So5 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY . GIFT OF Sir Gilbert Parker Cornell University Library D 505.G78 1915a Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924026425144 COLLECTED , i DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR. LONDON: PKINTBD UNDBE THE AUTHOEITT OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE By HABEISON and SONS, 45-47, St. Mautin's Lahb, W.O., Pbintbis in Oedinabt to Hm Majesty. To be purchased, •ither direetlj or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN ^JTD SONS, Ltd., 29, Bbiams Buildinqs, Fbttee Lane, B.C., and 54, St. Makt Steeet, Cabdlfp; or H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, Fouth Street, BDiNETmaH; or E. PONSONBT, Ltd., 116, Gkafton Stkeet, Ditblin; or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of T. FISHEB UNWm, London, W.O. 1915. PrioeOne Shilling. X TABLE OF CONTENTS. Preface ^ I. List of Principal Persons Mentioned II. British Diplomatic Correspondence III. French Yellow Book IV. Russian Orange Book V. Belgian Grey Book Appendix regarding Anglo-Belgian relations VI. Serbian Blue Book Appendix containing Signor Giolitti's Speech of 5th December, 1914 VII. German White Book Appendix containing Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg Speech of 4th August, 1914 VIII. Austro-Hungarian Red Book • IX. Documents published subsequently Index ^ Page i xvii 1 121 265 299 349 369 399 403 436 441 535 545 S^h (-)•■'/ Mt/ M't/U't PREFACE. PREFACE. The object of this volume is to brLag together the official corre- spondence pubhshed by the various European Governments relating to the outbreak of the present war. The correspondence thus collected is not new, though official translations of the Serbian and Austrian Books now appear for the first time. Such a compilation of documents for the most part already widely known may appear to need some justification. The work has been undertaken, not in order to excite new attention, but rather for the benefit of students of history and poUtics. In these days historical evidence is apt to become rapidly overlaid by a mass of commentary and criticism through which the student has to dig back to the original sources. This volume is mainly designed to facihtate such work. With this end in view, the intention has been to repubUsh only those original documents which the various Governments have laid before the world as authentic records of events. Commentaries, even when proceeding from the Governments themselves, are therefore excluded. For instance, the preface to the cheap edition of the British White Paper is not reprinted in this volume. To this rule, however, certain exceptions have been made. For obvious reasons it has not seemed fair to exclude from a volume published in England the commentaries contained in the German White Book and the Austrian Red Book. Further, the special interest attaching to the question of Belgian neutraUty has been held to justify the publication, in an appendix to the Belgian Grey Book, of certain commentaries, emanating from Belgian and British official sources, on the charges brought in Germany against the good faith of the Belgian and British Governments. It is, however, hoped that these commentaries will not distract attention from the original documents published in the same appendix. The same considerations have led to the inclusion, as an appendix to the German White Book, of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's speech in the Eeichstag on August 4, as containing the German case for the violation of Belgian neutrality. Finally, the attention excited by Signer Giolitti's speech in the ItaHan ParUamept has seemed to justify its inclusion as an appendix to the Serbian Book. Documents which were not included in the collections originally published by the various Governments but have been published subsequently officially in the Press are given at the end of the volume (Part X). THE EUROPEAN WAK. As historical sources these documents are of the first importance. Taken separately, they are interesting; but taken together ana compared, they constitute a body of evidence of quite exceptional value. The object of the succeeding pages is to furnish a tentotive guide to their comparison and to their valuation as a whole, inere will be no attempt at a narrative, for the events are now too weU known. Even a full discussion of all important pomts is im- possible within the hmits of a short preface. AH that can be done ia to give examples of how such documents may be handled. In a work of this kind, at this time, it is impossible to attain the im- partiahty of the historian, but what follows is a sincere attempt to approximate to that attitude. II. For purposes of comparison, the documents may be divided into three periods : — 1. The state of European politics previous to the events of last summer. This, the prefatory period, is only illustrated by a few documents, namely, the first chapter of the French Yellow Book (pp. 121-143), Signor Giolitti's speech (p. 401), the Austrian Statement as to the past activities of the Pan-Serb movement (p. 461 et seq.), the exchange of notes between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon in November, 1912 (pp. 80-1 and 260-1), and the original documents in the appendix to the Belgian Grey Book (p. 350 et seq.). These docu- ments do not, of course, pretend to give any general history of the causes which • produced the crisis of 1914 ; they merely throw light on certain definite points immediately connected with that crisis itself. It is clearly impossible to deal with this period in the present Preface, as no full official correspondence relating to it has yet been published, and it would be improper to make statements with regard to it without the production of the evidence on which such statements would be based. There is, indeed, already a mass of evidence for this period before the public on which conclusions may well be founded, but the time has not arrived for its discussion in a Government publication like the present volume. 2. The period between the murder of the Archduke and the pre- sentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia. For this period we have Chapter II of the French Yellow Book (pp. 144-153), the first six numbers of the Austrian Eed Book (pp. 448-452), Nos. 1, 2 and 161 (pp. 1 and 114) of the British White Paper, and Nos. 1 to 31 of the Serbian Book (pp. 370-387). This period is dealt with in the next section. 3. The period between the presentation of the Austrian Note and the outbreak of war. The bulk of all the correspondence, except in the case of the Serbian Book, is concerned with this period. The books vary, however, a good deal in the point up to which they carry the story of events. The Serbian Book ends with the declaration of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia on July 28. The German, Austrian and Russian Books practically end with the declaration of PEEFACE. jii war between Germany and Russia on August 1, though the Russian Book adds the formal declaration of war with Austria-Hungary on August 6, and the Austrian Book adds twelve documents illustrating the formal steps as the result of which Austria-Hungary found herself ^t war with the other alUed countries. The British and French Books «arry the story down to the declaration of war between England and (Germany at midnight on August 4, and the French Book adds the Declaration signed at London on September 4, binding England, France and Russia not to negotiate or conclude peace separately. The Belgian Book carries the story down to August 5 when Belgium finally found herself at war with Germany and was assured of the armed :support of the other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, but it then proceeds to reproduce a series of documents illustrating subsequent «yents down to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Belgium on August 28. Of these 26 papers, the two last record the formal rupture between Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Six deal with miscellaneous subjects : the neutrahty of Holland, the naviga- tion of the Scheldt, the taking over of German interests in Belgium by the United States, and the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. Seven relate to the extension of the war to the posses- ;sions of the belligerents in Africa. The remaining eleven papers illustrate the renewed ofEer made by Germany to Belgium on August 9 and its rejection on August 12. As a whole, therefore, the correspondence in this volume is a minute record of the events of 10 days from July 23 to August 1. The subject is the Serbian Question. On August 1 the scene shifts ; the Ught is switched from Serbia to Belgium and the French frontier. Tor the next four days, August 2 to 5, we have a record, equally minute, of the attitude of England, France and Belgium on the brink ■of war and of the communications received by them from the German ■Government. But we have practically nothing from the other side. There is the speech of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag (pp. 436-9) ; 1;here is the Note handed in at Paris by Baron von Schoen on August 2 (French Book, No. 133, p. 234) and the telegram to Prince Lichnowsky of August 4 (British Book, No. 157, p. 108) ; there is the ■conversation with Herr von Below-Saleske at the Belgian Foreign Office, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3 (Belgian Book, No. 21, p. 311) ; there are finally the five telegrams semi-officially published in the German Press and reprinted in the collection at the end of this volume (pp. 538-541). That is all. " Very early " in the morning of August 2 the German troops appear on the bridges of WasserbilHg and Remich in Luxemburg (p. 104) ; later on the same day they are reported to be across the French frontier at Ciry and near Longwy (p. 234) ; on August 3 their advance guard is at Gemmerich in Belgium (p. 316). Behind this screen of troops Berlin is almost silent. At London, Paris and Brussels decisions are still being formed. Dehberations continue ; telegrams are exchanged. But at Berlin the direction of events has already passed from the Foreign Office to the General ^tafE, which does not talk and which publishes no records. There is one other gap in the correspondence which must be noted. We know practically nothing of anything which passed between Vienna (m 3649) h iv THE EUEOPEAN WAR. and Berlin during this whole period. In the German Book t^ere ie only one comraunication between the two capitals (No. 16, P- ^-^^^ " in the Austrian Book there are only eight (Nos. 33, p. 506 ; dS, d», p. 515 ; 42, 43, p. 520 ; 46, p. 522 ; 48, p. 524, and 57, p. 5^»j. The earliest of these is dated July 27 (No. 33). There is, indeed, as we shall see, no doubt as to the general relations between the two Governments, but from the historian's point of view this is not enough. We are dealing with a diplomatic episode; 10 days ot feverish' activity when new proposals and new developments followed each other hour by hour. The only real interest of such a crisis is to estimate how a general attitude responds to each new factor in the situation and thereby to gain an impression of the spirit behind the attitude. Here the German correspondence fails us. _ This very failure may not be without value as a guide to the historian. It has been perhaps the secret alike of Germany's predominance and of the strain under which Europe has Uved for a decade, that Germany has always shown the world her power, but has never taken it into her confidence. III. The Period between the Mxirdbr oe the Archduke and the Presentation oe the Austrian Note to Serbia, June 28- JULY 23. First, as to the attitude of the German Government. This may be dismissed in a few words. The German Book states, " We permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations " (p. 406). All the Books agree that the German Government professed to have no previous knowledge of the terms of the ultimatum. How much they did know can only be inferred from such documents as French Book, Nos. 9 and 21 (pp. 145 and 153), British Book, No. 1 (p. 1), Serbian Book, No. 26. (p. 383). On the question, what part Herr von Tschirsky played personally in the counsels of the Austro-Hungarian Government during this period, we know only the common belief of the representatives of the Powers at Vienna as revealed in British Book, Nos. 32 (p. 28), 95 (p. 74) and 161, 2nd para. (p. 114) ; Serbian Book,, No. 52, 4th, 12th and 20th paras, (pp. 394, 396 and 398) ; Eussian Book, No. 41 (p. 281) ; and French Book, No. 18 (p. 151). Second, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. This is the vital point. After all that has been said and written lately on the subject it is not necessary to discuss the Pan- Serb movement. There may be a question as to the trustworthiness of the police reports on Serbian propaganda contained in No. 19 of the Austrian Book (p. 461 et seq.). But the broad fact is not in doubt. Serbia had nationahst ambitions incompatible with the recently estabhshed sovereignty of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those ambitions are practically admitted in British Book, No. 30^ (p. 27), they are presupposed in the advice given to Serbia as recorded in that document and in French Book, No. 26 (p. 157), they were evident in the attitude of the Serbian Press. The only question for Austria-Hungary was whether by her PREFACE. V dramatic annexation of the two Provinces in 1908, she had finally closed against herself the door of peaceful settlement. Whether Serbia or Austria had tried to keep that door open in the five years since 1909 is not a question which can be dealt with here — ^we can only refer to the different accounts of those years given in Austrian Book, No. 8 (p. 453) and Serbian Book, Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 10 (p. 386). Be that as it may, Austria decided in July that the door was closed. Probably, as indicated in Signer Giolitti's speech, she had taken the same decision long before. Now, at all events, she made up her mind that war was inevitable and inomediate war desirable. (Austrian Book, No. 6, p. 450.) It was on this issue that Austria made war. The question of Serbian guilt in the murder of the Archduke could not have given rise to the Austrian ultimatum. Whatever may be the value of the evidence on this particular question contained in Austrian Book, No. 19 (p. 461 et seq.), few people would be found to say that this evidence involved the Serbian Government itself in a way that a jury could consider for a moment, and no one will say that it could have justified an ultimatum with a forty-eight hours' time hmit. Whatever may be the value of the statement in Austrian Book, No. 9, paras. 2 and 3 (p. 455), as to the failure of the Serbian Government to investigate the murder, on the one hand, and on the other hand the assurances given by the Serbian Government of readiness to conduct such investigations (Serbian Book, Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 5 (p. 385) ; Russian Book, No. 6 (p. 268) ; British Book, No. 30 (p. 27); French Book, No. 15 (p. 148)), it is obvious that, in regard to the murder itself, the Serbian Govern- ment had at any rate committed no flagrant breach of the duty of a neighbouring State to assist in the apprehension of criminals. It is the general account of Serbian propaganda in Austrian Book, No. 19 (p. 461 etseq.) which constitutes Austria's real case against Serbia. The distinction is well stated in Nos. 17 (p. 378) and 25 (p. 382) of the Serbian Book. It was a question of a fundamental antagonism of aims and ideals and a long-nursed sense of wrong. Such cases are very difficult, but they are not new. It was not the first time that Austria-Hungary had deliberately placed herself across the path of a nationaUst movement. In comparing the feverish atmosphere of the Austrian and Serbian Books a calm view of the issues may perhaps best be attained by reference to a correspondence which has now passed into history. From 1817 to 1848, Metternich was writing of the poHcy of the Piedmontese Government in its rela^ tion to Itahan nationahsm and Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia, in the same strain as Count Berchtold writes of Serbia. The same epithets are applied to the leaders of Itahan nationahsm ; they are " poisoners," " highway robbers," " pickpockets." Take a few sentences at random. " The scheming policy of the Turin Cabinet.'^ " There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet cherishes ambitious pro- jects which can only be.carried out at the expense of Austria." " The causes (of complaint against Austrian administration in Italy), even had they been a hundred times more serious than they are, would not have justified the least of the plots hatched by the Piedmontese conspirator. In reality, in the struggle in which we are engaged, it fM .f?fi4.Q 6 2 -Vi THE EUBOPEAN WAR. is not a question of our administrative faults, but of the attacks which faction directs against the existence of Austrian power. ^ iJie Aing seeks to mask under the veil of assistance rendered to the mdependence of the Italian nation' the blow which he strikes at respect tor tJie sacredness of treaties and the manner in which he thus attacks at its base the maintenance of general peace and of all mternational re^- tions " " The word ' nationahty ' and the words Eespect due to nationahties ' as apphed to the Itahan Peninsula are words devoid ot practical sense." History has given its judgment on this correspond- ence ; it is not for us to give one on the present controversy, ihe Serbian question is only a rehearsal of an old drama ; it is enough that we recognise the plot. The intention of Austria under these circumstances is undisputed. It is stated in the preface (pp. 443-7) and in No. 6 of the Austrian Book (p. 450) precisely as it was stated by M. Jules Cambon on July 24 (French Book, No. 30, pp. 161-2) and by Sir M. de Bunsen on "July 27 (British Book, No. ^1, p. 38). War was to be made inevitable ; all means of retreat were to be cut off. There is one further point to notice. The British Book, the French Book, and the Serbian Book agree in the picture they draw of the mystery surrounding the Foreign Office at Vienna during this period. On the whole the German and Austrian Books bear out this impres- sion. It seems that the deliberate intention was to take both Serbia -and Europe by surprise. IV. Events subsequent to the Presentation of the Austrian Note. We have no space to deal with the complex negotiations which fiU the bulk of the Books. We can only consider three points as illus- trations of the way the Books may be compared. 1. The character of the negotiations with Russia immediately following on the rupture with Serbia. 2. The view of the negotiations implied by the title of the German Book : " How Russia betrayed Germany's confidence." 3. The question of Belgian neutrahty. It will be observed that we omit any direct treatment of the position ■of Great Britain and France in relation to the outbreak of the war. The case for these two Powers has been often stated and is now before the world. A re-statement could carry no added conviction. On the •other hand, of the above three points the first two have received no -adequate treatment from the historical point of view, partly because the Austrian Book has only recently been published ; while the third point touches so nearly the heart of the present struggle that a brief statement on it may not be out of place. V. 'The Character ob' the Negotiations with Russia, immediately following the Rupture with Serbia. Austria knew, at the time when she presented her Note to Serbia, that she was risking a conflict with Russia. The fact is stated in so many words in Austrian Book, No. 26 (p. 501). Indeed, it was one of PREFACE. • Vll the commonplaces of European diplomacy and witness is borne to it throughout all the Books mthout exception. There is no sign in the Austrian correspondence that Austria was under any illusion as to the danger of Eussian intervention. But to judge from Count Pourtal^s" airy words to the Serbian Minister at Petrograd on July 24 (Serbian Book, No. 36, p. 389) and Herr von Tschirsky's equally confident remarks to Sir M. de Bunsen at Vienna on July 26 (British Book, No. 32, p. 28), Germany was counting on Russian weakness or timidity to avert this danger. No such illusion, however, even if it was- originally genuine, could have survived the events which immediately followed. The point on which all the Books show striking unanimity is the absolute openness of Russia's attitude from the beginning. The steady consistency of that attitude gives the Russian Book its unity and its force. M. Sazonof's conversations on July 24 with the German Ambassador (German Book, No. 4, p. 427 ; Austrian Book, No. 16,. p. 459 ; French Book, No. 38, pp. 167-8), and with the Austrian Ambassador (Austrian Book, No. 14, pp. 457-8 ; Russian Book, No. 25, p. 275) ; his instructions to M. Kudacheff on the same day (British Book, No. 13, p. 19) and the official announcement in the Russian Press on July 25 (Russian Book, No. 10, p. 269) were- calculated to remove any possible doubt in the mind of the German and Austrian Governments. The way in which Austria met this open attitude is curious. If there is one point on which the German and Austrian Books lay extraordinary emphasis it is the assurances given by Austria that she contemplated no attack on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia. But the nature of her communications to Russia on the subject is worth examining. On July 24 Count Berchtold says Austria^ wants nothing but the maintenance of the statiis quo (Austrian Book,. No. 18, p. 461) ; on July 25 he mentions an indemnity (No. 20, p. 499) ; on the same day he declares that neither the territorial integrity nor the sovereignty of Serbia will be touched, but " we wiU proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands " (No. 26, p. 502) ; on July 27 the assurance that no territorial demands will be made on Serbia is made conditional on the " locahsation " of the war (No. 32, p. 506). Clearly, this method of defining policy was not calcu- lated to allay the apprehension frankly declared by M. Sazonof on July 24 (Austrian Book, No. 14, p. 458) : " You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a fife you will lead Europe ! " The general impression produced by Austria's assurances in this matter, whether that impression was just or unjust, may be seen from the doubt expressed in British Book, No. 79 (p. 61), whether she would consent to convert those assurances into " a binding engagement to Europe." There is another point which indicates the distrust awakened, not unnaturally, in the mind of Russian statesmen by Austria's steps after her rupture with Serbia. Points 5 and 6 of the Austrian demands on Serbia relate to the participation of Austrian officials in one form or another in the measures to be taken by the Serbian Government against the anti- Austrian propaganda on Serbian territory, and against those implicated in the actual plot for the murder of the Archduke. In VUl THE EUEOPEAN WAE. the annotations on the Serbian reply published both in the German and Austrian Books, the following commentary is made on the Serbian reply to these demands: " If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between enquSte judiciare and simple recherches must be famihar to them" (p. 513). Now, the Serbian Government were not the only people who misunderstood these demands, for they raised the immediate apprehensions of M. Sazonof , Sir E. Grey and M. Bienvenu-Martin (Austrian Book, No. 14, p. 458 ; British Book, No. 5, p. 13 : French Book, No. 25, p. 156 ; and Austrian Book, No. 11, p. 456). Such general misapprehensions are always possible, but the strange thing is that Count Berchtold, as early as July 25, found it necessary to offer a special explanation on this very point to the Russian Government (Austrian Book, No. 27, p. 503). This explanation was given to the Russian Government " in strict eonfideiice." In other words, Russia is informed in confidence of a point on which the Serbian Government certainly had a right to a full explanation. Austria might perhaps reasonably have considered it incompatible with her dignity to make the explanation to Serbia direct, but it could have easily been made indirectly through Russia. As a matter of fact it was made too late to influence the Serbian reply and under the seal of secrecy ; and, moreover, both the explanation itself and the annotation on the Serbian reply are hard to reconcile with the statement about " supervision "■ made by Herr von Jagow on July 29 (French Book, No. 92, p. 204). The whole circumstance appears to require explanation, especially as it is duplicated by a similar " confidence " in the case of Great Britain, which may also be noticed. On July 24 Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count MensdorfE in London that the Note to Serbia was not an ultimatum but a " demarche with a time limit" (Austrian Book, No. 17, p. 460), and that this fact should be communicated to Sir E. Grey. Sir E. Grev received this information (British Book No. 14, p. 20) and telegraphed it to Paris and Petrograd. It was c6riveyed to M. Sazonof on the morning of July 25 (British Book, No. 17, p. 21). He replied that this did not tally with the information which came to him from Germany. We know from German Book, No. 1 (p. 424), French Book, No. 28 (p. 159) and British Book, No. 9 (p. 16) what kind of language the German Ambassadors at the capitals of the Entente Powers were holding on July 24. The reassuring Communication thus made to Great Britain can therefore only be explained, in the light of the other communications sent to Sir E. Grey from Vienna on July 23 (Austrian Book, No. 9, p. 454) and on July 28 (No. 39, p. 516), as an attempt to keep Great Britain quiet. Any reassurance designed really to preserve peace should clearly have been made at Petrograd. But while Count Berchtold was doing his best to reassure Sir E. Grey by urgent telegrams on July 23 and 24, he contented himself with writing a despatch (for such it appears to be) to Petrograd on July 25, containing arguments for the education of M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 26, pp. 501-3): Again it must be said that these proceedings were not calculated to promote a Irank exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd. The real inference from this correspondence seems to be— and it lies very near the heart of the calamities from which Eurone is nnw PREFACE. ix suffering— that Austria proceeded throughout on the principle that it is better not to enter into discussions with the person with whom you have a difEerence of opinion. Hence the mystery reigning at Vienna ior the first three weeks of July, and hence also the confidences as to Austria's moderate intentions carefully imparted on July 24 and 25 to the Powers not the most directly concerned with those intentions. We have here laboured perhaps a rather minor point, and have not considered the course of those " conversations " between Vienna and Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation by the four dis- interested Powers, which formed the main features of the three days between July 25 and 28. But these main features have already been exhaustively discussed and commented on in pubHc during the last few months, and the minor points dealt with above are raised because they seem comparatively new and because for that reason they throw additional fight on the grounds for M. Sazonof's remark on July 28, recorded in French Book, No. 82, p. 199 : " Certainly Austria is unwilling to converse. ' ' This distrust may usefully be com- pared with the impression made on M. Bienvenu-Martin by Hen von Schoen's communications at Paris on July 24 to 26 (French Book, No. 61, p. 183), and with the character of M. Jules Cambon's con- versations with Herr von Jagow on July 24 and 27 (French Book, Nos. 30 and 74, pp. 161-2 and 191-2). Silence and a show of power were the weapons on which Germany and Austria relied. VI. The View of the Negotiations implied by the Title of the German Book : " How Russia Betrayed Germany's Con- fidence." The ground of the charge thus made by Germany against Russia is a little difficult to fix. As we have seen, Russia's attitude was entirely open throughout the negotiations, and the German Chan- cellor's telegrams to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and Petrograd of July 26 (German Book, Nos. 10, 10a, and 10b, p. 428) show that, on the day following the rupture between Austria and ■Serbia, that attitude was already clearly understood in Germany. In fact, there is not a sign in the whole correspondence that any statesman an the whole of Europe, ever doubted that Russia would regard an actual armed attack on Serbia under the circumstances as an attack upon herself. We are forced to the conclusion that if Count Pourtales at Petrograd continued to under-estimate the danger of war until his conversation with M. Sazonof at 2 a.m. on the night of July 29 to 30 (British Book, No. 97, p. 75 ; Russian Book, No. 60, p. 288 ; French Book, No. 103, p. 212), at which he " completely broke down •on seeing that war was inevitable," his under-estimate must have been based on a doubt, not as to Russia's poUcy, but as to her courage ; and this is borne out by the attitude both of the German Ambassador at Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin (British Book, Nos. 32 and 71, pp. 28 and 57). Russia was not " in a position to make war." But, so far as can be understood, the gravamen of the German .charge against Russia is that the German military attache at Petrograd X THE EUROPEAN WAR. characterised the assurances of the Russian General Staff on July 29,. as " an attempt to mislead us " (p. 410), and that the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor, of July 31 (p. 411), was despatched at the moment when the general mobihsation of the Russian Army was being ordered. That is to say, the German case is that :— 1. In the period between July 28 and July 31, durmg which the Russian Government assured the German Government that mobilisa- tion was only proceeding to meet Austrian preparations m Gralicia_, the Russian Army was in reality being at least partially mobihsed in "Warsaw, Vihia and other districts against Germany. Russia was therefore taking advantage of Germany's attitude as stated to Sir E. Goschen by Herr von Jagow on July 27 (British Book, No. 43, p. 39) that " if Russia only mobiUsed in the south, Germany would not mobilise." 2. The Russian mobihsation occurred at a moment when Germany was making a special effort at peaceful mediation, and at a moment when the Czar was actually encouraging those efforts by pacific assurances. We will take these two points separately. 1. Russian mobilisation measures between July 28 and July 31. The German Book rests almost its whole case on the priority of mobilisation measures. The way in which that case was carefully built up during the negotiations is shown by British Book No. 71 (p. 56), where the German Chancellor declares on July 28 that the Russian mobilisation in the south endangered the efforts of the German Government to encourage direct communications between Vienna and Petrograd. Compare this with British Book Nos. 70 (p. 55), 74 (p. 58), 93 (1) and (3) (pp. 70 and 72) ; Russian Book No. 47 (p. 283) ; Austrian Book Nos. 40 (p. 517), 42 (p. 520), and 48 (p. 524) ; German Book No. 16 (p. 430). It will be seen that at the moment the Chancellor was speaking, Austria had already refused both direct dis- cussions with Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's mediation proposals, before she heard of the Russian mobilisation, and on the sole ground that she had herself declared war on Serbia. It was after she heard of the Russian preparations that she resumed conversations on July 29- 30. It will be observed that on July 28 Russia believed that the general Austrian mobilisation had been ordered. As a matter of fact, in sifting any case based on mobilisation reports there are several points to be remembered. Mobilisation measures as preliminaries to war are a German tradi- tion. If anyone will refer to the account of the negotiations between Prussia and Austria from March 31 to May 8, 1866, before the Prusso- Austrian war, given in Sybel's " Foundation of the German Empire,"' Book 16, Chapter 1, he will see the example in this line set by Bismarck. But a case based on priority of mobihsation measures is never a strong one for several reasons. First, it is difficult enough to tell " who began it " when the nego- tiations are spread over months, but it is practically impossible to do so when, as here, it is a question of hours. Take the German telegram of July 26 to Petrograd (p. 408), given in the body of the German narrative, and the conversation between M. Sazonof and Count Pourtal§s on July 29, recorded in No. 58 (p. 287) of the Russian Book. PREFACE. XI The actual mobilisation measures are taken in the midst of a cloud of accusations and threats, and it is impossible to separate cause from effect, in the hurried hours which we have to study. Secondly, in any attempt to state the facts, the minor accusations and innuendoes must be discarded as of shght importance, except as a guide to the psychology of the moment. Such minor points are German Book,Nos. 6 and 9 (pp. 427-8) ; Serbian Book, No. 52 (p. 395) ; French Book, No. 89 (p. 202) ; Austrian Book, No. 47, penultimate para., last sentence (p. 523), and a dozen other similar reports. The same may be said of rumours of violations of frontier (Austrian Book, No. 40, p. 518 ; German narrative, p. 413 ; British Book, No. 144, p. 103 ; French Book, No. 106, p. 214 ; British Book, No. 105, p. 80). They have their value, but to put them forward, as does the German and Austrian correspondence, as the actual ground for the commencement of hostilities is to assume the impossible position that the fate of nations is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol. Frankly, a marked insistence on such reports, as in the German Book, shows a poor appreciation of the value of the evidence. Thirdly, mobilisation " orders " are not mobihsation. The mobili- sation systems of different countries are radically different ; the pre- cise nature of those systems, the hues of the railways and a hundred other points must be taken into consideration in judging mobihsation measures, and any statement which ignores these factors is a mere bid for uninformed pubhc opinion. We cannot enter into a considera- tion of all these factors here, but a few indications may be given. No. 3 (p. 134) of the French Book, contains an allusion to the well- known fact of the secrecy of the first stages of German mobihsation, and M. Jules Cambon beheved that this first stage was set on foot as early as July 21 (French Book No. 15, p. 149 ; see also No. 59, p. 182). It is unnecessary to estimate the accuracy of the various reports of German preparations in the French Book, interesting as they are. The hard fact that though Germany only proclaimed " Kriegsgefahr- zustand " on July 31 and mobihsation on August 1, to take effect on August 2, the German troops were across the Luxemburg frontier at dawn on August 2, will probably be judged to be historical evidence of far more value than any isolated reports received during the crisis. As to Russian mobilisation, British Book, Nos. 43 (p. 39), and 121 (p. 92) show that it was fully reahsed in Germany that the Russian system was so compUcated as to make it difficult to distinguish the locaKties really affected by mobihsation. Germany accuses Russia of mobilising against Germany, not Austria, because she is reported to be mobilising at Vilna and Warsaw, but both those towns are nearer to the Gahcian frontier than Prague is to the Serbian frontier, and Austria was reported to be mobilising at Prague four days before she declared to Russia that she was only mobihsing against Serbia (Russian Book, No. 24, p. 274; French Book, No. 90, p. 203; Austrian Book No., 50, p. 526 ; German Book, No. 23, p. 432). The bare facts are of very slight value as evidence without a knowledge of the points already mentioned. If the charges as to the priority of Russian mobihsation are examined in the hght of these considerations, it will be admitted that the evi- dence for those charges is remarkably shght, and that, given the Xii THE EUEOPBAN WAR. admitted extreme slowness of Eussian, and the extreme rapidity of German, mobilisation, a fact which is frequently alluded to in the correspondence, there is no indication in favour of, and an over- whelming presumption against, the theory that the Eussian measures were further advanced than the German when war was declared on August 1st. 2. The charge that the Czar's telegram of July 31 (p. 411) was misleading, and that the mobilisation orders issued about the time of its despatch destroyed the effect of sincere efforts then being made by Germany to mediate between Eussia and Austria. In the first place, a glance at the Czar's telegram is sufficient to show that this, charge is, to put it frankly, of the flimsiest character. His Majesty gave his " solemn word " that, while it was " technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations," the Eussian troops would " undertake no provocative action " " as long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue." There was no promise not to mobihse ; there was nothing but a statement which is abnost word for word the same as that contained in the German Emperor's telegram to King George twenty-four hours later (page 540, No. 6) — the statement that, under certain circumstances, mobihsa- tion would not be converted into hostilities. As a matter of fact, a somewhat unscrupulous use, in effect though perhaps not in intention, has been made of the Czar's telegrams to substantiate the theory of " betrayal." Take for instance the German Chancellor's statement on July 31 (British Book, No. 108, p. 84), that " the news of the active preparations on the Eusso-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request." The telegram referred to must be that of July 29 (German Book, No. 21, p. 431), since this is the only one which mentions " old friendship " ; but this telegram, though it asks the Emperor to restrain Austria, also says in so many words that popular opinion in Eussia would soon force measures which would lead to war. As to Germany's efforts at mediation, it does seem to be true that on July 29 the Austrian Government showed some signs of moving, in the direction of a peaceful solution. On that day occurred the conversation between Count Szapary and M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 47, p. 523), which, on Count Berchtold's instructions of next day (Austrian Book, Nos. 49 and 50, p. 525) seemed Hkely to develop into a renewal of the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd. On that day, too, Herr von Jagow went so far as to admit that these conversations furnished " a basis for possible negotiation " (French Book, No. 92, p. 204), and on July 30 he forwarded to Vienna, but appa,rently without comment, Sir E. Grey's last proposal which admitted the possibiUty of an Austrian occupation of Belgrade before the mediation of the Powers could' be brought into effect (British Book Nos. 88 and 98, pp. 66 and 75 ; Austrian Book, No. 51, p. 526), and which Austria seems to have regarded at the time, and Germany subsequently professed to have regarded, as a promising basis of discussion (German narrative (pp. 410-1) and Austrian Book, No. 51). By Julv 31 these negotiations had resulted in distinct formulations of PREFACE. XIU the, ilussian and Austrian attitudes which w^re indeed far enough a,part, but which still offered some hope of reconciliation. (Russian Book, No. 67, p, 290 ; British Book, No. 120, p. 91 ; Austrian Book, No, 51, p, 526.) On July 31 the exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd was proceeding (Russian Book, No. 66, p. 290), and, though there is a remarkable absence in the Austrian Book of any indication that there was at this moment any revived hope of peace, it does seem from the British and French Books that the atmo- sphere at Vienna was clearing on July 30-31 (British Book, Nos. 94, 95, 96, 118, pp. 73-4, 89 ; French Book, Nos. 104 and 115, pp. 212 and 222). All this makes a fair showing, so far as the attitude of Austria and Russia is concerned. But what part had BerHn in these more friendly steps ? We hear of many German assurances of moderating counsels sent from Berlin to Vieima ; there are no documents either in the •German or the Austrian Book showing what: these counsels were, though the German Chancellor's account of one message to Vienna is given in British Book, No. 75 (p. 58), but they are mentioned in British Book, No. 95 (p. 74) as having come to the ears of M. Dumaine at Vienna, and it is only fair to point out that the renewal of conversa- tions on July 29 between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary was due to a hint given to the latter by the German Ambassador. The point here is, however, not whether these counsels were actually given, for documentary evidence of which we have still to wait, but whether the attitude of Germany at this momerit was calculated to reassure the Russian Government. And here we have the curious fact that there is in the whole correspondence not a single sign of any communication from Berlin to Petrograd during these days even hinting at the possi- bility of a compromise or of any form of international action to settle the dispute. Look at German Book, No. 14 (p. 429) ; British Book, No. 93 (2) (p. 71) ; Russian Book, Nos. 58, 60, 63 (pp. 287-289). These were the communications which reached M. Sazonof. Their tenour was " mobihsation," " proposals inacceptable," and so on. And breaking through the diplomatic correspondence come the German Emperor's telegrams. At 6.30 p.m. on July 29, His Majesty is, after all that has passed, still " of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war " (No. 22, p. 432) ; six and a half hours later, at 1 a.m., on July 30, he is threatening to abandon all attempts at mediation if Russia mobihses against Austria, No. 23. In ' this correspondence we have many assurances of mediation ; but are we allowed to see the substance ? In fairness, no one will wish to press against German statesmen points arising out of the events of these last days. We have only gone into these points because Germany herself has tried to make use of them against her antagonists. The truth about these days is, as usual, very simple. Under the strain of a sudden crisis, Europe was bound to break at its weakest link, and that weakest link was Germany. She, alone of all the nations of Europe, could not negotiate on the brink of war. The nature of her institutions, the character of her people, the very perfection of her military organisation alike forbade it. The calculations of her General Staff were too fine drawn ; . a state of uncertainty was intolerable to her nerves. The military machine was too vast and elaborate : once set in motion, it must occupy the whole XIV THE EUROPEAN WAR. stage of Government. ^ Every other country could mobilise and yet continue to negotiate with a hope of success. But the German mobih- sation was pecuhar, not only in its effect but in its nature. Open mobihsation was the last stage. It was not a military preparation ; it was in itself an offensive movement. On that order the German armies did not merely concentrate ; they marched. If history passes judgment on Germany it will not be because she did this or that in the final crisis, but because she had for years consciously set herself to create a mihtary machine which incapacitated her from assimung any other attitude but one of menace to her neighbours, and because, knowing the consequences of even a shght pressure on the levers of that machine, she acquiesced in or perhaps deliberately encouraged the steps which made that pressure inevitable. In all this, Russia's attitude deserves a fuller recognition than has yet been accorded to it. She made no parade of pacific intentions ; she played on no weaknesses ; she counted on no doubtful factors ; she took refuge neither in silence nor in catchwords. She stated openly the circumstances under which war would become inevitable. But she gave every chance to international action ; she shunned no discussion ; she was ready to accept any compromise provided only that the Austrian troops paused on the Serbian frontier. She steered her pohcy throughout by the light of the guiding fact that the Austro- Serbian conflict could not be localised even by her own abstention, for that conflict was not a simple attack on Serbia but a recommitment of the whole Balkan question. Her action during the whole crisis is entitled to the respect which is due to honesty and openness in international relations. VII. The Question of Belgian Neutrality. There is no need to go into the details of a question which has now been so exhaustively discussed and on which opinion is already so fuUy formed. But the charges made by Germany against the action of Belgium and Great Britain in the years preceding the war appear to necessitate a brief statement bringing these charges into relation with the correspondence during the crisis. Two charges have been made, which to a certain extent neutralise each other : — 1. That Great Britain had long intended to violate Belgian neutrality by force. 2. That there was an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments providing for the violation of Belgian neutrality by consent. As to the first charge, it may be dismissed in a few words. It is proved to be baseless, not by the statements issued by the British Government after the publication of the " incriminating " documents (Belgian Book, Appendix Nos. 2 and 6, pp. 351 and 354 et seq.), but by Sir E. Grey's despatch to Sir F. Villiers of 1913 (No. 1, p. 350) and by the simple fact that it was not till more than 60 hours after the presentation of the German ultimatum that Great Britain. PREFACE. XV on August 5, definitely and finally promised "joint action with a view to resisting Germany " (Belgian Book, No. 48, p. 324). Great Britain had the duty to defend Belgium by arms against a violation of her territory. On the one hand she had solemnly assured Belgium that such defence would never take the form of anticipatory violation. On the other hand, it had for years been a commonplace — not in closed diplomatic circles but among students of politics and in the columns of the Press — ^that German mihtary preparations indicated an intention to attack France through eastern Belgium. In these circumstances it was the elementary duty of the British Army to obtain such information and make such preparations as would enable Great Britain, if called upon to do so, not merely to go to war in defence of Belgium, but to save her ; and if any British officer approached any Belgian officer with this object, he was but fulfilling the functions for which a national army exists and without the fulfil- ment of which international obligations would become nothing but pious hopes. As to the second charge, allegiag an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments, the formal denials of such an arrangement issued by the two Governments are really unnecessary, for the charge is sufficiently rebutted by Baron Greindl's despatch, pubhshed by the Germans themselves (No. 2, pp. 351-2). Nothing that has been pubhshed contains a shadow of evidence of any- thing resembling such an arrangement. But if further evidence of the truth is required, it is contained in the Belgian Book. In this preface we can leave Great Britain's case to the judgment of the student ; but the action of Belgium, as revealed in the Grey Book, has never yet had full justice done to it, in spite of the general sympathy which it has excited. Nos. 2 and 16 of that Book (pp. 300 and 308) show the careful measures taken by the Belgian Government in advance to secure the maintenance of their neutrality by diplomatic means. But on July 31 the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affaics assured Sir F. ViUiers that it did not " seem possible that our neutrahty could be threatened " (No. 38, p. 319), and in any case stated, in order that there might be no possibihty of precipitate action by any of her guarantors, that she was able to defend herself (British Book, No. 128, p. 95). It was not till August 1, after the Belgian Government had received the assurances of the French Government (No. 15, p. 307), and had heard that the German Govern- ment would not commit themselves to any assurance (No. 14, p. 307), that the Belgian Representatives at the capitals of the guaranteeing Powers were instructed to present to the Governments the declaration of Belgium's intention to maintain and defend her neutrahty. The next day, on August 2, when the news of the invasion of Luxembourg had arrived and Berlin was still silent, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was careful to assure the German Minister at Brussels of his con- fidence in Germany's good intentions. At that conversation the German Minister alluded in reassuring terms to " his personal opinion as to the f eehngs of security which (Belgium) had the right to entertain towards (her) eastern neighbours " (No. 19, p. 309). Afew hours later, at 7 p.m., he presented the German ultimatum (Nos. 20 and 23, pp. 309-12). At 7 a.m. the next morning, August 3, the Belgian Government returned Xvi THE EUEOPBAN WAR : PEBFACE. their reply (No. 22, p. 311) and telegraphed to their Representath-es abroad that " Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack." But still Belgium waited. The enemy's troops were gathering on her f rentier ; at anytime her armies might be attacked ; but she still refused to be driven into one false step. That morning, some time before midday, the French Minister was informed that " the Belgian Govern- ment were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers (Belgian Book, No. 24, p. 313 ; French Book, No. 142, p. 238).* Then King Albert sent an appeal to King George, but still only for diplo- matic intervention (Belgian Book, No. 25 p. 313). Later on that day; or during the night, the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier (No. 30, p. 316; French Book, No. 151, p. 242). At 6 a.m. next morning, August 4, the Belgian Government received the final German notifica- tion (No. 37, p. 314). The Cabinet was assembled and after deliberation, decided to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, but that appeal was not made until the evening (Nos. 38, last para., 40 and 43, pp. 319-322), We see in this narrative how scrupulously careful the Belgian Government were to avoid the slightest sign of suspicion, the sUghtest incUnation to one of the guaranteeing Powers rather than the other, the slightest confession of mistrust — in short, the smallest movement in any direction, by word or deed, which could furnish the shadow of a pretext for such charges as those which have since actually been made. By this attitude Belgium was serving not only herself, but Europe ; she was not only safeguarding her own honour, but she was' preventing her peculiar international position from being made the occasion of suspicions or the excuse for hostihties. In face of this record, it may be possible to respect the straightforward avowal of the German Chancellor's speech (p. 438), however indefensible the policy he sought to justify ; but it is difiicult to treat with patience the insinuations made by Herr von Jagow, as early as July 31, regarding. Belgium's hostile acts (British Book, No. 122, p. 93) — insinuations which are effectively exposed in Belgian Book, No. 79, pp. 344-5). This, however, may be said. Charges against Great Britain are fair methods of warfare. They may call for denial, but not for protest. But charges against Belgium, made at such a moment and in such circumstances, can be justified by no standards of policy or morality. They fail before every test known to historical criticism, and the circumstances in which they are made are themselves a refutation. For the sufEerings of Belgium to-day are largely due to her steady and honourable determination to appeal for no assistance which by any stretch of malicious construction could be inter.preted as an infringe- ment of the law of her existence.f *, According to British Book, No. 151 (p. 106), the BYench miHtary attach^ actually made a definite offer on this day to the Belgian War Office of five army corps for the defence of Belgimn, but the Belgian and French documents seem to- show that this offer was unofficially made and was not alluded to by the I^ench Minister or referred to in the general reply of the Belgian Government, t The documents published in Germany (Belgian Book, App.No. 4, pp.' 354-361) have been most unscrupulously used in the German press. To take one instance • the word " conversation " in para. 8 of the first document has in more thaa one reproduction been printed as " convention." xvu I. LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. GREAT BRITAIN. Lord High Chancellor ... Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. French Ambassador Russian Ambassador German Ambassador Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister Serbian Minister Viscount Haldane. Sir Edward Grey. Sir A. Nicolson. M. Paul Cambon. M. de Meuriau (Charge d'Affaires), Count BenokendorfE. M. de Etter (Counsellor of- Embassy). Prince Liohnowsky. Count Mensdorff. Count de LalaJng. M. Boschkovitch. 2. FRANCE. President of the Republic ... President of the Council . . . Ministers for Foreign Affairs Political Director . . . British Ambassador Russian Ambassador German Ambassador Aitstro-Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister Serbian Minister M. Poincar6. M. Rene Viviani. 1. M. Jonnart. 2. M. Stephen Piohon. 3. M. Ren6 Viviani. 4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting).. 5. M. Doumergue. 6. M. Delcass6. M. Berthelot. Sir Erancis Bertie. M. Isvolsky. M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Affaires).. Baron von Schoen. Count Sz6esen. Baron Guillaume. M. Vesnitch. RUSSIA. Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for War British Ambassador French Ambassador German Ambassador Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Serbian Minister M. Sazonof. M. Suohomlinof. Sir George Buchanan. M. Pal6ologue. Count Pourtal^s. Count Sz&pary. Count Czemin (Charge d'Affaires). Dr. M. Spalaikbvitoh. XVlll 4. GERMANY. Imperial Chancellor Secretary of State ... Under-Secretary of State British Ambassador French Ambassador Russian Ambassador American Ambassador Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister Serbian Charge d' Affaires French Minister at Munich French Consul-General at Franhfort Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. • Herr von Jagow. Herr von Zimmermann, Sir Edward Gosohen. Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of Embassy). M. Jules Cambon. M. de Manneville (Charge d'Affa'ies). M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (Charg6 d'Afiaires). Mr. Gerard. Count Szogyeny. Baron Beyens. Dr. M. Yovanovitoh. M. Alliz6. M. Ronssin. :5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Searetary of State for Foreign Affairs Under-Secretaries of State for ~ Affairs. President of the Ministry of Hungary British Amiassador French Ambassador Russian Aniibassador American Ambassador Oerman Ambassador Italian Ambassador Belgian Minister Serbian Minister French Consvl-Oeneral at Buda-Pest Russian Consvl-Oeneral at Fiume Acting Russian Consul at Prague Count Berchtold. Baron Macchio. Count Eorgaoh. Count Tisza. Sir Maurice de Bunsen. M. Dumaine. M. Sohebeko. Prince KoudacLeS (Charge d'Afiaires). Mr. Penfield. Herr von Tsohirscky, Duke d'Avama. Count Errembault de Dudzeele. M. Yov. M. Yovanovitoh. M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin. M. Salviati. M. Eazansky. ^. TURKEY. British Chargi d' Affaires.. French Ambassador Serbian Charg& d' Affaires Austrian Consvl-Oeneral . Mr. Beaumont. M. Bompard. M. M. Georgevitch. Herr Jehlitsohka. ^. BELGIUM. Minister for Foreign Affairs Colonial Minister British Minister French Minister American Minister ^German Minister Austro-Hungarian Minister Dutch Minister M. Davignon. Baron van der Elst (Secretary- General). H. Renkin. Sir Francis Villiers. M. Klobukowski. Mr. Brand Whitlock. Herr von Below Saleske. Count Clary. M, de Weede. XIX 8. SERBIA. Prime Minister Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. British Minister French Minister Russian Charge d' Affaires Oerman 8ecreiaryj>f Legation Atistro-Hungarian Minister Belgian Minister Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish M. Pafihitoh. Dr. Laza Patohou. Mr. des Graz. Mr. Craokanthorpe (First Seore - tary). M. Boppe. M. Strandtman. Herr von Storok. Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. M. de Welle. Herr Hoflehner. 9. ITALY. Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador Frerhch Ambassador German Ambassador Serbian Minister Marquis di San Giuliano. Sir Bennell Rodd. M. Barrdre. Herr von Flotow. M. Ljub Michailovitch. 10. SPAIN. Belgian Minister ... Baron Grenier. 11. DENMARK. French Minister M. Bapst. 12. HOLLAND. • Minister for Foreign Affairs French Minister Belgian Minister M. Loudon. M. Pellet. Baron Pallon. 13. LUXEMBURG. Minister of State and President of the Dr. Eyschen, Oovemmenl. French Minister M. MoUard. Oerman Minister ... Herr von Buoh. 14. NORWAY. French Minister ... M. Chevalley. 15. SWEDEN. French Minister .. M. Thi6baut. 16. SWITZERLAND. French Consvl-Oeneral at Basle .. M, Farges. II. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC COEEESPONDENCE. No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bumhold, British Chared d' Affaires at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Eussia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known. I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Eussia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. I am, &c. E. GEEY. * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Toreigii Affairs. No. 2. Sir H. Bumhold, British Chargd d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 22.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian d-marche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would haye been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should (M 3649) A 2 THE EUROPEAN WAR. be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing. Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance. No, 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, Jvly 23, 1914. Count Mensdoeff* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which i would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Eussia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from_ Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards ; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Eussian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Eussian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be, used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed. Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria ; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of w^hich was to * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COREESPONDBNOB. O disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away. Count Mensdorfi" did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Eussia. I made the remark that, in a time of difiiculties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were . difficulties, Austria and Eussia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other. Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very favourable recently. I am, &c. E. GEEY. No. 4. Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Anibassador iig, London. — {Communicated hy Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.) (Translation.) Le Gouvernement Imperial et The Austro-Hungarian Go- Eoyal s'est vu oblige d'adresser vernment felt compelled to jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par address the following note to tlw I'entremise du Ministre JmpcSrial Servian Government on the et Eoyal k Belgrade, la note 23rd July, through the medium suivante au Gouvernement of the Austro-Hungarian Minister Eoyal de Serbie : at. Belgrade : — " Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre " On the 31st March, 1909, the de Serbie k Vienne a fait, d'ordre Servian Minister in Vienna, on (M 3649) A 2 THE EUROPEAN WAR. de son Gouvernement, au Gou- vernement Imperial et Eoyal la declaration suivante : — " ' La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ^t^ atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cred en Bosnie-Herzdgovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport k Parti- cle 25 du Traits de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage d^s k present k abandonner I'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observ^e a regard de I'annexion depuis I'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, k changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre d^sormais avec cette dernifere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.' " Or, I'histoire des derniferes annees, et notamment les ^v^ne- ment's douloureux du 28 juin, ont d^montr^ I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise cer- taines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivd k se manifester au del^ du territoire du royaume par des actes de terroisme, par une s&ied'attentatsetpardesmeurtres. "Le Gouvernement Eoyal s^be, loin de satisfaire aux engagements form els contenus dans la declara- tion du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouve- ment : il a tol^re I'activite crimi- nelle des differentes societ^s et affiliations dirig^es centre la Monarchie, le langage effv6n6 de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participa- tion d'officiers et de fonction- naires dans les agissements the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Eoyal Government: — " ' Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She under- takes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy witli regard to -Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neigh- bourly terms with the latter.' " The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The move- ment, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Govern- ment, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series, of outrages and murders. "Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the dedaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Eoyal Servian Govern- ment has done nothing to repress these movements. It has per- mitted the criminal machinations. of various societies and associa- tions directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated- unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the pei'petrators of outrages^ I HE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans rinstruction pub- lique, tol^r^ enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient in- duire la population serbe k la liaine de la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions. " Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Eoyal de Serbie n'avait pas cess4 au moment ou les dv^nements du 28 juin dernier en out ddmontr^ au monde entier les consequences funestes. " II rdsulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de I'atteutat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a et& tram6 a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont et6 - donn6s par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la " Narodna Odbrana," et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organist et effectue par des chefs du service-frontifere serbe. "Les r&ultats mentionn^s de rinstruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal de poursuivre plus long- temps I'attitude de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observee pendant des ann^es vis-^-vis des figissements concentres k Bel- grade et propag^s de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie ; ces r^sultats lui imposent au con- traire le devoir de mettre fin k des menses qui forment une menace perp^tuelle pour la tran- quillite de la Monarchie. " C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal se voit oblig^ de demander au Gouvernement and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. " This culpable tolerance of the Eoyal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. "It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which thp mur- derers were provided had v been given to them by Servian ofi&cers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; andfinally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. "The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hun- garian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of ex- pectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose ©n them the duty of putting an end to the in- trigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. " To achieve this end the Im- perial and Eoyal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Eoyal Servian Govern- THE EUROPEAN WAR. serbe I'^nonciation ofScielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchie austro- hongroise, c'est-i-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu k detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage k supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste. " Afin de donner un caractfere solennel k eet engagement, le Gouvernement Eoyal de Serbia fera publier k la premifere page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet I'dnonciation sui- vante : — "'Le Gouvernement Eoyal de Serbia condamne la propagande dirigfe contre I'Autriehe-Hon- grie, c'est-i-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu k detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sinc^re- nient les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. " ' Le Gouvernement Eoyal regrette que des ofi&eiers et fonc- tionnaires serbes aient particip^ k la propagande susmentionn^e et compromis par Ik les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gou- vernement Eoyal s'^tait solen- nellement engage par sa declara- tion du 31 mars, 1909. " ' Le Gouvernement Eoyal, qui ddsapprouve et r^pudie toute idde ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinies des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche- Hongrie que ce soit, consid^re de son devoir d'ayertir formellement les ofificiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il proc^dera avec la dernifere rigueur contre les per- sonnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts k prevenir et k rdprimer.' ment a formal assurance that the 3^ condemn this dangerous propa-' ganda against the Monarchy ; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propa- ganda. "In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Eoyal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration : — "•The Eoyal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy territories be- longing to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. "'The Eoyal Government regret that Servian officers and func- tionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neigh- bourly relations to which the Eoyal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909. '"The Eoyal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempt- ing to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.' THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. " Cette ^nonciation sera portde simultan^ment k la connaissance cle I'Arm^e Eoyale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera publide dans le 'Bulletin officiel ' de I'arm^e. " Le Gouvernement Eoyal serbe s'engage en outre : '* 1° k supprimer toute publica- tion qui excite k la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance g^nerale est dirig^e contre son int^grit^ territoriale ; " 2° a dissoudre immf^diatement la soci^t^ dite ' Narodna Od- brana,' k confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et k pro- ceder de la m^nje manifere contre les autres soci^t^s et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent k la propagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; le Gouverne- ment Eoyal prendra les mesures n^cessaires pour que les soci^t^s dissoutes ne puissent pas con- tinuer leur activity sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ; " 3° k ^liminer sans d^lai de I'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'in- struction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir k fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche- Hongrie ; " 4° k Eloigner du service mili- taire et de I'administration en general tous les officiers et fonc- tionnaires coupables de la propa- gande contre la Monarchic austro- hongroise et dont le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Eoyal se reserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Eoyal ; " 5° k accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organeS du Gouvernenient Imperial et Eoyal dans la suppression du mouve- ment subveraf dirig^ contre "This declaration shall simulta- neously be communicated to the Eoyal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin ' of the Army. "The Eoyal Servian Govern- ment further undertake: " 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and con- tempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general ten- dency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ; " 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ' Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of pro- paganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propa- ganda against the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy. The Eoyal Government shall take the neces- sary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from contiaxi- ing their activity under another name and form ; " 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria- Hungary; "4. To remove from the military service, and from the administra- tion in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Governmentreserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Eoyal Government ; w " 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment for the suppression of the subversive movement directed 8 THE EUEOPEAN WAE. rint%rit4 territoriale de la Monarchie ; " 6° k ouvrir une enquete judi- ciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ; " des organes, d61^gu6s par le Grouvernement Imperial et Eoyal, prendront part aux recherches j relatives ; " 7° k proceder d'urgence k I'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommd Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de I'jfitat serbe, compromis par les r^sultats de I'instruction de Sarajevo : "8° ^emp^cher,par(Jesmesures efficaces, le concours des autorit^s serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs k travers la frontifere ; "ci licencier et punir sev^rement les fonctionnaires du service- frontifere de Schabatz et de Loz- nica coupables d'avoir aid^ les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur .facilitant le passage de la fronti^re ; " 9° a donner au Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal des explica- tions sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qa'k I'etranger, qui, malgr^ leur position officielle, n'ont pas hdsitd apres I'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manifere hostile envers la Monarchie austro- hongroise; enfin " 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Imp&ial et Eojijal de rex(5cutioh des mesures com- prises dans les points precMents. " Le Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal attend la r^ponse du Gouvernement Eoyal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, k 6 heures du soir. against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ; " 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro - Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ; " 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tanko- sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employ^, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ; " 8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the ilLLeit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ; "9. To furnish the Imperial and Eoyal Government with explanations regarding the unjus- tifiable utterances of high Servian officials.both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their offi- cial position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in inter- views in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally, "10. To notify the Imperial and Eoyal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. ° "The Austro-Hungarian Go- \-ernment expect the reply of the Eoyal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening the 2oth July. ^' THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 9 " Un mdmoire concernant les r^sultats de rinstruction de Sara- jevo k regard des fonctionnaires mentionn^s aux points 7 et 8 est annex^ k cette note." J'ai riionneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note k la con- naissance du Gouveruement aupres dnquel vous Stes accr(^dit^, en accompagnant cette communi- cation du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouverne- ment Eoyal serbe a adress^ k rAutriche-Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci- dessus. Le lendemain mSme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagde dans une politique tendant a inspirer des iddes subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et k preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limi- trophes k la Serbie. La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. Des societes et affiliations ne tardferent pas k se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestine- ment, dtaient destinies k cr^er des d^sordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces societds et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des g^n^raux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les som- niites du monde officiel et inoffi- ciel du royaume. Le journalisme serbe est pres- qne enti^rement au service de cette propapande, dirigde centre rAutriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au m^pris de la Monarchie voisine ou a, des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement centre sa surete et son integrite " A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to . this note." I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the eon- tents of this note to the know- ledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations : — On the 31st March, 1909, the Eoyal Servian Government ad- dressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separa- tion of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. N"o time was lost in the forma- tion of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of dis- orders on Austro-Hungarian ter- ritory. These societies and groups count among their mem- bers generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or con- tempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. 10 THE EUROPEAN WAR. Un grand nombre d'agents est appele h soutenir par tous Jes moyens I'agitation centre rAutriche - Hongrie et a cor- rompre dans les provinces limi- trophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des poli- ticiens serbes, esprit dout ]es annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernifere crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-lk occupies en Macedoine sont venus se mettre h la disposi- tion de la propagande terroriste centre rAutriche-Hongrie. En presence de ces agissements, aiixquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposfe depuis des ann^es, le Gouvernemeiit de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gou- vernement serbe a manqu^ au devoir que lui imposait la declara- tion solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volont^ de I'Europe et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-S-vis de rAutriche-Hongrie. La longanimity du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal k I'egard de I'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie etait inspir^e du d^sin- t^ressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de m^me par apprdcier a sa juste valeur I'amitid de I'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bien- veillante pour les int^rSts poli- tiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Eoyal esp^rait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son c6t6 une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout k une pareille Evolution dans les idfes politiques en Serbie, lorsque, aprfes les 6v6ne- ments de I'ann^e 1912, le Gou- A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier pro- vinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propa- ganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaldng given to Austria-Hungary. The patience of the Imperial and Eoyal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating A.ustria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Eoyal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analo- gous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria- Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Eoyal THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COEEESPONDENCE. 11 vernement Imperial et Eoyal rendit possible, par une attitude d^sint^ress^e et sans rancune, I'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbia. Cette bienveillance manifest^e par I'Autriche-Hongrie k regard de rilltat voisin n'a eependant aucunement modifie les proc^dds du royaume, qui a continud k tol^rer sur son territoire une propaganda, dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestos au monde en tier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou rh^ritier pr4- somptif de la Monarchic et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tram^ k Belgrade. En presence de cet ^tat de choses le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a dd se decider a entre- prendre da nouvelles et pressantes demarches k Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe k arrSter la mouvement incen- diaire manaqant la sfiret^ et rint^grite de la Monarchic austro- hongroise. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal est persuade qu'en entre- prenant cetta d(^marche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilis^es, qui ne sauraient ad- mettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impun^ment dans la lutte poli- tique, et qua la paix europeenne fut continuellement trouble par les agissements partant de Belgrade. C'est k I'appui de ce qui pr^c^de que le Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal tiant k la dis- position du Gouvernement Royal de Grande -Bra tagne un dossier ^lucidant les menfes serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menses et le meurtre du 28 juin. Une commiinication identique est adress^a aux repr&entants Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandise- ment of Servia possible. The benevolence which Austria- Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the pro- ceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its terri- tory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demon- strated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regi- cide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually dis- turbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the 12 THE EUROPEAN WAR. Imp^riaux et Koyaux auprfes des autres Puissances signataires. Vous §tes autoris^ de laisser une copie de cette ddpeche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires ^^trangferes. Vienne, le 2^j'vAllet, 1914. Imperial and Eoyal representa- tives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands ot the Minister for '" Affairs. Vienna, July 24, 1914. Foreign Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo centre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative — crime commispar eux le 28 juin dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constations suivantes : 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son s^jour a Sarajevo, de I'Archiduc Francois ■ Ferdinand fut form^ k Belgrade par Gavrilo Prineep, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nonimd Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez, avee le concours du commandant Voija Tankosie. 2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition , moyennant lesquels les mal- faiteurs ont commis I'attentat, f iirent livres a Belgrade k Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomm^ Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosifi. 3°. Les bombes sont des grenades k la main provenant du d^pot d'armes de I'arm^e serbe a Kragujevac. •4°. Pour assurer la r^ussite de I'attentat^ Ciganovic enseigna k Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un foret pres du champ de tir k Topschider, des le9ons de tir avec pistolets Browning k Princip et Grabez. 5°. Pour rendre possible k Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la fronti^re de Bosnie- Annex. The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his acces- sories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions : — 1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, N"edeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosie. 2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosie at Belgrade. 3. The bombs are hand- grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian army at Kragujevac. 4. In order to^ ensure the suc- cess of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Top^ schider. _ 5. To enable Princip, Cabrino- vic, and Grabez to cross the fron- tier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 13 Herz^govine et d'y introduire smuggle in their contraband of clandestinement leur contrebande arms secretly, a secret system of d'armes, un syst^me de transport transportwas organised by Oigano- secret fut organist par Oiganovic. vi6. D'apr^s cette organisation Tin- By this arrangement the intro- troduction en Bosnie-Herzdgovine ducrion into Bosnia- Herzegovina des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes of criminals and their arms was fut opdr^e par les capitaines- effected by the officials controlling frontiferes de Chabac (Eade Popo- the frontiers at Chabac (Rade vid) et de Loznica ainsi q\\e par Popovic) and Loznica, as well as le douanier Eudivoj Grbic de by the customs officer Rudivoj Loznica avec le concours de divers Grbic, of Loznica, with the assist- particuHers. ance of various individuals. No. 5. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bit,nsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.* In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circum- stances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand Ko. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits. I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. Count Mensdorff* replied that the preaent situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder ; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. I said that if Servia had procrastinated m replying, a time limit could have been intr(^duced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 14 THE EUEOPEAN WA?. of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply withm a bmit of forty-eight hours from its presentation. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Mward Grey. — (Beceived July 24.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof * to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Govern- ment would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Eussia and France. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Eussia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Eussia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Govern- ment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Eussia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could, not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue. In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia. could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Eussian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria ? M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Eussian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to. I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to * Eussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORKESPONDENCE. 15 bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my sugges- tion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Eussian intervention, which would involve France and . Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. President of French EepubHc and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Eussia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Eussia are deter- mined to make a strong stand. _____ __ : __ No. 7. " ' Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna., to Sir Edivard Grey. — {Received Jiily 24.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Eussian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Eussia indifferent. Eussian Charg^ d' Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power. 16 THE EUROPEAN WAE. N"0. 8. Mr. Grackanthorpe, British Ghargi d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24 1914. Atjsteian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Govern- ment may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. . ■««■■•, 1, This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, wJio returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. No. 9. Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914. The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con- cerning the circumstances under, which the assassination of the, Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the cpnnivance of members of Government and army. The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that tune has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro- THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 17 Hungarian Grovernment, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Govern- ment by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them. The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two. immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. No. 10. Sir Edward, Ghrey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorfff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Eussia, we need not concern ourselves about it ; but, if Eussia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be qidte powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simul- taneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it ; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in Sb. Petersburgh till Eussia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Eussia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Eussia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Eussia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Eussia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it. * French Ambassador in London, t Austro-Himgarian Ambassador in London. (M 3649) B ■^ THE EUROPEAN WAR. M Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had OIlCf^ moved against Servia. The important thing was to gam time by mediatioS in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers. _ I said, that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. He replied that it was so. ■, ^,- r^ I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject. I am, &c. E. GEEY. No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bumbold, British Chargi d' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Jiily 24, 1914. German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I under- stand the German Government is making the same communication to tlie Powers. I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Eussia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Eussia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordiaarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Eussia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone. The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Eussia becoming threatening. The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Eussian Slav opinion demand that Eussia should march to help Servia ; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. Tou should iufoim Secretary of State. Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia ; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria. * German Ambassador in London. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 19 No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. CracJcanthorpe, British GJiargi d' Affaires at Belgrade. ^Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Eussian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Eussian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government. I. have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action. No. 13. Note communicated hy Russian Ambassador, July 25. M. Sazonof t^ldgraphie au Chaigd d'Affaires de Eussie k Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914: "La communication du Gou- vernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la presentation de I'ultimatum k Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un d^lai tout k fait insuf&sant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour I'aplanissement des complications surgies. " Pour pr^venir les conse- quences incalculables et ^gale- ment n^fastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paralt in- dispensable qu'avant tout le d61ai (M 3649) (Translation.) M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Eussian Charg^ d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914: " The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the diffi- culties that have arisen. " In order to prevent the con- sequences, equally incalculable ' and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro- Hungaxian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential B 2 20 THE EUEOPEAN WAR. donn6 k la Serbie pour r^pondre soit prolong^. L'Autriche-Hon- grie, se declarant disposfe h, in- former les Puissances des donn^es de I'enquete sur lesqnelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Eoyal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner ^galement le temps de s'en rendre compte. " En ee cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fond(5 de certaines des exigences autri- cbiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en consequence. " Un refus de prolonger le terme de I'ultimatum priverait de toute port^e la d-marche du Gouvernement austro - hongrois aupres des Puissances et se trou- verait en contradiction avec les bases me me des relations Inter- nationales. " Le Prince Koudachef est charge de communiquer ce qui precede au Cabinet de Vienne." M. Sazonof esp^re que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique adherera au point de vue expose, et il exprime I'espoir que Sir Edward 'Grey voudra bien munir I'Ambassadeur d'Augle- terre i Vienne d'instructions con- formes. that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria - Hungary, having de- clared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Eoyal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. " In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. " A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. " Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna." M. Sazonof hopes tliat His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the_ British Ambassador at Vienna. Ko. 14. Sir Edvjard Gn-ey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Pctersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. AusTEiAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a d-marche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations. In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 21 No. 15. Sir F, Bertie, British AnAassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.f * See No. 14. j See No. 12. No. 16. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Parish July 25, 1914. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, how- ever, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. No. 17. Sir G. Bucha-nan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. I SAW the Minister for Foreign Afiairs this morning, and com- municated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade-! The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and with- draw their forces into the interior, whUe they would at the same time * See No. 14. t See No. 12. 22 THE EUROPEAN WAB. His Excellency was in favour of appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was m lavuui ui their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the ohligations taken by ber^aa m 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatuin,*were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. ■ r r;''! ; If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Eussia would be quite- ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England,. France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Eussia would not pre- cipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Eussia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it- was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Eussia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and estabhshing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours.x If we took our stand firmly with France and Eussia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the rSle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Eussia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Eussia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Eussia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Eussia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face aU the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation, as desperate. No. 18. Sir H. Bumbold, British Ghargi d' Affaires at Berlin,, to Sir Hdward Grey, — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on. Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immedi- ately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to- Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtoldf is at Isehl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances, there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended-. * See No. 11. + Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Af&irs. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 23 Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro- Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro- Hungarian demands. Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Eussian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Eussia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Eussia in this morning's papers did not look veiy reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Eussia. He said that he had given the Eussian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Eussia became threatening, he was quite_ ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though be had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. No. 19. Sir B. Rodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 25, 1914."- I SAW the Seoreta,ry-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Eailway. No. 20. Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 24 THE EUEOPBAN WAR. m. 21. Mr. Crackanihm'pe, British Ghargd d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible. The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : — The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declara- tion in the " Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the fuU satisfaction offered in the Servian reply. No. 22. Mr. Grackanthorpe, British Ghargi d! Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Eussian colleague, and informed them of your views. They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. I think it is highly probable that the Eussian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. No. 23. Mr. Grackanthorpe, British Ghargi d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. The Government have left for JSIish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives. * The Servian Parliament. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 25 No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Biwhanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. ! am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make ^possible some more definite rapprochemeiit bjetweeo the Poweis than has been possible hitherto. No. 102. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Ooschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. I HAVE warned Prince Liohnowsky* that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky* to German 'Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July:f * German Ambassador in London. + See No. 98. No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador ai St. Petersbwrgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 79 Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should ^ve satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austeia. Territory occaipied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. EuBsian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,! and fears it cannot be modified ; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Afiairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would exaanine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same. It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. t See No. 97. No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign, Office, July 30, 1914. YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan* of to-day,t and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh. * British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. t See No. 103. No. 105. Sir EdAJoard Qrey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. gij Foreign Offi^ce, July 30, 1914. M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was 'seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of * Prench AmbaeBaderia London. 80 THE EUROPEAN WAR. Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would iiitervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit. I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon. I am, &c. E. GREY. Enclosure 1 in No, 105. Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been imderstood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Goverimient to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and tojpreserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to'them. Yours, &c. E. GREY. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. Enclosure 2 in No. 105. M. Cambon, French Ambassador in Lonion, to Sir Edward Grey. 81 VAmbassade de France, Londres, ce 23 novemhre, 1912. Cher Sir Edward, PAE votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande- Bretagne s'etaient consultees de temps en temps ; qu'il avait toujours 6te entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberty, pour chaque Grouverne- ment, de decider dans I'avenir s'ils se preteraient I'un I'autre le concours de leurs forces armees ; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre specialistea n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre conslderees comme des engage- ments obligeant nos Gouveme- ments k agir dans certains cas ; que Dependant je vous avais fait observer que, si I'un ou I'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisoas d'apprehender une attaque non provoquee de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il devien- drait essentiel de savoir s'il pour- rait compter sur I'assistance armee de I'autre. Votre lettre r^pond k cette observation, et je suis autorise a vous declarer que, dans le cas oii I'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appre- hender soit I'aggression d'lme tierce puissance, soit quelque evenement mena9ant pour la paix generale, ce Gouvemement examinerait immediatement avec I'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de pr6venir I'agression ou de (M 3649) (Translation.) French Embassy, London. November 23, 1912. Dear Sir Edward. YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd Novem- ber, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time ; that it had always been understood that these con- sultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Govern- ments to take action in certain eventualities ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Grovemment would imme- diately examine with the other the question whether both Govern- ments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two F 82 THE EUEOEEAH WAB. gauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvemements deli- bereraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposes k prendre en commun ; si ces mesures com- portaient une action, les deux Grouvernements prendraient aussi- tot en consideration les plans de leurs etats majors et decideraient alors de la suite qui devrait Itre donnee a ces plans. Votre sincerement devoue, PAUL CAMBON. Govenmients would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; ii those measures involved action, the two Govenmients would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffe and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours &c. PAUL CAMBON. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. Frenck Minister for Foreign Affadrs to M. Camhon, Freruh AmJHWsador in London. CLranslation.) THE German Army bad its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday ; German patrols, twice penetrated on to our territory.. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from ths^ frontier. The local population ia protesting against being thuS' abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Govern- ment wishes to make, it clear ta public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz^ reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier., Eeseivists have been called hack to Germany by tens of thousandai- This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we hav® not called, back a single reservists L'AEM^E allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bomes-fron- ti^res, hier ; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes out penetr6 sur notre territoire. Nos avant- postes sont en retraite a 10 kilom. en arri^re de la frontiere. Les populations ainsi abandonnees a I'attaque de I'armee adverse pro- testent ; mais le Gouvernement tient a montrer a I'opinion pub- lique et au Gouvernement britan- nique que I'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16® Corps de Metz renforce par une partie du 8® venu de Treves et de Cologne occupe la frontiere de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15° Corps d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusiUes les Akaciens- Lorrains des pays annexfe ne peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des r^servistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappeles en AUe- magne ; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation : or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reserviste. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CDKBESPONDENCE. 83 Comme vous le voyez, I'Alle- As you see, Germany has' 'done magne I'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes so. I would add that all my no's iBfoTmations concordent poui information goes to show that the montrer que les preparatifs alle- German preparations began on mands ont commence aamedi,* le Saturday,* the very day on which J9ur. meme de. la remise de la note the Austrian note was handed in. autrichienne. Ces el&Qients, ajoutes. a ceax These facts, added > to those contenus dans, mon telegramme contained in my telegram of dliier,, vous permettent de faire yesterday^ will enable you to la preuve au Gouvemement bri- prove to the British Grovernment tannique; de la volonte pacifiqiie the pacific intentions of the one de I'un et des. intentions agres- party and the aggressive inten- sives de. 1' autre.. tions of the other. * Sio : in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian laitimatam wasi in fact, Thuisday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914. I LEABNT from the Minister for Foreign Afiairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to beUeve that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russiaj and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlim to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an. exchange- of views between the four Powers should be resumedin any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she. would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non- siiccess for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of. these two countries, discussions, could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with Mis Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. (M 3649) !• 2 84 THE EXJEOPEAN WAR. No 107. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned. The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the i)utton " as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise. * See No. 84. No. 108, Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done eveiything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto- gether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 85 No. 109. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jvly 31, 1914. I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communica- tion without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of con- versation, and not as an official document. His Excellency Eigreed. * See No. 101. No. 110. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Jvly 31, 1914. I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign AHairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Slinister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians. The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Govern- ment to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their miUtary preparations. It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them. I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. 86 THE EUEOPEAN WAE. No, 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Anibassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign, Office, July 31, 1913.. I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling- block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found ty Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, aad T would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of - course suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germanj could get amy reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and thai Russia and Erance would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Pajis, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences ; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at BerUn, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) B^lin, July 31, 1914. ACCORDING to information just received by German Govera- ment from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Ruflsian army and fleet are being mobilised. 'Chancellor tells me that " Ejiegsg^hr "* will be proclaimed at once by Grerman Govemmei^, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the * " Imminence of War." THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 87 taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country. I This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies. I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Mmister for Foreiga Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. No. 113. Bir iG. Bucfuman, British Ambassador at 8t. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.') (Telegraphic.) St. Fetersluryh, July 31, 1914. IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is deter- mined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops j^gainst Russia as well as against Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador ai Berlin. {Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Grermany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Grovernment, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Govern- ment. It is important to have an early answer. No. 115. Sir .Edward Grey to Sir F. VilUers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility di a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre- 88 THE EUROPEAN WAB. pared to respect tke neatiality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. No. 116. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambaeaador at Parte. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.* Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite difiereat from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France ia being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expsct our neutrality. We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision. I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situa- tion again directly there is a new development. * See No. 99. No. 117. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fieet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COEEESPONDENCE. 89 German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours termi- nates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Grovernment'a answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances. He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. No. 118. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Ailairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recogm'se such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambaspadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard-the situation as despe- rate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conver- sation. The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace. •90 THE EUROPEAN WAE. No. 119. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Pans. Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. M. CAMBON*refen'ed to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolsonf this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, sapng that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether wb would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that -we -would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engage- ment to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. M. Camion then asked me for my reply to what he liad said yester- day. I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present tim& Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determiniiig our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parlia- ment to intervene or not to intervene in a war. Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgiun^, and it m?ght be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the b^inning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England!8 interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. * French Ambassador in London. t British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 91 I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon aa there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement. I am, &c. B. GREY. No. 120. Sir 0. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Teilegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914 JfflJlSTER ior Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to tdiegraph to our respective Grovernments subjoined formula as ibest calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your tdegram of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.f He trusted it would meet with your approval : — " Si I'Autriche consentira a arrSter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que leconflit austroserbe a assume ie caiactere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait aceordfit au Grouvemement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude >expectante."J His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intuition whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conver- sation with Austria continued, IBs Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress. M. Sazonof§ said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this. His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's <3ovemment, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Grovemment, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. ♦ See No. 103. t See No. 97. t Translation.— "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Kussia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." § Eusaian Miniaber for Foreign Affairs. 92 THE EUROPEAN WAR. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Berliri, July 31, 1914. YOUR telegram of 3Ist July.* I spent a a hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efiorts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day ; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately counter- mand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria. His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satis- factory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to "the German demand. He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisa- tion had spoilt everything. * See No. 111. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.* I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very ♦ See No. 114. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 93 doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to -me remote. In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government. No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. I TOLD the (Jerman Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to reUeve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing tMs question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the intregrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. _ I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. I am, &c. E. GREY. * See No. 122. 94 THE EXJEOPEAN WAIt No. 124. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Pa/ris, July 31, 1914. ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your teFegrain of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He' received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make. He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Grermany to order a. general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once; He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Emfea^y is packing up. ♦ See No. 114. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (ITelegrapbic.) Poms, July 31, 1914. MY immediately preceding telegram.* Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Afiairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows : — French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. Presiden* of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians^ and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. * See No. 124. No. 126. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Gr&f..— {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry; for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COIOtESPONBENOE. 95' to compreliend tte reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no difEerences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed, that the Firench Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding. The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up. No. 127, Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey- {Received Aiigust 1.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. No. 128. Sir F. VilUers, British Minifter at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, Augtist 1, 1914. BELGIAN neutrality. The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon. Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against' intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies; * See No. 115. 96 THE EUROPEAN WAR. No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 2.) Luxembourg, 2 acAt, 1914. (T6l6graphique.) MINISTRE d'Etat du Luxem- bourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par rintermediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne h Luxembourg, M. de Buck, un telegramme du Chan- celier de I'Empire allemand Beth- mami-HoUweg disant que les mesures militaires a Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinees k assurer contre attaque even- tuelle d'une armee franjaise. L'exploitation des voie8 ferrees afiermees k I'Empire Luxembourg recevra complete indemnity pour dommages 6ventuels. (Translation.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. (Telegraphic.) The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyshen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a tele- gram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann- Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxem- burg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire. No. 130. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador ai Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August. 1, 1914. WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships. I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered. You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government wiU, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 97 No. 131. Sir Edwwrd Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlm. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1,19U. I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in, order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at BerUn. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof * to Count Benckendorfif of the 31st July communicated to me to-day : — " (Urgent.) " Formule amend6e conformement k la proposition anglaise : ' Si Autriche consent k arreter la marche de ses troupes sue le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro serbe a assume le carac- tere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvemement austro-hongroia sans laisser porter atteinte k ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage k conserver son attitude expectante.' "| (Above communicated to all the Powers.) * Bussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. t Eusaian Ambassador in London. X Translation. — " Formula amended in accordance with the English pro- posal : ' If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " No. 133. Sw Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August I, 1914. M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a 'telegram from M. Sazonof ,t dated the 31st July, which are as follows : — * Counsellor of Russian Embassy' in London, t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (M 3649) G tfO THE EUROPEAN WAE. " The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers,) No. 134. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received Atigust 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. PRESIDENT of the Repubhc has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility ; that it was only after a decree of general mobiUsation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in efiect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preser- vation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 99 would natarally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can Eigree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government. No. 136. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, Augwt 1, 1914. MINISTER of War informed military attach^ this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have caUed up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobili- sation under another name. The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 Mlom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes. * " State of war." No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Avgust 1, 1914. I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro- Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak, (M 3649) , G 2 100 THE EUKOPEAN WAR. Count Mensdorfi* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hiingarian Ambassador at St. Petersbnrgh by Count Berchtold,t and gave me the substance. It states that Count Berchtold begged the Eussian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Eussian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. Special attention was called by Count MensdorfE* to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. ■j" Austro-Hnngarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. No. 138. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. YOUR telegram of to-day.* I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Eussia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of Jier wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard theii refusal to an answer as creating a state of war, * See No. 131. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 101 No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914. MY telegram of 31st July.* The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made. In the evening M. Sazonof t had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successfeil dis- cussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria- Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. M. Sazonof f informed the French Ambassador and myseK this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she coidd treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed imtil the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof f was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria * See No. 120. t Russian Minister for Foreign Afifairs. 102 THE EUEOPEAN WAB. aud Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobiUsation of Germany had created a desperate situation. M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep theii armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settle- ment of the present crisis. * See No. 120. No. 140. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. THE Minister of War again sent for the military attach^ this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks ^ that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken mihtary measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 103 Eussia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is con- vinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany. No. 142. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin,, August 1, 1914. ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. No. 143, Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. Your telegram of 1st August* acted on. Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoy- ance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay. ♦ See No. 130. No. 144. Sir E. Goschm, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. 104 THE EUROPEAN WAR. No. 145. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. MY telegram of 1st August.* Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- cautions being taken. * See No. 143. No. 146. Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914. THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphique.) Luxembourg, le 2 aout, 1914. J'AI I'honneur de porter a la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants : Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvemement Grand ducal a I'heure actuelle, ont penetre sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers le sud du pays et vers la viUe de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des munitions ont 6te ache- min6s par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, oii Ton s'attend de les voir arriver. (Translation.) Luxemburg, (Telegraphic.) August 2, 1914. I HAAHE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts : — On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated iato Luxemburg terri- tory by the bridges of Wasser- billig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxem- burg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC OOREESPONDENCE. 105 D'un instant h I'autre, ces faits is expected. These occurrences impliquent des actes manifeste- constitute acts which are mani- ment contraire a la neutralite du festly contrary to the neutrality Grand Duche garantie par le of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed Trait6 de Londres de 1867. Le by the Treaty of London of 1867. Gouvemement luxembourgeois n'a The Luxemburg Government have pas manqu6 de protester energi- not failed to address an energetic quement contre cette agression protest against this aggression auprSs des representants de Sa to the representatives of His Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne Majesty the German Emperor at a Luxembourg. Une protestation Luxemburg. An identical protest identique va etre transmise tele- will be sent by telegraph to the graphiquement au Secretaire Secretary of State for Foreign d'Etat pour les Affaires Etran- Affairs at Berlin, geres h Berlin. No. 148. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreigrir Office, August 2, 1914. AETER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memorandum : — " I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. " This assurance is of course subject to the pohcy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action imtil the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make there dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany imless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. M. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrahty of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in ParUament to-morrow— in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. * French Ambassador in London. 106 THE EXmOPEAN WAR. No. 149. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlm. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914 YOTIR telegram of 1st August.* I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulaorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. Yon should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,t I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified. * See No. 143. t See No. 130. No. 150. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received August 3.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, 1914. YOUR telegram of 2nd August* : Detention of British ships at Hamburg. No information available. ♦ See No. 149. No. 151. Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 3.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. FRENCH Government have ofEered through their military attach^ the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day : — " We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for ofEering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Govern- ment will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take." No. 152. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication : — THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 107 In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatmns had been presented to France and Eussia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuhano* replied : — The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' " In making this communication, M. Cambonf was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casut foederis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. I am, &c. £i. GxvrlXi * Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. + French Ambassador in London. No. 153. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlm. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914, THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms : — " Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have dehvered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutraUty entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and pronaising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also imderstand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply. 108 THE EUROPEAN WAR. No, 154. Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 4.) (Telegraphic.) Brussds, August 4, 1914. GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Afiairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. No. 155. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutraUty, Hia Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maiutaia their independence and integrity iu future years. No. 156. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaiuts from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London. — {Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914. PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 109 most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solenmly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir B. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrahty, it bemg for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. No. 158. Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 4.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. MILITARY attachd has been informed at War OfBlce that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Lidge has been simimoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. No. 159. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. WJE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Afiairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany dechned to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berhn and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrahty of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. ♦ See No. 153. 110 THE EUROPEAN WAE. No. 160. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. Sir, London, August 8, 1914:. IN accordance with the instructions contaiaed in your telegram of the 4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutraUty. Herr von Jagowf at once rephed that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, J and, in compliance with the instructions therein con- tained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Govenmient that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earUer in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be * See No. 153. t German Secretary of State. I See No. 159. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. Ill reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow* expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire pohcy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engage- ments, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. I then said that I should hke to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a word — " neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — ^just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better thai to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down hke a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* wished me to imderstand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and death " for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solenm engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrahty if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? The Chancellor said, " But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that ? " I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaMng solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so Uttle disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor- tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between * German Secretary of State. 112 THE EUROPEAN WAR. Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed oui separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily imderstand that no one regretted this more than I. After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew. up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.* At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken ofi, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagowf a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann J said that that was, ia fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann J left me, a flying sheet, issued by the " Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britaiu had declared war against Germany. The inamediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was gettiag unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagowf at once informed the Chief of PoUce, and an adequate force of mounted poHce, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred. After order had been restored Herr von Jagowf came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his coimtrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indeUble stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had repUed, " Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that * This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. t German Secretary of State. I German Under-Secretary of State. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COERESPONDENCE. 113 ellect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbour- hood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to dis- turbances. It was the "pestilential ' Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete. On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message : — " The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feehngs of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles." I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery. On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow* and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of pohce was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suSered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the .crowd to my Hussian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrange- ments ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A * German Secretary of State. n 114 THE EUEOPEAN WAB.' retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us ; hut beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my stafi under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and mihtary attaches, secretaries, and the two young attach&s buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. I should also Uke to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrange- ments for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. I have, &c. W. E. GOSCHEK * American Ambassador in Berlin. No. 161. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, Sir, London, September 1, 1914. THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose- now to add a few comments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky, * who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22hd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine. French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavaihng, and that the note which was being drawn * German Ambassador at Vienna. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 115 tip would be found to contain nothing with which a self- respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even infonned that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July, He had only been absent a few days when events compellod him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avama, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely afiected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fuUy into the confidence of Count Berchtold* daring this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 16th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the " Neue Freie Presse " and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official " Fremden- blatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calctilated to involve her in grave European complications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Gieslf had broken ofi relations at Belgrade, Vieima burst into a frenzy of dehght, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending «p at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal fimbassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was infonned, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even he said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, t Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 116 THE EUROPEAN WAE. Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punish- ment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly beheved that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as super- seding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 2Jth July that Eussia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as. a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.t On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly aa I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of CommonsJ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy. His * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Aflfairs. t " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 1 ^SeeHansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933. THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC COEEESPONDENCE. 117 Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the intennew, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th. July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szaparyf with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. J Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later {30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobiUsed against Austria, he received M. SchebekoH again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the Ist August I was informed by M. Schebekojl that Count Szaparyt had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof J that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,j M. Schebeko|| added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count MensdorfE.Tf to the effect that Austria, had neither " banged * German Ambassador in Vienna. + Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. i Russian Minister for Foreign Aflfairs. § Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Aflfairs, 11 Russian Ambassador in Vienna. ir Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 118 THE EUBGPEAN WAE. the door " on compromise nor cut off the conversations.* M. Schebekof to the end wos working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciUatory language to Count Berchtold,J and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,§ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebekof repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the lat August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' ■delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebekof had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Auatro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtoldt informed the foreign missions at Vieima that " the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian-coniQct and the fact that Russia had commenced hostihties against Germany, Austria-Hungary, considered herself also at war with Russia." M. Schebekof left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- Himgarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Comit Berchtold^ the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Grovemment. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly ofEended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that • See No. 137. t Russian Ambassador in Vienna. i Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Afiairs. § Austro-Hungarian Under Secretary of State ifor Foreign Affairs._ _ THE BEITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 119 Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated. The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Eeichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The " Neue Freie Presse " was violently insulting towards England. The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Grovemment no alternative but to take part in the war. The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely m«itioned in the newspapers. On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Grovemment. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count MensdorS,* at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the Grerman frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had iniormed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted imm^ately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Himgary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtoldf received me at midday. I dehvered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff* had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the imhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 120 EUROPEAN WAE : BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's con- sideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the coimtry. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Coimt Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Coimt Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profoimd respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deUver my message. Coimt Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurredi Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encimibered state of the hne. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Grovemment also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. I have, &c. MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 121 III. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 122 THE EUROPEAN WAR CHAPTER I. WARNINGS. (1913.) No. 1. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 17, 1913. OUR naval and military attaches are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excel- lency to these important documents. The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the- publication of the definite pro- posals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has beea reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (jpersonalite) of the Empire, constituting a distinct dimi- nution of their own sovereign power. However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis. The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been wel- comed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse- quence of German initiative. The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 123 memories o£ 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went througli the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that ol: a hundred years ago. The trend of public •opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Gennany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up jiist when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a coimterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force. Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave. JULES OAMBON. Enclosure I. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Mienne, Minister of War. Berlin, March 15, 1913. The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles. I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the Kolnisehe Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government. _ However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the Kolnisehe Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger. It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments. For some time now it has been quite a common ihing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speakmg of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation ; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete m this way with Germany. V. (33)26996(25656) Wt 43163— *99 30,000 5;]o E&S A 2 124 THE EUROPEAN WAR : To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which soher- minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely. To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much ou the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912. This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units iacomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.® The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, ftvrnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of I^iberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to' France. In order to show clearly the genesis of this military prograimne, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published : " We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year. " The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion. The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco. " It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion. " Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with owv forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power. "In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Govern- ment gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them * The problem 'whioh is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 125 nor US. People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again." And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, -when German military strength is. on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood. Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the " Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion reaUy seems indifferent to this " Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws. On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Ix)uise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers. These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year throiigh. In 1914 there wiU be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris. To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the Kolnisehe Zeitung, we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large. Germans wish for peace— so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be-feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of_ its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless. It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the various anniversaries of 1813. The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France. 126 THE EUROPEAN WAE : Enclosure II. M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine. Berlin, March l;!, 1913. In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us. Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgevieine Zeitung. The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable iis to consider' the communique of the Lokal Anzeiger as accurate. The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October 1914, the Imperial army wiU be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000. The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly api)roaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very miich stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations. The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the conunencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists. It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows ; but it will be very important TUE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 127 that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result. On. the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than, in success." And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable eifect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing oifensive movement against France. In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet aU possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The KoLnische Zeitung has said as much in an article both, spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhehnstrasse. But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the Kolnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense majority of tbe German people. In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a con- versation which, a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles. Referring to the new German militaiy proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows : — " French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 poptdar opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish, attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily- inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves." And the Prince added : " I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. _ That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it, is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such 128 THE EUROPEAN WAR : a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, yon are not sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, hut I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for wprk, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the- top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.' " And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exactitude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far gi-eater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous." In this way the old Prince gave expression to the con- fidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation. When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures. The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 firancs.) It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia : 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses. The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures. According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring " expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the " permanent " annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks. It seems certain that the " non-recurring " expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital., Small fortunes Would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax Avould not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect. THE FRENCa YELLOW BOOK. 129 The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1 813 and the present day. By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Inde- pendence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy. If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers saj'', the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for xis, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard. With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting fi-om the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming. To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in 'personnel and inateriel. With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion wliich can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour. If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France," the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active array will deteriorate. Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little m'ore. 130 THE EUROPEAN WAR : Tliey did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three j^ears' service -will upset their calculations. FARAMOND. No. 2. M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, April 2, 1913. I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention. ETIENNE. Enclosure. Memorandum, on the strengthening of the German Army. Berlin, March 19, 1913. I. — General Memorandum on the new Military Laws. The increase has taken place in three stages : — (1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria- Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy ; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Conti- nent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort. (2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 131 rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum. (3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new loi des cadres ; it was accordingly necessary to antici- pate the date of execvition contemplated by the new military law. Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supple- mentary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end. Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chau- vinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsehtum (German influence) all the world over. The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty. II. — Aim and Obligations of oue National Policy, of OUR Army, and of the Special Organisations for Army Pdrposes. Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armament^, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our 132 THE EUROPEAN WAR : financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed. We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco,, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies ; and on the conclusion of peace, we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneoiisly with the destruction of the means of communication ; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose ; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World. However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In ceitain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concenti'ation of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter. In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank. As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite THE FKEXCH YELLOW BOOiC. 133 the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a lai-ge superiority fi-om the fii-st days. For this pm-pose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would cnisli them in tlie event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for oui- flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, pai-tic\darly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective i"esistanoe. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in tbe west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guai-antee for the security of her nenti-ality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests. The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it wiU be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatiuu with a shoit time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law. Such are the duties which devolve on our army and whicli demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as om- brothers did a hundred years ago ; the eagle thus provoked will soai' in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, ai-e still in the hands of the Fiench ; that thousands of brother Gennans in the Baltic proATiices ai-e groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's fonner possessions should be restored to her. Xo. 3. if. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to J/. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, Maij 6, 1913. I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and tbe results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. " It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, " that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." " The 134 THE EUROPEAN WAR! height which we have just surmounted," I replied, was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross." The crisis which we have just gone througli has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know. I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe. I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East ; preparations have even been made here. The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists ia warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to " attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thriU would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day. This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco. Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the " Imperator," did not emlDark. The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army. The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 135 as to the responsibility of tlie aggressor. When, war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in sucli a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position oE equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it writhout delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance." This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy. This is what was being thought and said privately a fort- night ago. From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. They wish to he always ready. As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country. JULES CAMBON. No. 4. M. Allize, French' Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Piehon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Munich, July 10, 1913. From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alUances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.^ This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might ener- getically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's 136 THE EUROPEAN WAR : minds for the last two years appears no longer like sonie distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic diflSculties which will continue to increase. May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks il believing himself sure of victorj'." ALLIZE. No. 5. Beport to M. Stephen Pidion, Minister for Foreign Affairs {on PiMic Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents). Paris, July 30, 1913. From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds : — (1) The Treaty of the 4th November 1912 is considered a disappointment for Germany ; (2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war. Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Con- servatives to the Socialists, representing the most difFerent distiicts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementarj'^ school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, meichants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic news- papers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers fi-om the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two, points, with very slight difEerences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions : The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of Gennan dogma. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 137 In July 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German gi-eed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge. Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion. Why then did not Gennany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable ? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt. But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusion- ment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice hap discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William 11. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered: — "Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home." The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled. Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war ? German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider u 26996 B 138 THE EUROPEiN WAE : that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain. The forces consist of the following elements : — The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct. Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful. Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital. Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-fiOrraine, and Schleswig-Hol- stein — conquered, but not assimilated and suUenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans. Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions : — an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy. These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight, in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are, silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling. An .example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm. Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, espe- cially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, how- ever, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war. People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 139 tlie idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention thain this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a_ war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either con- vinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed. Those in favour of war are divided into several cate- gories ; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire. Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better. Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets ; or for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests tliat alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pampHlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible. Others are bellicose frona " Bismarckism " as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences wljere they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvereine, and other associations of Young Germany. Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolu- tionary France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war. Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form, as follows : — The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting B 2 140 THE EUROPEAN WAR : of the session wliicli has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conser- vative speaker put fonvard the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists. The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character. The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parlia- mentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest would be unknown. Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all these regard war as good business. Amongst the " Bismarckians " must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the " pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities. The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 141 statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with tlie industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses^ and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem. Historians, philosophers, political pam^leteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsveroine, Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known to need particular descrip- tion. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the member- ship of colonial societies. We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany ; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact. They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army BiU one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, " Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every soimd man under arms." In what terms -(vill this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany wiU not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence wiU be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition. Must war then be considered as inevitable ? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that 142 THE EUROPEAN WAR : viutoiy on sea will leave every thing in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained. As for Russia, even thougb she carries gi-eater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective. People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a dnel between France and Germany. No. 6. M. Jules Camhon, French Amhassa4or at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, November 22, 191,3. I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert, I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what 1 have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against, the war- like tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success. General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself stiU more assured of success "for," he said, to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your . Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes." The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff never- theless persisted in their point of view. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 143 During the course of this conversation the Emperor more- over seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further. One may well ponder over the significance of this conversa- tion. The Emperor and his Chief of the General StafE may hare wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict , between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke. For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It_ tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany. If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, " we must keep our powder dry." • JULES CAMBON. 144 THE EUROPEAN WAR ; CHAPTER n. PRELIMINAEIES. From the death, of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia (July 23, 1914). No. 7. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, June 28, 1914. News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have "been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite. The Emperor, who ia now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph. DUMAINE. No. 8. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 2, 1914. The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian militaiy circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired. The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures. DUMAINE. No. 9. M. de MannevRle, French Chargd d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 4, 1914. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 145 that h.e hoped Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Servia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her. The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so. DE MANNEVILLE. No. 10. M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Beni Vioiani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 6, 1914. In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'AfEaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his country. Count Czemin haAring given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : " No country," he said, " has had to suffer more than Russia from criines prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Servia ? Do not embark on such a course." Mav this warning not be in vain. PALEOLOGUE. No. 11. M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-Qeneral at Budapest, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Budapest, July 11, 1914. Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro- Servian question M. Tisza explained that before eyeiything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. Ajid the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions takeA at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a demarche 146 THK EUROPEAN WAU : at Belgrade, with wliicli all the papers of both hemispheres are full, wo\ild be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation. , With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the Hungarians haSj as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word " demarche," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expres- sion " pourparlers," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment aU is for peace. All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they Imew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this nmiour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is preparing a coup, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government news- papers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them {aplaisir). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; iiie nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this ; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents, were quoted yesterday at 79 ' 95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued. D'APCfflER LE MAUGIN. No. 12. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vienna, July 15, 1914. Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs ; this would ensure to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The MUi- tdrische Bundschau frankly admits it. (■' The moment is stiU favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 147 which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with iis : Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let . us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned — to be or not to be— which is in truth the great matter to-day.'*^ Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches Count. Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, " Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race. DUMAINE. No. 13. M. Dumaine, French Amhassador at Vienna, to M. Rend Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 19, 1914:. ^ The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half- yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source. I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing. You wiU find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains. DUllAINE. No. 14. Memorandum. {Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria.) Vienna, July 20, 1914. From information furnished by a person specially well iiiformed as to official news, it appears that the French Govern- ment would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism ; much wiU be demanded of Servia ; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in 148 THE EUROPEAN WAR: co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in tlie schools ; and it is a veiy diflicult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges hy which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply ; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenour of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin. There is here, and equally at' Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles ; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Servia. But eveiything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out : generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and. reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs ; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the oth^s. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a com- plete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on accoimt of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favour- able to war. The fact is significant. No. 15. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 21, 1914. It has come to my knowledge that the Servian represen- tative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhehnstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's require- ments arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 149 In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Charge d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to HeiT von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the asstirance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect. I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of " attention " attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant. JULES CAMBON. No. 16. M. Bienvenw-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petershurgh, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 21, 1914. I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin ; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme -weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attri- butes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question. M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 17. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petershurgh, Vienna, Home. Paris, Jtdy 22, 1914. M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenour of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text ; our Ambassador expressed 150 THE EUROPEAN WAR : his great astonishment at this. He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are cuiTent. M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo. In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this. I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to*him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe -would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 18, M. Dumaine; French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenvr- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 22, 1914. Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, ■vvho is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of " treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence. In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro- Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of. the, Servians ; M. Yovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch vnshes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a fuU resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian aimy ; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country. Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 151 to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so rnnch compromised. Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chanceiy would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Grovernment will not raise any objection to stei^ps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dis- solution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling. DUMAINE. No. 19. M. Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 22, 1914. YouE Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the demarche which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade. These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a demarche of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro- Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had faUen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria- Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe. The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian 152 THE EUROPEAN WAR: Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations. This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testi- mony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form {demarche) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow them- selves to be carried away too far. PAUL CAMBON. No. 20. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petershurgh, and Rome. Paris, July 23, 1914. According to information collected by the French Ambas- sador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations. The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory ; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be foimulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence oughl; to be placed in these assurances. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 153 In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very stort space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country. In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point ; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guiltj' and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 21. M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris. Munich, July 23, 1914. The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable ; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism. In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him {dont il avait connaissanee) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to bo very serious. u 26996 154 THE EUROPEAN WAE ; CHAPTER m. THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY. (From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.) No. 22. M. Bene Viviani, President of the Gouneil, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1 SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Diunaine the following information and instructions. Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m. In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria- Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of' which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything imdone to prevent a request for an explanation or some mise en demeure which would be equivalent to interven- tion in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him under- stand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna. The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect. M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agree- ment with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require. _ Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 155 Edward Grey, and to support tlie suggestion that the British Ambassador in Eussia will have made to this effect to -the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation. ren£ VIVIANI. No. 23. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, on hoard the "France." Paris, July 24, 1914. I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening. This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp ; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti- Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission. In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues as to his action. -BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 24. Text of the Austrian Note. See No. 4 of British Correspondence, p. 3. No. 25. M. Bienvenu-Martin,^ Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, m hoard the " France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petershurgh, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, July 24, 1914. I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count 3 156 THE EUROPEAN WAR : Scezsen informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.* The note is based on the undertaking made by Seryia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade. The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26tli a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations Imown to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publi- cations, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants w^hose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it. ' Annexed to this Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade ; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials. On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication. Count Scezsen without any observa- * The Austro-Hungax'ian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following con-ection : — " In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Grovemment expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgi-ade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. " I consider it my duty to infoi-m your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government." THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 157 tions informed him that the note had been presented. M. Ber- thelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosenfor so categorical a ddmarche with so short a time limit ; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburgh and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those P(wers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace. The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government. The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon. BIENVENU-MARTIN. ■ No. 26. M. Bienvenv^Martin, Acting Minister jor 'Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiebaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Borne, St. Petersburgh. Paris, July 24, 1914. M. Vesnitch was this morning stiU without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note. To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Servia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty- eight hom-s perhaps formed rather a " m,ise en demeure " than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Servia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full 158 THE EUEOPEAN WAE : infoimatiou as to the evidence m order to be able to verify it with all speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe. I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our infoimation that the Austrian note was not conununicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it. BIENVENU-]\rARTIN. No. 27. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for ike President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Home. Paris, July 24, 1914, The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Servia may give way. The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might stiU be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers. Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Charge d' Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening. M. Barrere informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications. BIENVENU-MARTIN. I'HE fMncU yellow boo£. 159 No. 28. M. Bienvenu-Uartin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm {foi- the President of the Council), and to 'Belgrade, London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. ' Paris, July 24, 1914. Herr von Sohoen came to infoi-m me of a note fi-om his Government, of wtich lie would not leave me a copy, but at my request lie read it twice over to me. The Note was almost word for word as follows : — " The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassina- tion of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southjern Slav provinces from the Austro-Himgarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army. " The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Govern- ment at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan- Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circimastances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried 160 THE EUROPEAN WAR : away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungaiy. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if tliey do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them." The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that tliis was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ; it is as follows :— " The Gennan Government " consider that in the present case there is only question of a " matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary " and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to " endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned. "The German Government desire urgently the localisation " of the dispute, because every interference of another Power " Ayould, owing to the natural play of alliances be followed " by incalculable consequences." I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which, could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution. I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the paii of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration ; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity. I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined ; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be .thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation. Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for thii'd Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germanj' to localise the dispute. Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considera- tions and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we shoiild give to the Austrian note the character of a simple mise en demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views. BIENVENU-MAHTIN. TUE FRENOll YELLOW BUOK. 161 No. 29. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign A fairs. Berlin, July 24, 1914. Tee delivery of tlie Austiian note to IServia has made a deep inipression. The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed. Most of the Charges d'AfEaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Charge d' Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh. He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle {par un sentiment de solidarite monarchique) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude. Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon. JULES CAMBON. No. 30. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenvr Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24, 1914. I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the news- papers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it. Herr von Jagow answered me in the affiimative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised. I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's require- ments before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus imdertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant. -j <(t • Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, It is only " because we are having a personal conversation that I allow " you to say that to me." 162 THE EUROPEAN WAR: " Certainly," I replied, " but if Peter I. humiliates Hmself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia ; that will open tlie door to fresh, possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna ? " I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the lan^age of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but be- tokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the short- ness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe. Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement {un peu d'emotion) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice. " I have no doubt," I then said to him, " that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions ; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter ? " The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances ; but immediately checked himself ; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I reaUy thought the situation serious. " Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off." All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong ; the conviction is that they were violent. An article which appeared in the Ldkal Anseiger this evening shows also that at the Gennan Chanceiy there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together {sentiment de la solidarite monarehique). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously. It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia. JULES OAMBON. THE FUEl^Cll yJiLLOW BOOK. 163 No. 31. M. PaUologue, French Ambassador at 8. Petershurgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914. The A-ustro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia. The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum -which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation. Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna. On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their. provocative attitude. PALfiOLOGUE. No. 32. M, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister jor Foreign Affairs. London, July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with th^ object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Servia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point. Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin. 164 THK EUROPEAN WAR : Count BenckendorfE told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned fi-om leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburgh and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count BenckendorfE had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany. The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum. The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events. However, Count BenckendorfE thinks it right to attempt the demarche upon which 1 have agreed with Sir Edward Grey. PAUL OAMBON. No. 33. M. Paul Oamhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 24, 1914. The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatimi, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's " Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it. In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official inter- vention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack. PAUL OAMBON. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 165 No. 34. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm {for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 24, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Govern- ment's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another ; he drew Count MensdorfE's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria. With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the co-operation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the Cour powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany ; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh. I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Atistria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible ■ivith her independence and her sovereignty. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 35. M. Jules Camhon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienrenu-MaHin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events. He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in tlie pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's d-marche. He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation. He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just inter- rupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies. JULES CAMBON. 166 THE EUROPEAN WAR : No. 36. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm {for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petershurgh, Vienna. Paris, July 25, 1914. The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article in tlie Echo de Paris wMcli applied the term "German threat" {menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain numlber of journalists, and came to state at the Direction Politique, that there has been no " concert " between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was com- municated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently. Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat" ; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it. The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's demarche. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the Echo de Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion. On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but " a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Atistro-Hungarian Govern- ment will begin military "preparations" but not military " operations." The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Peters- burgh', has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in tJie crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corre- sponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 167 Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not liave to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict woxdd consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction. The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any demarche at Vienna. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 37. M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. BienvenvrMartin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 25, 1914. The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia. Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy ? Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude {pourrait s'en desinteresser). De FLEURIAU. No. 38. M. PaUologue, French Ambassador at St. Peterslurgh, _ to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 25, 1914. The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which is offered to them. 168 THE EUROPEAN WAR : M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point _ out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtales loft an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof. The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow vrith the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete modera- tion. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations." PALfiOLOGUE. No. 39. M. Bienvenii-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. Paris, July 25, 1914. The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on tlie dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone. A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary woiild deprive of all meaning the demarche wliich she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and wovikl place her in a position of conflict with international ethics. The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. The I'liissiau Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest. BIENVENU-MARTIN. No. 40. M. de Fleuriau; French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenit-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 25, 1914. Siu Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian d-marche should be supported by the British Embassy. THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 169 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Sei-via to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only residt, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations. Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis. De FLEURTAU. No. 41. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenn-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreigti Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. This morning the British Gharg^ d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German* Ambassa- dor at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Isclil. In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted. The British Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germ.any had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that lie was not able to carry the matter further ; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria. Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one. JULES CAITBON. * In French text by an obvinua en-or " de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed* V 2(;<)9(! I) 170 THE EDROPEAN WAE : No. 42. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenv^MaHin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d' Affaires lias been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an_ urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers tfme to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. _ He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis. JULES OAMBON. No. 43. M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d' Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the* Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the vdtimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too late. M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into war. Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an " execution " in a local matter. The Charge d' Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences. The Russian Charge d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. 171 me, " what this word ' satisfaction ' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessi- mistic. JULES CAMBON. No. 44. M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 25, 1914. The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the d-marche which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action _ similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia. In the absence of tlie Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna. BARRiilRE. No. 45. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 25, 19l4. The Russian Charg^ d' Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis. Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the demarche which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en elair, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous. The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humilia- tion on Servia : it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia. DUMAINE. D 2 172 THE EDROPEAN WAR : No. 46. M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belgrade, July 25, 1914. * M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with, the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required of them ; they will communicate it also to the ai-my by meansof an Order of the Day ; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss fxom service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda ; they only request that the names of these officials may be communi- cated to them. As to the participation of Austian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations. They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hagiie Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909. BOPPE. No. 47. M. J ides Gamhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M~ Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, Jidy 25, 1914. THROUcriouT the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which aimounce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister. The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of niimlDers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of " Hurrah " for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the Siege.'