky. L. R. 440 [1907]), 1055. Dempster v. City of Chicago (175 111. 278, 51 N. E. 710 [1898]), 393, 400, 417, 947, 1432. Dempster v. People ex rel. Kern ( 158 111. 36, 41 N. E. 1022 [1895]), 1039, 1175, 1187, 1304. Denman v. Steinbach (29 Wash. 179 69 Pac. 751 [1902]), 1207. Dennett, Petitioner (32 Me. 508, 54 Am. Dec. 602), 216. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix [K*'ference& are to sections.] Dennis, In the Matter of (22 Hun (N. Y.) 607 [1880]), 1452. Bennison v. City of Kansas (95 Mo. 416, 8 S. W. 429 [1888]), 781, 1005, 1432. Dennison v. City of New York (182 N. Y. 24, 74 N. E. 486 [1905]), 1492. Denny v. City of Spokane (79 Fed. 719, 25 C. C. A. 164, 48 U. S. App. 282 [1897]), 301, 1504, 1510. Denver, City of v. Bayer (7 Colo. 113, 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 465 [1883]), 65, 70. Denver, City of v. Campbell (33 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]), 108, 118, 141, 245, 496, 666, 698, 700, 1085, 1337. Denver, City of v. Dumars (33 Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114 [1904]), 135, 325, 497, ■666, 711, 772, 1005, 1007, 1337. Denver, City of v. Dunning (33 Colo. 487, 81 Pac. 259 [1905]); 1440. Denver, City and County of v. Hin- dry (— Colo. . 90 Pac. 1028 [1907]), 530, 1505. Denver, City of v. Kennedy (33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, 80 Pac. 467 [1905]), -86, 131, 152, 359, 528, 549, 555, 560, 651, 666, 692, 709, 726, 1435. Denver, City of v. Knowles (17 Colo. 204, 17 L. R. A. 135, 30 Pac. 1041 [1892]), 11, 44, 92, 118, 152, 315, 666, 698, 703. Denver, City of v. Londoner (33' Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117), 119, 130, 245, 251, 266, 314, 620, 629, 632, 666, 698, 705, 723, 731, 795, 828, 1005, 1007, 1435, 1442. Department of Public Parks, In the Matter of the, to Acquire Lands 85 N. Y. 459 [1881]), 989, 1375. Department of Public Works, In the Matter of (13 Hun (N. Y.) 483 [1878]), 919. Derby v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (154 111. 215, 40 N. E. 438 [1894]), 731, 739, 986, 1000, 1372, 1439. Des Moines, City of v. Casady (21 la. 570 [1866]), 735, 737, 1047. Des Moines Brick Manufacturing Co. v. Smith (108 la. 307, 79 N. W. 77 [1899]), 475, 1070. 1103, 1109. Deslauries v. Soueie (222 111. 522, 113 Am. St. Rep. 432, 78 N. E. 799 [1906]), 1015, 1023, 1408. Detroit, City of v. Chapin. (See Detroit, City of v. Judge of Re- corder's Court.) Detroit, Board of Water Commis- sioners of City of V. Commission- ers of Parks and Boulevards ( 126 Mich. 459, 85 N. W. 1132), 353. Detroit, City of v. Judge of Record- er's Court (112 Mich. 588, 71 N. W. 149; sub nomine, Detroit, City of V. Chapin (42 L. R. A. 638 [1897]), 11, 118, 308, 663, 665, 666, 709. Detroit, City of v. Daly (68 Mich. 503, 37 N. W. 11 [1888]), 11, 69, 118, 247, 308, 668, 709. Detroit, City of v. Macier (117 Mich. 76, 75 N. W. Rep. 285 [1898]), 891. Detroit v. Parker (181 U. S. 399, 45 L. 917, 21 S. 624, 645 -[1901]), 118, 121, 702. Dewey v. Des Moines ( 173 U. S. 193, 43 L. 665, 19 S. 379 [1899]), 12, 127, 304, 549, 666, 677, 715, 1046, 1370. Dewey v. City of Des Moines (101 la. 415, 70 N. W. 605 [1897]), 12, 127, 298, 304, 549, '666, 677, 1041, 1046, 1182, 1370. Dewey v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Niagara (2 Hun N. Y. 392 [1874]), 14S6, 1495. DeWitt, County of, v. City of Clin- ton (194 111. 521, 62 N. E. 780 [1902]), 857, 859, 860, 867. DeWitt v. City of Elizabeth (56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]), 324, 414, 446, 549, 560, 563, 666, 977, 979. Dexter v. City of Boston ( 176 Mass. 247, 79 Am. St. Rep. 306, 57 N. E. 379 [1900]), 82, 103, 663, 627, 666, 700, 1484. xc TABLE OF CASES. [RcferenceK are to sectioDs.] Diamond Street, Pittsburg (196 Pa. St. 254, 46 Atl. 428 [1900]), 1393, 1406. Diamond v. 'City of Mankato (89 Minn. 48. 61 L. E. A. 448, 93 N. W. 911 [1903]), 314, 781, 783, 784. Dielc V. Philadelphia (197 Pa. St. 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]), 383, 462. Dick V. City of Toledo (11 Ohio C. C. 349 [1896]), 440, 584, 587, 663, 725. Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitch- burg (79 Mass. (13 Gray) 546 [1859]), 65, 66. Dickerson v. Peters (71 Pa. St. (21 P. F. Smith) 53 [1872]), 521, 1471, 1472. Dickey v. City of Chicago (164 111. 37, 45 N. E. 537 [1896]), 865, 912, 917, 918, 1350. Dickey v. City of Chicago (152 111. 468, 38 N. E. 932 [1894]), 394, 760. Dickey v. Holmes ( 109 Mo. App. 721, 83 S. W. 982 [1904]), 413, 496, 821, 857, 864, 984. Dickey v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger (160 111. 633, 43 N. E. 606 [1896]), 747, 764, 772, 930, 993, 1183. Dickey & Baker v. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 51, 72 N. E. 791 [1904]), 1029, 1184, 1189. Dickey v. Porter (203 Mo. 1, 101 S. W. 586 [1907]), 324, 495, 864, 1137. Dickinson v. City of Detroit (111 Mich. 480, 69 N. W. 728 [1897]), 305, 387, 463, 464. Dickinson v. Mayor, Aldermen and CommonaMy of the City of New York (92 N. Y. 584 [1883]), 1492. Dickinson v. City of Trenton (35 N. J. Eq. (8 Stew.) 416 [1882]), 1164. Dickinson v. Van Wormer (39 Mich. 141 [1878]), 1278. Dickinson v. City Council of Wor- cester (138 Mass. 555 [1885]), 323, 443, 693, 695, 813, 821, 1400. Dickson v. Omaha and St. L. E. Co. (124 Mo. 140, 46 Am. St. Eep. 429, 25 L. E. A. 320, 27 S. W. 476), 363. Dickson v. City of Eacine ( 65 Wis. . 306, 27 N. W. 58 [1886]), 359, 418, 947, 1277. Dickson v. City of Eacine (61 Wis. 545, 21 N. W. 620 [1884]), 142, 672, 674, 675, 1347, 1352. Dieckamann v. Sheboygan County (89 Wis. 570, 62 N. W. 410 [1895]), 783, 843, 844. Diefenthaler v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of New York (HI N. Y. 331, 19 N. E. 48 [1888]), 1418, 1462, 1486, 1492. Diefenthaler v. Mayor, Aldermen and Oommonalt^y of the City of New York (47 Hun (N. Y.) 627 [1888]), 1451. Dietz V. City of Neenah (91 Wis. 422, 64 N. W. 299, 65 N. W. 500 [1895]), 80, 119, 122, 231, 726, 729, 775, 1196, 1425, 1426, 1427. Diggins V. Brown (76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]), 323, 551, 554, 555, 574, 617, 628, 639, 646, 71i, 723, 861, 1358. Diggins V. Hartshorne (108 Cal. 154, 41 Pac. 283 [1895]), 301, 396, 537, 698, 703, 824, 886, 1030, 1182, 1216, 1239, 1317, 1337, 1381. Dikeman v. Dikeman (11 Paiges' Chan. Eep. 484 [1845]), 171, 1055. Dime Deposit and Discount Bank of Scranton v. Scranton (208 Pa. St. 383, 57, Atl. 770 [1904]), 1511. District of Clifton, Campbell Coun- ty V. Schneider (106 Ky. 605, 51 S. W. 13 (1899]), 1085. District of Columbia v. Armes (8 App. D. C. 393 [1896]), 67, 70, 86, 119, 244, 308, 419, 425, 553, 556, 557, 663, 672, 709, 1066. District of Columbia v. Burgdorf (7 App. D. C. 405), 119. District of Columbia v. Burgdorf (6 App. D. C. 465 [1895]), 119, 125, 234, 347, 666, 711, 735, 777. District of Columbia v. Sisters of Visitation (15 App. D. C. 300), 590, 611, 614. TABLE OF CASES. XCl [IVft relief's are to sections.] District of Columbia v. Weaver (6 App. D. C. 482 [1895]), 223, 234, 735. District of Columbia v. Wormley ( 15 App. D. C. 58 [1899]), 119, 244, 323, 727, 729, 735, 956, 962. District No. 110 v. Feck (60 Cal. 403 [1882]), 409, 423, 1226, 1264. Dittoe V. City of Davenport (74 la. 66, 36 N. W. 895 [1887]), 18, 40, 329, 679, 698, 711, 728, 777, 849, 876, 977, 979, 981, 1122, 1334, 1479. Diven v. Burlington Savings Bank (— Ind.App. , 82 N. E. 1020 [1907]), 629, 760. Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank ( 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. 542 [1905]), 486, 918, 1004, 1431, 1432, 1436. Dix, Commissioners of Highways of Town of V. Big Four Drainage District of Ford County (207 HI. 17, 69 N. E. 576 [1904]), 51, 61, 585, 928, 993, 1075, 1162, 1469, 1470, 1474, 1476. Dixon V. City of Cincinnati (11 Ohio C. C. 629, 5 Ohio C. D. 301 [1894]), 308, 309, 396, 398, 428, 700. Dixon V. City of Detroit (86 Mich. 616, 49 N. W. 628 [1891]), 484, 485, 531, 532, 1432. Dixon V. Labry ( — Ky. , 78 S. W. 430. 25 Ky. L. R. 1679, deny- ing rehearing of 24 Ky. L. Rep. 697, 69 S. W. 791 [1902]), 340, 637, 907, 1168, 1246, 1251. Doane v. Houghton (75 Cal. 360, 17 Pac. 426 [1888]), 440, 443, 865, 1234, 1245. Dobler v. Village of Warren (174 HI.. 92, 50 N. E. 1048 [1898]), 469, 1108. Dobson V. Duck Pond Ditching Asso- ciation (42 Ind. 312 [1873]), 254, 1232. Dockrill v. Schenk (37 111. App. 44 [1890]), 1054. Dodge V. City of Chicago (201 111. 68, '66 N. E. 367 [1903]), 828, 835. Dodge V. Van Buren Circuit Judge (118 Mich. 189, 76 N. W. 315), 365. Dodge County v. Acom (72 Neb. 71, 100 N. W. 136 [1904], 61 Neb. 376, 85 N. W. 292 [1901]), 142, 340, 877, 1367. Dodswoxth v. City of Cincinnati ( 18 Ohio C. C. 288, 10 Ohio C. D. 177 [1899]), 118, 308, 309, 42«, 702. Dolan V. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (62 N. Y. 472 [1875]), 740, 927, 930, 986, 996, 1457. Dolan V. Mayor, etc., of New York (4 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 397 [1868]), 616. Dolese v. McDougall (182 111. 486, 55 N. E. 547 [1899]), 1516. Dolese v. McDougall (78 111. App, 629 [1897]), 424, 874, 1506, 1516. Dollar Savings Bank v. Ridge (183 Mo. 506, 82 S. W. 56 [1904]), 273, 841, 878, 951, 972, 1016, 113.6, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1284. Dollar Savings Bank v. Ridge (62 Mo. App. 324 [1895]), 266, 273, 837, 841. Dollar Savings Bank v. Ridge (79 Mo. App. 26 [1898]), 847, 878, 1136. Dollar Savings Bank v. United States (19 Wall. 227 [1873]), 3. Donley v. Pittsburg (147 Pa. St. 348, 30 Am. St. Rep. 738, 23 Atl. 394 [1902], 414, 961. Donnelly v. Decker (58 Wis. 461, 46 Am. Rep. 637, 17 N. W. 389 [1883]), 5, 19, 97, 334, 338, 340, 717. Donnelly v. Howard (60 Cp.I. 291 [1882]), 413, 465, 479, 510. 542, 840, 1359. Donnelly v. Tillman (47 Cal. 40 [1873]), 499, 742, 749. Donohue v. Brotherton (7 Ohio N. P. 367 [1900]), 413, 424, 1057, 1068. Donovan v. Coles (33 Mo. App. 161 [1888]), 358, 454. Donovan v. City of Oswe^fo ■ ( 39 Misc. 291, 79 N. Y. S. 562 [1902]), 693, 699, 703, 780. XCll TABLE OF CASES. [Re'erences are to sections.] Dooley v. Town of Sullivan (112 Ind. 451, 2 Am. St. Eep. 209, 14 N. E. 566), 323. Dooling, Pros. v. Ocean City (67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 215, 50 Atl. 621 [1901]), 643, 690, 693, 699. Doppes V. City of Cincinnati (16 Ohio C. C. 183 [1898]), 685, 1012. Doran v. Barnes (54 Kan. 238, 38 Pac. 300 [1894), 141, 1337. Doran v. City of Murphysboro (225 111. 514, 80 N. E. 323 [1907]), 816. Dorathy v. City of Chicago (53 111. 79 [1869]), 410, 424, 527, 720, 837. Doremus v. City of Chicago (212 III. 513. 72 N. E. 403 [1904), 972. Doremus v. People ex rel. Kochers- perger (173 111. 63, 50 N. E. 686 [1898]), 228, 925, 1128, 1132. Doremus v. People ex rel. Koohers- perger (161 lU. 26, 43 N. E. Eep. 701 [1896]), 912, 927, 986, 1183, 1340. Dorgan v. City of Boston (94 Mass. (12 All.) 223 [1866]), 8, 64, 65, 70, 89, 103, 113, 308, 309, 570, 590, '695. Dorland v. Bergson (78 Cal. 637, 21 Pac. 537 ,[1889]), 479, 570, 1155, 1299. Dorland v. Hanson (81 Cal. 202, 15 Am. St. Eep. 44, 22 Pac. 652 [1889]), 1165. Dorland v McGlynn (47 Cal. 47 [1873]), 824, 1169, 1281, 1306, 1337. Dorman v. City of Jacksonville ( 1 3 Fla. 538, 7 Am. Rep. 253 [1870]), 70. Dorrance Street, In the Matter of (4 R. I. 230 [1856]), 86, 100, 111, 147, 148, 301, 323, 663, 666, 698, 709. Dorsey's Appeal (72 Pa. St. (22 P. F. Smith) 192 [1872]), 1015. DoughertJ' v. Coffin (69 Cal. 454, 10 Pac. 672 [1886]), 638, 1031, 1337, 1373. Dougherty v. Foley (32 Cal. 403 [1867]), 540, 830. Dougherty f. Harrison (54 Cal. 428 [1880]), 810, 1277. Dougherty v. Henarie (47 Cal. 9 [1873]), 166, 169, 170, 475, 1070, 1103, 1169, 1194, 1385. Dougherty v. Hitchcock (35 Oal. 512 [1868]), 223, 234, 510, 527, 574, 831, 902, 1332. Daugherty v. Miller (36 Cal. 83 [1868]), 624, 632, 635, 898, 1059. Dougherty v. Nevada Bank (81 Cal. 162, 22 Pac. 513 [1889]), 538, 1366, 1378. Doughten v. City of Camden (72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 451, 3 L. E. A. (N. S.) 817, 63 Atl. 170 [1905]), 5 349, 420, 464, 708. Doughten v. City of Camden (71 N. J. L. (42 Vr.) 426, 59 Atl. 106 [1904]), 5, 349, 464. Doughty V. Hope (3 Den. (N. Y.) 249 [1846]), 407, 415, 525, 813, 911. Douglas, In re (46 N. Y. 42 [1871]), 740, 762, 836. Douglas, In the Matter of (58 Barb. 174, 40 Howard, 201 [1870]), 735, 747, 762, 763, 836. Douglas, In the Matter of (12 Abb. Pr. 161 [1871]), 762, 763. Douglass, Matter of (9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 84 [1870]), 223, 234, 740, 770. Douglass V. City of Cincinnati (29 0. S. 165 [1876]), 620, 632, 635, 1067, 1072. Douglass V. Craig (4 Kan. App. 99. 46 Pac. 197 [1896]), 670. Douglass V. Town of Harrisville (9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Eep. 548 [1876]), 43, 85, 96, 162, 323, 1423. Dousman v. City, of St. Paul (23 Minn. 394 [1877]), 760, 916, 918, 1436. Dowden v. State for use of Bull 106 Ind. 157, 6 N. E. 136 [1885]), 1147. Dowell V. City of Portland (13 Or. 248, 10 Pac. 308 [1886]), 951, 958, 1206, 1279. Dowell V. Talbot Paving Co. (138 Ind. 675-, 38 N. E. 389), 170, 1110. TABLE OF CASES. XCIU [ReCerencea are to sections.] Dowlan v. County of Sibley (36 Minn. 430, 31 N. W. 517 [1887]), 103, 245, 260. Dowling V. Oonniflf (103 Cal. 75, 36 Pae. 1034 [1894]), 180, 1030, 1215, 1281, 1337, 1347, 1366. Dowling V. Hibernia Loan and Sav- ings Society (143 Cal. 425, 77 Pac. 141 [1904]), 570, 759, 764, 834, 1281, 1305. Downey v. Mississippi River & B. T. Ey. Co. (94 Mo. App. 137, 67 S. W. 945), 363. Downey v. People ex rel. Raymond 205 111, 230, 68 N. E. 807 [1903]). 531, 533, 986, 998, 1035, 1985, 1338. Downing v. City of Des Moines ( 124 la. 289, 99 N. W. 1066 [1904]), 305. 437, 657. Downs \r. Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte Co. (48 Kan. 640, 29 Pac. 1077 [1892]), 1012, 1015, 1436. Dows •/. Village of Irvlngton (66 Howaa-d (jST. Y.) 93 [1883]), 269, 276, 277, 645, 927, 1009, 1027. Doyle V. Austin (47 Cal. 353 [1874]), 40, 474, 475, 653, 690, 691, 723. Doyle V. Mayor and Common Council of City of Newark (34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 236 [1870]), 959. Doyle & Co. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark (30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 303 [1863]), 1409. Drainage of Lands, In re (35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 497 [1872]), 336. Drain Commissioner v. Baxter (57 Mich. 127; sub nomine, Robertson v. Baxter (23 N. W. 711 [1885]), 226, 228, 270. Drainage of Great Meadows. (See Great Meadows.) Drainage Commissioners of District No. 1 v. Village of Cerro Gordo, 217 111. 488, 75 N. E. 516 [1905]), 340, 585, 1031. Drainage Commissioners v. Hudson (109 111. 659 [1885]), 340, 1026, 1350, 1362, 1364, 1372, 1377, 1385. Drainage Commissioners of District No. 3 V. Illinois Central Railroad Company (158 111. 353, 41 N. E. 1073 [1895]), 557, 694, 595, 659, 1328. Drainage 'Oommissioners District Number Two v. Kinney (233 111. 67, 84 N. E. 34 [1908]), 953, 1424. Drainage Commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 1 of Mahn- amau and Montmorency Town- ships of Whiteside County v. Mil- ligan (227 111. 303, 81 N. E. 382 [1907]), 1347. Drainage Commissioners of Drain- age District No. 2 v. Drainage Commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 3 (211 111. 328, 71 N. E. 1007 [1904]), 340, 564, 659, 665, 666, 1032, 1313 Drainage Commissioners of Drainage District No. 2 v. Drainage Oom- missioners of Union Drainage District No. 3 (113 111. App. 114), 340, 564, 659, 665, 666, 1032, 1313. Drainage District No. 15 of Skagit County v. Armstrong (44 Wash. 23, 87 Pac. 52 [1906]), 340, 1033. Drainage District, Commissioners of V. Griffin (134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 995 [1891]), 748, 768. Drainage District No. 3 v. People ex rel. Baron (147 111. 404, 35 N. E. 238 [1894]), 245, 247, 340, 564, 771. Drainage Ditch No. 6, In re (109 N. W. 993 [1906]), 594, 614. Drake, In the Matter of the Applica- tion of (69 Hun (N. Y.) 95, 23 N. Y. S. 264 [1893]), 662, 786, 800, 1503. Drake v. Cincinnati (25 Ohio Cir. Ct. 373 [1903]), 684. Drake v. Grout (21 Ind. App. 534, 52 N. E. 775 [1898]), 554, 575, 639, 723, 1252, 1333. Drake v. Schoenstedt (149 Ind. 90, 48 N. E. 629 [1897]), 564. Draper v. City of Atlanta (126 Ga. 649, 55 S. E. 929 [1906]), 73, 293, 298, 1015, 1346. XCIV TAar^E OP CASES. [KcfefPuces are to sections.] Dreake v. Beasley (26 0. S. 315 [1875]), 322, 1047, 1142. Drennen v. People (222 111. 592, 78 N. E. 937 [1906]), 1126.. Dresaman v. Simonin ( 104 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767, 20 Ky. L. E. 868 [1898]), 324, 1068. Drew V. Town of Geneva (159 Ind. 364, 65 N. E. 9 [1902]), 15, 489, 1235. Drexel v. Town of Lake ( 127 111. 54, 20 N. E. 38 [1890]), 324, 3.30, 572. Driscoll V. Howard (63 Cal. 438 [1883]), 1220. Driver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. 542 [1905]), 486. Driver v. Moore (81 Ark. 80, 98 S. W. 734 [1906]), 665, 666, 672, 766, 784, 799, 927, 1005, 1285. Duane v. City of Chicago (198 111. 471, 64 N. E. 1033 [1902]), 297, 328, 448. 563, 642, 859. Dubuque, City of v. Harrison (34 la. 163 [1872]), 40, 50, 1122. Dubuque, City of v. Wooton (28 la. 571 [1870]), 747, 760, 836. Duffield V. City of Detroit ( 15 Mich. 474 [1867]), 77. Duffy, In the Matter of (133 N. Y. 512, 31 N. E. 517 [1892]), 1461. Duffy V. City of Saginaw ( 106 Mich. 335, 64 N. W. 581 [1895]), 1015. Dugger V. Hicks (11 Ind. App. 374, 36 N. E. 1085 [1894]), 301, 527, 1249. Dugro, In re (50 N. Y. 513 [1872]), 236. Duke V. O'Bryan (100 Ky. 710, 39 S. W. 444, 824, 19 Ky. L. R. 81 [1897]), 70, 101. Duker v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (Ky.) (25 Ky. Law Rep. 135, 74 S. W. 744 [1903]), 301, 610, 678. Dukes V. Working (93 Ind. 501 [1883]), 812. Dulaney v. Figg (— Ky. , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 678, 94 S. W. 658 [1906]), 396. Duluth, City of v. Davidson (97 ■ Minn. 378, 107 N. W. 151 [1906]), 324, 693, 714. f Duluth, City of v. Dibblee (62 Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 1117 [1895]), 130, 324, 367, 726, 732, 770, 910, 911, 914, 947. Duluth, City of v. Miles (73 Minn. 509, 76 N. W. 259), 1126. Dumesnil v. Hexagon Tile Walk Co. (— Ky. -, 58 S. W. 705. 23 Ky. L. R. 144), 1249, 1317. Dumesnil v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co. (109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 [1900]), 323, 464, 574, 617, 641, 646, 723, 724, 1330, 1336. Dumesnil v. Shanks (97 Ky. 354, 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]), 628. Duncan v. City of Elizabeth (25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Green) 430 [1874]), 895, 1197, 1199, 1426, 1432. Duncan v. Lankford ( 145 Ind. 145, 44 N. E. 12 [1896]), 927, 933, 955, 986, 1432. Duncan v. Ramish ( 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]), 73. 301, 485, 537, 550, 553, 555, 55.8, 661, 570, 624, 668, 670, 723, 724, 812, 918, 1026, 1027, 1337, 1414. Dunham v. City of Chicago (55 111. 357 [1870]), 173. Dunham v. People ex rel. McOrea, 96 111. 331 [1880]), 103, 104, 247, 249, 253, 259, 266, 356. . Duniway v. Portland (47 Or. 103, 81 Pac. 945 [1905]), 414, 424, 531, 534, 738, 760, 956, 974. Dunker v. Stiefel (57 Mo. App. 379 [1894]), 380, 381, 577, 648, 714. Dunkirk, City of v. Wallace (19 Ind. App. 298, 49 N. E. 463 [1897]), 1508. Dunkirk Land Company v. Zehner (35 Ind. App. 694, 74 X. E. 1099 [1905]), 17, 886, 1033. Dunkle v. Herron (115 Ind. 470, 18 N. E. 12 [1888]), 223, 950, 1113. Dunlap V. Gosnell ■( 18 Ky. Law R. 8, 35 S. W. 108 [1896]), 86. Dunn V. McNeely (75 Mo. App. 217 [1898]), 490, 511. Dunne v. Altschul (57 Cal. 472 ■ [1881]), 515, 537, 1290. TABLE OP CASES. xcv [Keferences are to sections.] Dunning, In the Matter of (60 Barb. (N. y.) 377 [1871]), 919, 1452. Dunning v. Calkins (51 Mich. 556, 17 N. W. 54 [1883]), 1125, 1373. Durkee v. City of Kenosha (59 Wia. 123, 48 Am. Rep. 480, 17 N. W. 677 [1883]), 1196, 1521. Durrell v. Dooner (119 Cal. 411, 51 Pac. 628 [1897]), 223, 234, 637. Durrell v. CTty of Woodbury (74 N. J. L. (45 Vr.) 206-. 65 Atl. 198 [1906]), 245, 301, 549, 560, 1015. 1020. Durrett v. Davidson ( — Ky. , (8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 546, 93 S. W. 25 [1906]), 168, 950. Durrett v. Kenton County ( — Ky. , 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1173, 87 S. W. 1070 [1905]), 549, 660, 653. Dupont V. Highway Oommrs. of Hamtramck (28 Mich. 362 [1873]), 1278. Dusenbury v. Mayor and C5ommon Council of the City of Newark (25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 295 [1874]), 528, 1015. 1423, 1436. Dyar v. Farmington Village 'Corpo- ration (70 Me. 515 [1378]), 9, 365, 677. Dyer v. Barstow (53 Cal. 81 [1878]), 1113. Dyer v. Barstow (50 Cal. 652 [1875]), 1226. Dyer v. Brogan (57 Cal. 234 [1881]), 1293, 1382, 1389. Dyer v. Brogan (70 Cal. 136, 11 Pac. 589 [1886]), 1306, 1378. Dyer v. Chase (52 Cal. 440 [1877]), 432, 465, 479, 610, 831, 869, 1154, 1155. Dyer v. Harrison (63 Cal. 447 [1883]), 574, 639, 723, 824, 886. Dyer v. Hudson (65 Cal. 374, 4 Pac. 231 [1884]), 570, 574, 831, 862. Dyer v. Martinovfch (63 Cal. 353 [1883]), 624. Dyer v. Miller (58 Cal. 585 [1881]), 784. Dyer v. City of Newport, Ky. (26 Ky. L. 204, 80 S. W. 1127 [1904]), 47, 212, 508. Dyer v. North (44 Cal. 157 [1872]), 313, 749, 783, 784, 830, 836, 1215, 1237. Dyer v. Parrott (60 Cal. 551 [1882]), 1358. Dyer v. Pixley (44 Cal. 153 [1872]), 1210, 1216. Dyer v. Scalmanini (69 Cal. 637, 11 Pac. 327 [1886]), 479, 964, 965, 1002. Dyer v. Woods (166 Ind. 44, 76 N. E. 624 [1906]), 119, 125, 323, 521, 831, 859, 1439, 1444. Dyker Meadow Land & Improve- ment Co. V. Crok (159 N. Y. 6, 53 N. E. 690), 557, 1072. Eager, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of (46 N. Y. 100 [1871]), 479, 515, 724, 867, 1451, 1452, 1455, 1458. Eager, In the Matter of (41 How. 107 [1870]), 472, 484, 485. 540, 542, 1458. Eager, In the Matter of (58 Barb. 557 [1871]), 167, 472, 525, 540, 977, 983, 1455. Eager, In the Matter of (12 Abb. Pr. 151 [1871]), 472, 511, 515, 867. Eager, In the Matter of (10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 229 [1871]), 223, 234, 540, S42, 1452, 1455. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Pell (2 Edw. Ch. 631), 1057. Eagle Manufacturing Company v. City of Davenport (101 la. 493, 38 L. R. A. 480, 70 N. W. 707 [1897]), 314, 620, 632, 1050, 1067, 1072. Eames v. Salem and Lowell R. R. Co. (98 Mass. 560, 96 Am. Dec. 676 [1868]), 363. Earhart v. Farmers' Creamery ( 148 Ind. 79, 47 N. E. 226 [1897]), 886, 915, 1362. Early v. City of Ft. Dodge (— la. , 113 N. W. 766 [1907]), 696, 1351, 1361. East 133rd Street, In re (95 N. Y. S. 76 [1904]), 603. XCVl TABLE OP CASES. [References ai*e to sections.] East Street, Evans' Appeal (210 Pa. St. 539, 60 Atl. 154 [1904]), 383, 462. East Grand Forks, City of v. Luck (97 Minn. 373, 6 L. R. A. (]Sf. S.) 198, 107 N. W. 393 [1906]), 6, 20, 353, 1045. Bast Jordan Lumber Company v. Village of East Jordan ( 100 Mich. 201, 58 N. W. 1012), 1015. East Orange, City of v. Hussey (72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 71, 59 Atl. 1060 [1905]), 166, 168, 223, 340, 414. East Orange, City of v. Hussey (70 N. J. L. (41 Vr.) 244, 57 Atl. 1086 [1903]), 340, 1368. East Saginaw and St. Clair K. R. Co. V. Benham (28 Mich. 459 [1874]), 771. East St. Louis, City of v. Albrecht (150 111. 506, 37 N. E. 934 [1894]), 413, 424, «37. East St. Louis, City of v. Davis (233 111. 553, 84 N. E. 674 [1908]), 297, 752, 770, 848. East St. Louis, City of v. Wittich (108 111. 449 [1884]), 911. Eastern Texas Railroad Company v. Eddings (30 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 70 S. W. 98 [1902]), 66. Ebensburg Borough v. Little (28 Pa. Super. Ct. 469 [1905]), 1012. Eckert v. Town of Walnut (117 la. 629, 91 N. W. 929 [1902]), 827. Eddy V. City of Omaha (72 Neb. 550, 101 N. W. 25 [1904] ) ; 102 N. W. 70, 103 N. W. 692 [1905]), 505, 521, 739, 771, 985, 1445. Ede V. Cogswell (79 Cal. 278, 21 Pac. 767 [1889]), 169, 244, 523, 538, 574, 831, 840. Ede V. Cuneo (126 Cal. 167, 58 Pac. 538 [1899]), 223, 234, 775, 777, 958, 960, 1231, 1242. Ede V. Knight (93 Cal. 159, 28 Pac. 860 [1892]), 169, 171, 538, 782, 824, 886, 1153, 1155, 1281, 1375, 1389. Edgerton v. Mayor and Aldermen of the Town of Green Oove Springs (19 Fla. 140 [1882]), 83, «6, 118, 147, 308, 425 Edgerton v. Huntington School Township (126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156 [1890]), 579, 580, 586, 612. Edmands y. City of Boston ( 108 Mass; 535 [1871]), 76. Edward C. Jones Co. v. Perry (26 Ind. App. 554, 57 N. E. 583 [1900]), 1043, 1085. CTwards v. Berlin (123 Cal. 544, 56 Pac. 432 [1899]), 415, 499, 638, 831, 834, 861, 1281, 1304. Edwards v. Bruorton ( 184 Mass. 629, 69 N. E. 328 [1904]), 81, 103. Edwards v. City of Chicago ( 140 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893]), 417, 418, 549, 558, 563, 576, 920. Edwards v. City of Oolunibus (7 Ohio N. P. 614 [1900]), 700, 707, 1012. Edwards v. Cooper (168 Ind. 54, 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]), 17, 550, 556, 825, 872, 1024, 1149, 1240. Edwards v. Jersey City (40 N. J. L. 176), 958. Edwards v. Lesueur ( 132 Mo. 410, 31 L. R. A. 815, 33 S. W. 1130), 216. Edwards House Co. v. City of Jack- son ( — Miss. , 46 So. 14 [1907]), 147, 301, 663, 809, 833, 857, 1502. Edwards & Walsh Construction Company v. Jasper County (117 la. 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 [1902]), 11, 16, 42, 89, 475, 514, 680, 581, 582, 612, 613, 620, 834, 849, 888, 918, 1015, 1022, 1075, 1103, 1108, 1109, 1215, 1303, 1309. Eel River Draining Association v. Oarriger (30 Ind. 213 [1868]), 247. Eel River Draining Association v. Topp (16 Ind.. 242 [1861]), 340, 525, 886, 923, 1232, 1236, 1283, 1317. Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin (27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 276 [1858]), 43, 147, 148, 343, 711. Ehni V. City of Columbus (3 Ohio C. C. 494 [1889]), 441, 561, 775, 950, 1435. TABLE OP CASES. XCVll [References are to secticns.] East Eighteenth Street, in the Town of Flatbush, In the Matter of the Assessment for Improving (75 Hun (N. Y.) 603, 27 N. Y. Supp. 591 [1894]), 53, 617, 641, 646, 720, 1403. Eightieth Street, In the Matter of (31 Howard (N. Y.) 99 [1865]), 241, 441, 484, 982, 1454. Eightieth Street, Matter of (17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 324 [1864]), 484, 485, 495, 1397, 1451. Eilert v. City of Oshkosh (14 Wis. 586 [1861]), 1506, 1511. Ek V. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co. (84 Minn. 245, 87 N. W, 844 [1901]), 194, 195. ' El Paso, City of v. Mundy Brothers 85 Tex. 316, 20 S. W. 140 [1892]), 663, 688, 775, 1050. Elder v. Fox (18 Colo. App. 263, 71 Pac. 398 [1903]), 1036, 1072. Eldridge v. Trezevant (160 U. S. 452, 40 L. 490, 16 S. 345), 343. Eleventh Avenue, Matter of Open- ing (49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 208 [1875]), 919. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company v. Hohenshell (193 III. 159, 61 N. E. 1102 [1901]), 69, 340, 739, 756, 758, 760, 1002, 1183, 1184, 1272, 1319, 1346. Elizabeth, Report of Commissioners of (49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 488, 10 Atl. 363 [1887]), 187, 198, 271, 414, 950, 956, 960, 968, 1066, 1072, 1083, 1113. Elizabeth, City of v. Hill (39 N^ J. L. (10 Vr.) 555 [1877]), 967, 1486. Elizabeth, City of v. Shirley (35 N, J. Eq. (8 Stewart) 515 [1882]), 971, 1036, 1037, 1072. Elizabeth, City of v. State, Meker, Pros. K5 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 157 [1883]), 408, 956, 964, 1361. Elkhart, City of v. Wickwire (121 Ind. 331, 22 N. E. 342 [1889]), 264, 279, 416, 423, 686, 74^, 875, 986, 1030, 1031, 1085, 1089, 1210, 1435, 1450. Ellinghouse v. Taylor (19 Mont. 462, 48 Pac. 757 [1897]), 355. Elliott V. Berry (41 0. S. 110 [1884]), 38, 574. Elliott V. Cale (113 Ind. 383, 14 N. E. 708 [1887]), 1053. Elliott V. City of Chicago (48 111. ■293 [1868]), 556, 1005. Ellis V. Pontchartrain Levee Dis- trict (43 La. Ann. 33, 8 So. 914), 155. Ellis V. Witmer (134 Cal. 249, 66 Pac. 301 [1901]), 500, 504, 951, 1103, 1106, 1184, 1279, 1290, 1435. Ellis V. Workman (144 Cal. 113, 77 Pac. 822 [1904]), 1197, 1473, 1474. Ellison V. Branstrator (34 Ind. App. 410, 73 N. E. 146 [1904]), 340, 950, 1113, 1199, 1206. Ell wood V. City of Rochester (122 X. Y. 229, 25 N. E. 238 [1890]), 554, 555, 723, 884, 885. Elma, Town of v. Carney (9 Wash. 466, 37 Pac. 707 [1894]), 313, 531, 534, 693, 709, 713, 832, 839. Elma, Town of v. Carney (4 Wash. 418, 30 Pac. 732 [1892]), 313, 887, 1219, 1230. Elmendorf v. City of Albany (17 Hun (N. Y.) 81 [1879]), 323. Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners 135 111. 269, 25 Ain. St. Rep. 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1890]), 8, 63, 89, 253, 283, 291, 337, 1519. Elmore v. Overton (104 Ind. 548, 54. Am. Rep. 343, 4 N. E. 197), 207. Elsberry, City of v. Black (120 Mo. App. 20, 96 S. W. 256 [1906]), 482, 495. Elston V. City of Chicago (40 111. 514, 89 Am. Dec. 361 [1866]), 360, 456, 986, 1478, 1484, 1488. Elwood V. City of Rochester (43 Hun, 102 [1887]), 308, 415, 416, 525, 581, 593, 614, 630, 672, 675, 693, 703, 719, 813, 825, 832. 894, 950, 979, 981. Ely, Case of Isle of (10 Rep. 141a), 387. Ely V. City of Grand Rapids (84 Mich. 336, 47 N. W. 447 [1890]), 541. XCVIU TABLE OP CASES. a [References are to sections.] Elyton Land Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Birmingham (89 Ala. 477, 7 So. 901), 150. Emery v. Bradford (29 Cal. 75 [1865]), 15, 532, 537, 1005, 1007, 1039, 1049, 1337, 1338. Emery v. San Francisco Gas Com- pany (28 Cal. 346 [1865]), 8, 86, 88, 89, 100, 110, 147, 148, 313, 436, 437, 541, 570, 624, 666, 831, 840, 857, 862. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, Matter of Petition of (75 N. Y. 388 [1878]), 273, 433, 482, 495, 496, 867. Emmert v. City of Elyria (74 O. S. 185, 78 N. E. 269 [1906]), 864. Emmert v. Elyria (27 Ohio C. C. E. 353 [1905]), 864, 866. Emporia, City of v. Bates ( 16 Kan. 495 [1876]), 414, 958, 959, 962, 965, 990. Emporia, City of v. Norton (13 lian. 569 [1874])., 106, 414, 570, 813. 956, 965, 983. Englebret v. McElwee (122 Cal. 284, 54 Pac. 900 [1898]), 889, 1153, 1240, 1265. English V. City of Danville (150 111. 92, 36 N. E. 994 [1894]), 293, 298, 1085. English V. Territory ( — • Ariz. , 89 Pac. 501, 90 Pac. 601 [1907]), 301, 555, 724, 1030, 1109, 1110, 1209, 1252, 1337, 1358. English V. Mayor and Common Council of Wilmington (2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Atl. 158 [1896]), 86, 118, 123, 134, 324, 653, 666, 708, 709, 712, 745. Eno V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (68 N. Y. 214 [1877]), 167, 466, 484, 485, 540, 1451, 1452, 1454, 1490. Eno V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (7 Hun (N. Y.) 320 [1876]), 167, 540. Eno V. Mayor, etc. (53 Howard 382 [1877]), 167, 740, 762, 836. Enos V. City of Springfield (113 111. 65 [1886]), 51, 153, 295, 323, 670. 715, 776. Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Brien (55 Neb. 735, 76 N. W. 417 [1898]). 825, 1277. Erie v. Bootz (72 Pa. St. (22 P. F. Smith) 196 [1872]), 762, 795, ^159. Erie to Use v. Brady (150 PaJ St. 462, 24 Atl. 641 [1892]), 816, 981. Erie, City of for Use v. Brady (127 Pa. St. 169, 17 Atl. Rep. 885 [1889]), 813, 981, 1253. Erie, City for Use v. Butler (120 Pa. St. 374, 14 Atl. 153 [1888]), 527, 1159, 1211, 1253. Erie, City of v. First Universalist Church (105 Pa. St. 278 [18S4]), 42, 588, 613. Erie, City of v. Griswold (184 Pa. St. 435. 39 Atl. 231 [1898]), 147, 148, 611, 641, 64-8, 720. Erie, City of for Use Erie Paving Co. v. Moody (171 Pa. St. 610, 33 A^tl. 378 [1895]), 437, 527, 604. Erie, City of v. Piece of Lacd Front- ing on State Street (175 Pa. St. 623, 34 Atl. 808 [1896]), 596, 598, 1078, 1159, 1333. Erie City v. Reed (113 Pa. St. 468, 6 Atl. 679), 414, 983. Erie, City of v. Russell (14« Pa. St. 384, 23 Atl. 1102 [1892]), 11, 382, 384, 665, 666, 677. Erie City v. Willis (26 Pa. Super. Ct. 459 [1903]), B3, 55, 737, 1063. Erie R. Co. v. City of Paterson (72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 83, 59 Atl. 1031 [1905]), 694, 595, 613. Erickson v. Cass County (11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]), 118, 119, 125, 140, 196, 244, 340, 403, 475, 549, 564, 586, 651, 552, 659, 729, 735, 1011, 1012, 1034, 1085, 1104, 1411, 1436. Erisman v. Board of Chosen Free- holders of the County of Burling- ton (64 N. J. L. (35 Vr.) 516, 45 Atl. 998 [1900]), 322, 624, 626, 1394, 1396. TABLE OF CASES. XCIX [References arc to sections.] Ernst V. Kunkle (5 0. S. 521 [1856]), 86, 89, 544, 700, 1216, 1346. Eschbach v. Pitts (6 Md. 71 [1854]), 1042, 1049, 1060. Espert V. City of. Chicago (201 111. 264, 66 N. E. 212 [1903]), 75, 721, Espy Estate Company v. Pacific County (40 Wash. 67, 82 Pac. 129 [1905]), 340, 525, 1468, 1469. Ess V. Bouton (64 Mo. 105 [1876]), 1284. Essex Public Road Board, Pros. v. Skinkle (49 N. J. L. (20 Vr,) 641, 10 Atl. 379 [1887]), 15, 166, 167, 253, 968, 1113, 1179. Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle (49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 65, B Ati. 435 [1886]), 166, 167, 253, 968, 1113, 1179, Essroger v. City of Chicago (185 111. 420, 56 N. E. 1086 [1900]), 864, 1392. Esterbrook v. O'Brien (98 Cal. 671, 33 Pac. 765 [1893]), 1431, 1435. Estes V. Owen (90 Mo. 113, 2 S. W. 133 [1886]), 314, 373, 374, 461. Etchison Ditching Association v. Busenback (39 Ind. 362 [1872]), 254, 1232, 1264. Eltchison DitcMng Association v. Hillis (40 Ind. 408 [1872]), 254, 340, 719, 777, 883, 891, 936, 981, • 1229, 1232, 1242, 1264, 1277, 1279, 1288, 1359. Etchison Ditching Association v. Jarrell (33 Ind. 131 [1870]), 340, 883, 886, 1238, 1239. Euphiwsine Street, Opening of (7 La. Ann. 72 [1852]), 63, 113, 155. Eustace v. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 424, 72 N. E. 1089 [1905]), 533. Eutaw, Town of v. Botnick ( — Ala. , 43 So. 739 [1907]), 73, 661. Evans v. City of Denver (26 Colo. 193, 57 Pac. 696 [1899]), 959, 965. Evans v. Lewis (121 111. 478, 13 N. E. 246 [1889]), 254, 558, 564, 1008, 1417, 1432, 1477. Evans v. The People ex rel. Kern (139 111. 552, 28 N. E. 1111 [1893]), 763, 764, 913, 914, 1299. Evans v. Sharp (29 Wis. 564 [1872]), 199, 896, 970, 1041, 1059. Evansville, City of v. Pftsterer (34 Ind. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 214 [1870]), 301, 528, 1015, 1022, 1435. 1436. Evart v. Village of Western Springs (180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478 [1899]), 900, 902, 922. Everett v. Deal (148 Ind. 90, 47 X. E. 219 [1897]), 483, 1347, 1352. 1358. Everett v. Marston (186 Mo. P'^^, 85 S. W. 540), 1072. Ewart V. Village of Western Springs (180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478 [1899]), 279, 368, 452, 978. Ewing V. McNairy (20 0. S. 315 [1871]), 998. Excelsior Springs, City of, to Use of MeCormiok v. Ettepson ( 120 Mo. App. 215, 96 S. W. 701 [1906]), 138, 245, 301, 468, 538, 777, 1284. Excelsior Draining Co. v. Brown (38 Ind. 384 [1871]), 254, 1232, 1264. Excelsior Paving Co. '" ireach (Cal.) 34 Pac. 116), 519. Excelsior Planting & Manufacturing Company v. Green (39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]), 4, 11, 37, 39, 43, 100, 103, 110, 113, 117, 147, 155, 184, 194, 198, 209, 237, 245, 343, 545, 548, 711. Exchange Alley, Matter of (4 La. Ann. 4 [18491), 155. Exchange Bank v. Ault (102 Ind. 322, 1 N. E. 562), 1444. Eyerman v. Blaksley (78 Mo. 145 [1883]), 118, 188, 244, 324, 401, 447, 473, 475, 550, 923, 1109, 1284. Eyermann v. Blakesley (13 Mo. App. 407 [188»]), 523, 574, 1138. Eyermann v. Blakesley (9 Mo. App. 231 [1880]), 293, 401, 447, 475, '523, '872, 1282, 1284. Eyerman v. Hardy (8 Mo. App. 311 [1880]), 511, 574, 666, 698, 707, 709, 714, 894, 1052, 1137. Eyerman v. Payne (28 Mo. App. 72 [1887]), 1134, 1249, 1284, 1317. TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Eyermann v. Provenchere (15 Mo. App. 256 [1884]), 324, 475, 511, 627, 531, 537, 781, 840, 1103, 1150. Byermann v. Scollay ( 16 Mo. App. 498, [1885]), 887, 998, 1137, 1138, 1169, 1221, 1245. Fagan v. City of Chicago (84 111. 227 [1876]), 104, 153, 236, 396, 426, 428, 455, 570, 578, 579, 643, 661, 662, 670, 676, 723, 920, 921, 923, 925, 1273, 1277, 1283, 1313, 1318. Fahnestock v. City of I^oria (171 111. 454,. 49 N. E. 496 [1898]), 65, 308, '653, 922, 1313, 1379. Fair Haven, and Westville Railroad Company v. City of New Haven 203 U. S. 379 [1906]), 172, 599, 603. Fair Haven <4; Westville Railroad Company v. City of JHew Haven (77 Conn. 667, 80 Atl. 651 [1905]), 172, 479, 519, 599, 603. Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Company v. City of New Haven (77 Conn. 494, 59 Atl. 737 [1905]), 7, 8, 223, 229, 234, 263, 601, 776. Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Company v. City of New Haven (77 Conn. 219, 58 Atl. 703 [1904]), 60, Slfl, 603. Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Company v. City of New Haven (75 Conn. 442, 53 Atl. 960 [1903]), 60, 86, 172, 244, 245, 314, 599, 600, 691, 699, 738. Fairbanks v. Mayor and Aldermen of Fitchburg (132 Mass. 42 [1882]), 444, 563, 568, 847, 848, 1400. Fairchild v. City of St. Paul (46 Minn. 540, 49 N. W. 325 [1891]J, 308, 747. Fairfield's Appeal (57 Conn. 167), 359. Fairfield, City of v. RatcliflF (20 la. 396 [1866]), 35, 231, 232, 443, 775. Fajder v. Village of Aitkin (87 Minn. 445, 92 N. W. 332, 934 [1902]), 1116, 1411, 1412. Faleh v. The People ex rel. John- son (99 111. 137 [1881]), 51, 86, 236, 245, 258, 670, 715, 1379. Falch v. People ex rel. (8 Bradwell (111.) 351 [1880]), 764, 1299. Fall Creek and Warren Township Gravel Road Co. v. Wallace (39 Ind. 435 [1«72]), 322, 459, 1094. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley (164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 S. 56 [1896]), 115, 117, 119; 121, 122, 131, 140, 249, 355, 556, 670, 697, 718, 726, 728, 730, 760, 1370. Falloon V. City of Hiawatha (66 Kan. 769, 71 Pac. 1127 [1903]), 1381, 1436. Fanning v. Bohme (76 Cal. 149, 18 Pac. 158 [1888]), 313, 784; 1279. Fanning v. Foley (99 Cal. 336), 33 Pac. 1098 [1893]), 1149, 1225. Fanning v. Leviston (93 Cal. 186, 28 Pac. 943 [1892]), 1030, 1109, 1281; 1337, 1381. Fanning v. Schammel (68 Cal. 428, 9 Pac. 427 [1886]), 169, 171, 538, 983. Farlin v. Hill (27 Mont. 27, 69 Pao. 237 [1902]), 637. Farmers' Bank v. Orr (25 Ind. App. 71, 55 N. E. 35 [1900]), 1033, 1035, 1091, 1259. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company v.. Borough of Ansonia (61 Conn. 76, 23 Atl. 705 [1891]), 60, 601, 605. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company v. Hastings (2 Neb. Unofficial, 337, 96 N. W. Rep. 104 [1902]), 223, 234, 777, 1386. Farniss, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (4 Hun 624 [1875]), 308, 1453. Farraher v. City of Keokuk (111 la. 310, 82 N. W. 773 [1900]), 463, 464, 784. Farr v. City of Detroit (136 Mich. 200, 99 N. W. 19 [1904]), 1023, 1436. TABLE OP CASES. CI [References are to sections.] Farr v. West Chicago Park Commis- sioners (167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 [1897]), 465, 477, 479, 623, 965, 975, 990. Farrar v. City ot St. Louis (80 Mo. 379 [1883], 47, 147, 148, 212, 374, 380, 381, 665, 666. , Farrell v. City of Chicago (198 111. 558, 65 N. E. 103 [1902]), 1469, 1473, 1506, 1518. Farrell v. Eemmelkamp ( 64 Mo. App. 425 [1895]), 463, 1135, 1284. Farrell v. City of St. Paul ( 62 Minn. 271, 54 Am. St. Rep. 641, 29 L. K. A. 778, 64 N. W. 809 [1895]), 989, 995, 1047, 1144. Farrell v. Town of West Chicago (162 111. 280, 44 N. E. 527), 1085, 1113. Farrell v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (181 U. S. 404, 45 L. 924, 21 S. 609, 645 [1901]), 314, 702. Farrell v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (182 111. 250, 55 N. E. 325 [1899]), 314, 559, 560, 650, 670, 714, 715, 723, 965, 1269, 1271, 1272, 1308. Farrington v. City of Mt. Vernon (166 N. Y. 233, 59 N. E. 820 [1901]), 244, 438, 551, 620, 777. Farson v. City of Sioux City (106 Fed. 278 [1901]), 301, 1508, 1512. Farwell v. Cambridge (77 Mass. (11 Gray) 413 [1858]), 284. Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Manu- facturing Company (97 la. 286, 35 L. E. A. 63, 66 N. W. 176 [1896]), 42, 315, 610, 614, 985, 1041, 1043, 1048, 1060. Fass V. Seehawer (60 Wis. 525, 19 N. W. 533 [1884]), 53, 55, 121, 538, 620, 632, 737, 747, 760, 781, 785, 1006, 1338. Faure v. Winans, Hopk. Ch. (283), 1057. Fay, In the Matter of (12 Hun 490 [1878]), 982. Fay V. City of Chicago (194 111. 136, 62 N. E. 530 [1902]), 864. Fay V. Peed (128 Cal. 357, 60 Pac. 927 [1900]), 510, 831, 857, 858, 864, 1229. Fay V. City of Springfield (94 Fed. 409 [1899]), 11, 118, 119, 132, 666, 702, 709. 715, 728. Fayette, City of, ex rel. Crews v. Rich (122 Mo. App. 145, 99 S. W. 8 [1907]), 850, 909, 956, 962. Fayssoux v. Denis (48 La. Ann. 850, 19 So. 760 [1896]), 15, 155, 218, 323, 1369. Fehler v. Gosnell (99 Ky. 380, 35 5. W. 1125 [1896]), 479, 519, 844, 1039. Fehringer v. City of Chicago ( 187 111. 416, 58 N. E. 303 [1900]), 859, 864. Felker v. City of New Whatcom (16 ' Wash. 178, 47 Pac. 505 [1896]), 525, 526, 739, 747, 754, 887, 1182, 1202. Fell V. Philadelphia, to the use of Cunningham (81 Pa, St. (31 P. F. Smith) 58 [1876]), 234, 314, 521, 527, 528, 537, 543, 777. Fellows V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (17 Hun (N. Y.) 249 [1879]), 1515. Felt V. City of Ballard (38 Wash. 300, 80 Pac. 532 [1905]), 624, 628. Felthousen v. City of Amsterdam (69 Hun 505, 23 N. Y. Supp. 424 [1893]), 223, 234, 777, 887. Fenelon'a Petition (7 Pa. St. (7 Barr.) 173 [1847]), 63, 113, 308, 950, 1049. Fenwick .Hall Company v. Town of Old Saybrooke (69 Conn. 32, 38 Atl. 1068 [1897]), 308, 907, 1433. Fergus Falls, City of v. Boen (78 Minn. 186, 80 N. W. 961 [1899]), 6, 20, 1032. Ferguson v. City of Coflfeyville ( — Kan. , 94 Pac. 1010 [1908]), 531. Ferguson v. Quinn (123 Pa. St. 337, 16 Atl. 844 [1889]), 992, 1157, • 1160. Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford (60 Conn. 4'32, 22 Atl. 782 [1891]), 11, 66, 118, 147, 284, 324, 651, 654, 1358. cu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections. I Ferry v. Ridge (56 Mo. App. 615 [1893]), 841. Ferris v. City of Chicago (162 111. Ill, 44 N. E. 436 [1896]), 533, 884, 912. Ferry v. City of Taooma (34 Wash. 652, 76 Pac. 277 [1904]), 679, 681, 682, 918, 1027. Ferson's Appeal (96 Pa. St. (15 Norris) 140 [1880]), 610, 665, 666, 706, 1012, 1014. Feust, In the Matter of (121 N. Y. 299, 24 N. E. 479 [1890]), 1458. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Company v. Voris, Exrs. (110 Ky. 315, 61 S. W. 474 [1901]), 629. Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (194 U. S. 618, 24 S. 784, 48 L. 1142 [1904]), 108, 144, 388, 464, 485, 515, 779, 1370. Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (117 Fed. 925 [1902]), 108, 144, 313, 314, 387, 388, 436, 438. 464, 480, 485, 515, 698, 779, 1026, 1136, 1324, 1370, 1414. Field V. City of Chicago (198 111. 224, 64 N. E. 840 [1902]), 166, 386, 463, 511, 551, 555, 570, 739, 747, 762, 828, 874, 913, 950. Field V. Inhabitants of the Tovirn- ship of West Orange (39 N. J. Eq. (12 Stew.) «0 [1884]), 968, 1171, 1447. Fields V. The Commissioners of Highland County (36 0. S. 476 [1881]), 11, 38, 147, 1421. Fifth Avenue Sewer, In the Matter of the Contract for the, in the City of Pittsburg (4 Brewster (Pa.) 364 [1870]), 388, 444, 468, 549, 558, 563, 867. Fifty-fourth St., Pittsburg's Appeal (165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [1894]), 554, 620, 626, 627. Figg V. Louisville & N. E. E. Co. . (116 Ky. 135, 75 S. W. 269, 25 Ky. L. E. 350 [1903]), 594, 595, 597, 598, 630. Findlay, City of v. Frey (51 0. S. 390, 38 N. E. 114 [1894]), 561, 577, 625, 681, 689, 700, 704. Findley v. Hull (13 Wash. 236, 43 Pac. 28 [1895]), 313, 1505. Findley v. City of Pittsburg (82 Pa. St. (1 Xorris) 351 [1876]), 497. Findley v. City of Pittsburg (Pa.) 11 Atl. 678), 53, 55, 323, 527. Finlayson v. Vaugh (54 Minn. 331, 56 N. W. 49), 365. Finnegan v. City of Fernandina (15 Fla. 379, 21 Am. Eep. 292 [1875]), 73. Finnell v. Howells (2 Cin. Sup. Ct. (Ohio) 150 [1872]), 171, 687. Finnell v. Kates (19 0. S. 405 [1869]), 120, 728, 740. Finney v. City of Oshkosh (18 Wis. 209 [1864]), 1512. First Division of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad 'Company v. City of St. Paul (21 Minn. 526 [1875]), 172, 594, 614. First Draining District, In the Mat- ter of the Commissioners of the (27 La. Ann. 20 [1875]), 119, 127, 340. 952. First Methodist Episcopal Church South, v. City of Atlanta (76 Ga. 181 [1886]), 613. First National Bank of Kansas City V. Arnoldia (63 Mo. 229), 1335. First National Bank of Sterling v. Drew (93 111. App. 630 [1900]), 409. First National Bank of Kansas City v. Nelson (64 Mo. 418 [1877]), 570, 575, 656, 1335. First Presbyterian Church of Fort Wayne v. City of Fort Wayne (36 Ind. 338, 10 Am. Eep. 35 [1871]), 588, 613. First Presbyterian Church v. City of Lafayette (42 Ind. 115 [1873]), 1191, 1215, 1245, 1356, 1373. Firth v. Broadhead ( 1 Mo. App. 563 [1879]), 171, 1081. Fisohback v. People ex rel. Tether- ington (191 111. 171, 60 N. E. 887 [1901]), 296, 927, 937, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. Fishburn v. City of Chicago (171 111. 338, 63 Am. St. Rep. 236, 39 L. R. A. 482, 49 N. E. 532), 515. TABLE OF CASES. cm [References are to sections.] Fisher v. City of Chicago (213 111. 268, 72 N. E. 680 [1904]), 324, 330, 917, 918, 1375. Fisher v. Georgia Vitrified Brick and Clay Company (121 Ga. 621, 49 S. E. 679 [1905]), 519, 1432. Fisher v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of New York (67 N. Y. 73 [1876]), 73, 910, 925, 1067, 1096, 1309. Fisher v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (6 Hun (N. Y.) 64 [1875]), 1009,_ 1286. Fisher v. Mayor,' etc., of City of New York (3 Hun (N. Y.) 648 [1875]), 73, 1090, 1096, 1161, 1259. Fisher v. City of Rochester (6 Lan- sing 225 [1872]), 280, 467, 526. Fisher v. Mayor, etc., of New York (4 Lansing 451 [1871]), 64, 1469. Fisher v. People ex rel. Kern ( 157 HI. 85, 41 N. E. 615 [1895]), 531, 988, 996. Fisher v. City of St. Louis (44 Mo. 482 [1869]), 1509. Fiske V. People ex rel. Raymond (188 111. 206, 52 L. R. A. 291, 58 N. E. 985 [1900]), 514, 927, 986, 992, 1183, 1375. Fitch V. Keeler (10 0. S. 169 [1859]), 86, 553. Fitzgerald v. City of Sioux City (125 la. 396, 101 N. W. 268 [1904]), 670, 707, 1035, 1082, 1165, 1194. Fitzgerald v. Walker (55 Ark. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]), 16, 151, 209, 249, 266, 314, 475, 531, 540, 686, 1015, 1022, 1035. Fitzhugh V. Ashworth (119 Cal. 393, 51 Pac. 635 [1897]), 324, 468, 541, 821, 833, 840. Fitzhugh V. City of Bay City (109 Mich. 581, 67 N. W. 904 [1896]), 1015, 1436. Fitzhugh V. City of Duluth (58 Minn. 427, 59 N. W. 1041), 367, 914. Fitzhugh V. Levee District (54 Ark. 224, 15 S. W. 455 [1891]), 73, 343, 1346. Flanagan v. City of St. Pa:ul (65 Minn. 347, 68 N. W. 47 [1896]), 746, 747, 1200. Flatbush, In the Matter of the As- sessments of Lands in the Town of, for the Extension of Prospect Park in the City of Brooklyn (60 N. Y. 398 [1875]), 409, 425, 637. Flatbush Avenue in City of Brook- lyn, In the Matter of ( 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 286 [1847]), 681, .889, 890, 922, 1278. Fleener v. Claman (126 Ind. 166, 25 N. E. 900), 266, 270. Fleet v..Dorland (11 Howard (N. Y.) 489 [1854]), 1055. Fleetwood v. City of New York (4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 475 [1849]), 1174, 1484, 1485. Fleming v. Hull (73 la. 598, 35 N. W 673), 337. Flemming v. Mayor and Council of the City of Hoboken (40 N. J. L. (11 Vr.) 270 [1878]), 1510. Fletcher v. Oliver (25 Ark. 281), 639. Fletcher v. City of Oshkosh (18 Wis. 228 [1864]), 974, 1069, 1489, 1505, 1518. Fletcher v. Prather (102 Cal. 413, 36 Pac. 658 [1894]), 324, 509. Flewellin v. Proetzel (80 Tex. 191, 15 S. W. Rep. 1043 [1891]), 171, 223, 234, 775, 777, 878, 879, 910. Flickinger v. Fay (119 Cal. 590. 51 Pac. 855 [1893]), 495, 500, 1437. Flinn v. Gouley (139 Cal. 623, 73 Pac. 542 [1903]), 1233. Flinn v. Peters (3 Cal. App. 235, 84 Pac. 996 [1906]), 514. Flinn v. Strauss (4 Cal. App. 245, 87 Pac. 414 [1906]), 498. Flint V. Webb (25 Minn. 93 [1878]), 420, 735, 745, 910, 913, 1067, 1202. Flora V. Cline (89 Ind. 208 [1883]), 1015, 1033, 1043, 1242. Florer v. McAffee (135 Ind. 540, 35 N. E. 277 [1893]), 1085, 1101. Florida v. . (See State of Florida v. . ) Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville (17 Ind. 169, /9 Am. Dec. 468), 15, 86, 134, 570, 1112, 1113, 1211, 1346. CIV TABLE OP CASES. ['snoi^Dds o; ajH sddnajaja)!] Floyd V. Atlanta Banking Co. (109 Ga. 778, 35 S. E. 172 [1899]), 17, 1033, 1436. Flushing Avenue, In the Matter of (98 N. Y. 445 [1885]), 918, 989. Flynn v. Canton Company of Balti- more (40 Md. 312, 17 Am. Rep. 603 [1874]), 56, 58. Flynn Township v. Woolman (133 ^ich. 508, 95 N. W. 567 [1903]), 340, 1431. Fogg V. Hoquiam (23 Wash. 340, 63 Pac. 234 [1900]), 1165. Foley V. Bullard (97 Cal. 516, 32 Pac. 574 [1893]), 1384. Folmshee v. City of Amsterdam (142 N. Y. 118, 36 N. E. 821 [1894]), 510, 781, 829, 837. Folsom, In the Matter of (56 N. Y. 60 [1874]), 762. Folsom, Petition of (2 S. (T. & C.) 55 [1873]), 745. Folz V. City of Cincinnati (2 Handy (Ohio) 261 [1855]), 413, 424, 1509. Poote V. City of Milwaukee (18 Wis. 270 [1864]), 484, 485, 521, 538, 737, 747, 1006, 1335, 1338, 1450. Forbes Street (70 Pa. St. (20 P. F. Smith) 125 [1871]), 113, 427. Forbis v. Bardbury (58 Mo. App. 506 [1894]), 804, 810, 1024. Ford, In the Matter of (6 Lansing (N. Y.) 92 [1872]), 47, 200, 495, 550, 745, 770, 864, 874, 981. Ford V. Delta and Pine Land Com- pany (164 U. S. 662, 41 L. 590, 17 S. 230 [1897]), 42, 343, 612, ■613, 617, 1092. Ford V. Delta & Pine Land Co. (43 Fed. 181 [1890]), 42, 343, 613. Ford V. Town of North Des Moines (80 la. 626, 45 N. W. 1031 [1890]), 119, 135, 728, 729, 732, 1026. Ford V. City of Toledo (64 0. S. 92, 59 N. E. 779 [1901]), 324, 327, 446, 549, 563, 578, 608, 641, 663. Forgey v. Northern Gravel Co. (37 Ind. 118 [1871]), 639, 723, 1432, 1444. Forry v. Ridge (56 Mo. App. 615 [1893]), 621, 631, 698, 709. Forsyth v. Wilcox (143 Ind. 144, 41 N. E. 371 [1895]), 70, 86, 113. Fort Chartres & Ivy Landing Drain- age & Levee Dist. No. 5 v. Smalk- and (70 111. App. 449' [1897]), 223, 234, 739,, 776, 813, 815. Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge (115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]), 12, 118, 301, 507, 603, 640, 666, 698, 709, 1414, 1504, 1508, 1509. Fort Scott, City of v. Kaufman (44 Kan. 137, 24 Pac. 64 [1890]), 447, 636. Fort Smith, School District of v. Board of Improvement (65 Ark. 343, 46 S. W. 418 [1898]), 586, 1077. Fort Street & Elmwood R. R. Co. V. Schneider ( 15 ' Mich. 74 [1866]), 438. Fort Wayne, City of v. Cody (43 Ind. 197 [1873]), 555. Fort Wayne, City of v. Shoaff ( 106 Ind. 66, 5 N. B. 403 [1885]), 358, 454. Foss v. City of Chicago (184 111. 436, 56 N. E. 1133 [1900]), 912, 1183. Foss V. City of Chicago (56 111. 354 [1870]), 860, 1337. Foster v. City of Alton (173 111. S87, 51 N. E. 76 [1898]), 956, 962, 1513. Fosterr v. Cape May (60 N. J. L. (31 Vr.) 78), 280. Foster v. Park Commissioners of Boston (133 Mass. 321), 356, 525. Foster v. Park Commissioners of Boston (131 Mass. 225), 356. Foster v. Paxton (90 Ind. 122 [1883]), 1030, 1414, 1431. Foster v. Commissioners of Wood County (9 0. S. 540 [1859]), 89, 189, 255, 322, 538, 711. Fountain v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark (57 N. J. Eq. (12 Dick.) 76, 40 Atl. 212 [1898]), 958, 959, 968, 1066, 1083, 1447. TABLE OP CASES. CV [References are to sections.] Fountain Head Drainage District Commissioners of v. Wright (228 111. 208, 81 N. E. 849 [1907]), 822, 952, 1382.. Fowler, Matter of (53 N. Y. 60), 142. Fowler v. City of St. Joseph (37 Mo. 228 [1866]), 423, 525, 527, 707, 714, 1059, 1113, 1427, 1432, 1442, 1502. Fox V. Middlesborough Town Co. (96 Ky. 262, 20 S. W. 776 [1894]), 439, 527. 561, 574, 628, 666, 709, 710, 735, 741, 848, 1015. Fralich v. Barlow (25 Ind. App. 383, 58 N. E. 271 [1900]), 301, 526, '843, 1235, 1236, 1272, 1303, 1324, 1375. Frank v. City of Chicago (216 111. 587, 15 N. E. 213 [1905]), 1375, 1376, 1377. Frankfort, Board of Councilmen of City of V. Brislin ( — Ky. , 104 S. W. 311, 31 Ky. L. R. 867 [1907]), 1346. Frankfort, Board of Councilmen of V. Mason & Foard Company (100 Ky. 48, 37 S. W. 290 [1896]), 52, 55, 227, 956, 963. Frankfort, Board of Councilmen of City of V. Murray (99 Ky. 422, 36 S. W. 180 [1896]), 53, 55. Frankfort, City of v. State ex rel. Ross (128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 [1891]), 578, 587, 629. Franklin v. Hancock (204 Pa. St. 110, 53 Atl. 644 [1902]), 147, 148, 314, 437, 622, 624, 698, 709, 1041, 1094. Franklin, Mayor of v. Mabery (6 Humph. (Tenn.) 368, 44 Am. Dee. 315), 1123. Franklin County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. Gardiner Savings In- stitution (119 Fed. 36 [1902]), 1498. Franklin County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. City of Ottawa (49 Kan. 747, 33 Am. St. Rep. 396, 31 Pac. 788 [1892]), 301, 580, 582, 1075. Franklin Park, Village of v. Frank- lin (231 111. 380, 83 N. E. 214 [1907]), 921, 1270. Franklin Park, Village of v. Frank- lin (228 111. 591, 81 N. E. 1132 [1907]), 1376. Frantz, Jr. v. Jacob (88 Ky. 525, 11 S. W. 654 [1889]), 304, 662, 1103, 1437. Eraser v. Mulany (129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]), 340, 554, 556, 564, 639, 723, 907. Frazer v. State for Use of Inger- man (106 Ind. 471, 7 N. E. 203 [1886]), 340, 1147, 1232. Frederick Street, Hanover Bur- rough's Appeal (150 Pa. St. 202, 24 Atl. Rep. 669 [1892]), 244, 776. Frederick v. City of Seattle (19 Wash. 428, 43 Pac. 364 [1896]), 408, 782, 956, 962, 965, 990, 1399. Freeport Borough v. Robert Mil- ler's Estate (34 Pa. Super. Ct. 395 [1907]), 1063. Freeport Street Railway Company v. City of Freeport (151 111. 451, 38 N. E. 137 [1894]), 413, 623, 837, 879, 956, 962, 967, 991, 1100. Fremont, City of v. Hayes (4 Ohio N. P. 379), 1125. French v. Barber Asphalt Co. (181 U. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]), 86, 118, 123, 244, 245, 293, 301, 314, 516, 553, 666, 702, 728, 1049, 1370. French v. Kirkland (1 Paige (N. Y.) 117), 336. French v. City of Lowell (117 Mass. 363 [1875]), 76, 312, 654. Frenna v. Sunnyside Land Company (124 Cal. 437, 57 Pac. 302 [1899]), 537, 1052, 1062. Frevert, Pros. v. Mayor and Council of the City of Bayonne (63 N. J. L. (34 Vr.) 202, 42 Atl. 773 [1899]), 667, 1404, 1408. Frey v. City of Findlay (7 Ohio C. C. 311 [1893]), 561, 577, 681, 704. Frick V. Morford (87 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1891]), 465, 479, 510, 537, 631, 831, 960, 965, 1030, 1358, 1359, 1471. CVl TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Fricke v. City of Cincinnati ( 1 Ohio N. P. 98 [1894]), 475, 975, 977, 1105. Friedenwald v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore {74 Md. 116, 21 Atl. 555, 24 Atl. 156 [1891]), 309, 432, 654, 816, 1349, 1363, 1414, 1432. Friedrich v. City of Milwaukee (118 Wis. 254, 95 N. W. 126 [1903]), 674, 923, 1005, 1283. Friedrich v. City of Milwaukee (114 Wis. 304. 90 N. W. 174 [1902]), 71, 639, 661, 1519. Frosh V. City of Galveston (73 Tex. .401, 11 S. W. 402 [1889]), 223, 234, 777, 813, 815, 830. Frost V. Leatherman (55 Mich. 33, 20 N. W. 705 [1884]), 781, 859, 867, 1049, 1052, 1426, 1427, 1443. Fruin-Bambrick Construction Com- pany V. Geist (37 Mo. App. 509 [1889]), 223, 234, 628, 777, 804, 811, 1303. Frush V. City of East Portland (6 Or. 281 [1877]), 1512. Frye v. Town of Mount Vernon (42 Wash. 268, 84 Pac. 864 [1906]), 301, 972, 1475. Fuchs V. St. Louis (167 Mo. 620, 57 L. E. A. 136, 67 S. W. 610), 324. Fuess V. Kansas City and the Brook- lyn Avenue Railway Co. ( 191 Mo. 692, 90 S. W. 1029 [1905]), 66, 654, 1373. Fulkerson v. City of Bristol (105 Va. 555, 54 S. E. 468 [1906]), 107, 161, 168, 639, 645, 688. Fuller V. City of Elizabeth (42 N- J. L. (13 Vroom) 427 [1880]), 927, 1003, 1486. Fuller V. City of Grand Rapids (105 Mich. 529, 63 N. W. 530 [1895]), 526, 839, 859, 865, 1057. Fulton Street, In the Matter of (29 Howard Pr. 429 [1865]), 461, 463, 464. Fulton V. Town of Dover (8 Houst. (Del.) 78, 6 Atl. 633, 12 Atl. 394, 31 Atl. 974 [1888]), 70. Fulton County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. Board of Commis- sioners of Henry County (64 Ohio St. 160, 59 N. E. 883 [1901J), 1371. Furman Street, Matter of (17 Wend. (N. Y.) 649), 653. F. v. Smith Contracting Co. v. City of New York (100 N. Y. S. 756, 115 App. Div. 180 [1906]), 538. Gable v. Altoona ( 200 Pa. St. 15, 49 Atl. 367 [1901]), 844, 1502, 1511. Gaertner v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co. (114 Ky. 160, 70 S. W. 293 [1902]), 443, 862, 1249. Gaffney v. Gough (36 Gal. 104 [1868]), 1049, 1151. Gafney v. City and County of San Francisco (72 Cal. 146, 13 Pac. 467 [1887]), 856, 862, 865, 1509, 1?15. Gage V. City of Chicago (225 111. 218, 80 N. E. 127 [1907]), 121, 266, 748, 758, 1039, 1279. Gage V. City of Chicago (225 111. 135, 80 N. E. 86 [1907]), 726. Gage V. 'City of Chicago. (223 111. 802, 79 N. E. 294 [1906]), 758, 764. Gage V. City of Chicago (216 111. 107, 74 N. E. 726 [1905]), 886, 909, 1085, 1104, 1391. Gage V. City of Chicago (211 111. 109, 71 N. E. 877 [1904]), 918. Gage V. City of Chicago (207 111. 56, 69 N. E. 588 [1904]), 266, 831, 857, 858, 864, 1279, 1289. Gage V. City of Chicago (203 111. 26, 67 N. E. 477 [1903]), 317, 440, 1377. Gage V. City of Chicago (201 111. 93, 66 N. E. 374 [1903]), 511, 570, 750, 831, 839, 864, 866, 918, 987, 1000, 1377. Gage V. City of Chicago (196 111. 512, 63 N. E. 1031 [1902]), 323, 469, 739, 747, 835, 864. Gage V. City of Chicago (195 111. 490, 63 N. E. 184 [1902]), 328, 448, 469, 835, 950, 1373. TABLE OF CASES. evil [References are to sections.] Gage V. City of Chicago (193 111. 108, 61 N. E. 850 [1801]), 852, 978, 994, 1390. Gage V. City of Chicago (192 111. 686, 61 N. E. 849 [1901]), 317, 323, 440, 835. Gage V. City of Chicago (191 111. 210, 60 N. E. 896 [1901]), 295, 297, 328, 401, 417, 418, 859. Gage V. City of Chicago (179 111. 392, 53 N. E. 742 [1899]), 864. Gage V. City of Chicago (162 111. 313, 44 N. E. 729 [1896]), 912, 947, 1281, 1372, 1377. Gage V. City of Chicago (146 111.' 499, 34 N. E. 1034 [1893]), 308, 311, 391, 394, 426, 920. Gage V. City of Chicago (143 111. 157, 32 N. E. 264 [1893]), 857. Gage V. Dupuy (137 111. 652, 24 N. E. 541, 26 N. E. 386 [1892] )., 746, 750, 1184, 1196, 1448. Gage V. Graham (57 111. 144 [1870]), 105, 259, 344. Gage V. Parker (103 111. 528 [1882]), 927, 986, 1199, 1429. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (225 111. 144, 80 N. E. 90 [1907]), 471, 472, 950, 1108, 1113. Gage V. People (221 111. 527, 77 N. E. 927 [1906]), 1132. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (219 111 219, 76 N. E. 834 [1906]), 526, 826, 1103, 1189, 1330. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (219 111. 369, 76 N. E. 498 [1906]), 471, 925, 950, 1113, 1183. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (219 111. 20, 76 N. E. 56 [1905]), 883, 1183. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 468, 72 X. E. 1108 [1905]), 491,- 986, 996, 1183, 1290, 1372. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 457, 72 N. E. 1099 [1905]), 301, 1189, 1389. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 410, 72 N. E. 1084 [1904]), 986, 998, 1184, 1343. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (213 111. 347, 72 N. B. 1062 [1904]), 491, 1324. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (207 111. 377, 69 N. E. «40 [1904]), 469, 723, 820, 909, 921, 927, 932, 996, 1183, 1340, 1389, 1390. Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg (207 111. 61, 69 N. E. 635 [1904]). 514, 818, 927, 986, 996, 1183, 1189. 1332. Gage V. People ex rel. (205 111. 547, 69 N. E. 80 [1903]), 746, 1101, 1108, 1178, 1299. Gage V. People ex rel. Raymond (200 111. 432, 65 N. E. 1084 [1903]), 531, 533. Gage V. People ex rel. Raymond (193 111. 316, 56 L. R. A. 916, 61 N. E. 1045 [1901]), 533, 989, 1342. Gage V. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (163 111. 39, 44 N. E. 819 [1896]), 311, 986, 996, 1183, 1340, 1379. Gage V. Springer (211 111. 200, 103 Am. St. Rep. 191, 71 N. E. 860 [1904]), 484, 539. Gage V. Springer (112 111. App. 103 [1904]), 484, 539. Gage V. Waterman (121 111. 115, 13 N. E. 543 [1889]), 51, 746, 748, '764, 1178, 1207, 1448. Gage T. Webb (141 111. 533, 31 N. E. 130 [1893]), 746, 748, 760, 764, 888, 1184, 1444. Gage V. Village of Wilraette (230 111. 428, 82 N. E. 656 [1907]), 324, 469, 472. Galbreath v. Newton (30 Mo. App. 381 [1888]), 18, 496, 530, 541, 856, 1028, 1137, 1138. Galesburg, City of v. Searles (114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]), 51, 153, 271, 279, 295, 324, 670, 715. Gallagher v. Bartlett (64 Mo. App. 268 [1896]), 1135, 1137, 1243, 1284. Gallaher v. Garland (126 la. 206, 101 N. W. 867 [1904]), 479, 740, 777, 962, 1028, 1196. Gallaher v. City of Jefferson ( 125 la. 324, 101 K W. 124 [1904]), 313, 432. CVlll TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Gait V. City of Chicago (174 111. 605, 51 N. E. 653 [1898]), 314, 388, 527, 663, 672, 675, 850, 912. Galveston, City of v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (107 Fed. 325, 46 C.,C. A. 319 [1901]), 45, 301, 1080, 1101, 1164, 1165. Galveston, City of v. Heard (54 Tex. 420 [1881]), 119, 120, 123, 132, 323, 474, 475, 485, 507, 521, 728, 737, 760, 763, 773, 779, 815, 1047, 1049, 1163. Galveston v. Loonie, 54 Tex. 517 [-1881]), 1504. Gans V. City of Philadelphia (102 Pa. St. 97 [1883]), 1063. Gantz, In re, to Vacate an Assess- ment (85 N. y. 536 [1881]), 1072, 1460, 1463. Gantz, In the Matter of (23 Hun (N. Y.) 350 [1880]), 1460. Garden City, City of v. Trjigg (57 Kan. 632, 47 Pac. 524 [1897]), 1498. Gardiner v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston (188 Mass. 223, 74 N. E. 341 [1905]), 425, 426, 480, 514, 723, 979, 981. Gardner, In the Matter of (41 How- ard, 255 [1871]), 313, 693, 699, 714, 900. Gardner, In the Matter of the Pe- tition of (6 Hun. (N. y.) 67 [1875]), 500. Garrett v. City of St. Louis (25 Mo. 505, 69 Am. Dec. 475 [1857]), 8, 70, 86, 89, 110, 308, 690, 697. Garrick v. Chamberlain (97 111. 620 [1881]), 173, 1049, 1185. Garrison v. City of New York (88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 196, 22 L. 612 [1874]), 166, 170, 1337. Gartside Coal Company v. Turk (147 III. 120, 35 N. E. 467 [1894]), 927, 1145. Garvey, In the Matter of (77 N. Y. 523 [1879]), 464, 781. Garvey v. Inhabitants of Revere (187 Mass. 545, 73 N. E. 664 [1905]), 67, 76. Garvin v. Dussman (114 Ind. 429, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637, 16 N. e. 826 [1887]), Un, 1.S2, 301, 726, 731, 773, 777, 979, Q'Sl, 1122, 1141, 1145, 1337. Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of New Albany (158 Ind. 268, 63 N. E. 458 [1901]), 11, 63, 70, 71, 102, 324, 887, 997. Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271, 22 N. W. 614 [1885]), 1200. Gas^n V. City of Portland (48 Or. ■82, 84 Pac. 1040 [1906]), 967, 974, 1088, 1207. Gaston v. Portland (41 Or. 373, 69 Pac. 34, 445 [1902]), 62, 63, 70, 308, 1010. Gatch V. City of Des Moines (63 la. 718, 18 N. W. 310 [1886]), 12, 119, 135, 666, 677, 717, 726, 729, 732. Gately v. Leviston (63 Cal. 365 [1883]), 781, 783, 828. Gates v. City of Grand Rapids ( 134 Mich. 96, 95 N. W. 998 [1903]), 293, 324, 325, 432, 441, 1015, 1436- Gates V. City of Toledo (57 0. S. 105, 48 N. E. 500 [1897]), 1515. Gates V. City of Toledo (10 Ohio C. C. 160 [1895]), 1515. Gates V. Toledo (7 Ohio N. P. 389 [1900]), 1515. Gatling v. Commissioners of Cart- eret County ( 92 N. C. 536, 55 Am. Rep. 432 [1885]), 73. Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Land- ing Drainage District No. 1 (131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]), 41, 223, 247, 284, 549, 550, 554, 556, 557, 564, 641, 642, 915, 920, 927, 1008, 1049, 1112, 1114, 1116, 1141, 1145, 1213, 1337. Gault's Appeal (33 Pa. St. (9 Ca- sey) 94 [1859]), 8, 89, 171, 1197. Gedge v. City of Covington ( — Ky. , 80 S. W. 1160, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 273 [1904]), 423, 1502. Geiger v. Bradley (117 Ind. 120, 19 N. E. 760 [1880]), 423, 878, 1113. Geiszler v. DeGraaf (166 N. Y. 339, 82 Am. St. Rep. 659, 59 N. E. 993 [1901]), 1072. Genet v. City of Brooklyn (99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777 [1885]), 70, 89, HI, 308, 309, .381, 555, 556, 666, 709, 884. TABLE OF CASES. CIX [References are to sections.] Genet v. City of Brooklyn ( 94 N. Y. 645 [1884]), 73. Gens V. City of Philadelphia (102 Pa. St. 97 [1883]), 1063. Greorge v. Young (45 La. Ann. 1232, 14 So. 137 [1893]), 37, 147, 212. 343, 548, 553, 660, 689, 711. German Bank v. Brose (32 Ind. App. 77, 69 N. E. 300 [1903]), 997, 1099. German Protestant Orphan Asylum V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (26 Ky. Law Rep. 805, 82 S. VV. 632 [1904]), 709, 710. German Savings & Loan Society v. Eamish (138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pac. 1067 [1902]), 73, 485, 521, 550, 551, 555, 570, 619, 781, 795, 801, 874, 1346. German-American Savings Bank v. City of Spokane (17 Wash. 315, 38 L. E. A. 2.59, 47 Pac. 1103, 49 Pac. 542 [1897]), 1468, 1469, 1473, 1504, 1510, 1518. Gerraania Bank v. City of St. Paul (79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542 [1900]), 525, 526, 527, 1490. Germond v. City of Tacoma (6 Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961 [1«93]), 140, 141, 475, 1103, 1337. Gest V. City of Cincinnati (26 0. S. 275. [1875]), 86, 475, 544, 975, 977, 1041, 1210, 1216. Gibbons v. District of Columbia (116 U. S. 404, 6 S. 427), 243. Gibbs I'. People's National Bank (198 111. 307, 64 N. E. 1060 [1902]), 49. Gibler v. City of Mattoon (167 111. 18, 47 N: E. 319 [1897]), 925, 1384, 1391. Gibson v. City of Chicago (22 111. 567 [1859]), 408, 472, 883, 1270. Gibson v. City of Cincinnati (9 Ohio C. C. 243 [1894]), 561, 625, 704, 1013. Gibson v. Farrell (106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 [1891]), 89. Gibson v. Kay ser's Executor ( 1 6 Mo. App. 404 [1885]), 315, 317, 381, 438, 440, 714. Gibson v. Owens (115 Mo. 258,' 21 S. W. 1107 [1892]), 499. Gibson v. Zimmerman (27 Mo. App. 90 [1887]), 437, 862, 1140, 1278, 1284, 1382. Gifford V. Republican Valley & Kan- sas Railroad Company (20 Neb. 538, 31 N. W. 11 [1886]), 2. Gifford Drainage District \. Shroer (145 Ind. 572, 44 N. E. 636), 291, 337. Gilbert v. Hall (115 Ind. 549, 18 N. E. 28 [1888]), 916, 1337. Gilbert v. Havemeyer (4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 506 [1849]), 244, 278, 1041, 1053, 1054, 1130. Gilbert v. City of New Haven (40 Conn. 102 [1873]), 616, 1304. Gilbert v. City of New Haven (39 Conn. 467 [1872]), 293, 644, 723, 738, 1352. Gilchrist's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 600), 637. Gilcrest v. McCartney (97 la. 138, 66 N. W. 103 [1896]), 552, 574, 620. Gilfeather v. Grout (91 N. Y. S. 533, 101 App. Div. 150 [1905]), 475, 10.35, 1097. Gilfillan ». Eddy (123 Mo. 540, 27 S. W. 471), 174, 595. Gilfillan V. Morris (43 Mo. App. 590), 174. Gilkerson v. Scott (76 I'.l. 509 [1875]), 272, 639, 688, 771, 909, 1351. Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices ( 13 Graft. (Va.) 577), 43, 162. Gill v. City of Oakland (124 Cal. 335, 57 Pac. 150 [1899]), 310, 731, 744. 952, 1444, 1481, 1482, 1484, 1485. Gill V. Patton (118 Iowa, 88, 91 X. W. 904 [1902]), 895, 956, 959, 962. Gillespie v. Police Jury of Concor- dia (5 La. Ann. 403 [1850]), 37, 343, 711, 983. Gillett V. McLaughlin (69 Mich. 547, 37 N. W. 551), 142, 1012. Gillette v. Denver (21 Fed. 822), 123. Gillis v. Cleveland (87 Cal. 214, 25 Pac. 351 [1890]), 998, 1039, 1049, 1059, 1062, 1131. ex TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Oilman v. City of Milwaukee (61 Wis. 588, 21 N. W. 640 [1884]), 367, 800, 835, 1444. Oilman v. City of Milwaukee (53 Wis. 328, 13 N. W. 266 [1882]), 356, 357, 549, 555, 636, 1098. Oilman v. City of Sheboygan (2 Black (67 U. S.) 510, 17 L. 305 [1862]), 548. Gilmore v. Fox (10 Kan. 509 [1872]), 1028, 1442, 1443. Gilmore v. Hentig (33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1885]), 11, 119, 134, 135, 324, 415, 526, 563, 670, 677, 690, 697, 731, 732, 750, 760, 819, 1420, 1432. Gilmore v. Norton ( 10 Kan. 491 [1872]), 81, 177, 409, 410, 414, 649, 815, «16, 980, 1231, 1268, 1294, 1450. Gilmore v. City of Utica (131 N. Y. 26, 29 N. E. 841 [1892]), 237, 373, 374, 501, 604, 770, 822, 918, 1290, 1375. Gilpin V. City of Ansonia (68 Conn. 72, 35 Atl. 777 [1896]), 223, 245, 950, 1525. Gilson V. Mun8on (114 Mich. 671, 72 N. W. 994 [1897]), 363. Gilsonite Construction Co. v. Arkan- sas M'Alester Coal Co. (205 Mo. 49, 103 S. W. 93 [1907]), 509, 797, 821, 828, 867, 1085, 1168. Oinn V. Moultrie, Coles and Douglas Drainage District (188 111. 305, 58 N. E. 988 [1900]), 66. Girvin v. Simon (127 Cal. 491, 59 Pac. 945 [1900]), 531, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1360. Girvin v. Simon (116 Cal. 604, 48 Pac. 720 [1897]), 301, 497, 1030, 1235, 1258, 1267, 1337, 1372. Givins v. City of Chicago (188 111. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]), 103, 104, 257, 259, 293, 801, 857, 920. Givins v. City of Chicago (186 111. 399, 57 N. E. 1045 [1900]), 781, 789, 815, 833, 863, 864, 895. Givins v. People ex rel. Raymond (194 III. 150, 88 Am. St. Rep. 143, 62 N. E. 534 [1902]), 495, 497, 514, 515, 1015, 1022, 1332. Gladstone, City of v. Throop (71 Fed. 341, 18 C. C. A. 61, 37 U. S. App. 481 [1893]), 570, 1502. Glass V. Gilbert (58 Pa. St. (8 P. F. Smith) 266 [1868]), 886. Glassell v. O'Dea ( — Cal. App. — , 95 Pac. 44 [1908]), 512. Oleason v. Barnett (115 Ky. 890, 61 S. W. 20 [1903]), 462, 787, 835, 83*8, 844. Oleason v. Barnett (106 Ky. 125, 50 S. W. 67 [1899]), 314, 437, 555, 561, 570, 628, 629, 666, 709, 710, 844, 1249. Oleason v. Waukesha County (103 Wis. 225, 79 N. W. 249 [1899]), 283, 347, 348, 451, 1431. Glenn v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (67 Md. 390, 10 Atl. 70 [1887]), 1054. Glenn v. Waddel (23 O. S. 605 [1873]), 944, 1004, 1431, 1442. Olos v. Cannata (121 111. App. 215 [1905]), 927, 929, 992, 1207. Glos V. Collins (110 111. App. 121 [1903]), 837, 1183, 1390. Glos V. Oleason (209 111. 517, 70 N. E. 1045 [1904]), 1126. Glos V. Hanford (212 111. 261, 72 N. E. 439 [1904]), 1126, 1443, 1444. Olos V. Woodward (202 111. 484, 67 N. E. 3 [1903]), 1126. Glover v. People ex rel. Raymond (201 111. 545, 66 N. E. 820 [1903]), 514, 1263. Glover v. People ex rel. Raymond 194 111. 22, 61 N. E. 1047 [1901]), 1083. Glover v. People ex rel. Raymond (188 111. 576, 59 N. B. 429 [1901]), 764, 772, 914, 930, 986, 993, 1183, 1340. Godbey v. City of Bluefield (— W. ' Va. , 57 S. E. 45 [1907]), 73, 661. Oodbold V. City of Chelsea (111 Mass. 294 [1873]), 76, 244, 1372. Goddard, Petitioner (33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 504, 28 Am. Dec. 259 [1835]), 58, 96, 323, 457. Godkin v. Rutterbush (147 Mich. 116, 110 N. W. 505 [1907]), 1495. Goff V. McGee (128 Ind. 394, 27 N. E. 754 [1891]), 375, 1414. TABLE OP CASES. cxt [References are to eections.] Goldstein v. Village of Milford (214 111. 528, 73 N. E. 758 [1905]), 1391. Goodale v. Fennell (27 0. S. 426, 22 Am. Eep. 321- [1875]), 171, 687, 1506, 1514. Goodrich v. City of Chicago (218 111. 18, 75 N. E. 805 [1905]), 956, 965. Goodrich v. Detroit (184 U. S. 432, 46 L. 627, 22 S. 397 [1902]), 118, 125, 308, 669, 670, 690, 709, 728, 729, 833, 1370. Goodrich v. City of Detroit (123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]), 118, 125, 308, 549, 550, 555, 560, 619, 626, 669, 670, 690, 691, 695, 709, 728, 729, 833, 1370. Goodrich v. City of Minonk (62 111. 121 [1871]), 341, 550, 564, 619, 643, 735, 764, '771, 1271, 1272, 1299, 1323, 1374, 1377. Goodrich v. City of Omaha ( 10 Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 424 [1880]), 231, 313, 428. Goodwillie V. City of Detroit (103 Mich. 283, 61 N. W. 526 [1894]), 266, 314, 494, 816, 1015, 1029, 1430, 1436. Goodwillie v. City of Lake View (137 111. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]), 223, 308, 393, 394, 396, 426, 429, 472, 663, 665, 666, 676, 677, 744, 745, 764, 813, 909, 913, 914, 916, 917, 920, 922, 954, 991, 1328, 1372, 1377, 1379, 1433. Goodwine v. Leak ( 127 Ind. 569 , ( 27 N. E. 161 [1890]), 277, 340, 723, 1002, 1375. Goodwine v. Leak (114 Ind. 499, 10 N. E. '816 [1887]), 739, 748, 809, 916. Gordon v. City of Chicago (201 111. 623, 66 N. E. 823 [1903]), 347, 1310. Gordon v. Commissioners of High- ways of Road District No. 3 (169 111. 510, 48 N. B. 451 [1897]), 69, 71. Gorman v. State ex rel. Koester ( 157 Ind. 205, 60 N. E. 1083 [1901]), 738, 916, 918, 927, 1005, 1026. Gormley's Appeal (27 Pa. St. (3 Casey) 49 [1858]), 1068. Gorton v. City of Chicago (201 111. 534, 66 N. E. 541 [1903]), 917, 956, 962, 965, 1385, 1390. Gosnell v. City of Louisville (104 Ky. 201, 46 S. W. 722, 20 Ky. L. R. 519 [1898]), 43, 147, 154, 475, 519, 613, 1105, 1108, 1164, 1526. Gotthelf V. Stranahan (138 N. Y. 345, 20 L. R. A. 455, 34 N. E. 286 [1893]), 11, 49, 1058, 1072. Gotthelf V. Stranahan (19 N. Y. Supp. 161), 1058. Gould V. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (59 Md. 378 [1882]), 8, 45, 314, 1042, 1053, 1115, 1146, 1164. Gould V. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (58 Md. 46 [1881]), 1042, 1043, 1057, 1169. Graden v. City of Parkville, 114 Mo. App. 527, 90 S. W. 115 [1905]), 838, 1432. Grafius Run, In re (218 Pa. St. 632, 67 Atl. 982 [1907]), 627. Grafius' Run (31 Pa. Super. Ct. 638 [1906]), 560. Graham v. City of Chicago (187 111. 411, 58 N. E. 393 [1900]), 517, 518, 670, 675, 709, 872, 1388. Graham v. Conger (85 Ky. 582, 4 S. W. 327, 9 Ky. L. R. 133 [1887]), 111, 322. Graham v. Mayor, etc., of City of Paterson (37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 380 [1875]), 1408. Grams v. Murphy ( — Minn. , 114 N. W. 753 [1908]), 509. Grand Island Gas Co. v. West (28 Neb. 852, 45 N. W. 242 [1890]), 486. Grand Rapids v. De Vries ( 123 Mich. 570, 82 N. W. 289), 372. Grand Rapids, City of v. Lake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co. (130 Mich. 238, 97 Am. St. Rep. 473, 89 N. W. 932), 1081. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad Company v. Horn (41 Ind. 479 [1873]), 69. cxu TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.! Grand Kapids School Furniture Co. V. City of Grand Kapids (92 Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028 [1892]), 86, 110, 135, 245, 301, 555, 556, 653, 670, 690, 709, 736, 886, 1299. Granger v. City of Buffalo (6 Abb. N. C..(N. Y.) 238 [1879]), 252, 410, 483, 808, 982, 1280. Grant Avenue, In the Matter of Op- ening (175 N. Y. 509, 67 N. E. 1083 [1903]), 672, 693, 1351. Grant v. Barber (135 Cal. 188, 67 Pac. 127 [1901]), 823, 831, 864, 867, 1248. Grant v. Bartholomew (58 Neb. 839, 80 N. W. 45 [1899]), 1013, 1277. Grant Park, Village of v. Trah (218 111. 516-, 75 N. E. 1040 [1905]), 67. Grant Park, Village of v. Trah (115 HI. App. 291 [1904]), 67. Graves v. Otis (2 Hill (N. Y.) 466 [1842]), 781. Gray, Appeal of ( — Conn. , 67 Atl. 891 [1907]), 1350, 1352, 1362. Gray v. Board of Aldermen of Bos- ton (139 Mass. 328, 31 N. E. 734), 420. Gray v. Bowles (74 Mo. 419 [1881]), 679, 895, 897, 997, 998, 1059, 1203. Gray v. Burr ( 138 Oal. 109, 70 Pac. 1068 [1902]), 803, «10. Gray v. Town of Cicero (177 111. 459, 53 N. E. 91 [1899]), 15, 223, -234, 329, 448, 555, 775, 950. Gray v. City of Detroit (113 Mich. 657, 71 N. W. 1107), 1179, 1194. Gray v. Lucas (115 Cal. 430, 47 Pac. 354 [1-896]), 537, 965. Grey v. People ex rel. Raymond ( 194 111. 486, 62 N. E. 894 [1902]), 514, 1290. Gray v. City of Pittsburgh (147 Pa. St. 354, 23 Atl. 395 [1892]), 961. Gray v. Richardson (124 Cal. 460, 57 Pac. 385 [1899]), 483, 823,. 1471. Gray v. Stiles (6 OkU 455, 49 Pac. 1083 [1897]), 3. Graydon and Hammill, In re (20 Ont. 199 [1890]), 1072. ' Great Falls Ice Co. v. District of Columbia (19 D. C. 327 [1890]), 542, 726, 902, 983. Great Meadows on Pequest River, In Matter of Drainage of (42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880]), 12, 101, 108, 119, 338, 339, 341, 449, 677, 717, 956, 962, 1370. Grea4 Meadows on Pequest River, In Matter of Commissioners to drain the (39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]), 32, 101, 339, 525, 956, 962. Greeley v. Town of Cicero (148 111. 632, 36 N. E. 603 [1894]), 665, 666, 677, 922, 943, 954, 955, 991. 1307. Greeley v. People of the State of Illinois (60 111. 19 [1871]), 181, 245, 674, 677, 715. Green v. City of Fall River (113 Mass. 262 [1873]), 70, 76. Green v. City of Springfield (130 111. 515, 22 N. E. 602 [1890]), 86 620, 663, 672, 698, 715, 877, 920, 1005, 1271, 1272, 1373. Green v. Tldball (26 Wash. 338, 55 L. R. A. 879, 67 Pac. 84 [1901]), 313, 1066, 1072, 1149. Green v. Ward (82 Va. 324 [1886]), 161, 223, 234, 264, 268, 438, 570, 663, 713, 1040, 1143. Green County, Commissioners of v, 'Commissioners of Lenoir County (92.]Sr. C. 180 [1885]), 11, 363, 665, 686. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co. V. Patten Paper Co. (172 XJ. 8. 58, 19 S. 97), 715. Green River Asphalt Company v. City of St. Louis (188 Mo. 576, 87 S. W. 985 [1905]), 517, 1500. Greencastle, City of v. Allen (43 Ind. 347 [1873]), 974, 1518. Greencastle & Bowling Green Turn- pike Company v. Albin (34 Ind. 554 [1870]), 554, 629, 639, 1432. Greendale, Town of v. Suit (163 Ind. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904]), 55, 229, 323, 420, 609, 630, 717, 1038, 1242. Greene County, Commissioners of v. Harbine (74 0. S. 318, 78 IST. E. 521 [1906]), 341, 449. TABLE OF CASES. CXIU [References are to Ftectlons. ] Greenfield Avenue, In re. Appeal of the City of Pittsburg, 191 Pa. St. 290, 43 Atl. 225 [1899]), 217, 779. Greenfield, City of v. State ex rel. Moore (113 Ind. 597, 15 N. E. »41 [1887]), 483, 826, 1471. Greenhood v. MacDonald ( 183 Mass. 342, 67 N. E. 330 [1903]), 1415, 1421, 1425. Greenlawn, City of v. Levers (200 Pa. St. 56, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]), •1159. Greensboro, City of v. McAdoo (112 N. C. 359, 17 S. B. 178 [1893]), 223, 231, 234, 244, 323, 777, 950. Greensburg Borough of v. Laird (138 Pa. St. 533, 21 Atl. 96 [1890]), 223, 234, 382, 1157, 1159. Greensburg, Borough of v. Young (53 Pa. St. 280 [1866]), 236, 237, 295, 662, 670, 713, 1346. Greensburg City of v. ZoUer (28 Ind. App. 126, 60 N. E. 1007 [1901]), 301, 833, 918, 1000. Greentree Avenue, In re (21 Pa. Super. Ct. 177 [1902]), 988. Greenville, City of v. Harvie (79 Miss. 754, 31 So. 425 [1901]), 236, 831, 873. Greenville & Columbia R. R. Com- pany v. Partlow (5 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 428 [1852]), 70. Greenwood v. Chandon (130 Cal. 467, 62 Pac. 736 [1900]), 301, 537, 907. Greenwood v. Morrison ( 128 Cal. 350, 60 Pac. 971 [1900]), 267, 499, 509, 670, B67, 1337. Greenwood, Town of v. State ex rel. Lawson (159 Ind. 267, 64 N. E. 849 [1902]), 266, 531, 840, 909. Gre'Tory v. City of Ann Arbor ( 127 ifich. 454, 86 N. W. 1013 [1901]), 719, 886. Gregory v. City of Bridgeport (52 Conn. 40 [1884]), 245, 264, 739. Grideley v. City of Bloomington (88 111. 554, 30 Am. Rep. 566 [1878]), 5", 457. Griffin v. City of Chicago (57 111. 317 [1870]), 764, 914, 1299, 1326. Griffin v. Dogan (48 Miss. 11 [1873]), 110. Griffith V. Pence (9 Kan. App. 253, 59 Pac. 677), 142. Griggs V. City of St. Paul (11 Minn. 308, [1866]), 323, 813, 829. Griggsry Construction Company v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 58 L. E. A. 349, 32 So. 399 [1902]), 36. Grimes v. Coe (102 Ind. 406, 1 N. E. 735 [1885]), 559, 586, 723, 748, 768, 825. Grimm v. Shickle (4 Mo. App. 585 [1877]), 395, 905. Grimmell v. City of Des Moines (57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]), 248, 324, 550, 555, 572, 831, 838, 843, 1435. Groesbeck v. City of Cincinnati (51 Ohio St. 365, 37 N. E. 707 [1894]), 466, 526, 1492. Groflf V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- mon Council of Frederick City (44 Md. 67 [1875]), 100, 110. Gross V. Village of Grossdale ( 176 111. 572, 52 N. E. 370 [1898]), 281, 998, 1085, 1377. Gross V. People ex rel. Raymond 193 111. 260, 86 Am. St. Rep. 322, 61 N. E. 1012 [1901]), 466, 918, 986, 987, 998, 1000, 1029, 1085, 1183, 1343. Gross V. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (172 111. 571, 50 N. E. 334 [1898]), 313, 856, 863, 866, 998, 1183. Gross V. People (169 111. 635, 48 N. E. 1108), 998. Grover v. Cornet (135 Mo. 21, 35 S. W. 1143 [1896]), 71. Groves v. Slaughter (15 Pet. (40 U. S.) 449, 10 L. 800 [1841]), 162. Grunewald v. City of Cedar Rapida (118 Iowa, 222, 91 N. W. 1059 [1902]), 50, 324, 507, 563, 689, 697, 719, 1504. Guokien v. Rothrock (137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. 17 [1893]), 118, 119, 126, 729, 885, 965, 1431. Guerin v. Reese (33 Cal. 292 [1867]), 1039, 1061, 1062, 1153. Guest V. City of Brooklyn (69 N. Y. 506 [1877]), 709, 761, 1085, 1415, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1427. CXIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Guest V. City of Brooklyn (8 Hun (N. Y.) 97 [1876]), 200. Guild V. City of Chicago (82 111. 472 [1876]), 11, 51, 108, 131, 194, 219, 223, 619, 623, 715, 776, 925. Guilder v. Town of Otsego (20 Minn. 74, 20 Gil. 59 [1873]), 61, 359. Guinotte v. Ridge (46 Mo. App. 254 [1891]), 15, 229, 500, 527, 779, 1028, 1236. Guliek V. Connely (42 Ind. 134 [1873]), 524, 535, 541, 1277, 1290, 1352. Gurnee v. City of Chicago (40 111. 165), 281, 381, 386, 464, 476, 478, 765, 825, 886, 962, 1129. Guthrie & Western Railway Co. v. Faulkner (12 Okl. 532, 73 Pac. 290 [1903]), 66, 69. Guy V. District of Columbia (25 App. D. C. 117 [1905]), 1408. Guyer v. City of Rock Island (215 111. 144, 74 N. E. 105 [1905]), 849, 856, 862, 863, 864, 867, 923, 1279, 1282. Gwynn v. Dierssen (101 Cal. 563, 36 Pac. 103 [1894]), 1195. H Haag V. Ward (186 Mo. 325, 85 S. W. 391 [1904]), 186, 215, 323, 479, 860, 865, 867, 1149, 1284. Hacker v. Howe (72 Neb. 385, 101 N. W. 255 [1904]), 3. Hackett v. State for use of Martin- dale (113 Ind. 532, 15 N. E. 799 [1887]), 340, 539, 739, 768, 1085, 1237, 1332, 1449. Hackworth v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co. (106 Ky. 234, 50 S. W. 33 [1899]), 380, 381, 864, 1055. Hackworth v. City of Ottumwa (114 la. 467, 87 N. W. 424 [1901]), 100, 118, 314, 620, 698, 709. Haddington Methodist Episcopal Church V. City of Philadelphia to Use, etc. (108 Pa. St. 466 [1885]), 1047, 1165. Hadley v. Dague (130 Cal. 207, 62 Pac. 500 [1900]), 82, 118, 301, 537, 553, 666, 668, 698, 709, 824, 833, 1216, 1282, 1366, 1502. Haegele v. Mallinckrodt (46 Mo. 577 [1870]), 864, 1135, 1284. Haegele v. Mallinckrodt (3 Mo. App. 329 [1877]), 570, 675, 857, 1137, 1389. Hagaman v. Moore (84 Ind. 496 [1^2]), 70. Hagar v. Gaet (119 Ky. 502, 84 S. W. 556, 27 Ky. L. R. 129 [1905]), 210, 581, 613. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108 (111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 469, 4 S. 663 [1884]), 108, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 131, 132, 135, 142, 147, 172, 251, 334, 335, 338, 340, 618, 665, 666, 728, 732, 760, 773, 1086, 1370. Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County (51 Oal. 474 [1876]), 223, 234, 952. Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County (47 Cal. 222 [1874]), 43, 79, 86, 97, 101, 147, 148, 228, 252, 335, 338, 340, 343, 355, 549, 564, 618, 1002, 1294, 1403, 1405, 1408. Hageman v. City of Passaic (51 N. J. L. (22 Vr.) 544, 18 Atl. 776 [1889]), 745. Hageman's Appeal (88 Pa. St. (7 Norris) 21 [1878]), 1047, 1068, 1144, 1216. Hagemeyer, In re (99 N. Y. S. 369, 13 App. Div. 472 [1906]), 1085, 1104, 1451. Hager v. City of Burlington (42 la. 661 [1876]), 783, 795, 843, 1028, 1432. Hagerstown, Mayor and Council of V. Startzman (93 Md. 606, 49 Atl. 838 [1901]), 45, 314, 1111, 1116. Haggard v. Independent School Dis- trict of Algona (113 la. 486, 8& N. W. 777 [1901]), 69. Haines v. Board of Chosen Freehold- ers of Burlington County (73 N. J. L. (44 Vr.) 82, 62 Atl. 18ft [1906]), 173. Haines v. Kent (11 Ind. 126 [1858]), 363. TABLE OP CASES. CXV [References are to sections.] Haiseh v. City of Seattle (10 Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 [1894]), 510, •534, 535, 554, 555, 1024. Hale V. City of Kenosha (29 Wis. 599 [1872]), 35, 163, 322, 360, 365, 456. Hale V. Moore (82 Ark. 75, 100 S. W. 742 [1907]), 340, 927, 986, 996, 1358. Haley v. City of Alton (152 111. 113, 38 X. E. 750 [1894]), 223, 314, 531, 5C8, 840, 911, 912, 922, 1002, 1312, 1338. Hall V. Street Commissioners of Boston (177 Mass. 434 [1901]). 86, 103, 117, 380, 381, 407, 408, 414, 666, 725. Hall V. City of Chippewa Falls (47 Wis. 267, 2 N. W. 279 [1879]), 740, 813, 844, 1505. Hall V-. City of Meriden (48 Conn. 416 [1880]), 416, 1361. Hall V. Moore (3 Neb. Unoff. 574, 92 N. W. 294 [1902]), 875, 877, 1006, 1007, 1011. Hall V. Slavbaugh (69 Mich. 484, 37 N. W. 545), 1012. Hallett V. United States Security and Bond Co. (— Colo. , 90 Pac. 683 [1907]), 135, 555, 751, 1435. Hallock V. City of Lebanon (215 Pa. St. 1, 64 Atl. 362 [1906]), 509. Halsey v. Town of Lake View ( 188 111. 540, 59 N. E. 234 [1901]), 67, 153, 368, 452, 475, 517, 518, 719, 837, 866, 927, 952, 955, 1106, 1373. Halstead v. City of Attica (28 Ind. 378 [1867]), 1353. Halton V. City of Milwaukee (31 Wis. 27 [1872]), 322. Hamar v. Leihy (124 Wis. 265, 102 N. W. 568 [1905]), 596, 598, 805, 1337. Hamilton, Town of v. Chopard (9 Wash. 352, 37 Pac. 472 [1894]), 483, 837, 951, 1281. Hamilton v. City of Fond du Lac (25 Wis. 490 [1870]), 456, 631, 895. Hamilton v. People ex rel. Raymond (194 111. 133, 62 N. E. 533 [1902]), 514. Hamilton v. Valiant (30 Md. 139), 1206. Hamilton Avenue, Matter of ( 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 405 [1852]), 918. Hamilton Company v. Massachusetts (6 Wall. (U. S.) 632 [1867]), 715. Hammett v. Philadelphia ( 65 Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1869, 1870]), 28, 34, 291, 304, 378, 382, 384, 387, 462, 549. Hammond v. Carter (161 111. 621, 44 N. E. 274 [1896]), 377, 909, 945, 1196. Hammond, Village of v. Leavitt (181 111. 416, 54 N. E. 982 [1899]). 781, 782, 918, 992, 1002, 1268. Hammond v. People for Use ( 178 111. 254, 52 N. E. 1030), 340, 1108, 1141, 1145, 1182. Hammond v. People for Use, etc ( 169 111. 545, 48 N. E. 573 [1897]), 340, 525, 819, 927, 932, 986, 996, 1089, 1141, 1145, 1183, 1340. Hancock Street, Extension of (18 Pa. St. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851]), 267, 278, 310, 557, 560, 626, 653, 690, 692. Hancock v. Whittemore (50 Cal. 522 [1875]), 8, 40, 1039, 1042, 1053, 1067. Hand v. Fellows (148 Pa. St. 456, 25 Atl. 1126 [1892]), 244, 706, 776, 784. Handy v. Collins (60 Ind. 229 [1883]), 1042. Hannewinkle v. Georgetown ( 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 547, 21 L. 231 [1872]), 308, 1423, 1426, 1427. Hannibal, City of v. Richards (82 Mo. 330 [1884]), 342. Hanscom v. City of Omaha ( 1 1 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]), 11, 35, 324, 326, 327, 418, 549, 555, 563, 729. Hansen v. Hammer (15 Wash. 315, 46 Pne. 332 [1896]), 103, 105, 121, 147, 247, 249, 262, 665, 666, 760. Harbach v. City of Omaha (54 Neb. 83, 74 N. W. 434 [1898]), 93. CXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Hardin v. City of Chicago (186 111. 424, 57 N. E. 1048 [1900]), 863, 917. Hardwick v. Danville and North Sa- lem Gravel Road Company (33 Ind. 321 [1870]), 554, 629, 639, 723, 884, 885, 899. Hardvirick v. City of Independence (— la. — , 114 N. W. 14 [1907]), 324, 799, 833, 837. Hardy v. McKinney (107 Ind. 364, 8 N. E. 232), 1351. Hare v. Kennerley (83 Ala. 608, 3 So. 683), 150. Harkness v. Board of Public Works (1 McArthur (D. C.) 121 [1873]), 1411, 1423. Harkness v. Sehiely (13 Ohio C. C. 177 [1896]), 1054. Harman v. People ex rel. Munster- man (214 III. 454, 73 N. E. 760 [1905]), 927, 931, 935, 986, 996, 1085, 1183, 1340, 1391. Harmon v. Dallas (165 Ind. 710, 75 N. E. -823 [1905]), 276. Harmon v. City of Omaha (53 Neb. 164, 73 N. W. 671 [1897]), 223, 234, 778, 1164, 1420. Harney v. Applegate (57 Cal. 205 [1881]), 1245. Harney v. Benson (113 Cal. 314, 45 Pac. 687 [1896]), 324, 401, 670, 674, 724, 812, 1005, 1007, 1358. Harney v. Heller (47 Cal. 15 [1873]), 301, 811, 812, 821, 823, 833, 858. Harper, Appeal of (109 Pa. St. 9, 1 Atl. 791 [18S5]), 413, 424, 496, 777, 1359. Harper v. Dowdney (113 N. Y. 644, 21 N. E. 63 [1889]), 1072. Harper v. City of Grand Rapids 105 Mich. 551,. 63 N. W. 517 [1895]), 531. Harper v. Commissioners of New Hanover County (133 N. C. 106, 45 S. E.-526 [1903]), 38, 147, 363, 549, 567, 665, 666. Harriman v. City of Yonkers (181 N. Y. 24, 73 N. E. 493), 308, 550, 555, 1375. Harriman v. City of Yonkers (95 N. Y. S. 816, 109 App. Div. 246 [1905]), 624, 1463. Harriman v. City of Yonkers (81 N. Y. S. 823, 82 App. Div. 408 [1903]), 308, 550, 555, 1375. Harris v. City of Ansonia (73 Conn. 359, 47 Atl. 672 [1900]), 223, 234, 264, 777, 841, 983. Har^s V. City ol Chicago 162 111. 288, 44 N. E. 437 [1896]), 633, 657, 989, 1183, 1313, 1342. Harris v. City of Macomb (213 111. 47, 72 N. E. 762 [1904]), 602, 603, 604. Harris v. People ex rel. Knight (218 111. 439, 75 N. E. 1012 [1905]), 51, 202, 323, 921, 1126. Harris v. Ross (112 Ind. 314, 13 N. E. 873 [1887]), 340, 375, 1444. Harris v. City of Tacoma (39 Wash. 185, 81 Pac. 691 [1905]), 1355, 1356. Harris, County of v. Boyd (70 Tex, 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]), 39, 40, 50, 145, 301, 582. Harriott Avenue (24 Pa. Super. Ct. 597 [1904]), 560, 601, 620, 1047. Harrisburg v. Baptist ( 156 Pa. St. 526, 27 Atl. 8 [1893]), 485, 527, 803, 1012, 1159. Harrisburg v. Funk (200 Pa. St. 348, 49 Atl. 992 [1901]), 291, 382, 383, 402. Harrisburg, City of v. M'Cormick (129 Pa. St. 213, 18 Atl. 126). 632. Harrisburg v. McPherran (200 Pa. St. 343, 49 Atl. 988 [1901]), 118, 666, 698, 709. Harrisburg, City of v. Segelbaum 151 Pa. St. 172, 20 L. R. A. 834, 24 Atl. 1070 [1892]), 86, 382, 383, 462. Harrisburg, City of v. Shepler (190 Pa. St. 374, 42 Atl. 893 [1899]), 274, 314, 505, 867. Harrison Brothers v. City of Chi- cago (163 111. 129, 44 N. E. 395 [1896]), 314, 857, 865, 902, 903. Harrison v. City of Chicago (61 111. 459 [1871]), 770, 968. Harrison Brothers v. City of Chica- go (60 111. 360 [1871]), 1185. TABLE OF CASES. cxvn [References are to sections.] Harrison v. City of Milwaukee (49 Wis. 247, 5 N. W. 326 [1880]), 1414, 1480, 1484, 1489. Hart V. ILievee Commissioners (54 Fed. 559), 343. Hart V. City of Omaha (74 Neb. 836, 105 N. W. 546 [1905]), 305, 549, 558, 560, 619. Hart Bros. v. West Chicago Park Commissioners (186 111. 464, 57 N. E. 1036 [1900]), 143, 774, 913, 1368. Hartford, City of v. Mechanics' Sav- ings Bank (79 Conn. 38, 63 Atl. 658 [1906]), 1049, 1050, 1064, 1163, 1164. Hartford, City of v. Taleott (48 Conn. 525, 40 Am. Rep. 189 [1881]), 56. Hartford, City of v. West Middle District (45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. 687 [1878]), 549, 580, 586, 652. Hartig v. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (159 111. 237, 50 Am. St. Rep. 162, 42 N. E. 879 [1896]), 1285. Hartman v. Hunter (56 0. S. 175, 46 ]Sr. E. 577 [1897]), 1164. Harton v. Town of Avondale ( 147 Ala. 458, 41 So. 934 [1906]), 82, 118, 301, 441, 663, 665, 666, 668, 700, 714, 864, 1406. Harts V. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (171 111. 458, 49 N. E. 539 [1898]), 291, 347, 34g, 351, 451, 886, 985. Hartsuff v. Hall (58 Neb. 417, 78 N. W. 716 [1899]), 1277. Hartwell v. Armstrong (19 Barb. (N. Y.) 166 [1854]), 101, 113, 324, 444, 855. Harvard Avenue, North In re ( — Wash. , 92 Pac. 410 [1907]), 657, 1282, 1338. Harvard College, President and Fel- lows of V. Board of Aldermen of the City of Boston (104 Mass. 470 [1870]), 8, 64, 86, 590, 614, 1054. Harward v. St. Clair & Monroe Levee Drainage Company (51 111. 130 [1869]), 105, 259, 344. Harwood v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston ( 183 Mass 348, 67 N. E. 362 [1903]), 103, 234, 667, 709. Harwood v. Donovan ( 188 Mass. 487, 74 N. E. 914 [1905]), 82, 103, 665, 666, 695, 1403. Harwood v. Drain Commissioners 51 Mich. 63fl, 17 N. W. 216 [1883]), 1436. Harwood v. Huntoon (51 Mich. 639, 17 N. W. 216 [1883]), 1012, 1034. Haskel v. City of Burlington (30 la. 232), 182. Haskell v. Bartlett (34 Cal. 281 [1867]), 15, 56, 223, 234, 475, 761, 763, 836, 1052. Hassan v. City of Rochester (67 N. Y. 528 [1876]), 42, 86, 555, 580, 581, 612, 613, 614, 639, 644, 723, 884, 941, 1004, 1282, 1435, 1438. Hassan v. City of Rochester (6 Lan- sing, 185 [1871]), 979, 981. Hassen v. City of Rochester ( 65 N. Y. 516 [1875]), 554, 555, 581, 012, 613, 639, 723. Hastings v. Columbus (42 0. S. 585 [1885]), 380, 381, 467, 500, 515, 517, 518, 527, 529, 542, 760, 763, 977, 1215, 1224. Hatch V. City of Buffalo (38 N. Y. 276 [1868]), 1425. Hatch V. Nevills (— Cal. . 93 Pac. 43 [1907]), 512. Hatch V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (45 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 599 [1879]), 1495. Hathaway v. Detroit, T. & M. Ry. Co. (124 Mich. 610, 83 N. W. 598 [1900]), 363. Hatzung v. City of Syracuse (92 Hun, 203, 36 N. Y. S. 521 [1895]), 414, 983. Haubner v. City of Milwaukee ( 124 Wis. 153, 101 N. W. 930, re-hear- ing denied, 102 N. W. 578 [1905]), 110, 220, 417, 700, 899, 959. Haughawout v. Hubbard (131 Cal. 675, 63 Pac. 1078 [1901]), 324, 831, 857, 867. Haughawout v. Raymond ( 148 Cal. 311, 83 Pac. 53 [1905]), 558, 838, 1026, 1337. cxviu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Hause v. City of St. Paul (94 Minn. 115, 102 X. W. 221 [1905]), 927, 1003. Haven v. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (173 N. Y. 611, 66 N. E. 1110 [1903]), 531, 537, 1319, 1487. Havens v. City of New York (73 N. Y. S. 678, 67 App. Div. 90 [1901]), 637, 1319. Havens v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (67 App. Div. 90, 73 N. Y. S. 678 [1901]), 531, 1487. Haviland v. City of Columbua (50 0. S. 471, 34 N. E. 679 [1893]), 561, 620, 625, 704, 1028. Hawes v. City of Chicago ( 158 111. 653, 30 L. K. A. 225, 42 N. E. 373 [1895]), 387. Hawes v. Fliegler (87 Minn. 319, ■92 N. W. 223 [1902]), 370, 746, 763, 1184, 1204. Hawkins v. Hortou (91 Minn. 285, '97 N. W. 1053 [1904]), 783, 789, 927, 931, 992. Hayden v. City of Atlanta (70 Ga. 817 [1883]), 73. Hawley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (33 Md. 270 [1870]), 308, 709, 723, 1384. Havrthorne v. City of East Portland (13 Or. 271, 10 Pac. 342 [1886]), 223, 234, 754, 777, 860, 887, 889, 890, 1011, 1047, 1049, 1064. Hawver v. City of Omaha (52 Neb. 734, 73 N. W. 217 [1897]), 392, 395, 997. Hay V. City of Baraboo ( 127 Wis. 1, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, 105 N. W. 654 [1906]), 56. Hay V. McDaniel (26 Ind. App. 683, 60 N. E. Rep. 729 [1901]), 1055. Hayday, Pros. v. Borough of Ocean City (69 N. J. L. (40 Vr.) 22, 54 Atl. 813 [1903]), 314, 968. Havden v. City of Atlanta (70 Ga. 817 [1883]), 35, 43, 100, 110, 147, 148, 570, 663, 666, 698, 709. Hayden, Pros v. Ocean City (67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.), 155, 50 Atl. 584 [1901]), 897, 968, 986. Hayes v. Douglas County .(92 Wis. 429, 53 Am. St. Rep. 926, 31 L. R. A. 213, 65 N. W. 482 [1896]), 134, 141, 693, 699, 700, 979, 1337, 1414, 1432, 1435. Hayes v. Missouri (120 U. S. 68, 30 L. 578 [1877]), 108. Hayes v. State ex rel. Murray (96 Ind. 284 [1884]), 758, 763," 1292, 132d. Hayford v. City of Belfast (69 Me. 63 [1879]), 735, 737, 1479. Hays V. City of Cincinnati (62 Ohio St. 116, 56 N. E. 658 [1900]), 685, 783, 950. Hays V. Jones (27 0. S. 218 [1875]). 781, 1502. Hays V. Tippy (91 Ind. 102 [1883]), 141,. 809, 916. Hays V. City of Vineennes (82 Ind. 178 [1882]), 309, 859, 1252, 1263. Haywood v. City of Buffalo (14 N. Y. 534 [1856]), 1426, 1427, 1444. Hazleton, In the Matter of the Pe- tition 'of (58 Hun, 112, 11 N. Y. S. 557 [1890]), 681, 1026, 1461, 1462. Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Company (113 U. S. 9, 5 S. 441, 28 L. 889), 336, 338. Heard v. Walton (39 Miss. 388 [I860]), 1197. Hearn, In the Matter of (96 X. Y. 378 [1884]), 266, 273, 983. Heath v. MeCrea (20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 [1898]), 207, 244, 265, 416, 423, 475, 545, 670, 677, 719, 724, 927, 933, 964, 975, 1004, 1066, 1083, 1085, 1141, 1145, 1337, 1435. Heath v. Manson (147 Cal. 694, 82 Pac. 331 [1905]), 57, 266, 292, 373, 374, 381, 461, 463, 481, 521. Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum, In the Matter of (70 N. Y. 476 [1877]), 475, 589, 681, 1466^ Hebrew Benevolent and Orphan Asy- lum, Matter of (10 Hun, 112 [1877]), 681, 686, 1466. Heckman v. Mayor, etc., of New York (22 Hun, (X. Y.) 590 [1880]), 1422. Hedges v. Roelke ( — Ky. , 100 S. W. 267, 30 Ky. L. R. 1092), 844. TABLE OF CASES. CXIX [References are to sections.] Heerman's Heirs v. Municipality No. 2 (15 Curry (La.) 597 [1840]), 280, 1333. Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Coun- ties (193 111. 439, 58 L. R. A. 353, 62 N. E. 201 [1901]), 335, 449. Heffner v. City .of Toledo (75 0. S. 413, 80 N. E. 8), 854, 1502. Heft V. Payne (97 Cal. 108 (31 Pac. 844 [1892]), 538, 1029, 1033, 1043. Hegeman v. City of Passaic (51 N. J. L. (22 Vr.) 544, 18 Atl. 776 [1889]), 744, 913. Hegeman, Pros. v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Passaic (51 N. J. L. (22 Vr.) 109, 16 Atl. 62 [1888]), 909. Heick V. Voight (110 Ind. 279, 11 N. E 306 [1886]), 11, 336, 549, 673, 677, 1005. Heim v. Figg (— Ky. . 89 S. W. 301, 28 Ky. Law Kep. 390 [1905]),, 462. Heine v. Levee Commissioners (86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 655, 22 L. 223 [1873]), 343, 1518. Heine v. Levee Commissioners (11 Fed. Cas. 1033, 1 Woods 246 ) , 343, 1518. Heinroth v. Kochersperger ( 173 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1898]), 324, 448, 484, 533, 539, 541, 550, 563, 645, 723, 1420, 1432, 1433, 1443, 1468. Heinz v. Buckham ( — Mich. , 116 N. W. 736 [1908]), 119, 731, 1404. Heiple v. City of Washington (219 111. 604, 76 N. E. 834 [1906]), 526, 750, 814, 912, 920. Heiser v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New- York (104 N. Y. 68, 9 N. E. 866 [1887]), 266, 1411, 1423, 1432. Helena, City of v. Kent (32 Mont. 279, 80 Pac. 258 [1905]), 58, 92, 457. Hellenkamp v. City of Lafayette (30 Ind. 192 [1868]), 541, 1015, 1350, 1352, 1436. Heller v. City of Garden City (58 Kan. 263, 48 Pac. 841 [1898]), 305, 1115, 1206, 1508. Hellman v. Shoulters (114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057 [1896]), 79, 80, 118, 140, 245, 476, 1085, 1103, 1170, 1281, 1304. Helm V. Witz (35 Ind. App. 131, 73 N. E. 846 [1904]), 414, 561, 575, 620, 626, 639, 656, 956, 962, 1239, 1244. Heman v. Allen (156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]), 86, 118, 120, 123, 244, 245, 283, 324, 445, 677, 702, 741, 728, 1238. Heman v. Farish (97 Mo. App. 393, 71 S. W. 382 [1902]), 1134, 11.35, 1284. Heman v. Gerardi (96 Mo. App. 231, 69 S. W. 1069 [190'2]), 527, 538, 1338. Heman v. Gilliam (171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 163 [1902]), 118, 321, 442, 524, 538, 549, 620, 666, 698, 709, 1139, 1284. Heman v. Handlan (59 Mo. App. 490 [1894]), 327, 444, 446, 662. Heman v. Larkin (108 Mo. App. 392, 83 S. W. 1019 [1904]), 18, 530. Heman v. Payne (27 Mo. App. 481 [1887]), 401, 447, 1249, 1284. Heman v. Ring (95 Mo. App. 231 [1900]), 293, 388, 464. Heman v. Schulte (166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1901]), 8, 100, 110, 293, 298, 400, 549, 555, 563, 1003. Heman •{. St. Louis Merchants Land Improvement Company ( 75 Mo. App. 372 [1898]), 57, 374, 521, 829. Heman v. Wolff (33 Mo. App. 200 [1888]), 324, 555, 679, 1284. Heman's Heirs v. Municipality No. 2, 15 La. 597 [1840]), 923. Heman Construction Co. v. Loevy (179 Mo. 544, 78 S. W. 613 1903]), 274, 275, 511, 524, 838, 867, 1040, 1067, 1182. Heman Construction Co. v. Loevy (64 Mo. App. 430 [1895]), 511, 525, 631, 865, 867, 1284. cxx TABLE OP CASES. [Referencps are to sections.] Heman Construction Company v. McManus (102 Mo. App. 649, 77 S. W. 310 [1903]), 53, 65, 317, 443, 620, 717. Heman Construction Co. v. Wabash Ey. Co. (206 Mo. 172, 104 S. W. 67 [1907]), 7, 8, 11, 43, 89, 147, 595, 1040, 1049. Heman v. City of Ballard (40 Wash. 81, 82 Pac. 277 [1905]), 245, 663, 1503. Heming v. Stengel (112 Ky. 906, 66 S. W. 41, 67 S. W. 64, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1793 [1902]), 651, 1381. Hemingway v. Chicago (60 111. 324 [1871]), 308, 321, 426, 675, 735, 745, 754, 764. Hempfield Township Road (122 Pa. St. 439), 909. Henderson v. Mayor and City Coun- cil of Baltimore, Use of Eschbach (8 Md. 352 [1855]), 15, 86, 223, 234, 314, 323, 525, 781, 786, 1067, 1282, 1335. Henderson, City of v. Lambert (77 Ky. (14 W. P. D. Bush.) 24 [1878]), 223, 234, 525, 527, 531, 541, 775, 776. Henderson v. City of South Omaha (60 Xeb. 125, 82 X. W. 315 [1900]), 781, 789, 791, 931. Hendersonville, Commissioners of Town of V. Webb (— N. C. , 61 S. E. 670 [1908]), 1504. Hendrick- v. Crowley (31 Cal. 471 [1866]), 835, 1215, 1216. Hendricks v. Gilchrist (76 Ind. 369 [1881]), 323, 644, 723, 887, 1283. Hendrickson v. Borough of Point Pleasant (65 N. J. L. 535, 47 Atl. 465 [1900]), 280, 281, 309, 847, 894. Hendrickson v. City of Toledo (23 Ohio C. C. 256 [19*1]), 17, 795, 1012, 1033, 1450. Hendrie v. City of Boston ( 179 Mass. 59, 60 X. E. 386 [1901]), 616, 1033. Henkel v. City of Cincinnati (58 0. S. 726, 51 N. E. 1098), 90, 308. Henning v. Stengel (112 Ky. 906, 66 S. W. 41, 67 S. W. 64, 23 Ky. L. R. 1796), 666, 679. 1011. Henningsen v. City of Stillwater (81 Minn. 215, 83 N. W. 983 [1900]), 1195, 1337. Hennepin County v. Bartleson (37. Minn. 343, 34 N. W. 222), 121, 733. Hennessy v. Douglas County (99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]), 119J 140, 301, 323, 324, 553, 620, 621, 622, 693, 694, 723, 733, 737, 751. Hennessy v. City of St. Paul (44 Minn. 306, 46 N. W. 353 [1890]), 391, 394. Hensley v. City of Butte (33 Mont. 206, 83 Pac. 481 [1905]), 805, 807, 808, 810, 1432. Hensley v. Reclamation District Xo. 556 (121 Cal. 96, 53 Pac. 401 [1898]), 247, 775, 1505. Hentig v. Gilmore (33 Kan. 234, 6 Pac. 304 [1885]), 11, 50, 223, 232, 281, 436, 438, 505, 677, 814, 816, 817, 840. Herhold v. City of Chicago (106 111. 547 [1883]), 1369. Hering v. Chambers (103 Pa. St. 172 [1883]), 986, 1157, 1160. Herman v. City of Oconto (100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W. 364 [1898]), 1503. Hermann v. State ex rel. (54 0. S. 506, 32 L. R. A. 734, 43 X. B. 990 [1896]), 421, 1032. Hershherger v. City of Pittsburg (115 Pa. St. 78, 8 Atl. 381 [1886]), 119, 726, 735, 979, 981. Hersee v. City of Buffalo (1 Shel- don (X. y.) 445 [1874]), 223. 234, 410, 568, 790, 843. Hert«r v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company (114 la. 330, 86 X. W. 266 [1901]), 596. Hertig v. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (159 111. 237, 50 Am. St. Rep. 162, 42 X. E. 879 [1896]), 772, 927, 930, 986, 993. Hess V. Potts (32 Pa. St. (8 Casey 407 [1859]), 1197, 1198. Hessler v. Drainage Commissioners (53 111. 105), 105, 259, 344. Heth V. City of Radford (96. Va. 272, 31 S. E. 8 [1898]), 115. TABLE OF CASES. CXXl [References are to EectloDS. ] Heubner v. City of Milwaukee ( 124 Wis. 153, 101 N. W. 930 [1904]), 899. Hewes v. Glos (170 111. 436, 48 N. E 922), 313, 347, 348, 351. Hewes v. Village of Winnetka (60 111. App. 654 [1S95]), 223, 234, 500, 742, 759, 774, 777, 824, 886, «89, 998, 1184, 1444. Hewetson v. City of Chicago (172 111. 112, 49 N. E. 992 [1898]), 917; Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 55), 414, 983. Heywood v. City of Buffalo (14 N. Y. 534 [1856]), 1423. Hibben v. Smith (191 U. S. 310, 24 S. 88 [1903]), 108, 115, 132, 133, 142, 280, 301, 670, 675, 699, 730, 731, 927, 956, 1005, 1067, 1083, 1370. Hibben v. Smith (158 Ind. 206, 62 N. E. 447 [1901]), 86, 108, 115, 132, 133, 280, 301, 670, 675, 699, 730, 731, 927, 956, 1004, 1005, 1066, 1067, 1083, 1370. Hieks V. City of Bristol (102 Va. 861, 47 S. E. 1001 [1904]), 107, 303. Higgins V. Bordages (88 Tex. 458, 53 Am. .St. Rep. 770, 31 S. W. 52, 803 [1895]), 42, 174, 213, 607, 998, 1141, 1145. Higgins V. City of Chicago (18 111. 276 [l«o7]), 39, 308, 545, 581, 584, 613, 995, 1041, 1067, 1162, 1469, 1518. Highland v. City of Galveston (54 Tex. 527 [1881]), 323, 1049, 1053, 1521. Highlands v. Dallas (165 Ind. 710, 75 N. E. 824 [1905]), 1085. Highlands, City of v. Johnson (24 Colo. 371, 51 Pac. 1004 [1897]), 45, 324, 1115, 1119, 1128, 1141, 1142, 1145, 1423. Higman v. City of Sioux City ( 129 la. 291, 105 N. W. 524 [1906]), 301, 472, 849, 886, .887, 1026, 1304. Hilbourne v. County of Suffolk ( 120 Mass. 393, 21 Am. Rep. 522 [1876]), 64, 65. Hildebrand v. Toledo (27 Ohio C. C. R. 427 [1905]), 549, 563, 1012, 1015. Hilgert v. Barber Asuhalt Paving •Company (173 Mo. 319, 72 S. W. 1020), 1369. Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company (107 Mo. App. 385, 81 S. W. 496 [1904]), 538. Hill v. Fontenot (46 La. Ann. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]), 37, 47, 111, 147, 155, 343, 553, 566, 666, 689, 711. Hill v. Higdon (5 0. S. 243, 67 Am. Dec. 289 [1855] ), 7, 35, 79, 86, 89, 90, 105, 106, 110, 113, 147, 690, 1041. Hill V. Siwingley (159 Mo. 45, 60 S. W. 114 [1900]), 324, 505, 520, 1282. Hill V. Tohill (225 111. 384, 80 N. E. 253 [1907]), 363. Hill-0'Meara Construction Company V. Hutchinson (100 Mo. App. 294, 73 S. W. 318 [1903]), 538. Hill-0'Meara Construction Co. v. Sessinghaus (106 Mo. App. 163, 80 S. W. '747 [1904]), 896, 1040, 1137, 1377. Hille V. Neale (32 Ind. App. 341, 69 N. E. 713 [1904]), 57, 119, 128, 983, 1017, 1072. Hillhouse v. City of New Haven (62 Conn. 344, 26 Atl. 393 [1892]), 234, 443. Hilliard v. City of Asheville (118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738. [1896]), 8, 100, 118, 119, 147, 148, 247, 248, 250, 301, 363, 620, 663, 732, 1418. Hills, v. City of Chicago (60 111. 86 [1871]), 173, 1185. Hilton V. Dumphey (113 Mich. 241, 71 N. W. 527 [1897]), 340, 1116, 1179. Hilltown Road (18 Pa. St. 233), 909. Himmelmann v. Bateman (50 Cal. 11 [1875]), 824, 886. Himmelmann v. Booth (53 Cal. 50 [1878]), 1153, 1381. Himmelmann v. Byrne (41 Cal. 500 [1871]), 504. Himmelmann v. Cahn (49 Cal. 285 [1874]), 500, 742, 759, 824, 886. CXXll TABLE OF CASES. [Beferencey ore to sections.] Himmelmann v. Carpentier (47 Cal. 42 [1873]), 502, 742, 770, 1169, 1281, 1292. Himmelmann v. Cofran (36 Cal. 411 [1868]), 958, 964, 1469. Himmelmann v. Danos (35 Cal. 441 [1868]), 223, 234, 777, 824, 907, 1061, 1062, 1153, 1229, 1230, 1281. Himmelmann v. Hoadley (44 Cal. 213 [1872]), 301, 436, 479, 485, 510, 889, 904, 982, 1062, 1151, 1293, 1317, 1337, 1375. Himmelmann v. Oliver (34 Ual. 246 [1867]), 475, 540, 1107. Himmelmann v. Reay (38 Cal. 163 [1869]), 1154, 1216, 1346, 1379. Himmelmann v. Satterlee (50 Cal. 68 [1875]), 432, 439, 499, 510, 742, 749, 831, 869. Himmelmann v. Spanagel (39 Cal. 389 [1870]), 48, 73, 1253, 1346, 1379. Himmelmann v. Steiner (38 Cal. 175 [1869]), 649, 889. Hiinmelmann v. Townsend (49 Cal. 150 [1874]), 1153, 1235. Himmelmann v. Woolrich (45 Cal. 249 [1873]), 301, 1151, 1251. Hinchman v. City of Detroit (9 Mich. 103 [I860]), 830. Hinckley v. City of Seattle (37 Wash. 269, 79 Pac. 779 [1905]), 1164. Hines v. City of Leavenworth (3 Kan. 186 (original edition), 180 (second edition [1865]), 3, 7, 103, 106, 147, 437, 711, 959, 1507. Hinkley v. Bishop ( — Mich. , 114 N. W. 676 [1908]), 659, 728, 748, 786, 792, 798, 1432. Hinsdale, Village of v. Shannon (182 111. 312, 52 N. E. 327 [1899]), 324, 572, 854, 859, 864, 1085. Hintze v. City of Elgin (186 III. 251, 57 N. E. 856 [1900]), 771, 864, 1029. Hitchcock v. Galveston (96 U. S. 341, 24 L. 659 [1877]), 780, 1012, 1504, 1508. Hitchcock -f. Galveston (12 Fed. Caa. 218, 2 Woods 272), 780. Hitchcock v. Board of Aldermen of Springfield (121 Mass. 382 .[1876]), 878. Hitner v. Ege (23 Pa. St. (11 Har- ris) 305 [1854]), 1054, 1055. Hixon V. Oneida County (82 Wis. 515, 52 N. W. 445 [1892]), 80, 1425, 1436. HixsMi V. Burson (54 0. S. 470, 43 N. E. 1000 [1896]), 174, 189, 224, 252. Hoagland v. State, Simonton, Pros. (43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881]), 12, 101, 108, 119, 338, 339, 341, 449, 677, 717, 956, 962, 1370. Hoagland v. Wurts (41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 175 [1879]), 32, 101, 339, 525, 659, 956, 962. Hobart v. City of Detroit (17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185), 437, 515. Hobbs V. Board of Commissioners of Tipton County (116 Ind. 376, 19 JT. E. 186 [1888]), 322, 781, 795, 951, 1450. Hobbs V. Board, etc., County of Tip- ton (103 Ind. 575, 3 N. E. 263), 726. Hoboken Manufacturers R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Hoboken (— N. J. L. , 68 Atl. 1098 [1908]), 6, 20, 353, 986, 1050, 1469. Hoefgen v. State ex rei. Brown (17 Ind. App. 537, 47 N. E. 28 [1896]), 340, 907, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1251, 1252. Hoertz v. Jefferson Southern Pond Draining Company (119 Ky. 824, 84 S. W. 1141, 27 Ky. L. E. 278 [1905]), 121, 166, 255, 340, 760, 910, 950. Hoffeld v. City of Buffalo (130 N. Y. 387, 29 N. E. 747 [1892]), 545, 557, 651, 672, 675, 697, 1415. Hoffman v. Shell ( — Mich. , 115 N. W. 979 [1908]), 770, 1432. Hoke v. City of Atlanta (107 Ga. 416, 33 S. E. 412 [1899]), 1484. Hoke V. Perdue (62 Cal. 545 [1881]), 554, 645, 1432. Holbrook v. Dickinson (146 111. 285 [1867]), 44, 153, 701, 1121, 1174, 1297. TABLE OF CASES. CXXlll [References are to sections.] Holden v. City of Chicago (212 111. 289, 72 N. E. 435 [1904]), 864, 1305, 1390. Holden v. City of Chicago (172 111. 263, 50 N. E. 181 [1898]), 857, 864. Holden v. City of Crawfordsville (143 Ind. 558, 41 N. E. 370 [1898]), 293, 308, 1352, 1519. Holdom V. City of Chicago (169 III. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897]), 418, 511, 560, 561, 623, 643, 652, 657, 676, 723. Holland v. People ex rel Miller ( 189 111. 348, 59 N. E. 753 [1901]), 906, 949, 981, 1005. Holland v. Spell (144 Ind. 561, 42 N. E. 1014 [1895]), 906. Holley V. Covinty oi Orange (106 Cal. 420, 39 Pac. 790 [1895]), 35, 38, 47, 548, 779, 780. Holliday v. City of Atlanta (96 Ga. 377, 23 S. E. 406 [1895]), 234, 393, 400, 409, 423, 777, 778, 959, 965. HoUingsworth v. Thompson, Tax Collector (45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Eep. 220, 12 So. 116 [1893]), 37, 549, 566, 711. Hollister, In the Matter of (180 N. Y. 518, 72 N. E. 1143), 407, 637, 956, 970. Hollister, In re (98 App. Div. 501, 89 N. Y. Supp. 518 [1904]), 407, 637, 956, 970. HoUoran v. Merman (27 Ind. App. 309, 59 X. E. 869 [1901]), 531, 532, 646, 720. Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889]), 113, 393, 396, 400, 455, 527, 570, 920. Holm.es v. Jersey City ( 12 N. J. Eq. (1 Beas.) 299)-, 395, 1406. Holmquist v. Anderson (67 Kan. 861, 74 Pac. 227 [1903]), 1437, 1440. Holt V. City of East St. Louis ( 150 III. 530, 37 N. E. 927 [1894]), 440, 570, 587, 630, 643, 670, 714, 715, 723. Holt V. Figg (— Ky. , 94 S. W. 34, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 613 [1906]), 321, 628, 1059, 1141, 1145, 1246. Holt V. City Council of Somerville (127 Mass. 408 [1879]), 86, 356, 549, 560, 618, 620, 651, 654, 694, 695, 844, 1406. Hoi ton V. City of Milwaukee (31 Wis. 27 [1872]), 8, 11, 62, 70, 360, 719. Ilolzhauer v. City of Newport (94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]), 147, 154, 155, 209, 324, 508, 613, 1504. Holtzman v. United States ( 14 App. D. C. 454 [1899]), 58. Homan v. McLaren (28 Mo. App. 654 [1888]), 1134. Home for Aged Protestant Women V. Borough of Wilkinsburg (6 L. E. A. 531); see Wilkinsburg Bor- ough Home for Aged Women ( 131 Pa. St. 109, 18 Atl. 937 [1890] ), 96. Hook V. Chicago and Alton Rail- road Company (133 Mo.' 313, 34 S. W. 549 [1895]), 308, 596, 598, 651, 657, 1318. Hood V. Finch (8 Wis. 381 [1859]), 737. Hood V. Trustees of the Town of Lebanon (15 S. W. (Ky.) 516, 12 Ky. L. R. 813 [1891]), 323, 528, 610. Hoover v. People ex rel. Peabody (171 111. 182, 49 N. E. 367 [1898]), 663, 670, 737, 747, 849, 886, 895, 1039, 1052, 1126, 1144, 1175, 1182, 1278, 1281, 1334. Hopkins v. City of Butte (16 Mont. 103, 40 Pac. 171 [1895]), 1478, 1484. Hopkins v. Mason (61 Barb. 469 [1871]), 196, 223, 234, 280, 731, 750, 980, 983, 1026, 1113, 1196, 1205. Hopkins v. Mason (42 Howard 115 [1871]), 223, 234, 280, 414^ 735, 751, 777, 927, 983, 1000, 1174, 1196. Horbach v. City of Omaha (54 Neb. 83, 74 N. W. 434 [1898]), 5, 19, 97, 342, 735, 737, 1428, 1427, 1432. CXXIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Horiston v. City Council of Charles- ton (1 MeCord (S. C.) 345 [1821]), 118, 223, 263, 776. Horn's Case (12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 124 [1861]), 485,' 495, 995, 1452, 1463. Horn V. City of Columbus ( 1 Ohio C. C. 337 [1886]), 1125, 1211. Horn V. Board of Supervisors of Livingston County ( 135 Mich. 553, 98 N. W. 256 [1904]), 1394, 1409. Horn V. Town of New Lots (83 N. Y. 100, 38 Am. Rep. 402 [1880]), 81, 1088, 1484, 1486, 1493, 1494. Hornsey Urban District Court v. Hennell (2 K. B. 73, 71 L. J. (K. B.) 479, 86 L. T. 423, 50 Weekly Eep. 521, 66 J P. 613 [1902]), 1048. Hornung v. McCarthy (126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 303 [1899]), 73, 89, 100, 269, 965, 974, 1062, 1346. Hosmer v. Hunt Drainage District (134 111. 360, 26 N. E. 584 [1891]), 271, 377, 566, 738, 912, 925, 1376, 1388. Houghton, Appeal of (42 Cal. 35 [1871]), 8, 89, 1368. Houghton V. Burnham (22 Wis. 289 [1867]), 864. Houk V. Barthold !73 Ind. 21 [1880]), 1375. House V. City of Dallas (96 Tei. 594, 74 S. W. 901 [1903]), 1214. House Eesolutions concerning Street Improvements, In re ( 15 Colo. 598, 26 Pac. 323 [1890]), 44, 152, 666. Houseman v. Kent (58 Mich. 364, 25 N. W. 369 [1885]), 977. Houstania, Inhabitants of the Vil- lage of V. Grubbs (80 Mo. App. 433 [1899]), 53, 55, 1044, 1050. Houston, City of v. Bartels (36 Tex. Civ. App. 498, 82 S. W. 323 [1904]), 65, 651, 654. Houston V. City of Chicago (191 111. 559, 61 X. E. 396 [1901]), 293, 859, 864, 865, 812, 920, 922, 1271, 1282, 1310, 1381. Houston V. McKenna (22 Cal. 550 [1863]), 169, 266, 433, 538, 697, 698, 725. Howard Avenue, In re, North, in City of Seattle (44 Wash. 62, 86 Pac. Ill7 [1906]), 210, 308, 586, 612, 613, 614, 626. Howard v. Brown (197 Mo. 36, 95 S. W. 191 [1906]), 1202, 1203. Hovrard v. The First Independent Church of Baltimore (18 Md. 451 [1862]), 86, 780, 792. Howard Savings Institution v. May- or and Common Council of City of Newark (52 N. J. L. (23 Vr.) I, 18 Atl. 672 [l'. Y. 310 [1876]), 400, 405, 572, 1455, 1466. Ingraham, In the Matter of the Pe- tition to Vacate an Assessment on Eighty-eighth and Ninety-first Streets (4 Hun (N. Y.) 495 [1875]), 400, 405, 572. Ingram v. Colgan (106 Cal. 113, 46 Ani. St. Rep. 221, 28 L. B. A. 187, 38 Pac. 315, 39 Pac. 437 [1895]), 92. Inhabitants of . (See name of town or city.) lola Electric R. Co. v. Jackson (70 Kan. 791, 79 Pac. 662), 363. Iowa Pipe & Tile Company v. Calla- han (125 Iowa 358, 106 Am; St. Rep. 311, 67 L. R. A. 408, 101 N. W. 141 [1904]), 677, 705, 754, 1435, 1509. Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Soper , (39 la. 112), 182. Ireland v. City of Rochester (51 Barb. 414 [1868]), 8, 79, 86, 89, 119, 136, 520, 726, 729, 748, 819, 833, 955, 966, ' 989, 1005, 1279, 1426, 1427, 1442, 1445. Iroquois and Crescent Drainage District No. 1 v. Harroun (222 HI.' 489, 78 N. E. 780 [1906]), 340, 403, 821, 923, 1330. Irvin V. Devors (65 Mo. 625 [1877]), 837, 1249. Irwin, Succession "of (33 La. Ann. 63 [1881]), 1041, 1149. Irwin V. Mayor, etc., of Mobile (57 Ala. 6 [1876]), 150, 301, 794, 950, 1372. Isle of Ely, Case of (10 Rep. 141), 26, 549, 659. Isom V. Mississippi Central Rail- road Co. (36 Miss. 306 [1858]), 71. Ittner v. Robinson (35 Neb. 133, 52 N. W. 846 [1892]), 1054. Ivanhoe v. City of Enterprise (29 Ore. 245, 35 L. R. A. 58, 45 Pac. 771 [1896]), 1048, 1049. Ives V. Irey (51 Neb. 136, 70 N. W. 961 [1897]), 737, 747, 1426, 1427. J. St A. McKechnie Brewing Com- pany T. Trustees of Village of Canandaigua (162 N. Y. 631, 57 N. E. 1113 [1900]), 100. J. & A. McKechnie Brewing Com- pany V. Trustees of the Village of Canandaigua ( 15 App. Div. 139. 44 N. Y. Supp. 317 [1897]), 100. Jackson v. City of Denver ( — Colo. ■ , 92 Pac. 690), 1337. Jackson v. City of Detroit (10 Mich. 248 [1862]), 1033, 1436. Jackson v. Healy (20 Johns. (N. Y.) 495 [1823]), 755, 886. Jackson v. McHargue ( — Ky. , 106 S. W. 871 [1908]), 1039. Jackson v. Smith (120 Ind. 520, 22 N. E. 431 [1889]), 264, 324, 390, 394, 405, 444, 549, 1005, 1006, 1015, 1324, 1429, 1435. Jackson v. State for Use of Dyar (104 Ind. 516, 3 N. E. 863 [1885]), 772, 1008. Jackson v. State for Use of Lindley (103 Ind. 250, 2 N. E. 742 [1885]), 735, 1237, 1244. Jackson County v. Waldo (85 Mo. 637 [1885]), 70, 308. Jackson Fire Clay Sewer Pipe & Tile Company v. Snyder (93 Mich. 325, 53 N. W. 359 [1892]), 475. Jacksonville, City of v. Hamill (178 III. 235, 52 N. E. 949 [1899]), 271, 663, 672, 675, 909, 953, 1368. Jacksonville Railway Company, The V. City of Jacksonville (114 111. 562, 2 N. E. 478 [1886]), 381, 386, 507, 623, 837, 856, 864, 887, 927, 929, 1054. Jacobs V. City of Chicago (178 111. 560, 53 N. E. 363 [1899]), 864, 1373, 1384. Jaeger v. Burr (36 O. S. 164 [1880]), 479, 688, 977. TABLE OF CASES. CXXIX [References are to sections.] Jaieks v. Merrill (201 Mo. 91, 98 S. W. 753 [1906]), 1015, 1018, 1085, 1135, 1242, 1284. Jaieks V. Middlesex Inv. Co. (201 Mo. Ill, 98 S. W. 759 [1906]), 491. Jaieks V. Sullivan (128 Mo. 177, 30 S. W. 890 [1895]), 1137, 1144, 1225. James v. Louisville (Ky.) (40 S. W. 912. 19 Ky. L. R. 447), 678. James v. Pine Bluflf (49 Ark. 199, 4 S. W. 760 [1887]), 55, 86, 93, 96, 151, 230, 293, 296, 298, 639. James v. City of Seattle ( — Wash. , 95 Pac. 273 [1908]), 685. Jamison v. City of New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 346 [1857]), 927, 934, 986, 1487. Janvrin v. Poole (181 Mass. 463, 63 N. E. 1066 [1902]), 322. Jardine v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (11 Daly 116 [1882]), 740, 836, 1499. Jarrett v. City of Chicago (181 111. 242, 54 N. E. 946 [1899]), 864. Jassen v. Pierce (25 Ind. App. 222, 57 N. E. 941 [1900]), 1091. Jatunn v. O'Brien (89 Cal. 57, 26 Pac. 635 [1891]), 1205. Jebb v. Sexton (84 111. App. 45 [1899]), 985, 986. Jefferson, City of v. Jennings Bank- ing and Trust Co. (35 Tex. Civ. App. 74, 79 S. -W. 876 [1904]), 365. Jefferson, County of v. City of Mt. Vernon (145 111. 80, 33 N. E. 1091 [1893]), 263, 264, 437, 856, 865, 884, 917, 1375. Jeffersonville, City of v. Patterson (32 Ind. 140 [1869]), 1191, 1432. Jeliff V. Newark (49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 239, 12 Atl. 770), 381. Jelly V. Oils (27 W. Va. 267 [1885]), 114. Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co. (12 Neb. 163, 10 N. W. 547 [1881]), 337, 343, 449. Jenkins v. Board of Supervisors of Rock County (15 Wis. 11 [1862]), 621, 895, 1175, 1426, 1427. Jenkins v. Stetler (118 Ind. 275, 20 N. E. 788 [1888]), 467, 537, 538, 541, 826, 1015, 1018, 1192, 1252, 1272, 1337. Jenkintown Borough v. Firmstone (2 Penn. Dist. Rep. 124 [1892]), 886, 1063. Jenks V. City of Chicago (56 111. 397 [1870]), 860, 867. Jenks V. City of Chicago (48 111. 296 [1868]), 672, 693, 724, 763, 764, 918, 1005, 1184, 1292, 1299. Jennings v. Le Breton (80 Cal. 8, 21 Pac. 1127 [1889]), 537, 698, 1281, 1290, 1358. Jennings v. LeRoy (63 Cal. 397 [1883]), 766, 1281. Jennings Banking and Trust Co. v. City of Jefferson (30 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 70 S. W. 1005 [1902]), 365. Jerome v. City of Chicago (62 111. 285 [1871]), 771, 918, 947, 1187, 1272. Jerrell v. Etchison Ditching Associa- tion (62 Ind. 200 [1878]), 1251, 1263, 1265. Jersey City, Mayor, etc., of v. Car- son (43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 664 [1881]), 909. Jersey City, Mayor, etc., of v. Green (42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 627 [1880]), 967, 1319, 1486, 1492. Jersey City, Mayor and Aldermen of V. O'Callaghan (41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 349 [1879]), 967, 1478, 1486. Jersey City, Mayor and Aldermen of V. Riker (38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 225, 20 Am. Rep. 386 [1876]), 1478, 1486. Jersey City, Mayor and Common Council of V. State, Howeth, Pros, (30 N. J. L. (1 Vt.) 521 [186;j]), 395, 754, 646, 1406. Jersey City, Mayor and Aldermen of V. State, Vreeland, Pros. (43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 638 [1881]), 6, 20, 349, 608, 666. Jersey City, Commissioners of Sink- ing Fund of V. Inhabitants of the Township of Linden in the Coun- ty of Union (40 N. J. Eq. (13 Stewart) 27 [1885]), 10G8. cxxx TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.! Jersey City and Bergen Railway Company, In the Matter of the, for a Summary Determination as to Certain Property Assessed by Jersey City and also by the State Board of Assessors (66 N. J. L. 37 Vr.) 501, 49 Atl. 437 [1901]), 596. Jessing v. City of Columbus ( 1 Ohio C. C. 90 [1885]), 313, 314, 431, 570, 783, 843, 1249. Jetter, In the Matter of (14 Hun (N. Y.) 93 [1878]), 1451, 1465. Jex. V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (111 N. Y. 339, 19 N. E. 52 [1888]), 1486, 1492. •Jex V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York 103 N. Y. 536, 9 N. E. 39 [1886]), 781, 1481, 1486. Job V. City of Alton (189 III. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. E. 622 [1901]), 51, 118, 130, 295, 323, 670, 698, 715, 745, 1183. Job v. People ex rel. Tetherington (193 111. 609, 61 N. E. 1079 [1901]), 441. John T. Connell (64 Neb. 233, 89 N. W. 806 [1902]), 677, 693, 699, 731, 911. John V. Connell (61 Neb. 267, 85 N. W. 82), 677, 693, 699, 731, 911. John Kelso Co. v. Gillette ( 136 Cal. 603, 69 Pac. 296 [1902]), 538, 952. Johnson, In the Matter of (103 N. Y. 260, 8 N. E. 399 [1886]), 283, 444, 468, 487, 495, 948, 1279, 1372. Johnson v. Village of Avondale (1 Ohio C. C. 229 [1885]), 324, 563, 572. Johnson v. District of Columbia (6 Mackey (D. C.) 21 [1887]), 223, 234, 621, 10.50. Johnson v. Duer (115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]), 324, 393, 400, 401, 447, 495, 555, 659, 563, 711, 723, 777, 1005, 1007, 1435. Johnson v. Lewis (115 Ind. 490, 18 N. E. 7 [1888]), 726, 756. Johnson v. City of Milwaukee (88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270 [1894]), 79, 191, 244, 432, 444. Johnson v. City of Milwaukee (40 Wis. 315 [1876]), 86, 163, 322, 360, 620, 693, 1420, 1432. Johnson v. Oregon Short Line Co. (7 Ida. 355, 53 L. R. A. 744, 63 Pac. 112 [1900]), 363. Johnson v. City of Oshkosh (21 Wis. 184 [1866]), 53, 737, 981, 1432, 1*34, 1444. Johnson v. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (177 111. 64, 52 N. E. 308 [1898]), 549, 927, 934, 986, 1183, 1340, 1367. Johnson v. People ex rel. Raymond (189 III. 83, 59 N. E. 515 [1901]), 857, 864, 866, 927, 929, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. Johnson v. People ex rel. Reed (202 111. 306, 66 N. E. 1081 [1903]), 723, 927, 987, 1000, 1183, 1340. Johnson v. State for Use of David- son (116 Ind. 374, 19 N. E. 29S [1888]), 340, 795, 1008, 1247. Johnson v. City of Taeoma (41 Wash. 51, 82 Pac. 1092 [1905]), 301, 316, 549, 560, 561, 646, 720. Johnston v. Louisville (74 Ky. (11 Bush.) 527 [1875]), 39. Joliet, City of v. Spring Creek Drainage Dist. (222 111. 441, 78 N. E. 836 [1906]), 62, 203, 270, 340, 547, 556, 587. Jonas v. City of Cincinnati (18 Ohio 318 [1849] >, 368, 508. Jones, In the Matter of (18 Hun (N. Y.) 327 [1879]), 1460. Jones V. Board of Aldermen of the City of Boston (104 Mass. 461 [1870]), 64, 65, 86, 100, 103, 244, 308, 415, 466, 525, 555, 650, 696, 775, 879, 885, 920, 921, 950, 1279, 1404, 1406, 1407. Jones V. Cardwell (98 Ind. 331 [1884]), 1442. Jones V. City of (Chicago (213 111. 92, 72 N. E. 798 [1904]), 321, 828, 831, 856, 864. Jones V. City of Chicas;o (206 111. 374, 69 N. E. 04 [1903]), 1275, 1318, 1327, 1382. Jones T. District oi Columbia (3 App. D. C. 26 [1894]), 321, 663, 709, 731. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXl [References are to sectious.] Jones V. Gable (150 Mich. 30, 113 N. W. 577 [1907]), 906, 1411, 1414, 1415, 1436. Jones V. Holzapfel (11 Okl. 405, 68 Pac. 511 [1902]), 43, 89, 145, 147, 244, 324, 481, 707, 713, 776, 1435. Jones V. Town of Lake View (151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894]), 73, 103, 194, 198, 245, 258, 259, 307, 308, 396, 556, 557, 672, 675, 690, 813, 814, 828, 909, 920, 922, 925, 1317, 1391. Jones V. Landis Township (50 N. J. L. (21 Vr.) 374, 13 Atl. 251), 166, 167, 1113. Jones V. Metropolitan Park Commis- sioners (181 Mass. 494, 64 N. E. 76 [1902]), 305, 508, 525. Jones V. Mayor and Common Coun- cil of the City of Newark (11 N. J. Eq. (3 Stock.) 452 [1857]), 324, 1431. Jones V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York 37 Hun 513 [1885]), 1462, 1486. Jones V. Schulmeyer (39 Ind. 119 [1872]), 526, 1057, 1067, 1072. Jones V. City of Seattle (23 Wash. 763, 63 Pac. 553 [1901]), 70. Jones V. Town of Tonawanda ( 158 N. Y. 438, 53 N. E. 280 [1899]), 322, 381, 726, 731, 779, 780, 956, 962, 969, 976, 1050. Jones V. Town of Tonawanda (35 App. Div. 151), 779. Jones V. Board of Water Commis- sioners of Detroit (34 Mich. 273 [1876]), 347, 353, 608. Jonesboro L. C. & E. E. Co. v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee District (80 Ark. 316, 97 S. W. 281 [1906]), 247, 343, 1231, 1251. Joplin, City of, ex rel. v. Freeman (125 Mo. App. 717, 103 S. W. 130 [1907]), 479, 620, 832, 909, 1249. Joplin, City of, ex rel. Carthage Di- mension & Flag Stone Co. v. Hol- lingshead (123 Mo. App. 602, 100 S. W. 500 [1907]), 323, 662, 836, 864, 873, 1133, 1135, 1216, 1230, 1284. Joplin Consolidated. Mining Co. v. Joplin (124 Mo. 129, 27 S. W. 406), 142. Jordan v. Hyatt (3 Barb. 273 [1848]), 117, 726, 735, 1056, 1175. Jordan Ditching and Draining As- sociation V. Wagoner (33 Ind. 50 [1870]), 340, 886, 1232. Joyce V. Barron (67 0. S. 264, 65 N. E. 1001 [1902]), 735, 740. Joyes V. Shadburn ( — Ky. . 13 S. W. 361, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 892 [1890]), 411, 707, 709, 710, 862, 1335. Judson V. City of Bridgeport (25 Conn. 426 [1857]), 280, 425, 429, 1484. Junction R. R. Co. v. City of Phila- delphia (88 Pa. St. 424, 32 Am. Rep. 417 [1879]), 598. Justice V. Robinson (142 Cal. 199. 75 Pac. 776 [1904]), 1478, 1482, 1484. Juvinall v. Jamesburg Drainage District (204 111. 106, 68 N. E. 440 [1903]), 71. K Kadderly v. Portland (44 Ore. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]), 43, 106, 147, 148, 214, 216, 665, 666, 1425, 1431. Kafferstein v. Knox (56 Mo. 186 [1874]), 1055, 1139, 1284. Kahl V. Love (37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 5 [1874]), 1036. Kaiser v. Weise (85 Pa. St. (4 Nor- ris) 366 [1877]), 118, 610, 665, 666, 706, 1072, 1163. Kalamazoo, City of v. Francoise (115 Mich. 554, 73 N. W. 801 [1898]), 118, 551, 698, 874. Kalbrier v. Leonard (34 Ind. 497 [1870]), 323, 610, 614. Kammann v. City of Chicago (222 111. 6.3, 78 N. E. 16 [1906]), 1406. Kankakee, City of v. Potter (119 111. 324, 10 N. E. 212 [1888]), 862. CXXXU TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Kankakee Drainage District v. Com- missioners of Lake Fork Special Drainage District (130 111. 261, 22 N. E. 607 [1890]), 564. Kankakee Stone and Lime Company V. City of Kankakee ( 128 111. 173, 20 N. E. 670 [1890]), 661, 924, 1328. Kansas City to the Use, etc. v. American Surety Co. (71 Mo. App. 315 [1897]), 1172, 1249. Kansas City ex rel. Neill v. Askew (105 Mo. App. 84, 79 S. W. 483 [1904]), 527. Kansas City v. Bacon (157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]), 71, 284. 358, 557, 586, 588, 589, 594, 652, 663, 675, .676, 690, 1328, 1381. Kansas City v. Bacon (147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. 860 [1898]), 47, 212, 215, 264, 272, 356, 508, 554, 657, 613, 642, 665, 666, 676, 679, 885, 1269, 1282, 1333, 1375, 1381. Kansas City v. Baird (98 Mo. 215 [1889]), 1333. Kansas City v. Block (175 Mo. 433, 74 S. W. 993 [1903]), 636, 1252, 1291. Kansas City, City, of v. Breyfogle (8 Kans. App. 276, 55 Pac. 508 [1898]), 781, 1006, 1007, 1440. Kansas City, City of v. Cullinan 65 Kan. 68, 69 Pac. 1099 [1902]), 787, 815. Kansas City, City of v. Gibson (66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]), 86, 118, 141, 247, 248, 250, 324, 549, 553, 555, 627, 642, 689, 702. Kansas City, City of v. Gray (62 Kan. 198, 61 Pac. 746 [1900]), 141, 787, 818, 1337. Kansas City, City of v. Hanson (60 Kan. 833, 58 Pac. 474 [1899]), 517. Kansas City, City of v. Hanson (8 Kans. App. 290, 55 Pac. 513 [1898]). 517, 1384, 1443. Kansas, City of v. Hill (80 Mo. 523 [1883]), 62, 272, 308, 1322, 1328, 1382. Kansas, City of v. Johnson (78 Mo. 661 [1883]), 86. Kansas City v. Kansas City Belt Railway Company ( 187 Mo. 146 86 S. W. 190 [1905]), 598, 661. Kansas City v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Kailroad Com- pany (189 Mo. 245, 88 S. W. 45 [1905]), 1330. Kansas City, City of v. Kimball (60 «Kan. 224, 56 Pac. 78 [1899]), 141, 1337. Kansas City v. McGrew ( — Kan. . 96 Pac. 484 [1908]), 141. Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co. ( 140 Mo. 458, 41 S. W. "43), 215. Kansas City v. Mulkey (176 Mo. 229, 75 S. W. 973 [1903]), 851, 966, 986. Kansas City v. Napiecek ( — Kan. — , 92 Pac. 827 [1907]), COS, 551, 619, 661, 886. Kansas City v. O'Connor (82 Mo. App. 655 [1899]), 291, 370, 458, 465, 479,' 657. Kansas City v. Eatekin ( 30 Mo. App. 416), 401, 447. Kansas City, The City of, to the Use of Enright v. City of Rice (89 Mo. 685, 1 S. W. 749 [1886]), 1211. Kansas City, City of, to the Use of Adkins v. Richards (34 Mo. App. 521 [1889]), 236, 293, 295, 297, 324, 327, 670. Kansas City v. Silver (74 Kan. 851, 85 Pac. 805 [1906]), 414, 956, 962. Kansas City v. Smart (128 Mo. 272, 30 S. W. 773 [1895]), 263, 308, 824. Kansas City, City of v. Smiley (62 Kan. 718, 64 Pac. 613 [19.00]), 1437. Kansas City, City of, to the Use of the Frear Stone & Pipe Manufac- turing Company v. Swope (79 Mo. 446 [1883]), 401, 447, 777. Kansas City, City of v. Trotter (9 Kans. App. 222, 59 Pac. 679 1900]), 1440. Kansas City v. Ward (134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]), 38, 100, 111, 121, 215, 356, 507, 549, 619, 634, 697, 760. TABLE OF CASES. cxxxm [References are to sections.] Kansas City Exposition Driving Park V. Kansas City (174 Mo. 425, 74 S. W. 979 [1903]), 42, 210, 591, 613, 614. Kansas City Grading Company v. Holden (107 Mo. 305, 17 S. W. 798 [1891]), 553, 554, 555, 870, 724, 1338. Kansas City Grading Company v. Holden (32 Mo. App. 490 [1888]), 523, 569, 675. Kansas City Transfer Company v. Huling (22 Mo. App. 654 [1886]), 495, 515. Kansas, State of v. . (See State of Kansas v. Kansas Town Co. v. City of Argen- tine (5 Kans. App. 50, 47 Pac. 542 [1896]), 816, 819, 839, 844, 1015, 1020, 1411, 1432, 1438. Karsten v. City of Milwaukee (106 Wis. 200, 48 L. R. A. 851, 81 N. W. 11(T3, 948 [1900]), 699. Kaufman v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor Railroad Company (11 Wash. 632, 40 Pac. 137 [1895]), 71. Kean v. Asch (27 N. J. Eq. (12 C. E. Greene) 57 [1875]), 735, 1432, 1435. Keane v. Gushing ( 15 Mo. App. 96 [1884]), 496, 504, 742, 838, 848. Keane v. Klausman (21 Mo. App. 485 [1886]), 410, 424, 837, 1015, 1249. Kearney v. City of Chicago (163 111. 293, 45 N. E. 224 [1896]), 745, 765, 772, 914, 1379. Kearney v. City of Covington (58 Ky. (1 Metcalf) 339 [1858]), 998, 1508, 1509, 1525. Kearney v. Post (3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 105 [1847]), 1054. Kearney Street (See North Beach and Mission R. R. Co., Appeal of; Reese's Appeal.) Kedzie v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (114 III. 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]), 244, 248, 253, 259, 266, 305, 356, 735, 776, 986, 987, 1439, 1444. Keehn v. MoGillieuddy (19 Ind. App. 427, 49 N. E. 609 [1898]), 1486. Keeler v. People ex rel. Kern (160 111. 179, 43 N. E. 342 [1896]), 745, 926, 927, 942, 986, 1196. Keene v. City of Seattle (31 Wash. 202, 71 Pac. 769 [1903]), 1069. Keese v. City of Denver ( 10 Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825 [1887]), 44, 93, 97, 152, 223, 234, 274, 666, 711, 717, 867. Kefferstein v. Holliday (3 Mo. App. 569), 50, 895. Keifer v. Bridgeport (68 Conn. 401, 36 Atl. 801 [1896]), 223, 777, 1006, 1035, 1100. Keigher v. City of St. Paul (69 Minn. 78, 72 N. W. -54 [1897] ) , 370, 415, 525, 1510. Keighley's Case (10 Rep. 139a (Mieh. 7 Jac.l), 21, 24, 25, 26, 549, 557, 696. Keigwin v. Drainage Commissioners of Hamilton Township (115 III. 347, 5 N. B. 575 [1886]), 254, 340, 1008, 1358, 1417, 1432, 1477. Keiser v. Mills (162 Ind. 366, 69 N. E. 142 [1903]), 888, 950, 1362, 1372. Keith v. Bingham (100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889]), 8, 50, 73, 86, 100, 110, 555, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1284, 1346. Keith V. City of . Philadelphia (126 Pa. St. 575, 17 Atl. 883 [1889]), 610, 635, 706, 9S9, 995, 1307. Keithsburg & Eastern Railroad Company v. Henry (79 111. 290 [1875]), 71. Kellenkamp v. City of Lafayette (30 Ind. 192 [1868]), 1253. Kellogg V. Ely (15 0. S. 64 [1864]), 340, 1015, 1436. Kellogg V. Village of Janesville (34 Minn. 132, 24 N. W. 359 [1885]), 244, 775. Kellogg V. Price (42 Ind. 360 [1873]), 280. Kelly v. Chadwiok (104 La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]), 46, 118, 314, 514, 529, 544, 549, 620, 651, 663, 666, 689, 698, 702, 1047, 1144, 1333, 1369, 1370, 1373. CXXXIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Kelly V. City of Chicago (193 111. 324, 61 N. E. 1009 .[1901]), 1305, 1379. Kelly V. City of Chicago (148 III. 90, 35 N. E. 752 [1894]), 324, 557, 563, 864, 918, 920, 922, 925, 1372, 1377, 1391. Kelly V. The City of Cleveland (34 O. S. 468 [1878]), 228, 550, 553, 554, 560, 619, 620, 626, 670, 692, 977. Kelly V. Luning (76 Cal. 309, 18 Pac. 335 [1888]), 409, 423. Kelly V. Mendlesohn (105 La. 490, 29 So. 894 [1901]), 1144, 1195, 1219, 1432. Kelly V. Minneapolis City (57 Minn. 294, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 L. R. A. 92, 59 N. W. 304 [1894]), 125, 278, 359, 727, 1347, 1411, 1412. Kelly V. Pittsburg (104 U. S. 78, 26 L. 658), 610. Kelly V. City of Pittsburg (85 Pa. St. 170, 27 Am. Eep. 633 [1877]), 414, 610, 983. Kelly V. City of St. Joseph (67 Mo. 491 [1878]), 1505. .Kelsey v. King (11 Abb. Prac. (N. y.) 180 [I860]), 1431. Kelso V. Cole (121 Cal. 121, 53 Pac. 353 [1898]), 223, 234, 538, 775, 777, 952. Kemper v. King (11 Mo. App. 116 [1881]), 420, 443, 540, 574, 631, 895. Kemper v. Village of St. Bernard (14 Ohio C. C. 134 [1897]), 685, 786, 1054. Kendall, In the Matter of (85 N. Y. 302 [1881]), 276, 281, 487, 495, 982. Kendig v. Knight (60 la. 29, 14 N. W. 78 [1882]), 315, 552, 573, 574, 620, 649, 698, 831, 848, 849, 891, . 1049, 1445. Kennedy v. Board of Health (2 Pa. St. (2 Barr.) 366 [1845]), 342, 372, 420, 1063, 1157. Kennedy v. Indianapolis (103 U. S. 599, 26 L. 550 [1880]), 70, 86, 361. Kennedy v. Indianapolis (14 Fed. Cases 314, 11 Biss. 13 [1878]), 70, 361. Kennedy v. Newman (3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 187 [1848]), 368, 837, 853, 1072, 1174, 1196, 1303. Kennedy v. State ex rel. Dorsett ( 124 Ind. 239, 24 N. E. 748 [1890]), 271, 739, 1067, 1247. K*nnedy v. State for Use of Doir- sett (109 Ind. 236, 9 IST. E. 778 [1886]), 735, 1237. Kennedy v. City of Troy (77 N. Y. 493 [1879]), 545, 549, 639, 1415. Kenny v. Kelly (113 Cal. 364, 45 Pac. 699 [1896]), 719, 1031, 1337. Kensington, Commissioners of the District of v. Keith (2 Pa. Sti (2 Barr. 218 [1845]), 686. Kent V. Common Council of City of Binghampton (94 App. Div. 522, 88 N. Y. S. 34 [1904]), 602. Kent V. City of St. Joseph (72 Mo. App. 42 [1897]), 71. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases (115 U. S. 321, 29 L. 414, 6 S. 57 [1885]), 108. Kenyon v. Board of Supervisors of Ionia Coimty (138 Mich. 544, 101 N. W. 851 [1904]), 1406, 1409. Keokuk, City of v. Independent Dis- trict of Keokuk (53 la. 352, 36 Am. Rep. 226, 5 N. W. 503 [1880]), 52, 55, 56, 96. Kepley v. Fouke (187 111. 162, 58 N. E. 303 [1900]), 1126. Kepley v. Scully (185 111. 52, 57 N. E. 187 [1900]), 1126. Kepple V. City of Keokuk (61. la. 653, 17 'N. W. 140 [1882]), 838. Kerfoot v. City of Chicago (195 111. 229, 63 N. E. 101 [1902]), 298, 469, 523, 741, 848, 922, 1276, 1306, 1326, 1382. Kerker v. Bocher ( — Okla. , 95 Pac. 981 [1908]), 1015, 1020. Kerr v. Butz (34 111. App. 220 [1889]), 321, 677, 699, 709, 781, 783, 964, 967, 1087, 1414, 1490. Keszler v. City of Cincinnati (3 Ohio C. C. 223 [1888]), 686, 1507. Keteltas, In the Matter of (48 How- ard (N. Y.) 116 [1874]), 762, 1466. TABLE OF CASES. cxxxv [References iire to sections.] Kettle V. City of Dallas (35 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 [1904]), 11, 119, 213, 549, 607, 665, 666, 1079. Keys V. City of Neodesha ( 64 Kans. 681, 68 Pac. 625 [1902]), 38, 313, 436, 1024, 1436. Keyser, Matter of ( 10 Abb. Prac. 481 [I860]), 484, 485, 837, 1402, 1463. Kidson v. City of Bangor (99 Me. 139, 58 Atl. 900 [1904]), 1099. Kiernan, In the Matter of (62 N. Y. 457 [1875]), 795, 1005, 1007, 1457. Kiley v. Cranor (51 Mo. 54.1 [1873]), 424, 437, 525, 837, 864, 984, 1134, 1136, 1138. Kiley v. Forsee (57 Mo. 391 [1874]), 213, 264, 872, 1040, 1134, 1381. Kiley v. City of St. Joseph (67 Mo. 491 [1878]), 1498, 1518. Kilgallen v. City of Chicago (206 111. 557, 69 X. E. 586 [1904]), 820. Kilgour V. Drainage Commissioners (111 111. 342 [1885]), 39, 104, 130, 145, 207, 247, 250, 259, 340, 771, 998, 1029, 1043, 1049, 1142, 1254, 1255, 1334, 1356. Kilgus V. Trustees of Orphanage of Good Shepherd (94 Ky. 439, 22 S. W. 750 [1893]), 589, 613. Kimball v. Mobile (14 Fed. Cas. 489, 3 Woods, 555), 36, 360. Kimble v. City of Peoria (140 HI. 157, 29 X. E. 723 [1893]), 279, 469, 570, 663, 848, 857, 860, 876. Kinealy v. Gay (7 Mo. App. 203 [1879]), 509, 817. ■ King V. Commissioners of Sewers for Essex (1 Barn. & Cress. 477, 2 How. & Ryl. 700 [1823]), 25, 26. King V. City of Frankfort (2 Kans. App. 530, 43 Pac. 983 [1895]), 1503, 1526. King V. Lamb (117 Cal.' 401, 49 Pac. 561 [1897]), 315, 740, 749, 761, 864, 1311. King V. City of Portland (184 U. S. 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902]), 118, 125, 134, 147, 301, 070, 713, 728, 1379. King V. City of Portland (38 Or. 402, 55 L. E. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]), 11, 43, 89, HI, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125, 134, 135, 147, 148, 241, 301, 317, 359, 666, 668, 670, 077, 695, 699, 700, 713, 728, 729, 732, 740, 747, 756, 836, 1337, 1379. King V. Portland (2 Or. 146 [1865]), 43, 86, 100, 125, 147, 148, 301, 666, 668, 690, 700. King Hill Brick Co. v. Hamilton (51 Mo. App. 120 [1892]), 273, 527, 840, 867. Kingman, Petition of ( 153 Mass. 566, 1-2 L. E. A. 417, 27 N. E. 778 [1891]), 61, 356, 525, 604, 696. Kingsbury v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. (156 Mo. 379, 57 S. W. 547 [1900]), 363. Kinnie v. Bare (68 Mich. 625, 36 N. W. 672), 291, 337. Kiphart v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ey. Co. (7 Ind. App. 122, 34 N. E. 375 [1893]), 772, 735, 1006. Kipley v. People of State of Illinois (170 U. S. 182, 18 S. 550), 715. Kirby v. Boylston Market Associa- tion (80 Mass. (14 Gray) 249, 74 Am. Dec. 682 [1859]), 58. Kirby v. Citizens Railway Company (48 Md. 168, 30 Am. Rep. 455), 483. Kirby v. Village of W'inton Place ( 7 Ohio N. P. 169 [1899]), 740. Kirchman v. People ex rel. Kooher- sperger (159 111. 321, 42 N. E. 883 [1896]), 772, 927, 930, 986, 993, 1341. Kirkendall v. City of Omaha (39 Neb. 1, 57 N. W. 732 [1894]), 65, 651, 654. Kirkland v. Board of Public Works of the City of Indianapolis (142 Ind. 123, 41 X. E. 374 [1895]), 325, 432, 805. Kirkpatrick v. Taylor (118 Ind. .329, 21 N. E. 20 [1888]), 267, 293, 294, 375, 538, 1351, 1408, 1409. Kirksville, City of, ex rel. Fleming Manufacturing Company v. Cole- man (103 Mo. App. 215, 77 S. W. 120), 777, 813, 817, 831. CXXXVl TABLE OP CASES. [References' are to sections.] Kirat i. Street Improvement Dis- trict No. 120 (— Ark. , 109 S. W. 526 [1908]), 697, 909. Kirtland v. Parker (— N. J. , 68 Aitl. 913 [1908]), 693, 951, ' 1405. Kirwan v. Fisher (4 Mo. App. 574 [1877]), 7-25, 950. Kirwin v. Nevin (111 Ky. 682, 64 S. W. 647, 23 Ky. L. R. 947 [1901]), 18, 1164, 1194, 1207, 1526. Kittinger v. City of Buffalo (148 N. Y. 332, 42 N. E. 803 [1896]), 266, 356, 459, 636. Kizer v. Town of Winchester ( 141 Ind. 694, 40 N. E. 265 [1895]), 119, 324, 1005, 1282. Klein v. City of Cincinnati (7 Ohio C. C. 266 [1893]), 118. Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company (162 Ind. 509, 70 N. B. 801 [1903]), 575, 620, 626, 656, 929, 1004. Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company (— Ind. App. , 66 N. E. 486 [1903]), 118, 575; 626, 929, 1004. Klein v. Tuhey (13 Ind. App. 74, 40 N. E. 144 [1895]), 555, 750, 751, 763. Kline v. Hagey (— Ind. , 81 N. E. 209 [1907]), 950. Kline v. City of Tacoma (11 Wash. 193, 39 Pac. 453 [1895]), 229, 1006, 1007. Klinger v. The People ex rel. Con- kle (130 111. 509, 22 N. E. 600 [1890]), 247, 564, 573, 692. Knapp V. City of Brooldyn (97 N. Y. 520 [1884]), 1422, 1451, 1463, 1486, 1489. Knapp v. City of Brooklyn (28 Hun, 500 [1882]), 1422, 1451. Knapp v. Heller (32 Wis. 467 [1873]), 1436. Knapp T. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken (38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 371 [1876]), 1218, 1508, 1511, 1518, 1525. Knaust, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of (101 N. Y. 188, 4 N. E. 338 [1886]), 266, 495, 837. Kneeland v. Furlong (20 Wis. 437 [1866]), 1432. Kneeland v. City of Milwaukee (18 Wis. 411, [1864]), 53, 223, 234, 821, 823, 1432. Knell V. City of Buffalo (54 Hun (N. Y.) 80, 7 N. Y. Sup. 233 [1889]), 1442. Knickerbocker v. JPeople ( 102 111. 218), 180. Ehoppi v. Gilsonlte Roofing & Pav- ing Company (92 Mo. App. 279, [1901]), 806, 811. Knowles v. Seale (64 Cal. 377, 1 Pac. 159 [1883]), 367, 437, 574, 862. .Knowles v. Temple ( — Wash. , 96 Pac. 1 [1908]), 1066, 1067, 1072. Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors of Rock County (9 Wis. 410 [1859]), 35. Knox V. Police Jury of West Baton Rouge (4 La. Ann. 62 [1849]), 1511. Knox County v. Nichols ( 14 0. S. 260), 365. Kodderly v. Portland (44 Or. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]), 956. Koehler v. Hill (60 la. 543, 14 X. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609), 216. Koestenbader ' v. Peirce ( 41 la. 204 [1876]), 72. Kohler Brick Co. v City of Toledo (29 Ohio C. C. 599 [1907]), 609, 629, 741, 848. Kokomo, City of v. Mahan ( 100 Ind. 242 [1884]), 388. Koller V. City of La Crosse (106 Wis. 369, 82 N. W. 341 [1900]), 67, 70, 77, 308, 1521. Koons V. Lucas (52 la. 177, 3 N. W. 84 [1879]), 380, 381, 463, 601. Kootenai County v. Hope Lumber Co. (13 Idaho, 262, 89 Pac. 1054 [1907]), 22. Kotheimer v. Louisville Interurban R. R. Co. (Ky.) S9 S. W. 104, 28 Ky. L. R. -298 [1905]), 2. Kramer v. City of Los Angeles (147 Cal. 668, 82 Pae. 334 [1905]), 324. 326, 400, 426. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll [References are to sections.] Kraut V. City of Dayton ( — Ky. , 97 S. W. 1101 [1906]), 1168, 1195, 1203. Kreling v. Muller (86 Cal. 465, 25 Pac. 10 [1890]), 684. Kretsch v. Helm (45 Ind. 438 [1874]), 500, 948, 1337, 1350, 1352. Kretsch v. Helm, 38 Ind. 207 [1871]), 496, 1350, 1352. Krumberg v. City of Cincinnati (29 0. S. 69 [1875]), 90, 113, 422, 425, 426, 548, 574, 828, 832. Krutz V. Gardner (25 Wash. 396, 65 Pac. 771 [1901]), 1068, 1195, 1225. Krutz V. Gardner (18 Wash. 332, 51 Pac. 397 [1897]), 995, 1179, 1204, 1223, 1225, 1243. Kuehner v. City of Freeport (143 111. 92, 17 L. R. A. 774, 32 N. E. 372 [1893]), 103, 104, 236, 601, 623, 665, 666, 670, 688, 715, 876. Kuester v. City of Chicago ( 187 111. 21, 58 N. E. 307 [1900]), 864, 1305, 1379. Kuhns V. City of Omaha (55 Neb. 183, 75 N. W. 562 {1898]), 308, 430, 576, 620, 622, 653, 1381. Kumiher v. Cincinnati (27 Ohio C. C. R. 683 [1905]), 651, 654, 690, 693, 699. Kunst V. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (173 111. 79, 50 N. E. 168 [1898]), 927, 928, 987, 1000, 1183. Kutchin v. Engelbret (129 Cal. 635, 62 Pac. 214 [1900]), 510, 639, 641, 840. L, In re Avenue, in City of New York (95 N. Y. S. 245, 107 App. Div. 581 [1905]), 427, 618. L'Hote V. Village of Milford (212 111. 418, 103 Am. St. Rep. 234, 72 N. E. 399 [1904]), 181, 784. La Veine v. City of Kansas City (67 Kan. 239, 72 Pac. 774 [1903]), 516, 570. Laakman v. Pritchard (160 Ind. 24, 66 N. E. 153 [1902]), 877, 1067. Labs V. Cooper (107 Cal. 656, 40 Pac. Rep. 1042 [1895]), 824, 886. Lacey v. City of Marshalltown (99 la. 367, 68 N. W. 726), 603, 604, 640. Lacey Levee & Drainage District, Commissioners of v. Langellier (215 111. 271, 74 N. E. 148 [1905]), 340, 1371. Lackland v. Walker (151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414 [1899]), 1053, 1057. Lacoste v. City of New Orleans (119 La. 469, 44 So. 267 [1907]), 515. Ladd V. Gambell (35 Ore. 393, 59 Pac. 113), 147. Ladd V. City of Portland (32 Or. 271, 67 Am. St. Rep. 526, 51 Pac. 654 [1898]), 166, 172, 373, 374, 380,' 381, 617, 648. Ladd V. Spencer (23 Ore. 123, 31 Pac. Rep. 474), 223, 234, 501, 735, 749, 754, 777, 848, 864. Lafayette, City of v. Fowler (34 Ind. 140 [1870]), 264, 388, 416, 464, 783. Lafayette, City of v. The Male Or- phans' Asylum (4 La. Ann. 1 [1849]), 42, 155, 589, 613. Lafayette, City of v. Shultz (44 Ind. 97 [1873]), 1519. Laflin v. City of Chicago (48 111. 449 [1868]), 475, 477, 956, 962, 968, 975. Laguna Drainage District v. Charles Martin (144 Cal. 209, 77 Pac. 933 [1904]), 83, 292, 335, 636, 659, 670, 768. Laimbeer v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 109 [1850]), 279, 281, 813, 886, 1375. Lake v. City of Decatur (91 111. 596 [1879]), 51, 103, 104, 550, 553, 555, 623, 642, 723, 862, 867. LaKe V; Trustees of the Village of Williamsburg (4 Denio, 520 [1847]), 1506. Lake Erie & Western Railway Com- pany V. Bowker (9 Ind. App. 428, 36 N. E. Rep. 864 [1893]), 324, 594, 596, 598, 886, 891, 918, 1026, 1078, 1224, 1305. cxxxvni TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co. V. Cluggish (143 Ind. 347, 42 N. E. 743 [1895]), 661. Lake Erie & Western E. E. Co. v. Walters (13 Ind. App. 275, 41 N. E. 465 [1895]), 543. Lake Erie & W. Ey. Co. v. Watkins (157 Ind. 600, 62 N. E. 443), 142, 1347. Lake Fork Special Drainage Dis- trict, Commissioners of v. The People ex rel. Bodman ( 138 111. 87, 27 N. E. 857 [1892]), 340, 564, 1477. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Eailway Company v. City of Chi- cago (148 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894]), 228, 229, 426. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Eailway Company v. City of Chi- cago (144 111. 391, 33 N. E. 602 [1893]), 495, 497, 864. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Eailway Co. v. City of Grand Eap- ids, 102 Mich. 374, 29 L. E. A. 195, 60 N. W. 767 [1894]), 42, 314, 594, 595, 598, 614, 1078. Lake Street Elevated Eailroad Com- pany V. City of Chicago (183 III. 75, 47 L. R. A. 624, 55 N. E. 721 [1899]), 601, 617. Lake Washington Waterway Co. v. Seattle Dock Co., (35 Wash. 503, 77 Pac. 845 [1904]), 124. Lakeview Avenue, In re, in City of Seattle (— Wash. , 89 Pac. 156 [1907]), 697. Lamar Wa/ter & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lainar, 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. E. A. 157, 26 S. W. 1025, 31 S. W. 756 [1895]), 8, 39, 47, 50, 145, 212. Lamb v. City of Chicago (219 111. 229, 76 N. E. 343 [1906]), 295, 315, 387, 464, 670, 715, 920, 1375. Lamb v. Elizabeth City (131 N. C. 241, 42 S. E. 603 [1902]), 67. Lambert v. Bates (148 Cal. 146, 82 Pac. 767 [1905]), 301, 531, 1366. Lambert v. Bates (137 Cal. 676, 70 Pac. 777), 531, 537, 1005, 1007, 1030, 1337. Lambert v. Marcuse (137 Cal. 44, 69 Pac. 620 [1902]), 315, 831, 864. Lambert v. Mills County (58 la. 666, 12 N. W. 715), 142. Lambertville, Inhabitants of the Town of v. Clevinger (30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 53 [1862]), 71. Lammers v. Balfe (41 Ind. 218 ♦ [1872]), 526, 964, 983, 1118, 1191,. 1377, 1392. Landes v. State ex rel. Matson ( 160 Ind. 479, 67 N. E. 189 [1903]), 845. Lands, Owners of v. People ex rel. Stookey (113 111. 2fl6 [1886]), 119, 249. Lane v. Burnap (39 Mich. 736 [1878]), 747, 764, 1003, 1278, 1402. Lane v. Morrel (3 Edward's Chan. Rep. 185 [1838]), 887, 1059, 1068. Lanfersiek v. City of Cincinnati (28 Ohio C. C. 822 [1904]), 657, 1432. Lang V. Kiendl (27 Hun 66 [1882]), 961. Langan v. Bitzer ( — Ky. , 82 S. W. 280, 26 Ky. L. Eep. 579 [1904]), 323, 420, 475, 575, 891, 977, 979, 981, 1330. Lange, In the Matter of the Ap- plication of to Vacate an Assess- ment (85 N. Y. 307 [1881]), 265, 482, 495, 496, 989, 1455. Langhor v. Smith (81 Ind. 495 [1882]), 1191, 1297, 1450. Langlois v. Cameron (201 111. 301, 66 N. E. 332 [1903]), 136, 263, 620, 623, 631, 751, 895, 1196. Langmead v. City of Cincinnati (29 Ohio C. C. 64 [1906]), 417, 658. Langsdale v. Nieklaus (38 Ind. 289 [1871]), 526, 1067. Lanning v. Palmer (117 Mich. 529, 76 N. W. 2 [1898]), 373, 375, 738. Lanphere v. City of Chicago (212 111. 440, 72 N. E. 426 [1904]), 570, 864. Lansing v. City of Lincoln (32 Neb. 457, 49 N. W. 650 [1891]), 321, 619, 713. Lansing, City of v. Van Gorder (24 Mich. 456 [1872]), 1512. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXIX [References are to sections. 3 Lanster v. Meyers ( — Ind. , 84 N. E. 1087 [1908]), 1384. Lantz V. Fishburn ( — Cal. App. , 91 Pac. 816 [1906]), 1112, 1174, 1177, 1181, 1200. Laporte County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. Wolff ( — Ind. — =— , 72 N. E. S60 [1904]), 534, 1449. Large v. Kien's Creek Draining Co. (30 Ind. 263, 95 Am. Dec. 696 [1868]), 340, 905, 1231. Larned v. Maloney ( 19 Ind. App. 199, 49 N. E. 278 [1898]), 509. Larson v. City of Chicago (172 111. 298, 50 N. E. 179 [1898]), 772, 900, 927, 935, 936, 947, 986, 996, 1183, 1340, 1379. Larson v. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger (170 111. 93, 48 N. E. 443 [18fl7]), 745, 765, 902, 927, 930, 936, 986, 993, 996, 1163, 1340, 1379. Lasbury v. MeCague (56 Neb. 220, 76 N. W. 862 [1898]), 342, 1072, 1431, 1450. Latham v. Village of Wilmette (168 in. 153, 48 N. E. 311 [1897]), 517, 518, 557, 657, 672, 923, 1085, 1306, 1333. Lathrop v. City of Buffalo (3 Abb. Ct. App. (N. Y.) 30 [1861]), 223, 234, 569, 785. Lathrop v. City of Kacine (119 Wis. 461, 97 N. W. 192 [1903]), 92, 98, 362, 713, 717. Lathrop Township, In re, Road in (84 Pa. St. (3 Norris) 126 [1877]), 925. Laverty v. State ex rel. Hill (109 Ind. 217, 9 N. E. 774 [1886]), 73, 340, 403, 1156, 1251, 1346. Laubach v. O'Meara (107 Mich. 29, 64 N. W. 865 [1895]), 403. Laughlin v. Ayers (66 Ind. 445 [1879]), 280, 1250. Law V. Johnston (118 Ind. 261, 20 N. E. 745 [1888]), 119, 301, 773, 1141. Law V. Madison, Smyrna & Graham Turnpike Company (30 Ind. 77 [1868]), 11, 43, 89, 145, 284, 322, 639, 651, 054, 665, 666, 688. Lawrence, City of v. Killam (11 Kan. 499 [1873]) 323, 440, 474, 486, 562, «20, 663, 1431, 1432, 1435. Lawrence v. People ex rel. Foote (188 in. 407, 58 N. B. 991 [1900])" 525, 1183, 1469. Lawrence, City of v, Webster (167 Mass. 513, 46 N. E. 123), 756. Le Breton v. Morgan (4 Mart. (La.) N. S. 138, 142' [1826]), 155. Le Moyne v. City of Chicago (175 111. 356, 51 N. E. 71i8 [1898]), 381, 386, 943, 966, 995. Le Moyne v. West Chicago Park Commissioners (116 III. 41, 4 N. E. 498, 6 N. E. 48 [1886]), 745, 763, 913, 918, 986, 1340. LeEoy v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (20 John Sup. Ct. 430, 11 Am. Dec. 289 [1823]), 557, 538, 1394. Lea V. City of Memphis (68 Tenn. (9 Baxter) 103 [1877]), 1439, 1483. Leake v. City of Philadelphia (171 Pa. St. 125, 32 Atl. 1110 [1895]), 291, 382, 383, 1431. Leake v. Philadelphia (150 Pa. St. 643, 24 Atl. 351 [1892]), 383, 1411. Leake and Watts Orphan Home, In the Matter of the Petition of the Trustees of the, in the City of New York to Vacate an Assess- ment (92 N. Y. 116 [1883]), 194, 195, 324, 432, 479, 482, 484, 485, 1454. Leakman v. Pritchard ( 160 Ind. 24, 66 N. E. 153 [1902]), 531. Lear v. Halstead (41 0. S. 566 [1885]), 629, 781, 1028. Leary v. Gardnei (63 N. Y. 624), 1460. Leavenworth, City of v. Jones (69 Kan. 857, 77 Pac. 273 [1904]), 1440. Leavenworth, City of v. Laing (6 Kan. .274 [1870]), 580. Leavenworth, City of v. Mills (6 Kan. 288 [1«70]), .538, 950, 1375, 1508. Leavenworth, City of v. Stille ( 13 Kan. 539 [1874]) 1508. cxl TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Leavenworth County v. Miller ( 7 Kan. 479, 12 Am. Rep. 425), 365. Leavitt v. Bell (55 Neb. 57, 75 N. W. 524 [1898]), 745, 763, 775, 781, 884, 911, 1057, 1304 Lebanon & Northern Ey. Co. v. Cin- cinnati (62 0. S. 465, 49 L. R. A. 566, 57 N. E. 229 [1900]), 700. Leeds v. Defrees (lo7 Ind. 392, 61 N. E. 930 [1901]), 86, 119, 301, 620, 690, 699, 745, 781, 1060, 1244, 1375. Leeds v. City of Richmond j( 102 Ind. 372, 1 N. E. 711 [1885]), 245, 293, 392, 400, 476, 1005, 1007. Lefevre v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit (2 Mich. 586 [1853]), 42, 314, 415, 525, 588, 613, 614, 886, 887. Leggett V. City of Detroit (137 Mich. 247, 100 N. W. 566 [1904]), • 616. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. City of Chicago (26 Fed. 415 [1886]), 71. Lehmaier v. Jones (91 N. Y. S. 687, 100 App. Div. 495 [1905]), 1054. Lehman v. McBride (15 0. S. 573 [1864]), 189. Lehmer v. People ex rel. Miller (80 111. 601 [1875]), 393, 396, 455, 927, 937, 986, 1340. Lehmers v. City of Chicago (178 111. 530, 53 N. E. 394 [1899]), 570, 862, 865. Leighton v. Ricker ( 173 Mass. 564, 54 N. E. 254), 1072. Leindecker v. The People ex rel. Johnson (98 111. 21), 45, 1126, 1176, 1188. Leinen v. Elter (43 Hun (N. Y.) 249 [1887]), 1056. Leitch V. Village of La Grange (138 111. 291, 27 N. E. 917 [1892]), 324, 610, 653, 655, 658, 663, 670. Leitch V. People ex rel. Gannaway (183 III. 569, 56 N. E. 127 [1900]), 745, 769, 772, 927, 928. Leman v. City of Lake View ( 131 111. 388, 23 N. E. 346 [1890]), 393, 396, 547, 587, 775, 909. Lembeck v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City (30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 554 [1879]), 1415. Lemont, Village of v. Jenks ( 197 111. 363, 90 Am. St. Rep. 172, 64 N. E. 362 [1902]), 6, 98, 354, 708, 717, 1039. Lennon v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (55 N. Y. 361 [1874]), 166, ^167, 983, i337, 1451. Lennon v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York (5 Daly (N. Y.) 347 [1874]), 983, 1113, 1196, 1426, 1427. Lenon v. Brodie (81 Ark. 208, 98 S. W. 979 [1906]), 553, 555, 795, 801, 1277. Lent V. Tillspn (140 U. S. 316, 35 L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891]), 119, 121, 133, 250, 251, 252, 266, 292, 309, 553, 728, 760, 761, 1370. Lent V. Tillson (72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887]), 86, 119, 125, 244, 247, 250, 251, 252, 266, 292, 293, 298, 309, 553, 726, 728, 745, 751, 760, 761, 918, 1015, 1026, 1333, 1337, 1370, 1414, 1431. Lentz V. City of Dallas (96 Tex. 258, 72 S. W. 59 [1903]), 93, 96, 323, 419, 420, 702, 717. Leominster, Inhabitants of v. Con- ant (139 Mass. 384, 2 N. E. 690 [1885]), 324, 367, 527, 625, 658, 707, 834, 855, 1067, 1130. - Leonard v. City of Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 498, 27 Am. .Rep. 80), 580. Leonard v. Sparks (63 Mo. App. 585 [1895]), 735, 747, 770. Leslie v. City of St. Louis (47 Mo. 474 [1871]), 308, 391, 394, 426, 1426, 1438. Lester, In the Matter of (21 Hun (N. Y.) 130 [1880]), 265, 1455. Lester v. City of Seattle (42 Wash. 539, 85 Pac. 14 [1906]), 301, 965, 990, 1447. Levee Commissioners, Board of v. Lario Bros. (33 La. Ann. 276 [1881]), 343. Lever, In re (1 Ch. 32 [1897]), 1065. Levi V. Louisville (97 Ky. 394, 28 L. R. A. 480, 30 S. W. 973), 613. Levy, In the Matter of (4 Hun 501 [1875]), 740, 747. TABLE OP CASES. cxH [References are to sections.] Levy V. City of Chicago (113 111. &50 [1886]), 313, 8ti4. Levy V. Superior Court of San Fran- oisco (167 U. S. 175, 17 S. 769), 715. Levy V. Wilcox (96 Wis. 127, 70 N. W. 1109 [1S97]), 3. Levpis, In the Matter of (31 Barb. (N. Y.) 82 [1S68]), 469, 50S, 1455. Lewis, In the matter of ( 35 Howard 162 [1868]), 266, 469, 485, 505, 532, 53-7, 740, 843, 844, 848, 1452. Lewis V. Albertson (23 Ind. App. 147, 53 N. E. 1071 [1899]), 301, 405, 568, 728, 831, 1150, 1229, 1234, 1235, 1240, 1242, 1249, 1262, 1275. Lewis V. City of Elizabeth (25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 298 [1874]), 515, 570, 1432. Lewis V. Laylin (46 0. S. 663, 23 N. E. 288 [1899]), 322, 672, 690, 1416. Lewis V. City of New Britain (52 Conn. 568 [1885]), 323. Lewis, In the Matter of the Petition of V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New iork (35 How. (N. Y.) 162 [1868]), 374, 381. Lewis V. Schmidt ( — Ky. , 43 S. W. 433, 19 Ky. L, Rep. 1315), 431. Lewis V. City of Seattle (28 Wash. 639, 69 Pac. 393 [1902]), 166, 263, 268, 414, 440, 569, 666, 670, 690, 725, 961, 969, 1169. Lewis V. Symmes (61 0. S. 471, 70 Am. St. Rep. 428, 56 N. E. 194 [1899]), 174, 189, 232. Lewis County v. Gordon (20 Wash. 80, 54 Pac. 770 [1808]), 338. Lexington, City of, on Appeal (96 Ky. 258, 28 S. W. 605 [189.4]), 200, 308, 1502. Lexington, City of v. Bowman (119 Ky. 840, 84 S. W. 1161, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 286 [1905]); (petition for rehearing overruled in 85 S. W. 1191, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 651), 1021, 1167. Lexington, City of, ex rel. Menefee V. Commercial Bank ( — Mo. App. , 108 S. W. 1095 [1908]), 499, 830. Lexington, City of v. Headley (68 Ky. (5 Bush.) 308 [1869]), 843, 951, 1279, 1280, 1304. Lexington, The Mayor, etc., of City of v. .Long (31 Mo. 369 [18«1]), 309, 698, 716, 1366. Lexington, City of v. McQuillan's Heirs (39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513, 33 Am. Dec. 159 [1839]), 12, 22, 34, 86, 100, 111, 147, 154, 243, 301, 308, 628, 662, 688, 710, 779, 781, 791, 843. Lexington, City of v. Walby ( — Ky. , 109 S. W. 299 [1908]), 527. Lexington Avenue, Matter of (92 N. Y. 629 [1883]), 188. Lexington Avenue, Matter of (29 Hun 303 [1883]), 188. Lexington Avenue, In the Matter of Opening (50 Howard (N. Y.) 114 [1874]), 833, 1016. Libbey v. Elsworth (97 Cal. 316, 32 Pac. 228 [1893]), 491, 322, 1235. Liljerty Township Draining Associa- tion V. Watkins (72 Ind. 430 [1880]), 364, 1273, 1337. Lieberniann v. City of Milwaukee (89 Wis. 336, 61 N. W. 1112 [1895]), 62, 266, 428, 777, 862, 981, 1196, 1426, 1427. Liebstein v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark (24 N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 200 [1873]), 16, 531, 534, 536, 1015, 1423, 1424, 1436. Lien v. Board of County Commis- sioners of -Norman County (80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094 [1900]), 86, 97, 194, 335, 340, 449. Lienen v. Elter (43 Hun (N. Y.) 249 [1887]), 1443. Ligare v. City of Chicago (139 111. 46, 32 Am. St. Rep. 179, 28 X. E. 934), 298. Lightner v. City of Peoria ( 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. '69 [1894]), 51, 245, 250, 258, -555, 574, .587, 601, 603, C04, 623, 643, 651, 666, 670, 677, 688, 715, 723, 872, 10S5, 1333. cxiii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Lill V. The City of Chicago (29 111. 31 [1862]), 223, 234, 554, 620, 670, 707, 941, 1341. Lima v. Cemetery Association (42 O. S. 128, 51 Am. Eep. 809 [1884]), 11, 35, 42, 301, 592, 613, 614, 1277. Linck V. City of Litchfield (141 111. 469, 31 N. E. 123 [1893]), 181, 245, 258, 281, 764, 883, 1183, 1299, 1303, 1305, 1317, 1372. Lincoln v. Board of Street Commis- sioners of the City of Boston ( 176 Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]), 64, 65, 66, 103, 118, 156, 350, 549, 556, 572, 642, 645, 651, 654, 656, 666, 695, 702, 724, 893. Lincoln, City of v. Janesch (63 Neb. 707, 93 Am. St. Eep. 478, 56 L. E. A. 762, 89 N. W. 280 [1902]), 96, 420. Lincoln Avenue, In re, Jenkinson's Appeal (193 Pa. St. 435, 44 AtL 1102 [1899]), 383. Lincoln Ave., In re Eodger's Appeal (193 Pa. St. 432, 44 Atl. 1102 [1899]), 462. Lindenberger Land Co. v. E. B. Park & Co. (— Ky. , 85 S. W. 213, 27 Ky. L. Eep. 437 [1905]), 301, 541, 575, 656, 822. Lindsay v. City of Chicago (115 111. 120, 3 N. E. 443 [1886]), 837, 843, 923, 951, 1280, 1281, 1299, 1304. Lindsay y. Commissioners (2 Bay (S. C.) 38 [1796]), 359. Lindsey v. Brawner ( — Ky. , 97 S. W. 1, 29 Ky. L. Eep. 1236 [1906]), 301, 462, 524. Lingenfelter v. Danville and North Salem Gravel Eoad Co. (33 Ind. 133 [1870]), 723. Lingle v. City of Chicago (172 111. 170, 50 N. E. 192 [1898]), 223, . 234, 266, 765, 914, 1304. Lingle v. City of Chicago (212 111. 512, 72 N. E. 677 [1904]), 913, 914, 1368. Lingle v. City of Chicago (210 III. 600, 71 N. E. 590 [1904]), 1348, 1356. Lingle v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (222 111. 384, 78 N. E. 794 [1906]), 293, 348, 356, 368, 418, 451, 653, 920. Linne v. Bredes (43 Wash. 540, 6 L. E. A. (N. S.) 707, 86 Pac. 858 [1906]), 1050, 1072. Linneus, City of v. Locke (25 Mo. App. 407 [1887]), 1135, 1137. Liftville V. State ex rel. (130 Ind. 210, 29 N. E. 1129), 267, 814. Lipes V. Hand (104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]), 202, .284, 287, 340, 341, 549," 584, 654. Lippert v. Parker (76 0. S. 568, 81 N. E. 1189 [1907]), 839. Lippert v. City of Toledo (29 Ohio C. C. 345 [1906]), 839. Lisbon Avenue Land Co. v. Town of Lake (— Wis. , 113 N. W. 1099 [1907]), 93, 96, 374, 717, 667. Lister v. City of Taeoma- (44 Wash. 222, 87 Pac. 126 [1906]), 301, 541, 1085. Litchfield v. McComber (42 Barb. 288 [1864]), 8, 89, 1214. Litchfield v. Vernon (41 N. Y. 123 [1869]), 11, 100, 110, 781. Litchfield & Madison Eailway Com- pany v. People, ex rel. McCormick (225 111. 301, 80 N. E. 335 [1907]), 322. Little, In the Matter of (60 N. Y. 343 [1875]), 740, 762, 836, 1466. Little, In the Matter of (3 Hun (N. Y.) 215 [1874]), 740, 836, 1466. Little V. City of Chicago (46 111. App. 534 [1892]), 601, 1080, 1277, 1469, 1506, 1518. Little V. City of Portland (26 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911 [1894]), 507, 1504, 1508, 1510, 1511. Little V. City of Eochester («7 Hun 493, 34 N. Y. S. 1010 [1895]), 721, 1037, 1090. Little Eock, City of v. Board of Im- provements, etc. (42 Ark. 152 [1883]), 89, 103, 105, 151, 247, 249, 256, 266, 268, 1469. Little Eock v. Fitzgerald (59 Ark. 494, 28 L. E. A. 496, 28 S. W. 32 [1894]), 55, 313, 443, 713. TABLE OF CASES. cxliii [References are to sections.] Little Rock v. Katzenstein (52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]), 103, 151, 548, 549, 019, 621, 626, 651, 653. Little Rock & Ft. Smith Railway Company v. AUister (08 Ark. 600, 60 S. W. 953 [1901]), 66. Livingston, In the Matter of the Pe- tition of to Vacate an A.ssessment (121 N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]), 16, 263, 271, 484, 485, 584, 670, 981, 1451, 1454, 1463. Livingston v. New York (8 Wend. . (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622), 73, 110, 147. Loan Association v. Topeka (87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 655, 22 L. 455), 283. Ajockwood V. Gehlert (53 Hun (N. Y.) 15, 6 N. Y. Supp. 20 [1889]), 1181, 1197. Loekwood v. City of St. Louis (24 Mo. 20 [1856]), 11, 78, 147, 324, 588, 612, 613, 1420, 1426. Locust Avenue, In the Matter of Opening, in Village of Port Ches- ter (185 N. Y. 115, 77 N. E. 1012 [1906]), 477, 663, 776, 783. Locust Avenue, Matter of (97 N. Y. S. 508, 110 App. Div. 774 [1906]), 477, 783. Locus.t Avenue, In re (87 N. Y. S. 798, 93 App. Div. 416 [1904]), 263, 775. Loeb V. Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S. 472, 45 L. 280, 21 S. 174 [1901]), 189, 698, 702, 1374, 1502. Loeb V. Trustees of Columbia Town- ship, Hamilton County, 0. (91 Fed. 37 [1899]), 81, 118, 189, 660, 698, 702, 709, 1374, 1502. Loeser v. Redd & Bro. (77 Ky. (14 Bush.) 18 [1878]), 629, 977. Loesnitz v. Seelinger (127 Ind. 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890]), 266, 268, 270, 322, 416, 423, 432, 465, 479, 540, 739, 951, 1004, 1337, 1366, 1435. Loew, In the Matter of (90 N. Y. . 666 [1«82]), 1373. Logansport, City of v. Humphrey (84 Ind. 467), 1206. Logansport, City of v. Legg (20 Ind. 315 [1863]), 843. Logansport, City of v. Shirk ( 129 Ind. 352, 28 N. E. 538 [1891]), 101, 119, 126, 729, 748. Logansport, City of v. Uhl (99 Ind. 531, 50 Am. Rep. lOrf [1884]), 1015. Lohrum v. Eyermann (5 Mo. App. 481 [1878]), 11, 1346. Lombard v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners (181 U. S. 33, 45 L. 731, 21 S. 507 [1901]), 51, 314, 356, 407, 414, 715, 959, 962, 1370. London and Northwesrt American Mortgage Company v. Gibson (77 Minn. 394, 80 N. W. 205, 777 [1899]), 986, 998, 1149, 1180, 1440. Londoner v. City and County of Denver (210 U. S. 373, 28 S. 708 [1908]), 119, 251, 629, 731. Long V. lona Probate Judge (130 Mich. 338, 89 N. W. 938), 1348. Long V. O'Rourke (10 Phil. 129), 521. Long V. Ruch (148 Ind. 74, 47 N. E. 156), 1444. Long Branch Police, Sanitary and Improvement Commission v. Dob- bins (61 N. J. L. (32 Vr.) 659, 40 Atl. 599 [1898]), 699, 025, 956, 973, 1282, 1366. Longwell v. Kansas City (69 Mo. App. 177 [1896]), 394, 757. Longworth v. City of Cincinnati (34 0. S. 101 [1877]), 316, 432, 468, 511, 542, 822. Longyear v. Toolan (209 U. S. 414, 28 S. 506 [1908]), 119. Loomis V. City of Little Falls (176 N. Y. 31, 68 N. E. 105 [1903]), 141, 1337. Loomis V. City of Little Falls (72 N. Y. S. 774, 66 App. Div. -299 [1901]), 141, 1337. - Lord, In the Matter of (78 N. Y. 109 [1879]), 381, 479, 1016, 1461. Lord, In the Matter of (21 Hun 555 [1880]), 1016, 1461. Lord V. Mayor and Council of City of Bayonne (65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 127, 46 Atl. 701 [1900]), 956, 959. cxli TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Lorden v. Coffey (178 Mass. 489, 60 N. E. 124 [1901]), 82, 103, 623, 667, 677, 695, 709, 1067. Lorenz v. Armstrong (3 Mo. App. 574), 393, 396. Los Angeles, City of v. Amidor (140 Cal. 400, 73 Pac. 1049 [1903]), 1490, 1496. Los Aiigeles Lighting Company v. City of Los Angeles ( 106 Oal. 156, 39 Pac. Eep. 535 [1895]), 804, 805, 810, 831. Louchheim v. City of Philadelphia (218 Pa. 100, 66 Atl. 1121 [1907]), 495. Louisiana, City of v. McAllister (104 Mo. App. 152, 78 S. W. 314 [1903]), 748, 768. Louisiana v. Miller (66 Mo. 467 [1877]), 323, 837, 1040. Louisiana v. Pillsbury ( 106 U. S. 278, 26 L. 1090 [1881]), 1469. Louisiana, City of v. Shaffner ( 104 Mo. App. 101, 78 S. W. 287 [1903]), 53, 55, 501, 510, 840. Louisiana Improvement Company v. Baton Kouge Electric & Gas Com- pany (114 La. 534, 38 So. 444 [1905]), 599, 663, 725, 1028, 1215, 1216, 1224, 1503. Louisville, City of v. American Standard Asphalt Co. ( — Ky. , 102 S. W. 806, 31 Ky. L. K. 133 [1907]), 628, 666, 709, 710, 977, 979, 1505. Louisville, City of v. Bitzier (115 Ky. 359, 61 L. E. A. 434, 73 S. W. 1115, 24 Ky. Law Eep. 2263 [1903]), 651, 674, 678. Louisville, City of v. Henderson (5 Bush. (68 Ky.) 515 [1869]), 517, 518, .1224. Louisville, City of v. Hyatt (41 Ky. (2 B. Monroe) 177, 36 Am. Dec. 594 [1841]), 86, 147, 245, 301, 488, 783, '789, 843, 1509. Louisville, City of v. Leatherman (99 Ky. 213, 35 S. W. 625 ri896[), 586, 612, 1077, 1498, 1508. Louisville, City of v. Louisville Eoll- ing Mill Company (66 Ky. (3 Bush.) 416, 96 Am. Dec. 243 [1867]), 71, 111, 678. Louisville, City of v. McNaughton (114 Ky. 333, 70 S. W. 841 [1902]), 1164, 1526. Louisville v. Nevin (73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 549, 19 Am. Eep. 78 [1874]), 42. Lotdsville, City of v. Osborne (73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 226 [1874]), 352, 628. Louisville, City of v. Selvage (106 Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 [1899]), 465, 479, 519, 628, 629, 675, 909, 710, 84*, 1106. Louisville, City of v. Tyler (111 Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 65 S. W. 125 [1901]), 462. Louisville, City of v. Wible (84 Ky. 290, 1 S. W. 605), 372. Louisville & Nashville E. E. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. ( 197 U. S. 430, 25 S. 466 [1905]), 115, 118, 570, 594, 595, 598, 628, 702, 1370. Louisville & Nashville E. E. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (116 Ky. 856, 76 S. W. 1097, 25 Ky. L. E. 1024 [1903]), 118, 570, 594, 595, 597, 598, 628, 630, 702, 1370. Louisville and x'^^ashville Eailroad Company v. County Court of Davidson County ( 33 Tenn. ( 1 Sneed.) 637, 62 Am. Dec. 424 [1854]), 365. Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company v. City of East St. Louis 134 HI. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]), 223, 234, 293, 298, 359, 490, 561, 597, 619, 776, 816, 849, 857, 895. Ijouisville & Nashville Eailroad Co. V. Thompson (57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 735 [1857]), 69, 71. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ey. Co. V. State for Use of Beek- man (122 Ind. 443, 24 N. E. 350 [1889]), 340, 598, 1065, 1078, 1145, 1380. Louisville Ey. Co. v. Southwestern Alcatraz Asphalt & Construction Co. (— Ky. , 74 S. W. 237,. 24 Ky. Law Eep. 2380 [1903]), 628, 629, 709, 710. TABLE OF CASES. cxlv [References are to seetlous. ] Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. An- derson (— (Ky.) , 57 S. W. 617, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 397), 352. Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. Meh- ler (112 Ky. 438, 64 S. W. 396, 64 S. W. 652, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1335 [1901]), 73, 313, 314, 394, 431, 436, 438, 1346. Lounsbury v. Potter (37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 57 [1874]), 1072. Lo-ve V. Howard (6 R. I. 116 [1859]), 49. Lovell V. City of St. Paul ( 10 Minn. 290 [1865]), 746, 763, 1103, 1104, 1177, 1178, 1512. Lovenberg v. City of Galveston ( 17 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 [1897]), 42, 108, 118, 147, 245, 301, 607, 1041, 1079. Low V. Dallas (165 Ind. 392, 75 N. E. 822 [1905]), 301, 746, 1229, 1240, 1242, 1279. Low V. Madison, Smyrna & Graham Turnpike Company (30 Ind. 77 [1868]), 35. Lowden, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of to Vacate an Assessment ( 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]), 119, 121, 324, 4^8, 480, 663, 727, 729, 732, 750, 915, 1455. Lowden, In the Matter of to Vacate an Assessment (25 Hun (N. Y.) 434 [1881]), 468. Lowden v. City of Cincinnati (2 Dis- ney (Ohio) 203 [1858]), 50, 849, 1122, 1508. Lowe V. Board of Commissioners of Howard County (94 Ind. 553 [1883]), 35, 580, 582, 1075. Lowell V. City of Boston (111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39), 336, 410. Lowell, City of v. Hadley (49 Mass. (8 Met.) 180 [1844]), 323, 420. Lowell, City of v. Wentworth (60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 221 [1850]), 745, 748, 981. Lower Chatham and Little Falls, In the Matter of the Application for Drainage of Lands between, in the Counties of Passaic, Essex and Morris (35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 497 [1872]), 101, 340, 677, 690, 691, 687. Lower Kings River Reclamation Dis- trict No. 531 V. McCullah (124 Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]), 129, 269, 426, 486, 556, 773, 886, 895, 1387. Lower Kings River Reclamation Dis- trict No. 531 V. Phillips (108 Cal 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335, [1895]), 118, 119, 123, 254, 280, 340, 677, 770, 886, 923, 951, 1004. 1005, 1006, 1008, 1277, 1313, 1331, 1339. Lowerre v. Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (46 Hun (N. Y.) 253 [1887]), 70, 308, 630. Loweree v. City of Newark ( 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 151 [1875]), 70, 86, 113, 308, 651, 1372. Lucas V. McCann (50 Mo. App. 638 [1892]), 49. Lucas County v. Hunt (5 0. S. 488, 67 Am. Dec. 303 [1856]), 486. Lucas, Turner & Co. v. San Fran- cisco (7 Cal. 463 [1857]), 16, 301, 812, 830, 984, 1049, 1498, 1504, 1512. Ludlow, City of v. Cincinnati South- ern Railway Company (78 Ky. 357 [1880]), 301, 594, 598, 612. Ludlow v. Union Township Gravel Road Co. (77 Ind. 409 [1881]), 1125, 1350. Lufkin v. City of Galveston (58 Tex. 545 [1883]), 42, 174, 213, 323, 607, 1049, 1272, 1277. Lumsden v. Cross (10 Wis. 282), 163, 370. Lumsden v. Milwaukee (8 Wis. 485 [1859]), 737. Lundberg v. City of Chicago (183 111. 572, 56 N. E. 415 [1900]), 864. Lundbom v. City of Manistee (93 Mich. 170, 53 N. W. 161), 956, 1015. Lusk V. City of Chicago (176 ill. 207, 52 N. E. 54 [1898]), 857, 864. Lusk V. City of Chicago (211 111. 183, 71 N. E. 878 [1904]), 947, 952, 955, 988, 1002, 1390. cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Lutes V. Briggs (5 Hun (N. Y.) 67 [1875]), 492, 510, 840, 1423, 1443. Luther v. Borden (48 U. S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L. 581), 216. Lutman v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. Co. (56 Ohio St. 433, 47 N. E. 248 [1897]), 1437. Lux and Talbott Stone Co. v. Donald- son (162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1903]), 73, 373, 374, 380, 381, 387, 413, 464, 528, 531, 534, 646, 720, 837, 927, 1005, 1011, 1012, 1015, 1022, 1249, 1258, 1267, 1335, 1346, 1385, 1386. Luzadder v. State for Use of Rhine (131 Ind. 598, 31 N. E. Rep. 453 [1891]), 886, 978. Lyman v. City of Chicago (211 111. 209, 71 N. E. 832 [1904]), 927, 986, 1411, 1414, 1416, 1432, 1439, 1450. Lyman v. Howe (64 Ark. 436, 42 S. W. 830 [1897]), 3. Lyman v. Plummer (75 la. 353, 39 N. W. 527 [1888]), 119, 121, 760. Lynch v. City of Kansas City ( 44 Kan. 452, 24 Pae. 973 [1890]), 3, 433, 511, 569, 870, 1337. Lynde v. Inhabitants of Melrose ( 10 All. (Mass.) 49), 1206. Lyon V. Alley (130 U. S. 177, 32 L. 899, 9 S. 480 [1889]), 570, 880, 907, 1037, 1067. Lyon V. City of Brooklyn (28 Barb. (N. Y.) 609 [1858]), 672, 675, 689, 690. Lyon V. District of Columbia (20 D. C. 484 [1892]), 1511. Lyon V. Town of Tonawanda (98 Fed. 361 [1899]), 118, 570, 702. Lyth V. City of Buffalo (48 Hun (N. Y.) 175 [1888]), 747, 770, 778, 927, 930, 1026, 1431, 1450. M' M'Causland v. Leuffer (4 Wharton (Pa.) 175 [1839]), 1050. H'Comb V. Bell (2 Minn. 295 [1858]), 234, 665, 777, 1277. M'Gonigle v. City of Allegheny (44 Pa. St. 118 [1862]), 570. M'Kusick V. City of Stillwater (44 Minn. 372, 46 N. W. 769 [1890]), 762, 818, 918, 927, 932, 981. M'Maken v. Hayes (29 Ohio C. C. 535 [1907]), 631. M'Masters v. Commonwealth (3 Watts (Pa.) 292 [1834]), 111, 308. Mac Macffarland v. Byrnes ( 19 App. D. C. 531 [1902]), 961, 1354. Mc McAboy V. Gosnsll ( — Ky. , 63 S. W. 961, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1187 [1901]), 1235. McAllister v. City of Tacoma (9 Wash. 272, 37 Pae. 447, 658 [1894]), 465, 479, 510, 519. McAuley v. City of Chicago (22 111. 563 [1859]), 738, 766, 947, 1281. McAunich v. Mississippi, etc., R. R. Oo. (20 la. 338), 180. • McBean v. Chandler (24 Am. Rep. 308 [1872]), 35, 44, 89, 96, 420, 700. (See also Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler. ) McBean v. Martin (96 Cal. 188^ 31 Pae. 5 [1892]), 1153, 1240., McBrian v. City of Grand Rapids (56 Mich. 05, 22 N. W. 206), 495. McBride v. State for Use of Clandy (130 Ind. 525, 30 N. E. 699 [1891]), 247, 340, 1008. MoCague v. City of Omaha (58 Neb. 37, 78 N. W. 463 [1899]), 1206. McCain v. City of Des Moines (128 Iowa 331, 103 N. W. 979 [1905]), 534, 1433. McCaleb v. Cool Run Drainage and Levee District ( 190 111. 549, 60 N. E. 898 [1901]), 909. McCall V. City of Rochester (89 N. Y. S. 766, 44 Misc. Rep. 129 [1904]), 1484, 1486. TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii [References are to sections.] MoCann v. City of Albany (158 N. Y. 634, 53 N. E. 673 [1899]), 1375. MoCaiui V. Albany (11 App. Div. 378), 1375. McCarty v; Brick (11 N. J. L. (6 Halst.) 27 [1829]), 249, 340, 711, 777, 824, 884, 1330, 1478; McCauley v. The People ex rel. Huek (87 111. 123 [1877]), 1184. McCausland v. LeufFer (4 Whart. (Pa.) 175 [1839]), 15. MoChesney v. City of Chicago (226 111. 238, 80 N. E. 770 [1907]), 347, 864, 926. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (213 III. 592, 73 N. E. 368 [1905]), 347, 475, 565, 603, 864, 1104. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (205 111. 611, 69 N. E. 82 [1903]), 570, 739, 811, 819, 828, 864, 1289. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (205 111. 528, 69 N. E. 38 [1903]), 469, 909, 978, 1390. MoChesney v. City of Chicago (201 III. 344, 66 N. E. 217 [1903]), 469, 472, 570, 739, 747, 800, 816, 820, 828, 832, 835, 839, 859, 862, 865. MeChesney v. City of Chicago ( 188 III. 423, 68 N. E. 982 [1900]), 819, 852, 943, 966, 986. MoChesney v. City of Chicago ( 173 111. 75, 50 N. E. 191 [1898]), 857, 862. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (171 III. 253,' 49 N. E. 548 [1898]), 298, 857, 859, 862. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (161 111. 110, 43 N. E. Rep. 702 [1896]), 852, 926, 942, 966, 986. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (159 111. 223, 42 N. E. 894 [1896]), 194, 195, 281, 923, 1281, 1299, 1376. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (159 111. 223, 42 N. E. 894 [1896]), 195, 281. MeChesney v. City of Chicago (152 111. 543, 38 N. E. 767 [1894]), 236, 347, 451, 816, 867, 1274. MoChesney v. Chicago (151 111. 307, 37 N. E. Rep. 872 [1894]), 920, 1377. MeChesney v. Village of Hyde Park (151 III. 634, 37 N. E. 858 [1894]), 103, 104, 271, 330, 377, 920, 922. MeChesney v. People ex rel. Johnson (99 111. 216 [1881]), 181, 356, 546, 1085, 1323. MeChesney v. People ex rel. Kern (148 111. 221, 35 N. E. 739 [1894]), 223, 234, 764, 913, 770, 772, 776, 777, 914, 993. MoChesney v. People ex rel. Kern (145 III. 614, 34 N. E. 431 [1893]), 758, 759, 763, 764, 765, 766, 772, 883, 886, 887, 913, 914, 993, 1299. MeChesney v. People ex rel. Koeher- sperger (174 III. 46, 50 N". E. 1110 [1898]),. 1126. MeChesney v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger ( 171 111. 267, 49 N. E. 491 [1898]), 912, 1108, 1132. MoChesney v. People ex rel. Ray- mond (200 111. 146, 65 N. E. 626 [1902]), 514, 994, 1183, 1390. MoChesney v. People (99 111. 216), 1103. McClave v. Mayor and Common Council of City of Newark (31 oST. J. Eq. (4 Stew.) 472 [1879]), 1196, 1428. MoClellan v. District of Columbia (7 Mackey (D. C.) 94 [1889]), 465, 479, 886. MeCoUum v. Uhl (128 Ind. 304, 27 N. E. 152, 725 [1890]), 748, 768, 992, 1031, 1067, 1069, 1225, 1444. McComb V. Bell (2 Minn. 295 [1858]), 8, 89, 100, 223, 313, 1117. MeConville v. City of St. Paul (75 Minn. 383, 74 Am. St. Rep. 508, 43 L. R. A. 584, 77 N. W. 993 [1899]), 525, 562, 1490. MoCormack, In the Matter of (60 Barb. 128 [1870]), 472, 479, 503, 515, 527, 977, 982, 1452, 1458. McCormack, Matter of (10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 234 [1870]), 437, 472, 479, 503, 515, 604, 1452, 1454. cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] McCormaek v. Patchin (53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Kep. 440 [1873]), 11, 293, 373, 380, 381, 388, 461, 666. McCormiek v. City of Omaha (37 Neb. 829, 56 N. W. 626 [1893]), • 308, 549, 576, 620, 622. MoCormick v. Tate (20 111. 334 [1858]), 363. McCrea v. Leavenworth (46 Kan. 767, 27 Pac. 129 [1891]), 1445. McCrowell v. City of Bristol (89 Va. 652, 20 L. R. A. 653, 16 S. E. 867 [1893]), 161, 223, 234, 314, 432, 865, 867, 1047, 1049. McCullough V. Village of Campbells- port ( 123 Wis. 334, 101 N. W. 709 [1904]), 236, 238. MoCutcheon v. Pacific Railroad Co. (72 Mo. App. 271 [1897]), 45, 594, 598, 1078, 1115. McDermott v. Mathis (21 Ark. 60 [I860]), 343, 556, 566. McDonald v. ConniflF (99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 [1893]), 138, 180, 552, 617, 624, 645, 646, 720, 824, 1030, 1281, 1337, 1358. MoDonald v. Dodge (97 Cal. 112, 31 Pac. Rep. 909 [1893]), 803, 843, 847, 1372. McDonald v. Littlefield (.5 Mackey (D. C.) 574 [1887]), 735, 745, 747. McDonald v. Mezes (107 Cal. 492, 40 Pac. 808 [1895]), 479, 510, 512, 527, 542, 831, 840, 950, 1522. McDonald v. Patterson (54 Cal. 245 [1880]), 221, 506, 813. McDonald v. People ex rel. Hanberg (206 111. 624, 69 N. E. 509 [1904]), 1035, 1183, 1343. McDonnell v. City of Chicago (60 111. 350 [1871]), 860. McDonnell v. Gillon (134 Cal. 329, 66 Pac. 314 [lOOl]), 864. McDowell V. City of Asheville (112 N. C. 747, 17 S. E. 537 [1893]), 62, 988, 989, 1469. McElroy v. Kansas City & Independ- ence Air Line (172 Mo. 546, 72 S. W. 913 [1903]), 70. McEneney v. Town of Sullivan (125 Ind. 407, 25 N. E. 540 [1890]), 142, 726, 781, 795, 843, 986, 996, 1005, 1007, 1030, 1031, 1347, 143L MoEwan v. City of Spokane (16 Wash. 212, 47 Pac. 433 [1896]), 1510. McEwen v. Gilker (38 Ind. 233 [1871]), 496, 948, 1235, 1337, 1350, 1352. Mcfarlane v. City of Chicago ( 185 111. 242, 57 N. E. 12 [1900]), 387, 561, 604, 640. McGee v. Board of County Commis- sioners of Hennepin County (84 Minn. 472, 88 N. W. 6 [1901]), 103, 104, 698. McGee v. Mathis (71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 [1866]), 15, 151, 172, 207, 256, 618, 711. McGehee v. Mathis (21 Ark. 40 [I860]), 15, 39, 145, 151, 172, 207, 256, 266, 343, 618, 711, 1338. McGill V. Bruner (65 Ind. 421 [1879]), 324, 390, 393, 649, 1242, 1268, 1352. McGilvery v. City of Lewiston (13 Idaho 338, 90 Pac. 348 [1907]), 468, 550, 619, 690, 763, 836, 1085. MeGlynn v. City of Toledo (22 Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]), 313, 428, 467, 471, 479, 480, 517, 518, 532, 1013. MoGonigle v. City of Allegheny (44 Pa. St. (8 Wright) 118 [1862]), 713. MoGown, In the Matter of the Pe- tition of, to Vacate an Assessment (18 Hun (N. Y.) 434 [1879]), 392, 400, 1019. McGrew v. City of Kansas City (64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [190.2]), 293, 314, 437, 575, 609, 620, 628, 629, 631. McGrew v. Stewart (51 Kan. 185, 32 Pac. 896 [1893]), 323. McGuinn v. Peri (16 La. Ann. 326 [1861]), 789. McGuire v. Brockman (58 Mo. App. 307 [1894]), 35. McGuire v. District of Columbia (24 App. D. C. 22 [1904]), 58. McHenry v. Selvage (99 Ky. 232, 35 S. W. 645 [1896]), 138," 397, 462, 628, 723, 1281. TABLE OF CASES. cxlix [References are to sections.] Mclnery v. Reed (23 la. 410 [1867]), 1141, 1145, 1173, 1190. Mclntirc v. Staie (5 Blacld. (Ind.) 384 [1840]), 86, 70, 113. MeKee v. Town of Pendleton (162 Ind. 667, 69 N. E. 997 [1904]), 301, 699, 809, 1411, 1412, 1432. McKee v. Town, of Pendleton (154 Ind. 652, 57 N. E. 532 [1900]), 699, 1431. McKeesport Borough, to Use of Me- Keesport City v. Busch (166 Pa. St. 46, 31 Atl. 49 [1895]), 313, 396, 455, 795, 1158. McKeesport v. Fiddler (147 Pa. St. 532, 23 Atl. 799), 45, 1112, 1142. McKeesport, City of v. Soles (178 Pa. St. 363, 35 Atl. 927 [1896]), 610. McKeesport v. Soles (165 Pa. St. 628, 30 Atl. 1019 [1895]), 610, 706. McKeever v. Jenks (59 la. 300, 13 N. W. 295 [1882]), 363. MeKinney v. State for Use of Nixon 101 Ind, 355 [1884]), 340, 986, 1027, 1209, 1252, 1254, 1337. McKnight v. City of Pittsburg (91 Pa. St. (10 Norris) 273 [1879]), 531, 862. McKusick v. City of Stillwater (44 Minn. 372, 46 N. W. 769 [1890]), 63, 81, 113, 280, 308, 1027. McLaughlin v. City of Chicago (198 111. 518, 64 N. E. 1036 [1902]), 878. McLaughlin v. Miller (124 N. Y. 510, 26l N. E. 1104 [1891]), 86, 119, 12S, 244, 245, 301, 309, 726, 728, 729, 1035, 1072. McLauren v. City of Grand Forks (6 Dak. 397, 43 N. W. 710 [1889]), 223, 234, 735, 777, 803, 830, 1013. McLean, County of v. City of Bloomington (106 111. 209 [1883]), 580, 582, 584, 612, 613, 1075, 1469, 1470. McLennan v. City of Chicago (218 111. 62, 75 N. E. 762 [1905]), 831, 857, 858, 912, 924, 1385. McLoon's Administrator v. Cum- mings (73 Pa. St. 98 [1873]), 2. McMaken v. Hayes (29 Ohio C. C. 535 [1907]), 625, 653. McMakin v. City of Cincinnati (7 Ohio N. P. 203 [1900]), 432, 653. McManus v. Hornaday ( 124 la. 267, 100 N. W. 33 [1904]), 18, 965, 983, 984. McManus v. Hornaday (99 la. 507, 68 N. W. 812 [1896]), 367, 838, 862. , McManus v, People ex rel. Ray- mond (183 111. 391, 55 N. E. 886 [1899]), 533, 782, 795, 927, 931, 940, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. McMasters v. Commonwealth (3 Watts (Pa.) 292 [1834]), 89. McMillan v. City of Butte (30 Mont. 220, 76 Pac. 203 [1904]), 118, 301, 553, 666, 709, 711. McMillan v. Fond du Lac County (— Wis. , 114 N. W. 1119 [1908]), 463, 979. McMillan v. Board of County Com- missioners of Freeborn County (93 Minn. 16, 100 N. W. 384, 1125 [1904]), 118, 373, 375, 414, 955. McMillan v. Richards (9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655), 1478. McMillan v. City of Tacoma (26 Wash. 358, 67 Pac. 68), 1069. McMillen v. Anderson (95 U. S. 37, 24 L. 335 [1877]), 115, 119, 133, 773. McNair v. Ingebrigsten (36 Wash. 186, 78 Pac. 789 [1904]), 1141, 1145, 1222. McNair v. Ostrander (1 Wash. 110, 23 Pac. 414 [1890]), 244, 313, 314, 436. McNamee v. City of Tacoma (24 Wash. 591, 64 Pac. 791 [1901]), 86, 111, 301, 408, 414, 670, 690, , 744, 918, 956, 1026, 1029, 1141, ' 1145. McNutt V. Brooks (42 111. App. 554 [1891]),' 1072. McPike V. City of Alton ( 187 111. 62, 58 N. E. 301 [1900]), 510, 840. McQuiddy v. Brannock (70 Mo. App. 535 [1897]), 18, 530, 538, 867. cl TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] MeQuillen v. Hatton (42 O. S. 202, [1884]), 117, 337. McQuiddy v. Smith (67 Mo. App. 205 [1896]), 73, 394, 744, 825. McQurddy v. Vineyard (60 Mo. App. 610 [1894]), 273, 784, 841. McQuinn v. Peri (16 La. Ann. 326 [1861]), 781. McRae, McMillanet, In re v. Board of Commissioners of .Freeborn County (100 N. W. 384, 1125 [1904]). (See McMillan v. Board of Com- missioners of Freeborn County.) McSherry v. Wood (102 Cal. 647, 36 Pac. 1010 [1894]), 381, 552, 646, 720, 895, 1030, 1093, 1298, 1337. McVerry v. Boyd (89 Cal. 304, 26 Pac. 885 [1891]), 380, 381, 464, 492, 538, 602, 604, 640, 723, 1030, 1281, 1298, 1337. MoVerry v. Kidwell (63 Cal. 246 [1883]), 527, 537. McVey v. City of Danville (188 111. 428, 58 N. E. 955 [1900]), 314, 787, 789, 923, 1282. McVey v. Lanier (50 Ark. 384, 8 S. W. 141 [1887]), 73. M Mabee v. Drain Commissioner (45 Mich. 568, 8 N. W. 578), 1012. Mace V. Trustees of the Village of Newburg (15 Howard (N. Y.) 161 [1857]), 1423. Mack V. City for Use of Moore (1 W. L. B. 84 [1876]), 1346. Mack V. Polecat Drainage District (216 111. 56, 74 N. E. 691 [1905]), 254, 1008, 1375. Mackay v. Hancock County ( — la. , 114 N. W. 552 [1908]), 1015, 1019, 1029. Mackin v. Wilson (45 S. W. 663, 20 Ky. L. E. 218), 462. Macklot V. City of Davenport (17 la. 379 [1864]), 1026. Macomber v. Hunter (7 Ohio M. P. 385 [1900]), 679. Macon, Town of v. Patty (57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]), 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 43, 55, 92, 93, 95, 96, 118, 147, 148, 323, 420, 548, 665, 698, 717, 779, 1039, 1049. Madderom v. City of Chicago ( 194 111. 572, 62 N. E. 846 [1902]), 244, 818, 1287, 1289. Madura Irrigation District, In the Matter of the Bonds of the (92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675 [1891]), 11, 12, 79, 86, 105, 119, 125, 134, 147, 209, 212, 249, 254, 355, 551, 553, 642, 666, 784, 927, 1008, 1085, 1303, 1333, 1337, 1502. Magee v. Commonwealth, for the Use of the City of Pittsburg (46 Pa. St. (10 Wright) 358 [1863]), 414, 574, 620, 666, 698, 709, 983. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank (170 U. S. 283, 42 L. 1037 [1898]), 108. Maguire v. Smock (42 Ind. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 353 [1873]), 792. MahaiTey v. Beech Creek R. R. (163 Pa. St. 158, 29 Atl. 881 [1894]), 66. Maher v. City of Chicago (38 111. 266 [1865]), 360, 1498, 1509. Mahlstadt v. Blanc (34 Cal. 577 [1868]), 1228, 1372. Mahoney v. Brauerman (54 Cal. 565), 147. Main v. Ft. Smith (49 Ark. 480, 5 S. W. 801 [1887]), 275, 301, 494, 857, 867, 868. Main Street, Big Run Borough (137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]), 280, 576, 620. Main St., In re, in Borough of Nich- olson ( 27 Pa. - Super. Ct. 570 [1905]), 271. Makemson v. Kauffman (35 0. S. 444), 248, 629, 792, 796, 785. Makley v. Whitmore (61 0. S. 587, 56 N. E. 461 [1899]), 1085, 1101, i;46. Malchus V. District of Highlands (67 Ky. (4 Bush.) 547 [1869]), 322, 711. TABLE OF CASES. Cli [References are to sections.] Maley v. Clark (33 Ind. App. 149, 70 N. E. 1005 [1903]), 805. Mall V. City of Portland (35 Or. 89, 56 Pac. 654 [1899]), 473, 1085, 1104. Malone v. Water Commissioners oi Jersey City (30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 247 [1863]), 1408. Maloy V. City of Marietta (11 0. S. 636 [I860]), 100, 106, 301, 549, 620, 1041. Maltby v. Tautges (50 Minn. 248, 52 N. W. 858 [1892]), 61, 158, 359. Manhattan Savings Institution, In the Matter of the Petition of the, to Vacate an Assessment (82 N. Y. 142 [1880]), 495, 1454, 1461. Manice v. City of New York (8 N. Y. 120 [1863]), 1509. Manistee, City of v. Harley ( 79 Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603 [1890]), 18, 234, 688, 777, 778. Manley v. Emlen (46 Kan. 655, 27 Pac. 844 [1891]), 315, 323, 805, 956, 962. Mann v. Board of Education of Un- ion Free District No. 2, of the Town of Onondaga (53 Howard (N. Y.) 289 [1877]), 1442. Mann v. District of Columbia (22 App. D. C. 138 [1903]), 372. Manning v. Den (90 Cal. 610, 27 Pac. 435 [1891]), 492, 509, 521, 742, 1031, 1039, 1141, 1145, 1182, 1311, 1337. Manning v. City of Devil's Lake ( 13 N. D. 47, 112 Am. St. Rep. 652, 99 N. W. 51 [1904]), 404. Manns v. City of Cincinnati (10 Ohio C. C. 549 [1895]), 561, 625, 704, 988, 1013, 1094, 1492. Mai- ^r V. Board of Commissioners of Jay Co. ( 137 Ind. 367, 34 N. E. 959, 36 N. E. 1101 [1893]), 322, 466, 469, 471, 732, 738, 781, 951, 952, 955, 964, 1269, 1303, 1351, 1360, 1373. Mansfield v. People ex rel. Wells (164 111. 611, 45 N. E. 976 [1897]), 864, 865, 1382. Mansur v. County Commissioners of Aroostook County (83 Me. 514, 22 Atl. 358 [1891]), 434, 844. Maple V. Borough of Beltzhoover (18 Atl. 650 [1899]), 666, 698. 709, 895. Mappa V. City Council of the City of Los Angeles (61 Cal. 309 [1882]), 538. Marengo v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (84 Minn. 397, 87 Am. St. Rep. 369, 87 N. W. 1117 [1901]), 363. Marietta, City of v. Slocomb (6 0. S. 471 [1856]), 1478, 1484. Marion v. Moody's Executors (25 la. 163), 1122. Marion Bond Co. v. Blakely (30 Ind. App. 374, 65 N. E. 291, 66 N. E. 71 [1902]), 1085, 1092. Marion Bond Co. v. Johnson (29 Ind. App. 294, 64 N. E. 626 [1902]), 11, 653, 669, 670, 677, 699, 709, 1000, 1141, 1145, 1333. Marion County v. Iiouisville and Nashville K. Co. (— Ky. , 78 S. W. 437, 25 Ky. L. E. 1600 [1904]), 365. Marion Road Co. v. McClure (66 Ind. 468), 1113. Marion Township Gravel Road Co. V. Sleeth (53 Ind. 35), 169. Marion Township Union Draining Co. V. Noirris (37 Ind. 424 [1871]), 1500. Marion Trust Co. v. City of Indian- apolis (37 Ind. App. 672, 706, 75 N. E. 834, 836 [1905]), 622, 656, 775, 776. Marion Water Company v. City of Marion (121 la. 306, 96 N. W. 883 [1903]), 50. Marion & Monroe Gravel Road Co. V. McClure (66 Ind. 468 [1879]), 166, 169, 983, 1028, 1445. Marionville, City of, to the Use of Grubaugh v. Henson ( 65 Mo. App. 397 [1895]), 293, 296, 374, 571, 714, 723, 784. Market Street, In the Matter of Opening and Grading (49 Cal. 548 [1875]), 8, 11, 283, 409, 410, 423, 1498. clii TzVBLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Markley v. City of Chicago (190 111. 276, 60 N. E. 512 [1901]), 263, 864, 866, 956, 962, 963, 965, 978, 1002. Markley v. City of Chicago (167 III. 626, 48 N. B. 1056 [1897]), 1384, 1392. Markley v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger (171 111. 260, 63 Am. St. Rep. 234, 49 N. E. 502 [1898]), 986, 998. Markley v. Rudy (115 Ind. 533, 18 N. E. 50 [1888]), 269, 1351. Marsh v. The City of Brooklyn (59 N. Y. 280 [1874]), 891, 951, 1425, 1426, 1427. Marsh v. City of Chicago (62 IW. 116 [1871]), 763, 764, 1185, 1299. Marsh, to Vacate an Assessment, In the Martter of the Petition of (83 N. Y. 431 [1881]), 495, 816, 1453. Marsh, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of (21 Hun (N. Y.) 582 [1880]), 487, 495, 948. Marshall v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (— Ky. , 66 S. W. 734, 23 Ky. L. R. 1971 [1902]), sub- stitute for opinion in 66 S. W. 182, which modified 52 S. W. 1117, 21 Ky. L. R. 712), 441, 628, 707. Marshall v. Commonwealth to the Use of Mayor, etc., of Allegheny City (59 Pa. St. (9 P. F. Smith) 455 [1868]), 540, 641, 570, 834. Marshall v.- Davies (78 N. Y. 414, Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320), 1057. Marshall v. City of Leavenworth (44 Kan. 459, 24 Pac. 975 [1890]), 805, 1337. Marshall v. People ex rel. Smith 219 111. 99, 76 N. E. 70 [1905]), 323, 533, 918, 986, 987, 1000, 1126. Marshall, City of, to Use of Jacoby V. Rainey (78 Mo. App. 416 [1898]), 502, 800, 818, 1290. Marshalltown Light, Power & Rail- way Company v. City of Marshall- town ( 127 la. 637, 103 N. W. 1005 [1905]), 602, 603, 917, 1026, 1350. Martin v. Carron (26 X. J. L. 2 Dutch.) 228 [1857]), 3^4. 781, 789, 997, 1004, 1060, 119li, 1204. Martin v. District of Columbia (205 U. S. 135, 51 L. 743, 27 S. 440 [1907]), 321, 665, 666, 690, 691. Martin v. District of Columbia (26 App. D. C. 146 [1905]), 321, 665, 666, 690, 691. Martin v. Greenwood (27 Pa. Super. Ct. 245 [1905]), 1068. Mattin v. MoCormick (8 N. Y. 331 [1854]), 1200. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa (126 la. 680, 102 N. W. 529 [1905], origi- nal opinion in 99 N". W. 557 [1904], withdrawn on rehearing, 223, 725, 766, 777, 827, 837, 838, 962, 965. Martin v. Roney (41 O. S. 141 [1884]), 986, 996. Martin v. Tyler (4 N. D. 278, 25 L. R. A. 838, 60 N. E. 392), 140. Martin v. Wagner (120 Cal. 623,. 53 Pac. 167 [1898]), 549. Martin v. Wills (157 Ind. 153, 60 N. E. 1021 [1901]), 110, 118, 620, 699, 1122, 1141, 1145, 1191. Martindale v. Palmer (52 Ind. 411 [1875]),. 301, 437, 511, 840, 847, 856, 895, 897, 1191, 1256, 1350, 1352. Marysville, Village of v. Schoonover (78 111. App. 189 [1898]), 1503. Mascall v. Commissioners Drainage District ( 122 111. 620, 14 N. E. 47 [1889]), 549, 676, 920, 921, 1351, 1363. Mason v. Austin (46 Cal. 385 [1873]), 618, 1269, 137«, 1381. Mason v. City of Chicago (178 111. 499, 53 X. E. 354 [1899]), 324, 583, 619, 1085, 1088. Mason v. City of Chicago (48 111. 420 [1868]), 1088. Mason v. City of Des Moines ( 108 la. 658, 79 X. W. 389 [1899]), 484, 485, 527, 748, 768, 974, 1355, 1375, 1391, 1501. Mason v. City of Independence (61 Kan. 188, 59 Pac. 272 [1899]), 1437. Mason t. City of . Sioux Falls (2 S. D. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 802, 51 X. W. 770 [1892]), 223, 234, 313, 395, 436, 479, 510, 831, 856. TABLE OF CASES. cliii [References are to sections.] Mason v. Spencer (35 Kan. 512, 11 Pac. 402 [1886]), 40, 414, 689, 697, 963. Mason v. Police Jury of Parish of Tensas (9 La. Ann. 368 [1854]), 38, 697. Mason and Tazewell Special Drain- age District, Commissioners of v. Gflffin (134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 995 [1891]), 249, 266, 564, 1396, 1399, 1404, 1406. Masonic Building Association v. Brownell (164 Mass. 306, 41 N. E. 306 [1895]), 86, 266, 309, 434, 525, 649, 886, 887, 890, 1406. Massing v. Ames (37 Wis. 645 [1875]), 191, 194, 198, 324, 813, 815, 887. Masters v. City of Portland (24 Or. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893]), 43, 86, 147, 148, 555, 644, 666, 690, 723. Mathews v. Wagner ( — Wash. , 94 Pac. 759 [1908]), 950, 1113, 1207. Mattea v. Great Northern- Ey. Co. (95 Minn. 386, 104 N. W. 234 [1905]), 363. Matthews v. Kimball (70 Ark. 451, 66 S. W. 651, 69 S. W. 547), 356. Mabtingly v. District of Columbia (97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098 [1878]), 243, 245, 301, 324, 663, 666, 707, 709, 725, 964, 983. Mauch Chunk, Borough of v. Shortz (61 Pa. St. (11 P. F. Smith) 399 [1869]), 223, 231, 234, 444, 775, 1050. Mauldin v. Hanscombe ( 12 Colo. 204, 20 Pac. 619/, 363. Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville (53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Rep. 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 [1898] (overruling, 42 S. €. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]), 44, 86, 118, 159, 250, 302, 323, 379. Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville (42 iS. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]), 30, 44, 95, 96, 118, 159, 302, 323, 324, 420. Mawell V. Auditor General (125 Mich. 621, 84 N. W. 1112 [1901]), 995, 1443. Maxwell v. City of Chicago ( 185 lil. 18, 56 N. E. 1101 [1900]), 745, 747, 758, 764, 856, 912, 913, 1374. May V. Holdridge (23 Wis. 93 [1«68]), 959. Mayall v. City of St. Paul (30 Minn. 294, 15 N. W. 170 [1883]), 569, 854, 1006, 1412. Maybin v. City of Biloxi (77 Miss. 673, 28 So. 566 [1900]), 236, 304, 662. • Maydwell v. City of Louisville (110 Ky. 885, 105 Am. St. Rep. 245, 63 L. R. A. 655, 76 S. W. 1091 [1903]), 370, 458. Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (101 N. Y. 284, 4 N. E. 336 [1886]), 308, 469, 475, 927, 986. 1003, 1438, 1490. Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (28 Hun 587 [1883]), 309, 475, 1490. Mayo V. Ah Loy (32 Cal. 477, 91 Am. Dec. 595 [1867]), 223, 234, 775, 887, 889, 998, 1112, 1149, 1182. Mayor, In the Matter of (50 N. Y. 504 [1872]), 194, 821. . Mayor, Matter of (11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77), 594. Mayor v. Huff (60 Ga. 221), 486. Mayor v. Board of Commissioners ot Jay County (137 Ind. 367, 36 N. E. 1101, 34 N. E. 959 [1893]), 266. Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry (25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 Am. Dec. 315 [1845]), 5, 19, 44, 53, 55, 93, 96, 160, 323, 420, 713, 717. Maypoither v. Gast ( — Ky. , 110 S. W. 308 [1908]), 1145, 1146, 1392. Mayaville, City of- v. Maysville St. R. and Transfer Co. ( — Ky. , 108 S. W. 960 [1906]), 601, 630. cliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood (140 111. 216, 29 N. E. 704 [1893]), 329, 3«3, 400, 636, 857, 920, 921, 924. Meaehem v. Fitchburg Railroad Company (58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 291 [1849]), 64, 65, 66, 71. Mead v. City of Chicago (186 111. 54, .57 N. E. 824 [1900]), 570, 663, 670, 675, 817, 863, 864, 917, 1367, 1368, 1385. Mead, In the Matter of (13 Hun N. Y. 394 [1878]), 166, 194, 479, 484, 485, 982, 1337, 1453, 1458. Meade, In the Matter of (74 N. Y. 216 [1878]), 106, 479, 679, 1389, 1458, 1463. Meadville, City of v. Dickson (129 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 513 [1889]), 190, 223, 234, 775, 1050. Meanor v. Goldsmith (216 Pa. 489, 10 L. E. A. (N. S.) 342, 65 Atl. 1084 [19071), 93, 96, 323, 737, 1055, 1203. Mecartney v. People ex rel. Ray- mond (202 111. 51, 66 N. E. 873 [1903]), 1172. Mechlem v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Ohio C. C. 211 [1905]), 1430. Medical Lake, Town of v. Smith (7 Wash. 195, 34 Pac. 835 [1893]), 244, 246, 1010. Medland v. Connell (57 Neb. 10, 77 N. W. 437 [1898]), 745, 762, 763, 825. Medland v. Linton (60 Neb. 249, 82 N. W. 866 [1900]), 11, 245, 549, 570, 609, 745, 750, 762, 775, 884, 1304. Meech v. City of Buffalo (23 N. Y. 198 [1864]), 324, 952. Meggett V. City of Eau Claire (81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]), 118, 119, 123, 132, 163, 314, 324, 549, 555, 570, 624, 666, 670, 698, 709, 747, 773, 1149, 1435, 1444. Mehrbach, In the Matter of (97 N. Y. 601 [1885])., 1462. Mehrbach, In the Matter of (33 Hun (N. Y.) 136 [1884]), 1462. Meier v. City of St. Louis (180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]), 8, 43. 89, 123, 125, 147, 148, 212, 215, 224, 247, 248, 250, 301, 553, 555, 620, 621, 624, 628, 631, 666, 698, 728, 729, 776, 1333. Meissner v. City of Toledo (31 0. S. 387 [1877]), 310, 620, 622, 623, 672, 692. Melrose Park, Village of v. Dunnel- hecke (210 111. 422, 71 N. E. 431 [1904]), 279, 775. Memphis, City of v. Bolton (9 Heisk. (56 Tenn.) 508 [1872]), 69, 655. Memphis, City of v. Hastings (113 Tenn. 142, 69 L. R. A. 750, 86 S. W. 609 [1904]), 356. Memphis Land & Timber Company V. St. Francis Levee District (64 Ark. 268, 42 S. W. 763 [1897]), 343, 566, 578, 694, 750, 1277, 1281. Mendenhall v. Clugish (84 Ind. 94 [1882]), 435, 573, 1238. Menefee v. Bell (62 Mo. App. 659 [1895J), 537, 855, 1134, 1255. Menzie v. City of Greensburg ( — Ind. App. , 85 N. E. 484 [1908]), 499, 742. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Niggeman (119 Mo. App. 56, 96 S. W. 293 [1906]), 1067, 1136. Merchants' National Bank of San Diego V. Escondido Irrigation Dis- trict (144 CaL 329, 77 Pac. 937 [1904]), 15, 169, 171, 355, 548, 1081. Merchants' Realty Company v. City Of St. Paul (77 Minn. 343, 79 N. W. 1040 [1899]), 1200, 1206. Mercy Hospital v. City of Chicago (187 111. 400, 58 N. E. 353 [1900]), 675, 136«. Meredith v. City of Perth Amboy (63 N. J. L. (34 Vr.) 523, 44 Atl. 1101 [1899]), 391, 394. Meriden, City of v. Camp (46 Conn. 284 [1878]), 392, 395, 423, 526, 1030, 1031, 1163, 1168, 1387. Merine v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. ( 125 Mo. App. 623, 103 iS. W. 508 [1907]), 538." Meriwether v. Garrett (102 U. S. 472, 26 L. 197 [1880]), 1518. TABLE OF CASES. clv [References are to sections.] Merriam, In the Maitter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (84 N. Y. 596 [1881]), 324, 465, 468, 479, 485, 495, 541, 663, 674, 752, 901, 913, 917, 1324, 1454, 1455, 1458. Merriam v. Moody's Executors (25 la. 163 [1868]) 40, 223, 229, 1122. Merriam v. People ex rel. Kooher- sperger (160 111. 555, 43 N. E. 705 [1896]), 772, 930, 1085, U13, 1372. Merrick v. Amherst (12 All. (94 Mass.) 504), 160. Merrill v. Abbott (62 Ind. 549 [187«]), 223. Merrill v. Schibel (185 Mo. 551, 83 S. W. 1133 [1904]), 538. Merrill v. Shields (57 Neb. 78, 77 N. W. 368 [1898]), 825, 1277, 1303. Merritt v. City of Duluth ( — Minn. , 114 N. W. 758 [1908]), 1437. Merritt v. Village of Port Chester (71 N. Y. 309, 27 Am. 47 [1877]), 223, 234, 281, 735, 744, 745, 753, 770, 771, 777, 1029. Merritt v. Village of Port Chester 29 Hun (N. Y.) 619 [1883]), 266, 273, 275, 391, 394. Meserole v. Mayor and Common Council of Brooklyn (8 Paige's Chan. 198 [1840]), 672, 927, 986, 996, 1430, 1519. Motcalf V. Carter (19 Ohio C. C. 196 [1900]), 561, 625, 635, 783, 843, 1035, 1432, 1436. Methodist Episcopal Church, In re (66 N. Y. 395 [1876]), 42. Methodist Episcopal Church of Har- lem V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (55 Howard (N. Y.) 57 [1877]), 679, 686, 927, 934, 1432, 1438. Metropolitan Gas Light Company, In the Matter of the (23 Hun, 327 [1880]), 948, 975. Metropolitan Eailroad Company v. Macfarland (20 App. D. €. 421 [1902]), 601, 1372. Metropolitan West Side Elevated Railway Company v. Stickney ( 150 111. 362, 26 L. R. A. 773, 37 N. E. 1098 [1894]), 6S, 66, 71. Meuser v. Risdon (36 Cal. 239 [1868]), 500, 504, 540, 867, 958, 984. Meyer v. Wright (19 Mo. App. 283 [1885]), 527, 529. Mexico, City of v. Lakeman ( — Mo. App. , 108 S. W. 141 [1908]), 747, 1140, 1226, 1230. Meyer v. Covington ( 103 Ky. 546 45 S. W. 769, 20 Ky. L. R. 239), 1039. Meyer v. Wright (18 Mo. App. 283 [1885]), 1236. Michael v. City of Mattoon ( 172 111. 394, 50 N. E. 155 [1898]), 471, 472, 750, 764, 947, 1085, 1372, 1373, 1379. Michael v. City of St. Louis (112 Mo. 610, 20 S. W. 666 [1892]), 293, 311, 394, 557, 927, 997, 1424, 1442. Michaels v. Keane (8 Wash. 6-48, 36 Pac. 681 [1894]), 1059, 1072. Michener v. City of Philadelphia (118 Pa. St. 535, 12 Atl. 174 [1888]), 55, 86, 293, 384, 555. Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Spring Creek Drainage District (215 in. 501, 74 N. E. 696), 203. Michigan City, Mayor and Common Council of v. Roberts (34 Ind. 471 [1870]), 293. Middaugh v. City of Chicago (187 111. 230, 58 N. E. 459 [1900]), 675, 709, 872. Middle Kittitas Irrigation District, Board of Directors of v. Peterson (4 Wash. 147, 29 Pac. 995 [1892] ), 105. Miles V. Bradford (22 Md. 170, 85- Am. Dec. 643), 21B. Miles V. McDermott (31 Cal. 271 [1866]), 763, 836, 1231. Milford V. Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Trac. Co. (26 Ohio C. C. 271 [1904]), 463. Mill Creek iSewer, In re (196 Pa. St. 183, 46 Atl. 312 [1900]), 324, 426, 444, 466. clvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Miller, In the Matter of (24 Hun (N. Y.) 637, [1881]), 475. Miller's Case (12 Abb. Pr; (N. Y.) 121 [1861]), 482, 484, 485, 541, 1444, 1454, 1463. Miller's Estate (Tucker (N. Y.) 346 [1867]), 1055. Miller v. City of Amsterdam ( 149 N. Y. 288, 43 N. E. 632 [1896]), 7«1, 795, 927, 945, 1007. Miller v. Anheuser (2 Mo. App. 168 [1876]), 324, 393, 400, 872. Miller v. City of Asheville (112 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765 [1893]), 77. Miller v. Atlantic City (— N. J. , 68 Atl. 64 [1907]), 538. Miller v. City of Cincinnati (18 Ohio C. C. 869 [1898]), 563. Mill'ir V. Goodwin (70 111. 659 [1873]), 1512. Miller v. Graham (17 0. S. 1 [1866]), 337, 414, «32, 977, 983. Miller v. Hixson (64 0. S. 39, 59 N. E. 749 [1901]), 38, •697. Miller v. Mayo (88 Cal. 568, 26 Pae. 364 [1891]), 509, 554, 624, 707, 759, 1237, 1239, 1337. Miller v. City of Toledo (12 Ohio C. C. 706 [1894]), 563, 619. Miller v. Toledo (7 Ohio N. P. 477 [1900]), 387, 563. Miller v. Wisener (45 W. Va. 59, 30 IS. E. 237 [1898]), 73. Milligan v. City of Lexington ( — Mo. App. , 105 S. W. 1104 [1907]), 837. Millikan v. Wall (133 Ind. 61, 32 N. E. 828 [1892]), 375, 461, 1030, 1414, 1433. Million T. Board of Commissioners of Carroll County (89 Ind. 5 [1883]), 927, 1004. .Millisor v. Wagner (133 Ind. 400, 32 N. E. 927 [1892]), 781, 801, 909. Mills V. Charleton (29 Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578 [1872]), 117, 199, 407, 408, 414, 437, 515, 958, 963, 965, 983, 1435. Mills V. City of Detroit (95 Mich. 422, 54 N. W. 897 [1893]), 813. Mills V. Village of Norwood (6 Ohio C. C. 305 [1892]), 296, 575, 1430, 1446. Milton V. Stell (— N. J. , 65 Atl. 1118 [1907]), 988, 990, 1410. Milton V. Stell (73 N. J. Law (44 Vr.) 261, 62 Atl. 1133 [1906]), 989, 990, 1410. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Elec- tric Light Company v. City of Mil- waukee (96 Wis. 42, 69 N. W. 796 [1897]), 50, 103, 106, 601, 611. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. C. v. Eble (3 Pinney (Wis.) 334 [1851]), 284. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beck- with (129 U. S. 26, 32 L. 585, 9 S. 207), 363. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Oo. v. Em- mons (149 U. S. 364, 37 L. 769, 13 S. 870]), 363. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. V. Lindquist (119 la. 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]), 118, 324, 325,' 555, 596, 598, 612, 620, 666,. 694, 699, 711, 812, 1078, 1358, 1414, 1444. Minnesota and M. Land and Im- provement Co. V. City of Billings (111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]), 119, 247, 248, 250, 324, 650, 555, 609, 630, 636, 645, 670, 709, 729. Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer (20 Minn. 468, 20 GiL 424 [1874]), 104, 350, 464, 466, 639, 708, 1417, 1425, 1426. Minnetonka Lake Improvement, Car- penter, In re v. Board of County •Commissioners of Hennepin Coun^ ty (56 Minn. 513, 45 Am. St. Rep. 494, 58 N. W. 295 [1894]), 360, 404. Minor v. Daspit, Sheriff (43 La. Ann. 337, 9 So. 49 [1891]), 4, 7, 37, 147, 668, 689, 711. Minor v. Board of Control of the City of Hamilton (20 Ohio C. C. 4 [1899]), 787, 800. Miservey v. People ex rel. Raymond (208 111. 656, 70 N.' E. 678 [1904]), 51, 949. TABLE OP CASES. clvii [References are to sections.] Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v. Cambern (66 Kan. 365, 71 Pac. 809 [1903]), 266, 343, 1078. Missouri, K'ansa-s & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Wetz (97 Tex. 581, 80 S. W. 988 [1904]), 363. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Harrelson (44 Kan. 253, 24 Pac. 465), 363. Mitchell V. Lane (62 Hun (N. Y.) 253, 16 N. Y. Supp. 707 [ISSl]), 449, 465, 479, 986, 1204. Mitchell V. City of Negaunee (113 Mich. 359, 67 Am. St. Rep. 468, 38 L. R. A. 157, 71 X. W. 646 [1897]), 368, 608. Mitchell V. Thornton (21 Gra.tt. 164 [1871]), 69. Mittel V. City of ^Chicago (9 Brad- well (111.) 534 [1881]), 549, 653, 6^4. Mix V. People ex rel. Shaw ( 106 111. 425 [18«3]), 525. Mix V. Ross (57 111. 121 [1870]), 11, 35, 45, 613, 1039, 1048, 1115. Moale V. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (61 Md. 224 [1883]), 440, 475, 521, 570, 626, 631, 632, 696, 698, 705, 739, 867, 890, 1042, 1049, 1060, 1444. Moale V. Mayor and City Council of Bailtimore (5 Md. 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276 [1854]), 86, 100, 110. Moberly f. Hogan (131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014 [1895]), 8, 50, 89, 562, 620, 625, 674, 698, 704, 1040, 1049, 1135, 1182, 1249, 1284, 1383. Moberry v. City of Jeffersonville (38 Ind. 198 [1871]), 223, 234, 264, 396, 433, 496, 760, 948, 1337, 1350, 1352, 1356. Mobile, Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of v. Dargan (45 Ala. 310 [1871]), 113, 150, 323, 690, 701. Mobile, County of v. Kimball (102 U. S. 691, 26 L. 238 [1880]), 36, 360. Mobile, City of v. Mobile Light & Railroad Company ( 141 Ala. 442, 38 So. 127. [1904]), 739, 748, 758. Mobile, Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of v. Royal Street Railroad 'C!ompany (45 Ala. 322 [1871]), HI, 113, 150, 323, 690, 701. Mock V. City of Muncie (9 Ind App, 536, 37 N. E. 281 [1893]), 301, 549, 553, 619, 626, 642, 654, 723. Mocker v. Cincinnati (7 Ohio N. P. 279 [1900]), 956, 764. Modesto Irrigation District, Board of Directors of v. Tregea ('88 Cal. 33*4, 26 Pac. 237 [1891]), 129, 1370, 1477. Moerlein Brewing Co. v. Westmeier (4 Ohio C. C. 296 [1890]), 1067, 1068, 1085, 1146, 1224. Moffitt V. Jordan (127 Cal. 622, 60 Pac. 173 [leOO]), 301, 537, 72«, 907, 1062, 1150, 1153, 1154, 1269, 1281, 1.334. Mogg V. Hall (83 Mich. 576, 47 N. W. 553), 340, 1041, 1047, 1081. Mohr V. City of Chicago (114 111. App. 283 [1904]), 495, 541, 1437, 1442. Moll V. City of Chicago (194 111. 28, 61 N. E. 1012 [1901]), 759, 764. 864. Molt V. Baumann (65 N. Y. App. Div. 445 [1901]), 1072. Monaghan v. City of Indianapolis (37 Ind. App. 280, 76 N. E. 424, reversing on rehearing 75 N. E. 33 [1905]), 515. Monroe v. City of Cleveland (29 Ohio C. C. 633 [1907]), 685, 687, 1015. Monroe County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. Fullen (118 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1888]), 1350. Monroe, Board of Commissioners of County of v. Harrell (147 Ind. 500, 46 X. E. 124 [1876]), 8, 11, 40, 50, 147, 247, 248, 253, 550, 553, 665, 666, 672, 677, 697, 1505. Monroe, County of v. City of Roch- ester (88 Hun, 164, 34 N. Y. S. 533 [1895]), 1361. Moore v. City of Paola (03 Kan. 867, 66 Pac. 1040 [1901]), 86, 314, 697. Moore v. People ex rel. Lewis ( 106 111. 376 [1883]), 104, 153, 340, 896, 918, 927, 955. clviii TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections,] Moore v. Simonson (27 Or. 117, 39 Pac. 1105 [1895]), 1055. Moorewood v. Corporation of Nfew York (6 Howard, 386 [1851]), 728. Moran v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City (58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 653, 35 Ail. 950 [1896]), 1368. Moran v. Thompson (20 Wash. 525, 56 Pac. 29 [1899]), 347, 495. Moran v. City of Troy (9 Hun (N. Y.) 540 [1877]), 89, 110, 381, 414, 464. Moirange v. Mix (44 N. Y. 315 [1«71]), 888, 1523. Morewood Avenue, Chamber's Ap- peal (159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]), 8, 11, 2-84, 382, 554, 620, 626, 627, 666, 672, 709. Morewood Avenue, Ferguson's Ap- peal (159 Pa. St. 39, 28 Atl. 130 [1893]), 223, 234, 744, 906. Morey v. City of Duluth (75 Minn. 221, 77 N. W. 829 [1899]), 301, 394, 915, 927, 939, 986, 996, 1057, 1183, 1348, 1358. Morford v. Unger (8 la. 82), 150. Morgan v. Pueblo & Arkansas Val- ley Railroad Company (6 Colo. 478 [1883]), 73. Morgan Civil Township v. Hunt ( 104 Ind. 590, 4 N. E. 299 [1885]), 744, 807, 1384. Morgan Park, Village of v. Gahan (35 III. App. 646 [1890]), 496, 738, 1499. Morgan Park, Village of v. Wiswall, (155 111. 262, 40 N. E. 611 [1895]), 284, 291, 351, 451. Morley v. Carpenter (22 Mo. App. 640 [1886]), 380, 381, 464. Morley v. Weakley (86 Mo. 451), 314.' Morning Park Side Case (10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 338 [1870]), 909, 927, 986. Monroe, County of v. City of Roch- ester (154 N Y. 570, 49 N. E. 139 [1898]), 672, 724, 1415, 1423, 1427, 1431. Monroe Avenue, Chamber's Ap- peal (159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]), 898. Monroe Avenue, Ferguson's Ap- peal (159 Pa. St. 39, 28 Atl. 130 [1893]), 916. Monticello, Town of v. Banks (48 Ark. 251, 2 S. W. 852 [1886]), 151, 608, 839, 697, 701. Montgomery, City Council of v. Bar- liett (— Ala. , 43 So. 92 *1907]), 519, 1432, 1437. Montgomery, City Council of v. Bird- song (126 Ala. 632, 28 So. 522 [1699]), HI, 118, 132, 150, 653, 690, 702, 1183, 1395, 1432, 1444. Montgomery City Council of v. Fos. ter (133 Ala. 587, 32 So. 610 [1901]), 323, 432, 653, 677, 702. Montgomery, City Council of v. Moore (140 Ala. 638, 37 So. 291 [1903]), 118, 194, 195, 314, 66.5, 666, 698, 702, 709. Montgomery v. Wasem (116 Ind. 343, 19 N. E. 184, 15 N. E. 795 [1888]), 531, 770, 772, 1008, 1015, 1018, 1292, 1431, 1435, 1436. Montgomery County, Board of Com- missioners of v. Fullen (118 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1888]), 465, 468, 469, 477, 479, 1350, 1371. Montgomery County, Board of Com- missioners of V. Fullen (111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]), 16, 263, 266, 278, 322, 477, 549, 561, 666, 709, 738, 776, 781, 952, 955, 1513. Moody & Co. V. Chadwick (52 La. Ann. 1888, 28 So. 361 [1900]), 525, 707, 714, 1047, 1371. Moore v. City of Albany (98 N. Y. 396 [1885]), 393, 396, 398, 403, 995, 1001. Moore v. Barry (30 S. C. 530, 4 L. R. A. 294, 9 S. E. 589 [1889]), 16, 1012, 1033, 1043. Moore v. City of Chicago (60 111. 243 [1871]), 860. Moore v. Molntyre (110 Mich. 237, 68 N. W; 130 [1896]), 1015, 1394, 1436. Moore v. City of Mattoon (163 111. 622, 45 X. E. 567 [1896]), 900, 902. TABLE OP CASES. clix [References are to secti^^riB. ] Moore v. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (73 N. Y. 238, 29 Am. Rep. 134 '[1878]), 768, 789, 848, 1028, 1444, 1498. Morewood v. Corporation of New York (6 Howard (N. Y.) 386 [1851]), 927, 935, 1004, 1005. Morewood Avenue, Chamber's Ap- peal (159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]), 287. Morrell v. Union Drainage District No. 1, (118 111. 139, 8 N. E. 675 [1887]), 254, 340, 670, 709, 952, 955, 1008, 1030, 1414, 1438, 1444. Morrilton Waterworks Improvement District v. Earl (71 Ark. 4, 69 S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [1903]), 16, 266, 268, 351. Morris v. Mayor and Council of the City of Bayonne (62 N. J. L. (33 Vr.) 385, 41 Atl. 924 [1898]), 1368, 1379. Morris v. Mayor and Council of Ba- yonne (25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Green), 345 [1874]), 55, 829, 1437. Morris v. City of Chicago (11 111. 650 [1850]), 430, 465, 480, 1369. Morris v. Lalaurie ( 39 La. Ann. 47 [1887]), 73. Morris v. Merrill (44 Neb. 423, 62 N. W. 865 [1895]), 266, 270, 1420. Morrison v.' Austin State Bank (213 111. 472, 104 Am. St. Rep. 225, 72 N. E. 1109 [1905]), 1503. Morrison v. City of Chicago (142 111. 660, 32 N. E. 172 [1893]), 223, 234, 271, 699, 777, 880, 906, 908, «10, 922, 925, 927, 936, 1309. Morrison v. Hershire (32 la. 271 [1871]), 301, 561, 562, 575, 620, 677, 838, 1116, 1173, 1435. Morrison v. Morey ( 146 Mo. 543, .48 S. W. 629 [1898]), 38, 47, 97, 111, 147, 343, 507, 679, 717, 1085. Morrison v. City of St. Paul (5 Minn. 108 (Gil. 83) [1861]), 813. Morrow v. Geeting (23 Ind, App. 494, 55 N. E. 787 [1899]), 475. Morrow v. Geeting (15 Ind. App. 358, 41 N. E. 848, 44 N. E. 59 [1896]), 375, 550, 674, 690, 1282. Morse v. City of Buffalo (35 Hun (N. Y.) 613 [1885]), 707, 723, 886, 1432. Morse v. Charles ( — Mass. , 83 N. E. 891 [1908]), 480, 663, 950. Morse v. City of Omaha (67 Neb. 426, 93 N. W. 734 [1903]), 223, 234, 670, 699, 781, 795, 951, 1004, 1432. Morse v. .Stocker (83 Mass. (1 All.) 150 [1861]), 396. Morse v. City of West Port (110 Mo. 502, 19 S. W. 831 [1892]), 314, 517, 518. Morton v. .Sullivan ( — Ky. , 29 Ky. L. Rep. 943, 96 S. W. 807 [1906]), 236, 301, 313, 549, 620, 686, 1215, 1224, 1298, 1524. Moseley v. Boush (25 Va. (4 Ran- dolph) 392 [1826]), 1040, 1050, 1055. Moss V. City of Fairbury (66 Neb. 671, 92 N. W. 721 [1902]), 313. Mott v. Hubbard (59 0. S. 199, 53 N. E. 47 [1898]), 189, 1011, I0l2, 1013. Mott V. City of Detroit (18 Mich. 494 [1869]), 43, 89, 92, 95, 118, 157, 317, 419, 437, 515, 531, 532, 570, 665, 666, 688, 698, 709, 713, 1012,-1015, 1020, 1060. Mound City Construction Company V. Macgurn (97 Mo. App. 403, 71 S. W. 460 [1902]), 545, 622, 681. Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller (170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]), 15, 202, 229, 247, 253, 335, 340, 666, 711. Mt. Auburn, Proprietors of the Cem- etery of V. City of Cambridge ( 150 Mass. 12, 4 L. R. A. 836, 22 N. E. 66 [1889]), 8, 11. Mt. Carmel, City of v. Friedrich ( 141 111. 369, 31 N. E. 21 [1893]), 911, 918. Mount Morris Square, Matter of (2 Hill (N. Y.) 14 [1842]), 206. Mount Pleasant Avenue, In re (171 Pa. St. 38, 32 Atl. 1122 [1895]), 1347, 1354, 1363. clx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Mt. Pleasant Borough v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Compahy ( 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 L. R. A. 520, 20. Atl. 1052 [1890]), 52, 53, 55, 231, 596, 598, 737, 829. Mt. Vernon, In re Petition City of, to Assess Cost of Local Improve- ments, etc. ( 147 111. 359, 23 L. R. A. 807, 35 N. E. 533 [1894]), 35, 581, 910, 1074, 1219. Mt. Vernon, City of v. State of Ohio ex rel. Berry (71 O. S. 428, 104 Am. St. Rep. 783, 73 N. E. 515 [1904] , 1012, 1015, 1019, 1472. Moxley v. Lawler ( — Ky. , 97 S. W. 365 [1906] , 301, 1049, 1072. Moyamensing, Commissioners and Inhabitants of the District of, to the use of the City of Philadel- phia V. Flanigan (3 Phil. 458 [1859]), 1063. Mudge V. Walker { — Ky. , 90 S. W. 1046, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 996 [1906]), 432, 462, 528. Miiire v. Falconer (51 Va. (10. Gratt.) 12 [1853]), 771. Mullane v. City of Newark ( — N. J. . 68 Atl. 412 [1905]), 495. Mulligan v. Smith (59 Cal. 206 [1881]), 781, 786, 787, 788, 791, 795, 1006, 1204. MuUikin v. City of Bloomington (72 Ind. 161 , 246. MuUins V. Shaw (77 Miss. 900, 28 So. 958 [1900] , 906. Municipal Securities Corporation v. Gates ( — Mo. App. , 109 S. W. 85 [1908]), 865. Municipal Securities Corporation v. Gates ( — Mo. App. , 105 S. W. 85 [1908]), 18. Municipality Number Two, Praying for the Opening of Benton Street V. White (9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]), 33, 113, 155, 622, j824, 690. Mimicipality No. 2, for Opening Eu- phrosine Street (7 La. Ann. 72 [1852]), 63, 113, 155. Municipality No. 1, Praying for the Opening of Orleans Avenue (8 La. Ann. 377 -[1853]), 745, 765, 1299. Municipality Number Two, for the Opening of Roffignac Street (7 La. Ann. 76 [1852]), 155, 308, 311, 426. Municipality Number One v. Young (5 La. Ann. 362 [1850]), 155. Municipality Number Two v. Cur- rell (13 La. 318 [1839]), 1054. Municipality Number Two v. Dunri («0 La. Ann. 57 [1855]), 155. Municipality Number Two v. Mc- Donough ( 16 La. Ann. 533 [1840]), 434. Munn, In the Matter of (165 N. Y. 149, 58 N. E. 881 [1900]), 672, 675, 888, 927, 979, 1337, 1369, 1371, 1455. Munn, In the Matter of (49 App. Div. 232), 927, 979, 1337, 1369, 1371, 1455. Munson v. Board of Commissioners of The Atehafalaya Basin Levee District (43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]), 35, 37, 89, 145, 147, 155, 343, 549, 651, 711, 779, 780. Murdock v. City of Cincinnati (44 Fed. 726 [1891]), 771, 1012, 1033, 1046, 1141, 1370. Murdock v. City of Cincinnati (39 Fed. 891 [1889]), 119, 132, 726, 773. Murnane v. City of St. Louis (123 Mo. 479, 27 S. W. 711 [1894]), 186. Murphey v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington (5 Del. Ch. 281 [1879]), 649, 890, 1430. Murphy, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacaite or Reduce As- sessments (20 Hun (N. Y.) 346 [1880]), 317, 440, 831, 1455. Murphy v. City of Albina (20 Or. 379, 26 Pac. 234 [1891]), 1500. Murphy v. Beard (138 Ind. 560, 38 N. E. 33 [1894]), 766, 1068. Murphy v. City of Chicago (186 111. 59, 57 N. E. 847 [1900]), 279, 282. Murphy v. Inhabitants of Clinton (182 Mass. 198, 65 N. E. 34 [1902]), 324, 1116, 1119, 1152. Murphy v. Dobben (137 Mich. 565, 100 N. W. 891 [1904]), 226, 340, 776, 1497. TABLE OP CASES. clxi [References are to sections.] Murphy v. City of Long Branch ( — N. J. Sup. , 61 Atl. 593 [1905]), 305, 433, 570. Murphy v. City of Louisville (72 Ky. (9 Bush.) 189 [1872]), 494, 1499. Murphy v. City of Omaha ( 1 Neb. (Unoff.) 488, 95 N. W. 680 [1901]), 14^32, 1496. Murphy v. People (120 111. 234, 11 N. E. 202), 153, 347. Murphy v. People ex rel. Raymond 183 111. 185, 55 N. E. 678 [1899]), 1183. Murphy v. City of Peoria (119 111. 509, 9 N. B. 895 [1888]), 244, 271, 279, 293, 295, 305, 431, 432, 444, 549, 560, 570, 748, 771, 775, 911, 918. Murphy v. Sims (27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 825 [1905]), 1012. Murphy v. Mayor and Couneil of the City of Wilmington (6 Houst. (DeL) 108, 22 Am. St. Rep. 345 [1880]), 86, 236, 245, 1423, 1425. Murr V. City of Naperville (210 111. 371, 71 N. E. 380 [1904]), 280, 348, 451, 922, 1316. Murray v. Cfity of Chicago (175 111. .340, 51 N. E. 654 [1898]), 965, 972, 990. Murray v. Graham (6 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 622 [1837]), 557, 927, 941, 986, 996, 1414. Murray v. Tucker (73 Ey. (10 Bush.) 240 [1874]), 223, 229, ^34, 273, 527, 531, 541, 775, 776, 867. Murtland v. City of Pittsburg (189 Pa. St. 371, 41 Atl. 1113 [1899-]), 1035, 1491. Muscatine, City of v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (88 la. 291, 55 N. W. 100), 575, 594, 595, 597, 598, 630, 677, 1028, 1105,' 1106, 1303. Muscatine City of v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. \79 la.' 645, 44 N. W. 909 [1890]), 1060. Musca,tine, City of v. Keokuk North ern Line Packet 'C&. (45 la. 185 [1876]), 827. Muskego, Town of v. Drainage Com- missioners (78 Wis. 40, 47 N. W. 11 [1890]), 93, 97, 239, 340, 420, 585, 664, 739, 750, 798, 909, 1299. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York to Vacate an As9es3- ment. In the Matter of the Peti- tion of the (89 N. Y. 530 [1882]), 323, 436, 443, 480, 865, 1453. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York ( 144 N. Y. 494, 39 N. E. 388 [1895]), 495, 1486, 1488. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (79 Hun (N. Y.) 482, 29 N. Y. S. 980 [1894]), 496, 1488. Myer v. Burns (4 Phil. 314 [1861]), 1146, 1194. Myers v. City of Chicago (196 111. 591, 63 N. E. 1037 [1902]), 295, 297, 298, 347, 348, 665, 666, 670. Myers v. Dodd (9 Ind. 290, 68 Am. Dec. 624), 363. Myrick v. City of La ©rosse ( 17 Wis. 442 [1868]), 53, 54, 737, 813, 981, 1420, 1432.- N N. P. Perine Contracting & Paving Company v. City of Pasadena (116 Cal. 6, 47 Pac. 777 [1897]), 777. N. P. Perine Contracting Co. v. Quackenbush (104 Cal. 684, 38 Pac. 533 [1894]), 314, 437, 499, 515, 867, 1086, 1141, 1145, 1235, 1265. Naegely v.. City of Saginaw (101 Mich. 532, 60 N. W. 46 [1894]), 843, 844, 851, 861. Nagle V. McMurray (84 -Cal. 539, 24 Pac. 107 [1890]), 1024, 1026, 1033. Nalle V. City of Austin ( — Tex. Civ. App. , 103 S. W. 825 [1907]), 43, 986. clxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] lualiner v. Blake (56 Ind. 127), [1877]), 432, 465, 479, 1181, 1196, 1207. Napa, City of v. Easterby (76 Cal. 222, 18 Pac. 253 [18S8]), 741, 838, 849, 854, 862. Napa, City of v. Easterby (61 Cal. 509 [1882]), 367, 436, 627, 741, 749, 837, 848, 854, 862, 1281, 1292. Nash V. Clark (27 Utah, 158, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) 208, 75 Pac. 371 [1904]), 355. Nash V. Kenyon (Mich. , 115 N. W. 45 [1908]), 482. Nash V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (9 Hun (N. Y.) 218 [1876]), 1478, 1484. Nash V. City of St. Paul (8 Minn. 172 [1863]), 313. Nashville, Mayor and City Council of V. Berry (2 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.) 561), 55, 86, 96, 160, 245, 323, 420, 717. National Bond & Security Co. v. City of St. Paul (91 Minn. 223, 97 N. W. 878 [1904]), 1195, 1206. National Fertilizer Co. v. Lambert (48 Fed. 458), 372. National Life Insurance Co. v. But- ler (61 Neb. 449, 87 Am. St. Kep. 462, 85 N. W. 437 [1901]), 49, 1057. National Tubeworks Co. v. Cham- berlain (5 Dak. 54, 37 N. W. 761 [1889]), 838. National Water Works Co. v. City of Kansas (28 Fed. 921]), 483. Naugatuck Railroad Co. v. City of Waterbury (78 Conn. 193, 61 Atl. 474 [1905]), 594, 596, 598. Neal V. Vansickel (72 Neb. 200, 100 N. W. 200 [1904]), 677, 729. Neenan v. Donoghue (50 Mo. 493 [1872]), 437, 537. Neenan v. Smith (60 Mo. 292 [1875]), 465, 479, 707, 1284, 1335. Neenan v. Smith (50 Mo. 525 [1872]), 79, 314, 698, 707, 714, 1040, 1182. Neenan v. Smith (30 Mo. 525 [1872]), 707. Neff V. Bates (25 0. S. 169 [1874]), 245, 395, 1015. Neff V. Covington Stone and Sand Co. (108 Ky. 457, 55 S. W. 697, 56 S. W. 723 [1900]), 492, 574, 679, 684, 1141, 1145, 1182. Nehasane Park Association v. Lloyd (167 N. Y. 431, 60 N. E. 741 [1901]), 223, 234, 1196. Neill V. Trans-Atlantic Mortgage Trust Company (89 Mo. App. 644 [1901]), 18, 530. Neilson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & Northwestern Railway Company (58 Wis. 516, 14 Am. & Eng. E. Cases, 239, 17 N. W. 310 [1883]), 71. Neiman v. State ex rel. Dickey (98 Ind. 58 [1884]), 1250, 1251. Nell V. Power (— Ky. , 107 S. W. 694 [1908]), 527. Nelson v. City of Chicago (196 111. 390, 63 N. E. '738 [1902]), 301, 523, 741, 844. Nelson v. City of Saginaw (106 Mich. 659, 64 N. W. 499 [1895]), 690, 692, 927. Nelitner v. Blake (56 Ind. 127 [1877]), 1204. Neptune v. Taylor (108 Ind. 459, 8 N. E. 566 [1886]), 322, 1371. Nesbit V. People (19 Colo. 441, 38 Pac. 221), 216. Neustadt v. Illinois Central Rail- road (31 111. 484), 615. Nevada, City of, to use of Gilfillan V. Eddy (123 Mo. 546, 27 S. W. 471), 234, 264, 273, 596, 838, 867, 877, 1134. Neivada, City of, to the use of Gil- fillan v. Morris (43 Mo. App. 586 [1891]), 273, 502, 570, 698, 1284, 1304. Nevada National Bank of San Fran- cisco V. Poso Irrigation District (140 Cal. 344, 73 Pac. 1056 [1903]), 579, 1072, 1073, 1261, 1380, 1426, 1427. Nevada National Bank v. Board of Supervisors of Kern County (5 Cal. App. 638, 91 Pac. 122 [1907]), 242, 259, 469, 1085. Neversorry v. Duluth South Shore and Atlantic R. Co. (115 Mich. 146, 73 N. W. 125), 363. TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to sections,] Nevin v. Allen ( — Ky. . 26 S. W. 180, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 836 [1894]), 569, 607, 622, 1197. Nevin V. City of Dayton (4 Ohio N. P. 203 [1897]), 1012. Nevin v. Gaertner ( — Ky. , 48 S. W. 153, 20 Ky. L. R. 1022), 1249, 1317. Nevin v. Roach (86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]), 119, 132, 134, 275, 296, 301, 553, 628, 666, 709, 710, 773, 844, 867, 1356, 1370. Nevins & Otter Creek Township Draining Company v. Alkire (3B Ind. 189 [1871]). 340, 554, 560, 639, 723, 745, 956, 960, 1011, 1254, 1262. New V. Village of New Rochelle (91 H-in (N. Y.) 214, 36 N. Y. S. 211 [1895]), 1484, 1485, 1488. New Albany, City of v. Conger ( 18 Ind. App. 230, 47 N. E. 852 [1897]), 626, 1505. New Albany, City of v. Cook (29 Ind. 220 [1867]), 11, 78, 549, 624, 631, 651, 657. New Albany, City of v. Sweeney ( 13 Ind. 245 [1859]), 1511. New Albany Gas Light & Coke Co. V. Crumbo (10 Ind. App. 360, 37 N. E. 1062 [1894]), 1015, 1018. New Castle City v. Jackson ( 172 Pa. St. 86, 33 AtL 236 [1895]), 42, 592, 613. New Castle & Richmond Railroad Co. v. Brumback (5 Ind. 543 [1854]), 69. New Eel River Draining Associaition v. Durbiu (30 Ind. 173 [1868]), 253, 254, 479, 1338. New England Hospital for- Women and Children v. Street Commis- sioners of the City of Boston ( 188 Mass. 88, 74 N. E. 294 [1905]), 307, 309, 310, 356, 424, 525, 570. Tfew England Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Missouri v. James (77 Mo. App. 616 [1898]), 538. New Haven, City of v. Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Company (38 Conn. 422, 9 Am. Rep. 399 [1871]), 11, 600, 601, 602, 1359. IJ^ew Haven, City of v. Whitney (36 Conn. 373 [1870]), 228, 229, 464, 776. New Haven & Ft. Wayne Turnpike Co. V. Bird (33 Ind. 325 [1870]), 255, 554, 629, 639, 723, 886, 1432. New Iberia, Mayor and Board of Trustees of the Town of v. Fon- telieu (108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]), 5, 19, 52, 53, 55, 57, 93, 96, 230, 443, 570. New Jersey, State of v. (See State). Chancellor of (See Chan- cellor ) . New Jersey, Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of v. Inhabitants of the Township of Linden (40 N. J. Eq. (13 Stewart) 27 [1885]), 959, 1057. New London, City of v. Miller (60 Conn. 112, 22 Atl. 499 [1891]), 8, 35, 89, 1056. New Orleans, City of, Praying for Opening of Casacaloo and Moreau Streets (20 La. Ann. 497 [1866]), 43, 155, 308, 560, 634, 698. New Orleans, City of. Praying for the Opening of Dryades Street ( 1 1 La. Ann. 458 [1856]), 731, 745. New Orleans, City of. Praying for the Opening of Phillip and Other Streets. (10 La. Ann. 313 [1855]), 308, 430. New Orleans, Application of Mayor and First Municipality of, for Ex- tension of Barrack Street (2 Rob- inson (La.) 491 [1842]), 1519. New Orleans, Second Municipality of V. Botts (8 Robinson (La.) 198 [1844]), 263, 413, 837, 873. New Orleans, City of v. Estate of Burthe (26 La. Ann. 497), 155. New Orleans, City of v. Elliott (10 La. Ann. 59 [1855]), 155, 625, 663, 666, 689, 698, 713. New Orleans, Second Municipality of V. McDonogh (9 Robinson (La.) 408 [1845]), 234. New Orleans, City of v. New Orleans Water Works Company (36 La. Ann. 432 [1884]), 73. New Orleans, City of, for the Use of Nicholson & Co. v. Stewart (18 La. Ann. 710 [1866]), 314, 806 clxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] New Orleans v. Warner (180 U. S. 199, 45 L. 597, 21 S. 353 [1901], modified on rehearing, 176 U. S. 92, 44 L. 385, 20 S. 280), 1508. New Orleans v. Warner ( 175 U. S. 120, 44 L. 96, 20 S. 44 [1899J, modified on rehearing, 176 U. S. 92, 44 L,. 385, 20 S. 280), 16, 580, 587, 1010, 1075, 1508. New Orleans City and Lake Rail- road Company v. Louisiana ex rel. City of New Orleans (157 U. S. 219, 39 L. 679, 15 S. 581 [1895]), 60, 166, 167, 599, 605, 1182. New Orleans Drainage Co. praying for the confirmation of a tableau, (11 Lp. Ann. 338 [1856]), 8, 43, 111, 155, 255, 653. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans ( 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. 831, 25 S. 471 [1905]), 483. New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Moye (39 Miss.. 374 [I860]), 71. New Whatcom, City of v. Belling- ham Bay Improvement Co. ( 18 Wash. 181, 51 Pac. 360 [1897]), 301, 670, 918, 927, 1004, 1141, 1145. New Whatcom, City of v. Belling- ham Bay Improvement Company (16 Wash. 131, 47 Pac. 236 [1896]), 119, 121, 122, 301, 570, 670, 693, 699, 747, 760, 962, 965, 969, 1026, 1141, 1145, 1179, 1299, 1303, 1307, 1337, 1346. New Whatcom, City of v. Belling- ham Bay Improvement Company (10 Wash. 378, 38 Pac. 1024 [1894]), 1017. New Whatcom, City of v. Belling- ham Bay Improvement Company (9 Wash. 639, 38 Pac. 163 [1894]), 223, 234, 713, 714, 777, 951, 1304, 1450. New York, In the Matter of the City of (190 N. Y. 350) ; sub nomine, In re Water Front in City of New York (83 N B. 299 [1907]), 86, 241, 245, 622. New York, Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of. Matter of the ( 186 N. Y. 237, 78 N. E. 952 [1906]), 426. New York, In the Matter of the Ap- plication of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of (178 N. Y. 421, 70 N. E. 924 [1904]), 680, 892. ^Jew York, In the Matter of the Pe- tition of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of, for Enlarging, Extending and Improv- ing Beekman Street in Said City (20 Johns. (N. Y.) 269 [1822])', 206, 271, 358. New York, Case of Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of, in the Matter of Enlarging and Extending Harman Street in the City of New York ( 16 John. Sup. Ct. 231 [1819]), 271, 304, 919, 1300. New York, In the Matter of the Ap- plication of the Mayor and Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of, for the Enlarging and Improv- ing a Part of Nassau Street in tha Said City (11 Johns. 77 [1814]), 35, 42, 147, 578, 588, 612, 613, 614.. New York, In the Matter of the City of, for Opening Avenue D ( 106 N. Y. S. 889, 122 App. Div. 416 [1907]), 680. New York, In the Matter of the City of. North River Water Front (105 N. Y. S. 750, 120 App. Div. 849), 86, 622. New York, In re City of ( 100 N. Y. S. 140 [1906]), 1486. New York, In the Matter of the Ap- plication of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of (99 N. \. 569 [1885]), 356. New York, In the Matter of the City of ( 106 App. Div. 31, 94 N. Y. S. 146 [1905]), 657. New York, In re City of (94 N. Y. S. 146 [1905]), 309. New York, In re City of (93 N. Y. S. 84, 103 App. Div. 496 [1905]), 680, 721. TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to sections.] New York, In re Mayor, etc., of (89 N. Y. S. 6, 95 App. Div. 552 [1904]), 119, 320, 356, 430, 475 618, 680, 729, 892, 947, 950, 1452 1457. New \ork. In the Matter of the City of, Grant Avenue (78 N. Y. S 737, 76 App. Div. 87 [1902]), 672^ 693, 1351. New York, In re City of (78 N. Y, S. 51, 38 Mise. Rep. 600 [1902] 584, 684, 693. New York, Matter of (28 N. Y. App, D. 143), 320. New York, In the Matter of the Ap plication of the Board of Street Ope^ing and Improvement of the City of. Relative to Acquiring Ti- tle to Forest Avenue in the Twen- ty-third Ward of the City of New YorK (74 Hun, 561, 26 N. Y. Supp. 855 [1893]), 639, 723. New York, In the Matter of Widen- ing Broadway in the City of (42 Howard (N. Y.) 220 [1872]). 1347. New York, In the Matter of the Ap- plication of the Board of Street Opening and Improvement of the City of, to Acquire Title to Forest Avenue (64 Hun (X. Y.) 59, 18 N. Y. .Supp. 727 [1892]), 308, 627. New York, Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of v. Cashman (10 Johns. (N. Y.) 96 [1813]), 1054. New Vork, Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of v. Colgate (12 N. Y. 140 [1854]), 1049, 1088, 1164, 1206. New York, Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of v. Colgate (9 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1 [1853]), 1049, 1068, 1164. New York, Mayor, etc., of the City ci V. Cornell (9 Hun (N. Y.) 215 [1876]), 472, 1108. New York, Mayor, Al'^ermen and Commonalty of the City of v. Tif- fanv (68 Hun (N. Y.) 158, 22 N. Y. S. 604 [1893]), 663. New York, Mayor, etc., of v. Whit- ney (7 Barb. (N. Y.) 485 [1849]), 360, 453, 549. Xew York Institution, In the Mat- ter of the Petition of the, for In- struction of the Deaf and Dumb to Vacate Assessments ( 121 N. Y. 234, 24 N. E. Rep. 378 [1890]), 228, 244, 663. New York & N. E. R. Co. Appeal (62 Conn. 527), 359. New York & N. E. R. Co.'s Appeal (58 Conn. 532), 359. New York Protestant Episcopal School, In the Matter of the (75 N. Y. 324), 479, 485, 492, 645, 1371, 1458. New York Protestant Episcopal School, Matter of Trustees of (31 N. Y. 574 [1864]), 910. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rj-. Co. v. City of Hammond ( — Ind. , 83 N. E. 244 [1908]), 7, 8, 100, 119, 131, 301, 1352. New York & Harlem R. R. Co. v. Board of Trustees of the Town of Morrisania (7 Hun 652 [1876]), .594, 598, 1078, 1426, 1444. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Prest (71 Fed. «15 [1896]), 291, 370, 458, 657. New 'iork & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol (151 U. S. 556,, 38 L. 269), 359. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. City of Xew Britain (49 Conn. 40 [1881]), 324, 596, 597. New York & New Haven Railroad Company v. City of X^ew Haven (42 Conn. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 534 [1875]), 596. New York Security & Trust Co. v. City of Tacoma (30 Wash. fiOl, 71 Pac. 194 [1903]), 1512, 1526. Newark v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (42 N. J. Eq. 196), 359. X^ewark v. Schuh (34 N. J. Eq. (7 Stew.) 262 [1881]), 956, 1428. Newark, JIayor and Common Coun- cil of V. gtate, Batten, Pros. (32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.l 453 [1865]), 392, 395, 979, 981, 1291. Newark, C ity of v. State, Edwards, Pros. (34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 523 [1870]), 1055. clxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Newark, Mayor and Common Coun- cil of V. Weeks (70 N. J. L. (41 Vr.) 166, 56 Atl. 118 [1903]), 2. Newby v. Platte County (25 Mo. 258 [1857]), 31, 33, 62, 70. Newcomb v. City of Davenport (88 la. 291, 53 X. W. 232 [1892]), 1479. Newell V. Wheeler (48 N. Y. 486 [1872]), 223, 234, 777, 891, 951, 1196, 1426. Newman v. City of Chicago ( 153 III. 469, 38 N. E. 1053 [1894]), 311, 663, 677, 857, 886, 997, 1374. Newman v. City of Emporia (41 Kan. 583, 21 Pac. 593 [1889]), 147, 414, 475, 727, 729, 959, 962, 969. • Newman v. City of Emporia (32 Kan. 456, 4 Pac. 815 [1884]), 413, 424, 832, 837, 838, 989, 1432. Newman v. Supervisors of Living- ston County (45 N. Y. 676 [1871]), 1466. Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Douglass (75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 673 [1877]), 73. Newton County Draining Company v. Nofsinger (43 Ind. 566 [1873]), 254, 1008. Nichol v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville (28 Tenn. (9 Hump.) 252), 365. Nicholes v. City of Chicago ( 184 111. 43, 56 N. E. 351 [1900]), 926. Nicholes v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger (171 111. 376, 49 N. E. 574 [1898]), 849, 856, 857, 927, 929, 1029, 1187. Nicholes v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger (165 111. 502, 46 N. E. 237 [1897]), 746, 771, 1183. Nicholes v. Bridgeport (23 Conn. 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854]), 8, 70, 86, 89, 100, 110, 119, 147, 245, 308. Nichols V. City of Chicago (192 111. 290, 61 N. E. 435 [1901]), 864. Nichols v.. Dallas (165 Ind. 710, 75 N. E. 824 [1905]), 1149. Nichols V. New England Furniture Co. (100 Mich. 230, 59 N. W. 155 [1894]), 1099. Nichols V. Voorhis (74 N. Y. 28 [1878]), 1049, 1369, 1459. Nichols V. Voorhis (18 Hun (N. Y. 33 [1879]), 1176, 1202, 1297. Nichols V. Voorhis (9 Hun (N. Y.) 171 [1876]), 1425. Nicholson v. New York & New Ha- ven Railroad Company (22 Conn. *4 [1852]), 70. Nicholson Borough, Main Street (27 Pa. Super. Ct. 570 [1905]), 72, 895. Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Painter (35 CaL 699 [1868]), 223, 234, 437, 483, 515, 777, 781, 1086. Nicodemus v. City of East Saginaw (25 Mich. 456 [1872]), 1012, 1484. Niklaus v. Conkling (118 Ind. 289, 20 N. E. Rep. 797 [1888]), 229, 629, 776. Niles, Board of Public Works of City of V. Pinch ( — Mich. , 116 N. W. 408 [1908]), 6, 1045, 1142. Ninth Avenue and Fifteenth Street, In the Matter of (45 X. Y. 729 [1871]), 426, 661. Nixon V. City of Burlington ( — la. , 115 N. W. 239 [1908]), 499, 843, 858, 1027, 1414, 1432. Noland v. Mildenberger ( — Ky. — , 97 S. W. 24 [1906]), 324, 867, 981. Noonan v. People ex rel. Hanberg (221 111. 567, 77 N. E. 930 [1906]), 89, 301, 314, 552, 553, 594, 595, 597, 598, 620, 630, 666, 688, 700, 818, 927, 932, 986, 996, 1068, 1078, 1130, 1183, 1215, 1340. Noonan v. People ex rel. Raymond (183 111. 52, 55 N. E. 679 [1899]), 295, 317, 440, 715, 719, 947, 1372. Noonan v. City of Stillwaiter (33 Minn. 198, 53 Am. Rep. 23, 22 N. W. 444), 158, 350. Norfolk, City of v. Chamberlain (89 Va. 196, 16 S. E. 730 [1892]), 12, 33, 67, 161, 308, 309, 435, 719. Norfolk v. Ellis (67 Va. (26 Grat- tan) 224 [1875]), 86, 96, 118, 161, 244, 314, 666, 698, 709. TABLE OF CASES. clxvii [References are to sections.] Norfolk, City of v. Young (97 Va. 728, 47 L. R. A. 574, 34 S. E. 886 [1900]), 89, 115, 119, 122,126, 726, 729, 731. Norsworthy v. Bergh ( 1 6 Howard (N. Y.) 315 [1858]), 1055. North Alton, Village of v. Dorsett (59 111. App. 612 [1895]), 62, 661 North Beach & Mission R. R. Co. Appeal of, in the Matter of Wid ening Kearney Street (32 Cal 500 [1867]), 118, 228, 304, 309 595, 597, 598, 601, 603, 690, 1372, North Jersey Street Railway Com pany v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City (68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 140, 52 Atl. 300 [1902]), 560, 601, 630. Nprth Kiver Bank v. Star. W. 563 [1905]), 62, 956, 1015, 1025, 1493. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham (54 Cal. 558 [1880]), 396, 404. Facific Paving Co. v. Bolton (97 Cal. 8, 31 Pac. 625 [1892]), 1248, 1374, 1384. Pacific Paving Co. v. Gallett (137 Cal. 174, 69 Pac. 985 [1902] >; 805, 808, 809, 1305. Pacific Paving Co. v. Geary ( 136 Cal. 373, 68 Pac. 1028 [1902]), 777, 805, 810, 811. Pacific Paving Co. v. Mowbray ( 127 Cal. 1, 59 Pac. 205 [1899]), 301, 805, 811, 1281, 1372, 1379. Pacific Paving Co. v. Sullivan Es- tate Company (137 Cal. 261, 70 Pac. 86 [1902]), 301, 803, 810, 830. Packard v. New Limerick (34 Me. 266), 1206. Packwood v. Briggs (25 Wash. 530, 65 Pac. 846); 1207. Paducah, City of, Petition ew parte (28 Ky. Law Rep. 412, 89 S. W. 302 [1905]), 495, 864. Paducah & Memphis Railroad Com- pany \. Stovall (59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 1 [1879]), 71. Page v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (34 Md. 558 [1871]), 281, 311, 425, 745, 747, 766, 1292, 1347, 1354, 1358. Page V. City of Chicago (60 111. 441 [1871]), 604, 639, 640, 723, 861, 1298. Page V. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. (70 111. 324), 203. Page V. City of St. Louis (20 Mo. 136 [1854]), 38, 324, 697, 1442. Page V. W. W. Chase Co. (145 Cal. 578, 79 Pac. 278 [1904]), 1169, 1225. Paillet V. Youngs (6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 50 [1850]), 363, 887, 1150, 1196, 1200, 1283. Paine v. S>pratley (5 Kan. 525 [1870]), 42, 45, 613, 1173, 1174. Palmer's Petition (1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 30 [1865]), 680, 686, 1026. Palmer, In the Matter of, to Have Assessment for Building Sewer in 34th St. Vacated (31 Howard (N. Y.) 42 [1865]), 265, 686, 911, 946. Palmer v. City of Danville ( 166 111. 42, 46 N. E. 629 [1897]), 347, 485, 520, 594, 598, 623, 698, 725, 921, 956, 963, 964, 1113. Palmer v. City of Danville (154 111. 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894]), 8, 11, 283, 295, 328, 347, 348, 713. clxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Palmer v. McMahon (133 U. S. 660, 33 L. 772, 10 S. 324 [1890]), 119, 122. Palmer v. Nolting ( 13 Ind. App. 581, 41 N. E. 1045), 370, 458, 475, 1103, 1110. Palmer v. City of Port Huron (139 Mich. 471, 102 N. W. 996 [1905]), 748, 751. Palmer v. Stumph (29 Ind. 329 [1868]), 86, 111, 147, 223, 698, 950, 1081, 1350, 1352. Palmer v. Way (6 Colo. 108 [1881]), 44, 89, 145, 152, 323, 420, 472, 666. Palmyra, Inhabitants of Town of V. Morton (25 Mo. 593 [1857]), 55, 96, 100, 110, 314, 713, 1210. Pan ton v. Duluth Gas & Water Co. (50 Minn. 175, 36 Am. St. Rep. 635, 52 N. W. 527 [1892]), 1484. Paola, City of v. Russell (75 Kan 826, 89 Pac. 651 [1907)], 324, 1435. Pardee Works v. City of Perth Am- boy (59 N. J. L. 335, 36 Atl. 666 [1896]), 973. Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park. (131 111. 537, 23 N. E. 345 [1890]), 972, 1191, 1202, 1297. Paret v. City of Bayonne (39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 559 [1877]), 894. Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Court of Decatur County (9 Ga. 341 [1851]), 117. Parish v. Louisville & N. R. Co. ( — • Ky. , 78 S. W. 186, 25 Ky. L. R. 1524 [1904]), 363. Park V. City of Chicago (22 111. 578 [1859]), 720. Park Avenue, Opening of. Appeal of Lnce Bros (83 Pa. St. (2 Norris) 175 [1876]), 4, 11, 675, 677, 927. Park Avenue, In re Opening of, Hui- dekoper's Appeal (83 Pa. St. (2 Norris) 167 [1876]), 8, 63, 101, 627, 1361. Park Avenue Sewer, In re ( 169 Pa. ■St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1895]), 327, 446, 554, 560, 563, 620, 633, 658, 665, 666, 709. Park Avenue Viaduct Assessment, In re (78 N. Y. Supp. 1030, 77 App. Div. 136 [1902]), 359. Park Ecclesiastical Society, The v. City of Hartford . (47 Conn. 89 [1879]), 324, 388, 444, 493, 563, 648, 658, 709, 779. Parke County Coal Co. v. Campbell (140 Ind. 28, 30 N. E. 149 [1894] ), «49, 550, 564. Parker v. City of Atchison (48 Kan. 574, 30 Pac. 20), 306. Parker v. Burgett (29 0. S. 513), 786. Parker v. Challiss (9 Kan. 155 [1872]), 323, 571, 624, 1431. Parker v. City of Detroit (103 Fed. 357 [1900]), 118, 121, 702. Parker v. Village of LaGrange (171 111. 344, 49 N. E. 550 [1898]), 314, 912, 1085, 1377. Parker v. City of Philadelphia ( — Pa. St. , 69 Atl. 670 [1908]), 495. Parker v. Reay (76 Cal. 103, 18 Pae. 124 [1888]), 318, 549, 628, 716, 1335. Parkersburg, City of v. Tavenner (42 W. Va. 486, 26 S. E. 179), 86, 118, 162, 324. Parkinson v. Meredith ( 158 Mo. 457, 59 S. W. 1099 [1900]), 1221. Parkland, Town of v. Gains (88 Ky. 561, 11 S. W. 649 [1889]), 36,194, 195, 610. Parmalee v. City of Cliicago (60 111. 267 [1871]), 309, 602, 603, 615. Parmalee v. Youngstown (43 0. S. 162, 1 N. E.-319 [1885]), 675,680, 683. Partridge v. Lucas (99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 [1S93]), 413, -^37, 439, 465, 479, 510, 740, S31, 1216,- 1220. 1252, 1300, 1359. Parks v. County of Hampden (120 Mass. 395 [1876]), 64, 65, 70. Parsons v. City of Columbus ( 50 0. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]), 53, 106, 189, 314, 387, 646. Parsons v. District of Columbia (170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 8 S. 521 [1898]), 119, 123, 241, 243, 252, 292, 347, 373, 376, 466, 553, 666, C9S, 708, 728, 1369. TABLE OP CASES. clxxiii L References are to sections.] Parsons v. District of Columbia (8 App. D. C. 391 [1896]), 119, 347, 373, 376, 698, 708, 1369. Parsons v. City of Grand Rapida (141 Mioii. 467, 104 N. W. 730 [1905]), 293, 324, 325, 432, 728, 729, 735, 896. Parsons v. City of Rochester (43 Hun 258 [1887]), 620, 639, 1492. Passaic, Village of v. State, Dela- ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, Pros. (37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 538 [1875]), 79, 313, 666, 677, 690, 691, 699, 894. Paterson, President and Council of tlie City of v. Society for Estab- lishing Useful Manufactures (24 N. J. L. (4 Zabriskie) 385 [1854]), 42, 590, 614. Patrie v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (6 Ida. 448, 56 Pac. 82), 363. Patterson v. Baumer (43 la. 477 [1876]), 337, 416, 423, 495, 531, 532, 781, 1003, 1015, 1018, 1431. Patterson v. Calhoun Circuit Judge (144 Mich. 416, 108 X. W. 351 [1906]), 1108. Patterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (99 Minn. 454), 594, 614. Patton V. City of Springfield (99 Mass. 627 [1868]), 658, 663, 1313, 13«5, 1367, 1389. Paul V. Conqueror Trust Co. (125 Mo. App. 483, 102 S. W. 1070 [1907]), 538. Paul V. City of Detroit (32 ilich. 108 [1875]), 63, 125, 308, 321, 728. Paulsen v. Portland (149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, IS S. 750 [1893]), 97, 115, 121, 125, 131, 135, 278, 324, 549, 555, 670, 674, 695, 732, 760, 1442. Paulson V. ' City of Portland ( 16 Ore. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]), 97, 115, 119, 121, 135, 278, 324, 549, 555, 670, 674, 695, 732, 1442. Paving District v. . (See Board of Improvement v. .) Paxson V. Sweet (13 N. J. L. 196 [1832]), 53, 86. Paxton, City of v. Bogardus (201 111. 628, 66 N. E. 853 [1903]), 413, 424, 837, 840, 856, 857. Payne v. City of Brooklyn (52 Hun (N. y.) 390, 5 N. Y. Supp. 281 [1889]), 1520. Payne v. Village of South Spring- field (L61 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 [1896]), 51, 328, 393, 401, 572, 594, 598, 643, 670, 698, 715. Payson v. People ex rel. Parsons (175 111. 267, 51 N. E. 588 [1898]), 69, 271, 748, 772, 927, 928, 930, 99^ 993. . Payton v. Village of Morgan Park (172 111. 102, 49 N. E. 1003 [1898]), 555. Peake v. New Orleans (139 U. S. 342, 35 L. 131, 11 S. 541 [1891]), 587, 1010, 1508. Peake v. City of Xew Orleans ( 38 Fed. 779 [1889]), 587, 1508. Pearce v. Village of Hyde Park ( 126 111. 287, 18 N. E. 824 [1890]), 280, 330, 864. Pearsall, Matter of (9 Abb. Pr. (\. S.) 203 [1870]), 911. Pearson v. City of Chicago (162 III. 383, 44 N, E. 739 [1896]), 310, 417, 456, 862, 864, 912, 922, 965, 1282, 1327, 1390. Pease v. City of Chicago (21 III. 500), 410, 720, 1337. Peay v. City of Little Rock (32 Ark. 31 [1877]), 151, 314, 639, 701. Peck V. City of Bridgeport (75 Conn. 417, 53 Atl. 893 [1903]), 748, 890, 1358. Peck V. City of Chicago (22 111. 578), 410. Peck V. City of Grand Rapids ( 125 Mich. 416, 84 N. W. 614 [1900]), 432, 436, 510, 831. Peck V. Sherwood (56 N. Y. 61.5 [1874]), 1055. Peebles v. City of Pittsburg (101 Pa. St. 304, 47 Am. Rep. 714 [1882]), 1478, 1484. Pells V. City of Paxton (176 111. 318, 52 N. E. 64 [1898]), 413, 424, 837, 873. clxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Pells V. People ex rel. Holmgrain (159 111. .580, 42 N. E. 784 [1896]), 510, 633, 817, 840, 852, 945, 989. Pelton, In the Matter of (85 N. Y. 651 [1881]), 475, 495, 1454, 1458. Pelton V. Bemis (44 0. S. 51, 4 N. E. 714 [1886]), 1168, 1496. Fennel's App. (2 Pa. St.. (2 Barr.) 216 [1846]), 713, 895. Pennie, In the Matter of the Petition of, to Vacate an Assessment (108 N. Y. 364, 15 N. E. 611 [1888]), 223, 234,^496, 777, 985, 1072, 1453, 1460. Pennie, In the Matter of the Peti- tion (45 Hun 391 [1887]), 496, 500, 985, 1453. Pennie, In the Matter of (19 Abb. N. C. 117), 500, 735, 742, 747, 770, 985, 1453. Pennington v. Woolfolk (79 Ky. 13 [1880]), 3. Pennock v. County of Douglas (39 Neb. 293, 27 L. R. A. 121, 42 Am. St. Rep. 579, 58 N. W. 117 [1894]), 1206. Pennock v. Hoover (5 Rawle (Pa.) 291 [1835]), 886, 895, 1068. Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole (132 Fed. 668 [1904]), 227, 415, 423, 725, 879, 886, 891, 983, 984, 1017, 1028. Pennsylvania Company v. City of Tacoma (36 Wash. 656, 79 Pac. 306 [1905]), 1069, 1194, 1223. Penrose Ferry Avenue (27 Pa. Super. Ct. 341 [1905]), 62. People V. or People ex rel. V. (See also State v. or State ex rel. v. •) People of the State of New York ex rel. Western New York and Penn- sylvania Railroad Company v. Adams (88 Hun 122, 34 N. Y. S. 579 [1895]), 359, 594, 598. People ex rel. Hallett v. Board of County Commissioners of Arapa- hoe County (27 Colo. 86, 59 Pac. 733 [1899]), 3. People ex rel. Ward v. Asten (6 Daly 18 [1875]), 263, 266. People ex rel. McOrea v. Atchison (95 111. 452 [1880]), 305, 878, 1049, 1164. People ex rel. Doyle v. Austin (47 Cal. 353 [1874.]), 40, S78, 579, 581, 584, 641. People ex rel. Day v. Bergen (6 Hun (N. Y.) 267 [1875]), 1085, 1101, ^146. People V. Boston & A. R. Go. (76 N. Y. 569), 359. People ex rel. Price v. Bridgeman (218 111. 568, 75 N. E. 1057 [1905]), 314, 510, 533. People ex rel. Miller v. Brislin (80 111. 423 [1875]), 103, 104, 194, 227, 247, 253, 259, 269, 356, 986, 996, 1183, 1185, 1340, 1385. People ex rel. Hayes v. City of Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 495 [1877]), 781, 981. People ex rel. Markey v. City of Brooklyn (65 N. Y. 349 [1875]), 374, 381, 603, 604, 781. People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]), 8, 11, 29, 31, 73, 86, 89, 99, 110, 118, 125, 147, 161, 248, 250, 301, 308, 553, 555, 570, 613, 651, 690. People on the Relation of Dikeman V. President and Trustees of the Village of Brooklyn (1 Wend. (N. Y.) 318, 19 Am. Dec. 502 [1828]), 1519. People ex rel. Reynolds v. City of Brooklyn (49 Barb. (N. Y.) 136 [1867]), 282, 969, 1393, 1399. People ex rel. Johnson v. City of Brooklyn (23 Barb. 180 [1856]), 223, 234, 443, 950, 1113. People ex rel. Marvin v. City of Brooklyn (23 Barb. (X. Y.) 166 [1856]), 418, 563. People ex rel. Grilling v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Brooklyn (9 Barb. (N. Y.) 535 [1850]), 86, 690, 910, 1394. People ex rel. Post v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn (6 Barb. (N. Y.) 209 [1849]), 86, 99, 110, 250, 553, 690. TABLE OP CASES. clxxv [Befereoces are to sections.] People ex rel. Ackerly v. City of Brooklyn (8 Hun 56 [1876]), 570, 1394, 1408. People ex rel. Brooklyn Park Com- missioners V. City of Brooklyn (3 Hun (N. Y.) 596 [1875]), 911, 1037, 1279, 1285,^1338, 1469. People ex rel. Russell v. Brown (218 111. 375, 75 N. E. 989 [1905]), 301, 866, 911, 927, 937, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. People ex rel. Bull v. City of Buf- falo (166 N. Y. 604, 59 N. E. 1128 [1901]), 373. People of the State of New York ex rel. Lehigh Valley Railway Com- pany V. City of Buffalo (147 N. Y. 675, 42 N. E. 344 [1895]), 360, 560, 576, 690, 692, 1410. People V. City of Buffalo (107 N. Y. S. 689 [1907]), 567. People T. City of Buffalo (107 N. Y. S. 281 [1907]), 700. People ex rel. Bull v. City of Buffalo (52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 157, 65 N". Y. Supp. 163 [1900]), 373. People ex rel. Herman v. Bug River Special Drainage District (189 111. 55, 59 N. E. 605), 340, 551, 564, 1330. People ex rel. Livermore v. Burnap (38 Mich. 350 [1878]), 764, 1278, 1402. People ex rel. Becker v. Burton (65 N. Y. 452 [1875]), 771. People V. Carr (231 HI. 502, 83 N. E. 269 [1907]), 841, 842, 853, 989. People V. Carroll ( — Mich. , 115 N. W. 442 [1908]), 509. People ex rel. Fisher i. Carter (210 111. 122, 71 N. E. 369 [1904]), 921, 1376. People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman (128 111. 496, 21 N. E. 507 [1890]), 646, 720, 909, 1026. People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman (127 111. 387, 19 N. E. 872 [1890]), 123, 340, 558, 645, 692, 724, 738, 921, 923, 1187, 1337. People ex rel. v. Chicago & Alton Railway Co. (228 III. 102» 81 N. E. 813 [1907]), 22. People ex rel. v. Chicago, Burling- ton & Quincy R. Co. (231 111. 112, 83 N. E. 120 [1907]), 1156. People ex rel. Keeney v. City of Chicago (152 111. 546, 38 N. E. 744 [1894]), 228, 229, 526, 1490. People ex rel. Raymond v. Church (192 m. 302, 61 N. E. 496 [1901]), 324, 527, 533, 840. People of the City and County of San Francisco v. Clark (47 Cal. 456 [1874]), 860, 867. People ex rel. Little v. Clayton (115 111. 150, 4 N. E. 193 [1886]), 340, 747, 1085, 1101, -1184. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Clif- ford (166 111. 165, 46 N". E. 770 [1897]), 886, 927, 938, 1183, 1341. People ex rel. Troy and Lansingburg R. R. Co. V. Coffey (66 Hun 160, 21 N. Y. Supp. 34 [1892]), 60, 602, 603, 666, 751, 1028. People V. Coghill (47 Cal. 361 [1874]), 278, 899, 900. People ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen (219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]), 119, 130, 142, 143, 819, 927, 941, 1347. People ex rel. Davidson v. Cole ( 128 111. 158, 21 N. E. 6 [1890]), 564, 639, 641, '692, 711, 735. People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler ( 166 N. Y. 1, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 52 L. R. A. 814, 59 >f. E. 716), 514. People ex rel. Russell v. Colegrove (218 111. 545, 75 N. E. 991 [1905]), 866, 1189. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Col- vin (165 111. 67, 46 N. E. Rep. 14 [1897]), 815, 926, 927, 932, 986, 996. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Cook (180 ni. 341, 54 N. E. 173 [1899]), 609, 631, 895. People ex rel. Samuel, Sr. v. Cooper (139 111. -461, 29 N. E. 872 [1893]), 269, 340, 557, 564, 739, 748, 759, 764, 844, 1005, 1299, 1477. People ex rel. Besse v. Village of Crotty (93 111. 180 [1879]), 827. clxxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections,] People of the State of New York ex rel. Cayadutta Plank Road Com- pany V. Cummings (166 N. Y. 110, 59 N. E. -703 [1901]), 397, 431, 587. People ex rel. Keim v. Desmond (186 N. Y. 232, 78 N. E. 857 [1906]), 549, 563, 575, 1402. People ex rel. Keim v. Desmond (97 N. Y. S. 795, 111 App. Div. 757 [1906]), 649, 563, 575, 1402. People ex rel. Board of Park Com- missioners V. Common Council of Detroit (28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202 [1873]), 251. People of the City and County of San Francisco v. Doe (48 Cal. 560 [1874]), 1219, 1239. People ex rel. Roediger v. Drain Commissioner of Wayne County (40 Mich. 745 [1879]), 1015, 1034. People ex rel. etc., v. Drainage Commissioners, District Xo. 1 of Town of Young America ( 143 111. 417, 32 N. E. 688 [1893]), 247, 249, 258, 259, 266, 340, 564. People ex rel. Phillips v. Drainage District, Xo. 5 (191 111. 623, 61 N. E. 381 [1901]), 564. People ex rel. Baron v. Drainage District, No. 3, of Martinton Township (155 111. 45, 39 N. E. 613 [1894]), 564. People ex rel. Selby v. Dyer (205 111. 575, 69 N. E. 70 [1903]), 254, 558, 1183, 1337, 1477. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Eg- gers (164 111. 515, 45 N. E. 1074 [1897]), 886, 927, 938, 986, 992, 1183, 1186, 1189, 1340, 1341. People ex rel. Raymond v. Field ( 197 111. 568, 64 N. E. 544 [1902]), 229, 305, 422. People of the State of New York ex rel. Rector, etc., of St. Ann's Church of Morrisania v. Fitch (87 Hun (N. Y.) 391, 34 N. Y. S. 368 [1895]), 588, 592, 711. People ex rel. Raymond v. Fuller (204 111. 290, 68 N. E. 371 [1903]), 851, 927, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. People ex rel. v. GUge (83 111. 486), 259, 267, 356, 636. People ex rel. Carroll v. Gary ( 105 III. 332 [1883]), 308, 915. People ex rel. Davidson v. Gilon (126 N. Y. 147, 27 N. E. 282 [1891]), 603, 1406. People ex rel. Davidson v. Gilon f58 Hun (N. Y.) 76, 11 N. Y. Supp. 439 [1890]), 603, 1406. People ex rel. Ganaway v. Glasco <203 111. 353, 67 N. E. 499 [1903]), 1347. People V. Glenn (207 111. 50, 69 N. E. 568 [1903]), 883, 981, 1304. People V. Gordon (81 Mich. 306, 21 Am. St. Rep. 524, 45 N. W. 658), 372. People ex rel. Doyle v. Green (3 Hun 7S5 [1875]), 428, 438, 439, 925. People ex rel. Mannen v. Green ( 158 111. 594, 42 X. E. 163 [1895]), 314, 507, 531, 532, 533, 539, 663, 886, 927, 929, 938, 987, 986, 996, 1000, 11S3, 1330, 1342, 1469. People ex rel. McKown v. Green (50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500 [1875]), 1472. People ex rel. Church of the Holy Communion v. The Assessors of Taxes, of Town of Greenberg ( 106 N. Y. 671, 12 N. E. 794 [1887]), 1395. People ex rel. Raymond v. Grover (203 III. 24, 67 N. E. 165 [1903]), 525, 707, 714. People V. Hagar (66 Cal. 59, 4 Pac. 951), 142. People of the State of California v. Hagar (52 Cal. 171 [1877]), 253, 340, 475, 618, 690, 724, 786, 899, 951, 1049, 1086, 1103, 1110, 1116, 1255, 1299, 1306, 1373, 1378. People V. Hagar (49 Cal. 229 [1874]), 278. 899, 900, 1331, 1335. People ex rel, Williams \. Haines (49 X, Y. 587 [1872]), 393, 403, 958, 1486, 1495. People of the State of California v. Hastings (34 Cal. 571 [1868]), 883, *909, 983, 1304. TABLE OP CASES. clxxvii [References are to sections.] People V. Houston (54 Cal. 536 [1880]), 242. People V. Hulbert (71 Cal. 72, 12 Pac. 43 [18861), 15, 340. People ex rel. Kochers'perger v. Hur- ford (167 111. 226, 47 N. E. 368 [1897]), 857, 867, 886, 927, 929, 991, 1183. People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village of Hyde Park (117 111. 462, 6 N. E. 33 [1887]), 236, 293, 425, 555, 662, 1472, 1476. People ex rel. Merriman v. Illinois Central Eailroad Co. (213 III. 367, 72 N. E. 1069 [1904]), 324, 927, 928, 986, 993, 1341. People ex rel. Parker v. County Court of Jefferson (55 N. Y. 604 [1874]), 692, 694, 711, 923, 1351. People ex rel. Wood v. Jones (137 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892]), 254, 416, 423, 558, 564, 784, 1008, 1417, 1432, 1477. People ex rel. Thompson v. Judson (233 111. 280, 84 N. E. 233 [1908]), 933, 952, 953, 986. People ex rel. Walkhill Valley Rail- road Company v. Keator (101 N. Y. 610, 3 N. E. 903 [1885]), 1371, 138«. People ex rel. Funk v. Keener ( 194 111. 16, 61 N. E. 1069 [1901]), " 1183, 1187, 1277, 1279. People of the State of New York ex rel. Jessup v. Kelley (33 Hun 389 [1884]), 283, 444, 480, 1403. People V. Common Council of City of Kingston (189 N. Y. 66, 81 N. E. 557 [1907]), 495, 569. People V. Common Council of City of Kingston (99 X. Y. S. 657, 114 App. Div. 326 [1906]), 495, 569, 624, 696, 1337. People of the City and County of San Francisco v. Kinsman (51 Cal. 92 [1875]). 983, 1113. People ex rel. Whitlnck v. Lamon (232 III. 587, 33 N. E. 1070 [1908]), 523. People ex rel. Raymond v. Latham (203 111. 9, 67 N. E. 403 [1903]). 525, 698, 715. People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence (41 N. Y. 137 [1869]), 100, 110. People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence (36 Barb. (N. Y.) 178 [1862]), HI, 118, 194, 312, 459, 553, 690, 699, 795, 1216, 1406, 1511. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Lin- gle (165 111. 65, 46 N. E. 10 [1897]), 857, 866, 902, 903, 927, 986, 987, 992, 996, 1183, 1340. People of the State of New York ex rel. Gage v. Lohnas (54 Hun 604, 8 N. Y. Supp. 104 [1889]), 188, 266, 309, 556, 1406. People of the State of California V. Lynch (51 Cal. 15 [1875]), 169, 242, 244, 245, 409, 414, 538, 554, 639, 670, 698, 980, 983. People ex rel. Price v. Lyon (218 111. 577, 75 N. E. 1017 [1905]), 510, 922, 1379. People of the City and County of San ■ Francisco v. McCain ( 50 Cal. 210 [1875]), 763, 836. People of the State of New York ex rel. Decker v. McCue (173 N. Y. 347, 66 N. E. 15 [1903]), 911. People ex rel. Decker v. McCue (74 App. Div. 40), 911. People V. McCune (57 Cal. 153 [1880]), 169, 665, 983. People ex rel. Kilmer v. McDonald (69 N. Y. 362 [1877]), 278, 279, 309, 414, 886, 983, 1304, -1405. People ex rel. Hanberg v. McMahon 224 111. 284, 79 N. E. 645 [1906]), 526, 744. People ex rel. MoOormack v. Mc- Wethy (177 HI. 334, 52 N. E. 479 [1898]), 466, 510, 526, 527, 857, 1183, 1186. People ex rel. McCormack v. Mc- Wethy (165 111. 222, 46 N. E. 187 [1897]), 466, 526, 540, 852, 926, 927, 945, 1183. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Markley (166 111. 48, 46 "n. E. 742 [1897]), 570, 752, 857, 859, 865, 900, 927, 936, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. People ex rel. Ijams v. Me^e'^s ( 124 111. 95. 16 N. E. 89 [1889]), 692, 994, 1183. clxxviii TABLE OP CASES. [Eeferences are to sections,] People ex rel. Trustees of Amity Baptist Church v. Monroe (81 N. Y. S. 972, 40 Misc. Rep. 286 [1903]), 589, 613. People ex rel. Martin v. Myers ( 135 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. 241 [1892]), 1395. People ex rel. Cook v. Nearing (27 N. Y. 806 [1863]), 958. People of the State of New York ex rel. Spencer v. Village of New Kochelle (83 Hun (N. Y.) 185, 31 N. Y. S. 592 [1894]), 726, 746, 1178, 1394. People ex rel. Smith v. The Com- missioners of Taxes of New York (101 N. Y. 651, 4 N. E. 752), 1108 People of the State of New York ex rel. Dean v. Board of Assessors of the City of New York (59 Hun 407, 13 N. Y. Supp. 404 [1891]), 73. People of the State of New York ex rel. Robbins v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (20 Hun (N. Y.) 73 [1880]), 1399. People of the State of New York ex rel. Law v. Commissioners of Tax- es and Assessments of County of New York (9 Hun (N. Y.) 609 [1877]), 1399. People ex rel. MonToe v. The Mayor, etc, of City of New York (5 Barb. (N. Y.) 43 [1848]), 279, 813, 815, 910, 1394, 1397, People ex rel. v. Nortrup (232 HI. 303, 83 N. E. '843 [1908]), 683. People ex rel. v. O'Neil (51 Cal. 91 [1875]), 983, 1113, 1357. People V. Owens (231 III. 311, 83 N. E. 198 [1907]), 886. People ex rel. McCrea v. Palmer (2 Bradwell (111.) 295 [1878]), 1092. People ex rel. President, Mana- gers and Company of the Dela- ware & Hudson Canal Company •V. Parker (117 N. Y. 86, 22 N. E. 752 [1889]), 279, 900, 1399. People ex rel. Hanberg v. Patton (223 111. 379, 79 N. E. 51 [1906]), 53, 263, 443, 1065. People ex rel. Hanberg v. Peyton (214 111. 376, 73 N. E. 768 [1905]), 51, 52, 53, 55, 223, 234, 949. People V. Phinney (231 111. 180, 83 N. E. 143 [1907]), 745, 770, 1187, 1189. People ex rel. Huck v. Pierce (90 ^1. 85), 223, 1126, 1166. People ex rel. Scott v. Pitt (169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 [1902]), 118, 123, 125, 241, 324, 666, 698, 699, 708, 709, 714, 728. People ex rel. Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Pontiac (186 111. 437, 56 N. E. 1114 [1900]), 867, 956, 962, 963, 965, 990, 1469. People of the State of New York ex rel. The New York Central & Hud- son River "Railroad Company v. Priest (169 N. Y. 432, 62 N. E. 567 [1902]), 3. People ex rel. Young v. Prust (219 HI. 116, 76 N. E. 68 [1905]), 340, 1126. People of the City and County of San Francisco v. Quaekenbush (53 Cal. 52 [1878]), 824, 886. People of th« City and County of San Francisco v. Reay (52 Cal. 423 [1877]), 746, 1149. People ex rel. Jeffries v. Record (212 111. 62, 72 N. E. 7 [1904]), 880, 909, 949, 1183, 1278. People ex rel. Connelly v. Reis (96 N. Y. S. 597, .109 App. Div. 748 [1905]), 554, 557, 584, 639, 693, 758, 1406. People ex rel. Tietjen v. Reis (96 N. Y. S. 601, 100 App. Div. 919 [1905]), 554, 557, 584, 603. People, etc., ex rel. Butts v. Com- mon Council of the City of Roches- ter (5 Lansing 142 [1871]), 404, 674, 731, 841, 981. People ex rel. Locke v. Common. Council of the City of Rochester (5 Lans. (N. Y.) 11 [187^]), 393, 563, 745, 754, 836, 841, 845, 848, 1280. TABLE OF CASES. clxxix [References are to sections.] People ex rel. Kern v. Ryan ( 136 111. 620, 41 N. E. 180 [1895]), 772, 986, 996, 1340. People on the Relation of Butler ' v. Board of Supervisors of Saginaw County (26 Mieli. 22 [1872]), 8, 89, 118, 283, 291, 337, 396, 403, 729, 983, 1469, 1471, 1474. People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon (51 111. 37), 227, 259, 344. People of the State of California ex rel. Macpherson v. Board of Su- pervisors of City and County of San Francisco (43 Cal. 91 [1872]), 63, 909, 1361. People V. San Francisco (27 Cal. 655), 365. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Sass (171 III. 357, 49 N. E. 501 [1898]), 393, 396. People ex rel. Miller v. Scott (132 111. 427, 23 X. E. 1119), 247, 248, 550, 564, 638. People ex rel. Hanberg v. Second Ward Savings Bank (224 111. 191, 79 N. E. 628 [1906]), 927, 928, 986, 993. People ex rel. Miller v. Sherman (83 111. 165 [1876]), 51, 103, 104, 236, 237, 239, 245, 258, 323, 573, 746, 771, 1184. People ex rel. Green v. Smith (55 N. Y. 135 [1873]), 781. People ex rel Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 629, 83 N. E. 1086 [1908]), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 621, 83 N. E. 1083 [1908]), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 576, 83 N. E. 1066 [1908]), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 575, 83 N. E. 1066 [1908]), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 III. 567, 83 N. E. 1083 [1908]), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 259, 83 N. E. 828 [IOCS] ), 1182. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 348, 83 N. E. 858 [1908]), 1182, 1184, 1389. People ex rel. Thompson v. Smythe (232 111. 242, 83 N. E. 821 [1908]), 1182, 1184, 1389. People ex rel. Rogers v. Spencer (53 N. Y. 1), 781. People ex rel. Johnson v. Springer 106 111. 542 (1883]), 41, 356, 1165, 1270, 1369. People of the State of New York v. Starkweather (42 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 325 [1877]), 472, 989, 995, 1111, 1520. People ex rel. Hanberg v. Stearns (213 111. 184, 72 N"_ e_ 728 [1904]), 671, 707. People ex rel. Vitnderbilt v. Still- well (19 N. Y. 531 (1859]), 1397, 1410. People ex rel. Hughes v. Stone (141 111. 281, 31 N. E. 502 [1893]), 1390. People ex rel Pollard v. Swi-ert (130 111. 608, 22 N. E. 787 [1890]), 140, 234, 584, 892, 1502. People ex rel. Ready v. Mayor and Common Council of Syracuse (144 >r. Y. 63, 38 N. E. 1008 [1894]), 974. People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor and Common Council of City of Syra- cuse (63 N. Y. 291 [1875]), 279, 280, 588, 651, 653, 657, 663, 696. People of the State of New York ex rel. Ready v. May-or and Common (Council of the City of Syracuse (65 Hun (N. Y.) 321, 20 N. Y. Supp: 236 [1892]), 537, 974, 1469, 1473, 1518. People ex rel. Thompson x. Mayor, etc., of the City of Syracuse (6 Hun 652 [1876]), 314, 523, 909, 956, 1405, 1406. People V. Mayor of Syracuse (2 Hun (N. Y.) 433), 594, 663. People ex rel. Raymond v. Talmadge (194 111. 67, 61 N. E. 1049 [1901]), 393, 394, 455, 986, 996. People ex rel. Little v. Trustees of Schools (118 111. 52, 7 N. E. 282), 586, 612. clxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] People of the State of New York v. Turner (117 N. Y. 227, 15 Am. St. Rep. 498, 22 N. E. 1022 [1889]), 744. People ex rel. Kerber v. 'City of Utica (7 Abb. N. C. 414 [1879]), 223, 234, 776, 777, 1304. People ex rel. Trundy v. Van Nort (65 Barb. (N. Y.) 331 [1873]), 487, 510, 515. People ex rel. ICochersperger v. Wadlow (166 111. 119, 46 N. E. 775 [1897]), 1390. People V. Walsh (96 111. 232, 36 Am. Rep. 135), 259. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. War- neke (173 111. 40, 50 N. E. 221 [1898]), 857, 866, 867, 927, 929, 992, 1183. People ex rel. v. Warren (231 111. 518, 83 N. E. 271 [1907]), 771, 863. People ex rel. Roediger v. Commis- sioner of Wayne County (40 Mich. 745 [1879]), 1012, 1403, 1408. People V. Weaver, (100 U. S. 539 [1879]), 3. People V. Weber (164 111. 412, 45 N. E. 723 [1897]), 345, 475, 986, 996, 1033, 1071, 1085, 1103, 1183, 1222, 1223, 1340. People V. Western Society (87 111. 246 [1871]), 42. People ex rel. Raymond v. Whid- den ( 191 111. 374, 56 L. R. A. 905, 61 N. E. 133 [1901]), 531, 532, 533, 539, 927, 945, 989, 1182, 1342, 1449. People V. Whyler (41 Cal. 351), 38. People ex rel. Price v. Wi°mers (225 111. 17, 80 N. E. 45 [1907]), 856, 866, 927, 929, 940. People V. Williams (51 111. 63), 356. People ex rel. Nostrand v. Wilsoi (119 N. Y. 515, 23 N. E. 1064 [1890]), 554, 927, 989, 1004, 1468, 1469, 1473. People ex rel. Gleason v. Yancey (167 111. 255. 47 N. E. 521 [1897]), 244, 323, 698, 776. People ex rel. Knox v. Village of Yonkers (39 Barb. 266 [1863]), 359, 465, 478, 499, 538, 572. People's National Bank of Brattle- *boro, Vermont, v. Ayer (24 Ind. App. 212, 56 N. E. 267 [1899]), 328, 1085. Peoria v. Kidder (26 111. 351), 101, 613. P^ia, City of v. Ohl (209 III. 52, 70 N. E. 632 [1904]), 816. Peoria, City of v. Smith (232 111. 561, 83 N. E. 1061 [1908]), 663, 1368. Pepper v. City of Philadelphia to Use of Horter (114 Pa. St. 96, 6 Atl. 899 [1886]), 483, 527, 529, 535, 610, 1029. Request River (Matter of Drainage of the Great Meadows on (42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880]). (See Great Meadows.) Perdue v. Big Four Drainage Dis- trict of Ford County (117 III. App. 600 [1905]), 1328. Perdue v. Mayor, etc., of New York (12 Abb. Prac. 31 [1861]), 1490. Perine v. Erzgraber (102 Cal. 234, 36 Pac. 585 [1894]), 575, 754, 1281. Perine v. Porbush (97 Cal. 305, 32 Pac. 226 [1893]), 431, 485, 491, 513, 537, 574, 575, 602, 604, 607, 723, 1030, 1031, 1079, 1229, 1235, 1337. Perine v. Lewis (128 Cal. 236, 60 Pac. 422, 772 [1900]), 763, 907, 1061, 1062, 1229, 1239, 1359, 1389. Perisho v. People ex rel. Gannaway (185 111. 334, 56 N. E. 1134 [1900]), 927, 931, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. Perkinson v. Hoolan (182 Mo. 189, 81 S. W. 407 [1904]), 798, 1013, 1019. Perkinson v. Partridge (7 Mo. App. 584 [1879]), 821, 823. Perkinson v. Partridge (3 Mo. App. 60 [1876]), 813, 821. Perkinson v. Schnaake (108 Mo. App. 255, 83 S. W. 301 [1904]), 461, 463, 1104, 1284. Pe'-kinsnn v. McGrath (9 Mo. App. 26 [1880]), 813, 1028, 1133. TABLE OP CASES. clxxxi [References are to sections.] Perry Avenue, In re, in City of New York (103 y. Y. S. 1069 [1907]), 592, 661. Perry, City of v. Davis & Younger (18 Okla. 427, 90 Pae. 865 [1907]), 781. Perry v. Otay Irrigation IM strict (127 Cal. 565, 60 Pac. 40 [1900]), 355, 1520. Perry v. People ex rel. Hanberg (206 111. 334, 69 X. E. 63 [1903]), 866, 986, 996, 1183. Perry v. People ex rel. Kern ( 155 111. 307, 40 N. E. 468 [1895]), 763, 764, 772, 913, 947, 1299. Perrysville Avenue, Marshall's Ap- peal (210 Pa. St. 537, 60 Atl. 160 [1904]), 316, 1011, 1015. Persson v. City of Bangor ( 102 Me. 397, 66 Atl. 1019 [1907]), 1347. Peru, City of v. Bartels (214 111. 515, 73 N. E. 755 [1905]), 670, 677, 715. Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Co. V. Hanna (68 Ind. 562 [1879]), 301, 594, 597, 598, 886, 1052. Petaluma Paving Company v. Sing- ley (136 Cal. 616, 69 Pae. 426 [1902]), 301, 528, 818, 822, 1030, 1277, 1380. Peters v. City of Chicago (192 III. 437, 61 N. E. 438- [1901]), 324, 857, 864. Peters v. Mayor, etc., of the City of Nev? York (8 Hun (N. Y.) 405 [1876]), 1519. Peterson v. City of Ionia ( — Mich. , 116 N. W. 562 [1908]), 742, 1015. PettigrevF v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (17 How. (N. Y.) 492 [1859]), 223, 234, 488. Pettit v. Duke (10 Utah 311, 37 Pac. 568 [1894]), 7, 291, 370, 458. Peugnet, In the Matter of (67 N. Y. 441 [1876]), 374, 381, 487, 740, 762, 948, 982, 983, 1372. Peyser v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (70 N. Y. 497, 26 Am. Rep. 624 [1877]), 1486. Peyser v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (8 Hun (N. Y.) 413 [1876]), 1478. Peyser v. New York Elevated Rail- - road Co. (12 Abb. N. C. 276 [1883]), 1098. Peyton v. Village of Morgan Park (172 111. 102, 49 N. E. 1003 [1898]), 293, 295, 314, 923, 1282. Pfaffinger v. Kremer (115 Ky. 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. R. 2368 [1903]), 619, 628, 678, 711, 715, 1039. Phelan v. Dunne (72 Cal. 229, 13 Pac. 662 [1887]), 1049, 1141, 1145, 1221. Phelps, In re (96 N. Y. S. 862, 110 App. Div. 69 [1905]), 575, 700, 1406. Phelps v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (112 N. Y. 216, 2 L. R. A. 626, 19 N. E. 408 [1889]), 504, 867, 1478, 1485, 1488. Philadelphia, City of to Use of Pe- ters v. Arnott (8 Phil. (Pa.) 41 [1870]), 541. Philadelphia to Use v. Baker (140 Pa. St. 11, 21 Atl. 238 [1891]), 383, 387, 646, 1159. Philadelphia, City of, to Use v. Ball (147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. 564 [1892]), 393, 396, 431, 433, 527. Philadelphia, City of, to Use of O'Rourke v. Bowman ( 175 Pa. St. 91, 34 Atl. 353 [1896]), 604. Philadelphia to Use of O'Rourke v. Bowman (166 Pa. St. 393, 31 Atl. 142 [1895]), 604, 1333. Philadelphia to the Use of Dyer v. Brooke (81 Pa. St. (31 P. F. Smith) 23 [1876]), 527, 538, 1158. Philadelphia, City of v. Burgin (50 Pa. St. (14 Wright) 539 [1865]), 482. Philadelphia v. Church of St. James (134 Pa. St. 207, 19 Atl. 497 [1890]), 588, 613. Philadelphia, City of v, Cooke (30 Pa. St. (6 Casey) 56 [1858]), 347, 1068, 1146, 1194, 1484. clxxxii TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Philadelphia to Use v. Cooper (212 Pa. 306, 61 Atl. 926 [1905]), 1157, 1160. Philadelphia to Use v. Cooper (2.7 Pa. Super. Ct. 552 [1905]), 1160. Philadelphia v. Ooulson (118 Pa. St. 541, 12 Atl. 604 [1888]), 1182. Philadelnhia v. Cox (1 Penna. Dis. Eep. 280 [1892]), 1194. Philadelphia to Use v. Dibeler (147 Pa. St. 261, 23 Atl. 567 [1892]), 383, 462. Philadelphia, City of v. Eastwick (35 Pa. St. 75 [I860]), 624. Philadelphia to Use of Mack v. Ed- dleman (169 Pa. St. 452, 32 Atl. 638 [1895]), 437, 1159. Philadelphia, City of, to Use of Winmill v. Edwards (78 Pa. St. (28 P. F. Smith) 62 [1875]), 53, 55, 737, 759. Philadelphia to Use v. Evans (139 Pa. St. 483, 21 Atl. 200 [1891]), 383, 437, 462, 520, 599. Philadelphia- City of, to Use of Mack V. Gorges (180 Pa. St. 296, 36 Atl. 868 [1897]), 314, 383, 462, 531, 532, 610, 635, 706. Philadelphia to Use v. Gowen (202 Pa. St. 453, 52 Atl. 3 [1902]), 397, 431, 610, 706, 1320. Philadelphia, City of v. Gratz Land Co. (38 Pa. St. 359 [1861]), 342, 1063. Philadelphia, City of, to Use v. H. C. Nichols Company (214 Pa. St. 265, 63 Atl. 886 [1908]), 509. Philadelphia, City of v. Hay (20 Pa. Super. Ot. 480 [1902]), 1113, 1172. Philadelphia to Use of Parker v. Henry (161 Pa. St. 38, 28 Atl. 946 [1894]), 387. Philadelphia, City of, to Use v. Hood (211 Pa. 189, 60 Atl: 721 [1905]), 491. Philadelphia v. Jenkins (162 Pa. St. 451, 29 Atl. 794), 121. Philadelphia to use v. Jewell (140 Pa. St. 9, 21 Atl. 239 [1891]), 483, 527, 531." Philadelphia to use v. Jewell ( 135 Pa. St. 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890]), 292, 293, 483, 520, 522, 527, 538, 839, 1335. Philadelphia, City of v. Keith (Pa.) (2 Atl. Rep. 207), 610, 706. Philadelphia, City of, to use v. Kel- ly (2 Penn. Dist. Eep. 143 [1892]), 1063. Philadelphia to use v. Ladies' United Aid Society (1 Penna. Dist. Ct. 249 [1892]), 589. Philadelphia to use v. MacPherson (140 Pa. St. 5, 21 Atl. 227 [1891]), 1063, 1277, 1281. Philadelphia, City of v. Manderfield (32 Pa. Super. Ct. 373 [1907]), 706. Philadelphia, City of v. Matchett (116 Pa. St. 103, 8 Atl. 854 [1887]), 1036, 1037, 1072, 1092. Philadelphia to use of Holgate v. Meager (67 Pa. St. (17 P. F. Smith) 345 [1871]), 1068, 1070, 1146, 1194. Philadelphia to use v. Meighan (159 Pa. St. 495, 28 Atl. 304 [1894]), 323, 713, 737. Philadelphia v. Meighan (27 Pa. Super. Ct. 160 [1905]), 384, 563. Philadelphia v. Merz (28 Pa. Super. Ct. 227 [1905]), 1091, 1160. Philadelphia to use v. Monument Cemertery Co. (147 Pa. St. 170, 23 Atl. 400 [1892]), 298, 378, 1325, 1333, 1382. Philadelphia to use v. Nell (31 Super. Ct. 78 [1906]), 1, 1063, 1160. Philadelphia, 'City of v. Nell (25 Pa. Silper. Ct. 347 [1904]), 451, 1157. Philadelphia to use of Yost v. Odd Fellows' Hall Association ( 168 Pa. St. 105, 31 Atl. 917 [1895]), 324, 563. Philadelphia to use v. Pemberton 208 Pa. St. 214, 57 Atl. 516 [1904]), 314, 431, 5.17, 518, 651. Philadelphia to use v. Pemberton (25 Pa. Super. Ct. 323 [1904]), 314, 517, 518. Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospi- tal for the Insane (154 Pa. St. 8, 25 Atl. 1076), 613. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxiii [References are to sections.] Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospi- tal (143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. 744 [1891]), 42, 93, 96, 323, 420, 589, 613. Philadelphia v. Peyton ( 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 350 [1904]), 1219. Philadelphia, City of, to use of Mc- Cann v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company (177 Pa. 292, 34 L. R. A. 564, 35 Atl. 610 [1896]), 40, 324, 595, 596, 598, 612, 1182, 1203. Philadelphia, City of to use of O'Rourke v. Philadelphia & Read- ing Railroad Company (88 Pa. St. (7 Norris) 314 [1879]), 521, 603, 723. Philadelphia, City of, v. Philadel- phia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. Co. (33 Pa. St. (9 Casey) 41 [1859]), 594, 595, 598. Philadelphia v. Provident, etc.. Trust Go. (132 Pa. St. 224, 18 Atl. 1114 [1890]), 372. Philadelphia, City of v. Richards (124 Pa. St. 303, 16 Atl. 802 [1889]), 223, 234, 737, 775, 777, 1063, 1372. Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Pas- senger Ry. Co. (143 Pa. St. 444, 22 Atl. 695 [1891]), 602, 603. Philadelphia, City of to use of John- son v. Rule (93 Pa. St. (12 Nor- ris) 15 [1880]), 527, 610, 665, 666, 706, 1312. Philadelphia, City of v. Sciple (31 Pa. Super. Ct. 64 [1906]), 1063, 1165. Philadelphia, City of v. Scott (93 Pa. St. (12 Norris) 25 [1880]), 1160, 1165, 1170. Philadelphia to use, etc., v. Sheri- dan (148 Pa. iSt. 532, 24 Atl. 80 [1892]), 610, 706. Philadelphia to use of Nestor v. Spring Garden Farmers' Market Company (161 Pa. St. 522, 29 Atl. 286 [1894]), 223, 549, 598, 611, 640, 723, 775. Philadelphia to use v. Spring Gar- den Farmers' Market Company (154 Pa. St. 93, 25 Atl. 1077 [1893]), 604, 1157, 1159, 1333. Philadelphia v. Stevenson ( 132 Pa. St. 103, 19 Atl. 70 [1890]), 55, 596, 1063. Philadelphia, City of v. Steward (31 Pa. Super. Ct. 72 [1906]), 1063. Philadelphia, City, of v. Sutter ( 30 Pa. St. (6 Casey) 53 [1858]), 1063, 1157. Philadelphia, City of v. Union Buri- al Ground Society of the City and County of Philadelphia (178 Pa. St. 533, 36 L. R. A. 283, 36 Atl. 172 [1896]), 42, 347, 592, 613. Philadelphia, City of to use of Mc- Manus v. Unknown Owner ( 140 Pa. St. 22, 24 Atl. 65 [1892]), 1033, 1063. Philadelphia v. Wistar (92 Pa. St. (11 Norris) 404), 382, 383. Philadelphia, City of v. Wistar (35 Pa. St. 427 [I860]), 481, 531, 1158, 1210. Philadelphia, City of v. Yewdall (190 Pa. St. 412, 42 Atl. 956 [1899]), 382, 383, 1052. Philadelphia Company's Petition (210 Pa. St. 490, 60 Atl. 93 [1904]), 190. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. V. City of New Whatcom ( 19 Wash. 225, 52 Pao. 1063 [1898]), 475, 975, 1047, 1092, 1411, 1469, 1508. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. V. City of Chicago (158 111. 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895]), 280, 308, 636, 652, 656, 856, 921, 925, 965, 967, 1279, 1286, 1348, 1349. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Balti- more Railroad Company v. Ship- ley (72 Md. 88, 19 Atri [1890]), 266, 308, 763, 918, 1142, 1150, 1231, 1240, 1266, 1350, 1356, 1469. Philbrook v. Inhabitants of the County of Kennebec (17 Me. 196 [1840]), 396, 399, 1499. Phillips, Matter of (60 N. Y. 16 [1875]), 373, 380, 381, 432, 437, 462, 762, 982, 1456. clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Phillips, In the Matter of v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of New York (2 Hun (N. Y.) 212 [1874]), 762, 951, 1279, 1442, 1450. Phillips V. City of Hudson (31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 143 [1864]), 1200, 1206. Phillips V. JoUisaint (7 Ind. App. 458, 34 N. E. 653), 1113, 1373. Phillips V. Lewis (109 Ind. 62, 9 X. E. 395 [1886]), 223, 950, 1262. Phillips V. City of Olympia (21 Wash. 153, 57 Pae. 347 [1899]), 972, 974, 976, 1037, 1469. Phillips V. People ex rel. Goedtner (218 111. 450, 75 N. E. 1016 [1-905]), 533, 745, 930, 986, 996, 1183. Phillips Academy, Trustees of v. In- habitants of Andover ( 175 Mass. 118, 48 L. E. A. 550, 55 N. E. 841 ]1900]), 89, 570, 666, 700, 709. Phoenixville Borough v. Miller (34 Pa. Super Ct. 16 [1907]), 441. Pickering v. State for use of Dyar (106 Ind. 228, 6 N. E. 611), 726, 735, 770, 1237, 1244, 1251, 1444. Pickett V. School District (25 Wis. 551, 3 Am. Rep. 105 [1870]), 486. Pickton v. City of Fargo (10 N. D. 469, 88 N. W. 90 [1901]), 119. Piedmont Paving Company v. All- man, 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493 [1902]), 495, 510, 542, 840, 856, 857, 864. Pier V. Fond du Lac County (53 Wis. 421, 10 N. W. 686 [1881]), 956, 1066, 1072, 1083, 1442. Pierce v. Aetna Life Insurance Com- pany (131 Ind. 284, 31 X. E. 68 [1891]), 1068. Pierce v. Bronnenberg's Estate (— Ind. App. , 81 N. E. 739, re- hearing denied, 82 X. E. 126 [1907]), 1067. Pierce v. Bronnenberg's Estate ( — • Ind. App. , 82 -N. E. 126; de- nying rehearing of 81 N. E. 739), 756. Pierce v. County Commissioners of Franklin County (63 Me. 252 [1872]), 52, 53, 54, 234, 399, 525, 729, 1404. Pierson v. People ex rel. Walter (204 111. 456, 68 N. E. 383 [1903]), 51. Pike V. City of Chicago ( 155 111. 656, 40 N. E. 567 [1895]), 278, 293, 381, 386, 672, 715, 920, 922, 1313. 1318, 1322. Pi^ V. Cummings, 36 0. S. 213 [1880]), 686, 1085. Pike Street, Master of, Seattle (42 Wash. 551; sui nomine In re City of Seattle, 85 Pac. 45 [1906]), (5.3, 271, 309, 661, 663, 675, 997. Pim V. Nicholson (6 0. S. 176 [1856]), 197. Pinchbeck v. Mayor, etc., of the Citv of New York (12 Hun (N. Y.) 556 [1878]), 1488, 1494. Pinckney, In the Matter of (22 Hun, 474 [1880]), 485, 511, 840, 1026, 1454. Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. City of Far- go (12 N. D. 360, 96 N. W. 357 [1903]), 238, 1512. Pinkstaff v. Allison Ditch District No. 2 of Lawrence County (213 111. 186, 72 N. E. 715 [1904]), 340, 661, 923, 924, 1274, 1277, 1282. Pioneer Irrigation District v. Brad- ley (8 Ida. 310, 101 Am. St. Rep.. 201, 68 Pac. 295), 118, 355. Piper's Appeal in the Matter of Wid- ening Kearney Street (32 Cal. 530 [1867]), 110, 292, 309, 345, 540, 556, 559, 560, 657, 670, 690, 694, 697, 947, 1381. Pipher v. People ex rel. Gannawa.\- (183 III. 426, 56 N. E. 84 [1900]), 927, 931, 986, 996, 1183, 1340. Pittelkow V. City of Milwaukee (94 Wis. 651, 69 N. E. 803 [1897] ), 02. 266, 661, 690, 783, 844, 899, 979. Pittman v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (3 Hun, 370 [1875]), 279, 1026. Pittsburg V. Brace Bros ( 158 Pa. St. 174, 27 Atl. 854 [1893]), 353, 637, 1049, 1050. Pittsburg V. Cluley (74 Pa. St. (24 P. F. Smith) 262 [1873]), 280, 856, 927, 933, 1009, 1337. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv [References are to sections. J Pittsburg V. Cluley (66 Pa. St. (16 P. F. Smith) 449 [1870]), 441, 1063. Pittsburg V. Coursin ( 74 Pa. St. ( 24 P. F. Smith) 400 [1873]), 735. Pittsburg, City of v. Harrison (91 Pa. St. (10 Norris) 206 [1879]), 1210, 1211, 1346. Pittsburg, City of v. Irwin's Exec- utors (85 Pa. St. 420 [1877]), 1519. Pittsburg, City of t. Knowlson (92 Pa. St. (11 Norris) 116 [1879]), 1163, 1168. Pittsburg V. Logan (165 Pa. St. 516, 30 Atl. 1017 [1895]), 967, 1035, ilOO. Pittsburg, City of v. MaeConnell (130 Pa. St. 463, 18 Atl. 645 ri889]), 527, 1159. Pittsburg, City of v. MoKnight (91 Pa. St. (10 Norris) 202, 1157, 1158, 1373, 1384. Pittsburg, City of v. Maxwell (179 Pa. St. 553, 36 Atl. 158 [1897]), 1391. Pittsburg V. Shaffer (66 Pa. St. (16 P. r. Smith) 454 [1870]), 387. Pittsburg V. Sterrett Subdistrict School (204 Pa. St. 635, 61 L. R. A. 183, 54 Atl. 463 [1903]), 8, 89, 586. Pittsburg V. Walter (69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. Smith) 365 [1871]), 234, 781, »51, "lloO, 1281. Pittsburg, Appeal of the City of (118 Pa. St. 458, 12 Atl. 366 [1888]), 1435. Pittsburg, Appeal of the City of (40 Pa. St. (4 Wright) 455 [1861]), 1068, 1146. Pittsburg's Appeal (70 Pa. St. (20 P. F. Smith) 142 [1871]), 1068, 1146, 1194. Pittsburg City District (2 Watts & ■C. 320 [1841]), 427. Pittsburg's Petition for Board of Viewers (138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. 757, 759, 761 [1890]), 81, 190, 278, 961, 1505. Pittsburg, Bradford & Buffalo Rail- way Company v. MoCloskey (110 Pa. St. 436, 1 Atl. 553 [1885]), 70. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Tiy. Co. v. Town of Crown Point (150 Ind. 536, 50 N. B. 741 [1897]), 783, 843, 951, 1000, 1030, 1031, 1431. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. V. Fish (158 Ind. 525, 63 N. E. 454 [1901]), 86, 108, 301, 598, 832, 1078, 1110, 1277. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Hays ( 17 Ind. App. 261, 44 N. E. 375 [1896]), 82, 594, 598, 1078, 1369. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Maehler (158 Ind. 159, 63 N. E. 210 [1901]), 598, 659, 918, 987, 1313. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Oglesby ( 165 Ind. 542, 76 N. E. 165 [1905]), 245, 263, 616, 895. Pittsburg, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Taber (168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 [1906]), 108, 301, 594, 595, 598, 620, 669, 670, 699, 709, 731, 745, 956, 978, 983, 1078, 1085, 1110. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Town of Wolcott (162 Ind. 399, 69 N. E. 451 [1903]), 70, 832. Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago R. R. Co. v. City of Chicago (53 111. 80 [1869]), 1183. Pittsburg R. Co. v. Harden (137 Ind. 486, 37 N. E. 324), 365. Piatt V. Stewart (8 Barb. 493 [1850]), 890, 902. Pleasant Hill, Village of v. Commis- sioners (71 0. S. 133, 72 N. E. 896 [1904]), 223, 234, 270, 449, 638, 775., Pleasant Hill, City of v. Dasher ( 120 Mo. 675, 25 S. W. 566 [1893]), 323, 1040, 1049. Pleasant Township v. Cook ( 160 Ind. 533, 67 N. E. 262 [1902]), 583, 587, 664, 727. 729, 738, 886, 1076. Pleasants v. City of Slireveport (110 La. 1046, 35 So. 283 [1903]), 8, 46, 484, 531, 553, 1299, 1369.- Plympton v. Boston Dispensary ( 106 Mass. 544 [1871]), 1055. clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Bections.] PocMla V. Calvert, Waco & Brazos Valley Railway Co. (31 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 72 S. W. 255 [1903]), 66. Poillon, Pros. v. Brunner (66 N. J. L. 116, 48 Atl. 541 [1901]), 986, 1085, 1168. Poillon V. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Rutherford (65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 538, 47 Atl. 439 [1900]), 119, 667, 699, 735, 766, 894. Police Jury v. Mitchell (37 La. Ann. 44), 218. Polk County Savings Bank v. State of Iowa (09 la. 24, 28 N. W. 416 ri886]), 501, 1074, 1509. Pollock V. Sowers (137 Mich. 368, 100 N. W. 596 [1904]), 340, 965, 990. Pomeroy Coal Co. v. Emlen (44 Kan. 117, 24 Pac. 340 [1890]), 3. Pontiac, City of v. Talbot Paving Co. (94 Fed. 65, 36 C. C. A. 88, 48 L. R. A. 326 [1899]), 1518. Pooley v. City of Buffalo ( 124 N. Y. 206, 26 N. E. 624 [1891]), 919, 1478, 1485, 1497. Pooley V. City of Buffalo ( 122 N. Y. 592, 26 N. E. 16 [1890]), 744, 745, 747, 915, 1484, 1485, 1488. Poplar Bluff, 'City of, to use of Wheeler v. Hoag (62 Mo. App. 672 [1895]), 438, 873. Porphyry Paving Co. v. Ancker (104 Cal. 340, 37 Pac. 1050 [1894]), 747, 1264. Port Angeles, City of v. Lauridsen (26 Wash. 153, 66 Pac. 403 [1901]), 416, 956, 965, 974. Porter v. City of Chicago (176 111. 605, 52 N. E. 318 [1898]), 023, 1029, 1277. Porter v. Midland Ry. Co. ( 125 Ind. 476, 25 N. E. 556), 1015. Porter v. Purdy (29 N. Y. 106, 86 Am. Dec. 283 [1864]), 280, 1009, 1521. Porter v. City of Tipton (141 Ind. 341, 40 N. E. 802 [1895]), 1506. Portland v. Bituminous Paving Co. (33 Ore. 307, 72 Am. St. Rep. 713, 44 L. R. A. 527, 52 Pac. 28 [1898]), 373, 483, 519. Portland,' City of v. Kamm (5 Ore. 362 [1874]), 77, 1349, 1351. Portland v. Oregon Real Estate Co. (43 Or. 423, 72 Pac. 322 [1903]), 805, 810, 981. Portland Lumbering & Manufactur- ing Co. V. City of East Portland (18 Or. 21, 6 L. R. A. 290, 22 Pac. 536 [1889]), 245, 1498. Portsmouth iSav. Bank v. City of Omaha (67 Neb. 50, 93 N. W. 231 [1903]), 763, 911, 1004. Post V. Kearney (2 N. Y. 394, 51 Am. Dec. 303 [1849]), 1054. Post V. City of Passaic (56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 421, 28 Atl. 553 [1894]), 1408. Post V. Supervisors (105 U. S. 667 [1881]), 1512. Poth V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (77 Hun (N. Y.) 225, 28 N. Y. S. 365 [1894]), 1481. Poth V. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York (151 N. Y. 16, 45 N. E. 372 [1896]), 465, 479, 496, 1481, 1484. Pott's Appeal (15 Pa. St. 414), 909. Potter V. Village of Norwood (21 Ohio C. C. 461 [1901]), 387, 563, 1437, 1444. Potter V. City of Whatcom (25 Wash. 207, 65 Pac. 197 ri901]), 670, 927, 933, 1004, 1030, 1337, 1511. Potwin V. Johnson (108 111. 70 [1883]), 194, 195, 245, 258, 736, 1112, 1317. Potwin V. Johnson (106 111. 532 [1883]), 41, 1369. Poundstone v. Baldwin (145 Ind. 139, 44 N. E. 191 [1896]), 373, 375, 781, 784. Powell V. Brunswick County (150 U. S. 433, 14 S. 166), 715. Powell V. Clelland (82 Ind. 24 [1882]), 1030, 1519. Powell V. City of Duluth (91 Minn. 53, 97 N. W. 450 [1903]), 353. Powell V. City of St. Joseph (31 Mo. 347 [1861]), 437. TABLE OP CASES. clxxxvii [References are to sections.] Power V. City of Detroit (139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]), 308, 465, 479, 549, 552, 555, 578, 629, 663, 670, 1085, 1103. Powers, In the Matter of the Appeal of (29 Mich. 504 [1874]), 63, 229, 272, 550, 747, 777, 825. Powers V. Barr (24 Barb. (N. Y.) 142 [1857]), 1108, 1175. Powers V. City of Grrand Rapids (98 Mich. 393, 57 N. W. 250 [1894]), 314, 561, 578, 651, 655. Powers -V. Town of New Haven ( 120 Ind. 185, 21 N. E. 1083 [1889]), 489 Praigg V. Western Paving and Sup. ply Company (143 Ind. 358, 42 N. E. 750 [1895]), 79, 628. Pratt V. City of Milwaukee (93 Wis. 658, 68 N. W. 392 [1896]), 41, 425, 429, 1116, 1173, 1181, 1195, 1196, 1337. Pray v. Northern Liberties (31 Pa. St. 69), 45, 166, 1063, 1113. Prendergast v. Richards ( 2 Mo. App. 187 [1876]), 324, 542, 636, 990, 1138, 1221. Presbytery of New York, In the Matter of the Trustees of the (54 Howard (N. Y.) 226 [1877]), 504, 867, 1453, 1459. Prescott V. City of Chicago (60 111. 121 [1871]), 194, 195, 355, 390, 394, 405, 997, 1291 President, etc., of v. . (See name of Corpora- tion or Institution.) Preston v. Board of Water Commis- sioners of Detroit (117 Mich. 589, 76 N. W. 92), 353. Preston v. Roberts (75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 570 [1877]), 301, 527, 628, 629, 635, 710, 777, 1015, 1255, 1375. Preston v. Rudd (84 Ky. 156, 7 Ky. L. R. 806 [1886]), 301, 555, 665, 770, 678. Prezinger v. Harness (114 Ind. 491, 16 N. E. 4«5 [1887]), 340, 528, 679, 684, 772, 1008, 1015, 1018, 1427, 1435. Price v. City of Toledo (25 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 617 [1903]), 189, 651, 653, 918, 1436. Prince v. City of Boston (111 Mass. 226 [1872]), 76, 86, 244, 309, 415, 525, 738, 879, 1334. Prindiville v. Jackson (79 111. 337 [1875]), 8, 11, 348, 421. Prindle v. Campbell (9 Minn. 212 [1864]), 735, 770, 981, 1178. Prior v. Buehler & Coney Construc- tion Company (170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]), 118, 324, 329, 553, 555, 666, 698, 709, 711. Proprietors of Locks and Canals v. Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corpo- ration (64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 385 [1852]), 66. Protestant Episcopal Public School, In the Matter of the (86 N. Y. 396 [1881]), 821, 1451, 1465. Protestant Episcopal Public School, In the Matter of the Application of the (40 Howard (N. Y.) 198 [1870]), 541, 550, 821, 824, 840, 855. Protestant Orphan Asylum of Pitts- burg and Allegheny, Appeal of the (111 Pa. St. 135, 3 Atl. 217 [1885]), 382, 462. Prout v. People ex rel. Miller (83 111. 154 [1876]), 568, 772, 927, 942, 1183, 1184, 1372. Provident Institution for Savings v. Allen (37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 627 [1883]), 349, 353, 1049, 1068, Provident Institution for Savings v. Allen (37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 36 [1883]), 6, 20, 349, 353, 354, 608, 665, 666, 690, 717, 1031. Provident Institution for Savings v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City (113 U. S. 506, 28 L. 1102, 5 S. 612 [1885]), 6, 20, 124, 353, 1049, 1068. Public Parks, In the Matter of the Department of (85 N. Y. 459 [1881]), 945. Pueblo, City of v. Robinson ( 12 Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899 [1899]), 44, 152, 324, 420, 674. Pugh V. Miller (126 Ind. 189, 25 N. E. 1040 [1890]), 1522. clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections.] Pulaski County, Board of Commis- sioners of V. Vurpillat (22 Ind. App. 422, 53 N. E. 1049 [1899]), 472. Purdy V. Drake (Ky.) (32 S. W. 939, 17 Ky. L. R. 819 [1896]), 73, 1346. Pursell V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New Zork (85 N. Y. 330 [I881]), 1054, 1467, 1487. Pusey's Appeal, In the Matter of Charles Street (83 Pa. St. (2 Nor- ris) 67 [1876]), 70, 1437. Putnam v. Grand Rapids (58 Mich. 416, 25 N. W. 330 [1885]), 368, 1437, 1442. Putnam County, Commissioners of V. Krauss (53 0. S. 628, 42 N. E. 831 [1895]), 1026, 1433. Putnam County, Commissioners of V. Young (36 0. S. 288 [1880]), 248, 322, 539, 564, 569, 629, 785,' 790, 796. Quarles v. Town of Sparta (2 Tenn. Ch. App. 714 [1902]), 263, 827. Quarry Road, In re. Opening of (82 N. Y. S. 965, 84 App. Div. 418 [1903]), 263. Queen City Foundry Co. v. City of Cincinnati (8 Ohio N. P. 167 [1901]), 677, 693, 700 Quest V. Johnson (58 Mo. 54 [189^]), 18, 530. Quick V. Parrott (167 Ind. 31, 78 N. B. 232 [1906]), 340, 1506. Quick V. Village of River Forest (130 111. 323, 22 N. E. 816 [1890]), 771, 918, 130fi. Quick V. Templin ( — Ind. , 85 N. E. 121 [1908]), 1442. Quill V. City of Indianapolis ( 124 Ind. 292, 7 L. R. A. 681, 23 N. E. 788 [1890]), 11, 139, 209, 301, 507, 651, 663, 665, 666, 731, 739, 1033, 1085, 1504, 1506. Quinlan v. Myers (29 0. S. 500 [1876]), 1007, 1432. Quinn v. City of Buffalo (26 Hun (K. Y.) 234 [1882]), 1508, 1516. Quinn v. City of Cambridge ( 187 Mass. 507, 73 N. E. 661 [1905]), 878. Quinn v. James (174 Mass. 23, 54 N, E. 343 [1899]), 326, 654, 750. Quint V. Hoffman (103 Cal. 506, 37 ^ac. 514 [1894]), 253, 254, 355, 1432, 1435. Quint V. MoMullen (103 Cal. 381, 37 Pac. 381 [1894]), 355, 1389, 1426. Quirk V. City of Seattle (38 Was''. 25, 80 Pac. 207 [1905]), 69, 7:5. 308, 611, 613. R R. B. Park & Co. v. Cane (— Ky. , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2294, 73 S. W. 1121 [1903]), 628, 666, 709, 710. Rabel v. City of Seattle (44 Wash. 482, 87 Pac. 520 [1906]), 549, 1054. Racer v. State for Use of Rhine ( 131 Ind. 393, 31 N. E. 81 [1891]), 340, 525, 532, 1254. Rackliffe v. Duncan ( — Mo. App. , 108 S. W. 1110 [1908]), 463, 616, 841. Rader v. Township of Union (44 N. .T. L. (15 Vr.) 259), 166, 167. Rader v. Township Committee of Union (39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 509), 168, 1081. Rae V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York ( 39 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 192 [1875]), 1422. Railroad Avenue, East, In the Mat- ter of the Application of the Commissioners of Public Parks, etc., relative to opening (47 Hun (N. Y.) 302 [1888]), 308, 601. Railway Company of Illinois v. Com- missioners of East Lake Fork Spe- cial Drainage' District (134 111. 384, 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 X. E. 781 [1891]), 1477. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxix [References are to sections.] Railroad Company v. Foreman (24 W. Va. 662 [1884]), 65. Railroad Company v. Mayor, Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of New York (63 Hun 271, 17 N. Y. Supp. 903 [1892]), 1422. Railway Co. v. Porter (38 Ind. App. 226, 76 N. E. 179 [1905]), (over- ruling petition for rehearing in 74 N. E. 260), 1110. Railroad Company v. Wagner (43 0. S. 75, 1 N. B. 91 [1885]), 72', 735, 977. Ualsch V. Hildebrandt (146 Cal. 721, 81 Pac. 21 [1905]), 1277, 1281. Ilaleigh, City of v. Peace (110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892]), 7, 11, 39, 79, 82, 100, 1.06, 145, 147, 148, 231, 241, 244, 245, 363, 665, 666, 668, 1039. Ramish v. Hartwell (126 Cal. 443, 58 Pae. 920 [1899]), 139, 522, 670, 871, 948, 1116, 1173, 1179, 1337, 1469. Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Co. (53 L. R. A. 421 [1901]), 104, 118, 350, 630, 702, 708. Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Co. (42 L. R. A. 639 [1898]), 104, 118, 350, 549, 609, 630, 702. Randolph v. Bayue (44 Cal. 366 [1872]), 1039, 1169. Randolph v. Gawley (47 Cal. 458 [1874[), 860, 867. Raritan Township v. Port Reading R. Co. (49 N. J. Eq. 11), 359. Rasmussen v. People ex rel. Kern (156 III. 574, 42 N. E. Rep. 161 [1895]), 925. Rasmussen v. People ex rel. Kern (155 111. 70, 39 N. E. 606 [1895]), 763, 913. Rauer v. Lowe (107 Cal. 229, 40 Pac. 337 [1895]), 273, 324, 512, 537, 740, 747, '907, 1052, 1062, 1281, 1293, 1522. Rawlins v. Brigorg L. R. (3 C. P. Div. 368 [1878]), 1054. Rawson v. City of Chicago ( 185 111. 87, 57 2Sr. E. 35 [1900]), 620, 629, 683, 781, 800, 857. Rawson v. City of Des Moi'nes ( 133 la. 514, 110 N. W. 918 [1907]), 629. Ray V. City of JefFersonville (90 Ind. 567 [1883]), 111, 217, 267, 301, 549, 619, 627, 650, 728, 781, 783, 814, 843, 1192, 13-47. Raymond, In the Matter of (21 Hun 229 [1880]), 484, 485. Raymond v. Cleveland (42 0. S. 522 [1885]), 7, 11, 86, 106, 308, 550, 551, 622, 623, 956, 962, 963, 970, 1447. Rayne, Town of v. Harrel (119 La. 652, 44 So. 330«[1907]), 777, 1050, 1114. Reading, City of v. O'Reilly (169 Pa. St. 366, 32 Atl. 420 [1895]), 610, 620, 817, 824, 1056. Reading, City of v. Savage ( 124 Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. 788 [1889]), 190, 244, 961. Reading, City of v. Savage (120 Pa. St. 198, 13 Atl. 919 [1888]), 190, 776, 981. Real Estate Corpora-tion of New York City v. Harper (174 N. Y. 123, 66 N. E. 660 [1903]), 1067. 1072. Reamer v. Hogg (142 Ind. 138, 41 N. E. 353 [1895]), 340, 526. Reasoner v. Creek ( 101 Ind. 482 [1884]), 804. Reclamation District No. 537 of Yolo County v. Burger (122 Cal. 442, 55 Pac. 156 [1898]), 253, 254, 343, 670, 694, 713, 788, 795, 951, 1008, 1318. Reclamation District No. 124 v. Coghill (56 Cal. 607 [1880]), 1269. Reclamation District No. 108 v. Evans (61 Cal. 104 [1882]), 132, 340, 773. Reclamation District No. 3 v. God- man (61 Cal. 205 [1882]), 48, 244, 776. Reclamation District No. 3 v. Gold- man (65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 678 [1884]), 132, 247, 266, 527, 541, 554, 557, 642, 773, 986, 998, 1213, 1390. cxc TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections,] Reclamation District No. 124 v. Gray (95 Cal. 001 30 Pac. 779 [1892]), 247, 249, 253, 254, 340, 983, 1008, 1301. Reclamation District No. 108 v. Hagar (66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]), 86, 132, 172, 244, 247, 248, 270, 340, 472, 549, 564, 618, 637, 666, 952, 1086, 1213, 1330. Reclamation District No. 108 v. Hagar (4 Fed. 366 [1880]), 118. 132, 147, 172, 334, 335, 340, 618, 665, 666, 773, 1086, 1370. Reclamation District No. 536 v. Hall (131 Cal. 662, 63 Pac. 1000 [1901]), 340, 1085. Reclamation District No. 3 v. Ken- nedy. (58 Cal. 124 [1881]), 223, 234, 254, 409. Reclamation District No. 3 v. Par- ■vin (67 Cal. 501, 8 Pac. 43 [1885]), 340, 899, 900, 1213. Reclamation District No. 551 v. Runyan (117 Cal. 164, 49 Pac. 131 [1897]), 340; 951, 1477. Rector v. Board of Improvement (50 Ark. 116, 6 S. W. 519 [1887]), 245, '636, 781, 786, 788, 1017. Rector of Trinity Church v. Higgins (27 N. \. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1 [1866]), 279, 832. Redden v. Town of Covington (29 Ind. 118), 246. Redding v. Esplen Borough (207 Pa. St. 248, 56 Atl. 431 [1903]), 50^ 1278. Redfork Levee District v. St. Louis Railway Co. (80 Ark. 98, 96 S. W. 117 [1906]), 886. Redick v. City of Omaha (35 Neb. 125, 52 N. W. 847 [1892]), 1431, 1435, 1436. Redmond v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (58 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Eep. 348, 11 N. Y. S. 782 [1890]), 762, 1484, 1485, 1488. Redmond v. Mayor, etc., of New York (26 Abb. N. C. 341 [1891]), 1478, 1484, 1488. E«d River Furnace Oo. v. Tennessee Central Railway Co. (113 Tenn. 697, 87 S. W. 1016), 365. Reed v. Bates (115 Ky. 437, 74 S. W. 234, 24 Ky. L. R. 2312 [1903] ), 725. Reed v. City of Cedar Rapids ( — Iowa , 111 N. W. 1013 [1907]), 418, 652, 658, 754, 821. Reed v. City of Cincinnati (8 Ohio C. C. 393 [1894]), 950, 983, 1373. Reed v. Erie (79 Pa. St. (9 P. F. Smith) 346 [1875]), 78, 362, 431. Reed v. City of Toledo ( 18 Ohio 161, [1849]), 232, 434. Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. Daw- son (97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. 725, 731, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]), 8, 44, 89, 97, 160, 345. Rees V. Watertown (86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, 22 L. 72 [1873]), 1518. Reese's Appeal in the Matter, of Wid- ening Kearney Street (32 Cal. 568 [1867]), 309, 1054. Reeves v. Grottendick (131 Ind. 107, 30 N. E. 889 [1891]), 142, 267, 631, 722, 723, 814, 887, 948, 962, 1192, 1227, 1330, 1337, 1347, 1350, 1352. Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County (8 0. S. 333 [1858]), 35, 90, 105, 117, 147, 245, 2«1, 294, 335, 337, 613. Regan Land Co. v. City of Carthage (— Mo. App. , 108 S. W. 589 [1908]), 6, 353, 1443, 1444. Regenstein v. Atlanta (98 Ga. 167, 25 S. B. 428 [1898]), 388, 1411, 1412, 1430. Reid V. Clay (134 Cal. 207, 66 Pac. 262 [1901]), 301, 472, 492, 537, 570, 861, 907, 969, 1062, 1110, 1216, 1281, 1279, 1282, 1288, 1303, 1324. Reilley v. City of Philadelphia (60 Pa. St. (10 P. F. Smith) 467 [1869]), 18, 234, 410, 413, 521, 778. Reilly v. City of Albany (40 Hun 405 [1886]), 537, 1005, 1508. Reinken v. Fuehring (130 Ind. 382, 30 Am. St. Bep. 247, 15 L. R. A. 624, 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 354, 30 N. E. 414 [1891]), 43, 111, 113, 118, 119, 143, 147, 370. Reis V. Graflf (51 Cal. 86 [1875]), 409, 742, 749, 983, 1081. TABLE OP CASES. CXCl [References iire to sections.] Remish v. Hartwell (126 Cal. 443, 58 Pac. 920 [1899]), 301. Remsen, Matter of (59 Barb. (N. Y.) 317 [1871]), 167. Remsen v. Wheeler (121 N. Y. 685, 24 N. E. 704 [1890]), 888, 1478, 1497. Remsen v. Wheeler (105 N. Y. 573, 12 N. E. 564 [1887]), 119, 121, 351, 354, 726, 729, 734, 1491. Renard v. City of Spokane ( — Wash. , 93 Pac. 517 [1908]). 807, 809, 1027, 1347, 1348. Reock V. Mayor and Common Coun- cil of Newark (33 N. J. L. (4 Vr.) 129 [1868]), 974. Rettinger v. City of Passaic (45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 146 [1883]), 1409. Reuting v. City of Titusville (175 Pa. St. 512, 34 Atl. 916 [1896]), 723. Reyburn v. Wallace .(93 Mo. 326, 3 S. W. 482 [1887])*, 1055. Reynolds v. Green (27 0. S. 416 [1875]), 1168. Reynolds v. Milks Grove Special Drainage District (34 111. App. 302 [1889]), 1430. Reynolds v. Newton (14 Ohio C. C. 433 [1893]), 985, 995, 1037, 1099. Reynolds v. Schweinefus (27 O. S. 311 [1875]), 828, 1279, 1289. Reynolds Street Sewer, In re (34 Super. Ct. 209 [1907]), 272, 426. Rhinelander, In the Matter of tha Petition of, to Vacate an Assess- ment (68 N. Y. 105 [1877]), 393, 396, 400. Rhinelander v. Mayor, eitc, of New York (24 Howard (N. Y.) 304 [1862]), 233, 431. Rhodes v. Board of Public Works of the City of Denver ( 10 Colo. App. 99, 49 Pac. 430 [1897]), 521, 781, 800. Rhoades v. City of Toledo (6 Ohio C. C. 9 [1890]), 111, 118, 308, 310, 426, 430. Rhodes v. Mummery (48 Ind. 216 [1874]), 363. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Babbitt (22 R. I. 113, 46 Atl. 403 [1900]), 49, 1055. Rice V. Mayor and Council of Ma- con (117 Ga. 401, 43 S. E. 773 [1903]), 144, 1412. Rich's Case (12 Abb. Prr-c 118 [1861]), 485, 663, 800, 1452, 1463. Rich V. Braxton (158 U. S. 375, 39 L. 1022, 15 S. 1006 [1895]), 1425. Rich V. City of Cb\cago (187 111. 396, 58 N. E. 306 [1900]), 864, 866, 927, 929, 943, 986, 1322. Rich V. City of Chicago (152 111. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]), 228, 244, 263, 292, 324, 402, 444, 545, 547, 548, 549, 561, 587, 594, 597, 598, 619, 630, 641, 643, 653, 676, 690, 694, 696, 771, 864, 867, 924, 1029, 1328, 1348. Rich V. City of Chicago (59 111. 286 [1871]), 132, 174, 202, 281, 762, 764, 783, 843, 910, 939, 1304, 1374. Rich V. Woods (118 Ky. 865, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 799, 82 S. W. 578 [1904]), 563. Richard v. Cypremort Drainage Dis- trict (107 La. 657, 32 So. 27 [1901-1902]), 551, 564. Richards v. City of Cincinnati (31 0. S. 506 [1877]), 306, 311, 431, 467, 527, 616, 620. Richards v. City of Jerseyville ,(214 111. 67, 73 N. E. 370 [1905]), 828 912, 1281. Richards v. Low (77 N. Y. S. 1102, 38 Misc. Rep. 500 [1902]), 265, 671. Richardson v. City of Brooklyn (34 Barb. 569 [1861]), 1511. Richardson v. City of Denver ( 17 Colo. 398, 30 Pac. 333 [1892]), 1206. Richardson v. Hydenfeldt (46 Cal. 68 [1873]), -867. gichardson v. Mehler (111 Ky. 408, 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. ■ Law Rep. 917 [1901]), 183, 490, 494, 501, 522, 537, 570, 765, 837, 857, 981, 1281, 1312. Richardson v. Morgan ( 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]), 38, 39, 43, 147, 239, 343, 663, 697. Richardson v. City of Omaha ( — ■ Neb. , 110 N. W. 648 [1907]), 748, 911, 1430. CXCll TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Eichcreek v. Moorman (14 Ind. App. 370, 42 N. E. 943 [1895]), 886, 1033, 1101. Rich Hill, City of v. Donnan (82 Mo. App. 386 [1900]), 813, 814, 864. Riehman v. Supervisors of Musca- tine County (77 la. 513, 14 Am. St. Rep. 308, 4 L. R. A. 445, 42 N. W. 422 [1889]), 194, 343, 956, 983. Richmond, City of v. Williams (102 Va. 733, 47 S. E. 844 [1904]), 131, 728, 748. Richmond & Allegheny R. R. Co. v. City of Lynchburg (81 Va. 473 [1866]), 43, 161, 347, 611, 641. Richter v. Merrill (84 Mo. App. 150 [1900]), 141, 533, 916, 1017, 1026, 1133, 1337, 1369. Eicketts v. Village of Hyde Park ( 85 111. 110 [1877]), 103, 121, 236, 347, 410, 531, 539, 541, 573, 662, 763. Ricketts v. Spraker (77 Ind. 371 [1881]), 474, 642, 672, 1010, 1283, 1298, 1430, 1435. Ridenour V. Saffin (1 Hand. (Ohio) 464 [1855]), 35, 106, 110, 147, 148, 317, 436, 531, 537, 576, 700, 776, 1330. Riebling v. The People for the Use of the Columbian Levee and Drain- age District (147 111. 120, 35 N. E. 467 [1894]), 344, 941, 986. Eighter, In the Matter of (92 N. Y. Ill [1883]), 484, 485, 1454, 1466. Rigney, Trustees v. Fischer (113 Ind. 313, 15 N. E. 594 [1887]), 449, 1471. Riker v. Mayor, Aldermen and lOom- monalty of the City of New York (3 Daly (N. Y.) 174 [1869]), 68, 825, 927-, 998. Riley v. Stewardt (50 Mo. App. 594 [1892]), 1133, 1138, 1245, 1375. Eisdon v. Shank (37 la, 82 [1873]), 323, 1041, 1048, 1215. Eisley v. City of St. Louis (34 Mo. 404 [1864]), 527, 505, 725, 950. Eitter v. Drainage District No. 1, Poinsett County (78 Ark. 580, 94 S. W. 711 [1906]), 105, 111, 121, 256, 340, 618, 651, 665, 666, 690, 691, 1381. Eitterskamp v. Stifel (59 Mo. App. 510 [1894]), 463. River Forest, Village of v. Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Com- pany (197 111. 344, 64 N. E. 364 [1902J), 594, 595, 598, 1318. Ei^r Rendering Co. v. Behr (77 Mo. 91, 46 Am. Itep. 6 [1882]), 372. River Rendering Co. v. Behr (7 Mo. App. 345 [1879]), 372. Eoaoh V. City of Eugene (23 Or. 376, 31 Pac. 825 [1893]), 501. Robbins to Vacate an Assessment. In the Matter of the Petition of (82 N. Y. 131 [1880]), 305, 482. Eobbins v. Sand Creek Turnpike Company (34 Ind. 461 [1870]), 554, 629, 639, 723, 1472. Eoberts, In the Matter of (81 X. Y. 62 [1880]), 264, 265, 407, 415, 423, 813, 873, 877, 911. Eoberts, In the Matter of (53 Hun 338, 6. N. Y. Supp. 195 [1889]), 1016, 1460, 1461. Eoberts v. Board of County Commis- sioners of Brown County (21 Kan. 247 [1878]), 65, 66. Roberts v. City of Evanston (218 111. 296, 75 N. E. 323 [1905]), 619, 748, 824, 912. Eoberts v. First National Bank of Fargo ( 8 N. D. 504, 79 N. W. 1049 [1899]), 86, 118, 649, 666, 698, 709, 888. Eoberts v. Gierss (101 Ind. 408 [1884]), 825, 1375. Eoberts v. Smith (115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]), 100, 118, 125, 280, 293, 449, 728, 1385, 1394, 1406. Eobertson v. Baxt^ (57 Mich. 127, 23 N. W. 711 [1885]), 226, 228, 270, 1395. Robertson v. City of Omaha (55 Neb. 718, 44 L. E. A. 534, 76 N. W. 442 [1898]), 461, 463. Eobeson v. People ex rel. Curry (161 111. 176, 43 N. E. 619 [1896]), 223, 234, 271, 272, 344, 735, 921. TABLE OP CASES. CXCIU [References jii-e to sections.] Robinson v. City of Burlington (50 la. 240 [1878]), 8, 1028, 1035, 1483. Robinson v. Logan (31 0. S. 460 [1877]), 800. Robinson v. Merrill (87 Cal. 11, 25 Pac. 162 [1890]), 1220, 1257, 1277, 1141, 1145. Robinson v. City of Milwaukee (61 Wis. 585, 21 N. W. 610 [1884]), 324, 549, 563, 1452. Robinson v. Rippey (111 Ind. 112, 12 N. E. 141), 1113. Robinson v. City of St. Paul (-10 Minn. 228, 41 N. W. 950 [1889]), 1368. Ro'j-hison V. City of Valparaiso ( 136 Ind. 616, 36 N. E. 644 [1893]), 1030, 1430, 1433, 1506. Roby V. Colehour (146 U. S. 153, 13 S. 47), 715. Roche V. The City of Dubuque (42 la. 250 [1875]), 747, 760. Roche V. Waters (72 Md. 264, 7 L. R. A. 533, 19 Atl. 535 [1890]), 1055. Rochester, City ol v. Campbell (123 X. Y. 405, 20 Am. St. Rep. 760, 10 L. R. A. 393, 25 N. W. 937 [1890]), 56. Rochester, City of v. Rochester Rail- way Company (182 N. Y. 99, 70 L. R. A. 773, 74 N. E. 953 [1905]), 60, '89, 95, 599, 600, 617. Rochester, City of v. Rochester Rail- way Co. (96 N. Y. S. 152, 109 App. Div. 638 [1905]), 1085. Rochester Railway Co. v. City of Rochester (205 'J. S. 236, 182 N. Y. 99), 617. Rock Creek Township v. Strong (96 U. S. 271, 24 L. 815), 365. Rockland Lake Trap Rock Co. v. Vil- lage of Port Chester (185 N. Y. 5C9, 78 N. E. 1111 [190C]), 1051. Rockland Lake Trap Rock Co. v. Vil- lage of Port Chester (92 IST.-Y. 8. 6C1, 102 App. Div. 360 [1905]), 1051. Roemheld v. City of Chicago (231 111. 467, 83 N. E. 291 [1907]), 542. Roffignac Street, Municipality No. 2, for Opening of (7 La. Ann. 76 [1852]), 155, 308, 311, 426. Rogers v. Heydeistaedt (65 Minn. 229, 68 N. W. 8 [1896]), 1183, 1186. Rogers v. City of Keokuk ( 154 U. S. 546, 18 L. 74, 14 8. 1162), 365. Rogers v. Milwaukee ( 13 Wis. 610 [1861]), 53, 737, 1444. Rogers v. St. Charles (54 Mo. 229 [1873]), 308. Rogers V. City of St. Paul (22 Minn. 494 [1876]), 11, 103, 104, 125, 142, 158, 260, 268, 284, 286, 298, 304, 437, 520, 553, 555, 556, 670, 822, 823, 864, 1490. Rogers v. Venis (137 Ind. 221, 36 N. E. 841 [1893]), 923, 1277. Rogers v. Voorhees ( 124 Ind. 469, 24 N. E. 374 [1890]), 340. Rogge V. City of Elizabel n (64 N. J. L. 491, 46 Atl. 164 [1900]), 313, 1408. Rogue V. People ex rel. Goedtner (224 111. 449, 79 N. E. 662 [1906]), 247, 258, 496, 1008, 1183, 1332, 1339. Rollo V. City of Chicago (187 111. 417, 58 N. E. 455 [1900]), 817. Rolph V. City of Fargo (7 N. D. 640, 42 L. R. A. 646, 76 N. W. 242 [1898]), 118, 147, 314, 653, 686, 677, 698, 709, 1333. Roly V. Shunganunga DrainaTe Dis- trict ( — Kan. , 95 Pac. 399 [1908]), 564, 659. Romig V. City of Lafayette (33 Ind. 30 [1870]), 621, 631, 895, 1351, 1356. Ronan v. People ex rel. Shafter (193 111. 631, 61 N. E. 1042 [1901]), 51, 323, 443, 551, 698, 715, 785, 789, 815, 857, 876, 949, 1065. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco v. Shipnjan (79 Cal. 288, 21 Pac. 830 [1889]), 1225, 1432. Rood V. Board of Supervisors of Mitchell Co. (39 la. 444 [1874]), 3. Rooke's Case (5 Rep. 99 b. (Hil. 40 Eliz.), 21, 25, 619, 639. CXCIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Rooney v. Brown (21 La. Ann. 51 [1869]), 46, 218, 570, 613, 1369. Rooney v. City of Toledo (9 Ohio C. C. 267 [1894]), 561, 625, 704, 1028. Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor, Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of New York (84 N. Y. 108 [1881]), 42, 324, 589, 613, 681, 821, 855. Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor, Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of New York (18 Hun 582 [1879]), 589, 613. Roper v. City of New Britain (70 Conn. 459, 39 Atl. 850 [1898]), 63, 1348. Ropes V. Essex Public Road Board (37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 335 [1875]), 909, 1408. Rork V. Smith (55 Wis. 67, 12 N. W. 408 [1882]), 521, 737, 958, 962, 995. Rose V. Trestrail (62 Mo. App. 352 [1895]), 15, 229, 234, 538, 771, 777, 813, 871, 1433. Resell, Pros. v. Mayor and Coun- cil of Neptune City (68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 509, 53 Atl. 199 [1902]), 665, 677, 1015, 1020, 1402. Rosenbaum, In the Maiter of (119 N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172 [1890]), 479, 496, 503, 977, 979, 995, 1461, 1467. Rosenbaum, In tne Matter of (53 Hun 478, 6 N. Y. Supp. 184), 496, 1467. Rosetta Gravel, Paving & Improve- ment Co. V. Jollisaint (51 La. Ann. 804, 25 So. 477), 155, 698, 1047, 1144. Rosetta Gravel, Paving & Improve- ment Co. V. Kennedy (51 La. Ann. •804, 26 So. 477 [1899]), 314, 1166, 1377. Ross V. Davis (97 Ind. 79), 202. Ross V. Gates (183 Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107 [1904]), 70, 108, 113, 118, 314, 451, 521, 649, 666, 693, 709, 1085, 1163, 1165, 1168, 1169, 1369. Ross V. Gates (117 Mo. App. 237, 93 S. W. 856 [1906]), 631, 1059, 1165, 1168. Ross V. Mayor of New York (3 Wend. (N. Y.) 333), -360. Ross v.'City of Portland (105 Fed. 682 [1901]), 10l6, 1436. Ross V. Prante ( — N. D. , 115 N. W. 833 [1908]), 272, 989. R(^ V. Stackhouse (114 Ind. 200, 16 N. E. 501 [1887]), 11, 500, 528, 549, 1015, 1018. Ross V. State for Use of Zenor (119 Ind. 90, 21 N. E. Rep. 345 [1888]), 886, 1244. Ross V. Van Natta (164 Ind. 557, 74 N. E. 10 [1905]), 465, 479, 746, 1335. Ross V. Board of Supervisors ot Wright County (128 la. 427, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 508 [1905]), 119, 125, 126, 142, 414, 525, 727, 729, 748, 767, 774, 983, 1285. Rossiter v. City of Lake Forest ( 151 111. 489, 38 N. E. 359 [1894]), 324, 527. Roswell, Town of v. Dominice (9 N. M. 624, 58 Pac. 342), 781. Roter V. City of Superior (115 Wis. 243, 91 N. W. 651 [1902]), 1509. Roth V. Forsee (107 Mo. App. 471, 81 S. W. 913 [1904]), 550, 739, 772, 781, 795. Roth V. Hax (68 Mo. App. 283 [1896]), 490,. 500, 821, 849. Rothschild v. Begole ( 105 Mich. 388, 63 N. W. 309 [U95]), 3. Roudenbush v. Mitchell (154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]), 57, 111, 113, 118, 119, 134, 375, 550, .564, 731, 773, 989. Rounds V. Mumford (2 R. I. 154 [1852]), 238, 244, 323. Rounds V. Whatcom County (22 Wash. 106, 60 Pac. 139 [1900]), 322,. 1517. Roundtree v. City of Galveston (42 Tex. 612 [1875]), 43, 100, 110, 147, 148, 713. Rousseau, Succession of (23 La. Ann. 1 [1871]), 1049, 1163. TABLE OF CASES. CXCV [References are to Bections.] Rowe, Proa. v. Commissioners of As- sessments, East OiSDge (69 N. J. L. (40 Vr.) 600, 55 Atl. 649 [19031), 280, 771, 798, 1012, 1409. Roxbury v. Boston & P. R. Corp. (6 Cudi. 424), 359. Roxbury, City of v. Nickerson (114 Mass. 544 [1874]), 1047, 1049. Royal Insurance Company v. South Park Commissioners (175 111. 491, 51 N. E. 558 [1898]), 391, 396, 405, 745, 763, 913, 923, 1279. Royce v. Town of Aplington (90 la. 352, 57 N. W. 868), 323. Royse v. Evansville & Terre Haute Railroad Company (160 Ind. 592, 67 N. E. 446 [1903]), 449. Rubright v. City of Pittsburg (147 Pa. St. 355, 23 Atl. 579 [1892]), 961. Rude V. Town of St. Marie (121 Wis. 634, 99 N. W. 460 [1904]), 5, 19, 97, 100, 335, 338, 373, 420, 717. Rue V. City of Chicago (66 111. 256 [1872]), 715, 763, 764, 914, 1299, 1304, 1321, 1406. Rumsey v. City of Buffalo (97 N. Y. 114 [1884]), 951, 1200, 1281, 1426. Ruscomb Street, In re (33 Pa. Super. Ct. 148 [1907]), 320. Rusk V. Berlin (173 111. 634, 50 .NT. E. 1071 [1898]), 311. Russell V. Adkins (24 Mo. App. 605 [1887]), 367, 375, 460, 1379. Russell V. Stansell (105 U. S. 303, 26 L. 9S9 [1881]), 1369. Russell and Allison Draina'^e Dis- trict v. Benson (125 111. 490, 17 N. E. 814 [1889]), 776, 1388. Rust, In the Matter cf, to Reduce an Assessment (24 Hun (N. Y.) 229 [1881]), 1085, 1094. Rutherford v. Maynes (97 Pa. St. 78), 340. Ryan v. Altseiiul (103 Cal. 174, 37 'Pac. 339 [1894]), 479, 570, 575, 639, 656, 725, 1030, 1031, 1337, 1359. Ryan & Company v. Citv of Cincin- nati (1 Cin. Su^. Ot. 245 [1871]), 686, 1506. Ryan \. Lynch (68 111. 160 [1873]), 1512. Ryan v. Sumner (17 Wash. 228, 49 Pac. 487 [1897]), 576, 610, 620, 624, 705, 956, 965, 990. Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton ( 175 •HI. 94, 51 N. E. 821 [1898]), 278, 401, 444, 663, 670, 698, 715, 907, 920, 1306. Ryers, Matter of (72 N. Y. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88), 101, 119, 335. Ryerson, Pros, v. City of Passaic (38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 171 [1875]), 1408. Ryerson v. Utley (16 Mich. 269 [1868]), 150. S. B. Mercer Co. v. City of Omaha (— Neb. , 112 N. W. 617 [1907]), 786, T91. S. D. Mercer Co. v. City of Omaha (— Neb. -.v- 107 N. W. 505 ]1906]), 414, 956, 959. S. D. Moody & Co. v. Chadwick ( 108 La. 66, 32 So. 181 [1901-19C2] ) , 1369. S. D. Moody & Co. v. Sewerage and Water Board (117 La. 360, 41 So. 649 [1906]), 479, 537, 1069. S. D. Moody & Co. v. Spotorno (112 La. 1108, 36 So. 836 [1904]), 324, 666, 698, 707, 709. Sackett, Douglass and De Graw Street, In the Matter of (74 N. Y. 95 [1878]), 194, 199. 252, 309, 407, 408, 424, 678, 950, 956. Sackett Street 'n the City of Brook- lyn, In the Matter of the Report of the Commissioners of Assess- ment for Grading, Paving, etc. (4 Hun 92 [1875]), 8, 89, 248. Sage V. City of Brooklvn (89 N. Y. 189 [1882]), 62, 79, 309, 1519. SsLpe V. City of Brooklyn (8 Abb. 279 [1880]), 1519. St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion Coun- ty (— Or. . 93 Pac. 231 [190811, 431, 553, 555, 560, 622, 629, 677, 690, 1411, 1414. cxcvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] -St. Bernard, Village of v. Kemper (60 0. S. 244, 45 L. R. A. 662, 54 N. E. 267 [1899]), 649, 685, 786, 1054. St. Charles, City of, ex rel. Budd V. Deemar (174 Mo. 122, 73 S. W. 469 [1902]), 118, 301, 666, 698, 709. St. John V. The City of East St. Louis (136 111. 207, 27 N. E. 543 [1892]), 527, 837, 840. St. John V. City of East St. Louis (50 111. 92 [1869]), 153, 2.39, 660, 677, 701, 715, 1183, 1351. St. Joseph's Asylum in the City of Xew York, In the Matter of the Petition of, to Vacate an Assess- ment (69 X. Y. 353 [1877]), 475, 589, 613, G81. St. Joseph, City of v. Anthony (30 Mo. 537 [I860]), 147, 245, 437, 527, 535, 777. St. Joseph, City of, ex rel. Forseo T. Baker (113 Mo. App. 691, 83 S. W. 1122 [1905]), 1138, 1169. St. Joseph, City of, ex rel. Forsee V. Baker (86 Mo. App. 310 [1900]), 1219. St. Joseph, City of v. Crowther (142 Mo. 155, 43 S. W. 786 [1897]), 118, 308, 426, 557, 675, 721. St. Joseph, City of, ex rel. Danaher V. Dillon (61 Mo. App. 317 [1895]), 401, 447, 465, 479, 563, 1028. St. Joseph, The City of, to Use of Gibson v. Farrell (106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 [1891]), 8, 50, 324, 444, 446, 550, 698, 709, 711, 893, 1284. St. Joseph, City of, ex rel. Gibson V. Forsee (110 .Md. App. 237, 84 S. W. 1138 [1905]), 475, 1105, 1109, 1137, 1284. St. Joseph, City of, to Use of Swen- son V. Forsee (110 Mo. App. 127, 84 S. W. 98 [1904]), 1135, 1137, 1195, 1203, 1219, 1284. St. Joseph, City of, to Use of the Saxton National Bank v. Lanilis (54 Mo. App. 315 [1893]), 223, 234, 324, 392, 400, 500, 776, 777, 840,' 849, 856. St. Joseph, City of, ex rel. King Hill Brick Manufacturing Company v. MoCabe (58 Mo. App. 542 [1894]), 539. St. Joseph, City of v. O'Donoghue (31 Mo. 345 [1861]), 110. St. Joseph, City of v. Owen (110 Mo. 445, 19 ,S. W. 713 [1892]), -43, 47, 147, 148, 212, 324, 387, 563, 658, 840, 857, 864. St. Joseph, City of v. Truckenmiller (183 Mo. 9, 81 S. W. 1116 [1904]), 121, 743, 760. St. Joseph, City of v. Wilshire (47 Mo. App. 125), 401, 447, 479, 483, 777, 838, 864, 867, 984. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Seiberi; V. Allen (53 JIo. 44 [1873]), 473, 475, 1040, 1107. St. Louis, City of v. Annex Realty Company (175 Mo. 63, 74 S. W. 961 [1903]), 308, 391, 394, 663, 724, 997, 1164, 1344. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Cor- nelli V. Armstrong (38 Mo. 167 [1866]), 138, 475, 1103, 1106, 1284. St. Louis to Use of Stadler v. Arm- strong (38 Mo. 29 [1866]), 1135, 1211, 1284. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Cream- er V. Bernoudy (43 Mo. 552), 1049, 1135, 1137, 1284. St. liouis. City of v. Brinekwirth (204 Mo. 280, 102 S. W. 1091 [1907]), 620, 754, 910, 911, 946, 997, 1140, 1255, 1278, 1344. St. Louis, City of Y. Brown (155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298 [1899]),. 557, 580, 582, 584, 909. St. Louis, City of v. Clemens (49 Mo. 552 [1872]), 301, 698, 1040, 1211. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Mc- Grath v. Clemens (36 Mo. 467 [1865]), 86, 475, 525, 570, 1040, 1211, 1282, 1346. St. Louis, City of v. Connecticut Mu- tual Life Insurance Company ( 107 Mo. 92, 28 Am. St. Rep. 402, 17 S. W. 637), 56. TABLE OP CASES. CXCVll [References are to sections.] St. Louis, City of, to the Use of Lakrum v. Coons (37 Mo. 44 [1865]), 138, 437, 1135, 1211, 1284. St. Louis, City of v. Cruikshank (16 Mo. App. 495 [1885]), 394, 837. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Rotch- ford V. De Noue (44 Mo. 130), 525, 1040, 1137, 1379. St. Louis, City of v. Excelsior Brew- ing Co. (96 Mo. 677, 10 S. W. 477 [1888]), 309, 553, 557, 951, 995, 1135, 1283, 1375, 1382. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Carroll V. Hardy (35 Mo. 261 [1864]), 437, 1211, 1235. St. Louis, City of v. Koch (169 Mo. 587, 70 S. W. 143 [1902]), 223, 234, 322, 743, 755. St. Louis, City of v. Lang (131 Mo. 412, 33 S. W. 54 [1895]), 85, 173, 781, 825, 837, 912, 916, 918, 950, 1231, 1249. St. Louis, City of v. Lawton (189 ,Mo. 474, 88 S. W. 80 [1905]), 63, 909, 1361. St. Louis, City of v. Nelson (169 Mo. 461, 69 S. W. 466 [1902]), 63, 925, 1391. St. Louis to use of Deppelheuer v. Newman (45 Mo. 138 [1869]), 73, 1040, 1049, 1164, 1211, 1524. St. Louis, City of, to Use of Cream- er V. Deters (36 Mo. 456 [1865]), 186, 324, 475, 781, 923, 950, 951, • 1135, 1284. St. Louis, City of -v. Provenchere ( 92 Mo'. 66, 4 S". W. 410 [1887]), 895. St. Louis V. Ranken (96 ito. 497, 9 S. W. 910 [1888]), 119, 123, 125, 247, 248, 250, 553, 7-26, 728, 729, 1229, 1333. St. Louis, City of v. Ranken (95 Mo. 189, 8 S. W.- 249 [1888]), 309, 1318, 1328. St. Louis, City of v. Richeson (76 Mo. 470 [1882]), 308, 773. St. Louis, City of v. Speck (67 Mo, 403 [1878]), 8, 89, 308, 622, 665, •666, 1338. St. Louis, City of v. Stoddard (15 Mo. App. 173 [1884]), 244, 246, 1113, 1249. St. Louis, City of v. Weber (44 Mo. 547), 293. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R, Co. V. People (224 111. 155, 79 N. E. 664 [1906]), 22. St. Louis, Arkansas & Texas Rail- road V. Anderson (39 Ark. 167 [1882]), 66. St. Louis County Court v. Griswold (58 Mo. 175), 356. St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern Railroad Company v. Knapp-Stout & Company (160 Mo. 396, 61 S. W. 300 [1900]), 71. St. Louis, Oak Hill and Carondelet Railway Company v. Fowler ( 142 Mo. 670, 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cases N. S. 405, 44 S. W. 77,1 [1890]), 71. St. Louis Quarry and Construction Company v. Frost (90 Mo. App. 677 [1901]), 514, 517, 518. St. Louis Quarry and Construction Company v. Von Versen (81 Mo. App. 519 [1899]), 514. St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis (26 Mo. 468 [1858]), 42, 580, 586. St. Mark's Church, Wardens, etc., of V. Mayor, etc., of Brunswick (78 Ga. 541, 3 S. E. 561 [1887]), 314, 688. St. Marys, Village of v. Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. (60 0. S. 136, 53 N. E. 795 [1899]), 59, 93, 98, 369, 717, 737, 1302. St. Paul, City of v. Mullen ( 27 Minn. 78, 6 N. W. 424 [1880]), 103, 104, 158, 468, 471, 902, 965. St. Paul, City of v. Nickl (42 Minn. 262, 44 N. W. 59 [1890]), 63, 119, 125, 728, 739, 1347, 1361. St. Paul, City of v. Rogers (22 Minn. 492 [1876]), 1269. St. Paul, City of v. St. Paul & Sioux City Railioad Company (23 Minn. 469 [1877]), 147, 172, 594, 614. St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. (First Division of) v. See First Division. cxcviu tAblb op cases. [References are to sections.] St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company v. City of Minneapolis (35 Minn. 141, 27 N. W. 500 [1886]), 73. Salem, Town of v. Henderson ( 13 Ind. App. 63, 41 N. E. 1062 [1895]), 620, 707. Salem, City of v. Mulford (22 Ohio C. C. 397 [1899]), 679, 686, 1085. Salter v. Eeed (15 Pa. St. (3 Harr.) 260 [1850]), 1146, 1195, 1219, 1225. Sample v. Carroll (132 Ind. 496, 32 N. E. 220 [1892]), 293, 340, 793, 886, 918, 1294, 1377. Samuels v. Drainage Commissioners (125 111. 536, 17 N. E. 829 [1889]), 4C, 104, 276, 340, 1112, 1119, 1141, 1145, 1176. San Antonio, City of v. Sullivan (23 Tex. Civ. App. 658, 57 S. W. 45 [1900]), 62, 308, 825, 1432. San Diego, City of v. Linda Vista. Ir- rigation District (108 Cal. 189, 35 L. K. A. 33, 41 Pac. 291 [1895]), 35, 42, 147, 610, 613. San Diego Investment Co. v. Shaw (129 Cal. 273, 61 Pae. 1082 [1900]), 15, 223, 234, 575, 624, 656, 775, 777. San Francisco, City and County of V. Buckman (111 Cal. 25, 43 Pae. Eep. 369 [1896]), 740, 829, 836. San Francisco, City and County of V. Certain Eeal Estate (42 Cal. 5.13 [1872]), 983, 1347, 1357. San Francisco, People of the City and County of v. Clark (47 Cal. 456 [1874]), 860, 867. San Francisco, People of the City and County of v. Doe (48 Cal. 560 [1874]), 1219, 1239. San Francisco, City and County of V. Kiernan (98 Cal. 614, 33 Pac. 720 [1893]), 1373, 1384. San Francisco, People of the City of V. Kinsman (51 Cal. 92 [1875]), 983, 1113. San Francisco, City and County of V. McCain (50 Cal. 210 [1875]), 763, 836. San Francisco; City and (bounty of V. Quackenbush (53 Cal. 32 [1878]), 824, 886. San Francisco, City and County of V. Reay (52 Cal. 423 [1877]), 746, 1149. San Francisco, Alameda & Stockton Railroad Company v. Caldwell (31 Cal. 367 [1866]), 70. San Francisco Gas Co. v. City of San Francisco (6 Cal. 190 [1856]), 838. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Bates (134 Cal. 39, 66 Pac. 2 [1901]), 118, 301, 492, 702, 1281, 1290. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Dubois (2 Cal. App. 42, 83 Pac. 72 [1905]), 301, 574, 624, 646, 1272. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Egan (146 Cal. 635, 80 Pac. 1076 [1905]), 1131, 1151, 1375. San Jose Improvement Co. v. Auze- rais (106 Cal. 498, 39 Pac. 859 [1895]), 831, 864. San Luis Obispo, City of v. Pettit ■(87 CaL 499, 25 Pac. 694 [1891]), 7, 777, 837, 849, 962. San Luis Obispo, County of v. White (91 Cal. 432, 27 Pae. 756, 24 Pa?. 864 [1891]), 50, 1212. Sanborn v. City of Mason City (114 la. 189, 86 N. W. 286 [1901]), 525, 1432. Sand Creek Turnpike Company v. Robbins (41 Ind. 79 [1872]), 723, 909, 950. Sanders v. Brown (65 Ark. 498, 47 S. W. 481 [1898]), 49, 1049, 1067,' 1072, 1085. Sanderson v. Herman (108 Wis; 662, 84 N. W. 890, 85 N. W. 141 [1901]), 86. Sandrock v. Columbus (51 0. S. 317, 42 N. E. 225 [1894]), 561, 620, 625, 635, 704. Sandrock v. City of Columbus (8 Ohio C. C. 79 [1894]), 625. Sanford v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (20 Howard, 298 [I860]), 1478. Sandford v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York (33 Barb. (N. Y.) 147 [I860]), 495, 528, 927, 1026, 1479, 1480. TABLE OP CASES. CXCIX [References are to uectlonB,] Sanford v. Mayor, etc., of New York (12 Abb. Pr. 23 [I860]), 485, 777, 1026, 1478, 1479, 1480. Sanford v. Village of Warwick (181 N. Y. 20, 73 N. E. 490 [1905]), 52, 55, 720. Sanford v. Village of Warwick (82 X. Y. S. 466, 83 App. Div. 120 -[1903]), 52, 55, 720. Sands v. City of Richmond (72 Va. (31 Grattan) 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]), 55, 86, 161, 244, 314, 323, 562, 843, 850. Sanger v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. (102Va. 86, 45 S. E. 750 [1903]), 363. Sanger v. City of Chicago (169 111. 286, 48 X. E. 309 [1897]), 857, 865. Sanger v. Rice ( 43 Kan. 580, 23 Pac. 633 [1890]), 40, 41, 437, 1116, 1173, 1202. Sanitary District of Chicago v. City of Joliet (189 111. 270, 59 N. E. 566 [1901]), 549, 578, 655, 693, 699. Sanitary Reduction Works v. Califor- nia Reduction Co. (94 Fed. 693 [1899]), 372. Santa Cruz Fair Building Associa- tion V. Grant (104 Cal. 306, 37 Pac. 1034 [1894]), 1419. Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Bowie (104 Cal. 286, 37 Pac. 934 [1894]), 527, 1039, 1049, 1141, 1145, 1156, 1252, 1269, 1278, 1375, 1376. Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Company V. Broderick (113 Cal. 628, 45 Pac. 863 [1896]), 463. Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Company V. Heaton (105 Cal. 162, 38 Pac. 693 [1894]), 314, 821, 837, 838, 867. Santiago Lima, In the Matter of (77 N. Y. 170 [1879]), 1451, 1462. Sarber v. Rankin (164 Ind. 236, 56 X. E. 225 [1899]), 270, 340, 527, 532, 760, 777, 1005, 1007, 1431, 1433, 1444. Sargent v. City of Evanston (154 111. 268, 40 N. E. Rep. 440 [,1894] (, 271, 279, 636, 856, 912, 925, 1279, 1285, 1305, 1372, 1373. Sargent & Company v. City of New Haven (62 Conn. 510, 26 At'. 1057 [1893]), 324, 563. Sargent .& Company v. Tuttle (67 Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822, 34 All. Rep. 1028 [1895]), 7, 8, 15, 4.-i, 223, 229, 234, 475, 525,. 776, 1103, 1109. Satterlee v. Matthewson ( 16 Ser;;. & Raw. 169 [1827]), 71. Saunders, In the Matter of (21 Hun (N. Y.) 579 [1880]), 1460. Saunderson v. Herman (95 Wis. 48, 69 N. W. 977 [1897]), 428, 862, 880, 1304. Savage v. City of Buffalo (59 Hun 606, 14 N. Y. S. 101 [1891]), 385, 554, 639, 663, 874. Savanna, City of v. Loop (47 111. App. 214 [1892]), 62. Savannah, Mayor and Aldermen of v. Weed (96 Ga. 670, 23 S. E. 900 [1895]), 314, 437, 568, 663, 666, 707, 709. Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. v. • City of Savannah (96 Ga. 680, 23 S. E. 847), 119. Saw Mill Run Bridge, Ballentine's Appeal, in re (85 Pa. St. 163, [1877]), 359. Siawyer v. City of Chicago ( 183 111. 57, 55 K. E. 645 [1899]), 439, 570, 604, 640, 723. Saxton V. Beach (50 Mo. 488 [1872]), 847. Saxton -v. City of St. Joseph ( (10 Mv). 153 [1875]), 437, 847, 1499. Saxton National Bank v. Haywood (62 Mo. App. 550 [1895]), 431, 527, 576, 594, 598. Sayward v. Denny' (158 U. S. 18i), 15 S. 777), 715. Scammon v. City of Chicago (42 III. 192), 278, 377, 584, 613, 694, 701, 723, 892, 1129. Scammon v. City of Chicago (40 111. 146 [1866]), 223, 234, 735, 763, 777, 1174, 1178. cc TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Schaefer v. Werling (188 U. S. 516, 47 L. 570, 23 S. 449 [1903]), 108, 118, 570, 669, 670, 677, 691, 699, 709, 1010, 1370. Schaefer v. Werling (156 Ind. 704, 60 N. E. 149 [1900]), 108, 118, 570, 669, 670, 677, 691, 699, 709, 1010, 1370. Sohafer v. Gerbers (234 111. 468, 84 N. E. 1064 [1908]), 1377. Scheer v. Cincinnati ( 15 W. L. B. (Ohio) 66 [1886]), 174, 189. Schell, In the Matter of the Petition of (76 N. Y. 432 [1879]), 479, 681. Schell, In the Matter of (16 Hun, 283 [1878]), 681. Schemick v. Chicago (151 111. 336, 37 N. E. Kep. 888 [1894]), 281, 764, 766, 909, 913, 956, 969, 1299, 1372, 1384. Schenck v. City of Jeffersonville (152 Ind. 204, 52 N. E. 212), 366. Schenectady, City of v. Trustees of Union College (144 N. Y. 241, 26 L. R. A. 614, 39 N. E. 67 [1894]), 440, 587, 627, 630. Schenectady, City of v. Trustees of Union College (66 Hun (N. Y.) 179, 21 N. Y. Supp. 147 [1892]), 138, 437, 440, 517, 518, 587, 773. Schenley v. Commonwealth for use . of the City of Allegheny (36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]), 267, 414, 467, 485, 532, 569, 666, 709, 886, 983, 1063, 1157, 1312. Schenley v. Commonwealth for use of the City of Allegheny (36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 62 [1859]), 1158. Schenley v. Commonwealth for US3 of the City of Allegheny (36 Pa. St. 29, 78 Am. Dec. 359 [1859]), 11, 315, 392, 395, 486, 541, 867, 895, 956, 958, 1063, 1163. Schenley v. City of Allegheny (25 Pa. iSt. (1 Oasey) 128 [1854]), 308. Scherm v. Garrett's Administrator (118 Ky. 29ei, 80 S. W. 1103, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 186 [1904]), 52, 55, 1067, 1072. Scherm v. Short (Ky.) (77 S. W. 357, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1108 [1903]), 537, 1039, 1144. Schertz v. The People ex rel. Taylor (105 111. 27 [1882]), 927, 965, 986, 988. Schibel v. Merrill (185 Mo. 534, 83 S. W. 1069 [1904]), 141, 538, 1337. Schintgen v. City of LaCrosse (117 %.Wis. 158, 94 N. W. 84 [1903]), 301, 414, 620, .621, 648, 962, 974, 1217. Schirmer -v. Hoyt (54 Cal. 280 [1880]), 479, 895, 1154, 1155. Schmelz v. Giles (75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 491 [1877]), 628. Schmidt v. City of Cincinnati (1 Ohio N. p. 48- [1894]), 625, 704. Schmidt v. Village of Elmwood Place (15 Ohio C. C. 351 [1897]), 53, 55, 737, 740, 977. Schmidt v. Market Street & Willow Glenn R. R. Co. (90 Cal. 37, 27 Pac. 61 [1891]), 599, 602, 754, 1124, 1215, 1231, 1264, 1375. Schmitt V. City of New Orleans (48 La. Ann. 1440, 21 So. 24 [1896]), 380, 381, 464. Schneider v. City of Detroit (135 Mich. 570, 98 N. V/. 258 [1904]), 359, 1179, 1194, 1195. Schneider v. District of Columbia (7 Mackey (D. C.) 252 [1889]), 527, 541. Schneider Granite Company v. Tay- lor (64 Mo. App. 37 [1895]), 1056. Schoeuberg v. Field (95 Mo. App. 241 [1902]), 515, 864. Scholle, In the Matter of (14 Hun (N. Y.) 14 [1878]), 681. "Scholtz v. Smith (119 Mich. 634, 78 N. W. 668 [1899]), 263, 266. School District of Font Smith v. Board of Improvement (65 Ark. 343, 46 S. W. 418 [1898]), 586. School Property, Assessment of (7 Ohio N. P. 568 [1900]), 586. Schott V. City of Cincinnati (3 Ohio N. P. 311 [1895]), 707. Schreiber, In the Matter of (3 Abb. N. C. 68 [1877]), 830, 834, 1357. TABLE OF CASES. CCl [References are to sections.] Schroder v. Overman (61 0. S. 1, 47 L. R. A. 156, 55 N. E. 158 [1899]), 111, 113, 118, 314, 668, 682, 700, 702, 709, 894, 895. Schroeder v. City of Jollet (189 111. 48, 52 L. R. A. 634, 59 N. E. 550 [1901]), 71. Schroeder v. Overman ( 18 Ohio C. C. 385 [1899]), 111, 118, 631, 682, 702, 895. Schrum v. Town of Salem ( 13 Ind. App. 115, 39 N. E. 1050 [1895]), 323. Schultze V. DeMenil (4 Mo. App. 595 [1877]), 1135, 1284. Schultze v.- Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York (103 N. Y. 307, 8 N. E. 523 [l«8bj), 995, 1486, 1494. Schumacker v. Toberman (56 Cal 508 [1880]), 242, 394, 414, 549, 624, 983, 1411, 1437, 1442. Schumm v. Seymour (24 N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 143 [1873]), 16, 534, 536, 1017, 1433. Schwiesau v. Mahon (128 Cal. 114, 60 Pac. 683 [1900]), 831, 857, 864. Schwiesau v. Mahon (110 Cal. 543, 42 Pac. Rep. 1065 [1895]), 223, 234, 483, 495, 777, 1050. Seobey v. Decatur County (72 Ind. 551 [1880]), 73. Scofield & Cavin v. City of Council Bluffs (68 la. 695, 28 N. W. 20 [1886]), 436, 438, 1509, 1515. Scofield v. City of Lansing ( 17 Mich. 437 [1868]), 273, 663, 1426, 1427. Scott V. Brackett (89 Ind. 413), 403. Scott V. Hayes ( 162 Ind. 548, 70 N. E. 879 [1903]), 301, 472, 475, 1033, 1085, 1121, 1141, 1145, 1217, 1242, 1274, 1502. Scott v. Onderdonk (14 N. Y. 9 [1856]), 1425, 1427. Scott v. People ex rel. Lewis ( 120 III. 129, 11 N. E. 408 [1889]), 247, 340, 1309. Scott V. Society of Russian Israel- ites (59 Neb. 571, 81 X. W. 624 [1900]), 1054. Scott v. State for use of Busenburg (89 Ind. 368 [1883]), 765, 907, 1067, 1250, 1265. Scott v. .Stringley (132 Ind. 378, 31 N. E. 953 [1892]), 375, 461, 466, 479, 482, 495, 550, 1281, 1362. Scott V. City of Toledo ( 36 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 6s8 [1888]), 118, 119, 122, 125, 126, 132, 308, 426, 430, 702, 728, 738. Scott County v. Hinds (50 Minn. 204, 52 N. W. 523 [1892]), 103, 323, 621, 624, 631, 895, 1125. Scovill V. City of Cleveland (1 0. S. 126 [1853]), 89, 100, 110, 147, 279, 431, 620, 626, 750. Scrahton City v. Ansley (34 Pa. Super. Ct. 133 [1907]), 190. Seranton v. Arndt (148 Pa. St. 210, 23 Atl. 1121 [1892]), 324, 1063, 1113. Seranton City v. Clarke (34 Pa. Super. Ct. 128 [1907]), 1063. Seranton City v. Bush (160 Pa. St. 499, 28 Atl. 926 [1894]), 313, 670, 690, 706, 862. Seranton v. Jermyn (156 Pa. St. 107, 27 Atl. 66 [1893]), 8, 89, 120, 483, 795, 1007, 1337, 1338. Seranton v. Koehler (200 Pa. St. 126, 49 Atl. 792 [1901]), 118, 604, 698, 714. Seranton, City of t. Levers (200 Pa. St. 56, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]), 554, 627, 639, 723, 1157. Seranton, City of v. Pennsylvania Coal Co. (105 Pa. St. 445 [1884]), 322, 610, 706. Seranton, City of v. Robertson (28 Super. Ct. 55 [1905]), 10&3, 1142. Seranton, City of v. Stokes (28 Pa. iSuper. Ct. 434 [1905]), 1113,1169. Seranton v. City of Sturges (202 Pa. St. 182, 51 Atl. 764 [1902]), 291, 382, 462, 1047, 1142. Seranton v. White (148 Pa. St. 419), 120. Pcranton Sewer, In re (213 Pa. 4, 62 Atl. 173 [1905]), 324, 510, 822, 1388. Seranton School District's Appeal, City of (113 Pa. St. 176, 6 Atl. 158 [1886]), 190. ceil TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Scudder v. Jones (134 Ind. 547, 32 N. E. 221 [1893]), 119, 771, 774, 1015, 1021, 1038, 1242. Seudder v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York ( 146 N. Y. 245, 40 N. E. 734 [1895]), 1428. Scully V. Ackmeyer (2 Cin. iSup. Ct. Rep. 296 [1872]), 1211. Scully V. City of Cincinnati (1 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Ohio) 183 [1871]), T5, 656. Seaboard National Bank v. Woeaten (176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464 [1903]), 8, 22, 301, 1109. Seaboard National Bank of New York V. Woesten (147 Mo. 467, 48 L. R. A. 279, 48 S. W. 939 [1898]), 484, 485, 495, 517, 518. Seaman v. City of Camden (66 N. J. L. (37 Vr.) 516, 49 Atl. 977 [1901]), 633. Seaman v. Hicks (8 Paiges' Chan. Rep. 655 [1841]), 1037. Seanor v. Board of County Commis- sioners (13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1895]), 11, 105, 206, 245, 262, 322, 723. Searcy v. Patriot and Barkworks Turnpike Company (79 Ind. 274 [1881]), 414, 965, 983, 1447. Sears v. Street Commissioners of the 'City of Boston (180 Mass. 274, 62 L. R. A. 144, 62 N. E. 397 [1902]), 103, 283, 284, 287, 309, 364, 392, 395, 573, 656. Sears v. Street Commissioners of Boston (173 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876 [1899]), 103, 119, 122, 134, 726, 729. Sears t. Board of Aldermen of City of Boston (173 Mass. 71, 43 L. R. A. 834, 53 N. a. 138, 1 Mun. Corp. Cas. 497 [1899]), 64, 89, 275, 370, 700, 868. Seattle, In re City of ( — Wash. — , 94 Pac. 1075 [1908]), 60, 74, 601, 616, 630, 837. Seattle, In re City of ( — Wash. — , 91 Pac. 548 [1907]), 301, 651, 672, 692, 694, 894. Seattle, In re City of (42 Wash. 551, 85 Pac. 45 [1906]. (See Pike Street, In the Matter of.) Seattle, City of v. Board of Home Missions of Methodist Protestant Church (138 Fed. 307, 70 C. C. A. 597 [1905]), 62, 66, 71, 313, 545, 653, 1313. Seattle, City of v. De Wolfe (17 •Wash. 349, 49 Pac. 553 [1897]), 1164. Seattle, City of v. Doran (5 Wash. 482, 32 Pac. 105, 1002 [1893]), 747, 765, 766, 841, 847, 908, 1299, 1304, 1309. Seattle, City of v. Hill (23 Wash. 92, 62 Pac. 446 [1900]), 475,1012, 1072, 1105. Seattle, City of v. Hill (14 Wash. 487, 35 L. R. A. 372, 45 Pac. 17 [1896]), 1068. Seattle, City of v. Kelleher (195 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ), 117; 392, 395, 407, 408, 414, 424, 437, 542, 576, 619, 620, 698, 956, 962, 971, 1072, 1370. Seattle, City of v. O'Connell (16 Wash. 625, 48 Pac. 412 [1897]), 1168. Seattle v. Seattle Electric Co. ( — ■ Wash. , 94 Pac. 194 [1908]), 601, 630. Seattle, City of v. Smith (8 Wash. 387, 36 Pac. 280 [1894]), 766, 930, 1230, 1281, 1292. Seattle, City of v. Wliittlesey (17 Wash. 292, 49 Pac. 489 [1897]), 45, 475, 1103. Seattle, City of v. Yesler (1 Wash. Terr. 577 [1878]), 86, 244, 24o, 666, 697, 709, 1047, 1049. Seattle Dock Co. v. Seattle & Lake Washington Wa)terway Co. (195 U. S. 624, 25 S. 789 [1904]), 124, 360, 421, 1049, 1072, 1074. Seattle & Lake Washington Water. way Co. V. 'Seattle Dock Co. (35 Wash. 503, 77 Pac. 845 [1904]), 124, 360, 421, 1049, 1072, 1074. Seavey v. City of Seattle (17 Wash. 361, 49 Pac. 517 [1897]), 1519. Secombe v. Kittleson (29 Minn. 555, 12 N. W. 519), 216. TABLE OF CASES. CClll [References lire to sections.] Second Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, In re (66 X. Y. 395 [1876]), 223, 234, 588, 589, 613, 679, 681, 775, 777, 1452. Second Municipality v. Duncan (2 La. Ann. 182 [1847]), 37, 155. Second Municipality of the City of Xew Orleans v. McFarlane (3 Rob. inson (La.) 406 [1843]), 475. Second Municipality of New Orleans V. Botts (8 Robinson (La.) IDS [1844]), 275, 424, 735. Second Municipality of New Orleans V. McDonogh (9 Rob. (La.) 408 [1845]), 223, 434. The Second National Bank of Lan- sing V. Lansing (25 Mich. 207 [1872]), 1505, 1518. Second Universalist Society in Prov- idence V. City of Providence (6 R. L 235 [1859]), 42, 308, 588, 613, 891, lOll, 1099, 1479. Security Savings Trust Co. v. Don- nell (145 Mo. 431, 46 S. W. 959 [1898]), 1172, 1369. Security Savings Trust Co. v. Don- nell {81 Mo. App. 147 [1899]), 1172, 1369. Security Trust Co. v. Heyderstaedt, (64 Minn. 409, 67 N. W. 219 [1896]), 1174, 1180, 1189. Security Trust & Safety Vault Co. V. City of Lexington (203 U. S. 323 [1906]), 133, 1277, 1361. Sedalia, City of, to use of Taylor v. Abell (103 Mo. App. 431, 76 S. W. 497 [1903]), 313, 436, 873. Sedalia, City of v. Coleman (82 Mo. App. 560 [1899]), 317, 624, 709, 716, 952, 955. Sedalia, City of, to use of Sedalia '■ National Bank v. Donohue (190 Mo. App. 407, 89 S. W. 386 [1905]), 174, 229, 245, 264, 273, 525, 837, 867, 877. Sedalia, City of v. Gallic (49 Mo. App. 392 [1892]), 756, 760, 887. Sedalia, City of ex rel. Gilsonite Con- struction Co. V. Montgomery ( 109 Mo. App. 197, 88 S. W. 1014 [1904]), 301, 804, 806, 811, 845, 1315, 1331, 1335. Sedalia, City of, ex rel. Gilsonite Construction Co. v. Scott ( 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276 [1903]), 804, 806, 811, 845, 1306. Sedalia, City of, ex rel. Taylor v. Smith (206 Mo. 346, 104 S. W. 15 . [1907]), 147, 538, 873. Sedgley Avenue, In re (217 Pa. 313, 66 Atl. 546 [1907]), 73, 661. Seeds, In the Matter of (53 N. Y. 400. [1873]), 500, 1454. Seeley v. Thomas (31 0. S. 301 [1877]), 197. Seely v. City of Pittsburg (82 Pa. St. (1 Norris) 360, 22 Am. Rep. 760 [1876]), 118, 322, 610, 665, 666, 706. Seely v. Sebastian (4 Or. 25), 340. Sefton V. Board of Commissioners of Howard County (160 Ind. 357, 66 N. E. 891 [1903]), 234, 237, 322, 662, 776. Seibert v. Allen (61 Mo. 482), [1876]), 395, 1284, 1323, 1329. Seibert v. Cavender (3 Mo. App. 421 [1877]), 813, 837. Seibert v. Copp (62 Mo. 182 [1876]), 1040, 1113, 1172. Seibert v. Tiffany (8 Mo. App. 33 [1879]), 73, 293, 657, 666, 670, 698, 707, 709, 821, 823, 1284, 1346. Seifert v. Brooks (34 Wis. 443 [1874]), 737. Seits v. Sinel (62 Ind. 253 [1878]), 280, 1250. Sennott v. Moredock and Ivy Land- ing Drainage District No. 1 ( 155 111. 96, 39 N. E. 567 [1895]), 1141, 1145, 1209, 1213. Serrill, In the Matter of (9 Hun, 233 [1876]), 381, 402, 1456. Sessions v. Crunkilton (20 0. S. 349 [1870]), 5, 19, 90, 93, 97, 113, 245, 340, 665, 666, 760, 802, 977, 1361. Setzler v. Pennsylvania Schuylkill Valley Railroad Company (112 Pa. St. 56, 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 280, 4- Atl. 370 [1886]), 70. Sewall v. St. Paul (20 Minn. 511 [1874]), 735, 763, 770, 981, 1425, 1432. CCIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sections.] Seward v. Eheiner (2 Kan. App. 95, 43 Pac. Rep. 433 [1895] ), 293, 296, 388, 775, 1431. Sexton V. Beaeh (50 Mo. 488 [1872]), 1134. Seyberger v. Calumet Drainage Com- pany (33 Ind. 330 [1870]), 247, 340, 859. Shady Avenue, In re ( 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 327 [1907), 589. Shafer v. Moriarty (46 Ind. 9 [1874]), 1500. ShaflFner v. City of St. Louis (31 Mo. 264 [I860]), 1519. Shaler v. McAleese ( — N. J. Eq. — , 68 Atl. 416 [1907])-, 7, 8, 89, 228, 301, 419, 1068. Shank V. Smith (157 Ind. 401, 55 L. E. A. 564, 61 N. E. 932 [1901]), 314, 517, 518, 528, 670, 731, 910, 927, 1004. Shanley v. People ex rel. Goedtner (225 111. 579, 80 N. E. 277 [1907]), 558, 564, 1008, 133'7, 1477. Shannon v. Village of Hinsdale ( 180 111. 202, 54 N. E. 181 [1899]), 319, 388, 459, 479, 527, 531, 539, 865, 1333, 1361, 1469. Shannon v. City of Omaha (73 Neb. 507, 103 N. W. 53, 106 N. W. 592 [1905]), 324, 381, 444, 550, 555, 693, 699, 771, 955, 1029. Shannon v. City of Omaha ( 72 Neb. 281, 100 N. W. 298 [1904]), 745, 747, 763, 768. Shannon v. Portland (38 Ore. 382, 62 Pac. 50 [1900]), 732, 1444. Sharp, In the Matter of the Peti- tion of, to Vacate an Assessment (56 N. Y. 257, 15 Am. Rep. 415 [1874]), 381, 1013. Sharp V. Curtiss ( 15 Conn. 526 [1843]), 363. Sharp V. Johnson (4 Hill (X. Y.) 92, 40 Am. Dec. 259 [1843]), 631, 735, 895, 1041, 1154. Sharp V. Spier (4 Hill 76 [1843]), 42, 352, 781, 1047, 1173. Sharp V. United States (191 U. S. 341, 48 L. 211, 24 S. 114 [1903]), 72. Sharpe v. United States (112 Fed. 893, 57 L. R. A. 932, 50 C. C. A. 597 [1902]), 72. Sharpless v. Philadelphia (21 Pa. St. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759), 365. Shattuck '/. City of Cincinnati (1 Ohio N. P. 394 [1895]), 625, 704. Shaver v. Starrett (4 0. S. 494 ^[1855]), 117. Shaw V. Des Moines County ( 74 la. 679, 39 N. w. 101), 1122, 1125. Shaw V. State of Indiana for use of Whitmore (97 Ind. 23 [1884]), 234, 1147, 1229. Shaw V. City of Ypsilanti (146 Mich. 712, 110 N. W. 40 [1906]), 1015. Sheafe v. City of Seattle (18 Wash. 298, 51 Pac. 385 [1897]), 1511. Sheboygan County v. City of She- boygan (54 Wis. 415, 11 N. W. 598 [1882]), 41, 1116. Sheehan v. Fitchburg (131 Mass. 523 [1881]), 855. Sheehan v. Gleason (46 Mo. 100 [1870]), 864. Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hos- pital (50 Mo. 155, 11 Am. Rep. 412 [1872]), 42, 589, 613, 614. Sheehan v. Martin ( 10 Mo. App. 285 [1881]), 324, 783, 813, 828, 832. Sheets v. Paine (10 N. D. 103, 86 N. W. 117 [1901]), 3. Sheffield Water Works v. Wilkinson (4 C. P. D. 410]), 1072. Shelby v. City of Burlington (125 Iowa, 343, 101 N. W. 101 [1904]), 74, 236, 615, 721. Shelbyville, City of v. Cleveland, Chi- cago & St. Louis Ry. Co. (146 Ind. 66, 44 N. E. 929 [1896]), 369, 864. Sheley v. City of Detroit (45 Mich. 431, 8 N. W. 52 [1881]), 118, 666, 698. Shepard v. Barron (194 U. S. 553, 48 L. 1115, 24 S. 737 [1904]), 118, 189, 541, 1019, 1033, 1345. Shepard v. Colton (44 Cal. 628 [1872]), 504, 742, 748, 1278, 1292. Shepard v. McNeill (38 Cal. 73 [1869]), 537, 964, 1337. T. Hig- the Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 don, 5 0. S. 243, 247, 67 Am. Dec. 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1890]. 289 [1855]. 13 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. §8 tion in a statute and with this general meaning the word as- sessment means a valid assessment.' § 8. Assessment for benefits a form of taxation. The nature of the power of the legislature to provide for levying local assessment is a question which is discussed in de- tail hereafter.^ It is sufficient, in this connection to point out that by the great weight of authority a local assessment, levied in return for the benefits Conferred upon the property assessed by the improvement for which the assessment is levied is a kind of tax.^ The power to levy local assessments is said to be ° City of San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499, 25 Pac. 694 [1891]. ' See Chapter V. ^ Whiting V. Quackenbush, 54 Cal. 306 [1880]; Hancock v. Whittemore, 50 Cal. 522 [1875]. In the matter of opening and grading Market street, 49 Cal. 546 [1875] ; Appeal of Hough- ton, 42 Cal. 35 [1871]; Chambers V. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Emery v. The San Francisco Gas Company, 28 Cal. 346 [1865]; Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Com- pany V. City of New Haven, 77 Conn. 494, 59 Atl. 737 [1905]; Sargent & Company v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822; 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]; City of New London v. Miller, 60 Conn. 112, 22 Atl. 499 [1891]; City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Company, 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869]; Nichols . V. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854;] Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. 363, 25 N. E. 101.0, [1890]; White v. People, ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 HI. 604 [1880]; City of Chicago v. Ward, 36 111. 9 [1864]; New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. City of Hammond, — Ind. , 83 N. E. 244 [1908]; Board of Commissioners of County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; Churchman v. City of Indianapolis, 110' Ind. 259, 11 N. E. 301 [1886]; Huston v. Tribbetts, 171 III. 547, 63 Am. St. Rep. 275, 49 N. E. 711 [1898]; Pal- mer v. City of Danville, 154 111. 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894] ; City of Bloom- ington V. Latham, 142 111. 462, 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. E. 506 [1892]; Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1891]; Wabash Eastern Railway Company of Illinois v. Com- missioners of East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 134 HI. 384; 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 N. E. 781 [1890]; County of Adams v. City of Quincy, 130 111. 566, 6 L. E. A. 155, 22 N. E. 624 [1889]; Prindiville v. Jackson, 79 111. 337 [1875]; Robinson v. City of Burlington, 50 la. 240 [1878]; Todd v. City of Atchison, 9 Kan. App. 251, 59 Pac. 676 [1900]; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush. 667; 3 Am. Rep. 309 [1870]; Pleasants v. City of Shreveport, 110 La. 1046, 35 So. 283; State ex rel. Hill v. Judges of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir- cuit of the State of Louisiana, 46 La. Ann. 1292, 16 So. 219 [1894]; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220 [1856] ; New Orleans Drainage Company praying for the confirma- tion of a Tableau, 11 La. Ann. 338 [1856]; Gould v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 59 Md. 378 [18f2]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880] ; White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 67 N. E. 359 [1903] ; Pro- prietors cf the Cemetery of Mt. Au- S8 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 14 ' ' essentially a power to tax. ' ' ^ The power of levying a local assessment is "distinguishable from our general idea of a tax, but owes its origin to the same source or power. ' ' * This propo- sition means, primarily, that an assessment is an enforced con- tribution for a public object. "It is a public tax in the sense that it is levied for a public object; it is a local tax in the sense in which most public taxes are local — that it is limited to burn V. Mayor and Aldermen of Cam- bridge, 150 Mass. 12; 4 L. R. A. 836, 22 N. E. 60 [1889]; President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Board of Aldermen of the City of Boston, 104 Mass. 470 [1870]; Dorgan v. City of Boston, 12 All. 223 [1866]; People on the relation of Butler v. Board of Supervisors of Saginaw County, 26 Mich. 22 [1872]; Wood- bridge V. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274 [1860], (decided by a divided court). Williams v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560 [1853] ; Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366 [1863] ; MeComb v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295 [1858]; Heman Con- struction Co. V. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo. 172; 104 S. W. 67 [1907]; Meier V. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391; 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Seaboard National Bank of New York v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464 [1903] ; Hemin V. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1902]; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014 [1895]; Lamar Water & Electric Light Company v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; 32 L. R. A. 157, 31 S. W. 756 [1895] ; City of St. Joseph to use of Gibson v. Far- rell, 106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 [1891]; Keith v. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889]; City of St. Louis V. Speck, 67 Mo. 403 [1878]; Garrett v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505, 69 Am. Dee. 475 [1857] ; Wilson V. City of Auburn, 27 Neb. 435, 45 N. W. 257 [1889]; Shaler v. McAleese, — N. J. Eq. — , 68 Atl. 416 [1907]; State, Asrens. Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 35 N. J. L. {6 Vr.) 168 [1871]; State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 227 [1870]; In the matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874]; People ex rel. Griffin V. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; Ireland V. City of Rochester, 51 Barb. 414 [1868]; Litchfield v. McComber, 42 Barb. 288 [1864]; In the matter of the Report of the Commissioners of Assessment for Grading, Paving, etc., Saekett Street in the City of Brook- lyn, 4 Hun. 92 [1875] ; Astor v. May- or, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 37 N. Y. Superior Ct. (5 J. & S.) 539 [1874]; Hilliard V. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; Pittsburgh v. Sterrett Sub-district School, 204 Pa. St. 635, 61 L. R. A. 183, 54 Atl. 463 [1903]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- ber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20; 28 Atl. 123 [1893]; Scranton v. Jermyn, 156 Pa. St. 107, 27 Atl. 66 [1893]; In re Vacation of Center Street, 115 Pa. St. 247, 8 Atl. 56 [1886]; Wolf v. City of Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 25 [1884]; In re opening of Park Ave- nue, 83 Pa. St. 167 [1876]; Gault's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 94 T 1859] ; Bishop V. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, 8 Atl. 692 [1887] ; Reelfoot Lake Levee District, V. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. 725, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174 [1872]; Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872] ; Holton v. City of Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 27 [1872]. ' Sargent & Company v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162,' 32 L. R. A. 822, 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]. •State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, 3-1 N. .J. L. (5 Vr.) 227, 230 [1870]. 15 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 9 a certain locality. It differs from ordinary public taxes in that it is not levied upon the polls and estates within a municipality or a district in respect of public or common benefits, but upon particular lands in respect of a particular benefit received by them from the execution of a public object.'"' Whether the right to levy assessments of this type in some eases may not be referred to and justified by some power of government other than the power of taxation, such as the police power or the power of eminent domain is a question which is discussed in detail elsewhere." Here it must be noted, first, that an assessment is very generally recognized as a manifestation of the taxing power; second, that as might be expected, such a proposition is so broad that it is used to support conclusions which are utterly incon- sistent with each other; and third, that the question whether the term "tax" is so broad as to include "assessment" depends on the circumstances of each particular case.'' § 9. Assessment for legal duty not taxation. Assessments of the second type, that is, assessments levied to •reimburse the public corporation for the cost of performing some act which the owner of the realty assessed, is bound by law to perform, but which he omits or refuses to do, do not, as we have seen, rest upon any theory of benefits conferred. Accord- ingly, such an assessment is not necessarily a form of taxation.* If the improvement confers benefit upon the property which it is sought to assess, and if the legislature provides that the amount assessed shall be limited to the benefits, and apportioned thereto, we have a form of taxation. This, however, is a case where the legislature, though having the right to levy the as- sessment of the second type irrespective of benefits, foregoes the extreme exercise of its power, exacts less from a property owner ordinarily than it would otherwise have a right to exact and levies an assessment of the first type. If the legislature sees ° Proprietors of the Cemetery of Mt. patrick, Pros. v. Commissioners of Auburn v. City of CambridQ;e, 150 Streets and Sewers in City of New Mass. 12; 4 L. R. A. 836; 22 N. E. Brunswick, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 510 66 [1889]. [1880]; State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, "See §§ 92, 99-102. 34 N. J. JD. (5 Vr.) 227 [1870]. To ' See Chapter III. the same efltect see obiter in Dyar v. ' Van Wagoner V. Mayor and Alder- Farmington Village Corporation, 70 men of City of Paterson, 67 N. J. L. Me. 515 [1878]. (38 Vr.) 455 [1902]; State, Kirk- §§ 10, 11 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 16 fit to exercise the full extent of its power, and to assess for the cost of the work done irrespective of the benefits, we have what is ordinarily regarded as an exercise, not of the power of taxa- tion, but of the police power.^ § 10. Assessment for goods furnished not taxation. The so-called assessment of the third type, that is, assessments for the price of commodities furnish^ for use on certain realty at the request of the person consuming them, is evidently not an exercise of the taxing power, nor is it a form of a tax. The relation between the public corporation, which furnishes the com- modity, and the person consuming it, is a relation purely con- tractual in its nature. As said before, the relation between the parties is substantially what it would have been had the com- modity been furnished by a private corporation or a natural person. The transaction is substantially a contract of sale, in some cases with additional remedies given to the public for the enforcement and collection of the purchase price over and above those granted in ordinary contracts of sale.^ Such a charge is, however, not infrequently referred to as a tax or an assessment.-- Thus a charge for water furnished is referred to as a "water tax or rates," and as "water rates or assessments."^ §11. Theory underlying the doctrine of assessment for benefits. The theory ijnderlying the doctrine of local assessments of the first type, which is held by the great majority of the courts is that is that the value of certain property is enhanced by an improvement of a public character, the property thus receiving an especial and peculiar benefit; and that upon such property a part or the whole of the cost of such public improvement is assessed to an amount not exceeding the amount of such bene- fits. The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no '' Westenhaver v. Village of Hoyts- dereliction of duty is no more a tax ville, 28 Ohio C. C. 357 [1905]. "The than an imprisonment for the viola- taxing power of a municipal corpora- tion of a police regulation." Barrow tion is as distinct from its power v. Hepler, 34 La. Ann. 362, 365 to regulate the manner of making and [1882]. repairing public roads and to enforce ' See § 6. its ordinances by fine or imprison- ^ See § 6. ment as it is distinct from the power ' Cook County v. City of Chicago, of such corporations to enforce any 103 111. 646 [1882]. police regulations. A fine for the 17 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. §11 poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.^' This general theory has been stated by the ^ Village of Xorwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 [1898], (affirming Baker v. Village of Norwood, 74 Fed. 997; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 [1897]; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Deca- tur, 147 U. S. 190, 37 L. 132, 13 S. 293 [1893]; {affirming Illinois Cen^ tral Railroad Company v. Decatur, 126 111. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613, 18 N. E. 315 [1888]; Fay v. City of Spring- field, 94 Fed. 409 [1899]; Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889] ; In the matter of the Bonds of Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. StI Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675 [1891]; Bixler v. Board of Supervis- ors of the County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698 [1881]; In the matter of Opening and Grading of Market Street, 49 Cal. 546 [1875]; Cham- bers V. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 [1866] ; City of Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 17 L. R. A. 135, 30 Pac. 1041 [1892]; Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford, 60 Conn. 432, 22 Atl. 782 [1891]; City of New Haven v. Fair Haven & Westerville Railroad Com- pany, 38 Conn. 422, 9 Am. Rep. 399 [1871]; City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Com- pany, 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 ]1869]; Allman v. District of Co- lumbia, 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894] ; City of Atlanta v. Hamlein, 96 Ga. 381, 23 S. E. 408 (1895]; De Clercq v. Bar- ber Asphalt Paving Company, 167 111. 215, 47 N. E. 367 [1897]; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. City of Decatur, 154 III. 173, 38 N. E. 626 [1894]; Palmer v. City of Danville, 154 111. 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894]; City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 III. 310, 24 L. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 [1894] ; Prindiville v. Jackson, 79 111. 337, [1875]; Mix v. Ross, 57 III. 121 [1870]; Trustees of the Illinois and Michigan Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403 [1851] ; Gas Light & Coke Company v. City of New Albany, 158 Ind. 268, 63 N. E. 458 [1902] ; Board of Commissioners of the County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 7 L. R. A. 681, 23 N. E. 788 [1890]; Law V. Madison, Smyrna &, Graham Turn- pike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [1868] ; City of New Albany v. Cook, 29 Ind. 220; ]1867]; Marion Bond Company v. Johnson, 29 Ind. App. 294, 64 N. E. 626 [1902]; Beck- er V. Baltimore & Ohio South West- ern Railway Company, 17 Ind. App. 324, 46 N. E. 685 [1897]; Burke v. Lukens, 12 Ind. App. 648, 54 Am. St. Rep. 539, 40 N. E. 641 [1895]; Simpson v. City of Kansas City, 46 "Kan. 438 [1891]; Henting v. Gil- more, 33 Kan. 234, 6 Pac. 304 [1885] ; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1885] ; Excelsior Planting & Manufacturing Company v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212, 24 Atl. 817 [1892]; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 1 L. R. A. 757 [1888]; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Moore, 6 Harris & J. 375 [1825] ; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hughes' Adm'r, 1 Gill. & J. 480; 19 Am. Dec. 243 [1829] ; City of Boston v. Boston §11 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 18 courts in many different forms, varying according to the point_ of view taken by the specific court and according to the particu- lar application of the general theory of assessments which it is sought to make in each specific ease. Thus it has been said to be & Albany Railroad Company, 170 Mass. 95, 49 N. E. 95 [1898]; Select- men of Norwood v. New York & New England Railroad Company, 161 Mass. 259, 37 N. E. 199 [1894]; Proprietors of the Cemetery of Mt. Auburn v. Mayor and Aldermen of Cambridge, 150 Mass. 12; 4 L. R. A. 836, 22 N. E. 66 [1889] ; City of De- troit V. Judge of Recorder's Court, 112 Mich. 588, 71 N. W. 149 [1897]; Sub nomine City of Detroit v. Chapin, 42 L. R. A. 638 [1897] ; City of De- troit V. Daly, 68 Mich, 503, 37 N. W. 11 [1888] ; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155, 24 Am. Rep. 535 [1876]; Hoyt V. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39, 2 Am. Rep. 76 [1869]; State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. District Court of Ramsey County, 75 Minn. 292, 77 N. W. 968 [1899]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunningham v. District Court of Ramsey County, 29 Minn. 62, 11 N. W. 133 [1882]; Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; Heman Con- struction V. Wabash R. Co., — Mo. , 104 S. W. 67 [1907]; McCor- mack V. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Rep. 440 [1873]; Lockwood v. City of St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20 [1856]; Lohrum V. Eyermann, 5 Mo. App. 481 [1878]; ■ Zoeller v. Eellogqr, 4 Mo. Apu. 163 [1877] ; City of Butte v. School Dis- trict No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 [1904]; Medland v. Linton, 60 Neb. 149, 82 N. W. 866 [1900]; Smith V. Citv of Omaha, 49 Neb. 883, 69 N. W. 402 [18961; Cain v. Citv of Omaha. 42 Neb. 120. 60 N. W. 368 [1894]; Hnnscom v. riity of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]; Van Wagoner, Pros. v. Mavor and Aldermen of the Citv of Paterson, 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 455, 51 Atl. 922 [1902]; Wilson v. Inhabitants of the City of Trenton, 61 N. J. L. 599, 68 Am. St. Rep. 714, 44 L. R. A. 540, 40 Atl. 575 [1898]; State, Agens, Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729 [1874]; Bogert v. City of Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 568 [1876] ; Gotthelf V. Stranahau, 138 N. Y. 345, 20 L. R. A. 455, 34 N. E. 286 [1893]; Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 506 [1871]; People, ex rel. Griffin v. JTayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419,, .55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; City of Asheville v. Wachovia Loan & Trust Co., 143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 800 [1906]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Busbee v. Commissioners of Wake County, 93 N. C. 143 [1885] ; Commissioners of Green County v. Commissioners of Lenoir County, 92 N. C. 180 [1885]; Walsh v. Barron, 61 0. S. 15, 76 Am. St. Rep. 354; 55 N. E. 164 [1899]; Wewell v. City of Cincinnati, 45 0. S. 407, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]; Raymond v. Cleveland, 42 0. S. 522 [1885] ; Lima v. Ceme- tery Association, 42 0. S. 128, 51 Am. Rep. 809 [1884]; Fields v. Com- m.issionei-s of Hin-hland County, 36 0. S. 476 [1881] ; Chamberlain v. Cleve- land, 34 O. S. 551, [1878]; King v. Portland, 38 Ore. 402. 52 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Hud- dleston v. Citv of Eupene, 34 Ore. 343, 43 L. R. A. 444, 55 Pac. 868 r 1(3991; Bovd v. Boroucrh of Wilkinsbure, 183 Pa. St. 198, 38 Atl. 592 [1897]; Morewood Avenue, Chan-bers's Anneal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]; City of Erie v. Russell, 148 Pa. St. 384, 23 Atl. 1102 [1892] ; City of Chester v. Black, 132 19 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. §11 "the fundamental principle of such special taxation, that it shall be measured by the special benefit."^ Other forms of stating this general theory are as follows: "The assessment is made solely on the ground of benefits conferred."' "It is a local assessment imposed occasionally, as required, upon a limited class of persons interested in a local improvement who are assumed to be benefited by the improvement to the extent of the assess- ment, and it is imposed and collected as an equivalent for that benefit and to pay for the improvement."^ "The foundation of special benefits for public improvements is the special benefit derived by the owners of property over and above the rest of the community. " ^ " The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments can be sustained is that the property subject to the assessments or taxation will be enhanced in value by such improvements to the extent of the benefit imposed. ' ' " "Assessments for local improvements can be justified only upon the theory that the lands upon which they are laid are specially benefited by the improvements for which they are laid, and hence ought to bear the burden rather than property generally; and if a law should authorize such assessments to be laid with- out reference to benefits it would either take property for pub- lie good without compensation or it would take property from one person for the benefit of another. ' ' ' An assessment is said to be "in the nature of compensation for a benefit."^ "The principle on which they are levied is 'that the territory sub- Pa. St. 568, 6 L. R. A. 802 [1890]; Company v. Jasper County, 117 la. Opening of Park Avenue, 83 Pa. St. 365, 381, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. 175 [1886]; Kettle V. City of Dallas, W. 1006 [1902]. 35 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 « City of Bridgeport v. New York [1904]; Barnes v. Dyer, 56 Vt. 469 & New Haven Railroad Company, 36 [1884] ; Woodhouse v. City of Bur- Conn. 255, 262, 263, 4 Am. Rep. 63 lington, 47 Vt. 300 [1875]; Allen v. [1869]. Drew, 44 Vt. 174 [1872]; Asberry v. ° Wewell v. City of Cincinnati, 45 City of Roanoke, 91 Va. 562, 42 L. R. 0. S. 407, 424, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]. A. 636, 22 S. B. 360 [1895]; Seanor "City of Butte v. School District V. Board of County Commissioners, No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 339, 74 Pac. 8611 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1895]: [1904]. Stowell V. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 523 ' Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, [1872]; Holton V. City of Milwaukee, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]. 31 Wis. 27 [1872]. 'Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- '' Vacation of Howard Street, 142 ham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. Pa. St., 601, 606, 21 Atl. 974 [1891], 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]. ' Edwards & Walsh Construction § 11 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 20 jected thereto will be benefited by the work.' " " "Assessments for street improvements are upheld on the ground that the ad- adjaeent property, upon which the cost of the improvement is assessed, is enhanced in value to an amount equal to the sum assessed against it, and that the owner has received peculiar benefit which the citizens do not share in common."^" "The making of such assessments is a form of taxation which rests upon the ground that the propertj^ in the neighborhood of a public improvement may receive special and peculiar benefits from the improvement that make it equitable as against the owner to charge it with the payment of a greater proportional part of the cost of the work than is paid by property owners generally. " ^^ "Assessments for street improvements are up- held on the ground that the adjacent property upon which the cost of the improvement is assessed is enhanced in value to an amount equal to the sum assessed against it, and that the owners have received peculiar benefits which the citizens do not share in common. "^^ "A tax or assessment for local improvement is based upon the theory that it is a return for the benefit received by the person who pays the tax or by the property assessed. ' ' ^' "These local assessments are authorized on the principle of the direct benefits resulting to those upon whom they are made, from the improvements."^* "An assessment is a charge laid upon individual property because the property "upon which the burden is imposed receives a special benefit which is different from the general one which the owner enjoys in common with others as a citizen An assessment is levied only upon the property benefited. It is uniformly restricted to the means for paying those local burdens arising by reason of the wants of ° Bixler v. Board of Supervisors of " City of Boston v. Boston & Al- the County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. bany Railroad Company, 170 Mass. 698, 702 [1881]; quoting Litchfield 95, 98, 49 N. E. 95 [1898]. V. N^ernon, 41 N. Y. 123 [1869]. "= Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 124 '"Marion Bond Company v. John- Ind. 292, 299, 300, 7 L. R. A. 681, son, 29 Ind. App. £94, 297, 64 N. E. 23 N. E. 788 [1890]. 626 [1902]; (citing Quill v. City of "Board of Commissioners of the Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 7 L. R. A. County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 681, 23 N. E. 788 [1890]; Ross v. 500, 505; 46 N. E. 124 [1896]. Staekhouse, 114 Ind. 200, 16 N. E. "City of New Albany v. Cook, 29 501 [1887]; Heick v. Voight, 110 Ind. 220, 223 [1867]. Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306 [1886]). 21 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 11 small communities. " ^^ So the theory of assessments is said to be "that the value of the lots is enhanced by the public ex- penditure."^" Such an assessment is said to be "an assessment to pay for an improvement for public purposes upon real prop- erty, which is, by reason of the locality of the improvement, specially benefited beyond the benefits by the improvement to real property gfenerally throughout the municipality, proportioned by such benefits."^'' "The theory upon which such assessments are sustained as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power is that the party assessed is locally and peculiarly bene- fited over and above the ordinary benefit, which as one of the community, he receives in all public improvements to .the precise extent of the assessment. ' ' ^^ Hence, one who agrees to buy a property free from incumbrances is not prejudiced by the construction of improvements and the levy of assessments therefor, after the time fixed for performance of the contract to convey, since under the theory of assessments, the property is benefited to the amount of assessment.^' The im- provement must be regarded as an entirety as far as it affects the question of special benefits. An assessment may be levied upon the theory of benefits where the improvement as a whole benefits the property assessed, even though a particular part of the improvement might have been omitted without affecting the benefit to the property.-" To levy such an assessment is said to be "to assess for contributions."-^ Indeed some courts occa- sionally put so much emphasis upon the special benefit to the immediate locality that they minimize or ignore the general benefit " Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, & Transportation Company, Pros. v. 594, 595, 49 A. S. R. 222, 28 L. R. A. Mayor and Common Council of the 679, 37 X. E. 402, 39 X. E. 809 City of Newark, 27 N. J. L. (3 [1?94]. Dutch.) 185, 190 [1858], quoted '" Schenley v. The Commonwealth City of Detroit v. Judge of Record- for the use of the City of Allegheny, er's Court, 112 Mich. 588, 589, 71 K. 30 Pa. St. 29, 57, 78 Am. Dec. 359 W. 1-19; sm6 nomine City of Detroit [1859]. V. Chapin, 42 L. R. A. 638 [1897]. "Wilson V. Board of Trustees of " Gotthelf v. Stranahan, 138 N. Y. the Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 345, 20 L. R. A. 455, 34 N. E. 280 111. 443, 469, 27 N. E. 203 [1890]; [1-893]. (citing Guild v. City of Chicago, 82 ™ Boyd v. Borough of Wilkinsbi'r,', 111. 472 [1876]; City of Sterling v. 183 Pa. St. 198, 38 Atl. 592 [1897]; Gait, 117 111. 11, 7 N. E. 471 [1886]. '^Opening of Park Avenue, 83 Pa. "State, The New Jersey Railroad St. 175 [1886]. § 12 ' TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT'. 22 to the public at large.''^ However it is, under most theories of local assessment, necessary that there should be also a general benefit to the public as well as a special local benefit, since without the general public benefit, the state would have no au- thority to enforce contribution for an improvement, however beneficial it might prove to the individual property owners.^* While the great majority of the courts are found to adopt the general theory here given, and to state it and restate it in many forms, differing somewhat in expression, but essentially the same, it must here be observed that the statement of the theory here .given is so broad and general in its terms that it leaves open for future decision many questions which might at first glance seem to be precluded by the form in which the theory is stated. Who determines the question of the existence and amount of special benefits conferred by the public improvement in question — whether the legislature can directly or through grant of power to municipalities or public quasi corporations, make the decision of the officers of such corporations or of the legislature a finality, or whether the courts will review the question of benefits de novo, are all problems, the answer to which determines the very nature of the local assessment, but nevertheless problems left open for consideration. Courts which agree in their general theory of assessments differ sharj)ly in the answers which they give to these questions. This branch of the subject is discussed elsewhere in detail.^* § 12. Divergent theories of assessment for benefits. Another theory is advanced by the Supreme Court of Iowa. It is that the local assessment is without any justification as long as each improvement is considered separately. It is only when the fact is considered that ultimately all the public improvements will be constructed and property assessed to pay. therefor, that a justification of local assessments can be found. "When we contemplate the case of a single street or a single block, the manner of specific taxation upon abutting lots may appear to -^ "Local improvements for which to be paid by the property specially assessments are made are not sup- benefited." Van Deventer v. Long posed to be beneficial to the general Island City, 139 N. Y. 133, 34 N. E. public. They are usually beneficial 774 [1893]. wholy or mostly to the locality in -' See § 283. which they are made, and they are to " See § 290 et seq.; § 666 et seq. 23 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 12 impose more unequally the burden in relation to the benefits, but when we take in view the fact that all the streets of the city, so far as the public good demands, are to be paved in the same way, we see at once that the burdens are more equally distributed. The lots on one street may not be taxed this year, but they will be next, or when the public good requires it. In due time they must bear their own. burden. If the public good never requires it, all that can be said is that the taxpayer is relieved because the public interest does not demand the expenditure of revenue realized from such tax. In this view the system is equitable and just. I do not claim that this is so perfectly; I know that it is not. But, as I have before pointed out, no system in my opinion is or can be. But it approximates a just distribution of the burden and is as near thereto as the system of general taxa- tion for such improvements can attain."^ There are two weak points in this theory. First, there is no assurance that subsequent improvements will be needed and constructed; nor, if they are constructed, is there any assurance, under many statutes, that the municipality may not elect to pay therefor by general taxa- tion. If, however, the remaining improvements are paid for by general taxation, there is nothing left of the theory of equality in the long run. Second, even if a form of equality in the long run is thus obtained, it is an equality as to realty only. Personal property is, under most systems of assessment, omitted entirely — an omission hard to justify on the ground of equality or uniformity if the theory of benefits is repudiated. A some- what similar theory has been suggested in a Mississippi ease in which it has been said that if all the streets in a municipality were improved at once, the burden of the cost of such improve- ment would be equalized if assessed upon the benefited prop- erty.^ The same theory as that adopted by the Iowa court had some time before been considered by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and held to be unsound, on the ground that an as- sessment upon one person could not be upheld or justified b.v the remote, contingent and uncertain possibility that a similar burden for a similar purpose might eventually and in process of time be imposed upon every other property owner.' The Su- 1 Warren v. Henly, 31 la. 31, 41 ° City of Lexington v. McQuillan's [18701. Heirs, 9 Dana 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 ^Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. [18391. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]. § 12 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 24 preme Court of Iowa has continued to adhere to the view that the justification of local assessments does not depend upon the theory of benefits.* Thus the court has said: '.'We do not understand that it has ever been held by any court that a prop- erty owner, called on to pay assessments for the general public benefit is allowed to show that the specific personal benefit which he derives from the subject-matter for which the tax is levied is not equal to the amount of the tex imposed on him for that object."^ Again it has said that a street improvement "is a public object which will support such an assessment regardless of the fact of whether or not it is a benefit to the abutting property. ' ' " This last case was taken on error to the Supreme Court of the United States and in that court it was urged that the assessment was invalid, since the Iowa theory of assessments was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment ; but the Supreme Court of the United States refused to consider or to pass upon this question on the ground that the Federal question, which it was thus sought to raise, had not been presented to the Iowa courts or passed upon by them.' In California the courts seem disposed to ignore the theory of benefits and to insist that the power of the legislature to select such basis of apportionment as it may see fit does not depend on the fact of benefit to the property upon which the assessment is levied.* In Kentucky it has been suggested that local assessments are to be justified on the same theory as that on which the citizens of a county have been required to make county roads and keep them in repair." The theory has been advanced that the property owner may be liable for an assessment, even though his property receives no particular benefit from the improvement for which the assess- ' Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power " Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 Company v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 416, 423, 70 N. W. 605 [1897]. la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]; Chicago, 'Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Com- 193, 43 L. 665, 19 S. 379 [1899]. pany v. Phillips, 111 la. 377, 82 N. * In the matter of the Bonds of the W. 787 [1900]; Allen v. City of Dav- Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. enport, 107 la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. [1898]; Gatch v. City of Des Moines, 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675 [1891]. 63 la. 718, 18 N. W. 310. "City of Lexington v. McQuillan's ''Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. Heirs, 9 Dana. 513, 35 Am. Deo. 159 43, 58, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. [1840]. 25 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 12 ment is levied.^" In Virginia, at a time when the constitution did not expressly restrict assessments as it now does,^^ the whole theory of assessments was considered, discussed at length, and sharply criticised.^- The court said: "It is grossly unjust as well as destructive of the principles of free government to hold that the expense of opening, widening, extending, or otherwise improving a public street in a city or incorporated town should be borne by the few who live nearest to it when such improve- ment, if made, is founded in public necessity, and is not only open to the public at large, but is used by the public, perhaps, hundreds of times where it is used but once by any one of the abutting owners who are made to bear the burden of its erec- tion. Any such imposition is necessarily repulsive* to the sense of justice of every fair-minded man and it would seem impossible for any free government to long survive the practice of such inequality, extortion and oppression. There is no just ground upon which to place any such arbitrary system of taxation, and any such system is opposed to the very letter and spirit of our Constitution."^' At the same time the court refrained from deciding the case on the view of assessments here expressed, but rested its holding on the ground that the municipality in levy- ing the assessment had not complied with the statute from which it derived its authority. While in some of these cases assess- ments of the second type are presented for consideration, in which the assessment is levied for the cost of doing somethir;g which the owner of the land assessed was legally bound to do and which he has neglected or refused to do, and accordingly the question of benefits is not necessarily involved,^* yet in many of the cases assessments .of the first type are presented which in theory at least are based upon and limited by the bene- fits conferred by the improvement for which the assessment is levied. In other cases assessments have been said to be inde- fensible in theory .^^ The New Jersey courts are disposed to justify assessments on the ground of ancient usage and long " Otter V. Barber Asphalt Paving " City of Norfolk v. Chamberlain, Co., — Ky. , 96 S. W. 862 89 Va. 196, 229, 16 S. E. 730 [1892]. [1906]. "See § 13; § 717. " See § 161 ; § 303. '" Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 "'City of Norfolk v. Chamberlain, Wis. 242 [I860]. 89 Va. 196, 229, 16 S. E. 730 [1892]. § 13 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 26 continued custom as much as on the theory of benefits.^" While it is true that this reason has been advanced in cases in-volving assessments which may be classed as assessments foi' the cost of performing what it is the legal duty of the land-owner to do, such as drainage assessments ;" it has also been advanced in cases involving assessments of classes which are usually justified only on the theory of benefits such as streets.^' With reference to some classes of improvement^® tha, theory has been advanced that the power to compel public improvements of such types and to levy local assessments therefor is a branch of the power to provide for the regulation and management of interests com- mon to a number of land-owners, which cannot be cared for efficiently expept by a common control exercised alike over the willing and the unwilling.^" In some jurisdictions we find that the theory upon which the doctrine of local assessments is based is a combination of the theory that the state may provide for the regulation and management of interests common to a num- ber of land-owners as well as to the general public, and of the theory that the owners of land especially benefited by a public improvement, must bear the burden of its eost.^^ § 13. Theory underlying doctrine of assessment for legal duty. The theory underlying the doctrine of assessment for the cost of performing a legal duty which the owner of the property is bound to perform, but which he has neglected or refused to perform, afid which the public corporation has performed at his' cost, has nothing to do with the doctrine of compensation "In matter of Drainage of the L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880]; (affirmed Great Meadows on Pequest River, 42 without opinion as Hoagland v. State, N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880] (af- Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) firmed without opinion as Hoagland 456 [1881] ; and affirmed by the Su- V. State, Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. preme Court of the United States as L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881], and affirmed Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, on error by the Supreme Court of 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1885]). the United States as Wurts v. Hoag- "'State, Society for Establishing land, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. Useful Manufactures, Pros. v. Mayor 1086 [1885] ; State, Society for and Aldermen of City of Paterson, Establishing Useful Manufactures, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 615 [1880]. Pros. V. Mayor and Aldermen of '» See §§ 13, 334 et seq; § 363. City of Paterson, 42 N. J. L. (13 '"See §§ 13, 334 et seq.; § 363. Vr.) 615 [1880]. « Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. "In matter of Drainage of Great 378; 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879J. Meadows on Pequest River, 42 N. J. 27 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 13 for benefits conferred by such improvement. The true theory in such cases is that the law compels the property owner to do certain things with reference to his property for the pro- tection of the public, irrespective of the question whether the performance of such legal duty will benefit the property with reference to which such act is required or not.^ In many cases such benefit is in fact conferred, a circumstance which often leads to confusion between assessments of this type and assess- ments based on the theory of benefits, and which often makes it impossible to determine whether a given assessment is based upon the one theory or the other. In other cases it may happen that no benefit is conferred, or that if a benefit is conferred, it is less in amount than the cost of doing such work. In these later cases the right of the legislature to authorize assessments for the cost of doing such work is established by the great weight of authority,^ and clearly has no connection with the doctrine of benefits, and is not dependent thereon. Assessments which might be explained upon this theory are not infrequently re- ferred to theories, different in expression, though not neces- sarily inconsistent with such theory. Thus it has been suggested that in some forms of public improvements, at least, assess- ments are to be justified on the theory of the power and duty of the state to make regulations for the management of prop- erty which for any reason can be managed efficiently only by concerted action.^ This theory does not attempt to demonstrate the propriety of placing the burden of the public improvement upon the individual owners instead of on the public treasury, and it seems to assume the duty of the property owner to make the improvement at his own expense — the very point which most ' State, Kirkpatrick, Pros. v. Com- management of property of persons, missioners of Streets and Sewers in whose property adjoins, or which. City of New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L. from some other reason, can be better (13 Vr.) 510 [1880]; State, Agens, managed and improved by some joint Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council operation, such as the power of regu- of Newark, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 415, lating the building of party wallp. 18 Am. Rep. 729 [1874]; State, Sig- making and maintaining partition ler. Pros. v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. (5 fences and ditches, constructing ditch- Vr. 227) [1870]. es and sewers for the draining of ^See § 93. uplands or marshes, which can be ' "It is the power of the govern- more advantageously drained by a ment to prescribe public regulations common sewer or ditch. This is a for the better and more economical well known legislative power, rorntr- S 14 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 28 needs explanation and justification. A theory for justifying the power of local assessment, as distinguished from the motive of the legislature in exercising a clearly recognized power, it seems superfluous if other justification can be found and defi- cient if no other justification can be found. If the assessment is one which can be upheld on the theory of benefits, as an assessment for an improvement public in its nature, which con- fers an especial private benefit upon \he property assessed there- for, or if it can be upheld on the theory of an assessment for the performance of a legal duty which rests primarily upon the owner of certain realty and which the public may perform at his expense if he refuses or omits to perform it, we have in either case an assessment which can be justified without re- sorting to the theory of the propriety of community of manage- ment. If, on the other hand, the assessment is one which cannot be upheld on either of these grounds, it is difficult to see, under constitutional restrictions, what power the legislature has, on the theory of a common management, to levy forced contribu- tions for purposes not falling within either of these classes. § 14. Theory underlying doctrine of assessment for goods fur- nished at request. The theory underlying the doctrine of the so-called assess- nized and treated by all jurisconsults provements which cannot be made and writer* upon law through the on one tract without aiTecting an- civilized world; a branch of legisla- other. These relate especially to tive power exercised by this state be- drainage, protection from inundation fore and since the Kevolution, and arid free passage and intercourse, before and since the adoption of the These improvements sometimes be- present constitution, and repeatedly come of public importance as well recognized by our courts. The legis- as indispensable to the proper enjoy- lature has power to regulate these ment of each separate tract. In such subjects, either by general law, or cases society has arranged for the by particular laws for certain locali- management of these common public ties or particular and defined tracts and private interests as would be of land. When the constitution vest- just and equitable; and to prevent ed the legislative power in the Sen the burden of such improvements ate and General Assembly, it con- from falling only on the liberal and ferred the power to make these pub- public spirited, has provided for it5 lie regulations as a well understood equitable division among those inter- part of that legislative power." Cos- ested. Such a regulation is a local ter V. Tide Water Company, 18 N. J. assessment." Town of Macon v. Pat- Eq. [3 C. E. Green] 54, 68, 69 ty, 57 Miss. 378, 400, 40U 34 Am. [1866]. "There are essential im- Rep. 451 [1879]. 21) ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 15 ment for the value of goods furnished for use on certain realty at the request of the owner or occupant thereof, has nothing to do with the doctrine of compensation for benefits conferred. As has been said before/ the transaction amounts to a contract between the city which furnishes the commodity and the per- son at whose request the commodity is furnished, and the trans- action is in effect a contract of sale, rather than an assessment. An assessment of this type being essentially a contract has nothing to do with taxation. It is entered into voluntarily, while taxation is essentially an involuntary imposition. - § 15. Assessment for benefits not based on contract. An assessment for benefits is a forced charge, levied upon the property benefited by the improvement for which the as- sessment is levied, in some cases upon the owner of such prop- erty, imposed by the sovereign power of the state, or b.v some public corporation or quasi corporation, or in some cases by a private corporation, under authority conferred by the state. This follows from the fact that the assessment for benefits is a branch of the taxing power, and a special manifestation of such • power. In turn, it is this characteristic of assessment for bene- fits that causes it to be classed as a branch of the power of taxation. The validity of a special assessment does not, there- fore, rest upon any theory of the assent of the property owner to such charge levied, either upon his property or upon him- self, nor does it rest upon any theory of contract between the property owner and the public.^ The local assessment is es- 'See § 6. [1887]); People v. Hulbert, 71 Cal. = See §§ 15, 20. 72, 1+ Pac. 43 [1886]; Haskell v. 'City of Worcester v. Worcester Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281 [1867]; Emery Consolidated Street Railway Com- v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 75 [1865] ; Gray pany, 196 U, S. 539, 25 S. v. Town of Cicero, 177 111. 459, 53 327 [1905].; (amrming City of Wor- N. E. 91 [1899]; Walker v. Jameson, cester v. Worcester Consolidated 140 Ind. 591, 49 Am. St. Eep. 222, 49, 64 N. E. 581 [1902] ) ; Essex Pub- 28 L. E. A. 679, 37 X. E. 402, 39 N. lie Koad Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. E. 869 [1894]; Flournoy v. City of S. 334, 35 L. 446, 11 S. 790 [1891], JefTersonville, 17 Ind. ieo, 79 Am. (affirming State, Essex Public Road Dec. 468 [1861]; t ity of Shreveporl Board, Pros. v. Skinkle, 49 X. J. L. v. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. 1895, 46 L. (20 Vr.) 65, 6 Atl. 435 ]1886], which R. A. 193, 26 So. 664 [1899] ; Hender- was affirmed in State, Essex Public son v. Mayor and City Council of Road Board, Pros. v. Skinkle, 49 N. Baltimore, use of Eschback, 8 Md. J. L (20 Vr.) 641, 10 Atl. 379 352 [1855] ; Rose v. Trestrail, 62 Mo. § 15 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 30 sentially a forced contribution, levied in invitum, by virtue of the sovereign power of the state.' "Such assessments are en- forced proportional contributions of a somewhat special kind, made in invitum, by virtue of legislative authority conferred upon the municipality for that purpose, upon such terms and conditions as the legislature within constitutional limits may see fit to impose. ' ' " Accordingly a statute modifying the rights and liabilities of the property own#r is not a statute impairing the obligation of a contract,* whatever other objection may be made thereto.^ So a local assessment is not a contract with reference to the right to interest thereon" or with reference to the limitation of actions thereon.' The contract entered into between the city and the contractor, providing for the construc- tion of the improvement for which the assessment is levied, is not the basis of the action to collect such assessment.* So if an improvement is constructed by the contractor under special contract with the land owner, no liability to the public cor- poration in the nature of an assessment lien exists therefor." In Louisiana it has been said that if the statute requires the consent of a majority of the property owners as a condition precedent to making the improvement, the local assessment lev- App. 352 [1895]; Brewster v. City of App. 356 [1895]; Rose v. Trestrail, Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 [1859]. "As 62 Mo. App. 3S2 [1895]. the lien does not rest upon any agree- ^ Sargent & Company v. Tuttle, 67 ment or specific assent of the owner Conn. 162, 166, 32 L. R. A. 822, 823, of the land charged with this burden, 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]. ' and the improvement is often against ' Essex Public Road Board v. Skin- his wish, a clear right should be kle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. 446, 11 S. shown by the municipality to justify 790 [1891], (affirming State, Essex such an act of sovereign power." Public Road Board, Pros. v. Skinkle, Western Pennsylvania Railway Com- 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 65, 6 Atl. 435 pany v. City of Allegheny, 92 Pa. St. [1886], a%med in State, Essex Pub- 100, 103 [1879]. lie Road Board, Pros. v. Skinkle, 49 = City Street Improvement Com- N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 641, 10 Atl. 379 pany v. Babeock, 139 Cal. 690, 73 [1887]). Brewster v. City of Syra- Pac. 666 [1903]; San Diego Invest- cuse, 1,9 N. Y. 116 [1859]'. ment Company v. Shaw, 129 Cal. "See Chapter XVII. 273, 61 Pac. 1082 [1900]; Brock v. "Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281 Luning, 89 Cal. 316, 26 Pac. 972 [1867]. [1891]; Mound City Land & Stock 'People v. Hulbert, 71 Cal. 72, 14 Company v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Pac. 43 [1886]. Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 « Drew v. Town of Geneva, 159 Ind. S. W. 721 [1902]; State ex rel. Gree- 364, 65 N. E. 9 [1902]. ly v. City of St. Louis, 67 Mo. 113 » MeCausland v. Leuffer, 4 Whart. [1877]; Guinotte v. Egelhoff, 64 Mo. (Pa.) 175 [1839].. 31 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 16 ied for such improvement is not a forced contribution, but is based on the consent of the property owners.^" This principle has been suggested in determining whether an assessment is a tax within the meaning of a provision giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases involving' the validity of a tax, regardless of the amount involved.^'^ The distinction is one which is not made by the courts of most other jurisdictions.^^ However, it has been held that a statute authorizing the organization of an ir- rigation district on the affirmative vote of a majority of the electors thereof, and providing that the bonds of the district and the inter- est thereon shall be paid from annual assessments on the realty in such district is so far a contract that a subsequent statute au- thorizing the board of directors of such district, without the con- sent of the owners of realty to pledge the realty, itself for the bonds is held to be invalid as impairing the obligation of con- tracts.'^' However, an assessment or the right to levy one ma.y be the subject matter of a contract.'* Such a contract will be protected against state legislation impairing its obligation.'"* § 16. Theory of contract invoked in assessment. In some cases, however, the theory of contract ias been in- voked in assessments levied upon the theory of benefits as a means of explaining in part the operation of such assessments. It is stated in some eases that in making an improvement to be paid for by local assessment, the municipality, acts as the agent of the property owners upon whom the assessment is to be levied.' In making the improvement for which a local assess- "Fayssoux v. Denis, 48 La. Ann. 385, 20 S. 280; Lucas, Turner & Co. 850, 19 So. 760 [1896]. v. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 463 "See § 1369. [1857]; Charnock v. Levee District, "See § 779 et seq. 38 La. Ann. 323; Liebstein v. Mayoi "Merchants' National Bank of San and Common Council of the City of Diego V. Escondido Irrigation Dis- Newark, 24 N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) trict, 144 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937 200 [1873] ; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 [1904]. ^^ J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 143 [1873]; "McGee t. Mathis, 71 U. S. (4 In the matter of the Petition of Liv- Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 [1866], re- in7.ston to Vacate an Assessment, 121 versing McGee v. Mathis,- 21 Ark. X. V. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]; In 40 [I860]. the matter of the Petition of Ander- " See § 171 et seq. son to Vacate an Asessment, 109 N. 'New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U. S. Y. 554, 559 [1888]. "The city in di- 120, 44 L. 96, 20 S. 44 [1899] ; modi- recting and making the improvement fied on rehearing, 176 U. S. 92, 44 L. was in some sense at least the agent § 16 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 32 ment is to be levied the city is said to be "more of an agent than a principal."^ "While it is true the city exercises but a delegated power in making these assessments and in so doing is acting as one of the instrumentalities of government, it is nevertheless true that in levying and collecting the same it acts merely as an agent of the parties and derives no direct benefit therefrom distinct from that of the property owners. " ^ A stat- ute allowing the contractor to sue «n the assessment is said to make him the agent of the municipality for the purpose of col- lecting such assessment.' An improvement district embracing the territory of a city is said to act as agent of the property owners and not as agent of the city.° These statements are, however, mere dicta, representing an analogy but not a prin- ciple. The municipality is the superior imposing a tax, not an agent binding a principal by contract. Wherever the question becomes a practical one, it is held that the public corporation or quasi corporation is not the agent." The liability of the parties to the agreement is sometimes based solely on the theor'y of an implied promise. Thus under a statute providing that on petition of one-third of the owners of land affected, the county commissioners should make a contract for drainage and assess the properties benefited, the proper number of land own- ers petitioned, the contract was let and the work done; but it proved to be of no benefit. It was held that the county commis- sioners and the land owners who did not petition were not liable, but that the owners who signed the petition had requested that the work be done, that it was done at their request, and that there was, accordingly, an implied promise on their part to pay of the property owners, and if it per- Company v. Jasper County, 117 la. mitted grossly extravagant or ficti- 365, 381, 94 Am. St. Eep. 301, 90 tious items to be included in the N. W. 1006 [1902]. sum to collect which the assessment * Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 was levied, that operated as a fraud Pac. 309 [1901]. upon him and entitled him to relief " Morrilton Waterworks Improve- in this proceeding." In the matter ment District v. 'Earl, 71 Ark. 4, of the Petition of Livingston to Va- 69 S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [1903]; cate an Assessment, 121 N. Y. 94, Fitgerald- v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148, 105, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]. 17 S. W. 702 [1891]. ^ North Pacific Lumbering & Man- " Board of Commissioners of Mont- ufacturing Company •{. East Port- gomery County v. Fullen, 111 Ind. land, 14 Or. 3, 12 Pac. 4 [1886]. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]. 'Edwards & Walsh Constrviction 33 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 17 therefor.' The fallacy of this theory lies in the fact that the request to do the work was a request to do it for a payment to be made in a certain way; while the theory imposes a general liability upon the owners who petition for the improvement. Cases of this sort are usually explained upon the theory of estoppel.' § 17. Special contract to pay assessment. In some eases, however, improvements are made under con- tracts between the municipal corporation and the owners of property benefited thereby, who agree to pay for such improve- ments. As long as such contract does not tend to place an undue share of the burden of the improvement upon the property own- ers who are not parties thereto, it is upheld, if possessing the elements of contracts in general.^ Such charges, however, are not properly regarded as true assessments, but as liabilities aris- ing out of contract. Under such contracts the cost of an im- provement may be charged upon property which by statute would be exempt except for such contract,^ such as a cemetery.' So by virtue of such contracts assessments may be enforced under circumstances which would make such assessment invalid except for such contract. Thus a contract was enforced whereby the property owners agreed that if the city would leave stand- ing a row of trees in the centre of a street which the city was ■ about to pave, and would place curbstones around such trees for the purpose of protecting them, the said owners would pay the cost of the curbstones so placed opposite their land on their side of the street.* So under such a contract an assess- tnent may be enforced, although no order was made extending the time for performance, and under the statute in force such fact would invalidate the assessment.^ Such a contract, like any other, requires a valuable consideration to support it. Such 'Moore v. Barry, 30 S. C. 530, 4 Boston v. Brazer, 11 Mass. 447 h. E. A. 294, 9 S. E. 589 [1889]. [1814J. 'See § 1011 et seq. ''Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, 'Bernstein v. Downs, 112 Cal. 197, 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]. 44 Pac. 557 [1896]; Floyd v. Atlanta Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, Banking Company, 109 Ga. 778, 35 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]. S. E. 172 [1899]; Edwards v. Cooper, * City of Springfield v. Harris, 107 168 Ind. 54, 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]; Mass. 532 [1871]. City of Springfield v. Harris, 107 "^Bernstein v. Downs, 112 Cal. 197, Mass. 532 [1871]; Inhabitants of 44 Pac. 557 [1898]. § 17 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 34 consideration is sometimes found in the doing of additional work by the contractor in reliance on such promise." Another form of valuable consideration is the construction of the improve- ment in question after the promise is made and in reliance thereon.'' Another form of valuable consideration is an exten- sion of time for payment of the assessment.^ If the improve- ment is made before the promise to pay the assessment is entered into, the question is then presenlfed whether the benefits con- ferred upon the property by such improvement form a consid- eration for a promise to pay or not. It seems to be assumed in some jurisdictions that the existence of such benefits consti- tuted a consideration." This view, however, is out of harmony with the general theories of consideration. The making of the improvement is a past transaction, imposing no liability upon the property or the owner thereof except in case of compliance with the terms of the statute.^" Such a transaction, leaving no liability of any kind cannot, properly speaking, form a consid- eration for a subsequent promise. If there is a genuine dispute as to the validity of the assessment, the compromise of such dispute and forbearance on the part of the city to enforce such assessment might furnish a consideration. In the absence of such comDromise and forbearance the effect of such a promise made after the improvement is constructed can be explained only on the theory of estoppel or waiver. A special contract between the municipal corporation and the owners of property to be assessed may operate to prevent the owner from inter- posing defenses which he would otherwise be entitled to make. Thus an agreement that the cost of the improvement should be assessed against certain property will prevent the owners of such property who entered into such agreement from raising the question that the city, while it had authority to construct such improvement, had no authority to lew assessments therefor.^' An agreement by which the owners of the land assessed agree that in consideration of -permission to pay the assessment in installments the owners will not make any objection to the •Bernstein V. Downs, 112 Cal. 197, pany, 109 Ga. 778, 35 S. E. 172 44 Pac. 557 [18961. [1899]. 'Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, "See §§ 18, 777, Chapter VI. 79 N. E. 1047 [1907], "Hendrickson v. Toledo, 23 Ohio •See § 1033. C. C. 256 [19011. ' Floyd V. Atlanta Banking Com- 35 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § IB legality or regularity of the assessments prevents them from making defenses otherwise available, such as the defense thai the report of the engineer on which the assessment was based did not contain a fuU description of each lot or parcel of ground bordering on the improved street, together with the name of the owner thereof.'^ Promises like this are often regarded not as valid contracts, enforceable in themselves, but as operating to estop the promisor from denying the validity of the assess- ment, or as operating as a waiver of defenses which might other- wise have been interposed. § 18. Assessment not based on quasi contract. "While the general theory of assessments for benefits presents some poiiits of resemblance to quasi contract * assessment is not a form of quasi-contract other than as taxes generally are. The attempt to identify assessment with quasi-contract is made most often where by reason of failure to comply with the statutory requirements,- or by reason of the statute's failure to comply with constitutional requirements, the assessment itself is invalid, and the attempt is then made to compel. the owner to pay for the benefits conferred upon him by an action in quantum meruit, irrespective of the validity of the assessment. It is a funda- mental rule of assessments that constitutional and statutory re- quirements must be complied with, in a substantial manner at least.^ It is evident that if assessment can be identified with quasi-contract in the manner here suggested, all the restrictions upon the power of a public corporation to levy assessments are swept away,^ except the limitation that assessments must not exceed the amount of the benefits. There would be small use in framing rules, the violation of which would produce no legal consequences, and the law of assessments would, in a manner, cease here. Accordingly, where this attempt to identify assess- ment with quasi-contract has been made, it has failed in the absence of some specific statute authorizing recovery, and if the irregularities and defects are so marked as to avoid the assess- " Dunkirk Land Company v. Zeh- 'Allen v. City of Davenport, 132 ner, 35 Ind. App. 694, 74 N. E. 1099 Fed. 209, 65 C. C. A. 641 [1904], (re- [1905]. versing City of Davenport v. Allen, 'See § 11. 120 Fed. 172 [1903T1. ' See § 777, Chapter VI. §18 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 36 ment, no recovery can be had on the theory of quasi-contract.* Of an action upon the common courts, ignoring the assessment, it is said that ' ' it does not conform to any known rule of law. ' ' ' At a sale under an apportionment warrant issued against one who was not the true owner of the property, the owner of the warrant bid the property in. This was held to extinguish the assessment. Accordingly, if the assessment itself could not be enforced it was said that the owner was "under no common law or moral obligation to pay the debt in question. " " So the city cannot, after paying for the cost of the improvement, main- tain an action against the property owner for money laid out and expended.' If any cause of action exists it must be one on the assessment. The original proceeding leading up to the attempted assessment is a statutory proceeding in invitum,^ and recovery, if permitted at all, must be on the assessment and not for reasonable compensation." In some of these cases it does not appear that a benefit was, in fact, received by the property owner.^" Thus a levee was constructed at a time when such improvement could not be paid for by assessment." The •O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. 450, 22 S. 354 [1902], (affirming O'Brien v. Wheelock, 95 Fed. 883, 37 C. C. A. 309 [1899], which affirmed 78 Fed. 673 [1897]); WooUaeott v. Meekin, — Cal. , 91 Pac. 612 [1907]; McManus v. Hornaday, 124 la. 267, 100 N. W. 33 [1904]; Craw, ford V. Mason, 123 la. 301, 98 N. W. 795 [1904]; City of Owensboro V. Hope, — Ky. , 110 S. W. 272 [1908]; City of. Manistee v. Harley, 79 Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603 [1890]; Heman v. Larkin, 108 Mo. App. 392, 83 S. W. 1019 [1904] ; Neill v. Trans- Atlantic Mortgage Trust Company, 89 Mo. App. 644 [1901]; MeQuiddy V. Brannock, 70 Mo. App. 535 [1897] ; Galgreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. 380 [1887]; Brady v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 234 [1858]; Burns v. Patterson, 2 Handy (Ohio) 270 [1855]; Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 467 [1869]. "It will not do to say, be- cause the property owner has been benefited by the improvement, that he should pay for it whether the law has been complied with or not. This would be to invoke the spirit of ex- pediency to which a court of justice should never resort." Municipal Se- curities Corporation v. Gates, — Mo. App. , 105 S. W. 85, 86 [1908]. ' City of Manistee v. Harley, 79 Mich. 238, 240, 44 N. W. 603 [1890]. "Kirwin v. Nevin, 111 Ky. 682, 64 S. W. 647, 687 [1901]. ' Mayor and City Council of Bal- timore V. Hughes' Adm'r, 1 Gill & J. 480, 19 Am. Dee. 243 [1829]. ' Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. 380 [1887]. See §§ 15, 778. " Heman v. Larkin, 108 Mo. App. 392, 83 S. W. 1019 [1904]. . » O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. . S. 450, 22 S. 354 [1902], (affirmii' O'Brien v. Wheelock, 95 Fed. 8S3. 37 C. C. A. 309 [1899], which af- firmed 78 Fed. 673 [1897]). "Updike V. Wright, 81 111. 49 [1876]. 37 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § 18 levee was not kept up and proved to be of no actual benefit to the land owners, it amounting to a partial failure of an in- divisible consideration. No recovery was allowed against the land owners. ^^ In some of the eases, however, the existence of a benefit was clear.^^ Thus if an assessment is invalid, the fact that the construction of a sewer, connected with the property assessed and thus used," or the grading of a street,'^ or the construction of a sidewalk^" conferred a benefit upon the prop- erty of the land-owner does not make him liable therefor in quasi-contract. The theory that assessment may be regarded as a form of quasi-contract has possibly been invoked through a misapprehension of other principles applicable to the law of as- sessments, but not involving the doctrine of quasi-contract. Thus in many cases, certain forms of acquiescence in an improvement which result in special benefit are held to estop the property owner from attacking the validity of assessment therefor, and from setting up defects which, but for such circumstances so operating as an estoppel, would have defeated the assessment.^' While occasionally confused with quasi-contract the doctrine of estoppel is of a radically different nature, since its operation renders the assessment itself enforceable, and does not leave the right of recovery one for benefits without support for the as- sessment. Certain principles for ascertaining the amount of the benefits received are also occasionally confused with quasi-con- tract. Under some statutes the rule applicable to contracts is also applicable to assessments, and no recovery is allowed . in case of material and substantial failure to construct the im- provement as stipulated. In other jurisdictions and under other statutes this rule is relaxed so far that the contract price less the proper amount of abatement for defects in construction is the basis for the amount of the assessment.^* These statutory provisions take the contract price as the basis for determining "O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603 [1890]; 450, 22 S. 354 [1902], (afflraiin'T Neill v. Trans-Atlantic Mortgage O'Brien v. Wheelock, 95 Fed. 883, Trust Company, 89 Mo. App. 644 37 C. C. A. 309 [1899]. which af- [1901]. firmed 78 Fed 673 [1897]. ''McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. "'■■City of Manistee v. Harlev, 79 App. 535 [1897]. Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603 [1890]; "Heman v. Larkin, 108 Mo. App. Heman v. Larkin, 108 Mo. App. 392, 392, 83 S. W. 1019 [1904]. S3 S. W. 1019 [1904]. "See § 1011 et seq. "City of Manistee v. Harley, 79 "See §§ 529, 530. § 18 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 38 the amount of the assessment and therefore do not, properly speaking, involve the theory of quasi-contract. More closely re- lated to quasi-contract is the statutory rule which is in force in a- few jurisdictions allowing recovery in ease of certain de- fects for the reasonable value of the work done, not to exceed the contract price.^° This, however, is a statutory method for estimating the amount of the assessment and resembles quasi- contract only in that quasi-contractual principles have been to a limited extent enacted into statutory form. Under a statute which provided: "In any such proceeding where the court try- ing the same shall be satisfied that the work has been done or material furnished which, according to the true intent of the act, would be properly chargeable upon the lot or land through or by which the street, alley or highway improved, repaired or lighted, may pass, a recovery shall be permitted or a charge enforced, to the extent of the proper proportion of the value of the work or materials which would be chargeable on such lot or land, notwithstanding any informality, irregularity or. de- feet in any such municipal corporation or its officers. * * * ^'^° Under this statute it was held by the United States Circuit Court that recovery in quantum meruit could be had even if the assessment and contract were both invalid and the city had no right to pay the contractor.^^ The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held by a majority vote that such assessment could not be enforced in quantum meruit/^ where the contract was one which the State Supreme Court had held to be void and without the power of the city to make.^' The Supreme Court of Iowa has taken the same view of such statute, holding that no recovery in quantum meruit could be allowed where the as- sessment was void,^* although such statute prevents the owners of property from invoking defects which are not jurisdictional "Quest V. Johnson, 58 Mo. App. la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]. 54 [1894]. See also Blngaman v. ^ Snouffer v. Grove, — la. , City of Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 353, 116 N. W. 1056 [1908], (involving 23 Atl. 395 [1892]. the assessment the levy of which "•§ 479, Code of Iowa [1873]. was enjoined in Wingert v. Tipton, ''■City of Davenport v. Allen, 120 134 la. 97, 108 N. W. 1035); Fed. 172 [1903]. Carter v. Cemansky, 126 la. 506, == Allen v. City of Davenport, 132 102 N. W. 438 [1905]; Crawford v. Fed. 209, 65 C. C. A. 641 [1904]. Mason, 123 la. 301, 98 N. W. 795 =» Allen V. City of Davenport, 107 [1904]. 39 ASSESSMENT AND PLACE IN LAW. § § 19, 20 to defeat the assessment, though the amount of recovery in some cases be reduced by such defects.'"' § 19. Assessment for legal duty not based on contract. From the nature of the assessment for the performance of a legal duty, and from the theory underlying such assessment,^ it follows that the assessment for the performance of a legal duty is a forced charge upon the owner of the property from whom such legal duty may lawfully be exacted. While such assessment is not based upon any theory of the assent of the property owner to such charge, nor upon any theory of a con- tract between the property owner and the public. An assess- ment of this type is essentially a forced contribution made in invitum by the authority of the sovereign power of the state, and is not in any way dependent on the assent of the property owner.^ § 20. Assessment for goods furnished based on contract. From the nature of the assessment for goods furnished or services rendered, and from the theory underlying such so-called assessment,^ it follows that the assessment of this type depends upon the assent of the owner of the property upon which, or with reference to which, use is made of the property for the use of which the assessment is levied. While such property owjier is not consulted in most cases with reference to the origi- nal statute or ordinance which provides for such charge, he has the option of making use of such property and thus rendering ^"Ottumwa Brick & Construction Kraus, 16 0. S. 54 [1864]; Charles- Company V. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 ton v. Werner, 38 S. C. 488, 37 Am. N. W. 510 [1899]; Dittoe v. City of St. Rep. 776, 17 S. E. 33 [1892]; Davenport, 74 la. 66, 36 N. W. 895 Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry, 6 [1887]; City of Chariton v. Holli- Humph. (Tenn.) 368, 44 Am. Dec. 315 day, 60 la. 391, 14 N. W. 775 [1882]. [1845]; Washington v. Mayor and 'See § 13. Aldermen of Nashville, 1 Swan ''Mayor and Board of Trustees of (Tenn.) 177 [1851]; Adams v. Fish- the Town of New Iberia v. Fonte- er, 63 Tex. 651 [1885]; Rude v. Town lieu, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]; of St. Marie, 121 Wis. 634, 99 N. W. Nugent V. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 460 [1904]; State ex rel. Baltzell v. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895]; Horbach Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, V. City of Omaha, 54 Neb. 83, 74 N. 43 N. W. 947 [1889]; Donnelly v. W. 434 [1898]; Brown v. Keener, 74 .Decker, 58 Wis. 461, 46 Am. Rep. N. C. 714 [1876]; Sessions v. Crun- 637, 17 N. W. 389 [1883]. kilton, 20 0. S. 349 [1870]; Bliss v. 'See § 14. i20 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 40 himself liable to such charge, or, on the other hand, of refrain- ing from the use of sueh property, and thereby incurring no liability for sueh charge. "While a charge of this type is not properly termed an assessment, it is a charge which rests upon the assent of the property owner.^ That the so-called assess- ment of this type does in fact rest upon the assent of the prop- erty owner is manifest in cases in which the attempt is made to levy an assessment of this sorl^ without the consent of the property owner. Such assessments cannot be sustained as as- sessments of this type; and if not apportioned substantially in accordance with benefit and thus sustained as assessments based upon the theory of benefits, they fail altogether.' The fact that such charge is based upon the assent of the property owner is said to be conclusive of the fact that it is not a true assessment.* "Provident Institution for Savings V. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. 1102, 5 S. 612 [1885], affirming Provident In- stitution for Savings v. Allen, 37 N. J. Eq (10 Stew.) 627 [1883], which affirmed without opinion 37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 36 [1883]); City of Chicago V. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 218 111. 40, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, 75 N. E. 803 [1905]; Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 49 Am. St. Rep. 222, 28 L. R. A. 679, 37 N. E. 402, 39 N. E. 869 [1894]; Carson v. Sewerage Com- missioners of Brockton, 175 Mass. 242, 48 L. R. A. 277, 56 N. E. 1 [1900]; City of East Grand Forks V. Luck, 97 Minn. 373, 107 X. W. 393 [1906] ; City of Fergus Falls v. Boen, 78 Minn. 186, 80 N. W. 961 [1899] ; Burke v. City of Water Val- ley, 87 Miss. 732, 112 Am. St. Rep. 468, 40 So. 820 [1905]. ' Hoboken Manufactures Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Hoboken, — N. J. L. , 68 Atl. 1098 [1908]; State, Culver, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 256 [1883]; State, Vree- land, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 43 2Sr. J. L. ( 14 Vr. ) 135 [1881], (affirmed Mayor, etc., of Jersey City v. State, Vreeland, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 638 [[1881]); Provident Institution for Savings v. Allen, 37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 36 [1883]. * Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 49 Am. St. Rep. 222, 28 L. R. A. 679, 37 N. E. 402, 39 N. E. 869 [1894]. CHAPTER II. HISTORY OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 21. Early analogies to local assessments — Feudal exactions. In mediaeval times the construction of public improvements which could confer special benefits on private property was a rare occurrence. Castles, palaces and cathedrals absorbed a much larger amount of the wealth of the people than paved streets, sidewalks and sewers. When public improvements of this sort were constructed, they were paid for in part by gen- eral taxation or its equivalent. The charge of such improve- ments in part rested upon the owners of certain land, in ac- cordance with the general theory of the feudal system. Such a charge, however, was not a local assessment as we know it, nor did it possess the essential elements thereof. It was not based upon the theory of benefits, it was not apportioned according to benefits, and it was not imposed- necessarily upon land benefited in the least by the improvement. A land-owner might be charged with the duty of constructing or maintaining a given public improvement; but if he was so charged, it was by virtue of an arrangement between himself and the lord of whom he held his land, and was in effect a part of the return made by him for such land. It stood on the same footing with the duty resting upon some tenants to furnish fully equipped men-at-arms in time of war, and with the duty resting upon other tenants to pay money, or grain, or other produce, for their land. These feudal charges and exactions undoubt- edly familiarized people with the idea that a part or all of the cost of public improvements might be imposed upon certain private individuals. They cannot be regarded, however, as any- thing more than analogies to the local assessment as it ulti- mately appeared. The feudal charge did not develop into the local assessment, but rather, tended to be crowded out and ex- tinguished by the local assessment as it developed under sub- § 22 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. > 42 sequent legislation.^ The later eases, however, showed a tend- ency to regard the feudal charge is persisting and as existing side by side with the statutory assessment.^ § 22. Work on roads. Another analogy to the local assessment has been sought in the duty imposed by law upon the ijesidents of certain districts to work upon the roads for a certain time each year, or to pay a fixed sum of money in lieu thereof.^ A charge of this sort is undoubtedly a tax. However, it lacks the essential elements of a local assessment. It is not imposed upon land-owners as such, is not apportioned according to benefits, and is not restricted to the lands benefited by the improvement. It is merely a spe- cial form of general taxation charged upon individuals, without reference to the property owned by them, resembling the local assessment chiefly in being a tax for the purpose of a public improvement which confers a special benefit, and differing from the ordinary form of general taxation solely in the fact that it is not apportioned in accordance to the value of the property owned by the taxpayer. " Rooke's Case, 5 Kep. 996 (Hil. year upon the public roads, and pen- 40 Eliz.). alties were prescribed for those who ^ Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139o failed to respond to an order to do (Mich. 7 Jac. 1). See § 25. such work. Then, as the natural and ' Kootenai County v. Hope Lumber inevitable development of the system Co., 13 Ida. 262, 89 Pac. 1054 [1907]; of improving roads the public was People ex rel. v. Chicago & Alton given authority to have the work Railway Co., 228 111. 102; 81 N. E. done and" to charge the cost thereof 813 [1907] ; Toledo, St. Louis & to the owners of the abutting prop- Western Railroad Co. v. People, ex erty that was specially benefited by rel., 226 111. 557, 80 N. E. 1059 the improvement. And to insure the [1907]; St. Louis, Alton & Terre prompt payment of that cost a pen- Haute R. Co. v. People, 224 111. 155, alty for delay in payment was im- 79 N. E. 664 [1906] ; Burnes v. May- posed. In both eases the penalty or and City Council of Atchison, 2 is imposed for failure to discharge Kan. 454 (original edition) [1864]; a public duty. In the former in- City of Lexington v. McQuillan's stance it was a penalty for not work- Heirs, 9 Dana (Ky.) 513, 35 Am. ing in person; and in the latter in- Dee. 159 [1839]; Seaboard National stance it is a penalty for not paying Bank of New York v. Woesten, 176 for the work done by another." Sea- Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464 [1903]. "At board National Bank of New York first every man was subject to the v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 61, 75 S. W. duty of working so many days every 464 [1903]. 43 HISTOEY OP LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. §§ 23, 24 §23. Origin of assessments in drainage. The necessity of draining marshes seems to have forced the adoption of a system of rules and regulations intended to equal- ize the burden of such drainage. The improvement and reclam- ation of Eumney Marsh seems to have been the occasion for the original adoption of provisions upon this subject. Coke tells us that "Rumney Marsh, in the County of Kent, containing 24,000 acres, is, at this day and long time hath been governed by certain ancient and equal laws of sewers made by a venerable justice, Henry de Bathe, in the reign of H. III., from which laws, not only other parts in Kent, but all England receive light and direction — ^for example : The said general act of 23 H. 8 Ca. 5, in the clause which giveth power to the com- missioners to make statutes, ordinances and provisions, etc., nec- essary and behooveful after the laws and customs of Rumney Marsh, in the County of Kent, or otherwise by any ways or means, etc. "^ "Both the town and marsh of Rumney took their name of one Robert Rumney. This Robert (as appeareth by the book of Domesday) held this town of Odo, Bishop of Bai- eux, wherein he had 13 burgesses who, for their service at the sea, were discharged of all actions and customs of charge, ex- cept felony, breach of the peace and forestalling. ' ' ^ § 24. Statute 23, Hen. VIII., C. 5. In the reign of Henry VIII., in 1531, a statute was passed providing for the construction of sewers, drains and other im- provements, designed to reclaim tracts of land. A part of this statute is as follows: "The bill of sewers with a new proviso, etc. Our sovereign lord the King, like a virtuous and most gracious prince, nothing earthly so highly weighing as the ad- vancing of the common profit, wealth and commodity of this, his realm, considering the daily great damages and losses which have happened in many and divers parts of this, his said realm, as well by the reason of the outragious flowing surges and course of the sea in and upon marsh-grounds and other low places here- tofore through politick wisdom won and made profitable for the great common wealth of this realm as also by occasion of land, waters and other outragious springs in and upon meadows, pas- M Inst. (Coke) 276, 277. "4 Inst. (Coke) 277. § 24 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 44 tures and other low grounds adjoining to rivers, floods and other water courses; and over that, by and through mills, mill-dams, wears, fishgarths, kedels, gores, gates, flood-gates, locks and other impediments in and upon the same rivers and other water- courses, to the inestimable damages of the commonwealths of this realm, which daily is likely more and more to increase un- less speedy redress and remedy be in this behalf shortly pro- vided ; wherein albeit that divers ana many provisions have been before this time made and ordained, yet none of them are suffi- cient remedy for the reformation of the premises, hath there- fore by deliberate advice and assent of his lords, spiritual and temporal, and also his loving commons in this present parlia- ment assembled, ordained, established and enacted, That com- missions of sewers and other premises shall be directed in all parts within this realm from time to time, where and when need shall require, according to the manner, form, tenor and effect hereafter ensuing, to such substantial and indifferent persons as shall be named by the lord chancellor and lord treasurer of England and the two chief justices for the time being, or by three of them, whereof the lord chancellor be one. ' ' ^ The form of commission to be issued under such statute was as follows: "We, therefore, for that by reason of our dignity and preroga- tive royal, we be bounden to provide for the safety and preser- vation of our realm of England, willing that speedy remedy be had in the premises have assigned you and six of you of the .which we will that A., B. and C. shall be three to be our jus- tices, to survey the said walls, streams, ditches, banks, gutters, sewers, gates, calcies, bridges, trenches, mills, mill-dams,, flood- gates, ponds, locks, hebbing-wears, and other impediments, lets and annoyances aforesaid, and the same cause to be made, corrected, repaired, amended, put down, or reformed as the case shall require, after your wisdoms and discretions ; and therein as well to ordain and do after the form, tenor and effect of all and singular the statutes and ordinances made before the first day of March, in the three and twentieth year of our reign, touching the premises or any of them as also to enquire by the oaths of the honest and lawful men of said shire or shires, place or places, where such defaults or annoyances be, as well within ^23 Hen. VIII., C. 5, par. 1 [1531]. 45 HISTORY OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 24 the liberties as without (by whom the truth may the rather be known), through whose default the said hurts and damages have happened and who hath or holdeth any lands or tenements, or common of pasture or profit of fishing or hath or may have any hurt, loss or disadvantage by any manner of means in the said places as well near to the said dangers, lets and impedi- ments as inhabiting or dwelling thereabouts by the said walls, ditches, banks, gutters, gates, sewers, trenches and the other said impediments and annoyances; and all those persons and every one of them to tax, assess, charge, distrain and punish as well within the metes, limits and bounds of old time, accus- tomed Of otherwise, or elsewhere within our realm of England after the quantity of their lands, tenements and rents, by the number of acres and perches, after the rate of every person's portion, tenure or profit or after the quantity of their common of pasture or profit of fishing or other commodities there, by such ways and means and in such manner and form as to you or six of you whereof the said A., B. and C. to be three, shall seem most convenient to be ordained and done for redress and reformation to be had in the premises.^ . . . " By the ex- press provisions of this statute the laws and customs of Rum- ney Marsh were extended at the discretion of the commissioners, over England. The commissioners were authorized "to make and ordain statutes, ordinances and provisions from time to time, as the ease shall require, for the safeguard, conservation, redress, correction and reformation of the premises and of every of them and the parts lying to the same, necessary and be- hooful after the laws and customs of Rumney Marsh, in the County of Kent or otherwise by any ways or means after your own wisdoms and discretions."' This provision, it was held sub- sequently, did not compel the commissioners to follow the cus- toms of Rumney Marsh if they did not deem it advisable so to do.* Section 8 of this statute provides that if the tax or as- sessment levied as therefore provided for, was not paid, the lands of the delinquent taxpayer, held by him in fee simple, fee tail, for life or for years, might be sold. T-his provision was subsequently extended to provide for a sale of lands held ^23 Hen. VIII., C. 5, par. III. • Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139o ■23 Hen. VIII., C. 5, par. III. (Mich., 7 Jac. 1). § 25 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 46 in copyhold in case of default." Section 9 of the statute, 23 Hen. VIII., C. 5, provides that the decrees of the commissioners therein provided for shall bind the lands of the king. Section 13 of the same statute provides for the payment of the expenses of the improvements including the compensation of the commis- sioners, their clerk, and the like, out of the taxes, levies and the like, therein provided for. Coke explains this statute as fol- lows: "Quando aqua profuit, that* is, when water doth issue, vulgarly sue : hereupon cometh the word suera for a sewer, passage, channel or gutter of water. At the complaint of Henry de Laeye, Earle of Lineolne, a commission of sewers was granted to Roger de Brabason, Mayor, and the sheriffs of Lon- don. Their authority is by 'eommission under the great seal in haec irerba, at this day grounded and warranted by the act of parliament of 23 Hen. VIII."' §25. Effect of statutory assessment on prescriptive duties. The effect of a statutory right of local assessment for such improvements upon the special duties resting upon certain land- owners to keep such improvements in repair — duties originat- ing in many cases under the feudal system as returns for the land granted to the tenant, ultimately justified in many eases on the doctrine of prescription — was presented for judicial con- sideration. It was held at first that the tax ought to be levied upon all the owners of land benefited, and not upon the owners immediately adjoining to the exclusion of others, even if the owners immediately adjoining always nised to repair such im provement, or were bound to repair such improvement, by pre- scription.^ This holding was subsequently explained and modi- fied; and the rule was laid down that if A. was bound by pre- scription to repair a wall as against the sea {contra Fluxum Maris), and A. was at fault in not repairing such wall against ordinary damage and deterioration, the commissioners might tax A. only, while if the wall was wrecked by a sudden and unusual flood the commissioners might tax all who would be damaged by "7 Ann. c. 10. 'Rooke's Case, 5 Rep. 996 (Hil. •IV Coke's Institutes, 275. 40 Eliz.) 47 HISTORY OP LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 26 sueh injury to the wall, without waiting to compel A. to make such repairs.^ § 26. Questions arising under early statute. The questions which arose under the statute foreshadowed many of the questions which have constantly been presented to the courts of this country under our statutes providing for local assessments. The provision of the statute entrusting the matter of repairs and assessments to the commissioners "ac- cording to your wisdom and discretion" was held not to give them an unlimited and arbitrary discretion, but to require them to act in substantial aecordapee with law and justice.^ An assessment for these purposes could be laid only on those who would be damaged by failure to make the improvement and keep it in repair, or who would be benefited by the reforma- tion thereof.^ Accordingly, where A. own^d land on higher ground than that drained by the ditch in question, which ground drained into another stream, and was in no way benefited by the construction of a ditch, it was held that no assessment could be levied upon A.^ In the absence of specific statutory au- thority it was held that the commissioners of sewers could not make a new river.* If an old wall could be repaired so as to perform the necessary service, it was held that the commission- ers ought not to destroy it and construct a new wall.^ A tax assessment and charge authorized by the statute should be in proportion to the quantity of land owned by each tenant, ac- cording to the acreage, or should be according to the rate of portion, tenure or profits held by him. Accordingly, an assess- ment upon a vill in gross, was held to be unauthorized." The 'Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139o Sewers for Essex, 1 Barn. & Cress. (Mich., 7 Jac. 1). See to the same 477, 2 How. & Ryl. 700 [1823]. effect the King v. Commissioners of "Case of Isle of Ely, 10 Rep. 141o Sewers for Essex, 1 Barn. & Cress. (7 Mich., Jac. 1). 477, 2 How. & Ryl. 70.0 [1823], where 'Anselm v. Barnard, 2 Keb. 675 contribution for rebuilding a wall cast ( Trin. 22 Car. II ) . down by an unugual storm is not ' Case of Isle of Ely, 10 Rep. 141a allowed unless the party who repairs ( 7 Mich., Jac, I ) . the sea-wall has not been in default 'Case of Isle of Ely, 10 Rep. 141a in his duty to make repairs. ( 7 Mich. Jac. I ) . 'Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139a "Case of Isle of Ely, 10 Rep. 141o (Mich., 7 Jac. 1). To the same effect ( 7 Mich., Jac. I ) . see the King v. Commissioners Of § 27 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 48 king owned eight hundred acres in a tract drained by a ditch. This land was omitted from the assessment. The assessment was held, for that reason, to be invalid on the ground that "a tax is unjust because by the not taxing of them a greater por- tion was laid upon the rest of the land than of right ought to be."'' Under the statute it was held that notice was neces- sary, and should be given to the owners of the property to be assessed.* If an old ditch existed, draining certain land so that it was not benefited by the construction of a new ditch, the commissioners ought to refund the assessment levied and make new assessments, on the theory of benefits.' The com- missioners ought to describe the lands assessed. " It was not necessary for them to name the owners thereof, since the im- position of such a requirement would make, in effect, an end of all assessments. On the other hand, it was not sufficient to describe the area taxed as all the land from such a place to such a place." §27. Assessment extended to street improvements. More than eighty years before the American Revolution, the idea of local assessments was extended in England to streets, lanes and alleys. A statute of William & Mary provided: "VI., and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid. That all open streets, lanes and alleys, which are now paved within any of the parishes or places aforesaid, shall be from time to time repaired, amended and paved at the costs and charges of the householders, inhabitants in any such streets and lanes respec- tively; and where any houses shall be empty and unoccupied in any such streets and lanes, then to be paved and repaired at the charge of the owners or proprietors thereof in the manner fol- lowing (that is to say) : every of the said householders, owners or proprietors of houses, to repair, pave, and keep repaired, amended and paved, the streets, lanes or alleys before his house, stables or out-houses, so far as his housing, walls or buildings extend unto the center-stone, channel or middle of the same 'Whitley v. Fawsett, Styles 12, 13 "Bow v. Smith, 9 Mod. 94 (Easter, (23 Car. I). 10 Geo. I). « Whitley v. Fawsett, Styles 12, 13 '"Bow v. Smith, 9 Mod. 94 (Easter, (23 Car. I). 10 Geo. I). 49 HISTORY OF LOCAJj ASSESSMENTS. § 28 street, lane or alley; upon pain to forfeit twenty shillings for every perch, or rod, and after that rate for a greater or less ■quantity for every default of twenty shillings a week, for every week after, until the same shall be sufficiently paved and amended. ' ' ^ Sections 9 and 10 of this statute provided for cleaning streets by a general tax. Section 13 of this statute provided for repairing streets by a general tax. Section 15 of this statute required householders to set out lights in front of houses at their own expense. It will be noticed that this statute requires each householder or land-owner, as the case might be, to repair the street in front of his house. The exaction im- posed was in the form of work and labor, the penalty in money being for the purpose of coercing performance. § 28. Early colonial legislation — Pennsylvania. The idea of local assessment was therefore one with which the English immigrants to this country at the date of its original settlement, were, to a greater or less degree, familiar. "We find accordingly that early colonial statutes provided for local improvements to be paid for by local assessments, appear- ing within a few years after the statute of 2 William & Mary.^ Such provisions existed in Pennsylvania from the year 1700. "By a province law of 1700 commissioners or assessors were to be appointed by the governor, with four of his council, for regulating the streets and water courses, the pitching, paving and graveling thereof; the clearing of docks, and repairing landing-places and bridges in the towns (the water-courses under ground to be arched and laid with brick or stone), and to defray the charge of pitching, paving, graveling and regulation of the said streets, and scouring and cleaning said docks each inhabitant concerned was to pay towards the same, in proportion to the number of feet of his lots or land- ings adjoining, on each or either side of the said streets or docks. And for defraying the charge of repairing landing- places, bridges, making- common sewers, and paving, pitching, graveling or regulating any part of the streets; scouring and cleansing any part of the docks belonging to the public, each inhabitant in the said respective town or place was to pay his '2 William & Mary, Second Ses- ' See § 28. sion, Ch. 8, Section VII [1690]. § 28 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 50 proportional rate according to his estate in each town. The com- missioners were empowered to agree with and employ workmen for performing the same from time to time, and having made the assessments were to appoint collectors and receivers thereof, and in case of non-payment each collector, by a warrant from the proper justice, was to levy the same by distress and sale of the delinquent's goods. A similar law had been passed in 1698. "1 "The districts [i. e., in fee neighborhood of Phila- delphia] being sparsely settled, with large vacant spaces, and inhabited by persons unable to bear heavy taxation, resorted to the old method of 1700, which applied to the whole province, of localizing the taxes and imposing the cost of the improve- ments upon those who were immediately benefited by them-. The district of the Northern Liberties comprised all of that part of the township of that name lying between the west side of Sixth, street and the Eiver Delaware, and between Vine street and Cohoeksink Creek; and by the act of 1803 its commissioners were given full power- to pave the footways and gutters within said district, to plant curbstones, and assess the freeholders in front of whose ground such footways shall be paved, in order to defray the expense of paving and keeping them in repair, in proportion to their respective extents of front; and upon the application of two-thirds of the freeholders on any street, lane or alley, to establish lamps and a nightly watch in such street, lane or alley, the expense to be defrayed by an assessment agree- ably to the county rates and levies within the district so lighted and watched, and upon like application to pitch and pave any street, lane or alley, provided said street, lane or alley, so re- quired to be paved, be not less in length than one nor exceed- ing two squares at any one time, and the owners of land in front of which such street is pitched and paved, shall be taxed in proportion to the respective fronts of their property within the streets so pitched and paved. ' ' " Similar acts were passed in 1813, 1826, 1837 and in 1844.= An interesting and detailed account of assessment legislation in Pennsylvania is to be found ^Dissenting opinion of Read, J., Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 160, in Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1869, 1870]. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 157, 158, 'Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1869, 1870]. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 160, 161, ^ I'rom dissenting opinion of Read, 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1869, 1870]. J., in Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 51 HISTORY OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 29 in some of the opinions of the Supreme Court.* A history of the legislation in Pennsylvania for the recovery of municipal claims is found in an opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl- vania.^ §29. New York. The existence of the local assessment in New York slightly antedates its existence in Pennsylvania. "In the colony and state of New York, the system of taxation for local purposes by assessing the burden according to the benefit has been in force for more than one hundred and fifty years. It was ap- plied to highways in the county of Ulster in, 1691 : Bradf . Laws, 45. The power was given to the corporation of New York in the same year: Id., 9. This statute remained in force in 1773, when Van Schaack's edition of the statutes was pub- lished, and no evidence of its repeal is found until 1787, when it seems to have been revised and its provisions re-enacted under the state constitution,: Van Schaack's Laws, 8, 9; 2 Jones & Var. 152; 1 Greenl. 443. The colonial statute was doubtless in force when the state constitution was adopted. It is not unworthy of remark, that in April, 1691, a bill of rights was passed for the security and protection of the people of the province. The stat- ute authorizing the assessments first mentioned was passed after- wards during the same year. In January, 1787, an act was passed declaring the rights of the citizens of this state, and prohibiting among other things that any person should be deprived of his property except by due course of law. The statute of 1787, au- thorizing street assessments in the city of New York, was passed by the same legislature, and" sanctioned by the same council of revision, which had assented to the bill of rights. Street assess- ments upon the same principle were authorized in the city of New York in 1793: 3 Greenl. 58; and in 1795: Id. 244, 245; and in 1796 : Id. 333, 334 ; and in 1801 : 2 K. & E. 130 ; and in 1813 : 2 R. L. 407. The corporation of New York has had and exercised * A detailed history of special as- Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352, sessment legislation in Philadelphia 358-360, 8 Am. Rep. 255 [1871]; is given in the dissenting opinion of Vacation of Howard Street, Phila- Eead, J., in Hammett v. Philadel- delphia, 142 Pa. St. 601, 21 Atl. 974 phia, 65 Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) [1891]. 146, 157-177, 3 Am. Eep. 615 [1869, 'Northern Liberties v. St. John's 1870]. For further account of as- Church, 13 Pa. St. 104 [1850]. sessment statutes in Pennsylvania see § 30 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 52 authority to make street assessments from the infancy of that city. Similar powers have been conferred on nearly every city, and on many of the villages of this state. It has also been ap- plied to highways, to turnpike roads, and to the draining of marshes. ' ' ^ § 30. South Carolina. Local assessments in South Carolina, too, slightly antedate those in Pennsylvania. "An examination of our statutes prior to 1790 relating to the improvement of streets and sidewalks will show that the provisions therein related to the city of Charleston and that such 'statutes were confined— that of 1698 (7 Stat. 12) to requiring every inhabitant of Charleston to amend and raise the sidewalk in front of his house in the manner and to the di- mensions therein prescribed on penalty of forfeiting for each house a penalty to be collected under the warrant of a justice of the peace and that of 1764 to requiring the construction of sew- ers or drains and sidewalks. These statutes were considered and upheld with reluctance in the two cases of Cruikshanks v. City Council, 1 M'Cord 360 decided i-n 1821, and Yeadon v. City Coun- cil, decided in 1828 (cited 12 Rich. 733) and when the act of 1850 (12 Stat. 59, 60) was considered by the court in the case of State V. City Council 12 Rich. 702 the court of errors distinctly repudiated as foreign to our laws any mode of taxation for the improvement of streets in the city of Charleston which looked to the assessment of property abutting on George street in that city according to the benefits to be derived from such improvement to such land-owners under the said act of 1850, saying: "As has been said, the general rule knows nothing about partial assess- ments for benefits or the selection of a portion for a class. Exist- ence of persons, or the possession of property, not the supposed benefits, are the guide. When each is taxed according to the value of his property, both equality and certainty may be attained to a reasonable extent; but what may be beneficial, or otherwise, is a matter of opinion or fancy or vague conjecture."^ This is the more interesting since South Carolina to-day is the only state '■ People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, '■ Mauldin v. City Council of Green- etc, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 ville, 42 S. C. 293, 302, 303; 46 Am. Am. Dec. 266, 282, 283 [1851]. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]. 53 HISTORY OP LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 31 which has totally repudiated the local assessment and all its works. § 31. Other colonial and state legislation. The colonies already mentioned have been selected only as ex- amples, showing the geographical extent of the local assessment statutes that appeared within a few years of the enactment of the English statute of 2 William and Mary. The local assess- ment also appeared in many other of the American colonies. "In Massachusetts, meadows, swamps and lanes may be assessed among the proprietors for the expense of draining the same, with- out reference to any political district, and in proportion to the benefit each proprietor derives from the work: R. S. of Massa- chusetts, 673. In Connecticut, the same power is given by statute to commissioners for draining marshy lands : Stat, of Connecticut, Ed. of 1839, p. 544." ^ A review of sidewalk legislation in Massa- chusetts from the statutes of 1799 e. 31 down to the present time is found in the opinion of the court in a recent ease.^ It will there be noted that the early assessment statutes are all special acts. An account of the developement of assessments is also to be found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri.' The Supreme Court of the United States has pointed out, in a case arising in Georgia, that local assesment was so uncommon in the early part of the nineteenth century that the word assessment must be re- garded as then used in the sense of general taxation.* No attempt is made here to do more than refer to some of the early statutes and comments thereon, for the purpose of showing the relation in point of time between the system of assessments and the speci- fic constitutional provisions which restrict them." A tabulated statement of assessment statutes would possess but little value and is not here attempted. ' People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, * "The fact is notorious that a cen- etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 tury ago special assessments were not Am. Dec. 266 [1851]. usual in this country and at that " Copeland v. Mayor and Aldermen time the word was used as synony- of Springfield, 166 Mass. 498, 44 N. mous with 'rates or taxes' generally.'' E. 605 [1896]. Wells v. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531, »Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 543 [1901]. 258, 269, 270 [1857]. "See Chapter V. §§32,33 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 54 § 32. Assessment not recognized by common law. The local assessment, therefore, has no existence at the com- mon law, but exists both in England and this country solely by virtue of statute.^ Upon the enactment of the legislature de- pends the existence of the right of levying such assessments. In New Jersey it has been said that the system of local assessments was general in 1788, and that while not justifiable on theories either of taxation or of eminent domlin, the system is "part of the local common law" and it is "quite too late to revert to first principles in order to overthrow a system of procedure which is possessed of such antiquity and has to its credit so many recogni- tions, ' ' - and that assessments depend for their justification upo;i ancient usage.' If really a part of the common law of New Jer- sey, the assessment is so by virtue of the adoption in New Jer- sey of the English assessment statutes as a part of their common law. On the other hand it has been said that there is no custom- ary law of taxation in Tennessee.* § 33. Statutory assessment held valid. The system of local assessment, therefore, is one of considerable antiquity in this country. It antedates specific constitutional pro- visions, which to a greater or less extent restrict or limit its oper- ation. Its recognition as an established and existing system of taxation which must have been known to the framers of the state constitution, and which it cannot be supposed that they intended to destroy or subvert, has been insisted upon in many cases. "We may remark, too, that taxation of this character has pre- vailed too long and too extensively to be treated as illegitimate or denounced as legislative spoliation under the guise of the tax- ing power. It prevailed in England several centuries ago; and the assessments made there by the commissioners of sewers on the lands affected by their operations was taxation of this char- ^ City of Owensboro v. Hope, — ° State, Society for Establishing Ky. , 110 S. W. 272 [1908]. See Useful Manufacturies, Pros. v. May- Chapter VI., § 775. or and Aldermen of the City of Pat- ^ Drainage Assessments. Hoagland erson, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 615 V. Wurts, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 175, [1880]. 180 [1879], (affirming; In matter of 'Taylor, McBean & Co. v. Chand- Commissioners to drain the Great ler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349, 24 Am. Meadows on Pequeat River, 39 N. J. Rep. 308 [1872]. L. (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]. 55 HISTORY OP LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. § 33 acter. (28 Hen. VIII Chap. 5, Sec. 5.) In Massachusetts, from an early period, meadows, swamps and lowlands were required to be assessed among the proprietors to pay the expense of draining them (Eev. Stat, of Mass. p. 673), and in Connecticut the same power was given to commissioners for draining marshy lands. (Conn. Stat. Ed. 1839, p. 544). It is said by the judge, who de- livered the opinion of the court of appeals in the Brooklyn case be- fore referred to, (People ex rel Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4, N.Y. 428), that the system of local taxation for local improve- ments by assessing the burden according to the benefit, had pre- vailed for more than one hundred and fifty years, and that this power was given to the corporation of New York in 1691, and had since been conferred on nearly every city and on many of the villages of the state. "^ "It is far too late to question now the validity of legislation like this imposing local assessments, in- vesting the local authorities with the discretion of judging as to the necessity for the improvements, and with power to levy and apportion the charge."^ "We believe the power exists; it has been recognized as an existing power in the state by the public, the legislature and by at least three decisions of this court. It may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to trace it to its proper source, and square its operation by logical rules, derived from a consideration of it as one of the precisely defined powers of the constitution. It had its origin and development in the principle of local self-government, characteristic of free institutions, founded by the Anglo-Saxon race — the leaving to each local com- munity the due administration of the affairs in which it had an ■exceptive, peculiar and local interest, atid in the nature of real property to which it is alone applicable. It is not the creation of a philosophical brain drafting constitutions and forms of gov- ernment, but the outgrowth of the necessities and varying exigen- cies of local communities, and hence like all institutions of sim- ilar origin and development, has inconsistencies and incongrui- ties. Its practical operation, so as to prevent injustice, depends largely upon the good sense and the capacities of the Anglo- Saxon race for the successful working of free government and 'Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. = Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 258, 269. 270 [1857]. Miss. 1040, 1056, 18 So. 493 [1895]. § 34 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 56 the management of their private affairs. " ^ It is probably this recognition as an existing system of taxation which has saved it under the provisions of modem constitutions. The courts have, with the exception of one state,* taken the attitude that the sys- tem of local assessment must be reconciled with the constitutional provisions rather than be destroyed by them. Hampered and lim- ited by constitutional provisions as it has been, it has, neverthe- less, prevailed where a new and unMfeard of system of taxation would probably have been overthrown by the courts as being in violation of the rights guaranteed by the constitution to the property owners. Even the courts which have criticised the sys- tem of local assessments as a system of taxation which cannot be sustained on principle have nevertheless upheld it.^ § 34. Development of constitutional restraints. The force, and effect of constitutional provisions affecting taxa- tion and local assessment were not at first understood very accur- ately by the courts. When such constitutional provisions as those requiring uniformity of taxation and forbidding the taking of property without due process of law were seen to have some application to the local assessment, the very existence of the power of local assessment was sharply challenged. At one time it seemed as though the constitutional provision requiring uni- formity of taxation would be applied by the court to the local as- sessment with the result that the existence of that power would be denied. The system of local assessments, however, had be- come too firmly entrenched in the system of American taxation thus to be overthrown. The final result of this discussion was thf view that while the local assessment is a form of tax, it is not a tax within the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of taxation except in the very special and peculiar sense that the amount of the assessment must not exceed the amount of the bene- fits conferred for the improvement for which the assessment is levied, and that the assessment must be apportioned according to such benefits. When this view became thoroughly established, it 'Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. Wis. 242 [I860]; Municipality Num- 378, 379, 400, 34 Am. Rep. 451 ber Two Praying for Opening of Ben- [1879]. ton Street v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 *For the view of the courts of [1854]; City of Norfolk v. Cham- South Carolina see §S 30, 118. berlain, 89 Va. 196; 16 S. E. 730 'Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 [1892]. 57 HISTORY OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. §34 seemed for awhile under the decision of the courts as though a power of taxation had been discovered which was subject to no practical restraint. It was assumed that the legislative determin- ation as to the existence and amounts of special benefits was final and conclusive. The application of this doctrine together with that of the freedom of the local assessment from the constitu- tional restrictions of uniformity left the legislature practically free to assess as it chose, as long as the purpose was one which might combine the elements of a public use and an especial local benefit. Prom that time on there has been a constant struggle to restrain the power of local assessment by the application of other constitutional provisions such as that forbidding the tak- ing of property without due process of law and by the application of limitations deduced from the very nature of the local assess- ment itself.' This attempt to restrict and regulate the power of ' An excellent discussion of the early history of this attempt to re- strain the power of local assessment is found in Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 390, 34 Am. Eep. 451 [1879]. The court said : "As the dangerous nature of the power began to be more and more recognized, when considered as a tax- ing power only and therefore virtual- ly without restriction, unless im- posed by the Constitution, and as the courts had held that it was not within the constitutional restriction in reference to the taxing power, the judicial mind, giving more import- ance to those peculiarities which dis- tinguished it from the taxing power pure and simple, began to discover I'estrictions and limitations arising from its nature and characteristics, as well as from the nature and char- acteristics of the taxing power in general." The court then discussed certain cases in which restrictions have been imposed upon the power of local as- sessment; among them City of Lex- ington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513; in which it was held improper to apportion the cost by requiring each owner to pay the ex- pense in that part of the improve- ment in front of his own land; the New Jersey eases, such as Tidewater Co. V. Coster, 18 N. J. E. (3 C. E. Green) 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634; State, New Jersey Railroad & Transporta- tion Company, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of New- ark, 27 N. J. L. (3 Dutch.) 185; State, Van Tassel, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 128; State, Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, Pros. V. Mayor, etc., Hoboken, 30 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 291, in which the court came to the conclusion that the determina- tion of the legislature as to the amount of benefits conferred by the improvement upon the property in question was not conclusive, but that the amount of benefits could be in- quired into in each case as a fact; and the Pennsylvania cases, such as Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. Smith) 352, 8 Am. Eep. 255, and Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615, in which it was held that assessments must be limited to spe- cial benefits, and that the front-foot rule could not be applied in all cases §34 TAXATION BY ASSESSJIENT. 58 local assessment is discussed in detail in the following chapters. indiscriminately, and that it was in- applicable to rural property. The court then said, "In tracing thus far the decisions in some of the most important states of the Union on the subject of local assessments, we have seen the gradual rise of the revisory power of the courts over this public imposition, which has not been extended to taxation pure and simple, and we have also seen the recognition of the wide differences be- tween the practical operation of the twQ^owera." Town of Macon v. Pat- ty, 57 Miss. 378, 395, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]. CHAPTER III. RELATION BETWEEN ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAX- ATION. § 35. General distinction between tax and assessment. While an assessment is in one sense a tax, it is a tax of a pecu- liar nature,^ differing from a general tax in important character- istics.^ It is said that an assessment is "distinguishable from our general idea of a tax but owes its origin to the same source or power. ' ' ' The chief and most important distinction between a tax and a local assessment is that a tax is levied for the purpose of raising revenue for paying the expenses of the government. The only benefits which the tax-payers receive, they receive as members of organized society. Many of the most valuable of these benefits would enure to them if they were not possessed of any property to be taxed. If, possessing property, some of them were able to evade the payment of the tax, they would receive the same benefits as they receive in case of payment. The individual tax-payer is, therefore, poorer in a sense by reason of the payment of the tax. The local assessment, on the other hand, does not, in theory at least, leave the property owner who pays his assessment any the poorer by reason of the entire transaction since he is ' City of Bridgeport v. New York poses and governed by principles & New Haven Railroad Company, 36 that do not apply generally." Cooley Conn. 255; 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869]; on Taxation, 416, 417, quoted Bixler Munson v. Board of Commissioners v. Board of Supervisors of the County of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dis- of Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698, 702 trict, 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1881]. [1891]. « State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, 34 ""'Special assessments are a pecu- N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 227 [1870]. liar species of taxation, standing "'Between taxes, or general taxes, apart from the general burdens im- as they are sometimes called by way posed for state and municipal pur- of distinction, which are the exac- 59 §35 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 60 fully compensated by the special benefits conferred upon him by the improvement for the amount of the assessment thus paid." tions placed upon the citizen for the support of the government paid to the state as a state, the considera- tion of which is protection by the state, and special taxes or special assessments which are imposed upon property within a limited area for the payment for a local improvement supposed to enhance the value of all property within that area there is a broad and clear line of distinction, although both of them are properly called taxes, and the proceedings for their collection are by the same offi- cers and by substantially similar methods. Taxes proper, ' or general taxes, proceed upon the theory that the existence of government is a ne- cessity; that it cannot continue with- out means to pay its expenses; that for those means it has the right to compel all citizens and property with- in its limit to contribute; and that for such contribution it renders no return of special benefit to any prop- erty, but only secures to the citizen that general benefit which results from protection to his person . and property and the promotion of those various schemes which have for their object the welfare of all.* * * On the other hand, special assessments or special taxes proceed on the theory that when a local improvement en- hances the value of neighboring prop- erty, that property should pay for the improvement." Illinois Central Eailroad Company v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 197, 198, 37 L. 132, 13 S. 293 [1893], (aflirming Illinois Central Eailroad Company, v. City of Decatur, 126 111. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613, 18 N. E. 315 [1890]. "We have spoken of the assessment for benefits as a, kind of taxation. The statement is correct to this ex- tent, that the authority to lay spe- cial assessments for benefits is found in the taxing power of the legisla- ture. It would, however, be im- proper to say that an assessment for benefits is ordinarily included in the term 'taxes' or 'taxation' It is not. 'It is never so spoken of ift the charters of cities or" boroughs or in the general law or in popular speech.' Taxes are the regular uniform and equal contribu- tions which all citizens are required to make for the support of the gov- ernment. An assessment for benefits may lack each of these qualities and yet be valid. 'It is a local assess- ment, imposed occasionally and upon a limited class of persons interested in a local improvement and is uni- form only in that it is supposed to give an added value to the property of each person assessed to the full amount of the assessment." City of New tondon v. Miller, 60 Conn. 112, 116, 117, 22 Atl. 499 [1891]. Speaking of the term "assessment," the court said: "It was employed therefore to represent those local bur- dens imposed. by municipal corpora- tions upon property bordering on an improved street or situated so near it as to be benefited by the im- provement, for the purpose of pay- ing the cost of the improvement, and laid with reference to the benefit which such property is supposed to derive from the expenditure of the money. This definition eas vi termini describes the power and defines with precision its limits. It is not a power to tax all the property within the corporation for general purposes but a power to tax specific property for a specific purpose. It is not a power to tax property generally founded upon the benefits supposed to be derived from the organization of a government for the protection of life, liberty and property, but a pow- er to tax specific property founded upon the benefit supposed to be de- 61 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. 35 This distinction between a tax and a local assessment is very gen- erally recognized by the courts.'' Furthermore a tax is a rived by the property itself from the expenditure of the tax in its imme- diate vicinity. Hence property not benefited by the improvement cannot be subjected to the burden imposed for that purpose." Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240, 254 [1866]. See § 665. " Illinois Central Railroad Com- pany v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 37 L. 132, 13 S. 293 [1893], affirming Illinois Central Railroad Company V. City of Decatur, 126 111. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613, 18 N. E. 315 [1890]; Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]; City of San Diego V. Linda Vista Irrigation District, 108 Cal. 189, 35 L. R. A. 33, 41 Pac. 291 [1895]; Wood v. Brady, 68 Cal. 78, 5 Pac. 623, 8 Pac. 599 [1885]; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 [1866]; Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [1883]; De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 167 111. 215, 47 N. E. 367 [1897], (af- firming De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 66 111. App. 596 [1896]; City of Mt. Vernon v. Peo- ple, 147 111. 359, 23 L. R. A. 807; Adams County v. City of Quincy, 130 111. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155 [1889]; Mix V. Ross, 57 111 121 [1870] ; Trus- tees of the Illinois and Michigan Ca- nal V. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403 [1851]; Lowe v. Board of Commis- sioners of Howard County, 94 Ind. 553 [1883]; Low v. Madison, Smyrna & Graham Turnpike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [1868]; City of Shreveport V. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. 1895, 46 L. R. A. 193, 26 So. 664 [1899]; Mun- son V. Board of Commissioners of The Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dis- trict, 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; McGuire v. Brockman, 58 Mo. App. 307 [1894] ; Hanscom v. City of Oma- ha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]; Matter of New York, 11 Johns. (N. Y. ) 77 ; Busbee v. Commissioners of Wake County, 93 N. C. 143 [1883]; Lima v. Cemetery Association, 42 0. S. 128, 51 Am. Rep. 809 [1884]; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]; Hill v. Higdon, 5 0. S. 243, 67 Am. Dec. 289 [1855] ; Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Hand. (Ohio) 464 [1855]; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352, 8 Am. Rep. 255 [1871]; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. City of Watertown, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. 1072 [1890]; Taylor, McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 349, sub nomine McBean v. Chandler, 24 Am. Rep. 308 [1872]; Hale v. City of Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599 [1872]; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271 [I860]; Knowlton v. Board of Su- pervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 1859]. "The general distinction that is taken between taxes and local assess- ments by courts and authors is that the former are forced contributions levied by the government alike on all property for the purpose of rais- ing revenue for the support of the government without reference to the benefit that the taxpayers may derive therefrom, while the latter are, also, forced contributions which are- levied by the government, but upon certain particular property and with a view of raising revenue for certain desig- nated purposes, having direct refer- ence to the special benefits which will enure to the property thus taxed." City of Shreveport v. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. 1895, 1904, 46 L. R. A. 193, 26 So. 664 [1899]. "Between this right to make spe- cial assessments for sidewalks and that of taxation for general corpo- ration purposes there is in the judg- ment of courts a clear distinction involving in their exercise essentially different powers and principles, the §35 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 62 recurring charge upon which an assessment is levied occasionally- only. ° one being an ordinary tax for de- fraying the expenses of the munici- pal government and the general im- provement thereof; whilst the other is a special impositon or liability arising out of the benefit conferred upon the property assessed." City of Fairfield v. Eatcliflf, 20 la. 396, 398 [1866]. "An assessment as distinguished from a tax is a special and local charge or imposition upon property in the immediate vicinity of munici- pal improvements, predicated upon the theory of benefits from such im- provements, and levied as a charge upon land, or property specially ben- efited thereby, while a, charge im- posed by law upon the assessed value of all property, real and personal, in a district, is a tax, and not an assessment, although the purpose be to malie a local improvement." Hol- ley V. County of Orange, 106 Cal. 420, 39 Pac. Rep. 790 [1895]. "The distinction between a tax and a special assessment is, that a tax is imposed for some general or pub- lic object; an exaction made for the purpose of carrying on the govern- ment directly; a charge on pro'perty that lessens its value, and in the pro- portion in which the owner is re- quired »to pay, his pecuniary ability is diminished; whereas, a special as- sessment has none of those distinct- ive features; it is levied for a special purpose, and not for a general or public object; the property is spe- cially assessed in the proportion in which it is benefited ; the assessment is but an equivalent for the increased value given to the property." De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 66 III. App. 596. 597 [1896], (affirmed De Clereq v. Barber As- phalt Paving Company, 167 111. 215, 47 N. E. 367 [1897]. " "A local assessment can only he levied on land. It cannot, as a tax, can, be made a personal liability ol the taxpayer; it is an assessment on the thing supposed to be benefited. A tax is levied on the whole state, or a known political subdivision, as a county or town. A local assess- ment is levied on property situated in a district created for the express purpose of the levy, and possessing no other function, or even existence, than to be the thing on which the levy is made. A tax is a continuing burden, and must be collected at stated short intervals for all time, and without it government cannot exist; a local assessment is excep- tional both as to time and locality — it is brought into being for a partic- ular occasion, and to accomplish a particular purpose, and dies with the passing of the occasion and the ac- complishment of the purpose. A tax is levied, collected and administered by a public agency, elected by and responsible to the community upon which it is imposed; a local assess- ment is made by an authority ai ex- tra. Yet it is like a tax, in that it . is imposed under an authority de- rived from the legislature, and is an enforced contribution to the pub- lic welfare, and its payment may be enforced by the summary method al- lowed for the collection of taxes. It is like a tax, in that it must be levied for a public purpose, and must be apportioned by some reasonable rule among those upon whose prop- erty it is levied. It is unlike a tax, in that the proceeds of the assess- ment must be expended . in an im- provement from which a benefit clear- ly exceptive and plainly perceived must enure to the property upon which it is imposed, or else the courts will interfere to prevent its enforce- ment." Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 386, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]. 63 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. §§ 36, 37 § 36. Exaction on political unit according to value held tax. If the charge or exaction is levied upon all the property within the limits of some political unit, such as a city, county, and the like, and if the levy is made in proportion to the valuation of the property upon which it is levied, such a charge or exaction is held to be a tax, and not an assessment, even if it is levied for a pur- pose for which the local assessment might have been levied.^ If the charge or exaction is levied upon all of the property in some pre-existing political subdivision of the given political unit, and is levied in proportion to the valuation of such property, such charge or exaction is ordinarily held to be a tax, and not a local assessment. The method of selecting the property which is to bear the burden in connection with the method of apportioning the burden among the property thus selected, shows that the charge was not based upon any theory of special benefits to the property upon which the tax is levied.^ Thus a tax levied upon aU the property in a given ward, for the construction of a bridge, has been held not to be a local assessment, but to be properly classed as a tax in the more limited sense of the term.^ § 37. Exaction on assessment district according to benefits, front- age or area held assessment. If a district is created which contains, or is supposed to contain, the property specially benefited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, and if the exaction is levied upon the property in such district in proportion to the benefits conferred by such iniprovement, such form of exaction is regularly recog- nized as a local assessment and not a form of general taxation. 1 County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 v. Commissioners, 38 0. S. 639 U. S. 691, 26 L. 238 [1880], (affirm- [1883]. ing Kimball v. Mobile, 14 Fed." ^ In speaking of an exaction the Cas. 489, 3 Woods 555 [1877]; court said: "As this tax, though Southern Ry. Co. v. Cherokee County, local, is levied on property, generally 144 Ala. 579, 42 So. 66 [1905]; Swan- and irrespective of local benefit, we son V. City of Ottumwa, 118 la. 161, conclude that it is not a local as- 59 L. R. A. 620, 91 N. W. 1048 sessment." Griggsry Construction [1902]; Town of Parkland V. Gaines, Company v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 88 Ky. 562, 11 S. W. 649 [1889]; 438, 58 L. R. A. 349, 351, 32 So. 399 Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) [1902]. 65 [1840]; Beggs v. Paine, 15 N. D. 'Griggsry Construction Company 436, 109 N. W. 322 [1906] ; Warder v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 58 L. R. A. 349, 32 So. 399 [1902]. § 38 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 64 A like result is reached if the property which is supposed to be benefited is marked off into an assessment district, and the ex- action for the improvement is levied upon such property, in ac- cordance with the frontage. Such an exaction is regularly held to be a local assessment, and not a form of general taxation.^ If the land which is supposed to be benefited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied is made into an assessment dis- trict, and the exaction is apportioned among such property ac- cording to the area thereof, such a form of exaction is regularly held to be a local assessment, as distinct from a form of general taxation.^ A common example of such form of assessment is found in levee districts, in which the property which is supposed to be benefited by the levee is often assessed at a certain rate per acre for the purpose of constructing the levee. Charges of this sort are regarded as local assessments.' § 38. Exaction on assessment district according to valuation. If the property, which is supposed to be benefited, is made into a special district for taxation purposes, and the exaction is appor- tioned among such property in proportion to the value thereof, we have a ease in which there is a conflict of authority on the question of whether such exaction is a local assessment or a form of general taxation. In a number of cases in which the question has been considered, it has been held that such an exaction is a 'Allentown v. Henry, 73 Pa. St. La. Ann. 182; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 404 [1873]. Miss. 652 [I860]; Williams v. Cam- ■ "Hill V. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. mack, 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; George v. [1854]. Young, 45 La. Ann. 1232, 14 So. 137 'Hill v. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. [1893]; Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; George v. 45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Eep. Young, 45 La. Ann. 1232, 14 So. 137 220, 12 So. 1 [1893]; Minor v. Das- [1893]; Minor v. Daspit, 43 La. Ann. pit, 43 La. Ann. 337, 9 So. 49 [1891]; 337, 9 So. 49 [1891]; Munson v. Munson v. Board of Commissioners Board of Commissioners of Tlie of The Atchafalaya Basin Levee Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, District, 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]; [1891]; Excelsior Planting & Manu- Excelsior Planting & Manufacturing facturing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Charnock 873 [1887]; Charnock v. Pordoche V. Fordoche & Grosse Tgte Special ' & Grosae T§te Special Levee Dls- Levee District Co., 38 La. Ann. 323 trict Co., 38 La. Ann. 323 [1886]; [1886]; Gillespie v. Police Jury of Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 Concordia, 5 La. Ann. 403 [1850]; [I860]; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Second Municipality v. Duncan, 2 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508 [1854]. 65 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. 38 local assessment and not a general tax.^ The theory upon which this result is reached is that the exaction is levied solely upon the property benefited by the improvement, and that apportion- ment according to the value of such property is in these cases a fair method of approximating the apportionment according to benefits. Thus where the property benefited by a levee is made into a special levee district, and an exaction made upon the prop- erty in such district in proportion to its value, we have a charge which is, in these cases, regarded as a local assessment.^ Like results have been reached where similar charges have been made for the expense of constructing sewers,^ or fences, under the stock law acts.* In other cases a charge upon the property which is supposed to be specially benefited by the improvement appor- tioned among such property in proportion to the value thereof, is held to be a general tax, and not a local assessment.^ "Much has been said in the argument against the validity of the statute on the assumption that it was intended as an exercise of the power of local assessment, but inasmuch as the burden does not purport Charnock v. Fordoche & Grosse T§te Special Levee District Co., 38 La. Ann. 323 [1886]; Richardson V. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 La. Ann. 220 [1856]; Mason v. Police Jury of Parish of Tensas, 9 La. Ann. 368 [1854]; Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329 [1847]; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543, 48 S. W. 629 [1898]; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; Page v. City of St. Louis, 20 Mo. 136 [1854]; Com- missioners of Chatham County v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 133 N. C. 216, 45 S. E. 566 [1903]. " Charnock v. Fordoche & Grosse Tgte Special Levee District Co., 38 La. Ann. 323 [1886]; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 La. Ann. 220 [18561; Mason v. Police Jury of Parish of Tensas, 9 La. Ann. 368 [1854]; Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329 [1847]; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543, 48 S. W. 629 [1898]; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]. ' Page V. City of St. Louis, 20 Mo. 136 [1854]. •Commissioners of Chatham Coun= ty V. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 133 N. C. 216, 45 S. E. 566 [1903]; Harper v. Commissioners of New Hanover County, 133 N. C. 106, 45 S. E. 526 [1903]; Busbee v. Commis- sioners of Wake County, 93 N. C. 143 [1883]; Cain v. Commissioners of Davie County, 86 N. C. 8 [1882]. "HoUey v. County of Orange, 106 Cal. 420 [1895]; Williams v. Cor- coran, 46 Cal. 553 [1873]; People V. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; Burguieres v. Sanders, HI La. 109, 35 So. 478 [1903]; Miller v. Hixson, 64 0. S. 39, 59 N. E. 749 [1901]; Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 0. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 [1890]; Elliott v. Berry, 41 0. S. 110 [1884]; Bowles v. State of Ohio, 37 0. S. 35 [1881]; Fields v. Commissioners of Highland County, 36 0. S. 476 [1881]; 'city of Toledo for use of Gates v. Lake Shore &' Michigan Southern Railway Co., 4 Ohio C. C. 113 [1889]. § 38 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. G6 to have been apportioned to property benefited according to benefits, it was not a rightful exercise of such power. We do not think the legislature intended to exercise the power of local as- sessment according to benefits. Except as to property within a- mile of the crossing of free turnpikes, there is no indication that special benefits were either the rule or the limit of the burden imposed. The intent of the legislature, we think, was to establish special taxing districts for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the construction of free turnpikes therein and to impose the burden thereof by taxation upon all the property within the district by a uniform rate according to its true value in money. ' ' " Thus where a district is created for the purpose of constructing a road,^ or a free turnpike,* or a levee," and the expense of such improvement is raised by a charge upon such property according to the valuation thereof, such charge is regarded in these cases as a general tax. An exaction of this sort, not to exceed ten mills on the dollar, upon all taxable real estate for the purpose of open- ing, widening, and grading streets, has been held to be a tax, even though called "assessment" in the statute by which such exaction was imposed.^" Under a statute authorizing the levy of a "special tax" to be levied "by the front foot or the assessed value there- of " a "special tax" of one per cent was levied on land in a street improvement district. This charge was upheld by the court as a form of general taxation, though referred to in the opinion as an "assessment." "Whether a legislature could authorize a munici- pal corporation to assess property for street improvements, not according to value, but according to the supposed benefit to ac- crue from the improvement to the property taxed, has sometimes been questioned, though generally, if not uniformly, such legisla- tion ha^ been sustained. But the tax under consideration in- volves no such question. It was assessed according to value upon the property abutting the street to be improved, and differs from ordinary taxation only in bejng levied upon streets instead of "Bowles V. state of Ohio, 37 0. S. 0. S. 35 [1881]; Fields v. Commis- 35, 44, 45 [1881]. sioners of Highland County, 36 0. 'Williams v. Corcoran, 46 Cal. 553 S. 476 [1881]. [1873]. "People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; 'Miller v. Hixson, 64 0. S. 39, 59 Burguieres v. Sanders, 111 La. 109, N. E. 749 [1901]; Carlisle v. Heth- 35 So. 478 [1903]. erington, 47 0. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 "Keys v. City of Neodesha, 64 [1890]; Bowles v. State of Ohio, 37 Kan. 681, 68 Pac. 625 [1902]. 67 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 39 larger districts. It is quite analogous in principle to the method of assessment of highway labor by districts in use in this and many other states. It is not tailing private property for use with- out just compensation, but a method of distributing among the citizens the public burden of improving the streets. We think the assessment for improving the streets was valid." '^ A charge ac- cording to valuation upon all the property in a sewer district for the purpose of building a sewer has been called a "general tax. " '^ §39. Term "tax" ppma facie excludes local assessment. Since there is this important and fundamental distinction be- tween the tax in the more limited sense and the local assessment, the question often arises whether provisions in constitutions and statutes which refer by name to taxes, include also local assess- ments. This is primarily a question of legislative intention. In the absence of anything to show the specific intention of the leg- islature, the general rule is that the local assessment possesses such marked peculiarities differentiating it from the tax in the more limited sense of the term, that the use of the term "tax" does not prima facie show an intention to include local assess- ments.^ "Burnes v. Mayor and City Coun- [1875]; Excelsior Planting & Manu- cil of Atchison, 2 Kan. 448, 479 factuiing Company v. Green, 39 La. [1864]. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Char- " City of Toledo for use of Gates nock v. Fordoche & Grosse Tete V. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Special Levee District Company, 38 Railway Co., 4 Ohio C. C. 113 La. Ann. 323 [1886]; Barrow v. [18£9]. Hepler, 34 La. Ann. 362 [1882]; ' Board of Improvement Paving Board of Levee Commissioners v. Lo- District No. 5 v. Sisters of Mercy of rio Bros., 33 La. Ann. 276 [1881]; Female Academy of Ft. Smith, — Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. Ark. , 109 S. W. 1165 [1908]; 429 [1862]; Wallace v. Shelt'on, 14 Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 La. Ann.- 498 [1859]; Williams v. S. W. 707 [1897]; McGehee v. Ma- Cammack, 27 Miss; 209, 61 Am. Dee. this, 21 Ark. 40 [I860]; Chambers 508 [1854]; Lamar Water & Electric V. Satterlee, 40 Cal.'497 [1871]; Kil- Light Company v. City of Lamar, gour V. Drainage Commissioners, 111 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. R. A. 157, 26 111. 342 [1885]; City of Chicago v. S. W. 1025, 31 S. W. 756 [1895]; Colby, 20 111. 614 [1858]; Higgins City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. V. City of Chicago, 18 111. 276 [1857]; 32; 14 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 Trustees of the Illinois and Michigan [1892]; Busbee v. Commissioners ot Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403 Wake County, 93 N. 0. 143 [1883]; [1851] ; Yeomans v. Riddle, 84 la! County of Harris v. Boyd, 70 Tex. 147," 50 N. W. 886 [1891]; Johnston 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]; Taylor v. v. Louisville, 74 Ky. (11 Bush.) 527 Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]. § 40 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. M § 40. Essential nature of charge controls. The use of the terms "tax" and "assessment" in statutory or constitutional provisions is by no means conclusive of the nature of the charge. This depends rather upon its own ' elements than upon the name by which it is called.^ On the one hand the term "assessment" is sometimes used where the context shows that a general tax is intended.^ It has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States that local asseslinents were so rare a century ago that the word 'assessment' then employed in a statute must be taken as referring to rates or to general taxes.' More often a charge which is essentially a local assessment is referred to in the statute as a tax.* Thus a charge which is in its essential nature a local assessment is referred as a "tax"^ a "special tax"" a "macadam tax"' a "sewer tax"* or a "levee tax."" So a stat- ute making certain property of railroad corporations "subject to taxation by ordinance for city purposes" has been held to confer the power to levy local assessments as well as to impose general taxes.^' In speaking of an exaction called in the statute a 'tax' but apportioned according to benefits, the court said: "designat- ing as a tax that which in tts elements is an assessment can have 'Doyle V. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 676, 20 L. 719 [1869]; Tallant v. [1874]. City of Burlington, 39 la. 543 'City Council of Augusta v. Mur- [1874]; County of Harris v. Boyd, phy, 79 Ga. 101, 3 S. E. 326 [1887]; 70 Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]. In tlie Matter of the Petition of For free gravel roads: Board of Dassler for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Commissioners of County of Monroe 35 Kan. 678, 12 Pac. 130 [1886]. v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. = Wells V. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531, 124 [1896]. 45 L. 986, 21 S. 697 [1901]. For side walks: City of Dubuque •Hancock v. Whittemore, 50 Cal. v. Harrison, 34 la. 163 [1872]; Mer- 522 [1875]; People ex rel. Doyle v. riam v. Moody's Executors, 25 la. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 [1874]; Daily 163 [1872]. v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367 [1872] 'Sanger v. Rice, 43 Kan. 580, 23 "An assessment for levee purposes Pac. 633 [1890]. is not a tax in the strict legal sense 'Dittoe v. City of Davenport, 74 of the term, although it is true the la. 66, 36 X. W. 895 [1887]; Mason Legislature has called it so in the v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512, 11 Pac. 402 act whose constitutionalit5' is at- [1886]. tacked." Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 " Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 La. Ann. La. Ann. 220, 221 [1856]. 220 [1856]. "Willard v. Presbury, 81 U. S. (14 "City of Philadelphia for use of Wall.) 676, 20 L. 719 [1869], (an McCann v. Philadelphia & Reading assessment for re-paving a street). Railroad Company. 177 Pa. St. 292, ''As in street improvements: Wil- 34 L. R. A. 564, 35 Atl. 610 [1896]. lard V. Presbury, 81 I' S. (14 Wall.) 69 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 41 no effect in determining whether it is one or the other." ^^ In the same opinion the same charge is often referred to indiscrimin- ately as a ' tax ' and ' assessment. ' ^- § 41. Term 'tax' as including assessment. If the statute specifically provides that the word 'tax' means any tax or special assessment, there is, of course, no question but that under such statute the word 'tax' includes assessments.^ Under such statute an assessment is regarded as a tax within the meaning of a statute providing for foreclosure in equity of the lien given by statute for such assessments,^ or within the meaning of a statute providing for appeals to a certain court.' Under some statutes the provisions concerning taxes are so worded as to show the intention of the legislature to include assessments in such provisions. Full effect is, of course, given to such intention, and an assessment is a tax within the meaning of such statutes.* Thus, under such statutes, an assessment is a tax with reference to the sale and conveyance of land for non-pay- ment of taxes," and with reference to the settlement of unpaid taxes between the town treasurer and the county treasurer." So a certificate issped upon a sale of land for the non-payment of an assessment is a ' tax certificate ' '' and a statute limiting the bring- ing of an action "to set aside any sale of lands for the non-pay- " People ex rel. Doyle v. Austin, N. W. 598 [1882]; Dalrymple v. City 47 Cal. 353, 358 [1874]. of Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178, 10 N. W. i^Willard V. Presbury, 81 U. S. (14 141 [1881]. Wall.) 676, 20 L. 719 [1869]; City "We have used the terms 'assess- of Dubuque v. Harrison, 34 la. 163 ment' and 'tax' interchangeably, for- [1872]. they are so employed in the statute ' Blake v. People for use of Cald- wnich rules this case. Within the well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. meaning of those statutes a special 2 Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Land- assessment for tlie cost of grading ing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. is a. tax." Sheboygan County v. City 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]. of Sheboygan, 54 Wis. 415, 421, 11 "People ex rel. Johnson v. Spring- N. W. 598 [1882]. er, 106 111. 542 [1883]; Potwin v. "Sanger v. Rice, 43 Kan. 580, 23 Johnson, 106 111. 532 [1883]. Pac. 633 [1890]; Yates v. City of * Sanger v. Rice, 43 Kan. 580, 23 Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 352, 66 N. W. Pac. 633 [1890]; Pratt v. City of 248 [1896]. Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 658, 68 N. W. " Sheboygan County v. City of She- 392 [1896]; Yates v. City of Mil- boygan, 54 Wis. 415, 11 N. W. 598 waukee, 92 Wis. 352, 66 N. W. [1882]. 248 [1896]; Sheboygan County v. 'Pratt v. City of Milwaukee, 93 City of Sheboygan, 54 Wis. 415, 11 Wis. 658, 68 N.'w. 392 [1896]. i412 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 70 raent of taxes, or to cancel any tax certificate, or to restrain or prevent the issuing of any tax deed or any tax certificate or to set aside and cancel any tax deed" to "nine months after the making of such sale, date of such certificate or recording of such tax deed, as the case -may be, and not thereafter ' ' applies to a sale for the non-payment of a local assessment.' § 42. Assessment not tax within pflsvisions for exemption. Many constitutional and statutory provisions are found ex- empting property from taxation or from taxation for certain pur- poses. The validity and effect of these provisions are discussed in detail elsewhere.^ In this connection it is sufficient to say that it is generally held that a local assessment is not a tax within the meaning of provisions of this sort.^ This principle has been ap- ' Dalrymple i . C ity of Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178, 10 X. W. 141 [1881]. ^See § 618. - Ford V. Delta &' Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. 590, 17 S. 230 [1897], (affirming Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 43 Fed. 181 [1890]) ; Board of Improvement Paving Dis- trict No. 5 V. Sisters of Mercy of Female Academy of Ft. Smith, — Ark. , 109 S. W. 1165 [1908] ; City of San Diego v. Linda Vista. Irrigation District, 108 Cal. 189; 35 L. R. A. 33; 41 Pac. 291 [1905]; City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869]; City of Chicago in Trust for LTse of Schools V. City of Chicago, 207 111. 37, 69 N. E. 580 [1904] ; County of Adams v. City of Quincy, 130 111. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155, 22 X. E. 624 [1890] ; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. City of Deca- tur, 126 111. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613, 18 N. E. 315. [1890]; University v. People, 80 111. 333, 22 Am. Rep. 187; People v. Western Society, 87 111. 246 [1871]; City of Ottawa V. Spencer, 40 111. 211 [1866] ; Trus- tees V. McConnel, 12 111. 138 [1850]; Edwards & Walsh Construction Co. V. Jasper County, 117 la. 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 [1902]; Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Manufacturing Co., 97 la. 286, 35 L. R. A. 63, 66 N. W. 176 [1896]; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 317 [1870] ; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail, road Co. v. Peterson, 5 Kan. App. 103, 48 Pac. 877 [1897]; Zable v. Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, 13 L. R. A. 668, 17 S. W. 212, 13 Ky. L. R. 385 [1891]; City of Lafayette v. Male Orphans' Asy- lum, 4 La. Ann. 1 [1849]; Crowley V. Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329 [1847]; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. City of Grand Rap- ids, 102 Mich. 374, 29' L. R. A. 195, 60 X. W. 767 [1894]; Lefevre v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 [1853] ; Washburn Memorial Orphan Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76 N. W. 204 [1898]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. W. 64 [1904]; Kan- sas City Exposition Driving Park v. Kansas City, 174 Mo. 425, 74 S. W. 979 [1903]; City of Clinton to use of Thornton v. Henry County, 115 JIo. 557, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415, 22 S. W. 494 [1893]; Sheehan v. Good Sa- maritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 155; City of Beatrice v. Brethren Church of Beatrice, 41 Neb. 358; 59 X. W. 932 [1894]; State, New Jersey Midland 71 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. §42 plied to constitutional and statutory provisions exempting from taxation churches,^ cemeteries,' charitable institutions,^ educa- tional institutions," and public school property.' So it has. been Hailroad Co., Pros. v. Mayor and Al- dermen of Jersey City, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 97 [1880]; State, New Jer- sey Railroad & Transportation Com- pany, Pros. V. City of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 330 [1875]; State, Protestant Foster Home Society, Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 30 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 478, 13 Am. Rep. 464 [1873]; State, New Jersey Railroad & Transportation Co., Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 27 N. J. L. (3 Dutch.) 185 [1858]; President and Council of the City of Paterson v. Society for Es- tablishing Useful Manufactures, g4 X. J. L. (4 Zab.) 385 [1854]; Roose- velt Hospital V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 84 N.' Y. 108 [1881]; Hassan V. City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528 [1876]; In re M. E. Church, 66 N. Y. 395 [1876]; Buffalo City Ceme- tery V. Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 503 [1871]; Sharp V. Speir, 4 Hill 76 [1843]; In the matter of the Application of the Mayor and Aldermen and Com- monalty of the City of New York for the Enlarging and Improving a Part of Nassau Street in the said City, 11 Johns. 77 [1814]; City of Philadelphia v. Union Burial Ground Society of the City and County of Philadelphia, 178 Pa. St. 533, 36 L. R. A. 263, 36 Atl. 172 [1896]; Beltz- hoover Borough v. Heirs of Beltz- hoover, 173 Pa. St. 213, 33 Atl. 1047 [1896]; New Castle City v. Jackson, 172 Pa. St. 86, 33 Atl. 236. [1893]; Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospi- tal, 143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. 744 [1891]; Second Universalist Society V. City of Providence, 6 R. I. 235; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. City of Watertown, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. 1072 [1890]; Yates v. City of Mil- waukee, 92 Wis. 352, 66 N. W- 248 [1896]. " City of Atlanta v. First Presby- terian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 12 L. R. A. 852, 13 S. E. 252 [1890]; Lefevre V. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 [1853]; City of Beatrice v. Brethren Church of Beatrice, 41 Neb. 358, 59 N. W. 932 [1894]; In the matter of the Application of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York for the Enlarging and Improving a Part of Nassau Street in the said City, 11 Johns. 77 [1814]. ' Louisville, v. Nevin, 73 Ky. ( 10 Bush.) 549, 19 Am. Rep. 78 [1874]; Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buf- falo, 46 N. Y. 506 [1871]; Lima v. Cemetery Association, 42 0. S. 128, 51 Am. Rep. 809 [1884]. "Zabel V. Louisville Baptist Or- phans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, 13 L. R. A. 668, 17 S. W. 212, 13 Ky. L. R. 385 [1891]; City of Lafayette v. Male Orphans' Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1 [1849]; Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329 [1847]; Washburn Memo- rial Orplian Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76 N. W. 204 [1898]; Boston Seamen's Friend Society v. Mayor of City of Boston, 116 Mass. 181, 17 Am. Rep. 153; Sheehan V. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 155, 11 Am. Rep. 412 [1872]; Roose- velt Hospital V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 84 N. Y. 108 [1881]. ' In the matter of College Street, 8 R. I. 474 [18.67]. ' City of Chicago in Trust for Use of Schools V. City of Chicago, 207 HI. 37, 69 N*. E. 580 [1904]; St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468 [1857]. § 42 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 72 applied to constitutional * and statutory " provisions exempting from taxation land belonging to the state, to municipalities and the like. It has been applied to statutes exempting land from "taxation" as long as it is leased, used and occupied by a State Agricultural Society " and to a statute exempting from ' taxes charges or impositions' property of a society for the establish- ment of useful manufactures.^^ Under the constitution of Texas a homestead is exempt from forced*sales, but by another provi- sion this exemption does not apply to sales for taxes due thereon. The original view of the Supreme Court of Texas was that an as- sessment was a tax within the meaning of this latter provision and that accordingly a homestead was not exempt from a forced sale for non-payment of an assessment due thereon.^- Subse- quently, however, this view of the meaning of the word 'tax' was abandoned, the earlier decision was overruled, and it was held that an assessment is not a tax within the meaning of such provi- sion, and that accordingly a homestead is exempt from forced sale for non-payment of an assessment.^^ So an assessment is not a tax within the meaning of a statute providing for a certain form of taxation for railroads and exempting them from all other taxation ; ^* or within a statute exempting from taxation for five years from the sale thereof, any lands sold by the United States ^^' or within a statute exempting from 'all taxation' lands granted ' Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Lovenberg v. City of Galveston, 17 City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 W. 64 [1904]; City of Clinton to [1897]. use of Thornton v. Henry County, " City of Bridgeport v. New York 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. St. Eep. 415, & New Haven Railroad Co., 36 Conn. 22 S. W. 494 [1893]. 255, 4 Am. Eep. 63 [1869]; Illinois ' Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 Central Railroad Co. v. City of Deca- N. Y. 528 [1876]. tur, 126 111. 92, 1 L. R. A. 613, 18 "Yates V. City of Milwaultee, 92 N. E. 315 [1890]; Lake Shore & Wis. 352, 66 N. W. 248 [1896]. Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. " President and Council of the City City of Grand Rapids, 102 Mich. 374, of Paterson v. Society for Establish- 29 L. R. A. 195, 60 N. W. 767 [1894] ; ing Useful Manufactures, 24 N. J, State, New Jersey Midland Railroad L. (4 Zab.) 385 [1854]. Co., Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of '^Lufkin V. City of Galveston, 58 Jersey City, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 97 Tex. 545 [1883]. [1880]; State, New Jersey Railroad "Higgins v. Bordages, 88 Tex. 458, & Transportation Co., Pros. v. City 63 Am. St. Eep. 770, 31 S. W. 52, of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 803 [1895]. To the same effect are 330 [1875]. Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 35 L. '"Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. Ann. R. A. 666, 38 S. W. 154 [1896]; 329 [1847]. 73 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 42 to a certain railroad ^° or exempting from taxation for any city purposes lands within the city limits used for agricultural pur- poses.^' In all these cases it is generally held that a local assess- ment is not a tax within the meaning of such provisions for ex- emption, and that it may, therefore, be levied notwithstanding such provisions. In Pennsylvania a local assessment was origin- ally held to be a tax within the meaning of provisions in the constitution and statutes exempting certain property from taxa- tion,^* except such assessments as were referred by the courts to the police power, such as assessments for curbing," or for side- walks.^' Subsequently, however, the earlier decisions were not followed, and it was held that within the meaning of such provi- sions for exemption an assessment is not a tax,^^ on the ground that "the constitutional exemption relates to taxes proper, or general public contributions levied and collected by the state, or by its authorized municipal agencies for general governmental purposes, as distinguished from peculiar forms of taxation or special assessments imposed on property within the limited areas by which the property assessed is specially and peculiarly bene- fited and enhanced in value to an amount at least equal to the assessment. ' ' ^^ This later view has been taken in several cases decided subsequently,^^ and the Pennsylvania courts now seem to be committed to the rule accepted by the great weight of au- thority. "Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. City Pa. St. 475, 30 Atl. 1007 [1895]. of Watertown, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. ■= Broad Street; Sewickley Metho. 1072 [1890]. dist Episcopal Church's Appeal, 165 "Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Pa. St. 475; 30 Atl. 1007 [1895], Manufacturing Co., 97 la. 286, 35 L. quoted in City of Philadelphia v. K. A. 63, 66 N. W. 176 [1896]. Union Burial Ground Society of the " City of Brie v. First Universalist City and County of Philadelphia, 178 Church, 105 Pa. St. 278 [1884]; Olive Pa. St. 533, 538, 36 L. R. A. 263, Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 36 Atl. 172 [1896]. St. 129, 39 Am. Rep. 732. "' City of Philadelphia v. Union " Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Burial Ground Society of the City Hospital, 143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. and County of Philadelphia, 178 Pa. 744 [1891]. ■ St. 533, 36 L. R. A. 263, 36 Atl. 172 ™ Wilkinsburg Borough V. Home for [1896]; Beltzhoover Borough v. Aged Women, 131 Pa. St. 109; 6 L. Heirs of Beltzhoover, 173 Pa. St. 213, R. A. 531, 18 Atl. 937 |1890]. 33 Atl. 1047 [1896]; New Castle City =' Broad Street; Sewickley Metho- v. Jackson, 172 Pa. St. 86, 33 At!, dist Episcopal Church's Appeal, 165 236 [1895]. §43 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 74 § 43. Assessment not tax within provision for equality and uni- formity. In the constitutions of the several states of the union are often found provisions that taxation must be uniform, or uniform and equal, throughout the state. Whether an assessment is a tax within the" meaning of these provisions is a question which has often been presented to the courts for decision, and it is held by the great weight of authority that»a local assessment is not a tax within the meaning of such constitutional provisions.' In some opinions this view is somewhat qualified by the expression ' Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Creighton v. Manson, 27. Cal. 614 [1865]; Burnett v. Ma/or and Common Council of the City of Sar- ramento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518 [1859]; Speer v. Mayor and Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49; 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [1883]; Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. 91 [1867] ; Reinken v. Fuehring 130 Ind. 382 30 Am. St. Rep. 247, 15 L. R. A. 624, 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 354, 30 N. E. 414 [1891]; Gosnell V. City of Louisville, 104 Ky. 201, 46 S. W. 722, 20 Ky. L. R. 519 [1898]; State ex rel. Hill v. Judges of Court of Appeals, 46 La. Ann. 1292, 16 So. 219; Excelsior Planting & Manufac- turing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; City of New Or- leans praying for Opening of Casaca- loo and Moreau Streets, 20 La. Ann. 497 [1868]; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; Yeatman V. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220 [1856] ; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann. 498 [1859]; New Orleans Drainage Com- pany praying for the confirmation of a tableau, 11 La. Ann. 338 [1856] ; (see opinion on rehearing, 351); Oakey v. Mayor, 1 La. 1 [1830]; Motz V. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 494 [1869]; Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895]; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; Vasser V. George, 47 Miss. 713 [1873]; Daily V. Swope, 47 Miss. 367 [1872]; He- man Construction Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo. 172, 104 S. W. 67 [19071; Meier v. City of St. Louis. 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; City of St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 19 S. W. 713 [1892]; Adam.s V. Lindell, 72 Mo. 198 [1880]. (So Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo. App. 197 [1878]); Shuford v. Commissioners of Gaston County, 86 N. C. 552 [1882]; Cain v. Commissioners ot Davie County, 86 N. C. 8 [18821; Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903J; King V. Portland, 38 Ore. 402, 52 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900] ; Mas- ters V. City of Portland, 24 Ore. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893]; King v. City of Portland, 2 Ore. 146 [1865]; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]; Allen v. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 [1879]; Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 612 [1875]; Nalle v. City of Austin, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 103 S. W. 825 [1907]; Davis v. City of Lynchburg, 84 Va. 881, 6 S. E. 230 [1888]; Richmond & Allegheny R. R. Co. V. City of Lynchburg, 81 Va. 473 [1866]; Gilkeson v. Frederick Jus- tices 13 Gratt. (Va.) 577; City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]; Douglass v. Town of Harrisville, 9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548 [1876]. 75 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 43 of the opinion that if such provision does apply, the assessment may nevertheless be so apportioned that it will conform to the requirement of uniformity as nearly as such a form of tax can.- It "is as uniform as any taxation in relation to the subject could be.'" This view has been expressed both in cases in which it has been said that the constitutional requirement of uniformity ap- plies,* and those in which it is said not to apply.^ Analogous pro- . visions are found in some constitutions to the effect that taxes levied upon property must be assessed in proportion to the value of such property. Under provisions of this sort it is ordinarily held that a local assessment is not a tax within the meaning of the term as used in such provision." This result has been reached under very stringent constitutional provisions, as that "all taxes levied on property shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property" '' or that "all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value," ^ or that taxes on prop- erty shall be "assessed equally, according to the just value there- of." " No matter how clear the constitutional requirement of uniformity may be, the theory, as held by these courts, is that such provisions are intended to apply only to general taxation im- posed for the purpose of raising revenue to carry on the govern- ment, and not to local assessments for which, in the theory of the law, at least, full compensation is made to the owner of the prop- erty assessed, in the form of benefits conferred by the improve- ment for which the assessment is levied.^" ^Whiting V. Quackenbush, 54 Cal. Deo. ^76 [1858]; Jones v. Holzapfel, 306 [1880]; Law v. Madison, Smyr- 11 Okl. 405, 68 Pae. 511 [1902]; na & Graham Turnpike Co., 30 Ind. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. City of 77 [1868]; Oakey v. Mayor, 1 La. Watertown, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. 1 [1830]. 1072 [1890]. "Oakey v. Mayor, 1 La. 1 [1830]. 'Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- * Whiting V. Quackenbush, 54 Cal. ham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 306 [1880]. • 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]. "Oakey v. Mayor, 1 La. 1 [1830]. Mones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okl. 405, 'Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- 08 Pac. 511 [1902]. ham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. "City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]; Richardson 212, 24 Atl. 817 [1892]. V. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; "These questions are considered in City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212, connection with specifle constitution- 24 Atl. 817 [1892] ; Egyptian Levee al provisions. See § 146 et seq. Co. V. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. § 44 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 76 5 44. Special views of certain states. In some jurisdictions a different vieV was taken originally, the courts in these states holding that an assessment was a tax with- in the meaning of the constitutional provision requiring uniform- ity ; but either by change in judicial decision or by constitutional amendment this view has been abandoned. Thus in Colorado it was held originally that an assessment was a tax and therefore invalid as in violation of the constftutional requirement of uni- formity.^ This theory was subsequently abandoned and the view entertained by the weight of authority, that an assessment was not a tax within the meaning of such constitutional requirement was adopted.^ It may be here noted that when the original Colo- rado rule on this point was in force it was applied to improve- ments which the court referred to the taxing power such as curb- stones and gutters,^ or grading and paving streets,* but not to improvements referred by the court to the doctrine of the police power, such as sewers,'^ in which case assessments were held to be valid though not uniform. In Illinois a local assessment was held to be a tax within the meaning of the constitutional requirement of uniformity." This principle, however, was applied so as to in- validate assessments apportioned according to the frontage of the land assessed,'' and was not so applied as to invalidate assess- ments entirely. If apportioned according to actual benefits, an assessment might be valid.' Subsequently on the adoption of the ' 7n re House Resolutions Concern- [1867]; Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. 91 iag Street Improvements, 15 Colo. [1867]; City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 598, 26 Pae. 323 [1890] ; Wilson v. 111. 306 [1866] ; City of Ottawa v. Chilcott, 12 Colo. 600, 21 Pac. 901 Spencer, 40 111. 211 [1866]; City of [1889]; Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 Chicago v. Larned, 34 111. 203 1864]. [1881]. '"In that case (i. e., City of Chi- -City of Denver v. Knowles, 17 cago v. Larned, 34 111. 203 [1864]) Colo. 204, 17 L. R. A. 135, 30 Pac. it was held that in taxation, equal- 1041 11892], (overruling Palmer v. ity and uniformity were indispensa- Way, 6 Colo. 106 [1881], and the ble to its constitutionality, and that cases which followed it). the same principle applied to assess- ' Wilson V. Chilcott, 12 Colo. 600, ments' for public improvements, and 21 Pac. 901 [1889]. that an assessment upon the size or * In re House Resolutions Concern- width of the front of a lot without ing Street Improvements, 15 Colo. reference to its value was invalid, ai 598, 26 Pac. 323 [1890]. being in violation of the principle ° City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 of equality and uniformity." Hol- Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899 [1889]; Keese brook v. Dickinson, 46 111. 285, 287, V. City of Denver, 10 Colo. 112, 15 288 [1867]. Pac. 825 [1887]. "Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. 91 [1867]. ' Holbrook v. Dickinson, 46 111. 285 77 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 44 constitution of 1870 a provision inserted therein " authorized tho legislature to "vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special as- sessment or by special taxation of contiguous property or other- wise." Under this provision it has been held that a local assess- ment is not within the provision of the constitution requiring uni- formity of taxation.^'' This question in Illinois, then, resolves itself into a question of the rule of apportionment, and is dis- cussed in detail under that topic. ^' In Minnesota it was held ori- ginally that a local assessment is a tax within the provision re- quiring a tax to be levied according to the valuation of the prop- erty assessed.^- Subsequently a provision was inserted in the new constitution of Minnesota allowing local assessments to be levied according to the benefits conferred by the improvement up- on the property assessed, and in some cases, according to the frontage of the property benefited, upon the improvement.^^ Un- der such a provision an assessment is not held to be a tax within the meaning of the provision requiring uniformity. In South Carolina the view is now maintained that an assessment is a tax within the meaning of the' provision requiring uniformity as far as such assessment is of a kind referrable to the taxing power.^* Whether an assessment, as for a sidewalk, can be referred to the police power, and hence held not to be a tax within the meaning of the provision requiring uniformity is a question upon which there is a eonfliet of opinion in these jurisdictions, Tennessee holding that such an improvement as a sidewalk is to be referred to the police power and is, therefore, not a tax within the mean- ing of the provision requiring uniformity,^' while in South Caro- lina it has finally been held that such improvements are not so "Constitution of Illinois 1870, Art. 322 [1898]; Mauldin v. City Council IX., § 9. of Greenville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. "White V. People ex rel. City of St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]. E. 842 [1893]; State ex rel. Hoel- " See Chapter XIII. beck v. City Council of Charlestown, '2 Bidwell V. Coleman, 11 Minn. 45; 12 Rich. 702 [I860]. Stinson V. Smith, 8 Minn. 366 [1863]. "Mayor and Aldermen v. Maber- ." Constitution of Minnesota, Art. ry, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 IX., § 9. ■ Am. Dee. 315 [1845] ; Whyte v. May- " Mauldin v. City Council of Green- or and Aldermen of Nashville, 32 ville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Rep. Tenn. (2 Swan.) 364 [1852]; Wash- 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 ington v. Mayor and Aldermen of [1898]; Stehmeyer v. City Council Nashville, 31 Tenn (1 Swan.) 177 of Charleston, 53 S. C. 259, 31 R. E. [1851]. § 45 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 78 within the police power that assessments therefor are not taxes. Accordingly such assessments are held to be taxes within the meaning of the provision requiring uniformity. '^^'^ In Tennessee assessments other than those, there referred to the police power, were for a long time held to be taxes within the rule requiring uniformity of taxation.^' This view has, however, been aban- doned, and in that state a local assessment is held not to be a tax within the meaning of such coHigtitutional provisions.^* In Wisconsin the provision requiring uniformity in taxation was held of itself to apply to a local assessment on the ground that an assessment is to be regarded as a tax, but under another clause of the constitution of Wisconsin ^^ providing that the legislature might "provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages and (to) restrict their power of taxation, assessment" and the like, it was held that an assessment could be upheld though not complying with the requirement of uniformity.^' § 45. Assessment as tax within provisions for collection. Statutes and ordinances often contain provisions of various kinds for the collection of taxes. Whether an assessment is or is not a tax within the meaning of such provisions depends largely on the context and on the way in which the words are employed. No absolute rule can be laid down. In general, however, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, an assessment is not a tax within the meaning of these provisions.^ Thus under 1° Mauldin V. City Council of Green- ^ Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 ville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Eep. Wis. 242 [I860]. 855, 43 L. K. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 'City of Galveston v. Guaranty [1898], (overruling dictum in Maul- Trust Co. of New York, 107 Fed. 325, din V. City County of Greenville, 42 46 C. C. A. 319 [1901] ; City of High- S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 lands v. Johnson, 24 Colo. 371, 51 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]). Pae. 1004 [1897]; Sargent & Com- " Reelfast Lake Levee District v. pany v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 32 L. E. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. A. 822, 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]; Sam- 725, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]; Taylor uels v. Drainage Commissioners, 125 McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 Tenn. 111. 536, 17 N. E. 829 [1889] ; Lein- (9 Heisk.) 349, sub nomine McBean decker v. People ex rel. Johnson, 98 V. Chandler, 24 Am. Rep. 308 [1872]; 111. 21 [1881]; Mix v. Ross, 57 111. State V. Butler, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea) 121 [1870]; City of Chicago v. Colby, 418 [1883]. ■ 20 111. 614 [1858]; Gould v. Mayor " Arnold v. Mayor and Aldermen and City Council of Baltimore, 59 of Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 3 L. R. Md. 378 [1882]; McCutcheon v. Pa- A. (N. S.) 837, 90 S. W. 469 [1905]. ciflc Railroad Co., 72 Mo. App. 271 « Art. XI., § 3. 79 ASSESSMENT AND GENERAL TAXATION. § 45 statutes requiring a claim for taxes to be registered," or requiring warrants to be. issued for the collection thereof,^ or authorizing the 'collection of interest on unpaid taxes,* or providing for the remission of part of the interest and penalties due on unpaid taxes if paid within a certain time,' or providing a special proeed- nre for foreclosing the liens of taxes," or providing at what term of court application for judgment for delinquent taxes must be made,' or authorizing a sale of real property' as the right of way of a railway company " in payment of delinquent taxes ; or au- thorizing the sale of personal property for delinquent taxes,^" or fixing a period of limitations within which the collection of taxes must be enforced,^^ or providing specifically that a period of lim- itations, otherwise applicable, should not apply to the collec- tion of taxes,^^ it is held that assessments are not taxes within the meaning of such provisions. In most of these cases it may be observed, there are other provisions governing assessments as such, or else there have been other provisions, since repealed gov- erning assessments. Thus where separate statutes provided for sales for taxes and sales for assessments, it was held that the re- peal of the statute providing for sales for assessments did not authorize a sale for assessments under and by virtue of the provi- sions authorizing a sale for taxes.^''' Power to sell "for the non-pay- ment of any taxes" does not confer power to sell for the non-pay- ment of local assessments." A statute providing that assessments [1897]; State of Nebraska ex rel. 'City of Chicago v. Colby, 20 111. Ransom v, Irey, 42 Neb. 186, 60 N. 614 [1858]; Allen v. City of Galves- W. 601 [1894]; Pray v. Northern ton, 51 Tex. 302 [1879]. Liberties, 31 Pa. St. 69 [1850]; Al- » McCutcheon v. Pacific Railroad len V. City of Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 Co., 72 Mo. App. 271 [1897]. [1879]; City of Seattle v. Whittel- "Mix v. Ross, 57 111. 121 [1870]; sey, 17 Wash. 292, 49 Pac. 489 State of Nebraska ex rel. Ransom [1897]. V. Irey, 42 Neb. 186, 60 N. W. 601 = Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 [1894]. Pa. St. 69 [1850]. "Gould v. Mayor and City Coun- = City of Highlands v. Johnson, 24 oil of Baltimore, 59 Md. 378 [1882]. Colo. 371, 51 Pac. 1004 [1897]. "City of Galveston v. Guaranty ' Sargent & Company v. Tuttle, 67 Trust Co. of New York, 107 Fed. 325, Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822, 34 Atl. 46 C. C. A. 319 [1901]. 1028 [1895]. "Citv of Chicago v. Colby, 20 111. = City of Seattle v. Whittelsey, 17 014 [1858]. Wash. 292, 49 Pac. 489 [1897]. "Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525 "Samuels v. D'-aina Warren v. Warrpti, 148 111. 641, 286 [18931. 36 N. E. 611 [18941. == Oibbs v. People's National Bank, However, a provision in a will re- 198 111. 307, 64 N. E. 1060 [1902]. §50 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 86 § 50. Special tax. The term "special tax" is one which is used with several differ- ent meanings. In many cases it is used as a synonym of the local assessment.^ Where this meaning attaches to the term, the charge is often referred to indiscriminately as a "special tax'' and as an "assessment." - It is occasionally called by both names at once.' Another meaning which attaches to the term "special tax" is that of a tax analogous to thf general tax, but devoted to a specific purpose and not to be used for the general expenses of the public corporation which levies it.* Thus a local assessment was held not to be a special tax within the meaning of a constitu- tional provision which imposed a limitation upon the rate of tax- ation ' ' general or special. ' ' ^ Such a special tax is a branch of the taxing power and not an exercise of eminent domain.'' '^Tallant v. City of Burlington, 39 la. 543 [1874]; City of Dubuque v. Harrison, 34 la. 163 [1872]; Board of Commissioners of County of Mon- roe V. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896] ; Hentig v. Gilmore, 33 Kan. 234, 6 Pac. 304 [1885]; Bar- ber Asphalt Paving Company v. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. W. 64 [1904]; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014 [1895]; City of Clinton to use of Thornton v. Hen- ry County, 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415, 22 S. W. 494 [ 1893] ; City of St. Joseph to use of Gibson v. Far- rell, 106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 [1891] ; Keith v. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889]; City of Springfield to the use of Tuttle v. Baker, 56 Mo. App. 637 [1894]; Ab len V. Krenning, 23 Mo. App. 561 [1886]; Thomas v. Hooker-Colville Steam Pump Company, 22 Mo. App. 8 [1886]; Kefferstei'n v. Holliday, 3 Mo. App. 570 (appendix) [1877]; Brockschmidt v. Cavender, 3 Mo. App. 568 (appendix) [1877]; Stad- ler V. Strong, 3 Mo. App. 568 (ap- pendix) [1877]; Creamer v. Allen, 3 Mo. App. 545 [1877]; City of Butte V. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 [1904] ; Low- den V. City of Cincinnati, 2 Disney (Ohio) 203 [1858]; County of Har- ris V. Boyd, 70 Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]. 'Tallant v. City of Burlington, 39 la. 543 [1874]; City of Dubuque v. Harrison, 34 la. 163 [1872]; City of Butte V. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 [1904]. ' Such charges are referred to as "assessments or special taxes." Mil- waukee Electric Railway & Electric Light Company v. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 42, 69 N. W. 796 [1897]. ' County of San Luis Obispo v. White, 91 Cal. 432, 24 Pac. 864, 27 Pae. 756 [1891] ; Marion Water Com- pany v. City of Marion, 121 la. 306, 96 N. W. 883 [1903]; Grunewald v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 la. 222, 91 N. W. 1059 [1902]; Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 118 la. 161, 59 L. R. A. 620, 91 N. W. 1048 [1902]; Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. V. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. R. A. 157, 26 S. \V. 1025, 31 S. W. 756 [1895]. " Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. V. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. R. A. 157, 26 S. W. 1025, 31 S. W. 756 ]1895]. " Chicago & Northwestern Railway Companj' v. Village of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 437 [1897]; Chi- cago &, Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet. I.i3 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [18941. 87 ASSESSMENT AND GENEKAL TAXATION. § 51 § 51. Special taxation in Illinois. The term "special tax" has a distinct and peculiar meaning in Illinois. In this state it was once held that local assessments were within the constitutional requirement of uniformity and that accordingly such assessments could not be apportioned by front- age or by any similar method of apportionment.^ Subsequently the constitution was so modified as to permit certain public cor- porations to make local improvements "by special assessment, specail taxation or otherwise. ' ' ^ The legislature thereupon con- ferred upon cities and villages the "power to make local im- provements by special assessments, or by special taxation, or both, of contiguous property or general taxation or other- wise as they shall by ordinance, prescribe." This language is substantially that of the constitution and is not regarded as any broader in its effect and meaning,'' and confers the power of making local improvements by special assessment, special taxation or general taxation.* Under this provision the special tax has been held to be distinct from both the general tax and the local assessment.^ Under this constitutional provision a special tax- must be limited to "contiguous prop- erty,"" while a special assessment need not be so limited but may be assessed upon any property benefited. On the other hand a special assessment apportioned according to benefits may be re- stricted to contiguous or abutting property.' The mere fact that the charge is limited to abutting property is not conclusive that it 'See §§ 44, 153. Waterman, 121 111. 115, 13 N. E. 543 ^Constitution of Illinois, Art. IX., [1889], § 9. The officer making the s.ile for a ' Falch V. People ex rel. Johnson, special tax must show his authority 99 111. 137 [1881]. so to sell, and merely showing au- * City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 111. thority to sell for special assessments 528, 75 N. B. 1044 [1905] ; Miservey is not sufficient. Butler v. Nevin, 88 V. People ex rel. Raymond, 208 111. 111. 575 [1878]. 646, 70 N. E. 678 [1904]; Ronan v. "Guild, Jr., v. City of Chicago, 82 People ex rel. Shafter, 193 IlL 631, 111. 472 [1876]. 61 N. E. 1042 ; People ex rel. Miller ' Bass v. South Park Commission- V. Sherman, 83 111. 165 [1876]. ers, 171 111, 370, 49 N. E. 549 [1898] ; "Gage V. Waterman, 121 111. 115, West Chicago Park Commissioners v. 13 N. E. 543 [1889]; Butler v. Ne- Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 N. E. 427 vin, 88 111. 575 [1878]; Guild, Jr., [1898]; Walker v. City of Aurora, V. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472 [1876]. 140 111. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]; The notice of the tax sale mu?t City of Springfield v. Sale, 127 111. show whether it is for a special tax 359, 20 N. E. 86 [1890]; Lake v. or a special assessment. Gage v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879]. §51 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 88 is a special tax as distinguished from an assessment.' The special tax is in most respects like the special assessment. They are both based on the theory of presumed equivalents for the charge or exaction in the form of benefits," differing in this respect from general taxation. The chief difference between the special tax and the special assessment is in the manner of ascertaining bene- fits.^" In special taxation the imposition of the tax is a conclu- sive determination of the fact of beijefit and the apportionment of the expense of the improvement, while in a special assess- ment the cost must not exceed the actual benefit and must be apportioned in proportion thereto." The determination to con- struct a sidewalk by special taxation has been said to be, "a de- termination that the property so specially taxed is benefited to ' "It does not follow 'that oecause the ordinance confined the assessment to abutting property it was a. spe- cial tax instead of a special assess- ment (Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879]; West Chicago Park Commissioners v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 JJ. E. 427 [1898]). In the case at bar the assessment was made ac- cording to benefits, and though con- fined to contiguous property, was a special assessment and not a special tax." Bass v. South Park Commis- sioners, 171 111. 370, 372, 373, 49 N. E. 549 [1898]. "Davis V. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 X. E. 888 [1893]. "Lightner v. City of Peoria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]. "Davis V. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]. ' xhe difference between special as- sessments and special taxation has been repeatedly pointed out by thi& court. It lies mainly in the manner of determining the benefits. In spe- cial taxation the body enacting the ordinance determines that the bene- fits are equal to the cost, and before the passage of the amendment to Sec- tion 17, Article 9, Chapter 24 of tho Revised Statutes in 1895 that deter- mination was conclusive and could not be reviewed by court or jury, while in special assessments the ben- efits are assessed by the commission- ers and were always reviewable by a jury." West Chicago Park Com- missioners v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 159, 49 N. E. 427 [1898]. "Special taxation, as spoken of in our Constitution, is based upon the supposed benefit to the contiguous property and differs from special as- sessments only in the mode of ascer- taining the benefits. In the case of special taxation, the imposition of the tax by the corporate authorities is of itself a determination that the benefits to the contiguous property will be as great as the burden of the expense of the improvement and that such benefits will be so nearly lim- ited or confined in their effect to contiguous property that no serious injustice will be done by imposing the whole expense upon such prop- erty. In the case of special assess- ments the property to be benefited must be ascertained by careful inves- tigation and the burden must be dis- tributed according to the carefully ascertained proportion in Avhich each part thereof will be beneficially af- fected." Craw V. Village of Tolono, 96 111. 255, 282, 36 Am. Rep. 143 [1880], quoted in Enos v. City of Springfield, 113 111. 65, 71 [1886]. 89 ASSESSMENT AND GENEHAL TAXATION. 51 the extent of the special tax. "^- Aeeordingly in the special tax it has been said to be no objection thereto that the amount of the tax exceeds the amount of the benefits.^' This theory of the spec- ial tax has been stated in a number of cases.'* Thus it has been said that the power of levying a special tax is an unqualified one, without restriction as to the benefiting of the contiguous property thus taxed.'^ While the validity of the special tax is-regularly recognized,'" the courts are now inclined to insist that the spec- ial tax must be reasonable. ' ' The only difference in special assess- ments and special taxation as to benefits is that in the latter case "Harris v. People ex rel. Knight, 218 III. 439, 443, 75 N. E. 1012 [ 1905] ; Pierson v. People ex rel. Walter, 204 111. 456, 68 N. E. 383 [1903]; Payne v. Village of South Springfield, 161 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 [1896]; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; City of Sterling v. Gait, 117 111. 11, 7 N E. 471 [1887] ; Craw v. Village of Tolono, 96 111. 255, 36 Am. Rep. 143 [1880]; White v. People ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]. '= "The objection that the special tax here exceeds the benefits to the lot implies that the only mode of making the improvement is by spe- cial assessment, whereas the broad power is given under the constitu- tion to make it either by special as- sessment or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise. ♦ V » This proceeding is in the special taxation of contiguous prop- erty, and in the adoption of that mode there is no requirement of ben- efits received and no respect thereto further than may be had by the city council in determining upon which particular one of the several modes of special taxation of contiguous property open to them shall be re- sorted to." Enos V. Oitv of Sp-'ini;- field, 113 111. 65, 71, 72 [1RS6], Quot- ing White V. People ex rel. Citv of Bloominston, 94 111. 604, 616 [1880]. "Whether or not the special tax exceeds the actual benefit to the lot is not material. It may be supposed to be based on a presumed equiva- lent. The city council have deter- mined the frontage to be the proper measure of probable benefits. That is generally considered as a very reasonable measure of benefits in case of such an improvement, and if it does not in fact in the present case represent the actual benefits it is enough that the city council have deemed it the proper rule to apply." Enos V. City of Springfield, 113 111. 65, 73 [1886], quoting White v. Peo- pie ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604, 613 [1880]. "City of Bloomington v. Latham, 142 111. 462, 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. E. 506 [1893]; County of Adams v. City of Quincy, 130 111. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155, 22 N. E. 624 [1890]; City of Sterling v. Gait, 117 111. 11, 7 N. E. 471 [1887] ; City of Galesburg v. Searles, 114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]; Enos v. City of Springfield, 113 111. 65 [1886]; People ex rel. Miller v. Sherman, 83 111. 165 [1876]. "City of Galesburg v. Searles, 114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]. "City ex rel. Hanberg v. Peyton, 214 111. 376, 73 N. E. 768 [1905]; Commissioners of Highways of Town of Dix v. Bi^ Four Drainage District ci Ford County, 207 111. 17, 69 N. E. 576 [1904]; Lightnor v. City of Ponria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 riF94]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 Til. 313. 21 L. B.. A. 583, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]. § 51 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 90 the determination of the city council is final — ^not an arbitrary- unreasonable determination, but one which can be seen to be fair- ly and reasonably made,"" and that even a special tax is to be regarded as based upon the theory of an equivalent for benefits in the increased value of the property taxed.^* Under the doe- trine that the special tax must be reasonable, special taxes clearly in excess of the benefits conferred have been held invalid.^' Whether a special tax is a taking of property without due process of law has been presented for adjudication. In Illinois it has been held that under a statute imposing a special tax, but pro- viding that the property owner may have the question of whether the special tax is in excess of the benefits or not, determined reg- ularly, such a tax is not in violation of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States.^" The same ques- tion has been presented to the Supreme Court of the United States,^^ but in this case the court refused to pass upon the ques- tion on the ground that the Federal question had not been pre- sented to the State Court, to whose decision error was prosecuted. It will thus be seen that the tendency of statutes and recent deci- sions in Illinois is to bring the special tax more nearly to the local assessment than the original holdings of the Supreme Court seemed -to indicate. Similar constitutional provisions are found in a few other states. ^^ "City of Bloomington v. Chicago 451, 26 N. E. 366 [1891]. See § 295 & Alton Railroad Company, 134 111. et seq. 451, 459, 26 N. E. 366 [1891J. =° Job v. City of Alton, 189 111. 256, "Huston V. Tribbetts, 171 111. 547, 82 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. E. 622 63 Am. St. Rep. 275, 49 N. E. 711 [1901]. [1898]; Chicago & Alton Railroad ^Eombard v. West Chicago Park Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. Commissioners, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894] ; Lightner 731, 21 S. 507 [1901], (affirming V. City of Peoria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. Cummings v. West Chicago Park E. 69 [1894] ; Davis v. City of Litch- Commissioners, 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. field, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 941 [1899]). 33 N. E. 888 [1893]. ^ Sec. 6, Article IX., Constitution "City of Bloomington v. Chicago of Nebraska; Darst v. Griffin, 31 & Alton Railroad Company, 134 111. Neb. 608, 48 N. W. 819 [1891], See § 103. CHAPTER IV. FO'KM. OF EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 52. Option to owner to construct improvement. An assessment usually takes the form of a charge or exaction in money.^ At the same time there is no reason why the charge might not be in the form of requiring the actual construction of the improvement by the party to be charged therewith instead of imposing upon him a charge in money to pay the cost thereof. However, if the party refuses to perform the work thus assigned to him, there is usually no method available of compelling specific performance. He may be coerced into performance by the impo- sition of a penalty, or in case of his refiisal, the work may be done by others and he may be charged with his proportionate share of the expense thereof. The latter of these methods is usually treated as a form of assessment.^ It will be noted that, although the charge is by this mean.s originally imposed as a form of work and labor, it is ultimately enforceable as a charge in money. Ac- cordingly, under such statutes the proceedings must provide some means for compelling payment in money. If a road is or- dered to be built by the adjoining land owners, but no assessment is levied in proportion to the benefits conferred, so that the roa ! 'See Chapter XX. For the ques- 290 [1896]; Mayor and Board of tion of the power to require payment Trustees of Town of New Iberia v. in certain limited kinds of money Fontelieu, 108 La. 460, 32- So. 369 or legal tender to the exclusion of [1901]; Cuming v. Gleason, 140 others, see § 1086. Mich. 195, 103 N. W. 537 [1905]; ^ People ex rel. Hanberg v. Pey- Sanford v. Village of Warwick, 181 ton, 214 111. 376, 73 N. E. 768 K. Y. 20, 73 N. E. 490 [1905] ; (re- [1905]; City of Keokuk v. Inde- versing 82 N. Y. S. 466, 83 App. pendent District of Keokuk, 53 la. Div. 120 [1903]; City of Wilming- 352, 36 Am. Rep. 226, 5 N. W. 503 ton v. Yopp, 71 N. C. 76 [1874]; [1880]; Scherm v. Garrett's Adm'r, Mt. Pleasant Bor. v. Bait. & 0. Ry. (Kv.) 80 S. W. 1101, 26 Ky. Law Co., 138 Pa. St., 365, 11 L. R. A. Rep. 186 [1904]; Board of Coun- 520, 20 Atl. 1052 [1890]; Wilson oilmen of Frankfort v. Mason & v. Town of Philippi, 39 W. Va. 75, Foard Co., 100 Ky. 48, 37 S. W. 19 S. E. 553 [1894]. 91 § 53 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 92 may be built by assessment if the work is not done, it has been held that the proceedings should be quashed upon certiorari.^ If the obligation to construct an improvement is imposed by lavv- upon a public corporation or a quasi public corporation such as a railroad company, such corporation may be compelled to con- struct such improvement by proceedings in mandadlus.* § 53. Power and duty to grant optidto. A municipal corporation may by ordinance give to the property owner the option to do the work in front of his property or pay an assessment therefor even if the statute does not provide for such option. Thus a municipal corporation may give to the abut- ting owner such option to do the work himself under a statute authorizing the council to pass ordinances to require the improve- ment of the street at the cost of the abutting owner,^ or even, it has been held, under a statute authorizing the board of trustees to make and pass such resolutions, ordinances and by-laws as may be deemed necessary and proper and to regulate and make im- provements to the streets, alleys, sidewalks, public squares, wharves, and other public property and places.^ Such option is frequently given to the property owner by statute.' If the stat- ute provides for an option to the owner to do the work himself or pay an assessment therefor, the municipal corporation must give such option as a condition precedent to levying such assessment.'' Other, property owners cannot complain because such option is given and advantage is taken of it by some property owners, and because upon assessment, allowance is made to the owners who 'Pierce v. County Commissioners ton, 223 111. 379, 79 N. E. 51 [1906] ; of Franklin County, 63 Me. 252 City of Chicago' v. Burkhardt, 223 [1872]. ^ 111. 297, 79 N. E. 82 [1906]. * ^fo^thern Pacific Ry. v. Duluth, ' City of Chicago v. Burkhardt, 208 U. S. 583 [1908], (affirming 223 111. 297, 79 N. E. 82 [1906]; State ex rel. City of Duluth v. North- Pierce v. County Commissioners of em Pacific Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 429,. Franklin County, 63 Me. 252 [1872] ; 108 N. W. 261). See § 1162. Brewster v. Mayor and Common ' Board of Councilmen of City of Council of the City of Newark, 1 1 Frankfort v. Murray, 99 Ky. 422, N. J. Eq. (3 Stockt.) 114 [1856]; 36 S. W. 180 [1896]. Mt. Pleasant Bor. v. Bait. & 0. R. = Mayor and Board of Trustees of Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 L. R. A. the Town of New Iberia v. Fonle- 520, 10 Atl. 1052 [1891]; Rogers lieu, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901], v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 610 'People ex rel. Hanherg v. Pat- [1861], 93 FORM OP EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 53 did the work themselves.'' Furthermore, if a property owner takes advantage of such option and performs the work in a proper manner, the city cannot levy an assessment without crediting him for such work so done." If the owner is not given the oppor- tunity to construct such improvement under a statute which pro- vides therefor,' as where a defective notice not giving specifica- tions which would enable him to ascertain what work was to be done, is served on him,* or where the ordinance providing for the improvement does not give the specifications or prescribe the manner of doing the work, but delegates to the city engineer the power to direct the method of doing the work,'' br where the statute gives the property owner the option to construct the whole of a sidewalk improvement and thus relieve himself from liability for assessment, and the notice served upon the owner gives him the option to construct the sidewalk except the inter- sections,^' the public corporation cannot construct the improve- ment at the cost of the property owners. Thus under a statute providing for such an option, the municipal corporation cannot construct the sidewalk and assess the co'^t thereof upon the abut- ting property owners unless they have been notified in accordance with the terms of the statute and have been given an opportun- = City of Connersville v. Merrill, Y. 92, 55 Am. Dec. 385 [1851]; a 14 Ind. App. 303, 42 N. E. 1112 case where the ordinance directed [1895']. that the owners or occupants of lots " Barber v. Board of Supervisors fronting on a certain described por- of the City and Ciounty of San Fran- tion of a given street should cause Cisco, 42 Cal. 630 [1872]; State, the street- in front of their respec- Mann, Pros. v. Mayor and Common tive lots to be pitched, leveled and Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. flagged at their own expense in such (4 Zab.) 662 [1855]; In the mat- manner as the city superintendent, ter of the Assessment for Improv- under the direction of the commit- ing East Eighteenth Street in the tee on roads appointed by the com- Town of riatbush, 75 Hun. (N .Y.) mon council, should direct and re- 603, 27 N. Y. Supp. 591 [1894]. quire; while the statute by virtue ' State v. Foster, 94 Minn. 412, of the ordinance was passed, em- 103 N. W. 14 [1905]; City of West- powered the common council to make port to use of Hoelzel v. Smith, 68 by-laws and ordinances directing any Mo. App. 63 [1896]; Erie City v. street or lane in the city to be Willis, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 459 [1903]; pitched, leveled, paved or flagged Johnson v. City of Oshkosh, 21 Wis. within such time and in such man- 184 fl866]; Kneeland v. City of ner as they might prescribe under Milwaukee. 18 Wis. 411 [1864]. the surerintendence and direction of ' Myrick V. City of La Crosse, 17 t'lo city superintendent. Wis. 442 '[1863]. "City of niicii'40 v. Burkhardt, "Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. 223 111". 297, 79 N. E. 82 [1906]. § 53 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 94 ity to construct the improvement themselves." An insufficient notice such as one served by placing it upon the premises under a stone which covered it entirely,'^ or one requiring the work to be done in seventeen days when the ordinance under which it is given 'provides that the owner shall be given thirty days in which to do the work/' gives the city no right to construct the improve- ment and assess the cost thereof upon the abutting property owners. At the same time the right*of the owner to do the work is not one which is secured to him by constitutional provisions." It is a mere favor conferred upon him by statute, and according- ly any notice which the statute provides for, is sufficient, such as notice by publication.^' If the notice is mailed properly the fact that the property owner has not received it, and so has had, in fact, no opportunity to do the work, does not relieve him from liability.^" In this respect notice to the owner to do the work is to be distinguished from notice of the assessment itself.^' Ac- cordingly he cannot insist upon an opportunity to do the Work himself if the statute makes no provision theref or.^^ If after due notice and oportunity, the owner neglects or refuses to do the work, subsequent proceedings are in the nature of ordinary local assessments. By failing to act in due season the property owner waives his right to do the work himself.^" Thus, under such a statute, if the owner neglects or refuses to construct a sidewalk in front of his property, the municipal corporation may proceed to do the work or to cause it to be done at the expense of such owner.^" If the abutting owners do not do the work, the city "Schmidt v. Village of Elmwood 19 N. W. 533 [1884]. Queried in Place, 15 Ohio C. C. 351 [1897] ; Brewster v. Mayor and Common Mt. Pleasant Bor. v. Bait. & 0. R. Council of the City of Newark, 11 Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 L. R. A. X. J. Eq. (3 Stockt.) 114 [1856]. 520, 20 Atl. 1052 [1890]. '» City of Chicago v. Gait, 225 111. "City of Philadelphia to use of 368, 8p N. E. 285 [1907]. Winmill v. Edwards, 78 Pa. St. (28 "See Chapter XIV. P. F. Smith) 62 [1875]. "Clapton v. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. "Washington v. Mayor and Al- 117 [1892]; Bingaman v. City of dermen of Nashville, 31 Tenn. (1 Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 353, 23 Atl. Swan.) 177 [1851]. (In such case 395 [1892]. the fact that the city delays thirty " Broadway Baptist Church v. days before commencing to do the McAtee, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 508, 8 work does not cure the defect in the Am. Rep. 480 [1871]. notice.) =»Buell v. Ball, 20 la. 282 [1866]; " Pass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, Cuming v. Gleason, 140 Mich. 195, 19 N. W. 533 [1884]. 103 N. W. 537 [1905];' City of '° Fass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, Louisiana v. Shaffner, 104 Mo. App. 95 FORM OF EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 54 may let the contract therefor as well as do the work itself.^^ Mere election on the part of the abutting owner to do the work and attempted performance on his part will not be sufficient to discharge his liability for such improvement. He must further- more comply substantially with the requirements of the ordi- nance." On the other hand, if the owner does the work and it is accepted by competent public authority, the other owners cannot resist payment of their assessments on the ground that such work so done by the owner was defective.^' If the statute does not give the property owner the option to do the work, the fact that he voluntarily constructs an improvement in front of his land does not prevent the city from making an improvement of the same general character, but of a different material, and levying an as- sessment therefor.-* Thus where a property owner voluntarily constructed a street surfaced with round cobble stones, the city had power to provide for surfacing such street with asphalt and levying an assessment therefor vipon the land owned by such property owner.^^ Hence, if the city permits an owner to con- struct a sidewalk "in front of his property" and is silent as to permitting him to construct intersections, but provides that a pro rata charge for intersections shall be made upon lots in front of which the owner has constructed the sidewalk, the owner can- not relieve himself from liability for assessment for intersections by constructing an intersection at the corner of his lot.^' § 54. Option to do work in assessment for benefits. In the ease of improvements, the cost of which is made-a charge 101, 78 S. W. 287 [1903]; City of =i People ex rel. Hanberg v. Pey- Springfield ex rel. Updergraff v. ton, 214 111. 376, 73 N. E. 768 Mills, 99 Mo. App. 141, 72 S. W. [1905]. 462 [1903]; Inhabitants of the Vil- "^^ Shrum v. Town of Salem, 13 Ind. lage of Houstania v. Grubbs, 80 Mo. App. 115, 39 N. E. 1050 [1895]. App. 433 [1899]; Paxson v. Sweet, '= Whitefield v. Hippie, — (Ky.) 13 Iv. J.. L. 196 [1832]; Bonsall v. — , 12 S. W. 150, 11 Ky. L. R. 386. Mayor, Recorder and Trustees of the "^ Parsons v. City of Columbus, 50 Town of Lebanon, 19 Ohio 418 0. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]. [1850]; Findley v. City of Pitts- == Parsons v. City of Columbus, 50 burg (Pa.), 11 Atl. 678 [1887]; 0. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]. Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry, " Heman Construction Company 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 Am. v. McManus, 102 Mo. App. 649, 77 Dec. 315 [1845]; Wilson v. Town of N. W. 310 [1903]. Philippi, 39 W. Va. 75, 19 S. E. 553 [1894]. § 55 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 96 upon the property owner on the theory of benefits, provisions giving to the property owner the option to do the work himself, are not as common as in improvements which it is the legal duty of the land-owner to construct, but such provisions are occasion- ally found. Similar views are entertained where the statute pro- vides that the owner shall be allowed to do the grading,^ curbing,- or guttering,^ in the construction of a street; or shall be allowed to construct a road,' or to constructs levee,^ or to clean out the bed of a creek.^ Charges of this sort are treated as ordinary as- sessments, subject to the option of the owner of the property to do the work himself. The question of the power of the legisla- ture to apportion the assessment by requiring each owner to pay for the work done in front of his property is not here considered, and is discussed elsewhere.' § 55. Option to do work in performance of legal duly. Assessments of this kind are most commonly found in cases in- volving assessments of the second type, that is assessment for the cost of performing a legal duty which the owner of the realty assessed has omitted or refused to perform. A common example of such a form of assessment exists where the owner of realty is required to construct a sidewalk in front of his property, or eon- tinguous thereto, and in event of his failure so to do, the municipal corporation is authorized, by statute, to do the work or to have it done and to charge such property owner with the expense thereof. This is treated as a form of assessment.^ Such form of 'Myriek v. City of La Crosse, 17 59 Ark. 494, 28 L. R. A. 496, 28 Wis. 442 [1863]. S. W. 32 [1894]; James v. Pine ^Childers v. Holmes, 95 Mo. App. BlufT, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S. W. 760 154, 68 S. W. 1046 [1902]. [1887]; City of Chicago v. Gait, 225 'Whitefield v. Hippie, — (Ky.) 111. 368, 80 N. E. 285 [1907] ; People — , 12 fe. W. 150, 11 Ky. L. R. 386. ex rel. Hanberg v. Peyton, 214 111. •Pierce v. County Commissioners 376, 73 N. E. 768 [1905]; Biggin's of Franklin County, 63 Me. 252 Estate v. People ex rel. Tethering- [1872]. ton, 193 HI. 601, 61 N. E. 1124; = Crowley v. -Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329 Town of Greendale v. Suit, 163 Ind. [1847]. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904]; Shrum "Brown v. Keener, 74 N. C. 714 v. Town of Salem, 13 Ind. App. 115, [1876]. 39 N. E. 1050 [1895]; City of Keo- 'See § 713. kulc v. Independent District of Keo- » Winter v. City Council of Mont- kuk, 53 la. 352, 36 Am. Rep. 226, gomery, 83 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235 5 N. W. 503 [1880]; Buell v. Ball. [1887]; Little Rock v. Fitzgerald, 20 la. 282 [1866]; Board of Cor.n- 97 FORM OF EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. §55 assessment for sidewalks has been upheld where ordinary assess- ments for benefits are held to be unconstitutional.- Other ex- amples of assessments of this type where the owner is required to do the work are found in cases of the construction of sewers,'' or of house connections therefor/ or the construction of drains/' under the alternative provision, in the event that he refuses or neglects to construct such improvement of having the same con- cilmen of Frankfort v. Mason & Foard Co., 100 Ky. 48, 37 S. W. 290 [1896] ; Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v. Murray, 99 Ky. 422, 36 S. W. 180; Mayor and Board of Trustees of Town of New Iberia v. Fontelieu, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]; Cuming v. Gleason, 140 Mich. 195, 103 N. W. 537 [1905]; Young V. Village of Waterville, 39 Minn. 196, 39 N. W. 97 [1888]; In- habitants of Town of Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593 [1857] ; City of Louisiana v. Shaffner, 104 Mo. App, 101, 78 S. W. 287 [1904]; Heman Construction Company v. McManus, 102 Mo. App. 649, 77 S. W. 310 [1903]; City of Springfield ex rel. Updegraff v. Mills, 99 Mo. App. 141, 72 S. W. 462 [1903]; Inhabitants of the Village of Houstania v. Grubbs, 80 Mo. App. 433 [1899]; State V. Several Parcels of Land, — Xeb. — , 107 N. W. 566 [1906]; Morris v. Mayor and Common Coun- cil of the City of Bayonne, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 345 [1874]; Brewster v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, UN. J. Eq. (3 Stoekt.) 114 [1856]; San- ford V. Village of Warwick, 181 N. Y.. 20, 73 N. E. 490 [1905] (revers- ing 82 N. Y. S. 466, 83 App. Div. 120.) Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92, 55 Am. Dec. 385 [1851]; City of Wilmington v. Yopp, 71 N. C. 76 [1874]; Wilhelm v. City of Defiance, 58 0. S. 56, 65 Am. St, Rep. 745, 40 L. E. A. 294, 50 N. E. 18 [1898]; Schmidt v. Village of Elmwood Place, 15 Ohio C. C. 351 [1897]; Hunt v. Hunter, 11 Ohio C. C. 09 [1895]; Mt. Pleasant Bor. v. Bait. & 0. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 L. R. A. 520, 20 Atl. 1052 [1891]; Philadelphia v. Stevenson, 132 Pa. St. 103, 19 Atl. 70 [1890]; Wilkins-. burg Bor. v. Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. St. 109, 6 L. R. A. 531, 18 Atl. 937 [1890]; City of Philadel- phia to use of Winmill v. Edwards, 78 Pa. St. (28 P. F. Smith) 62 [1875]; Findlay v. City of Pittsburg (Pa.) II Atl. 678 [1887]; Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 Am. Dec. 315 [1845]; Washington v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 31 Tenn. ( 1 Swan) 177 [1851]; Mayor and City Council of Nashville v. Berry, 2 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.) 561 [1877); Sands v. City of Richmond, 31 Gratt. 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]; Wilson V. Town of Philippi, 39 W. Va. 75, 19 S. E. 553 [1894]; Pass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 19 N. W. 533 [1884]. 2 Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 45 [1879]; Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 Am. Dec. 315 [1845]; Washington v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan.) 177 [1851]; Nashville v. Berry, 2 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.) 561 [1877]. ' State V. Foster, 94 Minn. 412, 103 N. W. 14 [1905]. * Erie City v. Willis, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 459 [1904]. "Scherm v. Garrett's Adm., 118 Ky. 296, 80 S. W. 1103, 26 Ky. L, R. 186 [1904]. § 56 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 98 structed by the proper public authorities at the cost of such owner. If the improvement is one the cost of which the land- owner cannot be compelled to pay, either on the theory of bene- fits or on the theory of the performance of a legal duty, no ad- ditional validity can be given to such exaction by requiring the owner to construct the improvement himself." Thus if a ditch is not necessary to protect the public health or to protect the con- tiguous land from nuisance it cannot be made the duty of the land-owner to construct it by giving him notice so to do.'' So, in Pennsylvania, where no assessment can be levied for a new im- provement if the old is in good condition,* the owner cannot be required to take up a curb which is in good condition and re- place it with a new and expensive curb as a part of the general plan of turning a street into a boulevard.' § 56. Primary duty upon city. Under statutes which permit a city to require property owners to construct improvements in front of their respective lands, the city remains liable to third persons for any damages which may be caused by failure to make such improvement or for defects in its construction. The effect of statutes of this sort is not to trans- fer liability by reason of such improvement from the city to abut- ting property owners.^ Hence the owner is not primarily liable to a traveler for an injury occasioned by the fact that the side- walk was out of repair.^ So, if the owner is, required to con- struct a sidewalk and he constructs it in a negligent manner, the city cannot recover indemnity from such owner by reason of a judgment which a third person, injured by such negligence, has "Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. Philadelphia, 118 Pa. St. 535, 12 Atl. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, 174] [1888]. 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]. i City of Keokuk v. Independent 'Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v, District of Keokuk, 53 la. 352, 36 Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, Am. Rep. 226, 5 N. W. 503 [1880] : 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]. Haskell v. Village of Penn. Van., 5 'See §§ 378, 382, 383. In assess- Lans. (N. Y.) 43 [1871]; Wilhelm ments on the theory of benefits, all v. City of Defiance, 58 0. S. 56, 65 reconstruction must be at the ex- Am. St. Rep. 745, 40 L. R. A. 294, pense of the city and not at the ex- 50 N. E. 18 [1898] ; Hay v. City of pense of the property owners. Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1, 3 L. R. A. (N. 'Wistar v. Philadelphia, 80 Pa. St. S.) 84, 105 N. W. 654 [1906]. 505, 21 Am. Rep. 112 [1876]; [dis- ^Hay v. City of Barahoo, 127 Wis. tinguished in Michener v. City of 1, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, 105 N. W. 654 [1906]. 99 FORM OF EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 57 recovered against the eity, although the city could have con- structed such sidewalk in a proper manner at the expense of such owner.^ So under a statute which provides that the city may re- quire a land-owner to repair a sidewalk in front of his land, if the eity allows the sidewalk to get into defective condition so that the city is held liable for damage caused thereby, it cannot re- cover indemnity therefor from such land-owner, although it could have recovered from him the cost of putting such sidewalk in good condition.* § 57. Repaii^i Statutes are found which in case of repairs, give the owner the option to do the work himself, or to permit it to be done at his expense by competent public authority. Thus provisions of this sort are found in the case of the repair of sidewalks.^ Power to assess if the owner does not perform the work has been found under a statute providing that where any portion of the roadway of any street or alley or any portion of any sidewalk shall be out of repair the board of public works shall require the owners or occupants of the property adjoining to repair such portion. This provision was held to authorize the board, in case of neglect or omission of the owner to make such repairs, to award a contract for the repair of such sidewalk or to take charge of such repairs itself.^ The same general prin- ciples applicable in eases of original construction are in force in ease of repairs. Thus if the owner complies with the notice, commences work within the prescribed time and proceeds in its performance with reasonable diligence, the municipal cor- poration cannot charge him with the cost of work done by the ^ Wilhelm v. City of Defiance, 58 * City of Keokuk v. Independent 0. S. 56, 65 Am. St. Rep. 745, 40 L. District of KeolHurt V. City of Atlanta, .100 Ga. 274, 28 S. E. 65 [1896]; Guess v. Stone Mountain Granite, etc., Com- pany, 72 Ga. 320, 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 236 [1884]; Mayor and Coim- cil of the City of Atlanta v. Central Railroad & Banking Company, 53 Ga. 120 [1874]; West Chicago Ma- sonic Association v. City of Chicago, 215 111. 278, 74 N. E. 159 [1905]; Davis V. Northwestern Elevated Railroad Company, 170 111. 595, 48 N. E. 1058 [1897]; Gordon v. Com- missioners of Highways of Road Dis- trict No. 3, 169 111. 510, 48 N. E. 451 11897] ; Metropolitan West Side Elevated Railway Company v. Stick- ney, 150 111. 362, 20 L. R. A. 773, 37 N. E. 1098 [1894], (not follow- ing Keithsburg & Eastern Railroad Company v. Henry, 79 111. 290 [1875] ) ; Washington lee Company v. City of Chicago, 147 111. 327, 37 Am. St. Rep. 222; 35 N. E. 378 [1894]; Andrews v. People ex rel. Rumsey, 84 111. 28 [1876]; Louisville & Nash- ville Railroad Company v. Thomp- son, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.). 735 [1857]; Abney v. Texarkana, Shreve- port & Natchez Railroad Company, 105 La. 446, 20 So. 890 [1901]; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 [1852]; Shipley v. Baltimore & Po- tomac Railroad Company, 34 Md. 336 [1871]; Meacham v. Fitchburi Railroad Company, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 291 [1849]; St. Louis, Keo- kuk & Northwestern Railroad Com- pany V. Knapp-Stout & Company, 160 Mo. 396, 61 S. W. 300 [1900]; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]; St. Louis, Oak Hill and Carondelet Railway Company v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 670, 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cases N. S. 405, 44 S. W. 771 [1890]; Smith v. City of Omaha, 49 Neb. 883, 69 N. W. 402 [1896]; City of Omaha v. Howell Lumber Co., 30 Neb. 663, 46 N. W. 919 [1890]; Clark v. City of Eliza- beth, 61 N. J. L. (32 Vr.) 565, 40 Atl. 616, 737 [1898]; Davis v. May- or and Common Council of the City of Newark, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 [1892]; Odell v. New York Elevated Railroad Com- pany, 130 N. Y. 690, 29 N. E. 998 [1892]; Carlisle v. City of Cincin- nati', 29 Ohio C. C. 91 [1906]; Pa- ducah & Memphis Railroad Company V. Stovall, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 1 [1879]; Neilson v. Chicago, Milwau- kee & Northwestern Railway Com- pany, 58 Wis. 516; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 239, 17 N. W. 310 [1883]. ' New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Company v. Moye, 39 Miss. 374 [I860]; Isom v. Miss- issippi Central Railroad Co., 36 Mis?. 306 [1858]; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 69 Am. Dec. 389 [1857]. § 71 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 122 dictions. Thus in Pennsylvania this view was expressed in an early ease,^ but in a later cas& it was pointed out that the ease was not one involving such rule, the court saying of the earlier opinion, that it is "not easy to determine whether the misap- prehension of the facts in the cause or the misapplication of the law to the facts is the most conspicuous. ' ' * Similar con- siderations apply where no part of the land has been taken, but it has been injured by a neighboring improvement in such a way as to entitle the owner to compensation. In such cases the bene- fits received from such improvement must be deducted from the damages caused thereby.' Thus where realty has been in- jured by a change in the grade of the adjoining street or road,"* or by the construction of a viaduct ' or by the construction of a tunnel for the use of a street railroa,d,* and the owner of the realty thus injured is entitled to recover damages therefor, the special benefits enuring to such realty by reason of such im- provement are to be deducted from the damages caused thereby. This, too, is not regarded so much as a set-off, as an ap- plication of the principle that "if the market value of the prop- erty is not decreased there is no damage and there can be no recovery. ' ' " ^ Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,- 2 Widman Investment Co. v. City of Ball. 304, 315 [1795]. St. Joseph, 191 Mo. 459, 90 S. W. *Satterlee v. Matthewson, 16 Serg. 763 [1905]; Grover v. Cornet, 135 & Raw. 169 [1827]. Mo. 21, 35 S. W. 1143 [18%]; Kent ° Juvinall v. Jamesburg Drainage v. City of St. Joseph, 72 Mo. App. District, 204 111. 106, 68 N. E. 440 -42 [1897]; Clark v. City of Eliza- [1903]; City of Chicago v. Webb, beth, 61 N. J. L. (32 Vr.)" 565, 40 102 111. App. 232 [1902]; Gas Light Atl. 616, 737 [1898]; Inhabitants & Coke Company v. City of New Al- of the Town of Lambertville v. Clev- bany, 158 Ind. 268, 63 N. E. 458 inger, 30 N. J. L. (IVr.) 53 [1862]; [1901]. Chambers v. South Chester Bor., 140 » City of Seattle V. Board of Home Ea. St. 510, 21 Atl. 409 [1891]; Missions of Methodist Protestant Mayor and Aldermen of Chattanooga Church, 138 Fed. 307, 70 C. C. A. v. Geiler, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea.) 611 597 [1905]; Cook v. City of Anso- [1884]; Friedrich v. City of Mil- nia, 66 Conn. 413, 34 Atl. 183 waukee, 114 Wis. 304, 90 N. W. 174 [1895]; Schroeder v. City of Joliet, [1902]. 189 111. 48, 52 L. R. A. 634, 59 N. E. ' Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. City 550 [1901]; City of Bloomington v. of Chicago, 26 Fed. 415 [1886]. Pollock, 141 111. 346; 31 N. E. 146 « Kaufman v. Tacoma, Olympia & [1893]; City of Louisville v. Louis- Gray's Harbor Railroad Company, 11 ville Rolling Mill Company, 66 Ky. Wash. 632, 40 Pac. 137 [1895]. (3 Bush.) 416, 96 Am. Dec. 243 "Schroeder v. City of Joliet, 189 [1867]; Chase v. City of Portland, III. 48, 52 L. R. A. 634, 59 N. E. 86 Me. 367, 29 Atl.' 1104 [1894]; 550 [1901]. 123 FORM OP EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. §§ 72, 73 § 72. Deduction not allowed if tracts distinct. Assessments are for many purposes regarded as being levied against specific tracts of property irrespective of the ownership thereof. If two distinct tracts of property owned by the same person are affected by the same improvement, each is ordinarily considered by itself, irrespective of the effect of such improvement upon the other tract so owned. Accordingly if the owner of land which is taken, either in whole or in part, by proceedings in emi- nent domain, owns another distinct and separate tract of land, benefits conferred upon one of such distinct tracts cannot be set off against damages to the tract which is taken. ^ § 73. Deduction of damages from special assessment for benefits. In the classes of cases thus far considered in connection with this subject benefits have been deducted from damages, and the corporation which has appropriated property by proceed- ings in eminent domain has urged such deduction. A different principle applies where a local assessment has been levied for the benefits received by the realty in question, and the owner thereof seeks to set off the damage received by such property by reason of such improvement against such assessment for bene- fits. In the absence of specific statutory provision, no set-off can be allowed against a claim of the state or of a municipal corporation for taxes.' A local assessment is a tax within the 'Sharp V. United States, 191 U. [1883]; Finnegan v. City of Fernan- S. 341, 48 L. 211, 24 S. 114 [1903]; dina, 15 Fla. 379, 21 Am. Rep. 292 (affirming Sharpe v. United States, [1875]; Cartersville Water Works 112 Fed. 893, 57 L. R. A. 932, 50 C. Company v. Mayor and Aldermen C. A. 597 [1902]; Todd V. Kankakee of Cartersville, 89 Ga. 689, 16 & Illinois River Railroad Company, S. E. 70 [1892]; Hawkins v. 78 111. 530 [1875]; White Water County of Sumter, 57 Ga. 166 Valley Railroad Company v. Mc- [1876]; Scohey v. Decatur Coun- f:iure, 29 Ind. 536 [1868]; State v. ty, 72 Ind. 551 [1880]; Newport Digby, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 543 [1841]; & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Douglass, Koestenbader v. Peiree, 41 la. 204 75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 673 [1877]; City [1875]; Whitaker v. Phoenixville of New Orleans v. New Orleans Bor., 141 Pa. St. 327, 21 Atl. 604 Water Works Company, 36 La. Ann. [1891]. See also Nicholson Borough, 432 [1884]; Morris v. Lalaurie, 39 Main Street, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 570 La. Ann. 47 [1887]; Seibert v. Tif- [1905]. fany, 8 Mo. App. 33 [1879]; Gatlins; ' McVey v. Lanier, 50 Ark. 384, 8 v. Commissioners of Carteret County, S. W. 141 [18871: Himmelmann v. 92 N. C. 536, 53 Am. Ren. 432 Spanagel. 39 Cal. .389 [1S70]; Mor- [1885]; Miller v. Wisener, 4S W. Va. gan V. Pueblo & Arkansas Valley 59, 30 S. E. 237 [1898]. Railroad Company. 6 Colo. 478 §73 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 124 application of this principle ^ and while the city may be liable for damages due to the construction of such improvement,^ no set- off can be allowed against such assessment ■ in the absence of some statutory authority therefor.* Accordingly if the legisla- ture sees fit to provide for the estimate and payment of dam- ages to the property owner in one proceeding and the estimate and payment of a local assessment for benefits by the property owner in another proceeding, the ^operty owner has no right to set off the damages due to him against the assessment due from him,^ nor can he resist payment of the assessment on the ground that damages are unpaid." Thus damages sustained by "See § 1346. "Town of Eutaw v. Botnick, — Ala. , 43 So. 739 [1907]; Averill V. City of Boston, 193 Mass. 488, 80 N. E. 583 [1907]; Coyne' v. City of Memphis, '118 Tenn. 651, 102 S. W. 355 [1907]; Crowe v. Corporation of Charlestown, — W. Va. , 57 S. E. 330 [1907]; Godbey v. City of Bluefield, — W. Va. , 57 S. E. 45 [1907]. Damages cannot be re- covered for the same facts by suc- cessive vendees. In re Sedgley Ave- iiue, 217 Pa. 313, 6o Atl. 546 [1907]. ' Fitzhugh V. Levee District, 54 Ark. 224, 15 S. W. 455 [1891]; Dra- per V. City of Atlanta, 126 Ga. 649, 55 S. E. 929 [1906]. 'Duncan v. Kamish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; German Savings & Loan Society v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pac. 1067 [1902]; Hornung v. McCarthy, 126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 303 [1899] ; Jones v. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663; 38 N. E. 688 [1894] ; Whiting v. Mayor and Al- dermen of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 [1870] ; St. Paul, Minneap- olis & Manitoba Railway Company V. City of Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141, 27 N. W. 500 [1886] ; Keith v. Bing- ham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889] ; McQuiddy v. Smith, 67 Mo. App. 205 [1896]; Fisher v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 67 N. Y. 73 [1876], (reversing Fisher v. The Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 3 Hun. 648 [ 1875] ; People of the State of >,e\v York ex rel. Dean v. Board of Assessors of the City of New York, 59 Hun. 407, 13 N. Y. Supp. 404 [1891]; Watt v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 23 [1847]; Smith v. City of Alle- gheny, 92 Pa. St. 110 [1879]; Quirk V. City of Seattle, 38 Wash. 25, 80 Pac. 207 [1905]. 'White V. City of Alton, 149 111. 225, 36 N. E. 1008. "We do not propose to consider whether such a claim of damages could be maintained against the city or against the mayor and aldermen in any form. Even if a liability to such damages could be substantiated in accordance with the principles laid down in Child v. Boston, 4 All. 41, we do not think that it can be set up against an assessment required for paying the expenses of a public improvement with which the mayor and aldermen are charged as public officers. It is a statute proceeding. The assessment is authorized, not merely as a means of enforcing a municipal claim in the nature of a private right; it is prescribed as a public duty. The whole proceeding, including the assessment and collec- tion of the amount of the expenses, depends upon the provisions of the statute and must be regulated en- tirely by them. Those provisions neither contemplate nor admit of such investiojations as would be nee- 125 FORM OP EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. §73 a delay in commencing to construct an improvement cannot be set off against an assessment for benefits levied to meet the cost of such improvement/ nor can damages claimed for defective performance be set off." Damages for the wrongful appropria- tion of road material by the contractor cannot be set off against an assessment. ° Still less can payment of assessment be re- sisted entirely on the ground that compensation for the damages sustained has not been first made, if the statute does not pro- vide for such payment as a condition precedent to any liability for such assessment." If, however, damages are allowed for a change of grade the amount of the assessment for making such change has been held to be an element of damage." Where damages have been estimated in one proceeding and a local as- sessment for benefits has been levied in another proceeding, the legislature may authorize the one to be set off against the other.^- Even after an assessment of damages and a local assessment for benefits have been made, it is within the power of the legisla- ture to provide that they may both be enforced in one action by setting off the one against the other.^^ In Kentucky, how- essary to enable parties assessed to avail themselves of any counterclaims they may liave, growing out of the mode in which the power has been exercised. To require the collection of the assessment to be delayed for that purpose would be » serious ob- struction and embarrassment to the discharge of a public duty and incon- sistent with the limited period al- lowed for the continuance of the lien upon the land." Whiting v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89, 93, 94 [1870]. 'Whiting v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 [1870]. To the same effect see Lav- erty v. State ex rel. Hill, 109 Ind. 217, 9 N. E. 774. •Lux & Talbott Stone Co. v. Don- aldson, 162- Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1904]: Darnell v. Keller, 18 Ind. App. 103. 45 N. E. 676. Such judg- ment cannot he rendered asainst the city where it is only a nominal party, the contractor being the real party in interest. St. Louis to use of Dep- pelheuer v. Newman, 45 Mo. 138 [1869]. 'Sims V. Hines, 121 Ind. 534, 23 N. E. 515 [1889]. "Duncan v. Eami--, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; Hornung v. Mc- Carthy, 126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 303 [1899]; Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. Mehler, 112 Ky. 438, 64 S. W. 396, 652, 23- Ky. Law Rep. 1335 [1901] ; McQuiddy v. Smith, 67 Mo. App. 205 [1896]. "Stowell V. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 523 [1872]. "Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 94 N. Y. 645 [1884]; People ex rel. Griffin v.. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dee. 266 [1851] ; Livingston v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622 [1831]; City of Cleveland v. Wick, 18 0. S. 303 [1868]. (For the present Ohio rule ns to the power of the leffislature to allow a local as- sessment in such a case see § 308). "Baldwin v. Citv of Newark, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 158 [1875]. § 74 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 126 ever, it is held that the legislature cannot authorize a local as- sessment to be set off against damages in such cases, on the theory that the owner must be compensated before his property is taken and that the benefits received do not constitute com- pensation.^* If suit is brought on the assessment by the con- tractor it has been held that a set-off of his individual debt on another transaction may be had.^' Under an ordinance which provided that a property owner whft wished to set off damages against benefits might do so by receipting on the docket for the amount of damages and obtaining a certificate of such receipt, the amount of which should be credited upon the assessment, it has been held that the fact that the property owner took warrants for payment to him of the damages did not operate as a waiver of his right of set-off.^" § 74. Special contract for set-off. A contract between a municipal corporation and owners of property whereby the property owners release their right for damages resulting from the improvement in consideration of which the municipal corporation assumes local assessments to be levied on such realty has been upheld,^ especially under a statute providing for such a contract." Thus a contract whereby a property owner assented to the change of location of a boule- vard through his land and released damages therefor in con- sideration of which the municipal corporation assumed assess- ments for such improvements and agreed to take care of any sewer assessments and surface water, was held valid, even though the municipal corporation would be thereby obliged to obtain the right to go upon the land of others and to go upon such land in or- der to perform its agreement to care for the surface water, the stat- ute authorizing a settlement on such terms as may be agreed upon.' "City of Covington v. Worthing- Seattle, — Wash. — , 94 Pac. 656 ton, 88 Ky. 206, 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. [1908]. Cases, 187, 11 S. W. 1038, 10 S. W. » Shelby v. City of Burlington, 125 790 [1889]. la. 343, 101 N. W. 101 [1904]. (A '^Bodley v. Finley, 111 Ky. 618; case in which the property owners 64 S. W. 439, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 851 had paid for one prior improvement [1901]. (This Question was raised of the street in question, and proba- but not decided in Purdv v. Drake, bly for two such improvements.) (Kv.), 32 S. W. 939, 17 Ky. L. E. ^Bell v. City of Newton, 183 Mass. 819. 481. 67 N. E. 599 [1903]. "State ex rel. Guye v. City of » Bell v. Citv of Newton, 183 Mass. 481, 67 X. E. 599 [1903]. 127 POEM OP EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 75 In this last ease the contract was made by the mayor under au- thority from the city council, had been recognized by the city by a recital in the instrument in which it assumed the local assessment and the city council had ratified and confirmed all settlements heretofore effected on account of such improvement. It was held, accordingly, that such contract was binding on the city, and that the owner could maintain an action for breach of the covenants to take care of the sewer assessments and the surface water.* If property owners agree that the assessment for benefits shall be deducted from the damages due to them and that the assessment shall be delayed until the amount of dam- ages can be determined, they cannot recover until the assess- ment is levied, even in ease of delay, as long as they have not requested the levy of the assessment.^ A diffeernt question may be presented if the contract for exemption from assessment operates to transfer to other property owners the burden of the . assessment of which the realty in question has been relieved." An assessment is void as to the other property owners if a given tract of land is relieved from assessment in consideration of a waiver of damages by such property owner, since the bene- fits may greatly exceed the damages and such contract may thus be unfair to the other property owners.'' § 75. Statutory provision for deduction of value of land donated. In the absence of specific statutory provision therefor, a land- owner who has donated land for a street cannot have the value of such land deducted from a subsequent assessment for bene- fits arising from the improvement of such street. Statutes are occasionally found, however, which provide that the value of the land so donated shall be deducted from such assessment. The right of the owner to deduct the value of the land donated by him is limited by and restricted to the terms of such stat- utes. Thus under a statute authorizing a city to accept dona- tions of land for use as a street, and providing that if the land is so used, the land of the donor shall not be assessed for such » Bell V. City of Newton, 783 Mass. ' In re City of Seattle, — Wash. 481, 67 N. E. 599 [1903]. — , 94 Pac. 1075 [1908]; (citing = Boston Water Power Co. v. City Ayer v. City of Chicago, 149 111. 262, of Boston, 194 Mass. 571, 80 N. E. 37 N. E. 57 [1894]; City of Chicago 598 [1907]. V. Shepard, 8 111. App. 602 [1881]). "See § 616 et seq., § 639 et seq. § 76 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 128 street, it was held that if land is donated which is not used for the particular street for which the assessment is levied, the land of the donor is liable for such assessment.^ If, however, the owner of land has donated a part thereof for a street under such statute, and subsequently proceedings' are instituted to widen such street, it is held that the value of the land so do- hated should be appraised and applied as a set-off to benefits assessed against land of such ownet, who was the grantee of such donor, abutting on such strip of land so donated.- § 76. Deduction of certain benefits and assessment for others. It is within the power of the legislature to provide that cer- tain kinds of benefit to property may be deducted from the dam- ages thereto while other kinds of benefit are not to be deducted, but are to be made the basis of a special assessment.^ Thus under a Massachusetts statute for laying out highways, it was said that benefits must be classified as (1) those directly occa- sioned to an estate bounding on the highway, peculiar to the estate itself as distinguished from other estates not bounding thereon; (2) those shared by such estate in common with other estates in the neighborhood; and (3) those extending to all es- tates in the same city ; and it was held that under such statute benefits of the first class could be allowed only by way of set- off for damages; benefits of the second class could not be set-off, but could be assessed for under the betterment acts; and for benefits of the third class no compensation could be exacted from the owner.^ So the legislature may provide for a pro- ceeding under one statute in which benefits cannot be set off, but must be assessed and also for a proceeding under another stat- ute in which benefits are to be set-off.^ Thus under the better- ment acts * benefits are not to be set off against damages, but iShurtleflF v. City of Chicago, 190 ton, 115 Mass. 377 [1874]; Upham 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]. v. City of Worcester, 113 Mass. 97 ''Espert V. City of Chicago, 201 111. [1873]; Allen v. City of Charleston, 264, 66 N. E. 212 [1903], (distin- 109 Mass. 243 [1872]. guishing Shiirtleff v. City of Chica- ^ Upham v. City of Worcester, 113 go, 190 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]. Mass. 97 [1873]. ' Garvey v. Inhabitants of Revere, ^ Godbold v. City of Chelsea, 111 187 Mass. 545, 73 ?C. E. 664 [1905]; Mass. 294 [1873]." French v. City of Lowell, 117 Mass. "Statutes 1866, c. 174; 1868, i;. 363 ]1875]; Bancroft v. City of Bos- 75, 216; 1869, u. 169. 129 POKM OF EXACTION IN ASSESSMENT. § 77 are to be the basis of an assessment in a separate proceeding,''' while under another statute " such benefits are to be set off.' Accordingly if the record leaves it in doubt which method was followed a ruling of the court will be presumed to be correct and it will be presumed that the method was followed under which such ruling would be correct." § 77. Method of computation of benefits and damages. "Where benefits are to be deducted from damages the question whether the amount of each is to be found or whether "the net amount merely is to be found is one of some difficulty, one which depends upon the wording and interpretation of the statutes which control, and one upon which several different views have been entertained. "Where the statute provides that the jury in a proceeding to open a street shall determine the benefits or enhanced value that will accrue from the improvements to the portion or portions not taken, and deduct the same from the dam- ages or compensation they would otherwise award to the owner or owners it has been held that the jury must concur on both the items of damage and the items of benefit and accordingly that the jury must report each separately.^ A general verdict has been said to be insufficient, on the ground that it should show either the amount of the benefits separately or at least the dif- " "These acts provide ^or the as- Society v. Mayor and Aldermen of sessment of the full damages at one Boston, 116 Mass. 181, 17 Am. Rep. stage of the proceeding^ and the as- 153 [ 1874] ; Bancroft v. City of Bos- sessment of the benefit and advan- ton, 115 Mass. 377 [1874]; Godbold tage to the land owner at a subse- v. City of Chelsea, 111 Mass. 294 quent stage and by an independent [1873]; Prince v. City of Boston, 111 act" Godbold v. City of Chelsea, Mass. 226 [1872], while under the 111 Mass. 294, 295 [1873]. To the highway acts (Statutes 1871, Chap, same effect see Edmands v. City of 382) benefits can be set off against Boston, 108 Mass. 535 [1871]. damages and only those benefits ° General Statutes, Chaps. 43, 44. which cannot be so set off can be ' in Benton v. Inhabitants of assessed as betterments. Under this Brookline, 151 Mass. 250, 23 N. E. statute the right of set-off' was up- 846 [1890], it was pointed out that held in Green v. City of Fall Eiver, opposite results in similar cases had 113 Mass. 262 [1873]; Upham v. been reached in Massachusetts under City of Worcester, 113 Mass. 97 different statutes. In proceedings [1873]. under the betterment acts ( Statutes ' Godbold v. City of Chelsea, 111 1866, Chap. 174) benefits cannot be Mass. 294 [1873]. set off against damages, and under ^ Duffield v. City of Detroit, 15 this statute the right of set-off was Mich. 474- [18671 "cannot properly be reckoned as a taxing power."" The power of assessing for sidewalks has been referred to the power o: taxation even where an apportionment not in proportion to bene- fits was upheld and the apportionment would have been held to be improper in a regular assessment for benefits.' Such a view is illogical. If such a charge can be imposed without an apportionment on the basis of benefits it cannot be an exercise of the taxing power,' and it can be ftpheld, if at all, only under the police power. § 97. Sewers and drainage. Assessments for the construction of sewers have been held to be referable to the police power, and accordingly have been upheld under circumstances which an assessment based upon benefits could not be sustained.' In other jurisdictions it has been held that assessments for sewers are referable to the power of taxation and not to the police power.^ Assessments for the drainage of large tracts of realty have also been referred to the police power,^ as well as assessments for widening, deepening " Douglass V. Town of Harrisville. 9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548 [1876]; (Citing Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504 [1835]; Nor- folk City V. Ellis, 26 Gratt (67 Va.) 224 [1875]. 'State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 227. [1870]. "See § 118, Chapter XIII. 1 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893], (af- firming P.iulson V. City of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]); Keese v. City of Den- ver, 10 Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825 [1887] ; Van Wagoner. Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Paterson, 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 455, 51 Atl. 922 [1902]. "A sewer is constructed in the ex- ercise of the police power for the health and cleanliness of the city, and the police power is exercised sole- ly at the legislative will." Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 40, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893], (affirming Paulson V. Citv of Portland. 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]). 'm re 127th Street, 56 How. (N. Y.) 60. Being an exercise of the power of taxation such assessments are subject to the constitutional re- quirement that they must be "pro- portional and reasonable." White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 67 N. E. 359 [1903]. 'Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 59ff [1894]; Hagar v. Board of Super- visors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; O'Reilly v. Kankakee Valley Draining Company, 32 Ind. 169 [1869]; Lien v. Board of County Commissioners of Norman County, 8') Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094 [1900]; Horbach v. City of Omaha, 54 Neb. 83, 74 N. W. 434 [1898] ; State, Brit- tin, Pros. V. Blake, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 442 [1872]; Taylor v. Craw- ford, 72 0. S. 560, 69 L. R. A. S05. 74 N. E. 1065 [1905]; Sessions v. Crumkilton; 20 0. S. 349 [1870]; Bliss V. Krauss, 16 0. S. 54 [1864]. 157 CONSTITUTIONAL BESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 98 and straightening the channel of a river as incident to drainage,* and assessments for filling up low ground so as to prevent the accumulation of stagnant water.'^ The view that drainage as- sessments are to be referred to the police power has been sub- ject to some criticism, nowever, even from courts which once have expressed the same view. In Wisconsin it has been said drainage assessments were referable to the police power," and indeed that such assessments could be justified only on the theory of the police power.^ A part, at least, of the reasoning of these cases has recently been condemned,' though without necessarily affecting the doctrine of the police power. If the assessment for drainage is not in violation of any constitutional provision it is comparatively immaterial whether it is referred to the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the police power." In some jurisdictions assessments for the construction of levees have been held to be referable to the police power.^" On the other hand assessments for the construction of levees have in other jurisdictions been held to be referable to the taxing power, and incapable of justification as an exercise of the police power.^^ § 98. Other types of improvement. Assessments against railway companies for the expense of light- ing grade crossing are referable to the police power * and have been held to be valid charges upon that theory.- Under this •State V. Blake, 36 N. J. L. (7 27 S. W. 590 [1894]; Lien v. Board Vr.) 442 [1872]. of County Commissioners of Norman "Charleston v. Werner, 38 S. C. County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094 488, 37 Am. St. Rep. 776, 17 S. E. [1900]. 33 [1892]. "In speaking of a law authorizing ' Town of Muskegon v. Drainage an assessment for the construction Commissioners, 78 Wis. 40, 47 N. of a levee, the court said: "the police W. 11 [1890]; State ex rel. Baltzell power of the state is broad enough V. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. to authorize the law in question." 394, 43 N. W. 947 [1889]; Bryant v. Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543, 562, Robbins, 70 Wis. 258, 35 N. W. 545 48 S. W. 629 [1898]. [1887]. "Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. 'Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461, Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. 46 Am. Rep. 637, 17 K W. 389 725, 36 S, W. 1041 [1896]. [1883]. 'Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton ' Rude V. Town of St. Marie, 121 Railroad Company v. Sullivan, 32 Wis. 634, 99 N. W. 460 [1904]. 0. S. 152 [1877]. See 5 59. " Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, ' Ohicaffo, Indianapolis & Louisville 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Carson v. St. Railway Company v. City of Craw- Francis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, fordsviile, 164 Ind. 70, 72 X. E. 1025 § 99 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 158 theory the cost of constructing a viaduct may be imposed upon a railway company.^ The expense of cleaning and sprinkling streets'* and of removing ice and snow from sidewalks ^ is to be charged upon the owner of the abutting property upon the theory of the police power in jurisdictions where such charges can be imposed upon the owners of abutting property at all. In some jurisdictions it is held that such assessments cannot be upheld upon any theory." The construction of public docks at the ex- pense of the owner of abutting property cannot be upheld as justified by the police power. An assessment was made for building a public dock upon the land of a' private owner, who had refused to build such dock when ordered. The city then built such dock and levied an assessment upon such land-owner for the cost thereof. It was held that such assessment could not be justified as an exercise of the police power.' A charge for laying waterpipes so that land can receive water thereby, cannot be upheld under the police power. So a tax was levied upon each lot or parcel of ground having a building upon it, which abutted on any street through which water supply pipes were laid and which could be conveniently supplied with water there- from. The tax, amounting to two dollars and fifty cents per annum, and the cost of the water actually consumed upon said premises was made a personal liability of the owner of such premises. It was conceded by the village that such charge was not a local assessment, based upon benefits, but it was sought to justify it under the police power. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that such a charge could not be justified under the theory of the police power and hence that such charge was invalid.' § 99. Attempt to base assessments on power of eminent domain. Occasionally courts have been urged to place the power of assessment upon the basis of eminent domain rather than of taxa- [1904]; Village of St. Marys V. Lake ern Pacific Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 429, Erie & Western Eailroad Company, 108 N. W. 269). See § 359. 60 O. S. 136, 53 N. E. 795 [1899]; 'See § 370. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R. R. "See §§ 58, 371. Co. V. Village of Bowling Green, "See §§ 370, 371. Ohio, 57 0. S. 336, 41 L. R. A. 422, 'Lathrop v. City of Racine, !!» 49 N. E. 121 -[1897]. Wis. 461, 97 N. W. 192 [1903]. 'Northern Pacific Ry. v. Duluth, 'Village of Lemont v. Jenks, 197 208 J. S. 583 [1908], (affirming 111. 363, 90 Am. St. Rep. 172, 64 N- State ex rel. City of Duluth v. North- E. 362 [1902]. 159 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 99 tion. Such attempt is usually made, it may be added, not in order to find a ground for justifying assessment, but rather in order to restrict the exercise of the power by applying the con- stitutional provision that property cannot be taken for public use without making compensation. This power undoubtedly limits eminent domain and by the great weight of authority has no application to taxation; and accordingly unless assessment is a branch of eminent domain it is not restricted by such provision.^ Special assessment, as based on benefits, is essentially an exac- tion from an individual or a charge upon property, upon the theory that it is, under the circumstances of the case, a fair contribution to the expense of a public improvement in return for the peculiar benefits received therefrom. Payment of such assessment does not leave the public indebted to the property owner for the amount thereof. The sole duty it owes by reason of such assessment is to make proper application of the fund thus created. Under eminent domain, on the other hand, prop- erty is taken, not as the fair proportion of public burdens due from the owner, but as something in addition to and beyond his share. What is taken from him is measured not by fair pro- portion, but by the needs of the public. The taking leaves the public indebted to the owner unless compensation is made in advance.- Another purpose in the attempt to base the right of '■ For discussion of this specific the owner's share of contribution to question see §§ 109-113. a public burden, but as so much be- ' One of the leading cases which yond his share. Special compensa- holds that assessment is not a branch tion is therefore to be made in the of the power of eminent domain i3 latter case, because the go.vernment People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., is a debtor for the property so taken ; of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. but not in the former, because the Dec. 266 [1851], overruling People payment of taxes is a duty, and cre- ex rel. Post v. Mayor, etc., of Brook- ates no obligation to repay otherwise lyn, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 209 '[1849]. than in the proper application of the ' In this case the essential distinction tax. Taxation operates upon a com- between the power of special assess- munity or upon a class of persons ment as based on benefits and the in a community, and by some rule power of eminent domain is stated of apportionment. The exercise of in language often quoted in subse- the right of eminent domain pper- quent decisions. ates upon an individual, and without "Taxation exacts money or services reference to the amount or value ex- from individuals as and for their acted from any other individual or respective shares of contribution to class of individuals. People ex rel. any public burden. Private property Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, taken for any public use, by right 4 N. Y. 419, 424, 55 Am. Deo. 266 of eminent domain, is taken, not as [1851]. §100 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 160 special assessment upon the -power of eminent domain is to in- sist upon having the question of the amount of benefits and the apportionment thereof passed upon by a jury. In most juris- dictions there is a constitutional provision securing the right to a jury in determining compensation in eminent domain. Under the taxing power on the other hand there is ordinarily no con- stitutional right to have the amount or the apportionment oi the tax passed upon by a jury. ^ § 100. Assessment not based on power of eminent domain. In determining this question, in whatever way it ,has arisen, the courts have held that the power of special asses^ent, as far at least as it is based on the theory of special benefits, is not a branch of the power of eminent domain nor is it to be referred thereto.^ 'Hornung v. McCarthy, 126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 303 [1899] ; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Emery V. San Francisco Gas Company, 28 Cal. 346 [1865]; Nichols v. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854]; Speer v. Mayor and Council of Athena, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; Hayden V. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [1883]; Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. Village of Elm- hurst, 165- HI. 148, 46 N. E. 437 [1897]; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; White V. People ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]; New York C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. City of Ham- mond, — Ind. , 83 N. E. 244 »[1908]; Chicago, Rock Island & Pa- cific Railway Company v. City of Ottumwa, 112 la. 300, 51 L. R. A. 763, 83 N. W. 1074 [1900]; Hack- worth V. City of Ottumwa, 114 la. 467, 87 N. W. 424 [1901]; Howell v. Bristol, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 493 [1871]; Bradley v. McAtee, 70 Ky. (7 Bush.) 667 [1870]; City of Lex- ington V. McQuillan's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 [1839]; Sutton's Heirs v. City of Louisville, 5 Dana (35 Ky.) 28 [1837] ; Barber Asphalt Paving Com- pany V. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So. 848 [1889] ; Excelsior Plant- ing & Manufacturing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Mayor and City Council of Balti- more V. Johns ' Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880]; Brooks v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 48 Md. 265 [1877]; Groff v. Mayor, Alder- men and Common Council of Fred- erick City, 44 Md. 67 [1875]; Moale V. Mayor and City Council of Balti- more, 5 Md. 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276 [1854]; Jones v. Board of Aldermen of City of Boston, 104 Mass. 461 [1870]; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]; Wood- bridge V City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274 [I860]; Williams v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560 [1853]; Stin- son V. Smith, 8 Minn, 366, 8 Gil. 326 [1863]; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295, 2 Gil. 256 [1858]; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1902]; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; Keith V. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889]; Inhabitants of Palmyra V. Morton, 25 Mo. 593 [1857]; Citj of Springfield to use of Tuttle v. Ba- ker, 56 Mo. App. 637 [1894]; J. & A. McKechnie Brewing Company v. 161 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 101 § 101. Theory that assessment is referable to power of eminent domain. The proposition that the power of special assessment is not referable to the power of eminent domain has not, however, been free from question. Cases are not wanting in which, in obiter at least, it is suggested that this power is, or may be, referable to the power of eminent domain. In California it has been suggested that it may be referable to the power of eminent do- main,^ but this suggestion is made solely for the purpose of showing that even if special assessment is a branch of eminent domain, the assessment cannot be a personal liability, but must be restricted to a lien upon the property against which it is assessed.^ In Illinois the Supreme Court in its earlier decisions seemed to hold that the power of local assessment might possibly be referred to the right of eminent domain.' In these cases, however, the actual holding was not necessarily based upon this proposition. The real point in question was the validity of spe- cial assessments upon the basis of frontage ; and the actual hold- ing was that under the Constitution of 1848 such assessments were invalid, since if referable to the taxing power they lacked the uniformity required by the constitution and if referable to the power of eminent domain, no provision for adequate compen- sation was made.' In New Jersey it was once suggested that Trustees of Village of Canandaigua, ington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. 162 N. Y. 631, 57 N. E. 1113 [1900], Smith) 352, 8 Am. Eep. 255 [1871]; (affirming J. & A. McKechnie Brew- Stroud v. City of Philadelphia, 61 ing Company v. Trustees of the Vil- Pa. St. 255 [1869]; In the matter of lage of Canandaigua, 15 App. Dlv. Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230 [1856]; 139, 44 N. Y. Supp. 317 [1897]); Rouudtree v. City of Galveston, 42 People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence, Tex. 612 [1875] ; Allen v. Drew, 44 41 N. Y. 137 [1869]; Litchfield v. Vt. 174 [1872]; Rude v. Town of St. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123 [1869]; Howell Marie, 121 Wis. 634, 99 N. W. 460. V. City of Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267 [1904]. [1867]; Brewster v. City of Syra- ' Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 614 ■cuse, 19 N. Y. 116 [1859]; Striker v. [1865]. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 9 [1844]; 'See Chapter XX. Hilliard v. City of AsheviUe. 118 N. 'Wright v. City of Chicago, 46 111. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; City 44 [1867]; Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 91, 92 Am. Dec. 196 [1867]; City of L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892] ; Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306 [1866] ; Maloy V. Citv of Marietta, 11 0. S. City of Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 111. 636 [I860]; Scovill V. ntv of Cleve- 211 [1866]; City of Chicago v. land, 1 0. S. 126 [1853]: Kin? v. Larned, 34 111. 203 [18641 -. City of City of Portlatirl. 2 Or. 146 [18651; Peoria v. Kidder.' 26 IM. 351 [1861]. In re Vaciti^n nf Cpjiter Street. 115 * rjtv of Chicatro v. lamed, 34 111. Ta. St. 247, 8 Atl. 56 [1886]; Wash- 203 [1864]. For the effect of the § 101 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 162 assessments for drainage might be justified under the theory of eminent domain.' This suggestion was made to justify the theory that such assessments would not necessarily be limited to the amount of the benefits conferred upon the property by reason of the improvement for which the assessment was levied. In an earlier case it had been said that assessments for purposes of drainage were not to be explained as resting either on the power of taxation or on that of eminent domain, but as a "part of the local common law. " " In other jurisdictions, also, it has been suggested that the right to levy local assessments foi the purpose of drainage is to be referred to the power of emi- nent domain.^ An assessment levied without notice to the prop- erty owners affected .thereby has been held to be invalid as a taking of private property for public use.' Assessments without notice are usually regarded as unconstitutional because lacking in due process of law." In a case involving an assessment upon certain towns for contributions for maintaining highways and bridges not within the limits of such towns, it has been saic that the power of assessment rested on the power of eminent domain.^" An assessment for a purpose not public in its char- special constitutional provision of the ' Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, constitution of 1870 upon such as- 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Hagar v. Su- sessment, see §§ 51, 104. pervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. ° in matter of drainage of the 233 ; Duke v. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. Great Meadows on Pequest Eiver, 42 710, 39 S. W. 444, 824 [1897]; In N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880], (af- matter of Commissioners to drain firmed without opinion as Hoagland the Great Meadows on Pequest River, V. State, Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]; L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881], and af- In the matter of the Application for firmed by the Supreme Court of the Drainage of Lands between Lower United States as Wurts v. Hoagland, Chatham and Little Falls, in the 114 TT. S. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 Counties of Passaic, Essex and Mor- [1885]). ris, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 497 [1872]; ° Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N. J. L. In the matter of the Application of (12 Vr.) 175 [1879], (affirming In Eyers for Audit of Accounts, 72 N. matter of Commissioners to drain Y. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88 [1878]; Hart- Great Meadows on Pequest River, 39 well v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]. It 166 [1854]; Burk v. Ayers, 19 Hun. was said to be "quite too late to re- (N. Y.) 17 [1879]. vert to first principles in order to 'City of Locransport v. Shirk, 129 overthrow a system of procedure Ind. 352, 28 N. E. 538 [1891]. which is possessed of such antiquity "See § 119 et seq. and has to its credit so many recog- " Town of Underbill v. Town of nitions." Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N. Essex, 64 Vt. 28, 23 Atl. 617 [1891]. J. L. [12 Vr.] 175, 180 [1879]. 163 (JONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLIC^UJLE, ETC. § 102 aeter has been said to be a taking of private property for a private use.^^ Assessments in excess of benefits have been said to be invalid as being an exercise of the power of eminent domain without making due compensation for the property taken.'^ § 102. Confusion of assessment with power of eminent domain. One excuse for confusing special assessment with eminent do- maili is to be found in the fact that often the actual taking of property by eminent domain for a public improvement is com- bined with the exercise of the power of special assessment to pay for such improvement;^ and accordingly a discussion of the two together is necessarily made. Furthermore, in some cases the validity of the special assessment depends upon the validity of the proceedings in eminent domain.^ Furthermore, in many cases the power of special assessment is discussed on the assump- tion, rather than on the specific holding, that it is a branch of eminent domain. These cases involve the question of the right to levy special assessments in disregard of the question of bene- fits accruing to the realty assessed by reason of the public im- provement to pay for which the assessment is levied. If no benefits exist or if the assessment levied is in excess of the benefits conferred the "assessment is according to many authori- ties not a valid tax. Such taking of property is then objection able as a taking without due process of law.^ Unfortunately on the assumption that special assessment is a branch of emi- nent domain, the invalidity of such assessments is placed, in the " Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. may so exercise the taxing power of Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. E. A. 525, the Commonwealth as to work the 65 N. B. 1020 [1902]. financial ruin of the owners of lands ^ "There is a line at which the within their boundaries." In re Op- right of taxation, which subjects the ening of Jfark Avenue, 83 Pa. St. (2 individual to his share of the pub- Morris) 167, 173 [1876]. lie burdens ceases, and the right of ' Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- eminent domain which subjects him trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 to more than his share, begins to [1894]; Gas Light & Coke Company operate. It is not requisite now to v. City of New Albany, 158 Ind. 268, attempt to define that line, or to an- 63 N. E. 458 [1901]. See § 63 et tieipate cases in which the question seq. will have to be met and settled ^ See § 390 et seq. whether officers of municipal corpo- "See § 118. rations, under legislative authority. §103 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 164 line of eases referred to, upon the ground that it is a taking of private property without compensation.* § 103. Specific ^ant of power of assessment. In most of the state constitutions no specific grant is made to the legislature of power to levy special assessments, since it is embraced in the general grant of legislative power, which in turn includes the power^of taxation. Special constitutional pro- visions are, however, occasionally to be found which specifically authorize assessments. Full effect is of course given to these provisions in all cases coming within the scope thereof.^ The constitution of Arkansas provides, "Nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prohibit the General Assembly from authorizing assessments on real property for local improvement:^ ' For the further discussion of this particular topic see Chapter XIII. ' Ahem v. Board of Improvement District No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901]; Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899] ; Carson v. St. Fran- cis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 [1894]; Little Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184 [1886]; City of Little Eock v. Board of Improve- ments, etc., 42 Ark. 152 [1883]; Givins v. City of Chicago, 188 111. 348, 58 N. B. 912 [1900]; Chicago & Northwestern KailvFay Company v. Village of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 437 [1897]; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894] ; McChesney V. Village of Hyde Park, 151 111. 634. 37 N. E. 858 [1894]; Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 143 111. 92, 17 L. R. A. 774, 32 N. E. 372 [1893]-, Smith V. People ex rel. Detrick,. 140 III. 355, 29 N. E. 676 [1893] ; Snrin- per V. Walters. 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893] ; Wilson v. Board of Trus-* tees of the Sanitary District of Chi- oa-jo, 133 111. 443, 27 N. '^. 203 [1891]; Wilbur v. City of Spring- field, 123 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]; Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]; Dun- ham V. People ex rel. McCrea, 96 111. 331 [1880]; White v. People ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]; Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879]; Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110 [1877]; People ex rel. Miller v. Sherman, 83 111. 165 [1876]; People ex rel. Mil- ler V. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]; Hines v. City of Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 180 [1865] ; Excelsior Planting & Manufacturing Company v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; McGee v. Board of County Commis- sioners of Hennepin County, 84 Minn. 472, 88 N. W. 6 [1901]; Scott County V. Hinds, 50 Minn. 204, 52 X. W. 523 [1892]; State of Minne- sota ex rel. Stateler v. Reis, 38 Minn. 371, 38 N. W. 97 [1888]; Dowlanv. County of Sibley, 36 Minn. 430, 31 X. W. 517 [-1887] ; City of St. Paul V. Mullen, 27 Minn. 78, 6 N. W. 424 [1880] ; Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]; Darst v. Grif- fin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 X. W. 819 [1891] : State of Nebraska ex rel. Abbott v. Board of Tnuntv Commissioners of Dodge Countv. 8 Xeb. 124. 30 Am. Rep. 819 [18791: TTurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336 [1876]; Hansen 165 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 103 in towns and cities, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law to be based upon the consent of a majority in value of the property adjoining the locality to be affected, but such as- sessments shall be ad valorem and uniform. . . . " ^ Whatever questions may be raised under such a provision there can be no doubt as to the possibility of providing for assessments, within the limits of such constitutional provision which shall be free from constitutional objections.^ A statute which provides foi an assessment but does not provide for securing the assent of the property owners is, under such a provision, unconstitutional.^ The constitution of Massachusetts provides that the legislature shall have power "to impose and levy proportional and rea- sonable assessments, rates and taxes..' ' ^ This provision is re- garded as a restriction as well as a grant of power, and under it a statute which authorizes an assessment without a correspond- ing equivalent in benefits is unconstitutional." It is this pro- vision which controls in case of such assessments and not the provision,' which forbids taking private property, except by eon- sent of the owner thereof, unless reasonable compensation is made.* On the other hand an assessment which is in proportion V. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pac. Mass. 529, 69 N. E. 328 [1904]; Har- 332 [1896]. And see upon this ques- wood v. Street Commissioners of the tion Milwaukee Electri? Railway & City of Boston, 183 Mass. 348, 67 N. Light Company v. City of Milwau- E. 362 [1903]; White v. Gove, 183 kee, 95 Wis. 42, 69 N. W. 796 [1897]; Mass. 333, 67 N. E. 359 [1903]; Dean v. Borehseniu?, ' 30 Wis. 236 Sears v. Street Commissioners of the [1872]. City of Boston, 180 Maas. 274, 62 = Article XIX., § 27, Constitution N. E. 397 [1902]; Lorden v. Coffey, of Arkansas. 178 Mass. 489, 60 N. E. 124 [1901]; ^ Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. Dexter v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]; Little Rock 247, 79 Am. St. Rep. 306, 57 N. E. v. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S, 379 [1900]; Lincoln v. Board of W. 198 [1889]. Street Commissioners of the City of * Craig V. Board of Improvements Boston, 176 Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 of Russelville Water Works Improve- [1900]; Sears v. Street Commission- ment District, 84 Ark. 390, 105 S. W. ers of Boston, 173 Mass. 350, 53 N. 867 [1907]. E. 876 [1899]; Weed v. Mayor and = Part. 11., Chap. 1, § 1, Art. IV., Aldermen of Boston, 172 Mass. 28, Constitution of Massachusetts. 42 L. R. A. 642, 51 N. E. 204 [1898]. 'Harwood v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 'Part I. (Bill of Rights), Art. X.. 487, 74 N. E. 914 [1905], (a case Constitution of Massachusetts. in which the plaintiff was not, how- ' 'Weed v. Mayor and Aldermen of ever, allowed to take advantage of Boston, 172 Mass. 28, 42 L. R. A. the unconstitutionality of the stat- 642, 51 N. E. 204 [1898]. ute). Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 § 104 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 166 to the special benefits conferred and not in excess of the amount of such benefits is not invalidated by this clause of the consti- tution.' § 104. Grant held to imply restriction. The difficult questions raised under such provisions are (1) what assessments are included within the scope of such provi- sions, and (2) whether such, provisions impliedly forbid assess- ment other than those included in their provisions. The greater number of these specific constitutional provisions authorizing as- sessments have been adopted because of judicial decisions ren- dered prior to the adoption of such provisions which either en- tirely prevented or greatly restricted the power of levying local assessments. Such specific provisions, it may be added, are com- paratively few in number because in most states the provisions ordinarily found in constitutions are so construed as to make it possible to levy and apportion assessments in a practicable man- ner,^ and it is, as a rule, only in jurisdictions where the con- struction placed upon the ordinary constitutional provisions is contrary to the weight of authority that such special provisions have been found to be necessary. In Illinois the courts held originally that assessments must be apportioned solely according to benefits, and that apportionment by the front foot was neces- sarily unconstitutional.^ The constitution which was adopted in 1870 contained the following provision: "The general' assembly may vest the corporate authorities of cities,^ towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special ass«issment or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise. . . . '" Under this provision, whatever questions have arisen, there has been no doubt of the validity of statutes, conferring upon the authorities of cities, towns or villages the power to levy "Cheney v. City of Beverley, 188 'See § 86. Mass. 81, 74 N. E. 306 [1905]; = City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. Smith V. Mayor and Aldermen of 306 [1866]; City of Ottawa v. Spen- Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. R. cer, 40 111. 211 [1866]; City of Chi- A. 728, 65 N. E. 40 [1902]; Hall v. cago v. Lamed, 34 111. 203 [1864]. Street Commissioners of Boston, 177 These decisions were rendered under Mass. 434, 59 N. E. 68 [1901]; Jones the Constitution of 1848. See §S 51, V. Board of Aldermen of the City • 101. of Boston, 104 Mass. 461 [1870]; » Art. IX., § 9, Constitution of Illi- Dorgan v. City of Boston, 12 All. nois, 1870. (94 Mass.) 223 [1866]. 167 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTBICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 104 special assessments.* This provision of the constitution of Illi- nois of 1870 has been regarded not only as granting the power of special assessment as therein set forth, but also as prohibiting the legislature from conferring the power of special assessment in any way other than as therein set forth.'"' Accordingly it was held that the power of special assessment could not be con- ferred upon any other corporation than a city, a town, or a village; that is, it could not be conferred upon a drainage dis- trict." To meet this difficultv an amendment was made to the constitution of 1870, which provided: "The general assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands to construct drains, ditches and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining purposes across the lands of others; and provide for the organization of drainage districts and vest the corporate authorities thereof with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches, and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore con- structed under the laws of this state by special assessment upon the property benefited thereby." Under this provision the power of the legislature to create special drainage districts and to em- power them to levy special assessments cannot be questioned ;' and it has been held that the legislature may, under this pro- vision, confer power upon cities and villages to levy assessments *City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 111. Chicago, 84 111. 227 [1876]; People 528, 75 N. E. 1044 [1905] ; Givins v. ex rel. Miller v. Sherman, 83 111. City of Chicago, 188 111. 348, 58 N. 165 [1876]; People ex rel. Miller v. E. 912 [1900]; Chfcago & North- Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]. western Railway Company v. Village ' Givins v. City of Chicago, 188 111. of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]. 437 [1897]; Chicago & Alton Rail- "Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 road Company v. City of Joliet, 153 [1876]. 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; Mc- 'Commissioners of Highways of Chesney v. Village of Hyde Park, 151 the Town of Colfax v. Commission- Ill. 634, 37 N. E. 858 [1894]; Kueh- ers of East Lake Fork Special Drain- ner v. City of Freeport, 143 111. 92, age District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. 17 L. R. A. 774, 32 N. E. 372 [1893] ; 206 [1890] ; Samuels v. Drainage Wilbur V. City of Sprinsfleld, 123 111. Commissioners, 125 111. 536, 17 N. E. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]; Huston 829 [1889]; Kilgour v. Drainage V. Clark, 112 111. 344 [1885]. Dun- Commissioners, 111 111. ,342 [1885]: ham V. People ex rel. McCrea, 96 111. Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 331 [1880];- White v. People ex rel. 109 111. 504 [1884]; Moore v. People City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604 ex rel. Lewis, 106 111. 376 [1883], [1880]; Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 decided under the amendment, Article ni. 596 [1879]; Fagan v. City of IV., § 31. § 104 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 168 for the purpose of drainage.' Under the constitution of Minne- sota, which contained the provision, "All taxes to be raised in this state shall be as nearly equal as may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation and be equalized and uniform throughout the state, " " it was held that such provision included local assessments under the term 'taxes,' and prevented the legislature from levying assessments on the theory of benefits or apportioning assessments according to the benefits accruing to the property assessed by reason oj the improvement for which such assessment was levied, or ap- portioning the assessments on any basis, but that of a cash valu- ation.'" Following this decision the constitution of Minnesota was amended so as to include the further provision, "the legislature may by general law or special act authorize mu- nicipal corporations to levy assessments for local improvements upon the property fronting upon such improvements or upon the property to be benefited by such improvements without re- gard to a cash valuation and in such manner as the legislature may prescribe. ' ' '^ Under this amendment the power of the legis- lature to levy assessments for local improvements without refer- ence to the cash valuation of the property upon which such as- sessment is levied is clearly established. '' Subsequently some difii- culty was experienced in levying assessments for waterpipes,'' and accordingly the constitution of Minnesota was further so amended as to include the provision, "And provided, further, that for the purpose of defraying the expenses of laying water- pipes and supplying any city or municipality with water, the legislature may by general or special law authorize any such city or municipality having a population of five thousand or more to levy an annual tax or assessment upon the lineal foot " McChesney v. Village of Hyde "^ McGee v. Board of County Corn- Park, 151 111. 634, 37 X. E. 858 mlssionera of Hennepin County, 84 [1894]; Village of Hyde Park v. Minn. 472, 88 N. W. 6 [1901] ; State Spencer, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 of Minnesota e.x rel. Stateler v. Eeis, [1888]. 38 Minn. 371, 38 N. W. 97 [1888]; "Art. IX., § 1, Constitution of City of St. Paul v. Mullen, 27 Minn. Minnesota [1857]. 78, 6 K W. 424 [1880]; Rogers v. "Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366, City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 8 Gil. 328 [1863]. [1876]. "Art. IX., § 1, Constitution of "Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Pal- Minnesota as amended in 1869; Laws mer, 20 Minn. 468, 20 Oil. 424 1869, Ch. 51. [1874]. 169 CONSTITUTIONAL KESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 105 of all lands fronting on any water main or water pipe laid by such city or municipality within corporate limits of said city for supplying water to the citizens thereof without regard to the cash value of such property; and to empower such city to collect any such tax assessments or fines or penalties for failure to pay the same or any fine or penalty for any violation of the rules of such city or municipality in regard to the use of water. or for any water rate due for the same " " Under this provision the power of levying assessments for the purpose of constructing water pipes is thoroughly established as far as the state constitution is concerned,^'' though with some doubt as to the validity of such apportionment under the constitution of the United States ^'' as construed at one time by the Supreme Court of the United States,^' a doubt which at one time led the Su- preme Court of Minnesota to hold such assessments invalid/* but which was subsequently resolved in favor of their validity.'" In Wisconsin it has been said that the power of assessment existed only by virtue of the express grant of the power of as- ■ sessment, and could not be sustained under the general grant of the taxing power. ^^ § 105. Grant held not to imply restriction. Where the other provisions of the constitution as construed by the court do not impose any serious restrictions upon local assessments, such provisions as those referred to in this section are not usually regarded as the source of legislative power con- cerning assessments; nor are they regarded as restrictions upon legislative power. The constitution of Arkansas provides: "Noth- ing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prohibit the general assembly from authorizing assessments on real property for local improvements in towns and cities under such regulations "Art. IX., § 1, Constitution of pany, 82 Minn. 390, 85 N. W. 207 Minnesota, amended 1881. [1901]; sub nomine Ramsey County " State of Minnesota v. Robert P. v. Robert P. Lewis Company, 53 L. Lewis Company, 72 Minn. 87; 75 N. R. A. 421 [1898]. W'. 108 [1898]; sul) nomine Ramsey "State v. Robert P. Lewis Com- County V. Robert P. Lewis Company, pany, 82 Minn. 402, 86 X. W. 611 42 L. R. A. 639. [1901]; svl nomine Ramsey Countr "Amendment XIV. v. Robert P. Lewis Company. 53 L. "Norwood V. Balrer, 172 U. S. 269, R. A. 427. 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 [1898]. ^° Weeks v. City of Milwaul^ee, 10 "State V. Robert P. Lewis Com- Wis. 242 [I860]. § 105 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 170 as may be prescribed by law, to be based upon the consent ol a majority in value of the property holders owning property adjoining the locality to be affected; but such assessments shall be ad valorem and uniform. ' ' ^ Under this provision it has been held that the legislature may confer the power of local assessment upon some public corporation or quasi corporatioi other than a city or a town, such as a levee district.- The leg- islature may, also, under this provision, create an improvement district ^ which may embrace the entire area of a city or town.* The constitution of Nebraska contains the provision: "The leg- islature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special as- sessment or by special taxation of the property benefited.'"* There have not been, under the construction placed upon the general provisions of the Nebraska constitution by the courts of that state, any especial restrictions upon the power of levying special assessments. The foregoing provision is not, therefore, re- garded in that state as the sole source of the power to levy local as- sessments, nor is it regarded as pi-eventing the legislature froir conferring upon other municipal corporations or public quasi corporations the power of levying special assessments; but on the contrary, such power is held to be embraced in the power of taxation, included in the grant of legislative power, and is not to be restricted by this specific provision." Accordingly such power may be conferred upon counties.^ In this respect 'Art. XIX., § 27, Constitution of Neb. 124, 30 Am. Rep. 819 [1879]. Arkansas [1874]. As originally expressed the view of ^Ritter v. Drainage District No. 1, the court was that the right of local Poinsett County, 78 Ark. 580, 94 assessment rested on this clause ex- S. W. 711 [1906]; Carson v. St. clusively. Hurford v. City of Oma- Francis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, ha, 4 Neb. 336 [1876]. 27 S. W. 590 [1894]; Davis v. 'Darst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184 N. W. 819 [1891]; State of Nebras- [1886]. ka ex rel. Abbott v. Board of County ' City of Little Rock v. Board of Commissioners of Dodge County, 8 Improvements, etc., 42 Ark. 152 Neb. 124, 30 Am. Rep. 819 [1879]. [1883]. » Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 * Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. [1876]; Board of Directors for 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]. Leveeing Wabash River v. Houston, 'Art. IX., § 6, Constitution of Np- 71 111. 318 [1874]; Gage v. Graham, braska. 57 111. 144 [1870]; Hessler v. Drain- • Darst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 age Commissioners, 53 111. 105 N. W. 819 [1891]; State of Nebras- [1870]; Harward v. St. Clair & Mon- ka ex rel. Abbott v. Board of County roe Levee Drainage Company, 51 111. Commissioners of Dodge County, 8 130 [1869]. 171 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 105 the courts of Nebraska differ from those of Illinois.*' Under the provision in the constitution of California, the legislature is not limited to the creation of cities and' towns as the sole public corporations upon which the power of levying local assessments may be conferred but may create other public corporations, such as irrigation districts,® and confer upon such district the power of special assessment. The constitution of Ohio pro- vides: "The general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contract- ing debts and loaning their credit so as to prevent the abuse of such power."" Under this provision local assessments are held to be valid.^' This provision is held on the one hand to show conclusively that local assessment is distinct from the power of general taxation; and on the other hand it is held not to limit the power of the legislature or to restrict its action in conferring the power of special assessment to "cities and incor- porated villages."^- Accordingly, the power of local assessment may be conferred upon township trustees.'^ The constitution of South Dakota contains the provision, "The legislature' may vest the corporate authority of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special taxation of con- tiguous property or otherwise."" The constitution of "Wash- ington provides: "The legislature may vest the corporate au- thorities of cities, towns and villages with the power to make local improvements by special assessment or by special taxation of property benefited. For all corporate purposes all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same." ^^ Without any discussion of the question it was at first assumed that under this provision the legislature had power to create ' In the matter of the Bonds of the '■' Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. " Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675 [1891]. County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]. "Article XIII., § 6, Constitution "Art. XI., § 10, Constitution of of Ohio [1851]. South Dakota. "Hill V. Hlgdon, 5 0. S. 243, 67 "Art. VII., § 9, Constitution of Am. Dec. 289 [1855]. Washington. §105 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 172 cpecial taxing districts/" such as an irrigation district,^' a road district," or a district for constructing dikes,^° and to confer upon such district the power of levying local assessments to pay for such improvements. When the power of the legislature to confer such power upon taxing districts was attacked specifically, it was held that the legislature possessed such power. ^'' Under this provision it has been held that a drainage statute requiring the commissioners to submit the scHeme of drainage to the court, in order that the court may determine whether such scheme is practical, conducive to public welfare and beneficial to the land to be drained; and further requiring damages and benefits to be estimated by a jury, and transcript of such proceedings to be certified to the county auditor who then proceeds to make such assessment, is valid, as it does not confer upon either the court or the jury the power of making such assessments.'^ So a stat- ute on the subject of assessments for street improvements which' allows the city to take the initiative in the question of levying assessments, but provides that the court shall appoint commis- sioners to make apportionment of such assessment, and that the court' shall on objection review such assessment, and shall cor- rect inequalities therein, is held to be valid, as conferring the power to make the assessment upon the city and not upon the court.^^ " Cass V. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 53 section, notes 6, 7 and 8, and de- Am. St. Rep. 859, 44 Pac. 113 [1896]; clined to follow the holding in Dli- Seanor v. Board of County Commis- nois: Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 Fioners, 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1876]. See § 104, pointing out, how- [1895]; Board of Directors of Mid- ever, a slight difference in phrase- die Kittitas Irrigation District v. ology between the Constitution of Peterson, 4 Wash. 147, 29 Pac. 995 Washington on the one hand, and [1892]. the Constitutions of Illinois and Ne- " Board of Directors of Middle Kit- braska on the other : the former pro- titas Irrigation District v. Peterson, viding "For all corporate purposes 4 Wash. 147, 29 Pac. 995 [1892]. municipal corporations may be vest- " Seanor v. Board of County Com- ed with the taxing power;" while the missioners, 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 two latter provide in such connec- [1895]. tion, "For all other corporate pur- "Cass V. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 53 poses." Am. St. Rep. 859, 44 Pac. 113 [1896]. -"> State of Washington on the rela- ^ Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. tion of Matson v. Superior Court f "■ 315, 46 Pac. 332 [1896]. The court Skagit County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 follows the holding in Nebraska: Pac. 264 [1906]. State of Nebraska ex rel. Abbott v. ^'In the matter of Westlake Ave- Board of County Commissioners of nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. Dodge County, 8 Neb. 124. 30 Am. 279 [1905]. Rep. 819 [1879]. See ante, this 173 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 106 § 106. Provisions requiring legislature to restrict power of as- sessment. In many of the state constitutions are to be found provisions, variously worded, to the general effect that it is the duty of the legislature to restrict the power of assessment as conferred upon public corporations so as to prevent the abuse thereof. These provisions are as follows: "The General Assembly shall pro- vide . . . for the organization of cities . . . and incorporated towns, and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrow- ing money and contracting debts so as to prevent the abuse of such power. ' ' ^ Such a provision evidently pre-supposes the existence of the power of local assessment.- Whether such provisions impose any effective restraint upon the exercise of the power of local assessment is a more difficult question. "Where the effect of such provisions upon the power of the legislature has been considered, it has been held that such provisions are addressed to the conscience of the legislature, that by the oath of office of the members of the legislature they are bound to respect and enforce such provisions, and that they should not pass any law in violation thereof; but that the courts cannot enforce so general and so indefinite a rule and cannot declare a statute to be unconstitutional because in the judgment of the court it does not restrict the power of public corporations suffi- ciently.^ The question, it may be added is the same 'as the one ' Article XII., § 3, Constitution of ' City of Emporia v. Norton, 13 Arkansas. Similar provisions are Kan. 569 [1874]; (on rehearing, found in Article XII., § 5, Constitu- 16 Kan. 236 [1876]); Hines v. City tion of Kansas; Article XIV., § 13, of Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186 (origi- Constitution of Michigan; Article nal edition), 180 (second edition), XI., § 5,- Constitution of Mississippi; [1865]; Hurford v. City of Oma- Article VIII., § 8, Constitution of ha, 4 Neb. 336; Tiflft v. City Nevada; Article XII., § 1, Constitu- of Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204 [1880]; tion of Nev7 York; Article VI., § 130, In the matter of the Petition of Constitution of North Dakota; Arti- Meade to Reduce an Assessment, 74 cle VIII., § 4, Constitution of North N. Y. 216 [1878]; City of Raleigh Carolina; Article XIII., § 6, Consti- v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. tution of Ohio; Article XI., § 5, Con- 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Parsons stitution of Oregon; Article VIII., v. City, of Columbus, 50 0. S. 460, § 3, Constitution of South Carolina; 34 N. E. 677 [1893]; Raymond v. Article X., § 1, Constitution of South Cleveland, 42 0. S. 522 [1885]; Ma- Dakota; Article XIII., § 3, Consti- loy v. City of Marietta, 11 0. S. 636 tution of Wyoming. [18601; Hill v. Hifrdon, 5 0. S. 243, ^Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy 67 Am. Dec. 289 [1855]; I'adderly (Ohio) 464 [1855]. v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 74 Pac. § 107 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 174. presented in eases involving general taxation, since the consti- tutional provisions already quoted apply to taxation as well as to special assessment. The conclusion reached in cases of spe- cial assessment is the same as that reached in cases of general taxation. Indeed it has been held that these provisions apply to general taxation alone and not to special assessments.* How- ever, in all these cases the statute which authorized the assess- ment contained some restrictions, Showing that the legislature had made some attempt, though possibly an inadequate one, to comply with the constitutional mandate. It may fairly be looked upon as still an open question, whether a statute which imposed no restriction of any sort could be held to be unconstitutional as being in violation of these provisions. Such a question, how- ever, is not likely to arise for two reasons: First, because no legislature is at all likely to pass such a statute; and second, because if it did, such statute would in all probability be in violation of other specific and more definite constitutional pre visions. A statute providing for the levy of local assessments must, therefore, be construed as restricting the power of the pub- lic corporation to which is given authority to levy such assess- ment.° § 107. Provisions forbidding assessment. The constitution of Virginia, which went into effect June 10, 1902, contains a provision, "No city or town shall impose any tax or assessment on abutting land-owners or other public local improvements, except for making and improving the walkways upon existing streets and improving and paving the existing alleys and for their construction or for the rise of sewers."^ The same constitution contained a provision that every city' having a municipal charter at the time of the adoption of the consti- tution might retain the same, except so far as it might be re pealed or amended by the general assembly, but "that every such charter is hereby amended so as to conform to all the pro- visions, restrictions, limitations and powers set forth in this ar- 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903] ; Milwaukea C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 Electric Railway & Light Company [1892]. V. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 42, "Bailey v. City of Zanesvllle, 20 69 N. W. 796 [1897]; Dean v. Borch- Ohio C. C. 236 [1900]. senius, 30 Wis. 236 [1872]. 'Art. VIII., § 170, Constitution of •City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. Virginia [19021. 175 CONSTITUTIONAL RBSTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 108 tide or otherwise provided in the constitution. ' ' '^ The schedule of the constitution contained a provision, "Except as modified by this constitution, all suits, actions and causes of action, prose- cutions, rights of individuals, of bodies corporate and politic, and of the state shall continue;"' and also a provision, "All taxes accrued or accruing to the commonwealth or to any po- litical subdivision thereof under laws now in force shall, undei this constitution, enure to the use of the commonwealth or ol such subdivision thereof."* Under these provisions it was held that an assessment for paving a street authorized by the ehartei prior to the taking effect of the new constitution, but not ac- tually made until after such constitution took effect, was even if a "tax," still not one "accrued or accruing;" and hence that such assessment was prohibited by the constitution.^ II some assessments were perfected and some not perfected when this constitutional provision took effect, it has been held that the assessments not perfected then could not be perfected there- after, and that on account of the constitutional requirement ' ol uniformity ° the assessments already perfected could not be en- forced since it was impossible to enforce the other assessments for the same improvement.' § 108. Equal protection of law. The Constitution of the United States and those of many of the states contain provisions securing the equal protection of the laws to persoris affected thereby. These provisions, requir- ing equal protection of the laws, are often found in constitutions united so closely with the provisions forbidding the taking of property without due process of law that the two classes of pro- visions are often discussed together.^ The clause of the Constitu- tion of the United States which contains this provision is as fol- ■"Art. XIII., § 117, Constitution of 'Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Virginia [1902]. Company, 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. 1142, ' Sec. 3, Schedule of Constitution of 24 S. 784 [1904], (modifying Field Virginia [1902]. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, * Sec. 4, Schedule of Constitution of 117 Fed. 925 [1902]); Hagar v. Virginia []902]. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 'Hicks V. City of Bristol, 102 Va. U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884] ; 861, 47 S. E. 1001 [1904]. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. ° See § 161. Louis Railway Company v. Taber, 'Fulkerson v. City of Bristol, 105 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 [1906]. Va. 555, 54 S. E. 468 [1906]. §108 TAXATION BY ASSFSSMENT. 176 lows : " . . .No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' ' ^ Many of the state constitutions contain in varying phraseology and with some repeti- tion the statement of the equality of men before the law. Under these provisions an assessment levied upon due notice and fairly apportioned according to benefits is not necessarily unconstitu- tional.^ Under these provisions an assessment apportioned ac cording to frontage as a fair methoiS of estimating benefits and not according to frontage eo nomine is not a violation of the requiremeiit of equal protection of the law.* A statute giving to resident property owners the right to stop an improvement by filing a protest against it, thereby preventing both the im provement and the levying of an assessment therefor, but giving no such right to non-resident property owners does not violate = Article XIV., § 1, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. ' Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. 1142, 24 S. 784 [1904], (modifying Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 117 Fed. 925 [1902]); Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 9 S. Ct. 192, 32 L. 544 [1888], (affirming Wat- son V. Nevin, 86 Ky. 492, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 819, 5 S. W. 546 [1887] ) ; Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1080 [1885], (alBrming In the matter of Drainage of the Great Meadows on Pequest River, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.). 553 [1880], which had been affirmed wit'iout opinion as Hoagland v. State, Simnnton, Pros. 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 450 [1881]).; Hagar v. Reclar ati^n District, No. ^n^ in r. S. 7"!. 2S L. 569 [1884]-; Pn ; s— w y-,v Orleans, 96 U. S. OV f^ !. nr, [1877]; State ex rel. Vr-' -. '-.Iris-Ti. 105 Ind. 463, 5 X. r. 553 [1885] ; Sisson v. Board of Supervisors of Buena Vista Coun- ty, 128 la. 442. 70 L. R. A. 440, 104 N. W. 454 [1905]: Owen v. City of Sioux Citv. 91 la. 190, 59 N. w. 3 [1894] ; Ross. v. Gates. 183 Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107 [1904]; Loven- berg V. City of Galveston. 17 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 [1897] ; "As the statute (providing foi drainage at the expense of the own- ers of property benefited) is appli- cable to all lands of the same kind, and as no person can be assessed under it for the expense of drain- age without notice and opportunity to be heard, the plaintiffs in error have neither been denied the equal protection of the laws, , nor been de prived of their property without due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States." Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 615, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1888], (affirming Matter of Drainage of Great Meadows on Re- quest River, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880], which had been affirmed without opinion as Hoagland v. State, Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881]). "Whenever the law operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated, equal prote"tion cannot be said to be denied." Walston v. Xe- vin, 128 U. S. 578. 582. 9 S. 192, 32 L. 544 [1888]. affirming Watson v. Nevi-i. 86 Kv. J92. 9 Fy. Law Rep. 819. oS. W. 546 [1887]. *Ross V. Gates, 183 Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107 [1904]. 177 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 108 this provision of the Constitution of the United States.* A stat- ute which provides that assessments are to be enforced against residents by a suit in the circuit court, but against non-residents as other taxes does not deny the equal protection of the laws to non-residents." A statute which authorizes the county surveyor to keep in repair the ditches constructed under the drainage laws of the state, and to certify the cost of such repair, includ- ing his own per diem to the county auditor, who is required to draw his warrant in favor of the holders of such certificates upon the county treasurer, payment to be made out of the county treasury, which is to be reimbursed thereafter by assessment lev- ied against the owners of property benefited by such repair, does not violate the provision insuring equal protection of law, an opportunity being given for appeal which gives the property owner his day in court and a full hearing.' A statute which requires the entire amount of the assessment to be paid at once, but which provides that those property owners who waive all objections to the legality of the proceedings shall have the privi- lege of paying the assessment in installments does not violate this constitutional provision,* or the corresponding provision of the Constitution of the United States. A similar statute was " "It is not the purpose of the in the subject matter and their abil- Fourteenth Amendment, as has been ity to protest promptly if the means frequently held, to prevent the States employed are objectionable, place from classifying the subjects of leg- them on a, distinct footing from tfie islation and making different regu- non-residents whom it may be diffi- lations as to the property "of different cult to reach. Furthermore, there is individuals differently situated. The no discrimination among the property provision of the Federal Constitution ovpners in taxing for the improve- is satisfied if all persons similarly ment. When the assessment is made situated are treated alike in privi- it operates on all alike." Field v. leges conferred or liabilities im- Barber Asphalt Paving Company, posed. (Citing Kentucky Railroad 194 U. S. 618, 621, 622, 48 L. 1142, Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. 414, 24 S. 784 [1904], {modifying Field 6 S. S7 [1885]; Hayes v. Missouri, v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. 578 [1877]; Ma- 117 Fed. 925 .[1902]). goun V. Illinois Trust & Savings ' Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, Bank, 170 U. S. 28^ 42 L. 1037 44 Sj W. 707 [1897]. [1898]; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe 'State ex rel. French v. Johnson, Railway Company v. Ellis, 165 U. 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 [1885]. S. 150, 41 L. 666 [1897].) » Sisson v. Board of Supervisors The alleged discrimination is cer- of Buena Vista County, 128 la. 442, tainly not an arbitrary one; the 70 L. R. A. 440, 104 N. W. 454 presence within the city of the resi- [1905]. dent property owners, their interest § 108 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 178 attacked as unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the corresponding provision of the constitution of Indiana: "All courts shall be open, and every man for injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; speedily and without delay."' The validity of such statute was upheld." Under the same constitutional provisions the validity of a statute imposing attorney's fees as part of the costs in a suit to collect a local assessment has been upheld.^' The Indiana statute for assessments for street improvements " has been held to be a violation of this constitutional provision, on the ground that the assessment was not limited to special benefits and that no notice and hearing was given except to revise ' and cor- rect the report and estimate of the engineer and make it eon- form to the prescribed basis of assessment.^' This case cannot be regarded as an authority, for the Supreme Court of Indiana has construed the statute as limiting the assessment to the amount of the special benefits, and has held that at the hearing given, the assessments are to be revised to limit them to the special benefits.^* With this construction, this statute has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be constitutional.*" The constitution of Colorado provides: "That courts of justice shall be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and that ri " . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . . " " Provisions substantially similar to the language used in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States are found in many of the state constitu- tions.^^ The constitution of Virginia separates property from life and liberty in the corresponding provision in its consti- tution. " . . .No person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. . . . " ^^ Some of the provi- sions found are of composite type, suggesting both the clause from Magna Charta and the more familiar requirement of due process of law. "No citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities or in any manner "Article I., § 14, Constitution of I., § 13, Constitution of Idaho; Arti- South Carolina. cle I., § 2, Constitution of Illinois; 'Article I., § 8, Constitution of Article I., § 9, Constitution of Iowa Tennessee. [1857]; § 6, Constitution of Louis- "■ Article V., Amendments to the iana ; Article VII., § 32, Constitution Constitution of the United States. of Michigan ; Article I., § 7, Constitu- [Adopted 1791]. tion of Minnesota; Article III., § 14, " Article XIV., Amendments to the Constitution of Mississippi ; Article Constitution of the United States. II., § 30, Constitution of Missouri; [Adopted 1868]. Article III., § 37, Constitution of "Article I., § 8, Constitution of Ala- Montana; Article I., § 3, Constitution bama; Article II., § 8, Constitution of of Nebraska; Article I., § 8, Constitu- Arkansas; Article I., § 13, Constitu- tion of Nevada; Article I., § 13, Con tion of California; Article II., § 25, stitution of North Dakota; Article Constitution of Colorado; Article I., VI., § 2, Constitution of South Da- § 9, Constitution of Connecticut; kota; Article I., § 3, Constitution of Article I., § 7, Constitution rf Dela- Washington; Article I., § 10, Consti- ware; Article XII., Constitution of tution of Wyoming. Florida; Article I., § 1, Paragraph "Article I., § 11, Constitution of III., Constitution of Georgia; Article Virginia [1902]. § 115 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 192 disfranchised except by the due course of the law of the land. ' ' " "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with- out due process of law and the judgment of his peers. "^^ § 115. Scope and meaning of "due process of law." The scope and meaning of the phrase "due process of law" is a question which has received some attention from the pourts. It is looked upon as the equivalent of the phrase "the law of the land," found in thle various charters in England, guarantee- ing the personal rights of the English, of which the most cele- brated is Magna Charta.^ This provision was inserted in the Constitution of the United States in one of the earlier amend- ments thereto,^ as a limitation upon the power of the Federal government. It has been incorporated in the constitutions of many of the states of the Union as a limitation upon the exer- cise of power by the officers of the governments of such states respectively.^ By a more recent amendment to the Constitution of the United States,* it has become a limitation imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the powers of the states. The fourteenth amendment resulted in a prompt and marked increase in the number of cases brought before the Supreme Court of the United States to obtain a construction of this clause and a determination of its force and effect.' The Supreme Court "Article I., § 19, Constitution of 'See § 114. Texas [1876]. * Amendment XIV., Constitution of "Article II., § 10, Constitution of United States. West Virginia. Though differing in = "It is not a little remarkable that form this provision of the Constitu- while this provision has been in the tion of West Virginia has the same Constitution of the United States, as meaning as the other constitutional a restraint upon the authority of the provisions "or" here meaning "and." Federal Government for nearly a cen- Jelly V. Dils, 27 W. Va. 267 [1885] ; tury, and while during all that time (See discussion on page 275). the manner in which the powers of *The equivalent of the phrase "due that government have been exercised process of law" according to Lord has been watched with jealousy and Coke is found in the words 'law of subjectea to the most rigid criticism the land' in the Great Charter in in all its branches, this special limi- connection with the writ of haieas tation upon its powers has rarely corpus, the trial by jury, and other been invoked in the judicial forum or guarantees of the rights of the sub- the more enlarged theatre of public ject against the oppression of the discussion. But while it has been a crown." Davidson v. New Orleans, part of the Constitution as a re- 96 U. S. 97, 101, 24 L. 616 [1877]. straint upon the power of the States ^Amendment V., Constitution of only a very few years, the docket of the United States. this court is already crowded with 193 CONSTITUTIONAL KESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 115 of the United States at first declined to attempt to define "due process of law" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend- ment, as impracticable, though highly useful." Subsequently an attempt was made to define or describe due process of law as follows: "It is sufficient to observe here, that by 'due process' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and wherever it is neces- sary for the protection of the parties it must give them an op- portunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. The clause in question means, therefore, that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty or property which may result in deprivation of either without the observance of those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights. ' ' ' Other attempts have been made to define "due process of law." "Due process of law requires an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the ease in which the citizen has an opportunity to be heard and to defend, enforce and protect his rights. A hearing or an opportunity to be heard is absolutely essential. "We cannot conceive of due process oi law without this. In his argument in the Dartmouth College cases in which we are asked to hold of such an important phrase, in the that State Courts and State Legis- Federal Constitution by the gradual latureshave deprived their own citi- process of judicial inclusion and ex- zens of life, liberty or property with- elusion as the cases presented for out due process of law." Davidson v. decision shall require with the rea- New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 103, 104, soning on which such decisions may 24 L. 616 [1877]. be founded." Davidson v. New Or- ° "If ... it were possible to define leans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, 24 L. 616 what it is for a state to deprive a [1877]. person of ' life, liberty or property ' Hagar v. Reclamation District without due process of law, in terms No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 708, 4 S. Ct. ■which would cover every exercise of 663, 28 L. 569 [1884] quoted in power thus forbidden to the state, Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 58, and exclude those which are not, no 47 L. 70, 23 S. 20 [1902] ; w^ere it more useful construction could be is said that "due process of law was furnished by this or any other court well defined" in the definition quoted, to any part of the fundamental law. The definition above quoted follows But apart from the imminent risk close upon the statement by the court of a failure to give any definition that the definition is a difficult one, ■which would be at once perspicuous, and its approval of the statement al- comprehensive and satisfactory, there ready quoted from Davidson v. New is wisdom, we think, in the ascer- Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, 24 L. 618 taining of the intent and application' [1877]. § 115 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 194 case, 4 Wheat. 519, Webster defines 'due process of law' as a proceeding 'whieh proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. ' " ' " Due process of law is not violated and the equal protection of the laws is given when the ordinary course is pursued in such proceedings for the assessment an, collection of taxes that has been customarily followed in the state, and where the party who may subsequently be charged in his property has had a hearing or the opportunity for one provided by the statute. " " " It is settled that if provision ir made 'for notice to and hearing of each proprietor at some stage of the proceedings upon the question what proportion of the tax shall be assessed upon his land, there is no taking of his property without due process of law. ' " i° Due process of law is said to consist in "an opportunity to appear and contest the legality, justice and correctness of a proposed assessment against (his) property, to defray any part of the expense of a local improvement, at some stage in the proceedings before the as- sessment becomes final, which was declared by this court to be his constitutional right. "^^ At the same time the difficulty of defining due process of law with perfect accuracy is still frequently noted.^^ Furthermore, while there can be no doubt that such constitutional provisions being written law can over- ride provisions of the common law inconsistent therewith,''' * Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, "Adams v. City of Roanoke, 102 191, 30 Am. Eep. 289 [1878]; quoted Va. 53, 45 S. E. 881 [1903]; (Citing in Campbell v. Dwiggins, 83 lud. City of Xorfollf v. Young, 97 Ya. 728, 473, 482 [1882]. 47 L. R. A. 574, 34 S. E. 886 [1900]; » Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Heth v. City of Radford, 96 Va. 272, Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 168, 41 L. 31 S. E. 8 [1898]; Violett v. City 369, 17 S. 56 [1896]; quoted in Hib- Council of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, ben V. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 322, 48 53 Am. St. Rep. 825, 31 L. E. A. L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; (affirming 382, 23 S. E. 909 [1896]). Hibben v. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, 62 N. '-"It would not be a simple mat- E. 447 [1902]). ter to state in a succinct proposition '° Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. any rule as to when a notice of assess- 30, 41, 37 L. 637, 13 8. 750 [1893]; ment is and when it is not due pro- ( Affirming Paulson v. City of Port- cess of law." Oliver v. Monona land, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 County, 117 la. 43, 53, 90 X. W. Pac. 450 [1888]); (Citing McMillen 510 [1902]. V. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. 335 " "If at common law private prop- [1877]); Davidson v. New Orleans, erty might be taken for private use. 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; Ha- or taken or destroyed without due gar V. Reclamation District No. 108, course of law, then our constitution 111 V. S. 701, 4 S. 663, 28 L. 569 has rendered inoperative the common [18?4] ; Srencer v. Merchant, 123 U. S. 345, 8 S. 921. 31 L. 763 [1888]. 195 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 116, 117 the condition of the law existing and well recognized when these provisions were adopted must be considered carefully, and is of great weight in aiding in the determination of what is due process of law. "It is important for this court to avoid ex- tracting from the very general language of the Fourteenth Amendment a system of delusive exactness in order to destroy methods of taxation which were well known when that amend- ment was adopted and which it is safe to say that no one then supposed would be disturbed."^" § 116. Sale of property as taking without due process. The enforcement of a void assessment,^ including assessments levied under unconstitutional statutes,^ is spoken of as amount- ing to a taking without due process of law. This is not the ordi- nary meaning of due process of law, however. If due notice and hearing are given, the owner has a right to take advantage of the invalidity of the assessment and of the statute under which it is levied. If no notice or hearing is provided for, such omission constitutes the want of due process of law. § 117. Due process of law requires taking for public use. It will be noted that the definitions of due process of law which have been given lay especial stress upon opportunity for a hear- ing. Constitutional provisions of this character may, however, affect the validity of assessments in several different ways. (1) Under such provisions, according to many authorities, the legis- ature is prohibited from levying an assessment for a purpose A^hich is not essentially public in its character. The determina- tion of the legislature that a given improvement is public in character is therefore not final and conclusive. It is, on the con- trary, a matter for the court to pass upon in order to determine whether the purpose for which an assessment is levied can 'be law in that regard. . . . The common v. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 295, 60 L. R. law in so far as it conflicts with these A. 525, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]. provisions of the constitution is in- " Louisville and Nashville Rail- operative. There is nothing so sacred road Company v. Barber Asphalt in the common law that it should Paving Company, 197 U. S. 430, 434, override a constitution or a statute. 25 S. 466 [1905]. Much of our constitution was 'Brady v. Kinii, 53 Cal. 44 [1878]. adopted and manv of our statutes ^ Brady v. King, 53 Cal. 44 [1878] ; enacted, to get rid of the iraperfec- Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477, 20 tions and injustice of the common N. W. 549 [1884]. law." Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. § 117 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 196 a purpose so public in its nature that an assessment can be levied therefor.' What these purposes are is a topic which, for the sake of convenience, is treated in greater detail elsewhere.'' There is no serious conflict of authority upon the proposition that the purpose for which an assessment may be levied must be one which is public in its nature ; though there is considerable conflict upon the question whether or not certain specific pur- poses are public' Upon the qilfestion of the specific constitu- tional provision which forbids an assessment for a private pur- pose, there is on the other hand, a conflict of judicial opinion. Thus it has been urged that such an assessment is unconstitu- tional,* because in conflict with the provision, "Private prop- erty shall ever be held inviolate but subservient to the public welfare, ' ' ^ and hence a taking of private property for a private use without the consent of the owner thereof. It may be added, however, that it has been said that private property can not be taken for private use even without such constitutional provision." This clause does not prevent an assessment for work which was not authorized by the improvement ordinance, but which has been adopted and accepted by the municipality, the work being of a kind which the municipality might have ordered in the first instance and thus have levied an assessment therefor.' A statute which provides that the city shall issue bonds to pay ' Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, 8 Am. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, Eep. 398 [1871]. 17 S. 56 [1896]; Consolidated Chan- "See Chapter VIII. nel Company v. Central Pacific Rail- ' See Chapter VIII. road Company, 51 Cal. 269 [1876]; 'Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, Court of Decatur County, 9 Ga. 341 65 X. E. 1020 [1902]; Reeves v. [1851]; Coster v. Tide Water Com- Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. S. pany, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Greene) 333 [1858]; As expressing the same 54' [1866]; In the Matter of the Peti- opinion see McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 tion of Tuthill for the Appointment 0. S. 202 [1884]. of Commissioners to Drain Certain ' Art. I, § 19, Constitution of Ohio Wet and Low Lands in the Towns of [1851]. Chester and Blooming Grove in ' Shaver v. Starrett, 4 0. S. 494 Orange County, 163 N. Y. 133, 79 [1855]. Am. St. Rep. 574, 49 L. R. A. 781, 'City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 57 N. E. 303 [1900] ; Chicago & Erie U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]; Railroad Co. v. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, Hall v. Street Commissioners of Bos- 60 L. R. A. 525, 65 X. E. 1020 ton, 177 Mass. 434, 59 N. E. 68 [1902]; McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 0. [1901]; Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt. S. 202 [1884] ; Anderson v. Turbe- 590 [1868] ; Mills v. Charleton, 29 ville, 6 Cold. (46 Tenn.) 150 [1868]; Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578 [1872]. 197 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 118 the expense of the improvement which is to be made thereafter, and that the city is to reimburse itself by levying an assessment upon the property benefited by such improvement is not invalid as in violation of the clause forbidding the taking of property without due process of law." It seems not to prevent the legis- lature from fixing the rate of interest to be paid on deferred installments of assessments." "Taking without due process of law" is usually regarded as meaning a taking by the public for its own use as well as a taking for the advantage of a private person, a taking under the guise of assessment or other form of taxation as well as undisguised confiscation. This provision has been said, however, to have no application to the taking of private property for public use, but to refer solely to the trans- fer of property from one person to another without the consent of the former.^" The constitutional provision forbidding the tak- ing of property without due process of law has been said to be restricted to eminent domain, and to have no application to local assessments.^^ This observation was, however, an obiter, since the proceeding contained the elements usually recognized as due process of law. § lis. Due process of law requires apportionment according to benefits. (2) These constitutional provisions forbidding the taking of property without due process of law, also affect the method of apportioning the assessment with reference to the property upon which it is levied. In theory, at least, it is held in the great majority of jurisdictions that an assessment must be apportioned according to the benefits conferred by the improvement for which such assessment is levied, and must not in any case be in sub- stantial excess of such benefits.^ As has already been said,^ the courts are not in harmony as to the constitutional principle which ' State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & '° Jordan v. Hyatt, 3 Barb. ( N. Y. ) Trust Company v. Ames, 87 Minn. 275 [1848]. 23, 91 N. W. 18 [1902]. "Excelsior Planting and Manufac- ° Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 202 turing Company v. Green, 39 La. U. S. 275 [1906]; This question was Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]. not brought to the attention of 'See § 11. either the trial court or the State ^See § 111 et seq. Supreme Court and accordingly was not passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. §118 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 198 is applicable in limiting assessments to benefits conferred. The great weight of authority, however, is that the constitutional provision applicable is that which forbids taking of property without due process of law. If the assessment does not exceed the amount of the benefits conferred by the improvement for which such assessment is levied, and is apportioned according to such benefits, it is not objectionable as a violation of the constitutional provisions here urfSer discussion.' If the assess- ' Lousville and Nashville Kailroad Company v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, 25 S. 486 [1905] ; (affirming Louisville and Nashville R. K. Oo. V. Barber Asphalt Pav- ing Co., 116 Ky. 856; 76 S. W. 1097, 25 Ky. L. R. 1024 [1903]); Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553, 24 "S. 737, 48 L. 1115 [1904]; Sch-iefer v. Werling, 188 U. S. 516, 23 S. 449, 47 L. 570 [1903]; (af- firming Schaefer v. Werling, 156 Ind. 704, 60 N. E. 149 [1901], which upheld the assessment without opin- ion on the authority of Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1900]); Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U. S. '640, 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903]; (affirming Kelly v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432, 46 L. 627, 22 S. 397 [1902]; (affirming Goodrich v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]); Voigt v. Detroit City, 184 U. S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902]; (affirming Voigt v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900]); King v. Portland City, 184 U. S. 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902]; (affirming King v. Port- land, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900] ) ; Shumate V. Heman, 181 U. S. 402, 45 L. 922, 21 S. 645 [1901]; (affirming He- man V. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]); Wormley v. District of Columbia, 181 U. S. 402, 45 L. 921, 21 S. 609 [1901]; ( per curiam. no opinion) ; Detroit v. Parker, 181 V. S. 399, 45 L. 917, 21 S. 624, 645 [1901] ; (reversing Parker v. City of Detroit, 103 Fed. 357 [1900]); Cass Farm Company v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, 45 L. 914, 21 S. 644, 645 [1901]; (affirming Cass Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 124 Mich. 433,-83 N. W. 108 [1900]); Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389, 45 L. 908, 21 S. 609 [1901]; (reversing Lyon v. Town of Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 381 [1899]); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 181 U. S. 324, 21 S. 625, 45 L. 879 [1901]; (affirming Barber Asphalt Paving Company v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]); Spencer v. Itfer- chant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (affirming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 683 [1884]; (affirming Reclamation District No. 108 v. Ha- gar, 4 Fed. 366 [ 1880] ) ; Brown v. Drain, 112 Fed. 582 [1901]; Burling- ton Sav. Bank v. City of Clinton, Iowa, 106 Fed. 269 [1901]; Harton V. Town of Avondale," 147 Ala. 458, 41 So. 934 [1908]; City Council of Montgomery v. Moore, 140 Ala. 638, 37 So. 291 [1903]; Inge v. Board of Public Works of Mobile, 135 Ala. 187, 93 Am. St. Rep. 20, 33 So. 678 [1902]; City Council of Montgomery V. Birdsong, 126 Ala. 632, 28 So. 522 [1899]; Chapman v. Ames, 135 Cal. 246, 67 Pac. 1125 [1901]; San Francisco Paving Company f. Bates, 134 Cal. 39, 66 Pac. 2 [1901]; Had- ley V. Dague, 130 Cal. 207, 62 Pac. 500 [1900]; Cohen v. City of Ala- meda, 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377 199 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. 118 ment is. not apportioned in substantially the same ratio as the benefits or if it is substantially in excess thereof, such assessment [1899]; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057 [1896]; Davies v. City of Los An- geles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; Appeal of North Beaeh and Mission Railroad Company in tlie Matter of Widening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. 500 [1867]; City of Denver v. Camp- bell, 33 Colo. 162, - 80 Pae. 142 [1905]; City of Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 17 L. R. A. 135, 30 Pac. 1041 [1892]; Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford, 60 Conn. 432, 22 Atl. 782 [1891]; English v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Atl. 158 [1896] ; Edger- ton V. Mayor and Aldermen of the Tovra of Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140 [1882]; Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580 [1890]; Speer v. Mayor and Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; Pioneer Irrigation District v. Brad- ley, 8 Ida. 310, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201, 67 Pac. 295 [1902] ; Job v. City of Alton, 189 III. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. E. 622 [1901]; Chi- cago and Northwestern Railvray Company v. Village of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 43T [1897]; Chi- cago and Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 107V [1894]; Wright v. City of Chi- cago, 46 111. 44 [1867] ; Deane v. Indiana Macadam & Construction Company, 161 Ind. 371, 68 N. E, 686 [1903]; Martin v. Wills, 157 Ind. 153, 60 N. E. 1021 [1901]; Wray v. Fry, 158 Ind. 92, 62 N. E. 1004 [1901]; Roundenbush v. Mitch- ell, 154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 151 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep.' 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1900] ; Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382, 30 Am. St. Rep. 247, 15 L. R. A. 624, 30 N. E. 414, 37 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cases, 354 [1891]; Minne- apolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Lind- quist, 119 la. 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Company v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]; Hackworth v. City of Ot- tumwa, 114 la. 467, 87 N. W. 424 [1901]; Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]; City of Kansas City v. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; Bar- field V. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 128, 63 S. W. 964 [1901] ; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush. (71 Ky.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871]; Burguieres v. Sanders, 111 La. 109, 35 So. 478 [1903]; Bruning v. Chadwick, 109 La. 1067, 34 So. 90 [1903]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43 [1894]; White V. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 67 N. E. 359 [1903]; Lincoln v. Board of Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 176 Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]; .Howe V. City of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 [1874] ; Cass Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 124 Mich. 433, 83 N. W. 108 [1900]; (affirmed Cass Farm Company v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, 45 L. 914, 21 S. 644, 645 [1901]); Voigt V. City of Detroit, 123 Mich, 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900] ; (affirmed Voigt v. Detroit City, 184 U. S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902] ) ; Goodrich v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900] ; City of Kalamazoo v. Francoise, 115 Mich. 554, 73 N. W. 801 [1898]; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]; Sheley v. City of Detroit, 45 Mich. 431, 8 N. W. 52 [1881]; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155, 24 Am. Rep. 535 [1876]; Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 494 [1869] ; McMillan v. Board of County Commissioners of Freeborn County, 93 Minn. 16, 100 N. W. 384 [1904]; State V. Trustees of Maealester Col- lege, 87 Minn. 165, 91 N. W. 484 [1902]; State V. Robert P. Lewis Company, 82 Minn. 402, 86 N. W. 611 [1901]; sub nomine Ramsey 118 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 200 is invalid as amounting to a taking without due process of law.* It may be observed that in many of the eases there was a failure County V. Robert P. Lfewis Co., 53 L. R. A. 421 [1901]; (reversing on rehearing State v. Robert P. Lewis Company, 82 Minn. 390, 85 N. W. 207 [1901] ; sub ■ nomine Ramsey County V. Robert P. Lewis Co., 53 L. R. A. 421); State of Minne- sota V. Robert P. Lewis Company, 72 Minn. 87, 75 N. W. 108 [1898]; sub nomine Ramsey County v. Rob- ert P. Lewis Co., 42 L. R. A. 639; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Munn, 185 Mo. 552, 83 S. W. 1062 [1904]; Ross V. Gates, 183 Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107 [1904] ; City of St. Charles ex rel. Budd v. Deemar, 174 Mo. 122, 73 S. W. 469 [1903] ; Heman v. Gil- liam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 163 [1902]; Prior v. Buehler & Coney Construction Company, 170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]; Barber Asphalt Paving Company v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]; City of Springfield to use of Central Nation- al Banlc V. Weaver, 137 Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 509, 39 S. W. 276 [1897]; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 [1883]; Tyler v. City of St. Louis, 56 Mo. 60 [1874]; State of Missouri ex rel. Cavender v. City of St. Louis, 52 Mo. 574 [1873]; Uhrig v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458 [1869]; McMillan v. City of Butte, 30 Mont. 220, 76 Pac. 203 [1904]; State, Ray- mond, Pros. V. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Rutherford, 55 N. J. L. (26 Vr.) 441, 27 Atl. 172 [1893] ; People ex rel. Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 [1902]; People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y^419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 178 [1862]; Hilliard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; City of Wilmington v. Yopp, 71 N. C. 76 [1874]; Erickson v. Cass County, 11 X. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; Webster v. City of Fargo, 9 N. D. 208, 56 L. R. A. 156, 82 N. W. 732 H900]; (affirmed as Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, 45 L. 912, 21 S. 623, 645 [1901]); Roberts v. First National Bank of, Fargo, 8 N. D. 504, 79 N. W. 1049 [1899]; Rolph V. City of Fargo, 7 N. D. 640, 42 L. R. A. 646, 76 N. W. 242 [1898] ; Schroder v. Overman, 61 0. S. 1, 47 L. R. A. 156, 55 N. E. 158 [1899]; (affirming Schroeder v. Overman, 18 Ohio C. C. 385 [1899]); Village of Norwood V. Ogden, 15 Ohio C. C. 539, 8 Ohio C. D. 383 [1898]; Harris- burg V. McPherran, 200 Pa. St. 343, 49 Atl. 988 [1901]; Scranton v. Koehler, 200 Pa. St, 126, 49 Atl. 792 [1901]; Wray v. Mayor, etc., of Pittsburgh for use, etc., 46 Pa.- St. (10 Wright) 365 [1863]; Cleveland V. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50 [1880]; Tripp V. City of Yankton,- 10 S. D. 516, 74 N. W. 447 [1898]; Arnold v. Mayor and Aldermen of Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195; 90 S. W. 469 [1905]; Loven- berg V. City of Galveston, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 [1897]; Norfolk City v. Ellis, 26 Gratt. (67 Va.) 224 [1875]; Dancer v. Town of Mannington, 50 W. Va. 322, 40 S. E. 475 [1901]; City of Parkersburg v. Tavenner, 42 W. Va. 486, 26 S. E. 179; Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]. ' Norwood V. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 [1898]; (af- firming Baker v. Village of Norwood, 74 Fed. 997 [1896]); White v. City of Tacoma, 109 Fed. 32 [1901]; Zehnder v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 108 Fed. 570 [1901] ; Bidwell V. Huff, 103 Fed. 362 [1900]; Fay v. Citv of Springfield, 94 Fed. 409 [1899]; Loeb v. Trustees of Colum- 201 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §118 to give the property owner a proper notice and hearing as to the amount and apportionment of his assessment as well as an excess of the amount of the assessment over the amount of the special benefits ;° which constitutes an additional reason for hold- ing that such assessment does not constitute due process of law.'' Questions of the details of a valid apportionment and a discussion of the specific classes of statutes upon the subject are considered subsequently.' In some few eases the theory that an assessment must be apportioned according to benefits or must be limited to the amount thereof has been repudiated.^ The constitution of South Carolina provides: "No person shall be arrested, impris- oned, despoiled or dispossessed of his property, immunities or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived bia Tp., Hamilton County, Ohio, 91 Fed. 37 [1899]; Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; Lower Kings River Reclama- tion District No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pae. 335 [1895]; City of Atlanta v. Hamlein, 96 Ga. 381; 23 S. E. 408 [1895]; Guokien v. Rothrock, 137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. 17 [1893]; Klein. v. Nugent Gravel Co., ■ Ind. App. , 66 N. E. 486 [1903]; City of Detroit V. Judge of Recorder's Court, 112 Mich. 588, 71 N. W. 149 [1897]; sub nomine City of Detroit v. Chapin, 42 L. R. A. 628; City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. 503, 37 N. W. 11 [1888]; Town of Macon V. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; City of St. Joseph v. Crowther, 142 Mo. 155, 43 S. W. 786 [1897]; State, Kirkpatrick, Pros. v. Commissioners of Streets and Sewers in the City of New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 510 [1880]; City of Dayton v. Bauman, 66 0. S. 379, 64 N. E. 433 [1902]; Cincinnati, Lebanon & Northern Ry. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 0. S. 465, 49 L. R. A. 566, 57 N. E. 229 [19001: (over- ruling City of Cleveland v. Wick, 18 O. S. 303 [1868], on the question whether such assessment (for payin?; the expense of taking land in emi- nent domain) can be levied on abut- ting property. See §§ 113, 308); Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 0. S. 551; Dodaworth V. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio C. C. 288, 10 Ohio C. D. 177 [1899]; Klein v. City of Cincinnati, 7 Ohio C. C. 266 [1893]; Rhoades V. City of Toledo, 6 Ohio C. C. 9 [1890]; Or. & Cal. R. R. Co. v. City of Portland, 25 Or, 229, 22 L. R. A. 713, 35 Pae. 452 [1894]; Craig v. City of Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. (8 Norris) 265 [1879]; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 Pa. St. (4 Norris) 366 [1877]; Seely v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. St. (1 Norris) 360, 22 Am. Rep. 760 [1876]; Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. R. A. 289, 51 S. W. 848 [1899]; (overruling Adams v. Fisher, 75 Tex. 657, 6 S. W. 772 [1890]; Ashberry V. Roanoke, 91 Va. 562, 42 L. R. A. 636, 22 S. E. 360 [1895]. = Fay V. City of Springfield, 94 Fed. 409; Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 688; Lower Kings River Reclamation District No. 531 V. Phillips, 108 Cal. 305, 30 Pac. 630; Guckien v. Rothrock, 137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. 17 [1893]. "See § 119 et seg. 'See Chapter XIII. "Rolph V. City of Fargo, 7 N. D. 640, 42 L. R. A. 646, 76 N. W. 242 [1898]; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533. § 118 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 202 of his life, liberty or estate but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land . . . "." The earlier decisions recognized the validity of assessments for sidewalks and drains under this clause of the constitution.^" In a later case, under the constitution of 1790, a ease was presented in which land had been taken for widening a street, and the expense of such taking had in part been assessed upon the lot holders on the other side of the street, whose lands had not been taken. Such assessment was held to be a violation of this clause of the constitution.^^ In a subsequent case decided under the constitution of 1868, the question of the validity of assessments for street improvements was considered. The Supreme Court of South Carolina construed the phrase "the law of the land" as meaning "the common law and the statute law existing at the adoption of our constitution, ' ' that is, in 1790." There being no express authority found in the law of South Carolina as it stood in 1790 for assessments for street improve- ments, it was held that they were rendered invalid by this clause of the constitution.^^ It was said, however, in an obiter in this case that by the decisions rendered prior to the present consti- tution, assessments for sidewalks, drains and sew3rs had been recognized as valid, and such assessments were therefore a part of the "law. of the land" within the meaning of the present con- stitution. In subsequent cases, however, this earlier obiter is overruled and it is held that by virtue of the clause of the eonsti- " § 14, Constitution of South Caro- validity of assessments for taking Una [1868]. A similar provision land, see §§ 113, 308 et seq. was found in Art. IX., § 2, Constitu- It will be noted that the result tion of South Carolina [1790]. would be concurred in by some courts " Sidewalks and drains. — Cruik- which would not agree with the rea- shanks v. City Council, 1 McCord soniug whereby such result was (S. C.) 360 [1821]. reached. Drains. — Horiston v. City Council ^This construction is not in ac- of Charleston, 1 MoCord (S. C.) 345 cordance with that generally given ti [1821]. this and to similar phrases. See Shoolbred v. Corporation of the § 115. City of Charleston, 2 Bay (S. C.) 63 It would seem to have the effect [1796], seems to be a case of assess- of petrifying the law of Soutli Caro- ment, but possibly of assessment pre- Una at 1790, making further ex- liminary to levying a general tax tension impossible, and not a special assessment. "Mauldin v. City Council of " State ex rel. Horlbeck v. City Greenville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Council of Charleston, 12 Rich. (S. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. C.) 702 [I860]. 842 [1893]. For the general view as to the 203 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 119 tution under discussion assessments even for sidewalks, drains and sewers are invalid.'* If these last decisions are adhered to and no constitutional amendment is made the law of local assessments in South Carolina is ended. § 119. Due process of law requires notice and hearing. (3) The constitutional provisions w'hich forbid the taking of property without due process of law find their most prominont sphere of influence as far as the law of local assessments is con- cerned, in the doctrine of the necessity of notice. That under these constitutional provisions the owner of the property assessed is entitled to some form of notice of the assessment at some stage of the proceedings is clear by the great weight of au- thority. At what stage of the proceedings such notice must be given and of what the property owner is entitled to notice, are questions upon which there is not so clear a consensus of opin- ion. The general rule is that at some time before the assessment becomes an absolute finality there must be a notice to the prop- erty owner and an opportunity for a hearing as to those ques- tions of fact which concern the amount of the assessment to be imposed upon such property, except such as the legislative power has authority to determine without especial inquiry, and has in fact so determined. "Whenever the amount of tax to be ex- acted depends upon the exercise of the judgment and discretion of those fixing the value of the property or benefits by which such amount is to be measured, an opportunity for correction must be afforded."^ Such notice and. hearing must furthermore be given as a matter of right. "It is not enough that the own- ers chance to have notice or that they may as a matter of favor have a hearing. The law must require notice to them and give them the right to a hearing and the opportunity of being heard. "^ An assessment made upon notice which possesses these elements is not invalid upon the ground of want of notice, and as far as notice is concerned, is not a taking without due process "Mauldin v. City Council of 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 986 Greenville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. [1904]. Rep. 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. = Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 252 [1898]; Stehmeyer v. City 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; quoted in Council of Charleston, 53 S. C. 259, Beebe v. Magoun, 122 la. 94, 96, 31 S. E. 322 [1898], 97, 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 'Beebe v. Magoun, 122 la. 94, 96, 986 [1904]. §119 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 204 of law.^ If, on the other hand, such notice is not given and under the law the assessment beoomes a finality, subject to be enforced summarily, without giving any opportunity for a hear- ' Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. S. 177, 28 S. 647 [1908]; (Affirm- ing Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Porter, 38 Ind. App. 226, 74 N. E. 260, 76 N. E. 179) ; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. 461, 27 S. 261 [1907]; (AffiTming 74 Ark. 174, 85 S. W. 252 [ 1905] ) ; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. 70, 23 S. 20 [1902]; Bellingham Bay & British Columbia Railroad v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314, 43 L. 460, 19 S. 205 [1899]; (Affirming City of New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Improvement Com- pany, 16 Wash. 131, 47 Pae. 236 [1896]); Parsons v. District of Co- lumbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 [1898]; (Affirming Parsons V. District of Columbia, 8 App. D. C. 391 [1896]); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 [1897]; (Reversing District of Co- lumbia V. Armes, 8 App. D. C. 393 [1896]; Bauman v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896]; Abbott v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 289 [1896]); Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 S. 56 [1896]; (Reversing Bradley v. Fallbrook Ir- rigation District, 68 Fed. 948 [1895] ; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; (Affirming Paulson v. City of Port- land, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]); Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891]; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. 772, 10 S. 324; Wals- ton V. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L, 544, 9 S. 192 [1888]; (Affirming Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]); Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. 'S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (Affirming Spencer v. Mer- chant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]) ; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1885]; (Affirming Matter of drainage of Great Meadows on Pequest River, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880] which was affirmed without opinion as ^oagland v. State, Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881]); Hagar v. Reclamation District, No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28- L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; Davidson v. New Or- leans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; (Affirming In the Matter of the Com- missioners of the First Draining District, praying for the Homologa- tion of the Assessment Roll, 27 La. Ann. 20 [1875]); McMillen v. An- derson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. 335; Brown V. Drain, 112 Fed. 582 [1901]; Min- nesota & M. Land & Improvement Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; Cohen v. City of Alameda, 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377 [1899]; In the matter of the Bonds of the Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 ^Pac. 272, 675 [1891]; Davies v. City of ' Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887]; City of Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; Clapp V. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868] ; Nichols v. City of Bridge- port, 23 Conn; 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854]; District of Columbia v. Wormley, 15 App. D. C. 58 [1899]; District of Columbia v. Burgdorf, 7 App. D. C. 405 ; District of Columbia v. Burgdorf, 6 App. D. C. 465 [1895] ; People ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, 219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; Citi- zens' Savings Bank and Trust Com- pany V. City of Chicago, 215 111. 174, 74 N. E. 115 [1905]; Owners of Land v. People ex rel. Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]; New York C. and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. City of Ham- mond, — Ind. — , 83 N. E. 244 [1908]; Dyer v. Woods, 166 Ind. 44, 76 N. E. 624 [1906] ;. Voris v. Pitts- 205 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §119 ing as to the questions of fact which concern the amount of the assessment other than those which the legislative power has au- thority to determine without especial inquiry, and which the legislative power has in fact so determined, such assessment then constitutes a taking without due process of law and is invalid as in violation of the constitutional provisions under considera- tion.* The hearing for which provision is made must be one burg Plate Glass Co., 163 Ind. 599, 70 N. E. 249 [1904]; Leeds v. De- frees, 157 Ind. 392, 61 N. E. 930 [1901]; Roundenbush v. Mitchell, 154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]; Kizer v. Town of Winchester, 141 Ind. 694, 40 N. E. 265 [1895]; Swain v. Fulmer, 135 Ind. 8, 34 N. E. 639 [1893]; Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382, 30 Am. St. Rep. 247, 37 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 354, 15 L. R. A. 624, 30 N. E. 414; Law v. Johnston, 118 Ind. 261, 20 N. E. 745 [1888]; Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637, 16 N. E. 826 [1887]; Ross v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, 128 la. 427, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 506 [1905]; Beebe v. Ma- goun, 122 la. 94, 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 986 [1904] ; Yeomans V. Riddle, 84 la. 147, 50 N. W. 886 [1891]; Amery v. City of Keokuk, 72 la. 701, 30 N W. 780 [1887]; Kevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43 [1894]; City of St. Paul V. Nickl, 42 Minn. 262, 44 N. W. 59 [1890]; City of St. Louis v. Ran- ken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S. W. 910 [1888] ; Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336 [1876]; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]; In the matter of the Petition of Low- den to Vacate an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]; Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88; Hilliard V. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; Taylor v. Crawford, 72 0. S. 560, 69 L. R. A.. 805, 74 N. E. 1065 [1905]; (Reversing Crawford v. Taylor, 27 Ohio C. C. 245) ; Cald- well v. Village of Carthage, 49 0. S. 334, 31 N. E. 602 [1892]; King v. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Cleveland y. Tripp, 13 R. L 50 [1880]; Kettle V. City of Dallas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 [1904]; Davis v. City of Lynchburg, 84 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 [1888]; Stone v. Little Yellow Drainage District, 118 Wis. 388, 95 N. W. 405 [1903]; Hen- nessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]; Meggett V. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]; See also as to sufficiency of notice in taxation Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U. S. 414, 28 S. 506 [1908]; (Affirming Toolan V. Longyear, 144 Mich. 55, 107 N. W. 699 [1906]). * Norwood V. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 [1898]; (Af- firming Baker v. Village of Norwood, 74 Fed. 997 [1896] ); Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250 [1907]; Fay V. City of Springfield, 94 Fed. 409 [1899]; Murdock v. City of Cincin- nati, 39 Fed. 891 [1889]; 44 Fed. 726 [1891]; Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385; 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; Lower Kings River Reclamation Dis- trict, No. 531 V. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895] ; .Hutson V. Woodbridge Protection "District, No. 1, 79 Cal. 90, 16 Pac. 549, 21 Pac. 435 [1889]; Boorman V. City of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. 313, 4 Pac. 31 [1884]; Brown v. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. 455 [18P41; Allman v. District of Co- lumbia, 3 App. D. C. 3 [1894]; Ben- §119 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 206 which gives to the property owner an opportunity for a fair and impartial determination as to the amount of his assessment." Hence a provision which permits an interested party to act as a commissioner in apportioning the assessment denies due process of law and is invalid." An opportunity to submit objections with- singer v. District of Columbia, 6 Mack. (D. C.) 285 [1888]; Savan- nah F. and W. Ry. Co. v. City of Savannah, 96 Ga. 680, 23 S. E. 847; Clarke v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 354, 57 N. E. 15 [1900]; Guckien v. Rothrocic, 137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. 17 [1893]; Scudder v. Jones, 134 Ind. 547, 32 N. E. 221 [1893]; City of Logansport v. Shirk, 129 Ind. 352, 28 N. E. 538 [1891] ; Hille v. Neale, 32 Ind. App. 341, 69 N. E. 713 [1904]; Beebe v. Magoun, 122 la. 94, 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 986 [1904]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Ford v. Town of North Des Moines, 80 la. 626, 45 N. W. 1031 [1890]; Lyman v. Plummer, 75 la. 353, 39 N. W. 527 [1888]; Gatch v. City of Des Moines, 63 la. 718, 18 N. W. 310; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1885]; Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Mullins, 94 Ky. 355, 22 S. W. 558 [1893]; Ulman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. A. 224, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709, 32 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 228 [1890] ; Sears v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 173 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876 [1899]; Sligh v. City of Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 497, 47 N. W. 1093 ; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155, 24 Am. Rep. 535 [1876]; People on the Relation of Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw County, 26 Mich. 22 [1872] ; Overmann v. City of St. Paul, 39 Minn. 120, 39 N. W. 66 [1888]; City of St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo! 497, 9 S. W. 910 [1888]; Poillon v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Rutherford, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 538, 47 Atl. 439 [1900]; State, Wat- rous. Pros. v. City of Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. (11 Vr.) 278 [1878]; State, Mann Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 14 Zab.) 662 [1855]; In the Matter of the Application of the Trustees of Union College for an Order directing the Treasurer of Long Island City to cancel certain water rates and rents, 129 N. Y. 308, 29 N. E. 460 [1891]; McLaughlin v. Miller, 124 K. Y. 510, 26 N. E. 1104 [1891]; Remsen v. Wheeler, 105 N. Y. 573, 12 N. E. 564 [1887]; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; Ireland v. City of Rochester, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 414 [1868]; In the Matter of the Application of the Common Council of the City of Am- sterdam to take lands for the exten- sion of Grove and Jay Streets, 55 Hun. (N. Y.) 270, 8 N. Y. Supp. 234 [1889]; In re Mayor, etc., of New York, 89 N. Y. S. 6, 95 App. Div. 552 [1904] ; Pickton v. City of Fargo, 10 N. D. 469, 88 N. W. 90 [1901]; Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. V. Keith, 67 O. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]; Hersh- berger v. City of Pittsburgh, US Pa. St. 78, 8 Atl. 381 [1886]; Hutche- son V. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. R. A. 289, 51 S. W. 848 [1899]; City of Galveston v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [1881]; City of Norfolk V. Young, 97 Va. 728, 47 L. R. A. 574, 34 S. E. 886 [1900]; Baltimore R. Co. v. Pittsburg R. Co., 17 W. Va. 835; Dietz v. City of Nee- nah, 91 Wis. 422, 64 N. W. 299, 65 N. W. 500 [1895]. " Commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 1 v. Smith, 233 111. 417, 84 N. E. 376 [1908]. ' Commissioners of Union Drainage District Nn. 1 v. Smith, 233 III. 417, 84 N. E. 376 [1908]. 207 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE; ETC. §§ 120, 121 out a provision for a hearing at which the objectors may offer evidence in support of their objections does not constitute due process of law.' . § 120. Theory that notice is not a constitutional right. In some eases language is used which seems to intimate that notice is not a constitutional right.^ "Claims for paving and other municipal improvements are a species of taxation and the property owner has only such right of contest and defence as the legislature chooses to allow him."" These cases, however, are for the most part cases holding that notice of the intention of making the public improvement for which the assessment is to be levied is not necessary,' or eases in which no notice was given in advance of a legislative determination of benefits,* or cases in which some reasonable notice was in fact provided for by the legislature. In other eases it seems to be held that the mere performance of the work itself, under a law which pro- vides for levying assessments therefor, is sufficient notice to the property holder.^ § 121. Legislative discretion as to nature and kind of notice. The legislature has a wide discretion in determining the nature and kind of notice to be given,^ though it has no power to dis- ' Londoner v. City and County of treats this question as no longer Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 28 S. 708 open, and cites upon the point Nor- [1908] ; (reversing City of Denver v. folk City v. Ellis, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117) ; 224 [1875] a case which does not Heinz V. Buckham, — Mich. ,116 seem to determine the question.) X. W. 736 [1908]. "All possible notice is given by the ' Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 progress of the vcork itself, and un- S. W. 559 [1900]; Finnell v. Kates, der our system of laws every citizen 19 0. S. 405 [1869]; Scranton v. is charged with notice of the public Jermyn, 156 Pa. St. 107, 27 Atl. 66 law." Davis v. City of Lynchburg, [1893]; Scranton v. Whyte, 148 Pa. 84 Va. 861, 870, 6 S. E. 230 [1888]. St. 419; Adams v. Fisher, 63 Tex. 'Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago 651 [1885]; City of Galveston v. and St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Porter, 210 Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [1881]. U. S. 177, 28 S. 647 [1908]; (Af- ' Scranton v. Jermyn, 156 Pa. St. fii'ming Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chica- 107, 27 Atl. 66 [1893]. go and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, 'See § 125, § 740. 38 Ind. App. 226, 74 N. E. 260, 76 * Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 N. E. 179); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 S. W. 559 [1900]. U. S. 241, 51 L. 461, 27 S. 261 ''Davis v. City of Lynchburg, 84 [1907]; (Affirming 74 Ark. 174, 85 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 [1888] ; (It may S. W. 252 [1905] ) ; Davidson v. NevI be noted that the foregoing case Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 121 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 208 pense with all notice.^ If such notice is given as will fairly and reasonably apprise the property owner of the pendency of the assessment proceedings so as to give him an opportunity for a hearing upon the merits he is not entitled as a matter of con- stitutional right to personal service. Notice by publication may therefore be provided for by the legislature without violating the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of property without due process of law.' Notice by publication consisting [1877]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Lowden to Vacate an Assess- ment, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]; Swain v. Fulmer, 135 Ind. 8, 34 N. E. 639 [1893]. = Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Eep. 289 [1878]. 'Ballard v. Plunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. 461, 27 S. 261 [1907]; (Af- firming Ballard v. Hunter, 74 Ark. 174, 85 S. W. 252 [1905] ) ; Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. 399, 45 L. 917, 21 S. 624, 645 [1901]; (Reversing Par- ker V. City of Detroit, 103 Fed. 357 [1900]); Wight V. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 45 L. 900, 21 S. 616 [1901];. Bellingham Bay & British Columbia Railroad v. New Whateom, 172 U. S. 314, 43 'L. 460, 19 S. 205 [1899]; (Affirming City of New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Improvement Com- pany, 16 Wash. 131, 47 Pac. 236 [ 1896] ) ; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 S. 56 [1896] ; (Reversing Bradley V. Fallbrook Irrigation District, 68 Fed. 948 [1895]; Paulsen v. Port- land, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; (Affirming Paulson v. City of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 P. 450 [1888]) ; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891]; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ' 544, 9 S. 192 [1888]; Hagar v. Re- clamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; Ritter v. Drainage District No. 1, Poinsett County, 78 Ark. 580, 94 S. W. 711 [1906]; Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17, 35 Pac. 353 [1894] i Davies v. City of Los Ange- les, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; Gage v. City of Chicago, 225 111. 218, 80 N. E. 127 [1907]; Rieketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110 [1877]; Lyman v. Plummer, 75 la. 353, 39 N. W. 527 [1888]; Hoertz v. Jefferson Southern Pond Drainin-' Company, 119 Ky. 824, 84 S. w' 1141, 27 Ky. L. R. 278 [1905]; Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com- pany V. Mull ins, 94 Ky. 355, 22 S. W. 558 [1893]; State v. Pillshury, 82 Minn. 359, 85 N. W. 175 [1901]; Hennepin County v. Bartleson, 37 Minn. 343, 34 N. W. 222 ; City of St. Joseph V. Truckenmiller, 183 Mo. 9, 81 S. W. 1116 [1904]; Kansas City V. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; In the Matter of the Appli- cation of the Common Council of the City of Amsterdam to take lands for the extension of Grove and Jay Streets, 126 N. Y. 158, 27 N. E. 272 [1891]; Remsen v. Wheeler, 105 N. Y. 573, 12 N. E. 564 [1887]; Spen- cer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]; (Affirmed .Spencer V. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. Ct. 921 [1888] ); In the matter of the Petition of De Peyster to Vacate an Assessment, 80 N. Y. 565 [1880]; King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2; Philadelphia v. Jenkins, 162 Pa. St. 451, 29 Atl. 794; Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332 [1896]; Fass v. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 19 N. W. 533 [1884]. 209 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 122 of one insertion in a paper of general circulation has been held sufficient as constituting due process of law.* The option which is often given to property owners to construct the improvement themselves instead of requiring them to pay an assessment there- for ° is a mere favor extended by the legislature. They have no constitutional right thereto." Notice may therefore be given in such cases by publication.' Notice may be given as well by the statute by which the assessment is authorized or by the ordi- nance by which the assessment is levied as by any other means. Accordingly if notice of thfe time and place of hearing is given in the ordinance by which the assessment is levied, such notice is sufficient.* The hearing provided by the Indiana statute is sufficient even though by statute the property abutting on the improvement is liable in the first instance and the strip of back- lying property extending one hundred feet in depth from the fifty-foot strip is liable only if the assessment upon the fifty-foot strip proves insufficient." § 122. Legislative discretion as to time of notice. Similar considerations apply to the question of the time for which the notice is to be given. The legislature has a wide range of discretion and as long as the time is sufficient to give the property owner a fair opportunity to be heard, the length of time is within the discretion of the legislature.^ A fair oppor- tunity for a hearing is, however, a constitutional right of the *Ritter v. Drainage District No. 1, U. S. 177, 28 S. 647 [1908]; (Affirm- Poinsett County, 78 Ark. 580, 94 S. ing Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago W. 711 [1906]. and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, 38 "See § 52 et seq. Ind. App. 226; 74 N. E. 260, 76 N. E. "li'ass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 19 179) ; following Voris v. Pittsburg N. W. 533 [1884]. Plate Glass Co., 163 Ind. 599, 70 N. ' Fass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 19 E. 249. N. W. 533 [1884]. "Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & ' Wulzen y. Board of Supervisors St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. of the City and County of San Fran- S. 177, 28 S. 647 [1908]; Cisco, 101 Cal. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. Bellingham Bay & British Colum- 17, 35 Pac. 353 [1894]; Arnold v. bia Railroad v. New Whatcom, 172 City of Fort Dodge, Iowa, 111 la. U. S. 314, 43 L. 460, 19 S. 205 152, 82 N. W. 495 [1900]; Broadway [1899]; (affirming City of New Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush. Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Im- (71 Ky.) 508, 8 , Am. Rep. 480 provement Company, 16 Wash. 131, [1871]. 47 Pac. 236 [1896]); King v. Port- » Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & land, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, 210 63 Pac. 2 [1900]. §123 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 210 property owner. A notice which is not given until the assess- ment has become a finality is given too late to satisfy the con- stitutional requirement of. ' ' due process of law. ' ' ^ § 123. Notice not necessary as to matters which legislature may determine. If the legislature has power to levy the assessment itself and has in fact so levied it, notice th*eof has been held to be un- necessary as to such matters as the legislature itself may pass upon.^ Two reasons, not necessarily inconsistent with each other, have been suggested for this rule. One is that where the ques- tion is within the discretion of the legislature which may in such cases pass upon the facts and determine the question of benefits, notice is useless, and therefore unnecessary. The other is that where the legislature itself levies the assessment, the property owner has in fact notice and hearing, not in person, but through his representative in the legislature. In accord- ance with the foregoing principles notice need not be given of the determination of such questions, as the legislature may pass ' Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 S. 56 "[ 1896] ; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. 772, 10 S. 324 [1890]; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (Affirming 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); Davidson v. New Or- leans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; Hagar v. Keclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; Beebe v. Magoun, 126 la. 94, 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 986 [1904] ; Ulman v. Mayor and City Cotincil of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. A. 224, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709, 32 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 228 [1F90]; Sears v. Street Commission- ers of Boston, 173 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876 [1899]; In the Matter of the Application of the Trustees of Union College for an order directing the Treasurer of Long Island City to cancel certain Water Rates and Rents, 129 N. Y. 308, 29 N. E. 460 [1891]; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; Chi- cago & Erie Railroad Co. v. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. S25, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]; Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. R. A. 289, 61 S. W. 848 [1899]; City of Norfolk v. Young, 97 V'a. 728, 47 L. R. A. 574, 34 S. E. 886 [1900]; Violett v. City Council of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 [1896]; Dietz v. City of Nee- nah, 91 Wis. 422, 64 N. W. 299, 65 N. W. 500 [1895]. 'Williams, Treasurer, v. Eggles- ton, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. 1047, 18 S. 617 [1898] ; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 [1898]; Spencer v. Mer- chant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (Affirming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]. 211 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §123 upon finally and as to which its determination is a finality.^ "Where the legislature has power to pass upon the question of benefits and determine what property is benefited and in what proportion/ the property owners have no right to notice as a condition precedent to such determination.* If the legislature in the exercise of its constitutional power has made such pro- vision concerning the area and limits of the assessment district, the determination of the amount of the assessment and the apportionment thereof, that the ascertaining of the amount that each property owner is to pay is a matter of mere arithmetical cal- culation, notice of the time and place of making such calculation is said to be useless, in that it could not avail the property owner. Accordingly, it is held in some jurisdictions that if the proceed- ings up to this point are not objectionable as being a taking of property without due process of law, omission to require or to give notice is not in such eases a violation of such constitutional provisions.' This principle is not, however, regarded in all juris- dictions as the correct one. Questions of various sorts, such as the extent of the land belonging to a given property owner as affecting the basis of arithmetical calculation, or special circum- stances peculiar to the tract in question, and modifying the ap- portionment, may arise. An opportunity for hearing should be ^Williams, Treasurer, v. Eggleston, 'See § 5.53 et seq. 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. 1047, 18 S. 617 *Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, [1898]; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. 63 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; [1901]. Lower Kings River Reclamation Dis- "Gillette v. Denver, 21 Fed 822; trict. No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. En;;lish v. Mayor and Council of 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895]; Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Barfield v. Gleason. Ill Ky. 491, 63 Atl. 158 [1896]; People ex rel. Bar- S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 [1901]; ber v. Chapman, 127 111. 387, 19 N. Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. E. 872 [1890] ; Amery v. City of 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Barber Keokuk, 72 la. 701, 30 N. W. 780 Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 [1887]; People of the State of New Mo. 534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. York ex rel. Scott v Pitt, 169 N. Y. 934 [1900]; (affirmed in French v. 521, 58 L. E. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. [1902]; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]; 50 [1880]; City of Galveston v. Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 634, 37 Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [1881] ; Adams v. S.W. 559 [1900]) ; City of St. Louis City of Roanoke, 102 Va. 53, 45 S. V. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S. W. 910 E. 881 [1903]; Stone v. Little Yel- [1888]; People of the State of New low Drainage District, 118 Wis. 388, York ex rel. Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. 95 N. W. 405 [1903]; Meggett v. Y. 521, .58 L. E. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 320, 51 [1902]. N. W. 566 [1892]. § 124 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 212 given to permit the property owner to raise questions of this sort if he wishes, according to the view entertained in many jurisdictions, and therefore in such jurisdictions notice is held necessary." § 124. Notice not necessary if liability optional with owner. If the charge is for a purpose of which the property owner may avail himself or not, at his option, and the charge is one to which he is not liable if he does not see fit to avail himself of such privilege, notice is unnecessary, since no assessment is im- posed for the improvement itself, but only for such use of the privilege.^ Thus where an assessment was to be levied upon the property from which private sewers might be connected with a public sewer, it was held that notice was unnecessary.^ So a statute providing that the state may make contracts for excavat- ing a waterway and filling in tide lands, and then selling the lands to private owners subject to the lien of the cost of such improvement, is not unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process of law.' So where the charge for water used upon the premises was based upon the amount so used, the owner being free to make use of the water or not, as he «UIman v. Mayor and City Council L. E. A. 519, 34 N. E. 545; Vreeland of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. A. v. O'Neil, 36 N. J. Eq. (9 Stew.) 399; 224, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709, 32 (affirmed 37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 228 [1890]; 574) ; E/ass v. Rathbone, 153 N. Y. McLaughlin v. Miller, 124 N. Y. 510, 435, 47 N. E. 905; Silkman v. Board 26 N. E. 1104 [1891]. of Water Commissioners of City of 1 Seattle Dock Co. v. Seattle and Yonkers, 152 N. Y. 327, 37 L. R. A. Lake Washington Waterway Co., 195 827, 46 N. E. 612 -[1897]; Alter v. U. S. 624, 49 L. 350, 25 S. 789 City of Cincinnati, 56 0. S. 47, 35 [1904]; (Affirming in a per curiam L. R. A. 737, 46 N. E. 69 [1897]. opinion without discussion Seattle " Carson v. Brockton Sewerage and Lake Washington Waterway Co. Commission, 182 U. S. 398, 45 L. v. Seattle Dock Co., 35 Wash. 503, 1151, 21 S. 860 [1901]; (Affirming 77 Pac. 845 [1904]) ; Carson v. Brock- Carson v. Sewerage Commissioners ot ton Sewerage Commission, 182 U. S. Brockton, 175 Mass. 242, 48 L. R. A. 398, 45 L. 1151, 21 S. 860 [1901]; 277, 56 N. E. 1 [1900]). ( Affirming Carson v. Sewerage Com- • Seattle Dock Co. v. Seattle and missioners of Brockton, 175 Mass. Lahe Washington Waterway Co., 195 242, 48 L. R. A. 277, 56 N. E. 1 U. S. 624, 25 S. 789 [1904]; [1900]); Provident Institution for (affirming in a per curiam Savings v. Mayor and Aldermen of report without discussion Seattle and Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. Lake Washington Waterway Co. v. 1102, 5 S. 612 [1884]; Wagner v. Seattle Dock Co., 35 Wash. 503, 77 City of Rock Island, 146 111. 139, 21 Pac. 845 [1904]). 213 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §125 might choose, notice is not necessary." The essential fact which renders notice imneeessary in levying such assessments is that it is optional with the party charged with such liability to accept or reject the article offered at his pleasure. It is not the nature of the article furnished that dispenses with the necessity of no- tice. Accordingly, if the statute attempts to impose a liability upon land which fronts upon the water pipes for the laying of which the assessment is levied, irrespective of the use of watei made upon such land, and irrespective of whether the owner voluntarily makes connection with such pipes, notice is necessary as in case of other assessments." § 125. Notice of preliminary steps not necessary. Notice of every step in assessment proceedings is by no means necessary.^ On the one hand it is not necessary that notice be given of preliminary matters, which lead up to the determination of the amount for which each tract of property is to be assessed, but do not directly involve such determination.^ "If the law provides for the required notice to the land-owner whose land * Provident Institution for Savings V. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. 1102, 5 S. 612 [1884]; Wagner v. City of Rock Island, 146 111. 139, 21 L. E. A. 519, 34 N. E. 545; Vreeland v. O'Neil, 36 N. J. Eq. (9 Stew.) 399; (affirmed 37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew) 574); Brass V. Rathbone, 153 N. Y. 435, 47 N. E. 905; Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 56 0. S. 47, 35 L. R. A. 737, 46 N. E. 69 [1897]; Silkman v. Board of Water Commissioners of City of Yonkers, 152 N. Y. 327, 37 L. R. A. 827, 46 N. E. 612 [1897]. ° In the Matter of the Application of the Trustees of Union College for an order directing the Treasurer of Long Island to cancel certain Water Rates and Rents, 129 N. Y. 308, 29 N. E. 460 [1891]. •Voigt V. Detroit City, 184 U. S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902]; (affirming Voigt v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 547, S2 N. W. 253 [1900] ) ; King V. Portland City, 184 U. S. 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902] ; (affirm- ing King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]). "Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432, 46 L. 627, 22 S. 397 [1902]; (affirming Goodrich v. City of De- troit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]); Voigt V. Detroit City, 184 U. S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902] ; (affirming Voigt v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900] ) ; King v. Portland City, 184 U. S. 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902]; (affirm- ing King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Lent V. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887] ) ; Weaver v. Templin, 113 Ind. 298, 14 N. E. 600 [1887]; Barfield v. Gleason, UZ Ky. 491, C3 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 [1901] ; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]; Kelley v. Minneapolis City, 57 Minn. 294, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 L. R. A. 92, 59 N. W. 304 [1894] ; City of St. Paul v. Nickl, 42 Wmn. 262, 44 N. W. 59 [1890] ; Adams v. City of Roanoke, 102 Va. 53, 45 S. E. 881 [1903]. § 125 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 214 it is proposed to charge with any part of the costs of the public improvement, an assessment against his property made under it will not be defeated if he has been given at some stage of the proceedings a fair opportunity to be heard to test the legality, justice and correctness of the assessment. It is only with the charge upon him that he is concerned, and of that alone he can complain. In the legality of that charge is necessarily involvec all that precedes it, and of which*it is the consequence. When the land-owner has been given a hearing at which he might insist that his property was not benefited to the amount assessed, or that it was not benefited at all, and thus obtains every ad- vantage which he might obtain were he informed of every step in the proceedings there is no want of due process of law withic the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; and where the ordi- nance or resolution of the council is that each lot in the district or section within which the improvement is made shall be as sessed in accordance with or not in excess of the benefits derived from the improvement, the whole question of the amount ol benefit derived from a particular parcel of real estate is opened up even to showing that no benefit whatever was occasioned by the improvement."^ This is true especially where such pre liminary steps are within the discretion of the legislative depart ment.* Thus, by the weight of authority no notice of the de- termination of making a public improvement need be given tc those to be assessed therefor.' In some cases, however, it seems "Adams v. City of Roanoke, 102 " Goodrich v. Detroit, 1 84 U. S. 432, Va. 53, 63, 64, 45 S. E. 881 [1903]; 46 L. G27, 22 S. 397 [1902]; (af- ( citing as under a similar statute firming Goodrich v. City of Detroit, Voight V. Detroit, 123 Mich. 547, 82 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900] ) ; N. W. 253 [1900]; affirmed 184 U, Voigt v. Detroit City, 184 U. S. 115, S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902]) ; 46 L. .627, 22 S. 397 [1902]; (af- and also Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 firming Voigt v. City of Detroit, 123 U. S. 432, 46 L. 627, 22 S. 397 Mich. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900]): [1902]. King v. Portland City, 184 U. S. 61, * Williams, Treasurer v. Eggleston, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902]; (Affirm- 170 U. S. 304,- 42 L. 1047, 18 S. ing King v. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 617 [1898]; Spencer v. Merchant, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]); 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 In the Matter of the Bonds of the [1888]; Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Ky. Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 491, 63 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. [1901]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 755, 28 Pac. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891]; 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. City of St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 71 [1887]; District of Columbia v. 497, 9 S. W. 910 [1888]. Burgdorf, 6 App. D. C. 465 [18951; 215 LONbTlTUTlONAL RESTEICTION iVPPLICABLB, ETC. § 125 to be assumed that such notice should be given." So notice need not be given of the condemnation of realty to those whose lands are not to be taken, but are to be assessed for the cost of the improvement.' Where local authorities are given discretion to determine whether a given improvement should or should not be made the better "view is that the persons whose property is to be assessed have no constitutional right to notice of the intention of such local authorities to make such improvement.* If the council, the board of commissioners and the like are given power to fix the limits of the assessment district, they may do so with- out giving notice of such determination of the limits of such assessment district if not required. by statute; arid the omission of the statute to require such notice, and the omission of the council, the board of commissioners and the like to give such notice, does not violate the constitutional right of the owners- of the land to be assessed, have to notice and hearing as long as an opportunity is given to them to file objections and to have a hearing upon the question of apportionment and of th( amount of the assessment to be charged upon each tract of realty." Thus if the statute authorizes the commissioners t( Dyer v. Woods, 166 Ind. 44, 76 N. erts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. E. 624 [1906]; Collins v. Holyoke, 1091 [1897]. 146 Mass 298, 15 N. E. 908; Roberts " Voigt v. Detroit City, 184 U. S. V. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 [1902]; [1897]; People of the State of 'New (Affirming Voigt v. City of Detroit, York ex rel. Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 123 Mich. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900] ) ; 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 King v. Portland City, 184 U. S. 6l', [1902]. 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902]; (Affirm- ' Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. ing King v. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; Board of L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]) ; Commissioners of Wells County v. Paulson y. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 Fahlor, 132 Ind. 426, 31 N. E. 1112; L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; Ross v. Paul V. City of Detroit, 32 Mich. 108 Board of . Supervisors of Wright [1875] ; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. County, Iowa, 128 la. 427, 1 L. R. A. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; State [N. S.] 431, 104 N. W. 506 [1905]; V. Fond du Lae, 42 Wis. 287. Voigt v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 'Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900]; Kelly v. 432, 46 L. 627, 22 S. 397 [1902]; Minneapolis City, 57 Minn. 294, 47 (Affirming Goodrich v. City of De- Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 L. R. A. 92, 59 troit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 N. W. 304 [1894]; Rogers v. City of [1900]) ; Lent v; Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]; Peo- 14 Pac. 71 [18871: Roberts v. Rtnith, pie of the State of New Vork px rel. 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [18971. Scott v. Pitt. 1R9 N. Y. 521. 58 L. R. ^Repair of Ditch. Weaver v. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 [1902]; People Templin, 113 Ind. 298. 14 N. E. 600 ex rel. Griffin v. Mavor, etc., of [1887]; Construction of Drain. Rob- Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. § 126 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 216 classify lands, with reference to a subsequent assessment thereon for drainage purposes as "low," "wet," "swamp" and "dry," such classification is in legal effect fixing the boundaries of the drainage district, and omission to give notice thereof does not amount to a want of due process of law.^° Owners of property to be assessed have no constitutional right to* a hearing upon the question as to who shall be appointed assessors, nor any right to appeal therefrom, and a^ordingly a statute which does not provide for notice and hearing upon such question is not on that account unconstitutional.^^ If the legislature has power to levy the assessment itself, notice is unnecessary.^^ Notice is necessary and s'ufScient if the .property owner is given an oppor- tunity to be heard before the tribunal which is to ascertain the facts, and upon such facts is to apportion the street assess- ment.^^ § 126. Notice of preliminary steps not suflBcient. On the other hand notice of matters preliminary to the de- termination of the amount to be assessed against the land of each property owner is not siifBcient if no notice is given of the determination of such amount, and the existence of such pre- liminary proceedings is not of itself sufficient to apprise the land- owner that in the ordinary course of events an assessment will follow.^ Thus if notice is given of a preliminary resolution which declares it necessary to open a street and to appropriate land therefor, but does not refer to the levy of an assessment to pay the cost thereof, such notice is not sufficient.^ So if notice has been given and opportunity for hearing had, subsequent increase of the assessment without notice and hearing, not based upon 266 [1851]; Erickson v. Cass County, (affirming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]). State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 "Meier v. "City of St. Louis, 180 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]. 947 [1889]. 'Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. "Ross V. Board of Supervisors of 385', 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; Guckien Wright County, Iowa, 128 la. 427, 1 v. Rothrock, 137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 506" 17 [1893]; City of Logansport, v. [1905]. Shirk, 129 Ind. 352; 28 N. E. 538 "Kelly V. Minneapolis Citv, 57 [1891]; City of Norfolk v. Young, Minn. 294, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 97 Va. 728, 47 L. R. A. 574, 34 S. E. L. R. A. 92, 59 N. W. 304 [1894]. 886 [1900]. "Spencer v. Merchant. 125 TT. R. = Scott v. City' of Toledo, 36 Fed. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]. 217 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETO. § 1^7 the former hearing is a taking of property without due process of law.^ Upon the last point, however, there is not complete accord among the authorities. Where the statute concerning the establishment of a drainage district provides that if, on making the first assessment, the commissioners report a sum too small to pay the entire cost of the work, the court may order a furthe: assessment in proportion to the original assessment, it has beer held that if notice of the original assessment is given, the prop erty owner is apprised of the assessment proceedings and of tht possibility of a supplemental assessment, so that no further notice of the supplemental assessment is necessary.* If, however, the preliminary steps of which notice are given are such that in th ordinary course of events an assessment will follow, such pre liminary notice is sufficient and further notice is unnecessary Notice of the inclusion of the property in question in an assess- ment district has been held sufficient where under the law notice of such inclusion would be sufficient to apprise the property owner that an assessment would be levied upon the land so in- cluded for the purpose of paying for such improvement." " . . .It seems to be well settled that a statute which pro- vides for notice to the property owner at some stage of the pro- ceedings before the assessment is made is not open to the consti- tutional objection simply because it does not provide for a new or additionpl notice of each successive step leading up to the assessment. ' ' ® § 127. Necessity of personal notice. If the owner of the property assessed is a resident of the state in which the assessment is levied so that personal notice could be given to him within the state, the question whether the. as- sessment is a personal liability of such owner or not, is not affected in any way by the clause which forbids taking property 'Guckien v. Eothrock, 137 Ind. [1905]; (Hting Voigt v. Detroit, 181 355, 37 N. E. 17 [1893]. U. S. 115, 46 L. 459, 22 S. 337 * Stone V. Little Yellow Drainage [1902]; Weyerhaueser v. State of District, 118 Wis. 388, 95 N. W. 405 Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550, 44 L. 583. [1903]. 20 S. 485; Winona and St. Paul Land 'Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 40 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. L. 247, 16 S. 83; Oliver ^. Monona "Ross V. Board of Supervisors of County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 Wright Countv. Tnwa, 128 Ta. 427, 1 [1902] ; Yeomans v.. Riddle, 84 la. L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 506 147, 50 N. W. 886 [1891]). §§ 128, 129 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 218 without due process of law."^ If, however, the owner of the prop- erty assessed is not a resident of the state in which the assess- ment is levied, and personal notice could not be given to him within the jurisdiction of the state, the clause of the Federal Constitution forbidding the taking of property without due process of law, applies to the question of personal liability and renders unconstitutional any statute which attempts to impose personal liability upon such non-fesident.^ Outside of the ques- tion of personal liability, personal notice is unnecessary and a reasonable notice given by publication is sufficient.^ § 128. Notice aft r determination of amount, insufficient. Furthermore a jotice given after the determination of the ap- portionment of the assessment, and of the amount to be charged upon each tract of realty assessed is insufficient if the entire ques- tion of apportionment and amount of assessment is not opened up for a hearing as to those thus subsequently notified;^ since the notice must be given in time to secure to the property own- ers a full and ample hearing on the merits. § 129. Fotice of proceeding to determine validity of assessment. A statute which provides for an action to be brought by a taxing district for determining the validity of the assessment in which notice and an opportunity for a full hearing on the merits is to be given to the property owner, the judgment rendered in which is to be conclusive between the parties thereto in any subsequent action upon the assessment, is not in violation of the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of property with- out due process of law.^ A similar question under this statute was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was there held that such proceeding was merely one for the purpose of obtaining evidence, that it did not involve the taking 1 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. Moines, 101 la. 416, 70 N. W. 605 S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; (affirming [1897]). In the Matter of the Commissioners ' Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, of the First Drainage District pray- 45 L. 900, 21 S. 616 [1901]. See § ing for the Homologation of the 121. Assessment Roll, 27 La. Ann. 20 ^Hille v. Neale, 32 Ind. App. 341, [1875]). 69 N. E. 713 [1904]. ^ Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. * Lower Kings River Reclamation 193, 43 L. 665, 19 S. 379 [1899]; District No. 531 v. McCuUah, 124 (reversing Dewey v. City of Des- Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]. 219 CONSTITUTIONAL, RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 130 of property, and that accordingly the question whether there was a taking without due process of law could not be consid- ered.^ § 130. Notice of confirmation. Whether notice and an opportunity to be heard upon appli- cation to confirm the assessment is a compliance with the con- stitutional provision forbidding the taking of property without due process of law, or whether such notice is gi-ven at too late a stage of the proceedings, is a question which depends for its answer upon the nature of the proceedings at confirmation and the effect therein of the prior proceedings. If at confirmation the property owner is given a full opportunity to be heard upor the merits of the case, it is generally held that such notice and opportunity for hearing constitute due process of law,^ whether such confirmation is upon hearing in court,^ or upon hearing before the council or other similar taxing body.' If, on the other hand, the confirmation is a mere review and no opportunity is given for a full and original hearing, notice of confirmation alone is not sufiicient. Thus, where on confirmation the assessment is assumed to be valid if not shown affirmatively to be invalid and where possibly the only inquiry permitted was as to the correct- ness of the principle upon which the assessment was levied without any inquiry into the facts, it was held that notice of such confirmation was insufficient.* A statute providing for the "Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation Dis- 93 N. W. 259 [1903]; City of Duluth triet, 164 U. S. 179, 41 L. 395, 17 S. v. Dibblee, 62 Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 52 [1896]; (dismissing error to 1117 [1895]. Modesto Irrigation District v. Tre- "^ People ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, gea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 Pac. 237). 219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; "Wight V. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, Job v. City of Alton, 189 111. 256, 82 45 L. 900, 21 S. 616 [1901]; Wurts Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 X. E. 622 V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. 229, [1901] ; City of Duluth v. Dibblee, 62 5 S. 1086 [1885]; Davidson v. New Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 1117 [1895]. Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 » Cohen, v. City of Alameda, 124 [1877]; Cohen v. City of Alameda, Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377 [1899]; City of 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377 [1899]; Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, City of Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; Auditor General 104, 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; People ex v. Hoffman, 132 Mich. 198, 93 N. W.. rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, 219 HI. 200, .259 [1903]. 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; Job v. City of 'State, The Board of Chosen Free- Alton, 189 III. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. holders of the County of Hudson, 448, 59 N. E. 622 [1901]; Auditor Pros. v. Paterson Avenue and Secau- General v. Hoffman, 132 Mich. 198, cus Road Commissioners, 41 N. J. L. §§131,132 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 220 re-opening of a prior order of confirmation, and an inquiry into the valuation and apportionment in such proceeding does not amount to a taking without due process of law.° § 131. Notice for hearing objections. Under some statutes provision is made for notice which gives to the owners of property assessed an opportunity to make ob- jections to the assessment as aetiftilly made and. to be heard before a board of commissioners, assessors, equalizers, and the like, before the assessment becomes a finality. Such a provi- sion is held to give such notice and hearing as complies with the requirement for due process of law.' Like results have been reached where the statute provided for an opportimity to make objections to the assessment as actually made, and to have a hearing before an officer, as distinguished from a board, as long as such oflSeer has authority to act upon such objections and readjust the assessments in conformity to the requirements of law.^ § 132. Notice of proceedings to enforce assessment. Whether a notice is necessary prior to proceedings to enforce the assessment in question is a matter which depends upon the nature of the proceeding by which such assessment is enforced. If the assessment is to be enforced summarily without notice or judicial proceedings, it is evident that no opportunity is there- (12 Vr.) 83 [1879]; (Citing State, S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; Wilkinson, Pros. v. Inhabitants of (Affirming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 the City of Trenton, 36 N. J. L. (7 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); Ha- Vr.) 499 [1873]; Vantilburg v. gar v. Reclamation District No. 108, Shann, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 740; HI U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 State, Mann, Pros. v. Mayor and. [1884]; Carson v. St. Francis Levee Common Council of Jersey Ciiy, 24 District, 59 Ark. 515, 27 S. W. 590 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 662 [1855]). [1894]; Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 'In the matter of widening Broad- 80 Pac. 81 [1905]; City of Denver v. way in the City of New York, 61 Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, Barb. (N. Y.) 583 [1872]; In the 80 Pac. 467 [1905]; New York, C. matter of widening Broadway in the and St. L. Ry. Co. v. City of Ham- City of New York, 42 How. (N. Y.) mond, — Ind. , 83 N. E. 244 220 [1872]. [1908]; City of Richmond v. Wil- 'Fallbrook Irrigation District v. liams, 102 Va. 733, 47 S. E. 844 Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 [1904]. S. 56 [1896]; Paulson v. Portland, "Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 149 U. iS. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 32 L. 544, 9 S. 192 [1888]. [1893] ; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. 221 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 132 by given to the property owner to contest the assessment upon its merits. The assessment has, in such case, already become a finality. Accordingly, if notice has not been given at a prior stage of the proceedings so that the property owner has an opportunity to contest the assessment upon its merits, the pro- ceeding is in violation of the constitutional provision which for- bids the taking of property without due process of law.'^ On the other hand if the proceeding to enforce the assessment is in the nature of a judicial proceeding in which notice is given to the property owner and a full opportunity is given to him to be heard upon the merits, such proceeding constitutes due process of law and no prior notice seems to be necessary.^ A statute which secures to the property owner the right to appeal to the city council to correct the assessment, and further pi'o- vides that the assessment cannot be enforced until a court ol equity shall have decreed its enforcement in a proceeding in which the property owner is given a full and ample opportunity to be heard upon the merits and to show cause why such de- cree should not be rendered is clearly a compliance with the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of property with- out due process of law.^ Under some statutes, the public cor- poration which seeks to enforce the assessment may elect be- tween a judicial proceeding in which notice is given to the property owner, and a full opportunity is given to him to be heard upon the merits and a proceeding of a summary nature 'Fay V. City of Springfield, 94 4 Pac. 945 [1884]; Eeelamation Dis- Fed. 409 [1899] ; Scott v. City of To- triet No. 3 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, ledo, 36 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 4 Pac. 676 [1884]; Reclamation Dis- [1888]; Hutson v. Woodbridge Pro- trict No. 108 v. Evans, 61 Cal. 104 tection District No. 1, 79 Cal. 90, 16 [1882]; Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 Pac. 549, 21 Pac. 435 [1889]. 111. 286 [1871]; City of Indianapolis "Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, v. Holt, 155 Ind. 222, 57 N. E. 966, 48 L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; (affirm- 988, 1100 [1900]; Garvin v. Dauss- ing Hibben v. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, man, 114 Ind. 429, 5 Am. St. Rep. 62 N. E. 447 [1901]) ; Hagar v. Re- 637, 16 N. E. 826 [1887]; Nevin v. clamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; [1887]; City of Galveston v. Heard, (affirming Reclamation District No. 54 Tex. 42 [1881]; Meggett v. Cit-y 108 V. Hagar, 4 Fed. 366 [1880] ) ; of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. Murdock v. City of Cincinnati, 39 W. 566 [1892]. Fed. 891 [1889]; Carson v. St. Fran- 'City Council of Montgomery v. cis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 Birdsong, 126 Ala. 632, 28 So. 522 S. W. 590 [1894]; Reclamation Dis- [1899]. trict No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, § 133 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 222 in which neither notice nor hearing is necessary. Such an elec- tion does not of itself constitute due process of law, at least where the public corporation has not elected to resort to the judicial proceeding, since by a resort to the other method it may deprive the property owner of an opportunity to be heard; and, accordingly, such method of enforcing an assessment will not supply the want of due notice.* § 133. Right to court review. Under some statutes the owner of the property assessed is given a full and ample opportunity to have the validity of the assessment and the justice of apportionment thereof reviewed by proceedings in court; and summary enforcement of the as- sessment is suspended until such review may be had. Such an opportunity for judicial hearing is held to constitute due process of law, even if sufficient notice of the fixing of the amount of the assessment was not provided for.^ In some states the prop- erty owner may avail himself of the remedy of injunction to resist an invalid assessment or one in which the amount of the assessment exceeds the benefits conferred by the improvement. Where such procedure is recognized as proper, the question may then arise whether the opportunity to sue in equity for an in- junction constitutes due process of law. If, in the suit in equity, the property owner is given a full and ample hearing upon the merits of the assessments and upon the question of benefits, the general rule is that such opportunity is due process of law.^ This is the rule in general taxation,^ and no reason appears why the analogy should not extend to cases of local assessments, even though a right to a hearing may exist in the latter ease but not in the former. It appears, however, to be assumed in some jurisdictions that the opportunity of suing for an injunc- tion and having a full hearing in that suit does not constitute 'Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 62 N. E. 447 [1901]); Caldwell v. 385, 1 L. K. A. 688 [1888]. Village of Carthage, 49 0. S. 334, 1 Security Trust and Safety Vault 31 N. E. 602 [1892]; Tone v. Colum- Co. V. City of Lexington, 203 U. S. bus, 39 0. S. 281, 48 Am. Rep. 438 323 [1906]; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. [1883]; Stephan v. Daniels, 27 0. S. S. 316, 35 L. 419, 11 R. 825 [1891]. 527 [1875]; Steese v. Oviatt, 24 0, 'Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, S. 248 [1873]. 48 L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; (Affirm- 'McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. ing Hibben v. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, 37, 24 L. 335 [1877]. 223 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 134 due process of law.* If reasonable notice is given of a hearing before the body which levies the assessment it is not necessary that an opportunity for a review by the courts be given to con- stitute due process of law. "The claim set up on the part of the lot owner that there can be no due process of law under which an assessment can be made which does not provide for a review of such assessment and a hearing by a court is not tenable. Assuming the necessity of a hearing before an assess- ment can be made conclusive the law may provide for that hear- ing by the body which levies the assessment, and after such hearing may make the decision of that body conclusive. Al- though in imposing such assessments the common council or board of trustees may be acting somewhat in a judicial char- acter, yet the foundation of the right to assess exists in the taxing power and it is not necessary that in imposing an as- sessment there shall be a hearing before a court provided by the law in order to give validity to such assessment. Due process of law is afforded where there is an opportunity to be heard before the body which is to make the assessment and the leg- islature of a state may provide that such hearing shall be eon- elusive so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned. ' ' '^ § 134. Right of appeal as supplying want of notice. Whether an opportunity for an appeal is a sufficient com- pliance with the constitutional requirement forbidding the tak- ing of property without due process of law is a question de- pending upon the nature of the hearing allowed on appeal. If an opportunity is given on appeal for a full and complete hear- ing upon the merits, the rights of the property owner are pro- tected and the proceeding constitutes due process of law.^ Like •Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. 582 [1901]; In the Matter of the Keith, 67 O. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, Bonds of the Madera Irrigation Dis- 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]. trict, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. "Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 321, 322, 48 L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; 675 [1891]; Davies v. City of Los (Affirming Hlbben v. Smith, 158 Ind. Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 206, 62 N. E. 447 [1901]). [1890]; Eoundenbush v. Mitchell, iKing V. Portland City, 184 V. S. 154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]; 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902] ; State ex rel. French v. Johnsnn, 105 (affirming King v. Portland, 38 Or. Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 [1885]; 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 [1900]); Brown v. Drain, 112 Fed. Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dec. 468 [1861]; § 135 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 224 results have been reached where provision was made for a suit to correct the assessment.^ So a statute providing that the "gen- eral council or courts in which suits may be pending shall make all corrections, rules and orders to do justice to all parties con- cerned" has been held to be sufficient to constitute due process of law.^ On the other hand the hearing on appeal may be so restricted as to preclude the property holder from obtaining a full and fair adjudication of his ^fights. Thus a statute grant- ing an appeal and providing that if the appellant were success- ful his only relief should be that the diiference between the amount originally assessed and the amount found on appeal to be the amount of benefits received by him should be paid by the city, leaving him to pay the amount so adjudged to be- the amount of benefits, and providing that such appeal should be the only remedy for any grievance which he might have by reason of the making of such improvement was held to be un constitutional, as a taking of property without due process, ol law.* Other statutes intended to restrict the power to the prop- erty owner to seek relief from the courts have been held uncon- stitutional when by reason of such restrictions it is impracticable or unreasonably difficult for the property owner to avail him- self of such relief.^ § 135. Effect of notice in fact where none provided for. If the statute providing for an assessment does not provide for notice specifically, but such notice is in fact given and a full and ample opportunity for a hearing is given, is such notice a Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 'Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, Pac. 781 [1885]; Mayor and City 32 L. 544, 9 S. 192 [1888]; (Affim- Council of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 ing Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492,' 5 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43 [18941; Sears v. S. W. 546 [1887]). Street Commissioners of Boston, 173 'Hayes v. Douglas County, 92 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876 [1899]; Wis. 429, 53 Am. St. Eep. 926, 31 Weed V. Mayor and Aldermen of L. R. A. 213, 65 N. W. 482 [1896] Boston, 172 Mass. 28, 42 L. R. A, ' "There was apparently a design 642, 51 N. E. 204 [1898]; Stone v. on the part of the draughtsman of Little Yellow Drainage District, ll'S the section to place these original as- Wis. 388, 95 N. W. 405 [1903]; sessments beyond the reach of judi- State ¥X rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 cial power except when that power Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. should be exercised in the circum- 947 [1889]. scribed and in many cases impracti- "^ English V. Mayor and Council of cable manner specified." Union Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Building Association v. City of Chi- Atl. 158 [1896]. cago, 61 111. 439 [1871]. 225 CONSTITUTIONAL KESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 135 compliance with the constitutional provision forbidding a tak- ing of property without due process of law? The position upon this question taken by many courts is that such power is neces- sarily subject to constitutional limitations, that it will not be assumed that the legislature intended to violate constitutional provisions,^ and that accordingly in such cases the public cor- poration will be regarded as given a broad discretion with ref- erence to the kind and character of notice which it gives, and that if such public corporation actually gives sufficient notice, the constitutional provision in question is not violated.^ In other .iurisdictions it seems to be held that notice must be provided for specifically by statute, as a right of the property owner, not as a favor to him.' Under such view an assessment statute not making provision for notice would be held invalid even if notice were in fact given.^ If possible by fair construction, provision as to notice found in one statute will be regarded as adopted by another statute which does not provide for notice in express terms, so as to avoid the constitutional question.'' Thus a pro- vision for a hearing to be given to the owners of the property 'See § 79. N. W. 447 [1898]; Davis v., City of 2 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, Lynchburg, 84 Va. 861, 6 S.' E. 230 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; (af- [1888] ; Baltimore and Ohio Railroad firming Paulson v. City of Portland, v. Pittsburgh, Wheeling & Kentucky 16 Or. 450, 1 L. E. A. 673, 19 Pac. Railroad, 17 W. Va. 812 [1881]. 450 [1888]); Hagar v. Reclamation '"It is not enough that the own- District, No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 4 ers chance to have notice or that S. 663, 28 L. 569 [1884]; City of they may, as a matter of favor, have Denver v. Dumars, 33 Colo. 94, 80 a hearing. The law must require no- Pac. 114 [1904]; Ford v. Town of tice to them and give them the right Des Moines, 80 la. 626, 45 N. W. to a hearing and the opportunity of 1031 [1890]; Gatch v. City of Des being heard." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 Moines, 63 la. 718, 18 N. W. 310; N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 (Quoted in Beebe v. Magoun, 122 la. Pac. 781 [1885]; Williams v. Mayor, 94, 96, 97, 101 Am. St. Rep. 259, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560 [1853]; 97 N. W. 986 [1904]). King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. 'Violett v. City Council of Alex- E. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Wilson andria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. V. City of Salem, 24 Or. 504, 34 Pac. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 9, 691 [18931; Strowbridge v. City [1896]. of Portland, 8 Or. 67 [1879]; (fol- 'Auditor General v. Hoffman, 132 lowed with regret in Paulson V. City Mich. 198, 93 N. W. 259 [1903]; of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. Grand Rapids School Furniture Com- 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]); Cleveland pany v. City of Grand Rapids, 92 V. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50 [1880]; Tripp Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028 [1892]. V. City of Yankton, 10 S. D. 516, 74 §§ 136, 137 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 226 to be assessed implies a provision for a notice of such hearing." If the provision which requires notice and hearing ' is incom- plete, as where the time and place of the hearing are not in fact given, an assessment is not invalid if a sufficient hearing is, in fact, given.' § 136. Right of each land-owner to notice. The right to notice, is a right which is possessed by each sep- arate owner of property which it is sought to assess for the improvement in question. Accordingly notice to certain prop- erty owners less in number than all,^ as to the owners of lands through or abutting on which the improvement is to be con- structed, but not to the owners "of other lands which are bene- fited and which it is proposed to assess," violates the consti- tutional rights of those land-owners who are not notified and whose land it is sought to assess, and amounts to a taking of their property without due process of law. § 137. Effect of omission of notice. If the constitutional requirement of notice sufficient to con- stitute due process of law has not been complied with, it is held that the entire assessment is void and not merely such part thereof as exceeds the benefits conferred by the improvement for which the assessment is levied.' "Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 234 [1889]; Ireland v. City ot 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; Rochester, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 414 (affirming Paulson v. City of Port- [1868]. land, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 ^Beebe v. Magoun, 122 la. 94, 101 Pac. 450 [1888]); Auditor General Am. St. Rep. 259, 97 N. W. 986- V. HoflFman, 132 Mich. 198, 93 N. W. [1904]; In the Matter of the Appli- 259 [1903]. cation of the Common Council of the ' Hallett V. United States Security City of Amsterdam to take lands for and Bond Co., — Colo. , 90 the extension of Grove and Jay Pac. 683 [1907]. Streets, 55 Hun. (N. Y.) 270, 8 N. 'Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, Y. Supp. 234 [1889]. 66 N. B. 332 [1903]; Beebe v. Ma- 'Ulman v. Mayor and City Council goun, 122 la. 94, 101 Am. St. Rep. of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. 259, 97 N. W. 986 [1904]; In the A. 224, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709, 32 Matter of the Application of the Am. and Eng. Corp. Cases 228 Common Council of the City of Am- [1890] ; Hutchison v. Storrie, 92 sterdam to take lands for the exten- Tex. 685, 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. sion of Grove and Jay Streets, 55 R. A. 289, 51 S. W. 848 [1899]. Hun. (N. Y.) 270, 8 N. Y. Supp. 227 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 138, 139 § 138. Statute making certain steps prima facie evidence of validity. Statutes not infrequently make certain steps prima facie evidence of the regularity and validity of the assessment pro- ceedings Under such statutes the property owner is given , ar opportunity to show any facts which may establish the invaliditj' of such assessment, and accordingly, although by force of the statute there is a presumption against him which he must over come, it has generally been held that such statute does not vio- late the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of prop- erty without due process of law.^ Thus, statutes which pro- vide that the account of the cost of the work done, duly cer- tified,^ or tax bills issued for the cost of the work,^ or the re- port of the commissioners, assessing benefits and damages,* or certified copies of the improvement ordinance, the contract for such improvement and the apportionment, ° shall respectively con- stitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the assessment, have been upheld. § 139. Statute making certain steps conclusive evidence of va- lidity. If the statute goes farther than making such steps prima facie evidence of the validity and regularity of the assessment and attempts to make them conclusive evidence thereof, it is gen- erally held that such statute is valid as to all matters not jurisdic- tional in their character,^ which the legislature might have dis- ^ Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 80 tenson, 120 Mo. App. 215, 96 S. W. Pac. 81 [1905]; McDonald v. Con- 701 [1906]; City of Schenectady v. niff, 99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 [1893]; Trustees of Union College 66 Hun. Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad (N. Y. ) 179, 21 N. Y; Supp. 147 Company v. City of Chicago, 217 111. [1892]. 343, 75 N. E. 499 [1905]; McHenry =■ City of Schenectady v. Trustees V. Selvage, 99 Ky. 232, 35 S. W. .645 of Union College, 66 Hun. (N. Y.) [1896]; Zable v. Louisville Baptist 179, 21 N. Y. Supp. 147 [1892]. Orphans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, 13 L. R. 'St. Louis to use of Cornelli v. A. 668, 17 S. W. 212 [1891]; St. Armstrong, 38 Mo. 167 [1866]; City Louis to use of Cornelli v. Armstrong, of St. Louis to the use of Lakrum 38 Mo. 167 [1866]; St. Louis to usi v. Coons, 37 Mo. 44 [1865]. of Lakrum v. Coons, 37 Mo. 44 * Chicago Terminal Transfer Rail- [1866]; City of Excelsior Springs to road Company v. City of Chicago use of McCormick v. Mississippi Val- 217 111. 343, 7'5 N. E. 499 [1905]. ley Trust Co., — Mo. App, — , 90 "McHenry v. Selvage, 99 Ky. 232, S. W. 707 [1906]; City of Excelsior 35 S. VP. 645 [1896]. Springs to use of MoCormick v. Et- ' Ramish v. Hartwell,- 126 Cal. 443. 58 Pac. 920 [1899]. . § 140 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 228 pensed with in advance. As to matters, however, which are jurisdictional in their character,^ and with which the legislature could not have dispensed in advance, a statute making such steps conclusive evidence of the validity of the assessment is uncon- stitutional if made obligatory upon the property owner.' Thus if the assessment is to be enforced by a proceeding of a judicial character, but in such suit the action of the officials who have levied such assessment is to be ^nal as to the apportionment ol the assessment, such proceeding cannot supply the want of no- tice before the assessment became a finality." If the property owner is given the option of making certain steps conclusive as to the validity of the assessment, he cannot after taking advantage of such option complain that it amounts to a takirif of property without due process of law. Statutes are occasion- ally found in which it is provided that the amount of the as- sessment shall be paid in full at once unless the property ownei agrees to waive all irregularities or other defenses to the as sessment, in which case he may exercise the option of paying the assessment in installments. Such statutes, it will be ob- served, merely give, to the property owner the option betweei resisting the assessment at once, or waiving defenses and pay ing in installments; and accordingly such statutes are held not to violate the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of property without due process of law.° § 140. Issuance of bonds. Statutes are frequently found which authorize the issuance of bonds in order to obtain the means of paying the contractors forthwith, and which provide for the redemption of the bonds by means of a fund raised by assessments. Such statutes are held to be valid.^ They do not violate the constitutional pro- = Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443, Company, 163 Ind. 599, 70 N. E. 249 58 Pac. 920- [1899]. [1904]; Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 'Violett V. City Council of Alex- 124 Ind. 292, 7 L. E. A. 681, 23 N. andria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Eep. E. 788 [1890]. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 » Fallbrook Irrigation District v. [1896]. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, *Violett V. City Council of Alex- 17 S. 56 [1896]; Bauman v. Boss, andria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 [1897]; Davidson v. New Orleans, [1896]. 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; Hell- "Voris V. Pittsburgh Plate Glass man v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 229 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC, 141 vision forbidding the taking of property without due process of law, even where the bonds are interest bearing and are pay- able in installments,^ at least as long as the property owner has the opportunity to pay the full amount of his assessment and thus stop interest.^ Such statutes have been held valid even where they fix the rate of interest which such bonds shall bear ;* though it has been contended unsuccessfully that by thus fixing the rate of interest they may preclude the city from borrowing money at a lower rate, and thus operate as a taking of property without due process of law.^ § 141. Restriction of time of making objection. Statutes are frequently found which require that objections to assessments must be made within some short space of time and that if not so made they shall be deemed to have been waived. Such statutes are usually held to be valid if the tim^ given is sufficient to enable the property owner to present his objections fairly.^ Thirty-day limitations have been upheld,^ as in eases of assessments for street improvements,^ or for sew- Pac. 915, 45 P. 1057; People ex rel. Pollard V. Swigert, 130 III. 608, 22 X. E. 787 [1890]; Martin v. Tyler, 4 N. D. 278, 25 L. R. A. 838, 60 N. W. 392, Hennessy v. Douglass Coun- ty, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]. ' Ericlcson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]. ' Ericlcson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]. *Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 217 111. 286, 75 N. E. 486 [1905]; Hul- bert V. City of Chicago, 213 111. 452, 72 N. E. 1097 [1905]; Germond v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961 [1893]. 'Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 213 HI. 452, 72 N. E. 1097 [1905]. 1 Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 80 Pac. 81 [1905]; City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]; Hays v. Tippy, 91 Ind. 102 [1883]; Loomis v. City of Little Falls, 176 N. Y. 31, 68 N. E. 105 [1903] ; (affirming Loomis v. City of Little Falls, 72 N. Y. S. 774, 66 App. Div. 299 [1901]); Union Pacific R. Co. V. Kansas City, 73 Kan. 571, 85 Pac. 603 [1906]; Germond v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961 [1893]. ^Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 80 Pac. 81 [1905]; City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]; Loomis v. City of Little Falls, 176 N. Y. 31, 68 N. E. 105 [1903]; (affirming Loomis v. City ol Little Falls, 72 N. Y. S. 774, 66 A^p. Div. 299 [1901]); Germond v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961 [1893]. Such a statutory provision has been held to be applicable to re-assess- ments; Kansas City v. McGrew, — Kan. , 96 Pac. 484 [1908]. ' Union Pacific R. Co. v. Kansas City, 73 Kan. 571, 85 Pac. 603 [1906]; City of Kansas City v. Kim- ball, 60 Kan. 224, 56 Pac. 78 [1899] ; Arends v. City of Kansas City, 57 Kan. 350, 46 Pac. 702; City of Ar- gentine v. Simmons, 54 Kan. 699, 38 Pac. 181; Doran v. Barnes, 54 Kan. 238, 38 Pac. 300 [1894]; Simpson V. City of Kansas City, 52 Kan. 88, 34 Pac. 406 [1893]. § 141 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 230 ers.* A three day limitation has been upheld,' even where on account of sickness the property owner was not able to file his remonstrance within the time limited." Such re- strictions are held in some jurisdictions to apply to consti- tutional questions as well as to failure to comply with stat- utory requirements,' while in other jurisdictions it is held that they cannot apply to constitutional questions.' In some states, however, restrictions even less strirtgent than those previously given have been held to be invalid as a taking of property without due process of law." Limitations of sixty ^'' and forty ^^ days have thus been held to be unreasonable and therefore invalid. "Any attempt to cut oif his (the property owner's) right with- out having afforded him such just and reasonable opportunity to be heard is not properly a statute of limitations at all. It savors rather of spoilation and plunder."^" The proposition has, in these jurisdictions, been assumed as almost axiomatic. It is said to be "too plain for discussion."^' A provision in a charter adopted by a city under a constitutional provision per- mitting such adoption, which requires the property owner to pay in the amount of the assessment as a condition precedent to contesting its validity, has been held to be unconstitutional, but rather on the ground that such power was not granted to cities by the constitutional provision permitting them to frame *City of Kansas City v. Gibson, 534, 83 S. W. 1069 [1904]; Barber 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. Kansas City v. Gray, 62 Kan. 198, 376, 68 S. W. 1043 [1902]; JRichter 61 Pac. 746 [1900]; Doran v. Barnes, v. Merrill, 84 Mo. App. 150 [1900]; 54 Kan. 238, 38 Pac. 300 [1894]; Hayes v. Douglas County, 92 Wis. City of Topeka v. Gage, 44 Kan. 87, 429, 53 Am. St." Rep. 926, 31 L. R. 24 Pac. 82 [1890]; Wahlgren v. City A. 213, 65 N. W. 482 [1896]. of Kansas City, 42 Kan. 243, 21 Pac. "Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. 1068 [1889]. Munn, 185 Mo. 552, 83 S. W. 1062 'Assessment for ditch; Hays v. [1904]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. Tippy, 91 Ind. 102 [1883]. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S. W. 1043 "Hays v. Tippy, 91 Ind. 102 [1883]. [1902]; Richter v. Merrill, 84 Mo. 'City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 App. 150 [1900]. Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]. " Hayes v. Douglas County, 92 Wis. »Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 6S5, 429, 53 Am. St. Rep. 926, 31 L. R. 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. R. A. A. 213, 65 N. W. 482 [1896]. 289, 51 S. W. 848 [1899]; Howell "Hayes v. Douglas Count", 92 v. City of Tacoma, 3 Wash. 711, 28 Wis. 429, 446, 53 Am. St. Ren. 926, Am. St. Rep. 83, 29 Pac. 447 [1892]. 31 L. R. A. 213, 65 N. W. 482 [1896]. " Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. • " Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Munn, 185 Mo. 552, 83 S. W. 1062 Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S. W. 1043 [1904]; Schibel v. Merrill, 185 Mo. [1902], 231 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPIJCABLE, ETC. §142 their own charters, than on the ground that such provision did not amount to due process of law." It has been doubted whether the legislature can limit the time within which certiorari can be brought, if the statute under which the assessment has been levied is unconstitutional.^" § 142. Appeal not essential to due process of law. If sufficient notice of the original making and apportionment of the assessment is given and a full hearing upon the merits is provided for, appeal is not essential to a compliance with the provision forbidding a taking of property without due process of law and may accordingly be dispensed with.' The fact that an appeal is not allowed in the case of improvements in towns, though it is in improvements in cities does not, by reason of "Wilson V. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 543, 27 Pac. 474 [1891]. •"Traphagen v. Township of West Hohoken, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 232 [1877]. iffibhen v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 48 L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; Spen- cer V. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schott- ler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. 173, 4 S. 48; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; People v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 59, 4 Pac. 951; Peo- ple ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, 219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; Deane V. Indiana Macadam & Construction Company, 161 Ind. 371, 68 N. E. 686 [1903]; Lake Erie & W. Ey. Co. v. Watkins, 157 Ind. 600, 62 N. E. 443; Bonfoy v. Goar, 140 Ind. 292, 39 N. E. 56; Reeves v. Groettendick, 131 Ind. 107, 30 N. E. 889 [1891]; Bar- ber Asphalt Paving Company v. Ed^- erton, 125 Ind. 455, 25 X. E. 436 [1890]; McEneney v. Town of Sulli- van, 125 Ind. 407, 25 N. E. 540 [1890]; Weaver v. Templin, 113 Ind. 298, 14 N. E. 600 [1887]; Ross v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, Iowa, 128 Iowa 427, 1. L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 506 [1905] ; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; AUerton v. Monona County, 111 la. 560, 82 N. W. 922; Chambliss v. Johnson, 77 la. 611, 42 N. W. 427 [1889]; Lambert v. Mills County, 58 la. 666, 12 N. W. 715; Griffith v. Pence, 9 Kan. App. 253, 59 Pac. 677; Sullivan v. Haug, 82 Mich. 548, 10 L. R. A. 263, 46 N. W. 795; Gil- lett V. McLaughlin, 69 Mich. 547, 37 N. W. 551; State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876] ; Joplin Consolidated Min- ing Co. V. Joplin, 124* Mo. 129, 27 S. W. 406 ; County of Dodge v. Acom, 61 Neb. 376, 85 N. W. 292 [1901]; State, Britton, Pros. v. Blake, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 208 [1871], 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 442 [1872]; Matter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60; Taylor v. Craw- ford, 72 0. S. 560, 69 L. R. A. 805, 74 N. E. 1065 [1905]; Bowersox v. Watson, 20 0. S. 496 [1870]; Statp ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 WU. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. 947 [1889]; Dickson v. City of Racine, 61 Wis. 545, 21 N. W. 620 [1884]; Teegarden v. City of Racine, 56 Wis. 545, 14 N. W. 614 [1883]. § 143 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 232 such discrimination, amount to a denial of due process of law - So if notice and hearing are given upon the question of benefits as well as upon other questions, but on appeal the owner is not allowed to show that his land receives no benefit from the con- templated improvement, such restriction upon the issues to be tried on appeal does not violate the constitutional provision re- quiring due process of law.' § 143. Right of appeal. ♦ If sufficient notice of the assessment proceeding has been given to constitute due process of law,^ it is not necessary, as has al- ready been stated,^ that provision be made for an appeal from the decision of the assessing body.' This principle is especially applicable where the assessment is, under the provisions govern- ing such proceedings, regularly brought before a court for con- firmation.* Under a constitution providing that appeals and writs of error may be taken to certain specified divisions of the Supreme Court, and that such writs of error and appeals should be allowed from the final determination of the county court as might be allowed by law,^ it has been held that a statute providing that a writ of error shall issue from the Supreme Court in an as- sessment case only if the application for such writ is accompanied by an affidavit showing that the applicant did not receive notice of the filing of such assessment for confirmation or otherwise learn of its pendency until ten days previous to the entry of applicant's default therein, is constitutional, since proceedings for the con- firmation of assessments are purely statutory and appeals from such proceedings are not controlled by the law relating to ap- peals in general." A statute denying the right of appeal from ^ Deane V. Indiana Macadam & Con- [1900]; Deane v. Indiana Macadam struction Company, 161 Ind. 371, 68 & Construction Company, 161 Ind. N. E. 686 [1903]. 371, 68 In. E. 686 [1903]; State, ' Ross V. Board of Supervisors of Britton, Pros. v. Blake, 35 N. J. L. Wright County, Iowa, 128 la. 427, (6 Vr.) 208 [1871]. 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 'People ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, 506 [1905]. 219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; 'See § 119 et seq. Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 185 = See § 142. 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 [1900]. "People ex rel. Hanberg v. Cohen, 'Article VI., §§8 and 19, Consti- • 219 111. 200, 76 N. E. 388 [1906]; tution of Illinois. Hart Bros. v. West Chicago Park ' Hart Bros. v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 186 111. 464, 57 N. E. Commissioners, 186 HI. 464, 57 N. 1036 [1900]; Bickerdike v. City of E. 1036 [1900]. Chicago, 185 HI. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 233 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEIOTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 144, 145 assessments for street improvements in towns is not unconsti- tutional, though an appeal is given in like forms of assessment; in cities/ It has, on the other hand, been said that the legis- lature cannot deny the right of the property owner to seek relief from the courts if the assessment is void.^ Where the right of the property owner to attack the assessment is so re stricted that it appears that the legislature intends to place such assessment practically beyond the reach of judicial power, it has been held that such restrictions are invalid." § 144. Right of protest not essential to due process of law. Statutes occasionally provide that property owners may by protest put an end to proceedings which, if not so ended, would have resulted in a public improvement and an assessment there- for. Such right of protest is by no means an essential feature of due process of law. A statute giving the right to residents to prevent the improvement and assessment if a majority of them protest against it, but not giving such right to non-resi- dent owners does 'not deny due process of law to the latter. § 145. Constitutional provisions restricting taxation not ap- plicable to local assessment. In the various state constitutions are found many provisions restricting the exercise of the power of taxation which is else- where conferred upon the state legislature. While local assess- ment is generally regarded as an exercise of the power of taxa- tion,' it is nevertlieless held for many purposes not to be a tax within the more limited use of that term.- These constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the power of taxation, are ' Deane v. Indiana Macadam & Con- or and Common Council of the City struction Company,' 161 Ind. 371, 68 of Newark, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.") 576 N". E. 686 [1903]. [1881]. ° Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 ° Union Building Association v. Neb. 34S, 72 N. W. 218 [1897], (an City of Chicago, 61 111. 439 [1871]. obiter, since the statute providing ' Field v. Barber Asplialt PaviiT! that no com-t should entertain a Co., 194 U. S. 618, 4S L. 114£. 24 complaint which the property owner S. 784 [1904], (modifying Field v. had a legal right to make, and did Barber Asplialt Paving Co., 117 Fed. make, to the board of equalisation, 925 [1902]). was construed as not applying to ' See § 89. cases where the assessment was ' See § 42 et seq. void) ; State, Peckham, Pros. v. May- § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 234 generally so worded as to show an intention of dealing with and restricting the exercise of the power of taxation in its more lim- ited rather than its broader sense. It is very generally held, therefore, that such constitutional provisions do not apply to the exercise of the power of local assessment.^ The courts have not been unanimous in their holdings upon this point, however. In some cases it has been queried, but not decided whether such con- stitutional provisions were appliSable to local assessments.* In other cases it has been held that since an assessment is a tax, con- stitutional provisions applying to taxation must include local as- sessments.' These latter cases have, however, been overruled by subsequent decisions." In view of the conflict of authority here in- dicated, and because the specific phraseology of the different con- stitutional provisions is sometimes insisted on as the ground for difference of judicial opinion, it is necessary therefore to con- sider in detail the different constitutional provisions on the sub- ject. § 146. Specific provisions for equality and uniformity of taxa- tion. Provisions requiring taxation to be uniform, equal and pro- portionate are found in most American constitutions. These pro- visions are as follows : All taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such prop- ' Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, Water & Electric Liglit Company v. 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; McGehee v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 [I860]); not af- R. A. 157, 26 S. W. 1025, 31 S. W. fected on this point by reversal in 756 [1895]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 1866]); Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 S. E. 521 [1892] ; Jones v. Holzapfel, Cal. 497 [1871]; Atlanta First Meth- 11 Okla. 405, 68 Pac. 511 [1902]; odist Episcopal Church v. Atlanta, Storrie v. Houston City Street Rail- 76 Ga. 181; Kilgour v. " Drainage way Company, 92 Tex. 129, 44 L. Commissioners, 111 111. 342 [1885]; R. A. 716, 46 S. W. 796 [1898]; Law V. Madison, Smyrna & Graham County of Harris v. Boyd, 70 Tex. Turnpike Company, 30 Ind. 77 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]; Taylor v. [1868]; Yeomans v. Riddle, 84 la. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]. 147, 50 N. W. 886 [1891]; Munson * Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. V. Board of Commissioners of The 'Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 Atchafalava Basin Levee District, [1881]; Taylor, McBean & Co. v. 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]; Chandler, 9 Heisk. (56 Tenn.) 349, Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 24 Am. Rep. 308 [1872], 61 Am. Dec. 508 [1854]; Lamar « See § 86, § 152, S 160. 235 CONSTITUTIONAL UESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146' erty, but no tax shall be assessed upon any debt for rent or hire of real or personal property, while owned by the landlord or hirer during the current year of such rental or hire, if such real or personal property be assessed at its full value.^ All prop- erty in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States shall be taxed in proportion to its .value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The word "property," as used in this ar- ticle and section, is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and other matters and things. real, personal and mixed, capable of private ownership; pro- vided, that property used for free public libraries £fnd free ifluseums, growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county or municipal corporation within this state, shall be exempt from taxation. The legislature may provide, except in case of credits secured by mortgage or trust deed, for a de- duction from credits of debts due to bona fide residents of this state. ^ Land, and the improvements thereon, shall be separately assessed. Cultivated and uncultivated land, of the same quality, and similarly situated, shall be assessed at the same value.^ All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected under general laws which shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal. Provided, That the household goods of every person being the head of a family, to the value of two hundred dollars, shall be exempt from taxation. Ditches, canals and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpora- tions for irrigating lands owned by such individuals or corpora- tions, or the individual members thereof, shall not be separately taxed so long as they shall be owned and used exclusively foi such purpose. And provided further, That the provisions oi this section shall not affect such special assessments for benefits and municipal improvements as the corporate authorities of cities, towns, or improvement districts may assess and collect undei provisions to be prescribed by law.* All taxes shall be uniforr. 'Article XL, § 211, Constitution = Article XIIL, § .2, Constitution of of Alabama. California. = Article XIII., § 1, Constitution 'Article X., § 3, Constitution of of California [Amended 1894]. Colorado. § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 236 upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws, but the General Assembly may by genera laws exempt from taxation such property as in the opinion of the General Assembly will best promote the public welfare,^ The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate oi taxation, and shall prescribe su^h regulations as shall secure b just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, edu- cational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." AL taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the terri- torial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws. The General Assembly may, however, impose a tax on such domestic animals as, from theii nature and habits, are destructive of other property.'' All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the ter- ritorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regu- lations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all prop- erty, real and personal. Provided, That the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shal. seem necessary and just, and all existing exemptions provided by the laws of the territory, shall continue until changed by the legislature of the state. Provided further, That duplicate taxa- tion of property for the same purpose during the same year, is hereby prohibited.* The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation; so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in propor- tion to the value of his, her, or its property, such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and no' otherwise." . . . The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall provide such regulations as shall secure a just valuation = Article VIII., § 1, Constitution of « Article VII., § 5, Constitution of Delaware. Idaho. 'Article IX., § 1, Constitution of "Article IX., § 1, Constitution of Florida. Illinois. 'Article VII., § 11, Constitution of Georgia. 237 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146 for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only, for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, relig- ious, or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law.^° The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; but all property used exclu- sively for state, county, municipal, literary, educational, scien- tific, religious, benevolent and charitable purposes, and personal property to the amount of at least two hundred dollars for each family, shall be exempted from taxation." All taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just valuation thereof." That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be prohibited ; that paupert ought not to be assessed for the support of the Government; but every person in the state, or person holding property there- in, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for thi support of the Government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property ; yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community.^^ The legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law : Provided, That the legislature shall pro- vide an uniform rule of taxation for such property as shall be assessed by a state board of assessors, and the rate of taxation on such property shall be the rate which the state board of assessors shall ascertain and determine is the average rate levied upon other property upon which ad valorem taxes are assessed and assessed for state, county, township, school and municipal purposes.^* All assessments hereafter author'zed shall be n property at its cash value. ^'^ All taxes to be raised in this state shall be as nearlv eiual as may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and be equalized and uniform throughout the state : Provided, That the legisla- ture may, by general lav: or special act, authorize municipal "Article X., § 1, Constitution of "Declaration of Eights, Article Indiana. XV., Constitution of Maryland. "Article XI., § I, Constitution of "Article XIV., § 11, Constitution Kansas. of MicliiiTan. "Article IX., § 8, Constitution of "Article XIV., § 12, Constitution Maine. of Michigan. § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 238 corporations to levy assessments for local improvements upon the property fronting upon such improvements, or upon the prop- erty to be benefited by such improvements, or both, without regard to a cash valuation, and in such manner as the legisla- ture may prescribe; and provided, further, that for the purpose of defraying the expenses of laying water pipes and supplying any city or municipality with water, the legislature may, by general or special law, authoriz* any such city or municipality having a population of five thousand or more to levy an annual tax or assessment upon the lineal foot of all lands fronting on any water main or water pipes laid by such city or municipality within corporate limits of said city, for supplying water to the citizens thereof, without regard to the cash value of such prop- erty, and to empower such city to collect any such tax assess- ments, or fines or penalties for failure to pay the same, or any fine or penalty for any violation of the rules of such city or municipality in regard to the use of water, or for any water rate due for the same.'* Taxation shall be uniform and equal through- out the state. ^Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. The legislature may, however, impose a tax per capita upon such domestic animals as from their nature and habits are destructive of other property. Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform rules, according to its true value But the legislature may provide for a special mode of valuatioi and assessment for railroads, and railroad and other corporate- property, or for particular species of property belonging to per sons, corporations or associations not situated wholly in one coun- ty. But all such property shall be assessed at its true value, and no county shall be denied the right to levy county and special taxes upon such assessment as in other cases of property situ- ated and assessed in the county." Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and all taxes shall be levied and col- lected b,y general laws." All property sub,iect to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.'" The necessary revenue "Article IX., § 3, Constitution of "Article X., § 3, Constitution of Minnesota. Missouri. " § 112, Constitution of Missis- '= Article X., § 4, Constitution of sippi. Missouri. 239 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTEIOTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146 for the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, except that specially provided for in this article. The legis- lative assembly may also impose a license tax, both upon per- sons and upon corporations doing business in the state.^" Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.^^ The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property and franchises, the tax to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct, and it shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, commis- sion merchants, showmen, jugglers, inn-keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, venders of patents, in such manner as it shall direct, uniform as to the class on which it operates.^^ All real property and possessory rights to the same, as well as personal property now existing or hereafter created, or corporations, shall be sub- ject to taxation the same as property of individuals; provided, that the property of corporations formed for municipal, chari- table, religious or educational purposes may be exempted by law.^' The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory, excepting mines and min- ing claims, the proceeds of which alone shall be taxed, and also excepting such property as may be exempted by law for mu- nicipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable pur- poses.-* The General Court has power to impose and levy pro- portional and reasonable assessments, rates and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within the said state, and upon "" Article XII., § 1, Constitution of == Article VIII., § 2, Constitution Montana. of Nevada. ==* Article XII., § 7, Constitution of "^Article X., § 1, Constitution of Montana. Nevada. ^'^ Article IX, § 1, Constitution of Nebraska. § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 240 all estates within the same.^^ Property shall be assessed for tax- ation under general laws and by uniform rules, according to its true valuation.^" Laws shall be passed taxing, by uniform rule, all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and, also, all real and personal prop- erty, according to its true value in money. The General Assem- bly may also tax trades, professions, franchises and incomes, provided that no income shall be^taxed when the property from which the income is derived is taxed.*'' All taxes levied by any county, city, town or township shall be uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, except property exempted by this constitution.^* Laws shall be passed taxing by uniform rule all property according to its true value in money.^° . . . Laws shall be passed, taxing by uniform rule, all moneys, credits, invest- ments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal property, according to its true value in money.'" The property of corporations, now existing or hereafter created, shall be subject to taxation the same as the property of individuals.'^ No tax duty shall be imposed without the consent of the people or their representatives in the Legislative Assembly; and all taxation shall be equal and uni- form.'- The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for ." uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation ; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal, educat^'onal, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted bv law," All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limi«ts of the authority levying the tax, arfd shall be levied and collected under general laws; but the General Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes, actual places of religious ^= Part II., Article V., Constitution » Article XII., § 2, Constitution of of New Hampshire. Ohio. '' Article IV., § 7, par. 12, Consti- "■ Article XII., § 4, Constitution of tution of New Jersey. Ohio. "Article V., § 3, Constitution of »" Article I., § 32, Constitution of North Carolina. Oregon. 2» Article VII., § 9, Constitution of »' Article IX., § 1, Constitution of North Carolina. Oregon. 2» Article XI., 5 176, Constitution of North Dakota. 241 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146 worship, places of burial not used or held for private or cor- porate profit, and institutions of purely public charity.^* All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety and happiness of the people. All laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole, and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens.'^ All property sub- ject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value. ^^ All taxes upon property, real and personal, shall be laid upon the actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascer- tained by an assessment made for the purpose of levying such tax.^^ The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uni- form and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall pre- scribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory, except mines and mining claims, the products of which alone shall be taxed ; and also excepting such property as may be exempted by law for munici- pal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable pur- poses: Provided, however. That the General Assembly may im- pose a capitation tax upon such domestic animals as from theii nature and habits are destructive of other property : And pro- vided further. That the General Assembly may provide for a graduated tax on incomes, and for a graduated license on occu- pations and business.** . . . All taxation shall be equal and uniform.'^ All taxes to be raised in this state shall be uniform on all real and personal property, according to its value in money, to be ascertained by such rules of appraisement and as sessment as may be prescribed by the legislature by general law ■so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in propor- tion to the value of his, her or its property. And the legisla- ture shall provide by general law for the assessing and levying of taxes on all corporation property, as near as may be by the same methods as are provided for assessing and levying of taxes on individual property.*" The legislature may vest the corporate '* Article IX., § 1, Constitution of ^Article X., § 1, Constitution of Pennsylvania. South Carolina. ''Article I., § 2, Constitution of '«' Article VI., § 17, Constitution of Rhode Island. South Dakota. '^ Article I., § 6, Constitution of "Article XI., § 2, Constitution of South Carolina. South Dakota. " Article HI., § 29, Constitution of South Carolina. § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 242 authority of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise. For all corporate purposes, all municipal corpora- tions may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes; but such tax shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same.*^ All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed, but the legis- lature may except such as may be held by the state, by counties, cities or towns, and used exclusively for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held and used for purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational, and shall except one thousand dollars' worth of personal property in the hands of each taxpayer, as the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer, and his immediate vendee. All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value.*'' Taxation shall be equal and uniform. All property in this state, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law. The legislature may impose a poll-tax. It may also impose occupation taxes, both upon natural persons and upon corporations, other than munici- pal, doing any business in this state. It may also tax incomes of both natural persons and corporations, other than municipal, except that- persons engaged in mining and agricultural pursuits shall never be required to pay an occupation tax ; provided, that two hundred and fifty dollars' worth of household and kitchen furniture, belonging to each family in this state, shall be exempt from taxation, and provided further, that the occupation tax levied by any county, city or town, for any year, on persons or corporations pursuing any profession or business shall not exceed one-half of the tax levied by the state for the same period on such profession or business.*' All property in the state, not " Article XI., § 10, Constitution of " Article VIII., § 1, Constitution Soutli Dalcota. of Texas. « Article I., § 28, Constitution of Tennessee. 243 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146 exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this con- stitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascer- tained as provided by law. The word property, as used in this article, is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises, and all matters and things (real, personal and mixed) capable of private ownership; but this shall not be so construed as to authorize the taxation of the stocks of any com- pany or corporation, when the property of such company or corporation represented by such stocks has been taxed." The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of . assessemnt and taxation on all property in the state, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by general law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property : Provided, That a deduction of debits from credits may be authorized : Pro- vided, further. That the property of the United States, of the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corpora- tions, and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Ditches, canals, reser- voirs, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or cor- porations for irrigating lands owned by such individuals or cor- porations or the individual members thereof, shall not be sep- arately taxed so long as they shall be owned and used exclu- sively for such purpose. Provided further, relatinsr to the re- mittance or abating of taxes of the indigent poor, that the taxes of the indigent poor may be remitted or abated at such time and in such manner as may be provided by law.*° That govern- ment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, pro- tection and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community." That no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in considera- tion of public services." All property, except as hereinafter "Article XIII., § 2, Constitution "Chap. I., Article VII., Constitu- of Utah. tion of Vermont. "Article XIII., § 3, Constitution "Article I., § 4, Constitution of of Utah. Virginia. § 146 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 244 provided, shall be taxed. All taxes, whether state, local, or mu- nicipal, shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.** Except as here- inafter provided, all assessments of real estate and tangible per- sonal property shall be at their fair market value, to be ascer- tained as prescribed by law. The General Assembly may allow a lower rate of taxation to be*imposed for a period of years by a city or town upon land added to its corporate limits, than is imposed on similar property within its limits at the time such land is added. Nothing in this constitution shall prevent the General Assembly, after the first day of January, 1913, from seg- regating, for the purpose of taxation, the several kinds or classes of property, so as to specify and determine upon what subjects, state taxes, and upon what subjects, local taxes, may be levied." No city or town shall impose any tax or assessment upon abut- ting land-owners for street or other public local improvements, except for making and improving the walk-ways upon then ex- isting streets and improving and paving alleys, and for either the construction, or for the use of sewers; and the same when imposed, shall not be in excess of the peculiar bene- fits resulting therefrom to such abutting land-owners. Ex- cept in cities and towns, no such taxes or assessments, for local public improvements, shall be imposed on abutting land-owners.^" All property in this state, not exempted un- der the laws of the United States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.^^ The legislature shall provide by law a uni- form and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the state, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe such regulations by general laws as shall secure a just valua- tion for taxation of all property, so that every person and cor- poration shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property: Provided, That a deduction of debts from credits may be authorized: Provided further. That the prop- erty of the United States and of the state, counties, school dis- tricts, and other municipal corporations, and such other property " Article XII., § 168, Constitution »» Article XIII., § 170, Constitution of Virginia. of Virginia. " Article XIII., § 169, Constitution '' Article VII., § 1, Constitution of of Virginia. Washington. 245 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 146 as the legislature may bj' general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation." The legislature shall provide by general law for the assessing and levying of taxes upon all corporation prop- erty as near as may be by the same methods as are provided for the assessing and levying of taxes on individual property.'*'' The legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited. For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the juris- diction of the body levying the same."'' Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to bo ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value; but property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable pur- poses;- all cemeteries and public property may, by law, be ex- empted from taxation. The legislature shall have power to tax, by uniform and equal laws, all privileges and franchises of per- sons and corporations.^' The legislature may,, by law, authorize the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages, for cor- porate purposes, to assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform, with respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the same.'"' The rule of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe." No tax shall be imposed without the consent of the people or their authorized representatives. All taxation shall be equal and uniform."' All property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly assessed for taxation, and the legislature shall pre- scribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxa- tion of all property, real and personal."" == Article VII., § 2, Constitution of ™ Article X., § 9, Constitution of Washington. West Virginia. == Article VII., § 3, Constitution of "Article VIII., § 1, Constitution Washington. of Wisconsin. "Article VII., § 9, Constitution of "'Article I., § 28, Constitution of Washington. Wyoming. ""Article X., § 1, Constitution of ""Article XV., § 11, Constitution West Virginia. of Wyoming. §147 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 246 § 147. Provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation not applicable to local assessments. The question whether such provisions as those given in the foregoing section, requiring uniformity and equality of taxation, apply only to general taxation, or whether they also operate as a restriction upon the power of the legislature to provide for the levy of local assessments is a question which has often been presented for judicial decision. 'The great weight of modern authority is that such provisions do not operate as a restriction upon the power of the legislature to levy local assessments, being limited in their operation to general taxation.^ The adoption ' Hagar v. Reclamation District ' No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; (affirming Recla- mation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 Fed. 366 [1880]) ; City of San Diego V. Linda Vista Irrigation District, 108 Cal. 189, 35 L. R. A. 33, 41 Pac. 291 [1895] ; In the matter of the Bonds of the Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891]; Mahoney v. Brauerman, 54 Cal. 565; Hagar v. Board of Super- visors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874] ; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 [1866]; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346 [1865] ; Burnett v. Mayor and Com- mon Council of the City of Sacra- mento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518 [1859]; Edgerton v. Green Covo Springs, 19 Fla. 140 [1882]; Speer V. Mayor and Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. K, 802 [1890]; Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [1883]; Board of Com- Hiissioners of County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500,' 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382, 30 Am. St. Rep. 247, 15 L. R. A. 624, 30 N. E. 414, 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 354 [1891] ; Pal- mer V. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329 [1868] ; Goodrich v. Winchester Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119; Warren v. Henly, 31 la. 31 [1870] ; Newman v. City of Emporia, 41 Kan. 583, 21 Pac. 593 [1889]; Ottawa County v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234, 27 Am. Rep. 101 ; City of Ot- tawa V. Barney, 10 Kan. 270 [1872]; Hines v. City of Leavenworth, 3 Kan, 180 [1865]; Gosnell v. City of Louis- ville, 104 Ky. 201, 46 S. W. 722, 20 Ky. L. R. 519 [1898]; O'Mahoney v. Bullock, 97 Ky. 774, 31 S. W. 878. Holzhauer v. City of Newport, 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]; Wolfs V. McHargue, 88 Ky. 251, 10 S. W. 809; City of Louisville v. Hyatt, i B. Mon. (41 Ky.) 177, 36 Am. Dec 594 [1841]; City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana (39 Ky.) 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 [1840]; Hill V. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; George v. Young, 45 La. Ann. 1232, 14 So. 137 [1893]; Minor v. Daspit, 43 La. Ann. 337, 9 So. 49 [1891]; Munson v. Board of Com- missioners of The Atchafalaya Ba- sin Levee District, 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]; Excelsior Plant- ing & Manufacturing Company v. Green, 3^ La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Charnock v. Fordoche & Grosse T§te Special Levee District Company, 38 La. Ann. 323 [1886]; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212, 24 Atl. 817 [1892]; Alexander v. Mayor of Baltimore, 5 Gill. (Md.) 383, 46 Am. Dec. 630; City of St. Paul v. St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad Company, 23 Minn. 469 [1877]; Edwards House Co. v. City of Jackson, — Miss. — , 45 So. 247 CONSTITUTIONAL BESTBICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. 147 of such provision does not invalidate a pre-existing special law 14 [1907]; Nugent v. City of Jack- son, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895] ; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; Yas- ser V. George, 47 Miss. 713 [1S73]; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367 [1872]; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 [I860]; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508 [1854]; Heman Construction Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo. 172, 104 S. W. 67 [1907]; City of Sedalia ex rel. Tay- lor V. Smith, 206 Mo. 346, 104 S. W. 15 [1907] ; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543, 48 S. W. 629 [1898]; City of St. Jos- eph V. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 19 S. W. 713 [1892]; Farrar v. City of St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379 [1883]; Adams V. Lindell, 72 Mo. 198 [1880]; City of St. Joseph V. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537 [1860] ; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Har- din, 27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 276 [1858]; Lockwood v. City of St. Louis, 24 Mo. 22, Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo. App. 197 [1878] ; Creamer v. Allen, 3 Mo. App. 545 [1877]; Di- rectors of Alfalfa Irrigation District V. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N. W. 1086; State of Nebraska ex rel. Ab- bott V. Board of County Commis- sioners of Dodge County, 8 Neb. 124, 30 Am. Rep. 819 [1879]; Hurford V. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336 [1876] ; Chancellor of State v. City of Eliza- beth, 66 N. J. L. (.37 Vr.) 688, 52 Atl. 1130 [1901]; (affirming Chan- cellor of State V. City of Elizabeth, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 483, -47 Atl. 455 [1900], which followed Chancel- lor of State V. City of Elizabeth, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 479, 47 Atl. 454 [1900] ) ; State, Reynolds, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Paterson, 48 N. J. L. (19 Vr.) 435, 5 Atl. 896 [1886]; State, Mann. Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 662 [1855]; People ex rel. GrifTin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dee. 266 [1851]; In the matter of the Application of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York for the En- larging and Improving a Part of Nassau Stret in the said City, 11 John Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 77 [1814]; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622; Harper V. Commissioners of New Hanovei County, 133 N. C. 106, 45 S. E. 526 [1903]; Hllliard v. City of Ashe- ville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Busbee v. Commis- sioners of Wake County, 93 N. C. 143 [1885]; Shuford v. Commission- ers of Gaston County, 86 N. C. 552 [1882]; Cain v. Commissioners of Davie County, 86 N. C. 8 [1882]; Webster v. City of Fargo, 9 N. D. 208, 56 L. R. A. 156, 82 N. W. 732 [1900]; (affirmed Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, 45 L. 912, 21 S. 623, 645 [1901]) ; Rolph v. City of Fargo, 7 N. D. 640, 42 L. R. A. 646, 16 N. W. 242 [1898]; Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 0. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 [1890], (distinguishing Fields v. Commissioners of Highland County, 36 0. S. 476 [1881]); Thompson v. Treasurer of Wood County, 11 0. S. 678 [I860]; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]; Hill V. Higdon, 5 0. S. 243", 67 Am. Dec. 289 [1855]; Scovill v. City of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 126 [1853]; Bon- sal v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio 418 [1850]; Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy (Ohio) 464 [1855]; Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Old. 405, 68 Pac. 511 [1902]; Kad- derly m. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]; King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; (affirmed 184 V. S. 61, 46 L. 431, 22 S. 290 [1902] ) ; Ladd V. Gambell, 35 Ore. 393, 59 Pac. 113; Masters v. City of Port- land, 24 Ore. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893] ; King v. City of Portland, 2 Ore. 146 § 148 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 248 providing for local assessments according to frontage.- A cura- tive statute validating assessments in certain classes of cities which were invalid because authorized only by a statute which was unconstitutional as based on an unconstitutional classifica- tion of municipal corporations," is not invalid as in violation of the clause requiring uniformity of taxation.* In states in which there are no constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation, the legislature is of course regarded as having power to levy assessments upon the basis of benefits and apportioned in substantial accordance therewith.^ § 148. Theory that such provisions are entirely inapplicable. Two theories, however, different in form but not inconsistent in ultimate result, are advanced by the courts which uphold this rule. Both theories agree that local assessments must, in theory at least, be limited to the amount of benefits conferred by the improvement for which such assessment is levied, and fairly ap- portioned according to the amount of such assessment.^ The difference between these theories consists in the reason assigned for such restriction and rule of apportionment, as the same is affected by the constitutional provisions requiring equality and [1865]; Anderson v. Lower Merion tree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 626 ; Loven- Township, 217 Pa. St. 369, 66 Atl. berg v. City of Galveston, 17 Tex. 1115 [1907]; Franklin v. Hancock, Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 [1897] ; 204 Pa. St. 110, 53 Atl. 644 [1902]; Norfolk City v. Ellis, 67 Va. (26 City of Erie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. St. , Gratt.) 224 [1875]; Hansen v. Ham- 435, 39 Atl. 231 [1898]; Beaumont mer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332 V Wilkes-Barre City, 142 Pa. St. 198, [1896]; Spokane Falls v. Browne, 21 Atl. 888 [1891]; City of Cliester 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]; V. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568, 6 L. R. A. Austin v. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 802, 19 Atl. 276 [1890]; Shoemaker 667, 27 Pac. 557 [1891]. V. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285, 16 ''Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre City, Atl. 366 [1888]; Cleveland v. Tripp, 142 P- St. 198, 21 Atl. 888 [1891]. 13 R I. 50 [1880] ; In the matter of "See § 176 et seq. , Dorrance Street. 4 R. I. 230 [185G]; 'City of Chester v. Black, 132 Pa. Tripp V. City of Yankton, 10 S. D. St. 568, 6 L. R. A. 802, 19 Atl. 276 516, 74 N. W. 447 [1898]; Winona [1890]. & St. P. R. Co V. City of Watertown, " Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford. 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. 1072 [1890]; 60 Conn. 432, 22 Atl. 782 [1891]; County of Harris v. Boyd, 70 Tex. City of Bridgeport v. New York & 23r, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]; Texas New Haven Railroad Company, 36 Transportation Co. v. Boyd, 67 Tex. Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869]; 153, 2 S. W. 364; Adams v. Fisher, Nichols v. City of Brideeport, 23 63 Tex. 651 [18R51: Tavlnr v. Bnvd, Conn. 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854]. 63 Tex. 533 [1RR5] : Mlpn v. Gal- 'See § 11, § 118, Chapter XIII. veston, 51 Tex. 302 [1879]; Round- ■^i'd CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §148 uniformity of taxation. One theory is that such provisions by their very terms apply to general taxation for the purpose of raising public revenue and are not intended to apply to local assessments levied upon the theory of benefits to pay for the cost of constructing public improvements which confer an es- pecial benefit upon the property assessed. Therefore, by this theory, such provisions do not in any way concern or aifect local assessments.- Under this theory, while assessment must un- doubtedly be apportioned, in theory at least, with reference to benefits, it is either because to do otherwise would be a taking of property without due process of law,^ or (which is possibly the same rule stated in a different form) because the very idea of an assessment presupposes such a method of apportionment, and without such method and basis of apportionment we have a form of extortion and confiscation and not an assessment, no matter by what naine it may be called.* '^Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 [1866] ; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346 [1865]; Burnett v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518 [1859]; Speer v. Mayor and Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; Hayden V. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [1883] ; Eeinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382, 30 Am. St. Rep. 247, 15 L. R. A. 624, 30 N. E. 414, 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 354 [1891]; Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895]; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; Vasser v. George, 47 Mias. 713 [1873] ; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367 [1872]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; City of St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 19 S. W. 713 [1892]; Farrar v. City of St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379 [1883] ; Adams v. Lindetl, 72 Mo. 198 [1880]; (afBrmin^ Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo. App. 197 [1878]); Egyptian Levee Company v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 276 [1858]: Creamer v. Allen, 3 Mo. App. 545 [18771; Hilliard v. City of Ashe- ville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A, 330; 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Shuford v. Com- missioners of Lincoln County, 86 N. C. 552; Cain v. Commissioners of Davie County, 86 N. C. 8 [1882]; Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy (Ohio) 464 [1855]; Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]; King v. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Masters v. City of Portland,. 24 Or. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893]; King V. City of Portland, 2 Or. 146 [1865]; Franklin v. Hancock, 204 Pa. St. 110, 53 Atl. 644 [1902]; City of Brie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. St. 435, 39 Atl. 231 [1898] ; City of Ches- ter V. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568, 6 L. R. A. 802, 19 Atl. 276 [1890]; In the Matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230 [1856]; Taylor v. Boyd, 03 Tex. 533 [1885]; Allen v. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 626; City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]; Austin v. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 667, 27 Pac. 557 [1891]. 'See § 118. 'See § 11, § 665. §§149,150 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT 250 § 149. Theory that such provisions axe partially applicable. The other theory is that such constitutional provisions are applicable in part and in part not applicable. As far as they restrict the method of apportionment to the valuation of the property assessed they do not apply because the theory of as- sessment is apportionment on the basis of benefits, and not of valuation. As far as they require assessments to be uniform and equal they are applicable UnHer this theory, however, equal- ity and uniformity mean one thing in the law of local assess- ments and another thing in the law of general taxation. Assess- ments have a uniformity and equality of their own, and that consists in an apportionment upon the theory of benefits. It is this uniformity and equality that under this theory is required by such constitutional provisions in the law of local assessments. Statutes have been held to be unconstitutional if they provide for the construction of improvements in such a way as not to insure a benefit to the property owner.^ Thus where the benefit to be derived from the construction of a system of drains,^ or levees,^ depended upon keeping them up and if they were not kept up the benefit conferred by their original construction would be far less than the assessment levied for such construction, a statute authorizing their original construction and an assessment there- for, but not an assessment for maintenance, has been held to be invalid. § 150. Special views of different jurisdictions — ^Alabama. The views expressed by the courts of several of the states need further comment, however, since they have been in the past at variance with the views already set forth. In most cases, it may be added, these variant views have been modified either by change of judicial opinion or by express constitutional pro- vision, so as to conform to those held by the majority of the courts. "While it was always held in Alabama that in the ab- sence of constitutional provisions the legislature had power to authorize public corporations to levy local assessments based on 1 State, Kean, Pros. v. Driggs 'O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. Drainage Company, 45 N. J. L. (16 450, 46 L. 636, 22 S. 354 [1902]; Vr.) 91 [1883]. (affirming O'Brien v. Wheelock. 9.5 ^ State, Kean, Pros. v. Driggs Fed. 883, 37 C. C. A. 309 [1899]); Drainage Company, 45 N. J. L. (16 Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 [1876]. Vr.) 91 [1883]. 251 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §150 special benefits accruing to private property by reason of pub-' lie improvements/ it was nevertheless the original doctrine in that state that the provisions of their constitution requiring taxes to be "assessed in exact proportion to the value" of the property to be taxed, and forbidding the taking of private property for public use without compensation were both applicable to local assessments and accordingly prevented local assessments from being based on the theory of benefits and apportioned thereto.^ This holding was, of course, directly contrary to the weight of authority which holds that a local assessment is not a tax within the meaning of such constitutional provision.^ It rested upon the theory that an assessment is a kind of tax and that accordingly it is subject to constitutional restrictions applicable to taxation.* In a later ease ^ it was sought to distinguish the 'Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mobile V. Royal Street Railroad Company, 45 Ala. 322 [1871]. 'Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mobile V. Royal Street Railroad Company, 45 Ala. 322 [1871]; Mayor, Alder- men, etc., of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310 [1871]. »See § 147. * "A tax is an orderly rate levied on the property of the citizen accord- ing to its value, or n. fixed sum lev- ied on his person, for the public use, and as it is for the use of all, it ought in strict justice to be levied on the property of all. Here the levy is not upon the property of all the citizens for a public purpose but it is on the property of a few, for fhe public use — for the improvement of a public street. Most clearly all faxes are intended to be as nearly equal as possible. If they are local and for community or local pur- poses, the whole community is pre- sumed to be interested in their ap- propriation; and for this reason all are require'd to contribute to supply them. A tax levied for national pur- poses is levied upon the whole peo- ple of the nation; a tax levied for a State falls on all its people; and in like manner a tax levied for a coun- ty is paid by the whole people of the county. So must it be with a tax levied on the people of a city or town in order to make it just and equal. Such levies may include every thing that can be called property — everything that can be owned. Such taxes, to make them just, must be in proportion to the value of the property upon which fhe burden is imposed and they must be levied up- on all and not upon a few only. This is said to be an inherent principle of taxation.* It is fhe limit that use affixes to the word. (Citing Mor- ford V. Unger, 8 la. 82; Covington V. Soufhgate, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491; Merrick v. Amherst, 12 All. (94 Mass.) 504; Ryerson v. Utley, 18 Mich. 269; Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258 ; Const. Ala. 1868, Art. IX., § 1 ) . If this, then, is not a tax in the just and proper sense of that word it is a seizure of the private property of the citizen for public use without his consent, and without first making to the owner just compensation for the same. This the constitution of fhe State forbids. Const. Ala. 1868, Art. IV., § 36." Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310, 319, 320 [1871]. " Irwin V. Mayor, etc., of Mobile, 57 Ala. 6 [1876]. § 150 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 262 ■ earlier eases without overruling them, upon the theory that the constitutional provisions already referred to were .adopted when the constitution of 1868, in which they were found, went into effect; that this constitution took effect June 25, 1868, when Congress declared that such constitution was adopted, and re- admitted Alabama over the veto of the President; that in the case at bar the ordinance was passed May 22, 1868, prior to the time that the constitution of 1'668 took effect; that the rec- ord did not show when the contract was let, and that the court would not assume, in order to invalidate the transaction that it was let subsequently to the time that the constitution of 1868 went into effect; and that accordingly such assessment would not be governed by the constitution of 1868 and the provisions therein already referred to. This attempt to distinguish the ease at bar from the earlier eases was, however, based entirely on an oversight. Conceding the correctness of the theory advanced as to the inapplicability -of the constitution of 1868 to the as- sessment in question, it must nevertheless be noted that the prior constitutions of Alabama contained similar provisions as to the taxation of lands.' This oversight was observed in a later ease in which the same question was presented,^ and the question of overruling the earlier eases or the later ease was presented squarely, since the constitution of 1875, which controlled this case, contained provisions like those of the constitution of 1868. The earlier cases alrfeady cited were there overruled,* and the doctrine laid down that these constitutional provisions had no application to local assessments, and that accordingly the legis- lature had power to provide for the levy of such local assess- ments." While overruling the earlier cases the court pointed "Constitution of Alabama, ArticU pany, 45 Ala. 322 [1871] and May- VI., § 8 [1819]; Article VI., § 8 or, Aldermen, etc., of Mobile v. Dar- [1861]; Article IV., § 38 [1865]; gan, 45 Ala. 310 [1871]). Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham ° "Are the provisions of Art. XI. V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. referring as we have seen to general 360, 7 So. 386 [1889]. taxes and taxation and to such only, ' Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- expressed limitations on the power ham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. E. A. of the legislature with respect to lo- 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]. cal assessments on property to pay 'Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- for local improvements, which benefit ham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. E. that particular property. We think A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]; (overrul- not. The overwhelming weight of au- irig Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mo- thority is against such a construc- bile V. Eoyal Street Eailroad Com- tion and in "favor of the validity of 253 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTBICTION APPLICABLE, ETC §151 out that they were cases in which the assessment was apportioned according to frontage, and that in sach earlier cases were inti- mations that if the assessments had been made according to benefits eo nomine, they might have been sustained. The doc- trine laid down in Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham v. Klein,^" has since been followed in later cases, ^^ and Alabama may now be considered as in line on this point with the weight of au- thoritv/- § 151. Arkansas. The provision of the former constitution of Arkansas : ' ' All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value — that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct: making the same equal and uni- form throughout the state. No species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species such assessments. In considering the question, jurists and judges have pro- ceeded on the theory that such charges were not taxes in the ordi- nary sense or within the meaning and intent of constitutional provisions similar to those of Alabama, but that they are in the nature of com- pensation for a benefit peculiar to the owner of the abutting property and traceable to him; that such as- sessments are not exacted for the general public welfare, and do not go to the support of governmental agen- cies from the existence and mainte- nance of which each citizen derives a like benefit, but that they are de- mandable because the government has expended an equivalent sum in improving the property against which they are laid, and thereby not the public, but the individual owner of the property improved has been ti that extent, the gainer. A tax, it is said, is a contribution to the general fund, the amount of which is taken from the individual and nothing which benefits him individually as distinguished from the mass of citi- zens is given in the place of it. He pays, and by the amount he pays i* poorer than he was before. Xot s-. with an assessment of the class we are considering. The property oviTier pays it, but in legal contemplation he loses nothing. He receives the value of his money in the betterment of his property and in addition to this he is benefited to the same ex- tent that all other citizens are in that a thoroughfare of the city in which his property is situated and he probably lives is improved. The authorities almost universally take such an imposition though confessed- ly laid under the taxing power out of the category of taxes and taxation as those terms are employed in or- ganic limitations on legislative power to levy or authorize the levying of taxes, and in general statutes." Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham v.- Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 465, 466, 8 L. R. A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]. "89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]. " C ity Council of Montgomery v. Birdsong, 126 Ala. 632, 28 So. 522 [1899]. ■- Elyton Land Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Birmingham, 89 Ala. 477, 7 So. 901; Hare v. Kennerly, 83 Ala. 608, 3 So. 683; Shultes v. Eberly, 82 A1.1. 242, 2 So. 345. § 151 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 254 of property of equal value," ^ was held not to apply to local as- sessments.^ Accordingly a statute providing for a special levee tax, and requiring the land to be valued at not less than ten dollars an acre is not invalid under this clause.' Under a simi- lar constitutional provision, "Laws shall be passed, taxing by a unifol-m rule, ... all real and personal property according to its true value in money, " * it was held that such provision was applicable to local assessments, that they must be appor- tioned according to the value of the property, and that if ap- portioned according to frontage, such assessments were invalid.^ The present constitution of Arkansas provides: "All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value, provided the General Assembly shall have power from time to time to tax hawkers, peddlers, ferries, exhibitions and privileges in such manner as may be deemed proper.. Pro- vided, further. That the following property shall be exempt from taxation: Public property used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries used exclusively as such; school buildings and apparatus; libraries and grounds used ex- clusively for school purposes, and buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity."^ "All laws ex- empting property from taxation other than as provided in this con- stitution shall be void."' "Nothing in this constitution shall be ' Article VII., Title Revenue, § 2, burden of taxes assessed. But the Constitution of Arkansas [1836]. . principle upon which this approxima- ^McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 tion to equality is to be maintained [I860]; (reversed on another point must be preserved inviolate in this in McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. {4 that all property subject to taxation Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 [1866]) ; (fol- shall be uniformly assessed according lowing Washington v. State, 13 Ark. to value, a rule applicable to all tax- 752 [1853] on the point that this ation, whether for general or local provision does not apply to local tax- and special purposes. . . . This • ation.) valuation and assessment cannot be ^ McGrehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 arbitrarily determined either by law [I860.]. or by an ordinance." Peay v. City •Article X., § 2, Constitution of of Little Eoek, 32 Ark. 31, 38, 39 Arkansas [1868]. [1877]. "Peay v. City of Little Rock, 32 °Art. XVI., § 5, Constitution of Ark. 31 [1877]; "We can scarcely Arkansas [1874]. expect absolute equality in all cases, 'Art. XVI., § 6, Constitution of or benefit commensurate with the Arkansas [1874]. 255 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 152 SO construed as to prohibit the General Assembly from author- izing assessments on real property for local improvements in towns and cities under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, to be based upon the consent of a majority in value of the property owners owning property adjoining the locality af- fected ; but such assessments shall be ad valorem and uniform. ' ' ' Under these provisions it has been held that special assessments must be according to value and not according to frontage.* Furthermore, if part of the property affected by the improve- ment is exempted, while other property similarly situated is assessed, the requirement of uniformity is violated.^" Assess- ments for benefits levied according to the value of the property are held under this provision to be constitutional.^^ It has been said, however; to be within the power of the legislature to assess either according to the value of the land affected or according to the value of the benefits added by the improvement, without violating this constitutional provision. ^^ This observation was in part obiter as in this case the benefits were assessed upon the basis of the valuation of the land affected. Three judges concurred in this opinion and decided the case on the theory that assessments levied in proportion to the increased value of the land caused by the improvement for which such assessment was levied was an ad valorem assessment. The fourth judge ren- dered an opinion in which he did not discuss this theory. Even under the theory that assessments must be apportioned according to the benefits received it has been held to be within the power of the legislature to require a property owner to construct a sidewalk in front of his land, on the theory that such requirement could be made under the police power ajid not under the power of tax- ation." § 152. Colorado. In Colorado it was held originally that the clause of the con- stitution providing for uniformity of taxation included local 'Art. XIX., § 27, Constitution of Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, Arkansas [1874]. 12 S. W. 198 [1889]; City of Litde ° Town of Monticello v. Banks, 48 Rock v. Board of Improvements, etc., Ark. 251, 2 S. W. 852 [1888]. 42 Ark. 152 [1883]. " Town of Monticello v. Banks, 48 '" Ahern v. Board of Improvement, Ark. 251, 2 S. W. 852 [1886]; Davis District No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark. V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901]. [1886]. "James v. Pine Bluflf, 49 Ark. 199, "Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 4 S. W. 760 [1887]. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]; Little § 152 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 236 assessments for special benefits as well as taxes in the narrower sense of the term, and that accordingly assessments referable to the power of taxation as distinguished from the police power could not be apportioned according to benefits/ This view was adhered to in subsequent cases ;^ and in a still later case the Supreme Court in response to a question submitted to it by the legislature declined to overrule its former decisions upon ex parte argument.** Soon afterward!, however, the same question was presented in litigation in which adverse interests were rep- resented, and it was then held that the constitutional require- ment of uniformity did not apply to local assessments and that it was therefore within the power of the legislature to pro- vide for local assessments, apportioned according to benefits and not according to valuation.* This last view is in accordance with the weight of authority,' and has since been followed consistently by the courts of Colorado." Even while the earlier rule was in force in Colorado, the courts upheld assessments, based on the theory of the performance of a legal duty and not upon the theory of benefits, even though such assessments were not ap- portioned upon a basis of valuation,'^ the court holding that as- sessments based upon the theory of legal duty were referable to the exercise of the police power and not to the exercise of the taxing power. Among assessments of this class were assess- ments for the construction of sidewalks ° and sewers.® The im- portance of this distinction for this purpose has of course been diminished by the change of view of the Colorado courts, since now assessments for all improvements of a public character, which confer a special and peculiar benefit to certain property may be levied on such property in proportion to the benefits con- ferred without violating the constitutional requirement of uni- formity. 1 Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 = See § 147. [1881]. "City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 ^^ Wilson V. Chilcott, 12 Colo. 600, Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, 467 [1905]. 21 Pac. 901 [1889]; City of Pueblo 'City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 V. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593, 21 Pae. Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899 [1889]; Pal- 899 [1889]; Brown v. City of Den- mer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 [188IJ. ver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. 455 [1884]. 'Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 " 7ra re House Resolutions concern- [1881]. ing Street Improvements, 15 Colo. " City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 598, 26 Pac. 323 [1890]. Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899 [1889]; * City of Denver v. Knowles, 17 Keese v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. Colo. 204, 17 L. R. A. 135, 30 Pae. 112, 15 Pac. 825 [1887]. 1041 [1892]. 257 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 153 § 153. Illinois. The constitution of Illinois of 1848 contained the following provisions: "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform with respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. And the Gen- eral Assembly shall require that all the property within the limits of municipal corporations belonging to individuals shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law. "1 " The General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation so that every person shall pay a tax in pro- portion to the value of his or her property. . . . "^ Under these provisions it was held that the doctrine of equality and uniformity of taxation was applicable to local assessments in a very limited and qualified manner. Local assessments were held to be referable to the power of eminent domain as has already been stated.^ From this view it was held to follow that com- pensation must be made for the assessment, either in money or in benefits,* and that if the assessment exceeded the amount of the benefits it was a violation of the constitution, since it could not be upheld to the extent of such excess, under the doctrine of eminent domain; nor could it be upheld as to such excess under the doctrine of taxation, since it lacked the equality and uniformity prescribed by the constitution.'' General principles often are laid down- with constant reference to the particular application of them which the court intended to make. In this instance the deduction made by the Supreme Court of Illinois was that while assessments were valid if apportioned according to benefits eo nomine,'^ they were invalid if apportioned accord- ing to frontage.' The explanation constantly given for this re- ' Art. IX., § 5, Constitution of lUi- and Michigan Canal v. City of Chi- nois [1848]. cago, 12 111. 403 [1851]. " Art. IX., § 2, Constitution of lUi- ' St. John i. City of East St. Louis, nois [1848]. 50 III. 92 [1869]; Holbrook v. Dick- «See § 101. inson, 46 111. 285 [1867]; Wright v. •City of Chit..go v. Ward, 36 111. 9 City of Chicago, 46 111. 44 [1867]; [1864]. Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. 91 [1867]; 'City of Chicago v. Ward, 36 111. City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 III. 306 9 [1864]. [1866]; City of Ottawa v. Spencer, "City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 40 111. 211 [1866]; City of Chicago 306 [1866]; Trustees of the Illinois v. Ward, 36 111. 9 [1864]; City of Chicago V. Larned, 34 111. 203 [1864]. § 153 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 258 suit was that such an assessment was a violation of the rule requiring equality and uniformity in taxation.* To escape the result arrived at in th^ foregoing cases, that assessments by front- age must be invalid, the following provision was inserted in the constitution which went into effect in Illinois in 1870: "The General Assembly may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment or by special ^^axation of contiguous property or otherwise. For all other corporate purposes all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, but such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same."" In a ease decided soon after the adoption of the constitution of 1870 it was said that the rules of equality and uniformity of taxa- tion were not strictly applicable to special assessments for local improvements; but that they must be levied,, it seemed, on the principle of the value of the property assessed in proportion to the benefits thereto." Under this provision it was finally held that the power of local assessment thus specifically given was free from the constitutional limitations of equality and uniform- ity.^^ The latter provision in the constitution of 1870 was as follows: "The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax by valuation so that every per- son arid corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property." " Under these provisions the power ' "In that case ( i. e. City of Chi- " Halsey v. Town of Lake View, cago V. Larned, 34 111. 203) it was 188 111. 540, 59 N. E. 234 [1901]; held that in taxation, equality and Wilbur v. City of Springfield, 123 uniformity were indisjiensable to its 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]; Mur- constitutionality and that the same phy v. People, 120 111. 234, 11 N. E. principle applied to assessments for 202;. City of Springfield v. Green, 120 public improvements and that an as- 111. 269, 11 N. E. 261; City of Ster- sessment upon the size or width of ling v. Gait, 117 111. 11, 7 N. E. 471 the front of the lot without refer- [1887]; City of Galesburg v. Searles, ence to its value was invalid as 114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]: being in violation of the principle Enos v. City of Springfield, 113 111. of equality and uniformity." Hoi- 65 [1886] ; Craw v. Village of Tolono. brook v. Dickinson, 46 111. 285, 287, 96 111. 255, 36 Am. Hep. 143 [1880]; 288 [1867]. White v. People ex rel. City of • Constitution of Illinois, 1870, Art. Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]; jX. § 9. Biorelow v. City of Chicago, 90 111. 49 >°' Hundley and Rees v. Commia- [1878] ; Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 aioners of Lincoln Park, 67 111. 559 111. 227. [1873]. "Art. IX., § 1, Constitution of Ill- inois [1870]. 259 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 154 of local assessment if attempted to be granted to any public corporation other than those mentioned in Article IX., Section 9, already quoted, must be exercised in compliance with the con- stitutional requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation.^' Accordingly when the legislature attempted to give to a drain- age district the power of local assessment it was held that such power could be granted only to such public corporations as were mentioned in Article IX., Section 9 ; and that if the power of taxa- tion for the construction of a levee was given to a drainage dis- trict it was limited by the requirements of uniformity and equality of taxation. ^^ Accordingly, as a result of this holding, an amend- ment to the constitution of Illinois was adopted as follows: "The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands to construct drains, ditches and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining purposes, across the lands of others and pro- vide for the organization of drainage districts and vest the cor- porate authorities thereof with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore constructed under the laws of this state by special assessments upon the property benefited thereby. "^^ Under this amendment it is held that assessments for drainage purposes are not subject to the constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation as the latter have, under the constitution in its present form, nothing to do with local assessments.^" § 154. Kentucky. In Kentucky at a time when there was no specific constitu- tional provision requiring uniformity of taxation, an assessment for benefits was held to be invalid upon grounds which wore sufficient to overthrow all assessments.^ The reason assigned for holding such assessment invalid was that if a tax it must be ap- portioned according to the value of the property taxed, while if a taking of private property for public use the exaction could not be in the form of money, since the constitutional require- "Updike V. Wright, 81 111. 49 "Moore v. People ex rel. Lewis, [1876]. 106 111. 376 [1883]. "Updike -V. Wright, 81 111. 49 'Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 35 [1876]. Ky. (5 Dana) 28 [1837]. "Constitution of 1870, Art. IV., § 31, adopted as amendment [1878]. § 154 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 260 ment for compensation would require a return of the same amount of money, and the transaction would therefore be a mere farce. The assessment was one in which the cost of land taken for widening a street was assessed upon the owners of abutting property — a kind of assessment which has caused more trouble than any other.^ The court receded from this extreme position in subsequent eases and it was held that the very nature of the power of taxation, of which local assessment was a branch, and the constitutional provisions forbidding the taking of property without due compensation,^ made it necessary to apportion an assessment substantially upon the basis of the benefits conferred ' by the improvement for which the assessment was levied, and forbade arbitrary exactions, irrespective of such basis of ap- portionment, but that if apportioned substantially upon a basis of benefits, such assessment might be valid.* "The distinction between constitutional taxation and the taking of private prop-' erty for public use by legislative will, may not be definable with perfect . precision. But we are clearly of the opinion that whenever the property of a citizen shall be taken from him by the sovereign will and appropriated without his consent to the benefit of the public the exaction should not be considered a tax unless similar contributions be made by that public itself or shall be exacted rather by the same public will from such con- stituent members of the same community generally as own the same kind of property. Taxation and ' representation go to- gether. And representative responsibility is one of the chief conservative principles of our form of government. When taxes are levied, therefore, they must be imposed on the public in whose name and for whose benefit they are required and to whom those who impose them are responsible. And although there may be a discrimination in the sub.jects of taxation, still persons in the same class and property of the same kind must generally be ■ subjected alike to the same common burden. This alone is taxa- tion, according to our notion of constitutional taxation in Ken- ■■See § 112, §113, § 308 et seq. Article X.,- § 12, Constitution of ' "Nor shall any man's property Kentucky, be taken or applied to public use 'Howell v. Bristol, 71 Ky. (8 without the consent of his represen- Bush.) 493 [1871]; City of Lexing- tatives and without just compensa- ton v. McQuillan's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 tion being previously made to him." Dana) 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 [1840]. 261 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 15i5 tucky. " ^ In a later constitution of Kentucky provisions were inserted requiring equality of taxation, as follows: Taxes shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation within the ter- ritorial limits of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws." All property shall be assessed at its fair cash value.' All property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this constitution ; and all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prevent the General Assembly from providing for taxation based on income, licenses or franchises.* These provisions were held to add nothing to the constitutional re- quirements already in force, but to be merely declaratory of the principles in force in Kentucky." Local assessments are not taxes within the meaning of these provisions requiring taxation in proportion to value. ^'' The sole uniformity and equality requi- site under these provisions is, as before their adoption, an ap- portionment upon a substantial basis of benefits. § 155. Louisiana. The original constitution of Louisiana contained no provision requiring equality or uniformity of taxation. It was, therefore, held in a ease not involving local assessments, that the legis- lature was practically unrestricted in its exercise of the power of taxation.^ While the law was in this condition, a local as- sessment for public improvements was held to be valid, in part, ' City of Lexington v. McQuillan's •" Gosnell v. City of Louisville, 104 Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513, 517, 35 Ky. 201, 46 S. W. 722, 20 Ky. L. R. Am. Dec. 159 [1840]. 519 [1898]; Holzhauer v. City of «Sec. 171, Constitution of Ken- Newport, 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 tucky. [1893]. ' Sec. 172, Constitution of Ken- ' "The constitution of this state tucky. having affixed no limits to the exer- * Sec. 174, Constitution of Ken- cise of the power of taxation by the tucky. legislature, it is difficult to suppose " Sections 171 and 174 of the pres- even a case in which the exercise of ent constitution of Kentucky an- that power could be considered un- nounce "nothing new but are merely constitutional or properly become declaratory of what was always tht the subject of judicial interference." law of taxation- in this state." Holz- Le Breton v. Moi-an. 4 Mart. (La.) hauer v. City nf Newport, 94 Ky. 396, X. S. 138, 142 [1826]. 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. § 155 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 262 on the theory that there was no provision requiring uniformity and equality of taxation, and in part upon the theory that the basis of apportionment was such that the assessment was uniform and equal according to its nature.^ The validity of such as- sessments was thereafter assumed without discussion.' Subse- quently in the later constitutions of Louisiana provisions were introduced requiring equality and uniformity of taxation, as follows: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. ' ' * Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the limits of the authority levying the tax, and all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be . ascertained as directed by law; provided, the assessment of property shall never exceed the actual cash value thereof; and provided further, that the tax- payers shall have the right of testing the correctness of their assessments before the courts of justice. In order to arrive at this equality and uniformity the General Assembly shall, at its first session after the adoption of this constitution, provide r system of equality and uniformity in assessments based upon the relative value of property in different portions of the state. The valuations put upon property for the purposes of state taxation shall be taken as the proper valuation for purposes o, local taxation, in every subdivision of the state.^ It was at firs held in a case not involving local taxation that such provisions applied only to state taxes and had no application either to local taxes or to assessments." In following out this theory the court held or in many eases, assumed without discussion, that such pro- visions had no application to local assessments.' Subsequently after a change in the personnel of the court, the majority of the court began to hold that such provisions were applicable to ^Oakey v. Mayor, 1 La.- 1 [1830]. Ann. 76 [1852]; Municipality No. 'Blanchet v. Municipality No. 2, Two for the Opening of Euphrosine 13 La. 322 [1839]. Street, 7 La. Ann. 72 [1852]; O'Leary 'Article 127, Constitution of Louis- v, Sloo, 7 La. Ann. 25 [1852]; iana [1845] ; Article 123, Constitu- Boulat v. Municipality Number One, tion of Louisiana [1852]. 5 La. Ann. 363 [1850]; Municipality ° Art. 225, Constitution of Louis- Number One v. Young, 5 La. Ann. iana. 362 [1850]; Matter of Claiborne "Second Municipality v. Duncan, 2 Street, 4 La. Ann. 7 [1849]; Matter La. Ann. 182 [1847]; (a case in- of Exchange A'ley, 4 La. Ann. 4 volving a school tax.) [1849]; City of Lafayette v. Malft ' Municipality Number Two far the Orphan Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1 opening of Roffignac Street, 7 La. [1849]. 263 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 155 local assessments.^ As a deduction from this rule, they held in some eases that such assessments must be apportioned on a basis of valuation, and not on the basis of benefits or of any approximation thereto." In this ease the majority attempted to distinguish the earlier cases on the ground that the con- stitutional provisions in question were found in the constitution then in force ^° and that the earlier cases were under constitu- tions not containing, such provisions." The minority dissented on the ground that the provision of this character in the con- stitution then in force*- was taken literally from the constitu- tion of 1845," and that since such provision had been held under the prior constitution not to be applicable to local assessments, this construction must be presumed to have been adopted as part of the new constitution. In other cases the majority held that such provisions applied to local assessments, but that these provisions were not violated by the assessments in question, they being as equal and uniform as in their nature was possible." The next ease that came before the Supreme Court of Louisiana was one involving drainage assessments. On the original hear- ing, the view that constitutional provisions requiring equality and unformity of taxation are applicable to local assessments ' City of New Orleans v. Elliott, taxation as was done previous to the 10 La. Ann. 59 [1855]; Municipality Act of 1832." Municipality Number Number Two v. Dunn, 10 La. Ann. Two Praying for the Opening of Ben- 57 [1855]; Municipality Number ton Street v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446, Two Praying for the Opening of Ben- 451 [1854], ton Street v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 *° Article 123 Constitution of Louis- [1854]; (decided by a vote of three iana [1852]. to two). "See the majority opinion in ' Municipality Number Two Pray- Municipality Number Two Praying ing for the Opening of Benton Street for the Opening of Benton Street v. V. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]; .White, 9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]; (dis- "It being impossible to ascertain the tinguishing Blanchet v. Municipality precise degree of benefit which is de- No. 2, 13 La. 322 [1839]). rived by any or by all of the prop- "Article 123, Constitution of erty holders within the district from Louisiana [1852]. any public improvement that may be " Article 127, Constitution of determined on by the local authori- Louisiana [1845]. ties, there is no other mode of ap- " City of New Orleans v. Elliott, portioning a tax for such improve- 10 La. Ann. 59 [1855] , The assess- ments which will be equal and uni- ments in question were said to be "as form but that of an ad valorem tax equal and uniform as the nature of on all property holders within the the thing admits of." Municipality district, or by paying the expense? No. 2 v. Dunn, 10 La. Ann. 57, 58 out of the funds derived from general [1855]. § 156 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 264 was adhered to.^^ The next ease involving this question eame up after a partial change in the composition of the Supreme Court. The view entertained in the cases immediately preced- ing was abandoned- and that entertained by the earlier eases and by the weight of authority, namely, that provisions requir- ing equality and uniformity of taxation are not applicable to local assessments, was adopted.^^ This was followed by a re- hearing of the New Orleans Drainage Company's ease," and at such rehearing " the view entertained at the original hearing was abandoned and it . was held that such constitutional provi- sions were not applicable to local assessments. This view has been adhered to consistently in the later cases and Louisiana may be classed with those holding the majority view.^" § 156. Massachusetts. The constitution of Massachusetts gives the legislature power "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments. rates and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resi- dent, and estates lying within the said commonwealth; and also to impose and levy reasonable duties and exercises upon any produce, goods, wares, merchandise and commodities, whatso- ever, brought into, produced, manufactured, or being within the same. "^ In its application to local assessments this provision "New Orleans Draining Company, 16 So. 219 (obiter) [1894]; Ellis v. Praying for the Confirmation of a Pontchartrain Levee District, 43 La. Tableau, 11 La. Ann. 338 [1856]; Ann. 33, 8 So. 914; Munson v. Board ( decided by a vote of two to one ) . of Commissioners of the Atchaf al- '"Yeatman V. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. aya Basin I.evee District, 43 La. 220 [1856]. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1891]; Barber " New Orleans Draining Company Asphalt Paving Company v. Gogreve, Praying for the Confirmation of a 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So. 848 [1889]; Tableau, 11 La. Ann. 338 [1856]. Excelsior Planting & Manuf'g. Co. v. "New Orleans Draining Co. Pray- Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873; ing for the Confirmation of a Tab- Charnock v. Pordoche and Grosse lean, 11 La. Ann. 351 [1856]. Tgte Special Levee District Company, "As holding this view see City of 38 La. Ann. 328 [1886] ; City of New Shreveport v. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. Orleans v. Estate of Burthe, 26 La. 1895, 46 L. R. A. 193, 26 So. 664 Ann. 497 ; City of New Orleans Pray- [1899]; Eosetta Gravel Paving SS ing for the Opening of Casacaloo and Improvement Co. v. Jollisaint, 51 La. Moreau Streets, 20 La. Ann. 497 Ann. 804, 25 So. 477; Fayssoux v. [1868]; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Denis, 48 La. Ann. 850, 19 So. 760 Ann. 498 [1859] ; Surgi v. Snetch- [1896] ; Hill v. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. man, 11 La. Ann. 387 [1856]. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; State ex 'Part II., Chap. 1, § 1, Art. IV., rel. Hill v. Judges, 46 La. Ann. 1292, Constitution of Massachusetts. 265 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 157, 158 is held to require that the assessment must be apportioned to the benefits conferred by the improvement for which such as- sessment is levied, and must be limited to the amount thereof.^ On the one hand an assessment so apportioned and limited is not invalidated by this clause in the constitution.^ On the other hand an assessment not so apportioned and limited is rendered invalid by the efEect of this clause.* § 157. Michigan. The courts of Michigan at first hesitated to commit themselves upon the question of the applicability of the constitutional pro- vision concerning uniformity of taxation to local assessments. In a ease arising under the laws passed prior to the adoption of the constitution it was held such provision was not self-executing, that it could not become operative until the legislature had provided some new rule in conformity with such requirement, and that such constitutional provisions could not affect assess- ments made before the legislature had provided such rule.^ Sub- sequently the court divided upon the question of whether such provisions were applicable to local assessments.^ Finally the view entertained by the majority of the courts was adopted and it was held that these provisions were applicable to the valua- tion and taxation of property for general purposes but not to local assessments for benefits.' § 158. Minnesota. The constitution of Minnesota contained the provision original- ly : " All taxes to be raised in this state shall be as nearly equal as may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation and be equalized and uniform throughout the State. "^ This provision was held to apply to = White V. Gore, 183 Mass. 333, 28, 42 L. E. A. 642, 51 N. E. 204 67 N. E. 359 [1903]. [1898], ' Warren v. Street Commissioners '■ Williams v. Mayor, etc., of De- of the City of Boston, 187 Mass. 290, troit, 2 Mich. 560 [1853]. 72 N. E. 1022 [1905]; Lincoln v. ^Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Board of Street Commissioners of the Mich. 274 [I860]. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 210, 57 »Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. N. E. 356 [1900]. 494 [1869]. * White V. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 07 ' Art. IX., § 1, Constitution of Min- N. E. 359 [1903]; Weed v. Mayor nesota [1857]. and Aldermen of Boston, 172 Mass. § 159 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 266 local assessments,^ and to require them to be apportioned on the basis of valnation of the property assessed and not on the basis of the amount of benefits conferred.' To avoid the effect of such holding, the constitution of Minnesota was amended in 1869 by adding to Article IX., Section 1, the following provision.- "The legislature may by general law or special act authorize municipal corporations to levy assessments for local improve- ments upon the property fronti^ upon such improvements or upon th? property to be benefited by such improvements with- out regard to a cash valuation and in such manner as the legis- lature may prescribe."* Under this amendment the clause re- quiring equality of taxation and a cash valuation does not prevent the legislature from apportioning assessments substantially ac- cording to benefits;^ but it does apply to assessments in excess of the amount of the benefits conferred or so apportioned as to ignore the question of benefits.' § 159. South Carolina. The constitution of South Carolina contains provisions for equality and uniformity of taxation.^ The provision re- quiring uniformity and equality within the jurisdiction of the local corporation imposing the tax was found in the earlier constitution of 1868, but not in those of 1779 and 1787. Prior to the adoption of such constitutional pro- vision local assessments were held to be valid.^ After its adop- tion, the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of prop- erty except by the law of the land was held to invalidate all ''Stinson V. Smith, 8 Minn. 366, Minn. 78, 6 N. w. 424 [1880]; Eog- 8 Gil. 326 [1863]. " ers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 'Bidwell V. Coleman, 11 Minn. 78, [1876]. 11 Gil. 45 [1865]; Stinson v. Smith, "State v. Pillsbury, 82 Minn. 359, 8 Minn. 366, 8 Gil. 326 [1863]. 85 N. W. 175 [1901]; State of Min- *Laws 1869 Ch. 51. nesota ex rel. Merchant v. District. ' State of Minnesota ex rel. City Court for St. Louis County, 66 Minn, of Duluth V. District Court- of St. 161, 68 N. W. 860 [1896]; State of Louis County, 61 Minn. 542, 64 N. Minnesota ex rel. Merrick v. District W. 190 [1895] ; Maltby v. Tautsres, Court of Hennepin County, 33 Minn. 60 Minn. 248, 52 N. W. 858 [1892]; 235, 22 N. W. 625 [1883]. State of Minnesota ex rel. Burger v. 'Article I., § 6; Article III., § 29 District Court of Ramsay County, and Article X., § 5, Constitution of 33 Minn. 295, 23 N. W. 222 [1885]; South Carolina. Noonan v. City of Stillwater, 33 ' City Council v. Pinckney, 1 Minn. 198, 53 Am. Ect). 23, 22 N. W. Treadway (S. C.) 42 [1812]. 444; City of St. Paul v. Mullen, 27 267 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 160 assessments for local improvements except those improvements which, like sidewalks, were upheld by the court under the police power.' Under this provision it has finally been held by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, that local assessments even for sidewalks and other improvements under the police power are invalid.* The theory upon which this result was reached was that the constitutional provision in question applied to local as- sessments and prevented the municipal corporation from subdi- viding the city into taxing districts, and thereby prevented the assessment of the property specially benefited by the local im- provement. South Carolina thus seems to be committed to the view contrary to that entertained by the overwhelming weight of authority. It may be noted, however, that the sidewalks and drains for which the assessments in the case in question were levied were made necessary only by the change of grade of the street. The result reached in the South Carolina case tas been reached in other jurisdictions ° without invoking the theory adopted in South Carolina. § 160. Tennessee. The constitution of Tennessee contains the following provi- sions : " . . . All property shall be taxed according to its val- ue, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. No species of property upon which a tax may be col- lected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value . . . "^ "The General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns in this state to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes respectively in such manner as shall be prescribed by law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the prin- ieiples established in regard to state taxation. ' ' ^ The original hold- ing of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was that local assessments 'Mauldin v. City Council of Green- 20 S. E. 842 [1893]) ; Stehmeyer v. ville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. City Council of Charleaton, 53 S. C. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842. 259, 31 S. E. 322 [1898]. * Mauldin v. City Council of Green- = See § 382. ville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Rep. 'Art. II,, § 28, Constitution of 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 Tennessee. [1898]; (overruling Mauldin V. City 'Art. II., § 29, Constitution of Council of Greenville, 42 S. C. 293, Tennessee. 46 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, § 161 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 268 referable to the power of taxation as distinguished from those referable to the police power, were controlled by these provi- sions, and that they must be equal, uniform and according to value.^ Under this theory assessments for street improvements* and for drainage purposes " were invalid if not apportioned according to valuation. This theory of course forbade ap- portionment except on a basis of valuation or some approximation thereto. It was adopted as the doctrine of Tennessee when the question first came before the courts ° and was adhered to till a very recent time.' One of the reasons given for this hold- ing was that in other states there was a customary law of as- sessments ante-dating constitutional restrictions, but in Tennes- see there was no such customary law." Finally, however, the court abandoned its former holding, overruled its earlier cases and adopted the doctrine held by the weight of authority, that such constitutional provisions have no application to local assess- ments." Assessments based on the theory of the performance of a legal duty, which the court regarded as referable to the police power rather than to the power of taxation were never, in Ten- nessee, held to be limited by the constitutional provisions in question. Such assessments could therefore be made according to frontage without violating this constitutional provision.^" § 161. Virginia. The constitution of Virginia contained the following provision : "Taxation, except as hereinafter provided, whether imposed by ' Reelf oot Lake, Levee District v. ' Taylor, McBean and Co. v. Chand- Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. ler, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 349, 24 725, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]; Taylor, Am. Rep. 308 [1872]. McBean and Co. v. Chandler, 56 ° Arnold v. Mayor and Aldermen of Tenn. (9 Heisk) 349, 24 Am. Rep. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 3 L. R. A. 308 [1872]. (N. S.) 837, 90 S. W. 469 [1905]. * Taylor, McBean and Co., v. Chand- "Mayor and City Council of Nash- ler, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 349, 24 Am. ville v. Berry, 2 Shannon's Cases 561 Rep. 308 [1872]. . [1877]; Whyte v. Mayor and Alder- "Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. men of Nashville, 32 Tenn. {2 Swan.) Davfson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. 364 [1852]; Washington v. Mayor 725, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]. and Aldermen of Nashville, 31 Tenn. » Taylor, McBean and Co. v. Chand- (1 Swan.) 177 [1851]; Mayor and ler, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 349, 24 Aldermen v. Mayberry, 25 Tenn. (6 Am. Rep. 308 [1872]. Humph.) 368, 44 Am. Deo. 315 'Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. [1845]. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 34 L. R. A. 725, 36 S. W. 1041 [1896]. 269 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 161 the state, county or corporate bodies, shall be equal and uniform and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in propor- tion to its value, to be ascertained as prescribed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other specigs of property of equal value. "^ Under this provision it was held that local assessments were not controlled by the constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity, which concerned general taxation alone. ^ Sub- sequently in eases presenting circumstances of peculiar hard- ship and oppression the correctness of the former holding was doubted.^ A statute providing that the assessment in addition to being a lien on the property "shall also be a personal debt of the owner of the property," was held to be unconstitutional as in violation of the foregoing provision requiring equality and uniformity.* In a later case the original doctrine was re-affirmed and it was held that an assessment apportioned according to benefits and not involving any question of personal liability was not affected by the constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity.^ The question has been, to a great extent, settled in Virginia by a constitutional provision already quoted," which forbids local assessments for all but a few specified pur- poses. An assessment was levied before the adoption of such constitutional provision, and at the time of the adoption thereof it had been perfected as to some of the tracts to be assessed but not as to all. It was held that the adoption of such con- stitutional provision rendered it impossible to perfect such as- ^Art. X., § 1, Constitution of Vir- 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851] the ginia. court said: "The doctrine held in ^ Davis V. City of Lynchburg, 84 that case if viewed in the light of Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 [1888]; Green the present constitution of Virginia V. Ward, 82 Va. 324 [1886]; R. and cannot, it would seem, be considered A. E. R. Co. V. Cit}' of Lynchburg, otherwise than as unwarranted and 81 Va. 473 [1866]; Sands v. City dangerous in the extreme." City of of Richmond, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) Norfolk v. Chamberlain, 89 Va. 196, 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]; Nor- 201, 16 S. E. 730 [1892]. folk City V. Ellis, 67 Va; (26 Gratt.) ' Asberry v. City of Roanoke, 91 224 [1875]. ' Va. 562, 42 L. R. A. 636, 22 S. E. 'McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 360 [1895]. Va. 652, 20 L. R. A. 653, 16 S. E. " Violett v. City Council of Alex- 867 [1893]; City of Norfolk v. andria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. Chamberlain, 89 Va. 196, 16 S. E. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 730 [1892]; In speaking of the lead- [1896]. ing case of People ex rel. ariirin v. "See § 107. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. T. §§ 162, 163 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 270 sessments thereafter, and that under the requirement of equality and uniformity the assessmnts already levied could not be en- forced/ § 162. West Virginia. The constitution of "West Virginia contains provisions requir- ing equality and uniformity of taxation.^ "The legislature may b,y law authorize the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages, for corporate purposes, to assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform with respect to persons and prop- erty, within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the same. "^ It has been held that the former provision applies only to laws applying to the entire state and not to laws ap- plicable to cities.^ The latter provision was held to be addressed to the legislature, not self-executing, prospective in operation and not operative to repeal a law in force when adopted.* Ac- cordingly, until the legislature should pass a law under such lat- ter constitutional provision, assessments under laws in force when the constitution was adopted were not affected by such consti- tutional provision. Decision of the question of the general ap- plicability of such constitutional provisions to local assessments was thus avoided. In later cases it has been held that provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation do not apply to assessments.^ § 163. Wisconsin. The constitution of Wisconsin contains the provision, "The rule of taxation shall be uniform."^ As far as this section alone was concerned it was held that it applied to and restricted ' Fulkerson v. City of Bristol, 105 case : Williams v. Mayor, etc., of De- Va. 555, 54 S. E. 468 [1906]. troit, 2 Mich. 560 [1853]; and also 'Art. VIII., § 1, Constitution of cases not involving assessments: West Virginia [1863]; Art. X., § 1, Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. (40 U. Constitution of West Virginia S.) 449, 10 L. 800 [1841]; Slack [1872]. V. Maysville and Lexington E. R. ^Art. X., § 9, Constitution of West Co., 13 B. Mon. (52 Ky.) 1; Cass v. Virginia [1872]. Dillon, 2 0. S. 607 [1853]). " Douglass V. Town of Harrisville, ' City of Parkersburg v. Tavenner, 9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548 42 W. Va. 486, 26 S..E. 179; Wilson [1876]; (citing Gilkerson v. Fred- v. Town of Philicpi, 39 W. Va. 75, erick Justices, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 577). 19 S. E. 553 [1894]. * Douglass V. Town of Harrisville, ' Article VIII., § 1, Constitution of 9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548 Wisconsin. [1876]; (citing a similar assessment 271 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 164 local assessments.- However, the constitution contained another provision: "It shall be the duty of the legislature and they are hereby empowered to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages and to restrict their power of taxa- tion, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loan- ing their credit so as to prevent abuses in assessments and taxa- tion and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations."^ This latter provision was held to except local assessments from the general constitutional requirement of uniformity and equality in taxation,' on the theory that the term "assessment" there used meant local assessment in usual significance of the term, including the idea of apportionment on the theory of benefits.^ In this way the "Wisconsin courts have reached the same result as that held in most jurisdictions, namely, that constitutional requirements of uniformity and equality of taxation do not ap- ply to local assessments.' § 164. Restriction of purposes of taxation. Constitutional provisions are found restricting the purposes for which taxation may be imposed. The constitution of Arkan- sas provides: "... The General Assembly may delegate the taxing power, with the necessary restrictions to the state's subor- dinate political and municipal corporations to the extent of pro- viding for their existence, maintenance and well-being, but no further. " ' " The legislature shall not have the right to levy "Hale V. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; 315 (1876]; Bond v. City of Keno- Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; sha, 17 Wis. 284 [1863]; State ex •Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. rel. Christopher v. City of Portage, 242 [I860]. 12 Wis. 562 [I860]; Weeks v. City = Art. XI., § 3, Constitution of of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242 [I860]; Wisconsin. Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; "We *Weels V. City of Milwaukee, 10 are of the opinion that the provision Wis. 242 [I860]. of the constitution relating to uni- ' It is generally held that such use formity in taxation does not apply to of the term assessment does not in- a tax of this character. It is more elude local assessments. See § 3. properly speaking of the nature of 'Meggett V. City of Eau Claire, 81 an "assessment" or special tax im- Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]; posed for the purpose of municipal Teegarden v. City of Racine, 56 Wis. and local improvements." Bond v. 545, 14 N. W. 614 [1883]; Dalrymple City of Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284, 288, V. City of Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178, 289 [1863]. 10 N. W. 141 ; Warner v. Knox, 50 ' Constitution of Arkansas, Article Wis. 429, 7 N.'w. 372 [1880]; John- II., § 23 [1874]. son V. City of Milwaukee, 40 Wis. § 165 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 272 taxes or impose burdens upon the people except to raise revenue sufficient for the economical administration of the government in which may be included the following purposes . . . "- These provisions are regarded as applying to general taxation only, and to have no reference to local assessments levied for special benefits. Accordingly such provisions do not restrict the legislature from granting, the power of levying local assessments for purposes other than those expressed in such provisions.* § 165. Specific provisions protecting the obligation of contracts. In the Constitution of the United States and in those of many of the states are found provisions intended to prevent state leg- islation which should impair the obligation of contracts, and ex- pressed in very similar terms. Among them are provisions which have been considered by the courts in cases involving assess- ments, as follows: "No state shall . . . pass any . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . '. "^ "No . . . law impairing the -obligation of contracts shall ever be passed."^ "No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be passed."^ "No . . . law impairing the obligation of con- tracts shall ever be passed. " * " The legislature shall not pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriv- ing a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which ex- isted when the contract was made. "^ "The General Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; but may by general laws authorize courts to carry into effect upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of the parties and officers by curing omissions, defects and errors in instruments and proceed- ings arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this state."* No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed."' "No . . law impairing the obligation " Article III., § 48, Constitution of » Art. II., § 14, Constitution of Illi- Texas. noia. 'Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, *Art. I., § 24, Constitution of 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Storrie v. Indiana [1851]. Houston City Street Railway Com- 'Art. IV., § VII., Par. 3, Constitu- pany, 92 Tex. 129, 44 L. R. A. 716, tion of New Jersey. 46 S. W. 796 [1898]. 'Art. II., § 28, Constitution of 'Art. I., § 10, Constitution of Ohio [1851]. United States [1787]. 'Art. I., § 21, Constitution of Ore- ''Art. I., § 16, Constitution of Cal- gon [1857]. iforriia [1879]. 273 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §166 of contracts . . . shall be passed. " * " No . . . law impair- ing the obligation of contracts shall be made. " " "No . . . law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed."" § 166. Assessment not a contract within such provisions. In determining the question of the extent to which these pro- visions restrict the power of the legislature in enacting new leg- islation concerning local assessments or in amending or repealing existing legislation, it is generally held that the laws which de- termine the method of levy and apportionment of an assessment, the assesjment itself, and the remedies given therefor are none of them contracts within the meaning of these constitutional provisions. Accordingly such laws may be modified at the will of the legislature,^ as long at least as the liability of the prop- 'Art. I., § 17, Constitution of Pennsylvania. "Art. I., § 16, Constitution of Texas. '"Art. I., § 23, Constitution of Washington [1889]. ^ City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co., 196 U. S. 539, 25 S. 327 [1905]; (affirm- ing City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co., 182 Mass. 49, 64 N. E. 581 [1902]) ; New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Com- pany V. Louisiana ex rel. City of New Orleans, 157 U. S. 219, 39 L. 679, 15 S. 581 [1895]; (affirming State ex- rel City of New Orleans v. New Orleans City and Lalce Railroad Co., 42 La. Ann. 550, 7 So. 606 [1890]); Essex Public Road Board V. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. 446, 11 S. 790 [1891]; (affirming Essex Public Road Board v. Skinl Article III., § 18, Constitution of Xew York [1900]. ' New York [1900]. 'Article IIL, § 18, and Article = In the matter of the application III., § 27, Constitution of New Yorfs [1900]. 301 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 189 been mapped out into streets and avenues, power to lay out, open, grade and construct such streets and avenues, and to provide for assessments upon the property benefited by such improvement was constitutional.'^ §189. Ohio. The constitution of Ohio provides: "The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate power." ^ This provision is held to apply to public corporations as well as to private corporations.^ A statute authorizing county commis- sioners to grant further time for the completion of free turnpike roads and for paying for the same, applicable to a public turnpike company incorporated by a special act under the old constitution of Ohio whose road was uncompleted and the assessments for which were not completed when the present constitution was adopted, was held not to violate this provision.'' The constitution of Ohio also provides : ' ' All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state. . . . "* This section was inserted to prevent the evils experienced under the old constitution, of laws operating over only a portion of the state. ^ It applies only to laws of a general nature. Accordingly where an assessment had, through a mistaken view of the law, been levied upon land to a depth greater than that allowed by law and the property had thereby been charged with the entire cost of the improvement which should have been borne in part by the public corporation, it was held that a special statute re- citing these facts and requiring the public corporation to refund to the property owner the excess over his rightful proportion of the expense was constitutional." Under this section it was held that a classification of cities on a basis of population was valid.' ° In the matter of the Application State ex rel. Attorney-General v. City of Church for the Appointment of of Cincinnati, 20 0. S. 18 [1870]. Commissioners, etc., 92 N. Y. 1 * Foster v. Commissioners of Wood [1883]. County, 9 0. S. 540 [1859]. ^Article XIII., § 1, Constitution * Article II., § 26, Constitution of of Ohio [1851]. Ohio [1851]. 'City of Cincinnati v. Taft, 63 0. 'Lehman v. McBride, 15 0. S. 573 S. 141, 58 N. E. 63 [1900]; State [1864]. ex rel. City of Columhia v. Mitchell, ° State ex rel. v. Hoffman, 35 0. 31 0. S. 592 [1877]; State v. City of S. 435 [1880]. Cincinnati, 23 0. S. 445 [1873]; ' Welker v. Potter, 18 0. S. 85 [1868]. § 189 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 302 The classification here made was a reasonable one, the act apply- ing to cities of the first class having at the last Federal census less than one hundred thousand inhabitants.^ Subsequently the legislature extended the detail of its- classification until every large city in the state was in a separate grade and class and might be given a separate form of government and separate powers from those of every other city. This scheme of classification was long held valid." After the earlier cases, the court upholds the constitutionality thereof on the ground that it "has been re- peatedly recognized in this court and the reasons for adhering to that construction of the constitution are cogent and satisfac- tory. " ^" In the cases following, the constitutionality of such classification is upheld chiefly on the doctrine of stare decisis, without the expression of great satisfaction with the correctness of the doctrine." In the cases that followed the constitutionality of the system of classification, when upheld on the doctrine of stare decisis, was upheld with expressions of grave doubt as to the propriety of the classification.^^ The constitutionality of this scheme of classification was upheld on the sole ground that the original act has been held as valid,^^ and that under the act in question, supplementary to the original act, bonds had been issued and sold in reliance upon such former judgment." Cases in which the provisions of the statute were held to be so re- stricted as to amount to a mere evasion of the constitutional re- quirement became more frequent.^' The entire scheme of classi- fication was denominated "isolation under the form of classi- fication."^" Finally the prior decisions were overruled and it 'Welker. v. Potter, 18 0. S. 85- 508 [1895]; State v. Hudson, 44 0. [1868]. S. 137, 5 N. E. 225 [1886]. 'City of Cincinnati v. Taft, 63 0. « State ex rel. v. Wall, 47 0. S. S. 141, 58 N. E. 63 [1900]; State ex 499, 24 N. E. 897 [1890]. rel. V. Baker, 55 0. S. 1, 44 N. E. "Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 0. S. 516 [1896] ; Parsons v. Columbus, 14, 8 Am. Rep. 24. 50 O. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]; "City of Cincinnati v. Taft, 63 State V. Toledo, 48 0. S. 112, 26 N. 0. S. 141, 58 N. E. 63 [1900]. E. 1061 [1891]; State v. Brewster, "State ex rel. v. Cowles, 64 0. 39 0. S. 653 [1883]; Welker v. Pot- S. 162, 59 N. E. 895 [1901]; Hixson ter, 18 O. S. 85 [1868]. v. Burson, 54 0. S. 470, 43 N. E. "State V. Brewster, 39 0. S. 653 1000 [1896]; City of Cincinnati v. [1883]. Steinkamp, 54 0. S. 284, 43 N. E. "State ex rel. v. Baker, 55 0. S. 490 [1896]; State ex rel. v. Smith, 1, 44 N. E. 516 [189«]; State ex rel. 48 0. S. 211, 26 N. E. 1069 [1891]. V. Cincinnati, 52 0. S. 419, 40 N. E. " State ex rel. v. Cowles, 64 0. S. 162, 59 N, E. 895 [1901]. 303 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 189 was held that such a classification as has been described was a mere evasion of the plain provisions of the constitution, and therefore invalid." Under this section and before the system of classification previously described was held to be unconstitutional, a statute providing for a street improvement to be paid for by local assessment, applicable to all cities of the first class having at the last federal census a population of less than one hundred thousand was held to be valid.^* When this statute was passed it applied to Cleveland only, but Toledo subsequently became a city of the first class within the classification of the statue, and this ease involved an assessment levied by Toledo. So a law providing for the improvement of streets in cities of the first grade of the second class, the improvement to be paid by local assessments, was held to be constitutional though applicable only to Columbus.^" Even while the general system of classification was held to be valid, a subdivision which not only placed but one city in each class, but made it impossible that any other city could come into such class was held invalid.^" Thus a statute appli- cable to cities of the second class having at the last Federal census a population of over thirty-one thousand was held invalid.^^ Af- ter the system of classification herein described was held to be unconstitutional, the question arose as to the effect of assessments levied under acts passed with reference to such system of classi- fication. In one ease legislation identical with that involved in the ease under consideration as far as its substantial features were concerned had previously been upheld by the Supreme Court.^^ The statute in question with reference to the same city was held, though unconstitutional, to be enforceable on the theory of res adjudicata.^^ An additional reason for upholding the statute was found in the fact that if the act in question was un- constitutional, the repealing clause thereof was inoperative as " state ex rel. v. Beacom, 66 0. ^' State ex rel. City of Columbus S. 491, 90 Am. St. Rep. 599, 64 N. v. Mitchell, 31 0. S. 592 [1877]. E. 427 [1902]; State ex rel. Knisely =^ Scheer v. Cincinnati, 15 W. L. V. Jones, 66 0. S. 453, 90 Am. St. B. (Ohio) 66 [1886]; (followed in Rep. 592, 64 N. E. 424 [1902]. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. «WeIker v. Potter, 18 0. S. 85 Hudson, 44 0. S. 137, 5 N. E. 225 [1868]. [1886]). ^° Parsons v. City of Columbus, 50 '' Shoemaker v. City of Cincinnati, O. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]. 68 0. S. 603, 68 N. E. 1 [1903]. ^ State ex rel. City of Columbus V. Mitchell, 31 0. S. 592 [1877]. § 189 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 304 well as the rest of the act; that the act was one of a series upon the same subject, which in substance give the same protection to the rights of the property owner; and that the first, at least, of such acts was uniform in its operation. Accordingly it seems to be suggested that the assessment could be upheld under such prior act. A like result was reached by the Circuit Court in a ease, in which, however, a recurrence to the prior constitutional statute would have limited the amftunt of the assessment to twenty-five per cent of the taxable value of the property. The assessment was levied before the decisions of the Supreme Court, overthrowing the scheme of classification. The Circuit Court held that such assessments were valid and collectable.^* Local laws for the construction of roads in specified counties were at first upheld.-'' Thus an act applicable to a specific county 're- quiring the county commissioners to levy a special tax and with the proceeds to construct a specifically described road, was held to be valid. ^^ Subsequently, but before the decisions over- throwing the classification statute, a similar act, applicable to a particular county therein named, and requiring a specific im- provement, set forth in great detail, to be made if approved by the county commissioners, and to be paid for by local assessments apportioned according to benefits, was held to be invalid. ^^ More- over such law was a local law, while the subject of roads was one in its nature general and therefore controlled by the constitu- tional provision quoted. A further objection to this act was the fact that it conferred corporate power on "any village owning any part of the lands necessary to be acquired for the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of such act, authorizing it to dedicate such land for such purpose.^* Soon after a law appli- cable to "any county which by the last Federal census had, or which at any subsequent Federal census may have a population of not less than thirty-five thousand one hundred and ninety and =' Price V. Toledo, 25 Ohio C. C. 54 0. S. 333, 43 N. E. 587 [18901; 617 [1903]. (In effect overruling on this point ^ State ex rel. v. Board of Com- State ex rel. Hibbs v. Board of Coun- missioners of Franklin County, 35 ty Commissioners of Franklin Coun- O. S. 458 [1880]. ty, 35 0. S. 458 [1880]). ^ State ex rel. v. Board of County ^ State ex rel. v. Commissioners, Commissioners of Franklin County, 54 0. S. 333, 43 N. E. 587 [1896]; 35 0. S. 458 [1880]; (not a case of (citing on this point Commissioners special assessment). v. Stall, 50 0. S. 653, 35 N. E. 887 ^ State ex rel. v. Commissioners, [1893]). 305 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 189 "not to exceed thirty-five thousand and two hundred," might con- struct free turnpikes was held to be unconstitutional.^' The question of the effect of such change of judicial opinion upon the validity of local assessments was soon presented to the court. An act similar to that considered in State ex rel. Hibbs v. Board of County Commissioners of Franklin County"" was passed on April 12, 1893, before the rendition of the decisions overruling the former case ; and the improvement was begun before the ren- dition of such decisions. Payment of the assessments was refused by certain of the property owners. It was held that the law was unconstitutional and that, as the specific statute had never been passed upon or held to be valid, the court was not bound to uphold the assessments levied under such unconstitutional stat- ute.^' The Supreme Court of the United States, held in a case arising in the Circuit Court of the United States and thence com- ing on error to the Supreme Court of the United States, that the Federal courts should follow the earlier decision of the state courts where the rule of law was clearly settled, and the rights of the parties in the case at bar were fixed before the date of the later decision overruling such earlier decision. Accordingly a statute requiring a specifically named township to construct a designated improvement, to issue bonds therefor, and to levy local assessments to meet the cost of such bonds was upheld."^ A similar question with an important point of difference was sub- sequently presented to the Supreme Court of the United States."" Under a statute similar to those already discussed, an improve- ment had been constructed, but to secure the sale of the bonds issued to pay for the improvement the property owners liable to assessment signed an agreement that the improvement was legally made and constructed. The ease came before the United States Court. The Circuit Court upheld the validity of the bonds on the theory that it was not bound to follow the later holdings of the Supreme Court of Ohio"* on the theory that where a case or ig- " Hixson V. Biirson, 54 0. S. 470, ^' Loeb v. Columbia Township Trua- 48 N. E. 1000 [1896]; (not an as- tees, 179 U. S. 472, 45 L. 280, 21 S. sessment case). 174 [1900]; (reversing Loeb v. Trus- =°35 0. S. 458, [1880]. tees of Columbia Township, Hamil- =' Lewis V. Symmes, 61 0. S. 471, ton County, Ohio, 91 Fed. 37 [1899]). 76 Am. St. Eep. 428, 56 N. E. 194 "The case arose under a statute [1899]. passed in 1890. "See Page on Contracts, § 1744. § 190 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 306 inated in the United States courts, they are not bound to follow the latest holding of the state courts where the latter courts have at different times held different views upon the question involved. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of the bonds on the theory that by signing the agreement referred to the property owners had virtually, although not technically, estopped themselves from taking advantage of the unconstitu- tionality of the act.^'' Statutes classif^ng counties with reference to the class and grade of cities located therein have, from their nature, a clearer tendency to local legislation than those con- cerning cities themselves. The classification thus adopted has ordinarily nothing to do with the subject matter of the statute; forms no just basis for the distinction in legal authority sought to be made, and is ordinarily an attempt to legislate specially, using the classification by cities while held valid to conceal the fact that special legislation is enacted. Thus an act authorizing the construction of sidewalks and the levy of an assessment therefor in any village of any city of the first grade of the first class in which no sidewalks had already been constructed under certain enumerated sections of the Revised Statutes was held invalid as resting upon an improper basis of classification.'" So an act applicable to "any county containing a city of the second grade of the first class," there being only one city of that grade and class, was held unconstitutional.^' § 190. Pennsylvania. The constitution of Pennsylvania provides: "The legislature shall not pass any local or special laws . . . regulating the affairs of counties, cities or" townships . . . authoriziug the laying out, opening or maintaining roads, highways, streets or alleys . . . creating ofifices or prescribing the. powers and duties of officers in counties, cities . . . regulating the prac- tice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in aiiy judicial proceeding or inquiry .before courts ... or other tribunals."^ A classification of cities based on essential dis- tinctions which make necessary legislation for one class different »» Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553, " Mott v. Hubbard, 59 0. S. 199, 48 L. 1115, 24 S. 737 [1904]. 53 N. E. 47 [1898]. •"Costello V. Wyomine, 49 0. S. 'Article III., § 7, Constitution of 202, 30 N. E. 613 [1892]. • Pennsylvania [1874]. 307 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 190 from that required for another class, is constitutional.^ Under this section an act classifying the cities of the state into three classes has been held to be valid. ^ So an assessment act made applicable to cities of the third class or any city of less than ten thousand inhabitants theretofore incorporated, as might accept it, has been upheld as constitutional.* The fact that it was left optional with each city to accept the provisions of the statute or not was at first held to make such statute unconstitutional ° but on re-hearing this view was abandoned and the statute held to be constitutional," a view which has since been adhered to.'' How- ever, an act relating to one class of cities only, is valid if it af- fects the powers and duties of the cities, the number, character and duty of officers and the like, and it affects all the cities of that class alike; but invalid if it relates to matters not under municipal control or affecting municipal government.* Under this theory an act which provided that in the construction of streets and sewers in cities of the second class a board of viewers should be created which should assess damages and benefits aris- ing from such improvements was held to be unconstitutional, . since it made such classification upon a matter not affecting municipal power or control. Furthermore it affected the powers and practice of the courts of law in Alleghenj^ county and cre- ated in this one county an oppressive system for assessing damages and benefits." Other objections to the system were that, the decision of the council as to the number of petitioners was final, and that the decision of the viewers was final unless on appeal to the city councils and thence to the courts — an appeal ^ Philadelphia Company's Petition, ° City of Eeading v. Savage, 124 210 Pa. St. 490, 60 Atl. 93 [1904]. Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. 788 [1889]. ' City of Reading v. SavaE;e, 124 ' City of Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. 788 [1889]; Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 513 [1889]. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 'Pittsburg's Petition for Board of 338 [1875]. Viewers, 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. 757, * City of Meadville V. Diclcson, 129 759, 761 [1890]; Wyoming Street, Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 513 [1889]; City 137 Pa. St. 494, 21 Atl. 74 [1890]. of Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. ' Pittsburg's Petition for Board of 328, 16 Atl. 788 [1889]; (distin- Viewers, 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. guishing City of Scranton School 757, 759, 761 [1890]; Wyoming District's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 176, Street, 137 Pa. St. 494, 21 Atl. 74 6 Atl. 158 [1886], and overruling [1890]. See also Scranton City v. City of Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. Ansley, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 133 St. 198, 13 Atl. 919 [1888]). [1907]. ' City of Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198, 13 Atl. 919 [1888]. § 193 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 308 which was made hard and technical and for which too short a time was given These last objections, however, were not the basis of decision in the cases cited. Classification, with separate legislation for each class, can be upheld, however, only if there exists an evident necessity therefor springing from manifest peculiarities which distinguish the cities of one class from those of the others, and which make necessary certain legislation for one class which would be useless and detrimental to the others.^" Accordingly the act which classified the cities of Pennsylvania into seven classes and provided differences in the organization of the government of each class was said to be "classification run mad, "^^ and was held to be unconstitutional.^- An assessment authorized under such classification statute is invalid. ^^ § 191. Wisconsin. The constitution of "Wisconsin provides: "The legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws in the fol- lowing eases : . . . 6th. For assessment or collection of taxes or for extending the time for collection thereof. 7th. For granting cor- porate powers or privileges except to cities. 8th. For incor- porating any city, town or village or to amend the charter there- of."^ "The legislature shall provide general laws for the trans- action of any business that may be prohibited by section thirty- one of this article, and all such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state. "^ Under this section,- before amendment, it has been held that an "act to authorize the im- provement of certain streets in the third ward of the city of Milwaukee and to authorize the levy of a special tax in said ward" is in effect an amendment to the city charter, and a grant of corporate powers to the city and not a special act for the assessment or collection of taxes ; and that is, therefore, not in "Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. St. 266, Pa. St. 285, 16 Atl. 366 [1888]. To 2 L. R. A. 577, 16 Atl. 356 [1888]. the same effect see City of Meadville " Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. St. 266, v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 279, 2 L. E. A. 577, 16 Atl. 356 513 [1889]. [1888]; (quoting Commonwealth v. ^ Article IV., § 31 (adopted as an Patton, 85 Pa. St. 258 ) . amendment, 1871; amended further " Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 in 1892 by adding "city" in para- Pa. St. 285, 16 Atl. 366 [1888]; graph 9). Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. St. 266, = Article IV., § 32, Constitution of 2 L. R. A. 577, 16 Atl. 356 [1888]. Wisconsin (adopted as amendment ■° Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 1871). 309 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTEICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 191 violation of this section of the constitution.' An act providing for the drainage of certain lands in a specified county and for the appointment of a board of drainage commissioners possessed of corporate powers to carry out the proposed system of drain- age was upheld on the theory that the main purpose of such act was the promotion of the public health and welfare under the police power, and not assessment for benefits under the power of taxation.* Under this section a classification of cities may be made, but there must be a substantial difference on which such classification is based; the classification must be germane to the purpose of the act; it must not be based solely on the circum- stances existing at the date of the enactment of the statute, but must also be prospective in its operation; and the character- istics of each class must be so far different from those of other members of that class as reasonably to suggest the propriety of different legislation.^ Accordingly a statute which is applicable to Milwaukee county only," or a statute giving power for a cer- tain year to a city of the first class ' are each in violation of these constituional provisions. The legislature may provide a general charter and leave it to the option of cities to adopt it or the whole of any sub-chapter therein,^ but a city cannot be authorized to adopt a part of a sub-chapter.^ Thus it cannot adopt a section authorizing it to assess for sprinkling, but not the sections prescribing the procedure in such cases. ^^ Apply- ing these principles to legislation concerning assessments, a stat- ute concerning street assessments'^^ applying to "any city hav- ing a population of two hundred thousand inhabitants or more," is valid, as it is construed as applying to all cities as soon as they attain that population. ^^ The legislature may classify cities both on a basis of population and also as to whether they are = Warner v. Knox. 50 Wis. 429, 7 ' Adams v. City of Beloit, 105 Wis. N. W. 372 [1880]. 363, 47 L. R. A. 441, 81 N. W. 869 'State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, [1900]. 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. " State v. Mayor and Common W. 947 [1889]. Council of La Crosse, 107 Wis. 654, "State V. Board of Trustees, 121 84 N. W. 242 [1900]. Wis. 44, 98 N. W. 954 [1904]; John- '» Dawley v. City of Antigo, 120 son V. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. Wis. 302, 97 N. W. 1119 [1904]; 383, 60 N. W. 270 [1894]. Borgman v. City of Antigo, 120 Wis. "Wagner v. Milwaukee County, 112 296, 97 N. W. 936 [1904]. Wis. 601, 88 N. W. 577 [1901]. " Ch. 310, Laws of 1893. ' Burnham v. City of Milwaukee, " Boyd v. City of Milwaukee, 92 98 Wis. 128, 73 N. W. 1018 [1897]. Wis. 456, 66 N. W. 603 [1896], § 192 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 310 acting under general laws or charters. Accordingly a statute which applies to all cities with special charters having a popula- tion of three thousand or more, and "authorized by such char- ters to construct sewers," has been held to be constitutional on the theory that by a fair construction, such statute applied to all cities whose charters expressly or impliedly authorize them to construct sewers.^' Prior to the amendment of the constitu- tion it was held that a statute,^* aiftending the charter of the city of Madison by authorizing the council to order the construc- tion of a sewer from a point in the. marsh in the second and third wards to Lake Monona and to charge the expense upon the lots situated upon said marsh was valid.^^ The constitu- tion of Wisconsin provides: "The legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable. ' ' ^^ Under this provision, a statute providing a special system for the drainage and reclama- tion of certain lands in a specific county is not invalid, on the theory that the drainage of swamps and marshes is not one of the ordinary functions of town or county officers.^^ § 192. Specific provisions restricting statute to one subject ex- pressed in title. A group of constitutional provisions require the legislature to confine each statute to but one subject, or to state that subject in the title, or both. These provisions as considered in assess- ment law are as follows: "... Each law shall contain but one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills and bills adopt- ing a code, digest or revision of statutes. . . . "^ "Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be ex- pressed in its title. But if any such subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in its title. "^ "No bill except general appropriation bills shall be "Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, "Bryant v. Eobbins, 70 Wis. 258, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270 [1894]. 35 N. W. 545 [1887]. "Ch. 213, P. and L. Laws 1871, 'Article IV., § 2, Constitution of Wisconsin. Alabama [1875]. "Massing v. Ames, 37 Wis. 645 = Article IV., § 24, Constitution of [1875]. California. "Article IV., § 23, Constitution of Wisconsin [1848]. 311 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 192 passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. ' ' ' " . . .No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. . . . "* "No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title. . . . " ^ " Every law en- acted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object, which shall be expressed in the title. " " "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. ..."'' "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. "^ "To avoid improper influ- ences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object and that shall be expressed in the title. . . . "° "No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title." ^^ "No bill shall em- brace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. ' ' " "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed con- cerning more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."" "No bill shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title."" "No private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title." " 'Article V., § 21, Constitution of "Article IV., § 7, par. 4. Constitu- Colorado [1876]. tlon of New Jersey. * Article IV., § 13, Constitution of '"Article III., § 16, Constitution Illinois [1870]. of New York. "Section 51, Constitution of Ken- "Article II., § 61, Constitution of tucky. North Dakota. •Article 29, Constitution of Louis- "Article III., § 3, Constitution of iana. Pennsylvania. 'Article IV.. § 20, Constitution of "Article II., § 19, Constitution of Michisan [1850]. Washington. » Article IV., § 27, Constitution of " Article IV., § 18, Constitution of Minnesota. Wisconsin. §§193,194 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 312 § 193. Purpose of such provisions. The provisions that no act shall relate to more than one sub- ject were intended to prevent log-rolling as far as possible; that is, to make it impossible to include a number of different subjects in one bill, thus securing a majority that could not have been secured for any one of them separately. The provision requiring the subject to be expressed in the title was in part to prevent the practice of striking out,«t a period late in the ses- sion, all of some bill which had progressed so far as to be nearly ready for a final vote, and substituting therefor a bill upon some totally different subject. In part, it was to secure the attention of the legislators to the subject of the bill by having the bill express that subject in its title. § 194. Form of title. The provision that the subject of a bill must be expressed in its title does not reqviire the title of a bill to be a complete and perfect index of the contents thereof.^ It is sufficient if the title suggests the subject in such a way as to give reasonable information, to one who reads the title, of what the subject of the bill is.^ > Whitney v. City of Pittsburg, 147 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Butler v. De- Pa. St. 351, 30 Am. St. Rep. 740, 23 troit, 43 Mich. 552, 5 N. W. 1078; Atl. 395 [1892]. Ek v. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co., ^City Council of Montgomery v. 84 Minn. 245, 87 N. W. 844 [1901]; Moore, 140 Ala. 638, 37 So. 291 Lien v. Board of County Commis- [1903]; Anderson v. Grand Valley sioners of Norman County, 80 Minn. Irrigation District, 35 Colo. 525, 85 58, 82 N. W. 1094 [1900]; Sta+e ex Pac. 313 [1906] ; McChesney v. City rel. Doyle v. Mayor and Cominon of Chicago, 159 111. 223, 42 N. E. Council of the City of Newark, 34 894 [1896]; Jones v. Town of Lake >>f. J. L. (5 Vr.) 236 [1870]; In View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 the Matter of the Petition of the [1894]; Blake v. People, for use of Trustees of the Leake and Waits Caldwell, 109 111. 504 T1884]; Pot- Orphan Home in the City of Nev win V. Johnson, 108 111. 70 [1883]; York to Vacate an Assessment, 92 Guild, Jr., V. City of Chicago, 82 111. N'. Y. 116 [1883]; In the matter of 472 [1876]; People ex rel. Miller v. the Confirmation of the Report of Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875] ; Prescott the Commissioners of Assessment for V. City of Chicago, 60 111. 121 [1871]; Grading, Paving and Otherwise Im- Richman v. Supervisors of Musca- proving Saekett, Douglas and De tine County, 77 la. 513, 14 Am. St. Graw Streets in the City of Brook- Rep. 308, 4 L. R. A. 445, 42 N. V/. lyn, 74 N. Y. 95 [1878] ; In the m»t- 422 [1889]; Town of Parkland v. ter of the Petition of Mayor to Va- Gaines, 88 Ky. 562, 11 S. W. 649 cate an Assessment, 50 N. Y. 504 [1889]; Excelsior Planting & Manu- [1872]; In the matter of the Peti- faeturing Co. v. Green, 39 La. \vn. tioii of Astor to Vacate an AssfS?- 313 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 195 § 195. Illustrations of titles expressing subject matter. The actual operation of these constitutional provisions may best be shown by some concrete illustrations. The courts allow a wide range of discretion to the legislature in selecting an appropriate title to the bill as long as the subject can reasonably be gathered from the title. Thus a statute entitled, "an act to authorize the city' council of Montgomery to issue bonds for the purpose of paving, ,or otherwise improving the streets, or side- walks, or either, of the city of Montgomery," is held to show the subject with sufficient certainty.^ A statute entitled "An act authorizing the ascertainment, assessment, levy and collection of costs, damages and expenses of municipal improvements, in- cluding the grading, paving, macaiiamizing or otherwise im- proving of any street, lane or alley or parts thereof completed or now in process of completion and authorizing the completion of any such improvement," shows with sufficient certainty that it is intended to cure such defects as omission to secure the con- sent of property owners, or the inclusion of the cost of improve- ments not warranted by law.^ A statute entitled, "an act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages" sufficiently shows its subject in its title, even though it provides that such act shall apply to cities and towns already incorporated, as well as to towns to become incorporated; and though as to such cities and towns already incorporated, it may operate only as an amend- ment to such charters.^ A statute entitled, "an act to amend the charter of the town of Parkland, in Jefferson county," ex- presses its subject sufficiently in its title if the effect of the act is to extend the limits of such town; but if the act creates a road district it is invalid, as the title does not express such sub- ject.* A statute entitled, "a further supplement to the act en- ment, 50 N. Y. 376 [1872]; lii Ihe Knox, 50 Wis. 429, 7 K W. 372 matter of the Application of fappan [1880]; Massing v. Ames, 37 Wis. to Vacate Certain Assessments, 54 645 [1875]. Barb. (N. Y.) 225 [1869]; Peoplfe 'City Council of Montgomery v. ex rel. Crowell ^. Lawrence, 36 Barb. Moore, 140 Ala. 638, 37 So. 291 (N. Y.) 178 [1862]; In the matter [1903]. of the Petition of Mead to Reduce ^Whitney v. City of Pittsburg, 147 an Assessment, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 349 Pa. St. 351, 30 Am. St. Rep. 740, 23 [1878]; Whitney v. City of Pitts- Atl. 395 [1892]. burg, 147 Pa. St. 351, 30 Am. St. » Guild, Jr., v. City of Chicago, 82 Rep. 740, 23 Atl. 395 [1892]; Brad- 111. 472 [1876]. ley V. City of Pittsburg, 130 Pa. St. *Town of Parkland v. Raines, 88 475, 18 Atl. 730 [1889]; Warner v. Ky. 582, 11 S. W. 640 [1889]. § 195 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 314 titled, 'an act to revise and amend the charter of the city of Newark, approved Marijh 11, 1857,' " and containing provisions with reference to prior defective assessments and provisions for a new assessment for such improvement, sufficiently expresses its subject matter in its title.' A statute entitled, "an act relative to contracts," and providing for the creation of a board of re- vision, is not invalid as failing to express its subject in its title.* The title need not indicate the means»by which the subject mat- ter of the bill is to be carried into effect.'' Accordingly, pro- visions which are incidental to the subject of the bill or a means for carrying into effect such subject need not be expressed in the title. An act, whose title shows it concerns cities, towns and villages, and which contains provisions concerning the opening and repair of streets, expresses its purpose sufficiently in the title, as the opening and repair of streets is an incident of mu- nicipal government and operation.' A statute entitled, "an act to provide for the organization and government of irrigation districts" which provides for the organization of irrigation dis- tricts, the construction of irrigation ditches, the appropriation of canals, by proceedings in eminent domain, the issuing of the bonds of the irrigation district, and the approval of the proceed- ings of the district by the court, sufficiently expftsses its sub- ject in its title.' A statute entitled, "an act to establish a board of public works," and containing a provision that proposed public improvements shall be referred to such board expresses its subject in its title with sufficient cer- tainty.^" A statute entitled, "an act to amend the char- ter of the city of St. Paul in relation to the duties and powers of the Board of Public Works of said city," containing provi- sions concerning the improvements over which such board has jurisdiction, which are connected with the incidental duty of the city treasurer to issue certificates on special assessment sales, " State ex rel. Doyle v. Mayor and ' Preseott v. City of Chicago, 60 Common Council of the City of New- 111. 121 [1871]. ark, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 236 [1870]; ' Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111. 70 See for a similar ease State, Wal- [1883]. ter, Pros. v. Town of Union in the " Anderson v. Grand Valley Irriga- County of Hudson, 33 N. J. L. (4 tion District, 35 Colo. 525, 85 Pae. Vr.) 350 [1869]. 313 [1906]. "In the matter of the Application "Butler v. Detroit, 43 Mich. 552, of Tappan to Vacate Certain Assess- 5 X. W. 1078. ments, 54 Barb. (X. Y.) 225 [1869]. 315 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABtE, ETC. § 195 sufficiently expresses its subject in its title." A statute entitled, "an act to make provision for the government of the city of New York," which contains a provision for the appointment of certain official papers in which must be published such notices as are required to be published to the exclusion of other papers, has been held valid on the ground that such provision falls within the general subject of the government of the city.^^ A statute entitled, "an act to provide for laying out, opening, ex- tending, widening, straightening, or closing up, in whole or in part, any street, square, lane, alley, place or court, within mu- nicipalities, and to condemn and acquire any and all land and property necessary or convenient for that purpose," and which contains provision authorizing the asesssment of such land as is benefited by such proceeding, is not invalid. The subject of the act is sufficiently expressed in the title, as the assessment is regarded as merely a means to the end thus indicated.^^ A statute entitled, "an act for the relief of James Ley and Son," which provides that the 'city shall levy a further assessment upon property originally assessed, and shall pay the proceeds of such assessment to James Ley and Son, the contractors by whom the original improvement was constructed as a payment over and above the contract price, has been held to show, the subject in the title with sufficient certainty.^* A statute, the subject of which shows that it is upon the subject of collection of assessments, and which contains a provision concerning the costs of collection, has been held not to be invalid on the ground that the subject of the act is not expressed in the title." An act concerning special assessments need not show in its title that it contains a provision to the effect that deferred installments of assess- ments may bear interest.^" It will ordinarily be presumed that the legislature complied with the provisions of the constitution.^^ A statute entitled, "an act to provide for the Eastern Boulevard in the city of New York, and in relation to certain alterations " Ek V. St. Paul Permanent Loan " Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 Co., 84 Minn. 245, 87 N. W. 844 N. Y. 116 [1859], [1901]. « Bradley v. City of Pittsburgh, "In the matter of the Petition of 130 Pa. St. 475, 18 Atl. 730 [1889]. Astor to Vacate an Assessment, 50 " McChesney v. City of Chicago, N. Y. 363 [1872]. 159 111. 223, 42' N. E. 894 [1896]. "Davies v. City of Los Angeles, "See § 79. 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]. § 196 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 316 of the map or plan of said city, and certain local improvements, ' ' and containing a provision authorizing the department of public work to improve Tenth avenue, and ■construct a sewer therein, was held to express the subject sufficiently in the title, inasmuch as it would be assumed that there was a connection between the part of Tenth avenue specified in the act, and the Eastern Boule- vard, in the absence of evidence showing that there was no such connection.^* « § 196. Illustrations of titles not expressing subject-matter. On the other hand if the title does not suggest the subject of the bill in a fair and reasonable manner so much of the statute as is not expressed in the title most jurisdictions held to be in- valid for failure to comply with these constitutional provisions.^ If a statute contains a provision not expressed in the title, such provision is invalid; but the invalidity of this provision, if it can be separated from the rest of the act, does not invalidate the rest of the statute as a whole. ^ Specific examples best illustrate the scope of these general principles. A statute entitled "an act to amend sections three, nine and twenty-four, of an act en- titled, 'an act to provide for the establishment of drainage dis- tricts,' " which provided for amending section five in addition to sections three, nine and twenty-four, is invalid, since the en- tire subject of the bill is not expressed in the title. ^ A statute entitled, "an act to amend chapter 245 of the laws of 1875, en- titled, 'an act to amend chapter 818 of the laws of 1868,' en- titled 'an act to incorporate the village of Port Chester and to amend chapter 227 of the laws of 1887,' " which statute at- " In the matter of the Petition of 494, 92 N. W. 841 [ 1902] ; Beckert the Trustees of the Leake and Watts v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191 Orphan Home in the City of New [1877]; State of Washington on the York to Vacate an Assessment, 92 Relation of Matson v. Superior Court N. Y. 116 [1883]. for Skagit County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 iSurget V. Chase, 33 La. Ann. Pac. 264 [1906]. 833 [1881]; Tingue v. Vil- ''In the matter of the Application lage of Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 294, of Van Antwerp to Vacate an As- 4 N. B. 625 [1886]; City of Water- sessment, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874]; Beck- town V. Fairbanks, 65 N. Y. 588 ert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. [1875]; Hopkins v. Mason, 61 Barb. 191 [1877]. (N. Y.) 469 [1871]; Turnquist v. 'State of Washington on the Re- Cass County Drain Commissioners, lation of Matson v. Superior Court 11 N. D. 514, 92 N. W. 852 [1902]; for Skagit County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. Pac. 264 [1906]. 317 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 197 tempted to authorize re-assessments in cases of assessments set aside or vacated before the passage of such act, as well as after such passage, was held to be insufficient, since the title of such act did not show that it related to the municipality in question; namely, the village of Port Chester.* A statute which purports to be an -amendment to a charter, and contains a provision which attempts to confirm previously unauthorized assessments has been held to be invalid, on the ground that the title did not sufficiently express the subject of the statute.^ If the title of a statute shows that it concerns the improvement of certain streets, and the statute contains a certain provision for keeping certain streets in repair at the expense of the city, such provision is invalid, as being a subject not expressed in the title.* A statute entitled, "an act to provide for the allowance and taxation of costs for additional attorneys' fees against the defendants in actions to enjoin drainage proceedings, or the levy and collection of taxes and assessments therefor," which contains a provision for the allowance of additional attorneys' fees against the plaintiffs in such an action, is held to be invalid as not expressing the sub- ject of the act in the title, although the wording of the title was probably a misprint.^ A statute entitled, "an act relative to grading, paving, curbing, and otherwise improving Troy Road in the city of Allegheny," which provides for- improving a portion of such road within the city limits, but for assessing the expense upon property paved within and without the city limits, was held invalid on the ground that the subject of the bill was not ex- pressed in the title thereto.' § 197. View that such provision directory. In some jurisdictions, it may be added, such provisions are regarded as merely directory and addressed to the conscience of the legislature. A violation of such provision does not, there- fore, render the statute invalid for that reason, in the jurisdic- •Tingue v. Village of Port Chester, of Van Antwerp to Vacate an As- 101 N. Y. 294, 4 N. E. 625 [1886]. sessment, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874]. " City of Watertown v. Fairbanks, ' Turnquist v. Cass County Drain 65 N. Y. 588 [1875], (not reported Commissioners, 11 N. D. 514, 92 N. in full). This question was raised W. 852 [1902]; Eriekson v. Cass but not decided in Hopkins v. Mason, County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 469 [1871]. " [1892]. ' In the matter of the Application ' Beckert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191 [1877]. § 198 TAXATION By ASSESSMENT. 318 tions where this view is entertained.^ In most jurisdictions such provisions regarded as mandatory and failure to comply with them renders the statute invalid.'^ § 198. Statute may provide for means of accomplishing general purpose. The clause requiring a bill to contain but one subject does not prevent the legislature from • ifteluding in a bill both the general subject to be accomplished and the means provided for carrying such subject into effect.^ A law, under such constitu- tional provision, may contain "several particular objects properly referable to and subdivisions of a single general object."^ A statute entitled, "An act to provide for the construction, repara- tion and protection of drains, ditches and levees across the lands of others for agricultural, sanitary, and mining purposes, and to provide for the organization of drainage districts" is not in- valid as embracing more than one subject. The subject. of snch statute is the protection of land against surplus water. The title of the statute goes into imnecessary detail in showing the means by which such end is to be reached, and the purposes and motives of the enactment; but this does not invalidate the statute.^ So the fact that such statute contains a provision for the construc- tion of levees as incidental to the general scheme of protection against surplus water does not make the statute invalid as con- taining more than one subject.* A statute entitled, "An act to amend sections 6, 7. and 9 of an act entitled 'An act in relation to the. completion of public parks and the management thereof, approved June 16, 1871, and to add two (2) sections thereto,' " and containing provisions with relation to the acquisition of property for park purposes, and containing in one of the added ' Seeley v. Thomas, 31 0. S. 301 In re Report of Commissioners, etc., [1877]; State ex rel. Attorney-Gen- of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) eral v. Covington, 29 0. S. 102 488, 10 Atl. 363 [1887]; Warner v. [1876]; Pirn v. Nicholson, 6 0. S. Knox, 50 Wis. 429, 7 N. W. 372 176 [1856]. [1880]. ^See § 196. = Excelsior Planting & Manufac- " Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 turing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894]; Blake 1 So. 873 [1887]. V. People for use of Caldwell, 109 'Blake v. People for use of Cald- III. 504 [1884]; Excelsior Planting well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. , & Manufacturing Company v. Green. ♦ Blake v. People for use of Cald- 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. 319 CONSTITUTIONAL KESTKICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §199 sections provisions with reference to driveways as incidents to parks, sufficiently expresses its subject in ita title; as such sec- tion is not to be regarded as a new and independent subject, since it is fairly within the scope of the general purpose of the completion and management of public parks.' This clause re- quiring a bill to contain but one subject does not, therefore,- forbid the legislature to provide for an improvement and an as- sessment therefor in one statute. A statute which deals with taxes and assessments levied before it is passed and also with those which may be levied thereafter does not include more than one subject, since it deals primarily with taxes and assessments and includes these classes of such general subject, as well as the means specified in such act for enforcing and collecting such assessments." A statute which authorizes a council to order the construction of a certain sewer, and to charge the expense upon certain land, is not invalid as containing more than one subject.' A statute which provides for the improvement of cer- tain streets, and the levy of assessments to pay for the cost of such improvement, does not embrace more than one subject.' § 199. Combination of improveTuents in one general plan. Furthermore two or more improvements which may reasonably be regarded as parts of a general plan may be embraced in one statute. A statute providing for the improvement and assess- ment of two or more streets, is not invalid as embracing more than one subject.^ A statute entitled, "an act to widen portions of Sackett, Douglass and President streets, ajid otherwise alter the commissioners' map of the city of Brooklyn," is held not to be invalid, as embracing more than one subject.^ A statute providing for levying re-assessments for the construction of two different roads, the assessment for which improvements had been levied under two different statutes, one a supplement of the other. " Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 ' In the matter of the Application 111. 063, 38 N. E. 688 [1894]. of Van Antwerp to Vacate an As- ° In re Report of Commissioners, sessment, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874]. etc., of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. (20 ' In the matter of the Confirmation Vr.) 488, 10 Atl. 363 [1887]. of the Report of the Commissioners 'Massing v. Ames, 37 Wis. 645 of Assessment for Grading, Paving [1875]. and Otherwise Improving Sackett, » Warner v. Knox, 50 Wis. 429, 7 Douglas and De Graw Streets in the N. W. 372 [1880]. City of Brooklyn, 74 N. Y. 95 [1878]. § 200 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 320 but levied by the same eommissioners and according to the same general method of assessment does not contain more than one subject.' A statute which provides for the reassessment of cer- tain defective assessments, to pay for certain pieces of Nichol- son pavement previously laid down in such city without authority of law, and further authorizing the municipal authorities of such city to order the streets of such city or any portion of them to be paved with such material as they might select, and if such pavement selected was patented, either to buy the patent for the city, or to let the work to the lowest bidder, was held not to em- brace more than one subject within the meaning of the consti- tutional provision in question.* § 200. Provision concerning form of tax laws. The provision of the constitution of New York: "Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object;' ' refers to state tax laws and has no application to local assess- ments for street improvements.'' The constitution of Michigan provides, "every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax, shall distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it shall be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object.' Under this provision, a statute which authorizes cities and villages to appropriate private property by eminent domain, and provides for ascertaining the amount of the damages, and the amount of special benefits conferred upon the property in the locality, and further provides for fixing the dis- trict which is deemed to be benefited by such improvement, and for determining the manner of such assessments, and then refers ■'State, Bergen County Savings 'Article III., § 24, Constitution of Bank, Pros. v. Inhabitants of the New York [1894]; Article III., § 20, Township of Union, in the County of Amended Constitution of New York Bergen, 44 N. J. L. (15 Vr.) 599 [1846]; Article VII., § 13, Constitu- [1882]. tion of New York. * Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, ' Guest v. City of Brooklyn, 8 Hun. 9 Am. Rep. 578 [1872]; (followed in (N. Y.) 97 [1876]; In the matter of Evans V, Sharp, 29 Wis. 564 [1872]). the Petition of Ford to Vacate an This point was queried, but not de- Assessment, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 92 cided in Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. [1872]. 522 [1871]. "Article XIV., I 14, Constitution of Michigran. 321 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. 201 to an existing charter for the machinery of levying and collecting the assessment, and the form to be observed in such proceedings, is valid. The law states both the tax and the object, and the reference to the charter of the city merely concerns matters of detail.* § 201. Specific provisions securing right of trial by jury. In many state constitutions are found provisions securing the right of trial by jury. Some of these provisions, which have been considered in cases involving the method of levying assess- ments, are as follows: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."^ "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate, but in civil actions three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict."^ "Trial by jury shall be as here- tofore."^ "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever. " * " The right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise provided in this constitution, shall remain inviolate. . . . "° "The right of trial by jury as here- tofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. "° "The right of trial by 'Trowbridge v. City of Detroit, 99 ^Mich. 443, 58 N. W. 368 [1894]. 'Article I., § 12, Constitution of Alabama; Article II., § 7, Constitu- tion of Arkansas; Article I., § 12, Constitution of Connecticut; Article I., § 20, Constitution of Indiana (as applied to civil cases) ; Article I., § ■9, Constitution of Iowa; Article III., § 31, Constitution of Mississippi; Article I., § 6, Constitution of Ne- braska; Article I., § 7, Constitution of New Jersey; Article I., § 15, Con- stitution of Rhode Island; Article I., § 11, Constitution of South Carolina; Article VI., § 6, Constitution of South Dakota; Article I., § 6, Con- stitution of Tennessee; Article I., § 15, Constitution of Texas; Article I., I 5, Constitution of Wisconsin. A similar provision is found in Article II., § 23, Constitution of Col- orado, with a provision that in civil cases a jury may consist of less than twelve men; in Article I., § 7, Con- stitution of Idaho, with a provision § 4, Constitution of that in civil actions three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict; in Article I., § 4, of the Constitution of Minnesota; Article I., § 21, Con- stitution of Washington; Article I., § 9, Constitution of Wyoming. 'Article I., § 7, Constitution of California. " Article I., Delaware. •Article I., § 3, Constitution of Florida; Article I., § 3, Constitution of Nevada (with a provision for a three-fourths verdict unless the leg- islature requires unanimity by a stat- ute passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each house of the legislature). 'Article VI., § 18, Constitution of Georgia. ■Article II., § 5, Constitution of Illinois; Article II., § 28, Constitu- tion of Missouri (containing a fur- ther provision to the effect that a jury may consist of less than twelve men). § 201 TAXATION BY ASSfcSSMBNT. 322 jury shall be inviolate.'" "The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred and the right thereof remain inviolate, sub- ject to such modifications as may be authorized by this consti- tution.'" "In all civil suits and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to trial by jury except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced."" "The inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of Eng- land and the trial by jury according to that law. . . . " ^* "In all controversies concerning property and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been other ways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury, and this method of procedure shall be held sacred unless in causes arising on the high seas and such as relate to mariners' wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it."" "The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be deemed to be waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties in such manner as may be prescribed by law."^'' "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate. . . . " " " The right of trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever. . . . " ^* "In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people and ought to remain sacred and inviolate. " ^^ "In all eases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. " ^^ " Tria;l by jury shall be as heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate. " ^^ " . . . When any issue in fact, properly for the cognizance of a jury. is joined in a court of law, the parties have a right to trial by jury which ought to 'Article I., § 5, C!onstitution of ^'Article III., § 23, Constitution Kansas; Article I., § 5, Constitution of Montana, with a provision for a of Ohio. verdict of two-thirds of the jury; ' § 7, Constitution of Kentucky Article I., § 7, Constitution of North [1891]. Dalcota. "Article I., § 20, Constitution of "Article I., § 2, Constitution of Maine. New York. " Article V., Declaration of Rights " Article I., § 13, Constitution of of Maryland. North Carolina. "Article I., § 15, Constitution of '« Article I., § 17, Constitution of Massachusetts. A similar provision Oregon. is found in Part I., Article XX., of "Article I., § 6, Constitution of the Constitution of New Hampshire. Pennsylvania. " Article VI., § 27, Constitution of Michigan. 323 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§202,203 be held saered. '"* "In controversies respecting property and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to, any other and ought to be held sacred. . . . "^° "In suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dol- lars, exclusive of interests and costs, the right "of trial by jury if required by either party shall be preserved. . . . " "" § 202. Provisions not applicable to local assessments. These provisions are held to be intended to secure and protect the right of trial by jury in cases where such right existed at common law. They are not intended, unless such affirmative in- tention is expressly stated, to extend the right of trial by jury to cases in which no such right existed at common law, as" in cases of taxation. Accordingly an assessment statute is not made unconstitutional by these provisions because it makes no provi- sion for having the question of benefits passed upon by a jury.^ § 203. Provisions applicable to eminent domain combined vsrith assessment. On the other hand it is not infrequently provided that the same commissioners or other assessing body, which is to act in deter- mining the amount of the assessment shall also exact in determin- ing the amount to be paid as compensation to the owners of property taken or injured by the improvement for which the assessment is levied. While no objection can be made to a stat- " Chapter I., Article XII, Consti- cago, 59 111. 286 [1871]; Baltimore tution of Vermont. and 0. and C. Ry. C9. v. Ketring, "Article I., § 11, Constitution of 122 Ind. 5, 23 N. E. 527; Lipes v. Virginia. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 ^Article III., § 14, Constitution of N. E. 160 [1885]; (citing Ross v. West Virginia. Davis, 97 Ind. 79; Indianapolis and ^ Harris v. People ex rel. Knight, Cumberland Gravel Eoad Co. v. 218 111. 439, 75 N. E. 1012 [1905]; Christian, 93 Ind. S'SO; Anderson Stack V. People ex rel. Talbot, 217 v. Caldvi^ell, 91 Ind. 451, 46 Am. 111." 220, 75 N. E. 347 [1905]; Trig- Rep. 613); In re Bradley, 108 la. ger V. Drainage District No. 1, etc., 476, 79 N. W. 280; Howe v. 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 [1901]; City of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company [1874]; Mound City Land & Stock V. City of Joliet, 153 HI. 649, 39 N. Co. v. Miller, 170' Mo. 140, 94 Am. E. 1077 [1894]; Briggs v. Union St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. Drainage District No. 1, 140 111. 53, W. 721 [1902]; Bishop v. Tripp, 15 29 N. E. 721 [1893]; White v. Peo- R. T. 466, 8 Atl. 692 [1887]; State pie ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 ex rel. Latimer v. Henry, 28 Wash. 111. 604 [1880]; Rich v. City of Chi- 38, 68 Pac. 368, § 204 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 324 ute which provides for conducting the assessment proceeding and the proceeding in eminent domain together/ yet there is gen- erally a constitutional provision securing the right of trial by jury in eminent domain; and where this is the case, a statutory provision for submitting the determination of the question of damages and benefits to a body which is not a constitutional jury is unconstitutional as far as the assessment of damages is concerned.^ Furthermore, where tfee amount of benefits and dam- ages is to be stated as net result, all that is given for each tract being the difference between the gross amount of the damages and the gross amount of the benefits, it is evident that the as- sessing body cannot pass upon the amount of benefits, leaving a constitutional jury to pass upon the question of damages, and the entire statute is therefore invalid.^ The damages must be assessed by a jury in a condemnation suit before an assessment is made for special benefits:* § 204. Specific provisions for separation of governmental powers. The state constitutions generally contain provisions for the separation of the three great governmental powers — the legisla- tive, the executive and the judicial. In some constitutions this is effected by specific provisions,^ which are substantially like ' See § 63 et seq. , whether there is any damage or not." ^Hutchins v. Vandalia Levee and Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage Drainage District, 217 111. 561, 75 District, 219 111. 454, 461, 76 N. E. N. E. 354 [1905]; Stack v. People 701 [1906]; (citing Page v. Chicago, ex rel. Talhot, 217 111. 220, 75 N. E. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 347 [1905]; Michigan Central Rail- 70 111. 324). road Co. v. Spring Creek Drainage * City of Joliet v. Spring Creek District, 215 111. 501, 74 N. E. 696. Drainage District, 222 111. 441, 78 = Hull V. Sangamon River Drainage N. E. 836 [1906]. District, 219 111. 454, 76 N. E. 701 ^ Article III., §§ 1, 2, Constitution [1906]; Hutchins v. Vandalia Levee of Alabama; Article IV., § 1, Con- and Drainage District, 217 111. 561, stitution of Arkansas; Article III, 75 N. E. 354 [1905]. § 1, Constitution of California; Ar- "On the question of damages to tide III., Constitution of Colorado; lands not taken the jury would be Article II., Constitution of Connecti- bound to consider the effect of the cut; Article II., Constitution of Flor- Improvement upon the land, both ida; Article I., § 11, Constitution of advantages and disadvantages, and Georgia; Article III., § 96, Constitu- for the purpose of reducing or balanc- tion of Indiana; Article III., § 1, ing damages would necessarily take Constitution of Iowa; § 27 Constitu- into account any special benefits. tion of Kentucky; § 14, Constitution That is not assessing benefits for of Louisiana; Article 3, §§ 1, 2, Con- the land but is merely ascertaining stitution of Maine; Article I., § 8, 325 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTBICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 205, 206 the following 'provision from the constitution of Illinois : ' ' The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments — ^the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person, or collection of persons, being one of these depart- ments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter, expressly, directed or permit- ted."^ In other constitutions the same result is accomplished by provisions conferring the separate kinds of governmental pow- er upon the respective separate branches of government. § 205. General effect of such provisions. Whether such provisions prevent the co-operation of these powers in matters of local assessment is a question which is occasionally presented to the courts for consideration. It is a special application of the broader question whether such. pro- visions prevent the partial intermingling of these three branches of governmental power to make up the power of those officers often termed administrative officers. It is generally held that no such separation is demanded by these provisions. Indeed to insist on such separation of powers would be to render local government difficult if not impossible.^ As far as the question of local assessments is concerned, these provisions do not pre- vent the legislature from providing for the co-operation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the levying and col- lection of assessments. Indeed, without such co-operation it is difficult to see how assessments could be levied and collected. § 206. Co-operation of courts in levy of assessment. Statutory provisions which provide for the co-operation of the courts in the levy of local assessments are generally held not to Constitution of Maryland; Article I., troduction), Constitution of Rhode § 30, Constitution of Massachusetts; Island; Article I., § 26, Constitu- Article III., § 1, Constitution of tion of South Carolina; Article II., Michigan; Article III., §§ 1, 2, Con- Constitution of South Dakota; Ar- stitution of Mississippi; Article II., tide II., § 1, Constitution of Texas; § 1 and Article III., Constitution of Article II., § 6, Constitution of Ver- Missouri; Article IV., § 1, Constitu- mont; Article I., § 7, and Article II., tion of Montana; Article III., § 1, Constitution of Virginia; Article II., Constitution of Nevada; Article III., § 1, Constitution of Wyoming. § 1, Constitution of New Jersey; ^Article III., Constitution of Illi- Article I., § 8, Constitution of North nois. Carolina; Article III., § 1, Consti- 'See §§ 206, 207. tution of Oregon ; Article IV. ( in- § 206 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 326 be invalidated by the constitutional provisions under discussion.^ Thus a statute which provides that a drainage district can be formed only if the court on proper application shall find that the necessary precedent steps have been taken to form such dis- trict; that when the district is formed the commissioners there- of shall determine the amount necessary to be raised by special assessment to complete the proposed work; and that a jury un- der supervision of the court shall Apportion the amount of such assessment among the dijfferent tracts of land benefited by such improvement, is not objectionable as an attempt to confer the power of taxation upon the judiciary.^ A similar statute has been upheld on the ground that there is no delegation of leg- islative power, but that the duties thus imposed on the court are judicial in their nature.^ The validity of similar acts is recog- nized in other cases.* So a provision for taking appeals in road assessment cases to the superior judge of the county, who is to file the transcript and docket the case, is not unconstitutional, as imposing a public and non-judicial employment upon a judge.^ The constitution of New York provided: "The judges of the Court of Appeals and the justices of the Supreme Court shall not hold any other office or public trust. . . . " " Under this provision a statute providing that the court shall appoint com- missioners and confirm their reports, does not confer upon them another office or public trust, and is therefore valid.' The power of the legislature to confer such powers and duties upon a court was questioned in an earlier case, on the theory that while acting under the statute, the judges were commissioners or quasi com- missioners rather than a court.* A statute granting power to the 'In the matter of Westlake Ave- 'Striker v. Kelly, 2 Denio (N. Y.) nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 323 [Court of Errors, 1845]; (revers- 279 [1905]. ing on another point Striker v. Kel- ^ Huston V. Clark, 112 111. 344 ley, 7. Hill (N. Y.) 9 [1844]). [1885]. * In the matter of the Petition of ' State of Washington on the rela- the Mayor, Aldermen and Common- tion of Matson v. Superior Court for alty of the City of New York in the Skagit County, 42 Wash, 491, 85 . matter of Enlarging and Extending Pac. 264 [1906]. ' Beekman Street in the City of New * Taylor v. Strayer, 167 Ind. 23, York, 20 John. (N. Y.) 269 [1819]. 78 N. E. 236 [1906]. See also the dissenting opinion of " Seanor v. Board of County Com- Porter, J., in Striker v. Kelley, 2 missioners, 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 Denio (N. Y.) 323 [1845], supra, in [1895]. which he cites: In the matter of "Article VI., § 10, Constitution of the Petition of the Mayor, Aldermen New York. 327 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 207 court to set aside assessments for fraud and irregularity " does not violate this provision. It does not confer any new jurisdic- tion, but merely extends to assessments the well established juris- diction of the courts over frauds and legal irregularities.^" Un- der constitutional provisions to the effect that the legislature may vest in municipal authorities the power to make local im- provements,^^ a statute providing that the city shall commence proceedings to levy local assessments ; that the apportionment of assessments Shall be made by commissioners appointed by the court; and that if objection to the assessment is made the court shall have power to correct irregularities therein, is valid, and is not objectionable as conferring upon the court the power to make assessments.^^ So a statute authorizing the court to de- termine in the first instance whether the proposed drainage scheme is practical and conducive to public welfare and whether it will increase the value of the lands which it is proposed to drain, is valid.^' §207. Action of administrative board as reviewing body. On the other hand it has been claimed that statutes providing for a board, which is to hear complaints and decide questions of fact, in which the levy and apportionment of the assessment de- pends, are invalid as conferring judicial power, which by its nature should be conferred only upon a court. This claim, how- ever, has failed in the eases in which it has been made and the courts have held such statutes valid,^ on the ground that such and Commonalty of the City of New man's Case, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y. ) 164 York in the matter of Enlarging and [I860]. Extending Beekman Street in the " Article VII., § 9, Constitution City of New York, 20 John. (N. Y.) of Washington. See § 103 et seq. 269 [1819]; Stafford v. Mayor, Al- '= In the matter of Westlake Ave- dermen and Commonalty of the City nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pae. of Albany, 7 John. Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 279 [1905]. 541 [1811]; Matter of Third Street, "State of Washington on the rela- 6 Cowen (N. Y.) 571 [1827]; Mat- tion of Matson v. Superior Court for ter of Canal Street, 11 Wend. (N. Skagit County, 42 Wash, 491, 85 Y.) 154 [1834]; Matter of Mount Pac. 264 [1906]. Morris Square, 2 Hill (X. Y.) 14 iMcGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 [1842]. [I860]; (reversed on another point "Act of April, 1858. as McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. (4 "In the matter of tlie Petition of Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 [1866]); Da- Eeekman' to Vacate Assessments, 19 vies v. City of Los An£feles, 86 Cal. How. (N. Y.) 518 [I860]; Beek- 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; Owners of § 207 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 328 board acts as a ministerial body and not as a judicial body.^ So a statute which provides that the county surveyor is to keep the ditches constructed under the laws of the state in repair and certify the cost of such repair, including his own compensation to the county auditor, who is to draw his warrant in favor of such certificate upon the county treasurer, is not invalid as delegating judicial power to the surveyor.^ While judicial power cannot be conferred upon a non-judicial officer,* the discretionary power here conferred is of a class that may be given to administrative, ministerial and executive officers.* The constitution of California provides: "The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation, company, association or in- dividual any power to make, control, appropriate, supervise, or in any way interfere with any county, city, town or municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or assessments or perform any municipal functions whatever. ' ' ^ Under this section a statute providing for the appointment of commissioners who are to make a finding as to the amount necessary to meet the expense of the improvement, but who act under the direction of the municipality and whose acts are not binding or effective until they are ap- proved and confirmed by the city council is not invalid as a delegation of municipal functions to such commissioners.' The appointment of such commissioners is not a delegation of power to make or control a municipal improvement, since the commis- sioners are not, in legal effect, independent officials, but merely agents of the city for such purpose.^ So a statutory provision to the effect that the contractor shall collect the assessment is valid." In making such collection he acts as the agent of the municipality and not as an independent officer to whom munici- Lands v. People ex rel. Stookey, 113 54 Am. Rep. 343, 4 N. E. 197. 111. 296 [1886]; Heath v. McCrea, "'State ex rel. French v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 342 [1898]; Bellinsham 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 [1885]. Bay Improvement Co. v. City of New ' Article XI., § 13, Constitution of Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53, 54 Pac. 774 California. [1898]. 'Davies v. City of Los Angeles, ^McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]. [I860]; Owners of Lands v. People 'Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 ex rel. Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]. Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]. ° State ex rel. French v. Johnson, ' Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 [1885]. Pac. 309 [1901]; Sullivan v. Mier, 'Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 07 Cal. 264, 7 Pac. 691 [1885]. 329 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 207 pal power has been delegated. A provision in an act of Con- gress to the effect that certain specified officers shall serve on the board of park commissioners for the District of Columbia, is valid, as it is merely an increase in the duties of existing officers, and not an attempt on the part of Congress to exercise the ap- pointing power.^" The constitution of Illinois provides: "The pow- ers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments — the legislative, executive and judicial ; and no per- son or collection of persons being one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. " ^^ "The Governor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (a majority of all the members elected Concurring by yeas and nays) appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution or which may be created by law and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for ; and no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the Gen- eral Assembly. "^^ Under this section, a statute conferring additional powers and imposing additional duties upon existing officers already elected by the people is not unconstitutional as an appointment or election to office by the Legislature.^' Hence the county surveyor, county treasurer and sheriff may be consti- tuted an appeal board to hear and decide all appeals from the drainage commissioners' orders confirming special assessments. Furthermore, such statute is not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers upon a non-judicial body, since the power of pass- ing on assessments in this manner is not regarded as judicial power.^* The statute may provide that the commissioners of high- ways of a- town shall also be the drainage commissioners of a township.^' The Legislature may confer upon the township trus- tees a discretionary authority to determine when it is necessary to repair public drains. ^° "Shoemaker v. United States, 147 gour v. Drainage Conmiigsioners, Til U. S. 282, 37 L. 170, 13 S. 361 111. 342 [1885]. [1893]. "Owners of Lands v. People ex rel. "Article III., Constitution of lUi- Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]. nois. " Kilgour v. Drainage Commission- " Article V., § 10, Constitution of era, 111 HI. 342 [1885]. Illinoia. '"Weaver v. Templin, 113 Ind. 298, "Owners of Land v. People ex rel. 14 N. E. 600 [1887]. Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]; Kil- §§208,209 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 330 § 208. Grant of taxing power to executive officer. Under such provisions the power of levying taxes cannot be con- ferred upon an executive officer either directly or indirectly. A statute authorizing the tax assessor to determine whether certain work in the nature of removing from streams on the lands of the owner thereof, impediments to the flow thereof, has been done by such owner, and if he finds that it has not been done, to report such fact to the clerk, who is to extend a specific tax against such land, has, under these constitutional provisions, been held to be unconstitutional.^ § 209. Restriction on power to incur debts. General, provisions which forbid the pledging of public credit or the incurring of debts are usually so worded As not to apply to local assessments. If, under the law in force, the contractor by whom the improvement is constructed, is to look solely to the assessments for his compensation, and is to have no personal claim therefor against the public corporation which requires the im- provement to be constructed, and which levies the assessment, such transaction creates no debt against such public corporation.^ In such case the constitutional limitation as to the amount of in- debtedness which such public corporation may contract does not apply.^ The constitution of Louisiana provides: "The General Assembly shall have no power to contract or to authorize the contracting of any debt or liability on behalf of the Mate, or to issue bonds or other evidence of indebtedness thereof except for the purpose of repelling invasion, or as the suppression of insur- rection. ' ' ^ This provision restricts the power of the state and does not prevent the state from authorizing a levee district to incur debts.* The further provision: "The funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state or of any political corporation thereof shall not be loaned, pledged or granted to or for any person or persons, association or corporation, public or private, . . . " ' does not prevent a levee district from issuing bonds for the con- 1 Cleveland, C, C. & St. Louis Ry. 'Article XLIV., Constitution of Co. V. People ex rel., 212 111. 638, 72 Louisiana [1879]. N. B. 725. ♦ Excelsior Planting & Manufaetur- '■iSee Chapter XXVI. ing Company v. Green, 39 La. Ann. ''Quill V. City of Indianapolis, 124 - 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]. Ind. 292, 7 L. R. A. 681, 23 N. E. "Article LVI., Constitution of 788 [1890]; Tuttle v. Polk & Hub- Louisiana [1879]. bel, 92 la. 433, 60 N. W. 733 [1894]. 331 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 209 struction of a levee, since such bonds are for the benefit of the district itself and not for the benefit of any other person or cor- poratjon." The provision of the constitution of California restrict- ing indebtedness applies only to the public corporations which are specified therein, and does not prevent the legislature from author- izing other types of public corporations, such as irrigation dis- tricts,' to incur indebtedness for public improvements for which as- sessments are to be levied, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters of such district. Under the provision of the consti- tution of Arkansas, restricting the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred by a county, town or other municipality,' it has been held that the words ' ' county, town or other municipality, ' ' do not include an improvement district, which derives its powers from the Legislature, and in exercising them acts as agent of the prop- erty owners.' The provision in the constitution of Kentucky,^" which provides that when a county or city "is authorized to con- tract an indebtedness it shall be required at the time time to pro- vide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the inter- est," is not self -executing and requires legislation to make it oper- ative.^' The section limiting the amount of indebtedness which towns and cities may incur ^' is indeed self-executing and requires no legislation to make it operative,'" but by its terms it does not apply when the proposed indebtedness was authorized under laws in force prior to the adoption of such constitution.'* Accordingly, improvements authorized by such prior laws may be made and contracts entered into therefor after the adoption of such consti- tution, without reference to the amount of the existing indebted- ness of the city or the amount of the debt to be created by such improvement ; '^ at least until the Legislature provides by general " Excelsior Planting & Manufactur- " Holzliauer v. City of Newport, ing Company v. Gjeen, 39 La. Ann. 94 Ky. 39.6, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]. "§ 158, Constitution of Kentucky. ' In the matter of the Bonds of the " Holzhauer v. City of Newport, Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893], 296, 27 Am. St. Eep. 106, 14 L. R. "City of Lexington on Appeal, 96 A. 755, 28 Pae. 272, 675 [1891], Ky. 258, 28 S. W. 665 [1894]; Holz- ' Article XVI., § 1, Constitution hauer v. City of Newport, 94 Ky. of Arkansas. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. "Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148, '"City of Lexington on Appeal, 96 17 S. W. 702 [1891]. Ky. 258, 28 S. W. 665 [1894]; Holz. '° § 159, Constitution of Kentucky. hauer v. City of Newport, 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. § 210 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 332 laws for the government of such cities.^" The constitution of Mis- souri provides: "No county, city, town, township, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the state s^U be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue pro- vided for such year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof Voting at an election to be held for that purpose. ' ' ^' This provision does not prevent the Legislature from authorizing a general judgment against a city for its proportionate share of an assessment, based on the city's ownership of property abutting on the street for the improvement of which the assessment is levied.^^ § 210. Constitutional provisions for exemption from taxation. In some of the state constitutions provisions are found exempt- ing certain kinds of property from taxation. As considered in the law of local assessments these provisions are like the following: "... The property of the United States and of the state, coun- ties, school districts and other municipal 'Corporations, and such other property as the Legislature may by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation. ' ' ^ These provisions, as worded, generally refer to taxation in the more limited sense of the term, and do not include local assessments. The Legislature may, there- fore, provide for levying local assessments against such land if it sees fit.^ The greater number of constitutional provisions, how- ever, merely permit the Legislature to exempt certain property, if it sees fit, and do not purport to make such exemption mandatory. The questions thus presented are chiefly statutory, and will be considered elsewhere.^ Furthermore, these provisions for ex- emption are exclusive and the Legislature cannot provide further i=City of Lexington on .Appeal, 96 S. W. 556, 27 Kj. L. R. 129 [1905]; Ky. 258, 28 S. W. 665 [1894]. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. City " Article X., § 12, Constitution of of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. W. Missouri [1875]. 64 [1904]; Kansas City Exposition ^'Barber Asphalt Paving Company Driving Park v. Kansas City, 174 V. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, Mo. 425, 74 S. W. 979 [1903]; Wi- 82 S. W. 64 [1904]. nona & St. P. R. Co. v. City of "•Article VII., § 2, Constitution of Watertovm, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. Washington [1889]. See also the 1072 [1890]; In re Howard Avenue, constitutional provisions quoted in North, in the City of Seattle, 44 § 146 et seq. Wash. 62, 86 Pac. 1117 [1906]. = Hagar v. Gast, 119 Ky. 502, 84 "See § 579 et seq., § 618. 333 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 211 exemptionc;. The constitution of Illinois once provided: "The property of the state and counties, both real and personal, and such other property as the General Assembly may deem neces- sary for school, religious and charitable purposes, may be ex- empt from taxation."* This provision was held to apply to general taxation only, and furthermore, to restrict the Legisla- ture from granting any further exemptions. Accordingly it was held that the Legislature could not exempt a religious or char- itable corporation from special assessments for local improve- ments.'' The constitution of Missouri provides: "The property, real and personal, of the state, counties and other municipal corporations, and cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxa- tion. . . . "" Under this provision, a statute which authorizes a general judgment against a city for assessments levied against property owned by such city, for the improvement of abutting streets is valid.'' § 211. Constitutional restrictions on amount of taxation — Spe- cific provisions. Tn some states are found constitutional provisions restricting and limiting the amount of the tax that may be levied. These provisions, as considered in the law of local assessments, are as follows: "No county, city, town, township, board of education or school district shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding, in any year, the in- come and revenue provided for such year. . . . "^ "The tax rate of cities, towns, counties, taxing districts and other munici- palities for other than school purposes, shall not, at any time, exceed the following rates upon the value of the taxable prop- erty therein. . . . "^ "The state tax on property for all pur- poses whatever, including expenses of government, schools, levees and interest, shall not exceed in any. one year six mills 'Article IX., § 3, Constitution of 'Article XI., § 18, Constitution of Illinois [1848]. California, containing further certain ° City of Chicago v. Baptist The- exceptions to such provision such ological Union, 115 111. 245, 2 N. E. as authority to incur debt if con- 254 [1886]. sented to by two-thirds of the elec- ° Article X., § 6, Constitution of tors, or in case a sinking fund is Missouri [1875]. provided sufficient to pay such debt '' Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. in at least forty years. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 =§ 157, Constitution of Kentucky. S. W. 64 [1904]. § 212 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 334 on the dollar of assessed valuation; . . . and no parish or mu- nicipal tax for all purposes whatsoever shall exceed ten mills on the dollar of valuation, provided that for the purpose of erecting and constructing public buildings, bridges and works of public improvement in parishes and municipalities, the rate of taxation herein limited may be increased when the rate of such increase and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been sub- mitted to a vote of the property ^axpaj'^ers of such parish or municipality entitled to vote under the election laws of the state, and a majority of same voting at such election shall have voted therefor.'" "No county, city, town, township, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the state shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that pur- pose. . . . "* § 212. Application of such provisions to local assessments. These provisions show by their phraseology that the sovereign authority that enacted them had in mind a taxation which could only be expressed and was necessarily stated in the form of a certain per centage of the valuation of the property taxed. Ac- cordingly it is held that these provisions are limited in their application to general taxation, have no application to local assessments, and do not restrict the power of the Legislature to authorize the levy and collection of local assessments.^ ^ Article 209, Constitution of Louis- Paving Company v. Gogreve, 42 La. iana [1879], Article 232 [1898]. Ann. 251, 5 So. 848 [1889]; Barrow •Article X., § 12, Constitution of v. Helpler, 34 La.. Ann. 362 [1882]; Missouri. Surget v. Chase, 33 La, Ann. 833 1 Mayor and Aldermen of Birming- [1881]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, ham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955; Kansas 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]; In the Mat- City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. ter of the Bonds of the Madera Irri- 860 [1898]; Lamar Water & Electric gation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 188, 32 L. R. A. 157, 26 S. W. 1025, Pac. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891] ; Dyer 31 S. W. 756 [1895] ; City of Clinton V. City of Newport, — Ky. , 80 to use of Thornton v. Henry County, S. W. 1127, 26 Ky. L. R. 204 [1904]; 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415, State ex rel. Hill v. Judges, 46 La. 22 S. W. 494 [1893]; City of St. Ann. 1292, 16 So. 219 [1894]; Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 19 S. George v. Young, 45 La. Ann. 1232, W. 713 [1892]; Farrar v. City of St. 14 So. 137 [1893]; Barber Asphalt Louis, 80 Mo. 379 [1883]. 335 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. §§ 213, 214 § 213. Constitutional provisions for exemption from sale. Specific provisions exempting certain kinds of property from forced sales, except for taxes due thereon, have been considered by the courts. Under the provision found in the constitution of Texas it was held, originally, that a local assessment was a tax within the meaning of the provision allowing forced sale of a homestead for taxes due thereon, and'that according a home- stead could be sold at forced sale to satisfy the lien of a local assessment.^ Subsequently, however, this question was consid- ered by the court, the original view abandoned, and the word "taxes" in such provision held not to include local assessments, with the result that a homestead was held to be exempt from forced sale for local assessments.- This change of judicial opin- ion was held not to amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts entered into after the decision in Lufkin v. City of Galveston,^ and in reliance thereon, and prior to the decision in Higgins v. Bordages,* and accordingly such contracts were controlled by the later decision as to the power to sell home- steads at forced sale to satisfy the lien of such assessments.^ § 214. Referendum and emergency provisions. The referendum and emergency provisions, which are found in some constitutions, have been considered _ as affecting local assessment. The constitution of Oregon provides: "... The second power is the referendum and it may be ordered (except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety) either by the petition signed by five per cent of the legal voters, or by the Legislative Assembly, as other bills are enacted. . . . "^ "No act shall take effect until ninety days from the end Qf the session, at which the same shall have been passed, except in ease of emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or the body of the law. "^ The 'Lufkin V. City of Galveston, 58 =58 Tex. 545 [1883]. Tex. 545 [1883]; construing Article '88 Tex. 458, 53 Am. St. Rep. 770, XVI., § 50, Constitution of Texas. 31 S. W. 52, 803 [1895]. ' Higgins V. Bordages, 88 Tex. 458, ' Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 35 53 Am. St. Rep. 770, 31 S. W. 52, L. R. A. 666, 38 S. W. 154 [1896]. 803 [1895]; (overruling Lufkin v, 'Article IV., § 1, Constitution of City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 545 Oregon [as amended 1902]. 11883]) ; Kettle v. City of Dallas, 35 ^Article IV., § 28, Constitution of Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 Ore-on [1857]. [1904].' § 215 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 336 decision of the Legislature that a given law is an emergency- matter, is held to be conclusive and not susceptible of judicial review.^ Accordingly the declaration of the Legislature, that the charter of Portland is an emergency matter, causes it to go into effect at once, and as it may fairly be regarded as concerning the public peace, health and safety, prevents the application of the referendum clause.* § 215. Home rule provisions. Certain constitutional provisions conferring upon cities the right to frame charters for themselves have been considered in connection with the law of local assessments.^ The constitution of Missouri provides: "Any city having a population of more than one hundred thousand may frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state. . . . "^ A charter adopted by the vote of the people of a city having such population and consistent with the constitution and laws of the state has the force and effect of an act of the Legislature.' Under this constitutional provision, a city within such specified class may frame a charter which provides that every special tax bill shall become a lien upon the lands assessed on the date of the receipt given to the Board of Public Works for such tax bill; that such lien shall continue for two years, unless suit shall be brought to collect and enforce the lien within that time ; in which case, the lien shall continue until the determination of such suit; provided, that in case of commencing such suit the plaintiff shall file in the ofSce of the city treasurer a statement showing the tax bill sued upon, and showing in what court the suit is brought, when it is brought, and against whom it is brought.* The pro- 'Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 'Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]; Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Kan- (citing and following State ex rel. sas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 Lavin v. Bacon, 14 S. D. 284, 85 N. S. W. 860 [1898]; Kansas City v. W. 225). Marsli Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S. 'Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, W. 943; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]. Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600; State ex rel. ^Turner v. Snyder, 101 Minn. 481, Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 112 N. W. 868 [1907); Haag v. 12 S. W. 802. Ward, 186 Mo. 325, 85 S. W. 391 *Haag v. Ward, 186 Mo. 325, 85 [1904]. S. W. 391 [1904]. = Article IX., § 16, Constitution of Missouri. 337 constitutionaij restriction applicable, etc. § 215 visions up to this point are valid, since they may be sus- tained on the ground that such notice must be given to lona fide purchasers to make such suit notice as against them. How- ever, the charter proceeded to provide that in case of failure to file such notice, the land should be free from the lien of such assessment and the lien of any judgment rendered thereon, and should not be sold for such judgment. This provision was not restricted to cases where bona fide grantees had acquired in- terests in such realty, but applied to cases where the original owner retained his rights in such property. The general laws of the state contain no provision destroying the lien of an assess- ment in such cases, and such charter provision was accordingly held to be invalid.^ The constitution of Washington provides: "... Any city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants or more shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the consti- tution and laws of this state. . . . ' '" Under this constitution- al provision a city cannot adopt an article in its charter to the effect that "no action shall be brought or maintained to test or question the validity of any assessment unless the plaintiff shall first pay into court the amount of the assessed tax."'' In the ab- sence of a constitutional provision permitting cities to frame their own charters a statute giving such authority is invalid as being in violation of the clause in the constitution forbidding special legislation and requiring legislation to be uniform.^ In Minnesota a provision securing to cities the right to frame their governments was subsequently adopted into the constitution." Under such provisions the power of local assessment is held to be implied.^" The Legislature may provide that cities, incorpo- rated under special charters when such charters were valid, may by vote of the electors, adopt the provisions of the general "Haag V. Ward, 186 Mo. 325, 85 Rep. 410, 34 L. R. A. 777, 69 N. W. S. W. 391 [1904]. 27 [189ff]. " Article XI., § 7, Constitution of ° State ex rel. Ryan v. District Washington [1889]. Court of Ramsey County, 87 Minn. 'Wilson V. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 148, 91 N. W. 300 [1902]. 543, 27 Pac. 474 [1891]. "State ex rel. Ryan v. District ' State of Minnesota ex rel. City of Court of Ramsey Countv, 87 Minn. St. Paul V. District Court, 72 Minn. 146, 91 N. W. 300 [1902]; See also 226, 71 Am. St. Rep. 480, 75 N. W. Turner v. Snyder, 101 Minn. 481, 112 224 [1898]; State ex rel. Childs v. N". W. 868 [1907]. Copeland, 66 Minn. 315, 61 Am. St. § 216 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 338 law incorporating cities, passed after the clause requiring uni- formity of legislation was adopted into the constitution.^^ § 216. Provisions concerning method of amending constitution. Questions concerning the validity of constitutional amend- ments are occasionally prescribed in the law of assessments. Apart from the law of assessments, and as a general question, the courts have power to decide wWfether a given amendment has been adopted in the method prescribed by the constitution,^ ex- cept in cases where the constitution itself has provided for some special tribunal whose decision on this question is to be final.^ A limited exception to this general principle is found in cases in which the question is as to the validity of the very constitution under which the court derives its authority; a question which, it is held, such court cannot pass upon.'' The constitution of California provides : " . . .If two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed amendment, or amendments, shall be entered in the journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon. . . . " * Under this provision a proposed amendment concerning local assessment was passed by the requisite majority in the Legislature, was not spread in full upon the journal of the Legislature but was referred to by title and number; and was voted for by the requisite majority. Upon the question whether such failure to enter the amendment at length upon the journal invalidated the amendment the court at first divided, a majority of the court in one ease holding that such omission "Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. v. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. (34 Vr.) 289, 73, 14 Pac. 615 [1887]; See §§ 176, 45 L. R. A. 251, 43 Atl. 744; State 177 and 178. ex rel. v. Rogers, 56 N. J. L. (27 » Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; Vr.) 480, 23 L. R. A. 354, 28 Atl. Nesbit V. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 726, 29 Atl. 173; State ex rel. Hudd Pac. 221; Koehler v. Hill, 60 la. 543, v. Timme, 54 "Wis. 318, 11 N. W. 785 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609; Se- [1882]. combe v. Kittleson, 29 Minn. 555, 12 ^Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 21 N. W. 519; State v. Young, 29 Minn. L. R. A. 716, 27 Atl. 616; Mijes v. 474, 9 N. W. 737; State ex rel. Mc- Bradford, 22 Md. 170, 85 Am. Dec. Clurg V. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 48 L. 643; Dennett, Petitioner, 32 Me. 508, R. A. 652, 27 So. 927; Edwards v. 54 Am. Dec. 602. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 31 L. R. A. "Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. (7 815, 33 S. W. 1130; State ex rel. How.) 1, 12 L. 581. Woods V. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 25 L. 'Article XVIIL, § 1, Constitution R. A. 560, 37 Pac. 840; Stnta ex-rpl. -' '^"I'f-rnia [1879]. 339 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 217 invalidated the amendment,'* and in another that it did not." It was finally held that such omission did not invalidate such amendment.'' The constitution of Oregon provides: "While an amendment, or amendments, which shall have been agreed upon by one legislative assembly shall be awaiting the action of a legislative assembly, or of the electors, no additional amendment or amendments shall be proposed. . . . "* In construing this provision it was held that a second amendment could not be introduced while a former one was "awaiting the action of a legislative assembly," even if they referred to different pro- visions of the constitution. It was further held in construing this provision that the Legislature, which was to pass a second time upon the proposed constitutional amendment before it was submitted to popular vote, was the Legislature chosen next after the Legislature which had passed such amendment; that if such Legislature next chosen did not act on such amendment it was no longer "awaiting the action of a legislative assembly," and that new amendments might be introduced." §217. Provisions concerning form of amending statute. Provisions with reference to the form of an amending statute have been considered in some cases involving assessments. The constitution of Pennsylvania provides: "No law shall be re- vived^ amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and pub- lished at length."^ Under this section it has been held that a statute,^ which provides, "in exercising the power aforesaid, all proceedings for the ascertaining of damages and the assessment of " Oakland Paving Company v. Hil- in different phraseology from that ton, 69 Gal. 479, 11 Pac. 3 [1886]. which was submitted to the people ' Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, and voted on by them has been held 11 Pae. 20 [1886]. to be invalid. Koehler v. Hill, 60 ' Oakland Paving Co. v. Tompkins, la. 543, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609. 72 Cal. 5, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17, 12 ' Article XVII., § 2, Constitution of Pac. 801; (followed in Thomason v. Oregon. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 Pac. 615 » Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, [1887]). In other jurisdictions the 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222 [1903]. opposite result has been reached : ' Article III., § 6, Constitution of State ex rel. v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, Pennsylvania [1874], 3 Am. St. Rep. 895, 12 Pac. 835; = Act of May, 1895, § 2, P. L. 105. An amendment copied on the journal § 218 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 340 benefits incident thereto shall be as now provided by law in refer- ence to payment of cases, damages and expenses of public improve- ments within municipal corporations" is valid.' The constitution of Illinois provides : " . . .No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act. ' ' * Under this provision it was held that a statute entitled "an act in re- gard to the completion of public parSs and the management there- of, " which contains a subject-matter fairly corresponding to such title, would not be regarded as intended primarily to amend the acts concerning Lincoln Park in the city of Chicago, since the court could not assume that there were no other uncompleted parks within the state; and accordingly such statute was held to be valid, even as applying as a general law to Lincoln Park, although it did not set forth at length the prior statutes con- cerning Lincoln Park, which were in effect amended by such aet.^ Under a similar provision, an amendatory statute which repeats the title of the amended statute correctly with the ex- ception of one word, the word "execute" being inserted in place of the correct word "exercise," but the meaning being sub- stantially the same, has been upheld.^ §218. Constitutional provisions regulating jurisdiction. A group of constitutional provisions which regulate the 'juris- diction of certain courts have been operative in the law of local assessments. The constitution of Louisiana provides: "The Su- preme Court, except in cases hereinafter provided, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which jurisdiction shall extend to all eases when the matter in dispute or the fund to be distributed, whatever may be the amount therein claimed, shall exceed one thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, to suits for divorce and separation from bed and board, and to all cases in which the constitutionality of any tax, toll or import whatever, . . . shall be in contestation, whatever may the amount thereof, and in such cases the appeal on the law and the fact shall be directly ' In re Greenfield Avenue, Appeal » Hundley & Rees v. Commissioners of the City of Pittsburg, 191 Pa. St. of Lincoln Park, 07 111. 559 [1873]. 290, 43 Atl. 225 [1899]. "Ray v. City of Jeffersonville, 90 'Article IV., § 13, Constitution of Ind. 567 [1883]. Illinois [1870]. 341 CONSTITUTIONAL EESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 218 from the court in which the case originated to the Supreme Court. . . . " ^ Whether, within the meaning of this clause an assessment is a tax so that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of a case involving an assessment, irrespective of the amount thereof, is a question upon which the court has rendered decis- ions apparently conflicting. Levee assessments were once held not to be taxes within the meaning of this provision.^ Subse- quently the court held that though such charges for the con- struction of levees were based upon the theory of benefits and were properly speaking assessments, yet, as they were generally termed taxes, they would be regarded as taxes with reference to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." At the same time other kiipids of assessments,* such as those for curbing and gut- tering" and paving," have been held not to be taxes within the meaning of this constitutional provision; and hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, unless of the amount specified. The constitution of Illinois provides: "... County Courts . . shall have original jurisdiction ... in proceed- ings for the collection of taxes and assessments. . . . " ' This provision does not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the County Court, but such jurisdiction may also be conferred upon the Cir- cuit Court.* The constitution of Illinois also provides: "The Supreme Court . . . shall have original jurisdiction in eases relating to the revenue. . . . " " This provision does not con- fer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court.^" .These ques- tions are 'considered elsewhere with reference to procedure in assessment cases, and in connection with statutory provisions. ^^ 'Article 81, Constitution of Louis- ' Fayssoux v. Denis, 48 La. Ann. iana. 850, 19 So. 760 [1896]; Rooney v. 2 Police Jury v. Mitchell, 37 La. Brown, 21 La. Ann. 51 [1869]. Ann. 44; Board of Levee Commission- 'Eooney v. Brown, 21 La. Ann. 51 ers V. Lorio Bros., 33 La. Ann. 276 [1869]. [1881]. "Fayssoux v. Denis, 48 La. Ann. = State ex rel. Hill v. Judges, 46 850, 19 So. 760 [1896]. La. Ann. 1292, 16 So. 219 [1894]; -Article VI., § 18, Constitution of In the opinion in this case the court Illinois [1870]. points out that for other purposes, ' Hundley & Rees v. Commissioners such as with reference to the consti- of Lincoln Park, 67 111. 559 [1873]. tutional provisions requiring uni- " Article VI., § 2, Constitution ot formity of taxation and those re- Illinois [1870]. stricting the amount of taxation, an "" Hundley & Bees v. Commissioners assessment is not a tax. of Lincoln Park, 67 111. 559 [1873], "See §§ 911, 1369 et seg. §§219,220 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 342 § 219. Law dependent for effect on future action. As in the ease of other laws, there is no constitutional objection to the passage of an assessment act which is not to take effect until the happening of some future events.^ Such statute is not a delegation of the legislative power, if the happening of such future facts depends upon the will of third persons.^ Thus an assessment statute may require the presenting of a petition,'' and the official finding of certain facte * in order that it may take effect. A statute for the organization of a drainage district may require that a petition therefor is to be presented to the County Court and the necessary facts found to be true before the cor- poration comes into existence.^ A city ordinance may provide that it shall not take effect until certain suits, then pending, shall have been dismissed.^ So a law to take effect upon ac- ceptance thereof by the municipality is valid.'' So by statute park commissioners may become corporate authorities upon the vote of the people within such park district. Subsequently the legislature may modify the powers and duties of such park com- missioners without submitting such supplementary and amenda- tory act to popular vote.' § 220. Provisions securing redress for injury to property. The constitution of Wisconsin provides: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely and without being obliged ' to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and with- out delay, conformably to the laws. ' ' ^ Similar provisions are found in many jurisdictions. Among them are the following: "All courts shall be open ; and every man for injury done to him in 'Guild, Jr. V. City of Chicago, 82 "Mayor and City Council of Balti- 111. 472 [1876]. more v. Clnnet, 23 Md. 449 [1865]. ^ Blake v. People for use of Cald- ' Guild, Jr., v. City of Chicago, 82 well, 109 111. 504 [1884]; Mayor and 111. 472 [1876]; Borgman v. City of City Council of Baltimore v. Clunet, Antigo, 120 Wis. 296, 97 N. W. 936 23 Md. 449 [1865]. [1904]; Adams v. City of Beloit, 105 'Blake v. People, for use of Cald- Wis. 363, 47 L. E. A. 441, 81 N. W. well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. 869 [1900]. * Blake v. People, for use of Cald- ' Andrews v. People ex rel. Eumsey, well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. 83 111. 529 [1876]. "Blake v. People, for use of Cald- ' Article T., § 9, Constitution of well, 109 111. 504 [1884]. Wisconsin [1848]. 343 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 221 his person property or reputation shall have due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely and without purchase; com- pletely and without denial ; speedily and without delay. " ^ "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person, property or reputation."' "All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law ; and justice administered without denial or delay."* "Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by hav- ing recourse to the laws, for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character ; he ought to obtain right and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without any denial; promptly and without delay ; conformably to the laws. ' ' '" These provisions do not invalidate a statute providing for a re-assessment of bene- fits and damages arising out of a street improvement, the origi- nal assessment being invalid." Under such constitutional pro- vision a statute which provides that as a condition precedent to the right to bring an action to set aside an illegal assessment or special tax, the owner of the property so assessed must first pay such tax is unconstitutional, as amounting to a denial of justice.' § 221. Other constitutional provisions. The constitution of California at one time contained a provi- sion, "No public work or improvement of any description what- soever shall be done or made in any city in, upon or about the streets thereof or otherwise, the cost and expense of which is made chargeable or may be assessed upon private property by special assessment, unless an estimate of such cost and expense shall be made, and an assessment in proportion to benefits on the property to be affected or benefited shall be levied, collected 'Article I., § 12, Constitution of tion of Vermont [1793]. Indiana. "Haubner v. City of Milwaukee, 'Article I., § 10, Constitution of 124 Wis. 153, 101 N. W. 930 [1905]; Oregon [in effect 1859]. (rehearing denied 102 N. W. 578 * Article I., § 16, Constitution of [1905]). Ohio [1851]. 'Weller v. City of St. Paul, 5 "Chapter I., Article 4, Constitu- Minn. 70, 5 Gilf. 95 [1861]. § 221 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 344 and paid into the city treasury before such work or improvement shall be commenced or any contract for letting or doing the same authorized or performed. . . . " ^ Such provision was held to be self-executing, to require no legislation to enforce it, and to render invalid a statute enacted prior to the adoption of such constitutional provision,^ and inconsistent therewith.^ This sec- tion of the constitution was subsequently amended by re-enacting it with the omission of the sentenee%quoted.* The constitution of California provides: "A mortgage, deed of trust, contract or other obligation by which a debt is secured, shall for the pur- poses of assessment and taxation be deemed and treated as an interest in the property aifected thereby. Except as to railroad and other quasi public ■ corporations, in case of debt so secured, the value of the property affected by such mortgage, deed of trust, contract or obligation less the value of such security shall be assessed and taxed to the owner of the property and the value of such security shall be assessed and taxed to the owner affected thereby is situate. . . '" A special assessment for benefits is not a tax within the meaning of this provision." Ac- cordingly a statute which provides for levying an assessment upon the property in an assessment district without deducting from the value of such property the amount of any mortgages which might affect such property is valid.'' Under a constitutional provision requiring an appropriation by law for paying money out of the count.y treasury,* it has been held that a statute which provides that the county surveyor shall keep the ditches in re- pair and shall certify the cost thereof, including his own per diem compensation to the county auditor, who shall then draw his warrant in favor of the holder of each certificate upon the county treasurer, who shall pay it, the county treasury to be reimbursed subsequently by assessments against the realty bene- fited by such repairs, is constitutional, since such statute setting ^Article XL, § 19 Constitution ol [1887]); Amendment approved Feb. California [1879]. 14, 1883, and ratified Nov. 4, 1884. 'Act of April 1st, 1872. = Article XIII., § 4, Constitution of ^McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. California. 245 [1880]. "Tregea v. Owens, 94 Cal. 317, 29 * Oakland Paving Co. v. Tompkins, Pac. 643 [1892]. 72 Cal. 5, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17, 12 Pac. ' Tregea v. Owens, 94 Cal. 317, 29 801; (followed in Thomason v. Ash- Pac. 643 [1892]. worth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 Pac. 615 » Article X., § 3, Constitution of Indiana. 345 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION APPLICABLE, ETC. § 221 aside as much of the county's revenues as is necessary to pay the cost of such repairs "is in legal effect an appropriation by law of so much of the county revenues of the several counties as is necessary to keep the ditches of the state in repair. ' ' " " State ex rel. French v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 463, 468, 5 N. E. 553 [1885]. CHAPTER VI. NECESSITY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. § 222. Assessment not inherent power. A municipal corporation has no inherent power to levy local assessments for special benefits accruing to property by reason of a public improvement.^ No such power is conferred upon a municipal corporation by any rule of the common law.^ §223. Power to assess for benefits must be conferred by writ- ten law. The power of levying special assessments to pay for the cost of constructing public improvements which confer some special local benefit not being an inherent power, and not existing at common law, it follows therefore that a municipal corporation does not possess such power unless it is conferred upon it by some express provision of the written law. The constitutions of the different states do not usually contain provisions con- ferring such power, though the power of levying local assessments has been construed to exist under a home-rule provision by impli- cation.^ Accordingly in most states such power can exist only ' "The power to levy them ( 1. e. sit. There is no common-law liabil- local assessments) io not inherent in ity resting upon lot-owners to pay any public corporation, but must be for the improvement of an adjacent directly conferred by statute." City street. Whatever liability they are of Greensboro v. McAdoo, 112 N. C. subject to is created by statute and 359, 362, 17 S. E. 178 [1893]. all such statutes must be construed ' City of Henderson v. Lambert, 77 most strictly against those asserting Ky. (U Bush.) 24 [1878]; "But claims under them." City of Hen- the obligation of lot-owners to pay derson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. ( 14 for improving streets does not rest Bush.) 24, 30, 31 [1878]. See §§ 15, alone on the ground that they are 17, 230 et seq. benefited by such improvements and '■ State ex rel. Ryan v. District therefore ought in natural justice to Court of Ramsey County, 67 Minn, pay for them. That they are bene- 146, 91 N. W. 300. For special con- fited furnishes the foundation for leg- stitutional provisions concerning the islative power to require them to pay power of assessment, see § 103 et sea. but does not raise an implied assump- 346 347 STATUTOEY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. 1223 if conferred upon municipal corporations by statute.- "It is from the state only that a municipality has power to levy an ''Watkins v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 344, 27 S. W. 234 [1894] ; City Street Im- provement Co. V. Babcock, 139 Cal. 690, 73 Pac. 666 [1903]; San Diego Investment Co. v. Shaw, 129 Cal. 273, 61 Pac. 1082 [1900]; Ede v. Cuneo, 126 Cal. 167, 58 Pae. 538 [1899]; Kelso V. Cole, 121 Cal. 121, 53 Pac. 353 [1898]; Durrell v. Dooner, 119 Cal. 411, 51 Pac. 628 [1897]; Schwiesau v. Mahou, 110 Cal. 543, 42 Pac. 1065 [1895]; Shipman v. Forbes, 97 Cal. 572, 32 Pac. 599 [1893]; Reclamation District No. 3 V. Kennedy, 58 Cal. 124 [1881]; Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County, 51 Cal. 474, [1876]; City of Stockton v. Whitmore, 50 Cal. 554 [1875]; Hewes v. Eeis, 40 Cal. 255 [1870] ; Chambers v. Sat- terlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Nichol- son Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 [1868]; Dougherty v. Hitchcock, 35 Cal. 51 [1868]; Himmelmann v. Danos, 35 Cal. 441 [1868]; Smith v. Cofran, 34 Cal. 310 [1867]; Haskell v. Bartlett, 34» Cal. 281 [1867]; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477, 91 Am. Dee. 595 [1867]; Taylor v. Conner, 31 Cal. 481 [1866]; Creigh- ton V. Manson, 27 Cal. 614 [1865]; Keese v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825 [1887] ; Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Co. v. City of New Haven, 77 Conn. 494, 59 Atl. 737 [1905]; Angus v. City of Hart ford, 74 Conn. 27, 49 Atl. 192 [1901]'; Harris v. City of Ansonia, 73 Conn. 359, 47 Atl. 672 [1900]; Eeifer v. City of Bridgeport, 68 Conn. 401, 36 Atl. 801 [1896]; Gilpin v. City of Ansonia, 68 Conn. 72, 35 Atl.- 777 [1896]; Sargent & Co. v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822, 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]; Crofut v. City of Dan- bury, 65 Conn. 294, 32 Atl. 365; Mc- Lauren v. City of Grand Forks, 6 Dak. 397, 43 N. W. 710 [1889]; Dis- trict of Columbia v. Weaver, 6 App. D. C. 482 [1895] ; Allman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8 [18B4]; Johnson v. District of Columbia, 6 Mackey (D. C.) 21 [1887]; Alexan- der v. Dennison, 2 McArthur (D. C. ) 562 [1876]; Halliday v. City of At- lanta, 96 Ga. 377, 23 S. B. 406 [1895]; City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 111. 310, 24 L. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 [1894]; City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]; Wright v. City of Chicago, 20 111. 252 [1858]; Dunkle v. Herron, 115 Ind. 470, 18 N. E. 12 [1888]; Churchman v. City of Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259, 11 N. E. 301 [1886]; Phillips V. Lewis, 109 Ind. 62, 9 N. E. 395 [1886]; Case v. Johnson, 91 Ind. 477 [1883]; Merrill v. Abbott, 62 Ind. 549 [1878]; Maberry v. City of Jeffersonville, 38 Ind. 198 [1871]; Wilson v. Poole, 33 Ind. 443 [1870]; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329 [1868]; City of Blufifton v. Miller, 33 Ind. App. 521, 70 N. E. 989 [1904] ; Town of Clay City v. Bryson, 30 Ind. App. 490, 66 N. E. 498 [1903]; People ex rel. Hanberg v. Peyton, 214 111. 376, 73 N. E. 708 [1905]; Gray v. Town of Cicero, 177 111. 459, 53 N. E. 91 [1899]; Lingle V. City of Chicago, 172 111. 170, "sO N. E. 192 [1898]; Robeson v. Peo- ple ex rel. Curry, 161 111. 176, 43 N. E. 619 [1896]; McCheaney v. Peo- ple ex rel. Kern, 148 111. 221, 35 N. E. 739 [1894]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]; Morrison v. City of Chicago, 142 111. 660, 32 N. E. 172 [1893]; Badger v. Inlet Drainage District, 141 111. 540, 31 N. E. 170 [1893]; City of Carlyle v. County of Clinton, 140 111. 512, 30 N. E. 782 [1893]; Goodwillie v. City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. V. City of East St. Louis, 134 III. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; Gftiien v. i223 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 348 assessment on property for street work. In the absence of a delegation of such power, its efforts in that direction would be Moredock and Ivy Landing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; People ex rel. Huck v. Pierce, 90 111. 85 L1878]; Guild, Jr. V. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472 [1876] ; Taylor v. People, Reed, 66 111. 322 [1872] ; Workmen v. City of Chicago, 61 111. 463 [1871]; Skinner v. City of Chicago, 42 111. 52 [1866] ; Scam- mon V. City of Chicago, 40 111. 146 [1866]; Lill v. The City of Chicago, 29 111. 31 [1862]; Fort Chartres & Ivy Landing Drainage & Levee Dis- trict No. 5 V. Smalkand, 70 111. App. 449 [1897]; Independent School Dis trict of Burlington v. City of Burling- ton, 60 la. 500, 15 N. W. 295 [1883] ; Ankeny v. Hennigsen, 54 la. 29, 6 N. W. 65 [1880]; Wardens & Vestry of Christ's Church v. City of Bur- lington, 39 la. 224 [1874] ; Merriam V. Moody's Executors, 25 la. 163 [1868]; Worthington v. City of Cov ington, 82 Ky. 265 [1884]; City of Henderson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. ( 14 Bush. 24 [1878]; Murray v. Tucker, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 241 [1874]; Cald- well V. Rupert, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 179 [1873]; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 71 Ky. (S Bush.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871]; Hentig V. Gilmore, 33 Kan. 234, 6 Pao. 304 [1885] ; Sleeper v. Bullen, 6 Kan. 300 [1870] ; Martin v. City of Oakaloosa, 126 la. 680, 102 N. W. 529 [1905]; (opinion in this case reported in 99 N. W. 557, [1904] withdrawn) ; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Watt, 51 La. Ann. 1345, 26 So. 70 [1899]; Surget V. Chase, 33 La. Ann. 833 [18811; Sirgi v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 613 [1872]; Second Municipal- ity of New Orleans v. McDonogh, 9 Rob. (La.) 408 [1843]; Henderson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore use of Esehbach, 8 Md. 35? [1855]; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Moore, 6 H. & J. (Md.) 375 [1825]; Thayer V. City of Ciranri Rapids, 82 Mich. 298, 48 N. W. 228 [1890]; State v. Foster, 94 Minn. 412, 103 N. W. 14 [1905]; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn 295 [1858]; City 6f St. Louis v. Koch, 169 Mo. 587, 70 S. W. 143 [1902]; West V. Porter, 89 Mo. App. 150 [1901]; City of St. Joseph to the us^ of the Saxton National Bank v. Landis, 54 Mo. App. 315 [1893]; Fruin-Bambrick Construction Co. v. Geist, 37 Mo. App. 509 [1889]; Trephagen v. City of South Omaha, 69 Neb. 577; 96 N. W. 248 [1903]; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hast- ings, 2 Neb. Unoff. 3l37 ; 96 N. W. 104 [1902]; City of South Omaha v. Tighe, 67 Neb. 572, 93 N. W. 946 [1903]; Morse v. City of Omaha, 67 Neb. 426, 93 N. W. 734 [1903]; Har- mon V. City of Omaha, 53 Neb. 164, 73 N. W. 671 [1897]; Bellevue Im- provement Co. v. Village of Bellevue, 39 Neb. 876, 58 N. W. 446 [1894]; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hast- ings, 2 Neb. Unoff. 337, 96 N. W. 104 [1902]; Mayor of East Orange v. Hussey, 72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 71, 59 Atl. 1060 [19051; State, Harris, Pros. V. Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Jersey City, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 85 [1875] ; Nehasane Park Association V. Lloyd, 167 N. Y. 431, 60 N. E. 741 [1901]; Stebbina v. Kay, 123 N. Y. 31, 25 N. E. 207 [1890]; In the Matter of the Petition of Pennie to Vacate an Assessment, 108 N. Y. 364, 15 N. E. 611 [1888]; Merritt v. Vil- lage of Port Chester, 71 N. Y. 309, 27 Am. Rep. 47 [1877] ; In the Mat- ter of the Petition of the Second Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, to Vacate an Assessment, 66 N. Y. 395 [1876]; Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486 [1872] ; Felthousen v. City of Amsterdam, 69 Hun. 505, 23 N. Y. Supp. 424 [1893]; In the Matter of ihe Petition of Van Buren, to Va- cate an Assessment, 17 Hun. 527 [1879] ; Matter of Eager, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 229 [18711; Matter of Doug- lass, 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 84 [1870]; 349 STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOB ASSESSMENT. 223 futile. ' ' ' Hence, if the state confers a certain power of levying local assessments upon cities having a population over a certain amount, that power cannot be exercised by a city having a People ex rel. Kerber v. City of Utica, 7 Abb. N. C. 414 [IS/Q]; Lathrop v. City of Buffalo, 3 Abb. Ct. App. 30 [1861] ; Hopkins v. Mason, 61 Barb. 469 [1871]; Brenn v. City of Troy, 60 Barb. 417 [1871]; People ex rel. Johnson v. City of Brooklyn, 23 Barb. 180 [1856]; Hopkins v. Mason, 42 How. (N. Y.) 115 [1871]; Pettigrew V. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 17 How. (N. Y.) 492 [1859]; Hersie v. City of Buffalo, 1 Sheldon (N. Y.) 445 [1874]; City of Greens- boro V. McAdoo, 112 N. C. 359, 17 S. E. 178 [1893] ; Bradshaw v. Board of Commissioners of Guilford County, 92 N. C. 278 [1885]; Village of Pleasant Hill v. Commissioners, 71 0. S. 133, 72 N. E. 896 [1904]; Smith V. City of Toledo, 24 0. S. 126 [1873]; Culbertson v. City of Cincinnati, 16 Ohio 574 [1847]; Brewer v. Incorporated Village of Bowling Green, Ohio, 7 Ohio C. C. 489 [1893]; Allen v. City of Port- land, 35 Or. 420, 58 Pac. 509 [1899] ; Smith v. Minto, 30 Or. 351, 48 Pac. 166 [1897]; Ladd v. Spencer, 23 Or. 193, 31 Pac. 474 [1892]; Northern Pacific Lumbering & Man- ufacturing Co. V. East Portland, 14 Or. 3, 12 Pac. 4 [1886]; Hawthorne V. City of East Portland, 13 Or. 271, 10 Pac. 342 [1886] ; Philadelphia to use of Nestor v. Spring Garden Far- mers' Market Company, 161 Pa. St. 522, 29 Atl. 286 [1894]; Morewood Avenue, Ferguson's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 39, 28 Atl. 130 [1893]; Widening of Burnish Street, Pottsville Bor- ough, 140 Pa. St. 531, 21 Atl. 500 [1891]; Borough of Greensburg v. Laird, 138 Pa. St. 533, 21 Atl. 96 [1890] ; City of Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 513 [1889]; City of Philadelphia v. Richards, 124 Pa. St. 303, 16 Atl. 802 [1889]; Western Pennsylvania Railway Co. V. City of Allegheny, 92 Pa. St. 100 [1879]; Borough of Mauch Chunk v. Shortz, 61 Pa. St. 399 [1869]; Cruikshanks v. City Council, 1 Mc- Cord (S. C.) 360 [1821]; Horiston V. City Council of Charleston, 1 Mc- Cord (S. C.) 345 [1821]; Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 S. D. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 802, 51 N. W. 770 [1892]; Whyte v. Mayor and Alder- men of Nashville, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan.) 364 [1852]; Breath v. City of Gal- veston, 92 Tex. 454, 49 S. W. 575 [1899]; Storrie v. Houston City Street Railway Co., 92 Tex. 129, 44. L. R. A. 716, 46 S. W. 796 [1898]; Connor v. City of Paris, 87 Tex. 32, 27 S. W. 88 [1894]; Flewellin v. Proetzel, 80 Tex. 191, 15 S. W. 1043 [1891] ; Wood V. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 13 S. W. 227 [1890]; Frosh V. City of Galveston, 73 Tex. 401, 11 S. W. 402 [1889]; Allen v. City of Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 [1879]; Ardrey v. City of Dallas, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 35 S. W. 726 [1896]; City of Dallas v. Ellison, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 30 S. W. 1128 [1895]; Violett v. City Council of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 [1896]; McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 20 L. R. A. 653, 16 S. E. 867 [1893] ; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324 [1886]; Blanchard v. City of Barre, 77 Vt. 420, 60 Atl. 970 [1905]; City of New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Improvement Co., 9 Wash. 639, 38 Pac. 163 [1894]; City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]; Osh- kosh City Railway Co. v. Winnebago County, 89 Wis. 435, 61 N. W. 1107 [1895]; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236 [1872]; Kneeland v. City of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 411 [1864]; » Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal 465, 472, 11 Pac. 20 [1886]. §§224,225 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 350 smaller population.* Where certain power to levy assessments is given by statute to reclamation districts formed under the municipal code or re-organized thereunder, such power cannot be exercised by a reclamation district which is not so formed or re-organized.° § 224. Consent of voters not sufficient. In the absence of specific constitutional provision, the consent of the voters or property owners of a district cannot confer upon the public authorities the power to levy a local assessment.^ The power of such public officers to levy local assessments can be conferred only by act of the legislature. If all the property own- ers assent to the making of the improvement, and the levy of a local assessment therefor, they may be bound on principles of estoppel.^ The assent of any number less than all, however, can- not bind those who do not assent.^ In some states constitutional provisions are found which expressly authorize the voters of certain cities to frame their own charters. Where such provi- sions exist, a grant of power by the voters, acting in compli- ance with such constitutional provision, has of course the same effect and validity as an act of the legislature.* § 225. Consent of voters necessary by specific provision. The consent of the voters of a public corporation may be made by statute or by constitutional provision, sufficient and neces- sary to enable the public corporation to adopt new powers.^ The legislature may provide that certain provisions regulating city government shall not go into effect unless the voters of such city adopt such provisions by vote at an election at which such question is submitted to them.^ If a constitutional provi- sion authorizes assessments only if based upon the consent of a majority in value of property ow;ners,^ a statute which author- ' State V. Moss, 44 Wash. 91, 86 * Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Pac. 1129 [1906]. Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; See ° Reclamation District No. 3 v. § 215. Kennedy, 58 Cal. 124 [1881]. ^ See § 780 et seq. 1 Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477, ^ State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- 20 N. W. 549 [1884] ; Hixson v. Bur- rick v. District Court of Hennepin son, 54 0. S. 470, 43 N. E. 1000. County, 33 Minji. 235, 22 N. W. 625 = See Chapter XIX. [1885]; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. "Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477, 652 [I860]. 20 N. W. 549 [1884]. = See § 103. 351 STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. §§ 226, 227 izes an assessment without any provision for securing the con- sent of property owners is invalid.* A provision requiring the assent of the voters of the district to certain forms of taxation applies only to general taxes and not to assessments for benefits." § 226. What is statute. A statute can exist only if enacted by the legislature in ac- cordance with the mandatory provisions of the state constitu- tion.^ The official acts of those charged with the duty of de- termining specific facts necessary to its enactment cannot ordi- narily be impeached. Where an act is found among the public laws, bearing the approval of the Governor, the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of errors, will presume that such act was con- stitutionally passed, if the record discloses no proof to the con- trary. The journals of the legislature will not be examined in the Supreme Court for the first time, to impeach the validity of such act, or to determine whether or not it was passed in compliance with constitutional requirements.^ Words in a print- ed statute which were not in the law as approved by the Goverr nor have no proper place in such statute and are not a part thereof.' If words are in a statute as passed by the legislature and as approved by the Governor they are a part of such stat- ute even if they are contained in brackets.^ § 227. Change of statute. In the absence of some specific constitutional provision, the legislature may modify the powers and organization of a city ^ or of an assessment district ^ so as to affect its power of levy- ing local assessments without obtaining the consent of the voters of such district to such modification. Even if the consent of a majority of the electors is necessary to determine that cities and towns theretofore organized shall organize under general * Craig V. Board of Improvement of 57 Mich. 127 ; siil nomine Robertson Russellville Waterworlcs Improve- v. Baxter, 23 N. W. 711 [1885]. ment District, 84 Ark. 390, 105 S. * Murphy v. Dobben, 137 Mich. 565, W. 867 [1907]. 100 N. W. 891 [1904]. ° Shuford V. Commissioners of Gas- ' Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. ton County, 86 N. C. 552 [1882]. 73, 14 Pae. 615 [1887]; Brientwall ^See §§ 79, 192 e« se?. v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 156 ^^Bedartf v. Hall, 44 111. 91 [1867]. [1883]. ' Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, ^ People ex rel. Miller v. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]. § 228 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 352 laws, instead of their special charters, the legislature may pass a general law affecting the charter of the city and county of San Francisco, without obtaining the consent of such cities and counties.^ Even where the original statute for a park district was accepted by a popular vote by the inhabitants of such dis- trict,* and possibly might have been unconstitutional but for provision for such acceptance as a condition precedent to its taking effect,'' the legislature may ^y statute modify the powers of such park without any new vote of the inhabitants thereof." Such district, when once formed, is subject to general legis- lation in the same way that any other municipal corporation is subject. If a statute which controls the method of levying an assessment is changed after contract is let and the work is begun such repeal does not prevent the city from compelling the prop- erty owner to reimburse it for expenses incurred and obligations entered into by said city under its contract for such improve- ment.'' A different rule applies where no work has been done and no contract has been entered into before the change of stat- ute. In such case the rights of the city are measured solely by the new statute.* A change of statute made by a repealing act which contains a saving clause as to existing assessments leaves . such assessments governed by the prior statute.® A change of statute will ordinarily be construed, if practicable, as having a prospective operation only, and as applying solely to subsequent improvements.^" Thus a statute which provides, "Whenever . . . common council . . . shall desire to construct sewers," was construed to apply only to sewers constructed after the passage of such statute.^^ § 228. General principles of statutory construction. The construction of a statute is a matter for the court. "Leg- islative construction of past legislation has no judicial force 'Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 543, 27 Pac. 474 [1891]. 73, 14 Pac. 615 [1887]. "Board of Councilmen of Frank- * Peope ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, fort v. Mason & Foard Co., 100 Ky. 51 111. 37. 48, 37 S. W. 290 [1896]; State, Brit- "See § 176 et seq. tin, Pros. v. Blake, 36 N. J. L. (7 « People ex rel. Miller V. Brislin, 8 D Vr.) 442 [1872]. 111. 423 [1875]. "Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, 132 'City of Spokane v. Browne, 8 Fed. 668 [1904]. Wash. 317, 36 Pac. 26 [1894]. "Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, 132 * Wilson V. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. Fed. 668 [1904]. 353 STATUTOEY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. § 228 except for the future,"^ though it may be considered as an aid in extracting the intention of the legislature from doubtful lan- guage.^ Intelligent and rational action on the part of the legis- lature is always to be presumed.^ The public necessities on which the power of assessment is based must be considered in determining the meaning of the statute.^ A statute is, if possi- ble, to be construed as one harmonious whole, every part thereof having effect in carrying out the general intention of the legis- laturg.' If two sections of a statute relate to the same subject matter, they are to be construed together in order to ascertain from both the intention of the legislature," and to accomplish this purpose and enforce the general intent of the legislature, particular provisions will, if necessary, be construed as having a meaning other than that which they literally bear.'' Statutes in pari materia are to be considered together, as though they were one statute.' Aeeoriin'gly, of two constructions, one of which will cause inconsistencies between parts of statutes in pari materia, and the other of which will reconcile the statutes and prevent inconsistencies, the latter will prevail." Repeals by implication are not favored.^" Hence, if by one construction two statutes passed at different times may be construed together so as to give full force and effect to each, and by another con- struction they are inconsistent so that the later statute will operate as an implied repeal of the prior statute, the former construction will be preferred.^^ Thus a special charter allow- ' Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, ' People ex rel. Keeney v. City of 57 Mich. 127; suh nomine Robertson Chicago, 152 111. 546, 38 N. E. 744 V. Baxter, 23 N. W. 711 [1885]. [1894]. ^ Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, ' Lake Shore & Michigan Southern 57 Mich. 127, sub nomine Robertson Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 V. Baxter, 23 N. W. 711 [1885]. 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894J. 'Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 "Clarke v. Mead, 102 Cal. 516, 30 [1866] ; Verdin v. City of St. Louia, Pac. 862 [1894] ; Lake Shore & Mich- 131 Mo. 26, 36 S. W. 52, 33 S. W. igan Southern Railway Co. v. City of 480 [1895]. Chicago, 148 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 'Shaler v. McAleese, — N. J. Eq. [1894]. , 68 Atl. 416 [1907]. "Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. -Appeal of North Beach & Mission 18, 38 N. W. 255 [1894]; Copeland R. R. Co., in the Matter of Widening v. Mayor and Aldermen of Spring. Kearney Street, 32 Cal. 499 [1867] ; field, 166 Mass. 498, 44 N. E. 605 People ex rel. Keeney v. City of Chi. [1896]. caso, 152 111. 546, 38 N. E. 744 "Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. [1894]. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]. "Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 U866i. § 228 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 354 ing the city of Springfield to construct sidewalks and assess the entire cost thereof upon the owners of abutting property is not repealed by implication by a subsequent statute allowing all cities to construct sidewalks and assess not more than one- half of the cost thereof upon the abutting property owners.^- The theory that the different sections of the same statute or the different statutes upon the same subject are, if possible, to be construed together, so as to harmonize them, and to give effect to each part is merely a prima facie theory of legislative intent, and yields to the affirmative indication of the opposite intention, if manifest on the face of the statute. If the legislature has evi- dently intended to create different rules for two or more par- ticular cases arising under the same general subject, such stat- utes will not to this extent be regarded as being in pari materia}^ Thus, if a legislature has provided two different methods of procedure in assessing benefits and damages, the one in the ordi- nary ease of eminent domain, and the other when land is taken by cities or villages for municipal purposes, the courts should not regard such statutes as being in pari materia as to the mat- ters upon which the legislature evidently intended to prescribe distinct rules. ^* A revising statute which covers the subject mat- ter of prior statutes and is inconsistent therewith is regarded as repealing such statutes by implication.^^ Hence, the consoli- dation act, which was intended to revise and consolidate all statutes 'Concerning the government of New York City, impliedly repeals a provision requiring the expense of certain improve- ments to be divided between the city and the property owners and substitutes therefor a general provision permitting an as- ^^Copeland v. Mayor and Alder- matter of antecedent statutes, and men of Springfield, 166 Mass. 498, such plainly appears to have been the 44 X. E. 605 [1896]. legislative intent, it is to be deemed "Lake Shore & Michigan Southern to contain the entire law on the Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 subject, and it virtually repeals the 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894]. former enactment, although there is " Lake Shore & Michigan Southern no express provision to that effect, Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 and although provisions of the for- 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894]. mer acts are omitted in the revising «In the Matter of the Petition of statute." In the matter of the Peti- the New York Institution for In- tion of the New York Institution for struction of Deaf and Dumb, to Va- Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, cate Assessments, 121 N. Y. 234, 24 to Vacate Assessments, 121 N. Y. N. E. 378 [1890]: "Where a revis- 234, 24 N. E. Rep. 378 [1890]. ing statute covers the whole subject- 355 STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. § 228 sessment of the entire expense upon the property owners, though such consolidation aet contains no express provision repealing such prior clause." If the later statute covers the same subject matter as an earlier statute and is clearly inconsistent there- with, it operates as a repeal of the earlier statute by implication. '' The intention of the legislature is to be deduced primarily from the language which it has seen fit to employ. In determining the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute, the primary question is, "not what the statute should be, but what it is. "^' The general intention of the legislature as deduced from the entire statute should prevail over the letter of the law.^" The literal wording of a statute must always yield to the legis- lative intent, where the latter is clearly apparent from the statute taken as a whole.^" A statute which specifically directs a par- ticular course of action, impliedly prohibits a course of action which differs materially from that prescribed. ^^ In ease of doubt the title of a statute may be resorted to as tending to aid in determining the intention of the legislature.-- ^The title is, how- ever, of but slight importance and can never be used to enlarge or control unequivocal language employed in the body of the act.^' In some states by express constitutional provision the title of a statute must show the subject matter thereof.^* The pre- amble is no part of the law, but it can be used for the purpose of identifying the subject matter of the law and explaining the motives and intention of the legislature.-^ Provisions in the char- ter of a city which prescribe the matter of instituting and con- ducting proceedings for constructing an improvement whereby an assessment is to be levied upon property owners, do not limit or restrict the power of the city to make such improvement if it is to be paid for by general taxation.-" "In the Matter of the Petition of Mo. 26, 30 S. W. 480, 36 S. W. 52 the New York Institution for In- [1895]. struction of Deaf and Dumb, to Va- -'City of New Haven v. Whitney, cate Asaessments, 121 N. Y. 234, 24 86 Conn. 373 [1870]. N. E' 378 [1890]. =^Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of "Doremus v. People ex rel. Koch- Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 n874]. ersperger, 173 III. 63, 50 N, E. 680 ^ Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of [1898]. Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]. "Kelly V. The City of Cleveland, ^* See § 192 et seq. 34 0. S. 468 [1878]. == Commonwealth to use of Alle- "Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 -gheny City v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. Mo. 26, 33 S. W. 480, 36 S. W. 52 328 [1871]. [1895]. =« Allen v. City of Janesville, 35 ""Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 Wis. 403 [1874]. §229 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 356 § 229. Statutes conferring power construed strictly. Furthermore, assessment proceedings are proceedings in in- vitum,'^ and have for their ultimate object the taking of prop- erty from the individual owner without his consent. As is the case in all proceedings of a similar character, such as taxation, the statutes conferring the power to impose local assessments must be construed strictly.^ The intention of the legislature to ' City Street Improvement Co. v. Babcock, 139 Cal. 690, 73 Pae. 666 [1903]; Sargent & Company v. Tut- tle, 67 Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822; 34 Atl. 1028 L1895]; Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Bep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]; Gui- notte V. Egelhoff, 64 Mo. App. 356 [1895]; Rose v. Trestrail, 62 Mo. App. 352 [1895]; Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [1897]. ^ Crofut V. City of Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 32 Atl. "365 [1894]; City of New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373 [1870]; People ex rel. Raymond V. Field, 197 III. 568, 64 N. E. 544 [1902]; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railvray Co. v. City of Chi- cago, 148 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894]; Wright v. City of Chicago, 20 III. 252 [1858]; Town of Green- dale V. Suit, 163 Ind. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904]; Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289, 20 N. E. 797 [1888]; Churchman v. City of Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259, 11 N. E. 301 [1886]: Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452 [1879]; Busenbark v. Clements, 22 Ind. App. 557, 53 N. E. 665 [1899] ; Ankeny v. Hennigsen, 54 la. 29, 6 N, W. 65 [1880] ; Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 la. 163 [1868]; Mur- ray V. Tucker, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 240 [1874]; Whitney v. Common Council of the Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189, 37 N. W. 184 [1888]; In the Matter of the Appeal of Pow- ers, 29 Mich. 504 [1874]; City of Sedalia to use of Sedalia National Bank v. Donohue, 190 Mo. 407, 89 S. W. 386 [1905]; Rose v. Trestrail, 62 Mo. App. 352 [1895]; Hutchinson V. City of Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [1897]; Bergen County Savings Bank v. Township of Union, 44 N. J. L. (15 Vr.) 599 [1882]; State, Peckham, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of New- ark, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 576 [1881]; Campion v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 355 [1879]; State, Terhune, Pros. v. City of Passaic, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 90 [1879]; State, Wilkinson, Pros. v. Inhabi- tants of the City of Trenton, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 499 [1873]; Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutch.) 594, 69 Am. Dec. 584 [1857]; State, Townsend, Pros. v. Mayor and Com- mon Council of Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutch.) 444 [1857]; State, Tims, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Newark, 25 N. J. L. (1 Dutch.) 399 [1856]; In the Matter of the Petition of Van Buren, 55 How. (N. Y.) 513 [1878]. . "It is un- necessary to cite authorities on these points. The A. B.' C. of the laws of municipal corporations, that the power to levy special assessments is to be construed strictly, that the mode prescribed is the measure of power and that material require- ments must be complied with before there is any liability is all that need be quoted. Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 34, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. An assessment made contrary to these principles is void and an in- junction lies to restrain its collec- tion." Buckley v. City of Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 267, 37 Pac. 441 [1894] : (quoted in Kfine v. City of Tacoma, 11 Wash. 193, 195, 39 Pac. 453 [1895]). 357 STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT. § 230 confer upon public corporations the power of levying local as- sessments must appear affirmatively. In case of fair and rea- sonable doubt as to the existence of such power, the presumption in construing the statute must be against its existence.^ If, how- ever, the entire statute, taken as a whole, shows that the legis- lature intended to confer the power of levying local assessments, full effect must be given to such intention. A grant of power to assess damages and special benefits is held to confer the power of levying a special assessment.* A grant of power is not to be limited so as to thwart the intention of the legislature.^ Thus, power to fix the time for commencing work, which is to be prosecuted to completion with reasonable diligence, and power "to extend the time so fixed from time to time," includes power to extend the time of completion." Provisions inserted for the benefit of the property owner are to be so construed as to accom- plish such purpose.'' §230. Construction of statutes authorizing assessments for per- formance of legal duty. The power of a public corporation to compel owners of land to ,. perform legal duties owing to the 'public with reference to their land and in default thereof- to perform such duty itself and to charge the land-owner with the expense thereof, is one which, if it exists at all, is construed in a much more liberal manner than the power of levying assessments on the theory of benefits.^ Since this is a true ease of exercise of the police power, a general grant of power to compel performance of a legal duty carries with it the power to enforce such performance by appropriate aud suitable means.^ Thus a general grant of power to compel ' "If there ia reasonable doubt as ' Oakland Paving Co. v. Barstow, to the existence of any such power 79 Cal. 45, 21 Pao. 514 [1889]. (i. e. the power to levy local assess- 'The People ex rel. v. City of Chi- ments for special beneiits) the pre- cage, 152 111. 546, 38 N. E. 744. sumption is that it does not exist." ' Mayor and Board of Trustees of Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Co. the Town of New Iberia v. Fontelieu, V. City of New Haven, 77 Conn. 494, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]. See 497, 59 Atl. 737 [1905]. also James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. •City of Asheville v. Wachovia 199, 4 S. W. 760 [1887]'; Nugent v. Loan & Trust Co., 143 N. C. .360, 55 City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 S. E. 800 [1906]. " So. 493 [1895]. " Oakland Paving Co. v. Barstow, ' Mayor "and Board of Trustees of 79 Cal. 45, 21 Pao. 514 [1889]. the Town of New Iberia v. Fontelieu, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901). § 231 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 358 owners of urban property to construct sidewalks in front of their lands and to keep them free from obstruction and in re- pair carries with it a grant of such powers as are necessary to carry into effect the power specifically given.' In this respect it differs from a grant of power to assess for benefits, since power to construct a given improvement which may be paid for by general taxation does not carry with it an implied power to levy a local assessment to pay for the c^t thereof. § 231. Power to construct improvement does not confer power to assess. A grant to a municipal corporation of power to construct a given form of public improvement does not of itself confer power to pay for such improvement by levying special assessments therefor.' While a grant of power carries with it, without spe- cific mention, thereof, all powers incidental to the main power granted, and reasonably adapted to carry such power into effect, the power of special assessment cannot be regarded as inci- dental to the power of constructing public improvements, since such improvements may be constructed and paid for out of funds raised by general taxation. Thus a grant of power "to grade, macadamize and pave the sidewalks and to lay out, change and open new streets," does not confer the power of levying a local assessment to pay for such improvement." A grant of power to a city to "regulate and improve all streets, alleys and sidewalks" 'Mayor and Board of Trustees of X. Y. 588 [1875]; City of Greens- the Town of New Iberia v. Fontelieu, boro v. MeAdoo, 112 N. C. 359, 17 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]. S. E. 178 [1893]; City of Raleigh v. ^Wilcoxon V. City of San Luis Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, Obispo, 101 Cal. 508, 35 Pae. 988 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Mt. Pleasant [1894]; City of Chicago v. Law, 144 Borough v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail- Ill. 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]; City road Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 L. R. of Fairfield v. RatcliflF, 20 la. 396 A. 520, 20 Atl. 1052 [1890]; Bor- [1866]; Mayor, Recorder and Alder- ough of Mauch Chunk v. Shortz, 61 men of the City of AnnapolFs v. Har- Pa. St. 399 [1869] ; Dietz v. City of wood, 32 Md. 471, 3 Am. Rep. 151 Neenah, 91 Wis. 422, 65 N. W. 500, [1870]; State v. Smith, 99 Minn. 64 N. W. 299 [1895] ; Cain v. City of 59, 108 N. W. 822 [1906]; Oster Elkins, 57 W. Va. 9, 49 S. E. 898 V. City of Jefferson, 57 Mo. App. [1905]. 485 [1894]; Goodrich v. City oi = City of Greensboro v. McAdoo, Omaha, 10 Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 424 112 N. C. 359, 17 S. E. 178 [1893]; [1880] ; State, Hoetzel, Pros. v. In- City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. habitants of East Oran94] ; sas City to the use of Adkins v. Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 143 TU. Richards, 34 Mo »rp 521 [1889]- 92, 17 L. R. A. 774, 32 X. E. 372; Wilson v. City of Auburn, 27 Neb. 365 STATUTORY AUTHOEITT FOR ASSESSMENT. § 237 fairer and more just in. the particular case is one of policy if the legal power to exercise both is given, and it is a question which can be determined more accurately by the city than by the state. The exercise of such discretion cannot, according to the great weight of authority, be controlled by the courts.^ Even if the city has in the past paid for improvements of a certain kind by general taxation, this fact will not prevent it from levy- ing special assessments for future improvements of the same kind.^ A contrary view has been expressed in Kentucky. Un- der similar statutes it has been held that the city has not the arbitrary and unlimited choice of paying for improvements, but that in such cases the city is bound to levy local assessments as a means of paying for public improvements except in cases in which local assessment would so exceed the benefits conferred as to amount in effect to a confiscation of the property assessed; and that in such case the city is bound to pay for the improve- ment by general taxation.* While this view differs from that held by the weight of authority the difference exists in the con- struction placed by the Kentucky court upon such statutes, and in the legislative intent which that court deduces from the lan- guage employed by the legislature. The city is held, it is true, to have a very limited amount of discretion; but there is no at- tempt on the T)art of the court to exercise discretion conferred upon a city. § 237. Power to tax does not abrogate power to assess. Since it is within the power of the legislature to confer upon a public corporation both the power to levy a general tax and the power to levy a local assessment, with discretion to determine in which method it will pay for the improvement in question, 435, 43 N. W. 257 [1889]; In re of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462, 6 N. E. Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513 [1872]; Astor 33 [1887]; Falch v. People ex rel. V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty Johnson, 99 111. 137 [1881]; Shelby of the City of New York, 37 N. Y. v. City of Burlington, 125 la. 343, Sup. Ct. 539 [1874]; Beers v. Dal- 101 N. W. 101 [1904]; Blanchet v. las City, 16 Or. 334, 13 Pac. 835; Municipality No. 2, 13 La. 322 In re Beechwood Avenue, Appeal of [1839]; Astor v. Mayor, Aldermen O'Mara, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. 127 and Commonalty of the City of New [1899]; Borough of Greensburg v. York, 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 539 [1874]. Young, 53 Pa. St. 280 [1866]; Mo- = McChesney v. City of Chicago, Cullough V. Village of Campbells- 152 111. 543, 38 N. E. 767 [1894]; port, 123 Wis. 334, 101 N. W. 709 ' City of Covington v. Wortliington, [1904]. 88 Ky. 206, 11 S. W. 1038, 10 S. W •People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village 790 [1889]. I 237 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 366 a grant of power by the legislature to a public corporation au- thorizing it to levy a general tax to pay for a certain kind of public improvement does not abrogate another grant of power authorizing such corporation to levy special assessments to de- fray the expense of such improvements.^ So a grant to a public corporation of authority to borrow money to pay for improve- ments of a certain class does not prevent such corporation from levying special assessments, if leg^ative authority therefor ex- ists and using the proceeds of such assessments to reimburse the city for the debt which has thus been contracted.^ Thus the statute authorized what was known as a "revolving fund" to be created as follows. The city was to issue bonds, and thus raise a fund, out of which the expense of constructing certain improvements was to be paid and into which the amount derived from local assessments levied on the property benefited by such improvements respectively was to be paid. It was held that a statute of this sort was within the power of the legislature, both as to improvements already made ' and as to improvements to be made thereafter.* Accordingly the mayor of such city could be compelled by mandamus to sign such bonds.^ A limited grant of power to levy a general tax for the expense of a public im- provement does not abrogate a pre-existing grant of power to levy a" local assessment therefor.* On the same principle a pro- vision in a state constitution, affirmatively granting the power of general taxation for a given form of improvement does not restrict or destroy the power of local assessment. A provision concerning a levee district: " . . .It may levy a tax not to exceed five mills on the taxable property situated within the alluvial portions of said districts subject to overflow,'"' does not limit the power of local assessment.' The intention of the framers ' People ex rel. Miller v. Sherman, * State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & 83 111. 165 [1876] ; Sefton v.- Board Trust Co. v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 of Commissioners of Howard County, N. W. 18 [1902]. 160 Ind. 357, 66 N. E. 891 [1903]; = State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N. Y. Trust Co. v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 26, 29 N. E. 841 [1892]; Borough of N. W. 18 [1902]. Greensburg v. Young, 53 Pa. St. 280 ° Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N. [1866]. Y. 26, 29 N. E. 841 [1892]. 'In re Beechwood Avenue, Appeal 'Article 214, Constitution of Louis- of O'Mara, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. iana. 127 [1899]. » Excelsior Planting & Manufactur- » Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 ing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623. 1 So. 873 [1887]. 367 STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOE ASSESSMENT. §§238,239 of the constitution in drafting this article was to grant a new and additional power and one which, but for such express grant, would have been forbidden by other articles of the constitution. The legislature did not intend thereby to destroy the power of local assessment which was already given." § 238. Power to assess does not abrogate power to tax. If the power of general taxation is given in a clear and un- equivocal manner, the subsequent grant of the power of levying local assessments does not abrogate the power of levying fyeneral taxes,^ since the evident intention of the legislature in cases of this kind is that the public corporation shall have the choice between these two methods of paying for a public improvement. Accordingly if the city constructs an improvement without tak- ing the steps necessary in ease of levying a local assessment, it may nevertheless be liable for the cost of such improvement and may pay therefor by general taxation. ^ If, however, the in- tention of the legislature is to deprive the municipality of the power of levying a general tax for certain improvements, and to restrict it to the levy of local assessments as the sole means of paying for such improvements, full effect must be given to such intention.^ § 239. Discretionary power to combine assessment and general taxation. The legislature, if not restrained by some specific constitu- tional provision, is not bound to choose between the alternatives " Excelsior Planting & Manufactur- luth, 45 Minn. 4, 47 N. W. 168 ing Co. V. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, [1890]; Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. 1 So. 873 [1887]. City of Fargo, 12 N. D. 360, 96 N. •Bradley v. Village of West Du- . W. 357 [1903]; State ex rel. The City luth, 45 Minn. 4, 47 N. W. 166 of Columbus v. Strader, 25 0. S. 527 [1890]; Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. [1874]; Stephens v. City of Spokane, City of Fargo, 12 N. D. 360, 96 N. 11 Wash. 41, 39 Pac. 266 [1895]; W. 357 [1903]; Stephens v. City of Soule v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. 315 Spokane, 11 Wash. 41, 39 Pac. 266 33 Pac. 384, 1080 [1893]. [i895]; Soule v. City of Seattle, 6 "See Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. Wash. 315, 33 Pac. 384, 1080 [1893]; 154 [1852] where the power to levy McCullough V. Village of Campbells- local assessments for the construe- port, 123 Wis. 334, 101 N. W. 709 tion of sidewalks existed, but it was [1904]; Allen v. City of Janesville, doubted, though not decided, whether 35 Wis. 403 [1874]. the power to levy local taxes for "Bradley v. Village of West Du- such purpose existed. § 239 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 368 providing for payment of the cost of an improvement solely by general taxation and of providing for such payment solely by local assessment. It may, in its discretion, provide that the im- provement in question shall be paid for in part by local assess- ment and in part by general taxation.^ Statutes are not infre- quent in which the legislature provides that a certain fixed por- tion of the cost shall be borne by the. property owners and the rest of the cost shall be borne by tSe city. Such provisions are upheld except in jurisdictions in which the assessment of the cost of an improvement or of a fixed portion thereof upon the owners of property benefited by such improvement, without a pre- liminary inquiry as to the existence and amount of the benefits conferred upon such property owners by the amount of such benefits, and without a specific restriction of the amount of as- sessment to the amount of such benefits, is unconstitutional.^ Even in the latter case, however, the objection is not to the use of general taxation and local assessment together, but to the imposition of a local assessment in excess of benefits. Statutes which provide that the land benefited by the improvement shall be assessed up to the extent of- the special benefit conferred by the improvement and that the rest of the cost of such improve- ment shall be paid by the public corporation out of funds raised by general taxation are held valid.^ 1 Brown v. Drain, 112 Fed. 582 40 N. J. L. (11 Vr.) 244 [1878]; [1901]; People ex rel. Miller v. Slier- Smith v. Mayor and Common Coun- man, 83 III. 165 [1876]; St. John v. cil of the City of Newark, 32 N. J. Citv of East St. Louis, 50 111. 92 Eq. (5 Stew.) 1 [1880]; In the Mat- [1869]; State ex rel. Horrall v. ter of the Application of Church for Thompson, 109 Ind. 533, 10 N. E. 305 the Appointment" of Commissioners, [1886]; Zumbro v. Parnin, 141 Ind. etc., 92 N. Y. 1 [1883]; Town of 430, 40 N. E. 1085 [1895]; City of Muskegon v. Drainage Commission- Terre Haute v. Blake, 9 Ind. App. ers, 78 Wis. 40, 47 N. W. 11 [1890]. 403, 36 N. E. 932 [1893] ; Richardson = See § 114, et seq.; § 709. V. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 [1862]; 'State, Youngster, Pros. v. Mayor Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. and Aldermen of Paterson, 40 N. J. 336 [1876]; State, Younorster, Pros. L. (11 Vr.) 244 [1878]. V. Mayor and Aldermen of Paterson, CHAPTER VII. BY WHAT AUTHORITY ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 240. Questions involved in discussion of power to levy assess- ment. The question of the power of various public bodies to levy local assessments is one which is not infrequently presented for judicial consideration. It involves certain fundamental theories of the organization, and powers of our state governments, and of the legislative branches thereof. Upon these principles, fun- damental and elementary as they may appear to be, there is a marked lack of harmony among the different courts. The chief of the general fundamental questions involved in this subject, are the following: (1) The legislature is a body of delegated power, having those powers conferred upon it by the people of the state, speaking through the constitution of such state. Has the legislature the power to create inferior public corporations, and to delegate to them the governmental powers, including the power of taxation, and the power of special assessment, which have been conferred upon the legislature by the people of the state? (2) If the legislature has the power of creating inferior public corporations for the purposes of local self-gov- ernment, is the legislature bound to confer upon such public corporations matters which involve local self-government, includ- ing local taxation and special assessment, or may the legislature exercise such powers itself by direct legislative act? (3) If the legislature has power to create inferior public .corporations for purposes of local self-government, is it bound to admit the people within the territorial jurisdiction of such inferior corporation to the control of such corporation; or, on the other hand, has the legislature power to create an inferior public corporation without the will of the persons who are subject to its jurisdic- tion, and without giving them any opportunity to choose its offi- cers, or otherwise to control its public action? §241. Power of legislature to levy assessment. The power of local assessment is sometimes exercised directly by the legislature itself, without the intervention of any inter- 369 §241 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 370 mediate public corporation. In the absence of any specific con- stitutional provision, it is generally assumed by the courts, and often held specifically, that the legislature has power to levy local assessments directly.^ In the absence of specific constitu- tional provision, it seems to be assumed that the legislature may fix such elements of an assessment as leave to the local public corporation merely the perfunctory duty of carrying into execu- tion the mandates of the legislature.- So the legislature may fix the amount of an assessment for sewer purposes at a certain amount per front foot,' or it may determine the amount to be raised for a given improvement and the district to be taxed therefor.* The power of the legislature to confirm a contract, which has been attacked on the ground of fraud, by enacting a special confirmatory statute and providing for an assessment to pay the cost of such improvement has been questioned by the 1 Matter of City of New York, 190 N. Y. 350, sub nomine; In re Water Front in City of New York, 83 N. E. 299 [1907]; (modifying judgment, 105 N. Y. S. 750, 120 App. Div. 849) ; In the Matter of the Application of Van Antwerp to Vacate an Assess- ment, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [1892]. ^ Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (af- firming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]. ' People of the State of New York ex rel. Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 [1902]. ' Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (af- firming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); King V. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 52 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; "The legisla- ture may commit the ascertainment of the sum to be raised and of the benefited district to commissioners, but it is not bound to do so, and may settle both questions for itself; and when it does so its action is neces- sarily conclusive and beyond review. Here an improvement has been or- dered and jnade, the expense of which might justly have been imposed upon adjacent property benefited by the change. By the act of 1881 the leg- islature imposes the unpaid portion of the cost and expenses upon that portion of the property benefited which has thus far borne none of the burden. In so doing, it necessarily determines two things, viz., the amount to be realized and the prop- erty specially benefited by the ex- penditure of that amount. The lands might have been benefited by the im- provement, and so the legislative de- termination that they were, and to what amount or proportion of the cost even if it may have been mis- takenly unjust, is not open to oui review. The question of special bene- fit and the property to which it ex- tends is of necessity a question of fact, and when the legislature deter- mines it in a case within its general power, its decision must of course be final." Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 T1885]; (af- firmed as Spencer v. Merchant, 125 V. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888] ; (quoted in Parsons v. District of Co- lumbia, 170 U. S. 45, 53, 54, 52 L, 943, 18 S. 521 [1898]). 371 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 242 lower courts of New York,* but on the other hand has been recognized by such courts." A statute appropriating a certain sum for repaying and repairing streets has been held to be val- id ;' and where in obedience to such law the council passes an ordinance appropriating such sum to such purpose, the work is regarded as being done by authority of the legislature and not by authority of the council.^ § 242. Specific provisions restricting power of legislature to levy assessments. Specific constitutional provisions, however, which are in force in some states, secure local self-government, and prevent the legislature from levying taxes or local assessments directly. The constitution of California provides: "The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns, or other public or municipal corporation, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal pur- poses ; but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such pur- poses. ' ' ^ Under this provision the legislature has no power to levy a local assessment directly within an incorporated city.^ Thus under a special act concerning a swamp land reclamation district, by which the trustees were required to make up a sworn statement of the cost of the reclamation work "based upon the books and vouchers thereof," and the amount so reported was to be assessed upon the lands, it was held that this was in effect a levy by the legislature of an assessment upon the lands of the ■ In the Matter of Regulating and ' Constitution of California, Arti- Grading Eightieth Street between cle XI., § 12. Fifth Avenue and the East River, 31 " Schumacker v. Toberman, 56 Cal. How. (N. Y.) 99 [1865]. 508 [1880]; People v. Houston, 54 "In the Matter of the Petition of Cal. 536 [1880]; Brady v. King, 53 the President, Managers and Com- Cal. 44 [1878]; People of the State pany of the Delaware & Hudson Ca- of California v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, nal Co. to Vacate an Assessment, 60 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]; "Nor can Hun. (N. Y.) 204, 14 N. Y. Supp. the legislature, by a direct act, make 585 [1891]. an assessment within an incorporated 'Brady v. Mayor of the City of city." Schumacker v. Toberman, 56 New York, 35 How. (N. V.) 81 Cal. 508, 511 [1880]; (citing Tay- [1868]. lor V. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240, [1866]; "Brady v. Mayor of the City of People of the State of California v. New York, 35 How. (N. Y.) 81 Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 [1875] ). [1868]. § 243 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 372 district, and that the act was accordingly unconstitutional.* The legislature may, however, authorize the board of supervisors of a county to levy an assessment to pay bonds of irrigation dis- tricts if the directors of such irrigation districts neglect to levy such assessments.* Under a provision in the constitution forbid- ding a "special act for the assessment or collection of taxes, "^ an act authorizing the improvement of certain streets in the third ward of the city of Milwaukee and the levy of a special tax in such ward therefor has been held valid as an amendment to the city charter and not an act for assessment of taxes." Un- der an earlier provision _of the constitution of Illinois,^ it was held that local assessments could not be imposed on a locality without the consent of the property owners affected.' § 243. Power of Congress to levy assessment. A corresponding question has been considered in cases in which the Congress of the United States has provided for local assess- ments in the District of Columbia, and it has been held that Congress has complete jurisdiction over the District of Colum- bia,^ and that this power includes the right to provide for the levy and collection of local assessments.^ It is also competent 'People V. Houston, 54 Cal. 536 ing Davidson v. Wight, 16 App. D. [1880]. C. 371 [1900]); Parsons v. District 'Nevada National Bank v. Board of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, of Supervisors of Kern County, 5 18 S. 521 [1898]; Bauman v. Ross, Cal.. App. 638, 91 Pac. 122 [1907]. 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 » Article IV., § 31, Subdivision 6, [1897]; Shoemaker v. United States, Amendments to the Constitution of 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. 170, 13 S. 361 Wisconsin. [1893]; Gibbons v. District of Co- » Warner v. Knox, 50 Wis. 429, 7 lumbia, 116 U. S. 404, 6 S. 427; Mat- N. W. 372 [1880]. tingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. '"The corporate authorities of S. 687, 24 L. 1098 [1878]; Willard counties, townships, school districts, v. Presbury, 81 U. S. (14 Wall) 676 cities, tovirns and villages may be 20 L. 719 [1869]. vested with power to assess and col- = Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 3?1, lect taxes for corporate purposes, 45 L. 900, 21 S. 616 [1901]; (revers- such taxes to be uniform in respect ing Davidson v. Wight, 16 App. D, to persons and property within the C. 371 [1900]); Parsons v. District jurisdiction of the body improving of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. the same." Article IX., § 5, Consti- 943, 18 S. 521 [1893]; Wilson v. tution of Illinois [1848J. Lambert, 168 U. S.- 611, 42 L. 599, 'Updike V. Wright, 81 111. 49 18 S. 217 [1897]; (reversing Craig- [1876]. hill V. Van Riswick, 8 App. D. C. 'Wiaht V. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 185 [1896]); Bauman v. Ross, 167 45 L. 900, 21 S. 616 [1901] ; (revers- U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 968 373 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 244 for Congress to provide that an assessment of a certain amount shall be levied upon property abutting on improvements of a certain character and that its action thus taken is conclusive of the question of benefits to abutting property.' An example of the exercise of power of this sort is found in a statute pro- viding for an assessment of one dollar and twenty-five cents per lineal front foot on all land abutting upon a street, road or alley in which a water main should be laid. Such a statute was held to be within the power of Congress.* §244. Legislative delegation of power to levy local assessment. Much more frequently than the attempt of the legislature to levy local assessments directly or by its own act, are its at- tempts to delegate to public corporations of various kinds the power to levy local assessments. This attempt has been attacked as unconstitutional, on the theory that the power of the legisla- ture is itself merely a delegated power, and that the creation of such inferior public corporations, with power to tax and levy local assessments, is a delegation of power which itself is dele- gated. Prom the standpoint of abstract logic, it might seem difficult to answer objections of this sort. Here, as in other cases, the effect of the written constitution is greatly modified by the pre-existing practice in force when the constitution was adopted. At the time of the adoption of written constitutions in the United States, public corporations existed everywhere for the purposes of local self-government, and the existence of such corporations is often recognized indirectly by the written consti- tutions. It has always been felt that the written constitutions were not intended to subvert the existing form of government in this country, except where specific provisions are manifestly inconsistent with prior practices. Indeed, it has been felt that written constitutions were intended to preserve and perpetuate local self-government, rather than to subvert and destroy it. The whole spirit of the written constitutions assumes the existence of local self-government. Accordingly it is held that in the [1897]; Shoemaker v. United States, "Parsons v. District of Columbia, 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. 170, 13 S. 361 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 [1893]; Mattingly v. District of Co- [1898]. lumbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098 'Parsons v. District of Columbia, [1878]; Willard v. Presbury, 81 U. 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 S. (14 Wall) 676, 20 L. 719 [1869]. [1898]. §244 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 374 absence of specific constitutional provisions the legislatures have the power to delegate to inferior public corporations powers of local self-government, including the power to levy assessments.^ '■ French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]; (affirming Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. §34, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 [1897] ; (reversing District of Colum- bia V. Armes, 8 App. D. C. 393 [1896] ; Bauman v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896]; Abbott v. Ross, 9 App D. C. 289 [1896]); Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899] ; City Street Improve- ment Co. V. Babcock, 139 Cal. 690, 73 Pac. 666 [1903] ; Capron v. Hitch- cock, 98 Cal. 427, 33 Pac. 431 [1893] ; Ede V. Cogswell, 79 Cal. 278, 71 Pac. Rep. 767 [1889]; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887]; Recla- mation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. Rep. 945 [1884]; Reclamation District No. 3 v. Gold- man, 61 Cal. 205 [1882]; People ol the State of California v. Lynch, 51 Cal. i5, 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]; -Wolflf v. City of Denver, 20 Colo. App. 135, 77 Pac. 364 [1904]; Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Com- pany V. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 442, 53 Atl. 690 [1903]; Angus v. City of Hartford, 74 Conn. 27, 49 Atl. 192 [1901]; Todd v. Macfarland, 20 App. D. C. 176 [1902]; District of Columbia v. Wormley, 15 App. D. C. 58 [1899]; Allman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894] ; Madderom v. City of Chicago, 194 III. 572, 62 N. E. 846 [1902]; Andrews V. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 173 m. 123, 50 N. E. 335 [1898]; People ex rel. Gleason v. Yancey, 167 111. 255, 47 N. E. 521 [1897]; Delamater V. City of Chicago, 158 HI. 575, 42 N. E. 444 [1895]; Tucker v. People ex rel. Wall, 156 111. 108, 40 N. E. 451 [1895]; Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Steele v. Village of River Forest, 141 111.' 302, 30 N. E. 1034 [1893] ; Coch- ran V. Village of Park Ridge, 138 111. 295, 27 N. E. 939 [1893]; Murphy v..|City of Peoria, 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]; Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1888] ; Iledzie v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 114 111. 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]; Skinner v. City of Chi- cago, 42 111. 52 [1866]; City of Chi- cago V. Wright, 32 111. 192 [1863]; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 71 Kyi (8 Bush.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871]; Surget v. Chase, 33 La. Ann. 833 [1881]; O'Leary v. Sloo, 7 La. Ann. 25 [1852]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43 [1894]; May- or and City Council of Baltimore V. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880]; Dashiell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, use of Hax, 45 Md. 615 [1876]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449 [1865]; Workman v. City of Worcester, 118 Mass. 168 [1875]; Butler V. City of Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 [1873]; Godbold v. City of Chelsea, 111 Mass. 294 [1873]; Prince V. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 226; [1872] ; Whiting v. Mayor and Alder- men of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 [1870]; Jones v. Board of Alder- men of the City of Boston, 104 Mass. 461 [1870]; Chandler v. Heisler, — Mich. , 116 N. W. 626 [1908] ; Kellogg V. Village of Janesville, 34 Minn. 132, 24 N. W. 359 [1886]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Burger v. District Court of Ram- sey County, 33 Minn. 295; 23 N. W. 222 [1885]; Wilzinski v. City of Greenville, 85 Miss. 393, 37 So. 807 [1905] ; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900] ; City of Spring- field to use of Central National Bank V. Weaver, 137 Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 375 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §245 § 245. Specific corporations to which power of levying local as- sessment may be given — Existing municipal corpora- tions. It being assumed that the legislature may confer upon in- ferior public corporations the power to levy local assessments, the question of its power to authorize specific existing corpora- tions to levy local assessments presents few difficulties. Prom this general principle it follows that statutes which confer upon cities the power of levying local assessments, are valid.^ Thus 509, 39 S. W. 276 [1896]; Eyerman V. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 [1883]; Smith V. Tobener, 32 Mo. App. 601 [1888]; City of St. Louis v. Stod- dard, 15 Mo. App. 173 [1884]; Far- rington v. City of Mt. Vernon, 166 N. Y. 233, 59 N. E. 826 [1901]; Mc- Laughlin V. Miller, 124 N. Y. 510, 26 N. E. 1104 [1891J; In the matter of the Petition of the New York Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb to Vacate an Assess- ment, 121 N. Y. 134, 24 N. E.'378 [1890]; In the matter of the Appli- cation of Tappan to Vacate Certain Assessments, 54 Barb. 225 [1869]; Gilbert v. Havemeyer, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 506 [1849]; City of Greens- boro V. McAdoo, 112 N. C. 359, 17 S. E. 178 [1893]; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32, 17 L. R. A. 330, 14 S. E. 521 [18921; Eriekaon v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okla. 405, 68 Pac. 511 [1902]; Beers V. Dalles City, 16 Or. 334, 18 Pac. 835 [1888]; Frederick Street, Han- over Borough's Appeal, 150 Pa. St. 202, 24 Atl. 669 [1892]; Hand v. Fellows, 148 Pa. St. 456, 23 Atl. 1126 [1892]; City of Reading V. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. 788 [1889]; Rounds v. Mum- ford, 2 R. I. 154 [1852]; Tay- lor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]; Sands v. City of Richmond, 31 Grat- tan, 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]; Norfolk City v. Ellis, 26 Grattan, 224 [1875];' Heath v. McCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 [1898]; State of V/ashington on the Relation of Heman v. City of Ballard, 16 Wash. 418, 47 Pac. 970 [1897]; City of Ballard v. West Coast Improve- ment Co., 15 Wash. 572, 46 Pac. 1055 [1896]; Town of Medical Lake V. Smith, 7 Wash. 195, 34 Pao. 835 [1893]; McNair v. Ostrander, 1 Wash. 110, 23 Pac. 414 [1890]; City of Seattle v. Yesler, 1 Wash. Terr. 577 [1878]; Boyd v. City of Milwau- kee, 92 Wis. 456, 66 N. W. 603 [1896]; Johnson v. City of Milwau- kee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270 [1894]. ' French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]; (affirming Barber As- phalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]); Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899] ; Ahem v. Board of Improvement Dis- trict No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901] ; Rector v. Board of Improvement, 50 Ark. 116, 6 S. W. 519 [1887] ; Watldns v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 344, 27 S. W. 234 [1894]; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057 [1896]; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 Pac. 615 [1887]; People of the State of California v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]; City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 Colo. 162, 80 Pao. 142 [1905]; City of Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; Wolff V. City of Denver, 20 Colo. App. 135. 77 Pac. 364 [1904]; Bassett v. Citv of New Haven, 76 §245 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 376 Congress can confer upon the city of Washington and the Dis- Conn. 70, 55 Atl. 579 [1903]; Bar- tram V. City of Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 122, 10 Atl. 470 [1887]; Gregory V. City of Bridgeport, 52 Conn. 40 [1884] ; Fair Haven & Westville Rail- road Company v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 442, 53 Atl. 960 [1903]; The Norwich Savings Society v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. 570 [1881]; Nichols v. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 60 Am. Dec. 636 [1854]; Murphy v. Mayor and Council of the City of Wilmington, 6 Houst. (Del.) 108, 22 Am. St. Rep. 345 [1880] ; Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Sa- vannah, 91 Ga. 500, 17 S. E. 749 [1893]; City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 111. 528, 75 N. E. 1044 [1905]; Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894] ; Light- ner v. City of Peoria, 150 111. 80; 37 N. E. 69 ]1894]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; Linck V. City of Lichtfleld, 141 111. 469, 31 N. E. 123 [1893]; Huston v. Ciark, 112 in. 344 [1885]; Potwin v. John- son, 108 111. 70 [1883]; Faleh v. People ex rel. Johnson, 99 HI. 137 [1881] ; People ex rel. Miller v. Sher- man, 83 111. 165 [1876]; Greeley v. People of the State of Iliuois, 60 111. 19 [1871]; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Com- pany V. Oglesby, 165 Ind. 542, 76 N. E. 165 [1905] ; Cason v. City of Leba- non, 153 Ind. 567; 55 N. E. 768 [1899]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. V. Edgerton, 125 Ind. 455; 25 N. E. 436 [1890]; Leeds v. City of Rich- mond, 102 Ind. 372, 1 N. E. 711 [1885]; Bradley v. McAtee, 70 Ky. (7 Bush.) 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309 [1870] ; City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 2 B. Monroe (Ky.) 177, 36 Am. Dec. 594 [1841]; City of Lexington v. ■McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana (Ky.) 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 [1840]; Ex- celsior Planting & Manufacturing Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]; Surget v. Chase, 33 La. Ann. 833 [1881]; Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore v. Johns Hop- kins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880]; Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 92 Mich. 564, -52 N. W. 1028 [1892]; Hoyt V. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 3», 2 Am. Rep. 76 [1869]; Burns v. City of Duluth, 96 Minn. 104, 104 N. W. 714 [1905]; State of Minne- sota ex rel. Merrick, v. District Court of Hennepin County, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 [1885]; City of Seda- lia to use of Sedalia National Bank V. Donohue, 190 Mo. 407, 89 S. W. 386 [1905]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. V. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. E. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]; Heman V. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]; City of St. Joseph v. An- thony, 30 Mq. 537 [I860]; City of Excelsior Springs to use of McCor- mick v. Etteuson, 120 Mo. App. 215, 96 S. W. 701 [1906]; City of Excelsior Springs to use of McC!or- mick V. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., — Mo. App. — , 96 S. W. 707 [1906] ; Medland v. Linton, 60 Neb. 249, 82 N. W. 866 [1900]; Durrell v. City of Woodbury, 74 N. J. L. (45 Vr.) 206, 65 Atl. 198 [1906]; In the Matter of City of New York, 190 N. Y. 350, sub nomine; In re Water Front in City of New York, 83 N. E. 299 [1907]; (modifying judgment 105 N. Y. S. 750, 120 App. Div. 849 ) ; McLaughlin v. Miller, 124 N. Y. 510, 26 N. E. 1104 [1891]; In the matter of the Application of Church for the Appointment of Com- missioners, etc., 92 N. Y. 1 [1883]; City of Asheville v. Wachovia Loan & Trust Co., 143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 800 [1906] ; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32; 17 L. R. A. 330; 14 S. E. 521 [1892]; Portland Lumber- ing & Manufacturing Co. v. City of East Portland, 18 Or. 21, 6 L. R. A. 290, 22 Pac. 536 [1889]; Charleston v. Werner, 38 S. C. 488, 37 Am. St. Rep. 776; 17 S. E. 33 [1892]; Nash- 377 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 245 trict of Columbia the power to .evy .ocal assessments.^ In like manner the power of the legislature to confer the power of local assessment upon other public corporations, or quasi-corpora- tions such as counties,* or townships,* is everywhere recognized. If a public corporation has been annexed to a larger one,° or has been dissolved and has become a part of an incorporated town- ship," the officials of the corporation into which it is thus merged are the ones who have authority to levy assessments within the territory of such f (>rmer corporations. The assessment is to be made according to the charter of the resulting city if this differs from the law applicable to the original corporation.^ If a municipality is annexed, under statutory proceedings, by a larger municipality after an assessment is levied, but before the construction of the im- provement for which said assessment is levied, the city into which said municipality is merged may discontinue the assessment pro- ceeding and abandon the improvement.* An ordinance enacted by a public corporation while organized as a town, remains its ordinance after it is organized as an incorporated village." A drainage district is held to change to one organized under the levee act, by virtue of a popular vote for such change, when the record of the certificate of the county clerk, showing that a majority of the votes cast at such election were for a change of organization, is filed.^" ville V. Berry, 2 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.) Board of County Commissioners, 13 561; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533; Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1895]. Lovenberg v. City of Galveston, 17 ' Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 0. S. Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 S. W. 1024 349; Eeeves v. Treasurer of Wood [1897]; Hemen v. City of Ballard, County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]; Ander- 40 Wash. 81, 82 Pac. 277 [1905]; son v. Lower Merlon Township, 217 City of Seattle v. Yesler, 1 Wash. Pa. St. 369; 68 Atl. 1115 [1907]. Terr. 577 [1878]; State ex rel. Bur- ^Gilpin v. City of Ansonia, 68 bank v. City of Superior, 81 Wis. Conn. 72, 35 Atl. 777; City of Clii- 649, 51 N. W. 1014 [1892]. cago v. Weber, 94 111. App. 561; Bar- ^Mattingly v. District of Colum- ber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Field, — bia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098 [1878]. Mo. App. , 111 S. W. 907 [1908]. Willard v. Presbury, 81 U. S. (14 "Adams v. County of Piscataquis, Wall.) 676, 20 L. 719 [1869]. 87 Me. 503, 33 Atl. 12. ° Dowlan v. Sibley County, 36 ' Gilpin v. City of Ansonia, 68 Minn. 430, 31 N. W. 517; Darst v. Conn. 72, 35 Atl. 777. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 N. W. 819 » City of Chicago v. Weber, 94 111. [1891]; State of Nebraska ex rel. App. 561 [1900]. Abbott V. Board of County Commis- "Neff v. Bates, 25 0. S. 169. aioners of Dodge County, 8 Neb. 124, " Drainage District No. 3 v. The 30 Am. Rep. 819 [1879]; Seanor v. People ex rel. Baron, 147 111. 404; 35 N. E. 238. §§ 246, 247 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 378 § 246. De facto municipal corporations. If the public corporation, which has constructed an improve- ment and levied an assessment therefor, is assuming to act under legal authority, and is at least a corporation de facto, the legality of its incorporation cannot be questioned in a proceeding to en- force the assessment.^ While a city may levy a re-assessment after re-incorporating, for an improvement constructed under the defective incorporation,^ the mere ndct of re-incorporating does not make prior assessments valid.' The legislature may legalize the re-incorporation of towns and cities which up to that time had been illegally incorporated and may make the contracts of such towns and cities legally binding.* § 247. Assessment districts. Somewhat different from the foregoing questions, is the ques- tion of the power of the legislature to create a public corporation,, or quasi corporation, for the primary purpose of levying local assessments. The exercise of this power usually takes the form of the creation of an assessment district, consisting of the prop- erty which it is assumed will be benefited by the proposed im- provement, and the conferring upon some board, public body, and the like, the power to levy local assessments in such district. The power of the legislature to create an assessment district con- sisting of the land which is benefited by the improvement, is very generally recognized in the absence of some specific con- stitutional restriction.^ The question of the finality of the legis- ' Swamp Land District v. Silver, • Abernathy v. Town of Medical 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pae. 866 [1895]; Mul- Lake, 9 Wash. 112, 37 Pac. 306 likin V. City of Bloomington, 72 Ind. [1894]. 161 ; Eedden v. Town of Covington, ^ Minnesota & M. Land Improve- 29 Ind. 118; Willard v. Albertson, ment Co. v. City of Billings, 111 23 Ind. App. 164, 53 X. B. 1077, 54 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; N. E. 403 [1899] ; City of St. Louis Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern R. V. Stoddard, 15 Mo. App. 173; con- R. Co. v. Board of Directors of St. tra, Medical Lake v. Smith, 7 Wash. .Francis Levee District, 80 Ark. 316, 195, 34 Pac. 835. See also City 97 S. W. 281 [1906]; Crane v. Si- of Ballard v. West Coast Improve- loam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. ment Co., 15 Wash. 572, 46 Pac. 955 [1899]; City of Little Rock v, 1055. Board of Improvements, etc., 42 Ark. ^ State ex rel. Heman v. Ballard, 152 [1883]; Carson v. St. Francis 16 Wash. 418, 47 Pac. Hep. 970. Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. "Medical Lake v. Smith, 7 Wash. 590 [1894]; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 195, 34 Pac. 835. 370, 3 S. W. 184; Hensley v. Recla- 379 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §247 lative act in determining that the property within such district is benefited, is considered elsewhere.^ On the other hand it has been said the legislature cannot authorize a city to make "a pri- vate property of small extent assume the name of an assessment district. ' ' ■' The existence of an assessment district may be shown by subsequent legislation which recognizes such exist- ence.* Mere failure to exercise its powers does not terminate its existence ^ in the absence of legislation depriving it of its powers or of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. An assessment district, such as a drainage or reclamation dis- trict, must be organized in substantial compliance with the statu- tory provisions on the subject. Under the provisions of some statutes an assessment district, such as for example, a drainage district, is organized by presenting a petition, signed as required by law. to the proper court, and by the action of the court in mation District No. 556, 121 Cal. 96, 53 Pac. 401 ; Swamp Land District V. Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1895]; Reclamation District No. 124 V. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887]; Reclamation Dis- trict No. 108 V. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [ 1884] ; Rogne v. People ex rel. Goedtner, 224 ni. 449, 79 N. E. 662 [1906] ; Carr v. People ex rel. Goedtner, 224 111. 160, 79 N. E. 648 [1906]; Smith v. People ex rel. De- trick, 140 111. 355, 29 N. B. 676 [1893]; Springer v. Watters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]; Wilson ^■. Board of Trustees of the Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 111. 443; 27 N. E. 203 [1891]; People ex rel. Mil- ler V. Scott, 132 111. 427, 23 N. E. 1119; Kilgour v. Drainage Commis- sioners, 111 111. 342; Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]; Dunham v. People ex rel. Mc- Crea, 96 111. 331 [1880]; People ex rel. Miller v. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875] ; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, ,154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899]; Board of Commissioners of County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; City of Kansas City V. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903] ; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1-874]; Meier V. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Mound City Land & Stock Co. V. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]; City of St. Louis V. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S.' W. 910 [1888]; Hilliard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332 [1896]. "See § 552 et seq. 'City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. 503, 509, 37 N. W. 11 [1888], (citing Clay V. City of Grand Rapids, 60 Mich. 451, 27 X. W. 596 [1886]. This, however, was a case of appro- priating a part of a tract of land and assessing one-half of the expense back on the residue not taken; a proceeding which in some jurisdic- tions has been held to be objection- able without regard to the area of the district. See §§ 308, 702. * Swamp Land District v. Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1895]. Reclamation District No. 124 V. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]. ° Swamp Land District v. Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1895]. § 247 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 380 finding that a proper petition has been presented and that the improvement petitioned for is necessary." The fact that the peti- tion is referred to the drainage commissioners within a shorter time than that specified by statute, is held not to invalidate the proceedings.'' If an organized public corporation, such as a city or village, determines that a specified portion of the lands with- in its limits needs drainage, and sets such lands apart as. a dis- trict to be drained, this amounts to an organization of a drain- age district, and no preliminary petition is necessary.^ If the authorities of a city or village have power to lay off assessment districts, their determination that a particular portion of lands within the limits of such village or city needs draining amounts to a virtual organization of such land as a drainage district and dispenses with the necessity of a "petition by the owners of land in such districts." Provision is made for a hearing of a quasi judi- cial character before a court of competent jurisdiction for the pur- pose of passing upon the necessity' of the public improvement which it is sought to make and for determining what land will be benefited thereby and the boundaries of the assessment dis- trict.^" If a drainage district be by popular vote re-organized under a different statute, a change of organization is effected from the time that the record of the certificate of the proper officer is filed showing that a majority of the votes cast at such election were for such re-organization.^^ The swamp land clerk may sign a notice for a meeting to re-organize a reclamation district.^^ If a drainage district is wholly within a county, re- port should be made to the board of supervisors of such county." Under some statutes, a drainage association is provided for which must be organized by preparing and filing articles of association » Commissioners of Mason & Taz- " Gauen v. Moredoek & Ivy Land- enill Special Drainage District v. ing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 995 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]. [1891]; Blake v. The People for use ''Drainage District No. 3 v. Peo- of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]; pie ex rel. Baron, 147 111. 404, 35 McBride v. State for use of Clandy, N. E. 238 [1894]. 130 Ind. 325, 30 N. E. 699 [1891]. "Eeclamation District No. 3 v. 'McBride v. State for use of Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 Clandy, 130 Ind. 325, 30 N. E. 699 [1884]. [1891]. • "Swamp Land District No. 150 v. 'Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pae. 866 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 346 [1888]. [1893]. ° Villasre of Hyde Park v. Spencer, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1888]. 381 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 247 showing the land to be drained and the nature of the improve- ment.^* If the articles of association do not show with sufifl- cient certainty the nature of the improvement/^ or the land to be affected thereby/" such articles are insufficient to form a drainage association under such statutes. A slight variance be- tween the corporate name and the name in which the assessment is levied is immaterial. ^^ Thus, if the name in the articles of association is "The Arctic Ditchers" and the assessment of bene- fits is in the name of "The Arctic Ditchers' Association," such variance is not fatal to the assessment on appeal.^* If the land to be drained was described with sufficient accuracy it was not necessary to describe the precise method of draining.^" A drain- ing association under the early Indiana statute had no corporate existence and no power to make a valid assessment until its articles of association had been recorded.^" If the owners of certain lands voluntarily connect the system for the drainage of such lands with the system already constructed by an exist- ing drainage district, they are regarded as in legal effect annex- ing themselves with such drainage district. ^^ A drainage district cannot be so laid out as to include lands which cannot possibly be drained by the system available for draining the rest of the lands in such district.^^ Under statutes which provide therefor, a drainage district may be so laid out as to cross township or county lines. ^' "Smith V. Duck Pond Ditching ^Eel River Draining Association Association, 54 Ind. 235 [1876]; v. Carriger, 30 Ind. 213 [1868]. Chase v. Arctic Ditchers, 43 Ind. 74 "' People ex rel. etc., v. Drainage [1873]; West v. BuUsliin Prairie Commissioners, District No. 1 of Ditching Company, 32 Ind. 138 Town of Young America, 143 111. [1869]. 417, 32 N. E. 688 [1893]; Streuter ^ Smith V. Duck Pond Ditching v. Willow Creek Drainage District, Association, 54 Ind. 235 [1876]; 72 111. App. 561 [1897]. West V. Bullskin Prairie Ditching ""Klinger v. The People ox rel. Company, 32 Ind. 138 [1869]. Conkle, 130 111. 509, 22 N. E. 600 "Smith V. Duck Pond Ditching [1890]. Association, 54 Ind. 235 [1876]. ^ Scott v. The People ex rel. "Chase v. Arctic Ditchers, 43 Ind. Lewis, 120 111. 129, 11 N. E. 408 74 [1873]. [1889]; Commissioners of Highwcaya " Chase v. Arctic Ditchers, 43 Ind. of the Town .of Colfax v. Commis- 74 [1873]. sioners. East Lake Fork Special " Seyberger v. Calumet Draining Drainage District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. Company, 33 Ind. 330 [1870]. E. 206 [1890]. §248 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 382 § 248. Assessment district, including parts of other political corporations. In laying off such assessment district, the legislature is, in the absence of specific constitutional restriction, not bound to pay any attention to the boundaries of pre-existing political subdi- visions of the state/ In this respect the power of local assess- ment differs from the power of general taxation. An assess- ment apportioned according to Btenefits may be levied upon a district laid out without regard to the boundaries of existing political districts, while the power of levying general taxation can be conferred only upon existing political districts.^ The assessment district thus created may include the entire area of a eity.^ It may, and more often does, include a part of the area of a city consisting of that part of the city which will be specially benefited by the proposed improvement.* A statute which provides for local assessments upon real property in any natural division of a city benefited thereby prevents the authorities from going ' Reclamation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884] ; Kedzie v. West Chicago Park Com- missioners, 114 111. 280, 2 N. E. 182, 6 N. E. 48 [1886]; Board of Com- missioners of County of Mon 'oe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 [I860]; State, Freeholders of Hudson V. Road Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 608 [1880]; Makemson v. Kauflfman, 35 0. S. 444; Commissioners of Putnam County v. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880]; "There being no constitutional prohibition the legislature may create a district for that special purpose or they may tax a class of lands or persons bene- fited to be designated by the public agents appointed for that purpose without reference to town, county or district lines." People ex rel. Grif- fin V. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; (quoted Matter of Sackett Street, 4 Hun. 92, 93 [1875]). ''State, Lydecker, Pros. v. Drainage and Water Commissioners of the Township of Englewood, 41 N. J. L. •(12 Vr.) 154 [1879]. ' Minnesota arid M. Land Improve- ment Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; Crane V. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark, 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]; Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]. * Crescent Hotel Co. v. Bradley, 81 Ark, 286, 98 S. W. 971 [1906]; Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]; Village of Hyde Park V. Spencer, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1888]; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E, 114 [1899]; City of Kansas City v. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; Voight v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 547, 82 N. W. 253 [1900]; (affirmed 184 U. S. 115, 22 S. 337 [1902]); Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; St. Louis v. Ran- ken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S. W. 910 [1888]; Hilliard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]. 383 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 249 out of a natural division of the city for the purpose of laying out an assessment district.' Certain improvements will confer benefits alike upon land within cities and land without. In such cases the legislature has power to lay off assessment districts, in- eluding city and county alike. A road district," or a drainage dis- trict may be so created as to include both city and county.'' Cer- tain forms of improvement may confer benefits upon two or more cities or towns. In such cases the legislature has power to lay off an assessment district containing two or more cities or towns.** A drainage district may be formed including two or more town- ships." A reclamation district may be authorized which runs across county lines.^" A road district may be created less in area than the pre-existing political subdivision in which it is located.^^ One drainage district may be created within the limits of another drainage district.^^ However, the same tract of land cannot be so placed in two assessment districts that it can be assessed twice for the same improvement." § 249. Assessment districts formed on petition of property owners. Assuming the power of the legislature to create a special as- sessment district for the purpose of levying local assessments, the difficult and important question still remains of the power of the legislature to confer authority to levy such assessments upon ' City of Ottawa v. Macy, 20 111. ° Commissioners of Highways of 413 [1858]. the Town of Colfax v. Commissioners ° Makemson v. Kauffman, 35 0. S. of East Lake Fork Special Drainage 444; Commissioners of Putnam District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. 206 County V. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1890]. [1880]. "Reclamation District No. 108 v. 'Wilson V. Board of Trustees of Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]. the Sanitary District of Chicago, " State Board of Chosen Freehold- 133 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1891]; ers of the County of Hudson, Pros. Town of Muskegon v. Drainage Com- v. Inferior Court of Common Pleas missioners, 78 Wis. 40, 47 N. W. of the County of Hudson, 42 N. J. 11 [1890]; State ex rel. Baltzell v. L. (13 Vr.) 608 [1880]; See to the Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. same effect in taxation as distin- 394, 43 N. W. 947 [1889]; Bryant guished from assessment, Bowles v. V. Bobbins, 70 Wis. 258, 35 N. W. State of Ohio, 37 0. S. 35 [1881]. 545 [1887]. "People ex" rel. Miller v. Scott, 132 'Dunham v. People ex rel. McCrea, 111. 427, 23 N. E. 1119 [1891], 96 111. 331 [1880]; People ex rel. " Abascal v. Bouny, 37 La. Ann. Miller v. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]; 538- Hundley and Rees v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 67 111. 559 [1873]. § 250 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 384 various public boards or governmental bodies. In many cases the statute providing for the organization of an assessment district requires that it should be organized upon the petition of a certain part of the property owners therein. Such a provision is generally held to give sufficient safeguard to the rights of the property owners upon whose property such assessment is to be levied, and therefore to be a constitutional exercise of legislative power.^ The fact that upon the»recommendation of the im- provement district the city council is bound to levy an assess- ment and that if it refuses to do so it may be compelled by man- damus proceedings to levy such assessment,^ and that the board is regarded in making such improvement as the agent of the property owners and not the agent of the public corporation ' does not prevent such statute from being constitutional. No difficulty is found where the assessment district is formed only if a majority of the electors within its limits vote for its forma- tion.* §250. Power of assessment exercised by officers elected by dis- trict. The power of levying local assessments is usually conferred upon officers elected by the voters of the assessment district of the po- ' Fallbrook Irrigation District v. missioners. District No. 1 of Town of Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. 369, 17 Young America, 143 111. 417, 32 N. S. 56 [1896]; (reversing Bradley v. E. 688 [1893]; Badger v. Inlet Drain- Fallbrook Irrigation District, 68 age District, 141 111. 540, 31 N. E. Fed. 948 [1895]) ; Board of Improve- 170 [1893]; Commissioners of Mason ment ■ District No. 60 v. Cotter, 71 and Tazewell Special Drainage Dis- Ark. 556, 76 S. W. 552 [1903]; trict v. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 of 995 [1891]; Owners of Lands v. Peo- Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 S. W. pie ex rel. Stookey, 113 111. 296 308; (affirmed on re-hearing, 71 S. [1886]; Huston v. Clark, 112 111. W. 247 [1902]); Ahern v. Board of 344 [1885]; State ex rel. Ashby v. Improvement District No. 3, of Tex- Three States Lumber Co., 193 Mo. arkana, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575 430, 95 S. W. 333 [1906]; McCarty [1901]; Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 v. Brick, 11 N. J. L. (6 Halst.) 27 Ark. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]; City [1829]; Hansen v. Hammer, 15 of Little Rock v. Board of Improve- Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332 [1896]. ments, etc., 42 Ark. 152 [1883]; Re- ''City of Little Rock v. Board of clamation District No. 124 v. Gray, Improvements, etc., 42 Ark. 162 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]; In [1883]. the Matter of the Bonds of the Ma- 'Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. dera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]. 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. * Dunham v. People ex rel. McCrea, 755, 28 Pac. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891] ; 96 111. 331 [1880]. People ex rel., etc., v. Drainage Com- 385 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 250 litieal subdivision in which such assessment district is situated. Such grant of power affiDrds protection to the interests of the prop- erty owners and is regarded as valid.^ Power to levy local assess- ments is sometimes conferred upon officers chosen by a popular vote, but by the vote of the electors of the political subdivisions which are included in whole or in part within such assessment dis- trict, and not by the vote of the electors or the property owners of such assessment district as a whole. Such officers are evidently not chosen for the express purpose of levying such local assessment, or participating therein, but such duty is merely incidental to the office to which they were primarily chosen. Such grant of power is generally held to be valid. Where the city is divided into assessment districts, the power to levy assessments is very often conferred upon the officers of the city generally without giving to the voters, or the property owners of the assessment district, any special claim to a voice in the selection of such officers. Such grant of power is ordinarily held to be valid.^ The earlier cases denying the power of the legislature to authorize a city to divide its territory into districts for the purpose of local assess- ment have been reversed or overruled,' as they practically deny the existence of the right to levy local assessments. In South Carolina the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of taxation * has been held to prevent a city from being authorized 'Lent V. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, Atchison, 2 Kan. 454 (original edi. 35 L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891]; (af- tion) 2 Kan. 448 (second edition) firming Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, [ 1864] ; Warren v. City of Grand 14 Pac. 71 [1887]); Kilgour v. Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Meier Drainage Commiaaioners, 111 111. 342 v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, [1885]; Blake v. People for uae of 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; St. Louis v. Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S. W. 910 ^Minnesota & M. Land Improve- [1888]; State, MoCloakey, Pros. v. ment Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. Chamberlin, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; Crane 388 [1875]; People ex rel. Griffin v. V. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. S. W. 955 [1899]; Davies v. City of 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; Hil- Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 liard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. [1890]; Lightner v. City of. Peoria, 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; State v. 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]; Moss. 44 Wash. 91, 86 Pac. 1129 Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 [1906]. Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Eep. 484, 49 ' ' People ex rel. Post v. Mayor, etc., L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899]; of Brooklyn, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 209 City of Kansas City v. Gibson, 66 [1849]. Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; * Article X., § 5, Constitution 'of Bumes v. Mayor and City Council of South Carolina [1895]. See §§ 118, 159. § 251 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 386 to divide its geographical area into assessment districts.^ This, however, is, in effect, the reason given by the courts of this state for denying in toto the doctrine of the validity of local assess- ments. § 251. Power of assessment not exercised by elective oflBcers— • Local self-government. In some cases, statutes have coftferred upon boards which are not chosen by the voters or property owners of the assessment dis- trict, nor of the political subdivisions therein included, the power to levy local assessments. "Whether such a statute is a valid exercise of legislative power, is a question upon which there is a sharp conflict of authority. In some jurisdictions it is held that the right of local self-government is a constitutional right, even though not protected by any speeifie provision of the con- stitution, and that such statutes are unconstitutional as invasions of such right. ^ Similar views have been expressed in eases not involving local assessments.^ Thus a statute which confers upon a city water board the additional power, not previously possessed by it, of requiring water-mains to be laid in the streets and of levying assessments therefor indirectly, by providing that such board shall submit its report to council, and council shall levy an assessment in accordance with such report, is invalid.' How- ever, a statute providing for a change in the term of drain com- ^ Mauldin v City Council of Green- to the lowest grade of powers while ville, 53 S. C 285, 69 Am. St. Kep. the power to tax is the highest that 855, 43 L. R. A 101, 31 S. E. 252 can exist in local municipal govern- [1898] (overruling, 42 S. C. 293, 46 ment. No precedent entitled to re- Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, spect can justify such a change of 20 S. K. 842 [1893]). powers, for from the very dawn of ^ Cook Farm Co. v. Citj' of De- our liberties the principle most un- troit, 124 Mich, 426, 83 X. W. 130 questionable of all has been this; that [1900]; People ex rel. Board of Park the people shall vote the taxes they Commissioners v. Common Council are to pay or be permitted to choose of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. representatives for the purpose." Rep. 202 [1873]; "In making con- People ex rel. Board of Park Corn- tracts and creating debts for the city missioners v. Common Council of De- the commissioners are in effect exer- troit, 28 Mich. 228, 248 15 Am. Eep. cising a power of taxation which is 202 [1873]. one of the highest attributes of sov • ^ Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of City of ereignty, and the distance between New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 38 their former power to advise and the Am. Dec. 669 [1842]. power now claimed to compel can ' Cook Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, only he adequately measured when 124 Mich. 426, 83 N. W. 130 [1900]. it is perceived that the one belongs 387 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 251 missioner of a certain county, and authorizing the Governor to appoint a drain commissioner for a period between the two terms for which under the statute no drain commissioner would be chosen, was held not to violate the right of local self-govern- ment.* In other jurisdictions, it is held that the legislature has the general power to make laws, except where restrained by some provision of the federal or state constitution, and that in the absence of specific restraint it confers the power of local self- government as a privilege and not as a right; that it may ac- cordingly give as much or as little local self-government as it chooses, and if it sees fit to provide for the levy of a local assess- ment by a board which the voters or property owners of the district have no opportunity to choose, no legal objection can be raised to such a statute, the sole remedy of the people, if dis- satisfied, being political.^ Thus, by the powers of a statute, a levee board was to be appointed by the legislature, and their successors were to be appointed by the Governor and vacancies filled by him. Such statute was held to be valid, the corporation being regarded as a quasi-public corporation and not as a private corporation. The right of local self-government is not here dis- cussed." A statute authorizing supervisors of eounties of a cer- tain class to establish reclamation districts which might include lands in other counties without the consent of such other county, or of the land owners thereof, has been held to be constitutional.'' A statute naming three commissioners and providing that they should make a street improvement and levy a local assessment therefor, the act to take effect when approved by the city council, was held to be valid.* Where commissioners were to be appointed to take charge of a public improvement, at the expense of the property owners, the city having no control over such work, it was assumed that such statute was valid." A statute 'Attorney General v. McClear, 146 "Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 Mich. 45, 109 N. W. 27 [1908]. L. 419, 11 S. 285 [1891]; (affirm- ' Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- ing Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 Pac. 71 [1887]). [1894]. "Astoria Heights Land Co. v. City ° Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- of New York, 179 N. Y. 579, 72 N. trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 E. 1139 [1904]; (affirming, without [1894]. opinion, 86 N. Y. S. 651, 89 App. Div. 'Hagar v. Reclamation District 512 [1903]). No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]. § 252 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 388 which provides that improvements can be constructed only if the board of public works recommends an improvement ordi- nance to the council and the council enacts such ordinance, the council having ample power to refuse to pass it; and which pro- vides that such board is to make a preliminary apportionment of the expense when the work is completed, and that the council, after hearing objections, has power to pass an assessing ordinance, does not deprive the city of its eo*itrol of local affairs."" Indeed, while local self-government is often referred to as a principle justifying the power of local assessments,^^ it has but seldom been considered by the courts to what extent, if any, it operates, in the absence of specific constitutional provisions, as a restriction upon such power. Probably questions of this sort would be pre- sented for judicial consideration more frequently if it were not for specific constitutional provisions forbidding special legisla- tion.^^ Under these constitutional provisions, only general laws can be passed; and the legislature is not likely to deprive the state at large of the privilege of local self-government by general laws. § 252. Power of legislature to prescribe specific improvement. A question analogous to that involving the power of the legis- lature to confer upon boards not chosen by the voters or property owners of the assessment district, or of the political subdivisions therein included, the power to levy local assessments, is the question of the power of the legislature to designate and require the construction of a specific improvement leaving to the mu- nicipal corporation, or other public corporation, merely the_ min- isterial duty of carrying into execution the mandate of the legis- lature. In the absence of some specific constitutional provision forbidding such statute, such as, for example, the constitutional provision forbidding special legislation, it is generally assumed "City of Denver v. Londoner, 33 baaed, had their origin in the prin- Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; (not ciple of local self-government." aflfected on this point by reversal in Board of Improvement District No. Londoner v. City and County of Den- 60 v. Cotter, 71 Ark. 556, 76 S. W. ver, 210 U. S. 373, 28 S. 708 [1908]. 552 [1903]; (citing Crane v. Siloam ""This court has held, in constru- Springs, 67 Ark. 300, 55 S. W. 955 ing the effect of these statutes that [1899]). they as well as the constitutional ""See § 176 et seg. provision upon which they were 389 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 252 that the legislature has the power to require the construction of a specific improvement by local assessment.^ Thus, in the District of Columbia, Congress may provide that certain water-mains shall be laid, and that the abutting property owners shall pay a certain amount per front foot therefor.^ A statute has been upheld in which the legislature had provided for the widening of a spe- cifically named street. In this case, however, the statute gave to a majority of the property owners the right to file a protest against such improvement, and thus to prevent it.' A statute has been upheld ill which the legislature provided two different methods of repairing the streets, one method for one portion of a specific street and the other method for the other portion.^ It has been held that the legislature can authorize a city to raise, by local assessment, an additional sum over and above the con- tract price, and pay the sum over to the contractor by whom the public improvement for which the original assessment was levied was constructed.'^ Where a statute of this sort has been held to be unconstitutional, it has been on account of some constitutional provision forbidding special legislation, and not because of any unwritten principle of the constitution securing local self-gov- ernment. Thus, in Ohio, a statute of this sort was at first held to be valid. '^ Subsequently the Supreme Court overruled its ' Parsons v. District of Columbia, ° Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 N. Y. 116 [1859]; In Granger v. [1898] ; Oakland Paving Co. v. Rier, City of Buffalo, 6 Abb. N. C. 238 52 Cal. 270 [1877] ; Hagar v. Board [1879] such a, statute was said to of Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 be a "very remarkable legislative en- Cal. 222 [1874]; In the Matter oi actment," in authorizing work done the Confirmation of the Report of under a prior contract, which had the Commissioners of Assessment for been held invalid, in 1 Sheldon Sup. Grading, Paving and Otherwise Im- Ct. 445, to be credited as performed proving Sackett, Douglas and De of a subsequent contract. For the Grew Streets in the City of Brooklyn, same principle in taxation on realty 74 N. Y. 95 [1878]; State ex rel. to reimburse certain individuals who Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 Wis. C20, 6 had voluntarily entered into a bond L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. 947 [1889]. to pay extraordinary expenses of the "Parsons v. District of Columbia, termination of a canal in Utiea; 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. (IST. Y.) [1898]. 65 [1840]. »Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, "State ex rel. Hibbs v. Board of 35 L. 419, 11 S. 285 [1891]; (af- County Commissioners of Franklin firming Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, County, 35 0. S. 458 [1880]; (A 14 Pac. 71 [1887]). case of an improvement to be paid 'Oakland Paving Co. v. Rier, 52 for by general taxation.) Cal. 270 [1877]. 253 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 390 earlier decision, and held such a statute invalid. The principle involved, however, was the effect upon such statutes of a pro- vision in ■ the constitution of Ohio requiring laws of a general nature to be uniform.' § 253. Public character of assessment districts. Assessment districts comprising the land which is benefited by the proposed assessment, and formed "by the consent of the property owners, are regarded as public corporations,^ or at least as quasi public corporations,- and not as private corporations.' Probably "public quasi corporation" is the term intended to be used instead of ' ' quasi public corporation. ' ' * The proceedings leading up to the formation of a drainage or reclamation district are, in legal effect, the levying of a local assessment for benefits.'* The organization of such a district "results in putting a burden on property against the will of the owners, and the requirements as to the proceedings of that character cannot be evaded by call- ing the governmental agency, through which the proceeding is 'Lewis V. Symmea, 61 0. S. 471, 76 Am. St. Eep. 428, 56 N. E. 194 [1900] ; Hlxson v. Burson, 54 O. S. 470, 43 N. B. 1000 [1896]; State ex rel. V. Commissioners, 54 0. S. 333, 43 N. E. 587 [1896]. 'Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184 [1886]; Quint v. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514 [1894]; Keclamation District No. 124 v. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]'; Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893] ; Elmore v. Drain- age Commissioners, 135 III. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]; Board of Commissioners of County of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 [1896]; New Eel River Draining Association v. Durbin, 30 Ind. 173 [1868]; Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]; Columbia Bottom Levee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53 [1866]. 'Kedzie v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 114 111. 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]. Drainage districts are "created for public purposes, are in no sense private corporations, but on the otlier hand, they are at least quasi public corporations, and as such the laws providing for their organi- zation- are subject to be changed, mod- ified or repealed, as the wisdom of the legislature may direct." Smith \\ People ex rel. Detrick, 140 111. 355, 29 N. E. 676 [1893]. 'Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]. ' Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 [1894]; To the same effect see: Es- sex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. 446, 11 S. 790' [1891]; (affirming, Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 65, 6 Atl. 435 [1886] vihmh was affirmed in Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 641, 10 Atl. 379 [18871). ° Reclamation District No. 537 of Yolo County v. Burger, 122 Cal. 442, 55 Pac. 156 [1898]. 391 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §254 conducted, a corporation."" Accordingly the legislature may take away from such assessment district a part or all of the powers which it has conferred upon it, as long as it does not prejudice those who have extended credit to such corporation in reliance upon the statutory powers which it then possesses.' Common examples of such corporations are drainage districts^ park districts ° and road districts." § 254. De facto districts. If there is in existence a valid law under which an assessment district might be organized, and there has been a bona fide .at- tempt to comply with such statute in organizing a district, the question of the regularity and validity of such organization can- not be raised collaterally as a defense in a suit to enforce such assessment or in an injunction suit to restrain the collection of such assessment.^ An assessment levied by a de facto assessment district is as valid as one levied by an assessment district de jure.'' "Reclamation District No. 537 of Yolo County v. Burger, 122 Cal. 442, 55 Pac. 156 [1898]. ' Cooper V. Arctic Ditchers, 56 Ind. 233 [1877]. 'People of the State of California V. Hagar, 52 Cal. 171 [1877]; Smith V. People ex rel. Detrick, 140 111. 355, 29 N. E. 676 [1893]; Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893] ; Wilson v. Board of Trustees, of the Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1891]; iMound City Land & Stock Co. v. Mil- ler, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. E. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]. " Dunham v. People ex rel. McCrea, 96 III. 331 [1880]; People ex rel. Miller v. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]. " Essex Public Road Board v. Skin- kle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. 446, 11 S. 790 [1891]; (affirming Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 65, 6 Atl. 435 [1886] which was affirmed in Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 641, 10 Atl. 379 [1887]). ^ Quint V. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514 [1894]; Morrell v. Union Drainage District No. 1, 118 111. 139, 8 N. E. 675 [1887]; Keigwin v. Drainage Commissioners of Hamilton Township, 115 111. 347, 5 N. E. 575 [ 1886] ; Etchison Ditching Associa- tion V. Hillis, 40 Ind. 408 [1872]; Etchison Ditching Association v. Busenback, 39 Ind. 362 [1872]; Ex- celsior Draining Co. v. Brown, 38 Ind. 384 [1871]; New Eel River Draining Association v. Durbin, 30 Ind. 173 [1868]. = Lower Kings River Reclamation District No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895] ; Quint V. Hoflfman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514 [1894]; Reclamation Dis- trict No. 124 V. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]; Tucker v. Peo- ple ex rel. Wall, 156 HI. 108, fl) N. E. 451 [1895]; People ex rel. Wood V. Jones, 137 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892] ; Wabash Eastern Railway Co. of Illinois v. Commissioners Of East Lake Fork Drainage District, 134 111. 384, 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 N. E. 781 [1891]; Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. 478, 13 N. E. 246 [1889J; Mor- rell V. Union Drainage District No. 1, 118 111. 139, 8 N. E. 675 [1887[; §254 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 392 The same principle applies to an irrigation district.' The validity of such assessment is said not to depend in any way upon the question whether the assessment district is a corporation de jure or de facto.* If it is desired to attack the validity of the organ- ization of the assessment district, this must be done directly by a proceeding in quo warranto.^ The rule that no collateral at- tack can be made upon the regularly and validity of the organi- zation of a drainage district applies with a special force in cases where there has been a full opportunity for a hearing at the time of the organization of such district, and where the party who now wishes to set up the invalidity of the organization of such district has omitted or neglected to raise the questions which he now seeks to raise." Under some statutes and in some jurisdic- tions no opportunity for a hearing is given at the time that the district is organized, and the owner of lands which it is sought to assess may show in an action on the assessment that such district has no legal validity, since this is his first opportunity to Keigwin v. Drainage Commissioners of Hamilton Township, 115 111. 347, 5 N. E. 575 [1886]; Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]; Etchison Ditching Associa- tion V. Hillis, 40 Ind. 408 [1872]; Etchison Ditching Association v. Bus- enback, 39 Ind. 362 [1872]; Excel- sior Draining Co. v. Brown, 38 Ind. 384 [1871]; New Eel River Draining Association v. Durbin, 30 Ind. 173 [1868]. = Quint V. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514 [1894]. •Quint V. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514 [1894]. ° People ex rel. Wood v. Jones, 137 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892]; Wa- bash Eastern Railway Co. of Illi- nois V. Commissioners of East Lake Fork Drainage District, 134 111. 384, 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 N. E. 781 [1891] ; Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. 478, 13 N. E. 246 [1889] ; Keigwin v. Drainage Commissioners of Hamilton Town- ship, 115 111. 347, 5 N. E. 575 [1886]; Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]. "Lower Kings River Reclamation District No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895] ; Reclamation District No. 124 v. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]; In the Matter of the Bonds of the Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675 [1891] ; People ex rel. Selby v. Dyer, 205 III. 575, 69 N. E-. 70 [1903] ; Tucker v. People, ex rel. Wall, 156 111. 108, 40 N. E. 451 [1895]; People ex rel. Wood v. Jones, 137 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892] ; Wabash Eastern Railway Co. of Illinois v. Commissioners of East • Lake Fork Drainage District, 134 III. 384, 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 N. E. 781 [1891]; Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. 478, 13 N. E.. 246 [1889]; Morrell v. Un- ion Drainage District No. 1, 118 111. 139, 8 N. E. 675 [1887]; Keigwin v. Drainage Commissioners of Hamilton Township, 115 111. 347, 5 N. E. 575 [1886]; Blake v. People for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]. 393 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 253 raise such question.' Such defense must, however, be made specifically. The articles of association of the drainage district are not properly* a part of the complaint in a proceeding to enforce the assessment, and their sufficiency cannot therefore be tested by general demurrer.^ The property owners have a right to a hearing at the organization of the district, and if such hear- ing is denied them they have a right to raise the question of the validity of the organization of the district in a suit upon the assessment." Where a statute provides a means for direct attack upon the validity of the organization district, such means may, of course, be taken advantage of. The fact that the district has not exercised its powers or acted as a corporation can be made a ground for a proceeding to forfeit its charter, either by a direct act of the legislature or by a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction acting under statutory authority." Such non-user cannot, however, be made the basis of a valid attack upon an assessment levied by such corporation.^^ If, however, a corpora- tion does not purport to be organized under a statute conferring certain powers, it cannot exercise the powers given by the statute, and its acts, which can be only upheld by assuming that such powers are conferred upon it, are invalid.'^ § 255. Assessment by private corporations. The legislature has occasionally attempted to confer upon pri- vate corporations the power to construct public improvements and levy assessments therefor. In some cases, such statutes have been held to be unconstitutional.' The theory often invoked is, 'Mack V. Polecat Drainage Dis- "Swamp Land District No. 150 v. trict, 216 III. 56, 74 N. E. 691 Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1893]. [1905]; Newton County Draining "Swamp Land District No. 150 v. Co. V. Nofsinger, 43 Ind. 566 [1873]; Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1893]. New Eel River Draining Association "Reclamation District No. 3 v. V. Durbin, 30 Ind. 173 [1868]. Kennedy, 58 Cal. 124 [1881]. * Dobson V. Duck Pond Ditching ' Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Association, 42 Ind. 312 [1873]; Hooper, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 350 [1859] ; Etchison Ditching Association v. State, Kean, Pros. v. Driggs Drain- Hillis, 40 Ind. 408 [1872]; Etchison age Co., 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 91 Ditching Association v. Busenback, [1883]; Coster v. Tide Water Com- 39 Ind. 362 [1872]; Excelsior Drain- pany, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Gr.) 54 ing Co. V. Browrt, 38 Ind. 384 [1871]. [1866]; (affirmed in Tide Water "Reclamation District No. 537 of Company v.. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 Yolo County v. Burger, 122 Cal. 442, C. E. Gr.) 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634 55 Pac. 156 [1898]. [1866]); In AUentown v. Henry, 73 § 255 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 394 that such a statute imposes a local burden for the private benefit of the members of the private corporation.^ In these eases, how- ever, the assessment imposed has been objectionable apart from the fact that it was levied by a private corporation. In one statute the area of the drainage district in question contained land amounting to more than one-third of the total area which would receive a very slight advantage from the drainage improvement, the owners of which land had nothing to do with obtaining the passage of the special act and no notice of the application there- for and had never assented to the provisions thereof. Such act was held to be unconstitutional.^ So a statute which gave to the private corporation the right to decide what land should be drained, and which provided for the payment of annual dividends, thus evidently contemplating that the- corporation would operate at a profit, and would charge the property owners more than the cost of such drainage, was held to be unconstitutional.* In an- other case, a private corporation was formed to drain certain swamps, under a contract to be. entered into between them and certain commissioners appointed to make such contract. No power was given to the owners of the land improved to prevent such improvement. For these reasons the statute was held, in the lower court, to be unconstitutional.'' This decision was afiirmed in the upper court, but apparently upon the sole ground that the amount of the assessment was not limited to the amount of the benefits conferred upon the land by the improvement for which such assessment was levied.^ In other cases, where it appears that the amount of the assessment is limited to the amount of the benefits conferred by the improvement for which such assessment is levied, statutes authorizing private corporations to make public improvements, and to procure assessments therefor, were upheld Pa. St. 404 [1873] ; a, statute author- * Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. izing a water company "to lay rea- Hooper, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 350 [1859]. sonable assessments" was said to be ' State, Kean, Pros. v. Driggs unconstitutional. This observation, Drainage Co., 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) however, was an oJiiier as the real 91 [1883]. point decided was that when such ' Coster v. Tide Water Company, powers were transferred to the city 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Gr.) 54 [1866]. they might he constitutionally exer- ° Tide Water Company v. Coster, 18 cised by such city. N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Gr.) 518, 90 Am. ° Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Dec. 634 [1866]. Hooper, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 350 [1859]. 395 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 256 as valid.^ In some of these eases, however, the assessment was to be made by public officers, acting upon the application of the private corporation.' Occasionally corporations are created which in form are private corporations, but which by reason of their com- position and powers, are essentially public corporations. Thus a corporation formed for the purpose of constructing a free turn- pike, and levying assessments therefor, the officers of which are really county or township officers discharging the ordinary public duty of attending to the construction of a public road, is in realty a public corporation." § 256. Effect of specific constitutional provisions — Arkansas. The power of the legislature to confer the power of local assess- ment upon public corporations, quasi-corporations and assessment districts has been considered by the courts of some jurisdictions with reference to the specific provisions of their respective state constitutions. The constitution of Arkansas provides: "Nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prohibit the General Assembly from authorizing assessments on real property for local improvements in towns and cities under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, to be based upon the consent of a majority in value of the property holders owning property adjoining the locality to be affected. . . . "^ This provision is regarded by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as not constituting a restriction upon the power of the legislature. The legislature may accord- ingly confer the. power of levying local assessments upon bodies other than towns and cities, such as levee districts,^, and improve- ment districts.' The legislature furthermore is not thereby pre- ' New Haven & !b'ort Wayne Turn- ' Foster v. Commissioners of Wood pike Co. V. Bird, 33 Ind. 325 [1870]; County, 9 0. S. 540 [1859]. Turner v. Thorntown & Mechanics- ^ Article XIX, § 27, Constitution of burg Gravel Road Co., 33 Ind. 317 Arkansas. [1870]; Hoertz v. Jefferson Southern ''Hitter v. Drainage District No. 1, Pond Draining Co., 119 Ky. 824, 84 Poinsett County, 78 Ark. 580, 94 S. S. W. 1141, 27 Ky. L. E. 278 [1905] ; W. 711 [1906] ; Carson v. St. Francis New Orleans Drainage Co. praying Drainage District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 for the confirmation of a tableau, 11 S. W. 590 [1894] ; Davis v. Gaines, La. Ann. 338 [1856]. 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184. ■ Hoertz v. Jefferson Southern Pond ' Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. Draining Co., 119 Ky. 824, 84 S. W. 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]; City of 1141, 27 Ky. L. R. 278 [1905]; New Little Rock v. Board of Improve- Orleans Drainage Co. praying for the ments, etc., 42 Ark. 152 [1883]. confirmation of a tableau, 11 La. Ann. 338 [1856]. § 257 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 396 vented from organizing an improvement district within a city, or one which in its territorial area embraces the entire territory of a city,* but which, after its organization, is beyond the control of the city. A provision to the effect that "... the General As- sembly may delegate the taxing power, with the necessary re- strictions, to the state's subordinate, political and municipal cor- porations, to the extent of provi(^g for their existence, main- tenance and well-being, but no further, ' ' ^ does not apply to local assessments but merely to general taxation, and therefore does not restrict the legislature in granting the power of local assess- ment.' Accordingly a statute which provided that the city council should lay off the city into improvement districts; that upon the petition of a majority in value of the owners of the realty in any such district for an improvement, the council should appoint three residents as a board to make such improvement; and that such board should make such improvement and report the cost thereof to the council, whereupon the council should levy an assessment for the cost of such improvement, was held to be valid on the ground that the discretion necessary in such a case need .not necessarily be left to the city council but might be reposed else- where.'' A former constitution of Arkansas provided that the County Court "shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursements of money for county purposes, and every other case that may be necessary to the internal improve- ment and local concerns of the respective counties."* This pro- vision was held applicable to public internal improvements and local concerns for general county purposes, and not to improve- ments for special local purposes, the costs of which were to be paid by assessments upon the property benefited by the improve- ment.' § 257. Illinois — Restrictions on legislative power. The constitution of Illinois provides: "The General Assembly may vest corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with * Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. Improvements, etc., 42 Ark. 152 30, 55 S. W. 955 [1899]. [1883]. " Article II., § 23, Constitution of ' article VI, § 9, Constitution of Arkansas [1874]. Arkansas [1836]. "Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, "McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 44 S. W. 707 [18971. [I860]; (not affected on this point ' City of Little Rock v. Board of by reversal in McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. (4 Wall) 143 [1866]). 397 AUTHOEITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS § 258 power to make local improvements by. special assessments or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise. For all other corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, but such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property with the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. ' ' ^ Prior to this consti- tutional provision giving specific authority for special assessments, the power of levying local assessments was so restricted by the construction placed by the court upon the constitutional require- ment of uniformity in taxation, that it was scarcely practicable to exercise it. The court held that local assessment must be apportioned either according to benefits eo nomine or according to value, excluding such methods as according to frontage and the like.^ Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Illinois has always tended to regard this constitutional provision as conferring the power of special assessments, and not as limiting the power given by the general grant of taxation.' "While in this respect the Supreme Court of Illinois entertains a view different from that held in most jurisdictions, the difference really dates from and is caused by the original hostile attitude of the Supreme Court of Illinois toward local assessments. § 258. Upon vsrhat corporations power of local assessment may be conferred. After the adoption of this constitutional provision there has been no question as to the power of the legislature to confer the power of local assessment in general upon cities, towns and vil- lages.^ The serious questions which have arisen in this connection concern the power of the legislature to confer the powder of local 1 Article IX., § 9, Constitution of ' City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 111. Illinois [1870]. 528, 75 N. E. 1044 [1905]; Jones v. ''City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 306 [1866]; City of Ottawa v. Spen- K E. 688; Lightner v. City of Peoria, cer, 40 111. 211 [1866]; City of Chi- 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]; eago V. Larned, 34 111. 203 [1864]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 111. The early attitude of the courts of 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 Illinois toward local assessments [1893]; Linck v. City of Litchfield, prior to this constitutional provision, 141 111. 469, 31 N. E. 123 [18931; has been discussed elsewhere. See Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111. 70 § 153. [18831 ; Falch v. People ex rel. John- 'Givins v. City of Chicao-o, 188 son. 99 111. 137 [1881] ; People ex rel. 111. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [19001; Up- Miller v. Sherman, 83 111. 165 [1876]. dike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 [1876]. § 258 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 398 assessment upon public corporations other than cities, towns and villages, and the meaning of the term "corporate authorities." Under this provision there are two general grants of power. The second grant is that of general taxation, and is conferred upon ' ' all municipal corporations. ' ' The first grant concerns the power to make local improvements by special assessments, or by special taxation of contiguous property. This power is not conferred upon municipal corporations generally, but merely upon the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages. The phrase- ology of this provision, therefore, prevents the legislature from conferring the power of special assessment of special taxation upon any municipal corporations other than cities, towns and villages, or upon a private corporation.^ Under this provision, the legislature attempted to provide for the creation and organi- zation of drainage districts, and the construction of drainage im- provements to be paid for by local assessments. No provision was made for obtaining the consent of the people to be taxed, and the statute provided for the levying of assessments for drainage im- provements by commissioners, or juries, or by the County Court. This statute was held to be unconstitutional.' It was held that under such constitutional provision the power of levying general taxes might be conferred upon public corporations other than cities, towns and villages, but that such taxes must be uniform within such district with respect to persons and property. This statute was also said to be unconstitutional as not providing for obtaining the consent of the electors of the district to the organ- ization thereof, to the construction of the improvement, or to levying a local assessment for the cost thereof. As a result of this 'decision the constitution of Illinois was amended so as to enable the legislature to provide for drainage districts by the adoption of the following provision: "The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands to construct drains, ditches and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining purposes, across the lands of others, and to provide for the organization of drainage districts, and vest the corporate authorities thereof with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches, and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore con- structed under the laws of this state by special assessments upon "Updike V. Wright, 81 111. 49 'Updike v. Wright, 81 III. 49 [1876]. [1876]. 399 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 259 the property benefited thereby. ' ' * After the adoption of this last provision, the power of the legislature to provide for the creation and organization of drainage districts, and of empowering such districts to levy local assessments, has been recognized without question.' Furthermore, the power of the legislature to authorize cities and villages to levy local assessments for the purpose of drainage, has been recognized." It may also provide for drainage districts, to include both city and county.' § 259. Who are corporate authorities. Under both of the foregoing sections of the Illinois constitution it is provided that the legislature may vest the "corporate au- thorities ' ' of the cities, towns, villages and drainage districts with the power of levying local assessments. Since, as has been before stated, it is held in Illinois that the legislature derives its power to authorize special assessments, apportioned upon the basis of frontage or other similar basis entirely from these specific pro- visions in the constitution, it follows that in that state the legisla- ture can confer the power of levying local assessments only upon the corporate authorities of the public corporations named in the constitution.^ In determining the meaning of the term ' ' corporate authorities ' ' the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the term • implies the officers in charge of such public corporation who have been elected by the voters of such corporation, or who have been chosen by officers who were elected by such voters.^ "The cor- * Article IV., § 31 [1878]. 'Wilson v. Board of Trustees, of " Rogne V. People ex rel. Goedtner, Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 111. 224 111. 449, 79 N. E. 662 [1906]; 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1891]. Carr v. People ex rel. Goedtner, 224 ' Givins v. City of Chicago, 188 111. 111. 160, 79 N. E. 648 [1906]; Peo- 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]; Cornell pie ex rel., etc., v. Drainage Commis- v. People ex rel., 107 111. 372 [1883]; sioners District No. 7, of Town of See to the same effect, Board of Dl- Young America, 143 111. 417, 32 N. rectors v. Houston, 71 111. 318 [1874]; E. 688 [1895]; Badger v. Inlet Gage v. Graham, 57 111. 144 [1870]; Drainage District, 141 111. 540, 31 N. Hessler v. Drainage Commissioners, E. 170 [1893]; Wilson v. Board of 53 111. 105 [1870]; Harward v. St. Trustees of the Sanitary District of Clair & Monroe Levee & Drainage Chicago, 133 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 Co., 51 111. 130 [1869]; People v. [1891]; Owners of Lands v. People, Solomon, 51 111. 37 [1869]. 113 111. 297 [1885]; Huston V. Clark, ^Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust 112 111. 344 [1885]. Co. v. City of Chicago, 215 111. 174, » Wilson V. Board of Trustees of 74 N. E. 115 [1905]; Givins v. City the Sanitary District of Chicago, of Chicago, 188 111. 348, 58 N. E. 133 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1891]. 912 [1900]. § 259 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 400 porate authorities upon whom the power of taxation may be conferred within the purview of this provision of the constitution are the authorities of the municipality who are either elected di- rectly by the people to be taxed or appointed in some mode to which they have given their assent. " ^ No other officials, it seems to be held, can be made the corporate authorities of the public corporation within the meani^jg of this provision of the constitution. Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature has the power of determining who shall constitute the corporate authorities of the public corporation, and what the powers of such corporate authorities shall be.* The legislature may dispose of the revenues of such corporations.^ Accordingly the legislature may provide for the formation of a drainage district on petition of the adult land owners of lands lying in the proposed district amounting to one-half in number of such owners, and to one-third in ownership of the total amount of land in such district, giving to the other land owners in the district an opportunity to contest the formation of such district. It may provide that the county commissioners shall be the drainage commissioners of such district, although they are not elected by the voters or land owners of such district, at least if the assessment is merely a lien upon the property •benefited and not a personal charge upon the owners of land. It may further constitute the county surveyor, county treasurer and sheriff a board of appeal from the orders of the drainage commis- sioners confirming special assessments, giving an appeal from such board to the County Court." The corporate authorities of a city or village may be made drainage commissioners within such city or village and given authority to determine what lands require drainage.'' The legislature may constitute the highway commis- "Givins v. City of Chicago, 188 III. 'Owners of Lands v. People ex rel. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]; Snell v. Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]. City of Chicago, 133 111. 413, 8 L. " Owners of Land v. People ex rel. R. A. 858, 24 N. B. 532; Wetherell Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]. This V. Devine, 116 111. 631, 6 ^^. E. 24; ease was decided under Article V., Cornell v. People es rel., 107 111. 372 § 10, and Article IV., § 31 of the [1883]. Constitution of Illinois: and Article 'Wilson V. Board of Trustees of IX., § 9, of such Constitution does the Sanitary District of Chicago, 133 not operate to restrict the power of 111. 443, 27 N. E. 203 [1891] ; Own- the legislature. ers of Land v. People ex rel. Stookey, 'Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, 113 111. 29 [1886]; Huston v. Clark, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1888]. 112 111. 344 [1885]. 401 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 259 sioners of a dl-ainage district a board of drainage commissioners." The supervisor and assessor of a town are corporate authorities within the meaning of these constitutional provisions, and the power of levying special assessments may accordingly be con- ferred upon them." The legislature may provide for a board of local improvements and confer upon it power to do preliminary work with reference to local improvements. It may provide that if a majority in quantity of the owners of property in two or more contiguous blocks abutting upon the street to be improved shall petition for an improvement the board may recommend such improvement, and on such recommen- dation an ordinance must be passed therefor. Such board is regarded as an agent of the municipal corporation for .the purpose of restricting the power of the corporate authorities thereof in the interest of the property owners. Its power to recom- mend such improvements, thereby making an ordinance therefor compulsory, is based upon the petition of the property owners.^" The legislature may authorize the formation of a park district consisting of several towns, and may authorize the corporate au- thorities of such towns to issue bonds for the cost of such im- provement." The power of levying local assessments may be con- ferred upon such park districts,^^ though such board is appointed by the Governor of the state, the act being submitted to popular vote.'' Accordingly, as the lands in such park are under the ex- ' People ex rel, etc., v. Drainage 728 [1897]; Chicago & N. W. Ey. Commissioners District No. 1 of Town Co. v. West Chicago Park Commis- of Young America, 143 111. 417, 32 sioners, 151 111. 204, 25 L. R. A. 300, N. E. 688 [1893]; Kilgour v. Drain- 37 N. E. 1079; Kedzie v. West Chi- age Commissioners, 111 111. 342. cago Park Commissioners, 114 111. •Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]; West Chi- lli. 663, 38 N. E. 688 ,[1894]; The cago Park Commissioners v. Western People ex rel. v. Gage, 83 ill. 486; Union Telegraph Co., 103 111. 33 "Givins v. City of Chicago, 188 [1882]; People v. Walsh, 96 111. 232, 111. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]. 36 Am. Rep. 135; South Park Com- " Dunham v. People ex rel. McCrea, missioners v. Dunlevy, 91 111. 49 96 111. 331 [1880]; People ex rel. [1878]; Wilcox v. People, 90 111. 186 Miller v. Brislin, 80 111. 423 [1875]; [1878]; People v. Salomon, 51 111. Under the Constitution of 1848 a 37. statute providing for the organiza- *'Act of 1869, Feb. 27; 1 Priv. tion of such park district and giving Laws, 1869, p. 342. West Chicago it the power of general taxation was Park Commissioners v. Farher, 171 held valid. People ex rel. Wilson v. 111. 146, 49 N. E. 427 [1897, 1898] ; Salomon, 51 111. 37 [1869]. West Chicago Park Commissioners v. "West Chicago Park Commission- City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. ers V. Sweet, 167 111. 326, 47 N. E. E. 697 [1894]. § 260 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 402 elusive control of the park commissioners for assessment purposes the city cannot levy an assessment against such lands.^* The powers of such, park district may be amended by action of the legislature without obtaining the consent of the voters resident therein/^ though such park districts, as originally formed, were accepted by the vote of the qualified voters resident in such dis- tricts.^" Accordingly, a statute autlwrizing the park commission- ers to levy assessments .for park purposes independent of the town authorities, and not requiring' such park commissioners to act through the. town authorities, as before, is valid.'' A special as- sessment district cannot be created for levee construction.^' Under a similar provision of the constitution of California,'® power to levy an assessment on an irrigation district may be conferred upon the board of supervisors of the county in ease the directors of the irrigation district fail to levy such assessment.^" Under a consti- tutional provision to the effect that "all city, town and village officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or appointed by such authorities thereof as the legis- lature shall designate," the legislature may confer power to im- prove certain streets near a park upon the park commissioners.^' A provision in the constitution of California forbidding the legisla- ture to levy taxes on public corporations, but authorizing the grant of power to the corporate authorities of such public corporation to assess and collect taxes is not violated by a statute which au- thorizes an assessment and levy by a board of supervisors.^^ § 260. Minnesota. The constitution of Minnesota provides : ' ' The legislature may, by general law or special act, authorize municipal corporations to "Billing8 V. City of Chicago, 167 ers v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 N. E. 111. 337, 47 N. E. 731 [1897]; West 427 [1897, 1898]. Chicago Park Commissioners V. City "Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 of Chicago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. E. [1876]. 697 [1894]. "Article XL, § 12. "'Andrews v. People ex rel. Rum- '"Nevada National Bank v. Board sey, 83 111. 529 [1876] ; People ex of Supervisors of Kern County, 5 rel. Miller v. Brisliij, 80 111. 423 Cal. App. 638, 91 Pac. 122 [1907]. [1875]. '"Astor v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 567 "People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, [1875]. 51 111. 37. '= Nevada National Bank v. Board " West Chicago Park Commission- of Supervisors of Kern County, 5 Cal. App. 638, 91 Pac. 122 [1907]. 403 AUTHORITY TO LEVy ASSESSMENTS. § 261 levy assessments for local improvements upon the property front- ing upon such improvements, or upon the property to be bene- fited. . . . " ^ Under this coiistitutional provision the term "municipal corporation" seems to be regarded as being broad enough to include any public corporation,^ such as a board of park commissioners,' or a county.* The legislature is, furthermore, not restricted in the form of city government which it may provide. It may leave the determination of the price to be paid for the improvement for which the assessment is to be levied, to the board of public works, without any restriction as to the maximum price to be paid." §261. Nebraska. The constitution of Nebraska contains a provision which is sub- stantially identical with the foregoing provision of the constitution of Illinois,^ providing that ' ' the legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited. For all other corporate purposes, all munici- pal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes. . . . " ^ The Supreme Court of Nebraska has taken a different view as to the effect of this constitutional provision from that entertained by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and has held that this provision is not a limitation or restriction upon the power of the legislature to confer the power of local assessment. On the contrary, it is there held that the power of local assessment is a branch of the general power of taxation, and that accordingly such power may be conferred upon other public corporations,' such as counties,* and drainage districts.'' The reason for this 'Article IX., § 1, Constitution of 'See § 257. Minnesota. ^ Article IX., § 6, Constitution of ^ State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- Nebraska, rick V. District Court of Hennepin 'Darst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 County, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 N. W. 819 [1891]; State of Nebraska [1885]. ex rel. Abbott v. Board of County ' State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- Commissioners of Dodge County, 8 riek v. District Court of Hennepin Neb. 124, 30 Am. Eep. 819 [1879]. County, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 *Darst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 [1885]. N. W. 819 [1891]. * Dowlan v. Sibley County, 36 " State of Nebraska ex rel. Abbott Minn. 430, 31 N. W. 517 [1887]. v. Board of County Commissioners of "Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Dodge County, 8 Neb. 124, 30 Am. Minn. 494 [1876]. Rep. 819 [1879]. §§262,263 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 404 difference of judicial opinion is in part the fact that in Illinois the power of special assessment was much limited and restricted under the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois up to the adoption of the constitutional provision concerning local assess- ments, while ia Nebraska the power of the legislature to authorize local assessment was never so restricted. §262. Washington. The constitution of Washington provides: "The legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages, with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited. For all corporate pur- poses all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes. . . . " ^ This provision differs from the provisions in Illinois and Nebraska, in that in the constitution of Washington the further grant of power is for "all corporate purposes," while in lUiilois and Nebraska the grant of power is for "all other corporate purposes." This distinction has been noted and commented upon.^ The actual result reached by the Supreme Court of Washington is in harmony with the Nebraska decisions, and contrary to those of Illinois ; and is to the effect that the legislature is not restricted by such constitutional provision, but that the legislature may confer the power of levying local assessments upon public corporations -other than cities, towns and villages,' such as counties,* and diking districts.' § 263. Statutory provisions conclusive as to oflacers by v?hom assessment may be levied. As long as the legislature does not impair the constitutional right of local self-government,^ it has full power to determine by what officers local assessments shall be levied.^ Even if by consti- tutional provision the power of levying special assessments is con- ferred upon public corporations, such as cities or villages, such 'Article VII., § 9, Constitution of mlssioners, 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. Washington. 552 [1895]. "Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, "Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 315, 46 Pac. 332 [1896]. 46 Pac. 332 [1896]. 'Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 'See § 244. 46 Pac. 332 [1896]; Seanor v. Board ^Markley v. City of Chicago, 190 of County Commissioners, 13 Wash. 111. 276, 60 N. E. 512 [1901]; Craw- 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1895]. ford v. The People, Eumsey, 83 111. 'Seanor v. Board of County Com- 557 [1876]. 405 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 263 corporations can act only through their officers or agents, and it is for the legislature to determine who these officers or agents shall be.' Accordingly, the legislature has a wide range of discretion in determining by what officers assessments are to be levied and assessments can be levied only by the officers thus authorized by statute.* Thus where an as- sessment is to be levied by commissioners, the county col- lector cannot levy an assessment or special tax against a lot not assessed by them.° If, by statute, city commissioners are required to apportion the cost in proportion to benefits, an assess- ment made by the council, on the report of the engineer, with- out referring the matter to the commissioners, is invalid." So, if a board of viewers is to determine the amount to be assessed, the board of county commissioners cannot determine such amount without referring it to the viewers.' If the statute requires a reference to commissioners and to a disinterested surveyor who is to make a map of the improvement, reference to the commis- sioners alone is insufficient.' If assessment is to be levied by the council, the clerk of the village cannot levy such assessments by certifying them to the auditor of the county to be entered on the 'Crawford v. The People, Eumsey, N. J. L. (28 Vr.) 330, 31 Atl. 276 83 111.557 [1876]. [1894]; Burns v. Majx)r of New •Walker v. District of Columbia, 6 York, 3 Hun. 212 [1874]; In re Lo- Mackey (D. C.) 352 [1888]; People cust Ave., 87 N. Y. S. 798, 93 App. V. Patton, 223 111. 379, 79 N. E. 51 Div. 416 [1904]; In re Opening of [1908]; Langlois v. Cameron, 201 Quarry Road, 82 N. Y. S. 965, 84 111. 301, 66 N. E. 332 [1903] ; County App. Diy. 418 [1903]; Brewer v. of Jefferson v. City of Mt. Vernon, Village of Bowling Green, Ohio, 7 145 111. 80, 33 N. E. 1091 [1893]; Ohio C. C. 489 [1893]; Horiston v. Crawford v. The People, Eumsey, 83 City Council of Charleston, 1 Mc- 111. 557 [1876]; Pittsburgh, Cincin- Cord (S. C.) 345 [1821]; Quarles v. nati, Chicago & St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Town of Sparta, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. Oglesby, 165 Ind. 542, 76 N. E 165 714 [1902]. [1905]; Alley v. City of Lebanon, "Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, 146 Ind. 125, 44 N. E. 1003 [1896]; 66 N. E. 332 [1903]. Board of Commissioners, Montgom- ° Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ey. Co. ery Co. v. Eullen, 111 Ind. 410, 12 v. Oglesby, 165 Ind. 542, 76 N. E. N. E. 298 [1887]; Second Munici- 165 [1905]. pality of New Orleans v. Botts, 8 ' Board of Commissioners, Mont- Robinson, (La.) 198 [1844]; State gomery Co. v. Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, of Minnesota ex rel. Merrick v. Dis- 12 N. E. 298 [1887]. trict Court of Hennepin County, 33 ' State, White, Pros. v. Mayor and Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 [1885]; Council of the City of Bayonne, 49 Stewart, Pros. V. Mayor and Common N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 311, 8 Atl. 295 Council of the City of Hoboken, 57 [1887]. § 263 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 406 tax duplicate for collection.® Commissioners appointed to ap- portion the assessment cannot correct any mistake which the authorities of the public corporation may have made in deter- mining the nature and character of the improvement.^" So if an assessment is, by statute, to be levied by the board of super- visors, the township supervisor cannot refuse to comply with their order to place the assessment on the tojv^nship rolls on the ground that, in his judgment, the proceedings were irregular.^ The power thus conferred upon special officers is not of course an arbitrary one. Since assessments must, in theory at least, be apportioned according to the benefits, power cannot be given to any officers to levy the assessments according to their arbitrary personal diseretion.^^ The legislature may of course alter pre- existing statutory provisions, and confer the power of levying local assessments on other officers than those theretofore em- powered to levy such assessments.^' A subsequent statute which does not expressly repeal a prior statute, and which can be reconciled therewith, will not be regarded as working a repeal by implication, and the officers already authorized to levy such assessment, will retain such authority under the new statutes.^* A change of statute which does not apply in express terms or by necessary implication to pending proceedings will not be re- garded as applying thereto.^^ If power to require certain im- provements to be made, such as grade crossings, is placed in the hands of railway commissioners, the authorities of a city cannot require such improvements to be made, and accordingly cannot levy local assessments therefor, even if in the absence of such provision conferring power on the railway commission, 'Brewer v. Incorporated Village of E. 290 [1890]; People ex rel. Ward Bowling Green, Ohio, 7 Ohio C. C. v. Asten, 6 Daly 18 [1875]; Lewis 489 [1893]. V. City of Seattle, 28 Wash. 639, 69 ^"County of Jeflferson v. City of' Pac. 393 [1902]. Mt. Vernon, 145 111. 80, 33 N. E. "Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 1091 [1893]. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Kansas "Scholtz V. Smith, 119 Mich. 634, City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 272, 30 S. W. 78 N. W. 668 [1899]. 773 [1895]; Bradshaw v. Commis- 1= State V. Hudson Comity Avenue, aioners of Guilford Co., 92 N. C. 278 Commissioners, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) [1885]; See also Wand v. Green, 7 12 [1874]. Mo. App. 82 [1879]; Adams v. Lin- " State V. Jersey City, 31 N. J. L. dell, 5 Mo. App. 197 [1878]. (2 Vr.) 575 [1865]; In the Matter "Cincinnati v. Davis, 58 O. S. 225, of Livingston, 121 N. Y. 94, 24 N. 50 N. E. 918 [1898]. 407 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §§ 264, 265 power to construct such improvements will be conferred by the general grant of power to the city/" § 264. Council. By statutory provisions, power to levy an assessment in a public corporation is often conferred upon the council or some corresponding body.^ If by statute the council is to act in two separate boards, it has no authority to act at a joint meeting of such boards.'' In the absence of a statute requiring it, the council is not obliged, as a preliminary step, to determine what land is benefited by the improvement, but it may leave such determination to commissioners appointed in accordance with statutory authority.^ If by statute the council is to appoint a special committee to report on a given improvement, a standing committee on streets and sidewalks is not the proper committee to whom to refer questions of street improvements.* § 265. Boards of revision or review. Under statutory authority therefor, assessments may be re- ferred to boards of revision,- review, and the like, for final ap- " Fair Haven & Westville Railroad 860 [ISO'S]; City of Sedalia to use Co. V. City of New Haven, 77 Conn. of Sedalia National Bank v. Dono- 494, 59 Atl. 737 [1905]. hue, 190 Mo. 407, 89 S. W. 386 'Harris v. City of Ansonia, 73 [1905]; City of Nevada to use of Conn. 359, 47 Atl. Rep. 672 [1900]; Gilfillan v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 546, 27 Birket v. City of Peoria, 185 111. 369, S. W. 853 [1894]; Kiley v. Forsee, 57 N. E. 30 [1900] ; County of Jef- 57 Mo. 390 [1874] ; In the Matter of ferson v. City of Mt. Vernon, 145 Roijerta, 81 N. Y. 62 [1880] ; Balti- 111. 80, 33 N. E. 1091 [1893]; State more & Ohio Railroad Co. v. ex rel. Keith v. Common Council of City of Bellaire, 60 0. S. 301, 54 Michigan City, 138 Ind. 455, 37 N. N. E. 263 [1899]; Brewer v. Incor- E. 1041 [1S94] ; City of Elkhart v. porated Village of Bowling Green, Wickwire, 121 Ind. 331, 22 N. E. Ohio, 7 Ohio C. C. 489 [1893]; City 342 [1889]; Jackson v. Smith, 120 of Toledo for the use of Gates v. Ind. 520, 2;i N. E. Rep. 431 [1889]; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Moberry v. City of Jeffersonville, 30 Railway Company, 4 Ohio C. C. 113 Ind. 198 [1871]; City of Lafayette [1889]; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324 V. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140 [1870]; Hydes [1886]. v. Joyce, 4 Bush. (67 Ky.) 464, 98 ^Harris v. City of Ansonia, 73 Am. Dec. 311 [1868]; Whitney v. Conn. 359, 47 Atl. Rep. 672 [1900]. Common Council of Village of Hud- ' State ex rel. Peters v. Mayor and son, 69 Mich. 189, 37 X. W. 184 Common Council of City of Newark, [1888] ; Steekert v. City of East Sag- 31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 360 [1865]. Inaw, 22 Mich. 104 [ 1870] ; Kansas * Gregory v. City of Bridgeport, 52 City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. Conn. 40 [1884]. § 266 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 408 proval.^ By statutory provision the council may be the body which is to act as such board of revision or review.^ Such a statute is not invalid, as conferring judicial power upon legis- lative and administrative bodies.^ The power of such boards of review is limited by the statutory grant of authority. A board of review, authorized to pass on questions involving the appor- tionment of the assessment, has no power to set the assessment aside because the public corporation*has no authority to impose such assessment.* If by statute an assessment is to be referred for final action to a board of revision, it is not necessary that the common council should confirm .such assessment. '' In the absence of statute, a board of estimate and apportionment, though having power to revise the acts of its predecessor, the board of public improvements has no power to revise its own determina- tions after they have been made and announced." §266. Administrative boards. The power of constructing public improvements, and requiring assessments to be levied therefor, may be conferred upon a board of improvements within a city.^ If the council refuses to levy an assessment, to pay for improvements ordered by the board within their statutory authority, the council may be compelled by mandamus to levy such tax.^ If such board fails to make the annual report reqiiired by law, the council has no power to re- 1 state ex rel. Ashby v. Three which the power of the county board States Lumber Co., 198 Mo. 430, _95 of equalization was recognized. State S. W. 333 [1906] ; Wales v. Warren, ex rel. Ashby v. Three States Lum- 66 Neb. 455, 92 N. W. 590 [1902]; ber Co., 198 Mo. 430, 95 S. W. 333 In the Matter of Lange, 85 N. Y. [1906]. 307 [1881]; In the Matter of Rob- 'In the Matter of Lange, 85 N. Y. erts, 81 N. Y. 62 [1880]; In the 307 [1881]. Matter of Palmer to have Assess- ' In the Matter of Roberts, 81 N. ment for Building Sewer in 34th Y. 62 [1880]; Street Vacated, 31 Howard (N. Y.) "Richards v. Low, 77 N. Y. S. 42 [1865]; In the Matter of Lester, 1102, 38 Misc. Rep. 500 [1902]. 21 Hun. (N. Y.) 130 [1880]; Rich- 'Morrilton Waterworks Improve- ards V. Low, 77 N. Y. S. 1102, 38 ment District v. Earl, 71 Ark. 4, 69 Misc. Rep. 500 [1902]. S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [1903]; 2 Wales V. Warren, 66 Neb. 455, 92 City of Little Rock v. Board of Im- N. W. 590 [1902]; Heath v. McCrea, provements, etc., 42 Ark. 152 [1883]. 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 [1898]. = City of Little Rock v. Board of 'Heath v. MoCrea, 20 Wash. 342, Improvements, etc., 42 Ark. 152 55 Pac. 432 [1898]. Such power has [1883]. been said to be judicial in a case in 409 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 266 move them by ordinance without notice and to appoint their successors, since if the council has power to remove such offi- cers, it must be for cause and after a hearing of which notice is given.^ Such board is not technically the agent of the city.* Provision is frequently made for a board of public works which is to determine the nature and character of im- provements to be constructed.^ If such board has power to de- termine the necessity of improvements, it will be presumed that it acts upon its own motion in preparing an improvement ordi- nance and submitting it to council, although council may have ordered it so to do; it being presumed that, since council had no power to make such order, the board of improvements re- garded such order as a mere petition." If the improvement is ordered, and the assessment levied, the board of improvements has no power to make a material change in the nature and char- acter of the improvements.' The power of constructing local improvements to be paid for by assessment may also be conferred upon the board of supervisors of a city.' The territorial area of a public corporation, such as a city, may be divided between different boards, some of which have power to construct improve- ' Morrilton Wa/terworks Improve- Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn, ment District v. Earl, 71 Ark. 4, 69 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905] ; State of S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [1903]. Minnesota e.^ rel. Lewis v. District * Morrilton Waterworks Improve- Court of Ramsey County, 33 Minn, ment District v. Earl, 71 Ark. 4, 69 164, 22 N. W. 295 [1885]; The Dol- S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [[1903]; lar Savings Bank v. Ridge, 62 Mo. Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148 App. 324 [1895]; Heiser v. The [1891]. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of " Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, 82 New York, 104 N. Y. 68, 9 N. E. Pac. 331 [1905]; In the Matter of 866 [1887]; In the matter of De- the proceedings to change the grada Peyster, 80 N. Y. 565 [1880] ; In the of Beale Street in the city and coun- matter of DePeyster, 18 Hun. 445 ty of San Francisco, 39 Cal. 495 [1879]; Pittelkow v. City of Mil- [1870] ; Houston v. McKenna, 22 waukee, 94 Wis. 651, 69 N. W. 803 Cal. 550 [1863]; City of Denver [1897]; Liebermann v. City of Mil- V. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac. waukee, 89 Wis. 336, 61 N. W. 1112 117 [1904]; Thorn v. West Chi- [1895]. cago Park Commissioners, 130 111. " Gage v. City of Chicago, 207 111. 594, 22 N. E. 520 [1890]; Masonic 56, 69 N. E. 588 [1904]. Building Association v. Brownell, 164 ' Young v. People ex rel. Raymond, Mass. 306, 41 N. E. 306 [1895]', 196 111. 603, 63 .N. E. 1075 [1902]. Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 'Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 Mich. 283, 61 N. W. 526 [1894]; L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891]; (Affirming Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 46 Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. Mich. 150, 9 N. W. 141 [1881]; 71 [1887]). State ex rel. Hughes v. District § 266 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 410 ments and levy assessments for certain purposes in a given part of the area of such city, while the general city authorities have power to construct improvements for other purposes and improve- ments in the remaining parts of such city. A common example of this is found where park boards are given authority to con- struct park improvements, and levy assessments therefor, while the city authorities have power to construct improvements other than for park purposes and levy assessments for such improve- ments." Under such statutes the board of park commissioners can act without an ordinance of the council,^" and can levy as- sessments for park boulevards,^^ or for improving streets giving access to the park and part of the general park system,"^^ but not for drainage sewers in a park boulevard, intended to drain neigh- boring residences and not for the benefit of the boulevard,^* nor for streets not included within their territorial jurisdiction." Park commissioners may be authorized to levy assessments di- rectly, and not through the town authorities.^^ A similar division of power may be made between the city and an aqueduct board,^* or between the city authorities and the trustees of a sanitary district.'^' If, however, the power of the trustees of a sanitary district becomes exclusive only when the system of sewers in the sanitary district is completed, the city will have authority to levy such assessments in the absence of evidence that such system has been completed.^* The power of levying assessments may be conferred upon the trustees of an incorporated village.^" They " West Chicago Park Commission- ^'^ Kedzie v. West Chicago Park ers V. Sweet, 167 111. 326, 47 N. S. Commissioners, 114 III. 280, 2 N. E. 728 [1897]; West Chicago Park 182 [1886]. Commissioners v. Farber, 171 111. 146, "Kittinger v. City of Buffalo, 148 49 N. E. 427 [1897-1898]; Kedzie V. N. Y. 332, 42 N. E. 803 [1896]. West Chicago Park Commissioners, "Lingle v. City of Chicago, 172 114 111. 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]; 111. 170, 50 N. E. 192 [1898]. Dunham tj The People ex rel. Mc- "In the matter of Deering, 85 N. Orea, 96 III. 331 [1880]; Hundley & Y. 1 [1881]. Rees V. Commissioners, etc., of Lin- '°West Chicago Park Commission- coin Park, 67 111. 559 [1873]; Kit- ers v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 N. E. tinger v. City of Buffalo, 148 N. Y. 427 [1898]. 332, 42 N. E. 803 [1896]; In tha "Burns v. Mayor, etc., of the City matter of the petition of Knaust, 101 of New York, 3 Hun. 212 [1874]. N. Y. 188, 4 N. E. 338 [1886]; In "Gage v. City of Chicago, 225 111. the Matter of Hearn, 96 N. Y. 378 218, 80 N. E. 127 [1907]. [1884]; In the matter of Deering, ''Gage v. City of Chicago, 225 111. 85 N. Y. 1 [1881]. 218, 80 N. E. 127 [1907]. "In the matter of Knaust, 101 N. "Crawford v. The People ex rel. Y. 188, 4 N. E. 338 [1886]. Eumse.Y, 83 111. 557 [1876]; Town 411 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. 266 cannot, however, act arbitrarily by increasing the assessment without any examination in fact of the benefits conferred.^" The power of levying assessments for local improvements is frequently conferred upon the officers of a county, such as the boards of supervisors, county commissioners, and the like.^^ Special boards of water commissioners may be created by statute, having charge of the water supply and with power to levy assessments there- for.^- The power of levying assessments may be conferred upon the trustees of a road district.^^ In the absence of statute re- quiring unanimous action on their part, it is not necessary that all the trustees concur in making such improvement.-* The power of levying local assessments may also be conferred upon a drain- age district board,-^ or. upon a drainage commissioner.^" Pro- vision is occasionally made for a special board for levying as- sessments for the construction of levees." Such board may be authorized to determine the rate of taxation as well as to de- of Greenwood v. State, ex rel.. Law- son, 159 Ind. 267, 64 N. E. 849 [1902]; People of the State of New York ex rel. Gage v. Lohnas, 54 Hun. 604, 8 N. Y. Supp. 104 [1889] ; Merritt v. Village of Port Chester, 29 Hun. 619 [1883]. ^'^ State, Souther, Pros. v. Village of South Orange, 46 N. J. L. ( 17 Vr.) 317 [1884]. " Reclamation District No. 3 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 [1884] ; Mayor v. Board of Commis- sioners of Jay County, 137 Ind. 367, 36 N. -E. 1101, 34 N. E. 959 [1893] ; Loesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890] ; Fleener v. Claman, 126 Irid. 166, 25 N. E. 900; Stipp V. Claman, 123 Ind. 532, 24 N. E. 131; Anderson v. Cla- man, 123 Ind. 471, 24 N. E. 175 [1889] ; White v. Fleming, 114 Ind. 560, 16 N. E. 487 [1887]; Board of Commissioners of Montgomery Co. v. Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887] ; Scholtz v. Smith, 119 Mich. 634, 78 N. W. 668 [1899]; Morris v. Merrill, 44 Neb. 423, 62 N. W. 865 [1895] ; In the Matter of Church, 92 N. Y. 1 [1883]. Such power may be withheld by the legislature in the case of streets which have been duly located. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Shipley, 72 Md. 88, 19 Atl. 1 [1890]. ^ State V. Jersey City, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 575 [1865]; Burns v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New Yorlt, 3 Hun. 212 [1874]. ^Corry v. Gaynor, 22 0. S. 584 [1872]. ^Corry v. Gaynor, 22 0. S. 584 [1872]. -" People ex rel. v. Drainage Com- missioners, of the Town of Young America, 143 111. 417, 32 N. E. 688 [1893]; Commissioners of Mason & Tazewell Special Drainage District v. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 995 [1891]; Owners of Lands v. The People ex rel. Stookey, 113 111. 296 [1886]; Turnquist v. Cass County Drainage Commissioners, 11 N. D. 514, 92 N. W. 852 [1902]. ^° Attorney General ex rel. Alexan- der V. McClear, 146 Mich. 45, 109 N. W. 27 [1906]; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]. ■^ Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184; McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 [1860] ; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Cambern, 66 Kan. 365, 71 Pac. 809 [19031. § 267 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 412 termine what lands are subject to be taxed for the construction of the levee.^' Such board may be given power to adjust the assessment and levy of the tax, and to decide all questions rela- tive thereto.^" In such action the board acts as a ministerial, and not as a judicial body.^" By a special statutory authority the board of commissioners in charge of the construction of levees, may act as viewers, or may themselves appoint viewers.'^ Such board ordinarily has discretion in determining whether an im- provement is necessary, and cannot be compelled by mandamus to levy assessments for repairs, unless their action is shown to be arbitrary or fraudulent, or to accomplish their own personal or selfish ends.'^ Authority to construct public improvements and to levy assessments therefor may by statute be conferred upon police juries.'" Provision is sometime? made by statute for a permanent board of assessors who pre to assess the property benefited by public improvements.'* Statutory authority is nec- essary, however, for appointing such a board. If the statute provides for the appointment of three impartial commissioners to determine the expense of an improvement when it is com- pleted, such commissioners must be appointed for each specific case, and a public corporation cannot establish a permanent board to act in all cases.'" If a permanent board or set of offi- cials is empowered to undertake assessment proceedings, and to levy an assessment, the fact that the individuals composing such board have been changed during the proceedings, does not invali- date such proceedings.'® § 267. Other officers. Power of levying assessments may be conferred upon other officials, and thus made a part of their official duties. The legis- ^ Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 " Smith v. City of Buffalo, 159 N. S. W. 184. Y. 427, 54 N. E. 62 [1899]; People =»McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 ex rel. Ward v. Asten, 6 Daly, 18 [I860]. [1875]. '" McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40 '^ State, Ogden, Pros. v. Mayor and [I860]. Common Council of the City of Hud- " Missouri, Kansas & Texas Rail- son, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 104 ■way Co. V. Cambern, 66 Kan. 365, [I860]. 71 Paey. 809 [1903]. "The Central Savings Bank of "^ Bromwell v. Flowers, 217 111. Baltimore v. The Mayor and City 174, 75 N. E. 466 [1905]. Council of Baltimore, 71 Md. 515. >» Barrow v. Helpler, 34 La. Ann. 18 Atl. 809, 20 Atl. 283 [1889]; In 362 [1882]. the Matter of Lewis, 35 Howard 162 [1868]. 413 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 267 lafure may provide that executive officers/ such as assessors/ shall determine questions of fact in levying the assessment. The supervisor and assessor of a village may be empowered, as cor- porate authorities, to levy assessments.'' A county surveyor may be authorized to repair existing ditches, and to certify the cost thereof to the county auditor, who may then be required to draw his warrant in favor of the certificate holders upon the county treasurer who is to be reimbursed by subsequent assessments.* By statute, the superintendent of streets may be authorized to assess benefits for the construction of sewers.^ Statutes con- ferring such authority are not invalid, although the street su- perintendent is not a member of the council," and although the exact method of assessment is not described.^ If such power is conferred exclusively upon the street superintendent, the co-opera- tion of the council is not necessary.' If the street superintendent is authorized by statute to act in making certain repairs in public improvements, and he makes such report, signed by him in his official capacity, the fact that a superfluous order of the court appointed him superintendent of special assessment in that par- ticular proceeding, does not impair the authority conferred upon him by statute." A city engineer may be given, by statute, au- thority to act in proceedings leading up to local assessments /" such as power to decide upon the material to be used,^^ or to make ' Shimmons v. City of Saginaw, 104 wealth for use of City of Allegheny, Mich. 511, 62 N. W. 725 [1895]. 36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]. ^ Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & ° Citizens' Sav. Bank & Trust Co. St. Louis R. R. Co. v. People, 212 v. City of Chicago, 215 III. 174, 74 111. 638, 72 N. E. 725 [1904]; Ex- N. E. 115 [1905]. tension of Hancock Street, 16 Pa. St. ' Greenwood v. Morrison, 128 Cal. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851]. 350, 60 Pae. 971 [1900]. ' People ex rel. Huck v. Gage, 83 ' Schenley v. Commonwealth for 111. 486 [1876]. use of City of Allegheny, 36 Pa. St. ♦State ex rel. French v. Johnson, (12 Casey) 64 [1859]. 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 [1885] ; See • Storrs v. City of Chicago, 208 111. also Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 118 Ind. 364, 70 N. E. 347 [1904]. 329, 21 N. E. 20 [1888]. "Linville v. State ex rel, 130 Ind. « Greenwood v. Morrison, 128 Cal. 210, 29 N. E. 1129; Van Sickle v. 350, 60 Pac. 971 [1900]; Williams Belknap, 129 Ind. 558, 28 N. E. 305 V. Bergin, 116 Cal. 56, 47 P?e.,877 [1891]; Taber v. Grafmiller, 109 Ind. [1897]; Citizens' Savings Bank & 206, 9 N. E. 721 [1886]; Akers v. Trust Co. V. City of Chicago, 215 III. Kolkemyer & Co., 97 Mo. App. 520, 174, 74 N. E. lis [1905]; Storrs v. 71 S. W. 536 [1902]; Waud v. Green, City of Chicago, 208 111. 364, 70 N. 7 Mo. App. 82 [1879]. E. 347 [1904]; Schenley v. Common- "Ray v. City of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883]. § 268 . TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 414 an estimate and apportionment of the cost of the improvement.^^ Statutes are occasionally found authorizing officers of a town- ship to construct public improvements at the expense of the owners of property benefited thereby, and to levy and collect assessments for such improvements.^* § 268. Combined action of public officials. It is frequently provided that as^ssments are to be levied only by the combined action of two or more public oflBcials or sets of officials.^ The board of public works may be given power to determine the limits of the taxing district, the council may be given power to determine the purpose for which money is to be raised, and the combined action of the two may be necessary in order to determine how much shall be raised for the improve- ment undertaken.^ A similar division of authority may be made between the board of improvement and the council, giving the council power to lay off the assessment district and to appoint the board, the board to make the improvement and report the cost to the council and the council to levy the assessment therefor.' The council may be given authority to create a board of public works which is to take charge of the construction of public im- provements.* Under some statutes power is given to two or more boards to levy local assessments only when acting together at a joint meeting.^ If the record of the proceedings is ambigu- ous, it will be presumed that the officers performed their legal duty, and that the meeting was a joint one.* If action is not taken at a joint meeting, it has been held that such defect may be cured by joint action, taken at a subsequent regular meeting.^ "Reeves v. Grottendick, 131 Ind. Improvements, 42 Ark. 152 [1883]; 107, 30 N. E. 889 [1891]. See also Morrilton Waterworks Im- " The Chicago & Northwestern provement District v. Earl, 71 Ark. Railroad Company v. The People ex 4, 69 S. W. 577, 71 S. W. 666 [1903]. rel. Miller, 83 111. 467 [1876]; 'Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324 Weaver v. Templin, 113 lud. 298, 14 [1886]. N. E. 600 [1887]. "Loesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. » Lewis V. City of Seattle, 28 Wash. 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 639, 69 Pac. 393 [1902]. [1890]; Bradshaw v. Commissioners "Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 of Guilford Co., 92 X. C. 278 [1885]. Minn. 494 [1876] ; See also City of "Xoesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. Toledo for the use of Gates v. Lake 422, 25 N. B. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 Shore & Michigan Southern Railway [1890]. Company, 4 Ohio C. C. 113 [1889]. 'Bradshaw v. Commissioner's of 'City of Little Rock v. Board of Guilford Co., 92 y. '^ "-<^ [1885]. ■115 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 269 § 269. Interest of public oflBcials. While it is not advisable that permanent officers of a cor- poration should be authorized to act in assessments, or indeed in any matters, in which they have personal interests, such ques- tions should be addressed to the discretion of the legislature, and not to the courts, and if the legislature sees fit to authorize offi- cers to act in spite of their interests, they may so act.^ Defects in the personal qualification of public officers cannot be the ground for a collateral attack upon the assessment under most statutes.'^ If the city engineer in oifice when the work is done, goes out of office without giving the certificate of performance, his successor in office at the time the certificate is given, is the proper person to give it.' The fact that one who acts as engineer and surveyor, owns land which is to be assessed,? and is related to other owners of land to be assessed,' does not disqualify him. By special statute a surveyor may be forbidden to act if land owned by him or by persons related to him within certain degrees of consan- guinity are benefited by the improvement or are liable to assess- ment therefor." In the absence of specific statute the fact that a member of a common council. owns land which is subject to assessment, does not disqualify him from acting.'' In the ab- sence of specific statute, officers such as county commissioners,^ or drainage commissioners,' are not disqualified because they own land liable to assessment. It is said that, at least, the proceed- ings are not absolutely void, but are at most merely voidable.^" It is not necessary that the election and qualification of town trustees should be shown affirmatively.^^ The fact that a trustee owns land subject to assessment does not disqualify him in the ' The People ex rel. Miller v. Bris- ' Corliss v. Village of Highland lin, 80 111. 423 [187fj]. Park, 132 Mieh. 152, 95 N. W. 254, ^Dows V. Village of Irvington, 66 93 N. W. 610; (AflBrmed on re-hear- Howard (X. Y.) 93 [1883]. ing, 95 N. W. 416 [1903]). 'Hornung V. McCarthy, 126 Cal. 17, 'Thompson v. Love, 42 0. S. 31 58 Pac. 303 [1899]. [1884]. * Thompson v. Goldthwait, 132 Ind. ° The People ex rel. Samuel, Sr. v. 20, 31 N. E. 451 [1892]; Thompson Cooper, 139 111. 461, 29 N. E. 872 V. Love, 42 0. S. 61 [1884]. [1893]. » Thompson v. Goldthwait, 132 Ind. " Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 20, 31 N. E. 451 [1892]. N. E. 322 [1906]. "Markley v. Rudy, 115 Ind. 533, "Sloeum v. Dallas, 165 Ind. 710, 18 N. E. 50 [1888]. 75 N. E. 823 [1905]. § 270 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 416 absence of specific statute.^' It has even been held that a trustee who has done work and expended money in constructing the im- provement, may collect therefor where his vote is not necessary for the allowance of his claim by the majority of the board." If the court before which assessment proceedings are to be held is by reason of interest incapable of acting, provision is made for appointing other judges to act." Under special statutory provisions it has been held that a member of a board of public works, who owns property affected by an improvement is dis- qualified to act by reason of his interest, and that if he does act, the ordinance and assessment are invalid.^^ § 270. Exercise of authority by public oflBcers. The public officers by whom an assessment may be levied must exercise the authority which is conferred upon them in substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute by which such power is conferred.^ Under general language the officers of a corporation will not have authority to levy an assessment upon lands outside of the territorial limits of the corporation of which they are officers, even though such land is benefited by the im- provement constructed.^ Thus, authority to locate "any ditch" does not authorize county commissioners to locate a ditch within the limits of a city or village, and levy an assessment therefor, upon land within such municipal corporation.'' If the statute specifically provides therefor, land which is benefited by the im- provement may be assessed, although it is outside the territorial limits of the corporation making the assessment.* Land cannot, however, be included in two or more assessment districts, where the effect is to assess such tract in excess of the tax imposed "Cdrlisa v. Village of Highland 'City of Joliet v. Spring Creek Park, 132 Mich. 152, 95 N. W. 254, Drainage District, 222 111. 441, 78 N. 95 N. W. 416 [1903]. E. 836 [1906]; Village of Pleasant "Lower Kings River Eeclamation Hill v. Commissioners, 71 O. S. 133, District No. 531 v. McCuffah, 124 72 N. E. 896 [1904]. Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]. "Eeclamation District No. 108 v. "In the Matter of Broadway Wid- Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]; ening, 63 Barb. 572 [1872]. Hudson v. Bunch, 116 Ind. 63, 18 I'Hunt V. City of Chicago, 60 111. N. E. 390 [1888]; Watkins v. State 183 [1871]. ex rel. Van Auken, 151 Ind. 123 51 'See § 229, 234. N. E. 79, 49 N. E. 169 [1898] ; Crist = Drain Commissioner v. Baxter, v. State ex rel. Whitmore, 97 Ind. 57 Mich. 127; suh nomine Robertson 389 [1884]. V. Baxter, 23 N. W. 711 [1885]. 417 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 271 upon other lands similarly situated.^ County commissioners may order an improvement at a special session." Oral notice of such special session is sufficient.' They cannot, however, during an ad- journment, without a call for a special session, make an order for an improvement, and an assessment levied for an improvement so made is invalid.* Where an improvement is constructed jointly by two counties, the proceedings are not absolutely void, if the boards of commissioners of the two counties act as one tribunal, even if the statute contemplates separate action. Such proceedings may be irregular but are not absolutely void." A board of review which has authority to correct errors and irregu- larities in assessment proceedings has no authority to adjudge such proceedings illegal.^" § 271. Action of court in lev3dng assessment. The legislature may confer upon a court the power to decide upon the necessity of the improvement,^ as in the case of a drain- age district.^ It may be provided by statute that a public cor- poration, such as a city or village, shall construct certain im- provements by filing a petition therefor with the proper court and securing an order of the court for the construction of such improvements, at the cost of the owners of property benefited thereby.^ It may be provided that a park board shall petition ° Abascal v. Bouny, 37 La. Ann. ' State of Washington ex rel. Mat- 538 [1885]. son v. Superior Court for Skagit "Loesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. 422, County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890]; [1905]. Fleener v. Claman, 126 Ind. 166, 25 ^Payson v. People ex rel. Parsons, N. E. 900; Stipp V. Claman, 123 Ind. 175 111. 267, 51 N. E. 588 [1898]; 532, 24 N. E. 131; Anderson v. Cla- State v. Superior Court of Skagit man, 123 Ind. 471, 24 IST. E. 175 County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 [1889]; White v. Fleming, 114 Ind. [1905]. 560, 16 N. E. 487 [1887]. 'Drainage Improvement; Stack v. 'Loesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. People ex rel. Talbott, 217 111. 220, 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 75 N. E. 347 [1905]; McChesney v. [1890]. Village of Hyde Park, 151 111. 634, 'Morris v. Merrill, 44 Neb. 423, 37 N. E. 858 [1894]; Walker v. City 62 N. W. 865 [1895]. of Aurora, 140 111. 402, 29 N. E. •Sarber v. Rankin, 154 Ind. 236, 741 [1893]; Hosmer v. The Hunt 56 N. E. 225 [1899]. Drainage District, 134 111. 360. 26 N. "Cavanaugh v. Sanderson, — E. 584 [1891]; City of G'alesburg v. Mich. . 115 N. W. 955 [1908]; Searles, 114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 680 Thayer Lumber Co. v. City of Mus- [1B86]; Kennedy v. State ex rel. Dor- kegon, — Mich. , 115 N. W. 957 sett, 124 Ind. 239, 24 N. E. 748 [1908]. [1890]; Street Improvement; In the §271 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 418 the court for authority to open a driveway through the park.^ The court has been empowered to pass upon the plan of the improvement.' The court may be authorized to determine what lands are benefited by the proposed improvement," as in the ease of a levee district;' or to determine the amount of benefits to each tract of land.* The court may be empowered to determine whether a sufficient number of property owners have petitioned for an improvement." The court may be authorized to appoint commissioners by whom the question of benefits is to be de- termined, and by whom the assessment is to be apportioned.^" The court may be authorized to adjust assessments already lev- ied,^^ and to reduce the amount thereof so that the assessments do not exceed the benefit conferred upon the property.^- The Matter of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 20 Johnson 269 [1822]. 'Astor V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York 62 N. Y. 567 [1875]. "In the Matter of the Mayor, Al- dermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 20 Johnson 269 [1822] ; (The validity of such grant of power was questioned in this case.) See also Badger v. Inlet Drainage Dis- trict, 141 111. 540, 31 N. E. 170 [1893]. ' Overstreet v. Levee Dist. No. 1 of Conway County, 80 Ark. 46Z, 97 S. W. 676 [1906] ; City of Valparaiso V. Parker, 148 Ind. 379, 47 X. E. 330 [1897]; State ex rel. Wilcox v. Jackson, 118 Ind. 553, 21 N. E. 321 [1888]; State of Washington on the relation of Matson v. Superior Court of Skagit County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 [1905]. ' Overstreet v. Levee Dist. No. 1 of Conway County, 80 Ark. 462, 97 S. W. 676 [1906]. ' State of Washington on the rela- tion of Matson v. Superior Court of Skagit County, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 [1905]. = Blake v. The People, for use of Caldwell, 109 111. 504 [1884]. "Trigger v. Drainage District No. 1, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 [1901]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. 354 [1895]; Sargeant v. City of Evanston, 154 111. 268, 40 N. E. 440 [1894]; Mc- Chesney v. Village of Hyde Park, 151 111. 634, 37 N. E. 858 [1894]; Smith v. The People ex rel. Detriek, 140 111. 355, 29 N. E. 676 [1893]; Mur- phy v. City of Peoria, 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]; j-'aylor v. Bur- nap, 39 Mich. 739 [1878]; Bakman, Pros. V. Hackensack Improvement Commission, 70 N. J. L. (41 Vr.) 499, 57 Atl. 141 [1904]; Striker v. Kelley, 2 Denio, 323 [1845]; In re Main St. in Borough of Nicholson, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 570 [1905]. " Chicago Consolidated Traction Co. V. Village of Oak Park, 225 111. 9, 80 N. E. 42 [1907] ; Birket v. City of Peoria, 186 111. 369, 57 N. E. 30 [1900] ; City of Jacksonville v. Ham- ill, 178 111. 235, 52 N. E. 949 [1899] ; Blanchet v. Municipality No. 2, 13 La. 322 [1839] ; In Report of Com- missioners of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 488, 10 Atl. 363 [1887]; In the Matter of Livingston, 121 N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]; In the Matter of Auchmuty, 18 Hun. 324 [1879]. " Chicago Consolidated Traction Co. V. Village of Oak Park, 225 111. 9, 80 N. E. 42 [1907]. 419 AUTHOEITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 272 court may be authorized to levy an assessment with the co- operation of a jury,''' or to order commissioners to make such levy.^* Under some statutes the court is to act in confirming an assessment." The amount of the assessment may be referred to the court for determination.^" Under a statute giving to the court power to modify, change, alter or annul an assessment, the court may deduct a certain per cent, from the amount assessed against property owners and impose such reduction upon the public corporation." In the absence of specific authority con- ferred by statute the court cannot levy an assessment if no ordi- nance has been passed.'^* If by statute the property owners are entitled to the determination of commissioners as to the amount of benefits, the court cannot determine such fact,^" nor can it decide what araount should be raised by assessment.-" If the amount of damage caused by the exercise of the right of emi- nent domain is to be determined, as well as the amount of bene- fits caused by the improvement, a judicial inquiry of some sort is necessary.^^ In taking part in levying an assessment, the judges are said to act as commissioners rather than as a eourt.^^ § 272. Jury. The property owners have, as has been said before,^ no con- stitutional right to a jury in determining the question of -the amount and apportionment of benefits.^ It is therefore within the power of the legislature to provide that damages should be assessed by a jury and benefit's by drain commissioners.* The legislature has, however, full power to provide for a hearing by "Robeson v. People ex rel. Curry, '^° Boskowitz v. Thompson, 144 Cal. 161 111. 176, 43 N. E. 619 [1896]. 724, 78 Pac. 290 [1904]. " Trigger v. Drainage District, No ^ City of Chicago v. Ward, 36 111. One, 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 9 [1864]. [1901]. '''In the Matter of the Mayor, Al- " See § 910 et seq. dermen and Commonalty of the City •°Zahu V. Borough of Rutherford, of New York, 20 Johnson 269 [1822]. 72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 446, 60 Atl. "See § 201 et seq. 1123 [1905]. 2 Trigger v. Drainage District, No "In the Matter of Pike Street, One, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 Seattle, 42 Wash. 551; suh nominee, [1901]; The Chicago & Alton Rail- In re City of Seattle, 85 Pac. 45 way Company v. City of Joliet, 153 [1906]. 111. 649, 39 N. E. Rep. 1077 [1894]; " Brewer v. Incorporated Village ' Ross v. Prante, — N. D. , of Bowling Green, Ohio, 7 Ohio C. C. 115 N. W. 833 [1908] ; Tyler v. Shea, 489 [1893]. 4 N. D. 278, 50 Am. St. Rep. 660, 61 "Morrison v. City of Chicago, 142 N. W. 468. 111. 660, 32 N. E. 172 [1893]. § 272 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 420 .1 jury upon the question of benefits, and if by statute it is pro- vided that such matters must be determined by a jury, such statute must be complied with substantially.* If the statute re- quires a jury without specifying the number, it is held that the term jury implies twelve men.' If, however, the statute provides for a different number," as for a jury of six men,^ com- pliance with such provision is sufficient. At a meeting to correct an assessment of damages and benefits a new juror cannot be appointed to take the place of one who acted in making the pre- liminary assessment.' The jury is frequently empowered by statute to determine certain facts essential to the assessment proceedings, leaving the remaining steps to be taken by the city officials." Thus the council may be empowered to determine the boundaries of the district benefited, while the jury is to find as a fact how much the benefits are to each tract of land.^" Under a statute requiring a jury without any provision as to its method of selection it has been held that an ordinance requiring the mayor to furnish the names of freeholders from whom the jury is to be drawn if the persons whose names were on the list were "good and unexceptional men," was "perhaps unwise and inex- pedient but not void. "^^ It has been held that clerical errors in a verdict may be corrected by the foreman after the jury has separated, "where by statute the foreman alone is to certify to the assessment.^^ Under some statutes provision is made for levying an assessment by public officers or commissioners chosen for that purpose, subject to the revision of a jury.^^ If a trunk sewer and lateral sewers are constructed under one contract as an entire improvement the property owner cannot object that ' Robeson v. People ex rel. Curry, ' City of Kansas v. Hill, 80 Mo. 161 111. 176, 43 N. E. 619 [1896]; 523 [1883]. Huston V. Clark, 112 111. 344 [1885]; » Gilkerson v. Scott, 76 HI. 509 Bibel V. The People for use of the [1875]. City of Bloomington, 67 111. 172 "Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. [1873]; Taylor v. Burnap, 39 Mich. 259, 48 S. W. 860 [1898]. 739 [1878]; In the Matter of the "Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich. 504 259, 48 S. W. 860 [1898]. [1874]; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 "State of Missouri ex rel. Caven- Mo. 259, 4'8 S. W. 860 [1898]. der v. City of St. "Louis, 52 Mo. 574 "Bibel V. The People for use of the [1873]. City of Bloomington, 67 111. 172 "Huston v. Clark, 112 HI. 344 [1873]. [1885]. •City of Kansas City v. Hill, 80 "Butler v. City of Worcester. 112 Mo. 523 [1883]. Mass. 541 [1873]. 421 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS §273 different juries were not appointed to view the trunk sewer and the laterals.^* § 273. Delegation of discretionary power. Under constitutional provisions which confer the power of levy- ing local assessments upon public corporations, the legislature may provide what agents or officers of the corporation shall have power to levy the assessment.^ A public corporation has no power to act except by and through its officers, and accord- ingly such constitutional provision must be regarded as contem- plating action through agents or officers to be designated by the legislature.^ In the absence of a statutory authority for dele- gating power to subordinates or other officials, discretionary pow- er vested by the legislature in one official, or set of officials, can- not be delegated to other officials.^ Thus, the official or set of officials are authorized to determine the necessity of the improve- ment,* or the character,^ or the cost thereof," or are authorized "In re Reynolds Street Sewer, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 209 [1907]. ^ State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- rick V. District Court of Hennepin County, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 [1885]. ' State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- rick V. District Court of Hennepin County, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625 [1885]. ' California Improvement Co. v. Eeynoias, 125 Cal. 88, 55 Pac. 802 [1898] ; Rauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 Pac. 337 [1895]; Warren v. Fer- guson, 108 Cal. 535, 41 Pac. 417 [1895]; Bolton v. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244, 45 Am. St. Rep. 33, 38 Pac. 881 [1894]; Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush. (73 Ky.) 241 [1874]; Hydes v. Joyce, 4 Bush. (67 Ky.) 464, 96 Am. Dec. 311 [1868]; Whitney v. Com- mon Council of the Village, of Hud- son, 69 Mich. 189, 37 Is". W. 184 [1888] ; Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437 [1868]; City of Sedalia to use of Sedalia National Bank v. Donohue, 190 Mo. 407, 89 S. W. 386 [1905]; City- of Nevada to use of Gimilan v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 546, 27 S. W. 471 [1894]; City of Westport v. Whiting, 62 Mo. App. 647 [1895]; The Dollar Savings Bank t?. Ridge, 62 Mo. App. 324 [1895]; McQuiddy v. Vineyard, 60 Mo. App. 610 [1894] ; The King Hill Briclc Manufacturing Co. v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App. 126 [1892]; State, Mann, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zabriskie) 662 [1855]; In the Matter of Hearn, 96 N. Y. 378 [1884]; In the Matter of Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]; Merritt v. Vil- lage of Port Chester, 29 Hun. 619 [1883]; Whyte v. Mayor and Alder- men of Nashville, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan.) 364 [1852]. 'Hydes v. Joyce, 67 Ky. (4 Bush.) 464, 96 Am. Dec. 311 [1868]; Whyte V. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan.) 364 [1852]. " California Improvement Company V. Reynolds, 123 Cal. 88, 58 Pac. 802 [1898]; Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush. (73 Ky.) 241 [1874]; King Hill Brick Manufacturing Company v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App. 120 [1892]. "Bolton V. Giller.an, 105 Cal. 244, 45 Am. St. Rep. 33. 38 Pac. 881 [1894]; Merritt v. Village of Port Chester, 29 Hun. 619 [18831. § 274 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 422 in their discretion to dispense with a formal contract for the improvement/ or are authorized to issue a certificate of the per- formance of the contract,* or are empowered to define the limits of the tax district,'' or are authorized to apportion the tax, issue tax bills, and the like,^" or to determine what proportion of the expense is to be borne by the property owners," cannot delegate to other officials the authority to exercise such discretionary powers. If by statute power is conferred upon certain officials, or sets of officials, and it is furthermore provided expressly that such power may be conferred by such officials upon others, such statutes are valid; and if power is thus conferred by the officials specified upon other officials in the manner provided for by stat- ute, the latter set of officials may exercise such power." Such provisions are, however, constructed strictly." Substantial com- pliance with the provisions of the statute has, however, been held to be sufficient.^* If, by statute, an engineer is authorized to appoint a deputy to act in place of such engineer, and the statute requires such appointment to be made in writing, it has been held that if such deputy has been appointed orally, but he acts as a deputy and is recognized as such, he may exercise the powers conferred by the statute upon the deputy.^' § 274. Delegation of non-discretionary power. It cannot, however, be intended by the legislature that the chief officials of the city shall personally attend to all the details of the 'Matter of Petition of Emigrant [1891]); City of Westport v. Whit- Industrial Savings Bank, 75 N. Y. ing, 62 Mo. App. 647 [1895]; Dollar 388 [1878]. Savings Bank v. Ridge, 62 Mo. App. 'Kauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 324 [1895]; State, Mann, Pros. v. Pae. 337 [1895]; Warren v. Fergu- Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 4 Za- son, 108 Cal. 535, 41 Pac. 417 [1895]. briskie (24 N. J. L.) 662 [1855]; ° Whitney v. Common Council ol In the Matter of Hearn, 96 N. Y. the Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189, 378 [1884]. 37 N. W. 184 [1888]. " Seofield v. City of Lansing, 17 '"Scofield V. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437 [1868]. Mich. 437 [1868]; City of Sedalia to ^=City' of Chicago v. Nodeek, 202 US2 of Sedalia National Bank v. Don- III. 257, 67 N. E. 39 [1903]. oliue, 190 Mo. 407, 89 S. W. 386 "City of Chicago v. Nodeek, 202 [1905]; Dollar Savings Bank v. 111. 257,* 67 N. E. 39 [1903J. Kidge, 183 Mo. 506, 82 S. W. 56 " Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo. 390 [1904]; City of Nevada to use of [1874]. GilfiUan V. Eddy, 123 Mo. 546; (Ee- '= Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo. 390 versing City of Nevada to use of [1874]. Gilflllan v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 686 423 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 275 various tasks placed upon them by statute. Accordingly, non-dis- eretionary ministerial powers may be delegated by such officials to subordinates, or to other officials.^ Thus, if the officialc to whom discretionary power is delegated have determined aL the facts which are essential to the validity and the amount of the as- sessment, and only a mathematical calculation is necessary to determine the amount of the assessment, power to make such mathematical calculation may be delegated to subordinates.^ So, the work of making out an apportionment warrant is not the same thing as levying a tax, and may accordingly be performed by an executive board which has no authority to levy a tax.^ § 275. Adoption or ratification of acts of subordinates. The fact that a given body is authorized by law to take certain steps with reference to an assessment, while, in fact, such body appoints a committee to investigate and report recommendations to such body, which recommenda.tions it adopts, and upon which it acts, does not amount to a delegation of power to such com- mittee, since, while the original investigation is made by the committee, the ultimate action is taken by the body appointing such committee.^ Upon the same principle the fact that the ofH- cer or officers authorized to levy the assessment ask for the re- ports of other officers upon matters relative thereto, and act upon such reports, does not amount to a delegation of power, since the ultimate, discretion is exercised by the officer to whom au- ' Keese v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, 190 112, 15 Pac. 825 [1887]; Walker v. Pa. 'St. 374, 42 Atl. 893 [1899]. District of Columbia, D. C. (6 Mack- = Bariield v. Gleaaon, 111 Ky. 491, ey) 352 [1888]; City of Burlington v. 23 Ky. Law Rep. 128, 63 S. W. 964 Quick, 47 la. 222 [1877]; Mayor and [1901]. City Council of Baltimore v. Johns ^Main v. Port Smith, 49 Ark. 480, Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880]; 5 S. W. 801 [1887]; Bassett v. City Heman Construction Co. v. Loevy, of New Haven, 76 Conn. 70; 55 Atl. 179 Mo. 455, 78 S. W. 613 [1903]; 579 [1903]; Bartram v. City of City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, 190 Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 122, 10 Atl. Pa. St. 374, 42 Atl. 893 [1899]. 470 [1887]; Bosell v. City of Marion, =■ Keese v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. — Ind. App. , 79 N. E. 1056 11?, 15 Pac. 825 [1887]; Walker v. [1907]; Sears v. Board of Aldermen District of Columbia, 6 Mackey (D. of Boston, 173 'Mass. 71, 43 L. R. A. C.) 352 [1888]; City of Burlington v. 834, 53 N. E. 138, 1 Mun. Corp. Cas. Quick, 47 la. 222 [1877] ; Mayor and 497 [1899]; Cruikshanks v. City City Council of Baltimore v. Johns Council, 1 MoCord (S. C.) 360 Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 [1880]; [1821]. § 276 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. * 424 thority is given to exercise such discretion.- Thus, if a subordi- nate computes a tax bill, and such computation is accepted by the authority authorized to issue the bill, and the bill is signed by them, such tax bill is sufficient.' If an assessment is incor- rectly apportioned by mistake, and is made by the assistant of the engineer under a statute authorizing the engineer to make such assessment, such fact does not invalidate a sub- sequent assessment apportioned upon a correct basis and made by the city engineer.* If the council fixes the limits of an assessment district just after the enactment of a statute con- ferring such power upon the board of public works, and on learn- ing of such amendment the board of public works proceeds to fix the limits of the assessment district, and fixes them exactly as they were fixed by the council, such action of the board of public works is valid.^ If an improvement has been ordered by an officer not authorized to bind the city, and such improvement has been constructed, the city cannot, after the construction of such improvement, adopt the acts of such unauthorized officer, and by ratification render the improvement a lawful one for which the property owner must pay the assessment imposed upon him.* § 276. Assessment by de facto officers. If the assessment is levied by persons who assume to be lawful officers of the public corporation, who are in fact- exercising the authority conferred by statute, and are de facto officers, the validity of their exercise of official powers cannot be questioned ^ Bassett v. City of New Haven, ment is not the determination by the 76 Conn. 70, 55 Atl. 579 [1903]; City board of the costs and expenses; Mer- of Burlington v. Quick, 47 la. 222 ritt v. Village of Port Chester, 29 [1877]; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, Hun. 619 [1883]. 5 S. W. 546 [1887]; Shimmons v. ' Heman Construction Co. v. Loe- City of Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511, 62 vy, 179 Mo. 455, 78 S. W. 613 N. W. 725 [1895]; Cuming v. City [1903]. of Grand Kapids, 46 Mich. 150, 9 N. * Casey v. City of Leavenworth, 17 W. 141 [1881]; Smith V. City of Buf- Kan. 189 [1876]. falo, 90 Hun. 118, 35 N. Y. S. 635 = Shimmons v. City of Saginaw, 104 [1895]. See also Baisch v. City of Mich. 511, 62 X. W. 725 [1895]. Grand Kapids, 84 Mich. 666, 48 N. 'Second Municipality of Xew Or- W. 176 [1891]. Contra, the adoption leans v. Botts, 8 Robinson (La.) 198 by a board of trustees of the report [1844]. of commissioners fixing the assess- 425 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §§277,278 in a proceeding to enforce the assessment.^ Thus the fact that township officers omitted to take an oath of office before enter- ing upon their duties does not render invalid an assessment levied by them.- The right to exercise the powers of the office which they are exercising, can be questioned only by a proceed- ing in the nature of quo warranto.^ The same principle has been invoked to uphold the acts of commissioners who omitted to take the prescribed oath of office.* If one who assumes to act as an officer is neither an officer de jure or de facto the prop- erty owner who is assessed can have no relief in equity as his remedies at law are ample." § 277. Method of attacking authority of officers. The question of the authority of public officers to construct an improvement and levy an assessment therefor, must be raised in the trial court, when the case is heard upon its merits,^ and cannot be raised for the the first time by a motion for a new trial,^ or by collateral attack.' § 278. Necessity and authority of special commissioners. Provision by a statute is frequently made for the appointment of commissioners, viewers, and the like, often by appointment in each particular case, who are to co-operate with the public authorities in determining the facts, such as the amount of bene- fits, the extent of the land benefited, and the like, which are by statute referred to them for determination.^ The advantage of ^Betts V. City of Naperville,, 214 'In the matter of Kendall, 85 N. 111. 380, 73 N. E. 75? [1905]; Smith Y. 302 [1881]. See § 281. V. The People ex rel Detrick, 140 111. " President, Managers Canal Com- 355, 29 N. E. 676 [1893]; Samuels pany v. Atkins, Collector, 121 N. Y. V. Drainage Commissioners, 125 111. 246, 24 N. E. 319 [1890]. 536, 17 N. E. 829 [1889]; Harmon ^ Goodwine v. Leak, 127 Ind. 569, V. Dallas, 165 Ind. 710, 75 N. E. 27 N. E. 161 [1890]. 823 [1905]; Deane v. Indiana Ma- ^Goodwine v. Leak, 127 Ind. 569, cadam & Construction Company, 161 27 N. E. 161 [1890]. Ind. 371, 68 N. E. 686 [1903]; Akers 'Downs v. Village of Irvington, 66 V. Kolkmeyer & Company, 97 Mo. Howard (N. Y.) 93 1883. See § App. 520, 71 S. W. 536 [1902]; 1375. Downs V. Village of Irvington, 66 'Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. Howard (N. Y.) 93 [1883]. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; ^ Downs V. Village of Irvington, 66 (affirming Paulson v. City of Port- Howard (N. Y.) 93 [1883]. land, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 'Samuels v. Drainage Commission- Pac. 450 [1888]); Swamp Land Dis- ers, 125 111. 536, 17 N. E. 829 [1889]. trict No. 307 v. Gwynn, 70 Cal. 566, §278 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 426 such a method of determining benefits over the method of hav- ing the council determine them has been pointed out by the courts.^ If special assessors are chosen to determine the fact and amount of benefits, and to apportin- the assessment upon the property benefited, such assessors can determine only such questions as are referred to them by statute.^ If by statute the trustees of a town have the authority to determine the fact that the benefits conferred upon real property equal or exceed the cost of the improvement, the commissioners need not determine such fact again.* On the other hand, the officers of the town, or "public corporation, cannot control the commissioners in mat- ters which by statute are left to the determination of the com- missioners.° Commissioners can only act if authorized by stat- 12 Pac. 462 [1886]; People v. Hagar, 49 Cal. 229 [1874]; People V. Cogliill, 47 Cal. 361 [1874]; Sum- ner V. Village of Milford, 214 111. 388, 73 N. E. 742 [1905]; Trigger V. Drainage District No. 1, 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 [1901]; Ryder's Estate V. City of Alton, 175 111. 94, 51 N. E. 821 [1898]; Brethold v. Village of Wilmette, 168 111. 162, 48 N. E. 38 [1897]; Pike v. City of Chicago, 155 111. 656, 40 N. B. 567 [1895]; Wright v. City of Chicago, 48 111. 285 [1868] ; Scammon v. City of Chicago, 42 111. 192 [1866]; Board of Commissioners, Montgomery Co. V. Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]; Crist v. State exrel. Whit- more, 97 Ind. 389 [1884] ; Blanchett V. Iklunicipality No. 2, 13 La. 322 [1839] ; Kelley v. Minneapolis, 57 Minn. 294, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 L. R. A. 92, 59 N. W. 304 [1894]; Williams v. Monroe, 125 Mo. 574, 28 S. W. 853 [1894]; State, King, Pros. V. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 188 [1881] ; State, Johnson, Pros. v. In- habitants of City of Trenton, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 166 [1881]; State, Free- holders of County of Hudson, Pros. V. Inferior Court of Common Pleas of County of Hudson, 42 N. J. L. ( 13 Vr.) 608 [1880]; State, Simmons, V. City of Passaic, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 60 [1875]; State, Peters, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of City of Newark, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 360 [1865]; State, Mann, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 662 [1866]; In the matter -of the Application of Emily P. Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 136 [1884]; Olmsted v. Den- nis, 77 N. Y. 378 [1879]; People ex rel. Kilmer v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 [1877] ; In the matter of the Ex- tension of Church Street, 49 Barb. 455 [1867]; Gilbert v. Havemeyer, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 506 [1849]; Vaca- tion of Howard Street, 142 Pa. St. 601, 21 Atl. 974 [1891]; Pittsburg's Petition for Board of Viewers, 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. 757, 759, 761 [1890]; Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851]; In re Westlake Avenue, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]; Bryant v. Robbins, 70 Wis. 258, 35 N. W. 545 [1887]. ' Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]. ' Union Building Association v. City of Chicago, 61 111. 439 [1871.] ' Crawford v. People ex rel. Rum- sey, 82 111. 557 [1876]. "Steckert v. City of East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104 [1870]. If the deter- mination of the amount of the assess- ment is left by statute to commission- ers, it cannot be the subject of arbi- tration; Smadbeck v. City of Mt Vernon, 109 N. Y. S. 70 [1908]. 427 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 279 ute, and accordingly if provision is made for a jury, commis- sioners can not aet.^ A formal report of the commissioners is prima facie valid.' It cannot subsequently be impeached by the testimony of one of the commissioners." The appointment, as shown by the record, cannot be impeached by the. testimony of one of the commissioners." § 279. Appointment and compensation of commissioners. The commissioners may be appointed, and are required to be appointed, in the manner specified by statute.^ If the legislature chooses, and there are no constitutional provisions preventing local legislation, the legislature may appoint.^ The legislature may provide that the commissioners or assessors shall be chosen by the electors of the district,^ or by the president of the boacd of local improvements in a village,* or by the township com- missioners,' or by the city council." Such assessors or commis- sioners must be appointed by ordinance, and not by resolution.' If it is provided by statute that no ordinance can be passed at the meeting at which it has been introduced, it is held that a change of name of one of the commissioners appointed by the ordinance makes it necessary to lay such ordinance over for another week after such change is made.* Under a statute providing that com- missioners shall appoint, the mayor cannot appoint." It is fre- ' Taylor v. Burnap, 39 Mich. 739 ^People ex rel. Kilmer v. McDon- [1878]; Strachan v. Brown, 39 Mich. aid, 69 N. Y. 362 [1877]. 168 [1878]. » Williams V. Corcoran, 46 Cal. ^53 'Trigger v. Drainage District No. [1873]. 1, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 * Sumner v. Village of Milford, 214 [1901]; Allen v; City of Chicago, 111. 388, 73 N. E. 742 [1905]. 176 111. 113, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]. See "Anderson v. Lower Merion Town- |§ 923, 1283. ship, 217 Pa. 369, 66 Atl. 1115 "Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, [1907]. 175 111. 94, 51 N. E. 821 [1898]; "City of Elkhart v. Wickwire, 121 Brethold v. Village of Wilmette, 168 Ind. 331; 22 N. E. 342 [1889] ; Laim- 111. 162, 48 N. E. 38 [1897]. beer v. Mayor, Aldermen and Com- ° Boynton v. People ex rel. Kern, monalty of City of New York, 155 111. 66, 39 N. E. 622 [1895]. 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 109 [1850]; ^ Bibel V. The People, for Soovill v. City of Cleveland, 1 0. S. use of the City of Bloomington, 67 126 [1853]. 111. 172 [1873]; Astor v. Mayor, Al- 'State, Gleason, Pros. v. Town of dermen and Commonalty of the City Bergen, 33 N. J. L. (4 Vr.) [1868.] of New York, 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep, » State, Ackerman, Pros. v. Town 539 [1874]. As to the effect of a of Bergen, County of Hudson, 33 N. change of statute as to the appoint- J. L. (4 Vr.) 39 [1868]. ment of commissioners, see Sta/te, " Bibel v. The People for use of Copeland, Pros. v. Village of Pas- saic, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 382 [18731. § 279 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 428 quently provided by statute that the commissioners are to be appointed by a court.^" Such a statute is valid under a consti- tutional provision to the effect that the legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities with the power to make local im- provements by special assessment, since the statute does not con- fer upon the court the power to make the assessment.^^ What court has such power, is determined and controlled by the pro- visions of the statute 5^" as is also the question of the term of the court at which such appointment may be made.^^ If the appoint- ment is made by the judge in writing, but is not filed as a part of the record of the court, such appointment must be shown to be genuine in order to be admissible to show the power of such commissioner.^* If commissioners are appointed in an improper manner by an oiBeial or body of officials, not having authority to make such appointment, subsequent proceedings are invalid.^^ Such mistake does not, however, invalidate prior proceedings, but it is sufficient if the proceedings are corrected at the point at which the improper appointment of a commissioner was made.^° The same result follows if the record does not show that some of the persons who act as eoi^missioners were appointed at all.^' If the persons who certify to the assessment roll are not assessors; either de jure or de facto, the assessment is said to be absolutely void.^' An objection to the appointment of commissioners h City of Bloomington, 67 111. 172 "Bannister v. Grassy Fork Ditch- [1%73]. ing Association, 52 Ind. 178 [1875]. " Allen V. City of Chicago, 176 111. « Williams v. Corcoran, 46 Cal. 113, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]; Township 553 [1873]; State, Ackerman, Pros, of Whiteford v. Phinney, 53 Mich. v. Town of Bergen, in County of Hud- 130, 18 N. W. 593 [1884]; In re son, 33 N. J. L. (4 Vr.) 39 [1868]; Westlake Avenue, 40 Wash. 144, 82 State ex rel. Hosley, Pros. v. Mayor Pac. 279 [1905]. and Aldermen of the City of Pater- "/m re Westlake Avenue, 40 Wash. son, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 409 [1875]; 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]. State, Hoetzel, Pros. v. Inhabitants "Smith V. The People ex rel. De- of East Orange, 50 N. J. L. (21 Vr.) trick, 140 111. 355, 29 N. E. 676 354, 12 Atl. 911 [1888]. [1893]. '"Village of Melrose Park v. Dun- '» Commissioners may be appoint- nelbecke, 210 111. 422, 71 N. E. 431 ed at a probate term. Davis v. City [1904]. of Litchfield, 155 111. 384, 40 N: E. "Murphy v. City of Chicago, 186 354 [1895]; Murphy v. City of Peo- 111. 59, 57 N. E. 847 [1900]. ria, 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]. "People ex rel. President, Man- The appointment is prima facie reg- ager and Company of Delaware & ular if the record can be so construed Hudson Canal Company v. Parker, fairly. Sargent v. City of Evanston, 117 N. Y. 86, 22 N. E. 752 [1889]. 154 111. 268, 40 N. E. 440 [1894]. 429 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. §279 waived if not made until after confirmation." Such objection cannot be interposed under a statute providing that an assessment shall not be vacated for irregularities.^" The tribunal which is authorized to appoint commissioners or assessors is generally em- powered to fill vacancies in such body.-^ If one of the comnjis- sioners is interested and the assessment is for that reason set aside on confirmation, new commissioners may be appointed with- out a new petition.-- Under most statutes it is necessary to fill vacancies in order to render the assessment valid, if vacancies existed.^' Under some statutes it is discretionary with the ap- pointing officials whether to fill vacancies or not.^* The power to fill vacancies is liberally construed. Thus, power to appoint a successor in case of death, absence, or other dis- ability, is regarded as conferring power to appoint in case of the resignation of one or more commissioners.^^ If no provision is made for filling vacancies it is said that the surviving commis- sioners can act and that no power to appoint successors exists.^* The tribunal appointing commissioners is held, in some cases, to have power to remove them.^' In other jurisdictions it is said that the tribunal appointing the commissioners has no inherent power to remove them in the absence of some statutes specifically providing therefor.^' If the council has authority to remove one ""Astor V. The Mayor, Aldermen ^'Williams v. Little White Lick and Commonalty of the City of New Gravel Road Company, Wilson's Sup. York, 62 N. Y. 580 [1875]. Ct. Eep. (Ind.) 7 [1871]. '^ Astor V. The Mayor, Aldermen ^^ State, King, Pros. v. Duryea, 45 and Commonalty of the City of New N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 258 [1883]; State, York, 62 N. Y. 580 [1875].' Water Commissioners of Jersey City, " Osborn v. Sutton, 108 Ind. 443, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council 9 N. B. 410 [1886]; The People ex of City of Newark, 27 N. J. L. (2 rel. Moore v. The Mayor, etc., of the Dutcher) 185 [1858]. City of New York, 5 Barb. 43 [1848] ; ^People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor Laimbeer v. Mayor, Aldermen and and Common Council of the City of Commonalty of the City of New York, Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291 [1875]. 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Hep. 109 [1850]; ^Laimbeer v. Mayor, Aldermen Eector of Trinity Church v. Higgins, and Commonalty of the City of New 27 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1 [1866]. York, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 109 ^^Ewart V. Village of Western [1850]; The People ex rel. Moore Springs, 180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478 v. The Mayor, etc., of the City of [1899]. New York, 5 Barb. 43 [1848]. "^In the matter of Beekman, 31 "* State, Terhune, Pros. v. City of Howard 16 [1865]; Matter of Beek- Passaic, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 90 man's Petition, 1 Abb. Pr. N. S. 449, [1879]. affirming Beekman's Petition, 19 Abb. Pr. 244 [1865]. § 280 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 430 commissioner, and instead of so doing it removes three commis- sioners, and then re-appoints two of those who were improperly removed, together with another commissioner, it has been held that such irregular action does not invalidate the assessment, since it is equivalent in legal effect to removing and appointing one of the commissioners.^" Acceptance by the appointee is necessary to enable him to act officially.^" The commissioners may be appointed after the ordii}fe,nce is signed and before it is approved by the mayor if it is approved ultimately.*^ If the statute requires the commissioner to qualify by giving bond, such bond must be given. *^ The fact that the commissioners receive an excessive compensation, is not ground for a collateral attack upon the assessment proceedings.^* If compensation is provided for the assessment commissioners by statute, such compensation is proper.*^ Since they are regarded as officers of the court, it is not necessary that a special appropriation be made for paying them.'* § 280. Qualifications of commissioners. The qualifications of commissioners are determined by statute.^ Under a statute requiring that commissioners shall be competent to serve as jurors, a personal privilege of exemption from jury duty does not render such person incompetent to serve as a commissioner.^ It is frequently provided by statute that the com- missioners must be freeholders.' and that they must be disinter- ^ State, Simmons, Pros. v. City of State, Bramhall, Pros. v. Bayonne, Passaic, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 524 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 476 [1872]; [1880]. State, Clark, Pros. v. City of Eliza- ™ Township of Whiteford v. Phin- beth, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) 357 [1867], ney, 53 Mich. 130, 18 N. W. Rep. ^Heerman's Heirs v. Municipality 593 [1884]. No. 2, 15 Curry (La.) 597 [1840]. ^^City of Galesburg v. Searles, 114 'City of Bridgeport v. Giddings, 111. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]. 43 Conn. 304 [1876]; Judson v. City 'ii Township of Whiteford v. Phin- of Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 426 [1857]; ney, 53 Mich. 130, 18 K. W. Rep. 593 Laughlin v. Ayers, 66 Ind. 445 [1884]. [1879]; Seits v. Sinel, 62 Ind. 253 "Pittman V. Mayor, etc., of the [1878]; State, Coward, Pros. v. May- City of New York, 3 Hun. 370 [1875]. or, etc., of North Plainfield, 63 N. "Kimble v. City of Peoria, 140 111. J. L. 61, 42 Atl. 805 [1899]; Dederer 157, 29 N. E. 723 [1893].. v. Voorhies, 81 N. Y. 153 [1880]; '" Kimble v. City of Peoria, 140 Porter v. Purdy, 29 N. Y. 106, 86 111. 157, 39 N. E. 723 [1893]. Am. Deo. 283 [1864]; Pittsburg v. "State, Hampton, Pros. v. Mayor Cluley, 74 Pa. St. (24 P." F. Smith) and Aldermen of the City of Pater- 262 [1873]. son, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 159 [1873]; 431 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. 280 ested.* It has been held that freeholders cannot act unless dis- interested, even in tlie absence of such specific statutory provision, on the theory that their power is in its nature judicial, and that it is accordingly essential that they be impartial and disinter- ested.^ By the term "disinterested," with reference to commis- sioners or other persons who are to take part in assessment pro- ceedings, it is meant that such persons must have no particular interest in the property affected by the improvement, or to be assessed therefor." The owner of property which is to be as- sessed is not a disinterested person.' If property upon the line of the improvement, but not immediately opposite the improve- ment is not subject to assessment, the owner of such property is a disinterested person.* If, however, such property is subject 'City of Bridgeport v. Giddings, 43 Conn. 304 [1876]; Murr v. City of Naperville, 210 111. 371, 71 N. E. 380 [1904]; White v. City of Alton, 149 111. 626, 37 N. E. 96 [1894]; Chase v. City of Evanston, 172 111. 403, 50 N. E. 241 [1898]; Philadel- phia & Reading Coal and Iron Com- pany V. City of Chicago, 158 111. 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895] ; Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 111. 226; sub nomine Albertson v. Town of Cicero, 21 N. E. 815 [1890] ; Pearce v. Village of Hyde Park, 126 111. 286, 18 N. E. 824 [1890]; City of Chicago v. Wheeler, 25 111. 478, 79 Am. Dec. 342 [1861]; Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 Ind'. 417 [1884]; Laughlin v. Ayers, 66 Ind. 445 [1879]; Seits v. Sinel, 62 Ind. 253 [1878.]; Combs v. Etter, 49 Ind. 535 [1875]; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]; McKusick V. City of Stillwater, 44 Minn. 372, 46 N. W. 769 [1890]; Hendrickson V. Borough of Point Pleasant, 65 N. J. L. 535, 47 Atl. 465 [1900]; State, Coward, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of North Plainfield, 63 N. J. L. (34 Tr.) 42 Atl. 805 [1899]; State, Kingsland, Pros. v. Township of Union, County of Bergen, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 268 [1874]; State, Wi- nans. Pros. v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 394 [1873]; O'Reilley v. City of Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439, 21 N. E. 1004 [1889]; People ex rel. Howlett V. Mayor and Common Council of City of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291 [1875]; O'Reilly v. City of Kingston, 3.9 Hun. 285 [1886]; Hopkins v. Ma- son, 42 Howard, 115 [1871]; Hop- kins V. Mason, 61 Barb. 469 [1871]; Main Street, Big Run Borough, 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]. " State, Winans, Pros. v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 394 [1873]. ' City of Bridgeport v. Giddings, 43 Conn. 304 [1876]. ' Nutwood Drainage and Levee Dis- trict V. Reddish, 234 111. 130, 84 N. E. 750 [1908] ; Commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 1 v. Smith, 233 111. 417, 84 N. E. 376 [1908]; Vandalia Levee and Drain- age District v. Hutchins, 234 111. 31, 84 N. E. 715 [1908] ; Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 111. 226; sub nomine Albertson v. Town of Cicero, 21 N. E. 815 [1890]; Batchelor v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, — N. J. , 68 Atl. 124 [1907]; State, Kingsland, Pros. v. Inhabitants of Township of Union, in County of Bergen, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 268 [1874]; State, Wi- nans, Pros. v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 394 [1873]. ' State, Coward, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of North Plainfield, 63 N. J. L, (34 Vr.) 61, 42 Atl. 805 [1899]. § 280 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 432 to assessment, though not actually upon the improvement, the owner of such property is not disinterested." The trustee of a religious corporation, the property of which is liable to assess- ment, is a disinterested person where the office of trustee does not confer any legal interest in the property of the corporation, nor render the trustee personally liable for its debts or assess- ments.^" In some of the lower New York courts it is held that a pew holder who is a regularly contributing church member, has such a pecuniary interest in the- property of the church that he is incompetent to act in assessment proceedings by which the property of such church might be assessed.^^ A person who is interested in a public contract may act in spreading the assess- ment for such improvement.^^ Thus if A is to act as engineer and receive as compensation five per cent, of the total cost, but the rights of the property owners are protected by requiring competitive bidding and by giving the property owners the right to do the work if they elect to do it, A may act as commissioner in spreading the assessment and is not disqualified by reason of his interest.^^ The fact that commissioners after resignation undertake part of the work and receive compensation therefor, is said not to avoid the contract in the absence of fraud or injury to the public interests, although the amount paid to them as compensation must be deducted from the amount of the as- sessment.^* The secretary of the board of trustees of a reclama- tion district is not thereby disqualified to act as a commissioner, though he is appointed by the board and receives a salary from them."^^ A city officer, who receives a fixed percentage on the amount of special assessments as compensation for his services, has such an interest as disqualifies him from acting as commis- " Main Street, Big Run Borough, tern of waterworks, and to make 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]. plans, specifications and estimates " People ex rel. Hewlett v. Mayor, for a certain per cent, of the cost of etc., of the City of Syracuse, 63 N. the work was not disinterested). Y. 291 [1875]. "Betts v. City of Naperville, 214 '^Hopkins v. Mason, 42 Howard 111. 380, 73 N. E. 752 [1905]; (over- 115 [1871]; Hopkins v. Mason, 61 ruling Murr v. City of Naperville, Barb. 469 [1871]. 210 111. 371. 71 N. E. 380 [1904]. "'Betts V. City of Naperville, 214 " ¥i3lier v. City of Rochester, 6 111. 380, 73 N. E. 752 [1905]; (over- Lansing 225 [1872]. ruling Murr v. City of Naperville, "Lower Kings River Reclamation 210 HI. 371, 71 N. E. 380 tl904], District No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. where it was held that one who was 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895]. employed by a city to design a sys- 433 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 280 sioner." A petitioner for an improvement is disqualified to act as a commissioner to assess damages and benefits caused thereby.^' One who testifies as an expert witness as to the effect of the improvement upon other property, is not disqualified from act- ing as a commissioner to make the assessment for the same im- provement upon another tract of land/* In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the fact that one of the owners of property to be assessed is a near relative of a commissioner, does not render the latter disqualified to act.*" Thus, the fact that the son of one of the assessors owns one of the lots assessed, and that a hotel is located thereon in which such assessor lives, has been held not to disqualify him, since he is not shown to be interested in the property, or to be an occupant thereof.^" The fact that one commissioner is a brother-in-law of a person whose property is not assessed does not disqualify him.^* If, by statute, it is provided that the commissioners or assessors must not be of kin to the parties, such relationship disqualifies them from actiDo;.'"' Thus, the father-in-law of a person whose property will be affected by the improvement, cannot act as commissioner.^' The fact that a commissioner was an employe of a person who is the agent of the owners of some of the property assessed in the name of the employer, does not render such commissioner an interested person.^* A general taxpayer is a disinterested •'Chase v. City of Evanaton, 172 =» O'Reilly v. City of Kingston, 114 111. 403, 50 N. E. 241 [1898]; (a N. Y. 439, 21 N. E. 1004 [1889]; case where the commissioner was also O'Reilly v. City of Kingston, 39 Hun. superintendent of special assessments, 285 [1886]. receiving one per cent, of the total ^ Eowe v. Commissioners and As- amount; and collector, receiving two sessments of East Orange, 69 N. J. per cent, of the total amount as com- L. (40 Vr.) 600, 55 Atl. 649 [1903]. pensation). ''^Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 "Hendrickson v. Borough of Point Ind. 417 [1884]; Laughlin v. Ayers, Pleasant, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 535, 66 Ind. 445 [1879]; Seita v. Sinel, 47 Atl. 465 [1900]; (citing Foster 62 Ind. 253 [1878]; Combs v. Etter, V. Cape May, 60 N. J. L. (31 Vr.) 49 Ind. 535 [1875]. 78; Traction Co. v. Board of Works, ■= Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 431; State, Ind. 417 [1884]. Winans, Pros. v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. " Pearce v. Village of Hyde Park, (7 Vr.) 394 [1873]. 126 111. 287, 18 N. E. 824 [1890] ; "Philadelphia & Reading Coal and See also Rowe v. Commisaioners and Iron Co. V. City of Chicago, 158 111. Assessments of East Orange, 39 N. 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895^ J. L. (40 Vr.) 600, 55 Atl. 649 "O'Reilly V. City of Kingston, 114 [1903]. N. Y. 439, 21 N, E. 1004 [1889]. § 280 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 434 person within the meaning of these statutes.^^ A commissioner may be a resident of the public corporation which is conduct- ing the improvement and making the assessment;^' and it is sometimes provided that he must reside in such city;" and some- times that the commissioners must reside in different wards.^' If the commissioners or assessors are appointed by the proper officers, and the only irregularity in such appointment is the fact that such commissioners are not quMified, such objection may be made at the time of the appointment, but if not made then such objection is regarded as waived, and the assessments cannot sub- sequently be attacked as invalid because the appraisers are not qualified.^" Thus, if a commissioner or assessor is not a free- holder, such objection must be interposed when such commission- er is appointed, and before the work is dt)ne, and the assessment made.'" An objection to the competency of a commissioner must be made at the time of the appointment, or within a reasonable time after his want of competency becomes known, or such ob- jection will be regarded as being waived.'^ Failure to object until the commissioners have filed their report waives such ob- jection.'^ Objections to the method of appointing the commis- sioners will not be considered after the commissioners have com- pleted the public improvement.'' Such objections are waived if '"Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, ^'Dederer v. Voorhies, 81 N. Y. 153 24 S. 88 [1903], (affirming Hibben [1880]; Astor v. The Mayor, Alder- V. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, 62 N. E. 447 men and Commonalty of the City [1901]) ; City of Bridgeport v. Gid- of New York, 62 N. Y. 5S0 [1875]; dings, 43 Conn. 304 [1876]; McKu- Porter v. Purdy, 29 N. Y. 106; 86 sick V. City of Stillwater, 44 Minn. Am. Dec. 283 [1864]; Thurston v. 372, 46 N. W. 769 [1890]; State, City of Elmira, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) Oonklin, Pros. v. Bergen County Cir- 119 [1868]; Pittsburg v. Cluley, 74 cuit Court, 64 N. J. L. (35 Vr.) 536, Pa. St. (24 P. F. Smith) 262 [1873]. 45 Atl. 981 [1900]; State, Bowker, =° Porter v. Purdy, 29 N. Y. 106, Pros. V. Wright, 54 X. J. L. (25 Vr.) 86 Am. Dee. 283 [1864]; Thurston 130, 23 Atl. 116 [1891]; State, Wi- v. City of Elmira, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. nans. Pros. v. Crane, 36 N. J. L, S.) 119 [1868]. (7 Vr.) 394 [1873]. 'iCity of Valparaiso v. Parker, 148 =»MeKusick v. City of Stillwater, Ind. 379, 47 N. E. 330 [1897]; Os. 44 Minn. 372, 46 N. W. 769 [1890]; born v. Sutton, 108 Ind. 443, 9 N. E. State, Bowker, Pros. v. Wright, 54 410 [1886]. N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 130, 23 Atl. 116 •''City of Valparaiso v. Parker, 148 [1891]. Ind. 379, 47 N. E. 330 [1897]. "State, Clark, Pros. v. City of »= State, Skinkle, Pros. v. Inhabi- Elizabeth, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) 357 tants of Township of Clinton, in [1867]. County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) "State, Malone, Proa. v. Mayor 656 [1877]. and Common Council of Jersey City, 28 N. J. L. (4 Dutcher) 500 [I860]. 435 AUTHORITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 280 not interposed before confirmation.^* Whether it will be pre- sumed that commissioners have the proper qualifications, or whether the fact of the existence of proper qualifications must appear affirmatively upon the record, is a question upon which there is a conflict of authority. In some cases it is held that such qualifications are presumed where the court appoints the commissioners.^^ It has furthermore been held that where public officials, such as the council,^" or the county commissioners,^^ ap- point the commissioners, their qualifications will be presumed to exist, and need not appear affirmatively upon the record. In other cases it has been held that where public officers,*' such as the council,^^ or the mayor,*" are to appoint commissioners, the qualification .of such commissioners must appear affirmatively upon the record. It has been held that if commissioners have been appointed to fill vacancies, their qualifications must appear affirmatively.*^ While there is some conflict of authority as to whether the qualifications of commissioners appointed to levy as- sessments for a particular improvement must appear affirmatively upon the record, it is generally held that the qualifications of commissioners who are permanent officers of the city need not appear affirmatively upon the record, but will be presumed.*^ "Nutwood Drainage and Levee J. L. (7 Vr.) 170 [1873]; State, District v. Reddish, 234 111. 130, 84 Pope, Pros. v. Town of Union, in N. E. 750 [1908]; Commissioners of County of Hudson, 32 N. J. L. (3 Union Drainage Di.strict No. 1 v. Vr.) 343 [1867]; State, Bramhall, Smith, 233 111. 417, 84 N. E. 376 Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of the City of [1908]. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 476 ''Philadelphia & Reading Coal and [1872]; State ex rel. Harris, Pros. Iron Co. V. City of Chicago, 158 111. v. Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Jersey 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895]. City, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 85 [1875]; '" State, Malone, Pros. v. Mayor State, ex rel. Hosley, Pros. v. Mayor, and Common Council of Jersey City, etc., of the City of Paterson, 37 N. 28 N, J. L. (4 Dutcher) 500 [I860]. J. L. (8 Vr.) 409 [1875]. " Kellogg V. Price, 42 Ind. 360 " Judson v. City of Bridgeport, 25 [1873]. Conn. 426 [1857]. " State ex rel. Speer, Pros. v. City " Vreeland v. Mayor and Council of Passaic, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 168 of the City of Bayonne, 54 N. J. L. [1875]. (25 Vr.) 488, 24 Atl. 486 [1892]; '• Vreeland v. Mayor and Council The State, Tims, Pros. v. Mayor and of the City of Bayonne, 54 N. J. L. Common Council of Newark, 25 N. J. (25 Vr.) 488, 24 Atl. 486 [1892]; L. (1 Dutcher) 399 [1856]. The State, Tims, Pros. v. Mayor and " State, Hoboken Land & Improve- Common Council of Newark, 25 N. ment Company, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., J. L. (1 Dutcher) 399 [1856]; State of Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 291 ex rel. Little, Pros. v. Mayor and [1873]. Common Council of Newark, 36 N. § 281 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 436 § 281. Oath of commissioners. It is frequently provided by statute that the commissioners must take oath in some prescribed form. If such oath is not taken, or if it is taken without complying substantially with the requirements of the statute, subsequent proceedings are invalid.' The commissioners must be sworn for each particular case.'' If commissioners have been sworn wili reference to a particular improvement, and their report is referred to them for recasting, it is not necessary that they be sworn a second time.^ If the evi- dence before the lower courts is not preserved, it will be presumed that the evidence showed that the commissioners took the oath required by law.* If no oath has been taken, it has been said that the assessment cannot be attacked collatefally on such ground.^ This is true especially where the assessment has been confirmed before a court of competent jurisdiction.® The oath must be in substantial compliance with the statutory formalities.'' Additional , clauses, not inconsistent with the statutory require- ments, may be disregarded.* Under a statute requiring an oath "fairly and impartially to execute the duties imposed on them by statute," an oath that the commissioners "will fairly and impartially execute duties imposed upon them by the above ap- pointment, and make a just and true report according to the best of their skill and judgment," has been held to be sufficient, the latter part of the oath being regarded as. surplusage. ° Under a statute requiring an oath "faithfully and fully to discharge the duties" required by statute, an oath by the commissioners that each would perform the duties "to the best of his ability" ' Wheeler v. City of Chicago, 57 ' Schemick v. City of Chicago, 151 111. 415 [1870]; Hentig v. Gilmore, 111. 336, 37 N. E. 888 [1894]. 33 Kan. 234, 6 Pac. 304 [1885]; * Gross v. Village of Grossdale, 176 Hendrickson v. Borough of Point 111. 572, 52 N. E. 370 [1898]. Pleasant, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 535, » Caskey v. City of Greensburg, 78 47 Atl. 465 [1900]; State, Spear, Ind. 233 [1881]; In the matter of Pros. V. City of Perth Amboy, 38 N. Kendall, 85 N. Y. 302 [1881]. J. L. (9 Vr.) 425 [1876]; State, "Walker v. People ex rel. Kocher- Hosley, Pros. v. Mayor and Al- sperger, 169 111. 473, 48 N. E. 694 dermen of City of Paterson, 37 N. [1897]. J. L. (8 Vr.) 409 [1875]; Merrit v. 'Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 III. Village of Port Chester, 71 N. Y. 286 [1871]. ■ 309, 27 Am. Kep. 47 [1877]. 'Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 HI. = State ex rel. Graham, Pros. v. 286 [1871]. Mayor, etc., of City of Paterson, 37 " State, Wilkinson, Pros. v. City N. J. L. (8 Vr) 380 [1875]. of Trenton, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 485 [1872]. 437 AUTHOEITY TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS. § 282 is insufficient.'" Under a statute requiring an oath to perforin duties "impartially and according to their best judgment," a report that the commissioners have been sworn "to the faithful discharge of their duties," is insufficient." The officer specified by statute is the proper one to administer the oath to the com- missioners.'^ If the commissioners are sworn to before a notary public who is also the attorney of the city, such action is irregu- lar; but if objection is not made to such proceedings on the ground of such irregularity, it is regarded as waived.'^ If the petition is signed "Joseph E. Paden, City Attorney," and the certificate to the oath is signed "J. E. Paden, Notary Public," it will not be prpsumed on appeal that the persons were identical.'* A notary who is superintendent of the assessment department of a city may administer the oath to special assessment com- missioners, and is not disqualified on the ground of his office. "* An oath is not invalid because taken at an earlier time than that provided for by law.'" The commissioners are required to take the oath before acting, but not before giving notice of their first meeting.''' It has been held to be sufficient if the oath is taken after the assessment is made, and before it is reported to the common council.'* If the commissioners are sworn when they make the assessment it is not necessary that they be sworn before hearing the evidence submitted on objections to the assessment." § 282. Exercise of power by commissioners. The commissioners who are appointed to determine benefits and to apportion the assessment, must exercise- their authority in sub- stantial compliance with the terras of the subject which authorizes them to act.' The authority of assessment commissioners is ex- " Merrit v. Village of Port Ches- " Gurnee v. City of Chicago, 40 ter, 71 N. Y. 309, 27 Am. Rep. 47 111. 165 [1866]. [1877]. "Page v. Mayor and City Council "Cambria Street, 75 Pa. St. (25 of Baltimore, 34 Md. 558 [1871]. P. F. Smith) 357. " Laimbeer v. Mayor, Aldermen " Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 and Commonalty of the City of New 111. 226; sub nomine Albertson v. York, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 109 Town of Cicero, 21 N. E. 815 [1890]. [1850]. "Linck V. City of Litchfield, 141 "Trigger v. Drainage District, 193 111. 469, 31 N. E. 123 [1893]. 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1U4 '[1901]. "Linck V. City of Litchfield, 141 'The details of the method of ex- Ill. 469, 31 N. E. 123 [1893]. erciaing this power are considered in "McChesney v. City of Chicago, connection with the method of levy- 159 111. 223, 42 N. E. 894 [1896]. ing an assessment and of making an apportionment. See Chapter XV. § 282 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 438 hausted when they have prepared and filed a formal report of their proceedings, and they cannot act subsequently in the absence of some statutory provision specifically authorizing them to act further.^ If a special committee is appointed to levy an assess- ment, or make out a special tax bill, such bill must be in writing, and signed and certified by all the members of the committee.^ '^ People. ex rel. Reynolds V. City of way,% 188 111. 156, 58 N. E. 979 Brooklyn, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 136 [1900] ; Murphy v. City of Chicago, [1867]. 186 111. 59, 57 N.E. 847 [1900]. ^Vennum v. People ex rel. Callo- CHAPTER VIII. IMPROVEMENTS FOR WHICH ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. A.— GENERAL NATURE OF IMPROVEMENT. § 283. Nature of improvement in assessment for benefits — Must be for public use. The elements which an improvement must possess in order to be one for which a local assessment may be levied based on the theory of benefits, are certainly two in number, and possibly three. (1) In order to justify a local assessment the improve- ment must be a public one;^ that is, it must be one which con- fers a general benefit upon the public at large, and which, therefore, the public acting through its government may con- struct without the consent of the particular individuals af- fected thereby. Local assessment for benefits is a form of taxation and the very nature of taxation implies that it is for a public interest.^ An improvement which lacks this element is essentially a private improvement, and no mat- ter how useful or advantageous it may be, the public cannot compel its construction, nor can it pay therefor by funds raised by general taxation.^ Being a private improvement it must be left to the judgment and voluntary consent of the owners of the private property affected thereby. "The power to make spe- cial assessments is referable to and included in the taxing power. . . . Even the owner of land benefited cannot be taxed to im- prove it unless public considerations are involved, but must be ^In the Matter of opening N. E. 397 [1902]; In the Matter of and Grading Market Street, 49 Cal. Johnston 103 N. Y. 260, 8 TST. E. 546 [1875]; Chambers v. Satterlee, 399 [1886]. 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Illinois Central "People on the Petition of Butler Railroad Company v. City of Deca- v. Supervisors of Saginaw County, tur, 154 111. 173, 38 N. E. 626 [1894]; 26 Mich. 22 [1871]. See §§ 4, 8. Sears v. Street Commissioners of the ' Loan Association v. Topeka, C7 City of Boston, 180 Mass. 274, 62 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 22 L. 455. 439 § 283 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 440 left to improve it or not as he may choose. ' ' * Thus a statute providing an assessment for making connection with a sewer sys- tem put down by a private contractor is invalid.' Conversely a corporation to which the power of levying local assessments can lawfully be given must be a public corporation.^ If, how- ever, an improvement which is to be used by all the public whose lands are so situated with reference thereto that it can be used by them, such as a sewer, is term«d a "private sewer," it may nevertheless be paid for by local assessment.'' It is not what the statute calls it, but what in its essential nature it in that determines whether its cost can be paid by local assessment or not. If the expense incurred is one which should have been burne by a private individual, a local assessment cannot be levied therefor. Thus, if gas pipes must be moved in grading a street,* or in laying a sewer,® and the expense is one which should be borne primarily by the gas company a local assessment cannot be levied therefor. Another example of an improvement which is not public in its nature and for which therefore the owners of property benefited by such improvement cannot be compelled to pay local assess- ments is found in some jurisdictions where assessments cannot be levied for draining large tracts of land, where no considera- tions of public welfare, utility or health supervene, although the owners of such property will be greatly benefited by such im- provement.^" The courts are not unanimous in their applica- tion of this principle, however, requiring the use to be a public one. Thus it has been held that an assessment may be levied for connections running from the lots which are assessed to the pipes of a private water company." So in some jurisdictions drainage assessments are upheld without reference to any pub- lic utility to be subserved.'^ ♦Elmore v. Drainage Commission- Deering to Vacate an Assessment, ers, 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. 93 N. Y. 361 [1883]. 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]. • In the Matter of Johnston, 103 "Weaver v. Canon Sewer Co., 18 X. Y. 260, 8 K e. 399 [1886]; Peo- Colo. App. 242, 70 Pac. 953 [1902]. pie of the State of New York ex re,. "Elmore v. Drainage Commission- Jessup v. Kelley, 33 Hun. 389 [1884]. ers, 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. " See 334 et seq. 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]. "Palmer v. City of Danville, 154 'Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 111. 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894]; Glea- S. W. 559 [1900]. son v. Waukesha County, 103 Wis. °In the Matter of the Petition of 225, 70 K. W. 249 [1899], "'See § 338. 441 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. 284 § 284. Improvement must confer special local benefit. (2) In order to justify a local assessment, the improvement must not only be public in its nature, but it must confer an especial and local benefit upon the property which is to be assessed there- for.* If the improvement confers an especial local benefit, it is no objection to an assessment therefor that it is constructed so as to benefit the public as much as possible and to injure it as little as possible.- Improvements of this sort must "have a double aspect of general public benefit and also of peculiar local bene- fit." ^ .The attempt to state in general terms what constitutes a local special benefit has often been made. "Benefits are special when they increase the value of the land, relieve it from a burden, or make it especially adapted to a purpose which enhances its value. " * " Whatever gives an additional value to the particular parcel of land is a special and not a general benefit, and it may be a special benefit, although not an immediate one. "° Without such local benefit the improvement may be public in character, so that the expense thereof may be borne by general taxation, but a local assessment, based upon the theory of benefits, cannot be levied therefor." ' Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford, 60 Conn. 432, 22 Atl. 782 [1891]; City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Company, 30 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869] ;■ Northwestern Universit-y v. Village of Wilmette, 230 111. 80, 82 N. E. 615 [1907]; Village of Morgan Park V. Wiswall, 155 111. 262, 40 N. B. 611 [1895]; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. City of Decatur, 154 III. 173, 38 N. E. 626 [1894] ; Gauen v. Drainage District, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N.E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; Law V. Madison, Smyrna & Graham Turn- pike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [ISqS]; Sears v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 180 Mass. 274, 62 L. R. A. 144, 62 N. E. 397 [1902]; W. F. Stewart Co. v. City of Flint, 147 Mich. 697, 111 N. W. 352 [1907] ; Wreford v. City of Detroit, 132 Mich. 348, 93 N. w. 876 [1903]; Rogers V. City cf St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]; Morewood Avenue, Chamber's Ap- peal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893], "W. F. Stewart Co. v. City of Flint, 147 Mich. 697, HI N. W. 352 [1907]. ° Sears ■/. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 180 Mass. 274, 281, 62 L. R. A. 144, 62 N. E. 397 [1902]. 'Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 508, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; (citing Allen v. City of Charleston, 109 Mass. 243 [1872]; Whitney v. City of Boston, 98 Mass. 312 [1867]; Farwell v. Cambridge, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 413 [1858]; Milwau- kee, etc., R. R. Co. V. Eble, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 334 [1851]). "Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 507, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]. "See § 360, § 367 et seq. § § 285-287 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 442 § 285. Permanency. (3) A third element which is said in some jurisdictions to be essential is that of permanency. While no public improvement can be said to be absolutely and unqualifiedly permanent, and no such requirement is made by any courts, yet some improve- ments are of a sort calculated to last ordinarily for a very con- siderable space of time, while others are ephemeral in their dura- tion. In some jurisdictions it is htld that permanency is an es- sential element of public improvements for which local assessments may be made, and the right to assess is denied in the case of improvements of the transient type. In other jurisdictions it is denied that permanency is an essential element of such improve- ments and it is held that if the improvement has the other requi- site elements, local assessments may be levied therefor even though it is one which will last for but a short space of time.^ §286. Meaning of "local improvement." In some states are found constitutional provisions which per- mit local assessments to be levied for "local improvements."^ The term "local improvement" thus used has substantially the same meaning as that which is already discussed.^ It is said to be a public improvement by which the realty adjoining or near the locality of such improvement is especially benefited,' or one which is confined to a locality and enhances the value of adjacent property in addition to the benefits which it confers upon the public generally.* "A local improvement within the meaning of the law is an improvement which by reason of its being con- fined to a locality enhances the value of property situated within the particular district, as distinguished from benefits diffused by it throughout the municipality. " ° § 287. Definition of local improvement. In view, then, of the foregoing discussion of the general ele- ments of a public improvement for which a local assessment may ' For a detailed discussion of this ' Illinois Central Railroad Com- Kubjeet see § 367 et seq. pany v. City of Decatur, 154 III. 173, 1 Article IX., § 9, Constitution of 38 N. E. 626 [1894]. Illinois ; Constitution of Minnesota, ' City of Butte v. School District Article IX., § 1. No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 339, 74 Pac. 369 "See § 283 et seq. [1904]; (citing City of Chicago v. 'Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Blair, 149 111. 310, 314, 315, 24 L. Minn. 494 [1876]. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 [1894]. 443 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §§ 288, 289 be levied on the theory of benefits, it may be defined as follows: An improvement for which a local assessment may be levied is one which confers both a general benefit to the public and also an especial and peculiar local benefit to the neighboring property.^ § 288. Nature of improvement in assessment for legal duty. In considering the forms of improvement for which assessments of the second type may be levied, we must keep in mind that the theory on which assessments of this type are justified is, that the owner of the realty owes a duty to the public to do, or to refrain from doing, certain acts with reference to his realty, that he has omitted to perform his duty, and that accordingly the public has the power to do such act, and to charge the owner of such realty with the expense thereof. Accordingly, the essential fea- ture of such an improvement is that it must be some act which the owner was bound to perform, and which in the event of his failure to perform the public has the right to do at his expense.^ There is little conflict of authority as to the general nature of such an improvement. The difficult questions which are pre- sented in improvements of this type arise out of the conflict of authority upon the question of what specific improvements or acts the owner of realty is legally bound to do, as distinguished from the acts which the public may do, but which if done must be paid for out of funds raised either by general tax:ation or by local assessment. § 289. Nature of improvement in assessment for goods sold. In determining for what purposes assessments of the third type may be levied, it must be kept in mind that so-ealled as- sessments of this sort are charges against the owner or tenant of property for personal benefit of some sort furnished for use upon such premises and voluntarily used by such owner or tenant, under an agreement, express or implied, that he is to make com- pensation therefor. Such a so-called assessment is, as we have already seen, not a true assessment, but a form of genuine con- ^Lipeg v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 397 [1902]; State v. Reis, 38 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; Minn. 371, 38 N. W. 97; Morewood Thomas v. Woods, — Ky. , 108 Avenue, Chamber's Appeal, 159 Pa. S. W. 878 [1908]; Sears v. Street St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]; See §§ Commissioners of the City of Boston, 11, 283, 285. _ 180 Mass. 274, 62 L. E. A. 144, 62 'See § 13. § 290 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 444 tract entered into by the voluntary consent of the parties there- to. A charge of this sort may therefore be levied for anything which the municipal corporation or other corporation has a right to furnish to the owner or tenant of property, and which the owner or tenant of such property is left free to accept, thus rendering himself liable to such charge, or to decline, thus pre- venting any liability for such charge,^s he may choose.^ B.— EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION. § 290. Conclusiveness of legislative determination in assessments for benefits. In determining for what purposes an assessment for benefits may be levied, we are met with the question of the effect of a legislative determination that a given improvement is public in its nature, and that it confers a special local benefit. Is such a legislative determination valid? If it is valid in all cases, there is little room for constitutional questions, since an assess- ment can be levied for any purpose for which the legislatures may see fit to levy an assessment. Is the correctness of the legislative determination to be inquired into in each ease as a question of fact? If it is, then the validity and constitutionality of an assessment statute is to be determined in each case as a question of fact, not law. This is only one phase of the same question which arises in determining what property is benefited, and is liable to assessment, and in determining how the assess- ment is to be apportioned among the tracts of land upon which a special local benefit is conferred by such improvement. In de- termining this question, two general principles must be liept in mind: (1) A legislature has power to tax, but under American constitutions private property is protected from confiscation even by the legislature. To attempt to levy a general tax for a pur- pose which is not public in its nature, is to attempt to take pri- vate property without due process of law. To attempt to levy a local assessment for a purpose which is not public in its nature, and which does not confer a special local benefit upon the prop- erty which it is sought to assess, is an attempt in another form to take property without due process of law. (2) On the other > See § 14. 445 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §291 hand, the legislature is presumed to have a competent knowl- edge of the subject-matter concerning which is legislates to un- derstand the constitutional restrictions which are imposed upon its power, and to exercise only such power as is thus conferred upon it by the constitution in obedience to such restrictions. While these two general principles are not inconsistent, widely different results may be reached by giving more force to the one or to the other of them. Prom their joint application the fol- lowing specific results have been reached by the courts. § 291. K improvement clearly improper, legislative determina- tion ineffectual. If the improvement is one which in its nature cannot combine the necessary elements of a public use, and a special local bene- fit, the legislature has no power to levy a local assessment there- for, and its action in attempting so to do, is anconstitutional. A statute of this sort has no legal effect and the legislative de- termination that such an improvement is a proper one for levy- ing local assessments is subject to review by the courts.^ While '■ New York Life Insurance Co. v. Prest, 71 Fed. 815, 37 U. S. App. 481 [1896]; Harts v. People ex rel. Kochensperger, 171 111. 458, 49 N. E. 538 [1898]; O'Neill v. People ex rel. Kochensperger, 166 111. 561, 46 N. E. 1096 [1897]; Village of Morgan Park v. Wiswall, 155 111. 262, 40 N. E. 611 [1895]; Crane v. West Chicago Park Oommissionera, 153 111. 348, 26 L. E. A. 311, 38 N. E. 943 [1894]; City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 111. 310, 24 L. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 [1894]; City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]; Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]; Gifford Drainage District v. Shroer, 145 Ind. 572, 44 N. E. 636; Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 [1889]; Oliver v. Monona Coun- ty, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Kinnie v. Bare, 68 Mich. 625, 36 N. W. 672 [1889]; People ex rel. Butler V. Supervisors of Sagi- naw County, 26 Mich. 22 [1872] ; State ex rel. Iltick v. Board of County Commissioners of Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. R. A. 161, 92 N. W. 216 [1902]; Kansas City V. O'Connor,* 82 Mo. App. 655 [1899]; City of Butte v. School Dis- trict No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 [1904]; State, Skinkle, Pros. v. Inhabitants of the Township of Clin- ton in the County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 656 [1877]; Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]; Scran- ton City V. Sturgea, 202 Pa. St. 182, 51 Atl. 764 [1902]; Harrisburg v. Funk 200 Pa. St. 348, 49 Atl. 992 [1901]; Leake v. City of Philadel- phia, 171 Pa. St. 125, 32 Atl. 1110 [1895]; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. ( 19 P. F. Smith) 8 Am. Rep. 255, 352 [1871]; Hammett v. Philadel- phia, 65 Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1870]; Pettit V. Duke, 10 Utah 311, 37 Pac. 568 [1894] ; In re Theresa Drainage Dis- trict, 90 Wis. 301, 63 N. W. 288. § 292 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 446 there is upon some questions great divergence of judicial opin- ion as to whether certain kinds of improvements combine the requisite elements of public use and especial local benefit— a di- vergence illustrated in the cases cited— yet upon the proposition in question, that legislative determination of the existence of these elements is not conclusive, the courts are practically harmonious. Some courts have said that the act of a public corporation in attempting to levy a local assessment for an improvement which does not combine the requisite elements therefor is ultra vires." If there is no statutory authority therefor such an act is of course ultra vires, but it is also a violation of constitutional rights. § 292. Finality of legislative determination if improvement may be proper. If the improvement is one which in its nature may possibly combine the elements of a public use and a special local benefit, but under the special facts and circumstances of the case it is claimed that it does not combine such elements, we find a di- vergence of judicial opinion. According to one theory in cases of this sort, the legislative determination that the improvement possesses these necessary elements is final, and is not subject to review by the courts.^ In other cases the rule is stated in a less positive manner, and the legislative determination is said to be final unless clearly mistaken.^ This principle has been applied where the legislature provides by statute for a specific improve- 2 City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 111. 255 [1894]; Otter v. Barber Asphalt 310, 24 L. E. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 Paving Co., — Ky. , 96 S. W. [1894]. 862 [1906]; Broadway Baptist 'Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Church v. McAtee, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) Commissions, 182 U. S. 398, 48 L. 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871] ; Mayor 1115 [1901]; (affirming, Carson v. and City Covincil of Baltimore v. Sewerage Commissioners' of Brockton, Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 175 Mass. 242, 48 L. R. A. 277, 56 [1880]; Philadelphia to use v. Jewell N. E. 1 [1900]); Williams, Treas- 135 Pa. St. 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890]. urer, v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 ''Parsons v. District of Columbia, L. 1047, 18 S. 617 [1898]; (affirm- 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 ing State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, [1898] ; Laguna Drainage District v. 48 L. R. A. 465, 35 Atl. 24, 421 Charles Martin Co., 144 Cal. 209, 77 [1896]); Heath v. Manson 147 Cal. Pac. 933 [1904]; Piper's Appeal in 694, 82 Pac. 331 [1905] ; Rich v. the Matter of Widening Kearney City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N. E. Street 32 Cal. 530, [1867]. 447 WHEN x\SSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 293 ment.' Another theory, differing from the former both in form and in the results reached thereunder, is that if an improvement is one which might confer a public benefit and a special local benefit, but under the circumstances of the particular case, one or both of these elements is lacking, the legislative determina- tion that such an improvement is a proper one to construct by local assessment is not final, but that the courts may investigate the question of public use and special local benefit as a matter of fact. Under this theory, accordingly, if under the special facts the improvement does not combine these two necessary elements the statute will be held to be unconstitutional.* Thus if the city charter gives to the council the power to order a street improved whenever it shall be unsafe, it has been held that the resolution of the council declaring the street to be unsafe is not binding on the court, but that the street must be unsafe in fact — a ques- tion which the court will determine.^ § 293. Delegation of discretion to public corporation as finality. If the improvement is one which in its nature may combine the necessary elements of a public use and a special local bene- fit, and the legislature has delegated to a public corporation or quasi-corporation the power to determine whether the improve- ment in question is necessary or not, we find a difference of judicial opinion similar to that which exists where the legislature itself has undertaken to determine the necessity of the improve- ment. In many jurisdictions, it is held that the legislature may delegate to a public corporation or quasi-corporation the power to determine the necessity and propriety of the improvement as a finality. Under this theory, if the legislature confers upon the city the power to determine whether to make an improvement of this sort or not, the action of the city in determining to make such improvement upon the basis of local assessment is final and conclusive as to the question that the improvement is both public in its character and one which confers a special local benefit. In such a case the courts have no power to pass upon the ques- ' Parsons v. District of Columbia, 14 Pae. 71 [1887]); Oakland Paving 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 Co. v. Rier, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]; [1898]; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 'Smith v. Minto, 30 Or. 351, 48 316, 35 L. 419, 11 S. 825 [1891] ; (af. Pac. 166 [1897]. firming. Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, ■'Smith v. Minto, 30 Or. 351, 48 Pac. 166 [1897]. §293 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 448 tion of the necessity of the particular improvement.^ Hence it is no defense in a proceeding to confirm an assessment to show that a different kind of .improvement made out of different ma- ^ French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]; (affirming Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]) ; James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S. W. 760 [1887]; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71 [1887]; Gilbert V. City of New Haven, 39 Conn. 467 [1872]; Draper v. City of Atlanta, 126 Ga. 649, 55 S. E. 929 [1906]; Lingle v. West Chicago Park Com'rs., 222 111. 384, 78 N. E. 794 [1906]; BromweU v. Flowers, 217 111. 174, 75 N. E. 466 [1905]; Givins v. City of Chicago 188 111. 348, 58 N. E. 912 [1900]; Topliff V. City of Chicago, 196 111. 215, 63 N. E. 692 [1902]; Peyton v. Village of Morgan Park, 172 111. 102, 49 N. E. 1003 [1898]; McChesney v. City of Chicago, 171 III. 253, 49 N. E. 548 [1898]; Pike V. City of Chicago, 155 111. 656, 40 N. E. 567 [1895]; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. City of Deca- tur, 154 111. 173, 38 N. E. 626 [1894]; English v. City of Danville, 150 111. 92, 36 N. E. 994 [1894]; Vane v. City of Evanston, 150 111. 616, 37 N. E. 901 [1894]; Washing- ton Ice Company v. City of Chicago 147 III. 327, 37 Am. St. Rep. 222 35 N. E. 378 [1894]; The Chicago; Burlington & Quincy Railroad Com pany v. City of Quincy, 139 111. 355 28 ir. E. 1069 [1893]; Chicago, Bur lington & Quincy Railroad Company v. City of Quincy, 136 111. 563, 29 Am. St. Rep. 334, 27 N. E. 192 [1892]; City of Bloomington v. The Chi- cago 1^ Alton Railroad Company, 134 111. 451, 26 N. E. 366 [1891] ; Louis- y:11<< & Nashville Railroad Company v. vjity of East St. Louis, 134 III. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 111. 509 9 N. E. 895 [1888] ; People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462, 6 N. E. 33 [1887]; Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 Ind. 567, 55 N. E. 768 [1899]; Barber Asphalt Paving Com- pany V. Edgerton, .125 Ind. 455, 25 N; E. 436 [1890]; Holden v. City of Crawfordsville, 143 Ind. 558, 41 N. E. 370 [1898]; Sample v. Carroll, 132 Ind. 496, 32 N. E. 220 [1892]; Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 118 Ind. 329, 21 N. E. 20 [1888] ; Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372 1 N. E. 711 [1885]; Yeakel v. City of Lafayette, 48 Ind. 116 [1874]; Mayor and Com- mon Council of Michigan City v. Rob- erts, 34 Ind. 471 [1870]; Coates v. Nugent, — Kan. , 92 Pac. 597; •McGrew v. City of Kansas City, 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]; Wilkin V. Houston, 48 Kan. 584, 30 Pac. 23 [1892]; State of Kansas, on the re- lation of Young V. City of Neodesha, 3 Kans. App. 319, 45 Pac. 122 [1896] ; Seward v. Rheiner, 2 Kan. App. 95, 43 Pac. 423 [1895]; Hydes v. Joyes, 67 Ky. (4 Bush.) 464, 96 Am. Dec. 311 [1868] ; Parsons v. City of Grand Rapids, 141 Mich. 467, 104 N. W. 730 [1905] ; Gates v. City of Grand Rapids, 134 Mich. 96, 95 N. W. 998 [1903]; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5, 72 N. W. 1091 [1897]; Shimmons V. City of Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511, 62 N. W. 725 [1895]; Wilkins v. De- troit, 46 Mich. 120, 8 N. W. 701, 9 N. W. 427 [1881] ; Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895]; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1901] ; Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo. 349, 49 S. W. 1026 [1898]; (reversing 64 Mo. App. 441 [1895] ) ; Michael v. City of St. Louis, 112 Mo. 610, 20 S. W. 666 [1892]; McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Rep. 440 [1873] ; Heman" v. Rins, 85 Mo. App. 231 [1900]; City of Marionville to use of Grubaugh V. Henson, 65 Mo. App. 397 [1895]; City of Kansas City to the use of 449 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 293 terials would have given better results at a lower cost,^ or that the improvement was not necessary.^ The public corporation may, however, show the necessity of the improvement without preju- dicing the adversary party.* If the public corporation deems it unwise to construct a given improvement, the courts will not review its exercise of discretion and compel it to construct such improvement.^ So the commissioners of a drainage and levee dis- trict are not bound to petition for authority to levy an assess- ment for repairs if no funds are available. It is within their sound discretion to determine whether to make such repairs or not, and unless it appears that their action is arbitrary, fraudu- lent, or to accomplish their own personal or selfish ends, their discretion will not be controlled." The legislature may, of course, provide some means for a review of the propriety and necessity of the improvement.' This usually takes the form of a direct pro- ceeding attacking the order for the improvement, such as an appeal from the order of the common council for the improve- ment.* Even where the determination of the public corporation is regarded as final, it is subject to review if the discretion of the public corporation has been abused." Adkins v. Richards, 34 Mo. App. 521 ' Houston v. City of Chicago, 191 [1889]; Eyermann v. Blakesley, 9 111. 559, 61 N. E. 396 [1901]. Mo. App. 231 [1880]; Seibert v. Tif- 'Chicago & Northern Pacific Rail- fany, 8 Mo. App. 33 [1879]; Matter road Company v. City of Chicago, of the Extension of Church Street 172 111. 66, 49 N. E. 1006 [1898], from Fulton Street to Morris Street, " People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village in the City of New York, 49 Barb. of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462, 6 N. E. (N. Y.) 455 [1867]; The State ex 33 [1887]. rel. Hibbs v. Board of County Com- ° Bromwell v. Flowers, 217 111. 174, missioners of Franklin County, 35 75 N. E. 466 [1905]. 0. S. 458 L1880]; Beers v. Dallas 'Gilbert v. City of New Haven, City, 16 Or. 334, 18 Pac. 835 [1888]; 39 Conn. 467 [1872]. Philadelphia to use v. Jewell, 135 " Gilbert v. City of New Haven, 39 Pa. St. 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890] ; Conn. 467 [1872]. City of Williamsport v. Beck, 128 ' City of Bloomington v. Chicago & Pa. St. 147, 18 Atl. 329 [1889] ; Alton Railroad Company, 134 111. 451, Michener v. City of Philadelphia, 118 26 N. E. 366 [1891] ; Barfleld v. Glea- Pa. St. 535, 12 Atl. 174 [1888]; son, HI Ky. 491, 23 Ky. L. 128, 63 Brientnall v. City of Philadelphia, S. W. 964 [1901]; "Speaking in 104 Pa. St. 156 [1883] ; Adams v. general terms the authorities of a Fisher, 75 Tex. 657, 6 S. W. 772 city may be said to hav«! a large dis- [1890]. cretion as to the necessity or expedi- ''City of Blomington v. Chicago & ency of the ordinances which they Alton Railroad Company, 134 111. adopt. But their powers in this re- 451, 26 N. E. 366, [1891], gard are by no means omnipotent; otherwise the citizen would be with- §§ 294, 295 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 450 § 294. Delegation of discretion to specific officers. By the terms of some statutes, power to determine the necessity and propriety of certain kinds of improvement is sometimes vested in certain public ofiSeials. The action of such officials is generally regarded as final, at least in the absence of circum- stances of fraud and oppression.^ Thus if the county surveyor has power to pass upon the question of the propriety of repair- ing a public ditch, his decision is*final.= By the application of similar principles the action of commissioners who are appointed specially to pass upon the question, is regarded as final.^ So the action of a board as to the necessity of the improvement may be final.* The same result follows where township officials are given the power to determine whether a certain improvement confers a public benefit and a special local benefit.^ § 295. Unreasonable and oppressive ordinances. It is often said that by the principles of common law the ordi- nances of a municipal corporation must be reasonable; and that if unreasonable and arbitrary, such ordinances are invalid upon common law principles.'^ Whether this common law principle ex- ists, independent of constitutional and statutory restrictions, or whether it is merely a -different form of stating certain of the constitutional rights of the property owners, is a question upon which there is comparatively little direct authority.^ It has been out. remedy or redress. Those pow- '^ Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 118 Ind. ers must be exercised within the 329, 21 N. E. 20 [1888]. bounds of reason and apparent neces- ° State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, sity; they must not impose a bur- 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. E. A. 394, 43 N. W. den without a benefit, and the rea- 947 [1882]. sonableness of their exercise is a fit * Simonton v. Hays, 88 Ind. 70 subject for inquiry. This principle [1882]; State, Jersey City & Ber- has been expressly recognized by this gen R. R. Co., Pros. v. Mayor and court, Judge Bliss saying: 'That cor- Common Council of Jersey City, 31 porations have none of the elements N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 575 [1865]. of sovereignty ; that they cannot go " Reeves v. Treasurer Wood County, beyond the powers granted them, and 8 0. S. 333 [1858]. that they must exercise such granted ^ City of Belleville v. Perrin, 225 powers in a reasonable manner, are 111. 437, 80 N. E. 270 [1907]; Bor- propositions that cannot be disputed.' ough of Greensburg v. Yoimg, 53 Pa. City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. St. 280 [1866]. 547;" Corriffan v. Gage 68 Mo. 541, = Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 544, 545 [1878] ; See § 295 et seq. 111. 313, 21 L. E. A. 563, 33 N. E. 'Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 118 Ind. 888 [1893]. 329, 21 N. E. 20 [18881. 451 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 295 said that the common law rule which requires the ordinances of a corporation to be reasonable and not to impose a burden with- out a fair equivalent, is a rule which operates in addition to the constitution and statutes of the state.'' An ordinance which is in compliance with the provisions of a constitutional statute cannot be successfully attacked as unreasonable.* The objection that an ordinance is unreasonable, and therefore void, is, however, made most frequently where the ordinance is defective for various spe- cific reasons, which seem to be summed up by the courts under the same general and comprehensive objection of unreasonable- ness. The question of the unreasonableness of an ordinance has been raised most frequently in Illinois in special taxation. In that state, as has been said before, a special tax is regarded as an equivalent or compensation for the enhancement of value, real or presumptive, due to the improvement for which such special tax is levied.^ In this respect it resembles the special assessment. It differs from the special assessment in that the assessment must be apportioned to the benefits, and provision made for inquiry in some form into the existence and amount of such benefits; while in special taxation the imposition of the tax is said to be in itself a determination that the benefits to the contiguous prop- erty will be as great as the burden of the taxation imposed there- on." Accordingly, if the determination of the city is arbitrary, and imposes a tax where there is manifestly no benefit, or one which is manifestly in excess of the benefit conferred, such as- sessment ordinance is said to be void as being unreasonable.^ Accordingly the application of this doctrine prevents special taxa- ' Borough of Greensburg v. Young, E. 622 [1901]; Bickerdike v. City of 53 Pa. St. 280 [1866]. Chicago, 185 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 *City of Kansas to the Use of Ad- [1900]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, kins V. Richards, 34 Mo. App. 521 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. 354 [1895]; [1889]. PaJmer v. City of Danville, 154 111. = Davis V. City of Litchfield, 145 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894]; City of 111. 313, 21 L. K. A. 563, 33 N. E. Bloomington v. Chicago & Alton Eail- 888 [1893]. road Company, 134 111. 451, 26 N. E. "Davis V. City of Litchfield, 145 366 [1891]; City of Springfield v. 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. Green, 120 111. 269, 11 N. E. 261; 888 [1893]. City, of Sterling v. Gait, 117 111. 11, 'Chicago Union Traction Company 7 N. E. 471 [1887]; City of Gales- v. City of Chicago, 208 111. 187, 70 N. burg v. Searles, 114 111. 217, 29 N. E. 234 [1904]; Gage v. City of Chi- E. 686 [1886]; Bnos v. City of ca-^o 191 111. 210, 60 N. E. 896 Springfield, 113 111. 65 [1886] ; Craw [1901]; Job V. City of Alton, 189 v. Tolono, 96 111. 255, 36 Am. Rep 111. 256,- 81 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. 143 [1880]. 295 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 452 tion from being unconstitutional as an exaction in excess of bene- fits.« As has been said before,' the city authorities have ordi- narily been vested by the legislature with a wide discretion as to the type and nature of improvement for which they will make provision. Except in case of a clear and manifest abuse of- such discretion, an improvement ordinance cannot be attacked as un- reasonable on the ground that such improvement is unnecessary.^" This principle is a general one, 'being by no means confined to Illinois, but on the contrary recognized generally." The council may provide for the improvement of several contiguous blocks, including a number of different streets." The council may pro- vide for paving a street through land which is chiefly open prairie, with but few houses, the occupants of which none of them keep vehicles, where it appears that but for such paving the street would be impassable during a considerable portion of the year.^** The council may provide that the entire width of the street shall be graded, but that a strip in the center thereof shall be sodded instead of graveled for traffic, and may provide for an assessment to pay the cost of such improvement.^* The council may, if exercising a reasonable discretion, determine the width of that part of a street which is to be used for a roadway, and the width thereof which is to be used for a sidewalk.^' An abuse of the discretion of the council may, however, render the assessment ordinance for paving unreasonable.^" Thus, a paving « Job V. City of Alton, 189 111. 256, " Winter v. City Council of Mont- 82 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. E. 622 gomery, 83 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235 [1901]. [1887]; James v. Pine Bluff, 49 •See § 293. Ark. 199, 4 S. W. 760 [1887]; Van "Washington Park Club v. City of Wagoner, Pros. v. Mayor and Alder- Chicago, 219 111. 323, 76 N. E. 383 men of the City of Paterson 67 N. [1906]; Ton v. City of Chicago, 216 J. L. (38 Vr.) 455, 51 Atl. 922 111. 331, 74 N. E. 1044 [1905]; [1902]. Myers v. City of Chicago, 196 111. "Ton v. City of Chicago, 216 111. 591, 63 N. E. lOsV [1902]i Topliff 331, 74 N. E. 1044 [1905]. V. City of Chicago, 196 111. 215, 63 "Peyton v. Village of Morgan N. E. 692 [1902] ; Peyton v. Village Park, 172 111. 102, 49 N. E. 1003 of Morgan Park, 172 111. 102, 49 N. [1898]. E. 1003 [1898]; Washington Ice "Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 Company v. City, of Chicago, 147 111. 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]. 327, 37 Am. St. Eep. 222, 35 N. E. "Topliff v. City of Chicago, 196 378 [1894]; Murphy v. City of 111. 215, 63 N. E. 692 [1902]. Peoria, 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 "Chicago Union Traction Com- [1888]. pany v. City of Chicago, 208 111. 187, 70 N. E. 234 [1904]. 453 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 296 ordinance which provides for a second assessment of a street intersection for which an assessment has already been levied, is said to be unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore void.*^ In such a case the ordinance as a whole is void. The court has no power to regard it as void, as far as it affects such intersec- tions, and valid as to the rest of the improvement." Whether a paving ordinance is so oppressive and unreasonable as to be void, is said in Illinois to be a question of fact, to be determined by the tribunal by which such .facts are to be adjudicated.'" Thus, a question whether a paving ordinance which required a new combined curb and gutter to be used instead of providing for making use of the old curbing which was in place, and in fair condition, was so unreasonable and oppressive as to be void, is a question of fact to be determined primarily by the county court on objections to the confirmation of the assessment for the improvement, and the finding of such court that such ordinance is not unreasonable will be sustained on appeal, unless contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.^" §296. Unreasonable sidewalk improvement ordinances. The power of a city to require specific types of sidewalk im- provement has frequently been exercised in a manner which has been attacked by the persons upon whose property such improve- ment is charged, as unreasonable. Upon the question of the validity of such ordinances the courts have held that while a city must not exercise its power in a capricious, oppressive or unreasonable manner,' yet, on the other hand, the type of im- provement which is necessary and desirable in the particular location, must be determined by the city, rather than by the court, and unless the improvement is clearly and manifestly an unreasonable one, the courts will not interfere nor attempt to overrule the city's exercise of discretionary power.^ The ques- " Chicago Union Traction Com- "Lamb v. City of Chicago, 219 III. pany v. City of Chicago, 20g 111. 187, 229, 76 N. E. 343 [1906], 70 N. E. 234 ri904]. =°Lamb v. City of Chicago, 219 "Chicago Union Traction Com- 111. 229, 76 N. E. 343 [1906]. pany v. City of Chicago, 208 111. 187 ' Winter v. City Council of Mont- 70 N. E. 234 [1904]; ( distins;uish- gomery, 83 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235 [1887]. ing Noonan v. People ex rel. Ray- ^ Winter v. City Council of Mont- mond, 183 111. 52, 55 N. E. 679 gomery, 83 Ala. 589, 3, So.- 235 [1899]). [1887]; James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. § 296 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 454 tion of what improvement is reasonable, depends largely upon the location of the improvement, the size and wealth of the city, and the general type of improvement, both public and private, of which the contemplated improvement is to form a part. An ordinance requiring a sidewalk to be constructed ten feet wide, and to be made of brick, with a curb, has been held to be rea- sonable on the theory that, in the absence of proof, it would be presumed that brick was necessiry because the sidewalk was within the fire limits of the city.' The determination of the authorities of a city to require a new sidewalk made of brick, to be constructed where an existing board sidewalk could be made to serve the purpose in an adequate manner, making moder- ate repairs, cannot be reviewed by the courts on the ground that such ordinance is unreasonable.* An ordinance of the city of St. Louis requiring that sidewalks which become out of repair must be replaced by stone sidewalks is not unreasonable, although it requires a stone sidewalk to be constructed at a cost of three hundred dollars while the brick walk in existence could be re- paired at a cost of seven dollars." However, an ordinance re- quiring a sidewalk to be constructed in an uninhabited portion of the city, not connected with any other walk, was held to be unreasonable." The extent of discretion vested in the authorities of a public corporation to provide for the construction of a sidewalk along the side of a street or to pave the entire width of the' street, making no provision for a sidewalk is a question upon which there is some conflict of authority. In some juris- dictions an ordinance which makes no provision for a sidewalk is said to be unreasonable and void.^ Thus in a village in which 199, 4 S. W. 760 [1887] ; Seward v. Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App. 441 Rheiner, 2 Kan. App. 95, 43 Pac. [1895]). 423 [1895]; Skinker v. Heman, 148 ° Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541 Mo. 349, 49 S. W. 1026 [1898]; (re- [1878]. versing Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. ' Carter v. City of Chicago, 57 111. App. 441 [1895]); City of Marion- 283 [1870]; See also Fischback v. ville to the Use of Grubaugh v. Hen- People ex rel. Tetherington 191 111. son, 65 Mo. App. 397 [1895]. 171, t^ N. E. 887 [1901]; Such ob- "James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, jection must, however, be raised in 4 S. W. 760 [1887]. the proper way. If not interposed in • City of Marionville to the Use of the hearing upon the question of con- Grubaush v. Henson, 65 Mo. App. firmation, it is too late to interpose 397 [1895]. on an application for a judgment of 'Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo. 349, sale. Fischback v. People ex rel. 49 S. W. 1026 [1898]; (reversing Tetherington, 191 111. 171, 60 N. E. 887 [1901]. 455 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 297 a general ordinance was in force providing fer a sidewalk upon each side of the street, a special ordinance applicable to one street, and providing that there should be a sidewalk upon one side only, and that the paved portion of the street should extend up to the lot lines on the other side, was held to be an unreasonable ordinance.* In some jurisdictions it is held that the question of the width, location and existence of a sidewalk is for the mu- nicipal authorities and that the courts cannot interfere with the exercise of their discretion.' Thus in Michigan the common coun- cil of a city is said to have discretionary power to pave the entire width of the street, including those portions used before as a sidewalk, thus indirectly abolishing the sidewalk.*" § 297. Other unreasonable and oppressive ordinances. The doctrine that an unreasonable and oppressive ordinance is void finds application in other forms of improvement. The size and cost of a sewer is a matter peculiarly within the discre- tion of the municipal authorities of a city and if the city acts in compliance .with its statutory authority, its exercise of discre- tion in determining th'e size and cost of such sewer cannot be attacked as unreasonable.^ If the city, in providing for the con- struction of a sewer, requires that at the time of such construction connections be laid from the sewer to the lot lines, so as to pre- vent the subsequent necessity of tearing up the street, it has been held that such requirement is not unreasonable if the connections thus required are not of themselves unreasonably numerous or expensive." Thus it has been held that a provision of a city ordi- ' Mills V. Village of Norwood, 6 or and Aldermen of the City of Pat- Ohio C. C. 305 [1892]. erson 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 455, 51 •In Kentucky it is sa'id to be a Atl. 922 [1902]. question for the determination of the ° City of East St. Louis v. Davis, city whether there shall be a space 233 111. 553, 84 N. E. 674 [1908]; left on either or both sides of a street Washington Park Club v. City of for a sidewalk. Nevin v. Roach, 86 Chicago, 219 111. 323, 76 N. E. 383 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]. [1906]; Walker v. City of Chicago, "Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 202 111. 531, 67 N. E. 369 [1903]; Mich. 322 [1872]. Duane v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 'City of Kansas to the Use of Ad- 471, 64 N. E. 1033 [1902]; City of kins V. Richards, 34 Mo. App. 521 Chicago v. Corcoran, 196 111. 146, 63 [1889]. N. E. 690 [1902] ; Vandersyde v. Peo- ' Washington Park Club v. City of pie ex rel. Raymond, 195 111. 200, 62 Chicago, 219 111. 323, 76 N. E. 383 N. E. 806 [1902]. [1906]; Van Wagoner, Pros. v. May- § 298 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 456 nance requiring sewer cbhneetions, known as house slants, every twenty-five feet, is not an unreasonable or arbitrary division of the property owner's land, and that such house slants may be constructed at the expense of such property owner.' On the other hand, where the land was held in large tracts, used chiefly for agricultural purposes, and not for residence purposes,* or the land was divided into lots of about fifty feet frontage each,' it was held to be unreasonable to Require house slants to be con- structed every twenty feet. Similar considerations apply to as- sessments for the construction and extension of water pipes. Un- less a clear abuse of discretion is shown, the courts will not attempt to review the action of a public corporation in determin- ing the necessity and propriety of such improvement.' Certain lots which were worth about two hundred and fifty dollars apiece were assessed eighteen dollars and fifty cents each for the cost of extending a water pipe. In the absence of evidence showing that the water pipes did not in fact confer an improvement upon such land, it was held that the court could not regard such ordi- nance as being void for unreasonableness.' § 298. Review of exercise of discretion. The doctrine that the exercise of discretion by a public cor- poration is a finality is one ordinarily advanced in cases where the ordinance is not clearly unreasonable and where the transac- tion is apparently free from oppression and fraud. In a number of cases we find the rule laid down that if the discretion granted to the city is exercised in a reasonable and honest manner, the court will not review it,^ but if the council is acting in a manner • Bickerdike V. City of Chicago, 185 202 111. 531, 67 N. E. 369 [1903]; 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 [1900] ; (dis- Myers v. City of Chicago, 196 111. tinguished in Vandersyde v. People 591, 63 N. E. 1037 [1902]; Vane v. ex rel. Raymond 195 111. 200, 62 N. City of Evanston 150 111. 616, 37 N. E. 806 [1902]). E. 901 [1894]; English v. City of ''Gage V. City of Chicago, 191 111. Danville, 150 111. 92, 36 N. E. 994 210, 60 N. E. 896 [1901]. [1894]; McChesney v. City of Ghi- • Myers V. City of Chicago, 196 111. cago, 171 111. 253, 49 N. E. 548 591, 63 N. E. 1037 [1902]. [1898]; Illinois Central Railroad 'Myers v. City of Chicago, 196 111. Company v. City of Decatur, 154 111. 591, 63 N. E. 1037 [1902]. 173, 38 N. E. 626 [1894]; English 1 James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, v. City of Danville, 150 111. 92, 36 4 S. W. 760 [1887]; Ton v. City of N. E. 994 [1894]; Chicago, Burling- Chicago, 216 111. 331, "H N, E. 1044 ton & Ouincy Railroad Company v. [1905]; Walker v. City of Chicago, City of Quincy, 139 111. 355, 28 N. E; 457 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 298 which is unreasonable and oppressive and for the purpose of evading the law, the courts will review the question.^ As stated in another form the courts will review only in ease of manifest abuse of such discretion.' It is also suggested that the courts may review the determination of the city as to the necessity of the improvement in ease of fraud.* The decision of the city council is said to be "final and conclusive unless perhaps in case of fraud or mistake.'"' "The necessity of making street im- provements is said to be a matter for the exclusive determination of the municipal corporation invested with the power to make such improvements, and when it acts within the authority given, and its determination is fairly made; that is, without fraud or oppression, it cannot be interfered with by the court. ' ' ° These forms of stating the rule are probably not inconsistent with the general rule that the exercise of discretion by a public corpora- tion is a finality and is not subject to review by the courts, with' reference to its determination as to the necessity and propriety of the improvement. It may be confessed, however, that the obiter found in some of the cases which lay down the principle that the discretion of the public corporation is not subject to review are inconsistent with the obiter found in other cases, which hold that in case of fraud or oppression the courts may review the exercise of discretion by the public corporation. In some cases still less weight seems to be attached to the decision of the public corpora- tion as to the necessity of the improvement. Thus it is said to be not conclusive but entitled to serious consideration.'' Under the last doctrine given, the necessity of the improvement seems to be subject to review in an action on the assessment as any other question of fact. In some jurisdictions the decision of the 1069 [1893]; Barfield V. Gleason, lU * Louisville & Nashville Railroad Ky. 491, 23 Ky. L. 128, 63 S. W. Company v. City of East- St. Louis, 964 [1901]. 134 111. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; ''Kerfoot v. City of Chicago 195 Shimmons v. City of Saginaw, 104 in. 229, 63 N. E. 101 [1902]; Li- Mich. 511, 62 N. W. 725 [1895]; He- gare v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 46, man v. Sehulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. 32 Am. St. Rep. 179, 28 N. E. 934; W. 163 [1901]. "The courts will look beyond the 'Rogers v. City of St. Paul 22 mere face, of the ordinance to its ef- Minn. 494 [1876]. feet and operation and judge it ac- 'Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 cordingiy. Ton v. City of Chicago, la. 416, 70 N. W. Rep. 605 [1897]. 216 111. 331, 74 N. E. 1044 [1905]. 'Philadelphia to use v. Monument «Lent V. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Cemetery Co., 147 Pa. St. 170, 23 Atl. Pac. 71 [1887]. 400 [1892]. §§299,300 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 458 city may be reviewed before the improvement is constructed, but not after.' § 299. Conclusiveness of legislative determination in assessments for legal duty. In assessments or charges levied upon the owner of property, to reimburse the public for the performance of some duty which rested primarily upon the owner "bf such property, the question of the finality of the determination of the legislature that such legal duty does rest upon the owner of property is one upon which the courts are not in harmony, either as to the general principles involved or as to the specific results reached in apply- ing such principles. On the one hand it seems to be settled by the weight of authority that the legislature may impose certain duties upon the owner or occupant of property, over and above those which rested upon him at common law. On the other hand the power of the legislature to impose legal duties upon the owner or occupant of realty, is by no means unlimited. The legislature cannot impose upon private persons duties which primarily and essentially devolve upon the state, or one of the public corpora- tions thereof. It is practically impossible to state an abstract rule which will indicate, however, just how far this discretion of the legislature extends, other than to say that there are cer- tain duties not existing at common law which the legislature may by statute devolve upon the owner or occupant of realty.^ § 300. Conclusiveness of legislative determination in assessments for goods sold. In determining for what, purpose goods may be furnished to the owner or occupant of property at his request the legislature has undoubtedly a wide range of discretion. If the purpose is one which is so public in its character that the municipal cor- poration, or other public corporation, may be authorized to un- dertake it, there seems to be no question that the legislature may authorize charges to be made upon persons who having the option to make use of such goods, or to decline such use, see fit to accept the goods and use them. The questions as to the power of the legislature or public corporation which arise in this connection. Draper v. City of Atlanta, 126 'See §§ 370, 372. G&.. 649, 95 S. E. 929 [1906]. 459 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. ' § 301 are generally questions involving the right of a public corpora- tion to furnish to some property of the sort which it furnishes to others. If the purpose were not one which the city could be authorized to undertake, but if the city did in fact furnish them, the property owner who voluntarily accepted such goods under the understanding that he was to pay therefor, would undoubt- edly be liable, either in contract, or quasi-contract.* C— SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ORIGINAL IMPROVEMENTS. § 301. Streets. In a community which is thickly settled, such as an ordinary city or village, a public street makes it possible for the public at large to travel, to transport goods, and to communicate freely both within the community itself and with the outside world. A public street is therefore undoubtedly . a public improvement of the most unquestionable type. Municipal corporations are al- most without exception given ample power to establish and con- struct such streets. In the absence of specific constitutional re- straint the legislature may confer upon municipal corporations the power to pay for the cost of public streets by general taxa- tion. In most instances, a public street, furthermore, confers a special and peculiar advantage upon the property situated upon it or near to, over and above the advantages conferred upon the community at large. Such abutting or adjacent property is by means of such public streets given a facility of access which makes it, if suitable either for business or for residence purposes, much more available therefor. Indeed, without public streets, land of the size of the ordinary city lot could scarcely be used at all. With the increased facility of access and increased utility comes, in most cases, a great increase in market value. For these rea- sons, it is held that in the absence of specific constitutional re- strictions, local assessments may be levied upon the property es- pecially benefited by public streets to pay for the cost of opening and constructing them.* This rule is so thoroughly recognized 'See §§ 332, 353, 354. land City, 184 U. S. 61 ^6 L. 431, 'Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 22 S. 290 [1902]; (affirming King 48 L. 195, 24 S. 88 [1903]; (affirm- v. City of Portland, 38 Or. 402, 56 ing Hibben v. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 1.1900]); 62 y. E. 447 [1901]) ; King v. Port- French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., §301 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 460 that in few of the cases which apply is there any discussion of the subject. The rule is assumed without discussion and the questions actually considered by the courts involve the validity 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. 879, 21 S. 625 [1901]; (affirming Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 54 L. E. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934 [1900]); Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. 544, 9 S. 192 [1888]; (affirming Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]) ; Mattingly V. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098 [18781; Brown v. Drain, 11'2 Fed. 582 L1901]; White V. City of Tacoma, 109 Fed. 32 [1901]; Zehnder v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 108 Fed. 570 [1901] ; City of Galveston v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 107 Fed. 325, "46 C. C. A. 319 [1901]; Farson v. City of Sioux City, 106 Fed. 278 [1901]; Burlington Savings Bank v. City . of Clinton, Iowa, 106 Fed. 269 [1901]; Denny v. City of Spokane, 79 Fed. 719, 25 C. C. A. 164, 48 U. S. App. 282 [1897] ; Harton v. Town of Avon- dale, 147 Ala. 458, 41 So. 934 [1906]; Irwin v. Mayor, etc., of Mobile, 57 Ala. 6 [1876]; English v. Territory, — Ariz. , 89 Pac. 5G1 [1907]; Main v. Ft. Smith, 49 Ark. 480, 5 ii. W. 801 [1887]; Lambert v. Bates, 148 Cal. 146, 82 Pac. 767 [1905]; Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 80 Pac. 81 [1905]; Duncan v. Eamish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; Cum- mihgs v. Kearney 141 Cal. 156, 74 Pac. 759 [1903] ; Williamson v. Joyce, 140 Cal. 669, 74 Pac. 290 [1903]; City Street Improvement Company v. Laird, 138 Cal. 27, 70 Pac. 916 [1902]; Pacific Paving Company v. Sullivan Estate Company, 137 Cal. 261, 70 Pac. 86 [1902]; Crane v. Cummings, 137 Cal. 201, 69 Pac. 984 [1902]; Petaluma Paving Company V. Singley, 136 Cal. 616, 69 Pac. 426 [1902]; Chapman v. Ames, 135 Cal. 246, 67 Pac. 1125 [1901]; Blanchard V. Ladd, 135 Cal. 214 67 Pac. 131 [1901]; Cotton v. Watson, 134 Cal. 422, 66 Pac. 490 [1901]; Belser v. AUman, 134 Cal. 399, 66 Pac. 492 [1901]; Reid v. Clay, 134 Cal. 207, 66 Pac. 262 [1901]; Greenwood v. Chandon, 130 Cal. 467, 62 Pac. 73« [1900]; Hadley v. Dague, 130 Cal. 207, 62 Pac. 500 [1900]; Warren & Malley v. Russell, 129 Cal. 381, 62 Pac. 75 [1900]; California Improve- ment Company v. Moran 128 Cal. 373, 60 Pac. 969 [1900]; Moffitt v. Jordan, 127 Cal. 622, 60 Pac. 173 [1900]; Williams v. Bergin, 127 Cal. 578, 60 Pac. 164 [1900]; Pacific Paving Company v. Mowbray, 127 Cal. 1, 59 Pac. 205 [1899]; Eemish V. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443, 58 Pac. 920 [1899]; Wilson v. California Bank, 121 Cal. 630, 54 Pac. 119 [1898]; Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 48 Pac. 720 [1897]; Buckman V. Landers 111 Cal. 347, 43 Pac. 1125 [1896]; Digging v. Hartshorn^, 108 Cal. 154, 41 Pac. 283 [1895]; San Francisco Paving Company v. Bates, 134 Cal. 39, 66 Pac. 2 [1901]; Treanor v. Houghton, 103 Cal. 53, 36 Pac. 1081 [1894]; Warren v. Postel, 99 Cal. 294, 33 Pac. 930 [1893]; Bonnet v. City and County of San Francisco, 65 Cal. -230, 3 Pac. 815 [1884]; Harney v. Heller, 47 Cal. 15, [1873]; Himmelman v. Woolrich, 45 Cal. 249 [1873]; Himmelman v. Hoadley 44 Cal. 213 [1872]; Lucas Turner & Co. v. Sau Francisco, 7 Cal. 462 [1856]; San Francisco Paving Company v. Dubois, 2 Cal. App. 42, 83 Pac. 72 [1905]; People ex rel. Russell v. Brown, 218 111. 375, 75 N. E. 989 [1905]; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. City of Chicago, 217 HI. 352, 75 N. E. 365 [1905]; Gage v. People ex rel. Han- berg, 213 III. 457, 72 N. E. 1099 [1905]; Nelson v. City of Chicago, 196 111. 390, 63 N. E. 738 [1902]; Thomson v. 461 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §301 of the steps taken in levying the assessment, the right to assess the specific tract in question, and the like, all based on the assumption that the purpose is undoubtedly one for which a People ex rel. Foote, 184 III. 17 59 N. E. 383 [1900]; Chicago Rock Is- land & Pacific Railroad Company v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]; New York C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. City of Hammond, — Jnd. — , 83 N. E. 244 [1908]; Daly V. Gubbins, — Ind. , 82 N. E. 659 [1907]; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 [1906]; Low v. Dallas, 165 Ind. 392, 75 N. E. 822 [1905]; Scott V. Hayes, 162 Ind. 548, 70 N. E. 879 [1903] ; McKee v. Town of Pendleton 162 Ind. 667, 69 N. E. 997 [1904]; Brown v. Central Bermudez Company, 162 Ind. 542, 69 N. E. 150 [1903]; Deane v. Indiana Macadam & Construction Company, 161 Ind. 371, 68 N. E. 686 [1903]; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. ±Msh, 158 Ind. 525, 63 N. E. 454 [1901]; Leeds v. De- frees, 157 Ind. 392, 61 N. E. 930 [1901]; Cason v. City . of Lebanon, 153 Ind. 567, 55 N. E. 768 [1899]; Van Sickle v. Belknap, 129 Ind. 558, 28 N. E. 305 [1891]; Quill v. City of Indianapolis 124 Ind. 292, 7 L. R. A. 681, 23 N. E. 788 [1890] ; Law V. Johnston, 118 Ind. 261, 20 N. E. 745 [1888]; Garvin v. Dussman, 114 Ind. 429, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637, 16 N. E. 826 [1887]; Taber v. Ferguson, 109 Ind. 227, 9 N. E. 723 [1886]; Ray V. City of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883]; Chamberlain v. City of Bvansville, 77 Ind. 542 [1881]; Peru & Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Hanna, 68 Ind. 562 [1879]; Martin- dale V. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 [1875]; Indianapolis, Peru & Chicago Rail- road Company v. Ross, 47 Ind. 25 [1874]; Ball v. Balfe 41 Ind. 221 [1872]; City of Evansville v. Pfis- terer, 34 Ind. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 214 [1870]; City of Greensburg v. Zol- ler. 28 Ind. App. 120- 60 N. E. 1007 [1901]; Fralich v. Barlow, 25 Ind. App. 383, 58 N. E. 271 [1900]; Lewis V. Albertson, 23 Ind. App. 147, 53 N. E. 1071 [1899]; Bozarth v. Mc- Gillicuddy, 19 Ind. App. 26, 47 N. E. 397, 48 N. E. 1042 [1897]; Dugger V. Hicks, 11 lad. App. 374, 36 N. E. 1085 [1894]; Mock v. City of Mun- cie, 9 Ind. App. 536 37 N. E. 281 [1893]; Higman v. City of Sioux City, 129 la. 291, 105 N. W. 524 [1906]; Ft, Dodge Electric Light & Power Company v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]; Al- len V. City of Davenport, 107 la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]; Smith v. City of Des Moines, 106 la. 590, 76 N. W. 836 [1898]; City of Burlington v. Quick, 47 la. 222 [1877]; Morrison V. Hershire, 32 la. 271 [1871]; Un- ion Pacific R. Co. V. Kansas City, 73 Kari. 571, 85 Pac. 603 [1906]; Board of Commissioners of Franklin County V. City of Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747, 33 Am. St. Rep. 396, 31 Pac. 788 [1892]; Barron v. City of Lex- ington, — Ky. , 105 S. W. 395 [1907]; Moxley v. Lawler, — Ky, , 97 S. W. 365 [1906]; Lindsey V. Brawner, — Ky. , 97 S. W. 1 [1906]; Morton v. Sullivan, — Ky. , 96 S. W. 807 [1906]; Otter V. Barber Asphalt Co., ■ — Ky. , 96 S. W. 862 [1906]; Cabell v. City of Henderson, — Ky. , 88 S. W. 1095, 28 Ky. L. R. 89 [1905]; Lind- enberger Land Co. v. R. B. Park & Co., — Ky. , 85 S. W. 213, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 437 [1905]; Orth v. Park & Co., 117 Ky. 779, 80 S. W. 1108, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 184 [1904]; denying rehearing of 79 S. W. 206.; (decree modified 26 Ky. L. R, 342, 81 S. W. 251); Duker V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., — Ky. , 74 S. W. 744, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 135 [1903]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gaar, 115 Ky. 334, 73 §301 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 462 local assessment may be levied. The different elements which enter into a street improvement require separate discussion, since in some jurisdictions at least such different elements are referred S. W. 1106, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2227 [1903]; Preston v. Rudd, 84 Ky. 150 [1886]; City of Ludlow v. Trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway Co., 78 Ky. 357 [1880] ; Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush. (75 Ky.) 570 [1877]; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush. (70 Ky.) 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309 [1870] ; City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. (41 Ky.) 177, 36 Am. Dec. 594 [1841]; City of Lexington v. Mc- Quillan's Heirs, 9 Dana (39 Ky.) 513, 35 Am. Dec. 159 [1840]; Grand Rapids School Furniture ' Company v. City of Grand Rapids, 92 Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028 [1892]; Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 46 Mich, 150, 9 N. W. 141 [1881]; State v. District Court of Blue Earth County, 102 Minn. 482, 113 N. W. 697, 114 N. W. 654 [1907]; Morey V. City of Duluth, 75 Minn. 221, 77 N. W. 829 [1899]; Edwards House Co. V. City of Jackson — Miss. , 45 So. 14 [1907] ; Asphalt & Granitoid Const. Co. v. Hauessler, 201 Mo. 400, 100 S. W. 14 [1907]; (Affirming, Asphalt & Granitoid Const. Co. V. Hauessler, — Mo. App. , 80 S. W. 5 [1904]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Seaboard National Bank of New York v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464 [1903] ; City of St. Charles ex rel. Budd v. Deemar, 174 Mo. 122, 73 S. W. 469 [1902]; City of Clinton to use of Thornton V. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415, 22 S. W. 494 [1893] ; City of St. Louis to use ot McGrath v. Clemens, 49 Mo. 552 [1872]; City of Excelsior Springs, to Use of McCormick v. Ettenson, 120 Mo. App 215, 96 S. W. 701 [1906]; City of Sedalia ex rel. Gilsonite Con- struction Company v. Montgomery, 109 Mo. App. 197, 88 S. W. 1014 [1904]; Brick & Terra Cotta Com- pany V. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]; McMillan v. City of Butte, 30 Mont. 220, 76 Pac. 203 [1904]; Shaler v. McAleese, ^ N. J. Eq. , 68 Atl. 416 [1907]; Durrell v. City of Woodbury, 74 N. J. L. (45 Vr.) 206, 65 Atl. 198 [1906]; State, Pud- ney. Pros. v. Village of Passaic, 37 N- J. L. (8 Vr.) 65 [1874]; Town of Al- buquerque V. Zeiger, 5 N. M. 674, 27 Pac. 315 [1891]; McLaughlin v. Mil- ler, 124 N. Y. 510, 26 N. E. 1104 [1891]; People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 65 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; Town of Albuquerque v. Zeiger, 5 N. M. 674, 27 Pac. 315 [1891]; Alvey v. City of Asheville, — N. C. , 5n S. E. 999 [1907]; Hilliard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; Lima v. Cemetery Asso- ciation, 42 0. S. 128, 51 Am. Rep. 809 [1884]; Hubbard v. Norton, 28 0. S. 116 [1875]; Creighton v. Scott, 14 0. S. 438 [1863]; Maloy v. City of Marietta, 11 0. S. 636 [I860]; Northern Indiana Railroad Company V. Connelly, 10 0. S. 160 [1859]; Oliver v. City of Newberg, — Or. , 91 Pac. 470 [1907]; King v. Portland, 38 Or. 402 55 L. R. A. 812, 63 Pac. 2 [1900]; Wilson v. City of Salem, 24 Or. 504, 34 Pac. 9, 691 [1893]; King v. City of Port- land, 2 Or. 146 [1865]; In re Beech- wood Avenue, Appeal of O'Mara, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. 127 [1899]; In the Matter of College Street, 8 R. I. 474 [1867]; In the Matter of Dor- rance Street, 4 R. I. 230 [1856] ; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. City of Watertown, 1 S. D. 46, 44 N. W. 1072 [1890]; County of Harris v. Boyd 70 Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]; Bennison v. City of Galves- ton, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 20, 44 S. W. 613 [1898]; Lovenberg v. City of 463 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 302 to different theories of governmental power and results are reached for certain of these elements differing widely from the results reached for others. Furthermore, specific constitutional provisions are applicable to certain of these elements but not to others. They will accordingly be considered in detail. § 302. Doctrine in South Carolina. The construction which the Supreme Court of South Carolina has placed upon the constitutional provision protecting persons .from being deprived of property except by the law of the land has made it impossible for the legislature to authorize valid assess- ments for opening or constructing streets. The constitution of 1790 provided in Article nine, section two: "No freeman of this state shall be . . . disseized of his freehold . . . or in any manner despoiled of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or by th% law of the land." Under this provision a statute authorizing an assessment on lots on the south side of a street to pay for the cost of a strip of land along the north side of such street, bought for the purpose of widening the street, was held to be unconstitutional.^ In the constitution of Galveston, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 42 37 Wash. 190, 79 Pac. 632 [1905]; S. W. 1024 [1897]; Vlolett v. City MoNamee v. City of Tacoma, 24 of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. Wash. 591, 84 Pac. 791 [1901] ; City St. Eep. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. of New Whatcom V. Bellingham Bay E. 909 [1896]; Davis v. City of Improvement Company, 18 Wash. 181, Lynchburg, 84 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 51 Pac. 360 [1897]; City of New [1888]; In re City of Seattle, — Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Im- Wash. , 91 Pac. 548 [1907]; provement Company, 16 Wash. 131, Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. City ot 47 Pac. 236 [1896]; Abernethy v. Seattle, — Wash. , 91 Pac. 244; Town of Medical Lake, 9 Wash. 112, City of Spokane v. Security Savings 37 Pac. 306 [1894]; Austin v. City Society, — Wash. , 89 Pac. 466 of Seattle, 2 Wash. '667, 27 Pac. 557 [1907] ; Lister V. City of Tacoma, 44 [l891]; Schintgen v. City of La Wash. 222, 87 Pac. 126 [1906]; Les- Crosse, 117 Wis. 158, 94 N. W. 84 ter V. City of Seattle, 42 Wash. 539, [1903]; Henuessy v. Douglas County, 85 Pac. 14 [1906]; State of Washing- 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]; ton on the Relation of the Barber Wells v. Western Paving & Supply Asphalt Paving Company v. City of Company, 96 Wis. 116, 70 N. W. 1071 Seattle, 42 Wash. 370, 85 Pac. 11 [1897]; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. [1906] ; Frye v. Town of Mount Ver- Paul Railway Company v. City of non, 42 Wash. 268, 84 Pac. 864 Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L. R. A. [1906]; Johnson v. City of Tacoma, 249, 62 N. W. 417 [1895]. 41 Wash. 51, 82 Pac. 1092 [1905]; 'State ex rel. Horlbeck v. City In the Matter of Westlake Avenue, Council of Charleston, 12 Rich. (S. Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 C.) 702 [18601. [1905];^ City of Aberdeen v. Lucas, § 303 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 464 1868 a similar clause was enacted in Article one, section fourteen, which provided : "No person shall be . . . despoiled or dispos- sessed of his property ... or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Under this clause it was held that as it substantially re-enacted the former provision, it must receive the same construction, even in opposition to the great weight of authority ; and that, therefore, a statute authorizing an assessmeBt based on benefits received from a street improvement was unconstitutional.^ Under this con- struction of the constitution not only street assessments but all assessments for purposes not referable to the police power are held invalid.* Even this concession to the traditional power of assess- ment was subsequently withdrawn ; and it was held that local as- sessments could not be levied for any purposes.* § 303. Constitutional restriction in Virginia. The ' constitution of Virginia, which went into effect June 10, 1902, provides in Article thirteen, section one hundred and sev- enty: "No city or town shall impose any tax or assessment upon abutting land owners for street or other public local improvements, except for making and improving the walkways upon the existing streets, and improving. and paving then existing alleys, and for either the construction, or for the use of sewers; and the same, when imposed, shall not be in excess of the peculiar benefits re- sulting therefrom to such abutting land owners. Except in cities and towns, no such taxes or assessments, for local improvements, shall be imposed on abutting land owners." Under this section it has been held that an assessment for a street improvement made after the constitution took effect was invalid, even though section one hundred and seventeen of the same constitution provides that municipal charters in force at the time of the adoption of the con- stitution shall be retained except in so far as they may be amended or repealed by the General Assembly, since the same section, one hundred and seventeen, expressly amends all such charters so as to make them conform to the limitations and powers contained in the constitution.^ " Mauldin v. City Ckrancil of Green- * Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. ville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 [1893]. [1898]. 'See § 118, § 169. 'H'cks v. City of Bristol, 102 Va. 861, 47 S. E. 1001 [1904]. 465 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 304 § 304. Thoroughfares. A question of a different sort is presented when the street which is to be improved is a great thoroughfare, whose improvement is necessary for the convenience of the general public, while the ex- tent and cost of the improvement is much greater than is necessary for the benefit qf the adjoining property. It is undoubtedly fair, as has been pointed out by the courts, that part or all of the ex- pense of such an improvement undertaken for the benefit of the general public primarily should be paid for, in part or in whole, by general taxation.^ The difficult question, however, is presented when an attempt is made to levy a local assessment to pay for part or all of such an improvement. In Iowa an assessment was levied on abutting property to pay for paving a street which was the thoroughfare from the city to the state fair grounds, and which, up to that time, had been a dirt road. The assessment was attacked by the abutting property owners as fraudulent ; not that any actual fraud on the part of the public officials was claimed, but on the ground that to assess the abutting property for an improve- ment, which was intended primarily for the benefit of the people of the whole city, or of the state at large, was constructively fraudulent. The Supreme Court upheld such assessment on the ground that such an improvement of a street was "a public object which will support such an assessment regardless of whether or not it is a benefit to the abutting property. " ^ On this point this case was not affected by its reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States,' since it was reversed solely on the ground of the personal liability of the property owner for the amount of the assessment, the Iowa court holding that personal liability could be imposed upon any owners on constructive notice, while the Su- preme Court of the United States held that such liability could not be imposed upon a non-resident owner domiciled in another state upon constructive notice merely.* But the ground upon which the holding is placed is rather extreme, since the weight of authority holds that the amount of the assessment must be limited to the benefits conferred upon the property by the improvement. 'Frantz, Jr. v. Jacob, 88 Ky. 525, "Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 11 S. W. 654 [1889]; Maybin v. City 193, 43 L. 665, 19 S. 379 [1899]. of Biloxi, 77 Miss. 673, 28 So. 566 *See § 1046. [1900]. ''Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 la. 416, 423, 70 N. W. 605 [1897]. § 304 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 466 In Kentucky a statute which provided for assessing abutting prop- erty for the expense of constructing a great public highway was, by reason of its peculiar provisions, unconstitutional." The hold- ing of the court in this ease was not, however, placed upon the ground that property could not be assessed for such an improve- ment, but on the ground that while the statute required a petition of the abutting property owners in ease of the improvement of every other street in the city of Covington, it provided that this street could be improved at the cost of the abutting property owners without any petition from them upon the unanimous vote of the city council; and was therefore lacking in uniformity and oppressive in its application. In Pennsylvania a street running through land partly irural in character was widened and paved. In an action to recover the amount of the assessment evidence was offered by a property owner tending to show that the street was widened, not for any local benefit but solely as a pubMc im- provement, to keep a grand avenue of a uniform width through the entire city. This evidence was rejected by the trial court, which ruling the Supreme Court held to be error.' The recon- struction of Broad street in the city of Philadelphia raised a question of this sort which was, however, settled by tho adoption of what ultimately developed into a much wider principle. In that case an existing street in good condition, paved with cobble- stones, was destroyed to lay out a wide pleasure drive for the general use of the public. It was held that local assessments could not be levied for such new improvement.' The theory on 'Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush. (71 Izing the improving of Broad street, Ky.) 493 11871]. passed March 23rd, 1866, (Pamph. "Craig V. City of Philadelphia, 89 L. 299), for evidence that it is for Pa. St. 265 [1879]. the general public good, not for mere 'Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. local benefit. It states it to be 'for St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 3 Am. the uses and purposes of tTie public, Rep. 615 [1870] ; '.'The object of this and the benefits and advantages which improvement is not to bring or keep will inure to them by making and Broad street as all the other streets forever maintaining Broad street in within the built-up portions of the the city of Philadelphia for its en- city are kept, for the advantage and tire length, as the same is now comfort of those who live upon it, opened, or may hereafter be opened, and for ordinary business and travel, the principle avenue of the said but to make a g.reat public drive — city.' Thus, we have special taxa- a pleasure ground — along which ele tion authorized, for an object, avowed gant eauipages may disport of an on the face of the act to be general afternoon. We need look no further and not local, which relieves the case than the preamble of the act author- of all diflSculty as to the fact. We 467 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 304 which this ease was decided has, however, been developed in Penn- sylvania into the broad principle that assessments cannot be levied for a second improvement unless the iniprovement is one of the class referable to the police power.' It will be seen, there- fore, that while the question has been discussed to some extent by the courts there is but little specific adjudication upon the point. The true rule, under the "theory of assessments, held by the majority of states, seems fa be that such an improvement is one for which an assessment may be levied upon adjacent property, but that the amount of such assessments must be limited to the benefits conferred upon such property by such improvement, leaving the residue, if any, to be raised by general taxation and paid out of the public treasury." Assessments of this sort do not seem to be invalidated by the fact that the assessment is levied to make a great thoroughfare.^" It was said to be unfair to lay upon abutting property owners the cost of enlarging and increasing the width of a street in order to benefit Fulton market.^^ The court expressed the opinion that such increased cost should be borne by general taxation and not by local assessment. A thorough- fare is a "local improvement" within the meaning of constitu- tional and statutory provisions.^^ have only to advance the project a 'thus far shalt thou go and no far- few steps farther, to see how prepos- ther.' To our own decisions, as far terous is the idea of paying tor such as they have gone, we mean to ad- an improvement by assessments. In here, but we are now asked to take a the natural course of things, we may step much in advance of them. This expect that it will be proposed to we would not be justified by the adorn this principal avenue with mon- principles of the constitution in do- uments, statuary and fountains. Will , ing." Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 their cost be provided for in the same Pa. St. ( 15 P. F. Smith ) 146, 156, way? How much does this plan dif- 157, 3 Am. Eep. 615 [1870]. fer from a proposition to erect new ' See § 382 et seq. public buildings on Independence » See Chapter XIII. Square, and assess the cost on the " Appeal of North Beach & Mis- lots situated on the neighboring sion E. E. Co. in the Matter of Wid- streets? On the same principle, lot^ ening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. 500 on the public square could be assessed [1867]; Eoeerg v. City of St. Paul, to pay for any new project to beau- 22 Minn. 494 [1876]. tify and adorn them, no matter how "Matter of the Petition of the great the expense. It mi^ht be Mayor of New York, 20 Johns (N. arsrued with equal plausibility that Y.l 269 [1822]. their value was increased by the im- "Eogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 provement. We must say at some Minn. 494 [1876]. time to this tide of special taxation, § 305 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 468 § 305. Boulevards. A question somewhat different from that presented in the ease of the ordinary street occurs when the legislature provides for a street improvement which is intended to be beautiful as well as useful, and which by reason of its beauty is more costly than one constructed for mere utility. The right of the legislature to authorize a local assessment to pay for the cost of establishing a public park undoubtedly exists, ana is discussed elsewhere.^ Since the greater includes the less, it follows that the legislature has power to provide for the construction of a street, which is not only a means of transportation but is also an ornament and a thing of beauty. Accordingly, the legislature may authorize an assess- ment for constructing a boulevard.^ , "It is the contention of appellant that the powers given by the statute we have cited have reference only to such improvements as tend to make the street a better or more available avenue of public travel and do not authorize improvements which are merely ornamental or beautiful. The facts presented by the record before us do not seem to necessitate a consideration of this question. It may be said, however, that the author- ity here expressly provided for the 'parking' of streets and avenues can scarcely be reconciled with the proposition that all street improvements must be limited by the single consideration of the convenience or safety of the traveling public. The term 'parking' is incapable of any plausible definition which does not involve the idea of beautifying those portions of the street not necessarily occupied by walks and roadways. To what extent this power may be exercised at the expense of abutting property we need not now determine. The improvement here objected to goes no farther than to provide that the paved roadway and the 1 See § 356. [1876]; Downing v. City of Dea " West Chicago Park Commission- Moines, 124 la. 289, 99 N. W. 1066 ers V. Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 N. E. [1904]; Bell v. City of Newton, 183 427 [1898]; Thorn v. West Chicago Mass. 481, 67 N. E. 599 [1903]; Park Commissioners, 130 III. 594, 22 Jones v. Metropolitan Park Commis- N. E. 520 [1890] ; Chicago and North- sioners, 181 Mass. 494, 64 N. E. 76 western Railway v. People, 120 111. [1902]; In re Spring Valley Park in 104, 11 N. E. 41 8 [1889]; Kedzie v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 674, 106 S. W. West Chicago Park Commissioners, '531 [1907] ; Hart v. City of Omaha, 114 111. 280, 2 N. E. 182 [1886]; 74 Neb. 836, 105 N. W. 546 [1905]; People, ex rel. McCrea v. Atchison, Murphy v. City of Long Branch, — 95 111. 452 [1880]; Andrews v. Peo- N. J. L. , 61 Atl. 593 [1905]. pie ex rel. Rumsey, 83 III. 529 469 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 305 space reserved for parking shall be separated by a line of curbing, and to authorize this action it is not necessary for the city to draw upon its power, if any it has, to improve and ornament such park. Counsel for appellants, directing their vision toward the future, see the park thus provided for, resplendent with trees, shrubs, flowers and statuary created and maintained at the expense of the abutting property and very naturally conclude from the lot owner's point of view, that 'a thing of beauty' is not necessarily and under all circumstances 'a joy forever.' In our judgment these prophetic fears cannot be well grounded upon the circumstances of this case, nor upon the assertion of municipal authority here upheld. The work sought to be enjoined comes well within appellant's own definition of the city's authority to make such improvements as directly tend to the betterment of the street as a public highway and not a mere matter of ornamentation."' There is danger of injustice in assessments of this sort. The cost of such a boulevard may greatly exceed the cost of a suitable and proper street of the ordinary type. However, it should not be the cost of the improvement but the benefit which it confers which measures the amount of the assessment.* Any departure from this principle may work injustice, but the fault is in the apportion- ment, not in the improvement. Another danger of injustice lies in the fact that the benefits conferred may be so great that the property owners, unable to pay for them, may be improved out of their property. If the benefits do exist, however, questions of what type of improvement is advisable are peculiarly within the discretion of the legislature, a discretion which may be conferred upon the city or other public corporation.' The right to levy an assessment for the construction of a boulevard has been recognized though the particular assessment has been held invalid," as because it was divided into installments without statutory authority,' or because a prior assessment equal to the full amount of the benefits had already been levied,' or because the improvement is not com- " Downing v. City of Des Moines, ' Culver v. People ex rel. Kocher- 124 la. 289, 291, 292, 99 N. W. 1066 sperger, .161 111. 89, 43 N. E. 812 [1904]. [1896]. 'See Chapter XIII. 'West Chicago Park Commiasion- 'See § 290 et seq. era v. Metropolitan West Side Ele- "In the Matter of the Petition of vated Railroad Co., 182 111. 246, 55 Bobbins to Vacate an Assessment, 82 N. E. 344 [1899]. N. Y. 131 [1880]. § 305 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 470 pleted as required by statute.' A common form of such an im- provement consists in two or more paved roadways in the street, separated by an intervening parkway. Such an improvement is held so to combine both public utility and private benefit that a local assessment may be levied therefor.^" Such an assessment has been upheld even if it is not shown that the parkway confers a benefit upon abutting property, where the paving of the entire width of the street would cost mbre than the cost of the street constructed with such parking.^^ In some of these cases the as- sessment has been levied for such expenses as sodding the park- way,^^ or constructing a grass plat,*' which do not facilitate the use of the street for travel, but are primarily for beauty and ornament. In other cases the improvement is of a sort tending directly to facilitate travel upon the street, such as curbing the parkway.** In Kansas the power of levying local assessments has been carried somewhat farther. An assessment for the purpose of planting maintaining and protecting shade trees along the public streets was authorized by the statute of that state, and was held to be within its power.*'' In this case, however, the validity of the as- sessment was not directly involved. The city let a contract for planting shade trees, to be paid for by assessments on the abutting property. After the trees were planted, in performance of such contract, the city repudiated the contract and refused to levy assessments in payment thereof, or to take any other steps toward raising a special fund to pay the price stipulated for in the con- tract. Suit was then brought against the city by the contractor to recover the contract price. It was held that the city was empowered to enter into such contract and to levy such assess- ments, and that by its refusal to levy assessments it became person- ally liable to the contractor for the contract price. While it has been held in Indiana that a street improvement resolution, which " Jones V. Metropolitan Park Com- " Downing v. City of Des Moines, missioners, 181 Mass. 494, 64 N. E. 124 la. 289, 99 N. W. 1966 [1904]. • 76 [1902]. "Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 111. "Thompson v. City of Highland 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]. Park, 187 111. 265, 58 N. E. 328 "People ex rel. Raymond v. Field, [1900]; Cummings v. West Chicago 197 111. 568, 64 N. E. 544 [1902]. Park Commissioners, 181 111. 136, "Downing v. City of Des Moines, 54 N. E. 941 [1899] ; Murphy v. 124 la. 289, 99 N. W. 1066 [1904]. City of Peoria, 119 III. 509, 9 N. "Heller v. City of Garden City, E. 895 [1888]; Downing v. City of 58 Kan. 263, 48 Pa^ E. 1110 [1896]; Bowen v. Hester, 143 Ind. 511, 41 N. E. 330 [1895]; Manor v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, 137 Ind. 367, 36 l^. E. 1101, 34 N. E. 959 [1893] ; Thompson v. Goldthwait, 132 Ind. 20, 31 K E. 451 [1892]; Loesnitz v. Seelir.^'er, 127 Ind. 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 "x. E. 887 [1890] ; Hobbs V. Board of Commissioners of Tipton County, 116 Ind. 376, 19 N. E. 186 [1888] ; White v. Fleming, 114 Ind. 560, 16 N. E. 487 [1887]; Board of Commissioners of Montgom- ery County V. Fullen,' 111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]; Neptune v. Taylor, 108 Ind. 459, 8 N. E. 566 [1886]; Brown v. Eagle Creek and Little White Lick Gravel Road Com- pany, 78 Ind. 421 [1881]; Hendricks V. Gilchrist, 76 Ind. 369 [1881]; State ex rel. Monroe Gravel Road Co. V. Stout, 61 Ind. 143 [1878]; Tur- pin V. Eagle Creek Gravel Road Co., 48 Ind. 45; Fall Creek and Warren Township Gravel Road Co. v. Wal- lace, 39 Ind. 435 [1872]; Turner v. Thorntown & Mechanicsburg Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 317 [1870] ; State on the Relation of Linsenfel- ter V. Danville &, North Salem Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 133 [1870]; Center & Warren Gravel Road Co. v. Black, 32 Ind. 468 [1870]; Law v. Madison, Smyrna & Graham Turn- pike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [1868]; Williams v. Little White Lick Gravel Road Company, Wilson's Sup. Ct. (Ind.) 7 [1871]; Barrow v. Helpler, 34 La. Ann. 362 [1882]; Janvrin v. Poole, 181 Mass. 463, 63 N. E. 1066 [1902]; Anderson v. Cortelyou, — N. J. , 68 Atl. 118 [1907]; (re- versing Cortelyou v. Anderson, 73 N. J. L. 427, 63 AtL 1095 [1906] ; Eris- man v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 64 N. J. L. (35 Vr.) 516, 45 Atl. 998 [1900]; State, Bergen County Savings Bank, Proa. v. Inhabitants of the Township of Union in the County of Bergen, 44 N. J. L. (15 Vr.) 599 [1882]; State, King, Pros. v. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 186 [1881]; Jones v. Town of Tonawanda, 158 N. Y. 438, 53 N. E. 280 [1899]; Rounds v. Whatcom County, 22 Wash. 106, 60 Pac. 139 [1900]; Seanor v. Board of County Commissioners, 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 [1895]; Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315 [1876]; Hal ton V. City of Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 27 [1872]; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599 ; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271 [I860]. ' Law V. Madison, Smyrna & Gra- ham Turnpike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [1868]. * City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Company, 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63 [1869]; Wilcox V. City of Meriden, 57 Conn. 120, 17 Atl. 366 [1889]. 497 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. 323 stantially." Special taxes for highways, levied upon small dis- tricts near such highways have been upheld," but in some juris- dictions these are regarded as general taxes levied on a taxing district of small area, and not as local assessments, because they are apportioned according to value/ In other jurisdictions, how- ever, it is held that a public road in the country is not a local improvement,' and that an assessment therefor is unconstitu- tional." The Pennsylvania courts hold that such assessment can- not be levied.^" This holding, however, is involved with the doctrine that improvements, even though consisting of city streets, cannot be levied on rural property if apportioned bj"^ the front foot rule,^' and is consistent with the theory that local as- sessments might be levied for the construction of county roads, if the assessment were apportioned on the basis of benefits eo nomine. § 323. Sidewalks. A sidewalk is an improvement which combines the two essen- tial elements of general benefit to the public at large and special benefit to the abutting property owner. It is, therefore, such an improvement as might be made the subject of local assess- ment even in jurisdictions in which the power of local assess- "City of St. Louis v. Koch, 169 Mo. 587, 70 S. W. 143 [1902]. "Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 0. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 [1890]; Thompson V. Love, 42 0. S. 61 [1884] ; Commis- sioners of Union County v. Greene, 40 0. S. 318 [1883]; State v. Com- missioners, 37 0. S. 520 [1882] ; Com- missioners of Putnam County v. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880] ; Craig v. Heis, 30 0. S. 550 [1876]; Dreake v. Beasley, 26 0. S. 315 [1875]; Foster V. Commissioners of Wood County, 9 0. S. 540 [1859]; And see as recog- nizing the same doctrine, Lewis v. Laylin, 46 0. S. 663, 23 N. E. 288 [1889]. 'See § 38. 'Sperry v. Elygare, 80 Minn. 325, 81 Am. St. Rep. 261, 49 L. R. A. 757, 83 N. W. 177 [1900]. ' Conger v. Graham, — Ky. , 11 S. W. 467, 11 Ky. L. R. 12 [1889] ; Conger v. Bergman, — Ky. , 11 S. W. 84, 10 Ky. L. R. 899 [1889] ; Graham v. Conger, 85 Ky. 582, 4 S. W. 327, 9 Ky. L. R. 133; (However, in Malchus v. District of Highlands, 67 Ky. (4 Busli.) 547 [1869] an assessment according to acreage for grading and paving a road in a sub- urban community was held to be con- stitutional; but the method of appor- tionment was the feature of this leg- islation which was most fiercely at- tacked. ) Sperry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 325, 81 Am. St. Rep. 261, 49 L. R. A. 757, 83 N. W. 177 [1900]. " City of Scranton v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 105 Pa. St. 445 [1884]; Seely v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. St. (1 Norria) 360, 22 Am. Rep. 760 [1876] ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. Smith) 352, 8 Am. Rep. 255 [1871]. "See § 610, § 706. 323 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 498 ment is referred primarily to the power of taxation.* Further- more, a sidewalk is one of the improvements the burden of which is traditionally east upon the abutting property owner; and one the right to levy local assessments for which is in several jurisdictions referred to the police power.^ From these considerations it follows that in the jurisdictions in which it is held that the improvement of a street may be paid for by local assessments,' the improvement of a, sidewalk may also be paid for in the same way.* In South Carolina the court when deciding 'See § 96. 2 See § 96. 'See § 301. * City Council of Montgomery v. Foster, 133 Ala. 587, 32 So. 610 [1901] ; Mayor and Aldermen of Ber- mingham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L. R. A. 369, 7 So. 386 [1889]; (over- ruling Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mo- bile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310 [1871]; and Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Mo- bile V. Royal Street Railroad Com- pany, 45 Ala. 322 [1871]) ; Winter v. City Council of Montgomery, 83 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235 [1887]; Diggins v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]; Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 [1881]; District, of Columbia v. Wormley, 15 App. D. C. 58 [1899]; AUman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894]; Huff v. City of Jacksonville, 39 Fla. 1, 21 So. 776 [1897]; Speer v. Mayor and Common Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; Mar- shall V. People ex rel. Smith, 219 111. 99, 76 N. E. 70 [1905]; Harris V. People ex rel. Knight, 218 111. 439, 75 N! E. 1012 [1905]; City of Chi- cago V. Wilson, 195 111. 19, 57 L. R. A. 127, 62 N. E. 843 [1902]; Ronan V. People ex rel. Shafter, 193 111. 631, 61 N. E. 1042 [1901]; Gage v. City of Chicago, 192 111. 586, 61 N. E. 849 [1901]; Job v. City of Alton, 189 111. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 448, 59 N. E. 622 [1901] ; Hyman v. City of Chicago, 188 HI. 462, 59 N. E. 10 [1900] ; Walker v. Village of Morgan Park, 175 111. 570, 51 N. E. 636; Adcock V. City of Chicago, 172 111. 24, 49 N. E. 1008 [1898]; People ex rel. Gleason v. Yancey, 167 111. 255, 47 N. E. 521 [1897] ; Boynton v. People ex rel. Kern, 159 111. 553, 42 N, E. 842 [1896]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. E. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; Watson V. City of Chicago, 115 111. 78, 3 N. E. 430 [1886]; Enos v. City of Springfield, 113 111. 65 [1886]; Craw v. Tolono, 96 III. 255, 36 Am. Rep. 143 [1880]; White v. People ex rel. City of Bloomington, 94 111. 604 [1880]; Dyer v. Woods, 166 Ind. 44, 76 N. E. 624 [1906]; Town of Green- dale V. Suit, 163 Ind. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904] ; Dooley v. Town of Sulli- van, 112 Ind. 451, 2 Am. St. Rep. 209, 14 N. E. 566; Taber v. Grafmil- ler, 109 Ind. 206, 9 N. E. 721 [1886] ; Darnell v. Keller, 18 Ind. App. 103, 45 N. E. 676 [1897]; City of Con- nersville v. Merrill, 14 Ind. App. 303, 42 N. E. 1112 [1895]; Cemansky v. Fitch, 121 la. 186, 96 N. W. 754 [1903]'; Royce v. Town of Aplington, 90 la. 352, 57 N. W. 868; Risdon v. Shank, 37 la. 82 [1873] ; Warren T. Henly, 31 la. 31 [1870]; Buell v. Ball, 20 la. 282 [1866]; McGrew v. Stewart, 51 Kan. 185, 32 Pac. 898 [1893]; Manley v. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655, 27 Pac. 844 [1891]; City of Lawrence v. Killiam', 11 Kan. 499 [1873]; Langan v. Bitzer, — Ky. , 82 S. W. 280, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 579 [1904] ; Dumesnil v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co., 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 [1900]; Chesapeake & Ohio 499 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §323 that local assessments could not be levied for street improve- ments held that such assessments could nevertheless be levied for such improvement as could, like sidewalks, be referred to the Railway Company v. Mulllns, 94 Ky. 355, 22 S. W. 558 [1893]; Hood v. Trustees of the Town of Lebanon, 15 S. W. (Ky.) 516, 12 Ky. L. R. 813 [1891]; Hydes v. Joyes, 67 Ky. (4 Bush.) 464, 96 Am. Dec. 311 [1868]; Fayssoux v. Denis, 48 La. Ann. 850, 19 So. 760 [1896]; Connell v. Hill, 30 La. Ann. 251 [1878]; Webber v. Gottschalk, 15 La. Ann. 376 [1860] ; O'Leary v. Sloo, 7 La. Ann. 25 [1852] ; Tournier v. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. Ann. 298 [1850]; Oakey v. Mayor, I La. 1 [1830]; Henderson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Use of Esehbach, 8 Md.. 352 [1855]; Dick- inson v. City Council of Worcester, 138 Mass. 555 [1885]; Howe v. City of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 [1874]; Goddard, Petitioner, 33 Mass. (16 PickT) 504,- 28 Am. Dee. 259; Lowell V. Hadley, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 180; Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274 [I860]; State of Minne- sota V. Armstrong, 54 Minn. 457, 56 N. W. 97 [1893]; Scott C6unty v. Hinds, 50 Minn. 204, 52 N. W. 523 [1892]; Griggs v. City of St. Paul, II Minn. 308 [1866]; Wilzinski "v. City of Greenville, 85 Miss. 393, 37 So. 807 [1905]; Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493 [1895]; Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; Haag V. Ward, 186 Mo. 325, 85 S. W. 391 [1904]; City of Louisiana v. Miller, 66 Mo. 467 [1877] ; Weber v. Schergens, 59 Mo. 389 [1875]; City of Joplin ex rel. Carthage Dimension & Flag Stone Co. v. HoUingshead, 123 Mo. App. 602, 100 S. W. 506 [1907]; State V. Several Parcels of Land, — Neb. , 107 N. W. 566 [1906]; State, Kirkpatrick, Pros. v. Commis- sioners of Streets and Sewers in the City of New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 510 [1880]; State, Agens, Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of Newark, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729 [1874]; State, Van j.assel. Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 128 [1874]; State, Wilson, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of thb City of Hudson, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) 365 [1867]; In the Matter of the Petition of the Mutual Life Insur- ance Company of New York to Vacate an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 530 [1882] ; Buflfalo City Cemetery v. City of Buf- falo, 46 N. Y. 506 [1871]; City of Greensboro v. McAdoo, 112 N. C. 359, 17 S. E. 178 [1893]; Wilhelm v. City of Defiance, 58 0. S. 56, 65 Am. St. Rep. 745, 40 L. R. A. 294, 50 N. E. 18 [1898]; Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio 418; Meanor v. Goldsmith, 216 Pa. St. 489, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 342, 65 Atl. 1084 [1907]; Ambersou Avenue, Appeal of Childs, 179 Pa. St. 634, 36 Atl. 354 [1897]; Philadelphia to use v. Meighan, 159 Pa. St. 495, 28 Atl. 304 [1894]; Whitney v. City of Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 351, 30 Am. St. Rep. 740, 23 Atl. 395 [1892]; Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. 744 [1891]; Wilkinsburg Borough V. Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. St. 109, 6 L. R. A. 531-, 18 Atl. 937 [1890]; Findlay v. City of Pittsburg (Pa.) 11 Atl. 678; Debloia v. Barker, 4 R. I. 445 ; In the Matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230 [1856]; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154 [1852]; Tripp v. City of Yankton, 10 S. D. 516, 74 N. W. 447 [1898] ; Lentz v. City of Dallas, 96 Tex. 258, 72 S. W. 59 [1903]; Luf- kin v. City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 545 [1883]; Highland v. City of Galves- ton, 54 Tex. 527 [1881]; City of Gal- veston V. Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [1881]; Sands v. City of Richmond, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]; Wilson v. Town of Philippi, 39 W. Va. 75, 19 S. E. 553 [1894]; Douglass V. Town of Harrisville, 9 §323 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 500 doctrine of the police power.^ At a subsequent hearing of this case the_ Supreme Court reversed itself in part by overruling in part the opinion just cited and holding that no local assessments could be levied for sidewalks, there being no power to subdivide a city into tax districts." In Tennessee, at a time when ordinary assessments for benefits were held invalid,' assessments for side- walks were regarded as valid as being under the police power.* While the present holding of the Tennessee courts recognizes the validity of ordinary assessments for benefits," and while it is no longer necessary to invoke the police power as a basis for sidewalk assesments, the validity of such assessments would un- doubtedly be recognized. In the law of assessments the con- struction of a sidewalk includes grading,^" or grading and laying,^^ or laying with any proper material, such as flagstones,^^ cement concrete,^' cement ^* and planks or boards ■" but not a railing thereto.^' This power extends to ordering the construction of a sidewalk along a public highway*' or along the side of a turn- pike " situated within the limits of the city ordering such im- provement, since the public and the abutting property owner W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Kep. 548 [1876]; Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]; State ex rel. Christopher v. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562 [I860]; Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. ' Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Eep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]. « Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville, 53 S. C. 285, 69 Am. St. Eep. 855, 43 L. R. A. 101, 31 S. E. 252 [1898]. 'See § 160. « Nashville v. Berry, 2 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.) 561; Whyte v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan.) 364 [1852]; Washington v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 177 [1851]; Mayor and Aldermen v. Maberry, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 368, 44 Am. Dec. 315 [1845]. »iSee § 160. "Lewis V. City of New Britain, 52 Conn. 568 [1885]. The legislature may of course re- quire the municipality to grade the street full width at the proper grade before the abutting owner can be com- pelled to construct his sidewalk or to pay therefor. President and Fellows of Yale College v. New Haven, 57 Conn. 1, 17 Atl. 139 [1889]. "Schrum v. Town of Salem, 13 Ind. App. 115, 39 N. E. 1050 [1895]. "Peck V. Sherwood, 56 N. Y. 615 [1874]. " Gage V. City of Chicago, 196 111. 512, 63 N. E. 1031 [1902]. "City of Chicago v. Wilson, 195 111. 19, 57 L. R. A. 127, 62 N. E. 843 [1902]. "Kalbrier v. Leonard, 34 Ind. 497 [1870]; Borough of Beltzhoover v. Maple, 130 Pa. St. 335, 18 Atl. 650 [1889]. "Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn. 190 [1824]. "McGrew v. Stewart, 51 Kan. 185, 32 Pac. 896 [1893 J. "Elmendorf v. City of Albany, 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 81 [1879]. 501 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED § 324 each have an easement in such land. A statute vsrhich requires the sidewalk to be constructed before the street is paved is valid.^' On the other hand the council may, unless restrained by statute, pave the entire width of the street, leaving no part thereof for foot passengers."" Statutes in some states requiring the repair of sidewalks to be made .at the expense of the ad- joining property owners are held to be valid. ^^ However, a stat- ute requiring the abutting property owner to keep the sidewalk in front of his lot in repair under penalty of a fine, has been held to be invalid.^^ § 324. Sewers. A sewer is a "drain or passage to convey off water and filth underground. " '^ A sewer is very clearly a public improvement, absolutely essential to the health and well-being of every thickly settled urban community. A modern city simply could not exist without a proper and adequate system of sewers. Nor is there any serious question that a sewer may confer a great benefit upon the land which is drained thereby, rendering it inhabitable under modern conditions of civilized life and thereby benefiting it over and above the general benefit received by the community by reason of better conditions of general health. For these reasons it is generally held that a statute is a valid one which "Challis V. Parker, 11 Kan. 384 120 Pa. St. 357, 14 Atl. 170 [1888]. [1873]; Parker v. Challis, 9 Kan. See § 713, § 717. 155 [1872]. ^^City of Chicago v. Crosby, HI =»Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 III. 538 [1885]; The invalidity of Mich. 322 [1872]; contra, Carter v. such fine rests on two reasons (1) City of Chicago, 57 III. 283 [1870]. that non-payment even of a valid as- See § 296. sessment cannot be punished by fines; '^ Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, and (2) that such statute in requir- 82 Pae. 331 [1905] ; Manley v. Em- ing each ovpner to keep in repair the len, 46 Kan. 655, 27 Pac. 844 [1891] ; sidewalk in front of his house ignores State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Dis- the question of benefits, trict Court Ramsey County, 89 Minn. ' Drexel v. Town of Lake, 127 111. 292, 94 N. W. 870 [1903]; Young 54, 57, 20 N. E. 38 [1890]; (quoting V. Village of Waterville, 39 Minn. Webster's Dictionary.' Similar defini- 196, 39 N. W. 97 [1888] ; City of tions are given in City of Valparaiso Pleasant Hill v. Dasher, 120 Mo. 675, v. Parker, 148 Ind. 379, 47 N. E. 25 S. W. 566 [1893]; Elmendorf v. 330 [1897]; Clay v. City of Grand City of Albany, 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 81 Rapids, 60 Mich. 451, 27 N. W. 596 [1879]; Borough of Beltzhoover v. (1886]; and Fuchs v. St. Louis, 167 Maple, 130 Pa. St. 335, 18 Atl. 650 Mo. 620, 57 L. R. A. 136, 67 S. W. [1889]; Smith v. Kingston Borough, 610.) §324 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 502 provides for the construction of a sewer and for assessing the expense thereof upon property which is especially benefited there- by.^ The fact that the land does not receive as great a benefit 'Shumate v. Heman, 181 U. S. 402, 45 L. 922, 21 S. 645 [1901]; (affirming Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]); Paulsen V. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]; affirming Paulson V. City of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]); Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098 [1878]; Minne- sota & M. Land & Improvement Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901] i Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 668, 82 Pac. 334 [1905]; Haughawout v. Hub- bard, 131 Cal. 675, 63 Pac. 1078 [1901]; Fitzhugh v. Ashworth, 119 Cal. 393, 51 Pac. 635 [1897]; Har- ney V. Benson, 113 Cal. 314, 45 Pac. 687 [1896]; Rauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 _ Pac. 337 [1895]; Fletcher V. Prath'er, 102 Cal. 413, 36 Pac. 658 [1894]; Anderson v. De Urioste, 96 Cal. 404, 31 Pac. 266 [1892]; Boyle V. Tibbey, 82 Cal. 11, 22 Pac. 1128 [1889]; City of Highlands v. John- son, 24 Colo. 371, 51 Pac. 1004 [1897]; City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899 [1889]; Wolff V. City of Denver, 20 Colo. App. 135, 77 Pac. 364 [1904]; Bas- sett V. City of New Haven, 76 Conn. 70, 55 Atl. 579 [1903]; Sargent & Company v. City of New Haven, 62 Conn. 510, 26 Atl. 1057 [1893]; Fer- guson V. Borough of Stamford, 60 Conn. 432, 22 Atl. 782 [1891J; New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- road Company v. City of New Bri- tain, 49 Conn. 40 [1881]; Park Ec- clesiastical Society v. City of Hart- ford, 47 Conn. 89 [1879]; Hunger- ford V. City of Hartford, 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Clapp v. City of Hart-, ford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868]; Cone v. City of Hartford, 28 Conn. 363 [1859] ; English v. Mayor and Coun- cil of Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Atl. 158 1896] ; Gage v. Vil- lage of Wilmette, 230 111. 428, 82 N. E. 656 [1907]; Cline v. People ex rel. Barlow, 224 111. 360, 79 N. E. 663 [1906]; Washington Park Club v.. City of Chicago, 219 111. 323, 76 N. E. 383 [1906]; Connecticut Mu- tual Life Insurance Company v. City of Chicago, 217 111. 352, 75 N. E. 365 [1905]; Close v. City of Chica- go, 217 111. 216, 75 N. E. 479 [1905] ; People ex rel. Merriman v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 213 111. 367, 72 N. E. 1069 [1904]; Fisher v. City of Chicago, 213 111. 268, 72 N. E. 680 [1904] ; Walker v. City of Chi- cago, 202 111. 531, 67 N. E. 369 [1903]; Smythe v. City of Chicago, 197 in. 311, 64 N. E. 361 [1902]; Vandersyde v. People ex rel. Ray- mond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. 806 [1902]; Peters v. City of Chicago, 192 111. 437, 61 N. E. 438; People ex rel. Raymond v. Church, 192 111. 302, 61 N. E. 496 [1901]; Village of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 111. 312, 55 N. E. 327 [1899]; Church v. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 179 111. 205, 53 N. E. 654 [1899]; Mason v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 499, 53 N. E. 354 [1899]; Hynes v. The City of Chicago, 175 111. 56, 51 N. E. 705 [1898]; Heinroth v. Kochersperger, 173 111. 205, 50- N. E. 171 [1898]; Walker v. People ex rel. Kochersper- ger, 166 111. 96, 46 N. E. 761 [1897] ; Beach v. People ex rel. Kern, 157 111. 659, 41 N. E. 1117 [1895]; Bar- ber V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 37, 38 N. E. 253 [1894] ; Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Rossiter v. City of Lake Forest, 151 111. 489, 38 N. E. 359 [1894] ; Kelly v. City of Chicago, 148 in. 90, 35 N. E. 752 [1894]; Leitch V. La Grange, 138 111. 291, 27 N. E. 917 [1892]; City of Springfield v. Sale, 127 in. 359, 20 N. E. 86 [1890]; City of Springfield v. Math. us, 124 m. 88, 16 N. E. 92; City of 503 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §324 from a sewer, owing to the fact that the mains of the city water works have not been extended along the streets upon which some Galesburg v. Searles, 114 III. 217, 29 N. E. 686 [1886]; Village of Hyde Park V. Borden, 94 111. 26 [1879]; Boyce v. Tuhey, 163 Ind. 202, 70 N. E. 531 [1904] ; Gas Light & Coke Co. V. City of New Albany, 158 Ind. 268, 63 N. E. 458 [1901]; Wray v. Fry, 158 Ind. 92, 62 N. E. 1004 [1901]; Alley V. City of Lebanon, 146 Ind. 125, 44 N. E. 1003 [1896]; Kizer V. Town of Winchester, 141 Ind. 694, 40 N. B. 265 [1895]; Swain v. Ful- mer, 135 Ind. 8, 34 N. E. 639 [1893] ; Jackson v. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, 22 N. E. 431 [1889]; McGill v. Bruner, 65 Ind. 421 [1879]; Board of Com- missioners of Allen County v. Sil- vers, 22 Ind. 491 [1864]; Norton v. Fisher, 33 Ind. App. 132, 71 N. E. 51 [1903]; O'Brien v. Bradley, 28 Ind. App. 487, 61 N. E. 942 [1901]; Spaulding v. Baxter, 25 Ind. App. 485, 58 N. E. 551 [1900]; Spades v. Phillips, 9 Ind. App. 487, 37 N. E. 297 [1893]; Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company v. Bowker, 9 Ind. App. 428, 36 N. E. 864 [1893] ; Hard- wick V. City of Independence, — la. , 114 N. W. 14. [1907]; Com- stock V. Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 11i"N. W. 51 [1907]; Minne- apolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Lind- quist, 119 la. 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Grunewald v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 la. 222, 91 N. W. 1059 [1902] ; Dittoe v. City of Davenport, 74 la. 66, 36 N. W. 895 [1887]; Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]; City of Paola V. Russell, 75 Kan. 826, 89 Pac. 651 [1907] ; City of Kansas City V. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903] ; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1885]; Noland V. Mildenberger, — Ky. , 97 S. W. 24 [1906]; City of Covington v. W. T. Noland, — Ky. , 89 S. W. 216, 28 Ky. L. R. 314 [1905]; Dressman v. Simonin, 104 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767, 20 Ky. L. R. 868 [1898]; Holzhauer v. City of New- port, 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]; S. D. Moody & Co. v. Spot- orno, 112 La. 1008, 36 So. 836 [1904]; City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212, 24 Atl. 817 [1892]; Tay- lor V. City of Haverhill, 192 Mass. 287, 78 N. E. 475 [1906]; Cheney v. City of Beverly, 188 Mass. 81, 74 N. E. 306 [1905]; Atkins v. City of Boston, 188 Mass. 77, 74 N. E. 292 [lbo5]; Smith v. Mayor and Alder- men of Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. R. A. 728, 65 N. E. 40 [1902]; Murphy v. Inhabitants of Clinton, 182 Mass. 198, 65 N. E. 34 [1902]; Weed v. Mayor and Aldermen of Boston, 172 Mass. 28, 42 L. R. A. 642, 51 N. E. 204 [1898]; Smith v. Abington Savings Bank, 171 Mass. 178, 50 N. E. 545 [1898]; Inhabi- tants of Leominster v. Conant, 139 Mass. 384, 2 N. E. 690 [1885]; Snow V. City of Fitchburg, 136 Mass. 183 [1883] ; Butler v. City of Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 [1873]; Brewer v. City of Springfield, 97 Mass. 152 [1867]; Parsons v. City of Grand Rapids, 141 Mich. 467, 104 N. W. 730 [1905]; Walker v. City of De- troit, 136 Mich. 6, 98 N. W. 744 [1904]; Gates v. City of Grand Rap- ids, 134 Mich. 96, 95 N. W. 998 [1903]; Corliss v. Village of High- land Park, 132 Mich. 152, 93 N. W. 254, 93 N. W. 610, 95 X. W. 416 [1903]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; '" Hy of Duluth v. Davidson, 97 Minn. 378, 107 N. W. 151 [1906]; City of Duluth V. Dibblee, 62 Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 1117 [1895]; Dickey v. Por- ter, 203 Mo. 1, 101 S. W. 586 [1907]; Curtice v. Schmidt, 202 Mo. 703, 101 S. W. 61 [1907]; South Highland Land & Improvement Com- pany V. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523, 72 S. W. 944 [1902]; Prior v. Bueh- ler & Cooney Construction Company, 170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]; 324 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 504 of the land which is to be assessed for such sewer is situated, as it would if such mains had been so extended, does not prevent Hill V. Swingley, 159 Mo. 45, 60 S. W. 114 [1900]; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559 [1900]; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]; City of St. Louis V. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 19 S. W. 713 [1892]; City of St. Joseph to Use of Gibson v. Farrell, 106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 [1891]; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 [1883]; State of Missouri ex rel. Cavender v. City of St. Louis, 56 Mo. 277 [1874]; City to Use of Fox v. Sehoenemann, 52 Mo. 348 [1873] ; City of St. Louis to Use of Creamer v. Oeters, 36 Mo. 45e [1865] ; Lockwood v. City of St. Louii, 24 Mo. 20 [1856]; Page v. City of St. Louis, 20 Mo. 136 [1854] ; Barton v. Kansas City, 110 Mo. App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]; Akers v. Kolkmeyer & Company, 97 Mo. App. 520, 71 S. W. 536 [1902]; City of St. Joseph to the Use of the Saxton National Bank v. Landis, 54 Mo. App. 315 [1893]; City of Kansas to the Use of Adkins v. Richards, 34 Mo. App. 521 [1889]; Heman v. Wolf, 33 Mo. App. 200 [1888] ; Eyer- mann Provenchere, 15 Mo. App. 256 [1884]; Sheehan v. Martin, 10 Mo. App. 285 [1881]; Creamer v. Allen, 3 Mo. App. 545 [1877]; Prendergast V. Richards, 2 Mo. App. 187 [1876]; Miller v. Anheuser, 2 Mo. App. 168 [1876] ; Shannon v. City of Omaha, 73 Neb. 807, 103 N. W. 53, 106 N. W. 592 [1905]; Hans- com V. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]; Van Cleve V. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commis- sioners, 71 N. J. L. 183, 58 Atl. 571 [1904]; Van Wagoner, Pros. v. May- or and Aldermen of the City of Pat- erson, 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 466, 51 Atl. 922 [1902]; Brown v. Town of Union, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 601, 48 AtL 562 [1900]; State, Central New Jersey Land & Improvement Co. v. Mayor and Council of the City of Bayonne, 56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 297, 28 Atl. 713 [1893]; DeWitt v. City of Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]; State, Pat- erson and Hudson River Railroad Company, Pros. v. City of Passaic, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 340, 23 Atl. 945 ♦ [1892]; State, King, Pros. v. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 186 [1881]; State, Henderson, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 489 [1879]; Jones v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of New- ark, 11 N. J. Eq. (3 Stock.) 452 [1857]; People of the State of New York ex rel. Seott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662 [1902]; Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, 43 L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]; In the Matter of the Petition of the Trustees of the Leake & Watts Or- phan Home in the City of New York to Vacate an Assessment, 92 N. Y. 116 [1883]; In the Matter of Low- den to Vacate an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]; In the Matter of the Petition of Merriam to Vacate an As- sessment, 84 N. Y. 596 [1881]; Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor and Al- dermen of the Commonalty of the City of New York, 84 N. Y. 108 [1881]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of De Peyster to Vacate an As- sessment, 80 N. Y. 565 [1880]; City of Watertown v. Fairbanks, 65 N. Y. 588 [1875]; In the Matter of the Petition of the New York Protestant Episcopal Public Schools to Vacate Certain Assessments, 47 N. Y. 506 [1872]; Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198 [1864]; In the Matter of the Petition of Williamson to Vacate an Assessment v. Mayor, etc., of New York City, 3 Hun. 65 [1874]; Ford V. City of Toledo, 64 0. S. 92, 59 N. E. 779 [1901], affirming City of Toledo V. 'Ford, 20 Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]; Wewell v. City of Cincin- nati, 45 0. 8. 407, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]; Hartwell v. Railroad Co., 505 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §325 an assessment for such improvement if it, in fact, does confer a benefit.' In South Carolina it was formerly held that a local assessment could be levied for the construction of a sewer,* but under the view of the general invalidity of local assessments in force in that state, such purpose would not at present be one for which an assessment could be levied." §325. Storm and drainage sewers. As can be inferred from the definition of a sewer already quoted, a sewer constructed for the purpose of carrying rain water off the public streets may be paid for by local assessments,^ 40 0. S. 155 [1883]; City of Cincin- nati for use of Ashman v. Bickett, 26 O. S. 49 [1875]; Taylor v. Wapa- koneta, 26 Ohio C. C. 285 [1904]; City of Toledo v. Ford, 20 Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]; (affirmed in Ford v. City of Toledo, 64 O. S. 92, 59 N. E. 779, [1901]) ; Conner v. City of Cin- cinnati, 11 Ohio C. C. 336 [1896]; (affirmed City of Cincinnati v. Con- nor, 55 0. S. 82, 44 N. E. 582 [1896] ) ;• Johnson v. Village of Avon- dale, 1 Ohio C. C. 229 [1885]; Wil- son V. City of Cincinnati, 5 Ohio N. P. 68 [1897]; Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okl. 405, 68 Pac. 511 [1902] ; Paul- son V. City of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]; (affirmed as Paujsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]); Beers v. Dallas City, 16 Or. 334, 18 Pac. 835 [1888]; Strow- bridge v. City of Portland, 8 Or. 67 [1879] ; Scranton Sewer, 213 Pa. St. 4, 62 Atl. 173 [1905]; In re Mill Creek Sewer, 196 Pa. St. 183, 46 Atl. 312 [1900]; City of Phila- delphia V. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 177 Pa. St. 292, 34 L. R. A. 564, 35 Atl. 610 [1896]; Philadelphia to use of Yost v. Odd Fellows' Hall Association, 168 Pa. St. 105, 31 Atl. 917 [1895]; City of Scranton v. Arnt, 148 Pa. St. 210, 23 Atl. 1121 [1892]; Wolf v. City of Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 25 [1884] ; Wain's Heirs v. City of Phil- adelphia to use of Armstrong, 99 Pa. St. 330 [1882]; Commonwealth for use, etc., V. Woods, 44 Pa. St. (S Wright) 113; Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, 8 Atl. 692 [1887]; Cleveland V. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50 [1880]; City of Spokane v. Preston, — Wash. . 89 Pac. 406 [1907]; City of Parkers- burg v. Tavenner, 42 W. Va. 486, 26 S. E. 179; State ex.rel. Schintgen v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of La Crosse, 101 Wis. 208, 77 N. W. 167 [1898]; Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]; Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]; Robinson v. City of Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 585, 21 N. W. 610 [1884]; Massing v. Ames, 37 Wis. 645 [1875]. * Walker v. City of Aurora, 140 111. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]. ' Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. 723, 27 L. R. A. 284, 20 S. E. 842 [1893]. = See § 118, § 159. ^ City of Denver v. Dumars, 33 Colo. 94, 80 Tac. 114 [1904]; Cone V. City of Hartford, 28 Conn. 363 [1859]; Northwestern University v. Village of Wilmette, 230 111. 80, 82 N. E. 615 [1907]; Kirkland v. Board of Public Works of the City of Indianapolis, 142 Ind. 123, 41 N. E. 374 [1895]; Minneapolis and St. Louis R. R. Co. V. Lindquist, 119 la. 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Parsons V. City of Grand Rapids, 141 Mich. 467, 104 N. W. 730 [1905]; Gates V. City of Grand Rapids, 134 Mich. 96, 95 N. W. 998 [1903]. §§ 326, 327 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 506 as well as a sewer constructed for the purpose of draining build- ings and removing house sewage. Even if there is an existing system of sewers, a storm sewer may be a proper improvement to be constructed on the assessment plan if the existing system is insufiScient to carry off the surface water.^ §326. Use of natural stream as sewer. If the natural topography is*^ such ibhat it is an appropriate method of constructing a sewer to cover over and wall in a natural water course and convert it into a sewer, an assessment for this purpose is as valid as one for the construction of a sewer in the ordinary way would be.' § 327. Main sewers. Assessments may be levied for the construction of a main sew6r or trunk sewer; that is, a sewer intended to carry sewage from a large area of drainage. All property drained by such main sewer and by the lateral sewers connecting therewith is es- pecially benefited by such main sewer and may be assessed, there- for.' The difficulty of apportioning the cost of the main sewer, however, has not infrequently led the legislature to provide that the cost of the main sewer must be paid for out of the general funds of the municipality.'' A similar result is reached by a statute providing that only the land abutting on the sewer can be assessed therefor.^ Under such statute if a larger sewer is constructed than is needed for local drainage, in order to serve " Northwestern University v. Vil- ' Bassett v. City of New Haven, 76 lage of Wilmette, 230 111. 80, 82 N. Conn. 70, 55 Atl. 579 [1903]; Alley E. 615 [1907]. V. City of Lebanon, 146 Ind. 125, 44 'Kramer v. City of Los Angeles. N. E. 1003 [1896]; South Highland 147 Cal. 668, 82 Pae. 334 [1905] ; Land and Improvement Company v. Hungerford v. City of Hartford, 39 Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523, 72 S. W. Conn. 279 [1872]; Quinn v. James, 944 [1902]; City of Kansas to the 174 Mass. 23, 54 N. E. 343 [1899]; use of Adkins v.' Richards, 34 Mo. Beals V. Inhabitants of Brookline, App. 521 [1889] ; Hanscom v. City 174 Mass. 1, 54 N. E. 339 [1899] ; of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 Beals V. James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 [1881]; City of Toledo v. Ford, 20 N. E. 245 [1899]; Butler v. City of Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]; (affirmed Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 [1873]; Eord v. City of Toledo, 64 0. S. 92, Clay V. City of Grand Rapids, 60 59 N. E. 779 [1901]). Mich. 451, 27 N. W. 596 [1886]; "Heman v. Handlan, 59 Mo. App. Hanscom v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 490 [1894], See § 663. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]. "Witman v. City of Reading, 169 Pa. St. 375, 32 Atl. 576. 507 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §§328,329 as a trunk sewer for another drainage section, the owner of realty drained thereby cannot be assessed for such increased cost.* Questions arising under such statutes, as well as questions of apportionment of assessments among lands benefited by the improvement and questions as to what lands may be assessed for such improvements are discussed elsewhere. §328. Lateral sewers. Local assessments may also be levied for local or lateral sewers, that is, for sewers connecting the property to be drained, with a main sewer or a branch thereof, either directly or indirectly.^ So assessments may be levied for openings from main sewers opposite different lots, so that connections with house drainage may be made thereafter.^ This is recognized even in cases where the provisions for such lateral sewers or connections were invalid as being indefinite,' or unreasonable.* § 329. Assessment for outlet. A sewer without an outlet which can be used as of right is as useless a thing as can be imagined. The right to assess for a sewer, which has no outlet, involves the theory of public improve- ments on private property, and is discussed elsewhere.^ A local as- sessment may be levied on land drained by a sewer to secure an outlet therefor;^ and the fact that such outlet must be sought 'Park Avenue Sewers., Appeal of [1902]; Vandersyde v. People ex rel. Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 Raymond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. 806 [1895]. * [1902]. ' Payne v. Village of South Spring- ' Wetmore v. City of Chicago, 206 field, 161 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 111. 367, 69 N. E. 234 [1903]; Van [.1896] ; Palmer v. City of Danville, Wagoner, Pros. v. Mayor and Alder- 154 111. 156, 38 N. E. 1067 [1894]; men of the City of Paterson, 67 N. People's National Bank of Brattle- J. L. (38 Vr.) 455, 51 Atl. 922 boro, Vermont, v. Ayer, 24 Ind. App. [1902]. 212, 56 N. E. 267 [1899]; Byram v. * Gage v. City of Chicago, 191 111. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, 47 N. E. 210, 60 N. E. 896 [1901]; Bicker- 351 [1897] ; Cobum v. Bossert, 13 dike v. City of Chicago, 185 III. 280, Ind. App. 359, 40 N. E. 281 [1895]; 56 N. E. 1096 [1900]; (distin- Coates V. Nugent, — Kan. — • — , 92 guiahed in Vandersyde v. People ex. Pac. 597 ]1907]. rel. Raymond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. ^■Duane v. City of Chicago, 198 806 [1902]). 111. 471, 64 N. E. 1033 [1902]; ^ See § 401. Smythe v. City of Chicago, 197 111. ' Board of Improvement District 311, 64 N. E. 361 [1902]; City of No. 5 of Texarkana v. Oflfenhauser, Chicago V. Corcoran, 196 111. 146, 63 84 Ark. 257, 105 S. W. 265; N. E. 690 [1902]; Ga?e v. City of Gray v. Town of Cicero, 177 HI. 459, Chicago, 195 111. 490, 63 N. E. 184 53 N. E. 91 [1899]; Atkins v. City § 330 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 508 outside the limits of the municipal corporation does not invali- date the assessment ; ' although, ordinarily, property cannot be assessed for an improvement in another municipality or political district. The fact that the outlet of the sewer is carried to a point at which sewage could be discharged with the minimum injury to public health, and without polluting a stream, does not prevent the levy of local assessments therefor.* % § 330. Pumping station. Where' the country is flat and level, sewage cannot always be made to flow off by the force of gravitation, as there may not be sufficient slope between the land to be drained and the outlet to secure a natural flow. Under such circumstances some addi- tional force is necessary to secure a proper flow of sewage ; and this additional force is very often sought in pumping stations to drive the sewage on in some way, either by propulsion or by lifting it to a greater height and thus securing a greater slope for the outlet sewer. Can the cost of such a pumping station be assessed upon the land drained by such sewers? In Illinois it is held that such a pumping station, under these conditions, is an essential part of a system of sewers; that its cost can be classed with the cost of the sewers themselves, especially with the cost of main or trunk sewers, and can be assessed upon the land which is benefited by such system of sewers. The leading case on this point is one involving a pumping station for a drainage system,^ and it has been followed by a series of cases which up- hold the validity of assessments for such pumping stations used in connection with sewers.^ In these cases it is held that sueh a of Boston, 188 Mass. 77, 74 N. E. * W. F. Stewart Co. v. City of 292 [1905]; W. F. Stewart Co. v. Flint, 147 Mch. 697, 111 N. W, City of Flint, 147 Mich. 697, 111 N. 352 [1907]. W. 352 [1907]; Prior v. Buehler ^ Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, and Cooney Construction Company, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1888]. 170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]. ^ Close v. City of Chicago, 217 111. "Gallon V. City of Jacksonville, 216, 75 N. E. 479 [1905]; Fisher 147 111. 113, 35 N. E. 223 [1894]; v. City of Chicago, 213 111. 268, 72 Maywood County V. Village of May- N. E. 680 [1904]; MoChesney v. wood, 140 111. 216, 29 N. E. 216, 29 Village of Hyde Park, 151 111. 634, N. E. 704 [1893]; Cochran v. Vil- 37 N. E. 858 [1894]; Drexel v. Town lage of Park Roads, 138 111. 295, 27 of Lake, 127 111. 54, 20 N. E. 38 N. E. 939 [1893]; Shreve v. Town [1890]; Pearce v. Village of Hyde of Cicero, 129 111. 226; suh nomine Park, 126 111. 287, 18 N. E. 824 Albertson v. Town of Cicero, 21 N. [1890]. E. 815 [1890]. 509 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §§ 331, 332 pumping station is of local utility and that, therefore, such assess- ments are valid; in distinction from cases of a general water- works plant, or a general plant for street lighting, which are said to be of general utility, and, therefore, improvements for which local assessments cannot be made. The force of the dis- ■ tinction is not easy to grasp. In each case the central plant is an essential part of the general system, and if the reasons assigned justify local assessments for one they should justify it for the others. Can the running expenses of 'such a pumping station be assessed upon the land drained by such sewerage system? It is held where such question has been raised that such expenses cannot be met by local assessment.' In Illinois such result seems to depend on the provisions of the statute, and it is there held that repairs may be paid for by assessments.* In New Jersey the statute expressly provided for a surface tax on land drained to defray the expense of running and maintaining a pumping sta- tion ; and such statute was held to be unconstitutional.*" § 331. Sewer without lateral connections. A so-called sewer, constructed for sanitary purposes and for which council provides no connections, so as to afford a means of draining sewage from the land which it is sought to assess, is not a sewer within the meaning of the rule allowing local assess- ments for sewers.^ The fact that later, and before tax-bills issued the park board ordered such connections was held not to render such assessments valid, the council, and not the park board, hav- ing authority to assess.^ § 332. Charge for privilege of making sewer connection. A statute which provides that if a sewer has been built, to be paid for by local assessments, and such assessments have been declared to be invalid, a property owner who has not paid such assessment cannot connect his premises with such sewer unless ° McChesney v. Village of Hyde " State, M'Closkey, Pros. v. Cham- Park, 151 111. 634, 37 N. E. 858 berlin, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 388 [1894]; State, M'Closkey, Pros. v. [1875]. Chafflberlln, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 'Barton v. Kansas City, 110 Mo. 388 [1875]. . App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]. * McChesney v. Village of Hyde ^Barton v. Kansas City, 110 Mo. Park, 151 HI. 634, 37 N. E. 858 App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]. [1894]. §§333,334 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 510 he pays a special charge for such privilege is valid.^ However, if no such provision is made by statute, and a regular license fee is provided for by statute, the city cannot impose an additional charge upon the owners of realty who have not paid such invalid assessment." § 333. Private sewer. If a sewer is constructed, not as a public improvement but as a private enterprise, it is not an improvement for which an as- sessment can be levied.^ Thus, A. constructed a private sewer system under an ordinance authorizing him to construct such system, and giving him the exclusive right to construct the same, and authorizing him to collect reasonable annual compensation from all persons using such system. B. made connection with a sewer, so that B. 's land received the benefit of such system. It was held that A. could not collect from B. for such use." How- ever, the question of the power of the legislature to authorize such extension was not involved in this case, since the statute did not authorize such ordinance. § 334. Drainage a special local benefit. The drainage of wet and marshy land renders it suitable for use as agricultural land, or for residence and manufacturing pur- poses. It makes useful land, which, before, was useless. There can be no question but that drainage confers a great benefit upon the owner of the property which is drained.^ Possibly the special and local benefit is clearer in drainage than it is in any other of the public improvements for which assessments are levied. The improvements of drainage, and its beneficial effect upon the land drained are matters of general knowledge which have often been commented upon by the courts.^ In order to justify a special assess- ' Carson v. Brockton Sewerage ' Weaver v. Canon Sewer Corn- Commission, 182 U. S. 398, 45 L. pany, 18 Colo. App. 242, 70 Pae. 1131, 21 S. 860 [1901]; (affirming 953 [1902]. Carson v. Sewerage Commissioners ^Weaver v. Canon Sewer Co., 18 of Brockton, 175 Mass. 242, 48 L. E. Colo. App. 242, 70 Pae. 953 [1902]. A. 277, 56 N. E. 1 [1900]). ' Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, = State of Ohio ex rel. Burner v. 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 Graydon, 6 Ohio C. C. 634 [1892] ; [1889] ; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. (affirmed by a divided court, 30 W. 461, 46 Am. Rep. 637, 17 N. W. 389 L. 351). An additional charge of [1883]. two dollars per front imposed by the " Hagar v. Reclamation District city authorities for the privilege of No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 469, connecting with the sewer was held 4 S. 663 [1884]; (affirming Reclama- to be invalid in this case. tion District No. lOS v. Hagar, 4 511 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED.' § 335 ment on the theory of benefits, howftver, it is necessary not merely that the improvement confer a special benefit, but that it also shall be of a public character, in order to justify the legislature in providing for such improvement, either at public expense or at the expense of the owners of property benefited. In the case of assessments for drainage improvements, the great difSeulty is to find in all cases a public use and benefit which justifies the public in constructing the improvement and compelling the owners of land benefited to contribute thereto. § 335. Theory of benefit to public health. If land in its natural condition is generally or often covered with stagnant water it is likely to be a menace .to public health. The danger to health is, of course, greater, if the land is so poorly drained by nature as to be a* marsh or a swamp. Under these circumstances there is no doubt that the drainage of such land, by artificial means, is an improvement which confers a bene- fit upon the public at large.' As far as the element of public in- terest is required the public health is a sufiicient basis for local assessments for purposes of drainage.^ At the same time it has Fed. 366 [1880]); Chicago, Burl- [1878]; Oliver v. Monona County, ington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; 212 111. 103, 72 N. E. 219 [1904]. State ex rel. Utick v. Board of ^ Hagar v. Keclamation District County Commissioners of Polk Coun- No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, ty, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. R. A. 161, 4 S. 663 [1884]; (affirming Reclam- 87 N. W. 216 [1902]; Lien v. Board ation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 of County Commissioners of Norman Fed. 366 [1880]); Laguna Drain- County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094 age District v. Charles Martin Co., [1900]; Mound City Land & Stock 144 Cal. 209, 77 Pae. 933 [1904]; Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, .94 Am. Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; S. W. 721 [1902]; O'Neill v. City Chicago, Burlington & Quiney Ry. of Hoboken, 72 N. J. L. 67, 60 Atl. Co. V. People, 212 111. 103, 72 N. E. 50 [1905]; Matter of Ryers, 72 N, 219, (see discussion on p. 119) Y. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88; Thompson v. [1904]; Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. Treasurer of Wood County, 11 O. S. 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 678 [1860]; Rude v. Town of St. 782 [1889]. Marie, 121 Wis. 6.34, 99 N. W. 460 ^Laguna Drainage District v. [1904]; State ex rel. Witte v. Cur- Charles Martin Co., 144 Cal. 209, 77 tis, 86 Wis. 140, 56 N. W. 475; Pae. 933 [1904] ; Heffner v. Cass State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 and Morgan Counties, 193 111. 439, Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. 58 L. R. A. 353, 62 N. E, 201 [1901] ; 947 [1889] ; Bryant v. Bobbins, 70 Bate V. Sheets, 64 Ind. 209 [1878]; Wis. 258, 35 N. W. 545 [1887]. Tillman v, Kircher, 64 Ind. 104 § 336 • TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 512 been held that lands which a»e not actually drained by artificial means cannot be assessed for the expense of such drainage, even though the public health throughout the whole neighborhood may be improved by means of such drainage. Benefits of this sort are said to be too uncertain and too indirect.' This, however, is merely a special application of the principle that assessments cannot be levied for general benefits.' It seems not to be neces- sary that the legislature should^eclare specifically that the im- provement authorized will benefit public health. It is sufficient, if the court can take judicial knowledge of the topography of the country and see that benefit to the public health exists.'' If, however, the statute does not purport to limit the purpose of the drainage improvement to public health, convenience and welfare, the statute may be held invalid, though in the particular case such considerations may exist." § 336. Theory of benefit to public highways. While improvement of the public health is the usual form of benefit to the public arising out of such improvement it is not the only form of public benefit. The benefit that the public high- ways may receive from the drainage of large tracts of land has been held to be sufficient to authorize the levy of special assess- ments to pay for such drainage.^ "That the drainage of large tracts of wet and overflowed lands will operate beneficially to the public there can be no serious doubt. Statutes authorizing and providing for such drains have been enacted and in force in this country for over a century and have been sustained on various grounds. Some have been upheld where large tracts of agricultural lands have been reclaimed and made suitable for cultivation, independent of any effect the drainage of such lands might have upon the public health; it being held in those cases ' State, Skinkle, Pros. v. Inhabi- ' Commissioners of Highways of tants of the Township of Clinton in the Town of Colfax v. Commission- the County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. ers of East Lake Fork Special Drain- (10 Vr.) 656 [1877]. age District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. *See § 654. 206 [1890]; Oliver v. Monona = State ex rel. Utick v. Board of County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 County Commissioners of Polk [1902] ; State ex rel. Utick v. Board County, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. E. A. of County Commissioners of Polk 161, 92 N. W. 216 [1902]. County, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. E. A. "Beeves v. Treasurer of Wood 161, 92 N. W. 216 [1902]. County, 8 0. S. 333 [1858]. 513 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 337 that draining considerable portions of the public domain and bene- fiting all lands through which the drain may pass and others ad- jacent, perhaps, is a public benefit within the meaning of the law. While the element of public health is often made an important factor in the consideration of statutes of this kind, it is believed tb.at any public benefit, such as the improvement 6f highways or the reclamation of large tracts of otherwise waste lands is sufficient to support them. ' ' ^ Thus, where the drainage did not benefit the public health, but did benefit the public high- ways, and did also render several hundred acres of land more valuable and productive, it was held that a local assessment therefor could be levied on the lands benefited thereby, even though such lands were not benefited by the improvement of the public highways.^ § 337. Extent of special benefit do^ not constitute public benefit. Greater difficulty is presented where the condition of the land is not such as to be an acute menace to public health, and yet where the drainage of the land will be of great benefit to the owners of the land thus drained. Upon this question there are two theories, inconsistent in the form in which they are expressed, though not so often inconsistent in the results actually reached nnder such theories.' According to the statement of one theory as set out in many cases, if the drainage system established is intended solelv for the private gain of the owners of land wb^ch is to be drained thereby, and is not intended to subserve the public health, convenience or welfare, such an improvement cannot be constructed or authorized by the state, nor can a local assessment therefor be levied, even upon lands which are greatlv benefited thereby.^ As in other cases of assessment, the underlying theory "^ State ex rel. Utiek v. Board of City, 9 Cush. 233; In re Drainage of County Commissioners of Polk Lands, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 497 County, 87 Minu. 325, 335, 60 L. [1872]; French v. Kirkland, 1 Paige R. A. 161, 177, 178, 92 N. W. 216 (N. Y.) 117; Ohio v. Commission- [1902]; (citing Wurts v. Hoadand, ers, 41 O. S. 423). 114 U. S. 606, 29 li. 229. 5 S. 1086 = Heick v. Voisht, 110 Ind. 279, [18851; Head v. -Amoskeag Manu- 11 N. E. 306 [1886]. facturing Co., 113 TI. S. 9, 5 S. 'ElTnore v. Drainage Commission- 441, 28 L. 889: O'T^eillv v. Kan- ers, 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. Tcakee Vallev Draininc; Company, 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]; Gifford 32 Tnd. 169: Lowell v. Citv, 111 Di-ainase District v. Shroer, 145 Ind. Mass. 454. 15 Am. Reo. 39: Coonjes 572, 44 N. E. 636; Zigler v. Menges, V. Burt, 22 Pick. 422; Wright v. 121 Ind. 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, § 337 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 514 must be public good, not private advantage.- Unless public good demands, the owner of private property cannot be compelled to improve it against his wiU, no matter how wise it may be to make such improvement or how much it may add to the utility or value of his land. "If the sole purpose of the ditch was to im- prove certain specified lands for the direct pecuniary benefit of the owners thereof, then the whole statute would be unconstitu- tional; for the owner of one pJfece of property cannot be com- pelled to contribute to the expense of the improvement of another piece of property, nor can the land of one owner be taken for the purpose of furnishing an outlet for the drainage of the land of another. The statutory provisions which are involved in this case are supported on the theory that the public health conven- ience and welfare are promoted by the construction of the improvement — not simply that the lands of particular owners are rendered more valuable. ' ' ^ The fact that by reason of the improvement the lands drained would be benefited,* and that siich land would be rendered more fertile and productive,^ or more valuable," is held not to be such a public purpose as will enable the legislature to authorize an assessment for such drainage, if no considerations of public health, welfare, or utility supervene. 22 N. E. 782 [1889]; Bate v. Sheets, = Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 64 Ind. 209 [1878]; Tillman v. Kir- [1876]. cher, 64 Ind. 104 [1878]; Oliver v. » Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. Monona County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. 43, 55, 56, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; W. 510 [1902]; Fleming v. Hull, (citing Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 73 la. 598, 35 N. ^A'. 673, 22 Am. & 477 [1876], and Fleming v. Hull, 73 Eng. Corp. Ca. 310; Hull v. Baird, la. 598, 35 N. w. 673). 73 la. 528, 35 N. W. 613; Kinnie v. 'Elmore v. Drainage Commission- Bare, 68 Mich. 625, 36 N. W. 672; ers,. 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. People ex rel. Butler v. Super- 363, 25 N. E. 1010 [1892]; GiflFord visors of Saginaw County, 26 Drainage District v. Shroer, 145 Mich. 22 [1872]; State ex rel. Utick Ind. 572, 44 N. E. 636; Zigler v. v. Board of County Commissioners Manges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. of Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. 357, 22 N. E. 782 [1889]; State ex R. A. 161, 92 N. W. 216 [1902]; rel. Utiek v. Board of County Com- Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co., missioners of Polk County, 87 Minn. 12 Neb. 163, 10 N. W. 547 [1881]; 325, 60 L. R. A. 161, 92 N. W. 216 Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. [1902]; Chicago & Erie Railroad Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. A. 525, Co. v. Keith, 67 0. S. 279, 60 L. R. 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]; McQuillen v. A. 525, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902]; Reeves Hatton, 42 0. S. 202; Miller v. Gra- v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. District, 90 Wis. 301, 63 N. W. 288. S. 333 [1858]. ham, 17 0. S. 1 [1866]; Reeves v. = McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 O. S. 202. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 0. S. "Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. 333 [1858]; In re Theresa Drainage 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. 515 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 338 In New York, under an amendment to the constitution, providing "General laws may be passed permitting the owners or occupants of agricultural lands to construct and maintain for the drainage thereof necessary drains, ditches and dykes upon the lands of others, under proper restrictions and with just compensation,"^ it was held that local assessments for such drains were not au- thorized and that a statute providing for such assessments was unconstitutional.' In this case the court divided on the question of whether such drainage, if solely for the benefit of the land drained was a public purpose. "Under its provisions the au- thority to tax may be exercised in favor of a single person for the improvement of a single acre of agricultural land — a result which we feel certain was not within the contemplation of the framers of the constitutional provision. ' ' " § 338. Theory of public interest in condition of land. Under the other theory it is held that the reclamation of a large tract of ground, so as to convert it from marshy or swampy land into'land suitable for use by man, of which uses agriculture is the most common, is of itself a use so public in its nature as to justify public corporations in requiring such work to be done and in levying local assessments therefor, if authorized by statute.'^ The public is said to have an interest in the condition of land within the boundaries of the state over and above its interest based upon considerations of the public health. "The public has an interest beyond the mere sanitary condition of land, and founded upon other and different principles than the controlling 'Constitution of New York, Arti- County, 163 K Y. 133, 79 Am. St. cle I., § 7, adopted in 1894. Rep. 574, 49 L. E. A. 781, 792, 57 N. = In the Matter of the Petition of E. 303 [1900]. Tuthill for the Appointment of ' Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. Commissioners to Drain Certain Wet 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1885]; and Low Lands in the Towns of (aflBrming Hoagland v. State, Simon- Chester and Blooming Grove in ton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) Orange County, 163 N. Y. 133, 79 456 [1881]; which affirmed IMatter Am. St. Rep. 574, 49 L. R. A. 781, of Drainage of the Great Meadows 57 N. B. 303 [1900]. on Request River, 42 N. J. L. (13 "Opinion of appellate division Vr.) 553 [1880] without opinion.); quoted In tBe Matter of the Petition Hagar v. Reclamation District No. of Tuthill for the Appointment of 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 8. Commissioners to Drain Certain Wet 663 [1884]; Haear v. Board of Su- and Low Lands in the Towns of Ches- pervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. ter and Blooming Grove in Orange 222 [1874]. § 338 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 516 or abatement of nuisances where any considerable number of per- sons are concerned or tract of land is useless, and improvements may be made commensurate to the benefits received and the land itself may be taxed for such benefits. The principle requires careful application but many illustrations of its existence can be found sustained by the highest authority."" This interest has been suggested to be one arising from an increase in the taxable value of the land caused by draftiage. "The community is bene- fited by anything that makes considerable bodies of land arable and adds to their taxable value, and so it is by anything that lessens disease. ' ' ' Many of the cases which uphold statutes pro- viding for the compulsory drainage of wet or marshy lands at the expense of the owners thereof, do so on the theory that such statute^ are to be upheld "independently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regulations for the general ad- vantage of those who are treated for this purpose as owners of a common property. ' ' * This theory is inconsistent with the one previously discussed, since it requires no public benefit to support such a statute other than that which will enure to the public through the private gain of the owners of. the land benefited by such drainage." At the same time it will be found that the same court will uphold assessments now on the one theory, now on the other, and occasionally upon both the theory of benefit to the public health and the theory of reclamation of large tracts of land in combination. The theory that the improvement and reclamation of large tracts of land is of itself a public benefit and use sufiicient to justify local assessments for drainage was at one time advanced in Wisconsin." These remarks were, however, ^^ Lewis County v. Gordon, 20 553 [1880] without opinion.); Cos- Wash. 80, 90, 91, 54 Pac. 779 [1898]. ter v. Tide Water Company, 18 N. •Zigler V. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, J. Eq. (13 C. E. Green) 54 [1866]. 102, 16 Am. St. Eep. 357, 22 N. E, "Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 782 [1899]. Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 •Head v. Amoskeag Manufactur- [1899]. ing Co., 113 U. S. 9, 28 L. 889, 5 "In speaking of drainage and tha S. 441. See also as expressing similar nature of the public use and benefit views, Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. the court said: "The primary ob- S. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1885]; ject is solely to restore such lands (afBrming Hoagland v. State, Simon- to a proper condition for tillage and ton. Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 456 agriculture by the several owners [1881]; which affirmed Matter of and for their use alone. It enhances Drainage of the Great Meadows on their value intrinsic and in market Pequest Eiver, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) . . . This is the only object which 517 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. .§-339 obiter, and while subsequently approved in other states,' they have been criticised in "Wisconsin, and the theory thus advanced has been repudiated.* § 339. Drainage assessments held part of common law. The right to levy local assessments to pay for compulsory drainage, where any public benefit of any kind can be found, even though the real motive in requiring such drainage is primarily to benefit the property owners whose lands are drained thereby io a matter of history and tradition. In New Jersey the right to levy local assessments for the improvement, by drainage, of the land of private owners, was said to rest neither on the right of taxation nor on the right of eminent domain, but to exist as a "part of the local common law."^ By reason of the antiquity of the system, rather than by its conformity to the principles of constitutional law, it was upheld on the theory that it was "quite too late to revert to first principles in order to overthrow a system of procedure which is possessed of such antiquity and has to its credit so many recognitions." ^ In a subsequent decision on the same facts and between the same parties the court upheld local assessments for drainage, as based on the right of eminent domain, and as therefore a case in which the amount of the assess- ment was not necessarily limited to the benefits conferred by the improvement.^ The decision of the state courts upon this question is final. The Supreme Court of the United States will not review their decisions upon the theory that such an assessment, if not for a public purpose, is a taking without due process of law.* concerns their use and that use is ' Hoagland y. Wurts, 41 N. J. L. strictly private." Donnelly v. Deck- (12 Vr.) 175, 180 [1879]; (affirm- er, 58 Wis. 461, 468, 46 Am. Rep. ing, Matter of Commissioners to 637, 17 N. W. 389 [1883]. Drain Great Meadows, 39 N. J. L. 'Zigler V. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]). Am. St. Hep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 = Matter of Drainage of the Great [1899]. Meadows on Pequest River, 42 N. J. »Rudo v. Town of St. Marie, 121 L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880]; (affirmed Wis. 634, 99 N. W. 460 [1904]. without opinion Hoagland v. State, ^Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N. J. L. Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 (12 Vr.) 175, 180 [1879]; (affirm- Vr.) 456 [1881]; affirmed by the ing Matter of Commissioners to Supreme Court of the United States Drain Great Meadows, 39 N. J. L. in Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. (10 Vr.) 433 [1877]); See State, 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1086 [1885]). Britton, Pros. v.. Blake, 36 N. J. L. * Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. (6 Vr.) 208 [1871]. 606, 29 L. 229, 5 S. 1088 [1885]; §340 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 518 § 340. Drainage held proper purpose for assessment. If a statute provides for a drainage improvement which con- fers any form of public benefit, it is held that local assessments may be levied to pay therefor.^ (affirming Matter of Drainage of Great Meadows on Pequest River, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 553 [1880] which was affirmed as Hoagland v. State " Simonton, Pros., 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 456 [1881] without opinion). *Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, HI U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 S. 663 [1884]; (affirming Reclam- ation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 Fed. 366 [1880] ) ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. 616 [1877]; (affirming In the Matter of the Commisstoners of the First Draining District, 27 La. Ann. 20 [1875] ) ; United States ex rel. Kil- patrick v. Capdevielle, 118 Fed. 809, 55 C. C. A. 421 [1902]; Hale v. Moore, 82 Ark. 75, 100 S. W. 742 [1907]; Ritter v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 Poinsett County, 78 Ark. 580, 94 S. W. 711 [1906]; Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S W. .707 [1897]; Reclamation District No. 536 V. Hall, 131 Cal. 662, 63 Pac. 1000 [1901]; Weinrich v. Hensley, 121 Cal. 647, 54 Pac. 254 [1898]; Reclamation District No. 551 v. Runyan, 117 Cal. 164, 44 Pac. 131 [1897]; Swamp Land District No. 307 V. Glide, 112 Cal. 85, 44 Pac. 451 [1896]; Lower Kings River Re- clamation District No. 531 v Phil- lips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335 [1895]; Swamp Land Dis- rict No. 150 v. Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866 [1893]; Reclamation District No. 124 v. Gray, 95 Cal. 601, 30 Pac. 779 [1892]; Hutson v. Woodbridge Protection District No. 1, 79 Cal. 90, 16 Pac. 549, 21 Pac. 435 [1889]; People v. Hulbert, 71 Cal. 72, 12 Pac. 43 [1886]; Swamp Land District No. 307. v. Gwynn, 70 Cal. 566, 12 Pac. 462 [1886]; Re- clamation District No. 3 v. Parvin, 67 Cal. 501, 8 Pac. 43 [1885]; Re- fclamation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]; Re- clamation District No. 108 v. Evans, 61 Cal. 104 [1882]; Bixler v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Sac- ramento, 59 Cal. 698, [1881]; Peo- ple of the State of California v. Ha- gar, 52 Cal. 171 [1877]; Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; Iroquois & Crescent Drainage District v. Har- roun, 222 111. 489, 78 N. E. 780 [1906]; City of Joliet v. Spring Creek Drainage District, 222 111. 441, 78 N. E. 836 [1906] ; Barnes v. Drainage Commissioners of Drainage District No. 1, etc., 221 111. 627, 77 N. E. 1124 [1906]; People ex rel. Young v. Prust, 219 111 116, 76 N. E. 68 [1905] ; Drainage Commission- ers of District No. 1 v. Village of Cerro Gordo, 217 111. 488, 75 N. E. 516 [1905]; Stack v. People ex rel. Talbott, 217 111. 220, 75 N. E. 347 [905] ; Lacey Levee and Drainage District v. Langellier, 215 111. 271, 74 N. E. 148 [1905]; Pinkstaff v. Allison Ditch District No. 2 of Law- rence County, 213 111. 186, 72 N. E. 715 [1904]; Drainage Commission- ers of Drainage' District No. 2 v. Drainage Commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 3, 211 111. 328, 71 N. E. 1007 [1904]; (affirming 113 111. App. 114; Trigger v. Drain- age District No. 1, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 [1901]; Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company v. Hohenshell, 193 111. 159, 61 N. B. 1102 [1901]; People ex rel. Herman v. Commissioners of Bug River Special Drainage District, 189 111. 55, 59 N. E. 605; Hammond v. Peo- ple, 178 111. 254, 52 N. E. 1030 [1899] ; Hammond v. People, for Use, etc., 169 111. 545, 48 N. E. 573 [1897]; People of the State of Illi- nois V. Weber, 164 111. 412, 45 N. E. 723 [1897]; Tucker v. People ex rel. 519 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. 340 ■This statement leaves for discussion elsewhere the the- Wall, 156 111. 108, 40 N. E. 451 [1895]; Drainage District No. 3 v. People ex rel. Baron, 147 111. 404, 35 N. E. 238 [1894]; People ex rel., t'tc. V. Drainage Comrs., District No. 1 of Town of Young America, 143 III. 417, 32 N. E. 688 [1893]; Wallcer v. City of Aurora, 140 III. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]; Briggs v. Union Drainage District No. 1, 140 III. 53, 29 N. E. 721 [1893] ; People px rel. Samuel, Sr. v. Cooper, 139 111. 461, 29 N. E. 872 [1893]; Com- missioners of Lake Fork Special Drainage District v. The People ex rel. Bodman, 138 111. 87, 27 N. E. 857 [1892]; Wabash Eastern Rail- way Company of Illinois v. Commis- sioners of East Lake Fork Drainage District, 134 111. 384, 10 L. R. A. 285, 25 N. E. 781 [1891]; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Com- missioners of East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 129 111. 417, 21 N. E. 925 [1890]; Commissioners of Highways of the Town of Colfax v. Commissioners of East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 127 111. .581, 21 N. E. 206 [1890]; People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman, 127 lU. 387, 19 N. E. 872 [1890]; Samuels v. Drainage Commissioners, 125 111. 536, 17 N. E. 829 [1889]: Scott v. Peo- ple PX rel. Lewis, 120 111. 129, 11 N, E. 408 [1889]; Morrell v. Union Drainage District No. 1, 118 111. 139, 8 N. E. 675 [1887]; Keigwin v. Drainafp Commissioners of Hamilton Town=hi'i, 115 111. 347, 5 N. E. 575 [1886] : People ex rel. Little v. Clay- ton, 115 111. 150, 4 N. E. 193 [1886]; Kilgour V. Drainage Commissioners, 111 111. 342 [1885]; Drainage Com- missioners V. Hudson, 109 III. 659 [1885]; Moore v. People e.x rel. Lewis, 106 111. 376 [1883]; Com- missioners of Spoon River Drainage District in Champaign County v. Conner, 121 111. App. 450 [1905]; Streuter v. Willow Creek Drainage Di-strict, 72 111. App. 561 [18971; Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N. E. 322 [1906]; Taylor v. Strayer, 167 Ind. 23, 78 N. E. 236 [1900]; Quick V. Parrott, 107 Ind. 31, 78 N. E. 232 [1906]; Ager v. State ex rel. Heaston, 162 Ind 538, 70 N. E. 808 [1903]; Skelton v. Sharp, 161 Ind. 383, 67 N. E. 535 [1903]; Sample V. Carroll, 132 Ind. 496, 32 N. E. 220 [1892]; Racer v. State for Use .of Rhine, 131 Ind. 393, 31 N. E. 81 [1891] ; MeBride v. State for Use of Clandy, 130 Ind. 525, 30 N. E. 699 [1891]; White v. McGrew, 129 Ind. 83, 28 N. E. 322 [1891]; Budd v. Reidelbach, 128 Ind. 145, 27 N. E. 349 [1890]; Goodwine v. Leak, 127 Ind. 569, 27 N. E. 161 [1890]; Zig- ler V. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 [1889]; Otis v. De Boer, 116 Ind. 531, 19 N. E. 317 [1888]; Harris v. Ross, 112 Ind. 314, 13 N. E. 873 [1887]; In- dianapolis & Cumberland Gravel Road Co. V. State ex rel. Flack, 105 Ind. 37, 4 N. E. 316 [1885]; Mc- Kinney v. State for Use of Nixon, 101 Ind. 355 [1884]; Albertson v. State ex rel. Wells, 95 Ind. 370 [1883]; Bannister v. Grassy Fork Ditching Association, 52 Ind. 178 [1875]; Bate v. Sheets, 50 Ind. 329 [1875]; Chase v. Arctic Ditchers, 43 Ind. 74 [1873]; Etchison Ditch- ing Asociation v. Hillis, 40 Ind. 408 [1872] ; Etchison Ditching Asso- ciation v. Jarrell, 33 Ind. 131 [1870]; Jordan Ditching & Draining As- sociation v. Wagoner, 33 Ind. 50 [1870]; Sarber v. Rankin, 154 Ind. 236, 56 N. E. 225 [1899]; Osborn v. Maxinkuckee Lake Ice Company, 154 Ind. 101, 56 N. E. 33 [1899]; Reamer v. Hogg, 142 Ind. 138, 41 N. E. 353 [1895]; Rogers v. Voorhees, 124 Ind. 469, 24 N. E. 374 [1890]; Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company v. State for the use of Beckman, 122 Ii^d- 443, 24 N. E. 350 [1889]; Johnson v. State for use of Davidson, 116 Ind. 374, 19 N. E. 298 [1888]; Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491, 16 N. E. 495 §340 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 520 ory of the measure of the amount of assessments in such [1887]; Hackett v. State for use of Martindale, 113 Ind. 532, 15 N. E. 799 [1887] ; Laverty v. 'State ex rel. Hill, 109 Ind. 217, 9 N. E. 774 [1886]; Deegan v State for use of Stoddard, 108 Ind. 155, 9 N. E. 148 [1886]; Frazer v. State for Use of Ingerman, 106 Ind. 471, 7 N. E. 203 [1886] ; Lipea v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885] ; Nevins & Otter Creek Township Draining Company v. Alkire, 36 Ind. 189 [1871]; Seyberger v. Calumet Draining Company, 33 Ind. 330 [1870]; Large v. Keen's Creek Drain- ing Company, 30 Ind. 263, 95 Am. Dec. 696 [1868]; Eel River Drain- ing Association v. Topp, 16 Ind. 242 [1861]; Beck v. Tolen, 62 Ind. 469 [1878]; Ellison v. Branstrator, 34 Ind. App. 410, 73 N. E. 146 [1904] ; State for Use of Cram v. Elliott, 32 Ind. App. 605, 70 N. E. 397 [1903]; Hoefgen v. State ex rel. Brown, 17 Ind. App. 537, 47 N. E. 28 [1896]; Zinser v. Board of Supervisors of Buena Vista County, — la. , 114 N. W. 51 [1907]; Sisson v. Board of Supervisors of Buena Vista County, 128 la. 442, '70 L. E. A.- 440, 104 N. W. 454 [1905]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Wormley v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, Iowa, 108 la. 232, 78 N. W. 824 [1899] ; Hoertz v.. Jefferson South- ern Pond Draining Company, 119 Ky. 824, 84 S. W. 1141, 27 Ky. L. R. 278 [1905]; Dixon v. Labry, — Ky. , 78 S. W. 430, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1679 [1902]; (denying rehear- ing of 24 Ky. S. Rep. 697, 69 S. W. 791 [1902]); Burguires v. Sanders, 111 La. 109, 35 So. 478 [1903]; Beals V. Inhabitants of Brookline, 174 Mass. 1, 54 N. E. 339 [1899]; Beals V. James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245 [1899]; Dean v. Treasurer of Clinton County, 146 Mich. 645, 109 N. W. 1131 [1906]; Attorney- General V. McClear, 146 Mich. 45, 109 N. W. 27 [1906] ; Murphy v. Dobben, 137 Mich. 665, 100 N. W. 891 [1904] ; Polock V. Sowers, 137 Mich. 368, 100 N. W. 596 [1904]; Township of Flynn v. Woolman, 133 Mich. 508, 95 N. W. 567 [1903]; Anketell v. Hayward, 119 Mich. 525, 78 N. W. 657 [1899]; Brady v. Ha.vward, 114 •Mich. 326, 72 N. W. 233 [1897]; Hilton V. Dumphey, 113 Mich. 241, 71 N. W. 527 [1897]; Mogg v. Hall, 83 Mich. 576, 47 N. W. 553; Brown- ell V. Board of Supervisors of Grat- iot County, 49 Mich. 414, 13 N. W. 798 [1882]; Taylor v. Burnap, 39 Mich. 739 [1878]; State ex rel. Utick V. Board of County Commis- sioners of Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 60 L. E. A. 161, 92 N. W. 216 [1902]; Clapp v. Minnesota Grass Twine Company, 81 Minn. 511, 84 N. W. 344 [1900]; Lien v. Board of County Commissioners of Norman County, 80 Minn. 68, 82 N. W. 1094 [1900]; Mound City Land & Stock Company v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S. W. 721 [1902]; State ex rel. Mispagel v. Angert, 127 Mo. 456, 30 S. W. 118 [1894]; Sheridan v. Fleming, 93 Mo. 321, 5 S. W. 813 [1887]; Dodge County v. Acom, 72 Neb. 71, 100 N. W, 136 [1904]; (affirming on rehearing County of Dodge v. Acom, 61 Neb. 376, 86 N. W. 292 [1901]) ; Zeliff v. Bog & Fly Meadow Company, 68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 200, 56 Atl. 302 [1902]; Mayor and City Council of East Orange v. Hussey, 72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 71, 59 Atl. 1060 [1905]; Mayor and City Council of East Orange v. Hussey, 70 N. J. L. (41 Vr.) 244, 57 Atl. 1086 [1903]; State, Kean, Pros. v. Drigga Drainage Company, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 91 [1883]; State, Brit- tin, Pros. v. Blake, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 442 [1872]; In the Matter of the Application f or Drainage of Lands between Lower Chatham and Little Falls in the Counties of Pas- saic, Essex and Morris, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 497 [1872]; State, Brittin, 521 WHEN ASSESSMENTS I»See § 455. N. Y. 105. [1877]; People ex rel. "MoUill V. Eruner, 65 Ind. 421. Williams v. Haines, 49 N. Y. 587 >» Carpenter v. Board of County [1872]; In the Matter of One Hun- Com'rs of Hennepin County, 50 dred Twenty-Seventh Street, 56 How. Minn. 513, 45 Am. St. Kep. 494, 53 (X. Y.) 60 [1878]; The New York N. W. 295 [1894]; State, Kerrigan, cases above cited are recognized as Pros. V. Township of West Hoboken, correct but are distinguished in 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 77 [1874]; In Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N. Y. the Matter of the Petition of Cheese- 396 [1885]; decided under a statute brough, to Vacate an Assessment, which permitted the property on 78 N. Y. 232 [1879]; Olmsted v, which the. public improvement was Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378 [1879]; In located to be taken by subsequent the Matter of the Petition of Rhine- procedings in eminent domain, lander to Vacate an Assessment, 68 ^ See §§ 390-393. 599 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 394 benefit on the adjacent property for like reasons. For these rea- sons no local assessment can be levied for a street laid out on private land, over which the general public and the adjoining property owners have no easement and cannot acquire one. At the same time if the public and the adjoining owner are given a legal right as against the owner of such private property it makes no difference as affecting the validity of the assessment how such right is acquired." If proceedings in eminent domain have been instituted to acquire either a fee or an easement in such property, mere irregularities or errors in such proceedings will not affect the validity of an assessment for such street im- provement if the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties." Such an objection to the validity of the assessment is a collateral attack upon the judgment in eminent domain and cannot be permitted. Thus in a proceeding involving the valid- ity of the assessment the judgment in eminent domain cannot be attacked on the ground that the certificate of publication of the notice was defective in failing to state the last day of its inser- tion,* or on the ground that the judgment did not assess any benefits to the public against the city,^ or on the ground that in the condemnation proceedings the realty was not described with sufficient accuracy * since such irregularities do not affect the validity of the judgment. So the fact that a land-owner entitled to damages in a condemnation proceeding has not been paidj^he amount of such damages does not invalidate an assessment levied for the improvement of such realty,^ at least as long as the fail- ^ Jackson v. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, ° City of St. Louis v. Annex Realty 22 N. E. 431 [1889]. Company, 175 Mo. 63, 74 S. W. 961 ' South Chicago City Railway Com pany v. City of Chicago, 196 111 490, 63 111. 1046 [1902]; Gage v City of Chicago, 146 111. 499, 34 N E. 1034 [1893] ; Prescott v. City of Chicago, 60 111. 121 [1871] ; Carpen ter V. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn 232 [1876]; City of St. Louis v Annex Realty Company, 175 Mo. 63 74 S. W. 961 [1903]; Michael v, City of St. Louis, 112 Mo. 610, 20 S. W. 666 [1892]; Merritt v. Vil lage of Port Chester, 29 Hun. (N [1903]. "Gage V. City of Chicago, 146 111. 499, 34 N. E. 1034 [1893]. ' Boynton v. People ex rel. Kern. 159 111. 553, 42 N. E. 842 [1896]; Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. Meh- ler, 112 Ky. 438, 64 S. W. 396, 652. 23 Ky. L. R. 1335 [1901]; Barfield V. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, 63 S. W, 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 [1901]; Mo Quiddy v. Smith, 67 Mo. App. 205 [1896]; City of Springfield to the Use of Tuttle v. Baker, 56 Mo. App. Y.) 619 [1883]. 637 [1894]; See also as presenting ' Prescott V. City of ' Cliicago, 60 somewhat similar facts, though prob- 111. 121 [1871]. ably there was no encroachment on § 394 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 600 ure to pay such damages does not prevent the city from acquir- ing the property condemned or an easement therein. A diflferent question is presented when a party to the proceeding in eminent domain has, by proceding in error, appeal or certiorari in the nature of a direct attack upon the judgment, succeeded in having such judgment reversed, set aside or vacated. Under such circum- stances the original judgment is of no validity whatever. Indeed to claim it as still valid would be jji the nature of a collateral attack upon the judgment of the reviewing court. Accordingly in such cases an assessment cannot be levied for such street im- provement.' Under such circumstances a property owner who has not attacked the judgment whereby land was taken may take advantage of the fact that another property owner whose land is taken by such judgment has defeated such proceeding by prose- cuting certiorari." If an appeal from the judgment in eminent do- main has been taken and the city has no right to enter the realty condemned by the judgment appealed from, it cannot levy an assessment for such an improvement without giving such bond.^" If, however, there is a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings in eminent domain, the property owner whose land it is sought to take by such proceedings is not bound thereby and may insist on his rights in such land notwithstanding such judgment. Accord- ingly the public has acquired no interest in this realty by the pro- cee^ngs in eminent domain; nor have the adjoining property owners, as a result of such proceedings, acquired any new right of access to their property. Under these circumstances therefore no local assessment can be levied for such a street improvement,'^ private property, City of Indianap- 104, 210 [1897]; Leslie v. City of olis V. Gilmore, 30 Ind. 414 [1868]. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474 [1871]; Long- ' Butler V. Board of Commission- well v. Kansas City, 69 Mo. App. ers of the Town of Keyport, 64 N. 177 [1896]; State, Kerrigan, Pros. J. L. (35 Vr.) 181, 44 Atl. 849 v. Township of West Hoboken, 37 [1899]; Meredith v. City of Perth N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 77 [1874]; State, Amboy, 63 N. J. L. (34 Vr.) 523, Grant, Pros. v. Mayor and Common 44 Atl. 1101 [1899]. Council of Newark, 28 N. J. L. (4 "Butler V. Board of Commission- Dutch.) 491 [I860]; Carron v. Mar- ers of the Town of Keyport, 64 N. tin, 26 N. .J. L. (2 Dutch.) 594, 69 J. L. (35 Vr.) 181, 44 Atl. 849 Am. Dec. 584 [1857]; (reversing [1899]. Martin v. Carron, 26 N. J. L. (2 "Hennessy v. City of St. Paul, Dutch.) 228 [1857]); Astor v. May- 44 Minn. 306, 46 N. W. 353 [1890]. or, Aldermen and Commonalty of the " Brush v. City of Detroit, 32 City of New York, 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Mich. 43 [1875]; Smith v. City of 539 [1874]. . St. Paul, 69 Minn. 276, 72 N. W. "If the condemnation judgment is 601 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 394 except in jurisdictions in which assessments may be levied for im- provements on private property.'^ Thus if the real owner of the land sought to be taken in eminent domain is not made a party to the proceeding," or is not properly notified/* or if some jurisdic- tional condition precedent such as an attempt to agree with the property owner as to the terms of purchase before instituting pro- ceedings in eminent domain/^ or a petition in writing by three- fourths of the owners of land lying on the road or street to be opened " is omitted, the owner of realty against which an assess- ment is sought to be levied may resist such levy. So if the statute in force has taken from the council the power to lay out streets, and subsequently the council does lay out a street, a property owner may resist an assessment to pay for the land so taken. ^^ However it has been held that the omission to make a mortgagee a party to a proceeding to condemn land for street purposes does not deprive the court of jurisdiction in eminent domain, if there is enough land left to satisfy the mortgage, and the city actually takes possession of the street as condemned. Under such special circumstances, therefore, a property owner cannot take advantage of such defect in the proceedings in eminent domain.^* In an- entered without jurisdiction it may tice was essential to the validity of he collaterally attacked in the pro- the condemnation ordinance, raised ceeding to confirm the special assess- but did not decide the question ment." Bass v. The People ex rel. whether such invalidity would be a Raymond, 203 111. 206, 208, 67 N. defense to the assessment, and held E. 806 [1903]; (citing Dickey v. that if it were a defense the burden City of Chicago, 152 111. 468, 38 N. was on the party resisting the as- E. 932 [1894]; Ayer v. City of Chi- sessment to show that such notice cago, 149 111. 262, 37 N. E. 57 ; Good- was not given. Willie V. City of Lake View, 137 111. ^'ISee § 393. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]). "Smith v. City of St. Paul, 69 However in the case of Dashiell v. Minn. 276, 72 N. W. 104, 210 [1897]. Mayor and City Council of Balti- "Brush v. City of Detroit, 32 more, use of Hax, 45 Md. 615 Mich. 43 [1875]. [1876]; the property owner who "Leslie v. City of St. Louis, 47 was resisting an assessment objected Mo. 474 [1871]. to the introduction in evidence of the " Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L. record of proceedings for the open- (2 Dutch.) 594, 69 Am. Dec. 594 ing and condemnation of that part [1857]; (reversing Martin v. Car- of the street in question, on the ron, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutch.) 228 ground that the record did not show [1857]). on its face that sixty days notice " State, Grant, Pros. v. Mayor and of the application for the condemna- Common Council of Newark, 28 N. tion ordinance had been given and J. L. (4 Dutch.) 491 [I860], that no evidence of such notice was "* Smith v. City of Detroit, 120 given. The court held that such no- Mich. 572, 79 N. W. 808 [1899]. § 395 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 602 other jurisdiction it has been said that a mortgagee is not a nec- essary party in proceedings to condemn land for a street.^* Not affecting the principle in question but limiting its applica- tion is the rule which is subsequently discussed at length ^° that if an opportunity is afforded at a certain stage of assessment pro- ceedings, such as confirmation, to interpose a certain defense, a failure to interpose a given defense at such stage operates as a waiver thereof. If a judgment of confirmation is entered by a court of competent jurisdiction it cannot be attacked collaterally thereafter.^^ Accordingly in such jurisdictions it has been held that a judgment of confirmation which is not attacked directly will preclude the parties on whose property such assessment has been levied from subsequently interposing as a defense the fact that the court which rendered the judgment in eminent domain was without jurisdiction." So if a mortgage lien upon property taken for a street is not satisfied, it may be possible to interpose the existence of such lien to prevent confirmation of the assess- ment and entry of judgment, but if such objection is not made then it is waived.-^ If the ordinance authorizing condemnation is to-take effect only in ease certain realty is dedicated by the owner no proceedings can be had under such ordinance unless such dedication is made.^* § 395. Location of street on land acquired in other manner. If the street has been dedicated by the prior owner of such realty, so that the public has acquired either the fee thereof or an easement therein, an assessment for the improvement of such street may of course be levied.^ Dedication after suit was brought "Mehumaker v. Toberman, 56 Cal. [1878]; Terrell v. Hart, — Ky. , 508 [1880]. 90 S. W. 953, 28 Ky. L. R. 901 ="See § 910 et seq., § 986 et seq. [1906]; Siebert v. Allen, 61 Mo. ■"See § 910 et seq. 482 [1876]; Skrainka v. Allen, 2 ^'Bass V. People ex rel. Eaymond, Mo. App. 387 [1876]; State, Pros. 203 111. 206, 67 N. E. 806 [1903]; v. City Council of Atlantic City, People ex rel. Raymond V. Talmadge, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 99 [1869]; 194 111. 67, 61 N. E. 1049 [1901]. State, iloran. Pros. v. City of Hud- ^Morey v. City of Dulutli, 75 son, 34 X. J. L. (5 Vr.) 25 [1869]; Minn. 221, 77 X. W. 829 [1899]. Mayor and Common Council of IS'ew- " City of St. Louis V. Cruikshank, ark v. State, Batten, Pros., 32 N. J. 16 Mo. App. 495 [1885]. J-. (3 Vr.) 453 11865]; State v. 'City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 Dean, 23 X. J. L. (3 Zab.) 335 U. S. 351, 25 S. 44 [1904]; City of [1852]; ^■efi• v. Bates, 25 O. S. 169 Meriden v. Camp, 46 Conn. 284 11874]; Schenley v. Commonwealth 603 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. % 395 on the assessment and before trial has been held sufficient.^ The property owners who have dedicated such street are not thereby relieved from assessment on property retained by them." If land properly dedicated as a street has been vacated without authority of the law, an assessment subsequently levied for improving the street so vacated is not invalid by reason of such vacation. Thus where surveyors, of highways have no authority to vacate streets,* tliey attempted to vacate a street. Subsequently an assessment was levied for improving such street; and it was held that the assessment was not void by reason of the attempted vacation of the street." If a street is not dedicated when the original assess- ment is levied, but it is dedicated subsequently and a re-assess- ment is levied, such re-assessment may be valid." If the street has been acquired by the public by purchase, so that the public has either a fee or an easement therein, an assessment for the im- provement of such street may be levied. It is not necessary that a formal conveyance should have been made to the city passing the legal title to the property to be used as a street. If a valid and subsisting contract has been entered into between the city and the owner of the property to be used as a street, whereby the owner of such property agrees to convey it to the city for such use, an assessment for a street improvement constructed upon such land before such conveyance has been made is held to be invalid.' The form which such purchase assumes is not material as long as either fee or easement passes to the public. Thus by a statute passed in 1857 the power of laying out public streets in the City of Newark, New Jersey, was taken from the common council and vested in a board of commissioners. Under such statute an ordi- nance laying out a new street passed by the mayor and council for the Use of the City of Allegheny, * Holmes v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. 36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 29, 78 Am. Dec. Eq. (1 Beas.) 299. 359 [1859]. . 'Mayor and Common Council of ' City of Toledo for the Use of Jersey City v. State, Howeth, Pros., Horan v. Barnes, 1 Ohio N. P, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 521 [1863]. 187 [1894]; contra Spaulding v. "City of Toledo v. Barnes, 1 Ohio Wesson, 115 Cal. 441, 47 Pac. 249 N. P. 187. [1896]. 'Sears v. Street Commissioners of •Ktate, Moran, Pros. v. City of the City of Boston, 180 Mass. 274, Hudson, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 25 62 L. R. A. 144, 62 N. E. 397 [1869]; State v. Dean, 23 N. J. L. [1902]. (3 Zab.) 335 [1852J. § 395 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 604 after such statute took effect was void.' It appeared, however, in another case based on a similar ordinance that the owners of such realty had agreed to transfer it to the city for use as a street, and that such ordinance was passed in performance of such agreement. It was held, accordingly, that an assessment for the improvement of such street was valid.' If the public has ac- quired an easement in realty by prescription, it has a right to make such use of the property whiclf it has thus acquired without the consent of the property owner. Accordingly an assessment may be levied for improving a street upon land in which the public has acquired an easement for use as a street by prescrip- tion.^" If the owner of property taken for a street has by his conduct estopped himself from denying that it is a public street, owners of property assessed for the improvement of such street cannot resist assessments on the ground that such land had not been acquired as a street, since by the force of the estoppel both the public and the adjoining land-owners will receive as much benefit from the street as though such land had been acquired regularly.^* Thus A. attempted to dedicate certain land as a public street. Subsequently B., who succeeded A. in interest, al- lowed the village to improve such street under a contract by which the contractor agreed to receive the assessments in full satis- faction, the village to be under no liability whatever B. knew that the improvement was to be paid for by such assessments. It was held that B. was estopped from resisting payment of such assessments to the contractor on the ground that the land taken for a street was not legally dedicated.^^ So A. 's land was taken for a street by proceedings in eminent domain. Subsequently A. brought suit against the city to recover the value of the land thus taken on the ground that the prior proceedings in eminent domain were void for want of jurisdiction. A. recovered judgment in ' State, Grant, Pros. v. Mayor and " Grimm v. SMckle, 4 Mo. App. 58S Common Council of Newark, 28 N. (appendix); Hawver v. Ci^ ol J. L. (4 Dutch.) 491 [I860]. Omaha, 52 Neb. 734, 73 N. W. 217 "Mayor and Common Council of [1897]; NeflF v. Bates, 25 0. S. 169 Newark v. State, Batten, Pros., 32 [1874] ; Barlington v. Common- N. J. L. (3 Vr.) 453 [18fi5]. wealth for the Use of the City of AI- "Bpeir v. Town of New Utrecht, legheny, 41 Pa. St. (5 Wright) 68 121 N. y. 420, 24 N. E. 692 [1890] ; [1861]. (modifying Speir v. Town of New "NeflF v. Bates, 25 O. S. 169 Utrecht, 49 Hun. (N. Y.) 294, 2 N. [1874]. Y. S. 426 [1888]). 605 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 396 such suit. Subsequently an assessment for improving such street was levied upon A.'s abutting property. It was held that A., by his election to recover the value of the land taken for use as a street, was estopped from denying the right of the city to such easement, and that A. could not, therefore, resist such assessment on the ground that the proceedings in eminent domain were void.^' So deeds gfven by the property owner resisting the assessment, whereby he conveyed other realty on the street in question, in which deeds he recognized the existence of such street, may be considered as bearing on the fact of the existence of such street." So owners of property which abuts on a strip of land which has for years been used by the property owners and the city as a street, cannot resist assessments for improving such street on the ground that the city has no title thereto.^' § 396. Location of sftreet on land in which public has no interest. If a municipal corporation attempts to construct a street on realty in which it has neither the fee nor the easement, the ques- tion of the validity of an assessment for such an improvement is one upon some phases of which there is a conflict of authority. Without considering the effect of future acquisition, by proceed- ings in eminent domain, of the right to make use of such land for a street, it may be said that the general rule, supported by the great weight of authority is that an assessment cannot be levied for a street improvement to be constructed on land in which the public has neither the fee or the easement.^ This principle is rec- "Hawver v. City of Omaha, 52 S. W. 658 [1906]; De Grilleau v. Neb. 734, 73 N. W. 217 [1897]. Frawley, 48 La. Ann. 184, 19 So. "Darlington v. Commonwealth for 151 [1896]; Philbrook v. Inhabitants the Use of the City of Allegheny, 41 of the Conjity of Kennebec, 17 Me. Pa. St. (5 Wright) 68 [1861]. 196 [1840]; Mayor and City Council »' Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 of Baltimore v. Hook, 62 Md. 371 S. D. 640, 39 Am. St. Kep. 802, 51 [1884]; Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. N. W. 770 [1892]. (1 All.) 150 [1861]; People on the • Spaulding v. Wesson, 115 Cal. Relation of Butler v. Board of Su- 441, 47 Pac. 249 [1896]; Cook v. pervisors of Saginaw County, 26 Sudden, 94 Cal. 443, 29 Pac. 949 Mich. 22 [1872]; Coates v. Camp- [1892]; Spaulding v. Bradley, 79 bell, 37 Minn. 498, 35 N. W. 366; Cal. 449, 22 Pac. 47 [1889]; Paciflo Carroll v. City of St. Louis, 4 Mo. Bridge Co. v. Kirkham, 54 Cal. 558 App. 191 [1877]; Lorenz v. Arm- [1880]; Snyder v. Foster, 77 la. 638, strong, 3 Mo. App. 574 (appendix); 42 N. W. 506; Dulaney v. Fisg, — Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 Ky. . 29 Ky. Law Kep. 678, 94 N. Y. 420s 24 N. E. 692 [1890]; § 396 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 606 ognized even where the question is not properly presented, and the defense is therefore ineffectual.^ Occasionally, however, we find it held that no owner except the true owner can resist an assess- ment on the ground that the land on which the street is located is private property.^ The difficult questions that are presented in this connection are those arising out of the possibility of the public's acquiring by proceedings in eminent domain after the levy of an assessment, an interest in4he land on which the street in question has been constructed. According to some authorities an assessment in such cases is invalid even if it might be possible to secure a fee or easement in such realty by subsequent proceed- ings in eminent domain.* This holding is based on the theory that the adjoining property owner receives no real and present bene- fit from such improvement ; but that there is at best a mere pos- sibility that he may at some time in the future receive a benefit if the municipal corporation proceeds to attempt to appro- priate the property by proceedings in eminent domain, and if it is successful in such attempt. In other eases the same result is reached where the statute or ordinance under which the assess- ment is made provides that the street shall be first dedicated or properly opened.^ So an assessment for improving a private al- ley in which only the abutting property owners had easements was held to be invalid under a statute providing for levying an assessment for the improvement of a "street or part thereof" since such ' alley was not a street within the meaning of the statute." In such case there is no legislative authority for the ordi- nance and the question of power to authorize is not involved. (modifying Speir v. Town of New Council of Baltimore v. Hook, 62 Utrecht, 49 Hun. (N. Y.) 294, 2 N. Md. 371 [1884]; CarroU v. City of Y. S. 426 [1888]); Western Penn- «t. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 191 [1877J; sylvania Railway Company v. City L,orenz v. Armstrong, 3 Mo. App. of Allegheny, 92 Pa. St. (11 Nor- 574 (appendix); State, Grant, Pros, ris) 100 [1879]. v. Mayor and Common Council of ^Moberry v. City of JeflFersonville, Newark, 28 N. J. L. (4 Dutch.) 38 Ind. 198 [1871]. 491 [I860]; McKeesport Boro., to ■Beck V. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, Use of McKeesport City v. Busch, 74 Pac. 410 [1903]. 166 Pa. St. 46, 31 Atl. 49 [1895]. * Diggins V. Hartshorne, 108 Cal. ' City of Philadelphia to Use v. 154, 41 Pac. 283 [1895]; Spaulding Ball, 147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. 564 V. Bradley, 79 Cal. 449, 22 Pac. 47 [1892]. [1889]; Bodley v. Finley's Bxr., Ill 'De Grilleau v. Frawley, 48 La. Ky. 618, 64 S. W. 439, 23 Ky. L. Ann. 184, 19 So. 151 [1896]. Rep. 851 [1901]; Mayor and City 607 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 396 Even in jurisdictions holding that such an assessment cannot be levied, it is held that a property owner who has paid assessments for the improvement of such a street may, under some circum- stances, compel the municipal corporation to bring proceedings to condemn such realty for public use as a street. Thus a street was opened by virtue of a statute which required an assessment of damages and benefits to property along the line of the street to be opened. No assessment of either damages or benefits was made against a tract of land owned by a railroad which such street crossed. A., an abutting property owner paid an assessment for opening such street, and subsequently paid another assessment for grading, curbing and guttering such street. Later, on learn- ing that no assessment had been made for damages or benefits against such tract belonging to the railroad company A. applied to the board of aldermen to take the necessary steps to open such street. An ordinance for that purpose was introduced but failed to pass. A. then applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal corporation to open such street. The court held that the objection that the discretion of the board of aldermen could not be controlled by mandamus was a formidable one, but that it might not be fatal, and that as the question should be put in form to permit of a decision in the court of last resort, an alter- native writ of mandamus should be awarded.^ In jurisdictions which take a similar view of the rights of the owner of realty which has been assessed to pay for improving a street in which the public has neither a fee nor an easement it has been held that under such circumstances the fact that the owner of the realty on which the street is situated has dedicated it to the public after the assessment is levied does not make such assess- ment valid.* In other jurisdictions it is held that if the munici- pal corporation has power to appropriate the land on which the street is constructed by subsequent proceedings in eminent do- main, an assessment for a street improvement is valid though the public has neither a fee nor an easement in the land on which such street is situated. ° Thus, where a street embankment was ' Barnert v. Board of Aldermen of of Toledo for the Use of Horan v. the City of Paterson, 69 N. J. L. Barnes, 1 Ohio N. P. 187 [1894]. (40 Vr.) 122, 54 Atl. 227 [1903]. "Allen v. City of Chicago, 176 111. "Spaulding v. Wesson, 115 Cal. 113, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]; Royal In- 441;, 47 Pac. 249 [1896]; contra City surance Company v. South Park 396 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 608 sloped so as to extend 'over upon private ground, it was held that an assessment for the improvement of the street was not in- validated by such use of private property, since there was a means provided by law by which sueh easement could be acquired by proceedings in eminent domain.^" The earlier Illinois cases appear to recognize the doctrine that a public improvement like a street cannot be constructed on private property,^^ even in cases where such objection could no^be raised; as where the ob- jection was made on application for judgment on the special as- sessment, and it was held that it should have been made before the Commiaaloners, 175 111. 491, 51 N. E. 558 [1898]; Bass v. South Park Cominiasioners, 171 111. 370, 49 . N. E. 549 [1898]; People ex rel. Koch- ersperger v. Sass, 171 111. 357, 49 N. E. 501 [1898]; (overruling con- trary observations in Boynton v. People ex rel. Kern, 159 111. 553, 42 N. E. 842 [1896]; and disapproving the language used in Lehmer v. People ex rel. Miller, SO III. 601 [1875]); Jones v. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. H. 688 [1894]; Uoodwillie v. City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]; Leman v. City of Lake View, 131 111. 388, 23 N. E. 346 [1890]; Hunerberg v. Vil- lage of Hyde Park, 130 111. 156, 22 N. E. 486 [1890]; Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889] ; Moore v. City of Al- bany, 98 N. Y. 396 [1885]; (dis- tinguishing In the Matter of the Pe- tition of Cheesebrough to Vacate an Assessment, 78 N. Y. 232 [1879]; and In the Matter of the Petition of Rhinelander, to Vacate an Assess- ment, 68 N. Y.. .105 [1877] ; which were cases holding that an assess- ment could not be levied for a sewer on private land, as being eases de- cided under a statute which gave no means for the public to acnuire title thereafter.) In Beck v. Hol- land, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pac. 410 [1903] it was said that an abutting property owner who claims no inter- est in the land used as an alley can- not resist an assessment for open- ing such alley on the ground- that the land does not belong to the city. There was neither discussion nor ci- tation of authorities on this point and it does not appear whether the objection went to the jurisdiction of the court in eminent domain or not. " Moore v. City of Albany,' 98 N. Y. 396 [1885]. Furthermore in this case such an embankment was held to be a benefit to the abutting prop- erty owners since they would un- doubtedly wish to grade their lots to the level of the street, and this em- bankment would save them that amount of grading and filling. A similar question was presented in Dixon V. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio C. C. 629, 5 Ohio C. D. 301 [1894], but was not specifically passed on by the court. It appeared, however, that the owners of the property oc- cupied by the sloping embankment were willing to accept damages for such use of their property with- out formal condemnation proceedings. The objection of the property own- ers was to the inclusion of such dam- ages in the amount of the assess- ment. The court held that such in- clusion was prouer as the c"st of a retaiTiini? wall which would otherwise have been necessary would have been much greater. '^Facan v. City of Chicaffo, 84 111. 227 [1876]; Lehmer v. People ex rel. Miller, 80 111. 601 [1875]. 609 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 396 assessment was eonfirmed." So it was held that the owner who was assessed for benefits for opening a street could not interpose the objection that he had been allowed to keep one and ninety- five one-hundredths of a foot of land in the line of such street, since if there was any wrong done it was to his advantage. '^ The later cases have repudiated this doctrine however/* and it is held that it cannot be interposed as a defense even at confirmation that the municipal corporation had not acquired title to the land to be used as a street.^'' The modern Illinois doctrine seems to be that if the power of eminent domain exists, whereby the public may acquire either a fee or an easement in the property to be improved if it wishes to acquire it, an assessment may be levied be- fore such public right may be acquired. ^° This court has said that if there is any probability that the municipal corporation would not acquire title to the street, a court of equity would en- join the proceeding until the title is acquired.^' If the law does not provide a valid method of appropriating land for public use as a street, an assessment for such street improvement is invalid.^' Such an assessment is said to be invalid because "there is no pro- vision that the street or way shall ever be made a public way, or that any use of it shall ever be secured to the person who is com- pelled to contribute to its construction."^" Thus when the stat- ute in force gave no means of assessing damages to the owners of land taken for public use, an assessment ordinance for damages •^Lehmer v. People ex rel. Miller, Commissioners, 175 111. «491, 51 N. 80 111.601 [1875]. E. 558 [1898]; Burhans v. Village i=Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 of Norwood Park, 138 111. 147, 27 111. 227 [1876]. N. E. 1088 [1892]; Leman v. City "People ex rel. Kochersperger v. of Lake View, 131 111. 388, 23 N. E. Sass, 171 111. 357, 49 N. E. 501 346 [1890]; Hunerberg v. Village of ■ [iSaSJ disapproving the language Hyde Park, 130 111. 156, 22 N. E. used in Lehmer V. People ex rel. Mil- 486 [1890]; Holmes v. Village of ler, 80 111. 601 [1875] as far as it Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. intimates that such defense might be 540 [1889]. interposed at confirmation, and over- "Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park, ruling the language used in Boynton 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889]; V. People, ex rel. Kerji, 159 111. 553, To the same effect see Goodwillie v. 42 N. E. 842 [1896]. City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 27 "Holmes v. Villase of Hyde Park, N. E. 15 [1892]. 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889]; "Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. (1 (following Village of Hvde Park v. All.) 150 [1861]; State, Kerrigan, Borden, 94 111. 26 [1879]). Pros. v. Township of West Hobo- "Allen v. City of Chicaoro, 176 ken, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 77 [1874]. 111. 113, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]; Royal "Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. (1 Insurance Company v. South Park All.) 150, 159 [1861]. § 397 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 610 and benefits based on such law was passed. It was held that as the provision for assessing damages was without authority, the assessment of benefits was also invalid.'"' § 397. Improvement of toll road. If a toll road or part thereof is taken into the city, a statute which authorizes such municipal corporation to improve such road and to assess the cost of such improvement upon the property especially benefited thereby is upheld as valid, since the owners of such property have a right to use such street and the benefit of such improvement cannot be denied to them.^ The right to levy such assessment exists even though it may be doubtful whether as against the toll road company the city had a right to make suQh improvement. If the improvement is in fact made, whether right- fully or not, the owners who receive the benefit thereof must pay the assessment for such benefits, and cannot set up the violation of the rights of the toll road company as a defense.^ Thus where it was doubted whether the power to change the grade existed it was held that the power to pave undoubtedly existed, and such grading as was merely incidental to paving could be made at the expense of the property benefited.^ A statute authorizing a municipal corporation to assess a plank road company for im- proving the land on which such road is located has been upheld.* The cases denying or doubting the right to levy such assessment do so on the ground that the statute controlling in such cases does not provide for such assessment.^ Upon this ground assessments - =" State, Kerrigan, Pros. v. Town- Mayor, etc., of the City of New sliip of West Hoboken, 37 N. J. L. Brunswick, 30 N. j. l. (x Vr.) 395 '■■18. Yt.) 77 [1874]. [1863]. •Huelfeld v. Covington, — (Ky.) 'State, Parker, Pros. v. City of "-^ , 60 S. W. 296 [1901]; Bagg v. New Brunswick, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) Detroit, ,5 Micli. 336 [1858]; State, 548 [1867]. Parker, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of the 'People. of the State of New York City of New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L. ex rel. Cayadutta Plank Road Com- (1 Vr.) 395 [1863]; State, Town- pany v. Cummings, 166 N. Y. 110, send. Pros. v. Mayor and Common 59 N. E. 703 [1901]. Council of Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 'Philadelphia to use v. Gowen, (2 Dutch.) 444 [1867]; See also 202 Pa. St. 453, 52 Atl. 3 [1902];' McHenry v. Salvage, 99 Ky. 232, 35 Breed v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. S. W. 645. St. (4 Norris) 214 [1877]; Wilson V. City of Detroit, 5 Mich. v. Allegheny City, 79 Pa. St. (29 P. 336 [1858]; State, Parker, Pros. v. F. Smith) 272 [1875]. 611 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §§ 398, 399 for grading " or widening ' a private toll road, which the city has not sought to condemn and in which it has not acquired an easement, have been held invalid. It has been held that a city may improve a plank road and assess the road company for the benefits thus conferred.' § 398. Appropriation by mistake. If the city has made no attempt as a public corporation to ap- propriate land for use as a street, but its officials have made a gen- uine mistake concerning the location of the boundary line and under such mistake have encroached upon A.'s land, A. cannot on account of such encroachment enjoin an assessment for such improvement nor can he otherwise resist such assessment. His sole remedy is an action for damages.^ § 399. Location of sidewalks and roads. Other applications of the general principles already discussed are found in eases of other public improvements like streets in their general nature. If a sidewalk has been laid on A.'s private property and no formal or regular steps are taken by the public corporation to acquire title thereto. A. cannot be excluded by any person from the enjoyment of such improvement and his property is therefore benefited thereby, and is accordingly liable to local assessment.^ Conversely the fact that A. has constructed his build- ing over the line of his property so that the sidewalk cannot be constructed of the width specified in the ordinance does not in- validate the assessment.^ No assessment can be levied for im- proving as a public road a strip of land in which the public has not acquired any title.' ° Wilson V. Allegheny City, 79 Pa. Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N. Y. St. (29 P. F. Smith) 272 [1875]. 396 [1885]. ' Breed v. City of Alleg:heny, 85 ' Boynton v. People ex rel. Kern, Pa. St. (4 Norris) 214 [1877]. 159 111. 553, 42 N. E. 842 [1896]; 'People ex rel. Cayadutta Plank City of Indianapolis v. Gilmore, 30 Road Co. V. Ciunmings, 166 N. Y. Ind. 414 [1868]. 110, 59 N. Ji. 703 [1901]. ^Hyman v. City of Chicago, 188 'Dixon V. City of Cincinnati, 11 111. 462, 59 N. E. 10 [1900]. Ohio C. C. 629, 5 Ohio C. D. 301 'Barker v. Board of Commission- [1894]; Davis v. Silverton, 47 Or. ers of Wyandotte County, 45 Kan. 171, 82 Pac. 16 [1905]; This is es- 681, 26 Pac. 585 [1891]; Pierce v. pecially true if the city has the County Commissioners of Franklin power to acquire title by eminent do- County, 63 Me. 252 [1872]; Phil- main to the property so occupied. brook v. Inhabitants of the County § 400 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 612 § 400. Location of sewers. If a sewer is constructed over private property under such eir- eumstanees that the owner of such private property is estopped to deny the right of the public and the abutting property owners to make use of the same, no objection can be interposed to the val- idity of the assessment on the ground that the sewer is built on private property.^ Thus if the owner of such private property knows that the sewer is being bui* on his property as a public sewer, and if he makes no objection thereto ^ or acquiesces there- in, ' or consents thereto, * he is estopped from denying the right of the public to use such sewer and no objection to an assessment can be interposed on the ground that the sewer is constructed on private property. If a sewer is built through private property un- der a contract with the owner thereof, by which he is bound to permit such public use to continue, no objection to such assess- ment can be interposed on the ground that the sewer is situated on private property.' If, however, the contract merely provides for the laying and maintenance of such sewer, and does not pro- vide that adjoining property owners may have the right to con- nect with such sewer upon such private property, no assessment therefor can be levied upon property which cannot be connected with such sewer except across such private property.* If a sewer is constructed which runs in whole or in part through private prop- erty, the question of the validity of a local assessment for the of Kennebec, 17 Me. 196 [1840]; ^Village of Hyde Park v. Borden, Copcutt V. City of Yonkers, 59 Hun. 94 111. 26 [1879]; In the Matter of (N. Y.) 212, 13 N. Y. Supp. 452 the Petition of McGown to Vacate [1891]. The question involved in an Assessment, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 434 the above cases are, however, largely [1879]. statutory, depending on the power of ' Wilson v. City of . Cincinnati, 5 the legislature to levy assessments Ohio N. P. 68 [1897]. under statutes authorizing improve- 'City of St. Joseph to the Use of ments on "public roads," or on "coun- the Saxton National Bank v. Landis, ty roads." 54 Mo. App. 315 [1893]. 'Village of Hyde Park v. Borden, "Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, 94 111. 26 [1879]; City of St. Joseph 147 Cal. 668, 82 Pac. 334 [1905]; to the Use of the Saxton National Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. Bank v. Landis, 54 Mo. App. 315 372, 1 N. E. 711 [1885]; City of St. [1893]; In the Matter of the Peti- Joseph to the Use of the Saxton tion of McGown to Vacate an Assess- National Bank v. Landis, 54 Mo ment, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 434 [1879]; App. 315 [1893]. Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 5 "State ex rel. McKune v. District Ohio N. P. 68 [1897 J. Court of Ramsey County, 90 Minn 540, 97 N. W. 425 [1903] 613 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §400 cost of such sewer is determined by the general considerations al- ready discussed. If the municipal corporation has in any way acquired the right to lay and maintain the sewer upon the pri- vate property on which it has in fact been laid, and, if necessary, the right to authorize abutting property owners to make connec- tions therewith on such private property, the authorities are prac- tically unanimous in holding that the fact that such sewer is lo- cated upon private property is no objection to an assessment therefor. If the sewer is laid in realty dedicated to the public for a street, such dedication renders such land subject to be appro- priated for any or all of the uses to which public streets are de- voted to meet the wants and convenience of the general public. Among these uses is included the laying of sewers in public streets.'' Accordingly if a sewer is laid in a public street neither the public nor the abutting property owners can be prevented by the former owner of such realty from making use of such sewer; and an assessment may be levied for the cost of such sewer.' Accordingly if the owner of land conveys a part of it reserving a right of way for owners of other lots along a platted street which has never been opened by the city, and permits the public to use such street as a highway, such acts amount to a dedication to public use, and the city may lay a sewer in such street and levy an assessment therefor.' So if land has been dedicated by parol dedication for use as a sewer, the city may lay a sewer therein and levy an assessment therefor, even if the city has made an in- effectual attempt to appropriate such land by eminent domain.^" So if a sewer is ordered in a private way, but before the sewer is built such private way is dedicated as a street, an assessment for such sewer cannot be resisted on the ground that the sewer as originally ordered was situated in a private way.^^ If the muni- cipal corporation or other public corporation has not acquired the right to lay and maintain a sewer upon the private property upon which it has in fact been laid, we find as in eases of other im- ' Warren v. City of Grand Haven, Streets, 4 Hun. (N. Y.) 495 [1875]; 30 Mich. 24 [1874]. (affirmed In the Matter of the Peti- »Cone V. City of Hartford, 28 tion of Ingraham to Vacate an As- Conn. 363 [1859]; Warren v. City sessment, 64 N. Y. 310 [1876]). of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]. "Creamer v. Allen, 3 Mo. App. »In the Matter of the Petition of 545 [1877]. Ins;ra.»iam to Vacate an Assessment "-Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, 8 on Eighty-eighth and Ninety-first Atl. 692 [1887]. § 400 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 614 provements, some conflict of authority." In some jurisdictions it is held that local assessments cannot, under such circumstances, be levied for the expense of constructing the sewer,'' and a statute which authorizes an assessment for such an improvement has been held to be invalid." In some of these cases the possibility of ac- quiring a public easement for the sewer by subsequent proceedings in eminent domain is not referred to.^^ The validity of such assessment has been denied even ^here the owner of the land taken has subsequently sued for damages for the taking of his land, and recovered them.'" The presumption, however, is that the city has acquired a right to make use of such land for sewer purposes ; and the party resisting such assessment must show af- firmatively that the city has not acquired such right." If a part of the sewer runs through A.'s land which has been regu- larly taken for sewer purposes by proceedings in eminent 'domain, and part of it runs through A.'s land which has not been so taken, it has been held that an assessment may be levied on A.'s land for that part of the sewer running through the land which has been regularly condemned, since no one can keep A. from using the sewer, but that an assessment cannot be levied for that part of the sewer which runs through land not condemned.*' Where the city made a mistake in pointing out to the contractor the lines of the street so that the sewer is constructed in part on private property, it has been held that the owners of land drained by such ■ sewer must pay for at least so much thereof as is in the public street. In such a case it is possible to rebuild, in the street, that part of the sewer outside of the street lines, and thus the use of such improvement can be secured to the owners of land drained "iSee § 393, § 396. "Holliday v. City of Atlanta, 96 "Holliday v. City of Atlanta, 96 Ga. 377, 23 S. E. 406 [1895]; Fur- Ga. 377, 23 S. E. 406 [1895] ; State thermore in this case a curative ex rel. MeKune v. District Court of statute had been passed subsequent- Ramsey County, 90 Minn. 540, 97 ly authorizing such re-assesament. N. W. 425 [1903]; Anderson v. Such statute was, however, held un- Lower Merion Township, 217 Pa. constitutional. See Ch. XVII. St. 369, 66 Atl. 1115 [1907]. " Cline v. People ex rel. Barlow, "Anderson v. Lower Merion Town- 224 111. 360, 79 N. E. 663 [1906] ship, 217 Pa. 369, 66 Atl. 1115 "Miller v. Anheuser, 2 Mo App [1907]. 168 [1876]. The latter part of this "State ex rel. McKune v. District holding depends in part on the stat- Court of Eamsey County, 90 Minn. ute under which such assessment 540, 97 N. W. 425 [1903]. was levied, and does not involve the constitutional question directly. 615 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. ■§ 400 thereby." If the location of the private property through which the sevrer runs is such that A. cannot make use of such sewer without trespassing on such private land, A. may resist an assess- ment therefor, even if the city has an easement to maintain the sewer.-" This, however, involves not the nature of the improve- ment but the benefit to the land assessed and is discussed else- where.''^ In some jurisdictions it is held that if a sewer is laid in private property and if under the law it is possible to acquire a public easement in such property by subsequent proceedings in eminent domain, the fact that the sewer is laid in private property is no defense to an assessment therefor, since the easement may be acquired as well before making the improvement as after; and it will be presumed that the public corporation will do its duty, while ordinarily means will exist for compelling it to do its duty." Still, even in jurisdictions taking this view, there is some authority for holding that if the municipal corporation secures confirmation of the assessment by means of an agreement to condemn, and sub- sequently, after the objections of the property owners have been withdrawn and a confirmation has been had, the city repeals the ordinance to condemn the property and dismisses its proceedings for that purpose, the property owners may have the confirmation set aside. "^ If, however, there is no way provided for by law by which the land on which the sewer has been constructed can be taken in eminent domain, it is evident that the public and the owners of land which such sewer is intended to drain are at the mercy of the owner of the land on which the sewer has been constructed. No use of it can be had unless his consent is in some way obtained. Accordingly it is held that in contemplation of the law, the owners of land to be drained by such sewer receive no benefit from such improvement and accordingly local assessments "Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, Borden, 94 111. 26 [1879]; State, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]. Vanderbeck, Pros. v. Mayor and ™ State ex rel. McKune v. District Common Council of Jersey City, 29 Court of Ramsey County, 90 Minn. N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 441 [1861]. 540, 97 N. W. 425 [1903]; contra "^ Dempster v. City of Chicago, 175 Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 111. 278, 51 N. E. 710 [1898]; But S. W. 163 [1901]. see for the theory that the remedy "See § 563. of the property owner is to pay tlie '^Maywood Co. v. Village of May- assessment and bring suit to compel wood, 140 111. 216, 29 N. E. 704 the city to proceed with the coh- [18f)3]; Holmes v. Village of Hyde demnation proceedings, § 393, N. 11; Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 § 1468 et seq. [1889]; Village of Hyde Park v. § 401 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 616 cannot be levied therefor.^* This view has been taken where the land through which the drain is constructed is the land sought to be assessed."' In Rhode Island it has been held that if a sewer is constructed in a private road, not regularly laid out as a street, nor dedicated by the owner and accepted by the public, no assess- ment can be levied therefor, even if such land is subsequently laid out as a street.^" This holding, however, is based on the local statute under which such assessment was levied, which authorized assessments for sewers "made in any of the streets." § 401. Sewer without outlet. If an outlet to the sewer has not in fact been obtained, but if under the law such outlet can be obtained, as by proceedings in eminent domain,^ it has been held that an assessment for the con- struction of a sewer is valid, though the outlet therefor is still to be obtained across private property," or along a highway out- side of the limits of the village ' Thus where a company had filled a river and thus reclaimed land it was held that an assess- ment could be levied for a sewer to pass through such reclaimed land to secure an outlet since if the company had a right to make such accretion there was "ample power in the city to open a way to the rivei*. "* If the ordinance provides a sufficient outlet on its face, objections to the sufficiency of such outlet do not affect =*In the Matter of the Petition of "In the Matter of One Hundred Cheesbrough to Vacate an Assess- Twenty-Seventh Street, 46 How. (N. ment, 78 N. Y. 232 [1879]; In the Y.) 60 1 1878 J. Hhis, however, de- Matter of the Petition of Rhine- pends in part upon statutory con- lander to Vacate an Assessment, 68 struction. N. Y. 105 [1877]; While the court ^Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, In the Matter of the Petition of In- 8 Atl. 692 [1887]. graham to Vacate an Assessment, 64 'See §§ 393, 400. N. Y. 310 [1876] at first observed "Harney v. Benson, 113 Cal. 314, that one property owner could not 45 Pac. 687 [1896]; Payne v. Vil- complain of trespass to another in lage of South Springfield, 161 Ind. laying a sewer on the land of such 285, 44 N. E. 105 [1896]; South other, it finally held on application Highland Land & Improvement Com- for a rehearing that the question of pany v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523, the validity of the assessment would 72 S. W. 944 [1902]. depend on the question whether the ' Cochran v. Village of Park Roads, land had been dedicated for a street 138 111. 295, 27 N. E. 939 [1893]. or not ; and if not, whether the * South Highland Land & Improve- owner of the property had assented ment Company v. Kansas City, 172 to the laying of the sewer on his Mo. 523, 72 S. W. 944 [1902]! land. 617 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §401 the validity of the ordinance." So if an outlet is in the form of another sewer with which connection is to be made, the assess- ment is not invalid because such sewer has not as yet been con- structed.' If an ordinance provides for the outlet of a sewer "at the north branch of the Chicago river, ' ' it will be assumed that the real bed of the stream is intended even if by another ordinance the "north branch" of such river is fixed at a point some four hun- dred feet east of its actual location.' It has, however, been inti- mated that the assessment, while not invalid, should not be col- lected until the right to construct an outlet over private property has been secured by eminent domain or otherwise, and that pro- ceedings to assess benefits might be enjoined until such outlet is thus secured.' If the ordinance shows on its face that no outlet exists it is invalid." In other jurisdictions it has been said that if an extension to secure an outlet is contemplated when the assess- ment for the construction of the sewer was levied and if such ex- tension is in fact made, no objection to the assessment can be interposed on the ground that the outlet was not secured when the assessment was levied.^" If no method of securing an outlet exists, the sewer cannot be used without the consent of owners of private property and an assessment therefor is invalid.^^ It is essential under the laws governing some cities in Missouri that a sewer be so constructed as to have an outlet either into a public sewer, district sewer or natural drainage.^" Such connection may be through an intermediate sewer over which the city has control,^' •Bickerdike V. City of Chicago, 185 "Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 [1900]. 21 S. W. 800 [1892J; City of Kan- ' Kyder's Kstate v. City of Alton, sas City to the Use of the Frear 175 111. 94, 51 N. E. 821 [1898]. Stone & Pipe Manufacturing Com- ' Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, pany v. Swope, 79 Mo. 446 [1883 J; 185 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 [1900]. City of St. Joseph ex rel. Danaher 'Burhans v. Village of Norwood v. Dillon, 61 Mo. App. 317 [1895]; Park, 138 111. 147, 27 N. E. 1088 City of St. Joseph ex rel. Danaher [1892]., V. Wilshire, 47 Mo. App. 125 [1891]; •Gage V. City of Chicago, 191 111. Bayha v. Taylor, 36 Mo. App. 427 210, 60 N. E. 896. ' [1889]; Kansas City v. Ratekin, 30 "Wilson V. City of Cincinnati, 5 Mo. App. 416. Ohio N. P. 68, 9 Low. Dec. (Ohio) '? Eyerman v. Blakesley, 78 Mo. 145 242 [1897]. [1883]; (aifirming Eyermann v. "In the Matter of the Petition of Blakesley, 9 Mo. App. 231 [1880 J) ; Braincrd to Vacate an Assessment Heman v, Payne, 27 Mo. App. 481 for Sewers in Tenth Avenue, 51 [1887]. Hun. (N. Y.) 380; 3 N. Y. Supp. 889 [1889]. §.§ 402, 403 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 618 even if it has not been established by ordinance/* Such require- ment is made by statute in that state and the question, therefore, turns on the construction of such statutes and will be considered elsewhere in detail.^' § 402. Outlet in stream. If a sewer has an outlet in a stream, lake or river, the water of which is polluted by the sewage thtis discharged into it, in viola- tion of statute, it has been held that such fact does not prevent an assessment from being levied for the construction of such sewer,* at least if the outlet is in fact used for the discharge of sewage. This holding has been placed on the theory that such statute pro- vides against pollution of streams but does not prevent such dis- posal of sewage unless it is in fact pollution.^ An assessment has been upheld where it was shown that the discharge of sewage into a stream might be a nuisance but there was no evidence to show that the discharge was in fact a nuisance, nor was it shown that the owners of land through which the stream ran had not consented to such use.* Accordingly a city ordinance which provides for discharging sewage into Lake Michigan has been said not to be so far against public policy as to be void.* § 403. Location of drains and ditches. The applicoition of these general principles to drains and ditches is substantially the same as their application in case of sewers. A drain may be located in a public street, since this purpose is one for which it inust be considered that land is taken when acquired for purposes of a street.* If land has been appropri- ated for a drain by proceedings in eminent domain, mere irregu- larities not aflfeeting the jurisdiction of the court to enter a judg- ment appropriating such land can defeat an assessment for such drain.^ If land has been conveyed as a right of way for a ditch "Akers v. Kolkmeyer & Company, * Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 97 Mo. App. 520, 71 S. W. 536 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]. [1902]. 'Steele v. Village of River Forest, "See §§ 444-448. 141 111. 302, 30 N. E. 1034 [1893]. 1 Glene£.y v. Norwood, 137 Fed. 962 " Laverty v. State ex rel. Hill, 109 [1905]; Walker v. City of Aurora, Ind. 217, 9 N. E. 774 [1886]- Lau- 140 111. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]. bach v. O'Meara, 107 Mich. 29, 64 = Walker v. City of Aurora, 140 iN. W. 865 [1895]. A ditterent rule 111. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]. of course, applies in direct attack 'Cone V. City of Hartford, 28 upon the proceedings in eminent do- Conn. 363 [1859]. main. See Scott v. Brackett 89 619 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 404 and such deeds are defective in form, but are sufficient to pass an equitable title, at least in connection with the fact that the county has taken possession of such land and has constructed such drain, such defect is not a sufficient ground for resisting an assessment for the cost of such diteh.^ On the other hand if a drain is lo- cated on private land, and there is no method provided under the law for acquiring an interest in such land by proceedings in emi- nent domain, no assessment can be levied for such an improve- ment.* A revocable license from the owner of the land, permitting the public to make temporary use of such drain is insufficient to make an assessment therefor valid.' If a method of securing a permanent right of way for a drain by proceedings in eminent domain exists, an asessment may be levied for a drain over private land." § 404. Locaition of other improvements. An assessment cannot be levied for the cost of constructing a bridge which is in part situated on private property, if the owner of such property will be able to prevent the public and the owners or occupants of the property assessed for such improvement from using it.^ However in some jurisdictions, if the public can ac- quire an interest in the realty on which the improvement is located, by means of proceedings in eminent domain, without the consent of the owner of such property a local assessment may be levied for a bridge constructed on such private property.^ Like considera- tions apply in case of an assessment to pay for an improvement Ind. 413, as distinguished in Laverty ' Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378 V. State ex rel. Hill, 109 Ind. 217, 9 [1879]. X. E. 774 [1886]. "Iroquois and Crescent Drainage 'Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. District No. 1 v. Harroun, 222 III. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]. 489, 78 N. E. 780 [1906]; Moore v. * People on the Relation of Butler City of Albany, 98 N. Y. 396 [1885]. V. Board of Supervisors of Saginaw ' Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham, County, 26 Mich. 22 [1872]; In the .54 Cal. 558 [1880]. A tax cannot be Matter of the Petition, of Cheesebor- levied for the cost of a bridge sit- ough to Vacate an Assessment, 78 uated in vphat is not a legal high- N. Y. 232 [1879] ; Olmsted v. Den- way: Manning v. City of Devil's nis, 77 N. Y. 378 [1879]; People Lake, 13 N. D. 47, 112 Am. St. Rep. ex rel. Williams v. Haines, 49 N. Y. 652, 99 N. W. 51 [1904]. 587 [1872]; In the Matter of the = People, etc., ex rel. Butts v. Com- petition, Church Wardens and Ves. mon Council of the City of Roches- trymen of the Church of Holy Sepul- ter, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 142 [1871]. cher to Vacate an Assessment, 61 How. (N. Y.) 315 [1880]. §405 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 620 which is intended to promote and facilitate navigation. Thus, an improvement of Lake Minnetonka was provided for by statute. The waters of this lake varied in height from time to time with a variation of six feet between the two extremes, and the proposed improvement was designed to keep the water of the lake at a uniform and steady level intermediate between the two extremes No provision was made for compensating the owners of land which, as matters stood were covered with water a part of the time only, but which after the improvement was constructed would be sub- merged all the time; and it was held that since no compensation was provided for, there was no way of acquiring the right to flood their lands ; and that therefore since the benefit of such improve- ment eould not be secured to the adjoining property owners, no assessment could be levied.* § 405. Presumption of validity of public acts. If an assessment is resisted on the ground that the improvement is on private land, the ordinary presumption that public officials are performing their duty and acting in compliance with the law ' applies, and it will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the public has an estate or easement in the realty upon which the improvement is situate sufficient to protect the rights of the public and to secure to them the use of such improve- ment irrespective of the wishes of private individuals.^ Accord- ingly the burden of proof is upon the person who resists the assess- ment and claims that the improvement is on private ground.' Thus it' it is shown that a sewer is located in a street and that the 'In re Minnetonka Lake Improve- 224 111. 360, 79 N. E. 663 [1906]; ment, Carpenter v. Hoard of County Royal Insurance Company v. South Com'rs. of Hennepin County, 50 Park Commissioner!?, 175 111. 491, 51 Minn. 513, 45 Am. St. Rep. 494, 58 N. E. 558 [1898]; Bass v. South N. W. 295 [1894]. Park Commissioners, 171 111. 370, 49 •Kee § 1279. N. E. 549 [1898J ; Prescott v. City of ^Cline V. People ex rel. Barlow, Chicago, 60 III. 121 [1871]- Jack- 224 111. 360, 79 N. E. 663 [1906]; son v. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, 22 N. E. Aldis V. South Park Commissioners, 431 [1889]; Lewis v Alhertson 23 171 111. 424, 49 N. E. 565 [1898]; Ind. App. 147, 53 N. E. 1071 {1899]- Prescott V. City of Chicago, 60 HI. Dashiell v. Mayor and City Council 121 [1871]; State, Society for Es- of Baltimore, Use of Hax 45 Md 615 tablishing Useful Manufactures, [1876] ; State, Society fo'r Establish- Pros. V. City of Paterson, 40 N. J. ing Useful Manufactures Pros v L. (11 Vr.) 250 [1878]. City of Paterson, 40 N. J. L '(11 •Cline V. People ex rel. Barlow, Vr.) 250 [1878]. 621 WHEN ASSESSJiENTS MAY BE IiEVIED. ■§■§ 406, 407 city has acquired title to but one lateral half of the street it will be assumed in the absence of proof that the sewer was located in the city's half of such street.* The fact that a plan of the sewer shows its course across a tract of land which constitutes a subdivi- sion and is platted into lots is not enough to show that the oitjrhas not acquired the right to use such property for a sewer.^ G.— TIME OF MAKING IMPROVEMENTS WITH REFERENCE TO ASSESSMENT. § 406. Assessments for pre-existing improvements — General nature. Whether an assessment can be levied for an improvement which was constructed before such assessment was levied is a question which has received some consideration from the courts, but upon which there is an unfortunate lack of harmony. The questions involved are in part constitutional questions involving the power of the legislature to levy assessments or to authorize public corpor- ations to levy them, and in part, statutory questions involving the power of the public corporation as determined by the construction of the statutes conferring such power. These questions will be considered in detail. §407. Assessments for pre-existing improvements held valid. Statutes in some jurisdictions, provide that assessments may be levied for the cost of pre-existing public improvements which have been already constructed under circumstances such that, but for the particular statute under discussion, no assessment could be levied for such improvement. Whether the legislature has power to authorize an assessment for an improvement constructed be- fore the public corporation decided to pay for it by assessment, the benefits of which have already been received and enjoyed by the property to be assessed, is a question upon which there is com- paratively little authority. When the question has been pre- sented for decision some courts have held that in the absence of some specific constitutional provision the legislature has the power 'In the matter of the Petition of on Eighty-Eighth and Ninety-First Ingraham to Vacate an Assessment, Streets, 4 Hun. (N. Y.) 495 [1875]). 64 N. Y. 310 [1876]; (affirming ' " Cline v. People ex rel. Barlow, In the matter of the Petition of 224 111. 360, 79 N. E. 663 [1906]. Ingraham to Vacate an Assessment § 408 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 622 to authorize local assessments for such public improvements/ An analogy to this rule is to be found in the principle that a general tax may be levied to pay q pre-existing debt of the public corpora- tion levying such tax. The power to levy local assessments is or- dinarily regarded as a branch of the taxing power '' and governed by many of the principles that control ordinary taxation. Another and closer analogy is to be found i%the power of the legislature to authorize re-assessments if for any reason the original assess- ment proves invalid.^ Both of these analogies have been pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States. "The principles of taxation are not those of contract. A special assessment may be levied upon an executed consideration, that is to say for a public work already done. If this were not so it might be hard to justify re-assessments. ' ' * § 408. Statutes authorizing assessments for improvements made when no statutory authority for assessment exists. Improvements are sometimes made when there is no statutory authority for levying local assessments therefor, and when accord- ingly no assessment can be levied.^ Subsequently the legislature has passed a statute authorizing an assessment for improvements of this sort, and either the terms of such statute are broad enough 'City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 6>25) ; In the Matter of the Petition U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ; of Roberts to Vacate an Assesament, Lombard v. West Chicago Park 81 N. Y. 62 [1880]; In the Matter Commissioners, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. of the Confirmation of the Report of 731, 21 S. 507 [1901]; (affirming the Commissioners of Assessment for Cummings v. West Chicago Park Grading, Paving and Otherwise Im- Commissioners, 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. proving Sackett, Douglas and De 941 [1899]); Boul v. The People ex Graw Streets in the Gity of Brooklyn, rel. Baker, 127 111. 240, 20 N. E. 74 N. Y. 95 [1878]; In re Hollister, 1 [1890] ; Warren v. Street Commis- 98 App. Div. 501, 89 N. Y. Supp. sioners of the City of Boston, 187 518 [1904]; (affirmed in 180 N. Y. Mass. 290, 72 N. E. 1022 [1905]; 518, 72 N. E. 1143); Wetmore v. Hall v. Street Commissioners of Bos- Campbell, 4 N. Y. Sup. 341 [1849]; ton, 177 Mass. 434, 59 N. E. 68 Doughty v. Hope, 3 Den. (N. Y.) [1901]; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 249 [1846]; Bellows v. Weeks, 41 652 [I860]; Williams v. Cammack, Vt. 590; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578 [1872]. [1854]; Howard Savings Institution "See § 8; § 89. v. Mayor and Common Council of "Wee Chapter XVII City of Newark, 52 N. J. L. (23 Vr.)^ 'Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U S 1, 18 Atl. 672 [1889]; Matter of 351, 359, 49 L. 232 25 8 44 ri904l" CuUen, 119 N. Y. 628, 23 N. E. 1144; ^See Chapter VI ' § 775 (affirming S3 Hun. 534, 6 N. Y. S. ' ' 623 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. 408 to include improvements already made, or by express terms they include such pre-existing improvements. The power of the leg- islature to impose upon the owners of property benefited by such improvement a burden which up to the time of the passage of such statute devolved upon the entire community has been recognized in some jurisdictions.'' The courts which take this view do so on the theory already stated, that the principles of assessment are not those of contract, and that an assessment may be levied for an executed consideration. This view was expressed in a case in which planking was laid down at a time when under the law it was to be paid for by general taxation. A subsequent statute authorized the levy of assessments to pay for such improvements, and assessments were thereupon levied. The Supreme Court of the United States held that such statute and assessment were valid, pointing out that while it was doubtful if the planking was origin- ally authorized, the improvement had been adopted by the city and presumably paid for.^ So it has been held that the legisla- ^iCity of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ; Aleorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 [I860]; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508 [1854]; Zahn V. Borough of Rutherford, 72 N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 446, 60 Atl. 1123 [1905]; Brown v. Town of Union, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 601, 48 Atl. 562 [19001; .City of Elizabeth v. State, Meker, Pros., 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 157 [1883]; In the Matter of the Confirmation of the Report of the Commissioners of Assessment for Grading, Paving and Otherwise Im- proving Sackett, Douglass and De Graw Streets in the City of Brook- lyn, 74 N. Y. 95 [1878] ; Howell v. City of Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267; Mat- ter of Van Antwerp, 1 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 423; Butler v. City of Toledo, 5 0. S. 225 [1855]; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50 [1880]. Ihe validity of such legislation has been recognized where the specific assessment is not within the terms of the statute; Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dee. 205 [1869]. 'City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 11904J. Upon .this question the court said: "The answer to the other objections may be made in a few words. If, as said, planking was not authorized under the word 'side- walks' in Ordinance No. 1285, the city has done or adopted the work and presumably has paid for it. At the end the benefit was there, on the ground, at the city's expense. The principles of taxation are not those of contract. A special assessment may be levied upon an executed con- sideration, that is to say, for a pub- lic work already done. Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vermont 590, 599, 600; Mills v. Charleton, 9 Am. Rep. 578 29 Wisconsin, 400, 413 [1872]; Hall v. Street Commissioners, 177 Massa- chusetts 434, 439. If this were not so it might be hard to justify re-as' sessments. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 293, 19 S. 187, 43 L. 443 [1898]; Williams v. Supervisors of Albany, 122 U. S. 154, 30 L. 1088, 7 S. 1244; Frederick v. City of Seat- tle, 13 Washington 428, 43 Pac. 364 [1896]; Cline v. City of Seattle, 13 Washington 444, 43 Pac. 367 [1896]; Bacon v. City of Seattle, 15 Wash. 1408 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 624 ture could adopt and sanction an improvement which it could have authorized in advance; and could provide for an assessment to pay therefor after the improvement was constructed.* So it has been said that a statute authorizing an assessment for. levees, and providing that part of such assessment shall be expended for levees which have already been built and shall be applied to paying such pre-existing debts is valid.^ So an assessment was levied for a street improvement, based on the preliminary estimate of the cost. Such assessment proved to be insufficient to pay the cost of such improvement. At that time there was no statutory authority for a supplementary assessment and the excess of the cost of the improvement over the amount of the assessment was to be borne by the city. After the improvement was constructed a statute was passed authorizing supplementary assessments in case of defi- ciency and applying to improvements already constructed. The court held that such statute as applying even to pre-existing im- provements was valid." So it has been held that where- a private ingtoji 701, 47 Pac. 1102; Cooley, Taxation, 3d. ed. 1280. The same answer is sufficient if it be true that when the work was done the cost of planking could not be included in the special assessment, which again de- pends on the meaning of the words •'sidewalk' and 'pave' in the old Char- ter . Sec. 8, taken with the special provision for planking in Section 7, Laws of 1S85-1886, pp. 238-241. The charge of .planking on the general taxes was not a contract with the land-owners, and no more prevented a special assessment being authorized for it later than silence of the laws at the same time as to how it should be paid for would have. In either case the legislature could do as it thought best. Of course, it does not matter that this is called a re-assess- ment. A re-assessment may be a new assessment. Whatever the leg- islature could authorize if it were or- dering an assessment for the first time it equally could authorize, not- withstanding a previous invalid at- tempt to assess. The previous at- tempt left the city free 'to take such steps as were within its power to take, either under existing statutes, or under any authority that might thereafter be conferred upon it, to make a new assessment upon the plaintiff's abutting property' in any constitutional way. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 293; McNamee V. Tacoma, 24 Washington, 591; An- nie Wright Seminary v. Tacoma, 23 Washington 109." City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 359-360, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]. * In the Matter of the Confirma- tion of the Report of the Commis- sioners of Assessment for Grading, Paving and Otherwise Improving Sackett, Douglass and D.e Graw Streets in the City of Brooklyn, 74 N. Y. 95 [1878]. 'Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 [I860]; (citing Williams v. Cam- mack, 27 Miss. 209, 61- Am. Dec. 508 [1854]). • ' Butler V. City of Toledo, 5 0. S. 225 [1855]. A complication existed in the fact that in the meantime the property had been sold to a third person. The court said: "Here the property of the complainant had reaped the benefit of a local improve- 625 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §409 sewer is constructed and is subsequently bought by a public cor- poration, assessments may be levied for the purchase price there- of.^ This may, however, be explained on the theory that the ex- tinguishing of the rights of the former owners of such sewers was a new benefit. So some courts hold that extinguishing the rights of the owners of a private toll road is a new benefit for which as- sessments may be levied.* Conversely if an improvement is be- gun to be paid for by local assessments, the legislature may by subsequent statute make such improvement a charge upon the public corporation, to be paid for out of general taxation.® § 409. Such statutes held invalid. The courts are not, however, unmnimous in upholding .such statutes. There are some jurisdictions which seem to hold that a statute authorizing a local assessment for an improvement already constructed under circumstances which did not make the adjoin- ing or abutting property liable to assessment for such improve- ment, is unconstitutional.^ If no statute authorized special assess- ments when the improvement was made, none could then have been levied. The property owners received full benefit from the con- struction of the improvement. To levy assessments at a later time, under a statute passed subsequently is to charge them for a benefit which they possess already. Accordingly in some jurisdic- ment, for the. making of which the chased his lots subject to any bur- property was originally and justly den which the state might lawfully liable to contribute. By a mistake impose, and we cannot perceive how in the preliminary estimate of cost — the vested rights of complainant are a thing of no rare occurrence, and any more impaired than are those of affording no presumption of fraud — every recent purchaser of real estate the fund first assessed proved to be in Ohio, whose estate is now yearly insufficient. It is but just that he taxed for the payment of interest should contribute ratably to supply and principal on a state debt con- the deficiency, and if he refuses, it is tracted long before his purchase." but just to compel him. Nor do we Butler v. City of Toledo, 5 0. S. see how any vested right is impaired 225, 231-233 [1855]. by the fact of his purchase inter- ' Slocum v. Selectmen of Brookllne. mediate the assessment and re-assess- 163 Mass. 23, 39' N. E. 351 [1895], ment.' He voluntarily purchased lots ' See § 412. in a young and thriving city, to the " O'Neill v. City of Hoboken, 72 ■prosperity and growth of which, as- N. J. L. (43 Vr.) 67, 60 Atl. 50 sessments for purposes of local im- [1905]. provement were absolutely essential, ^ HoUiday v. City of Atlanta, 96 and which, as a reasonable being, he Ga. 377, 23 S. E. 406 [1895]. must have anticipated. He pur- § 410 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 626 -tions it is held that such statutes are invalid as far as they apply to previous work." Thus a street v?as constructed while a stat- ute was in force which did not authorize a local assessment for the cost of the intersections. Subsequently a statute was passed authorizing a local assessment for the cost of the intersections. It was held that such statute, as far as it authorized assessments for work already done, was invalid.^ Assessments levied to pay pre- existing debts have been held invalid.* In these cases, however, the legislature had not authorized such assessments. Constitution- al questions were not involved. The view was expressed, however, that if the statute authorized the levy of assessments upon land outside of the limits of the municipality making the improvement at the time that such improvement was made, such statute would be unconstitutional.^ If an improvement has been begun, to be paid by general taxation, the city cannot subsequently levy an as- sessment therefor." § 410. Assessments for improvement under invalid contract. If the improvement was made under a contract which is in- valid and imposes no liability upon the city, or if it is made under other circumstances which leave no liability of any kind enforce- able against the city, there are authorities which hold that no assessment can thereafter be levied therefor.^ Thus it has been held that no assessment can be levied for work done two or three ^ Kelly V. Lunlng, 76 Cal. 309, 18 ° In the Matter of the Assessments Pae. 335 [1888]; District No. 110 v. of Lands in the Town of Flatbush Feck, 60 Cal. 403 [1882]; Reclama- for the Extension of Prospect Park tion District No. 3 v. Kennedy, 58 in the City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. Cal. 124 [1881]; In the Matter of 398 [1875]. Opening and Grading Market Street, 'Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 49 Cal. 546 [1875]; Gilmore v. Nor- — la. , 115 X. W. 582 [1908]. ton, 10 Kan. 491 [1872]. ' De Haven v. Berendes, 135 Cal. 'Kelly V. Luning, 76 Cal. 309, 18 178, 67 Pac. 780 [1901]; In the Mat- Pac. 335 [1888]; (citing Brady v. ter of Opening and Grading Market King, 53 Cal. 44 [1878], and People Street, 49 Cal. 546 [1875]; Dorathy of the State of California v. Lynch, v. City of Chicago, 53 111. 79 [1869]; 51 Cal. 15, 21 Am;"Rep. 677 [1875]). City of Chicago v. Rosenfeld, 24 111. •Kirst National Bank of Sterling 495 [I860]; Peck v. City of Chicago, T. Drew, 93 111. App. 630 [1900J; 22 111. 578; Pease v. City of Chicago, In the Matter of the Assessments of 21 111. 500; Gilmore v. Norton, 10 Lands in the Town of Flatbush for Kan. 491 [1872] ; Keane v. Klaus- the Extension of Prospect Park in man, 21 Mo. App. 485 [1886]; Reilly the City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 398 v. City of Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. [1875]. (10 P. F. Smith) 467 [1869]. _627 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. .§ 410 years before under an invalid contract." If improvements are made by private persons and subsequently adopted by the city, it is held that the city cannot levy assessments therefor.' In these cases, hovrever, it does not appear that the city paid for the im- provement, except voluntarily and v^ithout authority. No statu- tory authority for making such payments or levying such assess- ments seems ever to have been granted. The city might have omitted from assessment the property in front of which the own- ers thereof had made such improvements,* but it could not assess other property owners for the cost of such improvement. Ac- cordingly where the improvement was made by the city itself or at its expense, without levying an assessment therefor, and sub- sequently after such improvement is completed, an assessment is levied, such assessment has been held to be valid." There is, how- ever, some authority for holding that even express authority from the legislature to enforce such assessments would be invalid." A street was constructed voluntarily by certain persons and subse- quently the city levied an assessment to pay therefor. Such as- sessment was held to be invalid, even though the legislature had expressly authorized it.'' Some eases, however, have gone to an extreme in the opposite direction. Thus it has been held that after an improvement has been constructed under a contract and the contract price paid therefor, the legislature may authorize an assessment in order to pay a gratuity to the contractor and thus reimburse him for his loss under the contract.' Cases of this sort seem like taking pri- vate property without compensation, in order to make a present of it to a third person. , The purpose is not one for which general taxation could be .justified, even in much stronger cases,' and no 'In the Matter of Opening and city; Peck v. City of Chicago, 22 Grading Market Street, 49 Cal. 546 111. 578; Pease v. City of Chicago, ri875]. 20 111. 500). » Creote v. City of Chicago, 56 111 422 [1870]^ Dorathy v. City of Chi cago, 53 111. 79 [1869]; City of Chi cago V. Rosenfeld, 24 111. 495 [1860] Peck V. City of Chicago, 22 111. 578 Pease v. City of Chicago, 21 111. 500 "Gilmore v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 [1872]. 'Gilmore v. Morton, 10 Kan. 491 [1872]. ' Brewater v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 [1859]. •See § 646. 'State v. Oaawkee, 14 Kan. 418, 'Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 19 Am. Eep. 99; Lowell v. City of 85 111. 110 [1877]; (distinguishing Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. as cases where the improvement was 39; Deering v. Peterson, 75 Minn. made by private persons on their own 118, 77 N. W. 568. account not under contract with the §§ 411, 412 ^ TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 628 reason appears why local assessments for such purpose should be in any better position than genferal taxation. The lower courts of New York have taken a different view of such statutes. Thus an assessment and contract were held void.^" A curative statute au- thorizing a contract with the specifically named contractor and providing that such work done by him before the passage of the act should be regarded as performance was characterized as a "very remarkable legislative enac^ent,"" and held invalid." § 411. Purchase of private improvement. . If a private person has constructed an improvement of a kind which the public might have constructed and for which it is per- mitted to levy local assessments, a statute authorizing the public corporation to buy such improvement and to levy an assessment to pay for the cost of such purchase is valid as long as such assess- ment is not levied upon the land of owners who had previously ac- quired a vested right to make use of such improvement while it was owned by such private person.^ Thus a city may be author- ized to buy a private sewer and to levy an assessment to pay the cost thereof upon the owners of abutting property, as long as such owners had not acquired fixed rights to use such sewer." § 412. Conversion of toll road into public road. The acquisition of the rights of the owners of a toll road therein, and the conversion of such road into a public road is a public pur- pose, the expense of which may be met by general taxation.^ "Hersee v. City of Buifalo, 1 leges and liberties of those who own Sheldon Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 445 [1874]. that same property and wherein "Granger v. City of Buffalo, 6 would then consist the assured safety Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 238, 243 [1879]. and permanence of the constitutional >"The court said: "To say that rights of property or liberty? one man's property can by special Such an enactment is more like revo- law be taken or incumbered in a man- lution than the administration of ner and by proceedings that do not just and equal laws and has no war- apply to all is tyranny and revolt- rant in the law or in the customs of ing to the theory and sentiment of our fathers." Granger v. City of republican equality. If it is com- Buffalo, 6 Abb. (N. C.) 238, 245, 246 petent for the legislature thus to ex- [1879]. press its will in regard to property ^ Slocum v. Selectmen of Brookline, situated upon the line of one of our 163 Mass. 23, 39 N. E. 351 [1895]. highways why is it not competent ^Slocum v. Selectmen of Brookline, for it to prescribe laws differing from 163 Mass. 23, 39 N. E. 351 [1895]. the general laws governing the rest ^Warder v. Commissioners, 38 O. of society as to the personal privi- S. 639 [1883]. 629 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. § 412 The difficulty in upholding assessments for this purpose lies in finding a special or peculiar benefit to the adjoining property. If the abutting property owners have in fact, access to their prop- erty over a turnpike or toll road, and it is proposed to appropriate or to purchase such road for use as a public road or street, the question is presented whether such use as a public road gives the abutting property owner any additional benefit over and above that which he already possessed. Upon this point the authorities are few and divergent. In New Jersey it is held that such proceed- ings confer no benefit to the adjacent land-owner, as he has no ad- ditional right of access; and the land upon which such road is situated is still subject to the easement in favor of the public. It is held therefore that it is neither a case of opening a street nor one of vacating a street and the assessment for the cost of such acquisition is accordingly invalid.^ In Ohio the courts have held that if a toll road within the city limits has been appropriated by the city in eminent domain, an assessment for the cost of such pro- ceedings less two per cent, which the statute provided should be paid by the eitj' might be assessed upon the abutting property owners.' The Circuit Court in its opinion reached this conclusion with reluctance as upholding an assessment which was unjust but constitutional. Probably a different result would be reached under later Ohio decisions which hold that local assessments cannot be levied for paying for the cost of opening a street.* In jurisdictions where local assessments may be levied for acquiring land for .a public road or street " it is difficult to see why the acquisition of an existing road which could be used only upon payment of com- pensation therefor is not a benefit to the property dependent there- on for access. The fact that some form of access, upon piayment of consideration, already existed should, it would seem, affect only the amount of the assessment, and not the power of levying assess- ments for such purpose. 'Ho held in cases where the public Ohio Dee. 291; same result reached purchased such toll road ; State, Al- on appeal in Winslow v. City of dridge. Pros. v. Essex Public Road Cincinati, 10 Ohio C. C. 191, 6 Ohio Board, 48 N. J. L. (19 Vr.) 366, 5 C. D. 150 [1894]; the latter case Atl. 784 [1886]; State, Speer, Pros. affirmed by the Supreme Court with- V. Essex Public Road Board, 47 N. out report in Winslow V. City of Cin- J. L. (18 Vr.) 101 [1885]; State v. cinnati, 53 0. S. 665, 44 N. E. 1150 Laverack, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 207; [1895]. Carter v. Wright (3 Dutch.) 207. 'See § 308. ■Winslow V. City of Cincinnati, 2 °«ee § 308. §•§ 413, 414 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 630 § 413. Assessments without valid ordinance. Under many of the statutes on the subject of local assessments, the ordinance providing for the public improvement must show the determination of the public corporation that such improvement shall be paid for by local assessment, or else it will be impossible by subsequent ordinance to levy assessments to pay for such im- provements. Questions of this class involve statutory construc- tion, do not involve any constitutional questions and are else- where discussed in detail.^ Here it may be observed that under such statutes, if the city constructed an improvement without an ordinance for such improvement, a subsequent assessment there- for is invalid, in the absence of a prior statute providing that the omission of such prior ordinance shall have some other and differ- ent effect, and in the absence of some subsequent curative statute.^ Thus, if the resolution for construction of a sewer provides that its cost shall be paid out of the general fund of the city, the city can- not after the work is completed, on finding that the city is indebted beyond the constitutional limit, assess the owners of property bene- fited by such sewer for the cost thereof.' § 414. Re-assessments held valid. Objections of this sort are, however, chiefly statutory. If the legislature has provided specifically concerning the effect of the I'See Chapter XV. Rapids, 118 la. 714, 92 N. W. 657 'Ve Haven v. Berendes, 135 Cal. [1902]; Lux & Talbott Stone Com- 178, 67 Pac. 786 [1901]; Partridge pany v. Donaldson, 162 Ind. 481, 68 V. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 N. E. 1014 [1903]; Newman v. City [1893] ; Donnelly v. Howard, 60 Cal. of Emporia, 32 Kan. 456, 4 Pac. 815 291 [1882]; City of Paxton v. Bo- [1884]; Second Municipality of New gardus, 201 111. 628, 66 N. E. 853 Orleans v. Botts, 8 Rob. (La.) 198 [1903]; Connecticut Mutual Life In- [1844]; Brown v. Mayor and Alder- surance Company v. City of Chicago, men of Fitchburg, 128 Mass. 282 185 111. 148, 56 N. E. 1071 [1900]; [1880]; Dickey v. Holmes, 109 Mo. Pells V. City of Paxton, 176 111. 318, App. 721, 83 S. W. 982 [1904]; 52 N. E. 64 [1898]; Davis v. City Smith v. Small, 50 Mo. App. 401 of Litchfield, 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. [1892]; Donohue v. Brotherton, 7 354 [1895]; Freeport Street Railway Ohio N. P. 367 [1900]; Folz v. City Company v. City of Freeport, 151 III. of Cincinnati, 2 Handy (Ohio), 261 451, 38 N. E. 137 [1894]; City of [1855]; Appeal of Harper, 109 Pa. East St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 111. St. 9, 1 Atl. 791 [1885]; Reilly v. 506, 37 N. E. 934 [1894]; Weld v.' City of Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. (10 People ex rel. Kern, 149 111. 257, 36 P. F. Smith) 467 [1869]; Buckley v. N. E. 1006 [1894] ; City of Carlyle City of Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 37 Pac. V. The County of Clinton, 140 111. 441 [1894]. 512, 30 N. E. 782 [1893]; City of ' Spaulding v. Baxter, 25 Ind. App. Alton V. Foster, 74 111. App. 511 485, 58 X. E. 551 [1900]. [1897]; Zalesky v. City of Cedar 631 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §414 omission to pass a valid ordinance before an assessment is made, and such specific provision declares in express terms or in effect that such assessment is valid, full effect is given in most jurisdic- tions to such statutes.^ Thus, if the city is given power to modify its requirements concerning the construction of sewers, a sewer be- gun under a defective ordinance but constructed under a subse- quent valid ordinance.may be paid for by assessment.^ If the ordi- nance provides that the improvement shall be paid for by assess- ments, and such ordinance is valid as to the improvement therein provided for, but invalid as to the particular form of assessment to be levied, it is possible for the city to levy an assessment by a subsequent assessment ordinance." So a drainage commissioner may levy a subsequent assessment to pay the cost of a prior ini- provement.* If the public corporation has made a public improve- ment and at the time of making such improvement has made an invalid and ineffectual attempt to levy an assessment therefor, a statute curing such defect and providing for a re-assessment for such improvement is valid, if the defect concerned a matter with which the legislature could have dispensed at the outset." Such 'See Chapter XVIII. "City to use of Fox v. Schoene- mann, 52 Mo. 348 [1873]. 'Cummings v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941 [1899]; (affirmed in Lomhard v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. 731, 21 S. 507 [1901]) ; Helm v. Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131, 73 N. E. 846 [1904]. 'Dean v. Treasurer of Clinton County, 146 Mich. 645, 109 N. W. 1131 [1901]. In this case, however, the subsequent assessment was levied on a larger area than the original assessment, and accordingly it was held that the surplus left after pay- ing for widening cleaning and ex- tending the drain could not be used for paying debts due for the original construction. 'City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 105 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ; Jjombard v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. 731, 21 S. 507 [1901]; (affirming Cummings v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941 [1899]); Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (affirming Spencer v. Mer- chant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682 [1885]); Ross v. Board of Super- visors of Wright County, Iowa, 128 la. 427, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 104 N. W. 506 [1905]; Kansas City ,. Silver, 74 Kan. 851, 85 Pac. 805 [1906] ; Newman v. City of Emporia, 41 Kan. 583, 21 Pac. 593 [1889]; Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512, 11 Pac. 402 [1886] ; City of Emporia v. Bates, 16 Kan. 495 [1876]; City of Emporia v. Norton, 13 Kan. 589 [1874]; Gilmore v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 [1872]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469. 30 Atl. 43 [1894]; Mayor and Citv Council of Baltimore v. Horn. 26 Md. 194 [1866]; Warren v. Street Commissioners of the Citv of Boston, 187 Mass. 290, 72 N. E. 1022 [1905] ; Hall V. Street Commissioners of Bos- ton, 177 Mass, 434, 59 N. E. [1901]; State V. District Court of Ramsey §414 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 632 statutes are not looked upon with favor and are construed even more strictly than original assessment statutes.* After judgment has been rendered declaring a .specific assessment invalid the leg- islature cannot annul such judgment and ratify such assessment." County, 98 Minn. 63, 107 N. W. 726 [1906]; MoMillan v. Board of County Commissioners of Freeborn County, 93 Minn. 16, 100 N. W. 384, 1125 [1904]; State ex rel. Gotzian V. District Court of Ramsey County, 77 Minn. 248, 79 N. W. 971 [1899]; S. D. Mercer Co. v. City of Omaha, — Neb. , 107 N. W. 565 [1906] ; City of East Orange v. Hussey, 72 N. J. L,. (43 Vr.) 71, 59 Atl. iOBO [1905 J; DeWitt v. City ot Klizabeth, 56 N. J. L. (27 Vroom) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]; In re Report of Commission- ers, etc., of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 488, 10 Atl. 363 [1887]; State, Bergen County Savings Bank, Pros. V. Inhabitants of the Township of Union in the County of Bergen, 44 N. J. L. ( 15 Vroom) 599 [1882] ; State, Peckham," Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of New- ark, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vroom) 576 [1881]; State, Walter, Pros. v. Town of Union in the Cotuity of Hudson, 33 N. J. L. (4 Vr.) 350 [1869]; In the Matter of the Application of the Trustees of Union College for an Order directing the Treasurer of Long Island City to cancel certain water rates and rents, 129 N. Y. 308, 29 N. E. 460 [1891]; People ex rel. Kilmer v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 [1877]; In the Matter of the Application of Van Antwerp to va- cate an assessment, 56 N. Y. 261 [1874] ; Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 [1859]; Hatzung v. City of Syracuse, 92 Hun. 203, 36 N. Y. S. 521 [1895] ; Moran v. City of Troy, 9 Hun. 540 [1877]; Hopkins V. Mason 42 Howard (N. Y.) 115 [1871]; In the Matter of Regulating and Grading Eightieth Street be- tween Fifth Avenue and the East River, 31 Howard, 99 [1865]; Astor V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 539 [1874]; Miller v. Graham, 17 0. S. 1 [1866]; Butler V. City of Toledo, 5 O. S. 225 [1855] ; Duniway v. Portland, 47 Or. 103, 81 Pac. 945 [1905]; Thomas v. Portland 40 Or. 50, 66 Pac. 439 [1901]; Whitney v. City of Pittsburg 147 Pa. St. 351, 30 Am. St. Rep. 740, 23 Atl. 395 [1892]; Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348, 30 Am. St. Rep. 738, 23 Atl. 394 [1892]; City of Chester V. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568, 6 L. R. A. 802, 19 Atl. 276 [1890]; Erie City V. Reed, 113 Pa. St. 468, 6 Atl. 679; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55; Kelley v. City of Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 170, 27 Am. Rep. 633 [1877]; Commonwealth to use of Allegheny City V. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. Smith) 328 [1871]; Magee v. Commonwealth for the use of the City of Pittsburg, 46 Pa. St. 358 ( 10 Wright) 358 [1863]; Schenley v. Commonwealth for the use of the City of Allegheny, 36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]; Lewis v. City of Seattle, 28 Wash. 639, 69 Pac. 393 [1902] ; McNamee v. City of Tacoma, 24 Wash. 591, 64 Pac. 791 [1901]; Abemethy v. Town of Medical Lake, 9 Wash. 112; 37 Pac. 306 [1894]; Haubner v. City of Milwaukee, 124 Wis. 153, 101 N. W. 930 (re-hearing denied, 102 N. W. 578 [1905]); Schintgen v. City of LaCrosse, 117 Wis. 158, 94 N. W. 84 [1903] ; Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578 (1872]; Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. 522 [1871]; see Chapter XVII. •Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. 522 [1871]. ' Searcy v. Patriot and Barkworks Turnpike Company, 79 Ind. 274 [1881]; Thomas v. Portland. 40 Or. 633 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §415 ' ' It would not be competent for the legislature to validate such an assessment notwithstanding an adjudication of a court declaring it a nullity and thus permit it to be enforced in the manner pointed out by the charter, through the issuance of a warrant and levy and sale of the property thereunder. A statute which operates to an- nul or set aside the final judgment of a court of competent juris- diction and to disturb or defeat rights thus vested is inoperative and void. By reason of the distribution of powers under the con- stitution assigning each its separate and distinct functions, one department is not permitted to trench upon the functions and powers of the other. " ' In some jurisdictions it has been held that ' ' the legislature cannot legalize a void assessment. " " So a statute attempting to cure assessment proceedings under an uncon- stitutional statute has been held invalid." However, a statute au- thorizing another assessment for the same improvement is not ob- jectionable as setting aside a pre-existing judgment declaring a former assessment invalid.'^ Such re-assessment statute recog- nizes and is based upon the theory that the original assessment is invalid. § 415. Contract may precede assessment. If the statute permits the assessment to be levied after the con- tract is made, full effect is given to such statute. No constitutional restrictions seem to compel the legislature to require that the as- sessment shall be levied before the contract is made.^ In such 50, 66 Pae. 439 [1901]; Mills v. State of Kansas on the relation of Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. Young v. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. 578 [1872]. App. 319, 45 Pac. 122 [1896]; Prinea 'Thomas v. Portland, 40 Or. 50, v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 22B 52, 66 Pac. 439 [1901]. [1872]; Whiting v. Mayor and AI- " Schumacker v. Toherman, 56 Cal. dermen of the City of Boston, 106 508, 511 [1880]; (citing People of Mass. 89 [1870]; Jones v. Board of the State of California v. Lynch, 51 Aldermen of the City of Boston, 104 Cal. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]); Mass. 461 [1^70]; Butler v. Detroit, Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 43 Mich. 552, 5 N. W. 1078; Lefevre [1866]. To the same effect see v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. Brady v. King, 53 Cal. 44 [1878]. 586 [1853]; Keigher v. City of St. "State, Peekham, Pros. v. Mayor Paul, 69 Minn. 78, 72 N. W. 54 and Common Council of the City of [1897]; Elwood v. City of Rochester, Newark, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 576 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 102 [1887]; Webber [1881]. V. Common Council of the City of « Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, Lockport, 43 How. (N. Y.) 368 9 Am. Rep.. 578 [1872]. [1872]; Addyston Pipe and Steel 'Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole. 132 Company v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. Fed. 668 [1904]; Gilmore v. Hentig, St. 41, 80 Am. St. Rep. 812, 46 Mh 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1885]; 1035 [1900]. §416 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 634 cases the work is begun under circumstances which, if not modi- fied by the subsequent- action of the public corporation would make the cost of the improvement a charge upon the public cor- poration, to be paid for out of the revenues accruing from general taxation,^ but the validity of such statutes is not affected thereby. Property owners are bound to know, when the improvement is begun, that the public corporation has not made a final election to pay for such improvement by general taxation, but that it may still assess therefor. § 416. Payment by city does not invalidate assessment. If authorized by statute the city or other public corporation may pay for the cost of a public improvement out of its treasury, from funds raised by general taxation and then proceed to reimburse itself in whole or in part by levying an assessment for the cost of such improvement.^ This rule applies even if by statute the public corporation should have paid the cost of such improve- ment only out of the fund created by the assessment." So the fact that the improvement is paid out of a fund raised by several local assessments does not prevent the levy of local assessments.' The fact that the public corporation has borrowed money * as by issu- ' Smith V. Duck Pond Ditching (19 Vr.) 101, 2 Atl. 627 [1886]; Association, 54 Ind. 235 [1876]; In Elwood v. City of Rochester, 43 Hun. the Matter of the Petition of Roberts (N. Y.) 102 [1887]; Heath v. to Vacate an Assessment, 81 N. Y. 62 MeCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 [1880]; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio [1898]; Town of Tumwater v. Pix, (N. Y.) 249 [1846]; Wetmore v. 18 Wash. 153, 51 Pac. 323 [1897]. Campbell, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 341 = Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 [1849]; Strowbridge v. City of Port- [1876]. land, 8 Or. 67 [1879]. 'Burns v. City of Duluth, 96 Minn. • Sweet V. West Chicago Park Com- 104, 104 N. W. 714 L1905J. The missioners, 177 111. 492, 53 N. E. 74 money raised by the various local aa- [1899]; City of Elkhart v. Wick- sessments was deposited in a "revolv- wire, 121 Ind. 331, 22 N. E. 342 ing fund" out of which new improve- [1889]; City of Lafayette v. Fowler, ments were paid for in advance: and 34 Ind. 140 [1870] ; City of Burling- then assessments were levied for such ton V. Quick, 47 la. 222 [1877]; Pat- improvements to replenish such terson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 [1876]; fund. Burns v. City of Duluth, 96 Minn. * Davis v. City of Newark, 54 N. J. 104, 104 N. W. 714 [1905]; Bradley L. (25 Vr.) 144; 23 Atl. 276 [1891]; v. Village of West Duluth, 45 Minn. In re Beechwood Avenue, Appeal of 4, 47 N. W. 166 [1890]; State, Jelliff, O'Mara, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council [1899]. of the City of Newark, 48 N. J. L. 635 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED, § 417 ing bonds,° and has thus paid for the cost of such improvement does not prevent the subsequent levy of an assessment against the property benefited by such improvement to reimburse the city. So if the public corporation has paid for the improvement by issu- ing warrants to the contractor " or to one who loans money to pay for such improvement ' it may reimburse itself by levying an as- sessment. § 417. Benefit dependent on future action. The property owner must have a fixed right to the improvement and the benefits which accrue therefrom to render him liable to assessment therefor. If he is not vested with such rights, and he may or may not continue to enjoy such benefits, dependent upon the future action of a natural person or of a private or public cor- poration, such benefit is too precarious to be the basis of an as- sessment for benefits.^ Thus if owners of water seek damages for diverting water, the city cannot set off the value of the use of the returned sewage if the city is under no legal obligation to return such sewage:^ An assessment for improving a navigable stream was held invalid among other reasons, because such improvement was dependent upon the approval of the Secretary of War, which approval had not yet been secured and might never be secured.^ However, if a bridge has actually been constructed across a navi- gable stream to connect the parts of a street upon either bank, the legality of such bridge will be presumed and the assent of the "People ex rel. Wood v. Jones, 137 234 111. 460, 84 N. E. 1061 [1908]; 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892]; Loes- Uage v. 'City of Ohicago, 191 111. nitz V. Seellnger, 127 Ind. 422, 25 N. 210, 60 N. E. 896 [1901]; Title Guar- E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890]; Citj antee and Trust Co. v. City of Chi- of Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. 296, cago, 162 111. 505, 44 N. E. 832 25 Pac. 605 [1891]; State of Minne- [1896]; Edwards v. City of Chicago, sota V. Norton, 63 Minn. 497, 65 N. 140 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893]; W. 935 [1896]; State, Hand, Pros. Hutt v. City of Chicago, 132 111. 352, V. City Council of the City of Eliza- 23 N. E. 1010 [1891]; Swenson v. beth, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 547 [1864]. Board of Supervisors of To'Hfn of Hal- " City of Atchison v. Leu, 48 Kan. lock, 95 Minn. 161, 103 N. W. 895 138, 29 Pac. 467 [1892]; City oif [1905] Langmead v. City of Cincin- Port Angeles v. Lauridsen, 26 Wash. nati, 29 Ohio C. C. 64 [1906]; In re 153, 66 Pac. 403 [1901]. Barre Water Co., 72 Vt. 413, 48 Atl. ' Corliss V. Village of Highland 653. Park, 132 Mich. 152, 93 N. W. 610, 'In re Barre Water Co., 72 Vt. 95 N. W. 254; affirmed on rehearing 413, 48 Atl. 653. 95 N. W. 416 [1903]. 'City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. 'City of Waukegan v. Burnett, 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]. §418 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 636 Secretary of War need not be shown.* Relief will be given against an assessment of which confirmation is obtained by means of a promise to condemn the land on which the improvement is located, where the city abandons the condemnation proceedings after ob- taining such confirmation.'" The most common form of attempted assessment in such cases is found where a public corporation seeks to levy assessments for improvements to be made in the future. § 418. Assessments for future improvements. Cases are occasionally presented in which an improvement has been constructed which does not of itself confer any benefit, or which does not confer a benefit upon land which it is sought to as- sess but which will prove beneficial in the future if the municipal corporation or other public corporation proceed to construct a further and additional improvement. If the public corporation has resolved to construct such improvement, it is generally held that a statute authorizing the levy of an assessment for the bene- fits which will be conferred by such improvement, already resolved upon but to be constructed in the future, is constitutional.^ A public corporation is regarded as under a legal obligation to construct such improvement, an obligation which may be enforced by the owners of the property assessed in case such public corpor- ation does not voluntarily construct such improvement. In the eases thus far considered, a public corporation was under some legal obligation to construct the future improvement which would cause a benefit to inure to the property assessed, in return for which benefit the assessment is levied. Different considerations apply where the public corporation is not under any legal obliga- tion to construct such improvement, but is free to construct it, or not to construct it, as in its discretion it may deem best. In cases of this sort the property owner has no means of compelling a public corporation to construct the improvement so as to benefit him in any way. Accordingly, it is generally held that in such cases the local assessment cannot be levied, since the property owner has no assurance that the improvement will ever be so constructed as to confer a benefit upon his property which it is sought to assess •Pearson v. City of Chicago, 162 missioners, 222 111. 384, 78 N. E. 794 111. 383, 44 N. E. 739 [1896]. [1906]; Reed v. City of Cedar Rap- "Dempster v. City of Chicago, 175 ids, — la. , 111 N. W. 1013 111. 278, 51 N. E. 710 [1898]. [1907]. ' Lingle v. West Chicago Park Com- 637 WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED. §418 for such improvement.^ Thus a street was laid out across a river, but no provision for a bridge was made. It was held that the benefits which would accrue in the future if the bridge was con- structed could not be estimated in determining the amount of the assessment.' Thus no assessment can be levied against land which will be benefited by a sewer only if the sewer is extended.* Thus it has been held that no assessment can be levied for the con- struction of a sewer on land a third of a mile away which could be drained by such sewer if a lateral sewer were constructed, where the public corporation is not bound to construct such lateral sewer.° So no assessment can be levied or charge made for drain- age for a benefit which will probably result in the future, in ac- cordance with past custom, as a result of the construction of a highway, the town not being bound to construct such highway so as to cause drainage.* There is, however, some authority for al- lowing such assessments. Thus a street would prove beneficial to its full extent only if a bridge were built to connect the two sec- tions of the street on opposite sides of a river. It was held proper to levy the assessment on the assumption that such bridge would be built.' "City of Waukegan v. Burnett, 234 111. 460, 84 N. E. 1061 [1908]; City' of Paxton v. Bogardus, 201 815 [1884]; Second Municipality of 111. 628, 66 N. E. 853 [1903]; New Orleans v. Botts, 8 Kobinson Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance (La.) 198 [1844]; Keane v. Klaus- Company V. City of Chicago, 185 111. man, 21 Mo. App. 485 [1886] ; Folz 148, 56 N. E. 1071 [1900]; Pells v. v. City of Cincinnati, 2 Handy City of Paxton, 176 111. 318, 52 N. E. (Ohio), 261 [1855]; Donohue v. 64 [1898]; Thaler v. West Chicago "Brothertou, 7 Ohio N. P. 367 [1900]; Park Commissioners, 174 111. 211, Appeal of Harper, 109 Pa. St. 9, 1 52 N. E. 116 [1898]; Winkelman v. AtL 791 [1885]; Buckley v. City of Moredock and Ivy Landing: Drainage Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 37 Pac. 441 District, 170 IlL 37, 48 N. E. 715 [1894]. [1897]; Davis v: City of Litchfield, ' Creote v. City of Chicago, 56 111. 155 111'. 384, 40 N. E. 354 [1895]; 422 [1870]; Dorathy v. City of Ohi- City of East St. Louis v. Albrecht, cago, 53 III. 79 [1869]. 649 -STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 425 levy an assessment for such purchase price.'' So it has been held in some jurisdictions that a city may purchase a toll road or turn- pike and levy an assessment for the cost of such purchase.* Statutes are found in many states which authorize a city to levy an assessment for work done before the passage of a valid ordi- nance providing for constructing such improvements at the cost of the property owners. Such statutes are regarded as valid,'' are given full force and effect, and assessments levied for such improvements under such statutes are valid." So it has been held that the legislature may authorize the city to levy an assess- ment to pay an additional amount to the contractor over and above the contract price, which under the charter of the city it was for- bidden to pay.' The power to levy assessments for pre-existing improvements is, however, limited by the terms of the statute authorizing such assessments.* Thus, under a statute authiorizing the acceptance of grading previously done and crediting the owner who has done such grading for the cost thereof upon his assess- ment, no such allowance can be. made for macadamizing and curbing already done." If work has been begun under a defec- tive ordinance and before the performance of the contract an ordinance has been passed curing the defect, an assessment for such improvement has been held to be valid.^" § 425. Expense of apropriation of property for public use. It is very frequently provided by statute that the expense of appropriating property by eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a public improvement is one of the items which may be included in special assessments for such improvements if the improvement is one of the types for which a special assessment "Slocum V. Selectmen of Brookline, Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 [1859]; Dunl- 163 Mass. 23, 39 N. E. 351 [1895]. way v. Portland, 47 Or. 103, 81 Pac. 'See § 412. 945 [1905]; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 "See § 413. K. I. 50 [1880]. • Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, ' Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]; New N. Y. 116 [1859]. England Hospital for Women and «De Haven v. Berendes, 135 Cal. Children v. Street Commissioners of 178, 67 Pac. 786 [1901]. the City of Boston, 188 Mass. 88, 74 » De Haven v. Berendes, 135 Cal. N. E. 294 [1905]; In the Matter 178, 67 Pac. 786 [1901]. of Sackett, Douglass and De Graw '" Kiley v. Craner, 51 Mo. 541 Streets in the City of Brooklyn, 74 [1873]. N. Y. 95 [1878]; Brewster v. City of §426 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 650 may be levied.^ There must be a valid statute for appropriating land in order to justify a special assessment for the cost of such proceedings.^ Such assessment cannot be levied if the appropria- tion proceedings are entirely void.* The cost of appropriating land cannot be made the subject of assessment unless the statute provides therefor.* If the statute provides that the cost of ap- propriation must be paid for by general taxation, a local assess- ment canot be levied therefor.' - § 426. Value of land appropriated. The value of the land which has been taken by proceedings in eminent domain is one of the most important items of cost in appropriation proceedings and under most statutes may be levied upon the land which is benefited by the improvement.' Under 'Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 1270, 17 S. 966 [1897]; (re- versing District of Columbia v. Armes, 8 App. D. C. 393 -[1896]; Bauman v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896] ; Abbott v. Ross, 9 App. D. C 289 [1896]); In the Matter of the proceedings to change the grade of Beale Street in the City and County of San Francisco, 39 Cal. 495 [1870] ; Judson V. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 426 [1857]; Edgerton v. Mayor and Al- dermen of the Town of Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140 [1882]; Wagge- raan v. Village of North Peoria, 155 111. 545, 40 N. E. 485 [1895]; (dis- tinguishing City of Bloomington v. Latham, 142 111. 462, 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. B. 506 [1893]) ; People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462; 6 N. E. 33 [1887]; Page v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 34 Md. 558 [1871]; Gardi- ner v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 188 Mass. 223, 74 N. E. 341 [1905]; State ex rel. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. City of Kansas, 89 Mo. 34, 14 S.. W. 515 [1886]; Clark v. City of Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. (32 Vr.) 565, 40 Atl. 616, 40 Atl. 737 [1S9S] Davis v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 [1892]; State, Aldridge, Pros. v. Essex Public Board, 46 N. J. L. (17 Vr.) 126 [1884]; Pratt v. City of Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 658, 68 N. W, 392 [1896]. ° State, Kerrigan, Pros. v. Town- ship of West Hokoken, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 77 [1874]; Carron v. Mar- tin, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutcher) 594, 69 Am. Dec. 584 [1857]. ' State, Kerrigan, ' Pros. v. Town- ship of West Hoboken, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 77 [1874]; Carron v. Mar- tin, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutcher) 594, 69 Am. Dee. 584 [1857]. ' In the Matter of the Assessments of lands in the Town of Flatbush for the Extension of Prospect Park in the City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 398 [1875]. ° Krumberg v. City of Cincinnati, 29 0. S. 69 [1875].. ' South Chicago City Railway Com- pany V. City of Chicago, 196 111. 490, 63 N. E. 1046 [1902]; Goodwillie. v. City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]; Andrews v. People ex rel. Rumsey, 84 111. 28 [1876]; Municipality Number Two for the opening of Roffignac Street, 7 La. Ann. 76 [1852]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284, 79 Am. Dec. 696 [1861]; Gardiner v. Street Commissioners of 651 STATUTORY PKOVISIONS CONCEENING IMPKOVEMENTS. § 426 a statute authorizing assessments for the value of lands appro- priated, the Value of land owned by a city and formerly used for public park, but since taken for the purpose of widening streets,' or acquired by the city for a pipe-line and afterwards taken for a street,' or property held by the city in trust for school purposes,* may be included in the assessment. The value of property which; has been used as a right of way appurtenant to certain land and which has been taken for a public street may be included, since no public easement exists therein.^ The value of property be- tween a levee and a stream where such property is subject to a public use cannot be included," but if the levee has been ad- vanced by public authorities so as to include such property and the public use has thereby been extinguished, an assessment may be levied therefor/ If the appropriation proceedings are dis- tinct from the assessment proceedings, a judgment appropriating, the property is final both as to the necessity and as to the right of appropriation and cannot be attacked collaterally.' Hence, in an assessment proceeding the defense cannot be interposed that the land appropriated for a street had already been dedi-, eated to the public." In some jurisdictions the power of levying local assessments for the cost of land appropriated has been lim- ited or entirely denied.^" If there is no authority for assessing, such items of expense against the property owners, they will be presumed to be included in the part of the assessment apportioned to the city." In Illinois it is held that the cost of land appro- the City of BostQn, 188 Mass. 223, .74 and Commonalty of New York, 186 N. E. 341 [1905]; Leslie v. City of N. Y. 237, 78 N. E. 952 [1906]. ' St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474 [1871]; State * Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 111. V. Several Parcels of Land, — Neb. 227 [1876]. , 110 N. W. 753 [1907]; State, 'Hemingway v. City of Chicago, 60 White, Pros. v. Mayor and Council .111. 324 [1871]. of the City of Bayonne, 49 N. J. L. ' Municipality Number Two for the (20 Vr.) 311, 8 Atl. 295 [1887]; Opening of Eoffignac Street, 7 La. State, Aldridge, Pros. v. Essex Pub- Ann. 76 [1852]. lie Eoad Board, 46 N. J. L. (17 Vr.) 'Municipality Number Two for the 126 [1884]; In re Opening of 178th Opening of Eoffignac Street, 7 La. Street, City of New York, 94 N. Y. Ann. 76 [1852]. S. 838, 107 App. Div. 22 [1905]; » Gage v. City of Chicago, 146 111. In re Mill Creek Sewer, 196 Pa. St. 499, 34 N. E. 1034 [1893]. 183, 46 Atl. 312 [1900]. » Gage v. City of Chicago, 146 III. ■"In the Matter of Widening and 499, 34 N. E. 1034 [1893]. Improving Ninth Avenue and Fif- "City of St. Joseph v! Crowther, t«enth Street in the City of Brook- 142 Mo. 155, 43 S. W. 786 [1897]. lyn, 45 N. Y, 729 [1871]. "/« re Reynolds Street Sewer, 34 "Matter of the Mayor, Aldermen Super. Ct. 209 [1907]. § 426 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 652 priated may be paid for by special assessment where the actual benefits are inquired into,^^ but not by special taxation where the question of benefits is not inquired into.^^ In Ohio it was held originally that while the cost of appropriating land could not be included in a special assessment in the absence of specific statutory authority," it might be so included if authorized by statute.^' Subsequently, in passing upon the Ohio statute, the Supreme Court of the United Stages held that a statute pro- viding for assessing the entire cost of appropriating property upon the adjoining property, a part of which had been appro- priated, and apportioning this entire cost according to frontage was unconstitutional as amounting to a taking of property with- out due process of law.^° Subsequently this decision was followed in Ohio.*^ It will be observed that this decision does not neces- sarily hold that an assessment cannot be levied for such items, but nierely that the method of apportioning such assessment is invalid under the circumstances of the particular case." The later decisions in Ohio have, however, gone farther than the de- cision of the Supreme Court of the United States and have held that an assessment cannot constitutionally be levied even under express statutory authority, either upon property a part of which has thus been appropriated," or upon other property," It is ordinarily assumed that a grant of power to appropriate property includes power to acquire such property by contract.^^ Where ""Waggeman v. Village of North See, also, Scott v. City of Toledo, 30 •Peoria, 155 111. 545, 40 N. E. 485 Fed. 385, 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]. [1895]; (distinguishing City of " Dodsworth v. City of Cincinnati, ' Bloomington v. Latham, 142 111. 462, 18 Ohio C. C. 288, 10 Ohio C. D. 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. E. 506 177 [1899]. [1893]). • "See, also, Rhoades f. City of To- "City of Bloomington v. Latham, ledo, 6 Ohio C. C. 9 [1890]. 142 111. 462, 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. "Cincinnati, Lebanon and North- E. 506 [1893]. ern Railway Company v. City of Cin- » Krumberg v. Cincinnati, 29 O. S cinnati, 62 0. S. 465, 49 L. R. A. 69 [1875]. 566, 57 N. E. 229 [1900]. '" City of Cleveland v. Wick, 18 ™ City of Dayton v. Bauman, 66 0. 0. S. 303 [1868]; Village of Nor- S. 379, 64 N. E. 433 [1902]. wood V. Ogden, 15 Ohio C. C. 539, 18 ^Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, Ohio C. C. 869, 8 Ohio C. D. 383 147 Cal. 668, 82 Pac. 334 [1905]; [1898]. Lower Kings River Reclamation Dis- " Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 trict No. 531 v. MoGullah, 124 Cal. U. S. 269, 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]; State v. [1898]; (affirming Baker v. Village Several Parcels of Land, — NeU of Norwood, 74 Fed. 997 [1896]). , 110 N. W. 753 [1907]. 653 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 427 this theory is entertained the contract price may form one of the items for which the assessment is to be levied.^^ The existr ence of this power has, however, been doubted.^^ § 427. Value of building taken by appropriation. The value of buildings upon land appropriated for a public improvement, which must be removed or destroyed in the con- struction of such improvement, forms a proper item of assess- ment.^- By statute it may be provided that if no buildings are taken, the assessment district shall not extend beyond the center line of the blocks adjacent to the streets improved, while a wider area may be assessed if buildings are taken.^ Under such stat- utes it is equally improper to assess the entire cost of buildings upon the adjacent blocks,' and to assess non-adjacent blocks for more than a proportionate part of the cost of buildings.* By statute in New York it has been provided that a map or plan of the proposed streets may be filed and that no damages can be recovered for the value of buildings erected upon ground to be occupied by such proposed streets after the filing of such plan.° Such provision has been held not to amount to a taking of prop- erty without just compensation." A similar statute has been held to be valid in Pennsylvania.' § 428. Damage caused by appropriation. The damage caused by a public improvement to land which is not appropriated for such improvement is another item for which it is often provided by statute that assessments may be levied ^^ Lower Kings River Reclamation 'In the Matter of the Board of District No. 531 v. MoCuUah, 124 Street Opening, 74 Hun. 561, 26 N. Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]. Y. Supp. 855 [1893]. "^Lake Shore and Michigan South- "In the Matter of the Board of ern Railway Company v. City of Chi- Street Opening, 64 Hun. 59, 18 N. cago, 148 111. 509, 37 N. E. 88 [1894]. Y. Supp. 727 [1892]. ^ In re Avenue L in City of New » In the Matter of One Hundred York, 95 N. Y. S. 245, 107 App. Div. and Twenty-Seventh Street, 56 How- 581 [1905]; In the Matter of the ard, 60 [1878]. Board of Street Opening, 74 Hun. « In the Matter of One Hundred 561, 26 N. Y. Supp. 855 [1893]; In and Twenty-seventh Street, 56 How- the Matter of the Board of Street ard, 60 [1878]. Opening, 64 Hun. 59, 18 N. Y. Supp. 'Forbes Street, 70 Pa. St. (20 P. 727 [1892]. F. Smith) 125 [1871]; Pittsburg ^In the Matter of the Board of City District, 2 Watts & C. 320 Street Opening, 74 Hun. 561, 26 N. [1841]. Y. Supp. 855 [1893]. § 429 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 654 upon property benefited by the improvement.* One of the most common forms of damage in such eases is that caused by change of the grade of a street.^ Unless the statute specifically au- thorizes an assessment for damages, no assessment can be levied.' If the city is authorized to change the grade of a street but there is no specific provision for assessing the cost of such change Upon property benefited, such expense must be paid for by gen- eral taxation.* It has been said that a construction of the stat- ute which would require payment of damages to an abutting owner followed by an assessment upon him to reimburse the city for such payment would be absurd."* However, it has been held proper to assess the cost of grading upon a lot and then in case the grade had previously been established to allow the lot owner to recover as one of his items of damages the amount of such assessment." In Ohio, in analogy to the rule now adopted which holds assessments to pay for the cost of land appropriated to be invalid,' an assessment cannot be levied on abutting property owners to reimburse the city for the damages which it has been obliged to pay to such owners for such change of grade." The taking of an alley. to open a street in its place is said not to cause damage to abutting property, since the alley furnished the same access as the street.' § 429. Irregtdarities in appropriation proceedings. Under some statutes a provision is made for assessing dam- ages and benefits in one proceeding. Under such statutes the ques- ' State of Minnesota ex rel. Chapin City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio C. C. 629, V. District Court of Ramsey County, 5 Ohio C. D. 301 [1894]. 40 Minn. 5, 41 N. W. 235 [188S]; 'Goodrich v. City of Omaha, 10 State, Ropes, Pros. v. Essex Public Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 242 [1880]; Bar- Road Board, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 335 nett'a Case, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 361 [1875]; People ex rel. Doyle v. [1905]. Green, 3 Hun. 755 [1875]; Dixon v. « Goodrich v. City of Omaha, 10 City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio C. C. 629, Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 242 [1880]. 5 Ohio C. D. 301 [1894]; Saunderson "Goodrich v. City of Omaha, 10 V. Herman, 95 Wis. 48, 69 N. W. 977 Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 242 [1880]. ]1897]; (following Liebermann v. " Stowell v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 523 City of Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 336, 61 [1872]. N. W. 1112 [1895]); Stowell v. Mil- 'See § 308, | 426. waukee, 31 Wis. 523 [1872]. 'McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 ^ State, Ropes, Pros. v. Essex Pub- Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]. lie Road Board, 37 N. .J. L. (8 Vr.) • Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 ni. 335 [1875]; People ex rel. Doyle v. 227 [1876]. Green, 3 Hun. 755 [1875]; Dixon v. 655 STATtTTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 430 tion of the value of the property taken is to be determined in the same proceeding as that in which the amount of benefits is determined.* Under other statutes the value of the property taken is determined in a proceeding different from that in which the assessment is apportioned. In proceedings of the latter type the determination of the value of the property taken, made in the appropriation proceedings, is final and the question of value cannot be inquired into in the assessment proceedings.^ If au- thority to appropriate land by eminent domain exists, a mere irregularity in the appropriation proceedings does not invalidate an assessment therefor if the court had jurisdiction of the case.' However, the fact that the certificate of appointment of three disinterested freeholders of the city to assess damages caused by laying out a street does not show that they were disinterested freeholders, has been held to invalidate the assessment of dam- ages and the assessment of benefits to pay for such damages.* A judgment in a proceeding in which both benefits and damages are to be assessed and the one set off against the other, is con- clusive, both as to the city and the property owner." It therefore prevents a subsequent assessment of such property for benefits arising from such improvement." § 430. Interest and costs in appropriation proceedings. Where by statute the title of property appropriated passes be- fore the levy of the assessment it has been held proper to include interest on the value of the property from the time of the passing of title as an item of assessment.* Whether the costs in con- ' Andrews v. People ex rel. Rum- whose property has been sold for sey, 83 111. 529 [1876]. such assessment to recover from the 'Goodwillie v. City of Lake View, city the money received by it on 137 111. 51, 27 N. E. 15 [1892]; An- such sale). drews v: People ex rel. Rumsey, 84 ' Davis v. Mayor and Common 111. 28 [1878]; In re Opening of Council of the City of Newark, 54 178th Street, City of New York, 94 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 N. Y. .S. 838, 107 App. Div. 22 [1892]. [1905]. See § 997. 'Davis v. Mayor and Common 'South Chicago City Railway Com- Council of the City of Newark, 54 pany v. City of Chicp.go, 196 111. 490, N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 63 N. E. 1046 [1902]; Pratt v. City [1892]. of Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 658, 68 N. W. ^ In re Mayor, etc., of New York, 392 [1896]. 89 N. Y. S. 6, 95 App. Div. 552 •Judson v. City of Bridgeport, 25 [1904]. Conn. 426 [1857]; (a suit by one § 430 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 656 demnation proceedings can be made the item of assessment is a question upon which there is some diversity of opinion arising chiefly from differences in wording of the respective statutes which apply. In Dlinois it has been said to be error to add the costs of a proceeding to appropriate land for widening a street to the amount for which the assessment is to be levied." Thus, where the damages amounted to over eight thousand dollars it was held to be error to add an item of ninety-six dollars for compensation for the city attorney, the printer, the surveyor, the clerk of the court and the commissioners.^ In Louisiana it has been held that the fees of commissioners cannot be included in an assessment for opening a street.* A different result has been reached under other statutes. Thus it has been held proper to include the compensation of appraisers who are to assess damages for opening a street in an assessment for such improvement.' In Ohio the costs and expenses of proceedings in appropriation have been placed upon the same basis as the damages for the value of the land taken, being regarded as proper items of as- sessment where the value of the land taken is regarded as proper," and improper when it has been held that the value of. the land taken cannot be included in the assessment.'' Whether the ex- pense of searching title to land which it is proposed to appropriate for opening a street can be included in an assessment has been discussed but not decided.^ ''Trustees of the Illinois and Mieh- 'Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 igan Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 111. U. S. 269, 43 L. 443, 19 S. 187 403 [1851]; Morris v. City of Chi- [1898]; (affirming Baker v. Village cago, 11 111. 650 [1850]; City of of Norwood, 74 Fed. 997 [1896]); Chicago V. Cook, 105 111. App. 353 Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, [1903]; judgment affirmed 68 N. B. 1 L. R. A. 688 [1888]; City of Day- 538. ton V. Bauman, 66 0. S. 379, 64 N. »Morri-. v. City of Chicago, 11 111. E. 433 [1902]; Cincinnati, Lebanon 650 [1850]. and Northern Railway Company v. *City of New Orleans praying for City of Cincinnati, 62 0. S. 465, 49 the. opening of Phillip and other L. R. A. 566, 57 N. E. 229 [1900]; streets, 10 La. Ann. 313 [1855]. Rhoades v. City of Toledo, 6 Ohio C. "Kuhns V. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. C. 9 [1890]. 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]. 'State, Raymond, Pros. v. Mayor "City of Cleveland v. Wick, 18 0. and Council of the Borough of S. 303 [1868]; Village of Norwood Rutherford, 56 N. J. L. (26 Vr.) 441, V. Ogden, 15 Ohio C. C. 539, 18 Ohio 27 Atl. 172 [1893]. C. C. 869, 8 Ohio CD. 383 [1898]. 657 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 431 §431. Highways included in term "street." Since a street is a public improvement for which local assess- ments may be levied/ the power of a city or other public cor- poration or public officer to levy local assessments therefor turns on questions of statutory construction. Power may be given to construct a street by general taxation,- or to construct it by local assessment to the exclusion of general taxation,^ or to construct it by either method in the discretion of the city.* Power to im- prove streets by local assessment is very generally given by stat- ute.^ The term "street" in this connection is a generic one and is broad enough to include boulevards." It is also broad enough to authorize the city to construct a parkway separating the drive- ways of a street/ and to provide for sodding such parkway and planting trees.' However, under a statute authorizing the grad- ing and paving of a street, it was held that the city had no power to require the space between the sidewalk and the curb to be filled with rich earth and sodded at the expense of the abutting property owners.' The term "street" is regarded as broad enough to include a public road or a turnpike which has been taken into the city limits.^" The existence of this power has, ' See § 301 et seq. Park, 187 111. 265, 58 N. E. 328 ^ State ex rel. The City of Colum- [1900]; Cummings v. West Chicago bus V. Strader, 25 0. S. 527 [1874]. Park Commissioners, 181 111. 136, 54- » Rhinelander v. Mayor, etc., of N. E. 941 [1899]. New York, 24 Howard (N. Y.) 304 'Thompson v. City of Highland [1862]. Park, 187 111. 265, 58 N. E. 328 * Oakland Paving Company V. Rier, [1900]; Murpfiy v. City of Peoria, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]. 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]. » Ferine v. Forbuah, 97 Cal. 305, ' Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 32 Pac. 226 [1893]; Scoville v. City Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 126; Clark v. L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899]. City of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 139 "Huelefeld v. City of Covington, [1853]; Jessing v. City of Columbus, — Ky. , 60 S. W. 296, 22 Ky. 1 Ohio C. C. 90 [1885]; (affirmed 22 L. Rep. 1188 [1901]; Lewis v. W. L. B. 453) ; Philadelphia to use v. Schmidt, — Ky. , 43 S. W. 433, Pemberton, 208 Pa. St. 214, 57 Atl. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1315; State, Town- 516 [1904]). send. Pros. v. Mayor and Common " West Chicago Park Commission- Council of Jersey City, 26 N. J. L, ers v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 49 N. E. (2 Dutch.) 444 [1857]; People of 427 [1898] ; Thompson v. City of the State of New York ex rel. Caya- Highland Park, 187 111. 265. 58 N. E. dutta Plank Road Company v. Cum- 328 [1900]; Cummings v. West Chi- mines, 166 N. Y. 110, 59 N. E. 703 cago Park Commissioners, 181 111. [1901]; Philadelphia to use v. 136, 54 N. E. 941 [1899]. Gowen, 202 Pa. St. 453, 52 Atl. 3 'Thompson v. City of Highland [1902], § 431 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 65S however, been doubted." While a turnpike company may have a right to object to an improvement of its road within city limits by the city, property owners cannot object thereto if the turn- pike company does not see fit to do so." Under an ordinance providing that no street shall be accepted for public use of a less width than thirty feet and that streets must be first dedi- cated or properly opened, an assessment cannot be levied for paving a street the width of whi?h on the city plan is thirty feet, but which has been opened for a less width." The fact that a railroad track is located in a street does not prevent it from being a street within the meaning of these statutes.^* Even if the surface of the street is covered with railroad tracks, it has still been held to be a street so that the city may improve it at the expense of the abutting property owners under a statute au- thorizing such improvement of the street.^' The fact that a rail- road company whose tracks occupy a street has agreed to grade and pave such street and to keep it in good repair does not pre- vent the city from repairing such street itself at the expense of the abutting property owners.^" A street crossing a railroad at a grade which carries the street below the railroad and below the natural surface of the ground is said to be "a subway but still a street" within the meaning of a statute authorizing the paving of streets.*' The term "street" has been held not to include a cause-way running out into the lake between water lots and connecting the-shore with a pier.** Such improvement is intended primarily for the public benefit, is chiefly intended for through traffic, and does not benefit the adjoining water lots in the way that an ordinary street benefits lots abutting thereon. Under "State, Parker, Pros. v. City of Quincy Railroad Company v. City of New Brunswick, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) Quincy, 136 111. 563, 29 Am. St. Eep. 548 [1867]. 334, 27 N. E. 192 [1892]. " Bagg V. City of Detroit, 5 Mich. " Bichards v. City of Cincinnati, 336 [1868]; State, Parker, Pros. v. 31 O. S. 506 [1877]; contra, Saxton Mayor, etc., of City, of New Bruns- National Bank v. Haywood, 62 Mo. wick, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 395 App. 550 [1895]. [1863]. "Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 "City of Philadelphia to use v. Ind. 567, 55 N. E. 768 [1899]. Ball, 147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. 564 "Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. [1892]. Mehler, 112 Ky. 438, 64 S. W. 396,. " Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 64 S. W. 652, 23 Ky. Law Eep. 1335 Railroad Company v. City of Chi- [1901]. f. E. 538 [1898]; O'Neil N. E. 767 [1894]. V. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 166 'City v. McCalmont, 6 Phil. 543 111. 561, 46 N. E. 1096 [1897]; [1868]. Hughes V. City of Momence, 163 ' Lingle v. West Chicago Park HI. 535, 45 N. E. 300 [1896]; North- Commissioners, 222 111. 384, 78 N. em Liberties v. St. Johns Church, E. 794 [1906]. 13 Pa. St. (1 Harr.) 104; City of "Lingle v. West Chicago Park Philadelphia v. Neil, 25 Pa. Super Commissioners, 222 111. 384, 78 N. E. Ct. 347 [1904]; City v. MoCalmont, 794 [1906]. 6 Phil. 543 .[1868]; Smith v. City "Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 111. 241, 71 N. E. 884 [1904]. 689 STATUTORY PEOVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 452 In this state both the constitution and the statutes give authority to levy assessments for local improvements.' "While a pumping- station is an essential feature of most systems of water-works it is held in Illinois not to be a local improvement but to be an im- provement of a general character which must be paid for by general taxation and not by special assessment or by special taxa- tion.' A stand-pipe and an engine-house are not within the term "local improvements." ° A city has power to regulate the method of making connections between abutting property and water- pipes.'" It has been held that while this power authorizes the coun- cil to prescribe the terms and methods of making connections by ordinance, it does not give power to levy assessments for making such connections." It is generally held, however, that a city has power to assess for the cost of such connections,'^ even if the wa- ter-pipes belong to a private company.'^ If providing for connec- tions from water-pipes to abutting property, the city cannot sub- divide the platted lots and require a service-pipe to be laid to each half lot.'* The cost of removing water-boxes, which were put in by the city, is a proper item to include in an assessment for paving a street.'^ § 452. Lighting. The lighting of a city by electricity, or other means, is an im- provement for which a local assessment may be levied.' Assess- ments may be levied for improvements which are incident to and a part of a general system of lighting, such as cables, lamp posts, arc lamps and the like.^ If, however, the assessment ordinance provides for the erection of electric lamp posts, it does not justify 'See § 51, § 153. '^Alvord v. City of Syracuse, 163 ■Harts V. People ex rel. Kocher- N. Y. 158, 57 N. E. 310 [1900]. sperger, 171 111. 458, 49 N. E. 538 '^ Gleason v. Waukesha County, [1898]; Hughes v. City of Momence, 103 Wis. 225, 79 N. W. 249 [1899]. 164 111. 16, 45 N. E. 302 [1896]; i» Gleason v. Waukesha County, Hughes V. City of Momence, 163 111 103 Wis. 225, 79 N. W. 249 [1899]. 535, 45 N. E..300 [1896]; Village of "Warren v. City of Chicago, 118 Morgan Park v. Wiswall, 155 111. 111. 329, 11 N. E. 218 [1887]. 262, 40 N. E. 611 [1895]. "Acklin v. Parker, 29 Ohio C. C. "O'Neil V. People ex rel. Kocher- 625 [1907]. sperger, 166 111. 561, 46 N. E. 1096 ' Ewart v. Village of Western [1897]. Springs, 180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478 "Alvord V. City of Syracuse, 16S [1899 J. See § 3B8. N. Y. 158, 57 N. E. 310 [1900]. ^Halsey v. Town of Lake View, 188 111. 540, 59 N. E. 234 [1901]. § 453 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 690 an assessment for the cost of conduits, cable switches and lamps in addition to the cost of the posts.' If an assessment ordinance, as originally passed, assumes that lamp-tops will be donated by the park board, and they are not so donated, a second ordinance providing for special assessments for such lamp-tops does not amount to a double assessment for the same improvement.* A power-house and a generator plant dp not constitute a "local im- provement" within 'the meaning of a Itatute authorizing an assess- ment for local improvements.' § 453. Filling and grading lots. Under a statute authorizing such charge, an assessment may be levied for the cost of filling lots so as to prevent the accumulation of stagnant water.^ Under such a statute the city may require not merely the removal of the stagnant water then upon the prem- ises but the filling of the lots in question so as to prevent a re- currence of the nuisance.^ Whether a land-owner can be com- pelled, under such power, to remove a nuisance which is due to the construction of public improvements, such as streets by the city, without providing for drainage, as incident thereto, is a question upon which there is some conflict of authority. It is generally held that assessments cannot be levied under such cir- cumstances. In other jurisdictions it seems to be held that the assessment is valid, although the property owner has a right of action against the city.^ The right of a city to require lots to be filled as a part of a street improvement has been discussed but not passed upon.* Under authority to fill slips, it has been held that where the filling of a slip resulted in the extension of a street, the improvement might be regarded by the city as the filling of the slip and an assessment levied under such statute.'' "Smith V. City of Chicago, 169 "Smith v. City of Milwaukee, 18 111. 257, 48 N. E. 445 [1897]. Wis. 63 [1864]. See § 342. * Halsey V. Town of Lake View, 188 * Blake v. City of Brooklyn. 26 111. 540, 59 N. E. 234 [1901]. Barb. 301 [1857]. (The decision in ' Ewart V. Village of Eastern this case turned upon the fact that Springs, 180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478 the plaintiff had sued in equity when [1899]. his remedies in law were adequate.) 1 In the Matter of Tappen, 36 How. ' Mayor, etc., of New York v. 390 11869J. «ee § 342. Whitney, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 485 "Bliss V. Kraus, 16 O. S. 54 [1849]. [1864]. 691 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 454 § 454. Market places. Under statutory authority, assessments may be levied in some jurisdictions for market places.^ Such power must be conferred expressly, or by necessary implication, however. Under a statute conferring power to assess for improving streets and alleys the city couneil cannot provide for paving a space to be used as a market place. ^ § 455. Improvement on private land. A city or other public corporation may levy assessments for the construction of improvements upon private property, if such city or public corporation has the means of securing an easement in such property by subsequent proceedings in eminent domain.^ If, however, the statute provides for levying assessments only for the improvement of a public street, road and the like, such statute does not authorize an improvement unless the public easement has been secured in some way before the improvement is made.^ Such objection must, however, be made in the proper way. If the ob- jection is not made until after confirmation, the judgment of con- firmation is regarded as conclusive in favor of the validity of the assessment.^ In Illinois such assessment may be levied before the easement is acquired, and accordingly such objection cannot be made even at confirmation.* No objection can be made that a part of the interest of the complainant in the street has not been con- demned bui that he has been allowed to keep it.° § 456. River and harbor improvements. In some jurisdictions assessments for river and harbor im- ' Donovan v. Coles, 33 Mo. App. * Barker v. Board of Commission- 161 [1888]. "The statute here don- ers of Wyandotte County, 45 Kan. sidered gave specific power to vacate 681, 26 Pac. 585 [1891]; In the streets and establish market places Matter of One Hundred and Twenty- The space for the paving on which Seventh Street, 56 How. (N. Y.) 60 the assessment was levied was used [1878]; McKeesport Borough to Use for a market for a small part of the of McKeesport City v. Busch, 166 Pa. day and in other respects the space St. 46, 31 Atl. 49 [1895]. was used as any other public street ' People ex rel. Raymond v. Tal- in St. Louis." Donovan v. Coles, 33 madge, 194 111. 67, 61 N. E. 1049 Mo. App. 161, 164 [1888]. [1901]; Lehmer v. People ex rel.Mil- = City of Fort Wayne v. Shoaff, ler, 80 111. 601 [1875]. 106 Ind. 66, 5 N. E. 403 [1885]. 'Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park, 'See § 390 et seq.; Holmes v. Vil- 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889]. lage of Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 » Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 111. N. E. 540 [1888]. 227 [1876]. § 457 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 692 provements have been held to be valid, if authorized by statute.' A statute authorizing an assessment for widening a river does not authorize an assessment for deepening such river, except as far as the deepening is a mere incident to widening.^ In jurisdictions in which the validity of such assessments was recognized the power of a city to levy such assessments has since been denied.' This conclusion has since been reached under constitutional and statu- tory provisions authorizing assessments for local improvements. The improvement of a navigable river is held not to be a local improvement within the meaning of these provisions. An addi- tional consideration rendering such assessment invalid is the fact that navigable rivers are under the control of the United States.* However, where a bridge had been constructed across a navigable river connecting two parts of a street separated by such river, it was. held that the authority of the Secretary of War might be pre- sumed. The bridge in this case was to be paid for by general taxation.' Whether such assessments can be levied has been dis- cussed but not decided in some of the cases." Where such assess- ments have been held valid, it has been held that an assessment may be levied for removing an obstruction from a navigable stream, even if caused by the negligence of the city.'' § 457. Removal of ice and snow. In some jurisdictions, it has already been pointed out,^ a city may compel a property owner to remove ice and snow from sidewalks adjoining his property under a statutory grant of 1 Bond V. City of Kenosha, 17 Wis. cago, 162 111. 383, 44 ■ N. E. 739 284 [1863]; (In Hale v. City of [1896]). Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599, it was doubted "Pearson v. City of Chicago, 162 whether such a charge was an assess- 111. 383, 44 N". E. 739 [1896]. nient or a tax in the narrower sense. "Hamilton v. City of Fon du Lac, See § 360. 25 Wis. 490 [1870]. ^ Wright V. City of Chicago, 20 ' Buffalo Union Iron Works v. City 111. 252 [1858]; Elston t. City of of Buffalo, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Chicago, 40 111. 514, 89 Am. Dec. Y.) 141 [1870]. (In this case the .361 [1866]. obstruction consisted of a float which ' City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. the city had negligently towed put 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]. , into the stream and allowed to sink * City of Chicago v. Law, 144 111. and about which the wrecks of other 569, 33 N. E. 855 [1893]; (distin- vessels had accumulated.) guished in Pearson v. City of Chi- ' See § 58. 693 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 458 power.^ This power is sometimes granted specifically by statute." It may be granted by statutes which confer in general terms power to regulate nuisances.* In other jurisdictions cities are held not to have the power to compel property owners to remove ice and snow from the adjoining sidewalks," and questions of this sort accordingly do not arise. Thus a statutory grant of power to construct local improvements has been held not to give authority to compel property owners to remove ice and snow." § 458. Sprinkling streets. The sprinkling of city streets is a public benefit and may be paid out of funds raised by general taxation.^ In many juris- dictions as has been said before,^ it is held that local as- sessments cannot be levied for sprinkling.' In some cases the reason for this holding is based on constitutional grounds and statutes giving specific authority for such assessments are held unconstitutional.* A statiite conferring power to levy assessments for "local improvements" is held not to confer power to levy as- sessments for sprinkling.'' A statute authorizing local assessments for "sewerage, paving and other like purposes," is held not to confer power to assess for sprinkling." In other jurisdictions, assessments for sprinkling may be levied.' A statute which pro- vides that the board of public works shall let sprinkling contracts "State V. McMahon, 76 Conn. 97, 88 111. 554, 30 Am. Rep. 566 [1878]. 55 Atl. 591 [1903]; Union Railway 'Maydwell v. City of Louisville, Company v. Mayor and Aldermen of 116 Ky. 885, 76 S. W. 1091 [1903]. Cambridge, 11 All. 287 [1865]; God- = See § 370. dard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Prest, 504, 28 Am. Dec. 259 [1835]; City 71 Fed. 815 [1896]; City of Chicago of Helena v. Kent, 32 Mont. 279, 80 v. Blair, 149 111. 310, 24 L. R. A Pac. 258 [1905]; Carthage v. Fred- 412, 36 N. E. 829 [1894]; Kansas erick, 122 N. Y. 268, 19 Am. St. Rep. City v. O'Connor, 82 Mo. App. 655 490, 10 L. R. A. 178, 25 N. E. 480. [1899]; Pettit v. Duke, 10 Utah 311, = State V. McMahon, 76 Conn. 97, 37 Pac. 568 [1894]. 55 Atl. 591 [1903]. *Kew York Life Ins. Co. v. Prest, 'City of Helena v. Kent, 32 Mont. 71 Fed. 815 [1896]. 279, 80 Pac. 258 [1905]. 'City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 HI. "Chicago V. O'Brien, 111 III. 532, 310, 24 L. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829 53 Am. Rep. 640 [1884]; Grideley [1894]. V. City of Bloomington, 88 111. 554, "Pettit v. Duke, 10 Utah 311, 37 30 Am. Rep. 566 [1878]; State v. Pac. 568 [1894]. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318, 42 L. R. A. 'Palmer v. Nolting, 13 Ind. App. 438, 42 Atl. 347 [1898]. 581, 41 N. E. 1045 [1895].. "Urideley v. City of Bloomington, § 459 TAXATION BY ASFESSMENT. 694 and that the cost of such sprinkling shall be assessed pro rata upon the property owners along the line of the street sprinkled as the cost of public improvements is assessed authorizes such assess- ment.' § 459. Other types of improvement. A culvert is a part of a street improvement or of a system of- drainage. Assessments may be levied therefor under statutory authority.^ Whether a provision in a contract for grading in- cludes constructing culverts was not decided, since if the con- tractor constructed culverts he could not recover therefor from the property owners under the head of grading, as by statute, grading was to be paid for by the city.^ Under statutory authority an assessment may be levied to compensate a railroad for giving up its right to use steam power within the city limits.' A road in the country is an improvement for which in some jurisdictions local assessments may be levied.* A statute providing for the method of levying and collecting assessments for such improvement is applicable to a road partially constructed at the time of the passage of such statute, if the construction of such road is begun upon the assessment plan.' If there is statutory authority there- for assessments may be levied for the purchasing of land for use as a park and the improvement thereof.* Under a statute which gives to the park department the exclusive power to pave roads in a park while the city council has exclusive power to pave roads outside of the park, the park department may include in an assessment for park purposes, work done on streets outside of the park necessary to complete the paving in the park, to make the connecting streets and approaches safe for travelers, and to furnish the park with proper drainage.'' Even where assess- ments can be levied for the cost of removing garbage no such "Palmer v. Nolting, 13 Ind. App. Gravel Road Company v. Wallace, 39 581, 41 N. E. 1045 [1895]. Ind. 435 U872]. » Shannon v. Village of Hinsdale, " Kittinger v. City of Buffalo, 148 180 111. 202, 54 N. E. 181 [1899]. M. Y. 332, 42 N E. 803 [1896]; ' City of Covington v. Dressman, In the Matter of the Commission- 69 Ky. (6 Bush.) 210 [1869]. ers of Central Park, 63 Barb. (N. "People ex rel. Crowell v. Law- Y.) 282 [1872]. See § 356. rence, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 178 [1862]. ' Kittinger v. City of Buffalo, 148 •«ee 1.322. N. Y. 332, 42 N. E. 803 [1896]. Tall Creek and Warren Township 695 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMJPROVEMENTS. § 460 assessment can be levied in the absence of statutory authority therefor.* § 460. Temporary improvements. A temporary improvement which is incident to an improve- ment of a permanent character is one for which a local assess- ment may be levied under a statutory grant of power.^ Thus a statute which provides for assessments for grading and paving streets and further provides, ' ' the work done in constructing any street may be protected from surface water by temporary drains and culverts put in under the direction of the city engineer," authorizes the expense of temporary culverts used to protect the work already done from surface water, to be assessed upon the property to be benefited by the permanent improvement.^ § 461. Repairs. The question of the power of the legislature to authorize as- sessments for improvements of this type has already been dis- cussed.' Questions of constitutional and statutory construction are so closely connected that some repetition of questions already discussed is necessary to a clear presentation of the subject. Pow- er to provide for constructing and maintaining streets is a con- tinuing power.^ The repair of pre-existing streets is an improve- ment for which a local assessment may be levied under statutory authority.^ By statute in many jurisdictions it is expressly provided that the repair of an existing street is to be paid for by general taxation.* Statutes providing for general taxation for repairs frequently describe such improvements as "ordinary re- "Trephagen v. City of South 515, 74 N. E. 797 [1905] ; Perkinson Omaha, 69 Neb. 577, 111 Am. St, v. Sohnaake, 108 Mo. App. 255, 83 Rep. 570, 96 N. W. 248 [1903]. S. W. 301 [1904]; Barber Asphalt ^ Russell V. Adkins, 24 Mo. App. Paving Company v. Muchenberger, 605 [1887]. 105 Mo. App. 47, 78 S. W. 280 "Russell V. Adkins, 24 Mo. App. [1903]; O'Meara v. Green, 25 Mo. 605 [1887]. App. 198; O'Meara v. Green, 16 Mo. ^See §§ 373-378. . App. 118 [1884]'; Robertson v. City = Estes V. Owen, 90 Mo. 113, 2 S. of Omaha, 55 Neb. 718, 44 L. R. A. W. 133 [1886]; McCormack V. Patch- 534, 76 N. W. 442 [1898]; Brenn in, 53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Rep. 440 v. City of Troy, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) [1873]. 417 [1871]; In the Matter of Fulton 'Estes V. Owen, 90 Mo. 113, 2 S. Street, 29 Howard 429 [1865]; W. 133 [1887]. Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 'Bush V. City of Peoria, 215 111. 648 [1872]. § 461 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 696 pairs. "^ Under a statute authorizing assessments for "local im- provements" repairs are held not to be local improvements.' An assessment may be levied for repairs, although the contractor who constructed such improvement was bound by contract to keep the improvement in repair for a given space of time which has not yet' elapsed. While the primary duty in such cases rests upon the contractor, yet in case he is insolvent the contract does not discharge the property owners from liability to assessment for such improvement.'' By statute it is frequently provided that the cost of repairing sidewalks must be paid for by general taxation.* Other statutes authorize the city to require the abut^ ting property owners to repair sidewalks on which their property abuts.® Such a statute authorizes the city to make a contract for the repair of sidewalks in case the abutting property owners neglect or refuse to make such repairs when notified to do so.^' Under a statute authorizing the same, assessments may be levied for repairing and maintaining an existing sewer.^^ The repair of ditches constructed for drainage purposes is an improvement for which an assessment can be levied under a statute authorizing the same.^^ Under such statute a new ditch cannot be constructed under color of proceedings to repair a ditch.^' However, the fact that the ditch is made wider by the process' of cleaning it out does not invalidate the assessment." Under authority to construct drains it is doubtful whether the item of filling land below the level of the surrounding land can be included.^' Authority to "Robertson v. City of Omaha, 55 "Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, Neb. 718, 44 L. R. A. 534, 76 N. W. 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846 [1887]; 442 [1898]; Brenn v. City of Troy, Scott v. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, 31 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 417 [1871]. N. E. 953 [1892]; Weaver v. Temp- " Crane V. West Chicago Park Com- lin, 113 Ind. 298, 14 N. E. 600 missioners, 153 111. 348, 26 L. R. A. [1887]; State ex rel. French v. John-. 311, 38 N. E. 943 [1894]. son, 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553 'State ex rel. Woulfe v. St. Paul, [1885]; Dean v. Treasurer of Clinton 107 La. 777, 32 So. 88 [1902]. County, 146 Mich. 645, 109 N. W. » Bonnet v. Citv and County of San 1131 [1906] ; Angell v. Cortright, 111 Francisco, 65 Cal. 230, 3 Pac. 813 Mich. 223, 69 X. W. 486 [1896]. [1884]. "Millikan v. Wall, 133 Ind. 51, 32 "Young V. Village of Waterville, N. E. 828 [1892]. 39 Minn. 196, 39 N. W. 97 [1888]. "Angell v. Cortright, 111 Mich. "Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, 223, 69 N. W. 486 [1896]. 82 Pac. 331 [1905]. "It was held that filling was not " Smith V. Mayor and Aldermen of authorized in In the Matter of Van Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. R. Buren, 55 Howard (N. Y.) 513 A. 728, 65 N. E. 40 [1902]. [1878]; but this question was not 697 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 462 construct an improvement of which a culvert is a part does not confer authority to levy an assessment for repairs to such culvert which became necessary during the progress of the work.^° § 462. What constitutes original construction. In New York by statute assessments for reconstruction may be set aside upon many grounds upon which assessments for original construction could not be set aside. Under- the New York statute, therefore, the question of what an original construction was be- came material and was frequently discussed. To constitute an original improvement of a street there must have been a sub- stantial paving of the part of the street improved.^ Accordingly, a street which was curbed and guttered, but upon each side of which a narrow strip was laid with cobble stones to protect the gutter and by which sidewalks had been laid was held not to be paved within the meaning of this statute.^ Since the term "street" in its broad sense includes "sidewalks," the work of paving and setting curb stones and gutter stones is a part of the work of paving the street and the reconstruction of such im- provements subsequently is a repavement within the meaning of these statutes.'' These statutes apply only where the prior improvement was constructed upon the assessment plan and such assessments have in fact been paid. The mere presumption of payment arising from a lapse of time is not sufficient to protect the property only in such cases.' The paving of a street at the expense of the property owners voluntarily and without any as- sessment does not constitute an original improvement within the meaning of these statutes.'"^ Where the city owns certain prop- erty at the time that a former improvement was made and the city paid the assessment thereon and subsequently conveyed the decided in the Court of Appeals, in In meister, 76 N. Y. 174 [1879]; (re- the Matter of Petition of Van Buren, versing In the Matter of Petition of 79 N. y. 384 [1880]. Burmeister, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 613 « Spangler V. City of Cleveland, 35 11877J); In the Matter of Burke, O. S. 469 [1880]. 62 N. Y. 224 [1875]; Matter of Phil- *In the Matter of the Petition of lips, 60 N. Y. 16. Brady, 85 N. Y. 268 [1881]. * In the Matter of Willet, 70 N. ^n the Matter of the Petition of Y. 490 [1877]; In the Matter of Ser- Brady, 85 N. Y. 268 [1881]; (Ac- rill, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 233 [1876]. cordingly a subsequent pavement was "Petition of Astor, 2 Sup. Ct. (T. not a repavement.) & C.) 488 [1874]. ' In the Matter of Petition of Bur- § 462 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 698 property to a third person, such improvement is not an original improvement within the meaning of the statutes." In Pennsyl- vania the attitude of the courts was from the first strongly against permitting assessments for reconstruction. Under statutes au- thorizing the paving of streets but not providing specifically for reconstruction, the court declined to construe such statutes so as to permit the repaving of a street in place of a pre-existing street in good condition.' Even where authority to pave was construed not to include authority to repave, it was said that a statute au- thorizing local assessments for such repaving would be uncon- stitutional.* Subsequently under statutes which provided spe- cifically for assessments for repaving it was held that such stat- utes were unconstitutional," whether the original improvement was paid for by local assessments,^" or whether it was paid for by general taxation,^' or whether a pavement not constructed by the city on either plan is subsequently adopted or acquiesced in.^^ This principle has not, however, been applied to improvements such as sidewalks, assessments for which are justified not on the theory of benefits but on the theory that the owner of prop- erty may be required to pay the cost of performing a legal duty which he has neglected to perform.^'' Since in Pennsylvania the legislature has' no power to authorize an assessment for recon- struction, the question of what is an original construction is material. An original construction within the meaning of the "In the Matter of Welsh, 30 Hun. 1070' [1892]; West Third Street (N. Y.) 372 [1883]. Sewer, Appeal of the City of Will- ' Wistar v. Philadelphia, 80 Pa. iamsport, 187 Pa. St. 565, 41 Atl. 476 St. (30 P. F. Smith) 505, 21 Am. [1898]; Appeal of the Protestant Rep. 112 [1876]; Hammett v. Phil- Orphan Asylum of Pittsburgh and adelphia, 65 Pa. St. (15 P. F. Smith) Allegheny, 111 Pa. St. 135, 3 Atl. 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1870]. (This 217 [1885]. improvement was undertaken for the " Appeal of the Protestant Orphan purpose of making a great public Asylum of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, driveway by widening and repaving 111 Pa. St. 135, 3 Atl. 217 [1885]. with wooden blocks a street upon '^ City of Harrisburg v. Segel- which there was a good cobble stone baum, 151 Pa. St. 172, 20 L. R. A. pavement.) 834, 24 Atl. 1070 [1892]; West ' Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. Third Street Sewer, Appeal of the St. (15 P. F. Smith) 146, 3 Am. City of Williamsport, 187 Pa. St. Kep. 615 [1870]. 565, 41 Atl. 476 [1898]. "Scranton City v. Sturges, 202 Pa. ^^Dick v. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St. St. 182, 51 Atl. 764 [1902]; City of 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]. Harrisburg v. Segelbaum, 161 Pa. " Smith v. Kingston Borough, 120 St. 172, 20 L. E. A. 834, 24 Atl. P*. St. 357, 14 Atl. 170 [1888]. 699 STATUTOEV PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 462 rule which protects a property owner from assessments for re- constructions is said to be one which is put down originally or adopted or acquiesced in subsequently by the authorities of the public corporation for the purpose and with the intent of chang- ing an ordinary road into a street." The existence of an origi- nal construction depends therefore in part upon the nature of the improvement and the material with which it is made and in part upon the intention with which it is done.^° If there is no intention of changing the road into a street, a surfacing of the road, no matter how carefully or expensively done, does not amount to an original construction.'" Macadamizing a road is said prima facie to be an original construction in a small town or city but not an original construction in a large city.'' Repair- ing a pre-existing highway and maintaining it in use as such does not amount to an original eostruction." Still less does use of a turnpike as a road amount to a construction where the turnpike company has stoned less than one-half the width of the road, and at the time it ceased to own such road the stoning was in a ruinous condition, was removed by the borough in paving such street and the borough has never used nor adopted such road as a street.'" Repairing a plank road to keep it in con- dition fit for travel until a permanent improvement could be made is not an original construction within the meaning of the stat- ute.^" Repairing a roadway with brokfen limestone is not an "Dick V. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St. 169 Pa. St. 452, 32 Atl. 639 [1895]; 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]; Philadel- Macadamizing may be an original phia to Use of Mack v. Eddleman, paving. City of Harrisburg v. Seg- 169 Pa. St. 452, 32 Atl. 639 [1895]. elbaum, 151 Pa. St. 172, 20 L. K. A. "East Street, Evans' Appeal, 210 834, 24 Atl. 1070 [1892]. Pa. St. 539, 60 Atl. 154 [1904]; In « East Street, Evans' Appeal, 210 re Lincoln Ave., Rodger's Appeal, Pa. St. 539, 60 Atl. 154 [1904]; 193 Pa. St. 432, 44 Atl. 1102 [1899] ; Harrisburg v. Funk, 200 Pa. St. 348, Philadelphia to Use of Mack v. Ed- 49 Atl. 992 [1901]; Philadelphia to dleman, 169 Pa. St. 452, 32 Atl. 639 Use of Mack v. Eddleman, 169 Pa. [1895]. St. 452, 32 Atl. 639 [1895]; Phila- "Diek v; Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]; Philadel phia to Use of Mack v. Eddleman, 169 Pa. St. 452, 32 Atl. 639 [1895] " Dick v. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]; Philadel phia to Use of Mack v. Eddleman delphia to Use v. Dibeler, 147 Pa. St. 261, 23 Atl. 567 [1892]. " In re Lincoln Ave., Rodger's Ap- peal, 193 Pa. St. 432, 44 Atl. 1102 [1899]. ^"East Street, Evans' Appeal, 210 Pa. St. 539, 60 Atl. 154 [1904]. § 462 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 700 original construction.-^ The use of a plank road after freeing it from tolls, and subsequent regrading of it so as to destroy the planking does not amount to an original construction so as to re- lieve the abutting owners from assessment for a vitrified brick pavement.^^ If a part of a street has been paved and a part left unpaved,^^ as where a part of a street was left for use as a market place,-* or has been left as a parkway down the center of a street,^^ the subsequent paving* of such previously unpaved part of the street is not a reconstruction but is regarded itself as an original construction. In Kentucky under statutes spe- cifically authorizing it, assessments for the reconstruction of streets have been held to be valid.^° Original constructions are controlled by some statutes difiEerent from those applicable to subsequent constructions, and the question of what an original construction is, is therefore material.^' The ordinance for an original improvement must be enacted with certain specified for- malities.^' By statutes applicable to some cities original con- struction of public ways is to be at the exclusive cost of the abut- ting owners while the reconstruction is to be one-half at the cost of the abutting owners and one-half at the cost of the city.^° By such a statute a sidewalk is held not to be a public way and hence the reconstruction of a sidewalk may be entirely at the cost of the abutting owners.^' Under statutes applicable to other cities it is provided that the cost of reconstruction must be borne en- tirely by the eity.'^ Under the statutes in force in Kentucky ap- plicable to some cities, assessments cannot be levied for a recon- ^ Harrisburg v. Funk, 200 Pa. St. in connection with an improvement 348, 49 Atl. 992 [1901]; Philadel- refers to an improvement when first phia to Use v. Dibeler, 147 Pa. St. made." Thomas v. Woods, — Ky. 261, 23 Atl. 567 [1892]. , 108 S. W. 878, 880 [1908]. == Dick V. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St. " Thomas v. Woods, — Ky. , 467, 47 Atl. 750 [1901]. 108 S. W. 878 [1908]. "= Philadelphia to Use v. Evans, ^ Mudge v. Walker, — (Ky.) , 139 Pa. St. 483, 21 Atl. 200 [1891]; 28 Ky. Law Eep. 996, 90 S. W. 1046 Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 112 [1906]. Pa. St. 494, 4 Atl. 185 [1886]. =»Mudge v. Walker, — (Ky.) =* Philadelphia to Use v. Evans. 28 Ky. Law Rep. 996, 90 S. W. 1046 139 Pa. St. 483, 21 Atl. 200 [1891]. [1906]; (The probability of this con- =® Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, struction is aided by the fact that 112 Pa. St. 494, 4 Atl. 185 [1886]. the statute contained a specific pro- ^ Broadway Baptist Church v. Mc- vision for assessing the cost of side- Atee, 8 Bush. (71 Ky.) 508, 8 Am. walks upon abutting owners.) Rep. 480 [1871]; Bradley v. McAtee, "City of Louisville v. Tyler, 111 7 Bush. (70 Ky.) 667, 3 Am. Rep. Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 65 S. W. -125 309 [1870]. [1901]. " "The word 'original' when used 701 STATUTOKY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 462 struction even if the original construction was not at the cost of the abutting owners.'^ It is not necessary that the original construction should have been authorized by ordinance when made.^' The fact that the street was originally improved by building a "turnpike" road which was said to mean a macadam pavement, does not prevent such improvement from being an original construction so that no assessment can be levied for a subsequent improvement.^* The fact that no sidewalk was built on the side of the street does not prevent the improvement from being an original construction.'^ Property owners were allowed to improve a strip sixteen feet wide in the center of a thirty- foot street, by paving the same. This was held to be an original construction so that assessment could not be levied for a subse- quent construction, although the city had given such permission under a resolution that the street was not then "in condition for a more perfect and complete construction. ' ' '° Grading a dirt road so as to level the center for drainage purposes and leveling inequalities upon its surface, '' or temporarily repairing a street from time to time by putting crushed stone upon it,'" or grading and covering the surface of a street with cinders and mill ashes,'" or covering a strip eighteen feet wide in the center of a road with macadam a foot deep without curbing or gutter- ing,*" are none of them original constructions of the street. Ac- cordingly, a subsequent paving of such streets is regarded as an original construction and not a reconstruction. If a macadamized road,*^ or a turnpike road,*^ is taken into the city limits, the subsequent paving thereof is regarded as an original construction and not a reconstruction. »^City of Louisville v. Tyler, 111 [1901]; (citing Mackin v. Wilaon, Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 65 S. W. 125 45 S. W. 663, 20 Ky. L. R. 218; [1901]. Ormsby v. Jamison, 9 Ky. L. R. 325). ''City of Louisville v. Tyler, 111 " Lindsey v. Brawner, — Ky. . Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 85 S. W. 125 97 S. W. 1 [1906]. [1901]. "Adams v. City of Ashland, — "City of Louisville v. Tyler, 111 Ky. , 80 S. W. 1105, 26 Ky. Law Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 65 S. W. 125 Rep. 184 [1904]. [1901]. "Heim v. Figg, — Ky. , 89 ""City of Louisville v. Tyler, 111 S. W. 301, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 396 Ky. 588, 64 S. W. 415, 65 S. W. 125 [1905]. [1901]. "City of Catlettsburg v. Self, 115 '«Gleai?on v. Barnett, 115 Ky. 890, Ky. 669, 74 S. W. 1064, 25 Ky. Law 61 S. W. 20 [1903]. Rep. Ifil [1903]. "Barfleld v. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, "McHenry v. Selvage, 99 Ky. 232, 63 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 128 35 S. W. 645 [1896]. § 463 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 702 § 463. Distinction between repairs and reconstruction. Since the method of paying for the cost of reconstructions is in many jurisdictions different from the cost of paying for re- pairs, the question whether a given improvement is a recon- struction or a repair is often material. Whether an improvement is a repair or a reconstruction has been said to be a question of faet.^ It is more accurate to say that it is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined largely by the character of the work and the relation of the new work to the old.^ The council cannot change the legal character of a repair by calling it a reconstruction.' If new material is used in the improvement of a different kind from the old, and the old material is entirely replaced, the improvement is evidently a reconstruction and not a repair.* Thus if a street which has been graded and paved with stone is subsequently regraded and paved with a Nicholson block pavement, the latter improvement is not a repair but a reconstruction.' Accordingly it has been said that the difference between reconstruction and repairs is that in reconstruction a new material is used and it may be a different kind of material; and changes in the structure of the improvement may also be involved; while in repairs the same kind of material of which the improvement was originally composed is used, and the struc- ture of the improvement must not be changed in any material way." It is not, however, necessary to remove all the old mate- rial in cases of reconstruction.' Furthermore, a rule of a street commissioner which designates as reconstruction, only the work in which a new and different kind, of paving is used, is held to be a rule which may often be incorrect, and which if incorrect, cannot' control the true character of the work.' Specific examples may be helpful in illustrating the difference between reconstruc- 'O'Meara v. Green, 16 Mo. App. 'Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 118 [1884]. Wis. 648 [1872]. 'O'Meara v. Green, 25 Mo. App. " Farrell v. Rammelkamp, 64 Mo. 198 [1887]. App. 425 [1896]. 'O'Meara v. Green, 25 Mo. App. 'Field v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 198 [1887]. 224, 64 N. E. 840 [1902]; Rackliile •Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Com- v. Duncan, — Mo. App. , 108 S. pany v. Broderiek, 113 Cal. 628, 45 W. 1110 [1908]. Pac. 863 [1896]; In the Matter of ' Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. Repaying Fulton Street. 39 Howard App. 510 [1894]. (N. Y.) 429 [1865]; Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. 703 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 463 tion and repairs. An improvement consisted of a concrete base, a binder course and a surface of asphalt. The asphalt surface had become badly worn and in many places both the asphalt surface and the binder coat has disintegrated and had worn away through to the concrete base. The street had been repaired twice and finally the asphalt coat and the binder coat were re- moved and a new asphalt coat and binder coat were placed upon the concrete foundation. This was held to be a reconstruction and not a repair.' In a case presenting similar facts the asphalt coat was removed and the old concrete base was left wherever it was in good condition, and where necessary, was built up so as to bring it to a certain level. Upon the base thus made a coat of asphalt was laid. The trial court found that this was a re- construction and not a repair and the court of appeals held that such finding could be supported upon the evidence.'" However, an improvement consisting of relaying a new three-inch asphalt surface on the original macadam base without disturbing the latter is held to be a repair and not a reconstruction.^' An im- provement consisted of wooden blocks laid upon a concrete base. After the blocks were worn out they were removed and vitrified brick was laid on the old base. This was held to be a reconstruc- tion and not a repair." The old paving stones were removed and new paving stones were used in paving an alley, and the grade was changed a. few inches, although it was not at the outset in- tended that the grade should be changed. This was held to amount to reconstruction and not to a repair.'^ A street had been covered with refuse stone from a neighboring quarry with- out gutters or curbstones. Seven years afterward it was in bad condition, below the grade and lower in the middle than at the sides. At the time it was ordered that the street should be graded, curbstones set, the gutters paved with stone and the street macadamized with six inches of broken stone covered with two inches of gravel. This was held to be a reconstruction and not a repair.'* A street which had never been so improved was paved •Bush V. City of Peoria, 215 111. ute, and not the property owners.) 515, 74 N. E. 797 [1905]. - "Robertson v. City of Omaha, 55 "Barber Asphalt Paving Company Neb. 718, 44 L. R. A. 534, 76 N. W. V. Muchenberger, 105 Mo. App. 47, 442 [1898]. 78 S. W. 280 [1903]. " Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. "City of Covington v. Bullock, — App. 510 [1894]. Ky. , 103 S. W. 276 [1907]; » Koons v. Lucas, 52 la. 177, 3 N. (The city is therefore liable, by stat- W. 84 [1879]. § 463 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 704 with bituminous rock on a macadam foundation. This was held to be a reconstruction.^^ A macadamized roadbed was scraped, cleaned, filled and rolled so as to present an even surface and covered with a new coating of macadam six and one-half inches thick. This was held to be a reconstruction and not a repair, since it was not necessary to constitute a reconstmetion that the old material should be removed entirely and replaced with mate- rial of a different character.^" A btick sidewalk was taken up, a new trench dug, a new foundation of sand laid and a number of new bricks used in relaying the walk. This was held to amount to a reconstruction and not a repair.^' A street was graded and paved so as to leave grass plots between the sidewalks and the roadways in which shade trees grew. Subsequently the grass plots and trees were destroyed and the space formerly occupied by them was covered with an extension of the paving of a street. This was regarded as a repaving and not as an original construc- tion.^* However, where a sidewalk consisted of two strips of ce- ment walk with a wooden walk between the two and, as the wood- en walk was in bad condition, the owner was ordered to construct a cement sidewalk in place thereof, this was held to be a proper exercise of power under a statute giving the Board of Public Works power to specify, in the notice to the property owners, what material should be used in repairs.^' Straightening a curb and replacing rotten stones with new ones where the old stones were in bad condition is a repair and not a reconstruction.^" Resetting flagstones and curbstones is a repair. ^^ An ordinance requiring a turnpike to be put in repair requires the holes in such ''Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Com "Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, pany v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628, 45 82 Pac. 331 [1905]. Pae. 863 [189«]. ^Perkinsou v. Schnaake, 108 Mo. "Field V. City of Chicago, 198 App. 255, 83 S. W. 301 [1904]. In 111. 224, 64 N. B. 840 [1902]. Kacklitfe v. Duncan, — Mo. App. "Farraher v. City of Keokuk, 111 -, 108 S. W. 1110 [1908] an im- la. 310, 82 N. W. 773 [1900]. (An provement whioh consisted of making assessment for such an improvement the street over, although the old was accordingly void since the prop- curb and gutter stones were used erty owners had not petitioned there- «rherever serviceable, was held to be for.) a reconstruction. "Wreford v. City of Detroit, 132 '''State, Cronin, Pros. v. Mayor Mich. 348, 93 N. W. 876 [1903]. See and Aldermen of Jersey City, 38 N. for a similar case, Dickinson v. City J. L. (9 Vr.) 410 [1876]. of Detroit, 111 Mich. 480, 69 N. W. 728 [1897]. 705 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 464 pike to be filled and the surface made even. It does not require iHe construction of a new road to a new grade. ^- Improvements whieh from their nature would amount to repairs cannot be treated as reconstructions because the original construction was made by property owners who at the time such construction was made were outside of the city limits, even if such repairs are the first improvement made after such road has been taken into the city.^* In Wisconsin, by statute, an original permanent im- provement in case of ' graveling a street is defined as placing gravel at least one foot in depth by sixteen feet in width. Un- der such a statute, the placing of crushed stone on a street ten feet in width and eight inches in depth was held not to be an original permanent improvement.^* § 464. Reconstruction. Whether the legislature may authorize a special assessment for the reconstruction of an improvement which has once been con- structed is a question which has been discussed heretofore.^ Where such assessments are held to be valid statutes are frequently found authorizing assessments for reconstructions. Pull effect is given to such statutes.^ Under a statute which provides that the ^Milford V. Cincinnati, Milford & Orleans, 48 La. Ann. 1440, 21 So. Loveland Trac. Co., 26 Ohio C. C. 24 [1896]; State ex rel. Wheeler v. 271 [1904]. District Court of Ramsey County, 80 ''O'Meara v. Green, 16 Mo. App. Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 [1900]; 118 [1884]. Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo. 349, 49 ^McMillan v. Fond du Lac Coun- S. W. 1026 [1898]; (reversing 64 ty, — Wis. , 114 N. W. 1119 Mo. App. 441 [1895]); Smith v. [1908], Hence the abutting property Tobener, 32 Mo. App. 601 [1888]; could be assessed for a subsequent Morley v. Carpenter, 22 Mo. App. improvement. 640 [1886]; State, Jelliff, Pros. v. "■See § 379 et seq. Mayor and Common Council of the " Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving City of Newark, 48 N. J. L. ( 19 Co., 194 U. S. 618, 24 S. 784, 48 L. Vr.) 101, 2 Atl. 627 [1886]; Conde 1142 [1904]; (modifying Field v. v. City of Schenectady, 164 N. Y. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 117 Fed. 258, 58 N. E. 130 [1900]; Moran v. 925 [1902]); MeVeery v. Boyd, 89 City of Troy, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 540 Cal. 304, 26 Pac. 885 [1891]; Bush [1877]; In the Matter of Repaying V. City of Peoria, 215 111. 515, 74 N. J^'ulton Street, 29 Howard (N. Y.) E. 797 [1905]; Gurnee v. City of 429 [1863] ; Adams v. City of Beloit, Chicago, 40 111. 165 [1866] ; Lux & 105 Wis. 363, 47 L. R. A. 441, 81 N. Talbot Stone Company v. Donaldson, W. 869 [1900]; Warner v. Knox. 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1903]; 50 Wis. 429, 7 N. W. 372 [1880]; City of Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 140 [1870]; Schmidt v. City of New 648 [1872]. § 464 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 706 "expense of maintaining, relaying, keeping in repair, and clean- ing of streets" is to be borne by general taxation, "relaying" means only relaying in the course of ordinary repairs and does not mean repaying.^ Authority to construct an original im- proTsmsnt, such as paving, is regarded as a continuing power and in the absence of some . specific statutory provision to the contrary confers authority to as^ss for repaving.* So under a statute authorizing the city to charge seventy-five cents per foot of frontage upon land which borders on" streets through which water pipes are laid, the city may make such charge where new pipes are laid in place of the old pipes which had been laid by a water company.' The discretion of the city in determining when reconstruction is necessary is final," if not grossly abused. Where this power exists an assessment may be levied for a re- construction, even though the property owner has already paid an assessment for the original improvement.' Under many stat- utes it is provided that the expense of repaying must be borne by the city out of funds raised by general taxation." Under other statutes repaying is to be paid out of the general funds of the city except in special cases.* Thus it may be provided that repaying cannot be paid for by special assessment unless a ma- .jority of the property owners to be assessed, petition therefor.^" By statute is may be provided that no assessment can be levied •Adams v. City of Beloit, 105 Wis. 451, 63 Atl. 170 [1906] as not ap- 363, 47 L. K. A. 441, 81 K. W. 869 portioned according to benettts). [1900]. "Dumesnil v. Louisville Artificial •City of Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 Stone Co., 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 Ind. 140 [1870]; State ex rel. [1900]; (A case in which .a sidewalk Wheeler v. District Court of Ramsey which had been laid twenty-two County, 80 Minn. 293, 83 X. W. 183 years but was in fair condition was [1900]; Smith v. Tobener, 32 Mo. rebuilt.) App. 601 [1888]; Morley v. Carpen- 'McVeery v. Boyd, 89 Cal. 304, 26 ter, 22 Mo. App. 640 [1886]; State, Pac. 885 [1891]. Jelliff, Pros. v. Mayor and Common 'Dickinson v. City of Detroit, 111 Council of the City of Newark, 48 Mich. 480, 69 X. W. 728 [1897]; N. J. L. (19 Vr.) 101, 2 Atl. 627 Heman v. Ring, 95 Mo. App. 231 [1886]; Conde v. City of Schenec- [1900]; Winnebago Furniture Manu- tady, 164 N. Y. 258, 58 N. E. 130 faeturing Company v. Fond du Lae [1900]; Blount v. City of Janesville, County, 113 Wis. 72. 88 N. W. 1018 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. "To repave is [1902]. to pave," Schmitt v. City of New "Blanchard v. Biedeman, 18 Cal. Orleans, 48 La. Ann. 1440, 1442, 21 261 [1861]. So. 24 [1896]. "Farraher v. City of Keokuk, HI 'Doughten v. City of Camden, 71 la. 310, 82 N. W. 773 [1900]; In N. J. L. (42 Vr.) 426, 59 Atl. 16 the Matter of Garvey, 77 N. Y. 52a [1904]; (reversed in Doughten *. [1879]. Citv of Camden, 72 X. J. L. (43 Vr.) 707 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS. § 464 for repaving unless the street is unsafe. ^^ Under such statute it was held that a street which was impassable for heavily loaded teams, but was not otherwise unsafe, could not be paved on the as- sessment plan.^- By statute it may be provided that assessments may be levied for new work, or improvements or alterations not in the nature of ordinary repairs.^' Under such statutes the expense of grading a new street is regarded as new work.^* Under a statute providing that "all expenses of making, main- taining and altering highways" should be paid for by general taxation, but that the expenses of "any sewer or other public work or improvement might be paid for by special assessment," it was held that the former provision, being more specific, con- trolled in the case of street improvements and that macadamizing a street was "maintaining" it within the former provision and was not a "public improvement" within the meaning of the last provision.^^ Whether an ordinance which requires the recon- struction of an improvement while the old improvement is still in existence is so unreasonable and oppressive as to be void is regarded as a question of fact to be determined by the tribunal trying disputed questions of fact.^" If regrading is necessary to prepare the surface of a street for paving and the cost of re- grading is not included in the assessment, the property owners cannot be heard to object to the regrading.^' Under a statute authorizing the city to take up a defective sewer and rebuild it, the city cannot, if the existing sewer becomes defective con- struct a new and different sewer at the expense of the abutting property owners.^' If water pipes have once been laid they may subsequently, if it is necessary, be lowered and relaid at the cost of the owners of abutting property.'" "Smith V. Minto, 30 Or. 351, 48 " Amberson Avenue, Appeal of Pac. 166 [1897]. Chllds, 179 Pa. St. 634, 36 Atl. 354 "^ Smith V. Minto, 30 Or. 351, 48 [1897]. Pac. 166 [1897]. "State, Fiacre, Pros. v. Mayor and " Breen v. City of Troy, 60 Barb. Common Council of Jersey City, 34 (N. y.) 417 [1871]. N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 277 [1870]. " Breen v. City of Troy, 60 Barb. -» Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. (N. Y.) 417 [1871]. Palmer, 20 Minn. 424 [1874]; Ank- '=City of New Haven v. Whitney, eny v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 431 [1874]; 36 Conn. 373 [1870]. (A charge therefor cannot, however, '"Lamb v. City of Chicago, 219 111. exced the actual expense of the 229, 76 N. E. 343 [1906]. ' change.) CHAPTER X. SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. §465. Necessity of statutory authority to include items in as- sessment. Since the only authority which a public corporation has to levy an assessment for local improvements is that conferred by statute,^ a public corporation cannot levy an assessment for items not authorized by statute.^ What items are included within the terms and the meaning of the different statutes must therefore be considered in detail. 'See § 223. "Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pae. 1082 [1893]; Frick v. Mor- ford, 87 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1891] ; Donnelly v. Howard, 60 Cal. 291 [1882]; Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1877]; Spalding v. City of Den- ver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 128 [1905] ; McClellan v. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey (DC.) 94 [1889]; Chicago Union Traction Company v. City of Chicago, 208 III. 187, 70 N. E. 234 [1904]; Farr V. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 [1897] ; Morris v. City of Chi- cago, 11 111. 650 [1850]; Ross v. Van Natta, 164 Ind. 557, 74 N. E. 10 [1905]; Loesnitz v. Seelinger, 127 Ind. 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890]; Board of Commis- sioners of Montgomery County v. FuUen, 118 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1888] ; Naltner v. Blake, 56 Ind. 127 [1877]; Allen v. City of Daven- port, 107 la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898] ; City of Louisville v. Sel- vage, 106 Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 [1899]; Wells v. Street Commissioners of City of Boston, 187 Mass. 451, 73 N. E. 554 [1905]; Povfer V. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]; Weenan V. Smith, 60 Mo. 292 [1875] ; Kansas City V. O'Connor, 82 Mo. App. 655 [1899]; City of St. Joseph ex rel. Danaher v. Dillon, 61 Mo. App. 317 [1895] ; Davis v. Mayor and Common .Council of the City of Newark, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 [1892]; State, Randolph, Pros. v. In- habitants of the City of Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 93 [1875]; Poth V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 151 N. Y. 16, 45 N. E. 372 [1896] ; In the Mat- ter of the Petition of Deering to Va- cate an Assessment, 93 N. Y. 361 [1883]; In the Matter of Upson to Vacate an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 67 [1882]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Merriam to Vacate an As- sessment, 84 N Y. 569 [1881]; Mitchell V. Lane, 62 Hun. (N. Y.) 253, 16 N. Y. Supp. 707 [1891]; In the Matter of Auchumty, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 324 [1879]; People ex rel. Knox, V. Village of Yonkers, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 266 [1863]; Annie Wright 708 709 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 466 § 466. Assessment limited to cost of improvement and incidental items. While an assessment is levied upon the theory of benefits to the property conferred by the public improvement in which the assessment is levied, it is also, in theory, levied for the cost of such improvement. Accordingly, if the benefits exceed the cost the assessment can only be for the actual cost of the work to- gether with the proper items incident thereto. The excess of benefit over such expenses inures to the benefit of the property owner. He cannot be required to pay such excess into the pub- lic treasury.^ Thus, where the cost of lowering and relaying a water main was three hundred and thirty dollars and an assess- ment therefor of one dollar per foot was levied aggregating an amount of six hundred and sixty dollars, such assessment was held to be invalid.^ If, however, the cost of maintenance and re- pair may be properly included in the assessment, the fact that the amount of the assessment exceeds the actual cost of the work does not invalidate the assessment." Thus a water pipe was laid at a cost of one dollar and fifty cents per foot. An assessment of one dollar and twenty-five cents per front foot was levied on the property on each side of the street, making the as- sessment two dollars and fifty cents per foot of pipe. Such as- sessment was held to be valid.* A statute limiting the assessment to the cost of the improvement paid by the city means the entire cost without deduction for any re-imbursement by assessment.^ Seminary v. City of Taeoma, 23 Commonalty of the City of New Wash. 109, 62 Pac. 444 [1900] ;Me- York, 68 N. Y. 214 [1877]; City of AUister v. City of Taeoma, 9 Wash. Asheville v. Wachovia Loan & Trust 272, 37 Pac. 447, 658 [1894]; Wells Co., 143 N. V. 360, 55 S. E. 800 V. Western Paving & Supply Com- [1906]; In re Mill Creek Sewer, 196 pany, 96 Wis. 116, 70 N. W. 1071 Pa. St. 183, 46 Atl. 312 [1900]. [1897]; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 "Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Pal- Wis. 236 [1872]. mer, 20 Minn. 468, followed without ^ Davis V. City of Litchfield, 145 opinion in Ankeny v. Palmer, 20 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. Minn. 477 [1874] . 888 [1893]; Union Building Associa- 'Parsons v. District of Columbia, tion V. City of Chicago, 61 111. 439 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 [1871]; State on the Relation of [1898]. Lingenfelter v. Danville and North ' Parsons v. District of Columbia, Salem Gravel Road Company, 33 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. 943, 18 S. 521 Ind. 133 [1870]; Minnesota Linseed [1898]. Oil Co. V. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468 ^ Jones v. Board of Aldermen of the [1874] ; Eno V. Mayor, Aldermen and City of Boston, 104 Mass. 461 [1870]. § 46 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 710 In jurisdictions where an assessment may be levied and con- firmed before the improvement is constructed and the cost of the improvement definitely determined, the property owner can re- sist collection of the assessment over the actual cost of the im- provement and the proper items of incidental expense even after confirmation." If a property owner is obliged to pay the entire assessment he may recover the excess of such assessment over the actual cost of improvement and the proper items of inci- dental expense.' The actual cost of doing the work, is, in the absence of fraud, an item for which the assessment may be lev- ied,* subject always to ihe rule that the assessment must not exceed the actual or theoretical amount of benefits. If inquiry as to the cost of the work is material, the cost must be that of doing the work at that time in that city and not the price charged in other cities at other times." The expense of prospect- ing to find material suitable for use in the improvement is not an item which can be included in the cost of the assessment.^" § 467. Credit for material used by contractor. In constructing a new improvement the contractor occasion- ally makes use of the material of the old improvement. It has been said that the value of the material so used by the contractor should be deducted from the assessments levied on the property owners.^ On the other hand, the city cannot credit itself for the value of such material, since it belongs to the property own- er." Under an ordinance which requires that the granite paving on the old driveways should be sold to the highest bidder and the proceeds of the sale used in paying the cost of the improve- ' People ex rel. McCormack v. Mc- ' Scott v. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, Wethy, 177 111. 334, 52 N. E. 479 31 N. E. 953 [1892]. [1898]; People ex rel. McCormack ' Amberson Avenue, Appeal of V. McWethy, 165 111. 222, 46 N. E. Childs, 179 Pa. St. 634, 36 Atl. 187 [1897]. Conversely if it is not 354 [1897]. shown that the cost of the improve- '"Manor v. Board of Commission- ment has been collected the objee- ers of Jay Co., 137 Ind. 367 34 N. E. tion that the amount of the assess- 959, 36 N. E. 1101 [1893]- (A case ment is too large cannot be raised. where it is sought to include the cost Gross V. People ex rel. Raymond, 193 of prospecting for gravel to improve 111. 260, 86 Am. St. Rep. 322, 61 N. a gravel road.) E. 1012 [1901]. 'Hastings v. Columbus, 42 O. S. 'However he must sue within the 585 [1885]. time limited : Grosheck v. Cincinnati, ' Fisher v. City of Rochester 6 51 O. S. 365, 37 N. E. 707 [1894]. Lansing (N. Y.) 225 [1872]. 711 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCIjUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 468 ment, it is not necessary that such pavement be sold before the assessment is levied. It is sufficient if it is sold within a rea- sonable time.' If old material is used but no charge therefor is included in the assessment, the property owner cannot object to an assessment for the labor necessary in making such im- provement.* If two or more streets are graded under separate con- tracts, it has been held that the contractor may make use of the surplus material excavated from one street to fill depressions in the other and that the assessments for such streets may include the cost of excavation and the cost of filling as separate items.' If the contract provides that the surplus dirt accumulating from excavations shall be the property of the contractor, it has been said that the validity of such provision cannot be questioned in proceedings to enforce an assessment." Under a contract which provides that credit shall be given for dirt furnished by the city and used in filling depressions, it has been said not to amount to fraud if the contractor presents a bill for the entire contract price without any allowance for earth taken from another street and used upon the street in question to fill in depressions.'' Earth furnished by the city for filling a street but which is, without the fault of the contractor, used to fill up a lot and not to fill up the street, is an item which should not be deducted from the con- tract price.' If a contractor hires a steam roller from the city, the price paid by him therefor should not be deducted from the amount of the assessment." §468. Compensation of surveyor and engineer. Whether surveyor's fees form an item which may be included in the assessment is a matter within the discretion of the legis- lature. If such an item is provided for by statute it may be •Aldis V. South Park Commission- cedure which made it impossible in ers, 171 111. 424, 49 N. E. 565 [1898]. an action to enforce an assessment * In the Matter of Anderson, 60 to go back to matters arising prior Barb. (N. Y.) 375 [1871]; In the to the execution of the contract.) Matter of Anderson, 39 Howard (N. 'Darlington v. Commonwealth for Y.) 184 [1870]. ' Use of City of Allegheny, 41 Pa. St. "Schenley v. Commonwealth for (5 Wright) 68 [1861]. the Use of the City of Allegheny, 36 " Richards v. City of Cincinnati, 31 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]. 0. S. 506 [1877]. •Jenkins v. Stetler, 118 Ind. 275, "McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 20 N. E. 788 [1888]; (This result Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]. was reached, however, under a pro- § 468 TAXATION BY ASSESSMKNT. 712 included in the assessment.^ Only the actual fees can be included in the assessment.^ It was held, however, on error, that if the exact cost of such fees is not given, yet an approximation thereto is given and if the charge does not appear to be unreasonable or excessive, the assessment is valid.* The cost of supervision is a necessary item of expense in a public improvement and may be included in the assessment under statutory authority therefor.* The services of an engineer are necesssary in all public improve- ments of any magnitude. The cost of securing such services is a proper item of assessment, if authorized by statute.^ Any ob- jection to the propriety of such item is waived if appeal is not taken in the manner provided for by statute." The fact that the engineer is employed by the city at a monthly or annual salary does not in some jurisdictions prevent the city from reimbursing itself by including a fair compensation for his services in assess- ments.' The city engineer, who has constructed maps and plans under an abandoned resolution, cannot recover compensatiorf by having his services included in an assessment under a new reso- lution, if such new resolution referred to his plans and the new city engineer was, to some extent, aided by the former plans.' • 'Burns v. City of Duluth, 96 Minn. [1907]; Vandalia Levee & Drainage 104, 104 N. W. 714 [1905]; State, District v. Hutchinsj 234 111. 31, 84 Kohler, Pros. v. Town of Guttenberg, -N. E. 715 [1908]; City of Atchison 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 419 [1876]; In v. Price, 45 Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605 the Matter of Johnson, 103 N. Y. [1891]; Cuming v. City of Grand 260, 8 N. E. 399 [1886] ; In the Mat- Eapids, 46 Mich. 150, 9 N. W. 141 ter of Lowden, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]; [1881]; City of St. Paul v. Mullen, In the Matter of Merriam, 84 N. Y. 27 Minn. 78, 6 N. W. 424 [ 1880] ; 596 [1881]; In the Matter of Low- The State v. CouumI of City of Eliz- den to Vacate Assessment, 25 Hun. abeth, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 365 (N. Y.) 434 [1881]. [1863]; In the Matter of Lowden, 89 ^n the Matter of Lowden, 25 Hun. N. Y. 543 [1882]; In the Matter of (N. Y.) 434 [1881]. Tappen, 36 How. Pr. 390 [1869]; = In the Matter of Lowden, 89 N. Adkins v. Toledo, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. Y. 548 [1882], ' 417 [1905]. * Gibson v. City of Chicago, 22 111. ' Boyle v. Hitchcock, 66 Cal. 129, 567 [1859]; City of Atchison v. 4 Pac. 1143 [1884]. Price, 45 Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605 ' Gibson v. City of Chicago, 22 111. [1891] ; Beniteau v. City of Detroit, 566. 41 Mich. 116, 1 N. W. 899 [1879]; ' Fitzhugh v. Ashworth, 119 Cal. Burns v. City of Duluth, 96 Minn. 393, 51 Pac. 635 [1897]. (The ques- 104, 104 N. W. 714 [1905]. tion whether the former city engineer = Gibson v. City of Chicago, 22 III. had any legal remedy, and if so, what 567 [1859]; McGilvery v. City of it was, was not passed upon.) Lewiston, 13 Ida. 338, 90 Pac. 348 713 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 469 In other jurisdictions the value of the services of a city engineer employed on a salary does not form a proper item of assessment.' The value of the services of a city engineer, who is employed on a fixed salary, is properly omitted from the ordinance and the estimate, even if by the terms of the contract the contractor is bound to pay all engineering expenses.^* The assignment of an assessment to a contractor cannot include the expense of an engineer's services.^^ § 469. Expense of levying assessment. Whether the cost of levying an assessment can be included in the assessment depends upon the provisions of the statute. It is an item which the legislature is authorized to include and which in many jurisdictions, the legislature has included.^ Only the actual cost of the levy can be included.^ Accordingly, if the city has resisted the original claim for the cost of the levy and has succeeded in having such item reduced, only the actual cost thus paid by the city should be included in the assessment, and the owner should be. given the benefit of such reduction.' It is so necessary to include the cost of levying an assessment in the assessment that the failure of a committee to include such cost » Hoard of Commissioners of Mont- 715 [1908]; Dobler v. Village of gomery Coiinty v. Fullen, 118 Ind. Warren, 174 111. 92, 50 N. E. 1048 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1888]; Long- [1898]; Ware v. City of Jerseyville, worth V. City of Cincinnati, 34 0. S. 158 111. 234, .41 N. E. 736 [1895] ; 101 [1877]; Smith v. City of Port- Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 III. land, 25 Or. 297, 35 Pac. 665 [1894] ; 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 In the Matter of the Contract for [1893]; Kimble v. City of Peoria, the Fifth Avenue Sewer in the City 140 111. 157, 29 N. E. 723 [1892] ; of Pittsburgh, 4 Brewster (Pa.) 364 Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, 82 [1870]. Mich. 298,' 46 X. W. 228 [1890]; ^°City of Excelsior Springs, to Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and Corn- Use of MoCormick v. Ettenson, 120 monalty of the City of New York, Mo. App. 215, 96 S. W. 701 [1906]; 101 N. y. 284, 4 N. E. 3.36 [1886]; (Such contract is not invalidated In the Matter of Tappan, 54 Barb, thereby). 225 [1869]. " Corry v. Gaynor, 22 0. S. 584 ' Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and [1872]; (It was not decided whether Commonalty of the City of New such item could have been included York, 101 N. Y. 284, 4 N. E. 336 in the assessment.) [1886]. " Nevada National Bank v. Board ' Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and of Supervisors of Kern County, 5 Commonalty of the City of New Cal. App. 638, 91 Pac. 122 11907]; York, 101 N. Y. 284, 4 N. E. 336 Vandalia Levee & Drainage District [1886]. V. Hutohins, 234 111. 31, 84 N. E, § 469 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 714 in its estimate is a fatal defect.* The fact that the assessment is made by salaried oflSeers does not prevent the city from in- cluding the actual cost of making the levy in the assessment." On the other hand, many states, and among them some of which had regarded the cost of the levy as included in the assessment where not specifically provided for, have provided that such cost must be paid by general taxation." Under such statutes it is error to include the cost of making and levying the assessment in the assessment on confirmation upon the statement of the counsel for the city that it would be deducted from the judg- ment.' Where the statute has been changed so as to require the cost of levying an assessment to be paid out of the general funds, such change of statute applies to proceedings pending when such act took effect.' If a petition for confirmation is filed after such act takes effect the new statute is applicable." If the cost of levying the assessment is included erroneously, the reviewing .court cannot strike out such item and direct the County Court to deduct such amount from its judgment but it must refer the case to the trial court for a new assessment.^" The trial court may recast the assessment and eliminate such improper item.'^ •Ware v. City of Jeraeyville, 158 Chesney v. City of Chicago, 205 111. 111. 234, 41 N. E. 736 [1895]. 528, 69 N. E. 38 [1903]; McChes- "In the Matter of Tappen, 36 How. ney v. City of Chicago, 201 III. 344. (N. Y.) 390 [1869]. 66 N. E. 217 [1903]; Thompson v. "Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, City of Chicago, 197 HI. 599, 64 N. 207 111. 377, 69 N. E. 840 [1904]; E. 392 [1902]; Gage v. City of Chi- Thompaon v. People ex rel. Hanberg, eago, 196 III. 512, 63 N. E. 1031 207 111. 334, 69 N. E. 842 [1904]; [1902]; Gage v. City of Chicago, 195 MoChesney v. City of Chicago, 205 111. 490, 63 N. E. 184 [1902]. 111. 528, 69 N. E. 38 [1903]; Thomp- 'Kerfoot v. City of Chicago, 195 son V. City of Chicago, 197 111. 599, 111. 229, 63 N. E. 101 [1902]. 64 N. E. 392 [1902] ; Gage v. City of 'Gage v. City of Chicago, 196 HI. Chicago, 196 HI. 512, 63 N. E. 1031 512, 63 N. E. 1031 [1902]. [1902]; Gage v. City of Chicago, 195 "Gage v. City of Chicago, 195 111. 111. 490, 63 N. E. 184 [1902]; Ker- 490, 63 N. E. 184 [1902]. foot V. City of Chicago, 195 III. 229, "Thompson v. City of Chicago, 63 N. E. 101, [1902] ; In the Matter 197 111. 599, 64 N. E. 392 [1902]. of Wood, 51 Barb. 275 [1868]; In "Thompson v. People ex rel. Han- the Matter of Lewis, 51 Barb 82 berg, 207 111. 334, 69 N. E. 842 [1868] ; In the Matter of Lewis, 35 [1904] ; Gage v. People ex rel. Han- Howard 162 [1868]. Such was the berg, 207 111. 377, 69 N. E. 840 effect of the act of 1901 in Illinois, [1904]; McChesney v. City of Chi- Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, 207 cago, 205 111. 528, 69 N. E 38 111. 377, 69 N. E. 840 [1904]; Me- [1903]. 715 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 470 A new ordinance is not necessary." The cost of making out the tax duplicate cannot be charged to a fund raised by assessment in the absence of statutory authority." The expense of main- taining a board of local improvements, not being incurred solely for the specific assessment in question, cannot be included in such assessment." If the board of local improvement is made up of members of the council and the statute does not contemplate payment to them of any additional compensation as members of such board, they cannot be paid out of the assessment, even under a statutory provision for including the cost of levying the assess- ment as an item of expense.''^ If no provision is made for com- pensating the county auditor for services rendered in an assess- ment proceeding, compensation for such services cannot be made a proper item of assessment.'" Plans and specifications are necessary to the successful construction of most improvements and are generally required by statute." If there is statutory authority therefor it is ordinarily proper to include the cost of such plans and specifications in the assessment as an item there- of." The cost of making estimates, plans and assessments, and making up the books of assessment may be included.^' The cost of probable jury trials, which will be necessary if objections to an application for judgment of confirmation are filed, cannot be esti- mated in advance and included as part of the cost of making and levying the assessment.^" § 470. Printing. Various items of expense for printing are ordinarily required by the assessment statutes. If the statute so provides the expense of such printing may be included as an item of assessment.' Thus "Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, "Burns v. City of Duluth, 98 207 111. 377, 69 N. E. 840 [1904]; Minn. 104, 104 N. W. 714 [1905]. McChesney v. City of Chicago, 205 " Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, 111. 528, 69 N. E. 38 [1903]. 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]! " Manor v. Board of Commission- ™ Dobler v. Village of Warren, 174 ers of Jay County, 137 Ind. 367, 34 111. 92, 50 N. E. 1048 [1898]. N. E. 959, 36 N. E. 1101 [1893]. ' Burk v. Altschul, 66 Cal. 533, 6 "Betts V. City of Naperville, 214 Pac. 393 [1885]; Thayer v. City of 111. 380, 73 N. E. 752 [1905]. Grand Rapids, 82 Mich. 298, 46 N "Gage v. Village of Wilmette, 230 W. 228 [1890]: Cumina v. City of 111. 428, 82 N. E. 656 [1907]. Grand Ranids. 46 Mich. 150, 9 N. W. "Board of Commissioners of Mnnt- 141 [1881]; State, Kohler, Pros. v. gomerv County v. Fullen, 118 Ind. Town of Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. (9 158, 20 TSr. E. 771 [18881- Vr.) 419 [1876]. "See § 819 et seq. § 471 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 716 the cost of printing abstracts of title to the land upon which the improvement was to be located may be included in the assess- ment." Any question as to the propriety of including such items is waived if an appeal is not taken in a manner provided for by statute." § 471. Advertisement and notice. Under most assessment statutes advertisement of various kinds is required. If the statute so provides, the cost of such adver- tisement may be included as an item of assessment,^ A special assessment judgment for the "special assessment, printer's fees and costs," is not subject to the objection of allowing a double recovery for printer's fees." If the number of papers in which the advertisement is to be inserted is not fixed by law, the dis- cretion of the city, if not abused, controls and the cost thus in- curred is a proper item of assessment.' Thus it is proper to in- clude in the assessment the cost of advertising for bids.* If an assessment is assigned to a contractor for compensation for his work, such assignment cannot include the assessment for adver- tising.' Under assessment statutes notice of various forms is frequently required and is indeed often indispensable." If the statute so provides, the cost of making and serving such notices may be included in the assessment.'^ If they are made and served by one who is not bound in law to do such work without compen- sation, it is proper to charge therefor.' If the statute provides what fees shall be charged for making and serving notices no "Thayer v. City of Grand Eapids, 225 111. 144, 80 N. E. 90 [1907]. 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]. 'Cincinnati v. Davis, 58 O. S. 225, "Boyle V. Hitchcock, 66 Cal. 129, 50 N. E. 918 [1898]. 4 Pac. 1143 [1884]; Burke v. Alt- * Beniteau v. City of Detroit, 41 schul, 66 Cal. 533, 6 Pac. 393 [1885]. Mich. 116, 1 N. W. 899 [1879]. ' Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, ^ Corry v. Gaynor, 22 O. S. 584 219 111. 369, 76 N. E. 498 [1906]; L1872J. (The propriety of including Michael v. City of Mattoon, 172 111. such item in the assessment was not 394, 50 N. E. 155- [18981; Beniteau passed upon.) V. City of Detroit, 41 Mich. 116, 1 'See Chapter XIV. N. W. 899 [18791; City of St; Paul MVatkins v. State ex rel. Van Au- V. Mullen, 27 Minn. 78, 6 N. W. 424 ken, 151 Ind. 123, 49 N. E. 169, 51 [1880] ; Cincinnati v. Davis, 58 0. S. N. E. 79 [18981 ; Adkins v. Toledo. 225, 50 N. E. 918 [1898]; Adkins v. 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 417 [1905]. Toledo, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 417 ' WatVins v. State ex rel. Van Aw- [1905]. ken, 151 Ind. 123, 49 N. E. 169, 51 "Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg N. E. 79 [1898]. 717 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 472 Charge can be made as an item of assessment m excess of sucli statutory rate." In the absence of statutory authority such ex- penses cannot be included in the assessment.^" § 472. Cost of collection. The cost of collecting an assessment is a necessary item of expense and may be included in the assessment if the statute so provides.^ Failure to include the cost of collecting in the esti- mate of expenses is, under such statutes, fatal to the proceedings.^ A statute may provide for adding a certain percentage of the total amount of the assessment for the expense of collection.^ No charge can be made, in the assessment for fees for collection in excess of those allowed by law.* If the statute provides a certain percentage for collection, it is improper to add a per- centage in excess of that fixed by statute.^ If the court has power to deduct such erroneous charge, including it does not invalidate the assessment; but it may be so deducted." Unless specifically provided for by statute, only the actual cost of collection can be included.^ In the absence of statutory authority it is improper to add a certain percentage of the assessment as the estimated 'McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 Mich. 560 [1853]; State, Kohler, Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]. (A charge of Pros. v. Town of Guttenberg, 38 N. $2.50 as a fee for writing a letter to J. L. (9 Vr.) 419 [1876]; In the a non-resident giving him notice of Matter of Eager, 58 Barb. 557 the assessment.) [1871]; In the Matter of Eager, 41 "Manor v. Board of Commission- How. 107 [1870]; Matter of Eager,^ ers of Jay Co., 137 Ind. 367, 34 N. 12 Abb. Pr. 151 [1871]. E. 959, 36 N. E. 1101 [1893]. ^Ware v. City of Jerseyville, 158 >Gage V. Village of Wilmette, 230 111. 234, 41 N. E. 736 [1895]. 111. 428, 82 N. E. 656 [1907] ; Gage v. 'Warren v. City of Grand Haven, People ex rel. Hanberg, 225 111. 144, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Williams v. 80 N. E. 90 [1907]; Goodwillie v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560 City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 27 [1853]; In the Matter of Eager, 58 N. E. 15 [1891]; Davis v. City of Barb. 557 [1871]; In the Matter of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. Eager, 41 How. 107 [1870], 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; Gibson v. 'In the Matter of McCormack, 60 City of Chicago, 22 111. 567 [1859]; Barb. 128 [1870]; Matter of McCor- Board of Commissioners of Pulaski mack, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 234 [1870]. County V. Vurpillat, 22 Ind. App. ° In the Matter of McCormack, 60 422, 53 N. E. 1049 [1899]; Dashiell Barb. 128 [1870]. V. Mayor and City Council of Balti- ° In the Matter of McCormack, 60 more. Use of Hax, 45 Md. 615 Barb. 128 [1870]; Matter of McCor- [1876]; Warren v. City of Grand mack, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 234 [1870]. Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Wil- 'The Northern Liberties v. St. liams V. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Johns Church, 13 Pa. St. 104 [1850]. § 472 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 718 cost of collection.' The fact that this percentage was to be paid to the treasurer, if the assessment was collected by him, did not justify including such item if other means of collection were available by statute." By some statutes it is provided that the cost of collection cannot be included in the assessment but must be paid for out of the general funds of the city. Under such statutes the cost of collection is not a proper item of assessment.^" Where by statute it is provided that assessments must be paid to the county treasurer, that he shall receive three-fourths of one per cent, on all money collected by him as taxes, and that the cost of a street improvement shall be assessed upon adjacent property without making specific provision for including the cost of collection, it is held that such cost cannot be included in the assessment.^^ Under a statute giving to the collector of as- sessments a certain commission, it has been held that he cannot collect such commission upon any assessment assessed against the eity.^^ Printing the list of property-owners who have been delinquent in paying assessments is, under many statutes, a neces- sary item of expense in collecting the assessments. If the statute so provides, such item of expense may be included in the assess- ment.^' Indeed, it has been held that such item of expense can- not be paid out of the general fund of the city but that it must be paid solely out of the special fund raised by assessment." The court costs which will be incurred in the ordinary course of the assessment proceedings may be included in tlie assessment.'' Such costs, if excessive, may be retaxed by the trial court.'* It is not necessary that the property owner bring a separate suit in equity therefor." If there is statutory authority therefor, a ' Spangler v. City of Cleveland, 35 " Brooks v. City of San Luis Obis- 0. S. 469 [1880]; The Northern Lib- po, 109 Cal. 50, 41 Pae. 791 [1895]; erties v. St. Johns Church, 13 Pa. 'St. The Chicago & Northwestern Eail- 104 [1850]. road Company v. People ex rel. Mil- » Spangler v. City of Cleveland, 35 ler, 83 111. 467 [1876]. O. S. 469 [1880]. "Brooks v. City of San Luis Obis- "McChesney v. City of Chicago, po, 109 Cal. 50, 41 Pac. 791 [1895]. 201 111. 344, 66 N. E. 217 [1903]; "Michael v. City of Mattoon, 172 Higman v. City of Sioux City, 129 111. 394, 50 N. E. 155 [1898]. la. 291, 105 N. W. 524 [1906]. "Mayor, etc., of the City of New '1 Higman v. City of Sioux City, York v. Cornell, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 129 la. 291, 105 N. W. 524 [1906]. 215 [1876]. "People of the State of New York "Mayor, etc., of the City of New V. Starkweather, 42 N. Y. Sup. Ct. York v. Cornell, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 215 Eep. 325 [1877]. " [1876]. 719 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. §§473,474 part of the fund raised by special assessment may be appro- priated to retain special counsel to collect unpaid assessments.^' By special statutory authority, an attorney's fee may be recov- ered in a suit to collect an assessment or to enforce the lien thereof.^" This is in the nature of a penalty.^" A statute pro- viding for such attorney's fee is applicable to an assessment levied before the statute is passed where the suit to enforce the lien is begun subsequently."^ Only one attorney's fee can be re- covered in one suit, no matter how many causes of action are in- volved."" § 473. Penalties for delinquency. As a means of compelling prompt payment of assessments the legislature may provide that a penalty shall be added to the amount of the assessment in case of non-payment thereof.^ Such penalties cannot be added unless there is statutory authority therefor, however." If a penalty is added without authority the property owner cannot enjoin the collection of the assessment and penalty unless he has offered to pay that part of the assess- ment which is properly due.^ § 474. Excess charges due to failure to pay cash. If the credit of the city, or the method proposed for paying an assessment, is such that a greater sum must be paid for the " Reclamation District No. 108 v. '^ Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]. St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Porter, 38 ind. " Eeid V. Clay, 134 Cal. 207, 66 App. 226, 74 N. E. 260, 76 N. E. 179 Pac. 262 [1901]; Scott v. Hayes, 162 [1905]., Ind. 548 [1903]; 70 N. E. 879 ""Hughes v. Alsip, 112 Cal. 587, 44 [1903]; Brown v. Central Bermudez Pac. 1027 [1896]. Company, 162 Ind. 452, 69 N. E. 150 » Eyerman v. Elaksley, 78 Mo. 145 [1903]; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi- [1883]; City of St. Louis to Use of cago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, Seibert v. Allen, 53 Mo. 44 [1873]; 38 Ind. App. 226, 74 N. E. 260, 76 N. Baker v. French, 18 Ohio C. C. 420 E. 179 [1905]; Palmer v. Nolting, 13 [1899]; Yates v. Borough of Mead- Ind. App. 581, 41 N. E. 1045 [1895]. ville, 56 Pa. St. (6 P. F. Smith) 21 Such act has been held to be uncon- [1867]. stitutional because the title thereof "Annie Wright Seminary v. City did not express the subject matter. of Tacoma, 23 Wash. 109, 62 Pac. 444 Turnquist v. Cass County Drain [1900]. Commissioners, 11 N. D. 514, 92 N 'Annie Wright Seminary v. City W. 852 [1902]. of Tacoma, 23 Wash. 109, 62 Pao. "» Brown v. Central Bermudez Com- 444 [1900]. rmv. 162 Ind. 452, 69 'N. E. 150 [1903]. § 474 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 720 improvement than would be necessary if the contractor were as- sured of prompt payment in cash, the question arises whether the loss thus suffered must be borne by the city out of its general funds or whether it may be assessed upon the property owners benefited. In some jurisdictions it seems to be assumed that the expense of the improvement may be computed with reference to the manner of payment and on the basis thereof.^ Accord- ingly, if bonds are issued to pay the cost of the improvement in anticipation of the assessment and by statutory authority, such bonds are sold below par, the discount can be included in the assessment and charged upon the owners of property bene- fited.^ If the contractor is paid in city warrants, and by reason of their depreciation the city is obliged lo pay more in such war- rant to such contractor than it would have to pay in cash, it has been held that such loss may be charged upon the property- owners and an assessment may be levied for the full amount paid by the city.' A fencing district is held to have authority to levy an assessment for the amount which, discounted at six per cent, will pay the cost of the improvement.* In other jurisdic- tions the discount due to the bad financial standing of the city or the uncertainty of payment must be borne out of the general funds of the city.^ This result is often reached under statutes providing expressly or by implication for charging such items upon the city. If bonds can be sold only for less than par it has been held that the discount must be borne by the city and cannot be charged upon the property owners." So if the credit of a city is such that in constructing sidewalks on credit it must pay more than it would have to pay in cash, such losses cannot be charged upon the property owners.^ Where -a contractor offers to do certain work, for a certain amount in cash and for a larger amount in assessments to be assigned to him and collected by him. ^Yarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 Kan. 103 [1875]. S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1902]. ^Eieketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371 "Doyle v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 [1881] ; State, Baiter, Pros. v. City [1874] ; City of Galveston v. Heard, of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) 54 Tex. 420 [1881]. 142 [1874]. = Doyle v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 = Warren v. Henly, 31 la. 31 [1874]. [1870]. 'City of Galveston v. Heard, 54 *Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 Tex. 420 [1881]. 721 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 475 a property owner cannot be assessed for more than the cash value of the work, even if the city agreed to pay the larger amount in assessments.* If, however, a contract provides for a certain rate of compensation, if the contractor was paid at the regular time for paying taxes, about nine months after the per- formance of the contract; and also provides that the lot owner may, by pacing a much smaller sum at once, discharge all liability for such improvement, a lot owner who has not elected to make prompt payment cannot subsequently object because of the in- crease in the contract price due to such owner's act in deferring payment." § 475. Interest. The legislature has power to determine in advance whether interest may be included in assessments or whether interest is not an item which can be included. The question is entirely one of policy.^ It may fix the rate of interest which tax certificates shall draw." The legislature may delegate to the city the power t)f fixing the rate of interest.^ Thus, the city may be authorized to fix any rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent.* The ordinary rule is that in the absence of some statute expressly or impliedly authorizing interest, interest cannot be allowed on an assessment nor included therein." Statutes which provide for interest on judgments do not authorize interest on assess- ments, even in jurisdictions in which an assessment is regarded for many purposes as analogous to a judgment." A statute au- thorizing interest on taxes is not regarded as authorizing an interest on assessments since the word ' ' tax ' ' is regarded as being « Elis3 V. Kraus, 16 0. S. 54 v. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So. [1864]. 848 [1889]. "City of Lawrence v. KUlam, 11 "People of the State of California ivan. 375 [1873]. v. Hagar, 52 Cal. 171 [1877]; Doyle 'Germond v. City of Tacoma, 6 v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 [1874]; Has- Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961 [1893]. kell y. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281 [1867]; = Edwards & Walsh Construction Himmelmann v. Oliver, 34. Cal. 246 Co. V. Jasper County, 117 la. 385, [1867] ; Weber v. City of San Fran- 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 cisco, 1 Cal. 455 [1851]; Sargent & [1902]. Company v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 32 "Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal, L. E. A. 822, 34 Atl. 1028 [1895]; 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057 Morrow v. Geeting, 23 Ind. App. 494, [1896]. 55 N. E. 787 [1899]. * Barber Asphalt Paving Company ° Morrow v. Geetinsr, 23 Ind. App. 494, 55 N. E. 787 [1899]. § 475 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 722 used in this connection in its narrower meaning.' A statute which provides that neither the principal nor interest of an assessment shall be collected until the work is completed may recognize the right of the legislature to add interest to an assessment, but it does not of itself operate as a provision for such interest.' Au- thority to a city to divide an assessment into installments bearing interest does not authorize the city to charge interest where the assessment is to be paid in one payment.' If a city is authorized to borrow money for the purpose of constructing an improvement, the interest on such loan may.be included in the assessment as a proper item of expense.^" An assessment may be levied so as to include the cost of the improvement and the rate of discount necessary to obtain the present value of such assessment.'^ If the statute authorizes a city to issue bonds in anticipation of the subsequent payments of the assessments in order to pay for the improvements, the interest on such bonds may be included in the assessment as a proper item thereof.'^ If, however, the money borrowed by the -city by the sale of bonds to pay for an improve- ment, has been used in the meantime for other purposes, property owners cannot be charged with interest thereon for such time as a part of the assessment.'^ The legislature has power to fix the rate of interest in advance,'* or to authorize the city to fix the rate of interest.'^ Naming the rate of interest which bonds are to bear in an ordinance which provides for issuing the bonds is a sufficient fixing of the rate of interest.'^ Interest which is due to the contractor upon the contract price for his work may be 'Sargent & Company v. Tuttle, 67 "Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 213 Conn. 162, 32 L. R. A. 822, 34 Atl. 111. 452, 72 N. E. 1097 [1905]; 1028 [1895]. Scott v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 548, 70 N. » Sargent & Company V. Tuttle, 67 E. 879 [1903]; Eriekson v. Cass Conn. 162, 32 L. E. A. 822, 34 Atl. ' County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 1028 [1895]. [1902]. "McChesney v. City of Chicago, "State, Balder, Pros. v. City of 213 111. 592, 73 N. E. 368 [1905]. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) '"Davis V. City of Newarlt, 54 N. 142 [1874]. J. L. ('25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 "Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 213 [1891]; State, Skinkle, Pros. v. In- 111. 452, 72 N. E. 1097 [1905]. habitants of the Township of Clin- '" Scott v. Haves, 162 Ind. 548, 70 ton, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 656 [1877]'. N. E. 879 [1903]. " Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 " Scott v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 548, 70 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 S. N. E. 879 [1903]. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1902]. 723 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 475 included in the assessment by statutory authority.^' The statute may provide for paying the contractor by issuing warrants or vouchers to him for the amount of work done. In the absence of statute such warrants or vouchers do not bear interest." If, how- ever, the statute so provides such vouchers may bear interest and the interest so added may be included in the assessment.^" If, by ordinance, vouchers are to be issued which do not bear in- terest, interest upon such vouchers cannot be included in the assessment.^" If it is erroneously so included and the amount of such interest can be separated from the amount lawfully due, the amount of the assessment may be eliminated without invali- dating the entire assessment." If, however, the amount allowed for the payment of such interest does not appear from the assess- ment the entire assessment is void.^^ Assessment vouchers issued by a city for its proportionate share of assessments may, by stat- utory provisions, bear interest until paid.^' If the value of land to be appropriated is to be estimated and the title thereto is to pass before payment of the amount fixed by appropriation pro- ceedings, interest may, by statute, be allowed thereon. ^^ Statutes frequently provide for interest upon assessments after they are due. Full effect is given to such statutes.^' Such a provision is "In the Matter of Deering, U Tex. 129, 44 L. R. A. 716, 46 S. W. Daly (N. Y.) 89 [1886]. Since a 796 [1898]. contract does not bear interest until '" Cratty v. City of Chicago, 217 the time fixed for the payment of 111. 453, 73 N. E. 343 [1905]; City money thereon unless there is some of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 111. 346, special provision in such contract for 68. N. E. 786 [1903]. interest, a contract by a city to pay '^ City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 a contractor when the assessments 111. 346, 68 N. E. 786 [1903]. should be collected and if they should "^ Cratty v. City of Chicago, 217 not be colleetied at th« end of two III. 453, 75 N. E. 343 [1905]. years the amount then unpaid to ^ City of Chicago v. People ex rel. the contractor was to become due. Union Trust Company, 215 III. 235, does not bear interest before the end 74 N. E. 115 [1905]. of two years. Booth v. Pittsburg, "In re Mayor, etc., of New York, 154 Pa. St. 482, 25 Atl. 803 [1893]. 89 N. Y. S. 6, 95 App. Div. 552 "Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281 [1904]; In re East One Hundred and [1867]; United States ex rel. TJiomp- Fifty-Eighth Street, 80 N. y. S. 594, son V. Dent, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 463 39 Misc. 598 [1903]. [1882]. >* Dougherty v. Henarie, 47 Cal. 9 "Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. [1873]; Palmer v. Nolting, 13 Ind. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]; Town of App. 581, 41 N. E. 1045 [1895]; Cicero v. Green, 211 111. 241, 71 N. Langan v. Bitzer — Ky. , 82 S. E. 884 [1904]; Storrie v. Houston W. 280, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 579 [1904] ; City Street Railway Company, 92 Moale v. Mayor and City Council of ■ § 475 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT 724 upheld, as in the nature of a penalty.-* If the assessment, as originally levied, is defective, and by reason of such defect the exact amount thereof cannot be determined, it is generally held that interest cannot be charged upon such assessment until the amount thereof is definitely and correctly ascertained.^^ This result is reached sometimes under statutes which provide spe- cifically for interest and penalty only "if the assessment pro- ceedings shall appear to be regular.* ' ^^ Under such statute there is no authority for allowing interest if the assessment proceedings are irregular.^' However, where an item for the fees and ex- penses of the commissioners who made the assessment was made, it was held that while the property owner could have the benefit of such reduction, he was liable to interest from the date of the assessment.^" The theory of this holding was that this reduction was in the nature of a credit to be applied on a conceded debt. If the assessment proceedings are irregular, but a reassessment is not necessary, the assessment may bear interest in the absence of a statute restricting interest to cases where the proceedings are regular.^^ Where the court has power, in case of defective assessment proceedings, to determine the amount to be charged against the lot owner, the court may allow interest upon the amount properly due from the time fixed by the city for the Baltimore, 61 Md. 224 [1883]; Bar- rel. Miller v. Love, 37 N. J. L. (8 ber Asphalt Paving Company v. Vr.) 261 [1874]; In the matter of Peck, 186 Mo. 506, 85 S. W. 387 Pelton, 85 N. Y. 651 [1881]; In the [1905]; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 matter of St. Joseph's Asylum, 69 N. Mo. 145 [1883] ; City of St. Louis to Y. 353 [1877] ; In the matter of Mil- use of Seibert v. Allen, 53 Mo. 44 ler, 24 Hun. (X. Y.) 637 [1881]. [1873]; City of St. Louis to use of =» City of Seattle v. Hill, 23 Wash. Cornelli v. Armstrong, 38 Mo. 167 92, 62 Pac. 446 [1900]. [1866]; City of St. Louis to use of ^ See also City of St. Joseph ex rel. McGrath v. Clemens, 36 Mo.- 467 Gibson v. Forsee, 110 Mo. App. 237, [1865]; City of St. Louis to use of 84 S. W. 1138 [1905]. Creamer v. Deters, 36 Mo. 456 ™ Mayer v. Mayor, Aldermen and [1865]; State, Kohler, Pros. V. Town Commonalty of the City of "New of Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) York, 101 N. Y. 284, 4 N. E. 336 419 [1876]; City of Galveston v. [1886]; (aflfirming Mayer v. Mayor, Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [18S1]. Aldermen and Commonalty of the ^Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 City of Nevr York, 28 Hun. 587 [1883]. [1883]). "Laflin v. City of Chicago, 48 111. ='Langan v. Bitzer, — Ky. . 449 [1868]; Gosnell v. City of Louis- 82 S. W. 280, 26 Ky. Law Eep. 579 ville, 104 Ky 201, 46 S. W. 722, 20 [1904]. Ky. Law Rep. 519 [1898]; State ex 725 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 475 payment of the assessment.^- If the time for the payment of an assessment or an installment thereof is postponed to a future date, such assessment or installment thereof does not bear interest until it is due in the absence of some specific provision for in- terest before maturity."" If the original assessment is invalid and a reassessment is authorized by statute, interest upon the amount which should have been charged on the first assessment from the date thereof may be included as a proper item of re- assessment."* It has been said to be proper to include interest at least from the date of the curative act,^' or from the date of the second levy.'" If it is provided by statute that interest shall run from a given time, full effect must be given to such provision since without statutory authority no interest can be allowed."" Thus the statute may provide for interest upon an unpaid assess- ment beginning thirty days from the date that the tax bill is issued to the contractor and providing for an increased rate of interest if the tax bill is not paid within six months."' A provision that an assessment "shall be paid in cash within ninety days after the work is done, or in notes . . . bearing interest at the rate of eight per cent, a year," imposes liability for interest at the end of such period of ninety days."" If execution may lawfully be issued on an assessment, the assessment bears interest at least from the date of such execution."' If the statute provides that an assessment is not due or a lien until the title thereof is entered in the record of titles, interest cannot be allowed thereon from the date of confirmation.*" If a tax bill is not due until demand for '^ Gest V. City of Cincinnati, 26 "° Newman v. City of Emporia, 41 0. S. 275 [1875]; Fricke v. City of Kan. 583, 21 Pac. 593 [1889]. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio N. P. 98 [1894]. *■ City of St. Louis to use of Cor- "Mall V. City of Portland, 35 Or. nelli v. Armstrong, 38 Mo. 167 89, 56 Pac. 654 [1899]; Connor v. [1866]. City of Paris, 87 Tex. 32, 27 S. W. "City of St. Louis to use of Cor- 88 [1894]. nelli v. Armstrong, 38 Mo. 167 =^ State, Johnson, Pros. v. Inhab- [1866]. itants of the City of Trenton, 43 N. " Second Municipality of the City J. L. (14 Vr.) 166 [1881]; State, of New Orleans v. McFarlane, 3 Rob- Watson, Pros. V. City of Elizabeth, inson (La.) 406 [1843]. 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 508 [1880]; " Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Heath v. McCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Savannah, 105 Ga. 62, 31 S. E. 127 Pac. 432 [1898]; Philadelphia Mort- [1898]. gage & I'rust Company v. City of " In the matter of Willis, 30 Hun. New Whatcom, 19 Wash. 225, 52 Pac. (N. Y.) 13 [1883] ; In the matter of 1063 [1898]. Deering, 55 How. 296 [1878]. ""Blount V. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. § 475 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 726 payment, interest does not, in the absence of a specific provision therefor, commence until such demand is made,*^ though interest may run from the date of suit in the absence of a demand.*^ By statute deferred installments of a special tax bear interest from thirty days after confirmation.*' On the other hand, by statute an assessment may bear interest before it is due.** Whether the legislature may change the law with reference to interest upon an assessment after such assessment has been levied is a question upon which there is some apparent conflict of authority. In some jurisdictions it has been said that the legislature cannot increase the rate of interest upon assessments levied before the statute was passed.*' On the other hand, if an improvement is begun when the statute authorizes the council to regulate the rate of interest on overdue assessments and the council fixes the rate at eight per cent., a subsequent statute providing that assess- ments should be subject to the same interest and penalties as that provided for by other statutes therein referred to, was held not to apply.*" If a contract for a street improvement is made and an assessment provided for, a subsequent statute providing that overdue installments shall bear interest, was held to be valid as against constitutional objections, though applying to such prior assessment.*' A drainage assessment was divided into install- ments at a time when the statute provided that such installments should draw interest only from the time they became payable. Subsequently the statute was amended so as to provide that as- sessments should draw interest from the time of confirmation. Subsequently the original division of assessments into install- ments was set aside and a new division made. Tt was held that such installments bore interest from confirmation under the amending statute.*' If no judgment is rendered upon an assess- ment, as where the assessment is collected by a summary sale, " Storms V. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46, " Jackson Fire Clay Sewer Pipe 3 N. E. 401 [1885]; Barber Asphalt & Tile Company v. Snyder, 93 Mich. Paving Company v. Peck, 186 Mo. 325, 53 N. W. 359 [1892]. 506, 85 S. W. 387 [1905]. « Camp v. Neuscheler, 67 N. J. L. "Eyerman v. Provenchere, 15 Mo. (38 Vr.) 21, 50 Atl. 597 [1901]. App. 256 [1884]. "Dougherty v. Henarie, 47 Cal. 9 "Village of Western Springs v. [1873]. Hill, 177 111. 634, 52 N. E. 959 "People of the State of Illinois v. [1899]. Weber, 164 111. 412, 45 N. E. 723 «Steese v. Oviatt, 24 O. S. 248 [1897]. [1873]. 727 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 475 interest is ordinarily to be calculated down to the date of the sale.*" If a judgment is rendered as in a former action to enforce the assessment, interest should be calculated on the assessment down to the date of the judgment,'" and the judgment, after its rendition, bears the rate of interest provided for by statute. ^^ If interest on deferred installments is made to run from a time ■ later than is provided for by the ordinance, the property owner cannot complain of such irregularity.'^ If a part of an assess- ment is apportioned against a municipality, such part bears in- terest in the same way as an assessment against a private owner of property, in the absence of some statute making specific pro- vision for the assessment against the municipality."' A statute which provides for a remission of penalties and interest on "taxes" for certain years does not apply to local assessments.'* The right to charge interest on overdue assessments is in the nature of enforcing a penalty and may be justified upon that theory." Under a statute which provides that assessments shall be paid to the treasurer, with six per cent, interest, and shall be collected as other taxes, and provides in another section that if the munic- ipality sues to enforce an assessment, it may recover interest at ten per cent., a private person who sues to enforce an assessment can recover only six per cent.'" A property owner who resists an assessment because interest is illegally included therein can- not have affirmative relief in equity unless he first pays or offers to pay the amount legally due.'' A statute which provides for compromising an assessment by accepting in full, payment of one-third of the original amount, may provide for computing in- terest on such one-third.'* " Brookbank v. City of Jefferson- "' City of Seattle v. Whittlesey, 17 ville, 41 Ind. 408 [1872]. Wash. 292, 49 Pac. 489 [1897]. ■" City of St. Louis to use of Sei- '" Eyermaim v. Blaksley, 9 Mo. bert V. Allen, 53 Mo. 44 [1873]. App. 231 [1880]. ■" Himmelmanu v. Oliver, 34 Cal. "^ Des Moines Brick Manufacturing 246 [1867]; City of St. Louis to use Company v. Smith, 108 la. 307, 79 of Seibert v. Allen, 53 Mo. 44 [1873]. N. W. 77 [1899]. " Halsey v. Town of Lake View, "' Spalding v. City of Denver, 33 188 111. 540, 59 N. E. 234 [1901]; Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126 [1905]; Allen Bradford v. City of Pontiac, 165 111. v.. City of Davenport, 107 la. 90, 77 612, 46 N. E. 794 [1897]. N. W. 532 [1898]; Annie Wright ^' City of Chicago v. People, 215 Seminary v. City of Tacoma, 23 111. 235, 74 N. E. 137 [1905]; (af- Wash. 109, 62 Pac. 444 [1900]. firming 116 111. App. 564 [1904]); "'Gilfeather v. Grout, 91 N. Y. 8. Barber Asphalt Paving Company. v. 533, 101 App. Div. 150 [1905]. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. W. 64 [1904]. §§476,477 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 728 § 476. Damages. Damages for which a city is liable by reason of injuries which are caused by negligence in the construction of a public improve- ment, are not part of the expenses of constructing such improve- ment. Such items of expense cannot be assessed against the property benefited by the improvement.^ They must be paid out of the public treasury.^ On the same principle the expense in- curred in the unsuccessful defease of damage suits brought against a public corporation for its illegal and negligent conduct in constructing a public improvement cannot be included in an assessment for the cost of such improvement.' So the possible damages which a city may be obliged to pay in a pending suit in case such suit is decided adversely to the city cannot be in- cluded in the assessment.* § 477. Cost of prior defective assessment. The costs of an unsuccessful attempt to sustain an invalid assessment cannot be included in the costs of an improvement on making a second and valid assessment therefor.^ Accordingly, neither the attorney's fees in such unsuccessful suit to uphold an assessment,^ nor the cost of the copy of the opinion in such unsuccessful suit,' can be -included in such assessment. Under some statutes, however, it seems to be held that the expense of irregular and defective proceedings may be included in the final assessment for the improvement.* Costs made on an unsuccess- » Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 gomery County v. Fullen, 111 Ind. Ind. 372, 1 N. E. 711 [1885]. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]; cannot be ^ Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 included in second assessment.); In Ind. 372, .1 N. E. 711 [1885]. the Matter of Opening Locust Ave- » State, De Witt, Pros. v. Mayor nue in Village of Port Chester, 185 and Common Council of the Borough N. Y. 115, 77 N. E. 1012 [1906]; of Rutherford, 57 N. J. L. (28 Vr.) (affirming with modification 97 N. Y. 619, 31 Atl. 228 [1895]. S. 508, 110 App. Div. 774 [1906]). ' Gurnee v. City of Chicago, 40 111. ' Farr v. West Chicago Park Com- 165 [1866]. missioners, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 ^Farr v. West Chicago Park Com- [1897]; Board of Commissioners of missioners, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 Montgomery County v. Fullen, 118 [1897]; Laflin v. City of Chicago, 48 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1886]. 111. 449 [1868]; Board of Commis- 'Farr v. West Chicago Park Com- sioners of Montgomery County v. missioners, 167 III. 355, 46 N E 893 Fullen, 118 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1897]. [1888]; (holding that the costs of *Auketell v. Hayward, 119 Mich, the former proceeding, reported in 525, 78 N. W. 557 [1899]. Board of Commissioners of Mont- 729 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. §§478,479 ful remonstrance against the public improvement cannot be in- cluded in the cost of the improvement.'* § 478. Contingent expenses. Since an assessment cannot be levied in an amount exceeding the actual cost of the improvement for which it is levied/ an amount for contingent expenses cannot be added to the specific items enumerated in the assessment.^ So an assessment cannot be levied for the amount of damages which may possibly be re- covered against the city in a suit then pending, where the liability of the city for damages and the amount for which it might be held liable were both contingent on the outcome of the pending suit.^ There is some authority for allowing an amount for con- tingent and unspecified items of expense. The allowance of one thousand dollars for contingent expenses does not invalidate the contract.* Usually, however, the items of expense must be cer- tain, and they must be specified in advance. § 479. Effect of including improper items. Whether the inclusion of unauthorized items to a substantial amount invalidates the entire assessment or merely avoids the assessment as to such unauthorized items is a question upon which there is some divergence of authority. In some jurisdictions an assessment is regarded as an entirety, possessing no validity excepting that conferred upon it by statute, and accordingly the inclusion of an invalid item is regarded as invalidating the en- tire assessment.^ This view is expressed in cases in most of which, probably, the assessment does not afford the means of sep- arating the legal items from the illegal ones. The assessment would "Zigler V. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 16 Schirmpr v. Hoyt, 54 Cal. 280 Am. Bt. Kep. 357, 22 N." E. 782 [1880] ; Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1889]. [1887]) ; Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 'See § 466. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 [1893]; Borland ^People ex rel. Knox v. Village of v. Bergson, 78 Cal. 637, 21 Pac. 537 Yonkers, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 266 [1889] ; Wilson v. Poole, 33 Ind. 443 [1863]. [1870]; Poth v. Mayor, Aldermen 'Gurnee v. City of Chicago, 40 111. and Commonalty of the City of New 165 [1866]. York, 151 N. Y. 16, 45 N. E. 372 *Betts V. Williamsburg, 15 Barb. [1896]; Mitchell v. Lane, 62 Hun. 255 [1853]. (N. Y.) 253, 16 N. Y. Supp. 707 >Ryan v. Altschul, -103 Cal. 174, [1891]; McAllister v. City of Ta- 37 Pac. 339 [1894]; (citing Donnel- coma, 9 Wash. 272, 37 Pac. 447, 658 ly V. Howard, 60 Cal. 291 [1882]; [1894]. §479 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 730 therefore be invalid under a less extreme theory.' At any rate this view is a more extreme one than that entertained in most juris- dictions. If the illegal items are severed from the legal ones by the terms of the assessment so that by inspection of the pro- ceedings the amount, which is properly assessable, can be ascer- tained, the assessment is invalid as to the illegal items and valid as to those which are legal.* If t}ie assessment does not sever the legal frora the illegal items, it is keld in most jurisdictions that the court has no power to determine the amount of the legal items by extrinsic evidence, and that the entire assessment is " See post this section, N. 4. 'Bpaulding v. Wesson, 115 Cal. 441, 47 Pac. 249 [1896]; McDonald V. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Frick v. Morford, 87 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1891]; Donnelly v. Howard, 60 Cal. 291 [1882]; Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1877]; Spalding V. City of Denver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126 [1905]; McClellan v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 94 [1889]; City of Chicago v. Hul- bert, 205 111. 346, 68 N. E. 786; Shannon v. Village of Hinsdale, 180 111. 202, 54 N. E. 181 [1899]; Farr V. West Chicago Park Commission- ers, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 [1897]; Ross v. Van Natta, 164 Ind. 557, 74 N. E. 10 [1905]; Board of Commissioners of Montgomery Coun- ty V. Fullen, 118 Ind. 158, 20 N. E. 771 [1888] ; New Eel River Draining Association v. Durbin, 30 Ind. 173 [1868] ; Gallaher v. Garland, 126 la. 206, 101 N. W. 867 [1904]; Allen V. City of Davenport, 107 la, 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]; City of Louis- ville V. Selvage, 106 Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 [1899]; S. D. Moody & Co. v. Sewerage and Water Board, 117 La. 360, 41 So. 649 [1906]; Power V. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905] ; Neenan v. Smith, 60 Mo. 292 [1875]; City of Boon- ville ex rel. Cosgrove v. Rogers, — Mo. App. , 101 S. W. 1120 [1907]; City of St. Joseph ex rel, Danaher v. Dillon, 61 Mo. App. 317 [1895]; Davis v. Mayor and Com- mon Council of the City of Newark, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 595, 25 Atl. 336 [1892]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Deering to Vacate an Assess- ment, 93 N. Y. 361 [1883]; In the Matter of the Petition of Auchmuty, 90 N. Y. 685 [1882]; In the Matter of the Petition of Auchmuty, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 324 [1879]; In the Matter of the Petition of Upson to Vacate an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 67 [1882]; In the Matter of Lord, 78 N. Y. 109 [1879]; In the Matter of Schell, 76 N. Y. 432 [1879] ; In the Matter of Walter, 75 X. Y. 354 [1878]; In the Matter of New York Protestant Epis- copal School, 75 N. Y. 324; In the Matter of Mead, 74 N. Y. 216 [1878]; In the Matter of Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum, 70 N. Y. 476 [1877]; In the Matter of Cram, 69 Jf. Y. 452 [1877]; In the Matter of the Petition of Merriam to Va- cate an Assessment, 84 N. Y. 596 [1881]; Matter of McCormaek, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 128 [1870]; Matter of McCormaek, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 234 [1870] ; Jaeger v. Burr, 36 0. S. 164 [1880]; McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 Ohio C. 0. 34 [1901]; Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 S. D. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 802, 51 N. W. 770 [1892]; Annie Wright Seminary V. City of Taeoma, 23 Wash. 109, 62 Pac. 444 [1900]; Wells v. Western Paving & Supply Company, 96 Wis. 116, 70 N. W. 1071 [1897]; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236 [1872]. 731 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 479 therefore invalid.* If the record does not show the means of separating the valid items from the invalid it may be proper to set the assessment aside/ while if in another action on the same assessment the record shows the means of separating the legal items from the illegal items, the amount of the assessment may be reduced and the assesment, as reduced, may be upheld." In other jurisdictions it is held that the court may determine from extrinsic evidence what is proper assessment for the amount of the legal items and may enforce such assessment as to such legal items without regarding it as entirely invalid.' Thus, if the con- tract for constructing a street was for a gross amount which included both the cost of original construction and the cost of maintenance, and a street railway company could not be charged with the cost of maintenance since it remained liable to the city under its franchise to keep that part of the street between its tracks in repair, it was held that the court might determine, from extrinsic evidence, what part of the contract price was intended for original construction and what part for maintenance and enforce the assessment as to the cost of the original construction.' So where it is held that a guaranty to keep a street in repair for five years, to be secured by the deposit in bonds of ten per cent, of thi contract price, cannot be included in the assess- •Spaulding v. Wesson, 115 Cal. S. W. 52 [1895]; City of Joplin ex 441, 47 Pae. 249 [-1896]; Chicago rel. v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 717, Union Traction Company v. City of 103 S. W. 130 [1907]; City of St. Chicago, 208 111. 187, 70 . N. E. 234 Joseph ex rel. Danaher v. Wilshire, [1904]; Naltner v. Blake, 56 Ind. 47 Mo. App. 125 [1891] ; In the Mat- 127 [1877]; Kansas City v. O'Con- ter of the Petition of Eosenbaum, nor, 82 Mo. App. 655 [1899]; State, 119 N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172 [1890]; Randolph, Pros. v. Inhabitants of the In the Matter of the Petition of the City of Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. (9 Trustees of Leake and Watts Orphan Vr.) 93 [1875]; In the Matter of Home, 92 N. Y. 116 [1883]; In the JNew York Protestant Episcopal Matter of Mead, 13 Hun. (N. Y.) School, 75 N. Y. 324 [1878]. 349 [1878]; Williamsport v. Hughes, "In the Matter of New Vork Pro- 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 443 [1902]; Young testant Episcopal School, 75 N. Y. v. City of Taeoma, 31 Wash. 153, 71 324 [1878]. Pae. 742 [1903]; Cook v. City of 'In the Matter of the Petition of Racine, 49 Wis. 243, 5 N. W. 352 Auchmuty, 90 N. Y. 685 [1882]. [1880]. ' Fair Haven & Westville Railroad ' Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Company v. City of New Haven, 77 Company v. City of New Haven, 77 Conn. 667, 60 Atl. 651 [1905]; Feb- Conn. 667, 60 Atl. 651 [1905]. See ler v. Goanell, 99 Ky. 380, 35 S. W. also to the same effect Williamsport 1125 [1896]; Verdin v. City of St. v. Hughes, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 443 Louis, 131 Mo. 26, 33 S. W. 480, 36 [1902]. § 479 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 732 ment, the court may regard the amount of such bond as the amount of the increase in price due to such provision for maintenance.* So if a contract has been let at a price so exorbitant as to amount to fraud, the court may determine from extrinsic evidence what a proper price would be and may reduce the assessment to such price." So if a contract has been let without competitive bid- ding, the court may determine how great is the excess over the price that could have been obtafhed under competition.^^ A statute authorizing a deduction from the amount of the assess- ment instead of the vacation of the entire assessment is not re- tro-active and does not apply to proceedings had before the passage of su^h statute.^^ In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that improper items have not been included in the assessment.^' Thus, where in repairing a ditch more work is done than is authorized, but the amount of the assessment does not exceed the amount actually paid for repairs, it will not be presumed that such assessment is ex- cessive.^* Where an ordinance for constructing a sidewalk provided, in excess of the authority of the city, that if areas or vaults had not been roofed over, the necessary arching^ should be built by the contractor under specifications to be furnished by the city engineer, it was held that a tax bill issued under such ordinance which recited that it was for constructing sidewalks and contained no reference to the construction of arches would be presumed to be valid in the absence of a showing that such part of such bill represented the cost of constructing such arehes.^^ Under some statutes the only remedy against in- cluding improper items in an assessment is an appeal to a desig- nated board. Failure to take such appeal operates as a waiver of such defeet.'^" If the objection to certain items as improper is not » Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380, 35 " Scott v. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, S. W. 1125 [1896]; Young v. City 31 N. E. 953 [1892]; Haag v. Ward, of Tacoma, 31 Wash. 153, 71 Pac. 186 Mo. 325, 85 S. W. 391 [1904]. 742 [1903]. ' "Scott v. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, '°In the Matter of the Petition of 31 N. E. 953 [1892]. the Trustees of the Leake and Watts i= Haag v. Ward, 186 Mo. 325, 85 Orphan Home, 92 N. Y. 116 [1883]. S. W. 391 [1904]. "In the Matter of the Petition of '" Frick v. Morford, 87 Cal. 576, Eosenbaum, 119 N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 25 Pac. 764 [1891]; Dyer v. Scalma- 172 [1890]. nini, 69 Cal. 637, 11 Pac. 327 [1886] ; "In the Matter of the Petition of Blair v. Luning, 76 Cal. 134, 18 Pac. Eager, 46 N. Y. 100 [1871]. 153 rispai- Hiirinelmann v. Hoad- 733 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT. § 480 taken in the court below, it cannot be raised for the first time in proceedings in error.^' "While appeal may be the exclusive remedy where there is statutory authority for including the items in question if such authority is improperly exercised/* it is not exclusive if there is no statutory authority for such items.^' § 480. Immaterial errors in including items. In accordance with' the maxim de minimis non curat lex, an as- sessment may include unauthorized items, but the amount of such items may be so small in proportion to the entire assessment that the assessment will not be disturbed by the courts on account, of such improper items.^ On the other hand, the amount of the improper items included may be small and yet it may be of such magnitude with reference to the assessment that it will not fall within this maxim; and the inclusion of such improper items will avoid the assessment.^ When the maxim applies and when it does not are questions upon which there is some conflict of authority; and which can better be illustrated by specific examples than by abstract statements. Including in an assessment an unauthorized fee for serving notices amounting to two dollars and fifty cents has been held to be within the maxim.^ In an improvement the total cost of which was over nineteen thousand dollars, there ley, 44 Cal. 276 [1872]; Loesnitz v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 108 Seelinger, Treas., 127 Ind. 422, 25 N. [1871]; In the Matter of the Peti- E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 [1890]. tion of Lowden to Vacate an Assess- "Deady v. Townsend, 57 Cal. 298 ment, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]; In the [1881]. . Matter of the Petition of The Mu- " Himmelmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. tual Life Insurance Company of New 276 [1872]. York to Vacate an Assessment, 89 "City Street Improvement Com- N. Y. 530 [1882]; People of the pany v. Taylor, 138 Cal. 364, 71 Pae. State of New York ex rel. Jessup v. 446 [1903]; Himmelmann v. Hoad- Kelley, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 389 [1884] ; ley, 44 Cal. 276 [1872]. McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 Ohio 1 Chicago Consolidated Traction C. C. 34 [1901]. Company v. Village of Oak Park, 225 ^ Morris v. City of Chicago, 11 111. 111. 9; 80 N. E. 42 [1907]; Gardiner 650 [1850]; In the Matter of the V. Street Commissioners of the City Petition of Deering to Vacate an As- of Boston, 188 Mass. 223, 74 N. E. sessment, 93 N. Y. 361 [1883]; In 341 [1905]; Workman V. City of Wor- the Matter of Willis, 30 Hun. (N. cester, 118 Mass. 168 [1875]; State, Y.) 13 [1883]. Raymond, Pros. v. Mayor and Coun- 'MeGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 cil of the Borough of Rutherford, 55 Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]. (The assess- N. J. L. (26 Vr.) 441, 27 Atl. 172 ment in this case was, however, set [1893] ;, State, Agens, Pros. v. Mayor aside upon other grounds.) and Common Council of the City of § 480 ' TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 734 was included the cost of constructing thirty-nine additional feet improperly included by the ordinance at a cost of twenty-seven dollars and thirty cents. The proportion of this item, which was charged upon a street railway company, was two dollars and forty-five cents. It was held that this amount was too trifling to render the ordinance unreasonable, oppressive or void.* Under an order for assessing four hundred and fifty thousand dollars for drains and sewers the fact that" four hundred and fifty thou- sand and one dollars were assessed did not invalidate the assess- ment.^ The maxim has been applied in cases where the excess cost bore a larger proportion to the cost of the entire improve- ment. Thus, where the total amount of the assessment was over one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars and it included an item improperly allowed for damages to gas mains exceeding four thousand dollars and the commissioners^ regarded such amount as falling within the application of the maxim de minimis non curat lex, it was held that the commissioners could apply such maxim where courts of law could not and their action should be affirmed." The excess of six cents in an assessment exceeding twenty-nine thousand dollars has been held to be immaterial.' So an excess of five cents upon an assessment has been held to be within the operation of the maxim.' Where an unlawful item has been larger in proportion to the total assessment, the maxim has been held not to apply. Thus, an unlawful and unauthorized item of seven dollars has been held to avoid an assessment of nearly two hundred and fifty dollars ; " an unauthorized item of ninety-six dollars has been held to avoid an assessment of nearly nine thousand dollars ; ^° and the addition to an assessment of over twelve hundred dollars of an item of four hundred and sixty dollars for contingencies has been held to avoid the assess- ment.^^ In some jurisdictions excesses no greater than those re- * Chicago Consolidated Traction ' Coleman v. Shattuck, 68 N. Y. Company v. Village of Oak Park, 225 349. 111. 9, 80 N. E. 42 [1907]. » In the Matter of the Petition of 'Workman v. City of Worcester, Deering to Vacate an Assessment, 93 118 Mass. 168 [1875]. N. Y. 361 [1883]. 'People of the State of New York "Morris v. City of Chicago, 11 111. ex rel. Jessup v. Kelley, 33 Hun. (N. 650 [1850]. Y.) 389 [1884]. " People ex rel. Knox v. Village of 'State, Agens, Pros. v. Mayor and Yonkers, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 266 Common Council of the City of New- [1863]. ark, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 168 [1871]. 735 SPECIFIC ITEMS INCLUDED IN ASSESSMENT § 480 garded in other courts as falling within the application of the maxim have been held to invalidate the assessment. Thus, where a contract for making an improvement was let at one dollar a foot an assessment of eighty-three dollars and eighty-four cents upon a lot, the front of which was eighty-two and one-half feet, was held to be unauthorized.^^ An addition of excessive interest amounting to one dollar has been held to avoid the assessment.'" If unauthorized items have been included in computing the cost of an improvement, but the assessment as levied is for less than the amount of the authorized item, the inclusion of the unauthor- ized items does not invalidate the assessment.^* If, however, the greater part of the expense is incurred under a contract invalid because bids were not advertised for, it has been held that assessments levied for such improvement were invalid even if an amount in excess of the assessments was expended legally, since the assessment was levied for benefits received from the entire improvement and not merely from the part thereof for which legal expenditures were made.^'' If unauthorized work has been done in an improvement, but there is no evidence to show that a charge therefor is included in the assessment, the fact that such work is done does not make the assessment in- valid.^« "Wilson V. Poole, 33 Ind. 443 L. (26 Vr.) 441, 29 Atl. 172 [1893]; [1870]. In the Matter of the Petition of The '° In the matter of Willis, 30 Hun. Mutual Life Insurance Company of (N. Y.) 13 [1883]. New York to Vacate an Assessment, "Morse V. Charles, — Mass. , 89 N. Y. 530 [1882]; In the Matter 83 N. E. 891 [1908]; Gardiner v. of the Petition of Lowden to Vacate Street Commissioners of the City of an Assessment, 89 N. Y. 548 [1882]. Boston, 188 Mass. 223, 74 N. E. 341 '" Warren v. Street Commissioners [1905]; Wells v. Street Commission- of the City of Boston, 181 Mass. 6, ers of City of Boston, 187 Mass. 451, 62 N. E. 951 [1902]. 73 N. E. 554 [1905]; State, Ray- " Field v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., mond. Pros. v. 'Mayor and Council of 117 Fed. 925 [1902], the Borough of Rutherford, 55 N. J, CHAPTER XI. THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. ♦ § 481. Power to let contract. A grant of power to a city to construct an improvement im- pliedly confers powers upon such city to let contracts for the con- struction of such improvements.^ Thus, statutes which authorize a city to require the owners or occupants of adjoining prop- erty to repair streets, alleys or sidewalks which are out of re- pair,^ or a statute authorizing a public corporation to provide for the construction of lateral sewers and to apportion the actual cost of labor or material expended,' each of them au- thorizes the public corporation to let a contract for such im- provement instead of constructing it by employing laborers and purchasing material. So a statute authorizing municipal cor- porations to cause any lot upon which water should become stagnant to be filled up or drained or which provides that in case of failure or refusal of the owner to do so it is to be done at the expense of the municipal corporation, authorizes the mu- nicipal corporation to let a contract for such work and to assess the cost thereof upon the owners of such property.* So where a city authorizes the majority of the property owners upon a certain street to pave the same, and a majority avail themselves of such privilege and enter into a contract with a third person to pave such street it is held that such contractor has done the work under the authority of the city, that he is to be regarded as the agent of the city for the purpose of doing such work and that accordingly the defense cannot be made that the work was not done by the city or any of its agents.^ 1 Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, = Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okla. 405, 82 Pac. 331 [1905]; Jones v. Holz- 68 Pac. 511 [1902]. apfel, 11 Okla. 405, 68 Pac. 511 ' BHss v. Kraus, 160. S. 54 [1864]. [1902]; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 0. S. 54 'City of Philadelphia v. Wistar, [1864]. 35 Pa. St. 427 [I860]. (Such con- ^ Heath v. Manson, 147 Cal. 694, tractor was authorised to file liens 82 Pac. 331 [1905]. in the name of the city for his use.) 736 737 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 482 § 482. Necessity of letting contract. Whether a city is bound to let contracts for the construction of public improvements or whether it has power ro employ men and purchase material and so construct improvement itself is a question which depends entirely upon the provisions of the stat- ute conferring power upon public corporations. In the absence of a statute specifically requiring the city to let contracts, it is not necessary that the city should do so. It may, if it pleases, construct an improvement by employing men by the day and by purchasing the necessary material.^ If there has been no violation of statutory provisions requiring the letting of a con- tract or competitive bidding, the fact that no competition was invited, no contract was let and the workmen paid by the day, is not in the absence of fraud a defense to the assessment.^ A statute which authorizes a public corporation to let contracts does not require them so to do in the absence of some mandatory provision. Thus a statutory provision that a fencing district "may advertise for proposals for doing any work by contract" is a directory and not a mandatory provision and such board may let a contract without advertisement if it sees fit.^ In the absence of a statute requiring the letting of contracts for the construction of public improvements a city may construct a part of a street itself and let contracts for the construction of the rest of the street.* Under a statute requiring a city to let con- tracts by advertisement and in the absence of bidders to con- struct the work itself, a city has no power in the absence of bidders to let a contract without advertisement.^ Under many statutes it is. provided that improvements exceeding a certain amount in value must be constructed by contract, let in the manner prescribed by statute. Such statutes are mandatory and ^ Scott V. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, ' Scott v. Stringley, 132 .Ind. 378, 31 N. E. 953 [1892]; In the Matter 31 N. E. 953 [1892]. of the Petition of the Trustees of the ' Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 Leake and Watts -Orphan Home in of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 the City of New York, 92 N. Y. 116 S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1902]. [1883]; Webber v. Common Council 'Town of Tumwater v. Pix, 18 •of the City of Loekport, 43 Howard Wash. 153, 51 Pac. 353 [1897]. (N. Y.) 368 [1872]; City of Phila- "City of Elsberry v. Black, 120 delphia v. Burgin, 50 Pa. St. {14 Mo. App. 20, 96 S. W. 256, 257 Wright) 539 [1865]; Town of Tum- [1906]. water v. Pix, 18 Wash. J53, 51 Pac. 353 [1897]. § 482 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 738 an improvement constructed except as provided for by statute, cannot be paid for by assessment upon property owners." Under a statute which provides that any work involving an expenditure of over one thousand dollars shall be let by contract in a specified manner and providing elsewhere that the department of public works shall have the powers and functions previously possessed by the old department of public works, the new department of public works is bound to let contracts if the expenditure exceeds one thousand dollars, although the old board was not so re- stricted.^ If the statute authorizes a certain majority of the ■council to dispense with the letting of contracts such power must be exercised by the council, in each specific ease and cannot be delegated generally by a three-fourths vote to other public offi- cials.' Thus an ordinance adopted- by the council by three- fourths vote and authorizing the commissioners of public works to do certain work as they might deem expedient and for the best interests of the city and property owners was held not to authorize the commissioners to do the work which involved an expenditure of over one thousand dollars by day 's work and with- out a contract." A statute which requires public improvements to be constructed under a contrapt let in the manner specified by statute does not apply to improvements already commenced un- der pre-existing statutes.^" Thus where the work was begun on the day before the act took eifect, it was held that such statute did not apply.*' Omission to let a contract where the expendi- ture exceeds the amount limited has been said not to be a fraud or legal irregularity within the meaning of the statute authoriz- ing the vacation of an assessment on those grounds.'^ Thus ° City Improvement Company v. ' In the Matter of the Petition of Broderiqk, 125 Cal. 139, 57 Pac. 776 the Emigrant Industrial Savings [1899]; Town of Clay City v. Bry- Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]. son, 30 Ind. App. 490, 66 N. E. 498 "In the Matter of the Petition of [1902] ;, In the Matter of the Peti- the Emigrant Industrial Savings tion of Blodgett, 91 N. Y. 117 Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]. [1883]; In the Matter of the Appli- '° Tripler v. Mayor, Aldermen and cation of Lange to Vacate an Assess- Commonalty of the City of New York, ment, 85 N. Y..307 [1881]; In the 125 N. Y. 617, 26 N. E. 721 [1891]. Matter of the Petition of Bobbins to " Smith v. Mayor, Aldermen and Vacate an Assessment, 82 N Y. 131 Commonalty of the City of New York, [1880]; In the Matter of the Peti- 82 Hun. (N. Y.) 570, 31 N. Y. Supp. tion of the Emigrant Industrial Sav- 783 [1894]. ings Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]. '^Miller's Case, 12 Abb. Prac. (X. 'In the Matter of the Petition of Y.) 121 [1861]. Blodgett, 91 N. Y. 117 [1883]. 739 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 483 under a statute authorizing a tax for lighting and water to be levied when the town trustees have made a contract for light and water, such tax cannot be levied before such contract is made.''' The fact that a drain commissioner has not declared a contract void for non-performance and that he has not relet the contract does not justify the board of supervisors in refusing to levy an assessment for the work.^* § 483. Necessity of valid contract. If a contract for the construction of the public improvement has been let and an assessment levied to pay such contract price, the validity of such contract is essential to the validity of the assessment since otherwise the assessment would be levied to pay the claim not legally due against the city.^ Thus if a con- tract is invalid because let without a petition for the improve- ment by a majority of the lot owners,^ or because it is entered into by persons who are not officers of the city either de facto or de jure and who act only under an unconstitutional statute,' an assessment therefor is invalid. If a contract has been let under a defective ordinance, such contract cannot be corrected by a subsequent resolution of the council. If it can be corrected at all, it must be by a new ordinance passed in proper form.* If no contract at all exists but a specific statute has been passed for levying an assessment to pay a gratuity to one who performed work, it has been held that such assessment is valid. The pro- priety of this holding is very doubtful and it seems to be con- « Brewer v. Bridges, 164 Ind. 358, [1891]; State, Van Home, Pros. v. 73 N. E. 811 [19051. Town of Bergen, 30 N. J. L. (1 "Nash V. Kenyon, — ilich. , Vroom) 307 [1863]; Portland v. 115 N. W. 45 [1908]. Bituminous Paving Co., 33 Or. 307, 1 Gray v. Richardson, 124 Cal. 460, 72 Am. St. Rep. 713, 44 L. R. A. 527, 57 Pac. 385 [1899]; Sehwiesau v. 52 Pac. 28 [1898]; Town of Hamil- Mahon, 110 Cal. 543, 42 Pac. 1065 ton v. Chopard, 9 Wash. 352, 37 Pac. [1895]; Nicolson Pavement Company 472 [1894]; Dean v. Borchsenius, V. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 [1868]; But- 30 Wis. 236 [1872]. ler V. Detroit, 43 Mich. 552, 5 N. W. ^ Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 1078 [1880]; State of Minnesota ex 35 Cal. 699 [1868]. rel. City of St. Paul V. District Court "State of Minnesota ex rel. City of Ramsey County, 72 Minn. 226, 71 of St. Paul v. District Court of Ram- Am. St. Rep. 480, 75 N. W. 224 sey County, 72 Minn. 226, 71 Am. [1898]; Verdin v. City of St. Louis, St. Rep. 480, 75 N. W. 224 [1898]. 131 Mo. 26, 33 S. W. 480, '36 S. W. 52 ' City of St. Joseph ex rel. Dana- [1895]; City of St. Joseph ex rel. her v. Wilshire, 47 Mo. App. 125 Danaher v. Wilshire, 47 Mo. App. 125 [1891]. § 483 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 740 trary to the general weight of authority." If by statute a specific method is provided for testing the validity of the contract, the property owner must resort to the means thus provided. If he omits such method of testing the validity of the contract, he waives his objection thereto and cannot interpose such objection as a defense to an action on the assessment." A property owner is said not to be a person "aggrieved" and hence not entitled to appeal from the action of the»street superintendent in letting the contr^t even if his property has been assessed under a void contract.^ If the invalidity of the contract is due solely to the failure of certain subordinate city officers to comply with the directions of superior city officers, such as the city council, such superior city officers may, by ratification, make, valid such con- tracts, as they could have authorized in advance.' Since the legislature niay dispense with advertisement, receipt of bids, or letting a contract,' it may provide that after the contract has in fact been performed, the property owner cannot inquire into its original validity.^" It may, by provisions for re-assessment, make valid a contract which was originally invalid.^^ Especially in assessment proceedings where the cost of an improvement is to be charged upon the owners of property benefited by the improve- ment is it true that a city cannot incorporate in its contract items for which the city has no authority to contract.^^ If the city acts in good faith in constructing a public improvement, the ^ Such a statute was said to be a ' Philadelphia to use v. Jewell, 140 "very remarkable legislative enact- Pa. St. 9, 21 Atl. 239 [1891]; Phila- ment" and invalid in Granger v. City delphia to use v. Jewell, 135 Pa. St. iif Bufifalo, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 238 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890]; Pepper v. [1879]; but it was held valid in City of Philadelphia to use of Hor- Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. ter, 114 Pa. St. 96, 6 Atl. 899 [1886]; Y. 116 [1859]. City to use of O'Rourke v. Hays, 93 "Spaulding v. North San Francis- Pa. St. 72 [1881]. CO Homestead & Railroad Associa- "See §§ 482, 496-504. tion, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pac. 600, 25 Pac. '» Brientnall v. City of Philadel- 249 [1890]; Oakland Paving Com- phia to use, 103 Pa. St. 156 [1883]. pany v. Eier, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]; (This case was decided under a pro- Everett V. Deal, 148 Ind. 90, 47 N. cedure in which the city as local E. 219 [1897] ; Alley v. City of Leb- plaintiff sued on behalf of the con- anon, 146 Ind. 125, 44 N. E. 1003 tractor as equitable plaintiff.) [1896]; City of Greenfield v. State "State v. District Court of Blue ex rel. Moore, 113 Ind. 597, 15 N. E. Earth County, 102 Minn. 482, 113 241 [1887] ; Scranton v. Jermyn, 156 X. W. 697, 114 N. W. 654 [1907]. Pa. 107, 27 Atl. 66 [1893]. »=Inge v. Board of Public W6rks of ' Brock V. Luning, 89 Cal. 316, 26 Mobile, 135 Ala. 187, 93 Am. St. Rep. Pac. 972 [1891], 20, 33 So. 678 [1902]; Chippewa 741 THE IMPROVEMENT COlirTKACT. § 484 fact that, by reason of such improvement, the property of a cor- poration which has rightfully been laid in or upon a public street is damaged does not render the city liable therefor, since the right of the corporation to keep its property in or upon a public street is always subservient to the right and duty of the city to maintain such street in condition suitable for public use/' As has already been said the city cannot include such items of ex- penditure in an assessment against an abutting property owner. '^^ Accordingly a provision in a contract for a street improvement, whereby the contractor agreed, in making excavations, to sup- port water and gas pipes situated in the street, to be liable to injury to such water and gas pipes, and for waste of water and gas due to any injury caused by such excavations, and to be liable to a street railway company for any damage to its tracks, is invalid.^' Such provisions operating to increase the cost of the work and being incorporated in the specifications upon which bids were based, make the entire contract illegal and unen- forceable.^" An assessment levied to pay the contractor for work done under a contract which has been held void has been held to be invalid, though specifically authorized by statute.^' Such contract was held in this case to be unconstitutional. A special statute authorizing a special assessment to pay to the contractor a gratuity over and above his contract was, however, held valid in the same jurisdiction.^^ § 484. Effect of fraud. In most jurisdictions an assessment can be attacked by reason of fraud and collusion between the public officials and the con- tractor whereby the property owners are wronged. Such fraud invalidates the assessment affected thereby.^ By statute in New Bridge Co. v. City of Durand, 122 "Anderson v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, Wis. 85, 106 Am. St. Rep. 931, 99 41 So. 684 [1906]. N. W. 603 [1904]. "Granger v. City of Buffalo, 8 "New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drain- Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 238 [1879]. age Commission of New Orleans, 197 " Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 U. S. 453, 49 L. 831, 25 S. 471 N. Y. 116 [1859]. [1905]; National Water Works Co. 'Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350 V. City of Kansas, 28 Fed. 921; Kir- [1880] ; Mason v. City of Des Moines, by V. Citizens Railway Company, 48 108 la. 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]; Md. 168, 30 Am. Rep. 455. Pleasants v. City of Shreveport, 110 "See § 461. La. 1046, 35 So. 283 [1903]; Dixon '=Ande'-son v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, v. City of Detroit, 86 Mieh. 516, 49 41 So. 684 [1906]. N. W. 628 [1891]; Weston v. Citv § 484 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 742 York, assessments may be attacked for fraud, although they are made valid as against most other defenses.- It has been said that fraud, in the sense at least of actual fraud, implies collu- sion between the public officials and the contractors.'* In accord- ance with this theory the defense of fraud cannot be made if the contractor did not participate therein.* However, it has been held that the fact that the officers of the public corporation are innocent of the fraud does not^revent the existence of fraud which might invalidate the assessment.^ If a sufficient remedy against fraud is provided such fraud may not for that reason render invalid an assessment which otherwise would be affected thereby." Thus the fact that a city fraudulently relieved certain contractors from doing a part of the work contracted for by them and was about to pay other contractors for doing the same work, was said not to be a ground for enjoining the collection of the assessment,^ since adequate relief could be obtained by enjoining the city from paying out such funds improperly. Furthermore, the property owner could also maintain an action against the improvement board and the contractor for respec- tively constructing and accepting the public improvement inferior to that required by the contract.' of Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. 211 111. 200, 103 Am. St. Rep. 191, St. Rep. 472, 43 L. E. A. 678, 53 N. 71 N. E. 860 [1904]; (reversing Gage E. 12 [1899]; In the Matter of the v. Springer, 112 111. App. 103 Petition of Livingston, 121 N. Y. [1904]). 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890] ; In the Mat- ^ Astor v. The Mayor, 62 N. Y. 580 ter of the Trustees of the Leake and [1875]; In the Matter of Meade, 13 Watts Orphan Home, 92 N. y. ne Hun. (N. Y.) 349 [1878]; Miller's [1883]; In the Matter of Eighter, Case, 12 Abh. Pr. (N. Y.) 121 92 N. Y. Ill [1883]; Eno v. Mayor, [1861]; Matter of Keyser, 10 Abb. 'Aldermen and Commonalty of the Pr. (N. Y.) 481 [I860]. City of New York, 68 N. Y. 214 'Seaboard National Bank of New [1877]; In the Matter of Raymond, York v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467, 48 .21 Hun. (N. Y.) 229 [1880]; In the L. R. A. 279, 48 S. W. 939 [1898]; Matter of Meade, 13 Hun. (N. Y.) In the Matter of Eightieth Street, 349 [1878]; In the Matter of Eager, 31 Howard (N. Y.) 99 [1865]. 41 Howard (N. Y.) 107 [1870]; In 'Seaboard National Bank of New the Matter of Beekman, 18 Howard York v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467, 48 (N. Y.) 460 [1859]; Matter of L. E. A. 279, 48 S. W. 939 [1898]. Eightieth Street, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) = Pleasants v. City of Shreveport, 324 [1864]; Foote v. City of Mil- lib La. 1046, 35 So. 283 [1903]. waukee, 18 Wis. 270 [1864]; Cook v. "Heinroth" v. Kochersperger, 173 City of Racine, 49 Wis. 243, 5 N. 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1898]. W. 352 [1880]. The public officials ' Heinroth v. Kochersperger, 173 who are guilty of the fraud are per- III. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1898]. sonally liable to the property owner » Gasfe v. Springer, 211 111. 200 103 injured thereby; Gage v. Springer, Am. St. Rep. 191, 71 N. E.' 860 743 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 485 § 485. Nature of fraud. The nature of the fraud which invalidates an assessment has been discussed by the courts repeatedly.' If a resolution by the common council modifying a sewer contract is passed by means of fraud and corruption, such conduct renders such modifica- tion invalid.'' The existence of material alterations in a written contract wrongfully and fraudulently increasing the contract price is ground for defeating the assessment.' The mayor of a city, hearing that the legislature had passed a statute preventing the mayor from making contracts on his sole authority, on April 17th sent for a contractor, and on April 22d without public com- petition he let a number of contracts to him with the under- standing that they should not be of any effect if this new statute had already become a law; and they were accordingly locked up until it could be learned whether such statute had' become a law. The statute in fact became a law on April 30th. It was held that this amounted to fraud.* An excessive price for a public improvement may be so grossly excessive as to suggest fraud.^ Thus where the contract price was over one hundred and seventy thousand dollars, while a reasonable price for the same work was about forty-one thousand dollars, it was said that fraud existed.* So, where rock excavation worth four dollars a cubic yard was let at fourteen dollars a cubic yard; pipe culvert worth one dollar and fifty cents per foot was let at over seven dollars a foot ; and a brick sewer worth about four dollars and fifty cents a foot was let at twenty-five dollars a foot, fraud was held to exist.' So where filling is let at one dollar and forty-seven cents [1904]; (reversing Gage v. Springer, 121 N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]; 112 111. App. 103 [1904]). In the Matter of the Trustees of the "^ Matter of Keyser, 10 Abb. Pr. Leake and Watts Orphan Home, 92 (N. Y.) 481 [I860]. N. Y. 116 [1883]; In the Matter of ^Weston V. City of Syracuse, 158 Righter, 92 N. Y. Ill [1883]; Eno N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, 43 v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]; of the City of New York, 68 N. Y. (reversing Weston v. City of Syra- 214 [1877]; In the Matter of Meade, cuse, 82 Hun. (N. Y.) 67, 31 N. Y. 13 Hun. (N. Y.) 349 [1878]; Cook S. 186). V. City of Racine, 49 Wis. 243, 5 N. 'Miller's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) W. 352 [1880]. 121 [1861]. 'In the Matter of Livingston, 121 .'In the matter of Raymond, 21 N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [1890]. Hun. 229 [1880]. , 'In the Matter of the Trustees of ' Dixon V. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. the Leake and Watts Orphan Home, 516, 49 N. W. 628 [1891]; In the 92 N. Y. 116 [1883]. Matter of the Petition of Livingston, § 485 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 744 per cubic yard when the usual price therefor is eighty cents per cubic yard, such excessive price is at least evidence of fraud." The fact that a part of the assessment is imposed upon the city as a property owner, leaving to be imposed upon the property owners benefited an assessment not exceeding the reasonable value of the work done, does not make such assessment valid, since the city is to be regarded as a property owner and the assess- ment should be apportioned an»ng the property owners.' A different result is reached if the given charge is made upon the city, not as property owner, but on the theory that a part of the cost of the improvement is to be borne by general taxation. Unless the excess over a reasonable price is so gross as to sug- gest fraud, or unless fraud is otherwise shown to exist, the price to be paid for work or materials is within the discretion of the public corporation making the improvement; and the assessment cannot be attacked successfully on the ground that the price was greater than market price.^" Thus, an agreement to pay a con- tractor a uniform price per square yard for brick pavement with- out regard to the streets or the locality to be improved is valid.^* Private contracts entered into between the public contractor and some of the property owners for doing work for them on terms different from those on which the rest of his work is done have been presented for adjudication. Such a contract is said to avoid the public contract which is obtained thereby.^^ If provision is made by statute for testing its validity by a direct attack upon it, it is said that such private contract must be made the ground for a direct attack upon the public contract or such objection will be waived.^^ A statute forbidding the allowance of rebates to property owners is held not to apply to the remission of a small amount in a settlement made more than four years after the work is accepted in the absence of any evidence to show that there was a prior contract for such remission.^* If the privi- lege of entering into the special arrangement in question is given «Tn the Matter of Eighter, 92 N. "Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350 Y. Ill [1883]. [1880]. »In the Matter of Livingston, 121 "Himmelmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. 290 [18.90]. 213 [1872]. "Palmer v. City of Danville, 166 »/w re Ayers Asphalt Paving Co., 111. 42, 46 N. E. 629 [1897]. 118 La. 640, 43 So. 262 [1907]. " City of Galveston v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420 [1881]. 745 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 485 to all the property owners, no fraud exists. ^° An agreement by certain property owners who had by statute a right to take the contract themselves whereby they agreed to give up such right in consideration of a reduction of twenty-five per cent in their assessment is held not to be fraudulent where it does not appear that the complaining property owner could have done the work below the contract price if the other property owners had com- bined with him or that he desired to take the contract.^" An oral agreement between a property owner and the contractor whereby the contractor agrees to accept in payment of the assess- ment a certain tract of land and to pay to the owner thereof the cash difference between the agreed price thereof and the as- sessment is unenforceable.^' If the property owners have by stat- ute the right to elect to do the work, the fact that the city gives an unreasonable short time for their performance of such work when the city has already secured most of the men, teams and material necessary to perform such contract has been regarded as amounting to fraud and avoiding a subsequent assessment.^' Fraud is also sai4 to exist if an assessment is levied greatly in excess of the ascertained cost of the work,^" or for work which has been entirely omitted.^" On this question the certificate of the authorized inspector is said to be conclusive in the absence of fraud.^^ A false certificate by the inspector as to the rates at which the work is done is said to amount to fraud.^^ Apart from constructive fraud, which is considered subsequently,"' fraud which avoids an assessment means actual fraud and not omis- sions, errors or negligence."* The fact that an assessment is levied before the work is done,"" or the fact that a man of con- siderable political experience and influence is employed by a paving company as its agent to secure paving contracts,"" none " German Savings and Loan So- " In the Matter of Lewis, 35 How- ciety V. Eamish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 ard (N. Y.) 162 [1868]. Pae. 89, TO Pac. 1067 [1902]. ''"In the Matter of Beekman, 18 "Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, Howard (N. Y.) 460 [1859]. 76 Pac. 661 [1904]. =»See § 486. "Perine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305, ^Rich's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 32 Pac. 226 [1893]. 118 [1861]. "Foote V. City of Milwaukee, 18 ^Beekman's Petition, 1 Abb. Pr. Wis. 270 [1864]. 449 [1865]. " Union Building Association v. " Barber Asphalt Paving Company City of Chicago, 61 111. 439 [1871]. v. Field, 188 Mo. 182, 88 S. W. 860 =»In the Matter of Eager, 41 How- [1905]. ard (N. Y.) 107 [1870]. § 485 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 746 of them amount to fraud. The fact that one of the directors of a levee district stated to a land-owner that the approximate cost of the work would be a certain sum when in fact the cost was much greater does not constitute fraud." The reservation by the city officials of the right to alter the dimensions and quan- tities provided for in the contract does not of itself amount to fraud.^' Omitting for good cause a part of the street specified in the ordinance and not levying In assessment for such part is not fraud.^" The fact that one who takes a contract for grading and filling several streets makes use of the earth which he has removed from one street in filling depressions in another is said not to amount to fraud."" Fraud is said not to exist even if the contractor has agreed to allow a drawback for dirt furnished by the city and he presents a bill for' the full contract price without allowance for dirt procured from another street at no cost to him."^ Wilfully defective performance,"^ as by using much less cement than the specifications call for and thus making an inferior job "" is said to amount to fraud. Failure to award a contract to the lowest bidder is said not to be-technical fraud,"* especially where not required by statute,"^ unless done in pur- suance of an actually fraudulent scheme."" Letting a contract after a judgment of confirmation has been reversed is not bad faith so as to preclude a re-assessment."' If actual fraud is alleged the burden of proof is upon the party who claims fraud."* ^ Overstreet v. Levee District No. Protestant Episcopal School, 8 Hun. 1 of Conway County, 80 Ark. 462, (N. Y.) 457 [1876]; Horn's Case, 12 97 S. W. 676 [1906]. Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 124 [1861]; San- ® In the Matter of Merriam, 84 ford v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 12 N. Y. 596 [1881]. Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 23 [I860]. "In the Matter of Pinckney, 22 "> In the Matter of the Delaware Hun. (N. Y.) 474 [1880]. & Hudson Canal Company, 60 Hun. '"It is said that the city could 204, 14 N. Y. Supp. 585 [1891]. reap no benefit from such use of ma- '"'Matter of Eightieth Street, 17 terial; Schenley v. Commonwealth Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 324 [1864]. for the use of the City of Allegheny, "City of Chicago v. Clark, 233 III. 36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]. 404, 84 N. E. 363 [1908]. =* Darlington v. Commonwealth for ™ Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving the use of the City of Allegheny, 41 Company, 117 Fed. 925 [1902]; not Pa. St. (5 Wright) 68 [1861]. aflfected in this point by modification =^ Mason v. City of Des Moines, in 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. 1142, 24 S. 108 la, 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]. 784 [1904]; Seaboard National Bank ''Mason v. City of De^ Moines, 108 of New York v. Woesten, 147 Mo. la. 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]. 467, 48 L. E. A. 279, 48 S. W. 920 "In the Matter of the New York [1898]. 747 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 486 He must allege the specific facts and not merely charge fraud in general terms.*"" §486. Constructive fraud. Fraud may, in some cases, be presumed from the relations of the parties and the facts and circumstances of the ease. A con- tract whereby a city enters into a contract with one of its own officials who has duties to perform in the protection of the city's interests in the transaction is invalid, since the same person is thereby placed in a position representing two antagonistic, and inconsistent interests.^ Thus a contract of a city with one of its own school trustees for a street improvement,'' or a contract be- tween a town treasurer and the town for the improvement of a public street,' is each void and cannot serve as the basis of a valid assessment. A member of the council was a large stock- holder and business manager for a lumber company. A con- tractor who sought a public contract after the construction of sidewalks agreed to buy his lumber from such company before the contract was let to him. It was held that under a statute providing that no city official should be interested directly or indirectly in a city contract a claim based on such contract was void.* If there is a specific statute which forbids payment upon such contracts, the doctrine of estoppel is said not to apply and the contract and assessment based thereon is said to be invalid even after performance.' In other jurisdictions under "'Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 32 S. W. 1091, and do not merely St. 526, 27 Atl. 8 [1893]. disqualify the councilman. Bradley ^Capron v. Hitchcock, 98 Cal. 427, v. Jacques, — Ky. . 110 S. W. 33 Pac. 431 [1893]; Benton v. Ham- 836 [1908]. ilton, 110 Ind. 294, 11 N. E. 238 = City of Northport v. Northport [1886]; City of Northport v. North- Townsite Company, 27 Wash. 543, 68 port Townsite Company, 27 Wash. Pac. 204 [1902]; (distinguishing as 543, 68 Pac. 204 [1902]. This result cases where such contract is held to is reached usually under specific stat- be merely voidable, and if it is af- utory provisions. firmed, compensation must be made, ''Capron v. Hitchcock, 98 Cal. 427, Call Publishing Co. v. Lincoln, 29 33 Pac. 431 [1893]. Neb. 149, 45 N. W. 245 [1890], and 'Benton V. Hamilton, 110 Ind. 294, Grand Island Gas Co. v.. West, 28 11 N. E. 238 [1886]. Neb. 852, 45 N. W. 242 [1890], and * City of Northport v. Northport distinguishing Pickett v. School Dis- Townsite Company, 27 Wash. 543, 68 trict, 25 Wis. 551, 3 Am. Rep. 105 Pac. 204 [1902]. Such statutes make [1870], as a, case where the contract the contract void, as in Nunnemaoh- is not forbidden by statute). er V. City of Louisville, 98 Ky. 334, § 486 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 748 such statutes, it has been said that the contract cannot be at- tacked after performance except in case of actual fraud."' In some jurisdictions it is held that in the absence of actual fraud a contract between the city and the officer thereof cannot be at- tacked after performance/ and after such performance an as- sessment for such improvement cannot be resisted upon the ground of such constructive fraud.' Thus under a statute forbidding members of the city council from being interested in any con- tract for work or service with the city, a property owner who makes no objection until after the work is done and who does not make objection thereto when opportunity is given to him in compliance with statute cannot resist his assessment, it not ap- pearing that the cost of the work was increased in any way." In the absence of statute it has been held that if the vote of the officer who has entered into a contract with the public corpora- tion is not necessary to give the requisite majority for the al- lowance of his claim, such contract is valid.^" Thus, where one o£ the trustees of a reclamation district had performed work and expended money in the construction of a levee, it was held that if no fraud existed in fact and his vote was not necessary to an allowance of his claim, such claim could be allowed.^^ Where a property owner cannot inquire into the validity of the contract between the city and the contractor, he cannot attack the assess- ment on the ground that certain of the city officials were interested in the contract.^^ A contract entered into between the city and one who was not a public officer when such contract was made is not rendered invalid by the fact that such contractor was, either before or afterwards, a city -official.^" Thus where a part- nership had a contract with the city to build sidewalks and sub- ' Driver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, '° Lower King's River Reclamation 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. 542 11905]. District No. 531 v. MeCullah, 124 'Argenti v. City of San Francisco, Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]. 16 Cal. 256 [I860]; Mayor v. Huff, "Lower King's River Reclamation 60 Ga. 221; Diver v. Keokuk Sav- District No. 531 v. MoCullah, 124 ings Bank, 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]. 542 [1905]; Currie v. School Dig- " Schenley v. Commonwealth for trict, 35 Minn. 163, 27 N: W. 922 the use of the City of Allegheny, 36 [1861]; Lucas County v. Hunt, 5 0. Pa. St. 29, 78 Am. Dec. 359 [1859]. S. 488, 67 Am. Dec. 303 [1856]. "White v. City of Alton, 149 111. "Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 626, 37 N. E. 96 [1894]; City of 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. 542 [1905]. Lawrence v. Killam, 11 Kan. 499 'Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, [1873]. 126 la. 691, 102 N. W. 542 [1905]. 749 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 487 sequently a member of such partnership became a member of the city council and was a member while such contracts were being performed," or where an alderman of the city who was a member of the committee to estimate the cost of a proposed street im- provement resigned and after his resignation was accepted be- came a bidder upon such contract and obtained the same,^" such contracts are valid in each case and assessments may be levied therefor. Where one councilman was a stockholder in a cor- poration that furnished brick to the contractors, there being no evidence that the contractors were aware of such fact, and an- other councilman was eniployed by the contractors as a time- keeper, it was held that a finding by the trial court that no fraud existed could not, as a matter of law, be reversed.^" A remote relationship between the contractor and the city official does not in the absence of a specific statute affect the validity of the con- tract.^^ Thus a contract entered into between the city and the son-in-law of a deputy civil engineer of the city was held to be valid.^' § 487. Certificate of freedom from fraud. In some states it has been provided by statute that certain designated officials shall examine the proceedings leading up to the assessment and shall give a certificate that such proceedings are free from fraud if they find such to be the fact. Such statu- tory provisions are held to be valid.^ A certificate given under such statute makes valid a contract which was originally in- valid because bids were not advertised for, and such contract was not let to the lowest bidder,^ or because the price of an item, such as rock excavation, was fixed arbitrarily and not submitted to competition.' Such statute applies to improvements in which "City of Lawrence v. Killam, U Matter of Kendall, 85 N. Y. 302 Kan. 499 [1873]. [1881]; In the Matter of Peugnet, "White V. City of Alton, 149 111. 67 N. Y. 441 [1876]; Brown v. May- 626, 37 N. E. 96 [1894]. or, 63 N. Y. 239 [1875] ; In the Mat- '° Ferguson v. City of Coffeyville, ter of Auchmuty, 11 Hun. (N. Y.) — Ilan. , 94 Pae. 1010 [1908]. 76 [1877]. " Cason V. City of Lebanon, 153 ^ In the Matter of Johnson, 103 N. Ind. 567, 55 N. E. 768 [1899]. Y. 260, 8 N. E. 399 [1886]. To the " Cason V. City of Lebanon, 153 same effect see In the Matter of ind. 537, 55 N. E. 768 [1899]. Marsh, 21 Hun. 582 [1880], '■ In the matter of Johnson, 103 N. « In the Matter of Kendall, 85 K. Y. 260, 8 N. E. 399 [1886]; In the Y. 302 [1881]. § 488 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 750 the work is done after the passage of the act.* Such certificate is said to be final and conclusive.^ Under such statute a cer- tificate can be given only as to a contract which has previously been authorized by the council." The commissioners have no power to change the contract so as to make it conform to such ordinance where, as actually made, it does not so conform.' § 488. Mistake. ^ A mistake which goes to an essential element of the contract may invalidate such contract.* Thus, where a contractor offered a bid at forty-two cents and his bid was accepted upon the under- standing that it was for twenty-two cents and that he was ac- cordingly the lowest bidder, such contract was held to be invalid on the ground of mistake.^ The difficulty involved in questions like this is that if the offer is in writing and the adversary party had an opportunity to become acquainted with its terms, he is ordinarily estopped from alleging that he did not know the con- tents of such offer.' So it has been held that where A offers in writing to do certain macadamizing at thirty-two cents per square yard, to a depth of eight inches; and council accepts, thinking that A's proposition is thirty-two cents per cubic yard and ac- cordingly rejecting B's bid of thirty-three cents per cubic yard as higher than A's, the contract between A and the city is valid.* However, a contract to grade and remove dirt at twenty-five cents per square yard has been construed as meaning that rate per cubic yard.^ If an assessment is attacked as invalid by reason of mistake it has been said that the party objecting cannot show the existence of fraud," even under a statute authorizing the court to review an assessment in case of fraud or mistake of fact.' ^In the Matter of Peugnet, 67 N. — S. C. . 61 S. E. 96 Y. 441 [1876]. [1908]. = In the Matter of Auchmuty, 11 °City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 41 Hun. (N. Y.) 76 [1877]. Ky. (2 B. Monroe) 177, 17 Am. Dec. "People ex rel. Trundy v. Van 594 [1841]. Nort, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 331 [1873]. "State of Minnesota ex rel. Powell 'People ex rel. Trundy v. Van- v. District Court of Eamsey County, Nort, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 331 [1873]. 47 Minn. 406, 50 N. W. 476 [1891]. 'Pettigrew v. Mayor, etc., of the (The objection here was to assessing City of New York, 17 How. (N. Y.) lots on another street as much for 492 [1859]. grading as those on the street where ^Pettigrew v. Mayor, etc., of the the grading was done.) City of New York, 17 How. (N. Y.) 'State of Minnesota ex rel. Powell 492 [1859]. V. District Court of Ramsey County. 'See Page on Contracts, § 76. 47 Minn. 406, 50 N. W. 476 [1891]. ' Blasingame v. City of Laurens. 751 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §§ 489, 490 § 489. Form of contract. If by statute it is provided that the contract between the city and the contractor must be in writing, such requirements must be complied with.' A contract not in writing is, under such stat- utes, invalid.- Acceptance by the city of a written bid does not constitute a written contract within the meaning of these stat- utes.' If the statute does not require such contract to be in writing it may be that wise policy would indicate that it should be in writing in any event, but it is not illegal if not in writ- ing.* A suit on the assessment is said not to rest upon the con- tract between the city and contractor as a basis. It is therefore not necessary to show affirmatively that such contract is in writ- ing." Indeed it is held that an averment that a contract was entered into is sufficient, at least in the absence of motion, as it will be assumed that the contract was entered into in such form as to be enforceable unless the contrary is shown." In other jurisdic- tions under a statute requiring the contract to be in writing it has been said that if the complaint does not aver that it is in writing and does not have a copy of the contract annexed, it will be presumed that the contract is not in writing.'' § 490. Incorporation of document in the contract. A contract may so refer to another written document as to in- corporate such document in the contract and make its terms a part thereof. Under this principle a contract for a public im- provement may so refer to the ordinance or to plans and specifi- cations as to make them a part thereof or they may be made a part thereof by the operation of statute.^ Thus an ordinance which directs an improvement is a part of the contract and the basis thereof if it is properly referred to.^ Plans and specifiea- ^Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452 364, 65 N. E. 9 [1902]; Powers v. [1879]; City of Indianapolis v. Im- Town of New Haven, 120 Ind. 185, terry, 17 Ind. 175 [1861]; Stephens 21 N. E. 1083 [1889]. V. City of Sopkane, 11 Wash. 41, 39 "Stephens v. City of Spokane, 11 Pac. 266 [1895]. Wash. 41, 39 Pac. 266 [1895]. ' Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452 ' Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452 [1879]; Arnott v. City of Spokane, [1879]. 6 Wash. 442, 33 Pac. 1063 [1893]. ' Hutt et al. v. City of Chicago, 132 'Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452 . 111. 352, 23 N. E. 1010 [1890]. [1879]. ^ State ex rel. Keith v. Common ' Drew V. Town of Geneva, 159 Ind. Council of the City of Michigan City, 2M, 65 N. E. 9 [1902]. 138 Ind. 455, 37 N. E. 1041 [1894]. ' Drew V. Town of Geneva, 158 Ind. § 490 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 752 tions prepared under proper authority for a public improvement may if referred to- in the order for the public improvement be made a part of such order and therefore, a part of the contract." Thus where an engineer's report contained a plan in which the course of a proposed sewer was indicated by a red line, it was held that the adoption of such plan by the town located the sewer with sufficient certainty.* Specifications prepared and referred to in the notice are incorporated therein and hence made a part of the estimate.' Accordingly, a notice to bidders is not defec- tive for failure to state the kind of material to be used or the time of performance where the specifications referred to in the notice show such facts." Specifications may be incorporated in a contract by proper reference made therein and thus may be- come a part of such contract.' Plans and specifications which are referred to in an ordinance and notice of an improvement are incorporated therein and become a part thereof.* So plans, speci- fications and profiles of the work referred to in the contract are incorporated therein and become a part thereof." It is a gen- eral rule that the document which is to be incorporated in a written contract by reference therein must be in existence at the time such contract is made. If, however, an ordinance is sufiB- eiently definite, the fact that it refers to plans and specifications not then in existence does not invalidate it." Thus an ordinance which provides that the roadway of a certain street between two specified points shall be of a designated width and shall be improved by grading, curbing and paving with vitrified brick or block pavement, with corner stones at the inter- sections of streets and alleys, and footways crossing across ' City of Stockton v. Skinner, 53 ° Owens v. City of Marion, Iowa, Cal. 85 [1878]; Taylor v. Palmer, 127 la. 469, 103 N. W. 381 [1905]. 31 Cal. 240 [1866]; Smith v. Abint- ' Whittemore v. Sills, 76 Mo. App. ton Savings Bank, 171 Mass. 178, 50 248 [1898] ; Dunn v. MoNeely, 75 K. E. 545 [1898]; Bowditeh v. Su- Mo. App. 217 [1898]. perintendent of streets of Boston, 168 'Louisville & Nashville Railroad Mass. 239, 46 N. E. 1046 [1897]; Company v. City of East St. Louis, State of Minnesota ex rel. Lewis v. 134 111. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; District Court of Ramsey County, 33 Clinton v. City of Portland, 26 Or. Minn. 164, 22 N. W. 295 [1885]; 410, 38 Pac. 407 [1894]. Both v. Hax, 68 Mo. App. 283 [1896]. " Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 'Smith V. Abington Savings Bank,' 46 Mich. 150, 9 N. W. 141 [1881]. 171 Mass. 178, 50 N. E. 545 [1898]. »» Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. "Owens V. City of Marion, Iowa, 408; 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. Law d\t 127 la. 469, 103 X. W. 381 [1905]. [1901.]. 753 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 491 all intersecting streets and alleys, in accordance with the plans and specifications on file in the office of the board of public works, is sufficiently definite, although the plans and specifications were not in existence when the ordinance was passed ; and accordingly could not be regarded as a part thereof .^^ On the other hand, a bid, invalid when made, cannot be made valid by a bond attached thereto executed by the contractors and their sureties and misreciting the bid or proposal to which it is attached.'^ § 491. Time within which contract must be entered into. By statute it is sometimes provided that, a contract for certain forms of public improvements must be entered into within a certain time. Such a provision is mandatory and not directory and a failure to comply therewith invalidates the contract and assessment based thereon.^ Accordingly, if the statute requires a contract to be entered into within fifteen days after the first posting of the notice of the award to the contractor a contract entered into after such time is invalid if it is not shown that the delay in entering into the contract was not caused by any fault of the contractor." Where by statute an ordinance does not go into effect until it is published, an ordinance approved on the fifteenth of the month and published on the nineteenth requir- ing a written contract to be entered into in ten days authorizes a contract and bond executed and deposited with the city clerk on the twenty-third of the month, though marked filed on the twenty- fifth and not approved by the mayor until the twenty-eighth ; since the ten days run from the publication of the ordinance.^ Every presumption is made under such statutes in favor of the validity of a contract which is apparently otherwise regular.* Thus un- der a statute requiring the first step for letting a contract tp be taken within fifteen days after the final determination of the ap- " Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. ""Libbey v. Elsworth, 97 Cal. 316, 408, 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. Law 917 32 Pae. 228 [1893]; Ferine v. For- [1901], bush, 97 Cal. 305, 32 Pac. 226 [1893]. "Williams v. Bergin, 129 Cal. 461, 'City of Springfield ex rel. Upde- 62 Pac. 59 [1900]. graff v. Mills, 99 Mo. App. 141; 72 'Libby v. Elsworth, 97 Cal. 316, S. W. 462 [1903]. 32 Pac. 228 [1893]; Perine v. For- * Ga.^e v. People ex rel. Hanberg, bush, 97 Cal. 305, 32 Pac. 226 213 111. 347, 72 N. E. 1062 [1904]. [1893]. § 492 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 754 peal from the judgment of confirmation of the special assess-' ment for the work, the fact that bids were advertised for six months after the affirmance of the judgment of confirmation dftes not invalidate the assessment in the absence of evidence show- ing that no step toward letting the contract had been taken within such fifteen days.^ So under a statute which provides that the first step towards letting the contract must be taken within ninety days after the expitation of the term at which the judgment of confirmation is entered, a contract will be regarded as valid if the first step is taken on a day which was within ninety days from the day to which such term might have been continued, and there is no evidence as to the fact of such con- tinuance." In the absence of statute fixing the time within which the contract must be entered into, a delay in entering into the contract may discharge the contractor, but does not invali- date the contract if the contractor does not avail himself .of the delay. The "fact that the city delays five years after a bid is made before accepting it while it may authorize the contractor to refuse to enter into such contract, does not authorize the property owner to object to an assessment levied to pay the cost of such improvement if the contractor performs the contract and it is not shown that the property owner is obliged to pay more than he would have had to pay had the contract been entered into when the bid was accepted.' Thus, a delay of a year and one- half between the passage of the ordinance and the making of the contract does not invalidate the assessment.' § 492. Execution of contract. A corporation may bind itself by a contract made in a name differing from its corporate name if its identity is clear.' If the board of trustees or directors of a corporation pass a reso- lution conferring upon the president of a corporation full power with reference to municipal street work, such president is thereby given authority to contract with the city on behalf of the cor- poration for the improvement of a public street.^ Even if the - " Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, » Jaicks v. Middlesex Inv. Co., 201 213 111. 347, 72 N. B. 1062 [1904]. Mo. Ill, 98 S. W. 759 [1906]. "Gage V. People ex rel. Hanberg, ' Neff v. Covington Stone & Sand 213 111. 468, 72 N. E. 1108 [1905]. Co., 108 Ky. 457, 55 S. W. 697, 56 'City of Philadelphia to use v. S. W. 723 [1900]. Hood, 211 Pa. 189, 60 Atl. 721 = Oakland Paving Company v. Rier, [1905]. 52 Cal. 270 [1877]. 755 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 492 power conferred upon the president were defective, yet if the contract purported to be made with the corporation and it was performed by the corporation, both city and corporation would be estopped to deny the validity of the contract.'' The power of the president of a corporation to bind a corporation by contract for a public improvement will be presumed if the contract has been performed by the corporation and the corporation is seeking to enforce the assessment.* Thus, it has been said that a con- tract purporting to be that of the corporation, but without the corporate seal, and signed "A., Pres., " is prima facie valid." So if a contract which purports to be made by a corporation is signed in the name of the corporation by its secretary and such contract is performed by the corporation, the authority of the secretary will be presumed," especially if the corporate seal has been afSxed and the corporation has treated such contract as valid.'' After a contract has been performed it will be presumed that a power of attorney given by the contractor to another per- son authorizing such person to enter into a contract with the city on behalf of the contractor will be presumed to be valid.^ Stat- utes which provide how a contract is to be executed on behalf of a city must be complied with in at least a substantial manner. By statute it may be provided that if the mayor of a city signs a contract, such signature makes the contract valid as far as au- thority is concerned and is prima facie evidence of the due ob- servance of all antecedent forms and requirements of law.' Un- der a statute requiring that contracts should be executed on the part of a city by the president of the board of public works or such of their members as the board should designate, that the seal of the board should be attached thereto and that the contract should then be countersigned by the city comptroller, it was held that a contract executed properly by the president of the board of public works is valid, although the comptroller has not coun- tersigned it, as in such case his countersigning is a mere clerical ' Oakland Paving Company v. Rier, v. Bates, 134 Cal. 39, 66 Pac. 2 52 Cal. 270 [1877]. [1901]. *Clty Street Improvement Com- ' Reid v. Clay, 134 Cal. 207, 66 pany v. Laird, 138 Cal. 27, 70 Pae. Pac. 262 [1901]. 916 [1902]. 'McVerry v. Boyd, 89 Cal. 304, 26 'City Street Improvement Com- Pac. 885 [1891]. pany v. Laird, 138 Cal. 27, 70 Pac. ° Bruning v. Chadwick, 109 La. 916 [1902]. 1067, 34 So. 90 [1903]. " San Francisco Paving Company § 493 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. Y56 duty which the contractor or board could have compelled him to perform.^" The omission of the signature of the officer who is authorized to make public contracts on behalf of the city in- validates the contract." Thus, if by statute the superintendent of streets is to sign such contracts, a contract not signed by him is invalid." Under a statute providing that an assessment should not be set aside except in a case where fraud was shown, a mere defect of authority to enter intft a contract was held not to amount to fraud so as to invalidate the assessment.^* A contract for a public improvement must ordinarily be made in the name of the public corporation by which such improvement is con- structed." Thus where the commissioners of public works of a city entered into a contract in the name of the commissioners of public works, it was said to be questionable whether the contract had any validity. It was said that in such case a con- tract should be made in the name of the city of which they were offlcers.^^ By statute it may be provided that a con- tract cannot be entered into unless the head of the department concerned files a certificate that such work is necessary. A con- tract entered into under such statute without such certificate is invalid and the contractor cannot recover thereon.^" § 493. Vote necessary to validity of contract. The statutes occasionally provide what vote of the council or other body of public officials is necessary to enter into a con- tract to make a public improvement. Substantial compliance with such statutes is sufficient.^ A resolution awarding a public contract and directing the city auditor to enter into a contract with a bidder is not a resolution of a "permanent or general nature," and hence does not require a vote of. two-thirds of the council.^ A vote of two-thirds of the council to enter into a street 1° State of Minnesota ex rel. Benz *' Lutes v. Briggs, 5 Hun (N. Y.) V. District Court of Ramsey County, 67 [1875]. 32 Minn. 181, 19 N. W. 732 [1884]. "Burns v. Mayor, etc., of the City '1 Manning v. Den, 90 Cal. 610, 27 of New York, '3 Hun (N. Y.) 212 Pac. 435 [1891]. [1874]. •= Manning v. Den, 90 Cal. 610, 27 'Brown v. Central Bermudez Com- Pac. 435 [1891]. pany, 162 Ind. 452, 69 N. E. 150 "In the Matter of the New York [1903]. Protestant Episcopal Public School, ' City of Cincinnati for use of Ash- 8 Hun. (N. Y.) 457 [1876]. man v. Bickett, 26 0. S. 49 [1875]. "Lutes V. Briggs, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 67 [1875]. 757 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 494 improvement contract is good as against collateral attack.' A statutory provision to the effect that no public work which in- volved an expenditure of more than ten, thousand dollars should be undertaken unless it was submitted to a vote of the electors of the city, was held to apply only to improvements which af- fected the public at large and were to be paid for by the city.* § 494. Parties to contract. There is no constitutional requirement making it necessary that the council of a city should approve contracts for the con- struction of public improvements at the expense of owners of abutting property.^ Such an act is ministerial and an executive board may be empowered by statute to perform the same.^ If the statute specifically provides that the city council shall let contracts for public improvements, such provision is mandatory and a contract let by any other agency is invalid; and a valid assessment cannot be levied therefor.' Thus, under such a stat- ute a committee of the council cannot accept a bid or award a contract.' In some states, however, it has been held that a contract made by a committee of the council may be ratified by the council and thus made valid." Thus, under an ordinance which provided that contracts for street improvements should be let to the lowest bidder and that the lowest bid should be sub- mitted to the council for action, it was held that where a com- mittee appointed for the purpose let a contract and subsequently the council with full knowledge of the facts made an order au- thorizing the committee to employ a superintendent of the work, such order was an acceptance of the bid." Under a statute re- quiring all contracts for street improvements to be referred to a committee of the city council, a contract not so referred is in- valid.' A contract entered into by the mayor without the con- ' Brown v. Central Bermudez Com- ' City of Stockton v. Creanor, 45 pany, 162 Ind. 452, 69 N. E. 150 Cal. 643 [1873]; State, Van Home, [1903]. Pros. V. Town of Bergen, 30 N. J. L. *The Tark Ecclegiastical Society (1 Vroom) 307 [1863]. V. City of Hartford, 47 Conn. 89 * City of Stockton v. Creanor, 45 [1879]. ' Cal. 643 [1873]. 'Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, "Main v. Fort Smith, 49 Ark. 480, 63 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. E. 128 5 S. W. 801 [1887]. [1901]. "Main v. Fort Smith, 49 Ark. 480, 'Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, 5 S. W. 801 [1887]. 63 S. W. 964, 23 Ky. L. R. 128 ' Worthington v. City of Coving- [1901]. ' ton, 82 Ky. 265 [1884]. § 494 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 758 .currence of the council is under such statute invalid.* By stat- ute the co-operation and approval of some boards, such as the board of public works, . may be necessary to the execution of a contract for a public improvement." Under such statutes a contract not concurred in by a majority of the board specified is invalid.^" Thus, where by statute the mayor, the civil en- gineer and three commissioners were to constitute the board, it was held that the vote of the^mayor and civil engineer for the improvement, one commissioner voting against it and the other two being absent, was insufficient, and that an assessment for such improvement was invalid." A statute requiring the board of public works to place before the council a detailed esti- mate of the cost of a public improvement is held to be complied with substantially, where the board of public works places before the coun^cil an estimate of the gross cost of sach improvement, which estimate the council accepts and upon which it acts.^^ If by statute it is provided that a foreign corporation must com- ply with certain requirements in order to be permitted to do busi- ness in that state and it is held that a contract made by a foreign corporation which has not complied with such requirements is invalid, a city should not make a contract for a public improve- ment with a foreign corporation which has not complied with such requirements. However, if the improvement is a proper one, for which an assessment may be levied, and the property assessed is benefited thereby to an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the assessment, equity will not relieve the property owner even if the contract is void.^" An ordinance which re- quires persons engaged in the original construction of public works to obtain a license before undertaking such work was held to be unconstitutional.^* However, it was not shown that such ordinance was enforced or that any one was thereby prevented ' Murphy v. City of Louisville, 72 " Brophy v. Landman, 28 0. S. 542 Ky. (9 Bush.) 189 [1872]. [1876]. » Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, " Goodwlllie v. City of Detroit, 103 103 Mich. 283, 61 N. W. 526 [1894]; Mich. 283, 61 N. W.- .526 [1894]. Baisch v. City of Grand Rapids, 84 »'Beaser v. Barber Asphalt Paving Mich. 666, 48 N. W. 176 [1891]; Company, 120 Wis. 599, 98 N. W. Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 Mo. 525 [1904]. 26, 33 S. W. 480, 36 S. W. 52 [1895]; "Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. Brophy v. Landman, 28 0. S. 542 408, 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. Law Rep. [1876]. 917 [1901]. "Brophy v. Landman, 28 O. S. 542 [1876]. 759 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 495 from bidding. The contract was let and the work was performed. The invalidity of such ordinance requiring a license could not then be urged to defeat the validity of the assessment." § 495. Letting contract on competitive bidding. In the absence of statute it is not necessary that a contract for a public improvement should be let on competitive bidding or should be let to the lowest bidder.^ A provision that a public cor- poration "may advertise for proposals for doing any contract" is directory and does not require advertisement for bids.' A statute which provides "all city improvements of whatever kind or char- acter including the erection of public buildings made or to be erected at the expense of the city shall be let by contract to the lowest and best bidder, ' ' has been held not to apply to work done at the expense of the abutting property owner.' By modern stat- utes it is, however, often provided that contract must be let to the lowest bidder. Such provisions are intended to protect the proper- ty owners and are mandatory.* A statute requiring a contract to be let to the lowest bidder in ease of an improvement to be paid for by special assessment and in case of "such improvements as the city council shall by ordinance prescribe" includes a contract for the construction of additions to its existing waterworks sys- tem.* The provision requiring contracts to be let to the lowest bidder are generally applicable to contracts for improvements "Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. Southern Railway Company v. City 408, 63 S. W. 9^7, 23 Ky. Law Rep. of Chicago, 144 III. 391, 33 N. E. 917 [1901]. 602 [1893]; City of Elsberry v. 'Scott V. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, Black, 120 Mo. App. 20, 96 S. W. 31 N. B. 953 [1892]; Yeomans v. 256, 257 [1906]; MuUane v. City of Riddle, 84 la. 147, 50 N. W. 886 Newark, — N. J. . 68 Atl. 412 [1891]; In the Matter of the Peti- [1905]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188, 4 N. tion of the Emigrant Industrial Sav- E. 338 [1886]; Tarentum Borough ings Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878] ; Bra- V. Moorhead, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 273 dy v. New York, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) [1904]. 234; Louchheim v. City of Philadel- "Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 phia, 218 Pa. 100, 66 Atl. 1121 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 [1907]; Ardray v. City of Dallas, S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1903]. 13 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 35 S. W. Rep. ' Kansas City Transfer Company 726 ; Moran v. Thompson, 20 Wash. V. Huling, 22 Mo. App. 654 [1886]. 525, • 56 Pac. 29 [1899]; Dean v. 'Flickinger v. Fay, 119 Cal. 590, Charlton, 27 Wis. 522 [1871]. 51 Pac. 855 [1898]; Sieefel v. City "Moran v. Thompson, . 20 Wash, of Chicago, 223 111. 428, 79 N. E. 280 525, 56 Pac. 29 [1899]. [1906]; Lake Shore and Michigan § 495 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 760 exceeding a certain amount in value. The contract cannot be valid if based upon proposals which tend to restrict free compe- tition." A statute providing that contracts shall be let to the lowest bidder, evidently contemplates that the proposals should be made upon a common basis and that there should not be any change therein after the bids are received and before the contract it let; since if a change were allowed it would be impossible to determine who the lowest bidder, was. Accordingly it has been held that a city has no power to change the terms of a contract so as to differ materially from the advertisement or specifications which form the basis of the bids.' Under a statute permitting recovery of an assessment if the work has been done and the property is properly to be charged therefor, notwithstanding any informality, irregularity or defect, a variance between the con- tract and the ordinance or advertisehient is said not to be juris- dictional and if not prejudicial to property owners to be an irregularity which should be disregarded.' Under a statute re- quiring the letting of contracts to the lowest bidder a provision in the contract that the contractor should do such extra work as the street commissioner should direct at a price to be fixed by the commissioner was held not to avoid the contract.' Under such statutes the assessment is invalid if the improvement is not described in the ordinance with sufScient accuracy,^" since the bidders cannot know in advance for what they are bidding, and the public officials cannot determine who the lowest bidder is." If the contract does not define what work is to be done and con- tains no reference to the ordinance or specifications' which might supply such deficiency, such contract is so indefinite that it can- not be enforced and an assessment therefor is invalid.^^ "Whether proposals may be advertised for and bids received without speci- fying the materials to be used, leaving the public corporation free to determine what material is to be used after learning the price at which each can be furnished is a question upon which there "Anderson v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, "See § 856 et seq. 41 So. 684 [1906]. "Piedmont Paving Co. v. Allman, 'Mohr V. City of Chicago, 114 111. 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493 [1902]; App. 283 [1904]. Wells v. Burnham, 20 Wis. 112 'Ottumwa Brick & Construction [1865]. Co. V. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. "Schwiesau v. Mahon, 110 Cal. 510 [1899]. 543, 42 Pac. 1065 [1895]. •Allen V. Rogers, 20 Mo. App. 290 [1886]. 761 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 495 is a conflict af authority. Under some statutes it is held that such manner of ascertaining the lowest bidder is proper and that the material to be used need not be determined until after bids have been received.^' Under other statutes it is said that the object of requiring bids is to secure them for definite amounts for a particular kind of work, and that there can be no competitive bid in which the quality of the material to be furnished is to be considered as well as the price to be charged.'* A property owner who wishes to object on the ground that the contract was not let to the lowest bidder must interpose his objection before the contract has been performed.^' If a provision is made for confirming an assessment on a formal hearing, si^ch objection must be interposed at that time. The property owner cannot wait until application is made for a judgment of sale for failure to pay such assessment.'^ If a bid is made for doing work such as excavation at a certain amount per cubic yard instead of at a gross sum it has been held in some jurisdictions that such bid is invalid." In other jurisdictions a contract in which the price is fixed at a certain rate per unit of quantity is valid although the quantity is not fixed.'^ Where it is impossible from the nature of the improvement to determine in advance the amount of exca- vation necessary, an assessment is valid although the ordinance does not specify the amount of excavation to be made if the con- tract is let at a certain rate per cubic yard."* Where the amount of wood sheeting to be used could not be determined in advance and accordingly no quantity was specified, it was held that an ^Em parte City of Paducah, — S. W. 800 [1»93] ; Sanford v. Mayor, Ky. , 89 S. W. 302, 28 Ky. Law etc., of the City of New York, 33 Rep. 412 [1905]; Attorney-General Barb. (N. Y.) 'u7 [I860]; Sanford on the Relation of Cook v. City of v. Mayor,- etc., of New York, 12 Abb. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263 [1872]; War- Pr. (N. Y.) 23 [I860]. ren Brothers Co. v. City of New '" Givins v. People ex rel. Raymond, York, 190 N. Y. 297, 83 N. E. 59 194 111. 150, 88 Am. St. Rep. 143, 62 [1907]; In the Matter of Ford, 6 N. E. 534 [1902]. Lansing (N. Y.) 92 [1872]; Parker "Brady v. Mayor of New York, V. City of Philadelphia, — Pa. St. 20 N. Y. 312 [1859]; , 69 Atl. 670 [1908]. " Cady v. City of San Bernardino, "Piedmont Paving Co. v. Allman, — Cal. , 94 Pac. 242 [1908]; 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493; Coggeshall (contract for electric lights) ; Dickey V. City of Des Moijies, 78 la. 235, 41 v. Porter, 203 Mo. 1, 101 S. W. 586 N. W. 617, 42 N. W. 650 [1889]. [1907]; (amount of masonry). " City of Bloomington v. Phelps, " Dickey v. Porter, 203 Mo. 1, 101 149 Ind. 596, 49 N. E. 581 [1897]; S. W. 586 [1907]. Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 §495 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 762 agreement to pay at one dollar per lineal foot per sewer for such sheeting as should be left in by the direction of the engineer did not invalidate the assessment.^" A contract in which neither the quantity nor the price is fixed is clearly invalid." The legislature may provide that certain ofBcials shall examine the work and give a certificate that the proceedings are free from fraud if they find such to be the fact. A certificate of this character is held ta cure the omission to advertise^or bids and let to the lowest bidder." Accepting a bid which is not the lowest is not a legal irregularity within the meaning of the New York statutes for vacating* assessments and recovering money paid in.^* If the statute requires the contra,ct to be let to the lowest bidder, the city has no right to provide that it will determine who the lowest bidder is upon certain items only of the work to be done, since the bidder who is the lowest upon the specified items may be the highest upon the entire contract.^* Under such statutes the city has no power to withhold one or more material items from compe- tition by fixing arbitrarily the amount to be paid for. the per- formance of certain kinds of work.^^ Thus, the city eannot fix an arbitrary rate for rock excavation.^" Such assessment is not, however, entirely void, but void only as to the amount to be paid ™City of Cincinnati v. Anchor White Lead Go., 44 0. S. 243, 7 N. E. 11 [1886]. ^ McBrian v. City of Grand Rap- ids, 56 Mich. 95, 22 N. W. 206. ''In the Matter of the Petition of Johnson, 103 N. Y. 260, 8 N. E. 399 [1886] ; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Kendall, 85 N. Y. 302 [1881] ; In the Matter of the Petition of Marsh, 21 Hun. (N. Y.) 582 [1880]. '^ In the Matter of the Application of Lange to Vacate an Assessment, 85 N. Y. 307 [1881] ; Sanford v. May- or, etc., of New York, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 23 [I860]; Horn's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 124 [1861]; Ben- nett's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 127 [1861]. ^ Brady v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 20 N. Y. 312 [1859] ; Brady v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 343 (affirming Brady v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commbnalty of New York, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 432; Brady v. New York, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 234). -= State, Hampton, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Pater- soli, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 159 [1873]; Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 144 N. Y. 494, 39 N. E. 386 [1895]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Pelton to Vacate an Assess- ment, 85 N. Y. 651 [1881]; In the Matter of the Petition of Merriam to Vacate an Assessment, 84 N. Y. 596 [1881]; In the Matter of the Petition of the Manhattan Sayings Institution to Vacate an Assessment, 82 N. Y. 142 [1880]. '"In the Matter of the Petition of Pelton to Vacate an Assessment, 85 N. Y. 651 [1881]; Mutual Life In- surance Company of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 144 N. Y. 494, 39 N. E. 386 [1895]; In the 763 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 495 for rock excavation.-' So where the rock excavation was seven- eighths of the work and it was possible to determine the quantity of such rock, a contract let on bids for the rest of the work and allowing to the lowest bidder on such remainder whatever price he chose to ask for the rock excavation is invalid.^' If by statute the contract is to be let to the lowest bidder on the entire eon- tract, the city cannot let the contract to one who bids at a certain rate per unit of quantity. The price thus offered depends upon the quantity of the work to be done which is to be determined later and which may prove much higher than some of the gross bids made in competition therewith. The city has, however, power to fix an arbitrary ratio between the prices of different kinds of work.-" Thus, the action of the city in requiring bids to be made per cubic yard for rock excavation and allowing one-fourth of that price per cubic yard for earth excavation has been held not to be a violation of the statute.^" Accordingly the city has a right to reject the lowest bid offered if in such bid the price for earth excavation was slightly more than one-fourth of that for rock excavation.'^ Under such a method of bidding, however, the fraudulent conduct of the city officials in over- estimating the quantity of rock to be excavated and underesti- mating the quantity of earth to be excavated, thus letting the contract to one whose bid is the lowest on the estimated quanti- ties but is not the lowest with reference to the actual quantities Matter of the Petition of Merriam ^ Brady v'. Mayor, etc., of the City to Vacate an Assessment, 84 N. Y. of New York, 20 N. Y. 312 [1859]; 5,96 [1881]; In the Matter of the Pe- Brady v. Mayor, etc., of the City of tition of the Manhattan Savings In- New York, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 343; stitution to Vacate an Assessment, 82 (affirming Brady v. Mayor, Aldermen N. Y. 142 [1880] ; Brady v. Mayor, and Commonalty of New York, 16 etc., of the City of New York, 18 How. Pr. N. Y. 432). How. Pr. (N. Y.) 343 [1859]; (af- ^ In the Matter of the Petition of firming Brady v. Mayor, Aldermen Marsh to Vacate an Assessment, 83 and Commonalty of New York, 16 N. Y. 431 [1881]. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 432). '"In the Matter of Marsh, 83 N. ^Mutual Life Insurance Company Y. 431 [1881]. of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen "' In the Matter of the Petition of and Commonalty of the City of New Marsh to Vacate an Assessment, 83 York, 144 N. Y. 494, 39 N. E. 386 N. Y. 431 [1881]. (In this case, [1895]; In the Matter of the Peti- while the accepted bid was not the tion of Pelton to Vacate an Assess- lowest on the estimated quantities, it ment, 85 N. Y. 651 [1881]; In the proved to be the lowest with refer- Matter of the Petition of Merriam, ence to the actual quantities of earth 84 N. Y. 590 [1881]. and rock to be excavated.) § 495 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 764 of rock and earth excavation entitles the property owner to relief.*^ So does an honest but excessive mistake as to the actual quantities of excavation to be done.^* Under a statute requiring the letting of a contract to the lowest bidder it has been held that the city has power to notify contractors in advance that bids in excess of a certain charge would not be considered.'" The fact that a bid on a single section was lower than the price at which the entire contract was l%t does not invalidate the con- tract and assessment.^' Under a statute requiring the contract to be let to the lowest bidder, a private contract between the successful bidder and the owners of some of the land to be assess- ed whereby he agreed to do the work at a certain rate in place of that awarded by the city was held to operate as a fraud upon the other owners and avoid the contract." Conduct of this sort may also amount to fraud so as to invalidate the assessment.'* Under a statute which authorizes the city to do the work if no bids are received, a city has no power to let a contract without competitive bidding, though no bids were received upon the first advertisement for bids, '° or though all bids were rejected." If the statute authorizing the assessment requires the record of the common council to show that there was a bidder for the performance of a local improvement whose bid was accepted, an assessment made without such record is said to be a nullity.** ^It is frequently provided that certain city officials shall have power to dispense with the letting of contracts to the lowest bidder.*^ Thus, such requirements may be dispensed with by '= Matter of Eightieth Street, 17 ™ City of Elsberry v. Black, 120 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 324 [1864]. Mo. App. 20, 96 S. W. 256, 257 «*In the Matter of the Petition of [1906]. Anderson, 47 Hun. (N. Y.) 203 *» Zorn v. Warren-Scharf Asphalt [1888]. Paving Co., — Ind. App. , 81 »» Seaboard National Bank of New N. E. 672 [1907]. (The specifica- York V. Woeaten, 147 Mo. 467, 48 tiona were changed as to material L. R. A. 279, 48 S. W. 939 [1898]. and the contract let to one of the The members of the Board of Public original bidders after reconsideration Improvements had agreed among of the vote letting the contract to themselves not to- consider any bid another bidder.) for maintenance in excess of fifty " Whitney v. Common Council of cents per square per annum. the Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189, =» Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 37 N. W. 184 [1888]. [1876]. "In the Matter of the Petition of "Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350 the Emigrant Industrial Savings [1880]. Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]. "See § 485. 765 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 495 three-fourths of the common council,*' or two-thirds of the council." It may be provided that if the order and contract for an improvement are adopted by a vote of more than two- thirds of the aldermen elected, letting to the lowest bidder is not necessary.*^ A council cannot delegate to any other official discretion as to dispensing with such requirements.*" If it is not shown that the required number of the council dispensed with advertising for bids, advertisement will be presumed to be neces- sary.*^ The city council not having authority to dispense with the requirement for letting contracts to the lowest bidder in the first instance cannot ratify a contract which is invalid for that reason.*^ The legislature has authority to dispense with such requirements in the first instance and accordingly may ratify and make valid contracts otherwise invalid by reason of omission to comply with such requirements.*" In some jurisdictions, stat- utes making valid such contracts have been construed very strict- ly. Thus, a statute which provided for a re-assessment if the tax had been adjudged void for any irregularity in any of the pro- ceedings in levying it, for any omission to comply with the forms of the law under which it was assessed or for non-compliance with any of the provisions of the city charter, in ordering or let- ting the work or making the contracts, was held not to include a contract void for failure to let to the lowest bidder, since such con- duct was said to be a misfeasance and a violation of a plain pro- vision of the law in fraud of the rights of the property own- ers.^" A bid of a lump sum for several different improvements cannot be the basis of a valid contract, since the cost of each improvement is not fixed by competitive Ibidding.^^ "In the Matter of the Petition of (N. Y.) 234; Brady v. Mayor, etc., the Emigrant Industrial Savings of New York, 20 N. Y. 312 [1859]. Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878].' ""In the Matter of the Petition of " Siegel V. City of Chicago, 223 III. the President, Managers and Com- 428, 79 N. E. 280 [1906]. pany of the Delaware & Hudson Ca- 'Tity of Chicago v. Sherwood, 104 nal Company, 60 Hun. (N. Y.) 204, 111. 549 [1882]. 14 N. Y. Supp. 585 [1891]. ' "In the Matter of the Petition of °° Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. 522 the . Emigrant Industrial Savings [1871]. Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]. « People v. Common Council of ^'Siesrel v. City of Chicago, 223 111. City of Kingston, 189 N. Y. 66, 81 -!28, 79 N. E. 280 [1906]. N. 'e. 557 [1907]; (order reversed •"Brady v. New York, 7 Abb. Pr. 99 N. Y. S. 657, 114 App. Div. 326 [1906]). § 496 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 766 § 496 Advertising for bids. There is no constitutional necessity of advertising for bids for a public improvement to be paid for by assessment.^ The legislature has power to provide for an assessment, although there is no provision for advertising ior bids or for letting the contract to the lowest bidder.^ Provisions are frequently found in modem statutes which provide that contracts for public im- provements must be let to the lowiBst bidder after letting of such contract has been given.'' It has been suggested that these stat- utes have been enacted in part for the purpose of affording to all an equal opportunity to obtain the employment which will be afforded by the construction of the public improvement.* While this motive may have existed in part in the mind of the legislature, the real purpose of such statutes is to secure com- petition, obtain the lowest available price for the work to be done, prevent, as far as possible, fraudulent combinations between public oflScers and contractors, and thus to benefit tax payers or the property owners against whom assessments are to be levied for the improvement.^ Whether it is necessary to give notice of the letting of a contract and to let it to the lowest bidder is therefore a matter of statutory construction. A statute which provides for an estimate to be made by the city engineer and provides that in advertising for bids such estimate shall not be published does not prevent a city from making a valid contract without advertisements for bids and does not require the city to let the contract to the lowest bidder." If the statute provides that the letting of the contract must be advertised or published in some way, such provision, being for the benefit of the property owners, is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the city.' ^City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 Baltimore v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]; Yar- [1884]; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. nold V. City of Lawrence, 15 Kan. App. 381. 126 [1875]; Dean v. Borphaenius, 30 "Yarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 Wis. 236 [1872]. Kan. 126 [1875]. ' City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 ' City Improvement Co. v. Broder- Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142 [1905]; Ben- iek, 125 Cal. 139, 57 Pac. 776 [1899]; nett V. City of Emmetsburg, — la. Siegel v. City of Chicago, 223 111. , 115 N. W. 582 [1908]; Dean v. 428, 79 N. E. 280 [1906]; Eogne v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236 [1872]. People ex rel. Goedtner, 224 111. 449, s,see § 495. 79 N. E. 662 [1906]; Bennett v. City * Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. of Emmetsburg, — la. , 115 N. W. 381. 582 [1908]; Comstock v. Eagle Grove 'Mayor and City Councilmen of City, 133 la. 589, 111 N. W. 51 767 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §496 Under such statutes an assessment cannot be enforced if the contract is let or the improvement is constructed without such advertisement for bids.* On the same principle, if the city by ordinance requires the board of public improvements to give notice of the letting of a public contract, such requirement is mandatory and the board of public improvements, cannot dis- pense therewith." Bids may be advertised for, submitted and accepted before the improvement ordinance is passed, if the im- provement provided for in the contract is the same as that ordered [1907]; Brookbank v. City of Jef- fersonville, 41 Ind. 406 [1872]; Mo- Ewen V. Gilker, 38 Ind. 233 [1871]; Kretsch v. Helm, 38 Ind. 207 [1871] ; City of Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175 [1861]; Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines, 78 la. 235, 41 N. W. 617, 42 N. W. 650 [1889] ; Warren v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 181 Mass. 6, 62 >f. E. 951 [1902]; Bowditch v. Superintendent of the Streets of Boston, 168 Mass. 239, 46 N. E. 1046 [1897]; Dickey v.. Holmes, 109 Mo. App. 721, 83 S. W. 982 [1904] ; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. 381; Poth V. Mayor, Al- dermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 151 N. Y. 16, 45 N. E. 372 [1896]; In the Matter of the Petition of Bxjsenbaum to Vacate an Assessment, 119 X. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172 [ 1890] ; In the Matter of the Petition of Rosenbaum, 53 Hun. 478, 6 N. Y. Supp.- 184 [1889] ; In the Matter of the Petition of Pennie, 108 N. Y. 364, 15 N. E. 611 [1888]; In the Matter of the Petition of Pennie to Vacate an Assessment, 45 Hun, (N. Y.) 391 [1887]; In the Matter of the Application of Lange to Va- cate an Assessment, 85 N. Y. 307 [1881]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of the Emigrant Industrial Sav- ings Bank, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878]; Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 79 Hun. (N. Y.) 482, 29 N, Y. a 980 [1894]; Steese v. Oviatt, 24 0. S. 248 [1873]; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 0. S. 232 [1873]; Appeal of Harper, 109 Pa. St. 9, 1 Atl. 791 [1885]; Breath v. City of Galveston, 92 Tex. 454, 49 S. W. 575 [1899]. *Rogne V. People ex rel. Goedtner, 224 111. 449, 79 N. E. 662 [1906]; Brookbank v. City of Jeffersonville, 41 Ind. 406 [1872]; McEwen v. Gil- ker, 38 Ind. 233 [1871]; Kretsch v. Helm, 38 Ind. 207 [1871]; Moberry V. City of Jeffersonville, 38 Ind. 198 [1871]; City of Indianapolis v. Im- berry, 17 Ind. 175 [1861]; Oogges- hall V. City of Des Moines, 78 la. 235, 41 N. W. 617, 42 N. W. 650 [1889] ; Bowditch v. Superintendent of Streets of Boston, 168 Mass. 239, 46 N. E. 1046 [1897]; Dickey v. Holmes, 109 Mo. App. 721, 83 S. W. 982 [1904]; Poth v. Mayor, Alder- men and Commonalty of the City of New York, 151 N. Y. 16, 45 N. E. 372 [1896]; In the Matter of the Petition of Pennie, 108 N. Y. 364, 15 N. E. 611 [1888]; In the Matter of the Petition of Pennie, 45 Hun 391 [1887] ; In the Matter of the Appli- cation of Lange, 85 N. Y. 307 [1881] ; In the Matter of the Petition of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Banlc, 75 N. Y. 388 [1878] ; In the Matter of the Petition of Rosenbaum, 53 Hun. (N. Y.) 478, 6 N. Y. Supp. 184 [1889]; Appeal of Harper, 109 Pa. St. 9, 1 Atl. 791 [1885]; Breath v. City of Galveston, 92 Tex. 454, 49 S. W. 575 [1899]. " Keane v. Cushing, 15 Mo. App. 96 [1884]. § 497 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 768 by the ordinance." Advertisement for bids is notice of an im- provement ordinance but is notnotice of an assessment ordinance passed subsequently.^^ § 497. Discretionary power to determine bidder. Statutes which provide for letting public contracts on compe- tition usually grant some discretionary power to the city or- other public corporation which receives bids, to determine what bid is the most advantageous to the pifblic interest. It is usually not required by such statutes that the bid should in all eases be let to the lowest bidder irrespective of other considerations as to the advisability or non-advisability of letting the contract to him. The discretion of the public authorities in determining- who the best bidder is, is ordinarily not subject to review if fairly exercised.^ The language employed in describing the person to whom the contract is to be let frequently shows that some dis- cretion is conferred upon the city. Thus a provision that the contract should be let to the lowest responsible bidder ^ or the lowest reliable and responsible bidder' or that bidders must satisfactorily prove their ability to perform their contracts * shows that the city is to exercise its discretion in determining not only which of the bids is lowest in terms but which of the bidders are reliable and responsible. A city has power to reject a bid even of the lowest responsible bidder if it results from a combination of the bidders or if the successful bidder has so acted as to stifle competition and increase the contract price.^ If a " City of Springfield to use of Cen- ley v. City of Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St. tral National Bank v. Weaver, 137 (1 Norris) 351 [1876]. Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 509, 39 S. W. 276 ^nge v. Board of Public Works, [1896]; (overruling in part Zeane 135 Ala. 187, 93 Am. St. Eep. 20, V. Cushing, 15 Mo. App. 96 [1884]). 33 So. 678 [1902]; Giving v. People "Villa-^e of Morcran Park v. Ga- ex rel. Eaymoiid, 194 111. 150, 88 Am. han, 35 111. App. 646 [1P90]. St. Eep. 143, 62 N. E. 534 [1902]; ^ In');e v. Board of Public Works Findley V. City of Pittsburg, 82 Pa. of Mobile, 135 Ala. 187, 93 Am. St. St. (1 Norri") 351 [1876]. Eep. 20, 33 So. 678 [1902]; Girvin V. ''City of Denver v. Dumars, 33 Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 48 Pac. 720 Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114 [1994]. [1897]; City of Denver v. Dumars, 'Case v. Inhabitants of City of 33 Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114 [1904]; Trenton, — N. J. , 68 Atl. 57 Giving v. People ex rel. Raymond, [1907]. 194 111. 150, 88 Am. St. Eep. 143, 62 "Giving v. People ex rel. Eaymond, N. E. 534 [1902]; Clarton v. Taylor, 194 111. 150, 88 Am. St. Eep. 143, 62 49 Mo. App. 117 [1892]; Case v. N. E. 534 [1902]. (This remark in Inhabitants of City of Trenton, — this case is in the nature of an obiter N. J. , 68 Atl. 57 [1907] ; Find- since the assessment was ultimately held to be valid.) 769 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 498 bidder has been delinquent in a former contract with the city, the city officials may reject his bid even if it is the lowest of those offered.* The determination of the city on questions of fact in determining who is the lowest and best bidder is regarded as final in the absence of fraud or misconduct.^ If a contract is awarded to one who is not the lowest and best bidder and there is a clear abuse of the discretion vested in the city officials, the contractor has no right to recover for the work done in any form of action.' He cannot recover upon qontract since the contract is invalid as not in compliance with the statute- He cannot recover in quantum meruit since the work was done under an express contract which is not merely void for failure to comply with the statute, but is in violation of the positive mandatory re- quirements of the statute necessary for the benefit of the tax payer.' Under a statute requiring contracts to be let to the lowest responsible bidder, the city cannot by ordinance reserve the right of rejecting any and all proposals." The power to reject all bids if the city shall think it wise so to do is frequently, however, conferred by statute.^^ § 498. Form and contents of bid. The bid must conform to the terms of the proposal. If the proposal invites bids for the improvement of a street as a whole, bids for a part of the improvement may be disregarded.^ Omission to distinguish in the bid between the portions of the improvement which are to be paid by property owners and those portions which are to be paid by the city does not invalidate the bid if such portions have been already fixed and the bid is not inconsistent with such determination.^ Omission to give the formula of the wearing surface of the paving and to deposit samples may be waived by the city if the bidder names the "Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 48 Railway Company v. City of Chicago, Pac. 720 [1897]. 144 III. 391, 33 N. E. 602 [1893]. 'Clapton V. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. " Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 117 [1892]. 48 Pac. 720 [1897]. » Brady t. New York, 7 Abb. Pr. ' Stimson v. Hanley, 151 Cal. 379, (N. Y.) 234. 90 Pac. 945 [1907]. •Brady v. New York, 7 Abb. Pr. ''Beniteau v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 116, Zorn V. Warren-Schaaf Asphalt sou, 62 Md. 225 [1884]; Roth v. Paving Co., — Ind. App. , 84 N. Forsee, 107 Mo. App. 471, 81 S. W. E. 509 [1908]. 913 [1904]; Wilder v. City of Cin- ^Flickinger v. Fay, 119 Ca!. 590, cinnati, 26 0. S. 284 [1875]. 61 Pae..855 [1893]; Brooks v. Sat- "Ellis v. Witmer, 134 Cal. 249, terlee, 49 Cal. 289 [1874]; Hewes v. 66 Pae. 301 [1901]. Eeis, 40 Cal. 255 [1870]; Taber v. 'Ellis v. Witmer, 134 Cal., 249, 66 Ferguson, 109 Ind. 227, 9 N. E. 723 rae. 301 [1901]'. [1886]; Kretsch v. Helm, 45 InO. * Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 438 [1874]; Bozarth v. McGilli- Mich. 322 [1872]. cuddy, 19 Ind. App. 26, 47 N. E. 397 773 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 500 advertisement was not necessary." If a contract has been let to the lowest bidder on due advertisement but such contractor subsequently makes default and it becomes necessary to relet the contract, it is held under some statutes that it is as necessary to advertise for bids for reletting such contract as it is in the original letting of a contract.". Under other statutes where the contractor is obliged to give bond for the performance of his work, it has been held that it is not necessary to advertise for the reletting of a contract on the theory that the liability of the contractor and his sureties is adequate indemnity against any additional expense in performing the contract and that if the price under the contract as relet is excessive, such loss falls on the defaulting contractor.'^ If alterations may be made in the contract after it has been let,^ it has been held not to be neces- sary to advertise for bids for such alterations or additional work." This holding is based on the theory that it would not in most cases be practicable to let the 'Contract to anyone but the original contractor and that to allow him to put in a bid without compe- tition would be a violation of the spirit of the "statute requiring a"dvertisement for bids and might make the city or the property owners liable for a contract price greatly in excess of that which could have been obtained without such letting. On the one hand no more extended publication than that specified by statute is required. Under an ordinance requiring advertisement for bids for five days, the publication was made on Saturday, Sunday, Wednesday and Thursday. It was held that this was a sub- stantial compliance with the ordinance since the ordinance did not specify publication upon consecutive dates. ^'' Under a stat- ute requiring notice of letting contracts to be published for three weeks, a notice published May twenty-fifth, June first and June eighth for letting a contract on June sixteenth was held to be suffieient.^^ A statute requiring publication in a newspaper re- 'Ross V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. matter of the Petition of Gardner, 200,-16 N. E. 501 [1887]; Davies v. 6 Hun. (N. Y.) 67 [1875]. City of Saginaw, 87 Mich. 439, 49 'See § 495. N. W. 667 [1891]. "Hastings v. Columbus, 42 O. S. •Meuser v. Eisdon, 36 Cal. 239 585 [1885]. [1868] ; Guinotte v. Egelhoff, 64 Mo. "Roth v. Forsee, 107 Mo. App. 471, App. 356 [1895]. 81 S. W. 913 [1904]. ' In the matter of the Petition of " Bozarth v. McGillieuddy, 19 Ind. Seeds, 53 N. Y. 400 [1873]; In the App 26, 47 N. E. 397, 48 N. E. 1042 [1R97] § 500 TAXiVTION BY ASSESSMENT. ' 774 quired such publication in one paper only. If the city by ordi- nance requires publication in two papers but acts under a publi- cation in one paper only, such publication is sufficient, since the requirement of an additional newspaper, being imposed by the city can be waived by the eity." A statute requiring the giving • of notice for a certain number of days ordinarily refers, not to the number of publications, but to the time that must elapse between the publication and the*expiration of the time for receiv- ing bids.^'' Thus under a statute requiring at least a week's notice to be given by five consecutive publications, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, a publication from May fifteenth to nine- teenth inclusive of a notice of a meeting of the board of contract to receive bids to be held May twenty-first was insufScient." So a statute providing for "giving notice for at least ten days by two publications in a newspaper" requires ten days between the last publication and the end of the time for receiving bids." Under a statute requiring three weeks notice, a notice the first publication of which was on the first and the last on the twenty- second of the month, the thirtieth being the last day for receiv- ing bids, was held to be sufficient.^" In the absence of statute forbidding it, publication on Sunday is sufficient.^' Thus if a publication is to be given and continued in a paper for at least ten days a publication which began on the twelfth of a month and continued in each successive daily issue of that paper until the twenty-second inclusive was sufficient although one of the • intervening publications was in the Sunday issue and although according to the custom of such paper no paper was issued on the Monday following." So the last publication may be made on Sunday in the absence of a statute specifically for- " City 'of Connersville v. Merrill, N. E. 242, 79 N. E. 490 [1906]. 14 Ind. App. 303, 42 N. E. 1112 " Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, .23 [1895]. Minn. 232 [1876] ; City of St. Joseph '' In the matter of the Petition of to the use of the Saxton National Pennie to vacate an assessment, 45 Bank v. Landis, 54 Mo. App. 315 Hun (N. Y.) 391 [1887]. [1893]. " In the matter of the Petition of " Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, 23 Pennie, 45 Hun. (N. Y.) 391 [1887]; Minn. 232 [1876]. See to the same In the Matter of Pennie, 19 Abb. N. general effect City of St. Joseph to C. 117. the use of the Saxton National Bank " Comstock V. Eagle Grove City, ex rel. v. Landis, 54 Mo. App. 315 133 la. 589, 111 N. W. 51 [1907]. [1893]. "Shirk -v. Hupp, 167 Ind. 509, 78 775 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 500 bidding it." On the other hand if it^ is provided by stat- ute that Sunday shall be excluded from the computation of the number of days of publication, full effect must be. given to such statute.^" Thus, under a statute requiring a notice inviting proposals for v7ork to be published daily, Sundays ex- cepted, in a daily newspaper for five days, the publication which began on Wednesday and ended on the following Sunday was insufficient.^^ The last publication should have been on the Mon- day foUowing.^^ Under a statute requiring notice to be pub- lished a given number of times, publication on the day on which the contract was to be let should not be counted. ^^ If the city council has dire.cted a certain method of publication, the officers of the city must comply, substantially at least, with such method. Under an ordinance directing the city clerk to advertise for pro- posals in a newspaper and also by posting printed notices in five of the most public places in the city, publication by newspaper alone is not sufficient.'* If a city council has directed publication of no- tices inviting proposals for work to be made in two newspapers, publication in one only is not a compliance with such order.-^ So if the ordinance requires publication in three newspapers, publi- cation in one only is insufficient.-" On the other hand a publica- tion which falls short of a substantial compliance with the re- quirements of the statute is insufficient.-^ Thus a statute requir- ing a notice inviting sealed proposals for a contract for a street improvement to be posted for five days means five official days; that is, the notice must be posted before nine o'clock a. m. of the first day and must remain until four o'clock p. m. on the fifth day."* Under a statute which requires notice of proposals for public work to be posted for five days, posting such notice for "Clapton V. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. ^ Taber v. Ferguson, 109 Ind. 227, 117 [1892]. 9 N. E. 723 [1886]. * Alameda Macadamizing Com- ^ Mayor and City Council of Bal- pany v. Huff, 57 Cal. 331 [1881]. timore v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 ^Alameda Macadamizing Com- [1884]. pany v. Huff, 57 Cal. 331 [1881]. ^ Hewea v. Kei.s, 40 Cal. 255 '"Alameda Macadamizing Com- [1870]; Kretsch v. Helm, 45 Ind. pany v. Huff, 57 Cal. 331 [1881]. 438 [1874]; Wilder v. City of Cin- ^Eoth V. Hax, 68 Mo. App. 283 cinnati, 26 0. S. 284 [1875]. [1896]. '"» Himmelmann v. Calm, 49 Cal. « Kretsch v. Helm, 45 Ind. 438 285 [1874]; Brooks v. Satterlee, 49 [1874]. Cal. 289 [1874]. § 501 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 776 only three days is insufficient. -° Under a statute requiring four weeks advertisement, advertisement for three weeks is not suffi- cient.'" Under a statute requiring advertisement in two news- papers, an advertisement in English newspapers is prima facie required and an advertisement in one English newspaper and one German newspaper is insufficient.'^ § 501. Contents of notice for bid's. Technical accuracy is not necessary in the contents and form of the notice inviting proposals for work ; but such notice must show that it is issued by proper authority, and must give such inform- ation, either on its face or by reference to specifications and the like, of the nature and kind of work to be done, as to enable the prospective bidders to bid thereon intelligently, and to inform them of the terms of the contract into which they are invited to enter.^ Anything short of this would not secure the competition in bidding which is necessary to protect the interests of the pub- lic. Under a statute requiring the board of public works to advertise for bids, it has been held sufficient that if the advertise- ment purports to issue from the office of the board and states that bidders Inust file a satisfactory bond with the board and is signed with the name of the board.^ The notice or advertisement must contain the intended requisites .of the specifications of the proposed improvement, ' although it may refer to specifications on file for such information.* Under a city ordinance requiring a notice to state the time and place where the contract is to be let and the time within which it is to be performed, a notice that bids would be received by the street committee at the city record- er's office until a specified date according to the ordinance requir- '^Hewes v. Reis, 40 Cal. 255 = Beniteau v. City of Detroit, 41 [1870]. Mich. 116, 1 N. W. 899 [1879]. (The ™Steese v. Oviatt, 24 0. S. 248 board subsequently acted upon such [1873]. advertisement and treated it as is- "^ Wilder V. City of Cincinnati, 26 sued by their authority.) 0. S. 284 [1875]. » Wilkins v. City of Detroit, 46 ' Owens V. City of Marion, Iowa, Mich. 120, 8 N. W. 701, 9 N. W. 427 127 la. 469, 103 N. W. 381 [1905]; [1881]. Wilkins V. City of Detroit, 46 Mich. * Owens v. City of Marion, Iowa, 120, « N. W. 701, 9 N. W. 427 127 la. 469, 103 N. W. 381 [1905]; [1881]; State, Ogden, Pros. v. Mayor Clinton v. City of Portland, 26 Or. and Common Council of the City of 410, g8 tac. 407 [1894]. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 104 [I860]. 777 TUE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 501 ing such bids to be let to the lowest bidder and that the grading should be completed within sixty days and the graveling within ninety days frofn the date of letting the contract complies suffi- ciently with the ordinance." If the statute requires the adver- tisement to show the date after which bids will not be received, it is not necessary for council to fix such date." Thus under a statute requiring a notice and specifications to be posted for five days and also to be published in a newspaper for five days, a resolution passed on December the sixteenth ordered such notice and publication. On December thirtieth the council opened the bids and awarded the contract. This was held to be a sufficient compliance with the statute.'' An advertisement announced that proposals would be received up to twelve o'clock M. on Satur- day September nineteenth. In that year the nineteenth came on Sunday. The bids were opened and the contract awarded Satur- day September eighteenth at seven-thirty p. m. This was held to be a sufficient compliance with the notice.' A three weeks notice that bids would be received up to five o'clock of a certain day was held sufficient although the resolution provided for giv- ing the bids up to six o 'clock of such day." The fact that a notice inviting sealed proposals for grading a street uses the term "re- giraded" instead of "graded" does not invalidate the notice.^" If a discrepancy or mistake in a notice is such as to mislead bid- ders and prevent the competition which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, such notice is insufficient.^^ Thus a notice was dated May thirteenth and stated that bids would be received up to Monday evening May thirteenth. Monday came on the eighteenth and on Monday the eighteenth the bids were opened. It was held that the notice was not sufficient.^^ If the time for completing the contract is of the essence thereof, such time should in some way be shown by the advertisement.^^ How- " Roach V. City of Eugene, 23 Or. Ind. 116 [1874]; Richardson v. Meh- 376, 31 Pac. 825 [1893]. ler, 111 Ky. 408, 23 Ky. Law Rep. •Beckett v. Morse, 4 Cal. App. 917, 63 S. W. 957 [1901]; Ladd v. 228, 87 Pac. 408 [1906]. Spencer, 23 Or. 193, 31 Pac. 474 'Beckett v. Morse, 4 Cal. App. [1892]. 228, 87 Pac. 408 [1906]. "Yeakel v. City of Lafayette, 48 "Case V. Fowler, 65 Ind. 29 [1878]. Ind. 116 [1874]. (Furthermore, the "Shirk y. Hupp, 167 Ind. 509, 78 notice was not published for the re- N. E. 242 [1906]. quired period of time.) "Brady v. Feisel, 53 Cal. 49 "Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. [1878]. 408, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 917, 63 S. W. "Yeakel v. City of Lafayette, 48 957 [1901]. §§ 502, 503 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 778 ever, if no objection is made to the contract on this ground until the contract has been let and performed and the work accepted the objection comes too late." A notice which specifies work not authorized in the ordinance is invalid.'^ The fact that an erroneous notice was published does not invalidate a subsequent correct notice, at least if there is no showing that any one was misled by the first notice.^" Advertisements for proposals for materials for a number of distinct improvements is held to be valid where the statute does not require the entire contract to be let on bids.^' § 502. Proof of publication for bids. In the absence of a statute requiring proof of publication by affidavit, such form of proof is not necessary.^ The fact of publi- cation may therefore be proved by oral testimony." In the ab- sence of evidence it will ordinarily be presumed that the notice was properly given.' Thus if two notices were published and the first notice was defective as not stating the grade properly, and as not being published for the required time, and the award was made under the second notice, it will be presumed that the second notice was valid.* So if there is no satisfactory evidence to show that bids were advertised for or received except the fact that the contract shows that it was let on bids had for that purpose, it will be presumed that bids were received regularly in the absence of further evidence." § 503. Effect of failure to give notice for bids. The statute which requires a notice inviting proposals for work frequently prescribes what effect shall be given to a failure to comply therewith. Since the legislature has power to dispense "Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. ^ City of Nevada to Use of Gilflllan 408, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 917, 63 S. W. v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 586 [1891]. 957 [1901]. 'Himmelman v. Carpentier, 47 Cal. "City of Louisiana v. Shaffner, 42 [1873]; Spaulding v. Baxter, 25 104 Mo. App. 101, 78 S. W. 287 Ind. App. 485, 58 N. E. 551 [1900]; [1903]. City of Marsliall to Use of Jacoby v. "Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N. Rainey, 78 Mo. App. 416 [1898]. Y. 26, 29 N. E. 841 [1892]. *HimmeIman v. Carpentier, 47 Cal. "Alberger v. Mayor and City 42 [1873]. Council of Baltimore, 64 Md. 1, 20 " City of Marshall to Use of Jacoby Atl. 988 [1885]. v. Rainey, 78 Mo. App. 416 [1898]. ' City of Nevada to Use of Gilfillan V. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 586 [1891]. 779 THE IMPEOVEMENT CONTRACT. § 503 entirely with advertisement, it has power to prescribe the effect of a defective or incomplete advertisement.^ Accordingly if it is provided that the assessment shall not be void for failure to ad- vertise, but that the increased cost due to failure to secure compe- tition shall be deducted from the amount of the assessment full effect must be given to such provision." So if it is provided by statute that in ease of irregularities an assessment may never- theless be enforced to the extent that expense has been incurred which is a proper charge upon the property, failure to advertise does not avoid the assessment entirely but is merely ground for reducing it to the amount of the proper charge.' At what stage of the proceedings the objection can be interposed that there was no sufficient advertisement is a question upon which there is a conflict of authority. In some jurisdictions it is said that such objection cannot be made after the work is completed.* If no objection is made to the contract by reason of defective advertising until after the performance of such contract, it is generally said that objection is then too late and that the defects must be regarded as waived, " at least in the absence of fraud * or of a showing that the price to be paid for the work has been increased by failure to advertise for bids.' In other jurisdictions it is said that such objection cannot be made before any taxes have been levied or assessments made to pay for the work.' In other jurisdictions it is said that a tax payer cannot raise such objection at all by an action against the city and the contractor to restrain payment under such contract." In jurisdictions where the property owner cannot attack the validity of the contract at all, he cannot show that a contract was defective because proper advertisement for bids was not made.^" ' In the Matter of Eosenbaum, 119 "Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. N. Y..24, 23 N. E. 172 [1890]. 305 [1904]. ""In the Matter of Rosenbaum, 119 "Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172 [1890]. 305 [1904]. 'Matter of McCormaok, 60 Barb. 'Taylor v. Wapakoneta, 26 Ohio (K Y.) 126 [1870]; Matter of Me- C. C. 285 [1904]. Cormack, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. {N. Y.) 'Ballard v. City of Appleton, 26 234 [1870]; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Wis. 67 [1870]. 0. S. 232 [1873] ; Steese v. Oviatt, 24 'Brady v. Mayor of the City of 0. S. 248 [1873]; Taylor v. Wapak- New York, 35 Howard (N. Y.) 81 oneta, 26 Ohio C. C. 285 [1904]. [1868]. »Bacas v. Adler, 112 La. 806, 36 '» Brientnall v. City of Philadel- So. 739 [1904]. phia, 103 V-a. 8t, 156 [1883]. § 504 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 780 § 504. Power to order or dispense with advertisement for bids. If the statute requires advertisement for bids and such adver- tisement is in fact had, it is not necessary that the ordinance should contain a provision therefor.^ The fact that advertise- ment is made before the passage of the ordinance ordering the streets to be paved does not of itself validate the contract and assessment if the city subsequently acts upon such advertisement, treating it as valid.^ If the legislature has conferred upon certain specified public officials authority to order advertisement for bids, such advertisement can be ordered only by the officia,ls speci- fied.' In the absence of statutory authority a board or council having authority to order advertisement for bids cannot delegate such povrer to their clerk even by a general resolution giving him such authority.* If the board having authority to provide for advertisement for bids orders such clerk to advertise for a specific improvement, such order is sufficient, although it does not require sealed proposals or specify the time or place of giving notice." Such general order must be considered with reference to the requirements of statute. Accordingly general authority to advertise for proposals is construed as meaning authority to ad- vertise for the time provided by law." If an order is made for advertisement for bids in a designated newspaper, a subsequent order to re-advertise without designating the newspaper will be construed as meaning a re-advertisement in the same paper.' An order by the city council for the publication of a notice in- viting proposals is not invalid because the clerk of the council and not the council has fixed the time within which proposals are to be presented." If a resolution for advertisement for bids contains the designation of a newspaper placed thereon with a rubber stamp, it will be presumed that the clerk did his duty and read such name to the council and not the name of another newspaper which was subsequently inserted after erasure of the 'Bambrick v. Campbell, 37 Mo. * Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239 App. 460 [1889]. [1868]. ' City of Springfield to Use of Cen- " Hjmmelman v. Byrne, 41 Cal. 500 tral National Bank v. Weaver, 137 [1871]. Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 509, 39 S. W. 276 « Shepard v. Colton, 44 Cal. 628 [1896]; (overruling in part Keane [1872]. V. Gushing, 15 Mo. App. 96 [1884]). 'Ellis v. Witmer, 134 Cal. 24!), 66 'Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 230 Pac. 301 [1901]. [1868]. ' Belser V. Allman, 134 Cal. 399, 66 Pac. 492 [1901]. 781 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 505 iformer name." Accordingly if the advertisement was in fact made in such other nevyspaper and its name was inserted later, such publication is insufficient." If by statute some official or board is given authority to dispense with advertisement for bids, such power can be exercised only by such official and not by any other person.^^ Thus, if council is authorized to dispense with advertisement by a three-fourths vote it cannot by a general resolution delegate such power to any other official.'- Thus, coun- cil cannot by a three-fourths vote authorizing the commissioner of public works to construct an improvement "by days work or in such manner as the said commissioner may deem expedient for the best interests of the city and the property owners" empower him to dispense with letting contracts.'* A statute authorizing the mayor to give written authority to dispense with advertising for bids does not empower him to ratify a contract by indorsing his approval thereon after it is made." § 505. Statutes requiring appropriation or sufficient funds in the treasury. By recent statutes in some jurisdictions it is provided that contracts for improvements cannot be made unless there is suffi- cient money in the treasury to pay the cost thereof, or under some statutes, unless some designated official has filed a certificate to the effect that there is sufficient money in the treasury. Stat- utes of this class have been enacted in order to prevent the city from plunging deeper into debt. Such statutes do not accord- ingly apply to improvements which are to be paid for by a special assessment and not out of the general treasury.' Such a statute 'California Improvement Company New York, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 116 V. Moran, 128 Cal. 373, 60 Pac. 969 [1879]. [19001. "Warren v. Street Commissioners " California Improvement Company of the City of Boston, 181 Mass. 6, V. Moran, 128 Cal. 373, 60 Pac. 969 62 >f. E. 951 [1902]. [1900]. 'Risley v. City of St. Louis, 34 '1 Warren v. Street Commissioners Mo. 404 [1864]; Eddy v. City of of the City of Boston, 181 Mass. 6, Omaha, 72 Neb. 550, 101 N. W. 25 62 N. E. 951 [1902]. [1904]; (modified on rehearing, 102 "Phelps V. Mayor, Aldermen and N. W. 70, 103 N. W. 692 [1905]); Commonalty of the City of New Comstock v. Incorporated Village of York, 112 N. Y. 216, 2 L. R. A. Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N. 626, 19 N. E. 408 [1889]. E. 15 [1809]: City of Cincinnati v. "In the Matter of the Petition of Holmes, 56 Ohio St. 104, 46 N. E. the Trustees of the Presbytery of 514 [1897]. § 506 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 782 is, however, applicable to so much of the cost of the improvement as is to be paid by the city out of the funds raised by general taxation.^ The contractor must ascertain, at his peril whether such certificate has been made and filed or not.' After the city has in fact paid its share of the cost of an improvement a prop- erty owner who is assessed for his share cannot object on the ground that the city had not money in the treasury when it entered into such contract.* By Sbme statutes it is provided that a public contract cannot be entered into unless an appropriation of the funds necessary therefor has first been made.' Such stat- utes do not apply to the cost of improvements which are to be paid for by special assessment and not out of the general treas- ury." Such a provision does, however, apply to the share of an assessment to be borne by the city.'' § 506. Necessity of collecting assessment in advance of contract. It may be provided that public officials cannot make contracts for improvements unless the money therefor is already in their hands.^ Such statute, however, has been regarded as applicable to expenses payable out of funds raised by general taxation and not to expenses payable by local assessment.^ In California the constitution once provided that an assessment must be levied and collected for a given improvement before a contract could be made for the construction of such improvement. This provision was held to be self executing, to require no legislation to enforce it; and when it went into effect, to invalidate prior statutes per- mitting the contract to be made before the assessment was lev- ied.' A constitutional amendment which abrogated this provi- sion was attacked as invalid on the ground that it was not copied "Comstock V. Incorporated Village ley, 159 Mo. 45, 60 S. W. lU [1900]; of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N. In the Matter of Lewis, 51 Barh. E. 15 [1899]. (N. Y.) 82 [1868]; In the Matter of 'Comstock V. Incorporated Village Lewis, 35 Howard (N. Y.) 162 of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N. [1868]. E. 15 [1899]. 'City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, 190 •Eddy V. City of Omaha, 72 Neb. Pa. St. 374, 42 Atl. 893 [1899]. 550, 101 N. W. 25 [1904]; (modified 'Badger v. Inlet Swamp Draina- on rehearin?, 102 N. W. 70, 103 N. District, 42 111. App. 79 [1890]. W. 692 [1905]). ^ State of Kansas on the Relation = Hentig v. Gilmore, 33 Kan. 234, of Young v. City of Neodesha, 3 6 Pao. 304 [1885]. Kans. App. 319, 45 Pao. 122 [1896]. "Hentig v. Gilmore, 33 Kan. 234, = McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 6 Pao. 304 [1885]; Hill v. Swing- 245 [1880]. 783 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 507 on the journal but was referred to by title and number, but such amendment was held to be valid.* § 507. Constitutional or statutory limit of indebtedness. By the provisions of many recent statutes a limit of indebted- ness has been fixed for cities and other public corporations beyond which they have no authority to go. Such provisions have no application to contracts for public improvements where no liabil- ity of any kind is undertaken by the city, but the contractor has agreed to look solely to the assessments to be levied and col- lected for his compensation for such work.^ A provision fixing the debt limit is said not to prevent a city from being liable for failure or omission to collect an assessment where the contractor has bound himself to look to the assessments for compensation, though such liability exceeds the debt limit.^ If the contract for public improvements causes a personal liability against the city such contract is within the provision of the statute fixing the debt limit.* If the debt limit has been exceeded, a contract of this sort made thereafter is invalid even if the city is to reim- burse itself by assessment for the expenses thus incurred.* How- ever, it has been held that a limitation of the power of a city to borrow money for general purposes does not restrict its power to borrow money for the construction of sidewalks for which the * Oakland Paving Co. v. Tompkins, 98 la. 655, 68 N. W. 431 [1896]; 72 Cal. 5, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17, 12 Tuttle v. Polk & Hubbel, 92 la. 433, Pac. 801; (affirmed in Thompson v. 60 N. W. 733 [1894]; State of Kan- Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 Pac. 615 sas on the Relation of Young v. City [1887]); Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 of Neodesha, 3 Kana. App. 319, 45 Cal. 465, 11 Pac. 20 [1886]. The Pac. 122 [1896]; Morrison v. Morey, court had previously divided on this 146 Mo. 543, 48 S. W. 629 [1898]; question, Oakland Paving Co. v. Hil- Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, ton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3 [1886]. 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; Little v. City 'The Jacksonville Railway Com- of Portland, 26 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911 pany v. City of Jacksonville, 114 111. [1894]; City of Galveston v. Loonie, 562, 2 N. E. 478 [1886]; Quill v. 54 Tex. 517 [1881]; Smith v. City of City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 7 Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 L. R. A. 681, 23 N. E. 788 [1890]; [1901]. Grunewald v City of Cedar Rapids, ''Addyaton Pipe & Steel Company 118 la. 222, 91 N. W. 1059 [1902]; v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. St. 41, 80 Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 118 Am. St. Rep. 812, 46 Atl. 1035 Iowa 161, 50 L. R. A. 620, 91 N. W. [1900]; See § 1508 et seq. 1048 [1902]; Ft. Dodge Electric = Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Light & Power Company v. City of la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]. Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 'Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 [1902]; City of Clinton y. Walliker, la. 90, 77 N. W. 532 [1898]. § 507 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 784 city was ultimately to be reimbursed by assessment." If the con- tract is entered into after the city has exceeded its debt limit, and such contract imposes a personal liability upon the city, it has been held that the pl-operty owner is not entitled to any relief if he is not assessed more than his proportionate share of the cost of improvement and the assessment does not exceed the benefits to his property. The fact that the city cannot be held liable has been said not to invalidate the assessment as to the share of the property owners." Such assessment is invalid as to the share of the city if the debt limit has been exceeded.' The property owner, however, cannot defend against liability on the ground that the city is not liable for its share as long as no attempt is made to impose the share of the city upon the property owner.*' It has been said that a general tax payer may sue to restrain the public corporation from paying its share of the assessment if the debt limit has been reached.* The question of the power of the city to make such contracts and incur such liability is said not arise until the city seeks to borrow money or to incur an indebtedness of some sort under such contract.*" The mere mak- ing of the contract does not seem to be regarded as the incurring of such debt.** If bonds are to be issued they count as a debt only from the time that they are actually issued.*^ A statutory provision for a re-assessment precludes the property owner from objecting that the contract was originally invalid as exceeding the debt limit.*^' " City of Galveston v. Heard, 54 ° O'Malley v. Olyphant Borough, Tex. 420 [1881]. 19? Pa. St. 525, 48 Atl. 483 [1901]. ' City of Galveston v. Loonie, 54 '° The Jacksonville Railway Com- Tex. 517 [1881]; Beaser v. Barber pany v. City of Jacksonville, 114 111. Asphalt Paving Company, 120 Wis. 562, 2 N. E. 478 [1886]; Osborn v. 599, 98 N. W. 525 [1904]. Sutton, 108 Ind. 443, 9 N. E. 410 ' Cason V. City of Lebanon, 153 [1886]; Redding v. Esplen Borough, Ind. 567, 53 N. E. 768 [1899]; Ft. 207 Pa. St. 248, 56 Atl. 431 [1903]. Dodge Electric Liaht & Povper Com- "The Jacksonville Railway Com- pany V. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. pany v. City of Jacksonville* 114 111. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]; O'Malley v. 562, 2 N. E. 478 [1886]; Osborn v. Olyphant Borough, 198 Pa. St. 525, Sutton, 108 Ind. 443, 9 N. E. 410 48 Atl. 483 [1901]. [1886]; Redding v. Esplen Borough, "People ex rel. Mannen v.' Green, 207 Pa. St. 248, 56 Atl. 431 11903]. 158 111. 594, 42 N. E. 163 [1895]; '^Redding v. Esplen Borouo;h, 207 Cason V. City of Lebanon, 153 Ind. Pa. St. 348, 56 Atl. 431 [1903]. 567 55 N. E. 768 [1899]; Hushes v. "State v. District Court of Blue Parker, 148 Ind. 692, 48 N. E. 243 Earth County, 102 Minn. 482, 113 N. [1897]'; Ft. Dodge Electric Li"ht & W. 697, 114 N. W. 654 [1907]. Power Company v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]. 785 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §§ 508, 509 § 508. Other restrictions on indebtedness. A constitutional provision to the effect that whenever any county or city is authorized to contract an indebtedness it shall be required at the same time to provide for the collection of an annual tax therefor, does not apply to cities empowered prior to such .constitution to contract indebtedness, until the legislature has passed statutes putting such constitutional provision into operation as to such cities.^ Hence, under prior statutes which remain in force, cities may incur debts for such public improve- ments as streets and sewers, though they thereby exceed the debt limit.'' A statute which restricts the tax rate to a certain prescribed percentage applies prima facie to general taxation and not to special assessments.' Authority to a city to anticipate the collection of a street paving tax by borrowing money and pledg- ing such tax authorizes a loan for which it may be necessary to pledge such tax to be levied for several successive years.* A city may, by statute, be forbidden to spend more than its annual revenue. ° Such a statute, if made applicable to cities and po- lice juries does not apply to levee districts." § 509. Necessity of contractor's giving bond or security. Occasionally statutes prescribe that a contract»r must give bond for the faithful performance of the work. In some jurisdictions failure to give bond invalidates further proceedings.^ In other jurisdictions under such statutes, failure to give bond is said not to invalidate subsequent proceedings.^ In other jurisdictions failure to give bond is at least admissible in evidence as tend- ing to show that no contract has in fact been let.' If a bond has 'City of Lexington on Appeal, 96 1&02]. See also, Jones v. City of Ky. 258, 28 S. W. 665 [1894] ; Holz- Cincinnati, 18 Ohio 318. hauer v. City of Newport, 94 Ky. 396, ° Hughes v. Board of Commission- 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. ers of Caddo Levee District, 108 La. "■Holzhauer v. City of Newport, 94 146, 32 So. 218 [1901-1902]. Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752 [1893]. ' Bowditch v. Superintendent of 'Dyer v. City of Newport (Ky.), Streets of Boston, 168 Mass. 239, 46 26 Ky. L. 204, 80 S. W. 1127 [1904]; N. E. 1046 [1897]; (In this case Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, there was also a failure to advertise 48 S. W. 860 [1898]. for bids.) *Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines, ^Larned v. Maloney, 19 Ind. App. 78 la. 235, 41 N. W. 617, 42 N. W. 199, 49 N. E. 278 [1898] ; Thurston 650 [1889]. v. City of Elmira, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. "State ex rel. Woulfe v. St. Paul, (N. Y.) 119 [1868]. Judge, 107 La. 777, 32 So. 88 [1901- =Mannins v. Den, 90 Cal. 610, 27 Pao. 435 [1891]. § 509 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 786 in fact been given, but it is irregular, such irregularities, if not taken advantage of at the time, are ordinarily regarded as waived.* Thus the fact that the preliminary bond binding the con- tractor to enter into the contract if his bid should be accepted is a few dollars less than ten per cent, of the aggregate amount of the proposal, ^ or that such preliminary bond is not filed, <" or the fact that the contractor has not filed his bond as provided by stat- ute, ' or the fact that the supeBJfitendent of streets has not ap- proved t-he bond of the contractor" or the fact that under a statute requiring one bond to be given when the bid is made which is to cover not only the execution of the contract but its perform- ance, council has required two bonds, one to accompany the bid binding the contractor to enter into the contract, and the other executed on the award of the contract and conditioned for its performance,' none of them invalidate the assessment. Un- der a municipal ordinance requiring bonds to be given by the contractors for the building of certain water works in the amount of the contract price without stating when such bond was to be given, it was held that a bond given on the com- pletion of the contract and when the first installment of the con- tract price was due was given in sufficient time.^" Under an ordinance requiring the city engineer to specify the amount of security to be given, it is sufficient if in accordance with the cus- tom of the engineer's office, {he amount of security, based on the amount of the bid, is inserted in the specifications.^^ By con- * Greenwood v. Morrison, 128 Cal. tion of the charter made valid every 350, 60 Pac. 971 [1900]; Conde v. assessment for the purpose author- City of Schenectady, 164 N. Y.'258, ized by the charter "'notwithstanding 58 N. E. ' 130 [1900]; The sureties any irregularity, omission or error in cannot avoid liability by shoA^ing any of the proceedings relating to the that the city authorities did not ap- same.") prove the bond : People v. Carroll, — '" Hallock v. City of Lebanon, 215 ]V[ich. , 115 N. W. 42 [1908]. Pa. St. 1, 64 Atl. 362 [1906]. For "Greenwood v. Morrison, 128 Cal. the construction of a bond condi- 350, 60 Pac. 971 [1900]. tioned to pay "any and all persons, "Cady V. City of San Bernardino, any and all sums of money which Cal. , 94 Pac. 242 [1908]. may be due for labor and material ' Larned v. Maloney, 19 Ind. App. supplied or performed in and about 199, 49 N. E. 278 [1898]. such work," see City of Philadelphia ' Miller v. Mayo, 88 Cal. 568, 26 to Use v. H. C. Nichols Company, 214 Pac. 364 [1891], Pa. St. 265, 63 Atl. 886 [1906]. » Conde v. City of Schenectady, '' Gilsonite Construction Co. v. Ar- 164 N. Y. 25«, 58 N. E. 130 [1900]; kansas M'Alester Coal Co., 205 Mo. (In this case, however, another sec- 49, 103 S. W. 93 [1907]. 787 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 510 tract, the city may be authorized to retain enough of the contract price to indemnify the city against all suits against it due to the defective construction of the improvement or to the negligence of the contractor.^^ A bond given by a contractor to indemnify persons damaged by reason of the contractor's failure to per- form his contract through injuries arising in the process of con- struction does not enure to the benefit of the owners of property assessed.^' By statute it may be provided that the bidder for the construction of a public improvement must advance to the super- intendent of streets or some designated public official the cost of the publication of notices, resolutions, orders and other speci- fied expenses.^* Such statute is intended for the protection and benefit of those to whom such expenses are to be paid and for the protection of the city and the offi^eial to whom such payment is to be made. It is not intended for the benefit of the abutting property owners and if the persons entitled to the payment of such expenses file a written waiver of their right to have such expenses collected from the contractor in advance and such exr penses are accordingly not so collected, such omission does not invalidate the assessment.^" In the absence of special statutory provisions, it has been held that a provision that all damage aris- ing from the nature of the work should be borne by the con- tractor and that he should indemnify the city against all suits brought on account of damages from the action of the contractor, imposes conditions which tend to increase the cost of the work and to add to the burden of the property owners, an4 is there- fore void.'* § 510. Contract must conform to resolution or ordinance. If a public improvement is constructed by a city a resolution or ordinance is usually made necessary by statute and forms the basis of subsequent proceedings.^ Such resolution or ordinance is the sole authority which the officers of the city have for enter- ing into such contract and constructing such improvement. Furthermore, under statutes which require a contract to be let "Sweeten v. City of Millville, — "Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413 N. J. . 66 Atl. 923 [1907]. 36 Pac. 658 [1894]. " Grams V. Murphy, ^- Minn. , " Wollacott v. Meekin, 151 Cal. 114 N. W. 753 [1908]. 701, 91 Pac. 612 [1907]. "Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413, 'See § 830 et seq; § 837 et seq; 36 Pac. 658 [1894]. § 840. §510 TAXA.TION BY ASSESSMENT. 788 to the lowest bidder it is, as has been said elsewhere, ^ essential that the terms of the contract into which the bidders are invited to enter should be set forth in order that the bidders may know what liability they are about to assume, and in order that the city officials may be able to determine who is in fact the lowest bidder. P^om these considerations it follows that the contract which is entered into must .conform substantially to the require- ments of the resolution or ordinance. If it does not so conform there is on the one hand no authority for entering into such con- tract and on the other hand it is impossible to tell who is the low- est bidder to whom the contract should have been awarded. Ac- cordingly, if the contract does not conform substantially to the resolution or ordinance, it is invalid and cannot be the basis of a valid assessment, and if the contract is let for a gross sum and is not separable, its invalidity defeats the entire assessment.' Thus, if in the contract, work is required in addition to that which is pro- vided in the ordinance or resolution and the entire contract is let at a gross price, the contract and assessment based thereon are both invalid.* Thus under a resolution to improve a street in a = See § 495 et seq. ' Piedmont Paving Company v. All- man, 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493 [1902] ; Bay Eock Company v. Bell, 133 Cal. 150, 65 Pac. 299 [1901]; Kutchin v. Engelbret, 129 Cal. 635, 62 Pac. 214 [1900] ; Fay v. Reed, 128 Cal. 357, 60 Pac. 927 [1900] ; Partridge v. Lu- cas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 [1893] ; Brock V. Luning, 89 Cal. 316, 26 Pac. 972 [1891]; Frick v. Morford, 87 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1P91] ; Dyer V. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1«77]; Him- melmann v. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 68 [1875] ; City of Stockton v. Whit- more, 50 Cal. 554 [1875]; City of Stockton V. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643 [1873] ; Dougherty v. Hitchcock, 35 Cal. 512 [1868] ; Beaudry v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 269 [1867]; People ex rel. Price V. Bridgeman, 218 111. 568, 75 N. E. 1057 [1905]; People ex rel. Price V. Lyon, 218 111. 577, 75 N. E. 1017 [1905]; Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 111. 241, 71 N. E. 884 [1904] ; Young v. People ex rel. Ray- mond, 196 111. 603, 63 N. E. 1075 [1902] ; McPike v. City of Alton, 187 111. 62, 58 N. E. 301 [1900]; Pells V. People ex rel. Holmgrain, 159 111. 580, 42 N. E. 784 [1896]; Peck v. City of Grand Ea.pids, 125 Mich. 416, 84 N. W. 61 [1900]; City of Boonville ex rel. Cosgrove v. Step- hens, — Mo. App. •, 95 S. W. 314 [1906]; Turner v. City of Sprin-jfield, 117 Mo. App. 418, 93 S. W. 867 [1906]; Barton v. Kansas City, 110 Mo. App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]; City of Louisiana v. Shaffner, 104 Mo. App. 101, 78 S. W. 287 [1903]; City of Trenton ex rel. Gardner v. Collier, 68 Mo. App. 483 [1896] ; Folmsbee v. City of Ams- terdam, 142 N. Y. 118, 36 N. E. 821 [1894]; Calm v. Metz, 101 N. Y. S. [1906]; Lutea v. Briggs, 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 67 [1875]; Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 S. Dak. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 802, 52 K. W. 770 [1892]; McAllister y. City of Tacoma, 9 Wash. 272, 37 Pac. 447, 658 [1894]. * Piedmont Paving Company v. All- man, 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493 [1902] ; 789. THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §510 jurisdiction where the street is not regarded as including gutters, a contract which includes the construction of rock gutters and the assessment based thereon are both invalid.' A resolution to macadamize the street does not give authority to enter into a con- tract for curbing the sidewalk.® Under a resolution to curb and macadamize a street, the contract cannot include constructing sidewalks.'^ An order to pave a fifty-four foot roadway with bitu- minous rook upon a six inch concrete foundation does not author- ize a contract for the construction of sidewalks and curbing.^ A resolution to construct a street does not authorize a contract including the construction of a sewer for draining sewage from abutting property.' A resolution to change the grade of a street, invalid because not based upon the petition of the property own- ers, does not authorize the construction of a sidewalk upon an- other street and an ssessment therefor is invalid.^" A resolution for grading a street at a given grade does not authorize a con- tract which provides for a change of grade.^^ A resolution for grading a street does not authorize a contract including the curb- ing of such street.^^ Under an improvement ordinance provid- ing for certain described sewers the construction of extra sew- ers and additional catch basins and the substitution of flush tanks for lamp posts is not authorized even if such items are beneficial and desirable.'' If the specifications are not referred to in the resolution so as to make them a part thereof, the specifications Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 "Beaiidry v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 269 Pac. 10«2 [1893]; Donnelly v. How- [1867]. ard, 60 Cal. 291 [1882]; Dyer v. ' Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1877]. Chase, 52 Cal. 440 [1877]; Himmel- "McAllister v. City of Tacoma, 9 mann v. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 68 [1875] ; Wash. 272, 37 Pac. 447, 658 [1894]. Beaudry v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 269 'Peck v. City of Grand Rapids, [1867]; Peck v. City of Grand Rap- 125 Mich. 416, 84 N. W. 614 [1900]. ids, 125 Mich. 416, 84 N. W. 614 "° Folmsbee v. City of Amsterdam, [1900]; Folmsbee v. City of Amster- 142 N. Y. 118, 36 N. E. 821 [1894]. dam, 142 N. Y. 118, 36 N. E. 821 "Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 [1894]; Lutes v. Briggs, 5 Hun. (N. S. Dak. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 802, 51 Y.) 67 [1875]; People v. Van Nort, X. W. 770 [1892]. 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 331; Mason v. City "Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 of Sioux Falls, 2 S. Dak. 640, 39 S. Dak. 640, 39 Am. St. Rep. 302, Am. St. Rep. 802, 51 N. W. 770 51 N. W. 770 [1892]. [1892]; McAllister v. City of Ta- "People ex rel. McCormack v. Mc- coma, 9 Wash. 272, 37 Pac. 447, 658 Wethy, 177 111. 334, 52 N. E. 479 [1894]. [1898]. 'Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 [1893]. §510 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. ■ 79O cannot be resorted to, to supplement, or add to, the terms of the resolution." A contract cannot provide for the purchase of additional material not fairly included within the description of the ordinance." Thus under an ordinance for buying cast iron water pipe, water hydrants cannot be purchased." Different material from that specified in the ordinance cannot be con- tracted for." Thus under an ordinance providing for cover- ing a street with six inches of the best quality of broken lime- stone, the board of improvements cannot change such paving material to seven inches of rolling mill slag." Different work from that authorized by the ordinance cannot be contracted for even if it is as good as that provided for by the ordinance." Thus after a paving, contract has been performed in an unsat- isfactory manner a city comptroller whose power is to settle and adjust all claims in favor of or against the corporation cannot enter into a contract whereby the contractor is to lay a new pavement of a different nature in consideration of receiving the unpaid balance of the purchase price."" A contract which pro- vides for a method of doing the work different from that speci- fied in the ordinance or resolution is invalid."^ Thus a resolu- tion required a course of brick in street paving to be rolled once with the street roller. Such resolution was held to mean the roller then used by the city. Subsequently and before the con- tract was entered into, the city purchased a smaller roller and the contract permitted such brick to be rolled with such small roller. Such contract was held to be invalid."" Under an ordi- nance requiring bidders upon a grading contract to bid on each block separately, a bid and contract for grading the entire street at a certain sum per cubic yard is invalid and invalidates the assessment."^ In some jurisdictions it is held that a contract "Bay Eock Company v. Bell, 133 "Cahn v. Metz, 101 N. Y. S. 392 Cal. 150, 65 Pae. 299 [1901]. Ques- [1906]. tion raised but not decided for want '"Cahn v. Metz, 101 N. Y. S. 392 of proper pleading in Fay v. Reed, [1906]. 128 Cal. 357, 60 Pac. 927 [1900]. "City of Boonville ex rel. Cos- '"Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 111. grove v. Stephens, — Mo. App. , 241, 71 N. E. 884 [1904]. 03 S. W. 314 [1906]. "Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 111. ^^ City of Boonville ex rel. Cos- 241, 71 N. B. 884 [1904]. grove v. Stephens, — Mo. App. , "Young V. People ex rel. Raymond, 95 S. W. 314 [1906]. 196 111. 603, 63 N. E. 107S [1902]. ^City of Stockton y. Creanor, 46 "Young V. People ex rel. Raymond, Cal. 643 [1873]. 196 111. 603, 63 N. E. 1075 [1902]. 791 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 510 for less work than that which is specified in the resolution of in- tention or the ordinance is invalid.^* This view is based upon the theory that the only authority to the city officials to enter into a contract or construct an improvement is that found in the reso- lution or ordinance, and that they have no power to contract for less work than that for which* they were required to contract. Thus if a resolution provides for improving a certain part of a street, as from' one cross street to another, a contract for the improvement of a part of such street less in length than that specified in the ordinance or resolution is invalid.^' If an ordin- ance for paving a certain part of a street has been passed, a sub- sequent ordinance providing for paving a portion of one of such streets at the entire cost of a private corporation operates as a repeal of a former ordinance and invalidates an improvement made thereunder.^" An ordinance which provides for the ■con- struction of a street sixty-one feet wide under which an assess- ment is levied and confirmed is repealed by a subsequent ordi- nance reducing the width of the street to fifty-five feet and such assessment is rendered invalid.^^ An ordinance authorizing the construction of a sewer for sanitary and drainage purposes does not authorize the construction of a sewer for drainage purposes only without any house connections.^' If it is possible from the terms of the contract to separate the cost of the unauthorized part of the improvement from the cost of that which is authorized, the assessment will be valid as to the latter and invalid as to the former.^'' Thus where a sewer was constructed at a certain rate per foot and the plans and specifications required about eight feet more of sewer to be laid than was provided for by the reso- =*Kutchin v. Engelbret, 129 Cal. "^ City of Stockton v. Whitmore, 50 635, 62 Pac. 214 [1900]; City of Cal. 554 [1875] ; Dougherty v. Hitch- Stockton V. Whitmore, 50 Cal. 554 cock, 35 Cal. 512 [1868]. [1875]; Dougherty v. Hitchcock, 35 ""McPike v. City of Alton, 187 Cal. 512 [1868]; McPike v. City of 111. 62, 58 N. E. 301 [1900]. Alton, 187 III. 62, 58 N. E. 301 "Pells v. People ex rel. Homgrain, [1900]; Pells v. People ex rel. Holm- 159 III. 580, 42 N. E. 784 [1896]. grain, 159 111. 580, 42 N. E. 784 ^Barton v. Kansas City, 110 Mo. [1896]; Barton v. Kansas City, 110 App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]. Mo. App. 31, 83 S. W. 1093 [1904]; ^ Prick v. Morford, 87 Cal. 576, City of Trenton ex rel. Gardner v. 25 Pac. 764 [1891]; Himmelmann v. Collier, 68 Mo. App. 483 [1896]; In Hoadley, 44 Cal. 276 [1872]; Beau- re Soranton Sewer, 213 Pa. St. 4, 62 dry v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 269 [1867]; Atl. 173 [1905]. Bennett v. City of Emnistsburg, — la. . 115 N. W. 582 [1908]. § 511 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 792 lution of intention, the assessment is valid as to all except such eight feet."" If the cost of grading can be ascertained separate from the cost of unauthorized curbing, the assessment may be enforced as to the cost of such grading." If the cost of the two kinds of work cannot be separated, the entire assessment is in- valid.*" If the board of supervisors has awarded a contract to be performed in a certain time, and time is of the essence of such contract, the contract entered into by the superintendent of streets giving a longer time for performance is invalid and an assessment based thereon cannot be enforeed.^^ If, by the con- tract an assessment district is formed differing from that laid out by the ordinance, such contract is invalid.** Hence under a resolution of intention to improve a certain described street the city cannot give permission to certain lot owners to construct that part of the improvement in front of their respective lots.*' If the contract conforms substantially to the ordinance but in the performance of such contract additional work is done, the assessment for the improvement specified in the ordinance and contract is valid, although the items of extra work must be elimi- nated.*" If the contract conforms to the ordinance and the objec- tion to the assessment is that the contract has not been performed, a different question arises which is discussed elsewhere.*' §511. Substantial compliance suflBcient. It is not necessary that the contract should conform literally to the resolution or ordinance authorizing the improvement. It is .sufficient if there is a substantial conformity.^ Thus, under an ^ Frick V. Morford, 87 Cal. 576, " See § 527 et seg. 25 Pac. 764 [1891]. *Gage v. City of Chicago, 201 HI. "Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 93, 66 N. E. 374 [1903]; Hyman v. S. D. 640, 39 Am. St. Kep. 802, 51 City, of Chicago, 188 111. 462, 59 N. N. W. 770 [1892]. E. 10 [1900]; Martindale v. Palmer, "^Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 52 lud. 411 [1875]; Lynch v. City of 33 Pac. 1082 [1893]. Kansas City, 44 Kan. 452, 24 Pac. «> Brock V. Luning, 89 Cal. 316, 26 973 [1890]; Mayor and City Council Pac 972 [1891]. "^ Baltimore v. Eaymo, 68 Md. 569, «Kutehin v. Engelbret, 129 Cal. 13 Atl. 383 [1888] ; Cole v. Skrainka, 635 62 Pac. 214 [1900]; Haisoh v. 105 Mo. 303, 16 S. W. 491 [1891]; City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 435, 33 Pac. Dunn v. McNeely,' 75 Mo. App. 217 ,,„•. ri894] [1898]; Eyermann v. Provenchere, 15 '''Kutehin v Enselbret, 129 Cal. Mo. App. 256 [1884]; Voght v. Buf- 635 62 Pac 214 [1900]. Mo, 133 X. Y. 463, 31 N. E. 340 '"McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, [1892]; City of Spokane v. Browne, 40 P"c 808 [1895]. » Wash. 317, 36 Pac. 26 [1894]. 793 THE IMPEOVEMENT CONTRACT. § 511 ordinance providing for a Nicholson or wooden block pavement, a contract for "what is known as wooden block pavement" is sufiScient.^ An ordinance which provides for grading certain streets authorizes a contract for " grading, grubbing, guttering and curbing" such streets.' An ordinance for paving a street designated by its popular name authorizes a contract covering the same length of such street though the contract describes it by its official name, the street being known officially by another name after the bend therein.* A resolution which refers to a street as forty-two feet wide to be improved according to plans and specifications, authorizes a contract for paving thirty-seven feet in width, where the plans and specifications show that a strip five feet wide in the center of the street is omitted as being a part of the street which the railway company is bound to pave.'"' An ordinance for a fourteen foot sidewalk authorizes a contract for improving the sidewalk, although the space between the building and the curb is but thirteen feet on account of the fact that the property owner's building extends over the line." An ordinance for paving a street with vitrified brick author- izes a contract for paving it with "hard burned brick specially burned for paving."^ An ordinance for paving a street with granite blocks eight inches in depth authorizes a contract for paving such streets with granite blocks ranging from seven to eight inches in depth.* An ordinance for paving a street by a specified patent process authorizes a contract which differs from the pf^tent in permitting the street to be rammed as well as rolled, differs as to the angle at which the stones were to be laid and differs as to the material to be placed between the joints of the stone." If the contract does not conform to the ordinance owing' to clerical errors, the assessment is nevertheless valid if per- formance is had according to the terms of the ordinance.^" In some jurisdictions it is held that a variance between the ordinance ^Martindale V. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 'Dunn v. McXeely, 75 Mo. App. [1875]. 217 [1898]. 'City of Spokane v. Browne, 8 'Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mo. 303, 10 Wash. 317, 36 Pac. 26 [1894]. S. W. 491 [1891]. * Lynch v. City of Kansas City, 44 ° Mayor and City Council of Balti- Kan. 452, 24 Pac. 973 [1890]. more v. Eaymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. "Voght V. Buffalo, 133 N. Y. 463, 383 [1888]. 31 N. E. 340 [1892]. "Eyermann v. Provenehere, 15 Mo. 'Hyman v. City of Chicago, 188 App. 256 [1884]. 111. 462, 59 N. E. 10 [1900]. § 511 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 794 and the contract which is not prejudicial to the property owners does not invalidate the contract or the assessment therefor." One reason given for this view is that if the city had the power in the first instance to make the contract which it did make, ratification of the contract by the proper officials is equivalent to a subsequent grant of authority and has the same legal effect.'= Thus, under a resolution to pave a given length of a specified street a contract to pave a shorteotportion of such street has been held to be valid if the burden of the property owners was not increased and property not benefited by the improvement a; actually constructed was not assessed.^" Under an ordinance for Constructing n street and a sidewalk a contract for the construc- tion of a street alone has been held to be valid and the assess- ment therefor has been upheld.^* So, under a resolution for lay- ing cross-walks at intersecting streets, an assessment is valid though walks were laid only where the intersecting streets were; paved with Belgian or concrete pavement as long as only the walks actually laid are charged for.^^ If the original notice of intention to improve specifies a given material, property owners cannot complain if a different material which is both cheaper and more serviceable than that originally selected is in fact used.^" If the specifications require work not named in the ordinance but such work is not required by the contract and no charge \^ made therefor the contract and assessment therefor are valid.^' Improvements which are incidental to the improvements speci- fied in the ordinance or resolution and which by construTjtion may be regarded as a part thereof may be provided for in the ''Oakland Paving Company v. 93 Pa. St. (12 Norris) 72 [1881]. Rier, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]; Field v. "In the Matter of Pinckney, 22 City of Chicago, 198 111. 224, 64 N. Hun. (N. Y.) 474 [1880]; Hutchin- E. 840 [1902]; Heman Construction son v. Pittsburg, 72 Pa. St. (22 P. Company v. Loevy, 179 Mo. 455, 78 F. Smith) 320 [1872]. S. W. 613 [1903]; (reversing Heman "Heman Construction Company \. Construction Company v. Loevy, 64 Loevy, 171 Mo. 455, 78 S. W. 613 Mo. App. 430 [1895] ); In the Matter [1903]; (reversing Heman Con- of Pirickney, 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 474 struction Company v. Loevy, 64 Mo. [1880]; Barkley v. Oregon City, 24 App. 430 [1895]). Ore. 515, 33 Pac. 978 [1893]; City to "Matter of Eager, 12 Abb. Pr. X. Use of O'Rourke v. Hays, 93 Pa. St. S. (N. Y.) 151 [1871]. (12 Norris) 72 [1881]; Hutchinson "Barkley v. Oregon City, 24 Ore. V. Pittsburg, 72 Pa. St. (22 P. F. 515, 33 Pac. 978 [1893]. Smith) 320. " Oakland Paving Company v. Rier, "City to Use of O'Rourke v. Hays, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]. 795 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 511 contract, although not expressly named in the resolution.^' Un- der a resolution to construct a sewer, a contract may be made which provides that manholes and lampholes shall be constructed as a part thereof.^° Under a resolution for the construction of a sewer, a provision in the contract that the contractor should take up the old sewer pipe along the line of the contemplated improvement without additional expense to the city does not invalidate the contract where it appears that by reason of such provision a higher contract price was not necessarily in the bid.^" Under an ordinance or resolution providing for several improve- ments, distinct contracts may be let to different persons for each improvement.-^ However, under an ordinance to improve a street between two given points a city engineer has no power to let the work in sections and to compute the cost thereof accord- ingly.^'' In some cases a much greater divergence between the contract and the ordinance is allowed than is indicated by the authorities already discussed. Thus it has been said that a dif- ference between the contract and the ordinance as to the dimen- sions of the stone to be used in paving may permit the city to make such divergence a defense if sued on the contract, but cannot invalidate an assessment levied for the improvement.-''' The repair of a sewer extending sixty feet beyond the distance indicated by the ordinance has been held not to invalidate the assessment.^* Under an ordinance and contract for building a street, the subsequent construction of a retaining wall which proved to be necessary by reason of the nature of the soil when the excavation was once made was held not to invalidate the contract or assessment.^'' In ease of a conflict between two dif- ferent ordinances with reference to street improvements, an or- dinance for improving a specific street in a certain described man- ner prevails over a prior general ordinance which provides that " Comstock V. Eagle Grove City, " Dashiell v. Mayor and City 133 la. 589, 111 N. W. 51 [1907]. Council of Baltimore, Use of Hax, 45 "Comstock V. Eagle Grove City, Md. 615 [1876]. 133 Iowa 589, 111 N. W. 51 [1907]. ^Webber v. Common Council of -"Comstock V. Eagle Grove City, the City of Lockport, 43 Howard 388 133 Iowa 589, 111 N. W. 51 [1907]. [1872]. "Bates V. Twist 138 Cal. 52, 70 =' Longworth v. City of Cincinnati, Pac. 1023 [1902]. 34 0. S. 101 [1877]; (The cost of ^- Eyerman v. Hardy, 8 Mo. App. such wall was held to be a, proper 311 [1880]. item of the assessment.) § 512 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 796 subsequent street improvements should be made as therein speci- fled.^« § 512. Effect of invalid terms. The contract between the public corporation and the contractor who undertakes to construct a public improvement is controlled by the rules with reference to subject matter applicable to con- tracts in general. It is often soulht to incorporate into such contracts, terms which in some form violate the policy of either the written or the unwritten law. Such provisions cannot be enforced. Their effect upon the rest of the contract turns on the question whether such terms are merely void or whether they are not merely void but illegal. If the terms are merely void their incorporation into the contract does not affect the valid terms of the contract if such valid terms are by themselves suf- ficient to constitute a contract.^ However, in some jurisdictions this rule is not followed. If the void terms are made the basis of competitive bidding and the effect of incorporating them into the prospective contract is to restrict competition and to in- crease the .contract price, it is held in some eases that an assess- ment levied for the contract price is invalid.^ If the invalid terms are not merely void but illegal their effect upon the rest of the contract turns upon the question whether the contract is entire or seperable. If the contract is entire the incorporation of an illegal term invalidates the entire contract. If the contract is severable the incorporation of an illegal term does not invalidate those terms of a contract which can be separated from the illegal part thereof. These questions, however, can best be discussed in connection with the specific types of void and illegal terms which have been con- sidered by the courts. A provision in a contract for a street improvement which attempts to relieve the street superinten- dent and his sureties from liability for any delinquency upon his part is unauthorized by sta+ute and is apparently void but the insertion of such clause does not invalidate the rest of the con- tract.' A clause which requires the contractor to bear all loss or ^'Holdom V. City of Chicago, 169 'See §§ 514, 515. 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [isgr]. . 'McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, 1 McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Eauer v. Lowe, 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Rauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 Pac. 337 [1895]. 107 Cal. 229, 40 Pac. 337 ri895]. 797 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §§513,514: damage resulting from the nature of the work imposes an extra burden on the property owner in excess of any benefits to him and renders the assessment void.* § 513. Terms fixed by law. If the law fixes the liability of the parties as to certain mat- ters, such terms will be implied in the contract although not ex- pressed and accordingly a contract will not be invalid because such terms are not incorporated therein specifically.'^ Thus, where the law fixes the amount of the cost of paving which shall be borne by the abutting property owners and the city, where work is done upon a street in the center of which is a strip not used for ordinary street purposes, it is not necessary that said terms should be incorporated in the contract.'' The incorporation into a eon- tract in express terms of a provision which the law would imply in the absence of express terms cannot affect its validity.^ If a contract provides for the performance of all the work specified in the resolution of intention but furthermore contains a provi- sion that the adjoining property should not be assessed for im- proving the part of the street occupied by a railway company, the contractor agreeing to look to the railway company for pay- ment for such portion of the work, the insertion of such provi- sion does not invalidate the contract.* § 514. Provisions with reference to labor. Contracts for public improvements often contain provisions restricting the number of hours which shall constitute a day's work for those employed in the performance of such contract. Under modern statutes, eight hours is the number commonly se- lected as constituting a day's work. In some jurisdictions stat- utes restricting the number of hours which shall constitute a day's work are regarded as invalid. Where such view obtains •Van Loenen v. Gillespie, — Cal. v. Grogreve, 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So. , 96 Pac. 87 [1908]; Hatch v. 848 [1889]. Nevills, — Cal. , 95 Pac. 43 "Barber Asphalt Paving Company [1907]; Blochman v. Spr«ckels, 135 v. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So. Cal. 662, 57 L. R. A. 213, 67 Pac. 848 [1889]. 1061; Woollacott v. Meekin, 151 Cal. ' Perine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305, 32 701, 91 Pae. 612; Glassell v. O'Dea, Pae. 226 [1893]. — Cal. App. , 95 Pac. 44 [1908]. * Perine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305, 32 Barber Asphalt Paving Company Pac. 226 [1893]. § 514 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 798 it is said that if the specifications contain a provision restricting the number of hours which shall constitute a day's work and bids are made and the contract let upon such terms as a basis, the contract and the assessment therefor are invalid, since the cost to the property owner is improperly increased.^ Where this view prevails, a property owner in resisting the assessment need not show that such provision actually increased the cost of the work.= It is sufficient if he shows = Inge V. Board of Public Works of 540, 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903]; Mobile, 135 Ala. 187, 93 Am. St. Rep. (affirming Kelley v. Chadwick, 104 20, 33 So. 678 [1902]. La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); (In this " City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 case the contract provided that the 111. 346, 68 N. E. 786 [1903]. contractor should employ only 6ono "City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 fide residents of the city.) 111. 346, 68 N. E. 786 [1903]. =° St. Louis Quarry and Construc- " Edwards & Walsh Construction tion Company v. Von Versen, 81 Mo. Co. V. Jasper County, 117 la. 365, 94 Apn. 519 [1?99]. Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 =» It. Louis Quarry and Gonstruc- [1902]; (citing People ex rel. Rod- tion Company v. Frost, 90 Mo. App. gers V. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 82 Am. St. 677 [1901]. Rep. 605, 52 L. R. A. 814, 59 N. E. '' Flinn v. Peters, 3 Cal. App. 235, 716). 84 Pac. 995 [1906]. "Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U. S. 80] THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT § 515 Whether a provision in the proposals to the effect that preference would be given to a bidder who would agree to pay the full union schedule to his employes invalidates the assessment, was questioned but not decided in a recent Massachusetts case,^^ as in that case the expenses incurred for damage to realty exceeded the amount of the assessment, which could thus be sustained, irrespective of the validity of the contract. § 515. Patented or monopolized articles. A patent is a legal monopoly and there can be no competition in a patented article unless the person owning the patent vol- untarily offers it for sale in open market.^ Under a statute which provides for competition and the letting of contracts to lowest bidders, the question has been presented in many cases whether a patented article can be required. Upon this question there has been a conflict of authority. In some jurisdictions it is said to be improper under such statutes to include patented articles in the specifications and invite bids thereon.^ In some cases the question has been raised but not decided.^ In other jurisdictions it has been said to be proper to include patented articles.* One of the theories given for this is, that persons may bid on such contract and may secure the consent of the owner of the patent to make use thereof.^ A special statute which provides spe- cifically for the use of a patented article has been held to be valid." It has been held that if it is proper to make use of a patented article, the contract therefor should not be let on com- ^ Gardiner v. Street Commission- * Yarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 ers of City of Boston, 188 Mass. 223, Kan. 126 [1875]. 74 N. E. 341 [1905]. * Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 1 Barber Asphalt Paving Company 494 [1869]; Hobart v. City of De- V. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann. 251, 5 So, troit, 17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185; 848 [1889]; Burgess v. City of Jef- Kansas City Transfer Company v. ferson, 21 La. Ann. 143. Huling, 22 Mo. App. 654 [1886]; ''Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Matter of McCormack, 60 Barb. (N. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 [1868]; Siegel Y.) 128 [1870]; Matter of McCor- v. City of Chicago, 223 111. 428, 79 mack, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 234 N. E. 280 [1906]; Monaghan v. City [1870]. of Indianapolis, 37 Ind. App. 280, 'Hobart v. City of Detroit, 17 76 N. B. 424, reversing on rehearing Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185. ■75 N. E. 33 [1905]; Lewis v. City of "Dean v. Borehsenius, 30 Wis. 236 Elizabeth, 25 N: J. Eq. (10 C. E. [1872]; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wi3. Gr.) 298 [1874]; Dolan v. Mayor, 400, 9 Am. 578 [1872]; Dean v. ■etc., of New York, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. Charlton, 27 Wis. 522 [1871]. Stifel v. MacManus, 74 Mo. App. "^Eiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541 558 [1898]. [1873]; City, to Use of McGrath v. =' Stifel v. MacManus, 74 Mo. App. Clemens, 49 Mo. 552 [1872]; (over- 558 [1898]. rulin.^ City of St. Louis to Use of "^Whiting v. Mayor and Aldermen McGrath v. Clemens, 36 Mo. 467 of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 [1865]; and City of St. Louis to Use [1870]. § 526 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 826 § 526. Assessment upon basis of estimated cost. Where a preliminary estimate is provided for by statute to be made before the improvement is undertaken, the effect of such estimate upon the amount for which the assessment may be levied depends entirely upon the provisions of the statute. Since an assessment may be levied before the improvement is made, ^ or even before the contract is let,^ the amount of the estimate may be taken as a basis for assessment.^ In some jurisdictions this amount cannot be exceeded in levying the assessment.* Under the practice in some states the question .whether the estimate is for the correct amount must be raised by appeal or it is regarded as waived.' If the preliminary estimate is merely required as a basis for bids, the assessment is not restricted by the amount of such preliminary estimate but may be for the actual cost even if larger than the estimate in the absence of fraud.' A change in the plans of the improvement may, in such case, be made after the estimate but before the contract.' Under a statute which authorizes a municipality to which new territory has been an- nexed, to proceed with assessment proceedings already begun except where they have been carried to a finality, if an assess- ment has been confirmed and collected more than nine years be- fore the annexation and the improvement has been completed for about the same time, such proceeding has been carried to a finality and a further assessment cannot be levied even if the original assessment was for too small a sum.' Under a statutory proceed- ing authorizing" the levy of an assessment for ' ' the probable amount of expense" of public improvements, the city is not re- stricted to an assessment before the work is done upon a basis of preliminary estimates only.' If the statute provides for a hear- ing upon the estimate and provides that the price fixed in the estimate shall not be increased, an estimate which is ascertained to be too small in amount to complete the work may be abandoned and an increased estimate may be filed, if notice and hearing •See §§ 417, 418, 522. Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 419 = See § 522. [1876]. »Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 'Fuller v. City of Grand Rapids, 5 Pac. 781 [1885]. See § 813 et seq. 105 Mich. 529, 63 N. W. 530 [1895]. 'Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 'Town of Cicero v. Hill, 193 111. 5 Pac. 781 [1885]. 226, 61 N. E. 1020 [1901]. 'Balfe V. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347, "City of Meriden v. Camp, 46 10 N. E. 92 [1886]. Conn. 284 [1878]. ' State, Kohler, Pros. v. Town of 827 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 526 are given upon such new estimate." In jurisdictions where the statute does not require that the improvement should be com- pleted before the assessments are collected, the fact that the esti- mate for such improvement has been exceeded and that the im- provement has never been completed does not enable the property ovraei;p to resist such assessments." On application for a judg- ment of S9,le for a delinquent special assessment the court can- not reduce the assessment to an amount equal to a proportionate part of the cost of the improvement already completed and the estimated amount necessary to finish the work," If an assess- ment is levied and collected before^ the improvement is con- structed and such improvement is subsequently abandoned, those who paid such assessments may recover them in an action for money had and received on the theory of failure of considera- tion.^' The amount which can be recovered is the amount of the assessment paid in, less the amount of benefits received by the property of the party seeking recovery.^* Furthermore, if the city has expended in a legal and honest manner the money raised by the assessment, upon the improvement for which assessment was levied, the assessment cannot be recovered even though the property of the party seeking recovery was not benefited by such expenditure. '° However, it has been held that when a street was to be opened, widened and graded, and an assessment was levied and the amount raised expended on grading, the owner of pro- perty not benefited thereby may recover the amount paid in when the improvement is abandoned.^" It may be provided by stat- ute that partial estimates may be made of the amount due on the work while such work progresses and that assessments may be levied based upon such partial estimates.^' The validity of such '"City of Denver v. Kennedy, 38 [1899]; Strickland v. City of Still- Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122 [1904]; 80 water, 63 Minn. 43, 65 N. W. 131 Pac. 467 [1905]. [1895]. " Felker v. City of New Whatcom, " Strickland v. City of Stillwater, 18 Wash. 178, 47 Pac. 505 [1896]. 63 Minn. 43, 65 N. W. 131 [1895]. " Connecticut Mutual Life Insur- " Germania Bank v. City of St. ance Co. v. People ex rel. Kocher- Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542 sperger, 172 111. 31, 49 N. E. 989 [1900]. [1898]. "McConville v. City of St. Paul, "Germania Bank v. City of St. 75 Minn. 383, 74 Am. St. Rep. 508, Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542 43 L. R. A. 584, 77 N. W. 993 [1899]. [1900]; McConville v. City of St. "City of Indianapolis v. Imberry, Paul, 75 Minn. 383, 74 Am. St. Rep. 17 Ind. 175 [1861]; Fralich v. Bar- 508, 43 L. R. A. 584, 77 N. W. 993 low, 25 Ind. App. 383, 58 N. E. 271 § 526 TAXA.TION BY ASSESSMENT. 828 an assessment is not affected by the fact that the city engineer, in signing an estimate, placed an improper title after Ms name.^' The objection that the estimate is not for the proper amount is one which must under the procedure in some states be raised on appeal and not by injunction.^* Such preliminary estimate is generally mandatory where an assessment is levied after the work is begun and before it is completed.^" Such estimate is not necessary where the cost of the entire work has been definitely ascertained." Whether council can revise an estimate once made is a question which has been raised but not decided."" Confirma- tion of an assessment cannot be resisted on the ground that the contract price is less than the estimate."' If an assessment may be levied URon the basis of the preliminary estimate before the improvement is constructed and the actual cost of the improve- ment is less than the amount of the assessment, such amount must be repaid to the owner or credited upon his assessment."* If the property owner demands it. such rebate should be made upon his assessment before he is obliged to pay the same in."' The stat- ute providing that such rebate is to be made at once, means imme- diately upon ascertaining the amount of the surplus and not upon the issuing of vouchers."* Accordingly, an agreement between the city and a property owner that the property owner shall al- low the assessment to be confirmed, and that if the contract price of the improvement is less than the estimate, the judgment of con- firmation shall be vacated and a judgment for the exact amount of the" assessment shall be entered, does not invalidate the assess- ment, since such provision is substantially that which the law [1900]; state of Minnesota ex rel. '^ City of Indianapolis v. Patterson, City of Duluth v. District Court of 33 Ind. 157 [1870]. St. Louis County, 61 Minn. 542, 64 ^'Danforth v. Village of Hinsdale, N. W. 190 [1895]. 177 111. 579, 52 N. E. 478 [1899]. "Heiple v. City of Washington, ^Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 219 111. 604, 76 N. E. 854 [1906]. Cal. 37 [1890]; 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; "Balfe V. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347, Gage v. People ex rel. Hanberg, 219 10 N. E. 92 [1886]. 111. 634, 76 N. E. 834 [1906]; Thaler * Lammers v. Balfe, 41 Ind. 218 v. West Chicago Park Commission- [1872] ; Jones v. Schulmeyer, 39 Ind. ers, 174 111. 211, 52 N. E. 116 [1898]. 119 [1872]; Landsdale v. Nicklaus, *Gage v. People ex rel. Hanberg, 38 Ind. 289 [1871]; City of Indian- 219 111. 634, 76 N". E. 834 [1906]; apolis V. Ittberry, 17 Ind. 175 Groesbeck v. Cincinnati, 51 O. S. 365, [1861]; In the Matter of Beekman, 37 K E. 707 [1894]. 31 Howard (K. Y.) 16 [1865]. "People ex rel. Keeney v. City of ='In the Matter of Beekman, 31 Chicago, 152 111. 546, 38 N. E.744 Howard (N. Y.) 16 [1865]. [1894]. 829 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. § 526 would imply." The amount of the surplus of the estimate over the assessment should be credited upon the assessment, and when enough has been collected upon the assessment to equal the actual cost of the work, no further collection should be allowed." Under some statutes the entire amount of the assessment must be paid in and the excess subsequently repaid to the property owners.^" If the property owner has paid in an amount upon the assessment in excess of the actual cost of the work he may maintain assump- sit to recover such payment from the city.?" After denying the right of the property owner to such surplus, the city cannot be allowed to raise the question that the property owner should not have sued in assumpsit but should have sued in mandamus to com- pel the council to apportion and pay over such excess.'^ Upon the same principle, if the improvement is abandoned in whole or in part the owner may recover a proportionate share of the amount paid in by him.^^ The surplus cannot be applied to other uses, even if they are purposes for which general taxes or local assessments might have been levied."^ Such surplus cannot be transferred to the general funds, ^* nor can it be applied to meet deficiencies in funds raised by assessment for other improvements undertaken at the same time.^^ An assessment for benefits for the construc- tion of a drainage ditch in excess of the cost thereof cannot be applied to new work.^° If the amount of the assessment is less than the amount of the benefits conferred and the cost of the improvement exceeds the amount of the assessment, it is ordi- " Billings V. City of Chicago, 167 116 111. App. 559 [1904]; Thayer v. 111.. 337, 47 N. E. 731 [1897]. City of Grand Rapids, 82 Mich. 298, ^People ex rel. Hanberg v. McMa- 46 N. W. 228 [1890]; Cleveland v. hon, 224 111. 284, 79 N. E. 645 Tripp, 13 R. I. 50 [1880]. See § [1906] ; Betts V. City of Naperville, 1490. 214 111. 380, 73 N. E. 752 [1905]; "'Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, People ex rel. MoCornack v. Mc- 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]. Wethy, 177 111. 334, 52 N. E. 479 == Germania Bank v. City of St. [1898]; Thaler V. West Chicago Park Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542 Commissioners, 174 111. 211, 52 N. [1900]. E. 116 [1898]; People ex rel. McCor- °= Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, nack V. McWethy, 165 111. 222, 46 N. 82 Mich. 298, 48 N. W. 228 [1890]. E. 187 [1897]. =♦ Reamer v. Hogg, 142 Ind. 138 * Fisher v. City of Rochester, 6 41 N. E. 353 [1895]. Lansing (N. Y.) 225 [1872]. == Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, ""City of Chicago v. MoCormick, 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]. 124 111. App. 639 [1906]; City of "° Reamer v. Hogg, 142 Ind. 138, 41 Chicago V. Fisk, 123 III. App. 404 N. E. 353 [1895]. [1905] ; City of Chicago v. Singer, § 527 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 830 narily provided by statute that supplemental assessments may be levied to pay the excess of the leost of the improvements over the assessment already levied." Under a statute, however, authoriz- ing a city to proceed with public improvements in territory an- nexed to such city where the proceedings have not been carried to a finality, a supplemental assessment cannot be levied where the improvement has been completed, and the original assessment collected several years before the^annexation.''* § 527. Necessity and nature of substantial performance. If the contract for the construction of the public improvement for which the assessment in question is levied is performed fully, no question .can, of course, arise as to the validity of the assess- ment on that ground.^ Serious questions, however, arise if such contract is not performed fully. The effect which non-perform- ance shall have is to a very large extent in the discretion of the legislature. Since the legislature has power to determine the nature and character of the improvement and since it may dele- gate this power to the public corporation by which such improve- ment is to be constructed, it follows that the legislature may pro- vide what shall constitute performance or may delegate this power to the public corporation by which such improvement is to be constructed. Under many statutes there can be no recovery upon a local assessment unless the contract is performed in at least a substantial manner.- In some cases it is said that the contract =• See § 952 e* seg. Roberta, 75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 570 ''Town of Cicero v. Hill, 193 111. [1877]; Gtermania Bank v. City of 226, 61 N. E. 1020 [1901]. St. Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542 iFell V. Philadelphia, to Use of [1900]; City of St. Joseph v. Anth- Cunningham, 81 Pa. St. (31 P. F. ony, 30 Mo. 537 [I860]; Heman v. Smith) 58 [1876]. Gerardi, 96 Mo. App. 231, 69 S. W. ^ Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Com- 1069 [1902]; Shoenberg v. Heyer, 91 pany v. Bowie, 104 Cal. 286, 37 Pac. Mo. App. 389 [1902]; Brady v. Rog- 934 [1894]; McVerry v. Kidwell, ers, 63 Mo. App. 222 [1895]; The 63 Cal. 246 [ 1883] ; Crawford v. King Hill Brick Manufacturing Com- Mason, 123 la. 301, 98 N. W. 795 pany v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App. 120 [1904]; Mason V. City of Des Moines [1892]; Guinotte v. Ridge, 46 Mo. 108 la. 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]; App. 254 [1891]; Kansas City ex Wingert v. Snoufifer & Ford, 134 la. rel. Neill v. Askew, 105 Mo. App. 97, 108 N. W. 1035 [1906]; City 84, 79 S. W. 483 [1904]; Meyer v. of Lexington v. Walby, — Ky. , Wright, 19 Mo. App. 283 [1885]; 109 S. W. 299 [1908]; City of Hen- State, Central Railroad Company, derson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. (14 W. Pros. v. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. P. D. Bush.) 24 [1878]; Preston v. L. (6 Vr.) 332 [1872]; Cahu v. 831 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §527 must be performed strictly.'' This rule is, however, more favor- able to the property owner than that in force in the great majority of jurisdictions. It is generally said that it is sufficient if the con- tract has been complied with in a substantial manner even if lit- eral performance is wanting.' If by statute a specific method is provided for raising the question of defective performance,'^ as by filing an affidavit stating the defects in performance," failure to raise such questions in the manner prescribed operates as a waiver thereof. What amounts to substantial performance is a question upon which there is some diversity of opinion. The principles applicable in the ordinary law of contracts are not always recognized in assessment cases, since it is suggested that the existence of benefit to the property owner by reason of the improvement should be the test of substantial performance. If the improvement does substantially the same work as that con- tracted for 'and confers substantially the same benefit upon the property owner, it is said that the contract is performed sub- stantially.' What constitutes substantial performance is a ques- Metz, 101 N. Y. S. 392 [1906] ; Stone V. Viele, 38 0. S. 314 [1882]; City of Cincinnati for Use of Wirth v. Cincinnati and Spring Grove Avenue Company, 26 0. S. 345 [1875]; Tay- lor V. Wapakoneta, 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 285 [ 1904] ; Harrisburg v. Bap- tist, 156 Pa. St. 526, 27 Atl. 8 [1893]; City of Philadelphia to Use v. Ball, 147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. 564 [1892]; Erie City for Use v. Butler, 120 Pa. St. 374, 14 Atl. 153 [1888]; City of Philadelphia to Use of John- son V. Rule, 93 Pa. St. (12 Norris) 15 [1880]; Philadelphia to Use of Dyer v. Broolte, 81 Pa. St. (31 P. r. Smith) 23 [1876]; Findley v. City of Pittsturg (Pa.), 11 Atl. 678; Ber- wind V. Galveston and Houston In- vestment Company, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 426, 50 S. W. 413 [1899]. 'Heman v. Gerardi, 96 Mo. App. 231, 69 S. W. 1069 [1902]. * Reclamation District No. 3 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 [1884]; Sarber v. Rankin, 154 Ind. 236, 56 N. E. 225 [1899] ; People ex rel. Raymond v. Church, 192 111. 302, 61 N. E. 496 [1901]; Inhabi- tants of Leominster v. Conant, 139 Mass. 384, 2 N. E. 690 [1885]; Mayor and City Council of Balti- more V. Raymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. 383 [1888]; Dashiell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Use of Hax, 45 Md. 615 [1876]; Angell v. Cortright, 111 Mich. 223, 69 N. W. 486 [1896]; Eisley v. City of St. Louis, 34 Mo. 404 [1864]; Saxton National Bank v. Haywood, 62 Mo. App. 550 [1895]; Meyer v. Wright, 19 Mo. App. 283 [1885]; Eyermann V. Provenehere, 15 Mo. App. 256 [1884]; Voght V. City of BuiTalo, 133 N. Y. 463, 31 N. E. 340 [1892]; Philadelphia, to Use v. Jewell, 135 Pa. St. 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890]; Philadelphia to Use v. Jewell, 140 Pa. St. 9, 21 Atl. 239 [1891]. '^ In the Matter of Bridgeford, 65 Hun (N. Y.) 227, 20 N. Y. Supp. 281 [1892]. "In the Matter of Bridgeford, 05 Hun. (N. Y.) 227, 20 N. Y. Supp. 281 [1892]. ' Church V. People ex rel. Koeher- sperger, 179 111. 205, 53 N. E. 554 [1899]; Rossiter v. City of Lake § 527 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 832 tion which can be determined better from specific illustrations than from a statement of abstract principles. Thus, a slight change in the location of the improvement which does not affect the benefit conferred upon the property by such an improvement does not prevent the contract from being performed substan- tially.* So the construction of a system of sewers from which were omitted two lateral sewers which were to drain onlv the streets in wh^'ch they were laid, w^s held to be a substa"^'''! per- formance authorizing an assessment upon the property drained by the system as constructed.' If the improvement constructed is in an entirely different location from that contracted for so that it cannot perform the same functions or benefit the same property as if i+ wpre performed under the contract, such performance invali- dates the assessment, as it is not a substantial performance.^" Thus, if an entirely different street is improved from that con- tracted for the assessment is invalid." A slight change in the size of the improvement does not prevent the performance from being substantial.^^ Thus the existence of slight inequalities in the width of a sidewalk,^^ or the fact that a street as paved is slightly wider than its original limits,^* or the fact that in the performance of a contract to clean out a ditch it is made some- what wider than it was originally,^' or the fact that the sewer as laid out varies two inches in diameter from that shown upon the plan,^° are all of them variances so slight as to amount to sub- stantial performance. Under a contract for constructing a street Forest, 151 111. 489, 38 N. E. 359 " Windsor v. District of Columbia, [1894]; Sarber v. Kankin, 154 Ind. 7 Mackey (D. C.) 96 [1889]. 236, 56 N. B. 225 [1900]; Eisley v. "Watson v. City of Philadelphia, City of St. Louis, 34 Mo. 404 [1864] ; to Use of Adams, 93 Pa. St. Ill City of St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 [1880]; Inhabitants of Leominster Mo. 537 [I860]; Wewell v. City of v. Conant, 139 Mass. 384, 2 N. K. Cincinnati, 45 0. S. 407, 15 N. E. 690 [1885]; An^ell v. Cortria;ht, 111. 196 [1887]. Mich. 223, 69 N. W. 486 [189B]. 'Church V. People ex rel. Kocher- "Watson v. City of Philadelphia, sner^er, 179 111. 205, 53 N. E. 554 to Use of Adams, 93 Pa. St. Ill [1899]; Rossiter v. City of Lake [1880]. Forest, 151 111. 489, 38 N. E. 359 » Dugeer v. Hicks, 11 Ind. App. [1894]. • 374, 36 N. E. 1085 [1894]. "Wewell V. City of Cincinnati, 45 " Angell v. Cortright, 111 Mich. 0. S. 407, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]". 223, 69 N. W. 486 [18P6]. ■" Windsor v. District of Columbia, "° Inhabitants of Leominster v. 7 Mackev (T). C.I 96 [1R89]; Sehnei- Conant, 139 Mass. 384, 2 N. E. 690 der V. District of Tolumbia, 7 Mackey [1885]. (D. C.) 252 [1889], 833 THE IMPKOVEMENT CONTRACT. § 527 at a certain grade the construction of a street at a substantially different grade is not substantial performance.^^ An assessment for the construction of such street is invalid even if the contractor in working to such grade has acquiesced in the action of the city after the contract was let in reducing such grade.^* Performance according to the ordinance and according to the true intention of the parties is suificient, although by clerical mistake the contract does not express such intention correctlv.^° Failure to construct an incidental part of an imnrovement which is not pronerly cov- ered bv the contract does not invalidate the contract or the assess- ment.^" Thus, if the erection of a railing and barriers is not a part of .a public highway contracted for, the failure to construct such railing and barriers does not invalidate the assessment.''^ So if curbing and guttering is not regarded as a part of grading and macadamizing a street, the omission of such curbing and gutter- ing under a contract to grade and macadamize does not invali- date the assessment.^^ If the part of a street covered entirely by railway tracks cannot be paved at the cost of the owners of lots abutting on other parts of such street, the omission to pave such part does not invalidate the assessment.^^ If the ordinance and contract required paving the street with asphalt "from curb to curb, ' ' the fact that subsequently a street railway company whose tracks were located therein was required to pave that portion of the street between its tracks with stone, was held not to render the assessment invalid.^^ This is true, especially if the street railway is not to be laid upon the portion of the street which is required to be improved.^' If only a part of the improvement has been constructed and default is then made in the contract, such performance is not substantial if the part of the improve- ment as constructed does not perform substantially the same functions as would have been performed by the improvement eon- " Brady v. Rogers, 63 Mo. App. ^ Chase v. Board of Aldermen of 222 [1895]. Springfield, 119 Magg. 556 [1876]. " Brady v. Rogers, 63 Mo. App. '" Fox v. Middlesborough Town 222 [1895]. Company, 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776 "Eyermann v. Provenchere, 15 Mo. [1894]. 256 [1884]. "'Saxton National Batik v. Hay- ™Fox V. Middlesborough Town wood, 62 Mo. App. 550 [1895]. Company, 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776 "'City of Erie v. Moody, 171 Pa. [1894] ; Chase v. Board of Aldermen St. 610, 33 Atl. 378. of Springfield, 119 Mass. 556 "''Thompson v. People ex rel. [1876]. Foote, 184 111. 17, 56 N. E. 383. § 527 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 834 structed in accordance with the terms of the contract. The fact that an improvement, such as a street, has been completed in front of certain property does not show that such property has received all the benefit that it would have received had the improvement been completed.^' In many types of im- provement, construction of that part in front of the given tract of property can be of no benefit unless the entire im- provement is constructed. Accordingly, if only a part of a street contracted for is constructed, an assessment cannot, in the absence of statute, be levied therefor.^' By statute in some states it is provided that if a certain proportion of a street has been con- structed, a proportionate assessment may be levied for the work done.^* The benefit accruing from the construction of a side- walk depends upon the continuity thereof. Accordingly, if under a eontracL to construct a sidewalk, the contractor omits the side- walks in front of property used by the owners thereof as home- steads, this does not amount to substantial performance.^" If a part of the improvement which cannot in any way afE'ect the prop- erty assessed, has been omitted in performing the contract, such omission does not invalidate the assessment.'" Thus, in the con- struction of a general plan of sewers, sewers were omitted on two streets which were not graded to the established grade. These sewers were to be laterals draining only the streets in which they are laid. Such omission was held not to invalidate the' assess- ="City, to Use of McGrath v. Clem- John v. City of East St. Louis, 136 ens, 49 Mo. 552 [1872]; Fowler v. 111. 207, 214, 27 N. E. 543 [1891]; City of St. Joseplj, 37 Mo. 228 (citing Dougherty v. Hitchcock, 35 [1866]. Cal. 512 [1868]; Holmes v. Village ^ City of Cincinnati for Use of of Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. Wirth V. The Cincinnati and Spring 540 [1889] ; Dorathy v. City of Chi- Grove Avenue Company, 26 0. S. cago, 53 111. 79 [1869] ; City of Hen- 345 [1875]; St. John v. City of derson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. (14 East St. Louis, 136 111. 207, 27 Bush) 24; Murray v. Tucker, 73 N. E. 543 [1892]; City of Hender- Ky. (10 Bush) 240 [1874]; Pepper son V. Lambert, 77 Ky. ( 14 W. v. City of Philadelphia to Use of. P. D. Bush.) 24 [1878]; State, Horter, 114 Pa. St. 96, 6 Atl. 899 Central Railroad Company, Pros. v. [1886]). City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) ^ See Chapter X^J. 332 [1872]; "A special assessment * Berwind v. Galveston and Hous- cannot be levied to pay for part of ton Investment Company, 20 Tex. the improvement required by an or- Civ. App. 426, 50 S. W. 413 [1899]. dinance nor can a special assessment '" In the matter of McCormack, 60 be levied to pay for the whole after Barb. 128 [1870]. a part has been abandoned." St. 835 THE IMPEOVEMENT CONTRACT. § 527 ment as to the property drained by tie sewers as constructed." The use of material in the performance of a contract which is substantially different from that contracted for does not amount to substantial performance especially if the material as used does not perform the same functions as that contracted for.'- Under a contract for grading and paving streets, a provision for crushed river gravel is not performed substantially by the use of gravel which was not crushed where it was shown that crushing was important becau-se crushed gravel would bind into a solid body while uncrushed gravel would not.^' Under a provision for con- structing a layer of brick laid flat, the use of broken rock, three inches shallovor than the prescribed depth, is not a substantial performance.'* Under an ordinance and contract requiring pave- ment in part of brick and in part of crushed granite, the construc- tion of a pavement entirely of brick is not substantial perform- ance.'^ If a property owner is required to construct a brick side- walk in front of his property and he is subsequently by another ordinance given the right to construct it of granitoid if he pre- fers, and he does not construct any sidewalk, he cannot complain if the city constructs a sidewalk of granitoid.'" The use of a smaller amount of cement than that required by the contract which makes the curbing constructed therefrom inferior to that con- tracted for is not substantial performance.'^ If the improvement as constructed can be made to comply with the contract by mak- ing repairs, it has been held that this amounts to substantial per- formance so that the contract price, less the cost of repairs, may be recovered.'* If the material used under the contract per- forms the same functions as that contracted for, but is substan- tially different therefrom, it is held in some jurisdictions that this amounts to substantial performance.'" Thus, under a contract " Wewell V. City of Cincinnati, 4.5 turing Company v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. 0. S. 407, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]. App. 120 [1892]. ''Mason v. City of Des Moines, 108 == City of Lexington v. Walby — la. 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]; Kan- Ky. , 109 S. \V. 299 [1B08]. sas City ex rel. Neill v. Askew, 105 ™ Nell v. Power, — Ky. , 107 Mo. App. 84, 79 S. W. 483 [1904]; S. W. 694 [1908]. King Hill Brick Manufacturing Com- " Mason v. City of Des Moines, pany v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App. 120 108 la. 658, 79 N. W. 389 [1899]. [1892]. =• Hastings v. Columbus, 42 0. S. ''Kansas City ex rel. Neill v. 585 [1885]. Askew, 105 Mo. App. 84. 79 S. W. "Richards v. City of . Cincinnati, 483 [1904]. 31 0. S. 506 [1877]. "The King Hill Brick Jlanufac- § 528 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 836 for filling with pure earth, sand, gravel or rock, it was held that the use of bricks and mortar in such filling was a substantial per- formance, where this material was shown to be equal in durabil- ity to that specified.*" In other jurisdictions the use of a material substantially different from that specified is not substantial per- formance even if the material used is equal to or better than that specified. Thus, under a contract to lay an asphalt block pave- ment the construction of a better pavement of sheet asphalt was held not to be substantial performance." If the council-has passed invalid "orders" after the enactment of the improvement ordin- ance, which are without effect as am'endments thereof, and which change the requirements of the ordinance as to the material used, it will not be presumed, in the absence of evidence, that such ord- ers were followed and the ordinance ignored.*^ The contractor should be allowed to show the character and kind of material used by him if it is claimed that inferior material has been used.*^ If more work has been performed than was provided for by the con- tract an assessment cannot be levied for such extra work,** but such additional performance does not invalidate the assessment if the cost thereof can be separated from the cost of the work done under the contract.*^ In some jurisdictions it is said that a defect in performance must, in order to affect an assessment, inflict a special injury upon the owner of the property assessed.*" Under this theory damages should not be pro-rated by deducting the total damages from the total amount of the assessment, but the damages specially suffered by each owner must be deducted from his assessment.*^ § 528. Excuses for failure to perform. A property owner who has acquiesced in the performance of the contract has been held to be estopped from resisting the enforce- " Richards v. City of Cincinnati, N. E. 181 [1899]; People ex rel. Mc- .31 0. S. 506 [1877]. Cornack v. McWethy, 177 III. 334, "Cahn V. Metz, 101 N. Y. 392 52 N. E. 479 [1898]. [1906]. "McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, "Gait V. City of Chicago, 174 111. 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Shannon v. Vil- 605, 51 N. B. 653. lage of Hinsdale, 180 111. 202, 54 «City of Philadelphia to Use of X. E. 181 [1899]. Johnson v. Rule, 93 Pa. St. 15 "City of Pittsburg v. MacConnell, [1880], 130 Pa. St. 463, 18 Atl. 645. "McDonald V. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, "Creamer v. Bates, 49 Mo. 523 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Shannon v. Vil- [1872]; Meyer v. Wright, 19 Mo. lage of Hinsdale, 180 111. 202, 54 App. 283 [1885]. 837 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. 528 ment of the assessment under such performance.' This is true, especially if the property owner has requested changes to be made in the improvements which have been made in accordance with such request,' and the rule applies with especial force where the change in material, which constitutes the defect in performance, was made at the request of the property owner who now objects to the assessment on the ground of such change.* In some juris- dictions, however, it is held that property owners are not obliged to watch the performance of the work or to protest because of failure to perform the contract.* If an abutting owner volun- tarily makes performance of certain terms of the contract impos- sible, he cannot take advantage of such non-performance in order to defeat the assessment.^ Thus, failure to make a pavement as wide as ordered in the notice to property owners does not invali- date the assessment where due to the unlawful act of the owner in extending his fence into the street beyond his line." Failure to perform provisions in a contract, the performance of which the law forbids, does not invalidate the contract.^ Thus, under a con- 'Petaluma Paving Co. v. Singley, 136 Cal. 616, 69 Pac. 426 [1902]; Lux & Talbott Stone Co. v. Donald- son, 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1903]; Shank v. Smith, 157 Ind. 401, 55 L. R. A. 564, 61 N. E. 932 [1901] ; Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491 [1887] ; Ross v. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200, 16 N. E. 501 [1887]; City of Evansville v. Pfisterer, 34 Ind. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 214 [1870]; Clug- gish V. Foons, 15 Ind. App. 599, 43 N. E. 158; Arnold v. City of Fort Dodge, Iowa, 111 la. 152, 82 N. W. 495 [1900]; Mudge v. Walker, — (Ky.) , 90 S. W. 1046, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 996 [1906]; Brick & Terra Cotta Company v. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]; Dusenbury v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 295 [1874]; Sandford v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 147 [I860]. "■Lux and Talbott Stone Company V. Donaldson, 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1903]; Prezinper v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491, 16 N. E. 495 [1887]; Ross V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200, 16 N. E. 501 [1887]; City of Evans- ville V. Pfisterer, 34 Ind. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 214 [1870]; Cluggish v. Koons, 15 Ind. App. 599, 43 N. E. 158; Arnold v. City of Fort Dodge, Iowa, 111 la. 152, 82 N. W. 495 [1900]; Brick & Terra Cotta Company v. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]; Dus- enbury V. Mayor and Common Coun- cil of the City of Newark, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 295 [1874]. ' Thus where the change from arti- ficial to natural stone was made at the request of the defendant, he is estopped from setting up such changes as a ground for invalidat- ing the assessment. Brick & Terra Cotta Company v. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]. 'Wingert v. Snoufl'er, 134 la. 97, 108 N. W. 1035 [1906]. °Hood V. Trustees of Town of Leb- anon, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 813, 15 S. W. 516 [1891]. ' Hood V. Trustees of Town of Leb- anon, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 813, 15 S. W- 516 [1891], 'Steffen v. Fox, 56 Mo. App. 9 [1893]; Fell v. Philadelphia to the § 529 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 838 tract to pave a certain portion of a street, failure to pave a part thereof whicli was by statute forbidden to be opened was held not to invalidate the assessment.' A contract for paving a sidewalk was made under an ordinance regulating the slant of the sidewalk and making a failure thereof a misdemeanor. The sidewalk con- tracted for was constructed at the intersection of two streets having different grades. It was held that compliance with the ordinance being impossible, the-.eonstruction of a sidewalk which conferred the same benefit upon the property assessed and was equally convenient for public use as that specified in the ordin- ance, amounted to substantial performance." § 529. Amount of recovery in case of substantial performance. If the contract has been performed substantially but not liter- ally the contractor is ordinarily allowed to recover the contract price, subject to deductions for defective performance.^ It is sometimes suggested that the measure of his recovery is the value of the work done." This rule, however, ignores the contract en- tirely, allows recovery in quasi contract and deprives both the contractor and the public corporation of any benefit which may have been obtained by either of them under the terms of the contract. Accordingly, the rule generally adopted is . that the contract price may be recovered less a proper reduction for defec- tive work, and not the value of the work as done.' The amount of this deduction has been said to be the cost of repairs and work necessary to make the improvement what it would have been had the contract been performed.* Another form of stating the rule Use of Cunningham, 81 Pa. St. (31 App. 283 [1885]; State, Wataon, P. F. Smith) 58 [1876]; See also § Pros. v. City of Elizabeth, 42 n! J. 514. L. (13 Vr.) 508 [1880]; Hastings v. "Fell V. Philadelphia to the Use Columbus, 42 0. S. 585 [1885]; of Cunningham & McNichol, 81 Pa. Corry v. Campbell, 25 0. S. 134 St. (31 P. F. Smith) 58 [1876]. [1874]; Pepper v. City of Philadel- "^tpffen V. Fox, 58 Mo. App. 9 phia to Use of Horter, 114 Pa. St. [1893]. 96, 6 Atl. 899 [1886]. •Kelly V. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, "^ Barber Asphalt Paving Company 29 So. 295; (affirmed in Chadwick v, v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543, 38 S. W. Kelly, 187 U. S. 540, 47 L. 293, 23 458 [1896]. S. 175 [1903]) ; Barber Asphalt Pav- » Corry v. Campbell, 25 0. S. ing Company v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 134 [1874]. 543, 38 S. W. 548 [1896, 1897]; 'Hastings v. Columbus, 42 0. S. Creamer v. Bates, 49 Mo. 523 585 [1885]. [1872] ; Meyer v. Wright, 19 Mo. 839 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 530 for the proper amount of deduction is that it should be the dif- ference between the cost of the work and materials, if furnished in accordance with the terms of the contract and the cost of the work and materials as actually furnished.' Another method of stating the amount of recovery is that the contractor should re- cover such portion of the contract price, as the value of the work done bears to the value which it would have had, had it been done according to contract." § 530. Quasi contractual rights in case of defective performance. Tf the contract has not been performed in at least a substantial manner, the contractor cannot recover the reasonable value of the work done bv him. iarnoring the contract price, and have an assess- ment levied for such compensation, in the absence of some statute specifically authorizing such recovery.^ Thus, if the original con- tractor A performs in part and then makes default and B is em- ployed to finish the work, A cannot, by mandamus, compel the city to levy an pssessment to raise the difference between the contract price for which A agreed to do the work and the price that was paid to B." Since the legislature may give such effect as it pleases to breach of contract on the part of the contractor, it may be provided by statute that in ease of non-performance the contractor may recover reasonable compensation for the work done by him,' not exceeding the contract pfiee.* The mere fact that the property owner has made use of an improvement such as a street," which is situated upon pronerty the fee of which be- longs to such abutting owner and which the owner cannot keep 'Bond V. Mayor and Common 512; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. Council of Newark, 19 N. J. Eq. (4 App. 381 [1887]. C. E. Green) 376 [1869]; (A suit ""City of Auburn v. State ex rel. by the property dwner to enjoin the First National Bank, — Ind. , city from paying the contractor.) 83 N. E. 997 [1908]; (The contract ° Creamer v. Bates, 49 Mo. 523 contained a provision that the city [1872]. might annul the contract if progress ' City and County of Denver v. by the contractor was unsatisfac- Hindry, — Colo. , 90 Pac. 1028 tory.) [1907]; Citv of Auburn v. State ex 'City of Davenport v. Allen, 120 rel. First National Bank, — Ind. Fed. 172 [1903]; Quest v. Johnson, , 83 N. E. 997 [1908]; Neill v. 58 Mo. App. 54. Trans- Atlantic Mortgage Trust Com- ' Quest v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 54. pany. 89 Mo. App. 644 [1901]; 'Neill v. Trans-Atlantic Mortgage Traders' Bank v. Payne, 31 Mo. App. Trust Company, 89 Mo. App. 644 [1901]. § 531 TAXATION BY iiSSESSMENT. 840 from using-exeept by abandoning his property," does not render such owner liable on the theory of quasi contract. If the con- tractor alleges performance and sues to enforce the assessment upon the theory of performance he cannot recover in that action for a reasonable compensation for labor and material.' Under a statute allowing recovery for only the actiial value of the work done, if performance is not had in accordance with the terms of the contract, it has been held liiat if the contract is wholly ig- nored and such contract is itself valid and enforceable, no recov- ery can be had either on the contract or in quasi contract.* Thus, if time is of the essence of the contract and the contract has not been performed within the time limited, it has been held that no recovery for work done can be had in an action for work, labor and materials." § 531. Acceptance by public corporation conclusive. Under many statutes the public corporation or some designated officer or set of officers thereof is made the sole judge, to determine questions arising as to the construction of public improvements including questions concerning the performance of contracts for such construction.^ The city council is often, by statute, made the sole judge to determine questions of performance. ° Under such statutes, if the public corporation or the proper officer there- of accepts the work done as a full and complete performance of the contract, such acceptance is final and conclusive in the ab- sence of fraud and the property owner cannot show in order to resist an asesssment, that the work has not been performed in a proper manner.^ Thus, -it may be provided by statute that the "Neill V. Trans-Atlantie Mortgage = Murray v. Tucker, 73 Ky. (10 Trust Company, 89 Mo. App. 644 Bush.) 240 [1874]^ Harper v. City [1901]. of Grand Rapids, 105 Mich. 551, 63 'Heman v. Larkin, 108 Mo. App. N. W. 517 [1895]; Weston v. City 392, 83 S. W. 1019 [1904]. of Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. 'McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. St. Eep. 472, 43 L. R. A. 678, 53 N. App. 535 [1897]. E. 12 [1899]. " McQuiddv v. Brannock, 70 Mo. ' Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. App. 535 [1897]. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]; Lambert ' City of Henderson v. Lambert, 77 v. Bates, 137 Cal. 676, 70 Pao. 777 Ky. (14 Bush.) 24 [1878]; Harper [1902]; City of Chicago v. Hulbert, V. City of Grand Rauir's, 105 Mich. 205 111. 346, 68 N. E. 786 [1903]; 551, 63 N. W. 517 [18951 ; Halev v. Downey v. People ex rel. Raymond, City of Alton, 152 III. 113, 38 N. E. 205 111. 230, 68 N. E. 807 [1903]; 750 [1894]. Gage v. People ex rel. Raymond, 200 841 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §531 property owner may appeal to a designated board for the deter- mination of the question whether the contractor has performed the contract in a proper manner or not ; and the determination of such board may be made final.'' Such appeal may be made inform- ally, as by filing a written instrument protesting against the acceptance of the work for the reason that it is not performed in accordance with the contract,'* or remonstrating against the accept- ance of the contract on the grounds that the "contract has not been done according to specifications on file in the office of the 111. 432, 65 N. E. 1084 [1903] ; Peo- ple ex rel. Raymond v. Whidden, 191 111. 374, 56 L. R. A. 905, 61 N. E. 133 [1901]; Shannon v. Village of Hinsdale, 180 111. 202, 54 N. E. 181 [1899]; Craft v. Kochersperger, 173 111. 617, 50 N. E. 1061 [1898]; Cal- lister V. Kochersperger, 168 lit. 334, 48 N. E. 156 [1897]; Haley v. City of Alton, 152 111. 113, 38 N. E. 750 [1894]; People ex rel. Mannen v. Green, 158 111. 594, 42 N. E.' 163 [1895]; Fisher v. People ex rel. Kern, 157 111. 85, 41 N. E. 615 [1895]; Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110 [1877]; Lux and Talbott Stone Company v. Donald- son, 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. 1014 [1903] ; Leakman v. P.ritchard, 160 Ind. 24, 66 N. E. 153 [1902]; Studa- haker v. Studataker, 152 Ind. 89, 51 N. E. 933 [1898]; Montgomery v. Wasem, 116 Ind. 343, 15 N. E. 795, 19 N. E. 184 [1888]; Simonton v. Hays, 88 Ind. 70 [1882]; Holloran V. Morman, 27 Ind. App. 309, 59 N. E. 869 [1901] ; Darnell v. Keller, 18 Ind. App. 103, 45 N. E. 676 [1897]; Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 [1876]; Ferguson v. City of Cof- feyville, — Kan. , 94 Pac. 1010 [1908]; City of Henderson v. Lam- bert, 77 Ky. (14 W. P. D. Bush.) 24 [1878]; Murray v. Tucker, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 241 [1874]; Whitefield V. Hippie, 12 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 150, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 386 [1889]; Harper V. City of Grand Rapids, 105 Mich. 551, 63 N. W. 517 [1895]; City of Henderson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. (14 W. P. D. Bush.) 24 [1878]; Dixon V. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 49 N. W. 628 [1891]; Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 494 [1869]; Lieb- stein V. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Newark, 24 N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 200 [1873]; Haven v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 173 N. Y. 611, 66 N. E. 1110 [1903]; (affirm- ing Havens v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 67 App. Div. 90, 73 N. Y. S. 678 [1901]); Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, 43 L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]; Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy (Ohio) 464 [1855]; Duniway V. Portland, 47 Of. 103, 81 Pac. 945 [1905] ; Chance v. City of Portland, 26 Ore. 286, 38 Pac. 68 [1894]; City of Philadelphia to Use of Mack, v. Gorgas, 180 Pa. St. 296, 36 Atl. 868 [1897]; Philadelphia to Use v. Jew- ell, 140 Pa. St. 9, 21 Atl. 239 [1891] ; MeKnight v. City of Pittsburg, 91 Pa. St. (10 Norris) 273 [1879]; City of Philadelphia v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St. (11 Casey) 427 [1880]; Town of Elma v. Carney, 9 Wash. 466, 37 Pac. 707 [1894]. * Girvin v. Simon, 127 Cal. 491, 59 Pac. 945 [1900]; Creed v. McCombs, 146 Cal. 449, 80 Pac. 679 [1905]; Lambert v. Bates, 148 Cal. 146, 82 Pac. 767 [1905]. "Creed v. McComba, 146 Cal. 449, 80 Pae. 679 [1905]. § 532 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 842 street superintendent. ' ' ° Where the public corporation has power to determine questions of performance conclusively, the act of such corporation in determining that work done by a property owner in front of his property under an ordinance requiring him to do so was properly constructed, was held to be conclusive and not subject to be questioned by other property owners.' On the other hand, it has been held that the fact that the officers of a public corporation act in good faith, does not prevent the property own- ers from bringing a suit to prevent the city from accepting the work, paying the city's proportion of the costs and issuing certi- ficates for the proportion due from the property owners where the contractors are acting in bad faith.' In a proceeding in which pure questions of law are presented, such as cer- tiorari, questions as- to the performance of the contract, being questions of fact, cannot be raised." Whether the decision of the city officials upon questions of the performance of the contract are administrative or judicial is a question upon which there is some conflict of authority which turns in part upon the wording of the different statutes. Under some statutes the city officials in passing upon such questions are said to act judicially.^' Under other statutes the city officials are said to act in an administrative capacity and not in a judicial capacity.^' § 532. Effect on rights of property owners of acceptance by pub- lic corporation. In accordance with the theory already given as to the effect of the acceptance of work by the city or other public corporation, it has been said that if the ptiblic corporation has accepted the work as being in proper performance of the contract under which the improvement has been constructed, the question of actual per- formance as a matter of fact is immaterial,^ if it cannot be shown »Girvin v. Simon, 127 Cal. 491, 59 '^Town of Greenwood v. State ex Pao. 945 [1900]. rel. Lawson, 159 Ind. 267, 64 N. E. 'Whitefi«ld V. Hippie, 12 S. W. 849 [1902]; Eyermann v. Proven- Rep. (Ky.) 150, 11 Ky. L. Eep. 386 chere, 15 Mo. App. 256 [1884]. [1889]. 'Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 75; "Pleasant v. City of Shreveport, People ex rel. Raymond v. Whid- 110 La. 1046, 35 So. 283 [1903]. den, 191 111. 374, 56 L. R. A. ° State, Wilson, Pros. V. Mayor and 905, 61 jST. E. 133 [1901]; People Common Council of the City of Hud- ex rel. Mannen v. Green, 158 111. son, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vr.) 365 [1867]. 594, 42 N. E. 163 [18951; Sarber v. "Lambert v. Bates, 137 Cal. 676, Rankin, 154 Tnd. 236, 56 N. E. 225 70 Pae. 777 [1902], [1899]: Studabaker v. Studabaker, 843 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §533 that in accepting the work the public officials were guilty of fraud or bad faith.^ The suggestion that fraud may invalidate the action of the city officials in accepting the performance of the contract is ordinarily made in cases where defective performance is claimed, but there is no showing of fraud or bad faith.'' § 533. Acceptance by public corporation final unless different im- provement is constructed. It is held in some jurisdictions that if an improvement has been constructed to the satisfaction of the public authorities and has been accepted by them, defects in performance are no defense to the assessment unless the improvement is a different one from that which has been contracted for.^ If the improvement contracted 152 Ind. 89, 51 N. E. 933 [1898]; Racer v. State for Use of Rhine, 131 Ind. 393, 31 N. E. 81 [1891]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Raymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. 383 [1888]; Dashiell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Use of Hax, 45 Md. 615 [1876]; Wliiting v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 [1870] ; Dixon V. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 49 N. W. 628 [1891]; Columbia Bot- tom Ijevee Company v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53 [1866] ; State, Vanderbeck, Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 441 [1861]; In the Matter of Lewis, 35 Howard (N. Y.) 162 [1868].; City of Philadelphia to Use of Mack v. Gorgas, 180 Pa. St. 296, 36 Atl. 868 [1897]; Schenley v. Commonwealth far use of City of Allegheny, 36 Pa. St. (12 Casey) 64 [1859]. 'HoUeran v. Morman, 27 Ind. App. 309, 59 N. E. 809 [1901]; Darnell v. Keller, 18 Ind. App. 103, 45 N. E. 676 [1897] ; Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 [1876]; Whitefield v. Hip- pie, (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep. 150, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 386 [1889]; Dixon v. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 49 N. W. 628 [1891] ; Motz v. City of De- troit, 18 Mich. 494 [1869]; In the Matter of Lewis, 35 Howard 162 [1868]; McGlynn v. City of Toledo, 22 Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]; Chance v. City of Portland, 26 Ore. 286, 38 Pac. 68 [1894]. ' Holleran v. Morman, 27 Ind. App. 309, 59 N. E. 869 [1901]; Darnell v. Keller, 18 Ind. App. 103, 45 N. E. 676 [1897]; Patterson v. Baumer, 43 la. 477 [1876]; Dixon v. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 49 N. W. 628 [1891]; Motz V. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 494 [1869]; In the Matter of Lewis, 35 Howard 162 [1868]; Mc- Glynn V. City of Toledo, 22 Ohio C. C. 34 [1901]; Chance v. City of Portland, 26 Ore. '286, 38 Pac. 68 [1894]. '■ Marshall v. People ex rel. Smith, 219 111. 99, 76 N. E. 70 [1905]; People ex rel. Price v. Bridgeman, 218 111. 568, 75 N. E. 1057 [1905]; Phillips V. People ex rel. Goedtner, 218 Hi. 450, 75 N. E. 1016 [1905]; Eustace v. People ex rel. Hanberg, 213 111. 424, 72 N. E. 1089 [1905]; City of Chicago v. Sherman, 212 111. 498, 72 N. E. 396 [1904]; City of Chicago V. Ayers, 212 111. 59, 72 N. E. 32 [1904]; City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 111. 346, 88 N. E. 786 [1903]; Downey v. People ex rel. Raymond, 205 111. 230, 68 N. E. 807 [1903]; Wells v. People ex rel. Ray- mond, 201 111. 435, 68 N. E. 210 [1903]; Gage v. PeopV ex rel. Ray- mond, 200 111. 432, Co N. E. 1084 § 533 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 844 for has been constructed, but the performance is defective, the assessment is under this theory not rendered invalid by reason of such defect.^ Thus, if a sewer is laid on a line different from that prescribed, in order to avoid interfering with water pipes; and the improvement as constructed is as beneficinl to the nrnrterty owners as if it had been laid on the line prescribed, such devia- tion does not invalidate the assessment.' Where a sewer is not constructed on the line indicated»J)y the ordinance, in the absence of proof that the improvement as constructed was as beneficial as it would have been if constructed in accordance with the contract and ordinance, the improvement should be regarded as a different one from that contracted for and the assessment should be held as invalid.* Under a provision that cobble stones used should be uniform in quality, and broken so as to pass through a ring four inches internal diameter, a slight deviation as to the size of such cobble stones does not make the improvement a different one.' The fact that the curb and gutter are five inches thick instead of six inches thick and that the crushed stone which by the ordinance was to pass through a ring of an internal dia- meter of three inches, was some of it a little larger than such size, does not render the improvement a different one." So the [1903]; Gage v. People ex rel. Eay- 219 111. 99, 76 N. E. 70 [1905]; Peo- mond, 193 111. 316, 56 L. R. A. 916, pie ex rel. Price v. Bridgeman, 218 61 N. E. 1045 [1901]; People ex rel. 111. 568, 75 N. E. 1057 [1905]; City Eaymond v. Church, 192 111. 302, 61 of Chicago v. Sherman, 212 111. 498, N. E. 496 [1901]; People ex rel. 72 N. E. 396 [1904J; Wells v. Peo- Eaymond v. Whidden, 191 111. 374, pie ex rel. Eaymond, 201 III. 435, 66 56 L. E. A. 905, 61 N. E. 133 [1901]; N. E. 210 [1903]; People ex rel. McManus v. People ex rel. Eaymond, Eaymond v. Church, 192 111. 302, 61 183 111. 391, 55 N. E. 886 [1899]; N. E. 496 [1901]; People ex rel. Church V. People ex rel. Kocher- Eaymond v. Whidden, 191 111. 374, sperser, 174 111. 366, 51 N. E. 747 56 L. E. A. 905, 61 N. E. 133 [1898]; Craft v. Kocher9pers;er, 173 [1901]; Church v. People ex rel. 111. 617, 50 N. E. 1061 [1898]; Hein- Kochersperger, 174 111. 366, 51 N. E. roth V. Kocherspereer, 173 111. 205, 747 [1898]. 50 N. E. 171 [18981; Callister v. ' People ex rel. Raymond v. Church Kochersperser, 168 111. 334, 48 N. 192 111. 302, 61 N. E. 496 [1901]. E. 156 [1897]; Ferris v. City of Chi- * Church v. People ex rel. Kocher- cago, 162 111. Ill, 44 N. E. 436 sperger, 174 111. 366, 51 N. E. 747 [1896] ; Pells v. People ex rel. Holm- [1898]. grain, 159 111. 580, 42 N. E. 784 "People ex rel. Price v. Bridge- [1896]; People ex rel. Mannen v. man, 218 111. 568, 75 N. E. 1057 Green, 158 111. 594, 42 N. E. 163 [1905]. [1895]. "City of Chicago v. Sherman, 212 ^Marshall v. People ex rel. Smith 111. 498, 72 N. E. 396 [1904]. 845 THE IMPROVEMENT OONTBAGT. § 533 use of less cement than that specified in the contract ; the failure to use Portland cement; the use of lime screenings in place of sand; and failure to plaster the curb walls down far enough, do not make the improvement a different one.'' So an improvement is the same as that specified, although the cement is inferior in quality to that provided for * or the sidewalk is two or three inches shorter than that provided for and- of a softer stone." Under this theory, acceptance by the city of an improvement, which is in effect a different one from that provided for, does not render the assessment for such improvement valid. ^^ Thus, if a different street is improved from that provided for,^^ or the width is increased,^- as from fifty to sixty-four feet,^'' or if it is reduced from sixty-one feet to fifty-three feet,^* the improvement has been held to be in legal effect a different one from that contracted for. Under a contract for macadamizing a road, the construc- tion of a road out of a mixture of clay, gravel, limestone and slag, which amounts to nothing more than a dirt road, is in effect the construction of a different improvement.^^ So if in a street improvement the grade is changed several feet and the cost is thereby materially increased, such improvement is regarded as in effect a different one.^° 'People ex rel. Raymond v. Whid- cago, 162 111. HI, 44 N. E. 436 den, 191 111. 374, 56 L. R. A. 905, [1896]; Pells v. People ex rel. Holm- 61 N. E. 133 [1901]. grain, 159 111. 580, 42 N. E. 784 nVells V. People ex rel. Raymond, [1896]. 201 111. 435, 66 N. E. 210 [1903]. "Ferris v. City of Chicago, 162 "Marshall v. People ex rel. Smith, 111. Ill, 44 N. E. 436 [1896], 219 111. 99, 76 N. E. 70 [1905]. "City of Chicago v. Ayers, 212 "Phillips V. People ex rel. Goedt- 111. 59, 72 N. E. 32 [1904]. ner, 218 111. 450, 75 N. E. 1016 "City of Chica-ro v. Ayers, 212 [1905]; Eustace v. People ex rel. 111. 59, 72 N. E. 32 [1904]. . Hanberg, 213 111. 424, 72 N. E. 1089 "Pells v. People ex rel. Holm- [1905] ; City of Chicago v. Ayers, grain, 159 111. 580, 42 N. E. 784 212 111. 59, 72 N. E. 32 [1904]; [1896]. Gage V. People ex rel. Raymond, 200 '"Gage v. People ex rel. Raymond, 111. 432, 65 N. E. 1084 [1903]; 200 111. 432, 65 N. E. 1084 [1903]; Young V. Peopli ex rel. Raymond, Gage v. People ex rel. Raymond, 193 196 III. 603, 63 IN. E. 1075; Gage v. 111. 316, 56 L. R. A. 916, 61 K E. Peopl^ ex rel. Raymond, 193 111. 316, 1045 [1901]. 56 L. R. A. 916, 61 N. E. 1045 "Eustace v. People ex rel. Han- [1901]; Church v. People ex rel. bei--. 213 111. 424, 72 N. E. 1089 Kochersperger, 174 111. 366, 51 N. E. [1905]. 747 [1898]; Ferris v. City of Chi- § 534 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 846 § 534. Acceptance induced by fraud or mistake. It has also been suggested that either bad faith or probable mistake might invalidate the action of the officers of a public corporation in determining that the contract has been performed but that in the absence of either bad faith or probable mistake, such determination is final.' What constitutes fraud is a ques- tion upon which there is some conflict of authority. If it can be shown that the public officials v^o accepted the performance of the contract were acting in collusion with the contractor by whom the improvement was constructed, fraud exists.^ If the evidence falls short of establishing this state of facts, it is difficult in some jurisdictions to make it a case of fraud. Thus a fraudulent com- bination between the engineer and the committee of the council who were influential members of such body to keep the facts from the council and thus to procure the acceptance of the improvement by the council has been held not to amount to fraud, although the contractor was a party to such combination.' So the combination of the contractors and the city engineer to make fraudulent rep- resentations to the board of public works with reference to the performance of the contract, which representations were believed by the board and upon which the board acted in good faith in accepting performance was held not to amount to fraud.* In other jurisdictions a false certificate by a street commissioner with reference to the rate at which the work is done under a contract has been held to amount to fraud so as to invalidate the assess- ment.' The acceptance by the public corporation of performance which, is clearly and grossly defective is held in some jurisdictions to amount to fraud so that an assessment for such work is invalid." Thus, under a contract for covering a road with an even surface of broken stone to a depth of six inches so as to preserve an even surface, putting on stone varying from six inches to a foot in diameter each, and laid so roughly that teams could not pass over ' Town of Elma v. Carney, 9 Wash. ' In the Matter of the Petition of 466, 37 Pac. 707 [1894]. Beekman, 18 Howard (N. Y.) 460 "Board of Commissioners of La- [1859]. porte County v. Wolff, — Ind. , ' McCain v. City of Des Moines, 72 N. E. 860 [1904]. 128 Iowa 331, 103 N. W. 979 [l"905]; 'Lux and Talbott Stone Company Liebstein v. Mayor and Common V. Donaldson, 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. Council of the City of ISTewark, 24 E. 1014 [1903]. N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 200 [1873]; * Duniway v. Portland, 47 Or. 103, Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 81 Pac. 945 [1905]. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 [1894]. 847 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. §§ 535-537 it, was held to be so gross a breach that acceptance thereof was fraudulent.' However, acceptance of a gutter three feet wide in- stead of one four feet wide as required by contract has been said to be conclusive.' § 535. Acceptance by public corporation not final. In some jurisdictions the acceptance of an improvement by a public corporation is not conclusive.^ Under other statutes the acceptance of work by the city is only prima facie evidence that the work has been performed substantially in accordance with the terms of the contract." § 536. Acceptance or rejection of work as affecting contractor. The granting of power to the city to accept work,^ also author- izes it to protect the property owners by rejecting the work in a proper case." By statute the contractor cannot recover unless the county court finds that the improvement has been completed in substantial compliance with the terms of the ordinance.' A city cannot refuse to accept an improvement for immaterial de- fects in performance.* § 537. OfScial certificate of performance. Under some statutes provision is made for a certificate of the performance of the contract to be issued by some specific public officer when he finds that the contract has in fact been performed.^ The purpose and effect of such certificate differs under different ' Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. ' Liebstein v. Mayor and Common (9 C. E. Gr.) 143 [1873]. Council of the City of Newark, 24 'Whitefield v. Hippie, 12 S. W. N. J. Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 200 [1873]. Eep. (Ky.) 150, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 386 = Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. [1889]. ■ Eq. (9 C. E. Gr.) 143 [1873]. ' City of St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 ' Case v. City of Sullivan, 222 111. Mo. 537 [I860]; Toledo for Use v. 56, 78 N. E. 37 [1906]; (affirming, Grasser, 7 Ohio N. P. 396 [1883]; Case v. City of Sullivan, 123 111. Pepper v. City of Philadelphia to App. 671.) Use of Horter, 114 Pa. St. 96, 6 Atl. * Whitworth v. Webb City, 204 Mo. 899 [1886]; Berwind v. Galvesion 579, 103 S. W. 86 [1907]. and Houston Investment Company, ' Scherm v. Short, 77 S. W. 357, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 426, 50 S. W. 413 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1108 [1903]; Dix- [1899]; Haischv. City of Seattle, 10 on v. Labry, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1679, Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 [1894]. 78 S. W. 430 [1904]. = Hi, lick. v. Connely, 42 Ind. 134 [1873], § 537 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 848 statutes. Under some statutes such certificate is necessary as a condition precedent to the validity of the assessment, " or to the issuing of bonds which are to be paid out of the fund raised by assessment/' Under such statutes, the certificate, to be valid, must show substantially that the proper officer has determined as a fact that the work as per- formed is substantially that provided for by the contract.* Thus a certificate of an engineer which». states that in his office there is a record of another certificate which shows that the work of grad- ing in question was examined and found to be practically right for official line and grade is insufficient.'' A certificate showing that a contract as modified has been performed is sufficient, if such modi- fication is valid." Under some statutes it is provided that such certificate must be recorded.^ Where such requirement exists, a diagram on the back of the certificate which is necessary to an understanding of the work performed and of that unperformed, must be recorded and its omission is fatal.^ If the statute re- quires the certificate to be recorded with the assessment, record- ing it in a small book in which no assessments were recorded, with- out any reference thereto in the assessment records, is insufficient." On the other hand, immaterial omissions in recording the assess- ment are inoperative. Thus, omitting the words "depth being 0. K, " is immaterial where the depth is shown in the recorded certificate." "Where the certificate of record shows by reference to the page of the record that all the proper documents including th» engineer's certificate have been recorded, the fact that in enumerating the documents recorded the engineer's certificate is omitted does not invalidate the assessment." Only the officer authorized by statute may sign such certificate." Thus, a certi- = Obermeyer v. Patterson, 130 Cal. ' Buckman v. Cuneo, 103 Cal. 62, 531, 62 Pac. 926 [1900]; Frenna v. 36 Pac. 1025 [1894]. Sunnyside Land Company, 124 Cal. ' Buekman v. Cuneo, 103 Cal. 62,. 437, 57 Pao. 302 [1899]; Case v. 36 Pac. 1025 [1894]. City of Sullivan, 222 111. 56, 78 N. » Rauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 E. .S7 [1906]. Pac. 337 [1895]. 'Case V. City of Sullivan, 222 111. " Moffit v. Jordan, 127 Cal. 622, 56, 78 N. E. 37 [1906]. 60 Pac. 173 [1900]. * Obermeyer v. Patterson, 130 Cal. *' Greenvrood v. Chandon, 130 Cal. 531, 62 Pac. 926 [1900]. 467, 62 Pac. 736 [1900]. = Obermeyer v. Patterson, 130 Cal. "Eauer v. Lowe, 107 Cal. 229, 40 531, 62 Pac. 926 [1900]. Pac. 337 [1895]; Frenna v. Sunny- « Weston V. City of Syracuse, 158 side Land Ctompany, 124 Cal. 437, 57 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. i?ep. 472, 43 Pac. 302 [1899]. L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]. 849 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 537 fieate signed not by the officer nor by a deputy, but by a mere clerk in the office,^^ or by an employe who did the surveying and measuring certified to," is insufficient. A certificate signed by all the members of the board of public works has been held to be sufficient, although the president and secretary also have au- thority to sign such certificate.^" If by statute the deputy or depu- ties of the board are authorized to receive and reject work, and the board in electing the chief engineer, authorized him to accept or reject work, the assistant engineer appointed by the board may, while acting in place of the chief engineer, accept such work.^" On the other hand, if the proper officials arbitrarily refuse a cer- tificate the contractor may recover without waiting to obtain same.^^ Thus, where out of a board of three, one examined the work and accepted it, while the other two refused to examine it, it was held that the contractor might enforce the assessment there- for, if the work was in fact properly performed.^^ A certificate of full performance is not necessary, however, unless required by statute.^" If the statute does not make such certificate a condi- tion precedent to the validity of the assessment, the approval of the proper officer is sufficient without a formal certificate of per- formance.^" Under some statutes certificates are to be filed by certain officers for the benefit of other officers to enable the latter to determine whether the contract has been performed or not. Such statutes are purely directory and not mandatory. If the "^Rauer v. Lowe, 107 Gal. 229, 40 he can recover on it; and if an ap- Pac. 337 [1895]. proval by an outside party is made a " Frenna v. Sunnyside Land Com- condition precedent, such an approv- pany, 124 Cal. 437, 57 Pac. 302 al must be obtained in a suit upon [1899]. the contract. But here the action is ""^'^enefee v. Bell, 62 Mo. App. 659 not founded upon the contract. The 11895]. contract is merely used as an instru- " Richardson v. Mehler, 111 Ky. ment of proof, and if the plaintiff 408, 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. Law Rep. shows that he has done the work un- 917 [1901]; (If his power is doubt- der the agreement, he should be per- ful the subsequent action of the mitted to recover whatever he may board in approving his report oper- show himself justly entitled to." ates as a ratification.) Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo. 493, "Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo. 493 495 [1872]. [1872]; "If he has performed his "Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo. 493 contract he is entitled to pay, and [1872]. whether there has been a perform- '"Gray v. Lucas, 115 Cal. 430, 47 ance is a question of fact to be deter- Pac. 354 [1896]. mined upon by {sic) the evidence. ^ Fell v. Philadelphia to the Us6 It is true that if a party makes a of Cunningham, 81 Pa. St. (31 P, F, contract he must abide by it before Smith) 58 [187«1. § 537 . TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 850 ofSeer, for whose benefit the certificate in question was to be filed, does not refuse to act on account of the failure to file such certi- ficate the property owner cannot object to such failure.^^ A statute requiring, an entry of the due performance of a contract for street work upon the record of the superintendent of streets, is regarded as being for the benefit of other public officials and as directory merely.^^ Accordingly, omission to make such entry does not invalidate the assessment.-^ Under some statutes the certificate of performance is merely prima facie evidence of the proper performance of the contract." Under such statutes the amount of the assessment may be reduced by the court, below that fixed in the certificates, if the latter amount is too large.*" Under some statutes such certificates have been held not to be binding upon the city as conclusive, and if the city ignores such certificate and decides that the contract has not been performed, such decision is not binding upon the contractor.*" Under some statutes, however, such certificate is conclusive unless it can be shown that it was given in fraud and collusion.*^ Even under such statutes the existence of fraud or collusion or bad faith invalidates the certificate.** Thus, where the proper board rejected a part of . the work, withheld part of the compensation, took a bond from the contractor to perform the rest of such contract and then gave • him a certificate of performance, such certificate was held to be invalid.*" By statute in some jurisdictions the certificate of some specific officers, such as the superintendent of streets,'" is made ^ Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; Reid v. Clay, 35 Howard (N. Y.) 162 [1868]; 134 Cal. 207, 66 Pac. 262 [1901]. Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy (Ohio) "Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350 464 [1855]; People of the State of [1880]. New York ex rel. Ready v. Mayol- ^ Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350 and Common Council of the City of [1880]. Syracuse, 65 Hun. (N. Y.) 321, 20 ^Jenkins v. Stetler, 118 Ind. 275, N. Y. Supp. 236 [1892]. 20 N. E. 788 [1888]; Barber Asphalt '* In the Matter of the Petition of Paving Company v. Goereve, 41 La. Wood, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 275 [1868]. Ann. 251, 5 So. 848 [1889]. /» In the Matter of the Petition of "'S. D. Moody & Co. v. Sewerage Wood, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 275 [1868]. and Water Board, 117 La. 360, 41 '"Williams v. Bercrin, 116 Cal. 56. So. 649 [1906]. 47 Pac. 877 [1897]; Digging v. =» Reilly v. City of Albany, 40 Hun. Hartahorne, 108 Cal. 154, 41 Pac. 405 [1886]. 283 [1895]; Warren v. Eiddell, 106 "Case V. City of Sullivan, 222 Cal. 352, 39 Pac. 781 [1895] ; Perine 111. 56, 78 N. E. 37 [1906] ; In the v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305. 32 Pac. 226 Matter of the Petition of Lewis v. [1893]; Frick v. Morford, 87 Cal. 851 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 537 conclusive upon questions of performance as against the property owners in the absence of fraud. If the property owner is dis- satisfied with such certificate, his only remedy is to appeal to the body designated by statute. The determination of such ques- tion upon appeal is final and if appeal is not taken the certificate is regarded as correct.^^ As long as the contract is one which the city had power to make and the question is merely one of performance, appeal is necessary.-'^ Thus, the fact that under a contract to grade a street the wrong grade is assumed as the offi- cial grade, does not defeat the assessment if the work is approved by the street superintendent and no appeal is taken.'" The de- termination of the city council on appeal that the work has been performed is final." In case of fraud, however, acceptance by the superintendent is not controlling."'^ Thus, where under speci- fications requiring the use of one barrel of cement to each barrel of sand, fifteen per cent, more sand was used than the specifica- tions called for, acceptance by the superintendent was not con- clusive if fraud on his part was shown."" The acceptance of work by an officer under such a statute is said not to be a judicial act."' Accordingly, he may subsequently correct an erroneous decision with reference to such work which he has made in conse- quence of a clerical error."" A certificate which shows that the work has been accepted is not avoided by a detailed statement of the reasons therefor."" Thus, a street superintendent accepted 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1891]; Jennings V. bush, 97 Cal. 305, 32 Pac. 226 Le Breton, 80 Cal. 8, 21 Pac. 1127 [1893]; Frick v. Morford, 87 Cal. [18891; Dunne v. Altschul, 57 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1891]; Emery v. 472 [1881]; Cochran v. Collins, 29 Bradford, 29 Cal. 75 [1865]. Cal. 130 [1865]; Emery v. Bradford, ''Warren v. Riddell, 106 Cal. 352, 29 Cal. 75 [1865]. 39 Pac. 781 [1895]. "Diggins V. Hartshorne, 108 Cal. »* Lambert v. Bates, 137 Cal. 676, 154, 41 Pac. 283 [1895]; Warren v. 70 Pac. 777. Riddell, 106 Cal. 352, 39 Pac. 781 "' McVerry v. Kidwell, 63 Cal. 246 [.1895]; Perine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. [1883]. 305, 32 Pac. 226 [1893]; Frick v. ""McVerry v. Kidwell, 63 Cal. 246 Morford, 87 Cal. 576, 25 Pac. 764 [1883]; (Furthermore, seven per [1891]; Jennings v. Le Breton, 80 cent, of the bricks were of inferior Cal. 8, 21 Pac." 1127 [1889]; Shep- quality.) ard V. McNeill, 38 Cal. 73 [1869]; " Eyermann v. Provenchere, 15 Cochran v. Collins, 29 Cal. 130 Mo. App. 256 [18«4]. [18651; Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. '^ Eyermann v. Provenchere, 1? 75 [1865]. Mo. App. 256 [1884]. ''Warren v. Riddell, 106 Cal. 352, "» Hadley v. Dai?ue, 130 Cal. 207, 39 Pac. 781 [1895]; Perine v. For- 62 Pac. 500 [1900]. § 538 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 852 certain work. On appeal, the city council vacated sue", assess- ment and ordered the contractor to complete the work required by the contract under the direction of the city council and ordered the superintendent to accept the same when completed. When the completed work was accepted bv council the superintendent gave a formal written acceptance of the work, but endorsed upon the assessment the statement that the work was performed under the supervision of the council aud accepted bv the council; that it was not done under his control or supervision and was not ac- cepted by him; that he had no responsibilitv therefor. It was held that such endorsement could not oualify the effect of the for- mal acceptance.*" In the absence of some specific statutory pro- vision the mere lapse of time between the acceptance of the work and the issuing of the assessment does not invalidate the assessment." Under some statutes such certificates are binding only as between the city and the contractor and have no effect with . reference to the property owner to be assessed.*^ The fact that in a suit between the city and the contractor the city has alleged that the certificate of expense of the imnrovement is false, does not conclusively establish the invalidity of such certificate as be- tween the city and the property owners.*' The action of a pub- lic ofBeer in accepting an improvement is final only as to the mat- ters which he has, by statute, power to determine. To constitute an accepted street, the street must be accepted to the full width thereof, when approved under regulations adopted by the council specifying the character of work to be done. Acceptance of work done on a street is not sufScient to make the street an accepted street within the meaning of the statute requiring the city to im- prove streets after they are accepted." § 538. Necessity of performance within time limited. Whether failure to perform a contract within the time specified by the contract or the ordinance authorizing the improvement " Hadley v. Dague, 130 Cal. 207, " Haven v. Mayor, Aldermen and 62 Pac. 500 [1900]. Commonalty of the City of New "Williams v. Bgrgin, 116 Cal. 56, York, 173 N. Y. 611, 66 N. E. 1110 47 Pnc. 877 [1897]. [1903]; (affirming. Havens v. City •=In the Matter of the Petition of of New York, 73 N. Y. S. 678, 67 Bu'-meister, 56 Howard (N. Y.) 416 Apr). Div. 90 [1901]). [1879]. "OaHand Pavin? Company v. Rier, 52 Cal. 270 [1877]. 853 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTEACT. §538 defeats the right of the contractor to recover, and invalidates an assessment levied for such improvement, is a question which de- pends upon the terms of the statute authorizing the improvement and the assessment, and upon the terms of the specific contract. Under some statutes time is made the essence of the contract, the city is bound upon entering into a contract to fix the time within which such contract must be performed; and failure to perform within which such time discharges the contract, prevents the con- tractor from recovering, and invalidates an assessment levied for the cost of such improvement.^ Failure to perform in six months ^ and in ninety days " from the time fixed for performance, has been held to be so material as to invalidate the assessment. Some of these statutes are so sweeping in their scope that the city has no power to ratify the contract after breach by failure to perform within the time limit. An attempt by the city to render such contract valid by recognizing it as in force and levying an assess- ment or issuing tax bills therefor, is a nullity and does not make the assessment valid.* Under such statutes the city cannot, after 'John Kelso Co. v. Gillette, 136 Cal. 603, 69 Pao. 296 [1902] ; Kelso V. Cole, 121 Cal. 121, 53 Pac. 353 [1898]; Brady v. Burke, 90 Cal. 1, 27 Pac. 52 [1891] ; McVerry v. Boyd, 89 Cal. .304, 26 Pac. 885 [1891]; Dougherty v. Nevada Bank, 81 Cal. 162, 22 Pac. 513 [1889]; Dougherty V. Coffin, 69 Cal. 545, 10 Pac. 672 [1886] ; Fanning v. Schammel, 68 Cal. 428, 9 Pac. 427 [1886]; Mappa V. City Council of the City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 309 [1882]; Schibel V. Merrill, 185 Mo. 534, 83 S. W. 1089 [1904] ; Merrill v. Schibel, 185 Mo. 551, 83 S. W. 1133 [1904]; Bar- ber Asphalt Paving Company v. Kidge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S. W. 1043 [1902] ; Smith v. City of Westport, 105 Mo. App. 221, 79 S. W. 725 [1904]; Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 107 Me. App. 385, 81 S. W. 496 [1904]; Heman v. Gerardi, 96 Mo. App. 231, 69 S. W. 1069 [1902]; City of Springfield ex rel. Gilaonite Construction Co. v. Schmook, 120 Mo. App. 41, 96 S. W. 257 [1906] ; Shoenberg v. Heyer, 91 Mo. App. 389 [1902]; Winfrey v. Linger, 89 Mo. App. 159 [1901]; Ayers v. Schmohl, 86 Mo. App. 349 [1900]; Richter v. Merrill, 84 Mo. App. 150 [1900]; New England Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Mis- souri' V. James, 77 Mo. App. 616 [1898]; McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. App. 535 [1897]; Rose v. Tres- trail, 62 Mo. App. 352 [1895]; Phil- adelphia to Use V. Jewell, 135 Pa. St. 329, 19 Atl. 947 [1890]. ''McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. App. 535 [1897]. "Shoenberg v. Heyer, 91 Mo. App. 389 [1902]. * Barber Asphalt Paving Company -V. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S. W. 1043 [1902]; Smith v. City of Westport, 105 Mo. App. 221, 79 S. W. 725 [1904]; Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 107 Mo. App. 385, 81 S. W. 496 [1904]; Heman v. Ger- ardi, 96 Mo. App. 231, 69 S. W. 1069 [1902]; City of Springfield ex rel. Gilsonite Const. Co. v. Schmook, 120 Mo. App. 31, 96 S. W. 257 [1906]: Ayers v. Schmohl, 86 Mo. App. 349 [1900] ; Richter v. Merrill, 84 Mo. App. 150 [1900] ; New England Safe § 538 xaXation by assessment. 854 the time limited has expired without performance, grant a propor- tional assessment under another statute, authorizing a propor- tional assessment where the contract has been performed in part and in part abandoned.^ Upon the expiration of the time limited, the contract if unperformed becomes a nullity, so that the pro- perty owner does not waive anv rieht bv failing to file objections thereto." The time within which the con+rtict !X>. Div. 512 [1904]). Mannpn v G^een. l.'tS Til. 59^. 42 N. 'Commissioners of Putnam County E. 163 [18951: TicVettp v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110 [1877]. 861 THE IMPEOVEMENT CONTEACT. § 540 traet,° instead of resisting the assessment on the ground of defec- tive performance. § 540. Effect of abandonment of prior contract. In the absence of specific statute a public corporation has a right as against the property owners to rescind a contract, entered into with the consent of the contractor, and to let a new contract.* The fact that such contract is let at a higher rate does not invali- date the assessment.- A new contract entered into between the city and the same contractor for the construction of the same public improvement is regarded as discharging a former contract between the same two parties.' This is true even if the new eon- tract is let for a higher price than the original contract.* It will be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the city had proper reasons for such action. If a prior contract for a public improvement has been abandoned by the contractor the public corporation has, in the absence of some specific stat- ute, authority to make a new contract for the completion of the improvement already under construction.^ The public authori- ties have ordinarily power in such eases to proceed to readvertise for bids without repeating the steps necessary to obtain jurisdic- tion." The jurisdiction acquired by them to make the original contract is regarded as continuing to enable them to make such contracts as are necessary to secure the complete performance 'People ex rel. Raymond v. Whid- Mayor, etc., of Allegheney City, 59 den, 191 111. 374, 56 L. E. A. 905, Pa. St. (9 P. F. Smith) 455 [1868]. 61 N. E. 133 [1901] ; Shannon v. Vil- ^Marshall v. (Commonwealth to the lage of Hinsdale, 180 111. 202, 54 N. Use of Mayor, etc., of Allegheny E. 181 [1899]; Heinroth v. Kocher- City, 59 Pa. St. (9 P. F. Smith) 455 stierser, 173 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1868]. [1898]; Callister v. Kochersperger, ° Spaulding v. North San Francis- 168 111. 334, 48 N. E. 156 [1897]; co Homestead and Railroad Associa- People ex rel. Mannen v. Green, 158 tion, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pae. 600, 25 111. 594, 42 N. E. 163 [1895]; Hack- Pac. 249 [1890]. ett V. State for Use of Martindale, * Spaulding v. ISforth San Francis- 113 Ind. 532, 15 N. E. 799 [1887]; eo Homestead and Railroad Associa- Indianapolis and Cumberland Gravel tion, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pac. 600, 25 Road Co. V. State ex rel. Flack, 105 Pac. 249 [1890]. Ind. 37, 4 N. E. 316 [1885]; Simon- = Kemper v. King, 11 Mo. App. 116 ton V. Hays, 88 Ind. 70 [18P2]. [1881]. 'Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. "Himmelmann v. Oliver, 34 Cal. 148, 17 S. W. 702 [1891]; Marshall 246 [18671: Dougherty v. Foley, 32 V. Commonwealth to the Use of Cal. 408 [1867]. § 540 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 862 of the work originally contracted for.' The reletting of a con- tract is, however, in some states a separate and distinct proceed- ing, though under jurisdiction already acquired.* Accordingly, the grant by a board to its clerk of authority to invite proposals under which the original contract was let does not authorize him to give notice inviting proposals for reletting the contract. He can give such notice only upon a new and specific grant of au- thority from the board.' If a second contract for an improve- ment is let for an increased price while the original contract is in force, it has been said that the remedy of the land-owner is by appeal to the board of supervisors and not by awaiting per- formance of the contract and then resisting the assessment." If the city has accepted a bid and a bidder has given bond with solvent sureties and the city subsequently releases him, readver- tises for bids and lets the contract to the lowest bidder on such second advertising, whose bid is higher than that of the original contractor, it has been said that property owners are entitled to recover from the city their proportionate share of such differ- ences.^^ If a contractor has given bond for the performance of his contract and he makes default in performance and the con- tract is relet at an increased price, the city must enforce such bond and apply the amount recovered thereon upon the contract price under the new contract instead of assessing the property owners for the full amount of the contract price under the new contract.^^ Such facts are said, in some jurisdictions, to invali- date the assessment,^" and in other jurisdictions to be ground for reducing the amount of the assessment, but not for vacating it.^* If, as part of a contract for an original construction, the contractor has agreed to keep such improvement in repair, the 'Himmelmann v. Oliver, 34 Cal. "Eno v. Mayor, Aldermen and 246 [1867] ; Dougherty v. Foley, 32 Commonalty of the City of New Cal. 403 [1867]. York, 68 N. Y. 214 [1877]; (revers- ^Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239 ing Eno v. Mayor, Aldermen and [1868]. Commonalty of the City of New "Meuser v. Eisdon, 36 Cal. 239 York, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 320 [1876])-. [1868]. "Spaulding v. North San Fran- ">. Spaulding v. North San Fran- ciaco Homestead and Railroad Asso- cisco Homestead and Railroad Asso- elation, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pac. 600, 25 elation, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pac. 600, 25, Pac. 249 [1890], Pac. 249 [1890]. "In the Matter of the Petitiorf of '^Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Kv. 491, TTpson to Vacate an Assessment, 89 23 Kv. Law Rep. 128, 63 S. W. 964 N. Y. 67 [1882]. [1901], 863 . THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 541 fact that the contractor becomes insolvent and does not perforin such contract does not prevent the city from levying another assessment for necessary repairs. ^^ The fact that a part of the fund raised by assessment has been misappropriated is no defense as against the collection of further installments of such assess- ment.^" The remedy of the property owner is to compel the proper application of such fund. So, if an assessment is levied to pay bonds, issued to obtain money for the cost of a public improvement, the fact that part of the fund has been wasted in litigation is no defense.^^ An assessment cannot be levied for work which has been abandoned entirely and which is not and will not be performed.'* An improvement which has been begun may be abandoned by the city as far as the rights of the property owners are concerned.'" This right exists even if an assessment has been levied for such an improvement and confirmed.^" A municipality to which a smaller municipality has been an- nexed has a right to abandon an improvement commenced by such smaller municipaMty.^' If the city has entered into a contract for constructing the improvement, it has no greater right to terminate such contract than a private individual as against the adversary party to the contract. Accord- ingly, if the city orders further proceedings to be stayed after confirmation, such order is not a defense to an application for judgment for the assessment ;^^ nor is it ground for setting aside at a subsequent term such judgment of confirmation.^* § 541. Modification of contract. In the absence of statutory authority a public corporation can- "Bacas v. Adler, 112 La. 806, 36 App. 561 [1900]. (This decision So. 739 [1904]; State ex rel. Woulfe was based in part upon the theory V. St. Paul, Judge, 107 La. 775, 32 that in an application for judgment So. 88 [1901-1902]. for the assessment, the abandonment '" State, Sigler, Pros. v. Fuller, of the improvement being a matter 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 227 [1870]. which had occurred since confirma- " Loesnitz v. Seelinger; 127 Ind. tion, might be interposed as a de- 422, 25 N. E. 1037, 26 N. E. 887 fense.) [1890]. "City of Chicago v. Weber, 94 111. "In the Matter of Eager, 41 How- App. 561 [1900]. ard (N. Y.) 107 [1870]; In the Mat- ^ Clingman v. People ex rel. Ray- ter of Eager, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 557 mond, 183 111. 339, 55 N. E. 727 [1871]; In the Matter of Eager, 10 [1899]. Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 229 [1871]. ^^ People ex rel. McCornaek v. Mc- "City.of Chicago v. Weber, 94 111. Wethy, 165 111. 222, 46 N. E. 187 App. 561 [1900]. [1897]. «> City of Chicago v. Weber, 94 111. § 541 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. . 864 not modify a public contract after it has been entered into be- tween the parties.^ Thus, a cbntraetor cannot be authorized to improve a portion of a street not included in his contract in lieu of similar work which he was bound to do on another street." Under the discretionary power conferred by many statutes upon public corporations with reference, to public improvements, it is held that a public corporation has the power to modify a contract for a public improvement once entered into.^ This result is most easily reached under statiftes which specifically authorize a public corporation to change a contract for a public improve- ment already entered into.* If by statute a contract is to be let to the lowest bidder, it is held in many jurisdictions that the public corporation has no power to modify the contract so as to make a material variance between the contract as entered into and the specifications and bids by means of which the contract was ori- ginally let; since if the power to make such change did exist, it would be impossible to determine who was the lowest bidder upon the contract as finally entered into.' It has been held that if the city permits the lowest bidder to change his bid in a ma- terial respect after the contract is awarded, an unsuccessful bid- der may maintain an injunction suit to restrain the city from 'Schneider v. District of Colum- 515 [1889]; Lindenberger Land Co. bia, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 252 [1889]; v. R. B. Park & Co., — Ky. , 85 Windsor v. District of Columbia, 7 S. W. 213, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 437 Mackey (D. C.) 96 [1889]; Gal- [1905] ; Weston v. City of Syracuse, breath v. Jfewton, 30 Mo. App. 381. 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, ^Windsor v. District of Columbia, 43 L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]; 7 Mackey (D. C.) 96 [1889]. In the Matter of the Protestant ' Reclamation District No. 3 v. Episcopal Public School, 40 Howard Goldman, 85 Cal. 636, 4 Pac. 676 (N. Y.) 198 [1870]. [1884]; Sims v. Hines, 121 Ind. 534, ° Young v. People ex rel. Raymond, 23 N. E. 515 [1889]; Jenkins v. 196 111. 603, 63 N. E. 1075 [1902]; Stetler, 118 Ind. 275, 20 N. E. 788 Mohr v. City of Chicago, 114 111. [1888]; Gulick v. C'^nnely, 42 Ind. App. 283 [1904]; Steffins v. Stewart, 134 [1873]; Hellenkemp v. City of 53 Kans. 92, 36 Pac. 55 [1894]; City Lafayette, 30 Ind. 192 [1868]; of Henderson v. Lambert, 77 Ky. Stra9=-hein v. Jerman, 56 Mo. 104 (14 Bush.) 24 [1878]; Ai ditor Gen- [1874]; Weston v. City of Syracuse, eral v. Stoddard, 147 Mich. 329, 110 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, N. W. 944 [1907]; Butler v. Detroit, 43 L. R. A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]; 43 Mich. 552, 5 N. W. 1078; Ely v. In the MattT nf the Protestant City of Grand Ranids, 84 Mich, 336, Episcopal Pub'ic School, 40 Howard 47 N. W. 447 [1890]; Scalding v. (N. Y.) 198 [1870], Fnraee. 109 Mo. App. 675, 83 S. W. 'ReclamatioTi Dist. No. 3 v. Gold- 540 [19041: Smith v. '"ityof West- man, 65 Cil. 635. 4 Pac. 676 [18841; port. 105 Mo. App. 221, 79 S. W. Sims V. Hines, 121 Ind. 534, 23 N. E. 725 [1904]. 865 THE IMPEOVEMENT CONTRACT. § 541 entering into such contract." Such a change under statutes wliich provide for letting the contract to the lowest bidder has been held to invalidate the assessment levied for the cost of such im- provement.'^ Thus, if after a contract is let, the grade of the street is changed materially and the contract is regarded as modified to suit the grade thus fixed without letting the contract anew, an assessment for the cost of such improvement is in- valid.' So if time is of the essence of the contract, the city cannot extend the time after the contract has been let in the absence of statutory authority therefor." If, by statute, power is given to a city to make changes in the plans of public im- provements with the consent of the contractor, and by another statute it is provided that the contract must be let to the lowest bidder, a question arises whether the power to make such changes in public improvements extends to contracts which by the terms of the statute are to be let to the lowest bidder. If the legis- lature has not provided specifically either that such power to make changes applies to contracts let to the lowest bidder or does not apply, we have a case in which the courts have to de- termine the intention of the legislature upon a question which was probably not in the mind of the legislature when it enacted the statutes in question. In some jurisdictions it is held that under such a combination of statutes the public corporation may change the_ terms of public contracts after they are made.^" In other jurisdictions, under such a combination of statutes, it is- held that- the power to make changes does not extend to con- tracts which must be awarded to the lowest bidder.^^ The fact "Mohr V. City of Chicago, 114 lU. 675, 83 S. W. 540 [1904]; Smith v. App. 283 [1904]. City of Westport, 105 Mo. App. 221, 'Young V. People ex rel. Raymond, 79 S. W. 725 [1904]. 196 111. 603, 63 N. E. 1075 [1902]; '° Lindenberger Land Co. v. R. B. Steffins V. Stewart, 53 Kans. 92, 36 Park & Co., — Ky. , 27 Ky. L. Pac. 55 [1894]; City of Henderson Rep. 437, 85 S. W. 213 [1905]; Wes- V. Lambert, 77 Ky. (14 Bush.) 24 ton v. City of Syracuse, 158 K. Y. [1878]; Auditor General v. Stod- 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, 43 L. R. dard, 147 Mich. 329, 110 N. W. 944, A. 678, 53 N. E. 12 [1899]. [1907]; Butler v. Detroit, 43 Mich. "Auditor General v. Stoddard, 147 552, 5 N. W. 1078; Ely v. City of Mich. 329, 110 N. w. 944 [1907] ; Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 336, 47 N. Butler ^. Detroit, 43 Mich. 552, 5 W. 447 [1890]. N. W. 1078; Ely v. City of Grand » Steffins v. Stewart, 53 Kans. 92, Rapids, 84 Mich. 336, 47 N. W. 447 36 Pac. 55 [1894]. [1890]. " Spalding v. Forsee, 109 Mo. App. § 541 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 866 that the commissioners of public works have reserved the right to increase or diminish the amount of work to be done, has been held in the absence of fraud not to impair the validity of the contract." In some jurisdictions it has been said that the fact that the coatraet was changed after it was made is not a ground for resisting a special assessment, but that if the objection is valid it must be interposed by an injunction before the work is completed." In the same juritdiction it has been said in a later ease that the remedy is to enjoin the payment to the contractors and not to resist the assessment.^* If the property owners ac- quiesce in the change, they cannot use such change as a means of defeating the assessment.^' An immaterial change in the contract is held not to affect its validity." Thus, if a resolution calls for grading and macadamizing a portion of a street begin- ning and ending at certain specified limits, a contract which provides for grading and macadamizing that portion of such street, except where already done, is held to conform sufficiently to the contract and to be valid.^^ A change in the contract which is intended to correct a clerical mistake in the original ordinance does not invalidate the contract.^' Thus, where bids were re- ceived upon the understanding that the assessments were to be paid in ten annual installments the counsel may correct a mis- take in a prior. resolution which provided for receiving payments in five annual installments.'" Material alterations in a contract whereby the price of the work is increased may constitute fraud, which will invalidate the assessment.^" If the original contract is regarded as rescinded and after a new resolution of intention has been published a contract is let for the same improvement to the same contractor at a higher price, the action of the city will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be assumed to be based upon a sufficient reason, and the assessment levied for "In the Matter of the Petition of "Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co.. Merriam to Vacate an Assessment, 28 Cal. 346 [1865]. 84 N. Y. 596 [18811. "Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co.. "Eicketts v. Village of Hyde 28 Cal. 346 [1865]. Park, 85 111. 110 [187.7]. "Lister v. City of Tacoma, 44 "Heinroth v. Kochersoerger, 173 Wash. 222, 87 Pac. 126 [1906]. 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [18981. "Lister v. City of Tacoma, 44. '"Slierard v. Barron, 194 U. S. Wash. 222, 87 Pac. 126 [1906]. 553, 24 S. 737, 48 L. 1115 [1904]. =° Miller's Case, 12 Abb. Prac. (>f. Y.) 121 [1861]. 867 THE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT. § 542 such improvement will be valid.^^ An inferior agent of the city has no power to modify the terms of the contract entered into by proper authority.^- It has even been held that if such change is made, the city council cannot subsequently ratify it,"' even if the alteration is to the benefit of the lot owner," so as to make valid an assessment for the cost of such improvement. It has been held in some jurisdictions that if the power to modify a contract exists, the property owner is not bound by the con- tract price, but that he can be compelled to pay only what the work as finally done was reasonably worth. ^^ Items not covered by the bid cannot be included in the contract where the contract must be let to the lowest bidder."" Expenses incurred and work done under a former resolution for an improvement which has been abandoned cannot be included in an assessment for the same improvement when constructed under a subsequent resolution."' If, however, a pre-existing corporation, after making a contract for a public improvement, is annexed to a city, such city may make a new contract for the same improvement without the consent of the property owners."' § 542. Extras. Under many statutes no .allowance to a contractor can be made for extra work and material not provided for in the contract or ordinance.^ The ordinance is the sole authority of the city officials for entering into such contract. A contract in excess of the authority thus conferred is invalid whether it is express or implied. Extra work done by reason of a mistake of the city ''Spaulding v. North San Fran- =» Allegheny City v. Blair, 74 Pa, Cisco Homestead and Kailroad Asso- St. (24 P. F. Smith) 225 [1873]; ciation, 87 Cal. 40, 24 Pac. 600, 25 That the property owners are not Pac. 249 [1890]. parties to the original contract see ^Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush. (73 Schenley v. Commonwealth for Use Ky.) 241 [1874]; In the Matter of of City of Allegheny, 36 Pa. St. (12 Wood, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 275 [1868]. Casey) 29; and that the consent of ^ Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush. ( 73 the property owners is not necessary Ky.) 241 [1874]. to the rescission of the contract, see " Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush. ( 73 Marshall v. Commonwealth, 59 Pa. Ky.) 241 [1874]. St. (9 P. F. Smith) 455. ==C'ity to the Use of Peters v. Ar- > Blair v. Luning, 76 Cal. 134, IS rott, 8 Phil. (Pa.) 41 [1870]. Pac. 153 [1888]; Donnelly v. How- =«Smith V. City of Portland, 25 ard, 60 Cal. 291 [1882]; State, Ore. 297, 35 Pac. 665 [1894]. Board, Pros. v. City of Hoboken, 38 "Fitzhugh V. Ashworth, 119 Cal. N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 378 [1873]; Smith 393, 51 Pac. 635 [1897]. v. City of Portland, 25 Or. 297, 35 Pac. 665 [1894]. :§542 , TAXATION BY assbssm:int. .868 engineer eannqt be the basis of recovery.^ Where the statute .yequires the letting of a eontraet on competitive bidding, the -purpose of such statute would fail if the contract so let were merely the point of departure from which the city and the con- tractor, could, agree for further expenditures without advertising for bids. For these reasons, extras can ordinarily not be included in the assessments.' Thus, under an ordinance for buying cast iron water pipe the city auth((rities cannot make a valid con- ; tract for cast iron hydrants.* No authority exists for awarding extra compensation for performance before the time iixed by the contract.^ The extra work can ordinarily be severed from ■the work provided for by ieontraet." Where this can be done the assessment is valid for the work provided for by the contract but invalid as to such extras.'' Under statutes which leave public officials a wide discretion after the contract has been entered into, extras may be ordered and included in the assessment.^ pven where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder a pro- vision, that the contractor shall do extra work as the street com- missioner shall direct at a price to be fixed by the commissioner does • not invalidute the contract.® An award against the city for extra work under an agreement to arbitrate has been upheld and an assessment therefor has been held valid.^' Under statu- tory authority a reassessment may include extra work not pro- vided for by the original contract.^^ Even under statutes which require the letting of contracts on competitive bidding, it has ' Wilson V. City of St. Joseph, 125 ' In the Matter of the Petition Mo. App. 460, 102 S. W. 600 [1907]. of Eager, 41 Howard (N. Y.)' 107 * Piedmont Paving Company v. [1870]; Matter of Eager, 10 Abb. '.AHman, 136 Cal. 88, 68 Pac. 493 Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 229 [1871]. ' [ 1902] ; , McDonald v. Mezes, . 107 " McDonald v. Mazes, 107 Cal. 492, !Cal. 492, 40 Pac. 808 [1895]; Great ' 40 Pac. 808 [1'895]. Falls Ice Company v. District of 'McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, .Columbia, 19 D. C. 327; Town of 40 Pac. 808 [1895]. ' Cicero v. Green, 211 111. 241, 71 N". = State, Vandferbeck, Pros. v. May- E. 884 [1904] ; Prendergast v. Rich- or and Common Council of Jersey ards, 2 Mo. App. 187 [1876]; In the City, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 441 Matter of the Petition of Wood, 51 [1861]; Allen v. Rogers, 20 Mo. Barb. (N. Y.) 275 [1868]; In the App. 290 [1885]. Matter of the Petition of Eager, 41 "Allen v. Rogers, 20 Mo. App. 290 Howard (N. Y.) 107 [1870]; Mat- [1885]. ter of Eager, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. '"Brady v. Mayor, etc., of Brook- Y.) 229 [1871]. lyn, 1 Barb. {N. Y.) 584 [1847]. 'Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 111. '^ Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. ,241, 71 N. E. 884 [1904]. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]. 869 THE IMPROVEMENT COIWE'ACT. §§ 543j 544 been held that changes may be made in a contract' after per- formance is begun if the city officials decide that snch changes are necessary to the proper construction Of the im- provement, iand the expense thereof may be included in the assess-^ ment without advertising for bids.^" So a retaining wall, the^ necessity of which as well as the size and character ■ of which^ could not be determined until excavation had begun, was allowed' to be constructed at the expense of the abutting property owners." Full effect is given to a term in the contract fixing the compensation to be awarded for extra work.^* A provision in a contract that no recovery could be had for extra work not specified in the contract uialess done oh the written order of the commissioner of public works, which order was to be annexed to the contract, applies only to extra work, which becomes neces- sary in the course of the improvement for the proper completion of work previously done or for its security.^'' § 543. Impossibility. Provisions in a contract which become legally impossible are discharged, and failure to perform the same does not invalidate an assessment levied for such contract.^ Thus, after a contract for a street improvement was let, a railroad switch was con- structed in the street with the consent of the city, and the con- struction of such switch rendered compliance with the contract impossible-. It was held that the contractor could recover for the work and material spent in performing the contract as far as, under the circumstances, was possible.^ § 544. Assignment of improvement contract. In the absence of some specific statute to the contrary, it is generally assumed that the contract for the construction of a public improvement is assignable. Whether assignable or not, in "Hastings v. Columbus, 42 0. S. "Eoemheld v. City of Chicago, 585 [1885]. 231 111. 467, 83 N. E. 291 [1907. " Longworth v. City of Cincin- ^ Fell v. Philadelphia to the usa nati, 30 0. S. 101 [1877]. of Cunningham, 61 Pa. St. (31 P. "Talbott V. Town of New Oastle, F. Smith) 58 [1876]. — Ind. , 81 N. E. 724 [1907], ^'Lake Erie & Western R. E. Co. transferred from Appellate Court, v. Walters, 13 Ind. App. 275, 41 81 N. B. 82. N. E. 465 [1895]. § 544 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 870 ease the city objected to such assignment, the property owner cannot object to performance by an assignee if a city has ac- quiesced upon such performance and the contract has been per- formed by the assignee without objection." This is true even if the assignee is a corporation which possibly had no power to take the assignment or to do the work, but which has neverthe- less performed such contract.^ 'Chadwick y. Kelley, 187 U. S. Mo. App. 433 [1892]; Gest v. City 540, 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903]; of Cincinnati, 26 0. S. 275 [1875]; (affirming Kelley v. Chadwick, 104 Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 0. S. 52111836]. La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); Brick 'Gest v. City of Cincinnati, 26 O. & Terra Cotta Company v. Hull, 49 S. 275 [1875]. CHAPTER XII. PROPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 545. Corporeal property. Corporeal real property is the kind of property which gen- erally receives a special benefit from the improvement for which the special assessment is levied. Where this is the case, no ob- jection whatever can be made to levying an assessment upon the realty thus benefited.^ The fact that by statute certain interests in realty are to be regarded for purposes of general taxation, as personal property does not prevent such interests from being assessed as real property to pay for the cost of local improve- ments. Real property may be assessed notwithstanding the dif- ferent estates and interests which may exist therein.^ A ques- tion that is raised under statutes, which authorize the assessment of realty but make no provision as to personalty, is whether improvements of a permanent nature constructed on such realty so as to become a part thereof can be assessed. Under statutes of this sort it has been held that the improvements may be as- sessed if the officials to whose discretion such question is entrusted ^ City of Seattle v. Board of Home of the State of New Jersey v. City of Missions of Methodist Protestant Elizabeth, 66 N. J. Law ( 37 Vr. ) 688, Church, 138 Fed. 307, 70 C. C. A. 52 Atl. 1130 [1901]; (affirming 597 [1905]; Piper's Appeal in the Chancellor of State v. City of Eliz- Matter of Widening Kearney Street, abeth, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 483, 47 32 Cal. 530 [1867]; Cicero and Pro- Atl. 456 [1900]); Clark v. Village viso Street Railway Company v. City of Dunkirk, 75 N. Y. 612; (affirming of Chicago, 176 111. 501, 52 N. E. without report Clarke v. Village of 866 [1898]; Rich v. City of Chicago, Dunkirk, 12 Hun. 181 [1878]) ; Hof- 152 ni. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; feld v. City of Buffalo, 130 N. Y. City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306 387, 29 N. E. 747 [1892]; City of [1866]; Higgins v. City of Chicago, Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 18 111. 276 [1857]; Excelsior Plant- 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]; Heath v. ing and Manufacturing Company v. McCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1898]. [1887]; Mound City Construction ^Cicero and Proviso Street Rail- Company V. Macgurn, 97 Mo. App. way Company v. City of Chicago, 176 403, 71 S. W. 460 [1902]; Chancellor 111. 501, 52 isT. E. 866 [18981. 871 § 545 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. • 872 decide as a fact that such improvements are benefited by the local improvement for which such assessment is levied.' If, on the other hand, such officials decide that such improvements are not so benefited, they may exclude them.* Accordingly, if the assessors assume as a matter of law that such improvements must be excluded, their action is plainly erroneous.^ The propriety of including improvements is especially clear, where by statute it is provided that the term "real property" shall include aU improvements thfireon." On the other hand, under a statute which" authorizes local assessments upon ' ' real estate only, "it is im- proper to include the permanent improvements on real property in such assessment.'' Under such a statute, including' improve- ments invalidates the entire assessment,* even if the land and the improvements thereon are valued separately.' The act of the owners in carving different estates out of the fee in such realty does not preclude the state from levying an assessment against the corpus of such property if it so desires.^' The fact that certain lands have been conveyed in trust, thus causing a separation of the legal and equitable titles, does not prevent them from being assessed for local improvements. This is- true even if the title to such property is taken in the name of a state offieial.^'^^ 'Kennedy v. City of Troy, 77 N. ing the question of damages caused Y. 493 [1879]; Clark v. Village of by a change of grade the effect upon Dunkirk, 75 N. Y. 612 [1878]; (af- the property as improved is the ques- firming without report Clark v. Vil- tiou to be considered. City" of Sekt- lage of Dunkirk, 12 Hun. 181 tie v. Board of Home Missions of [1877]). Methodist Protestant Church, 138 •Hoffeld V. City of Buffalo, 130 N. Fed. 307, 70 C. C. A. 597 [1905]. Y. 387, 29 N. E. 747 [1892]. "City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, = Kennedy v. City of Troy, 77 N. Y. 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. 493 [1879]; Clark v. Village of- ° Heath v. MoCrea, 20 ' Wash. 342, Dunkirk, 75 N. Y. 612 [1878]; (af- 55 Pac. 432 [1898]. firming without report, €lark v. Vil- " City of Chicago v. Baer, 4l 111. lage of Dunkirk, 12 Hun. 181 306 [1866] ; Higgins v. City of Chi- [1877]). cago, 18 111. 276 [1857]. "Mound City Construction Com- "Chancellor of State v. City of pany v. Macgurn, 97 Mo. App. 403, Elizabeth, 65 N. J. L. (36 Vr.) 483^ 71 S. W. 460 [1902]. 47 Atl. 455 [1900]; (affirmed with- ' Heath v. Mc€rea, 20 Wash. 342, out opinion in Chancellor of the 55 Pac. 432 [1898] ; City of Spo- State of New Jersey v. City of Eliz- kane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, abeth, 66 N. J. L. (37 Vr.) 688, 52 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. In consider- Atl. 1130 [1901]). 873 PEOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 546 § 546 Easements. Whether land subject to an easement in favor of a number of persons is so far public that it is exempt from assessment is a question on which there is some conflict of authority. The owner of certain land dedicated it as a park for the benefit of the owners of lots fronting on the same, to be ornamented and improved in such manner as the majority of such owners should desire. It was held that, although such land was dedicated to the trustees of the town, it was not, by reason of the peculiarity of such dedication, the property of the town or a public park, but that it, remained private property and as such was subject to local assessment.^ The owner of certain land reserved a strip one foot in width along the east and south boundary of the given lot until the owner of such lot should give ten feet along such boundaries for an alley. It was held that such strip of ground was not dedicated to public use until such condition was fulfilled and that in the meantime such land was subject to assess- ment.^ A strip of land two feet in width lying between a street and the lots adjoining was reserved for a fence. It was to be for the use . of several lots along such strip. It was held that such land could not be assessed or sold for a street improve- ment, the court regarding it by reason of such dedication as analogous to a sidewalk.' An easement is not land and is there- fore not ordinarily subject to local assessment. A right of way leading through an improved street to property at some distance therefrom is not regarded as benefited by the improvement of such street and therefore cannot be assessed for such improve- ment.* If property is conveyed subject to building restrictions and subsequently a decree is rendered at the instance of the grantee relieving such property from the operation of such re- strictions, the former existence of such restrictions cannot pre- vent the assessment of such property.*" ' McChesney v. People ex rel. * Whiting v. Mayor and Aldermen Johnson, 99 111. 216 [1881]. of the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 'Creamer v. MoCune, 7 Mo. App. [1870]; Board of Health v. Gloria 91 [1879]. Dei., 23 Pa. St. 259 [1854]. ' Town of Woodruff Place v. Ras- ° Cummings v. West Chicago Park chig, 147 Ind. 517, 4-6 N. E. 990 Com'rs., 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941 [1896], [1899]. .§ 547 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 874 § 547. Interest of owner in land subject to public easement. If land has been appropriated for a public use by proceeding in eminent domain, and the use for which it is appropriated is one which is in the ordinary course of things a permanent one, no assessment can be levied against the land so appropriated even if the former owner of such land is regarded as retaining an interest therein.^ Thus, that part of a lot which was appro- priated for a street cannot be asiessed.^ If an assessment, made upon an estimate of the cost of the improvement, is apportioned according to the frontage and a part of such frontage is subse- quently appropriated by a municipal corporation for a street, the courts should not, in subsequently reducing the amount of the assessment because the actual cost fell below the estimate, subtract the amount of frontage thus appropriated and thereby cast an increased burden upon the rest of the property. The city should pay the assessment upon such property.* Land which has been appropriated for a public drain cannot be assessed.* On account of the presumption of the regularity of the action of public officials," it will be presumed that if a lot is assessed by a lot number, the part of such lot which has been appro- priated for a street has not been regarded as benefited by such taking, and the amount of such assessment does not include any allowance for benefits to the parts so taken.* If an attempt is made to assess the residue of the land left, after appropriating a part of it for public use, we find a conflict of authority as to whether such residue can be assessed for the cost of taking the part which has been taken.' It is well settled that such residue "City of Joliet v. Spring Creek 'See § 1279. Drainage Dist., 222 111. 441, 78 N. E. " Waggemah v. Village of North 836 [1906]; Waggeman v. Village of Peoria, 155 111. 545, 40 N. E. 485 North Peoria, 155 111. 545, 40 N. E. [1895]. See to the same effect, De- 485 [1895]; Leman v. City of Lake Koven v. City of Lake View, 129 III. View, 131 III 388, 23 N. E. 346 399, 21 N. E. 813 [1890]. [1890]. 'See § 308. 'Rich V. City of Chicago, 152 111. Such expense may be paid for by 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Wasireman local assessment levied on the theory V. Village of North Peoria, 155 111. of benefits, Waggeman v. Village of 545, 40 N. E. 485 [1895]; Leman v. North Peoria, 155 111. 545, 40 N. E. City of Lake View, 131 111. 388, 23 485 [1895]; but not by special taxa- N. E. 346 [1890]. tion levied without regard to bene- ' Spaneler v. City of Cleveland, 35 fits, City of Bloomington v. Latham, O. S. 469 [18801. 142 111. 462, 18 L. R. A. 487, 32 N. 'City of Joliet v. Spring Creek E. 506 [1893]. Drainas-e Dist., 222 111. 441, 78 N. E. 836 [1906]. 875 PKOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 548 may be assessed for the cost of improving the part which has been taken, as by grading, paving and the like.' This question has been discussed in connection with the subject of the im- provements for which an assessment may be levied." § 548. Personal property. From the nature of the improvements for. which special as- sessments are levied upon the theory of the benefits conferred by the improvement upon the property assessed, it is, in the greater number of cases, real property which is benefited by the improvement, while personal property situated near such improve- ment usually derives no benefit therefrom. In a general discus- sion of the subject, we often find the special or local assessment treated as if it were levied upon the real estate only, and occa- sionally we find remarks to the effect that it must be levied upon real estate only in order to be an assessment;^ and that if levied upon the personal property, as well as real property, it is in its essential nature a general tax and not a local assessment." If the improvement is one which from its nature cannot benefit personal property, it is proper to exclude personal property from the operation of the assessment and it would be improper to include it.' An assessment upon a railway, based on a valuation which includes personal property as well as real property, has been held to be invalid because of the inclusion of personalty.* ' See § 313 et seq. Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 'See § 301 et seq. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. "A local In Davis v. City of Newark, 54 N. assessment can only be levied on land J. L. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 [1891] . . . ." They "apply to land and the question was raised but not de- are a charge on land only." Town cided whether houses and buildings of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 damaged by a change of grade, which Am. Rep. 451 [1879]. damage haxi been paid to the owner, "Holley v. County of Orange, 106 could be assessed for benefits caused Cal. 420, 39 Pac. 790 [1895]; Chi- by such change of grade. cago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Eail- 'Holley v. County of Orange, 106 way Company v. Phillips, 111 la. 377, Cal. 420, 39 Pac. 790 [1895]; City of 81 N. W. 787 [1900]. Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306 [1866]; 'City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. Co. v. Phillips, 111 la. 377, 82 N. * Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul W. 787 [1900]; Beecher v. City of Railway Company v. Phillips, 111 la. Detroit, 92 Mich. 268, 52 N. W." 731 377, 82 N. W. 787 [1900]; Commis- [1892]; Town of Maoon v. Patty, 57 sioners of Chatham County v. Sea- Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451 [1879]; board Air Line Railway Company, State, King, Pros. v. Duryea, 45 N. 133 N. C. 216, 45 S. E. 566 [1903]. J. L. (16 Vr.) 258 [1883]; City of §548 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 876 The assessments in these cases were, however, levied for pur- poses which, it was held, could not confer benefits upon the personal property, such as the construction of a sewer,'' or of a fence in a public fencing district." Remarks of this sort are generally obiter when they attempt to extend beyond the par- ticular case, and to lay down principles applicable to all kinds of assessments. Probably in each ease in which such observa- tions are found, the partieulaniassessment under discussion was one which could • be levied upon real property, but not upon personal property, because the personal property was not bene- fited by such assessment while the real property was; and an attempt to levy such exaction against personal property, as well as real property, could be justified only under the power of gen- eral taxation. A tax levied upon realty and personalty alike at a certain per cent, of its value is ordinarily an example of gen- eral taxation.' On the other hand a general tax levied upon realty only has been held invalid in some jurisdictions.* Other cases seem to assume the validity of such form of general tax." If, on the other hand, the improvement is one which can confer a special benefit upon personal property, -we find some conflict in authority, though chiefly a conflict in obiter dicta. The con- flict is, however, chiefly confined to obiter and as far as the gen- eral principles of general law are involved, the question should seem clear. If the improvement is one which can confer a. spe- cial benefit upon personal property, no reason is apparent either from the nature of the property or from general .principles of ■assessment law for omitting such property from the operation of the assessment. It is true that local assessments are, as a general rule, levied on land alone; but this is only because land is the kind of property which is usually benefited. There exists no constitutional or other restriction on the legislative power in this regard, and when particular personal property has enjoyed a benefit from the work to which it owes its existence and pres- . ' Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul ' Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 2 Railway Company v. Phillips, 111 la. Black (67 U. S.) 510, 17 L. 305 377, 82 N. W. 787 [1900]. [1862]; Cobb v. Corporation of Eliz- ° 'Commissioners of Chatham Coun- beth City, 75 N. C. 1 [1876]. iy V. Seaboard Air Line Railway ° Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. ( N. -Company, 133 N. C. 216, 45 S. E. Y.) 65; Barker v. State, 18 Ohio -566 [1903]. 514 [1849]. •' Krumberg v. City of Cincinnati, 29 O. S. 69 [1875]. 877 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 54i> ervation,. nothing prevents the legislature from assessing it/" There seems to be no reason under the constitutional provisions generally in force, or under the general theory of local assess- ments why a local assessment may not be levied upon pergonal property if the improvement for which the local assessment is levied does in fact confer a special benefit upon such personal; property.^^ Some assessments exist in which the improve- ment for the cost of which the assessment was levied con- fers a benefit on certain designated personal property, and in such eases assessments levied against the personal property thus benefited have been upheld and regarded as local assessments as distinct from general taxation." A form of assessment of - this type is found in some of the assessments ' for the construc- tion of levees. In some of the statutes on this subject it is pro^ vided that a tax or assessment of a certain amount per bale upon each bale of cotton raised upon the land protected by the levee shall be levied as a means of paying for such improve- ment. Such an exaction is held to be a special assessment and not a general tax.^^ A similar charge is made upon each bushel of oysters grown in salt water from which fresh water is kept out by levees.^* Such a charge is not affected by the limita- tions of the constitution applicable to general taxation.^'' The "Excelsior Planting and Manufac- sior Planting and Manufacturing Co.- turing Company v. Green, 39 La. v. Collector Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, ■ Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 [1887]. 464, 1 So. 873 [1887]. ^ "It is vain to say that a bale of " Hughes v. Board of Commission- cotton is- pergonal property and that ers of the Caddo Levee District, 108 local assessments can only be levied La. 146, 32 So. 218 [1901, 1902]; on real estate. There exists no such George v. Young, 45 La. Ann. 1232, constitutional or other restriction on 14 So. 137 [1893] ; Excelsior Plant- the legislative power. 'It is true,' ing and Manufacturing Company v. as Mr. Burroughs says, 'that as u. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 general rule the local assessment is [1887]. solely on land, and not on personal "Hughes v. Board of Commission- proerty.' [Citing Burroughs on ers of the Caddo Levee District, 108 Taxation, p. 473.] When, as in the La. 146, 32 So. 218 [1901, 1902]; present case, the particular personal George v. Youns;, 45 La. Ann. 1232, property assessed has enjoyed a ben- 14 So. 137 [1893]; Excelsior Plant- efit from the works to which it owes ing and Manufacturing Company v. its existence and preservation, and Green, Collector, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 when the leffislature has in the exer- So. 873 [1887]. cise of its judsrment determined that " Board of Commissioners for it should contribute for such benefit, Buras Levee District v. Mialegvich, no principle or precedent can be 52 La. Ann. 1292, 27 So. 790 [1900]. found which would justify a court " George v. Young, 45 La. Ann. in overruling its decision." Excel- 1232, 14 So. 137 [T893]. •§ 548 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 878 justice of such legislation is upheld as far as third persons are concerned, because the cotton is assessed not simply as a bale of cotton, but a bale of cotton which has been produced on lands protected by the levees, and has, during the period of its cultivation and growth, enjoyed the benefit of its protection. No one dealing with such cotton can be prejudiced, because all are advised by the law, from the moment when the cotton is planted, that when it reaches the condition of ginned bale, it must pay this tax.^" While such a charge is undoubtedly a local assess- ment, it is doubtful whether it is a true charge upon personal property or whether it is not essentially a charge upon realty based upon the amount of the product thereof, different from the ordinary assessment on realty only as to the manner of appor- tionment. By some constitutional provisions express authority to assess real property is given without any corresponding refer- ence to personal property.^' It is often provided by statute that assessments shall be levied on "real property" or "real estate."" Under statutes of this sort two different classes of questions may be raised. Such statute evidently, excludes per- sonal property from local assessment. If the personal property is not in fact benefited by the improvement for which the assess- ment is levied, there is no impropriety in omitting it and the assessment is not on that account invalid.^" Under a statute which authorizes the assessment of all the real property within the district, an irrigation district cannot assess the poles and wires of a telegraph company which have been constructed by such company upon the land of a railroad company under a contract whereby they are reserved as the personal property of the telegraph company.^" If the improvement is constructed and the original assessment provided for under a statute which makes the assessment a lien upon the real property in the district, a subsequent statute which authorizes the board of directors of such district to pledge the real, personal and mixed property of the district, without the consent of the property owners, as " Excelsior . Planting and Manufac- "Rich v. City of Chicago; 152 111. turing Company v. Green, 39 La. 18. 38 N. E. 255 [1894]. Ann. 455, 1 So. Rep. 873 [1887]. "See § 641. "Article XIX., § 27, Constitution ™ Western Union Telegraph Co. v. of Arkansas. Little Rock v. Kat7en- Modesto Irrigation Co., 149 Cal. 662, stein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 87 Pac. 190 [1906]. [1889]. 879 PBOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §549 security for the improvement bonds, impairs the obligation of the contract as affecting the property owners, and is therefore unconstitutional."' § 549. Property benefited subject to assessment in absence of statutory restrictions. The general theory underlying the local assessment is, as we have seen,' that such assessment is levied upon property which receives an especial and peculiar benefit from an improvement of a public character, and that such assessment is levied in return for such benefits." The general rule in determining what property may be assessed on the theory of benefits conferred by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, is that any property which is in fact benefited by such improvement may be subjected to assessment therefor, if the legislature authorizes such assessment and does not in some way restrict the area of the property subject to assessment.' This statement of the rule =" Merchants' National Bank v. Es- condido Irrigation District, 144 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937 [1904]. »See § 11. '"Assessments for street and other similar improvements are upheld up- on the theory that each lot or tract of land assessed is benefited in a special and peculiar manner in a sum equal to the amount estimated or as- sessed against it." Becker v. Balti- more and Ohio South Western Kail- way Company, 17 Ind. App. 324, 328, 46 N. E. 685 [1897]; (citing Jack- son V. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, 22 N. E. 431 [1889]; Ross v. Stackhouse, 114 Ind.- 200, 16 N. E. 501 [1887] ; Heick V. Voight, no Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306 [1886]; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; City of New Albany v. Cook, 29 Ind. 220 [1867]; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 [1878]; Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 0. S. 551 ; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. (15 P. r. Smith) 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615 [1870]). 'Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139 a. b.; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. 170, 13 S. 361 [1893]; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540, 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903]; (affirming, Kelley v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); Board of Improve- ment District Number Five of Tex- arkana v. Offenhauser, 84 Ark. 257, 105 S. W. 265- [1907]; Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Little Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]; Martin v. Wagner, 120 Cal. 623, 53 Pac. 167 [1898]; Boyle v. Tibbey, 82 Cal. 11, 22 Pac. 1128 [1889]; Recla- mation District No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]; Bixler v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698 [1881]; Hagar v. Board of Supervisors of Yolo Co., 47 Cal. 222 [1874]; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Piper's Appeal in the TSfatter of Widening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. 530 [1867]; Burnett v. Mayor and Common Coun- cil of the City of Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518 [1859]; City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, 467 [1905]; Dann v. Woodruff, 51 Conn. 203 [1883]; Hungerford v. City of Hartford, 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Clapp v. City of § 549 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 880 leaves out of consideration for the present tlie fact that the determination of the legislature as to what property is bene- Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868]; Sny- dacker v. Village of West Hammond, 225 111. 154, 80 N. E. 93 [1907] ; The Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 204 111. 363, 68 N. E. 519 [1903]; Washburn v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 506, 64 N. E. 1064 [1902] ; Shurtleff v. City of Chicago, 190 111. 473, 60 N. B. 870 [1901]; Sanitary District of Chicago v. City of Joliet, 189 111. 270, 59 N. E. 566 [1901]; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; Briggs V. Union Drainage District No. 1, 140 111. 53, 29 N. E. 721 [1893]; Gau(-n V. Moredock and Ivy Landing Drainage District, No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; Commis- sioners of Highways of the Town of Colfax V. Commissioners of East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. 206 [1890]; Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]; Hundley and Rees v. Commissioners of Lin- coln Park, 67 III. 539 [1873]; Trus- tees of the Illinois and Michigan Ca- nal V. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403 [1851]; (followed Wright v. Chi- cago, 46 111. 44 [1867]); Commis- sioners of Spoon River Drainage Dis- trict in Champaign County v. Con- ner, 121 111. App. 450 [1905]; Mittel V. City of Chicago, 9 Bradwell (111.) 534 [1881]; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 [11906]; Culbertson v. Knight, 152 Ind.' 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898]; Zisler v. Menses. 121 Ind. 99, 16 Am. St. Rfep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 [1889']; Board of Commissioners of Montgomery County v. Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]: Rsy V. Citv of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883] ; Bate v. Sheets. 64 Ind. 209 [1878T! Citv of New Albany v. Cook, 29 Ind. 220 [18671; Bvram v. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629. 47 N. E. 351 [1897]; Mock V. City of Muncie, 9 Ind. App. 536, 37 N. E. 281 [1893]; Chambliss v. Johnson, 77 la. 611, 42 N. W..427 [1889]; Buell v. Ball, 20 la. 28-2 [1866]; City of Kansas City V. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; Morton v. Sullivan, — Ky. , 96 S. W. 807, 29 Ky. L. Rep. '943 [1906]; Durrett v. Kenton Coun- ty, — (Ky.) , 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1173, 87 S. W. 1070 [1905] ;Ho!- lingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Rep. 220, 12 So. 1 [1893] ; Munson v. Board of Commis- sioners of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 43 La. Ann. 15 8 So. 906 [1891]; City of New Or- leans praying for opening of Casacaloo and Moreau Streets, 20 La. Ann. 497 [1868]; Beals V. James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245 [1899]; Holt v. City Council of Somerville, 127 Mass. 408 [1879]; Howe V. City of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 [1874]; Power v. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]; Goodrich v. City of De- troit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874] ; Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39, 2 Am. Rep. 76 [1869]; State ex rel. Hughes V. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905] ; State ex rel. Eaton v. Dis- trict Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 503, 104 N. W. 563 [1905]: State of Minnesata v. Robert P. Lewis Company, 72 Minn. 87, suh nomine; Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Company, 42 L. R. A. 639, 75 N. W. 108 [1898]; State of Min- nesota ex rel. Cunnintrham v. District Court of Bamsev Countv, 29 Minn. P2. 11 N. W. 133 [1S821: Smith v. Willis. 78 Miss. 243, 28 So. 878 [19001 : Dflilv V. Swone. 47 Miss. 367 [18721; South Hicrhland Laid and TrnTirrweTneit Co. v. Kpir^s Citv. 172 Mo. .•;'>S. 72 S. W. 944 [19021 : Heman V. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 881 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §549 fited by a given type of improvement is of great and sometimes of controlling weight.* In like manner the effect of the determina- tion of the city or other municipality or of the public officers to whom the legislature has entrusted the duty of determining what property is benefited, which is of great weight and which sometimes is controlling, is omitted from the present discussion. These questions are considered elsewhere.^ The question of what constitutes benefit in point of fact and what determines the amount of benefit is also reserved for discussion elsewhere." If property is benefited by a public improvement it may be assessed, although it belongs to a non-resident.' The same principles apply in cases of an improvement by a drainage or levee eor- 163 [1902]; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; Columbia Bottom Levee Company v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53 [1866]; State v. Several Parcels of Land, — ^Neb. , 113 N. W. 248 [1907]; Hart v. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. 836, 105 N. W. 546 [1905] ; Medland v. Linton, 60 Neb. 249, 82 N. W. 866 [1900]; Mc- Cormick v. City of Omaha, 37 Neb. 829, 56 N. W. 626 [1893]; Durrell V. City of Woodbury, — N. J. Sup. , 65 Atl. 198 [1906]; DeWitt v. City of Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. (27 Vroom) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]; State, Agens, Pros. v. Mayor and Common CoumEil of Newark, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729 [1874] ; State, Morris and Essex Railroad Company, Pros. v. Jersey City, 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 56 [1872]; State, Britton, Pros. v. Blake, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 208 [1871]; State Gregory, Pros. v. Mayor and Alder- men of Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 390 [1871]; Voght v. City of Buflfalo, 133 N. Y. 463, 31 N. E. 340 [1892] ; In the Matter of the Appli- cation of the Common Council of the City of Amsterdam to take Lands for the Extension of Grove and Jay Streets, 126 N. Y. 158, 27 N. E. 272 [1891]; Kennedy v. City of Troy, 77 N. Y. 493 [1879]; In the Matter of Broadway- Widening, 63 Barb. 572 [1872]; Mayor, etc., of New York v. Whitney, 7 Barb. 485 [1849]; Harper v. Commissioners of New Hanover County, 133 N. C. 106, 45 S. E. 526 [1903]; Erickson v. Casa County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; Maloy v. City of Marietta, 11 0. S. 636 [I860]; City of Toledo for Use V. Beaumont, 3 Ohio N. P. 287 [1895] ; Paulson v. City of Port- land, 16 Ore. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]; (affirmed, Paulsen V. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]); Allentown v. Henry, 73 Pa. St. 404 [1873]; In re Fifth Avenue Sewer, 4 Brewster (Pa.) 364 [1870]; Kettle v. City of Dallas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 [1904]; Violett v. City Council of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 53 Am. St. Rep. 825, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909 [1896]; Meggett V. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892]; Robinson v. City of Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 585, 21 N. W. 610 [1884]; Oilman v. City of Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 328, 13 N. W. 266 [1882]; Rabel v. City of Seat- tle, 44 Wash. 482, 87 Pac. 520 [1906]; Johnson v. City of Taooma, 41 Wash. 51, 82 Pac. 1092 [190S]. ' See § 553 et seq. ° See § 555 et seq. ' See § 652 et seq. ' Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 la. 416, 70 N. W. 605 [1897]. §549 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 882 poration. Under statutory authority land belonging to one not a member of such corporation may, if especially benefited, be assessed.' The question of want of especial benefits may also be waived by failure to raise it in the proper way." As has before been said,^" the general theory which underlies the doc- trine of local assessments is repudiated in some states, and it is there denied that there is any essential and vital connection between the local assessment and the especial and peculiar bene- fits for which such assessment is ordinarily said to be levied. "Where this doctrine is expressed or is entertained in any way, we find it said that it is not necessary that the land upon which the assessment is levied should receive an especial benefit by reason of the improvement for which such an assessment is levied.^^ The converse of the foregoing rule is also true. If property is not benefited in an especial and peculiar manner by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, it is not proper to assess the same for such improvement.'" This state- ' Columbia Bottom Levee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53 [1866]. ' Whiting V. Townsend, 57 Cal. 515 [1881]; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409. 66 S. W. 163 [1902]. ^9 See § 12. "Oliver v. Monona County, 117 Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 610 [1902]; Chi- cago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Rail- way Co. V. Phillips, 111 la. 377, 82 N. W. 787 [1900]. "Such an im- provement of a street is a public ob- ject which will support such an as- sessment regardless of the fact of whether or not it is a benefit to the abutting property." Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 la. 416, 70 N. W. 605 [1897]; (not affected by revers- al in Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 43 L. 665, 19 S. 379 [1899]). "Case of Isle of Ely, 10 Rep. 141 a.; City of Hartford v. West Middle District, 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. 687 [1878]; Benson V. Biintin"', 141 Cal. 462, 75 Pac. 59 [1903]; Parker v. Reay, 76 Cal. 103 [18?8V PciiiiTracker v. Toberman. 56 Cal. .508 ri880]: AUman v. Di=tnct of Columbia. 3 Anp. D. C. 8 [18941; Clark V. City of Chicago, 214 111. 318, 72 N. E. 358 [1905]; West Chi- cago Park Comrs. v. Chicago Ter- minal Transfer Railroad Company, 183 111. 68, 56 N. E. 1134 [1899]; Johnson v. People ex rel. Kocher- sperger, 177 111. 64, 52 N. E. 308 [1898]; Culver v. City of Chicago, 171 111. 399, 49 N. E. 573 [1898]; City of Chicago v. Adcock, 168 111. 221, 48 N. E. 155 [1897]; Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 III. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Edwards v. City of Chi- cago, 140 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893]; The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]; The City of Bloomington v. The Chicago and Alton R. R. Com- pany, 134 111. 451, 26 N. . E. 366 [1890]; Mascall v. Commissioners of Drainage District, 122 111. 620, 14 N. E. 47 [1889]; Parks County Coal Company v. Campbell, 140 Ind. 28, 39 N. E. 149 [1894]; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; Bate v. Sheets, 64 Ind. 209 [1878]; Tillman v. Kirchef, 64 Ind. 104 [1878] ; Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. Phillips, 111 la. 377, P2 N. W. 787 883 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. .§549 ment of this rule, like the statement of the former rule, omits for the present both the question of the effect of proper determin- ation by the legislature, city or authorized public officers as to what land is benefited and also the question of what amounts to an especial and peculiar benefit. The true reason that prop- erty which is not benefited in an especial degree should not be assessed is to be found in the very nature of the assessing power. The only right which the legislature possesses by virtue of its power to assess, is to assess property benefited by a public improvement in proportion to and not exceeding the benefits conferred by such improvement. To use such a power as a jus- tification for a tax levied upon property which is not benefited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, would be to attempt to support by the theory of the power of local assessment, an exaction which has none of the elements of the local assessment. Another reason that property not benefited [1900]; HoHingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Rep. 220, 12 So. 1 [1893]; Munson v. Board of Commissioners of The Atohafalaya Basin Levee District, 43 La. Ann. 15, 8 So. 906 [1893]; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220 [1856]; Lincoln v. Board of Street Commis- sioners of the City of Boston, 176 Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900] ; State V. Pillsbury, 82 Minn. 359, 85 N. W. 175 [1901]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunningham v. District Court of Ramsey County, 29 Minn. 62, UN. W. 133 [1882]; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541 [1878]; Hanscom v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]; Vreeland v. Mayor, etc., of Bayonne, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 126, 32 Atl. 68 [1895]; State, New Jer- sey- Railroad & Transportation Co., Pros. V. City of F/li'abeth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 330 [1875]; State. Kin«, Pros. V. Tfped. 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 186 [18811; State, wSVinkle, Pros. v. .Inhabitants of the Town'liip of Clin- ton. S9 N. J. T,. (10 Vroom) 656 [18771: State. Hunt. Pros. v. Mayor and Crtrarr'^n Council of tlie Cjtv of Rahwav. 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 646 [1877]; State, Mann, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jer- sey City, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 662 [1855]; People ex rel. Keim v. Des- mond, 186 N. Y. 232, 78 N. E. 857 [1906]; (reversing, 97 N. Y. S. 795, 111 App. Div. 757 [1906]) ; Ericlfson V. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; Chicago & Erie Rail- road Company v. Keith, 67 O. S. 279, 60 L. E. A. 525, 65 N. E. 1020 [1902] ; Ford V. City of Toledo, 64 0. S. 92, 59 N. E. 779 [1901]; Bloch v. God- frey, 26 Ohio C. C. R. 781 [1904J; Hildebrand v. Toledo, 27 Ohio C. C. R. 427 [1905]; Bowler v. Biddinger ■^-ee Turnpike Co., 6 W. L. B. (Ohio) 404 [1881]; Oregon & Cali- fornia R. E. Co. V. City of Portland, 25 Or. 229, 22 L. R. A. 713, 35 Pac. 452 [1894]; Beechwood Avenue Sewer ( 1 ) Pittsburg's Appeal ( 1 ) , 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 [1897]; Philadelphia to Use of Westor v. Spring Garden Farmers Market Com- panv, 161 Pa. St. 522, 29 Atl. 286 [18941: Kettle v. City of Dallas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 632. 80 S. W. 874 [1904]; PJoyden v. Villa<='e of Brat- tlfiboro, 65 Vt. 504, 27 Atl. 164 [1893]. ■§"550 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 884 cannot be assessed is found in the constitutional provisions which forbid the taking of property except by due process of law." This reason is not necessarily inconsistent with the former rea- son. Taking by legitimate taxation is not a taking without due process of law. Taking under guise of taxation or of that branch of that power of taxation known as local assessment, in defiance of the essential elements of such power, is a taking of property without due process of law. On^ who resides upon certain land, but has no interest therein^ cannot be assessed for an improvement which results in benefit to such land." Accordingly, the legisla- ture cannot charge persons who reside upon a given street with the expense of improving such street." The rule that only prop- erty which receives a special benefit from a public improvement can be assessed, while applicable to assessments levied upon the theory of benefits, has no application to assessments which are in the nature of charges for the performance of a legal duty which the owner of certain realty is bound to perform for the benefit of the public. "When charges of this sort are involved the land which may be assessed is the land with reference to which the owner thereof owes the legal duty for the non-per- formanee of which the charge is exacted.^" Thus, while the con- struction of a sidewalk along real property ordinarily confers a benefit upon it, the owner of such real property may be com- pelled in most states to construct such sidewalk at his own expense without any reference to the fact of benefits conferred by such improvement.^' § 550. The assessment district. From the nature of the local assessment it is generally neces- sary that the assessment district be laid out and defined before assessment can be apportioned and levied.' Under a statute "Oregon & California R. R. Co. L. {8 Vr.) 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729 V. City of Portland, 25 Ore. 229, 22 [1874]. L. R. A. 713, 35 Pac. 452 [1894]. "State, Agens, Pros. v. Mayor and See 5 118. Common Council of NewarkrS7-N. J. " Creighton V. Manson, 27 Cal. 614 L. (8 Vr.) 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729 [1865]. [1874]. "Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 614 'Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, [1865]. 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; German Sav- " Ptate, Affens, Pros. v. Mavor and in^s and Loan Society v. Ramish, Common Council of Newark, 37 N. J. 138 Cal. 1120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pae. 1067 885 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §550 authorizing council to assess such non-abutting lands as will in their opinion be specially benefited and requiring the council to fix the amount to be so assessed, it has been held that non- abutting lands cannot be assessed unless the same are fixed and designated.^ It is not necessary, however, that the assessment district should be defined in advance.' This is the general and proper method of procedure, but special circumstances may make it necessary to depart therefrom.* Thus, if to define the assess- ment district in, advance would result in placing the assessment of damages and benefits in different hands to be managed sep- arately, the district should not be laid out in advance.' By stat- ute, however, it may be provided specifically that an assessment district must be laid out as a preliminary step in assessment proceedings." By statute, it may be made necessary to divide the entire city into assessment districts for improvements of a given •character, such as sewers, before any improvement is constructed. In the absence of unequivocal language, this construction will not, however, be adopted.^ In laying off such assessment dis- trict the legislature may ignore the boundaries of counties, town- ships and municipalities.* If the city is authorized to create special assessment districts within the city, it may include the [1902]; Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 "Boehme v. City of Monroe, 106 111. 596 [1879]; Oliver v. Monona Mich. 401, 64 N. W. 204 [1895]; County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 In the Matter of the Appeal of Pow- [1902]; Edwards V. Cooper, 168 Ind. ers, 29 Mich. 504 [1874]; Strow- 54, 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]; City of bridge v. City of Portland, 8 Ore. 67 Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. 296, 25 [1879]. Pac. 605 [1801]; Goodrich v. City * In the Matter of the Appeal of of Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. Powers, 29 Mich. 504 [1874]; Eyer- 255 [1900]; Boehme v. City of Mon- man v. Blalcsley, 78 Mo. 145 [1883]; roe, 106 Mich. 401, 64 N. W. 204 Strowbridge v. City of Portland, 8 [1895]; In the Matter of the Appeal Ore. 67 [1879]. of Jr-owers, 29 Mich. 504 [1874]; City "In the Matter of tlie Appeal of of Asheville v. Wachovia Loan & Powers, 29 Mich. 504 [1874]. Trust Co., 143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. °In the Matter of the Petition of 800 [1908]; Kaymond v. Cleveland, Ford to Vacate an Assessment, 6 42 0. S. 522 [1885]; Kelly v. City Lansing (N. Y.) 92 [1872]. of Cleveland, 34 0. S. 468 [1878J. 'In the Matter of the Application By '-.tatute the necessity for a dis- of the Protestant Episcopal Public trict may be dispensed with. Wilson School to Vacate an Assessment, 40 V. City of Cincinnati, 5 Ohio N. P. Howard 198 [1870]. '68 [1897]. ' Board of Commissioners of County ' Kelly V. City of Cleveland, 34 0. of Monroe v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, S. 468 [1878]. 46 N. E. 124 [1876]. §■550 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 886 entire city in an assessment district." A city may create a new sewer district within the limits of a larger sewer district.^" Power to create sewer districts includes power to create sub-districts.^^ The fact that a city council has fixed an assessment district for the cost of opening a street and subsequently the council of such city, after a change of membership, fixed a slightly different district for the grading and curbing of such street in which two tracts included in the first^district were omitted, does not invalidate the second district." Authority to grade and improve streets at the expense of the owners of adjacent lots impliedly confers power to create assessment districts consisting of such adjacent lots.^^ A statute giving specific authority to cities hav- ing a population exceeding a given amount to create special assess- ment districts does not give such authority to cities having a smaller population." The commissioners who are to lay out the work and report to the court upon the limits of the assessment district, may change the boundaries thereof at any time before the court has finally declared the district established, subject to the ultimate approval of the court." If an assessment district has been laid out and subsequently the improvement has been extended so as to benefit other lands, it has been held tliat the question of the determina- tion of the assessment district should be considered again and that it is improper to leave the district as it was fixed with reference to the original plan of the improvement." On the other hand, if the remedy provided by law in such a case is mandamus to compel the addition to the district of the land benefited by the extension, failure to extend the district does not make the assessment in- valid.^^ Under a statute providing that the subdivisions of a dis- • Minnesota & M. Land and Im- "State v. Moss, 44 Wash. 1129, 86 provement Co. v. City of Billinss. HI Pae. 1129 [1906]. Fed. Rep. 972, 50 C. C. S. 70 [1901] ; "State v. Moss, 44 Wash. 1129, 86 Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 Pae. 1129 [1906]. la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]. "Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Land- •" Shannon v. City of Omaha, 73 in? Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. Neb. 507, 103 N. W. 53, 106 N. W. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]. 592 [1905]. "Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, " McGilvery V. City of Lewiston, 13 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]; City of Co Idaho 338, 90 Pae. 348 [1907]. lumbus v. Storey, 35 Ind. 97 [1871]. " Harriman v. Citv f'f Yonkers, " Heinroth v. Kochersnerger, 173 181 N. Y. 24, 73 N. E. 493; (affirm- 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1898]. ing judgment, 81 N. Y. S. 823, 82 App. Div. 408 [1903]). 887 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 550 trict, or joint district, should not be changed after a sewer has been constructed therein, it has been held that where a number of small districts have been combined into joint districts, it is still possible to combine all of such districts into a larger joint district in order to construct a sewer which will complete the drainage system of all of such districts." A drainage district may be laid out within the boundaries of a pre-existing drainage district.^" If an improvement has not been completed, the assessment district as originally laid out may be changed.^" In the absence of specific statutory provision, it is not necessary that lands assessed for the original construction of a ditch or drain should be assessed for the repair thereof.^^ Only lands benefited by such repair should be assessed therefor.^^ However, it has been held that the legisla- ture may provide specifically that the land which is assessed for the original construction of the ditch or drain should be assessed for the repair thereof. ^^ In case of reassessment, it is not neces- sary that the district as originally fixed for assessment purposes, should be assessed.^* Land in such district which is not benefited, or upon which the original assessment has been paid voluntarily,^^ may be omitted. Land outside of such original district which is benefited, may be included.^" If the statute which defines the property which may be assessed for a given improvement has been changed after the original assessment has been made and before "People ex rel. Miller v. Scott, [1894]; Morrow v. Greeting, 15 132 III. 427, 23 N. E. 1119 [1891]. Ind. App. 358, 41 N. E. 848, 44 N. "South Highland Land Improve- E. 59 [1896]; Dean v. Treasurer of ment Company v. Kansas City, 172 Clinton County, 146 Mich. 645, 109 Mo. 523, 72 S. W. 944 [1902]. N. W. 1131 [1906]. "The City of St. Joseph ex rel. v. » Scott v. Stringley, 132 Ind. 378, Farrel, 106 Mo. 437, 17 S. W. 497 31 N. E. 953 [1892]. [1891]. « State ex rel. Eaton >r. District "Goodrich v. City of Minonk, 62 Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 111. 121 [1871]; Roundenbush v. 503, 104 N. W. 553 [1905]; In the Mitchell, 154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. [1900]; Parke County Coal Company 261 [1874]; In the Matter of Broad- V. Campbell, 140 Ind. 28, 39 N. E. way Widening, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 572 149 [1894]; Morrow v. Greeting, 15 [1872]; Cline v. City of Seattle, 13 Ind. App. 358, 41 N. E. 848, 44 N. Wash. 444, 43 Pac. 367 [189R1, E. 59 [1896]; Dean v. Treasurer of == State ex rel. Eaton v. District Clinton County, 146 Mich. 645, 109 Court of Ramsev Countv, 95 Minn. N. W. 1131 [1906]. 503. 104 N. W. 553 [19051. = Roundenbush v. Mitchell. 154 '"State ex rel. Eaton v. District Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]; Court of Ramsey County. 95 Minn. Parke County Coal Company v. 503, 104 N. W. 553 [1906], Campbell, 140 Ind. 28, 39 N. E. 149 ' § 551 ■ TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 888 the reassessment, the reassessment should be made in aeeordanee with the law in force at the time at which it is made.^' § 551. Description of assessment district. It is not necessary specifically to state that the assessment district is situated in the state, the county or the city, since it will be presumed that it is in the city by which such assessment is levied.^ A description of an ^assessment district is sufficient, if it would have constituted a valid description of land in a convey- ance,^ or a sufiicient description in an act of the legislature of a political district or municipal corporation." Thus, where a street called Sixth Street ran east, then turned in a semi-circle at almost right angles and ran south, a description of the assessment district as extending ' ' to the easterly side of Sixth Street ' ' was held to be sufficiently definite.* It is not necessary that the assessment district should be defined by ordinance in the absence of a statute specifically requiring such definition.^ It is sufficient, if the entire record of the tax proceeding clearly shows what property is to be assessed.* Where a plat or diagram has been filed with the city clerk, showing all the parcels of land abutting on the portion of street to be paved, and showing the relative location of each lot, the lot numbers, the names of the various plats where the land has been platted, the frontage and boundary lines of each lot and the names of the owners of each, it has been held that a resolution of the city council, which describes the assessing dis- trict as, "all the lots, premises and parcels of land fronting upon" the part of the street to be paved, "as shown by a map of the proposed district on file in the office of the city clerk," is a suffi- ciently definite description of the assessed district;'' Under a ■"Cline V. Citv of Seattle, 13 Wash. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. E. A. 444, 43 Pac. 367 [1896]'. 755, 28 Pae. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891]. '■ Kansas City v. Napieeek, — Kan. * German Savings & Loan Society , 92 Pac. 827 [1907]. v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pae. 89. ^German Savings and Loan Society 70 Pae. 1067 [1902]. V. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, °City of Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. 70 Pac. 1067 [1902]; Thomason v. 296, 25 Pac. 605 [18fll]; State ex Cuneo, 119 Cal. 2'5, 50 Pac. 846 rel. Peters v. Mayor and Common [1897] ; Central Irrigation District Council of City of Newark, 31 N. J. V. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 352, 21 Pac. L. (2 Vr.) 360. 825. 'Citv nf Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. . 'In the Matter of the Bonds of the 29R. 25 Pac. 605 [1891]. Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. ' Boehme v. Citv of Monroe. 106 Mich. 401, 64 N. W. 204 [1896]. 889 PROPERTV SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. % 551 statute authorizing au asseosment to be levied upon the lots front- ing the street, along which a sewer is to be constructed, it is not necessary that the city should formally lay out an assessment district for such improvement.* Even if the statute provides that the common council must "describe or designate the lot and premises or locality to be assessed, " it is held that it is sufSeient to describe the taxing district as the property fronting upon the improvement for which the assessment is to be levied." So a description of property as "contiguous," "adjacent" and "abut- ting" has been held sufficient as fixing the assessment district.^" A description of the improvement, as consisting of plank side- walks to be constructed upon a given street between two others named, is h'eld, when taken in connection with the statute author- izing the property situated upon the improvement to be assessed, to be a sufficient description of the assessment district.^^ At the time that a commissioner was appointed to lay out an assessment distHct, the statute required the assessment district to be de- scribed by boundaries. After such appointment, but before the assessment roll was filed, the statute was amended so as to make it necessary to describe the assessment district by boundaries only in case of sewer imnrovements. It has been held that such assessment roll was valid if it described the property to be assessed with sufficient accuracy, although it did not describe the assessment district by boundaries.^^ If, in the description of the assessment district bv courses and distances and by monuments,' the calls for the angles and the directions of the lines are at vari- ance with the calls for the streets and the fixed points upon them, the streets will be regarded as monuments and the calls therefor will control the calls for angles and directions of the boundary lines." The resolution of a city council described an assessment district as including "North Fourth Avenue, from the north side of Primrose Avenue to the northerly city line." Primrose Ave- nue started at Fourth Avenue and ran east, but did not cross Fourth Avenue or extend west thereon. It was held that under 'White V. Harris, 103 Cal. 528, 37 '"Field v. City of Chieasfo, 198 111. Pac. 502 ri8941. 224, 64 N. E. 840 [1902]; (distin- » ritv nf TCalatnazoo v. Franeoiae, p'uishins; Yagey v. City of Chicago, 115 Mich. 554. 73 N. W. 801 [1898]. 194 111. 88, 62 K E. 316 [1901]). "T!avTT,nnd v. Cleveland, 42 0. S. "Thomason v. Cuneo, 119 Cal. 25, .5'22 [18851. . 50 Pac. 846 [1897]. "Die-ffins v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]. § 551 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 890 such description, property on the west side of Fourth Avenue north of Primrose Avenue was included." If the statute requires the assessment district to be described by a resolution of the council "specifying the exterior boundaries" of the district to be assessed, an ordinance which described such district as con- sisting of "all lots and parcels of land fronting" on a certain street between two other specified streets, is not sufficient." Such ordinance does not show the extent of the district either way from the part of the street whtch is to be improved.*" Under statutory provisions, it is necessary to describe an assessment district, if non-abutting property is to be assessed, and failure so to do renders the assessment invalid.*' Under a statute fixing the assessment district at a mile and one-half on either side of the turnpike for the construction of which the assessment is levied, a location of the proposed turnpike on the route of an exist- ing turnpike, or "as near thereto as practicable," has been held to be too indefinite, since it is not possible from such description to mark out the boundaries of the assessment district.*' That a tract of land connected voluntarily with a drainage district is so described that some of the land therein cannot be identified, is said not to ■ be a defense available to those whose lands are properly described.** A drainage district, described as bounded on the west, north and east by the ' ' summit of the ridge ' ' forming the water shed, and on the south side by the proposed canal, or where the canal does not extend by arable lands, was held upon the first hearing to be sufficiently described as to the north, east and west boundaries and on a re-hearing was held valid as to the south boundary, also.*"" If the property abutting a street is made an assessment district for the improvement thereof, the fact that the city has constructed a portion of such street with- out letting contracts therefor, and has paid for such improve- ment out of its general funds, does not show that the assessment " Farrington v. City of Mt. Ver- " Turner v. Thorntown and Mechan- non, 166 N. Y. 233, 59 N. E. 826 icsburg Gravel Road Company, 33 [1901]. Ind. 317 [1870]. •"Dehail v. Morford, 95 Cal. 457, "People ex rel. Herman v. Com- 30 Pac. 593 [1892]. missioners of Bug River Special "Dehail v. Morford, 95 Cal. 457, Drainage District, 189 111. 55, 59 N. 30 Pac. 593 [1892]. B. 605. " Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, " Richard v. Cypremort Drainage - la. , 115 N. W. 582 [1908]. District. 107 La'. 657, 32 So. 27 [1901-1902]. 891 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 552 district is to be restricted to the land abutting the rest of such street.^"- If, however, a street is improved in sections under dif- ferent ordinances and the land opposite each section is made an assessment district, land opposite one section cannot be assessed for the improvement of another section.^- In the absence of a statute requiring the exterior boundaries of an assessment district to be specified, a description of the property assessed as that fronting on the improvement is sufficient.^' If, however, the stat- ute requires the council to specify the exterior boundaries of the district to be assessed, a description of the land as that fronting on a given street between two intersecting streets is insufficient.^* § 552. Legislative discretion in laying out assessment district. The legislature has a wide discretion in determining the area of the assessment district upon which an assessment is to be levied ; and it may confer a similar discretion upon a city or other public corporation. Accordingly, unless such discretion is exceeded, com- plaint cannot be made that the assessment- district does not in- clude all the territory which possibly might have been included within it.^ Thus, it may be provided that only land bordering upon the actual improvement is to be assessed.^ Land which borders upon a part of a street which has already been improved may be omitted from an assessment district formed to pay the cost of improving the rest of the street.' If a street is constructed "^Town of Tumwater v. Pix, 18 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]; Wash. 163, 51 Pac. 353. Smith v. City of Toledo, 24 O. S. =^ Smith V. Small, 50 Mo. App. 126 [1873]; Creighton v. Scott, 14 401 [1892]. O. S. 438 [1863]; Weston v. Com- '^ White V. Harris, 103 Cal. 528, 37 missioners of Hamilton Co., 6 Ohio C. Pac. 502 [1894]; Eonan v. People ex C. 641 [1892]; Blount v. City of rel. Shafter, 193 111. 631, 61 N. E. Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. 1042 [1901]. "MeSherry v. Wood, 102 Cal. 647, "Dehail v. Morford, 95 Cal. 457, 36 Pac. 1010 [1894]; McDonald v. 30 Pae. 593 [1892]. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 'McSherry v. Wood, 102 Cal. 647, [1893]; Kendig v. Knight, 60 la. 29, 36 Pac. 1010 [1894]; McDonald v. 14 N. W. 78 [1882]; Smith v. City ConnifT, 99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 of Toledo, 24 0. S. 126 [1873]; [1893]; Bacon v. Mayor and Alder- Creighton v. Scott, 14 0. S. 438 men of Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. [1863]. E. 580 [1890]; Bradford v. City of "McSherry v. Wood, 102 Cal. 647, Pontiae, 165 111. 612, 46 N. E. 794 36 Pac. 1010 [1894]; McDonald v. [18971; Gilcreat v. McCartney, 97 Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 la. 138, 66 N. W. 103 [1896]: Ken- [1893]; Kendisr v. Knight, 60 la. 29, dig V. Kniffht, 60 la. 29, 14 N. W. 14 N. W. 78 [1882]; Smith v. City 78 [1882]; Power V. City of Detroit, of Toledo, 24 0. S. 126 [1873]; § 553 T.ULA.TION BY ASSESSMENT.' 892 in different parts of different materials, assessment districts may be formed of' land bounding. on each separate section.* If the street is of different widths, each section may be treated as a separate improvement.^ If, however, the statute provides for levying the assessment for a street as an entirety, the public cor- poration cannot levy separate assessments for separate sections upon the property bounding on each section, although the sections are constructed of different materials." Such division into sec- tions for purposes of apportionment is not necessary, if not re- quired by statute.^ The action of a city council in boundina: an assessment district for opening a street by lines three hundred feet on. each side of such street cannot be reviewed bj^ the courts." If the assessment district is so small as to impose an assessment greatly in excess of benefits upon the property assessed, a clear abuse of discretion exists and the assessment is invalid." § 553. Power of legislature to determine what lands are bene- fited. The question of what property is benefited by a public improve- ment is said to be a legislative question. '^ This statement means Creifrhton v. Scott, 14 0. S. 438 peculiarly benefited by the entire [1863] ; Northern Indiana R. R. Co. paving of the street and the assess- V. Connelly, 10 0. S. 159 [1859]. See ment should be laid with relation to to the same eifect Blount v. City of the benefit derived by the imprdve- Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. ment as a whole. It cannot under '■ Bradford v. City of Pontiac, 165 the conditions in this case be divided 111. 612, 46 N. E. 794 [1897]; Gilcrest up and one-half assessed one way V. McCartney, 97 la. 138, 66 N. W. and another another." Cossitt Land 103 [1896]. Co. V. Neuscheler, — N. J. , 60 ''Bacon v. City of Mayor and Al- Atl. 1128 [1905]. dermen of Sava,hnah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 ' Smith v. City of Cincinnati, 6 S. E. 580 [1890]. Ohio N. P. 175 [1898]. ° Cossitt Land Co. v. Neuscheler, — * Power v. City of Detroit, 139 N. J. Sup. — , 60 Atl. 1128 [1905]. Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]. Where part of the street was paved " Clay v. Grand Rapids, 60 Mich, with brick and part with asphalt, 451, 27 N. W. 596 [1886]. and each section was treated as a ' Illinois Central Railroad Com- sep.arate improvement, the court pany v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 197, said: "The basis they did take is 37 L. 132, 13 S. 293 [1893]; Baiiaz evidently unjustifiable. It imposes v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 Pac. 309' upon the owners of property on the [1901]; Hadley v." Da Oliver v. Monona County, 117 La. 1046, 35 So. 283 [1903] ; Hughes Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Chi- v. Board of Commissioners of Caddo cago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Rail- Levee District, 108 La. 146, 32 So. way Company v. Phillips, 111 la. 218 [1901-1902]; Hill v. Fontenot, 377, 82 N. W. 787 [1900]. 46 La. Ann. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; ^''Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, George v. Youns, 45 La. Ann. 1232, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 986 [1897]; (revers- 14 So. 137 [1893]; Smith v. Mayor ing, District of Columbia v. Armes, and Aldermen of Worcester, 182 8 App. D. C. 393 [1896] ; Bauman v. Mass. 232, 59 L. R. A. 728, 65 N. E. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896]; Ab- 40 [1902]; Smith v. Willis, 78 Miss, tott V. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 289 243, 28 So. 878 [1900]; McMillan v. [1896]); Duncan v. Eamish, 142 . City of Butte, 30 Mont. 220, 76 Pac. Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; Banaz 203 [1904]. V. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, C5 Pac. 309 ''In. the Matter of the Bonds of [1901]; Hadley v. Da-'ue, 130 Cal. the Madera Irrigation District, 92 ■207, 62 Pac. 500 [1900] ; In the Mat- Cal. 296, .27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 I,. ter of the Bonds of the Madera Irri- R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 28 Pac. 675 gation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. [1891]; City of Ottawa v. Macy, 20 §554 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 898 conclusiveness of legislative determination seem to be applied alike to both classes of eases, as far as can be deduced from the somewhat vague and general language used. However, in spite of similarity between the two classes of cases in the abstract state- ment of the principles controlling, the legislative determination is attacked with success in cases in which it is claimed that prop- erty not benefited is included, far oftener than in cases in which it is claimed that property benefited is excluded from the assess- ment district.^* § 554. Legislative determination conclusive as to subordinate officials. If a district has been fixed by the legislature, or by public corporation, or official authorized by statute, subordinate officials cannot omit from assessment any of the land within such district, if such omission will materially increase the assessment upon the rest of the land assessed.^ This principle has been applied to 111. 413 [1858]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903] ; State, Society for Bstabliah- ing Useful Manufactures, Proa. v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Pat- erson, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 615 [1880] ; State, Board of Chosen Free- holders of the County of Hudson, Pros. V. Peterson Avenue and Secau- cus Road Commissioners, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 83 [1879]; People ex rel. Crowell V. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 178 [1862]; Weston v. Commissioners of Hamilton County, 6 Ohio C. C. 641 [1892]; City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pae. 1077 [1891]. (Where it was claimed un- successfully that the legislature could not provide for assessing the land only, exclusive of the improve- ments thereon.) " "Whether the assessment shall be confined to contiguous property, or whether all property benefited shall bear a part of the burden the instru- ment is silent, and as the les;islature has the right to confer the power without restriction in this recrard. we are aware of no reason why that oower mav not be exercised." Lake V. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596, 601 [1879]; (quoted in West Chicago Park Commissioners v. Farber, 171 111. 146, 158, 49 N. E. 427 [1898]). ^Diggins V. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]; People of the State of California v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]'; Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Landing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; Nevins and Otter Creek Township Draining Company v. Al- kire, 36 Ind. 189 [1871]; Greencas- tle and Bowling Green Turnpike Company v. Albin, 34 Ind. 554 [1870]; Bobbins v. Sand Creek Turn- pike Company, 34 Ind. 461 [1870]; Hardwick v. Danville and North Salem Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 321 [1870]; New Haven and Fort Wayne Turnpike Company v. Bird, 33 ind. 325 [1870]; Drake v. Grout, 21 Ind. App. 534, 52 N. E. 775 [1898]; Beck v. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pac. 410 [19031; State, Cul- ver, Pros. v. Town of Bersen in the County of Hudson. 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 266 [18611; People ex reL Connelly v. Rpis. 96 N. Y. S. 597, 109 App. Div. 748 [1905]; People ex 899 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. .§ 554 asse^ments for streets,^ roads," sewers,* and drains." In this respect local assessment differs from general taxation, since the improper omission of property from general taxation does not invalidate the tax." Thus, where the council had determined that a certain specifically described district was benefited by an im- provement and the commissioners appointed to apportion the benefits, divided such district into two parts and found that one part was not benefited at all, it was held that such action on the part of the commissioners was invalid.^ If the drainage com- missioners have determined what land is. benefited, a jury sub- sequently appointed to assess damages and benefits has no power to determine that certain land within the limits fixed by such commissioners is not benefited. The determination of the drain- age commissioners is final and cannot be ignored by the jury." The omission from assessment of property within the dis- trict as determined is not, however, ground for enjoining the construction of the improvement in the absence of a show- ing that there is not in existence a sufficient fund to pay the cost of such improvement, outside of such assessment." If an assessment is levied for the construction of a road by a turnpike company, and the assessors are appointed by the county commissioners and omit part of the land within the assess- ment district, such conduct is not ground for an information against the company, since the assessors are not appointed by the rel Tietjen v. Eeis, 96 N. Y. S. 601, ' People ex rel. Connelly v. Eeis, 109 App. Div. 919 [1905-]; City of 96 N. Y. S. 597, 109 App. Div. 748 Scranton v. Levere, 200 Pa. St. 56, [1905]; People ex rel. Tietjen v. Reis, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]; Fraser v. Mu- 96 N. Y. S. 601, 109 App. Div. 919 lanv 129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1905]; City of Scranton v. Levers, [1906]. 200 Pa. St. 56, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]. ^ Drake v. Grout, 21 Ind. App. 534, = Nevins and Otter Creek Township 52 N. E. 775 [1898]; State, Culver, Draining Company v. Alkire, 36 Ind. Pros V Town of Bergen in the 189 [1871]; Fraser v. Mulany, 129 County of Hudson, 29 N. J. L. (5 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]. Dutch.) 266 [1861]. "Van Deventer v. Long Island 'Greencaatle and Bowling Green City, 139 N. Y. 133, 34 N. E. 774 Turnpike Company v. Albin, 34 Ind. [1893]. 554 [1870]- Robbins v. Sand Creek ' Ellwood v. City of Rochester, 122 Turnpike Company, 34 Ind. 461 N. Y. 229, 25 N. E. 238 [1890]. [1870]; Hardwick v. Danville and » Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Land- North Salem Gravel Road Company, in-^ nvainase District No. 1, 131 111. 33 Ind. 321 [1870]; New Haven and 446. 2.S N. E. 633 [1890]. Fort Wavne Turnnike Company v. "Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545 Bird, 33 Ind. 325 [1870]. [1881]. §554 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 900 company nor subject, to its control." Since the legislature has p,b^er to provide that commissioners specially appointed for that purpose may determine in the first instance what land is benefited, tlie legislature may provide for the laying out of an assessment district and then permit the commissioners to determine what property in such district is in fact benefited.^^ Accordingly, if the jury appointed to assess benefits assesses certain land in the district, and further reports ^hat ' ' against all property in the benefit district not herein specifically described and assessed with benefits, we find and assess no benefits," it has been held that such report is proper and that it cannot be said that the jury has omitted to assess property within such district." An omission of property within the district as laid out which does not result in materially increasing the assessment upon the rest of the property within such district, cannot be objected to by such property own- ers.^^ If the omission of such land within the assessment district results in an increase of the assessment upon the rest of the property in such district, it has been said that the remaining property owners cannot enjoin the collection of such assessment without tendering the amount which is actually due.^* If the legislature or public corporation or official authorized by statute has determined what property is benefited, has laid out an assessment district, such determination cannot be revised by sub- ordinate officials. Accordingly, such subordinate officials cannot include in the assessment, land outside of such district, even if in fact benefited.^^ If the legislature has determined what "State on the Relation of Lingen- ark, 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 felter v. Danville and North Salem Atl. 276 [1891]. Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 133 " City of Ottawa v. Barney, 10 [1870]. Kan. 270 [1872]. "■ Reclamation District No. 3 v. " Benson v. Bunting,. 141 Cal. 462, Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 75 Pac. 59 [1903]; Miller v. Mayo, [1884]; City of Atchison v. Price, 45 88 Cal. 568, 26 Pac. 364 [1891]; Lill Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605 [1891]; Kan- v. City of Chicago, 29 111. 31 [1861]; sas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 City of Ottawa v. Macy, 20 111. 413 8.. W. 860 [1898]. ^ [1858]; State ex rel. Keith v. Com- '^ Kansas City v. Baoon, 147 Mo. mon Council of the City of Michigan 259, 48 S. W. 860 [1898]. City, 138 Ind. 455, 37 N. E. 1041 "Ottumwa Brick & Construction [1894] ; Caldwell v. Rupert, 10 Bush. Go. V. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. (73 Ky.) 179 [1873]; People ex rel. 510 [1899] ; State, Humphreys, Pros. Nostrand v. Wilson, 119 N. Y. 515, V. Mayor and Council of the City of 23 N. E. 1064 [1890]; Wheeler v. Bayonne, 60 N. J. L. 406, 38 Atl. Treasurer of Muskingum County, 3 761 [1897] ; Davis v. City of New- Ohio C. C. 596 [1889] ; Park Avenue 901 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §554 property is benefited, the city cannot assess property outside-.of the limits of the district as marked out by the determination of the legislature." Thus, if the legislature has determined that only land fronting on an improvement,^' or abutting thereon,^' or bounding and abutting thereon," is benefited by such iin- provement, the city has no power to assess the property bene- fited by such improvement, if any of the property benefited lies outside of the assessment district as fixed by the legislature. If the council has exercised its power to determine what property is benefited, the commissioners or appraisers to apportion such assessment upon the property benefited cannot modify or revise the determination of the council either by excluding property which the council has determined is benefited, or by adding, lOther property thereto.^" If the exercise of discretion as to what property is benefited is given to the council, it cannot delegate such discretion to other officers. ^^ Thus, where a city fixed an assessment district, a contract which provides for doing the work and assessing the cost thereof upon a district different froin that fixed by the ordinance of the city council^ is invalid.^- If, on the other hand, the legislature has given to commissioners specially appointed for that purpose, power to determine what property is benefited and thus to lay out the assessment district, the city council cannot, by restricting the district to the property contigu- ous to the improvement, prevent the commissioners from inelud- Sewers, Appeal of Parker, 169 Pa. '= Fifty Fourth St., Pittsburgh's St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1895]; Beech- Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 wood Avenue Sewer, Pittsburg's Ap- [1894]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- peal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 ber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. [1897]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- 123 [1893]. ber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. " Kelly v. City of Cleveland, 34 0. 123 [1893]; Fraser v. Mulany, 129 S. 468 [1878]. Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]. '"Kansas City Grading Company v. '« Miller v. Mayo, 88 Cal. 568, 26 Holden, 107. Mo. 305, 17 S. W. 798 Pac. 364 [1891]; Kelly v. City 'of [1891]; Ellwood v. City of Roclies- Cleveland, 34 0. S. 468 [1878]; ter, 122 N. Y. 229, 25 N. E. 238 Wheeler v. Treasurer of Muskino-um [1890]; Hassen v. City of Rochester, County, 3 Ohio C. C. 596 [18S9]; 65 N. Y. 516 [1875]. Fifty Fourth St., Pittsburgh's Ap- ^ Such as assessors. Savage v. peal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 City of Buffalo, 59 Hun. 606, 14 N. [1894]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- Y. Supp. 101 [1891]. ber's Apnea], 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. ==Haiseli v. City of Seattle, ' 10 123 [1893]. Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 [1894]. "Miller v. Mayo, 88 Cal. 568, 26 Pac. 364 [1891]. §555 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 902 ing property benefited by the improvement but not contiguous thereto.^* § 555. Delegation of power to public corporation. The legislature may delegate to municipal corporations the power to determine what property within such municipal corpora- tion is especially benefited by public improvements.^ The deter- mination of the city, under stakites of this character, is said to be final and conclusive in the absence of fraud,^ or fraud or mis- " In the Matter of Westlake Ave- nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]. "^ Minnesota & M. Land & Improve- ment Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. Rep. 972, 60 C. C. A. 70 [1901] ; Eng- lish V. Territory, — Ariz. , 89 Pae. 501 [1907]; Board of Improve- ment District No. Five of Texarkana V. Offenhauser, 84 Ark. 257, 105 S. W. 266 [1907] ; Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904J; Thomason v. Cuneo, 119 Cal. 26, 50 Pae. 846 [1897]; Digsjins v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pae. 373 [1888] ; Hal- lett V. United States Security & Bond Co., — Colo. , 90 Pac. 683 [1907]; Spalding v. City and County of Denver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126 [1904]; City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122 [1904]; 80 Pac. 467 [1905]; Wolff v. City of Denver, 20 Colo. App. 135, 77 Pac. 364 [1904]; Field v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 224, 64 N. E. 840 [1902]; Gray v. Town of Cicero, 177 111. 459, 53 N. B. 91; Payton v. Village of Morgan Park, 172 111. 102, 49 N. E. 1003 [1898]; Lightner v. City of Peoria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]; Davis v. City of Litchfield, 146 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; State ex rel. Keith V. Common Council of the City of Michigan City, 138 Ind. 455, 37 N. E. 1041 [1894]; Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]; City of Kansas City v. Gib- son, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903] ; Gleason v. Barnett, 106 Ky. 125, 50 S. W. 67 [1899]; Power v. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 2°8 [1905]; Goodrich v. City of De- troit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; Shimmons v. City of Sagi- naw, 104 Mich. 511, 62 N. W. 725 [1895]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39 2 Am. "3p. 76 [1869]; Car- penter V. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232 [1876]; Rogers V. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]; Kansas City Grading Com- pany V. Holden, 107 Mo. 306, 17 S. W. 798 [1891]; Shannon v. City of Omaha, 73 Neb. 607, 103 N. W. 53, 106 N. W. 592 [1905]; Har- riman v. City of Yonkers, 181 N. Y. 24, 73 N. E. 493 [1905]; (affirming judgment, 81 N. Y. S. 823, 82 App. Div. 408 [1903]); Ellwood V. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 229, 25 N. E. 238 [1890]; Genet V. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777 [1886]; People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 65 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; Coates V. Village of Norwood, 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]; St. Bene- dict's Abbey v. Marion County, — Or. ; , 93 Pac. 231 [1908]; Strow- bridge v. City of Portland, 8 Ore. 67 [1879]; State v. Moss, 44 Wash. 91, 86 Pac. 1129 [1906]; Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 435 [1894]. " Shimmons v. City of Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511, 62 N. W. 725 [1895]. 903 PBOPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 555 take/ or unless such action on the part of the city is fraudulent or unreasonable,* or unless the absence of benefit makes it mani- fest that the burden amounts to spoliation and not taxation.' If the legislature gives to a municipal corporation power to deter- mine what land is benefited by a public improvement, the exer- cise of this power is. most frequently lodged in the city council." ° State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Powell v. District Court of Esimsey County, 47 Minn. 406, 50 N. W. 476 [1891]. *City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, 80 Pae. 467 [1905]. "Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 150 [1886]; Clay v. Grand Rapids, 60 Mich. 451, 27 N. W. 596 [1886]. •Lenon v. Brodie, 81 Ark. 208, 98 S. W. 979 [1906] ; Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904J; German Savings and Loan Society V. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pac. 1067 [1902]; Dann v. Wood- ruff, 51 Conn. 203 [1883]; Storrs v. City of Chicago, 208 111. 364, 70 N. E. 347 [1904]; Chicago and North- western Railway Company v. Village of Elmhurat, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 437 [1897]; Davis v. City of Litch- field, 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. 354 [1895] ; Chicago and Alton Railroad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. io77 [1894]; People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462, 6 N. E. 33 [1887] ; Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879] ; Wray v. Fry, 158 Ind. 92, 62 N. E. 1004 [1901]; State ex rel. Keith V. Common Council of the City of Michisran City, 138 Ind. 455, 37 N. E. 1041 [1894]; City of Fort Wayne v. Cody, 43 Ind. 197 [1873]; Klein v. Tuhey, 13 Ind. App. 74, 40 N. E. 144 [1895]; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Lindaulst, 119 la. 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Buell V. Ball, 20 la. 282 [1866]; City of -■Atchison V. Price, 45 Kan. 296, 25 Pnc. 605 [1891]; Blair v. City of Atchison, 40 Kan. 353, 19 Pac. 815 [1883]; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Johns Hopkins' Hospi- tal, 56 Md. 1 [1880] ; Jones v. Board of Aldermen of the City of Boston, 104 Mass. 461 [1870]; Power v. City of Detroit, 139 Mich.' 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]; Goodrich v. City of De- troit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; Brown v. City of Saginaw, 107 Mich. 643, 65 N. W. 601 ; Boehme V. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401, 64 N. W. 204 [1895]; Grand Rapids School Furniture Company v. City of Grand Rapids, 92 Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028 [1892]; Beecher v. City of Detroit, 92 Mich. 268, 52 N. W. 731 [1892]; Davies v. City of Saginaw, 87 Mich. 439, 49 N. W. 667 [1891] ; Whitney v. Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189, 37 N. W. 184 [1888]; Beniteau v. City of Detroit, 41 Mich. 116, 1 N. W. 899 [1879]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232 [1876]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Prior v. Buehler & Cooney Construction Company, 170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1901]; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]; Keith V. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683 [1889]; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541 [1878]; Heman v. Wolff, 33 Mo. App. 200; Beck v. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pac. 410 [1903]; Ellwood V. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 229, 25 N. E 238 [1890]; Hassan V. Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528; Hassen V. City of Rochester, 65 N. Y. 516 [■1875] ; People ex rel. Marvin v. City of Brooklyn. 2.S Barb. (N. Y.) §555 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 904 The decision of the eity council upon a question of this sort is often said to be final/ This general statement must be taken, however, with the proper limitations. "When the exact meaning of the rule becomes material, it is qualified in various ways, as by holding that the determination of the council is final as long as its discretion is honestly exercised and not abused,* or in the absence of fraud," or in the absence of fraud or mistake," or in the absence of fraud or siich gross mistake as to preclude sound judgment," or in the absence of fraud and corruption,^^ or fraud and oppression,^' or in case of a clear abuse of such discretion.^* It has been said that the courts will not review the decision of the council unless the property assessed is so situated as to render it physically impossible for the improvement to benefit it.*' It 166 [1856]; City of Asheville v. Wachovia Loan & Trust Co., 143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 800 [1906]; City of Toledo V. Ford, 20 Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]; Coates v. Village of Nor- wood, 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]; Conner v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio C. C. 336 (affirmed 55 0. S. 82 [1896]); Or. & Cal. R. E. Co. v. City of Portland, 25 Ore. 229, 22 L. R. A. 713, 35 Pac. 452 [1894] ; Mich- ener v. City of Philadelphia, 118 Pa. St. 535, 12 Atl. 174 [1888]; Brientnall v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 156 [1883]; Wray v. Mayor, etc., of Pittsburg for Use, etc., 46 Pa. St. (10 Wright) 365 '[186'3]; Commonwealth for Use, etc., V. Woods, 44 Pa. St. (8 Wright) 113 [1862]; Kettle v. City of Dallas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 80 S. W. 874 [1904] ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. City of Seattle, — Wash. , 91 Pac. 244 [1907]; Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 [1894]; Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892] ; Teegarden v. City of Racine, 56 Wis. 546, 14 N. W. 614 [1883|; Oilman v. City of Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 328, 13 N. W. 266 [1882]. ' Chicago and Northwestern Rail- way Company v. Village of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. E. 437 [1897]; Davis V. City of Litchfield, 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. 354 [1895]; Chicago and Alton Raili-oad Company v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. E. 1077 [1894]; Wray v. Fry, 158 Ind. 92, 62 N. E. 1004 [1901]; Klein v. Tu- hey, 13 Ind. App: 74, 40 N. E. 14i [1895]; Buell v. Ball, 20 la. 282 [1866]; Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Prior V. Buehler & Cooney Construc- tion Company, 170 Mo. 439, 71 S. W. 205 [1902]; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]; Ell- wood V. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 229, 25 N. E. 238 [1890]; Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566 [1892 J. * Oregon & California R. R. Co. v. City of Portland, 25 Ore. 229, 22 L. R. A. 713, 35 Pac. 452 [1894]. ° Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 66 S. W. 163 [1901]. ^"Lenon v. Brodie, 81 Ark. 208, 98 S. W. 979 [1906]. "Beck V. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pac. 410 [1903]. ''City of Ft. Wayne v. Cody, 43 Ind. 197 [1873]. I'City of Toledo v. Ford, 20 Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]. "Storrs V. City of Chicago, 208 111. 364, 70 N. E. 347 [1904]. "= Paulson V. City of Portland, 16 Ore. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673, 19 Pac. 450 [1888]; (aflirmed Paulsen v. Port- land. 149 IT. S. 30. 37 L. 637, 13 S. 750 [1893]). 905 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §556 has been said that the willful, arbitrary and intentional omission by the city council to assess a part of the property benefited by local improvement, thereby incteasing the burden upon the owners of property assessed, renders the assessment void.^" Thus, where it was physically impossible to drain certain property by a sewer because of the high ground intervening between such property and the sewer, it was said- that a finding by the city council that such property was benefited was "a fraud on its face."" Where council created an assessment district of a frontage of one hundred and forty feet and charged such district with the cost of what the council termed a street improvement, which consisted in real- ity of rebuilding a sewer under a street and running diagonally across it, it was held that the action of the council in determin- ing that this property w;as benefited by such improvement and other property was not, with the result that the entire cost of such improvement was thrown upon such small district, was sub- ject to review by the courts.^' This was said to be a very pecu- liar exercise of the power of creating assessment district and soli- tary in the experience of the court. Council determined to con- struct a sewer and determined what property would be benefited thereby. Subsequently, council decided to construct such sewer upon a larger scale and draining a greater territory, at an in- creased expense, without changing its determination as to the property benefited thereby. It was held that such determination of the council as to the property benefited was subject to review by the courts.^" The determination of the council that a side- walk benefits adjoining property which is vacant and unoccupied, except for one small shanty and over which there is no travel, has been held subject to review.^" § 556. Grant of power to public oflScers or boards. The legislature may grant to some local board or officer the power to determine what property is benefited by a public im- provement.^ This power may be granted to a board of super- ." Masters v. City of Portland, 24 " Oorrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541 Ore. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893]. [1878]. "Hansoom v. City of Omaha, 11 ^ Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Neb. 37 [1881]. Bradley, 164 IT. S. 112, 41 L. 369, "Clay V. City of Grand Rapids, 60 17 S. 56 [1896]; Bauman v. Ross, Mich. 451, 27 isT. W. 596 [1886]. 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 "City of Columbus v. Storey, 35 [18971; (reversing District of Po- ind. 97 [1871]. Inmbia v. Armes, 8 App. D. C. 39'3 §556 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 906 visors,^ as in drainage and reclamation improvements. The de- termination of drainage supervisors is said not to be final where they fraudulently or arbitrarily omit lands from the assessment which are directly benefited and assessed lands which are not benefited.^ This discretion may be conferred upon a board of public works. ^ The determination of such board is said to be final except in ease of fraud,' or fraud, mistake or • transgression of authority,' or fraud, demonstrable mistake of fact, or the ap- plication of an erroneous rule oi law.'' If the statute provides for entering the finding of the board as to what property is bene- fited, upon the records of such board, it has been held that where the board has determined upon a sewer improvement and made a finding as to the property benefited, and subsequently changes [1896]; Bauman v. Eoss, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896]; Abbott v. Eoss, 9 App. D. C. 289 [1896]); Shoemaker V. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. 170, 13 S. 361 [1893]; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184; In re Change of Grade of Beale Street, 39 Cal. 495 [1870]; Appeal of Piper, 32 Cal. 530 [1887]; Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688; Clinton Township v. Teachout, 150 Mich. 124, 111 N. W. 1052 [1907]; Grand Eapids School Furniture Company v. City of Grand Eapids, 92 Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028 [1892]; Hoyt v. City of East Sagi- naw, 19 Mich. 39, 2 Am. Eep. 76 [1869]; State v. Several Parcels of Land, — Neb. , 110 N. W. 753 [1907]. ^ Lower King's Kiver Eeclamation District No. 531 v. McCuUah, 124 Cal. 175, 56 Pac. 887 [1899]; Ap- peal of Piper, 32 Cal. 530 [1867]; Chambliss v. Johnson, 77 la. 611, 42 N. W. 427 [1889]. 'Eraser v. Mulaney, 129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]. ' Elliott V. City of Chicago, 43 111. 293 [1868]; Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]; State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; State ex rel. v. District Court of Eamsey County, 33 Minn. 164, 22 N. W. 295 [1885]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunning- ham v. Board of Public Works of the City of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 442, 8 N. W. 161 [1881]; Eogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [1876]. = Elliott v. City of Chicago, 48 111. 293 [1868]. ° State v. Several Parcels of Land, —Neb. . 110 N. W. 753 [1907], ' State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Eamsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Public Works of the City of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 442, 8 N. W. 161 [1881]. The finding of such board as to what property is benefit- ed is said to be "conclusive except in case of fraud or demonstrable mistake of fact." State of Minne- sota ex rel. Lewis v. District Court of Eamsey County, 33 Minn. 164, 22 N. W. 295 [1885]; (Citing State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunningham v. Dis- trict Court of Eamsey County, 29 Minn. 62, 11 N. W. 133 [1882] ; State of Minnesota ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Public Works of the City of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 442, 8 N. W. 161 [1881]; Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232 [1876]; Eogers V. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 [187'6]. 907 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 557 such improvement by constructing a branch of such sewer and does not make a new finding as to the property benefited by the improvement as modified, such failure to make such finding is a jurisdictional defect.' Such power may be conferred upon drain- age commissioners." The exercise of this power by a board of drainage commissioners is said to be conclusive in the absence of fraud." Such power may be conferred upon park commission- ers.*' The power to determine what property is -benefited by a levee may be conferred upon levee inspectors." The power to de- termine what property is benefited, may be conferred upon county commissioners." The power to determine what property is bene- fited may be conferred upon a permanent board of street com- missioners." The power to determine what property is benefited may be conferred upon the board of trustees of a village.*' It may be conferred upon a board of equalization.*" § 557. Grant of power to commissioners or jury. A common method of determining what property is benefited by an improvement is found in the statutes which provide that such action shall be determined by a body of persons appointed for that purpose, often by a court. Such persons are frequently called commissioners.* The action of the commissioners is some- ' Edwards v. Cooper, 168 Ind. 54, "Lincoln v. Board of Street Com- 79 N. E. 1047 [1907]. missioners of the City of Boston, 176 "City of Joliet v. Spring Creek Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]. Drainage District, 222 111. 441, 78 "Crawford v. People ex rel. Rum- X. E. 836 [1906]; Gauen V. Moredock sey, 83 111. 557 [1876]; People of and Ivy Landing Drainage District the State of New York ex rel. Gage No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 v. Lohnas, 54 Hun. (N. Y.) 604, 8 [1890]; Alstad v. Sim, 15 N. D. 629, N. Y. Supp. 104 [1889]. 109 N. W. 66 [1909]; Turnquist v. "State ex rel. Ashby v. Three Cass County Drain Commissioners, States Lumber Co., 198 Mo. 430, 95 11 N. D. 514, 92 N. W. 852 [1902]; S. W. 333 [1906]. State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 ' Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. 42 L. 270, 17 S. 966 [1897]; (revers- 947 [1889] ; Bryant v. Robbins, 70 ing District of Columbia v. Armes, Wis. 258, 35 N. W. 545 [1887]. 8 App. D. C. 393 [1896]; Bauman ""Turnquist v. Cass County Drain v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 260 [1896]; Commissioners, 11 N. D. 514, 92 N. Abbott v. Ross, 9 App. D. C. 289 W. 852 [1902]. [1896]); Reclamation District No. 3 "Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777 [1885]. [1884]; Trigger v. Drainag* District, "McDermott v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114; Allen 60 [I860]. V. City of Chicago, 176 III. 113, 52 "Bowen v. Hester, 143 Ind. 511, N. E. 33 [1898]; Latham v. Village 41 N. E. 330 [1895]. of Wilmette, 168 III. 153, 48 N. E. §557 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 908 times said to be conclusive.- This is too broad a statement in view of the actual decisions.^ Under a statute authorizing: com- missioners to assess property benefited "according to your wis- dom and. discretion," it was held that arbitrary power was not given, but that such words meant according to law and justice.* It' is said that the action of the commissioners is conclusive ex- cept in case of fraud.^ It has been held that the action of com- missioners in determining what land is benefited, cannot be re- viewed unless their action was so negligent or improper as to be in effect fraudulent." Under most statutes some means is provided for reviewing their determination and setting it aside if clearly erroneous.'' The persons appointed especially to determine what lands are benefited are sometimes known as viewers,' or assess- ors." Under some statutes it is left for some court to determine 311 [1897]; Jones v. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894]; The People ex rel. Samuel, Sr., V. Cooper, 139 111. 461, 29 N. e. 872 [1893]; Wright v. City of Chi- cago, 48 111. 285 [1868]; Zumbro v. Parnin, 141 Ind. 430, 40 N. E. 1085 [1895]; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Peterson, S.Kan. App. 103, 48 Pac. 877 [1897]; City of St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298 [1899]; St. Louis V. Excelsior Brewing Co., 96 Mo. 677, 10 S. W. 477 [1888] ; State, Al- dridge. Pros. v. Essex Public Road Board, 46 K; J. L. (17 Vr.) 126 [1884]; State, Johnston, Pros v. In- habitants of the City of -Trenton, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 166 [1881]; State, Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Hudson, Pros. v. Paterson Avenue and Secaucus Road Commis- sioners, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 83 [1879]; State, Hunt, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council' of the City of Rahway, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 646 [1877]; Dyker Meadow Land & •Improvement Co. v. Cook, 159 N. Y. 6, 53 N. E. 690; LeRoy et al. v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, 20 John Sup. Ct. 430 [1823]; Murray v. Graham, 6 Paiges Chan. Rep. 622 [1837]; In the Matter of Extension of Church Street in New York, 49 Barb. 455 [1867]; In the Matter of Westlake Avenue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]; State ex rel. Balt- zell V. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 6 L. R. A. 394, 43 N. W. 947 [1889]. ^ Jones V. Town of Lake View, 151 111. 663, 38 N. E. 688 [1894]; Bige- low V. City of Chicago, 90 111. 49 [1878]. ° City of St. Joseph v. Crowther, 142 Mo. 156, 43 S. W. 786 [1897]. *Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139 a. b. = Latham v. Village of Wilmette, 168 111. 153, 48 N. E. 311 [1897]; People ex rel. Samuel, Sr., v. Cooper, 139 III. 461, 29 N. E. 872 [1893]; Wright V. City of Chicago, 48 111. 285 [1868]. ° Allen V. City of Chicago, 176 111. 11.3, 52 N. E. 33 [1898]. 'Hoffeld V. City of Buffalo, 130 N. Y. 387; 29 N. E. 747 [1892]; Copcutt V. City of Yonkers, 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 178, 31 N. Y. S. 659 [1894]; In re Cedar Park, 1 How. Pr. N. S. 257. ^ Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851]. " In the Matter of the Petition of Cruger to Vacate an Assessment, 84 N. Y. 619 [1881] ; People ex rel. Con- nelly V. Reis, 96 N. Y. S. 597, 109 App. Div. 748 [1905]; People ex rel. Tietjen v. Reis, 96 N. Y. S. 601, 109 App. Div. 919 [1905]. 909 PEOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §555 in the first instance what land is benefited by the proposed im- provement.^'* Provisions of this sort are most frequently found in drainage and reclamation improvements. Under some statutes the question of what land is benefited by the improvement is referred to a jury.^^ The jury cannot lay out an assessment dis- trict arbitrarily, without reference to the existence of benefits as a fact." § 558. Method of reviewing determination as to land benefited. The statute may provide a special method of testing the cor- rectness of the determination of the legislature, or public corpora- tion, or official, in deciding that the lands included in the assess- ment district are benefited by the improvement. If this question is not raised in the manner pointed out by statute, the property owner is regarded as waiving such objection.^ It cannot there- after be raised in a collateral proceeding.^ Thus, if it is held that the proper method of testing the right of drainage commissioners to annex certain lands to a drainage district is by a proceeding in quo warranto to compel them to show by what right they have annexed such territory, the validity of such annexation cannot " Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1903]; Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Landing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; State ex rel. Stotts V. Wall, 153 Mo. 216, 54 S. W. 465 [1899]. " Drainage Commissioners of Dis- trict No. 3, V. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 158 111. 353, 41 N. E. 1073 [1895]; Kelly v. City of Chicago, 148 111. 90, 35 N. E. 752 [1894]; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900] ; Kan- sas City V. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. 860 [18S8]; Michael v. City of St. Louis, 112 Mo. 610, 20 S. W. 666 [1892]. "State ex rel. Greeley v. City of St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 503 [1876]; (except possibly in the case of abut- ting property). ' Haughawout v. Raymond, 148 Cal. 311, 83 Pac. 53 [1905]; Dun: can V. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904] ; Spalding v. City and County of Denver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126 [1904]; Trigger v. Drain- age District No. 1, 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. 1114 [1901]; Commission- ers of Mason and Tazewell Special Drainage District v. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 995 [1891] ; Bodman V. Lake Fork Special Drainage Dis- trict, 132 111. 439, 24 N. E. 630 [1891] ; The People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman, 127 111. 387, 19 N. E. 872 [1890]; Oliver v. Monona Coun- ty, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Clinton Township v. Teachout, 150 Mich. 124, 111 N. W. 1052 [1907]; Smith v. Carlow, 114 Mich. 67, 72 N. W. 22 [1897]. ^ Haughawout v. Raymond, 148 Cal. 311, 83 Pac. 53 [1905]; Dun- can V. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. § 559 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 910 be tested subsequently by a bill in equity.' On the other hand, if no means is provided by which the correctness of the determin- ation of the legislature, public corporation or public official in including certain lands in the assessment district is to be ascer- tained, such questions may be raised at the first hearing given to the property owner. Thus, in the absence of any special pro- ceeding of this sort the question of benefits may be determined on confirmation.* The method»whereby such question may be raised seems to be largely in the discretion of the legislature. It has been held, that where at the time a drainage district was established, a means was given for determining directly the ques- tion whether certain lands could properly be included in such dis- trict, and such question could also be raised after the assessment was levied as a defense to such assessment, a subsequent change of statute taking away the right to raise such question after the assessment has been levied as a defense thereto, is valid." Under some statutes, which provide that some local officer or board shall determine what land is btnefited by the proposed improvement, it is further provided that by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal from the decision of such officer, such question may be reviewed by a designated court.* § 559. By whom correctness of determination can be questioned. The objection that property, which is benefited by an improve- ment and should have been assessed therefor, is omitted, is one which can be made only by a property owner who is able to show that the assessment levied against his property is by reason of ' Bodman v. Lake Fork Special 'Chamblisa v. Johnson, 77 Iowa, Drainaffe District, 132 111. 439, 24 611, 42 N. W. 427 [1889]; Beals v. N. E. 630 [1891]; Smith v. Carlow, James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245 114 Mich. 67, 72 N. W. 22 [1897]. [1899]; State ex rel. Greeley v. City See to the same effect People ex rel. of St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 503 [1876]; Wood V. Jones, 137 111. 35, 27 N. E. Hart v. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. 836, 294 [1892]; Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. 105 N. W. 546 [1905]; LeRoy v. 478, 13 N. E. 246 [1889]; Osborn v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty People, 103 111. 224 [1882]. of the City of New York, 20 John •Shanley v. People ex rel. (Joedt- Sup. Ct. 430, 11 Am. Dee. 289 ner, 225 ' 111. 579, 80 N. E. 277 [1823]; In the Matter of the Con- [1907] ; People ex rel. Selby V. Dyer, tract for the Fifth Avenue Sewer 205 111. 575. 69 N. E. 70 [1903]; in the City of Pittsburg, (Pa.) Edwards v. City of Chicago, 140 111. 4 Brewster 364 [1870]; Klrkpatriok 440. 30 N. E. 350 [1893]. v. Taylor, 118 Ind.'329, 21 N. E. 20 'Oliver v. Monona Countv, 117 [1888], Iowa, 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. 911 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §560 such omission greater than it would have been had such property- been included in the assessment.^ The objection that land which is not benefited by an improvement is assessed for the cost there- of, is one which can be made only by a party prejudiced by the inclusion of such land.^ The owner of property, the benefit to which is not denied, cannot object that other property owners, whose property has not been benefited by the improvement, have been assessed therefor.^ If it is erroneous to include such other property, it is an error which operates to the benefit and not to the prejudice of the property owner in question.* § 560. Assessment' district consisting of property benefited in fact. The legislature may not attempt to exercise its discretion in determining what land is benefited, and may not attempt to de- scribe the assessment district specifically, but may provide that land benefited by the improvement shall be assessed therefor, leaving it to be determined as a question of fact what land is in fact so benefited. Such method of indicating and describing the land which is to be subject to an assessment has been held to be valid.^ While other methods of describing the land to be assessed iBalfe V. Bell, 40 Ind. 337 [1872]; [1894]; Grimes v. Coe, 102 Ind. 406, State, Humphreys, Pros. v. Mayor 1 N. E. 735 [1885]; Johnson v. Duer, and Council of the City of Bayonne, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 [1892]. 60 N. J. L. (31 Vr.) 406, 38 Atl. 761 'White v. City of Alton, 149 111. [1897]; Davis v. City of Newark, 626, 37 N. E. 96 [1894]; Grimes v. 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. Coe, 102 Ind. 406, 1 N. E. 735 276 [1891]; State, Righter, Pros. v. [1885]. Mayor and Common Council of the " Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, City of Newark, 45 N. J. L. (16 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Piper's Appeal Vr.) 104 [1883]. ' in the Matter of Widening Kearney 2 Piper's Appeal in the Matter of Street, 32 Cal. 530 [1867]; City of Widening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. Denver v. Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 530 [1867]; Farrell V. West Chicago Pac. 122 [1904]; 80 Pac. 467,. Park Commissioners, 182 111. 250, 55 [1905]; Hungerford v. City of Hart- N. E. 325 [1899]; Corcoran v. Board ford, 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Clapp v. of Aldermen of Cambridge, — Mass. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 , 85 N. E. 155 [1908]; Johnson [1868]; Farrell v. West Chicago V. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800 Park Commissioners, 182 HI. 250, 55 [1892]. N. E. 325 [1899]; Holdom v. City of 'Piper's Appeal in the Matter of Chicago, 169 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 Widening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. [1897] ; Chicago, Rock Island and 530 [1867]; Farrell v. West Chicago Pacific Railway Company v. City of Park Commissioners, 182 111. 250, 55 Chicago, 139 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 N. E. 325 [1899]; White v. City of [1893]; Murphy v. City of Peoria, Alton, 149 111. 626, 37 N. E. 96 119 HI. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]; §.560 T.VXATION BY ASSESSME5NT. ;m2 for a street improvement are more common/ the lan^. to be assessed . for a street improvement is very often, especially in re- cent statutes, defined as the land benefited by the improvement.' This description is also used in the case of land to be assessed for Shirk V. Hupp, 167 Ind. 509, 78 N. E. 242, 79 N. E. 490 [1906]; ■ Culbertson v. Knight, 152 Ind. . 121, 52 N E, 700 [1898]; Nevins and Otter Creek Township Dfainirig Company v. Alki're, 36 Ind. 189 [1871]; City of Columbus v. Storey, 35 Ind. 97 [1871]; City of New Orleans praying for opening of " Casacalbo and Moreau Streets, 20 La. Ann. 497 [1868]; Atkins v. City of rBoBton,; 188 .'Mass. 77, 74 N. E."292 {1906] ; Holt V. City Council' of Som- ^eryille, . 127 Mass. 408 [1879]; '- Goodrich v. City- of Detroit, 123 Mich-. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; j-Warren v; City of Grand Haven, 30 'Micii. 24 [1874]-; Hart v. City of ' Omaha, 74 ISTeb. ' 836, 105 N. :W. 546' [1905];' Durrell v. rCity of Woodbury, — N. J. Sup. — ^, 65 Atl. 198 [1906]; North Jersey Street ., Railway Gom- '^any v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jer- 'sey City, 68 N. J. L.'t39 V'r.) 140, 5^ Atl. 300 [19021; PeWitt v. City "of Elizabeth, 56-¥. J, L. (fef-Vroom) ;.il9, 27 Atl. 801 [1£93]; 'state, Mul- Ter, Pros. v. Mayor and Council of the City of Bayonne, 55 N. J. L. (26 ,Vr.)' 102,25 Atl. 267; [1892]; State, ^Bchulting, Pros. v. City of Passaic, 47, N. J. L. (18 Vr.) 273 [1885];. , State, Jlenderson, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. (12 yroom) 489 [1879]; State, Hunt, Pros. ,v, Mayor and Common ^Council of the Oity of Rahway, 39 isf. J. L. (10 Vroom) 646 [1877]; State, . Peters, ■ Pros. v. Mayor and .Common Council of City of Newark, Si N, J. L, (2 Vr.) 360 [1865]; State, Culver, Pros, v. Town of Ber- gen in the County of Hudson, 29i N. t L. ,(5'r)iitch.) 266 [1861]; People of tlie Stale of ' New York ex ,rel. Le- high "Valley Railway Company v. City of Buffalo, 147 N. Y. 675, 42 N. E. 344 [189i5] ; In the Matter of Common Council of the City of Ams- terdam, 126 N. Y. 158, 27 N. E. 272 [1891]; Kelly v. City of Cleveland, 34 0. S. 468 [1878]; St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion County, — Or. , 93 Pac. 231 [1908]; Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851]; Johnson v. City of Ta- coma, 41 Wash. 51, 82 Pac, 1092 [1905]. 2 See § 620 et seq. 'Piper's Appeal in the Matter, of Widening Kearney, Street, 32 Cal. 530 [1867]; Holdom v. City of Chi- ,- eago, 169 111. 109., 48 N. E. .1;64 [1897]; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company. v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 673, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]; Murphy V. City ' of 'Peorifi, 119 111. 509, 9 X. E. 895 [1888]; Shirk V. Hupp, 167 Ind, 509, T8 N. i;. 242, 79 N. E. 490 [1906]; City of ^\ew Orleans praying for opening . of Casacalpo, and Moreau Streets, 20 La. Ann. 497 ';[1868]; Goodrich v. City of Detroit, "J23 Mich. 559; 82 N. w! 255 [1900]; Durrell v. City of Woodbuiy, — N. J. Sup. ^— , 65 Atl. 198 [1900]; State, Sehulting, Pros. v. City of Pas- -saic, 47 -N, J. L. (18 Vroom) 273 /[1885]; State, Van Home, Pros. v. Town of Bergen, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr J 307 [1863]; State, Culver, Pros. v. Town of Bergen in the County of Hudson, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 20,6 [1861] ; In the Matter of Common Council of the City of Amsterdam, 126 N. Y. 158, 27 N. E. 272 [1891]; Kelly V. City of Cleveland, 34 O. S. 468 [1878]; Extension of Hancock 'street, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harr.) 26 [1851}; Johnson v. City of Tacoma, 41 Wash, 51, 82 Pac. 1092 [19Q5]. ■913 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §561 a viaduct,* or a park,'' or boulevard.' Land to be assessed for a sewer/ or a ditch/ is very often described in this way. Land to be assessed for improving the navigation of a stream has thus been described." Even if the statute describes the property to be assessed as the property "benefited" by the improvment, the context may restrict the meaning of the term "benefited."^'' Thus, if such provision occurs in the statute which provides for the assessment of benefits and damages in one proceeding, it is held that since only the property through which the improvement passes can ordinarily be damaged thereby, and since the property which may be benefited is apparently regarded by the legislature as being the same as that which may be damaged, only the proper- ty abutting on the line of the improvement is to be regarded as Benefited and as subject to assessment.^^ § 561. Land benefited by street. The property which is benefited by a street improvement is ordi- narily the property abutting on such street which is rendered easier of access by such improvement.^ Property which is bene- fited by the construction of a street or road may be assessed therefor.^ The fact that the property assessed does not abut upon the street does not necessarily prevent it from being benefited 'City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 [1898]; City of Columbus v. Storey, Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122 [1904]; 80 38 Ind. 97 [1871] ; Nevins and Otter Pac. 467 [1906]. Creek Township Draining Company = Holt V. City Council of Somer- v. Alkire, 36 Ind. 189 [1871]. ville, 127 Mass. 408 [1879]. "People of the State of New York "Hart V. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. ex rel. Lehigh Valley Railway Com- 836, 105 N. W. 546 [1905]. pany v. City of Buffalo, 147 N. Y. 'Hungerford v. City of Hartford, 675, 42 N. E. 344 [1895]. 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Clapp v. City "Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal of of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868]; At- Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 kins V. City of Boston, 188 Mass. [1895]. 77, 74 N. E. 292 [1905]; Warren v. "Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal of City of Grand HaA^en, 30 Mich. 24 Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1874]; Warren v. City of Grand [1896]; Witman v. City of Reading, Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; DeWitt 169 Pa. St. 375, 32 Atl. 576 [1895] ; V. City of Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. (27 Harriott Avenue, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. Vroom) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]; 597 [1904]; Graflus' Run, 31 Pa. State, Henderson v. Jersey City, 41 Super. Ct. 638 [1906]. N. J. L. (12 Vroom) 489. 'See § 301; § 657. ' Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, "Board of Commissioners of Mont- 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Ciilbertson v. gomery County v. Fullen, 111 Ind. Knight, 152 Ind. 121, 52 N. E. 700 410, 12 N. E. 298 [1887]. § 561 TAXA.TION BY ASSESSMENT. 914 thereby.' The fact that property is contiguous to a street which is improved, does not necessarily establish as a matter of law that it is benefited by such improvement.* If the grade of a street has been so changed in approaching a viaduct, that it is twelve feet above the adjoining property, it has been said that said ad- joining property is not benefited by such improvement.' The mere fact, however, that certain land abuts upon a given street, does not as a matter of law establish the existence of a benefit to such property by reason of the improvement of such street in the absence of any legislative determination that such property is benefited.' Land which fronts upon an improved street may be benefited by the improvement of a street in the rear of such land, whereby access can be obtained from another direction.'' This is true, even if the street in the rear of this property is at a grade considerably below that of the front of such land.* The fact that land does not abut upon a given street and does not receive direct access from such street, is not conclusive as to the fact that such land is not benefited by such street.' If property in a cer- tain section can have access to the heart of a city, only by means of a certain street which crosses a ravine filled with ear tracks, an assessment for the improvement of such street may be made upon the land which will receive access to the business part of the city by means of such street.^' Property at the end of a street to be improved is benefited by such improvement and may be assessed therefor.'^' Whether such land is included in the legis- lative description of the land benefited and to be assessed, is a question depending upon the wording of the statute. Property at the end of the street and at right angles to the street line is not regarded as "fronting" upon said street, within the meaning of the statute authorizing the assessment of property fronting upon 'Shurtleff v. City of Chicago, 190 'Johnson v. City of Tacoma, 41 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]; Louia- Wash. 51, 82 Pae. 1092 [1905]. ville and Nashville Railroad Com- ' Johnson v. City of Tacoma, 41 pany v. City of East St. Louis, 134 Wash. 51, 82 Pac. 1092 [1905]. 111. 'fi56, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; Rich "Shurtleff v. City of Chicago, 190 V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N. 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]. E. 955 [1894]. "State ex rel. Hughes v. District ' Holdom V. City of Chicago, 169 Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897]. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]. ' McFarlane v. City of Chicago, " Brooks v. City of Chicago, 168 185 Til. 242, 57 N. E. 12 [1900]. 111. 60, 48 N. E. 'l36 [1897]; Helm 'H'^ldom V. City of Chicago, 169 v. Witz. 35 Ind. App. 131, 73 N. E. HI. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897]. 846 [1904]. 915 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT, §561 the street improvement.^- A tract of land on either side of a river on a part of which a canal was situated, and across which canal a brick building had been built, was held to be benefited by the paving of a street which crosses said river on a bridge." K the property which it is sought to assess' for a street improvement is a corner lot, the street in front of which has already been improved, and it is sought to assess such lot for the improvement of the street along the side thereof, the question is presented whether such lot can properly be said to receive from the construction of such street any benefit in addition to that which it has already received from the con- struction of the street in front. There has been but little speci- fic discussion of this question, as it seems to be generally assumed where it is presented that a benefit is conferred by improvements of this sort.^* Still clearer is the right of the city to assess for an abutting street, where another abutting street has been pro- vided for by an ordinance which has been introduced in council, but not acted upon." The questions on the subject of corner lots which have been presented to the courts, concern the method »2 Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]. "Powers V. City of Grand Rapids, 98 Mich. 3«3, 57 N. W. 250 [1894]. (In this case it was possible to get access to such building from one of the footways of the bridge.) "Wolf V. City of Keokuk, 48 la. 129 [1878]; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 la. 271 [1871]; Gleasop v. Barnett, 106 Ky. 125, 60 S. W. 67 [1899]; Fox V. Middlesborough Town Com- pany, 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776 [1894]; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871] ; Allen v. Kren- ning, 23 Mo. App. 561 [1886]; Cos- sitt Land Co. v. Neuseheler, — N. J. Sup. , 60 Atl. 1128 [1905]; City of Cincinnati v. James, 55 0. S. 180, 44 N. E. 925 [1896]; City of Toledo V. Sheill, 53 O. S. 447, 30 L. R. A. 598, 42 N. E. 323 [1895]; Sandrock V. Columbus, 51 O. S. 317, 42 N. E. 255 [1894]; Findlay v. Frey, 51 0. S. 390, 38 N. E. 114 [1894]; Havi- land V. City of Columbus, 50 O. S. 471, 34 N. E. 679 [1893]; Metcalf V. Carter, 19 Ohio C. C. 196 [1900]; Tompkins v. Village of Norwood, 18 Ohio C. C. 883 [1897]; Betz v. City of Canton, 18 Ohio C. C. 676 [1893]; Calkins v. City of Toledo, 12 Ohio C. C. 202 [1896]; Manns v. City of Cincinnati, 10 Ohio C. C. 549 [1895]; Baker v. Schott, 10 Ohio C. C. 81 [1894]; Rooney v. City of Toledo, 9 Ohio C. C. 267 [1894]; Gibson v. City of Cincinnati, 9 Ohio C. C. 243 [1894]; Barney v. City of Dayton, 8 Ohio C. C. 480 [1894]; Frey v. City of Findlay, 7 Ohio C. C. 311 [1893]; Squier v. City of Cincinnati, 5 Ohio C. C. 400 [1891]; Ehni v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio C. C. 494 [1889]; Clements v. Village of Nor- wood, 2 Ohio N. P. 274 [1895]. See also Cossitt Land Co. v. Neuseheler, — N. J. Sup. , 60 Atl. 1128 [1905]. " In re Beechwood Avenue, Appeal of O'Mara, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. 127 [1899]. §§562,563 " TAXATION by assessment. 91 @ of estimating the assessable frontage of such lot upon the side street,^" and the method of apportioning the cost of the improve- ment upon such lot.^^ These questions are discussed elsewhere. § 562. Land benefited by sidewalk. The property benefited by the construction of a sidewalk is ordinarily that property which abuts on such walk and to which access is given thereby.^ Whether a corner lot in front of which a sidewalk has been constructed can receive a benefit from a side- walk constructed along the side of such lot, so that it can be assessed for the cost thereof, is a question upon which there is but little specific authority. It seems to be assumed that, a corner lot, under such circumstances, can receive a benefit from the con- struction of a sidewalk along its side.'' § 563. Land benefited by sewer. In assessments for the construction of sewers,. it is usually pro- vided that land benefited by the sewer shall be assessed for the construction thereof. This includes in tlie assessment district, land which receives an especial benefit from the construction of the sev/er,^ and ordinarily means the land which can be drained by the sewer, for the cost of which the assessment is levied.^ It is accordingly improper to add the cost of all the sewers eon- structedin a city in a given year, and pro rate the same upon " See § 704. Wheeler, 80 N. Y. S. 204, 39 Misc. "See § 704. Rep. 484 [1902]. 'See § 323. ■ ^Walker v. City of Chicago, 202 = Wilbur V. City of Springfield, 123 111. 531, 67 N. E. 369 [1903]; Duaue 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]; Morri- v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 471, 64 son V. Hershire, 32 la. 27L [1871]; N. E. 1033 [1902]; Mason v. City of City of Lawrence v. Killam, 11 Kan. Chicago, 178 111. 499, 53 N. E. 354 499 [1873]; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 [1899]; Taylor v. City of Haverhill, Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014 [1895]; Tripp 192 Mass. 287, 78 N. E. 475 [1906]; V. City of Yankton, 10 S. D. 516, 74 Atkins v. City of Boston, 188 Mass. N. W. 447 [1898]; Sands v. City of 77, 74 N. E.'292 [1905]; Butler v. Richmond, 72 Va. (31 Grattan) 571, City of Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 31 Am. Rep. 742 [1879]. [1873]; Warren v. City of Grand > Hiingerford v. City of Hartford, Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874].. "A lot 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Clapp v. Ciiy derives special benefit from a sewer, of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [ISCS] ; whether main or lateral, when it js City of Chicago v. Adcoek, 168 111. so situated and constructed fas) '221, 48 N. E. 155 [1897] ; Hpinroth that connection can be made tlier.e- V. Eochersperger, 173 III. 205, 50 with." Bennett v. City of Emmets- N. E. 171 [1898]; .Appeal of burg, — la. , 115 N. W. 582, 589 [19081. 9i7 PROPERTY SOBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 563 all the land fronting upon said sewer.' Land is benefited by a sewer in the contemplation of the law, when such land may be drained thereby.* Land which is drained by a sewer may be assessed, even if the city water works system has not yet been extended to such land.^ The claim that the property assessed it not benefited by the sewer is usually based upon one of two grounds. It may be claimed that such property is not and cannot be drained by the sewer in question; or it may be claimed that the property which it is sought to assess, is already supplied with sufficient drainage. Land which is not and cannot be drained by a sewer cannot be assessed therefor." If certain land is not per- mitted under the existing law to drain into a sewer, such land cannot be assessed for the cost thereof.' Thus, if only land in a drainage district, or sewer district, can drain into a given sewer, land outside of such district cannot be assessed.* It is proper to exclude from a sewer district, land which the owner thereof is not permitted by law to connect with such sewer." The slope of the ground and the location of the sewer may be such that certain land cannot drain into it. It is ordinarily held that such land cannot be assessed for such sewer.^' Land which it is sought to assess, may be so situated that the owner can connect it with the sewer, but the sewer may be constructed at such level that such land will not drain into the sewer at its present elevation. It is, of course, possible for the owner of such land at greater or less expense to grade it so that it will so drain. Under such facts it is held m some jurisdictions, that the owner of such land is liable for an assessment for the construction of such sewer.^' It 'State V. Pillsbury, 82 Minn. 359, E. 1033 [1902]; City of Chicago v. 85 N. W. 175 [1901]. Adcock, 168 111. 221, 48 N. g. 155 * Mason v. City of Chicago, 178 111. [1897]. 499, 53 N. E. 354 [1899]. "Clark v. City of Chicago, 214 III. "Walker v. City of Aurora, 140 111. 318, 73 N. E. 358 [1905]; Duane v. 402, 29 N. E. 741 [1893]. City of Chicago, 198 111. 471, 64 N. "Edwards v. City of Chicago, 140 E. 1033 [1902]; City of Chicago v. III. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893]; Gil- Adcock, 168 111. 221, 48 N. E. 155 more County Clerk v. Hentig, 33 [1897]. Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 [1883] ; City of "Duane v. City of Chicago, 198 IlL St. Joseph ex rel. Danaher v. Dillon, 471, 64 N. E. 1033 [1902]. 61 Mo. App. 317 [1895]; Wewell v. "Hansoom v. City of Omaha, II City of Cincinnati, 45 0. S. 407, 15 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739 [1881]. N. B. 196 [1887]. "Hildebrand v. Toledo, 27 Ohio C. 'Clark V. City of Chicago, 214 111. C. R. 427 [1905]; City of Toledo v. 318, 73 N. E. 358 [1905]; Duane v. Ford, 20 Ohio C. C. 290 [1900]; City City of Chicago, 198 111. 471, 64 N. of Toledo for the use of Gates v. § 563 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 918 has been suggested that if he has any remedy, it is an action at law for damages for the change of the grade/^ In other juris- dictions, it is held that land which is situated below the level of the sewer so that it cannot drain into it cannot be assessed.*' Land which it is sought to assess may be separated from the sewer by intervening private property, through which a lateral sewer cannot be carried without the consent of the owner thereof. Such property cannot be assessed for such sewer.** The fact that cer- tain property is situated three-fourths of a mile from the sewer, does not establish as a matter of law that such property is not benefited thereby.*' Land which could be drained by a sewer according to the recorded plat existing when the assessment was made, is subject to assessment as an entirety, although the owner has sold the part abutting the sewer so that his land cannot be drained without passing over the property of his grantee.*" It has, however, been held that land so situated that it cannot be connected with the sewer except by a drain passing through pri- vate ground belonging to another person, may be assessed for the cost of such sewer.*^ However, the owner of the land which can drain into such sewer cannot complain because other land, which cannot drain into such sewer, is included in the assessment.*' A property owner who connects his land with a sewer by means of a drain is benefited thereby, if he has a fixed license to make such connection,** but not if he has merely a revocable license to con- nect with the private drain of another, by means of which his land connects with the sewer.''^ Conversely, a property owner who has been assessed for a sewer has a right to connect his land there- with.^* It is sometimes sought to assess land which may be drain- Kohn, 2 Ohio N. P. 47 [1895]; Rob- "Kelly v. City of Chicago, 148 inson v. City of Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 111. 90, 35 N. E. 752 [1894]. 585, 21 N. W. 610 [1884]. "City of Atchison v. Price, 45 " Eobinson v. City of Milwaukee, Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 606. 61 Wis. 585, 21 N. W. 610 [1881]. " Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, '"People ex rel. Locke v. Common 66 S. W. 163 [1901]. At least in a Council of the City of Rochester, 5 collateral proceeding. Lansing (N. Y.) 11 [1871]. "Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, "State ex rel. McKune v. District 21 S. W. 800 [1892]. Court of Ramsey County, 90 Minn. "Butler v. City of Worcester, 112 540, 97 N. W. 425 [1903] ; State, Mass. 541 [1873]. New Jersey Railroad and Transpor- ^ Fairbanks v. Mayor and Alder- tation Co., Pros. v. City of Eliza- men of Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42 beth, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 330: Peo- [1882]. pie ex rel. Marvin v. City of Bi-ook- "" Miller v. City of Toledo, 12 Ohio lyn, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 166 [1856]. C. C. 706 [1894]'. 919 PHOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §561! ed by a given sewer if the public authorities shall subsequently construct branch sewers so as to drain such land. If the con- struction of such branch sewers is optional with the public authori- ties, the owner of such land has no certain right to the use of such sewer. Accordingly, such land cannot be assessed there- for.^^ It is often held that if land is properly drained by an existing sewer, it receives no benefit from the construction of another sewer, and therefore cannot be assessed for such new sewer.^' This result is often reached through statutory provisions which provide for the exemption of property which is already drained.^* Under such theory of the law the question of what is existing sufficient drainage becomes material. Whether land is supplied with drainage or not is a question of f act.^^ An existing sewer, without a proper outlet, cannot be said to be sufficient drainage.^" A pipe intended to drain a pond of water is not suffi- cient drainage as a sewer, although it is of sufficient size."^ The fact that the land in question has a sufficient surface drainage and is at the time unimproved, does not constitute sufficient drainage for sewet purposes, within the meaning of the statute.^' Land ==Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 280, 56 N. E. 1096 [1900]; Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 162 111. 505, 44 N. E. 832 [189«]; Edwards v. City ol Chicago, 140 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893] ; Vreeland v. Mayor, etc., of Bayonne, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 126, 32 Atl. 68 [1895] ; State, King, Pros. V. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 180 [1881]. That such land can be as- sessed: Coates V. Nugent, — Kan. , 92 Pae. 597. ™ State, Fiacre, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 277 [1870]; At least it cannot be assessed at the same rate per front foot as land not already drained by a sewer: People ex rel. Keim v. Desmond, 186 N. Y. 232, 78 N. E. 857 [1906]; (revers- ing, 97 N. Y. S. 795 [1906]) ; In the Matter of the Petition of the Rec- tor, Church Wardens and Vestry- men of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, to vacate an assesomeiit, 61 Howard (N. Y.) 315 [1880]; Potter V. Village of Norwood, 21 Ohio C. C. 461 [1901]; Toledo v. Potter, 19 Ohio C. C. 661 [1893]; Miller v. City of Toledo, 12 Ohio C. C. 706 [1894]; Miller v. Toledo, 7 Ohio N. P. 477 [1900]; Phjladelphia V. Meighan, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 160 [1905]. " City of Cincinnati for use of Ash- man V. Bickett, 26 0. S. 49 [1875]; Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio C. C. 869 [1898]; City of Toledo for Use V. Beaumont, 3 Ohio N. P. 287 [1895]. ^'Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio C. C. 869 [1898]. * Sargent and Company v. City of New Haven, 62 Conn. 510, 26 Atl. 1057 [1893]; Wilson v. City of Cin- cinnati, 5 Ohio N. P. 68 [1897]. " City of Toledo for the use of Gates V. Brown, 2 Ohio N. P. 45 [1895]. =»Ford V. City of Toledo, 64 O. S. 92. 59 N. E. 779 [1901] ; City of Cin- cinnati for use of Jonte v. Kassei- mann, 23 W. L. B. (Ohio) 392 § 563 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 920 drained by a sewer to whose use the owner of such land has a revocable license is not supplied with drainage within the mean- ing of such provisions.^' If land is drained by a private sewer, which has a proper outlet, some jurisdictions hold that such land is sufficiently drained, and cannot be assessed for the cost of a public sewer.^' This result is usually reached under statutes which provide for the exemption of land which is properly drain- ed. In other jurisdictions, it is held that land drained by a pri- vate sewer is not sufficiently drained, so as to exempt such prop- erty from assessment for a sewer constructed by the city.^* This result is generally reached under statutes which provide for assessing property benefited, without specifically exempting prop- erty which is already sufficiently drained. Th« owner of land, who voluntarily connects a private drain with a public sewer, cannot raise the question of want of tlotice or lack of benefits.'^ A public sewer intersected a private sewer and connection between the two was made at the point of intersection. Before such public sewer was constructed, the private sewer had an outlet upon mud flats, about eight hundred feet from low-water mark. The pub- lic sewer had an outlet in deep water. It was held that the land drained by such private sewer might be assessed for the cost of the public sewer if the assessment did not exceed the amount of actual benefit conferred by such public sewer.'' In the absence of a statute, excepting from assessment, land which is already drained by a sewer or making some specific provision for the assessment of corner lots for sewer improvements, it is held that a corner lot which has been assessed for constructing a sewer along one street may also be assessed for constructing a sewer along the [1890]; contra, City for use of Wil- "'City of Atchison v. Price, 45 son V. Hess, 19 Ohio C. C. 252 Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605 [1891]; City [1900]; State. King, v. Eee.d, 43 N. of St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, J. L. (14 Vr.) 186 [1881].' 19 S. W. 713 [1892]; Johnson v. ^ Fairbanks v. Mayor and Alder- Village of Avondale, 1 Ohio C. G. men of Fitehburg, 132 Mass. 42 229 [1885]; Philadelphia to use of [1882]. Yost V. Odd Fellows Hall Associa- »»Wewell V. City of Cincinnati, 45 tion, 168 Pa. St. 105, 31 Atl. 917 0. S. 407, 15 N. E. 196 [1887]; City [1895]. of Toledo for use of Gates v.. Lake '= Butler v. City of Worcester, 112 Shore and Michigan Southern Kail- Mass. 541 [1873]. way Company, 4 Ohio C. C. 113 '"Sargent and Company v. City of [1889]. New Haven, 62 Conn. 510, 26 Atl. 1057 [1893]. 921 PROPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 563 other street.'* However, under a statute providing for assessing property for a sewer improvement according to the lineal measure of the land along the sewer, it was held that where a sewer ran nearly across a tract of land and then turned at right angles and ran across the tract at right angles to its former course, such tract was double assessed for such improvement and the statute was unconstitutional with reference thereto.'^ Under a statute authorizing the council to exempt from special assessment such portion of the frontage of either lot which had a greater frontage than its average depth and so much of the comer lots as seemed equitable, such exemptions might be made in the case of sewer improvements and the property owners assessed could not com- plain that such assessment was not uniform.'" If a sewer has already been constructed and the land which it is sought to assess is thus drained, it is held in some jurisdictions that such land may nevertheless be assessed for the cost of a new sewer if it can be shown that it is benefited thereby." It has been suggested that the fact of existing drainage is to be considered in determining the amount of the assessment.'" Under some statutes the cost of a main sewer which is intended to connect with lateral sewers and thus drain a wide area, must be assessed upon all the property drained by such laterals." Under such statute it is improper to assess the cost of the main sewer solely upon the abutting prop- erty.*" Further, property which does not abut the main sewer may be assessed in part for the cost thereof as well as for the cost " Coburn v. Bossert, 13 Ind. App. The court refused to disturb a 359, 40 N. E. 281 [1895] ; Rich v. finding that such property was bene- Woods, 118 Ky. 865, 82 S. W. 578, fited but said that it wag hard to 26 Ky. Law Rep. 799 [1904]. see how any benefit could, in fact, "Dexter v. City of Boston, 176 exist; In the Matter of the Contract Mass. 247, 79 Am. St. Rep. 306, 57 for the Fifth Avenue Sewer in the N. E. 379 [1900]. City of Pittsburg, 4 Brewster (Pa.) "Cleneay v. Norwood,, 137 Fed. 364 [1870]. See also Clapp v. City 962 [1905]. of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868]. "Park Ecclesiastical Society v. "Clapp v. City of Hartford, 35 Hartford, 47 Conn, 89 [1879]; Byram Conn. 66 [IS y. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, 47 N. E. =» State, Schlapfer, Pros. v. Town 351 [1897]; Grunewald v. City of of Union, in the County of Hudson, Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 222, 91 N. 53 N. J. L. (24 Vr.) 67, 20 Atl. 894 W. 1059; Coates v. Nugent, — Kan. [1890]. , 92 Pac. 597 [1907]; Rich v. "State, Schlapfer, Pros. v. Town of Woods, 118 Ky. 86'5, 26 Ky. Law Union, in the County of Hudson, 53 Rep. 799, 82 S. W. 578 [1904]. N. J, L. (24 Vr.) 67, 20 Atl. 894 [1890], §563 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 922 of laterals.*^ It has been held proper to assess the cost of a main sewer upon the property abutting thereon, as long as such cost does not exceed the benefits conferred by such improvement.*^ Under such statutes property drained by lateral sewers, but not abutting on the main sewer, need not be assessed for the cost of such main sewer.*' It has, however, been held that the amount which can be assessed upon abutting property can not exceed the cost of a sewer which would have furnished sufiSeient drainage for the property assessed, without mcluding the increased cost aris- ing because the sewer had been constructed of a larger size to provide for draining other property.** If the statute so provides, land which does not abut upon the sewer but which is connected therewith by laterals may be assessed for the cost of such sewer.*^ On the other hand, it has been held that that property which does not abut upon a sewer cannot be assessed for its cost.*" The new sewer which is constructed may be connected with the old sewer. If such new sewer is built to prolong the old sewer, as to procure •a proper outlet therefor, land drained by the old sewer may be assessed for the cost of the new one.*^ The new sewer may be a prolongation of the old sewer so as to afford drainage to other land. It has been held that the land already drained by the old sewer cannot be assessed for' the cost of the new sewer.** In other jurisdictions, it has been held that such land is to be assess- ed for the prolongation of the old sewer, but that credit must be given in levying an assessment for the entire system for the amount paid upon the old sewer.*" A sewer may be constructed " Mason v. City of Chicago, 178 " Beeehwood Avenue Sewer, Pitts- Ill. 499, 53 N. B. 354 [1899] ; DeWitt burg's Appeal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 38 V. City of Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. (27 Atl. 209 [1897]; Park Avenue Sew- Vroom) 119, 27 Atl. 801 [1893]. ers. Appeal of Parker, 169 Pa. St. "Hungerford v. City of Hartford, 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1895]. 39 Conn. 279 [1872]; Ayer v. Mayor "Sargent and Company v. City of and Aldermen of Somerville, 143 New Haven, 62 Conn. 510, 26 Atl. Mass. 585, 10 N. E. 457 [1887]. 1057 [1893J; State, Green, Pros. v. *'Ayer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Hotaling, 44 N. J. L. (15 Vr.) 347 Somerville, 143 Mass. 585, 10 N. E. [1882]. 457 [1887]. "Boyden v. Village of Brattles- "Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal of boro, 65 Vt. 504, 27 Atl. 164 [1893]. Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 "Mayor and Council of the City [1895]. of Bayonne v. Morris, 61 N. J. L. (32 «Byram v. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, Vr.) 127, 38 Atl. 819 [1897] ; State, 47 N. E. 351 [1897]; State, Hen- Vanderbeck, Pros. v. Mayor and Com- derson. Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey mon Council of Jersey City, 29 N. City, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vroom) 489 J. L. (5 Dutch.) 441 [1861]. [1879]. 923 PEOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §564 to connect certain land with a sewer already constructed. Land drained by such new sewer may be assessed therefor.^^ Land, the market value of which is increased by the construction of such improvement, is benefited thereby." The fact that land which cannot be drained by a sewer receives a benefit from the increase in general health in the neighborhood due to the construction of a sewer, does not render such land liable to assessment as such bene- fit is a general and not a special one.^'' § 564. Land benefited by ditch or drain. In assessments for purposes of drainage, it is generally provided that the district shall consist of lands benefited by the improve- ment.^ Land which merely receives the benefits from a system of drainage which are general to a whole community, cannot be assessed for the cost thereof.^ Increase of general healthfulness of a community is not an especial benefit within the meaning of this rule.^ It has been held, however, that any benefit which makes land more valuable for tillage, more desirable as a place of residence, or more valuable in the general market, is a benefit "Snydacker v. Village of West Hammond, 225 111. 154, 80 N. E. 93 [1907]. ''Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]. '^Beechwood Avenue Sewer, Pitts- burg's Appeal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 [1897]. 'Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S. W. 707 [1897]; Drainage Com- missioners of Drainage District No. 2 V. Drainage Commissioners of Un- ion Drain Dist. No. 3, 211 111. 328, 71 N. E. 1007 [1904]; (affirming, 113 111. App. 114) ; Gauen v. More- dock and Ivy Landing Drainage Dis- trict, No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; People ex rel. Miller v. Scott, 132 III. 427, 23 N. E. 1119 [1891]; Bodman v. Lake Fork Spe- cial Drainage Dist., 132 111. 439, 24 N. E. 630 [1891] ; People ex rel. Pol- lard V. Svyigert, 130 111. 608, 22 N. E. 787 [1890]; Klinger v. The People ex rel. Oonkle, 130 111. 509, 22 N. E. 600 [1890]; Kankakee Drainage Dis- trict V. Commissioners of Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 130 111. 261, 22 N. E. 607 [1890]; Commis- sioners of Highways of the Town of Colfax V. Commissioners of East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. 206 [1890]; Streuter v. Willow Creek Drainage District, 72 111. App. 561 [1897]; Eoundenbush v. Mitchell, 154 Ind. 616, 57 N. E. 510 [1900]; Culbert- son v. Knight, 152 Ind. 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898]; Drake v. Sohoenstedt, 149 Ind. 90, 48 N. E. 629 [1897]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Fraser v. Mulany, 129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]. 'Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]; State. Skinkle, Pros. v. Inhabitants of the Township of Clinton in the County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 656 [1877]; Tillman v. Kircher, 64 Ind. 104 [1878]. " State, Skinkle, Pros. v. Inhabi- tants of the Township of Clinton in the County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. ( 10 Vroom) 656 [1877]. § 564 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 924 which renders such land liable to assessment, whether it is actuailly drained by a ditch or not.* In some jurisdictions, ' it has been held that increase in general healthfulness,' especially if coupled with increased facility of access, due to the improvement in the condition of the highways caused by drainage," may be regarded as a benefit for which an assessment may be levied. Land which is especially benefited by a system of drainage may be assessed for the cost thereof under these statutes.'' The benefit accruing from this sort of improvement is usually the drainage of the lands benefited.' Land which is drained by the construction of a system of ditches and drains is so benefited thereby that it may be assessed therefor.' If land which does not immediately join a drain or ditch is nevertheless drained thereby, such land may be assessed for the cost of such improvement.^" The drainage of land is a benefit in improvements of this sort, no matter from what reason the land is in need of drainage.^^ By statute it is pro- vided in some jurisdictions that if drains on land outside of a drainage district are connected with the drains and ditches of such district, such land thus drained may be annexed to such drainage district.'^ This statute does not, however, apply to a 'Culbertson v. Knight, 152 Ind. in the County of Essex, 39 N. J. L. 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898]. (10 Vroom) 656 [1877]. " Beals V. Inhabitants of Brook- " Goodrich v. City cf Minonk, 62 line, 174 Mass. 1, 54 N. E. 339 111. 121 [1871]; Eriekson v. Cass. [1899]. County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 "Oliver v. Monona County, 117 la. [1902]. 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. " Streuter v. Willow Creek Drain- 'Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N. age District, 72 111. App. 561 [1897]. E. 871, 4 N. E. 160 [1885]. i'' Shanley v. People ex rel. Goedt- ' Richard v. Cypremort Drainage ner, 225 111. 579, 80 N. E. 277 District, 107 La. 567, 32 So. 27 [1907]; Drainage Commissioners of [1901-1902]. Drainage District No. 2 v. Drainage ' ileclamation District No. 108 v. Commissioners of Union Drain Dist. Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [ 1884] ; No. 3, 211 111. 328, 71 N. E. 1007 Bixlfir V. Board of Supervisors of the [1904]; (affirming,' 113 HI. App. County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698 114); Trigger v. Drainage District, [1881]; Hagar v. Board of Supervis- No. 1, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. ors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222 1114 [1901] ; The People ex rel. Her- [1874]; People ex rel. Davidson v. man v. Bug River Special Drainage Cole, 128 111. 158, 21 N. E. 6 [1890]; District, 189 111. 55, 59 N. E. 605; Osborn v. Maxinkuckee Lake Ice Drainage District No. 3 v. The Peo- Company, 154 Ind. 101, 56 N. E. 33 pie ex rel. Baron, 147 111. 404, 35 [1899]; Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. N. E. 238 [1894]; People ex rel, etc., 99, 16 Am. St. Rep. 357, 22 N. E. 782 v. Drainage Comrs. District No. 1 of [1889] ; State, Skinkle, Pros. v. In- Town of Young America, 143 III. 417, habitants of the Township of Clinton 32 N. E. 688 [1893]; Commissioners 925 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT, § 564 drainage district formed under an independent statute. It is limited to districts formed under the act of which it is a part, and the amendment thereof.^^ The fact that lands thus volun- tarily connected lie in an adjoining town does not prevent them from becoming a part of the drainage district." The drainage commissioners may be eomnelled by mandamus to assess lands thus volunfeirily connected.^' The amount to-be paid is gener- ally the amount which such land would have had to pav had it been originally included in the district. This rule applies to an entire drainage district where one district connects its drains with the drains of another.^" The determination of the commis- sioners of the district which annexed such land, that the land which is thus connected is benefited by such connection and is accordingly subject to, such assessment, is final in a suit upon the assessment.^' If the correctness of such judgment is to be attack- ed and the question of benefits 'tried as a fact, it must be in a proceeding in quo warranto}^ If a land owner deepens ditches on his own land so as to connect with the drains in a drainage district, he thereby in fact annexes his own land to such drain- age district,^" but he does not thereby annex the lands of other of Lake Fork Special Drainage Dia- Murdock y. Drainage Commissioners trict V. The People ex rel. Bodman, of Union Drain Dist. No. 3, 211 111. 138 111. 87, 27 N. E. "857 [1892]; 328, 71 N. E. 1007; (affirming, 113 Commissioners of Mason and Taze- 111. App. .114 [1904]); People ex rel. well Special Drainage District v. Samuel v. Cooper, 139 111. 461, 29 Griffin, 134 111. 330, 25 N. E. 99S N. E. 872 [1893]. [1891]; Bodman v. Lake Fork Spe- " Shanley v. People ex rel. Goedt- cial Drainage, 132 111. 439, 24 N. E. ner, 225 111. 579, 80 N. E. 277 630 [1891]; Kankakee Drainage [1907]; Trigger v. Drainage District District v. Commissioners of Lake No. 1, etc., 193 111. 230, 61 N. E. Fork Special Drainage District, 130 1114 [1901]. 111. 261, 22 N. E. 607 [1890]. " Shanley v. People ex rel. Goedt- " Kankakee Drainage District v. ner, 225 111. 579, 89 N. E. 277 Commissioners of Lake Fork Special [1907] ; People ex rel. Wood v. Jones, Drainage District, 130 111. 261, 22 137 111. 35, 27 N. E. 294 [1892]; N. E. 607 [1890], Bodman v. Lake Fork Special Drain- "People ex rel., etc. v. Drainage age District, 132 111. 439, 24 N. E. Comrs. District No. 1 of Town of 630 [1891]; Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. Young America, 143 111. 417, 32 N. 478, 13 N. E. 246 [188«] ; Osborn E. 688 [1893]. v. People, 103 111. 228. '' Commissioners of Lake Fork " People ex rel. Phillips v. Drain- Special Drainage District v. The age District No. 5, 191 111. 623, 61 People ex rel. Bodman, 138 111. 87, N. E. 381 [1901]; Dayton v. Drain- 27 N. E. 857 [1892]. age Commispinners, 128 III. 271, 21 '» Drainan-e Commissioners of N. E. 198 [1890]. Drainage District No. 2 of Town of § 564 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 926 owners which drain through such deepened ditches.^" Other land owners whose land is not thus annexed to the district have no right to the drainage of their lands by such system of ditches.^^ The fact that a land owner has merely exercised reasonable and proper care of his ditches, does not prevent his land from being annexed to the drainage district, if such reasonable and proper care results in fact in his making use of the ditches of such drain- age district.^^ It is not necessary that the owners of land to be benefited by connection, with the ditches of a drainage district should make any formal application for annexation.^' In some jurisdictions it is said that a land owner whose land has not been assessed for a ditch, may be prevented from constructing drains so as to discharge water from his land into the drainage system."* A land owner who has paid an assessment for constructing a drainage system may prevent the owner of land not assessed from constructing ditches to di'ain his land into such drainage system where such additional water cannot be carried by the drainage system without damage to the other land owners whose lands are drained by such ditch."^ In other jurisdictions, it is held that such land owner cannot enjoin the use of such drainage sys- tem by land owners whose lands have not been assess- ed."" His remedy seems to be to have such lands an- nexed to the drainage district and thus made to bear a proportionate part of the cost of constructing the system of drainage in question."^ One ground of objecting to a drainage assessment from the standpoint of benefits is that the land assess- ed is not in fact drained by the ditch for the construction of which the a,'ssessment is levied. Land which is not drained by a system of drainage cannot ordinarily be assessed for the cost of such system,"* although land which is not itself subject to over- flow, but is subject to damage by reason of the overflow of other =" People ex rel. Phillips v. Drain- " Young v. Gentis, 7 Ind. App. 199, age District, No. 5, 191 111. 623, 61 32 N. E. 796 [1893]. N. E. 381 [1901]. ^ Drake v. Schoenstedt, 149 Ind. = Dayton v. Drainage Commission- 90, 48 N. E. 62S [1897]; Young v. ers, 128 111. 271, 21 N. E. 198 Gentis, 7 Ind. App. 199; 32 N. E. [1890]. 796 [1893]. ^People ex rel. Baron v. Drainage "Springer v. Walters, 139 III. District, No. 3 of Martinton Town- 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]. ship, 155 111. 45, 39 N. E. 613 "Springer v. Walters, 139 111. [1894]. 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]. ^ Streutef v. Willow Creek Drain- ^ Klinger v. People ex rel. Conkle, age District, 72 111. App. 561 [1897]. 130 111. 509, 22 N. E. 600 [1890]. 927 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 564 land, may be assessed for a ditch whereby such other land is drained.^" Saeh objections must, however, be made at the time and in the manner provided for by statute. If such objection is not made in the proper way, it will ordinarily be regarded as waived.'" Land which is so located that by reason of the slope of the ground it cannot drain into the ditch in question, is not benefited thereby." Another grotmd for objecting to the levy of an assessment upon land which it is claimed is drained by a sys- tem of drainage is, that such land is already drained and needs no further drainage. Where the question of benefits is to be de- termined as a fact it is held that such land cannot be assessed."- If such land drains into another basin and the surface water therefrom does not reach the ditch in question, the right of such land to be free from such assessment is clear.''' Where it is held that the owner of higher ground has a property right in the es- tablished and regular course of surface drainage from his higher ground to the lower ground of adjoining land owners, it is held that such higher land cannot be assessed for the cost of a ditch eonstructed^to drain such lower land, although the drainage of such lower land is to a considerable degree necessary because of the surface water which flows upon it from such higher land.-''* The owner of the higher land has, however, no right to change the natural course of surface drained, by cutting ditches so as to collect the water in a channel and thus discharging it in a body upon the lower land. Where the upper owner has done this, he may be enjoined by the lower one from permitting such condi- tions to continue. Accordingly, his land may be included in the drainage district, if the water thus discharged in a body is col- ^Roby V. Shunganunga Drainage v. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 186 District, — Kan. . 95 Pae. 39!) [1881]; In the Matter of the Peti- [1908]. tion of Cheesbrough to Vacate an =° Oliver V. Monona County, 117 la. Assessment, 78 N. Y. 232 [1879]; 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]; Commis- Blue v. Wentz, 54 0. S. 247, 43 N. aioners of Putnam County v. Krauss, E. 493 [1896]. 53 O. S. 628, 42 N. E. 831 [1895]. =»Anselm v. Barnard, 2 Keb. 675. "Klinger v. People ex rel. Conkle, '^ Zinn v. Board of Supervisors of 130 111. 509, 22 N. E. 600 [1890]; Buena Vista County, — la. ,114 In the Matter of the Petition of Van N. W. 51 [1907]; Beals v. James, Buren to Vacate an Assessment, 79 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245 [1899]; N. Y. 384 [1880]. Blue v. Wentz, 54 0. 6. 247, 43 N. "^Anselm v. Barnard, 2 Keb. 675; E. 493 [1896]; Buckley v. Commis- Beals V. James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 sibners of Lorain' Co., 1 Ohio C. C. N. E. 245 [1899]; State, King, Pros. 251 [1885]. § 564 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 92S leeted and carried oflf by the drainage of such district.'' Where, land is already drained by artificial drainage, the ques-. tion of its liability to assessment turns on the fact of benefit inur- ing to such land from the new system of drainage for which it is sought to levy such assessment. If the previous artificial drainage does not drain such land completely, such land may be assessed for a system of ditches which will complete, such drainage.'" If such land is already completely drained, it cannot be assessed further for drainage.'' However, if a drainage improvement has been constructed in part so as to drain certain land and subse- quently is extended so as to drain other land, the owners of lands drained by the ditch as originally constructed, cannot resist an as- sessment for the extension on the ground that such original ditch was sufBcient for the drainage of their own lands." The assess- ment which such owners are called upon to pay is no greater than it would have been had the entire improvement been made at once and all the land drained been assessed by one assessment. If a drain affords drainage to certain land, but does' not pass through it, such land is benefited.'" The benefit accruing from drainage need not be for agricultural or sanitary purposes alone.*" If land is improved for purposes of travel, or for residence, or for the growth of timber, it is to be regarded as benefited." If a special proceeding is provided for by which the question of exist- ence of benefits is to be determined, a land owner who does not take advanfafre of such proceeding has no right to raise such ques- tion of benefits subsequently in tesisting the assessment levied.*^ Under some statutes which provide for the formation of draining associations, as^sessments can be levied only upon the lands of the members thereof. Accordingly, under such statutes, land be- lonsring to a married woman carnot be assessed, if under the law in force such married woman cannot, by reason of her coverture, =« CuTbertson v. Knight, 152 Ind. '"Cribbg v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898]. 44 S. W. 707 [1897]. '"Commissioners of Spoon River "Springer v. Walters, 139 111. Drainage District in Champaigrn 419, 28 N. E. 761 [1893]. County V. Conner, 121 111. App. *50 '^Commissioners of Highways of [1906]. the Town of Colfax v. Commi=sion- ■"Bow V. Smith, 9 Mod. 94, 95. ers of East Lake Fork Special Drain- ''Brie-gs v. Union Drainage Dis- age Distr-ict, 127 111. 581, 21 N E triot, No. 1, 140 111. 53, 29 N. E. 206 [1890]. 721 [1893]. "Oliver v. Monona County, 117 Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 510 [1902]. 929 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §§ 565, 566 enter into a contract or become a member of such association.*' An assessment for repairing a ditch can be levied upon land bene- fited by such repairs. Land benefited by the original ditch, but not benefited by such repairs, cannot be assessed therefor.** § 565. Land benefited by water pipes. Property to which water is carried by water pipes may be assess- ed for the cost of constructing such pipes. If, however; a tract of property is already supplied by water through a system of pipes, it seems to be held in some jurisdictions that such property cannot be assessed unless a special benefit from such additional system of pipes can in fact be shown.^ Thus, where a lot had been assessed for water pipes laid along the front thereof, and it was subsequently sought to assess such property for water pipes laid along the side thereof, such assessment was held to be in- valid.'' In other jurisdictions, it seems to be held that property may be assessed for water pipes laid on three sides thereof, under a statute apportioning the cost to the amount of pipe laid. In this case, however, the fact that the pipes were laid on three sides of the property may have conferred a greater benefit than would have been conferred had the pipes been laid on one side of the property.* § 566. Land benefited by levees. Land which is subject to overflow in the absence of a system of levees, and which is protected from overflow by the construc- tion of a system of levees, is undoubtedly benefited by such sys- tem so that it may be assessed for the cost thereof.^ If land is not subject to overflow, it cannot be said as a matter of law that such land cannot be benefited by a 'system of levees.^ Increased *^ Liberty Township Draining Asso- ' State v. Trustees of Macalester ciation v. Watlcins, 72 Ind. 439 Collece, 87 Minn. 165, 91 ;N. W. 484 [1880]. [1902]. *' Goodrich v. City of Minonk, 62 * Streuter v. Willow Creek Drain- Ill. 121 [1871]; Parke County Coal age District, 72 111. App. 561 Company v. Campbell, 140 Ind. 28, [1?97]; Hill v. Fontenot, 46 La. 39 N. E. 149 [1894]. Ann. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; State ^McChesney v. City of Chicago, 213 ex rel. Ashby v. Three States Lum- m. 592, 73 N. E. 368 [ 1905] ; Baker ber Co., 198 Mo. 430, 95 S. W. 333 V. Gartside, 86 (5 Norris) Pi. St. [1906]. 498. ^Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dis- ^ Baker v. Gartside, 86 Pa. St. (5 trict, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 Norris) 498. [1894]; McDermott v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 60 [I860]. § 567 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 930 access to such land and improved drainage thereon may consti- tute benefits accruing from a system of levees for which such land may be assessed.' Land which is at so low a level that it is not protected in any way from overflow, cannot be assessed for the cost of a levee which protects higher land from overflow.* Land which lies between the river and the levee and is not in any way protected by such levee cannot be assessed therefor.^ The fact that the land in question is wet during the time of the winter and summer rains after the construction of the levee, does not prevent it from being benefited by such construction." Legislative or constitutional determination of the fact of benefit may be conclu- sive.' Land within a drainage district as recognized by the con- stitution and not lying between the levee and the river is said to be subject to assessment, even if in fact it is damaged rather than benefited by such levee.* Where the statute so provides, the deter- mination of the engineer as to what land is incapable of protec- tion by levees is final." A drainage district may construct a levee outside of its territorial boundaries, if such levee is necessary to prevent land within the district from overflow.^" In determining what property may be assessed for the construction of a levee, the statute may describe such property as alluvial land.^^ Such de- scription seems to be regarded as sufiieient. It is necessary under such description to determine as a fact what property is allu- vial." § 567. Land benefited by other improvements. Property which is included in a fencing district may be assessed for the cost of such fence.^ It has been held, however, that terri- ^ Carson v. St. Francia Levee ' Hill v. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]. [1894]; McDermott v. Mathis, 2i "Hosmer v. Hunt Drainage Dis- Ark! 60 [I860]. trict, 134 111. 360, 26 N. E. 584 *Hill V. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. [1891]. 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]; Yeatman v. " Hollingsworth v. Tax Collector, Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220 [1856]. 45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Rep. " Owens T. Yazoo & Mississippi Val- 220, 12 So. 1 [1893]. ley Railroad Co., 74 Miss. 821, 21 " HoUingsworth v. Tax Collector, So. 244 [1897]. 45 La. Ann. 222, 40 Am. St. Rep. " Memphis Land & Timber Company 220, 12 So. 1 [1893]. V. St. Francis 'Levee District, 64 ' Busbee v. Commissioners of Wake Ark. 258, 42 S. W. 763 [1897]. County, 93 N. C. 143 [1885]; Cain ' Hill V. Fontenot, 46 La. Ann. v. Commissioners of Davie County, 1563, 16 So. 475 [1894]. 86 N. C. 8 [1882]. 'Smith V. Willis, 78 Miss. 243, 28 So. 878 [1900]. 931 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSBSLMENT. § 568 'tory which has been fenced out of a fencing district is not bene- fited by such fencing district and therefore cannot be assessed for the cost of such fences.^ Lard on a private ship canal, which is connected with a public canal, is benefited by the dredging and improvement of the public canal' § 568. Land benefited by combination of improvements. 'Whether different tracts of land may be assessed for a combina- tion of improvements upon the theory that it receives a benefit from some part of the combination, is a question which depends for its solution in part upon the nature of the improvement, and in part upon the powers of the public corporation and upon the restrictions thereon. With reference to this question improve- ments are of two general classes. (1) The city or other public corporation may seek to combine in one improvement different improvements which in their nature are parts of one united whole. The city or other corporation may, in the absence of some speci- fic statutory provision preventing the same, combine improve- ments of this class.' (2) The city or other public corporation may attempt to combine two or more improvements which are not in their nature parts of one united whole ; but which may be con- structed together, in a very efficient and economical manner. No objection can be made to the act of the city in constructing im- provenients together as long as no injustice results and no stat- ute is violated.'' No objection can be made to constructing two or more improvements under one resolution,/* or ordinance,* or under one contract,' if the assessment is so apportioned that only the land benefited by each improvement is assessed there- '^ Harper v. Commissioners of New nah v. Weed, 96 Ga. 670, 23 S. E. Hanover County, 133 N. C. 106, 45 900 [1895]; Haley y. City of Alton, S. E. 526 [1903]. 152 111. 113, 38 N. E. 750 [1894]; 'People V. City of Buffalo, 107 N. County of Adams v. City of Quiney, Y. S. 689 [1907]. 130 111. 566, 6 L. E. A. 155, 22 N. E. 'Stoddard v. Johnson, 75 Ind. 20 624 [1890]; Wilbur v. City of [1881]. Springfield, 123 111. 395, 14 N. E. ^Prout V. People ex fel. Miller, 83 871- [1889]. III. 154 [1876]; Bye v. Atlantic City, "Alameda Macadamizing Company ^, N. J. Sup. , 64 Atl. 1056 v. Williams, 70 Cal. 534, 12 Pac. 530 [1906]. [1886]; Fairbanks v. Mayor and ' Bates V. Twist, 138 Cal. 52, 70 Aldermen of Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42 Pac. 1023 [1902]; Lewis v. Albert- [1882]; State of Minnesota ex rel. son, 23 Ind. App. 147, 53 N. E. PoweU v. District Court of Ramsey 1071 [1899]. County, 47 Minn. 406, 50 N. W. 476 'Mayor and Aldermen of Savan- [1891], §569 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 932 for. The apportionment of the cost of each improvement to the property benefited thereby and to no other property may be se- cured by having separate estimates made for each improvement.* It may be secured where the contract is let at a gross price for all the improvements, by the action of the Board of Public "Works, or other similar body, in determining what amount is necessary for the cost of each separate improvement, the aggregate amount thus raised for each of the improvements being equal to the gross amount of the contract price.' If an assessment is levied upon the property fronting and abutting on each street for the cost of such street, the fact that the city ofiBcials have purchased under one contract a quantity of stone intended for a number of dis- tinct improvements does not invalidate such assessment.' A city cannot, however, assess a part of the cost of an improvement upon property which is in no way benefited thereby. If, by statute, it is provided that certain improvements can be made only if the property owners affected thereby, or a certain percentage of them, petition for such improvement, the city cannot combine two dis- tinct improvements so as to construct either of them upon the petition of a smaller number of property owners affected by each than is provided for by statute.' § 569. Combination of streets. Two or more streets, or parts of streets, which naturally form one connected and entire whole, may be combined. The two parts of a street separated by a parkway form an entire improve- ment.^ The two parts of a street, which are separated by a tract of land which is dedicated to free and unobstructed public use, ex- cept for wheeled vehicles, are parts of an entire improvement.^ If two or more streets really form one continuous improvement, they may be improved together and one assessment levied there- ° Haley v. City of Alton, 152 111. 'Cummings v. West Chicago Park 113, 38 N. E. 750 [1894]. Com'rs., 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941. ' State of Minnesota ex rel. PowelV So with branches of a street sur- V. District Court of Ram=ey County, rounding an open space in a street 47 Minn. 406, 50 N. W. 476 [1891]. and forming with the street, one con- 'Alberger v. Mayor and City tinuous thoroughfare; Cuming v. Council of Baltimore, 64 Md. 1, 20 City of Grand Rapids, 46 Mich. 150, Atl. 988 [1885]. 9 N. W. 141 [1881]. 'Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 "Alvey v. City of Asheville, — N. Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [18971,; Her- C. . 59 S. E. 999 [1907]. see V. City of Buffalo, 1 Sheldon (N. y.) 445 [1874]. 933 PEOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 561) for.' The same rule applies to different sections of the same street, though paved with different material and under different contracts.* The same principle applies to two county roads which form one continuous road." Thus, where for any reason a section of a street is left unimproved, the rest of such street, even if separated by such section, may be improved as one improvement," at least in the absence of any showing that property on one section of the street was not benefited by the improvement of the other section.'' So where a street as laid out is really continu- ous, but contains a jog, such street may be improved as one im- provement,' even if the part of the street beyond the jog is known by a different name." The attempt is sometimes made to group together a number of streets which do not constitute one contin- uous street in reality, and to assess the aggregate cost of such improvement equally upon all the property benefited by any of such streets. An assessment of this sort is usually held invalid, as it results in assessing for the improvement of one street, property which is in no material way benefited thereby.^' Under a statute authorizing a city to grade "any street," it was held that a city could not grade nine distinct streets and levy one assessment foi ' Lewis V. City of Seattle, 28 Wash. ' Wilder v. City of Cincinnati, 26 639, 69 Pac. 393 [1902]. "The na- 0. S. 2«4 [1875]. ture, character and extent of an im- ' Lewis v. City of Seattle, 28 Wash, provement must rest within the dis- 639, 69 Pac. 393 [1902]. cretion of the city council. The law 'Culver v. City of Chicago, 171 111. fixes no metes or bounds in this re- 399, 49 N. E. 573 [1898]; Lynch v. spect beyond which' it cannot go, fur- City of Kansas City, 44 Kan. 452, ther t!ian that it may not permit a 24 Pac. 973 [1890]. gross abuse of such discretion. "Lynch v. City of Kansas City, 44' Whether, therefore, the work as or- Kan. 452, 24 Pac. 973 [1890]. dered and performed consists of dis- "Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, connected portions or of a continuous 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]; portion of a street, or whether it Willard v. Albertson, 23 Ind. App: consists of work done upon different 164, 53 N. E. 1077, 54 N. E. 403 streets, furnishes no ground of com- [1899]; Nevin v. Allen, (Ky.) 26 plaint to the individual property S. W. 180, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 836 holder so long as the work confers [1894]; Kansas City Grading Com- a benefit upon his property and he is pany v. Holden, 32 Mo. App. 490 not charged with a cost exceeding [1888]; Kinealy v. Gay, 7 Mo. App. such benefit." Lewis v. City of Se- 203 [1879]; Hutchinson v. City of attle, 28 Wash. 639, 69 Pac. 393 Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 '[1902]. [1897]; State, Kerrigan, Pros. v. •7» re Shady Avenue, 34 Pa. Township of West Hoboken, 37 N. J. Super. Ct. 327 [1907]. L. (8 Vroom) 77 [1874]; City to "Commissioners of Putnam County use of Brooks v. Lea, 9 Phila. (Pa.) V. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880]. 106 [1872]. § 5,69 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 934 all upon the property benefited by such improvements." If the work is let as one contract and there is no competitive bidding as to each street, separately, as required by statute, the assess- ment is invalid under a statute providing for assessing "property 'immediately benefited" by the improvement." If material exca- vated from one street can be used to fill up others, and separate contracts are let, the expense of the work may be estimated under the principal contract with reference to the existence of the other contraets.^^ A statute authorizing the grading of two or more streets as one improvement, when in the proper prosecution of the work the material taken from one street may be used in filling the others, does not authorize an assessment for iniproving two or more streets together under any other circumstances.^* A city or village may provide for extending the improvement of a street a few feet into cross streets, if lateral extensions are to be paid for by general taxation and not by the owners of prop- erty abutting on the street improved.^^ If an ordinance is passed for the improvement of two streets and only one of such streets is improved, the cost of such improvement cannot be assessed upon the land abutting on both streets.^" If a petition signed by. a certain percentage of the abutting property owners is necessary for the construction of a street improvement on the assessment plan, the city cannot improve two or more separate stre.ets upon a petition signed merely by the proper percentage of the aggre- gate number of owners of property on all of such streets. The petition must be signed by the proper number of property own- ers on each of such separate streets.^' If the petition is signed for the construction of a continuous pavement on two streets which intersect at a right angle 'and the petition is insufficient as to one of such streets because it is not signed by a majority of the owners of each contiguous block thereon, the improvement of the other street cannot be undertaken unless the petition shows "■ Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 ' " White v. City of Alton, 149 111. Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [1897]. 626, 37 N. E. 66 [1894]. '^People V. Common Council of "Willard v. Albertson, 23 Ind. City of Kingston, 189 N. Y. 66, 81 App. 164, 53 N. E. 1077, 54 N. E. K. E. 557 [1907]; (reversing, 96 403 [1899]. N. Y. S. 657, 114 App. Div. 326 " Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 [1906]). Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [1897]; " Schenley v. Commonwealth for Lathrop v. City of Buffalo, 3 Abb. use, 36 Pa. St. 64. Ct. App. (N. y".) 30 [1861]. "Mavall V. City of St. Paul, 30 Minn. 294, 15 N. W. 170 [1883]. 935 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. | 570 on its face that it is in legal effect a separate petition for each street." If the construction of two or more streets as one ijfXi provement results in assessing for the construction , of any one of the streets, property not benefited thereby, spch assessment is invalid.^* Thus, where two streets of materially different widths- are improved, the city cannot divide the total cost by the entire frontage on both streets and regard such amount as the assess- ment per front foot.'"' Assessments were levied for eight distinct iipprovements as to some of which there was a surplus and as to; others a deficit. In such a case the city cannot appropriate any part of such surplus to apply to such deficit."" § 570. Combination of parts of entire street improvement. The opening of a street or road by condemning or otherwise acquiring a fee or easement in the realty necessary therefor is often conducted as a separate and distinct improvement without any relation to the surface improvement thereof. ■ Improvement of the other forms of surface improvement, are naturally and most economically made together. If they are all parts of one and the same improvement, affecting adjoining property owners in similar ways, there is no constitutional objection to combining them in one general improvement for which one assessment is levied. Accordingly, assessments for opening and widening a street,' opening, widening and grading a street,^ opening and extending a street,' opening, extending and grading a street,* opening, grading and paving a street,^ widening and extending, a, street,* or acquiring land on the ocean front for a street and "City of Bloomington v. Reeves, 223 [1866]; Astor v. Mayor, Alder- 177 111. 161, 52 N. E.,278 [1898]. men and Commonalty of the City of "Kevin v. Allen, (Ky.) 15 Ky. New York, 62 N. Y. 580 [1875]; In Law Rep. 836, 26 S. W. 180 the Matter of the Petition of Arnold [1894]; Thayer v. City of Grand to Vacate an Assessment, 60 N. Y. Rapids, 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 26 [1875]. [1890]; Kansas City Grading Com- = Wilmington Avenue, 213 Pa. 238, pany v. Holden, 32" Mo. App. 490 62 Atl. 848 [1906]. [1888]; State, Kerrigan, Pros. v. ' Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 111. Township of West Hoboken, 37 N. J. 227 [1876]. L. (8 Vroom) 77 [1874]. *MedIand v. Linton, 60 Neb. 249, =°Nevin v. Allen, (Ky.), 26 S. 82 N. W. 866 [1900]. W. 180, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 836 [1894]. "Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. -''Thayer v. City of Grand Rapids, 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (af- 82 Mich. 298, 46 N. W. 228 [1890]. firming, Snencer v. Merchant, 100 N. . 'Pavies V. Citv of Los Angeles. 86 Y. 585. 3 N. E. 682 [1885]). Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; Dorean "Cohn v. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367. 14 (;, City of Boston, 94 Mass. (12 All.) Pac. 26 [1887]; New England Hos- 570 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 936 erecting an elevated walk thereon ^ have each been upheld as valid exercise of the power of levying local assessments. As would naturally follow from the nature of the improvement, grading is usually effected in connecting with other forms of surface improvements. Accordingly, assessments are frequently made for grading and paving undertaken together as part of the same improvement, and such assessments are held to be valid as an exercise of the power to provide for a local assessment.* So are assessments for grading, paving and curbing,* grading, pav- pital for Women and Children v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 188 Mass. 88, 74 N. E. 294 [1905]. ' Murphy v. City of Long Branch, — N. J. Sup. -^— , 61 Atl. 593 [1905]. •Schaefer v. Werling, 188 U. S. 516, 47 L. 570, 23 S. 449 [1903]; (affirming Schaefer v. Werling, 156 Ind. 704, 60 N. E. 149; following without opinion Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Kep. 484, 49 L. E.'A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899] ) ; Webster v. City of Far- go, 181 U. S. 394, 45 L. 912, 21 S. 623, 645 [1901]; (affirming, Webster v. City of Fargo, 9 N. D. 208, 56 L. E. A. 156, 82 N. W. 732 [1900] ) ; Tona- wanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389, 45 L. 908, 21 S. 609 [1901]; (reversing, Lyon V. Town of Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 361 [1899]) ; City of Gladstone V. Throop, 71 Fed. 341, 18 C. C. A. 61, 37 U. S. App. 481 [1895]; Dun- can V. Eamish, 142 "Cal. 686, 76 Pac. 661 [1904]; German Savings and Loan Society v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pac. 1067 [1902] ■ Dyer v. Hudson, 65 Cal. 374, 4 Pac. 231 [1884]; (following Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346 [1865] ) ; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346 [1865]; City of At- lanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 12 L. E. A. 852, 13 S. E. 252 [1890] ; Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580 [1890]; Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 [18831; Lan. phere v. City of Chicago, 212 111. 440, 72 N. E. 426 [1904]; McChes- ney v. City of Chicago, 201 111. 344, 66 N. E. 217 [1903]; Field v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 224, 64 N. E. 840 [1902] ; Lehmers v. City of Chi- cago, 178 111. 530, 53 N. E. 394 [1899]; Holt v. City of East St. Lojiis, 150 111. 530, 37 N. E. 927 [18941; Woods V. City of Chicago, 135 111. 582, 26 N. E. 608 [1892]; Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540 [1889]; Flour- noy V. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dec. 468 [1861]; City of Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 la. 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143 [1871]; Motz V. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 494 [1S69]; People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266 [1851]; Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336 [1876]; Haegele v. Mallinckrodt, 3 Mo. App. 329 [1877]; People ex rel. Ackerly v. City of Brooklyn, 8 Hun. 56 [1876]; Jessing v. City of Columbus, 1 Ohio C. C. 90; (affirmed, 22 W. L. B. 453 [1885]); Beaumont v. Wilkes- Barre City, 142 Pa. St. 198, 21 Atl. 888 [1891]; M'Gonigle v. City of Al- legheny, 44 Pa. St. 118 [1862]. "Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, 25 S. 466 [1905]; (af- firming, 116 Ky. 856, 76 S. W. 1097, 25 Ky. L. R. 1024 [1903]) ; Oakland Paving Company v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3 [1886]; MoChesney V. City of Chicago, 205 111. 611, 69 N. E. 82 [1903]; Gage v. City of Chi- cago, 201 111. 93, 66 N. E. 374 [19031 : City of Chicaoro v. Sherwood, 104 111. 549 [18821; City of Chicago V. People of the State of Illinois, 56 937 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. 1570 ing, curbing and guttering,^" grading, planking and constructing sidewalks,^^ grading, paving and draining,^^ grading and the con- struction of sidewalks," grading, curbing, paving, guttering and constructing sidewalks," and grading and the construction of sewers.^" Paving is an improvement which is generally effected in connection with other improvements. In addition to the illus- trations already given, grading and repaving," filling, grading, flagging and draining,^^ and filling, paving, curbnig, gutter- ing and constructing sidewalks,^' have all been treated as proper exercises of the power to levy a local assessment. Asesssments for paving and curbing," paving, curbing and guttering,^" pav- 111. 327 [1870]; Richardson v. Meh- ler, 111 Ky. 408, 63 S. W. 957, 23 Ky. L. K. 917 [1901]; Gleason v. Barnett, 106 Ky. 125, 50 S. W. 67 [1899]; Moale v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 61 Md. 224 [1883]; Ulman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. A. 224, 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 228, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709 [1890]; Lewis v. City of Elizabeth, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 298 [1874]; Fifty Fourth Street, Pitts- burg's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [1894]; Allegheny City v. Blair, 74 Pa. St. (24 P. F. Smith) 225 [1873]. "City of St. Louis to use of Mc- Grath v. Clemens, 36 Mo. 467 [1865]. "^Bellingham Bay and British Co- lumbia Railroad v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314, 43 L. 460, 19 S. 205 [1899]; (affirming City of New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Im- provement Company, 16 Wash. 131, 47 Pac. 236 [1896]). "Brewer v. Incorporated Village of Bowling Green, Ohio, 7 Ohio C. C. 489 [1893]. "First National Bank of Kansas City V. Nelson, 64 Mo. 418 [1877]. " State, Provident Institution for Savings in Jersey City, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 52 N. J. L. (23 Vr.) 490, 19 Atl. 1096 [1890]. "State, Provident Institution for Savings in Jersey City, Pros. v. May- or, etc., of Jersey City, 92 N. J. L. (23 Vr.) 490, 19 Atl. 1096 [1890]; Marshall v. Commonwealth to use of Mayor, etc., of Allegheny City, 59 Pa. St. 455 [1868]. " In the Matter of the Petition of Buhler, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 79 [1859]. " State, Mpran, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 144, 35 Atl. 284 [1895]. "State, Malone, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 28 N. J. L. (4 Dutch.) 500 [I860]. "Bowling v. Hibernia Loan and Savings Society, 143 Cal. 425, 77 Pac. 141 [1904]; Reid v. Clay, 134 Cal. 207, 66 Pac. 262 [1901]; Will- iams V. Bergin, 116 Cal. 56, 47 Pac. 877 [1897]; Borland v. Bergson, 78 Cal. 637, 21 Pac. 537 [1889]; Mead V. City of Chicago, 186 111. 54, 57 N. E. 824 [1900] ; Claflin v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 549, 53 N. E. 339 [1899]; Chicago & Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. City of Chi- cago, 172 111. 66, 49 N. E. 1006 [1898]; People ex rel. Kochersper- ger V. Markley, 166 111. 48, 46 N. E. 742 [1897]; Kimble v. City of Peo- ria, 140 111. 157, 29 N. E. 723 [1893] ; Wilbur V. City of Sprins^eld, 123 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1899]; City of Topeka v. Gage, 44 Kan. 87, 24 Pac. 82 [1890] ; Olsson v. City of Topeka, 42 Kan. 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; Blair v. City of Atchison, 40 Kan. 353, 19 Pac. 815 [1888]; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104 [1870]; Howell v. City of Phil- adelphia, 36 Pa. St. 471 [1861]; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324 [1886]. =» Le Veine v. City of Kansas City 67 Kan. 239, 72 Pac. 774 [1903]; § 571 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 938 ing and guttering,"^ for paving and the construction of a sewer,-- for grading and paving a street and filling and adjusting se^'ers, catch-basins and man-holes,^' and for grading a street, sodding the center thereof and graveling the sides and constructing a sewer thereunder," have been upheld. So curbing and gutter- ing," or curbing and the construction of sidewalks,^" or curbing, guttering and the construction of sidewalks ^^ are improvements which may be made together and for which one assessment may be levied. § 571. Sidewalks. Sidewalks on each side of the same street may be regarded as one improvement and an assessment for the aggregate cost thereof may be levied upon the property on both sides of the street.^ It has been held that an assessment for sidewalks on two or more streets is prima facie valid in the absence of a showing that such streets are so separate that a sidewalk on one does not benefit property on the other." A property owner whose assessment is less where two or more sidewalk improve- ments are grouped together than it would have been had a sep- arate assessment been levied for each improvement, cannot com- plain because such improvements are grouped.' It has been held City of Emporia v. Norton, 13 Kan. Nevada to the use of Gilfillan v. Mor- 569 [1874]; Strasshein v. Jerman, ris, 43 Mo. App- 586 [1891]; In the 56 Mo. 104 [1874]. Matter of the Petition of Auchmuty =^Burk V. Altachul, 66 Cal. 533, to Vacate an Assessment, 11 Hun. 76 6 Pac. 393 [1885]; Warren v. Henly, [1877]. 31 la. 31 [1870]. "" Mayor and Board of Trustees- of =" Cincinnati for use, etc., v. Jung, the Town of New Iberia v. Fonte- 7 Ohio N. P. 665 [1900]; Megett v. lieu, 108 La. 460, 32 So. 369 [1901]. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 "Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177, 32 N. W. 566 [1892]. L. 899, 9 S. 480 [1889]; (affirming ^Sawyer v. City of Chicago, 183 Alley v. Lyon, 14 D. 0. (3 Mackey) 111. 57, 55 N. E. 645 [1899]. 457 [1885]); Ryan v. Altsehul, 103 « Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 Cal! 174, 37 Pac. 339 [1894]. 111. 509, 9 N. E. 895 [1888]. 'Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 == Arnold v. City of Fort Dodge, 111. 313, 21 L. E. A. 563, 33 N. E. Iowa, 111 la. 152, 82 N. W. 495 888 [1893]; Watson v. City of Chi- [1900]; Rooney v. Brown, 21 La. cago, 115 111. 78, 3 N. E. 430 [1886], Ann. 51 [1869]; City of Omaha v. 'Storrs v. City of Chicago, 208 111-. Gsanter, 4 Neb. Unoff. 52, 93 N. W. 364, 70 N. E. 347 [1904]. 407 [1903]; State, Ward, Pros. v. "City of Marionville to the use of Commissioners of Streets and Sewers Grubaugh v. Henson, 65 Mo. App. of New Brunswick, 49 N. J. L. (20 397 [1895]. Vr.) 552, 10 Atl. 109 [1887]; City of 939 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. i§ 572 that under a statute authorizing the same, sidewalks may be constructed on different streets and the entire cost of such side- walks assessed upon all property abutting any of such streets.* This procedure, however, will result in injustice except where the benefits are substantially the same to all the property assessed. It is, on principle, wrong, except where the sidewalks are of substantially the same cost and confer substantially the same benefit to the property in front of which they are laid. Two or more sidewalks on different streets not forming a continuous or connected improvement cannot be constructed as one iniprove- ment and the cost thereof levied upon all the property fronting each one of said sidewalks in proportion to the frontage thereof." Such an assessment would charge one tract of property with a part of the cost of an improvement which did not in any way benefit it. The construction of a sidewalk as an entirety, includ- ing sidewalk intersections, is proper.' A title drain to carry sur- face water away from a street is regarded as so essentially a part of a street improvement that it is properly constructed under a petition of property owners praying for the improvement of the street without specific reference to such drain.' § 572. Sewers. If two sewers are connected so as to form in fact one continu- ous improvement, an assessment may be levied for the aggregate cost of the construction thereof upon the property benefited thereby,^ even if such sewer runs along two or more different streets.^ A sewer which is bisected by another sewer, with an outlet at the point of bisection, is to be regarded as one improve- nient and not as two different sewers running from the outlet in •Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 15;) Moines, 57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1872]. [1881]; Mayor and Council of the "People ex rel. Hanberg v. Stearns, City of Bayonne v. Morris, 61 N. 213 111. 184, 72 N. E. 728 [1904]; J. L. (32 Vr.) 127, 38 Atl. 819 -Arnold v. City of Cambridge, 106 [1897]; In the Matter of the Peti- Mass. 352 [1871]; Cist v. City of tion of Ingraham to Vacate an As- Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N. P. 559 [1901], sessment, «4 N. Y. 310 [1876]; (af- "Hyman v. City of Chicago, 188 firming In the Matter of the Petition 111. 462, 59 N. E. 10 [1900]. of Ingraham to Vacate an Assess- ' Taylor v. Wapakoneta, 26 Ohio ment on Eighty-ei?hth and Ninety- C. C. 285 [1904]. first Streets; 4 Hun. (N. Y.) 495 ■ ■ ChuTich V. Peonle ex rel. Kocher- [1876]. spereer, 179 111. 205; 53 N. E. 554 =Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, [1899]; Grimmell v. City of Des 57 la. 144, 10 N. W. 330 [1881]. I 572 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 940 each direction.' A sewer with the branches thereof is to be regarded as one improvement for this purpose.* The construc- tion of a drain and the construction of man-holes thereto amount to one improvement.^ The construction of sewers and connec- tions therewith and the establishing of building lines may be .regarded as one improvement.* If a pumping station is neces- sary to secure the flow of sewage, such pumping station and the system of sewers may be cons^ucted together as one improve- ment.' Ordinarily the construction of a bridge and the construc- tion of a sewer would constitute two different improvements for which it would be improper to levy one assessment covering the aggregate cost. However, if the sewer is designed to drain the surface water from the street and to prevent such water over- flowing the bridge, the two may be regarded as one improve- ment.* If only property abutting on a sewer can be assessed, it has been held to be improper to levy an entire assessment for the cost of a connected system of sewers." Two or more sewers draining different tracts of property cannot be regarded as one im- provement, if they do not naturally form one continuous improve- ment.^" Accordingly, a statute which provided for estimating the aggregate cost of aU sewers constructed, relaid or extended in any one season and for apportioning the aggregate cost thereof upon the property abutting on any of such sewers at a certain rate per front foot is regarded as unconstitutional as assessing for an improvement, property which is not beneflted thereby.^* A number of city blocks requiring different kinds of drainage cannot be grouped together and subjected to an assess- ment for the entire cost of draining such property by improve- ments, a part of which confer no benefit upon some of the prop- ' Church V. People ex rel. Kocher- '.Drexel v. Town of Lake, 127 111. sperger, 179 111. 205, 53 N. E. 554 54, 20 N. E. 38 [1890]. [1899]. 'People ex rel. Knox v. Village of * Payne V. Village of South Spring- Yonkers, 39 Barb. 2'6'6 [1863]. field, 161 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 "Witman v. City of Reading, 169 [1896]; Lincoln v. Street Commis- Pa. St. 375, 32 Atl. 576 [1895]. sioners of the City of Boston, 176 "State v. Pjllshury, 82 Minn. 359, Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]. 85 N. W. 175 [1901]; In the Matter 'Steele v. Village of River Forest, of the Petition of Van Buren to Va- 141 111. 302, 30 N. E. 1034 [1893]. eate an Assessment, 79 N. Y. 384 'Lincoln v. Board of Street Com- [18801. missioners of the City of Boston, 176 " State v. Pillshury, 82 Minn. 359, -Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]. 85 N. W. 175 [1901]. 941 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 573 erty.thus assessed." If to add together the cost of different sewers laid on different streets and to apportion the aggregate cost upon the property fronting on any of such sewers, results in assessment which is not materially in excess of the benefits conferred upon any tract of property, such assessment is not invalid." § 573. Other improvements. The construction of a terminal station and the changes in streets leading thereto, necessary as essential parts of the general plan of such construction, may be made together and one assess- ment may be levied for the aggregate cost of such improvement upon any property benefited thereby.' The laying out of a pub- lie park and the sanitary improvement of the neighborhood thereof may be regarded as one improvement and the aggregate cost thereof paid for by one assessment.^ Two alleys in the same block, one running north and south and the other running east and west, cannot be treated as one improvement. The aggregate cost thereof cannot be assessed upon all the property in the rear of which each alley is constructed.'' A connected system of water works may be regarded as one improvement and an assessment levied upon all the property benefited thereby.* If the proceed- ings are distinct, by statute, the improvements cannot be com- bined even if parts of an entire whole.' Under such statutes widening cannot be combined with grading and graveling.* It has been held that where gutters have been constructed on two or more streets under different resolutions, assessments may be levied for the aggregate cost thereof.' Lands in different water sheds, requiring different ditches for their drainage, cannot be assessed by one assessment for a ditch which can drain but one « In the Matter of the Petition of Mass. 274, 62 L. K. A. 144, 62 N. E. Van Buren to Vacate an Assessment, 397 [1902]. 79 N. V. 384 r 18801. ''Bri'"TS v. W'litney, 159 Mass. 97, "Villape of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 34 N. E. 179 [1P93]. 182 111. 312, 52 N. E. 327 ri8P91; »Weckler v. City of Chicago, 61 Beach v. People ex rel. ^'ern. 157 111. 142 [1871]. 111. 659. 41 N. E. 1117 [1895]: John- 'People ex roi. Miller v. Sherman, son V. Village of Avondale, 1 Ohio 83 111. ]R5 [1876]. C. r'. ??9 [1^851- " Mendenhall v. Clugish, 84 Ind. ' Wells V. Street ComTrisaioTiP'-s of 94. Citv of Boston, 187 Mass. 451. 73 N. "Menrlenhall v. riugish, 84 Ind. 94. E. 554 [19051: Sears v. Street Corn- ''Tem^T v. T'night, 60 la. 29, 14 missioners of the City of Boston, 180 N. W. 78 [1882]. § 574 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 942 of such water sheds.* A water pipe was laid on one street and then turned at a right angle and ran along another street to its terminus. It was held that this constituted one improvement." § 574. Separation of improvements. Whether improvements which in their nature are connected parts of an united whole may be constructed separately, is ordinarily within the discretion«of the city, in the absence of a statute which either expresslj' or in effect requires the construc- tion of such improvements together.^ Thus, the planking and grading of a street,^ or the macadamizing and grading of a street,^ may be constructed separately. The grading and macad- amizing of a street may be constructed without providing for curbing and gutters.* An assessment for widening a street does not exhaust the power of the city, but it may assess subsequently for grading and paving.'' If the statute in force provides for the construction of a given kind of improvement only as auxiliary to another kind of improvement, the city or other public cor- poration has no power to undertake such auxiliary improvement apart from the kind of improvement which it . was intended to aid.' Thus, if a drainage statute permits the construction of a levee as a part of a system of drainage for agricultural and sanitary purposes, a levee cannot be constructed as an independ- ent improvement apart from any system of drains and ditches.'' Statutes are sometimes found restricting the amount of assess- ments to a certain percentage of the value of the land assessed.* Occasionally an attempt is made to .evade the provisions of such statute by separating the improvement into a group of improve- ments, the assessment for each of which will be below the statu- tory limit. If the improvements thus separated are really con- stituent parts of one general improvement, such separation can- ' Klinger v. People ex rel. Conkle, ' Dyer v. Hudson, 65 Cal. 374, 4 130 III. 509, 22 N. E. 600 [1890]. Pac. 231 [1884]. ' Rlcketts V. Village of Hyde Park, * Fox v. Middlesborough Town Co., 85 111. 110 [1877]. 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776 [1894]. ' For a division of an improvement " Krumberg v. Cincinnati, 29 0. S. to evade the requirements as to the 69. formalities of letting the contract "Updike v. Wright, 81 111. 49 see § 523. [1876]. = Knowles v. Seale, 64 Cal. 377, 'Updike v. Wright, 81 III. 49 1 Pae. 159 [1883]. [1876]. ' See § 679 et seq. 943 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. % 574 not be made." Thus, a street improvement was divided into two parts, one for grading said curbing stones and flagging and the other for paving a roadway. It was held that the assess- ments for each of these improvements must be added together to determine whether the statutory limit had been exceeded.^" If, by the separation of an improve- ment into two or more distinct improvements, a property owner is obliged to pay less than if the improvement had been made as an entirety, he cannot complain of such action of the public corporation." A city has, ordinarily, in the absence of some statutory provisions showing the contrary intention of the legislature, the power to divide a street or similar improvement into sections and improve each section separately.'^ Such im- provement may be made, as to each section, at the cost of the property abutting that particular section," without assessing property abutting on any other part of the street.'* Such section may terminate in the middle of a block." If certain property is so nearly valueless that an assessment thereon would be un- availing, the city may provide for paying the improvement oppo- site such property out of the general funds of the city and may assess the rest of the work against the other property abutting.'" "In the Matter of the Petition of Stone & Sand Co., 108 Ky. 457, 55 WaJIter to Vacate Certain Assess- S. W. 697, 56 S. W. 723 [1900]; ments, 75 N. Y. 354 [1878]. State of Minnesota ex rel. Benz v. "In the Matter of the Petition of District Court of Ramsey County, Walter to Vacate Certain Assess- 32 Minn. 181, 19 N. W. 732 [1884]; ments, 75 N. Y. 354 [1878]. Eyerman v. Blakesley, 13 Mo. App. '^Magee v. Commonwealth for the 407 [1883]; Creighton v. Scott, 14 use of the City of Pittsburg, 46 Pa. 0. S. 438 [1863]; Commonwealth to St. 358 [1863]. , use of Allegheny City v. Marshall, "Bates V. Twist, 138 Cal. 52, 70 69 Pa. St. (19 P. F. Smith) 328 Pac. 1023 [1902]; Treanor V. Hough- [1871]; Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. ton, 103 Cal. 53, 36 Pac. 1081 Super. Ct. 305 [1904]. [1894]; Ede V. Cogswell, 79 Cal. 278, " Kendig v. Knight, 60 la. 29, 14 21 Pac. 767 [1889]; Dougherty v. N. W. 78 [1882] ; Creighton v. Scott, Hitchcock, 35 Cal. 512 [1868]; Brad- 14 O. S. 438 [1863]; Wabash Ave- ford V. City of Pontiac, 165 111. 612, nue, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 305 [1904]. '46 N. E. 794 [1897]; Lightner v. "Creighton v. Scott, 14 O. S. 438 City of Peoria, 150 111. 80; 37 N. E. [1863]; Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. 69 [1894]; Bigelow v. City of Chi- Super. Ct. 305 [1904]. cago, 90 111. 49 [1878]; Bozarth v. "Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 McGillicuddy, 19 Ind. App. 26, 47 Mich. 322 [1872]. N.,E. 397, 48 N. E. 1042 [1897]; "Ottumwa Brick & Construction Kendi? v. Knight, 60 la. 29, 14 N. Co. v. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. W. 78 [1882]; Neff v. Covinj-ton 510 [1899]. § 574 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 944 Under a statute providing that all or part of a street may be paved and that, when such action will allow the just proportion of^ the entire cost to. be assessed uniformly to each abut- ting front foot, the cost of the whole or any part of the im- provement may be levied at one time and under one plat and no- tice, it is held that different amounts may be levied upon dif- ferent front feet abutting on different parts of such improvement, if a just proportion of the entjre cost is thereby assessed uni- formly.^^ A street cannot, however, be arbitrarily broken up into sections so as to produce an unequal distribution of the assessment.^' The legislature may intend that each street or similar improvement is to be regarded as an entirety. If such is the legislative intent, the city cannot divide such improve- ment into sections.^' Thus, under a statute providing that the improvement of each street or a part thereof shall be under a separate proceeding, a city cannot divide a street into separate parts in the same proceeding, each part of which is to be im- proved with different classes of improvements.^" A statute which provides for the consent of a certain number of the owners of lots fronting on a given street or road is held to require the im- provement of such street or road as an entirety, since otherwise it would be impossible to obtain the necessary proportion of all of the abutting property pwners.^^ Where an improvement has been constructed in front of certain property and such improve- ment is adopted by the city or is made by the owner Under a statute which provides for exempting the property in front of which an improvement is voluntarily made, it is proper for the city to divide an improvement into sections so as to omit that part of the work which has been done already by the property owners.^^ The same rule applies where a part of an improve- "Gilerest v. McCartney, 97 la. '^Town of Bowling Green v. Hob- 138, 66 N. W.. 103 [1896]. son, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 478 [1843]; "Lightner v. City of Peoria, 150 Elliot v. Berry, 41 0. S. 110 [1884]. 111. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]. « Diggins' v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, "Everman v. Hardys 8 Mo. App. 18 Pac. 373 [1888]; San Francisco 311 [1880]; Elliot v. Berry, 41 0. S. Paving Company v. Dubois, 2 Cal. 110 [1884]; Oregon Transfer Co. v. App. 42, 83 Pac. 72 [1905]; Dumes- Portla,nd, 47 Or. 1, 81 Pac. 575, 82 nil v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co., Pac. 16 [1905]. 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 [1900]; f" Oregon Transfer Co. v. Portland, BecV v. Obst, 75 Ky. (12 Biish.) 268 47 Or. 1, ,81 Pac 575, 82 Pac. 16 [1876]. [1905]. 945 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 575 ment has been constructed under a contract since abandoned."' If a street railway company is bound to pave a part of the streets upon which its tracks are laid, it is proper for the city in providing for an improvement of such street to omit the part which such street railway company is bound to improve at its own cost."* So the contractor may be bound by an agree- ment to look to the street railroad company and not to the abut- ting property owners for that part of the cost of such improve- ment."" In an improvement consisting of constructing a road- way, curbing and constructing a sidewalk, one assessment was levied for the roadway and curbing and another for the side- walk. It was held that one assessment should have been levied for all of such improvements considered together as in legal efifect one improvement; but that if a separate assessment were required for each kind of work, the assessment was invalid, be- cause in one of such assessments the cost of curbing and paving the roadway was included."" § 575. Lat^al division of improvement. A city or other public corporation has ordinarily a wide range of discretion and may improve a part only of the width of the entire street.^ A question of this sort is "a matter within the discretion of the city officials. " " If a street is improved, the land on both sides thereof is benefited, and may, accordingly, be assessed for such improvement.' This is true even if the improvement is confined to a part of the width of the street improved, on one side of the middle line thereof.* If there is a grass plot in the middle of a street, and the roadway on one "^ Kemper v. King, 11 Mo. App. 'McGrew v. City of Kansas City, 116 [1881]. 64 Kan. 61, 62, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]. " Billings V. City of Chicago, 167 ' Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company, 111. 337, 47 N. E. 731 [1897]; Chi- 162 Ind. 509, 70 N. E. 801 [1903]; cago & Northern Paciflc Railroad (reversing Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company V. City of Chicago, 172 111. Co., 66 N. E. 486 [1903]); Drake 66, 49 N. E. 1006 [1898]. v. Grout, 21 Ind. App. 534, 52 N. "Ferine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305, E. 775 [1898]. 32 Pac. 226 [1893]. 'Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company, "Dyer v. Harrison, 63 Cal. 447 162 Ind. 509, 70 N. E. 801 [1903]; [1883]. (reversing Klein v. Nuofent Gravel »Helm V. Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131, Co., Ind App. 66 N. E. 486 [1903]); 73 N. E. 846 [19041; Morrison V. MeGrew v. Citv of Kansas Citv, 64 Hershire, 32 la. 271 [18711 ; Me- Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [19021 ; In re Grew V. City of Kansas City, 64 Phelps, 96 N. Y. S. 862, 110 App. Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]. Div. 69 [1905]. § 57.5 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 9i6 side only of such street has been improved, land on the other side of the street may be assessed therefor." If a street is widened by appropriating land on one side of the street, the cost thereof must be levied upon the land upon both sid^s of the street, even if owners of land on the side not assessed had voluntarily dedi- cated a strip of land for the street half the width of the street appropriated." An assessment for a sewer upon one side of the street only has been regarded us valid, unless it is shown that the land not' assessed is not supplied with drainage and is in need of drainage, and is therefore subject to assessment.' By statute, however, provision may be made for assessing against the property on one side of the street the cost of the improve- ment of that half of the street divided lengthwise.' If, however, the statute authorizes an assessment upon land on one side of the street only if the work for which such assessment is levied is opposite work of the same class already done, an assessment cannot be levied upon the land upon one side of the street only, except in strict compliance with the conditions of such statute." Where one-half of a street divided lengthwise has been improved at the cost of the owners of the land upon that side of the street, the other half of said street may subsequently be improved at the cost of the owners of the land upon that side of the street." If the middle of a street divided lengthwise is the dividing line between two public corporations, each corporation may improve its half of the street at the cost of the owners of property on that side of the street.^^ Under a statute authorizing the city 'In re Phelps, 96 N. Y. S. 862, 110 pany, 24 Ind. App. 114, 54 N. E. App. Div. 69 [1905]. 1076 [1899]; First National Bank "Huntington v. City of Cincinnati, v. Nelson, 64 Mo. 418 [1877]; Lin- 2 Ohio N. P. 35 [1895]. For a simi- denberger Land Co. v. R. E. Park & lar case see City of Cincinnati v. Co., (Ky.) 27 Ky. L. Eep. 437, 85 S. Batsche, 52 0. S. 324, 27 L. R. A. W. 213 [1905]; O'Brien v. Markland, 536, 40 N. E. 21 [1895]. (Ky.) 9 Ky. L. Eep. 773, 6 S. W. 713 'People V. Desmond, 186 N. Y. 232, [1888]'. 78 N. E. 857 [1906]; (reversing "San Diego Investment Company People V. Desmond, 97 N. Y. S. 795 v. Shaw, 129 Cal. 273, 61 Pac. 1082 [1906]); City of Toledo for use v. [1900]. Beaumont, 3 Ohio N. P. 287 [1895], "Shirk v. Hupp, 167 Ind. 509, 78 ■Perine v. Erzgraber, 102 Cal. 234, N. E. 242 [1906]; O'Brien v. Mark- 36 Pac. 585 [1894]; Eyan v. Alt- land, 9 Ky. L. Eep. 773, 6 S. W. schul, 103 Cal. 174, 37 Pac. 339 713 [1888]; Scully v. City of Cin- [1894] ; Shirk v. Hupp,, 167 Ind. 509, cinnati, 1 Cin. Sup. Ct. Eep. 183 78 N. E. 242 [1906]; Indianapolis [1871]. & Vincennes Eailviray Company v. "Scully v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Capitol Paving & Construction Cota- Cin. Sup. Ct. Eep. 183 [1871]. 947 PKOPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 575 to require property owners to pave one-half of the width of the street contiguous to their respective lots, the city cannot pave a part in width of the street upon one side of the middle line thereof, and assess the entire cost of such improvement upon the property upon that side of the street.^^ After an improve- ment was ordered, and before the contract was let and the assess- ment made, the statute, which had previously provided that work done on one side should be assessed on that side only, except curbing and grading, was modified so as to provide that curbing and g^rading, too, should be assessed against the land on the side of which such work was done, but such change was not to apply to work or proceedings commenced. Under such statute it was held improper to assess against the property on one side of the street, the entire expense of such curbing and grading.^' If land is appropriated in widening a street, the special benefit from such widening to that part of the land not taken, may be deducted from damages sustained from such owner, although land on the opposite side of the street, none of which is taken, is also benefited.^* Under a statute providing that the expense of the paving to the middle of a street opposite public grounds of a citji shall be paid from the ward fund, the owner of property along a part of a street in which the city has constructed a park forty-two feet wide in the center with a roadway fifty- eight feet wide on each side of it, cannot be charged with the cost of improving more than one-half of the roadway on his side of the street.'' The owners of property across the street from county property used as a court house, which is exempt from local assessment, cannot be compelled to pay for the improve- ment of the entire width of the street." The city may, in the exercise of its discretion, construct sidewalks on both sides of the street.^^ In some jurisdictions it has been said that if the city exercises its discretion to build a sidewalk only upon one side of the street, such act is unreasonable and oppressive to " City of Muscatine v. Chicago, " Boyd v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Rock Island & Pacific Railway Com- Wis. 456, 66 N. W. 603 [1896]. pany, 88 la. 291, 55 N. W. 100 "Thornton v. City of Clinton, 148 [1893]. Mo. 648, 50 S. W. 295. "Ryan v. Altschul, 103 Cal. 174, "Langan v. Bitzer, — Ky. , 37 Pac. 339 [1894]. 26 Ky. Law Rep. 579, 82 S. W. 280 "Abbott V. Inhabitants of Cottage [1904]. City, 143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325 [1887]. § 576 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 948 owners of land upon the side of street which is denied a side- walk.^* § 576. Property on part of improvement for which assessment is not levied. If a street is opened or improved, property which fronts on such street, but is beyond the part which is improved and does not abut thereon, may be benefited by such improvement. If it is so benefited a statute authorizing the assessment of such property is valid and enforceable.^ Property a thousand feet beyond the termination of planking, but on the same street, may be assessed therefor.^ Property abutting on a stream above the point of termination of the widening and deepening of such stream may be assessed therefor, at least, if, at slight expense, the stream may be rendered navigable up to said land.' A statute providing for an assessment for opening a street against owners of land on the line of such street is held to include owners of property upon the part of the street already opened and not merely the owners of property upon that part of the "street which is opened.* A similar rule is applied to assessments for widen- ing a street.' Where, by such statute, the expense of grading a street is to be charged upon the lots on both sides of such street throughout its entire length, while paving is to be charged merely upon the lots contiguous to such paving, grading which is merely accessory to the work of paving may properly be charged upon the contiguous lots alone." In the absence of a statute providing for assessing land upon a street as originally constructed, for the extension thereof, land upon the original portion of such street cannot be assessed for the extension "Mills V. Village of Norwood, 6 [1890]; Chestnut Avenue, 68 Pa. St. Ohio C. C. 305 [1892]. See § 296. (18 P. F. Smith) 81 [1871]. iritv of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 ^ City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ; U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]. I'uhns V. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 'People of the State of New York 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]; McCor- ex rel. Lehigh Valley Railway Com- mick V. City of Omaha, 37 Neb. 829, pany v. rity of Buffalo. 147 N. Y. 56 N. W. 626 [1893]; People of the 675, 42 N. E. 344 [18951. State of New York ex rel. Lehigh ' Thestnut Avenue, 68 Pa. St. ( 18 Valley Railway Company v. City of P. F. Smith) 81 [1871]. Buffalo, 147 N. Y. 675. 42 N. E. 344 M^ain Street, Big Run Borough, [1895]; Main Street. Bi" Run Bor- 137 Pa. St. 590. 20 Atl. 711 [1890]. ough, 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 " Blonnt v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. 949 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 577 thereof.^ This is true even if such street as originally constructed terminated in a cul de sac and the extension gives a new outlet to the land on the original portion of the street.^ Under such statutes only land abutting on the part of the street which is extended can be assessed for the cost of improvement." If the property, beyond the improvement is not benefited, or if the stat- ute does not authorize the assessment of such property, it cannot be assessed for the cost of an improvement, which does not extend to such property.^" The owner of land abutting on such improve- ment cannot complain because the owners of land beyond such improvement are assessed.^^ Thus, land which is beyond a sewer and which is not shown to be benefited thereby cannot be assessed therefor.'- Land beyond the point to which a street is extended cannot be assessed for such improvement.'* Land beyond the point to which a street is widened is not subject to assessment for such widening.'* The reason given for such rule is that such land is liable to assessment when the street is widened opposite such land.'^ The question, however, is primarily one of statu- tory construction. If such land is benefited and the statute authorizes its assessment, the fact that it may be assessed sub- sequently for further widening of the street is no defense, since in the latter case the land in that part of the street first widened would be subject to assessment for widening the second portion of such street. § 577, Improvement of varying width and cost. A street which is improved may be of different widths at dif- ferent points in its length. Whether such an improvement shall 'State, Schulting, Pros. v. City of wood, 62 Mo. App. 550 [1895]; Ryan Passaic, 47 N. J. L. (18 Vroom) 273 v. Sumner, 17 Wash. 228, 49 Pac. [1885]; Smith v. City of Toledo, 24 487 [1897]. O. S. 126 [1873]; In the Matter of " Eidenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy the Opening of Orkney Street, Ap- (Ohio) 464 [1855]. peal of the City of Philadelphia, 194 " Edwards v. City of Chicago, 140 Pa. St. 425, 48 L. R. A. 274, 45 Atl. 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350 [1893]. 314 [1900]. "Ryan v. Sumner, 17 Wash. 228, 'In the Matter of the Opening of 49 Pac. 4S7 [1897]. Orkney Street, Appeal of the City of " Bigelow v. City of Chicago, 90 Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 425, 48 L. III. 49 [1878]. R. A. 274, 45 Atl. 314 [1900]. "Bigelow v. City of Chicago, 90 •Creighton v. Scott, 14 0. S. 438 111. 49 [1878]. A similar question [1863]. was raised but not decided in Wright "Saxton National Bank v. Hay- v. City of Chicago, 48 111. 285 [1868], § 578 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT 950 be regarded as ah entirety or shall be divided into sections, each section of the same width throughout, rests within the discre- tion of the public authorities.^ It is proper to regard the im- provement of such street as an entirety and to levy an assessment upon the abutting or adjoining property without reference to that part of the street opposite such property.^ On the other hand such street may be divided into sections, each of the same width throughout and the lots |butting each section assessed for the cost of such section? It has, indeed, been said that if such street is improved as an entire improvement, it is improper to divide it for assessment purposes into sections of equal width; but that the entire cost must be computed and assessed upon the property benefited, irrespective of the width of that portion of the street in front of such property.* This view has been expressed, however, in cases in which the attempt was made to apportion the assessment according to the amount of work done in front of each lot.' § 578. Peculiar use of land as aflfecting benefits. Cases are not infrequently presented in which the improve- ment for which it is sought to levy an assessment would confer an especial benefit upon the land assessed if such land were used for ordinary purposes, or for any one of a variety of purposes to which it might be put, but in which the land is used by the owner thereof for a special and peculiar use, and the improve- "^ Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of assessment thereon the same. The Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580 method adopted was a just one. Each [1890]; Dunker v. Stiefel, 57 Mo. section pays for the improvement on App. 379 [1894]; Smith v. City of it. The same result could have been Cincinnati, 6 Ohio N. P. 175 [1898]. attained by separate proceedings. ' Dunlter v. Stiefel, 57 Mo. App. This, however, would have added to 37S [1894]; Smith v. City of Cin- the expense, without any compensa- cinnati, 6 Ohio N. P. 175 [1898]. tion to the property holders. No ' Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of good reason is shown why it could Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580 not all be done in one, as well as in [1890]; Findlay v. Frey, 51 0. S. many, different proceedings." Find- 390, 38 N. E. li4 [1894]; (reversing lay v. Frey, 51 0. S. 390, 403,' 38 Frey v. City of Findlay, 7 Ohio C. C. N. E. 114 [1894]; (reversing Frey 311 [1893]). "It-is also objected that v. City of Findlay, 7 Ohio C. C. the assessment on Sandusky Street 311 [1893]). is not uniform. The street was im- * Davis v. City of Litchfield, 145 proved in sections, because not of 111. 313, 21 L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. uniform width. Each section is, 888 [1893]. however, of uniform width; and the "See § 713. 951 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 578 ment in question does not confer any benefit or any substantial benefit upon the land in question while devoted to such special use. In cases of this sort, the question which is presented is whether such land is to be considered as benefited by the im- provement on the theory that benefit is a question of the use which might be made of the land, or whether such land is to be considered as not benefited on the theory that the present and actual use of the land controls the question of benefit. On this question we find a conflict of authority. Land which is owned by the public and used for some public or governmental purpose may be said with some propriety to be devoted to that use.' The right to assess land owned by the public and occupied for a public use is discussed in detail hereafter.^ If the land is owned by a private person or corporation, and is devoted to a special private use by reason of ^which it is not benefited by the public; improvement, the true rule would seem to be that the right to assess such land is not restricted by the fact of such special and peculiar use. Private owners ought not to be free at their pleas- ure to withdraw land from the operation of the taxing power and to throw a corresponding burden either upon the other property owners or upon the general taxpayers. If the appro- priation to the peculiar use in question is purely voluntary, the owner may change such use at his pleasure and thus obtain the benefit accruing from the improvement. In other cases the owner is restricted either by specific provisions in the conveyance of property to him or by the means whereby he acquired title to the same, from making general and unrestricted use of such prop- erty. Even in such cases, however, the co-operation of the for- mer and present owners of such property could free such land from such restrictions as to use and make it available for gen- eral use. Accordingly, it seems contrary to the general policy of the law of assessments to permit a special private use of land to withdraw it from the operation of assessment laws and this view is expressed in some cases.^ It must be admitted that this expression of opinion is chiefly obiter, as the use in question 'People ex rel. Doyle v. Austin, 47 'Memphis Land and Timber Com- Cal. 353 [1874]; Fagan v. City of pany v. St. Francis Levee District, Chicago, 84 111. 227 [1876]; City of 64 Ark. 2i58, 42 S. W. 763 [1897]; Frankfort v. State ex rel. Ross, 128 Powers v. City of Grand Rapids, 98 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 [1891]. Mich. 393, 57 N. W. 250 [1894]. 'See I 579 et seq. §578 TAXATION BY ASSESSMBSHT. 952 was a voluntary private use. Where the use is voluntary and private it seems clear that the owner of the land cannot by such conduct prevent the legislature from levying an assessment thereon.* Land which is used voluntarily by the owner thereof for a given business may be assessed for a local improvement which benefits such land generally, even though such improve- ment does not benefit such land for the purposes for which it is actually used.° Thus, lots owned by a sanitary district on which offices are built, which ate to be used temporarily, pend- ing the construction of a drainage canal, may be assessed for the construction of a sewer, even though such improvement may not benefit such land with reference to such temporary use." Property vised as a wharf may be assessed for the construction of a sewer.' It has been said that property used as a coal mine should not be assessed for the expense of constructing a fence around a fencing district, in which such mine is situated.'* How- ever, if such property can also be used for agricultural pur- poses it may be included in such assessment." The use of prop- erty for a slaughter house was considered and permitted to increase the amount of benefit conferred upon such property by the construction of a sewer along a strip of land which had been used as a way through the property thus employed.^* The deci- * Memphis Land and Timber Com- pany V. St. Francis Levee District, 64 Ark. 258, 42 S. W. 763 [1897]; Chicago Union Traction Company v. City of Chicago, 215 111. 410, 74 N. E. 449 [1905] ; Chicago Union Trac- tion Company v. City of Chicago, 207 111. 544, 69 N. E. 849 [1904]; Chi- cago Union Traction Company v. City of Chicago, 204 111. 363, 68 N. E. 519 [1903]; (distinguishing Illi- -nois Central Railroad Company v. ■City of Chicago, 141 111. 509, 30 N. E. 1036 [1893] where the use was one fixed by Federal Statute) ; Chi- cago Union Traction Company v. City of Chicago, 202 111. 57«, 67 N. E. 383 [1903] ; Sanitary District of Chicago V. City of Joliet, 189 111. 270, 59 N. E. 566. [1901]; Clark v. City of Chicaffo, 166 111. 84, 46 N. E. 730 [1897] ; Powers v. City of Grand Eapids, 98 Mich. 393, 57 N. W. 250 [1894]; State, Protestant Foster Home Society, Pros. v. City of New- ark, 35 N. J. L. (6 Vr.) 157, 10 Am. Rep. 223; Dasey v. Skinner, 33 N. Y. S. R. 15, II N. Y. Supp. 821; Ford V. City of Toledo, 64 O. S. 92 59 N. E. 779 [1901]; Boeres v. Strader, 1 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. 57 [1870]. ■ Sanitary District of Chicago v. City of Joliet, 189 HI. 270, 59 N. B. 566 [1901]. ' Sanitary District of Chicago v, City of Joliet, 189 111. 270, 59 N. E. 566 [1901]. ' Boeres v. Strader, 1 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. 57 [1870]. ' Stiewel V. Fencing District, No. 6 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1902]. 'Stiewel v. Fencing District, No. 6 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1902]. '° Butchers' Slaughtering & Meltin'» Association v. Commonwealth, 169 Mass. 103, 47 N. E. 599 [1897]. 953 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 578 sions of the courts upon this question depend so largely, how- ever, upon the nature of the use and upon the special statutory provisions applicable thereto, that the subject must be consid- ered in detail in the following sections." If the use for which the property is taken is a quasi public use, as where property is appropriated by a railroad company under statutes which per- mit of its being used only for the purpose for which it was appropriated, there is some authority for holding that such com- pulsory use prevents such property from being subject to local assessment.*- Upon this question there is a conflict of authority and the subject is discussed in detail subsequently.*^ "Where the existence of a special use of the property is said not to prevent the property from being assessed on the theory of special benefits, it is nevertheless said in some jurisdictions that the nature of such use and the probability of its continuance are to be considered in determining the amount of benefits which are to be assessed against such property. If the use in question is such that no benefit inures to the property while such use exists, and if the circumstances are such as to make it probable that such use will be permanent, it has been said that the assess- ment should be for a nominal amount.** This principle is ap- plied especially to land held by quasi public corporations, such as corporations formed for general transportation, and devoted to use in transportation.*' While such property is not regarded as exempt in the strict sense of the term, the practical operation of such theory often is to reduce the assessment upon such property to a purely nominal amount. If the use is a voluntary one and the owner is free at any time to make such use of the property as he may see fit, justification for this theory seems to be lacking in the law of local assessments. By the operation of "See 5 579 et seq. Mayor of Albany, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) "Chicaeo and Alton Railroad Com- 374; In the Matter of the Applica- pany v. City of Joliet, 153 111. 649, tion of the Mayor, Aldermen and 39 N. E. 1077 ri894]; Allenklin County v. City of 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. Ottawa. 49 Fan. 747, 33 Am. St. W. 1006 [1902]. Rpp. 396, 31 Pac. 788 [1892]. § 582 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 960 a constitutional provision that the property of counties may be exempt from taxation by general law has been held to imply that such property is liable to taxation and assessment in the absence of some law specifically exempting it." Real property belonging to a county and used for governmental purposes cannot, of course, be sold to satisfy the lien of a street assessment.^ Where the assessment of county property is permitted, the county is com- pelled to pay the amount of the assessment.* According to the theory in force in other jurisdictions, a city or other similar public corporation cannot assess property unless the power to levy such assessment is clearly given.. Failure on the part of the legislature either to exempt such property specifically or to provide for its assessment, is regarded as exempting it from the operation of local assessments.® Different reasons are given in support of this theory. One reason which is applicable to all classes of statutes is that to permit a city to levy assessment upon county property is to permit it to invade the power and authority of the county and interfere with its governmental operations; a result which will never be presumed but must be specifically pro- vided by Lbfr legislature.^" Another reason applicable only to certain classes of statutes is that no means is provided for the collection of local assessments, which is applicable to public prop- erty. Such property cannot be sold and if the only remedy for collecting a local assessment is the sale of the property assessed, it is held by some courts that such provision shows the intention of the legislature not to assess county property.^^ Under this theory •Cook County v. City of Chicago, 545, 53 S. W. 298 [1899]; Thornton 103 111. 646 [1882]. v. City of Clinton, 48 Mo. 648, 50 'County of McLean v. City of S. W. 295 [1898]; City of Clinton Bloomington, 106 111. 209 [1883]; to use of Thornton v. Henry County, Lowe V. Board of Commissioners of 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415, 22 Howard County, 94 Ind. 553 [1883]. S. W. 494 [1893]; Von Steen v. Bea- ' County of McLean v. City of trice, 36 Neb. 421, 54 N. W. 677 Bloomington, 106 111. 209 [1883]. [1893]; County of Harris v. Boyd, "iStiewel v. Fencing District No. 70 Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]. 6 of Johnson County, 71 Ark. 17, 70 " County of Harris v. Boyd, 70 S. W. 308, 71 S. W. 247 [1903]; Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713 [1888]. City of Pi" Rapids v. Foard of Sup- "Citv of St. Louis v. Brown, 155 erviso'-s of M'-coHa County. 99 Mich. Mo. 545. 56 S. W. 298 [1899]; City 351, 58 N. W. 358 [1P941: /citing of Clinton to u=e of Thornton v. Worcester County v. Wi'xiesteT. 116 Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, 37 Am. Mass. 193, 17 Am. Ren. 159 [1874]) ; St. Rep. 415, 22 S. W. 494 [1893]. City of St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 961 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §§ 583, 584 a city cannot levy an assessment against a court house for the cost of constructing an adjoining street. ^^ A poor farm belonging to a county cannot be assessed as a part of a fencing district.^' Even where this theory is entertained, a provision exempting county property from taxation does not apply to local assess- ment.^* § 583. Property belonging to township. If the statute specifically provides therefor, property belong- ing to a township may be assessed for benefits.^ Thus, by stat- utory authority an assessment for drainage may be levied upon a highway and the township by which said highway is constructed may be charged with the cost thereof.^ An individual land owner cannot complain because township property has been assessed.' § 584. Property belonging to city. The cost of a public improvement, which confers a local benefit may be charged against a city or town on three different theories. Such assessment may be levied against the city or town as a property owner, treating the city or town for such purpose as any private individual is treated.' Such assessment may be levied against the city or town for benefits accruing to the city or town as a whole.^ The third case is not, correctly speaking, one of assessment. After the individual property owners have been assessed to the full amount of the benefits conferred upon them by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, the excess, if any, may and should be charged upon the town, not on any theory of special benefits, but because it is the duty of the city or town to pay by general taxation for the cost of the improvement over and above the amount of special benefits to the property owners.' The legislature has undoubtedly power to provide that "Thornton v. City of Tlinton, 148 40 N. E. 1085 [18P.'5]; State ex rel. Mo 648 50 S W 295 [1898]; Coun- Horrall v. Thompson, 109 Ind. 533, ty of Harris v. Boyd, 70 Tex. 237, 7 10 N. E. 305 [1886]. S W 713 [1888], ^ State ex rel. Horrall v. Thomp- "Stiewel v. Fencing District No. 6 son, 109 Ind. 533, 10 N. E. 305 of Johnson Oonntv, 71 ArV. 17, 70 [188B]; P'easant TownsVip v. Cook, S. W. 308. 71 S. W. 247 [1903]. 160 Ind. 533, 67 N. E. 262 [1902]. "City of Clinton to u=e of Thorn- '"Grimes v. Coe, 102 Ind. 406, 1 ton V Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, N. E. 735 [1885]. 37 Am St Eep 415, 22 S. W. 494 'See post; this section. [1893].' '^'^ « 585- 'Zumbro V. Parnin, 141 Ind. 430, » See § 063. § 584 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 962 property belonging' to a city shall be assessed for local improve- ments in the same way as the property of private individuals.'' In the absence of a statute which either specifically exempts or includes city property, it is held in some jurisdictions that city property should be included." One reason which is assigned for this theory is that to include city property will tend to equality cf assessment in proportion to benefits.* Since the question in- volved is whether a city has power to assess its own property, the objections which may be urged against allowing a city to assess other forms of property, are in part absent, since there can be no question of interference by the citj^ with the operation of any other corporation. The fact that city property is exempt from general taxation does not operate to exempt it from local assess- ment. The constitution of Missouri provides: "The general as- sembly shall not impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or- property thereof, for county, city, town or other municipal purposes . . ."'' This provision does not prevent the legislattire from authorizing a general judgment against a city for its proportion of a street assessment, based on its ownership of realty abutting the street for the improvement of which such assessment is levied.'* Under this theory, a street improvement may be paid for in part ' West Chicago Park Commission- " Scammon v. City of Chicago, 42 ers V. City of Chicago, 152 111., 392, 111. 192 [1866] ; Bennett v. Seibert. 38 N. E. 697 [1894]-, Higgins v. City 10 Ind. App. 369, 35 N. E. 35, 37 X. of Chicago, 18 111. 276 [1857]; Trus- E. 1071 [1894]; Matter of the Ex- tees of the Illinois and Michigan tension of Church Street from Fiil- Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403 ton Street to Morris Street in the [1851]; Barber Asphalt Paving Com- tity of New York, 49 Barb. 455 pany v. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. [1867]; In the Matter of the Peti- 451, 82 S. W. 64 [1904]; City of St. tion of Turfler to vacate an assess- Louis V. Brovi^n, 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. ment for paving the Eighth Avenue W. 298 [1899]; In the Matter of the in the City of New York, 44 Barb. Petition of Livingston to vacate an (N. Y.) 46 [1865]; Dick v. City of assessment, 121 N. Y. 94, 24 N. E. Toledo, 11 Ohio C. C. 349 [1896]. 290 [1890]; In re City of New York, "Scammon v. City of Chicago, 42 38 Misc. Rep. 600, 78 N. Y. S. 51 111. 192 [1866]. [1902]; People ex rel. Connelly v. 'Article X., § 10, Constitution of Reis, 96 N. Y. S. 597, 109 App. Div. Missouri [1875]. 748 [1905]; People ex rel. Tietjen, "Barber Asphalt Paving Company 96 N. Y. S. 601, 109 App. Div. 919 v. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, [1905]; Turfler's Case, 19 Abb. Pr. 82 S. W. 64 [1904]. (N. Y.) 140 [1865]. 963 ]»EOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 584 by assessments levied on public parks," or markets,^" or on a work house." Land owned by the city may be assessed for sewer purposes.'- A public square is subject to assessment.^' As in the case of assessments against other forms of public property, such assessment cannot be collected by sale of the public proper- ty, but some means must be provided whereby the city can be compelled to pay the amount which is assessed against its prop- erty.'* However, a want of power to sell the property does not necessarily mean that the property cannot be assessed. Thus,. in Illinois, it was once held that city property should be assessed in the same manner as property belonging to individuals.'^ Sub- sequently, it was held that a sale by a city of its own property was unauthorized and absolutely void.'" While the decision in this case was based in part upon the want of power in the city to assess its own property, these two eases were subsequently ex- plained as not inconsistent, the true point of dfcisim of the second case being said to be that the city had no power to sell its own property which it had assessed." In other jurisdictions, it seems to be held that a city cannot assess its own property for local improvements in the absence of a statute expressly author- izing such assessment." Under this theory land hold by a city ' West Chicago Park Commission- " In tlie Matter of the Petition of ers V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, Turfler to vacate an assessment for 38 X. E. 697 [1894]; Scammon v. paving the Eighth Avenue in the City of Chicago, 42 111. 192 [18G6]; City of New York, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) Bennett v. Seibert, 10 Inii. App. 369, 46 [1865]. 35 N. E. 35, 37 N. E. 1071 [1894]; "West Chicago Park Commission- Matter of the Extension of Church ers v. City of C^hieago, 152 111. 392, Street from Fulton Street to Morris 38 X. E. 697 [1894]; Barber Asphalt Street in the City of New York, 49 Paving Company v. City of St. Jos- Barb. 455 [1867] ; In re City of New eph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 R. W. 64 [1904] ; York, 38 Misc. Eep. 600, 78 N. Y. Bennett v. Peiliert, 10 Ind. App. 369, 51 [1902]. 35 N. E. 35, 37 N. E. 1071 [1894] ; " Matter of the Extension of In the Matter of t'le Petition of Liv- Church Street from Fulton Street to ingston to vacati> an assessment, 121 Morris Street in the City of New X. Y. 94, 24 X. E. 290 [1890]. York, 49 Barb. (X. Y.) 455 [1867]; "Scammon v. City of Chicago, 4il Dick v. City of Toledo, 11 Ohio C. 111. 192 [1866]. C. 349 [1896]. "Taylor v. The People ex rel. "Barber Asphalt Paving Com- Reed, 66 111. 322 [1872]. pany v. City of St. Joseph, 183 Mo. " See explanation of earlier cases 451, 82 S. W. 64 [1904]. ' found in County of McLean v. City "People ex rel. Connelly v. Eeis, of Bloomington, 106 111. 209 [1883].. 96 N. Y. S. 597, 109 App. Div. 748 "People ex rel. Doyle v. Austin, [1905]; People ex rel. Tietjen, 96 47 Cal. 353 [1874]; State v. Several N. Y. S. 601, 109 App. Div. 919 Parcels of Land, — Neb. , I13- [1905]. N. W. 248 [1907]; City of St. Loui* § 585 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 96 1 as a public park cannot be assessed for benefits by reason of the construction of a boulevard.'" Accordingly, since property used exclusively for city purposes cannot be assessed, it should not be counted in determining whether the owners of one-half of the frontage abutting upon a street to be improved have objected to such improvement.-" Where a city made a contract for the street improvement by which it was expressly stipulated that the city should be under no expense for such improvement except for in- tersections, it was held that the contractor could not charge the city on the ground that the city owned a market place in the center of the street which was improved under such a contract.^' § 585. Assessment of city for benefits received as a whole. Under statutory authority, it is proper to charge a city or town with the amount of benefits which the improvement for which the assessment is levied confers upon such city or town as a whole.^ Thus, such a charge may be levied for benefits re- ceived from drainage.^ A city or town may be assessed for the benefit which it receives by reason of the improvement in the condition of its highwaj'B caused by the local improvement for which such charge is exacted.^ Such a charge is not a lien upon the property of the town nor can such property be sold there- for.* The city or town must be compelled by proper proceedings to pay the amount of such charge. In the absence of statutory authority empowering drainage commissioners to attach to their drainage district the streets and alleys of a village which have connected their drains with those of the district, such drainage V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298 - Commissioners of Highways of [1899]; Armstrong v. Os;den City, Town of Dix v. Big Four Drainage 12 Utah 476, 43 Pac. 119 [1895]. District of Ford County, 207 111. 17, '» State V. Several Parcels of Land, 69 N. E. 576 [1904] ;" State, Kini, — Neb. , 113 N. W. 248 [1907]. Pros. v. Eeed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.") "Armstrong v. Ogden City, 12 186 [1881]; Town of Muskego v. Utah 476, 43 Pac. 119 [1895]. Drainage Commissioners, 78 Wis. 40, » Howell V. City of Philadelphia, 47 N. W. 11 [1890]. 38 Pa. (12 Casey) 471 [1861]. "Town of Muskei^o v. Drainage ' Commissioners of Highways of Commissioners, 78 Wis. 40, 47 N. W. Town of Dix v. Big Four Drainage 11 [1890]. District of Ford County, 207 111. 17, * Commissioners of Highways of 69 N. E. 576 [1904]; State, King, Town of Dix v. Bi? Four Drainage Pros. V. Reed, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) District of Ford County, 207 III. 17, 186 [1881]; Town of Muskego v. 69 N. E. 576 [1904]. Drainage Commissioners, 78 Wis. 40, 47 N. W. 11 [1890]. 965 PBOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 586 commissioners have no power to cause the assessment of such village for benefits." § 586. Public school property. Whether land belonging to a school board or district can be assessed for local improvements, is another question upon which the same conflict of authority exists. In some jurisdictions, it is held that unless such property is specifically exempt, school prop- erty other than that which is given in trust for school purposes, can be assessed.^ Under this theory school property can be assessed for the cost of abutting streets.^ Where, by statute, property which is benefited is to be assessed, and the question of determining what property is benefited is left to a jury, it is held that the court cannot say as a matter of law that school property is either bene- fited or not benefited, but that such question must be passsed upon by the jury.^ The rule that school property given in trust for school purposes is subject to local assessments, is said to apply equally to property occupied for school purposes, to vacant lots and to property occupied by buildings from which the school dis- trict receives rent.* Its application to property belonging to a school district, but not used for school purposes is especially clear.' The fact that the legal title to the school property is in the city in trust for the school district, does not prevent the levy of assess- ment upon such district." Such property cannot be sold. The proper method of enforcing such assessment is to compel the school district to pay the amount of its assessment out of its 'Drainage Commissioners of Dis- ber v. Common Council of the City trict No. 1 V. Village of Cerro Gordo, of Lockport, 43 Howard (N. Y.) 368 217 111. 488, 75 N. E. 516 [1905]; [1872] ; 7m re Howard Avenue, North, (accordingly the village is not liable in City of Seattle, 44 Wash. 62, 86 even if it fails to make objections or Pae. 1117 [1906]. to appeal.) 'In ^e Howard Avenue, North, in ' School District of Fort Smith v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash. 62, 86 Pac. Board of Improvement, 65 Ark. 343, 1117 [1906]. 46 S. W. 418 [1898]; City of Chi- 'Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. cago in trust for use of Schools v. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]. City of Chicago, 207 111. 37, 69 N. 'City of Chicago in trust for use E. 580 [1904]; Board of Education of Schools v. City of Chicago, 207 of City of Chicago v. People, ex rel. 111. 37, 69 N. E. 580 [1904]. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 219 'School District v. Board of Im- 111. 83, 76 N. E. 75 [1905] ; City of provement, 65 Ark. 343, 46 S. W. Sioux City v. Inclependpnt School 418 [1898]. Di-tnct of Sioux City, 55 Iowa 150 'City of Chicago in trust for use [18801 : Kansas Citv v. 'Banon, 157 of Schools v. City of Chicago, 207 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]; Web- 111. 37, 69 N. E. 580 [1904]. 586 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 966 funds.'' It has been h«ld, however, that property belonging to •■\ school district, but not used exclusively for school purposes may be sold to satisfy a local assessment.' If property has been con- veyed by the United States to a state for school purposes, it is held in some jurisdictions that it can be assessed like other school property." In other jurisdictions, it is held that such property cannot be assessed,^" and this rule has been applied even in juris- dietions where other school property is held liable to assessment. Under this theory lands given *by the United States in trust for school purposes, cannot be assessed for the cost of drainage.^^ In other jurisdictions, school, property is regarded as devoted to a special use, inconsistent with the diversion of part of its funds to pay local assessments. Under this theory school lauds which are used for school purposes cannot be assessed for the cost of local ijnprovements.^^ Thus, school property cannot under this theory be assessed for the cost of streets,^' sidewalks,'* drainage,'"' 'City of Sioux City v. Independent School District of Sioux City, 55 Iowa 150 [1880]. 'School District of Fort Smith v. Board of Improvement, 65 Ark. 343, 46 S. W. 418 [1898]. "'St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468 [1858]. " The People ex rel. Little v. Trus- tees of Schools, 118 111. 52, 7 N. E. 262 [1887]; Edgerton v. Huntington School Township, 126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156 [1890]; Erickson v. Cass Counfy, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]; City of Spokane v. Security Savings Society, — Wash. , 89 Pac. 466 [1907]. " Edgerton v. Huntington School Tbwnship, 126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156 [1890]. " Board of Improvement v. School District, 56 Ark. 354, 35 Am. St. Eep. 108, 16 L. R. A. 418, 19 S. W. 969 [1892] ; City of Hartford v. West Middle District, • 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. 687 [1878] ; Witter v. Mis- sion School District, 121 Cal. 350, 66 Am. St. Rep. 33, 53 Pac. 905 [1898]; Sutton v. School City of Montpelier, 28 Ind. App. 315, 62 N. E. 710 [1902]; City of Butte v. School Dis- trict No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 [1904]; Von Steen v. City of Bea- trice, 36 Neb. 421, 54 N. W. 677 [1893]; City of Toledo v. Board of Education, 48 0, S. 83, 26 N. E. 403 [1891]; Board of Education v. City of Toledo, 48 0. S. 87, 26 N. E. 404 [1891]; Assessment of School Property, 7 Ohio N. P. 568 [1900]; Pittsburgh v. Sterrett Sub-district School, 204 Pa. St. 635, 61 L. R. A. .183, 54 Atl. 463 [1903]. "Witter V. Mission School Dis- trict, 121 Cal. 35C, 66 Am. St. Rep 33, 53 Pac. 905 [1898] ; City of Hartford V. West Middle District, 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Eep. 687 [1878]; Sut- ton V. School City of Montpelier, 28 Ind. App. 315, 62 N. E. 710 [1902]; Assessment of School Property, 7 Ohio N. P. 568 [1900]; Pittsburgh V. Sterrett Subdistriet School, 204 Pa. St. 635, 61 L. R. A. 183, 54 Atl. 463 [1903]. "City of Toledo v. Board of Edu- cation, 48 0. S. 83, 26 N. E. 403 [1891]. "Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 92 N. W. 841 [1902]. 967 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 587 sewers,^* or sprinkling." A school property held by a school board for the use of the state to carry on a system of common schools is said to be exempt from local assessment, because it is not subject to execution, or levy, or sale under decree of court to satisfy the lien of street improvement." The intention of the legislature to exempt school property from local assessment, has been deduced in some cases from the general wording of statutes which do not contain any such specific provision. Thus, an act which provided for levying an assessment for fencing upon all real estate in the district which was taxable by the state and county was held not to include school lands which were gener- ally not taxable.'' It seems to be held in some of these jurisdictions that if land is owned by a school district, but is not used for school purposes, it can be assessed.^" The reason sometimes given for exempting school property from local assessment is, that from the nature of its use, it can not receive a benefit from the im- provement for which it is sought to levy the assessment.^' In other cases the reason for exempting such property from local assessment is said to be that no means is provided for enforcing the collection of the same.^" § 587. Streets and roads. In the absence of specific statutory authority for assessing a street, no assessment can be levied against it.' This principle applies even though such street is in fact benefited by the con- '« Assessment of School Property, 7 School, 204 Pa. St. 635, 61 L. R. A. Ohio N. P. 568 [1900]. 183, 54 Atl. 463 [1903]. " City of Butte v. School District, ^ Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 Savannah, 105 Ga. 62, 31 S. E. 127 [1904]. [1898]; Cunningham v. City of "City of Louisville v. Leatherman, Peoria, 157 111. 499, 41 N. E. 1014 99 Ky. 213, 35 S. W. 625 [1896]. [1895]; Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 "Bradshaw v. Board of Commis- 111. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Holt v. sioners of Guilford County, 92 N. C. City of East St. Louis, 150 111. 530, 278 [1885]. 37 N. E. 927 [1894]; Lightner v. » Witter V. Mission School Dis- City of Peoria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. trict, 121 Cal. 350, 66 Am. St. Rep. 69 [1894]; Leman v. City of Lake 33, 53 Pac. 905 [1898]. View, 131 111. 388, 23 N. E. 346 =1 City of Hartford V. West Middle [1890]; DeKoven v. City of Lake District, 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. View, 129 111. 399, 21 N. E. 813 687 [1878]; City of Butte v. School [1890]; (followed in Waggeman v. District, No. 1, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Village of North Peoria, 155 111. ?ac. 869 [1904]. 545, 40 N. E. 485 [1895]); City of ^ Pittsburgh v. Sterrett Subdistrict Frankfort v. State ex rel. Ross, 128 § 587 TAXATION B¥ ASSESSMENT. 968 struction of another street.^ This principle depends in part upo;i the fact that streets are public highways. The city may have the legal title to them, but it holds such title solely for the benefit of the general, public and subject to their use. Such property is therefore devoted to a public use, even more than the other prop- erty belonging to a city. Another reason for holding such prop- erty not subject to assessment is found under statutes which pro- vide for collecting an assessment by sale of the property assessed. A street cannot, of course, be sdld and therefore it cannot be the intention of the legislature by such a statute, to provide for assess- ing, a street.* Special stress is sometimes laid upon the statutory description of the property to be assessed as indicating an inten- tion not to assess streets. Thus, if the statute provides for the assessment of "lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land contiguous to such improvement," such description does not include streets which cross the improvement.* So, if the statute provides for assessing abutting lots, such description does not include the street which crosses the improvement.® Streets and highways cannot be assessed, even if the description of the land to be assess- ed might seem prima facie to include them. Thus, under a stat- ute authorizing an assessment of land one hundred and fifty feet back from the line of the improvement, a public highway within that distance cannot be assessed." If the city has merely acquired an easement in the street and the former owner retains the fee. it is said that such fee is of so little value that the former owner should not be expected to pay the cost of such assessment.' Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 [1891]; Savannah, 105 Ga. 62, 31 S. E. 127 Whiting V. Mayor and Aldermen of [1898]. the City of Boston, 106 Mass. 89 'State ex rel. City of Columbus v. [1870]; Smith v. City of Buffalo, Mitchell, 31 0. S. 592 [1877]. 159 N. Y. 427, 54 N. E. 62 [1899]; 'Cunningham v. City of Peoria, Affirming, Smith v. City of Buffalo, 157 111. 499, 41 N. E. 1014 [1895] ; 90 Hun. 118, 35 N. Y. S. 635 Lightner v. City of Peoria, 150 III. [1895]); City of Schenectady v. 80, 37 N. E. 69 [1894]. Trustees of Union College, 144 N. = Holt v. City of East St. Louis, Y. 241, 26 L. R. A. 614, 39 N. E. 150 111. 530, 37 N. E. 927 [1894]. 67 [1894]; (reversing, 66 Hun. 179, 'City of Frankfort v. State ex rel. 21 N. Y. S. 147); In the Matter of Ross, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 11 IS the Application of Churchill to va- [1891]. cate an assessment, 82 N. Y. 288 ' City of Schenectady v. Trustee i [1?80]; Ftate ex rel. City of Colum- of Union College, 144 N. Y. 241, 2) bus v. Mitchell, 31 0. S. 592 [1877]. L. R. A. 614, 39 N. E. 67 [1894]; 'Bacon v. Mayor and Aldermen of (reversing, 66 Hun. 179, 21 N. Y. S. 147). 969 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 587 In this case, the statute described the property to be assessed as "the lots and buildings lying upon" the improvement and this description did not include streets crossing the improvement. A street which has been closed and:aceordingly reverts to the prop- erty owners is not subject to assessment until such a strip of land is placed upon the tax assessment rolls.' There is some authority for holding that a statute authorizing an assessment upon a cer- tain area authorizes an assessment upon the streets within that area. Under a statute authorizing the assessment of benefits according to the area of the land drained by the improvement it is held that an assessment may be levied upon city streets. -The street is not to be sold for such assessment, but the city must pay the amount of the assessment thus levied against it. One of the most celebrated cases on this proposition arose out of the drainage improvement which was constructed in and about the city of New Orleans. When this case first came before the United States Supreme Court, it was held that the city was probably liable for the amount of benefits conferred by such improvement upon the streets of said city, but that as the city had issued bonds, the proceeds of which had gone into such fund in excess of the amount of benefit to the streets, equity would regard this as in effect a full payment of such liability.' When the case came before the United States Supreme Court again, that court answered one question certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals and declined to answer the other and sent the case back for hearing.^* When it next came before the Supreme Court of the United States, that court held that the city of New Orleans had voluntarily rendered the coUeeton of drainage assessments impossible by abandoning the improvement,^^ and thus destroyed the drainage fund. By reason of these facts, the city was held liable and it was also held liable for the amount of benefits conferred upon the streets and squares of the city.^^ By the specific provisions of the statute, an assess- ment may be levied upon streets to be paid by the city, or what " In the Matter of Churchill to va- " So held in Davidson v. New Cr- eate an assessment, 82 N. Y. 288 leans, 34 La. Ann. 170, and see War- [1880]. ner v. New Orleans, 167 U. S. 467, •Peake v. New Orleans, 139 U. S. 42 L. 239, 17 S. 892 [1897]. 342, 35 L. 131, 11 S. 541 [1891]; (af- "New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U. firming, Peake v. City of New Or- S. 120, 44 L. 96, 20 S. 44 [1899]; leans. 38 Fed. 779 nS'OIK (modified on rehearing: 176 U. S. "Warner v. New Orleans, 167 U. 92, 44 L. 385, 20 S. 280 [1900]). S. 467, 42 L. 239, 17 8. 892 [1897]. § 587 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 970 is in effect the same thing, it may be provided that the city shall pay a part of the cost of the improvement consisting usually of the cost of intersections.^' However, a statute which provides for apportioning a part of the cost of drainage against any "public or corporate road," and providing specifically for the payment of assessments against a county,, state or free turnpike road or town- ship road, is held not to empower the drainage district to assess benefits to public streets in the city without the consent of the city.^* Other statutes have provided in specific terms for assess- ing highways for the amount of benefits which they may receive by reason of drainage and imposing the cost of such assessments upon the respective public corporations or quasi corporations.^'' Under such statutes, such assessments may be levied and must be paid by the respective public corporations. A public corpora- tion upon which such liability is sought to be imposed may show, however, that no such highway exists.^" A gravel road has been held to be benefited by a drainage improvement and subject to assessment therefor.^' Since the condition of the property at the time that proceedings are instituted and the assessment is levied, controls as to questions of assessment ^* the fact that a part of an abutting lot is dedicated for street purposes after the assessment is levied, does not entitle the property owner to a reduction iu the assessment." A plank road may be improved by the cits'- within which it is situated, if it has become a city street and the plank road company may be assessed therefor, on account solely of its ownership of such road.^' "Dick V. City of Toledo, 11 Ohio 533, 67 N. E. 262 [1902]; State ex C. C. 349 [1896]. rel. Horrall v. Thompson, 109 Ind. "City of Joljet v. Spring Creek 533, 10 N. E. 305 [1886]. Drainage District, 222 111. 441, 78 N. "Commissioners of Big Lake Fork E. 836 [1906]. Special Drainage Dist. v. Oommis- " Commissioners of Big Lake sioners of Highways of Sand Ridge, Special Drainage Dist, v. Commis- 199 111. 132, 64 N. E. 1094 [1902]. sioners of Highways of Sand Ridge, " Indianapolis and Cumberland 199 111. 132, 64 N. E. 1094 [1902]; Gravel Road Co. v. State ex rel. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Flack, 105 Ind. 37, 4 N. E. 316 Commissioners of East Lake Fork [1885]. Special Drainage District, 129 III. "See § 635. 417, 21 N. E. 925 [1890]; Commis- >» Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 5 sioners of Highways of the Town of Ohio N. P. 68. Colfax V. Commi=sioners of East ^People ex rel. Cayadutta Plank Lake Fork Special Drainage Di=ti-icf, Road Co. v. Ciimmings, 166 N. Y. 127 III. 581, 21 N. E. 206 [1890]; 110, 59 N. E. 703. Pleasant Township v. Cook, 160 Ind. 971 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §588 § 588. Property owned by religious bodies. Property belonging to a church, even if used entirely for relig- ious purposes is subject to assessment for the benefits conferred upon such property by a local improvement, in the absence of a statute specifically exempting such property from local assess- ment.* In some jurisdictions it is said to be a question of fact whether prbperty used for church purposes is benefited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied.^ In some juris- dictions it is said that church property is subject to local assess- ment, but that the test of the amount of benefit is not the increase in the market value of the property.^ The question of benefit is said to depend upon the probability that such property will con- ' Ahern v. Board of Improvement District No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901] ; City of At- lanta V. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 12 L. R. A. 852, 13 S. E. 252 [1890]; (over- ruling Trustees v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181); City of Ottawa v. Trus- tees of the Free Church, 20 111. 424 [1858] ; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtce and Cassidy, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871]; Lefevre v. Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 [1853]; Lockwood v. City St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20 [1856] ; City of Beatrice v. Brethren Church of Bea- trice, 41 Neb. 358, 59 N. W. 932 [1894]; People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291 [1875]; In the Matter of the Appli- cation of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York for the Enlarging and Improving a part of Nassau Street, in the Said City, 11 John Sup. Ct. 77 [1814]; People of the State of New York ex rel. Hector, etc., of St. Ann's Church of Morrisania v. Fitch, 87 Hun. (N. Y.) 391, 34 N. Y. S. 368 [1895]; Webber v. Common Council of the City of Lockport, 43 Howard 368 [1872]; Broad Street, Sewickley Methodist Episcopal Church's Ap- peal, 165 Pa. St. 475, 30 Atl. 1007 [1895]; The Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 15 Pa. St. 104; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. 103 [1850]; Second Universalist Society in Providence v. City of Providence, 6 R. I; 235 [1859]; Thompson v. Love, 42 0. S. 61 [1884] is not contra. Whila church property was omitted from assessment in this case and was also omitted in determining whether a majority of the property owners de- sired such improvement and had pe- titioned therefor and such omission was held not to invalidate the peti- tion, it was apparently regarded as erroneous to omit such property from assessment. The theory on which this point was decided was that the commissioners might have referred the report back to the viewers for correction, but for the purpose of passing on the sufficiency of the peti- tion they had a right to accept it as it was made. ^Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]. "Clapp V. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 [1868] ; People ex rel. How- lett V. Mayor and Common Council of the Cily of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291 [1875]; In the Matter of the Application of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York for the Enlarging and Improv- ing a part of Nassau Street in the said city, 11 John Sup. Ct. 77 [1814]. §588 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 972 tinue to be used for religious purposes. If such continuance is likely, it is said that the benefit to the property, if devoted to such use, will be small in comparison with business and residence property and that the amount of the assessment ought to be pro- portionately small.* This principle has been applied in cases of street assessments " and sewer assessments.* Even if property used for religious purposes is by statute exempt from general taxa- tion, such exemption does not ^fevent such property from being assessed for local improvements.' A constitutional provision ex- empting property used for religious purposes from taxation is regarded as applicable solely to general taxation. Such provi- sion does not exempt such property from local assessment.' If a church join in a petition for a street improvement and the front- age of such church property must be included in order to secure a sufficient number of signers to such petition, it seems likely that such church thereby estops itself claiming an exemption from such assessment." By some statutes the amount of the local assess- ment to be levied depends upon the valuation of the property assessed upon the general tax duplicate. In some states it is held that under such a statute property which is exempt from general taxation and has not been placed on the general dupli- cate at any valuation, cannot be assessed for a local assessment, * People ex rel. Hewlett v. Mayor tawa v. Trustees of tlie Free Church, and Common Council of the City of 20 111. 424 [1858]; Broadway Bap- Syracilse, 63 N. Y. 291 [1875]; In tist Church v. MeAtee and Cassidy, the Matter of the Application of the 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 508, 8 Am. Rep. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty 480 [1871]; Lefevre v. Mayor, etc., of the City of Hew York for the En- of Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 [1853] ; Loek- larging and Improving a part of wood v. City of St. Louis, 24 Mo. Nassau Street in the said city, 11 20 [1856]; City of Beatrice v. Breth- John Sup. Ct. 77 [1814]. ren Church of Beatrice, 41 Neb. 358, ■'In the Matter of the Application 59 N. W. 932 [1894]; Broad Street, of the Mayor, Aldermen and Com- ' Sewiekfey Methodist Episcopal monalty of the City of New York for Church's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 475, 30 the Enlarging and Improving a part Atl. 1007 [1895]; The Northern Lib- of Nassau Street in the said city, 11 erties v. St. John's Church, 15 Pa. John Sup. Ct. 77 [1814]. St. 104; Second Universalist Society ' Clapp v. City of Hartford, 35 in Providence v. City of Providence, Conn. 66 [1868]. 6 K. I. 235 [1859]. ' Ahem v. Board of Improvement ' City of Beat'-ice v. Brethren Dist. No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark. ChUrch of Beatrice, 41 Neb. 358, 59 68, 61 S. W. 575 [1901]; City of At- N. W. 932 [1894]. lanta v. First Presbyterian Ohurch, " Broad Street, Sewickley Methodist 86 Ga. 730, 12 L. R. A. 8'52, 13 S. E. Episcoual Church's Appeal. 165 Pa. 252 [1890]; (overrulin'? Trustees St. 476, 30 Atl. 1007 [1895]. v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181) ; City of Ot- 973 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 588 even if not specifically exempted therefrom." The theory under- lying such holding is that such an assessment statute applies only to property which is already on the tax duplicate at a valuation. On the other hand, it has been held under a somewhat similar statute that the valuation of such property is to be determined by extrinsic evidence, and that the mere fact that such property is not on the tax duplicate does not prevent its assessment.^^ A statute which specifically exempts from local assessment property used for religious purposes is valid and prevents an assessment for benefits against such property.^'' A statute which provides for exempting "churches. . . .with the grounds thereunto an- nexed necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same . . . .from all and every county, city. . . .tax," is held to exempt from assessment for a local improvement a church and the land upon which it stands." Th;s rule applies to every form of local improvement for which the assessment is based on the theory of benefits.^* Such statutes are rather strictly construed. Under a statute exempting property used for religious purposes from assessments for public improvements, which are levied during three years from January 1st, 1906, it has been held that a religious corporation is not exempt from assessments for improvements wh'ch were begun during that time but for which the assessments were not levied until after such period.'^ Under a statute ex- empting "places of religious worship or burial," it is held that a parsonage in which the rector of a church resides is not exempt from local assessment.^' A religious society had leased land and had erected a building thereon which was occupied by them in part for religious worship and in part was rented for stores and other similar purposes, the proceeds of which rent were appropriated exclusively to religious uses. It was held that such property was "First Presbyterian Church of • [1£90] ; City of Erie v. First Univer- Fort Wayne v. City of Fort Wayne, salist Church, 105 Pa. St. 278 [1884]. 36 Ind. 338, 10 Am. Rep. 35 [1871]; "Assessment for sewers. City of In the Matter of the Petition of the Erie v. First Universalist Church, Second Ave. Methodist Church to Va- 103 Pa. St. 278 [1884]. Assessment cate an Assessment, 66 N. Y. 395 for water pipes. Philadelphia v. [1876]. Church of St. Jaires, 134 Pa. St. 207, " Ahern v. Board of Improvement 19 ^tl. 49 rif90]. District No. 3, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. « In re Onenino; of East 176th St., 575 [1901]. 83 N. Y. S. 433, 85 App. Div. 347 "City of Erie v. First Universalist [1903]. Church, 105 Pa. St. 278 [1884]. "Wardens, etc., of St. Mark's "PhiladelT^liia v. '"hurch of Pt. Cbu^-ch v. Mayor, etc.. of B'-unswiok, James, 134 Pa. St. 207, 19 Atl. 497 78 Ga. 541, 3 S. E. 561 [1887]. § 589 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 974 exempt from general taxation but not from local assessment for special benefits." § S89. Property owned by charitable organizations. Property which belongs to a charitable corporation or associa- tion and is used for charitable purposes is not, in the absence of a statute specifically exempting it from local assessment, exempt therefrom.^ In some jurisdictions it is said to be a question of fact to be determined by the assessing body, whether such land is in fact benefited or not;^ The fact that property held for such charitable use is exempt from general taxation does not exempt it from local assessment.' Thus, a provision that property of a charitable corporation shall be "exempted from taxation of every kind," * or that it shall be exempt "from assessment and taxation under the revenue laws of the commonwealth or under any ordin- ance, resolution or other act of the city," ' or "from all taxation by state or local laws for any purpose whatever," " or "from all taxation either by the state, parish or city," '' is held in each case not to exempt such property from local assessment. In some jurisdictions there is a tendency to construe provisions concern- " Second Universalist Society in Baptist Orphans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, Providence v. City of Providence, 6 13 L. R. A. 668, 17 S. W. 212 [1891]; K. I. 235 [1859]. City of Lafayette v. The Male Or- ^Kilgus V. Trustees of Orphanage phans Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1 [1849]; of Good Shepherd, 94 Ky. 439, 22 S. Washburn Memorial Orphan Asylum W. 750 [1893]; Zable v. Louisville v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76 N. E. 204 Baptist Orphans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, [1898]; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan 13 L. E. A. 668, 17 S. W. 212 Hospital, 50 Mo. 155, 11 Am. Eep. [1891]; City of Lafayette v. The 412 [1872]; Roosevelt Hospital v. Male Orphans Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1 Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of [1849]; Washburn Memorial Orphan the City of New York, 84 N. Y. 108 Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76 [1881]; Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor, N. W. 204 [1898]; Sheehan, Jr. v. . Aldermen and Commonalty of the Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. City of New York, 18 Hun. 582 155, 11 Am. Rep. 412 [1872]; Roose- [1879]. velt Hospital v. Mayor, Aldermen * Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hos- and Commonalty of the City of New pital, 50 Mo. 155, 11 Am. Rep. 412 York, 84 N. Y. 108 [1881]; Roose- [1872]. velt Hospital v. Mayor, Aldermen "Kilgus v. Trustees of Orphanage and Commonalty of the City of New of Good Shepherd, 94 Ky. 439, 22 York, 18 Hun. 582 [1879]. 8. W. 750 [1893]. ' Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. • Zable v. Louisville Baptist Or- 450, 57 S. W. 1045 [1900]. phans' Home, 92 Ky. 89, 13 L. R. A. »Fil'ilarlelnh'ia v. Stevenson, 132 Pa. 103, 19 Atl. 70 [1890]. 989 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 596 elusively used in the operation of its road is subject to local assess- ment and taxation. Under such statute it was held that a grain elevator belonging to a railway company situated on its. land next to its tracks, which was leased to tenants who paid a nominal rent and used it exclusively for storing grain for shipment over such railroad, is not subject to local assessment." Land owned by a railway in fee, which it may use as it pleases, and which it uses as a place for running oif freight cars and leaving them, has been held to be subject to a sewer assessment.^' A railroad company owning a lot which is divided by its right of way into two parts, may be assessed for the parts of such lot not used for its right of way.^* It is not prejudicial error to assess such part separately.^" In some jilrisdictions it is provided by statute that real property belonging to a railroad and used exclusively in the operation of its road is exempt from assessment while other real property own- ed by the road is subject to assessment.^^ In some states it is pro- vided by statute that any real property belonging to a railroad, except the right of way, may be assessed.^^ Accordingly, if it is shown that a railroad owns land, but it does not appear how such land is used, an assessment is regarded as prima facie valid."- Under such a statute a tract of land used in part as a right of way and in part for railroad yards was subject to assessment ex- cept as to such part thereof as was used as a road bed.^' In some jurisdictions, land used for side tracks may he a'sess^d for local improvements.^* The amount of the assessment is said to depend upon the probability that such land may thereafter be devoted to "Herter v. Chicago, Milwaukee & phia to Use of MeCann v. Philadel- St. Paul Railway Company, 114 la. phia & Reading Railroad Company, 330, 86 N. W. 266 [1901]. 177 Pa. 292, 34 L. R. A. 584, .35 Atl. "XVew York, etc., R. R. Co. v. 610 [1S96]; City of Erie v. Piece of New Britain, 49 Conn. 40. Land Fronting on State Street, 175 i» Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Pa. St. 523, 34 Atl. 808 [1896].- Co. V. Lindquist, 119 la. 144, 93 N. '"Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. W. 103 [19'J3]. Co. V. Lindquist, 119 Iowa, 144, 93 ■"Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. JN. W. 103 [1903J. Co. V. Lindquist, 119 la. 144, 93 JSI. ^ City of Philadelphia v. Philadel- W. 103 [1903]. phia & Reading Railroad '^ompany, ■"Herter v. Chicago, Milwaukee & 177 Pa. 292, 34 L. R. A. 564, 35 Atl. St. Paul Railway Company, 114 la. 610 11896]. 330, 86 N. W. 266 [1901]. "State, New Jersey Midbnd Rail- '^Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. road Company. Pros. v. Mayor and Co. V. lind'-uist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 Aldermen rf .lerse^' City, 42 N. J. L. N. W. 103 [1903]; City of Philadel- (13 Vroom) 97 [1880]. § 597 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 990 other purposes." In other jurisdictions it is said to be doubtful whether a side track can be assessed.^" Land used for freight and lumber yards may be assessed for the construction of adjoining sidewalks.^' Land used for warehouses, roundhouses and shops is said to be subject to assessment for local improvements.^' Land whicli is net usfd for railway purposes is subject to local assess- ment, and the fact that it is owned by a railway company does not affect such liability.^" The fact that it is probable that such land will in the future be required for railroad purposes does not ex- empt it from local assessment.^'' If a railway company has con- structed transfer tracks and stock yards on a part of a tract of land, the rest of such tract is not thereby renjJered exempt from local assessment.''^ § 597. Effect of interest held by railroad in land. In some jurisdictions the right to assessi the right of way of a railroad seems to turn upon the nature of the interest which the railway company has in such land. If the railway company has appropriated such land by eminent domain and possesses only an easement therein, it is said that such easement cannot be assessed.^ This result depends in part upon a question of statutory construc- tion, the easement being held not to be a lot within the meaning of the statute providing for an assessment upon adjoining lots.^ In other jurisdictions it is said to be immaterial whether the rail- road company has acquired the fee or an easement in the land =■' state, Morris and Kssex Kail- Assessors, 66 N. J. L. (37 Vr.) 501, road Company, Pros. v. Jersey (Jity. 49 Atl. 437 [1901]. 36 N. J. L. (7 Vr.) 56 [1872]. '"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ^ Ahem > . Board of Improvement Railway Company v. City of Milwau- District No. 3 of Texarkana, 69 Ark. kee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L. R. A. 249, 62 68, 61 8. W. 575 [1901]. JN. W. 417 [1895J. '^ Mt. Pleasant Bor. v. Baltimore " State of Minnesota ex rel. Minne- & Ohio Ry. Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 11 sota transfer Railway Company v. U R. A. 520, 20 Atl. 1052 [ 1890] ; JJistriot Court of Ramsey County, 68 Philadelphia v. Stevenson, 132 Pa. Minn. 242, 71 N. W. 27 [1897J. 103, 19 Atl. 70. ' Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific ^-^ Atchison, Topeka & Santa l''e Railway Company v. City of Ot- Railroad Company v. Peterson, 5 tumwa, 112 la. 300, 51 L. R. A. 763, Kan. App. 103, 48 Pac. 877 [1897]. «3 N. W. 1074 [1900]; City of Mus- "' In the Matter of the Jersey City catine v. Chicago, Rock Island and and Bergen Railway Company for a Pacific Railway Company. 88 la. Summary Determination as to Cer- 291, 55 N. W. 100 [1893J. tain Property Assessed by Jersey - See § 630. City and also by the State Board of 091 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 598 which it uses for its right of way. This theory leads, however, to widely different results. In some jurisdictions it is said that the right of way cannot be assessed whether the railway company has a fee or an easement therein." In other jurisdictions it is said that the right of way can be assessed even if the railway company has merely an easement therein acquired by eminent domain.* A railroad is said to have such an interest in the soil that such in- terest is subject to local assessment." It is real estate within the meaning of a statute authorizing the assessment of real estate." A railroad which has a mere license to run its trains over the tracks of another railroad which right is revocable on notice, has no interest in such right of way which may be assessed.^ Land owned by a railway in fee, Without restriction in its use is held to be subject to assessment.' In some jurisdictions, while the prop- erty of a railway company including its right of way may be assessed for local improvements," land donated by congress for the sole use of the railroad can be assessed only for the benefits which it receives if used for that particular purpose.^" § 598. Specific type of improvement as affecting assessment of right of way. Furthermore, since in many jurisdictions, the question of actual benefit to the property assessed is regarded as material, it is necessary to consider the chief types of local improvement with reference to the right to assess railroad property therefor. This ' AUeghenf City V. West Penna. R. road f. E. 762 [1904]. 37 N. E. 1041 [1894]; Ft. Dodge 'Chicago v. Sheldon, 76 U. S. (9 Electric Light & Power Company v. Wall.) 50, 19 L. 594 [1869]; City of Ft. Dodge, 115 la. 568, 89 Western Paving & Supply Co. v. Citi- N. W. 7 [1902]; Lacey v. City of zens Street Railroad Co., 128 Ind. Marshalltown, 99 la. 367, 68 N. W. 525, 25 Am. St. Rep. 462, 10 L. R. 726 [1896]; State of Minnesota ex A. 770, 26 N. E. 188, 28 N. E. 88 rel. Benz v. District Court of Ram- [1891]; State ex rel. City of Kansas sey County, 32 Minn. 181, 19 N. W. v. €orrigan Consolidated Street Rail- 732 [1884]; People ex rel. Davidson way Co., 85 Mo. 263. V. Gilon, 126 N. Y. J47, 27 N. E. "City of Binghampton v. Bing- 28-2 [1891]; (reversing People of the hampton & Port Dickinson Railway State of New York ex rel. Davidson Company, 61 Hun. 479, 16 N. Y. V. Gilon, 58 Hun. (N. Y.) 76, 11 N. Supp. 225 [1891]. Y. S. 439 [1890]); People ex rel. 'Marshalltown Light, Power & Markey v. City of Brooklyn, 65 N. Y. Railway Company v. City of Mar- 349 [1875] ; City of Philadelphia to s^-alUnwi, 127 la. 637, 103 N. W. use of O'Rourke v. Bowman, 175 Pa. 1005 [19051 St. «1, 34 Atl. 353 [1896]. 1005 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 603 by which a street railroad agrees to pave a given part of the street no further assessment can be levied upon such railway company.' A statute providing that a street railway company must pay a certain part of the cost of paving any street on which its tracks are situated "which the council may direct to be paved" is prospective in its operation, applies only to paving laid subsequently and does not authorize the city to require a street railroad company, as a condition precedent to laying its tracks upon a street already paved, which it has a right to occupy, to pay the cost of such paving.* A contract by which a street railway company is to keep in repair so much of the street as' it occupies, but such company is exempted from assessments for grading, paving, macadamizing, filling or planking such street, does not exempt such railway company from an assessment for the cost of widening such street.' If the city has power to require a street railway company to repay to the abutting property own- ers the cost of the paving between the rails where street rail- road tracks are laid upon a street already paved, such provision does not require the company to pay to the city the cost of paving at street intersections.^'' If the street railway company is to pave that part of the street occupied by its rails the com- pany has a right to a hearing upon the question of the amount of space thus oecupied.^^ If the street railway company is to do the work in the style which council might order notice to the street railway company to do such work is necessary in order to charge it with the cost thereon.^^ A street railway company was to bear all the expense of a pavement between the rails and for two feet on each side thereof. In paving such street it was necessary to place expensive blue granite stone along each exterior rail by reason of the existence of such track. Such stone was more exnensive than the average cost of paving such street. It was held that the railway company must bear such 'West Chieaaio Street TtaiVov Co. and Bridsre Company, 114 la. 141, 86 V. City of Chicago, 178 111. 339, 53 N. W. 222 [1901]. N. E. 112 [1899]. "City of Shreveport v. Presoott, 'Oskaloosa Street Railway & Land 51 La. Ann. 1895, 46 L. R. A. 193, Company v. City of Oskaloosa, 99 26 So. 664 [1899]. la. 496, 68 N. W. 808 [18961. "People of the State of New York 'Parmalee v. City of Chicago, 60 ex rel. Troy & Lansinsbureh Railroad 111. 267 [1871]. Company v. Coffey, 66 Hun. 160, 21 "City of Council Bluffs v. Omaha N. Y. Supp. 34 [1892]. and Council Bluffs Street Railway §603 TAXATION BY- ASSESSMENT. 1006 extra cost." Under a contract by a railroad company to repave and repair it is for the city to determine the necessity of repay- ing or repairing and material with which it is to be done." Lia- bility of a street railway company to pave and keep in good condition and repair a certain space in each street on which its tracks are situated does not make such company liable for the cost of laying a water pipe on one side of the street.^' If a railroad company is liable to pav| and keep in repair a certain part of a street it cannot be held liable for an assessment for a street improvement which includes as a part thereof the cost of the improvement and an agreement to keep in repair for a long term of years if the bond of the contractor to maintain such repairs does not inure to the benefit of the street railway com- pany, since otherwise such company might be obliged to pay twice for such repairs in case the contractor made default.^" If it is sought to assess the street railway on the theory of bene- fits, it is necessary, in the absence of legislative determination, to ascertain whether the railway is benefited by the improve- ment in question. Whether the right of a street railway com- pany can be said to be benefited by widening the street is a ques- tion upon which there is a difference of authority. The greater number of jurisdictions hold that such widening can benefit such property.^^ In other jurisdictions it is held that the widening of a street confers no benefit upon the right of way of a street railway.^' The construction of a sewer in a street upon which a railroad has laid its tracks is regarded as a benefit to such road." It has been held, however, that the grading of a street "Washington & Georgetown Rail- Company v. City of New Haven, 77 road Company v. District of Colum- Conn. 219, 58 Atl. 703 [1904]. bia, 108 U. S. 522, 27 L. 807, 2 S. " Appeal of North Beach and Mia- 865 [1883]. sion R. R. Co. in the Matter of " Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Widening Kearney Street, 32 Cal. Passenger Ry. Co., 143 Pa. St. 444, 500 [1867]; Chicago City Railway 22 Atl. 696 [1891]; (apparently to Company v. City of Chicago, 90 111. the same effect Fair Haven and West- 573, 32 Am. Rep. 54 [1878] ; Parma- ville Railroad Company v. New Ha- lee v. City of Chicago, 60 111. 267 ven, 203 U. S. 379 [1906]; affirm- [1871]. ing 77 Conn. 667). "In re Anthony Avenue. 95 N. Y. '"MoChesnev v. City of Chicago, S. 77, 46 Misc. Rep. 525 [1905]; In 213 111. 592, 73 N. E. 368 [1905]. re East 133rd Street 95 N. Y. S. 76 "Fair Haven and Westville Rail- [1904]. road Companv V. City of New Havpn, "Troy & Lansinn-bursh Railroad 77 Conn. 667, 60 Atl. 651 [1905]; Companv v. Kane, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) Fair Haven and Westville Railroad 506 [1877]. 1007 PROi^ratTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 604 does not confer any benefit upon a strip of land in the middle of such street belonging to a street railroad company whose cars are drawn by horses, so as to make it liable to assessment.^" § 604. Liability of street railway enures to benefit of property owners. If a street railroad company is liable for part or all of the cost of paving its street on which the tracks are situated, the adjoining property owner can interpose such liability as a de- fense if the city" attempts to assess upon such property owner any part of the cost which should be borne by the street rail- way company.^ One who pays his assessment in full, not know- ing of the ordinance which imposes a part of the cost upon the street railway company, may recover a proportionate part thereof.^ If the contractor who constructs the improvement has agreed to look to the street railway company for compensation for paving the part of the street which the street railway company is bound to pay, he clearly cannot enforce compensation for pav- ing from the abutting property owners.' Property owners cannot take advantage of an agreement to pave a part of the street entered into by the street railroad company after the contract =" Davis V. City of Newark, 54 N. J. O'Rourke v. Bowman, 166 Pa. St. L. (2S Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 [1891]. 393, 31 Atl. 142 [1895]; Philadel- 1 Ferine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305, phia to use v. Spring Garden Farm- 32 Pac. 226 [18«3]; American Hide ers' Market Company, 154 Pa. St. 93, & Leather Company v. City of Chi- 25 Atl. 1077 [1893]; contra People ca^o, 203 111. 451, 67 N. E. 979 ex rel. Markey v. City of Brooklyn, [1903]; City of Chicago v. Nodeck, 65 N. Y. 349 [1875]. Such question, 202 111. 257, 67 X. E. 39 [1903] ; Mc- cannot, however, be raised in a pro- Farlane v. City of Chicago, 185 111. ceeding in which the only questions 242, 57 N. E. 12 [1900]; Sawyer v. for determination are whether the City of Chicacts for exemption. A contract for exemption from taxation or local assessment or for the commutation of by payment of an equivalent therefor is not to be implied. A statute exempting property from local assessment or providing for a commutation thereof is, accord- ingly, not a contract and may be modified by subsequent action of the legislature.^ An ordinance providing that an elevated railroad company may construct its tracks over a street and that it shall restore the pavements, gutters, sidewalks and water, gas and sewer pipes, if they are disturbed by the construction of .said road, to as good a condition as they were before such con- struction, does not amount to a contract exempting such com- I)any from assessment for street improvements.^ A conveyance in consideration of one hundred thousand dollars to be paid by exempting from assessment contiguous land of the grantor to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars includes not only assessments already made and due, but assessments which have been made that are not yet entered upon the tax books for collection, installments of prior assessments to come due in the future and assessments which may be made in the future.^ Under a statute authorizing the value of land donated for a street to be set off against assessments for the improvement of such street the value of land donated but not used for the street for which the assessment in question was levied, since it was several blocks away, cannot be set off against such assess- ments.* A strip of land which surrounded a track intended for a public park was conveyed upon condition that the city should improve such strip as a street and keep it in good order and repair at its own expense. Under such contract it was held that the adjoining land belonging to the grantor of such strip could not be assessed for a street improvement, even in the hands of owners to whom he had subsequently conveyed it,' nor could 1 State, Mount Pleasant Cemetery Company v. City of Chicago, 18.3 111. Company, Pros. v. Mayor and Com- 75, 47 L. R. A. 624, 55 N. E. 721 mon Council of Newark, 50 N. j. L. [1899]. (21 Vr.) 66, 11 Atl. 147 [1887]; "State ex rel. City of Minneapolis City of Rochester v. Rochester Rail- v. District Court of Fourth Judicial way Company, 182 N. Y. 99, 70 L. R. District, 83 Minn. 170, 86 N. W. I.t A. 773, 74 n' E. 953 [1905] ; Ladd v. [1901]. City of Portland, 32 Ore. 271, 67 * Shurtleflf v. City of Chicago, 19(1 Am. St. Rep. 526, 51 Pac. 654 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]. flggg]. "City of Omaha v. Meeeath, +6 = Lake Street Elevated Railroad Neb. 502, 64 N. W. 1091 [1895]. § 617 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1032 sueh land be assessed for the cost of constructing a sidewalk." A contract with reference to the assessment of land outside of the city for the construction of a sewer when such land should be connected with such sewer does not affect the liability of the owners thereof as to other property owned by them within the city.^ A deed from the state reciting that lands had been sold to the state for taxes due such state and that the grantee has paid two cents an acre in full of all state and county taxes due thereon to the present date, does*"not show payment of an assess- ment for a levee, although such assessment is referred to as a special tax.* Another form of a contract for exemption from local assessments or commutation thereof is found in contracts between a city and a street railroad by which the street railroad is to pave a certain portion of a street in return for which it is relieved from other assessments.' The transfer by a street rail- way company of its estate, property rights, privileges and fran- chises, does not pass to the grantee the benefit of an exemption contract.^" Another form of exemption from local assessment or commutation, is found where provision is made that the property owners may do part or all of the work and receive credit there- for upon their assessments.'^ If the property owners act in re- liance upon such provision, the transaction may amount to a con- tract. In the absence of such action in reliance on such provisions, it is at least a statute for exemption or commutation and is valid until amended or repealed.'^ ' Browne v. Palmer, 66 Neb. 287, " McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 92 N. W. 315 [1902]. 34 Pac. 71 [1893]; Dumesnil v. ' State, Estate of Brown, Pros. v. Louls.ville Artificial Stone Co., 109 Town of Union, 62 N. J. L. (33 Vr.) Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 [1900]; In the 142, 40 Atl. 632 [1898]. Matter of the Assessment for Improv- 'Ford V. Delta and Pine Land ing Erst Eighteenth Street in the Company, 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. 590, Town of F.latbush, 75 Hun. (N. Y.) 17 S. 230 [1897]. 603, 27 N. Y. Supp. 591 [1894]. •Chicago V. Sheldon, 76 U. S. (9 '''Barber v. Board of Supervisors Wall.) 50, 19 L. 594 [1869]; West of the City and County of San Fran- Chicago Street Railroad Company v. cisco, 42 Cal. 630 [1872]; Diggins City of Chicago, 178 111. 339, 53 N. v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pacf 373 E. 112 [1899] ; Western Paving and [1888] ; City of Connersville v. Mer- Supply Company v. Citizens Street rill, 14 Ind. App. 303, 42 N. E. 1112 Railroad Company, 128 Ind. 525, 25 [1895]; Beck v. Obst, 12 Bush. (75 Am. St. Rep. 462, 10 L. R. A. 770, Ky.) 268 [1876]; State, Kin?, Pros. 26 N. E. 188, 28 N. E. 88 [1891]. v. Duryea, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 258 « Rochester Railway Co. v. City of [1883]. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236 (affirming 182 N. Y. 99). 1033 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 618 § 618. Construction of special statutes for exemption and com- mutation. In Massachusetts a city may assume assessments for betterments against the portion of the land not taken on condition that the owner releases claims for damages caused by laying out the street. The board of street commissioners of a city cannot make a con- tract for exemption from assessment, except under such statute.^ A property owner who has settled with the city for damages, cannot take advantage of a statute authorizing a property owner, a part of whose property is taken, to surrender the rest and re- cover the full value of the property.^ If such statute applies to abutting property, property which is separated by a street from that which is taken cannot be surrendered under such statute.^ In New York under the charter of Greater New York, the owner of land within the lines of a street laid out on the rnap, may con- vey his interest in such land to the city without compensation, and if his title is good, such conveyance shall prevent assessment upon lands fronting on the portion of the street so conveyed, ex- cept a fair proportion of the awards made for the value of build- ings destroyed in opening such street.* Under such statute, such conveyance may be made after the application of the city to open the street, at least up to'the time that commissioners are appoint- ed.'' Under such statute the owner of land is liable for a fair pro- portion of the costs of buildings removed in opening such street.* Under such statute, other land owners who do not acquire their title froin the donor of the street and whose land does not front on the portion of the street so conveyed, cannot claim exemption from assessment by reason of such conveyance.'' The United States has conveyed swamp lands to the different states, the proceeds of which are to be applied to reclaim such swamp lands. The en- forcement of such provisions, is left to the good faith of the re- 'Whitcomb v. City of Boston, 192 tion Counsel of the City of New Mass. 211, 78 N. E. 407 [1906]. York, 185 N. Y. 539, 77 N. E. 1198 ''Holt V. City Council of Somer- [1906]; (affirming, Westminster ville, 127 Mass. 408 [1879]. Heights Co. v. Delany, 95 N. Y. S. "Holt V. City Council of Somer- 247, 107 App. Div. 577 [1905]). ville, 127 Mass. 408 [1879]. "In re Avenue L. in City of New ♦Laws 1897, p. 355, c. 378, § 992, Yorlc, 95 N. Y. S. 245, 107 App. Amended Laws, 1901, p. 421, c. 466. Div. 581 [1905]. " In the Matter of the Application ' In re yi&yox, etc., of City of New of the Westminster Heights Com- York, 93 N. Y. S. 84, 103 App. Div. pany for a Peremptory Writ of Man- 496 [1905]. damns Against Delany as Corpora- § 619 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1034 spective states and an individual only who buys such laud from the state, cannot take advantage of such statute as exempting such land from subsequent local assessments. Furthermore, if it is a contract, it is a contract between the United States and the state to which the United States has conveyed such lands. The individual who purchases such land from the state, cannot take advantage thereof.^ However, where such land was conveyed by such state under a statute providing that such land should be exempt from taxation for the term of ten years, or till it should be reclaimed, it was held that such statute amounted to a con- tract which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation and that local assessments known as special taxes were included in such exemption." The state may provide for the reclamation of swamp and overflowed lands, even if the title was derived from a Mexican grant.^" § 619. Property not in physical contact with improvement. In order to receive a benefit from a public improvement, land need not abut or front thereon in the absence of a determination by the legislature or some public corporation, or official author- ized by statute, that only the abutting or fronting property is benefited.' Accordingly, non-abutting land may be benefited by ' Hagar ^. Reclamation District * Rooke's Case, 5 Rep. 99 b. ( Hil. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 40 Eliz.) ; City of Seattle v. Kelle- S. 663 [1884]; (affirming Reclama- her, 195 U. S. 351, 25 S. 44 [1904]; tion Dist. No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 Fed. Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 366 [1880]); Ritter v. Drainage S. W. 707 [1897]; Little Rock v. Dist. No. 1, Poinsett County, 78 Ark. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 580, 94 S. W. 711 [1906]; Reclama- 198 [1889]; German Savings and tion District No. 108 v. Hagar, 66 Loan Society v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]; contra 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pae. 1067 [1902]; Mc- Mason v. Austin, 46 Cal. 385 [1873]. Gilvery v. City of Lewiaton, 13 Ida. 'McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. (4 338, 90 Pac. 348 [1907]; Roberts Wall.) 143, 18 L. 314 [1866]; (re- v. City of Evanaton, 218 111. 296, 75 versing, McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. N. E. 923 [1905]; Walker v. City 40 [I860]). of Chicago, 202 111. 531, 67 N. E. "Hagar v. Reclamation District 369 [1903] ; Sliurtleff v. City of Chi- No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. 569, 4 cago, 190 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 S. 663 [1884]; (affirming, Reclama- [1901] ;, Mason v. City of Chicago, tion Dist. No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 Fed. 178 111. 499, 53 N. E. 354 [1899]; 366 [1880]); Hagar v. Board of Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18. Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Louisville and 222 [1874]; People of the State of Nashville Railroad Company v. East California v. Hagar, 52 Cal. 171 St. Louis, 134 111. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1877]. [1891] ; Guild, Jr. v. City of Chicago. 1035 PEOPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §619 the improvement of a street,^ or by the construction of a sewer,'' or a system of draigage,* or by a park," so that it may be assess- 82 111. 472 [1876]; Goodrich v. City of Minonk, 62 111. 121 [1871]; Cul- bertson v. Knight, 152 Ind. 121, 52 N. E. 700 [1898] ; Ray v. City of Jef- fersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883]; Mock V. City of Muncie, 9 Ind. App. 536, 37 N. E. 281 [1893]; Kansas City v. Napiecek, — Kan. , 92 Pao. 827 [1907]; Olsson v. City of Topeka, 42 Kan. 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; City of Ottawa V. Barney, 10 Kan. 270 [1872]; Pfaffinger v. Kremer, 115 Ky. 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2368 [1903]; Goodrich v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; Kansas City V. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; State v. Several Parcels of Land, — Neb. , 113 N. W. 248 [1907] ; Hart v. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. 836, 105 N. W. 546 [1905]; Lansing v. City of Lincoln, 32 Neb. 457, 49 N. W. 650 [1891]; Allison Land Co. v. Borough of Tenafly, 69 N. J. L. (40 Vr.) 587, 55 Atl. 39 [1903]; (affirming on rehearing Al- lison Land Co. v. Borough of Ten- afly, 68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 205, 52 Atl. '231 [1902]); State, Henderson, Pros. V. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vroom) 489 [1879]; In the Matter of the Application of the Common Council of the City of Amsterdam to take lands for the ex- tension of Grove and Jay Streets, 55 Hun. (N. Y.) 270, 8 N. Y. Supp. 234 [1889]; Kelly v. City of Cleve- land, 34 O. S. 468 [1878]; Coates v. Villac'e of Norwood, 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]; Miller v. City of Toledo, 12 Ohio C. C. 706 [1894]; In the Matter of Westlake Avenue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]. "Roberts v. City of Ev!inst"i. 218 111. ?9fi, 75 N. E. 923 [19051; Shurtleff v. City of Chicasro, 190 111. 473, 60 N. E. 870 [1901]; Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. East St. Louis, 134 111. 656, 25 N. E. 962 [1891]; Ray v. City of Jef- fersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883]; Mock v. City of Muncie, 9 Ind. App. 536, 37 N. E. 281 [1893]; Olsson v. City of Topeka, 42 Kan. 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; City of Ottawa v. Bar- ney, •O.Kan. 270 [1872]; Pfafiinger v. Kremer, 115 Ky. 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2368 [1903]; Goodrich v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N. W. 255 [1900]; State ex rel. Hughes v. District Court of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 [1905]; Allison Land Co. v. Borough of Tenafly, 69 N. J. L. (40 Vr.) 587, 55 Atl. 39 [1903]; (affirming on rehearing Al- lison Land Co. v. Borough of Ten- afly, 68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 205, 52 Atl. 231 [1902]); In the Matter of the Application of the Common Council of the City of Amsterdam to take lands for the extension of Grove and Jay Streets, 55 Hun. (N. Y.) 270, 8 N. Y. Supp. 234 [1889].; Kelly V. City of Cleveland, 34 0. 8. 468 [1878] ; In the Matter of West- lake Avenue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]. ' McGilvery v. City of Lewiston, 13 Ida. 338, 90 Pac. 348 [1907]; Walker v. City of Chicago, 202 111. 531, 67 N. E. 369 [1903]; Mason v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 499, 55 N. E. 354 [1899]; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 [1874]; State, Henderson, Pros. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vroom) 489 [1879]; Miller v. City of Toledo, 12 Ohio C. 0. 706 [1894]. *Rooke's Case, 5 Rep. 99 b. (Hil, 40 Eliz. ) ; Goodrich v. City of Min- onk, 62 111. 121 [1871]; Culbertson V. Knicrht. 152 Ind. 121, 52 N. E. 700 118981. "F!"i9!>s Citv V. Wa'-'l, ]S4 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600 [1896]; Hart v. § 620 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. . 1036 ed for the expense thereof. The fact that property to be assessed for a park or boulevard is three-quarters of* a mile away there- from does not justify the court as a matter of law, in saying that such property is not benefited." By statute, assessments for local improvements were to be made upon the contiguous property bene- fited. After an ordinance for appropriating land for a street was passed but before the supplementary petition was filed, such stat- ute was modified by omitting tlje word "contiguous." It was held that under such statiites it was proper to assess any prop- erty actually benefited tj^ugh not contiguous to the improve- ment.' In Illinois, under the constitutional provision authoriz- ing the construction of public improvements by general taxation, by special assessment or by special taxation of contiguous prop- erty, it has been held that the phrase "of contiguous property" is connected only with the grant of the power of special taxation and does not limit the power of special assessment.^ Accordingly, an assessment based on the theory of benefits may be levied upon property benefited but not contiguous to the improvement." § 620. Abutting property. The assessment district is often described as consisting of prop- erty which bears a certain relation in space to the improvement. Property which abuts ^ on the improvement for which the assess- ment is levied is frequently made into an assessment district by the legislature or public corporation or officer duly authorized to determine what property is benefited and to lay out the City of Omaha, 74 Neb. 836, 105 N. ' City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. ;W. 546 [1905]. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]; "Hart v. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. Chadwiek v. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540, 83B, 105 N. W. 546 [1905]. 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903]; (affirm- ' In the Matter of Wegtlake Ave- ing, Kelley v. Chadwiek, 104 La. nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); City of 279 [1905]. ' Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 » Guild, Jr. V. City of Chicago, 82 Pac. 117 [1904]; Bacon v. Mayor and 111. 472 [1876]; (construing Article Aldermen of Savannah, 91 Ga. 500, IX., § 9, of the Constitution of Illi- 17 S. E. 749 [1893]; Speer v. Mayor nois.) and Council of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 "Roberts v. City of Evanston, 218 L. R. A. 402, 11 S. E. 802 [1890]; 111. 296, 75 N. E. 923 [1905]; Shurt- Vandersyde v. People ex rel. Ray- lefF V. City of Chicago, 190 111. 473, mond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. 806 60 N. E. 870 [1901]; Louisville and [1902]; Bass v. South Park Corn- Nashville Railroad Company v. City missioners, 171 111. 370, 49 N. E. of East St. Louis, 134 111. 656, 25 549 [1898]; Thorn v. West Chicago N. E. 962 [1891] ; Guild, Jr. v. City Park Commissioners, 130 111. 594, 22 of Chicago, 82 111. 472 [1876]. N. E. 520 [1890]; Green v. City of 1037 PEOPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT, §620 assessment district. Districts consisting of the abutting property Springfield, 130 111. 515, 22 N. E. 602 [1890]; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ey. Co. V. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 [1906]; Klein v. Nugent Gravel Company, 162 Ind. 509, 70 N. E. 801 [1903]; Deane v. Indiana Macadam & Construction Company, 161 Ind. 371, 68 N. E. 686 [1903]; Leeds v. Defrees, 157 Ind. 392, 61 N. E. 930 [1901]; Martin v. Willa, 157 Ind. 153, 60 N. E. 1021 [1901]; Tay- lor V. City of Crawfordaville, 155 Ind. 403, 58 N. E. 490; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 484, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114 [1899]; Helm v. Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131, 73 N. E. 846 [1904]; Byram v. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, 47 N. E. 351 [1897] ; Rawson v. City of Des Moines, 133 la. 514, 110 N. W. 918 [1907]; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. V. Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Edwards & Walsh Construction Company v. Jas- per County, 117 Iowa 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 [1902]; Hackworth v. City of Ottumwa, 114 la. 467, 87 N. W. 424 [1901]; Ot- tumwa Brick & Construction Co. v. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. 510 [1899]; Gilcrest v. McCartney, 97 la. 138, 66 N. W. 103 [1896] ; Amery V. City of Keokuk, 72 la. 701, 30 N. W. 780 [1887]; Kendig v. Knight, 60 la. 29, 14 N. W. 78 [1882]; Mor- rison y. Hershire, 32 la. 271 [1871]; Warren v. Henly, 31 la. 31 [1870]; McGrew v. City of Kansas City, 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pae. 438 [1902]; Morton V. Sullivan. (Ky.) 29 Ky. L. Rep. 943, 96 S. W. 807 [1906]; City of Covington v. Matson, — Ky. — •, 34 S. W. 897, 17 Ky. L. R. 1323 [1896]; Slooum V. Selectmen of Brookline, 163 Mass. 23, 39 N. E. 351 [1895]; Ayer V. Mayor and Aldermen of Somer- ville, 143 Mass. 585, 10 N. E. 457 [1887]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. V. Munn, 185 Mo. 552, 83 R. W. 1062 [1904]; Meier v. City of St. Lnuis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 163 [1902]; City of Spring- - field to Use of Central National Bank v. Weaver, 137 Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 509, 39 S. W. 276 [,18&6] ; Heman Construction Company v. McManus, 102 Mo. App. 649, 77 S. W. 310 [1903]; City of Omaha v. Gsanter, 4 Neb. Unoff. 52, 93 N. W. 407 [1903]; Kuhns v. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]; Hutchin- son V. City of Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218 [1897]; McCormick v. City of Omaha, 37 Neb. 829, 56 N. W. 626 [1893]; Farrington v. City of Mt. Vernon, 166 N. Y. 233, 59 N. E. 826 [1901]; Parsons v. City of Rochester, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 258 [1887]; Halliard v. City . of Ashe- ville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]: Kelly v. City of Cleveland, 34 0. S. 468 [1878]; Meissner v. City of Toledo, 31 0. S. 387 [1877]; Smith V. City of Toledo, 24 0. S. 126 [1873]; Creighton v. Scott, 14 0. S. 438 [1863]; Maloy v. City of Marietta, 11 0. S. 636 [I860]; North- ern Indiana Railroad Company v. Connelly, 10 0. S. 160 [1859]; Sco- ville V. City of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 126 [1853]; (followed in Clark v. City of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 139 [1853]) ; Oliver v. City of Newberg, — Or. '-, 91 Pac. 470 [1907]; In the Matter of the Opening of Ork- ney Street, Appeal of the City of Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 425, 48 L. R. A. 274, 45 Atl. 314 [1900]; Beech- wood Avenue Sewer, Pittsburg's Ap- peal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 [1897]; Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal of Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1895]; City of Reading v. O'- Reilly, 169 Pa. St. 366, 32 Atl. 420 [1895]; Fifty-Fourth Stieet, Pitts- burg's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [1894] ; Morewood Avenue, Chamber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 At\. 123 [1P93]; Main Street, Big Run BoroiiTh. 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]; Magee v. Common- §620 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1038 are most frequently found in assessments for street improvements,^ but may also be found in assessments for sewers,' as where the assessment is levied upon the property abutting the street in which the sewer is located.* Assessment districts of this sort are also found where the improvement is the construction of a gutter,' or the construction of a curb or gutter," or the improvement of an alley.' Property is ordinarily said to abut on an improvement or a street when it is so situated with reference thereto that it is not separated therefrom by an^ intervening property,' or at wealth for the Use of the City of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 358 [1863]; Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 305 [1904]; Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, 8 Atl. 692 [1887]; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885] ; Ryan v. Sumner, 17 Wash. 228, 49 Pac. 487 [1897]; Sehintgen v. City of La Crosse, 117 Wis. 158, 94 N. W. 84 [1903] ; Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail- way Company v. City of Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L. R. A. 249, 62 N. W. 417 [1895]; Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315 [1876]. ^City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904] ; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540, 47 L. 293, 23 S. 175 [1903] (affirm, ing, Kelley v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 So. 295 [1901]); Green v. City of Springfield, 130 111. 515, 22 N. B. 602 [1890]; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741- [1906]; Hackworth v. City of Ottumwa, 114 la. 467, 87 N. W. 424 [1901]; Ottumwa Brick & Construction Co. v. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W.'510 [1899]; Amery v. City of Keokuk, 72 la. 701, 30 N. W. 780 [1887] ; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 la. 271 [1871]; Morton v. Sullivan, — Ky. , 29 Ky. L. Rep. 943, 96 S. W. 807 [1906]; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Munn, 185 Mo. 552, 83 S. W. 1062 [1904]; City of Spring- field to Use of Central National Bank V. Weavpr, 137 Mo. PiiO. 37 S. W. 509. 39 S. W. 276 [18961; Filliard V. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738 [1896]; City of Cincin- nati V. Batsche, 52 0. S. 324, 27 L. R. A. 536, 40 N. E. 21 [1895]; Kel- ly V. City of Cleveland, 34 0. S. 468 [1878]; In the Matter of the Open- ing of Orkney Street, Appeal of the City of Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 425, 48 L. R. A. 274, 45 Atl. 314 [1900]; Fifty-fourth Street, Pitts- burg's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [1894]; Fifty-fourth Street, Pittsburg's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [ 1894] ; Morewood Avenue, Chamber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 [1893]; Main Street, Big Run Borough, 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]; Magee v. Common- wealth for the Use of the City of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 368 [1863]; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533 [1885]. ' Vandersyde v. People ex rel. Ray- mond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. 806 [1902] ; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. V. Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N. W. 103 [1903]; Beechwood Avenue Sewer, Pittsburg's Appeal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 [1897]; Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal of Par- ker, 169 Pa. St. 433, 32 Atl. 574 [1895]. ' Byram v. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, 47 N. E. 351 [1897]. "Kendig v. Knight, 60 la. 29, 14 N. W. 78 [1882]. ° City of Omaha v. Gsanter, 4 Neb. Unoff. 52, 93 N. W. 407 [1903]. 'Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 163 [1902]. ' "To speak of property as abutting ut)on a st'-eet, has a well understood and definite meaning, as well in legal 1039 PEOPEKTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §620 least only by intervening property which is subject to a public easement, for the use for which the improvement has been con- structed." It is said that property cannot be abutting an improve- ment if it does not touch it." "Abutting is sometimes used as equivalent to "adjoining" or "fronting."" The context of the statute or ordinance in which the term is employed may, how- ever, suggest a different meaning for each of these respective terms.^^ In Illinois, constitutional and statutory provisions auth- orizing the assessment of contiguous property are held to author- ize assessment by the city of property abutting on the street or improvement. Within the meaning of these provisions "contig- uous" is regarded as synonymous with or including "abutting." ^^ In most jurisdictions the question whether property abuts on an improvement or not, is to be determined by the actual use made of it at the time of the assessment proceedings and not by the platted lines, if the property is actually used and occupied.^* Accord- ingly, if a platted lot has been divided in actual use into two distinct tracts, one of which is separated from the street by the other, the one in the rear is not regarded as abutting on the im- as in common parlance. It means property which lies adjacent to and is bounded by the lines of the street, the street line and property line be- ing coincident." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Eailroad Company v. South Park Commissioners, 11 111. App. 562, 563 [1882]. "'Abut' means the same as 'bound' that is to terminate or border; to be contig- uous; to meet." Barney v. City of Dayton, 8 Ohio C. C. 480, 481 [1894]. "AUman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894]; City of Jop- lin ex rel. Kee v. Freeman, — Mo. App. — , 103 S. W. 130 [1907]; Richards v. City of Cincinnati, 31 0. S. 506 [1877]. " Holt V. City Council of Somer- ville, 127 Mass. 408 [1879]. "Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014 [1895]. I'' "We have reached this conclusion (i. e. that a lot adjoining a street on its side is not one fronting on such street) after a due considera- tion of the authorities in other juris- dictions construing the statutes on germane subjects in which the words 'fronting,' 'adjoining,' 'abutting' and similar expressions are held to be synonymous, but in none of them ' have these different words been so carefully distinguished as they ap- pear to be in the framing of these amendments. We cannot regard these different words 'adjoining,' 'fronting' and 'abutting,' apparently so care- fully differentiated with reference to their context in the charter, as mere- ly tautological or as synonymous." Collier Estate v. Western Paving Supply Company, 180 Mo. 362, 383, 79 S. W. 947 [1904]. ''Vandersyde v. People ex rel. Ray- mond, 195 111. 200, 62 N. E. 806 [1902]; Thorn v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 130 111. 594, '22 N. E. 520 [1890]; Green v. City of Spring- field, 130 111. 515, 22 N. E. 602 [1890]. "Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, 66 N. E. 332 [1903]. § 620 • TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 104:0 provement.^^ The authorities, however, are not unanimous on this question. Where two lots are used together as a single tract, it has been held that they cannot be regarded as one tract abutting upon an improvement, upon which only one of such lots as laid out in the plat actually abuts.^" In determining the scope and meaning of the term "abutting," a number of interesting questions have been discussed. One of them is whether property can be said to abut" on an improvement, if the improvement touches the property at the side along its greatest length and not at the end which is used as a front. It is ordinarily said that property which touches an improvement upon its side is to be regarded as abutting property.^^ In Ohio, under a statute provided for assessing abutting property in pro- portion to the number of front feet, it has been held that while a lot could abut an improvement upon its side, the depth of such lot to be assessed depended upon the width of the front of the lot and not upon its depth abutting on the improvement for which the assessment was levied.^' These decisions, however, turn on the meaning of "front foot" and not on the meaning of "abut- ting."^' Somewhat similar results have been reached in New Jersey under a statute providing for apportioning assessments according to benefits.^" In Pennsylvania it was held that prop- erty in the front of which a water pipe had been laid could not be assessed for laying a pipe along the side thereof.^^ The deci- sion of this case, however, turned rather upon the question wheth- er such improvement was in fact a benefit to the land thus as- sessed than on the question of what abutting property was.^'' Whether part of a sidewalk at the corner of two streets meeting at right angles, which is bounded by the prolongation of the side and front lines of the corner lot, can be said to abut upon the corner lot which it touches only at one point has been discussed but not '"Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. " Sandrock v. Columbus, 51 Olii i 301, 66 N. E. 332 [1903]; Clapton v. St. 317, 42 N. E. 255 [1894]; Havi- Taylor, 49 Mo. App. 117 [1892]. land v. City of Columbus, 50 0. S, "Smith V. City of Des Moines, 106 471, 34 N. E. 679 [1893]. la. 590, 76 N. W. 836 [1898]. "See § 625; § 704. " City of Springfield v. Green, 120 ^ Cossitt Land Oo. v. Neuscheler, 111. 269, 11 N. E. 261; City of Law- — N. J. , 60 Atl. 1128 [1905]. rence V. rillam, 11 Fan. 499 [1873]; =* Baker v. Gartside, 86 Pa. St. (5 MobeHv V. TTnaan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. Norris) 498. W. 1014 [1895]. =° Baker v. Gartside, 86 Pa. St. (5 Norris) 498. 1041 PROPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT § 620 decided.''^ Property which is separated from the improvement by intervening land over which neither the public nor the owner of the tract in question possesses an easement giving access to the improvement for which the easement is levied is not regarded as abutting property.^* However, a tract of land which was sep- arated from a street by a small stream over which were two bridgesi giving access to such tract was said to be abutting on such street.-" If the strip of land intervening between the land in question and the improvement, has been conveyed fraudu- lently in order to prevent the property in question from being assessed, it has been held that the existence of such intervening strip does not prevent the property back of it from being regard- ed as abutting property.^" This principle has been applied where the property back of such strip has been conveyed to a grantee, who had notice of such fraudulent conveyance. ^^ The intervening strip may have been conveyed after the time at which the condi- tion of the property is regarded as fixed. In such case, the exis- tence of such intervening strip does not prevent the property from being regarded as abutting.^' The intervening strip may in some way have become the property of the owner of the tract which is separated from such improvement by such strip. In such case, the tract back of such strip is regarded as abutting on the im- provement.^" Thus, where a city in straightening a street va- cated a strip of ground on one side and by ordinance provided that the portion of such strip in front of each lot should be donated to the owner thereof, to become a part of «aeh lot and further pro- vided that the mayor should execute conveyances accordingly, it was held that although such conveyances were not executed, yet if the portion of such strip in front of each lot was enclosed there- with for years, with the knowledge of the owner, he became at least the equitable owner of the portion of such strip and the en- ^City of Laurence v. Killam, 11 [1887]; Fass v. Seehawer, 60 Wis. Kan. 499 [1873]. 525, ]!) N. W. 533 [1884]. * Damkoehler v. City of Milwau- " Eagle Manufacturing Company v. kee, 124 Wis. 144, 101 N. W. 706 City of Davenport, 101 la. 493, 38 [1905]. L. R. A. 480, 70 N. W. 707 [1897]. ^Wakefield Local Board of Health ^Douglass v. City of Cincinnati, V. Lee, 1 Ex. T>iv. 336. 29 0. S. 165 [1876]. " Eagle Manufacturing Company v. ^ Ottumwa Brick & Construction Citv of Davenport, 101 Ta. 493. 38 Co. v. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N W. L. T?. A. 480, 70 N. W. 707 [1897]; 510 [1899]. Stifel V. Brown, 24 Mo. App. 102 § 620 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1042 tire lot was to be regarded as abutting on the improvement.*" The intervening strip may be one in which the public or the own- er has such an easement that he can have free access to the im- provement. In such cases the existence of such strip does not prevent the property back of it from being abutting property." Thus, a city encroached upon grounds which were dedicated to the county as a public square, by using a strip on the side of such square'as a part of the street. Subsequently the city obtained a decree preventing the county frdin interfering with the city's possession of such strips. It was held that the existence of such strips did not prevent the public square owned by the county from abutting on such street.'^ The existence of a public parking between a lot and the sidewalk in front of it does not prevent such lot from abutting on such sidewalk.'* A strip of land ninety-one feet in width was dedicated for a street. The city improved a street thereon ninety feet in width, leaving one foot upon one side, used only for sloping embankments and excavations. It was held that the existence of such strip did not prevent lots abutting on such strip from abutting on the street.** The property including the right of way of a railway company which touches a street may be regarded as abutting thereon.*' If such property is held not to be subject to assessment, it is not because it is held not to abut upon the improvemnt, but because it is held to be exempt *■ Ottumwa Brick & Construction vening foot of land deprives them of Co. V. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. full, free, and lawful access to the 510 [1899]. ' street improved; but such depriva- ^ Allman v. District of Columbia, tion could result only when the right 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894]; Edwards & and exclusive use thereto have re- Walsh Construction Company v. Jas- verted to the original dedicators and per County, 117 Iowa 365, 94 Am. their heirs. If the public right to St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006 [1902]; its use still continues, or if the right City of Joplin ex rel. Kee v. Free- to the strip has vested absolutely in mg,n, — Mo. App. , 103 S. W. the owners of lands abutting upon it, 130 [1907]; Richards v. City of Cin- after abandonment by the public, cinnati, 31 0. S. 506 [1877]. then, in either ease, their liability to "^Edwards & Walsh Construction assessment is certain." Richards v. Company v. Jasper County, 117 Iowa City of Cincinnati, 31 0. S. 506, 514 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. [1877]. 1006 [1902]. » Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. "Allman v. District of Columbia, v. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 3 App. D. C. 8 [1894]. [1906]; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. ""It seems to us that, in order to Paul Railway Company v. City of exempt these proprietors from assess- Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L. R. A. ment as abuttors on the imnrove- 249, 62 N. W. 417 [1895]. ment, it must appear that this inter- 1043 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 620 from assessment generally,'" or because it is held not to be a lot of land within the meaning of the statute. The tracks of a rail- road which are situated in a street and run along the length there- of are not regarded as abutting on such street.'' The right of way of a railroad company running across a street has been held not to be abutting property.''* One street which intersects another is not regarded as property abutting on such street.'" Thus, under an ordinance providing that where railroad tracks are laid in a street already paved, the owners shall pay the property owners for the paving between the rails, the railway company is not obliged to pay the city for the paving opposite intersecting streets.*" If part of an undivided tract abuts upon an improvement, it has been held that the entire tract is liable to assessment.*^ On the other hand, it has' been said that a tract of forty acres unplatted and used for farm purposes, a part of which abuts upon a street im- provement, cannot be assessed for such improvement as an entire- ty.*^ If the property belonging to one owner consists of two or more different tracts, the fact that one of the tracts abuts upon the improvement does not constitute the other tract abut- ting property within the meaning of the assessment statute.*' Where the improvement consists of a part of the width of a street, '"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ject to the reasonable supervision of Railway Company v. City of Milwau- the police powers of the city." Chi- kee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L. R. A. 249, 62 cago, Burlington and Quincy Rail- N. W. 417 [1895]. road Company v. South Park Com- " 'South Park Commissioners V. The missioners, 11 Bradwell (111.) 562, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 564 [1882]. Railroad Company, 107 111. 105 =■ City of Council Bluffs v. Omaha [1883]; City of Boston V. Boston and & Council Bluffs Street Railway & Albany Railroad Company, 170 Mass. Bridge Company, 114 la. 141, 86 N. 95, 49 N. E. 95 [1898]; Boehme v. W. 222 [1901]. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401, 64 "City of Council Bluffs v. Omaha N. W. 204 [1895]; Harriott Avenue, & Council Bluffs Street Railway & 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 597 [1904]. Contra, Bridge Company, 114 la. 141, 86 N. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St.- L. Ry. Co. v. W. 222 [1901]. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N. E. 741 "Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 466, 8 [1906]. Atl. 692 [1887]. '"Chicago, Burlington and Quincy "Ryan v. Sumner, 17 Wash. 228, Railroad Company v. South Park 49 Pac. 487 [1897]. Commissioners, 11 Bradwell (111.) "This was held under a statute 562 [1882]. "The right of way of a making unplatted property abutting railroad company across a street can on a street subject to assessment to in no proper sense of the term be a depth of three hundred feet. Mc- classed as property abutting on the Grew v. City of Kansas City, 64 street. It is merely a risiht of oceu- Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]. pancy of a portion of the street, sub- § 620 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1044 property abutting on the side of the street not improved is re- garded as abutting on the improvement.** Property which abuts upon a prjvate way through which a sewer runs, which private way is subsequently laid out into a public way becomes property abutting on a public way through which a sewer runs, and is lia- ble to. assessment under a statute providing for assessing such property.*^ Property abutting on a lateral sewer is not regarded as abutting on the main sewer within the meaning of a statute providing for levying an assessment upon property abutting the. sewer for which the assessment is levied.*" A tract of land which as originally platted abutted on one street but which as actually used, is severed from the rest of such tract and is separated from the street by such residue, is not a lot abutting on such street.*^ If, in the exercise of proper discretion, the assessment district is made to consist of abutting property, other property cannot be assessed for the cost of such improvement, even if it is in fact benefited thereby.*' Under a statute authorizing an assessment upon land bounding and abutting upon a street, it has been held that the city could not provide by ordinance for assessing the cost of an improvement "upon all the lots and parcels of land benefited thereby. "*° So under a statute restricting the assessment to abutting property, if made in proportion to frontage, non-abutting property though benefited cannot be assessed.^" Land abutting upon one improvement cannot be treated as abutting upon an- other improvement by the process of providing for constructing the two improvements together and assessing the property abut- " Klein V. Nugent Gravel Company, 21 [1895]; Kelly v. City of Cleve- 162 Ind. 509, 70 N. E. 801 [1903]; land, 34 0. S. 468 [1878]; Beech- Helm V. Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131, 73 wood Avenue Sewer, Pittsburg's Ap- N. E. 846 [1904]; City of Cincinnati peal, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209 V. Batsehe, 52 0. S. 324, 27 L. R. A. [1897] ; Park Avenue Sewers, Appeal 536, 40 N. E. 21 [1895]. of Parker, 169 Pa. St 433, 32 Atl. '^Slocum V. Selectmen of Brook- 574 [1895]; Fifty-fourth Street, line, 163 Mass. 23, 39 N. E. 351 Pittsburg's Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 [1895]. Atl. 503 [1894]; Morewood Avenue, "> Ayer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Chamber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 5»o, Somerville, 143"Mass. 585, 10 N. E. 28 Atl. 123 [1893]. 457 [1887]. "Fellv v. Pity of Cleveland, 34 O. "LanHnis V. Cameron, 201 111. S. 468 [1878]. 301. ffi N. E. 332 ri9031. "Cincinnati v. Batsehe, 52 0. S. "Till v. ritv of -"hicao-o, 29 111. 324, 27 L. K. A. 536, 40 N. E. 21 31 n8P21; nneinnati v. Batsehe. 52 [1895]. O. e. 324, 27 L. R. A. 536, 40 N. E. 1045 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 620 ting upon either." This is especiEllly true if only one of the . streets provided for in the ordinance has been improved."^ If two alleys are established in one block, a separate district must be made for each alley, consisting of the property abutting on eaeh.'^ On the other hand, a break or jog in a street does not make the parts thereof distinct streets. A tract of land abutting upon one part of such street may be said to abut on: the entire street and may be assessed, although the improvement is upon the other part of such street.'** The statute or ordinance for assessing abutting property often describes such property as abut- ting on the improvement. Under such a statute or ordinance, only property which abuts upon that part of the street, sewer and the like which is being improved, and for the improvement of which the assessment is levied, can be assessed.^'' Under a stat- ute providing that abutting property is to be assessed for a street improvement, part of a tract which abuts upon a bridge in a street, which bridge is not improved, cannot be assessed.^" How- ever, under such a statute it was held that where a street improve- ment consisted of grading and planking, property abutting on the street as improved by either of these means, might be assessed for the improvement, although some of the land assessed was a thousand feet beyond the termination of the planking.^' In this case, it was suggested as possible that the cost of the grading at that end of the street might have been the most expensive part of the work and that the owner of such land might not there- fore be paying more than a nroportionate share of the cost of such "City of Covington v. Matson,, 14 O. S. 438 [1863]; Northern Indi- (Ky.), 34 S. W. 897, 17 Ky. L. ana Railroad Company v. Connelly, K. 1323 [1896]; Hutchinson v. City 10 0. S. 160 [1859]; Scaville v. City of Pmaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. of Cleveland, 1 0. S. 126 [1853]; 218 [1897]; City of Reading v. O'- (follovired without opinion in Clark Reilly, 169 Pa. St. 386, 32 Atl. 420 v. City of Cleveland, 1 O. S. 139 [1895]. [1853]) ; In the Matter of the Open- "^Willard v. Albertson, 23 Ind. ing of Orkney Street, Appeal of the App. 164, 53 N. E. 1077, 54 N. E. City of Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 425. 403 [1899]. 46 L. R. A. 274, 45 Atl. 314 [1900]; °°City of St. Louis v. Brinckwirth, Fifty-fourth Street, Pittsburg's Ap- 204 Mo. 280, 102 S. W. 1091 [1907]. peal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 " Kuhns v. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. [1894]; Wabash Avenue, 26 Pa. 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]. Super. Ct. 305 [1904]. ^ Cincinnati v. Batsche, 52 0. S. •" Tovra of Salem v. Henderson, 13 324, 27. L. R. A. 536, 40 N. E. 21 Ind. App. 563, 41 N. E. 1062 [1895]. [1895]; Smith v. City of Toledo, 24 "City of Seattle v. Kelleher. 195 0. 'S. 126 [1873]; Creighton v. Scott, U. S. 351, 49 L. 232, 25 S. 44 [1904]. § 621 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1046 improvement. Some statutes or ordinances provide for assess- ing property which abuts upon the line of the street improved. Under such provisions it is not necessary to assess merely the property abutting on that part of the street which is improved. Property abutting on the street beyond the part thereof which is improved, may be assessed."* § 621. Adjoining property. In the exercise of its discretion* the legislature or public cor- poration or officer to whom is given by statute the power to deter- mine what property is benefited in laying out an assessment dis- trict may provide for levying an assessment upon "adjoining" property.^ A district consisting of adjoining land is not looked upon as unduly restricted in boundary.^ A statute authorizing an assessment "upon the property adjoining and to be specially benefited by the improvement" is held to amount to a legislative determination that the property adjoining is specially benefited, and not to mean that the adjoining property is to be assessed only if it is benefited.' The term "adjoining" with reference to property means that such property is in immediate contact with the improvement and not separated therefrom by intervening property.* The term "adjoining" is said to be the equivalent of "fronting."^ Accordingly, under a constitutional provision al- lowing an assessment to be made "upon the property fronting such "McCormick v. City of Omaha, 37 visors of Rock County, 15 Wis. 11 Neb. 829, 56 N. W. 626 [1893J; [1862]. Main Street, Big Run Borough, ^Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 137 Pa. St. 590, 20 Atl. 711 [1890]. Wis. 129, 74 K W. 983 [1898]. ' Johnson v. District of Columbia, ' United States ex rel. Henderson 6 Mackey (D. C.) 21 [1887]; United v. Edmunds, 3 Mackey (D. C.) 142 States ex rel. Henderson v. Edmunds, [1884]. 3 Mackey (D. C.) 142 [1884]; Casey 'Johnson v. District of Columbia, V. City of Leavenworth, 17 Kan. 189 6 Mackey (D. C.) 21 [1887]; In the [1876]; Scott County v. Hinds, 50 Matter of the Petition of Ward to Minn. 204, 52 N. W. 523 [1892]; Vacate Certain Assessments, 52 N. Forry v. Kidge, 56 Mo. App. 615 Y. 395 [1873]. "The word adjoin- [1893]; In the Matter of the Peti- ing in its etymological sense means tion of Ward to Vacate Certain As- touching or contiguous as distin- sessments, 52 N. Y. 395 [1873]; City guished from lying near or adja- Council V. Pinekney, 1 Treadway cent." Hennessy v. Douglas County, (S. C.) 42 [1812]; Sch'intgen v. City 99 Wis. 129, 137, 74 N. W. 983 of La Crosse, 117 Wis. 158, 94 N. [1898]. W. 84 [1903]; Hennessy v. Douglas "Scott County v. Hinds, 50 Minn. County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983 204, 52 N. W. 523 [1892]. [1898]; Jenkins v. Board of Super- 1047 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT, § 621 improvements," a statute providing for assessing "lots and par- eels of land adjoining said sidewalks" has been upheld." The context may, however, show that the word "adjoining" has a meaning different from "fronting."' Thus, under a statute pro- viding that assessments for improvements of streets shall be lev- ied upon "grounds fronting upon or adjoining the improvement," it has been held that the word ' ' fronting ' ' refers to the end of the lot used as the front which touches upon an improvement, while the term "adjoining" refers to a side street which touches the property assessed.* Property separated from an improvement is ordinarily held not to be adjoining thereto." Thus, where a pub- lic square intervened between a lot and a street which was im- proved, it was held that while such lot might be adjacent to such street, it was not adjoining thereto.'" However, where a street ninety-five feet wide was paved in the middle for a width of twenty-five feet leaving room for travel on each side between the pavement and the curb stone, it was held that such improvement adjoined the lots which touched the street as laid out.'' The tracks of a railroad company within a street apd running along the length thereof do not adjoin such street within the meaning of a statute providing for assessing adjoining property.'^ Wheth- er property adjoins a street, is to be determined by the use made thereof at the time of such improvement or assessment, as dis- tinguished from the way in which such property is laid out by th'» lines of a plat, if such tract is in fact occupied and used.'' Thus, where two lots were occupied and used as one, it was held that th- entire tract was adjoining to a street which touched one of such lots.'* On the other hand, if a lot has been divided in fact and is used as two distinct tracts, the one which is separated from the im- provement by the other cannot be regarded as adjoining such 'Scott County v. Hinds, 50 Minn. "Johnson v. District of Columbia 204, 52 N. W. 523 [1892]. 6 Maekey (D. C.) 21 [1887]. ' Collier Estate v. Western Paving " Bowditch v. City of New Haven & Supply Company, 180 Mo. 362, 79 40 Conn. 503 [1873]. S. W. 947 [1904]. "O'Eeilley v. City of Kingston •Collier Estate v. Western Paving 114 N. Y. 439, 21 N. E. 1004 [1889]. & Supply Company, 180 Mo. 362, 79 Brick & Terra Cotta Company v. S. W. 947 [1904]; Meier v. City of Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. "Eomig v. Lafayette, 33 Ind. 30 955 [1903]. [1870]. "In the Matter of the Petition of "Wolfort v. City of St. Louis, 115 Ward to Vacate Certain Assess- Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 [1892]. ments, 52 N. Y. 395 [1873]. §622 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1048 improvement.^' The expression "adjoining the locality to be affected" includes property adjoining the improvement or near thereto, which is affected physically -or the value of which is af- fected commercially by the improvement.^" § 622. Adjacent, property. The legislature, in the exercise of its discretion, or the public corporation or officer authorized by statute to determine what property is benefited by an improvtment and to lay out an assess- ment district therefor, may provide for levying an assessment upon "adjacent" property.^ Assessment districts of this sort are most frequently laid out in assessments for street improvements,^ but may be laid out in assessments for a park,' or a drain.* The "Eomig V. Lafayette, 33 Ind. 30 [1870]. "Little Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]. ' Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 [1871]; Burnett v. Mayor and Common Council of the Ci'/ of Sac- ramento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518 [1859]; Town of Woodruff Place V. Kaschig, 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. B. 990 [1896]; Wormley v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, Iowa, 108 la. 232, 78 N. W. 824 [1899]; Nevin v. Allen, (Ky.), 26 S. W. 180, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 836 [1894]; Municipality Number Two, Praying for the Opening of Benton Street v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]; Walker v. City of Ann Ar- bor, 118 Mich. 251, 76 N. W. 394 [1898]; State of Minnesota ex rel. Merchant v. District Court for St. Louis County, 66 Minn. 161, 68 N. W. 860 [1896]; City of St. Louis v. Speck, 67 Mo. 403 [1878]; Mound City Construction Company v. Mac- gum, 97 Mo. App. 403, 71 S. W. 460 [1902]; Kuhns v. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]; Mc- Cormiek v. City of On-aha, 37 Neb. 829, 56 N. W."626 [1893]; Matter of the City of New York, 190 N. Y. 350, sm5 nomine; In re Water Front in City of New York, 83 N. E. 299 [1907]; (modifyinsf judg- ment, 105 N. Y. S. 750, 120 App. Div. 849); Raymond v.- Cleveland, 42 0. S. 522 [1885]; Meissner v. City of Toledo, 31 0. S. 387 [1877]; St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion County, — Or. , 93 Pac. 231 [1908] • Franklin v. Hancock, 204 Pa. St. 110, 53 Atl. 644 [1902]; State V. Moss, 44 Wash. 91, 86 Pac. 1129 [1906]. ""Town of Woodruff Place v. Ras- chig, 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. E. 990 [1896]; Nevin v. Allen, (Ky.) 15 Ky. Law Rep. 836, 26 S. W. 180 [1894]; Municipality Number Two, Praying for the Opening of Benton Street v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]; Walker v. City of Ann Ar- bor, 118 Mich. 251, 76 N. W. 394 [1898]; City of St. Louis v. Speck, 67 Mo. 403 [1878]; Mound City Construction Company v. Macgurn, 97 Mo. App. 403, 71 S. W. 460 [1902]; Kuhns v. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]; Ray- mond v. Cleveland, 42 0. S. 522 [1885]; Meissner v. City of Toledo, 31 O. S. 387 [1877] ; State v. Moss, 44 Wash. 91, 86 Pac. 1129 [1906]. 'State of Minnesota ex rel. Mer- chant V. District Court for St. Louis County, 66 Minn. 161, 68 N. W. 860 [1896]. * Wormley v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, Iowa, 108 la. 232, 78 N. W. 824 [1899]. 1049 PROPERTY SCBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §622 term "adjacent" as ordinarily used means that the property is near the improvement so as to be affected thereby and so as to enjoy the use thereof, but not necessarily touching such improve- ment.' Accordingly, it is possible that land which is separated from an improvement by intervening land may be adjacent." Thus, where an intervening strip of land two feet in width separ- ated a tract of land from a street, such tract was nevertheless held to be adjacent to such street.^ The context of some stat- utes may make necessary a narrower meaning for the term "ad- jacent."' Thus, under a statute requiring a petition for a ditch to be signed by "a majority of persons resident in the county owning land adjacent to such improvement," it was held that the term adjacent meant abutting on." The term "adjacent" is frequently found in combination with other terms which to a greater or less extent modify its primary meaning. Thus, a pro- vision may be made that an assessment shall be levied on property "abutting on or adjacent" to,'!* or lots and lands that are "con- tiguous and adjacent as well as those that abut,"^^ or "adjacent "Town of Woodruff Place v. Ras- chig, 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. E. 990 [1896]; In the Matter of the Peti- tion of Ward to Vacate Certain As- sessments, 52 N Y. 395 [1873]. "The meaning of these words (i. e. contig- uous and adjacent) especially 'adja- cent' cannot be limited by any abso- lute or fixed measurement, but in each case mu»t be determined by cir- cumstances; yet for all practical pur- poses they may be said to embrace lots and lands 'near to' the improve- ment; and all such when specially benefited are liable to be charsed with the costs and expense." Mei'^sner v. City of Toledo, 31 0. S. 387, 395, 396 [1877]. "Not only the real es- tate abutting on the street but adja- cent real estate may be included in such taxing district and so assessed for the contemnlated work and im- provement. 'Adiacent' signifies, in this cnniection, 'Iving near, close to, or cnnti'nioiia' b"t tint a^tunllv 'tonchin".' The distinction betwpen 'adjacent' and 'adjoining' seems to be that the former implies that the two bodies are not widely separated though they may not actually touch, while 'adjoining' indicates that they are so joined or united that no third body intervenes." Hennessy v. Doug- las County, 99 Wis. 129, 130, 137, 74 N. W. 983 [1898]. " Town of Woodrufl' Place v. Ras- chig, 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. E. 990 [1896]. ' Town of Woodrufl' Place v. Ras- chig, 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. E. 990 [1896]. ' Wormley v. Board of Supervisors of Wright County, Iowa, 108 la. 232, 78 N. W. 824 [1899]. ° Wormley v. Board of Supervisors of Wriorht County, Iowa, 108 la. 232. 78 N. W. 824 [1899]. "Kuhns V. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 183, 75 N. W, 562 [1898]; Mc- Cormick v. City of Omaha, 37 Neb. 829. 56 N. W. 626 [1893]. "Ravrnnnd v. Cleveland, 42 0. S. 522 [1885]; Meissner v. City of To- ledo, 31- 0. S. 387 [1877]. § 623 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1050 to or fronting,"^- or "immediately upon and adjacent to,"^^ or "specially benefited and adjacent,"'* to the improvement for which the assessment is levied. A statute providing for assessing property "adjacent" to an improvement, means, with reference to the im- provement of a street which has been improved in sections, ad- jacent to that part of the street upon which has been done work for which the assessment is levied.^' The legislature may, of course, authorize property adjacent to the street at any part of its length to be assessed for an i^piprovement upon one section thereof.'" By statute, it may be provided that if an improvement is constructed upon one side of a street, the property adjacent to such side shall be assessed for the cost of such improvement.'' In the absence of such specific provision, however, property may be adjacent to an improvement, although the work is done on the side of the street not immediately next to such property.'^ § 623. Contiguous property. The legislature or the public corporation or officer authorized to determine what property is benefited by an improvement and to lay out an assessment district, may provide that such assess- ment district shall consist of property "contiguous" to the im- provement.' Such determination is ordinarily conclusive and cannot be invalidated by showing that property other than that which is contiguous is in fact benefited.- Furthermore, contigu- ous property is not as a matter of law, benefited. If property "Municipality Number Two, Pray- "Marion Trust Co. v. City cf In- ing for the Opening of Benton Street dianapolia, 37 Ind. App. 672, 706, 75 V. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 [1854]. X. E. 834, 836 [1905]. "Town of Woodruff Place v. Eas- ' Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, clii-i-. 147 Ind. 517, 46 N. E. 990 66 N. E. 332 [1903]; West Chicago [1896]. Park Commissioners v. Farber, 171 "Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. III. 146, 49 N. E. 427 [1898]; Davis 497 [1871]; St. Louis v. Speck, 67 v. City of Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 21 Mo. 403 [1878]; Meissner v. City of L. R. A. 563, 33 N. E. 888 [1893]; Toledo, 31 0. S. 387 [1877]. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy " Clapton V. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. Railroad Company v. City of Quincv. 117 [1892]. 136 111. 563, 29 Am. St. Rep. 334, 27 '"Kuhns V. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. N; E. 192 [1892]; Lake v. City of 183, 75 N. W. 562 [1898]; McCor- Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879]; Mleiss- mick V. City of Omaha, 37 Neb. 829, ner v. City of Toledo, 31 0. S. 387 56 N. W. 626 [1893]. [1877]; Raymond v. Cleveland, 42 0. "Marion Trust Co. v. City of In- S. 522 [1885]. dianapolis, 37 Ind. App. 672, 706, 37 =Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. Ind. App. 706, 75 N. E. 834, 836 596 [1879]. [1905]. 1051 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 623 is omitted from assessments, the mere fact that it is contiguous does not show that it is benefited and therefore is improperly- omitted.^ If by statute it is necessary at the time that the ordin- ance provided for an improvement is adopted to assess "contigu- ous property benefited" but before the assessment is made, the statute is amended by omitting the word "contiguous," it is pro- per to assess any property benefited though not contiguous.* The term "contiguous" is generally used in statutes in its popular meaning, which is said to be "in actual or close contact," "touch- ing" or "near."'' It seems to be regarded in some cases as equi- valent to "abutting" or "bounding."" In other eases the term "contiguous" has been regarded as equivalent to "near."' Land separated from an improvement by an intervening strip of land over which the owner of the tract in question has no easement and which is not subject to a public easement is not contiguous thereto.' If a lot as originally platted touched the line of a street but in its subsequent use it has been divided into two lots, one of which is separated from such street by the other, the tract thus separated from such street is not contiguous thereto." If the intervening strip of land is subject to a public easement, its ex- istence does not prevent the property separated from the street thereby from being contiguous to a street.^" Thus, property sep- arated from a street by a strip of ground used for a sidewalk is contiguous to the street." Property lying at the end of a street which is to be improved may, if contiguous thereto, be assessed under a statute providing for the assessment of contiguous prop- erty.^^ Under the provision of the Illinois constitution authoriz- 'Holdom V. City of Chicago, 169 ' Meissncr v. City of Toledo, 31 0. 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897] ; Chi- S. 387 [1877]. cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway » Langlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, Company v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 66 N. E. 332. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]. " Langlois v. Cameron, 201 III. 301, •In the Matter of VVestlake Ave- 66 N. E. 332 [1903]. nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. "Chicago, Burlington & Quincy •279 [1905]. Railroad Company v. City of Quincy, 'County of Adams v. City of Quin- 136 111. 583, 29 Am. St. Rep. 334, 27 cy, 130 111. 566, 6 L. R. A. 155, 22 N. E. 192 [1892]. N. E. 624 [1890]. "Chicago, Burlington & Quincy « "The word 'contiguous' as used in Railroad Company v. City of Quincy, the statute and foregoing ordinance 136 111. 563, 29 Am. St. Rep. 334, 27 means 'in actual or close contact,' X. E. 192 [1892]. 'touchin"',' 'adjacent' or 'near.'" "Brooks v. City of Chicago, 168 Langlois" V. Cameron, 201 111. 301, Til. 60, 48 N. E. 136 [1897]. 306, 66 N. E. 332 [1903]. § 623 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 1052 ing public improvements to be made by general taxation, special assessment or special taxation of contiguous property, the term "contiguous property" refers only to special taxation.^* Ac- cordingly, a special assessment based on the theory of benefits may be levied on property benefited whether contiguous or not.^* On the other 'hand, in the exercise of the city's discretion a special assessment may be levied upon contiguous property only.^^ The fast that an ordinance confines an assessment to abutting or con- tiguous property is not conclusive*that the charge is a special tax. It may also be a special assessment.^" A right of way of a railroad which touches an improvement may be regarded as con- tiguous thereto.^' A railroad situated in a street and running along the length thereof has been held to be contiguous to such street, within the meaning of constitutional and statutory provi- sions authorizing assessment or special taxation of contiguous property.'^ A different result may be reached if other terms are combined in the term statute or ordinance with the word "contig- uous." Thus, a statute authorizing assessments or special taxes upon "contiguous property abutting" upon the street or avenue improved, does not authorize an assessment upon the right of way of a railway company in a street on the theory that a street or avenue cannot be said to abut on itself and accordingly an in- corporeal right in such street cannot be said to abut." While con- tiguous it does not front on the improvement, and cannot be assess- ■° Guild, Jr., V. City of Chicago, " Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 82 111. 472 [1876]. Railway Company v. City of Moline, " Farr V. West Chicago Park Com- 158 111. 64, 41 N. E. 877- [1895]; missioners, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 893 Freeport Street Railway Company v. [1897]; Guild, Jr. v. City of Chi. City of Freeport, 151 111. 451, 38 X. cago, 82 111. 472 [1876]. ■ E. 137 [1894]; Kuehner v. City of '"Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. Freeport, 143 111. 92, 17 L. R. A. 774, 596 [1879]. 32 N. E. 372 [1893]; The Jaekson- '" Bass V. South Park Commission- ville Railway Company v. City of ers, 171 111. 370, 49 N. E. 549 [1898]. Jacksonville, 114 111. 562, 2 N. E. "Palmer v. City of Danville, 166 478 [1886]. 111. 42, 46 N. E. 629 [1897]; Chicago '"South Park Commissioners v. & Northwestern Railway Company v. The Chicago, Burlington & Qiiincv Village of Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 Railroad Company, 107 111. 103 N. E. 437 [1897]; Illinois Central [1883]. (The result reached in this Railroad Company v. Citv of Fan- ease depends primarily upon the use kakee, 164 111. 608, 45 N. E. 971 and meanin City of Kansas City v. Gibson, P.F.Smith) 81 [1871]. 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]; '" Fifty-fourth Street, Pittsburg's Dexter v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 3D Atl. 503 247, 79 Am. St. Rep. 306, 57 N. E. 379 [1894]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- [1900]; City of Scranton v. Levers, ber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 200 Pa. St. 56, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]. 123 [1893]; Chestnut Avenue, 68 Pa. 'City of Kansas City v. Gibson, St. (18 P. F. Smith) 81 [1871]. 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [1903]. =» Morewood Avenue, Chamber's 'City of Napa v. Easterby, 61 Cal. Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. 123 509 [1882]; City of New Orleans v. [1893]. Elliott, 10 La. Ann. 59 [1855]; ^Scoville V. City of Cleveland, 1 O'Leary v. Sloo, 7 La. Ann. 25 [1852]. 0. S. 126 [1853]; (followed without In the Matter of the Application of opinion in Clark v. City of Cleveland, the Board of Street Opening and Im- 1 0. S. 139). provement of the City of New York '^ Little Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 to Acquire Title to Forest Avenue, Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]. 64 Hun. (N. Y.) 59, 18 N. Y. Supp. '» Little Rock v. Katzenstein, 52 727 [1892]. Ark. 107, 12 S. W. 198 [1889]. 1063 PBOPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 627 which an improvement passes is to be assessed therefor.* Under such statute a tract of land was separated from a street by a nar- row strip a few inches in width. It was held that the action of the lower covrt in excepting such property from assessment was not reviewable." Assessments are sometimes found in which the prop- erty assessed is described as on the line of the improvement." Such a method of describing an assessment district seems to be re- garded as proper. Such statute is a valid exercise of the power of assessment and amoiints to an adjudication that real property on the line of the improvement is benefited thereby.'' A statute requiring an assessment to be made against the owners of land on the line of the street, does not restrict such assessment district to land touching the part of the street for the improvement of which the assessment is levied.' While a statute providing for assessing property on the line of the street opposite the improve- ment has been held to be invalid, it was not from any considera- tion of the propriety of the assessment district, but because the statute did not in any way restrict the amount of the assessment to the benefits conferred." The term ' ' on the line of the improve- ment" is substantially synonymous with abutting.^" Property not on the line of the improvement cannot be assessed under such statute.^^ Under some statutes it is provided that the assess- ment district shall consist of the lots and lands upon the street to be improved.^^ Under such statute only the lots bounded by the lines of the street to be improved can be assessed." Lots 'In re Opening of Park Avenue, [1876]; (reversing Bogert v. City Huidekoper'B Appeal, 83 Pa. St. (2 of Elizabeth, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Norris) 167 [1876]. Green) 426 [1874]). ■/« re Opening of Park Avenue, "In re Grafius Run, 218 Pa. St. Huidekoper'B Appeal, 83 Pa. St. (2 632, 67 Atl. 982 [1907]; Fifty-fourth Norris) 167 [1876]. Street, Pittsburg's Appeal, 165 Pa. "Smith V. Mayor and Aldermen of St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 [1894]. Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. K. "Fifty-fourth Street, Pittsburg's A. 728, 65 N. E. 40 [1902]; Butler Appeal, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503 V. City of Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 [1894]; Morewood Avenue, Cham- [1873]; Chestnut Avenue, 68 Pa. St. ber's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 20, 28 Atl. (18 P. P. Smith) 81 [1871]. 123 [1893]. ' Smith V. Mayor and Aldermen of " Wilbur v. City of Springfield, 123 Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. R. A. 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889] ; City 728, 65 N. E. 40 [1902]. of Schenectady v. Trustees of Union "Chestnut Avenue, 68 Pa. St. (18 Collese, 144 N. Y. 241, 26 L. P A. P. F. Smith) 81 [1871]. 614. 39 N. E. 67 [1894]. » Bogert V. City of Elizabeth, 27 " Wilbur v. City of Sprinsfleld, 123 N. J. Eq. (12 C. E. Green) 568 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]. § 628 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1064 back of the lots abutting upon the street cannot be assessed under such statute, even if benefited by the improvement.^* Under a statute providing for assessing the. lots and buildings lying upon a street in which the public had an easement, the ultimate fee be- ing in the original owner could not be assessed.^^ This decision, however, turns upon the proposition that such land is not a ' ' lot, ' ' rather than. upon the construction of the term "lying upon." § 628. Assessment district consisting of blocks or parts of blocks. Under some statutes it is provided that the assessment district shall consist of the squares or parts thereof which adjoin the improvement.^ This has been held a proper method of laying off assessment districts, both in assessments for streets,^ and in assessments for wells and- cisterns.^ Statutes in Kentucky pro- vide that streets shall be improved at the cost of the owners of lots in each fourth of a square.* This method of determining what property is benefited and is hence subject to assessment, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.^ Within the meaning of such a statute a square is a subdivision bounded on all sides by principal streets." While it may be possible that a tract of land surrounded on all sides by principal streets is so large that it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend to treat such " Wilbur V. City of Springfield, 123 Ky. 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. 111. 395, 14 N. E. 871 [1889]. Rep. 2368 [1903]; City of Louisville " City of Schenectady v. Trustees v. Selvage, 106 Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, of Union College, 144 N. Y. 241, 26 52 S. W. 809 [1899]; Gleason v. Bar- L. E. A. 614, 39 N." E. 67 [1894]. nett, 106 Ky. 125, 50 S. W. 67 ^City of Louisville v. Osborne, 73 [1899]; Washle v. Nehan, 97 Ky. Ky (10 Bush.) 226 [1874]; City of 351, 41 S. W. 1040 [1895]; Nevin v. Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 39 Roach, 86 Ey. 492, 5 S. W. 546 Ky. (9 Dana) 513, 85 Am. Dec. 159 [1887]; Caldwell v. Rupert, 73 Ky. [1840]. (10 Bush.) 179 [1873]. ^City of Lexington v. McQuillan's "Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513, 35 Am. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 Dec. 159 [1840]. U. S. 430, 25 S. 466 [1905]; (affirm- = City of Louisville v. Osborne, 73 ing 76 S. W. 1097, 25 Ky. L. R Ky. (10 Bush.) 226 [1874]. So as to 1024). the cost of intersections. Parker v. " City of Louisville v. American Reay, 76 Cat. 103, 18 Pae. 124 Standard Asphalt Co., — Ky. , [1888]. 102 S. W. 806 [1907]; Pfafflnger v. 'Holt V. Figg, — Ky. , 94 S. Kremer, 115 Ky. 498, 74 S. W 238 W. 34, 29 Kv. L. Rep. 613 [1906]; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2368 [1903]; 'cald- Specht V. Barber Asphalt Paving well v. Runert, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) Company, — Ky. , 80 S. W. 179 [1873]; Broadway Baptist 1106, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 103 Church v. Me4,tee, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) [1904]; Pfaffinger v. Kremer, 115 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480 [1871]. 1Q65 PROPERTy SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 628 subdivision of territory as a square within the meaning of such statute, the mere fact that a square is materially larger than the usual squares of the city does not withdraw it from the operation of the statute.' It has been said, however, that, while the fore- going meaning of the term "square" is its ordinary meaning, it is not of universal application, but that each ease must be deter- mined by its own peculiar facts, and that one of the controlling considerations is that the property benefited by the improvement should bear the expense.^ In doubtful cases the court has some discretion in determining what a square is.' A tract of land which was the size of two ordinary city squares, which was sur- rounded by streets and opposite the middle of which on either side a street had been opened but did not extend through the large tract in question was treated as consisting of two squares by re- garding such street as opened so as to extend through such traet.^' Where it is shown that cross streets on the north side of the street improved were not extended to intersect the streets on the south side, because of the existence of an intervening right of way, such cross streets will be regarded as extended for the purpose of the assessment.^' A tract of land which is bounded on three sides by streets, and on the fourth side of which is a street which extends part way across such tract, but which does not connect with the other street so as to complete the enclosure, there being a gap of over two hundred feet where no street exists, is regarded as a square.^^ Where a tract of land is bounded Jjy principal streets which do not meet at right angles so that the enclosed tract is not a right angled parallelogram, the quarter square which is to be the assessment district is to be determined by ascertaining what is one quarter of the entire area of the square.^^ Under such a ' Cooper V. Xevin, 90 Ky. 85, 13 " SpeeJit v. Barber Asphalt Paving S. W. 841 [1890]; Nevin v. Roach, Company, — Ky. , 80 S. W. 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]; • 1106, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 193 [1904]. See also Watson v. Ifevin, 86 Ky. "Holt v. Figg, — Ky. , 94 495, 5 S. W. 546, where the court S. W. 34, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 613 [1906]. treated a tract of land seven hundred (The land which would be covered and forty feet deep as an undivided by the street were the street extend- gquar 6(1 should be excluded from the as- "Dumesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, assessment district.) 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]. "R. B. Park & Co. v. Cane, — •Dumesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, Ky. , 73 S. W. 1121, 24 Ky. Law 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]. Rep. 2294 [1903]. "Dumesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]. § 628 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 1066 statute, land is not within the assessment district unless the fourth of the square in which it lies is contiguous to the improvement.^* It is the location of the fourths of the squares and not the loca- tion of the lots assessed which determines whether property is sub- ject to assessment or nof Under such statute, it is not neces- sary that the property to be assesed should abut upon the im- provement.^* A lot within a square contiguous to the improve- ment may be assessed although such lot does not itself abut upon the improvement,^^ or although t^ improvement extends along only a part of its face." However, it has been held that a pro- vision in an ordinance which provides for assessing the property fronting the street does not render the entire ordinance invalid since the statute will control as to the apportionment.^' Such a statute is not applicable to territory which is not divided into squares.^" In the absence of some specific provision as to assess- ing territory not divided into squares it cannot, under such stat- ute, be assessed, by regarding it as divided into squares although it is not in fact so divided.^^ It is provided by statute that if property is not divided into squares the council is to fix the depth to which the property is benefited and is to be assessed.^'' Under such prot^ision in connection with the preceding provi- sions, the council has no power in fixing such depth to fix a depth which will cross another street." Under such statutes an assess- ment may be invalid because, owing to the fact that the property on one side of an improved street' is divided into blocks and on the other side is not so divided, gross inequality in assessments is thus produced.^* In such case the assessment should be equalized "Washle v.. Nehan, 97 Ky. 351, 71 S. W. 332, 24 Ky. L. R. 1193 41 S. W. 1040 [1895]. [1902]; Caldwell v. Rupert, 73 Ky. "Washle v. Nehan, 97 Ky. 351, 41 (10 Bush.) 179 [1873]. S. W. 1040 [1895]. =^ Button v. Kremer, 114 Ky. 463, "Pfaffinger v. Kremer, 115 Ky. 71 S. W. 332, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1193 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. R. 2368 " [1902]; Caldwell v. Rupert, 93 Ky. [1903]. (10 Bush.) 179 [1873]. "Pfaffinger v. Kremer, 115 Ky. ^Gleason v. Barnett, 106 Ky. 125, 498, 74 S. W. 238, 24 Ky. L. R. 2368 50 S. W. 67 [1899]. See §§ 609, 629. [1903]. == Louisville Ry. Co. v. Southwest- "« Boone v. Nevine, — Ky. ^ — , ern Alcatraz Asphalt & Construction 23 S. W. 512, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 547 Co., — Ky. , 74 S. W. 237, 24 [1893]. Ky. Law Rep. 2380 [1903]. " Fox V. Middlesborough Town " City of Louisville v. Selvage, 106 Company, 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776 Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 [1894]. [1899]; Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. =" Button V. Kremer, 114 Ky. 463, (12 Bush.) 570 [1877]. 1067 PEOPEETY SnBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 628 by fixing the depth of the assessment district so as to include territory of equal depth on both sides of the street.^" Inequality, resulting from different sizes of squares, where the adjoining land is all divided into squares does not, however, invalidate the assess- ment.^" Since these statutes are to be construed so that the cost of an improvement will be assessed upon property benefited there- by as far as this can be done in compliance with the terms of the statute,^' an alley which is situated entirely in one-fourth of a square and which benefits only property situated in that one- fourth must be paid for by assessments upon that fourth alone.-" There is, however, no arbitrary rule that an alley lying exclusive- ly in two quarters of a square must be paid for by an assessment upon those two quarters alone.'"' If an alley is situated in a square, eighty feet on one side of the middle line thereof, but the lots in such square are so laid out that all of them touch the alley at the edge, it is proper to assess all .the lots in such square.*" If an alley lies entirely in two quarters of a square and the lots in the other two quarters do not touch such alley, it is proper to assess the cost of such alley upon the two quarters through which it runs.*^ If an alley divides two quarters of a square from each other and extends a short distance into the other two quarters, it has been held proper to assess the cost of that part of the alley ex- tending into such other two quarters upon siich two quarters, while the rest of the cost of such alley should be assessed upon the two quarters between which the rest of such length runs.*^ A right of way fifty feet wide had been improved as a highway and buildings had been erected fronting upon it. It was held that although not formally dedicated, it was a public street and not an internal improvement, and hence that it was not neces- sary to charge its cost on the entire square.^' Such street did not "^City of Louisville v. American " Dumesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, Standard Asphalt Co., — Ky. , 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]. 102 S. W. 806 [1907]. ""Schmelz v. Giles, 75 Ky. (12 "■Cooper V. Nevin, 90 Ky. 85, 13 Bush.) 491 [1877]. S. W. 841 [1890]; Nevin v. Roach, "Wagner v. Gast, — Ky. , 71 86 Ky. 492, 5 S. W. 546 [1887]; Ba- S. W. 533, 24 Ky. L. E. 1401 [1903]. ker V. Selvage, 7 Ky. L. R. 838. '^Wagner v. Gast, — Ky. , 71 "Dumesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, S. W. 533, 24 Ky. L. R. 1401 30 S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895]. [1903]. =»Washle v. Nehan, 97 Ky. 351, 41 »' Steinacker v. G^st, — Ky. , S. W. 1040 [1895]; (cited in Du- 89 S. W. 481, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 573 mesnil v. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, 30 [1905]. S. W. 654, 31 S. W. 864 [1895] as a manuscript opinion). § 628 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1068 ran through the block but terminated in an alley. It was held that the land on either side could not be regarded as divided into blocks by such street, and it was accordingly proper for the city to charge the cost of improving such street upon the property ly- ing north and south of it to the points midway to the next streets.'* If property is not divided into squares but is assessed as if it were so divided and the amount of such assessment is less than it would be if assessed properly, the owner of such land cannot complain.'" So, if the council has fixed the depth of the property to be assessed and such action is erroneous because the assessment should have been levied upon the adjacent quarter squares, yet if the depth is so fixed as to assess the quarter squares in point of fact though not by that description, the property owners cannot complain.'" Such statute if made applicable only to streets is not applicable to curbing, which, in this jurisdiction is regarded as part of the sidewalk, and non-abutting property cannot therefore be assessed therefor."^ By statute it may be provided that for certain im- provements only the blocks opposite which the street is improved are to be assessed.'* Under this statute, an improvement may stop in the middle of the block and the assessment district may end there.'" Under such statutes it is erroneous to limit the assessment for other kinds of improvements to the blocks opposite which the improvement has been constructed. Thus, under a stat- ute which provides that the cost of street openings where no buildings are to be taken, is to be assessed upon the blocks op- posite the part of the street opened, it is' error so to restrict the assessment if buildings are taken.*" On the other hand, if build- ings are taken it is error to assess more than a proportionate part of the cost of the buildings taken upon the property beyond the block opposite which the street is opened.*^ Under a group of fi"^ilar s'^atntps, it is provided that land may be assessed on either '"Steinacker v. Gast, — Ky. , which modified 52 S. W. 1117, 21 Ky. 89 S. W. 481, 28 Ky. Law Eep. 573 L. R. 712). [1905]. ''Digging v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, ""McHenry v. Selvage, 99 Ky. 232, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]. 35 S. W. 645 [1896]. »» Breevort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322 ""Zender v. Barber Asphalt Pav- [1872]. ing Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2279, 74 " In the Matter of Board of Street S. W. 201 [19031. Opening, 74 Hun. 561, 26 N. Y. Supp. "Marshall v. Barber Asphalt Pav- 855 [1893]. ing Co., — (Ky.) . 66 S. W. « In the Matter of the Board of 734, 23 Ky. L. R. 1971 [1902]; (sub- Street Opening, 64 Hun. 59, 18 N. stitute for opinion in 66 S. W. 182, Y. Supp. 727 [1892]. 1069 PEOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §628 side of the improvement back to the center of the block on eithe.* side thereof, or, which is substantially the same thing, half way back to the next street on either side of such improvement. This is held to be a proper way of laying out and describing an assess- ment district.*^ The land on either side of the improvement up to the lines thus described constitutes the assessment district.^^ While it has been said that a block is any portion of the city en- tirely enclosed by streets,** the same court has subsequently held that land can be called a "block" even when surrounded by streets only when it is platted into lots.*^ Under a statute providing that the land on either side of a street to the center of a block is to be assessed, land within such distance is to be assessed whether it abuts on the improvement or not.*" Under a statute providing for assessing platted lots which front on the improvement and for assessing unplatted land to the midway line between the street im- proved and the next parallel street, the whole of a platted lot fronting on the street improved may be assessed, although it ex- tends beyond such midway line.*^ On the other hand, if ground is platted into lots, the fact that the owner has used a number of such lots as an entire tract does not justify the assessment on any lots except those that front upon the street improved where they ^'Olsson V. City of Topeka, 42 "A block is a portion of platted Kan. 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; Blair ground in a city surrounded by V. City of Atchison, 40 Kan. 353, 19 streets, and the term is not ordina- Pae. 815 [1888]; City of Ottawa rily applied to a tract of unplatted V. Barney, 10 Kan. 270 [1872]; land." MoGrew v. City of Kansas State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Paving City, 64 Kan. 61, 63, 67 Pac. 438 Company v. City of St. Louis, 183 [1902]. "In the absence of any- Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]; thing showing a contrary intent, the Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. ordinary signification should be given .301. 79 S. W. 955 [19031: Citv of to terms employed in the statutes Spokane v. Security Sav. Society, — and according to this interpretation Wash. , 89 Pac. 466 [1907]; Felt 'lots' and 'blocks' a:s used in the V. City of Ballard, 38 Wash. 300, 80 statute in question must be regarded Pac. 532 [1905]. as the subdivisions ordinarily made *^01sson V. City of Topeka, 42 in plattine." McGrew v. City of Kan. 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; Blair Kansas City, 64 Kan. 61, 64, 67 V. City of Atchison, 40 Kan. 353, 19 Pac. 438 [1902]. Pac. 815 [1888]. "Olsson v. City of Topeka, 42 Kan. "Blair v. City of Atchison, 40 709, 21 Pac. 219 [1889]; City of Kan. 353, 19 Pao. 815 [1888]; City Ottawa v. Barney, 10 Kan.- 270 of Ottawa V. Barney, 10 Kan. 270 [1872]. [1872]. "State ex rel. Barber Asphalt *' McGrew v. City of Kansas Oity, Paving Company v. City of St. Louis, 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]. 183 Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]. § 628 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT, 1070 extend back to the midway line.*' If property is not platted into lots, it is not to be regarded as an entire tract fronting or adjoin- ing the street improved, but it can only be assessed back to the midway line between the street improved and the next street.** Under such statute the assessment district cannot be extended to the next street.^" A private way, the title to which is in cer- tain trustees for the abutting property owners is not a street with- in the meaning of such statutes, though it has been used by the public as a street for over ten years," and accordingly the area to be assessed may extend beyond such private way."" Under a statute providing that property fronting on the street improved should, if platted into blocks, be assessed back to the center of the blocks, it was held that a triangular corner lot which touched the improvement only at the apex of the lot and was entirely or al- most entirely outside of a line drawn at right angles to the part of the street improved, was nevertheless. subject to the assessment, since it lay between the street improved and the center of a block which abutted thereon. °^ Some statutes provide for assessing property up to the next street adjacent to the improvement.'* Land between which and the improvement there is a street, can- not be assessed under such statute. '^ Under a statute providing for assessing land back to the next adjoiiiing street, land may be assessed, although an alley lies between it and the improvement.'* Thus, under a statute providing that half the cost of street and alley intersections shall be apportioned upon the lots abutting upon the intersecting streets or alleys to the first street parallel to the street or alley improved, land which abuts upon an alley " State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Louis Shovel Co., — Mo. App. , Paving Company v. City of St. Louis, 110 S. W. 86 [1908]. 183 Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]. ■* Collier's Estate v. Western Pav- *° State ex rel. Barber Asphalt ing and Supply Company, 180 Mo. Paving Company v. City of St. Louis, 362, 79 S. W. 947 [1904]. 183 Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]; "^Collier's Estate v. Western Pav- Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. ing and Supply Company, 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]. 362, 79 S. W. 947 [1904]. ■» Collier Estate v. Western Paving " Felt v. City of Ballard, 38 and Supply Company, 180 Mo. 362, Wash. 300, 80 Pae. 532 [1905]. 79 S. W. 947 [1904]. If the next "In the Matter of the Petition of street is at different distances from Van Buren, 79 N. Y. 384 [1880]. the street improved at different ™ In the Matter of the Petition of places, the assessment district is nee- Van Buren, 79 N. Y. 384 [1880]. essarily of different widths. Fruin- "Praieg v. Western Pavin? anrl Bambrick Construction Co. v. St. Supply Companv, 143 Ind. 358, 42 N. E. 750 [1895]. 1071 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. 629 which intersects a street improved, which land is located between such street and the next parallel street may be assessed, although between such land and the street improved is a cross alley, which is wide enough to be recognized in some states as a street.^' § 629. Assessment district consisting of land within certain dis- tance of improvement. Under some statutes it may be provided that land is to be assess- ed if within a certain number of feet of the improvement for which the asssesment is levied.^ In assessments or special taxes for county roads it is often provided that land within a certain dis- tance of the road is to be assessed for the cost thereof.^ What this distance shall be, depends largely upon the discretion of the legislature. It may be two miles,' a mile and one-half,* or one "Praigg V. Western Paving and Supply Company, 143 Ind. 358, 42 N. E. 750 [1895]. [This case arose concerning a street improvement in Indianapolis where, the Supreme Court said with an outburst of local pride, "The wide streets, avenues and even the universal wide alleys are the pride of the whole state."] "^City of Frankfort v. State ex rel. Eoss, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 [1891]; Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289, 20 N. E. 797 [1888]; Ray V. City of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567 [1883]; Rawson v. City of Des Moines, 133 la. 514, 110 N. W. 918 [1907]; McGrew v. City of Kansas City, 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]; Power V. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]; Asphalt Granitoid Const. Co. v. Hauessler, 201 Mo. 400, 100 S. W. 14 [1907]; (affirming. Asphalt & Granitoid Const. Co. V. Hauessler, — Mo. App. , 80 S. W. 5 [1904]) ; Wolfortv. City of St. Louis, 115 Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 [18921; Stifel v. Brown, 24 Mo. App. 102 [1887]; State ex rel. V. Hoffman, 35 0. S. 435 [1880] ; Coates V. Village of Norwood, 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]; St. Bene- dict's Abhey v. Marion County, — Or. , 93 Pao. 231 [1908]. 'Bowen v.' Hester, 143 Ind. 5U, 41 N. E. 330 [1895]; Greencastle and Bowling Green Turnpike Com- pany V. Albin, 34 Ind. 554 [1870]; Robbins v. Sand Creek Turnpike Company, 34 Ind. 461 [1870]; New Haven and Fort Wayne Turnpike Company v. Bird, 33 Ind. 325 [1870]; Hardwick v. Danville and North Sa- lem Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 321 [1870]; Turner v. Thornton and Mechanicsburg Gravel Road Com- pany, 33 Ind. 317 [1870]; State on the relation of Lingenfelter v. Dan- ville and North Salem Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 133 [1870]; Cor- nell V. Commissioners of Franklin County, 67 0. S. 335, 65 N. E. 998 [1902]; Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 O. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 [1890]; Commissioners of Putnam County v. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880]; Lear v. Halstead, 41 0. S. 566 [1885]. »Spaulding v. Mott, 167 Ind. 58, 76 N. E. 620 [1906]; Bowen v. Hes- ter, 143 Ind. 511, 41 N. E. 330 [1895]; St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion County, — Or. , 93 Pac. 231 [1908]. •New Haven and Fort Wayne Turnpike Company v. Bird, 33 Ind. 325 [1870]; Turner v. Thornton and Mechanicsburg Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 317 [1870]. §629 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1072 mile.' Under a statute providing for taxing land "within one mile on each side of the road," land within a radius of one mile from the end of the road or beyond the termination of such road cannot be taxed.* Under such statutes, all the land within the prescribed area must be taxed.^ Land within the limits of a mun- icipal corporation,^ such as a village," may be taxed for such road if within the prescribed distance. Under such statutes it is oecar sionally provided that if another rq^d runs on either side of the proposed road, the assessment district is to extend half way from the proposed road to such other road.^' Thus, where the assess- ment district is to be one mile on either side of the proposed road, the boundaries to such district are to be reduced in case another road runs substantially parallel to the proposed road within two miles thereof.''^ This exception does not, however, exist where a road crosses the proposed road but is not connected with it and does not run in a course substantially parallel to it.^^ It has been held that the legislature does not abuse its discretion in finding that a district within three hundred feet of the improvement is benefited and that such assessment district is not too small.^' Pro- vision is made for the adjustment of the assessment in land in- cluded within two overlapping districts.^* To what distance from the improvement the assessment district may extend has been determined variously by different legislatures, assessment dis- tricts extending three hundred feet,^' one hundred and fifty 'Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 0. S. emson v. Kauffman, 35 0. S. 444 235,' 24 N. B. 488 [1890]; iear v. [1880]. Halstead, 41 0. S. 566 [1885]. '"Cornell v. Commissioners of °Lear v. Halstead, 41 0. S. 566 Franklin County, 67 0. S. 335, 65 [1885]. N. E. 998 [1902] ; Carlisle v. Hether- ' ' Greencastle and Bowling Green ington, 47 0. S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 Turnpike Company v. Albin, 34 Ind. [1890]. 554 [1870]; Robbins v. Sand Creek "Carlisle v. Hetherington, 47 0. Turnpike Company, 34 Ind. 461 S. 235, 24 N. E. 488 [1890]. [1870]; New Haven and Fort Wayne "Cornell v. Commissioners of Turnpike Company v. Bird, 33 Ind. Franklin County, 67 0. S. 335,-65 N. 325 [1870]; Hardwiek v. Danville E. 998 [1895]. and North Salem Gravel Road Com- "Power v. City of Detroit, 13!) pany, 33 Ind. 321 [1870]; Turner Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]. V. Thornton and Mechanicsburg " St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 317 County, — Or. , 93 Pac. 231 [1870]. [1908]; (adjustment to be made by ' Commissioners of Putnam County the county court. ) . v. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880]. '"MeGrew v. City of Kansas City, , ° Commissioners of Putnam County 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]; V. Young, 36 0. S. 288 [1880]; Mak- Power v. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 30, 102 N. W. 288 [1905]. , 1073 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 629 feet,^° one hundred feet," and fifty feet," from the im- provement having been held to be valid. In some cases it is left for the council to fix the depth to which the land shall be subject to assessment.^" Under the statutes of Kentucky authorizing the council to fix the depth to which prop- erty may be assessed where the land is not divided into blocks by principal streets, it has been held that council cannot fix such a depth as will extend the assessment district across a principal street.^" Where the land on one side of the improvement is di- vided into blocks and on the other side is not, the inequality caused by fixing the depth to which the land is to be assessed may invalidate the assessment. ^^ Under such statutes land cannot be assessed to a greater depth on one side of the improvement than on the other.^^ If the assessment district is made to extend to a greater distance on one side than on the other it is said that such irregularity does not avoid the entire assessment but that it is invalid as to the excess distance included on the one side.^^ If by statute the council is to fix the depth of the land to be assess- ed not more than one hundred fifty, nor- less than twenty feet, such provision does not exempt land less than twenty feet in "Eawson v. City of Des Moines, 61 S. W. 474 [1901]; City of Louia- 133 la. 514, 110 N. W. 918 [1907]; ville v. Selvage, 106 Ky. 730, 51 S. City of Frankfort v. State ex rel. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 [1899]; Glea Ross, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 son v. Barnett, 106 Ky. 125, 50 S. [1891]; Asphalt & Granitoid Const. W. 67 [1899]; Loeser v. Redd & Co. V. H:auessler, 201 Mo. 400, 100 Bro., 77 Ky. (14 Bush.) 18 [1878]; S. W. 14' [1907]; (affirming. Asphalt Kohler Brick Co. v. City of Toledo, & Granitoid Const. Co. v. Haues- 29 Ohio C. C. 599 [1907]. gler, — Mo. App. , 80 S. W. 5 ^Louisville Ry. Co. v. Southwest- [1904]); Wolfort v. City of St. ern Alcatraz Asphalt & Construction Louis, 115 Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 Co., — Ky. , 73 S. W. 237, 24 [1892]; Stifel v. Brown, 24 Mo. App. Ky. Law Rep. 2380 [1903]; Fidelitv 102 [1887]; Coates v. Village of Trust and Safety Vault Company v. Norwood, 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]. Voris' Executors, 110 Ky. 315, 61 S. "State ex rel. v. Hoffman, 35 0. W. 474 [1901]. S. 435 [1880]. "^City of Louisville v. Selvage, 106 "Nildaus v. Conlding, 118 Ind. Ky. 730, 51 S. W. 447, 52 S. W. 809 289, 20 N. E. 797 [1888]; Ray v. [1899]; Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. City of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567 (12 Bush.) 570 [1877]. [1883]. ^^ Loeser v. Redd & Bro., 77 Ky. "Louisville Ry. Co. v. Southwest- (14 Bush.) 18 [1878]; Preston v. ern Alcatraz Asphalt & Construe- Roberts, 75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 570 tion Co., — Ky. , 74 S. W. 237, [1877]. 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2380 [1903]; Fi- ^Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. (12 delity Trust and Safety Vault Com- Bush.) 570 [1877].. pany v. Voris, Exrs., 110 Ky. 315, § 629 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1074 depth.''* Statutes restricting the depth to which property can be assessed often apply only to unplatted land.^^ Under such a stat- ute a highway cannot be assessed, nor can land separated from the improvement by a highway, be assessed."" The provision re- stricting the depth to which land may be assessed is often inserted for the purpose of determining whether the assess- ment exceeds the percentage of the value of the property assessed to which it is restricted by statute."' Under such statutes the value is to be calculated only to the specified depth."' It may be provided that land abutting upon the improvement is to be assessed to a certain depth; and that, if this is insuificient, back lying land to a certain depth fur- ther may be assessed."' The fact that the owners of the land abutting on the improvement have signed a waiver of irregulari- ties and have promised to pay the assessment does not relieve the owners of the back lying land from assessment.^" By statute it is sometimes provided that unplatted property is to be assessed to the average depth of lots in the neighborhood,^^ or to the average depth to which assessments on subdivided lots are levied.^" Un- der such statutes an assessment cannot be levied beyond such depth.^^ It seems to be held that the failure of the council to fix such average depth of lots in the neighborhood, does not invali- date the assessment if the law fixes such depth,^* and the court is given power on hearing to determine the depth to which the " City of Denver v. Londoner, 33 burg Plate Glass Co., 163 Ind. 599, Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117 [1904]; (not 70 N. E. 249; City of Terre Haute affected on this point by reversal in v. Mack, 139 Ind. 99, 38 N. E. 468; Londoner v. City and County of Den- Diven v. Burlington Savings Bank, ver, 210 U. S. 373, 28 S. 708 [1908]). — Ind.- App. , 82 N. E. 1020 ^City of Frankfort v. State ex rel. [1907]. Ross, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 =°Voris v. Pittsburg Plate Glass [1891]. Co., 163 Ind. 599, 70 N. E. 249 "City of Frankfort v. State ex rel. [1904]; Diven v. Burlington Savings Ross, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115 Bank, — Ind. App. , 82 N. E. [1891]. 1020 [1907]. » Stifel v. Brown, 24 Mo. App. 102 »i Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. [1887]. Watt, 51 La. Ann. 1345, 26 So. 70; ''Rawson v. City of Des Moiries, Baltimore and Ohio R. E. Co v 133 la. 514, 110 N. W.,918 [1907]; City of Bellaire, 60 0. S. 301, 54 n1 Stifel v. Brown, 24 Mo. App. 102 E. 263 [1899]. [1887]. ""Cain v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. ^Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicaoro & 120, 60 N. W. 368 [1894]. St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. ''Cain v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. S. 177, 28 S. 647 [1908]; (affirm- 120, 60 N. W. 368 [18941. in? S. C. 38 Ind. App. 226, 74 N. E. "Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 5 260, 76 N. E. 179) ; Voris v. Pitts- Ohio N. P. 68 [1887]. 1075 PBOPEETY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. | 630 assessment is to extend.^" If no such power were given to the court it would seem that the failure of the council or other assess- ing body to fix the depth would invalidate the assessment. Un- der such statutes land further away from the improvement than the distance indicated cannot be assessed.'" "Whether property assessed must, under such statutes, touch the improvement or not, depends upon the wording of the statute. If the statute merely provides that lands within a certain distance of the improvement are to be assessed, lands within such distance may be assessed though they do not touch the improvements.'^ On the other hand, if the statute provides that abutting property is to be assessed to a certain depth from the improvement, property within such dis- tance but not abutting, cannot be assessed.'* Under a statute of the latter class in determining what property adjoins or touches the improvement, the use of the property and not merely the plat- ted lines are to be considered.'" Thus, under a statute providing that the adjoining property is to be assessed to a depth of one hundred and fifty feet, a tract of land bordering on the street and running back from it a depth of sixty feet is subject to assess- ment if used by the owner as an entire tract, although as platted such tract consists of two lots, one of which does not adjoin the improvement.** § 630. Meaning of ' ' lot. ' ' In statutes describing the land which is subject to assessment, the term "lot" is often used. There is a divergence of authority as to the meaning of this term. In some jurisdictions, it is said that the term "lot" is synonymous with the term "tract" or "par- cel,"^ and does not necessarily imply that the land is platted into "Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. ""Wolfort v. City of St. Louis, 115 City of Bellaire, 60 0. S. 301, 54 N. Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 [1892]. E. 263 [1899]. "Wolfort v. City of St. Louis, 115 "Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 [1892]. 289, 20 N. E. 797 [1888]; Asphalt ^ State v. Robert P. Lewis Com- & Granitoid Const. Co. v. Hauessler, pany, 82 Minn. 390, 402; sub nomine, 201 Mo. 400, 100 S. W. 14 [1907]; Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis (affirming, Asphalt & Granitoid Co., 53 L. R. A. 421, 85 N. W. 207, Const Co. V. Hauessler, — Mo. App. 86 N. W. 611, [1901]; State of '-, »(> S. W. 5 [1904]); State ex Minnesota v. Robert P. Lewis Com- rel. V. Hoffn-an, 35 O. S. 435 [1880]. pany, 72 Minn. 87, 75 N. W. 108; " Ray V. City of Jeffersonville, 90 sub nomine, Ramsey County v. Rob- Ind. 567 [18831; Coates v. Village of ert P. Lewis Co., 42 L. R. A. 639 Norwood. 16 Ohio C. C. 196 [1898]. [1898]. "McGrew v. City of Kansas City, 64 Kan. 61, 67 Pac. 438 [1902]. §630 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1076 small divisions suitable for residence or business purposes.- The term "parcel" is said to be equivalent to lots as subdivided.' So the word "lot" has been said to apply to any portion, piece or division of land.* Under a somewhat similar theory as to the meaning of the term "lot," it has been said that the terms "lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land" is as broad as the term "real estate."^ In other jurisdictions, the term "lot" is held to be ap- plicable only to land which has b£en platted into small tracts suitable for business and residence purposes." This result has been reached under a statute requiring the owners of "town lots" to grade and pave or plank sidewalks.' If it is specifically pro- vided that only land which has been subdivided into lots and blocks can be assessed, such terms exclude unplatted land.* A street which intersects the improvement is not a "lot" abutting or fronting thereon within the meaning of statutes providing for assessing lots.® The right of way of a railroad which lies wholly within the street and runs along the length thereof is not a "lot" within the meaning of such statutes,^' neither is it a "lot and parcel of land,"" "lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land,"" ^ State of Minnesota v. Robert P. Lewis Co., 72 Minn. 87, 75 N. W. 108; sub nomine, Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Co., 42 L. R. A. 639 [1898]. = City of Terre Haute v. Mack, 139 Ind. 99, 38 N. E. 468. * Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506, 42 Pac. 986 [1895]; Buell v. Ball, 20 la. 282 [1866]. 'Rich V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N". B. 255 [1894]. "Town of Greendale v. Suit, 163 Ind. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904]. 'Town of Greendale v. Suit, 163 Ind. 282, 71 N. E. 658 [1904]. ' Minnesota & M. Land & Improve- ment Co. V. City of Billings, 111 Fed. Rep. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]. 'Cunninsham v. City of Peoria, 157 111. 499, 41 N. E. 1014 [1895]; Holt V. City of East St. Louis, 150 111. 530, 37 N. E. 927 [1894]; City of Schenectady v. Trustees of Union Colle-e, 144 N. Y. 241, 26 L. R. A. 614, 39 N. E. 67 [1894]; Lowerre V. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of t^e Citv of N<>w York, 46 Hun. (N. Y.) 253 [1887]. "Indianapolis and Vincennes Rail- way Company v. Capitol Paving and Construction Company, 24 Ind. App. 114, 54 N. E. 1076 [1899]; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Com- pany V. City of Ottumwa, 112 la. 300, 51 L. R. A. 763, 83 N. W. 1074 [1900]; City of Muscatine v. Chi- .cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, 88 la. 291, 55 N. W. 100 [1893]; City of Maysville v. Mays- ville St. R. and Transfer Co., — Ky. , 108 S. W. 960 [1908]; North Jersey Street Railway Com- pany v. ■ Mayor and Aldermen of Jer- sey City, 68 N. J. L. (39 Vr.) 140, 52 Atl. 300 [1902]; Chicago, Mil- waukee & St. Paul Railway Company V. City of Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L, E. A. 249, 62 N. W. 417 [1895]. "Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. City of Ot- tumwa, 112 la. 300, 51 L. R. A. 763, 83 N. W, 1074 [1900], (However, the statute also added "fronting on the street"). "In re City of Seattle, — Wash. 1077 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §631 " lands, "'^ or "real estate."" A right of way by the side of an improvement and touching the same, even though acquired by eminent domain and amounting to an easement only, has been held to be a " lot " within the meaning of a statute authorizing the assessment of lots.^^ If the statute provides for assessing the "lots and land,"" or for assessing "land,"" the propriety of assessing the right of way of a railway is still more clear. Water mains and surface pipes belonging to the city and the pipes of gas and light companies and the poles and wires of telegraph, telephone and electric light companies are not included in the term "lots."" Neither are they parcels of land within the mean- ing of the statute providing for assessing lots and parcels of land.^" § 631. Effect of platted lines. In determining what area of land constitutes a lot the general rule is that the platted lines control unless the property is actually used and occupied in a manner inconsistent with the platted lines, in which case the actual use and occupation controls.^ Thus, if , 94 Pac. 1075 [1908]; Seattle V. Seattle Electric Co., — Wash. , 94 Pac. 194 [1908]. " Brick & Terra Cotta Co. v. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433 [1892]. (Lands on both sides of and adjoining the street.) O'Reilly v. City of King- ston, 114 N. Y. 439, 21 N. E. 1004 [1889]; ("bordering or adjoining" the street). " State of Minnesota ex rel. St. Paul City Railway Company v. Dis- trict Court of Ramsey County, 31 Minn. 384, 17 N. W. 954 [1884]. See also §§ 594-606. "Figg V. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 116 Ky. 135, 75 S. W. 269, 25 Ky. L. R. 350 [1903]. "Under the statute governing street improvement a lot is any piece of land within the territory defined by the statute, or the general council where the terri- tory to be assessed is not bounded by principal streets. The use or nonuae, or the character of the use to which the parcel of land is put does not dei termine the question whether it is or is not a lot. The strip of land used by the railroad company the day be- fore it was appropriated by it as a. right of way was a lot, in the mean- ing of the statutes and to thus ap- propriate it cannot change its char- acter." Figg V. Louisville & Nash- ville R. R. Co., 116 Ky. 135, 143, 75 S. W. 269, 25 Ky. L. R. 350 [1903] ; quoted in Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 116 Ky. 856, 76 S. W. 1097 [1903]. " Indianapolis and Vincennes Rail- way Company v. Capitol Paving and Construction Company, 24 Ind. App. 114, 54 N. E. 1076 [1899]. " Northern Indiana Railroad Com- pany V. Connelly, 10 0. S. 160 [1859]. (Where the railroad crosses the street at right angles.) '* Elwood V. City of Rochester, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 102 [1887]. "Elwood V. City of Rochester, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) '102 [1887]. 'Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506, 42 Pac. 986 [1895]; Langlois v. Cameron. 201 111. 301, 66 N. E. 33,2 [1903]; Hamilton v. City of Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 490 [1870]. §631 TAXATION. BY ASSESSMENT. 1078 the owner of two or more tracts of land which as platted are separ- ate lots, uses them together as one entire lot, they may be treated as one lot.^ The owner of such tracts need not have acquired the title thereto from the same source or hold the same estate therein. Thus, one in possession of two tracts of land, one of which he owns in fee and the other of which he holds by perpetual lease with the privilege of purchase,* or one who holds two tracts of land, one by the legal title and the other by an equitable title,* may so use such tracts as to make them fc* assessment purposes one lot. A tract of land of over six hundred feet frontage, five hundred feet of which is from one hundred to two hundred feet deep, while the rest is twelve feet deep, may if used as an entire lot, be so re- garded for assessment purposes.^ However, three lots which are used together, two of which belong to the wife and the third of which belongs to the husband, are not to be regarded as one lot for assessment purposes." If a tract of land which, as platted, constitutes one lot, is aetauUy occupied and used as two or more distinct lots, it must be treated for assessment purposes as con- sisting of different parcels according to the use made of them.' This view is not entertained, however, in all jurisdictions. In some cases the platted lines prevail over the use.* Thus, where land which as platted composed two lots was used as one entire "Ottumwa Brick & Construction 144 [1892]; (citing Kemper v. King, Ck). V. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. U Mo. App. 116 [1881]). 510 [1899]; Wolfort v. City of St. ' Clements v. Village of Norwood, 2 Louis, 115 Mo. 139, 21 S. W. 912 Ohio N. P. 274 [1895]. [1892]; Heman Construction Co. v. '*Ottumwa Brick & Construction Loevy, 64 Mo. App. 430 [1895]; Co. v. Ainley, 109 la. 386, 80 N. W. Kemper v. King, 11 Mo. App. 116 510 [1899]. [1881]; Clements v. Village of Nor- ° Moale v. Mayor of Baltimore, 61 wood, 2 Ohio N. P. 274 [1895]. Md. 224 [1883]; (even if it is' all "Where property is unimproved and assessed at a uniform rate per front vacant the divisions thereof on plats foot.) of survey may generally be regarded "M'Maken v. Hayes, 29 Ohio C. C. as the basis for such assessments as 535 [1907]. these; but where the owner, by the ' Lanerlois v. Cameron, 201 111. 301, manner of his use and improvement 66 N. E. 332 [1903] ; Romi<» v. City of his land has discarded such arti- of Lafayette, 33 Ind. 30 [1870] ; City ficial divisions and has practically of New Albany v. Cook 29 Ind. 220 made one lit of several, he cannot [1867]; Brennan v. Citv of St. Paul justlv comnlain if the taxing author- 44 Minn. 464, 47 N. W. 55 [1890] ■' itv t'eats his t)roT>ertv as one T>ioce, Clantnn v. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. 117 just p« ^p. himself hag d"io." Wol- []9pc>7, ifort V. City of St. Louis, 115 Mo. 139, 'P-ith v. Citv of Des Mr>ines, 106 la. 590, 76 N. W. 836 [1898]. 1079 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 631 tract, it was held that only the lot which as platted abutted on the street, could be used under a statute which provided that the assessment should be limited to the lots or lands bounding or abutting on such street." If the statute shows that the legisla- ture in providing for the assessment of property had in mind the property as platted, as distinct from the use made of it, full ef- fect must be given to such intention, and the platted lines will control the use." So, if a division of a large platted lot has been made in fact, but such division does not appear on the city plan, the lot may be assessed as an entirety, as it appears on such plan.^* Such intention has- been found where the legislature provided that platted property was to be assessed to the depth of the lots fronting on the improvement while unplatted property was to be assessed to a line drawn midway between the street improved and the next street." Where the legislature thus makes the lines as platted the material factor in determining what a "lot" is, a divi- sion of property in a partition suit, which has not been approved by the board of public improvements or recorded in the record- er's oflSce, does not constitute a division by recorded plat.^^ If an improvement extends in front of a part of an entire tract, it has been said that the entire tract should be assessed and that it is error to attempt to subdivide it.^* A somewhat different view has, however, been expressed where the assessment district is to include the property fronting on the improvement, and it has been held that if the improvement extends over a part of the frontage only, the lot should be assessed only for an amount based on such frontage.^" If a city has appropriated land for opening a street and has thereby severed what was originally an entire tract into two distinct tracts, such tracts are to be treated as sfeparate lots •Smith V. City of Des Moines, 106 City of St. Louis, — Mo. . Ill la. 590, 76 N. W. 836 [1898]. S. W. 89 [1908]. ""State ex rel. Barber Asphalt "Hutchinson v. Pittsburg, 72 Pa. Paving Company V. City of St. Louis, St. (22 P. F. Smith) 320 [1872]. 183 Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]; "State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Pav- Meier v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. ing Company v. City of St. Louis, 391, 79 S. W. 955 [1903]; Hutch- 183 Mo. 230, 81 S. W. 1104 [1904]. inson v. Pittsbur^City of Philadelphia to Use of v. City of Buffalo, 148 N. Y. 332, Mack V. Gorgas, 180 Pa. St. 296, 36 42 N. E. 803 [1896]. Atl. 868 [1897]. ^Minnesota and M. Land and Im- ^' City of Cincinnati v. Wynne, 19 provement Co. v. City of Billings, Ohio C. C. 747 [1900]. Ill Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; 1 Minnesota and M. Land and Im- Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, provement Co. v. City of Billings, 140 111. 216, 29 N. E. 704 [1893]; 111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 111. Laguna Drainage District v. Charles 226; sub nomine, Albertson v. Town, Martin Co., 144 Cal. 209, 77 Pac. of Cicero, 21 N. E. 815 [1890]. 133 [1904]; Maywood Co. v. Village § 636 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1086 sary as an outlet for such system.' It has been held that cor- porate authorities of a town may levy an assessment for an appro- priation for park purposes of a tract of land a part of which is without the corporate limits of such town.* A park board, which has exclusive power to pave roads and places within the park may levy an assessment for such paving, though work included in the assessment is done upon streets outside the park, where such work is necessary to complete the paving^in such park and furnish access thereto, and drainage therefor, even though the city council has jurisdiction outside of such park.' In the absence of statutory authority a public corporation, or assessment district, cannot levy an assessment for an improvement outside of its limits.' Under a statute which provides with reference to an assessment for a sewer, "the cost and expenses of constructing the same shall be assessed against the lots or pieces of ground contained in the dis- trict in which the same is situated," a city cannot construct a discharging sewer outside of a sewer district drained thereby, and assess the cost of such sewer against the land within such sewer district.' However, if money raised in one district has been expended in another, the taxpayers of the first district cannot compel the second district to repay such amount.* In the ab- sence of such statutes, a drainage district extending over more than one township may raise money by special assessment within its area and expend it, without restricting the expenditure of the amount raised in one township to that part of the improvement in that township.' After the repeal of a statute which provided for apportioning the expense of maintaining a highway or a bridge "Laguna Drainage District v. 'City of Fort Scott v. Kaufman, Charles Martin Co., 144 Cal. 209, 77 44 Kan. 137, 24 Pae. 64 [1890]. For Pac. 933 [1904]; Briggs v. Union decisions under similar statutes see Drainage District No. 1, 140 111. 53, Crescent Hotel Co. v. Bradley, 81 29 N. E. 721 [1893]. Ark. 286, 98 S. W. 971 [1906]; Rec- ' People ex rel. Huck v. Gage, 83 tor v. Board of Improvement, 50 Ark. 111. 486 [1876]. See also, Hundley 116, 6 S. W. 519 [1887]. and Rees v. Commissioners of Lin- 'Crescent Hotel Co. v. Bradley, 81 coin Park, 67 111. 559 [1873]. Ark. 286, 98 S. W. 971 [1906]. ° Kittinger v. City of Buffalo, r48 " Commissioners of Highways of N. Y. 332, 42 N. E. 803 .[1896]. the Town of Colfax v. Commission- " Rector v. Board of Improvement, ers of East Lake Fork Special Drain- 50 Ark. 116, 6 S. W. 519 [1887]; age District, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. City of Fort Scott v. Kaufman, 44 206 [1890]. See also Gilman v. City Kan. 137, 24 Pac. 64 [1890]; Town of Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 328, 13 N. W. of Underhill v. Town of Essex, 64 266 [1882], Vt. 28, 23 Atl. 617 [1891]. 1087 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 636 not wholly within the limits of any given town upon the towns benefited by the maintenance thereof, it was held that no town, even though benefited by the maintenance of a highway or bridge, could be compelled to contribute to the expense thereof/^ So a city cannot assess for the construction of a sidewalk outside of its boundaries ;^^ but, if the city constructs the walk with reference to a well recognized and undisputed line bounding such city the correctness of such line cannot be questioned in a collateral pro- ceeding.^^ If an improvement is constructed partly within and partly without the assessment district, and no authority exists for assessing land within the district for an improvement without it, an assessment may nevertheless be levied for so much of the improvement as is within the district where the cost of such im- provement can be separated from thp rest.^' An ordinance for an improvement need not specifically state that the improvement proposed is within the city. The omission of such affirmative and specific statement does not necessarily render the ordinance in- valid;^* but if, from a fair construction of the entire ordinance it appears that the improvement is within the city, the ordinance will be regarded as sufficient. Any statement, no matter how informal, which shows that the improvement is within the given city, is sufficient. Thus, an ordinance which provided that "Davis street in the city of Bvanston, from the west line of Maple avenue to the east line of Wesley Avenue in said city, be paved," shows that the improvement in question is located within the city." If the ordinance provides for an improvement upon certain named streets, but does not state that they are within the city, it will ordinarily be presumed that they are within such city.*" An "Town of Underhill v. Town of and Iron Co. v. City of Chicago, 158 Essex, 64 Vt. 28, 23 Atl. 617 [1891]; 111. 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895]; Beach (citing and following Wardsboro v. v. People ex rel. Kern, 157 111. 659, Jamaica, 59 Vt. 514; Tunbridge v. 41 N. E. 1117 [1895]; City of Chi- Royalton, 58 Vt.'212). eago v. Silverman, 156 111. 601, 41 "Bloomington Cemetery Associa- N. E. 162; Bliss v. City of Chicago, tion V. People of the State of Illi- 156 111. 584, 41 N. E. 160 [1895]; nois, 139 111. 16, 28 N. E. 1076 Zeigler v. People ex rel. Kern, 156 [1893]. 111. 133, 40 N. E. 607 [1895]. "^ Bloomington Cemetery Associa- "Sargent v. City of Evanston, 154 tion V. People of the State of Illi- 111. 268, 40 N. E. 440 [1894J. nois, 139 111. 16, 28 N. E. 1076 '» Chicago West Division Raihvay [1893]. Company v. People ex rel. Kern, 154 "Prendergast v. Richards, 2 Mo. 111. 256, 40 N. E. 342 [1894]; Stan- App. 187 [1876]. ton v. City of Chicago, 154 111. 23, "Philadelphia and Reading Coal 39 N. E. 987. § 637 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1088 ordinance for a public improvement which shows upon its face that it was enacted by a city council of a certain city, will be regarded prima facie as being within the jurisdiction of such council, since it will not be presumed that the city council exceeded its statu- tory jurisdiction and violated its legal duty. Accordingly, if the city council has no authority to provide for an improvement out- side of the city limits, it will be presumed, in the absence of any- thing to show a contrary intent, that the improvement was within the territorial jurisdiction of the council." If the party who re- sists an assessment wishes to interpose the objection that the street improved is outside of the territorial limits of the municipality, he must show such fact by affirmative proof, even if the ordinance does not state that the improvement is within the city.^* § 637. Property outside of public corporation which levies as- sessment. The power of a taxing district, or a public corporation, to levy an assessment for benefits upon land which is situated outside of the territorial jurisdiction of such public corporation, or taxing district, has been presented for judicial consideration. If, under the statutes in force a benefit is positively secured by such im- provement to the owners of the land assessed, there seems to be no constitutional objection to authorizing the levy of an assess- ment upon land outside of the jurisdiction of the public corpora- tion which constructs such improvement and levies such assess- ment.^ Accordingly, if the statute provides for the levy of such assessment, such lands may be subjected to assessment for such improvement.^ A common illustration of this is found in the ease "Philadelphia and Reading Coal "Kansas City v. Block, 175 Mo. and Iron Co. v. City of Chicago, 158 433, 74 S. W. 993 [1903]. 111. 9, 41 N. E. 1102 [1895]; Beach ^ Reclamation District No. 108 v. V. People ex rel. J' em, 157 111. 659, Hagar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pae. 945 [1884]; 41 N. E. 1117 [1895] ; Wisner v. Peo- Watkins v. State ex rel. Van Auken, pie ex rel. Eern, 156 111. 180, 40 N. 151 Ind.- 123, 49 N. E. 169, 51 N. E. E. 574 [1895]; West Chicago Street 79 [1898]; Hudson v. Bunch, 116 Railway Company v. People ex rel. Ind. 63, 18 N. E. 390 [1888]; Crist Kern, 156 111. 18, 40 N. E. 605 v. State ex rel. Whitmore, 97 Ind. [1895]; West Chicago Street Rail- 389 [1884]; State for the Use of way Company v. People ex rel. Kern, Cram v. Elliott, 32 Ind. App. 605, 70 155 111. 299, 40 N. E. 599 [1895]; N. g. 397 [1903]. Wheeler v. People ex rel. Kern, 153 = Watkins v. State ex rel. Auken 111. 480, 39 N. E. 123 [18941; Kan- 151 Ind. 123, 49 N. E. 169, 51 N e' sas City V. Block, 175 Mo. 433, 74 S. 79 [1898]. W. 993 [1903]. 1089 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 637 of ditches and drains, where it is held competent for the legisla- ture by statute to authorize a county to construct drains and to assess a part of the expense thereof upon lands in other counties benefited by such improvement.' The board of supervisors of one count7 may be authorized by the legislature to include within a reclamation district, lands which are situated in another county.* Another example of the operation of this principle is found in the power of the legislature to authorize a city to furnish water to persons outside of the city limits, and to enforce the collection of water rents by the entry of a lien therefor, in substantially the same way as water rents charged against real property within the city limits are enforced. ° The converse of this proposition is found where the legislature requires a city to furnish water to per- sons or to public corporations outside of the city limits. If such rates thus fixed are reasonable, such statutes have been held to be valid." A city, however, has "no extra territorial jurisdiction without some special statute authorizing it,"^ and without some special provision authorizing a city to levy an assessment upon land outside of its territorial jurisdiction, no such assessment can be levied under a grant of power to construct an improvement at the expense of the property benefited.' The grant of power to one corporation may impliedly exclude all other corporations from exercising the same power in the same territory.* Two dis- tinct municipal corporations cannot exercise the same powers, jurisdiction and privileges in the same territory at the same time.^" " Watkins V. State ex rel. Van Au- N. E. 731 [1897]; West Chicago ken, 151 Ind. 123, 49 N. E. 169, 51 Park Commissioners v. City of Chi- N. E. 79 [1898]; Hudson v. Bunch, cago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. E. 697 116 Ind. 63, 18 N. E. 390 [1888]; [1894]; Hundley and Eees v. Corn- State for the Use of C ram v. Elliott, missioners of Lincoln Park, 67 III. 32 Ind. App. 605, 70 N. E. 397 559 [1873]; Spaulding v. Mott, 167 [1903]. Ind. 58, 76 N. E. 620 [1908]; Abas- * Reclamation District No. 108 v. cal v. Bouny, 37 La. Ann. 538 Hasar, 66 Cal. 54, 4 Pac. 945 [1884]. [1885]; In the Matter of the Assess- ' Pittsburg V. Brace Bros., 158 Pa. ments of Lands in the Town of Flat- St. 174, 27 Atl. 854 [1893]. bush, 60 N. Y. 398 [1875]; In the " City of Chicago v. Town of Cicero, Matter of the City of Brooklyn v. 210 111. 290, 71 N. E. 356 [1904]. Lott, 2 Hun. (N. Y.) 628 [1874]. 'Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. "West Chicago Park Commission- 600. era v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, »City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 38 K E. 697 [1894]. 111. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903]; Bishop ""West Chicaffo Park Commission- T. People of the State of Illinois, 200 ers v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, 111. 33, 65 N. E. 421 [1902]; Billings 38 N. E. 697 [1894]. ■V. City of Chicago", 167 111. 337, 47 § 637 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1090 Thus, under statutes which authorize a board of park commission- ers to levy an assessment for the improvement of streets of which they have assumed jurisdiction, the city has no power to levy assessments, either upon lands in the park," or for the improve- ment of streets running along the park of which the park com- missioners have assumed jurisdiction.^^ It is not that park lands are exempt from assessment, but because the exclusive power of levying assessments is in the board of park commissioners.^^ So, if a city assumes jurisdiction and cbntrol for drainage purposes of streams and ditches within the city limits, such streams and ditches cannot be made a part of a drainage district organized out- side of the eity.^* So, if assessments for constructing a highway may be levied on property within two miles of such highway, it has been held that if a highway is within two miles of the county line, the assessment district cannot extend beyond such county line.^' So, land included in a city levee district cannot be made a part of ariother levee district.^" The acts of the park commis- sioners in constructing a curb on one side of a street which adjoins the park, building a concrete walk and constructing catch basins, show that the park board has assumed jurisdiction and control over the street, notwithstanding the improvements are all on one side thereof.^' The fact that the park commissioners have ac- cepted and used a viaduct built by a city and railroad company, in a part of the street which the commissioners had already form- ally determined to improve does not show that the park commis- sioners have relinquished control to the city.^' If the authorities of two towns, each having in its limits a part of one entire park, are authorized to levy assessments therefor, the supervisors and assessors of the two towns should not act as one body in assessing '1 Billings V. City of Chicago, 167 " Spaulding v. Mott. 167 Ind. 38, 111. 337, 47 N. E. 731 [1897]; West 76 N. E. 620 [1906]. Chicago Park Commissioners v. City "A statute attempting so to in- of Chicago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. E. corporate such land was held uncon- 697 [1894]. stitutional as causing unequal taxa- " City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 tion. Abascal v. Bouny, 37 La. Ann. 111. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903]. 538 [1885]. " West Chicago Park Commission- " City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 ers V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, 111. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903]. 38 N. E. 697 [1894]. "West Chicago Park Commission- " Bishop V. People of the State of ers v. Sweet, 167 111. 326, 47 N. E. Illinois, 200 111. 33, 655 N. E. 421 728 [1897]. [1902]. 1091 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 638 lands in both towns.'" Under a statute which provides that a lien may be acquired and enforced upon a lot in front of which street improvement work has been done "in an incorporated city," no lien can be acquired where street improvement work has been done in front of a lot outside of the limits of an incorporated city." If a statute could be so construed as to permit an assessment upon lands outside of a city for a prior debt incurred by such city in appropriating lands inside its limits for a park, it has been said that under such construction, such statute would be unconstitution- al." A statute authorizing an assessment for an improvement by which the property assessed could not be benefited, would be as we have seen, unconstitutional." Accordingly, if the fact that the property assessed is outside of the taxing district or public corpor- ation, prevents the owner of such property from having any fixed right in the use of the improvement for which such assessment is levied, the same facts render such assessment invalid. The owner of land outside of the limits of a city cannot be compelled to pay special assessments for a sewer constructed by the city in the street in front of his land where the owner of such lot is not given the right to connect his lot with such sewer .^^ If land is outside the city limits when a street improvement is begun, and accordingly it is omitted from assessment, although it abuts on one side of the street, but before the improvement is completed such land is taken into the city, it is proper to extend the assessment district so as to include such land.^* § 638. Land in two or more assessment districts. The courts are occasionally called upon to determine whether one tract of land can be situated in two or more different assess- ment districts, and can be subjected to two or more distinct assessments, levied by each of said districts. The question thus presented is in part constitutional, and part statutory. l! the land in question can, under the rules for determining the ques- tion of benefits,' be legally said to receive a benefit from each " Hundley and Rees V. Commission- =^ See §§ 118, 284. era of Lincoln Park, 67 111. 559 '^Farlin v. Hill, 27 Mont. 27, 69 [1873]. . Pac. 237 [1902]. ^'Durrell v Dooner, 119 Ca'l. 411, •*/» re Hollister, 180 N. Y. 518, 51 Pac. 628 [1897]. 72 N. E. 1143; (affirming 89 N. Y. a In the Matter of the Assessment S. 518, 96 App. Div. 501). of Lands in the Town of Flatbush, 'See §§ 561-567. 60 N. Y. 398 [1875]. § 638 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1092 of such improvements, there seems to be no constitutional '^b- jeetion to allowing a given tract of land to be subjected to two or more assessments levied by different assessment districts for different improvements.^ If, on the other hand, the benefit con- ferred by one improvement is such that no further benefit enures to the land in question by reawon or the other improvements, no assessment can be levied for tlie improvement which does not enure to the benefit of the land thus assessed. Subject to the constitutional restrictions aU-caii/ given, the remaining ques- tions are purely those of statutory construction. If the legisla- ture, either expressly or by implication, has provided that the jurisdiction of one assessment district shall exclude the juris- diction of another assessment district, the tract of land which is situated in the first cannot be subjected to an assessment lev- ied by the second district, even if it falls within the geographical limits thereof, since it is within it from a territorial standpoint, but not from a standpoint of jurisdiction.^ Thus, if the legisla- ture gives exclusive control over streets and boulevards situated within a parlj; district to the commissioners of such park district, a city, within the limits of which such land is situated, cannot levy an assessment upon the same land for the same purposes.* Thus, a city cannot levy an assessment for a street," or for the cost of boulevard lamps," upon land of which the park com- missioners have exclusive jurisdiction. Under the same prin- ciple, if the effect of a statute is to give to a city exclusive juris- diction "over the subject of drains and sewers within the terri- torial limits of a city, land within such city cannot be subjected to an assessment levied for drainage purposes by a county,^ or ^ People ex rel. Miller v. Scott, 132 v. City of Chicago, 167 111. 337, 47 111. 427, 23 N. E. 1119 [1891]. N. E. 731 [1897]; West Chicago ' City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 Park Commissioners v. City of Chi- lli. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903] ; Bishop cago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. E. 697 V. People of the State of Illinois, [1894]. 200 111. 33, 65 N. E. 421 [1902]; ' City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 Billings V. City of Chicago, 167 111. 111. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903]; Bill- 337, 47 N. E. 731 [1897]; West Chi- ings v. City of Chicago, 167 111. 337, eago Park Commissioaera v. City of 47 Jf. E. 731 [1897]. Chicago, 152 111. 392, 38 N. E. 697 » West Chicago Park Commission- [1894] ; Village of Pleasant Hill v. ers v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 392, Commissioners, 71 0. S. 133, 72 N. E. 38 N.' E. 697 [1894]. 896; City of Dayton v. Taylor's Ad- 'Village of Pleasant Hill v. Com- ministrator, 62 0. S. 11, 56 N. E. missionera, 71 O. S. 133, 72 N. E. 480. 896; City of Dayton v. Taylor's Ad- ' City of Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 ministrator, 62 0. S. 11, 56 N. E. 111. 402, 66 N. E. 362 [1903] ; Billings 480. 1093 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §639 by a drainage district,' within the territorial limits of which the land in such city is situated. If the land in question can legally be said to be benefited by the improvements constructed by each of the assessing districts, the legislature may authorize the levy of assessments by each district upon such land. Thus, under the Illinois Drainage Act of 1885, a new and independent drainage district could be organized and maintained within the limits and boundaries of another drainage district theretofore organized, maintained and in full operation." § 639. Unauthorized omission of land benefited. Land is sometimes omitted from the eifeet and operation of assessment, although such land is benefited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied; is not excluded from the operation of the assessment by any legislative determination that it is not benefited, or by the determination of the public corporation or other public body by which such assessment is levied; and is not omitted for reasons peculiar to the character of such property, which make it exempt from assessment. If the entire cost of the improvement has been assessed upon the property benefited by such improvement, the fact of such im- proper omission of property benefited is not only to exempt the omitted property from the burden of the assessment which it ought to bear, but also to increase the burden of the assessment upon the rest of the property which has been benefited. If the assessment is to be paid in part by the owners of the property benefited and in part by general taxation, the effect of such im- proper omission is to increase the burden east upon the general tax payer. In either ease such omission operates unfairly and if taken advantage of in the proper manner invalidates such assessment.^ Such action is said to be "arbitrary and unlaw- ' Bishop V. People of the State of [1894]; Davies v. City of Los Ange- Illinois, 200 111. 33, 65 K E. 421 les, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771 [1890]; [1902]. Diggins v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 'People ex rel. Miller v. Scott, 132 Pac. 373 [1888]; Dyer v. Harrison, 111. 427, 23 N. E. 1119 [1891]. 63 Cal. 447 [1883]; People of the iPooke's Case, 5 Rep. 99 b. (Hil. State of California v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 40 Eliz.); Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 677 [1875]; People 370, 3 S. W. 184 [1886]; Town of ex rel. Davidson v. Cole, 128 111. 158, Monticello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, 25 21 N. E. 6 [1890]; Gilkerson v. S. W. 852; Kutchin v. En^elbret, 129 Scott, 76 111. 509; Page v. City of Cal. 635, 62 Pac. 214 [1900]; Ryan Chicago, 60 III. 441 [1871]; City of v. Altschul, 103 Cal. 174, 37 Pac. 339 Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306 [1866]; §639 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1094 f ul. ' ' ^ Thus, the omission of vacant property from assessment, when such property is benefited in the same way that occupied property is benefited, invalidates the assessment.' In some jurisdictions it has even been held that the legislature cannot con- fer upon a city the power to exempt certain benefited land from local assessments, or to make valid contracts for that Forgey v. Northern Gravel Road Co., 37 Ind. 118 [1871]; Nevins and Otter Creek Township Draining Company v. Alkire, 36 Ind. 189 [1871]; City of Columbus v. Storey, 35 Ind. 97 [1871]; Greencastle and Bowling Green Turnpike Company v. Albin, 34 Ind. 554 [1870]; Eobbins V. Sand Creek Turnpike Company, 34 Ind. 461 [1870]; Hardwick v. Dan- ville and North Salem Gravel Eoad Company, 33 Ind. 321 [1870]; New Haven and Fort Wayne Turnpike Company v. Bird, 33 Ind. 325 [1870] ; Law v. Madison, Smyrna and Graham Turnpike Company, 30 Ind. 77 [1868]; Helm v. Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131, 73 N. E. 846 [1905]; Drake v. Grout, 21 Ind. App. 534, 52 N. E. 775 [1898]; City of Ottawa v. Bar- ney, 10 Kan. 270 [1872]; Clay v. City of Grand Rapidsi, 60 Mieh. 451, 27 N. W. 596 [1886]; Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468 [1874]; Beck v. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pae. 410 [1903]; Sim- mons v. City of Millville, — N. J. L. , 66 Atl. 895 [1907]; State ex rel. Wilson v. Longstreet, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 312 [1876]; State, Kilburn, Pros. v. Essex Public Eoad Board, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vr.) 273 [1874] ; State, Van Home, Pros. v. Town of Bergen, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 307 [1863] ; State, Culver, Pros. v. Town of Bergen, in the - County of Hudson, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 266 [1861]; State, Vanderbeck, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jer- sey City, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 441 [1861]; State Water Commis- sioners of Jersey City, Pros. v. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Hudson, 27 N. J. L. (3 Dutcher) 214 [1858] ; Van Deventer v. Long Island City, 139 N. Y. 133, 34 N. E. 774 [1893] ; Hassan v. City of Eoches- ter, 67 N. Y. 528 [1876]; (reported on former appeal, 65 N. Y, 516 [1875]); Hassen v. City of Roches- ter, B5 N. Y. 516 [1875]; Hassan v. City of Rochester, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 185 [1871]; Savage v. City of Buf- falo, 59 Hun. 606, 14 N. Y. Supp. 101 [1891]; People ex rel. Connelly V. Reis, 96 N. Y. S. 597; 109 App. Div. 748 [1905]; People ex rel. Tiet- jen V. Reis, 96 N. Y. S. 601, 109 App. Div. 919 [1905]; Webber v. Common Council of the City of Lockport, 43 Howard (N. Y.) 368 [1872]; In re Cedar Park, 1 How. Pr. N. S. 257 [1885]; Copcutt v. City of Yonkers, 83 Hun. 178, 31 N. Y. S. 659 [1894] ; Bell V. City of Yonkers, 78 Hun. 196, 28 N. Y. S. 947 [1894]; In the Matter of the Application of the Board of Street Opening and Im- provement of the City of New York, Relative to Acquiring Title to Forest Avenue in the Twenty-third Ward of the City of New York, 74 Hun. 561, 26 N. Y. Supp. 855 [1893]; Parsons V. City of Rochester, 43 Hun. 258 [1887] ; Kennedy v. City of Troy, 14 Hun, 308 [1878]; City of AsheviUe V. Trust Company, 143 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 800 [1906] ; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 0. S. 232 [1873]; Huntington V. City of Cincinnati, 2 Ohio N. P. 35 [1895]; City of Scranton v. Levers, 200 Pa. St. 56, 49 Atl. 980 [1901]; Fulkerson v. City of Bris- tol, 105 Va. 555, 54 S. E. 468 [1906] ; Eraser v. Mulainy, 129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139 [1906]. ^Friedrich v. City of Milwaukee. 114 Wis. 304, 90 N.'w. 174 [1902]. 'Town of Monticello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, 2 S. W. 852. 1095 PBOPEBTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 639 purpose.* In this respect, there is a marked difference be- tween the local assessment and general taxation. A per- son whose property has been assessed and taxed, cannot resist the payment of such tax because other property liable to such taxation has been omitted.^ That omission of land which should have been assessed results in an unfair apportionment was noticed at an early date. Thus, where 800 acres of land belonging to the King was omitted from assessment, such assess- ment was held invalid, the court saying, "The tax is unjust be- cause by the not taxing of them (i. e. the lands belonging to the King) a greater burden was laid upon the rest of the land than of right ought to be."" In some jurisdictions, the reason as- signed for holding that assessments are rendered invalid by the improper omission of benefited property is that such assess- ment violates the constitutional provisions of uniformity and equality.' While the correct result has undoubtedly been reach- ed in these cases, the propriety of such reason is doubtful, as it is ordinarily held that the constitutional provision requiring uni- formity and equality applies to general taxation only and not to local assessments. However, this reason may be justified on the theory that the provision requiring uniformity and equality of taxation applies to local assessments in the special sense of requiring a fair apportionment according to benefits. There is some authority for saying that the omission of property which should be assessed invalidates a charge levied for the non-perfor- mance of a legal duty, which the owner of the property assessed is bound to perform.* Thus, it has been said that an ordinance requiring property owners to construct sidewalks must apply in a uniform manner to all land similarly situated.' This view, however, seems contrary to the weight of authority. Such charges have nothing to do with benefits and in the absence of special constitutional restrictions, the power of the legislature * City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. cello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, 2 S. W. 306 [1866]. See § 616. 852; Peay v. City of Little Rock, 32 "Van Deventer v. Long Island Ark. 31 [1877]; Fletcher v. Oliver, City, 139 N. Y. 133, 34 N. E. 774 25 Ark. 281. [1893]. 'James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 'Whitley v. Fawsett, Styles 12 4 S. W. 760 [1887]. (•23 Car. 1). 'James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 'Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 4 S. W. 760 [1887]. S. W. 184 [1886]; Town of Monti- § 640 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1096 or the city to determine the necessity of the performance of such legal duties is final. § 640. Omission to impose proper charge on street railway. A case analogous to that of the omission of benefited property is found where a part of the cost of a street improve- ment should be borne by a railroad, the tracks of which occupy a part of the street, but the entire cost of such improvement has been assessed upon the owners of property abutting on such a street. By such a method of assessing, not only is the railway company relieved from the burden which in justice it ought to bear, but the owners of abutting property are assessed in excess of the amount which in justice they ought to pay Omission to require the railway company to pay its proportionate share of the cost of such improvement will, if properly taken advantage of, invalidate the assessment.^ Whether the presumption is that a street railway company is bound to pay a part of the cost of paving the street upon which its tracks are situated, or whether such liability is never presumed to exist, but must be shown affirmatively, is a question upon which there is a conflict of authority.^ It has been said to be at least necessary to show that the company, when it obtained the right to lay its tracks, had agreed to pave a part of the street.' If it is shown that the company entered into a contract to pave a part of the street, such liability will be presumed to exist, unless it is shown that the company has been released in some way.* If the city is giv- en the power to require a street railway company to pave a part of the street upon which its tracks are located within the '■ American Hide & Leather Com- tor v. Spring Garden Farmers Mar- pany v. City of Chicago, 203 111. 451, ket Company, 161 Pa. 522, 29 Atl. 67 N. E. 979 [1903]; City of Chi- 286 [1894]. cago V. Nodeck, 202 111. 257, 67 N. B. "Presumption in favor of liability 39 [1903]; McFarlane v. City of of railway company. Pa^e v. City Chicago, 185 III. 242, 57 N. E. 12 of Chicago, 60 111. 441 [1871]. Pre- [1900]; Sawyer v. City of Chicago, sumption against liaUlity of rail- 183 111. 57, 55 N. E. 645 [1899]; way' company. State ex rel. Wheeler State ex rel. Keith v. Common Coun- v. District Court of Ramsey County, cil of the City of Michigan City, 138 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 [1900]. Ind. 455, 37 N. E. 1041 [1894]; ' State ex rel. Wheeler v. District State ex rel. Wheeler v. District Court of Ramsey County, 80 Minn. Court of Ramsey Countv, 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 [1900]. 293, 83 N. W. 183 [1900]: Wales v. 'Sawyer v. City of Chicago, 183 Warren, 66 Neb. 455, 92 N. W. 590 111. 57, 55 N. E. 645 [1899]. [1902]; Philadelphia to Use of Nes- 1097 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 641 city, and is given a discretion as to the exercise of such power, a property owner cannot complain because the city has not seen fit to impose such charge upon a street railway company,' nor because the city has seen fit to release a street railway com- pany from such liability." It has been held that a property owner who attacks an assessment because no charge is imposed upon a street railway company must show that the expense of improving the part of the street occupied by the tracks of the railway company was included in the assessment against such property owner.'' An ordinance giving to a street railway com- pany a power to occupy a part of the street and requiring it to pave the part so occupied, imposes no liability until accepted by the company. Accordingly, such an ordinance does not of itself repeal a prior ordinance for improving such street at the cost of the property owners.' § 641. Omission of land not subject to assessment. The omission of land which, under the circumstances of the particular ease it is not proper to assess, does not, of course, in- validate the assessment.^ The omission of property which is legally exempt, either by the provisions of a specific statute,^ or by reason of its peculiar use,' or by reason of its being pub- lic property* does not invalidate the assessment. Since land belonging to the United States cannot be assessed, the omission of such land does not invalidate the assessment.' Cases are found in which the public improvement has been constructed in front of part of the property by the owners thereof at their own "Ft. Dodge Electric Light and 633 [1890]; Dumesnil v. Louisville Power Company v. City of Ft. Dodge, Artificial Stone Co., 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. 115 la. 568, 89 N. W. 7 [1902]. W. 371 [1900]; Ford v. City of To- •Lacey v. City of llarshalltown, ledo, 64 O. S. 92, 59 N. E. 779 99 la. 367, 68 N. W. 726 [1896]. '[1901]. 'McVerry v. Boyd, 89 Cal. 304, 26 = See § 618. Pac. 885 [1891]. "See § 578 et seq. 'Thomson v. People ex rel. Foote, 'Smith v. City of Buffalo 159 N. 184 111. 17, 56 N. E. 383 [1900]. Y. 427, 54 N. E. 62 [1899]; Smith * People ex rel. Doyle and Ralston v. City of Buffalo, 90 Hun. 118, 35 V. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 [1874]; Sny- N. Y. S. 635 [1895]; In the Matter dacker v. Village of West Hammond, of the Application of Churchill to 225 111. 154, 80 N. E. 93 [1907]; Vacate an Assessment, 82 N. Y. 288 Rich V. City of Chicago, 152 III. 18, [1880]. 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Gauen v. More- "People ex rel. Doyle and Ralston dock and Ivy Landing Drainage Dis- v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 [1874]. trict. No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. § 641 TAXATION .BY ASSESSMENT. 1098 expense, either under the precedent authority of the public cor- poration, or with its sanction and adoption. Provision is often made in such eases for constructing the improvement in front of the rest of the property and for exempting from the operation of such assessment land in front of which such improvement was already constructed." On the same principle the legislature may provide for an assessment for laying water pipe, excepting there- from property to which water is «upplied and against which wa- ter rates are charged.' After assessment proceedings have been initiated by a resolution of intention to order a certain street im- provement, the council has no power to permit individual lot own- ers to construct the improvement in front of their property and to omit such improvement from the contract and such property from the assessment.' Cases are found in which an assessment has been levied in a manner so^ defective that it has subsequently been set aside. Before such judgment vacating the assessment, owners of part of the land assessed have paid such assessments voluntarily. In providing for a re-assessment the land of those who have paid such assessment voluntarily is often omitted from the operation of such re-assessment. The omission of such land does not invalidate such assessment." A different rule applies where such credit is given for some reason other than prior pay- ment. If certain land is credited with the amount assessed against it on the theory that such land is not benefited, this is in legal effect the omission of such land from assessment and if no power exists to omit such land from assessment directly it can- not be done indirectly.^' ' Barber" v.' "Boail-'d of Supervisors [1898]; Blount v. City of Janesville, of the Cit^ and'Coiinty of San Fran- 31 Wis. 648 [1872]. Cisco, 42 Calf' 63» [1872]; City of 'R. & A. R. R. Co. v. City of Connersville v. Merrill, 14 Ind. App. Lynchburg, 81 Va. 473 [1866]. 303, 42 N. E. 1112 [1895]; Dumes- 'Kutchin v. Engelbret, 129 Gal. nil V. Louisville Artificial Stone Co., 635, 62 Pac. 214 [1900], 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 [1900] ; Beck 'Mayor and City Council of Balti. V. Obst, 75 Ky. (12 Bush.) 268 more v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. [1876]; Warren v. Street Commis- 43, 165 U. S. 719 [1894]; (original sioners of Boston, 187 Mass. 290, 72 assessment held invalid in Ulman v. N. E. 1022 [1905]; In tJie Matter of Mayor and City Council of Balti- the Assessment for Improving East more, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. R. A. 224 Eighteenth Street in the Town of 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases 228 20 Flatbush, 75 Hun. 603, 27 N. Y. Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709 [1890]) ' Supp. 591 [1894]; City of Erie v. "The People ex rel. Davidson v Griswold, 184 Pa. 435, 39 Atl. 231 Cole, 128 111. 158, 21 N. E. 6 [1890] 1099 PROPERTY ST7BJECT TO ASSESSMENT. §§ 642, 643 § 642. Omission by legislative determination. The legislature, the public corporation levying the assessment, and the like, have a wide discretion in determining the limits of the assessment district. If such discretion is not abused, the assessment is not invalid by the fact that in the exercise of such discretion the legislature or corporation has omitted land which the evidence may intend to show was in fact benefited.^ § 643. Fresiunption of propriety of omission. Every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the regu- larity and propriety of the action of public officers. According- ly, a property owner who complains of the omission of land from a local assessment must show affirmatively that such land was benefited by such improvement and that the omission thereof was improper.^ The mere fact that certain land was omitted from the assessment is not sufficient to invalidate the assess- ment unless the complainant further shows that such property ' Cleneay v. Norwood, 137 Fed. 962 [1905]; O'Dea v. Mitchell, 144 Cal. 374, 77 Pac. 1020 [1904]; In the Matter of the Bonds of the Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pae. 272, 28 Pac. 675 [1891]; Reclamation District No. 3 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 [1884]; Duane v. City of Chicago, 198 111. 471, 64 N. E. 1033 [1902]; Gauen v. Moredock and Ivy Landing Drainage District No. 1, 131 111. 446, 23 N. E. 633 [1890]; Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596 [1879]; Bigelow v. City of Chicago, 90 III. 49 [1878]; Wright V. City of Chicago, 48 III. 285 [1868]; Bowen v. Hester, 143 Ind. 511, 41 N. E. 330 [1895]; Ricketts V. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371 [1881]; Mock V. City of Muncie, 9 Ind. App. 536, 37 N. E. 281 [1893]; City of Kan- sas City V. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222 [19031; Lincoln v. Board of Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 176 Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]; State ex rel. Ashby v. Three States Lumber Company, 198 Mo. 430, 95 S. W. 333 [1906]; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. 860 [1898] ;- State, Central New Jersey Land and Im- provement Co., Pros. V. Mayor and Council of the City of Bayonne, 56 N. J. L. (27 Vr.) 297, 28 Atl. 713 [1893]; iState, Society for Establish- ing Useful Manufactures, Pros. v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Paterson, 42 N. J. L. (13 Vr.) 615 [1880]; State, Board of Chosen Free- holders of the County of Hudson, Pros. V. JPeterson Avenue and Secau- cus Road Commissioners, 41 N. J. L. (12 Vr.) 83 [1879]; State, Hunt, Pros. V. Mayor and Common Council of the City of Rahway, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 646 [1877]; Weston v. Commissioners of Hamilton County, 6 Ohio C. C. 641 [1892]; City of Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 Pac. 1077 [1891]. 'Culver v. City of Chicago, 171 111. 399, 49 N. E. 573 [1898]; Rich V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 38 N. E. 255 [1894]; Chicago, Rock Is- land and Pacific Railway Company v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]. § 644 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. . 1100 should have been included.^ The fact that after an assessment has been levied, the city confesses in court that certain property- is not benefited thereby, and the court accordingly sets aside such assessment as to such property does not, in the absence of fraud or of a showing that the omitted property was in fact benefited, invalidate the assessment as to the remaining proper- ty.' The mere fact that contiguous property is not assessed does not invalidate the assessment in» the absence of a showing that such property is benefited, where the assessment is to be levied on property benefited and there has been no determination that contiguous property has been benefited.* The fact that land bene- fited by the original construction of a ditch is not assessed for the repairs thereof, does not invalidate the assessment unless it is further shown that such land is benefited by such repairs.' § 644. Omission not operative if not prejudicial. A property owner who complains of the omission of other prop- erty, must show that by reason of such omission his own assess- ment will be increased disproportionately and unfairly.^ In some jurisdictions, it is held that the omission of property which should have been assessed does not invalidate the assessment unless the ''Holdom V. City of Chicago, 169 'Culver v. City of Chicago, 171 111. 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897]; Payne 399, 49 N. E. 573 [1898]. V. Village of South Springfield, 161 * Holdom v. City of Chicago, 169 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 [1896]; Holt v. 111. 109, 48 N. E. 164 [1897]; Chi- City of East St. Louis, 150 111. 530, cago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail- 47 N. E. 927 [1894] ; Lightner v. way Company v. City of Chicago, 139 City of Peoria, 150 111. 80, 37 N. E. 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108 [1893]. 69 [1894]; Illinois Central Railroad "Goodrich v. City of Minonk, 62 Company v. City of Chicago, 141 111. 111. 121 [1871]. 509, 30 N. E. 1036 [1893]; Eagan 'Bowditch v. City of New Haven, V. City of Chicago, 84 111. 227 40 Conn. 503 [1873] ; Gilbert v. City [1876]; Goodrich v. City of Minonk, of New Haven, 39 Conn. 467 [1872]; 62 111. 121 [1871]; Warren v. Street Balfe v. Bell, 40 Ind. 337 [1872]; Commissioners of Boston, 187 Mass. State, Humphreys v. Mayor and 290, 72 1^. E. 1022 [1905]; Heals v. Council of the City of Bayonne, 60 James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245 N. J. L. (31 Vr.) 406, 38 Atl. 761 [1899]; Whiting v. Mayor and Al- [1877]; Davis v. City of Newark, 54 dermen of the City of Boston, 106 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 Mass. 89 [1870]; Dooling, Pros. v. [1891]; State, Righter, Pros. v. Ocean City, 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 215, Mayor and Common Council of the 50 Atl. 621 [1901]; Dean v. Mayor City of Newark, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) and Aldermen of the City of Pater- 104 [1883]; Bloch v. Godfrey, 26 son, 67 N. J. L. (38 Vr.) 199, 50 Ohio C. C. R. 781 [1904]. Atl. 620 [1901]; Bloch v. Godfrey, 26 Ohio C. C. R. 781 [1904]. 1101 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 644 party complaining thereof can show that the result of such omis- sion has been to impose upon his land an assessment greater than it otherwise would have been called upon to bear.^ Thus, the omission to assess a part of the cost of a street improvement against a street railway company does not invalidate the assess- ment if the property owners are assessed less than they would have been had the assessment been made with strict regularity.'' The omission to assess two small lots has been held to be too un- important a matter to authorize the court to set aside the entire assessment, it not appearing that substantial injustice was done.* It seems, however, to be assumed elsewhere that the omission to assess sixteen feet of land might invalidate the entire assess- ment.^ It has been held, however, that the fact that the assess- ment upon the property included in the operation of the assess- ment, does not exceed the benefits, does not of itself prevent 'the omission of certain land which should have been assessed, from invalidating the assessment." If it is shown that certain land which should have been assessed has been omitted, the presump- tion will be that such omission has resulted in a substantial in- crease of the assessment upon the property included in the opera- tion of such assessment.'' While such omission will not be al- lowed to affect the assessment if the amount is trifling, such fact will not be presumed, but must be established.^ One who seeks relief on the ground that certain land which should have been' assessed has been omitted, must, be able to show that he has suf- fered some material prejudice thereby. If all the land which should have been assessed has in fact been included, but some of it has been included as belonging to one who is not its owner, = Bowditch V. City of New Haven, * Gilbert v. City of New Haven, 39 40 Conn. 503 [1873]; Gilbert v. City Conn. 467 [1872]. of New Haven, 39 Conn. 467 [1872]; » State ex rel. Wilson v. Long- Balfe v. Bell, 40 Ind. 337 [1872]; street, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 312 State, Humphreys v. Mayor and [1876]. [The real point involved, Council of the City of Bayonne, 60 however, was that as the oommission- N. J. L. (31 Vr.) 406, 38 Atl. 761 ers could not amend their report [1897]; Davis v. City of Newark, 54 mandamus would not lie to compel N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 144, 23 Atl. 276 them to include such land.] [1891]; State, Eighter, Pros. v. "Masters v. City of Portland, 24 Mayor and C6mmon Council of the Ore. 161, 33 Pac. 540 [1893]. City of Newark, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vr.) 'Hassan v. City of Eochester, 67 104 [18831 N- ^- ^2^ [1876]. •Bowditch V. Citv of New Haven, 'Hassan v. City of Eochester, 67 40 Conn. 503 [1873]. N. Y. 528 [1876]. § 645 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1102 and no advantage is taken by such owner of such defect, another property owner cannot resist such assessment on the ground that property which should have been assessed has been omitted." § 645. Remedies for improper omission. If the legislature has provided a method for attacking the local assessment and has given an opportunity for a full hearing an-1 ample relief, the aggrieved property owner must ordinarily pur- sue such remedy and if he does not take advantage of the defect in the manner indicated by the legislature, he cannot raise the question subsequently. Accordingly, omission to assess land bene- fited by the improvement for which the assessment is levied, must be taken advantage of by the other property owners in the manner indicated by statute, or such objection is to be regarded as waived.^ Thus, if such objection is to be taken advantage of by appeal, omission to appeal prevents the aggrieved property owner from raising such objection in a suit to foreclose such assessment." So, if the remedy of the property owner is manda- mus to compel the assessment of the omitted property, equity will not restrain the collection of such assessment for such- omission.' If the court has power on finding that certain land which should have been assessed has been omitted, to reduce the assessment upon the land which is assessed to the amount it would have borne had no land been omitted improperly, it may exercise such power and refuse to treat the assessment as a nullity.* Under some systems of assessment, the Court has no power to reduce the amount of the assessment to the amount which the assessors would have assessed against the land in question, had they in- cluded land which should have been included but was in fact omitted. "Where the power of the court is thus limited, the court • Cohen v. City of Alameda, 124 sioners of the City of Boston, 176 Cal. 504, 57 Pae. 377 [1899]; Hen- Mass. 210, 57 N. E. 356 [1900]; dricks V. Gilchrist, 76 Ind. 369 Butler v. City of Worcester, 112 [1881]. Mass. 541 [1873]; Downs v. Village 1 Minnesota & M. Land & Improve- of Irvington, 66 (N. Y.) Howard 93 ment Co. v. City of Billings, 111 Fed. [1883]. Rep. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70 [1901]; "Buckman v. Landers, 111 Cal. Buekman v. Landers, 111 Cal. 347, 347, 43 Pac. 1125 [1896]. 43 Pac. 1125 [1890]; McDonald v. ' Heinroth v. Kochersnerger, 173 Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 34 Pac. 71 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171 [1898]. [18931: The Peonle ex rel. Barber v. • Creamer v. MoCune, 7 Mo. App. Chapman, 127 111. 387. 19 N. E. 872: 91 [1879]. Lincoln v. Board of Street Commis- 1103 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 645 can only set aside the assessment where land which should have been assessed is omitted.' If a board of commissioners appointed to assess benefits, omits certain land and has no power to amend its report, the effect of such omission is to invalidate the assess- ment." Improvements are sometimes constructed by corporations which are in outward form private corporations, such . as turn- pike companies. If the appraisers who are to assess lands bene- fited are appointed by the county commissioners, their omission of land within the assessment district is not regarded as the act . of the company in the sense that it is ground for an information against such company.' The omission of property which should be assessed is said to be sufficient ground for enjoining the col- lection of the assessment, but not for enjoining the improvement, since there may be a sufScient fund in the treasury to pay the expense of such improvement.' Cases are found in which prop- erty which is benefited by a public improvement is unintentional- ly omitted from the assessment. Thus, notice may be given to certain property owners but omitted as to others, whereby the lands of the latter class of owners are relieved from such assess- ment. In such case, if the power of levying a supplemental assessment exists, the omission of such land does not invalidate the assessment as to the rest of the property benefited.' The proper procedure is said in other states to be to set aside the entire assessment without prejudice to the right of the city to make a reassessment in which all the land benefited may be in- cluded.*' If no power exists to levy another assessment, which will include the omitted property, the omission of such property is said to invalidate the entire assessment. An assessment was ■ In the Matter of the Petition of » State ex rel. Wilson v. Long- Auehmuty to Vacate an Assessment, street, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 312 18 Hun. 324 [1879]. "There is no [1876]. fixed sum or criterion for the court ' State on the Relation of Lingen- to act upon. The court would occupy felter v. Danville and North Salem the position of assessors and the as- Gravel Road Company, 33 Ind. 133 sessment would be according to its [1870]. judgment instead of the judgment of 'Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545 the assessors. Besides, it would have [1881]. no power to make the assessments • State of Washington, on the Rela- iipon the omitted parcels and thus tion of the Barber Asphalt Paving make a valid assessment for the im- Company v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash, provement. I think that the whole 370, 85 Pac. 11 [1906]. assessment is void." Matter of New "Upington v. Oviatt, 24 O. S. 232 York Protestant Eniscopal School, 75 [1873]. N. Y. 324, 329 [1878]. § 646 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1104 levied in Virginia before the adoption of the recent constitution forbidding assessments for such purposes.^^ This assessment was perfected as to some of the property to be assessed, but not as to the rest, when the new constitution was adopted, making it im- possible to proceed to perfect the incomplete assessments. It was held that the assessments already perfected could not be enforced as this would violate the principle of apportionment ac- cording to benefits. ^^ ^ § 646. Effect of construction of improvement by property owner. If a property owner has done a part or all of the work of con- structing an improvement of a public character, adjoining his property in substantial compliance with the plans adopted by. the public corporation, some allowance must ordinarily be made to such property owner for the value of such work, if the same is used by the city as a part of a subsequent improvement.^ On the other hand, the fact that a property owner has done a part of the work which is used ought not to exempt him from all assessment for the work actually done.^ In such cases, the relief given to the property owner ordinarily takes the form of a credit upon his assessment.^ If the property owner has constructed the en- tire improvement in front of his property, credit of some sort should be made. The method of crediting such property owner is a matter of legislative discretion. It usually assumes one of two forms. The property owner who has constructed the whole of an improvement adjoining his property may be entirely reliev- ed from assessment when the city or other public corporation completes such improvement.* It is proper to omit from assess- ment, land in front of which an improvement has been construet- "See §§ 107, 161. ° People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman, "Fulkerson v. City of Bristol, 105 128 111. 496, 21 N. E. 507 [1890]; Va. 556, 54 S. E. 468 [1906]. In the Matter of Auohmuty, 18 ^Holloran v. Morman, 27 Ind. App. Hun. (N. Y.) 324 [1879]. 309, 59 N. E. 869 [1901]; State, * McDonald v. Conniflf, 99 Cal. 386, Mann, Pros. v. Mayor and Common 34 Pao. 71 [1893]; Diggins v. Brown, .Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1888]; (4 Zab.) 662 [1855]. See § 641. Dumesnil v. Louisville Artificial nn the Matter of Auchmuty, 18 Stone Co., 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. 371 Hun. (N. Y.) 324 [1879]; In the [1900] ; In the Matter of the Assess- Matter of Auohmuty, 11 Hun. (N. ment for Improving East 18th Street, Y.) 76 [1877]; State ex rel. Chris- 75 Hun. (N. Y.) 603, 27 N. Y. Supp. topher V. City of Portage, 14 Wis. 591 [1894]; Hutchinson v. Pittsburg, 550 [1861]. • 72 Pa. St. (22 P. F. Smith) 320 [1872]. ^^^^ PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 646 ed by the owner thereof in accordance with the terms of a stat- ute authorizing property owners to construct the improvement at their own expense and thus relieve such property from assess- ment, if such improvement is in accordance with the plan adopted by the city." Land in front of which an improvement is con- tracted for by one who has no authority to bind the owner of the land, is not exempted from the operation of a contract entered into by the city for improving the street except such part as the owners and representatives of the property had already contract- ed for.° In other jurisdictions, the property owner in front of whose property the work is done is assessed for his share of the cost of the entire improvement and then the cost of the work done by him is credited upon his assessment.^ The result reached by these two methods is substantially the same. Accordingly, under a statute which provides that where a property owner has already made an improvement similar in character to the one proposed, his lot shall be excluded from assessment, it has been held proper to assess the cost of setting new curb stones upon lots in front of which curb stones had already been set by the prop- erty owner and then to credit such property owner with the cost of setting such curb stones.* In the absence of statute, the prop- erty owner cannot by voluntarily constructing an improvement preclude the city from constructing a different style of improve- ment and assessing the abutting property therefor." If the work done by the property owner is not authorized by statute, is not in accordance with the general plan of the improvement adopted by the public corporation" and is not adopted and used by the city, the property owner who has made such improvement volun- tarily, cannot claim exemption from assessment by reason thereof, nor can he claim a credit on the amount of his, assessment for the ''MoSherry v. Wood, 102 Cal. 647, 'People ex rel. Barber v. Chap- 36 Pac. 1010 [1894]; Diggins v. man, 128 III. 496, 21 N. E. 507 Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 18 Pac. 373 [1890]; Holloran v. Morman, 27 [1888]; San Francisco Paving Co. v. Ind. App. 309, 59 N. E. 869 [1901]; Dubois, 2 Cal. App. 42, 83 Pac. 72 Johnson v. City of Tacoma, 41 Wash. [1905]; Dumesnil v. Louisville Arti- 31, 82 Pac. 1092 [1905]. ficial Stone Co., 109 Ky. 1, 58 S. W. ' Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 371 [1900] ; Beck v. Obst, 75 Ky. (12 Wis. 648 [1872]. Bush ) 268 [1876] "Parsons v. City of Columbus, 50 «Chica™ V. Sherwood, 104 111. 549. O. S. 460, 34 N. E. 677 [1893]. [The si-nature "Newton Burke, "Lux & Talbott Stone Company A^ent f"'- Soelpy Estate" was here v. Donalds^n, 162 Ind. 481, 68 N. E. held insufficient.] 1014 [1903]. §§ 647, 648 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1106 cost of such improvement. If the statute provides for exempt- ing such property from assessment if the city approves the kind and quality of the work done, the mere construction of such work without obtaining the approval of the city does not prevent the city from levying an assessment against such property for the cost of the subsequent improvement.^' § 647. Property on which owner has paid invalid assessment. , Where an invalid assessment has been levied and some of the property owners have paid such assessments on their property, it has been held that in case of re-assessment, it is proper to ojnit the property upon which such prior invalid assessment has been paid voluntarily.' § 648. Land already assessed for similar improvement. It is often sought to assess for benefits from an improvement, land which has already been assessed for the same or a similar im- provement. No inflexible rule of law can be laid down for de- termining whether such property can be assessed or not. The question is primarily whether the improvement for which it is sought to levy the assessment confers a benefit upon the prop- erty assessed or not. If such benefit is conferred, payment of the prior assessment does not prevent levy of the subsequent assess- ment.' If, on the other hand, the improvement for which it is sought to levy the assessment, does not confer any special benefit upon the property assessed, such assessment cannot be levied." In most cases, therefore, the question of the existence and pay- ment of a prior assessment is immaterial. Thus, an assessment may be levied for a local sewer upon property which has already been assessed for the construction of a sewer.^ In most jurisdic- tions, the power to improve and to levy local assessments is a con- tinuing power and assessments may be levied for repairs and re- " Philadelphia to Use v. Baker, 140 • Park Ecclesiastical Society v. Pa. St. 11, 21 Atl. 238 [1891]. City of Hartford, 47 Conn. 89 [1879] ; 'Mayor and City Council of Balti- Byram v. Foley, 17 Ind. App. 629, more v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 47 N. E. 351 [1897]. 43 [1894]; (original assessment held ^Toledo v. Potter, 19 Ohio 0. C. invalid in TTIrr-an v. Mayor and City 661 [1893]. Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 'Park Ecclesiastical Society v. 11 L. P. A. 2''4, 32 Am. & Enor. Com. City of Hartford, 47 Conn. 89 [1879] ; Cases 228, 20 Atl. 141. 21 Atl. 709 Bvram v. Folev, 17 Ind. App. 629, [1890]). See also § 64. 47 N. E. 351 [1897]. 1107 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 648 construction where such improvements confer a benefit upon the property assessed.* Statutes are occasionally found which pro- vide that property may be assessed but once for a given kind of improvement. A provision in a city charter that a street may be improved at the expense of the owners of abutting property and that if so improved it shall not be improved again at their expense, has been held to constitute a contract when such owner has paid such assessment and he cannot be assessed for a recon- struction under a subsequent statute which attempts to authorize such assessment." Under a statute which provided that no prop- erty fronting on any street should be exempt from assessment on account of paving such street with a permanent pavement having a concrete foundation, until such property should have paid for the street pavements thereon the sum of three dollars per square yard, and under another statute providing that when a street has once been paved at the cost of the owners of adjoining prop- erty, the expense of construction should be paid out of the gen- eral fund, it was held that where a street had once been paved . at the expense of the owners of adjoining property at a cost of less than three dollars a square yard, an assessment should not be levied for a reconstruction unless it was shown that the pave- ment for which the assessment had been levied had a concrete foundation.® In Pennsylvania, the courts have held that property owners cannot be assessed for reconstruction where the assess- ment is levied on the theory of benefits.'' This doctrine is ap- plied in this state, however, whether the original improvement was paid for by local assessment or by general taxation. If the assessment is one levied under the theory of an exaction for the performance of a public duty, such assessment may be levied for reconstruction.* If an assessment has been levied and is proved to be defective, it has been held proper on re-assessment to omit the property of those who have voluntarily paid the original assessment." Indeed, it is improper to assess such property a ' Williams v. Mayor, etc., of De- ° Assessment for reconstruction of troit 2 Mich. 560 [1853] ; Dunker sidewalk. Wilkinsburg Bor. v. Home V. Stiefel, 57 Mo. App. 379 [1894J. for Aged Women, 131 Pa. St. 109, 6 'Ladd V. City of Portland, 32 Ore. L. E. A. 531, 18 Atl. 937 [1890]. 271 67 Am St. Rep. 526, 51 Pae. 'Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 654* [1898]. 345, 31 L. 763, 8 S. 921 [1888]; (af- • Schintgen v. City of La Crosse, firming Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. 117 Wis. 158, 94 N. W. 84 [1903]. Y. 585, 3 ]Sf. E. 682 [1885]) ; Mayor ' See S 382. ^^^ ^^^y Council of Baltimore v. Ul- § 649 TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT. 1108 second time unless the city has repaid to such owners the amount 'of the assessment thus paid by them/' If property benefited is exempted by the legislature because the owner thereof has al- ready contributed his share toward the cost of such improvement,. it is generally held that such exemption does not invalidate such assessments." It has, however, been held in some jurisdictions that such exemption invalidates the assessment.^^ § 649. Title not involved. In determining what property may be assessed on the theory of benefits for the cost of constructing a legal improvement, the question of the title or ownership of such property is not involved in the absence of a statutory provision making questions as to such ownership material.^ Thus, an action to have special tax bills paid out of the proceeds arising from the condemnation of land, does not involve the title of land within the meaning of a statute giving to the Supreme Court jurisdiction of such cases irrespective of the amount involved.^ If, however, the question of personal liability of the owner of the property assessed is in- volved, a person who is charged with the payment of an assess- ment may show that he is not in fact the owner of the property assessed.^ Thus, an alleged owner of property may show that he possesses merely an easement in the nature of a right of way man, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43 [1894]; Zion Church of the City of Balti- State ex rel. Eaton v. District Court more v. Mayor and City Council of of Ramsey County, 95 Minn. 503, 104 Baltimore, 71 Md. 524, 18 Atl. 895 N. W. 553 [1905]. [1889]; Masonic Building Associa- " State, Norris, Pros. v. City of tion v. Brownell, 164 Mass. 306, 41 Elizabeth, 51 N. J. L. (22 Vr.) 485, N. E. 306 [1896]; Smith v. Carney, 18 Atl. 302 [1889]. 127 Mass. 179 [1879]; Brewer v. "Warren v. Street Commissioners City of Springfield, 97 Mass. 152 of the City of Boston, 187 Mass. 290, [1867]; E^ss v. Gates, 183 Mo. 338, 72 N. E. 1022 [1905]; City of Erife 81 S. W. 1107 [1904]; Roberts v. V. Griswold, 184 Pa. St. 435, 39 Atl. First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N. 231 [1898]. D. 504, 79 N. W. 1049 [1899]; Vil- " Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 lage of St. Bernard v. Kemper, 60 S. W. 184 [1886]. ' 0. S. 244, 45 L. R. A. 662, 54 N. E. iffimmelmann v. Steiner, 38 Cal. 267 [1899]. See § 887 et seg. 175 [1869]; Murphey v. Mayor and ^Ross v. Gates, 183 Mo. 338, 81 S. Coimcil of Wilminffton, 5 Del. Ch. W. 1107 [1904]. 281 [18791; McGili v. Bruner, 65 'Dashiell v. Mayor and City Ind. 421 [1879] ; Ball v. Balfe, 41 Council of Baltimore, Use of Hax, 45 Ind. 221 [18721; Fe^idi? v. Knight, Md. 615 [1876]; Board of Health v. 60 la. 29. 14 N. W. 78 [18821; Gil- Gloria Dei., 23 Pa. St. (11 Harr.) more v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 [1872]; 259 [1854]. 1109 PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT. § 650 over such property and the legal title thereto is not in such al- leged owner.* The fact that the owner of property is under legal disability does not prevent such property from being assessed on the theory of benefits.^ Thus, where coverture constitutes a dis- ability, land belonging to a married woman may nevertheless be assessed for its share of the cost of a street improvement." § 650. Change of statute pending assessment proceedings. If the statute which provides what property may be subject to assessment is changed after the commencement of the proceed- ings which will result in an assessment, such statute is ordinarily regarded as not retroactive.^ Where the law in force when the improvement ordinance was passed required council to fix the front of the land assessed to the usual depth of the lots in the neighborhood in case among others "there be lots numbered and recorded .... lying lengthwise" along such street, and be- fore the assessment was made the law was amended omitting re- ference to lots lying lengthwise, it was held that the assessment should be levied in accordance with the law in force when the im- provement ordinance was passed.^ At the time that the work was done the statute in force allowed only abutting lots to be assessed. Before the assessment was levied, the statute was changed so that other property than that abutting might be assessed,^ but it was held that the assessment for this work could be only upon abutting lots.* A different view has been entertained in some jurisdictions.^ At the time of the adoption of the improvement ordinance, the statute in force limited the assessment to contiguous property. Subsequently this statute was amended omitting the word "contiguous" and allowing any ■property benefited to be assessed. Subsequently, a supplemen- tary petition was filed in the assessment proceedings. It was held that the assessment might be made under the law as it stood when the assessment was made and might therefore include ' Board of Health v. Gloria Dei., ' Cincinnati v. Seasongood, 46 0. 23 Pa. St. (11 Harr.) 259 [1854]. S. 296, 21 N. E. 630 [1889]. 'Ball V Balfe, 41 Ind. 221 [1872]. 'Ray v. City of Jeflfersonville, 90 "Ball V. Balfe, 41 Ind. 221 [1872]. Ind. 567 [1883]. • Durrett v. Kenton County, — * Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347, (Ky.) , 87 S. W. 1070, 27 Ky. 10 N. E. 92 [1886]. . Law Eep. 1173 [1905]; Jones v. Al- ° In the Matter of Westlake Ave- dermen of Boston, 104 Mass. 461. nue, Seattle, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 [1905]. KF 6785 Pl^ Author Vol. Page, Wm. Herbert v.l Title CopT Taxation by Local and Special. . .