THE LIBRARY OF THE NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924002687386 The People's Money. A Brief Analysis of the Present Position in America, With some Observations on the World-Organisation of Labour. By JOHN W. de KAY. COPYRIGHT 1913 By JOHN W. DB KA.Y, I^ONDON : EFFINGHAM WILSON, 54 Thrbadnekdle Street, E.C. ffWVvT The People's Money. A Brief Analysis of the Present Position in America, With some Observations on the World - Organisation of Labour. THERE is an increasing feeling through- out the United States that there has developed in recent years a power with which the Government is unable to cope, and which is beyond the control of the public. The steps by which this power has been centred in the hands of a few men are little known or understood by the public at large, and the vast majority of the American people have no part in them, except that they are victims of a system by which they are legally robbed, and by which (if it is not stopped) they will be politically enslaved. There has been widespread inquiry, which has sought to get at the root of this hitherto undefined evil. It has been considered that the banking system in America was the basis upon which this evil was founded. There has been a vast amount of legisla- tion for the control of banks and banking, as a means by which the great aggregations of capital in the United States might be kept within reasonable bomids. The difficulty with all of the inquiry and all of the legislation is that it has failed to measure the scope of this aggregated capital or to take adequate account of the means by which it has been concentrated. Though not generally understood, it is a fact that the centralised control of capital through banks represents but a single unit in a huge system, and that the banks have been only one of the instruments employed to enable a relatively small number of men to gain a control which is almost inconceiv- able in its scope and power over the fortunes and the destiny of the commercial Ufe of America. I^egislation, in order to be effective and in order to remedy to any considerable extent the grave conditions existing in America, must be more fundamental. It is sound so far as it goes, to prescribe the conditions under which banks may loan their resources against the securities of cor- 3 porations, but legislation, in order to be of practical value, must go deeper than this. It must establish a new basis upon which securities may be created. I go so far as to say that no system of banking laws can be devised to remedy existing conditions unless they are a part of a broad national system which deals with the formation and conduct of all important enterprises. Private individuals in America organise banks and trust companies because they can through these banks and trust companies utilise their capital to a better advantage than by using it as private banking-houses. This is due chiefly to the public belief that through a system of Government regulation and control there is an added element of safety which does not exist as regards private banks. On the whole there are fewer failures of private banking-houses than of either National or State banks. But this is due chiefly to the fact that pri- vate banks are not as a rule the depositories of large sums of the people's money, but are rather principally devoted to finance outside of banking and to the placing of securities 4 of public corporations. The element of security which Government control is sup- posed to afford is one of the large factors in obtaining for organised banks the deposits of the general public, and these deposits, which are in normal times the principal strength and resource of all banks, become in times of trouble their chief peril. In the great financial centres of America the relatively few men who a century ago would have been private bankers have now created the leading National and State banking institutions in all of these financial centres. It frequently happens that the real owners of these banks do not appear either as officers or directors, but they exercise their control over these banks through men whom they have selected to carry out their policy. These real owners of the banks are fre- quently engaged as prominent private bankers in New York and elsewhere. They undertake, as private bankers, the placing of great issues of securities with the public, and they use in these issues, directly and indirectly, the money of the people entrusted 5 to the National and State banks. The broad principle which I wish to make clear is that the ^ evils attendant upon the con- centration of wealth cannot be remedied by mere legislation designed to control National and State banks. The part, great and important as it is, which is played by the National and State banks in furthering the plans of a few men in the United States is relatively small when considered in connection with the larger questions involved. If these larger questions are not dealt with, banking legislation will be futile. If a number of private individuals were to establish, for example, in New York, a private bank with capital and surplus equal to the leading National bank in New York, and if this private bank had as its partners the same men who constitute the board of the leading National bank in New York, they could not, through their private bank, obtain for themselves more than a very small fraction of the benefits which they now obtain through incorporating a part of their resources into a National bank. It is for this reason, chiefly, that they organise a National bank. ,In tHs National bank they have con- stantly on deposit not only, large sums belonging to the commercial commmiity, but also funds belonging to thousands of banks throughout the United States. If these thousands of banks were to de- posit their money in a private bank it would not be considered as " reserve " under the National Bank Act, and therefore it would not be deposited with a private bank. There is in the United States a National bank with five milKon dollars of capital, which has on deposit with it upwards of 50 million dollars of money belonging to some thousands of other banks throughout the United States. This bank is, I beheve, con- trolled by that small group of men which dictates the financial pohcy of America. I do not say that this bank is not sound or that it is not well managed, but I cite it merely as an illustration of the means by which a few men [with the investment of a relatively small amount of money, may be placed in control of the people's money to the extent of from 16 to 50 times the amount of their own capital involved. It is the principle upon which these institutions may be created, and the use to which they may be put in the creation of public companies that is subject to criticism. Men of re- sources and power organise National banks, not primarily because they are in favour of the present system, but because they can, through this channel better than through any other, keep under their control, not only the resources which they invest in the National bank, but the great resources, by way of deposits, of the people's money, which, under the American system of banking, they could not secure in any other way. This being, as it undoubtedly is, the position, it must follow that no legislation which is directed to the control and super- vision of banks can be effective as a solution of the great problem in which banking con- trol is only one of the important parts. I propose to indicate the broad lines along which I believe it is necessary to proceed in order that Corporation business and banking may be placed upon a sound basis as regards their relations to the whole people, and without violence to the 8 just interests of any part of the people. The theory of this legislation must be that it shall not be designed for tiie purpose of transferring the power now in the hands of a few men into the hands of another class of men, but rather that it is legislation passed by a Government of the people and so conceived that it shall be, legislation for the people. It should be so designed as to effectually prevent the present or any future group of men from doing what they are now able to do — ^namely, it should > prevent the confiscation of liie resources of the masses by making it impossible to create a security which represents nothing , and exchange that security for what is the equivalent of accumulated toil. I believe that, as the great resources of production, manufacture and distribution are now to an extent generally unrealised in the control of institutions created by the State, it is within the power of the people who constitute the State to enact, without violence and without hate, mea- sures which are founded upon such broad principles of justice as will give to every member of society a fair equivalent for what he contributes to the welfare of society and that they will give neither more nor less than this. It is useless to say what is being said every day by able and prominent men throughout the country — ^that the roads which lead to power are, under our present system, open to aU men. The truth is rather that in every society there are only a very small number of people capable of commanding or of using power, and, so far as the vast majority are concerned, for all the practical purposes of their hves, the roads which lead to power are and wiU for ever be closed. Legislation enacted by the people must deal with people as they are, and must recognise that what is wrong if obtained by a few men would be equally wrong if obtained by many men. It is the lot of the majority of men that to a greater or a less extent they must be controlled by other men. But we have given the ballot to the people, and we are imder a Government where numbers are intended to be supreme. It has been the purpose of the few to combine while they have kept the many 10 divided. The great majority of men who do the real work of the world are content to have peace and a chance to labour, and, measured by a rational standard of living, they are satisfied with what in reality is a small part of the wealth they create. Modem machinery and competition have tended to make men only so many units in a great system, [and through modem corporations the individual has been ab- sorbed and lost. But the time is coming when a few men will no longer be able to allocate to themselves and to their machines an arbitrary and undue part of all pro- duction while they distribute to the pro- ducers of that wealth a mere fraction of what they produce. There is no greater fallacy than to say that men are created equal, but all men, regardless of the inequality of their natural endowments, have the right to work, and with it the right to receive a fair propor- tion of the result of that work. It is too much to expect of human nature that the natural helplessness of the many wiU ever cause the few to voluntarily deal. n with them, not as competitive units in a vast machine, but rather as men who have the right to live, to labour and to play. What has been heretofore denied to the people as a whole may be obtained by them through the power now in their hands, if that power is exercised for the purpose of sound and effective control over those institutions which, under the authority of the State, have been organised and devel- oped on Hnes which in principle are unsotmd and in operation unfair to the whole people. I wotdd Hke to be able to make jt clear to the masses of men that they have, by dividing their power over what are really minor matters of government, failed to avail themselves of the use of that broad power which is in their hands for the enactment of measures which are funda- mental to nations as a whole, and which vitally affect the chief interests of the great body of voters wherever they may be located and to whatever party they may belong. I shall deal with National and State bsmking, and with corporations, and under these headings indicate the remedies which 12 the people mjy apply to solve the great problem of their generation, and by which they may bequeath to posterity a new heritage. I have said somewhere that life insurance is love's tribute to death, but to the real rulers of America, who are enthroned in New York, life insurance means that the gathered millions of the American people are so much more power in a few hands, enabling them to extend their control to the farthest comers of the banking world in America, and to so increase their power that no great business can be carried on in America without their sanction. Yoti must pay tribute to Wall Street if you would develop the resources of Texas and Dakota. It is not necessary to deny to capital the right to name its price, but the great danger to American business and to the free institutions of this country is that a small group of men have, by the adroit use of the opportunities afforded by our new civilisation and our vast resources, so centred in themselves the financial power of the country that they are able to fix 13 terms which can prevent any individual enterprise on a large scale. What I propose to show is that property and integrity combined have the right to credit, and that when the banking institu- tions of a country fall into such lines that a small group of men in a single city in that country have the power to prevent a man of integrity, ability and resources from obtaining any credit, the people must establish an institution which, upon sound lines, will be unable to discriminate against any man. It is the boasted glory of the United States that it is a free cotmtry, but there is no country in the world in which men are, beyond a certain point, less free. It has been impossible for the people of the United States to establish a Parcel Post because it would interfere with the abusive monopoly now enjoyed by Express Companies, which are controlled in Wall Street. You can send a package by parcel post from London to New York and across the United States to San Francisco, a distance of more than seven thousand miles for less than it costs to send that package by Express one 14 hundred miles in the United States. The telegraph monopoly is another pro- duct of Wall Street, which takes its huge toll from a patient people in a free country ! There was a popular demand for Post Office Savings Banks, and a law establishing them, was finally passed by Congress, but it was so cleverly devised in the interests of bank- ers, rather than to serve the people, that it is of little practical value. It is surrounded by such stupid restrictions and limitations as to prevent its general use. That is as the bankers intended it should be. It has been the history of all people that they have lost their freedom through the institutions of their own making, and the American people have set up institutions in this country which have already taken away from them the freedom of individual enterprise on an extended scale, and which, unless they are altered, will take away their pohtical freedom. The man who has power to make or destroy the credit of another man has as much absolute power over that man as the feudal lord had over his slave. If you have the power to take away the means 15 by which a man may live you have the ultimate power over that man — ^namely, the power of life and death. The business of the world is done on credit. The transactions not based upon credit are probably a fraction of i per cent. Broadly speaking, the banks of a country are the great creditors in that country. By far the largest part of the resources of every bank are the moneys which the people have entrusted to that bank. A study of the reports issued by the American banks will show that practically the whole of the loans and discounts of every bank are funds which belong to their depositors. They are loaning other people's money, not their own. This is a well-founded reason why all possible safeguards should be placed upon their transactions. They might be willing to risk their own capital, but they must not take undue risk with capital which is not their own. It was upon this theory that the National Banking lyaws were enacted, and it is this principle which has been the dominating factor in the State supervision and control of State and private banks. i6 lyike many other meastires which seem to be sound in theory, they do not work out in practice. Hand in hand with measures which will safeguard depositors there must be such a sol;d basis for credit as wiU protect the borrower from discrimination and abuse, and since no system can be devised as regards National, State, or private banks which can require them to extend credit where for personal reasons they may not wish to do so, the people must estabUsh a great central bank vmder the safeguards and for the purposes I shall hereafter set out. I know of an institution in one of the leading cities of America which has fixed and Uquid assets of upwards of seven milhon dollars. It is an institution owned and controlled by practical men. A quarter of a century ago they started on a small scale, and by a combination of talent and integrity they have developed a business of inter-State importance. The president of the institution was invited to become a director in one of the leading National banks in his city. As a director in this bank he objected to the large lines of credit 17 . . extended to the president of the bank. He pointed out that the loans involved a great element of spectdation, that they were made in respect of enterprises out- side the legitimate range of the bank's activities, that the money so employed was needed in the community, and that the loans should be reduced. From the stand- point of good banking the objections of this director seemed to be sound, and his position a reasonable one. The concern with which this director was connected had large lines of credit with important banks in New York, Philadelphia, Boston and elsewhere. Soon after he had objected to the course being pursued by the local bank, the outside banks began to call the loans in which he and his company were interested. The means employed to discredit and, if possible, to destroy this director were simple and effective. His enemies used the office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States. It is weU-known that the National Bank Examiners appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency are clothed with ample power, which they may and sometimes do. i8 exercise arbitrarily and unjustly. In this particular instance the local National Bank Examiner intimated that the local banks must call the loans of the director in question. In widely . scattered sections of the United States other National Bank Examiners expressed a similar view con- cerning the paper of this director. The mischief had been done in the Comptroller's office in Washington, and the boycott was complete. In the meantime matters in the local bank were coming to a crisis, and the pubHc became aware that there were serious differences among the directors, and that these differences might involve the stability of the bank. The loo-dollar par shares of this bank stood in the market at about 500 dollars per share. The director under discussion was the largest single stockholder in the bank. The pubUc began to withdraw their money, and the bank lost several million dollars of deposits. The value of the shares decreased about one-half. The terms upon which the local Bank Examiner would permit the bank to con- tinue business were that the directors »9 should charge off a large part of the bank's surplus, and that he (the local Bank Examiner) should be made president of the bank at a salary of 25,000 dollars a year. I have given prominence to this incident because the principle involved strikes at the root of the free institutions of America and menaces the personal Hberty of every business man -in the cotmtry. It is too weU established to need reitera- tion here that the theory upon which Nat- ional and State banks are created is that the men of local prominence throughout the country, being familiar with the resources and standing of individuals and companies in their locality, are the best possible judges as to the extent to which they are entitled to credit. In the instance above cited the important National bank referred to was, through the arbitrary power at his disposal, placed under the control of a clerk from the Comptroller's office. I am advised that this clerk had been drawing a salary of about 5,000 dollars a year. In his new position he draws 25,000 dollars a year, and it would 20 seem that he was hardly qualified, either by his experience or training or know- ledge of the local conditions, %to occupy the position which he forced the bank to give him. This is one side of the evil of the present system. From causes which are too fundamental to be removed by legislation, it will not be possible to obUterate abuses where the exercise of discretion and arbitrary power are involved. It is therefore, imperative, that a bank shall be created to which, with aU due allowance for the abuse of power, the people may have recourse from the evils involved under the present system. Another grave defect which has been found to exist in actual practice is that in nearly every community this power, sooner or later, falls into the hands of men who, through their wish to monopolise the various lines of business, are able, by the interlocking of directors, to cripple or destroy any individual or institution in their locality, and they have the power to effec- tively prevent the success, upon a large scale, of any new institution which has not previously made terms with them or in- 21 terested them in its success. When the individual is thus attacked locally, and he obtains outside support from banks in various parts of the country, the banking interests which seek to destroy his credit have immediate recourse to the machinery of the Comptroller's office in Washington as to National banks, and through the State Banking Departments as to State banks, and by the means of this machinery they are able to call his loans throughout the country and prevent him making fresh ones. He has one of three alternatives left : — First, sell the control of his business to the men who have destroyed his credit and become their employee. Second, discharge his current HabiHties through the reduction of his working stocks and other quick assets, or Third, endeavour to finance his opera- tions in Europe. As to the first, aU men of spirit refuse to accept it. The difficulties in the way of adopting the second course are so munerous and fund- amental as to make it generally imprac- 22 ticable. If he curtail his lines of credit to customers below the established normal basis his customers are forced to place their business elsewhere. If, as another alterna- tive, he reduce his stock in hand and his raw material in process of manufacture, he must reduce his output and as the basis of his manufactured cost is determined by the volume of his output, if he takes this latter course he would soon find himself unable to produce his product on a basis of competitive cost, and gradually his position and business are lost. If he takes the last course that may be open to him, and seeks his capital in a for- eign country, the chances are ten to one against his success. When he presents his business, say, in London, the London institution (if the business appeals to it) makes inquiries of its New York corres- pondent, which, ninety-nine times in a hundred, is one of the well-known New York banks. In the ordinary course if the inquiry is made in such a way as to indicate that the London inquirer will be to a great extent governed by the New York reply, the New York bank is naturally reluctant to take any responsibiKty. Assuming the most favourable conditions to exist in New York, and that the New York bank is not governed by any ulterior or personal motive which would cause it to make an unfavourable report without inquiry, this New York bank wiU inquire of its correspondent in the locality where the industry is situated. Usually this local correspondent is the leading bank. Sometimes the New York bank may have two or more local banks as its correspond- ents. It asks each bank for an expression of its opinion as to the standing and resources of the concern in question, and as to whether it is entitled to confidence and credit. I do not go so far as to say that in every case the local boycott is unjustified, but I believe it will be agreed by aU men of affairs and experience that in the great majority of instances this local boycott exists for reasons which may not involve, or reflect upon, the resources of the institution or the standing of the men who control it, and that the inability of the institution to obtain the local credit to which it is entitled may not be founded 24 upon a legitimate or bpna fide reason. The report, therefore, which the local bank makes to its New York correspondent, and which the New York bank in turn passes on to London, is of such a nature that in due course, the l^ondon house sends an intimation to the effect that it is unable to entertain the business. The financial section of every great city is a ' whispering gallery,' and whether it be London, Paris, Brussels, or Berlin, there are only a small number of houses which are either willing or able to finance important American undertakings. In pre- senting his business to a second house in any of these cities the American is boimd in honour to say that it has been under the consideration of a given house, and that, for reasons which he does not know," it has been decUned by it. In the majority of instances this is sufficient to prevent the business being done in Europe — and thus the arm of the local boycott has been long enough to reach around the world. Behind the simple paragraphs in the metropolitan newspapers of America in which amalgamations are announced, and 25 the appointment of receivers are noted, there is the long unpublished struggle which I have outlined above, and through which many of the best men in America have been brought to ruin. I know that in bringing this about, men have worked in accordance with their n3,ture, and that you cannot change this nature. It is not necessary to discuss the men who have acquired this power, and who use it as they do, but rather to point out how the abuses of such power in the hands of any group of men may be imme- diately minimised and ultimately abolished . It is probable that many generations will pass before society is established upon a basis that wiU require every man to render to society a fuU equivalent for what he receives. When the present devices are no longer practicable, there will be new methods put into effect to enable a small minority of society to dictate an xmjust distribution of the product of all toil. When over-capitalisation, adulteration and the rental system are all abohshed there will be other means employed to permit the 26 few to control the fortunes and the lives of the many. In the nature of things this is inevitable. I hold no optimistic view that exact justice and the broad principle of equality can, or ever will be established among men. But there is between the conditions of the present and even an approach to those better conditions of the future a vast chasm of wrong and injustice, which may, without wrong or injustice, be bridged. The fundamental defect with nearly all " reform " legislation is that it seeks to transfer from its present hands into other hands the machinery through which this injustice and these wrongs are made pos- sible, instead of aiming to abolish it alto- gether. It will, I believe, be generally conceded that if B is given the power and the oppor- tunity which are to-day in the hands of A, he will use them as A has used them. His course may differ in one or another way, but its effect will broadly be the same. The nature of man will not change. It is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever. What have changed, and will never cease to change, are the relations which the members of society bear to each other, and to the aggregate. We have sought to prevent men from taking by violence the property of other men, and as regards open violence and petty larceny we have succeeded. But we have not succeeded in preventing men, through perfectly legal means, from appro- priating to themselves the life-savings and the life-earnings of millions of other men against their wiU and without their con- sent. We do not find any difficulty in putting a man in prison if he steals a loaf of bread when he is hungry, but we find great diffi- culty in putting a man in prison if he steals a railroad because he wants more money and more power. The difference is that petty larceny is illegal and the grand larceny is legal. We should make the grand larceny impossible and the petty larceny unnecessary. Since nearly all of the principal business of the world is done by corporations which derive their existence from the State, the solution lies to a great extent in a proper 28 control over organised capital. I intend to indicate the broad lines along which this control may be eflFectivel> exercised in such a manner as to avoid unjust interference with capital or unrea- sonable restrictions upon individual en- deavour. The adoption of measures which wiU give effect to the following plan would go a long way toward the solution of the greatest question of this age : My suggestions are, briefly : — I. — ^AU corporations in the United States should be licensed by the Federal Govern- ment. Under the theory by which the union of our States has been established there are practical and well-founded diffi- culties in the way of restricting the right of the separate States in the exercise of their present control over State affairs, and it may be that the great businesses which at present control the inter-State commerce of the country would not seek to avoid a rational control by the Federal Government. If in practice it should be found that companies doing an inter-State business were able to thwart the wUl of 29 the nation, I would so amend the Constitu- tion of the United States as to deprive the separate States of their right to grant charters to companies transacting an inter- State business or which are a unit in or a part of a larger company, which transacts such business. Undoubtedly earnest objection will be raised to a plan which, in its e£fect, places in the power of the Federal Government the great centralised control and domina- tion which I believe it is entitled to exercise over public corporations. There are many sotmd answers to this objection, and one of such answers is that under the theory of our government the people are supreme, and that no permanent injustice can be inflicted through the machinery of Federal control except with the consent of the people as a whole. If the enlarged powers which I would confer upon the Federal Government should be abused, the remedy for this abuse is in the hands of the people, whereas under the present system of corporation control the people as a whole are without any remedy or power of control. 30 I believe that, broadly, the people can be relied upon to legislate for the benefit of the aggregate, in the same manner that we must expect the few to endeavour to protect the interests of the few. II. — ^The Federal licence should be gran- ted from year to year — say, from March ist to March ist. III. — ^All private individuals or unincor- porated firms transacting a yearly volume of business above a fixed minimum should be required to incorporate such business in order to bring them under effective central control. Congress should prescribe the form of the application to be made in respect to each of such corporations seek- ing a Government licence. This form should be so comprehensive in the scope of its questions as to exhibit the true position of each company and give the details of its capital and trading accounts. It should be certified under oath by the president and a majority of the board of directors of each company. The Government should reserve the right to require specific replies, under oath, to any questions which might be raised 31 through an examination of the company's report, and, if not satisfied with the course pursued by the company, the Government should decline to grant an extension of the company's right to carry on its business. rV. — ^The basis of the organisation of each company to be submitted to the Government, and approved by it prior to the formation of the company. Each company to be required, before it is authorised to begin the transaction of its business, to issue a prospectus, in which all of the facts in regard to the formation of the company shall be fully set out. The prospectus must contain the names and addresses of everyone who has had to do with the formation of the company, and the nature and extent of the interest which he has acquired or agreed to acquire in the company, and what he is paying for it. Every corporation should be prohibited from issuing any stocks, bonds, debentures, or other certificates of interest or obliga- tion, except for actual cash, at par. AU agreements having to do with the formation of the company to be set out in 32 a schedule in the prospectus, the efEect of each agreement being stated in the prospec- tus, and a copy of all of such agreements to be open to public inspection for one clear week in the dty where the company- is organised or where the issue of its securi- ties is being made, and a certified copy of all of these agreements and contracts to be filed with the Department of Corpora- tions of the Federal Government. If an understanding has been arrived at that A or B is to subscribe for a certain interest in the company, and to pay for this interest in cash, and that this cash is to be subsequently repaid to|A or B for pro- perty to be acquired from A or B, the nature of such property and thejprice at which it is being acquired|are to be set out in the prospectus, together with a statement from A or B as to the amount which this property has cost him. This prospectus and information to be pubUshed in fuU in one or more of the leading newspapers in the city in which the company is organised or in which its securities are being issued. Each director of the company to be personally responsible for the accuracy 33 of every statement in the prospectus. I would prescribe that, regardless of the State in which the company had been organised, it should be required before the issuance of its securities, and before it began to transact any business, to place all of the documents above mentioned before the Department of Corporations of the Federal Government with an applica- tion to the Federal Gk)vermnent for a Federal licence to commence business. If the Federal Government decline to grant this licence, I should allow the corporation to proceed with its business, but would require that the communication of the Government in declining to grant the requested licence should state clearly the ground upon which it declined, and all of the correspondence on the subject should be published in the prospectus. With the safeguards above set out, the public would be able to determine for itself whether this refusal of the Govern- ment to grant the licence was based upon a defect which should prevent the public from becoming interested in the securities. I would give the company the right to .34 subsequently apply to the United States Court for an order requiring the Govern- ment to issue this licence, and I would give either the Government or the Company the right of final appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Under the Companies' Act in Great Britain it is necessary to set out in the prospectus some of the information above indicated, but this information is usually set out in such a way that the public is unable to understand it. If, however, this information were submitted to the Department of Corporations of the Federal Government, the experts in charge of the Department would be able to detect the weakness in the organisation of the pro- posed company, where this weakness under the present system is unobserved by the investing public. In any subsequent year, if the Govern- ment for any reason decided to withhold the company's licence to do business, the question should likewise be submitted to the Court, and its decision should be final, and in the meantime the company should be allowed to carry on its business without 35 the Federal licence. If the ruling of the Department was sustained by the Court, the company would be restrained from further transaction of its business until it had met the requirements of the Govern- ment and obtained its licence, or had met the requirements laid down by the Court. Owing to the great amount of controversy that would inevitably arise, it might not be practicable for these questions to take their course through the existing tribunals, but since the carrying out of these measures would constitute one of the great functions of the Government, there might be set up special tribunals, created as the existing tribunals are created, for the sole purpose of dealing with the questions which these measures would raise. I have reason to know that in 1911 repre- sentations were made to the Government of Canada in regard to the conduct of one of the great corporations of Canada which required, in order to carry on its business, that the Government of Canada shovild extend its charter, and I am aware that the Government of Canada, instead of granting the customary extension of this 36 charter for a period of ten years, granted a temporary extension to July ist, 1912, and subsequently granted a further exten- sion to July ist, 1913. I believe that as a result of the representations made to the Canadian Government measures will be enacted by that Government to prevent the recurrence of the abuses heretofore practised, and that these measures will be enacted before or concurrently with the further extension of the company's charter. I refer to this incident because in the ordinary course it might be very difficult for the Government of Canada to give efiFect to what it may consider necessary as meas- ures to remedy the evils complained of, and that perhaps the chief power of the Government in this instance arises from the fact that only by the passage of an Act extending the charter of the Canadian institution is this institution able to con- tinue its business. Under the charter granted to this institution it was assumed that by an Act of recurring legislation, to be passed in the ordinary course, the char- ter of this institution would be from time to time extended for ten-year periods. 37 But the point which I wish to make is that, because aflSrmative action on the part of the Canadian Government was from time to time necessary to perpetuate the charter of this company, there was placed in the hands of the Canadian Government the broad power to decline to extend this charter unless in the judgment of the Government this extension carried with it measures for the adequate protection of the public. It may be very diflScult to remedy by legislation those specific abuses of the general powers conferred upon corporations where it would not be diflficult to apply this remedy through refusal to extend the licence in instances where power had been abused. I have now to deal with the remedy for the abuses mentioned arising through the centralised control of existing banking institutions in the United States. This remedy would take away the power of one man to destroy the business and credit of another man, and, taken together with the measures set out as safeguards in the formation and conduct of companies, it 38 would put the banking power and the cor- poration profits of the whole of the United States upon a sound basis as regards the millions who have created the existing wealth in this country, and who are to create its future wealth. It would raise the basis of individual and company credit to such a solid plane as to for ever remove the possibility of an individual or an institu- tion being denied the resources to conduct their business if they are entitled to such resources. I would create a great central bank, which would not have the power to loan its resources to anyone who did not have security, but which would also be unable to refuse to loah its resources to any one who did have security. I am aware that the personal element involved in the control of property may well be regarded as the chief basis for a loan against such property, and also that in special circumstances it may be sound banking to loan money to men who have no property. I would leave these special circumstances to be dealt with as they are now dealt with, and I would estabUsh a central bank — ^to be 39 controlled by the people — for the purpose of affording credit to men who possess property, but who, for one reason or another may be deprived of the credit to which they are entitled by this property. The currency reform plan recommended to the people of the United States by the Aldrich Committee would, if it had been adopted, have had the effect of further concentrating the money resources of the country under the arbitrary control of a small group of men whose present domina- tion of these resources constitutes one of the chief perils to America. The organisa- tion of a central bank, as proposed by that committee, would in practice extend the existing grave defect by which to-day the credit of some of the most important and soundest concerns in America does not depend upon either their resources or the stability and intelligence of their manage- ment, but upon the caprice of a local banker who, through the present organisation of money, is given the power to extend his otherwise inconsiderable influence to the remotest part of the world. It is well known that practically the loaning power 49 of every financial institution of the United States is somewhat less than the deposits of the money of the people in the banks of the United States. It is dear, therefore, that it is through the control of the people's money that a few men have acquired and retain their vast power in America. This same statement as regards the deposits and the loans of banks in the United States ■ applies with almost equal accuracy to every country in the world. The remedy which I propose is needed perhaps more in the United States than in any other country ; but I beUeve that its broad value to every country wiU be at once apparent. To-day the money deposited by the people of the United States in the banks of the country brings them an interest return which varies from nothing at aU up to a maximum of 4 per cent, on deposits left for a considerable and specified length of time. In times of unrest in the United States the evil of our present system is vastly exaggerated, and again has the effect of increasing the power and the profits of a 41 few men in liie financial centres of America. The great financial panics of recent years in the United States have been precipitated by the gambling in Wall Street when the general condition of national prosperity and the expansion of national wealth made such panics unnecessary and unjustifiable. When the investors of the country become uneasy and sell their securities, and gen- erally withdraw their cash from the indus- tries of the country, they for the most part deposit this cash with the leading banks. The men in control of these banks use this money to manipulate the value of all securities in America and to take for them- selves the benefits of the depreciation which they have caused in all classes of securi- ties, and they have manipulated this depre- dation and taken advantage of these conditions by using the money entrusted to them by the people. When matters have reached their lowest state of depres- sion the financial manipulators begin to raise the prices of the various stocks and bonds which the inside interests have, with the money of the people, controlled on small margins, and by loans from the 42 banks which they dominate. These inter- ests sell back to the people the stocks and bonds which they frightened the people into disposing of, and the huge difference in price goes to further augment the riches of those who have controlled the people's money, and who, by the use of that money, have not only worked untold injury to the country, but have appropriated to them- selves a substantial part of the identical money which the people entrusted to the banks. I was the owner of a considerable amount of the shares of a well-known New York National bank, which was not then con- trolled by the so-called Money Trust. This bank was a sound commercial institution, doing an old-fashioned banking business, and declining to place its resources at the disposal of the Wall Street gamblers. The bank preferred to pursue the sounder course of legitimate banking and loan its depositors' money to established mercan- tile and manufacturing concerns who were its customers. I saw the stock of this bank beaten down in one day from 340 dollars per share to 200 dollars per share, 43 although the institution was, and, so far as I know, now is, one of the soundest and best-managed banks in New York. It would retjuire volumes to tell the story which is woven around the abuse of the banking power in America. There are hundreds of men and institutions whose fortunes and reputations have been ruined in every chapter of that long unpublished story. I do not believe that anyone will seriously urge that the grave defects which exist should not be definitely reme- died, and I beheve if the inside informa- tion which is possessed by a few men were reaKsed and understood by the people at large, nothing could restrain them in their demand that an effective remedy should be forthmth applied. I have followed as closely as possible the various remedies which have from time to time been proposed. These remedies have invariably been either entirely fanci- ful and unworkable, or they have been cleverly devised plans to further augment (and NOT to remedy) the existing evil. The Government bonds of the United States are held as the sole guarantee of the 44 currency of all National banks. These bonds are purchased from the Government, and the Government regularly pays the interest on them to the banks. The bank then issues its currency to the full par value of all such bonds. It then loans that cur- rency to the people. The effect of this transaction is that as soon as the bank has purchased, say, one million dollars or any other sum of Government bonds, for which it has paid shghtly more than par, it deHvers those bonds back to the Govern- ment and receives National bank notes for the full par value of such bonds. The resources of the bank are, to that extent, invested in a sound security, upon which the bank will perpetually draw its interest, and practically the whole of the purchase price has been handed back to the bank in the form of currency. In the aggregate this discrimination in favour of the bank as against the individual holder of the bonds costs the people millions of dollars a year, but this defect is the slightest and least ftmdamental of all the defects involved in our system of banking. I have referred to it only because there is 45 involved in my remedy the continued use of this basis of national currency. The obligation of the people, as represented by their Government, constitutes in our pre- sent money system, the sole asset back of aU National bank notes. I would propose that Federal legislation be passed which would give public accoun- tants the position of direct responsibility to the Federal Government. I would provide that aU firms, corporations and banks who are the borrowers of money should be regularly examined and reported upon by public accountants. I would apply a rigid civil service test among the qualifications required of public accountants. I would make it obhgatory that the qualifications prescribed by the Federal Government should be shown to exist before the Govern- ment issued a Ucence to any accountant, and that without this Ucence no account- ant would be qualified to act. I would create a Federal bank, which would reserve to itself the sole power to issue aU paper currency, and I would pro- vide that this currency could be issued up to the par value of all of the gold, silver 46 and Government bonds held and owned by this Federal bank, and that it could issue paper currency to the amount of 50 per cent, of its bills receivable. Since this bank would at once become the real centre of the banking power of the United States, I would provide that the election of its directors should be carried. out in the same manner as we now conduct the election of the President of the United States. I would have one director to represent each of the States of the United States, and I would provide that not less than 25 of such directors would be necessary to constitute a quorum of the board. I would make tlie President or the Vice- President of the United States the ex- officio president of the bank, with the casting vote. I would provide that the term of service of these directors should be as to one- third for four years, one-third eight years, and one-third twelve years. I would distribute equitably throughout the United States the four, eight and twelve year directorates, so that there 47 would always be on the board from every section of the United States directors who were familiar with the affairs of the bank. I would provide that, if at a meeting of the board the whole of the minority of such meeting dissented from the decision, even if that decision had received the approval of the president of the bank, the minority should, by unanimous request, be able to refer this decision to the final determina- tion of the Supreme Court. As already suggested, a new tribunal, to be called the Supreme Court of Commerce of the United States, might be created. I would pay a salary of not less than 25,000 "dollars per annum to each of the directors of the bank. And no director would be permitted to hold any other position or to be a director or officer of any corporation, and the bank would be prohibited from making any loan'^to any institution in which any director was interested. Any director who did not attend meet- ings of the board at least once a month would forfeit his seat on the board. Provision should be made that any 48 director could at any time be removed by the people whom he had been elected to represent. This removal and the choice of his successor to be effected by an election held for that purpose. I think it wUl be clear from the trend of my suggestions that I have sought to establish a great central bank, to be owned and actually controlled by the people, and I hope to be able to show that if this were done, the man who owns cattle on the prairies of the West, or cotton in the fields of the South, or grain in the bins of the North, or who owns wire and nails in Pitts- burg, or silk in the looms of New Jersey, or wool in the factories of Massachusetts, or who has a stock of merchandise in any city or village in America, would have a place where, against this security, he would have the right to ask for, and the assur- ance of receiving, the financial accommoda- tion to which his assets entitle him. He would be no longer at the mercy or caprice of his local banker, or of any other banker. He would have his books and accounts examined by a chartered accountant, quali- fied and licensed in the manner above 49 suggested. He would attach the report of this chartered accountant to his appKca- tion for a loan, and, if requested to do so, he could supplement the report of the accountant by the report of a Hcensed appraiser, who would certify to the value of his fixed assets, which in the ordinary- course of business would be outside the scope of an auditor's report. There would be Hcensed appraisers, who would possess the qualifications prescribed by the Federal Government. They would be in the employ of the Government, and prohibited from accepting fees or employ- ment from private individuals or corpora- tions. In estabhshing this central bank, and fixing the basis upon which the fvmds of the institution should be loaned, care would be taken to establish a percentage bor- rowing right, which would bear proper relation to the following factors : — 1. The net surplus of fixed assets over funded liabilities — such as bonds, stocks, etc. 2. The net surplus of accounts receiv- able over accounts payable. 50 3. The net market value of the unchar- ged quick assets. 4. The net earnings of the corporation during the precedmg penod of one, three, five and ten years ; or, in the alternative since the company commenced business. 5. It will be urged that two companies with the same assets and the same liabili- ties and the same dividend record might require and be well entitled to receive largely different borrowing facilities, owing either to the difference in the business involved or to the difference in the locality where the same businesses were concerned ; but the broad principles could be well estabhshed by a classification of the various businesses somewhat along the lines of their present division for credit purposes. I would not seek to supplant either the large or the small banks throughout the country, except that I would enact different regulations as regards their loans on Stock Exchange, grain and provision transactions. I deal with this under another heading. The central bank would be so organised and conducted that no one with property could be deprived of the facilities of credit. 51 and no one without property could obtain credit from the coitral bank. In so far as the local banks could and did meet the requirements of their customers they would not need to have access to the National Institution of credit, the purpose of which is not that it shall do the banking business of the country, but rather that it should be the great safeguard of public credit and the refuge of every man who is entitled to credit but who, from one cause or another, is tmder the present system unable to obtain that credit. I am aware that when the demand for money exceeds the supply of money, there is no way under our present system of banking by which the banks as a whole, or separately, can increase their cash re- sources through the use of their bills receivable. In the ordinary' course the smaller banks endeavour to so increase their cash resources to meet special con- ditions by re-discounting their biUs receiv- able ; but ultimately this facihty of re-dis- count depends upon Wall Street, and if Wall Street wants the money to use in the manipulation of stocks, it makes the re- 52 discounting by out-of-town banks imprac- ticable either by refusing such re-discounts altogether, or by asking a prohibitive rate of interest. It will, I think, be conceded that if the present laws governing banks were to be modified so as to permit the issuance of currency against bills receiv- able the broad credit requirements of the country as a whole would not be assured, unless the use of this elastic measure was placed in the hands of a great people's bank, organised under the safeguards I have indicated, and having the sole right to issue paper Currency. The farmers of the country require greater banking facili- ties. The majority of farmers purchase machinery and supplies on long credit from neighbouring merchants. This is expensive and unsatisfactory. When the farmers are able to borrow money the interest-rate is frequently too high. The restricted credit of the farmer lessens his productive capacity and increases the cost of all production* This burden of increased cost falls at last upon the consumers who are the wage-earn- ers of the country. There is no safer security than that 53 offered by farmers, but our banking system has developed along such lines that the local banks find it difficult to extend the large lines of credit locally re- quired by farmers, and the ability of these banks to obtain assistance from the financial centres of America depends upon the caprice of Wall Street. It is easier to obtain a loan against a certificate of watered stock with nothing but organised ingenuity behind it, than it is to borrow money on the solid products of the soil. Through the Central Bank the credit requirements of the farmers could be met at a comparatively low rate of interest. The farmers of the country are borrowers of hundreds of millions of pounds sterling, and they could profitably use hundreds of millions additional which they are now un- able to obtain. The Central Bank could hold the farm mortgages and issue its two, five and ten year debentures against them, and could carry the farmers' requirements under present conditions at less then five per cent. per annum and in an unlimited amount. 54 There is and has been open to the stock- man special facilities when his borrowing requirements have outgrown the capacity of local banks. These facilities consist of loans made direct by Hve-stock commission firms, which advance money, on the paper of the stockmen. The commission firms discotmt this paper in the banks of Chicago and other packing-house centres elsewhere, but these banks are more and more involved in the great money system of the country, which is dominated by Wall Street. This avenue of credit is, therefore, Uke all others, frequently curtailed, and sometimes prac- tically closed through the operations in Wall Street, and thus the credit to which the cattleman is entitled is in the last analysis influenced to a great extent not by any conditions connected with the hve-stock business, but rather by Wall Street manipulation. When these operations do not interfere with the placing of the paper of the cattle- man, and his facilities are imrestricted, there are stiU objections to the present system of ioans through commission houses. Some of these objections are that they 55 involve the payment of commissions, as well as liberal interest on the money bor- rowed, and the owner of the live stock is compelled to market and sell his Hve stock through the commission house which dis- covmts his paper. In many instances this live stock could be dealt with more satis- factorily to the stockman if he were given^ a freer hand. The stockmen of the country pay an unnecessary tribute of many miUions of dollars a year, which might be done away with through the establishment of the Central Bank, and the money which they require to properly conduct their business would be available when wanted and at a minimum rate of interest. They could no longer be compelled to market their stock when it suited the wishes of the Hve stock banks which are controlled by the packers. I would establish a new basis for Stock Exchange transactions, and for all dealings in the great staple products, such as cotton, com, wheat, and all classes of provisions. I would require all Stock Exchange houses and boards of trade and provision firms to conduct their business under licence from the Federal Government. I would place 56 all stock exchanges and boards of trade under direct Federal Government control and sub- ject them to rigid inspection. I would ap- point National Examiners to periodically inspect their books, the same as the Govern- ment now does in regard to National banks. I would prohibit all dealings on margin,^ either in stocks, bonds, grain, cotton or provisions. I would require that the buyer of any of the above must pay for them in full, and that the seller must deliver the stock, bond, or commodity sold. In order that this might not be evaded through the loaning by banks to favoured customers of 90 per cent, of the amount involved, I would prohibit the loaning of more than 60 per cent, against any transactions, either in stocks, bonds, grain, or provisions. And I would require weekly settlements in full. It is impossible to calculate the harm which is involved in the present specvda- tion on Stock Exchanges and Boards of Trade throughout the country, and it is likewise impossible to estimate the great benefits which would result to the country as a whole if this gambling were made impossible. I wotild enforce these regula- 57 tions by effective measureSj one of which would be that any violation of the law would involve the withdrawal of the right to do business in respect to the firm and the bank concerned. I intend in a subsequent book to deal with the broad question involved in a more just distribution of the product of all labour, and I shall endeavour to show that there is a sound and equitable solution of the existing controversy between capital and labour. It win, I believe, be apparent that if the reforms that I have here suggested were put into effect they would go far toward dissolving the differences which now exist between capital and labour. It will be urged that these reforms, which make " watered stock " and colossal for- tunes impossible, wiU do away with the incentive which is to-day the motive power behind the establishment of the great insti- tutions and industries of the country, but I hope to be able to show conclusively that the great drawback to individual endeavour on a large scale in America would by my system be removed, and that such jindi- 58 vidual endeavour would be enormously stimulated. It does not seem to be generally realised that the harm which results through the present system of over-capitalisation has only begun when the over-capitaUsed secu- rities are sold to the public. The evil involved in the creation and sale of securi- ties which do not represent either property or human toil is a small evil compared with the greater ones which attend the evolution of this system. I will take,* by way of illustration, the formation of a company with a capital stock of 100 million dollars. This company is formed to acquire the assets of other companies. These assets may be worth 30 million dollars. The whole of the 100 million dollars of capital stock is issued in acquiring the various institutions in such a way that the stock is technically paid up. A portion of this 100 njilLions is distri- buted among the small factors in the combination, and the control finds its way to the dominating factors and to the financial house which is behind the amalga- mation. The combination then makes an 59 issue of first mortgage bonds and preference stock in an amount greatly in excess of the value of the properties being amalgamated. These bonds and preferred stock are either sold to the pubhc and the cash price paid over for the property acquired, or they are delivered to the people interested. Subsequently, through manipulation in Wall Street, practically the whole of this in- flated capital is worked off upon the invest- ing public. The inside interests retain a sufl&cient amount of the common stock to ensure their continued control of the business, and in the majority of cases they have succeeded in withdrawing the actual capital which they had involved in the enterprise. By means which are perfectly legal, and through the employment of which men have obtained colossal fortunes and vast power and eminence, 30 or 40 miUion dollars have been wrongfully taken from the investing public in the single instance cited. This is the beginning of the evil involved in the present system. This corporation em- ploys thousands of people, and the product of their labour is to a great extent ievoted 6o to the payment of dividends upon this fic- titious capital. Through the mill of Wall Street a few men take by improper means the earnings which to a great extent should have remained in the pockets of the men who earned them. The producer of the raw material sold to this company, and aU of the men employed in such production must pay their toU ; and, on the other hand, the consumer, who is Ukewise a labourer and a victim ©f the same conditions is compelled to pay a higher price for the products of this com- pany than he would have paid if there had been no necessity for the company to €am dividends upon fictitious capital. If the evil of the present system did not go farther than to take away from investors hvmdreds of millions of dollars a year with- out giving them proper security or value for their money it would stiU be one of the greatest evils affecting the present genera- tion ; but when its further power to appropriate the earnings of present and future generations is considered it becomes a matter of gravest pubHc consequence. It may be contended that when a com- 6i pany is able to declare dividends upon fictitious capital it has justified its capitali- sation as regards its investors. This is, however, unsound in practice, because, while a company may be able (by econo- mies effected through amalgamation and by its temporary monopoly acquired in a given Hne) to earn and pay reasonable dividends on its fictitious capital, it is not creating a reserve of tangible assets which would to any considerable extent put capital resources behind securities which were not in the first instance issued against tangible capital assets. If it succeeds, in special instances, in making good its watered capital through undistributed earnings, it is taking the people's money to repair an evil which should never have been created, and is putting that money into the pockets of a few men who have not given to society any equivalent for what they have received. The adoption of my system would make this quite impossible. The position is, generally, that if the company is called upon to meet changed conditions, which may arise from one of many causes, and its earning power is temporarily interfered 62 with and its condition becomes critical, practically the whole of the capital invested in its ordinary and preferred stocks is wiped out. From any point of view, whether- it be as an investor in its inflated securities, or an employee, or a producer of raw material, or a consumer of finished products, one or aU are in the course of the career of such a company bound to con- tribute a huge sum of money, which ultim- ately finds its way into a few hands, and for which no adequate return has been, or ever can be, given. The capital of the rail- way companies in America is watered to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars. The initial evil which resulted from the creation of this watered capital has been followed by a greater evil which has re- quired every passenger carried and every pound of freight moved in America to pay direct toll of scoresof millions of dollars yearly into the mill of watered stock. This stock once created continues to levy its tribute upon generation after generation of the American people. It must be clear that if this evil did not exist or were to be done away with, the result would be better wages 63 to the employees of railway companies and cheaper and more efficient service to the people as a whole. There is no objection to be raised against the collection of passenger and freight tariffs which are ade- quate to provide a proper return upon the actual investment employed, but the evil consists in the ability of any class of men to collect for themselves huge sums of money by way of dividends on capital which was never invested. • It would not be diflScult for me to give specific instances where one or all of these evils have been involved, and where ' the loss to the American public is so enormous that it could not be computed in hundreds of millions of dollars. The broad principle which I want to make clear is that, as we require of labour a doUar of tangible value before we pay that dollar, we must obhterate the means by which any man can create securities which he is able to exchange for dollars, vmless the securities are issued against the tangible product of toil and in an amount which does not exceed the actual value of the property against which they are issued. 64 Some of the provisions as to publicity and information for public prospectuses which I have outlined, above are already- embodied in the laws of Great Britain and are required of all public companies formed under British law, but the remedies which I have suggested go farther in. their scope toward the protection of the pubUc than any legislation heretofore enacted or sug- gested for the control of pubUc corporations. Theprospectusinformation required by the Companies Act is generally so set out that not one investor in a thousand ever understands the information disclosed in a prospectus. If, however, these prospectuses, and the information which I would require public companies to give, were placed in the hands of a competent Government Committee, as above outlined, this Committee would have no difficulty in so safeguarding the formation of public companies under my plan as to make it impossible to carry through more than a very small percentage of the enterprises which are now foisted upon the people. In every community, if a prospectus is supported by certain names, thepubUc do 65 not examine or inquire into the details, and it is because of this that individuals seeking to establish any important tindertaking are sooner or later under the necessity of making terms with a comparatively small number of men, whose vast fortunes and immense power have been acquired through their ability to control and appropriate to them- selves the fortunes and the labour of their fellow men. In nearly every instance where an enter- prising man seeks to establish a business of great magnitude which he expects to per- sonally develop he would like to see that enterprise founded upon sound lines rather than to see it issue huge sums of fictitious capital ; but unless ' he is prepared to create inflated stocks and issue them as bonuses to promoters, brokers, issuing houses and others, he is unable to enlist their support, and without this support he is unable to establish his business. Under my system, if he had a sound business which he wanted to estabHsh on conservative and sound lines he would be able to go direct to the people, and to give to the people fuU security and value for 66 their money. The mere fact that his plans and his security had received the sanction of the Federal Government would be a sufficient aegis under which he could create his business without introducing •the intermediaries who are to-day largely responsible for the losses incurred through investment in stocks and bonds. It may be broadly accepted as a settled rule among the great banking and issuing houses of the world that they only identify themselves with the issue of such securities as they believe the public will ultimately absorb. It is clear, therefore, that all obligations incurred by the foimders of public companies are incurred upon the theory that the financial burden imposed by those obHgations will be transferred from them to the people. I hold that the chief evil, from the point of view of the investor and of the pubUc at large, arises from the necessity of paying a relatively small group of men for assuming an obligation which need never exist if under proper Government regulations a system were devised to enable the founder of public companies to deal direct with the people. 67 The relatively small ntimber of men who are able to transfer their responsibility from themselves to the people have the power to do this through the control which they exercise over the money of the people. I wotdd do away with these expensive and unnecessary intermediaries. The people as a whole are the ones who have the money to2,irivest, and I would institute such a system as would enable them to invest with the minimum of risk. Let us suppose that in the great staple article of meat the same lax methods were in force for the protection of the public as prevail with the securities of public corporations. The practical effect as re- gards meat would be the same as it now is as regards securities. To illustrate : — The purchaser of meat in any shop in America is assured under the present system of Government inspection and control that the meat offered is pure. He does not need to purchase it from A, who has an eminent standing in the community, or to refuse to purchase it from B, who may have no stand- ing, because he knows that through an 68 adequate system of Govemirient inspection this meat has passed all the necessary tests at its point of origin. If this were not so lie would feel compelled, if he were able to do so, to go to a certain shop which gave a moral guarantee to the product, and purchase it at a greatly increased price. He would do this not because the meat was better, but because there was a certain personality behind it which ought at any rate to be a guarantee of its purity. He would in this way be practically com- pelled to pay a very high price for a nominal guarantee which, through the present system of Government control at its source, he is able to obtain without any cost what- soever. Through this system A and B are placed upon an equal footing as regards the public, and the success of each becomes a matter of personal ability. I contend that the same broad principle holds equally true as regards securities, and that it is entirely sound and practic- able to so control the issue of these securi- ties at their point of origin as to fix the basis of general security in such a way that it will no longer be necessary to 69 pay a large part of all capital investments in order to obtain the favourable sanction of "A" or "B," since the basis of the security to the public has been passed upon by the people's Government at a purely nominal cost to the people as a whole. Many and grave evils have attended the inevitable development of organised busi- ness. From a system which was bounded by the exchange of one article for another, and into which neither currency nor credit had entered, we have reached a point where the world's business is conducted through a system of book-entries in which either paper or credit has become the token of barter and exchange. The defect of all legislation which has sought to control and regulate this business is broadly that we have failed to reahse that you cannot enact effective legislation which seeks to in any way change the nature of man, and also that you cannot stop by any kind of legislation the logical outcome of the vast forces which are set in motion by the activities of man. We must not legislate against trusts upon the theory that trusts are^wrong, but 7° rather upon the theory that through fierce competition they have become inevitable,' and in principle are sound. We must use the immense machinery which has been con- structed by human ingenuity and human toil in such a manner as to make it a great agency for the betterment of humanity. I believe it will be generally accepted as good reasoning to say that commercially the amalgamation of industries is sotmd. I hold that it is necessary, inevitable, and bound to continue, and that more and more it will result in the elimination of every- thing which takes its toll between the producer and the consumer. The aim of the legislation of the future should be, not to seek to prevent the utmost development of what we now call the trusts, but rather to endeavour to prevent the wrongs which are associated with the 'formation and conduct of these trusts and to thereby do away with the grave evils which attend their development. The great, and I believe the most vital defect of organised capital and industry to-day is that by the use of the power which the people have placed at the disposal of 71 the strong, it is possible for men to reap where they have not sown. I would so change the conditions under which capital could be put to efiEectiveuse that it would not be possible for any man to gather the fruits of another man's toil. We have not yet arrived at such a state of moral development that we consider this to be a moral wrong. I,ittle by Kttle the masses of mankind have achieved more and more power, and in the exercise pf this power they are constantly seeking to bridge the great chasm which exists between the few who control the wealth and the resources of the world, and the many who are the victims of that control. The legis- lation which they have enacted has proved ineffective and futile and the aim they have sought has not been realised. Shorn of all of its pretence of justice and of aU of the broad human motives which are claimed to be the basis of its legislation, the aim of this legislation has been to transfer to B the power which has been acquired by A* We look back across the centuries at the feudal system, and say that it was wrong, 72 but the remedy for the feudal system was not that the power which one man enjoyed should be transferred to another man or to many men, but that the feudal system itself should be abolished. We look back upon slavery and we under- stand that the solution of the problem of human slavery did not depend upon changing the position of the master and the slave, but rather upon giving effect to the broad principle of justice that all men ought to be free. The solution of the great problem of industrial slavery does not lie in taking the power now enjoyed by a few men and giving it to a larger number of men, but rather in a broader adjustment, through which wage- slavery will be abolished. In the most enlightened country in the world (England) the people have sought to estabhsh some measure of equalising the great wealth which becomes the subject of bequest through wiUs, but the solution of that prob- lem does not lie through increased death duties. Behind the great fortunes which, are the subject of this legislation Ues the fundamental evil of landlordism. The 73 remedy for this evil is not that a vast estate accumulated through the collection of rents should pay a tax of 2s. in the £, but rather that the rental system should be abolished. It may be urged that the remedies which I propose are so fundamental that they strike at the root of the present basis by which all business is established and all fortunes are accumulated, and I admit that this is so. I hold that the solution of the great problem involved in the acquisition and control of wealth must be a fundamental solution, which for the future will eflFec- tively control, on a broad basis of human justice, all acquisition and the control of all wealth. Recognising the failure of legislation, the great army of industrial slaves throughout the world have organised trade unions. These unions have their definite value, and have, no doubt, obtained better conditions for labour and higher wages for their mem- bers ; but upon the broad line of obtaining the undeniable rights of the people involved the trade unions have not succeeded. One 74 reason why they have not succeeded is that, in the vmiversal sense in which capital is organised, labour is not organised. The united mine-workers of a given country may declare a strike, and the out- come usually is that, after a few weeks of idleness, their resources being exhausted, they resume work with their conditions slightly bettered, if at aU, and in many cases their strike only results in loss of wages and defeat. The men who control the industries and the middlemen who distribute the product MAKE USE of the strike for increasing the price of the commodity, and transferring to the people as a whole the economic burden > involved in the strike. If the production of an important staple, such as coal is at issue, the consequences of the strike extend to aU branches of industry, to the immediate detriment of all^labour employed. The effect of this is generally that, instead of recognising the cause of the strikers as a part of the larger cause of all labour, the labourers who are affected by the strike seek to bring pressure upon 75 the strikers, and it is through this division of interest that their fight is always lost. I beUeve that within ten years after the operation of the system which I have outlined the necessity for strikes would disappear. In the meantime there is, broadly, only one basis upon which these strikes would be bound to succeed, and that basis is that the members of every trade union, controlling as they do the bulk of aU industrial labour throughout the world, should consider that for pur- poses of offence and defence they are ONB, and that until, through a better-organised society, they are protected without the need of strikes, they will, if a strike is declared, be as one man in support of that strike. In 1912 there was in Great Britain a general strike of aU. coal-miners. The number of men who went out under this strike order was approximately, 1,800,000. Counting on the general average of five being represented by each man, this strike directly involved nearly one-fourth of the en- tire population of Great Britain. On account of the strike the resources collected by 76 the contributions of the miners through a long period of time were paid out to sup- port in a most miserable way the striking miners and those dependent upon them. The general effect upon the public was that the mine-owners, jobbers and retailers of coal increased their prices to such an extent that they were enabled not only to dispose of large quantities of theretofore practically unsaleable coal, but they com- pensated themselves for the cessation of work in the mines. After this strike, the miners returned to work under conditions which left the settlement of their differences to various commissions, and which, in most cases, I be- lieve, left the miners either as they were before or in a worse condition. The general pubhc of Great Britain was put to enormous expense and inconvenience and many of its manufacturing industries during the period of the strike were compelled either to suspend operations altogether, or to curtail their output and discharge a portion of their men. This condition extended to the railways and to nearly all industrial enterprises. The forces of organised society 77 were brought to bear upon the strikiug miners and the result was not satisfactory to the miners. I do not presume to say that the miners had or did not have sufficient reason for declaring a general strike, but what I would poiat out is that the remedy which is in the hands of organised labour is a remedy which can only be exercised, tmder the present condition of society, at great personal sacrifice to the labourers involved. And it must be assumed, therefore, that the expedient of a strike would be resorted to only when it was not only justified, but when the men involved had become pre- pared to make sacrifices for it. The future strength of organised labour must depend upon aU labour organisations making com- mon CAUSE with one another. I am aware that there are many unselfish and able men devoted to the great task of organising and directing labour, but I beheve that the vast untested power of labour can only be realised through a wider organisation than labour has ever known. It may be that the reforms which are pro- posed in my remedy can only be brought 78 about when organised labour forces society to accept them, and, if this is so, the first great step to bring about that better era in the world must come through the EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION of the LABOUR OF THE WORLD, I wotild like to see a man with the vast genius of Napoleon dedicate his Ufe to this cause — to the end that when in the deliberate judgment of a great section of organised labour in any part of the world there was a wrong to be righted, that single organisation would have the solid support of every labour organisation in the world. If in 1912, when 1,800,000 Englishmen declared a strike in the coal mines, as the best means within their power to better their condition, this strike had been supported by a general strike, which involved 50,000,000 men throughout the world, there would have been no solution of that strike except a solution which con- ceded the broad principles for which the men contended. Capital knows its power. Broadly, it is effectively organised. lyabour does not know its power and it is not effectively 79 organised. The control of both capital and labour can still be exercised by the whole people in an equitable solution of the great human problems involved. It is not too late to adopt sound and constructive measures which will prevent a further aggravation of existing conditions and which would in another generation go far toward the solution of the vast differ- ences which we are now seeking to settie by force. It may be that this remedy can be employed in time to save an experience which would stop the wheels of the world's industries and bring the great questions involved to a point where they must be adjusted under universal pressure or dis- posed of by violence. The great defects which I have outlined and the remedy for these defects are world- wide. It may be that in the United States the people still retain sufficient direct power to solve these questions by just and sound legislation which wiU accept present conditions as they are and seek to remedy them on the lines I have in- dicated, or upon better lines if they can be found. 8o It may also be that the people have already lost this power. The majority of men take their opinions from other men. Few are able to do any thinking for them- selves, but the wants of the milUons are simple wants, and they have earned a larger share in the prosperity of their time. They are convinced that this is so, but they are divided in their opinion as to how this result may be attained. It is the business of organised society to keep them divided ; so long as they are divided they are power- less. United they would at once be irre- sistible. While legislators are discussing remedies and passing futile laws, the toilers of the world should organise. They should estab- lish, not a Brotherhood of I^ocomotive Engineers, but that Universal Brotherhood of Man. They are men first, and engineers, miners and artisans last. Their cause is a common cause. Their fight is a fight for hfe and all the weapons are in their hands. No one wiU doubt that if the American locomotive engineers were to confine their organisation to the State of New York they would be helpless. Their present relative strength lies in the fact that their organisa- tion reaches from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Maine to the Gulf. The next great step for them to take is to make their organisation W0Ri