Olorn^U ICam ^rl|oal Kibrarg 
 
Comatl University Library 
 KF 1286.B36 1892 
 
 A treatise on ttie law of contributory ne 
 
 3 1924 019 360 050 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
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BY -THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 COMMENTARIES ON MODEM EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 In Two Octavo Volumes. Price $13.00. 
 
 ■ This work is a complete and practical treatise along 
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 much more exhaustively than any other work, an exposition 
 of those doctrines of Equity that concern the Courts of to-day. 
 
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COUNTER NEGLIGENCE 
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LAW 
 
 OF 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
 
 OR 
 
 NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES FISK B^ACH, Jr., 
 
 OF THE NSW TOBK BAB, 
 
 AiTTHOB 01- "HoDKBH EijniTT Jubispbusxhoe," "Pbitatb CoBPOBATioira," "The 
 
 MoDiBK Law 01 Bahwatb," "Thb Law op Ekobivbbb," "Thb Law 
 
 OF Wills," etc.; Editob of "The Akebicah Pbobatb 
 
 Bbfobtb," etc., andbometiue Editob of "The 
 
 Bail WAT ahs Cobpobation Law < 
 
 JOUBHAL." 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 BAKEE, VOOEHIS & COMPANY. 
 
 1892. 
 
COFTBIOHT, 1892. 
 
 BAKEE, VOORHIS 4 CO. 
 
 WiLLiB McDonald. & Go., Printere, 
 39-43 Gold Street, N. T. 
 
TO THE 
 
 HONOURABLE MARCUS BEACH 
 
 OF KEW JEE8EY 
 
 A KIKSMAN OF Mlire 
 
 TO WHOM 
 
 I WAS IKDEBTBD FOB THE 
 
 BEGIKNINGS OF MT EDUCATION IN THE LAW 
 
 AND IN BEMEMBBANCE OF 
 
 MANY KINDlfESSES IN LATEB TEABS 
 
 THIS 
 
 SECOND EDITION OF MY FIBST LAW BOOK 
 
 IS 
 
 COBDIALLY AND BESPECTFULLY 
 
 DEDICATED. 
 
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 In the preparation of a second edition of this work I have 
 availed myself of the opportunity to rewrite the text in many 
 places, to reconstruct and increase the number of the chap- 
 ters and sections, and to include as nearly as possible a cita- 
 tion of all the valuable cases reported since the publication 
 of the first edition. The volume of the work, as compared 
 with the earlier edition, has been increased nearly fifty per 
 cent., and the number of cases cited is nearly doubled. I 
 have done the work of revision almost entirely with my own 
 hand, and it is literally true that every sentence of the present 
 volume has passed directly under my eye, and that I have 
 spared no reasonable effort to make it accurate and complete. 
 
 The first edition of this work was my first venture in legal 
 authorship ; the volume in hand is my first attempt at second 
 or revised editions of my own work. The original edition 
 was generally and generously commended by the profession, 
 and, inasmuch as I believe that the work in its present 
 shape is now much more available as a lawyer's tool than it 
 has heretofore been, I am not without confidence that this 
 new edition may prove useful and acceptable to my brethren 
 in the law. 
 
 Ghables F. Beach, Jb. 
 
 Thb MnxB BoiLDiNs, 35 Wau. Stbeit, 
 Nbw Tobk, May 2d, 1808. 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 I HAVE made this book upon the Law of Contributory 
 Negligence in the belief that such a work, even if only fairly 
 well done, would be timely, and might possibly be, in some 
 degree, useful to the bench and bar. The libraries have fur- 
 nished, hitherto, no separate treatise upon this subject ; the 
 latest editions of the standard works upon the Law of Negli- 
 gence, which consider Contributory Negligence only incident- 
 ally, were published several years ago, and the subject is one 
 of constant, and constantly increasing interest and import- 
 ance to the profession. It is by far the most important and 
 material branch of the Law of Negligence, and although we 
 already have at hand, aside from the several English treat- 
 ises, the three excellent American works of Messrs. Shearman 
 & Bedfield, Dr. Wharton, and Judge Thompson respectively 
 — each in its way the best of the three — I have thought, be- 
 cause the subject is an interesting one and impinges so much 
 upon so many other leading titles in the law, that this work 
 of mine might supplement rather than supplant what has 
 already been better done upon the more general subject of 
 Negligence, and that it might, in consequence, turn out not a 
 wholly superfluous undertaking. I have collected and cited 
 more than three thousand cases — not omitting, as I believe, a 
 reference to any valuable adjudication in point, by the State 
 and federal courts of our own country, and have endeavored 
 to give a due prominence to recent English authorities, and 
 to include, particularly, citations from the latest volumes of 
 the reports and from current periodical legal literature. 
 
 I may frankly acknowledge that in the progress of my 
 work I have drawn without stint from many sources. I owe 
 much to the three American treatises on Negligence, to divers 
 other works, and to many essayists, pamphleteers, and report- 
 ers, as the notes declare. 
 
 Chaeles Fisk Beach, Jb. 
 
 Ths COUBIKB-JOrBNAI. BUQiDIIta, 
 
 LoDigviiJ.E, Kt., Oct. 10, 1885. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 IHTBODUCTOKT — OF BEOLIOKKCB AND OP COHTHIBTrrORY NEGLIOENCE 
 
 OBKBRAUiT. 
 
 FAQE 
 
 § 1. The derivation of the law of negligence 1 
 
 2. Coggs V. Bernard — Sir William Jones and the later commen- 
 
 tator 2 
 
 3. The scholastic theory 3 
 
 4. Attempts at definitions of negligence 4 
 
 5. The definitions of Baron Alderson, John Austin and the Amer- 
 
 ican commentators .- ' 5 
 
 6. Negligence defined 8 
 
 7. Contributory negligence defined 7 
 
 8. Butterfield e. Forrester 9 
 
 9. The text of Lord Ellenborough's decision 9 
 
 10. Davies c. Mann -. 10 
 
 11. Davies «. Mann criticised. 11 
 
 12. The reasons for the role that contributory negligence is a 
 
 defense 12 
 
 13. The reasons for the rule further considered 13 
 
 CHAPTER IT. 
 
 THE OElTEBAIi BX7LE. 
 
 FAes 
 
 14. General statement of the rule 15 
 
 15. Express or implied waiver of a right of action 18 
 
 16. The same subject continued 19 
 
 17. Ordinary care 20 
 
 18. Ordinary negligence 21 
 
 19. Ordinary care as affecting the rule in question 22 
 
 20. Ordinary care and the plaintiff's conduct 24 
 
 21. What is ordinary care 25 
 
 22. Ordinary care usually a question of fact 26 
 
 23. Dlustration of this rule 27 
 
 24. Proximate cause 28 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 25. The doctrine of proximate cause stated 30 
 
 26. Not the sole proximate cause 31 
 
 27. Illustration of this rule.— The influence of Davies e. Mann. . . 33 
 
 28. The rule in Davies v. Mann 33 
 
 29. The influence of Davies v. Mann on the New York courts ... 34 
 
 30. The influence of Davies v. Mann in other States 35 
 
 31. What is a proximate cause 36 
 
 32. The same subject continued , 37 
 
 33. Distinction between casual connection and a plaintiff's 
 
 negligence 39 
 
 34. Connection of the plaintiff's negligence with his injury 42 
 
 35. Summary statement of the doctrine- of contributory negli- 
 
 gence as a defense 45 
 
 CHAPTER m. 
 
 THE PLAINTIFP'S COSTDTJCT OR CONDITION AS AFFECTING THE BIGHT TO 
 
 KBCOTBK. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 § 36. The plaintiff's previous knowledge 46 
 
 37. Voluntary exposure to danger 48 
 
 38. Plaintiff's failure to anticipate the fault of defendant. 51 
 
 39. This rule further stated 53 
 
 40. Plaintiff acting erroneously under the impulse of fear pro- 
 
 duced by the defendant 54 
 
 41. The same subject continued 57 
 
 42. Plaintiff acting erroneously in trying to save human life .... 58 
 
 43. No duty or right to be generous at the expense of another. . 61 
 
 44. The contrary rule considered 61 
 
 45. Plaintiff doing an illegal act 63 
 
 46. Wilful negligence of the defendant 64 
 
 47. Where plaintiff acts in violation of law 64 
 
 48. A misapplication of this rule 65 
 
 49. When plaintiff and defendant are in pari delicto 66 
 
 50. Plaintiff a trespasser 68 
 
 51. Invitation upon or license to go upon dangerous premises ... 72 
 
 52. A trespass as^er ae contributory negligence 75 
 
 53. The same subject continued 75 
 
 54. Plaintiff's prior negligence in connection with defendant's 
 
 subsequent negligence 7g 
 
 55. Judge Thompson's position criticised 77 
 
 56. When the plaintiff's negligence precedes the defendant's in 
 
 point of time 70 
 
 57. Plaintiff's negligence after the catastrophe 80 
 
 58. The same subject continued 81 
 
 59. This statement of the rule examined 82 
 
 60. Negligence of the decedent under Lord Campbell's act 83 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. XI 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE CSNDUCT OF THE DEPENDANT AS AFFECTING THE MATTES OF COH- 
 TRIBnTORT NEOLIOENCE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 61. Gross negligence of the defendant 87 
 
 62. Distinction between gross negligence and wilful negligence . 88 
 
 63. Defendant's gross negligence 89 
 
 64. Wilful negligence of the defendant . ' . . . 90 
 
 65. Actions for assault and battery 91 
 
 66. Application of this rule in Pennsylvania and Kentucky..'. . . 93 
 
 67. When the defendant, by his acts or omissions, throws the 
 
 plaintiff off bis guard 93 
 
 68. This rule illustrated 94 
 
 69. Mitigation and apportionment of damages. 96 
 
 70. Application of this doctrine 97 
 
 71. The rule criticised 98 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 COMPARATIVE NBOLIOBNCE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ( 72. Comparative negligence 100 
 
 73. The theory of the rule of comparative negligence 101 
 
 74. The degrees of negligence the measure of the comparison . . , 102 
 
 75. The extent to which this rule prevails 103 
 
 76. This modification of the general rule 104 
 
 77. The same subject continued '. 104 
 
 78. The rule in Illinois 105 
 
 79. Oalena & Chicago Union Railroad Company v. Jacobs 106 
 
 80. The later Illinois cases , 108 
 
 81. This rule attributed to Chief Justice Breese 110 
 
 82. Further criticism of the Illinois rule Ill 
 
 83. The same subject continued Ill 
 
 84. The Illinois rule not a rule of contributory negligence 113 
 
 85. A comparison of relative degrees of negligence 114 
 
 86. The rule in Kansas 115 
 
 87. A comparison of the degrees of negligence with proximate- 
 
 ness and remoteness 116 
 
 88. The rule in Georgia 116 
 
 89. Macon, &c., Railroad Company v. Davis 117 
 
 90. The later Georgia cases 118 
 
 91. The confusion in these cases pointed out 119 
 
 02. Summary statement of the Georgia rule 120 
 
 93. The rule in Tennessee 123 
 
 94. Whirley v. Whiteman 133 
 
 95. The defense of this rule 133 
 
 96. The rale in Kentucky 134 
 
3tii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 97. The Kentucky statute, **5 
 
 98. Louisville, &c., Railroad Company v. Collins 126 
 
 99. The position of the Kentucky courts stated 127 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE IMPUTED C0NTBIBT7T0KT NEGUOENCE OP THIRD PBKSOMB. 
 
 FASE 
 
 I 100. The rule stated 138 
 
 101. The reason of the rule... , 130 
 
 103. No contribution among tort feasors 131 
 
 103. Thecontributory negligence of the plaintiffs agent must be 
 
 iobputed to the plaintiff. 132 
 
 104. The rule illustrated 133 
 
 105. The rule in Thorogood ». Bryan. 134 
 
 106. A similar rule in the Admiralty. 135 
 
 107. Baron Pollock's criticism — Thorogood c. Bryan overruled . , 136 
 
 108. Thorogood v. Bryan in Pennsylvania \..."... 137 
 
 109. Thorogood v. Bryan in Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, and 
 
 Michigan 139 
 
 110. The general American rule. 141 
 
 111. Thorogood e. Bryan in New Jersey 142 
 
 112. The New Jersey doctrine ftu-ther stated - 144 
 
 113. Privity in negligence between a public carrier and a shipper 
 
 of goods 145 
 
 114. The prevalence of this rule 146 
 
 115. Plaintiff's negligence concurring with that of the driver of a 
 
 private (ionveyance 148 
 
 116. In the case of persons non aui juris 149 
 
 117. Who are to be held non 8ui juris . 149 
 
 118. The status of infants . 151 
 
 119. The New York rule— Hartfleld e. Roper 151 
 
 120. The language of the court , 152 
 
 121. The later cases following Hartfleld v. Roper 153 
 
 122. The rule modified in various jurisdictions 155 
 
 123. The modification in New York.' 156 
 
 124. The same subject continued 157 
 
 125. Negligence of the defendant must be shown 158 
 
 126. The English doctrine further considered 160 
 
 127. A criticism of Hartfleld v. Roper 161 
 
 128. The same subject continued 163 
 
 129. The criticism continued , 163 
 
 130. The rule in Hartfleld v. Roper denied 165 
 
 131. When the action is for the parent's benefit 167 
 
 132. This rule illustrated 168 
 
 133. The rule modified by reason of the plaintiff's poverty or des- 
 
 titution jgg 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii 
 
 PAOB 
 
 134. A further statement of the rule in PennBylvania 171 
 
 135. This doctrine commended 173 
 
 186. Ordinary care in a child 173 
 
 137. Children as trespassers .> 175 
 
 188. Other English cases 176 
 
 189. The doctrine condemned , 177 
 
 140. The general American rule 177 
 
 141. The Massachusetts rule 179 
 
 142. What acts and omissions on the part of parents have been 
 
 held contributory negligence 180 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 BAIL WAT FASBBNOBBS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ) 143. Contributory negligence as a defense tp actions brought 
 
 against railway companies ; 183 
 
 144. Duty of a public carrier to passengers 184 
 
 145. The reciprocal duty of the passenger ., 186 
 
 146. Boarding moving trains. 187 
 
 147. Alighting from moving trains. . , 188 
 
 148. Where the passenger acts upon the advice or direction of 
 
 the train-men 190 
 
 149. Standing or riding on platform 191 
 
 150. Biding in baggage cars, on locomotives, or in other unau- 
 
 thorized positions or places 193 
 
 151. The passenger must comply with the reasonable rules of the 
 
 company 194 
 
 152. Employee's waiver of the rules not a defense 195 
 
 158. The rule herein summarized 196 
 
 154. Biding in exposed or unlawful places 196 
 
 155. Injuries at car windows and doors 199 
 
 156. The same subject continued 201 
 
 157. The rule in Wisconsin. 202 
 
 158. Notice of the danger 203 
 
 159. The English rule 204 
 
 160. Injuries at and about railway stations 205 
 
 161. The same subject continued 210 
 
 162. The English rule 211 
 
 163. The rule further stated 212 
 
 164. Where plaintiff is hit by something thrown or dropped from 
 
 a moving train 214 
 
 166, Injuries to free passengers 214 
 
 166. The same subject continued 216 
 
 167. Newsboys, peddlers, etc 217 
 
 168. Carrier's liability limited by contract 218 
 
 169. The English rule 219 
 
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS, 
 
 § 170. The rule of the Supreme Court of thd United States 220 
 
 171. The New York rule 221 
 
 172. The general American rule 222 
 
 173. Passenger's negligence as to baggage 225 
 
 174. Conditions stamped or printed on checks 227 
 
 175. Traveling on Sunday '. 228 
 
 176. Bosworth «. Inhabitants of Swansey— the Massachusetts rule . 229 
 
 177. Rule in "Vermont, Maine and elsewhere 230 
 
 CHAPTER Vm. 
 
 THE BAIIiWAT COMPANY IN ITS KBLATION TO STRANOBRB. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 i 178. Duty of a public carrier to persons lawfully upon its prem- 
 ises, but who are neither passengers nor employees 232 
 
 179. The rule further stated 233 
 
 180. Duty of the public at railway crossings 234 
 
 181. The duty to look and listen 235 
 
 182. The same subject continued 238 
 
 183. The rule modified 239 
 
 184. The rule in Massachusetts 240 
 
 185. Duty of the railway company at crossings 241 
 
 186. The effect of a statute. 243 
 
 187. Right of a trespasser 244 
 
 188. Plaintiff's ignorance no justification for his carelessness 245 
 
 189. The rule illustrated 247 
 
 190. Flagmen, gatemen, &c 247 
 
 191. When the view at the crossing is obstructed 249 
 
 192. Crossings at grade 251 
 
 193. Duty of care 352 
 
 194. Duty of the railway 252 
 
 195. Vigilance of one crossing a track must be proportionate to 
 
 the danger 353 
 
 196. The rule summarized 254 
 
 197. Plaintiff deaf or intoxicated 356 
 
 198. Trespassers on a railway track — The Pennsylvania rule 257 
 
 199. Judge Gibson's statement of the rule 358 
 
 200. The Pennsylvania rule further stated 359 
 
 301. The modified rule as to trespassers 361 
 
 302. The same subject continued 363 
 
 303. The rule summarized 363 
 
 304. Children as trespassers on railroad property 365 
 
 305. The turn-table cases 367 
 
 206. The rule illustrated _ 367 
 
 307. Judge Dillon 'p decision ; 268 
 
 308. The Minnesota case ggg 
 
 309. The later cases 3gg 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV 
 
 _ PAGE 
 
 I 210. The New York rule 271 
 
 211. Walking along a railway track 271 
 
 212. Where the track is a quaii public way 373 
 
 218. The English rule [[ 275 
 
 214. Further statement of the rule in the United States 276 
 
 215. The duty ot the railway to the trespasser after the injury. . . 277 
 
 216. Various other acts of trespass upon railway property 278 
 
 217. Flying switches 279 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 FBNCES AND FIBBS. 
 
 (A.) Fences. 
 
 PASE 
 
 §218. Injuries to domestic animals trespassing on railway tracks. . 280 
 
 219. How far the English rule prevails in the United States 281 
 
 220. A modification of the English rule 285 
 
 221. The American rule 286 
 
 222. The American the reverse of the English rule., 286 
 
 223. The efEect of a statute 289 
 
 224. A summary statement of the prevailing doctrine 291 
 
 225. Duty of a railway company to maintain fences 293 
 
 226. Statutes requiring the maintenance of a fence 295 
 
 227. These statutes considered 299 
 
 228. Contributing to a breach in a fence, or failure to repair. . . . 302 
 
 229. Where the land owner contracts to fence for the railway . . . 305 
 
 230. Where the stock escape and are injured 305 
 
 231. The New York decisions •. 307 
 
 232. The same subject continued 308 
 
 233. Summary statement of the' rule. , 309 
 
 234. The rule in New England and in Wisconsin. 309 
 
 (B.) FiBES. 
 
 235. Negligent communication of fire 310 
 
 236. The effect of a statute 311 
 
 237. A further statement of the rule in the United States 312 
 
 238. Vaughan v. Taflf Vale Ry. Co. — the doctrine of this case 
 
 criticised. 313 
 
 239. The rule as to combustibles, shavings, dried grass, &c 315 
 
 240. The obligation of the plaintiff herein 317 
 
 241. The analogy of the " Squib case " . 318 
 
 242. The rule in Pennsylvania 320 
 
XVI TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 HI0HWAT8 OTHBR THAS BArLWATS — THK IiAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 § 343 Liability of municipal corporations for injuries from defec- 
 tive highways < 321 
 
 244. Duty of corporate officials 322 
 
 245. Liability for injuries to runaway horses occasioned by de- 
 
 fects in the streets 324 
 
 246. Traveler's own negligence contributing to the injury 325 
 
 247. Not negligent to use a defective highway 327 
 
 248. Qualifications of this rule 329 
 
 249. The obligation of the traveler on a defective highway 330 
 
 250. Injuries from excavations in the highway 330 
 
 251. Right of pedestrian in the roadway 332 
 
 252. Deviation from the highway 333 
 
 253. Duty of the municipal authorities herein 334 
 
 254. The rule further stated 336 
 
 255. Further illustrations 337 
 
 256. Trespass upon the highway 339 
 
 257. Illustrations of this rule 340 
 
 258. Leaving horses untied or unattended on the highway 340 
 
 250. The same subject continued ' 341 
 
 260. Unskillful or reckless driving. : , 34S 
 
 261. Sunday traveling , 344 
 
 262. The New England rule j ' 346 
 
 263. The Massachusetts rule illustrated 346 
 
 264. The same subject continued 347 
 
 265. The rule in Maine and Vermont 348 
 
 266. The Rhode Island rule 349 
 
 267. These decisions criticised ■ 35O 
 
 268. Pedestrians crossing the highway 351 
 
 269. The same subject continued 353 
 
 270. Icy sidewalks 354 
 
 371. The same subject continued 355 
 
 272. Mere slipperiness not a defect in the highway 356 
 
 273. The duty of the traveler on an icy highway 357 
 
 274. The liability of the owner of property in respect to icy pave- 
 
 ments ; 368 
 
 375. The foregoing rules summarized 359 
 
 276. Injuries to persons in the highway from something falling 
 
 from the adjoining property 3g0 
 
 277. The same subject continued 3gg 
 
 278. Children injured upon the highway. 353 
 
 379. This rule further illustrated -^ ggo 
 
 380. The rule in New Hampshire " gg^ 
 
 281. The author's criticism ggg 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. xvii 
 
 PASS 
 
 283. Collisions upon the highway 366 
 
 283. The same subject continued 367 
 
 284. Injuries upon ferry boats 369 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 STREET EAILWAT8. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 285. Duties of street railway companies as common carriers. ... 371 
 
 286. Intoxicated passengers 373 
 
 287. Duty as to pedestrians 375 
 
 288. Walking upon a street railway track 377 
 
 289. The track not a highway 378 
 
 290. The degree of care not the same as that required in case of 
 
 steam railroads 380 
 
 291. Alighting from or boarding moving street cars 380 
 
 292. The same subject continued 381 
 
 293. Riding upon the platforms of street cars 381 
 
 294. How far it is the duty of the passenger to ride inside the car 
 
 when there is room 383 
 
 295. The same subject Continued 384 
 
 296. Passenger's hand or arm outside of the car window 386 
 
 297. Free passengers and trespassers upon street cars 387 
 
 298. The New England Sunday rule applied to street railways . . . 388 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT — THE SERVANT'S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 299. Servant's own contributory negligence a bar. , . . 390 
 
 300. The same subject continued — Illustrations 391 
 
 301. Servant's contributory negligence further considered 392 
 
 302. Master's individual neglect a ground of liability 393 
 
 303. Tills doctrine stated 394 
 
 804. So when the master's negligence combines with that of a co- 
 servant in producing the injury 394 
 
 305. Herein of proximate cause 395 
 
 306. Bespondeat superior 396 
 
 307. The early cases . 397 
 
 308. The exception to the rule of respondeat superior 398 
 
 309. Later English cases following Priestley v. Fowler 399 
 
 810. The same subject continued , . . 399 
 
 811. The rule in the United States. — Murray ». South Carolina 
 
 RCo 400 
 
 312. The reasoning of the South Carolina case 401 
 
 818. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. Co 402 
 
 B 
 
XVUl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 314. The rule stated 403 
 
 315. The reasoning of the Massachusetts case 403 
 
 316. The reason of the rule criticised 405 
 
 317. The same subject continued 406 
 
 318. The modification of this rule in Kentucky 407 
 
 319. The leading case in Kentucky. 408 
 
 320. The opinion in the Collins case 408 
 
 321. The rule in Illinois. 409 
 
 322. The rule in Tennessee 410 
 
 323. Who are fellow-servants 410 
 
 324. The rule stated. .' 411 
 
 325. When the servant is deemed the agent of the master, or his 
 
 vice-principal, as qualifying the rule 414 
 
 326. A further statement of this rule in the United States 415 
 
 327. Applications of this doctrine • 417 
 
 328. Test whether one is a mere servant or the representative of 
 
 the master 419 
 
 329. Should there be one rule in this particular applicable to cor- 
 
 porations and another less stringent one applicable to 
 
 other defendants ? 420 
 
 330. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. «. Ross 421 
 
 331. This case further considered 422 
 
 332. What is common employment ? 423 
 
 333. The same subject continued 434 
 
 334. Illustrations. — ^Railway employees . .' 425 
 
 335. The same subject continued 427 
 
 336. Further illustrations. — Miscellaneous employees 431 
 
 337. Servants not in common employment. — Illustrations 432 
 
 338. Servants of different masters 433 
 
 339. The rule stated 433 
 
 340. This rule approved 435 
 
 341. As between different railway corporations having running 
 
 connections 43g 
 
 342. As to volunteers 437 
 
 343. The same subject continued 439 
 
 344. Partnerships and receivers as employers 440 
 
 CHAPTER xm. 
 
 MASTER AND 8EKVAST— THE MASTEb's OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. 
 
 § 345. The obligation of the master 4^0 
 
 346. Defective, dangerous or unfit machinery, appliances, tools, 
 
 or premises ^o 
 
 347. Applications of this rule.— Dangerous premises 444 
 
 348. The same subject continued.— Defective machinery ! ! ! 447 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 349. The master's duty as te machinery a continuing duty 449 
 
 350. This rule criticised 450 
 
 351. Master must provide safe and good, but not the safest and 
 
 best, appliances 450 
 
 352. Master not a guarantor of the safety or sufficiency of his ap- 
 
 pliances 453 
 
 353. Incompetent and unfit employees 463 
 
 354. The duty as to servants also a continuing duty 465 
 
 356. The master not held to warrant the faithfulness or compe- 
 tency of his servants 456 
 
 356. The master may act through an agent and become responsible 
 
 for his acts 457 
 
 367. The rule as to minor servants 458 
 
 358. Where the master orders the servant into danger or into a 
 
 service which he did not contract to perform 460 
 
 359. The patent and latent dangers of the employment 460 
 
 360. The servant's assumption of risk 463 
 
 361. Bisks not assumed. — Illustrations 466 
 
 362. The master's duty toward minor servants 468 
 
 363. Overhead railway bridges and depot roofs ... 469 
 
 364. Injuries to train-men in coupling cars 471 
 
 365. The same subject continued 472 
 
 366. Knowledge on the part of the employer 474 
 
 367. The same subject continued 474 
 
 368. The obligation of the servant 476 
 
 369. He must possess a fair measure of skill for the service he un- 
 
 dertakes, and must inform himself at the outset of the 
 
 duties and dangers peculiar to his work 476 
 
 370. His knowledge when a bar 477 
 
 371. Continued service, after knowledge, a waiver of the danger 
 
 or defect 480 
 
 372. A qualification of this rule 482 
 
 373. Servant must obey rules established to promote his safety. . . 484 
 
 374. Liability of a servant to a fellow-servant 485 
 
 375. His liability to the master and to third persons 486 
 
 376. Statutory modifications of the rule which exempts a master 
 
 from liability to one servant for the negligent wrong- 
 doing of a co-serrant 487 
 
 377. The Employer's Liability Act in England. 487 
 
 378. The effect of the Act 488 
 
 379. Legislation on this subject in the United States 489 
 
 380. Should the employee be allowed to make a contract releas- 
 
 ing his employer from the liability imposed by these 
 
 statutes 492 
 
 381. The same subject continued. — Griffith v. The Earl of Dudley. 493 
 
 382. The English doctrine not approved in America 494 
 
 383. Contracts releasing the employer from his common law lia- 
 
 bility. — The general American rule 496 
 
XX TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOB. 
 
 § 384. The Georgia cases 496 
 
 385. The laws of other countries as to the liability of an employer 
 for injuries to an employee caused by the carelessness of 
 
 a fellow-employee. — Scotland 497 
 
 S86. The Scotch rule further stated. 498 
 
 387. The rule in Ireland 499 
 
 388. The rule on the Continent of Europe 499 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 SFECIA.L AND PABTICtTLAE CASES. 
 
 FAaB 
 
 § 389. Intoxication as contributory negligence 501 
 
 390. Intoxication as want of ordinary care 502 
 
 391. The intoxication of trespassers 504 
 
 392. This rule illustrated 505 
 
 393. The presumption of sobriety 505 
 
 394. This rule further stated 506 
 
 395. One intoxicated not beyond the pale of the law 508 
 
 396. Deafness, blindness, or other physical infirmity as a defense.. 509 
 
 397. The rule as to physical disabilities further considered 510 
 
 398. Kegligence as a defense in actions upon policies of insurance . 51 1 
 
 399. The same subject continued 512 
 
 400. In actions for failure to transmit or deliver telegraphic dis- 
 
 patches 513 
 
 401. The same subject continued 515 
 
 402. The rule in the Admiralty 516 
 
 403. Lord StoweU's rules considered 517 
 
 404. Lord Stowell's second rule defended , 518 
 
 405. Contributory negligence in actions between attorney and 
 
 client 520 
 
 406. In actions between physician and patient. 521 
 
 407. The same subject continued 522 
 
 408. In actions between innkeeper and guest j. 524 
 
 409. Cayle's case 525 
 
 410. The key of the guest's room 626 
 
 411. Duty of the guest to exercise care 527 
 
 412. The rule illustrated , 528 
 
 413. Accidents in discharge of fireworks 539 
 
 414. Injury to one walking on the sea shore 630 
 
 415. Where the plaintiff's property is a nuisance 530 
 
 416. Miscellaneous 631 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE BURDEN OF FBOOF. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 § 417. The question stated 683 
 
 418. The rule in Butterfield v. Forrester. 534 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 FASB 
 
 419. Whether the presumption should be against the plaintiff. . . . 635 
 
 420. The plaintiff in this class of cases generally at fault 585 
 
 421. The presumption sometimes in favor of the plaintiff 536 
 
 423. The burden upon the plaintiff. 537 
 
 423. This rule defended 539 
 
 424. Mr. Freeman's criticism of the rule 540 
 
 425. His position untenable 541 
 
 426. The burden upon the defendant 542 
 
 427. This rule notinflexible : 544 
 
 428. The rule in Connecticut 545 
 
 429. Judge Redfield's statement of the rule 546 
 
 430. The rule in Kansas 547 
 
 431. This rule criticised 547 
 
 432. The rule distinguished 548 
 
 433. The rule in New York 549 
 
 434. The rule in New York further stated 550 
 
 435. The development of the rule in New York 552 
 
 436. This development further considered 553 
 
 437. The position of the New York court stated 554 
 
 438. The New York cases further considered 555 
 
 439. The New York rule summarized. 556 
 
 440. The disagreement of the courts upon this question 558 
 
 441. No possible middle ground 559 
 
 442. Tendency toward the better rule 560 
 
 443. Pleading contributory negligence 560 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 LAW AND FACT. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 444. General statement 562 
 
 445. A mixed question of law and fact 563 
 
 446. A preliminary question of law for the court 564 
 
 447. Contributory negligence as matter of law 565 
 
 448. When a question of fact 566 
 
 449. A question of law only in a plain case 567 
 
 450. Contributory negligence as a question of fact 569 
 
 451. Judge Cooley's statement of the rule 571 
 
 -452. What the inquiry involves 571 
 
 453. The tendency of the law in its development 572 
 
 454. Summary statement of this tendency , 573 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [Tbe references are to pages.] 
 
 Abbett V. Chicago <bc. B. Oo. (29 Minn. 
 
 482), 264 
 Abbett V. Johnson Connty (114 Ind, 
 
 61; a. 0. 16 N. E. Rep. 121), 322 
 Abbott V. Johnstown Ac. R. Co. (80 IT. 
 
 Y. 27; 8. 0. 86 Am. Rep. 672), 437 
 Abbott V. Macfie (2 Hnrl. & Colt, 744; 
 
 s. o. 10 Jur. (N. S.) 682; 33 L.J. 
 
 (Exoh.) 177; 12 Week. Kep. 316), 
 
 267 
 Abel V. Delaware &b. Canal Co. (103 N. 
 
 T. 581; s. 0. 67 Am. Rep. 773), 
 
 462 
 Abend V. Terre Haute <!tc. R. Co (111 
 
 HI. 202; s. 0. 20 Cent. L. J. 77; 19 
 
 Cent. Law Jour. 360; 63 Am. Bep. 
 
 616), 17, 391, 428, 484, 566 
 Abernethy v. Van Buren (62 Mich. 383), 
 
 827 
 Abraham v. Reynolds (6 Hurl. <b If. 
 
 142; s. o. 6 Jur. (N. S.) 63; 8 
 
 Week. Bep. 181), 433, 434 
 Absor V. French (2 Show. 28), 336 
 Accola V. Chicago (be. R. Co. (70 Iowa, 
 
 185), 303 
 Achtenhagen v. Watertown (18 Wis, 
 
 331), 161, 544 
 Acker v. County of Anderson (20 S. C. 
 
 495), 343 
 Ackert v. Lansing (48 How. Pr. 374; 
 
 8. 0. 69 N. T. 64B), 78 
 Acton V. Blundell (12 M. <fe W. 324), 3 
 Adams v. Carlisle (21 Pick. 147). 326, 
 
 637 
 Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co. (78 Mich. 271; 
 
 s. 0. 44 N. W. Bep. 270), 256 
 Adams v. Lancashire &o. By. Co. (L. B. 
 
 4 C. P. 739), 206 
 Adams v. McEinney (Add. 268), 293 
 Adams v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (100 
 
 Mo. 656; s. o. 12 S. W; Rep. 687), 
 
 213 
 Adams v. ITatick (13 Allen, 429), 336 
 Adams v. Town of Chicopee (147 Mass. 
 
 440; 8. 0. 18 N. E. Rep. 281), 366 
 Adams v. Van Alstyne (26 N. Y. 282), 
 
 294 
 Adams v. Wicasset Bank (1 Greenl. 
 
 361), 322 
 
 Adams v. Young (44 Ohio St. 80), 318 
 Adolph V. Central Ac. B. Co. (66 N. Y. 
 
 664), 378 
 Ahern v. Steele (1 N. Y. Snpl. 269), 
 
 181 
 Ainley v: Manhattan By. Co. (47 Hun, 
 
 206), 206 
 Alabama &c. B. Co. v. Arnold (80 Ala. 
 
 600), 569 
 Alabama &e. B. Co. v. Arnold (84 Ala. 
 
 159; 8. 0. 4 So. Bep. 359), 207 
 Alabama <&c. R. Co. v. Chapman (80 
 
 Ala. 616; s. o. 2 So. Bep. 738), 39, 
 
 271 
 Alabama &c. B. Co. v. Hawk (72 Ala. 
 
 112), 192 
 Alabama &e. B. Co. v. McAlpine (71 
 
 Ala. 545), 288 
 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. McAlpine (76 
 
 Ala. 113), 292 
 Alabama &o. R. Co. v. Thomas (83 Ala. 
 
 343; s. 0. 3 So. Rep. 802), 223 
 Alabama <&c. B. Co. ». Waller (48 Ala. 
 
 ' 459), 402 
 Albert ». Bleecker St. B. Co. (2 Daly, 
 
 389), 63, 341, 375, 376 
 Albert v. State (66 Md. 326), 71, 86 
 Albertson v. Eeokuk &c. R. Co. (48 
 
 Iowa, 492), 168 
 Albion, Town of, v. Hetrick (90 Ind. 
 
 646; s. c. 46 Am. Bep. 230), 48, 49, 
 
 61, 132, 142, 326, 327, 328 
 Albright v. Penn. (14 Tex. 290), 369 
 Albro V. Agawam Canal Co. (6 Gush. 
 
 76), 411, 436, 486 
 Albro V. Jaquith (4 Gray, 99; a. o. 64 
 
 Am. Dec. 66), 485 
 Aldrich v. Gorham (77 Me. 287), 39, 
 
 324 
 Aldridge v. Blast Co. (78 Mo. 669), 479 
 Aldridge v. Great Western By. Co. (3 
 
 Man. G. <fc S. 615), 311 
 Alexander v. Louisville <&o. B. Co. (83 
 
 Ky. 689), 464, 484 
 Alexander v. Toronto' <fec. By. Co. (88 
 
 Upper Canada, 474), 225 
 Alexander v. Town of New Castle (116 
 
 Ind. 61; s. o. 17 Atl. Rep 200), 
 
 326 
 Alger V. Lowell (8 Allen, 402), 82, 843, 
 
 501, 502 
 
XXIV 
 
 TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Alger V. Mississippi <tc. B. Co. (10 
 
 Iowa, 268), 287, 291 
 Alleghany County v. Broadwaters (69 
 
 Md. 638; s. o. 16 Atl. Rep. 223), 828 
 Allegheny Heating Co. v. Rohan (118 
 
 Penn. St. 223; s. o. 11 Atl. Rep. 
 
 789), 403 
 Allen V. Demlng (14 N. H. 188), 231 
 Allen V. Duffie (43 Mich. 1; 8. o. 88 Am. 
 
 Rep. 169), 346 
 Allen V. Hancock (16 Vt. 230), 79, 343 
 Allen V. Johnson (76 Mich. 31; s. o. 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1076), 48 
 Allen V. Maine Cent. R. Co. (82 Me. Ill; 
 
 B. 0. 19 Atl. Eep. 106), 240 
 Allen V. New Gas Co. (1 Exch. Div. 
 
 261; s. 0. 45 L. J. 668; 44 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 26; 82 L. T. (N. S.) 19; 28 
 
 "Week. Eep. 836), 414, 421 
 Allen V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (12 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 493), 246 
 Allen V. WUlard (67 Penn. St. 874), 543 
 Allerton v. Boston &e. R. Co. (146 
 
 Mass. 241; s. 0. 15 N. E. Rep. 621), 
 
 248 
 Allerton Packing Co. ». Egan (86 111. 
 
 263), 482 
 Allison V. Western <fec. R. Co. (64 N. 
 
 C. 382), 897 
 
 Allyn V. Boston <fec. R. Co. (105 Mass. 
 
 77), 237, 239, 246, 638 
 Alpern v. Churchill (63 Mich. 607), 51 
 Alsop *. Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. (19 111. App. 
 
 292), 301 
 Alston V. Herring (11 Exch. 822), 80 
 Altee V. South Carolina Ry. Co. (21 S. 
 G. 560; s. 0. 53 Am. Eep. 699 (n.) ), 
 470 
 Altoona v. Lotz (114 Penn. St. 238), 61 
 American Ins. Co. v. Insley (7 Penn. St. 
 
 223; s. 0. 47 Am. Dec. 609), 612 
 Ames V. Broadway <fec. R. Co. (56 N. 
 
 Y. Super. Ct. 3), 181 
 Anderson v.' Bath (42 Me. 346), 343 
 Anderson v. Bennett (16 Or. 615), 406, 
 
 414 
 Anderson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. (42 
 Minn. 490; s. o. 44 N. W. Eep. 
 6)8), 376 
 Anderson D. Morrison (22 Minn. 274), 
 
 460 
 Anderson ». New Jersey Co. (7 Eobt. 
 
 611), 393 
 Anderson v. New York <fec. R. Co. (6 N. 
 
 T. Supl. 182), 254 
 Anderson v. Northern Mill Co. (42 Minn. 
 424; s. 0. 41 N. "W. Eep. 315), 446 
 Anderson v. Scholey (114 Ind. 563; s. o. 
 
 17 N. E. Rep. 126), 62 
 Anderson d. Wasatch &c. R. Co. (2 Utah, 
 
 618), 318 
 Anderson v. Winston (81 Fed. Rep. 
 628), 412, 417 
 
 Anderson, City of/ «. Hervey (67 Ind. 
 
 420), 539 ^ ^„ . 
 
 Andrews «. Boedecker (17 lU. App. 
 
 213), 434 
 Andrews v. Capitol Ac. E. Co. (2 Mac- 
 key 137; s. o. 47 Am. Eep. 266), 
 38'3. 385 
 Andrews v. Mason City <fec. E. Co. (77 
 Iowa, 669; s. o. 42 N. W. Eep. 
 618), 39 
 Andrews «. Runyon (65 Cal. 629), 663 
 Anglo-American Ac. Co. v. Baier (20 
 
 111. App. 376), 26 
 Annapolis Ac. R. Co. ■». Baldwin (60 
 Md. 88; s.,0. 45 Am. Eep. 711), 282, 
 284, 294 
 Annas v. Milwaukee Ac. E. Co. (67 Wis. 
 
 46; s. 0. 57 Am. Rep. 388), 226 
 Anthony v. Leeret (105 N. Y. 691; s. o. 
 
 12 N. E. Rep. 661), 446, 480 
 Apitz «. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (17 Mo. 
 
 App. 419), 809 
 Appel V. Buffalo Ac. E. Co. (Ill N. Y. 
 
 660; a. o. 19 N. E. Eep. 93), 465 
 Arctic Fire Ins. Co. ». Austin (69 N. Y. 
 470; s. 0. 25 Am. Eep. 221), 136, 
 147, 519 
 Ardesco Oil Co. «. Gilsbn (63 Penn. St. 
 
 146), 443 
 Arkerson «. Dennison (117 Mass. 407), 
 
 443 
 Armistead «. Wilde (17 Q. B. 261), 524, 
 
 527 
 Armour «. Hahn (111 U. S. 313), 425 
 Armstrong v. Medbury (67 Mich. 250; 
 
 S.O. 34N. W. Rep. 566), 74 
 Armstrong ». Southeastern Ry. Co. (11 
 
 Jur. 788), 85 
 Armstrong v. The Lancashire A York- 
 - shire Ry. Co. (28 W. E. 296; s. o. 
 L. E. 10 Exch. 47), 136, 137 
 Arnold v. Illinois Ac. E. Co. (83 lU. 273; 
 
 B. o. 26 Am. Eep. 383), 198 
 Artman v. Kansas Ac. E. Co. (22 Kan. 
 
 296), 250 
 Artusy v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. (78 
 Tex. 191; s. o. 11 S. W. Rep. 177), 
 264 
 Artz V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (34 Iowa, 
 153, 160; B. 0. 38 Iowa, 293; 44 
 Iowa, 284), 81, 105, 244, 249, 263 
 Ashbrook v. Frederick Ave. Ry. Co. 
 
 (18 Mo. App. 290), 383 
 Ariiby V. White (1 Smith's L. C. (6th 
 ' Eng. ed.) 266; s. o. 8th Am. ed. of 
 1886, 606), 136, 145 
 Asher v. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (89 Mo. 
 
 116), 296 
 Ashmore ®. Pennsylvania Steam Ac. Co. 
 
 (28 N. J. Law, 180), 221 
 Ashton «. Detroit City Ry. Co. (78 
 Mich, 587; s. o. 44N.W.Rep. 141), 
 380 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XXV 
 
 Ashworth v. Stanwix (3 £1. & El. 101; 
 
 ». o. 1 3m. (N. S.) 467; 80 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 134; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 86), 
 
 893, 394, 440 
 Aesop V. Yates (2 Hurl. A N. 161), 481 
 Aston V. Heaven (2 Espin. 683), 68 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. d. Bales (16 Ean. 
 
 262), 318 
 Atchison <&c. B. Co. v. Cash (2? Ean. 
 
 687), 299 
 Atchison &c. B. Co. v. Flinn (24 Ean. 
 
 627), 191, 194 
 Atchison &o. B. Co. «. Hegwir (21 Ean. 
 
 622), 288, 286 
 Atchison &d. B. Co. v. Holt (29 Ean. 
 
 149), 444, 449 
 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Ledbetter (34 
 
 Ean. 326). 448 
 Atchison &c. B. Co. e. McEee (37 Ean. 
 
 692; 8. o. 15 Pac. Rep. 484), 447, 
 
 448, 462, 467, 482 
 Atchison &c. B. Ce. v. Moore (29 Ean. 
 
 632), 444 
 Atchison &c. B. Co. v. Morgan (43 Ean. 
 
 1; s. o. 22 Pac. Rep. 996), 263 
 Atchison &c. B. Co. v. Plnnkett (26 
 
 Ean. 188; s. o. 2 Am. <& Eng. By. 
 , Cas. 128), 477 
 Atchison &c. B. Co. v. Shaft (33 Ean. 
 
 621), 300 
 Atchison Ac. R. Co. v. Smith (28 Ean. 
 
 661), 166, 266, 663, 670 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. D. Stanford (12 
 
 Ean. 364; s. o. 16 Am. Bep. 362), 
 
 317 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. v. Thnl (32 Ean. 
 
 256), 445 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. «. Townsend (39 
 
 Ean. 116; s. c. 17 Pac. Rep. 804), 
 
 242, 264 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. v. Wagner (33 Ean. 
 
 660), 473 
 Atchison Ac. B. Co. v. Walz (40 Ean. 
 
 433; s. 0. 19 Pac. Rep. 787), 67 
 Atkins V. Merrick Thread Co. (142 
 
 Mass. 431), 462 
 Atkinson v. Abraham (46 Hnn, 238), 73 
 Atkinson v. Goodrich Transportation 
 
 Co. (60 Wis. 141; s. o. 60 Am. Bep. 
 
 362), 29, 38, 130 
 AtMnson v. SeUers (6 C. B. (SS. S.) 442), 
 
 348 
 Atkyn«. Wabash By. Co. (41 Fed. Bep. 
 
 193), 437 
 Atlanta, City of, v. Wilson (89 Ga. 644; 
 
 8. o. 27 Am. Bep. 396; 60 6a. 478), 
 
 326 
 Atlanta Cotton Factory b. Speer (69 Ga. 
 
 137; s. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 760), 416, 
 
 460 
 Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil Mills «. Coffey 
 
 (80 Ga. 146; s. o. 4 S. E. Bep. 
 
 769), 73 
 
 Atlanta Ac. R. Co. v. Ayers (68 Ga. 12), 
 
 S6, 98, 120 
 Atlanta Ac. R. Co. v. Wyiy (66 Ga. 120), 
 
 121, 663 
 Atlantic Ac. R. Co. v. Bnrt (49 Ga. 606), 
 
 294 ' 
 Atwater «. Town of Veteran (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 907), 26, 829 
 Auo. New York Ac. B. Co. (29 Fed. 
 
 Bep. 72), 427 
 Angusta Ac. R. Co. v. Eillian (79 Ga. 
 
 284; s. 0. 4 S. E. Bep. 166), 84, 
 
 437 
 Augusta Ac. B. Co. v. McElmurry (24 
 
 Ga. 76), 89, 98, 120, 121 
 Augusta Ac. B. Co. v. Benz (66 Ga. 
 
 126), 382 
 Aurora v. Dale (90 111. 46), 827, 329, 
 
 8S7 
 Aurora v. HiUman (90 111. 61), 266, 327, 
 
 328, 882, 833, 867, 603 
 Aurora Ac. B. Co. v. Grimes (18 HI. 
 
 686), 25, 36, 106, 164, 274, 688 
 Austin «. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (91 111. 86), 
 
 262, 263 
 Austin ®. Great Western Ac. By. Co. 
 
 (L. E. 2 Q. B. 442), 1*6, 197, 215 
 Austin v. Manchester Ac. By. Co. (16 
 
 Jur. 766), 21 
 Austin «. Manchester Ac. Ry. Co. (16 
 
 Q. B. 600; 8. 0. 10 C. B. 464), 87, 
 
 219 
 Austin V. New Jersey Steamboat Co. ^ 
 
 (43 N. Y. 76, 82), 24, 80, 86, 78 
 Austin, City of, v. Ritz (72 Tex. 391; 
 
 9 S. W. Rep. 884), 25 
 Austin Ac. R. Co. v. Beatty (73 Tex. 
 
 692; s. 0. 11 S. W. Bep. 858), 26, 64 
 Avegno v. Hart (26 La. Ann. 236; s. o. 
 
 13 Am. Bep. 133), 867 
 Avery v. Maxwell (4 N. H. 36), 281 
 Axford V. Prior (C. P. 14 W. B. 611), 
 
 72, 629 
 Ayer v. City of Norwich (39 Conn. 876; 
 
 8. 0. 12 Am. Bep. 896) 342 
 Ayleswurth v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (30 
 
 Iowa, 467), 296 
 
 B 
 
 Babson «. Bockport (101 Mass. 93), 389, 
 
 844 
 Bailey v. Mayor of New York (8 Hill, 
 
 631; 8. 0. 38 Am. Dec. 669), 324 
 Bailey v. New Haven Ac. B. Co. (107 
 
 Mass. 496), 253 
 Baird «. Addie (16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 490), 
 
 499 
 Baird v. Chicago Ac: B. Co. (61 Iowa 
 
 869), 471, 479 
 Bains v. Syracuse Ac. B. Co. (34 Hnn 
 
 (N. Y.) 168), 39 
 
XXVI 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Bajus V. Syracnae <!ic. R. Co. (103 IS'. Y. 
 
 312; 8. 0. 8? Am. Rep. '723), 447 
 Baker n. Allegheny R. Co. (96 Penn. St. 
 
 211; 8. 0. 40 Am. Rep. 634), 394, 
 
 443, 462 
 Baker v. Chicago <fcc. R. Co. {IS Ipwa, 
 
 389; 8. 0. 36 N. W. Rep. 460),' 292 
 Baker v. Pehr {91 Penn. St. 70), 643, 
 
 663, 666 
 Baker v. Flint &c. R. Co. (68 Mich. 90; 
 
 s. 0. 36 N. W. Rep. 8!!6), 176 
 Baker D. Fendergast (32 Ohio St. 494; 
 
 s. 0. 30 Am, Rep. 620), 362 
 Baker ©. Portland (68 Me. 199^ s. o. 4 
 
 Am. Rep. 274), 42, 63, 324, 326, 
 
 340, 343, 601, 603 
 Baker «. Robbins (9 Kan. 303), 283 
 Balbridge 4c. Bridge Co. v. Oartrett (76 
 
 Tex. 628; 8.c. 13 S.W. Rep. 8), 326 
 Balcb n. Smith (7 Hurl. <t N. 736; s. o. 
 
 8 Jur. (N.S.) 197; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 
 
 201; 10 WeekKep. 387; 6 L. T. (N. 
 S.) 168), 70, 76 
 Balcom v. Dubuque <bc. R. Co. (21 Iowa, 
 
 102), 283,288 
 Baldwin v. Barney (12 R. I. 392; s. o. 
 
 34 Am. Rep. 670), 168, 229, 230, 
 
 349, 360 
 Baldwin «. Chicajo <fec. R. Co. (60 Iowa, 
 
 680), 480 
 Baldwin v. Ensign (49 Conn. 113; a. c. 
 
 44 Am. Rep. 205), 341 
 Baldwin «. Greenwoods Turnpike Co. 
 
 (49 Conn. 238; s. o. 16 Am. Rep. 33), 
 
 334 
 Baldwin v. Railroad Co. (60 Iowa, 680), 
 
 443 
 Baldwin v. St. Louis <tc. Ry. Co. (63 
 
 Iowa, 210), 51 , 
 Baldwin v. Turnpike Co. (40 Conn. 238), 
 
 326 
 Ball B. Town of Woodbine (61 Iowa, 83; 
 
 s. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 806), 830 
 Ball V. Wabash <fec. Ry. Co. (83 Mo. 
 
 874), 223 
 Ballou «. Chicago &c. R. Co. (84 Wis. 
 
 269; 8. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 81), 428, 
 
 444, 450, 473 
 Balor V. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (9 West 
 
 Va. 270), 292 
 Baltimore, The (8 Wall 877), 518 
 Baltimore v. Morriott (9 Md. 160), 648 
 Baltimore Elevator Co. •». Neal (65 Md. 
 
 438), 456 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. v. Boteler (38 Md. 
 
 668), 267, 801 
 Baltimore <fec. B. Co. t. Brady, (32 Md. 
 
 328), 221 
 Baltimore <tec. R. Co. v. Breinig, (26 Md. 
 hw 378), 237, 249 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Colyin (118 
 
 Penn. St. 230; s. o. 12 Atl. Rep. 
 
 837), 248 
 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. •». Depew (40 Ohio 
 
 St. 121), 48 
 Baltimore <fec. R. Co. «. Fitzpatrick (36 
 
 Md. 32), 28, 42 
 Baltimore <fcc. B. Co. v. Johnson (69 lad. 
 
 188), 306 
 Baltimore <fec. B. Co. v. Kane (69 Md. 
 
 11; 8. o. 18 Atl. Rep. 887), 187 
 Baltimore <fec. R. Co. v. Kean (66 Md. 
 
 394), 78 
 Baltimore dec. R. Co. v. Lamborn (12 
 
 Md. 267), 282 
 Baltimore <feo. R. Co. «. Leapley (68 
 
 Md. 871), 95 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. ®. McDonnell (43 
 
 Md. 634),79,164, 158, 375 
 Baltimore <&c. R. Co. v. McKenzie (81 
 
 Va. 71), 413, 446 
 Baltimore &e. B. Co. v. Mah(66 Md. 83), 
 
 246 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Mulligan (48 
 
 Md. 487), 79, 282, 291, 292 
 Baltimore &e. R. Co. v. Reaney (42 Md. 
 
 117), 29, 132 
 Baltimore <fcc. R. Go. v. Rose (66 Md. 
 
 485), 73 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Rowan (104 
 
 Ind. 88), 470 
 Baltimore itc. R. Co. v. Schultz (43 
 
 Ohio St. 270) 308 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Schwindling 
 
 (101 Penn. St. 258; s. o. 47 Am. 
 
 Rep. 706), 261, 266, 270 
 Baltimore <bc. R. Co. «. Shipley (39 
 
 Md. 261), 319 
 Baltimore <tc. B. Co. v. Skeels (3 West 
 
 Va. 656), 226 
 Baltimore ice. R. Co. i>. State (18 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1107), 194 
 Baltimore <&c. R. Co. «. State (29 Md. 
 
 252), 289 
 Baltimore <Scc. R. Co. v. State <33 Md. 
 
 842), 69, 262 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. State (64 Md. 
 
 648), 262 I 
 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. State (62 Md. 
 
 479; 8. 0. 60 Am. Rep. 233), 260 
 
 262, 273 
 Baltimore &c. B. Co. ». State (63 Md. 
 
 135), 210 
 Baltimore <fec. R. Co. v. State (69 Md. 
 
 561; 8. 0. 16 Atl. Rep. 212), 67 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. ■». State (11 Rep. 
 
 160), 25 
 Baltimore <fec. R. Co. e. Strickler (51 
 
 Md. 47; 8. 0. 34 Am. Rep. 291), 471 
 Baltimore <tc. R. Co. ■». Trainer (38 
 
 Md. 642), 79, 243 
 Baltimore <fec. B. Co. v. Whitacre (86 
 
 Ohio St. 627), 49, 287, 643, 544 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co ». Whittaker (24 
 Ohio St. 642), 239 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XXTTll 
 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. ». 'WightmBn (29 
 
 Giatt. 431; s. o. 26 Am. Rep. 384), 
 
 185 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Woodruff (4 
 
 Md. 242; s. o. 69 Am. Dec. 72), 6, 
 
 8, 313 
 Baltimore City Paaaenger E. Co. «. Kemp 
 
 (61 Md. 619; a. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 
 184), sn 
 
 Baltimore ifcc. Turnpike Co. v. Bate- 
 
 maa (68 Md. 389; s. o. 13 Atl. Rep. 
 
 54), 325 
 Baltimore &c. Turnpike Co. «. Caaaell 
 
 (66 Md. 419), 334 
 Baltimore &c Turnpike Road v. Caaon 
 
 (20 Atl. Rep. 113), 384 
 Bancroft v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (97 Maaa. 
 
 275), 86, 274, 276 
 Baniater «. PennaylTania Co. (98 Ind. 
 
 220), 301 
 Banks r>. Highland St. R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 485), 64, 91 
 Bannon v. Baltimore <fec. R. Co. ('24 
 
 Md. 108), 157 
 Barbee ». Reese (60 Miss. 906), 29 
 Barber v. Essex (27 Vt. 62), 544, 667 
 Barber v. Roxbury (11 AJlen, 320), 324 
 Barbo v. Bassett (36 Minn. 486), 448 
 Bardwell e. Mobile &c. R. Co. (63 Misa. 
 
 574), 95 
 Bare v. PennaylTania R. Co. (19 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 935), 256 
 BarkdoU ■». Peunaylvania E. Co. (18 
 
 Atl. Rep. 82), 472 
 Barker v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (98 Mo. 
 
 50; 8. o. 11 S. W. Rep. 264), 262 
 Barker v. Savage (45 N. Y. 191; s. c. 6 
 
 Am. Rep. 66), 77, 267, 332, 352, 353 
 Barker v. Town of Perry (67 Iowa 146), 
 
 323 
 Barksdull v. New Orleans <fec. R. Co. 
 
 (23 La. Ann. 180), 166, 182 
 Barley v. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (4 Bias. 
 
 430), 266 
 Barnes «. Chapin (4 Allen, 444), 341 
 Barnes v. Chicopee (138 Mass. 67; s. o. 
 
 52 Am. Rep. 269), 335 
 Barnes v. Sowden (119 Penn. St. 63; 
 
 8. 0. 12 Atl. Rep. 804), 49 
 Barnes v. Ward (9 C. B. 392; s. G. 19 
 
 L. J. (C. P.) 195), 336 
 Bamnm ■». Terpenning (76 Mich. 567; 
 
 a. o. 42 N. W. Rep. 967), 21 
 Barrett «. Market St. Ry. Co. (81 Cal. 
 
 296), 374 
 Barrett v. Third Ave. E. Co. (45 N. Y. 
 
 628), 132, 142 
 Barry a. New York Ac. R. Co. (92 N. Y. 
 289; a. c. 44 Am. Rep. 377), 71, 
 
 176, 274 
 Barrjr v. Oyster Bay Ac. Steamboat Co. 
 (67 N. Y. 301; s. o. 2S Am. Rep. 
 
 115), 218 
 
 Baratow «. Old Colony R. Co. (143 
 
 Maaa. 536; a. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 265), 
 
 272, 488 
 Bartlett «. Crozier (17 Johns. 449; s. o. 
 
 8 Am. Dec. 42s), 322 
 Bartlett «. Hooksett (48 N. H. 18), 342 
 Bartlett «. New York Ac. Tranap. Co. (8 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 309; a. o. 57 N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. 348), 186, 370 
 Barton «. St. Louis Ac. E. Co. (52 Mo. 
 
 253; s. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 418), 201, 
 
 202, 663, 669 
 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire (3 
 
 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266; s'. o. 4 Jur. 
 
 (N. S.) 767; 1 Pat. Sc. App. 786), 
 
 400, 499 
 Bartonshill Coal Co. «. Reid (3 Macq. 
 , 266; s. 0. Jur. (N. S.) 767; 1 Pat. 
 
 Sc. App. 796), 400, 413, 423 
 Bass ®. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (28 JU. 9), 
 
 107, 287, 314 
 Bassett «. City of St. Joseph (63 Mo. 
 
 290; a. c. 14 Am. Rep. 446), 336 
 Baaaett «. Fish (75 N. Y. 80S), 60, 61 
 Batchelor ». Fortescue (11 L. E. Q. B. 
 
 Div. 474), 88, 461 
 Bateman v. New York Ac. R. Co. (47 
 
 Hun, 429), 206 
 Batterson ». Chicago Ac. R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 184), 452 
 Batterson ». Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (53 
 
 Mich. 126), 477 
 Batterson «. Vogel (10 Mo. App. 236), 
 
 624, 526 
 Battishill «. Humphreys (38 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 681), 91 
 Bauer v. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (46 Ark. 
 
 388). 391 
 Baughman v. Shenango Ac. R. Co. (92 
 
 Penn. St. 335; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 
 
 690), 237 ' 
 
 Baulec v. New York Ae. R. Co. (69 N. 
 
 Y. 356; s. c. 5 Lans. 436; 62 Barb. 
 
 623; 17 Am. Rep 326), 414, 466 
 Baun V. Chicago Ac. R. Go. (53 Iowa, 
 
 695), 415 
 Baxter v. Boston &c. R. Co. (102 Mass, 
 
 383), 297 
 Baxter v. Roberta (44 Cal. 187), 443, 475 
 Baxter v. Troy Ac. R. Co. (41 N^ Y. 
 
 502), 237; 242, 262 
 Bay City Ac. R. Co. v. Auatin (21 Mich. 
 
 390), 298 
 Bayley v. Manchester Ac. Ry. Co. (L. 
 
 R. 7 C. P. 416), 872 
 Baylor a. Baltimore Ac. R. Co. (9 Wea]; 
 
 Va. 270), 287 
 Baylor v. Delaware Ac. E. Co. (40 N. J. 
 
 Law, 23; s.o. 29 Am Rep. 208), 470 
 Bay Shore E. Co. v. Harris (67 Ala. 6), 
 
 160 
 Beach v. Parmenter (23 Penn. St. 196), 
 
 352, 368 
 
XXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF, OASES. 
 [The references are to pageB.] 
 
 Beall V. Township of Athens (46 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1014), S9 
 Bean v. Oceeinic Steam Nav. Co. (24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 124), 447 
 Bian «. St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. (20 Mo. 
 
 App. 641), 301 
 Beardsley v. Swann (4 McLean, 833), 
 
 642 
 Beatty v. Gilmore (16 Penn. St. 468; 
 
 8. 0. 66 Am. Dec. 614), 22, 79, 648 
 Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mipins Co. (60 
 
 Mich. 163; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. SO), 
 
 40, 132 
 Beaulieu v. Portland Co. (48 Me. 291), 
 
 466, 668 
 Beoht V. Gorbin (92 N. Y. 688), 662, 
 
 666 
 Beck V. Carter (68 N. T. 283; s. o. 28 
 
 Am. Rep. 176), 336, 336 
 Beck V. East River Ferry Co. ^6 Robt. 
 
 82), 143 
 Beckdolt v. Grand Rapids ibc. R. Co. 
 
 113 Ind. 843; s. o. 16 N. E. Rep. 
 
 686), 299 
 Becke v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (102 Mo. 
 
 644; s. 0. IS S. W. Rep. 1063), 
 
 Wl 
 Beckham «. HiUier (47 N. J. Law, 12), 
 
 484, 486 
 Beckwith v. New York <fec. R. Co. (7 N. 
 
 T. Snpl. 719; b.o. 64 Hun, 446), 266 
 Bedel v. Lull (Cro. Jao. 224), 134 
 Bedell v. Berkey (76 Mich. 435; s. o. 
 
 43 N. W. Rep. 808), 78 
 Bedford &e. R Co. v. Rainbolt (99 Ind. 
 
 661), 186 
 Beems v. Chicago &c. R. Co (68 Iowa, 
 
 160), 471, 479 
 Beers v. Housatonic <&c. R. Co. (19 
 
 Conn. 666), 26, 667, 671 
 Behler v. German &o. Ins. Co. (68 Ind. 
 
 363), 612 
 Behrens v. Kansas &a. R, Co. (6 Colo. 
 
 400), 663 
 Beisieget v. Hew Yprk Ac. R. Co. (14 
 
 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 29; s. o. 40 N. Y. 
 
 9), 236, 662 
 Beittenmiller v. Sergner &c. Brewing 
 
 Co. (12 Atl. Rep. 699), 480 
 Belford v. Canada Snipping Co. (36 Hun, 
 
 847), 447 
 Belk II. People (126 111. 684; s. o. 17 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 744), 181 
 Bell V. Central R. Co. (78 Ga, 620), 85 
 Bell V. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 699), 268 
 Bell V. New York <fcc. R. Co. (17 Week. 
 
 Dig. (N.Y.)79), 68 
 Bell V. Smith (89 Conn. 211), 667 
 Bellefontaine i&c. R. Co. v. Bailey (11 
 
 Ohio St. 838), 291 
 Bellefontaine <kc. R. Co. v. Hunter (38 
 
 Ind. 386, 366), 237, 239, 242 
 
 Bellefontaine Ac. B. Co. v. Reed (88 
 
 Ind. 476), 288, 807 
 Bellefontaine Ac. B. Co. v. Snyder (18 
 
 Ohio St. 899; s. o. 24 Ohio St. 670), 
 
 40, 169, 166, 167, 181 
 Bellman v. New Yorfe Ac. B. Co. (42 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) 180), 94 
 Belton V. Baxter (64 N. Y. 248; s. o. 18 
 
 Am. Rep. 678; 68 N. Y. 411), 237, 
 
 332, ,362, 868 
 Bemis v. Connecticut Ac. R. Co. (42 Yt. 
 
 376; s. o. 1 Am. Rep. 839), 286 
 Benn v. Null (68 Iowa, 407), 468 
 Bennett v. Brooks (9 Allen, 118), 230 
 Bennett V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (19 Wis. 
 
 148), 282, 810 
 Bennett v. Fitfield (18 R. I. 189; B. o. 
 
 43 Am. Rep. 17), 824 
 Bennett v. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (102 U. 
 
 S. 677), 206, 288, 274, 829 
 Bennett v. LoveU (12 R. I. 166; B. o. 84 
 
 Am. Rep. 628), 381, 842 , 
 Bennett v. New Jersey Ac. Trans. Co. 
 
 (86 N. 3. Law, 226; s. 0. 18 Am. 
 
 Rep. 486), 186. 142, 148, 146, 877 
 Bennett v. New York. Ac. B. Co. (87 
 
 Conn. 422; s. o. 18 Atl. Rep. 668), 
 
 208 
 Bennett ». Railroad (102 U. S. 877), 71' 
 Bennett v. Syndicate Ins. Co. (89 Minn. 
 
 264; 8. o. 89 N. W. Rep. 488), 670 
 Benson v. Goodwin (147 Mass. 287; s. o. 
 
 17 N. E. Rep. 817), 481 
 Benson v. Titcomb (72 Me. 81), 687 
 Bentley v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. (86 
 
 Ala. 484; e. o. 6 So. Rep. 87), 263 
 Benton v. Central R. Co. (42 Iowa, 192), 
 
 289 
 Benton v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (86 Iowa, 
 
 496), 191, 872 
 Benzing v. Steinway (101 N. Y. 847), 
 
 467, 476 
 Bequette v. Peoples' Transportation Co. 
 
 (2 Oregon, 200), 118 
 Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft (31 Ohio St. 
 
 287; s. o. 27 Am. Rep. 610), 416, 
 
 417, 460 
 Bergheim v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. (8 
 
 0. P. D. 221), 226 
 Bergman v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (88 
 
 Mo. 678; s. o. 1 S. W. Rep. >884), 
 
 67, 279 
 Bernhardt v. Rensselaer Ac. R. Co. (1 
 
 Abb. App. Dec. 181; 8. o. 32 Barb. 
 
 16.5; 18 How. Pr.427; 19 Hpw. Pr. 
 
 199), 87, 235 
 Bernina, The (L. R. 12 P. A D. 68; 
 
 8. 0. L. R. 18 App. Cas. 1), 8, 181, 
 
 187 >' • ' 
 
 Berns ». Coal Co. (27 WestVa. 286; 
 
 8. o. 66 Am. Rep. 804), 896, 461 
 Berry v. Northeastern R. Co. (72 Ga. 
 
 187), 84 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The referenceB are to pages.] 
 
 XXIX 
 
 Bertelson v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (6 
 
 Dak. S18; s. o. 40 N. W. Bep. 681), 
 
 260 
 Beael v. New York <frc. E. Co. (70 N. 
 
 Y. lYI), 429 
 Beihea v. Baleigh &c. B. Co. (106 N. 
 
 C. 279; 8. o. 10 S. E. Bep. 1046), 
 
 291 
 BeTier v. Delaware &c. Canal Co. (13 
 
 Hun, 254), 318 
 Blddle V. Heatonville &c. By. Co. (112 
 
 Penn. St. 551), 887 
 Bigelow V. Reed (61 Me. 825), 68, 861 
 Bigelow V. Rutland (4 Cash. 247), 344, 
 
 537 
 Billings «. Worcester (102 Mass. 829; 
 
 8. 0. 8 Am. Bep. 460), 856, 366 
 Binicker v. Hannibal &o, B. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 660), 803 
 Binney «. Proprietors (6 Pick. 606), 294 
 Birge «. Gardner (19 Conn. 507), 17, 69, 
 
 166, 178. 262, 268 
 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (110 
 
 S. Y. 504; s. o. 18 N. E. Bep. 108), 
 
 85, 181, 352 
 Birmingham v. Dorer (8 .Brews. 690), 
 
 168 
 Bisaillon ». Blood (64 N. H. 666; s. o. 
 
 IB AtL Bep. 147), 166 
 Bishop V. Township of Schuylkill (8 
 
 Atl. Bep. 449), 823 
 Bishop V. Union K. Co. (14 B. I. 314; 
 
 B. o. 51 Am. Bep. 386), 388 
 Bissell V. New York <fec. B. Co. (29 
 
 Barb. 602; s. c. 25 N. Y. 442), 221, 
 
 222 
 Bitner v. Utah Cent. By. Co. (4 Utah, 
 
 602; 8. 0. 11 Pac. Bep. 620), 67 
 Black ». City of Lewiston (13 Pac. Bep. 
 
 80), 860 
 Black V. Goodrich Trans. Co. (65 Wis. 
 
 319; 8. o. 42 Am. Bep. 718), 224 
 Elaine v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co. (9 
 
 West Va. 252), 287, 292 
 Blair ». Erie By. Co. (66 N. Y. 313; 
 
 8. o. 23 Am. Rep. 66), 186. 215 
 Blair v. Grand Bapids &e. B. Co. r60 
 
 Mich. 124; s. o. 26 N. W. Bep. 
 
 856), 69 
 Blair v. 'Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (20 Wis. 
 
 264), 298 
 Blake «. Ferris (6 N. Y. 48; s. o. 65 
 
 Am. Dec. 3( 4), 398 
 Blake v. Maine <&c. R. Co. (70 Me. 60; 
 
 8. c 36 Am. Bep. 297), 4U8, 412, 466 
 Blakeley v. Le Due (19 Miun. 187), 869 
 Blanchard v. Lake Shore Ac. By. Co, 
 
 (126 111. 416; B. 0. 18 N. E. Rep. 
 
 799), 242, 260, 276 
 Blessing V. Missouri Ac. R. Co. (77 
 
 Mo. 410), 429 
 >B1iss V. London Ac. By. Co. (2 Fost. & 
 
 Fin. 841), 311 
 
 Bliss 8. South HBdley(14e Mass. 91- 
 
 8. 0. 13 N. E. Rep. 852), 181 
 Blockman «. Toronto Street By. Co. (38 
 
 Up. Can. Q. B. 178), ,276 
 Blodgett V. Boston (8 Allen, 287), 339, 
 
 863, 864 
 Blood 'B. Tyngsboro (108 Mass. 609), 
 
 844 
 Bloomfield v. Burlington ifec. R. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa, 607; s.c. 88 N. W. Rep. 481), 
 
 238 
 Bloomington v. Rogers (88 Ind. 261), 539 
 Bloomington, City of v. Perdue (99 III. 
 
 829), 326, 829, 344 
 Bloomsburg S. <fe E. L. Co. v. Gardner 
 
 (126 Penn. St. 80; s. c. 24 W. N. C. 
 
 21; 17 Atl. Rep. 521), 47 
 Bloor V. Town of Delafleld (69 Wis. 
 
 273; s. 0. 34 N, W. Rep. 115), 23 
 Blyth V. Birmington Water Works Co. 
 
 (llExch. 784; s. c. 2 Jur. (N. S.) 
 
 338; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 212), 6, 26, 811 
 Blyth V. Topham (Cro. Jac. 158), 70 
 Board of Internal Improvements «. 
 
 Scearce (2 Duv. 576), 93, 407 
 Board of Trustees <fec. v." Mayer (10 Ind. 
 
 401), 589 
 Boardman v. Brown (44 Hun, 336), 447 
 Boatwright ■». Northeastern B. Co. (25 
 
 S. C. 128), 403 
 Bogard «>. Louisville &c. By. Co. (100 
 
 Ind. 491), 432 
 Bogenschutz v. Smith (84 Ky. 330; s. o. 
 
 1 S. W. Bep. 678), 480 
 Boggs V. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. 274), 301 
 Boggs V. Pan (3 Hughes, 604), 618 
 Bogie ». TownofWaupun (75 Wis. 1; 
 
 8. 0. 43 N. W. Bep. 667), 337 
 Bogle ». Winslow (6 Phila. 186), 521 
 Bohan v. Milwaukee <fec. R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 30), 287 
 Bohler v. Owens (60 Ga. 186), 526 
 Boland ®. Missouri Ac. R. Co. (36 Mo. 
 
 484), 169, 166, 169, 179, 376 
 Bolch v. Smith (7 Hurl. & N. 736), 362, 
 
 629 
 Boldt «. New York Ac. B. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 482), 426, 429 
 Bolton V. Colder (1 Watts, 860), 367 
 Bomar v. Maxwell (9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 620: 8. o. 51 Am. Dec. 682), 226 
 , Bomboy v. New York Cent. Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (47 Hun, 425), 236 
 Bon V. Railway Pass. Ass. Co. (56 Iowa ' 
 
 664; 8. o. 41 Am. Bep. 127), 613 
 Bonce v. Dubuque Ae. B. Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 278), 638 
 Bond «. Smith (118 N. Y. 878; 8. o. 21 
 
 N. E. Rep. 12S; 44 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 219), 61, 73 
 Bonnell v. Delaware Ac. B. Co. (89 N. 
 
 J. Law, 189), 261 
 
XXX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Booth V. Boston <fcc. R. Co. (61 N. Y. 
 
 598; 8. 0. 73 N. Y. 38; 29 Am. 
 
 Eep. 97), 395, 415, 443, 446 
 Booth V. Mister (7 Car. * P. 66), 397 
 BoTgman v. Omaha <fee. By. Co. (41 
 
 Fed. Eep. 667), 414 
 Born «. Albany piank Koad (101 Penn. 
 
 St. 334), 332, 570 
 Borou^ of Manch Chunk v. Kline (100 
 
 Penn. St. 119; s. o. 45 Am. Eep. 
 
 364), 867 
 Boss V. Litton (5 Car. <fe P. 407), 382, 
 
 862, 863 
 Boss v. Providence <fcc. E. Co. (16 E. I. 
 
 149; s. o. 4 East. Eep. 490; 32 Alb. 
 
 Law Jour. 266; 1 Atl. Eep. 9), 211, 
 
 2^3 
 Bossont «, Borne Ac. E. Co. (10 IT. Y. 
 
 Supl. 602), 456 
 Bossworth «. Swansey (10 Meto. 863; 
 
 8. 0. 43 Am. Dec. 441), 64, 229, 846, 
 
 637 
 Boteford v. Michigan &B. E. Co. (33 
 
 Mich. 256), 444, 461 
 Bott V. Pratt (33 Minn. 323; s. c. 58 Am. 
 
 Eep. 47), 841 
 Bonwmeester v. Grand Eapids ifco. E. 
 
 Co. (67 Mich. 87; b. c. 84 N. W. 
 
 Eep. 414), 268, 264 
 Bovee v. Town of Danville (63 Vt. 190), 
 
 329, 667 
 Bdwen v. Chicago <tc. Ey. Co. (96 Mo. 
 
 268; s. 0. 8 S. W. Eep. 280), 446 
 Bower v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 457), 246 
 Bower e. "Wellington (126 Mass. 391), 
 
 862 
 Bowman «. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 583), 306 
 Bowman v. Troy Ac. E. Co. (87 Barb. 
 
 616), 282, 290, 808 
 Bowyer «. Burlew (8 N. Y. Snpar. Ct. 
 
 862), 282 
 Boyce v.- Manhattan Ry. Co. (54 N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. 286), 206 
 Boyle «. MisBOuri Fac. Ry. Co. (21 Mo. 
 
 App. 416), 309 
 Boyle v. Mowry (122 Mass. 261), 475 
 Boyle V. New York Ac. R. Co. (39 Hun, 
 
 171), 293 
 Brabbitts «. Chicago Ac. E. Co (88. 
 
 Wis. 289), 403, 416 
 Brace «. Hew York Ac. E. Co. (27 N. 
 
 Y. 269), 300 
 Bradbury D. Furlnng (18 E. I. 16; 8. o. 
 
 43 Am. Rep. 1), 84 , 
 Bradbury v. Goodwin (108 Ind. 286), 
 
 447 
 Bradford, City of, 9. Downs (126 Penn. 
 
 St. 622; s. c. 24 W. N, C. 153; 17 
 
 Atl. Eep. 884)^43 
 Bradley «. Andrews (61 Vt. 689), 17, 
 
 680 
 
 Bradley v. Boston Ac. E. Co. (2 Cnsb. 
 
 539), 263 
 Bradley v. Nashville Ac. Ry. Co. (14 
 
 Lea(Tenn.)374), 427, 438 
 Bradley i>. New Yofk Ac. R. Co. (62 
 
 N. y. 99), 438, 460 
 Bradley v. Rea (103 Mass. 188; 8. o. 4 
 
 Am. Rep. 624), 346 
 Brady ■». BaU (14 Ind. 317), 283 
 Brady D.Rensselaer Ac.R. Co. (3 Thomp. 
 
 A C. 637; 8. 0. 1 Hun, 878), 308, 810 
 Brady ,■». Toledo Ac. R. Co. (81 Mich. 
 
 616; 8. 0. 45 N. W. Rep. 1110), 255 
 Branan v. May (17 Ga. 136), 543 
 Brann v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (63 Iowa, 
 
 595), 443,449 
 Brannen v. Kokomo Ac. E. Co. (116 
 
 Ind. 116; 8. c. 17 N. E. Eep. 202), 
 
 148 
 Brannon v. Adams (76 HI. 331), 509 
 Branuon «. May (17 Ga. 136), 118, 119, 
 
 120 
 Branson v. Labrot (81 Ky. 638; s. o. 50 
 
 Am. Eep. 198), 158, 179 
 BrazU Block Coal Co. v.Graftasy (119 
 
 Ind. 465; s. o. 21 N. E. Eep. 1102), 
 
 469 
 Brazil A Chicago Coal Co. v. Cain (98 
 
 Ind. 282), 481 
 Breasted «. Farmers' Loan A Trust Co. 
 
 (8N. Y. 299; s. o. 59 Am. Dec. 
 
 482), 512, 518 
 Breckenfelder v. Lake Shore Ac. Ey. 
 
 Co. (79 Mich. 560; s. o. 44 JI. W. 
 
 Rep. 957), 252 
 Breen v. New York Ac. R. Co. (99 N. Y. 
 
 297), 199 
 Brebm v. Greatwestern By. Co. (34 
 
 Barb. 256), 132 
 Bremmer v. Green Bay Ac. R. Co. (61 
 
 Wis. 114), 297 
 Brendell v. Buffalo Ac. R, Co. (27 Barb. 
 
 684), 242 
 Brennan v. Fair Haven Ac. R. Co. (45 
 
 Conn. 284; s. o. 29 Am. Eep. 679), 
 
 168, 185, 217, 887 
 Brennan «. Friendship (67 Wis. 223), 26 
 Brennan v. Gordon (118 N. Y. 489; 
 
 s. o. 28 N. E. Rep. 810; 13 Daly, 
 
 208), 483, 462 
 Brentner v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (68 
 ( Iowa, 530; s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 668), 538 
 Brezee v. Powers '(80 Mich. 172; s. o. 
 
 46 N. W. Rep. 180), 51 
 Brice v. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (9 S. W. 
 
 Eep. 288), 47S 
 Brick V. Rochester Ac. E. Co. (98 N. Y. 
 
 211; 8. 0. 82 Alb. Law Jour. 62), 
 
 408, 414, 420, 430, 446, 449 
 Brickell v. New York Ac. R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 290; 8. o. 24 N. E. Eep. 449), 
 149, 240 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XXXI 
 
 Bricker v. Caldwell (182 Penn. St. 1 ; 
 
 8. 0. 18 Atl. Rep. 983), 216 
 Bricker v. Phils. iScc. B. Co. (132 Pena. 
 
 St. I; B. 0. 18 Atl. Bep. 983), 216 
 Brickman v. South Carolina &o, R. Co. 
 
 (8 S. C. 173), 445 
 Brickner v. New York Ac. R. Co. (2 
 
 Laos. 606), 468 
 Brickner v. New York &e. R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 672), 420 
 Bridge v. Grand Jnno. <&c. Ry. Co. (3 
 
 M. <fe W. 244), 16, 28, 42, 135, 246, 
 
 544 
 Bridger v. Asheville &c. R. Co. (26 
 
 S. C. 24), 26, 150, 176 
 Bridger s. AsheviUe Ac.' R. , Co. (27 
 
 S. C. 466; s. o. 3 S. £. Bep. 866), 
 
 269 
 Bridges i). North London Ry. Co. (L. R. 
 
 6 Q. B. 377; s. o. 24 L. T. Rep. 
 
 (N. S.) 835), 210 
 Briggs V. Gnilford (8 Yt. 264), 334 
 Briggs V. MisBouri Pac. Ry. Co. (82 
 
 Mo. 37), 296 
 Briggs V. Taylor (28 Vt. 183), 162, 671 
 Briggs V. Union St. By. Co. (148 Mass.* 
 
 72; B. 0. 19 N. E. Rep. 19), 330 
 British Ac. Ins. Co. v. Golf Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (63 Tex. 475; s. o. 51 Am. Rep. 
 
 661), 223 
 Britton d. Cammington (107 Mass. 347), 
 
 79, 834, 339 
 Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co. 
 
 (L. R. 7 Ezch. 130), 460, 481 
 Broadwell v. Swigert (7 B. Mon. 89; 
 
 B. 0. 45 Am. Dec. 47), 44, 146, 147, 
 
 619 
 Broderick v. Detroit Union R. Co. (56 
 
 Mich. 261; 8. c. 56 Am. Rep. 382), 
 
 412 
 Brodenr v. Yalley Falls Co. (16 B. I. 
 
 448; 8. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 54), 413, 
 
 464 
 Bronson v. Sonthbnry (37 Conn. 199), 
 
 166 
 Brooks v. Boston (19 Pick, 174), 40 
 Brooks V. Boston Ac. B. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 21), 189 
 Brooks e. BnfFalo Ac. R. Co. (25 Barb. 
 
 600; 8. o. 1 Abb. App. Dec. 211), 
 
 246, 279 
 Brooks V. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (35 Mo. 
 
 App. 571), 293 
 Brooks V. Hart (14 N. H. 307), 367, 
 
 368 
 Brooks v. Lincoln St. Ry. Co. (22 Neb. 
 
 816; B. 0. 36 N. W. Rep. 529), 376, 
 
 877 
 Brooks B. New York Ac. B. Co. (13 
 
 Barb. 694), 298, 299, 302 
 Brooks V. Petersham (16 Gray, 181), 66 
 Brooks v. Schwerin (64 N, Y. 348), 383, 
 
 362 
 
 Brooksville v. Pnmphrey (69 Ind. 78; 
 
 8. o. 26 Am. Bep. 76), 342 
 Brooksville Ac. Turnpike Co. ■». Pnm- 
 phrey (69 Ind. 74; s. o. 26 Am. Bep. 
 
 76), 326 
 Broschart ®. Tattle (69 Conn. 20), 13 
 Brossman v. Lehigh Valley E. Co. (118 
 
 Penn. St. 490; B. o. 67 Am. Rep. 
 
 479), 471 
 Brothers v. Carter (57 Mo. 373; s. o. 14 
 
 Am. Rep. 424), 416 
 Brown v. Byroads (47 Ind. 435), 438 
 Brown o. Central Pac. R. Co. (12 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 612), 29 
 Brown «. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (64 Iowa, 
 
 662), 446 
 Brown v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (69 Iowa, 
 
 161), 466 
 Brown «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (54 Wis. 
 
 342; s. o. 41 Am. Rep. 41), 30, 41, 
 
 67, 212 
 Brown v. Christopher Ac. R. Co. (34 
 
 Hnn, 471), 375 
 Brown v. Eastern R. Co. (11 Cusb. 97), 
 
 228 
 Brown «. European Ac. R. Co. (68 Me.^ 
 
 384), 164, 169 
 Brown v. Gilchrist (80 Mich. 66; s. c. 
 
 45 N. W. Rep. 82), 457 
 Brown D. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (27 Mo. 
 
 App. 894), 162, 179 
 Brown u. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 461; B. o. 11 Am. Bep. 420), 246, 
 
 262, 274 
 Brown v. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (99 Mo. 
 
 310; s. o. 12 S. W. Rep. 655), 260 
 Brown v. Hard (56 111. 317), 108 
 Brown v. Kings Co. Ac. Ins. Co. (31 
 
 How. Pr. 612), 612 
 Brown v. Lynn (31 Penn.' St. 510), 52, 
 
 69, 77. 259 
 Brown e. McLeish (71 Iowa, 381; s. o. 
 
 32 N. W. Bep. 385), 477 
 Brown v. Maxwell (6 Hill (N. Y.) 692; 
 
 8. 0. 41 Am. Dec. 771), 391, 411, 
 
 469, 653 
 Brown v. Milwaukee Ac. R. Co. (22 
 
 Minn. 165), 17,24.25,237 
 Brown v. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. (21 
 
 Wis. 89), 297 
 Brown v. Minneapolis Ac. R. Co. (28 
 
 Am. Law Reg. 335), 427 
 Brown v. New York Ac. E. Co. (32 N. 
 
 Y. 597; s. o. 81 Barb. 386), 143, 
 
 279 
 Brown v. Sennett (68 Cal. 226), 432 
 Brown v. Skowhegan (82 Me. 278; 8. o. 
 
 19 Atl. Rep. 899), 386 
 Brown v. Sullivan (71 Tex. 470; 10 8. 
 
 W. Rep. 288), 32 
 Brown v. Texas Ac. By. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 860; i. o. 7 So. Bep. 682), 
 
xxxu 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Brown v. Wabash &c. Ry. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. B68), 224 
 Brown «. Wabash <fec. Ky. Co. (20 Mo. 
 
 App. 222), 39 
 Brown v. Winona <fec. B. Co. (27 Minn. 
 
 162; 8. 0. 38 Am. Rep. 285), 403, 
 
 427, 430 
 Brown B. Wood (16 Atl. Rep. 42), 391 
 Browne v. Providence &c. R. Co. (12 
 
 Gray. 66), 302 
 BrownelU. Flagler (B Hill, 282), 91, 563 
 Browning o. City of Springfield (17 111. 
 
 143; 8. 0. 63 Am. Dec. 346), 323 
 Brownlie v. Tennant (16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 
 
 998), 499 
 Bruker v. Town of Corington (69 Ind. 
 
 33; s. 0. 36 Am. Rep. 202), 49, 326, 
 
 329, 330. 338 
 Brunswick &o. R. Co. v. Hoover (74 
 
 Ga. 426), 243 
 Brnsso d. Citv of Buffalo (90 N. T. 679), 
 
 331 
 Bryan ®. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (82 Mo. 
 
 App. 228), 224 
 Bryant D. Biddcford (39 Me. 193), 230 
 Bryant n. Bnilington dec. R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 306; 8. o. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 669; 66 Am. Rep. 276), 466, 479 
 Bryant v. Central &e. R. Co. (66 Vt. 
 
 710), 314, 316 
 Bryant v. Rich (106 Mass. 180; B. o. 
 
 8 Am. Kep. 311), 872,873,897 
 Brydon «. Stewart (2 Macq. 3u; b. o. 
 
 1 Pat. So. App. 447), 400 
 Buchanan v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa, 393; s. o. 89 H. W. Rep. 
 
 668), 437 
 Bucher «. Cheshire R. Co. (25 U. S. 
 
 566), 230 
 Bncher v. Fitchburg R. Co. (131, Mass. 
 
 166; S.O. 41 Am. Rep. 216), 230, 347 
 Bncher v. New York <fcc. R. Co. (98 N.. 
 
 T. 128), 190, 563, 670 
 Buck V. City of Biddelord (82 Me. 433; 
 
 8. 0. 19 Atl. Rep. 912). 349 
 Buckingham v. Fislier (70 III. 121), 340 
 Buckley e. Gutta-Percha ifcc. M%. Co. 
 
 (lis N. Y. 640; s. o. 21 N. E. Rep. 
 
 717), 469 
 Buckley V. Port Henry Iron Ore Co. 
 
 (2 N. Y. Supl. 188), 449 
 Buddenburgh e. Benner (1 Hilt. 84), 
 
 626 
 Buel a. New York Ac. R. Co. (31 N. Y. 
 
 314), 66, 57, 191, 192 
 Buesching v. St. Louis Gas Light Co, 
 
 (73 Mo. 219; s. o. 39 Am. Rep. 603), 
 
 71, 643, 569 
 BafiSngton e. Swansey (2 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 286), 349 
 Bnhrens e. Dry Dock Ac. Ry. Co. (63 
 
 Hun, 571; s. o. 6 N. Y. Supl. 224), 
 
 377 
 
 Bulger V. Albany Ry. Co. (42 N. Y. 
 
 469), 169, 376 
 Bnlkley v. New York Ac. R. Co. (27 
 
 Conn. 479), 282, 286, 297 
 BuUard v. Harrison (4 Man. & Sel. 387; 
 
 8. c. 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 
 
 3 '), 336 
 Bullock It. Mayor <fec. of New York (99 
 
 N. Y. 654; 8. 0. 1 East. Rep. 170), 
 
 49, 322, 328 
 Bullock *. Wilmington Ac. R. Co. (108 
 
 N. C. 180; 8. 0. 10 S. E. Rep. 988), 
 
 250 
 Bulman «. Monmouth Ins. Co. (36 Me, 
 
 227), 612 
 Bunt «. Sierra Buttes Gold Mining Co. 
 
 (24 Fed. Rep. 847), 478 
 Buntina; o. Central R. Co. (14 Nevada, 
 
 361), 254 
 Bunting v. Central Ac. R. Co. (6 Nev. 
 
 277), 31, 91, 246 
 Burbridge v. Kansas City R. Co. 36 Mo. 
 
 App. 669), 379 
 Burdick^i. Worrall (4 Barb. 696), 366 
 Burgess v. Clements (4 Maul. A Sel. 306), 
 
 626 
 Burgees «. Great Western Ry. Co. (6 
 
 C. B. (N. S.) 923; s. o. 95 Eng. 
 
 Com. L. 923), 186 
 Burke 9. Broadway Ac. R. Co. (34 How. 
 
 Pr. 239; s. o. 49 Barb. 629), 164 
 
 168, 662 
 Burke «. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (7 Heisk. 
 
 461; 8. o. 19 Am. Rep. 618), 313 
 Burke ®. Norwich Ac. R. Co. (34 Conn. 
 
 474), 403, 434 
 Burke «. Witherbee(98 N. Y. 662), 447, 
 
 461 
 Burling «. Illinois Ac. R. Co. (86 111. 
 
 18), 272 
 Burlington Ac. R. Co. v. Crockett (17 
 
 Neb. 670), 85 
 Burlington Ac. R. Co. v. Crockett (19 
 
 Neb. 138), 445 
 Burlington Ac. R. Co. ■». Franzer (16 
 
 Keb. 866), 288 
 Burlington Ac. R. Co. ». Shoemaker (18 
 
 Neb. 369), 301 
 Burlington Ac. R. Co. v. Webb (18 
 
 Neb. 216; s. o. 63 Am. Rep. 809), 
 
 290, 298, 309 
 Burlington Ac. E. Co. e. Westover (4 
 
 Neb. 268), 813, 816, 818 
 Burnett v. Burlington Ac. R. Co. (16 
 
 Neb. 332), 262 
 Burnham v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (63 
 
 Me. 298; 8. o. 18 Am. Rep. 220), 
 
 Burns V. Bellefontaine Ac. E. Co, (50 
 
 Mo. 1S9), 382, 383 
 Burns ». Chicngo Ac. Ry. Co (69 
 
 Iowa, 4B0), 891, 461 
 Burns ». Elba (82 Wis. 606), 602 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pageB.] 
 
 ZXXlll 
 
 Burns v. North Chicago B. M. Co. (66 
 
 Wis. 812), 248 
 Burns v. Ocean S. S. Co. (84 Ga. 709; 
 
 «. o. 11 S. E. Rep. 498), 447 
 Burns v. Poulsen (L. B, 8 C. P. 663; B.o. 
 
 29 L. T. (N. S.) 829), SS7 
 Burrell o. Unoapher (117 Penn. St. 878; 
 
 s. c. 11 Atl. Bep. 619), 38, 323 
 Burroughs v. Housatonic B. Go. (16 
 
 Conn. 124; s. o. 38 Am. Dec. 64), 
 
 318 
 Burrows v. Erie By. Co. (68 N. Y. 566), 
 
 190 
 Burrows v. Marsh Gas <& Coke Co. (L. 
 
 B. 5 Exch. 67; a. o. L. B. 7 Exoh. 
 
 96), 38, 80, 130 
 Burton v. Missouri Pas. By. Co. (32 
 
 Mo. App. 466), 4>67 
 Burton v. North Mo. <fcc. B. Co. (30 Mo. 
 
 872), 296 
 Bush 11. Brainard (1 Cowen, 78; s. o. 18 
 
 Am. Dec. 618), 76, 76, 662, 553 
 Bush V. Johnson (28 Penn. St. 209), 
 
 643 
 -Bnshhy v. New Tork Ac. B. Co. (37 
 
 Hun, 1C4), 460 
 Bushby v. St. Louis &e. By. Co. (81 
 
 Mo. 48), 808 
 Buster v. Hannibal (&c. B. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. 578), 293 
 Butler V. Gettysburg Ac. B. Co. (126 
 
 Penn. St. 160; s. o. 19 Atl. Bep. 
 
 39), 238 , 
 
 Butler V. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. (28 
 
 Wis. 487), 245, 279 
 Butter'field v. Forrester (IX East, 60), 9, 
 
 10, 11, 16, 22, 24, 81, 117, 325,534, 
 
 653 
 Butterfield v. Western Ac. E. Co. (10 
 
 Allen, 632), 239, 240 241, 610 
 Button V. Frink (61 Conn. 342; s. o. 60 
 
 Am. Bep. 24), 326, 638, 571 
 Button ». Hudson Eiver B. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 248), 80, 84, 45, 78, 79, 89, 169, 
 
 662, 663 
 Butts «. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (98 Mo. 
 
 272; s. 0. 11 S. W. Bep. 754), 261 
 Bnzby v. Philadelphia Traction Co. (126 
 
 Penn. St. 669; s. o. 17 Atl. Bep. 
 
 895; 24 W. N. C. 156), 379 
 Buzzell V. Laconia Manfg. Co. (48 Me. 
 
 113), 444, 481, 484, 687 
 Byram v. McGuire (3 Head, 680), 80, 
 
 79 
 Byrne v. Boadle (2 Hurl. A C. 722; s. o. 
 
 33 L. J. (Exch.) 13; 9 L. T.(N. S.) 
 
 460; 12 Week. Bep. 279), 360, 862 
 Byrne «. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (66 N. 
 
 Y. Super, a. 837; s. o. 4 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 631), 368 
 Byrne v. New York Ac. B. Co. (104 N. 
 
 Y. 362; s. o. 68 Am. Bep. 512), 
 
 241, 276 
 
 i> c 
 
 Byrne v. N. Y. Ac. B. Co. (83 N. Y. 
 
 620), 175, 265 
 Byrne v. Wilson (15 Ir. Bep. C. L. 882), 
 
 182 
 Byrnes v. New York Ac. R. Co. (118 N. 
 
 Y. 261; 8. o. 21 N. E. Bep. 60), 
 
 428 
 
 Cahill «. Layton, (67 Wis. 600; s. o. 46 
 
 Am. Bep. 46), 381 
 Cairo Ac. E. Co. o. Murry (82 111. 77), 
 
 284, 289 
 Cairo Ac. B. Co. «. Woolsey, (85 111. 
 
 370), 286, 289, 309 
 Calder u Smalley (66 Iowa, 219; s. o. 
 
 19 Am. Law Bey. 664; 66 Am. Bep. 
 
 270), 338 
 Caldwell v. Pittsburgh Ac. E. Co. (74 
 
 Penn. St. 421), 887 
 Callaghan v. Del. Ac. B. Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 285; 8. 0. 52 Hun, 276), 248 
 Callahan v. Bean (9 Allen, 401), 160, 
 
 164, 638 
 Callahan v. Warne (40 Mo. 131), 20, 30 
 Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin 
 
 (116 111. 858), 107 
 Calvo ®. Charlotte Ac. E. Co. (28 S. C. 
 
 526; 8. 0. 66 Am. Rep. 28), 426 
 Camden Ac. E. Co. v. Baldanf (16 Penn. 
 
 St. 67; s. o. 65 Am. Dec. 481), 226 
 Camden Ac, E. Co. v Bausch (7 Atl. 
 
 Bep. 731), 224, 226 
 Camden Ac. B. Co. v. Hoosey (99 Penn. 
 
 St. 492; 8. 0. 44 Am. Bep. 120), 
 
 192, 385 
 Camp V. Church Wardens (7 La. Ann. 
 
 321), 403 
 Camp V Wood (76 N. Y. 92; s. o. 83 
 
 Am. Bep. 282), 73, 628 
 Campbell v. Atlanta Ac. E. Co. (53 Ga. 
 
 488; 8. o*. 56 Ga. 586), 121, 648 
 Campbell u. Boyd, (88 N. C. 129; s. o. 
 
 43 Am. Bep. 74ii), 70, 71, 274 
 Campbell v. Bridwell (6 Or. 311), 287, 
 
 296 
 Campbell v. Luneford (88 Ala. 512; s. o. 
 
 3 So. Bep. 622), 391 
 Campbell «. New York Ac. E. Co. (36 
 
 Hun, 606), 446 
 Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co. (62 Me. 
 
 552; 8. 0. 16 Am. Bep. 608), 71, 283 
 Campbell v. Race (7 Ciish. 408; 8. o. 54 
 
 Am. Deo. 728), 386 
 Campbell v. Stillwater (82 Minn. 808; 
 
 8. 0. 50 Am. Bep. 667), 39 
 Candiff v. Louisville Ac. By. Co. (7 So. 
 
 Bep. 691), 198 
 Canfield «. Baltimore Ac. R. Co., (93 N. 
 
 Y. 682; s. o. 46 Am. Rep. 
 
 222 
 
XXXIV 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [Tbe references are to pages.] 
 
 Oaniff V. Blanchard Nav. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 638; 8. 0. S3 N. "W. Eep. lU), 71 
 Cannon ®. Railway (6 Ir. L. E. 199), 129 
 
 192 
 Cannon v. Rowland (34 6a. 422; s. o. 35 
 
 Ga. 105), 66 
 Capper v. Louisville <&c. Ry. Co. (103 
 
 Ind. 805), 42Y 
 Carbine's Adm'r v. Bennington &c. R. 
 
 Co. (61 Vt. 348; B. o. 17 Atl. Rep. 
 
 491), 470 
 Card 9). Ellsworth (66 Me. 647; s. o. 20 
 
 Am. Rep. 722), 66 
 Carey «. Arlington Mills (148 Mass. 838; 
 
 s. o. 19 N. E. Rep. 626), 468 
 Carey ». Berkshire R. Co. (1 Cush. 476; 
 
 s. c. 48 Am. Dec. 616), 86 
 Carey v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 71), 82, 297 
 Carey v. Chicago <fcc. Ry. Co. (67 Wis. 
 
 608), 448 
 Carey «. Rae (68 Cal. 163), 336 
 Carle v. Bangor Ac. R. Co. (43 Me. 
 
 269), 403 
 Carlin «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (37 Iowa, 
 
 316), 268i 638 
 Carlisle i>. Brisbane (118 Penn. St. 644; 
 
 B. 0. 57 Am. Rep. 483), 138 
 
 Carlisle % Sheldon (38 Vt. 440, 447), 
 
 140 
 Carlton v. Franconia Iron Co. (99 Mass. 
 
 216). 73 
 Carlton v. Wilmington, Acl K. Co. (104 
 
 N. C. 366), 292 
 Carolina, The (SO Fed. Rep. 119; b. o. 
 
 31 Fed. Eep. 112), 447 
 Carpenter v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (97 N. 
 
 T. 494; 8. o. 49 Am. Rep. 649), 
 
 186, 214 
 Carpenter v. Mexican Nat. R. Co. (39 
 
 Fed. Rep. 816), 478 
 Carr ®. Lancashire Ac. Ry, Co. (7 Exch. 
 
 707), 219 
 Carraher «. San Francisco Bridge Co. 
 
 (81 Cal. 98; a. o. 22 Pac Rep. 480). 
 
 247 ' 
 
 Carrjngton v. Louisville Ac. R, Co. (88 
 
 Ala. 472; s. o. 6 So. Eep. 410), 16. 
 
 263 
 Carroll v. East Tenn. Ac. R. Co. (82 Ga 
 
 462), 484 
 Carroll v. Minnesota Ac. R. Co. (18 
 
 Minn. 80), 24, 91, 260, 263, 487 
 Carroll v. New Haven Ac. E. Co. (1 
 
 Duer, 571), 32 
 Carroll v. New Tork Ac. E. Co. (1 Duer, 
 
 671), 194 
 Carroll!; Pennsylvania R. Co. (12 Week. 
 
 Notes Cas. 448), 244, 261, 262 
 Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. (68 N. Y. 
 
 126; 8. 0. 17 Am, Rep. 221), 68, 
 
 184,231,360 
 
 Carroll v. Union Pac. Ey. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 289), 186 
 Carsley v. White (21 Pick. 266), 826 
 Carter v. Chambers (79 Ala. 223), 333, 
 
 340 
 Carter v. Columbia Ac. E. Co. (19 S. C. 
 
 20; 8. 0. 46 Am. Eep. 754), 76, 
 
 271, 644 
 Carter a. Kansas City Cable Ey. Co. (42 
 
 Fed. Eep. 37), 186 
 Carter v.' Louisville Ac. E. Co. (98 Ind. 
 
 562; 8. 0. 49 Am. Rep. 780), 197, 
 
 262, 872 
 Carter v. Towne (98 Mass. 567; s. o. 103 
 
 Mass. 507), 38, 161 
 Carterville, Village of, v. Cook (129 111. 
 
 162; 8. 0. 22 N. E. Rep. 14), 38 
 Cartwright v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (52 
 
 Mich. 606; B. o. 60 Am. Bep. 274), 
 
 209 
 Carver v. Detroit Ac. Plank Road Co. 
 
 (69 Mich. 616; 8. o. 25 N. W. Eep. 
 
 188), 334 
 Carver v. Detroit Plank Eoad Co. (61 
 
 Mich. 584; B. o. 28 N. W. Rep. 721), 
 
 669 
 Cary v. Cleveland Ac. R. Co. (29 Barb. 
 
 47), 228 
 Gary v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 213), 296 • 
 
 Casey «. Berkshire R. Co. (48 Am. Dec. 
 
 616), 125 
 Casey's Adm'r v. Louisville Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (84 Ky. 79), 409 
 Cashill ». Wright (6 El. A Bl. 891), 624, 
 
 527 
 Cassady v. Magher (86 Ind. 228), 608 
 Cassedy ». Stockbridge (21 Vt. 391), 
 
 843, 604, 609 
 Cassida v. Oregon Ry. A Nav. Co. (14 
 
 Or. 561 ; 8. o. 13 Pac. Rep. 438), 
 
 56, 275 
 Caasidy v. Angell (12 R. I. 447; s. o. 34 
 
 Am. Rep. 690), 239, 648, 645 
 Cassidy v. Maine Ac. R. Co. (76 Me. 
 
 488), 428 
 Caswell V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (98 Mass. 
 
 194), 186, 233 
 Caswell V. ChicE^o Ac. E. Co. (42 Wis. 
 
 198), 813 
 Caswell !). Worth (5 El. A Bl. 849), 49 
 Catawissa E. Co. v. Armstrong (49 
 
 Penn St 186), 44 
 Caterham Ey. Co. v. London E. (87 
 
 Eng. Com. Law, 410), 206 
 Catherine, The (17 How. (U. S.) l70), 
 
 518 ' 
 
 Catherine of Dover, The, Dawson (2 
 
 Hagg. Ad. 146), 616 
 Oauley v. Pittsburgh Ac. E. Co. (96 
 
 Penn. St. 398; b. o. 40 Am. Eep. 
 
 664), 266, 270, 271 
 Caulkins ». Matthews (6 Kan, 191), 116 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The referenceB are to pages.] 
 
 XXXV 
 
 Cajle's Case (8 Coke's Rep. S2; s. o. 
 
 1 Smith's L. C. (8th ed.) 249), 
 
 B26, 626 
 Cayzer v. Taylor (10 Gray, 274), 181, 
 
 39S, 447, 466 
 Central Branch ibc. B. Co. v. Henigh 
 
 (28 Kan. 347; i. o. 33 Am. Rep. 
 
 167), 116, 226, 270, 278, 563 
 Central &c. R. Co. v. Bayis (19 Ga. 
 
 487), 284, 291 
 Central Ac. R. Co. v. Feller (84 Penn. 
 
 St. 226), 266, 609 
 Central &c. R. Co. v. Gleason (69 Ga. 
 
 200), 102, 121 
 Central &c. B. Co. v. La^rrence (13 Ohio 
 
 St. 67), 286, 287, 292 
 Central <bc. R. Co. v. Lea (20 Kan. 353), 
 
 283, 289 ' 
 
 Central &c. R. Co. v. Mason (61 Miss. 
 
 234), 637 
 Central Ac. B. Co. v. Moore (24 N. J. 
 
 Law, 824), 236, 279 
 Central Ac. B. Co. v. Phillippi (20 Ean. 
 
 9), 283, 286 , 
 Central Ac. R. Co. v. Smith (69 Ga. 
 
 268), 190 
 Central Ac. R. Co. v. Smith (78 Ga. 
 
 694; s. 0. 3 S. E. Rep. 397), 121, 
 
 268 
 Central Ac. tC. Co. v. Van Horn (38 N. 
 
 J. Law, 133), 211 
 Central Passenger By. Co. v. Knhn (86 
 
 Ky. 578; s. o. 6 S. W. Eep. 441), 
 
 141 
 Central B. Co. v. Crosby (74 Ga. 737), 
 
 60 
 Central B. Co. v. DeBray (71 Ga. 406), 
 
 427 
 Central B. Co. v. Dixon (42 Ga. 327), 
 
 278 
 Central B. Co. ■». Freeman (76 Ga. 331), 
 
 186 
 Central R. Co. v. Harrison (73 Ga. 744), 
 
 62 
 Central B. Co. v. Haslett (74 Ga. 69), 
 
 478 
 Central B. Co. v. Letcher (69 Ala. 106; 
 
 s. c. 44 Am. Bep. 605), 16, 189 
 Central B. Co. v. Raiford (82 Ga. 400; 
 
 8, o. 9S. E. Rep. 169), 273 
 Central R. Co. v. Ryals (11 8. E. Bep. 
 
 449), 484 
 Central B. Co, v. Sanders (73 Ga. 513), 
 
 186 
 Central B. Co. of Ga. v. Sears (53 Ga. 
 
 , 630), 438 
 Central B. A B. Co. v. Kitchens (83 Ga. 
 
 88; s. e, 9 S, E. Eep. 827), 446 
 Central B. A B. Co. v. Miles (88 Ala. 
 
 266; B. c. 6 So. Bep. 696), 189 
 Central Trust Co. v. Texas Ac. Ky. Co. 
 
 (82 Fed. Bep. 448), 438, 447 
 
 Central Trust Ca. v. Wabash Ac. Ry. 
 
 Co. (26 Fed. Bep. 897), 62, 482 
 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash Ac. By. 
 
 Co. (27 Fed. Eep. 169). 249 
 Central Trust Co, v. 'Wabash Ac. Ry. 
 
 Co. (81 Fed. Rep. 246), 160 
 Centralia, City of, v. Krouse (64 111. 19), 
 
 828, 863, 367, 510 
 Chaffee v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (104 Mass. 
 
 108), 248 
 Chamberlain v. Enfield (43 K. H. 368), 
 
 342 
 Chamberlain v. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. 
 
 (7 Wis. 431), 644 
 Chamberlain v. Morgan (68 Penn. St. 
 
 168), 621, 622, 523 
 Chamberlain v. Town of Wheatland (7 
 
 N. T. Supl. 190), 343 
 Chambers v. Matthews (18 N. J. Law, 
 
 868), 282 
 Chambers v. Western liTorth Carolina R. 
 
 Co. (91 N. 0. 471), 390 
 Champlin v. Railway Pass. Ins. Co. (6, 
 
 Lans. 71), 613 
 Chapin v. Sullivan Ac. R. Co. (39 IT. H. 
 
 664), 306, 309 
 Chaplin v. Hawes (3 Car. A P. 666), 
 
 366, 368 
 Chapman «. Cook (10 B. I. 304; s. o. 14 
 
 Am. Rep. 686), 336 
 Chapman v. Erie Ry. Co. (66 N. Y. 679), 
 
 419, 466 
 Chapman «. New Haven Ac. R. Co. (19 
 
 N. Y. 341), 89, 142, 147 
 Chapman v. Rothwell (El., BI. <A EI. 
 
 168), 72, 74 
 Cartier's Tp. v. Phillips (122 Penn. St. 
 
 601; s. 0. 16 Atl. Rep. 26), 39 
 Chase v. Chase (15 Nev. 269), 288, 296 
 Chase v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (77 Me. 62; 
 
 8. 0. 52 Am. Rep. 744; 78 Me. 346; 
 
 1 Bast. Rep. 96), 26, 266, 637 
 Chase v. New York Ac. R. Co. (24 Barb. 
 
 873) 97 
 
 'le Ac. R. Co. V. Foster (88 
 
 Tenn, 671. s. o. 13 S. W. Eep. 694), 
 
 84 
 Chesapeake Ac. By. Co. v. Lee (84 Ya. 
 
 642; s. 0. 5 S. E, Eep. 679), 391 
 Chesapeake Ac. E. Co. v. McMannon (8 
 
 8. W. Eep. 18), 464 
 Chesapeake Ac. Ry. Co. v. Reeves' 
 
 Adm'r (11 S. W. Rep. -464), 209 
 Chesterfield v. Janssen (1 Atk. 362), 4 
 Chevalier v. Straham (2 Tex. 116; a. a. 
 
 47 Am. Deo. 639), 369 
 Chicago V. Starr's Adm'r (42 111. 174), 
 
 150, 154, 169, 178 
 Chicago A Alton R. Co. v. Murphy (17 
 
 111. App. 444), 48 
 Chicago, Burliogtoii A Quincy R. Co. v. 
 
 Dewey (26 111. 256), 109 
 
XXXTl 
 
 TABLE or OASES. 
 [The reterencCB are to pages.l 
 
 Chicago, Burlington it Quincy B. Co. v. 
 
 Hazzard (26 HI. 3V3), 109 
 Chicago, Burlington <fc Quincy B. Co. v. 
 
 Triplett's Adm'r (88 111. 482), 109 
 Chicago, City of, b. Bixby (84 111. 82; 
 
 S. 0. 26 Am. Eep. 429); 366 
 Chioage, City of, v. Hesing (83 111. 204; 
 
 8. 0. 25 Am. Bep. 878), 168, 166, 
 
 337 
 Chicago, City of, «. McGiven (78 111. 
 
 862), 366 
 Chicago, City of, v. Stearns (106 111. 
 
 664), 109 
 Chicago City By, Co, v. Bobinson (127 
 
 ni. 1; B. 0. 18 N. E. Eep. 772), 167, 
 
 376, 376, 379 
 Chicago City By. Co. «. Wilcox (24 N. 
 
 E. Eep. 419), 150, 165 
 Chicago Dredging and Dock Co. v. Mo- 
 
 Mahon (30 111. App. 368), 416 
 Chicago (fee. E. Co. v. Adler (66 111. 
 
 344), 244 
 Chicago (fee. B. Co. v. Asbury (84 III. 
 
 429), 481 
 Chicago 4c. B. Co. v. Avery (109 111. 
 
 314), 460 
 Chicago i&c. E. Co. «. Bayfield (37 Mich. 
 
 206), 403, 416, 428, 460 
 Chicago &o. B: Co. v. Becker (76 111. 
 
 26; 8. 0. 84 111. 483), 24, 66, 166 
 Chicago ifec. E. Co. ■». Bell (70 111. 102), 
 
 266, 604, 606 
 Chicago &e. E. Co. v. Bills (118 Ind. 
 
 221; s. 0. 20 N. E. Eep. 776), 91, 
 
 189 
 Chicago <&c. E. Co. v. Bingenheimer 
 
 (116 ni. 226), 446 
 Chicago itc. B, Co. v. Boggs (101 Ind. 
 
 622), 67 
 Chicago &e. B. Co. D. Bragonier (119 
 
 III. 51), 478 
 Chicago <fco. By. Co. ®. Brown (24 Pac. 
 
 Eep. 497), 116 
 Chicago &c. B. Co. v. Canffman (38 111. 
 
 424), 287 
 Chicago lice. By. Co. v. Chapman, (30 
 
 ni. App. 604; 8. 0. 24 N. E. Eep. 
 
 417), 21, 223 
 Chicago (fee. E. Co. v. Clark (70 111 
 
 276), 108 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Clark (108 HI. 
 
 113), 102, 109, 476, 479 
 Chicago &c. B. Co. ■». Coss (73 111. 394), 
 
 198, 278 
 . Chicago <fcc. E. Co. ■». Damerell (81 HI. 
 
 460), 239 
 Chicago <feo. E. Co. v. Dewey (26 111. 
 
 266), 107, 167, 278 
 Chicago <fcc. B. Co. v. Dignan (66 HI. 
 
 486), 279 
 Chicago &o. B. Co. e. Dillon (17 HI. 
 
 App. 366), 107 
 
 Chicago (fee. E. Co. «. Dimick (96 HI. 42), 
 
 102, 109, 114, 236 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Donahue (76 111. 
 
 106), 79, 108, 113 
 Chicago (fee. B. Co. ■». Doyle (18 Kan. 
 
 63), 19, 475 
 Chicago <tc..Ey. Co. v. Dunleavy (129 
 
 111. 132; s. 0. 22 N. E. Bep. 16), 
 
 62, 236 
 Chicago <Stc. E. Co. D. Dunn (61 HI. 385; 
 
 8. d. 62 111. 451), 102, 108, 113 
 Chicago Ac. By. Co. ®. Eininger (114 
 
 111. 79), 273 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. «. Engle (84 111. 
 
 897), 289, 290 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Fears (63 HI. 
 
 116), 242 
 Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. «. Pelton (126 HI. 
 
 468; s. 0. 17 N. E. Eep. 765). 56 
 Chicago &c. E. Co. ■». Fietsam(123 111. 
 
 618; 8. c. IB N. E. Eep. 169), 107, 
 
 114 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. ■». Flexman (103 111. 
 
 546), 372 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. ■». Flint (22 HI. 
 
 App. 602), 278 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. «. Garvey (58 111. . 
 
 85), 253, 279 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. o. Geary (110 El. 
 
 , 888), 430 
 Chicago Ac. Ey Co. ®. Goebel, (119 111. 
 
 616; 8. 0. 10 N. E. Eep. 369), 62, 
 
 233 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Gosa (17 Wis. 
 
 428), 282 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Goyette (133 111. 
 
 21; a. o, 24 N. E. Bep. 549). 814 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Gregory (68 111. 
 
 226), 108, 166, 156, 169, 410, 638 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. «. Gretzner (46 111. 
 
 74), 89, 107, 287, 246 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Hanley (26 HI. 
 
 App. 361), 67 
 Chicago Ac. B.|Ce. «. Harney (28 Ind. 
 
 28), 168,460 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Hatch (79 HI. 
 
 187), 108, 118, 237 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. «. Hazzard (26 111. 
 
 873), 107, 184, 198, 199, 688 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Hedges (106 Ind. 
 
 398), 236 
 Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. v. Hines (182 HI. 
 
 161; 8. 0. 23 N. E. Bep. 1021), 448 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Hogan (27 Neh. 
 
 801; 8. 0. 43 N. W. Bep. 1148), 
 
 299 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co, v. Hoearth (38 111. 
 
 8^0), 107 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Hunt (24 111. 
 
 App. 744), 814 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Jackson (68 HI. 
 
 492; s. 0. 8 Am. Eep. 661), 444, 
 
 476. 479, 481 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XXXVl 
 
 Chicago <bo. B. Co. v. Jacobs (63 111. 
 
 178), 236, 247 
 Chicago <fec. E. Co. e. Johnson (108 111. 
 
 612), 18, 102, 109 
 Chicago <feo. R. Co. ■». Keefe (47 HI. 
 
 108), 427, 428 
 Chicago <&c. B. Co. v. Kellam (92 111. 
 
 246; s. 0. 34 Am. Eep. 128), 69, 
 
 287, 306 
 Chicago &c. B. Co. v. Kennedy (22 HI. 
 
 App. 308), 304 
 Chicago &c. B. Co. v. Eusel (63 HI. 
 
 180, n.), 286, 237, 247 
 Chicago <icc. B. Co. v. Easter (22 111. 
 
 App. 188), 107 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Lane (ISO 111. 
 
 116; 8. 0. 22 K E. Bep. 513), 266 
 Chicago &o. B. Co. v. Langley (2 
 
 Bradw. 605), 109 
 Chicago (fee. E. Co. v. Lee (60 111. 601; 
 
 B.C. 68 ni. 566; 87111.454), 108, 
 
 lis, 256 
 Chicago, Ac. B. Co. v. Lewis (6 111. 
 
 242), 109 
 Chicago <6c. E. Co. v. McDonald (21 111. 
 
 App. 409), 426 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. McGaha (19 111. 
 
 App. 342), 94 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. McEean (40 111. 
 
 218), 67, 68, 107, 237 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Major (18 111. 
 
 349), 154, 166, 168, 169, 638 
 Chicago Ac. By. Co. v. Mason (27 111. 
 
 App. 460), 107 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. May (108 III. 
 
 302), 416 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Michie (83 III. 
 
 427), 66 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. ■». Mock (72 111. 
 
 141), 108, 113 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Montgomery (15 
 
 111. App. 206), 474 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. d. Moranda (93 III 
 
 302; B. 0. 34 Am. Bep. 168), 429 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 
 
 1008; 8. 0. 46 Am. Bep. 428), 224 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Mnrphy (63 111. 
 
 336), 427 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Murray (62 111. 
 
 326; 8. o. 71 111. 601), 108 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Nash (24 Bep. 
 
 884), 293 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. NotzM (66 111. 
 
 466), 242 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. O'Byran (15 111. 
 
 App. 134), 412 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co, v. O'Connor (119 
 
 Ul. 686), 666 
 Chicago &o. E. Co. v. Payne (69 111. 
 
 634; B. 0. 49 111. 499), 107, 249 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Pennell (94 111. 
 
 448), 817, 319, 693 
 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. •». Perkins (126 HI. 
 
 127; 8. 0. 17 N. E. Eep. 1), 247 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Perkins (26 111. 
 
 App. 67), 247 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Fondrom (61 111. 
 
 838; s. 0. 2 Am. Eep. 306), 201, 
 
 202 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Randolph (63 HI. 
 
 610; s. 0. 6 Am. Eep. 60), 191 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Eice (71 111. 667), 
 
 300 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Bogers (17 111. 
 
 App. 6S8), 114 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Boss (8 Fed. Eep. 
 
 544; 8. 0. 112 U. S. 377), 126, 402, 
 
 416, 421, 426 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Rnsch (84 111, 
 
 570), 403 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Bussell (91 111. 
 
 298; s. 0. S3 Am. Bep. 64), 444, 
 
 471, 475 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. ■». Byan (lai 111. 
 
 474; s. 0. 23 N. E. Bep. 886) 156 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Saunders (86 111. 
 
 288), 299 
 Chicago Ac. E. Ce. v, Seates (90 HI. 
 
 686), 188 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. ®. Seirer(60 111. 296), 
 
 303, 305 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Simonson (64 111. 
 
 604; s. 0. 6 Am. Bep. 165), 107, 
 
 312, 314 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Sims (17 Neb. 
 
 691), 82 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Smith (18 111. 
 
 App. 119), 461 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Smith (46 Mich. 
 
 604), 91, 266 
 Chicago Ac. By. Co. v. Snyder (117 111. 
 
 376), 391, 426 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Starmer (26 Neb, 
 
 680; s. C. 42 N. W. Eep. 706), 260, 
 
 264 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. i>. Still (19 111. 
 
 499), 237, 240, 615 
 Chicago Ac. R, Co. v. Stites (20 111. App. 
 
 648), 447 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. ■». Stumps (69 111. 
 
 409), 169 
 Chicago Ae. B. Co. v. Sullivan (63 El. 
 
 298), 108, 410 
 Chicago Ac. B, Co. v. Swanson (16 Neb, 
 
 264), 428 
 Chicago Ac, B, Co, v. Sweeney (52 HI, 
 
 880), 106, 108, 287 
 Chicago Ac. E. Co. v. Sweet (46 HI. 
 
 197), 444, 463 
 Chicago Ac, E. Co. v. Sykes (96 111. 
 
 162), 278 
 Chicago, Ac. E. Co, ». Taylor (69 111, 
 
 461; 8, 0, 10 Am. Eep. 626), 466 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. «, Tilton (26 111. 
 
 App. 862), 264 
 
XXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. ■». Triplett (88 111. 
 
 482), 86, 94, 107, 266 
 Chicago <fec. B. Co. «. Umphenor (69 
 
 111. 198), 209 ■ 
 Chicago (fee. R. Co. ■». Van Patten (64 
 
 111. 610; 8. 0. T4 111. 91), 108, 113 
 Chicago <feo. R. Co. ■». Ward (61 111. 130), 
 
 472 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. «. Warner (123 111. 
 
 38; B. 0. 14 N. E. Rep. 206), 107, 
 
 448 
 Chicago Ac. B. Co. v. Warner (108 111. 
 
 538), 476, 479 
 Chicago Ac. By. Co. ■». Wilson (133 111. 
 
 66; s. 0. 24 N. E. Rep. 666), 236 
 Chidsey v. Canton (17 Conn. 476), 322 
 Child v. Hearn (22 W. R. 864; s. o. L. 
 
 R. 9 Exch. 176), 136 
 Childs 1). New> Orleans St. Ry. Co. (33 
 
 La Ann. 164), 377 
 Chaes V. Drake (2 Mete. (Ky.) 146), 92, 
 
 407 
 Chippendale v. Lancashire Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (21 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 22), 219 
 Chisholm v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (1 
 
 N. T. Supl. 743), 333 
 Christian v. Erwin (126 111. 619; s. o. 
 
 17 N. E. Rep. 707), 107 
 Chrystal ». Troy Ac. B. Co. (4 N. T. 
 
 Supl. 708; 8. o. 106 N. Y. 164; 11 
 
 N. E. Rep. 380), 181 
 Church B. Charleston Ac. By. Co. (21 
 
 S. C. 496), 660 
 Churchill v. Holt (127 Mass. 166; s. c. 
 
 34 Am, Rep. 866; 131 Mass. 67; 41 
 
 Am. Rep. 191), 131, 338 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. v. Butler (108 Ind. 
 
 31), 242 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. v. Carper (112 
 
 Ind. 26; s. o. 13 K. E. Rep. 122), 
 
 94, 96 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. v. Eaton (63 Ind. 
 
 310), 260 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. 9>. Hildreth (77 
 
 Ind. 604), 299, 306 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co, v. Biltzhauer 
 
 (99 Ind. 486), 283 
 Cincinnati Ac. B. Co. v. Howard (124 
 
 Ind. 280; s. o. 24 N. E. Rep. 892), 
 
 246, 264 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. «. Jones (111 Ind. 
 
 269; 8. o. 12 N. E. Rep. 113), 300 
 Cincinnati Ac. R, Co. v. McMnUen (117 
 
 Ind. 439; 8. o. 20 N. E. Rep. 287), 
 
 460, 639 
 Cincinnati Ac. Ry. Co. v. Parker (109 
 
 Ind. 236; B. c. 9 N. E. Rep. 787), 
 
 298, 301 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. v. Peters (80 Ind. 
 
 168), 191, 563 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. ■». Smith (22 Ohio 
 
 St. 227; ». 0. 10 Am. Rep. 722), 
 
 287, 298 
 
 Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. ®. Street (60 Ind. 
 
 226), 283 
 Cincinnati Ac. B. Co. v. Waterson (4 
 
 Ohio St. 424), 91, 287, 306 
 Ciriack «. Merchants' Woolen Co. (161 
 
 Mass. 162; 8. 0. 23 N. E. Eep. 
 
 829), 469 
 Citizens' Ac. Ins. Co. v. Marsh (66 Penn. 
 
 St. 387), 612 
 Citizens' Pass. By. Co. B.Thomas (132 
 
 Penn. St. 604; s. c. 19 Atl. Eep. 
 
 286), 377 
 Citizens' St. By. Co. ». Carey, (66 Ind. 
 
 396), 876 
 Citizens' St. By. Co. v. Steen (42 Ark. 
 
 321), 376 
 Citizens' St. Ry. Co. «. Twiname (111 
 
 Ind. 687; s. o. 13 N. E. Rep. 56), 
 
 372 
 City ®. Kending (19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 492), 324 
 City Council «. Benjamin (2 Strobh. 
 
 608; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 608), 344 
 City Council of Montgomery, c. Wright 
 
 (72 Ala. 411; s. o. 47 -Am. Eep. 
 
 422), 666 
 City of Anderson ®. Herrey (67 Ind. 
 
 420), 539 
 City of Atlanta v. Wilson (69 Ga. 644; 
 
 8. o. 27 Am. Rep. 396; 60 Ga. 473), 
 
 326 
 City of Aurora v. Hillman (90 111. 61), 
 
 357 
 City of Austin v. Ritz (72 Tex. 391; 9 
 
 S. W. Rep. 884), 25 
 City of Bloomington ». Perdue (99 111. 
 
 329), 326, 329, 344 
 City of Bradford ». Downes (126 Pa. St. 
 
 622; 24 W. N. 0. 153; 17 Atl. Rep. 
 
 884), 43 , 
 City of Carlisle, The (39 Fed. Eep. 807), 
 
 620 
 City of Centralia v. Krouse (64 111. 19), 
 
 328, 363, 367, 610 
 City of Chicieo v. Bixby (84 111. 82; s. c. 
 
 25 Am. Rep. 429), 366 
 City of Chicago v. Hesing (83 111. 204; 
 
 B. o. 28 Am. Rep. 878), 108, 334 
 City of Chicago e. McGiven (78 HI. 362), 
 
 366 
 City of Chicago v. Stearns (106 HI. 564), 
 
 109 
 City of CoTingtoB «. Bryant (1 Bush. 
 
 248), 125 
 City of Erie ®. MagiU (IGl Penn. St. 
 
 616; s. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 739), 49, 
 
 328, 867 
 City of Goshen v. England (119 Ind. 
 
 868; 8. 0. 21 H. E. Eep. 977), 48 
 City of Hartford v. Talcott (48 Conn. 
 
 626; s. 0. 40 Am. Repl 189), 369 
 City of Huntington o. Breen (77 Ind. 
 
 29), 326, 327 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 City of Keokuk v. Independent District 
 
 of Keokuk (63 Iowa, 362: s. o. 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 226), 368 
 City of Lexington v. McQuillan (9 Dana, 
 
 518i 8. 0. 36 Am. Dec 169), 822 
 City of Lincoln «. "Walker (18 Neb. 224; 
 
 8. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 162), 331 
 
 643 
 City of Madison v. Ross (3 Ind. 236 
 
 s. 0. 64 Am. Dec. 481), 26 
 City of Montgomery i). Wright (72 Ala, 
 
 411; 3. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 422), 826, 
 
 327, 328, 563 
 City of Navasota ». Pearoe (46 Tex. 626; 
 
 B. 0. 26 Am. Rep. 279), 823 
 City of New York v. Starin (12 N. E 
 
 Rep. 631), 869 
 City of Qaincy v. Barker (81 111. 300 
 
 B. 0. 26 Am. Rep. 278), 367 
 City of Rock Island v. Yanlandschoot 
 
 (78 111. 485), 503, 609 
 City of St. Paul v. Kuby (8 Minn. 166), 
 
 164 
 City of Salina v. Trosper (27 Kan. 645), 
 
 326, 327, 601, 504 
 City of Soranton v. Hill (102 Penn. St. 
 
 378; s. o. 48 Am. Rep. 211), 333 
 City of Toledo c. Cone (19 Am. Law 
 
 Rev. 330), 417 
 City of Vicksbnpg v. Hennesay (54 Miss. 
 
 391; s. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 864), 326, 
 
 687 
 City of Vicksburg «. McLain (67 Miss. 
 
 4; 6 So. Rep. 774), 161 
 City Ry. Co. v. Lee (50 N. J. Law, 435; 
 
 8. o. 14 Atl. Rep, 883), 382 
 Clais 11. Minneapolis <fcc. R. Co. (84 
 
 Minn. 67), 298 
 Clapp v. City of Providence (17 How. 
 
 (U. S.) 161), 834 
 Clapp ». Town of Ellington (3 N. T. 
 
 Supl. 516; 8. o. 22 Abb. New Cas. 
 
 887), 827 
 Clara, The (102 TJ. S. 208), 619 
 Clardy ■». St. Louis &c. R. Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 676), 287 
 Clark V. Barnes (37 Hun, 389), 477 
 Clark V. Boston &o. R. Co. (128 Mass. 
 
 1), 249, 272 
 Clark ®. Boston &o. R. Co. (64 N. H. 
 
 323; 8. o. 10 Atl. Rep, 676), 306 
 Clark V. Burns (118 Mass. 275), 226 
 aark v. Chambers (L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 
 
 327), 177, 267, 881 
 Clark v. Chicago &e. R. Co. (62 Mich. 
 
 368; 8. c. 28 N. W. Rep. 914), 
 
 298 
 Clark V. City of Manchester (62 N. H. 
 
 677), 178 
 Clark V. Eighth Ave. R. Co. (86 N. Y. 
 
 136; 8. o. 32 Barb. 667), 382, 384 
 Clark s. Famous Shoe and Clothing Co. 
 
 (16 Mo. App. 463), 59 
 
 Clark V. Holmes (6 Hurl. <fe N. 849; 
 
 8. o, 7 Hurl. & N. 937), 445, 484 
 Clark V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (35 Kan. 
 
 360; s. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 134), 236, 
 
 286, 244 
 Clark V. St. Paul <fcc. R. Co. (28 Minn. 
 
 128), 481, 482 
 Clark ». Soule (137 Mass. 380), 396 
 Clark V. Syracuse &c. R. Co. (11 Barb. 
 
 112), 282, 290, 308 
 Clark V. Union Ferry Co. (36 N. Y. 
 
 485), 369 
 Clark V. Waltham (128 Mass. 567), 364 
 Clark V. Rhode Island Electric Light- 
 ing Co. (17 Atl. Rep. 59), 73 
 Clark's Adm'r v. Richmond <tc. R. Co. 
 
 (78 Ta. 709; s. o. 49 Am. Rep. 394), 
 
 471 
 Classen v. Leopold (2 Sweeney, 706), 
 
 626, 526 j . 
 
 Clazton «. Lexington <&c. R. Co. (13 
 
 Bush, 636), 93, 407, 568, 670 
 Clay V. Chicago (fee. B. Co. (17 Mo. App. 
 
 629), 668 
 Clay V. Wood (5 Espiu. 44), 366 
 Clayards ». Dethick (12 Q. B. 489), 63 
 • Claypool «. McAllister (20 111. 504). 869 
 Cleary ». Philadelphia &c. R. Co. (8 
 
 Penn. Co. Ct. Rep. 96), 84 
 Cleaves v. Pigeon Hill Granite Co. (146 1 
 
 Mass. 641; s. o. 14 N. E. Rep. 646), 
 
 264 
 Cleghorn v. New York <fec. R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 44), 604 
 Cleland v. Thornton (48 Cal. 439), 88 
 Clemens v. Hannibal <&c. R. Co. (63 Mo. 
 
 366; s. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 460), 313 
 Cleveland v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (42 
 
 Vt. 449), 318 
 Cleveland v. Spier (16 C. B. (N. S.) 398), 
 
 439 
 Cleveland «. Steamboat Co. (68 N. Y. 
 
 806), 869 
 Cleveland <fec. R. Co. v. Crawford (24 
 
 Ohio St. 681 ; 8. 0. 15 Am. Rep. 
 
 683), 22, 236, 238, 543 
 Cleveland (fee, R. t/O v. Crossby (86 
 
 Ind. 870), 298 
 Cleveland (fee. B. Co. i). Curran (19 
 
 Ohio St. 1 ; s. 0. 2 Am. Rep. 862), 
 
 223, 224 
 Cleveland (fee. R. Co. ». Elliott (4 Ohio 
 
 St. 474), 286,287 
 Cleveland (fee. p. Co. ■». Elliott (28 Ohio 
 
 St.340), 78, 239 
 Cleveland <fcc. R. Co. 1>. Keary (3 Ohio 
 
 St. 201), 416 
 Cleveland (fee. R. Co. v. Manson (80 
 
 Ohio St. 451), 166 
 Cleveland (fee. R. Co. v. Schneider (46 
 
 Ohio St. 678; 8. o. 17 N. E. Bep. 
 
 321), 249 
 
xl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Cleveland Ac. R. Co. ■». Terry (8 Ohio 
 
 St. 670), 44, 52, 243, 256, 509, 511, 
 
 663 
 Cleveland <fec. R. Co. v. Hynant (100 
 
 Ind. 160), 23 
 Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. ®. Corrigan 
 
 (46 Ohio St. 283; s. c. 20 JS. E. 
 
 Rep. 466), 175, 468 
 Cliff «. Midland Ry. Co. (L. R. 5 Q. B. 
 
 268), 237, 243 
 Clifford V. Dam (81 N. Y. 66), 331 
 Clifford V. Denver <fec. R. Co. (9 Colo. 
 
 333; s. c. 12 Pae. Rep. 219), 446 
 Clifford V. Old Colony R. Co. (141 Mass. 
 
 564), 426, 431 
 Clopp D. Mear (19 Atl. Rep. 604; b. o. 
 
 25 W. N. C. 571), 73 
 Clotworthy v. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (80 
 
 Mo. 220), 209 
 Clougheesy v. City of Waterbury (61 
 
 Conn. 405; s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 492), 356 
 Glowers «. Wabash (fee. Ry. Co. (21 Mo. 
 
 App. 213), 431, 450 
 Clute V. "Wigoins (14 Johns. (N. T.) 175; 
 
 s. 0. 7 Am. Deo. 449), 524 
 Coal Run Coal Co. ■». Jones (127 111. 379; 
 
 B. 0. 20 N. E. Rep. 89), 67 
 Coates V. Missouri (fee. R. Co. (61 Mo. 
 
 38), 313, 316 
 Cobb V. Standish (14 Me. 198), 344 
 Cockle V. London (fee. Ry. Co. (L. R. 7 
 
 C. P. 321; s. 0. 27 L. T. Rep. (N. 
 S.) 320), 211, 212 
 
 Coddington v. Brooklyn Croastown R. 
 
 Co. (102 N. Y. 66), 236 
 Cody «. New York (fee. R. Co. (151 Mass. 
 
 462; s. 0. 24 N. E. Rep. 402), 65 
 Coffey v. Chapel (2 N. Y. Supl. 648), 
 
 448 
 Coggin V. Central (fee. R. Co. (62 Ga.,686; 
 
 s. 0. 36 Am. Rep. 132), 434 
 CoggsB. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym. 909: s. o. 
 
 1 Smith's L. C. (8th ed.) 369), 2, 3, 
 
 20 
 Cogswell V. Oregon (fee. R. Co. (6 Or. 
 
 417)^266,264 
 Cohen «. Dry Dock (fee. R. Co. (69 N. Y. 
 
 170), 376 
 Cohen «. Eureka dec. R. Co. (14 Ncv. 
 
 376), 246 
 Cohen B. Hune (1 McCord, 444), 869 
 Colbert v. Rankin (72 Cal. 197; s. c. 13 
 
 Pac. Rep. 491), 477 
 Colchester, Mayor of, v. Brooke (7 Q. 
 
 B. 377, 839), 162, 164 
 
 Cole ». City of Newburyport (129 Mass. 
 
 594), 342 
 Cole V. Goodwin (19 Wend. 251; s. o. 32 
 
 Am. Deo. 470), 221, 225 
 Colegrove «. New Haven (fee. R. Co. 
 
 (20 N. Y. 492), 32, 142 
 
 Coleman 11. Fli,nt (fee. R. Co. (64 Mich. 
 
 160; s. 0. 31 N. W. Rap. 47), 300 
 Coleman v. Henderson (Littell's Select 
 
 Cases (Ky.) 171; s. o. 12 Am. Dec. 
 
 290),, 344, 345 
 Coleman v. Wilmington (fee. R. Co. (26 
 
 S. C. 446), 428 
 Colliers. Steinhart (61 Cal. 116), 412 
 Collins V. Atlantic (fee. R. Co. (66 Mo. 
 
 230) 295 
 Collins V. City <tf Council Bluffs (32 Iowa, 
 
 324; 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 200), 366 
 Collins V. Dodge (37 Minn. 503; s. c. 35 
 
 N. W. Rep. 368), 332 
 Collins i>. Long Island R. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 701), 246 
 Collins V. Middle Levee Commissioners 
 
 (L. R. 4 C. P. 279; s. o. 38 L. J. (C. 
 
 P.) 236; 20 L. T. (N. S.)442), 38 
 Collins ■» New York (fee. R. Co. (6 Hun. 
 
 499), 313, 316 
 Collins V. South Boston R. Co. (142 
 
 Mass. 301; 8. o. 67 Am. Rep. 676), 
 
 181, 375 
 Collis V. Dorchester (6 Gush. 396), 334 
 Colorado (fee. R. Co. v. Caldwell (11 Colo. 
 
 546; s. 0. 19 Pac. Rep. 542), 292 
 Colorado (fee. R. Go. v. Holmes (6 Colo. 
 
 197), 16, 44, 663, 565 
 Colorado (fee. R. Go. ». Martin (7 Colo. 
 
 592; B. o. 19 Am. Law Rev. 163), 
 
 414, 428,'>669 
 Colorado (fee. R. Co. v. Ogden (3 Colo. 
 
 499), 403, 475, 484 
 Colton «. Richards (123 Mass. 484), 430 
 Columbia (fee. R. Co. o. Hawthorn (3 
 
 Wafeh. T. 353 ;s. o. 19 Pac. Rep. 25), 
 
 447 
 Colombia Ins. Go. «>. Lawrence (10 Peters, 
 
 617), 512 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. v. Arnold (31 Ind, 
 
 174), 413, 429,444 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. v. Bradford (86 
 
 Ala. 574; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 90), 566 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. v. Farrell (31 Ind. 
 
 408), 206, 210 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. v. Terry (8 Ohio 
 
 St. 570), 245 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. ». Troesch (68 lU. 
 
 645; s. o. 18 Am. Rep. 578), 444, 
 
 456, 475 
 Columbus ^e. R. Go. ■». Webb (8 Ohio 
 
 Law Jour. 201; s. 0. 12 Ohio St. 
 
 475), 428, 444 
 Columbus (fee. R. Co. ■». Wood (86 Ala. 
 
 164; 8. 0. 5 So. Rep. 463), 278 
 Colwell «. Manhattan Ry. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 636y 96 
 Gomerford v. Dupuy (17 Cal. 308), 287 
 Coinings v, Hannibal (fee. R. Co. (48 
 
 Mo. 612), 287 
 Commonwealths. Boston (fee. R, Co. (126 
 
 Mass. 61), 649 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Xli 
 
 Commonwealth v. Boston <&c. R. Co. 
 
 (129 Mass. BOO; g. o. 87 Am. Rep. 
 
 882), 61, 199, 207, 213 
 Commonwealth v. Brockton &o. Ry. Co. 
 
 (148 Mass. 801; s. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 
 
 506), 372 
 
 Commonwealth v. liOuisTille <Stc. R. Co. 
 (80 Ky. 291; s. c.44 Am. Rep. 475), 
 231, 360 
 
 Commonwealth «. Metropolitan R. Co. 
 
 (107 Mass. 286), 375 
 Commonwealth v. Sampson (97 Mass. 
 
 407), 280, 348 
 Commonwealth ■». Vermont <icc. R. Co, 
 
 (108 Mass. 7; 8.0. 11 Am. Rep. 301), 
 
 186, 217 
 Comyns v. Boyer (8ro. Eliz. 406), 344 
 Con V. Bnrbridge (18 C. B. (N. S.) 480), 
 
 841 
 Condon v. Missouri dec. R. Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 567), 429, 449 
 Cone V. Delaware <fcc. B. Co. (81 N. Y. 
 
 206; 8. o. 87 Am. Rep. 491), 895, 
 
 448 
 Cones «. Cincinnati <tc. Ry. Co. (114 Tud. 
 
 828; s. o. 16 N.E. Rep. 688), 239 
 Congdon v. Central &c. R. Co. (66 Vt. 
 
 399; 8. 0. 48 Am. Rep. 793), 281, 
 
 297, 804, 310 
 Conley v. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co. (12 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 764), 245 
 Conley v. Forty-second St. <fec. Ry. Co. 
 
 (2 N. Y. Supl. 229), 881 
 Conley v. Pittsbnrgfa &c. R. Co. (95 
 
 Peon. St. 898; s. c. 98 Penn. St. 
 
 498), 182 
 Conley v. Portland (78 Me. 217), 432 
 Conly V. Penn. R. Co. (12 Atl. Rep. 496), 
 
 207 
 Connelly «. Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. (36 
 
 N. W. Rep. 682), 426 
 Conners v. Barlington &c. By, Co. (71 
 
 Iowa, 490; s. o. 32 N. W. Rep. 466), 
 
 390 
 Connolly v. City of Boston (117 Mass. 
 
 64; s. 0. 19 Am. Rep. 896), 231, 346 
 Connolly v. Davidson (15 Minn. 519; 
 
 s. o. 2 Am. Rep. 164), 431, 440 
 Connolly v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (114 
 
 N. Y. 104; 8. 0. 21 N. E. Rep. 101), 
 
 160, 388 
 Connor v. Pioneer Fireproof Const. Co. 
 
 (29 Fed. Rep. 629), 445 
 Connors v. Hennessy (112 Mass. 96), 486 
 Connyers v. Sioux City &e. R. Co. (78 
 
 Iowa, 410; s. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 267), 
 
 292 
 Canolly v. Crescent R. Co. (41 La. Ann. 
 
 67), 374 
 Conradt v. Claure (93 Ind. 476), 632 
 Conroy «. Iron Works Co. (62 Mo. 36), 
 
 444 
 
 D 
 
 Conroy «. Oregon Construction Co. (23 
 
 Fed. Rep. 71), 638, 542, 560 
 Conroy v. Vulcan Iron "Works (62 Mo. 
 
 38), 483 
 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Wombacher 
 
 (24 N. E. Rep. 627), 660 
 Constitution The (Gilp. 679), 618 
 Continental, The (14 Wall. 846), 518 
 Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead 
 
 (96 U. S. 161), 235 
 Conway ». Belfast By. Co. (Ir. R. 9 C. 
 
 L. 498), 400, 414, 421 
 Conway «. Hannibal <fcc. R. Co. (28 Mo. 
 
 App. 235), 24 
 Cook V. Central R. Co. (12 Rep. 356), 56 
 
 58 
 cook «. Champlain &c. B. Co. (1 Denio, 
 
 91), 79, 813 
 Cook«- City of Milwaukee (24 Wis. 270; 
 
 8. 0- ] Am. Rep. 183), 356 
 Cook «. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (63 Mo. 
 
 397), 415, 418 
 Cook V. Houston Nov. Co. (76 Tex. 8 ; 
 
 8. 0. 18 S. W, Rep. 476), 176 
 Cook v. Johnston (68 Mich. 437; s. o. 66 
 
 Am. Rep. 703), 39 
 Cook v. Metropolitan R. Co. (98 Mass. 
 
 361), 876 
 Cook V. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 329), 570 
 Cook v. Parham (24 Ala. 21), 66 
 Cook B. St. Paul &o. Ry. Co. (34 Minn. 
 
 46), 445, 461, 477 
 Cook V. Western <fcc. R. Co. (69.Ga. 619), 
 
 663, 670 
 Coolbroth v. Maine Ac. R. Co. (77 Me. 
 
 165; s. o. 1 East. Rep. 140), 466 
 
 479 
 Coombs V. Kew Bedford <iEc. R. Co. (102 
 
 Mass. 572; 8. o. 3 Am. Rep. 606), 
 
 61, 460. 462, 479, 481 
 Coombs V. Furrington (42 Me. 332), 44, 
 
 332 
 Coon V. Syracuse ice. R. Co. (6 N, Y. 
 
 492), 426 
 Cooper V. E. T. Co. (76 N. Y. 116), 143 
 Cooper V. Iowa Central R. Co: (44 Iowa, 
 
 134), 416 
 Cooper V. Lake Shore &c. Ry. Cb. (66 
 
 Mich. 261; s. o. 33 If. W. Rep. 306), 
 
 253 
 Cooper v. Massachusetts <&c. Ins. Co. 
 
 (102 Mass. 227), 612 
 Cooper V. itlUwaukee &o. B. Co. (23 
 
 Wis. 668), 413 
 Cooper V. Pittsburgh <tc. Ry. Co. (24 W. 
 
 Va. 87), 429 
 Copley v. New Haven &e. B. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 6), 237, 638 
 Coppins V. New York <tc. R. Co. (43 
 
 Hun, 26), 462 
 Corbett v. City of Leavenworth (27 Kan. 
 
 673 J, 49, 326, 828 
 
xlii 
 
 TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pageg.l 
 
 Corbett v. St. Louis &e. B. Oo. (26 Mo. 
 
 App. 621), 426, 429 
 Corby «. HUl (4 0. B. (N. S.) 666; a. o. 
 
 i Jut. (N. S.) 618; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 
 
 818), n, S86 
 Corcoran «. Boston <fec. B. Co, (183 Mass. 
 
 607), 688 
 Corcoran «. Holbrook (69 N. Y. 517; s. o. 
 
 17 Am. Bep. 369), 416, 448, 468 
 Cordell v. New York Ac. B. Co. (6 Hun, 
 
 461; 8. 0. 64 N. Y. 636; 70 N. Y. 
 
 119; 26 Am. Bep. 650; 76 N. Y. 
 
 380), 249, 260, 662, 666, 558 
 Corey v. Bath (36 N. H. 6S1), 231 
 Corey v Northern Pac. B. Co. (32 Minn. 
 
 467), 388 
 Corlies v. Cummin^ (6 Cowen, 181), 563 
 Corliss v. Worcestsr &e. B. Co. (68 N. 
 
 H. 404), 86 
 Cornman v. Eastern Counties By. Co. 
 
 (4 Hurl. <Se N. 781), 668 
 Giorrigan 1). Union Sugar Befinery (98 
 
 Mass. 677), 897 
 Corrister v. Kansas City &e. B. Co. (26 
 
 Mo. App. 619), 41 
 Corson v. Maine Cent. B. Ce. (76 Me. 
 
 244), 466 
 Corwin d. New York &c. E. Co. (13 N. 
 
 Y. 42), 284, 299, 307, 308 
 CesgroTe v. New. York dec. B. Co. (87 
 
 N. Y. 88; s, o. 41 Am. Bep. 366; 13 
 
 Hun, 329), 80, 85, 288 
 CosgroTO v. Ogden (49 N. Y. 266; s. o. 
 
 10 Am. ,Bep. 361), 164, 179, 181. 
 
 182, 368 
 Coskery «. Nagle (83 Ga. 696), 628 
 CoBulich v. Standard Oil Co.(68N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. 884), 40 
 Cotchett V. Savannah &e. By. Ce. (84 
 
 6a. 687: s. o. 11 S. E. Bep. 568), 
 
 192 
 Cotterill v. Startey (8 Car. <fc P. 691), 
 
 832, 348, 362 
 Cotton V. Edwards (123 Mass. 484), 467 
 Cotton V. Wood (8 C. B. (N. S.) 668), 
 
 352, 668 
 Cottrill V. Chicago- <fec. B. Co. (47 Wis. 
 
 634; 1. o. 82 Am. Rep. 796), 67, 69, 
 
 60, 486 
 Couch V. Charlotte Ac. B. Co. (22 S. C. 
 
 687), 466 
 Couch V. Steel (8 El. & BI. 402; s. o. 18 
 
 Jur. 675; 28 L. J.(Q. B.) 121), 400 
 Coulter V. Am. Ac. Express Co. (66 N 
 
 Y. 685), 66, 67 
 Counsell v. Hall (145 Mass. 468), 482 
 Counter v. Conob (8 Allen, 486), 68 
 .County Commissioners «. Burgess (61 
 
 Md. 29), 828, 643, 568, 670 
 County Commissioners v. Hamilton (60 
 
 Ind. 840), 17 
 County of Howard «. Legg (11 N. E. 
 
 Bep. 612), 47 
 
 Course v. New York Ac. B. Co. (2 N 
 
 Y. Supl. 812), 896 
 Coursen v. Ely (87 111. 388), 107 
 Coursen v. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (71 Iowa, 
 
 28; 8. 0. 82 N. W. Bep. 8), 306 
 Courtney v. Baker (60 N. Y. 1; s. o. 6 
 
 Jones A S. 249), 398 
 Covey V. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (27 Mo. 
 
 App. 170; B. o. 86 Mo. 636), 447, 
 
 484 
 Covington V. Western Ac. B. Co. (81 
 
 Ga. 273; s. o. 6 S. E. Bep. 593) 189 
 Covington, City of, v. Bryant (7 Bush, 
 
 248), 126 
 Cowan V. Snyder (6 N. Y. SupL 340), 
 
 333 
 Cowan «. Third Ave. By. Co. (9 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 610; s. 0. 1 N. Y. Supl. 612), 
 
 379 
 Cowan «. Union Pac. By. Co. (36 Fed. 
 
 Bep. 48), 287 
 Cowgill e. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (33 Mo. 
 
 App. 677), 295 
 Cowles ■B. Balzer (47 Barb. 662), 282 
 Gowles «. Richmond Ac. R. Co. (84 N. C. 
 
 809), 892, 416, 444, 454, 458, 481 
 Cox V. Minneapolis Ac. Ry. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 1«1; s.o. 42 N. W. Bep. 924), 
 
 306 
 Cox «. Bailway (3 Exch. 268), 216 
 Cox V. Westchester Turnpike Co. (83 
 
 Barb. 418), 611 
 Coxe 7). Bobbins (9 N. J. Law, 384), 
 
 282 
 Coylo V. Conway (86 Mo. App. 490), 68 
 Coyle «. Fierrepont (87 Hun, 379; s. o. 
 
 88Hnn, 811), 436 
 Crabell v. Wapello Coal Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 761), 390 
 Craflon v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (65 Mo. 
 
 580), 287 
 Crafts V. Boston (109 Mass. 619) 638 
 Cragin ®, N: Y. Ac. B. Co. (51 N. Y. 
 
 61; B. o. 10 Am. Bep. 669), 222 
 Craig ®. New York Ac. B. Co. (118 
 
 Mass; 437), 249, 649 
 Craighead v. Brooklyn City B. Co. (6 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 481), 888 
 Cramer «. Burlington (42 Iowa, 816), 
 
 502 
 Crandell v. Goodrich Trans. Co. (11 
 
 Biss. 616; s. o. 16 Fed. Bop. 75), 
 
 29, 44, 80 
 Cranston v. New York Ac. B. Co. (89 
 
 Hun (N. Y.),808), 266 
 Cratty v. Bangor (67 Me. 423; s. c. 2 
 
 Am. Bep. 66), 280, 848 
 Cravens. Cent. Pac. B. Co. (72 Cal. 845), 
 
 189 ^ ' 
 
 Crawford v. Delaware Ac. B Co. (64 N. 
 
 Y. Super. Ct. 262), 149 
 Crawford «. The WeUs City (88 Fed. 
 
 Bep. 47), 484 ' ^ 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 zliii 
 
 Creed v. Fennsylvania B. Co. (86 Penn. 
 St. 139; B. o. 27 Am. Ben. 693), 
 198 
 Cregan v. Marston (10 N. T. Supl. 681), 
 
 457 
 Cremer v, Portland (36 Wis. 99), 22, 23, 
 
 24, 42, 44 
 Cresent v. Anderson (114 Penn. St. 643), 
 
 148 
 Cressy v. Northern Ac. E. Co. (59 N. H. 
 664; 8. o. 47 Am. Eep. 227; 66 N. 
 H. 890), 281, 297, 304, 810 
 Cressy v. PostviUe (69 Iowa, 62), 326 
 Crew «. St. Louis &o. E. Co. (20 Fed. 
 
 Eep. 87), 542 
 Crine «. East Tenn. &o. By. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 661; s. o. 11 S. E. Bep. 665), 199 
 Crispin «. Babbitt (81 N. T. 616; s. o. 
 37 Am. Eep. 621), 415, 418,419, 
 468 
 Criswell v. Pittsburgh <tc. Ey. Co. (30 
 West Va. 798; 8. o. 6 S. E. Eep. 
 31), 414 
 Crocheren v. North Shore Ac. Ferry Co. 
 (1. N. T. Super, Ct. 446; s. o. 66 
 N. Y. 666), 366, 870 
 Crofts V. Waterhonse (8 Bing. 319), 330 
 Crogan «. Schiele (63 Conn. 186; s. c. 
 
 65 Am. Bep. 88), 73 
 Cromarty v. City of Boston (127 Mass. 
 
 329; 8. 0. 34 Am. Bep. 381), 366 
 Crsmmelin e. Coxe (80 Ala. 829), 22 
 Cronin u Delaran (60 Wis. 376), 18, 23, 
 
 27 
 Crosby ®. Detroit <tc. By. Co. (68 Mich. 
 
 468), 304 
 Cross V. Lake Shore Ac. By. Co. (69 
 Mich. 368; s. c. 37 N. W. Eep. 
 361), 206 
 Crossman i>. City of Lynn (121 Mass. 
 
 301), 231, 347 
 Crowley v. Appleton (148 Mass. 98; s. o. 
 
 16 N. E. Bep. 676), 474 
 Crowley u Burlington Ac. Ey. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 668), 40 
 Crawley v. Pacific Mills (148 Mass. 228; 
 
 s. 0. 19 N. E. Bep. 344), 469 
 Crowley v. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (24 
 
 Me. App. 119), 668 
 Crosselle v. Pugh (67 Ga. 430, 436; s. o. 
 
 44 Am. Bep. 724), 403, 433 
 Crutchfield v. Bichmond Ac. B. Co. (76 
 N. C. 320; s. o. 78 111. 800), S96, 
 473, 481, 482 
 Cruty V. Erie By. Co. (8 N. T. Sup. Ot. 
 
 (T. A 0.) 244), 437 
 Cuddy V. Horn (46 Mich. 696; s. o. 41 
 
 Am. Bep. 178), 132, 140, 142 
 Cnllen v. Delaware A H. Canal Co. (113 
 N. T. 667; 8. o. 21 N. E. Eep. 716), 
 67 
 Cnllen V. Norton (4 N. T. SupL 774; 8. o. 
 52 Hun, 9), 446 
 
 Cumberland Coal Co. v. Scally (27 Md 
 
 689), 428 
 Cumberland Ac. Ins. Co. v, Douglas, (68 
 
 Penn. St. 419), 512 
 Cumberland Ac. Iron Co. «. Scally (27 
 
 Md. 689), 668 
 Cumberland Ac. E. Co. v. Fazenbaker 
 
 (37 Md. 156), 86 
 Cumberland Ac. B, Co. v. Hogan (46 
 
 Md. 229), 420, 444 
 Cumberland Ac. E. Co. v. Mangans (61 
 
 Md. 63), 189 
 Cumberland Ac. E. Co. v. Moran (44 
 
 Md. 283), 420 
 Cumberland Ac. fi. Co. v. State (44 Md. 
 
 283), 416 
 Camming v. Brooklyn City E. Co. (38 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) 362), 67 
 Cummings v. Collins (61 Mo. 620), 461 
 Cnmmings v. Grand Trunk By. Co. (4 
 
 Cliff, 478), 467 
 Cnmmings v. Presley (4 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 316), 88, 79 
 Cunard Steam-Ship Co. v. Carey (119 
 
 n. S. 246), 448 
 Cunningham v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (5 
 
 McOrary, 466), 472, 477 
 Cunningham v. liyness (22 Wis. 246), 
 
 106, 369 
 Curley «. Harris (11 Allen, 113), 19, 
 
 435 
 Curley v. Illinois Cent. B. Co. (40 La. 
 Ann, 810; s. o. 6 So. Eep. 103), 
 247 
 Curraav. Merchants' Mfg. Co. (130 Mass. 
 874; s. o. 39 Am. Bep. 467), 456, 
 469 
 Curran v. Warren Chemical Mfg. Co. 
 
 (36 N. Y. 153), 662, 566 
 Current v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 62), 449 
 Curry v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (48 Wis. 
 
 666), 67, 285, 298, 302, 310 
 Curtiss V. Bochester Ac. E. Co. (20 Barb. 
 
 285), 213 
 Cnsick «. Adams (116 N. Y. 66), 71 
 Cuyler v. Decker (20 Hun, 173), 68 
 
 Dahl V. Milwaukee City By. Co. (66 
 
 Wis. 371), 181 
 DabI V. Milwaukee Ac. By. Co. (62 Wis. 
 
 662), 669 
 Dahlberg «. Minnesota St. B. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 404; s. o. 19 Am. Law Eev. 
 
 332; 60 Am. Eep. 685), 201, 886 
 Dahlstrom v. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 99; 8. 0. 8 S. W. Wep. 777), 
 
 262, 278 
 Daily v. Bichmond Ac. B. Co. (106 N. 
 
 C. 801; 8. o. 11 S. E. Bep. 820), 
 
 237, 264 
 
xliv 
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Dale V. St. Louis <&c. R. Co. (63 Mo. 
 
 46B), 444, 478, 481 
 Dale V. Webster County (76 Iowa, 370; 
 
 8. 0. 41 N. W. Rep. 1), 48 
 Daley «. Norwifch <fcc. K. Co. (26 Conn. 
 
 691), 22, 32, 68, 69, 166, 168, 246, 
 
 274 
 Daley B. Shaaf (28 Hun, 314), 443, 479 
 Dallas &c. Ry. Co. ■». Able (72 Tex. 160; 
 
 s. o. 9 8. W. Rep. 871), 260 
 Dallas <fcc. R. Co. «. Spicker (61 Tex. 
 
 427; s. o. 48 Am. Rep. 297), 644 
 Damon v. Inhabitants of Scitnate (119 
 
 Mass. 66; s. o. 20 Am. Rep. 316), 
 .366 
 
 Damon v. Scituate (119 Iowa, 66), 68 
 Damont v. New Orleans &o. R. Co. (9 
 
 La. Ann. 441; s. o. 61 Am. Dec. 
 
 214), 189 
 Damour v. Lyons (44 Iowa, 276), 62 
 Damrill 's. St, Louis &c. Ry, Co. (27 
 
 Mo. App. 202), 239 
 Dandle v. Southern Pae. R. Co. (7 So. 
 
 792), 390 
 
 Daniel v^ Metropolitan Ry. Co. (L. R. 3 
 239 
 
 C. B. 691 ; s. 0. 6 H. L. 46), 236, 
 
 Daniels e. Clegg (28 Mich. 32), 23, 344, 
 
 368 
 Daniels v. Union Pae. Ry. Co. (23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 762), 429 
 Danner v. South Carolina &a. R. Go. 
 
 (4 Rich. (Law) 329; s. o. 66 Am. 
 
 Dec, 678), 6, 8, 288, 643 
 Danville dec. Xornpike Co. v. Stewart 
 
 (2 Mete. (Ky.) 119), 142, 147 
 Darling v. Boston ibc. R. Co. (121 Mass. 
 
 118), 281, 286 
 Darracutti «. Chesapeake <&c. R. Co. 
 
 (83 Va. 288; 8. o. 2 S. E. Rep. 611), 
 
 484 
 Darrigan v. New York Ac. R. Co. (62 
 
 Conn. 286; s. o. 62 Am. Rep. 690), 
 
 419, 426 
 Dartmouth Spinning Co. u Achard (84 
 
 Ga. 14; s. o. 10 S. E. Rep. 449), 
 
 464 
 Dascomb v. Buffalo <fec. R. Co. (27 Barb. 
 
 221), 243 
 Davenport v. Rnckman (37 N. Y. 668; 
 
 s. o. 10 Bosw. 20), 363, 610, 611 
 Davey v. London <fcc. Ry. Co. (11 L. R. 
 
 Q. B. Div. 213), 264, 266, 644 
 Davey v. London <fcc. Ry. Co. (12 Q. B. 
 
 D. 70; 8. 0. 63 L. J. Q. B. 68; 49 
 
 L. T. 749), 242 
 Davidson ®. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa, 22; s. o. 39 N. W. Rep. 163), 
 
 303,307 
 Davidson «. City of Portland (69 Me. 
 
 116; B. 0. 31 Am. Rep. 263), 63, 230, 
 
 343 
 Davies v. Mann (10 Mee. & W. 646; s. o. 
 
 6 Jur. 984; 12 L. J. (Exch.) 10), 10. 
 
 11, 12, 18, 34, 35, 77, 98, 108, 117. 
 
 118, 124, 166, 161, 164, 166, 631 
 Davis V. Burlington <fec. R. Co. (26 
 
 Iowa, 649), 800 
 Davis ». Button (78 Cal. 247; s. c. 18 
 
 Pac. Rep. 133), 446 
 Davis V. Central Congregational Society 
 
 of Jamaica Plain (129 Mass. 367), 
 
 72 
 Davis ii. Central Vermont R. Co. (65 
 
 Vt. 34; a. o. 45 Am. Rep. 590), 426, 
 
 429, 430 
 Davis «. Chicago <fcc. R. Co. (40 Iowa, 
 
 292), 296 
 Davis *. Chicago &c. R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 646; B. 0. 46 Am. Rep. 667), 71, 
 
 274 
 Davis V. Columbia.Ac. R. Co. (21 S. C. 
 
 93), 6, 446 
 Davis V. Detroit <fec. R. Co. (20 Mich. 
 
 106), 450, 466, 479, 480, 482 
 Davis V. Falcoiibridge (46 Am. Rep. 660, 
 
 «.), 330 
 Davis V. Garrett (6 Bing. 716), 487 
 Davis «. Guarnieri (45 Ohi» St. 470; s. 
 
 0. 15 N. E. Rep. 350), 140 
 Davis ». Hannibal Ac. Ry. Co. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 425), 295 
 Davis V. Hill (41 N. H. 329), 336 
 Davis V. Inhabitants of Dudley (4 Allen, 
 
 668), 324, 341, 343 
 Davis V. Leominster (1 Allen, 184), 324 
 Davis v. N. Y. Ac. R. Co. (47 N. Y. 
 
 400), 288, 289, 254, 255 
 Davis V. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (68 Ark. 
 
 117; 8. o. 18 S. W. Rep. 801), 477 
 Davis V. SomervUle (12S Mass. 694; t. 
 
 o. 36 Am. Rep. 399), 346 
 Davis V. Utah Southern R. Co. (3 Utah, 
 
 218), 669 
 Day V. Brooklyn City Ac. R. Co. (12 
 
 Hun, 435), 387 
 Day f>. Crossman (4 Thomp. A Cook {JS. 
 
 Y. Sup. a.) 122), 81 
 Day «, Highland Street R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 118; 8. o. 46 Am. Rep. 447), 
 
 230, 347, 388 
 Day V. Milford (5 Allen, 98), 861 
 Day v. Mt. Pleasant (79 Iowa, 193), 387 
 Day t). New Orleans Ac. Ry. Co. (86 La. 
 
 Ann. 291), 298 
 Dayrell v. Tyrer (28 L. J. (Q. B.) 62), 
 
 136 
 Dayton R. Co. v. Miami Co. Infirmary 
 
 (82 Ohio St. 566), 302 
 Dealey«. MuUer (149 Mass. 432; B. o. 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 763), 150 
 Dean e. American Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
 
 (4 Allen, 102; b. o. 1 Big. Life & 
 
 Ace. Ins. Cas. 198), 612 
 Dean a. Sullivan Ac. R. Co. (22 N. H. 
 
 316), 297 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 xh 
 
 Deane «. Penn. B. Co. (129 Fenn. St. 
 
 614; s. o. 18 Atl. Rep. 718), 188, 
 
 148 
 DeArmand «). New Orleans <&c. K. Co. 
 
 (23 La. Ann. 264), 287 
 DeBenedetti v. Mauchin (1 Hilt. 213), 
 
 6B2 
 Debevoise v. New York Ac. R. Co. (98 
 
 N. T. 311; s. 0. 50 Am. Rep. 683), 
 
 668, 566 
 Decamp v. Sioux City (74 Iowa, 392; 
 
 B. 0. 87 N. W. Rep. 971), 39 
 Decker v. Gammon (44 Me. 322), 341 
 Deeds p. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (69 lewa, 
 
 164), 32, 42 
 Deeds v. Chicago <fec. Ry. Co. (74 Iowa, 
 
 164; B. o. 37 N. W. Rep. 124), 472 
 Deegan v. Chapel (6 N. T. Supl. 166), 
 
 838 
 DeggD. Midland Ry. Co. (1 Hnrl. <fe N. 
 
 773; 8. o. 3 Jur. (N. S.) 395; 26 L. 
 
 J. (Exoh.) 171), 487, 485 
 DeGraff®. New York <to. R. Co. (76 N. 
 
 Y. 126), 463 
 DeEay v. Chicago <fce. Ry. Co. (41 Minn. 
 
 178; s. 0. 43 N. W. Rep. 182), 210 
 Dalamatyr v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (24 
 
 Wis. 578), 190 
 Delaney®. Errickson(ll Neb. 633), 288 
 Delaware <tc. R. Co. v. Salmon (39 N. J. 
 
 Law, 299; s. o. 23 Am. Rep. 214), 
 
 812, 316, S18 
 Delaware <fec. R. Co. v. Trautwein (62 N. 
 
 J. Law, 169; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 178), 
 
 206, 231 
 Delaware, L. <& W. B. Co. v. Cadow (120 
 
 Penn. St. 669; s.c. 14 Atl. Rep. 460), 
 
 48 
 Delgar v. City of St. Paul (4 McCrary, 
 
 634), 663 
 Demarest v. Little (47 N. J. L. 28), 86 
 Denman v. St. Fanl &e. R. Co. (26 Minn. 
 
 367), 267, 506 
 Dennick v. Raih-oad Co. (108 U. S. 11), 
 
 86 
 Denver Ac. Ry. Co. «. Henderson (10 
 
 Colo. 11; 8. 0. 13 Pao. Rep. 910), 
 
 288, 292 
 Denver Ac. R. Co. ■». Pickard (8 Colo. 
 
 168), 188. 
 Derby's Adm'r v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (4 S. W. Rep. 803), 84 
 Deslottes v. Baltimore Ac. Tel. Co. (40 
 
 La. Ann. 188; s. o. 3 So. Rep. 866), 
 
 616 
 Detroit v. Blakeby (21 Mich. 84; b. o. 4 
 
 Am. Rep. 460), 323 
 Detroit Ac. R. Co. v. Van Steinberg (17 
 
 Mich. 99), 638, 663, 666, 869, 871 
 Deville®. Southern Pacific R. Co. (80 
 
 Cal. 383), 840 
 Devitt V. Pacific Ac. R. Co. (80 Mo. 802), 
 
 448, 481, 471, 480 
 
 Devlin v. Smith (89 N. Y. 470; a. o. 45 
 
 Am. Rep. 811), 484, 436, 468 
 Devlin v. Wabash Ac. Ry. Co. (87 Mo, 
 
 648), 467 
 Dewire ®. Bailey (131 Mass. 169; s. o 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 219), 61, 327, 328, 
 
 866, 368 
 Dewire v. Boston Ac. R. Co, (148 Mass 
 
 348; 8. 0. 19 N. E. Rep. 828), 191 
 Dexter v. McCrary (64 Conn. 171), 663 
 Deyo V. Stewart (4 Denio, 101), 298 
 Diamond State Iron Co. v. Giles (11 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 189), 446 
 Dibble «. Brown (12 6a. 217; s. o. 8« 
 
 Am. Dec. 660), 226 
 Dice V. Willamette Trans. Ac. Co. {i 
 
 Or. 60; 8. 0. 34 Am. Rep. 876), 206 
 
 218 
 Dickey v. Maine Tel. Co. (46 Me. 483), 
 
 637 
 Dickinson v. London Ac. Ry, Co. (1 
 
 Harr. A R. 899), 281 
 Dickinson ®. Port Huron Ac. Ry. Co 
 
 (68 Mich, 43), 191 
 Dickinson -o. Winchester (4 Cush. 121) 
 
 624 
 Dickson v. HoUister (123 Penn. St. 421 
 
 8. 0. 28 W. N. C. 128; 16 Atl. Rep 
 
 484), 338 
 Dickson v. McCoy (39 N. Y. 400), 841 
 Dickson v. Parker (8 How. 219; s. o. 3'. 
 
 Am. Dec. 78), 288 
 Dickson v. Railroad Co. (80 Ga. 212), 9< 
 Diebold v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (60 N. J 
 
 Law, 478; s. o. 14 Atl. Rep. 876) 
 
 233 
 Diethick v. Balto. Ac. R. Co. (68 Md 
 
 847), 880 
 Dietrich v. Northampton (138 Mass. 14 
 
 62 Am. Rep. 242), 84 
 Digby v. Kenton Iron Works (8 Bush 
 
 166), 106, 128, 407, 409 
 Dillon «. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (3 Dill 
 
 . 319), 446, 479, 480, 642 
 Dimes v. Petley (15 Q. B. 276), 68 
 Dimick s. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (80 HI 
 
 838), 249, 260 
 Dimmey v. Wheeling Ac. R. Co. 27 W 
 
 Va. 82), 66 
 Dimmock v. North Staffordshire Ry 
 
 Co. (4 Post. A Fin. 1068), 811 
 Dinwoodie v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (7( 
 
 Wis. 160; 8. p. 38 N. W. Rep. 296) 
 
 301 
 District of Columbia v. McElIigott (11' 
 
 0. S. 621), 482 
 Ditchett «. Spuyten Duyvil Ac. R. Co 
 
 (5 Hun, 168; a. o. 67 N. Y. 428) 
 
 267, 602 
 Dixon V. New York Ac. B. Co. (4 N. Y 
 
 Sopl. 296), 800 
 Dixon «. Rankin (lAm. R. Cas 667) 
 
 416 
 
xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Dixon 1). Rankin (14 Gt. of Ses. Cas. 
 
 420), 49T, 498 
 Dobbin v. Richmond <fco. R. Co. (81 N. 
 
 C. 446; 8. c. 31 Am. Rep. 612), 
 
 416, 418 
 Dobbins «. Brown (119 N. T. 188; b. c. 
 
 23 N. E. Rep. 637), 448 
 Doctor and Student, The (Dial, 2, c. 
 
 38), 219 
 D»eher v. Fitohburg (22 Wis. 6V6), 
 
 325 
 Doggett V. Richmond <fcc. Ry. Co. (78 
 
 N. C. 305), 24, 29, 31, 79, 313, 317, 
 
 638 
 Denahoe v. Wabash <fec. Ry. Co. (83 
 
 Mo. 660; B. c. 63 Am. Rep. 694), 
 
 69 
 Donaldson v. Milwaukee <fcc. R. Co. (21 
 
 Minn. 293), 261, 263, 274 
 Donkey Case (10 Mee. & "W. 546), 63 
 Donnelly D. Boston Ac. R. Co. (161 
 
 Mass. 210; s. o. 24 N. E. Rep. 38), 
 
 242, 263 
 Donohne v. St. Louis <fcc. Ry. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 367; 8. o. 2 S. W. Rep. 424; 
 
 3 S. W. Rep. 848), 244, 247, 265 
 Donovan v. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. 147; 8. o. 1 S. W. Rep. 232), 
 
 82, 296, 310 
 Dooley «. City of Meriden (44 Conn. 
 
 117; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 433), 828 
 
 365 
 Dooley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. App. 381), 295 
 Doran v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (73 Iowa, 
 
 116; 8. o. 34 N. W. Rep. 619), 
 
 306 
 Dorman v. Broadway R. Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Sup]. 769), 150 
 Dorsey v. Phillips <fec. Co. (42 Wis. 
 
 583), 444, 479, 481 
 Doss v. Missouri Ac. R. Co. (69 Mo. 27; 
 
 I. 0. 21 Am. Rep. 371), 189, 283 
 Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co. (66 B. 
 
 y. 1), 370 
 Dougherty v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (86 
 
 ■111. 467), 190 
 Dougherty «. Missouri <tc. R. Co. (81 
 
 Mo. 325; 8. 0. 51 Am. Rep. 239), 
 
 185,371 
 Dougherty v. Missouri R. Co. (97 Mo. 
 
 647; ,11 S. W. Rep. 261), 32, 42 
 Dougherty v. Missouri B. Co. (8 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 900), 186 
 Doughty B. Penobscot Log Driving Co. 
 
 (76 Me. 143), 412 
 Douglas ®. Texas Ac. Ry. Co. (63 Tex. 
 
 664), 457 
 Dow «. Kansas Pacific B. Co. (8 Kan. 
 
 642), 427 
 Dowd V. Chieopee (116 Mass. 93), 266, 
 
 324 
 
 Dowell V. General Steam Navigation 
 
 Co. (5E1. &B1. 196), 16,43 
 Dowell V. Guthrie (99 Mo. 663; s. o. 12 
 
 So. W. Rep. 900), 630 
 Dowliuff V. Allen (74 Mo. 13; s. c. 41 
 
 Am. Bep. 298), 415, 418, 431, 444, 
 
 460 
 Dowling V. Allen (88 Mo. 293), 176 
 Downey D. Chesapeake Ac. By. Co. (28 
 
 , W. Va. 732), 390 
 Down^ V. Hendris (46 Mich. 498; s. o. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 347), 384, 386 
 Downs V. N. Y. Ac. B. Co. (47 N. Y. 
 
 83), 181 
 Doyle V. Baird (6 N. Y. Supl. 617), 478 
 Doyle V. Lynn Ac. R. Co. (118 Mass. 
 
 196; s. o. 19 Am. Rep. 431), 230, 
 
 347 
 Drake ®. Kiley (93 Penn. St. 492), 29, 
 
 41 
 Drake v. Lowell (13 Mete. 292), 361 
 Drake v. Mount (33 N. J. Law, 441), 
 
 368 
 Drake ®. Phila. Ac. R. Co. (61 Penn. St 
 
 240), 282, 293 
 Drake v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (21 Pae. 
 
 Bep. 66C), 466 
 Drane ». Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 588), 473 
 Dreher «. Fitchbnrg (22 Wis. 676), 28 
 Dressier v. Davis (7 Wis. 627), 644 
 Drew «. Sixth Ave. B. Co. (26 N. Y. 
 
 49), 181 
 Drew V. Town of Sutton (66 Vt. 686; 
 
 8. 0. 45 Am. Bep. 644), 324, 827, 
 
 838, 334 
 Droyer «. New York Ac. Ry. Co. (48 N. 
 
 J. Law, 373; 8.0. 7 Atl. Bep. 417), 
 
 370 
 Duane v. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (72 Wis. 
 
 523; 8. o. 40 N. W. Bep. 394), 262, 
 
 253 
 Dublin Ac. By. Co. «. Slattery (3 L. E. 
 
 App, Cas. 1166), 48, 287, 239, 248, 
 
 276, 276, 886, 568 
 Dudley n. Bolles (24 Wend. 466), 368 
 Dudley v. Camden Ferry C«. (46 N. J. 
 
 Law, 368), 17, 29, 81, 66», 670 
 Dudley v. Camden A Phila. Ferry Co. 
 
 (83 N. J. Eq. 25; s. o. 38 Am. Bep. 
 
 601), 870 
 Duff V. Alleghany B. Co. (91 Penn. St. 
 
 458; s. o. 86 Am. Bep. 676), 218, 
 
 38*7 
 Duffs. G. N. B. Co. (4 L. B. Ir. 178), 
 
 225 
 Duffees v. Judd (48 Iowa, 256), 296 
 Duffy V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (32 Wis. 
 
 269), 238 
 Duffy V. Missouri Pao. By Co. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 380), 67 
 Duffy o. New York Ac. B. Co. (2 Hilt. 
 
 496), 802, 307 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 xlvii 
 
 Oufour e. Gent. Pao. R. Go. (67 Cal. 
 
 819), 570 
 Png^na v. Watson (16 Ark. 118; s. o. 
 
 60 Am. Dec. 56% 139, 147 
 Dukes V. Eastern Distilling Co. (4 !«. Y. 
 
 Supl. 662; s. o. 61 Hun, 605), 471 
 Dunbier v. Day (12 Neb. 596; s. o. 41 
 
 Am. Rep. 772), 524 
 Duncan v. St. Louis &c. Rj. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 68), 804 
 Dunkman v. Wabash &c. Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 232; s. o. 4 S. W. Rep. 670), 
 
 262 
 Dunlap V. Northeastern R. Go, (130 U. 
 
 S. 649), 484 
 Dunmead v. Am. itc. Ga. (4 McOrary, 
 
 244), 642 
 Dunn V. Grand Truiri: R. Co. (68 Me. 
 
 187; s. o. 4 Am. Rep. 267; 10 Am. 
 
 Law Reg. (N. S.) 616), 194, 198 
 Dunn v. Seaboard &c. R. Co. (78 Va. 
 
 645; s. o. 49 Am. Rep. 388), 199, 
 
 208 
 Dunnigan v. ChicE^o itc. R. Co. (18 
 
 . Wis. 28), 810 
 Dunning v. Bond (88 Fed. Rep. 818), 
 
 236 
 Durant «. Palmer (39 N. J. Law, 544), 
 
 323, 327, 830, 336, 643 
 Durbia v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Go, (17 
 
 Or. 6; a. o. 17 Pac. Rep. 6), 264 
 Durgin v. Munson (9 Allen, 396), S9B 
 Durham v. Wilmington &c, .R. Co. (82 
 
 N. C. 862), 291 
 Durkin v. Troy (61 Barb. 437), 328, 866, 
 
 357 
 Dnsh o. Fitzhugh (2 Lea, 307), 23, 47, 
 
 98 122 123 
 Dutton ®. Weare (17 N. H. 34; s. o. 43 
 
 Am. Dec. 690), 230, 822, 324 
 Dutzi V. Geisel (23 Mo. App. 676), 66, 
 
 412 
 Dwinnell v. Abbott (74 Wis. 514; s. o. 
 
 43 N. W. Rep. 496), 247, 254 
 Dyer v. Erie Ry. Co. (71 N. T. 228), 68, 
 
 140, 142 
 Dyer u. Taloott (16 111. 300), 29, 638 
 Dynen v. Leach (26 L. J. (Excb.) 221), 
 
 85, 451, 481 
 Dyson v. New York <kc. R. Co. (67 
 
 Conn. 9; 8. o. 17 Atl. Rep. 137), 
 
 249 
 
 E 
 
 Eades v. Clark (66 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 132), 666 
 Eames v. Boston Ae. R. Co. (14 Allen, 
 
 161), 297, 302, 806 
 Eames v. Salem <&c, R, Co. (98 Mass. 
 
 660), 281, 284, 806, 809 
 Earing «. Lansing (7 Wend. 185), 366 
 
 Earlville v. Garter (2 Bradw, 84; 6 
 
 Bradw. 421), 114 
 Eary v. Lake Shore &e. Ry. Co. (66 
 
 Mich, 349; s. o. 33 N. W. Rep, 
 
 813), 49, 270 
 Eaaon «, Sabine <feo. By, Co. (65 Tex. 
 
 577; s, 0. 57 Am, Rep, 606), 440 
 East &c. R. C». V. Eigbtower (92 111. 
 
 189), 444, 463 , 
 East Line <&c. Ry. C0. «. Rushing (69 
 
 Tex. 806; s. o. 6 S. W. Rep, 884), 
 
 209 
 East Line &o. R, Co. «, Scott (68 Tex, 
 
 694; s, o, 5 S, W, Rep. 601), 460 
 East Line Ac, Ry, Co. v. Smith (65 Tex. 
 
 167), 85 
 East Saginaw &c. City R. Co. v. Baker 
 
 (27 Mich. 503), 158, 159, 181, 387 
 East Tennessee &a. R. Go. v. Bayliss 
 
 (77 Ala. 429; s, o. 64 Am, Rep, 69; 
 
 76 Ala, 466), 292 
 East Tennessee <&c, R, Co. i). Collins 
 
 (86 Tenn, 227; s, o, 1 S, W Rep, 
 
 883), 418, 426 
 East Tennessee &o. R. Co, v. Duffield 
 
 (12 La, 68; s. o, 47 Am, Rep, 819), 
 
 481, 444, 461, 463, 663, 483 
 East Tennessee <fec, Ry, Co, ■», Hull (88 
 
 Tenn. 33; s, o. 12 S. W. Rep. 419), 
 
 122 
 East Tennessee Ac. R. Co, v. Johnston 
 
 (75 Ala. 596; s, 0, 61 Am, Rep, 
 
 489), 223 
 East Tennessee <&c. R. Go. v. King (81 
 
 Ala, 177), 263 
 East Tennessee (fee, R, Co, v. Lockhart 
 
 (79 Ala. 315), 41 
 East Tennessee &c. R, Co, v. Maloy 
 
 (77 Ga. 237), 394 
 East Tennessee &o. R. Co. v. Pratt (86 
 
 Tenn, 9; s, o, 31 S, W, Rep, 618), 
 
 277 
 East Tennessee (be, R, Go, v. Rush (16 
 
 La. (Tenn.) 146); 391, 426 
 East Tennessee <&c. R. Go, v. St. John 
 
 (6 Sneed, 624), 266, 277 
 East Tennessee dec. R. Go, v. Stewart 
 
 (13 Lea (Tenn.) 432), 395 
 East Tennessee &c. R. Co. ». Watson 
 
 (7 So. Rep. 818), 292 
 East Tennessee &c. R, Go, v. Winters 
 
 (86 Tenn, 240; s, o. 1 S, W, Rep, 
 
 790), 277 
 Eastern R. Go. v. Relief Fire Ins. Go. 
 
 (98 Mass, 423), 312 
 Eastman v. Meredith (36 N, H. 284), 
 
 322 
 Eastman v. Sanborn (3 Allen, 696), 66, 
 
 191 
 Easton v. Houston &o. Ry, Co. (32 
 
 Fed, Rep. 893), 430 
 Eaton ». Boston &Q. R, Co, (11 Allen, 
 
 600), 131, 143 
 
xlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Eaton V. Delaware Ac. E. Co. {61 N. T. 
 
 382; 8. 0. 16 Am. Bep. 613), 197, 
 
 216, 308 
 Eaton V. Erie By. Co. (SI N. Y. 544), 67, 
 
 236, 253 
 Eaten v. Oregon By. & Nav. Co. (19 Or. 
 
 371; 8. o. 24 Pac. Bep. 413J, 24, 82, 
 
 209 300 31*7 
 Ebright'w. Mineral B. <fe M. Co. (15 Atl. 
 
 pep. 70S), 52 
 Eckerd v. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (70 
 
 Iowa, 353; ». o. SO N. W. Bep. 
 
 616), 209, 211 
 Eckert v. Long Island B. Co. (57 Barb. 
 
 556; 43 N. T. 60.S; s. c. 3 Am. 
 
 Bep. 721), 57, 69 
 Eddy v. Aurora Iron Min. Co. (81 
 
 Mich. 648; s. o. 48 N. W. Bep. 17), 
 
 477 
 Eddy s. Kinney (60 Vt. 554; s. o. 15 
 
 Atl. Bep. 198), 82 
 Edgerton v. New York ifec. B. Co. (39 
 
 N. Y. 227), 194, 198 
 Edwards v. Hannibal &c. B. Ce. (66 
 
 Mo. 671), 299 
 Edwards «. New York Ac. B. Co. (98 
 
 N. Y. 246), 475 
 Egan D. Berkehire Apartment Ass'n 
 
 (10 N. Y. Snpl. 116), 73 
 Egyptian Monarch, The (36 Fed. Bep. 
 
 77S), 431 
 Ebret v. Kansas City Ac. B. Co. (20 
 
 Mo. App. 261), 801 
 Ehrgottu. The Mayor Ac. (96 N. Y. 
 
 264; s. 0. 48 Am. Rep. 622), 40 
 Eicheler v. St. Paul Furniture Co. (40 
 
 Minn. 263; s. o. 41 N. W. Bep. 
 
 976), 449, 478 
 Eighme v. Eome Ac. R. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 600), 817 
 Eiseoberg «. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (33 
 
 Mo. App. 85), 71 
 Eldridge d. Atlas S. S. Co. (55 Hun, 
 
 309; s. 0. 8 N. Y. Supl. 438), 481 
 Elkins V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (115 Mass. 
 
 190), 240, 510 
 Elkins V. Boston Ac. B. Co. (23 N. H. 
 
 275), 197, 216 
 Elliot i>. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (6 Dak. 
 
 623; 8. 0. 41 N. W. Bep. 768), 390 
 Elliott V. Pray (10 Allen, 384), 62 
 Elliott V. St. Louis Ac. B. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 272), 86 
 Ellis V. Houston (4 N. Y. Supl. 782), 
 
 890 
 Ellis V. London Ac. By. Co. (2 Hurl. 
 
 A N. 424; s. 0. 26 L. J. (Ezch.) 
 
 849; 3 Jut. (N. S.) 1008), 281, 
 
 289 302 
 Ellis V. New York Ac. B. Co. (95 N.Y. 
 
 546), 443 
 Ellis «;. Pacific Ac. B. Co. (48 Mo. 231), 
 
 806 
 
 Elwood V. N. Y. Ac. B. Co. (4 Hun, 
 
 808), 263, 278 
 Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea (89 Ala. 
 
 621; B. o. 7 So. Bep. 666), 50, 140, 
 
 149 
 Emerson v. Peteler (36 Minn. 481), 178 
 Emmerson v. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. App. 621), 306 
 Empire Trans. Co. v. Wamsutta Oil Co. 
 
 (68 Penn. St. 14; s. o. 8 Am. Bep. 
 
 618), 223. 
 Emporia v. Sehmidling (38 Kan. 486), 49 
 Engle T. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (77 Iowa, 
 
 661; 8. o. 42 N. W. Bep. 512), 314 
 Engle v. Smith (46 N. W. Bep. 21), 73 
 English V. Chicago Ac. By. Ce. (24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 906), 478 . 
 Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City Ac. B. 
 
 Co. (69 N. Y. 196 ; s. o. 26 Am. 
 
 Bep. 171), 380, 381 
 Equitable Life Ass. Soc. -v. Patterson 
 
 (41 Ga. 338; s. o. 6 Am. Bep. 636; 
 
 3 Big. Life A Ace. Ins. Cas. 634), 
 
 613 
 Erd V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (41 Wis. 66), 
 
 313,^ 316 
 Erickson «. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 600; s. o. 43 N. TV. Rep. 
 
 382), 446 
 Erie v. Magill (101 Penn. St. 616; s. c. 
 
 47 Am. Rep. 739), 17, 49, 326, 328, 
 
 867 
 Erie V. Schwingle (22 Penn. St. 384), 
 
 834, 643 
 Erie City Ac. Passenger By. Co. v. 
 
 Schuster (118 Penn. St. 412; 8. a. 
 
 67 Am. Bep. 471), 160, 166 
 Erie By. Co. v. Wilcox (84 HI. 289; 
 
 8. c. 26 Am. Bep. 451), 224 
 Ernst V. Hudson Ac. B. Co. (36 N. Y. 
 
 9 ; 8. 0. 39 N. T. 61; 32 Barb. 159; 
 
 19 How. Pr. 205; 84 How. Pr. 97; 
 
 82 How. Pr. 262), 62, 94,237, 242, 
 
 244, 276, 662, 666, 667, 660, 671 
 Estelle e. Lake Crystal (27 Minn. 243), 
 
 51, 328 
 Estes V. Atlantic Ac. R. Co. (68 Me. 
 
 308), 285 
 Estes V. St. Paul Ac. B. Co. (7 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 863), 228 
 Eureka Ce. v. Bass (81 Ala. 200), 891 
 Evans «. Adams Bzp. Co. (122 Ind. 
 
 362; 8. o. 28 N. E. 1039), 832 
 Evans v. American Iron A IMbe Co. (42 
 
 Fed. Bep. 619), 460, 461 
 Evans v. Atlantic Ac. B. Ce. (62 Mo. 
 
 49), 427 
 Evans v. City of Utica (69 N. Y. 166; 
 
 s. 0. 25 Am. Bep. 166), 51, 326, 
 
 328, 830, 358 
 Evans «. Bndy (34 Ark. 386), S70 
 Erans Brick Co. v. St. Louis Ac By 
 
 Co. (17 Mo. App. 624), 67 
 
TABLE OP 0ASE9. 
 [Tbe retercncea are to pages.] 
 
 dix 
 
 ETftnaich e. Gulf Ac. R. Co. {67 Tex. 
 
 126; s. o. 44 Am. Bep. 686), IIS, 
 
 266, 210 
 ETansyille <to. R. Co. ti. Barbee (M 
 
 Ind. 169), 307 
 Evansville Ac. R. Co. ®. Baiim (26 Ind. 
 
 1i\ 421 
 Eyansville &e. R. Co. v. Carvener (113 
 
 Ind. 51 ; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 738), 
 
 50, 250 
 Eransrille Ac. R. Co. v. Crist (116 Ind. 
 
 446 ; a. o. 19 N. E. Rep. 446), 50 
 EyansTiOe Ac. R. Co. v. Dexter (24 
 
 Ind. 411), 539 ^ 
 Evansville Ac. R. Co. v. Duncan (28 
 
 Ind. 442), 207, 213 
 Evansville Ac. R. ,Co. ». Griffin (100 
 
 Ind. 221 ; s. o. 60 Am. Rep. 783), 
 
 H 
 Evansville Ac. R. Co. v. Hiatt (17 Ind. 
 
 102), 61, 639 
 Evansville Ac. R. Co. v. Lowdermilk 
 
 (16 Ind. 120), 89, 90 
 Evansville Ac. K. Co. ». Wolf (69 Ind. 
 
 89), 150, 154, 260 
 Everhart v. Teire Haute Ac. R. Co. (78 
 
 Ind. 292; s. o. 41 Am. Rep. 667), 
 
 76, 438 
 Everson i>. Rollinson (8 AU. Rep. 194), 
 
 467 
 Ewald «. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (70 Wis. 
 
 420 ; s. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 12), 430 
 Ewan v. LippenCott (47 N. J. Law, 192; 
 
 8. c. 54 Am. Rep. 148), 436 
 Ewen V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (38 Wis. 
 
 613), 169 
 Swing V. Chicago' Ac. R. Co. (72 111. 
 
 26), 284, 286 
 Jikp. Stell (4 Hughes, 167), 266 
 
 Faber v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (29 Minn. 
 
 466), 264 
 Fagondes «. Central Fac. R. Co. (79 
 
 Cal. 97; 8. c. 26 Fed. Rep. 437), 428 
 Fairbank v. Haentzsche (73 HI. 236), 
 
 108, 410, 460, 479 
 Fairbanks v. Kerr (70 Penn. St. 86; s. c. 
 
 10 Am. Rep. 664), 37, 863, 630 
 FairchOd ». New Orleans Ac. R. Co. (62 
 
 Miss. 177), 288 
 Fales «. Dearborn (1 Pick. 344), 368 
 Fallon V. Central Park (64 N. Y. 13), 
 
 182 
 Fallon V. O'Brien (12 R. I. 518; s. o. 34 
 
 Am. Rep. 718), 341 
 Faren v. Sellers (39 La. Ann. 1011; s. c. 
 
 3 So. Bep. 308), 89S 
 Farish v. Reigle (11 Gratt. 697; 8. o. 62 
 
 Am. Dec. 666), 185, 638 
 
 E 
 
 Farley v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (66 Iowa, 
 
 887), 471, 479 
 Farlow v. Kelly (108 U. S. 288), 201, 
 
 202 
 Farmer v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Iowa, 18G), 891 
 Farmer, The, v. McQraw (27 Ala. 109), 
 
 45 
 Farnum v. Concord (2 N. H. 892), 322 
 Farrar v. Greene (82 Me. 574), 843 
 Farve «. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (42 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 441), 263, 264 
 
 Farwell v. Boston A Worcester R. Co. 
 
 (4 Mete. 49; s. o. 38 Am. Dec. 
 
 889), 402, 404, 411, 428, 426, 487 
 Fassett v. Roxbnry (66 Vt. 662), 27, 
 
 327, 663, 669 
 Faulkner v. Aurora (86 Ind. 180; s. o. 
 
 44 Am.Rep. 1), 358 
 Faulkner v. Erie Ry. Co. (49 Barb. 324), 
 
 456 
 Favor v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (114 Mass. 
 
 850; s. o. 19 Am. Rep. 864), 342 
 Fawcett v. Pittsburg Ac. Ry. Co. (24 W. 
 
 Va. 766), 39 
 Fawcett «. York Ac. Ry. Co. (16 Q. B. 
 
 610; s. o. 16 Jur. 173; 20 L. J. (Q. 
 
 B.) 222), 289, 296 
 
 Fay V. Minneapolis Ac R. Co. (36 Minn. 
 
 231), 472, 484 
 Fay «. Parker (53 N. H. 342; s. o. 16 
 
 Am. Rep. 270), 98 
 Federal St. R. Co. «f. Gibson (96 Penn. 
 
 St. 88), 386, 543 
 Feital v. Middlesex R. Co. (109 Mass. 
 
 398; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 720), 230, 
 
 347 
 Felder v. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (2 Mc- 
 
 Mull, 403), 267, 505 
 Feltham v. England (2 L. R. (Q. B.)83; 
 
 a. c. 4 Fest. A Fin. 460; 7 Best A 
 
 S. 676), 412 
 Fent V. Toledo Ac. R. Co. (69 111. 849; 
 
 s. o. 14 Am. Rep. 18), 29, 40, 318 
 Fenton v. Second Ave. R. Co. (56 Hun, 
 
 99; B. c. 9 N. Y. Supl. 162), 353, 
 
 376 
 Fenton's Case (1 Lewin, 179), 632 
 Ferguson v. Columbus Ac. Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Ga. 637), 270 
 Ferguson «. Columbus Ac. Ry. Co. (77 
 
 Ga. 102), 166, 269 
 Fernandes v. Sacramento City Ry. Co. 
 
 (52 Cal. 46), 29, 662, 666 
 Fernow v. Dubuque Ac. R. Co. (22 
 
 Iowa, 628), 298 
 Fero V. Bufialo Ac. R. Co. (22 N. Y. 
 
 209), 813,315 
 Ferris v. St Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (30 Mo. 
 
 App. 122), 296 
 Fenuenbrach'ti. South Pac. R. Co. (59 
 
 Cal. 269), 263 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The referencea are to pages.] 
 
 Field «. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (4 McCrary, 
 
 673}, 236, 242 
 Fifield V. Korthem &c. B. Co. (42 X. E. 
 
 226), 444 
 Filbert v. Delaware &c. Canal Co. (121 
 
 N. Y. 207; s. o. 23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1104), 458 
 Filer v. Boston <bc. B, Co. (149 Mass. 
 
 204; s. 0. 31 N. E. Bep. 311), 197 
 FUer V. New York Ac. B. Co. (49 N. Y. 
 
 47; s. o. 10 Am. Bep. 327),. 66, 96, 
 
 190 
 Finegan v. London & N. W. By. Co. (53 
 
 J. P. 663), 366, 670 
 Finegan v. Moore (46 N. J. Law, 602), 
 
 331 
 Fintlestein v. N. Y. <fee. B. Co. (41 
 
 Hm, 34), 176 
 Finlayson v. Chicago <&c. R. Co. (1 Dill. 
 
 679), 262, 274 
 Finn «. VaUejo'St. Wharf Co. (7 Cal. 
 
 266), 643 
 Fisher®. Cook (125 111. 280; s. c. 17 N. 
 
 E. Bep. 763), 73, 107 
 Fisher «. Farmers' Ac. Co. (21 Wis. 74), 
 
 284, 286 
 Fisher v. Golloday (38 Mo. App. 631), 
 
 84 
 Fisher «. Monongahela Ac. B. Co. (131 
 
 Penn. St. 292; s. o. 18 Atl. Bep. 
 
 1016), 263 
 Fisk B. Central Pac. E. Co. (72 Cal. 38; 
 
 s. 0. IS Pac. Bep. 144), 469 
 Fish V. Wait (104 Mass. 71), 62 
 Fitch V. Buffalo Ac. B. Co. (13 Hnn, 
 
 668), 308 
 Fitch®. Missouri Ac. B. Co. (46 Mo. 
 
 322), 313, 316 , 
 Fitch 9. Pacific Ac. E. Co. (45 Mo. 
 
 326), 317 
 Fitts a. Cream City Ac. B. Co. (59 Wis. 
 
 323), 563 
 Fitzgerald v. City of Berlin (64 Wis. 
 
 207), 323, 333 
 Fitzgerald a. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (18 
 
 Mo. App. 391), 299 
 Fitzgerald v. St. Paul Ac. B. Co. (29 
 
 Minn. 336; s. c. 43 Am. Bep. 212), 
 
 164, 168, 283, 298 
 Fitzgerald «. Weaton (62 Wis. 364) 
 
 604 
 Fitzpatrick v. Fitchburg B. Co. (128 
 
 Mass. 13), 265, 271, 274 
 Fitzpatrick ». Garrison Ac. Perry Co. 
 . (1 N. Y. Supl. 794), 71, 76 
 Fitzpatrick d. Great Western By. Co. 
 
 (12 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 646), 213 
 Flaherty «. Minneapolis Ac.' By. Co. 
 
 (39 Minn. 328; ». c. 40 N. W. Bep. 
 
 leo), 141 
 Flanders e. Meath (27 Ga. 368). 119 
 Flannagan e. Bailroad Co. (46 Wis. 98; 
 
 s. o. 50 Am. Bep. 4''2), 444 
 
 Flecks. Union By. Co. (134 Mass. 481), 
 
 382, 383 ' 
 
 Fleming a. Brooklyn City Ac. B. Co. 
 
 (1 Abb. New Cas, 433), 387 
 Fleming®. Cityof LockhaTen (15 W. N. 
 
 C. 216), 328 
 Flemming ®.' Western Ac. E. Co. (49 
 
 Cal. 253), 44 
 Fletcher ®. Atlantit! Ac. E. Co. (64 Mo. 
 
 484), 239 
 Fletcher v. Pitcfabats B. Co. (149 Mass. 
 
 127; 8. 0. 21 N. E. Eep. 362), 261 
 Fleytas v. Fonchartrain B. Co. (18 La. 
 
 339; 8. o. 36 Am. Dec. 668), 16 
 Flike V. Boston Ac. B. Co. (53 N. Y. 
 
 560; 8. c. 13 Am. Bep. 646), 394, 
 
 416, 419, 443, 456, 458 
 Flinn v. Phila. Ac. E. Co. (1 Hons. 
 
 (Del.) 472), 224, 226 
 Flint e. Nerwich Ac. Trans Co. (34 
 
 Conn. 664; s. c. 6 Blatchf. 168), 
 
 374 
 Flint Ac. B. Co. ®. Lull (28 Mich. 610), 
 
 285, 309 
 Flint Ac. B. Co. «. Weir (37 Mich. 
 
 Ill; s. c. 26 Am. Bep. 499), 186 
 Flori p. St. Louis (3 Mo. App. 231), 141, 
 
 568 
 Florida v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (37 
 
 Mo. App. 598), 227 
 Florida By. A Nav. Co. ®. Webster (26 
 
 Fia. 394; s. c. 5 So. Eep. 714), 197 
 Flower v. Adams (2 Taunt. 314), 30, 
 
 343 
 Flower v. Penn. Ac. B. Co. (69 Penn. 
 
 St. 210; B. c. 8 Am. Bep. 261), 216, 
 
 438 
 Flawergate, The (31 Fed. Eep. 762), 
 
 452 
 Flynn «. Kansas Ac. B. Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 195; s. 0. 47 Am. Eep. 99), 444, 
 
 479, 483 
 Flynn ®. San Francisco Ac. B. Co. (40 
 
 CaL 14; b. c. 6 Am. Eep. 696), 29, 
 
 313, 316 
 Flynn v. Wabash .Ac. By. Co. (18 lU. 
 
 App. 286), 446 
 Fogg v, InhabitontB of Nahant (98 Mass. 
 
 676), 324 
 Foley ®. Chicago Ac. E. C6. (48 Mich. 
 
 622; s. o. 42 Am. Rep. 481), 437, 
 
 444, 460, 480 
 Pollman ®. Mankota (35 Minn. 622), 140 
 Fones v. Phillips (39 Ark. 17; a. o. 43 
 
 Am. Eep. 264), 469, 463, 480 
 Popper V. Wheatland (69 Wis. 628), 
 
 367 
 Ford V. Fitchbnrg E. Co. (110 Mass. 
 
 240; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 698), 394, 
 ^ 443. 449, 461, 483. 484:485 
 Ford a. Lake Share Ac. B. Co. (2 N Y. 
 
 Supl. 1), 448 
 
TABLE OP 0A8ES. 
 [The references are to pages.l 
 
 li 
 
 Ford V. London Ac. Ry. Co. (2 Fost. A 
 
 Fin. "780), 186 
 Ford e. Lyons (41 Hun, 612), 446 
 Ford V. Umatilla Goa9ty (16 Or. 813; 
 
 8. 0. 16 Pao. Rep. 33), 267, 601, 
 
 602 
 Fordham «. London Ac. Ry. Oo. (L. R. 
 
 4 C. P. 619), 206 
 Fordyce v. Merrill (49 Ark. ill; s. o. 5 
 
 S. "W. Rep. 329), 207 
 Forshay e. Glen Hay en (25 Wis. 288; a. 
 
 o. 3 Am. Rep. 73), 342 
 Forsyth v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (103 Mass. 
 
 610), 207 
 Fort v. Union Pac. R. Co. (17 WaU. 366; 
 
 s. c. 2 Dill. 269), 460, 462 
 Fort Wayne Ac. R. Co. v. Gildersleeve 
 
 (33 Mich. 134), 444, 461, 473, 480 
 Fort Wayne Ac. R. Co. v. Herbold (99 
 
 Ind. 91), 300 
 Fort Wayne Ac. R. Co. o. Woodward 
 
 112 Ind. 118; s. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 
 
 260), 290 
 FosB V. Chicago Ac. Ry. C». (33 Minn. 
 
 392), 233 
 Foster v. Chicago' Ac. R. Co. (84 HI. 
 
 166), 108, 410 
 Foster o. Dixfield (18 Me. 380), 687 
 Foster v. Minnesota Ac. R. Co. (14 
 
 Minn. 360), 403, 412,430 
 Foster v. St. Loois Ac. R. Co. (90 Mo. 
 
 116; 8. o. 2 S. W. Rep. 138), 301 
 Fowler v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 169), 426 
 Fox B. Borkey (126 Pa. St. 164; s. c. 24 
 
 W. N. O. 49; 17 Atl. Rep. 604), 39 
 Fox V. Glastenbury (29 Conn. 204), 22, 
 
 28, 344, 667 
 Fox e. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 679), 246 
 Fox D. Sackett (10 Allen, 535), 62 
 Fox V. Sandford (4 Sneed. 36), 403 
 Foy v. Brighton Ac. R. Co. (18 C. B. 
 
 (N. S.) 226), 53 
 Fracker v. St. Paul Ac. Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 64), 430, 466 
 Fraler v. Sears Union Water Co. (la 
 
 Cal. 666), 53 
 Francis v. New York Steam Co. (114 N. 
 
 Y. 880; s. 0. 21 N. E. Rep. 988), 
 
 386 
 Francis v. St. Louis Transfer Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 7), 213 
 Franklin «. Forty-second St. R. Co. (8 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 229), 375 
 Franklin v. Winona Ac. R. Co. (37 
 
 Minn. 409; s. o. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 
 898), 395. 446 
 Frazer v. S. A N. Ala. B. Co. (81 Ala. 
 
 186; 8. 0. 1 So. Rep. 86), 48, 62, 
 
 264, 278 
 Frazier e. Nortinus (88 Iowa, 82), 287 
 
 Frazier v. Penn. Ac. R. Co. (38 Penn. 
 
 St. 104), 465, 476, 481 
 Freeh v. Phila. Ac. R. Co. (39 Md. 
 
 574), 264, 543 
 Frederick «. Taylor (14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 
 
 77), 30 
 Freeman «. Duluth Ac. Ry. Co. (74 
 
 Mich. 86; a. o. 41 N. W. Rep. 872), 
 
 238 
 Freer d. Cameron (4 Rich. (Law) 228; 
 
 s. o. 56 Am. Dec. 668), 16, 78 
 French v. Brunswick (21 Me. 29; 8. c. 
 
 38 Am. Dec. 260), 324, 826, 537 
 French v. CresBweU(13 Or. 418), 287 
 French v. Taunton Ac. R. Co. (116 Mass. 
 
 587). 279 
 Frick V. Potter (17 111. 406), 56, 191 
 Frick V. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 642; s. 0. 76 Mo. 696), 160, 166, 
 
 265 
 Fritz V. First Division Ac. R. Co. (22 
 
 Minn. 404), 290 
 Fritz V. Milwaukee Ac. R. Co. (84 Iowa, 
 
 837), 286, 289, 309 
 Frost D. Eastern R. Co. (64 N. H. 220; 
 
 8. o. 9 Atl. Rep. 790), 70 
 Frost V. Grand Trunk Ac. Ry. Co. (10 
 
 Allen, 387), 70, 210 
 Frost V. Hull (4 N. H. 168), 231 
 Frost e. Plumb (40 Conn. Ill; s. o. 16 
 
 Am. Rep. 18), 849 
 Frost V. Waltham (12 Allen, 85), 50. 
 
 328, 611 
 Fuller V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (134 Mass. 
 
 491). 560 
 Fuller V. Coats (18 Ohio St. 343), 628 
 FuUer v. Jewett (80 IT. Y, 46; 8. o. 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 676), 416, 443, 449 
 FuUiam v. Muscatine (70 Iowa, 436), 
 
 49, 50 
 Fulton Iron Works v. Eimball (62 Mich. 
 
 146), 327 
 Funston v. Iowa (61 Iowa, 462), 236 
 Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (13 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1044), 185 
 
 G. 
 
 GafiEhey v. Brown (150 Mass. 479 ; s. «. 
 
 23 N. E. Rep. 233), 73 
 Gahagan v. Boston Ac. R. Co, (1 Allen, 
 
 |Q*T\ 278 
 
 Gale V. Lisbon (62 N. H. 174), 68 
 Galena Ac. R. Co. v. Crawford (26 111. 
 
 629), 289, 299 ' 
 
 Galena Ac. K. Co. v. Dill (22 111. 264), 67 
 Galena Ac. R. Co. v. Fay (16 111. 668; 
 
 8. 0. 63 Am. Dec. 323), 105, 184. 
 
 191, 192. 638 
 Galena Ac. R. Co. v. Jacobs (20 HI. 
 
 478), 28. 76, 89. 102, 103, 106, 106, 
 
 109, 110, 268, 274, 638 
 
lii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The referenccB are to pages.] 
 
 Galena <&c. B. Co. v. Loomis (13 111. 
 
 848), 244 
 Galena Ac. R. Co. v. Tarwood (lY 111. 
 
 500; 8. 0. 18 111. 468), 66, 68, 192 
 Gallagher v. Coney I. <fcc. B. Co. (4 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 870), 62 
 Galligan u, Metacomet Mfg. Co. (143 
 
 Mass. 827). 62, 70 
 Gallin v. London &c. By. Co. (L. B. 10 
 
 ' Q. B. 212), 186 
 Galloway f v. Western &e. B. Co. (87 
 
 Ga. 812), 18, 496 
 Galpln V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. <19 Wis. 
 
 604), 282 
 Gait V. Adams Express Cd.' (MacArth. 
 
 A Mack. 124; s. a. 48 Am. Bep. 
 
 742), 223 
 Galveston o. Posnainsky (62 Tex. 118; 
 
 8. 0. 60 Am. Bep. 817), 39 
 Galveston City R. Co. v. Hewitt (67 
 
 Tex. 473), 376 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. Chambers (73 
 
 Tex. 296; 8. o. 11 S. W. Bep. 279), 
 
 266 . 
 Galveston Ac. B. Go. v. Crispi (73 
 
 Tex. 236; s. o. 11 S. W. Bep. 187), 
 
 213 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co, v. Drew (69 Tex. 
 
 10 ; 8. 0. 46 Am. Bep. 261), 391, 
 
 482 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. ETansich (61 
 
 Tex. 3), 168 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. Faber (77 
 
 Tex. 183; s. o. 8 S. W. Bep. 64; 
 
 63 Tex. 344), 428, 484 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. w. Graves (69 Tex. 
 
 330), 236 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v, Eutac (72 Tex. 
 
 643; 8. €. 11 S. W. Bep. 127), 149, 
 
 242 
 Galveston Ac. E. Co. v. Kutae (76 Tex. 
 
 473 ; B. o. 13 S. W. Rep. 327), 149 
 Galveston Ac. B. Go. v. Moore (69 Tex. 
 
 64; s. 0.46 Am. Bep. 268), 166, 
 
 176 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. Byon (70 Tex. 
 
 66 ; 8. 0. 7 S. W. Bep. 687), 260 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. Smith (69 Tex. 
 
 406), 188 . 
 Galveston Ac. B. Co. v. Smith (76 Tex. 
 
 611; 8, 0. 13 S. W. Bep. 662), 457 
 Galveston Oil Co. v. Morton (70 Tex. 
 
 400; 8. 0. 7 S. W. Bep. 766), 74 
 Galveston B. Co. v. Bracken (89 Tex. 
 
 71), 236 
 Galvin v. New York (112 N. Y. 223 ; 
 
 s. 0. 19 N. E. Bep. 678), 389 
 Gamble ir. Hine (2 N. Y. Supl. 778), 
 
 468 
 Ganiion «. Union Ferry Co. (29 Hnn, 
 
 681), 369 
 Gardner v. Grace (1 Fost. A Fin. 369). 
 
 160 
 
 Gardner v. Michigan Central R. Co; (88 
 
 Mich. 684), 484 
 Gardner v. N. H. Ac. Co. (61 Conn. 
 
 143 ; s. 0. 5 Am. Bep. 12), 186, 
 
 216 
 Gardner o. Smith (7 Mich. 410), 298 
 Garfield Manuf. Co. v. McLean (18 111, 
 
 App. 447). 114 
 Garland v. Towne (65 N. H. 65 ; s c. 20 
 
 Am. Bep. 164), 361 
 Garrahyn v. Kansas City Ac. B. Co. (28 
 
 Fed. Bep. 262; s. o. 26 Fed. Bep. 
 
 258), 410, 420 
 Gartland v. Toledo Ac. B. Co. (67 111. 
 
 498), 469 I 
 Gates V. Burlington Ac. B. Co. (39 
 
 Iowa, 45), 284, 484 
 Gates V. Madison Ac. Ins. Co. (8 N. Y. 
 
 469; 8. o. 86 Am. Dec. 360), 612 
 Gautret v. Egerton (L. B. 2 C. P. 271), 
 
 76 
 Gavin ». Chicago (97 111. 66; s. o. 37 
 
 Ail. Bpp. 99), 160, 168, 182, 270 
 Gay V. Winter (34 Cal. 153), 86, 643 
 Gaynor v. Old Colony B. Co. (100 Mass. 
 
 208), 206, 261, 272, 274, 276, 688 
 Gebhard ii. Detroit Ac. B. Co. (79 Mich. 
 
 886; 8. 0. 44 N. W. Rep. 1045), 
 
 251 
 Gee V. Metropolitan Ac. By. Go. (L. R. 
 . 8 Q. B. 161; 8. o. 5 Eng. Rep. 169), 
 
 63, 200, 204 
 Geiselman v. Scott (25 Ohio St. 86), 
 
 621 
 Geitz V. Milwaukee City Ry. Co. (72 
 
 Wis. 307 ; 8. c. 39 N. W. Bep. 866), 
 
 382 
 George v. Gobey (128 Mass. 289; s. o. 
 
 36 Am. Rep. 376), 485 
 George v. Haverhill (110 Mass. 511), 
 
 323 
 George v. Smith (Ired. (N. C.) Law, 
 
 278), 40 
 George H. Hammond A Co. v. Schweit- 
 zer (112 Ind. 246; 8. o. 13 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 869), 447 
 Georgia Ac. Banking Co. v. Rhodes (56 
 
 Ga. 645), 58 
 Georgia Ac. B. Co. v. Anderson (38 Ga. 
 
 110), 288, 804, 306 
 Georgia Ac. R. Co. v. Harris (88 Ga. 
 
 393 ; 8. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 786), 292 
 Georgia Ac. B. Co. v. Kenney (68 Ga. 
 
 486), 461, 463, 481 
 Georgia Ac. R. Co. «. McCurdy (45 Ga. 
 
 288; s. o. 12 Am. Rep. 877), 190 
 Georgia Ac. R. Co. ». Meely (60 Ga. 
 
 840), 79, 121, 288, 292 
 Georgia Ac. E. Co. v. Rhodes (86 Ga. 
 
 648), 403 
 Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hughes (87 
 
 Ala. 610; s. o. 6 So. Rep. 418), 
 
 141 ■ 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 liii 
 
 Georgia R. Ac. Co. v. Friddell (V9 Ga. 
 
 489; B. 0. 1 8. E. Eep. 214), 4S1 
 Georgia R. <fe B. Co. v. ITelms (83 Ga. 
 
 70; s. o. 9 S. E. Rep. 1049), 461 
 Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Wall (80 Ga. 
 
 202: B. o. 7 S. E. Rep. 639), 292 
 Gerald v. City of Boston (108 Mass. 636), 
 
 326, 332, 359, 663 
 Gern antown Pass. R. Co. v. Brophy 
 
 (106 Penn. St. 38), 199, 387 
 Germantown Pass. R. Co. v. Walling 
 
 (97 Penn. St. 66; s, o. 37 Am. Rep. 
 
 711 ; 2 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 20), 
 
 382, 383, 663, 666 
 Gessley v. Missonri Pac. Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Mo. App. 413), 62 , 
 
 Gereke v. Grand Rapids <&c. R. Co. (67 
 
 Mich. 689), 266 
 Glieens v. Golden (9fl Ind. 427), 639 
 Ghormly v. Dinsmore (51 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 196), 222 
 Gibbons v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 231), 390 
 Gibbons v. Williams (136 Mass. 333), 
 
 363 
 Gibbons D. Wisconsin Valley R. Co. (6i> 
 
 Wis. 161), 316 
 Gibson v. Erie Ry. Co. (63 N. T. 449; 
 
 s. o. 20 Am. Rep. 862), 470, 431 
 Gibson v. Pacific &c. R. Co. (46 Mo. 
 
 163; B. o. 2 Am. Rep. 497), 403, 
 
 445, 475 
 Giger ®. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (80 Iowa, 
 
 492; s. o. 46 N. W, Rep. 906), 304 
 Gilbert v. Boston (139 Mass. 313), 358 
 Gilbert B. Guild (144 Mass. 601; s. c. 12 
 
 N. E. Rep. 368), 463 
 Gilbert v. Kagle (118 Mass. 278), 73 
 Gilbert v. Eoxbury (100 Mass. 185), 
 
 356 
 Gilei V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (55 N. H. 
 
 552), 281, 306, 309 
 Giles V. Diamond S. I. Co. (8 Atl. Rep. 
 
 368), 466, 478 
 Giles V. Railroad (56 N. H. 555), 166 
 Gill V. Libby (36 Barb. 70), 526 
 Gillam v. Sioux City Ac. R. Co. (26 
 
 Minn. 268), 298 
 Gillen water v. Madison Ac. B. Co. (6 
 
 Ind. 339; 8. 0. 61 Am. Dec. 101), 
 
 429, 430, 466 
 Gillespie v. City (64 N. T. 468), 237 
 Gillespie v. MoGowen (100 Penn. St. 
 
 144; 8. p. 45 Am. Rep.' 365), 161, 
 
 179, 276, 336, 363 
 Gilligan v. New York Ac. R. Co. (1 E. 
 
 D. Smith, 453), 168 
 Gillis ». Pennsylvania R. Co. (59 Penn. 
 
 St. 129), 233, 282 
 Gillispie d. Newburgh (64 N. T. 468), 
 
 652 
 GiUshamion v. Stony Brook R. Co. (10 
 
 Cnsh. 228), 198, 413, 428, 430 
 
 Oilman v Eastern R. Co. (10 Allen, 
 
 233; s. 0. 13 Allen, 438), 394, 449 
 Gilman v. European Ac. R. Co. (60 Me 
 
 236), 38 
 Ginna v. Second Ave. E. Co. (67 N. Y 
 
 696), 382, 383 
 Given o. Western Union Tel. Co. (24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 119), 516 
 Glandon v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa, 457), 296 
 Glascock V. Central Pac. R. Co. (73 Cal. 
 
 137; 8. o. 14 Pac. Rep. 618), 238 
 Glassey v. Hestonville Ac. E. Co. (67 
 
 Penn. St. 172; s. o. 7 P. F. Smith, 
 
 172), 165, 167, 170, 180, 366 
 Gleason v. Bremen (50 Me. 222), 537 
 Gleason ti. Excelsior Manfg. Co. (7 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 188), 464 
 Glenn v. Columbia Ac. E. Co. (21 S. C. 
 
 466), 32 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ey. Co. (67 
 
 Me. 202; s. o. 2 Am. Rep. 39), 
 
 372 
 Goddard, Petitioner Ac. (16. Pick. 604; 
 
 s. 0. 28 Am. Dec. 269), 369 
 Godefroy v. Jay (7 Bing. 413), 520 
 Goins V. Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. (37 Mo. 
 
 App. 221), 448, 469 > 
 Goldstein v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Wis. 404), 48 
 Goldeworthy ». Town of Linden (75 
 
 Wis. 24; s. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 656), 
 
 326 
 Gonzales v. N. Y. Ac. R. Co. (60 How 
 
 Pr. 126), 263 
 GoodfeUow v. Mayor Ac. (100 N. Y. 
 
 16), 322 
 Goodhue v. Dix (2 Gray, 181), 367 
 Gsodlng V: Atcheson Ac. R. Go. (32 
 
 Kan. 180), 310 
 Goodlett V. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (122 
 
 U. S. 391), 391, 666 
 Goodman v. Gay (15 Penn. St. 188), 
 
 341 
 Goodman V. Richmond Ac. R. Co. (81 
 
 Va. 676), 447 
 Goodrich v. Ilew York Ac. R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 398; s. o. 22 N. E. Rep. 397), 
 
 472 
 Gordon v. Erie Ey. Co. (46 N. Y. 660), 
 
 35, 239, 242 
 Gordon v. ~Eeynolds Card Manfg. Co. 
 
 (47 Hun, 278), 481, 469 
 Gorman v. Lowell (117 Mass. 65), 231, 
 
 348 
 Gorman v. Morrison (12 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 
 
 1073 (Sc.) ), 434 
 Gorman v. Pacific Ac. E. Co. (26 Mo. 
 
 441, 442), 287, 291, 292, 294,' 295 
 Germley v. Ohio Ac. R. Co. (72 Ind, 
 
 31), 426, 539 
 Gormly v. Vulcan Iron Works (61 Mo. 
 
 492), 403, 418 
 
liv 
 
 TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The referenceB are to pages.] 
 
 Goshen, City of, v. England (119 Ind. 
 
 368; s. 0. 21 N. E. Bep. 911), 43 
 GosBport, Town of, v. Evans (112 Ind. 
 
 133; 8.0. 13 N. E. Rep. 266), 61 
 Gothard v. Alabama Ac. R. Co. {61 Ala. 
 114), 22, 29, 31, 56, 19, 91, 106, 
 236, 262, 271 
 Gottleib V. New York Ac. R. Co. (100 N. 
 
 Y. 462), i13 
 Gould V. Bangor Ac. R. Co. (82 Me. 
 
 122; s. 0. 19 Atl. Rep. 84), 297 
 Gould V. City of Topeka (32 Ka». 486; 
 
 8. 0. 49 Am. Rep. 496), 323 
 
 Gould V. McKenna (86 Penn. St. 297; 
 
 8.0. 27 Am. Rep. 795), 43, 83, 97, 99 
 
 Goulin V. Canada Southern Bridge Co. 
 
 64 Mich. 190; s. 0. 31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 44), 472 
 
 Gonrdinew. Cook (1 Nott. A M. 19), 
 
 369 
 Goutret v. Egerton (L. B. 2 C. P. 371; 
 8. 0. 36 L. J. (C. P.) 191; 15 Week. 
 Rep. 638; 16 L.'T. (N, S.) 17), 70 
 Government St. B. Co. v. Hanlon (63 
 
 Ala. 70, 81), 91, 166, 378, 379 
 Graham v. Pacific R. Co. (66 Mo. 636), 
 
 224 
 Graham v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Bep. 696), 370 
 Graham v. Toronto Ac. By. Co. (23 Up. 
 
 Can. (C. P.) 614), 198 
 Grahlman v. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (78 
 Iowa, 664; 8. , c. 43 N. W. Bep. 
 629), 304 
 Gramlich «. Wurst (86 Penn. St. 74; s.o. 
 
 27 Am. Bep. 684), 61, 70 
 Gramlick v. Bmlroad Co. (9 Phila. 78), 
 
 260 
 Grand Bapids Ac. B. Co. v. Monroe (47 
 
 Mich. 152), 298 
 Grandtewer Manfg. Co. v. Hawkins (72 
 
 111. 386), 108 
 Granger ■». Boston Ac. B. Co. (146 
 Mass. 276; 8. o. 16 N. E. Bep. 619), 
 248 
 Grant v. Baker (12 Or. 829), 643 
 Grant v. Hannibal Ac. Ry. Co. (26 Mo. 
 
 App. 227), 293 
 Grant v. Mosly (29 Ala. 302), 29 
 Graves ». Thomas (96 Ind. 861; a. e. 48 
 
 Am. Rep. 727), 70, 274 
 Graville v. Manhattan R. Co. (106 N. 
 
 Y. 626), 192 
 • Gray v. Brassey (16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 
 136), 498 
 Gray v. Gaslight Co, (114 Mass. 149; 
 
 s. 0. 18 Am. Rep. 844), 838 
 Gray v. McDonald (28 Mo. App. 477), 
 
 84 
 Gray v. Phila. Ac. R. Co. (23 Blatchf. 
 
 268), 131 
 Gray «. Phila. Ac. R. Co. (24 Fed. Rep. 
 168), 141 
 
 Gray v. Scott (66 Penn. St. 346), 42, 
 
 47, 174, 246 
 Gray v. Second Avenue R. Co. (66 N. 
 
 Y. 661), 340 
 Grayville v. Whitaker (88 111. 439), 108 
 Great Northern Ac. By. Co. v. Morville 
 
 (21L. J. (N. S.)Q. B. 319), 219 
 Great Western B. Co. v. Haworth (89 
 
 111. 346, 847), 107, 314, 815 
 Green v. Danby (12 Vt. 888), 384 
 Green ». Erie By. Co. (11 Hun, 833), 36, 
 
 261, 268 
 Green v. Pennsylvania B. Co. (36 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 66), 206 , 
 Green Ac. St. Ry. Co. v. Bresner (97 
 
 Penn. St. 103), 632 
 Greene v. Minneapolis Ac. B. Co. (31 
 Minn. 248; s. c. 47 Am. Bep. 788), 
 444,483 
 Greenland v. Chaplin (6 Exch. 243), 40, 
 
 83, 96, 186 
 Greenleaf v. Dubuque Ac. B. Co. (33 
 
 Iowa, 62), 484 
 Greenleaf v. 111. Ac. R. Co. (29 Iowa, 
 14; 8. 0. 4 Am. Rep. 181), 416, 
 443, 451, 452, 478, 475, 638, 667, 
 668 
 Greenwood v. Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. 
 (124 Penn. St. 672; 8. o. 28 W. H. 
 C. 425; 17 Atl. Rep. 188), 242 
 Gregg V. Gregg (55 Penn. St. 227), 282, 
 
 295 
 Gregg ®. Wyman (4 Cush. 322), 847 
 Gregory v. Adams (14 Gray, 242), 339 
 Gregory i>- Cleveland Ac. B. Co. (112 
 Ind. 885; 8. o. 14 N. E. Rep. 228), 
 260 
 Grethen v. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (22 
 
 Fed. Bep. 609), 263 
 Giidlay v. City of Bloomington (88 111. 
 
 864; s. 0. 30 Am. Rep. 566), 869 
 Griffifth V. Cave (22 Cal. 236), 369 
 Griffifths V. Gidlow (3 Hurl. A N. 648), 
 
 49 
 Griffifths V. London Docks Ac. Co. (60 
 L. T. (N. S.) 766; s. o. 12 Q. B. 
 Div. 493), 400, 443 
 Griffin ®. Auburn (58 N. H. 121), 828, 
 
 368 
 Griffin V. Boston Ac. B. Co. (148 Mass. 
 143; 8. 0. 19 N. E. Rep. 166), 448 
 Griffin v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 638), 286 
 Griffin ©.Willow (43 Wis. 609), 28 
 Griffith V. Gidlow (8 Hurl. A N. 648), 
 
 481 
 Griffith V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (98 
 Mo. 168; S.O. 11 S. W. Bep. 869), 
 94 
 Griffiths V. The Earl of Dudley (L. B. 9 
 
 Q. B. Div. 867), 498, 494 
 Griffiths V. Woltram (22 Minn. 188), 
 486 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Iv 
 
 Griggs V. Fleckenstein (14 Minn. 81), 
 
 68, 91, 148, 341 
 Grill V. General Iron Screw Collier Co. 
 (h. E. 1 C. P. 600), 21, 88, 182, 
 162 
 Grimes ». Pennsylvania Co. (36 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 72), 207 
 Grinnell v. Chicago <&c. By. Co. {13 
 
 Iowa, 93; s. o. 34 N. W. Rep. 768), 
 
 292 
 Grippen v. New York Central R. Co. 
 
 (40 N. Y. 34), 22, 32, 36, 48, 239, 
 
 246, 249, 263 
 Griswold v. N. Y. <fec. B. Co. (53 Conn. 
 
 371), 225 
 Grizzle v. Frost (8 Fost. <St Fin. 622), 
 
 460, 462, 481 
 Grogan v. Adams Es^. Co. (114 Penn. 
 
 St. 528; 8. o. 7 Atl. 134), 228 
 Groll V. Prospect Park Ac. B. Co. (4 N. 
 
 Y. Snpl. 80), 207 
 Grove v. Burlington dec. By. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa, 163; s. o. 39 N. W. Rep. 
 
 248), 289 
 Grover v. Gray (9 lU. 329), 109 
 Grows V. Maine Ac. B. Co. (67 Me. 100, 
 
 412), 237, 246, 279 
 Grnbe v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 830; 8. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 736), 
 
 480 
 Gmndy v. Louisville Ac. B. Co. (2 S. 
 
 W. Bep. 899), 292 
 Gubasko v. New York (12 Daly (N. Y.) 
 
 183), 328 
 Guenther v. St. Lonis Ac. By. Co. (95 
 
 Mo. 286; s. o. 8 S. W. Rep. 371), 
 
 242 
 Guess V. South Carolina By. Co. (30 S. 
 
 C. 168; 8. o. 9 S. E. Bep. 18), 
 
 801 
 Guggenheim v. Lake Shore Ac. By. Co. 
 
 (6& Mich. 160; s. o. 83 N. W. Bep. 
 
 161), 239, 248 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Anderson (76 Tex. 
 
 244; 8. 0. 13 S. W. Bep. 196), 240 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Blohn (73 Tex. 637; 
 
 s. o. 11 S. W. Bep. 867), 425 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Breitling (12 S. W. 
 
 Bep. 1121), 67 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Campbell (76 Tex. 
 
 174; s. 0. 13S. W. Bep. 19), 197 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Donnelly (70 Tex. 
 
 371; 8.0. 8 So. Rep. 62), 482 
 Gnlf Ac. Ry. C». *. Dorsey (66 Tex. 
 
 148), 487 
 Gnlf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Fox (6 S. W. Rep. 
 
 669), 51 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Gaascamp (69 Tex. 
 
 645; 8. o. 7 S. W. 227), 60 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Greenlee (70 Tex. 
 
 663, 8. 0. 8 S. W. Rep. 129). 246 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Hedges (76 Tex. 
 
 90; 8. 0. 13 8. W. Rep. 64), 234 
 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Keith (74 Tex. 287; 
 
 s. o. 11 S. W. Rep. 1117), 299 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Levy (19 Am. Law 
 
 Rev. 480), 88 
 Gulf Ac. Bv. Co. V. McGown (65 Tax. 
 
 640), 186, 224 
 Gnlf Ac. By. Co. v. McLean (74 Tex. 
 
 646), 315 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. McWhirter (77 Tex. 
 356 ; s. 0. 14 S. W. Bep. 26), 131, 
 270 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Pettis (69 Tex. 689; 
 s. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 93), 395, 396, 
 449 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Rediker (67 Tex. 
 
 190; s. 0. 2 S. W. Rep. 513), 446 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Ryan (69 Tex. 666 ; 
 
 s. 0. 7 S. W. Rep. 88), 484 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Silliphant (70 Tex. 
 623; s. c. 8 S. W. Rap. 673), 447, 
 449 
 Gulf Ac. E^. Co. V. Styron (66 Tex. 421), 
 
 269 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Frawick (68 Tex. 
 
 314; s. 0. 4 S. W. Bep. 567), 223 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. Walker (70 Tex. 
 126; g. G. 7 S. "W. Rep. 831), 250, 
 377 
 Gulf Ac. Ry. Co. v. Williams (70 Tex. 
 
 159; 8. c. 8 S. W. Bep. 78), 208 
 Gulf Ac. By. Co. v. York (74 Tex. 364; 
 
 s. c. 12 S. W. Bep. 68), 264, 279 
 Gumb V. Twenty Third St. By. Co. (9 
 N. Y. Supl. 316; 58 N. Y. Super. 
 Ct. 466), 26, 62, 876 
 Gums V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (52 Wis. 
 
 672), 57 
 Gunn v. Cambridge R. Co. (144 Mass. 
 
 430), 84 
 Gunn V. Wisconsin Ac. Ry. Co. (70 Wis. 
 
 203; s. 0. 35 N. W. Bep. ,281), 240 
 Gonn ■». Second Ave. R. Co, (67 N. Y. 
 
 596), 80 
 Gunter «. Graniteville Manfg. Co. (18 S. 
 C. 262; s. c. 44;Am. Bep. 673), 415, 
 418, 419, 468 
 Gunter v. Wicker (85 N. C. 310), 29, 31, 
 
 79 
 
 Guta v. Lake Shore Ac. By. Co. (81 Mich. 
 
 291; s. o. 45 N. W. Bep. 821), 236 
 
 Guthrie «. Louisville Ac. B. Co. (11 Lea. 
 
 372; 8.-0. 47 Am. Bep. 286), 431, 
 
 444, 463, 476 
 
 Guthrie v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (81 Me. 
 
 572; B. 0. 18 Atl. Rep. 296), 473 
 Gwynn v. Duffield (61 Iowa, 64; s. o. 47 
 Am. Bep. 802; 66 Iowa, 708), 70, 
 621 
 
 Haas V. Buffalo Ac. B. Co. (40 Hun, 146), 
 
 478 
 
Ivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Haas v. Grand Rapids &c. B. Co. (47 
 
 Mich. 401), 286 
 Haas «. Phila. Steamship C9. (88 Fenn. 
 St. 269; s. 0. 32 Am. Bep. 462), 436 
 Haase«). Oregon By. ANav. Co. (19 Or. 
 
 354; s. 0. 24 Pac. Bep. 238), 207 • 
 Haekett «. Manfg. Co. (101 Mass. 101), 
 
 443 
 Hackford ®. New York &e. B. Co. (53 N. 
 T. 6B4; 8. 0. 43 How. Pr. 222; 6 
 Lans. 381), 246, 255, 551, 553 
 Hadencamp v. Second Ave. B. Co. (1 
 Sweeney (N. T. Super. Ct.) 490), 
 382 
 Hadley?). Baxendale (9Exch. 341; s. o. 
 
 23 L. J. (Exch.) 179), 41 
 Hadley v. Toylor (L. B. 1 C. P. 68), SS5 
 Hadley v. Upshaw (27 Tex. 547), 626 
 Haff v. Minneapolis &c. B. Co. (4 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 622), 29 
 Hagon V. Philadelphia, &c. By. Co. (15 
 
 Phila. 278), 380 
 Haigh v. London <Sec. By. Co. (1 Post. & 
 Fin. 646; s. o. 8 Week. Bep. 6), 
 284, 302 
 Haines «. Illinois &c. B. Co. (41 Iowa, 
 
 227), 239 
 Haire s. Beese (7 Phila. 138), 521 
 Hale ®. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. (16 
 Conn. 689; s. c. 39 Am. Dec. 398), 
 221 
 Hale ■». Smith (78 N. T. 480), 552, 556 
 Haley v. Chicago i&c. B. Co. (21 Iowa, 
 
 26), 80 
 Haley ®. N. T. Ac. B. Co. (7 Hun, 84), 279 
 Haley 9. Bailroad Co. (7 Baxt. 242), 86 
 Haley v. Western Transit Co. (76 Wis. 
 
 344; a. p. 45 N. W. Rep. 16), 446 
 Hall V. Corcoran (107 Mass. 251; s. c. 9 
 Am. Bep. 30), 68, 230, 347, 348, 349 
 Hall V. Galreston <fec. By. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 18), 467 
 Hall V. Johnson (3 Hurl. & C. 689), 431 
 HaU -0. Lowell (10 Cush. 260), 359 
 HaU V. N. E. E. Co. (10 Q. B. 437), 225 
 Hall v. Ripley (119 Mass. 136), 63 
 Hall «. Union Pacific By. Co. (4 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 267), 471, 668 
 Halladay v. Marsh (3 Wend. 142; s. o. 
 
 20 Am. Dec. 678), 293 
 Hallikan «. Hannibal &c. B. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 113), 472 
 Hallocku Hnghes(42Iewa, 616), 287 
 Halloran v- Now Tork Ac. B. Co. (2 E. 
 
 D. Smith, 267), 282, 290, 809, 308 
 Hallower <o. Henley (6 Cal. 209), 448 
 HalTcrson v. Minneapslis &c. By. Co. 
 
 (32 Minn. 88), 298 
 Hamilton v. Boston (14 Allen, 475), 229, 
 
 230, 347, 348 
 Hamilton v. Delaware Ac. R. Co. (60 N. 
 J. Law, 263; s. o. 13 Atl. Rep. 29), 
 236 
 
 Hamilton v. Godin^ (65 Me. 428), 63 
 Hamilton «. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (89 
 
 Kan. 56; s. o. 18 Pac. Rep. 57), 86 
 Hamilton v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 85), 809 
 Hamilton v. Texas Ac. Ry. Co. (64 Tex. 
 
 251; s. o. 63 Am. Bep. 766), 206 
 Hammersmith Ac. By. Co. v. Brand (L. 
 
 B. 4 H. L. 171), 311 
 Hammond v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (43 
 
 Iowa, 168), 296, 303 
 Hammond v. Mnkwa (40 Wis. 35), 28, 
 
 42 
 Hammond v. North Eastern R. Co. (6 S. 
 
 C. 180; B. o. 24 Am. Rep. 467), 186, 
 216 
 
 Han v. Minneapolis Ac. R. Co. (4 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 622), 56 
 Hance v. Cayuga Ac. R. Co. (26 N. Y. 
 
 428), 79, 802, 806, 308 
 Hanks D. Boston Ac. R. Co. (147 Mass. 
 496; 8. o. 18 N. E. Rep. 218), 242, 
 264 
 Hanna v. Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. (119 
 Ind. 816; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 903), 
 802 
 Hannem i>. Pence (40 Minn. 127; s. o. 41 
 
 N. W. Rep. 667), 361 
 Hannibal Ac. B. Co. u Kanaley (39 Kan. 
 
 l;s. c. 17 Pac. Rep. 324), 461 
 Hannibal Ac. B. Co. v. Kennsy (41 Mo. 
 
 271), 287 
 Hannibal Ac. B. Co. c. Martin (111 111. 
 
 219), 193 
 Hanover Ac. B. Co. v. Coyle (54 Penn. 
 
 St. 396), 287, 240, 610 
 Hanrathy v. Northern Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Md. 280), 403, 481 
 Hansford's Adm'r v. Payne (11 'Bush, 
 
 380), 88, 407 
 Hanson 9. Mansfield Ry. Ac. Co. (38 
 La. Ann. Ill; s. c. 68 Am. Rep. 
 162), 198 
 Hard «. Vermont Ac. B. Co. (32 Vt. 
 
 472), 403, 468 
 Hardcastle ■». The South Yorkshire Ry. 
 Co. (4 Hurl. & N. 67; 8. o. 28 L. J. 
 (Exch.) 139), 70 
 Harder v. Bome Ac. B. Co. (2 N. T. 
 
 Snpl. 70), 238 
 Hardy v. Carolina Ac R. Co. (76 N. C. 
 
 5), 408, 444 
 Hare v. Mclntire (82 Me. 240; B. o. 19 
 
 AtL Bep. 468), 486 
 Hargis v. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (76 Tex. 
 
 19; s. 0. 12 S. W. Rep. 963), 266 
 Hargreaves v. Deacon (26 Mich. 1), 19, 
 
 69, 74 
 Haring n. New York Ac. R. Co. (IS 
 
 Barb. 9), 239, 246 
 Harkins «. Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. (16 
 Phila. (Pa.) 286), 84 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Harkins v. Standard Sugar Refinery 
 
 (122 Mass. 400), 394, 436 
 Harlan v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (64 Mo. ' 
 
 480: s. c. 65 Mo. 22), 67, 240, 242, 
 
 262 
 Harlow «. Humiston (6 Cowen, 189), 
 
 336, 552, 563 
 Harmon v. Columbia <fec. R. Co. (10 S. 
 
 £. Rep. 8T7), 290 
 Harney v. Rose (26 Ark. 3; s. c. 'I Am. 
 
 Rep. 595), 369 
 Harpell v. Curtis (1 E. D. Smith, IS), 
 
 62, 368 
 Harper «. Erie Rv. Co. (32 N. J. Law, 
 
 88), 188 
 Harper t. Indianapolis &,e. R. Co. (47 
 
 Mo. 667), 458 , 
 Harper «. Milwaukee (SO Wis. 365), 339 
 Harriman v. Pittsbui^h <fec. R. Co. (46 
 
 Ohio St. 11; s. c. 12 N. E. Rep. 
 
 451), 30, 76, 241, 274 
 Harrington v. New York <fee. R. Co. (4 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 640), 454 
 Harris e. Central R. Co. (78 Ga. 525; 
 
 s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 355), 210 
 Harris r. Hannibal <fec. R. Co. (89 Mo. 
 
 233; s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 325), 199 
 Harris s. Minneapolis <tc. R. Co. (37 
 
 Minn. 47; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 12), 
 
 236 
 Harris v. Mobbs (3 L. R. Exch. Div. 268), 
 
 342 
 Harris v. Township of Clinton (54 Mich. 
 
 447; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 325), 328, 
 
 3.30 
 Harris B. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (4MeCrary, 
 
 464), 9, 29, 663 
 Harrison U.Berkley (1 Strobh. (S. C.^ 
 
 549; 8. c. 47 Am. Dec. 578), 37, 
 
 40 
 Harrison v. Brown (5 Wis. 27), 282 
 Harrison v. Central &c. K. Co. (31 N. 
 
 J. Law, 293), 444 
 Harrison v. Great Northern By. Co. (3 
 
 Hurl. <fe C. 231), 13^ 
 Hart V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (56 Iowa, 
 
 166; s. o. 41 Am. Rep. 93), 244 
 Hart v. Devereux (41 Ohio St. 565), 62 
 Hart ■». Hudson River Bridge Co. 80 N. 
 
 Y. 622; s. c. 84 N. Y. 66), 552, 556 
 Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (112 U. S. 
 
 331), 224 
 Hart V. Western &o. R. Co. (13 Mete. 
 
 99; s. c. 46 Am. Dec. 719), 312, 318 
 Hartfield v. Roper (21 Wend. 615; s. c. 
 
 34 Am. Dec. 273), 89, 90, 91, 152, 
 
 153, 155, 531 
 Hartford v. Brady (114 Mass. 468), 293 
 Hartford, City of, v. Talcott (48 Conn. 
 
 525; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 189), 359 
 Hartman v. Muscatine (70 Iowa, 611), 
 . 49 
 
 F 
 
 Hartwig V. Bay State S. & L. Co. (118 
 
 N. Y. 664; s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 24; 
 
 43 Hun, 425), 391, 447 
 Harty v. Central <fec. R. Co. (42 N. Y. 
 
 468), 264, 273, 274 
 Harvey v. Dunlop (Lalor's Sup. Hill & 
 
 Denio, 193), 47 
 Harvey®. Eastern <fec. R. Co. (116 Mass. 
 
 269), 188 
 Harvey v. New York <fec. R. Co. (10 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 645: s. c. 19 Hun, 556), 30, 
 
 455 
 Hassenger v. Mich. &c. R. Co. (48 
 
 Mich. 206; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 470), 
 
 27, 28, 262, 271, 344 
 Hatfield v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (61 Iowa, 
 
 434), 670 
 Hathaway v. East Tennessee &a. R. Co. 
 
 (29 Fed. Rep. 489), 568, 571 
 Hathaway ■». Michigan &a. B. Co. (51 
 
 Mich. 263; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 569), 
 
 444, 478, 476 
 Hathaway ». Toledo <fec. R. Co. (46 Md. 
 
 26), 164, 263, 669 
 Hatt ®. May (144 Mass. 186; s. c. 10 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 807), 480 
 Haugb ®. Chicago <fec. Ry. Co. (73 Iowa, 
 
 66 ; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 116), 450, 472 
 Haugbey t>. Hart (62 Iowa, 96; s.c. 49 
 
 Am. Rep. 188), 335 
 Havens v. Erie Ry. Co. (41 N. Y.-296), 
 
 242 
 Haverly «. State Line &c. R. Co. (135 
 
 Penn. St. 60; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 
 
 1018; 26 W. N. C. 321), 41, 82 
 Hawes v. Burlington <fce. By. Co. (64 
 
 Iowa, 316), 638 
 Hawes v. Fox Lake (33 Wis. 438), 343 
 Hawk V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (11 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 459), 480 
 Hawker v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (15 
 
 West Va. 628), 291 
 Hawkins v. Great Western R. Co. (17 
 
 Mich. 57; s. c. 18 Mich. 427), 221 
 Hawkins v. Johnson (105 Ind. 29; s^ c. 
 
 56 Am. Rep. 169), 445 
 Hawks V. Northampton (11 6 Mass. 423), 
 
 324 
 Hawks c. Winans(74 N. Y. 609; s. c. 
 
 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 451), 369 
 Hawley v. New York &c. R. Co. (82 N. 
 
 Y. 370), 443, 479, 484 
 Hay ®. LeNeve (2 Shaw's App. Cases, 
 
 395), 616 
 Haycroft ». Lake Shore &e. B. Co. (64 
 
 N. Y. 636), 251 
 Hayden ». Manfg. Co. (29 Conn. 548), 
 
 443, 451, 453, 460, 481 
 Hayes «. Bush & Denslow Manuf. Co. 
 
 (41 Hun, 407), 468 
 Hayes v. Forty-second St. ifec. R. Co. 
 
 (97 N. Y. 259; 8. c 14 N. Y. Week. 
 
 Dig. 28), 42, 374 . 
 
Iviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Hayes v. Gainesville 8t. Ry. Co. (70 Tex. 
 
 602; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 491). IS 
 Hayes i>. Michigan <fec. R. Co. (Ill U. 
 
 S. 228), 266 
 Hayes v. Western R. Co. (S Cnsh. 270), 
 
 395, 427, 428 
 Hayman v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (118 
 
 Penn. St. 608), 370 
 Hays V. Gallagher (72 Penn. St. 136), 
 
 543, 644 
 Hays «. Millar (77 Penn. St. 238), 26 
 Hayward i>. MUler (94 111. 349; s. c. 34 
 
 Am. Rep. 229), 71, 73, 109, 528 
 Headen v. Rust (39 111. 186), 287 
 Healey v. Dry Dock &c. R. Co. (46 N. 
 
 Y. Snper. Ct. Rep. 473), 30, 35, 78 
 Healy v. New York (3 Hnn, 708), 502 
 He.aney«. Long Island R. Co. (112 N. 
 
 Y. 122; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 422), 
 
 250 
 Heard v. Chesapeake <fec. Ry. Co. (26 
 
 West Va. 465), 293 
 Hearns. St. Charles St. Ry. Co. (34 
 
 La. Ann. 160), 377 
 Hearne n. Southern <fec. R. Co. (50 Cal. 
 
 482), 31, 44 
 Heaston v. Wabash <fec. Ry. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. 403), 304 
 Heath «. Whitebreast Coal & Mining 
 
 Co. (65 Iowa, 737), 448 
 Heavey v. Hudson River Water Power 
 
 & Paper Co. (10 BT. Y. SupL 585) 
 
 468 
 Heckrott v. Buffalo St. E. Co. (Super. 
 
 Ct. of Buffalo, 13 Am. Law Rec. 
 
 295), 384 
 Heddles v. Chicago <Sec. Ry. Co. (74 Wis. 
 
 239; s. 0. 42 N. W. Rep. 237). 247 
 Hedges v. Kansas (18 Mo. App. 62), 380 
 Heffinger v. Minneapolis <tc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (43 Minn. 503; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1131), 263 
 Hegeman «. Wsstem &c. R. Co. (13 K 
 
 Y. 9), 452 
 Heil V. Glanding (42 Penn. St. 493), 13, 
 
 79, 101, 105 
 Heinlein «. Boston <fec. R. Co. (147 
 
 Mass. 136; s. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 608), 
 
 206 
 Heland v. Lowell (3 Allen, 407), 80, 
 
 340, 343 
 Hemmiugway b. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (72 Wis. 42; s. c. 37 N. W. Rep. 
 
 804; 67 Wis. 668), 55, 56, 174, 211 
 Henderson d. Wabash Ac. Ry. Co. (81 
 
 Mo. 605), 295 
 Henderson v. Western Ac. Ins. Co. (10 
 
 Rob. (La.) 164; s. c. 48 Am. Dec. 
 
 179), 512 
 Heriderson'sl Adm'r v. Kentucky Ac. R. 
 
 Co. (86 Ky. 389; s. c. 5 S. W. Rep. 
 
 876), 85 • 
 
 Hendricks v. Western Ac. R. Co. (52 
 
 Ga. 467), 9i, 121, 496 
 Hendrix v. St. Joseph Ac. Ry. Co. (38 
 
 Mo. App. 520), 295 
 Heney v. Dennis (93 Ind. 462; s. c. 47 
 
 Am. Rep. 378), 40 
 Henn's Case (W. Jones, 296), 836 
 Henisy v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 288; 8. c. 43 Am. Rep. 762), 40, 
 
 213 
 Henry «. Sioux City Ac. Bv. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 52), 472 
 Henry v. Southern Ac. R. Co. (60 Cal. 
 
 176), 318 
 Henry Co. Turnpike Co. v. Jackson (86 
 
 Ind. Ill; B. c. 44 Am. Rep. 274), 
 
 51, 326, 327, 328, 358 
 Henze v. St. Louis Ac. B. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 636), 236 
 Herbert v. Markwell (Q. B. Div. 1881), 
 
 524 
 Herbert v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (3 Dak. 
 
 38), 447 
 Herold v. Meyer (20 Iowa, 378), 287 
 Herriman v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (27 Mo. 
 
 App. 435), 418 
 Herring «. Wilmington Ac. R. Co. (10 
 
 Ired. (Law) 402; fe. c. 51 Am. Dec. 
 
 395), 69, 257, 261, 264, 505, 562 
 Hershey ». Township of Millcreek (9 
 
 Atl. Rep. 452), 327 
 Hencke it. Milwaukee City By. Co. (69 
 
 Wis. 401; s. o. 34 N. W. Bep. 243), 
 
 875 
 Hewiston v. City of New Haven (37 
 
 Conn. 476; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 842), 
 
 361 
 Hewitt V. Flint Ac. B. Co. (67 Mich. 61; 
 
 8. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 659), 445, 447, 
 
 465, 480 
 Hey T. Philadelphia (81 Penn. St. 44; 
 
 s. o. 22 Am. Rep. 733), 325, 334 
 Hibbard v. Thompson (109 Mass. 288), 
 
 79, 97, 326 521, 522 
 Hickey ». Boston Ac. R. Co. (14 Allen, 
 
 429), 44, 95, 192, 538 
 Hickey d. Ta»ffe (105 N. Y. 26; s. c. 12 
 
 N. E. Rep. 286; 99 N. Y. 204; 32 
 
 Hun, 7; I East Rep. 7), 443, 451, 
 
 460, 469 
 Hickman ». Missouri Pac. By. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 433; s. c. 4 S. W. Bep. 127), 
 
 209 
 Hicks v. Pacific Ac. E. Co. (65 Mo. 34; 
 
 B.C. 64 Mo. 430), 175, 543 
 Higgins V. Cherokee E. Co. (73 Ga. 
 
 149), 216 
 Higgins u Deeney (78 Cal. 578; s. c. 
 
 21 Pac. Rep. 428), 181 
 Higgins «. Harlem Ac. R. Co. (2 Bosw. 
 
 (N. Y.) 181), 192 
 Higgins V. Watervliet Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 N. Y. 28; 8. 0. 7 Am. Rep. 293), 372 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 lix 
 
 HigginsoD t. Xabant (11 Allen, 530), 
 
 339 
 Higlej «r. Gilraer (3 Mon. 90; s. c. 35 
 
 Am. Rep. 450), 191, 194 
 Hill V. Board of Aldermen of Charlotte 
 
 (72 N. C. SB; s. c. 21 Am. Eep. 
 
 451), 342, 529 
 Hill r. BoetoD (122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 
 
 Am. Rep. 332), 322 
 Hill V. Caledonian Ky. Co. (16 Ct of 
 
 Ses. Caa. 569), 499 
 Hill V. Callaban (S2 Ga. 109; s. c. 8 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 720), 121 
 Hill T. City of Fon da Lac (56 Wis. 
 
 246), 570 
 HUl r. Gast (55 Ind. 45), 460, 481 
 Hill V. Lonisville <tc R. Co. (9 Heist. 
 
 823), 86, 122, 2S7 
 Hill T. Kew Haven (■'57 Vt. 501), 544, 
 
 557 
 Hill V. New Orleans Ac. R. Co. (11 La. 
 
 Ann. 292), 23 
 HiU v. Ninth Ave. R. Co. (109 N. Y. 
 
 239; s. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 61), 375 
 Hillan e. Newington (57 Cal. 56), 143 
 Hiller e. English (4 Strobh. (Law) 486), 
 
 344 
 Hillier v. Allegheny Ac. Ins. Co. (3 
 
 Penn. St. 470; s. c. 45 Am. Dec. 
 
 666), 512 
 Hilts ». Chio^o^Ac. Ry. Co. (55 Mich. 
 
 437), 456 
 Hinckley c. Cape Cod R. Co. (120 Mass. 
 
 259), 67, 243, 279, 538. 549 
 Hinckley v. Penobscot (42 Me. 89), 230, 
 
 348 
 Hiackley v. Town of Somerset (145 
 
 Mass. 326 ; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 166), 
 
 324 
 Hinds V. Harbon (58 Ind. 121), 485 
 Hinds ». Overacker (66 Ind. 547; s. c. 
 
 32 Am. Rep. 114), 485 
 Hine ». Cashing (6 N. Y. Snpl. 850; 
 
 8. c. 53 Hnn, 519), 39 
 Hine v. Mnnson (32 Conn. 219), 295 
 Hinman v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (28 Iowa, 
 
 491), 296 
 Hinshaw v. Gilpin (64 Ind. 116), 295 
 Hinton v. Dibbin (2 Q. B. 661), 87, 103, 
 
 219 
 Hinz V. Starin (3 N. Y. Snpl. 290), 49 
 Hitte V. Kepnblican Valley R. Co. (19 
 
 Neb. 620), 434 
 mxon V. Lowell (13 Gray, 59), 361 
 Hoag V. Lake Shore Ac. R. Co. (85 
 
 Penn. St. 293; s. c. 27 Am. Rep. 
 
 653), 317, 320 
 Hoag «. N. Y. Ac. R. Co. (Ill >'. Y. 
 
 199), 148 
 Hoar V. Maine Central R. Co. (70 Me. 
 
 65; s. o. 35 Am. Rep. 299), 197 
 Uobba v. Staner (62 WU. 108; s. c. 19 
 
 Alb. Law Jonr. 490), 444, 447, 451 
 
 Hobson «. New Mexico Ac. R. Co. (11 
 
 Pac. Rep. 64), 52, 427, 543 
 Hoby V. Built (3 Barn. A Ad. 350), 
 
 520 
 Hocum ff. Weitherick (22 Minn. 152), 
 
 543 
 Hodge V. Bennington (43 Yt. 450), 343 
 Hodge V. New York Ac. R. Co. (27 Hun, 
 
 394), 307 
 Hodgkins v. Eastern R. Co. (119 Mass. 
 
 419), 440 
 Hoehl V. Mnscatine (57 Iowa, 444), 17, 
 
 31 
 Hoffman v, Chicago Ac. Ry. Co.' (40 
 
 Minn. 60; s. c. 41 N. W. Rep. 301), 
 
 316 
 HoSinan ». New York Ac. R. Co. (87 
 
 N. Y. 25; s. c. 41 Am Rep. 337), 
 
 372 
 Hoffinan ». ITnion Ferry Co. (68 N. Y. 
 
 385), 68 
 Hofnagle «. New York Ac. R. Co. (55 
 
 N. Y. 608), 413 
 Hogan V. Central Pac. Ac. R. Co. (49 
 
 Cal. 128), 455 
 Hogan V. Field (44 Hun, 72), 445 
 Hogan V. Smith (9 N. Y. Supl. 881), 
 
 445 
 Hoke V. St. Lonis Ac. By. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 360), 457 
 Holbrook v. TJtica Ac. B. Co. (16 Barb. 
 
 113; s. c. 12 N. Y. 236), 199, 552 
 Holden v. Fitchbnrg R. Co. (129 Mass. 
 
 268; 8. c. 37 Am. Rep. 343; 2 Am. 
 
 A Eng. Ry. Cas. 94), 394, 413, 443, 
 
 449 
 Holden v. Liverpool Gas Co. (3 C. B. 1), 
 
 544 
 Holden v. Rntland Ac. R. Co. (30 Tt. 
 
 298), 297 
 Holden «. Shattnck (34 Vt. 336), 281, 
 
 341 
 Holland v. Bartch (120 Ind. 46; s. c. 22 
 
 N. E. Rep. 83), 366 
 Holland ». Brown (35 Fed. Rep. 43), 85 
 Holland v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (5 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 549), 249, 272, 445 
 Holland v. Lynn Ac. R. Co. (144 Mass . 
 
 425; s. c. 11 N. E.JRep. 674), 84 
 Holland v. West End Ac. Ry. Co. (16 
 
 Mo. App. 172), 295 
 HoUender «. New York Ac. B. Co. (14 
 
 Daly, 219 ; s. o. 19 Abb. N. C. 18), 
 
 233 
 Holly V. Atlanta St. Railroad (61 6a. 
 
 215 ; s. 0. 34 Am. Rep. 97), 371 
 Holly V. Boston Gas Light Co. (8 Grav, 
 
 123), 154, 160, 161 
 Holmes t>. Central Ac. R. Co. (37 Ga. 
 
 593), 964, 272 
 Holmes r. Oarke (6 Hurl. A N. 349 ; 
 
 s. c. 7 HurL A N. 937), 479, 484 
 
Ix 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Holmes v. North Eastern Ry. Co. (L. B 
 4 Exeh. 264; s. c. L. R. 6 Exch. 
 123), 72, 274, 439 
 Holmes v. Seely (19 Wend. 507), 336 
 Holmes v. Worthington (2 Fost. <fe Fin. 
 
 533), 484 
 Holstine v. Oregon Ac. R. Co. (8 Ore- 
 
 , gon, 163), 91, 113, 245 
 Holzab V. New Orleans <fec. R. Co. (38 
 La. Ann. 185; s. c. 58 Am. Rep. 
 177), 55, 142 
 Homan v. Stanley (66 Peno. St. 464 ; 
 
 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 389), 335 
 Honegsberger v. Second Ave. R. Co. (1 
 Keys, 552; s. c. 33 How. Pr. 193; 2 
 Abb. App. Dec. 378), 154 
 iHonor v. Albrighton (93 Penn. St. 475), 
 
 438, 461 
 Hooker v. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (76 Wis. 
 
 542), 71, 168 
 Hoobsett V. Concord &c, R. Co. (38 N. 
 
 H. 242), 318 
 Hooper v. Boston <&c. R. Co. (81 Me. 
 
 260; s. c. 17 AtL Rep. 64), 254 
 Hooper ». Chicago <fec. Ry. Co. (33 N. 
 
 W. 314), 300 
 Hoover v. Texas Ac. R. Co. (61 Tex. 
 
 503), 263 
 Hopkins v. Kansas Ac. B. Co. (18 Kan. 
 
 462), 299 
 Sopkins V. Town of Rash River (70 
 Wia 10; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 909), 
 48, 323 
 Hopkins v. Utah Northern Ry. Co. (13 
 
 Pac. Rep. 343), 543 
 Hoppe V. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 857), 169, 181 
 Horn V. Atlantic Ac. R. Co. (35 N. H. 
 
 169), 297 
 Homer v. Williams (100 N. C. 230; s. o. 
 
 5 S. E. Rep. 734), 290 
 Horton v. Ipswich (12 Cnsh. 493), 326, 
 
 357 
 Hospes V. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (29 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 763), 215 
 Hotel Ass'n v. Walters (23 Neb. 280; 
 
 s. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 561), 73 
 Hoth V. Peters (65 Wis. 405), 17, 544 
 Honfe V. Fulton (29 Wis. 296; s. c. 9 
 
 Am. Rep. 568), 334, 343 
 Hough V. Railroad Co. (100 U. S. 213), 
 
 425, 442, 449, 542 
 Hough V. Texas Ac. R. Co. (100 F. S. 
 
 213), 452, 481, 483 
 Honghey «. Hart (62 Iowa, 96; s. c. 49 
 
 Am. Rep. 138), 632 
 Honghkirk v. President Ac. (92 N. Y. 
 
 219; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 370). 244 
 Hounsell v. Smyth (7 C. B. (N. SA 
 731; 8. c. 6 Jur. (N. S. 897; 29 L. 
 J.(C.P.)203; 8 Week. Rep. 227; 97 
 Eng. Com. Law, 731), 70, 261,275, 
 336, 336 
 
 Honrney v. Brooklyn City R. Co. v7 N. 
 
 Y. Snpl. 602), 384 
 Housatonic Ac. B. Co. ». Knowles (30 
 
 Conn. 313), 282 
 Housatonic Ac. B. Co. v. Waterbnry(23 
 
 Conn. 101). 289, 307 
 House ». Inhabitants of Fulton (29 Wis. 
 
 296; 8. c. 9 Am. Eep. 568), 325 
 Honser v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (60 Iowa, 
 
 230; 8. c. 46 Am. Bep. 65), 418, 
 
 431, 570 
 Houser v. Tully (62 Penn. St. 92; s. c. 
 
 1 Am. Bep. 390), 624, 628 
 Houston V. Traphagen (47 N. J. Law, 
 
 23), 337 
 Houston V. Vicksburg- Ac. E. Co. (39 
 
 La. Ann. 796; s. c. 2 So. Eep. 562), 
 
 264 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. Adams (63 Tex. 
 
 200), 304 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Brin (77 Tex. 
 
 174; s. o. 13 S. W. Eep. 886), 234 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Carson (66 Tex. 
 
 346), 78 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Clemmons (55 
 
 Tex. 88; 8. c. 40 Am. Bep. 799), 44, 
 
 193 - 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Conrad (62 Tex. 
 
 627), 391 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Cowser (57 Tex. 
 
 293), 544 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Dunham (49 Tex. 
 
 181), 444 
 Houston Ac By. Co. v. Garbett (49 Tex. 
 
 573), 23, 42, 106, 191 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. Hampton (64 
 
 Tex. 427), 186, 203 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Leslie (67 Tex. 
 
 83), 190 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Lowe (11 S. W. 
 
 1065), 395 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Moore (49 Tex. 
 
 31; 8.0. 30 Am. Bep, 98). 197, 216 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. O'Hare (64 Tex. 
 
 600, 478 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. Oram (49 Tex. 
 
 341), 444, 465 
 Houston Ac. By. Co. v. Reason(61 Tex. 
 
 613), 608 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Eichards (59 
 
 Tex. 373), 17 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. ». Eider (62 Tex. 
 
 267), 391, 392 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Simpson (60 Tex.- 
 
 108), 166, 175 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. ». Smith (52 Tex. 
 
 178), 505, 506 
 Houston Ac. Ey. Co. v. Smith (77 Tex. 
 
 179; 8.0. 13 S. W. Bep. 972), 26, 
 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. Sympkius (54 
 Tex. 615; 8. c. 38 Am. Rep. 632), 
 69, 267, 262, 265, 273, 505 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pagcs.l 
 
 ki 
 
 Houston Ac. Ry. Co. v. WUson (60 Tex. 
 
 142), 240 
 HoTorka v. Minaeapolis Ac. Ry. Co. (34 
 
 Minn. 281), 804 
 Howard v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 
 
 (40 Fed. Rep. 195), 430 
 Howard v. Denver Ac. Ey. Co. (26 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 887), 426 
 
 Howard v. Kansas City Ac. R. Co. (41 
 
 Kan. 403; s. 0. 21 Pac. Rep. 267), 
 
 116, 255 
 
 Howard v. LoaisTille Ac. Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Miss. 247; s. c. 7 So. Rep. 216), 292 
 
 Howard v. Northern Cent. Ey. Co. (1 
 
 N. T. Supl. 528), 236, 246 
 Howard v. St. Pavd Ac. Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 214), 253 
 Howard, County of, v. Legg (11 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 612), 47 
 Howd V. Mississippi Ac. R. Co. (50 Miss. 
 
 178), 403 
 Howells V. Landore Sietnan'g Steel Co. 
 (L. R. 10 (Q. B.) 62; s. c. 44 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 25; 32 L. T. (N. S.) 19; 
 23 Week. Rep. 335; 31 L. T. (N. 
 S.) 433), 414, 421 
 Howland v. Vincent (10 Mete. 37i), 
 
 336 
 Hoye V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (62 Wis. 
 666; 8. c. 23 N. W. Rep. 14), 247, 
 565, 569, 570 
 Hoyt V. Hudson (41 Wis. 105), 544 
 Hoyt V. New York Ac. R. Co. (118 N. 
 T. 399^ 8. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 565), 25 
 Hubbard ». Mason City (60 Iowa, 400), 
 
 509 
 Hubener ». New Orleans Ac. E. Co. (23 
 
 La. Ann. 492), 159 
 Hnbgh V. New Orleans Ac. E. Co. (6 
 La. Ann. 495; s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 
 563), 84, 391, 485 
 Huckshold V. St. Louis Ac. Ey. Co. (90 
 Mo. 548; s. c. 2 S. W. Rep. 794), 
 238 
 Hnddleston v. Machine Shop (106 Mass. 
 
 282), 483 
 Hudson V. Wabash Ac. Ry. Co. (32 Mo. 
 App. 667; s. c 101 Mo. 13; 14 S. 
 W. Rep. 15), 235, 543, 561 
 HneleeDkamp v. Citizens' R. Co. (34 Mo. 
 
 45; s. c. 37 Mo. 567), 38S, 569 
 Huey V. Gahlenbeck (121 Penn. St. 238; 
 
 8. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 520), 73 
 Huffs. Ames (16 Neb. 139; s. c. 49 Am. 
 
 Rep. 716), 166 
 Huff V. Austin (46 Ohio, 386; s. c. 21 
 
 N. E. Eep. 864), 394 
 Hughes V. Galveston Ac. Ey. Co. (67 
 Tex. 593; B.C. 4 S. W. Eep. 219), 
 264, 278 
 Hughes V. Great Western Ac. Ry. Co. 
 (14 C. B. 637), 219 
 
 Hughes V. Macfie (2 Hurl. A Colt. 744; 
 
 S.O. 10 Jur. (N. S.) 682; 33 L. J. 
 
 (Exch.) 177; 12 Week. Eep. 315), 
 
 160, 176, 178, 179, 26/7 
 
 Hughes V. Muscatine (44 Iowa, 672), 22 
 
 Huhn V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (92 Mo. 
 
 440; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 937), 446, 
 
 477 
 
 Huizega v. Cutler Ac. Lumber Co. (51 
 
 Mich. 272), 444 
 Hulehan v. Green Bay Ac. R. Co. (68 
 Wis. 520; s. o. 32 N. W. Rep. 529), 
 481 
 Hulett V. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 240j, 450, 472 
 Hull V. City of Kansas (54 Mo. 601; s. c. 
 
 14 Am. Rep. 487), 325 
 Hull V. Hall (78 Me. 114), 447 
 Hull V. Richmond (2 Wood B. A M. 
 
 337), 542 
 Hund V. Geier (72 111. 393), 108, 155, 
 
 156 
 Hungerford r>. Syracuse Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Hun, 339), 303 
 Hunn V. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (78 Mich. 
 513; 8. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 502), 395, 
 417, 419 
 Hunt V. Lowell Gas Co. (1 Allen, 343), 
 
 96 
 Hunt V. Salem (121 Mass. 294), 863 
 Hunt V. Town of Pownall (9 Vt. 411), 
 
 325 
 Hunter v. Cooperstown Ac R. Co. (112 
 N. y. 871; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 820), 
 84, 95 
 Huntington, City of, v. Breen (77 Ind. 
 
 26^ 326, 327, 539 
 Huntoon ». Trumbull (2 McCi-ary, 314), 
 
 140 
 Hurd V. Rutland &c. E. Co. (25 Vt. 116), 
 
 281, 293, 305 
 Hurst «. Bnmside (12 Or. 520), 477 
 Hurt V. St. Louis Ac. Ey. Co. (94 Mo. 
 255; S.C. 7 S. W. Eep. 1, 5), 105, 
 209 
 Hussey v. Coger (39 Hun (N. Y.) 639; 
 s. 0. 112 N. Y. 114), 415, 418, 420, 
 431 
 Hussey a, Eyan (64 Md. 426; s. c. 54 
 
 Aip. Eep. 772), 175, 530 
 Hutchins V. Priestley Express Wagon 
 Ac. Co. (61 Mich. 262; s. c. 28 N. 
 W. Eep. 85), 73 
 Hutchinson v. Collins (90 111. 410), 327, 
 
 329, 338 
 
 Hutchinson v. Concord (41 Vt. 271, 354 
 
 Hutchinson v. The York, New Castle 
 
 and Berwick Ey. Co. (6 Exch. 843; 
 
 8. c. 14 Jut. 837; 6 Eng. Eail. Cas. 
 
 588; 19 L. J. (Exch.) 296), 85, 399 
 
 Hyatt V. Hannibal &c. R. Co.. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 287), 445 
 Hyde v. Jamaica (27 Vt. 443), 322, 557 
 
Ixii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr (83 Penn. 
 
 St. 332), 178, 268 
 Hyland v. Toakers R. Co. (1 N. Y. Snpl. 
 
 363), 376 
 Hyland v. Yonters R. Co. (4 If . Y. Supl. 
 
 305), ISl 
 
 Ihl V. Forty-second St. R. Co. (47 N. Y. 
 
 317; B. c. 7 Am. Rep. 450:; 49 N. 
 
 Y. 323), 154, 156, 181, 363 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Handy (63 Miss. 
 
 609), 227 
 Illinois Gent. R. Co. «. Morrison (19 
 
 HI. 136), 225 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. ®. Person (65 Miss. 
 
 319; B. c. 3 So. Rep. 375), 292 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. ■». Read (37 111. 
 
 484)* 225 
 Illinois. Ac. R. Co. ■». Abel (59 111. 
 
 131), 56, 187 
 niinois (fee. R. Co. «. Adams (42 111 
 
 474), 221 
 lUiaois *c. R. Co. ■». Arnold (47-111. 
 
 173), 303 
 niinois Ac. R. Co. ii. Baches (55 111. 
 
 379), 107, 237, 279 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. b. Baker (47 111. 
 
 295), 285, 287 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. «. Benton (69 111. 
 
 174), 108, 113, 249 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ■». Buckner (28 111. 
 
 299), 256 
 lUinoiB Ac. R. Co. ■». Cox. (21 111. 20), 
 
 427, 428, 429 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Cragin (71 III. 
 
 177), 108, 257, 503, 504, 509 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ■». Ebert (74 111. 399), 
 
 240, 253, 610 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. a. Fears (63 111. 115), 
 
 107 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ®. Frezier (47 III. 
 
 505), 107, 314 
 niinois Ac. R. Co. ■». Goddard (72 111. 
 
 567), 108, 113 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. •». Godfrey (71 111. 
 
 500; s. c. 22 Aro. Rep. 112), 70, 
 
 108, 233, 261, 274 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co, ■». Goodwin 30 111. 
 
 . 117), 284 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Green (81 111. 19; 
 
 s. 0. 26 Am. Rep. 265), 190, 207, 
 
 210, 213 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ». Hall (72 111. 222), 
 
 24, 108, 263 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ■». Hammer (72 111. 
 
 347; s. c. 85 III. 526), 108, 113, 274, 
 
 275, 279 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. ■». Hetherington (83 
 
 in. 510), 16, 18, 24, 67, 102, 108, 
 
 114, 263, 274, 275, 276 
 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Hofiman (67 111. 
 
 287), 79 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Houck (72 HI. 
 
 285), 485. 
 niinois Ac. R. Co. v. Hutchinson {47 HI. 
 
 408), 257, 505, 510 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Jewell (46 111. 
 
 99), 456. 476 
 niinois Ac. B. Co. ■». McClelland (42 III. 
 
 355), 81, 317 
 niinois Ac R. Co. b. McKee (43 IH. 120), 
 
 302 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. <B. Moffit (67111. 431), 
 
 102, 108, 113 
 Illinois Ac. B. Co. ■». Middlesworth (43 
 
 111. 64, 65; s. c. 40 111. 494), 102, 
 
 107, 113, 284 
 niinois Ac. R. Co. v. Mills (42 HI. 407, 
 
 409), 107, 314 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Modglin (86 lU. 
 
 481), 264 
 Illinois Ac. B. Co. ®. Nunn (SI HI. 78), 
 
 107, 314 
 Illinois Ac. B. Co. ■». Pondrom (51 lU. 
 
 333; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 306), 107 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Simmons (38 HI. 
 
 242), 107 
 Illinois Ac, R. Co. ®. Slater (129 111. 91; 
 
 s. c. 21 If. E. Rep. 575), 169, 176, 
 
 181 
 Illinois Ac. B. Co. v. Sweeny (52 111 
 
 325), 107 
 Illinois Ac. B. Co. v. Welch (52 111. 183; 
 
 s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 593), 19, 444, 455 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Whalen (19 HI. 
 
 App. 116). 446 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Williams (27 [HI. 
 
 49), 300 
 litis ®. Chicago Ac. By. Co. (40 Minn. 
 
 273; s. c. 4\ N. W. Bep. 1040), 52 
 Hwaco Ry. Co. v. Hadrick (1 Wash. St. 
 
 446; s. c. 25 Pac. Bep. 385), 270 
 Imhoff V. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (20 Wis. 
 
 364), 205 
 In Re Rensselaer Ac. B. Co. (4 Paige, 
 
 553), 294 t 
 
 Indemaur s. Dames (L. E. 1 C. P. 274; 
 
 s. c. 12 Jur. (N. S.) 432; 86 L. J. 
 
 (0. P.) 184; 14 Week. Bep. 586; 14 
 
 L. J. (N. S.) 484; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 
 
 181; L. E. 2 C. P. 311; 15 Week. 
 
 Bep. 434; 16 N. T. (N. S.) 293), 19, 
 
 72, 74, 267, 336 
 Indiana Car Co. ■». Parker (100 Ind. 
 
 181), 457 
 Indiana Cent. B. Co. «. Mundy (21 Ind. 
 
 48), 226 
 Indiana Ac. Ey. Co. v. Bailey (110 Ind. 
 
 75), 443, 454, 466 
 Indiana Ac. Ey. Co. v. Hammock (113^ 
 
 Ind. l;s. c. UN. E. Bep. 737), 242 
 Indiana Ac. By. Co. v. Hudelson (1« Ind. 
 
 325), 261, 274 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 Indiana <tc. Rv.Co. '-. Quick (109 Ind. 
 
 295), 800, 301 
 Indiana Ac. Ry. Co. v. Sawyer (100 Ind. 
 
 342), 300 
 Indianapolis v. Cook (99 Ind. 10). 49 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Adldns (23 
 
 Ind. 340), 303, 306 
 IndianapoUs <&e. R. Co. e. Birney (11 
 
 ni. 391), 213 
 Indianapolis <fcc. R. Co. v. Brownenburg 
 
 (32 Ind. 199), 294 
 Indianapolis Ac. R. Co. v. Carr (35 Ind: 
 
 610), 57 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Evans (88 111. 
 
 63), 102, 108, 114 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Flanigan (77 
 
 Ind. 365), 444, ilS, 475 
 Indianapolis ice. R. Co. v. CTalbraiib (63 
 
 ni. 436), 257 
 Indianapolis &e. R. Co. r. Hall (88 111. 
 
 368), 299 
 IndianapoUs &c. R. Co. v. Harter (38 
 
 Ind. 667), 283 
 Indianapolis Ac. R. Co. v. Horst (93 U. 
 
 S. 291), 185, 197, 199, 542 
 Indianapdis &c. R. Co. » Johnson 
 
 (102 Ind. 352), 404 
 Indianapolis <&c. R. Co. v. Eeely (23 Ind. 
 
 133), 539 
 Indianapolis &e. R. Co. r. Kinney (8 
 
 Ind. 402). 298 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Love (10 lod. 
 
 664), 444, 452, 466 
 Indianapolis <fec. R. Co. v. McClaren 
 
 (62 Ind. 566). 264, 506 
 Indianapolis <fec. R. Co. a. McClure (26 
 
 Ind. 370), 283 
 Indianapolis <fec. R. Co. >'. Petty {ij Ind. 
 
 414), 303, 305 
 Indianapolis <fec. R. Co. v. Ratherford 
 
 (29 Ind. 82), 199 
 IndianapoGs &c. R. Co. v. Shinier (17 
 
 Ind. 295), 302, 303, 306 
 Indianapolis jec. R. Co. v. Smith (78 III. 
 
 112), 249 
 IndianapoKs <bc. R. Co. v. Stables (62 
 
 HI. 313), 108, 249 
 Indianapolis Ac. R. Co. v. Stout (53 Ind. 
 
 143 ; s. c. 41 Ind. 149), 22, 56, 58, 
 
 86, 236, 247, 250 
 Indianapolis <&c. R. Co. v. Townsend (10 
 
 Ind. 39), 307 
 Indianapolis (tc. R. Co. v. Troy (91 III. 
 
 474; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 57). 444, 
 
 452, 453 
 Indianapolis <bc. R. Co. v. Watson (114 
 
 Ind. 20; s. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 824), 
 
 566 
 Indianapolis <tc. R. Co. v. Wright (13 
 
 Ind. 213; a. c. 22 Ind. 377). 289, 303 
 Indianapolis P. A C. R. Co. v. Pitzer 
 
 (109 Ind. 179; s. c. 10 X. E. Rep. 
 
 70), 52 
 
 Ingalls tr. Bills (9 Mete. 1; s. c. 43 Am. 
 
 Dec. 346), 56, 184, 191 
 IngersoU v. New York <fec. R. Co. (6N 
 
 T. Supr. Ct. 416), 250 
 IngersoU ». Stockbridge <fcc. R. Co. (8 
 
 Allen, 438), 312 
 Inman «. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (60 Iowa, 
 
 459), 287, 290, 306 
 Insurance Co. «. Seaver (19 Wall. 542) 
 
 319 
 Insurance Co. ». Ti-ansportation Co (12 
 
 Wall. 199), 319 
 Insurance Co. ». Tweed (7 Wall. 44), 319 
 International <tc. B. Co. v. BeU(76 Tex. 
 
 50; s>. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 321), 447 
 International <fcc. R. Co. v. Cock (68 
 
 Tex. 713; s. c. 5 S. W. Rep. 635), 
 
 197 
 International Ac. R. Co. •». Dyer (76 
 
 Tex. 156; s. 0. 13 S. W. Rep. 377), 
 
 26, 240 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. Eckford (71 
 
 Tex. 274; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 679), 
 
 213 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. Folliard (66 
 
 Tex. 603; s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 624), 
 
 213 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. Garcia (75 
 
 Tex. 583; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 223), 
 
 256, 264 
 
 International <te. R. Co. v. Hester (72 
 
 Tex. 40; s. a 11 S. W. Rep. 1041; 
 
 64 Tex. 401), 464, 484 
 International Ac. R. Co. ». Bughes (68 
 
 Tex. 290; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 498), 
 
 301 
 International Ac. R. Co. w. Irvine (64 
 
 Tex. 529), 198 
 International Ac. R. Co. r. Kuehu (70 
 
 Tex. 582; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 484), 
 
 246 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. McDcmtdd 
 
 (75 Tex. 41; s. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 860), 
 
 234 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. Smith (62 
 
 Tex. 252), 265 
 International Ac. R. Co. v. Doyle(49 Tex 
 
 190), 444, 462 
 Interstate Ac. Ry. Co. v. Fox (41 
 
 Kan. 715; s. c. 21 Pac. Rep. 797), 
 
 390 
 Ireland c. Oswego Ac. R. Co. (13 N. Y. 
 
 533), 571 
 Irey v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (132 Penn. 
 
 St. 563; s. c. 26 W. N. C. 68; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 341), 239 
 Iron Ry. Co. v. Mowery (36 Ohio St. 418; 
 
 s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 597), 57, 191 
 Irvine v. Wood (51 N. Y. 224; s. r. 10 
 
 Am. Rep. 603), 331 
 Irwin V. Sprigg (.5 Gill. (Md.) 200), 29, 
 
 30, 543 
 
Ixiv 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Isaacs u. Beth Hamodash Society (1 Hilt. 
 
 469), 344 
 Isaacs V. Third Ave. R Co. (47 N. Y. 
 
 122), 372 
 Isaacson v. New York <fec. B. Co. (94 N. 
 
 Y. 278; s. c. 46 Am. Bep. 142), 228 
 Isabel V. Hannibal ^c. B. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 475). 69, 157, 168, 262, 265 
 Isabell V. New York &C. E. Co. (27 Conn. 
 
 393), 29, 31, 69, 79, 282, 285. 571 
 Ivens V. Cincinnati <!ec. By. do. (103 
 
 Ind. 27), 67 
 Ivory V. Town of Deer Park (116 N. Y. 
 
 476; s. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 1080), 325 
 
 Jackson v. County Com'rs(76 N. C. 282), 
 
 24 
 Jackson w. Georgia B. Co. (77 Ga. 82), 
 
 460 
 Jackson «. Indianapolis licc. R. Co. (47 
 
 Ind. 454), 539 
 Jackson v. Kansas &c. R. Co. (31 Kan. 
 
 761), 471, 479 
 Jackson c. Metropolitan By. Co. (3 A pp. 
 
 Cas. 193), 568 
 Jackson );. Nashville ibc. R. Co. (13 Lea, 
 
 491 ; s. c. 49 Am. Bep. 663), 39, 122 
 Jackson v. Rutland Ac. R. Co. (25 Vt. 
 
 150; s. c. 60 Am. Dec. 246), 281, 
 
 294 
 Jackson v. St. Lonis <tc. Ey. Co. (29 
 
 Mo. A pp. 49B), 189 
 Jackson r. ciecond Ave. R. Co. (47 N. 
 
 Y. 274; s. 0. 7 Am. Bep. 448), 372 
 Jackson Tp. v. Wagner (127 Penn. St. 
 
 184; s. c. 17 AU. Rep. 903 ; 24 W. 
 
 N. C. 217), 323 
 Jacobs V. Bangor (16 Me. 187; s. c. 33 
 
 Am. Dec. 652), 324, 330 
 Jacobs V. Lonisville Ac. B. Co. (10 Bnsh, 
 
 263), 17, 125, 407 
 Jacob's Case (20 HI. 478), 107 
 Jacobus v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (20 Minn. 
 
 125; 8. c. 18 Am. Bep. 360), 185, 
 
 194, 215, 224,225 
 Jaeger v. Chicago &o. Ry. Co. (75 Wis. 
 
 130; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 732), 300 
 Jager v. Adams (123 Mass. 26; s. c. 25 
 
 Am. Bep. 7), 361 
 JalieB. Cardinal (35 Wis. 118), 22, 527 
 James v. Emmet Mining Co. (55 Mich. 
 
 3.35), 432 
 James v. Great Western Ry. Co. (L. R. 
 
 2 C. P. 635, «.), 250 
 Jamison v. San Jose Ac. Bl Co. (55 Cal. 
 
 593), 17, 187 
 Jaqaith «. Richardson (8 Mete. 213), 
 
 366 
 Jarret v. Atlanta Ac. E. Co. (83 6a. 347; 
 
 s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 681), 189 
 
 Jefferis r. Phila. Ac. B. Co. (3 Honst. 
 
 447), 313, 315 
 Jefferson, Village of, v. Chapman (127 
 
 111. 438; s. c. 20 N. E. Rep. 33), 107 
 Jeffersonville Ac. B. Co. v. Adams (43 
 
 Ind. 403), 283 
 Jeffersonville Ac. E. Co. ®. Bowen (40 
 
 Md. 545; s. c. 49 Md. 154), 150, 154 
 Jeffersonville Ac. E. Co. v. Goldsmith 
 
 (47^nd. 43), 260, 274 ' 
 
 Jeffersonville Ac. E. Co. v. Hendricks 
 
 (26 Ind. 228), 187, 190, 539 
 JeffersonviUe Ac. B. Co. v. Lyon (72 Ind. 
 
 107), 539 
 Jeffersonville Ac. B. Co. v. Boss (37 Ind. 
 
 545), 298, .302, 307 
 Jeffersonville Ac. B. Co. ■». Underbill 
 
 (48 Ind. 389), 283 
 Jeffords v. Cramp (5 Week. Notes Cas. 
 
 10), 529 
 Jeffrey v. Keokuk Ac. E. Co. (56 Iowa, 
 
 546), 18, 22, 47, 48 
 Jenkins u. Mahopac Iron Ore Co. (10 N. 
 
 Y. Snpl. 484), 478 
 JenksiJ. Wilbraham (11 Gray, 142), 343 
 Jennings v. Van Schaick (108 N. Y. 530; 
 
 s. c. 15 N. E. Bep. 424), 327, 338 
 Jennings v. Wayne (63 Me. 468), 68 
 Jessen v. Swelgert (66 Cal. 182), 361 
 Jetter v. New York Ac. B. Co. (2 Keyes, 
 
 154), 181 
 Jewell n. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (54 Wis. 
 
 610; s. c. 41 Am. Bep. 63), 189, 190 
 Jewell D. Parr (13 C. B. 916), 568 
 Jewett V. Kansas City Ac. Ey. Co. (38 
 
 Mo. App. 48), 293 
 Jewett V Keene (62 N. H. 701), 178 
 Jewson s. Gath (I C. A E. 564), 70 
 Jochem ». Bobinson (72 Wis. 199; s. c. 
 
 39 N. W. Rep. 383). 49 
 John B. Lyon, The, (33 Fed. Rep. 184), 
 
 391 
 John's Adm'r v. Lonisville Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (10 S. W. Rep. 417), 263 
 Johnson v. Ashland Water Co. (71 Wis. 
 
 553; s. c. 37 N. W. Rep. 823), 455 
 Johnson v. Ashland Water Go. (77 Wis. 
 
 51; s. c. 45 N. W. Bep. 807), 420, 
 
 463 
 Johnson v. Baltimore Ac. R. Co. (25 
 
 West Va. 570; s. c. 6 Mackey, 232), 
 
 244, 293 
 Johnson v. Berkshire Ins. Co. (4 Alien, 
 
 388), 512 
 Johnson v. Boston (118 Mass. 114), 436 
 Johnson v. Boston Ac. E. Co. (125 Mass. 
 
 75), 91 
 Johnson v. Boston Towboat Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 209; s. c. 46 Am. Bep. 458), 
 
 403, 414,431, 475, 563, 570 
 Johnson v. Brnner(61 Penn. St. 58), 443, 
 
 570 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The lefercnces are to pages.] 
 
 IxT 
 
 Johnson v Canal St. Ry. Co. (2? La. 
 
 Ann. 58), 44, 79, S11 
 Johnaon t>. Chicago ^c. K. Co. {11 Mo. 
 546; s. c. 27 Mo. App. 879), 236, 239, 
 264, 300 
 Johnson v. Chicage cScc. B. Co. (56 Wis. 
 
 274), 262, 266, 271 
 Johnson ». Chicago <Scc. B. Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 348), 872 
 Johnson v. Hudson Biver &c. B. Co. (20 
 N. Y. 65 ; s. o. 6 Duer, 683; 6 Duer, 
 21), 80, 84, 44, 78, 659, 552, 555 
 Johnson v. Lindsay (66 L. T. E. 97 (H. 
 of L.); 8. c. 23 Q. B. Div. 508), 4? 6 
 Johnson v. Lowell (12 Allen, 572), 856 
 Johnson v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (18 
 
 Neb. 690), 391, 332, 570 
 Johnson v. St. Paul <Scc. B. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 53), 477 
 Johnson v. Small (5 B. Mon. 25), 367 
 Johnson e. Spear (76 Mich. 139; s. 0. 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1092), 447, 467 
 Johnson v. Town of Irasbnigh (47 Tt. 
 28; s. o. 19 Am. Rep. Ill), 230, 349 
 Johnson v. West Chester <fec. B. Co. (70 
 
 Penn. St. 357), 26, 56, 58, 187 
 Johnson v. Whitefield(18 Me. 218; s. c. 
 
 86 Am. Dec. 721), 22, 328, 326 
 Johnson v. Wilcox (135 Penn. St. 217; 
 
 s. c. 19 Atl. Bep. 939), 73 
 Johnson v. Wing (3 Mich. 163), 282 
 Johnson V. Pittsburgh <&c. B. Co. (114 
 Penn. St 443; s. o. 7 Atl. Bep. 184), 
 427, 454 
 Joliet V. Seward (86 lU. 402), 102, 108, 
 
 114 
 Joliet Ac. B. Go. o. Jones (20 HI. 221), 
 
 310 
 Jonasch v. Standard Gas Light Co. (66 
 
 N. T. Super. Ct. 447), 179 
 Jones V. Andover (10 Allen, 18), 229, 
 
 346, 366 
 Jones V. Boston (104 Mass. 76; s. c. 6 
 
 Am. Bep. 194), 361 
 Jones n. Boyce (1 Stark, 493), 55, 66, 
 
 191, 368 
 Jones V. Chicago^ &c B. Co. (48 Minn. 
 279; s. o. 45 N. W. Bep! 444), 193, 
 194 
 Jones t. Chicago dec. B. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 183; 8. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 1114), 95 
 Jones V. Columbia &c. R. Co. (20 S. C. 
 
 249), 288 
 Jones V. Corporation of Liverpool (14 Q. 
 
 B, D. 890), 136 
 Jones V. East Tenn. Ac. R. Co. (128 U. 
 
 S. 443), 255 
 Jones V. Florence Mining Co. (60 Wis. 
 268; s. c. 57 Am. Bep. 269), 896, 
 468 
 Jones V. Granite Mills (126 Mass. 84), 
 451 
 
 G 
 
 Jones V. Inhabitants of Waltham (4 Cash. 
 299; 8. 0. 50 Am. Dec. 783), 822, 
 324 
 Jones V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (31 Mo. 
 
 App. 614), 208 
 Jones v. New York Ac. B. Co. (10 Abb. 
 B. C. 200; s. o. 62 How, Pr. 450), 
 V 552, 656 
 Jones V. Nichols (46 Ark. 207; s. 0. 56 
 
 Am. Rep. 675), 835 
 Jones V. North Carolina Ac. B. Co. (67 
 
 N. C. 126), 245, 267 
 Jones o. Sheboygan Ac. B. Co. (42 Wis. 
 
 306), 303, 310 
 Jones V. TMca Ac. B. Co (36 Hun, II6). 
 
 150 
 Jones «. Vorhees (10 Ohio, 146), 223 
 Jones V. Western N. C. E. Co. (95 N. C. > 
 
 828), 288 
 Jones V. Witherspoon (7 Jones (Law) 
 
 655), 295 
 Jones V. Yeager (2 Dill. 64), 445, 480 
 Jones' Adm'r «. LouisyiUe Ac. B. Co. 
 
 (82 Ky. 610), 93, 125, 407, 470 
 
 Joseph Gameau Cracker Co. v. Palmer 
 
 (28 Neb. 307; s. o. 44 N. W. Bep. 
 
 463), 447 
 
 Joslin D. Grand Bapids Ice Co. (50 Mich. 
 
 516; B. o. 45 Am. Rep. 64), 397, 403 
 
 Joyce V. Worcester (140 Mass. 245), 51 
 
 Joynerv. Great Barrington (118 Mass. 
 
 463), 834 
 Joyner v. South Carolina B. Co. (26 S; 
 
 C. 49; s. 0. 1 S. E. Bep. 52), 288 
 Jucht V. Behrens (7 N. Y. Snpl. 195), 
 
 73 
 Judkins n. Maine Cent. B. Co. (81 Me. 
 351; s. c. 14 Atl. Bep. 735), 447 
 
 K. 
 
 Kahn v. Love (3 Or. 206), 538 
 
 Kain v. Larkin (9 N. Y. Snpl, 89; s. c. 
 
 56 Hun, 79), 84, 91 
 Kain v. New York, Ac. B. Co. (3 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 311), 240 
 Eain v. Smith (25 Hun, 149), 449 
 Ealbfleisch v. Long Island B. Co. (102 
 
 N. Y. 520; s. o. 55 Am. Bep. 832), 
 
 816 
 Kane v. New York Ac. B. Co. (9 N. Y. 
 
 Sup]. 879), 248 
 Kansas Ac. B. Co. v. Allen (22 Kan. 
 
 285), 270 
 Kansas Ac. R. Co. v. Cranmer (4 Colo 
 
 624), 79 
 Kansas Ac. R. Co. v. Dorough (72 Tex. 
 
 108; 8. o. 10 S. W. Rep. 7J1), 95, 
 
 188 
 Kansas Ac. R. Co. v. Fitzsimmons (22 
 
 Kan. 686; a. c. 31 Am. Bep. 203; 
 
 18 Kan. 84), 116, 178, 266, 270 
 
Ixyi 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pagee.] 
 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Little (19 Ean. 
 
 267), 415, 419 
 Kansas ^c. B. Co. v. McHenry (24 Kan. 
 
 501), 283, 299, 302 
 Kansas Ac. R. Co. v. Mower (16 Kan. 
 
 • 573), 283, 299 
 Kansas <fec. R; Co. v. Owen (25 Kan. 
 
 419), 313 ^ 
 
 Kansas <6c. R. Co. v. Peavy (29 Kan. 
 
 170; 44 Am. Rep. 630), 105, 116, 
 
 494 . 
 Kansas Ac. K. Co. v. Phillibert (25 Kan. 
 
 688), 548 
 Kansas &e. R. Co. v. Pointer (9 Kan. 
 
 620; s. o. 14 Ean. 37), 22, 89, 115, 
 
 274, 543, 547 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Salmoii (11 Kan. 
 
 83), 86, 413,489 
 Kansas &o. R. Co, v. Simpson (30 Kan. 
 
 646; s. 0. 46 Am. Rep. 104), 224 
 Kansas <fec. B. Co. v. Ward (4 Colo. 30), 
 
 563, 570 
 Kansas <tc. R. Co. v. Wiggins (24 Kan. 
 
 588),! 306 
 Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Bolson (36 
 
 Kan. 534; 8. c. 14 Pae. Rep. 5), 
 
 293 
 Kansas City <fec. R. Co. v. Borge (40 
 
 Kan. 736; s. o. 21 Pac. Rep. 589), 
 
 300 
 Kansas City &c. B. Co. v. Cravens (43 
 
 Kan. 650), 293 
 Kansas City Ac. B. Co. v. Danghtry (88 
 
 Tenn. 721; s. c. 13 S. W. Bep. 698), 
 
 85 
 Kansas City Ac. B. Co. v. Kirksey (48 
 
 Ark. 366; s. c. 3 S. W. Rep. 190), 
 
 292 
 Kansas City Ac. B. Co. v. Landis (24 
 
 Kan. 406\ 283, 302 
 Kansas City Ac. R. Co. v. Lane (33 Kan. 
 
 702), 293 
 Kansas City Ac. B. Co. v. Myers (7 So. 
 
 Bep. 321), 292 
 Kansas Pac. By. Co. v. Whipple (39 Kan. 
 
 581; s. 0. 18 Pac. Rep. 730), 175 
 Kaples V. Orth (61 Wis. 531), 361 
 Karle v. Kansas Ac. R. Co. (55 Mo. 
 
 476), 189, 235 
 Karr v. Parks (40 Cal. 188), 66, 68, 164, 
 
 181 
 Kaspari v. Marsh (74 Wis. 562; s. c. 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 368), 445 
 Kay B. Peun. R. Co. (66 Penn. St. 269; 
 
 s. o. 8 Am. Rep. 628), 166, 167, 171, 
 
 172, 175, 265, 274, 275, 363 
 Kean v. Baltimore Ac R. Co. (61 Md. 
 
 154), 266, 508 
 Kean v. Detroit Ac. Rolling Mills (66 
 
 Mich. 277; s. o. 33 N. W. Rep. 
 
 395), 454, 461 
 Keane v. Boycott (2 Henry JB. 611), 
 
 459 
 
 Kearney v. London Ac. Ry. Co. (L. E. 
 
 6 Q. B. 759), 361 
 Kearns v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (66 Iowa, 
 
 599), 446 
 Kearns v. Snowden (104 Mass. 63), 68 
 Keech v. Baltimore Ac. B. Co. (17 Md. 
 
 33), 282 
 Eeefe v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (142 Mass. 
 
 261), 206 
 Keefe v. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. (21 
 
 Minn. 207; 8. c. 18 Am. Bep. 393), 
 
 178 
 Keegan v. Kavanaugh (62 Mo. 230), 393, 
 
 484 
 ^eenan v. Cavanangh (44 Vt. 262), 281 
 Keffe V. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. (21 Minn. 
 
 207; s. 0. 18 Am. Bep. 393), 268, 
 
 269 
 Keilley v. Belcher (3 Sawyer, 600), 402 
 Keim v. Union Ry. Ac. Co. (90 Mo. 
 
 314; s. 0. 2 S. W. Rep. 427), 260, 
 
 262 
 Keitel v. St. Lonis Ac. R. Co. (28 Mo. 
 
 App 657), 560 
 Keith V. Easton (2 AUen, 552), 342 
 Keith V. Granite Mills (126 Mass. 90), 
 
 451 
 Keith V. Pinkham (13 Me. 501), 194 
 Keller v. New York Ac. R. Co. (24 How. 
 
 Prac. 172), 668, 569 
 Kelley v. Cable Co. (7 Mont. 70; s. c. 
 
 14 Pac. Rep. 683), 457 
 Kelley v. Manhatta^ By. Co. (112 N. T. 
 
 443; 8. c. 20 N. E. Rep. 383), 206 
 Kelley v. Mich. Cent. B. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 186-; s. 0. 31 W. W. Bep. 904), 273 
 Kelley v. Norcross (121 Mass. 508), 430 
 Kelley v. Silver Spring Co. (12 B. I. 
 
 112; s. c. 84 Am. Rep. 615), 461, 
 
 481 
 Kelley ». Union By. Ac. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. 161), 246 ^ 
 
 Kelley v. Wilson (21 IL. App. 141),478 
 Kelluyw. Mo. Pac: By. Co. (13 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 806), 89, 90, 266 
 Kellogg V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (26 Wis. 
 
 223; 8. c. 7 Am. Bep. 69), 52, 313, 
 
 316, 317 
 Kell(^g V. Janesville (34 Minn. 132)> 
 
 3^2 
 Kelly V. Abbott (63 Wis. 307; 8. a 63 
 
 Am. Rep. 292), 473 
 Kelly V. Baltimore Ac. E. Co. (11 Atl. 
 
 , Bep. 659), 391, 466 
 Kelly V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 634), 287 
 Kelly V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (85 Minn. 
 
 490), 466 
 Kelly V. Doody (116 N. T. 676; s.o. 22 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1084), 329 
 Kelly V. Erie Telegraph Ac. Co. (34 
 
 Minn. 821), 433 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pagee.! 
 
 Ixvii 
 
 Kelly «. Fond dn Lac (31 Wis. 179), 
 
 333 
 Kelly V. Hannibal <feo. E. Co. (76 Mo. 
 138; 8.0. 70 Mo. 604), 189, 236, 
 246 
 Kelly V. Hendrle (26 Mich. 256), 237, 
 
 3*79 
 Kelly V. Howell (41 Ohio St. 246), 431, 
 
 457 
 Kelly V. Johnson (128 Mass. 530; s. c. 
 
 36 Am, Bep. 398), 438 
 Kelly V. Minneapolis Ac. E. Co. (29 
 
 Minn. 1), 254 
 Kelly V. Newman (62 How. Pr. 156), 
 
 356, 358 
 Kelly V. New York <fec. E. Co. (9 N. Y. 
 
 SupL 90), 50 
 Kelly V. Pennfrylvania E. Co. (8 Atl. 
 
 Eep. 866), 246 
 Kelly V. Soathem <feo. E. Co. (28 Minn. 
 
 98), 249, 328, 358 
 Kelly «. Town of Biackstone (147 Mass. 
 
 448; s. 0. 18 N. E. Eep.. 217), 50 
 Kelly V. Union Ey. Ac. Co. (96 Mo. 
 
 279; s. o, 8 S. W. Eep. 420), 78 
 Kemp V. PhiUips (65 Vt. 69), 663, 669 
 Kendall v. Kendall (147 Mass. 482; s. c. 
 
 18 N. E. Eep. 233), 333 
 Kendrick ». Towle (60 Mich. 363; s. o. 
 
 27 N. W. Eep. 567), 318 
 Kennard v. Burton (26 Me. 39; s. o. 43 
 Am. Dec. 249), 16, 22, 29, 33, 168, 
 366, 368, 637 
 Kennayde v. Pacific Ac. E. Co. (45 
 
 Mq. 255), 254 
 Kennedy v. Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa, 559), 252 
 Kennedy ■s. Comity Comm'rs (69 Md. 
 
 66; s. c. 14 Atl. Eep. 624), 326 
 Kennedy v. Denver Ac. E. Co. (10 
 Colo. 493; 8. o. 16 Pac. Eep. 210), 
 264 
 Kennedy V. Manhattan Ey. Co. (33 Hun, 
 
 457), 464 
 Kennedy v. North Mo. E. Co. (36 Mo. 
 
 361), 235, 263 
 Kenney v. City of Cohoes (16 N. Y. 
 
 Week. Dig. 206), 356, 368 
 Kenney v. New York Ac. R. Co. (7N. Y. 
 
 Supl, 265), 222 
 Kenny «. Canard Steamship Co. (52 N.T. 
 
 Snper. Ct. 434), 431 
 Kenny ».' Cnnard Steamship Co. (55 
 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 658), 412 
 Kent v. Elstob (3 East. 18), 44 
 Kent V. New Oirleans Ac. Ey. Co. (67 
 Miss. 608; s. c. 7 So. Eep. 391), 
 292 
 Kentncky Cent. E. Co. v. Ackley (87 
 Ky. 271; s. o. 8S. W. Rep. 691), 425 
 
 Kentucky Cent. E. Co. v. Gastmeau's 
 
 Adm'r (83 Ky. 119), 88, 93 
 Kentncky Cent. E. Co. i>. Lebus (14 
 
 Bush, 518), 17, 282, 286, 291 
 Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Thomas' Ad- 
 
 biinistrators (79 Ky. 160; a. c. 42 
 
 Am. Eep. 208), 17, 44, 124, 186, 
 
 193, 642 
 Kentucl^ Cent. E. Co. v. Wainwright's 
 
 Adm'r (13 S. W. Eep. 438), 84 
 Kenyon v. New York Ac. B. Co. (6 
 
 Hun, 479), 36, 168, 261, 264 
 Keokuk, City of, v. Independent District 
 
 of Keokuk (53 Iowa, 852; s. o. 36 
 
 Am. Eep. 226), 358 
 Keokuk Ac. Packet Co. v. True (88 111. 
 
 608), 186, 372 
 Kepperlo v. Ramsden (83 111. 354), 68, 
 
 638 
 Kern v. DeCastro Ac. Eeflning Co, (6 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 648), 396, 396 
 Kerr v. Forgne (64 HI. 482; s. c. 5 Am. 
 
 Eep. 146), 107, 156, 158, 178, 266 
 KerVfhacker v. Cleveland Ac. R. Co. (3 
 
 Ohio St. 172; s. o. 62 Am. Dec. 
 
 246), 23, 29, 31, 42, 68, 69, 78, 89, 
 
 90, 91, 245, 284, 285, 286, 291, 294 
 Kesee v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (30 Iowa, 
 
 78; s. c. 6 Am. Eep. 643), 314 
 Kevern v. Providence Mining Co. (70 
 
 Cal. 392), 395 
 Kewanee v. Depew (80 Dl. 119), 108 
 Key Stone bridge Co. v. Newberry (96 
 
 Penn. St. 246; s. c. 42 Am. Eep. 
 
 543), 403, 431 
 Keys V. Village of Marcellas (50 Mich. 
 
 439; s. 0. 45 Am. Eep. 62), 335 
 Keyser «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (66 
 
 Mich. 559; s. o. 56 Am Rep. 406; 
 
 19 Am. Law Rev. 668), 266, 266, 
 
 270 
 Kibele v. Philadelphia (106 Pa. St. 41), 
 
 47, 475 
 Kidder v. Dunstable (11 Gray, 342), pS 
 Kielley v Belcher Ac. Co. (3 Sawyer, 
 
 500), 480 
 Killea v. Faxon (125 Mass. 485), 430 
 Kimball ». Rutland Ac. R. Co (26 Vt. 
 
 247), 221 
 Kimes v. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 611), 250 
 King V. American Trans. Co. (1 Flippin, 
 
 1), 631 
 King V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (9 Cush. 
 
 112; 8. o. 129 Mass. 277, ».), 429, 
 459 
 King V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (90 Mo. 
 
 520), 304 
 King u. Henkie (80 Ala. 506), 39 
 King V. Mo. Pac. Ey. Co. (98 Mo. 235; 
 
 s. 0. 11 S. W. Eep. 663), 246 
 King V. Ohio Ac. E. Co. (11 Biss. 326; 
 s. c. 25 Fed. Eep. 799), 39, 471 
 
Ixviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 [Tbe references are to pages.] 
 
 King V. Thompson {SI Penn. St. 366; 
 
 8. a 30 Am. Rep. 364), 326, 329, 
 
 380, 337 
 Kingsbury v. Dedham (13 AUen, 186), 
 
 342 . 
 Kinney v. Central &c. R. Co. (34 N. J. 
 
 Law, 513; B. o. 3 Am. Rep. 266: 32 
 
 W. J. Law, 407), 18S, 221, 225 
 Kinney ». Corbiu (132 Penn. St. 341 ; 
 
 B. 0. 19 Atl. Kep. 141), 412, 431, 
 
 449,478 ■ 
 Kirby v. Boylston Market (14 Gray, 
 
 261), 326, 359 
 Kirk II. Atlanta <fcc. Ry. Co. (94 N. C. 
 
 626; s. 0. 55 Am. Rep. 621), 430 
 Kistner v. Indianapolis (100 Ind. 210), 
 
 41 
 Kline v. Central <fec, R. Co. (37 Cal. 
 
 400), 16, 29 
 Klipper V. Coffey (44 Md. 117), 63 
 Klix v. Nieman (66 Wis. 271; s. o. 3'2 
 
 N. W. Rep. 223), 178 
 Knapp V. Dagg (18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 166), 139, 142 
 Knapp D. Sjijsbury (2 Camp. 600), 368 
 Knapp V. Sioux City <fec. -Ry. Co. (71 
 
 Iowa, 41; 8. o. 32 N. W. Rep. 18; 
 
 65 Iowa, 91; 50 Am. Rep. 569, n.), 
 
 39, 449, 467 
 Kjiickevbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters 
 
 (42 Md. 414), 512 
 Knight V. Albert (6 Penn. St. 472; B. o. 
 
 47 Am. Bee, 478), 282 
 Knight ■». Goodyear Rubber Co. (38 
 
 Conn. 438; s. o. 9 Am. Rep. 406), 
 
 342 
 Knight «. ITew Orleans &c. R. Co. (16 
 
 La. Ann. 106), 293 
 Knight «. New York &c. R. Co. (99 
 
 , N. Y. 25), 299 
 Knight V. Ponohartrain &c. R. Co. (23 
 
 La. Ann. 462), 44, 86, 188, 663 
 Knight «. Toledo &c. R. Co. (24 Ind. 
 
 402), 284, 286, 307 
 Knowles i>. Crampton (55 Conn. 336; 
 
 8. 0. 11 Atl. Rep. 593), 307 
 Knowlton v. Erie Ry. Co. (19'Ohio St. 
 
 260; 8. 0. 2 Am. Rep. 395), 223, 
 
 225 
 Knox V. Tucker (48 Me. 873), 281, 294 
 Kobe V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. 518; s. o. 82 N. W. Rep. 
 
 783), 300 
 Kohler v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (19 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1049; s. o. 26 "W. N. C. 176), 
 
 nog 
 
 Kohn ir. Lovett (44 Ga. 251), 19, 69 
 Koons V. St. Louis &c. R. Co^(65 Mo. 
 
 . 692), 168, 178, 270 
 Koons e. Western T|nion Tel. Co. (102 
 
 Penn. St. 164), 513 
 Kossmann v. Stutz (5 N. Y. Supl. 764), 
 
 478 
 
 Koutz ». Toledo &b. R. Co. (64 Ind. 
 
 516), 303 
 Krebs v. Minneapolis <fcc. Ry. Co. (64 
 
 Iowa, 670), 289 
 Kreig v. Wells (1 E. D. Smith, 76, 77)j 
 
 160, 154 
 Kresanowski «. Northern Pac. R. Co. 
 
 (5MoCrary, 528), 472 
 Kreuziger v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (73 
 
 Wis. 168; s. Ci 40 N. W. Rep. 657), 
 
 213 * 
 Krogg «. Atlanta &e. Ry. Co. (77 Ga. 
 
 202), 427 
 Kroy V. Chicago ifec. B. Co. (32 Iowa, 
 
 357), 483, 484 
 Krnger v. Louisville <fcc. Ry. Co. (Ill 
 
 Ind. 51; s. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 957), 
 
 419, 468 
 Krum «. Anthony (115 Penn. St. 431; 
 
 s. c. 8 Atl. Rep. 598), 24, 82 
 Kuhn v. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (42 Iowa, 
 
 420), 284, 285 
 Kuhn V. Jewett (33 N. J. Eq. 647), 319 
 Kuhns D. Wisconsin <fec. R. Co. (70 
 
 Iowa, 561; s. 0. 31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 868), 464, 465 
 Kunz «. City of Troy (104 N. Y. 344; 
 
 s. 0. lOJSI. E. Rep. 442), 181 
 Kuttuer v. Lindell Ry. Co. (29 Mo. App. 
 
 502), 142 
 Kwiotkowski v. Chic^o &c; Ry. Co. (70 
 
 Mich. 549; s. c. 88 N. W. Rep. 
 
 463), 248 
 Kyne ®. Wilmington Ac. R. Co. (14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 922), 155 
 
 Labuasier «. New York &c. R. Co. (10 
 
 Abb. Pr. 398,m.), 308 
 Lack V. Seward (4 Car. & P. 106), 44 
 Lackawanna &c. R. Co. v. Chendworth 
 
 (62 Penn. St. 382), 245 
 Ladd V. Foster (31 Fed. Rep. 827), 66, 
 
 370 
 Ladd «. New Bedford &c. R. Co. (119 
 
 Mass. 412; s. o. 20 Am. Rep. 331), 
 
 451,452,461,476,480 
 Lade v. Shepherd (2 Strange, 104), 280 
 Lafayette <&c. R. Co. v, Adams (20 Ind. 
 
 76), 89 
 Lafayette Ac. R. Co. v. HufiEinan (28 
 
 Ind. 287), 150, 164, 242, 260 
 Lafayette Ac. R. Co. v. Shriner (6 Ind. 
 
 141), 288 
 Laicher i>. New Orleans <fec. R. Co. (28 
 
 La. Ann. 820), 44, 256, 263 
 Laing «. Colder (8 Penn. St. 479; s. c. 
 
 49 Am. Dec. 633), 186, 200, 203, 
 
 223 . 
 Lake ghore Ac. R. Co. v. Bangs (47 
 
 Mich. 470), 190 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixix 
 
 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. o. Berlink (2 
 
 Brad. App. 427), 61 
 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Clemens (S 
 
 Brad. 77), 48 
 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Franz (127 
 
 Penn. St. 297; s. o. 24 W. N. C. 
 
 321; 18 Atl. Rep. 22), 249, 2B4 
 Lake Shore <fec. R. Co, ». Hart (87 111. 
 
 629), 268, 263 
 Lake Shore <&c. R. Co. v, Lavalley (36 
 
 Ohio St. 221), 455 
 Lake Shore <fcc. R. Co. v. MoCormick 
 
 (74 III. 440), 471, 476 
 Lake IShore 4c. R. Co. v. MiUer (25 
 
 Mich. 274), 69, 148, 287, 239, 256, 
 
 264, 385, 506, 606, 607, 638, 863 
 Lake Shore <feo. R. Co. v. O'Conner 
 
 (115 111. 254), 107 
 Lake Shore <fcc. R. Co. v. Parker (131 
 
 111. 557; s. 0. 23 N. E. Rep. 237), 
 
 392 
 Lake- Shore Ac. R. Co. v. Roy (6 Bradw. 
 
 82), 49 ' 
 Lake Shore &e. R. Co. v. Stupak (123 
 
 Ind. 210; s. c. 23 If. E. Rep. 246; 
 
 108 Ind. 1), 456 
 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Snnderland 
 
 (2 Bradw. 307), 239 , 
 Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Erickson (39 
 
 Mich. 492; a. o. 33 Am. Rep. 423), 
 
 434 
 Lakin v. Oregon Pac. R. Co. (15 Or. 
 
 220; s. o. 16 Pac. Rep. 641), 454 
 Lalor V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (52 111. 
 
 401), 416, 428, 460 
 Lamheth i>. North Carolina <fcc. R. Co. 
 
 (66 M. C. 494; s. 0. 8 Am. Rep. 
 
 508), 190 
 Lancaster ■». Kissinger (12 Rep. 636), 
 
 25, 49, 56 
 Lande ®. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (33 Wis. 
 
 640), 285 
 Landrae v. Lnnd (88 Minn. 638; s. c. 
 
 38 N. W. Rep. 699), 338 
 Lane v, Atlantic Works (107 Mass. 104; 
 
 s. 0. Ill Mass. 186), 79, 179, 268, 
 
 538, 563 
 Lane «. Bryant (9 Gray, 246), 368 
 Lane v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (69 Iowa, 
 
 443), 391 
 Lane v. Crombie (12 Pick. 177), 326, 
 
 368, 637 
 Laneye. Chesterfield County (29 S. C. 
 
 140; 8. 0. 7 S. E. Rep. 66), 327 
 Laney v. Kansas City &c. Ry. Co. (83 
 
 Mo. 466), 303 
 Langan v. City of Atchison (35 Kan. 
 
 318; s. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 38), 361 
 Langan v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (72 Me. 
 
 392), 47, 53 
 Langdon v. Godfrey (4 Fogt. & Fin. 
 
 446), 620 
 
 Lanier v, Tonngblood (73 Ala. 587), 
 
 624, 626, 627, 663 
 Laoing «. New York <fec. R. Co. (49 N. Y. 
 
 821; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 417), 403, 
 
 419, 443, 449, 486, 466, 479, 481 
 Lannon v. Albany Gaslight Co. (4" 
 
 Barb. 264; s. o. 44 N. Y. 489), 30, 
 
 77, 164, 167, 161, 398 
 Lapointe v. Middlesex R. Co. (144 Mass. 
 
 18; s. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 497)^ 376, 
 
 386 
 Larken v. O'Neill (1 N. Y. Supl. 232), 
 
 73 
 Larkin n. Taylor (5 Kan. 433), 80, 283 
 Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co. (101 
 
 N. Y. 391; B. 0. 64 Am. Rep. 718), 
 
 74 
 Larabee ®. Peabody (128 Mass. 561), 
 
 333 
 Larrabee v. Sewall (66 Me. 376), 36^ 
 Larson v. St. Paul <fec. R. Co, (43 Minn. 
 
 488; s. 0. 45 N. W. Rep. 1096); 
 
 391, 465 ' 
 Larue v. Farren Hotel Co. (116 Mass. 
 
 67), 829 
 Lary i>. Cleveland &c. R. Co, (78 Ind. 
 
 323; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 672), 70 
 Laverenz D. Chicago &c. R. Co. (56 
 
 Iowa, 689), 253, 264, 264 
 Lawler v. Androscoggin &a. R. Co. (62 
 
 Me. 463; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 492), 
 
 412,430,467 
 Lawless v. Conn. &c. R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 1), 479 
 Lawrence v. Coombs (37 N. H. 335), 
 
 294 
 Lawrence v. Green (70 Cal. 417), 55 
 Lawrence v. Jenldns (L. R. 3 Q. B. 
 
 274; s. o. 42 L. J. (Q. B.) 147), 38 
 Lawrence v. Milwaukee <fcc. R. Co. (42 
 
 Wis. 822), 310 
 Lawrence v. New York &c. R. Co. (36 
 
 Conn. 6»), 221 
 Lawrenceburg <fec. R. Co. ■». Montgom- 
 ery (7 Ind. 476), 198 
 Laws V. North Carolina <fec. R. Co. (73 
 
 Jones (Law) 468), 288 
 Lawson ®. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (57 Iowa, 
 
 672), 285 
 Lawton v. Fitchburg R. Co. (8 Cush. 
 
 230; s. 0. 54 Am. Dec. 753), 294 
 Lay V. Richmond <fec. R. Co. (106 N. C. 
 
 404; 8. 0. 11 S. E. Rep. 412), 78, 
 
 289 
 Learoyd v. Godfrey (138 Mass. 315), 62 
 Leary v. Boston <Ssc. R. Co. (139 Mass. 
 
 580; 8. o. 52 Am. Rep. 783), 403 
 Leasoii v. Maine <fec. R. Co. (77 Me. 85; 
 
 8. 0. 1 East. Rep. 100), 637 
 Leavenworth &o. Ry. Co. v. Forbes (37 
 
 Kan. 445; s. 0. 15 Pac. Rep. 596), 
 
 284, 289 
 
Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Leavejiworth &c. R. Co. v. Rice (10 
 
 Kan. 426), 238, 263 
 Leavitt v. Chicago <fec. Ry. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 228). BYO 
 Le Barron «. Jpslin (41 Mich. 313), 368, 
 
 340, B38 
 Le Claire «. First Division &c. R. Co. 
 
 (20 Minn. 9), 444, 481 
 Le Croy V. New York &c. R. Co. (10 N. 
 
 y. Supl. 382), 484 
 Leduke v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (4 Mp. 
 
 App. 485, 488), 67 
 Lee «. Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 131), 296 
 Lee ». Nixey (63 L. T. 285; s. o. 54 J. 
 
 P., 807), -331 
 Lee v. Riley (18 C. B. (N. S.) 722), 34) 
 Lee V. Troy Citizens' Gaslight Co. (98 
 
 N. Y. 115) 552,556, 557, 560 
 Lee ». Woolsey'(109 Penn. St. 124), 545 
 Lee, The R. E. (2 Abb. (U. S.) 49), 226 
 Leebrick v. Republican Val. <fec. R. Co. 
 
 (41 Kan. 7B6; s. o. 21 Pac. Rep. 
 
 796), 304 
 Leggett B. Rome <feo. R. Co. (41 Hun, 
 
 80), 299 
 Lehey v. Hudson River E. Co. (4 Robt. 
 
 204), 254 
 Lehigh &o. Coal Co. ■». Hayes (128 
 
 Penn. St. 294; s. c. 24 W. N. C. 
 
 559; 18 Atl. Rep. 387)s 461 
 Lehigh ic. Coal Co. «. Jones (86 Penn. 
 
 St. 432, 439; S. 0. 6 Rep. 125), 49, 
 
 412 
 Lehigh <fec. Coal Co. v. Lear (9 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 267), 237 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Greiner (113 
 
 Penn. St. 600). 390 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Hall (61 Peim. 
 
 St. 861), 237, 239 
 Lehigh Valley R; Co. «. McKeen (90 
 ' Penn. St. 122; s. o. 85 Am. Rep. 
 
 644), 312, 319 
 Lehman v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (47 
 
 Hun, 355; s. c. 29 Barb. 234), 40, 
 
 150, 153, 169, 568 
 Lehman «. Louisiana <fcc. R. Co. (37 La. 
 
 Ann. 705), 175 
 Lehman «. McQueen (65 Ala. 566), 175 
 Lehr v. Steinway <feo. R. Co. (118 N. 
 
 Y. 556; 8. 0. 23 N. E. Rep. 889), 
 
 130 
 Jemon«. Chanslor (68 Mo. 340; s. o. 30 
 
 Am. Sep. 799), 185 
 jcmon V. Chicago &c, Ey. Co. (59 
 
 Mich. 618), 298 
 jcmont «.' Washington (fee. R. Co. (1 
 Maokey, 180; s. o. 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 238; 2 Mackey, ,502; 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 268), 374 
 jemxv. Mo. Pac. Ry.Co. (76 Mo. 86), 263 
 jeonard «. Collins (-70 N. Y. 93), 393, 
 451, 452 ' 
 
 Leonard v. New York <fec. E. Co. (10 
 
 Jones & S. 226), 256 
 Lepp V. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 139), 296 
 Lesanv. Maine Cent. R. Co, (77 Me. 86), 
 
 236, 247 
 Leslie v. City of > Lewiston (62 Maine, 
 
 468), 154, 159, 333' 
 Leslie v. Wabash &c. Ry. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 60), 189 
 Lester v. PJttsford (7 Vt. 168), 667 
 Levering «. Union <fec. R. Co. (42 Md. 
 
 88), 221 
 Levy V. Carondelet Canal Co. (34 La. 
 
 Ann. 181), 18 
 Lewis V. Baltimore &c. E. Co. (38 Md. 
 
 588), 278, 279 
 Lewis V. Flint &c. Ey. Co. (54 Mich. 
 
 56), 40 
 Lewis V. New York Sleeping-car Co. (143 
 Mass. 267; s. c. 56 Am. Rep. 852, n. ; 
 6 N. Y. Supl. 313), 227, 239 ' 
 Lewis V. St. Louis ifec. R. Co. (59 Mo. 
 496; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 386), 444, 
 475 
 Lewis V. Seifert (116 Penn. St. 628; s. c. 
 11 Atl. Rep. 614), 412, 419, 426, 
 446, 457 
 Lewis V. The London ifec. Ry. Co. (L. 
 
 R. 2 Q. B. 66), 211 
 Lexingrton v. Lewis' Adm'x (10 Bush, 
 
 677), 93, 407 
 Lexington, City of, v. McQuillan (9 
 Dana, 513; s. c. 35 Am. Dec. 159), 
 322 
 Liddy v. St. Louis <fec. R. Co. (40 Mo. 
 
 606), 375 
 Lilley v. Fletcher (81 Ala. 234; s. c. 1 
 
 So. Rep. 278), 24, 82 
 Lilly V. New York <fec. E. Co. (107 N. 
 Y. 666; B.O. 14 N. E. Eep. 503), 
 448 
 Limpus I). London Omnibus Co. (1 Hurl. 
 
 & C. 526), 372, 397 
 Liuch V. Sagamore Manfg. Co. (148 
 Mass. 206; s. o. 9 N. E. Eep. 728), 
 477, 480 
 Lincoln, City of, v. Walker (18 Neb. 
 224; s. 0. 19 Am. Law Rev. 162), 
 331, 543 
 Lincoln Coal Mining Co. v. McNally (16 
 
 111. App. 181), 420 
 Lindall v. Bode (72 Cal. 245; s. o. 13 
 
 Pae. Eep. 660), 448 
 Lindvall v. Woods (41 Minn. 212; B. c. 
 
 42 N. W. Rep. 1020), 412,419 
 Linfield v. Old Colony Ac. R. Co. (10 
 
 Cush. 569), 239, 253, 569 > 
 
 Lingenfelter v. Lpuisville &c. R. Co.- (4 
 
 ,S. W. 185), 409 
 Linnehan v. Sampson (126 Mass. 606; 
 s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 692), 66, 57, 68. 
 59, 62 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 Liston V. Central Iowa Ey. Co. (70 Iowa, 
 
 714), 306 
 Litchfield Coal Co. v. Taylor (81 111. 
 
 590), 108 
 Little V. City of Madison (42 Wis. 643; 
 
 s. 0. 24 Am. Rep. 436), 842 
 Little V. Hackett (116 U. S. 366), 141, 
 
 143. 144 
 Little V. lathrope (5 Greenleaf, 36), 281 
 Little V. McGaire (38 Iowa, 560; s. c. 
 
 48 Iowa, 447), 287 
 Little Miami &c. R. Co. v. Stevens (20 
 
 Ohio, 415), 416, 543 
 Little Eock Ac. Ry. Co. v. Atkins (46 
 
 Ark. 423), 188, 543 
 Little Eock ,&c. Ey. Co. v. Dick (52 
 
 Ark. 402), 162, 179 
 Little Eock &c. By. Co. v. Eabanks (44 
 
 Ar^. 460), 4^5 
 Little Eock <feo. Ey. Co. v. Finley (37 
 
 Ark. 562), 288, 291 
 Little Eock Ac. By. Co. v. Haynes (47 
 
 Ark. 497; s. o. 1 S. "W. Eep. 774), 
 
 23, 260 
 Little Bock Ac. Ey. Co. v. Hecht (38 
 
 Ark. 367), 317 
 Little Eock Ac. By. Co. v. Miles (40 
 
 Ark. 298; s. o. 48 Am. Eep. 10), 
 
 186, 197, 215, 278 
 Little Eock Ac .Ey. Co. v. Pankhurst (36 
 
 Ark. 371), 16, 69, 267, 264, 505 
 Little Eock Ac. Ey. Co. v. Talbot (47 
 
 Ark. 97), 223 
 Little Eock Ac. Ey. Co. v. Townsend, 
 
 (41 Ark. 382), 453 
 Little Eock Ac. By. Co. v. Turner (41 
 
 Ark. 161), 292 
 Littlejohn v. Fitchburg R. Co. (148 
 
 Mass. 478; s. o. 20 K. E. Eep. 103), 
 
 216, 225 
 Littlejohn v. Jones (2 McMuU, 366; s .c. 
 
 39 Am. Deo. 132), 369 
 Lizzie Frank, The (31 Fed. Eep. 477), 
 
 452, 453 
 Lloyd V. Lloyd (60 Vt. 288; s. c. 13 Atl. 
 
 Eep. 638), 97 
 Locke V. St. Paul Ac. E. Co. (16 Minn. 
 
 350), 77, 283, 292 
 Locke V. Sionx City Ac. B. Co. (46 
 
 Iowa, 109), 484 ' 
 Lockbart v. Lichtenthaler (46 Fenn. St. 
 
 161), 137, 138 
 Lockbart v. Little Eock Ac. Ey. Co. (40 
 
 Fed. Eep. 6.31), 390 
 Lockwood V. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (66 
 
 Wis. 60), 472, 484 , 
 Lockwood V. New York Ac. E. Co. (17 
 
 Wall. 357 ; s. o. 10 Am. Eep. 866), 186 
 Loeb V. City of Attica (82 Ind. 176; a. o. 
 
 42 Am. Eep. 494), 360 
 Loeaer v. Humphrey (41 Ohio St. 378; 
 
 s. 0. 62 Am. Rep. 86; 32 Alb. Law 
 
 Jour. 66), 97, 340, 523 
 
 Loewer v. City of Sedalia (77 Mo. 431), 
 
 328, 501, 563, 570 
 Lofrano v. New York Ac. Water 
 
 Co. (8 N. Y. Supl. 717; s. o. 55 
 
 Hun, 462), 462 
 Lofton V. Vogles (17 Ind. 108), 169 
 Loftus «. Union Ferry Co. (84 N. Y. 
 
 456; s. c. 38 Am. Eep. 588), 870 
 Logah V. Gedney (38 Cal. 679), 287 
 Logan V. Matthews (6 Penn. St. 417); 
 
 349 
 Logan V, Pontchartraih (11 Bobinson 
 
 (La.) 24; s. o. 43 Am. Dec. 199), 
 
 226 
 Longenecker v. Penn. E. Co. (105 Penn. 
 
 St. 328), 244, 546, 664, 670 
 LoDgmore v. Great Western Ey. Co. (19 
 
 C. B. (N. S) 183; s. 0. 115 Eng. 
 
 Com. L. 183), 186 
 Lord V. Pueblo Smelting A Befininsr Co. 
 
 (12 Colo. 390; s. o. 21 Pac. Bep. 
 
 148), 480 
 Lord V. Wormwood (29 Me. 282; s. o. 
 
 50 Am. Dec. 586), 281 
 Lord Melville, The (2 Shaw's App. 
 
 Cases, 395), 616 
 Lords Bailiff-Jurats of Eiomney Marsh 
 
 V. The Corporation of the Trinity 
 
 House (L. E. 6 Exch. 204; s. c. L. 
 
 E. 7 Excb. 247), 38 
 Lome V. Hotel Co. (116 Mass. 67), 73 
 Loughlin v. State (105 N. Y. 169; s.c. 
 
 11 H. B. Eep. 371), 412, 419, 432 
 Louisville Ac. Canal Co. v. Murphy's 
 
 Admr. (9 Bush, 621), 127, 168, 
 
 407, 642 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Allen (78 Ala. 
 
 494), 461 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Ballard (88 Ky. 
 
 169; 8.0. 10 S. ,W. Eep. 429; 2 
 
 Mete. 177), 213, 280, 290, 294 
 Louisville Ac. B. Co. v. Bisch (120 
 
 Ind. 649; s. c. 23 N. E. Bep. 662), 
 
 192 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Boland (53 Ind. 
 
 402), 689 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Bowles (9 Heisk. 
 
 866), 416, 418 
 Louisville Ac. B. Co. «. Brooks' Adm'r 
 
 (88 Ky. 129), 98, 409, 426 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Buck (116 Ind, 
 
 666; 8. c. 19 N. E. Bep. 463), 391, 
 
 471 
 Louisville Ac. B. Co. v. Burke (6 Cold. 
 
 46), 245, 277 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Cahill (68 Ind. 
 
 , 34), 298, 302, 309 
 Louisville Ac. B. Co. v. Carroll (6 Heisk. 
 
 347), 123 
 , Louisville Ac. B. Co. », Case's Admr, 
 
 (9 Bush, 728), 142, 407 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Caven's Adm'r 
 
 (9 Bush, 5B9), 408 
 
Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The referenccB are to pages.] 
 
 Louisville &c. E. Co. v. Coleman's' 
 Adm'r (86 Ky. 556; s. o. 6 S. W. 
 Eep. 438;- 8 S. W. Rep. 875), 279 
 Louiaville <fcc. E. Co. v. Collins (2 Duv. 
 114), 17, 86, 89, 93, 126, 245, 408, 
 409, 423 
 Louisville &c. E; Co. «. Commonwealth 
 (13 Bush, 388; s. c. 26 Am. Eep. 
 205), 244 
 Louisville &c. E. Co. v. Connor (9 
 
 Heiak. 19), 277 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Conroy (63 
 
 Miss. 562), 434 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Cruni (119 Ind. 
 542; s. c. 21 N. E. Eep. 31), 188, 
 208 
 Louisville <fec. E. Co. e. Filbern'sAdmx. 
 
 (6 Bush, 574), 125, 407 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Francis (58 
 
 Ind. 389), 300 
 Louisville Ac, E. Co. v. Frawley (110 
 Ind. 18; s. o. 9 N. E. Eep. 594), 
 391,468 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Goetz (79 Ky. 
 442; s. 0. 42 Am. Eep. 227), 17, 
 236,236,239,542,644,563,570 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co! v. Goodbar (102 
 " Ind. 596), 302, 303 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. ®. Goodell (17 B. 
 
 . Mon. 586), 407 
 Louisville Ac. E.* Co. «. Gower (1 Pick. 
 465; s. 0. 3 S. W. Rep. 824; 86 
 Tenn. 465), 26, 473 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. ■». Graham (124 
 Ind. 89; s. o. 24 N. E. Rep. 668), 
 457 • 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Hagan (87 Ind. 
 
 602), 313, 639 . 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v. Hall (87 Ala. 
 
 708; s. 0. 6 So. Eep. 277), 470 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Hart (119 
 Ind. 273; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 763), 
 316 
 LouisvUIe Ac. E. Co. v. Head (80 Ind. 
 
 117), 539 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. v. Herd (80 Ind. 
 
 117), 249 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. ■». Howard (82 Ky. 
 
 212), 260 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Hurst (98 
 
 Ind. 330), 301 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. «. Jones (108 
 
 Ind. 561), 43 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. v. Katzenberger 
 (16 Lea (Tenn.) 880; s. o. 57 Am. 
 Eep. 282; 1 S. W. Eep. 44), 226, 
 227, 228 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. «. Kelly (92 Ind. 
 371; B. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 149), 9S, 
 192 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Kelsey (89 
 Ala. 287; s. o. 7 So. Eep. 648), 39 
 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Krinning (87 
 
 Ind. 351), 313, 539 
 Louisville Ac. E. Co. v.- Lahr (2 Pick. 
 
 335; B. c. 6 S. W. Eep. 663), 420 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co.- b, Lockridge (93 
 
 Ind. 191), 539 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. ■». Lucas (119 
 Ind. 583; s. c. 21.1T. E. Rep. 968), 
 206 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. McVay (98 
 Ind. 891; B. o. 49 Am. Eep. 770), 
 438 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Mask (64 Miss. 
 738; B. c. 2 So. Eep. 360), 208, 213 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. v. Milton (14 B. 
 Mon. 75; s. c. 5? Am. Dec. 647), 
 282, 291, 294 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Mahoney(7 
 
 Bush, 235), 125, 407 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. «. Moore (83 Ky. 
 
 676), 409, 426 
 LouisvUIe Ac. E. Co. «. Oden (80 Ala. 
 
 38), 223 
 LouisvUIe Ac. R. Co. v. Orr (84 Ind. 
 
 50), 639 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. B. Pedigo (108 
 
 Ind. 481), 185 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Perry (87 Ala. 
 
 892; 8. c. 6 So. Eep. 40), 472 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. ■». Petty (67 Miss. 
 
 255; s. c. 7 So. Rep. 361), 429 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. ,». Richardson (66 
 Ind. 48; a. o. 32 Am. Rep. 94), 
 313, S16 
 LouisviUe Ac R. Co. v. Robinson (4 
 Bush, 607), 17, 89, 126, 127, 408, 
 409, 425 
 LomsviUe Ac. R. Co. i>. Rusk (116 
 
 Ind. 666), 392 
 LouisvUIe Ac. E. Co.®. Sandford (117 
 Ind. 266; s. 0. 19 If. E. Eep. 770), 
 85 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Schmidt (81 
 
 Ind. 264), 247 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. ®. Schuster (7 S. 
 
 W. Eep. 874), 245 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Shanks (94 Ind. 
 
 698), 17 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. v. Sheets (13 S. 
 
 W. Eep. 248), 426 
 LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. v. SickUngs (6 
 
 Bush, 1), 125, 127, 200, 407 
 LouisviUe . Ac. R. Co. «. Simmons (86 
 Ky 151; s. o. 3 S. W. Rep. 10), 
 302 
 LouisviUe Ac. E. Co. ■». Smith (67 
 
 Miss. 15), 292 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Snyder (117 
 Ind. 436; s. o. 20 N. E. 284), 186, 
 199 
 Louisville Ac. R. Co. v. Spain (61 Ind. 
 460), 310 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Stacker (2 Pickle, 
 
 343; s. 0. 6 S. W. Rep. 131), 410 
 LoaisTille <&c. B. Co. v. SnUivan (81 
 Ky. 624; s. c. 60 Am. Bep. 186), 
 
 508 
 LonisviUe <frc. B. Co. v. Snmner (106 
 
 Ind. 65), 306 
 LooisyiUe &c. R. Co. v. Thomas (106 
 
 Ind. 10), 301 
 LoDisYille ^c. R. Co. t). Thompson 
 
 (lOT Ind. 442), 186 
 LonisTille &c. B. Co. c. Upton (18 HI. 
 
 App. 606), 301 
 Louisville &c.' B. Co. «. Wainscot (3 
 
 Bosh, 149), 282, 294 
 Lonisville Ac B. Co. v. Whitsell (68 
 
 Ind. 29"?), 299, 302 
 Lonisville Ac. B. Co. c. Wolfe (80 Ey. 
 
 82), 29, 233 
 LotuByille &c. B. Co. «. YniestTa(21 
 
 Fla. 100\ 13, 48 
 Lovejoy v. Boston <!cc. B. Co. (125 
 
 Mass. 79; s. 0. 28 Am. Bep. 206), 
 
 426, 450, ill 
 Loveng;nth o. (^ty of Bloomington (71 
 
 111.238), 367 
 Lovett e. Salem <fcc. B. Go. (9 Allen, 
 
 567), 164, 182 
 Low B. Grand Trunk By. Co. (72 Me. 
 
 313; s. c. 39 Am. Bep. 331), 62 
 Lowell o. Watertown (68 Mich. 668), 50 
 Lowery r. Manhattan By. Co. (99 N. Y. 
 
 168; 8. o. 62 Am. Rep. 12), 40 
 Loyd v. Hannibal &e. R. Co. (53 Mo. 
 
 609), 188 
 Lucas e. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (33 
 
 Wis. 41; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 735), 
 
 198 
 Lncas v. New Bedford Ac. R. Co. (6 
 
 Gray, 64), 190, 538 
 Lucas V. Pennsvlvania Co. (120 Ind. 
 
 206; 8. c. 21 N. B.Rep. 972), 206 
 Lucas e. Taunton 4c. R. Co. (6 Gray, 
 
 71), 168 
 Lnddington v. Miller (4 Jones & Sp. 1), 
 
 74 
 Ludwig ». Fillsbury (85 Miim. 256), 
 
 566 
 Luebke v. Chicago Ac B. Co. (59 Wis. 
 
 127; 8. o. 48 Am. Rep. 483), 408, 
 
 431, 456, 460 
 Luebke e. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (63 Wis. 
 
 91; 8. c. 68 Am. Bep. 266), 446, 
 
 458 
 Lnmley e. Caswell (47 Iowa, 189), 481, 
 
 482 
 Lund «. Tyngsboro (11 Cush. 563; s. o. 
 
 69 Am. Dec. 169), 56 
 Lnnt V. London Ac. By. Co. (L. B. 1 Q. 
 
 B. 277), 348 
 Lusk V. Belote (22 Minn. 468), 524 
 Luther v. Worcester (97 Mass. 
 
 366 
 
 H 
 
 Luxford ®. Large (6 Car. & P. 421), 44 
 Lygo V. Newbold (24 L. A Eq. 507; s. c. 
 
 9 Exch. 302), 76, 76, 159, 197, 216 
 Lyman e. Gibson (18 Pick. 422), 293 
 Lynam «. Union B. Co. (114 Mass. 83), 
 
 876, 379 
 Lynch ». Hurdin (1 Q. B. 29; s. o. 4 
 
 Per. A Dav. 672; 5 Jur. 797), 26, 
 
 110, 174, 175, 267 
 Lynch e. Smith (104 Mass. 52; s. o. 6 
 
 Am. Bep. 188), 164, 157, 174, 181 
 Lynn v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (63 Miss. 
 
 157), 468 
 Lyon V. Detroit Ac. R. Co. (31 Mich. 
 
 429), 484 
 Lyon, The John B. (33 Fed. Rep. 184), 
 
 391 
 Lyons ». Broadway Ac. B. Co. (10 K. 
 
 Y. Supl. 237), 373 
 Lyons ». Brookline (119 Mass. 491), 
 
 179, 363 
 Lyons «. Child (61 N. H. 72), 63 
 Lyons «. DesoteUe (124 Mass. 387), 347 
 Lyons o. Merrick (105 Mass. 71), 281, 
 
 341 
 Lyons v. New York Ac. E. Co. (39 Hun, 
 
 385), 464 
 Lyons v. Terre Haute Ac. B. Co. (101 
 
 Ind. 419), 283 
 Lyons ». Union Pac. By. Co. (35 Fed. 
 
 Bep. Ill), 186 
 
 M. 
 
 McAlpine v. Powell (70 N. Y. 126; s. c. 
 
 26 Am. Bep. 556; 65 How. Prac. 
 
 163), 71, 179, 261, 271, 629 
 McAndrews v. Burns (30 N. J. Law, 
 
 117), 408, 414, 433 
 McAnnidi v. Mismssippi Ac. B. Co> (20 
 
 Iowa, 338), 31, 42, 192 
 McBride v. Kansas City Ac. B. Co. (20 
 
 Mo. App. 216), 296 
 McBride v. Northern Pac. E. Co. (19 
 
 Or. 64; s. o. 23 Pac. Bep. 814), 
 
 239 
 McBride v. Union Pac. By. Co. (21 Pac. 
 
 Bep. 687), 412 
 McCall V. Chamberlain (13 Wis. 637), 
 
 282, 298, 310 
 McCall V. BaUroad Co. (64 N. Y. 643), 
 
 237, 239 
 McCandless «. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (45 
 
 Wis. 865), 285 
 McCandless v. McWha (22 Penn. St. 
 
 261; s. 0. 25 Penn. St 95), 621, 522 
 McCann v. Sixth Ave. B. Co. (117 N. 
 
 Y. 505; 23 N. E. Bep. 164), 39 
 McCarthy- V. Cass Ave. By. Co. (92 Mo. 
 
 536; 8. o. 4 S. W. Bep. 616), 160 
 McCarthy v. Portland (67 Me. 167; s. o. 
 
 24 Am. Bep. 23), 339 
 
Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 McCasker v. Long Island &c. B. Co. 
 
 (84 N. Y. 11), 415, 418 
 McCawley v. Furness K. Co. (L. R. 8 
 
 Q. B. SI), 225 
 MoCeUand v. LonisTille <&c. B. Co. (94 
 
 Ind. 276), 505 
 MoClain a.Brootlvn City R. Co. (116 
 
 N. y. 459; s"o. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1062), S19 
 MoClary v. Lowell (44 Vt. 116; s. o. 
 
 8 Am. Rep. 366), 68, 231, 849 
 McCleneghan v. Omaha <fec. R. Co. (25 
 
 Neb. 623; s. o. 41 N. W. Rep. 350), 
 
 97 
 McCollin V. Reed (16 Week. Notes Cas. 
 
 287), 529 
 McCool V. Galena <fco. R. Co. (17 Iowa, 
 
 461), 289 
 McCorkle v. CMcago &c. R. Co. (61 
 
 Iowa 555), 186, 197, 278 
 McCoy V. California &c. E. Co. (40 Cal. 
 
 632; s. 0. 6 Am. Rep. 623), 290, 
 
 310 
 McCoy V. Empire Warehouse Co. (10 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 99), 458 
 McCoy V. Philadelphia &c. E. Co. (5 
 
 Hous. (Del.) 599), 17 
 McCready v. South Carolina R. Co. (2 
 
 - Strobh. (Law) 356), 313 
 MoCrory v. Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (31 
 
 Fed. Rep. 631), 48, 264 
 McCue V. Klein (60 Tex. 168; s. c. 48 
 
 Am. Rep. 260), 609 
 McCullongh V. Shonemau (105 Penn. 
 
 St. 169), 438 
 McCullum V. Long Island E. Co. (38 
 
 Hud, 669), 142 
 McCutcheon v. Homer (43 Mich. 483; 
 
 s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 212), 323 
 McDade v. Washington <fcc. R. Co. (5 
 
 Mackey (D. C.) 144), 448 
 McDermottv. Hannibal, &c. E. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 286), 431, 480 
 McDermott v. Third Ave. R. Co. (44 
 
 Hun, 107), 652 
 McDonald v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (26 
 
 Iowa, 124), 186, 206, 233 
 McDonald v. Chicago &o. R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 439; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 
 
 880), 462 
 McDonald v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (75 
 
 Wis. 121 ; s. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 744), 
 
 272 
 McDonald v. Long Island R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 646; s. o. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1068), 209 
 McDonald v. Rockhill Iron & Coal Co. 
 
 (19 Atl. Rep. 797; s. o. 26 W. N. 
 
 C. 101), 478 
 McDonald *. Union Pac, Ry. Co. (36 
 
 Fed. Rep. 38), 70 
 McDonnell v. Pittsfield &c. R. Co. (115 
 
 Mass. 664), 281, 293, 306, 309 
 
 McDonough v. Metropolitan R. Co. 
 
 (137 Mass. 210), 372, 380, 387 
 McDowell V. Chesapeake <fec. E. Co. (5 
 
 S. W. Eep. 413), 483 
 McDowell V. New York <fec. R. Co. (37 
 
 Barb. 196), 294, 299, 307 
 McElroy v. Nashua &c. R. Co. (4 Cush. 
 
 400), 186 
 McEnery v. Waterford & Kilkenny Ry. 
 
 Co.,(8 It. C. L. R. 312), 499 
 McFadden v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. (92 
 
 Mo. 349; s. o. 4 S. W. K. 689), 
 
 223 
 McPee V. Vicksburg &c. E. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 790; s. o. 7 So. Eep. 720). 
 
 446 
 McGan ». O'Neil (6 Colo. 425), 288 
 McGarth v. Village of Bloomer (73 Wis. 
 
 29^ 23 
 McGary v. Loomis (63 N. Y. 104; s. o. 
 
 20 Am. E. 512), 47, 160, 154, 166, 
 
 181,182,362.363 
 McGatrick v. Wason (4 Ohio St. 566), 
 
 231 
 MoGeary v. East Ac. R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 363), 150, 154 
 McGee a. Boston Cordage Co. (139 
 
 Mass. 446; s. c. 1 East. Rep. 126), 
 
 403, 414, 443, 468 
 McGee v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (92 Mo. 
 
 208; a.c. 4 S. W. Eep. 739), 95, 
 
 198 
 McGinty v. Ciiy of Keokuk (66 Iowa, 
 
 725), 49, 326, 329, 330 
 McGlynn v. Brodie (81 CaL 376), 443 
 McGovern v. New York Ac. E. Co. (67 
 
 N.Y. 417),263 
 McGowan «. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (61 
 
 Mo. 628), 412, 428 
 McGrath v. Detroit Ac. R. Co. (57 Mich. 
 
 666), 300 
 McGrath v. Hudson River JB.. Co. (32 
 
 Barb. 144; s. o. 19 How. Pr. 211; 
 
 59 N.Y. 468; 17 Am. Rep. 369), 
 
 89, 286, 244 
 McGrath v. Merwin (112 Mass. 467; 
 
 s. o. 17 Am. Rep. 119), 230, 348 
 McGrath v. New York Ac. E. Co. (14 
 
 E. L 357), 466 
 McGrew v. Stone (53 Penn. St. 436), 40 
 McGuire v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (37 Fed. 
 
 Eep. 54), 175 
 McGuire v. Hudson Ac. E. Co. (2 Daly, 
 
 761), 238 
 McGuire v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. (23 
 
 Mo. App. 326), 296 
 McGuire v. Spence (91 N. Y. 303 ; s. c. 
 
 43 Am. Rep. 668), 47, 381, 362, 
 
 363 
 Mclntire v. Roberts (149 Mass. 460; s. c. 
 
 22 N. E. Rep. 13), 388 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pagee.] 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 Mcintosh V. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (26 Mo. 
 
 App. 377), 295 
 Mclntyre «. New York Ac. R. Co. (48 
 
 Barb. 632 ; s. o. 87 N. T. 287), 192 
 McKaSg V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (42 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 288), 429 
 McKean v. Borlington Ac. R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 192), 17, 81 
 McKee v. Nelson (4 Cowen, 366), 609 
 McKeever v. Market St &c. R. Co. (69 
 
 CaL 294), 563, 564, 670 
 McKellar v. City of Detroit (67 Mich. 
 
 168), 366 
 McKeller v. Township of Monitor (78 
 
 Mich. 485; s. o. 44 N. W. Rep. 412), 
 
 32,42 
 McKimble v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (139 
 
 Mass. 542; s. o. 141 Mass. 468), 84, 
 
 218, 637 
 McEjnne v. Califoniia &c. R. Co. (6 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 505), 391 
 McEinney «, NeU (1 McLean, 540), 67 
 McEone v. Michigan &e. R. Co. (51 
 
 Mich. 601; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 596), 
 
 71, 233 
 McKnne v. CaL Sonthern R. Co. (66 Cal. 
 
 302), 419,426 
 McLain v. Yan Zandt (7 Jones <!; Spen- 
 cer, 447), 150, 1.54 
 McLane v. Sharpe (2 Harr. (DeL) 481), 
 
 368 
 McLanghlin v. City of Corry (77 Penn. 
 
 St. 109; S.O. 18 Am. Rep. 482). 
 
 355 
 McLamry ». City of McGregor (64 Iowa, 
 
 717), 826, 332, 833, 563, 565 
 McLean v. Bine Point &c. Co. (61 Cal. 
 
 255), 402, 412 
 McLean ». Bnrbank (11 Minn. 277). 86 
 McMahon ». Davidson (12 Minn. 367), 
 
 148, 456 
 McMahon v. New York (33 N. Y. 642), 
 
 161 
 McMahon v. Northern Ac. R. Co. (89 
 
 Md. 489), 154, 156, 181, 278, 279 
 McManns v. Lancashire Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (3 Hnrl. & N. 328), 220 
 McMarra v. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (41 Wis. 
 
 69), 317 
 McMaster v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (4 So. 
 
 Rep. 69), 428 
 McMillan v. Burlington Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Iowa, 231), 266 
 McMnrtrey o. Louisville Ac R. Co. (67 
 
 Miss. 601; s. o. 7 So. Rep. 401), 
 
 188,661 
 McNamara v. Clintonville (62 Wis. 207; 
 
 s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 722), 43 
 McNarra v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (41 Wis. 
 
 69), 82 
 
 McNanghton v. Caledonian R. Co. (22 
 
 Dnnl. B. & M. 160; s. o. 31 Jur. 
 
 94; Hay's Dec. 206), 45 
 McNeal «. Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. (131 
 
 Penn. St. 184; s. o. 18 Atl. Rep. 
 
 1026), 264 
 
 McNulta V. Ensch (134 lU. 46; 8. o. 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 621), 211 
 McPheeters v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (45 
 
 Mo. 23), 287 
 McPherson v. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 253; s. c. 10 S. W. Rep. 846), 
 
 445 
 McPhillips V. New York Ac. R. Co. (12 
 
 Daly, 365), 161 
 McQneen ». Chicago Ac. R. Co. (80 
 
 Ean 689), 197 
 McQuilken v. Central Ac. R. Co. (50 Cal. 
 
 7; s. c. 64 CaL 463), 210, 543 
 McRicard v. Flint (114 N. Y. 222; s. o. 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 168; 13 Daly, 641), 
 
 73 
 McSwyny «. Broadway Ac. R. Co. (7 N. 
 
 Y. SupL 456), 372 
 McWilliams v. Pluladielphia Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (16 Atl. Rep. 654), 254 
 
 MacEalley's Case (9 Coke, 66; s. o. Cro. 
 
 Jac. 279), 344 
 Mabley v. Kittleberger (87 Mich. 360), 
 
 23, 368 
 MacdougaQ v. Central Ac. R. Co. (63 
 
 Cal. 481), 648 
 Mack v. Lombard Ac. R. Co. (8 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 305; s. o. 18 Wash. Law 
 
 Rep. 84), 89 
 Mackay v. New York Ac. R. Co. (86 N. 
 
 Y. 76), 260 
 Mackey v. City of Vicksbnrg (64 Miss. 
 
 777; 8. o. 2 So. Rep. 178), 161, 
 
 178 
 MacMn v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (186 Mass. 
 
 201; s. 0. 46 Am. Rep. 456), 428, 
 
 450 
 Macklin v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 
 
 (7 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 236), 226 
 Maclennan v. Long Island R. Co. (52 N. 
 
 Y. Super. Ct. 22), 208 
 Macomb ». Smithers (6 Br.adw. 470), 49 
 Macomber v. Nichols (34 Mich. 212; 
 
 s. o. 22 Am. Rep. 522), 342 
 Macon v. California Ac. R. Co. (40 CaL 
 
 532), 292 
 Macon Ac. R. Co. v. Baber (42 Ga. 300) 
 
 288, 291, 292 
 Macon Ac. R. Co. v. Davis (27 Ga. 113; 
 
 8. 0. 18 Ga. 679; 18 Ga. 68), 86, 89, 
 
 98, 102, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 
 
 245, 247, 285, 291, 807 
 Macon Ac. R. Co. v. Johnson (88 Ga 
 
 409), 98, 121 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 TABLE 01 OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Macon &o. R. Co. v. Lester (?0 Ga. 
 
 911), 288, 292 
 Macon <fec. R. Co. v. MoConnell (27 Ga. 
 
 481), 313, 316 
 Macon Ac. R. Co. v. Vaughn (48 Ga. 
 
 464), 288, 294 
 Macon <tc. R. Go. v. Winn (19 Ga. 440; 
 
 s. o.26Ga. 260), 18, 31, 119 
 Macy V. St. Paul <fec. R. Co. (35 Minn. 
 
 200), 430 
 Mad River R. Co. v. Barber (5 Ohio' St. 
 
 641), 444, 451, 463, 478 
 Madan v. Sherard (73 N. T. 329; s. o. 
 
 29 Am. Rep. 153), 228 
 Madden v. Chesapeake &e. R. Co. (28 
 
 W. Va. 610; s. o. 67 Am. Rep. 
 
 695), 426 
 Madden v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 303), 447 
 Maddox v. Cunningham (68 Ga. 431; 
 
 s. 0. 45 Am. Rep. 600), 362 
 Maddox v. Railway Company (38 L. T. 
 
 (N. S.)468), 205 
 Madison, City of, ®. Ross (3 Ind. 236; 
 
 s. 0. 64 Am. Dec. 481), 25 
 Magee v. Nqrth Pac. R. Co. (78 Cal. 
 
 430), 467 
 Maginliis v. Canada Southern Bridge 
 
 Co. (49 Mich. 171), 462 
 MagiitniB v. New York <fec. R. Co (52 N. 
 
 T. ai6), 67, 235, 253 
 M^nin v. Dinsmore (70 N. Y. 410; 8. o. 
 
 26 Am. Rep. 608; 66 N. Y. 168), 
 
 222 
 Magorfo v. Little (23 Blatchf. 399; s. o. 
 
 25 Fed. Rep, 627), 94 
 Maguire v. Middlesex R. Co. (116 Mass. 
 
 239), 382, 383 
 Maguire v. Russell (12 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 
 
 1071, Sc), 436 
 Maher v. Atlantic &c. R. Co. (64 Mo. 
 
 267), 264, 272 
 Mahlen v. Lake Shore <fec. R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 686), 246, 265 
 Mahogany v. Ward (17 Atl. Rep. 860), 
 
 39 
 Mahoney «. Metropolitan R. Co. (104 
 
 Mass. 73), 368 
 Makepeace v. Worden (1 N. H. 16), 281 
 Malcom v. Richmond <fec. R. Co. (106 
 : N. 0. 63; 8. 0. 11 a. E. Rep. 187), 
 
 192 
 Mallard v. Ninth Aye. R. Co. (7 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 666), 166 
 Mallory a. Griffey (86 Penn. St. 275), 
 
 643 
 Malone v. Boston &c. R. Co. (4 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 699; s. o. 61 Hun, 532), 266 
 Malone v. Hathaway (64 N. Y. 6; 8. o. 
 
 21 Am. Rep. 573), 412, ,415, 461 
 Malone v. Morton (84 Mo.' 436), 447 
 Maloy ®. New York &c. R. Co. (68 
 
 Barb 182), 827, 330 
 
 Maloy V. Wabasli <fco. Ry. Co. (84 Mo- 
 
 270), 62, 264 
 Maltby v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (62 
 
 Mich. 108), 250 
 Manchester <fec. Ry. Co. v. Wallis (14 C. 
 
 B. 213; 8. 0. 23 L. J. (C. P.) 186), 
 310 
 
 Manderschid ».| City of Dubuque (29 
 
 Iowa, 73; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 196), 
 
 334 
 Mangamt v. Brooklyn Ac. R. Co. (36 
 
 Barb. 239; s. c. 38 N. Y. 456), 160, 
 
 161, 153, 181, 182, 375 
 Mangam v. Attertou (4 Hurl. A Colt. 
 
 388; 8. c. L. R. 1 Exch. 239), 160, 
 
 176, 177, 179, 267 
 Mangerton, The (1 Swab. 120), 53 
 Manly v. Wilmington Ac. R. Co. (74 N. 
 
 0. 655), 23, 30, 42, 176, 257, 606, 
 
 538 
 Mann «. Birohard (40 Vt. 826), 221 
 Mann «. Central Ac. R. Co. (65 Vt. 484; 
 
 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 628), 250 
 Mann v. Oriental Print Works (11 R. I. 
 
 162), 414, 417, 460 
 Mann v. Williamson (70 Mo. 661),. 296 
 Mansfield Ac. Co. v. MoEnery (91 Penn. 
 
 St. 185; 8. 0. 36 Am. Rep. 662), 49, 
 
 478 
 Mantel v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (33 Minn. 
 
 62), 246 
 Manufacturing Co. v. Morrissey (40 Ohio 
 'St. 148; 8. o. 48 Am. Rep. 669), 
 
 444, 483 
 Manville v. Cleveland Ac. R. Co. (11 
 
 Ohio St. 417), 413, 428 
 Manz V. St. Louis Ac. By. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 278), 296 
 Manzoni v. Douglas (6 L, B. Q. B. Div. 
 
 145), 563 
 Marble v. Ross (124 Mass. 44), 22, 51, 
 
 69, 75, 105 
 Marble ®. Worcester (4 Gray, 404), 328 
 Marean v. Vanatta (88 111. 132), 632 
 Marfell v. South Wales Ac. Ry. Co. (8 
 
 C. B. (N. S.) 525; s. o. 7 Ins. (N. 
 S.) 240; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 316; 8 
 Week. Rep. 765; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 
 629), 300 
 
 Marietta Ac. R. Co. v. Picksley (24 
 
 Ohio St. 664), 239 
 Marietta Ac. R. Co. v. Stevenson (24 
 
 Ohio St. 48), 287 
 Marini v. Graham (67 Cal. 180), 322 
 Mark v. Hunson Ac. B. Co. (56 How. 
 
 Pr. 108), 30 
 Mark v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (30 Minn. 
 
 493), 56 
 Markham v. Houston Direct Nav. Co. 
 
 (73 Tex. 247; s. o. 11 S. W. Rep. 
 
 131), 142 
 Markin v. Priddy (39 Kan. 462; s. o. 18 
 
 Pac. Rep. 614), 805 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 IThe references are to pogeB.l 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 Marks d. Borum (1 Baxt. 8T; s. o. 26 
 
 Am. Rep. 764), 642 
 Marquette tScc. R. Co. v. Spear (44 Micli. 
 
 169; 8. o. S8 Am. Rep. 242), 49, 
 
 314, 317 
 Marriott v. Stanley (1 Scott's N. E. 
 
 Mars o. Delaware Ac. Canal Co. (8 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 107; s. o. 54 Hnn, 625), 39 
 Marsh v. Benton County (75 Iowa, 469; 
 
 s. o. 39 N. W. Rep. 713), 26 
 Marsh v. Chickering (101 N, Y. 396), 
 
 483 
 Marsh v. New York Ac. R. Co. (14 
 
 Barb. 364), 282, 290, 302, 308 
 March v. South Carolina R. Co. (66 Ga. 
 
 274), 471 
 Marshall v. Ipswich (110 Mass. 622), 
 
 384 
 Marshall v. Schricker (63 Mo. 208), 413 
 Marshall v. Stewart (2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 
 
 30; s. 0. 1 Pat. Sc. App. 447; 33 
 
 Eng. Law & Eq. I; 39 Am. & Eng. 
 
 B. Gas. 882, n.), 85, 400, 446, 485 
 Marshall «. Widdicomb Furniture Co. 
 
 (67 Mich. 167; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 
 541), 448 
 Morsland v. Murray (148 Mass. 91 ; s. o. 
 
 18 N. E. Rep. 680), 181 
 Martensen v. Ciiicago Ac. R. Co. (60 
 
 Iowa, 706), 24 
 Martin v. Baltimore Ac. R. Co. (14 West 
 
 Va. 180; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 748), 
 
 186 
 Martin v. Bishop (69 "Wis. 417), 17, 27 
 Martin D. CahiU (39 Hun, 446), 178, 
 Martin v. Great Northern Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (16 C. B. 179; 8. o. 81 Eng. Com. 
 
 Law, 179), 206, 644 
 Martin©. Stewart (73 Wis. 558; s. o. 41 
 
 N. W. Rep. 638), 290, 297 
 Martin v. Wallace (40 Ga. 62), 66 
 Martin v. Ward (14 C. of S. Cas. (N. S.) 
 
 814), 137, 181 
 Martin v. Western Ac. R. Co. (23 Wis. 
 
 437), 313, 815 
 Martin v. Wood (6 N. Y. Supl. 274), 91 
 Marty v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (38 Minn. 
 
 108; 8. o. 86 N. W. Rep. 670), 251 
 Marvin v. Wilber (52 N. Y. 270, 278), 
 
 216 
 Maryland v. Kttsbnrgh Ac. R. Co. (123 
 
 Penn. St. 487; a. o. 23 W. N. C. 
 
 95: 16 Atl. Rep. 623, 624), 238 
 Maryland Central R. Co. v. Neubeur (62 
 
 Md. 891), 67 
 Mascheck v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (3 Mo. 
 
 App. 600), 160 
 Maslin v. Baltimore Ac. R. Co. (14 
 
 West. Va. 180; s. o. 85 Am. Rep. 
 
 748), 223, 226 
 Mason v. Edison Machine Works (28 
 
 Fed. Rep. 228), 414 
 
 Mason e. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (27 Kan. 
 
 83; s. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 405), 69, 116, 
 
 261, 263, 278 
 Mason v. Thompson (9 Pick, 280; s. o. 
 
 20 Am. Dec: 471), 524 
 Masser v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa, 602), 68 
 Masterton «. New York Ac. E. Co. (84 
 
 N. Y. 247; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 610), 
 
 182, 143 
 Mathews v. Case (61 Wis. 491; s. c. 50 
 
 Am. Rep. 151), 431 
 Mathews «. London Street Tramway Co. 
 
 (68 L. J. Q. B. 12), 137 
 Matson v. Mauphin (76 Ala. 312), 25 
 Matta B. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (69 Mich. 
 
 109; s. c. 32 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 71), 105 
 Matthews v. Bonaee (51 N. J. Law, 30; 
 
 8. o. 16 Atl. Rep. 195), 70, 74 
 Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (26 
 
 Mo. App. 75), 566 
 Matthews v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (18 
 
 Minn. 434), 307 
 Matthews v. Warner (29 Gratt. 570; 
 
 a. o. 26 Am. Rep. 396), 97 
 Mauch Chunk, Borough of, v. Kline (100 
 
 Penn. St. 119; s. o. 45 Am. Rep. 
 
 364), 857 
 Maultby v. City of Leavenworth (28 
 
 Kan. 745), 326, 328 
 Maumus «. Champion (40 Cal. 121), 91 
 Mauritz v. New York Ac. R. Co. (23 
 
 Fed. Rep. 766), 227 
 Max Morrfs, The (28 Fed. Rep. 881), 
 
 616, 519 
 Maxim «. Town of Champion (4 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 516; s. 0. 50 Hun, 88), 334 
 Maxwell v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 96), 454 
 May «. Central R. Ac. Co. (80 Ga. 368; 
 
 8.0. 4S. E. Rep. 830), 263 
 May V. Hanson (5 Cal. 360; 8. o. 63 Am. 
 
 Dec. 135), 369, 543 
 Mayberry v. Concord Ac. R. Co. (47 N. 
 
 H. 891), 281, 806, 309 
 Maybey, The R. L. (4 Blatchf. 88), 
 
 519 
 Mayes «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (63 Iowa, 
 
 562), 478 
 Mayhew «. Burns (103 Ind. 328), 169 
 Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. (76 Me. 
 
 100; 8. 0. 19 Am. Law Rev. 328), 
 
 418, 434, 467 
 Maynard v. Boston Ac, R. Co. (116 
 
 Mass. 458; s. o. 16 Am. Rep. 119), 
 
 281, 297 
 Mayo ®. Boston Ac. R. Co. (104 Mass. 
 
 187), 548 
 Mayor v. Marriott (9 Md. 160), 356, 358 
 Mayor Ac. of New York v. Bailey (2 
 
 Denio, 433), 25 
 
Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke Cl Q. B. 
 
 877), 162, 164, 681 
 Mayton v. Texas Ac. By. Co. (68 Tex. 
 
 11; a. c. 61 Am. Eep. 687), 438 
 Mead v. Burlington <fce. B. Co. (52 Vt. 
 
 278), 290,",310 
 Meara's Adm's «. Holbrook (20 Ohio 
 
 St. 137; s. o. 5 Am. Bep. 633), 
 
 440 
 Meek v. Pennsylvania B.' Co. (38 Ohio 
 
 St. 632), 263 
 Meeks v. Southern &c. B. Co. (52 Cal. 
 
 602; s. 0. 56 Cal. 613; 38 Am. 
 
 Bep. 67), 29, 67, 69, 161, 154, 169, 
 
 265, 270, 273 
 Meesel «. Lynn <fec. E. \Co. (8 Allen, 
 
 234), 87sr, 382, 383, 671 
 Mehan ®. Syracuse <fec. E. Co. (73 N. T. 
 
 585), 49, 479, 484 
 Meibus v. Dodge (38 Wis. 800; s. o. 20 
 
 Am. Eep. 6), 176, 178, 266 
 Mellor V. Merchants' Manfg. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 362; s. o. 28 N. E. Eep. 100), 
 
 438 
 Memphis & Charleston E. Co. v. Hem- 
 
 bree (84 Ala. 182; s. o. 4 So. Bep. 
 
 392), 43 
 Memphis & Charleston B. Co. «. Whit- 
 field (44 Miss. 466; s. c. 7 Am. 
 
 Bep. 699), 212 
 Memphis &e. B. Co. v. Askew (90 Ala. 
 
 5; s. o. 7 So. Bep. 828), 448, 472 
 Memphis &c. E. Co. v. Blakeney (43 
 
 Miss. 218), 288, 291 
 Memphis &e. E. Co. v. Jones (2 Head, 
 
 517), 18, 496 
 Memphis Ac. E. Co v. Orr (43 Miss. 
 
 279), 294 
 Memphis &c. B. Co; v. Salinger (46 
 
 Ark. 528), 192 
 Memphis <fec. E. Co. «. Shoeoraft (13 
 
 S. W. Eep. 422), 292 
 Memphis &o. E. Go. v. Stringfellow (44 
 
 Ark. 822; s. o. 51 Am. Bep. 598), 
 
 211 
 Memphis &c. B. Co. v. Thomas (51 Miss. 
 
 687), 403, 484 
 Memphis <fec. E, Co. v. Womack (84 
 
 Ala. 149; s. c. 4 So. Eep. 618), 242, 
 
 275, 278 
 Mentges v. New York &c. E. Co. (1 
 
 Hilt. 426), 284, 308 
 Mentz V. Second Ave. E. Co. (2 Bobt. 
 
 356; s. 0. 3 Abb. App. Dec. 274), 
 
 375, 379 
 Merchants' Ac. Co. v. Cornforth (3 Colo. 
 
 280; s. 0. 25 Am. Eep. 757), 224 
 Mercier v. New Orleans &c. E. Co. (23 
 
 La. Ann. 264), 22, 236 
 Merkle «. New Tork Ac. B. Co. (49 N. 
 
 J. Law, 473; s. o. 9 Atl. Eep. 680), 
 
 266 
 
 Merriam v. Hartford Ac. E. Co. (20 
 Conn. 854; s. o. 62 Am. Dec. 344), 
 226 
 Merrill v. Eastern E. Co. (189 Mass. 
 238; s. o. 81 Alb. Law Jour. 508), 
 84, 216, 887 
 Merrill v. Hampden (26 Me. 234), 537 
 Merrill v. North Yarmouth (78 Me. 200; 
 
 s. 0. 57 Am. Eep. 794), 328 
 Merwin v. Manhattan By. Co. (1 N. Y. 
 
 Su|)l. 267), 129 
 Messenger «. Dennie (137 Mass. 197; 
 
 s. c. 20 Am. Eep. 296; 141 Mass. 
 
 335), 151 
 Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. 
 
 Fitchburg B. Co. (109 Mass. 277; 
 
 8. 0. 12 Am. Eep. 689), 88 
 Metcalfe v. Baker (11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 
 
 481), 140, 142 
 Metropolitan Ac. By. Co. v. Jackson (3 
 
 L. E. App. Cas. 193), 563 
 Metropolitan St. B. Co. v. Moore (83 Ga. 
 
 453; s. c. 10 S. E. Eep. 730), 887 
 Mettlestadt v. Ninth Ave. E. Co. (4 
 
 Bobt. 877), 380 
 Meuhlhausen v. St. Louis Ac. B. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 882; s. c. 2 S. W. Bep. 815), 
 
 175 
 Meyer v. Midland Ac. E. Co. (2 Neb. 
 
 319), 265 
 Meyer v. North Missouri Ac. E. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. 362), 299 
 Meyers v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (69 Mo. 
 
 223), 245 
 Meyers v. Union Trust Co. (82 Mo. 237), 
 
 296 
 Michael v. AUestree (2 Levintz, 172), 
 
 397 
 Michigan Ac. E. Co. v. Dolan (32 Mich. 
 
 510), 466, 468 
 Michigan Ac. B. Co. «. Fisher (27 Ind. 
 
 97), 283, 290 
 Michigan Ac. E. Co. v. Lantz (29 Ind. 
 
 528), 639 
 Michigan Ac. B. Co. v. Smithson (45 
 
 Mich. 212), 428, 444, 450, 477 
 Midl^d Ac. E.,Co. ■». Daykin (17 C. B. 
 
 126; s. 0. 25 L. J. (C. P.) 73), 280, 
 
 807 
 Milarkey v. Foster (6 Or. 878; s. o. 25 
 
 Am. Eep. 531), 822, 3S1 
 Milburn V. Kansas City Ac. B. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 104), 62 
 MUes V. Atlantic Ac. B. Co. (4 Hughes, 
 
 172). 197,266 
 Miles V. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (31 Mo. 
 
 407), 296 
 Millcreek Township v. Perry (12 Atl. 
 
 149), 50 
 Miller v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (69 Iowa, 
 
 707), 287, 290, 306 
 Miller ». Ohio Ac. By. Co. (24 111. App. 
 
 326), 413 ^ 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Miller a. Pendleton (8 Gray, 5i1), 369 
 Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (8 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 209), 32V ■ 
 Miller v. St. Louis <fcc. R. Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 471), 544 
 Miller b. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 454), 879 
 Miller v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. {2McCrary, 
 
 87; s. o. 4 McCrary, 118), 49, 272, 
 
 460 
 Milliman v. New York <fcc. R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 642), 211 
 Mills V. Alexandria <Scc. R. Co. (2 McAr- 
 
 thnr, 314), 437 
 Mills V. Chicago <fee. R. Co. (76 Wis. 
 
 422; s. o. 46 N. W. Rep. 225), 24, 
 
 81 
 Mills V. Start (4 N. H. 512; s. c. 17 
 
 Am. Dec. 4l4), 298 
 Milton V. Hudson River Steamboat Co. 
 
 (37 N. Y. 212), 16 
 Milwaukee <&c. R. Co. v. Hunter (11 
 
 Wis. 160), 250, 254, 644 
 Milwaukee <fcc. R. Co. v. Eellogg (94 U, 
 
 S. 469), 40, 319 
 Minerly v. Union Ferry Co. (9 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 104; s. o. 66 Hun, 113), 68 
 Misdssippi <fec. R. Co. v. Mason (SI 
 
 Miss. 234), 79 
 Mississippi <fec. R. Co. v. Miller (40 Miss. 
 
 45), 288, 291 
 Missouri <fec. R. Co. v. Cornell (80 Kan. 
 
 36), 313 
 Missouri <fcc. R. Co. «. Leggett (27 Kan. 
 
 323), 299, 800, 306 
 Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend (107 
 
 HI. 44; a. o. 47 Am. Rep. 425), 
 
 444, 479, 483, 688, 544 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brown (75 
 
 Tex. 267; s. o. 12 S. "W. Rep. 1117), 
 
 21,84 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Calbreath (66 
 
 Tex. 626), 473 
 Missouri Pac. Rt. Co. v. Cassidy (24 
 
 Pac. Rep. 88), 84 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cornwall (70 
 
 Tex. 611; 8. o. 8 S. W. Rep. 312), 
 
 223 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw (71 
 
 Tex. 840; a. o. 9 S. W. Rep. 262), 
 
 449 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dunham (4 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 472), 299 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dwyer (36 
 
 Kan. 68; s. c. 12 Pac. ,Rep. 852), 
 
 429 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Qedney (24 
 
 Pac. Rep. 464), 293 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haley (25 Kan. 
 
 86), 475 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris (67 
 
 Tex. 166; s. o. 2 S. W. Rep. 574), 
 
 223 ■ 
 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henry (75 
 
 Tex. 220; s. o. 12 S. W. Rep. 828), 
 
 447 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. HUl (9 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 351), 247 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Holcomb (44 
 
 Kan. 382; s. o. 24 Pac. Rep. 467), 
 
 199 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Holley (30 Kan 
 
 465^, 471, 479 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnston (36 
 
 Kan. 6^), 306 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones (75 Tex. . 
 
 151; B. c. 12 S. "W. Rep. 972), 437, 
 
 446 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lee (70 Tex. 
 
 496; s. 0. 7 S. "W. Rep. 867), 85, 
 
 236, 243 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. MoCally (41 
 
 Kan. 689; a. o. 21 Pac. Rep. 674), 
 
 390, 463 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. McElyea (71 
 
 Tex. 886; s. o. 9 S. W. Rep. 818), 
 
 457 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Peregoy (36 
 
 Kan. 427; a. c. 17 Pac. Rep. 7), 
 
 467 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pierce (6 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 878), 244 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Platzer (73 
 
 Tex. 117; s. c. 11 S. "W. Rep. 160), 
 
 317 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Somers (71 
 
 Tex. 700; a. o. 9 S. "W. Rep. 741), 
 
 466 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stevens (85 
 
 Kan. 622; a. o. 12 Pac. Rep. 25), 
 
 52 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Texas &o. Ry. 
 
 Co. (31 Fed. Rep. 627; a. o. 88 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 859; 34 Fed. Rep. 99; 86 Fed. 
 
 Rep 879), 187, 188, 207, 426 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Vandeventer 
 
 26 Neb. 222; s. o. 41 N. W. Rep. 
 
 998), 223 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Watts (64 
 
 Tex. 668; s. c. 63 Tex. 549), 462, 
 
 47T 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Weisen (66 
 
 Tex. 448), 262 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. White (76 
 
 Tex. 102; a. o. 13 S. W. Rep. 66), 
 
 473 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williama (75 
 
 Tex. 4; s. o. 12 S. W. Rep. 885), 
 
 414 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. «. Wilson (28 Kan. 
 
 637), 283 
 Mitchell V. Alestree (8 Keb. 660), 897 
 Mitchell V. Allestry (1 Vent. 296), 897 
 Mitchell V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (61 
 
 Mich. 236; a. o. 47 Am. Rep. 566), 
 
 190, 207, 210, 212, 588 
 
Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 MitchelJ V. City of Clinton (99 Mo. IBS; 
 
 s. 0. 12 S. W. Eep. 793), 543 
 Mitchell V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1 Am. 
 
 Law Rep. Ill), 18 
 Mitchell V. Robinson (80 Ind. 281; s. g. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 812), 898, 416, 431, 
 
 468 
 Mitchell V. Woods (16 L. T. (N. S.) 676), 
 
 527 
 Moakler v. Willamette Valley R. Co. 
 
 (18 Or. 189; 8.0. 22Pac. Rep. 948), 
 
 201 
 Moberly v. Kansas City &c. R. Co. (17 
 
 Mo. App. 618), 250 
 Mobile <fcc. R. Co. v. Ashcraft (48 Ala. 
 
 16), 58 
 Mobile <fcc. E. Co. v. Caldwell (83 Ala. 
 
 196; S.O. 3 So. Rep. 446), 292 
 Mobile &c. E. Co. ■». Crenshaw (66 Ala. 
 
 566), 176, 542 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Holborn (4 So. 
 
 Rep. 146), 479 
 Mobile Ac. R. Co. ». Hopkins (41 Ala. 
 
 486), 224 
 Mobile ace. R. Co. v. Hudson (60 Miss. 
 
 672), 288 
 Mobile <fcc. R. Co. v. Smith (59 Ala. 
 
 246), 414, 427 
 Mobile &o. R. Co. v. Stroud (64 Miss. 
 
 784; 8. 0. 2 So. Eep. 171), 266, 
 
 278 
 MobUe Ac. R. Co. v. Thomas (42 Ala. 
 
 672). 475 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. a. Williams (63 Ala. 
 
 696), 288 
 Mochler v. Town of Shaftsbury (46 Vt. 
 
 580; s. 0. 14 Am. Eep. 634), 367 
 ■ Moebus V. Becker (46 IT. J. Law 41), 
 
 530, 503, 666, 670 
 Moebus t. Herman (38 Hun, 370), 160 
 Mohney v. Cook (26 Penn. St. 342), «8, 
 
 231, 380 
 Mohoney v. Libbey (123 Mass. 20; s. c. 
 
 26 Am. Rep. 6), 860 
 Moline Plow Co. v. Anderson (19 111. 
 
 App. 417), 448 
 Monaghan v. New York Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Hun, 113), 426, 465, 478 
 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Bevard (11 
 
 Afl. Eep. 575), 50 
 Monongahela City v. Fisher (111 Pa. St. 
 
 9; 8. 0. 56 Am. Rep. 241), 43 
 Monroe v. Leach (7 Mete. 274), 368 
 Montgomery, City of, v. Wright (72 
 Ala. 411; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 422), 
 
 326, 327, 328, 663, 565 
 Monteomery Ac. R. Co. s. Boring (61 
 
 Ga. 182), 210 
 Montgomery Ac. E. Co. v. Chambers 
 
 79 Ala. 838), 642 
 Montgomery Ac. R. Co. v. Thompson 
 (77 Ala. 448; s. o. 64 Am, Eep, 
 72), 49 
 
 Montgomery Gas Light Co. «. Mont' 
 
 gomery A E. Ey. Co. (86 Ala. 372- 
 
 s. 0. 6 So. Eep. 736), 82 
 Moody V. Minneapolis Ac. E. Co. (77 
 
 Iowa, 29; s. o. 41 N. W. Eep. 477), 
 
 296 
 Moody V. Osgood (64 N. Y. 488), 368 
 Moomey «. Peak (67 Mich. 289), 46 
 Mooney «. Hudson Eiver E. Co. (6 Eobt. 
 
 648), 143 
 Mooney««. Maynard (1 Vt. 470; s. c. 18 
 
 Am. Dec. 699), 298 
 Moon's Admr. v. Eichmond Ac. E, Co. 
 
 (78 Va. 748; s. o. 49 Am. Eep. 401), 
 
 418, 428, 429 
 Moore v. Abbott (32 Me. 46), 343 
 Moore «. Central E. Co. (24 N. J. Law, 
 
 268), 26, 44, 242, 648 
 Moore «. City of Shreveport (3 La. Ann. 
 
 646), 587 
 Moore v. Gadsden (87 N. Y. 84; 8. o. 41 
 
 Am, Eep. 352), 368 
 Moore ®. Eenockee Township (76 Mich. 
 
 332; 8. 0. 42 N. W. 944), 322 
 Moore «. Levert (24 Ala. 810), 293 
 Moore «. Pennsylvania E. Co. (99 Penn. 
 
 St. 301; 8. 0. 44 Am. Eep. 106), 
 
 263, 266, 271 
 Moore v. Phila. E. Co. (108 Penn. St. 
 
 349; s. o. 32 Alb. Law Jour. 98), 
 
 244, 246, 261, 262, 264, 278 
 Moore v. Wabash Ac. Ey. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 588), 446, 468 
 Moran v. Harris (68 Iowa, 390), 478 
 Moran ®. Nashville Ac. R. Co. (58Tenn. 
 
 879), 240 
 Moran «. New York Ac. E. Co. (3 N. Y. 
 
 770), 430 
 Morey v. Fitzgerald (56 Vt. 487; s. o. 
 
 48 Am. Eep. 811), 836 
 Morgan v. Bridge Co. (5 Dill. 96), 160, 
 
 182, 642 
 Morgan «. Camden Ac. E. Co. (16 AtL 
 
 Eep. 868; s. o. 28 W. N. C. 189), 
 
 210 
 Morgan v. City of Hallowell (57 Me. 
 
 877), 70 
 Morgan v. Cox (22 Mo. 878), 25, 630 
 Morgan v. Thompson (82 Ky. 888), 408 
 Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ey. Co. (6 
 
 Best. A S. 786; s. c. C. d.. B. 1 Q. 
 
 B. 149; 85 L. J. (Q. B.) 28; 18 L. 
 
 T. (N. S.) 564; 12 Week. Eep. 144; 
 
 6 Best. A g. 670; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 
 
 1074; 88 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; IS 
 
 Week. Eep. 1081), 480" 
 Morgan, The, v. The Zebra (2 Hughes, 
 
 64), 519 
 Moriarty v. Central Iowa Ey. Co. (64 
 
 Iowa, 696), 306 
 Morison v. Broadway Ac. R. Co. (8 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 486), 881 
 Morning Light, 'Hie (2 Wal,, 650), 519 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 ,LThe references are to pages.l 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 Morris v. Chicago Ac. K. Co. (45 Iowa, 
 
 29), 77, 79 
 Morris ». Phelps (2 Hilt. 88), 340 
 Morris v. St. Louis <fcc. R. Co. (58 Mo. 
 
 78), 295 
 Morris v. Third Ave. R. Co. (28 How. 
 
 Pr. 846), 226 
 Morris <fcc. R. Co. v. State (86 N. J. 
 
 Law, 553), 812 
 Morris &c. R. Co. v. Haslan (38 N. J. 
 
 Law, 147), 256, 609 
 Morrison v. Constmction Co. (44 Wis. 
 
 405), 453 
 Morrison v. Cornelius (62 F. C. 346, 
 
 349), 16 
 Morrison w. Erie Ry. Co. (56 N. Y. 
 
 302), 154, 161, 190 
 Morrison v. Genenal Steam Nay. Co. (8 
 
 Exch. 783), 32, 68 
 Morrison v. Kansas City Ac. R, Co. (27 
 
 Mo. App. 418), 304 
 Morrison v. Lawrence (98 Mass. 219), 
 
 529 
 Morrison v. New York Ac. R. Co. (32 
 
 Barb. 568), 307 
 Morrison v. Shelby County (116 lod. 
 
 431; s. 0. 19 N. E. Rep. 316), 48 
 Morrissey v. Eastern &c. R. Co. (126 
 
 Mass. 377; s. e. 30 Am. Rep. 686), 
 
 91, 261, 266, 273 
 Morrissey v Ferry Co. (43 Mo. 388), 31 
 Morse v. Erie Ry. Co. (66 Barb. 490), 
 
 239 
 Morse v. Inhabitants of Belfast (77 Me. 
 
 44; 8. 0. 1 East. Rep. 67), 823 
 Morse v. Rutland <tc. R. Co. (27 Vt. 
 
 49), 281 
 Morse v. Sweenie (16 lU. App. 486), 
 
 843, 367 
 Morton v. Detroit iScc. R. Co. (81 Mich. 
 
 423; s. 0. 46 N. W. Rep. Ill; 20 
 
 N. E. Rep. 287), 429, 457 
 Morton v. Gloster (46 Me. 620), 63, 230, 
 
 349 
 Moser®. St. Paul <fec. R. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 480; 8. o. 44 N. W. Rep, 630), 300, 
 
 306 
 Moses V. Loaisville &c. R. Co. (89 La. 
 
 Ann. 649; s. c. 2 So. R«p. 667), 
 
 208 
 Moses V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (18 Or. 
 
 385; 8. 0. 23 Pac. Rep. 498), 287, 
 
 800 
 Mosey v. Troy (61 Barb. 580), 856, 368 
 Moss V. Johnson (22 III. 688), 216 
 Moss V. Pacific &c. R. Co. (49 Mo. 167), 
 
 455, 466 
 Mott V. Hudson River R. Co. (8 Bosw. 
 . 346; s. 0. 1 Robert, 686; 24 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 586), 88, 130 
 Moulton V. Aldrich (28 Kan. 800), 63, 
 368 
 
 Moulton V. Gage (138 Mass. 390), 463 
 Moulton ®. Inhabitants of Sanford (61 
 
 Me. 127), 324 
 Mt Adams Ac. R. Co. v. Renl (4 Ohio 
 
 Cir. Ct. 368), 180 
 Mt. Vernon v. Dusouchett (2 Ind. 586; 
 
 8. 0. 54 Am. Dec. 467), 639 
 Mt. Washington Road Co., Petition of 
 
 (85 N. H. 134), 363 
 Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester (9 
 Mass. 247; s. o. 6 Am. Dec. 63), 
 322 
 Mowrey v. Central Ac. R. Co. (66 Barb. 
 
 43), 153 
 Moye V. Wrightsville Ac. R. Co. (88 
 
 Ga. 669), 292 
 Moynihan v. Hills Co. (146 Mass. 686; 
 
 B. 0. 16 N. E. Rep. 574), 467 
 Moynihan v. Whidden (143 Mass. 287), 
 
 160, 385 
 Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R. Co. (91 
 Mo. 882; s.o. 2 S. W. Rep. 316), 
 29, 387 
 Muhr V. City of New York (2 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 69), 49 
 Muirhead v. Hannibal Ac. Ry. Co. (19 
 
 Mo. App. 634), 447 
 Mulcairns v. Janesville (67 Wis. 24), 
 
 432, 446 
 Muldowney v. Illinois Ac. R. Co. (39 
 Iowa, 616; s. o. 36 Iowa, 462; 32 
 Iowa, 176), 81, 42, 443, 472, 538 
 Mulherrin ji. Delaware Ac. R. Co. (81 
 Penn. St. 366), 69, 92, 268, 272, 
 276,604 
 MttUan V. Phila. Steamship Co. (78 
 Penn. St. 26; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 
 2), 415 
 Mullaney v. Spence (15 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 S.) 319J, 178, 182, 268 
 Mullen V. Rainear (46 N. J. Law, 620), 
 
 17 
 MuUen v. St. John (67 N. Y. 567; 8. o. 
 
 15 Am. Rep. 530), 360 
 Mulligan v. Curtis (lOS Mass. 512), 164, 
 
 174, 181 
 Mulvey v. Rhode Island Locomotire 
 
 Works (14 R. I. 204), 445, 457 
 Mumpower v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (59 
 
 Mo. 245), 289 
 Munch V. New York Ac. E. Co. (29 
 
 Barb. 647), 807 
 Mnnger v. Marshalltown (66 Iowa, 216; 
 
 s. o. 69 Iowa, 768), 326 
 Munger v. Tonawaijda R. Co. (4 "N. Y. 
 349; s. o. 53 Am. Dec. 384; 49 Am. 
 Dec. 239), 16, 44, 75, 290, 293, 
 302, 807 
 Munn V. Reed (4 Allen, 431), 167, 174, 
 
 182, 266 ' 
 
 Munson v. Town of Derby (87 Conn. 
 298; s. o. 9 Am. Rep. 832), 334 
 
Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [Tlic references 
 
 Muroh V. The Concord. R. Co. (29 If. H. 
 
 9), 198 
 Muychison v. SergeiitX69 6a. 206; s. o. 
 
 4l1 Am. Bep. 764), 524, 526 
 Murdock v. Boston &o. R. Co. (133 
 
 Mass. Ifi), 41 
 Murphy *. Boston <fec. R. Co. (88 N. 
 
 Y. 146; 8. 0.42 Am. Rep. 240), 
 
 403,429,443,461 
 Murphy v. Caralli (3 Hurl. & C. 462; 
 
 s. 0. 10 Jur. (N. S.) IWI; 34 L. J. 
 
 (Exch.) 14; 13 Wget. Rep. 165), 
 
 435 
 Murphy v. Chicago ifcc. R. Co. (38 Iowa, 
 
 639; s. 0. 45 Iowa, 661), 263, 274, 
 
 279,638 
 Murphy v. Chjoago'&o. R. Co. (45 WW. 
 
 222; 8. 0. SO Am. Rep. 721), 313, 
 ' 315, 316 
 Murphy ». City of Brooklyn (98 N. Y. 
 
 642), 530 
 Murphy v. Dean (101 Mass. 465; s, c. 
 
 3 Am. Rep. 390), 16, 44, 638 
 Murphy v. Gloucester (106 Mass. 470), 
 
 336 
 Murphy v. New York &c. R. Co. (118 
 
 N. Y. 627; 8. 0. 23 N. E. Rep. 812; 
 
 n Daly (ISr. Y.) 122), 390, 446 
 Murphy v. Rome &c. R. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 354), 209 
 Murphy v. Smith (19 C. B. (N. S.) 361; 
 
 s.o. 12L. T. (N. S.) 606), 414 
 Murphy v. Union Ry. Co. (118 Mass. 
 
 228), 374 
 Murray v. Currie, (6 L. B. (C. P.) 24; 
 
 s. c. 40 L. J. (C. P.) 26; 23 L. T. 
 
 (N. S.) 667; 19 Week. Rep. 104), 
 
 435 
 Murray v. Gulf <fec. Ry. Co. (73 Tex. 2; 
 
 8.0. 11 S. W. Rep. 125), 393, 484 
 Murray v. McShame (52 Md. 217; s. o. 
 
 36 Am. Bep. 367), 47, 336, 36C> 
 Murray v. Missouri Pa,c. Ry. Co. i(101 
 
 Mo. 236; s. o. 13 S. W. Rep. 817), 
 
 247 
 Murray v, Pouchartrain R. Co. (31 La. 
 
 Ann. 490), 16 
 Murray v. St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 673; s. o. 12 S. W. Rep. 252), 
 
 432 
 Murray v. South Carolina R. (Co. (1 
 
 MoMil. 886; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 268 ; 
 
 10 Rich. 227), 288, 400, 402, 403, 
 
 404,411,425,487 
 Murray v. Usher (117 N. Y. 542; s. o. 
 
 23 N. E. Rep. 564), 446 
 Mnrtaugh v. New York <feo. R. Co. (3 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 483; s. o. 49 Hun, 456), 
 
 468, 481 
 Muster v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 325; s. 0. 49 Am. Rep. 41), 214 
 Myers v. Dixon (3 Jones & S. 890), 362 
 
 are to pages.] 
 
 Myers v. Indianapolis <Sto. E. Co. (113 
 
 ni. 386), 563 
 Myers v. Meinrath (101 MasB. 366; s. c. 
 
 8 Am. Rep. 368; 3 Allen, 166), 
 
 846, 848 
 Mynard v. Syracuse &c. R. Co. (71 N. Y. 
 
 183; s. 0. 27 Am. Rep. 28), 222 
 Mvuning v. Detroit <fcc. R. Co. (64 Mich. 
 
 93^8.0. 31 N. W. Bep. 147; 69 
 
 Mich. 257; 67 Mich. 677), 242, 262, 
 
 63« 
 
 N 
 
 Nadau v. White Biver Lumber Co. (76 
 
 Wis. 120; 8. 0. 43 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1136), 469 
 Nagel e. Missouri <fec. R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 653; B. 0. 42 Am. Rep. 418), 178, 265, 
 
 270 
 Nagle V. Alleghany <feo. B. Co. (88 Penn. 
 
 St. 36; s. o. 32 Am. Rep. 418), 151 
 Nance v. Carolina &c. B. Co. (94 N. C. 
 
 619), 208 
 Nanticoke v. Wame (106 Penn. St. 373), 
 
 140 
 Nary v. New York <&c. B. Co. (9 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 153), 437 
 Nash V. New York Ac. B. Co. (4 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 626; s. o. 51 Hun, 594), 242, 
 
 243 
 Nash V. Richmond <fec. R. Co. (82 Va. 
 
 65), 240 
 Nashville Ac. B. Co. v. Carroll (6 Heisk. 
 
 647), 28, 31, 98, 122, 410, 429 
 Nashville <fec. R. Co. a. Elliott (1 Caldw. 
 
 611), 444, 469, 460 
 Nashville &c. B. Go. v. Handman (13 
 
 Lea (Tenn.) 423), 426 
 NashvUle &c. B. Co. «. Hembree (88 
 
 Ala. 481), 292 
 Nashville Ac. B. Co. «. Jones (9 Heisk. 
 
 27), 415, 444 
 Nashville Ac. B. Co. v. Prince (2 Heisk. 
 
 580), 277 
 Nashville Ac. E. Co. v. Smith (6 Heisk. 
 
 174), SO, 86, 98 
 Nashville Ac. B. Co. v. Wheless (10 Lea 
 
 741; 8. 0,48 Am. Eep. 817), 122, 
 
 403, 426 
 Nason v. Boston (14 Allen, 808), 366 
 Nason v. West (78 Me. 253), 474 
 Navasota, City of, e. Pearce (46 Tex. 
 
 626; 8. o. 26 Am. Eep. 279), 323 
 Nave ®. Flkck (90 Ind. 206; s. o. 46 Am. 
 
 Eep. 205), 80, 74, 828, Sifl 
 Naylor v. New York Ac. E. Co. (38 
 
 Fed. Rep. 801), 426 
 Neanow ». UUejch (46 Wis. 581), 8,42, 
 
 63 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 Needbam «. Louisville &c. B. Co. (86 
 
 Ky. 423; s. c. S S. W. Eep. 797; 11 
 
 S. W. Eep. SOi<), 26, 480, 669 
 Keedham v. San Francisco cSec. B. Co. 
 
 (SVCal. 409), 18, 29, 80, 44, 69,79, 
 
 80 
 Neff®. Town of Wellesley (148 Mass. 
 
 487; s. 0. 20 N. E. Rep. HI), 868 
 Nehrbas % Central iScc. B. Go. (62 Cal. 
 
 320), 17, 643 
 Neier v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (1 S. W. 
 
 Eep. 887), 246, 561 
 Neilling u Industrial Manfg. Co. (78 Ga. 
 
 260), 480 
 Neilon v. Marinette Paper Co. (75 Wis. 
 
 679; 8. o. 44 N. W. Eep. 772), 469 
 Neilson v. Kansas City &c. B. Co. (85 
 
 Mo. 699), 466_ 
 Nelson v. AUen Paper Car-Wheel Co. 
 
 (29 Fed. Eep. 840), 448 
 Nelson «. Atlantic &c, B. Co. (68 Mo. 
 
 698), 77 
 Nelson «. Chicago &o. E. Co. (88 Iowa, 
 
 664), 638 
 Nelson v. Chicago Ac, B. Co. (60 Wis. 
 
 324), 670 
 Nelson v. Dubois (11 Daly (N. T.) 127), 
 
 447 
 Nelson v. Johnson (18 Neb. 180; s. c, 
 
 63, Am. Eep. 806), 469 
 Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Co. (8 Cush. 497), 
 
 612 
 Nelson «. Vermont Ac. E. Co. (25 Vt. 
 
 717), 297 
 Nelson v. Village of Canisteo (100 N. T. 
 
 Neptune, The (30 Fed. Eep. 926), 449 
 Neslio V. Second &c. Passenger Co. (113 
 
 Penn. St. 300), 881 
 Nevin v. Pullman Ac. Car Co. (106 HI. 
 
 222; 8. c. 46 Am. Eep. 688), 372 
 New Albany Ac. E. Co. v. Maiden (12 
 
 Ind. 10), 306 
 New Albany Ac. E. Co. v. Tilton (12 
 
 Ind. 3), 283 
 New Haven Steamboat Co. v. Vander- 
 
 bUt (16 Conn. 420), 32 
 New Jersey Ac. B. Co. v. Kennard (21 
 
 Penn. St. 208), 199, 201 
 New Jersey Exp. Co.- v. Nichols (32 N. 
 
 J. Law, 166; s. o. 33 N. J. Law, 
 
 434), 22, 43, 91, 643, 644 
 New Jersey Trans. Co. v. West (82 N. 
 
 J. Law, 91), 261, 266, 609 
 New Orleans Ac. Ins. Co. v. Eailroad 
 
 Co. (20 La. Ann. 302), 224 
 New Orleans Ac. B. Co. v. Bourgeois 
 
 (66 Miss, 3; s. c. 6 So. Bep. 629), 
 
 292 
 New Orleans Ac. E. Co. ■». Burke (68 
 
 Miss. 200; s. o. 24 Am. Bep. 689), 
 
 371,374 
 
 New Orleans Ac. B. Co. v. Field (46 
 
 Miss. 673), 288, 291, 294 
 New Orleans Ac. E. Co. «. Harrison (48 
 
 Miss. 112; s. o. 12 Am. Bep. 856), 
 
 217, 438 
 New Orleans Ac. E. Co. v. Mitchell (52 
 
 Miss. 808), 289 
 New Orleans Ac. B. Co. ■». Norwood (62 
 
 Miss. 287; s. o. 62 Am. Rep. 191), 
 
 434 
 New Orleans Ac. B. Co. «. Thornton (66 
 
 Miss. 266; s. c. 3 So. Eep. 664), 
 
 801 
 New World v. King (16 How. (U. S.) 
 
 474)^ 87 
 New York, City of, v. Starin (12 N. E. 
 
 Eep. 631), 369 
 New York Ac. B. Co. v. Bell (112 Penn. 
 
 St. 400), 430 
 New York Ac. B. Co. v. Cooper (88 Va. 
 
 939; s. 0. 9 S. E. Bep. 321), 141 
 New York Ac. E. Co. ». 6oulbourn (69 
 
 Md. 360; s. o. 16 Atl. Bep. 208), 
 
 390 
 New York Ac. E. Co. v. Doane (116 
 
 Ind. 435; s. o. 17 N. E. Eep. 913), 
 
 94 
 New York Ac. E. Co. «. Eriches (127 
 
 Penn. St. 316; s. o. 24 W. N. C. 
 
 261; 17 Atl. Eep. 991), 188, 209 
 New York Ac. E. Co. v. Grand Bapids 
 
 Ac. E. Co. (116 Ind. 60; s. o. 18 N. 
 
 E. Eep. 182), 62 
 New York Ac. E. Co. ». Kellam's Adm'r 
 
 (83 Va. 851; s. c. 8 S. E. Rep. 708), 
 
 240, 242 
 New York Ac. B. Co. v. Lyons (119 
 
 Penn. St. 824; s. o. 13 Atl. Eep. 
 
 206), 480 
 New York Ac. R. Co. v. Steinbrenner 
 
 (47 N. J. Law, 161;. s. o. 64 Am. 
 
 Bep, 126), 141 
 Newcomb «. Boston Protective Depart- , 
 
 ment (146 Mass. 596; s. o. 16 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 666), 64 
 Newell V. Ryan (40 Hun, 286), 454 
 Newhouse v. Miller (35 Ind. 468), 81 
 Newkirk v. Sabler (9 Wend. 662), 836 
 Newman v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (80 
 
 Iowa, 672; a. o. 46 N. W. Bep. 
 
 1054), 391 
 Newman v. Ernst (10 N. Y. Supl. 318), 
 
 866 
 Newman «. Phillipsburgh Ac. R. Co. (19 
 
 Atl. Eep. 1102), 166 
 Newson v. New York Ac. B. Co. (29 N. 
 
 Y. 390), 82, 94 
 Niantic Coal A Min. Co. v. Leopard (26 
 
 111. App. 95), 460 
 Niblett ®. Nashville (12 Heisk. 684; s. o. 
 
 27 Am. Bep. 765), 334 
 
kxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The referenceB are to pages.] 
 
 Nichols «. Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. (69 Iowa, 
 
 154), B2 
 Nichols V. Minneapolis (33 Minn. 430; 
 
 s. o. 63 Am. Rep. 66), 60, 331 
 Niohola v. Sixth Ave. R. Co. (38 N. Y. 
 
 131), 385 
 Nichols' Adm'r ». Loniaville <fcc. E. Co. 
 
 (6 S. W. Rep. 339), 264 
 Nichols' Adm'r v. Washington <fcc. E. 
 Co. (83 Va. 99; s. o. 5 S. E. Rep. 
 171), 241, 275 
 Nicholson v. Erie Ry. Co. (41 N. Y. 
 
 526), 242, 261, 274 
 Nicholson v. Hannibal &o. E. Co. (82 
 
 Mo. 73), 296 
 Nicholson v. Lancashire &o. Ry. Co. (34 
 L. J. (Exch.)84; B. o. 3Huri. &C. 
 534), 72, 206 
 Nickerson v. Hammon (38 Me. 277), 86 
 Neimann «. Michigan Cent. E. Co. (80 
 Mich. 197; s. o. 44 N. W. Eep. 
 1049), 300 
 Nisbet V. Garner (75 Iowa, 814; s. o. 39 
 
 N. W. Rep. 616), 139, 140 
 Nitro Phosphate Co. v. Docks Co. (9 L. 
 
 R. Ch. Div. 503), 96 
 Noble V. City of Richmond (81 Gratt. 
 
 271; s. 0. 31 Am. Rep. 726), 324 
 NoblesTiUe Gas & Imp. Co. t). Loehr 
 (124 Ind. 79; s. o. 24 N. E. Rep. 
 579), 327 
 Nodine v. Doherty (46 Barb. 59), 347, 
 
 349 
 Nolan D. Brooklyn City <fec. R. C». (87 
 N. Y. 63; 8. o. 41 Am. Rep. 346), 
 382, 383 
 Nolan V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (28 Mo. 
 
 App. 353), 287 
 Nelan u King (97 N. Y. 665; s. o. 49 
 
 Am. Eep. 561), 331 
 Nolan ». New York Ac. E. Co. (53 Conn. 
 
 461), 51, 52 
 Nolton V. Western E. Co. (16 N. Y. 444), 
 
 215 
 Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Van Sant (99 
 
 Ind. 188), 447 
 Norfolk Ac. E. Co. v. Burge (84 Va. 63; 
 
 s. 0. 4 S. E. Rep. 21), 264 
 Norfolk <fcc. R. Co. v. Emmert (88 Va. 
 
 640; 8. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 145), 473 
 Norfolk &c. R. Co. v. Ferguson (79 Vii. 
 
 241), 198 
 Norfolk Ac. R. Co. v. Harman (83 Va. 
 
 563; s. 0. 8 S. E. Rep. 251), 266 
 Norfolk Ac. R. Co. v. Ormsby (27 Gratt. 
 
 465), 166 
 Norfolk Ac. R. Co. o. Prinnell (8 S. E. 
 
 Eep. 95), 208 
 Norris v. AndrOBCOggin Ac. R, Co. (39 
 Me. 273; s. c. 63 Am. Dec. 621), 
 281 294 297 
 Norris v. Kohler (41 N. Y. 42), 340 
 
 Norris V. Litchfield (35 N. H. 271), 32, 
 
 44, 68, 69, 231, 663 
 North Birmingham St. E. Co. 9. Calder- 
 wood (89 Ala. 247; s. c. 7 So. Eep. 
 360), 82, 42 
 North Chicago Ac. Ey. Co. a. Gastka 
 (128 111. 613; B. o. 21 N. E. Eep. 
 522), 873 
 North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. a. Ben- 
 son (18 lU. App. 194), 459 
 North *Chidago Rolling Mill Co. ». 
 
 Johnson (114 111. 67},"446 
 Norti' Chiw^o Ac. Mills ». Monk (4 
 
 ni. 664), 109 
 North Eastern Ac. E. Co. v. Sineath 
 
 (8 Eich, (Law) 186), 293 
 North Manheim, Township of, a. Arnold 
 
 (13 Atl. Eep. 444), 331 
 North Penn. E. Co. ■». Heileman (49 
 Penn. St. 60), 237, 239, 243, 276, 
 669, 571 
 North Penn. E. Co. «. Mahoney (67 
 Penn. St. 187; s. o. 6 Phila. 242), 
 150, 159, 165 
 North Penn. E. Co. ». Eehman (49 Penn. 
 
 St. 106), 282, 286, 306 
 Northeastern E. Co. v. Martin (78 Ga. 
 
 603; s. 0. 3 S. E. Rep. 701), 292 
 NortheaBtern Ry. Co. o. Wanless (43 L. 
 J. (Q. B.) 185; B. o. L. R. 7 H. L. 
 12; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 275), 248 
 Northern Central R. Co. v. Geis (31 
 
 Md. 367), 33, 80 
 Northern Central R. Co. v. Price (29 Md. 
 
 420), 25, 29, 77, 80 
 Northern Ac. E. Co. v. Husson (101 
 Penn. St 1; s. o. 47 Am. Eep. 690), 
 473, 477 
 Northern Ac. E. Co. v. State (29 Md 
 420; s. o. 31 Md. 367), 272, 278 
 543 
 Northern Pac. Ey. Co. v. Herbert (116 U, 
 
 S. 642), 458 
 Northern Pac. Ey.Co. v. HolmeB(18Pac. 
 
 Rep. 76), 265 
 Northern Pac. Ey. Co. v. Mares (128 IT. 
 
 S. 710), 480 
 Northern Pac. Ey. Co. b. O'Brien (1 
 Wash. 699; s. o. 21 Pac. Rep. 82), 
 446, 543 
 Nosier v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (73 Iowa, 
 268; a. o. 34 N. W. Rep. 860), 236, 
 242, 264 
 Nowell V. New York (62 N. Y. Snper. 
 
 Ct. 882), 334 
 Noyes «. Shepherd (80 Me. 173; B. o. 60 
 
 Am. Dec. 626), 22 
 Noyes v. Smith (29 Vt. 69; s. o. 28 Vt. 
 
 63), 444, 466 
 Noyes v. Town of Boscawen (64 N. H. 
 
 361; s. 0. 10 Atl. Rep. 690), 140 
 Nngent v. Boston Ac. E. Corp, (19 Ati. 
 Eep. 797), 570 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.l 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 Nnzum v. Pittsburgh iSto. E. Ce. (30 
 West Va. 228; s. o. 4 S. E. Eep. 
 242), 241, 2'r6 
 
 O'BaanoB v. Louisville &c; E, Co. (8 
 
 Bu*, 852), 282, 294 
 O'Brien v. Boston <&c. R. Co. (138 Mass. 
 
 387; s. 0. 52 Am. Rep. 279), 412 
 O'Brien e. Commercial Ins. Co. (6 Jones 
 
 & S. 626), 512 
 O'Brien v. McGlinohy (68 Me. 652), 8, 
 
 24, 81, 164, 157 
 O'Brien «. Phila. Ac. R. Co. (8 Phila. 
 
 76), 22, 44 
 O'Brien o. Tatujn (84 Ala. 186; s. c. 4 
 
 So. Eep. 168), 78 
 O'Byme v. Burns (16 Ct. of Ses. Cas, 
 
 1025), 499 
 O'Callaghan «. Bode (84 Cal. 489; s. c. 
 
 24 Pac. Eep. 269), 78 
 Ochsenbein v. Shapley (85 N. Y. 214). 
 
 61, 563, 570 
 
 O'Connell v. Baltimore &c. E. Co. (20 
 
 Md. 212), 428 
 O'Connell v. City of Lewistown (65 Me. 
 
 34; 8. 0. 2© Am. Eep. 673), 348 
 O'Connor v. Adams (120 Mass. 427), 
 
 469, 462 
 O'Connor v. Missouri Pao. Ey. Co. (94 
 
 Mo. 150; s. o. 7 S. W. Eep. 106), 
 
 62, 263 
 
 O'Connor v. North Truckee Ditch Co. 
 
 (17 Nev. 246), 29 
 O'Connor v. Eoberts (120 Mass. 227), 
 
 412 
 Odell ®. New York Ac. R. Co. (120 N. 
 
 Y. 323; s. c. 24 N. S. Eep. 478), 
 
 478 
 O'Donnell v. Allegheny Ac. R. Co. (60 
 
 Penn. St. 490; s. o. 69 Penn. St. 
 
 239), 194, 430, 443 
 O'Donnell v. Banm (38 Mo. App. 246), 
 
 461 
 O'Donnell v. Providence Ac. R. Co. (6 
 
 R. I. 211), 272 
 Oehme v. Cook (7 N. Y. Supl. 764), 478 
 O'Flaherty v. Fnion R. Co. (46 Mo. 70), 
 
 160, 168, 171, 181, 365 
 Ogden V. Rnmmens (3 Fost. A Fin. 751), 
 
 481 
 Oglesby v. Smith (38 Mo. App. 67), 39 
 Orfey V. MUes (8 |K. Y. Supl. 270), 469 
 O^agan v. Dillon (10 Jones A S. 466), 
 
 502 
 Ohio A M. Ry. Co. v. Hecht (116 Ind. 
 
 443; I. o. 17 N. E. Rep. 297), 32 
 Ohio A M. Ry. Co. v. Walker (113 Ind. 
 
 196; 8. 0. 16 N. E. Rep. 234), 52 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Bnibaker (47 111. 
 
 462), 301 
 
 ©hio Ac. Ry. Co, «. Clutter (82 111. 123) 
 
 249 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Collarn(73 Ind. 261; 
 
 8. 0. 38 Am. Rep. 134), 426, 429, 
 
 466, 486, 663 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Eaves (42 III. 288), 
 
 107, 244, 284 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. «. Fowler (85 111. 21), 
 
 285 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Hammersley (28 Ind, 
 
 371), 414, 460 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Ce. v. Maisch (29 111 
 
 App. 640), 261 
 Ohio Ac. Ry, Co. v. Muhling (80111. 9), 
 
 198 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Nicbols (71 Ind. 271), 
 
 224, 226 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. O'Donnell (26 111. 
 
 App. 848), 293 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Qo. s. Porter (92 HI. 437), 
 
 89 108 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. •». Selby (47 Ind. 471; 
 
 8. 0. 17 Am. Rep. 719), 186, 224, 
 
 226 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Shanefelt (47 HI. 
 
 497), 107, 314, 817 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Stratton (78 111. 88), 
 
 79, 156, 161, 188 
 Ohio Ac. Ry. Co. v. TinnaU(18 Ind. 866), 
 
 426 
 Ohio South R. Co. v. Morey (24 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 269), 331 
 Oil City Fuel Supply Co. v. Boundy 
 
 (122 Penn. St. 449; s. o. 15 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 866), 43 
 Oil City Gas. Co. s. Robinson (99 Penn. 
 
 St. 1), 29 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (82 Iowa, 
 
 . 467), 77, 104, 117, 508 
 O'Keefe «. Thorn (24 W. N. C. 379; s. o. 
 
 16 Atl. Eep. 737), 469 
 Oldenburg v. New York Ac R. Co. (9 
 
 N. Y. Supl. 419), 262, 264 
 Oldfield V. New York Ac. E. Co. (14 N. 
 
 Y. 310; s. 0. 3 E. D. Smith, 103), 
 
 181, 376, 560, 571 
 Oliver v. Worcester (1S2 Mass. 489; 
 
 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 485), 334 
 Olson V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (88 Minn. 
 
 412; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 362), 484 
 Olson vr Grossman (SI Minn. 222), 524, 
 
 626 
 Olson V. McMullen (84 Minn. 94); 464 
 Olsen V. St. Pavd Ac. R. Co. (34 Minn. 
 
 477), 394 
 Olson V. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (88 Minn. 
 
 117; 8. 0. 36 N. W. Rep. 866), 481, 
 
 466 
 Omaha Ac. R. Co. v. O'Donnell (22 Neb. 
 
 475; 8. 0. 85 N. W. Eep. 236), 240, 
 
 242 
 O'Malley v. Dorn (7 Wis. 286), 367 
 
Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 O'MaUey a. St. Paul &c. R. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 889; B.o. 46 N. W. Kep. 440), 
 
 270 
 CMora ®. Hudson River E. Co. (38 N. 
 
 T. 445), 157, 610 
 Omslaer «. Philadelphia Co. (81 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 3B4), 40 
 O'Neil V. St. Louie A Iron Mountain &c. 
 
 Ry. Co. (9 Fed. Rep. 337), 428, 450 
 O'Neill V. New Orleans (30 La. Ann. 
 
 220; s. 0. 31 Am. Rep. 221), 323 
 O'NeillJ ®. New York <fcc. R. Co. (115 
 
 N. T. 579; a. o. 22 N. E. Rep. 217), 
 
 318 
 Oppenheim ». White Lion Hotel Co. (L. 
 
 R. 6 C. P. 616), 624, 525, 527 
 Orange Ac. R. Co. v. tVard (47 N. J, 
 
 Law, 660), 570 
 Orleans, Tillage of, «. Perry (24 Neb. 
 
 831; B. c. 40 N. W. Rep. 417), 32, 
 
 44 . 
 Ormond v. Central <&c. R. Co. 68 Iowa, 
 
 •742), 314 
 'Ormonde. Hayes (60 Tex. 180), 228, 
 
 439 
 Ormond v. Holland (El., Bl. & El. 102), 
 
 3d4, 453, 456 
 Ormsbee v. Boston &a. R. Co. (14 R. I. 
 
 102; s. 0. 51 Am. Rep. 354), 238 
 Orndorff «. Adams Express Co. (3 Bash, 
 
 194), 224 
 O'Rourke ». Chicago &c. R. Co. (44 
 
 Iowa, 526), 79 
 O'Rorke 9. Union Pao. Ry. Co. (22 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 189), 478, 480 
 Orr V. Garabold (ll S. E. Rep. 778), 352 
 Ortmayer «. Johnson (45 111. 469), 107 
 Ortt V. Minneapolis &c. R. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. 396; s. o. 31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 619), 223 
 Osage City v. Brown (27 Kan. 74), 61, 
 
 326, 327, 357, 570 
 Osboru'S. Morgan (130 Mass, 102; s. c. 
 
 39 Am. Rep. 467; 137 M^ss. 1), 486 
 Osbeme v. Knox <fec. R. Co; (68 Me. 49; 
 
 s. o. 28 Am. Rep. 16), 438 
 Osborne v. Union Ferry Co. (68 Barb. 
 
 629), 206 
 Ostertag v. Pacific <Scc. R. Co. (64 Mo. 
 
 421), 169, 278 
 OszkoscU «. Eagle Pencil Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 501), 469 
 Otis V. Janesville (47 Wis. 422), 17, 28, 
 
 27, 44, 189 
 Otis «. Thom;(23 Ala. 469), 142 
 Otten v. Cohen (1 N. Y.' Supl. 430), 40 
 Owen v. New York &c. E. Co. (1 Lans. 
 
 108), 470 
 Owenu. Railroad Co. (87 Ky. 626), 85 
 Owens «. Baltimore <Sec. R. Co. (35 Fed. 
 
 Rep, 715), 96 
 Owens V. Hannibal &e. B. Co. (58 Mo. 
 
 387), 289 
 
 Owens V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (41 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 187), 283, 252 
 Owens «. Richmond &c. E. Co. (88 N. 
 
 C. 602), 538 
 Owners of the Steamboat Farmer v. Mc- 
 
 Craw (26 Ala. 189; s. o. 62 Am. 
 
 Dec. 718), 519 
 Oyshterbank «. Gardner (49 N. Y. Super. 
 
 a. 263), 510 
 Ozier v. Hinesburgh (44 Vt. 220), 333 
 
 Pacific E. Co. V. Brown (14 Kan. 469), 
 
 283, 286 
 Pacific E. Co. V. Houts (12 Kan. 328), 
 
 30, 102, 115, 284 
 Pacific R. Co. v. Lee (70 Tex. 496; 8. o. 
 
 7 S. W. Sep. 867), 241 
 Packet Co, v.. MoCue (17 Wall. 608), 86 
 Packett ». Atlas Steamship Co. (12 Daly 
 
 (N. Y.), 441), 431 
 Paddock v. Northeastern Ey. Co. (18 L. 
 
 T. (N. S.) 60), 72 
 Paduoah &e. R. Co. v. Hoehl (12 Bush, 
 
 41), 17, 44, 542 
 Page V. Bucksport (64 Me. 51; s. o. 18 
 
 Am. Rep. 239), 40, 56, 384 
 Page u Hodge (63 N. H. 610), 134 
 Page V. Hollingsworth (7 Ind. 817), 283 
 Page 1). Wells (37 Mich. 416), 487 
 Pallez V. Brooklyn City R. Co. (4 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 384), 26 
 Palmer v. Andover (2 Cnsh. 606), 826, 
 
 343 
 Palmer ®. Barker (3 Fairf. (Me.) 338), 
 
 366 
 Palmer «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (112 Ind. 
 
 250; s. d. 14 N. E. Eep. 70), 91 
 Palmer v. Dearing (93 N. Y. 7; s. c. 17 
 
 Week. Dig, (N. Y.) 145), 48, 663, 
 
 670 
 Palmer v. Detroit Ac. E. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 1), 253 
 Palmer ». Harrison (67 Mich. 182), 469 
 Palmer v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 217), 813 
 Palmer «. Northern Pac. Ey. Co. (87 
 
 Minn. 228; s. o. S3N. W. Eep. 707), 
 
 306 
 Palys V. Erie Ey. Co. (80 N. J. Eq. 604), 
 
 16, 29, 246 ' 
 
 Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Mining Co. (99 
 
 N. Y. 368), 418, 446 
 Pardington v. South Wales By. Co. (1 
 
 Hurl. A N. 392\ 220 
 Parish o. Eden (62 Wis. 272), 181, 827 
 Park V. O'Brien (23 Conn. 339), 538, 546, 
 
 667, 671 
 Parker v. Adams (12 Mete. 415; s. o. 46 
 
 Am. Dec. 694), 366, 867, 868, 638 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Boston &C, R. Co, (3 Cush. 
 s. 0. 50 Am. Deo. 709), 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 Parker v, 
 
 107; 
 
 828 
 Parker e. Latner (60 Me. 528; s. c. 11 
 
 Am. Rep. 210), S49 
 
 Parker v. Nassau (69 N. H. 402), 64, 
 
 68 
 Parker «. PorUand Publishing Co. (69 
 
 Me. 178; s.o. 81 Am. Kep. 262). 
 
 70, 274 
 Parker v. Rensselaer &c. R. Co. (16 
 
 Barb. 816), 300 
 Parkhill v. Brighton (61 Iowa, 108), 
 
 326, 328, 329, 830 
 Parkhorstv, Johnson (60 Mich. 70; s. c. 
 
 46 Am. Rep. 28), 462 
 Parkinson v. Nashua Ac. R. Co. (61 N. 
 
 H. 416X 26' 
 Parks V. ^nnibal &c. R. Co. (20 Mo. 
 
 App. 440), 296 
 Farmelee v. Farro (22 HI. App. 467), 
 
 114 
 Parrott w. Barney (2 Abb. C. C. 197; 
 
 s. 0. 1 Deady, 40S; 1 Sawyer, 423), 
 
 Parrott tr. Wells, Fai^ & Co. (16 Wall. 
 
 624), 26 
 ParshaU v. Minneapolis &e. R. Co. 
 
 (36 Fed. Rep. 649), 142 
 Parsons t». New York 4c. R. Co. (118 
 N. Y. 356; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 145; 
 37 Hon, ns), 210, 264 
 Parvis v. Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. (17 
 
 Atl. Rep. 708), 26 
 Passenger Railroad Co. v. Young (21 
 Ohio St. 618; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 78), 
 872 
 Pastene v. Adams (49 Cal. 87), 73 
 Patee v. Adams (87 Ean. 188; s. c. 14 
 
 Pac. Rep. 606), 68 
 Patten v. Chicago ibc. R. Co. (32 Wis. 
 
 638), 206 
 Patten v. Rea (2 C. B. (N. S.) 606), 
 
 397 
 Patterson v. Burlington <bc. R. Co. (88 
 
 Iowa, 879), 688 
 Patterson v. Hemenway(148 Mass. 94; 
 
 8. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 16), 73 
 Patterson v. Pittaboigh &c. R. Co. (76 
 Penn. St. 389; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 
 418), 416, 420, 443, 460, 482, 483 
 Patterson v. Wallace (1 Macq. 784), 446, 
 
 474 
 Patton V. Oentral Iowa Ry. Co. (73 
 Iowa, 806; s. o. 86 N. W. Rep. 
 149), 466, 480 
 Patton V. Chicago <tc. R. Co. (76 Iowa, 
 469; 8. c. 89 N. W. Rep. 708), 
 296 
 Patton V. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (87 
 Mo. 117; s. c. 66 Am. Rep. 446), 
 812 
 
 Patton V. Western North Carolina R 
 
 Co. (96 N. C. 455; s. 0. 1 S. E 
 
 Rep. 868), 418, 431 
 Paulmier v. Erie Ry. Co. (34 N. J 
 
 Law, 151), 86, -896, 444, 462 
 Payne «. Chicago <fec. Ry. C«. (39 Iowa, 
 
 623), 139 
 Payne v. Humeston Ac. R, Co (70 Iowa, 
 
 684; s. 0. 81 N. W. Rep. 886), 266 
 Payne v. Kansas City Ac. R. Co. (72 
 
 Iowa, 214; s. C. 83 N. W. Rep. 
 
 683), 296 
 
 Payne t». Troy Ac. R. Co. (9 Hun, 
 
 626), 260 
 Peach V. Utiea (10 Hun, 477), 868, 
 
 610 
 Pearce v. Atwood (13 Mass. 324, 360), 
 
 348 
 Pearsall v. Post (20 Wend. Ill), 362 
 Pearsall v. Western Union Tel. Co. (44 
 
 Hun, 682), 615 
 Pearson v. Chicago Ac, R. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 App. 648), 296. 296 
 Pearson v. Duane (4 Wall. 606), ?74 
 Pearson v. Milwaukee Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 Iowa, 497), 286, 289, 292, 296 
 Pease v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 168), 896, 427 
 Peck V. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (67 Mich. 
 
 8), 249 
 Peck V. Neil (3 McLean, 26), 143 
 Peek B. New York Ac. R. Co. (50 Conn. 
 
 379), 140 
 Feddicord «. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (88 
 
 Mo. 160), 303 
 Pederson v. City of Rushford (41 Minn. 
 
 289), 464 
 Peek «. North Staffordshire Ac. Ry. Co. 
 (10 H. L. Cas. 478, 494), 219, 220 
 Pelxotti V. McLaughlin (1 Strobh. 468; 
 
 s. o. 47 Am. Dec. 663), 226 
 Pence v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 746), 236 
 Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Shires (18 ©hio 
 
 St. 265), 376 
 Pendleton St. R. Co. «. StalJman (22 
 
 Ohio St. 266), 376 
 Pendrill ir. Second Ave. R. Co. (2 Jones 
 A S. 481; s. o. 43 How. Pr. 399), 
 376 
 Penfold V. Universal Life Ins. Co. (86 
 N. Y. 817; 8. 0. 39 Am. Rep. 660), 
 612 
 Penn. v. Lewis (Addison, 279), 682 
 Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Bentley (66 
 
 Penn. St. 30), 287, 643 
 Pennsylvania Co. «. Backes (133 HI. 
 266; B. 0. 24 N. E. Rep. 668), 238, 
 466 
 Pennsylvania Co. «. Dean (92 Ind. 469), 
 191, 663, 670 
 
Ixxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Donlap (13 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 403), 298, 301 
 Pennsvlvania Co. a. Fraoa (112 111. 
 
 398), 663 
 Pennsylvania Co. ». Gallagher (40 Ohio 
 
 St. 637; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 689), 
 
 487,438 
 Pennsylvania Co. v, Oallentine (11 Ind. 
 
 32^), 539 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Long (94 Ind. 250), 
 
 471,479 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. McCarty (112 Ind. 
 
 322; 8. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 409), 298, 
 
 301 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion (123 Ind. 
 
 4l5; s. 0. 23 N. E. Rep. 973; 104 
 
 Ind. 239), 51, 206 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Smith (98 Ind. 42), 
 
 14 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Stegmeier (118 Ind. 
 
 305; s. c. 20 N. E. Rep. 843) 249 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Stoelke (104 111. 
 
 201), 563 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitoomb (111 Ind. 
 
 212; s. c. 12 N. E. Rep. 380), 458 
 Pennsylvania &c. R. Co. v. Hnff(9 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 789), 237 
 
 Pennsylvania iSso. R. Co: v. Mason (109 
 
 Penn. St. 296; s. 0. 58 Am. Rep. 
 
 722), 467 
 Pennsylvania &o. R. Co. v. Rathgeb (32 
 
 Ohio St. 66), 236 
 Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. State (61 Md. 
 
 108), 262 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aclerman (74 
 
 Penn. St. 265), 238 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aiken (18 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 619; B. c. 26 W. N. C. 13), 236, 
 
 246 - 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aspell (23 Penn. 
 
 St. 147; s. 0. 62 Am. Dec. 323), 15, 
 
 79, 95, 189. 190, 206 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. o. Atha (22 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 920), 71 
 Rennsylvania R. Co. u Beale (73 Penn. 
 
 St. 604; s. C. 13 Am. Rep. 753), 
 
 238, 237, 238, 239 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. «. Bell (16 Atl. Rep. 
 
 561), iW 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bock (93 Penn. 
 
 St. 427), 167, 182 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Batler (57 Penn. 
 
 St. 335), 224 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. ». Goodman (62 
 
 Penn. St. 329), 16 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson (51 
 
 Penn. St. 315), 186, 228, 224, 225 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hope (80 Penn. 
 
 St. 373; s. o. 21 Am. Rep. 100), 41, 
 
 312, 319 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Horst (1 10 Penn. 
 
 Sti 226; s. c. 1 Atl. Rep. 217), 569 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. James (81 Penn. 
 
 St.. 194), 167 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. KeUy (31 Penn. 
 
 St. 372), 165 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kerr (62 Penn. 
 
 St. 353; s. o. 1 Am. Rep. 431), 41, 
 
 312,819 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kilgore (32 Penn. 
 
 St. 292), 188 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon (92 
 
 Penn. St. 21; s. o. 37 Am. Rep. 
 
 651), 44, 193, 196, 196 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lewis (79 Penn. 
 
 St. 33), 169, 268, 274, 275 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. B. Lyons (129 Penn. 
 
 St. 113; s. 0. 18 Atl. Bep. 759), 189, 
 
 191, 208 
 Pennsylvania E. Co. - o. McTighe (46 
 
 Penn. St. 316), 643 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Matthews (36 N. 
 
 J. Law, 531), 249, 251 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. «. Mooney (126 
 
 Penn. St. 244; s. o. 17 Atl. Bep. 590; 
 
 24 W. N. C. 40); 236 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Morgan (82 
 
 Penn. St. 134), 24, 167, 265 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Ogier (35 Penn. 
 
 St. 60), 94 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Shanghnessy 
 
 (122 Ind. 588; s. c. 23 N. E. Bep. 
 
 678), 390 
 Pennsylvania R. Co.w. Peters (116 Penn. 
 
 St. 206; s. 0. 9 Ati. Bep. 317), 189, 
 
 286 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Price (96 Penn, 
 
 St. 286), 186 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Bay (102 U. S. 
 
 481), 188 
 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Biblil (66 Penn. 
 
 St. .166), 282 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. «. Righter (42 N. 
 
 J. Law, 180), 16, 42, 108 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Biordon (119 
 
 Penn. St. 677; s. o. 13 Atl. Bep. 
 
 324), 228 
 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Boney (89 Ind. 
 
 453; s. 0. 46 Am. Bep. 173), 57, 
 
 89, 60, 104, 486 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bndel (100 111. 
 
 603), 236 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Schultz (93 
 
 Penn. St. 341), 316 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Sinclair (62 Ind. 
 
 301; B. o. 30 Am. Rep.. 186), 16,31, 
 
 91 
 Pennsylvania R, Co. e. Wachter (60 
 
 Md. 395), 475 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Weber (76 Penn. 
 
 St. 187; s. o. 18 Am. Bep. 407; 72 
 
 Penn. St. 27), 237, 239, 648 
 Pennsylvania B. Co. v. Werner (8 Rep. 
 
 59), 56 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The refeieucee are to pages.] 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 Pennsylvania 5. Co. v. Wilson (132 
 
 Penn. St. 27; s. o. 18 Atl. Eep. 
 
 1087), 150 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zebe (38 Penn. 
 
 St. 818; s. o. 87 Penn. St. 420), 79, 
 
 86, 167 
 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Zink (126 Penn. 
 
 St. 288; 8. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 614), 890 
 Pennsylvania Telegraph Co. v. Veu^nau 
 
 (15 Atl. Rep. 624), 46, Sg 
 People V. Eastwood (14 N. T. 562), 504, 
 
 509 
 People v. New Yort Hospital (3 Abb. 
 
 N. 0. 229), 622 
 People's Passenger Ry. Co. •». Green (56 
 
 Md. 84), 31, 380, 381, 383 
 People's Passenger Ry, Co. v. Lauder- 
 
 bach (19 Amt Law Rev. 163), 386 
 Peoppers v. Missouri Pac Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Ma 715; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 518), 317 
 Peoria v. Simpson (110 HI. 294; s. o. 51 
 
 Am. Rep. 683), 888 
 Peoria Bridge Association v. Loomis (20 
 
 ni. 285), 348 
 Peoria &c R. Co. v. Babbs (23 III. 
 
 App. 454), 304 
 Peoria &c. R. Co. v. Barton (80 111. 72), 
 
 299 
 Peoria Ac R. Co. v. Champ. (75 111. 
 
 578), 284 
 Peoria &c. R. Co. v. Clayberg (107 III. 
 
 644), 236, 241 
 Peplow V. Richardson (4 L. R. (C. P.) 
 
 168), 849 
 Pcrigo V. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (65 Iowa, 
 
 826), 471, 479, 481 
 Perkins v. Buffalo <fec. R. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 356), 260 
 Perkins v. Eastern &c. R. Co. (20 Me. 
 
 307; s. c. 50 Am. Dec. 589), 281, 
 
 284, 293, 297, 537 
 Perkins v. Inhabitants of Fayette (68 
 
 Me. 162; s. o. 28 Am. Rep. 84), 
 
 323, 824, 848 
 Perkins v. New York &c. R. Co. (24 N. 
 
 Y. 196), 87, 216, 221 
 Perley v. Eastern R. Co. (98 Mass. 414), 
 
 312, 318 
 Perrin v. Devendorf (22 HI. App. 284), 
 
 362 
 Perry v. Lansing (17 Hun, 34), 142 
 Peschel v. Chicago &e. R. Co. (62 Wis. 
 
 838; 8. 0. 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 
 
 Cent. L. J. 203), 414, 418, 447 
 Peters ». Rylands (20 Penn. St. 497; 
 
 s. 0. 59 Am. Dec 746), 184 
 Peterson v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (64 
 
 Mich. 621; s. o. 34 N. W.Rep. 260), 
 
 414 
 Peterson v. Wbitebreast C. <t M. Co. 
 
 (60 Iowa, 678; s. o. 32 Am. Rep. 
 
 148), 408, 412 
 
 J 
 
 Petition of Mt. "Washington Road Co. 
 
 (85 N. H. 134), 368 
 Petty V. Hannibal <fcc. R. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 306), 242 
 Peverly o. Boston (186 Mass. 366; s. o. 
 
 49 Am. Rep. 37), 17, 22, 869, 563 
 Peyton v. Texas <fec. Ry. Co. (41 La. 
 
 Ann. 861; s. o. 6 So. Rep. 690), 59, 
 
 275 
 Pfister V. Central Pac. R. Co. (70 Cal. 
 
 169), 226 
 Phalenv. Clark (19 Conn. 421; s. o. 60 
 
 Am. Dec. 263), 64 
 Phelps V. Winona &e. R. Co. (87 Minn. 
 
 485; s. 0. 82 N. W. Rep. 273), 250 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Anderson (20 
 
 Atl. Rep. 2), 211 
 Philadelphia <fec. R. Co. v. Boyer (97 
 
 Penn. St. 91), 22, 43, 95, 137, 186, 
 
 548 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Carr (99 
 
 Penn. St. 505), 246, 262, 256 
 Philadelphia <fcc. R. Co. v. Derby (14 
 
 How. (U. S.) 468), 186, 216. 278 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Edelstein (16 
 
 Atl. Rep. 847; s. o. 28 W. N. C 
 
 342), 95 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Fronk(67 
 
 Md. 339; s. o. 10 Atl. Rep. 204), 
 
 242 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Hassard (76 
 
 Penn. 867), 387 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. e. Hendrickson 
 
 (80 Penn. St. 183; s. o. 21 Am. 
 
 Rep. 97), 312, 315 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. «. Hogan (47 
 
 Penn. St. 244), 94 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. e. Homeland (66 
 
 Md. 149; 8. 0. 7 Atl. Rep. 106), 
 
 140 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v Hummel (44 
 
 Penn. St. 376), 92, 169, 258, 260, 
 
 274, 282 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Layer (112 
 
 Penn. St. 414), 266 
 Philadelphia Ac, R. Co. v. Lehman (56 
 
 Md. 209; s. o. 40 Am. Rep. 416), 
 
 281, 350 
 Philapelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Long (75 
 
 Penn. St. 257), 165, 167, 169, 171, 
 
 363, 866 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. e. McCormick 
 
 (124 Penn. St. 427; s. o. 23 W. N. 
 
 C. 344; 16 Atl. Rep. 848), 211 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Schultz (93 
 
 Penn. St. 341), 312 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Spearen (47 
 
 Penn. St. 800), 92, 157, 169, 166, 
 
 240, 246, 265, 278, 282, 506 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Stebbing (62 
 
 Md. 504), 67, 236 
 
xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. v. Towboafc Co. 
 
 (23 How. (U. S.) 209), 68, 229, 230, 
 
 231, .350 
 Philadelphia Traction Co. «. Orbann 
 
 {] 19 Penn. St. 37; s. o. 12 Atl. Rep. 
 
 816), 387 
 Philbrick v. Miles (2B Fed. Rep. 265), 
 
 564 
 Phillips «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 476), 437 
 Phillips ®. Clark (5 C. B. (N. S.) 884), 
 
 21 
 PhUlips V. De Wald (79 Ga. 732; s. o. 7 
 
 S. E. Eep. 151), 38 
 Phillips «. Dickeraon (88 HI. 11), 610 
 Phillips V. New York &c. R. Co. (6 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 621), 343 
 Phillips V. Rennsglaer <fec. R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 1771, 188 
 Phillips V. Ritchie County (31 W. Va. 
 
 477; 7 S. E. Rep. 427), 48 
 Picard v. Smith (10 C. B. (N. S.) 470), 
 
 528 
 Piedmont Electric Illuminating Co. ». 
 
 Patteaon's Adm'x (84 Va. 747; s. o. 
 
 6 ^. E. Rep. 4), 391 
 Pierce a, Atlanta Cotton Mills (79 Ga. 
 
 782; s. 0. 4 S. E. Rep. 381), 33 
 Pierce v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (73 Iowa, 
 
 140; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. -783), 446 
 Pierce®. New Bedford (129 Mass. 534: 
 
 8. 0. 37 Am. Rep. 387), 354 
 Pierce v. Whitcomb (48 Vt. 127; s. c. 
 
 21 Am. Rep. 120), 70, 72, 74, 275, 
 
 330 
 Piggot ■». The Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 
 
 (3 Man. G. <fe S. 230; s. o. 54 Eng. 
 .Com. Law, 229), 311,318 
 Pigott «. Lilly (55 Mich. 160), 367 
 Pike V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 764), 244 
 Pikei), Grand Trunk- Ry. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 255), 61, 566 
 Pingree v. Leyland (135 Mass, 398), 478 
 Piper V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (77 Wis. 
 
 247; s. 0. 46 N. W. Rep. 165), 244 
 Pitcher v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co. (8 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 389), 570 
 Pittsburgh «. Grier(22 Penn. St. 64; 
 
 s. 0. 60 Am. Dec. 66), 66, 233 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Adams (106 
 
 Ind. 161), 460 
 Pittsburgh (fee. R. Co. v. Andrews (39 
 
 Md. 329; s. o. 17 Am. Rep. 868), 
 
 199 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R Co. v. Binghanl (29 
 
 Ohio St. 365; s. 0. 23 Am. Rep. 
 
 761), 233 
 Pittsburgh <fce. R. Co. «. Bumstead (48 
 
 111. 221), 156, 167 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Caldwell (74 
 
 Penn. St. 421), 160, 158, 169 
 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. v. Collins (87 
 
 Penn. St. 408; s. o. 30 Am. Rep. 
 
 371), 48, 261, 273 
 Pittsburgh &6. R. Co. v. Connecticut 
 
 (104 Ind. 64), 41 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. v. Devinney (17 
 
 Ohio St. 197), 428, 427 
 Pittsburgh <fcc. R. Co. v. Dunn (66 Penn. 
 
 St. 280), 250 
 Pittsburgh <feo. R. Co. «. Hinds (53 
 
 Penn. St. 612), 371, 374 
 Pittsburgh <fc9. R. Co. v. Hixon (77 Ind. 
 
 Ill), 313 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. v. Jones (86 Ind. 
 
 496; s. o. 44 Am. Rep. 334), 313, 
 
 316 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. v. Euntson (69 
 
 lU. 103), 108, 279 • 
 Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. ■». McClurg (56 
 
 Penn. St. 294; s. o. 2 Am. Ry. 
 
 Cases, 662), 199, 200, 201, 663 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. McCombs 
 
 (18 Atl. Rep. 613), 447 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. Martin (82 
 
 Ind. 476), 236 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. Methven (21 
 ; Ohio St. 586), 302 
 ! Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. ■». Noel (77 Ind. 
 ; 110), 313, 639 
 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. •». Pearson (72 
 
 Penn. St. 169), 167, 169, 170, 171, 
 
 363, 365 
 Pittsburgh Ac. E. Co. ■». Pillow (76 
 
 Penn. St. 610; s. o. 18 Am. Rep. 
 
 424), 374 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. Rohrman (13 
 
 Week. Notes Cas. 268; s. c. 29 Alb. 
 
 Law Jour. 97), 58 ■ 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. I^Sentmeyer (92 
 
 Penn. St. 276; s. o." 37 Am, Rep. 
 
 684), 471 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. ■». Smith (26 Ohio 
 
 St. 124), 91, 305 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. a. Stuart (71 Ind. 
 
 505), 283, 284, 288, 306 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co v. iTaylor (104 
 
 Penn. St. 306; s. c. 49 Am. Eep. 
 
 580), 49, 51, 56, 246, 247, 343 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. Vining (27 Ind. 
 
 613), 161, 164, 168, 243, 639 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. ». Wright (80 Ind. 
 
 182), 238 
 Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. v. Zundt (78 Ind. 
 
 873), 241 
 Pitzner v. Shinniek (39 Wis. 129), 810 
 Plaster v. 111. Ac. R. Co. (35 Iowa, 449), 
 
 638 
 Piatt «. Forty-second St. R. Co. (2 Hun, 
 
 124), 387 
 Piatt V. Richmond Ac. R. Co. (108 N. 
 
 Y. 368), 223 
 Platz ■«. City of Cohoes (89 N. Y. 219; 
 
 S.O. 42Am. Rep 286), 231, 360 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 XCl 
 
 Pleasants v. Raleigh &e. R. Co. (9B N. 
 
 C. 196), 480 
 Pluckwell V. Wilson (5 Car. A P. 376), 
 
 368 
 Plnmley v. Birge (124 Mass. 57; s. o. 
 
 26 Am. Rep. 645), 151, 175, 266 
 Plummer v. Eastern R. Co. (73 Me. 
 
 691), 236, 240 
 Plymouth, Township of, ®. Grayer (125 
 
 Penn. St. 24; s. o. 24 W. N. C. 220; 
 
 17 Atl. Rep. 249), 38 
 Poeppers v. Missouri Ac. R. Co. (67 
 
 Mo. 716; s. 0. 29 Am. Rep. 618), 
 
 318 
 Poler ®. New York Ac. R. Co. (16 N. Y. 
 
 476), SOS, 805 
 PoUich V. Sellers (7 So. Rep. 786), 480 
 Pomfirey v. Saratoga Springs (84 Hun, 
 
 (N. Y.) 607), 828 
 Ponlret v. Ricroft (1 Saund. S23, n. 3), 
 
 336 
 Pool v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 659; s. o. 66 Wis. 227), 95, 194, 
 
 197 
 Poole V. Alger (11 Gray, 489), 293 
 Poole o. North Carolina R. Co. (8 Jones 
 
 (Law) 340), 263, 264 
 Popp c. Hew York Ac. R. Co. (7 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 249), 670 
 Porter d. Anhenser-Bosch Brewing 
 
 Assoc. (24 Mo. App. 1), 179 
 Porter v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (60 
 
 Mo. 160), 444 
 Post V. BufWa Ac. R. Co. (108 Penn. 
 
 St. 685), 315 
 Post V. Stockwell (44 Hun (N. Y.) 28), 
 
 61 
 Potter V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (21 Wis. 
 
 372; s. o. 22 Wis. 615), 105, 644 
 Potter V. Faulkner (1 Best. A S. 800; 
 
 8. 0. SJur. (N.sS.) 259; 31 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 30; 10 W«ek. Rep. 93; 5 
 
 L. T. (N. S.) 455), 439 
 Potter V. Moran (61 Mich. 60; s. o. 27 
 
 N. W. Rep. 854), 368 
 Potter V. Warner (91 Penn. St. 362; s. o. 
 
 36 Am. Rep. 668), 106, 521 
 Poucher v. New York Ac. R.'Co. (49 N. 
 
 Y. 263; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 364), 186, 
 
 221, 222 
 Powells. Missouri Pao Ry. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 80), 236, 246 
 Powell V. New York Ac. R. Co. (109 N. 
 
 Y. 613; s. o. 15 N. E. Rep. 891), 
 
 238 
 Powell V. Penn. R. Co. (32 Penn. St. 
 
 416), 282 
 Power v. Harlow (67 Mich. 107), 166 
 Powers V, New York Ac. R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Y. 274), 391, 479 
 Powhattan Ac. Co. v. Appomattox R. 
 
 Co. (24 How. 247), 68 
 
 Praeger v. The Bristol Ac. Ry. Co. (24 
 
 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 106), 212 
 Prather v. Richmond Ac. R. Co. (80 
 
 Ga. 427; s. o. 9 S. E. Rep. 530), 
 
 537, 684 
 Pray v. Mayor Ac. (32 N. J. Law, 394), 
 
 328 
 Prentiss «. Boston (112 Mass. 43), 538 
 PresBcott «. Eastern Ac. R. Co. (113 
 
 Mass. 870, ».), 260 
 President Ac. of Mt. Vernon v. Dusou- 
 
 chett (2 Ind. 586; s. o. 64 Am.' Dec. 
 
 467), 329, 338 
 Price V. Central Ac. R. Co. (31 Am. 
 
 Dec. 229; s. o. 82 Am. Dec. 19), 
 
 282 
 Price V. Houston Ac. Ry. Co. (46 Tex. 
 
 585), 403 
 Price V. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 
 414), 187, 189 
 Prideaux ir. Mineral Point (43 Wis. 518; 
 
 s. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 658), 139, 544, 
 
 669 
 Priest V. NichoUs (116 Mass. 401), 22 
 Priestley v. Fowler (3 Mee. A W. 1). 
 
 398, 402, 404, 411, 424, 487, 488, 
 
 497 
 Prince v. International Ac, R. Co. (64 
 
 Tex. 144; s. o. 20 Cent. L. J. 479), 
 
 197, 216 
 Prinsor's Case (Cro. Car. 602), 844 
 Probert «. Phipps (149 Mass. 268; s. c. 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 370), 469 
 Probst V. Delamater (100 N. Y. 266), 
 
 464 
 Probst V. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. (3 So. 
 
 Rep. 764), 472 
 Providence v. Clapp (17 How. 161), 322, 
 
 354, 855,866 
 Providence Ac. Steamship Co. ■». Clare 
 
 (127U.S. 45), 85 
 I Pucket V. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. (25 Mo. 
 ! App. 660), 296 
 
 Pufifer ». Orange'(122 Mass. 889; s. o. 
 
 23 Am. Rep. 868), 835 
 Puget Sound Iron Co. v. Lawrence (3 
 
 Wash. T. 226; s. o. 14 Pac. Rep. 
 
 869), 447 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm (109 
 
 111. 20; 8. 0. 50 Am. Rep. 601), 97, 
 
 523 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. ■». Gardner (14 
 
 Week. Notes Cas. 17), 529 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lowe (28 
 
 Neb. 289; s. o. 44 N. W. Rep. 226), 
 
 226 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pollock (69 
 
 Tex. 120; s. o. 6 S. W. Rep. 814), 
 
 227 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith (73 
 
 ni. 365), 226 
 
xcu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Pullutro V. Delaware &c. B. Co. (7 If . 
 
 Y. Supl. 610), 390, 395, 448 
 Purinton ®. Maine Cent. R. Co. (78 Me. 
 
 569; s. 0. 1 Atl. Rep. 707), 245 
 Purl V. St. Louis &o. R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 
 168), 256 
 PuTple V. Greenfield (138 Mass. 1), 339 
 Purvis V. Coleman (21 H. Y. Ill), 628 
 Puterbangh ».Reasor (9 Ohio St. 484), 
 
 133, 134, 141 
 Putnam v. Broadway <fcc. R. Co. (66 N. 
 
 Y. 108; s. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 190), 
 
 370, 373 
 Putnam v. New York &c. R. Co. (47 
 
 Hun, 439), 39 
 Pyne ®. Chicago &c. R. Co. (64 Iowa, 
 
 223), 427 
 Pzolla V. Mich. Cent. R. Co. (54 Mich. 
 
 273), 278 
 
 a 
 
 Quackenbush v. Chicago &c, R. Co. 
 
 (73 lowu, 458; s. c. 35 K. W. Rep. 
 
 623), 198 
 Quackenbush v. Wisconsin &c. R. Co. 
 
 (62 Wis. 411), 297 
 Quaid V. Cornwall (13 Bush, 601), 443 
 Quarman V. Burnett (6 Mee. & W. 499), 
 
 136, 397 
 Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant (133 
 
 U. S. 375), 431 
 Quick V. Indianapolis &c. R. Co. (130 
 
 lU. 334; s. 0. 22 N. E. Rep. 709), 
 
 446, 484 
 Quimby v. Boston <&c. B. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 366), 225 
 Quimby v. Vermont Ac. R. Co. (23 Vt. 
 
 393), 294 
 Quincy, City of, «. Barker (81 111. 300; 
 
 s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 278), 357 
 Quincy &o. R. Co. v. Gruse (26 El. 
 
 App. 397), 114 
 Qninn v. Donovan (85 111. 194), 108 
 Quinn v. Illinois Ac. B. Co. (51 lU. 495), 
 
 192 
 Quinn v. New Jersey Lighterage Co. (23 
 
 Fed. Bep. 363; s. o. 32 Alb. Law 
 
 Jour. 86), 402, 418, 420 
 Quinn v. Power (24 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 102), 216 
 Quinn D. South Carolina Ry, Co. 29 S. 
 
 C. 381), 201 
 
 E 
 
 R. V. Arundel (5 Man. & Sel. 257), 459 
 B. V. Chillesford (4 Barn. & C. 94), 469 
 R. V. St. Petroix (4 T. R. 196), 459 
 Baben v. Central Iowa By. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa, 732; s. o. 39 H. W. Rep. 
 
 621; 73 Iowa, 579; 35 N. W. Rep. 
 
 645), 189, 191, 209 
 
 Radcliffe v. St. Louis Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (90 Mo. 127; s. o. 2 S. W. Bep. 
 
 277), 296 
 Eadley ». London &c. Ry. Co. (L. R. 9 
 
 Exch. 71; s. c. 43 L. J. (Exoh.) 
 
 ■73; 1 App Cas. 764), 31, 32, 42, 79 
 
 Radman v. Haberstro (1 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 561), 97 
 Rafferty v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 33), 273 
 Ragadale ». Memphis Ac. R. Co. (59 
 
 Tenn. 426), 426 
 Bagsdale v Northern Pac. By. Co. (42 
 
 Fed. Bep. 383), 425 
 Baiford v. Mississippi ifcc. R. Co. (43 
 
 Miss. 233), 291, 288 
 Railroad Co. v. Barrett (36 Ohio St. 
 
 452), 226 
 Railroad Co. v. Bowler (9 Heisk. 866), 
 
 431 
 Railroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick (8 Ohio Law 
 
 Jour. 203; 8. o. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 163), 428 
 Railroad Co. v. Fort (17 Wall. 553; s. o. 
 
 2 Dm. 269), 414, 418 
 Railroad Co. v. Gladmou (15 Wall. 401), 
 
 175, 239, 375, 542, 549, 650, 557 
 Railroad Co. v. H.enning(15 Wall. 659), 
 
 205 
 Raikoad Co. v. Herbeck (60 Tex. 612), 
 
 166 
 RaUroad Co. v. Houston (96;U. S. 697), 
 
 287, 239, 261, 273, 276 
 Railroad Co. v. Jones (96 U. S. 439), 16, 
 
 22,44 
 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood (17 Wall. 
 
 357, 364; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 366), 
 
 220 221 226 
 Railroad Co. '». Lowrey (61 Tex. 149), 
 
 241 
 Railroad Co. v. Norton (24 Penn. St. 
 
 465; s. c. 64 Am. Dec. 672), 13 
 
 79, 92, 96, 101, 103, 105, 258, 276, 
 
 378 
 Railroad Co. v. Pollard (22 Wall. 341), 
 
 25 
 Railroad Co. v. Skinner (19 Penn. St. 
 
 298; s. 0. 57 Am. Dec. 664), 268, 
 
 282, 283, 284, 293 
 Railroad Co. v. State (36 Md. 366), 245 
 Railroad Co. «. Stevens (95 U. S. 655), 
 
 224, 225 
 RMboad Co. v. Stout (17 Wall. 657; 
 
 s. 0. 2 Dill. 294), 174, 177, 268, 269, 
 
 271, 567 
 Railroad Co. v. Wagner (33 Kan. 660; 
 
 s. 0. 7 Pac. Rep. 201), 451 
 Railroad Co. v. Walker (11 Heisk. 383), 
 
 122, 277 
 Railroad Co. v. Whitton (13 Wall. 270), 
 
 246 
 Railway Co. v. Lewis (33 Ohio St. 196), 
 
 413 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.l 
 
 xcm 
 
 Eailway Co. ». Spangler (44 Ohio St. 
 
 471), 406, 417, 495 
 Railway Co. v. SuUivan. (6 Tex. Law 
 
 Rev. 183), 415, 418 
 Rains v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 164; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 469), 471 
 Raisin v. Mitchell (9 Car. <feP. 613), 110 
 Rammell v. Schambacher (120 Penn. St. 
 
 579; s. 0. 11 Atl. Rep. 779), 508 
 Ramsay v. Quinn (4 Cent. Law Jour. 
 
 478), 418 
 Ramsden v. Boston <fec. R. Co. (104 
 
 Mass. 117; s. o. 6 Am. Rep. 200), 
 
 372 
 Ramsey v. LouisviUe Ac. R. Co. (Ct. of 
 
 App. Ky. 1886), 125 
 Ramsey v. Rushville (81 led. 394), 333, 
 
 570 
 Randall v Baltimore <fec. R. Co. (109 U. 
 
 S. 478), 425 
 Randall v. Conn. <fec. R. Co. (132 Mass. 
 
 499), 236, 670 
 Randall v. Frankford &o. R. Co. (8 Pa. 
 
 Co. Ct. Rep. 277), 130 
 Randall v. Richmond &c. R. Co. (104 N. 
 
 C. 410), 292 
 Ransler v. Minneapolis etc. R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 331), 396 
 Ransom v. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (62 Wis. 
 
 178; 8. 0. 51 Am. Rep. 7181, 94, 
 
 244 
 Rasmnssen v. Chicago <fcc. R. Co. (65 
 
 Iowa, 236; s. o. 42 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1063), 464 
 Rathbone v. Union R. Co. (13 R. I. 709), 
 
 380 
 Rathbnn v. Payne (19 Wend. 399), 89 
 
 553 
 Ranch «. Lloyd (31 Penn. St. 358), 165, 
 
 278 
 Rawson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (48 N. Y. 
 
 212; 8.0. 8 Am. Rep. 643), 228 
 Ray V. Manchester (46 N. H. 69), 363 
 Raymond v. Burlington &c. R. Co. (65 
 
 Iowa, 152), 538 
 Raymond v. City of Lowell (6 Cush. 
 
 524; 8. o. 63' Am. Dec. 57), 322, 323, 
 
 326, 332, 362, 563 
 Read V. Boston & Albany R. Co. (140 
 
 Mass. 199), 391 
 Read v. Grreat Eastern Ry. Co. (L. R..3 
 
 Q. B. 555), 494 
 Read v. Nichols (118 N. Y. 224; a. o. 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 468), 40 
 Read v. Patterson (11 Lea (Tenn.) 430), 
 
 520 
 Readhead«. Midland Ey. Co. (L. B. 2Q. 
 
 B. 412; 8. c. L. R. 4 Q. B. 379), 186, 
 
 461 
 Reading <fcc. R. Co. v. Ritchie (102 Penn. 
 
 St. 425), 236 
 Reading Iron Works v. Devine (109 
 
 Penn. St. 246), 84, 432 
 
 Ream v. Pittsburgh <fec. R. Co. (49 Ind. 
 
 93), 245, 261 
 Reardon v. City (66 Cal. 492; s. o. 19 
 
 Am. Law Rev. 492), 324 
 Reardon v. Thompson (149 Mass. 267; 
 
 s. 0. 21 N, E. Rep. 369), 74 
 Reary v. Louisville &C. R. Co. (40 La. 
 
 Ann. 32; s. o. 8 So. Rep. 390), 64 
 Rebelsky v. Chicago Ac R. Co. (79 
 
 Iowa, 55; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 536), 
 
 472 
 Reber v. Bond (38 Fed. Rep. 822), 199 
 Rector v. Pierce (3 Thomp. & C. 416), 
 
 330 
 Rector of the Church of the Ascension v. 
 
 Buckliardt (3 Hill. 193), 360 
 Reddington v. PMla. Traction Co. (132 
 
 Penn. St. 154; s. o. 19 Atl. Rep. 
 
 28), 380 
 Reddon v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (15 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 262), 415, 418 
 Redmond v. Rome Ac. R. Co. (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 330), 390 
 Redstone Coke Co. ». Roby (8 Atl. Rep. 
 
 693), 458 
 Reed v. Axtell (84 Va. 231; s. o. 4 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 687), 208 
 Reed v. Belfast (20 Me. 246), 322 
 Reed v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (74 Iowa, 
 
 188; s. o. 37N. W. Rep. 149), 254 
 Reed v. Northfield (IS Pick. 94; s. o. 23 
 
 Am. Dec. 662), 61, 326, 328 
 Reedie v. London Ac. Ry. Co. (4 Exch. 
 
 244), 136 
 Reese v. Biddle (112 Penn. St. 72), 458 
 Reeves «. Delaware Ac. R. Co. (30 Penn. 
 
 St. 464), 52, 259, 282, 283 
 Regina «. Rymer (13 Cox's C. C. 378), 
 
 349 
 Regina v. Watts (ISalk. 357), 360 
 Rehberg v. Mayor Ac. of New York (91 
 
 N. Y. 137; s. o. 43 Am. Rep. 657), 
 
 331 
 Reibel v. Cincinnati Ac R. Co. (114 
 
 Ind. 476; s. o. 17 N. E. Rep. 107), 
 
 189 
 Reich V. Mayor Ac. (17 N. Y. Week. 
 
 Dig. 149), 358 
 Reilly v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (94 Mo. 
 
 600; 8. 0. 7 S. W. Rep. 407), 181 
 Reinder's Adm'r v. Blick A Philips Coal 
 
 Co. (13 S. W. Rep. 719). 84 
 Reitman v. Stolte (120 Ind. 314; 8. o. 22 
 
 K. E. Rep. 304), 461 
 Renneker v. South Carolina R. Co. (20 
 
 S. C. 219), 17 
 Renner v. Canfield (36 Minn. 90; s. o. 30 
 
 N. W. Rep. 435), 39 
 Rensselaer Ac. R. Co. In Be (4 Paige, 
 
 563), 294 
 
XCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Renwick v. New York &c. E. Co. (36 N. 
 
 T. 133), 244, 51 1 
 Rex V. Brotherton (Stra. 102), 344 
 Rex V. Buff (4 Cox's C. C. 455), 158 
 Rex V. Friend (E. <fe R. 20), 168 
 Rex V. Peace (4 Barn. <fe Adol. 30), 293 
 Rex V. Smith (L. <fc C. 601; s. c. 10 Cox's 
 
 C. C. 82,) 158 
 Rex V. Squire (1 Rnss. C. <fe M. 80, 618), 
 
 168 
 Rexter v. Starin (T3 N. Y. 601), 18, 51, 
 
 61 
 Reynolds v. Burlington (62 Vt. 300), 25, 
 
 327 
 Reynolds v. Hindman (32 Iowa, 149), 
 
 80, 244, 638 
 Reynolds v. New York <fec. R. Co. (58 
 
 N. Y. 248; s. c. 2 N. Y. -Super. Ct. 
 
 644), 239, 246, 552, 556 
 Reynolds v. Texas &0. Ry. Co. (3'7 La. 
 
 Ann. 694), 207 
 RMemer v. Chicago' &c. Ry. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. ITO; s. o. 30 N. W. Rep. 
 
 648), 240 
 Rhines ». Chicago <fec. R. Co. (76 Iowa, 
 
 597; s. o. 39 N. W. Rep. 912), 801 
 Rhing V. Broadway <fec. R. Co. (53 
 
 Hnn, 321; s. o. 6 N. Y. Supl. 641), 
 
 380 
 Rhoades v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (58 
 
 Mich. 2Q3), 246 
 Rhoades v. Utica &c. R. Co. (5 Hun, 
 
 344), 299 
 Rice V. £ing Philip Mills (144 Mass. 
 
 229; s. o. 11 fk E. Rep. 101), 447, 
 
 449 
 Rice V. Montpelier (19 Vt. 470), 334, 
 
 336 
 Riceman ii. HaTenieyer'(84 N. Y. 647), 
 
 652, 556 
 Richards v. Enfield (13 Gray, 344), 322, 
 
 339 
 Richards v. Fnqua's Adm'r (28 Miss. 
 
 792; s. 0. 64 Am. Dec. 121), 369 
 Richards v. Rough (63 Mich. 212), 477 
 Richardson i(. MUhurn (11 Md. 340), 
 
 282 
 Richardson v. New York <fec. R. Co. (45 
 
 N. Y. 846), 249, 250 
 Richardson v. The Metropolitan Ry. Co. 
 
 (L. R. 3 C. P. 374, n.), 205 
 Richardson v. 'Wilmington <fec. R. Co. 
 
 (8 Rich. (Law) 120), 257, 505 
 Richmond ». Sacramento R. Co. (18 
 
 Cal. 351), 284, 292 
 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Anderson (31 
 
 Gratt. 812; s. o. 31 Am; Rep. 750), 
 
 16, 30, 31, 44 
 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Howard (79 
 
 Ga. 44; s. o. 3 S. E. Rep. 426), 26, 
 
 38,240 
 Richmond 4c. R. Co. v. Medley (75 Va. 
 
 499; 8. 0. 40 Am. Rep. 734), 312, 
 
 316 
 Richmond <feo. R. Co. v. Moore (78 Va. 
 
 93), 447 
 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Morris (31 
 
 Gratt. 200), 16, 22, 44, 189 
 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Normant (84 
 
 Va. 167; s. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 211), 
 
 446 
 Richmond &c. R, Co, v. PicMeseimer 
 
 (86< Va. 798; s. c. 10 S. E. 44), 
 
 188 
 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Williams (86 
 
 Va. 166; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep, 990), 
 
 427 
 Rieker v. Freeman (50 N. H. 420), 143 
 Rickert v. Stephens (19 Atl. Rep. 410), 
 
 478 
 Ricketts v. Birmingham St. By. Co. (85 
 
 Ala. 600; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 353), 380 
 Ricketts v. East & West India Docks 
 '<fcc. Ry. Co. (12 C. B. 160; s.o. 16 
 
 Jur. 1072; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 201; 12 
 
 Eng. Law <fe Eq. 520; 7 Eng. Ry. 
 
 Cases, 296), 280, 310 
 Riddle v. Proprietors (7 Mass. 169; s. o. 
 
 6 Am. Dec. 35), 322 
 Riest V. Goshen (42 Ind. 339), 539 
 Righy V. Hewett (6 Exch. 240), 136 
 Rigler v. Charlotte <fcc. R. Co. (94 N. C. 
 
 604), 246 
 Riley v. Connecticut &c. R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 292), 472, 638 
 Riley v. O'Brien (6 N. Y. Supl. 129; 
 
 s. 0. 63 Hun, 147), 411 
 Riley v. Steamship Co. (29 La. Ann, 
 
 791; s. 0. 29 Am. Rep. 342), 486, 
 
 443, 461 
 Riley v. West Virginia Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (27 West Va. 145), 446 
 Rine v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (88 Mo. 392), 
 
 264 
 Rinear v. Grand Rapids <fec. R. Co. (70 
 
 Mich. 620; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 699), 
 
 300 
 Ring ». City of Cohoes (77 N. Y. 83; s. c. 
 
 33 Am. Rep. 574), 79, 182, 325, 
 ' 342 
 Rippe V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 34; s. 0. 43 N. W. Rep. 662), 299 
 Ritterman v. Ropes (51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 25), 73 
 Ritt's Adm'z «. Louisyille <fec. R. Co. (4 
 
 S. W. Rep. 796), 446 
 Rivers v. City Council of Augusta (66 
 
 Ga. 376), 342 
 Rebel V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (46 Minn. 
 
 84), 470 
 Roberts ». Chicago <fcc. R. Co. (33 
 
 Minn. 218), 430 
 Roberts v. Smith (2 Hurl. & N. 213), 
 
 393 
 
TABLE OP OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.! 
 
 xcv 
 
 Robertson v. Cornelson (34 Fed. Rep. 
 
 716), 461,468 
 Robertson «. Erie Ry. Co. (22 Barb. 91), 
 
 197, 216 
 Robertson v. Terre Haate &e. R. Co. (78 
 
 lud. 77; s. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 552), 
 
 403, 429 
 Robeson v. French (12 Mete. 24; s. c. 
 
 45 Am. Dec. 236), 345 
 Robinson v. Chicago <fec R. Co. ('79 Iowa, 
 
 496; s. 0. 44 N. W. Rep. 718), 304 
 Robinson v. Cone (22 Vt. 213; s. o. 64 
 
 Am. Dec. 67), 158, 165, 174 
 Robinson », Fitchbnrg R. Co. (7 Gray, 
 
 92), 638 
 Robinson v. Flint <fec. R. Co. (79 Mich. 
 
 323; s. 0. 44 N. W. Rep. 779), 282 
 Robinson v. 6eoi<ge F. Blake Man%, Co. 
 
 (143 Mass. 628; s. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 
 
 314), 447, 448 
 Robinson ». Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Mich. 322), 298 
 Robinson v. Houston <fec. Ry. Co. (46 
 
 Tex. 540), 481 
 Robinson v. New York &c. R. Co. (66 
 
 S. Y. 13; 8. o. 23 Am. Rep. 1; 65 
 
 Barb. 146), 132, 140, 142, 462, 563 
 Robinson v. Pioche (5 Cal. 460), 502, 
 
 608 
 Robinson v. Westera <fcc. R. Co. (48 Cal. 
 
 409), 31, 53, 377, 543 
 Robostelli «. New York Ac. R. Co. (32 
 
 Fed.Rep. 796), 210 
 Rock I). Indian Orchard Mills (142 Mass. 
 
 622), 469 
 Rock Island v. Vanlandschoot (58 lU. 
 
 485), 603, 609 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. Byam (80 Til. 
 
 528) 239 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. a. Delaney (82 ID. 
 
 198; 26 Am. Rep. 308), 103, 108,' 
 
 114, 161, 266 
 Rockford &c. R. Co. »j Heflin (66 ID. 
 
 367), 301 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. Hillmer (72 111. 
 
 236), 108, 260 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. Irish (72 III. 404), 
 
 108, 284, 289, 292, 302 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. Lewis (58 111. 49), 
 
 287 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. Lynch (67 111. 
 
 149), 304 
 Rockford Ac. R. Co. v. RafiFerty (73 111. 
 
 68), 108, 287, 289 
 Roden v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (133 111. 
 
 72 ; s. c. 24 N. E. Rep. 425), 248, 
 
 260 
 Rodman v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (55 
 
 Mich. 57; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 348; 31 
 
 Alb. Law Jour. 34), 425, 428 
 Rodrian v. New York Ac. R. Co. (7 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 811), 265 
 
 Roesner v. Hermann (10 Biss. 486), 18 
 
 496 
 Rogen V. Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. (1 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 278), 891 
 Rogers v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (26 Iowa, 
 
 658), 300 
 Rogers v. Galveston City Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Tex. 502; s. 0. 13 S. W. Rep. 540) 
 
 480 
 Rogers «. Ludlow Mfg. Co. (144 Mass. 
 
 198; s. G. 11 N. E. Rep. 77), 467 
 Rogers v. Newbnryport Ac. R. Co. (1 
 
 Allen 16), 281, 290, 297, 310 
 Rogers v. Overton (87 Ind. 410), 485, 
 
 639 
 Rogers Ac. "Works a. Hand (50 N. J. 
 
 Law, 464; s. c. 14 Atl. Rep. 766), 
 
 458 
 Roll V. Northern Ac. R. Co. (15 Hun, 
 
 496), 67 
 Rolseth V. Smith (38 Minn. 14; s. c. 36 
 
 N. W. Rep. 565), 568 
 Rome V. Dodd (68 Ga. 238), 120 
 Romney Marsh, The Lord's Bailiff-Ju- 
 rats of, V. The Corporation of the 
 
 Trinity House (L. R 5 Exch. 204; 
 
 s. c. L. R. 7 Exch. 247), 38 
 Rompillon v. Abbott (1 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 662), 88 
 Ronan v. Midland Ry. Co. (47 L. R. Ir. 
 
 157), 223 
 Roof «. Railroad Co. (4 S. C. 61), 544 
 Rooney ». Allan (10 C. of S. Cas. 1224, 
 
 Sc), 391 
 Root V. New York Cent. Sleeping Car Co . 
 
 (28 Mo. App. 199), 227 
 Rose V. DesMoines Ac. R. Co. (39 Iowa, 
 
 246), 224 
 Ross V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (6 AUen, 87), 
 
 312, 316 
 Ross V. Davenport (66 Iowa, 548), 51 
 Rost V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (76 Tex. 
 
 168; s. 0. 12 S. W. Rep. 1131), 26 
 Rothe V. Milwaukee Ac. R. Co. (21 
 
 Wis. 256), 67, 245, 263 
 RothweU V. Hutchison (13 Ct. of Ses. 
 
 Cas. 463), 481 
 Ronl V. East Tenn. Ac. R. Co. (11 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 658), 390 
 Roulston V. Clark (5 E. D. Smith, 366), 
 
 69, 361 
 Rowe V. Raiboad Co. (7 S. 0. 167), 288 
 RoweU V. City of Lowell (7 Gray, 100), 
 
 361 
 RoweU V. Railroad (57 N. H. 132; s. c. 
 
 24 Am. Rep. 59), 313, 316 
 Rowen v. New York Ac. R. Co. (59 Conn, 
 
 365), 16 
 Rowland v. Cannon (35 Ga. 106), 169 
 Rowland v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (20 
 
 Mo. App. 463), 431 
 Rnbenstein v. Cruikshank (64 Mich. 
 
 199), 508, 528 
 
XCVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The referenoes are to pages.] 
 
 Rncker v. Missouri Ac. By. Co. (61 Tex. 
 
 Tex. 499), 194, 197 
 Eudd V. Eichmond Ac. E. Co. (80 Va. 
 
 546), 265 
 Endolphy v. Fuch^ (44 How. Prae. 155), 
 
 665 
 Bnland v. South New Market (69 N. H. 
 
 291), 563, 570 
 Kummell B. Dillworth, Porter & Co. (131 
 
 Penn. St. 609; s. o. 19 Atl. Eep. 
 
 345), 469 
 Bunyon v. Central R. Co. (26 N. J. Law, 
 
 656), 22, 43, 44, 242 
 Eusch V. Dayenport (6 Iowa, 443), 638 
 Rush B. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (36 Kan. 
 
 129; s. o. 12 Pac. Eep. 582), 465, 
 
 480 
 Eushville v. Poe (85 Ind. 83), 539 
 EuBsell V. Men of Devon (2 T. R. 667), 
 
 321 
 Enssell v. Minneapolis Ac. E. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 230), 467, 477 
 Russell V. Tillotson (140 Mass. 201), 463 
 Eussell V. yUlage of Canastota (98 N. Y. 
 
 496), 475 
 Eusfc V. Low (6 Mass. 90), 281, 293 
 Eutter V. foy (46 Iowa, 132), 90, 91 
 Eutter V. Missouri Pac. Ky. Co. (81 Mo. 
 
 169), 85 
 Eyall V. Central Pac. E. Co. (76 Cal. 
 
 474; s. 0. 18 Pac. Eep. 430), 392 
 Eyan v. Bagley (60 Mich. 179; s. c. 46 
 
 Am. Eep. 35), 416, 430, 432, 468 
 Eyan v. Cumberland Ac. E. Co. (23 
 
 . Penn. St. 384), 198, 427, 428 
 Eyan v. Fowler (24 N. T. 410), 393, 443 
 Eyan v. Hudson Eiver Ac. B Co. (1 
 
 Jones A Sp. 137), 652 
 Eyan v. Long Island B. Co. (51 Hnn, 
 
 607; s. 0. 4 N. Y. Supl. 381), 470 
 Eyan v. Miller (12 Daly, 77), 39, 468 
 Eyan b. Miflsouri Ac. By. Co. (66 Tex. 
 
 13; s. 0. 67 Am. Eep. 689), 223 
 Ryan v. New York Ac. B. Co. (35 N. Y. 
 
 210; 8. 0. 37 Hun, 186), 150, 319 
 Eyan v. Thompson (2 Jones A Sp. 133), 
 
 74 
 Eylands v. Fletcher (L. B. 1 Exch. 266; 
 
 s. 0. L. B. 3 H, L. 330; 3 Hurl. A 
 
 C. 774), 361 
 
 s 
 
 Saare v. Union By. Co. (20 Mo. App. 
 
 211), 376 
 Sabine Ac. By. Co. «. Dean (76 Tex. 78; 
 
 B. 0. 13 S. W. Eep. 46), 264 
 Sabine Ac. By. Co. v. Hanks (73 Tex. 
 
 323; 8. o. 11 S. W. Rep, 377), 260 
 Sadler v. Henlock (4 El. A Bl. 670; s. o. 
 
 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 138; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 
 
 677), 897 
 
 St. Clair Street By. Co. v. Eadie (43 
 
 Ohio St. 91 ; s. 0. 54 Am. Bep. 144, 
 
 ».), 140, 141 
 St. Johnsburg Ac. E. Co. v. Hunt (59 
 
 Vt. 294), 297 
 St.' Joseph Ac. R. Co. v. Chase (11 Kan. 
 
 47), 313, 316 
 St. Joseph, Ac. B. Co. v. Glover (11 
 
 Kan. 302), 299 
 St. Joseph Ac. E. Co. v. Wheeler (35 
 
 KAi. 185), 198 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. v. Basham (47 
 
 Ark. 321), 292 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. ». Bell (81 111. 76; 
 
 s. o. 25 Am. Eep. 269), 178, 266, 
 
 270, 271 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. ®. Box (52 Ark. 
 
 368; 6. c. 12 S. W. Bep. 757), 250 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Britz (72 IlL 
 
 266), 410, 413, 425, 426 
 St. Louis Ac. B.. Co. v. Cantrell (87 Ark. 
 
 519; s. 0. 40 Am. Eep. 105), 95, 190 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. v. Crosnoe (72 
 
 Tex. 79; s. c. 10 S. W. Bep. 342), 
 
 241, 276 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. v. Fairbaim (48 
 
 Ark. 491; 8. c. 4 S. W. Bep. 50), 
 
 208 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. ■». Faitz (23 ID. 
 
 App. 498), 107 
 St, Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Gaines (46 
 
 Ark. 666), 428 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Harper (44 Ark. 
 
 524), 432, 448 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Higgins (44 
 
 Ark. 203), 473 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Irwin (38 Kan. 
 
 701; B. o. 16 Pac. Bep. 146); 470 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. e. Manly (68 HI. 
 
 800), 68, 108, 237, 244 
 St. Louis Ac. E. Co. «. Marker (41 
 
 Ark. 542), 390 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. ■B. Mathias (60 Ind. 
 
 66), 242 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Monday (49 
 
 Ark. 257; B. c. 4 S. W. Bep. 782), 
 
 263 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Morgart (46 
 
 Ark. 318), 391 
 St. Lonis Ac. B. Co. v. Person (49 Ark. 
 
 182; 8. 0. 4 S. W. Bep. 765), 95 
 St. Louis Ac E. Co. v. Bice (61 Ark. 
 
 467; s. 0. 11 S. W. Bep. 699), 472 
 St. Louis Ac. B. Co. v. Eosenbeny (46 
 
 Ark. 266; 8. o. 11 S. W. Eep. 212), 
 
 96, 189 
 St. Lonis Ac. E. Co. v. Shackelford (42 
 
 Ark. 417), 426 
 St Louis Ac. B. Co. ■». Terhnne (60 HI. 
 
 151), 244 
 St. Lonis Ac. R. Co. v. Todd (36 HI. 
 
 409), 87, 107, 103, 118, 284, 285, 
 307 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 IThe reterenccB are to pages.! 
 
 XCVll 
 
 St. Louis <i;c. R. Co. v. Valirins (56 Ind. 
 
 511), 444, 452 
 St. Lonia Ac. R. Co. ©. Vincent (86 Ark. 
 
 461), 291 
 St. Lonis Ac. R. Co. v. WasbbnTn (97 
 
 III. 293), 304 
 St. Louis (fee. R. Co. V. "Weaver (35 
 
 Kan. 412; s. o. 11 Pac. Rep. 412), 
 
 425, 445, 463, 457, 543 
 St. Louis <te. R. Co. v. White (48 Ark. 
 
 495; s. o. 4 S. W. Rep. 52), 189 
 St. Lonis <tc. R. Co. v. Wilkerson (46 
 
 Ark. 513), 265 
 St. Paul, City of, ». Kaby (8 Minn. 
 
 166), 154 
 Salem v. GoUer (76 Tnd. 291), 17, 91 
 Salina, City of, v. Trosper (27 Kan. 545), 
 
 326, 827, 501, 604 
 Salisbury v. Hercheuroder (106 Mass. 
 
 458; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 364). 38 
 Salmon -o. Delaware &c. R. Co. (38 N. 
 
 J. Law, 5; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 866), 
 
 312, 316 
 Salmon ». New York &c. R. Co. (5 N. 
 
 T. Supl. 225), 248 
 Salter v. Utica &c. R. Co. (13 Hun, 
 
 197), 246 
 Sammon ». New York Ac. R. Co. (62 N. 
 
 Y. 351), 414 
 San Antonio Ac. Ry. Co. v. Bennett (76 
 
 Tex. 151), 644 
 Sanborn v. Atcbison Ac. R. Co. (86 
 
 Kan. 292), 469 
 Sanborn v. Madera Flume A Trading 
 
 Co. (70 Cal. 261), 457, 478 
 Sanders V. Reister (1 Dakota, 161), 69, 
 
 335, 336 
 Sanders v. Young (1 Head. 219), 869 
 Sanderson «. Frazier (8 Colo. 79; s. c. 
 
 54 Am. Rep. 544; 19 Am. Law 
 
 Rev. 312), 386, 544 
 Sandusky Ac, R. Co. v. Sloan (27 Ohio 
 
 St. 841), 802, 304 
 Sanford ®. Eighth Ave. R. Co. (28 N. 
 
 Y. 343), 91, 372 
 Sanford ». Standard OU Co. (118 N. Y. 
 
 571; s. o. 24 N. E. Rep. 813), 485 
 Sangamon Coal Mining Co. v. Wigger- 
 
 hans(122ni. 279; s. o. 18 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 648), 445, 468 
 Sappho, The (9 Jur. 560; s. o. 1 Parson's 
 
 Mar. Law, 189), 518 
 Sauter v. New York Ac. R. Co. (66 N. 
 
 Y. 50; s. 0. 23 Am. Rep. 18), 30, 
 
 86 
 Savage v. Bangor (40 Me. 176; s. o. 63 
 
 Am. Dec. 658), 323, 334 
 Savage v. Com Exchange Ins. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. 655), 32 
 Savannah Ac. R. Co. v. Barber (71 Ga. 
 
 644), 472 
 Savannah Ac. R. Co. v. Geiger (21 Fla. 
 
 669; 8. o. 58 Am. Rep. 697) 287 
 
 K 
 
 Savannah Ac. R. Co. v. Rice (23 Fla. 
 
 575; s. 0. 3 So. Rep. IVO), 293 
 Savannah Ac. R. Co. v. Stewart (71 
 
 Ga. 427), 263 
 Savannah Ac. R. Co. v. Watts (82 Ga. 
 
 229; s. 0. 9 S. E. Rep. 129), 211 - 
 Saverenz v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (56 
 
 Iowa, 689), 236 
 Sawyer v. Rutland Ac. B. Co. (27 Vt. 
 
 370), 437 
 Sawyer v. Sauer (10 Kan. 466), 22, 112 
 
 115, 116 
 Sawyer i;. Vermont Ac. R. Co. (105 
 
 Mass. 196), 307 
 Sayer v. Portsmouth Ac. R. Co. (31 
 
 Me. 228), 223 
 Say ward ®. Carson (1 Wash. 29; s. c. 23 
 
 Pac. Rep. 830), 432 
 Scanlan v. Boston (140 Mass. 84), 260 
 Schaab «. Wheel Co. (56 Mo. 173), 31 
 Schacherl «. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (42 
 
 Minn. 42; s. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 837), 
 
 380 
 Schaefler v. City of Sandusky (33 Ohio 
 
 St. 246; a. o. 81 Am. Rep. 638), 
 
 51, 828 
 Schaick v. Hudson River R. Co. (43 N. 
 
 Y. 527), 254 
 Schall «. Cole (107 Penn. St. 1), 891 
 Scheffer v. Railroad Co. (105 U. S. 249), 
 
 41 
 ScheflFer v. Washington Ac. B. Co. (106 
 
 U. S. 249), 86 
 Scheffler v. Minneapolis Ac. R. Co. (82 
 
 Minnc 125), 84 
 Schierhold s. North Ac. R. Co. (40 Cal. 
 
 447), 31, 154, 181, 265 
 Schilling v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (71 Wis. 
 
 256; 8. o. 37 N. W. Rep. 414), '236 
 Schlatera. Wilbert (41 La. Ann. 406; 
 
 8. o. 6 So. Rep. 107), 377 
 Schmidt «. Bauer (80 Cal. 566; s. o. 22 
 
 Pac. Eep. 256), 73 
 Schmidt v. Burlington Ac. R. Co. (75 
 
 Iowa, 606; s. o. 39 N. W. Rep.' 
 
 916), 52 
 Schmidt ®. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (83 HI. 
 
 406), 86, 108 
 Schmidt v. Humphrey (48 Iowa, 652; 
 
 8. 0. 30 Am. Rep. 414), 68, 229, 
 
 231, 848 
 Schmidt v. Kansas City Distilling Co. 
 
 (90 Mo. 284), 178 
 Schmidt ■». Leiaterkow (6 Dak. 386; a. o. 
 
 43 N. W. Rep. 820), 478 
 Schoenfeld ®. Milwaukee City Ry. Co. 
 
 (74 Wis. 433; a. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 
 
 162), 48 
 Bchofield ®. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (2 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 268), 286 
 Schofield*. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (114 U. 
 
 S. 615), 287, 241 242, 243 
 
XCTlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Schonhofif v. Jackson Branch R. Co. {Si 
 
 Mo. IBl; s. 0. 10 S. W. 618), 327 
 School District v. Boston Ac. R. Co. 
 
 (102 Mass. 562; s. o. 3 Am. Rep. 
 
 602), 223 
 Schroeder «. Michigan Car Co. (66 
 
 Mich. 132; s. o. 32 Alb. Law Jour. 
 
 134), 452, 473 
 Schultz V. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (44 Wis. 
 
 638), 19. 67 
 Schultz V. Chicago <fee. K. Co. (B7 Wis. 
 
 616; s. 0. 68 Am. Rep. 881; 31 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 321), 429, 464, 480 
 Schultz V. Milwaulree (49 Wis. 254; s. c. 
 
 35 Am. Rep. 779), 339, 363 
 Schultz V. Moon (33 Mo. App. 329), 41 
 Schultz ®. Wall (19 Atl. Rep. 742), 508, 
 
 624 
 Schulz V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (6 Rep. 
 
 376), 237 
 Schum «. Pennsylvania R. Co. (107 
 
 Penn. St. 8;^ s. o. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 823; 52 Am. Rep. 468), 239, 254, 
 
 646 
 Schwandner v. Birge (33 Hun, , 186), 
 
 469 
 Schwarz v. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (58 
 
 Mo. 207), 284, 289 
 Scott V. Dublin <fcc. Ry. Co. (11 Ir. 
 
 Com. Law (N. S.) 377), 33, 79 
 Scott V. Hogan (72 Iowa, 614; s. c. 34 
 
 N. W. Rep. 444), 26 
 Scott V. London Docks Co. (3 Hurl. <fe. 
 
 C. 596; s. o. 11 Jut. (N. S.) 204; 
 
 34 L. J. (Exch.) 17, 220; 11 Week. 
 
 Rep. 410; 11 L. T. (N. S.) 148; 10 
 
 Jm:. (N. S.) 1107), 362 
 Scott «. Pennsylvania R. Co. (9 N. T. 
 
 Supl. 189), 26 
 Scott V. Oregon Ey. <fe Nav. Co. (14 Or. 
 
 211; s. 0. 13 Pac. Rep. 98), 471, 
 
 473 
 Sdott V. Shephard (2 Black. 892), 40, 
 
 318 
 Scott V. Sweeney (34 Hun (N. Y.) 292), 
 
 412 
 ScoviUe V. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (81 Mo. 
 
 434), 362 
 Scranton and the Emerald Isle, The (2 
 
 Ben. 25), 619 
 Scranton, City of, v. Hill (102 Penn. St. 
 
 378; 8. o. 48 Am. Rep. 211), 833 
 Searle ®. Lindsay (11 C. B. (If. S.) 429), 
 
 431 
 Searles v. Milwaukee <Sec. R. Co. (36 
 
 Iowa, 490), 284, 287 
 Sears «. Central &c. R. Co. (63 6a. 
 
 630), 472, 473 
 Sears w. Dennis (106 Mass. 812), 66 
 Seaver v. Boston <fcc. R. Co. (14 Gray, 
 
 466), 430 
 Seawell v. Raleigh <feo. R. Co. (106 W. 
 
 0. 272), 292 
 
 Secord v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (fi Mc- 
 
 Crary, 516), 43, 82, 83, 97, 642 
 Sedgwick v. Illinois <fcc. R. Co. (73 
 Iowa, 158; s. o. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 790), 472 
 Sedgwick v. lUinoia <fcc.i R. Co. (76 
 Iowa, 340; s. c. 41 N. W. Rep. 36), 
 472 
 Seefeld v. Chicago &c. E. Co. (70 Wie. 
 
 216; 8. 0. 35 N. W. Eep. 278), 256, 
 
 569 
 Seeley v. Peters (10 111. 130), 287 
 Seeley «. Town of Litchfield (49 Conn. 
 
 134; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 213), 355 
 Seese v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 487), 472 
 Sehroth v. Giy of Prescott (63 Wis. 
 
 652), 323 
 Seley V. Southern P»c. R. Co. (23 Pac. 
 
 Rep, 751), 467 
 Self ®. Dunn (42 Ga. 628), 369 
 Selinas v. Vermont State Agr. Soc. (60 
 
 Vt. 249; 8. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 117), 73 
 Sellars v. Richmond &C. R. Co. (94 N. 
 
 C. 654), 248 
 Selleck v. Lake Shore <fec. R. Co. (68 
 
 Mich. 195), 39 
 Serandat v. Saisse (L. R. 1 P. C. 152), 
 
 499 
 Sever v. Boston &c. R. Co. (14 Gray, 
 
 466), 413 
 Severy v. Nickerson (120 Mass. 306; 
 
 s. o. 21 Am. Rep. 514), 70, 233, 336 
 Sevier v. Vicksburg <fcc. R. Co. (61 
 
 Miss. 8; 8. 0. 48 Am. Rep. 74), 207, 
 
 213 
 Sewell V. City of Cohoes (75 N. Y. 46 
 
 8. 0. 31 Am. Rep. 418), 471 
 Seybolt v. New York &c. R. Co. (95 N 
 
 Y. 562; s. o. 47 Am. Rep. 75), 186 
 
 222 
 Seymer v. Lake (66 Wis. 661), 257, 60 
 Seymour v. Maddox (16 Q. B. 326; s. o. 
 
 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 327), 275, 400 
 Shaber v. St. Paul R. Co. (28 Minn. 
 
 103), 238, 240 
 Shackelford's Adm'r v. Louisville Ac. 
 
 R. Co. (84 Ky. 48), 273^ 278 
 Shaefler v. City of Sandusky (33 Ohio 
 
 St. 246; 8. 0. 31 Am. Rep. 633), 
 
 367 
 Shaffer i>. Railroad Co. (106 U. S. 249), 
 
 29 
 Shanahan v. New York &c. R. Co. (10 
 
 Abb. Pr. 398), 308 
 Shannon v. Boston &c. R. Co. (78 Me. 
 
 52), 66, 56 
 Shanny ®. Androscoggin Mills (66 Me. 
 
 420), 444, 449, 486, 479, 484 
 Shapleigh v. Wyman (1S4 Mass. 118), 
 
 362, 863, 670 
 Sharp V. Pathhead Spinning Co. (12 Ct. 
 . of Ses. Cas. 574), 469 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references ore to pages.] 
 
 Sharrod v. London Ac. Ry. Co. (4 Exch. 
 
 580; s. 0. 14 Jur. 28; 20 Law Jour. 
 
 Exch. 186; 1 Dow. & L. 218; 6 Eng. 
 
 Ey. Cases, 289), 281 
 Shaw V. Boston &o. B. Co. (8 Oray, 46), 
 
 249 
 Shaw ». Craft (87 Fed. Kep. 31 7), 140 
 Shaw B. Deal (7 Penn. Co. a. Eep. 878), 
 
 468 
 Shaw V. Eobberds (6 Ad. & El. 76), 
 
 612 
 Shaw V. York Ac. Ey. Co. (18 Q. B. 
 
 847), 219 
 Shea V. Potrero <fcc. R. Co. (44 Cal. 414), 
 
 52, 877 
 Shea V. Reems (86 La. Ann. 966), 62, 
 
 363, 898 
 Sheehan v. Edgai»(68 N. Y. 631), 882 
 Sheeler v. Chesapeake &e. R. Co. (81 
 
 Va. 188), 471 
 Shearman v. Toronto (fee. Ry. Co. (34 
 
 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 461), 198 
 Sheff V. City of Hnntington (16 W. Va. 
 
 307), 18, 643 
 Sheffield v. Western Union Telegraph 
 
 Co. (36 Fed. Eep. 164), 140 
 Sheffield v. Eochester &o. E. Co. (21 
 
 Barb. 339), 240 
 Shelby's Adm'r v. Cincinnati <&c. Ey. 
 
 Co. (85 Ky. 224; s. o. 3 S. W. Eep. 
 
 157), 253 
 Sheldon v. Flint <fec. R. Co. (59 Mich. 
 
 172), 669 
 Sheldon v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 
 
 (4 N. Y. Snpl. 626; si o. 61 Hun, 
 
 691), 368 
 SheUabarger v. Chicago <Sic. R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 18), 296 
 Shepard v. Buffalo &c. R. Co. (86 N. Y. 
 
 641), 290 
 Shephard v. Midland Ry. Co. (20 W. R. 
 
 705), 186 
 Sheridan v. Brooklyn R. Co. (86 N. Y. 
 
 89), .129, 140,142,382 
 Sherley v. Billings (8 Bush, 147 ; s. o. 
 
 8 Am. Eep. 451), 372, 397 
 Sherman v. Anderson (27 Kan. 338; a. o. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 414), 283, 294, 299 
 Sherman v. Chicago &c. E. Co. (34 
 
 Minn. 269), 478 
 Sherman v. Fall River Iron Co. (2 Al- 
 len, 524), 97 
 Sherman v. Hannibal &o. R, Co. (72 
 
 Mo. 62 ; s. 0. 37 Am. Rep. 428), 
 
 197, 217 
 Sherman ®. Menomonee River Lumber 
 
 Co. (72 Wis. 122; s. o. 89 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 366), 396, 448 
 Sherman v. Eochester <fcc. E. Co. (17 N. 
 
 Y. 163), 425, 427 
 Sherman v. Stage Co, (24 Iowa, [616), 
 
 30,85 
 
 XCIX 
 
 Sherman v. Syracuse &o. R. Co. (17 N 
 
 Y. 158), 408, 411 
 Sherry v. New York Ac. R. Co. (104 N 
 
 Y. 652; s. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 128), 
 
 262 
 Sherwood v. City of Hamilton (87 Up 
 
 Can. (Q. B.) 410), 325 
 Sherwood v. General Ins. Co. (1 Blatchf 
 
 255), 512 
 Shields «. YouDge (18 Ga. 849; s. c. 60 
 
 Am. Dec. 698), 403 
 Shipley v. Fifty Associates (101 Mass. 
 
 261), 361 
 Short V. Baltimore City Passenger Ry. 
 
 Co. (60 Md. 73; s. o. S3 Am. Rep. 
 
 298), 359 
 Show V. Boston &c. R. Co. (8 Grav, 45, 
 
 66), 263 
 Shriver ». Sioux \ City &c. E. Co. (24 
 
 Minn. 606; s. o. 31 Am. Eep. 863), 
 
 224 
 Shumacher v. St Louis &c. R. Co. (89 
 
 Fed. 174), 392 
 Siegrist v. Arnot (10 Mo. App. 197), 
 
 68 
 Siela V. Hannibal <fcc. R. Co. (82 Mo. 
 
 430), 447 
 Sika V. Chicago <fee. R. Co. (21 Wis. 370), 
 
 298, 310 
 
 Silberstein v. Houston <fec. Ry. Co. (4 N. 
 
 Y.Supl. 843), 150,376 
 Silliman v. Lewis (49 N. Y. 379, 388), 32 
 Sills V. Brown (9 Car. <fe P. 601), 43, 83, 
 
 96 
 Silver v. Kansas City <fec. R. Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 628; 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 118), 287, 
 
 296 
 Silver Cord Mining Co. v. McDonald (14 
 
 Colo. 191; s. c. 23 Pac. Eep. 846), 
 
 66 
 Simkins v. Columbia &c. R. Co, (20 S. C. 
 
 268), 288 
 Simmons v. Chicago &c. E. Co. (110 111. 
 
 840), 478 
 Simmons v. New Bedford iSec. R. Co. (97 
 
 Mass. 868), 186 
 gimmonson v. StcUenmerf (1 Edm. Sel. 
 
 Cas. 194), 68, 366 
 Simms v. South Carolina R. Co. (27 S. C. 
 
 268; s. 0. 8 S. E. Rep. 301; 2 S. E. 
 
 486), 209, 353, 566 
 Simons v. Gaynor (89 Ind. 166), 882, 
 
 862 
 Simpson v. Bloss (7 Taunt. 246), 64 
 Simpson «. Hand (6 Whart. 811 ; s. o. 36 
 
 Am. Dec. 231), 16, 79, 134, 137, 
 
 188, 147 
 Sinclair v. Berndt (87 111. 174), 461 
 Siner v. Great Western Ry. Co. (L. R. 3 
 
 Exch. 150), 218 
 Siner v. Great Western Ry. Co. (L. R, 4 
 
 Exch. 117), 206, 385 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The referenceB are to pages.] 
 
 Singleton «. Eastern Counties Ry, Co. 
 
 (7 C. B. (N. S.) 28'7), 167, 160 
 
 Singleton v. Southwestern E. Co. (70 
 
 Ga. 464; s. o. 48 Am. Rep. 574), 
 
 437 
 
 Sioux City ®. Weare (69 Iowa, 96), 832 
 
 Sioux City <fec. R. Co. ■». Finlayson (16 
 
 Neb. 578), 482 
 Sioux City Ac. R. Co. ■». Smith (22 Neb. 
 776; s. c. 86 N. W. Rep. 286), 445 
 Sir Garnet Wolsely, The (41 Fed. Rep. 
 
 896), 478 
 Sisk v. Cramp (112 Ind. B04; s. c. 14 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 381), 336 
 Six Carpenters' Case, The (8 Rep. 146; 
 s. c. 1' Smith's Iieading Cases (8th 
 Am. ed. of 1896) 257), 164 
 Stelton V. London &c. Ry. Co. (L. R. 2 
 
 C. P. 68-1), 251 
 Skerritt v. Scallan (11 Ir. C. L. R. 389), 
 
 463 
 Skipp «. Eastern Counties' Ry. Co. (9 
 Exoh. 228; s. o. 23 L. J. (Exch.) 23; 
 240 Eng. L. 4 E. 396), 400, 481 
 Skjeggerud v. Minneapolis Ac. B. ,Co. 
 (38 Minn. 66; s. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 
 B72), 60 
 Slater v. Burlington &o. R. Co. (71 
 
 Iowa, 209), 139 ' 
 
 Slater v. Chapman (67 Micli. 523; s. o. 
 
 36 N. W. Rep. 106), 4l4, 454 
 Slater «. Jewett (85 N. Y. 61; s. o. 89 
 Am. Rep. 627), 408, 426, 428, 440 
 Slatterly v. New York &o. R. Co. (4 N. 
 
 Y. SupL 910), 480 
 Slattery v. Toledo Ac. B. Co. (23 Ind. 
 
 81), 429 
 Sleeper v. Sandown (52 N. H. 244), 
 
 353, 610 
 Slim V. Great Northern Ac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (14 C. B. 647), 219 
 Slimmer v. Merry (28 Iowa, 94), 869 
 Sloan V. Hubbard (84 Ohio St. 685), 
 
 287, 298 
 Sloop V. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (22 Mo. 
 
 App. 593), 293 
 SloBSon «. Burlington Ac. R. Co. (66 
 Iowa, 294; s. o. 60 Iowa, 216), 314, 
 588, 563, 670 
 Small V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (65 Iowa, 
 
 682), 814, 318 
 Smallman v. Whilter (87 111. 646; s. o. 
 
 29 Am. Rep. 76), 218 
 Stoethurst «. Barton Square Church 
 (148 Mass. 261; 19 N. E. Rep. 887), 
 361 
 Smith V. Atchison Ac. B. Co. (26 Ean. 
 
 738), 155, 266 
 Smith «. Boston,' Ac. R. Co. (120 Mass. 
 490; a. c. 21 Am. Rep. 688), 64 
 281, 346 
 Smith V. Boston Gaslight Co. (129 Mass. 
 318), 549 
 
 Smith V. Central B. Ac. Co. (S S. E. 
 
 Rep. 772), 95 
 Smith V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (42 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 620), 429, 453, 455 
 Smith V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (65 Iowa, 
 83 ; 8. o. 84 Iowa, 506;, 278, 284, 
 
 287 
 Smith V. Conway (121 Iowa, 216), 68 
 Smith V. County Court (33 West Va. 
 
 713; 8. 0. 11 S. E. Rep. 1), 326 
 Smith V. Dygert (12 Barb. 618), 366 
 Smith V. Eastern Ac. E. Co. (36 N. H. 
 
 866), 297, 543 
 Smith V. Flint Ac. R. Co. (46 Mich. 268; 
 
 8. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 161), 403, 428, 
 
 460, 473 
 Smith V. Gardiner (11 Gray, 418), 366, 
 
 367 
 Smith V. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. (88 Ala. 
 
 538; 8. c. 7 So. -Rep. 119), 211 
 Smith V. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (37 Mo. 
 
 287), 813, 316 
 Smith «. Hestonville Ac. R. Go. (92 
 
 Penn. St. 450; s. o. 87 Am. Rep. 
 
 705), 167, 182, 363, 479 
 Smith t;. Irwin (51 N. J. Law, 507; s. o. 
 
 18 Atl. Rep. 862), 393, 468, 469 
 Smith 1). Kansas Ac. R. Co. (68 Iowa, 
 
 622), 307 
 Smith V. London A St. Katherine's 
 
 Dock Co. (L. R. 8 C. P. 326), 72- 
 Smith V. London Ac. By. Co. (L. R. 5 
 
 C. P. 98), 26, 818 
 Smith V. Lowell Manfg. Co. (124 Mass. 
 
 114), 408 
 Smith v. Minnesota Ac. R. Co. (26 Minn. 
 
 419), 268 
 Smith V. Nashville Ac. R. Co. (6 Coldw. 
 
 689; s. 0. 6 Heisk. 174), 122, 277 
 Smith V. Hew York Ac. R. Co. (29 
 
 Barb. 182; a. c. 24 N. Y. 222), 87, 
 
 221 
 Smith V. New York Ac. R. Co. (38 Hun, 
 
 88), 148 
 Smith V. New York Ac. E. Co. (46 N. J. 
 
 Law, 7), 281 
 Smith V. New York Ao. R. Co. (19 N. Y. 
 
 182), 433, 434, 437, 452 
 Smith V. O'Connor (48 Penn. St. 218, 
 
 221), 167, 165 
 Smith V. Oxford Iron Co. (42 N. J. Law, 
 
 467; s. o. 86 Am. Rep. 685), 444, 
 
 462 
 Smith V. Peninsular Car Works (60 
 
 Mich. 601 ; s. o. 27 N. W. Rep. 
 
 662), 462, 468 
 Smith V. Railroad (36 N. H. 866, 867), 
 
 166 
 Smith ®. Richmond Ac. B. Co. (99 N. C. 
 
 241; 8. 0. 6 S. E. Rep. 896), 199 
 Smith V. Rollins (11 R. I. 464; S. c. 23 
 
 Am. Rep. 609), 349 
 Smith V. Byaii'<8 N. Y. Supl. 858), 61 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 CI 
 
 Smith V. St. Lawrence &c. Co. (L. R. 5 
 
 P. C. 308), 49 
 Smith V. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (91 Mo. 
 
 58; 9. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 836), 295 
 Smith ». St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (32 Minn. 
 
 1; B. o. 60 Am. Rep. 560), 372 
 Smith V. Savannah Ac. R. Co. (84 6a. 
 
 698; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 456), 256 
 Smith V. Sihiey Man%. Co. (85 6a. 333; 
 
 s. 0. 11 S. R Rep. 616), 480 
 Smith «. Simmons (103 Penn. St. 32), 
 
 831 
 Smith V. Smith (2 Pick. 621; s. c. 13 
 
 Am. Dec 464), 22, 68, 141, 147, 
 
 326 
 Smith V. Steele (L. R. 10 Q. B. 125; 
 
 s. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60), 85 
 Smith e. Stokes (^ Beat. & S. 84), 342 
 Smith V. Wabash &c. Ry. Co. (92 Mo. 
 
 359; s. 0. 4 S. W. Rep. 129), 419, 
 
 426, 485 
 Smith V. Wildes (143 Mass. 556; s. o. 10 
 
 N. E. Rep. 446), 338 
 Smith 0. Wilson (36 Minn. 334; s. c. 31 
 
 ». W. Rep. 176), 528 
 Smotherman v. St. Lonis <&c. Ry. Co. 
 
 (29 Mo. App. 265), 192 
 Snow V. Adams (1 Cnsh. 447), 324 
 Snow V. Fitchbnrg R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 552; a. c. 49 Am. Rep. 40), 186, 
 
 214 
 Snow V. Honsatonic R. Co. (8 Allen, 
 
 45(^ a. o. 8 Pick. 450), 51, 328, 
 
 443, 471, 483 
 Snow V. Provincetown (120 Mass. 580), 
 
 344 
 Snowden v. Boston &c. R. Co. (151 
 
 Mass. 220; s. c. 24 S. E. Rep. 40), 
 
 192 
 Snowden v. Norfolk &c. R. Co. (95 N. 
 
 C. 93), 292 
 Snyder v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 413), 159, 216, 397 
 Snyder v. Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co. (11 
 
 West Va. 15), 82, 312, 316, 317 
 Sobieski o. St. Paul <tc. R. Co. (41 Minn. 
 
 169; s. c. 42 N. W. Rep. 863), 390 
 Soewer v. City of Sedalia (77 Mo, 431, 
 
 446), 327 
 Solen V. Vii^nia Ac. R. Co. (13 Ne- 
 vada, 106), 262, 274 
 Solomon v. Central Park Ac. R. Co. (1 
 
 Sweeney (N. Y. Super. Ct.) 298), 
 
 383, 384 
 Solomon R. Co. v. Jones (30 Kan. 601), 
 
 449 
 Somer v. Harrison (8 Atl. Rep. 799), 
 
 432 
 Somerset A Cambria R. Co, o. 6albraith 
 
 (109 Penn. St. 32), 484 
 Sorenson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (36 
 
 Fed. Rep. 166), 85 
 
 South A North Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan 
 (84 Ala. 141 ; s. o. 4 So. Rep. 142), 
 181, 275 
 South A North Ala. R. Co. v. Schanfler 
 
 (75 Ala. 136), 190, 191 
 South A North Ala. R. Co. v. Thompson 
 
 (62 Ala. 494), 237 
 
 South A North R. Co. v. Williams (65 
 
 Ala. 74), 284, 285, 288, 292, 304, 306 
 
 South Covington Ac. Ry. Co. ■». Ware 
 
 (84 Ky. 267; s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 
 
 493), 56, 57 
 
 Southall o. Jones (5 Vict. L. R. 402), 
 
 341 
 Southcote V. Stanley (1 Hurl. A N. 247; 
 s. 0. 25 L. J. (Exch.) U9), 71, 336, 
 528 
 Southcote's Case (4 Rep, 83 b.; Cro. Eliz. 
 
 815), 2 
 Southern Express Co. v. Crook (44 Ala. 
 
 468^ s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 140), 224 
 
 South Side Passenger Ry. Co. •». Frich 
 
 (117 Penn. St. S90; s. c. 11 At!. Rep. 
 
 627), 40 
 
 Southwestern Ac. R. Co. v. Hankerson 
 
 (61 6a. J14), 69, 256, 257 504, 505 
 
 Southwestern Ac. R. Co. v. Paulk (24 
 
 ea. 356), 56 
 Southwestern Ac. R. Co. v. Singleton 
 (66 Ga. 252; s. c. 67 Ga. 306). 190, 
 191, 563, 570 
 Southworth v. Old Colony Ac. R. Co. 
 (105 Mass. 342; s. c~. 7 Am. Rep. 
 628), 289, 341 
 Soward v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (30 Iowa, 
 
 551), 300 
 Sparhawk v. Salem (1 AUen, 80), 335 
 Spaulding v. Town of Sherman (76 Wis. 
 
 77; 8. 0. 43 N. W. Rep. 558), 40 
 Spearbracker v. Larrabee (64 Wis. 573) 
 
 50 
 Spelman v. Fisher Iron Co. (56 Barb. 
 
 151), 462, 476 
 Spence «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (25 Iowa, 
 
 139), 289 
 Spencer v. Baltimore Ac. R. Co (4 
 Mackey 138; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 
 269), 265 
 Spencer v. Illinois Ac. R. Co. (29 Iowa, 
 
 65), 248 
 Spencer v. Milwaukee Ac. R. Co. (17 
 
 Wis. 487), 201, 203 
 Spencer v. Utica Ac. R. Co. (5 Barb. 
 
 337), 551, 552, 553 
 Spice V. Bacon (L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 463), 
 
 524, 525, 527 
 Spicer v. South Boston Iron Co. (188 
 
 Mass. 426), 447 
 Spinner v. New York Ac. R. Co. (67 
 N. Y. 153), 282, 285, 299, 306, 308 
 Spiva V. Osage Coal and Mining Co. (88 
 , Mo. 68), 84 
 
cu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Splittorf 1). State (108 N. T. 203; s. o. 
 
 15 N. E. Rep. 322), 48 
 Spofiford V. Harlow (3 AUen, 1'76), 63, 
 
 366 
 Spooner v. Brooklyn City <fec. R. Co. (64 
 N. Y. 230; s. 0. 13'Am. Rep. 610), 
 
 143, 382 
 Spooner v. Delaware Ac. R. Co. (115 
 N. Y. 22; s. 0. 21 N. E. Rep. 696), 
 
 69, 250, 265 
 Spring V. Hager(145 Mass. 186; s. o. 
 
 13 N. E. Rep. 479), 526 
 Springer Transp. Co. v. Smith (16 Lea, 
 
 498; B. o. 1 So. W. Rep. 280), 372 
 Springett v. Ball (4 Fost. & Fin, 472), 
 
 23, 86, 332, 343 
 Spring's Adm'r ®. Glenn (12 Bush, 172), 
 
 92, 408 ' 
 
 Squire v. Central Park R. Co. (4 Jones 
 
 & Sp. 436), 562 
 Staats V. Hudson River .R. Co. (4 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. 287; s. o. 3 Keyes, 196; 
 
 33 How. Pr. 139), 299, 306 
 Stacey v. Winona <fec. B. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 168; s. o. 43 K. W. Rep. 906), 306 
 Stackpole ». Healey (16 Mass. 33; s. c. 
 
 8 Am. Dec. 121), 293 
 Stackus V. New York &c. R. Co. (79 N. 
 
 Y. 464), 237, 240 
 Stacy V. Town of Phelps (47 Huu, 54), 
 
 325 
 Stafford v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (6 Chic. 
 
 Law Jour. 329; s. c. 114 111. 244), 
 
 403, 464 
 Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa (57 Iowa, 
 
 748), 139 
 Stafford v. Ingersoll (3 Hill. 38), 336 
 Stafford v. Rubens (115 111. 196), 181 
 Stager v. Bidge Ave. Ac. By. Co. (119 
 
 Penn. St. 70; s. c. 12 Atl. Rep. 
 
 821), 380 
 Stanton V. Metropolitan R. Co. (14 Al- 
 len, 485), 229, 346, 388 
 Stanton v. Springfield (12 Allen, 666), 
 
 366, 359 
 Star V. Rookesby (1 Salk. 335), 280, 293, 
 
 294 
 Starne v. Schlothane (21 111. App. 97), 
 
 432 
 Starry v. l)ubuque Ac. Ry. Co. (51 
 
 Iowa, 419), 544 
 State «. Baltimors Ac. R. Co. (69 Md. 
 
 839; B. c. 14 Atl. Rep. 686; 68 Md. 
 
 482; 36 Md. 366), 245, 256, 262, 
 
 263 
 State V. Baltimore Ac. R. Co. (15 West 
 
 Va. 362; s. o. 36 Am. Rep. 803), 
 
 281 
 State V. Berdetta (73 Ind. 185; s. c. 88 
 
 Am. Rep. 117), 340 
 State V. Boston Ac. R. Co. (80 Me. 430; 
 
 s. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 36), 140, 248, 
 
 249 
 
 State V. Burlington (36 N. H. 521), 322 
 State «. Collins (16 E. I. 371; s. c. 17 
 
 Atl. Bep. 131), 366 
 State V. Edens (86 N. C. 522), 340 
 State V. Goff (20 Ark. 289), 231 
 State V. Grand Trunk By. Co. (58 Me. 
 
 176; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 258), 210 
 State V. Hardister (38 Ark. 605; s. o. 42 
 
 Am. Rep. 5), 523 
 State V. Larry (7 Baxt. 95; s. c. 32 Am. 
 
 Bep.. 555), 345 
 State «. Maine Central R. Co.,(76 Me. 
 357; s. c. 49 Am. Bep. 622), 235 
 239, 246 
 State V. Maine Central R. Co. (81 Me. 
 84; s. 0. i6 Atl. Rep. 368; 77 Me. 
 538), 192, 236 
 States) Manchester, Ac. R. Co. (62 N. H. 
 
 628), 16, 29, 31, 69, 86, 237 
 State V. Marvland B. Co. (63 Md. 433), 
 
 413 
 State V. Bailroad Co. (24 West Va. 783; 
 
 8. 0. 49 Am. Bep. 290), 231 
 State V. Schulz (63 Iowa, 698; a. c. 39 
 
 Am. Bep. 187), 523 
 Steamboat New World v. King (16 How. 
 
 469), 21, 162, 185, 215 
 Stearns v. Old Colony, Ac. R. Co. (1 
 
 Allen, 493), 281 
 Stebbina v. Central B. Co. (64 Vt. 464; 
 
 s. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 866), 83, 97 
 Stebbins a. Township of £eane (65 
 Mich. 662; s. c. 22 N. W. Bep. 37), 
 49 
 Steele v. Burkhardt (1 04 Mass. 69 ; s. o. 6 
 Am. Bep. 191), 30, 42, 63, 64, 326, 
 340, 366 
 Steele v. Central Bl Co. of Iowa (43 
 
 Iowa, 109), 17, 22 
 Steele v. City of Boston (128 Mass. 583), 
 
 354 
 
 Steen v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (37 Minn. 
 
 310; 8. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 113), 447 
 
 Steers v. Liverpool, New York Ac. 
 
 Steamship Co. (57 N. Y. 1; s. o. 
 
 15 Am. Rep. 453), 222 
 
 Steffen v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (46 Wis. 
 
 259), 453 
 Steiler v. Hart (66 Mich. 644; s. c. 32 
 
 N. W. Bep. 875), 447, 469 
 Steimnetz v. Kelly (72 Ind. 442; 8. c. 
 
 37 Am. Rep. 170), 90, 91 
 Stell, Ex parte (4 Hughes, 167), 266 
 Stephens v. Doe (73 Cal. 26; s. c. 14 
 
 Pac. Rep. 378), 431 
 Stephens v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 221), 414, 418, 460 
 Stephens v. Martins (17 Atl. Bep. 242; 
 
 s. 0. 23 W. N. C. 475), 52 
 Stepp V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 229), 30 
 Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl (80 111. 
 251). 108 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pagee.l 
 
 cm 
 
 Stetler v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (46 Wis. 
 
 497; s. 0. 29 Am. Rep. 102, n.), 
 
 395 
 Stevens o. Boxford (10 Allen, 25), 56 
 Stevens B. Whistler (11 East, 51), 280 
 Stevenson v. Chicago &c. B. Co. (18 
 
 Fed. Rep. 493), 56, 
 Stevenson v. Duncan (13 Wis. 404; s. c. 
 
 41 N. W. Rep. SSI), 464 
 Steves ». Oswego Ac. R. Co. (18 N. Y. 
 
 422), 35, 240, 244, 510 
 Stewart ». Alcorn (2 Week. Notes CiB. 
 
 (Penn. 1876) 401), 337 
 Stewart v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (146 Mass. 
 
 605; 8. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 466), 95 
 Stewart v. Brooklyn Ac. R. Co. (90 N. 
 
 Y. 588), 372 
 Stewart v. Borliagton Ac. R. Co. (32 
 
 Iowa. 561), 296 
 Stewart v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (27 Iowa, 
 
 282), 289 
 Stewart v. Davis (31 Ark. 518; s. c. 25 
 
 Am. Rep. 576), 349 
 Stewart v. International Ac. R. Co. (53 
 
 Tex. 289; B. c. 37 Am. Rep. 753), 
 
 206 
 Stewart ». Philadelphia Ac. R. Co. (17 
 
 Atl. Bep. 639), 392, 445 
 Stewart v. Ripon (38 Wis. 584), 510 
 Stickney v. Uiddstone (30 Yt. 738), 56 
 Stickney v. Salem (3 Allen, 374), 339, 
 
 363 
 StUes V. Geesey (71 Penn. St. 439), 30, 
 
 44, 79, 105 
 Stillson V. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 671), 161, 166, 278 
 Stinson ». Gardner (42 Me. 248), 335, 
 
 363, 364 
 Stirk V. Central R. Ac. Co. (79 Ga. 495; 
 
 s. G. 5 S. E. Rep. 106), 470 
 Stock V. Wood (136 Mass. 353); 352, 
 
 363, 538 
 Stoddard v. St. Loais Ac. R. Co. (65 
 
 Mo. 514), 419, 444 
 Stoker v. Minneapolis (32 Minn. 478), 
 
 570 
 Stokes V. SaltonstaU (13 Peters, 181), 
 
 25, 56, 185, 191 
 StoU tr. Hoopes (14 Atl. Rep. 658), 391 
 Stone V. Dry-Dock Ac. Ry. Co. (115 N. 
 
 Y. 104; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 712; 
 
 46 Han, 184), 150, 376 
 Stone V. Hon (94 Mo. 475 ; s. c. 7 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 431), 561 
 Stone V. Jackson (16 C. B. 199; s. c. 
 
 32 Eng. Law A Eq. 349), 70, 362 
 Stoner «. Pennsylvania Ac. B. Co. (98 
 
 Ind. 384; s. o. 49 Am. Bep. 764), 
 
 187, 208, 380 
 Stover v. Shngart (45 111. 76), 287 
 Storey v. Dnbnqne St Ry. Co. (51 
 
 Iowa, 419), 17 
 
 Story V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (79 Iowa, 
 
 402; s. c. 44 N, W. Rep. 690), 
 
 306 
 Story V. Elliot (8 Cowen, 27; s. c. 18 
 
 Am. Dec. 423), 344, 345 
 Stout V. Indianapolis Ac. R. Co. (1 Wils. 
 
 (Ind'pls) 80), 247 
 Stont V. Sioux Kty Ac. R. Co. (2 Dill. 
 
 294), 268, 269 
 Stover V. Bluehill (51 Me. 439), 623 
 Strahlcndorf v. Rosenthal (30 Wis. 674), 
 
 475 
 Strand v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (64 Mich. 
 
 479; s. c. 67 Mich. 380; 31 IS. W. 
 
 Rep. 184; 34 N. W. Rep. 712), 209 
 Stratton v. Central Street Ry. Co. (95 
 
 111. 25), 109 
 Straugh v. Detroit Ac. R. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 706; a. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 161), 239 
 Straus V. Kansas Ac. R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 186; s. c. 86 Mo. 421), 80, 209 
 Strawbridge v. Bradford (128 Penn. St. 
 
 200), 160 
 Street tf. Inhabitants of Holyoke (105 
 
 Mass. 82; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 600), 
 
 323, 368 
 Street v. Laumier (34 Mo. 469), 63, 341 
 Stringer v. Frost (116 Ind. 477; s. o. 19 
 
 N. E. Rep. 331), 52 
 Stringer v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 299; s. o. 9 S. W. Rep. 905), 
 
 197 
 Stringham v. Stewart (100 N. Y. 516), 
 
 395, 448 
 Stroble ». Chicago Ac. Ry. Co. (70 Iowa, 
 
 555), 477 
 Strong V. Canton Ac. B. Co. (3 So. Bep. 
 
 465), 242 
 Strong V. Placerville B. Co. (14 Rep. 
 
 110), 23, 25 
 Strong V. Sacramento Ac. R. Co. (61 
 
 Cal. 326), 17, 22, 354, 265 
 Stnart «. Havens (17 Neb. 211), 331 
 Stuart V. Machias Port (48 Me. 477), 
 
 343, 501, 603 
 Stubley ». London Ry. Co. (L. R. 1 
 
 Exch. 13), 237, 252 
 Stncke v. Milwaukee Ac. B. Co. (9 
 
 Wis. 202), 80, 89, 282 
 StudweU V. Bitch (14 Conn. 292), 295 
 Stnrgis v. Detroit Ac. R. Co. (72 Mich. 
 
 619; 8. c. 40 N. W. Rep. 914), 207 
 Sturtevant v. Merrill (33 Me. 62). 281 
 Sullivan v. India Macfg. Co. (113 Mass. 
 
 396), 461, 459, 462, 481 
 SuUiyan v. Louisville Bridge Co. (9 
 
 Bush, 81). 17, 22, 32, 408, 443, 475, 
 
 481 
 Sullivan v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 113; 8. c. 10 S. W. Rep. 852), 
 
 426 
 Sullivan v. Pennsylvania B. Co. (30 
 
 Penn. St. 240), 282 
 
CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Sullivan v. PhUadelpliia &c. R. Co. (80 
 
 Penn. St. 234), 132 
 SuUlvan v. Tioga R. Co. (112 N. Y. 643; 
 
 8. 0. 20 N. E. Rep. B69; 44 Hun, 
 
 304), 432, iSI 
 SulliTan v. Toledo <fco. R. Co. (68 Ind. 
 
 26), 403 
 Sullivan v. Waters (14 Ir. C. L. 460), 
 
 IS, 214, 336 
 Summerhays v, Kansas iScc. R. Co. (2 
 
 Colo. 284), 403, 425 
 Summers a. Crescent City R. Co. (34 
 
 La. Ann. 139; s. o. 44 Am. Rep. 
 
 419), 6, 386 
 Summersell v. Fish (117 Mass. -312), 413 
 Sutherland v. Troy Ac. R. Co. (46 Hun, 
 
 372), 426 
 Sutton V. New York Central &c. R. Co. 
 
 (66 N. Y. 243), 274, 276, 279 
 Sutton V. Wauwatosa (29 Wis. 21 ; B. o. 
 
 9 Am. Rep. B34), 8, 68, 229, 231, 
 
 350, 570 
 Suydam v. Grand St. R. Co. (41 Barb. 
 
 375; 8. o. 17 Abb. Pr. 804), 376, 
 
 662 
 Suydam v. Moore (8 Barb. 358), 299 
 Svenson ». Atlantic Steamship Co. (67 
 
 N.Y. 112), 433, 434 
 Swainsou v. Northeastern Ry. Co. 3 
 
 Exch. Div. 341), 434, 485 
 Swan V. Broome (3 Burr. 1597; 8. c. 2 
 
 Bl. 627; 1 Wm. Bl. 526), 844, 845 
 Swanu V. Smith (14 Daly, 114), 627 
 Sweeney , v. Berlin Ac. Envelope Co. 
 
 (101 N. Y. 520; 8. 0. 64 Am. Rep. 
 
 722), 461 
 Sweeney v. Boston &c. R. Co. (128 
 
 Mass. 6), 272, 472 
 Sweeney ». New York Steam Co. (6 N. 
 
 Y. Supl. 628), 40 
 Sweeney c. Old Colony &c. R. Co. (10 
 
 Allen, 368), 71, 206, 233, 248, 267, 
 
 336 
 Swigert v. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 475), 79, 187 
 Swindler v. Hilliard (2 Rich. (Law) 
 
 286; 8. 0. 45 Am. Dec. 732), 224 
 Swoboda v. Ward (40 Mich. 420), 462 
 Sword 'J. Cameron (1 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 
 
 493), 497, 499 
 Sykes®. Town of Pawlet (43 Vt. 446; 
 
 8. 0. 6 Am. Rep. 295), 334, 339 
 
 Taber v. Delaware Ac. R. Co. (71 N. Y. 
 
 489), 210 
 Tabler «. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (6 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 810), 451 
 Tabor v. Missouri Ac. R. Co. (46 Mo. 
 
 353; 8. 0. 2 Am. Rep. 517), 264 
 Talbot V. Minneapolis Ac. R. Co. (46 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1113), 298 
 
 Talmadge v. Rensselaer Ac. R. Co. (13 
 
 Barb. 493), 305 
 Tanner v. Louisville Ac. R. Co. (60 Ala. 
 
 621), 91 
 Tarrant v. Webb (18 Q. B. 797; 8. c. 25 
 
 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 263), 400, 456 
 Tarwater v. Hannibal Ac. R." Co. (42 
 
 Mo. 193), 287 
 Tatham v. Lewis (66 Penn. St. 65), 620 
 Taylor v. Baldwin (78 Cal. 617; s. c. 21 
 
 Pac' Rep. 124), 478 
 Taylor i>. Carew Mannfg Co. (143 Mass. 
 
 470; s. 0. 10 N. E. Rep. 308; 140 
 
 Mass. 150), 49, 391, 478, 637 
 Taylor v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co. 
 
 (94 N. C. 525), 85 
 Taylor v. Delaware Ac. Canal Co. (113 
 
 Penn. St. 162; s. c. 8 Atl. Rep. 43), 
 
 241, 274 ' 
 Taylor v. EvansvUle Ac. R. Co. (121 
 
 Ind. 124; s. 0. 22 N. E. Rep. 876), 
 
 414 
 Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (48 N. 
 
 H. 304; 8. c. 2 Am. Rep. 229),. 185 
 Taylor v. Humphreys (10 C. B. (N. S.) 
 
 429), 349 
 Taylor v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (26 Mo. 
 
 App. 336 ; 8. c. 86 Mo; 457), 67, 189 
 Taylor v. Pectham, City Treasurer, Ac. 
 
 (8 R. L 349; s. o. 5 Am. Rep. 578), 
 
 323, 336, 360 
 Taylor v. Town of Constable (10 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 607), 60 
 Taylor v. Western Pacific R. Co. (46 
 
 Cal. 423), 437 
 Taylor v. Whitehead (2 Doug. 646), 836, 
 
 837 
 Teipel v. Hilsendegen (44 Mich. 461), 
 
 638, 549, 568 
 Telfer b. Northern R. Co. (SON. J. Law, 
 
 188), 43, 44, 85, 237, 246, 265 
 Templeton v. Montpelier (66 Vt. 828), 
 
 327, 328 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Augustus, (21 
 
 m. 186), 299 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. ®. Buck (96 Ind. 
 
 346; B. c. 49 Am. Rep. 168), 30, 41, 
 
 210, 212, 213, 380 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Clark (73 Ind. 
 
 168), 286 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Graham (46 
 
 Ind. 239; s. c. 96 Ind. 286; 48 Am. 
 
 Rep. 719), 17, 69, 266, 260, 261, 
 264, 273 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. McMurray 
 
 (98 Ind. 358; a. c. 49 Am. Bep. 
 762), 438 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Smith (16 
 
 Ind. 102), 806 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Voelker (129 
 111. 640; 8. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 20), 67, 
 236 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.l 
 
 CT 
 
 Terry v. New York 4c. R. Co. (22 Barb. 
 
 676), 282, 29S, SOS 
 Tetherow v. St. Joseph Ac. R. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. M; s. o. 11 S. W. Rep. 810), 
 
 260 
 Texas dtc. Ry. Co. v. Anderson (4 Texas 
 
 L. Rev. 211), 40 
 Texas Ac. Ry. Co. ». Barfield (S S. W. 
 
 Rep. 666), 278 
 Texas Ac Ry. Co. v. Berry (67 Tex. 288), 
 
 84 
 Texas 4a Ry. Co. v. Best (66 Tex. 116), 
 
 206 
 Texas 4c Ry. Co. v. Bradford (2 S. W. 
 
 69B; 8. o. 66 Tex. 782), 480 
 Texas 4c Ry. Ce. v. Carlton (66 Tex, 
 
 897), 475 
 Texas 4c Ry. Go. v. Chapman (57 Tex. 
 
 75), 240 
 Texas 4c Ry. Go. «. Cole (66 Tex. 662; 
 
 s. o. 1 S. W. Rep. 689), 41 
 Texas 4c By. Co. v. Harrington (68 
 
 Tex. 597), 427, 454 
 Texas 4c. Ry. Co. v. Herbeck (60 Tex. 
 
 602), 668, 670 
 Texas 4c Ry. Go. v. Eirk (62 Tex. 
 
 227). 457 
 Texas 4c Ry. Co. v. McAtee (61 Tex. 
 
 696), 472 
 Texas 4c Ry. Co. v. Murphy (46 Tex. 
 
 366; s. 0. 26 Am. Rep. 272), 187, 
 
 188, 380, 544 
 Texas 4c Ry. Co. v. O'Donnell (58 Tex. 
 
 27), 150, 158, 166 
 Texas 4c. Ry. Co. «. Orr (46 Ark. 182), 
 
 84. 97, 206. 543 
 Texas 4c Ry.Ca v.YaUie (60 Tex. 481), 
 
 461 
 Texas 4c Ry. Co. v. Young (60 Tex. 201), 
 
 53, 64, 288, 304 
 Thall ». Garnie (5 N. Y. Supl. 244), 396, 
 
 468 
 Thayer v. Arnold (4 Mete. 689), 281 
 Thayer «. St. Louis 4c R. Co. (22 Ind. 
 
 26), 412, 444 
 Theleman v. Moeller (78 Iowa, 108; s. o. 
 
 84 N. W. Rep. 766), 413, 458 
 Thetis, The (L. R. 2 A. 4 £. 866), 872 
 Thirteenth St. 4c R. Co. v. Bondron (92 
 
 Penn. St. 476; s. o. 87 Am. Rep. 
 
 707), 29, 47, 882 
 Thomas v. Delaware 4c. R. Co. (19 
 
 Blatch. 583). 254 
 Thomas «. Kenyon (1 Daly, 182), 96 
 Thomas v. Mayor 4c. (28 Hun, 110; s. o. 
 
 16 Week. Dig. (N. Y.) 878), 61, 328, 
 
 367 
 Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y. 897; s. 
 
 c. 67 Am. Dec. 456), 40, 398 
 Thompkina v. Clay St. Ry. Co. (19 Am. 
 
 Law Rey. 168, 818), 877 
 Thompkins v. Kanawha Board (21 West 
 
 Va. 884), 29, 663, 669 
 
 L 
 
 Thompson v. Bridgewater (7 Kck. 188), 
 
 826, 611 
 Thampson v. Central 4c R. Co. (64 Ga. 
 
 509), 121, 489, 648 
 Thompson o. Chicago 4c. R. Co. (4 
 
 McCrary, 629), 460 
 Thompson e. Duncan (76 Ala. 384), 642 
 Thompson v. New Orleans 4c. R. Co. 
 
 (50 Miss. 815; s. o. 19 Am. Rep 
 
 12), 213 
 Thompson «. New York 4c. R. Co. (33 
 
 Hun, 16), 264 
 Thompson «. North Missouri R. Co. (61 
 
 Mo. 190), 643 
 Thompson, The A. W. (39 Fed. Rep. 
 
 116), 86 
 Thorn ». New York City Ice Co. (46 
 
 Hun, 497), 463, 478 
 Thorogood v. Bryan (8 C. B. 115; s. o. 
 , 18 L. J. (C. P.) 336), 85, 134, 186, 
 
 137, 169 
 Thorp V. Brookfield (30 Conn. 321), 
 
 502 
 Thorpe o. Missouri Pac Ry. Go. (89 Mo. 
 
 650; B. c. 2 S. W. Sep. 3), 465, 488 
 Thorpe v. New York 4c. R. Co. (76 N. 
 
 Y. 406), 398 
 Thurher v. Harlem Ac R. Co. (60 N. Y. 
 
 333), 163 
 Tibby v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (82 Mo. ■ 
 
 292). 197 
 Tiemey v. Minnesota Ac. R. Co. (33 ' 
 
 Minn. 311 ; s. c 32 Alb. Law Jour. 
 
 133; 63 Am. Rep. 85), 408, 429 
 Tift «. Jones (74 Ca. 469), 48 
 Tighe «. Lowell (119 Mass. 472), 363 
 Mett V. Ward (L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 17; 
 
 s. c. 22 Am. Law Beg. N. S. 245), 
 
 881 
 Tilley v. St. Louis 4c. R. Co. (49 Ark. 
 
 585; s. o. 6 S. W. Rep. 6), 817 
 Tillock ». Webb (66 Mc 100), 348 
 Tilton V. Hamilton Ins. Co. (1 Bosw. 
 
 392), 512 
 Timins v. Chicago 4c. R. Co. (72 Iowa, 
 
 94; 8. 0. 38 N. W. Rep. 5(79), 289 
 Timm v. Northern Pac R. Co. (3 Wash. 
 
 Ter. 299; s. o. 18 Pac Rep. 415), 
 
 291 
 Timmons v. Ohio 4o. R. Co. (6 Ohio St. 
 
 106), 80 
 Tindley v. City of Salem (187 Mass. 
 
 171), 842, 629 
 Tissue V. BiQtimore Ac. B. Go. (112 
 
 Penn. St. 91; s. c. 66 Am. Rep. 
 
 810), 446 
 Titan, The (28 Fed. Rep. 418). 432 
 Titcomb v. Fitchborg R. Co. (12 Allen, 
 
 264), 341 
 Titus V. Inhabitants of Northbridge (97 
 
 Mass. 268), 324, 348 
 Tobin V. Portland Ac R. Co. (69 Me. 
 
 183; s. 0. 8 Am. Rep. 415), 838 
 
CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Todd V. City of Troy (61 N. Y. 606), 
 
 366 
 Todd V. Old Colony Ac. B. Co. (3 Allen, 
 
 18; s. 0. T Allen, 207), 186, 199, 
 
 216 
 Toledo, City of, v. Cone (19 Am. Law 
 
 EeT. 330), 417 
 Toledo Ac. K. Co. v. Asbnry (84 111. 
 
 429), 444, 472, 479 
 Toledo &c. B. Co. v. Badeley (54 ELI. 19; 
 
 s. c. 6 Am. Bep. 71), 213 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Barlow (71 111. 
 
 640). 287 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. BeggB (86 HI. 80; 
 
 B. 0. 28 Am. Bep. 613), 65 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Beyin (26 Ind. 
 
 443), 6.'i9 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Brannagan (75 
 
 Ind. 490), 639 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Bray (67 lU. 614), 
 
 287 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Brooks (81 111. 
 
 2^6), 66 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Cory (39 Ind. 218), 
 
 298 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Crane (68 111. 355), 
 
 299 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Eddy (72 lU. 138), 
 
 482 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Eder (46 Micb. 
 
 329), 298 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Fergusson (42 
 
 111. 449), 289 < 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Fredericks (71 111. 
 
 294), 473 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Goddard (26 Ind. 
 
 186), 22, 43 239 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. 6rable(88Ill. 441), 
 
 108, 114, 160, 165 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. •». Grush (67 111. 262; 
 
 s. 0. 16 Am. Bep. 618), 233 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Howell (38 Ind. 
 
 447), 300 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Ingrahun (58 Dl. 
 
 20; 8. 0. 77 m. 309), 287. 416 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Johnston (74 111. 
 
 83), 285 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Jones (76 HI. 811), 
 
 246 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Kid (29 111. App. 
 
 363), 96 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. MoGinnis (71 111. 
 
 347), 108, 284, 289 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Maxfleld (72 111. 
 
 96), 314 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Moore (77 HI. 217), 
 
 §6, 449 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. ■». O'Conner (77 111. 
 
 391), 108, 410 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Owen '(48 Ind. 
 
 405), 300 
 Toledo Ac. R. Co. •». Pease (71 111. 174), 
 
 304 
 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Pindar (63 111. 447; 
 
 s. 0. 5 Am. Bep. 57), 81, 107, 314, 
 
 317 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Eiley (47 HI. 614), 
 
 243, 256, 505 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Schnckman (50 
 
 Ind. 42), 242 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Spencer (66 HI. 
 
 628), 108 
 Toledo Ac. E. Co. v. Thomas (18 Ind. 
 
 215), 302 
 Toledo Ac. B. Co. v. Wand (48 Ind. 
 
 476), 462 
 Tolhausen v. Dayios (57 L. J. Q. B. 392), 
 
 71 
 Toll Bridge Co. n. Langrell (47 Conn. 
 
 Tolman v. Syracuse Ac. E. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Y. 198, s. o.*60 Am. Bep. 649), 239, 
 
 549, 662, 656 
 Tolson V. Inland Ac. Coasting Co. (6 
 
 Mackey, 39, 542 
 Tomle v. Hampton (129 111. 379; a. c. 21 
 
 N. E. Bep. 800), 114 
 Tompkins v. Clay Street E. Co. (66' Cal. 
 
 163). 142 
 Tonawanda R. Co. D. Mnnger (6 Denio, 
 
 266; s. o. 49 Am. Dec. 239; 4 N. Y. 
 
 349; £3 Am. Dec. 384), 6, 8, 13, 88, 
 
 91, 282, 288, 290, 293, 302, 307 
 Tonkins v. New York Ferry Co. (47 
 
 Hun, 662), 870 
 Tsomey v. London Ac. Ey. Co. (3 C. B. 
 
 (N. S.) 146, 668 
 Toomey v. Sanborn (146 Mass. 28; s. o. 
 
 14 N. E. Bep. 921), 73 
 Topeka City By. Co. v. Biggs (38 Kan. 
 
 375; 8. o. 16 Pac. Bep. 667), 383 
 Torians v. Eichmand Ac. E. Co. (84 
 
 Va. 192; s. c. 4 S. E. Bep. 339), 
 
 467 
 Totten ■». Phipps (62 N. Y. 364), 74 
 Tonaey v. Eoberts (21 N.. E. Bep. 399; 
 
 8. o. 114 N. Y. 312), 73 
 Tower v. Providence Ac. B. Co. (2 E. I. 
 
 404), 282, 284, 310 
 Tower v. Utica Ac. E. Co. (7 Hill. 47; 
 
 B. o. 42 Am. Dec. 36), 226 
 Tswler v. Baltimore Ac. E. C». (18 
 
 West Va. 579), 29, 47, 94, 96 
 Town of Albion v. Hetrick (90 Ind. 646), 
 
 8. c. 46 Am. Bep. 230). 61, 132, 
 
 142, 326, 328 
 Town of Gossport v. Evans (112 Ind. 
 
 138; s. 0. IS II. E. Bep. 256) 51 
 Town of Knightstown v. Musgrove (116 
 
 Ind. 121; B. 0. 18 N. E. Eep. 462), 
 
 140 
 Town of Salem v. Goller (76 Ind. 291), 
 
 91 
 Towne ®. Nashua Ac. E. Co. 124 Mass. 
 
 101), 281, 285 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The lefeiencee are to pages.] 
 
 evil 
 
 Townley ». COueago &c R. Co. (53 Wis. 
 
 636), 211 
 To^ma V. Cheshire <fcc. R. Co. (21 N. H. 
 
 S64), 309 
 Tomisend ». Wathen (9 East ill), 163, 
 
 164, 368 
 Township of Burrell «. Uncapher (llf 
 
 Penn. St. 363; s. c. 11 AtL Rep. 
 
 619), 38 
 Township of Milcreek «. Perry (18 AtL 
 
 149^ 50 
 Township of Noiih Manheim *. Arnold 
 
 (13 AU. Rep. 444), 331 
 Township of Plymonth •. Graver (136 
 
 Penn. St 34; s. a 24 W. N. C. 220; 
 
 17 AU. Rep. 349), 38 
 Townsley «. IGssonri Pac Ry. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. 31. s. o. 4 S. W. Rep. 15), 295, 
 
 296 
 Toy V. London Ac Ry. Oo. (18 C. B. 
 
 (N. S.) 235), 213 
 Traisy ». Troy Ac R. Co. (38 N. Y. 438), 
 
 399, 301 
 Transfer Oo. v. Kelly (36 Ohio St 86; 
 
 s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 33<^ 38 Am. Rep. 
 
 558), 133, 140, 143 
 Trask •. Shotwell (41 Minn. 66; s. c. 
 
 42 H. W. Rep. 699), 73 
 Travis r. Town of Carrollton (7 N. Y. 
 
 Snpl. 231), 48 
 Trihay v. BrooUjm Lead Min. Co. (4 
 
 Utah, 468; & c. 11 Pac. Rep. 613), 
 
 467 
 TroDt «. Tiiginia Ac. R. Co. (23 Gratt 
 
 619), 885, 388, 298, 306 
 Troy B. Yeimimt Ac R. Go. (84 Yt 
 
 487; a. c. 68 Am. Dec. 191^ 20, 30, 
 
 31, 79, 246, 281. 294, 297, 306, 
 
 309, 657, 563, 669 
 Troxler •. Richmond Ac R. Co. (74 N. 
 
 C. 377), 318 
 Troy ». C«^ Fear Ac R. Co. (99 N. C. 
 
 898; S.O. 6 S. E. Rep. 77), 241, 
 
 275 
 Troy Ac Ins. Co. ». Carpenter (4 Wis. 
 
 29), 512 
 True V. Plmnlev (36 Me. 466), 344 
 Tmo, The(srFed. Rap. 168), 447, 463, 
 
 520 
 TnAer ». Chaplin (3 Car. A Kir. 730^ 
 
 86, 169 
 Tnckw ». Henniker (41 N. H. 117), 
 
 343 
 Tmd ». Watson (47 Vt 634). 398 
 Tnff V. Warraan (8 C. B. (N. S.) 730; 
 
 s. c 6 C. B. (H. S.) 678). 8, 14, 16, 
 
 29, 81, 33, 44, 79, 136, 164 
 Tolly V. Fitchbmg R. Oo. (134 Mass. 
 
 499), 236 
 Tnnney v. Midland Ry. Co. (L. R. 1 C. 
 
 P. 291; s. c. 2 Jnr. (N. S.) 691), 
 
 414, 430 
 
 TorberriUe v. Stampe (1 Lord Raym. 
 
 364), 397 
 Tomer v. Bnchanan (82 Ind. 147; s. o. 
 
 42 An. Rep. 485)| 61, 67, 58, 247 
 Turner «. Holtzman (64 Md. 14«; s. c. 
 
 39 Am. Rep. 361), 340 
 Torner ». Klekr (37 lU. App. 391), 73 
 TntUe V. Chicago Ac R. Co. (48 Iowa, 
 
 336), 443 
 TutUe tr. Detroit Ac R. Co. (188 U. S. 
 
 189), 473, 477 
 
 Tattle t>. Farmington (68 N. H. 136), 
 
 343 
 Twigg V. Ryland (62 Md. 380; e. a. 19 
 
 Am. Law Rev. 319), 543 
 Twist 8. Winona Ac R. Co. (39 Minn. 
 
 164; 8. c. 39 N. W. Bep. 402), 161, 
 
 270 
 Twogood 0. Mayor (11 Daly, 167), 357 
 Twogood V. New York (13 Daly (U. Y.) 
 
 830), 49 
 Twomley v. Central Park Ac R. Co. (69 
 
 N. Y. 158; s. o. 25 Am. Rep. 163), 
 
 57,58 
 Tyler ». New York Ac R. Co. (137 
 
 Mass. 238), 563, 570 
 Tyson ». North Alabama Ac. R. Co, (61 
 
 Ala. 664; s. c 33 Am. Rep. 8), 466, 
 
 458 
 
 Ulrieh v. N. Y. Ac R. Co. (108 N. Y. 
 
 80; 8. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 60), 223 
 Umbeck •. Lake Shore Ac R. Co. (83 
 
 Ind. 191), 471, 478 • 
 Underbill «. Chicago Ac R. Co. (81 
 
 Mich. 43; 8. a 46 N. W. Rep. 608), 
 
 246 
 Underwood *. Waldron (33 Mich. 833), 
 
 79 
 Undhejem v. Hastings (88 Minn. 486; 
 
 B. 0. 38 N. W. Repi 448), 358 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. «. Adams (33 Kan. 
 
 437), 236 
 Union Pac Ry. Co. •. Dnnden (37 Kan. 
 
 1; 8. c 14 Pac Rep. 501), 269 
 Union Pac Ry. Co. v. Hand (7 Kan. 
 
 380), 186 
 Union Pac Ry. Co. v. Harris (38 Kan. 
 
 416; 8.C 19 Am. Law Rev. 669), 
 
 494 
 Union Pac Ry. Co. ». Henry (36 Kan.; 
 
 s. c. 14 Pac Rep. 1), 23 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. ». Hntchinson (39 
 
 Kan. 486; 8. c. 18 Pac Rep. 706; 
 
 19 Pac Rep. 312). 266 
 Union Pac Ry. Co. «. Nichols (8 Kan. 
 
 606; & c 12 Am. Rep. 475), 216 
 
cvm 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rollins (6 Ean. 
 
 161), 18, 36, 111, 116, 116, 283, 
 
 668 
 TJnion R. Co. ■». State (72 Md. 163; s. o. 
 
 19 Atl. Rep. 449), 236, 248 
 Union Ry. & Transit Co. v. Schacklett 
 
 (19 111. App. 146), 197 
 Union Steamship Co. v. New York (24 
 
 How. 307), 619 
 Union Trust Co. v. Thomason (26 Kan. 
 
 1), 403 , 
 United States Rolling Stock Co. v. 
 
 Wilder (116 111. 100), 454 
 
 Yale V. Bliss (60 Barb. 368), 323, 336 
 Valentine v. Broadway &c. R. Co. (4 N. 
 
 T. Supl. 481; 8. 0. 14 Daily, 640), 
 
 380 
 Valleaua. Chicago &e. Ry. Co. (73 
 ■ Iowa, 723; 8. o. 36 N. W. Rep. 
 
 760), 307 
 Valtez V. Ohio Ac.'R. Co. (86 HI. 600), 
 
 414,427 
 Van Ambiirg v. Viebsburg <fee. R. Co. 
 
 (37 La. Ann. 660; s. o. 66 Am. 
 
 Rep. 617), 446 
 Van Avery v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (36 
 
 Fed. Rep. 40), 426 
 Van Dusen v. Letellier (78 Mich. 492), 
 
 457 
 Van Horn v. Btirlington Ac. R. Co. (69 
 
 Iowa, 38), 287, 289, 290, 396 
 Van Riper v. Van Riper (1 Southard (N. 
 , JJ 166; 8. 0. 7 Am. Deo. 676), 844 
 Vtin Wickle v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (23 
 
 Blatchf. 422), 426 
 Vandegrift v. Rediker (22 N. J. Law, 
 
 186; s. 0. 61 Am. Dec. 262), 91, 
 
 282 
 Vanderbeck v. Hendry (84 N. J. Law, 
 
 467), 179 
 Vandergrift v. Delaware itc. R. Co. (2 
 
 Hons. 297), 282 
 Vanderkar v. Rehnselaer iScc. R. Co. (13 
 
 Barb. 390), 300 
 Vanderplank «. Miller (1 Moody <& M. 
 
 169), 22, 48, 185, 138, 146, 619 
 Varney v. Manchester (58 N. H. 430; 
 
 8. 0. 42 Am. Rep. 692), 47, 886, 
 
 363, 866 
 Vanghan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co. (8 Hurl. 
 
 <fc N. 742; 8. 0. 5 Hurl. & N. 678), 
 
 311 
 Vaughn v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (17 
 
 Mo. App. 4), 296 
 Vaux V. Sheflfer (8 Mo. P. C. 76), 618 
 Veerhusan v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (68 
 
 Wis. 689), 298 
 Vennall v. Gamer (1 Cromp. & M. 21), 
 
 44, 68, 162 
 
 Vick V. New Tork &c. R. Co. (96 N. Y. 
 
 267: ». o. 47 Am. Rep. 86), 428, 
 
 480 
 Vicksburg, City of, v. Hennessy (54 
 
 Miss, 391, s. o. 28 Am. Rep. 364), 
 
 326, 637 
 Vicksburg, City of, «. McLain (67 Miss. 
 
 4; B. 0. 6 So. Rep. 774), 151 
 Vicksburg <fcc. R. Co. ■». Alexander (62 
 
 Miss. 496), 266 
 Vickebuvg Ac. R. Co. v. Hart (61 Miss. 
 
 468), 17, 188 
 Vicksburg Ac. R. Co. v. McGown (62 
 
 Miss. 682; s. o. 62 Am. Rep. 205), 
 
 271, 273 
 Vicksburg Ac. R. Co. v. Patton (31 Miss. 
 
 157), 285, 288, 291, 294 
 Victoria v. Baker (67 N. Y. 866), 886 
 Viets V. Toledo Ac. R. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 120), 474 
 VillAge of Carterville v. Cook (129 111. 
 
 162; 8. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 14), 88 
 Village of JefiFei^son v. Chapman (127 
 
 fll. 438; 8. o. 20 N. E.Rep. 33), 107 
 Village of Orleans v. Perry (24 Neb. 
 
 881; s. o. 40 N. W. Rep. 417), 32, 44 
 Vimont v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (71 
 
 Iowa, 88; s. o. 82 N. W. Rep. 100), 
 
 96 
 Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. (11 Allen, 
 
 804), 374 
 Virginia Ac. R. Co. v. Barksdale's Adm'r 
 
 , (82 Va. 880), 268 
 Virginia Ac. R. Co. «. Bos well's Adm'r 
 
 (82 Va. 932; s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 383), 
 
 264 
 Virginia Ac. R. Co. v. Roach (88 Va. 
 
 376; a. o. 6 S. E. Rep. 175), 197 
 Virginia Ac. R. Co. v. Sayres (26 Oratt. 
 
 828), 224 
 Virginia Ac. R. Co. v. White's Adm'r 
 
 (84 Va. 498; s. o. 6 S. E. Rep. 673), 
 
 241, 246 
 Vogel V. Mayor Ac. of New York (92 N. 
 
 Y. 17), 898 
 Volkman v. Chict^o Ac. R. Co. (6 Dak. 
 
 69; 8. 0. 37 N. W. Rep. 781), 292 
 Voabnrgh v. Lake Shore Ac. R. Co. (94 
 
 N. Y. 374; 8. o. 46 Am. Rep. 148), 
 
 443. 475, 484 
 Vosburgh V. Moak (1 Cush. 453; s, o. 
 
 48 Am. Dec. 618), 889 
 Vose «. London A Yorkshire Ry. Co. (2 
 
 Hurl. A N. 728), 466 
 
 w 
 
 Wabash Canal Co. ■». Mayor (10 Ind. 
 
 400), 639 
 Wabash .Ac. Ry. Co. v. Central Trust Co. 
 
 (28 Fed. Rep. 618; s. c. 32 Alb. 
 
 Law Jour. 96), 542 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 LThe referencee are to pageB.1 
 
 CIX 
 
 WabBsh <fco. By. Co. v. Conkling (16 
 
 111. App. 167), 464 
 Wabash <kc. By. Co. v. Elliott (98 111. 
 
 408), 663, 666, 670 
 Wabash &e. By. Co. v. Henks (91 111. 
 
 406), 108 
 Wabash &c. By. Co. v. Jones (6 111. 601), 
 
 114 
 Wabash <fec. By. Co. v. Nice (99 Ind. 
 
 162), 288 
 Wabash <fcc. By. Co. v. Peyton (106 111. 
 
 684; s. 0. 46 Am. Bep. 706), 437 
 Wabash <fcc. By. Co. v. Shaoklet(106 111. 
 
 864; 8. 0. 44 Am. Bep. 791), 137, 
 
 138, 142, 148, 668, 670 
 Wabash <tc. By. Co. v. Tretts (96 Ind. 
 
 460), 298 
 Wabash Ac. By. Co. v. Wallace (110 111. 
 
 114), 107 
 Waddell v. Simonson (112 Penn. St. 
 
 676), 898, 468 
 Wagner v. Bissell (3 Iowa, 396), 287 
 Wagner v. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 612; B. o. 10 S. W. Bep. 486, 
 
 491), 198 
 Wagner v. Township of Jackson (188 
 
 Penn. St. 61), 826 
 Wait v. Burlington &o. B. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa, 207; s. o. 37 N. W. Bep. 169), 
 
 304 
 Waite V. Hundred of Stoke (Cro. Jac. 
 
 496), 344 
 Waite V. Northeastern iScc. By. Co. (7 
 
 W. B. 311; a. o. El., Bl. & El. 719), 
 
 186; 186, 187, 160, 161, 176 
 Wakefield v. Bailroad Co. 87 Vt, 380), 
 
 243 
 Waldhier v. Hannibal &o. B. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 37), 481 
 Waldron ». Portland <kc. B. Co. (86 Me. 
 
 422), 288 
 Waldron v. Bensselaer &c. B. Co. (8 
 
 Barb. 390), 308 
 Walker «. Bowling (22 Ala. 294), 416, 
 
 419 
 Walker v. Columbia Ac. R. Co. (26 S. 
 
 C. 141), 292 
 Walker v. Herron (22 Tex. 65), 288, 
 
 644 
 Walker v. Beidsville (96 N. C. 382), 48 
 Wdker «. Vicksburg Ac. B. Co. (41 La. 
 
 Ann. 796; s. c. 6 So. Bep. 916), 
 
 189 
 Walker v. Westfield (39 Vt. 246), 667 
 Walker v. York Ac. By. Co. (2 El. A 
 
 Bl. 760), 219 
 Wall V. Town of Highland (72 Wis. 486; 
 
 9. 0. 89 Nj W. Bep. 560), 46 
 Wallace v. Cannon (88 Ga. 199), 65 
 Wallace v. Merrimack Ac. B. Co. (134 
 
 Mass. 96; s. o. 45 Am. Bep. 301), 
 
 64, 66, 68, 848 
 
 Wallace v. Western Ac. B. Co. (98 N. C. 
 
 494; 8. 0. 4 S. E. Bep. 608), 199 
 Wallace v. Wilmington Aq. By. Co. (18 
 
 Atl. Rep. 818), 207, 208 
 Waller v. Hannibal Ac. B. Co. (83 Mo. 
 
 • 608), 190 
 Waller v. Southeastern By. Co. (2 Hurl. 
 
 A Cott. 102; 8.0. 7 Jur. (N. S.) 601; 
 
 82 L. J. (Exch.) Sb5), 426, 429 
 Wallingford v. Columbia Ac. B. Co. (26 
 
 S. 0. 268; s. o, 2 S. E. Bep. 19), 
 
 223 
 Wallace v. Morgan's Ac. B. Co. (38 La. 
 
 Ann. 166), 426 
 Walsh V. Oregon Ac. B. Co. (10 Or. 
 
 260), 27, 638, 563, 666, 667, 670 
 Walsh V. Peet Valve Co. (110 Mass. 23), 
 
 443, 476 
 Walsh V. Porterfield (87 Penn. St. 376), 
 
 508 
 Walsh V. Transportation Co. (52 Mo. 
 
 484), 16, 80, 81 
 Walsh V. Virginia Ac. R. Co.. (8 Nev. 
 
 Ill), 299 
 Walters v. Chicago Ac. E. Co. (41 Iowa, 
 
 71), 167, 168, 168, 169 
 Walton V. Ackerman (49 N. J. Law, 
 
 234; 8. o. 10 Atl. Bep. 709), 669 
 Walton V. St. Louis Ac. E. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 66), 800 
 Wanamaker v. Burke (111 Penn. St. 
 
 423), 446 
 Wanless v. Northeastern By. Co. (26 L. 
 
 T. (N. S.) 103; 8. 0. L. E. 6 Q. B. 
 
 481; L. E. IQ. B. 277), 248 . 
 Warbnrton v. Great Western By. Co. 
 
 (L. E. 2 Exob. 30; s. o. 86 L. J. 
 
 (Exch.) 9; 15 L. T. (N. S.) 361; 16 
 
 Week. Eep. 108; 4 HurL A Colt. 
 
 695), 487 
 Ward V. Central Park Ac. B. Co. (33 N. 
 
 Y. Super. Ct. 892; 8. o. 11 Abb. 
 
 Prac. (N. S.) 411; 4^ How. Prac. 
 
 289), 889 
 Ward V. Milwaukee Ac. E. Co. (29 Wis. 
 
 144), 23, 26, 313 
 Ward V. St. Louis Ac. B. Co. (91 Mo. 
 
 168), 296 
 Warden «. Missouri Pac. By. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 App. 681), 218 
 Warden v. Old Colony E. Co. (187 
 
 Mass. 204), 449, 471 
 Wardrop-Sims, The, v. Jones (2 Dods. 
 
 83), 516 
 Ware v. Barataria Ac. Canal Co. (16 La. 
 
 169; R. 0. 36 Am. Deo. 189), 897 
 Warner v. Erie By. Co. (49 Barb. 668; 
 
 8. 0. 39 N. Y. 468), 442, '449, 463 
 Warner v. Holyoke (112 Mass. 862), 836 
 Warner v. New York Ac. B. Co. (44 N. 
 
 Y. 465; 8. 0. 46 Barb. 299), 552. 
 
 666 
 
ex 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 Warner v. Weetern <fec. R. Co. (94 N. 
 
 C. 260), 85 
 Warren v. Fitchburg R. Co. (8 Allen, 
 
 227), 248 
 Warren v. Keoknk <fec. R. Co. (41 Iowa, 
 
 484), 304, 305 
 Warren «. Sonthern Kan. Ry. Co. (SI 
 
 Kan. 408; a. o, 15 Pac. -Rep. 601), 
 
 188 
 Washburn v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (68 
 
 Wi?. 474; b. o. 82 N. W. Rep. 234), 
 
 241 
 Washburn v. Nashville R. Co. (3 Head, 
 
 638), 194, 418 
 Washburn v. Tracy (2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 
 
 128; 8. c. 16 Am. Dec. 661), 22,34, 
 
 82, 368 
 Washington v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (17 
 
 West Va. 190), 285, 292 
 Washington and The Gregory, The (9 
 
 Wall. 613), 142 
 Waamer v. Delaware <tc. R. Co. (80 N. 
 
 Y. 212; 9. o 36 Am. Rep. 608), 61, 
 
 245, 331, 340 
 Waterbury ■». New York &c. R. Co. (21 
 
 Blatchf. 314), 185, 197, 216 
 Waters ». Merchants' Ins. Co. (11 Peters, 
 
 213), 612 
 Waters v. Moss (12 Cal. 636), 287 
 Waters v. Wing (69 Penn. St. 211), 543 
 Watkinds v. Southern Pac R. Co. (38 
 
 Fed. Rep. 711). 560 
 Watkins v. Reddin (2 Fost. & Fin. 629), 
 
 342 
 Watkins v. St. Louis <fec. R. Co. (13 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 893), 26 
 Watson V. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. (81 6a. 
 
 476; s. 0. 7 S. E. Rep. 864), 189 
 Watson V. Northern <Stc. R. Co. (24 Up- 
 per Can. Q. B. 98), 194 
 Wataon v. St. Paul <fco. R. Co. (42 
 
 Minn. 46; s. o. 43 N. W. Rep. 904), 
 
 372 
 Watson V. Wabash Ac. Ry. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 164), 233 
 Way V. Foster (1 Allen, 408), 64 
 Way V. Illinois <fec. R. Co. (40' Iowa, 
 
 341), 443, 538; 549 
 Wayde v. Lady Carr (2 Dow. & Ry. 
 
 266), 366, 369 
 Wayne' Co. Turnpike Co. v. Berry (6 
 
 Ind. 286), 639 
 Webb V. Portland <fcc. R. Co. (67 Me. 
 
 117), 237 
 Webb ». Richmond <fee. R. Co. (97 N. C. 
 
 387; s. 0. 2 S. E. Rep. 440), 472 
 Webb 0. Rome Ac. R. Co. (49 N. Y. 
 
 420; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 389), 313, 
 319 
 Webber v. Closson (36 Me. 26), 281 
 Webber v. Piper (38 Hun, 363), 482 
 Weber v. New lork Ac. R. Co. (58 N. 
 Y. 461; s. 0. 67 N. Y. 687), 288 
 
 Webster v. Hudson River R. Co (38 N. 
 
 Y. 260), 142 
 Webster v. Rome Ac. R. Co. (115 N. Y. 
 
 112; s. 0. 21 N. E. Rep. 725; 40 
 
 Him, 161), 193, 194 
 Wedgewood v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (41 
 
 Wis. 478 ; s. o. 44 Wis. 44), 444, 
 
 471 
 Weed V. Balston Spa (76 N. Y. 329), 60, 
 
 51 
 Weeks «. New Orltans Ac. R. Co. (40 
 
 La. Ann. 800; s. c. 5 So. Rep. 72), 
 
 188 210 
 Weeks v. New York Ac. R. Co. (72 N. Y. 
 
 60; s. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 104; 9 Hun, 
 
 671), 226, 371 
 Weger v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (56 
 
 Penn. St. 460), 413 
 Weil V. Dry Dock Ac. R. Co. (119 N. Y. 
 
 147; 8. 0. 23 N. E. Rep. 487), 181 
 Weil V. Wright (8 N. Y. Snpl. 776), 333 
 Weiler v. ^Manhattan Ry. Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 320; 8. c. 53 Hun, 372), 95 
 Weinberg v. National Steamship Co. (67 
 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 586; 8. o. 8 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 196), 222 
 WeisB V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (79 Penn. 
 
 St. 387), 239, 543 
 Welch V. McAllister (15 Mo. App. 492), 
 
 73 
 Welch V. Pullman Palace Car Co. (16 
 
 Abb. N. S. 352), 226, 629 
 Welch V. Wesson (6 Gray, 506), 38, 42, 
 
 63, 64,339,343 
 Wells V. Heal (9 Kan. 597), 283 
 Wells V. Burlington Ac. R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 520), 471 
 Wells V. Coe (9 Colo. 159; s. o. 11 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 50), 477 
 Wells V. Howell (19 Johns. 386), 336 
 Wells V. New York Ac. R. Co. (26 Barb. 
 
 641 ; 8. c. 24 N. Y. 181), 87, 221 
 Wells V. Sibley (9 N. Y. Supl. 843), 338 
 Welsch V. Hannibal Ac. R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 
 461; 8. o. 37 Am. Rep. 440), 244 
 Welsh V. Jackson Co. Ac. R. Co. (81 
 
 Mo. 466), 262 
 Welsh «. Wilson (101 N. Y. 254; 8.c. 
 
 64 Am. Rep. 698), 331 
 Wendell v. Baxter (12 Gray, 494), 2SS 
 Wendell v. New York Ac. R. Co. (91 N. 
 
 Y. 420), 237 
 Wsnzlick «. McCotter (87 N. Y. 122; 
 
 8. o. 41 Am. Rep. 368), 368 
 Werle v. Long Island R. Co. (98 N. Y. 
 
 650), 191, 382 
 Wertt>. Keim (13 Atl. Rep. 548), 391 
 Wesley Coal Co. ■». Herler (84 111. 126), 
 
 56 
 West V. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (77 Iowa, 
 
 664; s. c. 42 N. W. Rep. 512), 314 
 West V. Martin (31 Mo. 876), 32 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.! 
 
 CXI 
 
 West Cheater <fec. R. Co. a. McElwee (6t 
 
 P«nn. St. 811), 566 
 West End Ac. E. C». v. Mozely (79 Ga. 
 
 463; s. 0. 4 S. E. Bep. 824), 380 
 West Mahanoy v. Watson (112 Penn. 
 
 St. 674^ S.C. 86 Am. Rep. 336; 116 
 
 Penn. St. 344 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 430). 
 
 39, 326 
 West PhDa. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Gallagher, 
 
 (108 Penn. St. 624), 383 
 Westbrook v. Mobile Ac. R. Co. (66 
 
 Miss. 660; s. o. 6 So. Rep. 321), 
 
 161, 166, 167 
 Western <fec. E. Co. v. Bishop (50 Ga. 
 
 465), 18, 225, 461, 496 
 Western <tc. R. Co. v. Bloomingdale (74 
 
 Ga. 604), 260 
 Western iScc. R. 6o. v. Johnson (56 Ga. 
 
 133), 481 ' 
 W«stem &c. R. Co. v. Lazarus (88 
 
 Ala. 468), 292 
 Western <iEC. R. Co. v. Meigs (74 Ga. 
 
 867), 276 
 Western <&c. B. Co. v. Stanley (61 Md. 
 
 266; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 96), 204 
 Western &e. R. Co. v. Strong (62 Ga. 
 
 461), 496 
 Western &e. R. Co. v. Trimmier (84 
 
 Ga. 112), 292 
 Western <fee. R. Co. v. Wilson (71 Ga. 
 
 22), 187 
 Western <fec. R. Co. v. Toung (81 Ga. 
 
 397; s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 912), 160, 
 
 247 
 Western <tc. E. Co. v. Young (83 Ga. 
 
 512; 8.0. 10 S. E. Rep. 197), 175 
 Western Transit Co. v. Hosking (19 111. 
 
 App. 607), 223 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v^ Blan- 
 
 chard (68 Ga. 299; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 
 
 480), 616 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Du- 
 
 Boia(128Ill. 248; s. c. 21 N. E. 
 
 Bep. 4), 514 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Har- 
 
 derson (89 Ala. 610; s. o. 7 So. Bep. 
 
 419), 616 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Long- 
 well (21 Pac. Bep. 339), 514 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Daniel (103 Ind. 294), 614 
 Western Union Telegraph Co, v. McKib- 
 
 bon(114 Ind. 511; B. o. 14 N. E. 
 
 Bep. 894), 614 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bey- 
 
 nolds (77 Va. 173 ; 8. o. 46 Am. Bep. 
 
 716), 516 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Yopst 
 
 (118 Ind. 248; s. o. 20 N. E. Bep. 
 
 222), 516 
 Western v. Elevated By. Co. (73 N. Y. 
 
 596), 186, 214, 327, 328, 368 
 
 Westerly ». Begent's Canal Co. (12 C. 
 
 B. (N. S.) 1), ,30 
 
 Wettor V. Dunk (4 Fost. and Fin. 298), 
 
 132 
 Wcyl V. Chicago <fec. E. Co. (40 Minn. 
 
 350; s. 0. 42 N. W. Bep. 24), 238 
 Weymire v. Wolfe (52 Iowa, 683), 29, 
 
 69, 257, 264, 501, 605, 609 
 Whaalen v. Mad Biver B. Co. (8 Ohio 
 
 St. 249), 403, 415, 426, 429 
 Whalen v. Centenary Church (62 Mo. 
 
 226), 416, 418 
 Whalen v. Chicago <fec. B. Co. (76 Iowa, 
 
 663; s.o. 39 N. W. Bep. 894), 150, 
 
 279, 472 
 Whalen v. St. Louis Ac. B. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 323), 30, 236, 508 
 Whatman v. Pearson (L. E. 8 C. P. 422), 
 
 278 
 Wheeler v. Erie By. Co. (2 Thomp. & 
 
 C. 634), 307 
 
 Whaelor v. Bowell (7 N. H. 616), 281 
 Wheeler v. Wason Manfg. Co. (135 Mass. 
 
 294), 443 
 Wheeler v. Westport (30 Wis. 392), 26, 
 
 51, 334 
 Wheeler v. Worcester (10 Allen, 691), 
 
 148 
 Wheelock v. Boston Ac. E. Co. (106 
 
 Mass. 203), 239, 248 » 
 
 Wheelwright v. Boston Ac. B. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 226), 186, 236, 538 
 Wheelan ti. Georgia Ac. By. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 506; s. 0. 10 S. E. Eep. ^091), 189 
 Whelan v. New York Ac. E. Co. (38 
 
 Fed. Eep. 16), 142, 249 
 Whipple V. Wist Philadelphia Ac. St. 
 
 E. Co. (11 PhUa. 345), 386 
 Whirley v. Whiteman (1 Head. 610), 23, 
 
 69, 89, 98, 122, 166, 178, 268, 410, 
 
 668 
 Whitbeck v. Dubuque Ac. E. Co. (21 
 
 Iowa, 103), 284, 287 
 Whitcomb w.Gilman (35 Vt. 287), 231, 
 
 350 
 White V. Cincinnati Ac. R. Co. (12 S. 
 
 W. Eep. 936), 61 
 White V. Concord Ac. E. Co. (30 N. H. 
 
 188), 286,807, 543 
 White V. Conly (l4 Lea (Tenn.) 61; s. o. 
 
 62 Am. Bep. 164), 39 
 White V. France (2 C. P. DIt. 308), 74 
 White V. Lang (128 Mass. 698; s. o. 86 
 
 Am. Bep. 402), 348 
 White a. Nonantum Worsted Co. (144 
 
 Mass. 276), 479 
 White V. Philipston (10 Mete. 108), 487 
 White V. Wabash Ac. Ey. Co. (34 Mo. 
 
 App. 57), 89, 90 
 White V. Winisimmet Co. (7 Gush. 166), 
 
 369 
 
CXH 
 
 TABLE Ot CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 White Water .fee. R. Co. v. Butler (112 
 
 Ind. 598; s: c. 14 N. E. Kep. 699), 
 
 213 
 Whitehead v. St. Louis &e. R. Co. (99 
 
 Mo, 263; s. 0. 11 S. W. Rep. 761), 
 
 198 
 Whitelaw v. Memphis &c. R. Co. (16 
 
 Lea, 391; s. o. 1 S. W. Rep. 37), 
 
 468 
 Whitmore v. Boston Ac. R. Co. (160 
 
 Mass. 474; s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 220), 
 
 478 
 Whitney v. Maine <tc. E. Co. (69 Me. 
 
 208), 287 
 Whitney v. Pullman's Palace Car. Co. 
 
 (143 Mass. 243), 227 
 Whitsett B. Chicago <fec. R. Co. (67 
 
 Iowa, 160), 26 
 Whittaker v. Manchester <&c. Ry. Co. 
 
 (L. R. 5 C. P. 464, n. S), 210 
 Whittaker v. West Boylston (97, Mass. 
 
 273), 868 , 
 Whittier v. Chicago <fce. E. Co. (24 
 
 ' Minn. 394), 298, 305 
 Wichita &c. R. Co. 7). Davis (37 Kan. 
 
 74s ; s. 0. 16 Pac. Rep. 78), 116, 
 
 286, 236 
 Wiel V. Wright (8 N. T. Supl. 776), 362 
 WiggettK Fox (11 Exch. 882; s. o. 2 
 
 Jut. (N. S.) 966; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 
 
 188), 411; 486, ^86 
 Wight Fire Proofing Co. v. Roexekai 
 
 (130 ni. 139; 8. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 .643), 669 
 Wigmorea. Jay (6 Exch. 364; s. c. 19 
 
 L. S. (Exch.) 300. 85, 400, 412 
 Wilburn v. St. Louis <fec. R. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. App. 203), 95 
 Wilcox V. Rome Ac. R. Co. (39 N. T. 
 
 358), 237, 239, 242, 276 
 Wilder v. Chicago ' <fcc. R. Co. (70 
 
 Mich. 382; s. o. 38 N. W. Eep.' 
 
 289), 801 
 Wilder v. Maine <tc. R. Co. (66 Me. 332; 
 
 B. 0. 20 Am. Eep. 698),. 281, 290, 
 
 297, 309, 310 
 Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co. (83 Barb. 
 
 503; 8. 0. 24 N. Y. 430; 89 N. Y. 
 
 316), 23, 26, 30, 43, 79, 104, 169, 
 
 237, 279, 562, 655 
 Wilkerson a. Corrigan <fec.' St. Ry. Co. 
 
 (26 Mo. App. 144), 372 
 Wilkins «. Earl (3 Rob. 869; s. c. 19 
 
 Abb. Pr. 196), 226 
 WUkins «. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 93; s. o. 13 S. W. Rep. 898), 
 
 241, 247, 256 
 Wilkinson v. State (59 Ind. 416; s. c. 26 
 
 Am. Rep. 84), 360 
 Willard v Pinard (44 Vt 84), 44 
 Willard®. Swanson(126 HI. 381; 8.0. 
 
 18 N. E. Rep. 548), 107, 114 
 
 Willets v. Buffalq Ac. R. Co. (14 Barb. 
 
 685), 86, 149, 264 
 Wm. F. Babcoek, The (31 Fed. Eq). 
 
 418), 434 
 Waii&ms «. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 1), 67 
 Williams v. Churchill (137 Mass. 243), 
 
 461 
 Williams v. Clinton (28 Conn. 266), 22, 
 
 31 " 
 Williams «. Delaware Ac. E. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 628; s. c. 22 If. E. Rep. 
 
 1117; 2 N. Y. Supl, 486), 466, 470 
 Williams v. Edmnnds (76 Mich. 92, s. c. 
 
 42 N. W. 534), 32, 42 
 Williams v. Grealy (112 Mass. 79), 862 
 Williams v. Holland (6 Car. A P. 23), 
 
 369 
 Williams v. Iowa Ac. R. Co. (43 Iowa, 
 
 396), 471 
 Williams v. Kansas City Ac. R. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 275; s. c. 9 S. W. Eep. 573), 
 
 266 
 Williams «. Michigan Ac. E. Co. (2 
 
 Mich. 260; s. o; 56 Am. Dec. 69), 
 
 91,282,284,290,298 
 WilUams v. Moray (74 Ind. 26), 632, 
 
 639 
 Williams v. New Albany &c. E. Co. (6 
 
 Ind. Ill), 283, 298 
 Williams «. Northern Pac. E. Co. (3 
 
 Dak. 168), 287 
 Williams v. Richards (8 Car. A Kir. 81), 
 
 362 
 Williams v. Safford (7 Barb. 309), 336 
 Williams v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (72 
 
 Cal. 120; s. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 219; 11 
 
 Pac. Rep. 849), 264, 278 
 Williams v. Texas Ac. Ey. Co. (60 Tex. 
 
 206), 167 
 WilUams v. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 217), 
 
 80 
 Willis V. Long Island R. Ce. (34 N. Y. 
 
 670), 192, 886 
 Willis ®. Oregon Ry. A Nay. Co. (11 
 
 Or. 267), 431 
 Willoughby ®. Horridge (12 C. B. 745), 
 
 369 
 Wills o. Lynn Ac. R. Co. (129 Mass. 
 
 851), 49, 384 
 Wills V. Waters (6 Bush, 361), 296 
 Wilson V. Baltimore Ac. E. Co. (32 Mo. 
 
 App. 682), 227 
 Wilson V. Brett (11 Mee. A W. 118), 21, 
 
 88, 102 
 Wilson®. Charlestown (8 Alien, 138), 
 
 287, 838, 357 
 Wilson V. Chesapeake Ac. E. Co. (21 
 
 Gratt. 654), 227 
 Wilson V. Cunningham (3 Cal! 241 ; s. c. 
 
 58 Am. Dec. 407), 26 
 Wilson V. Hamilton (4 Ohio St. 722), 
 
 369 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] | 
 
 CXIU 
 
 Wilson V. Lonisville i&c. B. Co. (86 Ala. 
 
 269; s. 0. 4 So. Rep. 701), 478 
 WilsoQ V. Madison dkc. R. Co. (81 Ind. 
 
 226), 414, 427, 428 
 Wilson V. Merry (L. R. 1 Sc. App. 326; 
 
 B. c. 19 L. T. (N. S.) 80), 400, 406, 
 
 414, 494 
 WBson V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (26 
 
 Minn. 278; s. o. 87 Am. Rep. 410), 
 
 67, 58, 191 
 Wilsan v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 431), 804 
 Wilson V. Trafalgar (93 Ind. 287; s. o. 
 
 88 Ind. 826). 326, 639 
 Wilson V. Wabash Ac. By. Co. (18 Mo. 
 
 App. 268), 296 
 Wilson o. White (71 Ga. 606; g. o. 61 
 
 Am. Rep. 269), 332 
 Wilson D. WillimSntic &o. Co. (60 Conn. 
 
 438{ s. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 663), 416, 
 
 418, 458, 476 
 Wilson V. Wilmington <fec. B. Co. (10 
 
 Rich. (Law) 62), 288 
 Wilson r. Winona &o. R. Co. (37 Minn. 
 
 326; 8. o. 33 N. W. Rep. 908), 480, 
 
 483 
 Wilton ». Middlesex R. Co. (107 Mass. 
 
 108; s. o. 9 Am. Bep. 11; 126 
 
 Mass. 130), 216, 387 
 Winchester v. Case (6 Bradw. 486, 489), 
 
 114 
 WinHer v. St. Louis Ac. R. Co. (21 
 
 Mo. App. 99), 213 
 Winn V. Lowell (1 AUen, 177), 363, 610 
 Winn Case, The (26 Ga. 260), 119 
 Winnegar's Adm'r v. Central' Passenger 
 
 By. Co. (86 Ky. 547; s. o. 4 S. W. 
 
 Bep. 237), 84 
 Winship v. Enfield (42 N. H. 197), 326, 
 
 342, 343, 644 
 Winstaidey v. Chicago Ac. R. Co. (72 
 
 Wis. 376; s. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 866), 
 
 244 
 Winters v. Kansas City Ac. R. Co. (99 
 
 Mo. 609; s. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 662), 
 
 166, 376 
 Withkofeky v. Weir (32 Fed. Rep. 301), 
 
 447 
 Witherell v. St. Paul Ac. B. Co. (24 
 
 Minn. 410), 283 
 Witherley v. Begenf s Canal Co. (12 C. 
 
 B. (N. 8.) 2; 8. c. 6 L. T. (N. S.) 
 
 255; 3 Fost. A Fin. 61), 16, 43, 169 
 Wohl&hrt a. Beckert (92 N. Y. 490; s. o. 
 
 44 Am. Bep. 406), 49, 621 
 Wolf t>. Kilpatrick (101 N. Y. 146; 8. o. 
 
 64 Am. Bep. 672), 338 
 Womack v Central R. Ae. Co. (80 Ga. 
 
 132; 8. o. 5 8. B. Bep. 63), 84 
 Wonder «. Baltimore Ac. B. Co. (32 
 
 Md. 418; s. o. 3 Am. Bep. 148), 
 
 412, 429, 444, 461 
 Wood V. Andes (11 Hun, 648), 604, 609 
 
 M 
 
 Wood V. Detroit By. Co. (52 Mich. 402; 
 
 s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 269), 377 
 Woods. Fenwick (10 Mee. A W. 195), 
 
 459 
 Wood V. Jones (34 La. Ann. 1086; s, c. 
 
 16 Bep. 666), 31, 44, 79 
 Wood v. LuBcombe (28 Wis. 287), 368 
 Wood V. School District (44 Iowa, 27), 
 
 179, 268 
 Woodbury v. City of Owosso (64 Mich. 
 
 239; 8. c. 31"N. W. Bep. 130), 827 
 Woodley ®. Metropolitan Ac. By. Co. (2 
 
 Exch. Div. 384), 400, 434, 481 
 Woodman ». Hubbard (26 'S. H. 67), 64 
 Woodman ». Pitman (79 Me. 466; s. o. 
 
 10 Atl. Rep. 821), 49 
 Woods e. Devin (18 111. 747; s. o. 56 
 
 Am. Dec. 483), 226 
 Woods V. Lloyd (16 Atl. Rep. 43), 62, 
 
 70 
 Woodward Iron Co. v. Jones (80 Ala. 
 
 128), 478 
 Woodwortb v. St. Paul Ac. R. Co. (5 
 
 McCrary, 674), 446 
 Woolery ». Lonisville Ac. B. Co. (107 
 
 Ind. 381; s. o. 67 Am. Bep. 114), 
 
 64 
 Wolf v. Beard (8 Car. A P. 373), 44, 
 
 862 
 Woolheather «. Bisley (38 Iowa, 486), 
 
 609 
 Woolley V. Soovell (3 Man. A B. (K. B.) 
 
 106), 56 
 Woolson v. Korthern Ac. R. Co. (19 N. 
 
 H. 267), 306, 309 
 Wooster v. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (74 Iowa, 
 
 693; 8. 0. 38 N. W. Bep. 426), 78 
 Worcester v. Essex Merrimac Bridge 
 
 Corp. (7 Gray, 467), 80 
 Worden «. Humeston Ac. B. Co. (72 
 
 Iowa, 201; 8. o. 33 N. W. Bep. 
 
 629), 400, 483 
 Wormell «. Maine Cent. B. Co. (79 Me. 
 
 397; 8. 0. 10 Atl. Bep. 49), 461, 
 
 473 
 yVright v. Boston Ac. B. Co. (142 Mase. 
 
 296), 242, 276 
 Wright V. Brown (4 Ind. 96; s. o. 68 
 
 Am. Dec. 622), 79 
 Wright V. Chicago Ac. B. Co. (27 IlL 
 
 App. 200), 40 
 Wright V. Delaware Ac. Canal Co. (40 
 
 Hun, 843), 451 
 Wright V. Detroit Ac. E. Co. (77 
 
 Mich. 123; s. o. 43 N. W, Rep. 
 
 766), 174 
 Wright V, Great Northern R. Co. (8 Ir. 
 
 L. R. (C. P. Div.) 267), 66, 247 
 Wright V. Illinois Ac. Telegraph Co. (20 
 
 Iowa, 196), 97, 98 
 Wright V. London A Northwestern Ry. 
 
 Co. (1 Q. B. Div. 262; 8. c. L. 
 
 B. 10 Q. B. 298), 439 
 
CXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [The references are to pages.] 
 
 bright V. Maiden &c. B. Co. (4 AUen, 
 
 283), 164, 168, 663 
 Wright «. New York <fec. R. Co. (26 
 
 N. T. 662), 425, 448, 476, 481 
 Wright V. BaWBOD (62 Iowa, 329; s. o. 
 
 36 Am. Bep. 276), 392, 461 
 Wright V. Boxbui^h (2 Ct. of Ses. 
 
 Cas. (3d series). 748), 486 
 Wright 1). Third Ave. By. Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 707), 376 
 Wrinn v. Jones (112 Iowa, 360), 68 
 Wuotilla V. Dnluth Lumber Co. (37 
 
 Minn. 153; s. c. 33 N. W. Bep. 
 
 661), 468, 477 
 Wyandotte ». White (13 Ean. 191). 26 
 Wyckoff V. The Ferry Co. (62 N. Y. 32; 
 
 s. 0. 11 Am. Eep. 650), 369 
 ' Wyld V. Pickford (8 Mee. 4 W. 443), 
 
 219 , 
 
 Wylde a. Northern &c. E. Co. (53 N. 
 
 Y. 166), 385 
 Wyman v. Penobscot Ac. R. Co. (46 Me. 
 
 162), 281,297 
 Wymore v. Mahaska County (78 Iowa, 
 
 396; 8. c. 43 N. W. Bep. 264), 166, 
 
 167 
 Wynn v. Allard (5 Watts. <fe S. (Penn.) 
 
 624), 91, 368, 603, 604, 609 
 
 Yahn v. City of Ottumwa (60 Iowa, 429), 
 
 139, 140 
 Yancy v. Wabash <fec. By. Co. (93 Mo. 
 
 433; 8. 0. 6 S. W. Eep. 272), 242 
 Yarnell v. St. Louis (be. E. Co. (76 
 
 Mo. 576), 266, 267, 605 
 Yazoo i&c. B. Co. v. Brumfield (64 Miss. 
 
 637; s. 0. 4 So. Eep. 341), 292 
 Yerkes v. Sabin (97 Ind. 141; s. o. 49 
 
 Am. Eep. 434), 369, 370 
 
 Yik Hon v. Spring Valley Waterworks 
 
 (65 Cal. 619), 62 
 Yoemans v. Contra Costa &c, Co. (44' 
 
 Cal. 71), 186, 217 
 Yonoski v. State (79 Ind. 393; s. o. 41 
 
 Am. Eep. 614), 231, 360 
 Yordy v. Marshall County (80 Iowa, 
 
 406; s. c. 45 N. W. Eep. 1042), 
 
 ^27 
 York «. Davies (11 N. H. 241), 296 
 York &D. By. Co. ». Crisp (14 C. B, 
 
 627), 219 
 Youll «. Sioux City ifec. B. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa, 346), 466 
 
 Young V. (1 Ld. Baym. 726), 336 
 
 Young V. Charleston (20 S. C. 116; s. c. 
 
 fl Am. Bep. 827), 323 
 Young V. Detroit (be. E. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 430),' 263, 256 
 Young V. Hannibal <&c. E. Co. (82 Mo. 
 
 427), 304 
 Young ». Havvey (16 Ind. 314), 335, 632 
 Young V. New York <J;c. E. Co. (30 Barb. 
 
 229; B. 0. 107 N. Y. 500), 261, 434 
 
 Zeigler v. Danbnry Ac. E. do. (62 Conn. 
 
 643), 437 
 Zeigler v. Day (123 Mass. 162), 412,440 
 Zeigler V. Byroad Co. (5 S. C. 221; s. o. 
 
 7 S. 0. 402), 243 
 Zemp V. Wilmington .<&c. B. Co. (9 
 
 Eich. (Law), 84; s. o. 64 Am. Dec. 
 
 763), 191, 336, 646 
 Zettler'v. Atlanta (66 Ga. 196), 333 
 Zimmerman v. Hannibal &e. B. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 476), 16, 31, 79, 240, 266 
 Zoebisch v. Tarbell (10 Allen, 386), 70, 
 
 361 
 Zulke V. Wing (20 Wis. 408), 487 
 
A TREATISE 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LAW 
 
 OP 
 
 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY.— OF NEGLIGENCE AJSTD OF CONTRIBUTORY 
 . NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 
 
 §1- 
 
 The derivation of the law of 
 negligence. 
 
 Coggs V. Bernard — Sir William 
 Jones and the later commen- 
 tators. 
 
 The scholastic theory. 
 Attempts at definitions of neg- 
 
 The definitions of Baron Al- 
 derson, John Austin and the 
 American commentators. 
 6. Negligence defined- 
 
 § 7. Contributory negligence de- 
 fined. 
 
 8. Butterfleld v. Forrester. 
 
 9. The text of Lord EUenbor- 
 ough's decision. 
 
 10. Davies v. Mann. 
 
 11. Davies v. Mann criticised. 
 
 12. The reasons for the rule that 
 contributory negligence is a 
 defence. 
 
 13. The reasons for the rule further 
 considered. 
 
 § 1. The deriration of the law of negligence. — Our 
 
 Anglo-American law of NegUgenoe, including that of Con- 
 tributory Negligence, has come down to us, in ordinary- 
 generation, from the civil law of imperial Eome. It is a 
 part of that great debt which the common law owes to the 
 classical and the scholastic jurisprudence. No corpits juris, 
 adequate to the social and business necessities of an enlight- 
 ened and active people, could omit such titles as Bailment 
 and Negligence. They were, therefore, in the nature of 
 things, and by reason of the civilization, the wealth, and the 
 commercial enterprise of Bome, under the empire, included 
 in the consummate system ol jurisprudence which the law- 
 yers and the law-makers of that age originated and developed. 
 The underlying principles and the practical details of the 
 law in this behalf seem to have been fully comprehended 
 and worked out by the jurisconsults, as part of a body of 
 1 
 
INTBODUCTOBT. 
 
 [§2. 
 
 law stiited very exactly to the wants of a people that, in 
 periods of high civilization, controlled the business of the 
 globe. This classical jnrisprudenoe, as is well understood, 
 falling into the hands of the scholastic jurists of a subse- 
 quent era, was, by them, loaded and hampered with all the 
 belabored judicial subtleties and idealistic fictions of medi«- 
 valism, and thus perverted and distorted, first presented 
 itself to those earlier English jurists, who, in the seventeenth 
 and eighteenth centuries, began seriously to study the 
 civil law, with a view to adapting it, in some degree, to the 
 growing social and commercial necessities of Englishmen. 
 
 § 2. Coggs T. Bernard.— Sir Williain Jones and the 
 later commentators,— Accordingly, Lord Holt, in the case of 
 Goggs V. Bernard,^ turning to the Boman law for enlighten- 
 ment, and relying for his authority, when he found no 
 precedents in the English reports,* upon the scholastic 
 jurists of the middle ages, engrafted, in his famous opinion 
 in this case, upon a stout stem of the English common law a 
 much bescholiazed exotic from the code of Justinian. In 
 this famous case was laid the foundation of the modern 
 English law of Bailment, a subject with which the law of Neg- 
 ligence is so intimately associated that we are accustomed to 
 regard Lord Holt's learned and exhaustive opinion herein, as 
 the leading authority, in a case of novel impression, as well 
 upon the one title as the other. Sir William Jones* treatise 
 on Bailments, wherein Negligence is a principal topic, is 
 confessedly based upon the learning in Coggs v. Bernard, 
 and Mr. Justice Story, in his works upon Bailments and 
 Agency — the treatise of Gains not having been discovered 
 when he wrote — followed these two eminent authorities. 
 Chancellor Kent also added the sanction of his great name 
 to the same general exposition of the law. So it has come 
 to pass that our text writers upon this subject have, for the 
 
 ' 2 Anne, A. D. 1708 ; 8 Ld. Raym. pje, irrespective of any modern or 
 
 909 ; 6. c. Smltli's Leading Cases, foreign innovation, but Lord Holt 
 
 8th edition, 869. expressly disregards that authority, 
 
 ' I have not overlooked Southcote's It is completely overthrown, and the 
 
 Case (48 Eliz. A. D. ^IfiOl ; 4 Rep. law may fairly be said to date from 
 
 88i ; Cro. Eliz, 815), which presents Coggs v. Bernard. TTde Holmes* 
 
 the older English law pure and sim- Common Law, 196. 
 
8 3,] INTBODUCTOBY. 3 
 
 most part, set forth the law essentially from the standpoint 
 of the jurists or scholiasts of the middle age. 
 
 § 3. The scholastie thoory.— The courts, on the other 
 hand, finding this artificial and visionary jurisprudence 
 unsuited to the necessities of our time, have inclined more 
 and more avray from the scholastic formulas, accepting the 
 learning, on the authority of the jurists, as theoretically 
 sound, but refusing judicially to impose upon suitors the 
 burdens, inconveniences, and even absurdities they involve. 
 " The consequence was," says Dr. Wharton, in the preface 
 to his learned work upon Negligence, " that our adjudica- 
 tions have been on one plane of jurisprudence, and our prin- 
 ciples on another plane." The result of this contrast 
 between scholastic theory and modern common sense has 
 been somewhat remarkable. The courts, after starting out, 
 from Coggs v. Bernard, upon the theory of the middle ages, 
 have, more or less unconsciously, constructed for us, in flat 
 defiance of authority, a jurisprudence upon this topic that 
 very nearly assimilates itself to the jurisprudence of Bome 
 when it was the money power and the business power of the 
 whole earth.* It is the highest possible warrant to the 
 soundness and abstract correctness of our present law, as 
 well as to its inherent justness and propriety, that the social 
 and commercial necessities of our age have developed in the 
 courts, in spite of counter theories, a body of law as to this 
 matter singularly like that worked out by the jurists of the 
 most richly civilized and the most commercial era of 
 antiquity. It is as though iEacus and Ehadamanthus had 
 endorsed our doctrine.' 
 
 * " Tu regere imperio populot, Bo- it affords no small evidence of the 
 
 mcme, memento ; Boundness of the conclurion at which 
 
 Eae Ubi erunt wrtet—paeiique im- we have arrived if it proves to be 
 
 ponere morem — " supported by that law, the fruit of the 
 
 Virgil's ^neid, VI, 851, 852. researches of the most learned men, 
 
 ' " The Roman law forms no rule the collective wisdom of ages and 
 
 binding in itself upon the subjects of the groundwork of the municipal law 
 
 these realms ; but in deciding a case of most of the countries in Europe." 
 
 upon principle, where no direct au- Tindal, 0. J., in Acton v. Blundell, la 
 
 thority can be cited from our books, M. & W. 824, 853. 
 
4 INTEODUCTORY. [§ 4. 
 
 § 4. Attempts at definitions of negligence.— The theo- 
 rists, the text writers, and the judges have alike stumbled 
 over the definition of this term, and nothing generally satis- 
 factory has ever been proposed, from which it may perhaps 
 be safe to conclude that iit is impossible to define it with such 
 scientific accuracy as to embrace and conclude all the possi- 
 bilities.^ Is it not time to concede the joint in law literature, 
 notwithstanding the more or less imperious demand upon 
 every law writer for comprehensive, terse, and infallible defi- 
 nitions, that legal principles and legal terms in general are 
 not capable of definition after the fashion of the exact 
 sciences ; that law is scarcely a science at all in the scientific 
 sense, and that the attempt to express its principles in defi- 
 nitions or in rules of mathematical precision misleads oftener 
 than it enlightens? As Dr. Johnson once said, you may 
 walk in a straight line on a desert, but you cannot walk in a 
 straight line in Cheapside. The great jurists have not been 
 great definers in the mathematical way, and he who is glib- 
 best at such legal definition is perhaps one who knows a 
 little law wrong." In the High Court of Chancery the term 
 " fraud " is not defined.' By the older lawyers it seems to 
 have been regarded as peculiar in this respect, but are not 
 the reasons they assign for the failure to define it for the 
 most part cogent against defining any comprehensive legal 
 
 ' " To frame a definition of any le- thought over again until the disciple 
 
 gal term which shall be both ; posi- has gained the same outlook over the 
 
 tively and negatively accurate is pos- subject as the master— and then he no 
 
 sible only to those who, having legis- longer needs the definition." 1 Polit. 
 
 lative authority, can adapt the law to Science Quarterly, 1. 
 
 their own definition. Other persons ' Park's History of Chancery, 508. 
 
 have to take the law as they find it, " Fraud is infinite, and were a Court 
 
 and rarely indeed is it in their power of Equity once to lay down rules, 
 
 to frame any definition to which excep- how far they would go and no f ar- 
 
 tionmaynot justly betaken." Lindley ther, in extending their relief against 
 
 on Partnership, p. 1. it, or to define strictly the species 
 
 " " A real definition is a very attrac- or evidence of it, the jurisdiction 
 
 tive thing. It seems to ofEer the con- would be cramped, and perpetually 
 
 elusion of wisdom in a portable form, eluded by new schemes, which the 
 
 It is in fact the condensed result of a fertility of man's invention would 
 
 great deal of hard thinking ; but to contrive." Lawson's Snells' Equity, 
 
 understand it and appreciate what it 888 ; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 
 
 includes and what it excludes, the 353 (by Lord Hardwicke). 
 thoughts of the deflner must be . 
 
§ 5.] INTBODXJCTOBY. 5 
 
 term or principle in the sense in which there is a modern 
 tendency to expect and demand definition ? Hardly a better 
 illustration of the futility and inutility of legal definitions 
 of this character is at hand than those proposed by various 
 writers and judges of the term " negligence," and the 
 strictures of each of them upon the definitions of the 
 others. 
 
 § 5. The definitions of Baron Alderson, John Austin, 
 and the American commentators. — The definition of Negli- 
 gence by Baron Alderson is often quoted with approval. 
 " Negligence," says that discriminating jurist, " is the omis- 
 sion to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon 
 those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
 of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a 
 prudent And reasonable man would not do."* This is, it is 
 submitted, no more a definition of negligence than of the 
 opium habit, or the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, or 
 gambling or reckless speculation, or forty other things. 
 Mr. John Austin's definition is this : — " The term ' negligent ' 
 applies exclusively to injurious omissions ; to breaches 
 by omission of positive duties. The party omits an act to 
 which he is obliged (in the sense of the Eoman lawyers). He 
 performs not an act to which he is obliged, because the act 
 and the obligation are absent from his mind. An omission," 
 he says " (taking the word in its larger signification), is the 
 not doing a given act without adverting (at the time) to the 
 act which is not done."* This, judging from the definition, 
 is not what Baron Alderson was trying to set off by metes 
 and bounds ; neither is it what Dr. Wharton understands 
 negligence to he. H6 proposes this :— " Negligence in its 
 civil relations is such an inadvertent imperfection, by a 
 responsible human agent, in the discharge of a legal duty, 
 as immediately produces, in an ordinary and natural se- 
 quence, a damage to another. The inadvertency, or want of 
 due consideration of duty, is the injuria, on which, when 
 naturally followed by the damnum, the suit is based."' 
 
 ' Blyth V. BirmiDgham Water '•' 1 Austin's Lectures on Jnrispru- 
 
 Works Co., 11 Exch. 784 ; s. c. 3 Jur. dence (3d London ed.), 439. 
 (N. 8.)333; 25L. J. (Exch.)213. 'Wharton on Negligence, § 3. 
 
INTBODUCTOEY. 
 
 [§6. 
 
 Messrs. Shearman and Eedfield do not, I believe, attempt a 
 definition in terms. The three already given are some evi- 
 dence that a definition of any other value than as an illus- 
 tration of some phase or phases of the subject is impossible. 
 
 § a. Negligence deflned. — From a general viev? of the 
 subject it may be concluded that legal negligence consists for 
 the most part in the breach, or omission, of a legal duty,* which 
 may be either unintentional, as is usually the case, or inten- 
 tional, as is sometimes the case. This duty may be either 
 one imposed by the rules of civil society, in which case the 
 
 "This term ('negligence'), like its 
 Latin equivalent, 'culpa,' indicates a 
 state of mind, the description of 
 which has tasked the ingenuity of 
 many generations of commentators. 
 It covers all those shades of inadver- 
 tence resulting in injury to others, 
 which range between deliberate in- 
 tention ('dolus')- on the one hand, 
 and total absence of responsible con- 
 sciousness on the other." Holland's 
 Jurisprudence, 93. The foregoing 
 definition is criticized in the Law 
 Quarterly Keview, April, 1886, p. 367, 
 where it is said that "negligence is 
 the opposite of diligence, and dili- 
 gence is not a state of mind." "Ju- 
 ridical negligence is the inadvertent 
 omission to do something which 
 it would be the legal duty of a pru- 
 dent and reasonable man, guided 
 by those considerations which ordina- 
 rily regulate the conduct of human 
 affairs, to do, or the inadvertently do- 
 ing something which it would be the 
 legal duty of a prudent and reasona- 
 ble man not to do — such act or omis- 
 sion being on the part of a responsible 
 human being, and being such as in or- 
 dinary natural sequence immediately 
 results in the injury complained of." 
 Summers v. Crescent City R. Co., 34 
 La. Ann. 139 ; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 419. 
 "Negligence is defined to be the 
 absence of that care which men ordi- 
 narily bestow upon their business." 
 
 * * "Negligence is a relative term. 
 What would be negligence under one 
 stale of facts might be entirely free 
 from negligence under another. " Da- 
 vis s. Columbia, &c., R. Co., 31 S. C. 
 103, 104. Williams, in his " Forensic 
 Facts and Fallacies," p. 188, acutely 
 suggests that the definition of negli- 
 gence laid down in railroad cases is 
 somewhat colored by the popular 
 prejudice against railway companies, 
 and apprehends that "there is some 
 ■ground for fearing lest the law should 
 recognize a kind of special railway 
 negligence." 
 
 ' Shearman & Redfield on Neg- 
 ligence, % 3 et acq.; Thompson on 
 Negligence, preface; Wharton on 
 Negligence, § 3 «< seq.; 3 Puffen- 
 dorfl's Law of Nations, chap. I. 
 "Negligence, even when gross, is but 
 an omission of duty." Tonawanda 
 R. Co. ■». Hunger, 5 Benio, 356, 367; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 389; Banner*. Soutli 
 Carolina R. Co., 4 Rich. (Law), 829; 
 8. c. 55 Am. Dec. 678; Baltimore, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Woodruff, 4 Md. 343; s. c. 
 59 Am. Dec. 73. For a reference to 
 many decisions 'in which negligence 
 has been deflned and discussed, see 
 11 Am. St. Rep. 548, note; and 
 for a collection of decisions on negli- 
 gence, especially that consisting of a 
 breach of municipal ordinances, see 13 
 Am. St. Rep.. 700, note. 
 
§ 7.] INTRODUCTORY. 7 
 
 violation of it is a tort, or one voluntarily assumed by 
 contract, in which the failure is a breach of contract.* 
 Whence it appears that negligence, in its legal aspect, is of 
 two distinct sorts, the one springing out of relations resting 
 in contract, and the other not. In the one case there is an 
 action sounding in tort, and in the other there is an action 
 for breach of contract. It is clear that the same definitions 
 and the same rules of law cannot equally apply to each, and 
 that in consequence it is always necessary to consider negli- 
 gence in this dual aspect. While accurate and scientific 
 knowledge, clear thinking and precise expression as to the 
 principles of Jaw governing this subject are possible, to define 
 the term " negligence " in its legal sense — in its application 
 to all human interests as they may become subjects of litiga- 
 tion, or to reduce the law of negligence to rules of mathe- 
 matical completeness and precision, as one writes magic 
 squares — is hopelessly out of the question. There are the- 
 orists among law writers who, considering that the story of 
 Bobinson Crusoe has been very cleverly retold in words of one 
 syllable, would apply a somewhat analogous method of re- 
 vision and simplification to the law books. Shall we not, 
 however, rather rest with a presentation of the law as it 
 really is, in as luminous and orderly a way as the subject 
 reasonably admits, without essaying a method and a sim- 
 plicity which are not in the nature of things ? 
 
 § 7. Contributory negligence defined. — Between negli- 
 gence and contributory negligence there is the difference be- 
 tween genus and species, and it is, accordingly, far easier to 
 state with tolerable precision what contributory negligence 
 is, than to construct a satisfactory definition of the simple 
 term "negligence." In the qualified term we are held more 
 to a definition of the adjective than of the noun. Conceding, 
 then, the unknown quantity, we may proceed to define, or 
 
 '" Historically the liability in tort is and negligence independent of con- 
 older; and indeed it was by a special tract create liability in different 
 development of this view that the ac- ways; but the authorities that deter- 
 tion of assumpsit, afterwards the com- mine for us what is meant by negli- 
 mon mode of enforcing simple con- gence are in the main applicable to 
 tracts, was brought mto use." * * both." Pollock on Torts, pp. 354,355. 
 ■" Negligence in performing a contract 
 
8 INTKODUCTOBT. [§ 7. 
 
 find the value of the co-efficient in terms of the unknown 
 quantity ; that is to say, in the result we shall express the 
 unknown quantity with the value of its co-efficient somewhat 
 determined. I therefore, employing some such method of 
 definition as this figure suggests, propose the following: 
 Contributory negligence, in its legal signification, is such an 
 act or omission on the part of a plaintiff, amounting to a 
 want of ordinary care, as, concurring or co-operating with the 
 negligent act of the defendant, is a proximate cause or occa- 
 sion of the injury complained of.^ To constitute contributory 
 negligence there must be a want of ordinary care on the part 
 of the plaintiff^and a proximate connection between that and 
 the injury. Perhaps, besides these two, there are no other 
 necessary elements. Certainly they are the two points of 
 difficulty in the consideration of the question. "Did the 
 plaintiff exercise ordinary care under the circumstances ? " 
 " Was there a. proximate connection between his act or omis- 
 sion and the hurt he complains of ? " These are the vital 
 questions when contributory negligence is the issue. The 
 definition proposed is believed to cover fairly all the points 
 involved.* 
 
 ' "Contributory" is the word most Danner n. South Carolina R. Co., 4 
 used in the decisions to describe Rich. (Law), 339; s. c. 55 Am. , 
 the sort of negligence on the part Dec. 678; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 of a plaintiff which is Juridically Woodruff, 4 Md. 443; 8. c. 59 Am., 
 sufficient to prevent a recovery of Dec. 12 ; O'Brien v. Mc6Iinchy, 68 
 damages — though it is criticised by Me. 552. These two elements must 
 Crompton, J., in Tuff «. Wannan, 5 co-exist. In Neanow v. Uttech, 46 
 C. B. (N. B.) 573, 584, as "much too Wis. 587, it was held to be good law 
 loose," and " a very unsafe word." to charge the jury, that it made no 
 Sometimes the word "concur" is difference, and was of no consequence, 
 used and sometimes "co-operate" what want of care the plaintiff may 
 ( Vide Shearman & Redfield on have been guilty of, or how careless 
 Negligence, § 61), but contributory he may have been, unless they found 
 and contribute are the safer words to that such want of care contributed to 
 use, as having a more settled legal produce the injury complained of. 
 signification, and a more unchallenged Sutton v. Wauwatosa, 29 Wisi 21, 
 currency. In The Bemina, L. R. 12 where the court defined contributory 
 P. & D. 58, the judges use the phrase negligence to be a relation existing be- 
 " partly directly contribute," in de- tween the act and violation of law on 
 scribing the negligence which will de- the part of the plaintiff, and the in- 
 feat the plaintiff's action. jury or accident of which he com- 
 
 ' Tonawanda R. Co. v. Hunger, 5 plains, which relation must have been 
 
 Denio, 255; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 239; such as to have caused, or helped to 
 
§ 9.] INTKODUCTOEY. ' 9 
 
 § 8. Butterfleld t. Forrester.— This is believed to be the 
 earliest reported case in the English law in which the general 
 rule as to contributory negligence is distinctly announced. 
 It was decided by Lord EUenborough in the Court of King's 
 Bench in 1809,* and has ever since been regarded a leading 
 case. It may safely be said that it has been cited with ap- 
 proval as a controlling authority in every jurisdiction where 
 the common law obtains. The opinion is a model of judicial 
 brevity. It declares the rule, sets forth the reasons for it, 
 and suggests a good illustration, within the compass of a 
 dozen lines.' No case is more often referred to in oral argu- 
 ment,, and no case in any branch of the law is more generally 
 received as unquestionably sound. It was an action on the 
 case for obstructing the highway, by means of which ob- 
 struction the plaintiff, who was riding along the road, was 
 thrown from his horse and injured. It appears that the de- 
 fendant, for the purpose of making some repairs to his house, 
 which was close by the roadside, had put up a pole partly 
 across the street on his side, learving, however, free passage 
 through the street along the other side of the way, and that 
 the plaintiff, who was riding rapidly through the street, just 
 at nightfall, but before it was dark, not observing the ob- 
 struction, rode violently against it, and, being thrown from 
 his horse, was seriously injured. On this state of facts the 
 court directed the jury that, if a person riding with reason- 
 able and ordinary care coujd have seen and avoided the ob- 
 struction, and they were satisfied that the plaintiff was riding 
 extremely hard through the street, and without ordinary 
 care, they should find a verdict for the defendant, which they 
 accordingly did. 
 
 §9. The text of Lord Ellenborough's decisioB.— Upon 
 
 motion for a new trial, the court say, by Lord EUenborough, 
 C. J. : — " A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction 
 which has been made by the fault of another, and avail him- 
 
 cause, the injury or accident, not in a '11 Bast, 60. 
 
 remote or speculative sense, but in = Lord EUenborough 's opinion is de- 
 
 the natural and ordinary course of livered in exactly one hundred and 
 
 events, as one event is known to pre- sixteen words. 
 
 cede or follow another. Harris ». 
 
 Union Pacific Ry. Co. , 4 McCrary, 454. 
 
10 INTBODUCTOBY. [§ 10. 
 
 self of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary cau- 
 tion to be in the right. In cases of persons riding upon 
 what is considered to be the wrong side of the road, that 
 would not authorize another purposely to ride up against 
 them. One person being in fault will not dispense with an- 
 other's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must 
 concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road, by 
 the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to 
 avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." The doctrine of this 
 case, then, plainly is, that, although the defendant may have 
 been guilty of a want of ordinary care, tending to produce 
 the injury complained of, still the plaintiff will not be 
 entitled to recover damages if he could, by the exercise of 
 ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the de- 
 fendant's negligence, or, what is the same thing, that he 
 cannot recover when his own negligence proximately con- 
 tributed to produce the injury of which he complains. This 
 rule not only commends itself to our instinctive sense of 
 justice, since what can be a more reasonable requirement 
 than that a man must take ordinary care of himself, or 
 suffer the consequences, but it is also in harmony with the 
 spirit of the law in other respects, in that it puts every man 
 upon his guard, and suffers hijn not to take advantage of his 
 own lack of prudence or care, by first running into danger, 
 and then calling upon some one else to recompense him in 
 damages for what he suffers. It is a principle of law so con- 
 sonant with justice and right reason that it can never be 
 overthrown. 
 
 § 10. Davies v. Mann.— In this case, decided by Lord 
 Abinger in the Court of Exchequer in 1842,^ an entirely dif- 
 ferent rule is laid down, one which is not only subversive of 
 the reasonable rule declared in Butterfield v. Forrester,' but 
 which practically repudiates the entire doctrine of contribu- 
 tory negligence. It is known sometimes as "the donkpy 
 case," the facts being that the plaintiff's donkey, which he 
 had fettered and negligently allowed to graze at large upon 
 the highway, was run down and killed by the servant of the 
 
 ' 10 Mee. & W. 546 ; s. c. 6 Jur. ' 11 Bast, 60. 
 
 954; laL. J. (Exch.)lO. 
 
§ 11-] INTRODUCTOEY. 11 
 
 defendant, driving a wagon through the street. It was con- 
 ceded that the act of the plaintiff, in leaving his donkey on 
 the highway, so fettered as to prevent his getting out of the 
 way of passing vehicles, was negligent and unlawful, but, 
 inasmuch as it appeared that the defendant, by the exercise 
 of ordinary care, might have avoided running over the ani- 
 mal, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover. The clear 
 doctrine of this case is that a plaintiff, although he be guilty 
 of negligence, tending to produce the injury he complains of, 
 may, notwithstanding that, recover damages for the injury, 
 if the defendant could, in spite of such negligence, by the 
 exercise of drdinary care upon his part, have avoided inflict- 
 ing the injury.* 
 
 § 11. Davies v. Mann criticised. — Under this rule no 
 account is taken of the plaintiff's negligence. He is not held 
 to the duty of taking even ordinary care of himself. Let 
 him be never so heedless, or stupid, or careless of his safety, 
 if he can only make it appear that his injury might no1; 
 have happened to him if the defendant had exercised due 
 care, he may, under Davies v. Mann, have his action, and 
 the defendant, in the suit he brings, is held to responsibility, 
 not only for the consequence of his own neglect as in Butter- 
 field V. Forrester, but he must pay for the neglect of the 
 plaintiff also. Where both parties have been guilty of negli- 
 gence, concurring to produce an injury, the doctrine of this 
 case completely exonerates the party who suffers the injui;y, 
 ignores entirely his contributory negligence, and charges the ■ 
 other party with it all. This is sheer injustice, and it is a 
 striking evidence of the chaotic state of the law upon this 
 subject, that Davies v. Mann is esteemed a leading and 
 authoritative case. We find the judges citing it frequently 
 in the reported cases with approval, as enunciating a sound 
 rule of law, and sometimes side by side with Butterfield v. 
 Forrester, which it flatly contradicts, so that the two cases 
 cited together make nonsense. The doctrine of Butterfield 
 
 ' "The donkey case qualification such negligence was the proximate 
 may be put as correctly and more cause ot the daiaage." Shirley's Lead- 
 simply by saying that a plaintiff is not ing Cases, 370. Unfortunately Davies 
 disentitled by his negligence unless v. Mann isnot always thus interpreted. 
 
12 INTEODUCTORY. [§ 12, 
 
 tj. Forrester applied to the state of facts upon which Davies 
 V. Mann turns would give a judgment to the defendant. 
 Indeed the donkey case is a good deal clearer case than that 
 of the man riding at sundown through the streets of Derby. 
 If this pernicious and mischielf-making authority could be 
 distinctly repudiated, much of the uncertainty and confusion 
 in writing and in thinking iipon the subject of contributory 
 negligence would disappear. It is the doctrine that has 
 made all the trouble. The attempts to reconcile some such 
 rule or theory as this case propounds, with the obvious and 
 natural justice of the matter, have driven the courts into all 
 sorts of vagaries, and thfe reported cases show an endless 
 floundering and confusion. If the simple and just and 
 rational rule that a plaintiff guilty of contributory fault can- 
 not recover be adhered to, and all attempts to reconcile that 
 principle with 'any such rule as that of Davies v. Mann be 
 abandoned and fprgotton, the difficulty will be very much at 
 an end. It is submitted that this is the only way to reduce 
 our law in this behalf to an orderly and logical system. 
 
 § 12. The reasons for the rule that contributory negli- 
 gence is a defense. — The reasons of the rule which denies 
 relief to a plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence have 
 been variously stated.^ The common law refuses to appor- 
 tion damages which arise from negligence. This it does 
 upon considerations of public convenience and public policy, 
 and upon this principle, it is said, depends also the rule 
 which makes the contributory negligence of a plaintiff a 
 complete defense. For the same reason, when there is an 
 action in tort, where injury results from the negligence of 
 two or more persons, the sufferer has a full remedy against 
 any one of them, and no contribution can be enforced be- 
 tween the tort feasors. The policy of the law in this respect 
 is founded upon the inability of human tribunals to mete out 
 exact justice. A perfect code would render each man respon- 
 sible for the unmixed consequences of his own default ; but 
 
 ' The theory of contributory negll- Law Journal, ISO. See, also, an arti- 
 
 gence is discussed, and the learning of ele in 8 Harvard Law Review, 363, ' 
 
 the English, American, and Canadian by W. Schofleld, which includes 
 
 decisions and of the text-bwj^ upon a discussion of the doctrine of Da- 
 
 the subject is collected in So^Canada vies *. Mann 
 
§13.] 
 
 INTBODUCTOKY. 
 
 13 
 
 the common law, in view of the impossibility of assigning all 
 effects to their respective causes, refuses to interfere in those 
 cases where negligence is the issue, at the instance of one 
 whose hands are not free from the stain of contributory 
 fault,^ and where accordingly the impossibility of apportion- 
 ing the damage between the parties does not exist, the rule 
 is held not to apply.' 
 
 ^ § 13. The reasons for the rule further considered.— It is 
 
 said again, that the true theory upon which the rule rests is 
 that the defendant is not the cause of the injury if the plaint- 
 iff's negligence contributes to it ; but this is a very superficial 
 view. If it is meant that the defendant is not the sole cause, 
 the argument only goes around in a circle, and if it is meant 
 that the defendant is liable every time he is the sole cause of 
 an injury, it is not true. "The true ground," says Dr. 
 Wharton, "for the doctrine is that, by the interposition of 
 
 ' 1 Am. Law Rev. (N. S.) 770,, an 
 article by Ernest Howard Crosby, 
 Esq. : — " It is no more unjust in prin- 
 ciple to allow an injured person to 
 recover compensation in damages 
 from an entirely innocent third party 
 than it is to allow him to recover for 
 a self-inflicted injury. The real prin- 
 ciple is the same (although the degree 
 of injustice may not be), whether the 
 plaintiff was the sole author of his in- 
 juries, or whether his illegal act or 
 fault combined with that of the de- 
 fendant to produce ttiem, for in such 
 case it is impossible to apportion the 
 damages, or to determine the relative 
 responsibilities of the parties, or 
 whether the plaintiff would have been 
 injured at all, except for his own con- 
 tribution to the result." Loomis, J., 
 in Broschart e. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 20. 
 In Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Ynestra, 
 21 Pla. 700, the court denies the 
 justice of the rule of contributory 
 negligence, whereby the plaintiff may 
 be wholly debarred from recovery, 
 though the defendant may be clearly 
 guilty of negligence. The court pre- 
 
 fers the rule in the admiralty, where 
 the damages are apportioned, and de- 
 clares that "the law, at least in cases 
 where human life is concerned, cer- 
 tainly needs legislative revision." 
 "The parties being mutually in fault, 
 there can be no apportionment of the 
 damages. The law has no scales to de- 
 termine in such cases whose wrong- 
 doing weighed most in the compound 
 that occasioned the mischief." Rail- 
 road V. Norton, 24 Penn. St. 469. If 
 the plaintiff were allowed to recover, 
 he might be obtaining compensation 
 for his own misconduct. HeU «. 
 Glanding, 42 Penn. St. 493 ; Shearman 
 & Redfleld on Negligence, § 63. 
 
 ''Needham v. San Francisco, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 Cal. 409. Here the negli- 
 gence of the plaintiff was held to be 
 only a remote cause of the injury suf- 
 fered by him. Compare this case 
 with Tonawanda R. Co. v. Hunger, 
 5 Denio, 355, where the plaintiff, 
 under similar circumstances, was still 
 held contributorily negligent, and 
 damages were refused. 
 
14 INTBODUCTORY. [§ 13. 
 
 the plaintiflP's independent will, the casual connection be- 
 tween the defendant's negligence and the injury is broken."* 
 It is also sometimes assumed to rest upon the maxim volenti 
 rmnfit injuria, but the objection to this position, as well as to 
 Dr. Wharton's definition, is that negligence, in its very 
 essence, negatives the idea of an exercise of the will. A per- 
 son whose negligence causes an injury cannot be spoken of 
 with any accuracy of expression as " willing " it.' Negligence 
 can only be conceived upon the hypothesis that the will, as 
 to the particular condition, is inactive. In my judgment no 
 more satisfactory reason for the rule in question has been 
 assigned thaoi that which assumes it to have been founded 
 upon considerations of public policy. We need not seek for 
 any better reason for a rule of law than that, among all the 
 possible rules ' that might be adopted, it is plainly the best 
 — that indeed it is the only rule upon the subject for an 
 instant practicable. 
 
 '"Wharton on Negligence, § 300, As between individuals it might adopt 
 
 citing Tuff ». Warman, 5 C. B. (N. the mutual insurance principle pro 
 
 S.) S78, 585. tanto, and divide damages when both 
 
 ' Where plaintiff charges negligence were in fault, as in the rmHeumju- 
 
 and not a wilful injury, he cannot dimim, of the admiralty, or it might 
 
 prove the latter. Pennsylvania Co. v. throw all loss upon the actor irre- 
 
 Smith, 98 Ind. 42, spective of fault. The State does none 
 
 '"The State might conceivably of these things, however, and the pre- 
 
 make itself a mutual insurance com- vailing view is that its cumbrous and 
 
 pany against accidents, and distribute expensive machinery ought not to be 
 
 the burden of its citizens' mishaps set in motion unless some clear bene- 
 
 among all its members. There might fit is to be derived from disturbing 
 
 be a pension for paralytics, and State the ttatu* quo." Holmes' Common 
 
 aid for those who suffered in person Law, 96. 
 or estate from tempest or wild beasts. 
 
CHAPTER IL 
 
 THE GENERAL RULE. 
 
 14 General statement of the rule. 
 
 15. Express or implied waiver of a 
 right of action. 
 
 16. The same subject continued. 
 
 17. Ordinary care. 
 
 18. Ordinary fiegligence. 
 
 19. Ordinary care as affecting the 
 rule in question. 
 
 20. Ordinary care and the plain- 
 tiff's conduct. 
 
 21. What is ordinary care. 
 
 23. Ordinary care usually a ques- 
 tion of fact. 
 
 23. Illustration of this rule. 
 
 24. Proximate cause. 
 
 25. The doctrine of proximate cause 
 stated. 
 
 26. Not the sole proximate cause. 
 
 i 27. Illustration of this rule. — The 
 influence of Dayies v. Mann. 
 
 28. The rule in Davies e. Mann. 
 
 29. The influence of Davies v. Mann 
 on the New York courts. 
 
 30. The influence of Davies v. Mann 
 in other States. 
 
 31. What is a proximate cause. 
 82. The same subject continued. 
 
 33. Distinction between causal con- 
 nection and a plaintiff's negli- 
 gence. 
 
 34. Connection of the plaintiff's 
 negligence with his injury. 
 
 35. Summary statement of the doc- 
 trine of contributory negli- 
 gence as a defense. 
 
 § 14. General statement of the rule.— Contributory neg- 
 ligence, as we have seen,^ consists, in contemplation of law, 
 in snch acts or omissions, on the part of a plaintiff, amonnt- 
 ing to a want of ordinary care, as concurring or co-operating 
 with the negligent acts of the defendant, are a proximate 
 cause, or occasion of the injury complained of. It is a gen- 
 eral rule, firmly imbedded in the law, and conclusively set- 
 tled, that such negligence will defeat a recovery. Says 
 Black, C. J., in Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Aspell:' — "It has 
 been a rule of law from time immemorial, and it is not likely 
 to be changed in all time to come, that there can be no 
 recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of both 
 parties. When it can be shown that it would not have hap- 
 pened except for the culpable negligence of the party injured, 
 concurring with that of the other party, no action can be 
 
 § 3. mpra. 
 
 ' 23 Penn. St. 
 Dec. 323. 
 
 147 ; B. c. 62 Am. 
 
16 
 
 THE GENERAL RULE. 
 
 [§14- 
 
 maintained." From Butterfield v. Forrester,* to the latest 
 judgment of the appellate courts in every common law juris- 
 diction, the rule is consistently and uniformly declared.' 
 
 / ' 11 East, 60. 
 
 ' ' Freer v. Cameron, 4 Rich. (Law), 
 228 ; s. c. 55 Am. Dec. 663 (and es- 
 pecially Mr. Freeman's scholarly and 
 exhaustive note at page 666) ; Shear- 
 man & Kedfleld on Negligence, §61; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1146 ; 
 Wharton on Negligence, § 300 ; Saun- 
 ders on Negligence, 55, 60 ; Field 
 on Damages, 158, 159, 173, 529. 
 " Gross negligence " is not suflBcient 
 to overcome the injured person's con- 
 tributory negligence, unless it was 
 negligence to a degree that was wan- 
 ton, reckless, or intentional. Car- 
 rington v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 88 
 Ala. 473; 6. So. Rep. 410 ; Rowen r. 
 N. Y., &c., R. Co., 59 Conn. 365 ; 
 Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., 3 Mee. 
 & W. 244. In Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. 
 B. (N. S.) 573, 585, the Court says :— 
 "Mere negligence or want of ordi- 
 nary care and caution would ^^ot dis- 
 entitle the plaintiff to recover, unless 
 it were such that, but for that negli- 
 gence or want of ordinary care and 
 caution, the misfortune could not 
 have happened; nor if the defendant 
 might by the exercise of care on his 
 part, have avoided the consequences 
 of the neglect or carelessness of the 
 plaintiff." Witherley v. Regent's 
 Canal Co., 12 Id. 2; 8. c. 3 Fost. & 
 Fin. 61; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 255; Dowell 
 «. Steam Navigation Co., 5 EI & Bl. 
 195; Moak's TJnderhill on Torts, 283, 
 285; 4 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 
 718, § 2; Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 
 39; 8. c. 43 Am. Deo. 249; Railroad 
 Co. V. Jones, 95 IT. S. 439; Munger v. 
 Tonawanda R. Co., 4 N. Y. 849; 8. c. 
 53 Am. Dec. 384, and note; Milton «. 
 Hudson River Steamboat Co., 37 N. 
 Y. 212; Central R. Co. ®. Letcher, 69 
 Ala. 106; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 605; Lit- 
 tle Rock, &c., R. Co. V. Pankhurst,36 
 
 Ark. 371; Kline ». Central Pacific R. 
 Co., 37 Cal. 400; Colorado, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197: Illinois, &c., R. 
 Co. ti. Hetherington, 83111. 510; Fley- 
 tas V. Ponchartrain R. Co., 18 La. 
 339; 8. c. 36 Am. Dec. 658; Murray 
 V. Ponchartrain R. Co., 31- La. Ann. 
 490; State v. Manchester, &c., R Co„ 
 52 N. H. 528; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Goodman, 63 Penn. St. 329; Walsh 
 r. Transportation Co., 62 Mo. 434; 
 Zimmerman v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 71 Id. 476; Contributory negligence 
 is such want of care as materially 
 helps in producing the disaster. 
 Palys r. Erie Ry. Co., 30 N. J. 
 Eq. 604; Pennsylvania R. Co. ». 
 Righter, 42 N. J. Law, 180. H it ap- 
 pears that the party injured has, by 
 any act of omission or commission on 
 his part, contributed to the injury 
 complained of, it is generally dam- 
 num aibigue ir^uria. Morrison e. Cor- 
 nelius. 63 N. C. 346, 349. In Murphy 
 «!. Dean, 101 Mass. 455; s. c. 8 Am. 
 Rep. 390, it was contended that 
 contributory negligence on the part 
 of the plaintiff ought not to defeat 
 the action, unless it should appear 
 that it did in fact contribute to such 
 *an extent that the injury could 
 not or would not have occurred 
 but- for the plaintiff's negligence. 
 But the court held the counter-propo- 
 sition to be a truer statement of the 
 legal principle, namely, that there 
 can be no recovery unless it Shall ap- 
 pear that the injury happened, or 
 would have happened, irrespectively 
 of any negligence on the part of the 
 plaintiff. Richmond, &c., R. Co. r. 
 Morris, 31 Gratt. 200; Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Anderson, 31 Gratt. 
 812; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sin- 
 clair, 62 Ind. 301; s c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 185 (note); Simpson t>. Hand, 6 Whar 
 
§14.] 
 
 THE GENERAL BULE. 
 
 17 
 
 And even in those courts that liave invented and tolerate the 
 doctrine of "comparative negligence," or that follow, in 
 
 ton (Penn.) 311; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 
 231; Steele v Central R. Co. of Iowa, 
 43 Iowa, 1C9; McKean «. R. Co., 
 S5 Iowa. 193. The principle is well set- 
 tled that although a defendant has 
 been guilty of culpable fault or negli- 
 gence, producing an injury, yet if his 
 act was not wanton and intentional, 
 and if the plaintiff, by his own mis- 
 conduct, or neglect, amounting to the 
 want of ordinary care, essentially con- 
 tributed to produce the result, he 
 cannot recover. Birge v. Grardner, 19 
 Conn. 507, 511; 8. c. 50 Am. Dec. 
 261; Salem v. GoUer, 76 Ind. 391; 
 Hoehl V. Muscatine, 57 Iowa, 444. 
 The plaintiff is equally contributorily 
 negligent when the act done by him 
 exposes him to the injury as when it 
 co-operates in causing the misfortune 
 from which the injury results. Ky., 
 &c., R. Co. V. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160, 162; 
 8. c. 42 Am. Rep. 208; Bradley v. An- 
 drews, 51 Vt. 530; Erie v. Magill, 101 
 Penn. St. 616; Abends. Terre Haute, 
 Ac, R. Co., Ill Dl. 203; 8. c, 53 Am. 
 Rep. 616; Jamison «. San Jose. &c., 
 R. Co., 55 Cal. 593. The rule is not 
 that any degree of negligence, how- 
 ever slight, which directly concurs in 
 producing the injury will prevent a 
 recovery; but that, if the negligence 
 of the plaintiff, amotmting to the ab- 
 sence of ordinary care, shall contrib- 
 ute proximately in any degree to the 
 injury, the plaintiff shall not recover. 
 Strong e. Sacramento R. Co., 61 CaL 
 326; Nehrbas «. Central, &c., R. Co., 
 62 Cal. 320; McCoy v. Philadelphia, 
 &c., R. Co., 5 Hous. (Del.) 599. Con- 
 tributory negligence, however slight, 
 bars recovery. LouisviUe, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; Terre Haute, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Graham, 95 Ind. 286; 
 Storey v. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 51 
 Iowa, 419; County Com'rss. Hamil- 
 ton, 60 Ind. 340; Peverly «. Boston, 
 15 
 
 136 Mass. 366; s. c. 49Am. Rep. 37; 
 Vicksburg, &c , R. Co. ». Hart, 61 
 Miss. 468; Dudley v. Camden Perry 
 Co., 45 N. J. Law, 368; Mullen v. Rai- 
 near, 45 N. J. Law, 530; Renneker v. 
 South Car. R. Co., 30 S. C. 319; Hous- 
 ton, &c., R. Co V. Richards, 59 Tex. 
 373; Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Goetz, 
 79 Ky. 442; Kentucky Central R. Co. 
 V. Lebus, 14 Bush, 518. In Brown v. 
 Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 22 Minn. 
 165, 166, the court said : — " The com- 
 mon law impresses upon every one in 
 the fuU possession of his faculties, 
 when approaching a known place of 
 danger, the exercise of that degree of 
 prudence, care and caution incumbent 
 upon a person of ordinary reason and 
 intelligence in like circumstance; and 
 inasmuch as it may be well presumed 
 that the instinct of self-preservation 
 common to all must naturally prompt 
 an ordinarily prudent and careful 
 man to avoid an apprehended danger 
 by a diligent use of the available 
 means at his command, it has become 
 settled that a failure in this respect, 
 under ordinary circumstances, when 
 it is apparent that the danger might 
 have been avoided if such means had 
 been so used, is to be regarded as con- 
 curring negligence, and so declared 
 by thecourt." Sullivan v. Bridge Co., 
 9 Bush, 81 ; Paducah R. Co. v. Hoehl, 
 13 Bush, 41 ; Jacobs v. Louisville, &c., 
 R Co., 10 Bush, 368; Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Collins, 3 Duv. (Ky.) 114; 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Robinson, 4 
 Bush, 507; Martin v. Bishop, 59 Wis. 
 417 ; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405 ; Otis 
 «.Janesville,47Wis.423. Bemoteneg- 
 ligence of the plaintiff will not prevent 
 his recovery for an injury immediately 
 caused by the negligence of the de- 
 fendant. The negligence of the 
 plaintiff, which defeats his recovery, 
 must be a proximate cause of the 
 
18 
 
 THE GENEBAL BULE. 
 
 [§15. 
 
 some sort or another, the strange gods that led the fathers 
 astray, in Daviesv. Mann,' ei id omne genus, the force and 
 integrity of this rule are equally admitted.' It would re- 
 quire far greater judicial hardihood to challenge its sound- 
 ness than it does to explain it away. 
 
 § 15. Express or implied waiver of a right of action.— 
 
 It is held entirely lawful for one, by an express contract, ta 
 waive the right of action which he may have against another 
 for damages for an injury occasioned by the negligence of 
 such other person, provided that this contract is supported 
 by some consideration deemed valuable in law, and is in other 
 respects without such fraud or mistake as to its procurement^ 
 as would avoid any other contract.^ And when the contract 
 of waiver is made after the injury is received, if it is in other 
 particulars a lawful one, being founded upon a valuable con- 
 sideration, and procured without imposition or duress, the 
 
 injury. Shefi v. City of Huntington, 
 16 W. Yk. 307; Cronin v. Delavan, 50 
 Wis. 375. A man contributes to an 
 injury himself when the injury is one 
 which a prudent man might well an- 
 ticipate as resulting from the circum- 
 stances to which he exposed himself. 
 No speculation should be entered into 
 as to whether it might result in the 
 breaking of a finger or the smashing 
 of his le^. When anything of that 
 character is anticipated, he is guilty 
 of contributory negligence if he ex- 
 poses himself in such a way as a 
 careful and prudent man would not. 
 Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601. Where 
 there is mutual negligence, the prin- 
 ciple is, that where the negligence 
 of each party was a proximate 
 cause of the injury, no action can be 
 maintained. Levy v. Carondelet Canal 
 Co., 34 La. Ann. 181; Jeffrey v. Keo- 
 kuk, &e., R. Co , 56 Iowa, 546; Addi- 
 son on Torts, 33 et aeg., 237, 493; 1 
 Sedgwick on Damages, 173, and 8 Id. 
 347. 
 
 ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Hethering- 
 
 ton, 83 111. 510; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Johnson, 103 HI. 513, where it is 
 expressly said that in the absence of 
 ordinary care on the part of the 
 plaintifif, there is no right of action, 
 and can be no recovery. (See, also, 
 infra, % 85.) Macon, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Winn, 19 Qa. 440 ; Union Pacific Ry. 
 Co. B. Rollins, 5 Kan. 167. 
 
 ' Western, &c., R. Co. ». Bishop, 50 
 Ga. 465; Memphis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 3 Head, 517; Mitchell v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 1 Am. Law Rep. 
 717; Galloways. Western, &c., R. Co. 
 57 Ga. 513. Here, in consideration of 
 the employment, a servant of a rail- 
 road company made an agreement to 
 assume all risks incident to his labors. 
 This agreement was held to preclude 
 all right to sue and recover for injuries 
 sustained while so employed. But 
 see contra, Roesner v. Hermann, 10 
 Biss. 486, where Judge Gresham, in 
 an oral opinion, held that such a con- 
 tract, the sole consideration being the 
 employment, was absolutely void as 
 against public policy. 
 
§ 16.] THE GENEBAL RULE. 19 
 
 courts uphold it as valid.' Such a contract may be implied 
 as well as express, as, for example, between a master and 
 servant, when the servant enters into, or continues in, the 
 service with full knowledge of the risk to which he exposes 
 himself, by reason of his master's negligence.' This is held 
 to be an implied contract on the part of the employee to run 
 the risk of the danger, and a waiver of his right to an action 
 against his employer if injury results. Upon this principle, 
 also, one who goes upon the premises of another to do busi- 
 ness, or as a guest, impliedly accepts the risk of any open or 
 seen dangers that exist about the premises.' 
 
 § 16. The same subject continued.— It is clear that this 
 voluntary act, by which one waives his right of action, for 
 damages resulting to him from the negligence of another, is 
 nol at all the same thing as contributory negligence, though 
 in each case the result is the same-^that the plaintiff recovers 
 nothing. In the former case the defense is that the plaintiff 
 is barred of his action by his voluntary assumption of the 
 risk, that he has deliberately and with his eyes open, dis- 
 abled himself from recovering damages, that his case comes 
 within the principle of the maxim volenti non Jit injuria, while 
 in the latter case the defensive matter is that the plaintiff, 
 without any act of the will, was guilty of such negligent acts 
 as, concurring with the acts of the defendant, produced or 
 occasioned the injury of which he complains, or, what is the 
 same thing, that, in the first instance, he is deprived of his 
 right of action by his express or implied contract, which 
 Operates as a sort of estoppel, and in the second instance, he 
 is deprived of his right to recover by his negligence. This 
 distinction between a voluntary act and an involuntary one, 
 between a contract and an act of pure negligence, is an im- 
 
 ' If there be no mistake or fraud, ' This is fully considered in the 
 
 the amount received in the settlement chapter on Master and Servant, post, 
 
 is not material to its validity as a set- q. v. 
 
 tiement. Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, ' Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. 
 
 113; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ®. Doyle, 18 P. 374; 8. c. L. R. 3 C. P. 311; Kohn 
 
 Kan. 58; Dlinois, &c., R. Co. ■B.Welch, v. Lovett, 44 Ga. 351; Hargreaves ». 
 
 53 m. 183; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 593; Deacon, 35 Mich. 1; Thompson on 
 
 Schultzs. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 44 111. Negligence, chap. VII, and the cases 
 
 838. there collected. (See infra, § 50.) 
 
20 THE GENERAL KULE. [§ 17. 
 
 portant one. There is a confusion of ideas implied in such 
 expressions as that one cannot recover damages " where he 
 has consented or contributed to the act which occasioned the 
 injury." ^ It is one thing to consent, as we have seen, and an 
 essentially different thing to contribute to an injury, and, in 
 order to right thinking upon the question of contributory 
 negligence, the distinction should not be overlooked. 
 
 § 17. "Ordinary care." — The Eoman jurists of the clas- 
 sical period recognized but two grades of negligence, cvlpa 
 lata, gross negligence,* and cudpa levis, ordinary negligence, 
 or the failure to exercise the diligence belonging to a dUigens, 
 hcmus, stvdiosus pater famUias, " qui sobrie et non sine exacta de- 
 ligentia rem suam administrat." To these the scholastic jurists 
 added a third, ctdpa levissima, slight or infinitesimal negli- 
 gence. They insisted upon this as a material and essential 
 distinction, but it is conceded at present, that it was not 
 recognized by the classical jurists, and that it is a trouble- 
 some and unnecessary refinement. While the text writers 
 and theorists cling to it, it has been found incompatible with 
 the necessities of our modern business jurisprudence, and 
 the courts practically ignore it. The common law, however, 
 recognizes, in theory at least, the soundness of this triple 
 classification. The law Students have it " trippingly on the 
 tongue." Ordinary negligence, slight negligence, and gross 
 negligence, for so the text-books expound it. It may be said 
 to date from Coggs v. Bernard (2 Anne, A. D. 1703).' In Lord 
 Holt's famous opinion in this case, the scholastic law of neg- 
 ligence, as he had learned it in Bracton, is incorporated into 
 the law of England, and while, as we have seen, the courts of 
 later times have more or less entirely disregarded crdpa levis- 
 sima, and the impracticable refinements it involves, the au- 
 thority of that great case has not been challenged, and the 
 learning in it has formed the unquestioned basis of our law 
 in point. 
 
 'Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 136; ligunt." L. 213, § ult. D. de V. S. 
 
 Trow V. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 34 TJlpianus lib. 1, Regularum; Wil- 
 
 Vt. 487; B. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191. Hams' Institutes of Justinian, 154. 
 
 ^ " iMta culpa eat nimia negligentia, ' Ld. Raym. 909; s. c. 1 Smith's 
 
 id est non intelUgere quod omnea intel- L. C. (8th ed.) 369. 
 
§ 18.] THE GENERAL RULE. 21 
 
 § 18. Ordinary negligence.— Three grades of negligence 
 imply three correlative grades of diligence, and so we have 
 slight care, ordinary care, and great care, corresponding re- 
 spectively to gross negligence, ordinary negligence, and 
 slight negligence. Gross negligence is the failure to exer- 
 cise even slight care,^ and slight negligence the failure to 
 exercise great or extraordinary care ; while the failure to use 
 ordinary care is ordinary negligence. This somewhat allite- 
 rative terminology and artificial classification have provoked 
 much criticism,^ both from the text writers and the courts, 
 and from a practical point of view they must be conceded to 
 be obnoxious, to grave objection ; " gross " as applied to 
 negligence is said to be merely, in most instances, a species 
 of vituperation,' and the term " gross negligence " to have 
 no uniform meaning.* For the purposes of this treatise it is 
 not necessary to more than advert to the difficulties involved 
 in a complete and exhaustive discussion of the grades of neg- 
 ligence with their correlative grades of carefulness. We 
 proceed, therefore, to consider " ordinary care " in its bear- 
 ings upon the rule in question. 
 
 ' " Gross negligence " and " the ' Wilson e. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 
 
 want of slight care " are convertible where Baron Rolfe said that he could 
 
 terms, and mean the same thing. see no difference between negligence 
 
 Chicago, &c., Ry Co. v. Chapman, 30 and gross negligence — that it was the 
 
 111. App. 504. In Missouri P. Ry. Co. same thing, with the addition of a 
 
 «. Brown, 75 Tex. 367; 13 S. W. Rep. vituperative epithet. And in Bamum 
 
 1117, a definition of gross negligence ». Terpenning, 75 Mich. 557; 43 N. W. 
 
 as the want of ordinary care and cau- Rep. 967, the absence of gross negli- 
 
 tion was held fatally defective. gence was defined as conduct " not 
 
 ' Steamboat New Worlds. King, 16 wanting in reasonable care and pru- 
 
 How. (TJ. S. ) 469, 474, where the Court dence, in view of all the circumstances 
 
 says: — " The meaning of these three and surroundings of the injury." 
 
 grades is not fixed, or capable of be- Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier 
 
 ing so. One degree, thus described, Co., L. R. 1 C. P 600. See, also, 1 
 
 not only jnay be confounded with Smith's L. C. (8th ed.) 384 (n). 
 another, but it is quite impracticable * Austin «. Manchester, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 exactly to distinguish them. Their 16 Jur. 736. See, also, Wharton on 
 
 signification necessarily varies accord- Negligence, §g 26-69; Campbell on 
 
 ing to circumstances, to whose influ- Negligence (London, 1871), § 11 ; 
 
 ence the courts have been forced to Phillips «. Clark, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 884, 
 
 yield, until there are so many real and a valuable article on " Degrees of 
 
 exceptions, that the rules themselves Negligence " in the American Law 
 
 can scarcely be said to have a general Review, vol. 5 (1870), p. 38. 
 operation." 
 
22 
 
 THE GENERAL BULE. 
 
 [§19. 
 
 § 19. Ordinary care as affecting the rule in question. — 
 
 The two essential elements in contributory negligence are a 
 want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, and a 
 causal connection between that and the injury complained 
 of, the rule being that a plaintiff cannot recover damages for 
 an injury he has sustained, if the injury could have been 
 avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.' The 
 law does not require the plaintiff to be entirely free from any 
 negligence whatever contributing to the injury, although 
 there is a line of cases to that effect,^ because that is the same 
 thing as to hold him responsible for slight negligence. 
 This the law does not do ; slight negligence is the want of 
 extraordinary or great care, and that is not what is re- 
 
 ' Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 
 60; Marriott v. Stanley, 1 Scott's N. 
 R. 393 ; Smith v. Smith, 3 Pick. 631; 
 s. c. 13 Am. Dec. 464 ; Steele v. Central 
 K. Co., 43 Iowa, 109; Hughes ». Mus- 
 catine, 44 Iowa, 673; Priest v. Nich- 
 oUs, 116 Mass. 401; Kennard e. Bur- 
 ton, 35 Me. 39; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 349 ; 
 Hill «. New Orleans, &c., R. Co., 11 
 La. Ann. 393 ; Mercier v. New Or- 
 leans, &c., R. Co., 33 La. Ann. 364; 
 Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. 8. 439; 
 Richmond, <fec., R. Co. v. Morris, 31 
 Gratt. 300 ; Crommelin v. Coxe, 30 Ala. 
 339; Gothard v. Alabama, &c., R. Co., 
 67 Ala,. 114; Strong ». Sacramento, &c., 
 R. Co., 61 Cal. 336; Peverly b. Boston, 
 136 Mass. 366; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 87; 
 Jefflery v. Keokuk, &c., R. Co., 56 Iowa, 
 546; Sullivan v. Louisville Bridge Co , 
 9 Bush, 81; O'Brien u Philadelphia. 
 &c., R. Co., SPhila. 76; Marble v Ross, 
 134 Mass, 44; Jalie ». Cardinal, 35 Wis. 
 118; Runyon v. Central R. Co., 85 N. 
 J. Law, 556; Sawyer v Sauer. 10 Kan. 
 473; Kansas. &c., R. Co. ■». Pointer, 9 
 Kan, 620; B.C. 14 Kan. 37; Cleveland, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Crawford, 34 Ohio St. 
 631 ; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Stout, 
 53 Ind. 148; Daley «. Norwich, &c.,R. 
 Co., 36 Conn. 591; Williams v. Clin- 
 ton, 38 Conn. 366; Fox v. Glastenbury, 
 
 39 Conn. 304; Cremer v. Portland, 36 
 Wis. 99; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Penn. 
 St. 463; s. c. 56 Am, Dec. 514; 
 Washburn «. Tracy, 3 D. Chipman 
 (Vt.) 138; s. c. 15 Am. Dec, 661; 
 Noyes v. Shepherd, 30 Me. 173; s. c. 
 50 Am. Dec. 635: Johnson «. Whit- 
 field, 18 Me. 386; s. c. 86 Am. Dec. 
 731. 
 
 ' New Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 
 33 N. J. Law, 484, where the court, 
 while admitting that in many cases 
 the plaintiff was allowed to recover 
 whose conduct was, to some extent, 
 contributory to his injury, neverthe- 
 less holds that if he be negligent in 
 any degree, he is without redress, un- 
 less the act of the defendant was an 
 intentional wrong. Phila., &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Boyer, 97 Penn. St. 91; Wilds 
 ». Hudson River R. Co., 34 N. T. 430. 
 So in Grippen v. New York Central 
 R Co., 40 N. Y. 84, it was held that 
 the injury must be "solely" caused 
 by the negligence of the defendants. 
 It is not enough that it should be 
 " essentially " so caused. Even Ch. J. 
 Hunt, in dissenting, upheld this state- 
 ment as the correct formulation of 
 the law. Vanderplank v. Miller, 
 Moody and M. 169; Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co. «. Qoddard, 35 Ind. 185. 
 
§ 19.] 
 
 THE GENERAL EULE. 
 
 23 
 
 quired.' But while extraordinary care is not to be required 
 of a plaintiff who brings an action of negligence, and al- 
 though slight negligence on his part will not defeat a recov- 
 ery, it is held that the slightest want of ordinary care con- 
 tributing proximately to the injury will do so. This distinction 
 is made in several cases by the Supreme Court of "Wisconsin. 
 It is ingenious and philosophical, and capable of useful ap- 
 plication.' To essentially the same effect it is said that, al- 
 though there may have been slight negligence, that is to say, 
 a want of extraordinary or great care on the part of the per- 
 son injured, an action will nevertheless lie if there was no 
 want of ordinary care contributing to the injury.^ 
 
 ' "The mer.e want of a superior 
 -degree of care or diligence cannot be 
 set up as a bar to the plaintiff's claim 
 for redress; although the plaintiff 
 may himself have been guilty of neg- 
 ligence, yet, unless he might, by the 
 «xercise of ordinary care, have avoid- 
 .ed the consequence of the defendant's 
 negligence, he will be entitled to re- 
 cover." Whirley v. "Whiteman, 1 
 Head (Tenn.) 610; Nashville, &c., 
 E. Co. V. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347 ; Ma- 
 bley V. Kittleberger, 37 Mich. 860 j 
 Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Jacobs, 30 El. 
 478; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; 
 Cremer v. Portland, 36 Wis. 92; 
 Springett v. Ball, 4 Fost. & Fin. 473. 
 But in Little Rock, &c., Ry. Co. ■». 
 Haynes, 47 Ark. 497; 1 S. W. Rep. 
 774, an instruction '■ that slight negli- 
 gence is not a slight want of ordinary 
 care, but a want of extraordinary 
 care, and the law does not require 
 such care of the person injured by the 
 negligence of another as a condition 
 precedent to his recovery," was held 
 to be obscure and misleading. 
 
 " McGrath v. Village of Bloomer, 
 73 Wis. 29; Bloor v. Town of Dela- 
 fleld, 69 Wis. 373; Cremer «. Port- 
 land, 36 Wis. 92; Dreher n. Fitch- 
 burg, 23 Wis. 675, where it is well 
 said that the law does not attempt to 
 
 measiire how little or Ijow greatly the 
 plaintiff may have fallen short of 
 using ordinary care, but that any fail- 
 ure in this respect or a slight want of 
 such care, contributing directly to the 
 injury, will forbid a recovery. Ward 
 V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co,, 29 Wis. 
 144; Hammonds. Mukwa, 40 Wis. 35; 
 Griffln «. Willow, 43 Wis. 509; Otis v. 
 Janesville, 47 Wis. 432; Cronin v. 
 Delavan, 50 Wis. 37S. 
 
 ' Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henry, 36 
 Ean., 14 Pac. Rep. 1; Bloor v. Town 
 of Delafleld, 69 Wis. 373; 34 N. W. 
 Rep. 115; Strong v. Placerville R. 
 Co. (Cal.), 14 Rep. 110; Baltilnore, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Fitzpa,trick, 35 Md. 33, 
 containing a very lucid exposition of 
 the rule. Manley ®. Wilmington, &c. , 
 R. Co., 74 N. C 655; Korwhacker ®. 
 Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 
 173 ; Dush ». Pitzhugh, 3 Lea, 307 ; 
 Houston, &c., R. Co. v. Gorbett, 49 
 Tex. 573; Bridge a. Grand Junction 
 Ry. Co., 3 Mee. «& W. 344, where the 
 plea that the plaintiff was simply 
 negligent was held bad. Absence 
 of ordinary care should have been 
 alleged. But a general charge of 
 negligence in a complaint was held 
 good on demurrer, in Cleveland, &c., 
 Ry. Co. V. Wynant, 100 Ind. 160. 
 
24 THE GENEEAL BULE. [§ 20, 
 
 § 20. Ordinary care and the plainliflf's condnct.— Th& 
 
 standard by which the plaintiflf 's negligence is to be measured 
 is the standard of ordinary care, and the rule upon the sub- 
 ject is Correctly and pertinently summed up in Cremer v. 
 Portland* by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, viz. :—" If 
 the pMntiflf was guilty of any want of ordinary care and pru- 
 dence (however slight), which neglect contributed directly 
 to produce the injury, he cannot recover. . ... . It 
 
 is not the law that slight negligence on the part of the plain- 
 tiff will defeat the action. Slight negligence is the want of 
 extraordinary care and prudence, and the law does not require 
 of a person injured by the carelessness of others, the exercise 
 of that high degree of caution as a condition precedent to 
 his right to recover damages for the injuries thus sustained." 
 The weight of the most intelligent authority will, it is be- 
 lieved, sustain this position. Not slight negligence, but any 
 want, however slight, of ordinary care on the part of a 
 plaintiff, is sufficient to defeat the action. This want of ordi- 
 nary" care niay, in order to operate as a defense to the plain- 
 tiff's action, be, in point of time, either prior,* or subsequent 
 to the negligence of the defendant,' or contemporary there- 
 with.* 
 
 " 36 Wis. 93. ous to cross. Jackson t. Comity 
 
 " Thus, it was held an ahsence of Com'rs, 76 N. C. 383; Lilley®. Fletch- 
 
 ordinary prudence for a plaintiff to er, 81 Ala. 234; 1 So. Rep. 273; 
 
 walk deliberately upon the track of a Eaton v. Or. Ry. & Nav. Co. (Or.), 34 
 
 railroad. Such a one will be pre- Pa. Rep. 415, 417; Mills v. Chi- 
 
 sumed to assume the risk of the peril cago, M., &c., Ry. Co., 76 Wis. 422; 
 
 he may encounter. Illinois, &c., R. 45 N. W. Rep. 225; Krum «. An- 
 
 Co. D.Hall, 73111. 223; Illinois, ifcc, R. thony, 115 Penn. St. 481; 8 Atl. Rep. 
 
 Co. V. Hetheringtoft, 83 111. 510; Penn- 598; Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East, 
 
 Sylvauia R. Co. ■». Morgan, 83 Penn. 60; Brown*. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 
 
 St. 134 : Carroll*. MinuKSOta, &c., Ry. 22 Minn. 163; Martensen d. Chicago, 
 
 Co., 13 Minn. 930. In Austin «. New &e., R. Co., 60 Iowa, 705. (Seej7i/ro, 
 
 Jersey Steamboat Co., 43 N. T. 75, §§ 58, 59.) 
 
 82, it would seem that the court errs ' No action lies "where both par- 
 
 when it says that the plaintiff's negli- ties are contemporaneously and act- 
 
 gence "must be one occurring at the ively in fault." O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 
 
 time the accident happened." 68 Me. 552; Doggett «. Richmond, 
 
 = As where one attempts to cross a &c , Ry. Co., 78 N. C. 305 ; Chicago, 
 
 swollen stream, the bridge over it be- &c., R. Co. v. Becker, 76 HI. 26; 
 
 ing out of repair, when it is apparent s. c, 84111. 483; Moak's Underbill's, 
 
 that the stream is swollen and danger- Torts, 285. 
 
§21.] 
 
 THE GENEEAL RULE. 
 
 25 
 
 § 21. What is ordinary care.— What is the precise legal 
 intent of the term " ordinary care " must, in the nature of 
 things, depend upon the circumstances of each individual 
 case. It is a relative and not an absolute term. Chancellor 
 Walworth, in the case of the Mayor, &o., of New York v. 
 Bailey,* says :— " The degree of care and foresight which it is 
 necessary to use " (in any given case) " must always be in 
 proportion to the nature and magnitude of the injury that 
 will be likely to result from the occurrence which is to be 
 anticipated and guarded against. And it should be that care 
 and prudence which a discreet and cautious individual would, 
 or ought to,' use if the whole risk and loss were to be his 
 own exclusively." This doctrine is declared in many other 
 cases.' He who does what is more than ordinarily danger- 
 
 » 2 Denio, 433. 
 
 ' City of Madison v. Ross, 3 Ind. 
 236; s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 481; Brown ,». 
 Milwaukee, &c.. R. Co.. 32 Minn. 
 165; The Nitro-Qlycerine Case, Par- 
 rott V. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 Wall. 
 524i B. c. sub nom., Parrott v. Barney, 
 2 Abb. C. C. 197; s. c. 1 Deady, 405; 
 1 Sawyer, 423. "He who does what 
 is more than ordinarily dangerous, 
 is bound to use more than ordinary 
 care." Morgan «. Cox, 22 Mo. 373; 
 Northern Central R. Co. s. Price, 29 
 Md. 420; Beers v. Housatonic R. Co., 
 19 Conn. 566; Moore d. Central R. 
 Co., 24 N. J. Law. 268; Wyandotte u. 
 White, 13 Kan. 191. Ordinary care 
 is that which the great mass of man- 
 kind, «r ordinarily prudent men, 
 usually exercise in matters affecting 
 their own interests. Wheeler ■». West- 
 port, 30 Wis. 393; Ward s. Milwau 
 kee, &c., R. Co., 29 Wis. 144; Rail 
 road Co. v. Pollard, 33 Wall. 341 
 Stokes ®. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181 
 Reynolds v. Burlington, 53 Vt. 300 
 Strong V. Placerville, &c., R. Co 
 (CaL), 14 Rep. 550. That another 
 method of doing a thing would have 
 been safer does not show negligence. 
 Conway «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 34 
 Mo. App. 235. " To walk within six 
 
 inches of the curbstone of a side- 
 walk is not careless; but to walk as 
 near the edge of a precipice is the act 
 of a madman." Wild ». The Hudson 
 River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430, 434; John- 
 son V. West Chester, &c., R Co., 70 
 Penn. St. 857; Lynch ». Nurdin, by 
 Lord Denham, C. J. , 1 Q. B. 29; 8. c. 4 
 Per. «fc Dav. 673; 5 Jur. 797; Baltimore, 
 &c., R. Co. V- State (Md.), 11 Rep. 160. 
 "Negligence is the absence of care 
 under-the circumstances." Lancaster 
 ». Kissinger (Penn.), 13 Rep. 635; 
 Aurora, &c., R. Co. s. Grimes, 13 111. 
 585. The definition of "ordinary 
 care," which seems to be most in 
 vogue, with immaterial deviations, is 
 that degree of care which persons of 
 ordinary prudence would exercise 
 under similar circumstances. Austin, 
 &c., R. Co. ®. Beatty, 73 Tex. 593; 11 
 S. W. Rep. 358; City of Austin o. 
 Ritz, 72 Tex. 391; 9 8. W. Rep. 884; 
 Atwater v. Town of Veteran, 6 N. Y. 
 Supl. 907; Hoyt ®. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 118 N. Y. 399; 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 565; Needham v. Louisville & 
 N. R. Co., 85 Ky. 428; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 797; Matson v. Maupin, 75 Ala. 313- 
 Watkins v. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. 
 (Mo.), 13 S. W. Rep. 893; Scott v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 N. Y. Supl. 
 
26 
 
 THE GENEEAL RULE. 
 
 [§22. 
 
 ous, is bound to use more than ordinary care, that is to say, 
 it will require greater care under those circumstances to 
 amount in law to ordinary care than it would if the under- 
 taking were less hazardous.' And the measure of diligence 
 required of him is greater or less in the direct ratio of the 
 risk his acts entail upon others. The duty of a plaintiff is 
 to be measured by the same rule .that is applied to a 
 defendant, and just in proportion as the danger increases 
 must the care of the plaintiff be increased, if it is to be held 
 ordinary care under the circumstances. It is clear that 
 what might be entirely prudent in one condition of things 
 would be reckless and grossly negligent in another. 
 
 § 22. Ordinary care nsnally a question of fact.— Ordi- 
 nary care is generally, therefore, a question of fact, and the 
 question is not whether the actor thought his conduct was 
 that of a prudent man, but whether the jury thinks it was.^ 
 
 189; International, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Dyer, 76 Tex. 156; 13 S. W. Rep. 
 377; Riclimond & B. R. Co. v. How.- 
 ard, 79 Ga. 44; 3 S. E. Rep. 426; Pal- 
 lez «. Brooklyn City R. Co., 4 N. Y. 
 Supl. 384.' The care of an " ordinary 
 man," or " ordinary business man." 
 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 77 
 Tex. 179; 13 S. W. Rep: 973; or per- 
 j8on of "average" prudence Marsh 
 V. Benton County, 75 Iowa, 469; 39 
 JS. W. Rep. 713; or of other "well 
 regulated" railroads in a turn-table 
 case. Bridger«. Ashville, &c., R. Co., 
 35 S. C. 34, .have been held objection- 
 able as standards. But the care of 
 prudent, &c., ''railroad men," as ap- 
 plied to a railroad company, was tol- 
 erated in Rost V. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co., 76 Tex. 168; 13 S. W. Rep. 1131. 
 The courts are so jealous of any de- 
 parture from the established definition 
 that an exposition of ordinary care to 
 a, jury as the '■ care of a man of ordi- 
 nary prudence " as " just such care as 
 one of you, similarly employed, would 
 have exercised under the circum- 
 stances," was held to be erroneous. 
 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. ■». Gower, 1 
 Pickle (Tenn.) 465; 3 S. W. Rep, 824. 
 Evidence that the plaintiff was habitu- 
 ally reckless or careless in the particu- 
 lar matter is inadmissible. Brennan 
 V. Friendship, 67 Wis. 333; Chase v. 
 Maine Central R. Co., 77 Me. 63; s. c. 
 53 Am. Rep. 744; Contra, Anglo- 
 American, &c., Co. «. Baier, 30 111. 
 App. 376; Parkinson v. Nashua, t&c, 
 R. Co., 61 N. H. 416. The plaintiff 
 may show that he did as men usually 
 did in like circumstances. Whitsett v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Iowa, 150. 
 
 ' Wilson V. Cunningham, 8 Cal. 
 341; 8. c. 58. Am. Dec. 407; Parvis v. 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. (Del.), 17 
 Atl. Rep. 702; Scott «. Hogan, 73 
 Iowa, 614; 34 N. W. Rep. 444. 
 
 ' Blyth v. Birmingham Water- 
 works Co., 11 Exch. 784; Smiths. 
 London & Southwestern Ry. Co., L. 
 R. 5 C. P. 103; Hays «. Millar, 77 
 Penn. St. 338; and see Gumb v. 
 Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co., 9 N, T. 
 Supl. 316. " Suppose that a defend- 
 ant was allowed to testify that, before 
 acting, he considered carefully what 
 
§ 23.] THE GENERAL RULE. 27 
 
 The law prescribes as a standard of conduct— to which all 
 must conform at their peril — the conduct of an ideal average 
 prudent man,' whose equivalent for practical purposes the 
 jury is generally taken to be, and whose culpability or inno- 
 cence is the supposed test. This is a constant, and his con- 
 duct under given circumstances is theoretically always the 
 same.^ But while ordinary care is primarily a question for 
 the jury, there may be observed in the growth of the law a 
 manifest tendency to reduce the featureless generality that a 
 plaintiff is bound to exercise such care as a prudent man 
 would exercise under the circumstances, which means little 
 or much, and leaves every case without compass or rudder, 
 very largely to the caprice of a jury, to some specific rule or 
 requirement of law, that he is bound to use this or that pre- 
 caution under these or those circumstances. 
 
 § 23. Illustration of this rule.— In the infancy of the 
 law of railroads, for an example, it was the rule that a 
 traveler, upon approaching a point where a railway track 
 crossed a highway upon the same level, must exercise due 
 and ordinary care not to be run over by a passing train of 
 cars, and the question of what was ordinary care went to the 
 jury. Now it is tolerably well settled that under such cir- 
 cumstances a traveler must look up and down the track 
 attentively, and a failure to do this is generally negligence 
 as a matter of law. So the question of ordinary care tends 
 more and more to definiteness and certainty, and the law in 
 this behalf grows more and more concrete by judicial decision 
 and by statute. There is less and less danger that the term 
 will be misapplied or misunderstood. Specific rules for 
 
 would be the conduct of a prudent it was." Holmes' Common Law, p. 
 
 man under the circumstances, and 107. ' 
 
 acted accordingly. If the story was ' The diligena, bonus, siudiosus, pa- 
 believed, it would be conclusive terfwmiKas of the Koman lawyers, 
 against the defendant's negligence ' Holmes' Common Law, 111; 
 judged by a moral standard. But Walsh ». Oregon, &c., R. Co., 10 Ore- 
 supposing any such evidence to have gon, 350; Fassett v. Roxbury, 55 Vt. 
 got before a jury, it is very clear that 552; Martin v. Bishop, 59 Wis. 417; 
 the court would say. Gentlemen, the Hassenger v. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 
 question is not whether the defendant 48 Mich. 205; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 470; 
 thought his conduct was that of a Cronin v. Delevan, 50 Wis. 375; Otis 
 prudent man, but whether you think v. Janesville, 47 Wis. 422. 
 
28 
 
 THE GENERAL BULE. 
 
 [§24. 
 
 specific cases are taking the place of the general rule that 
 one must use ordinary care and prudence ; but whenever no 
 such rules have been laid down, we revert to the original 
 theory and decide the case upon the only remaining rational 
 principle, that ordinary care is to be held to mean that 
 measure of prudence and carefulness that the average prudent 
 man ' might be expected under the circumstances to exercise, 
 allowing the degree of it to vary in proportion to the hazard 
 of the particular enterprise, and referring the ultimate deci- 
 sion to a jury of twelve men.* 
 
 § 24. Proximate cause. — The essence of contributory 
 negligence is, as has been shown, a want of ordinary care on 
 the part of a plaintiff, which is a proximate cause, an occasion 
 
 ■ In Hassinger f. Michigan Central 
 R. Co., 48 Mich. 305 ; s. c. 43 Am. 
 Rep. 470, it was decided by Cooley, 
 J., that while sex can be taken into 
 account as a circumstance in judging 
 negligence, yet it cannot be laid down 
 that a less degree of care is required 
 of a woman than of a man. The rule 
 of reasonable ctire and prudence 
 knows nothing of sex. See, also, Fox 
 e. Glastenbury, 39 Conn. 304. 
 
 " Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell 
 Holmes, Jr., of the Supreme Judicial 
 Court of Massachusetts, in his learned 
 work entitled "The Common Law," 
 says, at page 108: — " The standards of 
 the law are standards of general appli- 
 cation. The law takes no account of 
 the infinite varieties of temperament, 
 intellect and education which make 
 the internal character of a given act 
 so different in different men. It does 
 not attempt to see men as Qod sees 
 them, for more than one suflScient rea- 
 son. In the first place, the impoBsi- 
 bility of nicely measuring a man's 
 powere ^d limitations is far clearer 
 than that of ascertaining his knowl- 
 edge of law, which has been thought 
 to account for what is called the pre- 
 sumption that every man knows the 
 
 law. But a more satisfactory expla- 
 nation is that when men live in society 
 a certain average of conduct, a sacri- 
 fice of individual peculiarities going 
 beyond a certain point is necessary to 
 the general welfare. If, for instance, 
 a man is bom hasty and awkward, is 
 always having accidents and hurting 
 himself or his neighbors, no doubt his 
 congenital defects will be allowed for 
 in the courts of heaven ; but his slips 
 are no less troublesome to his neigh- 
 bors than if they sprang from guilty 
 neglect. His neighbors accordingly 
 require him at his proper peril, to come 
 up to their standard, and the courts 
 which they establish decline to take 
 his personal equation into account. 
 The rule that the law does in general 
 determine liability by blameworthi- 
 ness is subject to the limitation that 
 minute differences of character are not 
 allowed for. The law considers, in 
 other words,- what would be blame- 
 worthy in the average man, the man 
 of ordinary intelligence and prudence, 
 and determines liability by that. If 
 we fall below the level in those gifts 
 it is our misfortune. So much as that 
 we must have at our peril for the rea- 
 sons just given." 
 
§24.] 
 
 THE GENEBAL BULE. 
 
 29 
 
 of the injury. We have considered, in the preceding section, 
 the law affecting ordinary care. It remains to set forth the 
 rnles of law in regard to that lack of ordinary care as a proxi- 
 mate cause of the injury of which the plaintiff complains. 
 The courts declare, and it is a settled rule of law, that, not 
 only must the negligence of one injured by another's culpable 
 neglect contribute to produce the injury, but that, if it is to 
 constitute contributory negligence, it must contribute as a 
 proximate cause, and not as a remote cause or mere con- 
 dition.* 
 
 * Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R. Co., 
 91 Mo. 333 ; 2 8. W. Rep. 315. Tnfl v. 
 Warman, 2 C. B. (N. 8.) 741, where 
 the jury was charged that if the neg- 
 ligence of the plaintiS was in any de- 
 gree the direct or proximate cause of 
 the damage, he was not entitled to re- 
 cover, however great might have been 
 the negligence of the defendant, b. c. 
 5 C. B. (N. 8.) 573 ; Irwin «. 8prlgg, 
 5 Gill (Md.) 200 ; Northern, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Price, 39 K. W. 420 ; Kline v. 
 Central, &c., R Co., 37 CaL 400; 
 ITeedham e. San Francisco, &c., R. 
 Co., 37 Cal. 409. The question of 
 proximate cause is usually for the 
 jury. Atkinsons. Goodrich Transpor- 
 tation Co., ^ Wis. 141. Andwherethe 
 plaintiff had a verdict, notwithstanding 
 his negligence, it was supported on the 
 theory that the jury did not consider 
 such negligence the proximate cause 
 of the accident. Brown e. Central 
 Pac. R Co. (CaL), 13 Pac. Rep. 512. 
 The rule releasing a defendant from 
 responsibility for damages because of 
 the negligence of the plaintiff, is 
 limited to cases where the act or omis- 
 sion of the plaintiff is the proximate 
 cause of the injury. Flynn v. San 
 Francisco, &c., Ry. Co., 40 Cal. 14 ; 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 
 Md. 117; Doggett «. Richmond, &c., 
 R. Co., 78 N. C. 305 ; Shaffer v. Rail- 
 road Co., 105 U. 8. 349 ; Fernandez v. 
 Sacramento, &c., R. Co. 53 CaL 45 ; 
 Meeks «. Southern Pac. R. Co., 56 Cal. 
 513 ; 8. c. 38 Am. Rep. 67. JSo ac- 
 
 tion will lie it the plaiatifi's negligence 
 has been simultaneous in its operation 
 with that of the defendant, of the 
 same kind, immediate, growing out of 
 the same transaction, and not some- 
 thing distinct and independent, of 
 prior date, remotely related to the 
 negligence of the defendant. Isbell 
 ». New York, &c., R. Co., 37 Conn. 
 393, 406 ; The State «. Manchester, 
 &c., R. Co., 52 N. H. 528 ; Gunter v. 
 Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 ; Dudley i. 
 Camden, &c., Ferry Co., 45 N. J. 
 Law, 368 ; Palys c. Erie Ry. Co , 30 
 N. J. Eq. 604; Thirteenth Street 
 Ry. Co. V. Boudrou, 93 Penn. St. 
 475 ; 8. c. 37 Am. Rep. 707 ; Oil City 
 Gas Co. V. Robinson, 99 Penn. St. 1; 
 Drake n. KUey, 93 Penn. St. 493; Ker- 
 whacker ». Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 
 Ohio St. 173; Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss 
 906; Louisville, &c., R Co. v. Wolfe, 
 80 Ky. 83; O'Connor v. North Tmckee 
 Ditch Co., 17 Nev. 346; Towlerc. Bal 
 timore, &c., R. Co., 18 West Va. 579; 
 Thompkins «. Eanawha Board, 31 
 West Va. 324; Harris v. Union Pacific 
 R. Co., 4 McCrary, 454 ; Haff v. Min- 
 neapolis, &c., R. Co., 4 McCrary, 633 ; 
 Crandall a Goodrich Trans. Co., 11' 
 Biss. 516; 8. c. 16 Fed. Rep. 75; 
 Eennard n. Barton, 35 Me. 39 ; 
 a. c. 43 Am. Dec. 349 ; Fent v. Bail- 
 road Co., 59 DL 349 ; 8. c. 14 Am. 
 Rep. 13 ; Grant v. Mosly, 29 Ala. 303 ; 
 Gothard v. Alabama, &c., R. Co., 
 67 Ala 114 ; Dyer s. Talcott. 16 HI. 
 800 ; Weymire a. Wolfe, 53 Iowa, 533 ; 
 
30 
 
 THE GENEBAL RULE. 
 
 [§ 25. 
 
 § 25. The doctrine of proximate cause stated. — This 
 rule is stated over and over in the reports, with almost 
 every possible limitation, and in almost every possible 
 way ; as, for example, that if the negligence of both parties 
 be proximately the cause of the injury, or when the plaint- 
 iffs negligence only is proximate, while tha,t of the defendant 
 is remote, there can be no recovery,' but that when the 
 defendant's negligence is the proximate cause and that of the 
 plaintiff the remote cause, the plaintiff may have his action.* 
 And again, if the negligence of the plaintiff being only a 
 
 Walsh V. Miss. Trans. Co., .52 Mo. 
 434; Whalen «. St. Louis, &c., R. 
 Co., 60 Mo. 323 ; Stepp v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 85 Mo. 239; Byram v. 
 McGuire, 3 Head, 580; Brown «. Chi- 
 cago, '&c., R. Co., 54 Wis. 343; b. c. 41 
 Am. Rep. 41. Nave «. Flack, 90 Ind. 
 205, 211; 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 168, where 
 the court says: — " A contribution to an 
 injury does not preclude a recovery, 
 unless it was a wrongful or negligent 
 contribution. Even a negligent con- 
 tribution does not necessarily bar a 
 recovery. Unless it proximately con- 
 tributes, mere negligence does not 
 defeat a plaintiff's action." Terre 
 Haute, &c., R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 
 346 ; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 38 N. Y. 
 317 ; Gunner v. Second Avenue R. Co., 
 67 N. T. 596 ; Sauter ». New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50 ; Johnson v. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 5 Duer, 27; 
 Button 0. Hudson River R. Co., 
 18 N. Y. 248 ; Austin e. N. J. Steam- 
 ,boat Co., 43 N. Y. 75; Healey v. 
 Dry Dock, &c., R. Co., 46 Super. 
 Ct. Rep. 473; Harvey «. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 19 Hun, 556; Mark v. 
 Hunson, &c., B. Co., 56 How. Pr. 
 108 ; Lannen v. Albany Gas Light 
 Co., 44 N. Y. 459; Cosgrove v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 13 Hun, 329. See, 
 also, 2 Sedgwick on Damages, 348, 
 362; Field on Corporations, 462, 464; 
 Cooley on Torts, 76, and note; Suther- 
 land on Damages, 63; 2 Bishop on 
 Criminal Law, 637, 639; 1 Hales' Pleas 
 
 of the Crown, 428; 1 Hawkins' P. C, 
 93; Mr. Freeman's Note, 55 Am. Dec., 
 668; Thompson, Wharton, and Shear- 
 man & Redfleld, in loco. 
 
 > Irwin ». Sprigg, 6 GiU (Md.), 200; 
 s. c. 46 Am. Dec. 667; Trow «. Ver- 
 mont, &c., R. Co., 24 Vt. 487; Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co., V. Anderson, 31 
 Gratt. 812; Alston v. Herring, 11 
 Exch. 833; Wetherly v. Regent's Ca- 
 nal Co , 12 C. B. (N. 8.) 1; Callahan 
 V. Warne, 40 Mo. 131; Frederick v. 
 Taylor, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 77; Wilds 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 
 430; Stiles •». Geesey, 71 Penn. St. 
 441; Sherman v. Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 
 515; Flower v. Adam, 3 Taunt. 314. 
 (In the head-note of this case it is said 
 that if the proximate cause of the in- 
 jury is the plaintiff's negligence, he 
 cannot recover, although the primary 
 cause was the defendant's negligence.) 
 
 ' If the negligence of the defend- 
 ant be the proximate cause of the 
 injury to the plaintiff, it is of no con- 
 sequence whether it be omission or 
 commission. Harriman ». Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11; 12 N. E. 
 Rep. 451; Pacific R. Co. v. Hants, 
 13 Kan. 328; Walsh «. Miss. Trans. 
 Co., 52 Mo. 434; Whalen «. St. Louis, 
 &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 333; Steele v. 
 Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59; Needham 
 V. San Francisco, &c., R. Co., 37 
 Cal. 417; Nashville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 6 Heisk. 174; Manly e. Wil- 
 mington, &c., R. Co., 74 N. C. 
 
§26.] 
 
 THE GENEBAL RULE. 
 
 81 
 
 remote cause, the defendant might have avoided inflicting 
 the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, the action for 
 damages is maintainable.' In such a case the defendant's 
 negligence is the proximate cause, and he is liable.^ But if, 
 on the contrary, the defendant's negligence being only the 
 remote cause, the plaintiff might have escaped the injury by 
 the exercise of ordinary care, his own negligence is the prox- 
 imate cause, and he can maintain no action.^ 
 
 § 26. Not the sole proximate cause. — The plaintiff's neg- 
 ligence, in order to constitute a defense to the action he 
 brings, need ,not, of course, be the sole proximate cause of 
 the injury, for this excludes the idea of negligence on the 
 part of the defendant, as in any legal sense material. If his 
 negligence is the sole cause of his injury, it is not contribu- 
 tory negligence at all. So the Supreme Court of Iowa 
 declares the rule to be that if the plaintiff's want of ordinary 
 care was in whole or in part a proximate cause of his injury, 
 he cannot recover.* And where the cburt instructs th,e jury 
 
 655; Trow v. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 
 24 Vt. 487; State v. Manchester, &c., 
 R. Co., 53 N. H. 528; Kerwhacker 
 «. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio 
 St. 172. 
 
 ' Tuff T). Warman, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 
 740; Day v. Grossman, 4 Thomp. & 
 Cook (N. T. Super Ct.) 122; Doggett 
 ». Richmond, (fee, R. Co., 78 N. C. 
 305. 
 
 " Schierhold «. North Beach, &c., 
 R. Co., 40 Cal. 447; Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. V. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301; 8. c. 30 
 Am. Rep. 185; McKean o. Burling- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 55 Iowa, 192; Nash- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. «. Carroll. 6 Heisk. 
 347; O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 
 582; People's, &c., R. Co. ■». Green, 
 56 Md. 84; Isbell «. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 27 Conn. 393; Zimmerman 
 V. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 71 Mo. 
 476; Bunting «. Central Pacific R. 
 Co., 16 Nev. 277; Gunter e. Wick- 
 er, 85 N. C. 310; Richmond, .fee, 
 R. Co. ■». Anderson, 31 Gratt. 813; 
 8. c. 31 Am. Rep. 750; Radley v. 
 
 London, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 9 Bxch. 
 71; 8. c. 43 L. J. (Bxch.) 73; 1 App. 
 Cas. 754. 
 
 ° Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 
 60; Wood ». Jones, 36 La. Ann.; 
 Hoehl .«. City of Muscatine, 57 I6wa, 
 444; Macon, &c., R. Co. b. Winn, 19 
 Ga.'440; Walsh ii. Miss. Trans. Co., 
 53 Mo. 434; Gothard i>. Alabama, 
 &c., R. Co., 67 Ala. 114; Dudley 
 «. Camden Ferry Co., 45 N. J. Law, 
 368; Newhouse «. Miller, 35 Ind. 463; 
 Robinson ». Western, &c., R. Co., 48 
 Cal. 409; Hearne v. Southern, &c., 
 R. Co., 50 Cal. 482; Morrissey <e. 
 Perry Co., 43 Mo. 383; Schaabs v. 
 Wheel Co., 56 Mo. 173; Williams «. 
 Clinton, 28 Conn. 266; Artz v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 393, and 
 generally the cases cited iupra. 
 
 * McAunich ®. Mississippi, &c., R. 
 Co., 30 Iowa, 338. So in Muldowney 
 t>. Illinois, &c., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615, it 
 was li^ld that a brakeman who, by 
 the exercise of ordinary care, had the 
 power to regulate the speed of ap- 
 
32 
 
 THE GENERAL EULE. 
 
 [§26. 
 
 that the plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence caused the 
 injury, they should not be left to suppose that such negli- 
 gence, in order to defeat him, must have been the sole cause.^ 
 
 , There must be not only negligence on the part of the plaint- 
 iff, but contributory negligence, a real causal connectibn 
 between the plaintiff's negligent act and the injury, or it is 
 no defense to the action.' So it is said that a plaintiff's neg- 
 ligence must substrnitic/My contribute to produce the injury, 
 in order to, avail the defendant anything,' and also that it 
 must not only concur in the transaction, but also co-operate 
 in producing the injury.* In Sullivan v. Louisville Bridge 
 Co., a leading authority in Kentucky,' it is said to be the rule 
 that the plaintiff's negligence, in order to constitute a de- 
 
 . fense, must have been so far an efficient caiise of the injury, 
 that, without it, the injury would not have happened. So 
 also there is a line of cases to the effect that, when the 
 plaintiff, though negligelit, could not, by the exercise of 
 ordinary care, have escaped the consequence of the defend- 
 ant's negligence, he may recover.' 
 
 preaching cars, could not recover for 
 an accident, of whicli his failure to 
 check the rate of speed was wholly or 
 in part the proximate cause. To the 
 same effect are also North Birming- 
 ham St. E. Co. V- Calderwood, 89 Ala. 
 347; 7 So. Kep. 360; Williams v. 
 Edmunds, 75 Mich. 92; 42 N. "W. 
 534; De^ds v. Chicago, &c , Ry. Co., 
 69 Iowa, 164; Dougherty v. Missouri 
 E. Co., 97 Mo. 647; 11 S. W. Rep. 
 251; McKellar®. Township of Moni- 
 tor, 78 Mich. 485; 44 N. W. Rep. 412. 
 
 ■ McEeller v. Township of Moni- 
 tor, 78 Mich. 485; Deeds v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 69 Iowa, 164; Dougherty 
 V. Missouri R. Co., 97 Mo. 647. 
 
 ' Wharton on Negligence, chap. 
 Ill, and §§ 323-333; Ohio & M. Ry. 
 Co. V. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443; 17 N. E. 
 Rep. 297; Savage v. Corn Exchange 
 Insurance Co., 36 N. Y. 655; Norris 
 V. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 371. As is 
 said in Silliman v. Lewis, 49 N. Y. 
 379, 383:-:" It is not enougi that the 
 plaintiffs have been negligent and an 
 
 injury has occurred; but the plaint- 
 iffs' neglect must be the proximate 
 cause, to some extent, at least, of the 
 injury; in other words, their negli- 
 gence must have contributed to it." 
 Glenn b. ColumTjia, &c., E. Co., 21 S. 
 C. 466; Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 403; 
 Morrison v. Gen. Steam Nav. Co., 8 
 Exch. 733; Shearman & Eedfleld on 
 Negligence, § 93. 
 
 ' Montgomery Gas-Light Co. v. 
 Montgomery & E. Ey. Co., 86 Ala. 
 372; 5 So. Rep. 735; Daley v. Nor- 
 wich, (fee, R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; 
 West v. Martin, 31 Mo. 375; New Ha- 
 ven Steamboat Co. ®. Vanderbilt, 16 
 Conn. 420. See, also, Grippen v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 40 N. Y. 34. 
 
 * Carroll ». New Haven, &c., R. 
 Co., 1 Duer, 571; Colegrove v. New 
 Haven, &c., R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492. 
 
 ' 9 Bush, 81. 
 
 " Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470, 
 10 S. W. Rep. 288; Village of Orleans 
 1). Perry (Neb.), 40 N. W. Rep. 
 417; Radley v. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
^ 28.] THE GENERAL EULE. 33 
 
 § 37. Illustration of this rule.— The influence of Davies 
 T. Mann. — This is a correct rule, but, jn the judgment of the 
 author, it is a dangerous way of expressing it. Lord Ma- 
 caulay said of his style, when some one complimented him 
 about it, that it came very near to being a very bad style ; 
 and so the courts, when they fall into this category, come 
 very near to a wrong statement of the rule. There is but a 
 single step from such a rule as this, expressed in this way, 
 to the heresy in Davies v. Mann,^ which ignores entirely the 
 negligence of the plaintiff, and makes an end of the whole 
 theory upon which the law of contributory negligence rests. 
 If the rule, as these oases put it, means that whenever the 
 plaintiff's negligence is the proximate or a proximate cause 
 of the injury he suffers, he cannot recover, and whenever it 
 is not, that he may recover, it is a sound rule. But if it 
 means anything less than this, it is unsound. It seems to 
 me that nothing is gained by these various round about 
 statements of the rule. The attempts of the judges to ring 
 a new change, or to find some novel and original phrase in 
 which to express the rule, that, whenever the negligence of a 
 plaintiff proximately contributes to cause the injury for 
 which he seeks to recover damages, he has no cause of 
 action, has thrown the law into confusion. 
 
 § 28. The rule in Davies t. Mann. — Davies v. Mann* has 
 contributed more than the full share of any one decision to 
 this end. It may be cited as authority for any onejror all, 
 
 L. R. 9 Ezch. 71; s. c. 43 L. J. the former, an action will lie. Rich- 
 
 (Exch.) 73; 1 App. Cas. 754; Tuff v. mond & D. R. Co. v. Howard, 79 
 
 Wai-man, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573; Ken- Ga. 44; 3 S. E. Rep. 426. And Code 
 
 nard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39; s. c. 43 Ga. § 2972 makes a defendant liable 
 
 Am. Dec. 349; Cummins v. Presley, under circumstances stated in the 
 
 4Harr. (Del.) 315; Scott ». Dublin, text. But Georgia has a tendency to- 
 
 4c., Ry. Co., 11 Ir. Com. Law (N. ward the rule of comparative negli- 
 
 S.) 377. In Northern Central Ry. gence (m/ra, § 88), and the foregoing 
 
 Co. V. Geis, 31 Md. 357, the rule is provision was held to be inapplicable 
 
 laid down that where the party in- where plaintiff claims full damages, 
 
 flictlng the injury, by proper care, and not as in case of contributory 
 
 might have avoided the consequences negligence. Pierce e. Atlanta Cotton 
 
 of the negligence of the party in- Mills, 79 Ga. 782; 4 8. E. Rep. 381. 
 
 jured, or where the latter could not, ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 by a proper degree of caution, avoid ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 the consequences of the negligence of 
 
 3 
 
34 THE GENERAL BULE. [§ 29. 
 
 of the four following propositions : 1. When the plaintiff's- 
 negligence is only a remote cause of the injury he sustains^ 
 it is not contributory negligence and he may recover. 2. 
 Contributory negligence is no bar to an action for a wilful 
 injury. 3. The negligence of the plaintiff and defendant- 
 .should be compared, and the one most in fault should b& 
 held solely responsible. 4. The defen,dant is on trial, not th& 
 plaintiff,* and if he is in fault, he is liable without regard to 
 any contributory negligence of the plaintiff, which is not a 
 material element in the case. The first two of these propo- 
 sitions are unquestionably sound rules of law, and it is be- 
 lieved that they will cover exactly every case in which a cor- 
 rect conclusion has been reached under the rille as declared 
 in Davies v. Mann.* 
 
 § 29. The inflaence of Davies t. Mann on the New Fork 
 courts- — This is well illustrated by a consideration of the 
 cases in the New Torlj: reports that assume to follow it, and 
 in which it is cited with approval. It was decided in the 
 Court of Exchequer in 1842, but the first appearance in New 
 York of the doctrine it announces seems to have been in 
 1855, in the case of Johnson v. Hudsbn Eiver E. Co.,' where 
 it is spoken of as " somewhat novel," but " highly reason- 
 able." The language of the court, after citing Davies v, 
 Mann, is : — " The defendant is not shielded from a recovery 
 notwithstanding contributory negligence on the part of the 
 plaintiff is proved when it appears that, but for his own sub- 
 sequent negligence, the accident would never have occurred, 
 that is ivhen it appears that his own negligence was its sole proximate 
 cause." This is assumed in the opinion to be the doctrine in 
 Davies v. Mann. Again in Button v. Hudson Eiver E. 
 Co.,* decided in 1858, the rule in Davies v. Mann,® is laid 
 down without qualification, in ipsissimis verbis, and Mr. Justice 
 
 ' Washburn v. Tracy, 3 D. Chip- the rule of law involved, and for the 
 
 man (Vt.) 138 ; s. c. IS Am. Dec. defendant, Skinner, Ch. J., saw the 
 
 66|, an old case where, in the first error of the lower court, and made the 
 
 instance, the charge to the jury was plaintiff's negligence -figure as a lever 
 
 such that the fate of the defendant in the case, 
 
 was made to depend entirely on the ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 amount of care- exercised by him. ' 5 Duer, 37. 
 
 The plaintiff's conduct was completely *18N. Y. 348. 
 
 ignored. Fortunately, however, for » 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
§ 30.] THE GENEBAL BULE. 35' 
 
 Harris, in stating the rule of remote cause, expressly affirms 
 it to be the equivalent of the rule as declared in the English 
 authority upon which he relies. He says, in concluding his 
 opinion, — " Where the negligence of the defendant is proxi- 
 mate and that of the plaintiff remote, the action may be sus- 
 tained. The question then is whether, it being conceded that 
 the plaintiff was not without fault, the defendant might by 
 the exercise of reasonable care and prudence at the time of 
 the , injury have avoided it."* In another line of cases in 
 New York, Davies v. Mann is cited as authority for the second 
 of our propositions, viz. : that contributory negligence is no 
 bar to an action for wilful injury. In Kenyon v. New York, 
 &c., E. Co.,' after citing Davies v. Mann, and laying down the 
 doctrine of that case broadly, the court says : — " Neglect on 
 the part of the person in charge of the engine to use ordinary 
 care to avoid injuring a person on the track is in contem- 
 plation of law equivalent to intentional mischief, and in 
 Green v. Erie Ky. Co.,' Davies v. Mann is cited as a control- 
 ling authority, and the rule therein is assumed to be equiva- 
 lent to the proposition that wilful neglect is not to be excused 
 by contributory negligence. We think it was a proper ques- 
 tion for the jury," says the Supreme Court in this case, 
 " whether the defendant was not guilty of such gross negli- 
 gence as was equivalent to intentional mischief." * 
 
 § 30. The inflaence of Davies t. Mann in other States. — 
 To this extent there is no objection to the doctrine in Davies 
 V. Mann. So far as it teaches the principle that remote 
 causes are not to be regarded, that only when the plaintiff's 
 
 ' See, also, the following later cases ' 5 Hun, 479. 
 in New York, in which Davies v. ' 11 Hun, 333. 
 Mann is cited as sustaining the doc- * See, also, to the same effect. Wilds 
 
 trine that the remote negligence of a v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 Barb, 
 
 plaintiff is not contributory negli- 503 ; s. c. 34 N. Y. 430, and 39 N. Y. 
 
 gence. Austin v. New Jersey Steam- 315 ; Grippen v. New York, &c., R. 
 
 boat Co., 43 N. Y. 75; Cosgrove e. Co., 40 N. Y. 34, and an essay by 
 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 13 Hun, 839; Edward E. Sprague, Esq., of New 
 
 Healey v. Dry Dock, <fcc., R. Co., York, " Contributory Negligence and 
 
 46 Super. Ct. Rep. 473; also, Steves the Burden of Proof," in Vol. VI of 
 
 e. Oswego, &c., R. Co., 18 N. Y. the Proceedings of the New York 
 
 433; Gorton «. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N. State Bar Association, for 1883, page ^ 
 
 Y. 660. 197. 
 
'36 THE GENERAL RULE. [§ 31. 
 
 negligence is a proximate cause will it bar his action, and 
 that contributory negligence is no delense to an action for 
 wilful negligence, it is a sound authority. But it does not 
 end there. It is equally an authority for the doctrine of com- 
 parative negligence, short of which there is no place to stop 
 if we frankly accept the rule to its full extent. In the earlier 
 cases in Illinois and other States wheie the doctrine of com- 
 parative negligence obtains, there is no trace of that doc- 
 trine,^ and it seems clear that it originated in an attempt to 
 adopt and apply the rule in Davies v. Mann.* In those juris- 
 dictions where comparative negligence is not the rule the 
 influence of this case has been to confuse the law and' under- 
 mine the sound principles upon which it should be based. Its 
 apparent resemblance to the two sound principles which 
 have been referred to, and. the rather ingenious, but really 
 clumsy way in which the fallacy is concealed, have enabled 
 it to pass current ; but until the falseness of its reasoning 
 and statement are recognized and its authority is dis- 
 tinctly repudiated, the doctrine of contributory negligence is 
 in peril. 
 
 § 31. What is a proximate canse ?— To return from this 
 excursus on Davies v. Mann, let us consider the definitions 
 the reported cases and the text writers propose for the term 
 "proximate cause." The plaintiff's want of ordinary care 
 must, we have seen, be a proximate cause of his injury or it 
 will not be contributory negligence. What then precisely is 
 a proximate cause ? It is a general rule of law that a man is 
 responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his 
 acts, and for these consequences only so far as they are 
 natural and proximate, and such as may on this account be 
 foreseen by ordinary forecast or, as it is sometimes expressed, 
 a man is presumed to intend the natural and probable con- 
 sequences of his acts. An act' is the proximate cause of an 
 event when in the natural order of things, and under the cir- 
 
 ' Aurora, &c., R. Co. v. Grimes, conduct has not concurred In pro- 
 
 13 IIJ. 585 ; where the broad rule is ducing the injury. Macon, &c., R. 
 
 laid down that where a party seeks to Co. v. Davies, 18 Ga. 679 ; Union 
 
 recover damages for a loss caused by Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 
 
 negligence or misconduct, he must 167. 
 
 show that his own negligence or mis- " Thompson on Negligence, 1165. 
 
§ 32.] THE GENEEAL RULE. 37 
 
 cumstances, it would necessarily produce that event, when it 
 is the first and direct power producing the result, the cansa 
 causans of the schoolmen. " If the wrong and the resulting 
 damages are not known by common experience to be usually 
 and naturally in sequence and the damage does not, accord- 
 ing to the ordinary course of events, follow from the wrong, 
 then the wrong and the damage are not sufficiently con- 
 joined or concatenated, as cause and effect, to support an 
 action," says Judge Cooley.^ That is to say, for remote 
 or secondary causes, men are not legally responsible.^ From 
 the nature of the matter there can be no fixed and immediate 
 rule upon this subject that can be applied to all cases — 
 much must depend upon circumstances, and what is, or what 
 is not, a proximate cause will very often have to be deter- 
 mined upon considerations of sound judgment and enlight- 
 ened common sense ^ without the aid of any certain rule or 
 infallible precedent. 
 
 § 32. The same snbject continued.— Says Judge Ag- 
 ue w, in Fairbanks v. ■ Kerr : ^ — " Many cases illustrate, but 
 none define what is an immediate, or what is a 
 remote cause. Indeed such a cause seems to be in- 
 capable of any strict definition which will suit every 
 
 case." "We are not to link together as 
 
 cause and effect events having no probable connection in the 
 mind, and which could not, by prudent circumspection and 
 ordinary thoughtfulness, be foreseen as likely to happen in 
 consequence of the act in which we are engaged. It may be 
 true that the injury would not have occurred without the 
 concurrence of our act with the event which immediately 
 caused the injury, but we are not justly called to suffer for it, 
 unless the other event was the effect of our act, or was with- 
 in the probable range of ordinary circumspection when en- 
 
 ' Cooley on Torts, 69. and shall concur to produce the con- 
 
 " Ccmm proxima rum remota spec- sequence, or may be traced in those 
 
 taiur. causes. To a sound judgment must be 
 
 ' "Such nearness in the order of hft each particular case." Harrison 
 
 events, and closeness in the relation of v. Berkley, 1 Strobh. Law (S. C.) 
 
 cause and effect, must subsist, that 525 ; s. c. 47 Am. Dec. 578. 
 
 the influence of the injurious act may * 70 Penn. St. 86 ; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 
 
 predominate over that of other causes, 664. 
 
38 
 
 THE GENERAL BULE. 
 
 [§32. 
 
 gaged in the act." For the practical purposes of this treatise 
 nothing can probably be gained by any further consideration 
 of this vexed metaphysical question. All the learning of the 
 speculatire philosophers from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill 
 has not availed to reduce it even to tolerable certainty. 
 Jjord Bacon in his Maxims '■ paraphrases the Latin rule,* as 
 follows : — " It were infinite for the law to consider the causes 
 of causes and their impulsions one of another, therefore it 
 contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of 
 acts by that without looking for any further degree." He 
 then proceeds to illustrate the meaning of the rule by cita- 
 tions of familiar cases from the Teaf Books, avoiding any 
 philosophical discussion of it, and not attempting a defini- 
 tion. I accordingly shall content myself with citing several 
 cases where the distinction between proximate and remote 
 causes is aptly illustrated, qtms vide.^ 
 
 ' Reg. 1. 
 
 ' "In jure non remota causa sed 
 proxima gpeeUtl/ur." 
 
 ' The Lords Bailiff- Jurats of Rom- 
 ney Marsh v. The Corporation of the 
 Trinity House, L. R. 5 Exch. 204; b. c. 
 L. R. 7 Exch. 347: Salisbury v. Her- 
 chenroder, 106 Mass. 458; s. c. 8 Am 
 Rep. 354; Burrows v. Marsh Gas & 
 Coke Co., L. R. 5 Exch. 67; s. c. L. 
 R. 7 Exch. 96 ; Welch v. Wesson, 6 
 Gray, 505; Metallic Compression 
 Casting Co. v. Eitchburg R. Co., 
 109 Mass. 277; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 
 689. (These five cases are selected 
 by Judge Thompson and printed in 
 full in fiis collection of leading 
 cases on Negligence, page 1063, 
 et seq.}; Collins v. Middle Levee 
 Commissioners, L. R. 4 C. P. 279; 
 s. c. 38 L. J. (C. P.) 236; 20 L. 
 T. (N. S.) 442. Defendant's act, 
 charged to be negligent, may be 
 deemed the proximate cause of the in- 
 jury complained of if the injury might 
 reasonably be expected to result. It 
 is not enough to show merely that the 
 injury was the natural consequence of 
 the act. Atkinson v. Goodrich Trans- 
 
 portation Co., 60 Wis. 141; Cleland 
 v. Thornton, 43 Cal. 439; Lawrence 
 T. Jenkins, L. R. 3 Q. B. 274; 8. c. 42 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 147. Even though two 
 causes of an accident exist, without 
 both o( which the accident would not 
 have occurred, and both are due to 
 negligence, one party guilty of negli- 
 gence cannot render the excuse that 
 he is not liable to plaintiff for dam- 
 ages caused thereby because a third 
 party was also in fault. Township of 
 Burrell v. Uncapher, 117 Penn. St. 
 358; 11 Atl. Rep. 619; Ball's Leading 
 Cases, 238 ; Holland's Jurisprudence, 
 130. Although the negligence of the 
 latter may have been nearest in point 
 of time to the injury. Township of 
 Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Penn. St. 24; 
 34 W. K. C. 320; 17 Atl. Rep. 
 349; Rompillon v. Abbott, 1 N. T. 
 Supl. 663; PhilUps v. De Wald, 79 
 Ga. 732; 7 S. E. Rep. 151; Gilman ». 
 European, &c., R. Co., 60 Me. 235; 
 Carter v. Towne, 109 Mass. 507 ; 
 Mott V. Hudson River R. Co., 34 N. 
 T. Supr. Ct. 685. 
 
 Defective Highways. — Village of 
 Carterville v. Cook, 139 111. 153; 32 
 
§ 33.] 
 
 THE GENEEAL BULE. 
 
 39 
 
 § 3:i. Distinction between causal connection and a plaint- 
 iiTs negligence.— The distinction between the negligence of 
 
 N. E. Rep 14; Galveston v. Posnains- 
 ky, 62 Tex. 118 ; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 517; De Camp ». Sioux City, 74 Iowa, 
 393; 37 N. W. Rep. 971; West Maha- 
 noy V. Watson, 113 Pa. St. 574 ; s. c. 
 56 Am. Rep. 836; Aldrich v. Gorham, 
 77 Me. 387; Campbell v. StUlwater, 
 33 Minn. 308; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 567; Beall ®. Township of Athens 
 (Mich.), 45 N. W. Rep. 1014; Mahog- 
 any V. Ward (B. I.), 17 Atl. Rep. 860; 
 Chartiers Tp. v. Phillips, 133 Penn. 
 St. 601; 16 Atl. Rep. 36. 
 
 Obatrueiion of Crossing by Cars. — 
 Andrews v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. 
 Co., 77 Iowa, 669; 43 N.W. Rep. 513; 
 Selleck v. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 
 58 Mich. 195; Brown v. Wabash, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 20 Mo. App. 322 ; Jackson v. 
 Nashville, &c., Ry. Co. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 
 491 ; B. c. 49 Am. Rep. 663. 
 
 Runaway Horse — Breaking of Beins. 
 — ^Putman v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 47 Hmi, 439; Oglesby v. Smith, 38 
 Mo. App. 67. Ala. Code, 8^ 2641, 
 gives a right of action to the personal 
 representative of one whose death was 
 "caused by the wrongful act or omis- 
 sion of another." It was held, that 
 the administratrix of one who died 
 immediately after drinking liquor 
 sold him by one knowing his intem- 
 perate habits, could not maintain an 
 action against the liquor seller, be- 
 cause the sale was not the immediate 
 cause of the death, and because the 
 contributory negligence of the de- 
 ceased would constitute a defense. 
 King V. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505; Hine v. 
 Cushing, 6N.T. Supl. 850; 53 Hun. 519. 
 "If a candidate for parliamentary 
 honors makes a stump oration in- 
 veighing against his opponents gene- 
 rally, and waves his hat into the bar- 
 gain, that is not a proximate cause of 
 one of those opponents getting his 
 windows or his head broken." Shir- 
 
 ley's Leading Cases, 360. King v. 
 Ohio, &c., Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 799 ; 
 Louisville & N. R. Co v. Kelsey, 89 
 Ala. 387; 7 So. Rep. 648; White v. 
 Conly, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 51; s. c. 53 
 Am. Rep. 154. Where a conductor 
 forced a. boy ofl the rear of a street 
 car and he ran under the wheels of a 
 car going in the opposite direction, it 
 was held, in Mack i>. Lombard, &c., 
 R. Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 305 ; 18 
 Wash. Law Rep. 84, that the conduc- 
 tor's act was not the proximate cause 
 of the injury, but in McCann v. Sixth 
 Ave. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 505; 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 164, that point seems to have 
 been ignored, and the questions of 
 negligence and contributory negli- 
 gence were left tp the jury. Renner 
 V. Canfleld, 36 Minn. 90; 30 N. W. 
 Rep. 435; Pawcett «. Pittsburg, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 34 W. Va. 755. A. sued B. 
 for burns received in rescuing a horse 
 from a fire which B.'s negligence 
 caused. It was held that he could 
 not recover. Cook v. Johnston, 58 
 Mich. 437; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 703. 
 Mars V. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 8 
 N. Y. Supl. 107; 54 Hun, 635; Ala- 
 bama, &c., R. Co. ®. Chapman, 80 
 Ala. 615; 3 So. Rep. 738: Fox®. Bor- 
 key, 136 Pa. St. 164; 34 W. N. C. 49; 
 17 Atl. Rep. 604. By reason of a de- 
 fective ladder a workman fell and 
 struck another workman. In an ac- 
 tion by the latter against the inaster 
 it was held that the defective ladder 
 was the direct cause of the injury. 
 Ryan v. Miller, 13 Daly (N. Y.)77. 
 A brakeman caught his foot in a 
 tie, and an engine, defective in that it 
 could not be quickly stopped, ran over 
 the foot. It was left for the' jury to 
 say whether the catching the foot or 
 the defect in the engine was the cause 
 of the injury. Bajus v. Syracuse, &c., 
 R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 153. Knapp 
 
40 
 
 THE GENERAL EULE. 
 
 [§ 33. 
 
 a plaintiff, and the causal connection between such negligence 
 and the injury of which he complains must not be overlooked. 
 
 ' ®. Sioux "City, &c., Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 
 91; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 569, note; 
 Crowley v. Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 
 65 Iowa, 658; Omslaer®. Philadelphia 
 Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 354; Loweiy v. 
 Manhattan Ry. Co., 99 N. Y. 158; s. c. 
 52 Am. Rep. 12. Evidence that the 
 proximate cause of the injuries was 
 the wrongful interference of a third 
 person, is admissible, , though such 
 third person was an infant under the 
 age of discretion. Otten v. Cohen, 1 
 N. Y. Supl. 430. Lehman v. Brook- 
 lyn City R. Co., 47 Hun, 355; Swee. 
 ney v. New York Steam Co., 6 N. Y. 
 Supl. 528; Wright v. Chicago, Sic., 
 Ry. Co., 27 111. App.. 200; South- 
 Side Passenger Ry. Co. v. Trich, 117 
 Penn. St. 390; 11 Atl. Rep. 627; Co- 
 sulich V. Standard; Oil Co., 55 N. Y. 
 
 ' Super. Ct. 384; Spaulding ®. Town of 
 Sherman, 75 Wis. 77; 48 N. W. Rep. 
 558; Lewis «. Flint, &c., Ry. Co., 54 
 Mich. 55, which contains an exhaust- 
 ive discussion by Judge Cooley of the 
 question of proximate cause. George 
 «. Smith, 6 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 273; 
 Texas, &c., R. Co. v. Anderson (Sup. 
 Ct. Texas), 4 Texas L. Rev. 211; 
 Brooks 9. Boston, 19 Pick. 174. 
 
 The Squib Oase.—BcoU i). Shepherd, 
 2 Wm. Black. 892, is an interesting 
 one. Here A., the defendant, threw a 
 lighted squib into a market house. 
 The said squib falling on the stand of 
 B., C, his neighbor, picked it up and 
 threw it across the said market 
 place, where it fell on the stand of 
 D., who, in order to save his wares, 
 cast it away, and accidentally struck 
 with it the plaintiff, putting out one 
 of his eyes. While Blackstone, J., ar- 
 gued that the injury was not a direct 
 consequence of the defendant's act, 
 since two independent agencies — C. 
 and D. — had given the squib very dif- 
 ferent impulses from the one which 
 
 first impelled it, yet the majority of 
 the court held that the action was main- 
 tainable. In throwing the squib, the 
 defendant intended wanton mischief, 
 and Whatever mischief followed, he 
 was the author of it; the intervention 
 of C. and D. was not that of free 
 agents, since they acted under a com- 
 pulsive necessity for their own safety. 
 The injury, therefore, could only be 
 regarded as the direct and immediate 
 act of the defendant. Bellefontaine, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Snyder, 18 Ohio 
 St. 399; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Penn. 
 St. 436; Greenland «. Chaplin, 5 
 Exch. 243; Harrison ». Berkley, 1 
 Strobh. Laws (S. C.) 549; s. c. 47 
 Am. Dec. 578; Page •». Bucksport, 
 64 Me. 51; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 239,- 
 Thomas «. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; 
 s. c. 57 Am. Dec. 455, and note; Mil- 
 waukee, &c., R. Co. ■». Kellogg, 94 
 U. S. 469; Ehrgott v. The Mayor, 
 &c., 96 N. Y. 264; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 622; Heney v- Dennis, 93 Ind. 452; 
 B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 378, and the note. 
 Where a fire has spread beyond its 
 natural limits by means of a new 
 agency — ^if , for example, after its ig- 
 nition, a high wind should arise, and 
 carry burning brands to a great dis- 
 tance, by which a Are is caused in a 
 place that would have been safe but 
 for the wind — such a loss might fairly 
 be set down as a remote consequence, 
 for such a loss could not be reasonably 
 anticipated from the careless setting 
 of the first fire, taking all the con- 
 comitant circumstances at the time 
 imder consideration. Fent v. Toledo, 
 &c., R. Co., 59 111. 349; B. c. 14 Am. 
 Rep. 13; Beauchamp v. Saginaw Min- 
 ing Co., 50 Mich. 163; s. c. 45 Am. 
 Rep. 80; Heni-y v. St: Louis, &c., E. 
 Co., 76 Mo. 288; b. c. 43 Am. 
 Rep. See, likewise, Read v. Nich- 
 ols, 118 N. Y. 224; 23 N. E. Rep- 
 
§ 33.] 
 
 THE GENERAL RULE. 
 
 41 
 
 It is plain that negligence is one thing, and causal connection 
 an essentially different thing. In order to avail the defendant 
 
 468, -where the. Are apparatus was 
 defective and the wind changed; and 
 Haverly v. State Line, &o., E. Co., 135 
 Penn. St. 50; 19 Atl. Rep. 1013; 26 
 "W. N. C. 321, where the fire was sup- 
 posed to have been put out and a wind 
 arose, and the question was left to the 
 jury. In Brown e. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 54 Wis. 342; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 41 and note, a pregnant woman 
 was carelessly directed by a brakeman 
 to leave the train at a point three 
 mUes short of her station, and she 
 walked to her destination. This walk 
 brought on miscarriage and death, 
 and it was held that for these con- 
 sequences the carrier was responsible. 
 In East Tennessee, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Lockhart, 79 Ala. 315, a girl of eight 
 was compelled to walk a mile over a 
 rough road, and recovered damages 
 for sickness. But see contra, Corrister 
 V. Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 25 Mo. 
 App. 619, where defendant was held 
 not liable for damages resulting from 
 exposure of plaintiff who, being un- 
 lawfully put off a train thirty miles 
 from his destination late in the after- 
 noon, and without money, walked on 
 all night in the rain. See, also, Texas, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Cole, 66 Tex. 563, 1 8. 
 W. Rep. 629; Hadley «. Baxendale, 
 9 Exch. 341; s. c. 23 L. J. (Exch.) 
 179; Drake ®. Kiely, 93 Penn.' St. 492. 
 In Scheffer ». Railroad Co., 105 
 U. S. 249, the facts were that, by 
 reason of a collision of railway trains, 
 a passenger was injured, and becom- 
 ing thereby disordered in mind and 
 body, he some eight months there- 
 after committed suicide. Held, that 
 his own act was the proximate cause 
 of his death. The court said: — "The 
 argument is not sound which seeks to 
 trace this immediate cause of the 
 death through the previous stages of 
 mental aberration, physical suffering. 
 
 and eight months' disease to the 
 original accident on the railroad. 
 Such a course of possible or even 
 logical argument would lead back to 
 that 'great first cause least under- 
 stood,' in which the train of all 
 causation ends." Compare, however, 
 Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. v. Buck, 96 
 Ind. 346; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 168, 
 where it is held that when an injury 
 to a passenger, caused by the negli- 
 gence of the carrier, is such as to 
 render the system of the injured man 
 liable to take on disease and to make 
 it less liable to resist its inroads, and 
 death results, the death is, in legal 
 contemplation, attributable to the 
 negligence of the carrier, which, in 
 other words, must be considered a 
 proximate cause. Murdock v. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 138 Mass. 15 ; Penn. R. 
 Co. V. Kerr, 62 Penn St. 353; s. c. 1 
 Am. Rep. 431; Penn. R. Co. •». Hope, 
 80 Penn. St. 378; B. c. 21 Am. Rep. 100. 
 Pleoiding. — The complaint in an 
 action founded on negligence must 
 state facts showing that the negligence 
 was the proximate cause of the injury 
 for which damages are sought. Pitts- 
 burgh, &c., Ry. Co., 104 Ind. 64. Oth- 
 erwise it is demurrable. Kistner «. 
 Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 210. Where 
 the petition, after setting forth the 
 acts and omissions constituting negli- 
 gence, alleged "that inconsequence 
 of the aforesaid wrongful acts, neg- 
 lect and default of defendants, and 
 without fault on his part, the said 
 W. . . . fell into and through 
 the hatchway,'" etc., it was held that 
 the negligence was sufficiently alleged 
 as a proximate cause of the injury, 
 Schultz V. Moon, 33 Mo. App. 329. See, 
 generally, on proximate and remote 
 cause, 3 Sutherland on Damages, 714, 
 715; Cooley on Torts, 69: Wharton on 
 Negligence, g§ 134, 138; Addison on 
 
42 
 
 THE GENEEAL BULE. 
 
 [§34. 
 
 anything there must be on the part of the plaintiff, not only 
 negligence in the juridical sense, but contributory negligence, 
 and in order to be contributory, as the law understands that 
 limitation, there must be, as we have seen, a true proximate 
 causal connection between the negligence and the injury. 
 Collateral negligence, by which is meant such negligence as is 
 neither a cause nor a condition of the injury, is not material,' 
 neither is remote negligence, which is described as a condi- 
 tion and not a cause of the catastrophe, nor are even collat- 
 eral violations of law, if they do not legally contribute to the 
 injury, a defense.' 
 
 § 34. Connection of the plaintiff's negligeoce with his 
 iiljnry. — What the causal connection between the plaintiff's 
 negligence and his injury must be, if it is to amount to a defense 
 to his action, has been precisely defined by the courts. His 
 negligence need not be the sole proximate cause of the injury 
 on the one hand,' nor is he required to be wholly free even from 
 slight negligence on the other hand.* Those cases which 
 
 Torts (3d ed. ), 5; Shearman & Redfield 
 on Negligence, § 94. 
 
 ' Penn. R. Co. e. Righter, 42 N. J. 
 Law, 180 ; Hayes s. 43d St. R. Co., 
 14 N. T. Week. Dig. 28; Gray s. 
 Scott, 66 Penn St. 345, where, a car 
 was negligently pushed over the end 
 of a track and kill6d a boy playing in 
 the passage. This boy had been fre- 
 quently warned not to be in the 
 passage on accouht of danger from 
 trucks and wheelbarrows. Hence, 
 as he had no reason to expect harm 
 from cars, his not heeding the warning 
 was held to be no contributory negli- 
 gence to the injury. 
 
 ' Steele «. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59 ; 
 s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 191, and note; Welch 
 V. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505. Thus, where 
 a plaintiff was injured by reason of a 
 defective way, he was allowed to re- 
 cover, though he was driving at a 
 rate which was a violation of a city 
 ordinance. Baker b. Portland, 58 
 Me. 199; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 374; Nea- 
 now e. Ullech, 46 Wis. 581. 
 
 ' Radley v. London, &c., R. t!o., L. 
 R. 9 Exch. 91 ; s. c. 43 L. J. (Exch.) 
 73; McAimich n. Miss.,&p., R. Co., 
 30 Iowa, 338; Muldowney n. Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615; North Bir- 
 mingham St. R. Co. V. Calderwood 
 (Ala. ), 7 So. Rep. 360 ; Williams ». 
 Edmunds, 75 Mich. 92; 42 N. W. Rep. 
 534; and the jury should be so 'in- 
 structed. Deeds e. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 69 Iowa, 164; Dougherty ». 
 Missouri R. Co., 97 Mo. 647; 11 S. W. 
 Rep. 251 ; McKeller v. Township of 
 Monitor, 78 Mich. 485; 44 N. W. Rep. 
 412. 
 
 * Bridge r>. Grand Junction Ry. Co., 
 3 Mee. & W. 244; Cremer v. Portland, 
 36 Wis. 93; Hammond b. Mukwa, 40 
 Wis. 35; Baltimore, <&c.,R. Co.s. Pitz- 
 patrick, 35 Md. 32; Houston, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Gorbete, 49 Tex. 573; 
 Kerwhacker «. Cleveland, &c., R. 
 Co., 3 Ohio St. 172; Manly v. Wil- 
 mington, &c., R. Co., 74 N. C. 
 655. 
 
§ 34.] 
 
 THE GENERAL KULE. 
 
 43 
 
 hold that the plaintiff must be entirely free from negligence, 
 and that the injury must be wholly due to the defendant's 
 negligence/ have not been generally followed. It is not, 
 however, sufficient that the plaintiff's negligence should have 
 contributed merely to aggravation of the injury without hav- 
 ing contributed to the happening of the accident.' The true 
 rule is, that if the negligence of the plaintiff contributed in 
 any degree to cause or occasion the accident, there can be no 
 recovery. The law refuses to apportion damages in such a 
 case or to weigh the wrong of one party over against the 
 fault of the other, and thus strike a book-keeper's balance, 
 and accordingly, when the plaintiff's negligence is in any de- 
 gree, however small, contributory to the injury he has no 
 remedy.^ This is of the very essence of the law of contribu- 
 
 'Phila., &c., R. Co. «. Boyer, 
 97 Penn. St. 91 ; New Jersey Express 
 Co. 11. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434 (but 
 see Bunyon s. Central K. Co., 35 N. J. 
 Law, 556, aud Telfer v. Northern R. 
 Co., 30 N. J. Law, 188); Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co. ■B. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; Wilds 
 ■B. Hudson River R. Co., 34 N. Y. 
 430; Griffenc. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 ' 40 N. Y. 34; Vanderplank v. Miller, 
 Moody ifc M. 169. 
 
 ' If plaintiff's negligence aggravated 
 the injury, without tending to cause 
 it, it would not bar a recovery, but 
 defendant would be liable only for 
 such damages as its negligence pro- 
 duced. City of Gpsheh v. England, 
 119 Ind. 368 ; 31 N. E. Rep. 977. 
 Even assuming that there could be no 
 recovery for the death of a child 
 caused by negligent treatment after the 
 accident, the claim for the original 
 injury would not be affected. City of 
 Bradford v. Downs, 126 Pa. St. 633 ; 
 34 W. N. C. 153; 17 Atl. Rep. 
 884. The defendant is liable for 
 the damages actually sustained, al- 
 though they are increased by a tend- 
 ency to disease on the part of the per- 
 son injured. McNamara v. Clinton- 
 ville, 63 Wis. 307; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 
 723 ; Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. v. Jones, 
 108 Ind. 551. In an action for killing 
 
 an ox, a refusal to instruct that if 
 plaintiff was informed of the accident 
 on the evening of the day when it oc- 
 curred, and could by reasonable dili- 
 gence have used the hide, or meat, 
 and did receive the hide, then the 
 value of the hide, and of the meat 
 that was or could have been used, 
 should be deducted from the value of 
 the ox when killed, was held to be 
 error. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Hem- 
 bree, 84 Ala. 183 ; 4 So. Rep. 392. 
 The question is not whether the plaint- 
 iff contributed to the amount of the 
 injury, but to its occurrence. Cole- 
 ridge, J., in Sills V. Brown, 9 Car. & 
 P. 601, 606 ; Stebbens v. Central R. 
 Co., 54 Vt. 464 ; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. . 
 855 ; Gould v. McKenna, 86 Penn. St. 
 297 ; s. c. 27 Am. Rep. 705 ; Secord 
 V. St. Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 5 McCrary, 
 515; Shearman & Redfield on Negli- 
 gence, § 93, and cases cited in their 
 note; Wharton on Negligence, g 868 
 et aeq. 
 
 'Oil City Fuel Supply Co. ». 
 Boundy, 122 Penn. St. 449 ; 15 Atl. 
 Rep. 865 ; Monongahela City v. Fis- 
 cher, 111 Pa. St. 9 ; 8. c. 56 Am. Rep. 
 341 ; Dowell v. General Steam Navi- 
 gation Co., 5 El. & Bl. 195 ; Wither- 
 ley V. Regents Canal Co., 13 C. B. (N. 
 S.) 3 ; B. c. 6 L.T. (N. S.) 355 ; 3 Fost. 
 
.u 
 
 THE GENEBAL EULE. 
 
 r§ 34. 
 
 tory negligence. The rule is sometimes said to be that it 
 must appear, in order to defeat the right of action, that, but 
 for the plaintiff's negligence operating as an efficient cause 
 of the injury, in connection with the fault of the defendant, 
 the injury would not have happened.* And so it is said that 
 the negligence of the plaintiff must " directly " contribute 
 to the happening of the injury or the plaintiff may have his 
 action.' 
 
 & Fin. 61 ; Lack v. Seward, 4 Car. & 
 P. 106; Luxford v. Large, 5 Car. &P. 
 421; Woolf «. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 373; 
 Vennall v. Garner, 1 Cromp. & M. 31 ; 
 Kent v. Elstob, 3 East, 18; Cremer ».' 
 Portland, 36 Wis. 92; Otis v. Janes- 
 ville, 47 Wis. 433; Kniglit v. Pon- 
 cliartrain R. Co., 33 La. Ann. 462; 
 Jolinson 's. Canal, &c., B. Co., 27 La. 
 Ann. 53; Laicher v. New Orleans, &c., 
 R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 330; Broadwelle. 
 Swigert, 7 B. Mon. 39; s. c. 45 Am. 
 Dec. 47, and tlie note; O'Brien «. 
 Phila., &c., R. Co.,3Phila. 76; Cata- 
 wissa R. Co., d. Armstrong, 49 Penn. 
 St. 186; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Penn. St. 
 439; Needham o. San Frandisco, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 Cal. 409; Hemming®. West- 
 ern, &c., R. Co., 49 Cal. 353; Hearne 
 V. Southern, &c., R. Co., 50 Cal. 483; 
 Coombs V. Purrington, 42 Me. 332; 
 Murphy «. Deane, 101 Mass. 455; Wil- 
 lard V. Pinard, 44 Vt. 34; Munger v. 
 Tonawanda, &c., R. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; 
 Crandell v. Goodrich, Trans. Co., 11 
 Biss. 516; s. c. 16 Fed. Rep. 75. 
 
 'Paducah, &c., R. Co. «. Hoehl, 
 13 Bush (Ky.) 41; Kentucky, &c., 
 R. Co. D. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160 ; b. c. 
 42 Am. Rep. 208; Houston, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88; 
 8. 0. 40 Am. Rep. 799 ; Hickey v. Bos- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 14 Allen, 439; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon, 92 
 Penn. St. 21 ; s. c. 137 Am. Rep. 651. 
 In Colorado, &c., R. Co. ®. Holmes, 
 5 Colo. 197, the rule is more 
 qualifiedly laid down. It is there held 
 that where the plaintiff him.self so far 
 
 contributes to the injury by his own 
 negligence, as that but for such fault 
 on his part the injury would not have 
 happened, he is not entitled to recover, 
 imless' the defendant, by the exercise 
 of care on his part, might have avoided 
 the consequences of the negligent con- 
 duct of the plaintiff. Murphy v. 
 Deane, 101 Mass. 455; s. c. 3 Am. 
 Rep. 390 ; Richmond, &c., B. Co. v. 
 Morris, 31 Gratt. 300; Richmond, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Anderson, 31 Gratt. 813; 
 Woods. Jones (La.), 15 Bep. 555; Bail- 
 road Co. V. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Bun- 
 yon V. Central E. Co., 25 N. J. Law, 
 556; Moore v. Central B. Co., 34 N. J. 
 Law, 268; Telfer v. Northern, &c., R. 
 Co., 30 N. J. Law, 188; Wharton on 
 Negligence, § 324. 
 
 " In Tuff ®. Warman, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 
 740; s. 0. 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573, much of 
 the discussion on the motion for a new 
 trial turned upon the. use of the word 
 "directly," the defendant's counsel 
 contending that the instruction should 
 have been that there could be no 
 recovery if the plaintiff contributed 
 in any way to the accident. The 
 court, however, refused the cor- 
 rection, and held that the only way 
 in which the imputed negligence 
 could operate was direct, and hence 
 the instruction could not mislead. Vil- 
 lage of Orleans*. Perry, 24 Neb. 831; 
 40 N. W. Rep. 417, is in qitaltuor 
 pedibus with Tuff v. Warman, supra. 
 See, also, Johnson v. Hudson B. Co., 
 20 N. Y. 65; Norris v. Litchfield, 
 35 N. H. 271 ; Cleveland &c., B. Co. 
 
§ 35.] THE GENEBAL RULE. 45 
 
 § 35. Summary statement of the doctrine of contributory 
 neglis;ence as a defense.— However it may have been ex- 
 pressed, the principle underlying all these decisions seems 
 to be, and verily it is the only sound basis upon which they 
 can rest, that whenever the plaintiff's case shows any want 
 of ordinary care under the circumstances, even the slightest, 
 contributing in any degree, even the smallest, as a proximate 
 cause of the injury for which he brings his action, his right 
 to recover is thereby destroyed. Anything more than this 
 imposes upon the plaintiff the duty of exercising more than 
 ordinary care, and refuses him a remedy for injuries that 
 others infliotnipon him ; and anything less than this, covered 
 up Aever so mistily in belabored and confusing l^gal phrase- 
 ology, imposes upon the defendant the duty of exercising 
 more than ordinary care, requires him to take better care of 
 the plaintiff than the law requires the plaintiff to take of 
 himself, and compels him to pay damages for injuries that 
 he did not inflict. There can be no middle ground ; either 
 the truth of these elementary propositions must be conceded 
 or the whole theory of our modern law of contributory neg- 
 ligence must be abandoned. Without this it is a theory of 
 oppression and injustice. There is no room for it in the 
 common law. 
 
 V. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570; The Far- held that the word "directly" did 
 
 mer v. McCraw, 27 Ala. 109; Mc- mislead the jury, and any concur- 
 
 Naughton u Caledonian R. Co. rence by the plaintiff in the produc- 
 
 (Scotch), 22 Dvinl. B. & M. 160 ; s. c. tion of the accident would bar re- 
 
 31 Jut. 94 ; Hay's Dec. 206 ; Shear- coveiy. The other judges, whDe 
 
 man & Bedfleld on Negligence, § 94 agreeing, still doubted whether the 
 
 But see (xwKrd, Buttons. Hudson River word did any practical injury to the 
 
 R. Co., 18 N. Y. 248, where Harris, J., defendant. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT OR CONDITION AS AFFECTING 
 THE RIGHT TO REQOVER. 
 
 i 36. The plaintiff's previous knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 37. Voluntary exposure to danger. 
 
 38. Plaintiff's failure to anticipate 
 the fault of defendant. 
 
 39. This rule further stated. 
 
 40. Plaintiff acting erroneously un- 
 der the impulse of fear pro- 
 duced by the defendant. 
 
 41. The same subject continued. 
 48. Plaintiff acting erroneously in 
 
 trying to save human life. 
 
 43. No duty or right to be generous 
 at the expense of another. 
 
 44. The contrary rule cbnsidered. 
 
 45. Plaintiff doing an illegal act. 
 
 46. Wilful negligence of the de- 
 fendant. 
 
 47. 
 
 48. A misapplication of this rule. 
 
 Where plaintiff acts in violation 
 of law. 
 
 52 
 
 53. 
 
 § 49. When plaintiff and defendant 
 
 are in pari delecto. 
 . 50. Plaintiff a trespasser. 
 
 51. Invitation upon or license to go 
 
 upon dangerous premises. 
 
 A trespass as per se contributory 
 
 negligence. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 54. Plaintiff's prior negligence in 
 connection with defendant's 
 subsequent negligence. 
 
 55. Judge Thompson's position crit- 
 icised. 
 
 56. When the plaintiff's negligence 
 precedes the defendant's in 
 point of time. 
 
 57. Plaintiff's negligence after the 
 catastrophe. 
 
 58. The same subject continued. 
 
 59. This statement of the rule ex- 
 amined. 
 
 60. Negligence of the decedent im- 
 der Lord Campbell's act. 
 
 36. The plaintiffs previous knowledge.— Knowledge on 
 
 the part of the plaintiff as to the danger to which he ia 
 exposed, or, what is the same thing in law, a legal obligation 
 to know of it, is an essential element in the case, when oon- 
 tribntory negligence is the issue. The law holds no one 
 responsible for exposing himself to a danger of which he 
 knew nothing, and of which he was under no obligation to 
 inform himself. We must use ordinary care and prudence 
 to avoid the ordinary and usual perils that beset us, but we 
 are not bound to guard against those which we have no 
 reason, under the circumstances, to suspect.' Hence, knowl- 
 
 ' Wall u. Town of Highland, 72 
 Wis. 435; 39 N. W. Rep. 560; Penn- 
 
 sylvania Tel. Co. v. Vamau(Pa.) 15 
 Atl. Rep. 624; Moomey v. Peak 57 
 
§ 36.] THE plaintiff's right to eeooyee. 47 
 
 edge of the probable danger, or a suflBioient reason to appre- 
 hend it, is essential to constitute contributory negligence. 
 When it appears that the plaintiff has suffered an injury at 
 the hands of the defendant from a cause which neither of 
 them knew, or had reason to believe would produce the 
 result, it is an inevitable accident, and the defendant is not 
 responsible. No one is juridically responsible, and the dam- 
 age must lie where it falls. In the language of Chief Justice 
 Nelson, of New York : — " No case or principle can be found, 
 or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual to 
 liability for an act done without fault on his part. . . . . 
 All the cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable 
 accident, or which in law or reason is the same thing, from 
 an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to 
 guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays 
 no foundation for legal responsibility."* And so, by parity 
 of reasoning, when a plaintiff suffers an injury at the hands 
 of a defendant, and it appears that the sufferer neither knew 
 of the danger to which his conduct exposed him, nor had 
 any reasonable ground to apprehend it, he is not guilty of 
 contributory negligence, and if the negligence of the defendant 
 is established, he may recover. It is upon this principle that 
 the law refuses to impute negligence to persons of unsound 
 mind, and to idiots and infants. 
 
 Mich. 259; Jeffrey «. Keokuk, &c.,R. along a sidewalk has a right to pre- 
 
 Co., 56 Iowa, 546; Langan v. St. sume it to he safe, and hence cannot 
 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 73 Mo., 392; he charged with negligence for not 
 
 Thirteenth Street R. Co. v. Boud- being on his guard against an unlaw- 
 
 rou, 92 Penn. St. 475; s. c. 37 Am. ful obstruction, or for not looking for 
 
 Rep. 707; Towler®. Baltimore, &c., it, although it is visible. See, also, to 
 
 R. Co., 18 West Va. 579; Gray v. the same point, County of Howard v. 
 
 Scott, 66 Penn. St. 346; Dush s. Fitz- Legg (Ind.), 11 N. B. Rep. 612; 
 
 hugh, 2 Lea, 307. A saloon-keeper is Bloomsburg S. & E. L. Co. ■». Gard- 
 
 not to be presumed to know that sew- ner, 136 Penn. St. 80; 24 W. N. C. 
 
 er-gas, when mixed in certain propor- 21; 17 Atl. Rep. 531; McGary v. 
 
 tlons with air, will explode; and, Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104; s. c. 30 Am. 
 
 therefore, is not necessarily negligent Rep. 510; Vamey «. Manchester, 58 
 
 in not making known the fact that N. H. 430; b. c. 42 Am. Rep. 593; 
 
 the. gas is escaping into his house. Murray «. McShane, 52 Md. 217; 8. c. 
 
 Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 41. 36 Am. Rep. 367. 
 
 Thus, in McGuire v. Spence, 91 N. ' Harvey v. Dunlop, Lalor's Sup., 
 
 T. 303, it was held that one passing Hill & Denio, 193. 
 
48 
 
 THE plaintiff's RIGHT TO EECOVEE. 
 
 [§ 37. 
 
 § 37. Toluntary exposure to danger.— While it is un- 
 questionably true that one may voluntarily and unnecessa- 
 rily expose himself, or his property, to danger without 
 thereby becoming guilty of contributory negligence as mat- 
 ter of law,^ it is, nevertheless, an established rule that, where 
 one does knowingly put himself or his property in danger, 
 there is a presumption that he, ipso^ facto, assumes all the 
 risks reasoliably to be apprehended from such a course of 
 conduct,' as where one goes volixntarily upon a railway 
 track, without keeping watch, at a point where it is known 
 to be especially dangerous,' or ventures upon a bridge, track, 
 or highway which he knows to be defective or unsafe.* And 
 
 ' Dublin, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Slattery, 
 3 L. R. App. Cas. 1155; Albioiv 
 V. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545; Jeffrey «. 
 Keokuk, &c., R. Co., 56 Iowa, 546. 
 
 ' Frazer «. South & N. Ala. . R. 
 Co., 81 Ala. 185; 1 So. Rep. 85. A 
 man cannot place himself in a posi- 
 tion of known danger, and recover 
 for an injury resulting therefrom. 
 Chicago & Alton R. Co. b. Murphy, 
 17 111. App. 444; Schoenfeld «. Mil- 
 waukee City Ry. Co., 74 Wis. 433; 
 43 N. W. Rep. 162; Allen v. Johnson, 
 76 Mich. 31; 43 N. W. Rep. 1075; 
 Goldstein v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 46 
 Wis. 404. "A party cannot know- 
 ingly expose himself to danger, and 
 then recover damages for an injury 
 which he might have avoided by the 
 use of a reasonable precaution. " Lake 
 Shore, &c., R. Co. v. Clemens, 5 Brad. 
 77, 80; Palmer v. Bearing, 17 Week. 
 Dig. (N. T.) 145. 
 
 ' Baltimore, &c., R. Co. ■». Depew, 
 40 Ohio St. 121; Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 Co. v. Collins, 87 Penn. St. 405; s. c. 
 30 Am. Rep. 371; Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co. -B. Yniestra, 21 Pla. 700. Plaint- 
 iff's intestate was killed by a train at 
 a crossing, the view of which was ob- 
 scured by smoke. Had he waited a 
 moment he could have seen the train. 
 It was held that a verdict for the de- 
 fendant was properly ordered. Mc- 
 
 Crory v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 31 
 Fed. Rep. 531. For cases on the 
 duty to " look and listen " at a rail- 
 way crossing, see infra, § 181, et »eq. 
 
 * In the following cases plaintiff's 
 knowledge of the defect or danger 
 precluded him from recovery: — 
 
 Bridges. — In Morrison «. Shelby 
 County, 116 Ind. 431; 19 N. E. Rep. 
 316, plaintiff had known for some 
 time before the accident that £he 
 bridge was out of repair, that the 
 boards were loose and travel-worn, 
 and had usually avoided it. He testi- 
 fied that on the occasion of the acci- 
 dent he exercised great care and cau- 
 tion in driving over the bridge, which 
 was then in public use. Nevertheless, 
 the court was held warranted in find- 
 ing him guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence. Travis v. Town of Carrollton, 
 7 N. Y. Supl. 331; SpUttorf v. State, 
 108 N. T. 205; 15 N. E. Rep. 322. 
 Knowledge is to be presumed from 
 habitual use for a long time. Dale v. 
 Webster County, 76 Iowa, 370; 41 K. 
 W. Rep. 1. But see Tift t>. Jones, 74 
 6a. 469. 
 
 Highway. — Delaware, L. & W. R. 
 Co. V. Cadow, 120 Penn. St. 559; 14 
 Atl. Rep.450; Phillips s. Ritchie Coun- 
 ty, 31 W. Va. 477; 7 S. E. Rep. 427; 
 Walker «. Reidsville, 96 N. C. 382. 
 See, also, Hopkins v. Town of Rush 
 
§37.] 
 
 THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO BECOVEE. 
 
 49 
 
 where one knowing the danger temporarily forgets it, and in 
 consequence suffers, his forgetfulness will not avail him as 
 an excuse. What he knows he must remember at his peril, 
 a,nd not to remember is contributory negligence if it occa- 
 sions the injury.^ Knowledge, however, in this respect, does 
 
 Eiver, 70 Wis. 10; 8. c. 34 N. "W. Rep. 
 909. The phrase " known dangerous 
 obstruction," in instructions was held 
 to mean an obstruction known to 
 plaintiff. Jochem v. Bobinson, 73 
 "Wis. 199; B. c 39 N. "W. Kep. 383. 
 
 Sidewalks. — Barnes ®. Sowden, 119 
 Penn. St. 53; s.c.i2 Atl. Rep. 804; Ma- 
 comb V. Smithers, 6 Bradw. 470. Here 
 the plaintiff, knowing the sidewalk to 
 be slippery, because of the snow and 
 ice thereon, walked on it as if no ob- 
 struction existed. He was not allowed 
 to recover. Twogood s. New York, 
 
 , 12 Daly (N. T.) 220. One who, 
 knowing of the existence of an ob- 
 struction in the sidewalk, stumbles 
 
 . over it in the dark, cannot recover. 
 
 \ Indianapolis v. Cook, 99 Ind. 10. 
 
 i Especially if there is a safe walk near 
 by. McGinty v. Keokuk, 66 Iowa, 
 
 ' 735. And see Hartman v. Muscatine, 
 70 Iowa, 511. But held a question 
 for the jury in FuUiam v. Muscatine, 
 70 Iowa, 436. See Bullock v. New 
 York, 99 N. Y. 654; Emporia v. ' 
 Schmidling, 33 Kan. 485, where it 
 was held that the presumption of neg- 
 ligence is not conclusive, and also 
 cases cited in note at end of this sec- 
 tion. Driving on ice-fleld. Wood- 
 man V. Pitman, 79 Me. 456; s.c.lO Atl. 
 Rep. 331. Palling into turn-table pit. 
 Early v. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 66 
 Mich. 349; fl. c. 33 N. W. Rep^ 813. 
 Through draw-bridge. Muhr v. City 
 of New York, 2 N. Y. Supl. 59. 
 Down river bank. Montgomery, 
 &c., Ry. Co. V. Thompson, 77 
 Ala. 448; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 72. Un- 
 guarded elevator well. Taylor v. Ca- 
 rew Manuf. Co., 140 Mass. 150. Div- 
 ing into shallow water. Hinz v. Starin, 
 4 
 
 3 N. Y. Supl. 290. Exposing horse 
 to object frightening other horses. 
 Pittsburgh Southern Ry. Co. v. Tay- 
 lor, 104 Pa. St. 306; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 
 580; City of Erie v. Magill, 101 Penn. 
 St. 616; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 739; Corbett 
 V. Leavenworth, 27 Kan. 673; Mehan 
 V. Syracuse, &c., R. Co., 73 N. Y. 
 585; Mansfield, &c., Coal Co. v. Mc- 
 Enery, 91 Penn. St. 185; s. c. 36 Am. 
 Rep. 662. See, also, Lancaster v. 
 Kissinger, 13 Rep. 635; Albion ■». 
 Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545; s. c. 46 Am. 
 Rep. 230; Miller v. Union Pacific R. 
 Co., 2 McCrary, 87. So, where a 
 passenger occupies a position in a car, 
 against the warning of the driver and 
 the rules of the corporation. Wills 
 V. Linn, &c., R. Co., 139 Mass. 351; 
 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. «. Jones, 6 
 Rep. 135; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Roy, 5 Bradw. 83; Marquette, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Spear, 44 Mich. 169; s. c. 38 
 Am. Rep. 142, where it was held that 
 one who invites another to bring upon 
 his premises for use a dangerous im- 
 plement, knowing it to be such, will 
 take , upon himself the consequences 
 which naturally follow. Stebbins v. 
 Township of Keane, 55 Mich. 
 552; 8. c. 23 N. W. Rep. 87; Wohlfahrt 
 V. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 490; s. o. 44 
 Am. Rep. 406; Griffiths «. Gidlow, 3 
 Hurl. & N. 648; Smith v. St. Law- 
 rence, &c., Co., L. R. 5 P. C. 308; 
 Caswell V. Worth, 5 El. & Bl. 849, 
 
 I As where a person familiar with a 
 dangerous railroad crossing, in a fit of 
 absent-mindedness, omitted to ascer- 
 tain whether a train was coming, and 
 consequently was injured. Baltimore, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 
 627; Bruker v. Covington, 60 Ind. 33; 
 
so 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S BIGHT TO BECOVEK., 
 
 [§ 37. 
 
 not necessarily constitute contributory negligence.^ It is 
 plain tliat one may exercise due care with full knowledge of 
 the danger to which he is exposed or to which he lawfully 
 exposes himself. This certainly is not contributory negli- 
 gence. When knowledge is fastened upon the plaintiff, it is 
 presumptive evidence of contributory negligence ; but it is 
 a disputable presumption and may ^e rebutted by proper 
 evidence of the exercise of ordinary care under the circum- 
 stances.* 
 
 s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 202; Bassetts. Pish, 
 
 75 N. T. 303; Weed «. Balston Spa, 
 
 76 N. Y. 329. 
 
 > Therefore, a complaint which sets 
 forth facts showing that plaintiff had 
 knowledge of the danger' is not de- 
 murrable on that ground. Evans- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Crist, 116 Ind. 
 446; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 446. 
 
 ' Bridges. — One is not necessaJJly 
 precluded from recovering damages 
 from a town for an accident sustained 
 from a defect in a bridge, by the fact 
 that he knew of the defect before he 
 drove on to it. Spearbracker ». Lar- 
 rabee, 64 Wis. 573; Kelly ■». New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 9 N. Y. Supl.90; 
 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Bevard 
 (Penn.), 11 Atl. Rep. 575; Taylor v. 
 Town of Constable, 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 607; Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Gasscamp, 
 69 Tex. 545; b. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 327. 
 
 Highway. — Where plaintiff was in- 
 jured while traveling in a dark night, 
 an instruction that if "the highway 
 was defective and dangerous, and was 
 left open and unguarded, to be trav- 
 eled by the public, and the plaintiff, 
 while traveling on said highway, was 
 injured in consequence of the defect, 
 the fact that the plaintiff was ac- 
 quainted with the condition of the 
 road does no^ of itself constitute neg- 
 ligence on his part, and would not 
 defeat his recovery, provided he was 
 exercising due care and caution at the 
 time of his injury," was held to be 
 correct. Millcreek Township v. Perry 
 
 (Penn.), 12 Atl. 149; Kelly v. Town of 
 Blackstone, 147 Mass. 448; s.c.18 N.E. 
 Rep. 217; Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Carvener, 113 Ind. 51 ; b. c. 14 N. E. 
 Rep. 738. In Frost v. Waltham, 12 
 Allen, 85, which was an action against 
 a town to recover damages sustained 
 by reason of a defective highway, by a 
 citizen who lived near the place of the 
 defect and fully knew of its existence, 
 it was held that the plaintiff had no 
 groimd of exception to a ruling that 
 he might nevertheless recover if he 
 had used due care, but that his resi- 
 dence and knowledge were evidence 
 tending to show carelessness on his 
 part. Elyton Land Co. «. Mingea, 89 
 Ala. 521; S.C. 7 So. Rep. 666; Nichols 
 ■B. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 430. Wheth- 
 er one who, knowing of the existence 
 of a hole in the street, steps into it on a 
 dark night, is guilty of negligence, is 
 a question of fact. Lowell v. Water- 
 town, 58 Mich. 668; Pulliam v. Mus- 
 catine, 70 Iowa, 436. In determining 
 whether plaintiff exercised ordinary 
 care in attempting to travel a highway 
 known to him to be partiaUy ob- 
 structed, evidence that there was no 
 other road by which he could reach 
 his destination is competent. Skjeg- 
 gerud v. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 38 Minn. 56; ,s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 572. 
 SidevxalJcs. — A pedestrian, in a city, 
 on a dark night, well acquainted with 
 the unsafe condition of a sidewalk, is 
 not guilty of contributory negligence 
 in taking it as the most direct way to 
 
§38.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S BIGHT TO KECOVEE. 
 
 51 
 
 § 38. Plaintiff's failure to anticipate the fault of the de- 
 fendant. — It is sometimes said that, inasmuch as there is a 
 natural presumption that every one will act with due care, it 
 cannot be imputed to the plaintiff, as negligence, that he did 
 not anticipate that another person would violate the law, or 
 would act negligently in a given particular, and in accord- 
 ance with such an anticipation provide against the conse- 
 quences of it. A long line of authorities is at hand in sup- 
 port of this propositioUj^ and if it means that it is not con- 
 
 his home, instead of some other way 
 also unsafe, if h& acted witli that care 
 with which a prudent man should 
 act; and this is a question of fact for 
 the jury. Altoona v. Lotz, 114 Penn. 
 St. 238; Smith v. Ryan, 8 N. T. Supl. 
 853; Town of Gossport v. Evans, 113 
 Ind. 133; B.C. 13N. E.Rep. 356; Brezee 
 V. Powers, 80 Mich. 173; s. c. 45 N. W. 
 Rep. 130; Ross v. Davenport, 66 
 Iowa, 548. Falling into area along- 
 side public alley. Bond v. Smith, 44 
 Hun (N.Y.) 219; Baldwin v. St. Louis, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 210. Railroad 
 platforms. "White v. Cincinnati, &c., 
 Ry. Co. (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 936; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 123 Ind. 
 415; B. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 973 ; Gulf, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Fox (Tex.), 6 8.W. Rep. 569. 
 Erecting buildings near chimney with 
 defective spark-arrester. Alpem v. 
 Churchill, 53 Mich. 607. Falling 
 down hatchway. Post v. StockweU, 
 44 Hun (N. Y.) 38. Where there is 
 no evidence of plaintiff's negligence, 
 he is not entitled to an instruction that 
 knowledge of the danger of that 
 which he was doing was not conclu- 
 sive evidence of neglect in failing to 
 avoid it. Joyce S.Worcester, 140 Mass. 
 245; Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; 
 8. c. 23 Am. Dec. 662; Snow v. Hou- 
 satonic R. Co., 8 Pick. 450; Coombs 
 V. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 
 Mass 585; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 506; Mar- 
 ble V. Rojss, 124 Mass. 44; Dewire v. 
 Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 219; Osage City v. Brown, 27 
 
 Kan. 74; Wheeler «. Westport, 30 
 Wis. 393; Turner v. Buchanan, 83 
 Ind. 147; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 485; 
 Henry Co., &c., Co. ■». Jackson, 86 
 Ind. Ill; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 274; 
 Town of Albion ®. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 
 545; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 330; Estelle v. 
 Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243; Thomas 
 1). Mayor, &c., 38 Hun, 110; s. c. 15 
 Week. Dig. (N. Y.) 378; Evans ». 
 City of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; b.,c. 35 
 Am. Rep. 165; Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. 
 Y. 303; Weed v. Balston Spa, 76 N. Y. 
 339; Ochsenbein «. Shapley, 85 N. Y. 
 314. See, also, Schaefler v. Sandusky, 
 33 Ohio St. 346; Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 Co. 1). Taylor, 104 Penn. St. 308; s. c. 
 49 Am. Rep. 580. 
 
 ' " We are entitled to count on the 
 ordinary prudence of our fellow-men 
 until we have specific warning to the 
 contrary. The driver of a carriage 
 assumes that other vehicles will ob- 
 serve the rule of the road, the master 
 of a vessel that other ships will obey 
 the statutory and other rules of navi 
 gation and the like, and generally no 
 man is bound (either for the estab- 
 lishment of his own claims or to 
 avoid claims of third persons against 
 him) to use special precautions against 
 merely possible want of care or skill 
 on the part of others." Pollock on 
 Torts, 388. A railroad company is 
 not bound to expect persons will use 
 the track at other places than at road 
 crossings. Nolan «. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 53 Conn. 461. An engineer 
 
52 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF 8 EIGHT TO EEOOVEE. 
 
 [§38. 
 
 tributory negligence not to look out for danger, when there is 
 no reason to apprehend any, it is a sound rule of law. That 
 
 who sees a person walking on the 
 track far ahead of the train is not 
 guilty of negligence in supposing that 
 he will get out of the way before the 
 train reaches him. Prazer v. S. &. N. 
 Ala. R. Co., 81 Ala. ,185; Central 
 Trust Co. V. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 
 26 Fed. Rep. 896; Maloy l>. Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 84 Mo. 370; Ohio & M. 
 Ry. Co V. Walker, 113 Ind. 196; s.c.15 
 N. E. Rep. 334. But if the person on 
 the track is a child, a higher degree 
 of care is reqiiired. Indianapolis, P. 
 & C. R. Co. ■». Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179; 
 s.c.lON.E.Rep.70. Whether the per- 
 son be a child or an adult, all the duty 
 resting- on the company is to try tp 
 avoid injuring him after he is discov- 
 ered, l^olan V. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 53 Conn. 461. A traiveler cross- 
 ing a raUroad track may assume that 
 the train will not run at a speed pro- 
 hibited by city ordinance. Hart v. 
 Bevereux, 41 Ohio St. 565; Schmidt 
 «, Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 75 Iowa, 
 606; B.C.39N.W. Rep. 916. And that 
 the statutory warning will not be 
 omitted. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. ■». 
 Stevens, 85 Kan. 622; s.c. 12 Pac. Rep. 
 35. And need not anticipate a negli- 
 gent act. O'Connor v. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co.j 94 Mo. 150; s. c. 7 8. W. Rep. 
 106. But, in Milburn ii. Kansas City, 
 &c., R. Co., 86 Mo. 104 (Norton, J., dis- 
 senting), it was held that where the 
 owner of cattle sees them in danger on 
 a railroad track, and can, by reasonable 
 exertion, get them off, if he does not, 
 and they are injured by a passing 
 train, he cannot recover. The owner 
 has no right to rely upon the per- 
 formance of the duty which the law 
 imposes on the company of giving 
 warning signals. It was held in 
 Gumb V. Twenty-third St. Ry. Co., 58 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 466, that the driver 
 of a street car has a right to presume 
 
 that teams will keep out of the way. 
 Contra, Gallagher v. Coney I., &c., R. 
 Co., 4 N. Y. Supl. 870. A pedestrian 
 crossing the highway need not antici- 
 pate repkless riding. Stringer v. 
 Frost, 116 Ind. 477; s. c.'19 N. E. Rep. 
 331. Nor that a wagon will overtake 
 and strike him, when there is ample 
 room to pass on either side. Shea v, 
 Reems, 86 La. Ann. 966. Customers 
 of a railroad company, loading and 
 unloading cars, and servants of the 
 company in the perfonhance of th^ir 
 duties, are justrfled in supposing that 
 trains will not be run carelessly or 
 contrary to rules. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ■». Goebel, 119 111. 515; Hobson v. 
 New Mexico & A. R. Co. (Ariz.), 11 
 Pac. Rep. 545; litis «. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 373; s. c. 41 N. W. 
 Rep. 1040; Gessley «. Missouri Pac. . 
 ^y. Co , 83 Mo. App. 413; Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co. «. Dunleavy, 139 111. 133; 
 s. 0. 33 N. E. Rep. 15 ; Nichols v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 69 Iowa, 154; Cen- 
 tral R. Co. «. Harrison, 78 Ga. 744; 
 Yik Hon v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 
 65 Cal. 619; Stephens «. Martins 
 (Penn.), 17 Atl. Rep. 343; s. c. 33 
 W.N.C. 475; New York, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Grand Rapids. &c., R. Co., 116 Ind. 60; 
 B.C. 18 N. E. Rep. 183; Ebright «. Min- 
 eral R.&M. Co. (Penn.), 15 Atl. Rep. 
 709; Anderson®. Scholey,114Ind. 553; 
 S.C. 17 N. E. Rep. 135; Ernst ». Hudson 
 River R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9 ; Newson ». 
 New York, &c , R. Co., 39 N. Y. 883; 
 Harpell ®. Curtis, 1 E. D. Smith, 78; 
 Cleveland, &c., R. Co. ■». Terry, 8 
 Ohio St. 570; Fox v. Sackett, 10 Al- 
 len, 585; Fisk ». Wait, 104 Mass. 71; 
 Reeves ». Delaware, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Penn, St. 454; Brown v. Linn, 31 Penn. 
 St. 510; Shea v. Potrero, <fcc., R. Co., 44 
 Cal. 414; Damour «. Lyons, 44 Iowa, 
 276. In Kellogg ®. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 26 Wis. 233, the general state- 
 
§ 39.] THE plaintiff's right to recoter. 53 
 
 all men will under all circumstances act with due care may 
 be a presumption of law. It is after the analogy of the pre- 
 sumption in the criminal law as to innocence, and therein 
 lies the fallacy. Presumptions, or rules of evidence,' appli- 
 cable to guilt and innocence are obviously wholly inapplica- 
 ble to care and carelessness. There is no sound analogy 
 between carefulness and innocence, or guilt and negligence in 
 this respect, and it is submitted that it is not a presumption 
 of fact that men will exercise care rather than carelessness, 
 on the average, under a given set of circumstances. Men of 
 ordinary carefulness do not act upon such a presumption in 
 the general Conduct of their affairs. 
 
 § 39. This rule further stated.— It is a duty to some ex- 
 tent to anticipate the probable carelessness and wrong doing 
 of others.^ The average prudent man does it every day, in 
 watching the details of his business, in warning his em- 
 ployees, in insuring his property and his life, in bolting his 
 doors at night, and, in short, in about everything he does, 
 that marks him as a prudent and cautious man, and distin- 
 guishes him from the most careless and hapless of his 
 neighbors. Not to exercise this measure of carefulness is to 
 fall below the standard that men call " ordinary care." In 
 
 ment is made that in the exercise of V. Aldrich, 38 Kan. 300; Langan «. 
 
 his lawful rights, every person has a St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 73 Mo. 393; 
 
 right to presiune that every other will Gee «. Metropolitan, &c., K. Co., L. 
 
 perform his duty and obey the law, R. 8 Q. B. 161. In a case for run- 
 
 and it is not negligence for him to as- ning down a ship, it was held that the 
 
 sume that he is not exposed to a dan- plaintiff could recover, although he 
 
 ger which can only come to him might have prevented the collision, 
 
 through a disregard of law on the provided that he had the right to as- 
 
 part.of some other person. In Fraler snme, because of the positions of the 
 
 V. Sears Union Water Co., 13 Cal. 555, ships, that the defendant would make 
 
 the learned judge says:— "We appre- way. Vennall «. Gardner, 1 Cromp. 
 
 hend, if a man carelessly flres a gun & M. 31; The Mangerton, 1 Swab, 
 
 into the street, that it would scarcely 130; Foy «. Brighton, &c., R. Co., 18 
 
 be admissible for him, when sued for C. B. (N. S.) 335; Clayards b. Dethick, 
 
 the injury done another by it, to say 13 Q. B. 439; Shearman & Redfield on 
 
 that, by reasonable care, the other Negligence, 4th ed., § 93; Wharton 
 
 might have got out of the way. . . on Negligence, §§ 74-78 incl. ; Thomp- 
 
 A mere want of reasonable care to son on Negligence, 1173; 1 Sedgwick 
 
 prevent the vnjvry, does not impair the on Damages, 8th ed., p. 333. 
 right to recover." Robinson©. West- ' Texas, &c., R. Co. ■». Young, 60 
 
 em, Ac, R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Moulton Tex. 301. 
 
64 THE plaintiff's bight to becovee. [§ iO. 
 
 a great variety of instances of everyday oocTirrence, to pro- 
 ceed upon the presumption of others' carefulness is nothing, 
 short of gross negligence. Prudent men, on the average, 
 instead of acting, in general, upon any such happy-go-lucky 
 presumption as this, rather proceed upon the opposite pre- 
 sumption, and conduct themselves according to the maxim of 
 the Kentucky backwoodsman, " Be sur^ you are right, then go 
 ahead."* The rule that a plaintiff must exercise ordinary 
 care under the circumstance in order to escape the imputa- 
 tion of contributory negligence will more oft^n require him 
 to act upon a presumption of the probable or possible neg- 
 ligence,, or wrong doing, of others, thaii it will justify him in 
 acting upon the contrary presumption. This, in the author's 
 judgment, is a view that commends itself to the common ex- 
 perience and common sense of the average of mankind, 
 though it has found little sanction at the hands of the 
 judges.^ 
 
 § 40. Plaintiff acting erroneously under the impulse of 
 tiBar produced hj the defendant.— When a plaintiff, through 
 the negligence of the defendant, is placed in a situation 
 where he must adopt a perilous alternative, or where, in the 
 terror of an emergency for which he is hot responsible, and 
 for which the defendant is responsible,' he acts wildly or 
 
 ' Attributed to Davy Crockett. mately connected with the plaintifl's 
 ' The Supreme Court of Texas, In excitement, and the latter exercises 
 the case of Texas, &c., R. Co. ■». the care of a person of ordinary pru- 
 Toung, decided in 1883, reported in dence under the circumstances. A 
 60 Texas, 301, suggests the theory I passenger in the caboose of a moving 
 have developed, "but, as far as I have freight train, frightened by the fall- 
 searched, no other reported case has ing of a pile of lumber from a flat car 
 been found precisely in point. next before the caboose, jiunped out. 
 « In Austin, &c., R. Co. v. The court held that he was to blame 
 Beatty, 73 Tex. 593; s.c. 11 S.W. Rep. for the injuries sustained, even though 
 858, the trial court, in charging the the company was negligent in piling 
 jury, overlooked an indispensable the lumber so that it could fall, 
 prerequisite to a legal verdict against Woolery «. Louisville, &c., Ry. Co., 
 the defendant, namely, the negligence 107 Ind. 381;, s. c. 57 Am. Rep. 114. 
 of the defendcmi. That the plaintiff In Reary«. Louisville, &c..Ry. Co., 40 
 was frightened, and under the stress La. Ann. 33; s.c. 3 So. Rep. 390, it was 
 of fear pursued a course resulting in decided that a railway company is not 
 injury to himself, is no ground of ac- liable for injuries sustained by a per- 
 tion, unless some negligent act or son who, because of fear, jumps from 
 omission of the defendant is proxi- a train in motion, unless such fear 
 
§40.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF 8 RIGHT TO EECOVER. 
 
 55 
 
 negligently, and suffers in consequence, such negligent con- 
 duct, under these circumstances, is not contributory negli- 
 gence, for the reason that persons in great peril are not to 
 be required to exercise all that presence of mind and care- 
 fulness which are justly required of a careful and prudent 
 man under ordinary circumstances. In such a case the neg- 
 ligent act of the defendant is the proximate cause ot the 
 injury, and the plaintiff may have his action.^ Said Lord 
 
 was caused by an agent of the com- 
 pany. In Chicago, &c., By. Co. i: 
 Felton, 135 111. 458; s. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 
 765, a train running on a road wliich 
 had a double track was stopped by a 
 snow-bank. There was a curve in 
 the track at that point, and during 
 the night some passengers saw the 
 light of an engine which they sup- 
 posed was on the same track with 
 them, approaching rapidly from be- 
 hind, and at the same time the engine 
 of the passenger train gave certain 
 sharp whistles, which they took for 
 whistles of alarm. The light was on 
 a snow-plow, which was on the other 
 track, and was known by those in 
 charge of the passenger train to be on 
 that track. One passenger, being 
 alarmed, ran out, and was caught in 
 the snow-plow and killed. It was 
 held that the whistle not being for 
 passengers the sounding of it was not 
 negligence, and the company was not 
 liable. A woman waiting for a train 
 received from the station agent per- 
 mission to sit in a certain car while 
 the waiting-room was being cleaned, 
 he assuring her that the car would 
 remain there. While she was sitting 
 there the car started, and she jumped 
 out and was injured. A verdict 
 against the railroad company was sus- 
 tained. Shannon «. Boston, &c., B. 
 Co. , 73 Me. 52. Hemmingway v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., By. Co., 72 Wis. 42; s.c. 37 
 N. W. Bep. 804, where a boy of ten, 
 who had told the conductor where he 
 was going, jumped off at the station, 
 
 not knowing that the train would stop 
 at a switch above and back down. The 
 company was held guilty of negli- 
 gence. 
 
 ' Jones V. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493; 
 Wright V. Great Northern By. Co., 8 
 Ir. L. B. (C. P. Div.) 257. A man 
 who, by another's want of care, finds 
 himself in a position of danger, can- 
 not be held guilty of negligence 
 merely because in that emergency he 
 does not act in the best way to avoid 
 the danger. That which appears the 
 best way to a court examining the 
 matter afterwards at leisure and with 
 full knowledge is not necessarily ob- 
 vious even to a prudent and skillful 
 man on a sudden alarm. Pollock on 
 Torts, 386. Jumping to avoid col- 
 lision. Cody V. New York, &c., B. 
 Co., 151 Mass. 462; s.c. 24 N. E. Bep. 
 402; Pennsylvania Tel. Co. v. Var- 
 nau (Penn.), 15 Atl. Bep. 624. If a 
 child goes upon a railroad trestle 
 bridge to escape from cattle of* which 
 she is afraid, it is not contributory 
 negligence on her part. Cassida v. 
 Oregon By. & Nav. Co., 14 Or. 551; 
 s. c. 13 Pac. Bep, 488; Holzab v. New 
 Orleans, &c., B. Co., 38 La. Ann. 185. 
 Jumping from overturning stage- 
 coach. Lawrence v. Green, 70 Cal. 
 417. Defendant, through its negli- 
 gence, having put plaintiff in a posi- 
 tion of danger, could not complain 
 that he did not exercise cool presence 
 of mind in his endeavor to escape 
 therefrom. Silver Cord Mining Co. v. 
 McDonald, 14 Colo. 191; s, c. 23 Pac. 
 
56 
 
 THE PLAINTIFFS EIGHT TO EECOTEK. 
 
 [# 40. 
 
 EUenborough.-T— " If I place a man in such a situation that he 
 must adopt a perilous alternative, I am responsible for the 
 consequences."^ And this is equally the rule even though it 
 turn out that no injury would have been sustained had there 
 been no attempt to escape the threatened danger.* The 
 
 Rep. 346; Ladd ®. Foster, 81 Fed. 
 Rep. 837. Jumping from runaway 
 horse-car. Dimmey «. Wheeling, 
 &c., R. Co., 37 W. Va. 33. Dutzi v. 
 Geisel, 33 Mo. App. 676; South Cov- 
 ington, &c., Ry. Co. V. Ware, 84 Ky. 
 367; S.C. 1 S.W. Rep. 493. WooUey ®. 
 Scovell, 3 Man, & R. (K. B.) 105, sub- 
 stantially giving the rule in the text, 
 and adding that even if the defendant 
 gives the plaintiff warning immedi- 
 ately before the accident, the former 
 will not be protected. Buel v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 81 N. T. 314; 
 Filer i> New York, &c., R. Co., 49 N. 
 Y. 47; Coulter v. Am., &c., Express 
 Co., 56 N,. Y. 585; Pittsburgh «. 
 Grier, 33 Penn. St. 54; Johnson v. 
 Westchester, &c., R. Co., 70 Penn. St. 
 357; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Werner 
 (Penn.), 8 Rep. 59; Lancaster v. Eis- 
 sin'ger (Penn.), 13 Rep. 635; Pitts- 
 burgh, &c., R. Co. V. Taylor, 104 
 Penn. St. 306; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 580; 
 Cook «. Parham, 24 Ala. 31. It 
 would be absurd to hold that a person 
 in time of imminent danger is negli- 
 gent, unless he take every precaution 
 . that a careful calculation afterward 
 will show he might have taken. Karr 
 ■». Parks, 40 Cal. 188, 193. To say, 
 however, that failure on the part of 
 the person injured, in cases involving 
 risk of life and limb, to take unutual 
 care is no defense to the action, as it is 
 said in Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. ® 
 Stout, 53 Ind. 143, lS5, is apt to 
 prove a confusing formulation of the 
 rule. Cook ». Central, &c., R. Co. 
 (Ala.), 13 Rep. 356; Cothard «. Ala- 
 bama, &c., R. Co., 67 Ala. 114; Frick 
 e. Potter, 17 111. 406; Galena, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Yarwood, 17 111. 500. Chicago, 
 
 &c., R.,Co. ■». Becker, 76 111. 35, 
 lucidly states the rule as follows; — 
 Where, as a direct and immediate re- 
 sult of the defendant's negligence, 
 the injured party is placed in a posi- 
 tion of compulsion and sudden sur- 
 prise, bereft of independent moral 
 agency and opportimity of reflection, 
 the law will not hold him responsible 
 for contributory negligence. Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Able, 59 111. 131; Wes- 
 ley Coal Co «. Herler, 84 HI. 136; In- 
 galls «. Bills, 9 Mete. 1; s. c. 43 Am. 
 Dec; 346; Lund v. Tyngsboro, 11 
 Cush. 5q3; s. c. 59 Am. Dec. 159; 
 Brooks ®. Petersham, 16 Gray, 181; 
 Eastman v. Sanbom, 3 Allen, 4; Ste- 
 vens v. Boxford, 10 Allen, 35; Sears 
 «. Dennis, 105 Mass. 313; Linnehan v. 
 Sampson, 136 Mass. 506; s. c. 80 Am. 
 Rep. 693; Mark «. St. Paul, &c., R. 
 Co., 30 Minn. 493; Card v. Ellsworth, 
 65 Me. 547; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 733; 
 Page V. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51; Stick- 
 ney ». Maidstone, 30 Vt.'738; South- 
 western, &c., R. Co. ■». Paulk, 34 Ga. 
 356. And the rule even holds good 
 when the party injured, believing 
 himself , in great peril, causes by his 
 actions the very accident which he 
 feared. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 
 Petus, 181 ; Han ®. Minneapolis, &c., 
 R. Co., 4 McOrary, 633; Stevenson v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 
 493; Hemmingway v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 73 Wis.43; s.c. 37 N. W. Rep. 
 804; Shannon «. Boston & A. R. Co., 
 78 Me. 53; Wharton on Negligence, 
 §§ 305,877; Thompson on Negligence, 
 1093, 1174. 
 
 ' Jones ®. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493. 
 
 ' South Covington, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Ware, 84 Ky. 367; s.c.l S.W. Rep. 493j 
 
§ 41.] THE plaintiff's BIGHT TO BECOVEB, 57 
 
 principle is that errors in judgment on the part of a plaint- 
 iff, in trying to escape imminent danger brought about by 
 the defendant's negligence, do not constitute contributory 
 negligence, if the acts done were such as ordinarily prudent 
 persons might have been expected to do under like circum- 
 stances, even though the injury would not have happened if 
 the acts had not been done. So, where a passenger, appre- 
 hending a collision, rushes out of the car, where he would 
 have been safe, and goes upon the platform, where he is 
 hurtj his act is, upon this principle, justifiable, and lie liaa 
 his action for damages against the railway company ;^ and 
 where one, being lawfully upon a railway track when a train 
 suddenly appears, jumps the wrong way in the excitement of 
 the moment, it is not contributory negligence.^ 
 
 § 41. The same subject continned.— This rule is also 
 frequently applied where persons leap from rains, or 
 vehicles on the highway, under apprehension of injury from 
 collision or derailment, or other accident, when, if they had 
 not done so, they would have escaped unhurt.' The ques- 
 
 Brown s. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 54 prove contributory negligence. Bern- 
 
 "Wis. 343; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 41, and liard «. Rensselaer, &c., R. Co.", 
 
 note; Gumz e. Chicago, &o., R. Co., 1 -A-bb. App. Dec. 131; Rexter v. 
 
 52 Wis. 673; Schultz v. Chicago, &c., Starin, 73 K. T. 601; McKinney «. 
 
 R. Co., 44 Wis. 638; Turner v. Bu- ^eil, 1 McLean, 540. See, also, 
 
 chanan, 83 Ind. 147; 8.0.42 Am. Rep. Commonwealth v. Boston, &c., 
 
 486; Iron Ry. Co. v. Mowery, 36 R- Co., 129 Mass. 500; b. c. 3T 
 
 Ohio St. 418; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 597; Am. Rep. 383, and note; Pennsylva- 
 
 Wilson V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 36 nia R. Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453; s. c. 
 
 Minn. 878; Roll v. Northern, &c., R. 46 Am. Rep. 173; Cottrill v. Chicago, 
 
 Co., 15 Hun, 496. It is said in &c., R. Co., 47 Wis. 634; s. c. 33 Am. 
 
 Twomley v. Central Park, &c., R. Rep. 796; Linnehan v. Sampson, 136 
 
 Co., 69 N. T. 158; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. Mass. 506; 8. c. 30 Am. Rep. 693, and 
 
 163, that where one is placed by Eckert e. Long Island R. Co. 43 N. 
 
 the negligent acts of another in Y. 503; 8. o 3 Am. Rep. 731, and the, 
 
 such a position that he is com- cases generally cited «M;)ra. 
 
 pelled to choose upon the instant, ' Iron Ry. Co. u Mowery, 36 Ohio 
 
 and in the face of apparently grave St. 418. 
 
 and impending peril, between two " Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Carr, 
 
 hazards, and he makes such a choice 35 Ind. 510; Coulter «. American, &c., 
 
 as a person of ordinary care pteed in Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585; Schultz v. 
 
 the game situation might make, and Chicago, &c., R. Co., 44 Wis. 638. 
 
 injury results therefrom, the fact that ' South Covington, &c., Ry. Co. ». 
 
 if he had chosen the other hazard he Ware, 84 Ky. 367; s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 
 
 would haveeicaped injury does not 493;Bi!el».New York, &c.,R. Co., 31 
 
58 THE plaintiff's bight to recover. [§ 42. 
 
 tion in these cases is not what a prudent man under ordinary 
 circumstances would have done, for the suddenness of the 
 emergency, the excitement, and the influence of terror, must 
 be taken into the account ; ^ and what other persons did at 
 the same time may be given in evidence to show what may 
 iave been reasonably prudent under the circumstances.^ In 
 the New York case just cited it appears that the driver of 
 one of the defendant's street cars, in which the plaintiff and 
 several other persons were passengers, attempted to cross 
 the track of the New York Central and Hudson Eiver Eail- 
 road, upon which a train was rapidly approaching, and that 
 the passengers in the car, seeing the danger of being run 
 over, rushed out of the car, with a single exception, and that 
 the plaintiff in so doing fell and was hurt. The car, how- 
 ever, passed the track in safety a,nd avoided the threatened 
 collision. Upon the question of the prudence of leaving the 
 car, evidence as ' to the conduct of the other passengers was 
 held competent. 
 
 § 42. Plaintiff acting erroneously in trying to save 
 human life. — So, also, upon a somewhat analogous principle, 
 
 N. y. 314; Twomley v. Central Park, The question whether the deceased 
 
 &c,, R. Co., 69 N.Y. 158; s. c. 35 Am. exercised due caution was a proper 
 
 Rep. 163; Dyer v. Erie Ry. Co., 71 one for the jury. Cuyler d. Decker, 
 
 N. Y: 228; Wilson e. Northern Pa- 30 Hun, 1*73; Siegrist ■». Arnot, 10 
 
 cific R. Go.,, 36 Minn. 278; Mobile, Mo. App. 197. 
 
 &c., R. Co. V. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15; • Johnson v. West Chester, &c., R. 
 
 Georgia, &c.. Banking Co. v. Rhodes, Co.,' 70 Penn. St. 357; Linnehan v. 
 
 56 Ga. 645; Turner v. Buchanan, 83 Sampson, 126 Mass. 506; s. c. 30 Am. 
 
 Ind. 147; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 485; Rep. 693; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 Bell D. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 17 Week. Rohrman, 13 Week. Notes Cas. 258; 
 
 Dig. (N. Y.) 79; Cook v. Central R. s. c. 39 Albany Law Jour. 97; Karr 
 
 Co. (Ala.), 12 Rep. 856, which was a v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188. The law makes 
 
 «ase where a man, walking over the allowance for the conduct of persons 
 
 trestle-work of a railroad, to avoid an imder the imminency of great peril, 
 
 advancing train, let himself down be- and leaves the circumstances to the 
 
 tween the ties on the trestle, and en- jury to find if the party acted rashly 
 
 deavored to hang down until the train and under an undue apprehension 
 
 should pass above him; unable to of the danger. Galena, &c., R. Co. 
 
 draw himself up, he fell, and died v. Yai'wooi, 17111.509,521; Indian- 
 
 from the effect of the injuries. It was apolis R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143. 
 held that a person is not chargeable « Twomley v. Central Park, &c., R. 
 
 with contributory negligence, who, Co., 69 H. Y. 158; 8. c. 25 Am. Rep. 
 
 when unwarned, peril comes on him, 162; Mobile, &c., R. Co. v. Ashcraft, 
 
 suddenly acts wildly and madly. 48 Ala. 15. 
 
§42.] 
 
 THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO EECOVEE. 
 
 59 
 
 when one risks his life, or places himself in a position of 
 great danger, in an effort to save the life of another, or to 
 protect another who is exposed to a sudden peril, or in dan- 
 ger of great bodily harm, it has been held that such exposure 
 and risk for such a purpose is not negligent. The law has so 
 high a regard for human life that it will not impute negli- 
 gence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such 
 circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of 
 prudent persons.^ Eckert if. Long Island E. Co.^ is a 
 leading authority in poini In that case it appears that 
 the plaintiff intestate, while endeavoring to rescue a child 
 from being tun over by an approaching railway train, 
 was himself struck by the train and so injured that he died.' 
 
 ' Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 57 
 Barb. 555; affirmed, 43 N. T. 503; 
 s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 721. It is not con- 
 tributory negligence in a mother to 
 attempt to rescue her infant child 
 from an approaching train, although 
 she may have negligently allowed it 
 to go on the track. But the defend- 
 ant is not chargeable unless negligent 
 in respect to the child before, or in 
 respect to the mother or child after, 
 the attempt at rescue. Donahoe «. 
 Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 560; 
 s. c. 53 Am. Rep. 594. A mother 
 who is injured by falling into an open 
 hatchway while trying to prevent her 
 f our-year-61d child, who has stumbled, 
 from falling therein, is not necessarily 
 guilty of contributory negligence, al- 
 though the hatchway was reasonably 
 guarded. Clark «. Famous Shoe and 
 Clothing Co., 16 Mo. App. 463. 
 "Where the plaintiff went on the track 
 to save younger children from dan- 
 ger, knowing that the train was com- 
 ing, and only half a mile away, she 
 was not a trespasser. Spooner v. Del- 
 aware, &c., R.C0..115N.Y.32; B.C. 21 
 N. E. Rep. 696. In Peyton v. Texas 
 <& P. Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann. 861; 8. c. 6 
 So. Rep. 690, plaintiff jumped on a rail- 
 road track, immediately in front of a 
 train approaching at high speed, to 
 
 rescue the life of another, and was 
 held not guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence. Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 
 Mass. 506; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 692; 
 Cottrill V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 47 
 Wis. 634; 8. c.,33 Am. Rep. 796; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Raney, 89 Ind. 
 453; 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 173. 
 
 ' 57 Barb. 555. On the other hand, in 
 Blair v. Grand Rapids, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Mich, 124; 8. c. 36N.W. Rep. 855, the 
 facts were that A. , who was not an em- 
 ployee of defendant railroad com- 
 pany, was requested by a watchman 
 to go up the track and notify the con- 
 ductor of an approaching train that 
 there was a broken rail on the track, 
 and being anxious to prevent loss of 
 life, A. did as he was bid and signaled 
 the train to stop. The conductor 
 stopped his train, but started on 
 again, and, while thCiCars were run- 
 ning at about four miles an hour, A. , 
 fearing his signal had not been under- 
 stood, attempted to get on the train 
 and speak to the conductor, when he 
 was thrown off and injured. It was 
 held that A. was guilty of gross con- 
 tributory negligence, and could not 
 recover. 
 
 ' Mr. Justice Grover, in delivering 
 the opinion of the court, said:—" The 
 important question in this case arises 
 
60 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S RIGHT TO EEC0Y;EB. 
 
 [§42. 
 
 In Pennsylvania Co. v. Eoney,* this rule is applied to the 
 case of an engineer of a passenger train who stuck to his 
 locomotive in the face of impending death, and lost his life 
 in an heroic attempt to save his train and the lives of the 
 passengers on board, when he might easily, by jumping from 
 the locomotive, have escaped personal injury.* 
 
 upon the exception taken by the de- 
 fendant's counsel to the denial of his 
 motion for a non-suit made upon the 
 ground that the negligence of the 
 plaintiff's intestate contributed to the 
 injury that caused his death. The 
 evidence showed that the train was 
 approaching in plain view of the de- 
 ceased, and had he, for his own pur- 
 poses, attempted to cross the track, 
 or, with a view to save property, 
 placed himself voluntarily in a posi- 
 tion where he might have received an 
 injury from a collision with the train, 
 his conduct would^ have been grossly 
 negligent, and no recovery could 
 have been had for such injury. But 
 the evidence further showed that 
 there was a small child upon the 
 track, who, if not rescued, must have 
 been inevitably crushed by the rapidly 
 approaching train. This the de- 
 ceased saw, and he owed a duty of 
 important obligation to this child to 
 rescue it from its extreme peril if he 
 could do so without incurring great 
 danger to himself. Negligence im- 
 plies some i.ct of commission or omis- 
 sion wrongful in itself. Under the 
 circumstances in which the deceased 
 was placed it was not wrongful in 
 him to make every effort in his power 
 to rescue the child, compatible with 
 a reasonable regard for his own safety. 
 It was his duty to exercise his judg- 
 ment as to whether he could probably 
 save the child without serious injury 
 to himself. If from the appearances 
 he believed that he could, it wai not 
 negligence to make an attempt so to 
 dOi although believing that possibly 
 he might fall and receive an injury 
 
 himself. He had no time for delibera- 
 tion. He must act instantly if at all, 
 as a moment's delay would have been 
 fatal to the child. The law has so 
 high a regard for human life that it 
 will not impute negligence to an effort 
 to preserve it, unless made under such 
 circumstances as to constitute rashness 
 in the judgment of prudent persons. 
 For a person engaged in his ordinary 
 affairs, or in the mere protection of 
 property, knowingly and voluntarily 
 to place himself in a position where 
 he is liable to receive a serious injury, 
 is negligence, which will preclude a 
 recovery for an injury so received; 
 but when the exposvire is for the 
 purpose of saving life, it is notvnrong- 
 ful, and therefore not negligent, un- 
 less such as to be regarded either 
 rash or reckless. The jury were 
 warranted in finding the deceased free 
 from negligence under the rule as 
 above stated." 
 
 • 89 Ind. 453; B. c. 46 Am. Eep. 
 173. 
 
 ' The same rule was applied in Cen- 
 tral K. Co. V. Crosby, 74 Ga. 787, 
 where an engineer remained at his 
 post and lost his life, though he might 
 have saved it by jumping out. See, 
 also, Cottrill V. Chicago, &c., K. Co., 
 47 Wis. 634; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 796, 
 which presents a similar state of facts. 
 The court well said:^"Who shall sit in 
 judgment upon this brave engineer to 
 coolly determine the alternative risks 
 and chances which he -is compelled to 
 take instantly ? It will never do to 
 establish a rule by which a man's 
 standing at his post and facing danger 
 will be negligence." 
 
§ 44.] THE plaintiff's bight to becovee. 61 
 
 § 43. No duty or right to be generous at the expense of 
 another. — It will be borne in mind that the fundamental 
 principles of the law of negligence cannot be abandoned even 
 to indemnify one who has suffered injury while exhibiting con- 
 summate courage and self-sacrifice in an extremity of peril. 
 The defendant must not be a " forgotten man." There must 
 be a default on his part, p, want of ordinary care, or the 
 plaintiff cannot recover. Thus^ in Evansville, &c., E. Co. v. 
 Hiatt,^ the plaintiff ran upon a railway track in front of an 
 approaching train to save his aged father who was carelessly 
 o6 the track. The plaintiff was himself struck by the train, 
 but the railrdteid operatives had made every effort to stop, 
 and upon all the facts in the case the proximate causes of the 
 injury could not possibly be traced to them. The court held 
 the defendant not liable,' and this is a sound rule. 
 
 § 44. The contrary rule considered.— The Court of Ap- 
 peals of New York has, however, taken the ground that, when 
 such risks are assumed, even to save property from destruc- 
 tion, allowance ought to be made for the excitement under 
 which one acts in such a case, and that running into danger 
 for this purpose may not, in view of all the circumstances, 
 be such negligence as will bar a recovery for a neigligent in- 
 jury.' And, upon the same theory, perhaps, it has been 
 held that when one, in the discharge of a legal duty, does an 
 act manifestly perilous, and suffers in consequence of the 
 negligence of another, he may have his action for the dam- 
 
 ' 17 Ind. 102. N. Y. 312; 8. c. 36 Am. Rep. 608. A 
 
 ' But in Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 woman left the house where she lived, 
 
 Penn. St. 74; b. c. 27 Am. Rep. 684, and went 40 or 50 rods, to where there 
 
 one endeavoring to save another who was a fire set by defendant's locomo- 
 
 had fallen into a pit which was un- tive. In attempting to extinguish the 
 
 fenced and left entirely uniUuminated fire she was fatally burned. The 
 
 at night, himself fell in, and he was house where she lived was not then in 
 
 not allowed to recover on the ground danger, nor did she have any interest 
 
 that the pit was dug on private lands, in the property which was on fire. It 
 
 the owner of which was under no was held that the proximate cause of 
 
 necessity to provide exceptional safe- her injury was her own voluntary act, 
 
 guards for legitimate occupations and there could be no recovery. iPike 
 
 performed thereon. «. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 
 
 'Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601; 255. 
 Wasmer «. Delaware, &c., R. Co.,. 80 
 
62 THE plaintiff's eight to eecoveb. [§ 44. 
 
 ages he sustains.* This is equivalent, it may be, to a rule 
 that doing one's duty in a lawful manner is not contributory 
 negligence, for in the Maine case just referred to, it appears, 
 that a detective, in search for smugglers, whose duty required: 
 him to go about upon a defective wharf in the night, without 
 carrying a lantern, which would obviously defeat the purpose 
 of his going, was injured by falling into the water through 
 an opening in the wharf negligently left unguarded and un- 
 lighted by the defendants. It was held that, inasmuch as thei 
 detective was doing his dutyj in a lawful manner, which was 
 also the only practicable manner of doing it at that time, he 
 might recover damages, whereas, it is plain that under ordi- 
 nary circumstances, to. wander about at night upon a dark 
 wharf without a lantern, might be grossly negligent.^ The 
 opinion of Barrows, J., in this case, is a full and luminous 
 presentation of the law in point. The question whether the 
 plaintiff's conduct in all the cases referred to in this section 
 was wanting in reasonable prudence and caution in view of 
 all the circumstances, is not one of law, but of fact. It. 
 should be submitted to the jury " as a question peculiarly 
 for them to decide." * " The question," says Mr. Justice Bar- 
 rows, in the very able opinion, to which I have already re- 
 ferred,* " are not of a character to be dispose d of by a little 
 neat logic. They are rather, as remarked by the court in 
 Elliott V. Pray, 10 Allen, 384, ' questions which can be best 
 
 ' Low e. Grand Trunk R. Co., 72 fendant is chargeable with neglect of 
 
 Me. 313; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 331. some legal duty. The owner of a city 
 
 " Low D. Grand Tnmk R. Co., lot bounded by a street cut down by 
 
 7a Me. 313; B. c. 39 Am. Rep. 331. the city 38 feet below the grade of 
 
 An officer, for the purpose of mak- the lot, not being bound to guard the 
 
 ing a lawful arrest, and at the re- precipice, was held not responsible 
 
 quest of the tenant of premises which for the death of a policeman who 
 
 thelandlord was bound to keep.in re- came upon the lot in pursuit of, an 
 
 pair, entered them in the night time oflender and fell into the street, 
 
 and stepped into an open well, of Woods v. Lloyd (Penn.), 16 Atl. Rep. 
 
 which there was no indication, the 48. See, also, Galligan v. Metacomet 
 
 well being in the natural and obvious Mfg. Co., 143 Mass. 537. 
 
 approach. The landlord was held • Linnehan v. Sampson, 136 Mass. 
 
 liable. Learoyd «. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 506; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 693. 
 
 315. But, though the plaintiff be in- * Low v. Grand Trunk, i&c, R. Co.,, 
 
 nocent of any fault, there can, of 72 Me. 313; b. c. 39 Am. Rep. 331. 
 course, be no recovery unless the de- 
 
§45.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S EIGHT TO BECOTEE. 
 
 63 
 
 determined by practical men on a view of all the facts and 
 circumstances bearing on the issue.' " 
 
 § 45. Plaintiff doing an illegal act. — It is no defense to an 
 action for negligence that the plaintiff was engaged in vio- 
 lating the law in a given particular at the time of the hap- 
 pening of the accident, unless the violation of law was a 
 proximate and efficient cause of the injury.* Some mere col- 
 lateral wrong-doing by the plaintiff, that has no tendency to 
 occasion the injury, cannot, of course, avail the defendant 
 through whose negligence the injury has been suffered. 
 Thus, for example, driving on the wrong side of the road 
 will not, as a matter of law, prevent a recovery in case of a 
 collision. It is a circumstance to go to the jury on the ques- 
 tion of the plaintiff's negligence.' So, also, one who places 
 his wagon in the street for the purpose of loading it, in such 
 a position as to violate a city ordinance, may, nevertheless, 
 recover from one who negligently runs into it,^ and in Baker 
 
 ' MinerlyD.TJnionFerry Co., 9N.Y. 
 Supl. 104; B. c. 56 Hun, 113, where the 
 pilot of a ferry boat was injured in a 
 collision. It was held that his viola- 
 tion of a statute regulating speed and 
 course merely placed the burden upon 
 him of showing, not only that defend- 
 ants were negligent, but that his vio- 
 lation of the statute in no way con- 
 tributed to the injury. SpofEord v. 
 Harlow, 3 Allen, 176; Welch ■». Wes- 
 son, 6 Gray, 305. In Steele v. Burk- 
 hardt, 104 Mass. 59 ; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 
 191, the court says: — " It is true gen- 
 erally that, while no person can main- 
 tain an action to which he must trace 
 his title through his own breach of 
 law, yet the fact that he is breaking 
 the law does not leave him remediless 
 for injuries wilfully or carelessly done 
 to him and to which his conduct has 
 not contributed." Hall®. Ripley, 119 
 Mass. 135; Morton v. Gloster, 46 Me. 
 520; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 335; 
 Hamilton v. Goding, 55 Me. 438; Baker 
 V. Portland. 58 Me. 199; s. c. 4 Am. 
 Rep. 374; Neanow v. Ullech, 46 Wis. 
 
 581 ; Klipper v. Coffey, 44 Md. 117, 
 where the donlcey case (10 Mee. & W. 
 546) is cited to sustain the proposition. 
 Albert v. Bleecker St. R. Co., 3 Daly, 
 839; Griggs».Fleckinstein,14Minn.81; 
 Davidson v. Portland, 69 Me. 116; s. c. 
 31 Am. Rep. 353. In Street ». Laumier, 
 34 Mo. 469, the defendant's horse and 
 wagon, by the carelessness of defend- 
 ant's servants, and without any fault 
 of the plaintiff, ran against and in- 
 jured the horse and wagon of the lat- 
 ter, which were standing in the street. 
 The jury was ^harged to find for the 
 plaintiff, provided this horse and wag- 
 on were "properly " in the street, and 
 he showed no want of care. Prom 
 this it might perhaps be doubted 
 whether. It the plaintiff had been vio- 
 lating a law in allowing his vehicle to 
 remain thus, the court would have ar- 
 rived at the same conclusion. 
 
 ' Spofford V. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176; 
 Lyons ». Child, 61 N. H. 73. 
 
 ' The court should instruct the jury 
 that, if the unlawful act contributed 
 to cause the alleged injury, the plaint- 
 
6i THE plaintiff's BIGHT TO BEOOVEE. [§ 47. 
 
 V. Portland,^ the Court says : — [The fact that the plaintiff] 
 " was smoking a cigar in the streets, in violation, of a munic- 
 ipal ordinance, while it might subject the offender to a pen- 
 alty, will not excuse the town for a neglect to make its ways 
 safe and convenient for travelers, if the commission of the 
 plaintiff's offense did not in any degree contribute to produce 
 the injury bf which he complains." 
 
 § 46. Wilfal negligence of the defendant.— This rule is 
 especially applicable in cases where the defendant's negli- 
 gence is wilful or wanton. In those cases the plaintiff's col- 
 lateral fault, or violation of law, is least of all a defense, as, 
 for instance, where the parties were trotting their horses, in 
 competition, on a highway where such high speed was for- 
 bidden by a municipal ordinance, and the defendant wilfully 
 ran into the plaintiff's sleigh and caused him an injury, the 
 plaintiff's unlawful act in one particular was held not to ex- 
 empt the defendant from his obligation to respond in dam- 
 ages, for the injurious consequences of his own illegal mis- 
 behavior in another,' 
 
 § 47. When plaintiff acts in violation of law.— But when 
 the plaintiff is obliged to lay the foundation of his action in 
 his own violation of law, he cannot recover.' And when his 
 illegal act also contributes to produce the injury of which 
 he complains, he has no action unless the defendant acted 
 wantonly,* but when the defendant's conduct amounts to wil- 
 fulness, or a reckless disregard of another's rights, it seems 
 to be the doctrine of the Massachusetts case just cited, that 
 not even the unlawful character of the plaintiff's act, in ad- 
 dition to the fact that it contributes to produce the injury, 
 
 iff was not in tbe exercise of due care. Smith u Boston, &c., R. Co.j 120 
 
 and he cannot recover. Newcomb ». Mass. '490;, s. c. 31 Am. Rep. 538; 
 
 Boston Protective Department, 146 Bosworth v. Swansej*-, 10 Mete. 363; 
 
 B. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 555. s. c. 48 Am. Dec. 441; "Woodman ». 
 
 ' 58 Me. 199. JHubbard, 35 N. H. 67; Phalen «. 
 
 ' Welch ®. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505; Clark, 19 Conn. 421; s. c. 50 Am. 
 
 Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59; Dec. 253; Simpson e. Bloss, 7 Taunt, 
 
 s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 191; Wallace «. Mer- 246. 
 
 rimack, «fcc., Nav. Co., 134 Mass. 96, » Bank s. Highland Street R, Co., 
 
 and generally the cases cited »upra. 136 Mass. 485; Parker v. Nassau, 59 
 
 s Way 0. Foster, 1 Allen, 408; N. H. 402. 
 
§ 48.] THE plaintiff's eight to kecover. 65 
 
 is sufficient to excuse the defendant. In Illinois, the illegal 
 and fraudulent character of the act — as where one traveling 
 upon a non-transferable free railroad pass, issued to another 
 person, and passing himself off as such person, was injured 
 by the negligence of the servants of a railway company — is of 
 itself held sufficient to prevent a recovery for such injury, 
 unless the negligence of the railway company was so gross as 
 to amount to wilfulness.^ So, also, where one is on a train 
 *' stealing a ride," or paying no fare through stealth or fraud, 
 and is killed by the negligence of the company his represen- 
 tatives can recover no damages therefor.' The soundness of 
 the conclusions reached by the court in these cases may be 
 fairly questioned. The plaintiff's illegal act in riding upon 
 a pass which did not belong to him, or in riding without 
 paying fare, was in no possible way a cause of the injury he 
 sustained. It was purely a collateral violation of law, and 
 as such, upon principle, was no proper defense to the action 
 for negligence. 
 
 § 48. A misapplication of the rule.— The Supreme Court 
 of Georgia, in reconstruction times, in a case in which their 
 patriotism very far outran their judgment, reached the as- 
 tonishing conclusion that an employee of a railway company, 
 injured while the train on which he was employed was en- 
 gaged in transporting troops and munitions of, war for the 
 Oonfederate States, could not recover damages against the 
 company, if he was voluntarily so engaged for the purpose 
 of making war upon the government of the United States.' 
 The court applied the maxim " In pari delicto potior est condi- 
 
 ' Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 steamboat, his unlawful act necessa- 
 
 111. 80; 8. 0. 28 Am. Kep. 613. It is rily contributes tp the injury, and he 
 
 also there held that a passenger rid- can maintain no action; but if the 
 
 ing under a free tickiet can only hold act of those in charge of the steam- 
 
 the company for negligence which boat, in running against the plaintifiE's 
 
 must be of the degree of recklessness, yacht, was wanton and malicious, his 
 
 In Wallace v. Merrimack, &c., Co., right of action will no longer be 
 
 1S4 Mass. 95, it was held that if a barred. 
 
 person sails for pleasure in his yacht " Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Brooks, 81 
 
 on "the Lord's day," in violation of 111. 345; Chicago, &c., R. Cd. v. 
 
 the Gen. Sts. C. 84, § 2, and if, while Michie, 83 111. 427. 
 
 he is so sailing, his yacht is injured ' "Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga. 199. 
 by being negligently run into by a 
 
 5 
 
66 THE plaintiff's eight to recoveb. [§ 49. 
 
 Ho de/endentis et possidentis," but whether it proceeded upon 
 the principle of this maxim, or upon any other principle, it 
 was wholly absurd to charge the employee with legal respon- 
 sibility. Even if the company was chargeable with fault, 
 this man had not the remotest share in it. He was no more 
 legally or morally responsible for the sort of freight the 
 railway that employed him transported, than for the pertur- 
 bations of Jove's satellites during the period of the civil war. 
 His obliquity was as great in the one matter as in the other. 
 But, for the purpose of the other view, granting never so 
 much fault on his part in the matter pretended, it was wholly 
 a collateral violation of law, which, as we have seen, is not a 
 defense in an action of negligence — as far removed from 
 being a cause of his injury as the east is from the west. 
 Into such vagaries and juridical nonsense have the courts 
 drifted in attempting refinements upon the elementary princi- 
 ples of the law of contributory negligence.* The rule that col- 
 lateral violations of law shall not operate as a defense in an 
 action brought to recover damages occasioned by the negli- 
 gence of another, if it were thought possible to impute fault 
 to this employee, applied to this case, would have given a cor- 
 rect "result. And the other undoubted rule that a train-man 
 is not a fellow-servant with the contracting freight agent, or 
 superintendent of a railroad, or with a military officer of the 
 Confederate government, applied to the case in hand, would 
 also have given a proper result. If the servant had suffered 
 by the master's neglect, without contributing to his own 
 injury, he ought to have recovered, and, under a fair appli- 
 cation of the reasonable rules of law in point, he would have 
 recovered. 
 
 § 49. When plaintiff and defendant are in pa/ri delicto. — 
 It must, to continue, be remembered that when the defend- 
 ant's negligence is also a violation of law, that is to say, ' 
 when both plaintiff and defendant are doing an unlawful act 
 at the time of the catastrophe, or when the plaintiff's act is 
 merely negligent and that of the defendant unlawful, the de^ 
 fendant's violation of law will not operate in favor of the 
 
 " Martini). Wallace, 40 Ga. 52; Cannon v. Rowland, 34 Ga. 423: b. c. 35 
 Ga. 105. 
 
§49.] 
 
 THE plaintiff's RIGHT TO RECOVER. 
 
 67 
 
 plaintiff any more than that of the plaintiff will in favor of 
 the defendant. In such a case, where the party injured has 
 been guilty of contributory negligence he cannot recover on 
 the ground that the defendant's negligence is a violation of 
 law. Where, for example, the locomotive engineer fails to give 
 proper signals, or those required by law, at a crossing, and 
 one is injured in attempting to cross without looking up and 
 down the track for a train, which is contributory negligence, 
 the unlawful omission of the signals is not a sufficient ground 
 for a recovery non obstante} 
 
 ' Atchison, &c., Jl. Co., ». Walz, 40 
 Kan. 433; s c.l9Pac. Rep 787; Cullen 
 «. Delaware &H. Canal Co., 113 N. Y. 
 667; 8.C. 21 N.E. Rep. 716, Danforth, 
 J., dissenting; Evans Brick Co. ■». St. 
 Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 17 Mo. App. 
 634; Maryland Central R. Co. v. 
 Neubeur, 63 Md. 391; Williams b. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 64 Wis. 1; 
 Taylor v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 86 
 Mo. 467; Ivens v. Cincinnati, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 103 Ind. 37; Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co. V. State. 69 Md. 551; b. c. 16 Atl. 
 Rep. 313; Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stebbing, 63 Md. 504; Meeks v. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co., 53 Cal. 603; 
 Curry ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 43 
 Wis. 666. The unlawful omission of 
 the signals is negligence per se. Chi- 
 cago, &c , R. Co. e.Hanley, 36 111. App. 
 351; Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Voelker, 129 111. 540; s.c. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 20; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Boggs, 101 
 Ind. 622; but the law does not pre- 
 sume that the accident was caused 
 thereby. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hanley, 26 111. App. 351; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. McKean, 40 111. 218. 
 A man cannot cover up his eyes and 
 ears and go upon a railroad track at 
 the time a train approaches, and then 
 hold a company liable because there 
 is a law requiring it to ring a bell. 
 Leduke v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 4 
 Mo. App. 486, 488; Eaton v. ErieRy. 
 Co., 51 N. Y. 544; Maginnia «. N. Y., 
 &c.,R. Co., 52 N.Y. 315; Hinckley ». 
 
 Cape Cod R. Co., 130 Mass. 259; Har- 
 lan V. 8t.Louis, &c., R. Co., 64 Mo. 480; 
 8. c. 65 Mo. 22; Rothe v. Milwaukee, 
 &c.. R. Co., 21 Wis. 256; Galena, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Dill, 23 111. 364. See, also, 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co. u Hetherington, 
 83 111. 510; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Berlink, 3 Brad. App. 437; and 
 cases on duty to "look and listen," 
 infra, § 181. The plaintiff recovers 
 in the absence of contributory 
 neglig^ce. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Breitling (Tex.), 12 S. W. Rep. 1121; 
 Bitner v. Utah Cent. Ry. Co., 4 Utah, 
 503; s. c. 11 PacRep. 630; Cumming 
 V. Brooklyn City R. Co., 38 Hun (N.Y.) 
 363. In Duffy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co., 19 Mo. App. 380, and Bergman 
 V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 678, 
 the plaintiff recovered, though negli- 
 gent himself, where the defendant's 
 unlawful act was deemed to be the 
 cause of the injury. In an action for 
 death, caused by natural gas, while 
 deceased was at work in defendant's 
 mine, the failure of the defendant to 
 employ the statutory safeguards 
 against such accidents (2 Starr & C. 
 St., c. 93, pars. 4-6) was held to be 
 immaterial, unless it were shown that 
 such safeguards would have prevented 
 the accident. Coal Run Coal Co. v. 
 Jones. 127 III. 379; 8. c. 20N.E. Rep. 
 89. See the following additional cases 
 standing for the general proposition 
 that mere collateral violations of law, 
 on the part either of the plaintiff or de- 
 
68 
 
 THE PLAINTIFFS EIGHT TO RECOVER. 
 
 [§50. 
 
 § 50. Plaintiff a trespasser.— It is .a general rule that 
 when the defendant's negligence is wilful, contributory neg- 
 
 fendant, will not, on the one hand, bar 
 the plaintiff's right of action, nor, on 
 the othef , make the defendant liable 
 to pa/' damages, as the text declares. 
 Smith f. Smith, 2 Pick. 631 ; s. c. 13' 
 Am. Dec. 484; "Wallace ». Merrimack, 
 &c.. Navigation Co., ]34Masg.95; s.c. 
 45 Am. Rep. 301. Plaintiff negli- 
 gently permitting his cattle to come' 
 in contact with defendant's diseased 
 cattle unlawfully in the State. Coyle 
 ■V. Conway, 35 Mo. App.490 ; Patee v. 
 Adams, 37 Kan. 133; s.c. 14Pac. Rep. 
 505. In the case last cited it was 
 held that knowledge by defendant of 
 the diseased condition of the animals 
 was also essential to a recovery 
 against him. Phila., &c., R. Co. v. 
 Phila., &c., Towboat Co., 38 How. 
 309. Driving a sleigh without bells, 
 in violation of a statute, does not 
 make the driver liable, if not negli- 
 gent, nor exempt a town from' liabil- 
 ity for Injuries caused by collision 
 upon a defective highway. Kidder ». 
 Dunstable, 11 Gray, 343; Counter v. 
 Couch. 8 Allen, 436; Keams «. Snow- 
 den, 104 Mass. 63; Hall ®. Corcoran, 
 107 Maos. 68. A boy of eleven, 
 while loitering on a railroad track, 
 was struck by a train which was going 
 faster than the city ordinance permit- 
 ted. He could not recover. Mas- 
 ser «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 68 Iowa, 
 602; "Wrinn v. Jones, 113 Iowa, 360; 
 Damon v. Scituate, 119 Iowa, 66; Smith 
 «. Conway, 131 Iowa, 316. Sutton ». 
 "Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 31; s. c. 9 Am. 
 Rep. 534, where the plaintiff violated 
 a statute by driving his cattle to mar- 
 ket on Sunday, when they were in- 
 jured by thd breaking down of a de- 
 fective bridge. Carroll «. Staten 
 Island R. Co., 58 N. Y. 136; Hoff- 
 man B. Union Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 
 385; Mohney v. Cook, 36 Penn. St. 
 342. In a leailned opinion by Bell, 
 
 J., in Norris ». Litchfield, 85 N. H. 
 371, 377, the rule is well laid down as 
 follows;— "As a general principle it 
 seems to us wholly immaterial 
 whether, in the abstract, the plaintiff 
 was a wrong-doer or a trespasser, or 
 was acting in violation of the law. 
 For his wrong or trespass, he is an- 
 swerable in damages, and he may be 
 punishable for his violation of law; 
 but his rights as to other persons, and 
 as to other transactions, are not af- 
 fected by that circumstance. A 
 Ijraveler may be traveling on a turn- 
 pike without payment of toll, or may 
 be riding on a day when riding is for- 
 bidden, or with a speed forbidden by 
 law, etc. ; yet in none of these cases is 
 his right of action for any injury he 
 may sustain from the negUgent con- 
 duct of another in any way affected. 
 He is none the less entitled to recover, 
 unless it appears that his negligence or 
 fault has directly contributed to his 
 damage." Gale v. Lisbon, 53 N. H. 
 174; Parkers. Nassau, 59 N. H.403; 
 Jennings v. Wayne, 68 Me. 468; 
 Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, 652 ; 
 s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 414; Baldwin ». Bar- 
 ney, 12R.L 393; 8. c. 34 Am. Rep. 670; 
 Kerwhackers. Cleveland, &c., R. Cb., 
 3 OhioSt.173; Morrison «. Genl. Steam 
 Nav. Co., 8 Exch. 731; Dimes s. 
 Petley, 15Q.B.376; Aston ». Heaven, 
 3 Espin. 533 ; Chicago, &c., R Co. s. 
 McKean, 40111. 318; St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Manly, 58 HI. 300; Kepperly 
 v. Ramsden. 83 111. 354; McClary «. 
 Lowell, 44 Vt. 116; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 
 366; Powhattan, &c., Co. v. Appo- 
 mattox R. Co., 34 How. (U. S.) 347; 
 Daley «. Norwich, &c., R. Co., 26 
 Conn. 591; Simmonson v. Stellen- 
 meirf, Edm. Sel. Cas. 194; Wharton 
 on Negligence, §§ 330, 381a, 405, 955; 
 Cooley on Torts, § 157. See, also, 
 infra, % 185. 
 
§50.] 
 
 THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO EECOVEB. 
 
 69 
 
 ligence is not a defense, and, accordingly, it is held that a 
 mere technical trespasses not such an offense as to deprive 
 the trespasser of his right to recover damage for an injury 
 which he suffers through the wilful negligence of another. 
 The bare fact that one trespasses upon my land, does not 
 place him so far beyond the pale of the law that I may, with 
 impunity, inflict an injury upon him ; ^ the owner of prop- 
 erty is under no legal obligation to keep it in a safe condition 
 for trespq,s8ers.' When, however, the circumstances are such 
 
 ■ The court, in Keedham v. San 
 Francisco, &c., R. Co., 37 Cal. 409, 
 says: — " A wrong-doer is not an out- 
 law, against whom every man may 
 lift his hand. Neither his life, limbs 
 nor property are held at the mercy of 
 his adversary. On the contrary, the 
 latter is bound to conduct himself 
 with reasonable care and prudence, 
 notwithstanding the fault of the for- 
 mer; and if by so doing he can avoid 
 injuring the person or property of the 
 former, he is liable if he does not, if 
 by reason thereof injiuy ensues." 
 Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dakota, 151; 
 Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head, 610; 
 Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. v. Graham, 
 95Ind. 286; s. c.'48 Am. Rep. 719. 
 In Georgia it was held, through a pe- 
 culiar provision of the Code, that if 
 one voluntarily becomes drunk, and 
 consequently falls down, or lies down, 
 in a state of insensibility on a railroad 
 track, so that he is injured by a pass- 
 ing train, he cannot recover for inju- 
 ries so received, even though the em- 
 ployees of the road may have been 
 negligent. Southwestern R. Co. v. 
 Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114; Kerwhacker 
 *. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 
 172; Norris «. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271; 
 State B. Manchester, Ac, R. Co., 52 
 N. H. 528; Mason e. Missouri Pac. R. 
 Co., 27 Kansas, 83; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 405. Brown v. Lynn, 31 Penn. St. 
 510, which holds that a trespasser has 
 a perfect right to presume that ordi- 
 nary care will be used to protect his 
 
 property from injury. Marble e. 
 Ross, 124 Mass. 44; Houston, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Sympkins, 54 Tex. 615; b. c. 
 38 Am. Rep. 632; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Kellam, 92 111. 245; s. c. 34 
 Am. Rep. 128; Isabel v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 475; Herring v. 
 Wilmington, &c., R. Co., 10 Ired. 
 (Law) 402; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 395; 
 Meeks v. Southern Pacific R. Co. , 56 
 Cal. 513; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 67; Mul- 
 herrin v. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 81 
 Penn. St. 366; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. 
 0. State, 33 Md. 542; "Weymire «. 
 "Wolfe, 52 Iowa, 533; Lake Shore, 
 &c., R. Co., V. Miller, 25 Mich. 279; 
 Little Rock, &c., R. Co. v. Pank- 
 hurst, 36 Arki 371 ; Birge «. Gardner, 
 19 Conn. 507; 8. c. 50 Am. Dec. 361; 
 Daley v. Noiwich, &c., R. Co., 26 Am. 
 Dec. 591; Isbell ». New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 27 Conn. 393. In this case it 
 was held that where, by mismanage- 
 ment of a railroad company, cattle on 
 the track are injured, their owner 
 may recover, notwitiistanding the 
 fact that the animals were trespassing. 
 To preclude an action, the owner 
 must have been guilty of actual neg- 
 ligence, and not of a mere technical 
 wrong. Shearman & Redfleld on 
 Negligence, 4th ed., §S 97, 98; Thomp- 
 son on Negligence, 303, 1162; "Whar- 
 ton on Negligence, § 344 ei aeq. 
 • ' Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1 ; 
 Kohn V. Lovett, 44 Ga. 251 ; Roulston 
 V. Clark, 3 E. D. Smith, 366. Thus, 
 where one is injured by falling through 
 
70 
 
 THE plaintiff's BIGHT TO EECOVEB. 
 
 [§50. 
 
 as to imply an invitation to go upon the property, he who 
 enters is no longer a trespasser, and the owner is bound to 
 exercise ordinary care and prudence toward him. The invi- 
 tation or license, express or implied, creates this duty.* So 
 
 a trap-door in a portion of a factory 
 exclusively used by workmen, he not 
 having the slightest allurement to en- 
 ter, no action can be maintained. 
 Zoebisch v. Tarbell, 10 Allen, 385. 
 Frost V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 10 Al- 
 len, 387; Morgan v. City of Hallowell, 
 57 Me. 377; Lary v. Cleveland, &c., 
 R. Co., 78 Ind. 323; B. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 573; Parker v. Portland Publishing 
 Co., 69 Me. 173; b. c. 31 Am. Rep. 
 363; Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Penn. St. 
 74; Severy v. Nickerson, 130 Mass. 
 306; B. c. 31 Am. Rep. 514; Pierce ». 
 Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127; s. c. 21 Am. 
 Rep. 120; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. God- 
 frey, 71 111. 500; s. 0. 33 Am. Rep. 
 112. The old case of Blyth v. Top- 
 ham, Cro. Jac. 158 (cited in Comyn's 
 Digest, Action upon the Case for a 
 Nuisance, C), held that an action 
 would not lie for digging a pit in a 
 common, by means of which a stray 
 mare ' tumbled in and perished. 
 Hardcastle «. The South Yorkshire 
 Ry. Co., 4 Hurl. & N. 67; s. c. 28 L. 
 J. (Exch.) 139; Goutret v. Egerton, 
 L.R. 3 C. P. 371; s. c. 86 L. J. (C. 
 P.) 191; 15 "Week. Rep. 688; 16 L. T. 
 (N. S.) 17 ; Stone s. Jackson, 16 C. B. 
 199; 8. 0. 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 349; 
 Balch t. Smith, 7 Hurl. &N. 786; B.C. 
 8Jur. (K 8.) 197; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 
 301: 10 "Week. Rep. 387; 6 L. T. (N. 
 S.) 158; Hounsell ». Smyth, 7 C. B. 
 (N. S.) 731; 8. c. 6 Jur. (N. S.) 897; 
 29 L. J. iC. P.) 203; 8 "Week. Rep. 
 337. Not even though the trespasser 
 is an infant. Frost ». Eastern R. Co., 
 64 N. H. 330; B.C. 9 Atl. Rep. 790. But. 
 see Turn-table cases, &c., infra, § 205 
 et seg., where defendant is held 
 responsible for objects alluring 
 children. McDonald v. Union Pac. 
 
 Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 38, is a 
 strong case. Defendant company, 
 in operating its coal mine, sank a 
 shaft, and threw out a pile of slack, 
 on its own ground, which caught fire, 
 and smouldered a long time, tmtil it 
 sank to the surface of the ground, on 
 the top nothing appearing but lifeless 
 ashes, but there being live coals im- 
 demeath. This was close to a town 
 of 700 inhabitants, was not fenced in, 
 and no notice was posted to warn per- 
 sons of the danger. PlaintifE, a boy 
 12 years of age, and a stranger in the 
 town, being threatened by some 
 miners, and fleeing from them, ran 
 across the slack, supposing it to be 
 nothing but ashes, and was severely 
 burned. It was held that defendant/ 
 had a right to put the slack on its own 
 ground, and that plaintiff was a mere 
 trespasser. See, also, "Woods v. Lloyd 
 (Penn.), 16 Atl. Rep. 43; Galliganu. 
 Metacomet Manuf. Co., 143 Mass. 527. 
 In an action for injuries received in 
 the manufactory of the defendants, 
 the general allegation that plaintiff 
 was lawfully on the premises was held 
 suflacient to show that he was not a 
 trespasser, but not that he was there 
 with greater right than that of a mere 
 licensee. Matthews v. Bonsee, 51 N. 
 J. Law, 30; Gwynn v. Duffleld, 66 
 Iowa, 708; Jewson v. Gath, 1 C. & E. 
 564. 
 
 ' Id Graves «. Thomas, 96 Ind. 361 ; 
 s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 737, where the pub- 
 lic had used a path across a city lot 
 for eight years, the owner was held 
 liable to the plaintiff, who fell into an 
 unguarded excavation near the path, 
 on a dark night. In Campbell v. 
 Boyd, 88 N. C 129; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 
 503, a private- way was opened by the 
 
§50.] 
 
 THE plaintiff's RIGHT TO BECOVER. 
 
 71 
 
 it is said that the owner, in such a case, is bound to take the 
 same care of one who enters his house by invitation, that he 
 
 defendant for his own convenience, 
 and a bridge built over a creek which 
 ran across it, and the public used the 
 same with his knowledge and permis- 
 sion. The plaintiff sustained injury 
 caused by the breaking of the bridge, 
 which, though apparently in good 
 condition, the defendant knew to be 
 unsafe. Held that he was liable to the 
 plaintiff in damages. See, also, 
 Hooker v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 76 
 Wis. 542. In Cusick v. Adams, 115 
 N. T. 53, under like circumstances, it 
 w^as held that the defendant owed no 
 duty to the plaintiff in regard to the 
 bridge. In tMs case, however, the 
 danger was patent. Even a person 
 invited cannot hold the owner liable 
 if the latter is ignorant of the defect. 
 Eisenberg v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 33 Mo. App. 85. The owner or occu- 
 pier of a dock is liable for damages 
 to a person who makes use of it by his 
 invitation, for an injury caused by the 
 unsafe condition of the dock, which 
 he permits to exist the person himself 
 •exercising due care. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co.-o. Atha, 23 Fed. Rep. 920. 
 One who negligently permits the tim- 
 bers of his wharf to become rotten so 
 that they give way, is liable if a per- 
 son rightly there is injured by the fall. 
 Albert v. State, 66 Md. 335; Fitzpat- 
 rick V. Garrison, &c., Ferry Co., 1 
 N.T. Supl. 794. The visitor must exer- 
 cise ordinary care himself. Caniff v. 
 Blanchard Nav. Co., 66 Mich. 638; 
 s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 744. Sweeny v. Old 
 Colony, &c., R. Co., 10 Allen, 368. 
 Here a railroad company was held lia- 
 ble to a person having occasion to 
 cross the track on a crossing made by 
 the company expressly to afford means 
 of passing between two public roads, 
 hecause having built the crossing and 
 placed a flagman there for that pur- 
 pose, and the flagman having assured 
 
 the party injured he could cross in 
 safety, there was not merely a permis- 
 sion, but a distinct invitation to cross. 
 " A licensee can only maintain an ac- 
 tion against his licensor when the dan- 
 ger through which he has sustained 
 hurt was of a latent character, which 
 the licensor knew of and the licensee 
 did not." Shirley's Leading Cases, 
 276, Campbell v. Boyd, 88 N. C. 139; 
 B. c. 43 Am. Rep. 740 ; Buesching v. 
 St. Louis Gas Light Co., 73 Mo. 219; 
 s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 503; Hay ward v. 
 Miller, 94 111. 349; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 229; McAlpin v. Powell, 70 N. T. 126; 
 B. c. 26 Am. Rep. 5S5, and note; 
 Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 
 Me. 552; B. c. 16 Am. Rep. 503; Mc- 
 Kone «. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 51 
 Mich. 601; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 596; 
 Davis V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 58 Wis. 
 646 ; 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 667 ; Bennett 
 1). Railroad, 103 IT. S. 577; Barry®. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 93 N. Y. 289. 
 The owner of premises is under no 
 liability to a licensee unless something 
 in the nature of a trap or concealed 
 danger exists, for the licensee must 
 take the premises as he finds them. 
 He must take them as they are, save 
 as above mentioned, for better and 
 for worse. Tolhausen v. Davies, 57 
 L. J. Q. B. 392. 'In Southcote v. 
 Stanley, 1 Hurl. & N. 247; 8. c. 35 L. 
 J. (Exch.) 339, where a visitor was in- 
 jured in the house of his host by, the 
 falling of a glass on him, and brought 
 action declaring that the accident oc- 
 curred "by and through the mere 
 carelessness, negligence, default and 
 improper conduct" of the host, the 
 court, by Bramwell, B., made a dis- 
 tinction between acts of commission 
 and omission on the part of the de- 
 fendant, holding that in the former he 
 would be held liable, but not in the 
 latter. So that, for example, if he 
 
72 
 
 THE PLAINTIFFS BIGHT TO BECOVEK. 
 
 [§ 61. 
 
 takes of himself and the other members of his household, 
 and that he must not -expose him to hidden dangers of which 
 he is himself aware, especially if the danger is in nature of a 
 trap.^ 
 
 § 51. InTitation upon or license to go npon dangerous 
 premises. — An invitation, in the technical sense of the word, 
 will be inferred where there is a common interest or mutual 
 advantage ; as, for instance, there is an implied invitation to 
 the public generally to enter business houses for the purpose 
 of transacting business.' In such a case the law imposes 
 upon the owner, or proprietor, the duty of exercising ordinary 
 care. " The owner, or occupant of land," says Mr. Justice 
 
 had omitted to air his visitor's sheets, 
 whereby the latter caught cold, he 
 could not be held ; and as the declara- 
 tion in the case at bar merely alleges 
 default in not doing something, that 
 is an act of omission, the court gave 
 judgment for the defendant. We 
 doubt, however, whether the distinc- 
 tion is a sound one. 
 
 ' Nicholson v. Lancashire, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 34 L. J. (Exch.) 84; 
 Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 556; 
 B. c. 4 Jur. (N. S.) 512; 37 L. 
 J. (C. P.) 318; Axford v. Prior, C. 
 P. 14 W. R. 611 ; Paddock v. North- 
 eastern Ry. Co., 18 L. T.' (N. S.) 60; 
 Smith V. London & St. Katherines' 
 Dock Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 336; Chap- 
 man D. Rothwell, El., Bl. & El. 168; 
 Holmes v. Northeastern Ry. Co. , L. 
 R. 4 Exch. 354; Davis v. Central Con- 
 gregational Society of Jamaica Plain, 
 139 Mass. 367. Indermaur v. Dames, 
 L. R. 1 C. P. 374; B. c. L. R. 3 C. P. 
 311, is one of the chief cases on this 
 point. A journeyman gas-fitter, 
 whose master had been employed to 
 work on defendant's premises, and 
 had sent the journeyman by appoint- 
 ment, was held to be included under 
 the protection of the contract, and 
 having been injured by falling through 
 
 a shaft, he was allowed to recover. 
 The decision went entirely on the 
 ground that he was there on lawful 
 business. Campbell on Negligence, § 
 32 ; "Wharton on Negligence, § 349 ; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 303. 
 Compare these cases with Pierce v. 
 "Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127. Here the de- 
 fendant, simply to accommodate the 
 plaintiff, consented to sell him some 
 oats, and took him to the granary to 
 procure them. The granary was 
 very dark, and while the plaintiff was 
 walking around he fell through a 
 shaft and was severely injured. The 
 court held that in allowing the plaint- 
 iff to go into the granary, the defend- 
 ant undoubtedly guaranteed that the 
 means of access were reasonably safe, 
 and if the plaintiff, in the actual trans- 
 action of the one piece of business 
 which brought him there, had slipped 
 into a pitfall, the case would have 
 been very different. Since, however, 
 he had been led to a safe place, and 
 instead of remaining there had, in the 
 moment when the defendant had gone 
 to find a measure, wandered about 
 from curiosity or other tnotive, he was 
 himself devoid of ordinary care, and 
 hence was contributorily negligent. 
 ' See generally the cases last cited. 
 
§51.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S EIGHT TO KECOVEE. 
 
 73 
 
 Gray, in Carlton v. Franoonia Iron Co.,* is liable in damages 
 to those coming to it, using due care, at his invitation or 
 inducement, express or implied, on any business to be trans- 
 acted or permitted by him, for an injury occasioned by the 
 unsafe condition of the land or of the access to it, which is 
 known to him and not to them, and which he has negligently 
 suffered to exist, and has given them no notice of."' The 
 
 ■ 99 Mass. 216. 
 
 ' " Where a person is upon premises 
 by the invitation or permission of the 
 occupier on lawful business in which 
 both he and the occupier have an 
 interest, there is a duty towards such 
 person cast upon the occupier to keep 
 the premises in a reasonably secure 
 condition." Shirley's Leading Cases, 
 278. This duty extends to all parts 
 of the premises, and their appurten- 
 ances, to which the customer has 
 need of access in the prosecution of 
 the business. Ball's Leading Cases, 
 392, where the whole subject is fully 
 discussed. One who occupies a build- 
 ing for business purposes is liable for 
 its reasonably safe condition to all 
 who enter it in the course of the 
 ordinary business transactions there. 
 Welch V. McAllister, 15 Mo. App. 
 492. The owner of a building who 
 puts an elevator into it for the use of 
 his tenants, and of those having busi- 
 ness with them, is bound to use ordi- 
 nary care in keeping it in good con- 
 dition for customary use. Ritterman 
 t). Ropes, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 25; O'Cal- 
 laghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 489; b. c. 34 
 Pac. Rep. 369; Huey v. Gahlenbeck, 
 121Penn.St. 338; 8.c.l5Atl. Rep. 520; 
 Engel v. Smith (Mich.), 46 N. W. 
 Rep. 21; CIopp V. Mear (Penn.), 19 
 AtLRep. 504; s.c.25 W. N.C. 571; Seli- 
 nas V. Vermont Sta,te Agr. Soc, 60 
 Vt. 249; 8.0. 15 Atl.Rep. 117; Toomey 
 v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28; B.C. 14 N B. 
 Rep. 921; Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil- 
 Mills r. Coffey, 80 Ga. 145; B.C. 4 S. E. 
 Rep. 759; Tousey v. Roberts, 21 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 399; s.c. 114 N. Y. 312; Egan v. 
 Berkshire Apartment Ass'n, 10 N. Y. 
 Supl. 116; Jucht V. Behrens, 7 N. Y. 
 Supl. 195; jO'Callaghan u. Bode, 84 
 Cal. 489; Clarke o. R. I. Electric 
 Lighting Co. (R. I.), 17 Atl. Rep. 59; 
 TrMk V. Shotwell, 41 Minn. 66; s.c. 42 
 N. W. Rep. 699; Larken v. O'Neill, 1 
 N.Y. Supl. 232; O'Brien v. Tatimi, 84 
 Ala. 186; s.c. 4 So. Rep. 158: Turner v. 
 Klekr, 27 111. App. 391; Hutchins v. 
 Priestley Express Wagon,. &c., Co., 
 61. Mich. 253; B. c. 28 N. W. Rep. 85; 
 Bedell v. Berkey, 76 Mich. 435; s.c. 43 
 N. W. Rep.308; Johnson v. Wilcox,135 
 Penn. St. 217; s. o. 19 Atl. Rep. 939; 
 Gaffney v. Brown, 150 Mass. 479; B.C. 
 23 N. E. Rep. 233; Hotel Ass'n v. Wal- 
 ters, 23 Neb. 280; s.c. 36 N. W. Rep. 
 561; McRickard v. Flint, 13 Daly 
 tN. Y.) 541; Bond«. Smith, 113N. Y. 
 378; s. 0. 31 N. E. Rep. 128; Atkinson 
 V. Abraham, 45 Hun, 338; Fisher .». 
 Cook, 125 111. 380; B. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 
 763; McRickard 1). Flint, 114 N.Y. 222; 
 B.C. 31 N. E. Rep.153; Patterson*. He- 
 men way, 148 Mass. 94; s.c. 19 N. E, 
 Rep. 15; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. 
 Rose, 65Md.485; Crogan v. Schiele, 53 
 Conn. 186; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 88; 
 Schmidt r>. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565; B.C. 32 
 Pac. Rep. 256; Engel b. Smith (Mich.), 
 46N.W. Rep. 21; Gilberts. Nagle, 118 
 Mass. 278; Lome v. Hotel Co., 116 
 Mass. 67; Freer ». Cameron, 4 Rich. 
 (Law) 328; s.c. 55 Am. Dec.663; Ack- 
 ert 8. Lansing, 48 How. Pr. 374; s.c. 59 
 N.Y. 646; Camp «. Wood 76 N.Y. 93; 
 B. c. 33 Am.Rep. 383 ; Pastene ». Adams, 
 49 Cal. 87. In Haywood v. Merrill, 94 
 
74 
 
 THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO EECOTER. 
 
 [§51. 
 
 courts draw a distinction between an invitation and a mere 
 license as affecting the rule in consideration. While an 
 invitation, express or implied, imposes the duty of ordinary 
 care upon a person in control of premises, a license, which is 
 inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of 
 the person enjoying it, imposes no such duty. Graves, J., in 
 Hargreaves, v. Deacon,* after considering the question of the 
 •duty on the part of an owner of property toward trespassers, 
 idlers and bare licensees, says :-r-" We have found no support 
 for any rule which would protect those who go where they 
 are not invited, but merely with express or tacit permission, 
 from curiosity, or motives of private convenience, in no way 
 connected with business, or other relations with the occu- 
 pant." This is the doctrine of both the English and the 
 American cases.* 
 
 111. 349; s. c. 34 Am. Bep. 339, and 
 note, the plaintiff being a guest in a 
 hotel, thinking to open the door of 
 his room, really opened an elevator- 
 door, and as it was dark, he stepped 
 in, and fell down the shaft. Held, 
 that it was the duty of hotel-keepers 
 to exercise ordinary care in the protec- 
 tion of their guests, and that the de- 
 fendant ought to have secured the 
 door so as to make the occurrence of 
 such accidents in the highest degree 
 improbable. Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 
 "Vt. 127; s. c. 31 Am. Kep. 130; Tot- 
 ten V. Phipps, 53 N. Y. 354; Ludding- 
 ton V. Miller, 4 Jones & Sp. 1 ; Ryan 
 V. Thompson, 3 Jones & Sp. 133; 
 Nave V. Flack, 90 Ind. 305; White v. 
 Prance, 3 C. P. Div. 308; Chapman 
 i>. Rothwell, El, Bl. & El. 168; In- 
 dermaur ®. Dames, L. E. 1 C. P. 
 374; s. c. L. R. 3 C. P. 311. The lia- 
 bility of the owner or proprietor of a 
 place open to the public, to persons 
 coming there to transact business, for 
 injuries inflicted by dangerous ani- 
 ', mals or caused by defects in the 
 premises, etc., is discussed, and the 
 English and American decisions are 
 collected, by J. F. Kelly, in an article in 
 29 Amer. Law. Reg. (N. S.) 34, note. 
 
 ■ 36 Mich. 1. 
 
 ' CampbeU on NegUgence, § 33. The 
 owner of premises has a right to sup- 
 pose that persons driving in and out 
 on business will use the ordinary, well 
 defined ways, and if they depart there- 
 from they become mere licensees and 
 caimot recover for injuries received on 
 land not substantially adjacent to 
 such ways. Armstroijg ii. Medbury, 
 67 Mich. 250; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 566. Plaintiff went to defend- 
 ant's oil-mill on business of his own, 
 and asking to see an employee, was di- 
 rected to the oil room. In trying to 
 find him in another room, he stepped 
 upon a pile of seed, and his foot sank 
 into an ordinary seed conveyor under 
 the floor and was injured. It was 
 held that the defendant was not liable, 
 and that a charge subniiitting to the 
 jury whether the plaintiff entered the 
 mill on the defendant's invitation was 
 erroneous. Galveston Oil Co. v. Mor- 
 ton, 70 Tex. 40(0; s.c. 7 S W. Rep. 756; 
 Matthews ». Bonsee, 51 N. J. Law, 30; 
 s.c.l6Atl.Rep.l95, istothesamepoint. 
 Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Griffln, 100 
 Ind. 331; s.c. 50 Am. Rep. 783; Rear- 
 don «. Thompson, 149 Mass. 367; s. o. 
 31 N. E. Rep. 369; Larroore v. Crown 
 
§ 53.] THE plaintiff's eight to recover. 75 
 
 § 52. A trespass as per se contributory negligence.— 
 
 We must remember, however, that when the plaintiflf's tres- 
 pass contributes to produce the injury he sustains, the gen- 
 eral rule as to contributory negligence applies to prevent his 
 recovering damages. Contributory negligence may take the 
 form of a trespass as well as any other form, and while the 
 mere fact that one is a trespasser will not alone prevent a 
 recovery, it may appear that going upon the premises was 
 fiuch a want of ordinary care under the circumstances as to 
 constitute contributory negUgence. The case of Marble v. 
 Eoss' suggests this distinction. The defendant kept a vicious 
 stag in his pasture, and the plaintiff, trespassing there, was 
 attacked by the stag, and injured. Here it is plain that 
 the matter of defense was not the trespass, but the con- 
 tributory negligence involved in the trespass. It was an act 
 harmless enough to walk through the pasture, but the stag 
 was known to be somewhat vicious, and it was careless to go 
 within his reach. The plaintiff had no remedy, not because 
 he was a trespasser, but because his trespass was a negligent 
 act, contributing to occasion the injury. 
 
 § 63. The same subject continued. — And, a fortiori, there 
 is the same rule when the plaintiff inflicts the injury, or 
 brings the disaster upon himself, by meddling or trespassing 
 with dangerous tools, or machinery, or other property, inad- 
 vertently exposed upon the defendant's premises.' Accord- 
 Point Iron Co., 101 N. Y. 391; s. c. The act was merely permissive and 
 54 Am. Rep. 718; Sullivan ». Waters, of his favor, and hence no recovery 
 Ir. C. L. R. Co. 460; Balch ». Smith, could be had. But see Fitzpatrick 
 7 Hurl. & N. 736; Gautret v. Egerlon, v. Garrison, &c., Ferry Co., 1 N. Y. 
 L. R. 2 C. P. 271. In Lygo v. New- Supl. 794, where defendants who were 
 bold, 24 L. & Eq. 507; s. c. 9 Exch. engaged in a business attracting people 
 303, a woman whose goods were in to a public place, which the public 
 charge of a freight carrier, was per- had long been accustomed to use, 
 mitted by his cartman, while on the were held liable for an accident occur- 
 way, to get up and ride with him on ring through the use of machinery so 
 the load. The cart breaking down, defective as to be dangerous, though 
 and an injury occurring both to her plaintiff, without negligence, was at 
 person and her goods, it was held she the place solely to gratify his curiosity, 
 could not recover for the personal Consult, also, cases cited supra, § 50, 
 injury, because she had no right upon note 2. 
 the cart beyond the driver's permis- ' 124 Mass, 44. 
 sion, which was no contract, he being ' Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cowen, 78; 
 
 employed for carriage of goods only. s. c. 13 Am. Dec. 513; Hunger*. 
 
76 THE plaintiff's bight to eecoveb. [§ 54. 
 
 ingly, it is held, in a carefully considered case in South Car- 
 olina,' that a railroad company is not liable for the death of 
 one who, while walki&g on its track without right, inter- 
 meddled with a torpedo which had , been placed there as a 
 danger signal, and was killed by its explosion. And in the 
 old case of Bush v. Brainard,^ where the defendant, baring 
 made maple sugar in his unfenced woodjand, left some of the 
 syrup in a kettle, under an uninclosed shed, and the plaintiff's 
 cow, running at large in the wood, came by night and drank 
 of it and died, there being no evidence of any town by-law 
 permitting cattle to run at large, nor of the defendant's con- 
 sent that the plaintiff's cattle, or cattle generally, might run 
 on his premises, it was held that the plaintiff had no right 
 of action. This rule, in its application to the case of an in- 
 fant trespasser, is somewhat modified.^ 
 
 § 54. Plaintiff's prior negligence in connection with 
 defendant's subsequent negligence —It is sometimes said to 
 be the rule that a plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding the 
 fact that his own negligence exposed him to the risk of in- 
 jury, if the defendant, after becoming aware of the plaintiff's 
 danger, failed to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him,* or, 
 
 Tonawanda R Co., 4 '^. Y. 349; s. c without the disapproval of the com- 
 53 Am. D^c. 384; Carter ». Columbia, pany. He carried it into a crowd of 
 &c., R. Co., 19 8 C. 30; 8. c. 45 Am. boys near by, and, not knowing what 
 Rep. 754; Everhart a. Terre -Haute, it was, attempted to open it. It ex- 
 Ac, R. Co., 78 Ind. 293; s. c. 41 Am. ploded, and injured the plaintiff, a 
 Rep. 567; Galena, &c., R. Co. v Ja- boy ten years of age. The court held 
 cobs, 30 111. 478; Lygo J). Newbold, 9 that the act of the boy who picked up 
 Exch. 303. the torpedo was only a contributory 
 ' Carter v. Columbia, &c., R. Co., condition, which the company's ser- 
 19 8. C. 30; B. c. 45 Am. Rep. 567. yants should have anticipated as a 
 But see Harriman v Pittsburgh, &c., probable consequence of their negU- 
 R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11; s. c. 13 N. E. gence in leaving the torpedo where 
 Rep. 451, where the facts were as fol- they did, and that that negligence was 
 lows: — A train of cars, passing over the direct cause of the injury suffered 
 some signal torpedoes, left one unex- ,. by the plaintiff, 
 ploded, which was picked up by a 1 =1 Cowen, 78; 8. c. 13 Am. Dec. 
 boy nine years old, at a point on the ' 513. 
 
 track which he and other children, in '' ' See infra, S§ 140, 204, 305. 
 
 common with the general public, had ^ Shearman & Redfield on Negli- 
 
 long been accustomed to use as a gence, 4th ed., § 99. 
 crossing, , with the knowledge and 
 
§ 55.] THE plaintiff's eight to recovee. 77 
 
 as Judge Thompson puts it ■} — " perhaps a better expression 
 of this rule is that, although the plaintiff has negligently- 
 exposed himself or his property to an injury, yet if the de- 
 fendant, after discovering the eoiyposed situution, inflicts the in- 
 jury upon him, through a failure to exercise ordinary care, 
 "the plaintiff may recover damages."^ This is but another at- 
 tempt to make sense out of the rule laid down in the case of 
 Davies v. Mann,^ and to make it square with the recognized 
 and unquestioned rules of law which obtain upon the subject 
 of contributory negligence. As it is first formulated above it is 
 equivalent, for practical purposes, to the rule that when the 
 defendant's ftegligence is the proximate cause of the injury, 
 while that of the plaintiff is only a remote cause or a mere 
 condition of it, the action will lie. This, as has been shown,* 
 is a correct rule, and it is correctly expressed. As used in this 
 sense " prior " and " subsequent " are very nearly, and often 
 exactly, equivalent to proximate and remote; "prior negli- 
 gence " will usually be found substantially the same as neg- 
 ligence that is regarded as a remote cause, and " subsequent 
 negligence " means, ordinarily, in the judge's opinion, the 
 negligence that did the mischief, which 'is more usually 
 known as negligence which is a proximate cause. 
 
 § 55. Judge Thompson's position criticised.— On the 
 
 other hand, the author ventures to suggest that the rule, as 
 stated by Judge Thompson, is only an indifferent way of 
 saying that, when the defendant's negligence is wilfu l, the 
 plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a defense! ^hen 
 one, after discovering that I have carelessly exposed myself 
 to an injury, neglects to use ordinary care to avoid hurting 
 
 ' Thompson on Negligence, 1157, Albany Gaslight Co , 44 N. Y. 459; 
 
 note. affirming 46 Barb. 364, and placing 
 
 ' Barlser v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191, the decision not so much on the 
 
 194; Brown v. Lynn, 31 Penn. groimd that the defendant failed to 
 
 St. 510; Northern, &c., R. Co. v. exercise due care after becoming 
 
 Price, 39 Md. 430; Locke r. First aware of the plaintiff's negligence, 
 
 Div., &c., R. Co., 15 Minn. 350; Nel- but rather on the gro'und that the lat- 
 
 son V. Atlantic, &c., R. Co., 68 Mo. ter was really a remote cause of the 
 
 593; O'Keefe v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., accident. 
 
 32 Iowa, 467; Morris v. Chicago, &c., ' 10 Mee. & W, 546. 
 
 R. Co., 45 Iowa, 39; Ball's Lead- ■" § 37, supra. 
 ing Cases, 389. Compare Lannen v. 
 
^ 
 
 78 THE plaintiff's bight to becoveb. [§ 56, 
 
 me and " inflicts " the injurj upon me as a result of his neg- 
 ligence, there is very little room for a claim that such con- 
 duct on his part is not wilful negligence. The author be- 
 lieves, as he has already suggested,* that every case in the 
 reports which assumes to rest -upon the rule that the prior 
 negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to the subsequent 
 negligence of the defendant, where a correct conclusion has 
 been reached, will be found to turn upon one or the other of 
 these elementary propositions. When the plaintiff in these 
 cases is held entitled to recover, it will appear either that the 
 defendant's negligence was wilful, or that it was the proxi- 
 mate cause of the injury. If this be true, nothing is gained 
 by stating the rule in this way. It begets confusion in ex- 
 pression and in thinking. And, moreover, as an abstract 
 proposition of law, it is open to the criticism that, whether 
 we express it in one way or the other, and either with or with- 
 out Judge Thompson's discovery clause, it ignores the prin-i 
 oiple upon which the law of contributory negligence has been 
 made to rest, and proceeds upon the theory of punishment. 
 The tendency of it is to unsettle and confuse established 
 principles. The culmination of it is "comparative negli- 
 gence." 
 
 § 56. When the plaintiff's negligence precedes the de- 
 fendant's in point of time. — The courts have usually adopted 
 this form of expressing the law in cases where the negligence 
 of the plaintiff preceded that of the defendant in point of 
 time, and it has more generally been applied where the de- 
 fendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury.* 
 
 1 § 27 «« aeq, supra. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 74 Iowa, 593; 
 
 " The rule is frequently resorted to s. c. 38 N."W. Rep. 435; Kelly ». Union 
 
 where the plaintiff is negligently upon Ry. & T. Co.^ 95 Mo. 279; a. c. 8 S. 
 
 a railroad track, and is injured by de- W. Rep. 420; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. 
 
 fendant's want of ordinary care after v. Kean, 65 Md. 394; Kerwhacker«. 
 
 he is discovered. Lay v. Richmond, Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 
 
 Ac, R. Co., 106 N. C. 404; s. c. 11 172; b. c. 62 Am. Dec. 246; Cleve- 
 
 S. E. Rep. 412, was such a case; the land, &c., R. Co. v. Elliott,. 28 Ohio 
 
 plaintiff recovered, though he was a St. 340; Johnson v. Hudson River R. 
 
 trespasser. See, also, Houston, &c., Co., 5 Duer, 27; Button v. Hudson 
 
 R. Co. «. Carson, 66 Tex. 345; Hayes River R. Co.. 18 N. Y. 248; Austin v. 
 
 V. Gainesville St. Ry. Co., 70 Tex. N.J. Steamboat Co., 43 N. Y. 75; 
 
 602; s. c. 8 S.W. Rep. 491; Wooster v. Healy v. Dry Dock, &c., R. Co., 46 
 
§56.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S BIGHT TO RECOVER. 
 
 W 
 
 When the negligent acts or omissions of the parties to the 
 action were contemporaneous — or, what is to say the same 
 thing, when the catastrophe is the result of concurring or 
 mutual acts of negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover dam- 
 ages. This is hardly more than a reiteration of the general 
 rule of contributory negligence, but it is the form in which 
 the rule is sometimes stated.^ Having now considered the 
 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 473; Kansas, &c., R 
 Co. «. Cranmer, 4 Colo. 524; Doggett 
 D. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 78 N. C. 
 305 ; Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310; 
 Keedbam v. San Francisco, &c., R. 
 Co., 37 Cal. 409. Gothard v. Alabama, 
 &c., R. Co., 67 Ala. 114, puts the rule 
 as follows: — "Although one negli- 
 gently exposes himself to peril, yet, if 
 be uses proper diligence in escaping 
 the danger when it becomes apparent, 
 and the defendant fails to use all the 
 proper means in his power to avert 
 the danger, the defendant is liable, 
 and the original negligence is no 
 defense to the action." The court, 
 however, also distinctly states that 
 the one point to be determined is 
 whether the plaintiff did or did not 
 proximately cause the accident. Zim- 
 merman V. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 71 
 Mo. 476; Swigert v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R Co., 75 Mo. 475; Trows. Vermont, 
 &c., R. Co., 24 Vt. 487; Wright v. 
 Brown, 4 Ind. 95; 8. c. 58 Am. Dec. 
 622; Cummins v. Presley, 4 Harr. 
 (Del.) 315; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Trainor, 33 Md. 542; Baltimore, &c., 
 R Co. V. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534; 
 Baltimore. &c., R Co. v. Mulligan, 45 
 Md. 486; Mississippi, &c,, R. Co. v. 
 Mason, 51 Miss. 234; Johnson v. 
 Canal, &c., E. Co., 37 La. Ann. 53; 
 Isbell V. Kew Tork» &c., R Co., 27 
 Conn. 393; Byram v. McQuire, 3 
 Head, 530; Underwood v. Waldron, 
 33 Mich. 232; O'Rourke «. Chicago, 
 Ac, R Co., 44 Iowa, 526; Morris v. 
 Chicago, &c., R Co., 45 Iowa, 39; Il- 
 linois, &c., R. Co. V. Hoffman, 67 111. 
 
 287; Chicago, &c., R Co. v. Dona- 
 hue, 75 in. 106; Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stratton, 78 Dl. 88. Georgia, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Neely, 50 Ga. 540, 
 where this principle can be seen in 
 the form of comparative negli- 
 gence. Lane ». Atlantic Works, 107 
 Mass. 104; Britton v. Cummington, 
 107 Mass. 347; Hibbard v. Thomp- 
 son. 109 Mass. 288; Tuff «. Warman, 
 3 C. B. (N. S.) 740; s. c. 5 C. B. 
 (N. S.) 573; Scott V. Dublin, &c., R. 
 Co., 11 Ir. C. L. 377; Radley b. Lon- 
 don, &c., R Co., 1 App. Cas. 754; 
 B. c. L. R. 9 Exch. 71 ; 43 L. J. 
 (Exch.) 73; Field on Damages, 161; 
 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 
 4th ed., §§ 99, 483; Thompson on 
 Negligence, 1157; Wharton on Negli- 
 gence, § 335 ei seq. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R Co. o. Aspell, 23 
 Penn. St. 147; s. c. 62 Am. Dec. 323; 
 Railroad Company v. Norton, 24 
 Penn. St. 469; Simpson v. Hand, 6 
 Wharton (Penn.) 311; s. c. 36 Am. 
 Dec. 231; Beatty®. Gilmore, 16 Penn. 
 St. 463; s. 0. 55 Am. Dec. 514; Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. Zebe, 33 Penn. St. 
 318; Heil v. Glanding, 42 Penn. St. 
 493; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Penn. St. 
 439; Cook v. Champlain, &c., R Co., 
 1 Denio, 91; Button ». Hudson River 
 R. Co., 18 N. Y. 248; Wilds v. Hud- 
 son River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 432; 
 Hance v. Cayuga, &c., R Co., 36 
 N. Y. 428; Ring v. City of Cohoes, 
 77 N. Y. 83; b. c. 33 Am. Rep. 574; 
 Allen V. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230 ; Trow 
 r. Vermont, &c., R Co., 24 Vt. 487; 
 B. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Wood «. 
 
80 THE plaintiff's RIGHT TO BECOTER. [§ 57. 
 
 legal effect of the plaintiff 's negligence, both when, in poiiit 
 of time, it is prior to that of the defendant, and when it is 
 contemporaneous therewith, we proceed to a discussion of 
 the consequences of that negligence when it is subsequent to 
 the negligent wrong-doing of the defendant. 
 
 § 67. Plaintiff's negligence after the catastrophe.— 
 
 In the preceding sections an attempt was made to show that, 
 when th6 defendant's negligence appears to' have been sub- 
 sequent to that of the plaintiff, so that the rule that the 
 plaintiff's prior negligence is not a defense to the subsequent 
 neglect, or wrong-doing of the defendant, is applied, if a 
 correct conclusion is reached, it will be found, in the last 
 analysis, either that the defendant's negligence was the 
 proximate cause of the injury, or that his negligence was 
 wilful. It has perhaps been somewhat overlooked, both by 
 the text- writers and the courts, that the converse of this 
 proposition is also true. The question , being whose negli- 
 gence was the proximate cause of the injury of which the 
 plaintiff complains, it will occasionally appear that the 
 plaintiff's negligent act, or omission to act, after the defend- 
 ant's Viegligence, was the eflScient cause of the mischief. When- 
 ever it can be shown in evidence that the plaintiff, after the 
 defendant's negligent act or omission, and with knowledge, 
 actual or constructive, of such negligence and its probable 
 consequences, refused or omitted to exercise ordinary care 
 under the circumstances to prevent an injury from that 
 cause to himself or his property, then, if he suffers, his own 
 negligence is the proximate and eflicient cause of the injury, 
 
 Jones, 34 La. Ann. 1086; Worcester Haley v. Chicago, &€., R. Co., 21 
 
 «. Essex Merrimac Bridge Corp., 7 Iowa, 35; Reynolds «. Hindman, 32 
 
 Gray, 457; Helandi). Lowell, 3 Allen, Iowa, 149; Northern Central R. Co. 
 
 407; Timmonse. Ohio, &c., R. Co., 6 v. Price, 39 Md. 430; Northern Cen- 
 
 Ohio St. 105; Larkin v. Taylor, 5 tral R. Co. «. Gies, 31 Iowa, 357; 
 
 Kan. 433. So the same idea is often Needham v. San Francisco, &c., R. 
 
 expressed as follows:— that when Co., 37 Cal. 433; Straus b. Kansas, 
 
 there has heen mutual negligence on &c., R. Co., 75 Mo. 185; Crandall «. 
 
 thepart of the plaintiff and defendant, Goodrich Trans. Co., 11 Biss. 516; 
 
 and the negligence of each was the s. c. 16 Fed. Rep. 75; Burrows v. 
 
 proximate cause of the injury, no ac- The Marsh Gas & Coke Co., L. R. 5 
 
 tion can be sustained. Stucke e. Exch. 67; b. c. L. R. 7 Exch. 96. 
 Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 9 Wis. 303; 
 
§ 58.] THE plaintiff's eight to eecover. 81 
 
 and, upon familiar grounds, his right of action is gone. The 
 issue, upon the determination of which the plaintiff 's case 
 rests, is, what was the proximate cause, and when his own 
 negligence, being, in point of time, either prior to that of 
 the defendant, or contemporaneous with it, or subsequent to 
 it, turns out to have been the proximate cause, his right to 
 recover is barred. 
 
 § 68. The same subject continued.— It is wholly imma- 
 terial when the plaintiff's negligence operated to produce the 
 injury. If it was the proximate cause he has no cause 6i 
 action, and that his negligence may as well be subsequent 
 to that of the defendant as any other way, may well be 
 illustrated by reference to the reported cases. In Illinois, 
 Ac, E. Co. V. McClelland,^ it appeared that a son of the 
 plaintiff saw a fire in some stubble near a fence separating 
 the plaintiff's land from a railway track, while on his way, 
 homeward, but that instead of stopping and trying to put 
 the fire out, he went on, and, upon returning to the place 
 some time afterward, found the fire burning so hotly and 
 extending so far as to be beyond control. The court held 
 this an act of negligence, chargeable to the plaintiff, and 
 sufficient to prevent his recovery. Here the negligence of 
 the plaintiff in failing to stamp out a fire negligently kindled 
 by sparks from the defendant's locomotive, after the prob- 
 ability that the fire would spread and burn up his fence had 
 been brought to his knowledge, was the proximate cause of 
 the injury he sustained. And again in Toledo, &c., E. Co. v. 
 Pindar,* where the plaintiff 's house was negligently set on 
 fire by a passing locomotive on the defendant's railway, and 
 the plaintiff, although he had ample time and opportunity 
 after the house began to burn up, to get out some money he 
 had in the house, but forgot it, and suffered it to be burned, 
 it was held that the plaintiff's failure to secure the money 
 was the proximate cause of its loss, and that therefore he 
 could not recover.' It is unquestionably a correct rule, and, 
 
 ' 42 111. 355. put out the fire is not contributory 
 
 ' 53 HI. 447; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 57. negligence as a matter of law. Mills 
 
 • An unnecessary delay of ten or v. Chicago, &c., By. Co., 76 Wis. 482; 
 
 fifteen minutes in making an effort to s.c. 45 N.W. Rep. 225. Where plaint- 
 
 6 
 
82 
 
 THE plaintiff's BIGHT TO BECOVEB. 
 
 [§ 59.. 
 
 at least, in view of the precedents, not a wholly incorrect 
 way of expressing it, that the subsequent negligence of the 
 plaintiff will be a defense to the prior negligence of the de- 
 fendant wheneyer the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary 
 care under the circumstances, after the discovery of the negli- 
 gent act of the defendant, could have escaped the injury. 
 
 § 59. This statement of the rule examined.— Perhaps this 
 is reading Judge Thompson's rendition of the rule in Davies 
 V. Mann* backwards, but, however that may be, it states a 
 correct rule, in a way which, in view of the fact that many 
 cases in the reports contain the reverse proposition, more or 
 less exactly put, will emphasize a phase of the subject which 
 should not be overlooked. The careful reader will not fail 
 to have noted that the author deprecates this way of express- 
 ing the rule, and has attempted to show that the real issue 
 is, not whose negligence came first or last, but whose negli- 
 gence, however it came, was the proximate cause. When 
 
 iff saw a Are, kindledby a locomotive, 
 buming in some dry grass upon de- 
 fendant's right of way near his own 
 hay-field, and was in a position to 
 put it out, but made no effort to do 
 so, his negligence was fatal. Eaton 
 V. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. (Or.), 24 
 Pac. Rep. 415, 417. See, also, 
 Washburn v. Tracy, 3 D. Chipman 
 (Vt.) 128; B. 0. 15 Am. Dec. 661; 
 Haverly v. State Line,&c., R. Co., 135 
 Penn. St. 50; s.c. 19 Atl.Rep.1013; 26 
 W. N. C. 321; Lilley®. Fletcher, 81 
 Ala. 234; s. c. 1 So. Rep. 278. In Mc- 
 Narra '». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 
 Wis. 69, however, a fire having orig- 
 inated thirty or forty rods from 
 plaintiff's land, and the only evidence 
 bearing upon plaintiff's negligence be- 
 ing that he saw smoke rising from 
 defendant's track for two or three 
 days.— the last time being eight days 
 before his property burned, — and 
 took no measures to have the fire ex- 
 tinguished: Held that this would 
 not sustain a finding of contribu- 
 
 tory negligence. Snyder b. Pitts- 
 burg, &c., R. Co., 11 West Va. 
 15; Secord v. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 5 
 McCrary, 515. In Emm v. Anthony, 
 115 Penn. St. 431; s. c. 8 Atl. Rep. 
 598, the owner of a horse, which was 
 killed by falling into a pit on adjoin- 
 ing land, was held guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence, if he put the horse 
 out to pasture, knowing that the 
 fence which it was the adjoining 
 owner's duty to maintain, was down 
 in places. Carey ». Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 61 Wis. 71, to the same effect. 
 Gonira, Eddy ». Kinney, 60 Vt. 554; 
 8.C. 15 Atl. Rep. 198, under R. L. Vt. 
 § 3184, making adjoining owner liable 
 for damages caused by reason of in- 
 sufficient fence. See, also, Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Sims, 17 Neb. 691; Don- 
 ovan V. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 89 Mo. 
 147, under statutes requiring railroads 
 to fence. 1 Sedgwick on Damages, 
 8th ed., p. 295 et seg. 
 
 ' Thompson on Negligence, 1155, 
 §§ 7 and 8. 
 
§ 60.] THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO EECOVEE. 83 
 
 the subsequent negligence of the plaintiff contributes, Jiot 
 to cause, but to aggravate the injury, it will not, as has been 
 hitherto suggested,^ avail the defendant as a defense, for the 
 obvious reason that, howsoever much it may have increased 
 the damage, it did not cause the injury, and the defendant's 
 negligence did cause it, which is the groijnd of his chargea- 
 bility.^ How far such negligence on the part of a plaintiff 
 will count in mitigation of damages is considered hereafter.* 
 
 § GO. NegligeiK^e of the decedent nnder Lord Campbell's 
 act. — In every State in the Union there is a statute, modeled 
 more or less Exactly after the English statute, known as Lord 
 Campbell's act,* under which actions are brought by the 
 personal representatives of deceased persons to recover dam- 
 ages for injuries which have resulted in death. These stat- 
 utes uniformly provide that no action is maintainable by the 
 representatives in cases where the deceased himself could 
 not have maintained the action if death had not ensued. All 
 the rules of contributory negligence, therefore, applicable to 
 any individual case, had it been brought by the deceased in 
 his lifetime, apply in full force when the action is brought 
 by his pelrsonal representatives after his death. The con- 
 tributory negligence of the dead person is as completely a 
 bar to the action brought for the benefit of his next of kin, 
 by his representative, as it would have been had he lived to 
 bring the action himself for his own benefit. A very consid- 
 _ erable proportion of all the cases in which the question of 
 contributory negligence is involved are those in which the 
 action has been brought to recover damages for injuries 
 which resulted in death. Accordingly to consider the au- 
 thorities in detail under this section would be to go over 
 
 ' § 34, supra. contributory negligence began to af- 
 
 ' Gould n, McKenna, 86 Penn. St. feet the result. Secord v. St. Paul, 
 
 397; 8. c. 37 Am. Rep. 705. Thus, &c., R. Co., 5 McCrary, 515; Sills v. 
 
 in Stebbins v. Central R. Qo., 54 Vt. Brown, 9 Car. & P. 601; Greenland v. 
 
 464; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 855; it was Chaplin, 8 Exch. 343; Shearman & 
 
 held that damage caused by fire Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., §95, 
 
 through the negligence of one party, and note; Wharton on Negligence, 
 
 but increased through tfie negligence § 868 ei seq. 
 
 of the party suffering the loss, may ' § 69, infra. 
 
 be recovered up to the time when the , * 9 and 10 Vict.. chap. 93. 
 
84 
 
 THE .PLAINTIFF S BIGHT TO BECOVEB. 
 
 [§ 60. 
 
 again eacli title of the whole subject seriatim} This would 
 be fruitless, and the citations below, selected to illustrate the 
 
 " The case of Hubgh v. New Or- 
 leans, &c., R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495; 8. c. 
 54 Am. Dec. 565, held that there was 
 absolutely no property right in a hus- 
 band or a father, and that an action 
 for damages caused by the homicide 
 of a free human being could not be 
 maintained. This was, of course, 
 before the adoption of Lord Camp- 
 bell's act. The case presents, how- 
 ever, a very learned and interesting 
 argument to uphold its conclusion. 
 BaUey's Conflict of Judicial Decisions, 
 1. See, also, Holland «. Lynn, &c., K. 
 Co., 144 Mass. 435; s.c. 11 N. E. Rep. 
 fi74; Gimn ®. Cambridge R. Co., 144 
 Mass. 430; Scheffler v. Minneapolis, 
 Ac, Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 125; Womacks. 
 Central R. & B. Co., 80 Ga. 133; s.c. 5 
 S. E. Rep. 63; Kentucky Cent. R. Co.' 
 D. Wainwright's Adm'r (Ky.), 13 S. 
 W. Rep. 438. The mother of an ille- 
 gitimate child cannot maintain an ac- 
 tion under a statute giving such right 
 to the "parents," &c., of the de- 
 ceased. Harkins v Philadelphia, &c., 
 R. Co., 15 Phila. (Pa.) 386. A four or 
 five months' fcBtus, surviving but a 
 few minutes after delivery, is not a 
 " person" for whose death an action 
 will lie. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 
 Mass. 14; B. c. 53 Am. Rep. 343, In 
 Rhode Island, it is held that no such 
 action can be maintained where the 
 defendant is only charged with passive 
 .neglect or a mere omission of duty. 
 Bradbury v. Purlung, 13 R. I. 15; 
 8. c. 43 Am. Rep. 1. A wilful injury 
 is not one caused by "neglect," even 
 though the defendant is a common 
 carrier, and the act was committed by 
 its servants. "Winnegar's Adm'r «. 
 Central Passenger Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 
 547; S.C. 4 S.W. Rep. 337 . As to what 
 constitutes "wilful neglect" under 
 the Kentucky statute, see Derby's 
 Adm'r v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (Ky.), 4 S. "W. Rep. 303; Reinderg 
 Adm'r n. Blick & Philips Coal Co. 
 (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 719. A person 
 actively aiding and abetting the prin- 
 cipal act(|r is liable. Gray v. McDon- 
 ald, 28 Mo. App. 477. In Massachu- 
 setts contributory negligence is not a 
 defense to an action under Mass. Pub. 
 St. Ch. 113; § 313, against a railroad 
 company for the death of a passen- 
 ger. Merrill v. Eastern R. Co , 189 
 Mass. 353; McKimble v. Boston, &c., 
 R Co., 139 Mass. 543. But generally 
 the ordinary rules applicable to ac- 
 tions for injuries not resulting in 
 death operate in a suit under the stat- 
 ute. Berry v. Northeastern R. Co., 
 73 Ga. 137; Spiva v. Osage Coal & 
 Mining Co., 88 Mo. 68; Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. Cassidy (Kan.), 24 Pa9. 
 Rep. 88; Cleary «. Philadelphia, &c., 
 R. Co., 8 Penn. Co. Ct. Rep. 96; Hun- 
 ter V. Cooperstown, &c., R. Co., 112 
 N.Y. 371;8.cl9N. E.Rep. 830; Texas, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Berry, 67 Tex. 238; 
 Fisher «. Golladay, 38 Mo. App. 531. 
 Contributory negligence is no defense, 
 however, if the defendant's act was 
 vrilful. Kain v. Larkin, 9 N.T. Supl. 
 89; 8.C. 56 Hun, 79; Missouri Pac. By. 
 Co. V. Brown, 75 Tex. 267; s.c. 12 S. 
 W. Rep. 1117. Reading Iron Works 
 V. Devine, 109 Penn. St. 346; Texas, 
 &c., Ry. Co. i>. Orr, 46 Ark. 182. 
 Features of the law of contribu- 
 tory negligence, or departures from 
 the rule, peculiar to the jurisdic- 
 tion in which the cause of action 
 arises have full force in suits under the 
 statute. In Augusta, &c., R. Co. «. Kil- 
 lian. 79 Ga. 334; s. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 165; 
 and Chesapeake, &c., R. Co. v Foster, 
 88 Tenn. 671; s. c. 13 8. W. Rep. 694, 
 the rule of comparative negligence in 
 its ' ' mitigated " form was a factor. See 
 Rule in Georgia and in Tennessee, 
 infra, §§ 88, 93. On a libel in admi- 
 
§ 60.] 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S RIGHT TO BECOVEE. 
 
 85 
 
 application of the rules of law in point to many special in- 
 stances, are believed to be fully sufficient to instruct the 
 
 ralty to recover on a State statute, the 
 rule of contributory negligence pre- 
 scribed by the statute controlled in- 
 stead of the rule in the admiralty. 
 The A. W. Thompson, 39 Fed. Rep. 
 115. In a suit under Comp. Laws 
 Oregon, § 371, for a death caused by 
 a collision by mutual fault of both 
 boats, the owners were held liable in 
 solido for the damages. Holland v. 
 Brown, 35 Fed. Rep. 43. 
 
 I/imitation of'aetum. — In Sherman 
 ti. Western Stage Co., 34 Iowa, 515, it 
 was held that the statute of limita- 
 tions began to run from the time of 
 the accident, not from the time of the 
 appointment of an administrator. 
 Rutter V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 81 
 Mo. 169; Taylor «. Cranberry Iron & 
 Coal Co., 94 N. C. 535. 
 
 Pleading. — The complaint must 
 show that the injury gave a cause of 
 action in the State where the accident 
 ocCTirred. HamOton v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 39 Kan. 56; s. c. 18 Pac. 
 Rep. 57. 
 
 Aeermtnts of title to sue, dke. — Bur- 
 lington, &c., R. Co. V. Crockett, 17 
 Neb. 570; Bell v. Central R Co., 73 
 Ga. 520; Warner v. Western N. C. R. 
 Co., 94N. C. 250. 
 
 Allegations of negligence, &c. — Mis- 
 souri Pac. R. Co. D. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; 
 8. c. 7 8. W. Rep. 857; LouisvUle. &c., 
 Ry. Co. V. Sandford,117Ind. 265; s.c. 
 19 N. E. Rep. 770; Owen v. Railroad 
 Co., 87 Ky. 636; Henderson's Adm'r v. 
 Kentucky, &c., R. Co., 86 Ky. 389; 
 s. c. 5 S. W. Rep. 875; Albert v. 
 State, 66 Md. 825. 
 
 Evidence. — Where the negligence of 
 the defendant is affirmatively shown, 
 and there is no proof of the conduct 
 of the deceased, the jury are at liberly 
 to infer ordinary diligence on his 
 part, taking into consideration his 
 character and habits, as proved, and 
 
 the natural instinct of self-preserva- 
 tion. Gay D. Winter, 34 Oal. 153. 
 Proof of death is not sufficient with- 
 out evidence connecting it with the 
 accident. Providence & S. 8. 8. Co. 
 r>. Clare, 127 U. 8. 45; s. c. 8 8. Ct. 
 Rep. 1094. Sorensoa «. Korthern Pac. 
 R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 166. 
 
 Dmmages. — A nominal verdict for 
 the plaintiff in such a case is repug- 
 nant, absurd, and perverse. Springett 
 v. Ball, 4 Fost. & Fin. 473. Exem- 
 plary damages may be recovered for 
 gross negligence, though death was 
 instantaneous. Kansas City, &c., R. 
 Co. 9. Daughtry, 88 Tenn. 731 ; s. c. 
 13 8. W. Rep. 698, following Haley v. 
 Railroad Co., 7 Baxt. 242. Corliss v. 
 Worcester, &c., R. Co., 63 N. H. 404; 
 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 
 • N. Y. 504; s. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 108; 
 Scheffier v. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 33 Minn. 518; Demarest v. Little, 47 
 N. J. L. 38. Fifteen thousand dol- 
 lars damages for the death by negli- 
 gence of a young and robust skilled 
 workman was held not so excessive as 
 to require a reversal of the verdict. 
 East Line, Ac, Ry. Co. v. Smith, 65 
 Tex. 167. Batchelor v. Fortescue, 11 
 L. B. Q. B. Div. 474; Armstrong «. 
 Southeastern Ry. Co., 11 Jur. 758; 
 Tucker v. Chaplin, 3 Car. & K. 730; 
 Thorogood c. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; s. c. 
 
 18 L. J. (C. P.) 336; Marshall v. Stew- 
 art, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 1; Hutchin- 
 son t). York, &c.. By. Co., 6 Eng. 
 Rail. Cas. 580; Smith v. Steele, L. R. 
 10 Q. B. 125; s. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60; 
 Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Exch. 354; s. c. - 
 
 19 L. J. (Exch.) 300; Dynen «. Leach, 
 26 L. J. (Exch.) 231; Carey v. Berk- 
 shire R. Co., 1 Cush. 476; 8. c. 48 
 Am. Dec. 616, and Mr. Freeman's 
 learned note, pp. 619 to 641; Knight 
 V. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 
 463; Telfer v. Northern, «&c., R. Co., 
 
86 
 
 THE PLAINTIFF S BIGHT TO EEOOVER. 
 
 [§eo. 
 
 student or gratify the curiosity of the general reader, while 
 the practitioner will look, in addition, for his authorities, as 
 the exigencies of his case require, under the proper heads 
 elsewhere. 
 
 30 N. J. Law, 188; Paulmier a. Erie 
 Ry. Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151; "WUletts 
 «. Buffalo, «fcc., K. Co., 14 Barb. 585, 
 where the deceased was a lunatic; 
 Elliott V. St. Loui^, &c., R. Co., 67 
 Mo. 373; Stater. Manchester, &c., R. 
 Co., 53 N. H. 538; Dennick v. Rail- 
 road Co., 103 U. S. 11; SchefEer ®. 
 "Washingtop, &c., R. Co., 105 TJ. S. 
 249; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stout, 53' Ind. 143; Bancroft v. Bos- 
 ton, &c,, R. Co., 97 Mass. 375; Sauter 
 «. New York, &c., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 
 50; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 18; Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. ». Collins, 3 Duv. 114; 
 Packet Co. ■». McCue, 17 Wall. 508; 
 Toledo, &b., R. Co. v. Moore, 77 111. 
 
 317; Schmidt v. Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 83 111. 405; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Triplett, 38 111. 483; Kansas, &c., R.Co. 
 V. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83; Cumberland, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Fazenbaker, 37 Md. 
 156; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 
 Penn. St. 818; Hill v. Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co., 9 Heisk. 833^ McLean «. 
 Burbank, 11 Minn. 377; Nickerson v. 
 Harriman, 38 Me. 377; Atlanta, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Ayers, 53 Ga. 13; Nashville, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1379, 1394, 
 at § 93; Shearman & Red field on 
 Negligence, 4th ed., § 65; Cooley on 
 Torts, 364; Addison on Torts, 503. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT AS AFFECTING THE 
 MATTER OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 ;§ 61. Gross negligence of the defend- 
 ant. 
 
 62. Distinction between gross neg- 
 ligence and wilful negligence. 
 
 63. Defendant's gross negligence. 
 
 64. Wilful negligence of the de- 
 fendant. 
 
 65. Actions for assault and battery. 
 
 66. Application of this rule in 
 Pennsylvania and Kentucky. 
 
 §67. 
 
 68. 
 69. 
 
 70. 
 71. 
 
 When the defendant, by his 
 acts or omissions, throws the 
 plaintiff off his guard. 
 This rule Illustrated. 
 Mitigation and apportionment 
 of damages. 
 
 Application of this doctrine. 
 The rule criticised. 
 
 § 61. Gross negligence of the defendant.—" Gross ne- 
 glect," said Chancellor Kent, " is the want of that care which 
 •everj man of common sense under the circumstances takes 
 •of his own property."^ However much this definition 
 may be obnoxious to criticism in other respects, it defines 
 ^ross negligence in such a way as to mark clearly the dis- 
 tinction between that grade of fault and wilful negligence, 
 with which it has sometimes been .rather strangely con- 
 founded. We find the term " gross negligence " occasionally 
 rased in the reports in such a way as to be, for the most part, 
 equivalent to vMful negligence. In St. Louis, &c., E. Co. v. 
 Todd,' gross negligence is defined as " amounting to wilful 
 injury," while, at the other extreme, there is a class of oases 
 holding that there is no juridical difference between gross 
 negligence and negligence merely.* Bairon Eolfe also calls 
 ■" gross " a " vituperative epithet," and intimates that he sees 
 no difference between negligence simply and negligence with 
 
 ' 2 Com. 560. 
 
 » 36 111. 409. 
 
 'Hinton v. Dibbin, 3 Q. B. 661; 
 Austin v. Manchester, &c., R. Co., 10 
 iC. B. 454, 474: Wells*. New York, 
 
 &c., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 181; Perkins 
 V. New York, &c., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 
 198; Smith «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 24 N. Y. 222; New World v. King, 16 
 How. (U. S.) 474. 
 
88 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. [§ 62. 
 
 gross prefixed.^ It should seem, however, at that extreme, 
 not hard to see the essential distinction between ordinary 
 negligence and gross negligence, but it is with the confusion 
 and misunderstanding as to the line of demarcation proper 
 to be observed between the terms gross negligence and wilful 
 negligence that we have now especially to do. 
 
 § 62. Distinction between gross negligence and wilful neg- 
 ligence.— The distinction between these two grades of fault 
 is suggested in a famous New York decision," in which 
 Beardsley, J., says :— " Negligence, even when gross, is but 
 an omission of duty. It is not designed and intentional mis- 
 chief." * Notwithstanding the confusion in the use of these 
 terms in the earlier cases, there is, it is believed, a somewhat 
 settled and determined meaning for each of them as they are 
 used by the judges at present. By negligence is meant ordi- 
 nary negligeiice, a term the significance of which is reason- 
 ably well fixed. By gross negligence is meant exceeding neg- 
 ligence, that which is mere inadvertence in the superlative 
 degree.* It is a convenient designation of a real thing, and 
 in this sense gross is merely intensive and not " vitupera- 
 tive." By wilful negligence is meant not strictly negligerwe a,i 
 all, to speak exactly, since negligence implies inadvertence, 
 and whenever there is an exercise of the will in a particular 
 direction, there is an end of inadvertence, but rather an in- 
 tentional failure to perform a manifest duty, which is impor- 
 tant to the person injured in preventing the injury,' in reck- 
 less disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or 
 property of another.* Such conduct is not negligent in any 
 proper sense, and the term " wilful negligence," if these 
 
 'Wilson «. Brett, 11 Mee. & W. this was g'j'o«« negligence, yet it is very 
 
 113. See, also. Grill «. Genl., &c., Aistinct from. 'being wilful. 
 
 Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 612. '"Gross negligence is not tant- 
 
 ' Tonawanda R. Co, v. Hunger, 5 amount to a wilful act or omission, 
 
 Denio, 255;, s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 239. , but it signifies a thoughtless disregard 
 
 ' See, also, in point, Hansford's of consequences." Gulf, &c., R. Co. 
 
 Adm'r «. Payne, 11 Bush, 380, where v. Levy (Sup. Ct. Texas), 19 Am. 
 
 it is said that "wilful" is not to be Law Rev. 480. 
 
 taken at all as synonymous with 'Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Gas- 
 
 "gross." An apothecary's clerk, in tineau's Adm'r, 83 Ky. 119. 
 
 filling a prescription, delivered a poi- "Gulf, &c., R. Co. e. Levy (Sup. 
 
 son instead of a harmless drug. "While Ct. Texas), 19 Am. Law Rev. 480. 
 
§63.] 
 
 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. 
 
 89 
 
 words are to be interpreted with scientific accuracy, is a mis- 
 nomer. It is, however, the name which the courts have fas- 
 tened upon a fault of that character, and by which it is most 
 usually designated in the reports. 
 
 § 63. Defendant's gross negligence.— Eecognizing these 
 several grades of negligence, and distinguishing them as I 
 have proposed, we come to a line of cases which hold that 
 when the defendant's negligence, either in faciendo or in non 
 fadendo, amounts to gross negligence, the contributory neg- 
 ligence of the plaintiff will not prevent a recovery.^ Of this 
 rule, as an abstract proposition of law, it may be said that it 
 is unsound. An examination of the cases cited, and othera 
 that announce the same rule, will show that they, for the 
 most part, fall into one of two classes. Either the " gros& 
 negligence " that they refer to is in reality ml/ul negligfenoe,. 
 or the doctrine of comparative negligence is discovered. The 
 older judges had a fashion of using the expression " gross or 
 wilful negligence," as though the two were in substance the 
 
 ' Kerwhacker v. Cleveland. &c.,.E. 
 Co., 3 Ohio St. 173; Augusta, &c., R. 
 Co. V. McElmurry, 34 Ga. 75, where 
 the plaintiff was allowed to recover 
 the value of an old negro woman, be- 
 cause of the gross negligence of the 
 defendant company in killing her, al- 
 though it was proved that she was 
 negligent herself. Macon, &c. , R. Co. 
 V. Davis, 37 G^. 113; Kansas, &c., R. 
 Co. e. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37; Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Collins, 8 Duv. 114. 
 In Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Robinson, 
 4 Bush, 607, the startling ( ! ) identity 
 of gross negligence and wilfulness is 
 well brought out. " Gross negli- 
 gence," the court holds, "is either an 
 intentional, or such a reckless disre- 
 gard of security and right, as to imply 
 bad faith, and, therefore, squints at 
 fraud, and is tantamount to the magna 
 culpa of the civil law, which, in some 
 respects, is ^asi criminal." After 
 such a definition, it is no wonder that 
 the plaintiflf was allowed to recover. 
 
 Hartfield v. Roper, 31 Wend. 615; a. c. 
 34 Am. Dec. 373; McGrath ». Hud- 
 son River R. Co., 33 Barb. 155; s. c. 
 19 How. Pr. 334; Rathbun «. Payne, 
 19 "Wend. 393; Chapman v. New 
 Haven, &c., R. Co., 19 N. T. 341; 
 Button v: Hudson River R. Co.,> 18 
 N. Y. 348; Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Ja- 
 cobs, 20 111. 478; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Gretzner, 46 111. 75; Ohio, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Porter, 92 111. 437; 
 Stacker. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 9 
 Wis. 203; Evansville, Ac, R. Co. v. 
 Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 130; Lafayette, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Adams, 20 Ind. 76, is 
 more careful in laying down the rule. 
 It is there said that when the defend- 
 ant's negligence is so gross as to imply 
 willingness to inflict the injury, the 
 plaintifiE may recover, though he be 
 negligent himself. Whirley i>. White- 
 man, 1 Head, 610. See, also, White 
 V. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 34 Mo. App. 
 57, and Kellny v. Missouri P. Ry. Co> 
 (Mo.), 13 S. W. Rep. 806. 
 
:90 THE, CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. [§ 64. 
 
 same/ and in many of the earlier cases, where this or some 
 equivalent form of expression is found, it is plain that that 
 grade of negligent wrong-doing is referred to which is con- 
 sidered in the succeeding section, and that what is there 
 called " gross, pr wilful," means simply wilful negligence. 
 In the later cases, the distinction between these two essen- 
 tially different grades of fault is more generally recognized, 
 and, as a consequence, we read in the recent reports less and 
 less about gross negligence, when wilful negligence is meant. 
 ■Except in those jurisdictions where the doctrine of compara- 
 tive negligence obtains, it is not at present usual to announce . 
 the rule in this way, i. e., that contributory negligence is no 
 defense when the negligence of the defendant is gross, for 
 the reason, as we have seen, that it either states the rule 
 wrong, or states it right in a wrong way. 
 
 § 64. Wilful negligence of the defendant.— When the 
 
 wrong-doing of the defendant is merely negligence, the con- 
 tributory negligence of the plaintiff may, as is well under- 
 stood, operate as a defense, but when the defendant's conduct 
 is wilful, it is no longer negligence, and when the injury sus- 
 tained by the plaintiff is the result of the wanton and wilful 
 act of the defendant, the question of the plaintiff's contribu- 
 tory negligence as a defense* cannot arise. In order to con- 
 stitute contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, 
 . there must be negligence on the part of the defendant." It is 
 accordingly the settled rule that when the defendant's con- 
 duct amounts to wilfulness, and when the mischief iS occa- 
 sioned by his intentional and wanton wrong-doing, the 
 plaintiff's negligence is no defense.' 
 
 ' Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 ; negligence, which contributed directly 
 
 8. c. 34 Am. Dec. 373; Kerwhacker v. to cause the injury, occurred after the 
 
 Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio St. danger in which plaintiff had placed 
 172, and Evansville, &c., E. Co. v. . himself by his own negligence was, or 
 
 Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120. by the exercise of reasonable care 
 
 "Rjitter*. Foy, 46 Iowa, 133; Stein- might have been, discovered by de 
 
 jnetz V. Kelly, 72 Ind. 443; s. c. 37 fendant in time to avert the injury. 
 
 Am. Rep. 170. then defendant was liable, however 
 
 ' In a late case in Missouri, where gross the negligence of plaintiff may 
 
 plaintiff was struck by a train at a have been. White v. Wabash W. 
 
 city crossing, it was held proper to Ry. Co., 34Mo. App. 57. And it was 
 
 charge the jury that if defendant's said in Kellny n. Missouri P. Ry. Co. 
 
^ 65.] 
 
 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. 
 
 91 
 
 § 65. Actions for assault and battery.— So it is held that 
 tjontributory negligence is no defense to an action for an assault 
 and battery,^ for the reason that the person assaulted is under 
 no obligation to exercise any care to avoid the assault by re- 
 treating or otherwise, and because, moreover, his want of 
 care can in no just sense be said to contribute to the injury 
 iinflicted upon him. An intentional assault inflicted upon 
 •one is an invasion of his right of personal security, for which 
 there is a redress by an action at law, and he cannot be de- 
 prived of this redress on the ground that he was negligent 
 and took no care to avoid such an invasion of his rights. 
 Moreover, aptfy said Adams, J.:' — " There can be no contrib- 
 
 <Mo.), 13 S. W. Rep. 806, that re- 
 covery is granted in such a case on the 
 ground that the defendant is estopped 
 by its own recklessness from assert- 
 ing the plaintiff's contributory neg- 
 ligence. Battishill «. Humphreys 
 (Mich.), 38 N. W. Rep. 581; and 
 Palmer O.Chicago, &c., R. Co.,113Ind. 
 250; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 70, were also 
 cases of recklessness in running trains. 
 Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615; 
 8. c. 34 Am. Dec. 273; Tonawanda 
 R. Co. «. Hunger, 5 Denio, 255; s. c. 
 49 Am. Dec. 239; Williams v. Michi- 
 gan, Sec., R. Co., 2 Mich. 359; s. c. 
 55 Am. Dec. 59; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Smith, 46 Mich. 504 When 
 the injury is wilful, as contributory 
 negligence is no defense, a point in 
 relation thereto is, of course, not 
 available on motion for non-suit. 
 Martin®. Wood, 5 N. Y. Supl. 274. 
 Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 
 3 Ohio St. 172; Cincinnati, &c., R. 
 Co. B. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 434; 
 Pittsburg, &c., R. Co. v. Smith, 36 
 Ohio St. 134; Brownell v. Flagler, 5 
 Hill, 283; Sanford «. Eighth Ave. R. 
 Co., 33 N. Y. 343; Vandegrift v. 
 Rediker, 32 N. J. Law, 185; New 
 Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 32 N. 
 J. Law, 166; s. c. 33 N. J. Law, 434. 
 Tanner v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 
 60 Ala. 621, where it is held that to 
 
 avoid the defense of contributory neg- 
 ligence it is not necessary that the 
 wrongful act of the defendant should 
 be "wanton and intentional," as 
 erroneously stated, in the case of 
 Government, &c., R. Co. v. Hanlon, 
 53 Ala. 70, for that defense is over- 
 come if the injury done be wanton, 
 reckless or intentional. Gothard b. 
 Alabama, &c., R. Col, 67 Ala. 114; 
 Banks v. Highland St. R. Co., 186 
 Mass. 485; Morrissey v. Eastern, &c., 
 R. Co., 126 Mass. 377; s. c. 30 Am. 
 Rep. 686; Johnson v. Boston, &c., R. 
 Co., 125 Mass. 75; Wjmn v. AUard, 
 5 Watts & S. 534; Bunting «. Central, 
 &c., R. Co., 6 Nev, 277; Holstine 
 ■a, Oregon, &c., R. Co., 8 Oregon, 163; 
 Maumus v. Champion; 40 Cal. 121; 
 Carroll v. Minnesota. &c., R. Co., 13 
 Minn. 30; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 
 Minn. 81; Pennsylvania R. Co. n. 
 Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301; b. c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 185, and the note; Town of Salem 
 V. Goller, 76 Ind. 391. 
 
 'The use of unnecessary force in 
 ejecting a person from a train makes 
 a case within this ml?. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. •». Bills, 118 Ind. 221 ; b. c. 20 N. 
 E. Rep. 775. Kain v. Larkin, 9 N. Y. 
 Supl. 89; s. c. 56 Hun, 79; Steinmetz «. 
 Kelly, 72 Ind. 443; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 
 170; Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa, 138. 
 
 ' Ruter ®. Foy, 46 Iowa, 133. 
 
92 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. [§ 66. 
 
 utory negligence except where the defendant has been guilty 
 of negligence to which the plaintiff's negligence could con- 
 tribute. An assault and battery is not negligence. The 
 former is intentional, the latter is unintentional."^ This 
 reasoning applies with eqa^l force to any other intentional 
 injury inflicted upon a plaintiff, and the rule that when the 
 defendant's conduct is of this character the plaintiff's negli- 
 gence is not a defense, is sustained not only by precedent, 
 but upon the soundest pri^ciples of legal right reason. 
 
 § 66. Application of this rule in Pennsylvania and 
 Kentucky. — In Pennsylvania the courts have materially 
 limited the application of this principle in actions for injuries 
 sustained by persons while unlawfully upon the track of a 
 railway company, by taking an extreme ground, somewhat 
 beyond that which is taken in other jurisdictions, as to the 
 right of the company to a clear track. In such cases the rule 
 in Pennsylvania seems to be that the trespasser acts wholly 
 at his peril ; that the railroad company hardly owes him the 
 duty of even slight care,, and that, if he is injured from the 
 ordinary prosecution of the , company's lawful business, he 
 must blame his own rashness and folly, and not expect the 
 courts to assist him except in cases of the most wanton 
 injury.' In Kentucky, on the contrary, the courts have gone 
 to the other extreme, and under a statute ' providing for the 
 recovery of punitive damages in case of loss of life " by the 
 wilful neglect of another person," railway corporations, in 
 cases where persons are injured in their employ, or in being 
 exposed to danger upon their tracks or elsewhere, through 
 the negligence of the company, are held to a somewhat unusual 
 
 ' See, also, Chiles v. Drake, 3 Mete, an infant. Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. 
 
 (Ky.) 146; Spring's Adm'r ». Glenn, v. Spearen, 47 Penn. St. 300, 30^ 
 
 13 Bush, 173, where, iinder a statute Philadelphia, &c., R. COi v. Hummell, 
 
 6t Kentucky, it is held that if the 44 Penn. St. 375; Mulherrin v. Dela- 
 
 defendant intentionally killed the ware, &c., R. Co., 81 Penn. St. 366. 
 
 plaintiff's intestate there could be no See, also, § 198 et seg:, infra, where 
 
 action, but if the latter was killed by the Pennsylvania rule upon this sub- 
 
 the wilful neglect of the former, ject is more fully considered, 
 damages could be recovered. ' Genl. Stat, of Ky., 1873, chap. 57, 
 
 " Railroad Co. v. Norton, 33 Penn. § 3, or 3 Stanton's Ky. Rev. Stat. 
 
 St. 465. This extreme view is not 510, § 3. 
 taken, however, when the trespasser is 
 
§ 67.] THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. 93 
 
 degree of care, and there is a tendency to construe many acts 
 and omissions " wilful " that perhaps in other jurisdictions 
 might not be so seyerely regarded.^ 
 
 § 67. When the defendant by his acts or omissions throws 
 the plaintiff off his gnard.— When the defendant, by his own 
 negligent or wrongful acts, or omissions, constituting a 
 breach of legal duty, throws the plaintiff off his guard, or 
 when the plaintiff acts in a given instance upon a reasonable 
 supposition of safety induced by the defendant, when there 
 is, in reality, danger, to which the plaintiff is exposing him- 
 self, in a way and to an extent which, but for the defendant's 
 inducement, might be imputed to the plaintiff as negligence, 
 sufficient to prevent a recovery, such conduct on the part of 
 the plaintiff, so induced, will not constitute contributory 
 negligence in law, and the defendant will not be heard to say 
 that the plaintiff's conduct under such circumstances is neg- 
 ligent, for the purpose of a defense to the action. The de- 
 fendant by his own negligent conduct, which has occasioned 
 the conduct of the plaintiff, is estopped, in a certain sense, 
 from making the defense that the plaintiff's conduct was 
 negligent, or in other words, he is not to be allowed) first, to 
 induce the plaintiff to be careless, and then to plead that 
 carelessness as a defense to an action brought against him 
 for the mischief that has been the result. The defendant 
 must not take advantage of his own wrong in suph a way as 
 that. When, for an example, a traveler, upon approaching a 
 railway crossing at a point where the view is obstructed, 
 
 ' Board of Internal Improvements ton®. Lexington, &c.,R. Co., 13Bush, 
 
 «. Scearce, 3 Duv. 676, holding that 636. See, also, Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 
 it is the duty of a turnpike company v. Collins, 3 Duv. 114. Kentucky, 
 
 to have bridges wherever the safety &c., R. Co. v. Gastineau's Adm'r, 83 
 
 of travel requires. Wilful neglect of Ky. 119, defining wilful neglect to be 
 
 this duty means a knowledge by the an intentional failure to perform a 
 
 company of the iosufflciency of its manifest duty in which the public has 
 
 bridge for that end, and a voluntary an interest, or which is important to 
 
 failure to remedy the defect; and a the person injured, in either preyent- 
 
 palpable and periloxis defect, discover- ing or avoiding the injury. Jones' 
 
 able by ordinary vigilance, might Adm'r v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 83 
 
 authorize the presumption of such Ky. 610; Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 knovrledge and neglect. Lexington Brooks' Adm'r, 83 Ky. 139. 
 V. Lewis' Adm'x, 10 Bush, 677; Clax- 
 
94 
 
 THE CONDUCT OP THE DEFENDANT. 
 
 [§ 68. 
 
 stops and listens for the customary signal, and, hearing 
 nothing, drives upon the track and is immediately run over 
 by a passing train and injured, the railway company ■vrill not 
 be allowed to make the defense that the plaintiff was negli- 
 gent in relying upon the fact that there was no whistle 
 blown or bell rung at the crossing, as evidence that no train 
 was near. The plaintiff in such a case, having been lulled 
 into a feeling of security by the defendant's negligent failure 
 to make the required signal, and having suffered an injury 
 thereby, may have his action.^ 
 
 § 68. This rule illustrated. — So, where the plaintiff acta 
 in obedience to the directions, or assurances, of the defend- 
 ant, or his servants, upon whom he has a right to rely, in 
 doing the act deemed negligent, unless the danger was a pat- 
 ent one, if he is injured in so doing he may recover, as when 
 a passenger does as the conductor tells him to do in jumping 
 from a train in motion, or ^n otherwise exposing himself.' In 
 
 ' So, too, where his horse is fright- 
 ened on approaching the crossing un- 
 der like Circumstances. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. McGaha, 19 111. App. 
 343; Ransom r. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 62 Wis. 178; ^. c. 51 Am. Rep. 718; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. ®. Ogier, 35 
 Penn. St. 60. Johnson, J., in New- 
 son V. New York, &c.,, R. Co. 29 
 N. Y. 390, stated the rule thus;—" The 
 law will never hold it imprudent in 
 any one to act upon the presumption 
 that another in his conduct will act in 
 accordance with the rights and duties 
 of both." See, also, Towler «. Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co., 18 West Va. 579; 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. v. Hogan, 
 47 Penn. St. 244; Ernst v. Hudson 
 River R. Co., 35 N. Y. 28. The fact 
 that the parly killed by the collision 
 was partially deaf, will not excuse the 
 continuous sounding of the whistle 
 from the point required by a statute. 
 He was at least entitled to such warn- 
 ing of the approach of danger as the 
 law designs to give thosfe paving full 
 
 possession of their faculties. Chicago 
 &c., R. Co. e. Triplett, 38 lU. 483. 
 
 " A stranger using a ferry at night 
 was directed by a watchman thereon 
 to go a certain way. In following the 
 direction, he drove upon a track and 
 was injured by a train backing down. 
 It was held that the proprietors of the 
 ferry were liable. Magoric v. Little,. 
 23 Blatchf. 399; b. c. 25 Fed. Rep. 
 627. Bellman v. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 130; Griffith 
 «. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co!, 98 Mo. 168; 
 s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 559; Dickson v. 
 Railroad Co., 80 Ga. 212; New York, 
 &c., Ry. Co. «. Doane, 115 Ind. 435; 
 S.C. 17N.E. Rep. 913. Where the direc- 
 tions of the conductor of a train are 
 within the scope of his agency ,a passen- 
 ger, in alighting from the train in obe- 
 dience to them, cannot be held guilty 
 of contributory negligence, although 
 he may receive an injury, unless obedi- 
 ence to such directions exposes him to 
 an obvious risk which a prudent man 
 would not incur. Cincinnati, &c., R- 
 
§68.] 
 
 THE CONDUCT OP THE DEFENDANT. 
 
 95 
 
 these cases the defendant having induced the plaintiff to act 
 in a certain way cannot, when injury results, set up that act 
 
 Co.B. Carper, 112 Ind. 26; s. c. 13 
 N. E. Rep. 123; St. Louis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Person, 49 Ark. 188; 8. c. 4 
 S. "W. Rep. 755 ; Jones ■». Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Minn. 183; s. c. 43 N. 
 W. Rep. 1114; Smith c. Central R. & 
 B. Co. (da..), 5 S. E. Rep. 773;' To- 
 ledo, &c., R. Co. V. Kid, 29 111. 
 App. 353; Baltimore, &c.>, R. Co. v. 
 Leapley, 65 Md. 571; Weiler ». Man- 
 hattan Ry. Co., 6 N". Y. Supl. 320; 
 B. c. 53 Hun, 372. It is not negligent 
 for a passenger in an elevated railway 
 car to leave his seat, atid go towards 
 the door, which at the time is held 
 open by one of the trainmen, as the 
 train approaches the station. Colwell 
 V. Manhattan Ry. Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 888. McGee «. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 92 Mo. 308; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 739; 
 Louisville, &c.,R. Co. v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 
 371; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 149; Filers. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 471; 
 B. c. 10 Am. Rep. 337, and 59 Am. 
 Rep. 351; Pool v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 53 "Wis. 659; s. c. 56 Wis. 337; 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co. v. Cantrell, 37 
 Ark. 519; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 105; 
 Towler v. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 18 
 West Va. 579. See, also, Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co. V. Aspell, 33 Penn. St. 
 147; B. c. 62 Am Dec. 823; Philadel- 
 phia, &c., R. Co. v. Boyer, 97 Penn. 
 St. 91. Ordinarily the questions of 
 negligence and contributory negli- 
 gence are for the jury. Jones v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 42 Minn. 183; b. c. 
 43 N. W. Rep. 1114; Wilbum v. St. 
 Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 36 Mo. App. 303; 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. ■». Edelstein 
 (Penn.), 16 Atl. Rep. 847; s. c. 33 
 W. N. C. 343; St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. 
 «. Person, 49 Ark. 182; Kansas &c., 
 R. Co. V. Dorough, 73 Tex. 108; s. c. 
 10 8. W. Rep. 711; McGee v. Missouri 
 P. Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 208. The follow- 
 ing cases, in which the plaintiff failed 
 
 to recover, serve rather to define than 
 to impair the rule as stated in the text. 
 In Hunter B. Cooperstown, &c.,R. Co., 
 113 N. Y. 371; B. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 
 820, where the plaintiff's decedent 
 attempted, by direction of the con- 
 ductor, to board a train running- 
 about six miles an hour past a station 
 at which it was advertised to stop, 
 and the depot platform was uneven, 
 it was held (Danforth, J., dissenting) 
 that the plaintiff should be non-suited. 
 In Stewart*. Boston, &c., R. Co., 146 
 Mass. 605; b. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 466, the 
 plaintiff, who, was on a wrong train 
 through his own fault, was told by 
 the conductor that, by taking, a rear 
 car, he could stop at a convenient 
 station beyond. In going to the rear 
 an ordinary lurch of the train threw 
 the plaintiff off the platform. It was 
 held that the information given by 
 the conductor was not such a com- 
 mand or direction as would support 
 an action against the c6mpany. The 
 words, "Jump off quick, if you are 
 going to," used by a conductor to a 
 passenger who had resolved to get off 
 a train after it had pulled out of a 
 station, were held not to be such an' 
 authoritative command as would jus- 
 tify an action against the railroad com- 
 pany for injuries received. Vimont 
 V Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 58; 
 8. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 100. See, also, 
 Bardwell v. Mobile, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Miss. 574; St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. ■». 
 Rosenberry, 45 Ark. 356. Directions 
 to a passenger, who has entered the 
 wrong train by mistake, as to where 
 he shall go, and how he shall go, to 
 secure passage on the right train, are 
 not within the line of the conductor's 
 duty and do not bind the company. 
 Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. «. Carper, 112 
 Ind. 36; b. c. 13 N. B. Rep. 123. See, 
 also, Hickey v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 
 
96 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. [§ 69. 
 
 as negligence in defense. If the plaintiff exercises ordinary 
 care and prudence under the circumstances in relying upon 
 the defendant's inducement, or in obeying defendant's orders 
 and directions, he may have his action. 
 
 § 69. Mitigation and apportionment of damages.— As a 
 
 general rule, contributory negligence , is never looked to in 
 mitigation of damages, and whenever it is a defense at all it 
 is a complete defense to the action. When both parties have 
 been guilty of negligence, it is said that " the law has no 
 scales to determine, ill such cases, whose wrong-doing 
 weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mis- 
 chief." ' And, to the same effect. Pollock, C. B., in Greenland 
 V, Chaplin,' says : — " The man who is guilty of a wrong, who 
 thereby produces mischief to another, has no right to say 
 ' part of that mischief would not have arisen if you had not 
 yourself been guilty of some negligence.' " But, while this 
 is the usual rule, it is otherwise when, as we have seen,' the 
 negligence of the plaintiff contributed not to cause, but 
 merely to aggravate the injury, and in those cases the de- 
 fendantj to catch the phrase of Baron Pollock, may say, 
 " part of that mischief would not have arisen if you had not 
 yourself aggravated the injury which my negligence caused," 
 and whenever the injury produced by the plaintiff's negli- 
 gence is capable of a distinct separation and apportionment 
 from that produced by the defendant, such an apportionment 
 must be made, and the defendant held liable only for such 
 a part of the total damage as his negligence produced.* 
 
 14 Allen, 429, where a passenger ' Railroad Co. v. Norton, 34 Eenn. 
 
 who, in conformity with a custom St. 469. 
 
 followed by the express permission of ' 5 Exch. 243. 
 
 the conductor, and without objection ' g§ 34 and 59. 
 
 from the superintendent and direct- * Owens v. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 
 
 ors, rode on the platform of a car on 35 Fed. Rep. 715; Nitre Phosphate 
 
 its approach to a station, and was in- Co. ■». Docks Co., 9 L. R. Ch. Div. 
 
 jured, he was not allowed to recover. 503; Sills v. Brown, 9 Car. & P. 601; 
 
 Ample places of security being pro- Thomas v. Kenyon, 1 Daly, 132; 
 
 vided for passengers, it was held that Hunt v. Lowell Gas Co., 1 Allen, 348. 
 
 a mere license given the plaintiff to Thus, where the defendants, by their 
 
 occupy an exposed position would imperfect manner of laying gaa pipes, 
 
 not excuse his negligence. contaminated the well water of the 
 
§ 70.] 
 
 THE .PLilNTIPF S EIGHT TO BECOVER. 
 
 97 
 
 § 70. Applications of this doctrine.— This is well illus- 
 trated by the facts in the case of Gould v. McKenna.' The 
 defendant had so constructed and maintained the roof of his 
 building that the water flowed therefrom upon the wall of 
 the plaintiff 's adjoining building, and, penetrating it, dam- 
 aged his goods. As a defense to the action the defendant 
 plead the openness and looseness of the plaintiff 's wall, and 
 charged that the condition of the wall made a case of con- 
 tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It appeared 
 in evidence that the improper construction of the defendant's 
 roof was the cause of the injury, but that the bad condition 
 ■of the plaintiff's wall had materially aggravated it. The 
 water ran down into the plaintiff's store because the defend- 
 ant had built his roof as he had, but the leak was much 
 worse than it would have been had there been no cracks and 
 chinks in the plaintiff's wall. The court held that these two 
 causes of injury were separable and independent ; that the 
 defendant was liable for so much of the damage as was due 
 to the improper constructibn of his roof, but not for that 
 
 plaintifC, the latter was allowed to re- 
 cover for the inconvenience suffered 
 because of the nuisance, but not for 
 injury caused by allowing his horse 
 to drink the water after he knew of 
 its corruption. Sherman v. Fall 
 Kiver Iron Co., 2 Allen, 534; Chase 
 «. N. T., &c., R. Co., 34 Barb. 373. 
 Defendant obstructed the plaintiff's 
 drain, and the latter could have in- 
 demnified himself for $35, but, by 
 delaying to repair, the damages 
 amounted to $100. It was held that 
 he could recover only $35. Lloyd v. 
 Lloyd, 60 Vt. 388; 8. c. 13 Atl. Rep. 
 638. McCleneghan v. Omaha, &c., R. 
 Co., 35 Neb. 533; s. c.41 N. "W. Rep. 
 350; Wright v. Illinois, &c., Tel. Co., 
 30 Iowa, 195; Gould v. McKenna, 86 
 Penn. St. 397; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 705. 
 Where one has been personally in- 
 jured by the negligence of another, 
 without fault on his own part, and 
 employs a reputable physician, his re- 
 
 7 
 
 covery of actual damages may not be 
 diminished by the physician's mistake 
 or neglect. Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 
 Ohio St. 378; s. c. 53 Am Rep. 86; 
 PuUman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 
 HI. 30; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 601; Rad- 
 man v. Haberstro, 1 N. T. Supl. 561. 
 See, also, Texas, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Orr, 46 Ark. 183. It would there- 
 fore be error, in such a case, to charge 
 the jury that if the plaintiff neglected 
 to do what a prudent man would 
 have done when he learned of the in- 
 jury, it would defeat his right of re- 
 covery for the previous as well as sub- 
 sequent damages. Stebbins v. Central, 
 &c., R. Co., 54 Vt. 464; s. c. 41 Am: 
 Rep. 855; Matthews «. Warner, 39 
 Gratt. 570 ; s. o. 36 Am. Rep. 396; 
 Secord v. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 5 
 McCrary, 515; Hibbard v. Thompson, 
 109 Mass. 386. 
 
 ■ 86 Penn. St. 397; s. c. 27 Am. 
 Rep. 705. 
 
98 THE plaintiff's bight to becoveb. [§ 71. 
 
 which was due to the open condition of the wall, and that it 
 was the duty of the jury to apportion the loss according to 
 the actual injury of the defendant, by separating it, as well 
 as they could upon the evidence, from the loss arising from 
 the openness of the wall ; that although there might be a 
 practical difficulty in separating the damage from each inde- 
 pendent cause, still that difficulty constituted no reason for 
 declining to undertake it, and that it did not change the na- 
 ture of the tortious act of the defendant nor relieve him 
 from liability, for the reason that a negligence which has no 
 operation in causing the injury, but which merely adds to 
 the damage resulting, cannot be a bar to the action, although 
 it will detract from the damages as a whole.^ 
 
 § 71. The rule criticised.— Perhaps it is safe to remark 
 that this is rather a dangerous doctrine. There is an obvi- 
 ous misapplication of it in the case of Wright i>. Illinois, &c.. 
 Telegraph Co.,* to which Judge Thompson has called atten- 
 tion.' In Tennessee the courts make an application of it 
 which is very like the rule in Illinois and in Kansas. If not 
 exactly, it is almost comparative negligence.* And in Geor- 
 gia this doctrine has been adopted in connection with the 
 rule in Davies v. Mann,' and applied and elaborated in such 
 a way as to make the rule in that State, at least in the judg- 
 ment of so discriminating a jurist as Dr. Wharton, also 
 equivalent to the rule of comparative negligence.' But, how- 
 ever it may have been misapplied, and notwithstanding its 
 tendency toward the doctrine of comparative negligence, the 
 
 ' See, also, in this connection, the rule " is fuUy considered in the fol- 
 
 leamed and exhaustive case of Fay v. lowing chapter, q. v. 
 
 Parker, 53 N. H. 342; s. c. 16 Am. ' 10 Mee. & W. 545. 
 
 Kep. 2T0. • Wharton on Negligence, § 384; 
 
 » 20 Iowa, 195, 215. Macon, &c., R. Co. ®. Davis, 18 Qa. 
 
 « Thompson on Negligence, 1163. 686; Augusta, &c., R. Co. v. McBl- 
 
 • Nashville, &c., R. Co. v. Carroll, murry, 24 Ga. 75; Macon, &c., R. 
 
 6 Heisk. 347; NashvDle, &c., R. Co. Co. ®. Johnson, 38 (Ja. 409; Hendricks 
 
 V. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174; Whirley «. ?;. Western, &c., R. Co., 52 Ga. 467; 
 
 Whiteman, 1 Head, 619; Dush «. Fitz- Atlanta, &c., R. Co. ®. Ayeis, 53 Ga. 
 
 hugh, 2 Lea, 307. This need not be 12. See, also, the discussion of the 
 
 discussed here, as the "Tennessee "Georgia rule" in the succeeding 
 
 chapter. 
 
§ 71.] THE plaintiff's EIGHT TO BECOTEB. 99 
 
 rule as stated in the two last preceding sections, and as illus- 
 trated in the case of Gould v. McKenna,^ and applied in the 
 cases generally cited above in its support, has a sound basis 
 in the logic of the law, and subserves the ends of substantial 
 justice. 
 
 ' 86 Penn. St. 297; B. c. 27 Am. Rep. 705. 
 
OHAPTEE V. 
 
 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 73. Comparative negligence. 
 
 73^ The theory of the rule of com- 
 parative negligence. 
 
 74. The degrees of negligence the 
 measure of the comparison. 
 
 75. The extent to which this rule 
 prevails. 
 
 76. This modification of the gen- 
 eral rule. 
 
 77. The same subject continued. 
 
 78. The rule in Illinois. 
 
 79. Galena & Chicago Union Rail- 
 road Company v. Jacobs. 
 
 80. The later Illinois cases. 
 
 81. This rule attributed to Chief 
 ■v Justice Breese. 
 
 82. Further criticism of the Illi- 
 nois rule. 
 
 83. The same subject continued. 
 
 84. The Illinois rule not a rule of 
 contributory negligence. 
 
 85. A comparison of relative de- 
 grees of negligence. 
 
 g 86. 
 87. 
 
 90. 
 91. 
 
 93. 
 
 94. 
 95. 
 96. 
 
 97. 
 
 99. 
 
 The rule in Kansas. 
 A comparison of the degrees of 
 negligence with proximateness 
 and remoteness. 
 The rule in Georgia. 
 Macon, &c., Railroad Company 
 V. Davis. 
 
 The later Georgia cases. 
 The confusion in these cases 
 pointed out. 
 
 Summary statement of the 
 Georgia rule. 
 The rule in Tennessee. 
 Whirley v. Whiteman. 
 The defense of this rule. 
 The rule in Kentucky. 
 The Kentucky statute. 
 Louisville, &c.. Railroad Com- 
 pany V. Collins. ' • 
 The position of the Kentucky 
 courts stated. 
 
 § 72. Comparatire negligence.— Instead! of the general 
 rules of law concerning contributory negligence, which, as 
 we have seen, prevail in England and in most of the States 
 of the Union, an exceptional doctrine — known as the rule of 
 comparative negligence — obtains in several jurisdictions in 
 this country. When an injury results to one of two parties 
 from the mutual and concurring negligence of both of 
 them, the one who suffers the injury can, according to the 
 prevalent doctrine, recover nothing from the other by way 
 of compensation or damages ; the contributory negligence 
 of the injured party is a defense and a complete defense to 
 the action, because " the law has no scales to determine, in 
 such cases, whose wrong-doing weighed most in the com- 
 
§ 73.] COMPABATITE NEGLIGENCE. 101 
 
 pound that occasioned the mischief."^ The common law re- 
 fuses either to apportion the damages as best it may, giving 
 to each man according to his deserts, as far as they can be 
 ascertained, or to divide the damages equally between the 
 parties in fault, as in the rusticum judicium of the admiralty, 
 and " the reason why, in cases of mutual, concurring negli- 
 gence, neither party can maintain an action against the 
 other," said Mr. Justice Strong,' " is not that the wrong of the 
 one is set-ofif against the wrong of the other ; it is, that the 
 law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is at- 
 tributable to the plaintiff's own fault." 
 
 § 73. The theory of the rale of comparative negligence. 
 
 — Upon considerations of public policy and general con- 
 venience the common law has steadily refused either to. en- 
 force contribution between tort feasors, or to parcel out thp 
 damages between the parties in cases of injury from mutual 
 and concurring neglect. In those jurisdictions, however, 
 where the doctrine of comparative negligence obtains, the 
 courts have proceeded upon an exactly contrary theory. 
 They assume it to be at once possible and judicious to com- 
 pare the negligence of the plaintiff with the negligence of 
 the defendant, in these actions, for the purpose of determin- 
 ing where the ultimate liability for the injury shall rest, and 
 if, upon such a comparison, judicially instituted, the negli- 
 gence of the plaintiff appears to have been slight, while that 
 of the defendant was gross — the plaintiff may have his ac- 
 tion. This is something more than a modification of the 
 usual rule. Under its operation contributory negligence is 
 no longer a defense. It completely ignores the principle of 
 compensation in awarding the damages, and proceeds upon 
 the theory of punishment. It contradicts the rule it assumes 
 to qualify. The rule is that contributory negligence is a de- 
 fense. The qualification is that it is not a defense. Beduced 
 to a canon it amounts to this : — Slight negligence on the part . 
 of a plaintiff, although never so much contributory negli-> 
 
 ' Railroad Co. v. Norton, 34 Penn. = Hell v. Glandlng, 42 Penn. St. 
 8t. 460. See, for a collection of cases 499. 
 on comparative negligence, Bailey's 
 Conflict of Judicial Decisions, p. 347. 
 
102 
 
 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 [§74. 
 
 gence, ia not a defense to gross negligence on the part of the 
 defendant.'^ 
 
 § 74. The degrees of negligence the measure of the com- 
 parison. — The term " gross negligence," as used in this rule, 
 must be understood to mean, not negligence merely, on the 
 one hand, as some English authorities suggest,^ nor wilful 
 negligence on the other hand, but that absence of slight care 
 which is mere inadvertence in a very high degree. It means 
 nonfeasance or misfeasance in the extreme, but not malfea- 
 sance. The rule in question recognizes the three degrees of 
 negligence with their reciprocal grades of carefulness,' and 
 it implies a comparison of the negligence of the plaintiff 
 with that of the defendant — hy these degrees. It is not the 
 rule that a mere preponderance of negligence on the part of 
 the defendant will warrant a recovery,* nor that the plaintiff 
 may have his action, unless he was guilty of more careless- 
 ness,* or greater negligence," than the defendant. The com- 
 parison to be instituted is not precisely like that made by a 
 
 ' Galena, &c., K. Co. v. Jacobs, 30 
 111. 478; Illmois, &c.. R. Co. ■». Heth- 
 erington, 83 111. 510; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Clark, 108 111. 113; Pacific, &c., 
 R. Co. ». Houts, 12 Ean. 828; Central, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Gleason, 69 Ga. 200. 
 
 = Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646, 
 661 (b^ Denham, C. J.); Wilson «. 
 Brett, 11 Mee. & TV- 113 (by Baron 
 Rolfe). It would only be a source of 
 confusion to introduce the expression 
 gross negligence, instead of the equiv- 
 alent, a want of due care. Grill «. 
 General, &c., Collier Co., L. R. C. 
 P. 600, 612. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. ». Johnson, 
 103 111. 512, where the court holds 
 that in applying the' rule that the 
 plaintiff may recover, notvirithstand- 
 ing his contributory negligence, when 
 his negligence is but slight and that of 
 the defendant gross, it must be under- 
 stood the terms " slight " and "gross " 
 are used in their legal sense, and ex- 
 press the extremes of negligence, of 
 which there are no degrees. 
 
 * Indianapolis, &c,., R. Co. ». Ev- 
 ans, 88 111. 63, holding it to be error 
 to instruct the jury that the plaintiff 
 may recover unless his negligence, 
 contributing to the injury, was eguai 
 to or greater than that of the defend- 
 ant. Chicago, &c., R. Co..b. Dimick, 
 96 111. 42. 
 
 " There must be more than a mere 
 preponderance against the defendant, 
 to recover. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Dunn, 61 111. 385. But compare Illi- 
 nois, &c., R. Co. «. Middlesworth, 48 
 111. 64, which holds that if the de 
 f endant has been guilty'of negligence 
 more gross than the plaintiff the lat- 
 ter can recover. 
 
 • Illinois, &c., R. Co. s. Mafflt, 67 
 111. 431; Joliet V. Seward, 86 Dl. 403. 
 But sefe Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 
 37 Ga. 113, 119, statmgthat "he who 
 is guilty of the greater negligence, or 
 wrong, must be considered the origi- 
 nal aggressor, and accountable accoid- 
 ingly." 
 
§ 75.] COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 103 
 
 book-keeper of the two sides of his accounts, and the rule is 
 not meant to regard slight differences in the relative amounts 
 of negligence, o£ plaintiff and defendant. There is no at- 
 tempt to balance to a cent, or, in other words, using the 
 figure of Mr. Justice Woodward in a case already cited,^ the 
 scales are not graduated to fractions of a degree, and unless 
 there is a difference in fayor of the plaintiff of at least one 
 whole degree the rule cannot apply. "The rule of this 
 court is," says Scholfield, J., in Eockford, Bock Island & St. 
 Ijouis R. Co. V. Delaney,* " that the rdative degrees of negli- 
 gence, in cases of this kind, is matter of comparison, and that 
 the plaintiff may recover although his intestate was guilty of 
 contributory negligence, provided the negligence of the in- 
 testate was slight and that of the defendant gross in compar- 
 ison with each other ; and, consequently, if the intestate's 
 negligence was not slight, and that of the defendant gross in 
 comparison with each other, there can be no recovery," 
 
 § 75. The extent to which the rule prevails.— The doc- 
 trine of comparative negligence had its origin, as it seems 
 from a consideration of the first case in which it is distinctly 
 declared,^ in a misunderstanding of the effect of previous 
 decisions, and also in an attempt to reconcile the rule laid 
 down in the English case of Davies v. Mann,* with the gen- 
 erally established doctrines of the law of contributory negli- 
 gence. It prevails to its full extent in but a single State of 
 the Union. In Illinois, where it originated, it is, as will appear 
 hereafter,' the established rule, and in Georgia, Kansas and 
 Tennessee, and possibly elsewhere — jurisdictions where it has 
 not been explicitly repudiated, as it has been in a majority 
 of the States, the courts have either followed the Illinois 
 rule, or proceeded independently upon a parallel theory to a 
 greater or less extent. In each of these States we find a 
 rule upon the subject of contributory negligence sui generis, 
 And, in each, savoring somewhat of the rule of comparative 
 negligence. This chapter is written to set out and illustrate 
 
 • Railroad Co. v. Norton, 34 Penn. ' Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 
 
 at. 465. ni. 478. 
 
 » 83 m. 196; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. * 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 508. ° § 78 e« teq., infra. 
 
104 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 77. 
 
 the law in these jurisdictions senatim, so far as it is in any 
 material particular anomalous. 
 
 § 76. This modification of the general rnle repudiated.— 
 
 The doctrine of comparative negligence, being so entirely at 
 variance with the accepted rules of law concerning contribu- 
 tory negligence, has very naturally f)rov,oked much sharp 
 criticism,^ and the courts of other States very occasionally 
 repudiate it with emphasis. The Court of Appeals of New 
 York in an early case — when the rule of comparative negli- 
 gence had just been announced — said : — " The question 
 presented to the court or the jury is never one of compara- 
 tive negligence, as between the parties, nor does very great 
 negligence on the part of a defendant so operate to strike a 
 balance as to give a judgment to a plaintiff whose own negli- 
 gence contributed in any degree to the injury 
 
 The law says to the defendant : — If you have by simple neg- 
 ligence caused this injury, so far as you are concerned the 
 ground of action is complete. At the same time it says to 
 the plaintiff : — Although, so far as the defendant's acts are 
 concerned, the case is made out, yet you cannot prevail if you 
 have by your simple negligence helped to bring about the 
 injury." * 
 
 § 77. The same subject continued.— So, also, the Supreme 
 Court of Indiana, in a late case, says^ — "We agree with 
 counsel that the doctrine of comparative negligence is un- 
 sound. We have no doubt that the rule is that, in actions 
 to recover for injuries caused by negligence, the contributory 
 negligence of the plaintiff will defeat the action, although it 
 is much less in degree than that of the defendant."* And in 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago, &c., E. Co.,* it is said by the Supreme 
 
 ' Judge Thompson says it is a rule criticise this doctrine with some se- 
 
 "not likely to be adopted in any verity. Perhaps his judgment upoB 
 
 other State where it does not now pre- snch a point is not inferior to that of 
 
 vail, imless by legislation." Thomp- any contemporary critic, 
 
 son on Negligence, 1168, § 16. And ' Wilds v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 
 
 the author remembers, when a law 24 N. Y. 432. 
 
 student, to have heard Prof. Theo- ' Pemisylvania Co. v. Roney, 89 
 
 dore W. Dwight, in his lectures in Ind. 463; b. c. 46 Am. Rep. 173. 
 
 the Columbia College Law School, ^ 32 Iowa, 467. 
 
§78.] 
 
 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 lOS. 
 
 Court of Iowa: — "This court recognizes and applies th& 
 doctrine of ' contributory negligence,' and not the doctrine of 
 ' comparative negligence.' The latter doctrine obtains only 
 in Illinois and Georgia, while the former obtains in the other 
 States, and also in the Federal Courts."* The Illinois 
 doctrine is also expressly denied in New Jersey, ' Alabama,' 
 Wisconsin,* Missouri,' Michigan,* Kansas,' Texas,' Massa- 
 chusetts,' Pennsylvania,*" and Kentucky." 
 
 § 78. The rule in Illinois.— In the earlier cases in th& 
 Illinois reports the doctrine of contributory negligence is 
 plainly declared. It was the unquestioned rule in that 
 State *' as in all other jurisdictions where the English com- 
 mon law prevails, until, in the case of the Gralena and Chicago 
 Union E. Co. v. Jacobs,*' Mr. Justice Breese worked out the 
 
 ' See, also, Artz ®. Chicago, '&c., R. 
 Co., 38 Iowa, 293, reversing the deci- 
 sion of the lower court, where the 
 jury had been instructed to give the 
 plaintiff damages unless he materially 
 contributed to the injury. 
 
 ^ If the plaintiff's negligence con- 
 tributes, the comparative degrees of 
 his and the defendant's negligence will 
 not be considered. Pennsylvania K. 
 Co. ■». Righteri 43 N. J. Law, 180. 
 
 ' Gothard s. Alabama, &c., R. Co., 
 67 Ala. 114. 
 
 ' The slightest negligence, if proxi- 
 mate or contributing to the injury, 
 prevents recovery. Potter v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 21 Wis. 372; s. c. 32 
 Wis. 615; Cunningham v. Lyness, 23 
 Wis. 345. 
 
 ''Hurt ■B. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 94 Mo. 255; s. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 1. 
 
 "Matta ■». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 69 
 Mich. 109; s. C. 33 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 71. 
 
 'Kansas, &c., R. Go. v. Peavy, 39 
 Kan. 170, 180, where the court says : 
 — " While it is settled in this State that 
 a party may recover for injuries done 
 to him or his property, even if his 
 negligence is slight, nevertheless this 
 
 court has not adopted what is gen- 
 erally called the rule of comparative 
 negligence. " This case is partially re7 
 ported in 44 Am. Rep. 630, omitting: 
 this point. Vide infra, § 86. 
 
 ' Houston, &c., R. Co. v. Gorbett, 
 49 Tex. 573, ,580, upholding the 
 charge given to the jury in the lower 
 court on the ground that "the law of 
 contributory negligence was clearly 
 given, and there was nothing to mis- 
 lead into the erroneous doctrine of' 
 comparative negligence." 
 
 » Marble « Ross, 124 Mass. 44. 
 
 '» Railroad Co. « Norton, 24 Penn. 
 St. 469; Heil «. Glanding, 42 Penn. 
 St. 499; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Penn. 
 St. 439; Potter 'v. Warner, 91 Penn. 
 St. 362; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 668. 
 
 " Digby «. Kenton Iron Works, 8' 
 Bush, 166. 
 
 >= Aurora, &c., R. Co. ■». Grimes, 13 
 HI. 585. Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Fay, 
 16 111. 558; 8. c. 63 Am. Dec. 323,. 
 where it was distinctly laid down that 
 the plaintiff, in order to recover, must 
 show that he was without fault in 
 producing the injury. Chicago., &c., 
 R. Co. ». Sweeney, 52 111. 330. 
 
 '3 20111.478. 
 
106 OOMPAEATITE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 79. 
 
 theory of comparative negligence. There is no hint of it in 
 any earlier case in the Illinois reports. To this early deci- 
 sion, and to this judge, is, therefore, properly ascribed the 
 origin of the doctrine. It is put forward as a qualification 
 of the rule that contributory negligence is a defense, but it 
 contradicts entirely the rule it assumes to qualify, and pro- 
 ceeds upon a theoty the very opposite,of that which justifies 
 the original doctrine. It ignores the principle of compen- 
 sation, and proceeds upon the theory of punishment. It 
 gives damages to the plaintiff not because he has suffered an 
 injury, but it makes the defendant pay damages because he 
 is very much more to blame than the plaintiff. It gives 
 damages to the plaintiff for an injury which he helped to 
 inflict upon himself, because he was not very much in fault, 
 and makes the defendant pay damages for an injury for 
 which he is only partially responsible, because he behaved 
 decidedly worse, upon the whole, than the plaintiff did. 
 
 § 79. Oalena & Chicago Union Railroad Company t. 
 Jacobs. — But let the cases speak for themselves : — In Galena, 
 &o., E. Co. V. Jacobs,^ the case in which the doctrine of com- 
 parative negligence was first announced, the court, " after 
 reviewing a number of decisions, noMe of which announced svch 
 a rule as that in q-aestion," ' says : — " it will be seen from these 
 {iases that the question of liability does not depend absolutely 
 on the absence of all negligence on the part of the plaintiff, 
 "but upon the relative degree of care, or want of care, as 
 manifested by both parties, for all care, or negligence, is, at 
 "best, but relative ; the absence of the highest possible degree 
 ■of care shovring the presence of some negligence, slight as it 
 may be. The true doctrine, therefore, we think, is that, in 
 proportion to the , negligence of the defendant, should be 
 measured the degree of care required of the plaintiff, that is 
 to say, the more gross the negligence manifested by the de- 
 fendant, the less degree of care will be required of the plaintiff 
 to enable him to recover," and the conclusion of the whole 
 matter is found in these words : — " We say, then, that, in this, 
 or in all like cases, the degrees of negligence must be 
 
 ^ 20 111. 478. ' Thompson on Hegligence, 1169, 
 
 note. 
 
§79.] 
 
 COMPAEATIYE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 107 
 
 measured and considered, and whenever it shall appear that 
 the plaintiffs negligence is comparatively slight, and that of 
 the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his action."' 
 The rule as thus conveniently formulated has never since 
 been challenged in that State, and a long line of subsequent 
 decisions reiterate this anomalous doctrine without addition 
 or abatement.^ 
 
 ■ The Jacobs Case (30 Bl. 478), at 
 page 496. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c.,R. Co. ®. Warner, 123 
 m. 38; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 206; St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co. V. Faitz, 23 111. 
 App. 498; Chicago, &o., R. Co. ■». 
 Kuster, 22 111. App. 188; Chicago, «&c., 
 R. Co. V. Fietsam, 123 111. 518; s. c. 
 15 N. E. Rep. 169; J'isher «. Cook, 
 125 HI. 280; s. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 763; 
 Christian v. Erwin, 125 HI. 619; s. c. 
 17 N. E. Rep. 707; Lake Shore, &c., 
 Ry. Co. V. O'Conner, 115 111. 254; 
 Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 
 115 m. 358; Chicago, Ac, R. Co. ■». 
 Dillon, 17 ni. App. 355; Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co. V. Wallace, 110 111. 114; 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. v. Mason, 27 
 HI. App. 450. Where an instruc- 
 tion properly exacted ordinary care 
 of the plaintiff and the court then 
 stated that "some" negligence, in com- 
 parison with which the defendant's 
 was gross, would not bar recovery, it 
 was held not to be fatal, though the 
 word "slight" would have been bet- 
 ter. Willard v. Swanson, 126 111. 381; 
 8. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 548. Village of Jef- 
 ferson ». Chapman, 127111.438; 8. C.20 
 N. E. Rep. 33; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Dewey, 26 111. 255; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Hazzard, 26 Dl. 373; Bass «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 28 111. 9; St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co. V. Todd, 36 111. 
 409. "Slight negligence of the 
 plaintiff in some degree contributing 
 to the injury, does not bar recovery." 
 Coursen v. Ely, 37 111. 338. Illinois, 
 Ac, R. Co. «. Simmons, 38 111. 242; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Hogarth, 38 
 111. 370; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Trip- 
 
 lett, 38 m. 482; Great Western R. Co. 
 «. Haworth, 39111. 346; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. V. McKean, 40 111. 218; Ohio, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Eaves, 42 111. 288; 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Mills, 42 111. 
 407: Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Middles- 
 worth, 48 m. 64; s. c. 40 111. 494. In 
 Ortmayer v. Johnson, 45 111. 469, the 
 rule is stated that in actions for neg- 
 ligence the plaintiff, to recover, must 
 show that the injury sustained re- 
 sulted from the negligence of the de- 
 fendant, and not from any default on 
 his part which materially contributed 
 to it; or, if not wholly free from fault 
 himself, that his negligence was slight 
 in comparison with that of the de- 
 fendant. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Qretzner, 46 111. 74; Ohio, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Shanefelt, 47 111. 497; Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Frazler, 47 HI. 505; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Payne, 49111. 
 499; s. c. 59 111. 534; Illmols, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Nunn, 51 lU. 78; Illinois, &c., 
 R. Co. v. Pondrom, 51 111. 333; 8. c. 
 2 Am. Rep. 306; Hlinois, &c., R. Co. 
 ■B. Sweeny, 52 111. 325; Illinois, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Fears," 53 111. 115; Toledo, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Pindan 53 111. 447; 8. c. 
 5 Am. Rep. 57; Kerr v. Forgue, 54 
 HI. 482; s. 0. 5 Am. Rep. 146; Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co. «. Simonson, 54 111. 
 604; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 156. Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Baches, 55 HI. 379, 
 holding that although the deceased 
 was guilty of negligence contributing 
 to the Injury, yet, if the defendants 
 were guilty of a higher degree of neg- 
 ligence, with which, when compared, 
 that of the deceased was greatly dis- 
 proportionate or slight, the plaintiff 
 
108 
 
 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 80. 
 
 § 80. The later Illinois cases.— In Chicago and North- 
 western E. Co. V. Sweeny,* we find the following detailed re- 
 
 might still recover. But if the negli- 
 gence of the deceased was equal to 
 that of the defendants, a recovery 
 cannot be had. Brown v. Hard, 56 
 111. 317; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Gregory, 58 111. 373; St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Manly, 58 111. 300; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Lee, 60 111. 501; s. c. 68 
 lU. 566; 87111. 454; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Dunn, 61 111: 385; s. c. 53 111. 
 451; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stables, 63 111. 313; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Murray, 63 111. 386; s. c. 71 111. 
 601, Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 
 63 111. 393; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Van Patten, 64 111. 510; B. c. 74 111. 
 91; Toledo, &c., R. Co. *. Spencer, 
 66 111. 538; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v.. 
 Mafflt, 67 111. 431; Pittsburg, &c., E. 
 Co. V. Kuntson, 69 111. 103; lUmois, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Benton, 69 111. 174; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Clark, 70 111. 
 376; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 
 111. 177; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Ginnis, 71 111. 346. Where, however, 
 the party injured was a trespasser, or 
 was enjoying a privilege or favor 
 granted without compensation or 
 benefit to the party granting it, and of 
 whose carelessness complaint is made, 
 the party complaining must have 
 used extraordinary diligence to en- 
 able him to recover. Illinois, <fcc., R. 
 Co. V. Godfrey, 71 111. 500; s. c. 33 
 Am. Rep. 113. Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Mock, 73 m. 141; Illinois, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Hall, 73 111. 333; Rockfoid, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Hilhner, 73 111. 335; 
 niinois, &c., R. Co. v. Hammer, 73 
 111. 847: 8. c. 85 lU. 536; Grandtower 
 Manfg. Co. «. Hawkins, 73 111. 386; 
 Hund 1). Geier, 73 111. 393; Rockford, 
 &c., R. Co. e. Irish, 73 El. 404; 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Goddard, 73 
 111. 567; Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 RafEerty, 73 HI. 58; Fairbank v. 
 Haentzsche, 73 HI. 336; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Coss, 73 HI. 394; Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co. «. Donahue, 75 111. 
 106; Tolpdo, &c., R. Co. «. O'Connor, 
 77 HI. 391; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hatch, 79 HI. 137; Kewanee*. Depew, 
 80 111. 119; SterUng Bridge Co. v. 
 Peari, 80 Ili. 351. In Litchfield Coal 
 Co. V. Taylor, 81 111. 590, the court 
 would seem to lean towards the dis- 
 carded rule. It is there held, that 
 when the injury was not wanton or 
 wilful, it is an essential element to a 
 recovery that the party injured must 
 have exercised ordinary care, but 
 where the injury haa been wilfully 
 inflicted, an action maybe maintained, 
 although the party injured may not 
 have been free from negligence. 
 Viewed in the light of St. Louis R. 
 Co. V. Todd, 36 111. 409, however, 
 where gross negligence is defined as 
 "amounting to wilful injury," the 
 case is, in reality, seen to be but an 
 iteration of the Hlinois doctrine in 
 deceptive guise. Rockford, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Delaney, 83 lU. 198; s. c. 35 
 Am. Rep. 308; City of Chicago i). 
 Hesing, 83 111. 304; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 
 378; Schmidt v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 83 HI. 405; Illinois, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Hetherington, 83 111. 510; Foster v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 84 HI. 164; 
 Quinn v. Donovan, 85 HI. 19^ Gray- 
 ville V. "Whitaker, 85 111. 439; Joliet 
 II. Seward, 86 111. 403; Indianapolis, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Evans, 88 HI. 63; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Grable, 88 111. 
 441; Wabash, &c., R. Co. v. Henks, 
 91 HI. 406. Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Porter,-93 111. 437, holding that to in- 
 struct a jury not to find for the 
 plaintiff unless they " believe from the 
 evidence that the injury complained of 
 
 ' 53 111. 330. 
 
,80.] 
 
 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 109 
 
 assertion of the rule of comparative negligence, by the same 
 judge who delivered the opinion in the first case in which 
 the doctrine is announced •} — " As some misapprehension 
 seems to exist in respect to the extent this court has gone in 
 discussing the doctrine of comparative negligence, it may 
 not be amiss to review the several cases on that subject. 
 But for that purpose it is not necessary to go back of the 
 case of the Galena and Chicago Union K. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 
 111. 478, as in that case all the previous decisions were re- 
 viewed and commented upon. Jacobs' case was the first case 
 announcing the doctrine of comparative negligence, the re- 
 ceived rule prior thereto having been if there was any negli- 
 gence on the part of the plaintiff he could not recover. The 
 English cases on this point were cited and commented on." 
 Then follows a statement of the rule in the Jacobs case, that 
 part of the opinion in that case which I have quoted above 
 being repeated in ipsissimis verbis and re-announced as the 
 correct rule.* 
 
 was caused by the negligence of de- 
 fendant, and the plaintiff was with- 
 out fault," is stronger than the law 
 will justify, as ignoring the doctrine 
 of comparative negligence. Haj^ward 
 V. Miller, 94 111. 349; B. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 339; Stratton v. Central Street Ry. 
 Co., 95 m. 35; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 ®. Dimick, 96 111. 42; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Johnson, 103 111. -513; City 
 «f Chicago V. Steams, 105 111. 554; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Clark, 108 HI. 
 113; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Langley, 
 2 Bradw. 505; North Chicago, Ac, 
 Mills ». Monka, 4 111. 664; Chicago, 
 Ac, R. Co. «. Lewis, 5 111. 343: Grover 
 ■B. Gray, 9 111. 339. 
 
 ' Breese, J., in Galena, &c., R. Co. 
 -». Jacobs, 20 m. 478. 
 
 ^ The learned judge continues : — 
 "Following this case" (meaning the 
 Jacobs case) "was the case of the 
 Chicago, Btirlington and Quincy R. 
 Co. «. Dewey, 36 Ibid. 355, where it 
 was said, it was not enough to show 
 a railroad company guilty of negli- 
 gence, but it must appear that the in- 
 
 jured party was not also negligent 
 and blamable. Bach party must em- 
 ploy all reasonable means to foresee 
 and prevent injury, and if the negli- 
 gence of one party is only slight, and 
 that of the other appears gross, a re- 
 covery may be had. In the case of 
 the same railroad company against 
 Hazzard, Ibid. 373, the ruling in Ja- 
 cobs' case was commented upon and 
 approved. The next case in the order 
 of time, having reference to injury 
 to persons, is that of the Chicago, 
 Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. 
 Triplett's Admr., 88 Ibid. 483, in 
 which it was again said although the 
 plaintiff may have himself been guilty 
 of some degree of negligence," yet if 
 it be but slight, in comparison with 
 that of the defendant, it should be 
 no bar to his recovery. No inflexible 
 rule can be laid down. Each case 
 must depend upon its own circum- 
 stances, and the question of compar- 
 ative negligence must be left to the 
 jury, imder the supervision of the 
 court The mle is the 
 
110 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 81. 
 
 § SI. This rule attributed to Chief Justice Breese.— This 
 is the doctrine as the late Chief Justice Breese, the father 
 of the rule in question, understood it. It is not a rule of 
 contributory negligence at all, but a law under which men 
 are fined for gross negligence, the fine being paid over to the 
 plaintiff, if he, on his part,, has been guilty of only slight 
 negligence. It had its origin appa^-ently from a misun- 
 derstanding, on the part of the judge who first declared 
 the rule, as to the effect of previous decisions. He seems 
 to have thought that he found his rule in the earlier En- 
 glish and American cases that he cites. " Although ' these 
 cases," said he,* " do not distinctly avow these doctrines in 
 terms, there is a view of it, very perceptible, running through 
 very many of them, as, where there are faults on both sides, 
 the plaintiff shall recover, his fault being to be measured by 
 the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff need not be wholly 
 without fault, as in Eaisin v. Mitchell, 9 Car. & P. 613, and 
 Lynch v, Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29." This language indicates very, 
 plainly that the learned chief justice misunderstood the 
 effect of these decisions, and that he founded his theory 
 upon this misapprehension. It is the essentially unanimous 
 judgment of common law judges and lawyers throughout 
 every jurisdiction where that law obtains, that these cases 
 are not the smalliest authority for such a doctrine as the Illi- 
 nois Supreme Court maintains. The mistake is, it is be- 
 lieved, in confounding the two essential elements which musti 
 concur to render negligence contributory negligence, (a) a] 
 want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, and (6) a( 
 proximate connection between such want of care and the in- 
 jury complained of. The rule that the plaintiff may have 
 his action whenever his negligence is merely the remote 
 cause of the mischief, while that of the defendant is the 
 proximate cause, is, in the rule of comparative negligence, 
 rewritten so as to make it that the plaintiff may recover 
 when his own negligence is slight and that of the defendant 
 gross. This confuses two essentially different things, and in 
 such a way as to destroy the rule upon which only a refine- 
 
 same in actions against railroad com- ' Galena, Ac, R. Co. «. Jacobs, 
 
 panics for injuries to personal prop- 20 111. 478, 496. 
 
 erty." 
 
§ 83.] COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 111 
 
 ment is attempted. Either contributory negligence in its 
 juridical sense is, or it is not, a defense. If it is a defense, 
 as the general rule declares, then there is no room for such a 
 theory as that of Mr. Justice Breese ; if it is not a defense 
 the whole theory upon which our law in this behalf has been 
 made to rest falls to the ground. 
 
 § 83. Farther criticism of the Illinois rule.— Under the 
 Illinois rule the question of proximateness and remoteness 
 as regards the cause of the injury does not arise. The ques- 
 tion is not whose negligence was the proximate cause, but 
 was the negligence of one party slight and that of the other 
 gross. It will be conceded without argument ; first, that 
 this is a much easier question to answer than that ; that 
 juries can far more readily compare one man's conduct with 
 another's, than they can determine so metaphysical a ques- 
 tion as that of causation ; that it makes the question con- 
 crete instead of abstract, and brings it nearer to the common 
 sense of the average juror ; and, second, that correct conclu- 
 sions can be reached perhaps as often under this rule as 
 under the other, that while the reason and the reasoning 
 will be wrong the result attained may be correct. We catch 
 a glimpse of the process by which this rule has been worked 
 out in the dictum of Mr. Justice Valentine, in his opinion in 
 Union Pacific E. Co. v. EoUins:' — "An act that may be 
 grossly negligent if it proximately contributes to the injury 
 may be reasonably careful if it only remotely contributes 
 thereto." Whether the act was gross negligence or slight 
 negligence, or ordinary negligence, is one thing, to be deter- 
 mined upon a consideration both of the intrinsic character 
 of the act itself, and of the circumstances under which it 
 was performed, and whether or not it was the proximate 
 cause of an injury is another thing, to be determined upon a 
 consideration of the law of cause and effect. 
 
 § 83. The same subject continued.— While it may be 
 said in favor of this rule that it is a convenient one for the 
 jury, and that under its operation a correct result is fre- 
 
 ■ 5 Kan. 167, 182. 
 
112 COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 83. 
 
 quentiy reached, it may also be suggested that it is rather a 
 poor reason for having one's rule wrong, that it gives the 
 iight answer about as often as the true rule.' By reading 
 the Illinois cases attentively it will be found that, very fre- 
 quently, when the plaintiff has had a judgment uider the 
 rule of comparative negligence, if a correct result was 
 reached, what the judges called the "gross negligence " of 
 the defendant was, in truth, nothing more than negligence 
 merely that was the proximate cause of the injury, while 
 what they call the " slight negligence " of the plaintiff was 
 negligence merely that was only a remote cause, or condition 
 of the injury. "But if such negligence was only slight, or 
 ■the remote cause of the injwry" says the Supreme Court of 
 Kansas,^ in announcing the rule of comparative negligence, 
 ■" the plaintiff may still recover, nottmthstanding such sligM 
 .negligence or remote cause." Sometimes also the " gross neg- 
 ligence " of the defendant is wilful negligence, and then, 
 upon familiar grounds, the plaintiff should have his action. 
 Jn both these classes of cases a correct conclusion is reached 
 oinder the rule of comparative negligence, no more and no 
 less a correct conclusion, however, than would have been 
 leached by the application of the general rules of contribu- 
 tory negligence, and quoad hoc the rule applied was not in 
 leality a rule of comparative negligence at all. It was a true 
 application of the established rules of law in point. But in 
 the third and remaining class of cases there is a real appli- 
 cation of this anomalous doctrine, and the result is rank in-, 
 justice. I mean that class of cases where the negligence of 
 the plaintiff, though what the court is pleased to denominate 
 his " slight negligence," is a proximate cause of the injury 
 lie suffers. In these cases, under the rule of comparative 
 negligence, the plaintiff recovers, or rather the defendant is 
 compelled to pay damages to the plaintiff, for an injury 
 which the plaintiff's own negligence has materially assisted 
 in producing. This is comparative negligence, pure and 
 simple, and, without the admixture of the wholesome excep- 
 tional rules of contributory negligence as in the two preced- 
 ing classes of cases, it is a rule which. Judge Thompson 
 
 ^ Cf. Wharton on Negligence, § 335. " Sawyer «. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466. 
 
§ 84.] COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 113 
 
 might well say, " is not likely to be adopted in any other 
 State . . . unless by legislation." ^ 
 
 §84. The Illinois rule not a rule of contributory negli- 
 gence. — In order to a fair statement of this Illinois rule, it 
 must be emphasized that the plaintiff can recover, when he 
 has himself been guilty of contributory negligence, only 
 when his negligence is slight, and the defendant's is gross, in 
 comparison with each other. The rule is that gross negli- 
 gence is ground for an action in spite of slight negligence, or 
 that slight negligence is not a defense when the defendant's 
 negligence is gross.* In some of the earlier cases the judges 
 tripped a little in stating the doctrine, making it equivalent 
 to a rule that a mere preponderance of negligence on the 
 part of the defendant was sufficient to warrant a recovery. 
 It was said that " he who is guilty of the greater negligence or 
 wrong, must be considered the original aggressor, and ac- 
 countable accordingly," ' and that unless the defendant has 
 been guilty of negligence more gross than the plaintiff there 
 can be no recovery.* But that this is an entire misconception 
 of the doctrine is expressly declared in many later cases.' 
 
 ' Thompson on Negligence, 1168, " Chicago, &c., E. Co. v. Dunn, 61 
 § 16. But compare Bequette v. 111. 385. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Van 
 Peoples' Transportation Co. , 2 Ore- Patten, 64 lU. 510, holding that to 
 gon, 200, and Holstine ». Oregon, announce the doctrine of comparative 
 &c., R. Co., 8 Oregon, 163, wherein negligence in such wise is not suf- 
 there is a suggestion that this rule flciently accurate. It is an incorrect 
 finds some favor in at least one State statement of the rule to say that al- 
 on the Pacific coast. It should be though the plaintifl was himself 
 remarked, however, that in these guilty of gross negligence, in neglect- 
 two cases the term "slight negli- ing to observe the ordinary precau- 
 gence," used by the court as not bar- tions expected from a prudent man, 
 ring the plaintifF's right to recover, yet if the defendant was guilty of a 
 really meant negligence which was a higher degree of gross negligence the 
 remote cause of the injury. plaintiff might recover. Illinois, &c., 
 
 'See generally the cases cited R. Co. o. Maffit, 67 111. 431; Chicago, 
 
 above. &c., R. Co. ». Lee, 68 lU. 576; HU- 
 
 ' Macon, &c., R. Co. «. Davis, 27 nois, &c., R. Co. v. Benton, 69 HI. 
 Ga. 113, 119. See, also, 8. c. 13 Ga 174; Chicago! &c., R. Co. b. Mock, 72 
 68 (where the decision was based on HI. 141; Illinois, &c., R. Co. «. Ham- 
 correct grounds), and 18 Ga. 679. mer, 72 111. 347; Illinois, &c., R. Co. 
 
 • Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Middles- e. Goddard, 72 HI. 567; Chicago, &c., 
 
 worth, 43 111. 64. See, also, St. Louis, R. Co. «. Donahue, 75 m. 106; Chi- 
 
 &c., R. Co. V. Todd, 36 lU. 414. cago, &c., R. Co. v. Hatch, 79 III. 137; 
 8 
 
114 COMPAKATITE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 85. 
 
 § 85. A comparison of relative degrees of negligence. — 
 
 The settled rule seems to be that the relative degrees of neg- 
 ligence are to be compared, and that the plaintiff may re- 
 cover, although guilty of contributory negligence, provided 
 his negligence was slight and that of the defendant gross in 
 comparison with each other, and consequently that, when- 
 ever it appears that the plaintiff's negligence was not 
 slight and the defendant's gross in comparison with each 
 other, there can be no recovery.* That the plaintiff's 
 negligence is slight is not alone sufficient. It must 
 also appear, at the same time, in order to the action^ 
 that the defendant's nagligenoe was gross,^ and whenever the 
 plaintiff 's negligence is of a higher degree, his right of action 
 is gone. If it is equivalent to a want of ordinary care, even 
 though the defendant's negligence was gross, the plaintiff 
 cannot recover,' which is the same as to say, that ordinary 
 negligence, or any higher degree than slight negligence, is a 
 defense to an action even for gross negligence, under this 
 rule. When the plaintiff's negligence is gross there can be 
 no recovery, according to a recent decision,* unless that of 
 the person inflicting the injury was wilful or criminal, 
 "Under this rule," says Judge Thompson,* "the negli- 
 
 Joliet V. Seward, 86 111. 403; Indian- Delaney, 83 111. 198; s. c. 35 Am. 
 
 apolis, &c., R. Co. e. Evans, 88 111. Rep. 308. ^ 
 
 63. It is not sufllcient, for plaintiff's = Chicago, &c., R. Co. n. Rogers, 17 
 
 recoveiy, that defendant may have HI. App. 638; Garfield Manuf. Co. ». 
 
 been guUty of a greater degree of McLean, 18 111. App. 447. Even an 
 
 negligence in respect to the producing infant must exercise ordinary care, 
 
 of the injury. Toledo, &o., R. Co. Quincy, &c., Ry. Co. v. Cruse, 36 lU. 
 
 t). arable, 88 m. 441 ; Chicago, Ac, App. 397; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 R. Co. «. Dimick, 96 111. 43; Earl- Hetherington, 83111. 510; Earlville®. 
 
 ville !). Carter, 3 Bradw. 84; "Wa- Carter, 6 Bradw. 431.. Aninstruc- 
 
 bash, &c., R. Co. ®. JoAes, 5111. 607. tion purporting to give the doctrine 
 
 ' Parmelee «. Farro, 33 111. App. should ,not omit the requirement of 
 
 467; Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. Dela- ordinary care by the plaintiff. Wil- 
 
 ney, 83 111. 198; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. lard ®. Swanson, 126111. 381; s. c. 18 
 
 308. N. E. Rep. 548; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 
 " Winchester v. Case, 5 Bradw. 486, «. Fletsam, 133 HI. 518; s. c. 15 N. E. 
 
 489, where the Court says:— "Slight Rep. 169; Tomle v. Hampton, 139 111. 
 
 negligence on the part of the person 879 ; s. c, 21 N. E. Rep. 800. 
 
 injured can be excused only by the * Illinois, &e., R. Co. v. Hethering- 
 
 gross or wanton negligence, or the ton, 83 111. 510. 
 
 wilful acts of the person causing the » Thompson on Negligence, 1171. 
 injury." Rockford, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 
§ 86.] COMPAEATIYE NEGLIGENCE. 115 
 
 genoe of both parties may combine to produce the injury, the 
 negligence of the person injured may operate as a factor in 
 producing the injury, but it is excluded as a factor in meas- 
 uring the damages. The plaintiff 's negligence, or that of the 
 person on account of whose injury he sues, helps in some 
 degree to produce the injury, but the defendant must bear all 
 the damages." 
 
 § 86. The rule in Kansas, — The Supreme Court of Kansas 
 has adopted a rule upon the question of contributory negli- 
 gence which differs essentially from the general rule, and 
 which for practical purposes is equivalent to the Illinois rule 
 of comparative negligence. The Kansas rule was first an- 
 nounced by Valentine, J., in the early case of the Union 
 Pacific Ey. Co. v. Rollins.* In the opinion in this case 
 there is an elaborate consideration of the whole question, 
 and the result reached is that it is not necessary in order to 
 enable a plaintiff to recover, even for injuries to his property, 
 that he be himself entirely free from negligence ; that if his 
 negligence is slight, or the remote cause of his injury, while 
 that of th& defendant is gross, or the proximate cause, the 
 plaintiff may have his action ; that whether or not there has 
 been negligence, in a given case, and its nature and degree 
 if found, are questions of fact for the jury ; but that to de- 
 termine what degree of care and diligence on the one hand, 
 and of negligence on the other, will entitle the plaintiff to a. 
 verdict, is a question of law for the court. In the later casea 
 the rule in Union Pacific Ey, Co. v. EoUins, as set out 
 above, prevails.' 
 
 ' 5 Kan. 167. Co. «. Houts, 12 Kan. 328. In 
 ' Wichita, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 37 Kansas, &c., R. Co. «. Pointer, 14 
 Kan. 743; 8. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 78. In Kan. 37, the jury found that the de- 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. V. Brown (Kan.), f endant was guilty of gross negli- 
 24 Pac. Rep. 497, an instruction gence, immediately causing the in 
 holding a railway company liable to jury; they also found that the plaint- 
 an injured employee if guilty of iff was guilty of negligence contribut- 
 "any" negligence and permitting a ing to the injury. It was held that it 
 recovery, though the employee was was apparent from the other findings, 
 guilty of slight negligence, was held and the instructions of the court, that 
 to be erroneous. CaulMns v. Mat- they intended only such slight negli- 
 thews, 5 Kan. 191; Sawyers. Sauer, gence as was consistent with a right 
 10 Kan. 466; Paciflc, &c., R. to recover compensation. Kansas, 
 
116 COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCE. ^ [§ 88. 
 
 § 87. A confusion of the degrees of negligence with 
 proximateness and remoteness.— The doctrine is formulated 
 in such a way in several of the cases cited as to suggest the 
 conclusion that " slight negligence," as used in what we may 
 call the Kansas rule, is synonymous with negligence which is 
 but a remote cause, and that " gross negligence " means 
 hardly more than negligence which is a proximate cause. In 
 the leading case it is said : — " An act that may be grossly 
 negligent if it proximately contributes to the injury, may be 
 reasonably careful if it only remotely contributes thereto."' 
 And in a later case we find the following gloss upon this 
 statement of the law : — " If the jury believe from the evi- 
 dence that the plaintiff 's negligence contributed to the injury 
 complained of " [by which must have been meant that if the 
 plaintiff's negligence appeared to them to have been a proxi- 
 mate cause of the injury] "he cannot recover. But if such 
 negligence was only slight, or the remote cause of the injury, 
 he may still recover, notwithstanding such slight negligence 
 or remote cause."* Such statements as this, it has been at- 
 tempted in the preceding section to show, involve a confusion 
 of ideas. There is a mistaking of causation for negligence. 
 In one of the later cases* it is denied that the rule of com- 
 parative negligence obtains in this State. But it is sub- 
 mitted, after a somewhat extended reading of the Kansas de- 
 cisions, that the distinction, if any there be, between the rule 
 as declared in Illinois and the rule taught by these cases, is 
 exceedingly minute, and one which, in practice, it will be 
 found at once impracticable and impossible to bring out. 
 
 § 88. The rule in Georgia.— The Georgia rule upon this 
 subject differs, on the one hand, from the general rule of con- 
 Ac, R. Co. ■». Fitzsimmons, 18 Kan. ' Union Pacific Ry. Co. ®. Rollins, 5 
 34; s. 0. 23 Kan, 686, and 31 Am. Rep. Kan. 167, at page 183. 
 303; Central, &c., R. Co. «. Henigh, ' Sawyer v. Sauef, 10 Kan. 466. 
 23 Kan. 347; Mason ». Missouri, &c., ' Kansas, &c., R. Co. ■». Peavey, 
 R. Co., 27 Kan. 88; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 29 Kan. 170. "It was settled in the 
 405. Compare Kansas, &c., R. Co. case of Kansas Pac. R, Co. ■». Pea- 
 -0. Peavy, 39 Kan. 169, where llie doc- vey that the doctrine of compara- 
 trine of comparative negligence is ex- tive negligence does not obtain in 
 pressly denied to he the law in the this State." Johnson, J., in Howard 
 State. > ®. Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 41 Kan. 
 
 403. 
 
§ 89.] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 117 
 
 tributory negligence, and on the other hand from the excep- 
 tional rnle of comparative negligence. Under the general 
 rule, the negligence of the plaintiff, if contributory in the 
 juridical sense, is a defense. Under the exceptional rule, the 
 slight negligence of the plaintiff, though contributory, is 
 not a defense when the negligence of the defendant is gross, 
 and under the rnle as declared by the Supreme Court of 
 Georgia, the slight negligence of the plaintiff, though con- 
 tributory, is not a defense when the negligence of the de- 
 fendant is gross, but it goes in mitigation of damages. Both 
 Dr. Wharton* and the Supreme Court of Iowa" state that the 
 rule of comparative negligence obtains in Georgia ; but per- 
 haps this rule is more correctly described as a rule in miti- 
 gation of damages, than as a rule of comparative negligence. 
 Although the rule implies a comparison of the negligence of 
 one party with the negligence of the other, in order to fix 
 the ultimate liability, yet this comparison is not the most 
 characteristic feature of the rule. In addition to the com- 
 parison, and as the distinguishing element in the Georgia 
 rule, the negligence of the plaintiff, when not so great as to 
 bar a recovery, under an application of the general rule, is 
 looked to in mitigation of damages. 
 
 § S9. Macon, &c., Railroad Company t. Davis. — The rule 
 in question may be said to have had its inception in the case 
 of Macon, Ac, E. Co. v. Davis.^ This is the first impor- 
 tant case in the Georgia reports in which the general ques- 
 tion of the effect of contributory negligence is considered. 
 It proceeds upon the theory that the rule of contribijtory 
 negligence as laid down in the EngKsh case of Butterfield v. 
 Forrester,* that if the injury results in whole or in part 
 from the misconduct of the plaintiff, he cannot recover, had 
 been so modified by later decisions, especially by the doctrine 
 in Davies v. Mann,^ as to be equivalent to a rule that, in cases 
 where the negligence of both parties concurred to occasion 
 the mischief, the plaintiff may nevertheless recover if the 
 
 ■ Wharton on Negligence, § 334. " 27 Ga. 113; s. c. 18 Ga. 679; 13 
 
 » O'Keefen. Chicago, &c., R. Co., Ga. 68. 
 32 Iowa, 467. * 11 East, 60. 
 
 ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
118 COMPAEATITE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 90. 
 
 defendant, by the exercise of ordinary care under the cir- 
 cumstances, could have avoided the infliction of the injury. 
 This pernicious and pestiferous doctrine, which is the same 
 thing ae a rule that when two are to blame, one shall be held 
 responsible and the other discharged and exonerated, seems 
 to have imposed upon the court in rather a peculiar way. 
 When the case under consideration^ was first decided, it was 
 decided right, under a true application of the general rule of 
 law in point.^ At the rehearing the court attempts to apply 
 the supposed modification of that rule by the later case of 
 Davies v. Mann, and says : — " We approve of this modifica- 
 tion of the principle, and think it ought to be left to the 
 jury to say whether, notwithstanding the imprudence of the 
 plaintiff's servant, the defendants could not, in the exercise 
 of reasonable diligence, have prevented the collision."* But 
 when the case came up again, upon a second rehearing, the 
 court seems to have begun to lose faith in the Davies v. 
 Mann " modification," which at the first rehearing they had 
 expounded and approved, and, after beating about for some 
 middle ground, reaches the conclusion, upon which the case 
 finally rested, that " he who is guilty of the greater negli- 
 gence, or wrohg, must be considered the original aggressor, 
 and accountable accordingly." ^ Starting out with the rule 
 in Butterfield v. Forrester,' which declares the received rule 
 of contributory negligence, the court attempts to apply, in 
 connection therewith, the rule in Davies v. Mann,* and the 
 result i^ the rule of comparative negligence, in so extreme a 
 form, that it has been found necessary, even where that rule 
 obtains, to reduce ft to less objectionable shape. 
 
 § 90. The later Georgia cases.— While the case of Ma- 
 con, &c., R. Co. V. Davis ' was in process of decision, two 
 
 ' Macon, &c.. R. Co. v. Davis, 37 want of ordinary cave to avoid it on 
 
 Ga. 113; s. 0. 18 Ga. 679, and 13 Ga. 68. the part of the plaintiff. 
 
 " Gf. Brannon i>. May, 17 Ga. 136. » Macon. &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 18 
 
 Here it was asserted in clear-cut Ga. 679, 686. 
 
 terms that to maintain an action for ■* Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 27 
 
 an injury received from an ohstruc- Ga. 113, 119. 
 
 tion in a highway, two things must ' 11 East, 60. 
 
 concur: an obstruction in the road by ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 the fault of the defendant, and no ' 37 Ga. 113. 
 
§ 91.] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 119 
 
 other cases were decided which should be noticed here. In 
 another case growing out of the same accident^ which had 
 occasioned the case. of Macon, &c., E. Co. v. Davis, the court, 
 by Lumpkin, J., lays down with much clearness th« rule 
 that contributory negligence is a defense, fortifying that po- 
 sition by the citation of many aiuthorities, both English and 
 American, and following the earlier case of Brannon v. 
 May,** in which the general rule is correctly declared. Con- 
 fronted with the later case of Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 
 which had just been decided on the rehearing,* in which the 
 doctrine in Davies v. Mann is approved and declared, the 
 learned judge 'attempts very ingeniously to reconcile the two 
 cases. He says : — " Is there any conflict between Brannon 
 V. May and Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Davis ? We do not per- 
 ceive it ; the two may, and do, well stand together ; " and 
 then enters into an extended argument to establish his 
 proposition, standing firmly to the ground taken, but en- 
 deavoring to reconcile it with the modification. Upon a re- 
 hearing in this case, Benning, J., in a dissenting opinion, 
 argues at length that the damages should suffer a reduction 
 in proportion to the fault of the plaintiff.* Then followed," 
 in point of time, the final decision in the case of Macon, 
 &o., R. Co. V. Davis,' in which the doctrine of comparative 
 negligence is broadly announced, and, in the same year, the 
 case of Flanders v. Meath,* in which it ik held that when 
 both parties are in fault' the plaintiff may have his action, 
 but that, inasmuch as the defendant was only slightly the 
 moist in fault, the damages awarded should be small. 
 
 § 91. The confusion in these cases pointed ont.— This is 
 comparative negligence and mitigation of damages at once. 
 But before this, and before the announcement of the final 
 
 ' Macon, &c , R. Co. v. Winn, 19 But Benning, J., concluding from the 
 
 <3a. 440; s. c. 26 Ga. 850. evidence that the parties injured were 
 
 ' 17 Ga. 136. somewhat negligent, argued that 
 
 ' 18 Ga. 679. recovery should only be had for the 
 
 * The Winn case, 36 Ga. 250. The part of the loss resulting from the neg- 
 
 ^ound on which Lumpkin, J. , had ligence of the defendant. 
 
 put his decision was that the parties ° 37 Ga. 113. 
 
 injured had used all ordinary care. ' 27 Ga. 358. 
 
120 OOMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 92. 
 
 rule in Macon, &c., E. Co. v. Davis/ in the case of Augusta, 
 &o., E. Co, V. McBlmurry,' when in the court below the 
 counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the 
 jury that the plaintiff's own freedom from contributory neg- 
 ligence was an essential element in his case, according to 
 the rule in Brannon v. May,' and the court refused, but 
 charged " that the defendants are bou^d for reasonable care 
 and diligence in running their cars, and a departure from the 
 rules of running is a want of such care and diligence ; that 
 when the plaintiff is cJiiefly in fault, he cannot maintain an 
 action ; where the parties are equally infavU he cannot main- 
 tain an action ; but that, though the plaintiff be somewhat in 
 faidt, yet, if the defendants have been guilty of gross negli- 
 gence, he may maintain an action." The court above held a 
 refusal to give the instruction asked not error, and that the 
 instruction given was a correct enunciation of the established 
 rule in that State, which was " that although the plaintiff be 
 somewhat in fault, yet, if the defendant be grossly negligent, 
 and thereby occasioned, or did not prevent, the mischief, the 
 action may be maintained." This is comparative negligence 
 pure and simple, without the modification as to mitigation 
 of damages, and it is substantially followed in a compara- 
 tively recent case.* We find, however, in Atlanta, &c., E. Co. 
 V. Ayers,^ the rule thus laid down : — " If it appears that both 
 parties were guilty of negligence, and that the person injured 
 could not by ordinary care and diligence have avoided the 
 consequences to himself of the negligence of the company, 
 or its agents, he may recover, but the jury shall lessen 
 the damages in proportion to the negligence and want of 
 ordinary care of the injured person." 
 
 § 92. Summary statement of the Georgia rnle.— Taking 
 the decisions in point as a whole, from first to last, it may be 
 said that the rule in Georgia is not settled. There is a 
 
 ' 27 Ga. 113. to the injury, yet that will not pre- 
 
 ' 24 Ga. 75. vent his recovery if, by ordinary care, 
 
 ' 17 Ga. 136. he could not have avoided the con- 
 
 * Rome V. Dodd, 58 Ga. 238, where sequences to himself of the defend- 
 
 it is declared that while the plaintiff ant's negligence. 
 
 may, in some way, have contributed ' 53 Ga. 12. 
 
§92.] 
 
 COMPABATITE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 121 
 
 tendency toward the rule of comparative negligence/ and it 
 is certainly usual, in cases where the plaintiff's negligence 
 is not regarded sufficient to prevent entirely a recovery, 
 to direct the jury to look to it in mitigation of damages as 
 has already appeared. But even this is not a universal rule. 
 It is the usage rather than the rule. The latest cases take 
 now one view and now the other,' and we must hear fur- 
 ther from the Supreme Court before there can be formu- 
 lated anything exactly and explicitly as the Georgia rule. 
 
 ^ E. g. Augusta, &c., R. Co. «. Mc- 
 Elmurry, 24 Ga, 75, where this rule 
 is explicitly set forth. Code Ga. § 
 8972, provides that defendant is not 
 relieved in an action for damages 
 caused by his negligence because 
 plaintiff in some way contributed to 
 the injury. It was held, that a 
 charge that no recovery could be had 
 if the person injured was in any way 
 at fault would not cause reversal, 
 where plaintiff sought to recover the 
 full damages, and made no request to 
 the court to give this principle in his 
 charge, and alleged and insisted to 
 the end that the person injured was 
 in no way at fault. Hill e. Callahan, 
 82 Ga. 109; s. c. 8 S. E. Rep. 730. 
 In Central, &c., R. Co. v. Smith, 78 
 Ga. 694; 8. c. 3 8. E. Kep. 397, the 
 rule contained in Code Ga. § 8034, 
 that in actions against railroad com- 
 panies, for negligent injuries to per- 
 son or property, if the complainant 
 and defendant are both in fault, the 
 complainant may recover, but his 
 damages shall be diminished in pro- 
 portion to his default, was held to 
 have no application where the com- 
 plainant is guilty of gross negligence. 
 
 'Thus, Central, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Gleason, 69 Ga. 200, and Atlanta, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Wyly, 65 Ga. 120, uphold 
 the principle of apportioning dam- 
 ages. In Thompson v. Central, &c., 
 R. Co., 54 Ga. 509, the doctrine of 
 comparative negligence would seem 
 
 to govern. In Campbell v. Atlanta, 
 &c., R. Co., 53 Ga. 488; s. c. 56 Ga. 
 586, it was held that for an employee 
 of a railroad to recover for injuries, it. 
 must be shown that he was entirely 
 without fault. This decision is based 
 on a provision in the Georgia Code, 
 covering the case. Hendricks ». 
 Western, &c., R. Co., 52 Ga. 467, 
 citing Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Johnson, 
 38 Ga. 408, holds not only that the 
 contributory negligence of the in- 
 jured party would reduce the amount 
 of recovery, but also that if the in- 
 jured party could have avoided the 
 consequence to himself, caused by the 
 negligence of the defendant, by the 
 exercise of ordinary diligence on his- 
 part, there was no right to any re- 
 covery. And in Georgia, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Neely, 56 Ga. 540, the Court re- 
 marks that a locomotive and a mule 
 may well pass over the same groimd, 
 so that they pass at different times. 
 If, however, they contend for the 
 same place at the same instant, and a 
 collision ensues, with damage to 
 either, the diligence of their respective 
 owners may be challenged and com- 
 pared. In two respects the compari- 
 son will influence the pecuniary con- 
 sequences of the collision; it will 
 decide whether any compensation is 
 due to the owner of the injured prop- 
 erty, and if any, whether it should be 
 full or only partial. 
 
122 COMPAEATITE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 94. 
 
 §93. The rule in Tennessee. — In Tennessee the contrib- 
 Titory negligence of a plaintiff is nbt a defense precisely to 
 the same extent that it is in the other States of the Union in 
 general. As, between the doctrine of comparative negli- 
 gence and the generally accepted rules of contributory 
 negligence, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has not taken, 
 it is believed, a doubtful position. Comparative negligence 
 is not the rule of that court, and to state it broadly, the 
 court maintains, in general, the rule that when a plaintiff's 
 own negligence is the proximate cause of the injury of 
 which he complains, he cannot recover.* But, whenever 
 the negligence of the plaintiff is slight, or merely the absence 
 ■of a superior degree of care or diligence, such negligence 
 being not sufficient to bar the action, may be looked to in 
 mitigation of damages.' In this respect the rule in Tennes- 
 see is the same as in Georgia. In both these States the 
 negligence of the plaintiff when slight is not a defense. In 
 Georgia this is a modification of the rule of comparative 
 negligence, but in Tennessee it is rather a qualification of 
 "the general rule as to contributory negligence. 
 
 § 94r. Whirley t. Whiteman.— This case, decided in 1858, 
 is regarded as the leading case in point.^ It has been some- 
 times misunderstood to announce the doctrine of compara- 
 -tive negligence. But a careful reading of the opinion will 
 show that such an impression is a pure misunderstanding. 
 The court says: — "When a party brings an injury uponhim- 
 self,-or contributes to it, the mere want of a superior degree 
 of care or diligence, cannot be set up as a bar to the plaint- 
 iff's claim for redress ; and, although the plaintiff may him- 
 self have been guilty of negligence, yet, unless he might by 
 the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the consequence 
 
 ' Jackson v. Ifashville, &c., R. Co., R. Co., 9 Heisk. 823, 826:— "It has 
 
 13 Lea, 491; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 663; been frequently adjudged by this 
 
 Nashville, <Sbc., R. Co. v. Whelees, 10 Court that contributory negligence on 
 
 Lea, 741; B.C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; the part of the party injured, maybe 
 
 Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head, 610. considered by the jury in mitigation 
 
 ' Dush «. Fitzhugh, 2 Lea. 807; of damages." Nashville, &c., R. Co. 
 
 R. Co. «. Walker, 11 Heisk. «. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Smith v. 
 
 383. Sneed, J., would seem to Nashville, &c., R. Co., 6 Heisk. 174. 
 make the statement too broad when = 1 Head, 610. 
 lie says, in Hill v. Louisville, &c.. 
 
§ 95.] COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 123 
 
 of the defendant's negligence, he will be entitled to recover." 
 This is but to say that a mere want of great care on the part 
 of the plaintiff is not sufficient to constitute contributory 
 negligence, or that the measure of the plaintiff's diligence is 
 the standard of ordinary care, which, as we have seen,i is 
 the general rule. But in subsequent cases it has been held 
 that the failure to exercise extraordinary care on the part of 
 the plaintiff, while not a defense to the action, may be looked 
 to in mitigation of damages,^ and there is a noticeable ten- 
 dency to extend this rule so as to include cases where the 
 plaintiff's negligence is something more than a want of slight 
 care — especially where the negligence of plaintiff and de- 
 fendant is highly disproportionate.* 
 
 § 95. The defense of this rule.— Much maybe said in fa- 
 vor of the rule which counts the plaintiff's negligence in 
 mitigation of the damages, in those cases which frequently 
 arise, wherein, on the one hand, a real injury has been suf- 
 fered by the plaintiff, by reason of the culpable negligence 
 of the defendant, and yet where, on the other hand, the 
 plaintiff's conduct was such as, to some extent, to contribute 
 to the injury, but yet in so small a degree that, to impose 
 
 ' g 19, supra. ways be, — "Whose conduct or neglect 
 " See, particularly, Louisville, &c., more imTnediately pioduced the y/iong 
 E. Co. V. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347, in or injury done ? " A criterion, we 
 which the court was of the opinion should say, very dangerously near to 
 that the dicta and decisions holding it that on which the doctrine of pure 
 a bar to recovery of the plaintiS in any comparative negligence is pivoted. In 
 degree contributed to the injury, are East Tennessee, &c., Ry. Co. v. Hull, 
 not supported by sound authority. It 88 Tenn. 33; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 419, a 
 was therefore held that even if the charge, drawing the attention of the 
 plaintiff might have escaped injury by jury to the comparative negligence of 
 the exercise of ordinary care, yet if the the plaintiff and defendant, and di- 
 defendant was guilty of gross negli- recting them to find for plaintiff if 
 gence, which was the more direct they found the injury was caused by 
 cause of the injury, the plaintiff the greater negligence of defendant, 
 could still recover, though his want was held to be error. But that 
 of care would mitigate the damages, case signifies nothing, for such a state- 
 See, also, generally, the later cases ment of the rule would also be pro- 
 cited above. nounced erroneous in Illinois and 
 ' Dush V. Fitzhugh, 3 Lea, 307, probably in Georgia. See, also, §§ 84, 
 holding that the chief inquiry in cases 91, 96, herein, 
 of contributory negligence must al- 
 
124 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. [§ 96, 
 
 upon him the entire loss, seems not to take a just account of 
 the defendant's negligence. Jn those cases which may be 
 denominated " hard cases " the Georgia and Tennessee rule 
 in mitigation of damages, without necessarily sacrificing the 
 principle upon which the law as to contributory negligence 
 rests, is a rule against which, in respect of justice and hu- 
 manity, nothing can be said. Where the severity of the 
 general rule might refuse the plaintiff any remedy whatever, 
 as the sheer injustice of the rule as laid down in Davies v. 
 Mann * would impose the whole liability upon the defendant, 
 it is quite possible to conceive a case where the application 
 of the rule which mitigates the damages in proportion to 
 the plaintiff's misconduct, but does not decline to impose 
 them at all, would work substantial justice between the 
 parties. 
 
 § 96, The rule in Kentucky. — A consideration of the rule 
 upon the sjibject in Kentucky is included in this chapter, not 
 because the rule of comparative negligence obtains in this 
 State to any extent or in any sense, nor because the Court 
 of Appeals at Frankfort is unsound to any degree upon the 
 general doctrines of the law of contributory negligence, but 
 because citations are occasionally made from the Kentucky 
 reports by text-writers, and by the courts of other States, to 
 this effect, and in such a way and with such a gloss as to give 
 currency to the impression that the Kentucky decisions are 
 obnoxious to this criticism. So far is this from being the 
 truth that it may safely be Asserted that nowhere is tjie gen- 
 erally accepted doctrine upon this subject more positively 
 declared, or more firmly and consistently adhered to, than in 
 Kentucky. " "When the defense is contributory negligence,"^ 
 says the Court of Appeals in the comparatively recent 
 case of the Kentucky Central E. Co. v. Thomas' Adminis- 
 trators,^ " the proper question for the jury is, whether the 
 damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or im- 
 proper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff 
 himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his own neg- 
 ligence or want of ordinary or common care and caution that, 
 
 ' 10 Mee. & W. 546. ' 79 Ky. 160; 8. c. 42 Am. Rep. 
 
 208. 
 
§97.] 
 
 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 125 
 
 but for such negligence or want of ordinary care and cau- 
 tion on his part, the misfortune would not have occurred. 
 In the first case, the plaintjflf would be entitled to recover ; 
 in the latter, he would not." This is the doctrine in both 
 the earlier and the later cases.* 
 
 § 97. The Kentucty statute. — As supplementary to the 
 common law rules in point, or, perhaps, rather as declarative 
 of a common law rule, there is a statute in Kentucky' which 
 provides for the recovery of punitive damages in certain 
 cases, where death results from the " wilful negligence " of 
 the defendant. In cases that have arisen under this statute, 
 it has been held conformably to the common law rule, that 
 the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, in such a case, 
 is not a defense to the action,® and some of these cases, in 
 which the court has been perhaps a little inexact in express- 
 ing the rule, have been cited as authority for the rule of 
 comparative negligence.* 
 
 • Louisville, <fcc., R. Co. v. Fil- 
 tem's Admx., 6 Bush. 574; City of 
 •Covington v. Bryant, 7 Bush. 248; 
 Digby V. Kenton Iron Works, 8 Bush. 
 166. In Jacob's Admr. v. Louisville, 
 •&C., R. Co., 10 Bush. 263, the rule 
 is laid down that if the plaintiff failed 
 to use that degree of care and skill 
 which may reasonably be expected 
 from one in like situation, and by 
 such failure proximately co-operated 
 in causing the death, no recovery can 
 be had, unless the defendant might, 
 by the exercise of ordinary care, 
 have nevertheless prevented the in- 
 jury. This rule, it is further held, is 
 only subject to modification in cases 
 of vdlful neglect. Jones' Admr. v. 
 LouisviUe, &c., R. Co., 82 Ky. 610. 
 
 " 2 Stanton's Ky. Stat. 510, § 3; 
 Genl. Stat, of Ky. ch. 57, § 3, passed 
 March 10, 1854. 
 
 = But it is said that " if the injury 
 received by the deceased was caused 
 wholly by his own negligence it neces- 
 sarily results that his life wa» not lost 
 by the wilful neglect of the defend- 
 
 ant, and the action cannot be main- 
 tained." Jones' Admr. v. Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co., 82 Ky. 610; Ramsey ii._ 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. (Ct. of App. 
 Ky. 1885), not reported. 
 
 * E. g. Dr. Wharton cites Louis- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Sicklings, 5 
 Bush. 1; Louisville, &c„ R. Co. 
 ■». Mahoney, 7 Biish. 235; Whar- 
 ton on Negligence, § 335, note. 
 Mr. Freeman, in his learned an- 
 notation of the case of Casey v. 
 Berkshire R. Co., 48 Am. Dec. 616, 
 cites (page 637) the case of Jacobs 
 V. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 10 Bush. 
 363, in conneption with some cases 
 from the Illinois reports, as an author- 
 ity for the proposition, — "Except 
 where the effect of slight contributory 
 negligence is held to be overcome by 
 evidence of the defendant's gross or 
 wanton negligence, aw i« the rule in 
 Bome- States," which should seem to be 
 equivalent to the statement that the 
 rules in Ulinois and Kentucky are, in 
 this respect, the same. Judge Thomp- 
 son also discusses an "innovation" 
 
126 COMPABATITE NEGLIGENCE. " [§ 98. 
 
 § 98. louisyille, &c., Railroad Company t. Collins.— 
 
 This misapprehension seems to have arisen principally from 
 some expressions of Chief Justice Eobertson in his opinion 
 in the case of the Louisville, &c., E. Co. v. Collins.' This 
 was an action brought by a common laborer for injuries 
 sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendant's en- 
 gineer, whose orders it was the plaintiff's duty to obey. 
 It was not an action under the statute of 1854, hitherto re- 
 ferred to, since the injuries did not result in death.* In 
 delivering the opinion of the court the Chief Justice said: — 
 " But had the appellee [plaintiff] been guilty of negligence, 
 nevertheless, the injury might have been avoided by the 
 proper care of the engineer, and is, therefore, attributable 
 to his gross negligence. In such a case both principle and 
 preponderating authority seem to decide that such a reme- 
 diable fault of the person injured should not exonerate the 
 wrong-doers from legal liability for the damage which, with- 
 out gross negligence, he could have prevented." ' And, in a 
 later case, in reaffirming this doctrine, the same judge speaks 
 of " the extraordinary or gross negligence " passed upon in 
 the Collins case, and then proceeds to a definition of it in 
 these terms : — " Gross neglect is either an intentional wrong, 
 or such a reckless disregard of security and right as to im- 
 ply bad faith, and, therefore, squints at fraud, and is tanta- 
 mount to the magna culpa of the civil law, which in some 
 respects is gMosi-criminal." * Inasmuch as this is what his 
 honor meant by gross negligence, the opinion in the case of 
 Collins gives no shadow of just ground for the impression 
 that that case teaches the doctrine of comparative negli- 
 
 that he discovers in the Kentucky re- low-servant ? " this case laid down 
 
 ported cases, under the title of com- the eminently just and reasonable rule- 
 
 parative negligence. Thompson on which was many years later adopted 
 
 Negligence, 1023, § 36. And, while by the Supreme Court of the United 
 
 perhaps he makes the impression that States in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. 
 
 this rule prevails in Kentucky, he Paul R. Co. ®. Ross, 113 U. S. 377. 
 
 does not say so. In another connec- See the chapter on Master and Serv- 
 
 tion, however, he gives the Court of ant, infra. 
 
 Appeals a "character" as to the 'Louisville, &c., R. Co. ®. Collins, 
 
 anomalous doctrine. Thompson on 2 DuV. 114, 119. 
 
 Negligence, 1003. « Louisville, &c., R. Co. ®. Robin- 
 
 ■ 2 Duv. 114. son, 4 Bush. 507, 509. 
 
 ' Upon the question "Who is a fel- 
 
§ 99.] COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 127 
 
 gence. That case, therefore, upon this point, teaches that 
 wilful negligence is not to be defended by a plea of slight 
 negligence, which is called in the opinion " the remediable 
 fault of the person injured," and this is but the unquestioned 
 rule of the common law.^ 
 
 § 99. The position of the Eentncky courts stated.— 
 
 In order that the position of the court may not be misunder- 
 stood, immediately following the definition of gross negli- 
 gence just quoted, the learned judge says : — " But if the 
 party complaining of hurt by his own negligence contributed 
 to it, he cannot recover damages from the company unless 
 its co-operating agent, charged with gross " [i. e. according 
 to his definition, wilful and intentional] " neglect, could have 
 avoided the impending damage, by the observance of ordi- 
 nary diligence, notwithstanding the neglect of the complain- 
 ing party."' It may be conceded that this is rather a 
 clumsy and confused statement of law, and that the definition 
 proposed for gross negligence is misleading. What is 
 termed gross negligence the better authorities now caU wil- 
 ful negligence, or wilful wrong-doing. But in the two opin- 
 ions, the one explaining the other, there is no uncertain 
 sound upon tlie point in dispute. There is no suggestion of 
 a rule of comparative negligence, and it is submitted that a 
 reading of the Kentucky decisions demonstrates that the 
 Court of Appeals of this State has placed itself squarely in 
 line with other common law courts in an orthodox attitude 
 upon the matter of contributory negligence.' 
 
 ' Of. Louisville, &c.. Canal Cp. v. ' See an essay by Helm Br ice. 
 
 Murphy's Admr., 9 Bush. 531, and Esq., of the LouisviUe Bar, io the 
 
 the note. Kentucky Law Journal for April, 
 
 9 Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Robin- 1882, upon " The Kentucky doctrine 
 
 son, 4 Bush. 509. See, also, Louis- of contributory negligence," in which 
 
 ville, &c., R. Co. ■». Sicklings, 5 the whole subject is fully and learn- 
 
 Bush. 1. edly considered. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 THE IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD 
 
 PERSONS. 
 
 100 The rule stated. 
 
 101 The reason of the rule. 
 
 103 No Gontributlon among tort 
 feasors. 
 
 103 The contributory negligence 
 of the plaintiff 's agent must 
 be imputed to the plaintifif. 
 
 104 The rule illustrated. 
 
 105 The rule in Thorogood v. 
 Bryan. 
 
 106 A similar rule in the Admi- 
 ralty. 
 
 107 Baron Pollock's criticism — 
 Thorogood ■». Bryan over- 
 ruled. 
 
 108 Thorogood v. Bryan in Penn- 
 syl-vania. 
 
 109 Thorogood v. Bryan in Ar- 
 kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, and 
 Michigan. 
 
 110 The general American rule. 
 
 111 Thorogood v. Bryan in New 
 Jersey. 
 
 112 The New Jersey doctrine fur- 
 ther stated. 
 
 113 Privity in negligence between 
 a public' carrier and a shipper 
 of goods. 
 
 114 The prevalence of this rule. 
 
 115 Plaintiff's negligence concur- 
 ring with that of the driver of 
 a private conveyance. 
 
 116 In the case of persons non sui 
 juris. 
 
 117 Who are to be held non »ui 
 
 118 
 
 The status of infants. 
 
 § 119 The New York rule— Hart- 
 field V. Roper. 
 
 120 The language of the court. 
 
 131 The later cases following 
 Hartfield v. Roper. 
 
 133 The rule modified in various 
 jurisdictions. 
 
 133 The modification in New York. 
 
 124 The same subject continued. 
 
 125 Negligence of the defendant 
 must be shown. 
 
 126 The English doctrine further 
 considered. 
 
 127 A criticism of Hartfield «. 
 Roper. 
 
 128 The same subject continued. 
 139 The criticism continued. 
 
 130 The rule in Hartfield v. Roper 
 denied. 
 
 131 When the action is for the 
 parent's benefit. 
 
 133 This rule illustrated. 
 
 133 The rule modified by reason 
 of the plaintiff's poverty or 
 destitution. 
 
 134 A further statement of the 
 rule ia Pennsylvania. 
 
 135 This doctrine commended. 
 
 136 Ordinary care in a chUd. 
 
 137 Children as trespassers. 
 
 138 Other English cases. 
 
 139 The doctrine condemned. 
 
 140 The general American rule 
 
 141 The Massachusetts rule. 
 
 142 What acts and omissions on 
 the part of parents have been 
 held contributory negligence. 
 
 § 100. The rnle stated.-^Contribntory negligence in its 
 juridical sense, is usually the personal default of the plaintiff 
 himself. The general rule is that when the plaintiff's own 
 
§ 100.] NEGLIGENCE 05 THIRD PERSONS. 129 
 
 want of ordinary care is a proximate cause of tha injury he 
 sustains, he cannot recover damages from another therefor. 
 But, under certain exceptional conditions, which we are to 
 consider in this chapter, a plaintiff may be legally chargeable 
 with the negligence of some third person, which is imputed 
 to him as though it were his own. In this particular the 
 law of negligence is analogous to the general principles of 
 ■the law as to liability, under which one is primarily respon- 
 sible for his own acts, and only secondarily for the acts of 
 others, as e. g. those of his servant or agent. The rule upon 
 this branch of our subject is that the contributory negli- 
 gence of third persons constitutes a valid defense to the 
 plaintiff's action only when that negligence is legally im- 
 putable to the plaintiff. There must, in order to create this 
 imputability, be some connection, which the law recognizes 
 between the plaintiff and the third person, from which the 
 legal responsibility may arise. The negligence of the third 
 person and its legal imputability must concur. It is clear 
 that there is no justification for the negligent misconduct of 
 the defendant in that some third person, a stranger, was also 
 in the wrong. When the defendant pleads the negligence of 
 Sk party other than the plaintiff in bar of the action, it must 
 appear, not only that such third person was in fault, but 
 that the plaintiff ought to be charged with that fault. In a 
 case in New York, for example, the defendant's street car, on 
 which the plaintiff's intestate was a passenger, having be- 
 come over-crowded, and the deceased having been thrown off 
 by another passenger rushing by him in haste in leaving the 
 car, it was held that the wrongful act of such passenger did 
 not relieve the defendants from the consequences of their 
 wrongful act in crowding their car, and thereby compelling 
 the deceased to stand upon the platform ; ^ or, in other 
 
 • Sheridan o. Brooklyn, Ac, R. Co., pushed under the wheels of the car 
 
 36 N. Y. 39. See, also, Merwin v. by the rush of a disorderly crowd 
 
 Manhattan Ry. Co., 1 N. T. Supl. of excursionists and injured, was not 
 
 267, a similar case on the elevated allowed to recover. It was held that 
 
 railroad where the same conclusion a railway company is not bound, even 
 
 was reached. Qf. Cannon «. The when an unusually large number of 
 
 Railway Company, 6 Irish L. R. 199, passengers are expected, to provide a 
 
 where a passenger on the platform staff of servants so large as to be en- 
 
 of a crowded ezbursion train being abled to control the violence of an 
 9 
 
130 NEGLIGENCE OP THIED PEBSONS. [§ 101. 
 
 words, that the negligent act of the passenger who pushed 
 his way recklessly through the crowd, upon the platform, in 
 leaving the car, ought not to be imputed to one who was 
 thereby pushed off and injured, j 
 
 § 101. The reason of the rule.— So, in an action against 
 a railway company for damages resulting from the careless- 
 ness of its servants in running over and cutting fire hose, 
 and thus letting the plaintiff's buildings burn, it was held 
 insufficient as a defense, that the firemen were also negligent 
 in stretching their hose across the track and failing to warn 
 an approaching train, the court saying : — " The grounds 
 upon which the defendants are charged in such a case is that 
 the wrong was done by an act in the doing of which it was 
 an actor. The fact . that others co-operated, or concurred 
 with it in effecting the wrong does not affect the question or 
 measure of its liability."' And, in an action against a gas 
 company for injuries arising from an explosion of gas, ilpon 
 the ground that the company had supplied a defective gas 
 pipe, it was held no defense that a gas-fitter's servant had 
 negligently ignited the gas.' In each of these cases there 
 
 assemblage of persons entering the Transportation Co., 60 Wis. 141; B. c. 
 station without permission, and over- 50 Am. Rep. 353.| 
 crowding the platform. The decision ' Bvirrows v. March Gas and Coke 
 went entirely on the ground that the Co., L. K. 5 Exch. 67; s. c. L. E. 7 
 Company was not negligent. Mt. Exch. 96. "If the question," says 
 Adams, &c., R. Co. b. Reul, 4 Ohio Tigott, B., "were to he simply re- 
 Cir. Ct. 363; Randall v. Frankford, garded as one of contract, the con- 
 Ac, R. Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 377. sideration whether the defendant's 
 In Lehr v. Steinway & H. P. R. Co., conduct was the proximate or re- 
 118 N. T. 556; B. c. 23 N. E. Rep. mote cause of the accident might 
 889, the question of defendant's negli- arise; still, regarding the question as 
 gence was left to the jury, but it was one of negligence, the mere fact of 
 said that plaintiff was not negligent another cause having co-operated 
 as a matter of law. with the main cause, does not make 
 ' Hunt, J., in Mott v. Hudson the main cause remote, though it may 
 River R. Co., 8 Bosw. 845; s. c. 1 give rise, in this case, whether the 
 Robert. 585. So, where a Are was doctrine of contributory negligence 
 started by defendant's negligence and applies." But in order that this 
 spread, to the plaintifPs house, it was should be so, the plaintiff must in 
 no defense th^t it first caught in shav- some way be considered as identical 
 ingsnegligently left by a third person, with the gas-fltter's servant. And 
 or that the city was negligent in not this the court held not to be the 
 putting it out. Atkinson v. Goodrich case. 
 
§ 102.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. 131 
 
 was no sufficient legal connection between the plaintiff and 
 the person whose negligence or wrong-doing was sought to 
 be interposed as a defense, and in each there was, accord- 
 ingly, no legal imputability. 
 
 § 102. No contribution among tort feasors.— This princi- 
 ple is, in some sort, a branch of the rule which refuses to 
 enforce a contribution among tort feasors. Not only, it may 
 be said, does the common law decline to enforce contribution 
 when judgment has gone against one for the wrong-doing of 
 several, but it refuses to allow one wrong-doer to set up the 
 concurrent wrt)ng-doing of another as a defense in the origi- 
 nal action. The defendant will not be heard to say that, 
 though guilty himself of negligence, the injury would not 
 have been inflicted if some third person, a stranger to the 
 plaintiff's case, had not also been negligent. This is famil- 
 iar learning. Numerous cases illustrate and enforce the rule, 
 that the contributory negligence of third persons, who are 
 mere strangers, or mere joint tort feasors, is not a defense 
 in an action for damages resulting from negligence when the 
 actionable negligence of the defendant is establised.^ The 
 
 ' Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 374; was held responsible for injuries to a 
 
 Eaton V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 11 Al- child in playing about a turn-table 
 
 len, 500. Where a servant is injured negligently left unfastened, though 
 
 by the joint negligence of his master the negligent acts of older children 
 
 and a fellow-servant, the master is lia- (possibly sui juris) assisted in causing 
 
 ble. See Chapter on Master and Ser- the accident. The Berniaa, L. R. 13 
 
 vant, infra. A fortiori, a third P. & D. 58. In Churchill v. Holt, 127 
 
 person cannot be relieved from Mass. 165; s. o. 34 Am. Bep. 355j 
 
 liability for his negligence on the 131 Mass. 67; 41 Am. Rep. 191, it isi 
 
 ground that the negligence of the held that if an occupant of a build- 
 
 plaintiff's fellow-servant contributed ing, by reason of his connection with 
 
 to cause the injury. Gray v. Phila., it, is compelled to pay damages re- 
 
 &c., R. Co., 23 Blatchf . 363. It is covered in an action of tort by a per- 
 
 not sufficient to absolve the defendant son who sustains an injury by falling 
 
 from criminal liability for gross neg- into a hatchway, which had been left 
 
 ligence causing a runaway, whereby open by the negligent act of a third 
 
 a person is killed, that the horse person, he may maintain an action 
 
 might have been checked by diligence against such third person for indem- 
 
 and care on the part of the driver, nity. The rule that one of two joint 
 
 Belk V. People, 135 HI, 584; s. c. 17 tort feasors cannot maintain an action 
 
 N. E. Rep. 744. In Gulf, &c., Ry. against the other for indemnity or 
 
 Co. V. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356; s. c. contribution does not apply to a case 
 
 14 S. W. Rep. 36, a railway company where one does the act or creates the 
 
132 NEGLIGENCE OP THIRD PEE80NS. [§ 103. 
 
 rule which imputes to a plaintiff in any case the negligence 
 of another, savoring as it does, to some extent, of harshness, 
 should not be applied except in a plain case, and, says Chief 
 Justice Church, of New York : — " should not be extended to 
 new cases where the reason for its adoption is not appar- 
 ent."i 
 
 § 103. The contributory Hogligence of the plaintiff's 
 agent must bie imputed to the plaintiff. — Inasmuch as the 
 contributory negligence of third persons is, under some cir- 
 cumstances, but not generally, to be imputed to a plaintiff 
 who seeks to recover damages for an injury sustained through 
 the negligence of the defendant, it is material to determine 
 what contributory negligence of third persons will be so im- 
 puted to him as to prevent his recovery. We remark at the 
 outset that, in order to this imputability, there must be a 
 pro tanto identification of the third person with the plaintiff, 
 and that such an identity will be found to exist, or be in dis- 
 pute, in two classes of cases — the first, where the third per- 
 son was guilty of the contributory negligence as the agent 
 of the plaintiff, and the second, where the cause of action is 
 derived from the third person. The rule as to the first class 
 of cases may be expressed as follows : — The contributory 
 negligence of a third person who is guilty thereof as the 
 
 nuisance, and the other does not join 545; b. c. 48 Am. Eep. 230; Sullivan 
 
 therein, but is thereby exposed to lia- ®. Phila., &c., R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 
 
 bility. Otherwise, had the plaintiff left 234; Byme ®. Wilson, 15 Ir. Rep. C. 
 
 the hatchway in an unsafe condition, L. 332; Harrison e. Great Northern 
 
 and the third person had so interfered Ry. Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 231; Wettor «. 
 
 as to make it more dangerous. Dunk, 4 Fost. and Fin. 298, in which 
 
 Brehm s. G-reatwestera Ry. Co., 34 it was held that if an excavation has 
 
 Barb. 256; Barrett v. Third Ave. R. been made so near to a highway as to 
 
 Co., 45 N. Y. 628; Ring v. City of create or increase danger to the puh- 
 
 Cohoes, 77 N. T. 83; s. c. 83 Am. lie, and an accident happens thereby. 
 
 Rep. 574; Masterton v. New York, the person making the excavation is 
 
 «&c., R. Co., 84 N. Y. 247; s. c. 38 not absolved from liability by reason 
 
 Am. Rep. 510; Cuddy «. Horn, 46 that a statutory obligation to fence 
 
 Mich. 596; s. c. 41 Am, Rep. 178; the highway is imposed upon other 
 
 Beauchamp «. Saginaw Mining Co., parties, who have neglected to do so. 
 
 50 Mich. 163; s. c. 45 Am. Rep, 30; Harrison ®. Great Northern Ry. Co., 
 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 3 Hurl. & C. 231. 
 
 Md. 117; Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 » Robinson v. New York, &c., B. 
 
 Ohio St. 86; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 558; Co., 66 N. Y. 13; s. c. 83 Am. Rep. 1. 
 Twon of Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Ind, 
 
§ 104.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIKD PEBSONS. 133 
 
 agent of the plaintiff must be imputed to the plaintiff. An 
 agent, in the contemplation of this rule, is a person whose 
 negligence, as understood in the rule, would be treated as 
 the principal's in an action for such negligence brought by a 
 third person against the principal. Whenever the contribu- 
 tory negligence of the third person is of such a character, 
 and the third person is so connected with the plaintiff that 
 an action might be maintained against the plaintiff, for dam- 
 ages for the consequences of such negligence, then, when the 
 plaintiff himself brings the action, that negligence is, in con- 
 templation of law, the plaintiff's negligence, and it is justly 
 imputed to him. QuifcKit per alium fadt per se, and when- 
 eyer the agency is undisputed and full, the rule is manifestly 
 correct.-^ 
 
 § 104. The rule illiistrated. — Where, for example, a ser- 
 vant, having in charge a valuable team, stopped on the high- 
 way, and, leaving the team unhitched and unattended, en- 
 gaged in a boisterous altercation with one E., which fright- 
 ened the team so that it ran away, and the horses were 
 injured, it was held, in an action by the owner of the horses 
 to recover damages from E., that the cohtributory negligence 
 of the plaintiff's servant, in exposing the horses upon the 
 highway, was a defense. The court says : — " For such a 
 wrong, no doubt the defendant E. would be liable, unless the 
 negligence of the plaintiff, or the person whom he had placed 
 in charge of the team, contributed proximately to the injury. 
 But if the servant was guilty of such negligence in the care 
 of the team as would preclude him, if he had been its owner, 
 from maintaining an action against E., this negligence must 
 be equally fatal in an action brought by this plaintiff, who 
 confided the team to his servant's care. It is true, the 
 plaintiff was not responsible for the unlawful act of his ser- 
 vant in accepting the challenge and fighting with E. ; but for 
 leaving the team loose and unoared for, whilst this noisy af- 
 fray was occurring in close proximity, he was responsible, so 
 far as others were concerned, if he entrusted the custody of 
 the horses to his servant, and his remedy in such a case is 
 against the servant alone; " and further, the court concludes : — 
 
 ' Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484. 
 
134 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEESONS. [§ 105, 
 
 " the same want of proper care which would giye the plaint- 
 iff a cause of action aginst his servant must prevent a recov- 
 ery against R." * It is not necessary to cite the reader to 
 authorities in support of the proposition that a master or 
 principal is responsible for the negligent wrong-doing of his 
 servant or agent in all cases in which the servant or agent is 
 acting about his master's or principal's business, of which 
 the rule just laid down is a necessary corollary. 
 
 § 105. The rale in Thorogood v. Bryan. — ^A common or 
 private carrier is, for certain purposes, unquestionably the 
 agent of the passenger or shipper whose person or goods h^ 
 receives for transportation. The undertaking of the carrier 
 is to receive and transport persons or property from place 
 to place, and, in virtue of that undertaking, he constitute^ 
 himself quoad hoc the agent of the person who employs him.' 
 In cases of injury by collision or other misadventure, occa- 
 sioned by the negligence or misconduct of the carrier, or his 
 servant, concurring or co-operating with the negligent wrong- 
 doing of a third party, where the passenger or shipper brings 
 his action for damages against the third party, rather than 
 against his carrier, the question is at once presented whether 
 the carrier is so far forth the agent of the plaintiff that the 
 rule set forth in the preceding section should be applied ; or 
 in other words, the question is, whether the contributory 
 negligence of the common carrier is to be imputed to the 
 plaintiff, in such a case, as a defense to the action against the 
 third party. This question has been found one of very con- 
 siderable difficulty, and the authorities are not consistent 
 upon the point in dispute. Thorogood v. Bryan,' until re- 
 cently overruled, was the leading English case in point, and 
 it established the rule that, in these actions, the negligence 
 of the carrier, contributing to produce the mischief, must be 
 
 " Puterbaugh «. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 311; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 381. There is 
 
 484. In Page v. Hodge, 63 N. H. a privity of contract between these 
 
 610, the facts and the judgment of parties, and when the merchant com- 
 
 the court were identical with those in mits the management and direction of 
 
 the Puterbaugh case. his goods to the carrier, he necessarily 
 
 " See, as between a shipper and his constitutes him, to some extent, his 
 
 carrier. Bedel «. Lull, Cro. Jac. 224; agent. 
 
 Simpson ». Hand, 6 Whart. (Penn.) ' 8 C. B. 115, decided in 1849. 
 
§ 103.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS 135 
 
 imputed to the plaintiff to bar a recoyery. This was the 
 English rule, to which for nearly forty years the rule of stare 
 decisis compelled the English courts to submit. In this 
 case it appeared that the plaintijQf's intestate had been a 
 passenger in an omnibus, and that his death was caused by 
 a collision of the omnibus with the defendant's vehicle. The 
 court, holding that the negligence of the omnibus driver pre- 
 vented a recovery, says : — " The negligence that is relied on 
 as an excuse is not the personal negligence of the party in- 
 jured, but the negligence of the driver of the omnibus in 
 which he was a passenger. But it appears , to me that, hav- 
 ing trusted the party by selecting the particular conveyance, 
 the plaintiff has so far identified himself with the owner and 
 her servants that if any injury results from their negligence, 
 he must be considered a party to it." * 
 
 § 106. A similar rule in the Admiralty.— Lord Tenterden, 
 more than twenty years before, in an action against the own- 
 ers of a vessel for damage done to goods upon another ves- 
 sel, announced a similar rule,^ and it is plain that the doctrine 
 of privity in negligence between a public carrier and a pas- 
 senger or shipper was well established in England, at least 
 to the extent of preventing recoveries in actions of this char- 
 acter.' In a comparatively recent case ^ the rule in Thoro- 
 good V. Bryan was strongly insisted upon, Bramwell, B., 
 saying : — " It must not be supposed, as far as my individual 
 opinion is of any value, that I am at all dissatisfied with the 
 
 ' Thorogocd «. BiyaD, 8 C. B., 115, W. R. 864; s. c. L. R. 9 Exch. 176; 
 
 130. ' Armstrong ». The Lancashire &Tork- 
 
 " Vanderplank v. Miller, 1 Moody shire Ry. Co., 23 W. R. 395; s. c. L. 
 
 & M. 169. Cf. Arctic Fire Insur- R. 10 Exch. 47. Qf. also, Waite v. 
 
 ance Co. v. Austin, 69 N. T. 470, Northeastern, &c., Ry. Co., 7 W. R. 
 
 484, where it is shown that Lord Ten- 311 ; s. c. El. , Bl. & El. 719, 738, in 
 
 terden's common law rule could not which case, although the action was 
 
 be applied in admiralty courts, as it against the contracting company, from 
 
 would overthrow the governing prin- the opinions it may be inferred that 
 
 ciple of that jurisdiction — the doctrine the same conclusion would have been 
 
 of dividing the loss between those in reached had it been against another 
 
 fault. As a common law rule, how- company. 
 
 ever, its authority is unquestioned, * Armstrong v. Lancashire, &c., Ry. 
 
 and thoroughly acted upon. Co., L. R. 10 Exch 47. 
 
 ' Bridge ®. Grand Jimction Ry. Co., 
 3 Mee. & W. 344; Child a. Heam, 33 
 
136 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS. [§ 107. 
 
 decision in Thorogood v. Bryan, .... which, though 
 it may have been questioned and impeached, has never been 
 overruled, and has since been acted on." As the learned 
 Baron suggests, however, this rule had been much " ques- 
 tioned and impeached " by the English judges. Dr. Lush- 
 ington said that he would not be bound by it, and did not ap- 
 prove of it.^ In the note to Ashby^i;. White, in Smith'& 
 Leading Cases,' the rule is sharply criticised, " and this criti- 
 cism," says Chief Justice Beasley, " has on two occasions at 
 least been referred to by the English courts with marked re- 
 spect.' From these considerations this case does not bear 
 the weight whidh a deliberate decision of the Court of the 
 King's bench ordinarily carries with it." * Not only has the 
 correctness of the rule ' been frequently questioned in the 
 English decisions, but the reason upon which it was origi- 
 nally made to rest was, even before The Bernina case, flat- 
 ly denied, and wholly abandoned. 
 
 § 107. Baron Pollock's criticism— Thorogood v. Bryan 
 overruled.— Says Baron Pollock: — "The only difficulty I 
 have had in applying it [i.e. the rule in Thorogood v. Bryan] 
 has been in consequence of the use of the word ' identified * 
 in the judgment of the court there. If the courts are to be 
 taken as meaning by that word, that the plaintiff by his own 
 proper conduct, or by the selection of the omnibus in which 
 he was riding, so acted as to constitute the driver his agent, 
 the proposition would, I think, be an unsustainable one. 
 But I do not understand the word to be used in that sense. 
 
 ■ In his own words:—" I decline to (n. g.) 750, and Waite «. Northeast- 
 be hound by it, because it is a single ern, &c., R. Co., El., Bl. & El. 728. 
 case, because I know upon inquiry t Bennett v. New Jersey, &c., E. 
 that it has been doubted by high au- qq qq jq- j l^.^ 335. 
 thority, because it appears to me not ^ « Consult, on this point, Kigby «. 
 reconcilable with other principles Hewett, 5 Exch. 240; Greenland v. 
 laid down at common law; and lastly, Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243; Quarman «. 
 because it is directly against the ordi- Burnett, 6 Mee. & W. 499; Jones v. 
 nary practice of the Court of Admi- Corporation of Liverpool, 14 Q. B. D. 
 ralty." The Milan, Lush, Adm'r, 890; Eeedie e. London, &c.,Ey. Co.,4 
 388, 403. Exch. 244; Dayrell v. Tyrer, 28 L. J. 
 
 " 1 Smith's L. C. (6th Eng. ed.), (q. b.) 62; TufEr. Warman, 2 C. B. 
 
 266; B. c. 8th American edition of (n. g ) 740; -vy^aite v. Northeastern, 
 
 1885, vol. l.page 505. &c., Ey. Co., El., Bl. & Bl. 719. 
 
 ' Citing Tuff 0. Warman, ^ C. B. 
 
§ 108.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. 137 
 
 I take the court to mean by it that, under the circumstances 
 of the case, the plaintiff, for the purpose of the action, must 
 be taken to be in the same position as the owner of the om- 
 nibus, or his driver. The case of Waite v. Northeastern, 
 &c., Ry. Co. (EL, Bl. & El. 719) is an illustration of this, 
 where the child, as far as regards contributory negligence, 
 was ' identified ' with its grandmother, in whose charge it 
 was, although it could not be said that the child exercised 
 any volition in the selection of its grandmother for its com- 
 panion."^ But in the Bernina case, lately decided, it was dis- 
 tinctly held that Waite v. Northeastern, &c., Ey. Co, had no 
 affinity with Thorogood v. Bryan.* Such was the status of 
 Thorogood v. Bryan in England until 1887, when a case went 
 to the Court of Appeal involving the precise p.oint that waa 
 litigated in Thorogood v. Bryan, and was the first case in 
 which an appellate tribunal had been afforded an opportu- 
 nity of expressing its opinion of the rule. • A passenger waa 
 killed by a collision between two steamers without fault on hia 
 part, but both carriers were negligent. Thorogood v. Bryan 
 was severely criticised in a long opinion, and unanimously 
 overruled as unjust and unsound.' The case was afterwards 
 taken to the House of Lords in 1888, and that body affirmed 
 the decision of the Court of Appeal.* 
 
 § 108. Thorogood t. Bryan in Pennsylvania.— The En- 
 glish rule upon this subject, as declared in Thorogood v. 
 Bryan,' prevails in several States of the Union. In Pennsyl- 
 vania it is followed both in the case of a shipper who brings 
 his action for damage to his goods,' and in the case of a pas- 
 senger where the action is brought for personal injuries.' In 
 each instance it is held without equivocation that the negli- 
 gence of the carrier must be imputed to the plaintiff, to the ex- 
 
 ' Armstrong v. Lancashire, &c., Bryan. Ball's Leading Cases, 303; 
 
 Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Exch. 47. Martin v. "Ward, 14 C. of 8. Cas. (N. 8.) 
 
 ' Read, also, upon this point Wa- 814. See, also, Mathews v. London 
 
 bash, &c., R. Co. v. Shacklet. 105 Street Tramway Co., 58 L.J. Q.B. 13. 
 
 HI. 364; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 791. ' 8 C. B. 115. 
 
 ' The Bernina, L. R. 12 P. & D. ' Simpson e. Hand, 6 Whart. (Pemi.> 
 
 58. 311; B. c. 36 Am. Dec. 231. 
 
 * The Bernina (Armstrong v. Mills), ' Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 4ft 
 
 L. R. 13 App. Cm. 1. The law of Penn. St. 151; Phila., &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 Scotland is opposed to Thorogood ®. Boyer, 97 Penn. St. 91. 
 
138 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. [§ 108. 
 
 tent of barring his action. Simpson v. Hand,^ which is a lead- 
 ing authority, was decided long before Thorogood v. Bryan. 
 It is the earliest case, excepting only Vanderplanok v. Miller,^ 
 precisely in point, which I have found. The opinion was writ- 
 ten by Chief Justice Gibson, tod the reason upon which that 
 ■eminent judge rested his position is, that the carrier is the 
 shipper's agent for whose negligence, contributing to the 
 loss, the shipper is justly held responsible. He cited Van- 
 derplank v. Miller with approval. The case of Lockhart v. 
 Ijichtenthaler,* was an action for the accidental killing of a 
 brakeman— the circumstances, however, being such that the 
 •court held that the deceased must not be considered, for the 
 purposes of the action, a servant, but rather regarded in the 
 light of a passenger. This case is, therefore, an authority 
 Tipon the second branch of the subject, i. e. the rule as affect- 
 ing aotionafor personal injuries, as contra-distinguished from 
 those for the loss of goods. It sustains the ruling in Thor- 
 ogood V. Bryan, but questions the reason of the rule as set 
 forth in that case — rejecting alike the theoryi of agency, 
 which had controlled not only in Thorogood v. Bryan, but 
 also in Simpson v. Hand/ and the theory of identity, and 
 assigning as the true reason " that it better accords with the 
 policy of the law to hold the carrier alone responsible 
 in such circumstances as an incentive to care and dili- 
 gence."' In two recent cases in Pennsylvania, Thorogood v. 
 Bryan has been distinctly repudiated, so far as it is at- 
 tempted to apply the rule to bar an action, by a passenger in 
 a private conveyance.* 
 
 ' 6 Wliart. (Penn.) 311; B. c. 36 alone responsible would have the ten- 
 Am. Dec. 331. dency claimed, yet to relieve the 
 
 ' 1 Moody & M. 169, by Lord Ten- other guilty party from all responsi- 
 
 terden. billty whatever, would have the con- 
 
 ° 46 Penn. St. 151. trary effect, so that whatever was 
 
 <6 Whart. (Penn.) 311; 8. c. 36 gained in one direction would be lost 
 
 Am. Dec. 331. , in the opposite direction." "Wabash, 
 
 ' Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 &c., R. Co. v. Shacklet, 105 111. 364, 
 
 Penn. St. 151. "We confess," says 381. 
 
 Mr. Justice Mulkey, in referring to ' Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Penn. 
 
 this conclusion, "that we are unable St. 544; s. c. 67 Am. Rep. 488; Deane 
 
 to perceive the force of this argu- v. Penn. R. Co., 129 Penn. St. 514; 
 
 ment; for, conceding that to hold the b. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 718. 
 oarrier of the plaintiff or his intestate 
 
§ 109.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS. 139 
 
 § 109. Thorogood v. Bryan in Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, 
 and Michigan.— In Arkansas, also, in a very carefully con- 
 sidered case, the English rule was followed. The plaintiff, 
 in this action, sued to recover damages for the loss of some 
 ■cattle which he had shipped on board a Mississippi river 
 steamboat bound to New Orleans, which steamboat, going 
 •down the river, was negligently run into and sunk by the de- 
 fendant's steamboat coming up the river, whereby the plaint- 
 iff's cattle were drowned. The defendant's had judgment in 
 the court below on the ground of the contributory negli- 
 gence of the plaintiff's carrier, and upon appeal the judg- 
 ment on this point was affirmed.^ ' The Supreme Court of 
 Arkansas for the twenty years prior to the Civil War was a 
 very learned and able court, and Duggins v. Watson is en- 
 titled to count as a cogent authority in favor of the English 
 xule in the United States. In Iowa Thorogood v. Bryan is 
 -wholly discarded.' . Some of the earlier cases in that State 
 have been cited by judges and text writers in support of the 
 rule imputing the negligence of a private driver to the occu-' 
 pant of the vehicle;' but in Nisbet v. Garner^ that view of 
 those cases was pronounced erroneous, and they were recon- 
 ■ciled with a total repudiation of Thorogood v. Bryan. In 
 Wisconsin the contributory negligence of the driver of a pri- 
 vate vehicle is imputed to one riding with him.' So, also, it 
 
 ' Duggins V. Watson, 15 Ark. 118; ' Nisbet v. Garner, 75 Iowa, 314; 
 
 B. C. 60 Am. Dec. 560. It should be s. c. 39 N. "W. Kep. 516. 
 
 noted, however, that while the court, ' Payne «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 4n this case, very decidedly followed 39 Iowa, 523; Yahn v. City of 
 
 Lord Tenterden's rule as to the rela- Ottumwa, 60 Iowa, 439; Slater v. 
 
 tion between shipper and carrier, it Burlington, &c., Ey. Co., 71 Iowa, 
 
 did not commit itself to a support of 209; Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa, 57 
 
 Thorogood v. Bryan. On the con- Iowa, 748. 
 
 trary. Chief Justice Watkins remark- ' 75 Iowa, 314. 
 
 •ed that it was quite possible that ' Prideaux ». Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 
 
 the law aflCecting passenger and car- 513; b. c. 28 Am. Rep. 558. But in 
 
 rier might be different, smce here, that case the court said:— "There 
 
 unlike the case where merchandise is might be great dlflSculty in applying 
 
 -shipped, the carrier could hardly be to them [common carriers] the rule of 
 
 called a bailee, and hence the fact personal trust and agency applicable 
 
 that a passenger could exercise voli- to private conveyances." Otis v. 
 
 tion of his own, might very likely en- Janesville, 47 Wis. 422. See, for a 
 
 ■large his resource, as one occupying contrary rule in such a case, Knapp 
 
 an independent position, against all «. Dagg, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.)165, 
 
 persons contributing to the injury, where the court held that the plaint- 
 
140 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OP THIED PEBSONS. 
 
 [§ 109. 
 
 seems in Michigan.* In several jurisdictions it has been 
 held, where an action is brought for injuries to a wife from 
 the negligence of the defendant, that the contributory negH-' 
 gence of her husband, driving the vehicle in which she was 
 hurt, should be imputed to her in bar of the action.' It ap- 
 
 ifl was not chargeable with the negli- 
 gence of the driver. She was injured 
 both by his negligence and by that of 
 the defendant. Hence, an action 
 against either would be sustained. 
 Metcalf V. Baker, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 
 431; Sheridan v. Brooklyn City R. 
 Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Robinson «. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 11; 
 Dyer v. Erie Ry. Co., 71 N. Y. 228. 
 Follman i>. Mankota, 85 Minn. 522; 
 Elyton Land Co. «. Mingea, 89 Ala. 
 521; s. c. 7 So. Rep. 66; Transfer 
 Co. V. Kelly, 86 Ohio St. 86; St. Clair 
 Street Ry. Co. v. Eadie, 43 Ohio St. 
 91; B. c. 64 Am. Rep. 144, note; 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. v. Hoge- 
 land, 66 Md. 149; s. c. 7 Atl. Rep. 
 105; Noyes «. Town of Boscawen, 
 64 N. H. 861; s. c. 10 Atl. Rep. 690; 
 Town of Enightstown ®. Mus- 
 grove, 116 Ind. 121; s.c. 18 N. E. Rep. 
 452; State «i. Boston, &c., R. Co. (Me.), 
 15 A. 36; Nisbet «. Garner, 75 Iowa, 
 314. 
 
 ' Cuddy V. Horn, 46 Mich. 596; B. c. 
 41 Am. Rep. 178. 
 
 " In Iowa the wiie is barred solely 
 by the relationship of the parties, the 
 rule in Thorogood v. Bryan being ex- 
 pressly excluded. Yahn v. Ottumwa, 
 60 Iowa, 429; explained, as above, in 
 Nisbet 1). Gamer, ' 75 Iowa, 814. In 
 Ohio the contributory negligence of a 
 husband in the purchase of a drug to 
 be used by his wife is not to be im- 
 puted to her in an action by her ad- 
 ministrator against the dealer for 
 death resulting from the use of such 
 drug, unless she constituted him her 
 agent, and in simply making known 
 to her husband her desire for the 
 medicine, by reason of which he ob- 
 
 tains it, the wife did not constitute 
 him her agent so that his contributory 
 negligence in purchasing can be fan- / 
 puted to her. Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 
 Ohio St. 470; s. C. 15 N. E. Rep. 350. In 
 Peck V. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 50 Conn. 
 379, no reason is assigned. The United 
 States Circuit Court holds that she 
 may recover, though her husband's 
 negligence "contributed" to the in- 
 jury, if defendant's negligence "di- 
 rectly contributed" to it. Shaw «. 
 Craft, 87 Fed. Rep. 317; Sheffield 
 9. Cent. Union Tel. Co., 36 Fed. 
 Rep. 164; Huntoon «. Trumbull, 
 2 McCrary, 314; Nanticoke v. Wame, 
 106 Penn. St. 373. In Carlisle v. Shel- 
 don, 38 Vt, 440, 447, the reasomng of 
 the court is exactly that of Tho- 
 rogood V. Bryan. " If the wife," the 
 judge holds, "had been a passenger 
 in a stage coach, and had received the 
 same injury, under the same circum- 
 stances, although she might have had 
 a cause of action against the proprie- 
 tors for the negligence of the driver, 
 we regard it as clear that no action 
 could have been maintained against 
 the town [the defendant in the case], 
 because the proprietors and their 
 driver would, in respect to the town, 
 be treated as being her agents and 
 servants, and their negligence would 
 be imputed to her. There is nothing 
 in the marital relation which would 
 change the situation of the wifeui 
 respect to her husband's negligence 
 under such circumstances;- for the 
 same consequences would have fol- 
 lowed if the relation, instead of being 
 that of husband and wife, had been 
 that of parent and child, or master 
 and servant, or if she had been an 
 
§ 110.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PEBSONS. 141 
 
 pears that the English doctrine of privity in negligence 
 l)etwe6n a common carrier and a passenger or shipper, ob- 
 tains to the full extent, in the United States, only in Penn- 
 sylvania ; that it has been held applicable as between a 
 shipper and a common carrier in Arkansas, and this will 
 hereafter be shown to be the rule in New York and Ken- 
 tucky.^ With these exceptions we shall see that elsewhere, 
 in this country, a different rule is applied. 
 
 § 110. The general American rnle.— The rule in Thoro- 
 good V. Bryan, except as has appeared in the preceding sec- 
 tion, is denied, in the United States. ■*" It is the general Amer- 
 ican rule that there is no privity in negligence between 
 passenger and carrier, and that, therefore, when the passen- 
 ger brings an action of negligence the contributory negli-. 
 gence of his carrier is not to be imputed to him, in any 
 degree, for the purpose of barring his recovery. The rule 
 in Thorogood v. Bryan has long been wholly repudiated. 
 Neither upon the theory of agency, nor upon the theory of 
 identity, nor from a supposed consideration of public policy 
 and convenience, will the passenger be held to such a con- 
 nection with the common carrier by which he is transported, 
 as to be responsible for negligence on his part." *" 
 
 entire stranger, and had been carried writers, as an authority in support of 
 
 by her husband as a passenger gratu- the rule in Thorogood «. Bryan, has 
 
 itously." Contra, Flori v. St. Louis, nothing to do with the question at all. 
 
 3 Mo. App. 231. It is there held that, Puterbaugh v. Eeasor is sometimes 
 
 under the laws of Missouri, any right miscited to the same efledt. 
 of action which has grown out of the ' See infra, § 114. 
 violation of the personal rights of a ' Little v. Hackett, 116 U. 8. 366. 
 
 feme covert ia her separate property, Gray «. Philadelphia, &c.,R. Co., 24 
 
 free from the control of her husband. Fed. Eep. 168; Central Passenger Ry. 
 
 and hence, that although the contrib- Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; s. c. 6 8. W. 
 
 utory fault of the injured party, or of Rep. 441; New York, &c., R. Co. «. 
 
 aome one whose fault is attributable Cooper, 85 Va. 939; s. o. 9 S. E. Rep. 
 
 to him, may excuse the defendant, the 321; Becke v. Missouri Pac. Ry Co., 
 
 contributory fault of the plaintiff of 102 Mo. 544; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 1053; 
 
 record is no answer to the claim. St. Claire Co. ». Eadie, 43 Ohio 8t. 91; 
 
 See § 104, mtpra, and the discussion Flaherty «. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 therein of the case of Puterbaugh «. 39 Minn. 328; s. c. 40 N. W. _Rep. 
 
 Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484. And observe 160; Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hughes; 
 
 that Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621; 8. c. 87 Ala. 610; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 413; New 
 
 13 Am. Dec. 464, which is a standing York, &c., R. Co. v. Steinbrenner, 47 
 
 citation, both by Judges and text- N.J. Law, 161; s. 0.54 Am. Rep. 126; 
 
142 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PEES0N3. 
 
 [§ 111. 
 
 § 111. Thorogood t. Bryan in New Jersey.— This doc- 
 trine, which may properly be denominated the American 
 
 Kuttner v. Lindell Ry. Co., 39 Mo. 
 App. 503; Tompkins ®. Clay Street R. 
 Co., 66 Cal. 163; Markham v. Hous- 
 ton Direct Nav. Co., 73 Tex. 347; s.c. 
 11 8. W. Rep. 131; Whelan v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 15; 
 Parshall v. Minneapolis, &c.,Ry. Co!, 
 35 Fed. Rep. 649; McCullum ». 
 Long Island R. Co., 38 Hun, 569; 
 Holzab V. New Orleans, &c., R. Co., 
 38 La. Ann. 185; s. c. 58 Am; Rep. 
 177; Danville, Sec., Turnpike Co. «. 
 Stewart, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 119; Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Case's Admr., 9 Bush. 
 738; Otis v. Thorn, 33 Ala. 469; Ben- 
 nett V. New Jersey, &c.. Trans. Co., 
 86 N. J. Law, 325; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 
 435. In Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 
 Ohio St. 86, 91; B. c. 46 Am. Rep. 230; 
 McUvaine, C. jl, in arraigning the 
 English rule, exclaims: — "It seems 
 as incredible to my niind that the 
 right of a passenger to redress 
 against a stranger for an injury, 
 caused directly and proximately by 
 the latter's negligence, should be de- 
 nied, on the ground that the negli- 
 gence of his carrier contributed to the 
 ^ injury, he being without fault him- 
 self, as it would be to hold such pas- 
 senger responsible for the negligence 
 of his carrier, whereby an injury was 
 inflicted upon a stranger. Town of Al- 
 bion ». Hetrick, 90 Ind, 546; s. c. 46 
 Am. Rep. 330; Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 
 596; s. e. 41 Am Rep. 178. One of the 
 reasons advanced by some cases fa- 
 voring the former English rule why 
 the action should be confined to the 
 carrier company is, that this compa- 
 ny, by its contract, express or implied, 
 is under special obligations to the pas- 
 senger to use due care, and carry him 
 safely, whereas, the other company 
 has entered into no such engagement 
 with him. The learned judge, in 
 Wabash, &c., R. Co. v. Shacklet, 105 
 
 111. 364, 379; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 791, 
 very ably meets this argument by 
 saying: — "While this aflEords a con- 
 clusive reason why an action ex con- 
 ProMtu will not lie against the other 
 company it does not, in our judgment, 
 furnish the slightest reason why an 
 action ex deliciu may not ■vijell be 
 maintained against it for the tort 
 committed by it, independently of a. 
 contract, which has resulted in an in- 
 jury to the plaintifiE." 
 
 Entirely asi^e from the right in per- 
 tonwm against the carrier, the plaint- 
 iff has a right in rem which entitles. 
 him, if free from fault, to be pro- 
 tected from all persons whomsoever. 
 The Washington and The Gregory, 9' 
 Wall. 513; Knapp v. Dagg, 18 How. 
 Prac. 165; Chapman o. New Haven, 
 &c., R. Co., 19 N. T. 341; Colgrove 
 r>. New York, &c., R. Co., 20 N. T. 
 493; Sheridan «. Brooklyn City R. 
 Co., 36 N. T. 39; Webster ®. Hudson 
 River R. Co., 38 N. T. 360; Barrett 
 «. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 45 N. Y. 628; 
 Robinson «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 66 N. Y. 11; 8.0. 65 Barb. 146; 
 33 Am. Rep. 1, and note; Dyer s. 
 Erie Ry. Co., 71 N. Y. 228; Metcalfe 
 ». Baker, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 431. In 
 Perry «. Lansing, 17 Him, 34, the 
 plaintiff, the pilot of a tug-boat, was 
 injured in consequence of a collision 
 with a boat owned by the defendant, 
 and was allowed to- recover, -though 
 the other employees of the tug-boat 
 were contributorily negligent, he him- 
 self being free from all personal neg- 
 ligence. Bockes, J., dissented, how- 
 ever, on the groimd that here, unlike 
 the cases where the plaintiffs are al- 
 lowed to recover, the plaintiff was 
 not a mere passenger, but, with oth- 
 ers, was in charge of the vessel, and 
 though himself free from fault, yet 
 this fact would bar all recovery as 
 
§ 111.] NEGLIGENCE OE THIED PEBS0N8. 143 
 
 rule, as distinguished from the English rule in Thorogood v. 
 Bryan, is fully set forth by Mr. Justice Field, of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, in Little v. Haokett,* and by 
 Beasley, C. J., in the New Jersey case of Bennett v. New 
 Jersey Bailroad and Transportation Co.,' and again by Mr. 
 Justice Mulkey, in the case of Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific 
 Bailway Co. v. Shacklet.* In the opinions in these lead- 
 ing cases, the question in dispute is learnedly and exhaus- 
 tively argued, and, in the judgment of the writer, so far as 
 that may be supposed to have any value, the reasons as- 
 signed for the refusal to follow the English precedent are 
 cogent and conclusive. In Little v. Hackett Judge Field 
 reviews the English and American cases, and thus concluded : 
 — " The truth is, the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan rests 
 upon undefensible, grounds. The identification of the pas- 
 senger with the negligent driver or the owner without his 
 personal co-operation or encouragement, is a gratuitous' 
 assumption. There is no such identity. The parties are not 
 in the same position. The owner of a public conveyance is 
 a carrier, and the driver or the person managing it is his 
 servant. Neither of them is the servant of the passenger, 
 
 well against the owners of the hoat See in this connection Hillan v. New- 
 of which he was pUot as against the ington, 57 Cal. 56. Masterson v. 
 defendant. Contra, Brown ®. New New Tork, &c., R. Co, 34 N. T. 
 York, &c., R. Co., 32N.T. 597; s. o. 31 247; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 510, where the 
 Barb. 385; Mooney v. Hudson River American rule is squarely upheld, the 
 R. Co., 5 Robt. 548; Beck «. East court refusing to e^^onerate the de- 
 River Ferry Co., 6 Robt. 82. [These fendant, because of the negligent acts 
 three cases annovmcing a contrary of a third party, a driver of a wagon, 
 doctrine have been distinctly over- who had invited the plaintiff to ride 
 ruled, and it is clear that, in New with him. See, also, Ricker v. Free- 
 Xork, the contributory negligence of man, 50 N. H. 430; Wheeler v. Wor- 
 the managers of a vehicle or vessel — cester, 10 Allen, 591; Eaton «. Boston, 
 either a public or private carrier— is &c., R. Co., 11 4-llen, 500; McMahon 
 not to be imputed to a passenger, v. Davidson, 13 Minn. 357; Griggs ti. 
 whether he be journeying gratuitously Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; Peck ». 
 or for hire, and irrespective of the Neil, 3 McLean, 36. 
 kind of conveyance.] Compare, also, ' 116 U. S. 366. 
 as illustrating the New York rule, " 36 N. J. Law, 335; s. c. 13 Am. 
 Spooner v. Brooklyn City R. Co, 54 Rep. 435. 
 
 N. Y. 330; B. c. 13 Am. Rep. 570; = 105 111 364; B. 0. 44 Am. Rep. 
 
 Cooper*. E. T. Co., 75 N. Y. 116. 791. 
 

 NEGLIGENCE OP THIED PEB80N8. 4^ 
 
 and his asserted identity with them is contradicted by the 
 daily experience of the world."^ In the New Jersey case 
 Judge :Beasley says : — " The reason given for the judg- 
 ment [in Thofogood v. Bryan] is that the passenger in the 
 •omnibus ' must be considered as identified with the driver of 
 the omnibus in which he voluntarily ' becomes a passenger, 
 and that the negligence of the driver is the negligence of the 
 passenger. But I have entirely failed to perceive how it is, 
 that the passenger in a public conveyance becomes identified, 
 in any legal sense, with the driver of such conveyance. 
 Such identification could only result, in one way, that is by 
 considering such driver the servant of the passenger. I can 
 see no ground upon which such a relationship is to be 
 iounded. In a practical point of view it certainly does not 
 ■exist." 
 
 § 112. The New Jersey rule farther stated. — In the same 
 case the rule is further stated as follows: — " The passenger 
 has no control over the driver, or agent in charge of the 
 vehicle, and it is this right to control the conduct of the 
 agent which is the foundation of the doctrine that the master 
 is to be affected by the acts of his servant. To hold that the 
 conductor of a street car or of a railroad train is the agent of 
 the numerous passengers who may chance to be in it,_would 
 be a pure fiction. In reality there is no such agency, and if 
 we impute it, and correctly apply legal principles, the pas- 
 senger on the occurrence of an accident from the carelessness 
 of the person in charge of the vehicle in which he is being 
 conveyed, would be without any remedy. It is obvious, in a 
 suit against the proprietor of the car in which he was a 
 passenger, there could be no recovery if the driver, or con- 
 ductor of such car, is to be regarded as the servant of the 
 passenger. And so, on the same ground, each passenger 
 would be liable to every person injured by the carelessness 
 of such driver or conductor, because if the negligence of such 
 agent, is to be attributed to the passenger for one purpose, it 
 would be entirely arbitrary to say that he is not to be 
 affebted by it for other purposes. And yet it is to be pre- 
 
 > Little «. Hackett, 116 U. 8. 366. 
 
§ 113.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 145 
 
 sumed that no court would go this length and impose on 
 each person being carried by a railroad train, responsibility 
 for the misconduct of the engineer or conductor of such 
 train. The doctrine of the English case appears to convert 
 the driver of the omnibus into the servant of the passenger 
 for the single purpose of preventing the passenger from 
 bringing suit against a third party, whose negligence has 
 co-operated with that of the driver in the production of the 
 injury. I am compelled to dissent to such a proposition. 
 TJnder the circumstances in question, the passenger is a per- 
 fectly innocent party, having no control over either of the 
 wrong-doers, and I see no reason why, according to the 
 usual rule, an action will not lie in his behalf against either 
 or both of the employers of such wrong-doers." * The Eng- 
 lish doctrine has not found favor with the critics or text- 
 Writers ; ' it has been, as has appeared, generally repudiated 
 "by our courts, and it is reasonably certain that Thorogood 
 V. Bryan will not be followed in the future, in any State in 
 the Union not already committed to that rule. 
 
 § 113. Fririty in negligence between a public carrier and 
 a shipper of goods. — The doctrine of privity in negligence 
 between a common carrier and a shipper of goods stands 
 Tipon quite a different ground from that upon which the rule 
 in Thorogood v. Bryan has been made to rest. The con- 
 tract for the carriage of goods differs in several very essen- 
 tial particulars from that for the carriage of passengers. In 
 the one case the carrier, at common law, is an insurer, in the 
 
 1 Bennett v. New Jersey, &c., the preparation of this section. "It is 
 
 Transportation Co., 36 N. J. Law, with great satisfaction that we learn, 
 
 225; B. 0. 13 Am. Eep. 435. just as these pages go to press, that the 
 
 ' Wharton on Negligence, § 395; English Appellate Court has Anally 
 Thompson on Carriers, 284; 1 Smith's overruled Thorogood «. Bryan, and 
 Leading Cases (8th Am. ed. of 1885), put an end to the mischief which that 
 505, the note to Ashby v. White. See, very unwise decision has been work- 
 also, an essay by Ernest Howard ingfor nearly forty years. We doubt 
 Crosby, Esq., of the New York Bar, not that the few American courts 
 upon "The Imputed Contributory which have followed it will now 
 Negligence of Third Persons," 1 Am. hasten to retrace their steps." Shear- 
 Law Rev. (N. S.) (Nov., 1880), 770, to man & Redfleld on Negligence, 4th 
 which I have, frequently referred in ed., § 66. 
 
 10 
 
146 NEGLIGENCE OF THIKD PERSONS [§114. 
 
 other he is not. As to the shipper, the carrier is an agent, 
 and liable to the full extent inTolved in that relation ; as to 
 a passenger, the carrier is indeed an agent to a certain ex- 
 tent ; but in a degree essentially different, and with powers 
 and obligations materially modified and curtailed. The pos- 
 session of the carrier is that of the merchant-shipper, he is 
 the bailee and, quasi, the agent of the shipper. Whatever he 
 does in the course of the service and bailment, he does as the 
 agent and representative of the owner of the goods, and, this 
 being so, it follows that all the consequences of the negli- 
 gence of the carrier ought to be visited upon the owner of 
 the freight, to the 6xtent of depriving him of a remedy over 
 against a third party for losses to which the carrier by his 
 wrongful or negligent act has contributed. The general 
 rules as to contributory negligence as a defense are properly 
 applied to the shipper in a case of this kind. It needs no 
 argument to show that there is no analogy between these 
 cases and those in which passengers in one conveyance have 
 been held entitled to an action against the owner of either, 
 or both of the vehicles, from the negligent management of 
 which injury has been received. In those cases there is no 
 bailment, and no agency. There is in them no absolute ob- 
 ligation on the part of the carrier to deliver his passenger 
 safely, and the carrier cannot maintain ^n action for an in- 
 jury to the passenger, whose right of action, however, is, and 
 ought to be, the same against both wrong-doers, and rests 
 upon the same foundation of wrong-doing. If it is concur- 
 rent, although not in intentional concert, the injured passen- 
 ger may recover of either. But the shipper, who has en- 
 trusted his goods to the common carrier, stands upon no 
 such footing, and it is justly held that the negligence of the 
 carrier shall be imputed to the shipper, when it has con- 
 tributed to produce the injury for which the shipper brings 
 his action against a third party. 
 
 § 114. The prevalence of this rule.— This rule was an- 
 nounced in Vanderplank v. Miller,' by Lord Tenterden, and 
 it has been followed in this country, in Kentucky,' Pennsyl- 
 
 ' ' 1 Moody & M. 169. 
 ' Broadwell v. Swigert, 7 B. Mon. 39; s. c. 45 Am. Dec. 47. 
 
§ 114.] NEGLIGENCE OP THIRD PERSONS. 147 
 
 vania,^ New York,* A-rkansas,' and perliaps in Massachu- ' 
 setts.* The weight of authority is, without question, in favorN 
 of imputing the negligence of a common carrier to a shipper, 
 in actions of the character considered in this and the pre- 
 ceding sections, to the extent of barring an action by him 
 against a third party, upon the grounds herein set forth ; . 
 and, on the other hand, there is a decided weight of' pre- 
 cedent against imputing the negligence of the carrier to a 
 passenger in like case. The shipper should, while the pas- 
 senger should not, be charged with his carrier's negligence. 
 The shipper, having constituted the carrier his agent, should 
 recover only when his agent has been free from fault, while 
 the passenger, not having constituted the carrier his agent 
 to the same extent, and not being chargeable with the con- 
 sequences of his acts or defaults, should recover whenever he 
 is himself free from the imputation of contributory neglect, 
 without regard to the acts or omissions of the carrier. This 
 . is the rule, in respect of both shipper and passenger, as de- 
 clared by the Courts of Appeal in New York,' and Kentucky,* 
 and it is submitted as the proper solution of the question. 
 
 ' In Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. acta or negligence of such third 
 
 311; s. c 36 Am. Dec. 231, a thorough party. 
 
 review of the cases in point is made, ' Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118; 
 
 and the court announces the conclu- 8. c. 60 Am. Dec. 560. 
 
 sion that it is an undoubted principle ' Smith v. Smith, 3 Pick. 621 ; s. c. 
 
 of the common law, that where there 13 Am. Dec. 464. In this case the 
 
 has been mutual negligence, the owner, suing for an injury to a horse 
 
 owner of goods on board a vessel can- received from a nuisance in the high- 
 
 not maintain an action against the way, while in possession, and being 
 
 owners of another vessel which col- used by one who had hired him, was 
 
 lided with his carrier's. defeated of his action by reason of the 
 
 ' Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 negligence of the bailee in possession. 
 
 N. Y. 470; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 331, » Qf. Chapman v. New Haven R. 
 
 where it is held that the possession of Co., 19 N. Y. 341, for the ruleof non- 
 
 the carrier is that of the owner of the imputability in the case of a passenger,, 
 
 freight, and whatever is done by the and The Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 
 
 former in the course of his service and 69 N. Y. 470, for the rule of imputa- 
 
 baUment, he does as the agent and bility in case of a shipper, 
 
 representative of the latter. And, ' Danville, &c.. Turnpike Co. v. 
 
 therefore, the owner is deprived of . Stewart, 3 Mete. (Ky,)119, for the 
 
 all action for injury to his goods rule as to passengers, and Broadwell v. 
 
 against a third party, unless it can be Swigert, 7 B. Mon. 39, for the cor- 
 
 proved that the damage or loss was responding rule as to a shipper, 
 occasioned solely by the wrongful 
 
148 NEGLIGENCE OP THIED PERSONS. [§ 115. 
 
 § 116. Plaintiff's negligence concurring with that of the 
 driver of a private conveyance. — It is everywhere held, on 
 familiar grounds, that if the negligence of the occupant con- 
 tributes with that of the driver and a third person, there can 
 be no recovery against the latter. Where A., being driven 
 in the carriage of B., who is not a common carrier, willing- 
 ly joins B. in driving over a place obviously dangerous, and 
 is injured in consequence, A. has no right of action against 
 the township;^ And a failure to look and listen, on the part 
 of one riding with his back to the driver, while approaching 
 a well-known railroad crossing at a fast trot, or to warn the 
 driver, or to take any precautions whatever, is contributory 
 negligence barring recovery.' Where a slightly intoxicated 
 driver recklessly drove across a railroad track, the' plaintiff 
 cannot recover, if by ordinary care he should have noticed 
 the driver's condition and remonstrated with him.' It was 
 said by the Court of Appeals of New York in a very late 
 <3ase : — " The rule that the driver's negligence will not be im- 
 puted to the plaintiff, should have no application to this case. 
 Such rule is only applicable to the cases where the relation 
 of master and servant or principal and agent exists, or where 
 the passenger is seated away from the driver, or is separated 
 from him by an enclosure and is without opportunity to dis- 
 cover danger and inform the driver of it. It is no less the 
 duty of the passenger where he has an opportunity to do so, 
 than of the driver to learn of the danger and avoid it if prac- 
 ticable. The plaintiff was sitting upon the seat with the 
 driver with the same knowledge of the road, the crossing, 
 and the environments, and with at least the same, if not bet- 
 ter, opportunity of discovering dangers than the driver pos- 
 sessed, and without any embarrassment in indicating them to 
 him. In Hoag v. N. T., &c., R. Co.,* where husband and 
 wife were sitting upon the same seat in a vehicle driven 
 by the husband, and both were killed by a collision at 
 a crossing, in an action brought by the administratrix of 
 the wife against the railroad company, it was held that she 
 
 ' Cresent «. Andereon,414 Pa. St. 38 Hun, 83. See, also, Brannen «. 
 
 643. Kokomo, &c., R. Co., 115 Ind. 115; 
 
 » Dean e. Penn. R. Co., 129 Penn. s. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 202; Lake Shore, 
 
 St. 614; B. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 718. &c., R. Co. v. MUler, 25 Mich. 274. 
 
 ' Smith «. New York, &c., R. Co., ♦ 111 N. Y. 199. 
 
§ 117.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEBSONS. 149 
 
 had no right, because her husband was driving, to omit some 
 reasonable and provident effort to see for herself that the 
 
 crossing was safe She was bound to look and 
 
 listen." » 
 
 § 116. In the case of persons non sui juris. — In actions 
 brought by or in behalf of children, idiots, lunatics, or other 
 persons non suijiiris, for injuries to which the negligence of 
 their legal custodians contributed, the question has arisen, 
 whether or not, upon the theory of agency or identity, such 
 contributory negligence on the part of the parent or guardian 
 should be imputed to the plaintiff in bar of the action. Upon 
 this question the courts have not been able to agree. It is 
 held in many jurisdictions in this country, that such negli- 
 gence is justly to be imputed to an infant plaintiff, while in 
 others it is strenuously denied. Let us first consider the 
 classes of persons to which the term non sui juris is applica- 
 ble. 
 
 § 117. Who are to he held non sui jv/ris. — Idiots and lu- 
 natics are of this class, and therefore, in general, have no 
 redress when injured through the carelessness of their 
 legal custodians in exposing them, or in suffering them to 
 expose themselves to danger, or where they are liable to in- 
 jury from being subjected to the same rules of conduct as 
 rational persons.^ Infants, also, it may be said, in general, 
 belong to this class, but not all infants very evidently. It is 
 a question of capacity, and it has been found a very difficult 
 
 ' Brickelli). N. Y., &c., R. Co., 130 death of deceased, was sustained. 
 N. T. 290; s. c. 34 Atl. Rep. 44. Galveston, &c. , Ry. Co. ji. Kutae, 76 
 See, also, Crawford ®. Delaware, &c., Tex. 473; s. c. 13 S. "W. Rep. 837. 
 R. Co., 54 N. T. Super. Ct. 363; The fact that plaintiff and the driver 
 Galveston, «&c., R. Co. v. Kutae, 73 were both in the employ of the city, 
 Tex. 643; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 137. A and engaged in the common enter- 
 refusal to charge that plaintifCs cannot prise of driving to a fire, did not ren- 
 recover if deceased's husband, with der them mutually responsible for 
 whom she was riding, but who was each other's acts. Elyton Land Co. 
 not driving, could, by the iise of ordi- v. Mingea,, 89 Ala. 531; s. c. 7 So. 
 nary care, have prevented the colli- Rep. 666. 
 
 sion, and if his failure to use such ' Willetts ®. Buffalo, &c., R. Co. 
 
 care contributed proximately to the 14 Barb. 585. 
 
150 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEBSONS. 
 
 [§ 117. 
 
 question, and has been, in many courts, a very fruitful 
 source of controversy, as to what age is suflficient to consti- 
 tute an infant sui juris. Unless the child is exceedingly young 
 it is usually left to the jury to determine the measure of care 
 required of the particular child in the actual circumstances 
 of the case.^ Where there is no doubt as to the capacity of 
 the child, at one extreme or the other, to avoid danger, the 
 court will decidei it as a matter of law. Thus, courts have 
 held, as a matter qf law, children of various ages from one 
 year and five months to seven years non sui juris? 
 
 '~^ SUberstein «. Houston, &c., R. 
 Co., 4 N. T. Supl. 843; "Western, - 
 &c., R. Co. r>. Young. 81 Ga. 397; 
 s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 912; McCarthy t>. 
 Cass Ave. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. 586; s. c. 
 4 S. W. Rep. 516; Bridger «. Ashe- 
 viUe, &c., R. Co., 25 S. C. 34; Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. 'Wilaon, 138 Penn. 
 St. 37; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 1087; Dor- 
 man V. Broadway R. Co., 5 N. Y. 
 Supl. 769; Strawbridge ®. Bradford, 
 138 Penn. St. 300; Stone e. Dry-Dock, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 115 N. Y. 104; b. c. 31 
 N. E. Rep. 712; Chicago City JRy. 
 Co. ®. Wilcox (111.), 241^. E. Rep. 
 419. In Bridger v. Asheville, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 S. C. 456, it was said that 
 the test of a boy's contributory neg- 
 ligence was his age, intelligence, abil- 
 ity to know his surroundings and the 
 danger of what he was doing. Con- 
 nolly 1). Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 
 N. Y. 104; s. C- 31 N. E. Rep. 101. 
 DealeyD. MuUer, 149 Mass. 483; s. c. 
 21 N. B. Rep. 768; Moebus it. Her- 
 man, 38_Hun, 370; Whalen «. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 664; s. c. 
 44 N. W. Rep. 849. 
 
 " Jones V. Utica, Ac, R. Co., 36 
 Hun, 115; Ryan e. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 Hun, 186; Moynihan ». 
 Whidden, 143 Mass. 287: Central 
 Trust Co. v. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 
 31 Fed. Rep. 246. Boy of six. Erie 
 City Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 130 Penn. 
 St. 413; B. c. 57 Am. Rep. 471; 
 Kreig ®. Wells, 1 E. D. Smith, 76; 
 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. e. Grable. 88 
 HI. 441; Callahan ». Bean, 9 Alien, 
 401; EvansvUle, &c., R. Co. «. Wolf, 
 59 Ind. 89; O'Flaherty b. Union R. 
 Co., 45 Mo. 70; Mangam v. Brooklyn, 
 &c., R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455; Mascheck 
 v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 
 600; Lafayette, &c., R. Co. e. Huff- 
 man, 38 Ind. 387, where it is laid 
 down as law that the unexplained 
 presence of a child under the age of 
 five years upon a track is an act of 
 negligence on the part of its parents, 
 which would prevent recovery. Pitts- 
 burgh, &c., R. Co. B. Caldwell, 74 
 Penn. St. 431; Jeffersonville,ifcc., B. 
 Co. V. Bowen, 40 Ind. 545; McGary v. 
 Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104; b. c. 30 Am. 
 Rep. 510. The court in North Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Penn. 
 St. 187, holds broadly that no contrib- 
 utory negligence can be imputed to 
 any child of ' ' tender years. " Lehman 
 ■B. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 334; McLain s. 
 Van Zandt, 7 Jones & Spencer, 347; 
 Gavin ». City of Chicago, 97 111. 66; 
 Bay Shore R. Co. c. Harris, 67 Ala. 
 6; Morgan v. Bridge Co., 5 Dillon, 96. 
 When the capacity of the infant has 
 once been adjudged, the question of 
 the amount of care exercised by it or 
 its custodian is, as in all other cases, 
 one for the jury. McQeary b. Bast, i 
 &c., R. Co., 135 Mass. 363; Texas, i 
 &c., R. Co. V. O'Donnell, 58 Tex. \ 
 37; Frick V. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., I 
 75 Mo. 543, 595; Chicago i>. Starr's '\ 
 
§ 119.] 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEBSONS. 
 
 151 
 
 § 118. The status of infants.— « An infant," says the 
 Court of Appeals of New York, " in its first years is not sui 
 Juris. It belongs to another to whom discretion in the care 
 of its person is exclusively confided. The custody of the in- 
 fant of tender years is confided by law to its parents, or to 
 those standing in loco parentis, and not having that discretion 
 necessary for personal protection, the parent is held in law 
 to exercise it for him, and in cases of personal injuries re- 
 ceived from the negligence of others, the law imputes to the 
 infant the negligence of the parents. The infant being non 
 ^ui juris, and having a keeper in law, to whose discretion in 
 the care of his person he is confided, his acts, as regards 
 third persons, must be held in law the acts of the infant, his 
 negligence the negligence of the infant." ^ 
 
 § 119. The New York rule— Hartfleld t. Roper.— In New 
 
 York it is sturdily maintained that the contributory negli- 
 gence of a third person, who is guilty thereof as parent, eus- 
 
 Admr., 43111. 174; Meeks t. South- 
 ■ern, Ac, R. Co., 53 Cal. 603; Ktts- 
 burgh, &c., R Co. n. Vining, 37 Ind. 
 513. But a child seven or eight years 
 of age has been held capable of tak- 
 ing ordinary care of himself. Gilles- 
 pie i). McGowen, 100 Penn. St. 144. J 
 So a child of eleven years when active 
 and intelligent. McMahon «. New 
 York, 33 N. T. 643; and so one of 
 thirteen and of fourteen years of age. 
 Achtenhagen v. Watertown, 18 Wis. 
 331; Plumley v. Birge, 124 Mass. 57, 
 58, in which the court says: — "The 
 age of the plaintiff [he was thirteen] 
 was an important fact for the consid- 
 eration of the jury; but the court 
 correctly held that the true rule was, 
 that he was entitled to recover if he 
 were in the exercise of that degree of 
 care which, under like circumstances, 
 would reasonably be expected of a 
 boy of his years and capacity." 
 Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. Delaney, 83 
 .ni. 198; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 308; Na- 
 :gle V. Allegheny, &c., R. Co., 88 ■ 
 Penn. St. 35; b. c. 33 Am. Rep. 413. : 
 
 See, also, the cases cited in the preced- 
 ing note. In Messengers. Dennie, 187 
 Mass. 197; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 395; 141 
 Mass. 335; Twist v. "Winona, &c., R. 
 Co., 39 Minn. 164; s. c. 39 N. W. 
 Rep. 403, and McPhilUps v. N. T., 
 &c., R. Co., 13 Daly (N. Y.) 365, 
 boys of 8, 10^ and 12, respectively, 
 were held guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence as a matter of law. Contrib- 
 utory negligence on the part of a 
 plaintiff of 6 years, or of 8, cannot 
 be inferred as a matter of law so as 
 to sustain a demurrer. Mackey v. 
 City of Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 777; b. c. 
 3 So. Rep. 178; City of Vicksburg v. 
 McLain, 67 Miss. 4; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 
 774. In Westbrook v. Mobile, &c., 
 R. Co., 66 Miss. 560; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 
 331, it was held that a plea of con- 
 tributory negligence on the part of a 
 plaintiff of four, without alleging ex- 
 ceptional maturity and capacity, was 
 demurrable, the law presuming him 
 to be Tion sui juris. 
 
 ' Mangam v. Brooklyn, &c., R. Co., 
 38 N. Y. 455. 
 
152 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. [§ 120, 
 
 todian, or one in loco parentis, must be imputed to a plaintiff 
 who is non sui juris, and who is,, therefore, in contemplation 
 of law under the charge or control of such third person. 
 The leading authority upon this question is the case of Hart- 
 field V. Eoper,^ in which this question, as affecting an infant 
 plaintiff, was first presented to the court. The facts disclosed 
 by the evidence were these : The plaintiff, a child about two 
 years old, was alone in the traveled portion of a highway at 
 some distance from any house ; the defendant was driving a 
 sleigh ; the child was run over by the horses and injured ; 
 neither the defendant nor those with him saw the child be- 
 fore the injury. The action was an action upon the case. 
 The verdict was for the plaintiff. The opinion of the court 
 was by Cowen, J., upon a motion for a new trial. A new 
 trial was granted ; first, because the evidence, which is fully 
 reported, failed to show negligence on the part of the defend- 
 ant, and, secondly, because it did show clearly, negligence on 
 the part of the plaintiff. The reasoning of the court upon 
 the second branch of the decision is in substance as follows : 
 — The custody of a child is confided by law to its parents ; it 
 cannot be exposed, as this child was, without gross negli- 
 gence. 4^ adult injured by a collision cannot recover if he 
 has contributed to the injury ; the same rule is applicable to 
 children; it can be enforced only by requiring care' from 
 those who have their custody. An infant is not sui juris. 
 He belongs to his custodian ; the custodian is his agent. The 
 custodian's neglect is the infant's neglect. 
 
 § 120. The language ofthe court.—" Was the plaintiff," 
 said the learned judge, the first of common law magistrates 
 in New Tort, " guilty of negligence ! His counsel seem to 
 think he made a complete exception to the general rule de- 
 manding care on his part by reason of his extreme infancy. 
 Is this, indeed, so ? The custody of such a child is confided 
 by law to its parents, or to others standing in their place, 
 and it is absurd to imagine that it could be exposed in the 
 joad, as this child was, without gross carelessness. . . . 
 The child has the right to the road for the purposes of travel, 
 
 ■ 21 Wend. 615; s. c. 34 Am. Dec. 273; decided in 1839 in the Supreme 
 Court of Judicature of New York. 
 
§ 121.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. 153 
 
 attended by a proper escort. But at the tender age of two 
 or three years, or even more, the infant cannot personally 
 exercise that degree of discretion that becomes instinctive at 
 an advanced age, and for which the law must make him re- 
 sponsible through others, if the doctrine of mutual care be- 
 tween the parties using the road is to be enforced at all in 
 this country. It is perfectly well settled that if the party 
 injured by a collision on the highway has drawn the mischief 
 upon himself by his own neglect he is not entitled to an ac- 
 tion, even though he be lawfully in the highway pursuing his 
 travels, which can scarcely be said of a toppling infant suf- 
 fered by his guardians to be there, either as a traveler or for 
 the purpose of pursuing his sports. The application may be 
 harsh when made to small children. As they are known to 
 have no personal discretion, common humanity is alive to 
 their protection ; but they are not, therefore, exempt from 
 the legal rule when they bring an action for redress — and", 
 there is no other way of enforcing it, except by requiring due 
 care at the hands of those to whom the law and the necessity 
 of the case have delegated the exercise of discretion. An in- 
 fant is not sui juris. He belongs to another to whom discre- 
 tion in the care of his person is exclusively confided. That I 
 person is keeper and agent for this purpose, and in respect ' 
 to third persons his act must be deemed that of the infant, 
 
 his neglect the infant's neglect If his proper 
 
 agent and guardian has suffered him to incur mischief it is 
 much more fit that he should look for redress to that guar- 
 dian, than that the latter should negligently allow his ward 
 to be in the way of travelers, and then harass them in courts 
 of justice, recovering heavy verdicts for his own miscon- 
 duct." ^ 
 
 § 121. The later cases following Hartfield v. Roper.— 
 
 This judgment, and the reasoning upon which it was based, 
 have always satisfied the New York courts, and they have 
 consistently adhered to this rule, abating no jot or tittle of its 
 anomaly and harshness.' It is followed, moreover, by the 
 
 ' Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615. lyn, &c., R. Co., 36 Barb. 339; s. c. 
 
 ' Thurber v. Harlem, &c., R. Co., 38 N. T. 466; Lehman v. City of 
 
 60 N. T. 333; Mangam v. Brook- Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 237; Mowrey e. 
 
154 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. 
 
 [§ 121. 
 
 courts of many other States, to the effect that, in the case of 
 a young child, the negligence of a parent, or other person to 
 whose care the child is entrusted, has the same effect in pre- 
 venting the maintenance of an action for an injury occasioned 
 by the negligence of another, than his own want of due care 
 would have if the plaintiff- were an adult.^ 
 
 7^ 
 
 Central, &c., R. Co., 66 Barb. 43; Mc- 
 Lain v. Van Zandt,7 Jones & Spencer, 
 351; McGary v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 
 104; B. c. 20 Am. Rep. 510; Morrison 
 ■0. Erie, &G.,R. Co., 56 N. Y. 303. 
 Here the plaintiff, an infant of twelve 
 years of age, was a passenger on de- 
 fendant's cars. While the train was 
 in motion, her father took her under 
 his arm, stepped from the car, fell, 
 and she was injured. Held (Church, 
 Ch. J., and Andrews, J., dissenting), 
 that the act of plaintiffs father was 
 her act, and, as the facts were undis- 
 puted, plaintiff, as matter of law, was 
 chargeable with contributory negli- 
 gence. Honegsberger v. Second Ave. 
 R. Co.,.l»Eeys, 553; s. c. 33 How. 
 'Pr.l93; 3 Abb. App. Dec. 378; Burke 
 V. Broadway, &c. R. Co., 49 Barb. 
 BB2; Kreig v. Wells, 1 E. D. Smith; 
 77; Ihl V. Forty-Second Street R. Co., 
 47 N. Y. 323; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 450; 
 Cosgrove ». Ogden, 49 K. Y. 355; 
 s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 361. But, com- 
 pare, Lannen «. Albany Gas Light 
 Co., 46 Barb. 370, in which Hoge- 
 boom, J., Bays: — "I know of no just 
 or legal principle which, when the in- 
 fant himself is free from negligence, 
 imputes to him the negligence of the 
 parent when, if he were an adult, he 
 would escape it." This is a much 
 quoted but somewhat irrelevant dic- 
 ium. The opinion from which it is 
 taken was given in a case where the 
 child was of such an age as to have, 
 perhaps, some degree of discretion. 
 In such cases, as will hereafter appear, 
 the rule in _ Hartfleld v. Roper is 
 usually modified even in those juris- 
 dictions where it is generally upheld. 
 
 'Wright V. Maiden, &c., R. Co., 4 
 Allen, 383; Lovett v. Salem, &c., R. 
 Co., 9 Allen, 557; Callahan ■». Bean, 
 9 Allen, 401; Holly v. Boston Gas 
 ■ Light Co., '*Gray, 133, holding that 
 the infant plaintiff^ cannot recover 
 without proving ordinary cai'e on the 
 part of itself and its father. Mulligan 
 i>. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512; Lynch «. 
 Smith, 104 Mass. 53 ; s. c. 6 Am. Rep: 
 188; McGerry «. East, &c., R. Co., 
 135 Mass. 363 ; Brown v, European, 
 &c., R. Co., 58 Maine, 384; Leslie v. 
 City of Lewiston, 63? Maine, 468. 
 Compare O'Brien v. McQlinchy, 68 
 Maine, 552; Karr v. Parks, 40 Cal. 
 188; Schierhold v. North, &c., R. Co., 
 40 Cal. 447; Meeks v. Southern, &c., 
 R. Co , 52 Cal. 603; s. c. 56 Cal. 513; 
 38 Am. Rep. 67; City of St. Pauls. 
 Kuby, 8 Minn. 166; Fitzgerald v. St. 
 Paul, &c., R. Co., 39 Minn. 336; s. c. 
 43 Am. Rep. 213; McMahon«. North- 
 erui &c., R. Co., 39 Md. 439; Balti- 
 more, &c., R, Co. ». McDonnell, 43 
 Md. 551. Ltt Pittsburg, &c., R. Co. 
 B. Vining's Admr., 27 Tind. 513, the 
 rule laid down is absolutely that the 
 unnecessary expostire to known dan- 
 ger of a child incapable of exercising 
 the care and judgment of mature 
 years,, is an act of negligence sufScient 
 to defeat a recovery, unless the injury 
 be wilful. La'^ayette, Ac, R. Co. «. 
 Huffman,^ Md. 287; Jeffersonville, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Bowen, 40 Md. 545; 
 8. 0. 49 Md. 154; Hathaway v. Toledo^ 
 &c., R. Co., 46 Md. 35; Evansville, 
 &c., R. Co, D. Wolf, 59 Md. 89; Au- 
 rora, &c., R. Co. ■», Grimes, 13 111. 
 585; Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Major, 
 18 111. 349; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
§ 122.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 155 
 
 § 122. The rule modified in various jurisdictions.— It 
 
 appears that the New York rule laid down in Hartfield v. 
 Eoper,^ obtains in Massachusetts, Maine, California, Min- 
 nesota, Maryland, Indianaj^'^liBaia; ana Kansas. But in 
 several instances the courts of these States, while adher- 
 ing more or less consistently to the rule, have modified it in 
 several very essential particulars. The harshness of it is 
 reicognized even in the courts that are governed by it, and 
 there may be noticed in the reports of each of these States a 
 tendency to confine the rule very strictly, and not in anywise 
 to extend it. Thus, in Maryland, it has been held that, where 
 the defendant might, by the exercise of ordinary care and 
 prudence, have avoided the consequences of his negligence, 
 a child non sui juris will not be prevented from recovering in 
 consequence of its parents' neglect.^ This is, perhaps, an 
 attempt to apply the learning in Davies v. Mann,' since it 
 amounts to very little more than the rule that if the defend- 
 ant, being a traveler, can, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
 avoid doing an injury to something exposed in the highway, 
 he is bound at his peril to do it — without much reference to 
 the conduct of the plaintiff. In another Maryland case,* 
 where the plaintiff, a child five years and nine months old, 
 having been sent by its parents across a street, upon an er- 
 rand, was injured by the defendant's cars, while returning to 
 its home, and there was some evidence of negligence on the 
 part of the persons in charge of the train, it was held a 
 proper case for the jury, and the court instructed the jury 
 that the plaintiff might recover if the injury resulted from 
 
 Starr's Admr., 42 lU. 174; Chicago, Co., 35 Kan. 738; Atchison, &c., R. 
 
 &c.,R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 HI. 326; Co. v. Smith, 28 Kan. 541; Chicago 
 
 Hund V. Geier, 72 111. 393 ; Chicago, City Ry. Co. ■». Wilcox (lU.), 24 N. E. 
 
 Ac, R. Co. V. Becker, 76 Dl. 25; B. c. Rep. 419. See, also, Kyne v. Wil- 
 
 84 111. 482 ; Ohio, &c., R. Co. ®. Strat- mington, &c., R. Co. (Del.), 14' Atl. 
 
 ton, 78 Hi. 88; Chicago., &c., R. Co. Rep. 922. 
 
 v. Hesing, 83 111. 204; Toledo, &c., R. ■ 21 Wend. 615; s. o. 34 Am. Dec. 
 
 Co. V. Giable. 88 Dl. 441 ; Gavin v. 373. 
 
 City of Chicago, 97111. 66. Inlllinois ^ Baltimore, &c., R. Co. «. McDon- 
 
 this question seems to be unsettled, nell, 43 Md. 556. 
 
 with a decided tendency to apply the » 10 Mee. & W. 546. 
 
 rule in Hartfleld v. Roper, as modified ' McMahon v. Northern, &c., R. 
 
 by the local»rule of comparative neg- Co., 39 Md. 439. 
 
 ligence. Smith «. Atchison, &c., R. 
 
156 NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. [§ 123. 
 
 a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant's 
 agents, provided it appeared that the plaintiff had acted 
 with such a degree of care and caution as, under the circum- 
 stances, might reasonably be expected from one of his age 
 and intelligence.^ The doctrine of comparative negligence, 
 of course, modifies the rigor of the rule in Illinois.* 
 
 § 123. The modification in New York. -Even in New 
 
 York, where the rule was first announced, it has been in 
 some degree qualified in late decisions. In IiIcGarry v, 
 Loomis,' it was held that a child four years old, being upon 
 the sidewalk and in the exercise of due care, might recover 
 for an injury received by falling into a pool of hot water 
 formed near the sidewalk by the escape of water from a 
 waste pipe from the works of the defendant,* and, again, in 
 Ihl WForty-Second Street E. Co.,' where a child afbout 
 thre^years of age was run down and fatally injured by the 
 , negligent management of a street railroad car, it was held 
 that^ if the child exercised proper care, the company was 
 liable without reference to the negligence of the parents of 
 the child in allowing it to go across the street. But it was 
 said that, if the child did not exercise due care the conduct 
 of its parents would then be essential to determine the lia- 
 
 • Barksdull v. New Orleans, &c., 54 111. 483; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 146; 
 
 R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 180. In this Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Gregory, 58 
 
 case the infant was of the age of 111. 326; Hund b. Geier, 72 111. 393; 
 
 five years and a half. The evidence Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Hesiag, 83 
 
 showed that it was in the habit of 111. 204; Chicago, &c., Ry.' Co. «. 
 
 going on the streets alone. Having Ryan, 131 111. 474; B. c. 23 N. E. 
 
 been run over by a car, it was held. Rep. 385. 
 
 in an action to recover damages, that '63 N. Y. 104; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 
 the defendant, in face of the evidence 510. 
 
 above noted, could not set up negli- ♦ Upon a precisely similar s^ate of 
 gence on the part of the infant's facts in the case of Prime v'. Ken- 
 parents; and further that the fact of tucky Furniture Co., it was decided, 
 the infant's failure to get out of the in Nov., 1884, in the Court of Com- 
 way of the car would not preclude mon Pleas at Louisville, by Stites, J., 
 recovery, as the car was being driven that the defendant was not liable 
 at a speed unusual, if not imlawful. for such hot water suffered to escape 
 Mallards. Ninth Ave. R. Co., 7 N. into a gutter, and that there was in 
 Y. Supl. 666. consequence no cause of action in 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Major, 18 favor of a scalded child, 
 
 ni. 349; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. ' 47 N. Y. 317; s. o. 7 Am. Rep. 
 
 Bumstead, 48 111. 321; Kerr«. Porgue, 450. 
 
§ 124.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PEESONS. 157 
 
 Ijility of the company. Where a child, even though never 
 so much non sui juris, has not committed, or omitted any ac^ 
 which would be held to constitute negligence in an adult, the 
 contributory negligence of its parent or guardian must not 
 be imputed to it, in an action in its behalf, for an injury from 
 the negligence of another. When the child has, of itself, 
 acted with discretion, and is, nothstanding that, injured by 
 another's fault, it is hardly short of monstrous to impute its 
 parents' or custodian's negligence or folly to it for the pur- 
 pose of defeating its action for the injury it has suffered.* 
 
 § 124. Thft same subject continued.— " I know of no just 
 or legal principle," says Hogeboom, J., " which, when the 
 infant himself is free from negligence, imputes to him the 
 negligence of the parent, when if he were an adult he 
 would escape it. This would be, I think, ' visiting the sins 
 of the fathers upon the children ' to an extent not contem- 
 plated in the Decalogue, or in the more imperfect digests of 
 human law."' It is believed that the rule of Hartfield v. 
 Boper has not been construed in any court, either to excuse 
 gross negligence or to permit a voluntary injury to one non 
 ^ui juris. It is a genetal rule, quite apart from this matter 
 of the imputability of a parent's negligence to an injured 
 child, that a higher degree of care must be exercised toward 
 persons of this class than the law exacts in dealing with 
 other classes of persons.^ Conduct which might ordinarily 
 
 > Mmm v. Reed, 4 Allen, 431; 48111.321; CUcago City By. Co. n. 
 
 Lynch «. Smith, 104 Mass. 52; s. c. Robinson, 127 HI. 1; s. c. 18 N. E. 
 
 « Am. Rep. 188. In O'Brien v. Rep. 773. 
 
 McGlinchey, 68 Me. 552, 556, the « Lanneno. Gas Co., 46 Barb. 364; 
 
 <;ourtsays:— "If the child, at the e. c. affirmed 44 N. Y. 459. 
 
 time o£ the accident, exercised as « Phila., &c., R. Co. b. Spearen, 47 
 
 much care and caution as any person Penn. St. 300; Smith s. O'Conner, 48 
 
 at the years of discretion could exer- Penn. St. 318; Penn. R. Co. ■». Mor- 
 
 cise under the same circumstances, gan, 82 Penn. St. 134; Isabel v. Hanni- 
 
 then the parental negligence did not bal R. Co., 60 Mo. 476; Chicago, &c., 
 
 contribute to the injury. It matters R. Co. t). Dewey, 26 HI. 259; Walters 
 
 not whether the plaintiff was three or v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 76; 
 
 thirty years of age, if he managed O'Mara v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 
 
 for his safety while upon the street N. T. 445; Singleton ®. Eastern 
 
 with the amount of care which the Counties Ry. Co., 7 C. B. (N. S.) 287. 
 
 law requires of persons generally." Contra, Bannon v. Baltimore, &c., R. 
 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Bumstead, Co., 24 Md. 108, holding that the in- 
 
158 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PEBSONS. 
 
 [§ 125. 
 
 be up to the standard of "due care" is sometimes held' 
 " gross negligence," or as evidence of a purpose to do a wil- 
 ful injury, when considered with reference to these irrespon- 
 sible classes.* Children, by reason of their tender age, are 
 entitled to more care under the same circumstance than an 
 adult. The policy of the law requires that peculiar tender- 
 ness should be exercised in extending to them civil protec- 
 tion. This view is clearly recognized on the criminal side of 
 the law. So far from the neglect, or dereliction, of parents 
 or guardians being a reason why a child should be misused 
 with impunity by third persons, it has been held that such 
 wrong-doing causing injury to children is an offense of an 
 aggravated nature.* 
 
 § 135. Negligence of the defendant must be shown.— 
 
 In actions for injuries to irresponsible persons there must 
 be, in every case, where the action can be sustained, a breach 
 of duty. It is not enough that somebody's child is hurt.. 
 There must be some dereliction on the part of the defendant,. 
 
 fancy of the plaintiff does not change 
 either the degree of care or diligence 
 to be used by the defendant, or en- 
 hance the measure of damages to be 
 adopted by the jury. The rules reg- 
 ulating the rights and duties of per- 
 sons to each other cannot vary ac- 
 cording to the years or degree of in- 
 tellect of natural persons, "without 
 producing an uncertainty in the law 
 destructive of all principle." Branson 
 V. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638; fl. c. 50 Am. 
 Eep. 193. 
 
 ' Robinson v. Cone, 32 Vt. 213; 
 s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 67; Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Caldwell, 74 Penn. St. 
 421, where it was held to be culpable 
 negligence for a driver to allow an 
 infant of five years to ride on the 
 platform of the car. Lucas v. Taun- 
 ton, &c., K. Co., 6 Gray, 71; Kerr i>. 
 Forgue, 54 111. 484; 8. c. 5 Am. Kep. 
 146; Brennan v. Fair Haven, &c., R. 
 Co., 45 Conn. 284; Walters®. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 76; Bast 
 Saginaw, &c., R. Co. v. Bohn, 27 
 
 Mich. 503. So, in Kenyon «. New 
 York, &c,, R. Co., 5 Hun, 479, it was 
 held that if the driver of defendant's 
 engine had failed to use ordinary 
 care, the contributory negligence of 
 the infant plaintiff would not consti- 
 tute a bar to recovery. Texas, &c., 
 R. Co. V. O'Donnell, 58 Tex. 27 r 
 Galveston, &c., R. Co. v. Evansich, 
 61 Tex. 3 and 24. 
 
 " Wharton's Criminal Law, § 2529; 
 Rex V. Friend, R. & R. 20; Rex s. 
 Squire. 1 Russ,. C. & M. 80, 678. Thus, 
 "where a parent supplies sufficient 
 food and clothing to another, for the 
 purpose of administering to his child, 
 and that other person wilfully with- 
 holds it from the child, and the parent . 
 is conscious that it is so withheld, and 
 does not interfere, and the child dies 
 for want of proper food and clothing, 
 the parent is guilty of manslaughter. " 
 Rex V. Bubb, 4 Cox's C. C. 455; Rex 
 e. Smith, L. & C. 607; 8. c. 10 Cox's- 
 C. C. 82. 
 
§ 125.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 159 
 
 or it is, in case of the child, as in the case of any one else, 
 damnum absque injuria. This important element in every 
 proper action of this nature seems frequently to be over- 
 looked. Judge Thompson calls attention to a curious in- 
 stance of it in the case of Lygo v. Newbold.' Alderson, B., 
 says, in that opinion : — " The negligence in truth is attribut- 
 able to the parent who permits the child to be at large. It 
 seems strange that a person who rides in his carriage with- 
 out a servant, if a child receives an injury by getting up be- 
 hind for the purpose of having a ride, should be liable for 
 the injury." In such a supposed case as this dictum suggests, 
 we should ha-ve the thoughtless act of a child bringing 
 himself in contact with a person performing his business in 
 a lawful manner, and, although the child were too young to 
 perceive the difference between danger and safety, still, there 
 being no breach of duty on the part of the owner of the 
 vehicle, the action as supposed would clearly be entirely 
 without foundation.* In North Penn. E. Co. v. Mahoney,* 
 where an infant was in the arms of one to whom it had not 
 been entrusted, and who, having rescued it from one peril, 
 immediately exposed it to another, it was held that the child 
 was not barred of its action, there being no proper legal con- 
 nection between the infant plaintiff and its self-constituted 
 custodian.^ The English rule is declared in Waite v. North- 
 
 ' 9 Exch. 303. «fcc., R. Co., 58 Me. 384; Meeks v. 
 
 ' Phila., &c., R. Co. v. Spearen, Southern, <fec., R. Co., 53 Cal. 603; 
 
 47 Penn. St. 300; Bulger v. Albany, s. c. 56 Cal. 513. 
 
 &c., R. Co , 43 N. T. 459; Hubener ' 57 Penn St. 187. 
 
 V. New Orleans, &c., R. Co., 33 La. * Qf. Pittsburg R Co. v. Caldwell, 
 
 Ann. 493; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 74 Penn. St. 431; Bellefontaine, &c.. 
 
 Stumps, 69 HI. 409; Phila., &c., R. R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; 
 
 Co. V. Hummel, 44 Penn. St. 375; s. c. 34 Ohio St. 670, where it is 
 
 Ostertag v. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 64 held that neither the negligence of 
 
 Mo. 431. A railroad company, for the parent in permitting an infant to 
 
 example, wiU not be held liable for be upon a track, nor of the person in 
 
 injuries received by a child while get- charge of the child in not keeping a 
 
 ting on one of its cars, in consequence proper lookout for the car, would bar 
 
 of an invitation from an employee recovery if the defendant failed to ex- 
 
 who, in so doing, was acting entirely ercise great caution. East Saginaw, 
 
 beyond the scope of hia authority. &c., R. Co. v. Bohn, 37 Mich. 503. 
 
 Snyder v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 60 Contra, Leslie «. Lewiston, 63 Me. 
 
 Mo. 413; Boland v. Missouri, &c., R. 468. 
 Co., 36 Mo. 484; Brown v. European, 
 
160 NEGLIGENCE OF THIED PERSONS. [§ 126. 
 
 ■eastern Ey. Co.' In this case it appears that the plaintiff, an 
 infant about five years of age, was in charge of its grand- 
 mother, who procured tickets for both at a station, with 
 the intention of taking the train at that place. In crossing 
 the track to reach a platform they were run down by a train, 
 under circumstances of concurrent negligence on the part of 
 the grandmother and of the servants of the company. The 
 grandmother was killed, and the plaintiff seriously injured. 
 Lord Campbell held that the plaintiff was so identified with, 
 its grandmother that the action could not be maintained. 
 This view was sustained on the appeal. " The case is the 
 same as if the child had been in the mother's arms." . . . 
 " The person who has charge of the child is identified with 
 the child." . . . "If afather.drivesacarr'iage, in whichhis 
 infant child' is, in such a way that he incurs an accident which 
 by the exercise of reasonable care he might have avoided, it 
 would be strange to say that though he himself could not 
 maintain an action, the child could,", said the judges in the 
 Court of Exchequer Chamber to which this case was 
 appealed. 
 
 § 126. The English doctrine further considered.— There 
 
 seems to be no other English case in point, and no decisions 
 similar to those in the American reports that follow more or 
 less exactly the New York case of Hartfield v. Boper.' 
 Waite V. Northeastern Ey. Co.' turns upon the legal identity 
 of the infant plaintiff with his guardian or custodian, and it 
 does not go beyond that class of cases in which the parent 
 or custodian is present and controlling the infant at the time 
 of the injury. Many American cases recognize it to be 
 material, in . actions of this kind, when the negligence of the 
 parent is to be imputed to the infant, that the parent be 
 present when the injury is suffered. Holly v. Boston Gas- 
 light Co.* is in point. In this case a child nine years of age 
 was injured by escaping gas, in her f^ither's house, the father 
 
 ' El., Bl. & El. 719. ®. Macfie, 3 Hurl. &Colt, 744; b. c. 10 
 
 » But see Singleton ®. Eastern Jur. (N. 8.) 682; 83 L. J. (Exch.) 
 
 Counties Ey. Co., 7 C. B. (N. S.)a87; 177: CampbeU on Negligence, § 81. 
 
 Mangan v. Atterton, 4 Hurl. & Colt, » El., Bl. & El. 719. 
 
 388; B. 0. L. B. 1 Exch. 239; Gardner « 8 Gray, 123. 
 
 «. Grace, 1 Eost. & Fin. 359; Hughes 
 
I 127.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 161 
 
 failing to take jproper precautions against injury after the 
 leak was discovered. The court held that the plaintiff, being 
 under the control of her parent, would have to bear the con- 
 sequences of any want of ordinary care on his part. " She 
 was under the care of her father," said the court, " who had 
 the custody of her person, and was responsible for her safety. 
 It was his duty to watch over her, guard her from danger, 
 and provide for her welfare, and it was her's to submit to his 
 government and control. She was entitled to the benefit of 
 liis superintendence and protection, and was consequently 
 subject to any disadvantages resulting from the exercise of 
 that parental authority which it was both his right and duty 
 to exert. Any want of ordinary care on his part is attribut- 
 able to her in the same degree as if she were wholly acting 
 for herself,"* This is the doctrine of the English case,^ 
 which, reduced to a rule, is, that' whenever the child is in the 
 actual custody and control of the parent or guardian, any 
 negligence contributing to the injury, of which such cus- 
 todian may have been guilty, must be imputed to the child, 
 in an action by, or for the benefit of the child, for damages 
 suffered by reason of the negligence of another.' 
 
 § 127. A criticism of Hartfleld v. Roper.— The rule of im- 
 puted negligence, as applied to persons non sui juris, is an 
 anomaly. The English law on this point presents an extra- 
 ordinary illustration. On the one hand it is held that the 
 negligence of a person having charge of a child is the negli- 
 gence of the child, and imputable to it, when the child comes 
 into a court of justice and asks damages for an injury negli- 
 gently inflicted upon it by the defendant.* But, per contra, 
 where a donkey is carelessly run down in the highway, where 
 he is negligently exposed, the defendant is held liable,' and 
 though oysters are negligently placed in a river-bed, it is an 
 
 ' Holly «. Boston Gaslight Co., 8 111. 88; Carters. Towne, 98Mass.567; 
 
 Gray, 123. 8- "■ 1"'^ Mass. 507; Morrison v. Erie 
 
 ' Waite 8. Northeastern Ry. Co., El., Ry. Co., 56 N. Y. 302. 
 
 <ei. & El. 719. ' Waite v. Northeastern Ry. Co., 
 
 » Stillson V. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., El., Bl. & El. 719. 
 
 67 Mo. 671; Lannen «. The Albany ' Davies v. Mann, 10 Mee. «& W. 
 
 Gas Co., 46 Barb. 284; s. c. 44 N. T. 546. 
 459; Ohio, &c., R. Co. «. Stratton, 78 
 11 
 
162 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS. [§ 127. 
 
 injury redressible at law in damages for a vessel negligently 
 to disturb tiiem.* It appears, therefore, that the child, were 
 he an ass or an oyster,* would secure a protection which is 
 denied him as a human being of tender years, in such juris- 
 dictions as enforce the English or the New York rule in this 
 respect.' But the objection to the rule which imputes a 
 parent's or guardian's negligence to an infant plaintiff, goes 
 far beyond the matter of consistency or inconsistency. The 
 case of Hartfield v. Eoper is obnoxious to far more serious 
 criticism, than that it seems to afford, less protection in 
 courts of justice to our infant children than to dogs, and oys- 
 ters and asses. With respect to the reasoning of Cdwen. 
 J., in that case, it may be said ; (a), that whether the dis- 
 tinction made between slight negligence, and gross negli- 
 gence, and voluntary injury has any foundation in principle 
 is, to say. the least, doubtful.^ A person, generally, in exer- 
 cising his own rights, must take due, care not to interfere 
 with the rights of others. What is due care depends, in any 
 given instance, upon the particular circumstances of the case. 
 If a person does not use due care, that is, the care requisite 
 under the circumstances, he then is guilty of negligence in 
 the legal signification of the word. Whether his conduct be 
 called simply negligence, or be alluded to with tenderness as 
 slight negligence, or be spoken of vituperatively as gross 
 negligence, his liability is the same. Neither is there gen- 
 ' erally a distinction, except perhaps in the form of action, 
 between the negligent and the wilful infliction of an injury. 
 (&). A second objection to the defense in^ question may be 
 drawn from its novelty. That an action is of first impression 
 
 ' Mayor of Colchester «. Brooke, 7 stock attracted to its track by salt, or 
 
 Q. B. 377; Vennall v. Garner, 1 Cromp. cotton seed, left there by the company. 
 
 & M- 21. Brown ®. Hannibafl, &c., R. Co., 37 
 
 " In England, even a dog, when a Mo. App. 394; Little Rock, &c., By. 
 
 trespasser, has some rights. Tpwn- Co. v. Dick, 52 Ark. 403. 
 
 send ®. Wathen, 9 East, 377, holding ' "Wharton on Negligence, § 813; 
 
 that an action on the case would lie Thompson on Negligence, 1184, § 34 
 
 where plaintlS's dog, attracted by his et seg. 
 
 instinct, trapassed on defendant's ' Grill v. General, &c.. Collier Co., 
 
 land, on which traps baited with meat L. R. 1 C. P. 600; Briggs ■». Taylor, 
 
 were placed, and was injured. So, 28 Vt. 185; Steamboat New World ». 
 
 too, a railroad company must exercise King, 16 How. (tJ. 8.) 474. 
 reasonable care to prevent injuries to 
 
§ 129.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEKSONS. 163 
 
 is regarded as a weighty argument against it, but that a de- 
 fense has been for the first time taken in a class of actions 
 where, if valid, there must have been many previous oppor^ 
 tnnities for setting it up, is considered a very weighty, and 
 all but conclusive objection to its validity.^ 
 
 § 128. The same subject continued.— (c). A third objec- 
 tion lies to the false assumption as to the legal status of an 
 infant. It is not true that an infant is not sid juris. In the 
 sense of being entitled to maintain an action for his own 
 benefit he is sui juris. As far as his right of action is con- 
 concerned he is in no respect the chattel of his father. At 
 common law he was required to sue by guardian. By Stats. 
 Westm,, I, c. ,48, and Westm., ll, c. 15, he was authorized to 
 sue by prochein ami. But in theqry of law both guardian and 
 prochein ami are appointed by the court. They are at all 
 times subject to the control of the court, and are its officers. 
 To protect the interest of the minor is the common law duty 
 of the court. The judgment, if any is recovered, is the prop- 
 erty of the minor ; it is recovered to his sole use. It is an 
 entirely false assumption, in Hartield v. Eoper, that the 
 parent or guardian may recover "neavy verdicts for their 
 own misconduct." Again, it is assumed in that opinion, that 
 an infant, injured by the joint negligence of his parent and 
 a third person, can hg,ve legal redress against his parent. 
 "It is much more fit," says the court, "that he should look 
 for redress tq that guardian." If this be so, if the right of 
 the infant be so distinct from the duty of the parent that the 
 relation of parent and child is not an objection to the main- 
 tenance of such a suit, then the whole theory upon which 
 this class of cases rests falls to the ground. 
 
 § 139. The criticism continued. — (d). Again it is falsely 
 assumed that the parent is the agent of the child. " Agency 
 is founded upon a contract, either express or implied, by 
 which one of the parties confides to the other the manage- 
 ment of some business to be transacted in his name or on his 
 own account, and by which the other assumes to do the 
 business and to render an account of it." " The relation of 
 
 ' Co. Litt. 81 b., 379 b. '2 Kent's Commentaries, 613. 
 
164 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. [§ 129. 
 
 child and parent is not the relation of principal and agent, 
 neither is it analogous to it. The child does not appoint his 
 father ; he has no control over his acts ; he cannot remove 
 him from power, or appoint another in his stead ; he has no 
 right of action against him ; every element of agency is want- 
 ing. The want oif any one of these elements is sufficient to 
 prevent the acts or omissions of the parent from being viewed 
 as the acts or omissions of the child upoti any analogy to be 
 drawn from the law of agency. By the common law, a child 
 cannot appoint an agent. The authority by which the parent 
 exercises control over the child is, therefore, an authority de- 
 rived from the law. It is a principle of law, laid down before 
 " the spacious days of great Elizabeth," that the abuse of an 
 authority derived from the law shall not work harm to, or 
 prejudice the rights of, the person subjected to it.^ The par- 
 ents authority is given for the protection of the child, but the 
 principle of Hartfield v. Eoper turns the shield into a sword, 
 and uses it to deprive the child of the very protection arising 
 from the parental relation, (e). Again the negligence which 
 will bar the plaintiffs recovery must be negligence which 
 contributes to the injury. But the negligence of a parent in 
 suffering his child to be exposed to danger, is not negligence 
 which can be said in any legal sense to contribute to the in- 
 jury. Even if such negligence be therefore imputed to the 
 infant plaintiff it cannot bar his recovery.^ -"cThe doctrine of 
 Hartfield v. Ropet, not being based upon authority, must be 
 judged by the reasoning by which it can be supported. The 
 Reasoning is founded upon false assumptions that there are 
 varying degrees of negligence, and corresponding degrees of 
 liability; that the judgment recovered, belongs not to the 
 child but to the parent ; that there is no duty upon the court 
 to protect the child ; that the parent is the child's agent ; that 
 the child has an adequate remedy against his parent, and 
 that such negligence is contributory negligence.* -^- 
 
 ' The Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Rep. B. 339; Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East, 
 
 146 ; 8. c. 1 Smith's Leading Cases 277. 
 (8th Am. Ed. of 1885) 257. ^ j„ the preparation of this section 
 
 ' Davies ■b. Mann., 10 Mee. & I have drawn freely from a very tren- 
 
 W. 546; Tuff v. Warman, 2 0. B. chant article, entitled " Contributory 
 
 (N. S.) 739; s. c. 5C. B. (N. S.) 573; negligence on the part of an infant," 
 
 Mayor of Colchestpr v. Brooke, 7 Q. in the American Law Review, for 
 
§ 130.] NEGLIGENCE OP THIBD PEB80NS. 165 
 
 § 130. The rule in Hartfleld v. Roper denied.— The rule 
 which imputes the negligence of parents and custodians to 
 .persons non sui juris, is denied in many of the States 
 of the Union. A leading case, repudiating the rule of 
 Hartfield v. Roper, is Eobinson v. Cone, decided by the Su- 
 preme Court of Vermont, in 1850.' In this case, the plaint- 
 iff, a boy less than four years of age, attending a school in the 
 country, as he returned home from school, amused himself by 
 sliding down hill on his sled, and, while engaging in his sport, 
 as he lay on his breast upon the sled, with his legs hanging 
 over the sled, was run down by the two-horse sleigh of the 
 defendant who drove down the hill upon a smart trot. Plaint- 
 iffs injuries were serious. The court denied the doctrine of 
 imputed negligence, and held that, although a child of tender 
 years may be in the highway through thie fault or negligence 
 of his parents, and so be improperly there, yet, if he be in- 
 jured through the negligence of the defendant, he is not pre- 
 cluded from his redress ; all that is required of an infant 
 plaintiff in such a case being that he exercise care and pru- 
 dence equal to his capacity. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl- 
 vania has shown no toleration of the doctrine of imputed 
 negligence in these cases.. In an action oh behalf of a child 
 four years of age, says that court : — " To a child of plaintiff's 
 years no contributory negligence can be imputed, she is not 
 precluded from recovery against one tort feasor, by showing 
 that others have borne a share in it."^ Carpenter, J., deliver- 
 ing the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 
 gives the doctrine a hard and contemptuous kick. He says, — 
 
 April; 1870 (Vol. IV, page 405), pub- O'Connor, 48 Penn. St. 318, 331, refer- 
 
 lished anonymously, but presumably ring to the rule In Hartfleld «. Eoper, 
 
 written by Judge Oliver Wendell says:— "This is compellin? the child to 
 
 Holmes, Jr. exercise not of its own but of the par- 
 
 ' 23 Vt. 213; 8. c. 54 Am. Dec. 67. ent's discretion. It is holding it re- 
 
 " North Peim. R. Co. v. Ma- sponsible for the ordinary care of 
 
 honey, 57 Penn. St. 187 j> c. 6 Phila. adults. In our opinioii the mle thus 
 
 242; Erie City, &c.. Passenger Ry. Co. broadly i^ated does not rest upon 
 
 S.Schuster, 113 Penn. St. 412; s. c. s6ond reason." Glassey «. Heston- 
 
 57 Am. Rep. 471. QT. Pennsylva- ville, &c., R. Co., 67 Penh. St. 172; 
 
 nia R. Co. «. Kelly, 31 Penn. St, "Kay v. Penn. R. Co., 65 Penn. St. 
 
 372; Rauch «. Lloyd, 31 Penn. St. 358; 369; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 628; Phila., &c , 
 
 Phila., &c., R. Co. ■d. Spearen. 47 R. (5o. «. Long, 75 Penn. St. 257; 
 
 Penn. St. 800. Strong, J., in Smith c. Wharton on Negligence. § 310, note. 
 
166 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PEE80NS. 
 
 [§ 130. 
 
 "The plaintiff would be entitled to damages for the defendant's 
 negligent, injury of his property similarly exposed to danger 
 by the carelessnes of his guardian.^ An infant of such 
 tender years as to be capable of exercising care is not 
 less under the protection of the law than his chattel."* 
 And this rule, which prevents the imputation of a par- 
 ent's or custodian's negligence or folly, to an infant, in 
 an action brought by it or in its behalf, is maintained 
 in several other States.' " The rule which visits the 
 negligence of the fathers on the children in this way is 
 denied in some of the States of the Union, and has not yet 
 been adopted by the English courts."* While, on the one 
 hand, in the States of New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Cali- 
 fornia, Minnesota, Maryland) Indiana, (Illinois/ and (^ansas^ 
 the negligence or misconduct of a parent or custodian is im- 
 puted to an infant plaintiff, who brings an action for damages 
 he has sustained by reason of another's negligence, the better 
 rule, that in sucli an action, by or in behalf of an infant, the 
 
 ' Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 
 546; Smith «. Railroad. 35 N. H. 
 366, 367; Giles i\ Railroad, 55 N. H. 
 555. 
 
 » Bisaillon v. Blood, 64 N. H. 565; 
 8. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 147. 
 
 ' Government St. R. Co. ■». Hanlon, 
 53 Ala. 70; Wyfflore v. Mahaska 
 County, 78 Iowa 396; s. c. 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 364; Vestbrook i>. Mobile, &c., 
 R. Co., 66 Miss. 860; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 
 331; Ferguson v. Columbus, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 77 Ga. 103; Newman v. Phil- 
 lipsburgh, &c., R. Co. (N. J.), 19 Atl. 
 Rep. 1103; Huff v. Ames, 16 Neb. 
 139; s. c. 49 Am. Rep 716. A parent's 
 admission that he had wamed an in- 
 fant to avoid a certain danger cannot 
 be used against the son on the trial of 
 his action for an injury. Power v. 
 Harlow, 57 Mich. 107; Bellefontainel 
 &c., R. Co. r. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 
 399; Cleveland, &c., R. Co. ■;;. Man- 
 son, 30 Ohio St. 451; Norfolk, &c., 
 R. Co. f. Ormsby, 37 Gratt. 455; 
 Birge s, Gardner, 19 Conn. 507; Da- 
 
 ley V. Norwich, &c., R. Co., 36 
 Conn 591:Bronson «. Southbuiy, 37 
 Conn. 199; Winters v. Kansas City, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 99 Mo. 509; s. c. 13 S. 
 "W. Rep. 653; Boland v. .Missouri, &c., 
 R. Co., 36 Mo. 484; Stillson b. Hanni- 
 bal, &c., R. Co., 67 Mo. 671; Frlck v. 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 75 Mo. 543; 
 s. c. 75 Mo. 595. In this case, 
 the court is of the opinion that 
 the weight of authority sustains the 
 rule, that in an action by the infant 
 for damages resulting from an injury 
 to himself by the negligence of a third 
 party, the negligence of the parent or 
 guardian is not to be considered, or 
 imputed to the infant. Whirley ». 
 Whiteman, 1 Head, 610; GalvestPtt, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Moore, 59 Tex. 64; 
 s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 365; Texas,"&c., B. 
 Co., r. O'Donnell, 58 Tex. 37; 
 Houston, &c., R. Co. «. Simpson, 60 
 Tex. 103; Railroad Co. v. Herbeck. 
 60 Tex. 613. 
 
 ■" Shirley's Leading Cases, 374, 
 
 ' § 121, supra. 
 
§ 131.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEESONS. 167 
 
 negligence of parent or guardian is not to be so imputed, pre- 
 vails in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Vermont, Alabama, Tennessee, 
 •Ohio, Connecticut, Missouri, Nebraska, TPexas, New Hamp- 
 shire, Iowa, Mississippi, Georgia and New Jersey. 
 
 § 131. When the action is for the parent's benefit.— 
 
 "When an action for the negligent injury of an infant is 
 brought by the parent, or for the parent's own benefit, it is 
 very justly held that the contributory negligence of such 
 parent may be shown in bar of the action. This is only one 
 phase of the general rule of contributory negligence to the 
 effect that the* plaintiff's own negligence is a defense to his 
 action. Its application to cases of this kind is well illus^ 
 trated in the case of the Belief ontaine, &c., K. Co. v. Sny- 
 der.^ In the earlier action, brought in the name of the 
 child, for injuries received by it through the negligence of 
 the employees of the railroad company, the contributory 
 negligence of the parent, or of the person to whom the 
 parent had temporarily entrusted the child, was held no bar 
 to the action ; while in the second suit, brought by the 
 parent in his own name, and for his own benefit, it was held 
 that the action would not lie. The negligence of his agent 
 to whom he had entrusted the child having contributed to 
 cause the injury, and such negligence being, in contempla- 
 tion of law, the parent's negligence was held to bar the ac- 
 tion. A great number of authorities can be cited in support 
 of this rule.* ' 
 
 ' 18 Ohio St. 399: s. c. 24 Ohio St. Miss. 560; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 331: Kay 
 
 670. V. Penn. R. Co., 65 Perm. St. 269;, 
 
 ' Smith V. Hestonville, &c., li. Co., s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 628; Glassey v. Hes-, 
 
 92Pemi. St. 450; s. c. 37 Aip. Rep. tonville, &c., R. Co., 57 Pemi. St.. 
 
 705; Pemi. R Co. v. Bock, 98 Penn. 173; Penn. R. Co. v. Zehe, 33 Penn. 
 
 St. 437; Penn. R. Co. v. James, 81 St. 318; s. c. 37 Penn. St. 420. The, 
 
 Penn. St. 194; Phila., &c., R. Co. ii. fact that parents inherit the estate of 
 
 Long, 75 Penn. St. 257; Pittsburgh, a child for whose death a recovery is 
 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Pearson, 73 Penn. St. sought, does not make the rule which 
 
 169. When an action for personal in- , would bar a parent who is guilty o^ 
 
 jury to an infant is brought in the contributory negligence from recover-,, 
 
 name of the infant, and for his bene- ing in his own right applicable to an 
 
 fit, by his parent, as next friend, the action by the administrator. Wymore, 
 
 plea of contributory negligence on the ii. Mahaska County, 78 Iowa, 396; 
 
 part of the parent is no defense. 8. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 364; Williams v. . 
 
 Westbrook r. Mobile, &c., R. Co., 66 Texas, &c., R. Co., 60 Tex. 305,' 
 
168 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEESONSi 
 
 [§ 132. 
 
 § 132. This rule illustrated. — And so, in actions of this 
 kind, by a parent, will the child's contributory negligence 
 defeat the claim, because when a plaintiff derives his cause 
 of action from an injury done to a third person, such plaintiff 
 is justly chargeable with the contributory negligence of the 
 third person.' " The father can recover only under the same 
 circumstances of prudence as would be required if the action 
 were on behalf of the boy." * This rule is applicable to 
 actions under Lord Campbell's act,^ and the statutes in this 
 country which authorize actions for personal injuries result- 
 ing in death. It is accordingly held in suits brought under 
 
 where it is held that while the negli- 
 gence of the parents in exposing their 
 child to danger could hot be charged 
 against it, yet when the suit is brought 
 by the surviving parents, this same 
 negligence will be regarded as con- 
 tributory to the fatal result, and no 
 recovery can be had. Isabel v. Hanni- 
 bal, &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 475; Koons v. 
 St. Louis, Ac, R. Co., 65 Mo. 593. 
 In Hookers. Chiciigp, &c., R. Co., 
 76 Wis. 542, where the action was by 
 the parent, the court said: — "Coun- 
 sel contends that the negligence of 
 the temporary custodian of the child 
 ought not to be imputed to the child 
 itself, or to the plaintiff. This court 
 has not yet decided that question. It 
 has frequently held, however, that in 
 such a case, where the child is so 
 young as to be non sui juris, it is a 
 material question whether the parent 
 was or was not negligent in commit- 
 ting the child to such temporary cus- 
 todian, and whether such custodian 
 was of proper age and discretion to 
 suitably care for it. There has been 
 no occasion to go further and decide 
 the above question." O'Flaherty «. 
 Union, &c., R. Co., 45 Mo. 70; Daley 
 «. Norwich, &c., R. Co., 36 Conn. 591, 
 598, holding it to be "obvious that 
 the negligence of the parents is not 
 the want of ordinary care in a child 
 less than three years of age, however 
 
 much such negligence might be a de- 
 fense to an action by the father, had 
 he sued for expenses incurred, or for 
 loss of service." Birmingham d. 
 Dorer, 3 Brews. 690. But see Wal- 
 ters 1). Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 
 71 [Laws of Iowa (1860), § 411]. It 
 was there held that when the pa/rents 
 of an infant are unable to give it their 
 pergonal cwre, and intrust him to the 
 custody of a suitable person, the neg- 
 ligence of the latter cannot be im- 
 puted to the parents, and will not de- 
 feat a recovery for negligence result- 
 ing in the death of the infant. 
 Albertson ». Keokuk, &c., R. Co., 48 
 Iowa, 492; Wright v. Maiden, &c., R. 
 Co., 4 Allen, 283; Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Vining's Admr., 37 Ind. 573; 
 Chicago V. Major, 18 111. 849; Louis- 
 ville, &cl, Can^l Co. ■». Murphy, 9 
 Bush. 533. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c.; R. Co. v. Harney, 
 38 Ind. 28; Gilligan v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 1 E. D. Smith, 453; Ken- 
 nard u. Burton, 35 Me. 39; s. c. 43 
 Am. Dec. 249; Burke ». Broadway, 
 &c., R. Co., 34 How. Pr. 239; s. C. 
 49 Barb. 539; Fitzgerald ®. St. Paul, 
 &c., R. Co., 29 Minn. 336; s. c. 4& 
 Am. Rep. 212. 
 
 ° Burke ®. Broadway, &c., R. Co., 
 84 How. Pr. 239; s. c. 49 Barb. 529. 
 
 ' 9 and 10 Vict. chap. 93. 
 
§ 133.] 
 
 SEQLIGENCE OF THIRD PEESOJiS. 
 
 169 
 
 statutes of this kind, that any contributory negligence which 
 might have barred a recovery by the deceased, had he sur- 
 vived, in an action brought by him for his injuries, is a de- 
 fense in the action for the benefit of the next of kin.* 
 
 § 133. The role modified by reason of the plaintiff's pov- 
 erty or destitution. — In courts which repudiate the harsh 
 rule in Hartfield v. Boper, an infant plaintiff, as we have 
 seen, is not prejudiced in his action by an imputation to him 
 of his parent's neglect. In some States we find it held, as a 
 refinement even upon this rule, that it may be a matter to go 
 to the jury, in case the parent is poor, and destitute of means 
 for safely restraining his child, whether or not proper, or 
 ordinary, care was displayed ; the question being, whether 
 the parent has exercised reasonable care of his child, the 
 jury may take account of his lack of means in determining it.' 
 
 ' Thorogood r. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; 
 Tucker d. Chaplin, 3 Car. &Klr. 730; 
 Witherley v. -Regent's Canal Co., 13 
 C. B. (N. S.) 2; 8. c. 6 L. T. (N. S.) 
 255; 3 Post. & Fin. 61; Button t. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 18 N. Y. 348; 
 Wflds r. Hudson River R. Co., 34 
 N. T. 430; p. c. 29 N. T. 315; 33 
 Barb. 503; Lehman ®. Brooklyn, 29 
 Barb. 234. Here the intestate, a child 
 four years old, had left its home, and ' 
 a half hour later was found dead in a 
 well. In an action against the city, 
 by the chUd's administrator, it was 
 held that the plaintiff, in order to re- 
 cover damages, must show that the 
 negligence and improvidence of the 
 intestate did not contribute to the re- 
 sult. Chicago e. Major, 18111. 849; 
 Chicago V. Starr's Admr., 43 111. 174; 
 Boland v. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 36 
 Mo. 484; Ewen v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 38 Wis. 613. This defense is 
 also valid in those States where the 
 statute contains no provision applying 
 to the negligence of the deceased. 
 Lofton c. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105 [2 Stet. 
 of Indiana (1876) 44, §27]; Penn R. 
 Co. V. Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33 [Laws 
 
 of Penn. (1855) c. 333]; Rowland®. 
 Cannon, 35 Ga. 105 [Code of Georgia 
 (1873) § 2971]. See, also, Walters v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 71 
 [Laws of Iowa (1860) § 411]. 
 
 -' Isabel c. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Mo. 475, 483; Walters v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 41 Iowa, 71; Pittsburgh, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Pearson, 73 Penn. St. 169; 
 Phila., &c., R. Co. «. Long, 75 Penn. 
 St. 257. See, also, Hoppe, Admr. ®. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 61 Wis. 357; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Gregory, 
 58 m. 226. In Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Slater, 129 111. 91; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 
 575, it was held that evidence of the 
 father's wealth was inadmissible in 
 defense where it was not shown that 
 the boy was incapable of taking care 
 of himself. Evidence of the father's 
 poverty was excluded in Mayhew v. 
 Bums, 103 Ind. 328, but on liberal 
 grounds, the court holding that 
 wealth and poverty were alike imma- 
 terial in any case, as the question of 
 negligence was to be determined by 
 the aeiual situation of the household. 
 The cases in which such evidence was 
 admitted were disapproved. 
 
170 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS. [§ 133. 
 
 Sharswood, J., said, in Pittsburgh, Ac, E. Co. v. Pearson : * 
 — " The only question raised by these assignments of error 
 which it is deemed necessary to discuss, is whether, undpr 
 the evidence, the plaintiffs below — the parents of the child 
 who was run over and killed by the railroad car of the 
 defendants — were guilty of culpable negligence in permitting 
 him to run abroad in the street without a competent pro- 
 tector. It was, undoubtedly, settled very properly in Glassey 
 V. Hestonville Passenger Eailway Co./ that, if the parents 
 permit a child of tender years to run at large without a pro- 
 tector in a city traversed constantly by cars and other 
 vehicles, they fail in the performance of their duties, and are 
 guilty of such negligence as precludes them from a recovery 
 of damages for any injury resulting therefrom. If the case 
 is barely such, the negligence is a conclusion of law, and 
 ought not to be submitted to the determination of the jury. 
 But in this case there was evidence that the child was not 
 permitted to run at large without a protector, and it was a 
 question for the jury whether the accident was to be attrib- 
 uted to the negligence of the parents. These parents were 
 careful parents. A board at the door prevented the child 
 from leaving the house of his own accord. When abroad he 
 was in charge of an old§r sister, between twelve and thirteen 
 years of age. It so happened, however, that the board was 
 removed temporarily for the purpose of scrubbing the floor: 
 The child watched his opportunity and escaped. He was im- 
 mediately missed, and his brother at once sent after him. He 
 returned and said that he was playing in the alley with Lizzie 
 Orr, a little girl of the neighborhood, between seven and 
 eight years of age, who was in the habit of playing with 
 him. The parents were satisfied that he was safe with her. 
 In the caprice of childhood the little boy ran away from her 
 down the alley to Bebecca street, where the railway was, ran 
 across the track, and in the course of a very few minutes was 
 run over. Now, whether Lizzie Orr was a competent pro- 
 tector, whether the parents ought to have been satisfied 
 when informed that he was with her, were questions for the 
 jury." 
 
 ' 72 Penn. St. 169. -^ 7 P. P. Smith, 172. 
 
I 134.] NEOLIGENCE OF THIRD PEBSONS. 171 
 
 § 13t. A further statement of the nile in Pennsylvania.— 
 
 The court in the same case further said : — " Children of that 
 age — more especially girls — are often sufficiently prudent 
 and thoughtful to be intrusted with the care of young 
 children. Persons in the condition of life of these parents 
 cannot afford to employ servants to look after their children. 
 Their necessary domestic duties prevent them from being 
 constantly on the watch themselves. We agree that ' to say 
 it is negligence to permit a child to go out and play without 
 it is attended by a grown attendant, would be to hold that 
 free air and exercise should only be enjoyed by the wealthy, 
 who are able to employ such attendants, and would amount to 
 a denial of these blessing to the poor.' O'Flaherty v. Union 
 R. Co.^ Agnew, J., has made a similar observation in Kay 
 V. The Pennsylvania K. Co.^ 'Here, a mother toiling for 
 daily bread, and having done the best she could in the 
 midst of her necessary employment, loses sight of her child 
 for an instant, and it strays upon the track. With no means 
 to provide a servant for her child, why should the necessities 
 of her position in life attach to the child and cover it with 
 blame ?' That, indeed, was an action by the child in which 
 the negligence of the parent would, perhaps, be no defense, 
 but we may ask with equal propriety why should the neces- 
 sities of the parents' position cover them with blame if they 
 have done all in their circumstances they could do."' Again, 
 in Philadelphia, &c., K. Co. v. Long,* the case of a child of 
 humble parents run over in the street, the court, Agnew, J., 
 says : — " In that part of the charge recited in the fourth 
 assignment the judge said, ' that the fact that the child is 
 found in the street affords a strong presumption of negligence 
 on the part of the plaintiffs. Tou will, therefore, consider 
 whether the mother took reasonable care of the child ; if she 
 did not, it was negligence.' To suffer a child to wander on 
 the street has the sense of permit. If such permission or 
 sufferance exists, it is negligence. This is the assertion of a 
 principle. But whether the mother did suffer the child so to 
 wander is a matter of fact, and is the subject of evidence, and 
 
 ' 45 Mo. 70. ' Pittsburgh, &c , R. Co. v. Pearson, 
 
 ' 65 Penn. St. 377. 73 Penn. St. 169. 
 
 '75Penn. St. 357. 
 
172 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. [§ 135. 
 
 this must depend upon the care she took of her child. Such 
 care must be reasonable care, dependent upon the circum- 
 stances. This is a fact for the jury. If she did hot exercise 
 this care, she was negligent. ' What more than this care can 
 be demanded of her? When a railroad runs through a 
 populous city, has the company a right to exact a harder 
 measure, and are we to say, as a njatter of law, that the 
 citizens are to be imprisoned in their houses, or their children 
 caged like birds, otherwise it is negligence ? Is it hegligenee 
 for the poor who congregate these crowded streets unless, 
 even in the summer's heat, they live shut up in the noisome 
 vapors of their closed tenements without a breath of heiilthy 
 air? Is this the life they must lead, or be adjudged to be 
 negligent? This mother gave her child a piece of bread 
 to satisfy it, closed the kitchen door to keep it in, and went 
 to the next toom to scrub the oil cloth on the floor, and be- 
 fore her labor was flnished, and in less than five minutes, 
 the mangled body of her little one was brought in and laid 
 before her. We have no reason to believe that her love for 
 her child was less than that of the more favored of her sex, 
 having servants at their beck. Because the child managed to 
 lift the latch and momentarily disappeared, are we to say that 
 this was negligence per se, and that she 'suffered her child to 
 wander into the street ? What sort of justice is that which 
 tells the mother agonizing over her dying child : ' Your neg- 
 Ugenoe caused this. You suffered your child to run into the 
 jaws of death. We pannot perceive any fault in the railroad 
 company. A speed of eight miles an hour along this popu- 
 lous thoroughfare was all right.' We can endorse no such 
 cruel doctrine, but we must say, as was said in Kay v. Eail- 
 road Co.,* the doctrine which imputes negligence to a parent 
 in such a case is repulsive to our natural instincts, and re- 
 pugnant to the condition of that class of persons who have 
 to maintain life by daily toil." 
 
 § 136. This doctrine commended.— This argument satis- 
 fies at once the sense of justice and the instincts of humanity. 
 Unless the rights of the poor are to be carelessly sacrificed 
 to the rapacity of the rich, account must be taken in such 
 
 '65Penn. St. 276. 
 
§ 136.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 173 
 
 actions as these, of the pecuniary condition of tiue plaintiff, 
 in determining whether or not due care has been exercised. 
 Most of the families living in the large cities are poor, and 
 unable to employ assistance in taking care of their children. 
 Often both parents' labor is required away from home, to 
 procure the food necessary for the family. Children are 
 crowded together in the ill-ventilated rooms of tenement 
 houses. A child cannot live if constantly confined in that 
 manner. The children of the poor can have no place of re- 
 sort but the streets. If one of these children is injured in 
 its helplessness, it by no means follows that either the child 
 or its parents have neglected any duty. If it is injured by 
 accident, all that can be done is to pity those whose poverty 
 exposes them to such accidents ; but, if it is injured by the 
 negligence of others, not only ought it to have the same 
 measure of jus|;ice to which every one is entitled who brings 
 an action in court, but also when its parents are needy, that 
 circumstance ought to be duly considered by the court in 
 reaching a conclusion upon the question of negligence. 
 Poverty, in these cases, ought to be, however, only a shield, and 
 never a sword. The destitution of the parent is not a license 
 to the child to act recklessly. But is there any principle of 
 law by which in this class of actions children are excepted 
 out of the rule applicable to all other plaintiffs, and on ac- 
 count of their own weakness, and their parents' poverty, are 
 made to bear an additional burden ? Is there any principle 
 upon which it can be held that they must establish not only 
 their own due care, but the due care of another person over 
 whom they have no control, measured by a standard beyond 
 that other person's power to attain ? 
 
 § 136. Ordinary care in a child. — An infant plaintiff, who, 
 on the one hand, is not so young as to escape entirely all legal 
 accountability, and, on the other hand, is not so mature as to be 
 held to the responsibility of an adult, is, of course, in cases in- 
 volving the question of negligence, to be held responsible for 
 ordinary care, and ordinary care must mean, in this connection, 
 that degree of care and prudence which may reasonably be 
 
174 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. [§ 136. 
 
 expected of a child.* In Ijyncii v. Smith' the court said : — "li 
 the jury find that the plaintiff was of such capacity that he 
 was in the street without negligence, either on the part of 
 himself or his parents, then the question arises, what degree 
 of care he was bound to exercise. In Mulligan v. Curtis,* it 
 was held to be a question for the jury, whether a boy three 
 and a half years old might not without negligence be trusted 
 to go across the street, accompanied by his brother nine 
 years old. Certainly the jury could not find that a boy nine 
 years old must exercise the capacity of an adult. But it was 
 implied that, if it was proper for him to be there, it was only 
 necessary for him to exercise such capacity as he had. 
 School children, who are properly sent to school unattended, 
 must use such reasonable care as school children can. It 
 must be reasonable care, adapted to the circumstances or, in 
 
 other words, the ordinary care of school children 
 
 If the child, without being able to exercise any judgment in 
 regard to the mattisr, yet does no act which prudence would 
 forbid, and omits no act that prudence would dictate, there 
 has been no negligence which was directly contributory to 
 the injury." In Munn v. Eeed,* where the infant had been 
 bitten while playing with a dog, it was held that if the child 
 had been attacked by the dog while using such care as is 
 • usual with children of its age, the action might be main- ' 
 tained. - In a case in Michigan, where the plaintiff was under 
 the age of fifteen years, it was held to be the duty of the 
 court, without being requested, to instruct the jury that a dif- 
 ferent rule should be applied in considering the question of 
 contributory negligence from that applicable in the case of 
 an adult.* The decisions enforcing this rule that children 
 are to be held responsible only for such a degree of care as 
 may reasonably be expected .of them, taking due account of 
 their age and the particular circumstances of each case, are 
 very numerous.' 
 
 ' Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; ' 100 Mass. 512. 
 
 Railroad Company v. Stout, 17 Wall. * 4 Allen, 431. 
 
 657; s. c. 2 Dill, 294; Gray v. Scott, » Wright e. Detroit, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 66 Penn. St. 345; Robinson v. Cone, 77 Mich. 128; s. c. 48 N. W. Rep. 
 
 22 Vt. 218; s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 67. 765. 
 
 " 104 Mass. 52; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. ' Hemmingway «. Chicago, &c., 
 
 188 • By. Co., 72 Wis. 42; s. c. 37 N. W. 
 
§ 137.] 
 
 "NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PEKBONS. 
 
 175 
 
 § 137. Children as trespassers.— Lynch v. Nurdin/ is the 
 leading English case upon this subject. The circumstances 
 of the case were these : — Negligence on the part of the defend- 
 ant's servant, tempting the plaintiff to mischief ; a technical 
 trespass by the infant, a child, capable of only a small measure 
 of care for its own safety ; conduct by the plaintiff which in 
 an adult would have been negligence per se. The facts were 
 these : — Defendant's cart being in charge of his cartman was 
 driven into a street where a number of children were playing ; 
 the cartman left the horse and cart standing unattended before 
 the door of a house which he had entered ; the plaintiff, a 
 child under seven years of age, climbed upon the wheel of the 
 cart ; another boy led the horse a step or two forward, the 
 plaintiff fell off and was run over by the wheel, and his leg 
 
 Rep. 804; Husaey 1>. Ryan, 64 Md. 
 426; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 773; Meuhl- 
 hausenc. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 91 
 Mo., 832; s. c. 2 S. W. Rep. 315; 
 Bridger «i. Asheville, &c., R. Co., 25 
 S. C. 24. In denying a motion for a 
 new trial, the court sa'd: — "If an 
 adult had been injured under the 
 same circumstances, instead of a child 
 about ten years of age, I should have 
 little hesitation in granting the mo- 
 tion. I feel, however, that this case 
 was a proper one for the jury." Mc- 
 Guire ». Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 37 
 Fed. Rep. 54. A boy of seven is not 
 bound as a matter of law to "look 
 and listen " before crossing a railroad 
 track. Baker v. Flint, &c., R. Co., 
 68 Mich. 90; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 836. 
 See, also, Lehman e. Louisiana, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 705; Finklestein 
 «. N. T., &c., R. Co., 41 Hun, 34; 
 Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. v. Corri- 
 gan, 46 Ohio St. 283; s. c. 20 N. E. 
 Rep. 466; Western, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Young, 83 Ga. 612; 8. c. 10 S. E. 
 Rep. 197; 111. Cent. R. Co. v. Slater, 
 129 ni. 91; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. s. 
 Whipple, 39 Kan. 531; s. c. 18 Pac. 
 Rep. 730; Hicks «. Pacific, &c., R. 
 Co., 64 Mo. 430; Railroad Co. v. 
 Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401; Kay c.Penn., 
 
 &c., R. Co., 65 Penn. St. 269; s. c. 
 3 Am. Rep. 628; Ma»ly v. Wilming- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 74 N. C. 655; Mo 
 bile, &c., R. Co. v. Crenshaw, 65 
 Ala. 566; Barry ». N. T., &c., R. 
 Co., 92 N. T. 289; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 
 377; Byrne b. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 83 
 N. Y. 620. The law fixes no certain 
 age at which children are of sufBcient 
 intelligence to have imposed upon 
 them the full degree of care incum- 
 bent on those of mature years, and 
 in every case the question of intelli- 
 gence of a child is one for the jury. 
 Houston, &o., R. Co. ®. Simpson, 60 
 Tex. 103. Ordinary neglect as to a 
 person of full capacity, might be 
 gross negligence as to a child. Leh- 
 man v. McQueen, 65 Ala. 566; Gal- 
 veston, &c., R. Co. V. Moore, 59 Tex. 
 64; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 265; Plumley 
 «. Birge, 134 Mass. 57; s. c. 36 Am. 
 Rep. 645; Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 
 300; s. c. 30 Wis. 6. If the child 
 does not act with the ordinary pru- 
 dence of a person of his age and in- 
 telligence, he is guilty of contributory 
 negligence. Cook v. Houston Nav, 
 Co., 76 Tex. 8; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 
 475; Dowling ». Allen, 88 Mo. 393. 
 • 1 Q. B. 29. 
 
176 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEB80N8. [§ 138. 
 
 was broken. The defendant was held liable, although the 
 plaintiff was a trespasser, and contributed to the mischief by 
 his own act. The question of the negligence of the lad's 
 parents, in suffering him to be at large in the street uuat- 
 tended, was not raised, and the case is therefore no authority 
 upon this point, thougli it is often cited as though it 
 were. 
 
 § 138. Other English cases. — Wait v. Northeastern Ey. 
 Co.* should not be regarded as questioning it, for the two cases 
 have nothing in common ; but whether or not Hughes v. 
 Macfie " and Mangan v. Atterton ' are not to be regarded as 
 shaking its authority is a much more difficult question. The 
 opinion of Pollock, C. B., in the former case, if not expressly 
 repudiating, is wholly inconsistent with it. In that case two 
 children, serpen and five years, of age respectively, playing about 
 and jumping on the covering of a bulkhead which had been left 
 tilted up against a wall upon a highway, were injured by its 
 falling upon them. The court says :— "We think the fact of the 
 plaintiff being of tender years makes no difference. His touch- 
 ing the flap was for.no lawful purpose. Had he been an adult, 
 it is clear he could have maintained no action. He would vol- 
 untarily have meddled, for no lawful purpose, with that 
 which, if left alone, would not have hurt him. He would, 
 therefore, at all events, have contributed by his own negli- 
 gence to his damage. As far as the child's act is concerned, 
 he had no more right to touch this flap, for the purpose for 
 which he did touch it, than he would have had if it had been 
 inside the defendant's premises."* In Mangan v. Atterton,' 
 the defendant exposed for sale, unfenced and unattended, a 
 machine which might be set in motion by any passer-by, and 
 which when in motion was dangerous. The plaintiff, a boy 
 of four years old, by the direction, of his brother, a boy of 
 seven, put his fingers into the cogs of the machine, while an- 
 other boy was turning the handle, whereby his hand was 
 crushed. The defendant was held not liable, on the ground 
 that he was guilty of no negligence in exposing his machine, 
 
 ' El., Bl. & Bl. 719. * Hughes v. Macfie, 2 Hurl. & Colt, 
 
 » 2 Hurl. & Colt, 744. 744. 
 
 • L. R. 1 Exch. 239. • L. K. 1 Excb. 289. 
 
§ 140.] NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 177 
 
 and because the plaintiff's own act had brought the injury 
 upon himself. The judge, in rendering the opinion, which 
 was probably right, assigned a reason which was certainly 
 wrong. " The defendant," says the court, " is no more liable 
 than if he had exposed goods coloured with a poisonous paint, 
 and the child had sucked them. It may seem a harsh way of 
 putting it, but suppose this machine had been of a very 
 delicate construction, and had been injured by the child's 
 fingers, would not the child, in spite of his tender years, have 
 been liable to an action as a tort feasor ? "* 
 
 § 139. The doctrine condemned.— Nothing worse than 
 this, as a specimen of judicial reasoning, can be found in the re- 
 ports. These three comparatively recent cases seem to leave 
 unsettled in England the question whether a child of tender 
 years, exercising all the care that can be expected of him, 
 but yet yielding to a temptation in his play to commit a tech- 
 nical trespass, may recover of a defendant for an injury caused 
 by his negligently exposing that which a child's natural in- 
 stinct may bring him in contact with to his hurt.* 
 
 § 140. The general American rnle.— In this country the 
 rule in Lynch v. Nurdin has been very generally followed, 
 both in the federal and in many State courts. The leading 
 case in the federal reports is Eailroad Co. v. Stout,' in which 
 Judge Dillon wrote the opinion at circuit.* This is the turn- 
 table case. It holds a railroad company liable for an injury 
 to an infant caused by a turn-table, left unguarded and un- 
 locked, in a place likely to attract children, even though upon 
 
 ' Mangan d. Atterton, L. R. 1 Exch. any one who touches it, without any 
 
 239. precaution against mischief, is not 
 
 ' ClaTk D. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div. only guilty of negligence, but of neg- 
 
 327. In this case a contrary doctrine ligenceof a very reprehensible charac- 
 
 to the later English cases is laid down, ter, and not the less so because the 
 
 It goes even farther than Lynch v. imprudent and unauthorized act of 
 
 Nurdin, and in discussing the case of another may be necessary to realize 
 
 Mangan' v. Atterton, Cockbum, C. J. the mischief to which the unlawful 
 
 (p. 339), says: — ' It appears to us that act or negligence of the defendant has 
 
 a man who leaves in a public place, given occasion." 
 
 along which persons, and amongst ' 17 Wall. 657. 
 
 them children, have to pass, a danger- * 2 Dillon, 294. 
 ous machine which may be fatal to 
 12 
 
178 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIBD PERSONS. 
 
 [§ 140. 
 
 the company's own ground.* In the case of Birge v. Gardner* 
 the facts are essentially the same as in the English case of 
 Hughes V. Macfie f but the (jonneotiout court sustains the 
 authority of Lynch v. Nurdin, and reaches a conclusion ex- 
 actly contrary to that of its English counterpart.* In Missis- 
 sippi, a city was held liable for injuries to a child by falling 
 into an excavation negligently left ungjiarded, the servants of 
 the city having reason to anticipate the probability that the 
 child would follow the pathway leading to the pit.^ But 
 
 ' Of. Kerr «. Forgue, 54 111. 482; 
 s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 146; Chicago v. 
 Starr's Admr., 42 111. 174; Keefe v. 
 Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 21 Minn. 207; 
 8. c. 18 Am. Rep. 393; Nagal v. Mis- 
 souri, &c., R. Co., 75 Mo. 658; s. c. 43 
 Am. Rep. 418; Bvansich «. Gulf, &c., 
 R. Co., 57 Tex. 126; s. c. 44 Am. 
 Rep. 586. Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Fitzsimmons, 22 Kan. 686; s. c. 31' 
 Am. Rep. 208, in which the court 
 aptly remarks that it was probably 
 intense amusement, almost irresistible, 
 for the boy to ride upon a turn-table; 
 and probably he did not imagine that 
 he was a trespasser or in the slightest 
 danger. "Boys," it goes on to say, 
 "can seldom be said to be negli- 
 gent when they merely follow the 
 irresistible impulses of their own 
 natures."- Koons v. St. Louis, &c., R. 
 Co., 65 Mo. 592; St. Louis, &c., R. 
 Co. T. Bell,' 81 111. 76; s. c. 25 Am. 
 Rep. 269; Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 
 507; B. 0. 50 Am. Dec. 261. And see 
 a full discussion of "the turn-table 
 ca.ses" in the following chapter, 
 §§ 204, 205 et seg. 
 
 '19 Conn. 507; s. c. 50 Am. Dec. 
 261. 
 
 ' 2 Hurl. & Colt, 744. 
 
 *Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head, 
 610; MuUaney v. Spence, 15 Abb. 
 Pr. (N. S.) 819. Cy. Meibus v. 
 Dodge, 88 Wis. 300. Hydraulic 
 Works V. Orr, 83 Penn. St. 882. Here 
 the facts were, that adjoining a factory 
 was a private alley which comnnini- 
 cated with a public street. At the 
 
 entrance of the alley was a gate upon 
 which was posted "private," and "no 
 admittance." This gate was fre- 
 quently opened, although the em- 
 ployees of the factory were instructed 
 to keep it closed. ' Intestate, a child 
 of four years, while at play in the 
 street, strayed into the alley, and was 
 killed by the falling of a platform 
 used to raise and lower goods. Held, 
 that whUe it is true in general, that 
 where no duty is owed no liability 
 arises, yet this rule varies with cir- 
 cumstances, and where, therefore, an 
 owner has reason to apprehend dan- 
 ger from the peculiar situation of his 
 property, and its openness to accident, 
 the question of duty then becomes one 
 for the jury. Verdict was given for 
 the intestate's parents. 
 
 'Mackey v. Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 
 777. But see Klix v. Kieman, 68 Wis. 
 271 } 8. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 228; Schmidt 
 •». Kansas City Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 
 284: Clark r. City of Manchester, 62 
 N. H. 577; Jewett «. Keene, 62 N. H. 
 701. In the two latter cases it was held 
 that the city was not liable, though the 
 place had a tendency to lure children. 
 Martin v. Cahill, 39 Hun, 445. A con- 
 tractor employed slowly moving cars 
 for the transportation of earth. These 
 cars were dangerous only to. persons 
 attempting to ride upon them, and it 
 was held that the contractor was not 
 bound to employ men to keep children 
 away from them. Emersop «. Pete- 
 ler, S5 Minn. 481. 
 
§ 141.] NEGLIGENCE OP THIED PERSONS. 179 
 
 where a pile of lumber fell upon a child, in a lumber yard, 
 from some unknown cause, the defendants, who had given 
 orders to their watchman to exclude all children from the 
 yard, were held not liable.' Under different circumstances, 
 however, the owners of lumber piled upon and near the side- 
 walk of a public street may be liable for damages to children 
 from it, though it was piled contrary to their order.^ In a 
 similar case in Kentucky the owner was held liable, the lot 
 upon which the lumber was piled being unfenced, and having 
 been used as a playground by children of the neighborhood.^ 
 
 § 141. The Massachusetts rule. — The Massachusetts court 
 seems to follow the rule in Mangan v. Atterton * and Hughes 
 V. Macfie.' It is the only court in this country that has not 
 affirmed Lynch v. Nurdin.* Lane v. Atlantic Works ' was the 
 case of an infant, seven years old, injured while playing 
 about a truck, standing in front of a foundry, loaded with a 
 heavy casting, which, when the truck was shaken or moved, 
 rolled off and injured the plaintiff. The defendant, owner of 
 the foundry, was held not liable upon essentially the grounds 
 assumed in the English cases.* The position of the Supreme 
 
 ' Vanderbeck r. Hendry, 34 N. J. J., said: — "• If, therefore, any one 
 
 Law, 467. using dangeroiis instruments, running 
 
 'Cosgrove «. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255. macliinery, or employing vehicles 
 
 See," also, as germane to this subject, which are peculiarly hazardous, knows 
 
 McAlpin c. Powell, 55 How. Prac. that infants, idiots, or others who are 
 
 163 ; s. 0. 70 N. Y. 126. bereft of, or have but imperfect dis- 
 
 ' Branson ®. Labrot, 81 Ky, 638; cretion, are in close or immediate 
 
 fi. c. 50 Am. Rep. 193, where the court proximity, he will be comp^elled to 
 
 said: — "Conduct which toward the the exercise of a degree of caution, 
 
 general public may be up to the stan- skill and diligence which would not 
 
 dard of due care, may be gross or be required in cases of other persons." 
 
 wUful negligence when considered in And see Gillespie ». McGowen, 100 
 
 reference to children of tender years Penn. St. 144; Porter ®. Anheuser- 
 
 and immature experience." Busch Brewing Assoc, 24 Mo. App. 
 
 • L. R. 1 Exch. 239. 1; Jonasch v. Standard Gaa-Light Co., 
 ' 2 Hurl. & Colt, 744. 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 447. In regard 
 
 • Lane ®. Atlantic Works, 109 Mass. to objects alluring to children, an in- 
 104; 8. 0. Ill Mass. 136. teresting analogy in favor of the chil- 
 
 ' 109 Mass. 104; s. c. Ill Mass. 136. dren may be found in Brown v. Han- 
 
 ' See, also, Lyons v. Brookline, 119 nibal & St. J. R. Co., 27 Mo. App. 
 
 Mass. 491; Wood v. School District, 394, and Little Rock, &c., Ry. Co. 
 
 44Iowa, 27; Boland ^.Missouri R.Co., v. Dick, 52 Ark. 402, where the rail- 
 
 36 Mo. 484. In this last case, Wagner, road companies were held liable for 
 
180 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PERSONS. 
 
 [§ U2. 
 
 Judicial Court of Massachusetts, uponthe^eneralj[uestion 
 of contributory negligence, as well as upon that branch of it 
 affecting infant plaintiffs, is not a satisfactory one. It has 
 taken extreme ground upon almost every point.^ 
 
 § 142. What acts and omissions on the part of parents 
 have been held contributory negligencp. — If parents permit 
 a child of tender years to run at large, without a protector, 
 in the streets of a city traversed constantly by cars and other 
 vehicles, they fail in the performance of their duties, and are 
 guilty of such negligence as precludes them from a recovery 
 of damages for any injury resulting therefrom.* But it is 
 
 injuries to stock allured to the track 
 by salt and cotton seed negligently 
 allowed to accumulate there. 
 
 ' " The law gives equal protection 
 to all, and requires, in turn, that each, 
 according to his capacity, shall pro- 
 tect himself. A diflEerent requirement 
 would place the weak at the mercy of 
 the strong, against whom they have a 
 Tight f ask for protection. It iS plain 
 that, in the case of a. foot passenger 
 who is injured in the street by being 
 run over, through the negligence of 
 another, the negligence of the plaintiff 
 is not to be measured, except by his 
 capacity. Any other rule would de- 
 prive half mankind of the protection 
 of the law. Infants, lunatics and 
 persons weak in body or mind are all 
 civilly responsible for the injury they 
 inflict upon others. When they be- 
 come active doers of injury, it may be 
 that, to protect the community, they 
 are held responsible for that prudent 
 foresight which might be expected 
 from -a strong and intelligent adult, 
 and that no allowance is to be made 
 for their want of strength, of skill, or 
 of understanding. But where they 
 are the victims of wrong, there is no 
 rule of law which makes the afflicted 
 of Providence outlaws in court. An 
 old person is not required to avoid 
 danger with the activity of youth, or 
 a woman to ward o£E peril with the 
 
 strength of a man. Sometimes blind 
 men walk the streets. Their necessi- 
 ties compel them to do so. They 
 have a legal right in the highway, but 
 from their infirmity they are more ex- 
 posed to accidents than other men are. 
 For accidental injuries there is no re- 
 dress. If a blind man is run over by 
 a vehicle, the fact that the driver was 
 ignorant of the man's infirmity is to 
 be considered in determining the 
 question of the driver's negligence. 
 Yet, when that negligence is estab- 
 lished, it is very unreasonable to say 
 that the fact that impaired vision 
 might perhaps have enabled the blind 
 man to escape the peril is an answer 
 to the action. If the law does not re- 
 quire, under such circumstances, 
 sight from the blind nor strength 
 from the weak, neither should it un- 
 der the same circumstances require 
 from a child more forethought than 
 it possesses. It should not require, as 
 the Massachusetts cases do require, 
 that the child of a foolish man should 
 have a prudent father." 4 American 
 Law Review, 405 (April, 1870), an 
 essay which arraigns the Massachu- 
 setts courts upon this point almost 
 
 ' Glassey s. Hestonville Passenger B. 
 Co., 57 Penn. St. 172 But see a recent 
 case in Scotland, in which it was held 
 that to allow children aged three and 
 
§ 142.] 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEB80NS. 
 
 181 
 
 not negligence per se to permit a child of three to go upon a 
 city street attended only by a child of seven,' or a child of 
 four attended by his sister of eleven,' or a child of two in 
 charge of his brother of eight ; * nor is it negligence per se 
 in a mother to allow a boy twelve years of age to go from 
 one car to another of a train, upon which they are traveling, 
 in search of a seat,* nor to permit children to play upon an 
 unfrequented street in the absence of any circumstance to 
 render it dangerous ; * nor to allow small children to go to 
 and fro from school without attendance ; ^ nor to send chil- 
 dren el^rrauds in the street under ordinary circumstances.' 
 
 five to cross a city street unattended 
 by any person was not negligence so 
 as to bar an action by the father. 
 Martin v. Ward, 14 So. Ct. of S. Cas. 
 814. 
 
 ' Stafford ». Rubens, 115 111. 196. 
 
 ' Collins «. South Boston R. Co., 
 142 Mass. 301; s. c. 57 Am Rep. 
 675. 
 
 ' Bliss V. South Hadley, 145 Mass. 
 91; 8. C.13K. E. Rep. 353. 
 
 ' Downs v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 47 
 N. Y. 83. 
 
 ' It is not, as a matter of law, negli- 
 gence to allow a child of four and 
 one-half years to play on the side- 
 walk with her brother, six years of 
 age, in a thickly populated portion of 
 a city, on an August afternoon, but 
 the questijon is for the jury. Birkett 
 V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 N. Y. 
 504; s. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 108; Karr u. 
 Parks, 40 Cal. 188; Mangam v. Brook- 
 lyn, &c., R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455; Jetter 
 V. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 2 Keyes, 154; 
 O'Flaherty v. Union R. Co., 45 Mo. 
 70. And so held in McGary e. 
 Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104; s. c. 20 Am. 
 Rep. 510, the question whether the 
 sidewalk was frequented or deserted 
 not arising; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 
 N. Y. 255; Oldfleld v. Harlem, &c., 
 R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; Schierhold v. 
 North Beach, &c., R. Co., 40 Cal. 447. 
 
 ' Drew V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 26 
 
 N. Y. 49; Lynch c. Smith, 104 Mass. 
 53; B. G. 6 Am. Rep. 188; Ihl v. 
 Forty-second St. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; 
 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 450. 
 
 ' East Saginaw City R. Co. v. 
 Bohn, 27 Mich. 503; Bellefontaine, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 
 399; McMahon v. Northern, &c., R. 
 Co., 39 Md. 438 ; Mulligan v. Curtis, 
 100 Mass. 512. In all of the follow- 
 ing cases the question of contrib;utory 
 negligence under various circum- 
 stances was left to the jury. Ames n. 
 Broadway, &c., R. Co., 56 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 3 ; Higgins v. Deeney, 78 
 Cal. 578; 8. 0. 21 Pac. Rep. 428; 
 Chrystal «. Troy, &c., R. Co., 4 N. Y. 
 Supi. 703; 8. c. 105 N. Y. 164; 11 N. 
 E. Rep. 380; Hoppe v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 357; Reilly v. Han- 
 nibal & St. J. R. Co., 94 Mo. 600; 
 8. c. 7 8. W. Rep. 407 ; Marsland v. 
 Murtay, 148 Mass. 91; s. c. 18 N. B. 
 Rep. 680; Ahem d. Steele, IN. Y. 
 Supl. 259; Hyland «. Yonkers R. Co., 
 4 N. Y. Supl. 305; Weils. Diy-Dock, 
 &c.,R.Co..ll9N.Y.147;8.c. 23N.E. 
 Rep. 487; Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 
 N. Y. 344; 8. c 10 N. E. Rep. 442; 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater, 129 111. 
 91; 8. C. 21 N. E. Rep. 575; South & 
 North Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan, 84 
 Ala. 141; s. c. 4 So. Rep. 142; Dahl 
 V. Milwaukee City Ry. Co., 65 Wis. 
 371; Parish r. Eden, 62 Wis. 272. 
 
182 
 
 NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PEESONS. 
 
 [§ 142. 
 
 But to allow a child to engage in a dangerous occupation is 
 negligence.^ 
 
 ' As -where a child, seven years old, 
 for a small compensation, served the 
 drivers and conductors of railway 
 cars with drink. Smith v. Heston- 
 ville, &c., R. Co., 92 Penn. St. 450. 
 See, alsQ, Conley v. Pittsburgh, &c., 
 R. Co., 95 Penn. St. 398; s. c. 98 
 Penn. St. 498; Gavin v. City of Chi- 
 cago, 97 111. 68; Morgan v. Bridge' 
 Co., 5 Dillon, 96; Penn. R. Co.®. 
 Bock, 93 Penn. St. 437. Parents are 
 not obliged to restrain their children 
 
 within doors at their peril. Mangan 
 7). Brooklyn, &c., R. Co., 38 N. Y. 
 455; Mullaney ®. Spence, 15 Abb. Pr. 
 (N. S.) 3J9; McGary v. Loomls, 63 
 N. T. 104; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 510; 
 Cosgrove n. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255; 
 Fallon ®. Central Park, 64 N. Y- 13: 
 Lovett v. Salem, &c., R. Co., 9 Allen, 
 557; Barksdull «. New Orleans, &c., 
 R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 180; Mimn b. 
 Reed, 4 Allen, 431. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 §143 
 
 144 
 
 145 
 
 146 
 147 
 148 
 
 149 
 150 
 
 151 
 
 153 
 
 153 
 
 154 
 
 155 
 
 156 
 157 
 158 
 
 Contributory negligence as a 
 defense to actions btouglit 
 against railway companies. 
 Duty of a public carrier to 
 passengers. 
 
 Tlie reciprocal duty of the pas- 
 senger. 
 
 Boarding moving trains. 
 Alighting from moving trains. 
 Where the passenger acts up- 
 on the advice or direction of 
 the train-men. 
 
 Standing or riding on platform. 
 Riding in baggage cars, on 
 locomotives, or in other unau- 
 thorized positions or places. 
 The passenger must comply 
 with the reasonable rules of 
 the company. 
 
 Employee's waver of the rules 
 
 not a defense. 
 
 The rule herein summarized. 
 
 Riding in exposed or unlawful 
 
 places. 
 
 Injuries at car windows and 
 
 doors. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 The rule in Wisconsin. 
 
 Notice of the danger. 
 
 159 
 160 
 
 161 
 163 
 163 
 
 164 
 
 165 
 166 
 
 167 
 168 
 
 169 
 
 170 
 
 171 
 172 
 173 
 
 174 
 
 175 
 176 
 
 The English rule. 
 
 Injuries at and about railway 
 
 stations. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 The English rule. 
 
 The rule further stated. 
 
 Where plaintiff is hit by 
 
 something thrown or dropped 
 
 from a moving train. 
 
 Injuries to free passengers. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 Newsboys, peddlers, etc. 
 
 Carrier's liability limited by 
 
 contract. ' 
 
 The English rule. 
 
 The rule of the Supreme Court 
 
 of the United States. 
 
 The New York rule. 
 
 The general American rule. 
 
 Passenger's negligence as to 
 
 177 
 
 Conditions stamped or printed 
 
 on checks. 
 
 Traveling on Sunday. 
 
 Bosworth V. Inhabitants of 
 
 Swansey — the Massachusetts 
 
 rule. 
 
 Rule in Vermont, Maine and 
 
 elsewhere. 
 
 § 143. Contribntory negligence as a defense to actions 
 brought against railway companies.-^In this chapter it is 
 proposed to consider contributory negligence as a defense in 
 actions brought against railway companies by passengers. The 
 term " passengers " will include not only regular passengers 
 for hire, but free passengers, intended passengers, and those 
 classes of persons transported which may be known as qicasi 
 passengers. By the term " strangers," per contra, the law af- 
 fecting which class of litigants is considered in the following 
 •chapter, is meant all persons who bring actions of negli- 
 
184 EAILWAY PASSENGERS. [§ 144. 
 
 gence for personal injuries against railway companies 
 and who are not, on the one hand, passengers, or on the 
 other, employees. The law of contributory negligence, 
 from one point of view, is scarcely more than a branch of 
 the law of railways. A very large proportion of the cases in 
 which the plea of contributory negligence is made in defense 
 are actions against these corporations. In addition to the 
 two classes of plaintiffs in such actions, already referred to, 
 we find employees of the railroads bringing a great number of 
 suits in which this defense is urged — and within these three 
 classes, passengers, strangers, and employees, may be included 
 all the actions a consideration of which, as concerning rail- 
 ways, is pertinent to this treatise. In the chapter next fol- 
 lowing the law affecting actions by the class denominated 
 strangers is discussed, and the authorities are collected and 
 cited, and in the chapter upon Master and Servant,' is found 
 a full discussion of the law affecting actions by railway em- 
 ployees. It therefore remains, herein, to treat of contributory 
 negligence as a defense in actions by plaintiffs who belong to 
 the first of these classes. 
 
 § 144. Duty of a public carrier to passengers- —A carrier 
 of passengers, unlike a carrier of goods at common law, is not 
 an insurer. He is not held to warrant absolutely the safety 
 of his passengers.' But while the passenger assumes all the 
 ordinary risks incident to the carriage,* it is the settled rule, 
 both here and in England, that the carrier must exercise the 
 highest possible degree of care, diligence, vigilance and skill 
 
 ' Chap. X, ir}fra, q. v. in transporting the passenger shall 
 
 ' Peters v. Rylands, 20 Penn. St. commit no wrongful act against him." 
 
 497; B. c. 59 Am. Dec. 746; Ingalls«. Taylor on Private Corporations, 
 
 Bills, 9 Mete. 1; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. §347; 3 Redfield on Railways, 5th ed., 
 
 346, and thcnote; Galena, Ac, R. Co. 316; Angell on Carriers, § 570; Story 
 
 V. Fay, 16 111. 558; 8. c. 63 Am. Dec. on Bailments, § 601 ; Thompson on 
 
 328; Carroll®. Staten Island R. Co., Carriers, 200; and see particularly, 
 
 58 N. Y. 138; 8. c. 17 Am. Rep. 228; Wheeler's Modern Law of Carriers, 
 
 Shirley's Leading Cases, 363; Wil- m Zoco, where this subject is fully and 
 
 liams' Forensic Facts and Fallacies, very satisfactorily discussed. 
 
 136. "While a carrier does not insure ' Galena, &c., R. Co. ®. Fay, 16 111. 
 
 his passengers against every conceiva-' 558; s. c. 63 Am. Dec. 333; Chicago, 
 
 ble danger, he is held absolutely to &c., R. Co., s. Hazzard, 26111. 381. 
 agree that his own servants engaged 
 
§ 144.] 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGEKS. 
 
 185 
 
 both in the selection, coDstruction and repair of his vehicles, 
 and in the conduct and management of them, in every par- 
 ticiilar, with a view to the safety of his passengers and their 
 baggage. For the slightest negligence or carelessness in 
 these respects the carrier is liable,^ and a casualty result- 
 ing in injury to a passenger raises a presumption of neg- 
 ligence against the former.^ This measure of carefulness 
 must be exercised alike toward all classes of passengers. 
 It is a duty to be discharged not only toward regular 
 passengers for hire, but also as to free passengers,^ intended 
 
 ' Dougherty v. Missouri R. Co. 
 (Mo.), 8 S. W. Rep. 900; Furnish v. 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 1044; Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. ®. 
 Thompson, 107 Ind. 442; Louisville, 
 &c., Ry. Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481; 
 Ford c. London, &c., Ry. Co., 2 
 Fost. & Fin. 730; Readhead v. Mid- 
 land Ry. Co , L. R. 2 Q. B. 412 ; s. c. 
 L. R. 4 Q. B. 379 ; Stokes v. Salton- 
 stall, 13 Peters, 181 ; Philadelphia R. 
 Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.)468. 
 When carriers undertake to convey 
 persons by the powerful and danger- 
 ous agency of steam, public policy 
 and safety require that they be held 
 to the greatest possible care and dili- 
 gence — that the personal safety of pas- 
 sengers should not be left to the sport 
 of chance, or the negligence of care- 
 less agents. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Ray, 102 U.S. 451; Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Wightman, 29 Gratt. 431; s. c. 
 26 Am. Rep. 884; Parish v. Reigle.ll 
 Gratt. 697; e. c. 62 Am. Dec. 666; 
 Taylor «. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 
 N. H. 304; B. c. 2 Am. Rep. 229; 
 Laing v. Colder, 8. Penn. St. 479; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 533; McElroy v. 
 Nashua, &c., R. Co., 4 Cush. 400. 
 In Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hand, 7 
 Kan. 380, the court holds that railway 
 companiee are required to use "the 
 utmost himian sagacity and foresight 
 in the construction of roads, to pre- 
 vent accidents to passengers." Sim- 
 mons ». New Bedford, &c., R. Co., 97 
 
 368; Keokuk Packet Co. «. 
 True, 88 111. 608; Philadelphia, &&, 
 R. Co. e; Boyer, 97 Penn. St. 91; 
 Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340; s. C. 
 30 Am. Rep. 799. 
 
 ' Carter v. Kansas City Cable Ry. 
 Co.; 42 Fed. Rep. 37; Central R. Co. 
 v. Freeman, 75 Ga. 331; Central R. 
 Co. V. Sanders, 73 Ga. 513; Louisville, 
 &c., Ry. Co. D. Snider, 117 Ind. 435; 
 s. c. 20 N. E. 384. An express aver- 
 ment that plaintiff was not guilty of 
 contributoiy negligence is not neces- 
 sary where the complaint states that 
 by reason of the negligence of the de- 
 fendant railroad company its train 
 broke through, a bridge. Bedford, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551. 
 
 = Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. v. McGown, 65 
 Tex. 640; Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. 
 9. Derby, 14 How. (U. 8.) 468; In- 
 dianapolis, &c., R. Co. V. Horst, 93 U. 
 8. 291; Steamboat New World «. 
 King, 16 How. (U. 8.) 469; Jacobus 
 V. St. Paul, &C., R. Co., 20 Minn. 125; 
 8. c. 18 Am. Rep. 360. Even if the 
 party injured was a trespasser on the 
 car, his right of action is not neces- 
 sarily thereby defeated. Brennan v. 
 Fair Haven, &c., R. Co., 45 Conn. 284; 
 8. c. 29 Am. Rep. 679; Waterbury u 
 New York, &c., R. Co.. 21 Blatchf. 
 314; Todd v. Old Colony, &c., R. Co., 
 3 Allen, 18; Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 
 Mo. 340;' fi. c. 30 Am. Rep. 799. 
 Cf. Kinney v. Central R. Co., 34 N. 
 J. Law, 513; 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 265; 
 
18o 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 [§ 145. 
 
 passengers,' and that class which may be known as qtuisi 
 passengers.* 
 
 § 145. The reciprocal duty of the passenger.— This duty 
 on the part of the carrier is qualified by the reciprocal duty 
 
 Austin V. Great Western, «&c., Ey. Co., 
 li. R. a Q. B. 442; Angell on Carriere, 
 §^ 528. But the rale is otherwise in 
 the case of baggage carried gratuitous- 
 ly. Here the railway company is held 
 to no greater diligence than any other 
 gratuitous bailee, one of the reasons 
 being that the element of public policy 
 is now no longer present. Flint, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Weir, 37 Mich. Ill; s. c. 26 
 Am. Rep 499. 
 
 ' Bartletts. New iTork, &c.. Transp. 
 Co.. 57 N. Y. Super. Ct. 348; Shep- 
 hard v. Midland Ry. Co., 20 W. R. 
 705; LoBgmore v. Great Western, Ry. 
 Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 183; 8. c. 115 
 Eng. Com. L. 183; Burgess «. Great 
 Western Ry. Co., 6 C. B. (N. S.) 923; 
 8. 0. 95 Eng. Coni. L. 923; Carpenter 
 D. Boston, &c., R. Co., 97 N. Y. 494; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 540; Weston v. Ele- 
 vated Ry. Co., 73 N. Y. 595; McDon- 
 ald V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 26 Iowa, 
 124, by Dillon, C. J.; Caswell v. Bos- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 194; Snow 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 136 Mass. 
 552; B. c. 49 Am. Rep. 40. Cf. 
 "Wheelwright «. Boston, &c , R. Co., 
 135 Mass. 225. And see Gardner 
 V. N. H., &c., Co., 51 Conn. 143; 
 B. 0. 50 Am. Rep. 13, where two 
 persons were accompanying stock, 
 and one of them, intending to pay his 
 fare, but having had no time to buy a 
 ticket, was injured by the negligence 
 of the company before he was called 
 upon for his fare. It was held that 
 there was no contract relation to pro- 
 tect him and therefore no liability on 
 the part of the company. 
 
 " B. g. Employees of express com- 
 panies riding on railway trsiins in the 
 line of their duty. Lyon ■». Union 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. Ill; Ken- 
 
 tucky Central R Co. «. Thomas, 79 
 Ky. 160; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 208; Blair 
 V. Brie Ry. Co., 66 N. Y. 313; s. c. 23 
 Am. Rep, 55; Yeomans «. Contra 
 Costa, (fee, Co.. 44 Cal. 71. Mail 
 agents riding in postal cars. See, also. 
 Rev. Stat, of U. 8. §§ 3997-4005. 
 Seybolt v. New York, &c., R. Co., 95 
 N. Y. 562; 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 75; 
 Houston, &c., R. Co, n. Hampton, 64 
 Tex 427; Hammond v. Northeastern 
 R. Co., 6 8. C. 130; b. c. 34 Am. 
 Rep. 467. See, for a contrary view, 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. *. Price, 96 Penn. 
 St. 256, Which turned, however, most- 
 ly on the requirements of a statute. 
 Persons traveling on "drovers' 
 passes." Carroll v. Union Pac. Ry. 
 Co., 88 Mo. 239; Lockwood « New 
 York &c., R. Co.. 17 Wall. 357; 8. c. 
 10 Am. Rep. 366; Martin « Baltimore, 
 &c., R. Co., 14 West Va. 180; s. c.35 
 Am. Rep. 748; Little Rock, &c., R. 
 Co. ®. Miles, 40 Ark. 298; b. c. 48 Am. 
 Rep. 10; Ohioy &c., R. Co. «. Selby, 
 47 Ind. 471; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 719; 
 Pehn. R. Co. ■». Henderson, 51 Penn. 
 St. 315. Contra, Poucher v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 263; s. c. 
 10 Am. Rep. 364, where one traveling 
 under, a drover's pass was not allowed 
 to recover, he having made a contract 
 with the defendant company to exon- 
 erate it from all liability. Gallin «. 
 London, &c.. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 
 213. See, also, Commonwealth ». 
 Vermont, '&c, B. Co., 108 Mass. 7; 
 8. 0. 11 Am. Rep, 301, and McCorkle 
 «. Chicago, &c , R. Co., 61 Iowa, 555. 
 For a consideration of the question 
 how far a common carrier of passen- 
 gers may limit his common law liabil- 
 ity by contract, see infra, § 168 ei teq: 
 
§ 146.J RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 187 
 
 which is imposed upon the passenger. While the carrier 
 must exercise extraordinary, or great care and diligence in 
 taking care of his passenger, the passenger must, on his part, 
 exercise ordinary care and prudence in taking care of him- 
 self.^ If the passenger's failure to exercise ordinary care 
 causes or contributes to the injury, such a failure is, upon 
 familiar grounds, a bar to his action against the carrier. In 
 the succeeding sections, the contributory negligence of a 
 passenger, as affecting his right to recover damages from a 
 railway company by whose negligence he has suffered, is 
 considered in detail. The duty of a passenger in his dealings 
 with a public carrier to exercise ordinary care, as, under all 
 circumstances, and in dealing with every other person, there 
 is imposed upon all men a duty to exercise ordinary care, 
 being assumed, we may take up in order various acts and 
 omissions on the part of a passenger held to be negligent, to 
 the extent of preventing a recovery when an action is brought 
 by a passenger against a railway company, for personal in- 
 juries sustained through the company's negligent default. 
 
 § 146. Boarding moving trains. — It is not contributory 
 negligence, as matter of law, to attempt to get on to a mov- 
 ing train.^ The circumstances may be such as to render it 
 entirely safe and prudent, and whether or not there was con- 
 tributory negligence in the attempt is generally a question 
 for the jury upon a view of all the facts.' In a majority 
 
 ' Thompson on Carriers, 357; Pat- Pennsylvania, &c., R. Co., 98 Ind. 
 
 terson's Ry. Accident Law, p. 46 et. 384; s. e. 49 Am. Rep. 764; Texas, 
 
 leg.; JefEersonvOle, &c., R. Co. v. &c., R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 356; 
 
 Hendricks, 36 Ind. 238; Price ®. 8t. s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 373. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 73 Mo. 414. ' Jamison v. San Jose, &c., R. Co., 
 
 ■ » Baltimore & O. R. Co. ». Kane, 55 Cal. 593; Johnson «. West Chester, 
 
 69 Md. 11; B. c. 13 Atl. Rep. 387; &c.. R. Co., 70 Penn. St. 357; Illi- 
 Johnson v. Westchester, &c., R. Co., nois, &c., R. Co. v. Abel, 59 111. 131. 
 
 70 Penn. St. 357; Swigert v. Hanni- Where a boy 15 years old was injured 
 bal, &c., R. Co. , 75 Mo. 475. The in an attempt to board a train moving 
 court may not declare an act to be at'the rate of from 12 to 15 miles an 
 negligent, unless the act be such that hour, which he would not have tried 
 all reasonable men would draw an in- to do but for the invitation of the 
 ference of negligence from it. If the brakeman, a verdict against the com- 
 inferences are doubtful, as they well pany was not disturbed. Western, 
 might be in this case, the question is &c., R. Co. v. Wilson, 71 6a. 22; 
 one of fact for the jury. Stoncr v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Texas, &c.. 
 
188 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 [§U7. 
 
 of instances, however, where the character of such an act 
 has been an issue, it has been held contributory negligence.^ 
 And'-in Massachusetts it is held, as matter of law, that such 
 an attempt is prima facie contributory negligence.' The 
 weight of authority is to the effect that while an attempt to 
 board a moving train of cars is not per se negligent, it is, 
 nevertheless, presumptively negligent, and in a majority of 
 cases actually negligent to the extent of preventing a recov- 
 ery from the railway company.. In Texas, &c., B. Co. v. 
 Murphy,* a charge by the lower court that an attempt to 
 board a train moving rapidly would be negligent, while 
 such an attempt, if the train were moving slowly, would not 
 be negligent, was held error on appeal. 
 
 § 147. Alighting from moving trains. — As in the case of 
 boarding a railway train in motion, so it is held not contribu- 
 tory negligence per seiar a passenger to jump off a train 
 which is moving.* Whether or not a railway company shall 
 
 Ry. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 92; Wairen v. 
 Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 37 Kan. 408; 
 s. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 601; Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Pickleselmer, 85 Va. 
 798; s. c. 10 S. E. 44; Kansas. &c., R. 
 Co. V. Dorough, 73 Tex. 108; s. c. 10 
 S. W. Rep. 711 ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Texas, &c., R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 
 879; Weeks v. New Orleans. &c., R. 
 Co , 40 La. Ann. 800; s. c. 5 So. Rep. 
 73; Denver, &c., R. Co. «. Pickard; 
 8 Colo. 168. An aged man. on a dark 
 and cold night, made such a desper- 
 ate attempt to board a train in motion 
 that, upon missing his footing, he 
 was dragged 150 yards without relin- 
 quishing his valise . He was not al- 
 lO'v^ed to recover, though the train 
 had not stopped at the station a rea- 
 sonable time. McMurlray ». Louis- 
 ville, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Miss. 601; s. c. 
 7 So. Rep. 401 ; Patterson's Ry. Ac- 
 cident Law, p. 264. 
 
 ' Phillips V. Rennselaer, &c., R. 
 Co., 49 N. T. 177; Knight v. Pont- 
 chartrain R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 462; 
 
 Harper v. Erie R. Co., 33 N. J. Law, 
 88. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Scates, 
 90 111. 586, citing Ohio, &c., R. Co. a. 
 Stratton, 78 111. 88, where it was held 
 that a passenger had no right to get 
 off a train in motion, and, however 
 disastrous the consequences, he must 
 bear them. The court held the same 
 rule to apply to passengers boarding 
 moving trains. Vicksburg, &c., R. 
 Co. ®. Hart, 61 Miss. 468. 
 
 " Harvey v. Eastern. &c., R. Co., 
 116 Mass. 269. In N. Y.. &c.. R. Co. 
 V Euches, 127 Penn. St. 316; s. c. 17 
 Atl. Rep. 991, it was held an absolute 
 bar to recovery for a person to at- 
 tempt to board a train at a station 
 after it began to move. 
 
 ' 46 Tex. 356; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 
 272. 
 
 * Louisville, &c., R. Co. ■». Crunk, 
 119 Ind. 542; B. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 31; 
 Little Rock, &c., Ry. Co. v. Atkins, 
 46 Ark. 423; Galveston, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 59 Tex. 406; Loyd v. Hanni- 
 bal, &c., R, Co., 53 Mo. 509; Penn. B. 
 
§ 147.] 
 
 KAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 189 
 
 be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by a passen- 
 ger in attempting to leave one of its trains while in motion, 
 will depend upon whether, under all the circumstances, it was 
 prudent for him to make the attempt.' In many cases such 
 an act has been held sufficient to prevent a recovery. " Lo- 
 comotives are not the only things that may go oflf too fast ; 
 and railroad accidents are not always produced by the mis- 
 conduct of agents. A large proportion of them is caused by 
 the recklessness of passengers," said Bla-ck, C. J., in a leading 
 case,* in which it is held that a passenger who jumps from a 
 running train to avoid being carried beyond his destination 
 cannot recover for injuries thereby suffered. This is the 
 doctrine of many other cases.' 
 
 Co. v. KUgore, 33 Penn. St. 292; 
 Bropks V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 135 
 Mass. 21. 
 
 • Leslie v. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 
 88 Mo. 50; Taylor v. Missouri, Pao. Ry. 
 Co., 26 Mo. App. 336; Pennsylvania 
 Ry. Co. V. Peters, 16 Penn. St. 206; 
 s. c. 9 Atl. Rep. 317; Covington v. Wes- 
 tern. &c., R. Co., 81 Ga. 373 ; s. c. 6 S. 
 E. Rep. 593 ; Raben v. Central Iowa Ry. 
 Co., 74 Iowa, 732; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 621; Central R. & B. Co., v. Miles, 88 
 Ala. 256; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 696; Jackson 
 V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 29 Mo. App. 
 495; St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. ®. White, 
 48 Ark. 495; b. c. 4 8. W. Rep. 53; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 
 Penn. St. 113; s. C. 18 Atl. Rep. 759. 
 When a person is injured in alighting 
 from a moving train, any negligence 
 on his part which contributes to the 
 injury must, of necessity, contribute 
 proximately. Craven «. Cent. Pac-. R. 
 Co., 72 Cal. 345; Price v. St. Louis, 
 &c , R. Co., 72 Mo. 414; Doss v. Mis- 
 souri, &c., R. Co., 59 Mo. 37; s. c. 21 
 Am. Rep. 371; Kelly v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R. Co., 70 Mo. 604; Karle v. Kansas, 
 (fee., R. Co., 55 Mo. 476. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania, R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 
 Penn. St, 147; s. c. 62 Am. Dec. 323. 
 
 ' Reibel v. Cincinnati, &c., Ry. Co., 
 114 Ind. 476; s. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 1,07; 
 
 Watson «. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 81 
 Ga. 476; s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 854; St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co. ■B. Rosenberry 
 (Ark.), 11 S. W. Rep. 312; Walker v. 
 Vicksburg, &c., R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 
 795; 8. c. 6 So. Rep, 916. Where the 
 declaration showed that plaintiff, an 
 experienced train hand, jumped off at 
 a crossing from a train running 
 unlawfully at 25 miles an hour, a 
 general demurrer was sustained. Jar- 
 ret D. Atlanta, &c., R. Co., 83 Ga. 
 347; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 681; Whelan 
 V. Georgia, &c., R. Co., 84 Ga. 506; 
 8. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 1091; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., V. Bills, 118 Ind 321; b. c.30 
 N. E. Rep. 775; Damont v. New Or- 
 leans, &c., R. Co., 9 La. Ann. 441; 
 s. c. 61 Am. Dec. 214; Jewell v. Chica- 
 go, &c , R. Co., 54 Wis. 610; B. c. 41 
 Am. Rep. 63; Richmond, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Morris, 31 Gratt. 200; Cumberland, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Mangans, 61 Md. 53; 
 Central R. Co. v. Letcher, 69 Ala. 106; 
 B. c. 44 Am. Rep. 505. Here plaintiff 
 having boarded a train for a lawful 
 purpose, was detained thereon until 
 after the train had started on its jour- 
 ney. Without giving notice to any 
 of the emyloyees, he jumped off, and 
 was injured. Held, that no recovery 
 could be had, though the defendant 
 was negligent in not giving the signals 
 
190 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 [§ 148. 
 
 § 14S. Where the passenger acts upon the advice or direc- 
 tion of the train men. — But where the passenger, acting 
 under the advice or directions of the company's employees. 
 Jumps from a train in motion the case is different. When 
 he jumps, in spite of the remonstrances and protests of the 
 train-men,^ it is negligence of an aggravated nature which, 
 as of course, will prevent a recovery* When, however, the 
 passenger, under the encouragement or instruction of the 
 company's servants, makes the leap, and suffers an injury 
 therefrom, such an act on the part of the passenger is not 
 generally held contributory negligence.* But when the pas- 
 senger leaves the train voluntarily, even though at the sug- 
 gestion of the conductor or other train-men, while the train 
 
 required by statute, before and at the 
 time the train left the station. South, 
 &c., K. Co. «. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252; 
 B. c. 67 Ga. 306; JefEersonville, &c., R. 
 Co. n. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; Lucas 
 «. New Bedford, &c., R. Co., 6 Gray, 
 64. Where the facts are undisputed, 
 and where the plaintiff's complete ab- 
 sence of care in alighting from a train 
 in motion is imquestionably patent, 
 the question of contributory negli- 
 gence need not be given to the jury. 
 Morrison ®. Erie Ry. Co., 50 N. Y. 302; 
 Burrows «. Erie Ry. Co., 63 N. Y. 556; 
 Doughertys. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 86 
 m. 467; Lambeth t. North, &c., R. 
 Co., 66 N. C. 494; Lake Shore, &c., R. 
 Co. B. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470 ; Mitchell v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 51 Mich. 236; 
 B. c. 47 Am. !Rep. 566; Houston, &c., 
 R. Co. r>. Leslie, 57 Tex. 83. Cf. Hli- 
 nois, &c., R. Co. v. Green, 81 111. 19; 
 B. c. 25 Am. Rep. 255, and Common- 
 wealth e. Boston, &c., R. Co., 129 
 Mass. 500; b. c. 37 Am. Rep. 382. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R. Co. d. Aspell, 23 
 Penn. St. 147; b. c. 62 Am. Dec. 823; 
 Jewell 9. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 54 
 Wis. 610; B. c. 41 Am. Rep. 63. 
 
 " A brakemans remark, "Come 
 on, hurry up ! " is admiBsible as part 
 of the res getiai, and tending to rebut 
 contributory negligence. Waller c. 
 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 83 Mo. 608. 
 But such a remark, though repeated 
 several times by a cpnductor, will not 
 sustain an averment that plaintiff was 
 "compelled and forced" to alight. 
 South & North Ala. R. Co v. Schau- 
 fler, 75 Ala. 136; Bucher ». New 
 York, &c., R. Co.. 98 N. Y. 128^ 
 Central, &c., R. Co. «. Smith, 69 Ga. 
 268; St. Louis, &c.. R. Co. «. Can- 
 trell, 37 Ark. 519; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 
 105; Filer v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 49 N. Y. 47; a. c. 10 Am. Rep. 327. 
 A passenger on a railroad train has a 
 right to expect that the carrier had 
 employed a skilful and prudent con- 
 ductor who has experience in his bu- 
 siness sufficient to correctly advise 
 and direct him as to the proper time 
 and manner of alighting from the 
 train. When, therefore, the motion of 
 the train is so slow that the danger of 
 jumping off would not be apparent to 
 a reasonable person, and a passenger, 
 under the instruction of the conduc- 
 tor, alights, the defense of contribu- 
 tory negligence would be unavailing. 
 Lambeth v. North Carolina, &c., R. 
 Co., 66 N. C. 494; b. c. 8 Am. Rep. 
 508; Georgia. &&, R. Co. «. McCurdy, 
 45 Ga. 288; b. c. 12 Am. Rep. 577. 
 Of. Delamatyr v. Milwaukee, &c., R. 
 Co., 24 Wis. 578. 
 
§ 149.] 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 191 
 
 is in motion, it is a question for the jury whether he acted 
 as a prudent man under the circumstances.^ In Iowa it is a 
 misdemeanor for a passenger to jump from a car in motion 
 without the consent of the person in charge of the train, 
 which operates to prevent recovery in the absence of proof 
 of such consent.* It is not, as has already been shown,' 
 an act of negligence on the part of a passenger to leap from 
 a train in motion under apprehension of impending peril, 
 and with a reasonable belief that by so doing he is to escape 
 injury.* 
 
 § 149. Standing or riding on platforms.— It is not negli- 
 gent per se for a passenger to ride upon the platform of a 
 railway car ; ° nor is it negl^ence to stand upon the platform 
 of cars in motion when there are no vacant seats inside the 
 car ; ' but, as a general rule, voluntarily and unnecessarily to 
 
 ' The act may be so manifestly neg- 
 ligent as to bar recovery as matter of 
 law, despite the conductor's advice. 
 South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Schauf - 
 ler, 75 Ala. 136; Penn. R. Co. ?■. Ly- 
 ons, 129 Penn. St. 113; s. c. 18 Atl. 
 Rep. 759; Patterson's Ry. Accident 
 Law, p. 288; Chicago, &c., R. Co. d. 
 Randolph, 53 111. 51(h B.C .5 Am. Rep. 
 60; Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. d. Peters, 
 80 Ind. 168; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Dean, 92 Ind. 459; Renton v. Chicago, 
 &c., R\ Co., 55 Iowa, 496; South- 
 western, &c., R Co. o. Singleton, 66 
 Ga. 252; B. c. 67 Ga. 306. See, also. 
 Galena, &c., R. Co. u. Pay, 16 111. 
 558; 8. c. 63 Am. Dec. 323; Houston, 
 &c, R Co. V. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 573; 
 Atchison, &c., R. Co. e. Flinn, 24 
 Kan. 627; a case of children who 
 had boarded a train without money 
 to pay their fare, and who, being 
 quasi trespassers, were ordered to 
 leave the train by the conductor, 
 and did so while the train was in mo- 
 tion, which action on their part, in 
 view of their being on board without 
 right, was held contributory negli- 
 gence, in an action against the rail- 
 
 way for damages sustained by them 
 in leaving the train. See, also, Hig- 
 ley c. Gilmer, 3 Montana, 90; b. c. 35 
 Am. Rep. 450. 
 
 ^ Raben v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 
 74 Iowa, 732; s. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 
 621; Acts 16th Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 
 148, § 2. 
 
 • § 40, supra. 
 
 • Wilson D. Korthern Pacific R. 
 Co., 26 Minn. 278; s. c. 37 Am. 
 Rep. 410; Buel o. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314. Such con- 
 
 . duct is but that of a man of ordinary 
 care and prudence under the circum- 
 stances. Iron Ry. Co. ■». Mowery, 
 36 Ohio St. 418; b. c. 38 Am. Rep. 
 597; Frink r>. Potter, 17 111. 406; 
 iUistman «. Sanborn, 3 AUen, 596; 
 Stokes «. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; 
 Jones «. Boyce, 1 Stark, 493; Ingalls 
 •0. Bills, 9 Mete. 1; b. c. 43 Am. Dec. 
 346; Patterson's Ry. Accident Law, 
 pp. i4, 62. 
 
 ' Zemp V. Wilmington, &c, R. Co., 
 9 Rich. (Law) 84; Dickinson v. Port 
 Huron, &c., Ry. Co., 53 Mich. 43. 
 
 • Werle -o. Long Island R. Co., 98 
 N. Y. 650; Dewire %>. Boston, &c., R. 
 
192 
 
 RAILWAY PA8SENGEB8. 
 
 [§ 149. 
 
 stand or ride upon the platform is such negligence as will 
 prevent a recovery for injuries received while there.' If 
 there is even standing room within the car it is negligent to 
 occupy the platform. This is the rule in Pennsylvania' and 
 in Illinois,^ and it is commended by Dr. "Wharton.* And so 
 when one passes on the platform from car to car on a train 
 in motion, with the sanction of the conductor, on a proper 
 errand, it is not an act of contributory negligence.' A 
 passenger who passes into another car which he was in- 
 
 Co., 148 Mass. 343; s.c. 19N.E. Kep. 
 523. Compare with the foregoing 
 case Snowden «. Boston, &c., B. Co., 
 151 Mass. 220; s. c. 24 N. E. Kep. 
 40; Willis «. Long Island R. Co., 34 
 K. T. 670. But see Graville v. Man- 
 hattan R. Co., 105 N. T. 525. 
 
 • Memphis, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Salinger, 
 46 Ark 528; State v. Maine Cent. R. 
 Co., 81 Me. 84; s. c. 16 Atl. Rep. 368; 
 Malcom v. Richmond, &c., B. Co., 
 106 N. C. 63; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 
 187; Smotherman v. St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 29 Mo App. 365; Louisville, 
 •fee, B. Co. v. Bisch, 120 Ind. 549; 
 s. c. 33 N. E. Rep. 662; Camden, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Hoosey, 99 Penn. St. 493; 
 B. c. 44 Am. Rep. 120 ; Hickey «. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 14 Allen, 439; 
 McAunich v. Mississippi, &c., R. Co., 
 20 Iowa, 338 ; Higgins v. Harlem, &c., 
 R. Co., 3 Bosw (N. y.) 131. Quinn 
 V. nUnois, &c , R. Co., 51 111. 495, 
 holding that where a passenger volun- 
 tarily places himseU on the platform, 
 with abundant standing room in the 
 cars, and falls to the ground, not in 
 consequence of a collision, or a broken 
 rail, or other fault of the company, 
 but in the endeavor to reach after 
 money that the wind has blown away, 
 the negligence of the passenger is far 
 greater than that of the company. 
 Buel V. New York, &c., R. Co., 31 
 N. T. 314; Alabama, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hawk, 73 Ala. 113 ; Cannon v. Rail- 
 way, 6 Ir. L. R. 199. 
 
 'Camden, &c., R. Co. b. Hoosey, 
 
 99 Penn. St. 493; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 
 120. 
 
 » Quinn v. Illinois, &c., R. Qc, 51 
 111. 495. In Willis v. Long Island R. 
 Co., 34 N. Y. 670, it was held that 
 one might safely stand on the platform 
 if there were no seats inside the car 
 unoccupied; but in Graville «. Man- 
 hattan R. Co., 105 N. Y. 535, the 
 court said:— "The fact that there 
 were no unoccupied seats in the car 
 did not, we think, change the duty of 
 the plaintiff to go inside [by direction 
 of the trainman]. If he had any well- 
 founded ground of complaint against 
 the company, for not providing ad- 
 equate accommodations for passen- 
 gers, this did not, we think, relieve 
 him from the duty of leaving the 
 platform and going inside the car, 
 although there was standing room 
 only." 
 
 * Wharton on Negligence, § 367. 
 
 ° Cotchett V. Savannah, &c., Ry. Co., 
 84 Ga. 687; b. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 553, 
 where the passenger started into an- 
 other car to get water ^ ithout express 
 permission. Mclntyre v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Barb. 533; affirmed 
 37 N. Y. 387; Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Kelly, 93 Ind. 371; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 149, where the passenger was di- 
 rected by the conductor to a forward 
 car to get a seat. Cf. Galena, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Yarwood, 15 111. 468; Ga- 
 lena, Ac, R. Co. V. Fay, 16 111. 558; 
 8. c. 63 Am. Dec. 323. 
 
§ 150.] RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 193 
 
 formed by an employee would be attached to the train is 
 justified in assuming that it is coupled so as to make a safe 
 passage.^ 
 
 § 150. Biding in baggage cars, on locomotives, or in other 
 nnanthorized positions or places. — It is contributory negli- 
 gence on the part of a passenger to ride in a baggage car, 
 contrary to the rules of the company.' The contract of car- 
 riage must be understood to be a contract to carry the pas- 
 sengers in a passenger car Qiud the baggage in the baggage 
 car. The passenger car is the place the company provides 
 for the passenger. It is his duty to occupy that car, and to 
 keep out of the other cars of the train. A failure to do this 
 is negligence.* It is sometimes said that riding in a baggage 
 car is such negligence as will prevent a recovery from the 
 railway company only when it appears that the passenger 
 would have escaped injury had he been in the passenger car. 
 In such a rule as this the theory is that when being in the 
 baggage car is a proximate cause of the injury, it will pre- 
 vent a recovery, but when it is not such a cause, that the ac- 
 tion will lie. Something may be said in favor of this rule.* 
 But, on the other hand, it may be urged that a passenger 
 
 ' Hannibal, &c., R. Co. v. Martin, Rep. 208. Tlie argument of C J. 
 
 Ill DL 319. Gofer is certainly very forcible. In 
 
 ' Many recent decisions on the sub- the course of his opinion he pointedly 
 
 ject of the contributory negligence of says: — " If a whole train be precipi- 
 
 passengers riding in dangerous places tated down an embankment, and a 
 
 on trains are collected ip 39 Am. & passenger seated in the express car is 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 409, note. drowned, his representative will have 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R. Co. b. Langdon, the same right to recover as the rep- 
 
 92Penn. St. SI; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. resentative of a passenger seated in a 
 
 651; Kentucky Central B. Co. v. passenger coach. There could be no 
 
 Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; s. c. 43 Am. pretense for saying that, because the 
 
 Rep. 208; Houston, &c., R. Co. «. passenger in the express car was more 
 
 Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88; a. c. 40 Am. exposed to danger in case of a collision 
 
 Rep. 799. than he would have been l^ad he been 
 
 * Jones V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 43 seated in a passenger coach, that he 
 
 Minn. 279; 8. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 444; ought not to recover, when it is clear 
 
 Webster d. Rome, &c., R. Co., 116 N. that, as respects the misfortune which 
 
 T. 112; B. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 725. In actually occurred, his danger was not 
 
 the latter case the passenger probably at aH increased by the fact that he 
 
 escaped death by being in the baggage was in the express car." Houston, 
 
 car. Kentucky Central R. Co. v. &c., R. Co. «. Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88; 
 
 Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; s. c. 42 Am. s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 799. 
 13 
 
194 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. [§ 151, 
 
 voluntarily in a baggage oar, when he might just as conven- 
 iently be in the car provided for his transportion, is a gtiad 
 trespasser. He plainly has no business in that car, and to- 
 ward trespassers a carrier is not bound to exercise that high 
 degree of care and circumspection due to his regular passen- 
 ^gers.i 
 
 § 151. The passenger mnst comply with the reasonable- 
 rales of the company. — If the passenger would hold the car- 
 rier to the full measure of his responsibility for safe car- 
 riage, he must conform to all the reasonable rules the carrier 
 makes, looking to the passenger's safety and convenience, and 
 if he viplates such rules and regulations by riding where he 
 has no right to ride, it is no very harsh rule that requires, 
 him to do it at his proper peril. When the conductor or 
 traip-men consent, or encourage the passenger to ride in the 
 baggage car, and especially, when they direct him so to do, 
 it is held that then the passenger is not guilty of negligence 
 of such a kind as to prevent his recovery if he sustains inju- 
 ries while riding there.* But it is difficult to see what sound 
 basis such a qualification as this can have. " If the passen- 
 ger," said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, " thus reck- 
 lessly exposing his life to possible accidents " [referring to a 
 passenger injured while riding in a baggage car with the 
 consent of the conductor], " were a sane man, more especially 
 if he were a railroad man, it is difficult to see how the knowl- 
 edge, or even the assent of the conductor to his occupying 
 
 ' Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Montana, 90 ; Dunn v. Gihid Trunk Ry. Co., 58 
 
 s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 450. And see, also. Me. 187; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 367; 10 
 
 Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. Flinn, 34 Am. Law Reg (N. S.) 615; Edgerton 
 
 Kan. 637. ■ V. New York, &c., R. Co., 39 N. 
 
 ^ Jones e. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., Y. 337, where damage for injuries 
 43 Minn. 379; e. c. 45 N. "W. Rep. were recovered by a passenger who 
 444; Webster s. Rome, &c., R. Co., was allowed to ride in caboose car. 
 40 Hun (N. Y.) 161; Baltimore, &c., Pool ®. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 53 Wis. 
 R. Co, «. State, 18 Atl. Rep. 1107, in 657; Rucker v. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 
 which a postal clerk was not guilty of 61 Tex. 499; Washburn v. Nashville 
 negligence, per ae, in riding in the R. Co., 3 Head, 638; Keith v. Pink- 
 postal car while returning home from ham, 13 Me. 501; Watson v. Northern, 
 duty. Carroll v. New York, &c., R. &c., R. Co., 34 tTpper Can. Q. B. 98; 
 Co., 1 Duer, 571 ; O'Donnell «. Alle- Jacobus v, St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 30 
 gheny, &c., R. Co., 50 Penn.^t. 490; Minn. 135; b. c. 18 Am. Rep. 360. 
 B. c. 59 Penn. St. 339. See, also. 
 
§ 152.] BAILWAY PASSENGEKS. 19£L 
 
 such a position could affect the case. There can be no license 
 to commit suicide. It is true the conductor has the control 
 of the train, and may assign passengers their seats ; but he 
 may not assign a passenger to a seat on the cow-catcher, a 
 position on the platform, or in the baggage car. This is 
 known to every intelligent man, and appears upon the face 
 of the rule itself " [the printed rules of the company posted 
 in the baggage cars]. " He is expressly required to enforce 
 it, and to prohibit any of the acts referred to, unless it be 
 riding upon the cow-catcher, which is so manifestly dangerous 
 and improper that it has not been deemed necessary to pro- 
 hibit it. We are unable to see how a conductor, in violation 
 of a known rule of the company, can license a man to occu- 
 py a place of danger so as to make the company responsi- 
 ble." ^ 
 
 § 152. Employee's waiver of the rules no defense.— This 
 
 is sound reasoning. How can an employee authorize a pas- 
 senger to violate, not only the express rules of the company,, 
 but also the rules that every prudent man establishes for 
 • himself for his own protection, to the extent of rendering the 
 company liable when injury results from the violation of 
 these regulations ? Upon what principle of justice or equity 
 can a passenger, who voluntarily leaves his proper place in 
 the passenger car, in violation of the rules of the company, 
 to ride in the baggage car, or other place of known danger, 
 though he have never so much the consent of one of the em- 
 ployees of the company, and who is injured while riding in 
 that exposed and unlawful position, call upon the carrier for 
 damages for such an injury ? The baggage cars are known, 
 places of especial danger. In this respect they differ from 
 the cow-catcher and the platforms only in degree. They are 
 placed ahead of the passenger cars and next to or near the 
 locomotive, the passenger cars being placed last in order in 
 making up the train, for the express purpose of affording the 
 passengers the utmost safety. An infant or an imbecile 
 might be excused for riding in baggage cars, by reason of 
 their conspicuous lack of mental capacity, but persons of 
 average intelligence may reasonably be presumed to know 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R- Co. v. Langdon, 92 Penn. St. 21; 8. o. 37 Am. Rep. 651. 
 
196 / RAILWAY PASSENGERS. [§ 154. 
 
 the danger of such a course, and held to assume the risks in- 
 volved. The better rule is, that riding in such exposed and 
 unauthorized positions is negligence, and that a passenger 
 who suffers an injury while so exposing himself, whether by 
 the consent of the train-men or not, and whether the injury 
 would have been sustained or not, had the passenger re- 
 mained in his proper place, can have; no action against the 
 carrier for damages so occasioned. The passenger forfeits 
 his right to recover when he violates the rules of the com- 
 pany or fails to avail himself to the full extent of all the pro- 
 tection the carrier provides for him. He may not refuse to 
 be protected and then claim damages. 
 
 § 163. The rule herein summarized.— After reviewing the 
 decided cases upon this subject, Paxson, J., of Peimsyl- 
 vania, in the opinion from which I have already quoted, as 
 the conclusion of the whole matter, said : — " I am not aware 
 that it has been decided, in any w6ll considered case, that a 
 passenger may, as a matter of right, ride in the baggage car at 
 the risk of the company. In a few cases it has been held that 
 the assent of the conductor is sufficient to charge the latter 
 with the consequences of such act; that it amounts to a 
 waiver of the rule forbidding passengers to ride in the bag- 
 gage car. But how can a conductor waive a rule which, by 
 its very terms, he ia commanded to enforce ? He may neglect 
 to enforce it, and, when the rule is a mere police arrangement 
 of the company, such neglect may, perhaps, amount to a 
 waiver, as between the passenger and the company. But 
 when the rule is for the protection of human life, the case is 
 very different. We are not disposed to encourage conduc- 
 tors, or other railroad oflacials, in violating reasonable rules 
 which are essential to the protection of the traveling public. 
 If it is once understood that a man who rides in a baggage 
 car, in violation of the rules, does so at his own risk, we shall 
 have fewer accidents of this description."* 
 
 § 154. Biding in exposed or unlawful places.— This 
 reasoning applies with equal cogency to the case of pas- 
 sengers riding in any other exposed or unlawful position 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon,'92 Penn. St. 81; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 651. 
 
§ 154.] 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 197 
 
 upon a railway train, and with the greater force in propor- 
 tion as the risk increases. If it is negligent to ride in bag- 
 gage cars, it is all the more negligent to ride upon locomo- 
 tives, even with the consent of the train-men,* or upon freight 
 trains in violation of the company's rule," or upon hand-cars,' 
 or upon the tops of freight cars,* or sitting in a loose chair 
 
 ■ Virginia, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Roach, 
 83 Va. 375; s. c. 5 S. E. Rep. 175; 
 Stringer v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 96 
 Mo. 299; s. c. 9 S. W. Rep. 905; Filer 
 V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 149 Mass. 30^ 
 s. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 311; Robertson v. 
 Erie Ry. Co., 23 Barb. 91; Waterbury 
 V. New York, &c., R. Co., 31 Blatchf. 
 814; Austins. Greatwestem, &c.,Ry. 
 Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 442. Ciwto-aRucker 
 B. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 61 Tex. 
 499, which was the case of a negro 
 boy, a passenger on the defendant's 
 traia, who, doing as he was told to do 
 by the person in charge of the train, 
 rode upon the pilot of the engine, and 
 while there was injured. His con- 
 duct, under the circumstances, was 
 held not to have been negligent. This 
 was a hard case, and the conclusion 
 reached is an illustration of the truth 
 of the proverb among lawyers, that 
 hard cases make bad law. The negro 
 did as he was told, as negroes iu Texas 
 are expected to do, and he got hurt, 
 without having been personally much 
 at fault. The authority of this case 
 should not, accordingly, count against 
 the rule. Cf. MUes v. Atlantic. &c.. R. 
 Co., 4 Hughes, 172, and Carter v. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 98 Ind. 552; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 780. 
 
 "Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. V. CampbeU, 76 
 Tex. 174; s. c. 13 8. W. Rep. 19; 
 Houston, &c., R. Co. ■». Moore, 49 Tex. 
 31; s. C. 30 Am. Rep. 98; Sherman v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co.. 72 Mo. 62; 
 B. c. 37 Am. Rep. 423; Eaton d. Dela- 
 ware, &c., R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382; s. c. 
 15 Am. Rep. 513, where the plaintiff 
 * was invited by the conductor of a coal 
 train upon defendant's road to ride 
 
 upon the train with a promise to get 
 him employment as a brakeman. 
 Being injured through the negligence 
 of the train-hands, he brought action, 
 biit was not allowed to recover. The 
 action of the conductor was held be- 
 yond the scope of his authority. ' ' The 
 presumption," the court says, "is that 
 a person on a freight train is not, 
 legally, a passenger ; and it lies with 
 him who claims to be one to take the 
 burden of proof to show that, under 
 the special circximstances of the case, 
 the presumption has been rebutted." 
 See, also, Elkins v. Boston, &c., R. 
 Co., 23 N. H. 275; Lygo v. Newbold, 
 9 Exch. 302; Redfield's Am. Ry. 
 Cases, 490. 
 
 'Hoar V. Maine Central R. Co., 70 
 Me. 65; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 299; Mc- 
 Queen V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Kan 689; Pool v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 53 Wis. 657; International, &c., R. 
 Co. J). Cock, 68 Tex. 713; s. c. 5 S. W. 
 Rep. 635. But see Prince «. Inter- 
 national, &c., R. Co., 64 Tex. 144, 
 where it was held that a company 
 may be liable to one permitted to ride 
 free on a hand-car. 
 
 ' Little Rock, &c., R. Co. v Miles, 
 40 Ark. 298; B. c. 48 Am. Rep. 10. 
 Shippers of stock are not necessarily 
 negligent in riding in places commonly 
 deemed dangerous. Tibby «. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 392; Union Ry. 
 & Transit Co. ■». Shacklett, 19 111. App. 
 145; Florida Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Web- 
 ster, 25 Fla. 394; B. c. 5 So. Rep. 714; 
 McCorkle v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 61 
 Iowa, 555. Contra Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. ■». Horst, 93 U. S. 291, where 
 the defendant in error was riding 
 
198 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 [§ 154. 
 
 tipped up against a box close to an open side door.^ With 
 respect, however, to the carriage of passengers upon freight 
 trains, the rule is somewhat modified, to the effect that, when-, 
 ■ever the company receives passengers upon those trains, and 
 calleots fare from them, although it is done in violation of a 
 rule of the company, it is lawful for the passenger to ride, 
 and if, while so riding, he suffers an injury, due to the com- 
 pany's negligence, he may have his action.' When the pas- 
 senger is received on the freight train, and is allowed to pay 
 his fare, notwithstanding a rule to the contrary, the relation 
 of carrier and passenger is held to be thereby created, and in 
 case of an injury, the passenger may recover.* The discom- 
 forts and dangers naturally incident to travel by rail are 
 greater on freight than on passenger trainS, arid call for a 
 correspondingly higher degree of care on the part of passen- 
 
 in a caboose car. It being necessary 
 to detach the latter, he was ordered to 
 the top of the train. Through the 
 negligence of the conductor, he fell, 
 and was, severely injured. He was 
 allowed to recover, the court holding 
 it no error to instruct the jury, "that , 
 a person talring a cattle-train is en; 
 titled to demand the highest possible 
 degree of care and diligence, regard- 
 less of the kind of train he takes." 
 
 ' Norfolk, (fee, E. Oo. ». Ferguson, 
 79 Va. 341. In this case, however, 
 the passenger had been drinking. 
 Gf. Quackenbush ». Chicago, &c., 
 By. Co., 73 Iowa, 458; s. e. 35 N. "W. 
 Rep. 533, where it was held not to be 
 contributory negligence. 
 
 ^ International, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Irvine, 64 Tex. 539 ; "Wagner v. 
 Missouri Pap. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 513; 
 B. c. 10 8. W. Rep. 486, 491; White- 
 head ■». St. Louis. &c., Ry. Co., 
 99 Mo/ 263; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 
 751. In the two cases last cited the 
 plaintifiE recovered for injuries from 
 lack of ordinary care, though he was 
 Tiding free. McGee v. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co., 93 Mo. 308; e. c. 4 8. W. Rep. 
 ■739, where the passenger was ignorant 
 
 of the prohibitory rule. Hanson ». 
 Mansfield Ry., &c., 6o., 88 La. Ann. 
 Ill; s. c. 58 Am. Rep. 163; St. Joseph, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185; 
 Dunn V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 
 187; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 367; 10 Am. 
 Law Reg. (N. 8.) 615; Lawrenceburg, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 
 476; Creed b. Pennsyl-eania R. Co., 
 86 Penn St. 139; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 
 698; Arnold t. Hlinois, &c., R. Co., 83 
 111. 273; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 383; Edger- 
 ton«.New Tork,&c.,R. Co.,89N.y. 
 337; Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Hazzard, 
 36 m. 375; Lucas ». Milwaukee, &c., 
 R. Co., 33 Wis. 41; s. c. 14 Am. 
 Rep. 735; Murch t. The Concord. 
 R. Co., 29 K. H. 9; Ohio, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Muhling, 30 HI. 9; Ryan v. Cum- 
 berland, &c., R. Co., 33 Penn. St. 384; 
 Cillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Co., 
 10 Cush. 228; Graham v. Toronto, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 33 Up. Can. (C. P.) 514; 
 Sheerman ®. Toronto, &c., Ry. Co., 
 34 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 451. A brake- 
 man on a freight train in charge of a 
 conductor has no authority to permit 
 a person to ride. Candiff t. Louis- 
 ville, &c. , Ry. Co. (La. ), 7 So. Rep. 691. 
 ^ See generally the cases last cited. 
 
§ 155.] 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 199 
 
 gers. Accordingly, it has been held in several cases that a 
 passenger is negligent who unnecessarily stands or leans 
 against the seat and is injured by bumping and jolting in 
 the coupling and management of such trains.^ 
 
 § 155. Iiyaries at car windows and doors.— It is a general 
 rule that a passenger who puts his head, or elbow, or any 
 other part of his body, out of the window of the car in 
 which he is riding, has no cause of action against the rail- 
 way company for any injury that he may sustain on that 
 Account, from contact with outside obstacles or forces. 
 Besting one's arm on the window sill, within the car, is not 
 contributory negligence,' but if any part of the passenger's 
 body extends through the open window, beyond the place 
 where the sash would be when the window is shut, it is suffi- 
 cient to prevent ^a recovery of damages by him.' The opin- 
 
 • Harris v. Hannibal, &c., E. Co,, 
 «9 Mo. 233; s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. ^25; 
 ■Crine V. East Tenn., &c., Ry. Co., 84 
 Ga. 651; s. c. 11 S.E.Kep. 555: Reber 
 V. Bond, 38 Fed Rep. 822; Wallace v. 
 Western, &c., R. Co., 98 N. C. 494; 
 B. c. 4 8. E. Rep. 503; Smith v. Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co., 99 N. C. 341; 
 8. c. 5 S. E. Rep. 896; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. J!. Hazzard, 36 lU. 373. Qf. 
 ■with Indianapolis, &c., Co. v. Horst, 
 93 U. 8. 391. On this point, the 
 Supreme Court of Kansas is wide 
 awake and exceedingly discreet. In 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Holcomb, 
 44 Kan. 333; s. c. 34 Pac. Rep. 467, 
 it was held that a railroad company 
 which for years has been in the habit 
 of carrying passengers on one of its 
 local freight trains is required to ex- 
 ercise the highest possible degree of 
 care to which such trains are suscep- 
 tible, and that in an action for injuries 
 to a passenger caused by the jerking 
 of the train in starling from a station, 
 instructions based upon the assump- 
 tion that the train was an ordinary 
 freight train were properly refused. 
 ' Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. n. Snider, 
 
 117 Ind. 435; s. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 384; 
 Breen v. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 99 N". T. 
 397; Germantown Pass. R. Co. ■». 
 Brophy, 105 Penn. 8t. 38. 
 
 ' Dun V. Seaboard, &c., R Co., 78 
 Va. 645; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 388, In 
 which the court uses the qualifying 
 language, "unless the railroad com- 
 pany, noticing his dangerous position, 
 neglected to warn him." Patterson's 
 Ry. Accident Law, p. 384; Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R Co. ■». McClurg, 56 Penn. St. 
 394 (overruling New Jersey, &o., R. 
 Co. ■». Kennard, 31 Penn. St. 303); 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. ■». Andrews, 
 39 Md. 329; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 568; 
 Holbrook v. Utica, &c., R. Co., 12 N, 
 T. 336. "Certainly, if it is a want 
 of due care to attempt to leave a car 
 when the train is in motion, although 
 going at a slow rate of speed, it is no 
 less a want of proper care to ride in a 
 car with an arm or leg exposed to 
 collision against passing trains or the 
 necessary structures on the side of the 
 tracks," said Bigelow, C. J. , in Todd *. 
 Old Colony, &c., R. Co., 3 Allen, 18; 
 s. c. 7 Allen, 307; Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Rutherford, 39 Ind. 82; 
 
200 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. [§ 155. 
 
 ion of l)hompson, 0. J., in the case of Pittsburgh, &c., E. 
 Co. V. McClurg,* is often quoted as declaring a sound doc- 
 trine in these cases. He said, inter alia : — " A passenger on 
 entering a railroad car is to be presumed to know the use of 
 a seat, and the use of a window — that the former is to sit in,, 
 and the latter to admit light and air ; each has its separate 
 use. The seat he may occupy in any way most comfortable to 
 himself. The window he has a right to enjoy, but not to oc- 
 cupy." Its use is for the benefit of all, not for the comfort 
 alone of him who has by accident got nearest it. If, there- 
 fore, he sit with his elbow in it, he does so without author- 
 ity, and if he allow it to protrude out, and is injured, is this 
 due care on his part? He was not put there by the carrier, 
 nor invited to go there, nor misled in regard to the fact that 
 it is not a part of his seat, nor that its purposes were not 
 exclusively to admit light and air for the benefit of all. His 
 position is, therefore, without authority. His negligence 
 consists in putting his limbs where they ought not to be, 
 and liable to be broken, without his ability to know whether 
 there is danger or not approaching. In a case, therefore, 
 where the injury stands confessed, or is proved to have re- 
 sulted from the position voluntarily or thoughtlessly taken 
 in a window, by contact with outside obstacles or forces, it 
 cannot be otherwise characterized than as negligence, and sa 
 
 to be pronounced by the court In the absence 
 
 of some justifying necessity, or incapacity to take care of 
 himself, on the part of the passenger, no one can doubt, I 
 think, from the reason of the thing, in view of the nature of 
 the vehicle used, being a railroad car, that to extend an arm 
 or a hand beyond the window sill is dangerous, and is reck- 
 .lessness or negligence. Wherever the facts present such a 
 case, singly and without any controlling or justifying neces- 
 sity, we think the court ought to declare the act negligence^ 
 and as there was nothing like this shown in the case before us, 
 we think the court ought not to have affirmed plaintiff *» 
 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Sickings, 5 ' 56 Penn. St. 294. 
 
 Bush,!; Laings. Colder, 8 Penn. St. » See, on this point, Geeo. Metro- 
 
 479; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 533. See, also, politan, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 
 
 Judge Redfield's note to Pittsburgh, 165. 
 
 &c., R. Co. V. McClurg, 2 Am. Ry. 
 
 Cases, 653, and cf. § 396, infra. 
 
§ 156.] EAILWAY PASSENGERS. 201 
 
 point. Unconsciously exposing himself did not help the 
 plaintiff's case, as it was not shown that his unconscious- 
 ness was not the result of a want of prudent attention to his 
 situation on the part of the plaintiff. It would be a novel 
 answer to the allegation of negligence to kllege that the 
 plaintiff had slept in the position he was in when hurt, and 
 that would be a condition of unconsciousness. Sleeping,^ 
 when due care would require one to be awake, or in danger- 
 ous circumstances, is negligence, and no answer to the com- 
 pany can be given to such act. Of course, these views are 
 predicated of a case in which there are no facts to qualify or 
 justify the act. It is possible that a state of facts might be 
 found to show an exception to the rule, and where that oc- 
 curs, the rule ceases."* 
 
 § 156. The same subject continued.— In another line of 
 authorities it is held that such an act on the part of a pas- 
 senger is not negligence per se, but that, whether or not the 
 mere fact that the plaintiff had his arm outside of the car 
 'window contributed to produce the injury complained of, i& 
 a proper question for the jury.* A consideration of the 
 cases to be cited in support of this view will, how- 
 ever, show that there is but a slight basis for it, and that 
 the weight of authority is decidedly against any such posi- 
 tion. The case of the New Jersey, <fec., E. Co. v. Kennard,*^ 
 has been expressly overruled, and does not declare the rule 
 now held in Pennsylvania. It was the earliest case in which 
 this question arose, and Chief Justice Gibson, who delivered 
 the opinion, took very extreme ground. It has never been 
 
 ' Wharton on Negligence, § 3C1; kee, &c., R. Co., 17 Wis. 487; New 
 
 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Jersey, &c., R Co. ■». Kennard, 21 
 
 4th ed., g 281. Penn. St. 203; Farlow ®. Kelly, 108 
 
 » Quinn v. South Carolina Ry. Co., U. S. 288. 
 29 S. C. 381; Dahlberg v. Minneapolis ' 31 Penn. St. 303. It was there held 
 
 St. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 40^ 8. c. 50 Am. to be the duty of the company to put 
 
 Rep. 585, a street car case. Moakler wire screens to windows wherever 
 
 c. Willamette Valley R. Co., 18 Or. there was risk of grazing; and that 
 
 189; 8. c. 22 Pac. Rep. 948; Barton v. in default of this the company was 
 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 52 Mo. 253; liable for injuries produced by such 
 
 B. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 418; Chicago, &c,, grazing. This case was, however, 
 
 R. Co. ■». Pondrom, 51111.333; s. c. overruled in Pittsburgh, «&c., R. Co. ®- 
 
 2 Am. Rep. 306; Spencer v. Milwau- McClurg, 56 Penn. St. 394. 
 
202 BAIL WAY PASSENGERS. [§ 157. 
 
 followed. The decision in the Illinois case' was reached un- 
 der the influence of the rule of comparative negligence, 
 which will suffice to destroy its influence as a controlUng 
 authority in other jurisdictions. Farlow v. Kelly ' goes no 
 further than to hold that it is not contributory negligence 
 for a passenger to rest his arm upon the window sill of the 
 car in which he is riding, without having it protrude, which 
 is scarcely Ijhe question in issue. In Barton v. St. Louis, 
 •<fec., R. Co.,' the evidence tended to show that the plaintiff, 
 when injured, was sitting in the rear car of the train, at, or 
 near, an open window, and that the injury to his arm was 
 ■caused by the car coming in contact with a wagon loaded 
 with a skiff. As to the position of his arm at the instant of 
 injury, whether inside or protruded out of the window, the 
 evidence was conflicting. In this state of facts, the court 
 held that, even if the plaintiff had his arm outside the win- 
 dow, still this was not negligent per se, under the circum- 
 stances, and whether it contributed to the injury was a ques- 
 tion for the jury. This case cannot, therefore, count very 
 strongly against the more accepted doctrine. 
 
 § 167. The rule in Wisconsin.— The Supreme Court of 
 Wisconsin, in the case of Spencer v. Milwaukee, &c., E. Co.,* 
 -considers the question with great ability, and reaches a con- 
 -clusion contrary to the general rule upon the subject. This 
 is the only case, as far as my reading goes, in which, upon the 
 .general question fairly presented, a court of last resort has 
 ield that suet acts are not negligent, as matter of law. But 
 that the case stands alone, is no conclusive argument against 
 it. It is entitled to weight not only as the deliberate judg- 
 ment of a court of acknowledged alaility, but also by reason 
 of the vigor of its reasoning, and the inherent fitness of the 
 position it takes. In the opinion, after reviewing the cases 
 in point, the court said : — " When we consider the manner in 
 which railroad cars are usually constructed, with windows 
 so that they can be opened and arranged at a sufficient height, 
 
 ' Chicago, &o., R. Co. ii. Pondrom, « 17 Wis. 487, which is practically 
 
 51 111. 333; s. c. 3 Am. Rep.' 306. the only case in -which the rule that 
 
 ' 108 U. S. 388. such an act is negligent per le is 
 
 ' 53 Mo. 358; s c. 14 Am. Rep. squarely denied. 
 418. 
 
§ 158.] EAILWAT PASSENGERS. 203 
 
 from the seat, so that passengers will almost unconsciously 
 place their arms upon the sill for support, there being no 
 tars or slats before the window to prevent their doing so, 
 then, to say that, if a passenger's arm extends the slightest 
 degree beyond the outside surface, he is wanting in proper 
 care and attention, and if an injury happens, he cannot re- 
 cover because his conduct must have necessarily contributed 
 to the result, appears to us to be laying down a very arbitrary 
 and unreasonable rule' of law. It is, probably, the habit of 
 every person while riding in the cars to rest the arm upon the 
 base of the window, and if the window is open, it is liable to 
 extend slightly outside. This, we suppose, is common habit. 
 There is always more or less space between the outside of 
 the car and any structure erected by the side of the track, 
 and must, necessarily, be so to accommodate the motion of the 
 car. Passengers know this, and regulate their conduct accord- 
 ingly ; they do not suppose that the agents and managers of 
 the road suffer obstacles to be so placed as to barely miss the 
 car while passing. And it seems to us almost absurd to hold 
 that, in every case, and under all circumstances, if the party 
 injured had his arm the smallest fraction of an inch beyond 
 the outside surface, he was wanting in ordinary care and 
 prudence." 
 
 § 1 5S. Notice of the danger.— ![n some of the cases there 
 is an intimation that the question should turn upon whether 
 or not timely notice of the danger had been given by the 
 company, so that the passenger might have avoided it, and it 
 is an inference that the company might be held liable when 
 the notice is not given.^ These cases seem to proceed upon 
 the theory that, ordinarily, it may not be especially dangerous 
 to allow the hand or arm to protrude somewhat beyond the 
 outer edge of the open window, and that the passenger is 
 justified in acting upon that supposition. And that when- 
 ever, for any reason, the danger in this regard is increased it 
 
 ' In Houston, &c., By. Co. b. Hamp- head out of the car window when it 
 
 ton, 64 Tex. 487, it was held that a was not safe. Laing b. Colder, 8 Penn. 
 
 railroad company may be liable to a St. 479; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 533; Dun v. 
 
 mail clerk, if the acts of the company's Seaboard, &c., R. Co., 78 Va. 645; 
 
 servants were such as to cause the s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 388. / 
 clerk to believe it safe to put his 
 
204 BAILWAT PASSENGERS. [§ 159. 
 
 is the duty of the company to notify their passengers, and to 
 warn them of it, the carrier's failure in the discharge of this 
 duty entitling the injured passenger to his action. It is 
 sometimes a question, when a passenger has sustained an in- 
 jury in opening or closing the door of a oar, or has suffered 
 the injury when an employee of the company opened or shut 
 it, whether or not the passenger's ownMegligence contributed 
 to the injury. In a recent case, where the plaintiff, who sat 
 near the front door of a dark and crowded car on the defend- 
 ant's railway, attempted, in passing through a long tunnel, 
 to shut the door, in order to keep out the smoke and cinders, 
 and received an injury in the attempt, there being no servant 
 of the defendant at hand to do it, the Court of Appeals of 
 Maryland held that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence 
 in so doing, and that the defendant was liable.* It is in this 
 case declared to b6 the duty of the company to provide ser- 
 vants to perform such services for the passengers, and the 
 right of the passenger, in case no servant is at hand, to per- 
 form the service for himself, and when the passenger is 
 injured in doing something for himself of this nature, which 
 it is the company's duty to have done for him, the company's 
 plea of contributory negligence as a defense to the action for 
 damages is bad. 
 
 § 159. The English mle. — "If the inconvenience is so 
 great that it is reasonable to get rid of it by an act not ob- 
 viously dangerous, and executed without carelessness, the 
 person causing the inconvenience by his negligence would be 
 liable for any injury that might result from an attempt to 
 avoid such inconvenience," said Chief Justice Cockburn.* 
 There are several English cases in which this question has 
 been passed upon, but they are not entitled to much weight 
 in this country, by reason of the difference, in very essential 
 particulars, between the railway service in the two countries. 
 In Gee v. Metropolitan Ey. Co.' it is held that a passenger 
 may lawfully look out of a window in a door, and if, in so 
 
 ' Western, &c., R. Co. v. Stanley, case of Gee v. Metropolitan, &c., By. 
 
 61 Md. 366; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 96; Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; B. c. 5 Eng. 
 
 Patterson's Ry. Accident Law, p. 15. Rep. 169. 
 
 ' In deciding this very point, in the ' L. R. 8 Q. B. 161. 
 
§ 160.] RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 205 
 
 doing, he leans against the door which is imperfectly and 
 negligently fastened, and which, in consequence, flies open, 
 and he falls out and is hurt, he may hare 'his action. In 
 this case, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, Cockburn, 
 J., said : — " The passenger did nothing more than that which 
 came within the scope of his enjoyment while traveling, 
 without committing any imprudence. In passing through a 
 beautiful country he certainly is at liberty to stand up and 
 look at the view, not in a negligent, but in the ordinary 
 manner of people traveling for pleasure." In the case of 
 Adams v. Lancashire, &c., Ey. Co.,^ in which it appeared 
 that the plaintiff shut the door of the railway carriage, 
 which flew open through the negligence of the company, 
 three several times, and that, in trying to shut it for the 
 fourth time, he fell out and was hurt, there was evidence that 
 the car was not crowded, that the plaintiff could have found a 
 seat away from the door, and that the train would have 
 -stopped at a station in three minutes. Under this state of 
 facts the court held, that, inasmuch as the inconvenience 
 from the open door was slight, and the passenger might have 
 escaped it entirely by moving his seat, trhile the danger of 
 Attempting to close the door was considerable, the conduct 
 of the plaintiff so far contributed to occasion the injury that 
 he could not recover.^ 
 
 § 160. Injuries at and about railway stations. — It is the 
 plain duty of a railway company, as a common carrier of 
 passengers, to keep its stations, and the approaches thereto, 
 in such a condition that those who have occasion to use these 
 premises for the purposes for which they are designed, may 
 .do so with safety. Any failure upon the part of the com- 
 pany to exercise ordinary care to thi^ end is a breach of 
 duty for which an action will lie.' Judge Cooley said : — 
 
 ' L. R. 4 C. P. 739. a guard in slamming a door, without 
 ' See, also, the following English warning, on a passenger's hand. Mad- 
 cases upon this general question: dox v. Bailway Company, 38 L. T. 
 Siner J). Great Western Ry. Co., L. R. (N. 8.) 458 (C. P. Div.); Wharton 
 4Exch.ll7;Richardsons. The Metro- on Negligence, §§ 363, and note, 
 politan Ry. Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 374, note; 632. 
 
 Eoidham ». London, &c., Ry. Co., ' RaQroad Co. v. Henning, 16 Wall. 
 
 L. R. 4 C. P. 619, where the company 659 ; Sweeney v. Old Colony R. Co., 
 
 was held liable for the negligence of 10 Allen, 373. 
 
206 
 
 RAILWAY PA88ENGEEB. 
 
 [§ 160. 
 
 " When one, expressly or by implication, invites others to 
 come upon his premises, whether for business or for any 
 other purpose. It is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is 
 not inviting them into danger, and to that end he must exer- 
 cise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises rea- 
 sonably safe for the visit." ^ The cases are numerous where 
 passengers have recovered for injuries received after alight- 
 ing from the cars, the carrier having failed to exercise due 
 care in providing means for their safe egress.' " EaUroad 
 Companies," said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,* 
 " must carry the passengers to their respective places of des- 
 
 ' Cooley on Torts, 604. It is the 
 duty of a railroad company to keep 
 its premises in a safe condition for the 
 use of one who goes to the station to 
 see a friend depart. Hamilton v. 
 Texas, &c., Ry. Co., 64 Tex. 351; 
 8. c. 53 Am. Rep. 756; Texas, &c., 
 Ry. Co. v. Best, 66 Tex. 116; hut not 
 for one who comes to the station to 
 take a train, and, finding it gone, waits 
 for a horse car. Heinlein ». Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 147 Mass. 136; s. c. 16 
 N. B. Rep. 608. 
 
 ' Boyee v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 54 
 N. T. Super. Ct. 386; Cross v. Lake 
 Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 69 Mich. 863; 
 B. c. 37 N. W. Rep. 361; Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. V. Marion, 133 I^d. 415; s. c. 
 38 N. E. Rep. 973; Delaware, &c., R. 
 Co. v: Trautwein, 53 N. J. Law, 169; 
 s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 178 ; Ainley v. Man- 
 hattan Ry. Co., 47 Hun, 306; Bateman 
 V. New York, &c., R. Co., 47 Hun, 
 429; Green «. Pennsylvania R. Co., 36 
 Fed. Rep. 66; Keefe ®. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 143 Mass. 351; Louisville, &c., 
 Ry. Co. ■». Lucas, 119 Ind. 583 ; s. c. 
 31 N. E. Rep. 968 ; Lucas e. Pennsyl- 
 vania Co., 130 Ind. 205; s. c. 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 972; Texas, &c., Ry. Co. v. Orr, 
 46 Ark. 182; Kelley v. Manhattan 
 Ry. Co., 112 N. Y. 443; s. c. 20 
 N. E. Rep. 383; Pennsylvania Co. «. 
 Marion, 104 Ind. 339; Stewart ». In- 
 ternational, &c., R. Co., 53 Tex. 
 
 289; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 753; Bennett 
 V. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 103 tJ. S. 
 577; Gaynor «. Old Colony, &c., R. 
 Co., 100 Mass. 311. Railroad com- 
 panies are under ohligation " to keep 
 in a safe condition all portions of their 
 platforms and approaches thereto, to 
 which the public do or would natu- 
 rally resort, as well as all portions of 
 their station grounds reasonably near 
 to the platforms, where passengers, or 
 those who have purchased tickets 
 with a view to take passage on their 
 cars, would naturally or ordinarily be 
 likely to go." McDonald ■». Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 36 Iowa, 134; Columbus, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Farrell, 31 Ind. 408; 
 Osborne v. Union Ferry Co., 53 Barb. 
 639; Dice v. Willamette Trans., &c., 
 Co., 8 Oregon, 60; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 575; ImhofE ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 20 Wis. 364; Patten v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 33 Wis. 533; Martin «. Great 
 Northern, &c., Ry. Co., 16 C. B. 179; 
 s. c. 81 Eng. Com. Law, 179; Nich- 
 olson V. Lancashire, &c., Ry. Co., 3 
 Hurl. & C. 534; Caterham Ry. Co. v. 
 London R, 87 Eng. Com. Law, 
 410; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 516 
 et seq.; Redfleld on Carriers, § 514; 
 Shearman & Redfleld on Negligence, 
 4th ed., § 410. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania R. Co. ■». Aspell, 23 
 Penn. St. 149; s. c. 62 Am. Dec. 323. 
 
§ 160.] RAILWAY PASSENGEKS' 207 
 
 tination, and set them dovm safety, if human care and foresight 
 can do it." But when the passenger, on his own part, fails 
 to exercise proper care and prudence, his right of action, 
 upon familiar grounds, is thereby forfeited.^ A person who 
 goes, in the night-time, in the midst of a car-jard, and at a 
 place where the railroad company is not accustomed to re- 
 ceive passengers, and, without the knowledge of those in 
 charge of a freight train, standing there, attempts to enter 
 the caboose attached to such freight train, and is injured, is 
 guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover for 
 such injury.* Where one, in order to reach the station to 
 take a train, went across a vacant lot, crawled under a wire 
 fence, crossed a ditch, and climbed an embankment to reach 
 the station platform ; and as he stepped on the track at the 
 top of the embankment was struck by a passing train and 
 killed, he was held to be a trespasser, the company incurring 
 no liability.* It is the duty of a railroad company to prop- 
 erly light the platform connected with its depot within a 
 reasonable time before the arrival and departure of its trains, 
 so as to insure the safety of persons coming to the depot as 
 passengers.* If a passenger alights in the night at a station 
 where he is a stranger, and finds himself in utter darkness by 
 the extinguishment of the light by the agent, it is not negli- 
 gent for him to seek information or a place of safety by 
 
 ' Evansville, &c., R. Co. ■». Duncan, Co., 61 Miss. 8 ; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 
 28 Ind. 442; Forsyth B. Boston, &c., 74. 
 
 R. Co., 103 Mass. 510; Commonwealth ° Haase v. Oregon Ry. &Nav. Co., 
 
 v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 129 Mass. 500; 19 Or. 354; s. c. 24 Pac. Rep. 238. 
 
 8. c. 37 Am. Rep. 382; Dlinois, &c., ' Conly v. Penn. R. Co. (Penn.), 12 
 
 R. Co. ■». Green, 81111. 19; B.C. 25 Am. Atl. Rep. 496. See, also, Sturgis v. 
 
 .Rep. 255. In Mitchells. Chicago, &c., Detroit, &c., Ry. Co., 72 Mich. 619; 
 
 R. Co., 51 Mich. 236; s. 0.47 Am. Rep. s. c. 40 N. W. Rep. 914; Missouri 
 
 566, a train approaching a station Pac. R. Co. v. Texas, &c., Ry. Co., 33 
 
 where there was a crossuig of tracks Fed. Rep. 359. 
 
 stopped, as required by law, several * Grimes S.Pennsylvania Co,. 36 Fed. 
 
 hundred feet from the crossing before Rep. 72; Alabama, &c., R. Co. «. Ar- 
 
 proceeding to cross the track. The nold, 84 Ala. 159; s. c. 4 So. Rep. 359; 
 
 name of the station had been called, Fordyce v. Merrill, 49 Ark. 277; s. c. 
 
 and a passenger, without the knowl- 5 8. W. Rep. 329; Reynolds v. Texas, 
 
 edge of the conductor orbrakemen, &c., Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694; Wal- 
 
 attempted to alight and injured him- lace v. Wilmington, &c., Ry. Co. (Del.), 
 
 self. No recovery was allowed. See, 18 Atl. Rep. 818 ; GroU v. Prospect 
 
 also, Sevier «. Vicksburg, &c., R. Park, &c., R. Co., 4N. Y. Supl. 80. 
 
208 BAILWAY PASSENGBBS. [§ 160. 
 
 crossing other ground of tlie company than that on which 
 the station is actually built.^ When a passenger intending 
 to board a train finds no one to inform him how to reach the 
 sleeping car, which is left standing outside of the yard, to 
 which a sidewalk maintained by the company and city leads 
 in a direct route, which he follows and from which he falls 
 by reason of insufficient light, he has an action against the 
 company.' A person going at dusk upon a defective plat- 
 form to read a notice which the company was required by 
 law to post there when stock was killed by, its trains was not 
 negligent as a matter of law,' On the other hand, where a 
 platform lamp had been temporarily removed to be trimmed 
 and a passenger, while staying over at the station, went out 
 and walked off the end of the platform, she was held guilty 
 of recklessness.^ And where a passenger, after alighting, 
 chose to leave the station by the only stairway out of four 
 which was unlighted, he was declared wanting in ordinary 
 care.' It is not negligence per se to board a passenger train 
 at a point elsewhere than at a depot platform.* And where 
 a stranger, supposing that a train which stood at a freight 
 platform some distance below the passenger platform 
 would back up to the latter and start from there, 
 waited until he learned that the train was just on the point 
 of starting, and then, running to get aboard, stumbled over a 
 box, the company was held liable for the injuries he sus- 
 tained.' When a train has arrived at the station a passenger 
 in alighting may assume that it will remain stationary for a 
 reasonable time, and whether the company has fulfilled its 
 duty in this regard is a question for the jury.^ There must 
 
 ' Wallace v. Wilmington, &c., E. Co. ' Maclennan v. Long Island R. Co., 
 
 (Del.), 18 Atl. Rep. 818. 52 N. T. Super. Ct. 23. 
 
 ' Moses V. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 39 " Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 
 
 La. Ajin. 649; s. c. 3 So. Rep. 567. Penn. St. 113; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 759; 
 
 ' St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. v. Fair- Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Mask, 64 
 
 baim, 48 Ark. 491; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. Miss. 738; Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Wil- 
 
 60. , Hams, 70 Tex, 159; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 
 
 ' Reed ®. Axtell, 84 Va. 231; s. c. 4 78; Norfolk, &c., R. Co. ®. Prinnell 
 
 8. E. Rep. 587. (Va.), 3 S. E. Rep. 95; Louisville, &c., 
 
 » Bennett «. New York, &c., R. Co., R. Co. ■». Crunk, 119 Lid. 542; s. c. 21 
 
 57 Conn. 422; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 668. N. E. Rep. 81; Jones ». Missouri Pae. 
 
 " Stoner «. Pennsylvania CO., 98 Ry. Co., 31 Mo. App. 614; Nance «. 
 
 Ind. 384; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 764. Carolina, &c., R. Co., 94 N. C. 619; 
 
§ 160.] RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 209 
 
 be reasonable facilities for stepping off the train with safety, 
 but if such suitable means are provided and the oars are in 
 proper position, passengers are not entitled as a matter of 
 law to personal assistance in alighting.^ It is not the duty 
 of a conductor " to know ". that a passenger has left the train 
 if he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so.^ But if the 
 conductor has reason to believe that a passenger, though 
 dilatory, may be in the act of alighting, and he starts his 
 "train without examination or inquiry, and such passenger is 
 thereby injured, the company will be liable.' Where a train 
 is so stopped that a lady can alight on the platform only by 
 going, forward through the smoker, she is not negligent in 
 getting off from the rear end of the car on which she is.* In 
 Pennsylvania it was held contributory negligence as a matter 
 of law to undertake to get off a train after it began to move, 
 and a new trial was granted for error of the court in submit- 
 ting the question generally instead of giving positive instruc- 
 tions for the defendant.' It has also been determined that if 
 the plaintiff was under the influence of liquor which contrib- 
 uted to any extent to his injury, it is not merely a circuni- 
 stance bearing upon the question of reasonable care, but an 
 absolute bar to recovery.^ It is, not negligence per se to get 
 off the wrong side of the train, that is, the side opposite the 
 
 East Line, &c., Ry. Co", v. Rushing, ^ Raben v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 73 
 
 69 Tex. 306; s. c. 6 S. W. Rep. 884; Iowa, 579; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 645; 
 
 Hickman v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Clot worthy v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Mo. 433; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 127; 80 Mo. 330; Chesapeake, &c.,Ry. Co. 
 
 Strand v. Chicago, «&c., Ry. Co., 64 v. Reeves' Adm'r (Ky.), 11 S. W. 
 
 Mich. 479, and 67 Mich. 880; s. c. 31 Rep. 464. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 184, and 34 N. W. Rep. ^ Straus v. Kansas, &c., R. Co., 86 
 
 713; Murphy «. Rome, &c., R. Co., 10 Mo. 431. 
 
 N. T. Supl. 354; McDonald v. Long * Cartwright v. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 
 Island R. Co., 116 N. Y. 546; s. c. 33 Co., 53 Mich. 606; 8. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1068. 374. But see Eckerd v. Chicago, 
 
 ' Raben®. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 74 Ac, Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 353; s. c. 30 
 
 Iowa, 733; p. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 631; N". W. Rep. 615. 
 
 Hurt V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 94 = New York, &c., R. Co. «. Enches, 
 
 Mo. 355; b. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 1, 5; 127 Penn. St. 316; a c. 34 W. N. C. 
 
 Raben v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 73 361; b. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 991. 
 
 Iowa, 579; B. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 645; ' Straud v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 Simms v. South C. Ry. Co., 37 B. C. 67 Mich. 380; S. c. 84 N. W. Rep. 
 
 268; 8. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 301. 713. 
 14 
 
210 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 
 
 [§ 161. 
 
 platform.^ A passenger crossing a railroad track at a sta- 
 tion, in order to leave or board a train halted for that pur- 
 pose, is not held to exercise the same care and diligence as 
 persons crossing highway tracks, but may assume that the 
 railroad corporation will so order its trains that he will be 
 safe from harm on the track, which he is thus invited and 
 required to cross in order to secure h^s passage.^ But it is 
 otherwise where one attempts to cross in front of cars in 
 motion or which are about to start.' 
 
 § 161. The same subject continued. — When the train stops 
 elsewhere than at a station, as at a water tank,^ or upon a 
 side track, to allow another train to pass, or for any other 
 purpose,^, or upon approaching the crossing of another rail- 
 way,* or upon a bridge or culvert,' or in a tunnel,' or at any 
 other place at which there is no express or implied invitation 
 
 ' McQuilken d. Central Pac. R. 
 Co., 64 Cal. 463; RobostelU v. New 
 York, Ac, R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep! 796. 
 But see, contra, Morgan v. Camden, 
 &c., R. Co. (Penn. St.), 16 Atl. Rep. 
 853; s. C..38 W. N. C. 189. 
 
 ^ Weeks «. New Orleans, &c., R. 
 Co., 40 La. Ann. 800; s. c. 5 So. Rep. 
 73. 
 • » Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. ®. State, 
 63 Md. 135; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Bell (Penn.), 15 Atl. Rep. 561; Par- 
 sons V. New York, &c., R. Co., 37 
 Him (N. Y.) 128; Harris «. Central 
 R. Co., 78 Ga. 525; s. c 8 S. E. Rep. 
 855; DeKay «. Chicago, &c.,Ry. Co., 
 41 Minn. 178; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 
 182. " 
 
 * When a railway train stops at a 
 place where it would be dangerous for 
 one to get off, there can be no require- 
 ment forcing the company to notify the 
 passenger not to alight. A passenger 
 taking it upon himself to . get off is 
 devoid of ordinary prudence, and can- 
 not recover in an action for injuries 
 sustained. Illinois, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Green, 81 111. 19; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 
 
 255; State v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 58 
 Me. 176; s. c. 4. Am. Rep. 258. 
 
 " Frost V. Grand Trunk &c., Ry. 
 , Co., 10 Allen, 387; Montgomery, &c., 
 R. Co. ®. Boring, 51 Ga. 182. 
 
 ' Mitchell V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 51 Mich. 236; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 566. 
 
 ' Columbus, &c., R. Co. «. Farrell, 
 31 Ind. 408; Terre Haute, &c., R.Co. 
 V. Buck, 96 Ind. 846; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 
 168. But in Taber v. Delaware R. 
 Co., 71 N. Y. 489, the court says :— 
 " The defendant company was bound 
 tp take notice of the circumstances, 
 viz. : that the station had been an- 
 nounced, ths,t passengers would natu- 
 rally assume that the train, when it 
 stopped, was at the station, and at the 
 place where they were to alight, . . 
 and that they, in the absence of no- 
 tice, would start to leave the train as 
 soon as it came to a stand still." 
 Verdict for the plaintiff affirmed. 
 Montgomery, &c., R. Co. v. Boring, 
 51 Ga. 182; Whittaker v. Manchester, 
 &c. , Ry. Co. , L. R. 5 C. P. 464, note 3. 
 
 ' Bridges v. North London Ry. Co , 
 L. R. 6 Q. B. 377, b. c. 24 L. T. Rep. 
 (N. S.) 835. 
 
§ 162.] 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 211 
 
 to the passenger to alight,* and where the stop is made for 
 the purpose of the railroad alone, it is generally held thaty 
 when the passenger leaves the cars, under these circumstances^ 
 he acts at his peril, and that, if he suffers an injury in so do- 
 ing, his own negligence will prevent a recovery.^ When, 
 however, the name of the station is announced by the proper 
 employee of the company, the passenger may rightfully infer 
 that the first stoppage of the train will be at that station, 
 and he will not be guilty of such contributory negligence as 
 will bar his recovery by construing such announcement and 
 stoppage as an invitation to him to alight.' 
 
 § 162. The English rule.— Upon this point Chief Justice 
 Cockburn well said : — " An invitation to passengers to alight, 
 on the stopping of a train, without any warning of danger to 
 a passenger who is so' circumstanced as not to be able to 
 alight without danger, such danger not being visible and 
 apparent, amounts to negligence, . i . . . and, it appears 
 to us, that the bringing up of a train to a final standstill for 
 
 • Hemmingway v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 668; Lewis v. The 
 London, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 
 66. 
 
 " See generally the cases cited supra. 
 " But as the facts and circumstances 
 in cases of this sort are so well nigh 
 infinite in their variety, and as each 
 case must depend almost entirely upon 
 the facts which appear in connection 
 therewith, authorities, hpwever per- 
 tinent, are useful mainly, only in so 
 far as they settle general propositions 
 of law, and assist the court in apply- 
 ing these propositions to the particular 
 facts of the case before it." Boss v. 
 Prov., &c., R. Co., 15 R. I. 149; 8. c. 
 4 East. Rep. 490; s. c. 32 Alb. Law 
 Jour. 266. 
 
 ' Memphis, &c., Ry. Co. v. String- 
 fellow, 44 Ark. 332; s. c. 51 Am\ Rep. 
 598; Philadelphia, Sue., R. Co. «. Mc- 
 Cormick, 124 Penn. St. 437; s. c. 
 33 W. N. C. 344; 16 Atl. Rep. 848; 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. v. Anderson, 
 
 (Md.), 30 Atl. Rep.' 3; McNulta v. 
 Eusch, 134 ni. 46; s. 0. 34 N. E. Rep. 
 631. But where a train stopped un- 
 der such circumstances in broad day- 
 light and all the surroundings indi- 
 cated that passengers were not ex- 
 pected to alight there, the company 
 was held not liable to one who was. 
 injured in getting off. Smith v. 
 Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Ala. 538; 
 8. c. 7 So. Rep. 119. If a passenger 
 is injured by alighting of his own 
 accord from a car at a place where 
 there is no platform, when, by passing 
 forward, he could alight with safely 
 on the platform, he is guilty of neg- 
 ligence, and cannot recover. Eckerd 
 ». Chicago, ifcc, Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 
 353. See, also. Savannah, &c., R. Co. 
 D. Watts, 82 Ga. 239; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 
 129; Central, &c., R. Co. v. Van Horn, 
 38 N. J. Law, 133; Milliman v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 66 N. T. 642; 
 Cockle V. Lo^idon, &c., Ry. Co., L.. 
 R. 7 C. P. 321. 
 
212 RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. [§ 163. 
 
 the purpose of the passengers' alighting, amounts to an in- 
 vitation to alight, at all events, after such a time has elapsed 
 that the passenger may reasonably infer that it is intended 
 that he should get out, if he proposes to alight at the par- 
 ticular station."^ When the train is stopped at any unusual 
 place, and the passenger is either compelled, or advised, to 
 alight by the servants of the carrier, the company will be liable 
 if injury result. An illustration of the application in this rule 
 is found in the case of the Memphis and Charleston B. Co. v. 
 Whitfield,^ where the defendants, having stopped their train 
 several hundred yards from the station, at a point where the 
 land was low, and covered with sleet and ice, compelled the 
 plaintiff, by refusing to back the train up to the platform, to 
 alight upon the ice and snow, whereby he dislocated his knee. 
 The jury found negligence in the defendants, and gave a ver- 
 dict for the plaintiff, and upon appeal the court held that 
 the judgment should be affirmed, saying : — " A railway com- 
 pany stopping its train for passengers at a place so steep 
 that they could not easily iolimb upon the train would be 
 bound to assist them to do so, and, most assuredly, not less 
 80 to aid a passenger in alighting under similar circumstances. 
 The conductor is bound, upon the request of any passenger, 
 to move the train backward or forward, so as to enable the 
 passenger to step upon the platform." 
 
 § 163. The rule further stated.— In Brown v. Chicago, 
 &c., B. Co,,' it is held that where a pregnant woman passen- 
 ger on a railway train was carelessly directed by one of the 
 train-men to leave the train, on a stormy night, three miles 
 short of her destination, and the exertion of walking home 
 in the night brought on a miscarriage and consequent sick- 
 ness and distress, the company was liable. This case contains 
 an exhaustive review of the authorities, and states the law in 
 
 ' Cockle ®. London, &c., Ry. Co., Haute, &c.,R. Co. ■». Buck, 96 Ind. 
 
 L. R. 7 C. P. 321; s. c. 27 L. T. Rep. 346; s. o. 49 Am. Rep. 168; Mitchell 
 
 (N. S.) 330; Praeger v. The Bristol, v. Chicago, Ac, R. Co., 51 Mich 336; 
 
 .&c., Ry. Co., 24 L. T. Rep. (N. S,) s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 566. 
 
 105. The hurdei of proof in such a ^ 44 Miss. 466; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 699. 
 
 case is cast upon the carrier to show ' 54 Wis. 843; s. o. 41 Am. Rep. 41. 
 that there was no negligence. Terra 
 
§ 163.] 
 
 BAILWA-S PASSENGERS. 
 
 213 
 
 point with great clearness and force.* Many cases may be 
 cited in support of the rule that when a railway passenger 
 t^ain is stopped elsewhere than at the platform of a station, 
 and passengers are compelled to alight there, they may law- 
 fully d,o so without any imputation of negligence, and, if in- 
 jury results to them, may have an action against the carrier.* 
 
 ' Mr. Irving Browne's learned note 
 to this case, 41 Am. Rep. 53, is a val- 
 uable schoUon upon the general ques- 
 tion. LouisviUe, &c., R., Co. ®. Bal- 
 lard, 88 Ky. 159; s.* c. 10 S. W. Rep. 
 429; Winkler v. St. Louis, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 31 Mo. App. 99; Kreuziger v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 73 "Wis. 158; 
 s. c. 40 N. "W. Rep. 657; Galveston, 
 &c., Ry. Co. «. Crispi, 73 Tex. 336; 
 B. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 187. See, also, 
 swpra, § 33, p. 41, note. 
 
 = White Water, &c., R. Co. ■». Butler, 
 113 Ind. 598; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 599: 
 International, &c., R. Co. v. Eckford, 
 71 Tex. 374; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 679; 
 Boss V. Providence, &c., R. Co., 15 
 R. I. 149; 8. c. 1 Atl. Rep. 9; Warden 
 V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Mo. App. 
 631; McKunble v. Boston, &c., R. 
 Co., 141 Mass. 463; Louisville, &c., 
 Ry. Co. ®. Mask, 64 Miss. 738; s. c. 3 
 So. Rep. 360; Terre Haute, &c., R. 
 Co. B. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; s. c. 49 Am. 
 Rep. 168. In leaving the place where 
 he has alighted, the passenger must use 
 ordinary care or he cannot recover 
 for subsequent injuries . International, 
 &c., R. Co. B. FoUiard, 66 Tex. 603; 
 s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 634; Adams ». 
 MiasouiiPac. Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 555; 
 8. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 637; Foy «. Lon- 
 don, &c.,Ry. Co., 18C. B. (N. 8.)335; 
 Curtiss V. Rochester, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Barb. 385; Dice v. WUliamette Trans., 
 &c., Co., 8 Oregon, 60; s. C. 34 Am. 
 Rep. 575; Fitzpatrick ». Great West- 
 ern Ry. Co., 13 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 645. 
 Where a passenger is carried several 
 miles beyond his station, and the con- 
 ductor courteously submits the option 
 
 to him to leave the train and walk 
 back, or ride to the next station and 
 return jfree of charge: — held that this 
 amounts to a compulsory choice. 
 Tljpmpson «. New Orleans, &c., R, 
 Co., 50* Miss. 315; 8. c. 19 Am. Rep. 
 13; Thompson on Carriers, 328; An- 
 gell on Carriers, §§ 559-569; 2 Red- 
 field on Railways, § 176; Hutchinson 
 on Carriers, § 613; Pierce on Railways, 
 475. (y. Siner r>. Great Western Ry." 
 Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 150; Evansville, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Duncan, 38 Ind. 44S;; 
 Indianapolis, &c., R. Co, v. Birney, 
 71 111. 391. But see Francis «. St. 
 Louis Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App. 7. 
 In this case the carrier, in violation 
 of its contract, set down the plaintiff 
 a mile from her destination, on a fre- 
 quented street on which street cars 
 passed by which plaintiff could easily 
 have reached her home. She walked 
 the distance, however, and, being in 
 delicate health, contracted such a cold 
 as to permanently injure her health. 
 Held, that the injury was too remote, 
 and that the contributory negligence 
 of the plaintiff was too direct to war- 
 rant a recovery for loss of health and 
 employment. Only a reasonable cost of 
 a conveyance home could be allowed. 
 Henry ». St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 76 Mo. 
 388; 8. c. 43 Am. Rep. 763; Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Green, 81 111. 19; s. c. 
 35 Am. Rep. 355; Commonwealth «., 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 129 Mass. 500;; 
 s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 383; Toledo, &c.,. 
 R. Co. B. Baddeley, 54 111. 19; s. c. 
 5 Am. Rep. 71; Sevier «. Vicksburg, 
 &c. R. Co., 61 Miss. 8; s. c. 48 Am. 
 Rep. 74. 
 
214 RAILWAY PASSENGERS. [§ 165. 
 
 § 164. Where plaintiff is hit by something thrown or 
 dropped from a moving train. — In Carpenter v. Boston & 
 Albany E. Go.' it was decided that where a plaintiff, waiting 
 on the platform of the defendant's station for the purpose of 
 taking an incoming train, was struck by a mail bag, thrown 
 from the postal car in the approaching. train, by a clerk in 
 the employ of the United States goTetnment, and it appear- 
 ing that it had long been the well-known custom to throw off 
 the bags, when passengers were on the platform, and that 
 the defendant took no precautions to prevent injury there- 
 from, such failure on the part of the company was negligent, 
 and that a recovery might be had. The plaintiff used the 
 platform in a lawful manner without negligence,* and was 
 accordingly entitled to protection in this particular. Pre- 
 cisely the same point, coming up in just the same way, was 
 made in the case of Snow v. Fitch burg E. Co.^by the Supreme 
 Judicial Court of Massachusetts ; but when the bag was 
 thrown off, not upon the platform, but some two hundred 
 feet beyond, and struck the leg of a scaffold upon which the 
 plaintiff was at work, so that it fell, and the plaintiff was 
 injured, the Supreme Court of "Wisconsin held that the rail- 
 way company was not liable, upon the ground that the com- 
 pany could not be charged with notice that the bag was 
 likely to be thrown off at the depot, and hence was not 
 bound to guard, by notice or otherwise, against an accident 
 to the plaintiff resulting from its being thrown off as it was 
 upon the occasion in question.* 
 
 § 165. Injuries to free passengers.— When an action is 
 brought against a railway company for damages for an in- 
 jury sustained by a person who was carried gratuitously, 
 two questions are usually presented ; (a) did the telation of 
 carrier and passenger actually subsist iDetween the parties, 
 and (6) was the common law liability of the carrier in any 
 degree limited by special contract? With respect to the 
 first question, it is the general rule that when the carrier 
 
 ' 97 N. T. 494; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. » 136 Mass. 552; s. c 49 Am. Rep, 40. 
 
 540, 4 Muster ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 
 = Upon this point see Weston v. 61 Wis. 325; b. c. 49 Am. Rep, 41. 
 Elevated Ry. Co., 73 N. Y. 595. 
 
§ 165.] 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 
 
 215 
 
 receives the passenger and undertakes his transportation, 
 -whether upon a consideration or not, he becomes ipso facto 
 liable as a carrier for the carriage, and will not be heard to 
 say, when injury results from his carelessness, that the pas- 
 senger rode gratuitously and, therefore, should not recover.^ 
 Having undertaken to carry, the duty arises to carry safely. 
 The carrier does not, by consenting to carry a person gratui- 
 tously, thereby relieve himself of responsibility for negligence. 
 When the assent to the riding free has been legally and prop- 
 erly given, the person carried is entitled in all respects to 
 ihe same degree of care as if he had paid for the transpor- 
 tation.^ " The right which a passenger by a railway has to 
 be carried safely does not depend on his having made a con- 
 tract ; " but, " the fact of his being a passenger, casts a duty 
 on the company to carry him safely."^ But where one rides - 
 upon a railway train, without the proper assent of the com- 
 pany, as a free passenger, the rule is otherwise. There 
 must be a true undertaking to carry; or the relation of car- 
 
 ' Littlejohn v. Fitchburg E. Co., 
 148 Mass. 478; s. c. 20 N. E. Eep. 
 103. But there must be reasonable 
 proof of negligence. The mere fact 
 that plaintiff was injured on the train 
 by the door being shut against him 
 does not, of itself, prove negligence 
 where the carriage was gratuitous. 
 Hospes V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 39 
 Fed. Rep. 763; Austin v. Great West- 
 ern Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 443; Wa- 
 terbuiy v. New York, &c., R. Co., 21 
 Blatchf. 314; Blair ». Erie Ry. Co., 
 66 N. T. 313; s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 55; 
 Todd v. Old Colony, &c., R. Co., 3 
 Allen, 18. "When carriers imder- 
 take to convey persons by the power- 
 ful but dangerous agency of steam, 
 public policy requires that they should 
 be held to the greatest possible care. 
 And whether the consideration be pe- 
 cuniary or otherwise, the personal 
 safety of the passengers should not 
 be left to the sport of chance." Phil- 
 :adelphia, &c., R. Co. v. Derby, 14 
 How. (U. S.) 468; Steamboat New 
 World D. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 469; 
 
 Little Rock, &c., R. Co. ®. Miles, 40 
 Ark. 398; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 10; Nol- 
 ton V. Western R. Co., 15 N. T. 444; 
 Perkins ®. New York, &c., R. Co., 34 
 N. Y. 300; Wilton c. Middlesex R. Co., 
 107 Mass. 108; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 11; 3 
 Redfield on Railways, 184, 185, and 
 notes; Jacobus «. St. Paul, &c., R. 
 Co., 30 Minn. 135; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 
 360. 
 " The cases supra. 
 ' Blackburn, J., in Austin ■». Great 
 Western Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. 
 B. 443. Of. Hammond «. North 
 Eastern R. Co., 6 S. C. 130; s. c. 24 
 Am. Rep. 467, holding that a mail 
 agent who is transported by a railroad 
 company \mder a contract with the 
 government to carry its mail agents 
 free of charge, may maintain an ac- 
 tion against the company to recover 
 damages for injuries arising from neg- 
 ligence. Such action is not founded 
 on the contract with the govern- 
 ment, but upon the duty which the 
 law imposes upon the company. 
 
216 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGEES. 
 
 [§ 166. 
 
 rier and passenger will not be held to subsist.^ So, when 
 the plaintiff rides without the defendant's permission, as 
 where he is invited or suffered to ride gratuitously by the 
 defendant's employees, who have no right to carry any one 
 free, there can be no recovery in case of injury.' 
 
 § 166. The same subject continued. — It is familiar learn- 
 ing that a principal is not liable for the acts of his servant 
 or agent beyond the sphere of his duty, and for the employ^ 
 ees of a railway to invite or permit persons to ride gratui- 
 tously will, generally, be outside the scope of their employ- 
 ment. The train-men are not hired for that sort of service, 
 and it is not in their power to impose a burden upon their 
 employers in that respect. It would be a harsh rule that 
 required a carrier to pay damages for the negligent injury of 
 a person upon their train, whose injury was sustained 
 
 ' In Bricker v. Caldwell (Brlcker ■b. 
 Phila., &c., R. Co.), 133 Penn. St. 1; 
 s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 983, where a pas- 
 senger was riding without the knowl- 
 edge or consent of the company, and 
 in Gardner v. N. H., &c., Co., 51 
 Conn. 143; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 12, 
 where a person was accompanying 
 the owner of stock, no fare having 
 been paid in either of the cases, but 
 both persons intending to do so, it 
 was nevertheless held that they were 
 not passengers toward whom there 
 was any duty of safe carriage. It is 
 held in Massachusetts that a person 
 who gets upon a railroad train after it 
 has started does not become a " pas- 
 senger," within the Pub. Sts. C. 113, 
 § 313, until he reaches a place of safety 
 inside of the car intended for him to 
 ride in, and no action can be main- 
 tained for his death, if he falls off the 
 platform of the car and is killed. 
 Merrills. Eastern R. Co., 139 Mass. 
 388; 8. c. 31 Albany L. J. 503. 
 
 ^ Higgins«. Cherokee R. Co., 73 Ga. 
 149; Lygo v. Newbold, 9 Exch. 303; 
 Eaton «. Delaware, &c,, R. Co., 57 N. 
 Y. 383; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 513; Robert- 
 
 son V. ErieRy. Co., 23 Barb. 91; Sny- 
 der «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 
 413. To recover, the company must 
 be under a duty to the plaintiff, which 
 makes his protection necessary. But 
 here the employees have no authority 
 general or special. The axiom. Qui 
 facit per aliumfadt per se, cannot ap- 
 ply. Flower ®. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 69 Penn. St. 310; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 
 351; Union Pacific Ry. Co. s. Nichols, 
 8 Kan. 505; B. c. 13 Am. Rep. 475; 
 Moss ®. Johnson, 32 111. 633; Quinn ». 
 Power, 24 N. T. Sup. Ct. 102; Hous- 
 ton, &c., R. Co. V. Moore, 49 Tex. 31; 
 s. c. 80 Am. Rep. 98; Cox v. Railway, 
 8 Exch. 368; Marvin v. Wilber, 53 
 N. T. 370, 373; Elkins v. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 33N. H. 375. But see 
 Prince V. International, &c., R. Co., 
 64 Tex. 144; B. c. 30 Cent. L. J. 479, 
 where it is held that a person in- 
 jured through the negligence of the 
 servants of a railroad company while 
 riding gratuitously on a hand-car at 
 the invitation of the company's agent, 
 may recover damages from the com- 
 pany. 
 
§ 167.] RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 21T 
 
 tkrough the negligence of the very employees who wrong- 
 fully permitted him to be upon the train as a free passen- 
 ger.* In cases of this kind, the defendant corporation was 
 not a carrier as to the plaintiff, nor under a carrier's obliga- 
 tion as to him. No contract of carriage, express or ifiiplied^ 
 can be assumed to exist in such a case, and such a passenger 
 must be held to travel at his own proper peril. 
 
 § 167. Newsboys, peddlers, &c.— A question as to the 
 liability of the railway, may arise in cases of injury to per- 
 sons allowed to be upqn the trains of the company in the 
 capacity of newsboys, peddlers and the like. In the case of 
 the Commonwealth v. Vermont, &c., E. Co.,^ in which a per- 
 son, who furnished the passengers upon the defendants' traina 
 with iced water, under a contract with the company, and wa& 
 also allowed to ride upon the trains and sell pop-corn, was 
 negligently killed while so riding, it was held that, while 
 traveling under this arrangement, such person was a passen- 
 ger, and not an employee, and that, consequently, the com- 
 pany might be held responsible for the injury he sustained. 
 And the same rule was declared in Toemans v. Contra Costa 
 Steam Navigation Co.^ In this case it appears that the 
 plaintiff kept a bar upon the defendant's steamboat, paying 
 two hundred dollars per month for the privilege. He also 
 acted as agent for an express company which carried on Ita 
 business over the defendant's lines. The defendant's route 
 consisted partly of a passage by steamer and partly of a 
 passage by railway, and the plaintiff was injured by one of 
 the defendant's locomotives while on his way to the boat on 
 his proper business. The eourt held him a passenger, and 
 not an employee, and, therefore, entitled to his action.* But,^ 
 
 '■ Shennan v. Hannibal, &c., R Co., defendant's cars, in the performance 
 
 72 Mo. 62; 8. 0. 37 Am. Rep. 433; of an errand for the driver. Jumping 
 
 New Orleans, &c., R. Co. ■». Harri- from the car, while in motion, he was 
 
 son, 48 Miss. 112; e. c. 18 Am. Rep. severely injured. Held, that the ne- 
 
 356. gleet of the employees of the duty to 
 
 ' 108 Mass. 7; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 301. collect fare, did not relieve them of 
 
 ' 44 Cal. 71. the obligations to use reasonable care 
 
 *Brennant).Fairhaven,&c.,R.Co,45 not to injure the plaintiflf. The latter. 
 
 Conn. 284; B.C. 29 Am. Rep. 679, where because of his tender years, should 
 
 the plaintiff, a boy ten years old, was have been forced to obey the rule of 
 
 riding free on the platform of one of the company not to stand on the plat- 
 
218 RAILWAY PASSENGEES. [§ 168. 
 
 on the contrary, a railway company is not liable for the acci- 
 dental death of a boy, permitted by the conductor, against its 
 rules, to ride gratuitously on the train to sell papers.^ The 
 duty of the carrier toward express messengers, mail agents, 
 persons riding on drovers' passes, and such other classes of 
 persons as may be denominated quasi passengers, has been 
 considered in a preceding section.^ 
 
 § 168. Carrier'sliabilitylimitedby contract.— It is not un- 
 common for a common carrier to stipulate, as part of the con- 
 ■tract by which he undertakes to transport passengers gratu- 
 itously, against liability to such passengers in case of injury. 
 When a pass is issued it generally contains some such exemp- 
 tion clause as this : — " The person accepting and using this 
 pass assumes all risks and damages for any injury to the per- 
 son, or for any loss or injury to his property, while using or 
 having the benefit of it, and waives all claim on this com- 
 pany therefor,"' or, " The person accepting this ticket 
 assumes, in consideration thereof, all risks of accidents, and 
 ■expressly agrees that the company shall not be liable under 
 any circumstances, whether of negligence by their agents or 
 otherwise, for any injury to the person, or for any loss or 
 injury to the property of the person using this ticket,"^ or, 
 " The person accepting and using this pass thereby assumes 
 all risk of accident and damage to person or property."' 
 By some such stipulation as this it is generally sought to 
 ■escape liability in case of injury to free passengers. The 
 courts have, in consequence, been called upon repeatedly to 
 pass upon the question whether, in this or any equivalent 
 way, a common carrier may thus stipulate, and, by special 
 contract, exempt himself, in cases of this kind, from liability 
 for his own or his servant's negligence. 
 
 tana.. The boy, even if regarded as ''§144, gupra. 
 
 a trespasser, could have his action ' This is the clause Inserted in 
 
 against the company. Smallman ». passes issued by the Chicago, Milwau- 
 
 Whllter, 87 El. 545; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. kee & St. Paul R. Co. 
 
 76; Barry ■». Oyster Bay, &c.. Steam- * Old Dominion Steamship Co.'s 
 
 boat Co., 67 N. Y. 301; s. c. 38 Am. 
 
 Rep, 115. ' Upon passes issued by the Louis- 
 
 1 Duffl «. Allegheny R. Co. , 91 Penn. ville and Nashville R. Co. 
 St. 458; B. c. 36 Am. Rep. 675. 
 
§ 169.] RAILWAY PASSENGEES. 219 
 
 § 169. The English rule.— The older English authorities 
 answered this question in the negative, holding special stipu- 
 lations by a public carrier, against liability for negligence or 
 misconduct, illegal and void. Thus, in the Doctor and Stu- 
 dent,^ speaking of a common carrier, it is said :- — " If he would 
 per se refuse to carry it [article delivered for carriage] unless 
 promise were made unto him that he shall not be charged 
 for no misdemeanor that should be in him, the promise were 
 void, for it were against reason and against good manners, 
 and so it is in all other cases like."'* This was the law in 
 England until about the year 1832,* but from that time, until 
 the passage of the Railway and Traffic Acts of 1854, it was 
 held that a carrier might, by a special notice, make a con- 
 tract limiting his responsibility, even in the case of gross 
 negligence, misconduct or fraud, on the part of his servants.* 
 " It is not for us," said Baron Parke, in a case decided in 
 1852,^ " to fritter away the true sense and mending these con- 
 tracts merely with a view to make men careful. If any in- 
 convenience should arise from their being entered into, this 
 is not a matter for our interference, but it must be 
 left to the legislature, who may, if they please, put a 
 stop to this mode which carriers have adopted of limit- 
 ing their liability." The railway companies were, therefore, 
 enabled for the most part, " to evade altogether the salutary 
 policy of the common law." In this state of the law, parlia- 
 ment, in 1854, passed the act entitled, " The Eailway and Canal 
 Traffic Act,"® which made railways liable for the negligence 
 of themselves or their servants, notwithstanding any notice 
 or condition to the contrary, unless the court should adjudge 
 
 ' Dial, 2, c. 38. shire, &c., Ry. Co., 31 L. J. (N. S.) 
 
 ''Quoted in Noy's Maxims, 92. See, Q. B. 22; Carr v. Lancashire, &c., Ry. 
 
 also, 2 Stephens' Commentaries 135. Co., 7 Exch. 707; Great Northern, 
 
 'Peek T. North Staffordshire, &c., &c., Ry. Co. v. Morville, 21 L. J. (N. 
 
 Ry. Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 494. S.) Q. B. 319; York, Ac, Ry. Co. «. 
 
 ' Wyld V. Pickford, 8 Mee. & W. Crisp, 14 C. B. 527; Hughes v. Great 
 
 443; Walker o. York, &c., Ry. Co., Western, &c., Ry. Co., 14 C. B. 637; 
 
 2 El. and BI. 750; Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Slim v. Great Northern, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 Q. B. 646; Shaw v. York, &c., Ry. 14 C. B. 647. 
 
 Co., 13Q.B. 347; Austin ». Manches- 'Carr v. Lancashire, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 ter, &c., Ry. Co., 16 Q. B. 600; s. c. 7 Exch. 707. 
 
 10 C. B. 454; Chippendale v. Lanca- '17 and 18 Vict., c. 31, § 7. 
 
220 BAILWAY PASSENGEBS. [§ 170. 
 
 the conditions just and reasonable/ Much controversy has 
 arisen in the courts in construing this act f but it seems now 
 to be settled that it amounts, in effect, to a restoration of the 
 common law doctrine as held prior to the year 1832.* 
 
 § 170. The rule ofthe Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 — The leading authority in this counfry upon the question^ 
 is Eailroad Co. v. Lockwood, decided by the Supreme Court 
 of the United States, at the October term, in 1873.* Mr. 
 Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court, which, 
 after a very full and impartial review of the authorities, con- 
 cludes as follows : — " The conclusions to which we have 
 come are : — 
 
 " First. That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate 
 for exemption from responsibility when such exemption is 
 not just and reasonable in the eye of the law. 
 
 " Secondly. That it is not just and reasonable, in the eye of 
 the law, for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption 
 from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his 
 servant. 
 
 " Thirdly. That these rules apply both to carriers of 
 goods and carriers of passengers for hire, and with special 
 force to the latter. 
 
 " Fourthly. That a drover, traveling on a pass, such as was 
 given in this case, for the purpose of taking care of his stock 
 on the train, is a passenger for ,hire. 
 
 " These conclusions decide the present case, and require 
 a judgment of aflarmance. We purposely abstain from ex- 
 pressing any opinion as to what would have been the result 
 of our judgment, had we considered the plaintiff a free 
 passenger instead of a passenger of hire." 
 
 ' 1 Fisher's Digest, 1466. Mamis «. Lancashire, &c., Ry. Co., 4 
 
 ^Pardington v. South Wales Ry. Hurl. & N. 328. " The truth is, that 
 
 Co., 1 Hurl, and N. 393, where Martin, this statute did little more than bring 
 
 B., and Bramwell, B., indicated that back the law to the original position 
 
 notwithstanding the Act, special con- in which it stood before the English 
 
 tracts with railway companies were courts took their departure from it." 
 
 binding, whether the conditions con- Bradley, J., In Railroad Co. ®. Lock- 
 
 tained in them were reasonable or not. wood, 17 Wall. 364. 
 
 ' Peek V. North Staffordshire, &c., * 17 Wall. 357; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 
 
 Ry. Co., 10 H. of L. Cas. 473; Mo- 366. 
 
§ 171.] RAILWAY PASSENGEES. 221 
 
 § 171. The New York rule.— In some of the earlier deci- 
 sions of various State courts in this country, there was a 
 "tendency, as between what was denominated gross negligence, 
 and what is called ordinary negligence, to hold that, while a 
 carrier might lawfully stipulate, in these cases, against lia- 
 l)ility for the consequences of ordinary neglect, it was con- 
 trary to public policy to permit such a stipulation for the con- 
 sequences of gross negligence.* But in the case from which I 
 have just quoted,^ and which is everywhere regarded as a con- 
 trolling authority, except, possibly, in the State of New York, 
 -where the Court of Appeals refuses to be influenced by it, 
 speaking to this point, it is said : — "We have already adverted 
 to the tendency of judicial opinion, adverse to the distinction 
 between gross and ordinary negligence. Strictly speaking, 
 these distinctions are indicative, rather of the degree of care 
 and diligence which is due from a party, and which he fails 
 to perform, than of the amount of inattention, carelessness, 
 •or stupidity which he exhibits. If very little care is due 
 from him, and he fails to bestow that little, it is called gross 
 negligence ; if very great care is due, and he fails to come up 
 
 iWells«.NewTork, «fcc.,R. Co.,26 Wend. 251; s. c. 33 Am. Dec. 470, 
 Barb. 641; s. c. 24 N. T. 181: Per- and Mr. Freeman's learned note ap 
 THtis v. New York, Ac, R. Co., 24 pended, in which the authorities pro 
 K. T. 196; Smith ®. New York, &c., and con are very fully cited; Hale v. 
 E. Co., 29 Barb. 132; s. c. 24 N. Y. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 15 Conn. 
 232; Bissell «. New York, &c., R Co., 539; s. c. 39 Am. Dec. 398; Lawrence v. 
 39 Barb. 603; 8. c. 25 N. Y. 443; New York, &c., R. Co., 86 Conn. 63; 
 Poucher v. New York, &c., R. Co., Kimball v. Rutland, &c., R. Co., 26 
 49 N. Y. 263; 8. c. 10 Am. Rep. 364. Vt. 247; Mann «. Birchard,40 Vt. 326; 
 In Ashmore v. Pennsylvania Steam, Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Adams, 42 1)1. 
 &c., Co., 28 N. J. Law, 180, Van 474; Hawkins v. Great Western R. 
 Dyke, J. (p. 192), lays down the rule Co., 17 Mich. 57; s. c. 18 Mich. 427; 
 that "a carrier taking the exclusive Baltimore, &c., R. Co. ®. Brady, 33 
 custody and control of the property Md. 328; Levering v. Union, &c., R. 
 of another, should be allowed to make Co., 43 Md. 88. Many of these cases 
 no contract by which he can justify were, however, decided by divided 
 himself in or defend himself against courts ; some of them limit the excep- 
 his own clear positive wrong, default, tion to cases of slight negligence, some 
 or misconduct, whether it arise from of them to ordinary negligence, and a 
 his own wilfulness, recklessness, in- few of them incline to extend the doc- 
 capacity, want of skill, or the failure trine to cases of gross negligence, 
 to exact it." Kinney v. Central, &c., ' Railroad Co. ■». Lockwood, 17 
 R. Co., 34 N. J. Law, 513; 8. c. 3 Wall. 357. 
 Am. Rep. 365; Cole «. Goodwin, 19 
 
222 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 
 
 [§ 172. 
 
 to the work required, it is called slight negligence ; and, if 
 ordinary care is due, such as a prudent man would exercise 
 in his own affairs, failure to bestow that amount of care is 
 called ordinary negligence. In each case, the negligence, 
 whatever epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the care and 
 skill which the situation demands, and hence it is more 
 strictly accurate, perhaps, to call it simply negligence, and 
 this seems to be the tendency of modern authority." 
 
 § 172. The general American rnle.— Aside from New York, 
 where it may now be regarded as settled that a common car- 
 rier for hire, or otherwise, may, by special contract, exempt 
 himself from all responsibility for loss or damage, arising 
 from the negligence of his servants, though this negligence 
 be gross,^ it is the general rule in this country, in both State 
 and federal Courts, that, while a common carrier for hire, 
 or otherwise, may, by express agreement, limit his common 
 law liability as an insurer of property intrusted to him for 
 transportation, he cannot stipulate for freedom from liability 
 
 > Ulricli ®. N.Y. Cent., &c.,R. Co., 
 108 N. T. 80; B. c. Ip N. E.Rep. 60; 
 Poucher ». New York, &c., R. Co., 
 49 N. T. 363; s. C. 10 Am. Rep. 364; 
 Cragin ». N. Y., &c., R. Co., 51 N. Y. 
 61; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 559; Bissell ». 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 25 N. Y. 
 442. A special contract, exempting a 
 carrier from liability foi loss occa- 
 sioned by negligence of its servants, 
 does not exempt tbe carrier from Ua- 
 bUity for its own negligence. Wein- 
 berg V. National S. S. Co., 57 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 586; s. c. 8 N. Y. SupL 
 195; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 70 N. Y. 
 410; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 608 ; 56 N. Y. 
 168; Steers v. Liverpool, New York, 
 &c.. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1; s. c. 
 15 Am. Rep. 453; Canfleld v. Bal- 
 timore, &c., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 533; 
 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 268; 75 N. Y. 
 144; Mynard v. Syracuse, &c., R. 
 Co., 71 N. Y. 188; s. c. 27 Am. Rep. 
 28. Where the contract provided 
 that written losses should be presented 
 
 within a month, it was held that the 
 month did not run while the carrier 
 was making efforts to trace and find 
 lost goods. Ghormley ». Dinsmore, 
 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 196. Qt- Sey- 
 bolt V. Brie Ry. Co., 95 N. Y. 563, 
 where a pass issued to a mail agent, 
 contaming a clause exempting the 
 company from liability was held no 
 bar to an action, on the ground that 
 the United States government does 
 not give its agents authority to enter 
 into contracts of this kind. (TJ. S. 
 R. S. §§ 3997 to 4005.) See, also, 
 ,Kenney v. New York, &c., R. Co., 7 
 N. Y. Supl. 255, where a contract be- 
 tween the railroad company and an 
 express company, exonerating the 
 former from liability for any injury 
 to an employee of the latter, was held 
 to confer no immunity for negligence 
 causiiig the death of an express mes- 
 senger who was Ignorant of the agree- 
 ment. 
 
§ 172.] 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 
 
 223 
 
 for injury or loss, resulting from the negligence of himself 
 or his servants, nor limit his liability, as a common carrier 
 at common law, to such injuries or losses as are caused by 
 his own, or his agents' gross negligence. Only a very small 
 part of the multitude of decisions of all the courts that in- 
 sist upon the salutary rule can be cited here.^ It has been 
 
 » Maslin v. BaltimoTe, &c,, R Co., 
 14 West Va. 180; s. c. 35 Am. Eep. 
 748 [entitled to rank as a leading 
 case, the opinion of Green, J., 
 wherein is luminous and exhaustive]. 
 Chicago, &c.,Ry. Qp. ■». Chapman, 30 
 m. App. 504; BaU c. Wabash, &c.. 
 By. Co., 83 Mo. 574; Little Rock, 
 &c., Ry. Co. r. Talbot, 47 Ark. 97; 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. «. Vandeventer, 
 26 Neb. 232; s. c 41 N. W. Rep. 998 
 (Const. Neb. § 4, Art. 11); Western 
 Transit Co. u. Hosking, 19 HI. App. 
 607; Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. v. Chap- 
 man (m.), 24 N. E. Rep. 417; Grogan 
 V. Adams Exp. Co., 114 Penn. St. 
 533; 8. c. 7 Atl. Rep. 134; Ortt v. 
 Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 
 396; E. c. 31 N.W. Rep. 519; Walling- 
 ford «). Columbia, &c., R. Co., 36 
 S. C. 358; s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 19; Mc- 
 Fadden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 93 
 Mo. 343; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 689; Mis- 
 souri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 67 Tex. 
 166; s. c. 2 S. W. Rep. 574; Gulf, 
 &c., Ry. Co. V. Trawick, 68 Tex. 314; 
 B. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 567. A statute 
 forbidding common carriers to impose 
 restrictions of their liability is not in- 
 fringed by a provision in a bill of lad- 
 ing that the carrier shall have the 
 benefit of any insurance to the owner 
 on the freight. British, &c., Ins. Co. 
 c. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co., 63 Tex. 475; 
 8. c. 51 Am. Rep. 661; East Tenn., 
 &c., R. Co. V. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596; 
 8. c. 51 Am. Rep. 489; Pennsylvania 
 R Co. a Riordon, 119 Penn. St. 
 577; s. c. 13 Atl. Rep. 334; Alabama, 
 &c., R. Co. D. Thomas, 83 Ala. 343; 
 8. c. 8 So. Rep. 803; Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. ComwSll, 70 Tex. 611; 
 
 8. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 313. A carrier 
 cannot exempt himself by contract 
 from liability for the wilful miscon- 
 duct of his servants. Ronan v. ' Mid- 
 land Ry. Co., 47 L. R. Ir. 157; Ryan 
 V. Missouri, &c., Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 13; 
 s. c. 57 Am. Rep. 589; Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Oden, 80 Ala. 38. The 
 South Carolina statute prohibiting 
 contracts limiting common law liabil- 
 ity does not apply to a contract made 
 in South Carolina by a corporation 
 organized in another State, respecting 
 liability for goods delivered to it in 
 the latter State for transportation 
 therein. Piatt v. Richmond, &c., R. 
 Co., 108 N.T. 358. See, generally on 
 this subject, Taylor on Private Corpo- 
 rations, %352et seq.j- Laing«. Colder, 8 
 Penn. St. 479; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 538; 
 Empire Trans. Co. v. Wamsutta Oil 
 Co., 68 Penn. St. 14; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 
 515; Pennsylvania R. Co. ». Hender- 
 son, 51 Penn. St. 315; Jones v. Voor- 
 hees, 10 Ohio, 145; Cleveland, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1; s. c. 
 3 Am. Rep. 362; Knowlton v. Erie 
 Ry. Co., 19 Ohio St. 260; s. c. 3 
 Am. Rep. 395. Sayer v. Portsmouth, 
 &c., R. Co., 31 Me. 328, holding that 
 the common law liability of a com- 
 mon carrier may be restricted by a 
 notice from him, brought home to 
 the knowledge of the customer, as to 
 the extent of the liability to be borne 
 by the carrier. But no notice or con- 
 tract can exonerate the carrier from 
 liability for damage occasioned by 
 Ms negligence or misconduct. School ' 
 District V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 102 
 Mass. 552; s. c. 3 Am, Rep. 503; Gait 
 V. Adams Express Co., MacArth. & 
 
224 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGEES. 
 
 [§ 172. 
 
 held by some courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, that a common carrier may limit the amount 
 •of his liability for loss occurring even from his own negli- 
 gence, the contract being fairly made, signed by the shipper, 
 and the rate of freight charged being based on the agreed 
 valuation.^ Whether a carrier may lawfully stipulate for ex- 
 emption from liability for injuries to^free passengers, and if 
 so, to what extent, are questions concerning which the de- 
 cisions are not in accord. In Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, 
 Delaware, Missouri, and Texas, such a stipulation, so fa,r as 
 it exempits the carrier from' the consequences of his own or 
 his servants' negligence, is invalid.' In Illinois, Indiana, 
 Minnesota, and Wisconsin, the carrier may relieve himself 
 
 Mack. 134: 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 742; 
 Xansas, &c. , R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 
 -Kan. 645; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 104; 
 Chicago, &o., R. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 
 1003; a. c. 45 Am. Rep. 438; Black 
 ■». Goodrich Trans. Co., 55 Wis. 319; 
 B. c. 43 Am. Rep. 718. Where there 
 is a contract limiting the liability of a 
 common carrier of goods , the burden 
 is on the carrier, and not on the own- 
 ers, to show from what cause a loss or 
 injury occurs. Shriver v. Sioux City, 
 &o., R. Co., 34 Minn. 506; s. c. 31 
 Am. Rep. 358; Virginia, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Sayres, 36 Gratt. 328; New Or- 
 leans, &c., Ins. Co. «. Railroad Co., 
 20 La. Ann. 303; Merchants', &ci, Co. 
 ■». Cornforth, 3 Colo. 380; s. c. 35 
 Am. Rep. 757; Brie Ry. Co. ■». Wil- 
 -cox, 84 111.' 389; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 
 451; OmdorfE v. Adams Express Co., 
 3 Bush, 194. Express companies, so 
 far as they are common carriers, may 
 reasonably limit their liabilities, but 
 public policy will not permit them, 
 even by special contract, to be ex- 
 empted for losses occasioned by the 
 negligence or misfeasance of them- 
 selves, or their servants. Southern 
 "Express Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468; 
 8. 0. 4 Am. Rep. 140; Swindler «. 
 Hilliard, 2 Rich. (Law) 286; 8. c. 45 
 Am. Dec. 733; Flinn v. Phila.,&c., 
 
 R. Co., 1 Hous. (Del.) 472; Ohio, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Selby,47 Ind. 471; s. c. 17 
 Am. Rep. 719; Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Nichols, 71 Ind. 371; Graham v. Pa- 
 cific R. Co., 66 Mo. 586; Rose v. Des 
 Moines, &c., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 346; 
 Jacobus V. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Minn, 135; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 360; 
 Railroad Co. v. Stevens,, 95 U. 8. 
 655. 
 
 ' Hart V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 113 
 TJ. S. 331, where the authorities pro 
 and con are collected. We do not 
 regard a contract limiting the right of 
 recqvery to a sum expressly agreed 
 upon by the parties as representing 
 the true value of the property shipped 
 as a contract in any degree exempting 
 the carrier from the consequences of 
 his own negligence. Brown u Wa- 
 bash, &c., Ry. Co., 18 Mo. App, 
 568. 
 
 ' Camden, &c., R. Co. ■». Bausch 
 (Penn.), 7 Atl. Rep. 731; Penn. 
 R. Co. «. Butler, 57 Penn. St. 335 
 Penn. R. Qo. «. Henderson, 51 Penn, 
 St. 315; Cleveland, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1; Mobile, &c. 
 R. Co. ■». Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486 
 Flinn®. Phila., &o., R. Co., IHoust, 
 (Del.) 469; Bryan ». Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 32 Mo. App. 238; Gulf, &c. 
 Co. V. McGown, 65 Tex. 640. 
 
§ 173.] 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGEBS. 
 
 225 
 
 from ordinary, but not from gross negligence.^ In England, 
 Oanada, New York, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, West 
 Tirginia, and Massachusetts, the carrier, in consideration of 
 free passage, may contract for exemption from all liability 
 for negligence of every kind, provided the exemption is 
 clearly and explicitly stated.^ The fact that a person is 
 traveling on a free pass does not necessarily subject him to 
 conditions of this kind contained therein. A drover traveling 
 free for the purpose of caring for stock for the transporta- 
 tion of which freight is paid, has been uniformly held to be 
 a passenger for hire.' 
 
 § 1 73. Passenger's negligence as to baggage.— The com- 
 mon law makes the carrier an insurer of the passenger's bag- 
 gage, and he is answerable for all loss or damage to it, not 
 occasioned by act of God or the public enemy, although the 
 owner accompanies the property.* But in order to this 
 
 ' m. Cent. R. Co. v. Read, 37 111. 
 484; 111. Cent. R. Co. o. Morrison, 19 
 111. 136; Ind. Cent. R. Co. s. Mundy, 
 21 Ind. 48; O. & M. R. Co. e. Selby, 
 47 Ind. 471; Jacobus v. St. Paul, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 20 Minn. 125; Annas v. Mil- 
 waukee, &c., R Co., 67 Wis. 46; 
 s. c. 67 Am. Rep. 388, and the note. 
 
 ' McCawley vt Fumess R. Co., L. R. 
 8 Q. B. 57; Hall «. N. E. R. Co., 
 10 Q. B. 437; Dufl v. G. N. R. Co., 4 
 L. R. It. 178; Alexander «. Toronto, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 33 Upper Canada. 474. 
 See New York cases cited in § 172, 
 lupra; Kinney v. Cent. R. Co., 82 
 N. J. Law, 407; s. c. 34 N. J. Law, 
 513; Western, Ac, R. Co. e. Bishop, 
 60Ga. 465; Griswold v. N. T.,&c., 
 R. Co., 53 Conn. 371, case of a minor; 
 B. & O. R. Co. V. Skeels, 3 West Va. 
 656; Quimby v. Boston & A. R. Co., 
 160 Mass. 365. Children of such an 
 age that they are carried free, if ac- 
 companied by adults, are within 1 
 Pub. St Mass. c. 112, § 212, making a 
 railroad company liable in damages 
 to passengers whose lives are lost in 
 nulroad accidents, etc., though the 
 15 
 
 accompanying adults are riding on 
 free passes. Littlejohn e. Fitchburg 
 R Co., 148 Mass. 478; s. c. 20 N. E. 
 Rep. 103. See an essay, "The 
 Rights of Gratuitous Passengers on 
 Railways," by H. Campbell Black, 
 Esq., 20 Cent. L. J. 485. See further, 
 other articles on the same subject in 
 30 Cent. L. J. 397, note; and 29 Am. 
 Law. Reg. (N. S.) 391, note. 
 
 ' Maslin <b. Baltimore, &c., R Co., 
 14 West Va. 180; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 
 748; Penn. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 
 Penn. St. 315; Knowlton s. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 19 Ohio St. 960; s.c. 2 Am. Rep. 
 395; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 
 Wall. 357; a. c. 10 Am. Rep. 366; 
 Ohio, &c., R. Co. V. Selby, 47 Ind. 
 471; 8. c. 17 Am. Rep. 719; Flinn e. 
 Phila., &c., R Co., 1 Houst. (Del.) 
 472; Ohio, Ac, R. Co. v. Nichols, 71 
 Ind. 271; Railroad Co. v. Stevens, 95 
 U. S. 655. See, also, Camden, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Bausch (Penn.), 7 Atl. Rep. 
 731. 
 
 * Cole o. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251; 
 s. 0. 32 Am. Dec. 470, and the note; 
 Bomar?. Maxwell, 9Himiph. (Tenn.) 
 
226 
 
 RAILWAY PASSENGEB8. 
 
 [§ 173, 
 
 liability there must be a delivery of the baggage to the car- 
 rier — a real bailment. The passenger must wholly part with 
 the possession of his luggage, or the carrier will not be liable.* 
 It is accordingly held that sleeping and parlor car companies 
 are not, in respect of their passenger's luggage, either inn- 
 keepers or common carriers, because the passenger in those 
 cars does not surrender the possession of his goods.' This 
 rule ceases, howeyer, with the reason for it, and if a sleeping 
 car company renders service similar in kind to an inn-keeper, 
 as when a passenger places wearing apparel in the care of 
 the porter, the company is liable if it is stolen.* The sleep- 
 
 620; 8. c. 51 Am. Dec. 682; Peixotti 
 v. McLaughlin, 1 Strobh. 468; b. c. 
 47 Am. Dec. 563; Tower v. Utica, 
 &c., R. Co., 7 mil, 47; s. c. 42 Am. 
 Dec. 36; Logan «. Pontchartrain, 11 
 Robinson (La.) 24; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 
 199. By baggage is understood such 
 articles of necessity or personal con- 
 venience as are usually carried by 
 passengers for their own use. The 
 question of what is baggage is one 
 for the jury, under the direction of 
 the court, based on the travelers con- 
 dition in life. Dibble v. Brown, 12 
 Ga. 217; s. c. 56 Am. Dec. 560. Money 
 to the amount of $90,000 is not "lug- 
 gage," which a railroad company is 
 compelled to carry with or for a pas- 
 senger. The company may insist that 
 the money shall go ejas an express 
 company, for which, under a special 
 contract, the railroad company fur- 
 nishes facilities. Pflster v. Central 
 Pac. R. Co., 70 Cal. 169; Camden, &c., 
 R. Co! V. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St 67; 
 s. c. 55 Am. Dec. 481; Woods®. De- 
 vin, 18 m. 747; s. c. 56 Am. Dec. 483. 
 » Wilkins v. Earl, 3 Rob. 369; s. c. 
 19 Abb. Pr. 196; Tower ®. Utica, &c., 
 R. Co., 7 Hill, 47; s. o. 42 Am. IJec. 
 86; Weeks ®. New York, &c., R. Co. 
 9 Hun, 671; s. c. 72 N. Y. 50; The R. 
 E. Lee, 2 Abb. (U. S.)49. Thus, a 
 watch, worn by a passenger on his 
 person by day, and kept by him with- 
 in reach for use at night, whether 
 
 retained upon his person or placed 
 under his pillow, is not so intrusted to 
 the custody and control of the carrier 
 as to make the latter liable for its loss. 
 Clark ». Bums, 118 Mass. 275; Berg- 
 heim v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 3 C. 
 P. D. 221; SUrley's Leading Cases, 
 59; Meniam v. Hartford, &c., R. Co., 
 20 Conii. 354; s. c. 52 Am. Dec. 344; 
 Railroad Co. ®. Barrett, 36 Ohio St. 
 453. 
 
 ' Thompson on Carriers, 530, § 20; 
 Welch V. Pullman Palace Car Co., 16 
 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 352; Pullman Palace 
 Car Co. «. Smith, 73 111. 365. See, 
 also, Macklin v. Kew Jersey Steam- 
 boat Co., 7 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 236; 
 Morris «. Third Ave. R. Co., 23 How. 
 Pr. 345, and " The responsibility of 
 the Pullman Palace Car Company for 
 thefts from passengers," by the Hon. 
 Sterling B. Toney, of the Louisville 
 Law & Equity Court, 19 Am. Law 
 Rev. (N. S.) 204, in which this ques- 
 tion is thoroughly and learnedly dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 ' Pullman Palace Car Co. ®, Lowe, 
 28 Neb. 239; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 226; 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v Ks,tzen- 
 berger, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 380; b. c. 57 
 Am. Rep. 232. The liability of a sleep- 
 ing-car company for loss of property 
 intrusted to its porter by a passenger, 
 and whether the company is liable 
 therefor as an inn-keeper is discussed* 
 and many American decisions and ci- 
 
§ 174.] RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 227 
 
 ing car compauj is botmd to use reasonable care to guard a 
 passenger from theft, and if, through want of such care, per- 
 sonal effects such as he may reasonably carry with him are 
 stolen the company is liable.* It cannot ayoid liability by 
 posting in the car a notice disclaiming responsibility for prop- 
 erty in the berths, if the notice is not known to the passenger.' 
 If a passenger retires from the car, even for a few minutes, leav- 
 ing valuable property exposed to theft, without notice to the 
 company's servants,' or goes to another part of the car for a 
 necessary purpose, leaving a large sum of money in his vest 
 pocket under his pillow,* it is such contributory negligence 
 as wUl defeat a recovery for its loss ; unless it be stolen by 
 one of the company's servants, in which case the company is 
 liable to a reasonable amount regardless of contributory 
 negligence.' 
 
 § 174. Conditions stamped or printed on checks. — 
 
 Notices or conditions, stamped or printed upon a baggage 
 check, have no effect to limit the carrier's liability, the check 
 being no evidence of any contract. Such notices do not 
 bind the passenger, unless his assent to the condition is. 
 shown, and accepting the check is no evidence of such as- 
 sent.* It is not contributory negligence on the part of a. 
 
 tations from text-books bearing upon * Wilson v. Baltimore, &c., R. Co. 
 
 the subject are collected by W. F. El- 32 Mo. App. 683. See, also. Boot «. 
 
 liott, Esq., in 30 Cent. L. J. 248, note. N. T. Cent. Sleeping-car Co., 28 Mo. 
 
 1 Lewis c. N. Y. Sleeping-car Co., App. 199. 
 
 143 Mass. 267; s. c. 56 Am. Rep. 852, ' Root v. N. T. Cent. Sleeping-car 
 
 note; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pol- Co., 28 Mo. App. 199. In Florida v. 
 
 lock, 69 Tex. 130;s. c.5 S. W. Rep. Pullman Palace Car Co., 37 Mo. App. 
 
 814; Root v. N. T. Cent. Sleeping-car 598, it was held not negligent for a 
 
 Co., 28 Mo. App. 199. The company is passenger to leave clothing and other 
 
 liable only for an amount necessary property in a vacant berth directly 
 
 for the reasonable expenses of the pas- above him, though he had not pur- 
 
 senger's journey. Illinois Cent. R. chased or secured the use of the berth. 
 
 Co. B. Handy, 63 Miss. 609; Wilson «. « Wilson v. Chesapeake, &c., R. Co... 
 
 Baltimore, &c , R. Co., 32 Mo. App. 21 Gratt. 654; Mauritz r>. N. Y., &c., 
 
 882. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 765. The ticket 
 
 » Lewis «). N. Y. Cent. Sleeping-car or check is not a written contract. 
 
 Co. , 143 Mass. 267; Louisville, &c., signed by the parties. It is, at most, 
 
 B. Co. V. Katzenberger, 16 Lea evidence of some existing contract, 
 
 (Tenn.) 380. *nd merely goes to show that its pos- 
 
 » Whitney v. Pullman's Palace Car sessor has paid the required stipend. 
 
 Co. 143 Mass. 343. Burnham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 63 
 
228 BAILWAT PAS8ENGEBS. [§ 175. 
 
 passenger to take the checks that a baggage-master gives 
 him, without examining them.* If the baggage miscarries 
 and the passenger is thereby injured, he may have his ac- 
 tion,^ and, when a passenger leaves the train without claiming 
 his baggage, such an act on his part is not negligence which 
 absolves the carrier from liability;' and, upon ^he other 
 hand, when a passenger upon arriving at his destination, in- 
 stead of trusting the carrier, as he might lawfully do, under 
 the doctrine of the case just cited, goes forward to the bag- 
 gage car, immediately upon alighting from the train, in or- 
 der to look up his luggage, and assist about it, and while so 
 engaged, is run over and killed by the negligence of the de- 
 fendant's servants, it is held that an action will lie against 
 the conipany, and that a plea of contributory negligence is 
 bad. Negligence is iiot imputable to one who looks after his 
 property in a lawful manner in such a case as this.^ 
 
 § 176. TraTellng on Sunday.— In some of the New En- 
 gland courts it has been held that when one travels on Sunday, 
 in violation of a statute which prohibits traveling on the 
 Lord's day, except from necessity or charity, no action can 
 be maintained for an injury thereby sustained. The violation 
 of law involved in traveling on Sunday is, in those States, a 
 sufficient defense to an action for damages for an injury re- 
 sulting from the defendant's negligence. In Massachusetts 
 the courts s6em to proceed upon the theory of contributory 
 negligence. Nothing could, however, be more illogical or 
 judicially absurd. " The Massachusetts decisions upon the 
 Sunday law," said Mr. Justice Grier, " depend upon the pe- 
 culiar legislation and customs of that State more than upon 
 
 Me. 298; s. o. 18 Am. Rep. 320. The 97; Rawson v. Perm. R. Co., 48 N. 
 
 laUroad company camiot limit its lia- T. 212; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 543; Madan 
 
 hility as an insurer of bisiggage by any v. Sherard, 73 N. T. 329; s. c. 29 
 
 special arrangement with the sleeping- Am. Rep. 158. 
 
 car company, because, so long as the 'Isaacson «. New York, Ac, R. 
 
 sleeper fonns part of the train, negli- Co., 94 N. Y. 278; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 
 
 ^enceonthe part of the sleeping-car 142. 
 
 agents is the negligence of the railway " Estes ». St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 7 
 
 ■company running the train. Louis- N. Y. Supl. 863. 
 
 ville, &c., R. Co. v. Katzenberger, 16 " Gary v. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 29 
 
 lea, 880; s. c. 1 8. W. Rep. 44; Barb. 47. 
 
 Brown le. Eastern R. Co., 11 Cush. • Ormond «. Hayes, 60 Tex. 180. 
 
§ 176.] RAILWAY PASSENGERS. 229 
 
 any general principles of justice or law." * In actions of this 
 kind, the violation of the Sunday law is, upon familiar 
 grounds, to be regarded as an entirely collateral violation of 
 law. It is, in no proper sense, a proximate cause of the in- 
 jury complained of, and upon the general principles of law 
 applicable to these cases, is no more a defense to an action 
 for negligence than that the plaintiff is guilty of violating 
 the revenue laws, or has been a smuggler, or is, upon general 
 principles, a bad and unworthy person. It is not generally 
 necessary for the plaintiff to establish the fact that he is a, 
 nice man, when he has been hurt through the carelessness of 
 a railway company ; and that his character is not what it 
 might be, is just as good a defense to such an action, in jus- 
 tice and right reason, as that he is riding in the cars on a 
 Sunday.* But, notwithstanding the indefensibtlity of such a 
 rule, it is, nevertheless, stoutly maintained. 
 
 § 176. Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansey.— The earliest 
 
 case in which it was declared is Bosworth v. Inhabitants of 
 Swansey,* wherein the opinion was written by Chief Justice 
 Shaw. In this case it is held that a persbn who is injured by 
 reason of a defect in a highway, over which he is traveling on 
 secular business, on Sunday, cannot recover of the town, 
 without proof that he is traveling from necessity or charity, 
 the burden b@ing on him to show that his own fault did not 
 concur in causing the injury.^ In Stanton v. Metropolitan 
 Street Eailway Co.,* the rule was applied to the case of one 
 riding upon a street car upon the Sabbath day ; and it was 
 held that such a passenger, who was riding for the purpose 
 of making a visit, was violating the law, and therefore was 
 not entitled ifco redress for an injury which he would not have 
 received but for such violation,* So, also, in cases of acci- 
 
 ' Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. «. Tow- ' 10 Mete. 363; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 
 
 boat Co., 23 How. (TJ. S.) 209. 441. 
 
 ' Sutton V. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 ^ In Jones «. Inhabitants of Ando- 
 
 Wis. 21; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 534; ver, 10 Allen, 18, a similar case was 
 
 Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, 652 ; similarly decided. 
 
 B. c. 30 Am. Rep. 414; Baldwin v. * 14 Allen, 485. 
 
 Barney, 12 R. I. 392; s. c. 34 Am. • See, also, Hamilton v. Boston, 14 
 
 Rep. 670; Cooley on Torts, § 157; Allen, 475, for an extended discussion 
 
 Wharton on Negligence, § 331. of this rale, and a history of the Mas- 
 sachusetts legislation in point. 
 
230 EAILWAY PASSENGEBS. [§ 177. 
 
 dent to persons traveling, on Sunday, upon railway trains, 
 unless the plaintiff can make it appear that his errand was 
 one of necessity or charity, he cannot recover.^ The logic of 
 these cases is, that a person who receives an injury while 
 traveling, which he could not have received if he had not 
 been traveling, contributes ^ to the injury by the act of trav- 
 eling, and that he is, therefore, bound to show his right to 
 travel, in order to show that his own fault did not concur in 
 causing his injury. The validity of this reasoning depends 
 on the validity of the assumption that the act of traveling is 
 a contributory or concurring cause of inj'ury. Is the assump- 
 tion just ? Is not the act of traveling to be regarded rather 
 as a condition than as a cause of the injury ? or, to state the 
 question in another way, is not the injury to be regarded 
 rather as an incident than as an effect of the traveling ? ' 
 
 § 177. Rule in Termont, Maine, and elsewhere.— This is 
 
 peculiarly a Massachusetts doctrine,* but it also obtains in 
 Vermont * and in Maine.' It is, however, denied with empha- 
 sis in Rhode Island,' and in New Hampshire,* and finds no 
 
 > Feital ®. Middlesex R. Co., 109 win, 113 Mass. 467; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 
 
 Mass. 398; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 720. 119. 
 
 Cf. -with this case, Bennett, ■». ' Baldwin ». Barney, 12 R. I. 393; 
 
 -Brooks, 9 Allen, 118; Commonwealth s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 670. 
 
 a. Sampson, 97 Mass. 407; Ham- * Phila., &c., R. Co. ®. PMla., &c., 
 
 ilton V. Boston, 14 Allen, 475. In Towhoat Co., 33 How. (U. S.) 209. 
 
 this last case it was held that a per- Where the cause of action arises in 
 
 son walking a short distance in a pub- Massachusetts the adjudications of the 
 
 lie highway, simply for exercise and Supreme Court of that State are fol- 
 
 to take the air, on the evening of the lowed by the Supreme Court of the 
 
 Sabbath, was not violating the stat- United States as the local law, regard- 
 
 utes, and could maintain an action for less of its own views on the subject, 
 
 injuries sustained because of a defect Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co., 25 TJ. S. 555. 
 
 in the highway. Doyle v. Lynn, &c., ' Johnson n. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28; 
 
 R. Co., 118 Mass. 195; s. c. 19 Am. s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 111. 
 
 Rep. 431; Bucher v. Fitchburg R. ' Hinckley «. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89; 
 
 Co., 131 Mass. 156; b. c. 41 Am Rep. Cratty «. Bangor, 57 Me. 423; Mor- 
 
 316; Day ■». Highland St. R. Co., 135 ton b. Gloster, 46 Me. 430; Bryant v. 
 
 . 113; s. 0. 46 Am. Rep. 447. Biddeford, 39 Me. 193; Davidson «. 
 
 'In Hall S.Corcoran, 107 Mass. 351, Portland, 69 Me. 116; s. c. 31 Am. 
 
 it is expressly declared that the illegal Rep. 253. 
 
 traveling of the plaintiff on Sunday ' Baldwin «. Barney, 13 R. I. 392; 
 
 "necessarily contributed" to his in- s. o. 34 Am. Rep. 670. 
 
 jury. But see, also, McGrath «. Mer- » Dutton «. Weare, 17 N. H. 34; 
 
§177.J 
 
 BAILWAY PASSENGERS. 
 
 231 
 
 countenance outside of New England.^ The question of the 
 «£feet of Sunday traveling upon the plaintiff's right to re- 
 cover in case of injury through the negligence of another, 
 has, in the courts of New England, very frequently arisen in 
 Actions brought against towns or cities for defects in high- 
 ways. These cases are considered in the following chapter.* 
 This defense has also occasionally availed the railway cor- 
 porations of New England in actions brought against them 
 for injuries to persons at railway crossings.* Mr. Irving 
 Browne, in his Humorous Phases of the Law,* has set forth 
 the law upon this general question in an entertaining and in- 
 structive fashidn. The industrious reader will refer to it. 
 
 s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 590; Corey v. Bath, 
 35 N. H. 531; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 
 N. H. 371; Frost ». HuU, 4 N. H. 153; 
 Allen V. Deming, 14 N. H. 133. 
 
 ' Phila., &c., R. Co. «. PhUa. Tow- 
 boat Co., 23 How. (U. S.) 309; Smith 
 e. New York, &c., R. Co., 46 N. J. 
 Law, 7; Delaware, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Trautwein, 53 N. J. Law, 169; s. c. 
 19 Atl. Rep. 178; Sutton f>. Wauwa- 
 tosa, 29 Wis. 21; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 
 534; Mohney s. Cook, 26 Penn. St. 
 343 ; Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, 
 652; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 414; Carroll 
 «. Staten Island R. Co., 58 N. T. 126; 
 8. c. 17 Am. Rep. 221; Platz v. City 
 of Cohoes, 89 N. T. 319; s. c. 42 Am. 
 Rep. 286. Of. State v. Raihroad 
 Co., 24 West Va. 783; s. c. 49 Am. 
 Rep. 290; State v. Baltimore, &c., 
 R. Co., 15 West Va. 362; s. c. 36 
 Am. Rep. 803; Commonwealth v. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 80 Ky. 291; 
 fi. c. 44 Am. Rep. 475; Phila., &c., R. 
 
 Co. V. Lehman, 56 Md. 409 ; b. c. 40 
 Am. Rep. 415; Tonoski v. State, 79 
 Ind. 393; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 614; 
 McGatrick s. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566; 
 State c. GofE, 20 Ark. 289; Whitcomb 
 ■B. Gihnan, 35 Vt. 297 ; Connolly v. 
 City of Boston, 117 Mass. 64; s. c. 19 
 Am. Rep. 396; Gorman n. Lowell, 117 
 Mass. 65; Smith v. Boston & Maine 
 R. Co., 120 Mass. 490; s. c. 21 Am. 
 Rep. 538; McClaiy ®. Lowell, 44 Vt. 
 116; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 366; Grossman 
 o. City of Lynn, 121 Mass. 301. 
 
 " Vide, infra, § 261 et aeq. 
 
 ' Smith c. Boston, &c., R. Co., 120 
 Mass. 490. See infra, % 299, note, as 
 to the right of a servant to maintain an 
 action against the master for injuries 
 suffered while laboring on Sunday. 
 
 * Chap. n. See, also, an essay on 
 " Rights of a person suffering injury 
 when violating the Sunday law," 31 
 Cent. L. J. 525 
 
CHAPTEE VIIL 
 
 THE RAILWAY COMPANY IN ITS RELATION TO STRANGERS. 
 
 178. 
 
 Duty of a public carrier to 
 persons lawfully upon its 
 
 § 198. 
 
 
 premises, but who are neither 
 
 199. 
 
 
 passengers nor employees. 
 
 
 179. 
 
 The rule further stated. 
 
 200. 
 
 180. 
 
 Duty of the public at railway 
 
 
 
 crossings. 
 
 201. 
 
 181. 
 
 The duty to look and listen. 
 
 
 183. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 202. 
 
 183. 
 
 The rule modified. 
 
 203. 
 
 184. 
 
 The rule in Massachusetts. 
 
 204. 
 
 185. 
 
 Duty of the railway company 
 
 
 
 at crossings. 
 
 205. 
 
 186. 
 
 The effect of a statute. 
 
 306. 
 
 187. 
 
 Right of a trespasser. 
 
 307. 
 
 188. 
 
 Plaintiff's ignorance no justi- 
 
 208. 
 
 
 fication for his carelessness. 
 
 309. 
 
 189. 
 
 The rule illustrated. 
 
 310. 
 
 190. 
 
 Flagmen, gatemen, &c. 
 
 211. 
 
 191. 
 
 When the view at the crossing 
 
 
 
 is obstructed. 
 
 312. 
 
 192. 
 
 Crossings at grade. 
 
 
 193. 
 
 Duty of care. 
 
 213. 
 
 194. 
 
 Duty of the railway. 
 
 314. 
 
 195. 
 
 Vigilance of one crossing a 
 
 
 
 track must be proportionate to 
 
 215. 
 
 
 the danger. 
 
 
 196 
 
 The rule summarized. 
 
 216. 
 
 197 
 
 Plaintiff deaf or intoxicated. 
 
 317. 
 
 Trespassers on a railway track 
 — ^The Pennsylvania rule. 
 Judge Gibson's statement of 
 the rule. 
 
 The Pennsylvania rule further 
 stated. 
 
 The modified rule as to tres- 
 passers. 
 
 The same sul^ect continued. 
 The rule summarized. 
 Children as trespassers on rail- 
 road property. 
 The turn-table cases. 
 The rule illustrated. 
 Judge Dillon's decision. 
 The Minnesota case. 
 The later cases. 
 The New York rule. 
 Walking along a railway 
 track. 
 
 Where the track is a gucuf 
 public way. 
 The English rule. 
 Further statement of the rule 
 in the United States. 
 The duty of the railway to 
 the trespasser after the injury. 
 Various other acts of trespass 
 upon railway property. 
 Flying switches. 
 
 § 178. Duty of a public carrier to persons lawfully upon 
 its premises, but who are neither passengers nor employees. 
 
 — Tke common carrier of passengers is, as we have seen,*^ 
 bound to exercise great or extraordinary care to the end that 
 those who entrust themselves to him as his passengers may 
 be safe, but as to all other persons with whom he deals, the 
 carrier is not held to so high a degree of responsibilty. To- 
 
 §-144, supra. 
 
§ 179.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 
 
 233 
 
 ward them he must exercise that measure of circumspection 
 which we call ordinary care, and which, as a rule, all men are 
 held bound to exercise toward all other men with whom they 
 come in contact. When one comes lawfully upon my prem- 
 ises, I owe him the duty of ordinary care ;' but I owe but 
 slight care to mere trespasser.^ 
 
 § 179. The rule further stated.— A railway company, ac- 
 cordingly, is bound to exercise ordinary care toward all per- 
 sons who come about its depots, or shops, or yards, or oth- 
 erwise upon its premises, upon their proper business. There 
 is an implied invitation to the public to do business with the 
 railroad, and out of this implied invitation arises," on the one 
 
 ' Foss V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 33 
 Minn. 392; Watson v. "Wabash, Ac, 
 Ry. Co., 66 Iowa, 164; Chicago, &a, 
 Ry. Co. V. Goehel, 119 HI. 515; s. c. 
 10 N. E. Rep. 369. Cases where 
 teamsters recovered for injuries suf- 
 fered while unloading cars. Shel- 
 ley's Adm'r v. Cincinnati, &c., Ry. 
 Co.,85Ky. 224; s.c. 3 S. W. Rep. 157; 
 Hollender v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 14 Daly, 219; s. c. 19 Abb. N. C. 18; 
 Owens o. Pennsylvania R. Co., 41 Fed. 
 Rep. 187; Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes, 
 183 ni 255; 8. c. 24 N. E. Rep. 563. 
 One who, having business with the 
 company's freight department, is 
 struck by a car while he is standing 
 on a track in the drUling-yard with 
 his back towards the only direction of 
 danger, is guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence. Diebold v. Pennsylvania R. 
 Co., 50 N. J. Law, 478; 8. c. 14 Atl. 
 Rep. 576; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Grush, 67 El. 262; 8. c. 16 Am. Rep. 
 618; Tobin c. Portland, &c., R. Co., 
 59 Me. 183; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 415; 
 McDonald «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 26 
 Iowa, 134 (by DiUon, C. J.); CasweU 
 V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 194. 
 " This is not a question of privity of 
 contract, but of obligation, under 
 which the owners of real estate lie to 
 all who are induced by the use which 
 such owners make of their property 
 
 to enter upon it for the transaction of 
 business," said Barrows, J., in Camp- 
 bell V. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 
 564; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 503; Wendell 
 v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494; Pittsburgh «. 
 Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; s. c. 60 Am. 
 Dec. 65; McEone v. Michigan, &c., 
 R. Co., 51 Mich. 601; b. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 596; Doss v. Missouri, &c., R. 
 Co., 59 Mo. 27; 8. c. 21 Am. Rep. 371; 
 LouisvUle, &c., R. Co. v. Wolfe, 80 
 Ky. 82; Cooley on Torts, 604-607; 
 Bennett e. LoxiiaviUe, &c., R. Co., 102 
 U. S. 577. 
 
 ' Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. «. Bmg- 
 ham, 29 Ohio St. 365; 8. c. 23 Am. 
 Rep. 751; Sweeny v. Old Colony, 
 &c., R. Co., 10 Allen, 372; GOlls v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 59 Penn St. 129; 
 Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306; 
 8. c. 21 Am. Rep. 514, where a la- 
 borer, employed in loading ice on 
 board a vessel, after finishing his 
 work, went on board the vessel for 
 the gratification of his curiosity, and 
 there fell down an open hatchway, 
 and broke liis leg. Held , that he was 
 a mere intruder, and that the owners 
 of the vessel, not having been guilty 
 of any active misconduct, were not 
 liable. Illinois, &c., R. Co. e. God- 
 frey, 71 111. 500; 8. C. 22 Am. Rep. 
 112. See, also, § 50, supra. 
 
234 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGEBS. [§ 180. 
 
 band, the right which the public has to go upon the prem- 
 ises of the railway company, in the usual manner, for pur- 
 poses of business, and, on the other hand, the duty of the 
 company toward persons of this description.^ When per- 
 sons cross a railway track at a regular crossing upon the 
 highway, they are neither passengers nor employees, nor are 
 they upon the premises of the railway company by virtue of 
 the implied invitation to which I have just referred, and 
 under which persons so upon the company's premises are 
 protected, but, nevertheless, they are lawfuUyupon the track, 
 and the railway company is bound to exercise toward them 
 the full measure of ordinary care. This is a duty not spring- 
 ing out of any contract, express or implied, as in the rela- 
 tions to which I have referred, but an obligation imposed 
 upon the railway company by the rules of civil society. 
 / The passenger has his action for breach of, contract, and so 
 has the employee, when either of them suffer by reason of the 
 ■company's neglect,* but, when one is carelessly run down at a 
 crossing, by a railway train, he brings an action sounding in 
 tort, because the company has, by its negligence, violated 
 one of the rules of civil order. The railway company owes 
 him the duty of ordinary care,* and wben it fails to exercise 
 that measure of Carefulness, the injured person may have his 
 action. 
 
 § 180. Duty of the public at railway crossings.— When 
 one approaches a point upon the highway where a railway 
 track is crossed upon the same level, it is his plain duty to 
 proceed with caution, and if he attempts to cross the track, 
 either on foot or in a vehicle of any description, he must ex- 
 ercise, in so doing, what the law regards ordinary care under 
 the circumstances. He must assume that there is danger, 
 and act with ordinary prudence and circumspection upon 
 
 ' See, also, generally, the cases cited sons are accustomed to use in like 
 
 ■supra. business. Houston, &c., Ry. Co. «. 
 
 ' Bach may, moreover, of course, Brin, 77 Tex. 174; b. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 
 
 have an action in tort. 886; Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Hodges, 76 
 
 ' The care and skill required in Tex. 90; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 64 See, 
 
 handling an engine at a crossing are also. International, &c., R. Co. s. 
 
 not such as the " most " prudent, but McDonald, 75 Tex. 41; b. c. 12 S. W; 
 
 such as the "mass" of prudent per- Rep. 860. 
 
181.] 
 
 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO 3TEANGEE8. 
 
 235 
 
 that assumption.^ The requirements of the law, moreover, 
 proceed beyond the featureless generality that one must do 
 his duty in this respect, or must exercise ordinary care under 
 the circumstances. The law defines precisely what the term 
 " ordinary care under the circumstances " shall mean in these 
 cases. In the progress of the law in this behalf, the question 
 of care at railway crossings as affecting the traveler, is no 
 longer, as a rule, a question for the jury. The quaidum of 
 care is exactly prescribed as matter of law. 
 
 § 181. The duty to look and listen.— In attempting to 
 cross, the traveler must listen for signals, notice signs put up 
 as warnings, and look attentively up and down the track. 
 A multitude of decisions of all the courts enforce this 
 reasonable rule.* It is also so consonant with right reason 
 
 ' Missouri Pac. R. Co. ■». Lee, 70 
 Tex. 496; s. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 857; 
 Wichita, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 37 
 Kan. 743; s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 78; Daniel 
 «. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 5 H. L, 45; 
 s. c. L. R. 3 C. B. 591; State ». Maine 
 Central R. Co., 76 Me. 357; b. c. 49 
 Am. Rep. 622; Phila., &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Stebbing, 62 Md. 504; Cleveland, &c., 
 R. Co. ». Crawford, 34 Ohio St. 631; 
 8. c. 15 Am. Rep. 638; Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442; 8.C.43 Am. 
 Rep. 227. " There never was a more 
 important principle settled than that 
 the fact of the failure to stop immedi- 
 ately before crossing a railroad track 
 is negligence," said Sharswood, J., in 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Beale, 73 
 Penn. St. 504; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 753; 
 Karle v. Kansas, &c., R. Co., 55 Mo. 
 476; Kennedy «. North Mo. R. Co., 
 36 Mo. 351; Whalen v. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 60 Mo. 323; McGrath v. Hud- 
 son River R. Co., 32 Barb. 144; s. c. 
 19 How. Pr. 211; 59 N. T. 468 ; 17 
 Am. Rep. 359; Bernhardt v. Rens- 
 selaer, «&c, R. Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. 
 131; s. c. 33 Barb. 165; 18 How. Pr. 
 437; 19 How. Pr. 199; Beisegel v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. 
 (N. S.) 39; 8. 0. 40 N. Y. 9; Eaton v. 
 Erie Ry. Co., 51 N. Y. 544; Maginnis 
 
 «. New York, &c., R. Co., 53 N. Y. 
 315; Central, &c., R. Co. ■». Moore, 
 24 N. J. Law, 834; Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Stout, 53 Ind. 143. Mercier 
 V. New Orleans, &c., R. Co., 33 La. 
 Ann. 364, holding it to be a settled 
 rule that if the party injured in such 
 a case might have avoided the accident 
 by the exercise of a reasonable degree 
 of prudence, and he did not, he can- 
 not visit his own indiscretion, or want 
 of judgment upon the other party, 
 even though that party be in fault 
 himself. Chicago, &c., R. Co. t. 
 Jacobs, 63 111. 178; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Kusel, 63 111. 180; Continental 
 Improvement Co. «. Stead, 95 U. 8. 
 161; Cooley on Torts, 678. 
 
 " " Is a traveler precluded from re- 
 covery for an injury sustained from a 
 collision while crossing a railroad 
 track, unless he stops, looks and 
 listens ?" Bailey's Conflict of Judicial 
 Decision, 263, where the authorities 
 on the question are collected. Deci- 
 sions on faUure to look and listen 
 when crossing a railway track, and 
 whether it is negligence as a question 
 of law, or a question for the jury, are 
 also collected in 39 Am. and Eng. R. 
 Cas. 634, note. See, also, Patterson's 
 Ry. Accident Law, p. 168. Clark v. 
 
236 
 
 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEBS. 
 
 [§ 181. 
 
 and the dictates of ordinary prudence, and so much in line 
 with the ordinary care which the average of mankind display 
 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Kan. 360; 
 Schilling v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 71 
 Wis. 355; s. c. 37 N. W. Rep. 414; 
 Bomboy «. New York Cent., &c., R. 
 Co., 47 Hun, 425; Pence v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 746; Nosier v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 73 Iowa,. 268; . 
 s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 850. The rale 
 applies to pedestrians as well as to 
 others. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aiken 
 (Penn.), 18 Atl. Rep. 619; s. c. 25 "W. 
 N. C. 13; Pennsylvania R. Co. ■». 
 Mooney, 126 Penn. St. 244; b. c. 17 
 Atl. Rep. 590; 24 W. N. C. 40; 
 Hamilton v. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 
 50 N. J. Law, 363; s. c. 13 Atl. Rep. 
 39; Howard v. Northern Cent. Ry. 
 Co., 1 N. Y. Supl. 528. It is proper 
 to charge that when a horse car crosses 
 the track of a steam railroad the driver 
 is bound to exercise the highest degree 
 of care and prudence, the utmost skill 
 and foresight. Coddington ®. Brook- 
 lyn CrosstowD R. Co., 103 N. Y. 66; 
 Harris ». Minneapolis, &c., R. Co., 37 
 Minn. 47; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 13; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. ®. Peters, 116 
 Penn. St. 206; s. c. 9 Atl. Rep. 317; 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 33 
 Kan. 427; Lesan i>. Maine Cent. R. 
 Co., 77 Me. 85; State ■». Maine Cent. 
 R. Co., 77 Me. 538. The rale is now 
 different in Illinois, where the ques- 
 tion of contributory negligence is one 
 of fact for the jury. Terre Haute & 
 I. R, Co: V. Voelker, 129 111. 540; s. c. 
 22 N. E. Rep. 20; Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Dunleavy, 139 Rl. 132; s. c. 23 
 N. E. Rep. 15; Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. 
 ®. Wilson, 133 111. 55; s. c. 24 N. E. 
 Rep. 555; Griffin v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 68 Iowa, 638; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. ®. Hedges, 105 Ind. 398; 
 Wichita & W. R. Co. v. Davis, 
 37 Kan. 743; s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 
 78; Dunning v. Bond, 38 Fed. Rep. 
 813; Guta v. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 81 Mich. 291; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 831; 
 Union R. Co. ». State, 73 Md. 153; 
 s, c. 19 Atl. Rep. 449; Clark®. Mis- 
 souri Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Kan. 350; s. c. 
 11 Pac. Rep. 134; Reading, &c., R. 
 Co. «. Ritchie, 103 Penn. St. 435; 
 Gothard v. Ala., &c., R. Co., 67 Ala. 
 114; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Dimick, 
 96 111. 42; Renn. R. Co. «. Rudel, 100 
 111. 603; Peoria, &c., R. Co. v. Clay- 
 berg, 107 HI. 644; Terre Haute, <fcc., 
 R. Co. v. Clark, 73 Ind. 168; Pitts- 
 burgh, &c., R. Co. ®. Martin, 83 Ind. 
 476; Saverenz d. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 56 Iowa, 689; Punston b. Iowa, 61 
 Iowa, 453; Wheelwright u. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co. 135 Mass. 325; Johnson v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 77 Mo. 546. A 
 person who voluntarily exposes himself 
 to such dangers as this, from which 
 he might have saved himself by the 
 proper use of liis senses, contributes 
 directly to his own death, and no 
 cause of action lies for the injury. 
 Galveston R. Co. ■». Bracken, 59 Tex. 
 71; Galveston, &c., R. Co. v. Graves, 
 59 Tex. 330; Louisville, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Goetz, 79 Ky. 443; Field v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 4 McCrary, 593; Tully n. 
 Fitchburg R. Co., 134 Mass. 499; 
 Kelly «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 75 Mo. 
 138; Powell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 76 Mo. 80; Randall ®. Conn., &c., R. 
 Co., 133 Mass. 499; Schofield v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 3 McCrary, 368; 
 Plummet v. Eastern R. Co., 73 Me. 
 591; Haas v. Grand Rapids, &c., R. 
 Co., 47 Mich. 401; Penn., &c., R. Co. 
 B.Rathgeb, 33 Ohio St. 66; Henze v. St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 71 Mo. 636. 
 When, however, the plaintiff has 
 looked and listened for a train, the 
 duty he owes to the railroad company 
 is performed. He need not, even if 
 the information is easily avaUable, in- 
 quire as to the schedules or the time 
 when trains are expected to pass. 
 
§ 181.] 
 
 EAILWAT COMPAirr AS TO STEANGEB8. 
 
 237 
 
 in the daily routine of life, that it should seem to be scarcely 
 dependent upon the authority of decided cases in the law 
 courts. The traveler on the highway must even come to a 
 halt for this purpose ;* but he is not required to get out of 
 
 South Ala. R. Co. v. Thompson, 63 
 Ala. 4£>4; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Whiteacre, 35 Ohio St. 637; Dublin, 
 Ac, By. Co. «. Slattery, 3 L. R. App. 
 Cas. 1155; Stubley ■». London By. Co., 
 L. R 1 Exch. 13; Cliff ®. Midland 
 By. Co., 5 Q. B. 358; Telfer v. North, 
 &c., R. Co., 30 N. J. Law, 138; State 
 V. Manchester R. Co., 53 N. H. 358; 
 Webb V. Portland, &c., R. Co., 57 
 Me. 117; McCall v. Railroad Co., 54 
 N. T. 642; Gillespie v. City, 54 N. T. 
 468; Belton v. Baxter, 54 N. T. 245; 
 Penn. R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Penn. St. 
 504; s. c 13 Am. Rep. 753; Wilson v. 
 Charlffltowu, 8 Allen, 138; AUyn v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 105 Mass. 77; 
 DeArmand v. New Orleans, &c., R. 
 Co., 33 La. Ann. 364. So, if the 
 plaintiff thoroughly knew the time- 
 table, and had every reason to believe 
 that no train was due for an hour at 
 least, still he would be required to 
 make use of his eyes and ears so far 
 as he liad an opportunity to do so. 
 Wilcox r>. Rome, &c., B. Co., 39 N. 
 T. 358; Baxter «. Troy, &c., E. Co., 
 41 N T. 502; North Penn. R. Co. v. 
 HeUeman, 49 Penn. St. 60; Hanover, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Coyle, 55 Penn St. 396; 
 St. Louis, &c., B. Co. V. Manly, 58 
 DL 300; Illinois, &c., B. Co. ■». Baches, 
 55 m. 379; Chicago, &c., B. Co. d. 
 Sweeney, 53 111. 335; Chicago, &c., B. 
 Co. «. 6retzner,46 HI. 74; Penn. Canal 
 Co. V. Bentley, 66 Penn St. 30; Lehigh 
 Valley B. Co. n. Hall, 61 Penn. St. 
 361; Baltimore, &c., B. Co. «. Breinig, 
 25 Md. 3'78; Lake Shore, &c., E. Co. 
 V. Miller, 35 Mich 374; Kelly v. Hen- 
 drie, 26 Mich. 255. A plaintiff so 
 failing to make use of his senses, can 
 only recover when the railroad com- 
 pany has been guilty of such conduct 
 as to imply an intent or wUlingness to 
 
 cause the injury. Bellefontaine B. 
 Co. V, Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; Brown v. 
 MUwaukee, &c.,B. Co.,33Mmn 165; 
 Ernst D. Hudson, &c., B. Co., 39 N. 
 T. 61; Stackus v. New York. &c., E. 
 Co., 79 N. T. 464; Chicago, &c., E. 
 Co., V. Kusel, 63 111. 180, note; Chi- 
 cago, &c., B. Co. B. McKean, 40 111. 
 218; Chicago, &c., E. Co. ■». Still, 19 
 111. 499; Bailroad Co. ■». Houston, 95 
 U. S. 697; Linfleld ®. Old Colony B. 
 Co., 10 Cush. 562; Chicago, &c., B. 
 Co. V. Hatch, 79 HI. 137; Whitney v. 
 Maine, &c., E. Co., 69 Me. 208; Grows 
 V. Maine, &c., E. Co., 67 Me. 412; 
 Bohan b. Milwaukee, &c., E. Co., 58 
 Wis. 30. But see Copley ii. JNew 
 Haven, &c., B. Co., 136 Mass. 6, 
 where the party injured, beiog a girl 
 sixteen years of age, the court held 
 that the burden of proof was on the 
 defendant to show that the girl was 
 guilty of gross negligence. Wendell 
 
 D. New York, &c., E. Co., 91 N. Y. 
 420; Baughman v. Shenango, &c., E. 
 Co , 92 Penn. St. 335; s. c. 37 Am. 
 Rep. 690; Schofleld v. Chicago, &c., 
 
 E. Co., 114 U. S. 615. 
 
 ' It is a question for the jury 
 whether he stopped at a proper 
 place. Pennsylvania, &c., B. Co. v. 
 Huff (Penn), 8 Atl; Bep. 789; Lehigh, 
 &c.,Coal Co. V. Lear (Penn.), 9 Atl. 
 Bep. 267; Wilds v. Hudson, &c., B. 
 Co., 39 N. Y. 315; Schulz v. Penn. B. 
 Co., 5 Eeporter, 376; Penn. Canal Co. 
 V. Bentley, 66 Penn. St. 30; Penn. E. 
 Co. V. Beale, 73 Penn. St. 504; s. c. 
 13 Am. Bep. 753; Penn. B. Co. v. 
 Weber, 76 Penn. St. 157; DaUy v. 
 Eichmond, &c., R. Co., 106 N. C. 301; 
 B. c. H S. E. Rep. 330; Kelly v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 88 Mo. 534; 
 Baughman «. Shenango, &c., R. 
 Co., 92 Penn. St. 335; s. c. 37 Am. 
 
238 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEES. 
 
 [§ 182. 
 
 his' wagon and go forward on foot for the purpose of look- 
 ing,* especially when such a course would not have prevented 
 the collision,* but would rather have exposed the -traveler to 
 the very peril it was designed to avoid.' 
 
 § 182. The same subject continued.— In Pennsylvania a 
 contrary rule has been laid down in at least one case ; * also 
 in Minnesota.® If a traveler, by looking, could have seen an 
 approaching train in time to escape, it will be presumed, in 
 case he is injured by collision, either that he did not look, 
 or, if he did look, that he did not heed what he saw. Such 
 conduct is held negligence per se.* 
 
 Eep. 690. Oontra Leavenworth, Sac, 
 R Co. V. Rice, 10 Kan. 436, in which 
 Kingman, C. J., said : — " The traveler 
 on the highway is no more bound to 
 stop when he approaches a railroad 
 than the managers of the train are 
 bound to stop when they approach a 
 highway. It may be the imperative 
 duty of either to stop when the con- 
 ditions require it. . . . In most 
 cases, as the traveler can arrest his 
 progress easier than the railway train, 
 it would be his duty to stop on the 
 approach of danger. But this obli- 
 gation does not arise from the superior 
 right of the railroad, but from the 
 conditions 6f the parties." Davis ». 
 New York, &c.,R. Co., 47 K. T. 400; 
 Cleveland, &c., R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 
 Ohio St. 631; s. g. 15 Am. Rep. 633; 
 Cosgrove «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 87 N. Y. 88; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 855. 
 
 ' This would mean the requirement 
 of extraordinary care on his part. 
 Kttsburgh, &c:, R. Co. v. Wright, 80 
 Ind. 182; Davis v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 47 N. Y. 400; Huckshold ». St. 
 Louis, &o., Ry. Co., 90 Mo. 548; s. c' 
 2 S. W. Rep. 794. 
 
 "Penn. R. Co. ®. Ackerman, 74 
 Penn. St. 265; McGuire v. Hudson, 
 &c., R. Co., 3 Daly, 761; Cleveland, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 
 361; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 633; Weber v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 451; 
 s. c. 67 N. Y. 587. 
 
 'Duffy «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 32 
 Wis. 269. 
 
 * Pennsylvania R. Co. ®. Beale, 73 
 Penn. St. 504; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 753, 
 where it is held that when the trav- 
 eler cannot see the track by looking 
 out, whether from fog or other cause, 
 he should get out, and, if necessary, 
 lead his horse and wagon. In doing 
 this, he would be acting as any pru- 
 dent man under such circumstances. 
 
 ' Shaber v. St. Paul R. Co., 28 
 Minn. 103. 
 
 ' The recent decisions or presump- 
 tions as to stopping, looking and listen- 
 ing at railroad crossings are collected 
 in 39 Am. and Eng. R. Cas. 615, note. 
 Butler V. Gettysburg, &c., R. Co., 
 126 Penn. St. 160; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 
 37; Ormsbee ®. Boston, &c., R. Co., 
 14 R. I. 102; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 354; 
 Brown v. Texas, &c., Ry. Co., 42 La. 
 Ann. 350; s. c. 7 So. Rep. 683; 
 Maryland ■». Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 
 123 Penn. St. 487; b. c. 23 W. N. C 
 95; 16 Atl. Rep. 623, 624; Glas- 
 cock V. Central Pac. R. Co., 73 
 Cal. 137; 8. c. 14 Pac. Rep. 518; 
 Powell «. New York, &c., R. Co., 109 
 N. Y. 613; B. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 891; ' 
 Harder «. Rome, &c., R. Co., 2 N. Y. 
 Supl. 70; Bloomfleld v. Burlington, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 74 Iowa, 607; s. c. 38 
 N. W. Rep. 431; Freeman v. Duluth, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 74 Mich. 86; s. C. 41 
 N. W. Rep. 872 ; Weyl v. Chicago, 
 
§ 183.] 
 
 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO STBANGEES. 
 
 239 
 
 § 183. The rule modifled.- 
 
 relaxed in some jurisdictions. 
 
 &c., Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 350; B. c. 42 
 N. W. Rep. 24; Tolman ®. Syracuse, 
 &c., R. Co., 98 N. T. 198; s. c. 50 
 Am. Rep. 649; Damrill v. St. Louis, 
 &c., E;y. Co., 27 Mo. App. 202; Irey 
 «. Pennsylvania R. Co., 133 Penn. St. 
 563; B. c. 26 W. N. C. 58; 19 Atl. 
 Rep. 341; Kohler «. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. (Penn.), 19 Atl. Rep. 1049; 
 B. c. 26 W. N, C. 176; Cones «. Cin- 
 cinnati, &c., Ry, Co., 114 Ind. 328; 
 8. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 638; Straugh v. 
 Detroit, &c., R. Co., 65 Mich. 706; 
 8. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 161; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. DamereU, 81 HI. 450; 
 Rockford, &c., R. Co. «. Byam, 80 
 m 528; Morse v. Erie Ry. Co., 65 
 Barb. 490; Haring a. N. T., &c., R. 
 Co., 13 Barb. 9; Benton v. Central 
 R. Co., 43 Iowa, 192; Haines v. Illi- 
 nois, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 237; New 
 Orleans, &c., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 53 
 Miss. 808; Gordon «. Erie Ry. Co., 
 45 N. T. 660; Reynolds v. N. T., 
 &c., R. Co., 58 N. T. 248; Cleve- 
 land, &c., R. Co. V. Elliott, 28 Ohio 
 St. 340; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Whittaker, 24 Ohio St. 642; Marietta, 
 (fee, R. Co. B. Rcksley, 34 Ohio St. 
 654. The excuse that the plainttS 
 was absent-minded, will not avail him. 
 His failure to look and listen wiU be 
 pronounced negligence by the court. 
 Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. v. Miller, 35 
 Mich. 374; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. 
 B. Sunderland, 3 Bradw. 307; "Wilcox 
 9. Rome, &c., R. Co., 39 K T. 359; 
 Griflan B. N. T., &c., R. Co., 40 N. T. 
 34; Davis v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 47 
 N. T. 400; Butterfleld v. West, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 10 Allen, 532; Allyn v. Bos- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 105 Mass. 77; 
 Wheelock b. Boston, &c., R. Co., 105 
 Mass. 203; Fletcher b. Atlantic, &c., 
 R. Co., 64 M-o. 484; Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co. B. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; Belle- 
 fontaine, &c., R. Co. b. Hunter, 33 
 
 -The strictness of this rule is 
 Thus, in Texas it is held not 
 
 Ind. 356; North Penn. R. Co. b. 
 HeUeman, 49 Penn. St. 60; Penn, R. 
 Co. B. Beale, 73 Penn. St. 504; Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co. B. State, 39 Md. 
 253; McCall v. Railroad, 54 N. Y. 
 643; Johnson v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 77 Mo. 546! Where, however, there 
 is no evidence that the party injured 
 stopped and listened, the court will 
 not presume that he did not stop, and 
 adjudge him gmltyof negligence, but 
 will leave the question to the jury. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. b. Goetz, 79 
 Ky. 443; 8. c. 43 Am. Rep. 327; 
 Schum B. Penn. R. Co., Supt. 
 Ct. Penn^ 19 Am. Law. Rev. 833, 
 834; State b. Maine Central R. Co., 
 76 Me. 357; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 633; 
 Daniel v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L. R. 
 3 C. B. 591; s. c. 5 H. L. 45. But 
 see, contra, McBride b. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co., 19 Or. 64; b. c. 23 Pac. Rep. 
 814, which holds that in the absence 
 of evidence one way or the other, the 
 presumption is that the traveler 
 looked and listened. Guggenheim 
 V. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 66 Mich. 
 150; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep.- 161; Le- 
 high, &c., R. Co. V. Hall, 61 Penn. 
 St. , 861, where the court, inter alia, 
 said: — "It is true that it was the 
 duty of the deceased, before he at- 
 tempted to cross the railroad, to stop 
 and look both ways, and listen for ap- 
 proaching trains, but it does not fol- 
 low that there can be no recovery for 
 his death, in the absence of direct and 
 positive evidence that he observed 
 these precautions." Penn. R. Co. b. 
 Weber, 76 Penn. St. 157; s. c. 18 Am. 
 Rep. 407; Weiss a. Penn. R. Co., 79 
 Penn. St. 387; Cassidy b. Angell, 13 
 R. I. 447 ; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 690, and 
 the note; Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 
 Wall. 401 ; Railroad Co. b. Houston, 
 95 U. S. 607; Dublin, <fcc., Ry. Co. 
 B. Slatteiy, 3 App. Cas. 1155; Lewis 
 
240 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 
 
 [§ 184 
 
 iContributory negligence per se, in the absence of a statntory 
 requirement, not to look up and down the track upon at- 
 tempting to cross it ; ' and so in Missouri ' and Georgia.* 
 But while it is not negligence not to let down a buggy top in 
 looking about at a crossing/ yet, where a person approaches 
 a crossing in a covered wagon, having an umbrella hoisted 
 inside as an additional protection from rain falling at th4 
 time, and looked only straight ahead, it was held negligence.'' 
 And, where a traveler was so wrapped np, to protect himself 
 from cold, that he could not hear distinctly, he was held 
 under obligation to exercise especial care to overcome the 
 temporary disability.* 
 
 § 184. ThernleinMassachnsetts. — Upon this point the Su- 
 preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said : — " Plaintiff 
 
 -». New York, &c., R. Co., 5 N. Y. 
 Supl. 313; Kain ®. New York, &o., 
 B. Co., 3 N. Y. Supl. 311. See, also, 
 18 Albany Law Jour. 144, 164, 184, 
 204; Cooley on Torts, 673. 
 
 'Gulf, &c., By. Co. V. Anderson, 76 
 Tex. 244; s. c. IB S. W. Eep. 196; 
 International & G. N. R. Co. ■». Dyer, 
 76 Tex. 156; b. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 377; 
 Texas, &c., R. Co. «. Chapman, 
 57 Tex. 75; Houston, &c., E. Co. d. 
 "Wilson, 60 Tex. 142. 
 
 ' Zimmerman «. Hannibal, &c., B. 
 Co., 71 Mo. 476. 
 
 » Bichmond & D. B. Co. v. How- 
 ard, 79 Ga. 44; b. c. 3 S. B. Bep. 
 426. 
 
 * Stackus V. N. Y., &c., B. Co., 79 
 N. Y. 464. 
 
 = Allen V. Maine Cent. B. Co., 82 
 Me. Ill; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 105; New 
 . York, &c., B. Co. v. Kellam's Adm'f, 
 83 Va. 851; s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 703; 
 SheflSeld b. Rochester, &c., R. Co., 
 21 Barb. 339; Brickell «. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 120 N. Y. 290; s. c. 24 
 N. E. Rep. 419; Nash v. Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co., 82 Va. 55; Rhie- 
 ner «. Chicago, &c., By. Co., 86 
 Minn. 170; 8. c. 30 N.W. Eep. 548. 
 
 " Illinois, &c., E. Co. v. Ebert, 74 
 HI. 399; Butterfieid «. Western, &c.. 
 
 B. Co., 10 Alien, 532; Steves v. Os- 
 wego, &c., E. Co., 18 N. Y. 422; 
 Gunn e. Wisconsin, &c.. By. Co., 70 
 Wis. 203; 6. c. 35 N. W. Bep. 281. 
 Chicago, &c., B. Co. v. Still, 19 lU. 
 499, holding that a person crossing a 
 track, who could have seen the cars 
 approach, but turned his. back in that 
 direction, and who had his ears so 
 bandaged that he could not hear, is 
 guilty of such negligence as will pre- 
 vent his recovery for injuries, unless 
 [here the doctrine of comparative neg- 
 ligence enters] he can prove a greater 
 degree of negligence on the part of 
 the railroad company. Hanover, &c., 
 B. Co. v. Coyle, 54 Penn. St. 396; 
 EMns B. Boston, &c., E. Co., 115 
 Mass. 190; Harlan v. St. Louis, &c., 
 B. Co., 64 Mo. 480; s. c. 65 Mo. 
 22; Moran v. Nashville, &c., R. Co., 
 58 TiBnn. 379; Phila., &c., R. Co. v. 
 Spearen, 47 Penn. St. 300. What 
 amount of precaution is necessary, and 
 whether or not it is a duty to stop, or 
 look, upon nearing a railway crossing, 
 is held to depend upon the circum- 
 stances. Plummer v. East., &c., R- 
 Co., 73 Me. 591; Shaber «. St. Paul, 
 &c., R. Co., 28 Minn. 103; Omaha, 
 &c., R. Co. V. O'Donnell, 22 Neb. 
 475; B. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 235. 
 
§ 185.] 
 
 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO STEANGERS. 
 
 241 
 
 was acquainted with the highway and railroad. If he had 
 looked, he would have seen the train. It came from the 
 west, and for half a mile west of the highway the track was in 
 plain sight. It was a stormy night ; raining, blowing hard 
 from the northwest, and snowing some. He had his hand 
 up, holding his hat on his head, and this prevented him 
 from seeing the train. He was listening for the oars ; his 
 attention was called to the subject, and he expected to hear 
 the bell or whistle, but there was no bell rung or whistle 
 blown. Plaintiff 's neglect to use his own eyes was palpable 
 negligence." ^ 
 
 § 185. Duty of the railway company at crossings. — Stat- 
 utes and municipal ordinances in every jurisdiction prescribe 
 specifically the duty of railway corporations in respect to 
 railway crossings ; * but no failure on the part of the railroad 
 
 •Butterfield ». "Western, &c., R. 
 Co., 10 AUen, 632 ; Schofield v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 114 U. S. 615. It 
 was there held that the plaintiff's fail- 
 ure to use his eyes was negligence pre- 
 cluding recovery, though the train 
 was running at a very high rate of 
 speed, did not stop at a depot 70 rods 
 from where the plaintiff crossed, as 
 all regular trains did, and failed to 
 blow a whistle or ring a bell. 
 
 ' When city ordinances prescribe 
 certain precautions to be observed by 
 railway companies at public cross- 
 ings, they do not relieve the companies 
 from the observance of ordinary care 
 in particulars not mentioned in the 
 ordinances. Wilkins v. St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 93; s. c. 13 8. W. 
 Rep. 898. See, also, Peoria, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Clayberg. 107 111. 644; Pitts- 
 burgh, &c., R. Co. V. Tundt, 78 Ind. 
 373; Railroad Co. v. Lowrey, 61 Tex, 
 149. When a railroad company has 
 for years, without objection, per- 
 mitted the public to cross its tracks 
 at a certain point, not in itself a pub- 
 lic crossing, those using the crossing 
 are not trespassers, and the company 
 16 
 
 owes the duty of reasonable care 
 towards them. Whether such reason- 
 able care has been exercised or not is 
 ordinarily a question for the jury, 
 under all the evidence. Taylor v. Del., 
 &c.. Canal Co., 113 Penn. St. 162; s. c. 
 8 Atl. Rep. 43; Harriman e. Pittsburgh, 
 &c.,R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11; s. c. 12 K 
 E. Rep. 451; Nichols' Adm'rs. Wash- 
 ington, &c., R. Co., 83 Va. 99; s. c. 5 
 S. E. Rep. 171; St. Louis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ■». Crosnoe, 72 Tex. 79; s. c. 10 S. 
 W. Rep. 342; Troy «. Cape Fear, &c., 
 R. Co., 99 N". C. 298; s. c. 6. S. E. 
 Rep. 77; Virginia M. Ry. Co. d. 
 White's Adm'r, 84 Va. 498; 8. c. 5 S. 
 E. Rep. 573; Nuzan v. Pittsburgh, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 30 West Va. 228; b. c. 4 8. E. 
 Rep. 242; Byrme v. N. T., &c., R. 
 Co., 104 N. T. 363; B. c. 58 Am. Rep. 
 512. Highway by dedication. Pac. 
 R. Co. «. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; s. c. 7 S. 
 W. Rep. 857. Non-user of legal 
 highway no abandonment. Wash- 
 burn V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 68 
 Wis. 474; b. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 234. 
 Where a company abandons its cus- 
 tom of giving statutory signals at a 
 private crossing, after it has put up 
 
242 
 
 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STEANGEB8. 
 
 [§ 185. 
 
 company to do its duty will excuse any one from using the 
 senses of sight and hearing, upon approaching a railway cross- 
 . ing, and, whenever the due use of either senses would have 
 enabled the injured person to escape the danger, the injury 
 is conclusive evidence of negligence, without any reference to 
 the railroad's failure to perform its duty,* This rule is only 
 
 usual sign-posts, it is negligence per se 
 if an accident is caused thereby. Nash 
 0. New York, &c., R. Co., 4 N. Y. 
 Supl. 525; s. c. 51 Hun. 594; Hanks 
 V. Boston, &c.. R. Co. (Mass.), 18 
 N. E. Rep. 218; Phil., &c., R. Co. 
 9). Fronk, 67 Md. 339; s. c. 10 Atl. Rep. 
 204. Contra, on the efEect of use by pub- 
 lic without objection. Blanchard «. 
 Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 126111. 416; 
 B. c. 18 N. B. Kep. 799; "Wright®. Bos- 
 ton & A. R. Co., 142 Mass. 396; Mem- 
 phis, &c., R. Co. V. Womack, 84 Ala. 
 149; s. c. 4 So. Rep! 618. 
 
 VDaveys. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 12 Q. B. D. 70; s. c. 63 L. J. Q. B. 58; 
 49 L. T. 749; Cincinnati, &c., R. 
 Co. «. Butler, 103 Ind. 31; Atchison, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Townsend, 39 Kan.. 115; 
 s. c. 17Pac. Rep. 804; Nosier «. Ohica-' 
 go, ifcc, Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 268; b. c, 
 34 N. W. Rep. 850; Donnelly v. Bos- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 151 Mass. 210; s. c. 
 24 N. E. Rep. 38; Petty v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 88 Mo. 306; Galveston, 
 H. & S. A. R. Co. V. Kutac, 72 Tex. 
 643; B. c. US, W. Rep. 127; Guenther 
 V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 95 Mo. 286; 
 s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 371; Strong v. Can- 
 ton, &c., R. Co. (Miss.), 3 So. 
 Rep. 465; Matti v. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 69 Mich. 109; b. o. 37 N. W. Rep. 
 54; Yancy v. Wabaah, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 93 Mo. 433; s. c. 6 S. W. Rep. 
 272; Kwiotkowski «. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 70 Mich. 549; b .o. 38 N. W. 
 Rep. 463; Indiana, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Hammock, 113 Ind. 1; s. c. 14 N. E. 
 Rep. 737; Greenwood v. Philadelphia, 
 &c., R. Co., 124Penn. St. 573; B. c. 23 
 "W. N. C. 425; 17 Atl. Rep. 188, 
 
 a strong case. New York, &c., R.. 
 Co. s. Kellam's Adm'r, 88 Va. 851; b. c. 
 3 S. E. Rep. 703: Schofleld v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 114 0. S. 615; Mynning 
 V. Detroit,. &c., R. Co., 64 Mich. 
 93; 8. c. 31 N. "W. Rep. 147. Qf. 
 Omaha, &c., R. Co., ®. O'Donnell, 32 
 Neb. 475; B. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 235; 
 Field ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 4 Mc- 
 Crary, 573; Brendell ®. Buffalo, &c., 
 R. Co., 27 Barb. 534; Bellefontaine, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Schuckman, 50 
 Ind. 43; St. Louis, &c., R. Co., v. 
 Mathias, 50 Ind. 65; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Notzki, 66 lU. 455. "U there 
 be negligence, the company would be 
 liable for all consequent injury to any 
 one who had not deprived himself of 
 his remedy by some default or mis- 
 conduct of his own." Moore n. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 24 N. J. Law, 268; Run- 
 yon V. Central R. Co., 35 N. J. Law, 
 557; Artz v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 34 
 Iowa, 160; Havens «. Erie Ry. Co., 41 
 N. Y. 296; Ernst «. Hudson, &c., R 
 Co., 39 N. Y. 61; a. c. 35 N. Y. 9; 
 Wilcox V. Rome, &c., R. Co., 39 N. 
 Y. 358; Baxter v. Troy, &c., R. Co., 
 41 N. Y. 503; Nicholson v. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 41 N. Y. 525; Gorton v. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 45 N. Y. 660;Harlan«. St. Louis, 
 &c., R. Co., 64 Mo. 480, holding that 
 while the failure of the engineer to ring 
 the bell was negligence, in law, yet, 
 since the deceased could nevertheless 
 have heard the locomotive had he stop- 
 ped to listen, there could be no recov- 
 ery;^.c. 55 Id. 33; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Pears, 53 111. 115;'LaFayette, &c., 
 R. Co. c. Huffman, 28 Ind. 287; 
 
§ 186.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGEBS. 243 
 
 an application of the elementary principles of the law upon 
 this subject. " It should and must be regarded as vejry little 
 short of recklessness for any one to drive on the track of a, 
 railroad without first looking and listening whether a mov- 
 ing train is near. The negligence of the defendant in this case 
 was a failure to ring the bell or sound the whistle. Yet, as 
 the plaintiff was also negligent, he cannot recover. Those 
 living near a railroad may, by contact, become careless, but 
 they will be no less chargeable with negligence in case they 
 rush on the track without looking and trying to ascertain 
 first whether danger is near. Failing in this respect, they 
 cannot be permitted to recover for injuries received. It is a 
 well settled principle of the common law, that he whose neg- 
 ligence has contributed in any essential degree to the injury 
 sustained, cannot maintain an action against the party whose 
 negligence has also contributed to the injury. When negli- 
 gence is the issue, it must be a case of unmixed negligence. 
 This rule is important — salutary in its effects — and should 
 be maintained in its purity. The careless are thereby taught 
 that if they sustain an injury, to which their own negligence 
 has contributed, the law will afford them no redress."* 
 
 § 186. The effect of a statute. — If a statute requires that 
 a train should give a particular warning of its approach,, 
 travelers have a right to presume that the provisions of the 
 statute will be regarded by train-men, and that in default of 
 such warning, the speed of the train will be reduced. Hence, 
 if a railroad neglects signals and lookout, when required 
 either by statute or common law, it is liable, although the 
 plaintiff was incautiously on the track, if he kept a proper 
 lookout,* and in Kentucky it is held to be the duty of a rail- 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. V. Vining, 27 27 Barb. 321; Schofield v. Chicago,. 
 Ind. 573; Cleveland, &c., R. Co. o. &c., R. Co., 114 U. 8. 615. 
 Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570; North Penn. " Brunswick, &c., R. Co. v. Hoover, 
 R. Co. V. Heilemaa, 49 Penn. St. 60; 74 Qa. 426; Nash D.New York, &c., 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. c. Riley, 47 111. R. Co., 4 N. Y. Supl. 625; s. c. 51 
 514; Hinckley v. Cape Cod R. Co., 120 Hun, 594; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Mass. 257; Zeigler ®. Railroad Co., 5 Lee, 70 Tex. 496; b. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 
 8. C. 221; s. c. 7 S. C. 402. See, also, 857; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. ■». Trainor, 
 gu^a, § 49.- 33 Md. 542; Cliff v. Midland Ry. Co., 
 
 ' Dascomb «. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., L. R 5 Q.B. 358; Wakefield v. Rail- 
 
2U 
 
 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO STRANGEBS. 
 
 [§ 187. 
 
 way coi^paiij to give signals of warning to travelers on pub- 
 lic highways at crossings, although none are required by 
 statute.* 
 
 § 187. Right of a trespasser.— Neither does the negli- 
 gence of a plaintiff constitute a defense, when the injury 
 might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care 
 and caution on the part of the railway company. Even a 
 trespasser cannot be run down with impunity simply because 
 he is a trespasser.' But it is not negligence for an engineer 
 
 road Co., 87 Vt. 330; Ernst ®. Hud- 
 son, &c., R. Co., 35 N. T. 9; s. c. 
 39 N. Y. 61; 33 Barb. 159; 19 How. 
 Pr. 205; 34 How. Pr. 97, and 33 How. 
 Pr. 363; Renwick v. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 36 N.),Y. 133; Steves i). Os- 
 I wego, &c., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 433, In 
 Galena,' &c., R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 HI. 
 548, it is held that the otmg is not 
 thrown on the railway company, un- 
 til some proof has been given, tend- 
 ing to show that the injury com- 
 plained of resulted from the want of 
 a signal. See, also, §^, supra, and 
 note; St. Louis, &c , R. Co. v. Manly, 
 68 111. 97; Reynolds v. Hindman, 33 
 Iowa, 146; Artz v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 34 Iowa, 153; Ohio, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Eaves, 43 Mo. 388; St. Louis, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Terhune, 50 111. 151; 
 56 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Adler, 
 111. 344. 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Com- 
 monwealth, 13 Bush. 388; s. c. 26 
 Am. Rep. 205. See, upon this point, 
 for modified views, Winstanley v. 
 Chicago, &c.,Ry. Co., 73 Wis. 375; 
 s. c. 89 N. W. Rep. 856, where it is 
 said that a railway company may be 
 guilty of negligence by not placing a 
 sign of warning, or sounding a whis- 
 tle at a crossing, though not required 
 to do so by statute. Johnson «. Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co., 6 Mackey, 283; Car- 
 roll V. Pennsylvania R. Co., — Penn. 
 St. — ; a. c. 12 Week. Notes Cas. 848. 
 
 A statutory requirement that a bell 
 should be rung and a whistle blown 
 on the approach of a train to a high- 
 way crossing, if neglected, makes the 
 company liable to one traveling on a 
 highway parallel to the track, whose 
 hoise took fright because of the, ap- 
 proach of the train without warning. 
 Ransom v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Wis. 178; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 71S. But 
 compare, on this point, Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. Pierce (Mo.), 5 Pac. Rep. 
 378; Clark v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 85 Ean. 850; s. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 134, 
 where it was held that the statu- 
 tory requirement was for the benefit 
 only of those who might be traveling 
 on the street for the crossing of which 
 the whistle should have been blown. 
 See, also. Pike v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 754; Moore v. PhQ. 
 R. Co., 108 Penn. St. 349; s. c. S3 
 Alb. Law Jour. 98; Longnecker v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 105 Penn. St. 
 328; McGrath ®. New York, &c., R. 
 Co.', 59 N. Y. 468; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 
 359, and the note thereto; Hart «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 56 Iowa, 166; 
 B. c. 41 Am. Rep. 93; Houghkirk 
 V. President, &c., 93 N. Y. 319; s.o. 
 44 Am. Rep. 370; Welsch v. Hanni- 
 bal, &c., R. Co., 73 Mo. 451; b. c. 87 
 Am. Rep. 440. 
 
 " § 50, tnipra; Piper b. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 77 Wis. 247; s. c. 46 
 N. W. Rep. 165; Donohue v. St. 
 
§ 188.] 
 
 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGEB8. 
 
 245 
 
 not . to stop his train to avoid a collision with one crossing 
 the track, in case the train cannot be brought to a halt in 
 time to prevent the accident, except at risks which a prudent 
 engineer would not assume.* 
 
 § 188. Plaintift's ignorance no justification for his care- 
 lessness. — Where the plaintiff had no previous knowledge of 
 the crossing and failed to learn of it in time to avoid the col- 
 lision, merely because he did not look out, his ignorance was 
 held no defense,* but where a traveler is a stranger, the ques- 
 tion of his negligence at a crossing may go to the jury.* And, 
 
 Loui§, &c., By. Co., 91 Mo. 357; s. c. 
 3 S. W. Rep. 424; 3 S. W. Rep. 848. 
 It is the duty of those in charge of a 
 train to be watchful; and, if they see 
 tliat an accident has happened to a 
 traveler at a crossing, they should use 
 reasonable efforts to stop the train in 
 season to avoid a collision. Purinton 
 c. Maine Cent. R. Co., 78 Me. 569; 
 8. c. 7 Atl. Rep. 707; State v. Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co., 69 Md. 339; s. c. 
 14 Atl. Rep. 685, 688; Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Schuster (Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep. 
 874; Kelleyp. Union Ry., &c., Co., 
 18 Mo. App. 151 ; Conley v. Cincin- 
 nati. &c., Ry.' Co. (Ky.), 12 S. W. 
 Rep. 764; Virginia M. Ry. Co. v. 
 White's Adm'r, 84 Va. 598; s. c. 5 
 8. E. Rep. 573; Brown ©. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 50 Mo. 461. While it is 
 true that an engineer has no right to 
 wilfully run over a man, yet where 
 he sees a person on or near the track 
 in a x)osition of danger, he has a 
 right, in the absence of contrary evi- 
 dence, to believe that such person is 
 in possession of his faculties, and that 
 he will step off the track and avoid 
 injury. Moore ®. Phil. R. Co., 108 
 Penn. St. 349, and infra, § 203; Gray 
 c. Scott, 66 Penn. St. 345; Trow d. 
 Vermont, &c., R. Go., 24 Vt. 487; 
 8. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Kerwhacker 
 V. Cleveland, &c., R Co., 3 Ohio St. 
 172; 8. 0. 62 Am. Dec. 246; Colum- 
 bus, &c., R. Co. V. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 
 
 570; Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Col- 
 lins, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 114; Raibroad Co. 
 «. State, 36 Md. 366; Rothe s. Mil- 
 waukee, (fee, R. Co., 21 Wis. 356; 
 Macon, &c. , R. Co. «. Davis, 18 6a. 
 673; Lackawanna, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Chendworth, 53 Penn. St. 383; Daley 
 v. Norwich, «fcc., R. Co, 36 Conn. 591. 
 Where the trains run through popu- 
 lous portions of the country, the care 
 which must be exercised by the com- 
 pany's servants is very greatly in- 
 creased. Butler «. Milwaukee, &c., 
 R. Co., 38 Wis. 487; Raibroad Co. v. 
 Whitton, 13 Wall. 370; Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Burke, 6 Cold. 45; 
 Bridges. Grand June, &c., Ry. Co., 
 3 M. & W. 344; Bunting v. Central 
 R. Co., 16 Nevada, 377; Holstine v. 
 Oregon, &c., R. Co., 9 Oregon, 163; 
 Meyers v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 59 
 Mo. 223; Ream c. Pittsburgh, &c.,iR. 
 Co., 49 Ind. 93; Wasmer «. Delaware, 
 &c., R Co., 80 N. T. 212; B. c. 36 
 Am. Rep. 608. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Gretzner, 
 46 111. 74; Jones v. North Car., &c., 
 R. Co., 67 N. C. 125; Phila., &c., R. 
 Co. V. Spearen, 47 Penn. St. 300; 
 Telfer «. Northern R. Co., 30 N. J. 
 Law, 188. 
 
 " Allyn «. Boston, Ac, R. Co., 105 
 Mass. 77. 
 
 ' Cohen v. Eureka, &c., R Co., 14 
 Nev. 876, where this fact had no little 
 bearing on the case, and was held to 
 
246 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STEANGEBS. 
 
 [§ 188. 
 
 whera ofie supposed a regular train had passed, when-, in 
 fact, being behind time, it had not passed, a' failure to look 
 out was still held negligence.^ And trying to cross a track 
 when a train is known to be due, and when the slightest de* 
 lay in getting across would probably be fatal, is negligence,* 
 If the traveler rushes forward at such a high rate of speed as 
 to be Unable to stop in time to avoid a collision at a cross- 
 ing, he will be regarded negligent,' and this negligence may 
 be so gross as to operatfe to excuse even the gross negligence 
 of the railway company.* And if, with an approaching train 
 in full view, he undertakes to reach the crossing and get over 
 in advance of the train by fast driving, it is negligence.'' 
 
 1)6 an important issue to be deter- 
 mined by the jury. King e. Missouri 
 I Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 235; s. c. 11 8. 
 TV. Rep. 563. In GuU, &c., Ry. Co. 
 V. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 553; s. c. 8 8. "W. 
 Rep. 139, it was held that one who is 
 , driving on a road parallel to a railway 
 track, is not negligent in not looking 
 for approaching trains before he dis- 
 covers a crossing, but it is suflScient if, 
 after discovering the crossing, he uses 
 ordinary diligence to avoid danger. 
 
 'Cincinnati, &q., Ry. Co. ». How- 
 ard, 124 Ind. 280; s. c. 34 N. E. Rep. 
 893; Howard v. Northern Cent. Ry. 
 Co., 1 N. Y. Supl. 538. But he is 
 not held to so high a degree of care in. 
 such a case as if the train were just 
 due, especially where the view is ob- 
 structed. Bower v. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 61 Wis. 457; Toledo, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Jones, 76 111. 311; Mahlen v. Lake 
 Shore, &c., R. Co., 49 Mich. 585. 
 See, also, Phila., &c., R. Co. ■». Carr, 
 99 Penn. St. 505. 
 
 ' Palys V. Erie Ry. Co., 30 N. J. . 
 Eq. 604; Brooks ». Buffalo, &c., R. 
 Co, 1 Abb. Ak>. Dec. 311; Reynolds 
 V. N". T., &c., R. Co., 58 N. T. 348. 
 
 ' Mantfel V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 33 
 Minn. 63. He should listen and look 
 before gettilig so near that he cannot 
 check Ms horses in case of their be- 
 coming frightened. Rhoades t». Chi- 
 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 58 Mich. 363; 
 Grippen v. New York, &c., R. Co.,40 
 N. Y. 34; Salter v. Utica,&c., R. Co., 
 13 Hun, 197; Kelly v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R. Co., 75 Mo. 138; Powell v. Mis- 
 souri, &c., R. Co., 76 Mo. 80. 
 
 * Haring «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 13 Barb. 9; Grows v. Maine, &c., R. 
 Co., 67 Me. 100. But see Hackford v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 53 N. Y. 654; 
 s. c. 43 How. Pr. 233. 
 
 ' Allen V. Pennsylvania' R. Co. 
 (Penn.), 12 Atl. Rep. 493; Interna- 
 tional, &c., Ry. Co. D. Kuehn, 70 
 Tex. 583; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 484; Un- 
 derbill V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 81 
 Mich. 43; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 508; 
 Rigler t. Charlotte, &c., R. Co., 94N. 
 C. 604; Neier «. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. (Mo.), 1 S. W. Rep. 387; State 
 ». Maine Central R. Co., 76 Me. 357; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 633. The rule ap- 
 plies to pedestrians as well as to per- 
 sons driving. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Aiken (Penn.), 18 Atl. Rep, 619; a. c. 
 35 W. N. C. 13; Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Mah, 66 Md. 53; Fox v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 679; Col- 
 lins V. Long Island R. Co., 10 N. Y. 
 Supl. 701; Kelly o. Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. (Penn. St.), 8 Atl. Rep. 856; 
 Grows V. Maine, &c., R. Co., 67 Me. 
 100; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. «. Ti^- 
 lor, 104 Penn. St. 306; s. c. 49 Am. 
 
§ 190.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 
 
 247 
 
 § 189. The rnle illustrated.— So, it is held negligence to 
 •attempt to drive a frightened horse toward a crossing where 
 an engine is standing.^ But if, having approached the cross- 
 ing without negligence so near as to render retreat apparent- 
 ly impossible, the driver resorts to fast driving as the only 
 practicable means of extricating himself from the danger of 
 his situation, such a course may be justifiable on the ground 
 of prudence,* even though had he not been overcome with 
 "terror at the sudden peril in which he found himself, he 
 might have acted more wisely.' 
 
 § 190. Flagmen, gatemen, &c.— Failure to comply with a 
 statute or ordinance requiring a flagman or watchman to be 
 stationed at a crossing, is held to be negligence per se.* In 
 the absence of such regulations the omission to employ any 
 one to warn passers by of danger is admissible in connection 
 with other facts touching the prudence or negligence of the 
 company.' And the withdrawal of a flagman from a crossing 
 
 Bep. 580. One who takes this risk, 
 and miscalculates, must bear the con- 
 sequences of his imprudence. Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co. v. Jacobs, 63 111. 178; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. ®. Kusel, 63 111. 
 180, note; Stout «. Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co., 1 Wils. (Ind'pls.) 80; s. o. 
 aub nom. Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stout, 41 Ind. 149, and 53 Ind. 143. 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Schmidt, 
 81 Ind. 364; Pittsburgh, &c., B. Co. 
 e. Taylor, 104 Penn. St. 306; s. c. 49 
 Am. Rep. 580. But see Turner v. 
 Buchanan, 83 Ind. 147; B. c. 42 Am. 
 Rep. 485, where it was held that 
 though plaintiff's horses had on a pre- 
 vious occasion run away, he was not 
 negligent in driving near an engine 
 again. It could not be foreseen or 
 predetermined whether the team 
 would at all times take fright at the 
 obstruction, though the latter was cal- 
 culated to frighten teams. See, also, 
 on the same point, Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. B. Hill (Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep. 851. 
 » Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 27 
 Ga. 118; Donohue «. St. Louis, &c.. 
 
 Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 357; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 424; s. c. 3 S. W. Rep. 848. 
 
 ' But see Wright v. Great Northern 
 R. Co., 8 Ir. L. R. (C. P. Div.) 257. 
 
 * Western, &c., B. Co v. Toung, 81 
 Ga. 397; B. c. 7 8. E. Bep. 912; Mur- 
 ray «. Missouri Pac. By. Co., 101 Mo. 
 336; B. c. 13 S. W. Bep. 817; Wilkins 
 ». St. Louis, &c.. By. Co., 101 Mo. 
 93; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 893; Curley v. 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co., 40 La. Ann. 810; 
 B. c. 6 So. Rep. 103. 
 
 ' Patterson's Railway Accident Law, 
 p. 163; Chicago, &c., B. Co. v. Per 
 kins, 26 111. App..67; Lesan «. Maine 
 Central B. Co., 77 Me. 85; Hoye v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 1; 
 Dwinnell v. Abbott, 74 Wis. 514; b. c. 
 43 N. W. Rep. 496; Chicago, <fec., B. 
 Co. v. Perkins, 125 111. 137; b. c. 17 
 N. E. Bep. 1; Heddles v. Chicago, 
 &c.. By. Co., 74 Wis. 339; s. c. 43 N. 
 W. Bep. 337; Carraher v. San Fran- 
 cisco Bridge Co., 81 Cal. 98; s. o. 33 
 Pac. Bep. 480; Lesan v. Maine Central 
 B. Co., 77 Me. 85. Although under 
 1 How. Annot. St. Mich. § 3365, it 
 
248 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AB TO STEANGEEB. 
 
 [§ 190. 
 
 where he has been voluntarily kept, is deemed an act of neg- 
 ligence.' Flagmen or other servants of the company are 
 , presumed to act as agents in giving nptice, £|,nd where a per- 
 son attempts to cross the track, having been notified or in- 
 vited to cross by such an agent, even though it may be in 
 view of an approaching train, he may, in case he is injured,, 
 recover damages therefor from the company.' Conversely, it 
 is contributory negligence to attempt to pass over in opposi- 
 tion to the plain remonstrance of the person attending the- 
 crossing.^ An open gate is notice of a clear track and that it 
 is safe to cross without taking the precautions usually re- 
 quired to discover approaching trains, and negligence is not 
 
 is foi the lailroad commissioner to de- 
 ,termine the necessity for having a 
 flagman at a crossing, yet when the 
 railroad so obstructs its tracks that its 
 tp"ains cannot be seen by those ap- 
 proaching the crossing, and so that 
 the signals required by statute, the 
 bell and whistle, are not sufficient, 
 some additional warning must be 
 given, and there are cases where a 
 flagman would be necessary to acquit 
 the company of negligence. Guggen- 
 heim V. Lake Shore, &c., Ky. Co. 
 (Mich.), 33 N. W. Kep. 161. A rail- 
 road company is not necessarily 
 chargeable with negligence in not 
 keeping a watchman at a switch. 
 Sellars v. Kichmond, &c., B. Co., 94 
 N. C. 654. Omission to provide a 
 flagman, &c., do not constitute negli- 
 gence as to a person who' is walking 
 along the track. Roden v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 183 111. 73; s. c. 24 N. 
 E. Rep. 435. 
 
 » State 9. Boston, &c., R. Co., 80 
 Me. 480; b. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 86; Bums 
 V. North Chicago R. M. Co., 65 Wis. 
 312. See, also, § 67, supra, 
 
 ' Kane v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 9 N. T. Supl. 879; Callaghan v. Del., 
 &c.,R. Co., 5N. T. Supl. 285; b. c. 
 62 Hun, 276; Lunt v. London. &c., 
 Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. 277; Chaffee v. 
 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 104 Mass. 108; 
 Wheelock v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 105^ 
 Mass. 203; Warren v. Fitchburg R. 
 Co., 8 Allen, 227; Spencer v. Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co., 29 Iowa, 55. See, for a 
 full discussion on this point. Sweeny v. 
 Old Colony, &c., R. Co., 10 Allen, 368, 
 placing the ground of the decision on 
 the rule already noticed — ^that an oc- 
 cupant expressly or impliedly inviting 
 persons to enter his premises, must 
 see to it that they are reasonably safe. 
 Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Wanless, 48 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 186; s. c. L. R. 7 H. L. 
 13; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 275; Wanless «. 
 Northeastern Ry. Co., 26 L. T. (N. S.) 
 103; 8. c. L. R. 6 Q. B. 481; L. R. 1 
 Q. B. 277; Dublin, &c., R. Co., ®- 
 Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1313. See, 
 also, § 67, supra. 
 
 ' Baltimore ^ O. R. Co. v. Colvin, 
 118 Penn St. 230; 8. c. 12 Atl. Rep. 
 337; Salmon «. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 5 N. Y. Supl. 235. But it should 
 appear that the watchman's signal 
 was understood. Union R. Co. v. 
 State, 73 Md. 163; 8. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 
 449. It is not prudent to cross after 
 the gates are lowered. Granger o. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 146 Mass. 276r 
 8. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 619; AUerton «. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 146 Mass. 241r 
 s. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 621. 
 
§ 191.] 
 
 BAILWAX COMPANY AS TO 8TRAKGEBS. 
 
 249 
 
 imputed to one who acts upon that assurance.^ But a 
 man, stationed at a crossing to look out for tr^iins, and giye 
 warning of their approach, if run over by a train cannot re- 
 coTcr.* It is not^er se, however, contributory negligence to 
 attempt to cross a track after a notice that it is not safe,^ nor 
 is it negligence on the part of a pedestrian to cross the track 
 anywhere at a regular crossing, whether on the sidewalk or 
 in the roadway.* 
 
 § 191. When the view at the crossing is obstrncted.^- 
 
 When the view of the track is obstructed, or when, for any 
 reason, there is an inadequate outlook, this is a circumstance 
 which demands of the employees of the railway company 
 the exercise of increased vigilance.* But by this is meant 
 the requisite degree of care, due care, under the circum- 
 stances ; the railroad need not anticipate circumstances that 
 are extraordinary in their nature.* And where the danger- 
 ous character of the crossing is enhanced by its negligent 
 construction, or where the track is so laid as to render it 
 
 ■ Cleveland, &c., Ey. Co. «. Schnei- 
 der, 45 Ohio St. 678; 8. c. 17 N. E. 
 Rep. 321; State v. Boston & M. R.Co., 
 80 Me. 430; s. c. 15 Atl. Rep. 36; 
 Pennsylvania Co. t>. Stegmeier, 118 
 Ind. 305; B. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 843; 
 Whelan v. N. Y., Ac, R. Co., 38 Fed. 
 Rep. 15; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 159; Lake 
 Shore, &c., Ry. Co. v. Franz, 127 
 Penn. St. 397; 8. c. 34 W. N. C. 331 ;< 
 18 Atl. Rep. 23. See, also, Peck 
 e. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 57 Mich. 3. 
 
 ' This is virtually a failure to do 
 what he is bound to do. Clark v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 128 Mass. 1. 
 See, also, Holland d. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 5 McCrary, 549. 
 
 ' Kelly D. Southern, &c., R. Co., 28 
 Minn. 98. 
 
 * Louisville, &c., R Co. ®. Herd, 80 
 Ind. 117. 
 
 • Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Payne, 59 
 m. 534; B. c. 49 Dl. 499; Indianapo- 
 lis, &c., R. Co. V. Stables, 62 lU. 313; 
 
 Richardson v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 45' 
 N. y. 846; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Benton, 69 HI. 174; Artz v. Chicago, 
 &o., R. Co., 44 Iowa, 284; Pennsylva- 
 nia R. Co. ■». Matthews, 36 N. J. LaW, 
 531, where it was held that the fact of 
 an obstruction on the track made it 
 obligatory on the company to keep a 
 flagman at the dangerous point. Dtm- 
 ick«. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 80 HI. 
 338; Craig v. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 118 
 Mass. 431; Cordell v. N. Y., &c., R. 
 Co., 70 N. Y. 119; IndianapoUs, &C.,. 
 R. Co. V. Smith, 78 111. 112; Ohio, 
 &c., R. Co. ». Clutter, 82 HI. 123. 
 But see Dyson v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 57 Conn. 9; s. o. 17 Atl. Rep. 
 137, where it was held sufScient to 
 give the statutory signals without 
 slackening speed or providing other 
 signals. 
 
 ' Shaw V. Boston, &c., R.' Co., 8 
 Gray, 45; Balto., &c., R. Co. v. Brei- 
 nig. 35 Md. 378; Grippeno. N. Y.^ 
 &c., R. Co., 40 N. Y. 34. 
 
250 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STEANGEBS. 
 
 [§ 191. 
 
 difficult for loaded vehicles to cross, the railway company, ia 
 case of an injury therefrom, is held liable.^ When the track 
 is obscured by smoke or fog, a failure to sound the whistle, 
 even in the absence of any statutory duty, is evidence of 
 negligence,^ so, also, where the railroad company permitted 
 oorn-cribs to stand near the tracks in such a way as to cut 
 oflf the view of the crossing,* or where, piles of lumber oper- 
 ated in the same way to obstruct the view.* Where the 
 
 • Eimes ®. St. Louis, &c.. Ry. Co., 
 85 Mo. 611; Bullock ®. Wilmington, 
 &c., R. Co., 105 N. 0. 180; s. c. 10 
 S. E. Rep. 988; Tetherow v. St. Jo- 
 seph, &c., Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 74; s. c 
 
 11 S. W. Rep. 310; Dallas, &o., Ry. 
 Co. V. Able, 72 Tex. 150; s. c. 9 S.W. 
 Rep. 871. The traveler's knowledge 
 of the defect does not bar a recovery. 
 He has a right, notwithstanding, to 
 use the highway. Maltby ®. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 52 Mich. 108; St. Louis, 
 Ac, Ry. Co. ®. Box, 52 Ark. 368; s. c. 
 
 12 S. W. Rep. 757. See, also, Spooner 
 V. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 115 N. Y. 
 22; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 896; Brown v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 99 Mo. 310; 
 s. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 655; Phelps «. 
 Winona, &c., Ry. Co., 37 Minn. 485; 
 8. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 273; Evansville, 
 Ac, R. Co. ■». Carvener, 113 Ind. 51; 
 8. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 738; Moberly v. 
 Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 17 Mo. 
 App. 518; Gulf, <fcc., Ry. Co. ■». 
 Walker, 70 Tex. 126; 8. c. 7 8. W. 
 Rep. 831; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stout, 53 Ind. 143; Payne ». Troy, 
 Ac, R. Co., 9 Hun, 536; Richardson 
 «. N. Y.. &c., R. Co., 45 N. Y. 846; 
 MOwaukee, &c., R. Co. v. Hunter, 11 
 Wis. 160. In Mann v. Central, &c., 
 R. Co., 55 Vt. 484; 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 
 628, the defendant company set up 
 the defense that it was the duty of 
 the municipality to keep the intersec- 
 tions of the track and highway in or- 
 der. But tlie court held that the 
 Tight of the company to construct its 
 
 railroad across the highway carried 
 with it the duty of keeping the cross- 
 ings in good and sufficient repair. To 
 the same point, Scanlan v. Boston, 
 140 Mass. 84; Pittsburgh, &c.,R. Co. 
 V. Dunn, 56 Penn. St. 280; Gramlick 
 ». Railroad Co., 9 Phila. 78; Dimick 
 ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 80111. 388; 
 Ingersoil v. N. Y., <fcc., R. Co., 6 N. 
 Y. Supr. Ct. 416. Artman ti. Kansas, 
 &c., R. Co., 22 Kan. 296. 
 
 " Prescott ». Eastern, &c., R. Co., 
 113 Mass. 370, note; James v. Great 
 Western Ry. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 635, 
 note. And see Keim v. Union Ry., 
 &c., Co., 90 Mo. 314; B.C. 2 S. W. 
 Rep. 427. But in Heaney v. Long 
 Island R, Co., 112 N. Y. 122; 8. c. 19 
 N. E. Rep. 422, the company was 
 held free from negligence, no munici- 
 pal or statutory regulation having been 
 violated, and the plaintiff was pro- 
 nounced guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence for not waiting until the 
 smoke cleared away. 
 
 ' Rockford, &c., R. Co. ■». Hillmer, 
 72 m. 235. Box car. Perkins v. 
 Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 356. Buildings. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Starmer, 26 Neb. 630; s. c. 42 
 N. W. Rep. 706. 
 
 * Mackay d. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 35 
 N. Y. 75; Cordell ». K Y.. &c.. R. 
 Co., 70 N. Y. 128; s. c. 26 Am. Rap. 
 550 (distinguishing Mackay v. N. Y., 
 &c., R. Co.), and holding thatarul- 
 way company doles not render itseU 
 liable to an action for negligence in 
 
§ 192.] BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEB8. 251 
 
 trayeler is misled by appearances, seeing a train with the 
 rear toward him, and believing it to be receding, when in 
 fact it is approaching, it is a question for the jury whether 
 under the circumstances in continuing to cross he exercises 
 proper care.^ 
 
 § 192. Crossings at grade. — A railway consisting of sev- 
 eral lines, crossed a public footpath on a level at a point 
 near a station, but the foot-path was not in other respects 
 dangerous. On each side of the railway was a good and 
 sufficient swing-gate. The railway company, by way of extra 
 precaution, usually, but not invariably, fastened the gates 
 when a train was approaching. B., wishing to cross the rail- 
 way, found the gate unfastened, and a coal train standing 
 immediately in front of it. He waited until the coal train 
 had moved off, and then, without looking up or down the 
 line, commenced crossing the railway, and was killed by a 
 passing train. If he had looked up the line he would have 
 seen the train coming, in time to stop and avoid the accident. 
 In an action against the company by B.'s administratrix, it 
 was held, in the English common pleas, that B. contributed 
 to the accident by his negligence. It was argued that the 
 mere failure to perform a self-imposed duty is not actiona- 
 ble negligence ; that the omission to fasten the gate did not 
 amount to an invitation to B. to come on to the track, and 
 that, therefore, even if B. were not guilty of contributory 
 negligence, the company was not liable.' 
 
 depositing lumber on its land to be Ohio, &c., By. Co. v. Maisch, 29 III. 
 
 used in the preparation of additional App. 640. 
 
 tracks. ' Skelton v. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 ' Bonnell v. Delaware, &c., R. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 631 ; Fletcher u. Ktch- 
 39 N. J. Law, 189. It is gross negli- burg R. Co., 149 Mass. 127; s. c. 
 gence to assume without stopping 21 N. E. Rep. 302; Marty v. Chi- 
 that a locomotive headlight is station- cago, &c., Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 108; 
 ary. Qf. CarrroUa. Penn. R. Co., — s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 670; Young v. 
 Penn. St. — ; 13 Week. Notes Cas. N. T., &c., By. Co., 107 N. Y. 500; 
 348; Moore v. Phila., &c., R. Co., — Butts «. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 98 
 Penn. St. —; 8. c. 32 Alb. Law Jour. 98; Mo. 272; 8. c. 11 8. W. Rep. 754; 
 Haycroft d. Lake Shore, &c., R. Co., Gebhard «. Detroit, &c., B. Co., 79 
 64 N. Y. 636; New Jersey Trans. Co. Mich. 586; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 1045. 
 v. West, 32 N. J. Law, 91; Penn. R. But where a train passed abd a par- 
 Co. V. Matthews, 36 N. J. Law, 531: son crossing immediately was killed 
 
252 , BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEBS. [§ 194. 
 
 § 193. Duty of care.— But, in Pennsjlvania, it is held not 
 contributory negligence per se tq attempt to cross a railway 
 track at a regular crossing without waiting until a train that 
 has just passed is far enough away to allow sight of a train 
 coming up in a contrary direction.* Said the Court of Ap- 
 peals of New York: — " The law requires care at all times 
 when in a situation of danger; and. mental absorption or 
 reyerie, from business, grief, etc., will not excuse its omis- 
 sion. The inquiry, is whether, from the evidence, it satis- 
 factorily appears that the plaintiff, by looking, could have 
 seen the train in time to have avoided the collision. If so, 
 the plaintiff should have been nonsuited."" And Bramwell, 
 B., in a carefully considered case, said : — " The track is of 
 itself, a warning of danger to those about to go upon it, and 
 cautions them to see whether a train is coming. Passengers 
 crossing the rails are bound to exercise ordinary and reason- 
 able care for their own safety, and to look this way and that 
 way to see if danger is to be apprehended."* 
 
 § 194. Duty of the railway.— When a train is backed, 
 over a crossing, or cars are pushed ahead in front of an en- 
 
 by detached cars following, which he Carroll v. Penn. R. Co., — Penn. St. 
 
 might have seen by looking, the ques- — ; s. c. 12 Week. Notes Cas. 348; 
 
 tion of contributory negligence was Moore®. Phila.,-&c., R. Co., — Penn. 
 
 left to the jury. Breckenfelder ». Lake St. — ; s. o. 33 Alb. Law Jour. 98. 
 
 Shore, &c., By. Co., 79 Mich. 560; s.c. " Baxter v. Troy, &c., R. Co,, 41 
 
 44 N. W. Rep. 957. See, also, Old- N. T. 503. 
 
 enburg v. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 9 N. Y. ' Stubley v. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 Supl. 419; Sherry®. N.Y.,&c.,R. Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 13. It is the duty of 
 104 N. Y. 653; B. c. 10 N. E. Rep. one about to cross a railroad track to 
 128. select, if he can safely do so, such a 
 ' Phila., ,&c., R. Co. v. Carr, 99 point as will enable him to see along 
 Penn. St. 505. Nor is one chargeable the track, both ways; and the fact 
 with contributory negligence in pro- that cars- are left in such a position as 
 ceeding to cross after a train has to obstruct the view of the track in 
 passed on out of his sight so as to in- one direction does not excuse him 
 duce the belief that it is to continue from looking in that direction. Ow- 
 on, and where he has no reason to ens «. Pennsylvavia R. Co., 41 Fed. 
 suppose that it will immediately re- Rep. 187. The rule of law that a 
 :turn. Duame ®. Chicago, &c., Ry. railroad track is in itself a warning of 
 Co., 73 Wis. 523; s. c. 40 N. W. Rep. danger applies as well to a side track 
 894. It is otherwise if he knows the as to a main line. Mynning v. De- 
 train is likely to back. Kennedy v. troit, &c. , R. Go., 59 Mich. 257. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 68 Iowa, 559; 
 
§ 195.] 
 
 BAIL-WAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEB8. 
 
 253 
 
 gine, it is held evidence of negligence not to employ a lookout 
 and all available means to avoid accidents to travelers at the 
 crossing,* and merely ringing the bell or blowing the whistle 
 upon a locomotive attached to a freight train standing with 
 its rear end partially across a street, is not proper notice 
 to the passer-by of an intention to back the train over the 
 crossing. Without other notice, the company in such a case 
 will be held negligent." 
 
 § 195. Tigilance of one crossing a track must be pro- 
 portionate to the danger. — The Supreme Court of Iowa de- 
 clared the law upon this point in the following language: — 
 " If the view of the railroad, as the crossing is approached 
 upon the highway, is obstructed by any means so as to render 
 it impossible or difficult to learn of the approach of a train, 
 or there are complicating circumstances calculated to deceive 
 or throw a person off his guard, then, whether it was negli- 
 gence on the part of the plaintiff or the person injured, under 
 the particular circumstances of the case, is a question of fact 
 for the jury." * 
 
 * It is gross negligence to bacl^ a 
 train, without a brakeman at the rear 
 end as a lookout, across the main thor- 
 oughfare of a village when there is no 
 flagman at the crossing, even at a rate 
 hut little faster than a person walks. 
 Cooper s. Lake Shore, &c., Ey. Co., 
 66 Mich. 361; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 306; 
 Duane v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 73 
 Wis. 533; Fisher®. Monongahela,&c., 
 R. Co., 131 Penn. St. 393; s. c. 18 
 Atl. Rep. 1016; Atchison, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Morgan, 43 Kan. 1; 6. c. 33 Pac. 
 Rep. 995; O'Coiinor «. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 150; B. C. 7 S. W. 
 Rep. 106. Sending a car forward, 
 through a town or other such place, 
 of its own impetus, without any one 
 in charge to control it, is negligence. 
 Shelby's Adm'r v. Cincinnati, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 324; s. c. 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 157. See, also, Palmer n. Detroit, 
 &c., R. Co., 56 Mich. 1; Howard v. 
 St. Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 83 Minn. 314; 
 
 Bailey v. New Haven, &c., R. Co., 
 107 Mass. 496; Show «. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 8 Gray, 45, 66; Bradley v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 3 Cush. 539; 
 Grippen v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 40 N. 
 T. 34; Leavenworth, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Rice, 10 Kan. 436; Kennedy «. North 
 Mo. R. Co., 36 Mo. 351; Hathaway v. 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co., 46 Ind. 35; 
 Young V. Detroit, &c., R. Co., 56 
 Mich. 430, a case of negligence in 
 the company for allowing a train to 
 stand across a highway for more than 
 five minutes, the time allowed by a 
 statutory rule. 
 
 » Linfleld v. Old Colony R. Co., 10 
 Cush. 564; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 (Jarvey, 58 111. 85; Dlinois, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Ebert, 74 111. 399; Eaton e. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 51 N. Y. 544;Maginnls v. N. Y., 
 &c., R. Co., 52 N. Y. 215; McGovem 
 V. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 417. 
 
 ' Artz V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 84 
 Iowa, 160; Laverenz «. Chicago, 
 
254 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STEANGEES 
 
 [§ 1%. 
 
 § 196. The rnle summarized. — In proportion as the danger 
 increases must the vigilance of the person who attempts the 
 crossing be increased. A railway crossing should, at all 
 times and under all circumstances, be approached with cau- 
 tion ; but, at an obstructed crossing, it is the duty of a trav- 
 eler to exercise a greater degree of care and caution than is 
 incumbent upon him usually.^ He is not, however, required 
 to show that he took precautions which the surrounding 
 circumstances would have rendered unavailing.* When the 
 
 &c., R. Co., 56 Iowa, 689; Reed 
 «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 74 Iowa, 
 188; s. c. 37 N. "W. Rep, 149; 
 Schum ». Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 
 Penn. St. 8; 8. c. 52 Am. Rep. 468; 
 Cleaves «. Pigeon Hill Granite Co., 
 145 Mass. 541; s. c, 14 N. E. Rep. 646; 
 Hanks «. Boston, &c., R. Co., 147 
 Mass. 495; s. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 218; 
 McNeal v. Pittsburgh, <fec., R. Co., 
 131 Penn. St. 184; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 
 1026; Dwinnell v. Abbott, 74 Wis. 
 514; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 496; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Tilton, 26 111. App. 
 362; Oldenberg v. New York, &c., R. 
 -Co., 9 N. T. Supl. 419; Parsons b. 
 N. T., &c., R. Co., 113 N. T. 355; 
 s. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 145; Nosier v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 78 Iowa, 268; 
 6. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 850; Anderson ». 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 6 N. Y. Siipl. 
 182; Hooper v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 81 
 Me. 260; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 64; Lake 
 Shore, &c., Ry. Co. v. Franz, 137' 
 Penn. St. 297; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 23; 
 Tabor v. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 46 
 Mo. 358; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 517; Ken- 
 naydee. Pacific, &c., B. Co., 45 Mo. 
 255; Milwaukee, &c., R. Co. v. Hunter, 
 11 Wis. 160; Kelly v. Minneapolis, &c., 
 R. Co., 29 Minn. 1; Paber «. St. Paul, 
 &c., R. Co., 29 Minn. 465; Abbett e. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 29 Minn. 482; 
 Strong v. Sacramento, &c., R. Co.^ 61 
 Cal. 326. 
 
 ' Atchison, &c., R. Co. «. Town- 
 send, 39 Kan. 115; 9. o. 17 Pac. Rep. 
 804; Durbin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 
 
 Co., 17 Or. 5; 8. c. 17 Pac. Rep. .5; 
 Thompson v. New York Cent., &c., 
 TR. Co.. 33 Hun (N. Y.) 16. The care 
 must be in proportion to the increase 
 of the danger that may come from 
 the use of the highway at such a 
 place. Cincinnati, &c., Ry. Co. ®. 
 Howard, 124 Ind. 280; s. c. 24 N. E. 
 Rep. 892; Sabine, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Dean, 76 Tex. 73; 8. c. 13 S.W. Rep. 
 45; McCroiyc. Chicago, &c.,Ry. Co., 
 31Ped. Rep. 531; Thomas ». Dela- 
 ware, &c., R. Co., 19 Blatch. 533; 
 Strong V. Sacramento, &c., R. Co., 61 
 Cal. 326; Laverenz v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 56 towa, 689. When, how- 
 ever, one about to cross the track has 
 carefully listened and has heard no in- 
 dications of an approaching train, he 
 has a perfect right to assume that the 
 statutory requirements of ringing a 
 bell or sounding a whistle will be 
 complied with, and is then warranted 
 in endeavoring to cross. Johnson «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 77 Mo. 546; 
 Bunting v. Central R. Co., 14 Nevada, 
 351; Davey v. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 11 L. R. Q. B. Div. 213; Lehey v. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 4 Robt. 204; 
 Schaick v. Hudson River R. Co., 43 
 N. Y. 5S7. 
 
 " Norfolk, &c., R. Co. v. Surge, 84 
 Va. 68; 8. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 21; Mc- 
 Williams ». Philadelphia, &c., R. 
 Co. (Penn.), 15 Atl. Rep. 654; Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co. ■». Starmer, 26 Neb. 
 630; 8. c. 42 N. W. Rep. 706; Davis 
 ■0. N. Y., &c., R. Co.. 47 N. Y. 400; 
 
§ 196.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGEBS. 
 
 255 
 
 train came from a direction where it could not have been 
 seen in time, one crossing is not required to look in that 
 direction/ and when there was noise sufficiently loud to 
 drown the rumbling sound of a train in motion, the fact that 
 the injured party did not listen, when there was no signal by 
 either bell or whistle of the approaching train, was held not 
 negligence.* "When a train obstructs a crossing so as to in- 
 terfere with travel on the highway, it has been held that a 
 person who attempts to cross by passing between the cars, or 
 climbing over the coupling pins, or over flat cars, is guilty 
 of contributory negligence depriving him of any remedy for 
 injuries suffered by the starting of the trains without notice, 
 or by jumping to the ground.' And if a horse known to be 
 
 Hackford v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 6 
 Lans. 381; s. C. 53 N. T. 654; 43 
 How. Prac. 232; Leonard v. N. T., 
 &c., R. Co., 10 Jones & 8. 235. 
 
 " Cranston v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 39 Hun (N. T.) 308. Where 
 one, about to cross a railroad, could 
 not see if he had stopped to look, and 
 could not have heard because the 
 train made so little noise, he is not 
 chargeable with negligence- in not 
 stopping to look and listen. Donohue 
 V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 357; 
 Northern Pac. R. Co. «. Holmes 
 (Wash. T.), 18 Pac. Rep. 76; McGuire 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 3 Daly, 76; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Lee, 87 111. 
 454; Phila., &c., R. Co. «. Carr, 99 
 Penn. St. 505; Strongs. Sacramento, 
 &c., R. Co., 61 Cal. 326; Davey v. 
 London, &c., Ry. Co., 11 L. R. Q. B. 
 Div. 213. 
 
 ' Jones V. East Tenn., &c., R. Co., 
 128 U. 8. 443; Rodrian v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 7 N. Y. Supl. 811; Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co. «. Lane, 130 HI. 
 116; s. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 513. In 
 Beckwith c. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 7 N. Y. Supl. 719; s. c. 54 Hun, 446, 
 there was a confusion of lights and 
 sounds, and the case, like the fore- 
 going cases, was submitted to the 
 
 jury. But see, also. Chase v. Maine 
 Cent. R. Co., 78 Me. 346, which re- 
 quires one to stop his horse if the view 
 is obstructed and bells are attaclied to 
 his team; Merkle v. N. Y., &c., R. 
 Co., 49 N. J. Law, 473; s. c. 9 Atl. 
 Rep. 680. To the same effect, where 
 the noise was caused by the rattling 
 of bottles in the wagoa Seefeld v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 70 Wis. 316; 
 8. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 378; Brady v. 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co., 81 Mich. 616; 
 s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 1110; Davis v. 
 N. Y., &c., R. Co., 47 N. Y. 400; 
 Leonard v. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 10 
 Jones & S. 335; Mafalen v. Lake 
 Shore, &c., R. Co., 49 Mich. 585. 
 
 ' Spencers. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 
 4 Mackey (D. C.)138; s. c. 54 Am. 
 Rep. 369. Passing between cars. 
 Hudson «. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 101 
 Mo. 13; B. 0. 14 S. W. Rep. 15. 
 Climbing over coupling. Howard «. 
 Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 41 Kan. 403; 
 s. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 267. Plaintiff 
 climbed over a coal car at the sug- 
 gestion of a train hand and broke a 
 leg in leaping to the ground. Conl/ra, 
 Philadelphia, &c.; R. Co. v. Layer, 
 113 Penn. St. 414, where a child of 
 six tried to pass between two cars of 
 a train which blocked the street. 
 
256 
 
 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGEBS. 
 
 [§197. 
 
 easily frightened by cars is allowed to stand or pass in close 
 proximity to a train which has halted at a crossing, the 
 owner cannot recover damages for a runaway.^ But where 
 persons become impatient of waiting and make endeavors to 
 get by in ways not obviously dangerous, the questions of 
 negligence and of contributory negligence are usually left to 
 the jury.' < ' 
 
 § 197. PlaintiflF deaf or intoxicated.— Deafness, so far 
 
 from excusing one for a failure to use his eyesight, rather 
 imposes upon him the duty of increased vigilance in the 
 employment of that faculty,* and when contributory negli- 
 gence is charged, it is, as a rule, not sufficient for the plaintiff 
 to urge his deafness by way of excuse. It may be of the 
 very essence of the plaintiff's default that, being deaf, he put 
 himself in a position where his deafness would especially ex- 
 pose him to injury. The rule is caveat surdus. Neither will 
 intoxication excuse one crossing a railroad track from the 
 exercise of such Care as is due from a sober man.* But in- 
 
 See, also, Wilkins v. St. Louis, «^o., 
 Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 93; s. c. 13 S. W. 
 Bep. 893. 
 
 ' Hargis v. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 75 Tex. 19; 6. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 953; 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. ®. Hutchinson, 
 39 Kan. 485, 488; s. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 
 705,706; 19 Pac. Rep. 313. 
 
 « Young V. Detroit, &c., Ry. Co., 56 
 Mich. 430;, Geveke ®. Grand Rapids, 
 &c., R. Co., 57Mich.589; Vicksburg, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Alexander, 62 Miss. 
 496; Kellny v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Mo.), 13 S. W". Rep. 806; Adams ». 
 ton Cliffs Co.,, 78 Mich. 371; s. o. 44 
 N. W. Rep. 370; Smith v. Savannah, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 84 Ga. 698; s. c. 11 
 S. E. Rep. 455; Bare v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. (Penn.), 19 Atl. Rep. 935. 
 
 = Cleveland, &c., R. Co. ■». Terry, 8 
 Ohio St. 570; Morris, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Haslan, 38 N. J. Law, 147; Central, 
 &o., R. Co. «. Fellar. 84 Penn. St. 236; 
 International, &c., Ry. Co. ». Garcia, 
 75 Tex. 583; s, c. 13 S. W. Rep. 235; 
 Mobile, &c., R. Co. «. Stroud, 64 
 
 Miss. 784; State v. Baltimore, &c., B. 
 Co., 69 Md. 494. For a deaf person 
 about to cross a track, not to make 
 the utmost use of his powers of vision, 
 is sheer recklessness. Zimmerman v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 71 Mo. 476; 
 Purl ®. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 73 Mo. 
 168; Illinois, &c., R. Co. ». Buckner, 
 38 111. 299; Chicago, &o., R. Co. «. 
 Triplett, 38 111. 482; New Jersey 
 Trans. Co. v. West, 32 N. J. Law, 
 91; Laicher v. New Orleans, &c., B. 
 Co., 28 La. Ann. 320; Cogswell v. 
 Oregon, &o., E. Co., 6 Oregon, 417; 
 Terre Haute, &c., E. Co. v. Graham, 
 
 46 Ind. 239; 8. c. 95 Ind. 386; 48 Am. 
 !Rep. 719; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. ®. 
 Miller, 35 Mich. 279; Hayes v. Michi- 
 gan, &c., R. Co.. Ill V. S. 228. 
 
 ' Eean v. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 61 
 Md. 154j Toledo, &c., R. Co. «. BUey, 
 
 47 111. 514; Chicago, «fcc., E. Co. v. 
 Bell, 70 111. 102; Tamall «. St. Louis, 
 &c., B. Co., 75 Mo. 575; Southwest- 
 em B. Co. V. Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114; 
 Norfolk & W. B. Co. «. Harman, 88 
 
§ 198.] 
 
 EAILWAY COMPANY A8 TO STRANGERS. 
 
 257 
 
 toxication can hardly be said, as matter of law, to be contrib- 
 utory negligence. It tends to show contributory negligence, 
 and is matter to go to the jury.* "Slight intoxication," how- 
 ever, when on the track of a railway, is said, in Illinois, not 
 to be contributory negligence f while, under the Georgia 
 Code, intoxication is an absolute defense to actions of this 
 character.' In every jurisdiction, presumably, falling asleep, 
 or being helplessly drunk, upon a railway track, would be 
 held such contributory negligence as to bar an action for 
 damages.^ 
 
 § 19S. Trest)as8er!ii on a railway track— the PennsylTania 
 rule. — There are two views taken by the courts in this country 
 as to the degree of care to be exacted from railway corpora- 
 tions with reference to trespassers upon its tracks. One class 
 of cases hold that the agents of a railroad company are under 
 no obligation to take precautions for the safety of tres- 
 passers. " Except at crossings," says the Pennsylvania court, 
 "where the public have a right of way, a man who steps 
 
 Va. 553; 8 S. E. Rep. 251. Houston, 
 «fcc., R. Co. V. Sympkins, 54 Tex. 615; 
 8. c. 38 Am. Rep. 632, where it was 
 left to the juiy to say whether the 
 injured party was intoxicated or was 
 suffering from a "providential dis- 
 pensation" — a fit. If he was drunk, 
 recovery would be barred. But if he 
 labored under the providential dis- 
 pensation, and the proximate cause of 
 the injury could be traced to the en- 
 gineer, his right to recover damages 
 would be clear. Herring v. Wilming- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 10 Ired. (Law) 402; 
 8. c. 61 Am. Dec. 395; Jones v. North 
 Carolina R. Co., 67 N. C. 125; Little 
 Rock, &c., R. Co. V. Pankhurst, 36 
 Ark. 371. 
 
 ' Seymer v. Lake, 66 "Wis. 651; Ford 
 u Umatilla County, 15 Or. 313; s. o. 
 16 Pac. Rep. 33; Aurora ». HQlman, 
 90 HI. 61; Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Boteler, 38 Md. 568; Ditchett v. Spuy- 
 ten Duyvil, &c., R Co., 5 Hun, 16J5; 
 8. c. 67 N. T. 425; Illinois, &o., R. 
 17 
 
 Co. V. Cragin, 71 111. 177; Barker ®. 
 Savage, 45 N. T. 191; Abbott's Trial 
 Evidence, 779; Field on Damages, 188; 
 Shearman & Redfleld on Negligeilce, 
 4lhed., §93. 
 
 'Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. ■». Gal- 
 braith, 63 111. 436. 
 
 " Southwestern, &c., R. Co. v. Han- 
 kerson, 61 Ga. 114. 
 
 ' Yamall v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 
 75 Mo. 575; Denman v. St. Paul, &c., 
 R. Co., 26 Minn. 357; Felder». Louis- 
 ville, &c., R. Co., 2 McMuU. (Law) 
 408. In such a case, the courts call 
 the proximate cause of the catastrophe 
 the injured person's own volimtary 
 act. Richardson v. Wilmington, &c., 
 R. Co., 8 Rich. (Law) 120; Herring v. 
 Wilmington, &o., R. Co., 10 Ired. 
 (Law) 402; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 895; 
 Manly n. Wilmington, &c., R. Co., 74 
 N. C. 655; Dlinois, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Hutchison, 47 111. 408; Weymire v. 
 Wolfe, 52 Iowa, 683. 
 
258 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO 8TBANOEES. [§ 199. 
 
 his foot upon a railroad track does so at his peril."* " The 
 law insists upon a clear track."' The Pennsylvania courts 
 insist to the utmost upon this rule. In Phila., &c., E. Co. v. 
 Hummell,' Strong, J., said : — " It is time it should be under- 
 stood in this State that the use of a railrcjad track, cutting, 
 or embankment, is exclusive of the public everywhere, except 
 ivhere a way crosses it. This has more than once been said, 
 and it must so be held, nOt only for the protection of property, 
 but, what is far more important, for the preservation of per- 
 sonal security, and even of life. In some other countries it 
 is a penal offense to go upon a railroad. With us, if not that, 
 it is a civil wrong, of an aggravated nature; for it endangers 
 not only the trespasser, but all who are passing or transport- 
 ing along the line." 
 
 § 199. Jndge Gibson's statement of the rale,— "As long 
 ago as 1852," continued the same judge, " it was said by Judge 
 Gibson, with the concurrence Of all the court, that ' a railway 
 company is a purchaser, in consideration of public accommo- 
 dation and convenience, of the exclusive possession of the 
 ground paid for to the proprietor of it, and of a license to 
 use the highest attainable rate of speed, with which neither 
 the person nor property of another may interfere. The com- 
 pany, on the one hand, and the people of the vicinage, on the 
 other, attend respectively to their particular concerns, with 
 this restriction of their acts, that no needless damage be done. 
 But the conductor of the train is not bound to attend to the 
 uncertain movements of every assemblage of those loitering 
 or roving cattle by which our railways are infested.'* So, in 
 Eailroad Co. v. Norton,^ it was said, that ' until the legislature 
 shall authorize the construction of railroads for something 
 else than travel and transportation, we shall hold any use of 
 them for other purposes to be unlawful, if not, indeed, a 
 public offense punishable by indictment.' But if the use of 
 a railroad is exclusively for its owners, or those acting under 
 
 'Mulherrin v. Delaware, &c., R. 478; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. v. Hart, 
 Co., 81 Penn St. 366. See mfra, § 211. 87 HI. 529. 
 
 " Railroad Co. v. Norton, 24 Penn. = 44 Penn. St. 375. 
 St. 465; 8. o. 64 Am. Dec. 672. Qf. ' Railroad Co. «. Skinner, 19 Penn. 
 Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 111. St. 298. 
 
 ' 24 Penn. St. 465. 
 
§ 200.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 259 
 
 them, if others have no right to be upon it, if they are wrong- 
 doers whenever they intrude, the parties lawfully using it are 
 under no obligation to take precautions against possible in- 
 juries to intruders upon it. Ordinary care they must be held 
 to, but they have a right to presume, and act on the presump- 
 tion, that those in the vicinity will not violate the laws, will 
 not trespass upon the right of a clear track; that even 
 children of a tender age will not be there, for, though they 
 are personally irresponsible, they cannot be upon the rail- 
 road without a culpable violation of duty by their parents or 
 guardians." 
 
 § 300. The Pennsylvania rule further stated.—" Precau- 
 tion," continues the opinion of Judge Strong, to which 
 reference is made in the two last preceding sections, "is a 
 duty only so far as there is reason for apprehension. No 
 one can complain of want of care in another, where care is 
 only rendered necessary by his own wrongful act. It is true, 
 that what amounts to ordinary care, under the circumstances 
 of the case, is generally to be determined by the jury. Yet a 
 jury cannot hold parties to a higher standard of care than 
 the law requires, and they cannot find anything negligence 
 which is less than a failure to discharge a legal duty. If the 
 law declares, as it does, that there is no duty resting up^n 
 any person to anticipate wrongful acts in others, and to take 
 precaution against such acts, then the jury cannot say that a 
 failure to take such precautions is a failure in duty and neg- 
 ligence. Such is this case. The defendants had no reason, 
 to suppose that either man, woman, or child, might be uponi 
 the railroad where the accident happened. They had a right, 
 to presume that no one would be on it, and to act upon the' 
 presumption. Blowing the whistle of the locomotive, or 
 making any other signal, was not a duty owed to the persons 
 in the neighborhood, and, consequently, the fact that the 
 whistle was not blown, nor a signal made, was no evidence of 
 negligence. Were it worth while, abundant authority might, 
 be cited to show that the law does not require anyone to pre- 
 sume that another may be negligent, much less to presume 
 that another may be an active wrong-doer. The principle 
 was asserted in Brown v. Lynn,* and in Eeeves v. Delaware- 
 
 ■ 31 Peim. St. 510. 
 
260 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO STBANGEES. [§ 200. 
 
 B. Co.' It is too well founded 'in reason, however, to need 
 authority. We act upon it constantly, and without it there 
 could be no freedom of action. There is as perfect a duty to 
 guard against accidental injury to a night intruder into one's 
 bed chamber, as there is to look out for trespassers upon a 
 railroad, where the public has no right to be. And the rule 
 must be the same, whether the railroad is in the vicinage of 
 many or few inhabitants. In the one case, as in the other, 
 going upon it is unlawful, and, therefore, need not be ex- 
 pected. In this case it appears that there are fifteen houses 
 between the railroad and public highway, all but two of them 
 built since the railroad was constructed. The danger of 
 trespassing may have been increased by the increase of the 
 population, but the standard of duty in the use of one's prop- 
 erty is not elevated or depressed by a varying risk of unlaw- 
 ful intrusions upon his rights. Of course, we are not speak- 
 ing of the duties of railroad companies to the public at lawful 
 crossings of their railways. We refer only to their obliga- 
 tions at points where their right is exclusive."' This is a 
 luminous and explicit statement of the rule as held not only 
 in Pennsylvania but in other States of the Union. Where 
 this rule prevails, only such aggravated negligence as 
 amounts to intentional mischief on the part of the railway, 
 will render it liable in the event of an injury to a trespasser.' 
 
 • 30 Penn. St. 454. v. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 126 111. 
 
 » Phila., &c., R. Co. v. Hummell, 416; s. o. 18 N. E. Rep. 799; Bertel- 
 
 44 Penn. St. 375. son «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 5 Dak. 
 
 ' Louistille, &c., R. Co. v. Howard, 313; s. c. 40 N. W. Rep. 581; Balti- 
 82 Ky. 212; "Western, <tc., R. Co. v. more, &c., R. Co. v. Statfi, 62 Md. 
 Bloomingdale, 74 6a. 604; Terre 479; Galveston, &c., Ry. Co. v. Ryon, 
 Haute, &c., R. Co. c. Graham, 95 70 Tex. 56; s. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 687; 
 Ind. 286; b. c. 48 Am. Rep. 719. Even Gregory v. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 
 if a child is in danger, the company is 112 Ind. 385; s. c. 14 N. B. Rep. 228; 
 only liable for gross negligence. Sa- Jeffersonville, &c„ R. Co. ®. Gold- 
 bine, &c., Ry. Co. V. Hanks, 73 Tex. smith, 47 Ind. 43; LaFayette, Ac, R. 
 323; 8. c. 11 8. W. Rep. 377. Roden Co. ■». HufEman, 28 Ind. 287; Cincin- 
 V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 133 111. 73; nati, &c., R. Co. ■». Eaton, 53 Ind. 310; 
 B. c. 24 N. E. Rep. 425; Little Rock, Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Wolf, 59 
 Ac, Ry. Co. V. Haynes, 47 Ark. 497; Ind. 89; Carroll v. Minn., &c.,R.Co., 
 fl. c. 1 8. W. Rep. 774. Mere con- 13 Minn. 30. Nor does the mere ac- 
 structive negligence in violating a quiescence of a railroad company in 
 *ity ordinance is not wil^ or in- the use of its track or right of way 
 tentional within the rule. BlaachaEd . by persons passing along it, as a foot- 
 
§ 201.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGERS. 261 
 
 § 201. The modified rale as to trespassers.— But the 
 
 courts of some of the American States iucline to relax the 
 severity of the rule as to the public, and hold that a railway- 
 company is bound to run its trains with a view to the proba- 
 bility, or, at most, the possibility, of constant trespass upon 
 its tracks. This is, however, neither correct in principle nor 
 conformed to the analogy in other branches of the law of tres- 
 pass. This doctrine is thus laid down by the Missouri court, 
 viz. : — " If, after discovering the danger in which the party had 
 placed himself, even by his own negligence, the company 
 could have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable 
 care, the exercise of that care becomes a duty, for the neglect 
 of which the company is liable. When it is said, in cases 
 where plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence, 
 that the company is liable if, by the exercise of ordinary 
 care, it could have prevented the accident, it is to be under- 
 stood that it will be so liable if, by the exercise of reasonable 
 care, after a discovery by defendant of the danger in which 
 the injured party stood, the accident could have been pre- 
 vented, or if the company failed to discover the danger 
 
 way, give such persons a right of way, Co., 37 Kan. 84; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 
 or make the company's liability greater 405, where one was run over by a 
 
 than to any other trespassers. Illinois, hand-car while crossing a piece of 
 
 &c., R. Co. V. Godfrey, 71 HI. 500; trestlework. The court ruled out the 
 
 8. c. 22 Am. Rep. 112; Donaldson «. evidence concerning the custom of 
 
 Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 21 Minn, foot-passengers crossing such trestle- 
 
 293; Herrings. WUmington, &c., R. work, and held the plaintiff to be a 
 
 Co., 10 Ired. 402; 8. c. 51 Am. Dec. trespasser, and hence without remedy, 
 
 395; Kenyon «. N. Y., &o., R. Co., 5 unless the defendant's conduct was 
 
 Hun, 479; Green ■». "Erie Ry. Co., 11 wilful and reckless. Nicholson i/. 
 
 Hun, 383; Baltimore, &c., R. Co., ». Erie Ry. Co., 41 N. Y. 525. Cf. 
 
 Schwindling, 101 Penn. St. 258; s. c. McAlpin «. Powell, 70 N. Y. 136; 
 
 47 Am. Rq). 706; Railroad Co. d. b. c. 26 Am. Rep. 555, and the 
 
 Houston, 95 U. 8. 697; Ream v. Pitts- note. The English statute upon 
 
 burgh, &c., R. Co., 49 Ind. 93; Gay- this subject (3 & 4 Vict. c. 97, § 16) 
 
 nor V. Old Colony R. Co., 100 Mass. makes it a penal offense wilfully to 
 
 208; Indiana, &c., R. Co. v. Hudel- trespass upon the line of a railway, 
 
 son, 13 Ind. 325; Morrissey v. Eastern and this is generally the rule of 
 
 R. Co., 126 Mass. 377; s. 0. 30 Am. law on the continent of Europe. 
 
 Rep. 686; Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. v. Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. (N. 8.) 
 
 Graham, 95 Ind. 286; s. c. 48 Am. 731; s. c. 6. Jur. (N. 8.) 897; 29 L. J. 
 
 •Rep. 719; Pittsburgh, &c.,R. Co. v. (C. P.) 203; 8 Week. Rep. 227; 97 
 
 Collins, 87 Penn. St. 405; s. c. 30 Am. Eng. Com. Law, 731. 
 Rep. 371; Mason v. Missouri, &c., R. 
 
262 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEES. 
 
 [§ 202. 
 
 through the recklessness or carelessness of its employees, 
 when the exercise of ordinary care would have discovered 
 the danger and averted the calamity." ' 
 
 » 
 
 § 203. The same subject continued. — As a general rule, 
 a trespasser on the track is held to be there at his peril. 
 He must keep himself informed of the approach of trains 
 from any direction, and, in case of injury, will be held guilty 
 of such contributory negligence, that he cannot recover from 
 
 1 Welsh ®. Jackson Co., &c., R. Co., 
 81 Mo. 466; Keim v. Union Ry. & 
 Transit. Co., 90 Mo. 314: s. c. 2. S. 
 "W. Rep. 427; Dunkman v. Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 95 Mo. 232; s. c. 4 S. 
 W. Rep. 670; Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, 
 •fee, Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 99; 8. o. 8 S. W. 
 777; Harlan v. St. Louis, &c., R. 
 Co., 64 Mo. 480; s. c. 65 Mo. 22; 
 Burnett ». Burlington, &c., R. Co., 
 16 Neb. 332. In Barker v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 98 Mo. 50; s. c. 11 S. W. 
 Rep. 254, the majority of the court 
 thought the circumstances called for 
 a mitigation of the rule, and held the 
 company not liable. The facts were 
 that the deceased walked upon a rail- 
 road track where hp had no right, and 
 knowing that a train was due from 
 behind him, but did not look in that 
 direction, and was struck and killed. 
 The track was properly fenced. The 
 train gave no signal, though the engi- 
 neer could hare seen him at nearly 
 200 yards distance. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. ■». Weisen, 65 Tex. 443. The neg- 
 ligence to make the defendant liable 
 must have occurred after its servants 
 either knew, or might, by the exercise 
 of ordinary care, have known of the 
 danger to the plaintiff. Scoville v. 
 Hannibal, &c.. R. Co., 81 Mo. 434; 
 Brown v. Hannibal^ &c., R. Co., 50 
 Mo. 461; B. c. 11 Am. Rep. 420; Isa- 
 bel «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 
 475; Finlayson v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 1 Dili. 579; Baltimore, &c., R. 
 
 Co. «. State, 33 Md. 542; State v. Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co., 36 Md. 366; Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co. V. State, 54 Md. 
 648; Penn., &c., Co. v. State, 61 Md. 
 108. In Baltimore, &c., R. Co. « 
 State, 63 Md. 479, it was held not to 
 be negligence per »e-if a railroad com- 
 pany failed to comply with a city or- 
 dinance requiring a man to ride on 
 the front of the locomotive within 
 city limits, the result of which failure 
 being the killing of a trespasser. Has- 
 senger«. Mich., &c., R. Co., 48 Mich. 
 205; a. c. 42 Am. Rep. 470; Johnson 
 V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 56 Wis. 274; 
 Aiistin i>. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 91 111. 
 35; Houston, &c., R. Co. v. Sympkins, 
 54 Tex. 615; B. c. 30 Am. Rep. 682; 
 Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507; s. C. 
 50 Am. Dec. 261; Gothard 'v. Ala- 
 bama, &c., R. Co., 67 Ala. 114. Clf. 
 Carter v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 
 98 Ind. 552; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 780 
 where it is held that when certain ser- 
 vants of the company have implied 
 authority to remove trespassers from 
 the engine, and, in consequence of 
 their reckless manner, they injure a 
 trespasser, the latter has an action 
 against the company. It is not 
 contributory negligence for one walk- 
 ing on the track, in a snow storm, 
 when the snow is blinding, to pre- 
 sume that the railway employees will 
 be careful in running their train. So- 
 lent. "Virginia, &c., R. Co., 18 Ne- 
 vada, 106. See § 50, supra. 
 
§ 203.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEE8. 
 
 263 
 
 the railway company, notwithstanding concurrent negligence 
 on their part.* 
 
 § 203. The rule snmmarized. — The doctrine upon this 
 point, declared by the Supreme Court of Missouri, is evidently 
 an attempt to apply the rule that Judge Thompson has formu- 
 lated," for the purpose of neutralizing the heresy in Davies v. 
 Mann,' but as has been already suggested,^ it is, in the author's 
 judgment, better to abandon the theory of that case than to 
 explain it away. The liability of a railroad company to a 
 trespasser on its track must be measured by the conduct of 
 its employees,, after they become aware of his presence there, 
 and not by their negligence in failing to discover him ; for, as 
 to such negligence, the contributory negligence of the tres- 
 passer will defeat a recovery.^ Nor is the company liable for 
 
 ' Central R. & B. Co. ®. Smith, 78 
 Ga. 69^ 8. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 397; Hef- 
 flnger v. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 48 Minn. 503; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 
 1131; East Tennessee, &c., R. Co. v. 
 King, 81 Ala. 177; Savannah, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Stewart, 71 Ga. 427; Gonzales v. 
 N. T., &c., R. Co., 50 How. Pr. 126; 
 Elwood v. N. Y., &c., R. Ca, 4 Hun, 
 808; Green v. Erie Ry. Co., 11 Hun. 
 833; lUinois, &c., R. Co. ■b. Hall, 72 
 HI 222; Elinois, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hetherington, 83 111. 510; Lake Shore, 
 Ac, R. Co. ». Hart, 87 HI. 529;-Austin 
 v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 91 111. 35; 
 Poole V. North CaroUna R. Co., 8 Jones 
 (Law) 340. The ornis will be on the tres- 
 passer to show that the company was 
 guilty of wanton conduct, if he would 
 recover. Carlin v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 37 Iowa, 316; Murphy v. Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 661; 8. c. 
 38 Iowa, 539; Laicher v. N. O., &c., 
 R. Co., 28 La. Ann. 820; Carroll d. 
 Minn., &c., R. Co., 13 Minn. 30; 
 Donaldson ■». Milwaukee, &c., R. 
 Co., 21 Minn. 293; Smith ii. Min- 
 nesota, &c., R. Co., 26 Minn. 419; 
 Rothe V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 21 
 Wis. 256; Moore v. Penn. R. Co., 99 
 Penn. St. 301; Mason v. Mo. Pac. R. 
 Co., 27 Kan. 88. And this will be 
 the case, even though the engine 
 
 were running backward with tender in 
 front, without ringing the bell or sound- 
 ing the whistle, and at a rate forbidden 
 by the ordinances of the city. Hoover 
 V. Texas, &c.,R. Co., 61 Tex. 508; Len- 
 ix V. Mo.Pac. R. Co., 76 Mo. 86; Meek 
 V. Penn., &c., R. Co., 38 Ohio St. 633; 
 State «. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 58 Md. 
 482; Feunenbrack ■». South Pac. R. 
 Co., 59 Cal. 269; Farve v. Louis- 
 ville, Ac, R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 
 441; John's Adm'r v. Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. (Ky.), 10 S. W. Rep. 417; Bent- 
 ley V. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Ala. 
 484; 8. c. 6 So. Rep. 87; Donnelly v. 
 Boston, &a, R. Co., 151 Mass. 210; s.c. 
 24 N. E.Rep. 38; May v. Central R. & 
 B. Co., 80 Ga. 863; s. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 
 380; Bell v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 
 80 Mo. 599; Grethen v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 609; Virginia 
 Midland R. Co. v. Barksdale's Adm'r,. 
 82 Va. 380. 
 ' § 54, supra. 
 
 ■ Thompson on Negligence, 1115,§ 7. 
 * § 27, supra. 
 
 ' St. Louis &c., Ry. Co. n. Monday, 
 49 Ark. 257; 8. c. 4 8. W. Rep. 782; 
 Bouwmeester e. Grand Rapids, &c., 
 R. Co., 67 Mich. 87; b. c. 34 N. 
 W. Rep. 414; Bentley v. Georgia Pac. 
 Ry. Co., 86 Ala. 484; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 
 37; Carrington v. Louisville, &c., R. 
 
264 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STKANGEES. 
 
 [§ 203. 
 
 a failure on the part of ^its employees to stop the train, on 
 seeing a person walking on the track, even though there was 
 time enough to do so, provided the proper signals of warning 
 were given. The company may presume that the trespasser 
 is in full possession of his senses, and that he will appreciate 
 his danger, and act with discretion.^ But an engineer, who 
 sees a helpless person, incapable of moving, on the track, is 
 guilty of negligence if he fails to make all prudent efforts to 
 avoid the collision, and this without reference to the cause of 
 the person's disability." 
 
 Co., 88 Ala. 472; s. c. 6 So. Kep. 910; 
 Farve v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 43 
 Fed. Rep. 441; Frazer «. S. & N. Ala. 
 E. Co., 81 Ala. 185; s. c. 1 So. Rep. 85. 
 ' Nichols' Adm'r v. Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. (Ky.), 6 S. W. Rep. 339; Inter- 
 national, &C., Ry. Co. «. Garcia, 75 
 Tex. 583; B. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 333; 
 Artusy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 78 
 Tex. 191, B. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 177; 
 Maloy B. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., 84 
 Mo. 370; Kennedy v. Denver, 8. P. 
 & P. R. Co., 10 Colo. 493; s. c. 
 16 Pac. Rep. 310, deaf persons. Daily 
 V. Richmond, &c., "R. Co., 106 N. C. 
 301; B. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 330, an idiot. 
 Bouwmeester v. Grand Rapids, &c., 
 R. Co., 67 Mich. 87; s. c. 34 N. W. 
 Rep. 414, a man subject to spfells of 
 absent-mindedness. Williams v. South- 
 ern Pac. R. Co., 73 Cal. 130; b. c. 13 
 Pac. Rep. 319; Virginia M. Ry. Co. 
 V. Boswell's Adm'r, 83 Va, 933; b. c. 7 
 S. E. Rep. 383; Houston?). Vicksburg, 
 &c., R. Co., 39 La. Ann. 796; s. c. 3 
 So. Rep. 563; Hughes v. Galveston. 
 &c., Ry. Co., 67 Tex. 595; b. o. 4 S. 
 W. Rep. 219. Where there is no 
 evidence that the engineer saw plaint- 
 iff in time to avoid the injury, an 
 instruction that if the engineer made 
 no effort to stop the engine, and gave 
 no warning, the defendant was liable, 
 is error. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. v. York, 
 74 Tex. 364; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 68; 
 Rine v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 88 Mo. 
 392; Illinois, &c., R. Co. ■». Modg- 
 lin, 85 111. 481; Herring v. Wilming- 
 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 10 Ired. L. 403; 
 s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 395; Poole d. 
 North Car. R. Co., 8 Jones (Law) 340; 
 Manly s, Wilmington, &c., R. Co., 
 74 N. C. 655; Holmes v. Central. &c., 
 R. Co, 37 Ga. 593;Mahere. Atlantic, 
 &c., R. Co., 64 Mo. 367; Freeh v. 
 Phna., &c., R. Co., 39 Md. 574; Wil- 
 lets V. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 14 Barb. 
 585; Kfenyon v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 5^ 
 Hun, 479; Harty v. Central, &c., R. 
 Co., 42 N. T. 468; Little Rock, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Pankhurst, 36 Ark. 371; 
 Laverenz «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 56- 
 lowa, 689; Cogswell v. Oregon, \&c., 
 R. Co., 9 Oregon, 417; Terre Haute, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Graham, 46 Ind. 339; 
 s. c. 95 Ind. 286; 48 Am. Rep. 719; 
 Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. ■». McClaren, 
 62 Ind. 566, where the court said: — 
 "It was the duty of the deceased to, 
 have stepped off the track of the rail- 
 road; he could see his danger; he had 
 the ability to do so at wiU, while it 
 was not in the power of the train to do- 
 so. The presumption was that he 
 would leave the track at the last mo- 
 ment, at least before being struck, and 
 it may be regarded as established law, 
 that those in charge of the train had 
 a right to act upon that presumption 
 till it might be too late to avoid con- 
 tact." Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. ■». Mil- 
 ler, 85 Mich. 379; Weymire ». Wolfe, 
 53 Iowa, 833; Moore v. Phila., &c., R. 
 Co., 108 Penn. St. 349; e. c. 33 Alb> 
 Law Jour. 98. 
 " If the engineer can see that a man 
 
§ 204.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 
 
 265 
 
 § 304. Children as trespassers on railroad property.— 
 
 The severity of the rule, as to trespassers upon railroad 
 property, is essentially relaxed in the case of trespassers of 
 tender years, who, in general, have not the faculties requi- 
 site for the perception of danger, or, having such faculties, 
 are not capable of exercising them with the discretion of 
 adults.^ When the traspasser is an infant, the railway corn- 
 
 is drunk, or knows that he is deaf, and 
 runs him down, the company is liable. 
 St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Wilkerson, 
 46 Ark. 513; International, &c., Ry. 
 Co. e. Smith, 63 Tex. 252; Spooner «. 
 Delaware L. & R. Co., 115 N. T. 22; 
 8. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 696; Payne v. 
 Humeston, &c.,.R. Co., 70 Iowa, 584; 
 8. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 886. As where 
 " the party injured is prevented by a 
 providential dispensation from the use 
 of his faculties at the time of the in- 
 jury." Houston, &c., R. Co. ■». Symp- 
 kins, 54 Tex. 615; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 
 632;Telfer®. Northern, &e,, R. Co., 
 
 30 N. J. Law, 188; East Tennessee, 
 &c., R. Co. V. St. John, 5 Sneed, 524; 
 Meeks c. Southern, &c., R. Co., 56 
 Cal. 513; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 67; Schier- 
 hold V. North Beach, &c. R. Co., 
 40 Cal. 447; Isabel v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R. Co., 60 Mo. 475. 
 
 ' Evansich c. Gulf, &c., R. Co., 57 
 Tex. 126; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 586; 8.0. 
 md> nam., Gulf, &c., R. Co. v. Evan- 
 sich, 61 Tex. 3 and 24; Rockford, 
 &c., R. Co. 11. Delaney, 83 111. 198; 
 8. c. 25 Am. Rep. 308; Nagel v. Mo. 
 Pac. R. Co., 75 Mo. 653; 8. o. 42 
 Am. Rep. 418; Kansas, &c., R. Co. 
 v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kan. 636; s. C. 
 
 31 Am. Rep. 203; Isabel ®. Hanni- 
 bal. &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 475. A 
 railroad company's neglect to fence is 
 for the jury to consider as bearing 
 on its liability for injury done to a 
 child going upon the track in conse- 
 quence. Keyser v. Chicago, &c.. Ry. 
 Co., 56 Mich. 559; s. c. 56 Am. Rep. 
 405. Where a child, walking on the 
 railroad track on her way from 
 
 school, stepped aside for a passing 
 train which had become separated from 
 some cause, and returning to the track 
 was run over by the detached part, it ' 
 was held that the uncoupling of the 
 train was not the proximate cause of 
 the accident, and the company, no 
 other negligence being shown, was 
 not liable. Galveston, &c., Ry. Co. 
 ®. Chambers, 73 Tex. 296; s. c. 11 
 S. "W. Rep. 279. Where a boy was 
 killed while lying asleep on the track, 
 having done the same thing before 
 and been warned, and every effort 
 was made to stop the train, an action 
 against the company could not be 
 maintained. Rudd «. Richmond, &c., 
 R. Co., 80 Va. 646; Prick ». St. 
 Louis, &c., B. Co., 75 Mo. 542 and 
 595; Barley v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 4 Biss. 430; Phila., &c., R. Co. a. 
 Spearen, 47 Penn. St. 800; Kay v. 
 Penn. R. Co., 65 Penn. St. 269;. 
 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 628; Penn. R. Co. 
 ■B. Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33; Penn. R. 
 Co. ■»: Morgan, 82 Penn. St. 134; 
 Byrne v. New York, &c., R. Co., 83 
 N. Y. 620; Meyer v. Midland, &c., R. 
 Co., 2 Neb. 319: Johnson v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 56 Wis. 274; Fitzpatrick 
 V. Ktchburg R. Co., 128 Mass. 13; 
 McMillan v. Burlington, &c. , R. Co. , 
 46 Iowa, 231. where it was held good 
 law to instruct the jury that "the 
 burden of proof is on the plaintiff to- 
 show both the negligence of the de- 
 fendant and the care of the deceased, 
 that is such care as a child of his age 
 and discretion would naturally use. 
 But she [the plaintiff] is not bound 
 to do more than raise by her proof a 
 
266 
 
 BAILWAT COMPANY AS TO STEANGEB8. 
 
 [§ 204. 
 
 pany, on the one hand, is held bound to exercise a higher 
 degree of care and caution than is required as to adults, and 
 the infant, on the other hand, is not required to exercise a 
 discretion and prudence beyond its years, but only that 
 measure of sense and judgment which it may reasonably be 
 expected to possess in view of its age.^ When, however, 
 children go so far, by way of a trespass, as to make a play- 
 ground of the railroad track, or of other exposed railway 
 premises or property, cases are not wanting to support the 
 rule that such conduct is negligent per se, and that the com- 
 pany will not be liable for injury to children so conducting 
 themselves, unless the acts of their employees evince a reck- 
 less and wanton disregard of human life which is equivalent 
 to intentional mischief.^ 
 
 reasonable presumption of negligence. 
 If the facts make it probable that the 
 defendant neglected his duty, it is for 
 the jury to decide whether or not it 
 •did so." Plumley v. Birge, 124 
 Mass. 57; s. C. 26 Am. Rep. 645; 
 Eerr « Forgue, 54 111. 482; s.c. 5 
 Am. Rep. 146; Meibus v. Dodge, 38 
 Wis. 300; s. 0. 30 Am. Rep. 6; Munn 
 «. Reed, 4 AUen, 431; Dowd v. Chic- 
 opee, 116 Mass. 93, which was an ac- 
 tion agninst a town to recover for in- 
 juries sustained from a defect in a 
 highway by a boy fifteen years old. 
 Held, that he need not show that he 
 exercised the same care as would be 
 required of an adult. Keyser 5). Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 56 Mich. 559; s. c. 
 19 Am. Law Rev. 668. 
 
 ' See generally the cases last cited. 
 
 ' Morrissey «. Eastern R. Co., 126 
 Mass. 377; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 686; 
 dentral Branch, &c., R. Co. v. He- 
 nigh, 23 Kan. 347; s. c. 33 Am. 
 Rep. 167; Smith v. Atchison, &c., R. 
 Co , 25 Kan. 738; s. o. sub nom., At- 
 chison, &c., R. Co. V. Smith, 28 Kan. 
 541; Cauley v. Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 Co., 95 Penn. St. 398: s. c. 40 Am. 
 Rep. 664. In Moore «. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 99 Penn. St. 301; s. C. 44 
 Am. Rep. 106, a boy ten years old, 
 of rare exceptional capacity, was sent 
 
 by his parents upon an errand along 
 a street in a populous suburb of a 
 city on which a railroad track was 
 constructed. He was run over and 
 killed by a passing train moving at 
 a rapid rate of speed without whistle 
 or other signal. It was found, how- 
 ever, that the boy, to amuse him- 
 self, was walking on the outer ends 
 of the sleepers at the time the injury 
 occurred. Held, that this was con- 
 tributory negligence barring recovery. 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. Schwindling, 
 101 Penn. St. 258; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 706; Chicago, &c., R. Co. jd. Smith, 
 46 Mich. 604; Malone d. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 4 N. T. Supl. 599; s. o. 51 
 Hun, 532. Where there was no evi- 
 dence that defendant's servants saw or 
 knew of the boy's danger, an instruc- 
 tion that, though there was contribu- 
 tory negligence, yet if his death could 
 have been prevented by reasonable 
 care on the part of defendant's em- 
 ployees after discovering his danger, 
 defendant was liable, would be erro- 
 neous. Williams ®. Kansas City, <fcc., 
 R. Co., 96 Mo. 275; s. c. 9 S. W. 
 Rep. 573; St. Louis, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Bell, 81 m. 76; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 
 269; M parte Stell, 4 Hughes, 157; 
 Miles v. Atlantic, &c., R. Co., 4 
 Hughes, 172. 
 
§ 206.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 267 
 
 § 205. The turortable cases.— In the application of the 
 general principles of the law of negligence and trespass to 
 cases involving the rights of infants, or persons of tender 
 years, various questions of considerable difficulty have 
 arisen. As a rule, a trespasser acts at his peril, and one 
 owes no duty to such a person except that a wanton 
 injury must not be inflicted upon him ; but where one goes 
 upon the premises or property of another, not as a mere 
 trespasser, or by mere passive license, but by some sort of 
 an invitation from the owner, the latter owes him a larger 
 duty. " The general rule or principle applicable to this 
 class of case's,'.' said Chief Justice Bigelow, in Sweeney v. 
 Old Colony and Newport E. Co.,^ " is that an owner or occu- 
 pant is bound to keep his premises in a safe and suitable 
 condition for those who come upon or pass over them, using 
 due care, if he has held out any inducment, invitation or al- 
 lurement, either express or implied, by which they have been 
 led to enter thereon."^ 
 
 § 206. The rale illustrated.— There are cases that hold, 
 as an application of this doctrine, that what an express 
 invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an at- 
 tractive plaything is to a child of tender years. Accordingly, 
 when one exposes upon his premises, in a place to which 
 children may, or are likely to resort or be attracted, a dan- 
 gerous tool, or machine, or other contrivance, which is cal- 
 culated to inflict an injury upon any one who meddles with 
 it, or even touches it heedlessly, without any precaution 
 upon the part of the person so exposing it against mischief, 
 it is held that such a person is not only guilty of negligence, 
 but of negligence of a very reprehensible character.' 
 
 ' 10 Allen, 368. Div. 337; Hughes r>. Macfle and Ab- 
 
 ' Of. Indennaur ®. Dames, L. E. bott v. Macfle, 2 Hurl. & Colt, 744; 
 
 1 C. P. 274; 8. c. 12 Jur. (N. 8.) s. c. 10 Jur. (N. S.) 682; 33 L. J. 
 
 432; 35 L.J. (C. P.) 184; 14 Week. (Exch.) 177: 12 Week. Rep. 315. 
 
 Rep. 586; 14L. T. (N. S.) 484; af- But for a contrary rule, see Mangan 
 
 firmed, 36 L. J. (C. P.) 181; L. R. 2 «. Atterton, 4 Hurl. «fc Colt, 388, in 
 
 C. P. 311; 15 Week. Rep. 434; 16 which it was held that defendant had 
 
 L. T. (N. S.) 293, and see § 67, a clear right to place the machine in 
 
 supra. the market. He was not to blame, 
 
 ' Lynch n. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; for instance, if he had painted it with 
 
 Clark V. Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. some poisonous paint, and a child had 
 
268 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. [§ 208. 
 
 § 207. Jndge Billon's decision.— Stout v. Sioux City and 
 Pacific R. Co.* is the first of a series of adjudications, which 
 may be known as " the^ turn-table cases," in which this rule 
 is applied in actions brought by, or in behalf of, infants, who 
 have been injured while playing on, or about turn-tables, 
 left by railway companies unlocked or unguarded — and in 
 such exposed positions as to tempt children to play with 
 them. In this case, the plaintiff, a boy six years of age, who 
 was playing upon such an exjiosed and unguarded turn-table 
 in compafly with several other boys, was seriously hurt, 
 and Judge Dillon, in delivering the charge, insisted that the 
 circumstance that the plaintiff was in some sense a tres- 
 passer, did not, under these circumstances, exempt the 
 defendant from the duty of care. The boy being the plaintiff, 
 and not his parents, and it being conceded that there was no 
 negligence on the part of the parents, and that as the 
 plaintiff was but six years of age, none could be predicated 
 of him, the simple question was as to the liability of the 
 company , by reason of their leaving the turn-table unlocked 
 and unguarded in a place where boys were likely to come. 
 It was held that the plaintiff might recover, and, upon ap- 
 peal, the judgment of the court below was affirmed.' 
 
 § 208. The llinnesota case. — The next case in which this 
 question came before a court of last resort was one ' in 
 which, upon an essentially similar state of facts, the same 
 result was reached. The court said :— " We agree with the 
 defendant's counsel that a railroad company is not required 
 to make its land a safe play-ground for children. It has the 
 
 sucked it. Why, then, make him even his neighbor's dogs into danger, 
 
 negligent if other people improperly by setting traps on his own land, 
 
 meddled with it 1 Whirley v. Whit- baited with strong scented meat, by 
 
 man, 1 Head (Tenn.) 610, Birge v: which the dogs were allured to come 
 
 Gardner, 19 Conn. 507; s. c. 50 Am. upon his land and into his traps— and 
 
 Dec. 261; Wood v. School District, 44 that, too, although the traps were not 
 
 Iowa, 27; Hydraulic Works Co. v. set to catch the dogs. 
 
 Orr, SSPenn. St. 332; Lane ». Atlan- ' 2 Dill. 294. 
 
 tic Works, 107 Mass. 104; MuUaney ' Affirmed mb nam.. Railroad Co. 
 
 V. Spence, 15 Abb., P. R. (N. S.) ®. Stout. 17 Wall. 657. 
 
 319; Townsend «. Wathen, 9 East, ' Keffe v. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 
 
 277, a case in which it was held 21 Minn. 207; B. c. 18 Am. Rep. 393. 
 to be unlawful for a man to tempt 
 
§ 209.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEKS. 269 
 
 same right to maintain and use its tarn-table that any land- 
 owner has to use his property. It is not an insurer of the 
 lives or limbs of young children who play upon its premises. 
 We merely decide that when it sets before young children a 
 temptation which it has reason to believe will lead them into 
 danger, it must use ordinary care to protect them from 
 harm. What would be proper care in any case must, in 
 general, be a question for the jury upon all the circumstances 
 of the case." ^ In the same opinion it is declared that : — " To 
 treat the plaintiff as a voluntary trespasser is to ignore the 
 averments of the complaint that the turn-table, which was 
 situate in a public (by which we understand an open, fre- 
 quented) place, was, when left unfastened, very attractive, 
 and when put in motion by them was dangerous to young 
 children, by whom it could be easily put in motion, and 
 many of them were in the habit of going upon it to play. 
 The turn-table, being thus attractive, presented to the natu- 
 ral instincts of young children a strong temptation ; and 
 such children following, as they must be expected to follow, 
 those natural instincts, were thus allured into a danger 
 whose nature and extent they, being without judgment or 
 discretion, could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and 
 against which they could not protect themselves. The dif- 
 ference between the plaintiff's position and that of a volun- 
 tary trespasser capable of using care, consists in this— ^that 
 the plaintiff was induced to come upon the defendant's turn- 
 table by the defendant's own conduct, and that as to him, the 
 turn-table was a hidden danger — a trap." " 
 
 § 209. The later cases. — The same rule is laid down 
 in several later cases,' and, except in a single case in lUi- 
 
 ' Keffe V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., &c., Ry. Co., 77 Ga. 102. Although 
 
 21 Minn. 207; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 393, the child had suflacient intelligence to 
 
 following Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 know that it was wrong to trespass 
 
 Wall. 657, and Stout o. Sioux City, upon the tum-table, yet, if he had no 
 
 Ac., R. Co., 2 Dill. 294. knowledge that playing upon the 
 
 ' KefEe v. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., table was dangerous, it cannot be 
 
 21 Minn. 207; 8. c. 18 Am. Rep. 393. said that he was guilty of contributory 
 
 ■ Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. v. Styron, 66 negligence. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Tex. 421; Bridger «. Asheville, &c., Dunden, 37 Kan. 1; s. c. 14 Pac. 
 
 R. Co., 27 8. C. 456; s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 501. Evidence of accidents 
 
 Rep. 860; Ferguson v. Columbus, which happened to others at the same 
 
270 
 
 RAILWAY COMPAKY AS TO 8TBANGEB8. 
 
 [§ 209. 
 
 nois,^ it is, I believe, nowhere denied that in such an action an 
 infant plaintiff may recoTer. In that case, the question is not 
 very fairly presented, and we may suspect that the doctrine of 
 comparative negligence influenced the court at least to some 
 extent. The plaintiff was nine years of age, and, in company 
 with several older boys, on a Sunday afternoon, while taking 
 a walk, went upon a turn-table, which was situated in an 
 isolated place, away from any public street or passage, and 
 was injured. It appeared, also, that the table was fastened 
 with a latch, which prevented it from being turned by acci- 
 dent ; but it was not locked. In this state of the case, the 
 court said : — " After a careful examination of the testimony 
 
 place is rightly excluded. Early ®. 
 Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 6P Mich. 
 349; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 813. That 
 plaintiff himself was unable to revolve 
 the table, and *as injured by its being 
 turned by older children, who may 
 have been responsible for their negli- 
 gent acts, does not relieve defendant 
 from liability for its negligence in 
 leaving its turn-table exposed and un- 
 fastened. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. V. Mc- 
 Whirter, 77 Tex. 356; s c 14 S.W. 
 Rep. 26; Ferguson v. Columbus, &c , 
 Ry. Co., 75 Ga. 637; O'Malley v. St. 
 Paul, "(fcc, Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 389; 
 8. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 440; Ilwaco Ry. 
 Co. V. Hedrick, 1 Wash. St. 446; a. c. 
 25 Pac Rep. 385. A boy 10^4 years 
 old, and of average intelligence, who 
 had often been near a railway turn- 
 table, and had a general knowledge 
 of its structure and operation, and 
 had been repeatedly warned by his 
 father that it was dangerous to play 
 on it, and told not to do so, and knew 
 that the railway company prohibited 
 children from playing on the table, 
 engaged with other boys in swinging 
 on it, and was injured. Held, con- 
 tributory negligence. Twist v. Wi- 
 nona, &c., R. Co., 39 Minn. 164; B. c. 
 39 N. W. Rep. 402. E:ansa8, &c., R. 
 Go. e. Fitzsiimnons, 22 Ean. 686; 
 8. c. 31 Am. Rep. 203; 8. 0. 18 Ean. 
 
 34; Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. Allen, 22 
 Zan. 285; Eoons v. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 65 Mo. 592. The Court in 
 Evansich v. Gulf, &c., R. Co., 67 
 Tex. 126; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 586, char- 
 acterizes turn-tables as dangerous ma- 
 chines to children, who are attracted to 
 them for amusement, it making no dif- 
 ference whether they be' situated on 
 the premises of the company or not. 
 Nagel «. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 
 75 Mo. 653; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 
 418. Of. Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Schwindling, 101 Penn. St. 258; 8. c. 
 47 Am. Rep. 706; Cauley v. Pitts- 
 burgh, Ac, R. Co., 95 Penn. St. 398; 
 8. c. 40 Am. Rep. 664; Central 
 Branch, &c., R. Co. ■». Henigh, 23 
 Kin. 347; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 167. But 
 in regard to swing bridges, in Gavin 
 V. Chicago, 97 111. 66; s. c. 87 Am. Rep. 
 99, it is held that municipal author- 
 ities are not bound to so construct 
 these as to make them safe for chil- 
 dren to play upon, and hence need 
 not place guards or mechanical con- 
 trivances to keep children off the 
 same. Meeks v. Southern Pacific R. 
 Co., 56 Cal. 513; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 
 67; Keyser v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 66 Mich. 559; s. o. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 668. 
 
 ' St. Louis, &c., R. Co. e. Bell, 81 
 lU. 76; 8. c. 25 Am. Rep. 269. 
 
§ 211.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 271 
 
 this court is of opinion that, in view of the isolated position 
 in which the tnrn-table was located, the proofs fail to show 
 that appellant was guilty of snch want of care as could law- 
 fully charge it with damages for the accident." * This case 
 cannot, therefore, count against the rule. 
 
 § 210. The New York rnle.— The New York Court of 
 Appeals said obiter, in McAlpin v. Powell : * — " We are 
 not now called to express an opinion as to the soundness of 
 these decisions in such a case " [referring to the turn-table 
 cases], " and while we are not prepared to uphold them, it is 
 enough to say that the facts are by no means analogous," 
 from which it may be inferred that the courts of that State 
 might not follow the rule of Bailroad Co. v. Stout,^ should a 
 case in point come before them. But, aside from these two 
 cases, there is no intimation in the reports, as far as my 
 reading has gone, that any contrary views upon this question 
 prevail. The rule is eminently just and reasonable, and 
 commends itself alike to the judgment and the natural 
 instincts. 
 
 § 311. Walking along a railway track.— As a general rule, 
 the courts declare that walking upon the track of a railway 
 is not negligence per se, but, in the event of an injury, the 
 question of negligence as to that act is one proper to go to 
 the jury.* So, also, even when one is upon the track, on horse- 
 
 ' St Lords, &c., R Co. v. BeU, 81 avoid the accident, the original negli 
 Dl. 76; 8. c. 25 Am. Rep. 269. gence is no defense, and the defendant 
 '70N.Y.126; 8.C. 26 Am. Eep. 561. is liable. Gothard o. Alabama, &c., 
 ' 17 Wall. 657. R. Co., 67 Ala. 114. But see § 198, 
 * Especially in a town or city, where tupra. Townley ?i. Chicago, &c., R. 
 passing and repassing are frequent. Co., 53 Wis. 626; Fitzpatrick v. Fitch- 
 Ala., &c., R. Co. «. Chapman, 80 Ala. burg R. Co., 128 Mass. 13; Hassenger 
 615; 8, c. 2 So. Rep. 738; Vicksburg, v. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 48 Mich. 
 &c., R. Co. e. McGown, 62 Miss. 682; 205; 8. c. 42 Am. Rep. 470; Johnson 
 8- c. 52 Am. Rep. 205; Carter c. Co- e. Chicago, Ac, R. Co., 56 Wis. 274. 
 lumbia, &c., R. Co., 19 S. C. 2(^ s. c. But in Pennsylvania, such an act is 
 45 Am. Rep. 754. While such person negligence, as matter of law. Moore <o. 
 negligently exposes himself to peril, Pennsylvania R. Co., 99 Penn. St. 301; 
 yet, if he uses all proper care in en- s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 106: Cauley r>. 
 deavoring to escape the danger when Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 95 Penn. St. 
 it becomes apparent, and the defend- 398; 8. c. 40 Am. Rep. 664. 
 ant fails to use all possible means to 
 
272 BAIL WAT COMPANY AS TO STBANGEBS. [§ 211. 
 
 back, between the crossings, such conduct is held not to 
 constitute negligence as matter of law. Upon this point the 
 Court of Appeals of Maryland said : — " He may have been 
 attempting to cross it under circumstances which would re- 
 lieve him of all imputation of negligence." ' The courts of 
 Pennsylvania, however, go to the opposite extreme.* What 
 would be negligence sufficient to bar, a right of action in a 
 trespasser upon the company's track, will also be sufficient 
 in the case of one of the company's servant's walking or rid- 
 ing upon the track of the company in whose employ he is, if 
 such action be not in the line of his duty, or essential to the 
 discharge of his duty.' The omission to give the signals, re- 
 quired by statute, at the public crossings, is not evidence of 
 negligence toward a person injured upon the track beyond 
 the crossing. This provision of law is made for the benefit 
 only of persons traveling upon the highway and coming law- 
 fully upon the track at a public crossing. 'JTh^ Supreme Ju- 
 dicial Court of Massachusetts had said, upon this point : — 
 " The law requires no one to provide protection or safeguards 
 for mere trespassers or wrong-doers, nor, indeed, for those 
 who enter by mere permission, without inducement held out 
 by the owner. Such go at their own risk, and enjoy the 
 license subject to its perils. Towards them there exists no 
 unfulfilled obligation or duty on the part of the owner."* 
 
 ' Northern, &c., R. Co. v. State, 29 R. Co., 81 Penn. St. 366. One who, 
 Md. 420. But see McDonald v. Chioa- though warned and knowing the 
 go, &c., By. Co., 75 Wis. 121; s. c. danger, while on an errand which he 
 43 N. W. Rep. 744, where it was held has volunteered to do for the station 
 that a sane man who drives a team agent, is struck by a train, supposed 
 upon a railroad track at a road cross- by him to be on another track, con- 
 ing at night, and continues driving tributes to his own injury so as to bar 
 thereon for nearly two miles, where recovery. Barstow i>. Old Colony R. 
 there is nothing to prevent his leaving Co., 143 Mass. 535; Maher ®. Atlantic- 
 the track except' darkness, is guilty of &c., R. Co., 64 Mo. 267; Clark «. Bos- 
 gross negligence, and no recovery can ton, &c., R. Co., 128 Mass. 1 ; Holland 
 be had for his death caused by a v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 5 McCraiy, 
 passing train, though the railroad 549; MiUer v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 3 
 company maintained the crossing in a McCrary, 87; Sweeney v. Boston, &c., 
 negligent manner, and decedent was R. Co., 128 Mass. 6. 
 not negligent in entering on the track. * Gaynor v. Old Colony, &c., R. 
 
 '%198,mpra. Co., 100 Mass. 208; O'Donnell «. 
 
 » Burling v. Illinois, &c., R. Co., 85 Providence, Ac, R. Co., 6 R. I. 211; 
 
 111. 18; Mulherrin v. Delaware, &c.. Holmes v. Central R. Co., 37 Qa. 
 
§ 212.] 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEBS. 
 
 273 
 
 Compliance with a city ordinance requiring that " when a 
 lotjomotive engine is used within the limits of the city, a man 
 shall ride on the front of the locomotive engine when going 
 forward, and when going backward on the tender, not more 
 than twelve inches from the bed of the road," is not due to 
 persons walking on the private way of the railroad company, 
 at an uninhabited point and not at a street crossing, although 
 in a path used by the public with the silent acquiescence of 
 the company.^ 
 
 § 213. Where the track is a qnasi public way.— Where 
 the track of a railway company is used by pedestrians for 
 purposes of travel, by permission of the company, such pe- 
 destrian thereby becomes a licensee. He is no longer a mere 
 trespasser upon the track at his peril ; and this considera- 
 tion enhances the duty of the employees of the company to 
 exercise caution and increased prudence in operating the 
 
 593; Railroad Co. ®. Houston, 95 U. 
 8. 697; Phila., &c., R. Co., v. Spearen, 
 47Pemi. St. 300; Elwood v-. N. T., 
 <fcc., R. Co., 4 Hun, 808. It makes 
 no difference how neglectful it may 
 be of a railroad company in some esses 
 to violate the statutory requirements 
 to give signals at certain points, — ^to- 
 ward trespassers such conduct will 
 not be called negligence. Harty d. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 43 N. T. 468. But in Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. Raiford, 83 Ga. 40ft a. c. 9 
 S. E. Rep. 169, the omission was held 
 evidence of negligence both as to those 
 crossing and those walking along the 
 track, and in Vicksburg, &c., R. Co. 
 «. McGtown, 63 Miss. 683; a. c. 53 Am. 
 Rep. 305, a trespasser in the exercise 
 of due care, recovered for an injury 
 oceasioned by the negligence of the 
 company in nmning at an unlawful 
 rate of speed. Mason v. Mo. Pac. R. 
 Co., 37 Kan. 83; a. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 405; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Collins, 
 87 Penn. St. 405; a. c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 371; Morrissey v. Eastern, &c., R. Co., 
 136 Mass. 377; a. c. 30 Am. Rep. 686; 
 18 
 
 Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 56 
 Cal. 513; a. c. 38 Am. Rep. 67; Terre 
 Haute, &c., R. Co. v. Graham, 95Ind. 
 386; a. c. 48 Am. Rep. 719; Houston, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Sympkms, 54 Tex. 615; 
 6.0. 38 Am. Rep. 633; Shackelford's 
 Adm'r v. Louisville, &c., R. Co.,' 84 
 Ky. 43. There is no duty to provide 
 a flagman at a street crossing in favor 
 of a man walking on the track. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co. V. Eininger, 114 
 m. 79. In Kelley «. Mich. Cent. R. 
 Co., 65 Mich. 186; a. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 
 904, plaintiff, while walking upon 
 the defend^t's tracks, and crossing 
 the highway, was struck by a stake 
 attached to an engine used in "stak- 
 ing cars." It was held that the plaint- 
 iff was not lawfully upon the public 
 highway, and that defendant owed 
 no greater or different duty to him 
 than if he were on the track off the 
 highway. 
 
 ' Baltimore, &c., R. Co. e. State, 63 
 Md. 479; a. c. 50 Am. Rep. 333; Raf- 
 ferty v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 91 
 Mo. 33. 
 
274 
 
 BAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STRANGERS. 
 
 [§ 212. 
 
 road at this point.^ But that there has grown up a habit on 
 the part of individuals, or of the public generally, to travel 
 over the track on foot, and that no measures have been taken 
 to prevent it, does not change the relative rights and obliga- 
 tions of the public and the company. It is not the less a 
 trespass in that it is repeated, or that there are many tres- 
 passers.'' A contrary doctrine is declared in several recent 
 cases to the effect that when the railroad permits people to 
 pass over their grounds, they thereby tacitly license the 
 public to come upon them, and that they do not become 
 trespassers if they do so in a proper manner.' This is, 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Hammer, 
 73 111. 347; Kay v. Pgim. R. Co., 65 
 Pemi. St. 269; Penn. R. Co. ■B.Lewis, 
 79 Penn. St. 33; Davis v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 58 Wis. 646; s. c. 46 
 Am. Rep. 667; Barry v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 93 N. T. 389; s. c. 44 
 Am. Rep. 877; Solen «. Virginia, &c., 
 R. Co., 13 Nevada, 106, where the 
 plaintiff walked along the track of 
 a company laid on a street proyided 
 with no sidewalks or passage-way. 
 Held, that the plaintiff had a right to 
 expect that the usual statutory signals 
 would be given. Fitzpatrick v. Fitch- 
 burg R. Co., 138 Mass. 13; Daley d. 
 Norwich, &c., R. Co., 36 Conn. 591; 
 Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kan. 
 620; 8. c. 14 Kan, 38; Brown ®, Han- 
 nibal, &c,, R. Co., 50 Mo. 461; Harty 
 V. Central R, Co., 42 N. T, 468; Mur- 
 phy V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 
 539; B. c. 45 Iowa, 661. But see Sut- 
 ton®. New York Central, &c.,R. Co., 
 66 N. Y. 243, holdirig that, although 
 a railroad company has given an im- 
 plied license to people to cross its 
 tracks at a certain point, yet it owes 
 no duty of active vigilance to those 
 crossing to guard them from accident. 
 It would be liable, however, for an 
 act which might reasonably be antici- 
 pated would result in injury to a per- 
 son lawfully on the track under the 
 license. Nicholson «. Erie Ry. Co,, 
 41 N, Y. 425; Donaldson v. MDwau- 
 
 kee, &c., R. Co., 31 Minn. 398; Graves 
 ®. Thomas, 95 Ind. 861; s. c. 48 Am. 
 Rep. 737; Campbell v. Boyd, 88 N. 
 C, 139; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 740; Ben- 
 nett «, LouisviUe, &c., R. Co., 103 U. 
 S. 577. 
 
 "Phila., &c., R. Co. «. Hummel, 
 44 Penn. St. 375; Gaynor «. Old Col- 
 ony, &C!, R. Co., 100 Mass. 308; Ban- 
 ■ croft V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 97 Mass. 
 276; Finlayson v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 1 Dill. 579; Indiana, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Hudelson, 13 Ind. 325; Jeflerson- 
 ville, &c,, R. Co. V. Goldsmith, 47 
 Ind, 43; Galena, &c,, R, Co. v. Ja- 
 cobs, 30 HI. 478. Implied assent of a 
 railroad company to the use of its 
 tracks as a foot-way cannot be deduced 
 from previous non-interference. No 
 right of way can be acquired sim- 
 ply because the company does not see 
 fit to keep people off its premises. 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co, «. Godfrey, 71 
 111. 500; B, 0, 22 Am, Rep. 312; DU- 
 nois, &c., R. Co. v. Hetherington, 88 
 111. 510; Aurora, &c., R. Co, b. 
 Grimes, 13 111. 585; Parker v. Port- 
 land Publishing Co., 69 Me, 173; s. o, 
 31 Am. Rep. 362; Sullivan v. "Waters, 
 14 Ir, C. L, 466; Holmes v. N. B. Ry. 
 Co., L. R. 4 Exch. 357. 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. «. Hammer, 
 73 m. 347; Taylor v. Delaware, &c,. 
 Canal Co,, 113 Penn. St. 163; b. c. 8 
 Atl, Rep. 43; Harriman v. Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R, Co., 45 Ohio St. 11; b. c. 12 
 
§ 213.] . RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGERS. 
 
 275 
 
 however, contrary to the general course of authority in this 
 country.* 
 
 § 213. The English rule.— In England it has been de- 
 cided, in a comparatively recent and very carefully considered 
 case, that where notices have been put up by the railway 
 company, forbidding persons to cross the track at a certain 
 point, but these notices have been continually disregarded by 
 the public, and the company's servants have not interfered 
 to enforce their observance, the company cannot, in case of 
 an injury to any one crossing the line at that point, set up 
 the existence .of the notices by way of answer to an action for 
 damages.* This is the rule of Illinois, <fec., E. Co. v. Ham- 
 mer,* but it is not the received rule in this country, as we 
 have seen. Our courts, very generally and consistently, ad- 
 here to the stricter rule which is well expounded by the Mas- 
 sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court : — " The law requires no 
 one to provide protection, or safe-guards for mere trespassers 
 or wrong-doers, nor, indeed, for those who enter by mere per- 
 
 N. E. Rep. 461; Nichols' Adm'r v. 
 Washington, &c., R. Co., 83 Va. 99; 
 8. c. 5 S. E. Rep. 171; St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co. v. Crosnoe, 73 Tex. 79; s. c. 
 10 8. W. Rep. 342; Troy c. Cape 
 Fear, &c., R. Co., 99 N. C. 398; 8. c. 
 6 8. E. Rep. 77; Nuzum v. Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R. Co., 30 West Va. 228; s. c. 4 
 8. E. Rep. 343; Bynne «. New Tork, 
 &c., R. Co., 104 K. T. 368; b. c. 58 
 Am. Rep. 513. Qf. Graves v. Thom- 
 as, 95 Ind. 361; s. c 48 Am. Rep. 
 737. 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Hethering- 
 ton, 83 ni. 510; Blanchard v. Lake 
 Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 136 111. 416; s. c. 
 18 N. E. Rep. 799; Wright v. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 143 Mass. 396; Memphis, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Womack, 84 Ala. 149; 
 8. c. 4 8o. Rep. 618; Kay v. Penn. R. 
 Co., 65 Penn. St. 269; RaUroad Co. v. 
 Norton, 34 ^Penn. St. 465; Penn. R. 
 Co. «. Lewis, 79 Penn. 8t. 83; Gilles- 
 pie c. McGowen, 100 Penn. 8t. 144; 
 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 865; Blockman v. 
 
 Toronto Street Ry. Co., 38 Up. Can. 
 Q. B. 173; HounseU v. Smyth, 7 G. 
 B. (N. S.) 731; Pierce c. Whitcomb, 
 48 Vt. 137; 8. c. 21 Am. Rep. 130; 
 Seymour v. Maddox, 16 Q. B. 336; 
 8. c. 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 337. See, how- 
 ever, the following cases, in which it 
 is declared as law that if the managers 
 of a train have reasonable grounds to 
 expect that persons will be upon the 
 track at a particular place, they must 
 exercise more care than ordinarily, 
 whether such persons are on the track 
 rightfully or wrongfully: Cassida v. 
 Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 14 Or. 551; 
 s. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 438; South & North 
 Ala. R. Co. V. Donovan (Ala.), 4 So. 
 Rep. 142; Peyton v. Texas, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 41 La. Ann. 861; 8. c. 6 So. Rep. 
 690; Western, &c., R. Co. s. Meigs, 
 74 Ga. 857. 
 
 = Dublin, &c., Ry. Co. v. Slatteiy, 3 
 App. Cas. 1115. 
 
 = 73 HI. 347. 
 
276 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEKS. [§ 214. 
 
 mission, without inducement held out by the owner. Such 
 go at their own risk, and enjoy the license subject to its 
 perils. Toward them there exists no unfulfilled obligation, 
 or duty, on the part of the owner." ^ The English case of 
 Dub|lin, (fee, By. Co. v. Slattery, cited above as stating the 
 present English rule in point, is fully set forth, and the 
 opinions of the judges reproduced i at length by Judge 
 Thompson,." ^ This exact and learned writer concludes : 
 — "The current of authority of this country is, undoubt- 
 edly, with the dissenting opinions in this case,' as to the 
 duty incumbent upon one stepping upon a railroad track, 
 to have all his faculties alive to the sense of danger, the ne- 
 glect of which precaution amounts to negligence per se." * 
 
 § 214. Farther statement of the rule in the United 
 
 States.— The courts of Pennsylvania have taken high ground 
 upon this question, insisting upon the absolute right of the 
 railway company to a clear track. This position, as I under- 
 stand it, is not extreme, and if the public could understand 
 that venturing upon a railway- track, in this way, is negli- 
 gence semper vbique, and that he who so acts, acts at his peril, 
 and in case of injury has no' remedy, it can well be believed 
 that fewer accidents of such a character would happen. In 
 Tennessee the matter of injuries to persons upon the track 
 is regulated by statute.' "Every railroad company," this 
 statute provides, "shall keep the engineer, firemen, or 
 some other person upon the locomotive, always upon the 
 look out ahead, and when any person, animal, or other ob- 
 struction appears upon the road, the alarm whistle shall be 
 sounded, the brakes put down, and every possible means em- 
 ployed to stop the train and prevent an accident." The bur- 
 den of proof is upon the company ; it must show that all the 
 
 ' Gaynori). Old Colony, &c., K. Co., removal of such precautions without 
 
 100 Mass. 308. notice may be negligence on its part. 
 
 " Thompson on Kegligence, 455. Ernst v. Hudson River R. Co., 39 N. 
 
 » Dublin, &c., Ry. Co. b. Slattery. Y. 61; Sutton v. N. T., &c., R. Co., 
 
 * Citing, Railroad Co. v. Houston, 66 N. T. 243; Mulherrin v. Delaware, 
 
 95 U. S. 697; Bancroft ®. Boston.&c, &c., R. Co., SlPenn. St. 866; Illinois, 
 
 R. Co., 97 Maas. 375; Wilcox ®. Rome, &c.,R. Co. ». Hetherington, 83 111. 
 
 &c., R. Co., 39 N. Y. 358. But where 510; North Penn. R. Co. ». HeUeman, 
 
 a railroad company has taken certain 49 Fenn. St. 60. 
 precautions in guarding the track, the ' Thompson & Steiger, § 1166 (5). 
 
§ 215.] RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STBANGEES. 277 
 
 statutory requirements have been complied with.^ It is not 
 sufficient merely to show that the accident was inevitable, 
 and would certainly not have been prevented by a strict com- 
 pliance on the part of the railroad with all the requirements 
 of the statute,' This is a somewhat more onerous obligation 
 than the law usually imposes upon railway corporations in 
 this particular. 
 
 § 215. The daty of the railway to the trespasser after 
 the iiyury. — Under certain circumstances, the railroad may 
 owe a duty to a trespasser after the injury. When a tres- 
 passer has been run down, it is the plain duty of the railway 
 company to render whatever service is possible to mitigate 
 the severity of the injury. The train that has occasioned the 
 harm must be stopped, and the injured person looked after ; 
 and, when it seems necessary, removed to a place of safety, 
 and carefully nursed, until other relief can be brought to the 
 disabled person. This is not more a rule of law than a dic- 
 tate of humanity. Where it appeared that a person, run 
 over and thought to be dead, was placed upon some rubbish 
 in a railway warehouse by the station master, and there left 
 over night, during which time he had revived and dragged 
 himself some distance along the floor, where he was found 
 dead the next morning with his body yet warm, in a stooping 
 posture, pressing his hand upon his leg to stop the flow of 
 blood from a severed artery, it was held that, even though 
 the accident was caused by the negligence of the deceased, 
 
 'Thompson & Steiger, § 1168. East 6 Heisk. 17^ Nashville, &c., R. Co. 
 
 Tenn.,&c.,R. Co. v. Pratt, 86 Tenn. 9; v. Prince, 3 Heisk. 580; Railroad Co. 
 
 8. c. 31 S. W. Rep. 618, holds the stat- «. Walker, 11 Heisk. 883. See, also, 
 
 ute to he merely declaratory of the HUl «. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 9 
 
 common law, and that an allegation Heisk. 823, holding that it is the 
 
 charging the defendant with wrong- positive and imperative duty of the 
 
 fuUy and negligently running its train engineer to sound the alarm whistle 
 
 over the plaintiff, is suflcient notice to the instant he sees a person upon the 
 
 compel the company to prove its com- track. We know not what might be 
 
 pliance with the statute. East Ten- the effect of the alarm whistle, even 
 
 nessee, &c. , R Co. ■». Winters, 85 Tenn. upon the maudUn brain of a drunken 
 
 240; e. c. 1 8. W. Rep. 790. man ; nor is the court allowed to con- 
 
 'East Tenn.,&c.,R. Co. v. St. John, jecture as to whether its startle may 
 
 5 Sneed, 524; Louisville, &c., R. Co. have saved his life. Louisville, &c., 
 
 «. Burke, 6 Col^w. 45; Smith u. Nash- R. Co. v. Conner, 9 Heisk.l9. 
 ville, &c., R. Co., 6 Coldw. 589; s. c. 
 
278 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY AS TO 8TBANGEK8. 
 
 [§ 216. 
 
 still it might go to the jury whether his death did not result 
 from the subsequent negligence of the railway employees.* 
 
 § 316. Yarions other acts of trespass upon railway prop- 
 erty .-^It is negligence "per se to attempt to crawl under cars 
 which have been stopped temporarily upon the tracks,' or 
 to stand between two tracks while a tJrain passes.' And the 
 act of climbing over stationary cars without looking to see 
 whether or not they are attached to a locomotive is held 
 gross negligence.* When the plaintiff was a child, and the 
 position of the cars in the street was illegal, the plaintiff's 
 conduct in thus attempting to cross the train was not contrib- 
 utory negligence.' It is negligence for one in charge of stock 
 to ride on top of cars in which the cattle are transported ;• 
 and, wherever it appears that a plaintiff voluntarily placed 
 himself in a dangerous position, where a collision could not 
 have been avoided by the train-men, such conduct is held 
 negligence as matter of law.' 
 
 'Northern, &c., B. Co. ■». State, 
 29 Md. 430, 442; 1 Redfleld on Rail- 
 ways, 510. Gf. Phila., &c., R. Co. 
 «. Derby, 14 How. 468; Whatman 
 «. Pearson, L. R. 3 C. P. 433. 
 
 = Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Bewey, 
 36 m. 355; Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Cross, 73 m. 394; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Sykes, 96 111. 163; Smith v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 55 Iowa, 33; 
 Central R. Co. v. Dixon, 43 Ga. 337; 
 Ostertag v. Pacjflc, &c., R. Co., 64 
 Mo. 421; Stillson v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R. Co., 67 Mo. 671. So to pass be- 
 tween cars while slowly moving. 
 Gahagan v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 1 
 Allen, 187; Lewis v. Baltimore, &c., 
 R. Co., 88 Md. 888; McMahon «. 
 Northern, &c., R. Co., 39 Md. 438. 
 Cf. Central Branch, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Henigh, 33 Kan. 347; 8. c. 33 Am. 
 Rep. 167. 
 
 ' Moore v. Philadelphia, &c., R. 
 Co., 108 Penn. St. 349. See, also, 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Flint, 33 111. 
 App. 503. And one who crosses at 
 an opening in a train does so at his 
 
 peril. Dahlstrom «. St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 99; 8. c. 88. W. Rep. 
 777. 
 
 ■* Lewis V. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 
 38Md. 588; Gahagan «>. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 1 AUen, 187. 
 
 » Ranch v. Lloyd, 31 Penn. St. 
 358. 
 
 « Little Rock, &c., R. Co. v. Miles, 
 40 Ark. 398; McCorkle «. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 61 Iowa, 555. 
 
 ' Memphis, &c., R. Co. ». Womack, 
 84 Ala. 149; s. c. 4 So. Rep. 618; Co- 
 lumbus, &c., R. Co. v. Wood, 86 
 Ala. 164; 8. c. 5 So. Rep. 463; Wil- 
 liams ■». Southern Pac. R. Co. (Cal.), 
 11 Pac. Rep. 849; Houston, &c., Ky. 
 Co. «. Smith, 77 Tex. 179; s. c. 13 
 S. W. Rep. 973; Hughes v. Galveston, 
 &c., R. Co., 67 Tex. 595; Texas, &o., 
 Ry. Co. «. Barfleld (Tex.), 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 665; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. 
 Stroud, 64 Miss. 784; s. c. 8 So. Rep. 
 171; Pzolla v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 54 
 Mich. 273; Shackelford's Adm'r ». 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 84 Ky. 48; 
 Frazer v. S. ifc N. Ala. R. Co., 81 Ala. 
 
§ 217.] 
 
 EAILWAY COMPANY AS TO STEANGEBS. 
 
 279 
 
 § 217. Flying switches.— The method of switching, known 
 as making a " running " or " flying " switch, is constantly a 
 fruitful source of accident to persons walking, or being 
 upon the tracks. It consists in detaching the portion of the 
 train to be switched off while the cars are in motion, the 
 fore part of the train advancing with increased speed, while 
 the rear portion, proceeding more slowly, is, at the proper 
 time, switched off upon the desired track ; or, the engine 
 may push forward a car or part of a train with considerable 
 speed, and then giving it a strong propulsion send it off alone 
 on the desired switch. This practice, in many courts, is 
 condemned as negligent, even toward trespassers.^ And, 
 when the cars are suffered to run over a crossing, after being 
 detached from the train, in making a flying switch, whereby 
 travelers are injured, it is held negligence of an aggravated 
 nature, and the practice is not unfrequently sharply de- 
 nounced by the judges.* 
 
 185; 8. c. 1 So. Rep. 85. A person 
 cannot recover for injuries received 
 by being struck by an engine while 
 walking on the ends of the ties on a 
 railroad track on a stormy night, with 
 his hat pulled over his eyes, and 
 ' ' looking straight down. " Gulf, &c. , 
 Ry. Co. v. York, 74 Tex. 364; s. c. 13 
 S. W. Rep. 68. WDds c. Hudson 
 River R. Co., 29 N. Y. 315; Brooks 
 v. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 25 Barb. 600; 
 S.C. 1 Abb. App. Dec. 211; Central R. 
 Co. V. Moore, 24 N. J. Law, 834. As 
 where one, seeing a train approach, 
 runs across the track instead of wait- 
 ing for it to pass. Grows v. Maine 
 Central R. Co., 67 Me. 100; Lewis v. 
 Balto., &c., R. Co., 38 Md. 588; Mc- 
 Mahon v. Northern, &c., R. Co., 39 
 Md. 438. See, also, Kttsburgh, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Kunston, 69 HI. 103. 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. t). Cole- 
 man's Adm'r, 86 Ky. 556; B. C. 6 
 S. W. Rep. 438; 8 S. W. Rep. 875. 
 
 Backing trains with no lookout or 
 other warning. Bergman e. St. 
 Louis, Sue, R. Co., 88 Mo. 678; s. c. 
 1 S. W. Rep. 384; Whalen ». Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 654; 8. c. 44 
 N. W. Rep. 849; Illinois, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Baches, 55 HI. 379; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. ®. Dignan, 56 HI. 486; Hlinois, 
 Ac, R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 HI. 347; 
 s. c. 85 IlL 526; Haley v. K. Y., &c., 
 R. Co., 7 Hun, 84; Sutton «. N. Y., 
 &c., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 343; Kay v. 
 Penn. R. Co., 65 Penn. St. 269; 8. c. 
 3 Am. Rep. 628; Murphy ®. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 539; 8. C. 45 
 Iowa, 661. 
 
 " French v. Taunton, &c., R. Co., 
 116 Mass. 537; Hinckley «. Cape Cod, 
 (Skc., R. Co., 130 Mass. 257; Butler t. 
 MUwaukee, &c., R. Co., 38 Wis. 487; 
 Brown n. New York, &c., R. Co., 33 
 N. Y. 597; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 (Jarvey, 58 HI. 83. 
 
CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 318. 
 319. 
 330. 
 331. 
 
 333. 
 334. 
 
 337. 
 238. 
 
 (A.) Fences. 
 Injuries to domestic animals 
 trespassing on railway tracks. 
 How far the English rule pre- 
 V3,ils in the United States. 
 A modification of the English 
 rule. 
 
 The American rule. 
 The American the reverse of 
 the English rule. 
 The efEect of a statute. 
 A summary statement of the 
 prevailing doctrine. 
 Duty of a railway company to 
 maintain fences. 
 Statutes requiring the mainte- 
 nance of a fence. 
 These statutes considered - 
 Contributing to a breach in a 
 fence, or failure to repair. 
 Where the land owner con- 
 tracts to fence for the railway. 
 Where the stock escape and are 
 injured. 
 
 331. The New York decisions. 
 
 332. Tfie same subject continued. 
 233. Summary statement of the 
 
 rule. 
 334." The rule in New England and 
 in Wisconsin. 
 
 (B.) FlBEB. 
 
 of 
 
 336. 
 387. 
 
 238. 
 
 285. Negligent communication 
 fire. 
 
 The effect of a statute. 
 A further statement of the rule 
 in the United States. 
 Vaughan ®. Taff Vale Ry. 
 Co. — the doctrine of this case 
 criticised. 
 
 239. The rule as to combustibles, 
 shavings, dried grass, &c. 
 
 240. The obligation of the plaintiff 
 herein. 
 
 341. The analogy of the "Squib 
 
 case." 
 243. The rule in Pennsylvania. 
 
 (A.) Fences. 
 
 § 218. Injuries to domestic animals trespassing on rail- 
 way tracks. — By the common law of England, the owner of 
 cattle is required to confine them to his own premises. 
 Fences, in her majesty's kingdom, are to keep one's cattle in, 
 not to keep other people's cattle out. The owner may drive 
 his cattle from place to place, upon the highway, and he may 
 lawfully herd them upon a common, but, if he permits them 
 to run at large, without a keeper, he is guilty of negligence. 
 If they trespass upon the premises of another, he is a wrong- 
 doer, and liable in damages for any injury consequent upon 
 their trespass.* 
 
 ' Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange, 104; 
 Stevens v. Whistler, 11 East, 51; Star 
 
 ®. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 335; Ricketts v. 
 East and West India Docks, &c., Ry. 
 
§ 219.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 281 
 
 § 219. How far the English rule prerails in the United 
 States. — This rule, that the owner of domestic animals must 
 keep them at home, ^.nd that there is no obligation to fence 
 against them, in the absence of statutes requiring owners of 
 land to fence, or permitting stock to run at large, prevails in 
 several of the older States of the Union. It is the law in 
 Maine,* New Hampshire,^ Vermont,' Massachusetts,^ Oonnect- 
 
 Co.. 12 C. B. 160; s. c. 16 Jur. 1072; 
 21 L. J. (C. P.) 201; 12 Eng. Law & 
 Eq. 520; 7 Eng. Ry. Cases, 295; Dick- 
 inson V. London, &c., Ry. Co., 1 
 Harr. & R. 399; iftlis e. London, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 2 Hurl. & K 424; s. c. 26 
 L. J. (Exch.) 349; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 
 1008. But if there is an obligation 
 on the part of the railway company 
 to keep a fence in repair, neglect to 
 do this and consequent injury to cat- 
 tle getting on the tracks because of 
 defective openings, will subject the 
 company to an action. Sharrod v. 
 London, &c., Ry. Co., 4 Exch. 580; 
 s. c. 14 Jur. 23; 20 L&w. Jour. Exch. 
 185; 7 Dow. & L. 218; 6 Eng. Ry. 
 Cases, 239; Tillett v. Ward, L. R. 10 
 Q. B. D. 17; s. c. 22 Am. Law Reg. 
 N.S. 245; 8 Kent's Commentaries, 536; 
 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 211; 
 Cooley on Torts, 337; 2 Waterman 
 on Trespass, § 858 et aeq. 
 
 ^ Little V. Lathrope, ( 5 Greenleaf, 
 35 ; Lord v. Wormwood, 29 Me. 282; 
 B. c. 50 Am. Dec. 586; Perkins «. 
 Eastern, &c., R. Co., 29 Me. 307; 
 8. 0. 50 Am. Dec. 589; Norris v. An- 
 droscoggin, &c., R Co., 89 Me. 278; 
 8. c. 68 Am. Dec. 621; Wyman u. 
 Penobscot, &c., R. Co., 46 Me. 162; 
 Wilder n. Maine, &c., R. Co., 65 Me. 
 332; 8. c. 20 Am. Rep, 698; Webber 
 V. CIoBson, 35 Me. 26 [but modified 
 by statute in 1834; Sturtevant v. 
 Merrill, 33 Me. 62; Knox v. Tucker, 
 48 Me. 375]. 
 
 ' Makepeace v. Worden, 1 N. H. 16. 
 The law in New Hampshire has, how- 
 
 ever, been changed by statute. Gen. 
 Sts. c. 148, § 1. So that in a later 
 case it was held that the neglect of a 
 railroad company to fence their road 
 does not excuse them from liability 
 for injury to animals upon the track, 
 although the owner of such animals 
 was aware of that neglect when he 
 turned them out to graze on his own 
 adjoining land. Cressy «. Northern, 
 &c., R. Co., 59 N. H. 564; s. c 47 
 Am. Rep, 227; Avery v. Maxwell, 4 
 N. H. 36; Wheeler v. Rowell, 7N. H. 
 515; Mayberry v. Concord, &c., R. 
 Co., 47 N. H. 391; Giles «. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 55 N. H. 552. 
 
 ' Trow v. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 24 
 Vt. 488; 8. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Jack- 
 son V. Rutland, &c., R. Co., 25 Vt. 
 150; B. c. 60 Am. Dec. 246; Hurd v. 
 RuUand, &c., R. Co., 25 Vt. 116; 
 Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336; Kee- 
 nan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt. 263; Cong- 
 don 11. Central, &c., ,R. Co., 56 Vt. 
 390; B. c. 48 Am. Rep. 793; Morse 
 V. Rutland, .fee., R. Co., 27 Vt. 49. 
 
 * Rust V. Low, 6 Mass. 90; Thayer 
 V. Arnold, 4 Mete. 589; Steams v. Old 
 Colony, &c., R. Co., 1 Allen, 498; 
 Eames ®. Salem, &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 
 560; Lyohs v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71; 
 Maynard v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 115 
 Mass. 458; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 119; 
 McDonnell v. Pittsfleld, &c., R. Co., 
 115 Mass. 564; Towne ®. Nashua, 
 &c., R. Co., 124 Mass. 101; Darling 
 v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 121 Mass. 118; 
 Rogers V. Newburyport, &c., R. Co., 
 1 Allen, 16. 
 
282 
 
 FENCES AND FIBE8. 
 
 [§ 219. 
 
 icut/ Ehode Island,' New York,* New Jersey,* Pennsylyania,' 
 Delaware,' Maryland,' Kentucky,* MioMgan,' Wisconsin," 
 
 . ' Isbell V. New York, &c., E. Co., 
 37 Conn. 393; Bulkley «. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 37 Conn. 479; Housatonic, 
 &c., E. Co. «. Knowles, 80 Conn. 
 318. 
 ' Tower «. Providence, &c., E- Co., 
 
 3 R. I. 404. 
 
 ' Tonawanda E. Co. v. Mimger, 5 
 Denio, 355; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 339, 
 and the note, pp. 348-373, in which 
 the whole law in point is set out; s. o. 
 
 4 N. Y. 349; 53 Am. Dec. 384; Clarke 
 -». Syracuse, &c., R. Co., 11 Barb. 
 113; Marsh v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 14 Barb. 364; Terry ». New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 33 Barb. 575; Bowman 
 «. Troy, &c., R. Co., 87 Barb. 516; 
 Cowles V. Balzer, 47 Barb. 563; Bow- 
 yer ». Burlew, 8 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 363; Halloran v. N. Y., &c., R. 
 Co., 3 E. D. Smith, 357. In New 
 York the common law rule is to 
 some extept changed by statute 
 Spinner ». New York, &c., R. Co., 67 
 N. Y. 153. 
 
 * Coxe ' 1). Robbins, 9 N. J. Law, 
 884; Chambers v. Matthews, 18 N. J. 
 Law, 868; Vandegrift ®. Rediker, 33 
 N. J. Law, 185; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 
 363; Price «. Central, &c., R. Co., 81 
 Am. Dec. 339; s. c. 33 Am. Dec. 19. 
 
 ' Knight «. Albert, 6 Penn. St. 473; 
 s. c. 47 Am. Dec. 478; Railroad Co. 
 V. Skinner, 19 Penn. St. 398; s. c. 57 
 Am. Dec. 654. When, however, a per- 
 son lawfully crosses a track at grade 
 with a drove of cattle, he is not boimd 
 to give a signal to an approaching 
 train. If necessary, it is the duty of 
 the company to employ a person to 
 give signals. Beeves «. Delaware, 
 &c., E. Co., 30 Penn. St. 454; Powell 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 32 Penn, St. 416; 
 Phila., &c., E. Co. ®. Hummel, 44 
 Penn. St. 378; Phila., &c., E. Co. •». 
 Speftren, 47 Penn. St. 403; North 
 
 Penn. E. Co. v. Rehman, 49 Penn. 
 St. 106; Drake «. Phila., &c., R. Co., 
 51 Penn. St. 340; Gregg v. Gregg, 55 
 Penn. St. 337; Gillis v. Penn. R. Co., 
 59 Penns St. 143; Penn. E. Co. «. 
 Eiblet, 66 Penn. St. 168. See, also, 
 Sullivan v. Penn. E. Co., 30 Penn. St. 
 240. 
 
 » Vandergrift v. Delaware, &c., E. 
 Co., 3 Houa. 397. 
 
 ' Richardson v. Milbum, 11 Md. 
 340; Baltimore, &c., E. Co. v. Lam- 
 bom, 12 Md. 357. By the several 
 acts of Assembly regulating the lia- 
 bility of railroad companies in Mary- 
 land for stock injured, a very high 
 degree of care is imposed on the com- 
 panies. Keech v. Baltimore, &c., E. 
 Co., 17 Md. 33; Baltimore, &c., E. 
 Co. ». Mulligan, 45 Md. 487; Annapo- 
 lis, &c., R. Co. V. Baldwin, 60 Md. 88; 
 B. c. 45 Am. Rep. 711. 
 
 * Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Ballard, 
 3 Mete. 177; Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Milton, 14 B. Mon. 75; s. c. 58 Am. 
 Dec. 647; but modified by statute, see 
 Kentucky Central R. Co. v. Lebus, 14 
 Bush, 518; Louisville, &c, R. Co. «. 
 Wainscot, 3 Bush, 149; O'Bannon v. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 8 Bush, 350. 
 
 9 Robinson ». Flint, &c., R. Co., 79 
 Mich. 833; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 779; 
 Williams v. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 2 
 Mich. 260; s. c. 55 Am. Dec. 59; 
 Johnson v. Wing, 3 Mich. 163. 
 
 " Harrison «, Browu, 5 Wis. 37; 
 Stucke V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co. 9 
 Wis. 303; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Goss, 17 Wis. 438, where the act of 
 allowing brute animals to stray upon 
 the tracks of a railroad is character- 
 ized as "gross negligence." Bennett 
 V. Chicago, &o., R. Co., 19 Wis. 145; 
 Galpin v. Chicago, &c., R. CO., 19 
 Wis, 604; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 
 Wis. 640. 
 
§ 219.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 283 
 
 Minnesota/ Indiana,^ and Kansas.^ In these States it has 
 generally been held that permitting stock to run at large 
 is such negligence, on the part of the owner, as to bar his 
 right of recovery for injuries to them, unless such injury 
 was wanton or wilful.* The general principles of the law of 
 contributory negligence, of course, apply to cases of injury 
 to stock. If the injury is the result of mutual carelessness, 
 as in any other case, neither has a remedy against the other; 
 but, if it be not in any degree ascribable to the negligence of 
 one party, due regard being had to the circumstances of his 
 position, he may recover from the other ; ^ but, where each 
 
 ' In Minnesota, by Gten. St. c 10, 
 § 15, sub. 6, cattle are prohibited 
 from going at large between October 
 15th and April 1st. In the absence of 
 any action by the various towns, how- 
 ever, this restriction is also held appli- 
 cable during the other months. Locke 
 «. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 15 Minn. 
 350; Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, &c., K. 
 Co., 29 Minn. 336; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 
 312; "WithereU v. St. Paul, &c., R. 
 Co., 24 Minn. 410. 
 
 ' Page B. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317; 
 Williams v. New Albany, &c., R. Co., 
 5 Ind. Ill; La Payette, &c., R. Co. 
 ■B. Shriner, 6 Ind. 141; Brady v. Ball, 
 14 Ind. 317; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. 
 V. McClMre, 26 Ind. 370; LyODS v. 
 Terre Haute, &c., R. Co., 101 Ind. 
 419; Wabash, &c., Ry. Co. d. Nice, 99 
 Ind. 153; Cincimiati, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Hiltzhauer, 99 Ind. 486. In Indiana 
 the boards of county commissioners 
 are authorized to determine what ani- 
 mals may run at large (1 G. & H. 65). 
 Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. «. Hartu, 
 38 Ind. 557; Jeflersonvme, &c., R. 
 Co. v. Adams, 43 Ind. 403; JefEerson- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Underbill, 48 
 Ind. 389; Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Street, 50 Ind. 335; Pittsburgh, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Stuart, 71 Ind. 505; New 
 Albany, «fcc., R. Co. s. Tilton, 12 
 Ind. 3; Michigan, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Fisher, 27 Ind. 96. 
 
 ' Wells V. Beal, 9 Kan. 597; Baker 
 
 i>. Robbins, 9 Kan. 303; Sherman v. 
 Anderson, 37 Kan. 383) s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 414; Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Rollins, 5 Kan. 168; Kansas, &c., R. 
 Co. r>. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Larkm 
 v. Taylor, 5 Kan, 433; Central Branch, 
 (fee, R. Co. V. Lea, 20 Kan. 353; At- 
 chison, &c., R. Co. ■». Hegwir, 31 
 Kan. 622; Compiled Laws 1879, 
 784, § 30. Cf. Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Brown, 14 Kan. 469, where a horse, 
 without its owner's knowledge, got 
 out of the barn, where it had been 
 locked in, strayed to the track of a 
 railroad and was injured. The owner 
 was allowed to recover. Kansas, 
 &c., R. Co. ». Landis, 20 Kan. 406; 
 Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. McHenry, 24 
 Kan. 501; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Wilson, 
 28 Kan. 637; Central, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Philippi, 30 Kan. 9 
 
 * See generally the cases cited gupra, 
 and especially Railroad Company v. 
 Skinner, 19 Penn. St. 298; b. c. 57 Am. 
 Dec. 654, in which the court not only 
 affirms this rule, but also declares 
 that in such cases the owner is very 
 apt to become liable to the ridlroad 
 company or the passengers for damage 
 done by his cattle. See, also, Tona- 
 wanda R. Co. ' «. Mimger, 5 Denio, 
 355; B. c. 49 Am. Dec. 239, note. 
 
 ' Reeves v. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 
 30 Penn. St. 455; Waldron v. Port- 
 land, &c., R. Co., 35 Me. 422; Balcom 
 ®. Dubuque, &c., R. Co., 21 Iowa, 
 
284 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 219. 
 
 is in fault, neither can recoTer.i rpj^g plaintiff's negligence, 
 in order to a recovery, must, as in any other case, be the 
 proximate or immediate cause of the injury,* and it must ap- 
 pear that permitting the stock to run at large contributed 
 proximately to the injury in order to bar a recovery,' It 
 
 102; Whitbeck v. Dubuque, &c., R. 
 Co., 21 Iowa, 103; Illinois, «&c., R. 
 Co. V. Goodwin, 30 111. 117; Fisher 
 «. Farmers', &c., Co., 21 Wis. 74. If 
 • the owner of a blind horse turns him 
 out upon the common, he is guilty of 
 gross negligence, amoimting to wil- 
 lingness to have any injury occur to 
 the animal, and under no circum- 
 stances can he recover. Knight «. 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co., 24 Ind. 402. In- 
 dianapolis, &c., R. Co. B. Wright, 22 
 Iiid. 377; Mentges v. Kew York, &c., 
 R. Co., 1 Hilt. 425; Annapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Baldwin, 60 Md. 88 ; s. c. 
 45 Am. Rep. 711; Fames v. Salem, 
 &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 560; Tower*. 
 Providence, &c., R. Co., 2 R. I. 404. 
 
 ' Haigh V. London, &c., Ry. Co., 1 
 Fost. & Fin. 646; Williams «. Michi- 
 gan, &c., R. Co., 2 Mich. 265; s. c. 
 55 Am. Dec. 59; Illinois, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Middlesworth, 43 111. 65. As 
 where a person in charge of stock 
 rushed them over the track of a rail- 
 road, though his son told him that he 
 thought he heard a train. Several of 
 the animals were killed by a train; 
 but no recovery was allowed, in spite 
 of the fact that the engineer had neg- 
 lected to give the statutory signals. 
 Ohio, &c., R. Co. V. Eaves, 42 111. 
 288. Pittsbvu-gh, &c., R. Co. v. Stuart, 
 71 Ind. 504; Railroad Co. v. Skinner, 
 19 Penn. St. 298; b. c. 57 Am. Dec. 
 654; Perkins v. Eastern, &c., R. Co., 
 29 Me. 307; s. c. 50 Am. Dec. 589. 
 
 " Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. Irish, 72 
 111. 405; St. Louis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Toddt 36 111. 409; South, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Williams, 65 Ala. 74; Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co. ■». McGinnis, 71 111. 347; 
 Ewing V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 72 
 
 ni. 35; Peoria, &c., R. Co. «. Champ, 
 75 111. 578. In Gteorgia, under the 
 doctrine of comparative negligence, 
 the owner of stock can recover for in- 
 juries done to them, even though he 
 be in some degree negligent himself. 
 Central, &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 19 6a. 
 437. Pac, &c., R. Co. *. Houts, 12 
 Kan. 328; Searles v. Milwaukee, &c., 
 ^. Co., 35 Iowa, 490; Gates v. Bur- 
 lington, &c., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 45; 
 Kerwhacker®. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 
 3 Ohio St. 172; s. c. 62 Am. Dec. 
 246; Smith v. Chicago, &C., R. Co., 
 34 Iowa, 506; Kuhn «. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 42 Iowa, 420; Schwarz v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 58 Mo. 207. 
 
 ' The fact that the plaintiff kept his 
 hogs in an insecure inclosure, and 
 thereby permitted them to escape and 
 go upon defendant's railroad was not 
 such negligence contributing directly 
 to the injury as to prevent his re- 
 covery. Leavenworth, &c., Ry. Co. 
 V. Forbes, 37 Kan. 445; s. c. 15 Pac. 
 Rep. 59^ In California it is not negli- 
 gence to allow stock to run at large. 
 The court, in Richmond ». Sacramento 
 R. Co., 18 Cal. 351, said :— "It is not 
 easy for us to see that the mere fact 
 that a party suffers his cows to go at 
 large near the line of a railroad, is 
 guilty of such negligence as to excuse 
 the corporation from reasonable dili- 
 gence and care to avoid injury to 
 them when they happen to be upon 
 the track. The suffering of them to 
 go at large is certainly not the usual 
 or natural cause of such an injury; 
 such a result would not probably hap- 
 pen once in a thousand, or perhaps ten 
 thousand times. Oorwin®. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42 ; Cairo, &c., 
 
§ 220.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 285 
 
 is sometimes held that turning stock out to graze, even 
 though it is negligence, must be regarded a remote, and can- 
 not be the proximate cause of the injury.* 
 
 § 330. A inodiflcation of the English rule.— In some 
 States the English rule is held in a more or less modified 
 form. Thus, it is held in several jurisdictions, that it is 
 proper to make a distinction between carelessly or rashly 
 permitting stock to roam upon the track of a railway, to the 
 peril of the lives and limbs of passengers and employees and 
 the property of the company, and using due care to restrain 
 cattle which, in spite of such precautions, break out and are 
 injured. In the one case there is gross negligence, barring 
 any recovery, and in the other there is no negligence at all. 
 This is a rational and just distinction. It is declared in 
 many cases.* 
 
 R. Co. D. Murray, 82 HI. 76; IHinois, 
 Ac, R. Co. c. Baker, 47 111. 295; 
 Euhn V. Chicago, &c., R. Co. 42 Iowa, 
 420; Fritz v. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 
 34 Iowa, 377; EwiDg v. Cliicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 72 ni. 25; Cairo, &c., R. Co. 
 n. Woolsey, 85 111. 370; BTint, &c., 
 IJ. Co. c. LuU, 28 Mich. 510; BeUe- 
 fontaine, &c., R. Co. ■». Reed, 33 Ind. 
 476; IsbeU v. New York, &c., Ry. Co. , 
 27 Conn. 393. 
 
 'Kerwhacker «. Cleveland, &c., 
 R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172; s. c. 62 Am. 
 Deo. 246; Central, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Lawrence, 13 Ohio St. 67; Cleveland, 
 Ac, R. Co. ■» Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474; 
 Vicksburg, &c., R. Co. «. Patton, 31 
 Miss. 157; Central. &c., R. Co. v. 
 PhilUppi, 20 Kan. 9. See, also, Wash- 
 ington «. Baltimore, &c., R., Co., 17 
 West Va. 190; Bemis «. Connecticut, 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Vt. 375; 8. C. 1 Am. 
 Rep. 339; Kentucky, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Lebus, 14 Bush, 518; Lawson «. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 57 Iowa, 672. 
 
 'McCandless v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co.. 45 Wis. 365; Curry ®. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Wis. 665; Lande v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 38 Wis. 640; 
 Fisher «. Farmers', &c., Co., 21 Wis. 
 
 74; ToWne v. Nashua, &c., R. Co., 
 124 Mass. 101; Estes v. Atlantic, &c., 
 R. Co., 63 Me. 308; Pacific, &c., R. 
 Co. v. Brown, 14 Kan. 469; Cairo, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Woolsey, 85 HI. 370; 
 Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. Fowler, 85 111. 
 21; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Johnston, 
 74 m. 83; Bulkley ®. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Isbell v. New 
 York, &c., Ry. Co., 27 Conn. 393; 
 White's. Concord, &c., R. Co., 30 N. 
 H. 188; Trout «. Virginia, &c., R. Co., 
 23 Gratt. 619; Pearson «. Milwaukee, 
 &c., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 497; South, &c., 
 Ala. R. Co. V. Williams, 65 Ala. 74; 
 Balcom ». Dubuque, &c., R. Co., 21 
 Iowa, 102; Macon, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Davis, 13 Ga. 68; Knight «. Toledo, 
 &c., R. Co., 24 Ind. 402; St. Louis, 
 Ac, R. Co. v. Todd, 36 111. 409. But, 
 for a contrary rule, to the effect that 
 even where animals escape from a 
 well-fenced enclosure, without their 
 owner's fault, and stray upon a rail- 
 way track and are there injured, they 
 are trespassers, and for a negligent 
 injury to them the owner cannot re- 
 cover, see Pittsburgh, Ac, R. Co. v. 
 Stuart, 71 Ind. 504 Spinner v. New 
 York, Ac, R. Co., 67 N. Y. 153; 
 
286 FENCES AND PIEES. [§ 222. 
 
 § 221. The American rule.— In a number of the States 
 the English rule on this point is distinctly repudiated, and 
 one more suited to the wants of a new and comparatively 
 thinly settled country has gitown up instead. In these States 
 a fence is regarded as something to keep animals out, rather 
 than to keep them in, and it is held not a trespass for cattle to 
 wander upon unenclosed lands. Statutes define what is a 
 " lawful fence," and declare that no one whose close is not 
 surrounded by such a fence shall recover damages from his 
 neighbor, whose cattle break in and do him an injury. It is, 
 therefore, not contributory negligence in these jurisdictions 
 to allow cattle to run at large. This may be known as the 
 American rule, in contradistinction to the rule we have 
 hitherto been considering. It was set forth with much force 
 and cogency of reasoning in the great case of Kerwhacker v. 
 Cleveland, Ac, E. Co.,* by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 
 1854, in which it is declared to be the common law of Ohio 
 that the owner of domestic animals is guilty neither of an 
 unlawful act nor of an omission of ordinary care in keeping 
 or caring for them, by allowing such stock to run at large 
 on the range of unenclosed lands ; that there is no law 
 which requires land owners to fence their land, and that this 
 equally applies to railway corporations ; that the owner who 
 leaves his lands unenclosed takes the risk of intrusions upon 
 them from the animals of other persons running at large^ 
 and that the owner of the animals, on his part, takes the 
 risk, in allowing them to be at large, of their loss or of injury 
 to them by unavoidable accidents arising from any danger 
 into which they may wander. 
 
 § 222. The American the reverse of the English rule.— 
 
 This is a complete abrogation of the English rule. The later 
 
 North Penn. R. Co. v. Rehman, 49 killed by a train of cars, it is a tres- 
 
 Penn. St. 104. And see, also, Darling passer, and the company is not liable 
 
 V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 131 Mass. 118, to the owner of the hoise, unless there 
 
 holding that if a horse is put in a was wanton misconduct on the part of 
 
 proper pasture by its owner, and es- those who managed the train. And 
 
 capes thence into a highway, and goes cf. Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. Hegwir, ' 
 
 upon the track of a railroad at a point 21 Kan. 622. 
 
 at which, although the company is ' 3 Ohio St. 172; 8. c. 62 Am. Deo. 
 
 bound to maintain cattle-guards, there 246. 
 are no such guards, and is there 
 
§ 222.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 287 
 
 cases in Ohio follow it,* and a similar doctrine is maintained 
 by the courts of Illinois,^ Iowa,' Missouri,* California,* 
 Dakota,* Florida,' West Virginia,' Oregon,' Colorado,*" 
 
 ' Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. v. "Water- 
 son, 4 Ohio St. 431; Cleveland, &c., 
 R. Co. V. EUiott, 4 Ohio St. 474; Cen- 
 tral, iSfcc., R. Co. V. Lawrence. 13 Ohio 
 St. 67; Marietta, &c., R Co. v. Steven- 
 son, 34 Ohio St. 48; Cincinnati, &c., 
 R. Co. ». Smith, 23 Ohio St. 327; B. c. 
 10 Am. Rep. 729. But the right to allow 
 domestic animals to run at large has 
 been abridged byt statute. Sloan v. 
 Hubbard, 34 Ohio St. 585. 
 
 ' Seeley v. Peters, 10 HI. 130; Bass 
 o. Chicago, &c., R. Co.. 28 HI. 9; Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co. T. Caufiman, 38 HI. 
 434. Where two i>ersons own land 
 adjoining each other, and join fences, 
 each building the fence on his own 
 land, and have no partition fence be- 
 tween them, and cattle break through 
 the defective fence of one and enter 
 the premises of the other, the latter 
 would have no right to take them up, 
 or recover for injuries against the 
 owner of the stock. Stoner v. Shugart, 
 45 IlL 76; Dlinois, &c. , R. Co. v. Baker, 
 47 m. 295 ; Headen v. Rust, 39 111. 186; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. ». Bray, 57111. 
 514; Rockfoid, &c., R. Co. v. Lewis, 
 58 m. 49; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v In- 
 graham, 58 lU. 30; Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co. D. Bariow, 71 m. 640; Rockford, 
 &c., R. Co. V. RafEerty, 73 111. 58; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Kellam, 93 
 m. 345; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 138. 
 
 ' Where stock are allowed to nm at 
 large, the owner must be held to take 
 the risk only of such injuries as do 
 not result from the defendant's negli- 
 gence. Van Horn v. Burlington, &c. , 
 R. Co., 59 Iowa, 38; Wagner «. Bissell, 
 3 Iowa, 396; Alger «. Mississippi, &c., 
 R Co., 10 Iowa, 368; Herold v. Meyer, 
 30 Iowa, 378; Smith v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co,, 34 Iowa, 506; Whitbecko. Du- 
 buque. &c., R Co., 31 Iowa, 103; 
 Inman v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Iowa, 459; Miller s. Chicago, &c., R 
 
 Co., 59 Iowa, 707; Frazier v. Norti- 
 nus, 38 Iowa, 83; Searles «>. Milwau- 
 kee, &c., R. Co., 35 Iowa, 490, modi- 
 fied by statute in 1870. See Hallock 
 V. Hughes, 43 Iowa, 516; Little ii. Mc- 
 Guire, 38 Iowa, 560; s. c. 43 Iowa, 
 447. 
 
 ' Nolan B. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 23 
 Mo. App. 353; Gorman b. Pacific, &c., 
 R. Co., 26 Mo. 443; Hannibal, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Kenney, 41 Mo. 371 ; Tarwater 
 V. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 42 Mo. 193; 
 McPheeters b. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 45 Mo. 33; Crafton v. Hannibal, &c., 
 R Co., 55 Mo. 580; Silver n. Kansas 
 City, &c., R Co., 78 Mo. 538; s. c. 
 47 Am. Rep. 118; Clardy v. St. Louis, 
 &C., R." Co., 73 Mo. 576; Comings 
 V. Hannibal, &c., R Co., 48 Mo. 513, 
 
 ' Waters v. Moss, 12 Cal. 535; Com- 
 erford c. Dupuy, 17 Cal. 308; Logan 
 V. Gedney, 38 CaL 579. 
 
 ' Williams ». Northern Pac. R. 
 Co., 3 Dak. 168. 
 
 ' Savannah, &c., Ry. Co. v. Greiger, 
 21 Fla. 669; s. c. 58 Am. Rep. 697. 
 
 8 Blaine v. Chesapeake, &c., R. Co., 
 9 West Va. 253; Baylor «. Balto., &c., 
 R Co., 9 West Va. 270. 
 
 » Campbell v. BridweU, 5 Or. 311. 
 But see French ■b. Cresswell, 18 Or. 
 418; Moses v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 
 18 Or. 385; s c. 23 Pac. Rep. 498. 
 
 '° Neither common nor statute law 
 in Colorado requires a railroad to 
 fence its track to prevent cattle from 
 straying on it. Hence, the company 
 is not liable for the death of one of its 
 engineers caused by a collision with 
 cattle on the track. Cowan v. Union 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 43. " The 
 general law of this State permits the 
 owners of cattle to allow them to 
 range at wiU, and, in the absence of 
 local acts, the owner of crops can only 
 recover damages done thereon by the 
 trespasses of cattle when the same 
 
288 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 [§ 222. 
 
 Nevada,* Alabama," Georgia,* Mississippi,* Arkansas," South 
 Carolina,^ North Carolina,' Texas,' Virginia,' and Nebraska." 
 
 are at the time of the trespass, inclosed 
 by good and suflBcient fences." Mc- 
 Gan B. O'Neil, 5 Colo. 435. Denver, 
 &c., Ry. Co. >. Henderson, 10 Colo. 
 11; B. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 910. 
 
 • Chase v. Chase, 15 Nev. 359. 
 "Mobile, &o., R. Co. ■B.Williams, 
 
 53 Ala. 595; South Ala., &c., B. Co. 
 V. Williams, 65 Ala. 74; Alabama, &c., 
 R. Co. V. McAlpine, 71 Ala. 545. 
 
 'Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Lester, 80 
 Ga. 914; Georgia, &c., R. Co. ®. 
 Anderson, 33 Ga. 110. In Macon, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Baker, 43 Ga. 301, the 
 jury was charged, "that if it were 
 shown that plaintifl's cow was injured 
 by defendant's servants, this presumes 
 negligence on their part, and they 
 must explain it, . . . that it was 
 hot true that if said cow, turned out 
 by the plaintiff, got upon the track it 
 made plaintiff a trespasser; unless the 
 track was inclosed by a lawful fence." 
 Georgia, &c., R. Co. ■». Seely, 56 Ga. 
 540;' Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Vaughn, 
 48 Ga. 464. 
 
 * Vicksburg, &c., R. Co. v. Patton, 
 31 Miss. 157; Memphis, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Blabeney, 43 Miss. 318; Railford v. 
 Mississippi, &c., R. Co., 43 Miss. 338; 
 New Orleans, &c., R. Co. v. Field, 46 
 Miss. 573; Mobile, &c., R. Co. ■» Hud- 
 son, 50 Miss. 573; Dickson v. Parker, 
 3 How. 319; b. c. 34 Am. Dec. 78; 
 Mississippi, <fcc., E. Co. v. Miller, 40 
 Miss. 45; Pairchild ®. New Orleans, 
 *c., R. Co., 63 Miss. 177. 
 
 ° Little Rock, <fcc., R. Co. «. Knley, 
 37 Ark. 563, holding that the common 
 law doctrine of inclosing domestic 
 aniqials has never been recognized in 
 the State. "Such a rule," says the 
 court, " is inapplicable to the condi- 
 tion and circumstances of our people. 
 It would be most oppressive and un- 
 wise; from the first settlement to the 
 present, all kinds of stock have been 
 
 allowed to go at large on uninclosed 
 lands." 
 
 ' An instruction that much less care 
 is required of raUroad companies in 
 providing against stock on its track 
 since the passage of the stock law re- 
 quiring stock to be inclosed, is correct. 
 Joyner v. South Carolina R. Co. 36 
 8. C. 49; s. c. 1 S. E. Rep. 53; Danner 
 v. South Carolina, Sue., R. Co., 4 Rich. 
 (Law) 339; s. o. 65 Am. Dec. 678; 
 Wilson «. Wilmington, &c., R. Co., 
 10 Rich. (Law) 53; Murray «. South 
 Carolina, &c., R. Co., 10 Rich. 337; 
 Rowe «. Railroad Co., 7 S. C. 167; 
 Simkins v. Columbia, &c. , R. Co., 30 S. 
 C. 358; Jones®. Columbia, &c.,R. Co., 
 30 S. C. 349. But, in Wilson «. Wil- 
 mington, &c., R, Co., mpra, the rule 
 is held of no application to the case of 
 a dog killed on a railway track. "It 
 would indeed be a startling doctrine," 
 the court says, "to hold that a train of 
 cars, whether freighted with produce 
 or with passengers, should be arrested 
 in its progress, and compelled, at the 
 hazard of responsibility, to come to a 
 dead halt whenever a domestic fowl, 
 or perchance a yelping cur, should 
 happen to take its stand on the track." 
 
 ' In North Carolina, a railroad com- 
 pany need not fence its tracks. And 
 if, in constructing its road, a pasture 
 fence is removed and animals fall into 
 an unf enced cut, the company is not 
 liable. Jones s. Western N. C. R. Co., 
 95 N. C. 338; Laws v. North Carolina, 
 &c., R. Co., 73 Jones (Law) 468. 
 
 8 Walker ®. Herron, 33 Tex. 55; 
 Texas, &c., R. Co. v. Young, 60 Tex. 
 201. 
 
 'Trout V. "Virginia, &c., R. Co., 23 
 Gratt. 619. 
 
 " Delaney v. En-ickson, 11 Neb. 533; 
 Burlington, &c. R. Co. ■». Franzer, 15 
 Neb. 365. 
 
223.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIEES. 
 
 289 
 
 § 223. The effect of a statute.— It is held not contribu- 
 tory negligence, as matter of law, to permit cattle to go at 
 large, even though it is in violation of a statute.' There is 
 a contrary rule in Kansas," while in Illinois, whether or 
 not such a practice is contributory negligence, is usually 
 held a proper question for the Jury.* In Iowa, where stock 
 is " lawfully " running at large, it is said not to be contribu- 
 tory negligence in an action against a railway company for 
 negligently running cattle down.* There is, howcTer, at 
 present a statute in that State which requires a railroad com- 
 pany to fence its trapk against animals running at large.^ 
 When contributory negligence is the issue in actions against 
 railway companies for injuries to cattle run down upon the 
 track, it is very generally held a proper question to go to 
 the jury.' Where a local municipal ordinance permits cattle 
 to run at large, it is, nevertheless, negligence on the part of 
 the owner of stock to suffer it to do so upon the highway in 
 
 ' Owens v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 58 Mo. 387; Schwarz v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R. Co., 58 Mo. 207; Mumpower 
 v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 59 Mo. 345. 
 
 " Central, &c., R. Co. ■». Lea, 20 
 Kan. 353; Leavenworth, '&c., Ry. Co. 
 D. Forbes, 37 Kan. 445; s. c. 15 Pac. 
 Rep. 595. See, also, Vanhom ®. Bur- 
 lington, &c., Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 67. 
 
 ' Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. Irish, 
 73 m. 405 ; Cairo, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Woolsey, 85 111. 370. QT. Galena, 
 &c., R. Co. <B. Crawford, 35 111. 529; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. ■». Pergusson, 43 
 m. 449; Toledo, «fec., R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Ginnis, 71 HI. 346; Rockford, Sec, 
 R. Co. c. RaflEerty, 73 111. 58; Cairo, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Murray, 83 111. 77; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Engle, 84 111. 
 397. 
 
 « McCool «. Galena, &c., R. Co., 17 
 Iowa, 461. 
 
 * Spence v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 35 
 Iowa, 139; Stewart «. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 37 Iowa, 283. Horses at- 
 tached to a sleigh, and wandering on 
 the prairie at night, driven by a man 
 in a drunken stupor, are not "live- 
 19 
 
 stock running at large " within Code 
 Iowa, § 1289, providing that if it fail 
 to fence, the railroad shall be liable 
 for damages to such stock. Grove®. 
 Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 75 Iowa, 
 163; 8. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 348; Krebs 
 v. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 
 670; Fritz V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 
 34 Iowa, 338; Pearson «. Milwaukee, 
 &c., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 497. But see 
 Vanhom v. Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 
 63 Iowa, 67. 
 
 • Timins v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 72 Iowa, 94; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 379; 
 Lay «. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 106 
 N. C. 404; s. c. 11 8. E. Rep. 413; 
 Southworth v. Old Colony, &c., R. 
 Co., 105 Mass. 343; Housatonic, &c., 
 R. Co. ■». "Waterbury, 38 Conn. 101; 
 Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Wright, 
 13 Ind. 313; Ellis v. London, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 3 Hurl. & N. 434; s. o. 36 
 L. J. (Exch.) 349; Fawcett v. York, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 16 Q. B. 610; s. c. 15 
 Jur. 173; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 333; Mid- 
 land, &c., R. Co. «. Daykin, 17 C. B. 
 136; 8. 0. 35 L. J. (C. P.) 73. 
 
290 
 
 FENCES AND FIEES. 
 
 [§ 223. 
 
 the vicinity of a railroad track.^ The prevailing rule is, that 
 it is not negligence to turn animals loose upon one's ovm 
 land, where there is an unfenced or defectively fenced rail- 
 way track adjoining or running through it, which the railway 
 is required by law to fence.* But, although a railroad com- 
 pany is in default for not maintaining a fence between its 
 right of way and the pasture land of an adjoining owner, 
 yet, where such owner habitually turns his cattle loose upon 
 such track, through a gate maintained for his accommoda- 
 tion, and thus willingly abandons them to destruction, he 
 cannot recover therefor.' And one who turned a colt into a 
 pasture, knowing that a fence next the railroad was down, 
 using no precaution to prevent the colt from going on the 
 track, and being authorized by statute to rebuild the fence at 
 the expense of the company after notice and default, was 
 held by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to be guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence, though he had no other pasture, and 
 requested the company to repair the fence.* 
 
 ' Williams v. Michigan, &c., R. 
 Co., 2 Mich. 259; s. c. 55 Am. Dec. 
 59; Fritz v. Rrst Div., &c., R. Co., 33 
 Minn. 404; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Engle, 84 111. 397; Marsh b. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 14 Barb. 364; 
 Clark v. Syracuse, &c., R. Co., 11 
 Barb. 113; Bowman v. Troy, &c., R. 
 Co., 37 Barb. 516; Halloran «. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 3 E. D. Smith, 
 357; Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger, 
 5 Denio, 355, holding that the term 
 "to run at large " does not apply to 
 railroads, which, " although designed 
 to subserve the public interest and 
 convenience, are still not highways, 
 but in strictness mere private property, 
 and no town has any right to author- 
 ize cattle to enter on them." s. c. 49 
 Am. Dec. 339, and note; B. c. tub 
 nom., Mtmger v. Tonawanda R. Co., 
 4N. Y. 349; s. c. 53 Am. Dec. 384; 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Ballard, 3 
 Mete. 177; Michigan, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Fisher, 27 Ind. 97; Van Horn ©. Bur- 
 lington, &c., R. Co., 59 Iowa, 38; Mil- 
 ler ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 59 Iowa, 
 
 707; Inman«. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 60 Iowa, 459. 
 
 ' Wilder ». Maine, &c., R. Co., 65 
 Me. 333; B. 0. 20 Am. Rep. 698; Mc- 
 Coy r>. California, &c., R. Co., 40 Cal. 
 532; B. c. 6 Am. Rep. 633; Rogers «. 
 Newburyport, &c., R. Co., 1 Allen, 
 16; Shepard v. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 
 36 N. Y. 641; Mead v. Burlington, 
 &c., R. Co., 53 Vt. 378. "It would 
 be a novel doctrine to hold that a 
 railway company, by violating the 
 law, could restrict one's rightful use 
 of his own land." Mr. Freeman's 
 note to Munger v. Tonawanda R. Co., 
 49 Am. Dec. 239, 371. See, also. 
 Homer v. Williams, 100 N. C. 230; 
 8. c. 5 S. E. Rep. 734; Burlington, 
 &c., R. Co. ». Webb, 18 Neb. 216; s. C. 
 63 Am. Rep. 809; Harmon v.. Colum- 
 bia, &c., R. Co. (S. C), 10 S. E. Rep. 
 877. 
 
 ' Fort Wayne, &c., R. Co. e. 
 Woodward, 112 Ind. 118; s. c. 13 
 N. B. Rep. 260. 
 
 * Martin v. Stewart, 73 Wis. 553; 
 8. c. 41 N. W. Rep. 538. 
 
§ 224] FENCES AND FIBES. 291 
 
 § 224. A SDmmary statement of the preTailing doctrine. — 
 
 In States where the modified or American rule prevails, as 
 distinguished from the stricter English rule, railway com- 
 panies are liable only for the ordinary negligence of their 
 servants toward animals straying on their tracks,^ and the 
 owners of animals turned out upon the range assume some 
 of the risks incident to their possibly wandering upon the 
 track, which is the same as to say that the owners assume 
 the risk of all unavoidable accidents ; the railway company 
 on their part assuming to operate the road, wherever the 
 track is unfenced, with due care to avoid any injury to cattle 
 that may stray upon their premises.* "Persons living con- 
 tiguous to railroads," said the Supreme Court of Mississippi, 
 " have the same right as others in more remote localities to 
 turn their cattle upon the ranges, but they assume the risk 
 of their greater exposure to danger. The cattle are liable to 
 go upon the road ; the company cannot detain them damage 
 feasant any more than any other land-owner, nor can they 
 treat them as unlawfully there, and, therefore, relax their 
 care and efforts to avoid their destruction. The only justifi- 
 cation of the company for injury to them is, that in the pros- 
 ecution of their lawful and ordinary business, the act could 
 not have been avoided by the use of such care, prudence and 
 skill as a discreet man would put forth to prevent or avoid it."' 
 
 ' Durham «. ■Wilmington, &c., R Dec. 647; Belief ontaine, &c., R. Co. 
 
 Co., 82 N. 0. 353; Vicksburg, <tc.,R. v. BaUey, 11 Ohio St. 333; Hawker «. 
 
 Co. V. Patton, 31 Miss. 157; Miasissip- Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 15 West Va. 
 
 pi, &c., R. Co. V. MiUer, 40 Miss. 45; 628. 
 
 New Orleans, &c., R. Co. «. Field, 46 ■ Timm v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 3 
 
 Miss. 574 Oorman v. Pacific, &c., R. Wash. Ter. 299; 8. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 
 
 Co., 26 Mo. 443; Alger o. Mississippi, 415; Bethea e. Raleigh, &c., R. Co., 
 
 &c., R. Co., 10 Iowa, 368; Macon, 106 N. C. 379; 8. c. 10 S. E.Rep. 1045; 
 
 &c., R. Co. e. Baber, 43 Ga. 300. Taylor on Corporations, §389; Macon, 
 
 Even in Maryland, where the common &c., R. Co. v. Davis, 18 6a. 680; Cen- 
 
 law rule prevails, it is held that the tral, &c., R. Co. s. Davis, 19 Ga. 437; 
 
 negligence of the owner of cattle in Memphis, &c., R. Co. d. Blakeney, 43 
 
 letting them trespass on the road of a Miss. 318; Raiford v. Mississippi, &c., 
 
 railway company wUl not bar recovery R. Co., 43 Miss. 333; Kerwhacker «. 
 
 for injuries if the company did not Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 Ohio St 172; 
 
 exerdse all reasonable care Baiti- s. c. 62 Am. Dec. 246; Kentucky, 
 
 more, &c., R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md. &c., R Co. v. Lebus, 14 Bush, 518; 
 
 487; St. Louis, &c., R. Co. v. Vincent, Little Rock, &c., R. Co. e. Pinley, 37 
 
 36 Ark. 451; Louisville, &c., R. Co. Ark. 573. 
 e. Milton, 14 B. Mon. 61; s. c. 58 Am. » New Orleans, &c., R..Co. v. Field, 
 
292 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 224. 
 
 In Alabama,' Arkansas,' Dakota,* Georgia.* Kentucky," North 
 Carolina,' South Carolina,' Mississippi,' Colorado,' Iowa," 
 
 46 Miss. 573. See, also, Richmond v. 
 Sacramento, &c., R Co., 18 Cal. 351; 
 Macon v. California, &c., R. Co., 40 
 Cal. 533; Blaine v. Chesapeake, &c., 
 R. Co., 9 West Va. 352; Balor v. Bal- 
 timore, &c., R. Co., 9 West Va. 370; 
 
 - Washington v. Baltimore, Sue., R. Co., 
 17 W;est Va. 190; Central, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Lawrence, 13 Ohio St. 66; Rock- 
 ford, &c., R. Co. V. Irish, 73 Rl. 404; 
 Macon, &c., R. Co. ■». Lester, 80 Ga. 
 911; Macon, &c., R. Co. v. Baber, 43 
 Ga. 300; Georgia, &c., R. Co. ». 
 IS^eely, 56 Ga. 540; Locke v. First 
 Div., &c., R. Co., 15 Minn. 350; 
 South, &c., R. Co. V. Williams, 65 
 
 ' Ala. 74; Pearson v. Milwaukee, &c., 
 R. Co., 45 Iowa, 497; Trout v. Vir- 
 ginia, &c., R. Co., 33 Gratt. 619, where, 
 under the circumstances of the case, 
 the company was held guilty of gross 
 negligence, although the engineer had 
 continuously sounded the whistle on 
 discovering the plaintiff's horses on 
 the track. Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Mulligan, 45 Md. dSe- Gorman v. Pa- 
 cific, &c., R. Co., 36 Mo. 441. 
 
 ' East, Tenn., &c., R. Co. v. Watson 
 <Ala.), 7 So. Rep. 813; Nashville, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Hembree, 85 Ala. 481; Ala., 
 &c., R. Co. V. McAlpine, 75 Ala. 
 113; Of. East Tenn., &c., R. Co. v. 
 Bayliss, 75 Ala. 466; East Tenn., &c., 
 
 . R. Co. V. Bayliss, 77A]a. 439; e. c. 54 
 Am. Rep. 69; Western Ry. Co. v. Laz- 
 arus, 88 Ala. 453; Mobile, &c., R. Co. 
 v. Caldwell, 83 Ala. 196; s. c. 3 So. 
 Rep. 445. 
 
 ' Little Rock, &c., Ry. Co. v. Tur- 
 ner, 41 Ark. 161; Kansas City, &c., 
 Ry. Co. «. Kirksey, 48 Ark. 366; s. c. 
 3 S. W. Rep. 190; Memphis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Shoecraft (Ark.), 13 S. W.Rep. 
 423; St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. «. Basham, 
 4!7 Ark. 821. 
 
 ° Volkman v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 5 Dak. 69; s. c. 37 N. W. Rep. 781. 
 
 * Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Wall, 80 
 Ga. 202; s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 689; Geor- 
 gia, &c., R. Co. v. Harris, 83 Ga. 393; 
 8. c. 9.S. E. Rep. 786; Northeastern 
 R. Co. v. Martin, 78 Ga., 603; s. c. 3 
 S. E., Rep. 701; Moye ®. Wrightsville, 
 &c., R. Co., 83 Ga. 669; Western, 
 «&c. , R. Co. «. Trimmier, 84 Ga. 113; 
 Georgia, &c., R. Co. v. Harris, 88 Ga. 
 393; s. C. 9 S. E. Rep. 786. 
 
 ' Grundy v. Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 (Ky.), 3 S. W. Rep. 899. 
 
 " Carlton ®. Wilmingtoii, &c., R. 
 Co., 104 N. C. 365; Randall v. Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co., 104 N. 0. 410; 
 Seawell v. Raleigh, &c., R. Co., 106 
 N. C. 373; Snowden v. Norfolk, &c., 
 R. Co., 95 N. C. 93. 
 
 ' Walker «. Columbia, &c., R. Co., 
 35 S. C. 141. 
 
 8 Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. v. Smith, 
 67 Miss. 15; Yazoo, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Brumfield, 64 Miss. 637; s. c. 4 So. 
 Rep. 341; 111. Cent. R. Co. v. Person, 
 65 Miss. 319; 8 So^, Rep. 375; New 
 Orleans, &c., R. Co. v. Bourgeois, 66 
 Miss. 3; B. c. 5 So. Rep. 539; Kent v. 
 New Orleans, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Miss. 
 608; B. o. 7 So. Rep. 891 ; Howard «. 
 Louisville, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Miss. 347; 
 s. c. 7 So. Rep. 316; Kansas City, &c., 
 R. Co. v. Myers (Miss, ), 7 So. Rep. 821. 
 
 • Colorado, &c., R. Co. v. Caldwell, 
 11 Colo. 545; 8. c. 19 Pac. Rep. 548; 
 Denver, &c., Ry. Co. «. Henderson, 
 10 Colo. 1; 18 Pac. Rep. 910. 
 
 '° Baker n. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 78 
 Iowa, 889; 8. 0. 85 N. W. Rep. 460; 
 Grimmell v. Chicago, &c.,,Ry. Co., 73 
 Iowa, 93; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 758; Con- 
 nyers d. Sioux City, &c., R. Co., 78 
 Iowa, 410; b. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 267. 
 
§225.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 293 
 
 New York,* Missouri,' Kansas,' West Virginia,^ Indiana, 
 Illinois,* and Florida,' there are statutes making the kill- 
 ing of animals by a train upon a railroad prima facie evi- 
 dence of negligence on the part of the company. In the 
 notes are cited many cases wherein it is decided what does 
 and what does not constitute ordinary care to relieve the 
 defendant from liability. 
 
 § 225. Duty of a railway compauy to maintain fences.— 
 
 At common law a railway company is not bound to maintain 
 fences sufficient to keep cattle off its tracks. It stands in this 
 regard upon precisely the same footing as any other owner 
 of land.^ But an obligation on the ^art of a railway to make 
 and maintain a fence may arise out of contract.' And such a 
 
 ' Boyle V. N. T., &c., R. Co., 39 
 Hun, 171. 
 
 " Jewett V. Kansas City, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 38 Mo. App 48; Brooks «. Han- 
 nibal, &c., R. Co., 35 Mo. App. 571; 
 Buster v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 18 
 Mo. App. 578; Sloops. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 32 Mo. App. 593; Grant «. 
 Hannibal, &'c., Ry. Co., 35 Mo. App. 
 337. 
 
 " Kansas City, &c., R. Co. ». Cra- 
 vens, 43 Kan. 650; Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. ■». Gedney (Kan.), 34 Pac. Rep. 
 464; Kansas City, &c., R. Co., v. 
 Lane, 33 Kan. 703; Kansas City, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Bolson, 36 Kan. 534; 8. C. 14 
 Pac. Rep. 5. , 
 
 * Heard v. Chesapeake, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 36 West Va. 455; Johnson c.Balti- 
 mpre, &c., R. Co., 35 West Va. 570. 
 
 'Chicago, &c., R. Co., v. Nash 
 (Ind.), 34 Rep. 884 
 
 ' Ohio, &c., Ry. Co. o. O'Donnell, 
 36 111. App. 348. 
 
 ' Savannah, &c., Ry. Co. ». Rice, 
 33 Fla. 575; s. c. 3 So. Rep. 170. 
 
 * Day ®. New Orleans, &c., Ry. Co., 
 36 La. Ann. 391 ; Rex ». Pease, 4 Barn. 
 & Adol. 80; Star v. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 
 335; Adams v. McKinney, Add. 358; 
 Rust V. Low, 6 Mass. 94; Stackpole v. 
 Healey, 16 Mass. 33; s. c. 8 Am. Dec. 
 
 131; Lyman ». Gipson, 18 Pick. 432; 
 Pool V. Alger, 11 Gray, 489; Hartford'- 
 V. Brady, 114 Mass. 468; McDonald v. 
 Pittsfleld, &c,, R. Co., 115 Mass, 564; 
 Mills «. Stark, 4 N. H. 513; s. c. 17 
 Am. Dec. 444; Halladay v. Marsh, 3 
 Wend. 143; s. c. 30 Am. Dec. 678, 
 Brooks V. New York, &c., R. Co., 18 
 Barb. 597; Terry v. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 33 Barb. 579; Railroad Co. ■». 
 Skinner, 19P'enn. St; 298; s. c. 57 Am. 
 Dec. 654; Knight v. New Orleans, &c., 
 R. Co., 15 La. Ann. 105; Moore ». Lev- 
 ert,34 Ala. 310; Hurd«. Rutland, &c., 
 R. Co., 25 Vt. 116; Perkins®. Eastern, 
 &c., R. Co., 39 Me. 307; s. c. 50 Am. 
 Dec. 589; North Eastern, &c., R. Co. ®. 
 Sineath, 8 Rich. (Law) 185; Munger v. 
 TonawandaR. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; s. c. 
 53 Am. Dec. 384. 
 
 « Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger, 5 
 Denio,;355; s. c.49Am. Dec. 239, and 
 the note; Femow®. Dubuque, &c., 
 R. Co., 23 Iowa, 528; Joliet, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Jones, 20 HI. 221. In Drake «. 
 Philadelphia, &c., R. Co., 51 Penn. 
 St. 340, it was held that, although a 
 railroad company bound itself by con- 
 tract to fence the plaintiff's land, no 
 action could be maintained by the lat- 
 ter for injury to his cattle in spite of 
 the fact that the company had not 
 
294 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 225. 
 
 contract will be implied, if in granting the right of way the 
 award of damages was made on the understanding that a 
 fence would be erected and maintained by the company.^ 
 In Kentucky, per contra, it is held that neither the grdntor 
 of right of way to a railway company through his property, 
 nor the company itself, is under any legal obligation to main- 
 tain fences.' When the track is not fenced by the railroad 
 company, it will be held to assume the risk of damage to its 
 own property, as the result of all intrusions from animals, 
 just as other proprietors are held to do who leave their lands 
 unenclosed.' In Vicksburg, &c., E. Coi v. Patton,* the court 
 said: — "Asa proprietor, the company is under no greater 
 obligation to fence its road than any other owner of land ; 
 but, in the event of an injury, the fact that the road was not 
 fenced must and should exercise an influence in weighing the 
 degree of care to be employed by the company. When an 
 injury is done, the omission to fence will be weighed along 
 with the other circumstances in determining the measure of 
 
 carried out its contract. McDowell v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 37 Barb. 195; 
 Quimby s. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 23 
 Vt. 393; Trow v. Vermont, &c., R. 
 Co., 24 Vt. 487; 8. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; 
 Norris «. Androscoggin, &c., R. Co., 
 39 Me. 373; B.C. 63 Am. Dec. 621; Jack- 
 son «. Rutland, &c.,R. Co., 35 Vt. 
 150; s. c. 60 Am. Dec. 346. Cf. Star 
 V. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 335; Binney v. 
 Proprietors, 5 Pick. 505; Adams v. 
 Van Alstyne, 35 N. T. 333; Knox v. 
 Tucker, 48 Me. 373; Lawrence ®. 
 Coombs, 37 N. H. 335. 
 
 ' Trow ®. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 
 24 Vt. 487; s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; 
 Lawton «. Pitchburg R. Co., 8 Cush. 
 830; s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 753; In r«,Rens- 
 selaer, &c., R. Co., 4 Paige, 558. 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. MUton, 
 14 B. Mon. 75; s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 647. 
 See Louisville, &c., R. Co. «>. Ballard, 
 3 Meto. 177; Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Wainscott, 3 Bush. 149; O'Bannon 
 «. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 8 Bush. 
 350, and qf. to the same point, In- 
 dianapolis, &c., R. Co. «. Brownen- 
 
 burg, 33 Ind. 199. In this case 
 a railroad company agreed, in part 
 consideration for a right of -way, 
 to reimburse the owner of the land 
 for whatever damage might be done 
 by the running of the cars. Held, that 
 the company was not bound by this 
 contract to answer in damages for the 
 consequences of the land-owner's neg- 
 ligence. 
 
 « Roll. Abr. Trespass, 565, pi. 3; 2 
 Waterman on Trespass, 399; Ker- 
 whacker v. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 3 
 Ohio St. 172, 185; 8. c. 63 Am. Dec. 
 246; Atlantic, &c., R. Co., v. Burt, 49 
 Ga. 606; Macon, &c., R. Co. s. 
 Vaughn, 48 Burt, 464; Vicksburg, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Patton, 31 Miss. 157; Mem- 
 phis, &c., R. Co. V. Orr, 48 Miss. 379; 
 New Orleans, *c., R. Co. v. Field, 
 46 Miss. 573; Gorman «. Pacific, &c., 
 R. Co., 26 Mo. 443; Sherman «. Ander- 
 son, 37 Kan. 333; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 414; Annapolis, &c., R. Co. «. Bald- 
 win, 60 Md. 88; 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 
 711. 
 
 * 31 Miss. 157. 
 
§ 226.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 295 
 
 diligence to be used by the company or its agents. The want 
 of the fence will increase the care required in order to pre- 
 vent wrong.^ 
 
 § 236. Statutes requiring tlie maintenance of a fence.— 
 
 In England, and in most, if not all of the States of the 
 Union, the duty of maintaining a sufficient fence upon each 
 side of their tracks is imposed upon railway companies by 
 statute, the object being to. prevent collisions with cattle 
 straying upon the road.* The English statute has served in 
 some sort as a model, and there are, accordingly, enact- 
 ments in material essentials similar to that of 8 <fe 9 Vict., 
 c. 20, in most of the New England and Western States. In 
 the Western courts, notably in Missouri,* these statutes 
 
 ' Chase v. Chase, 15 Nevada, 259; 
 WiUs «. Walters, 5 Bush. 351; 
 Studwell e. Ritch, 14 Conn. 292; 
 Hiue 0. MunsoD, 32 Id. 219; Mann i>. 
 Williamson, 70 Mo. 661; Jones v. 
 Witheispoon, 7 Jones (Law) 555; 
 Deyo o. Stewart, 4 Denio, 101; Mooney 
 v. Maynard, 1 Vt. 470; b. c. 18 Am. 
 Dec. 699; Hinshaw v. Gilpin, 64 Ind. 
 116; Duflees v. Judd, 48 Iowa, 256; 
 York s. Davies, 11 N. H. 341; Camp- 
 heU «. Bridwell, 7 Oregon, 311; Gregg 
 v. Gregg, 56 Penn. St. 337, as to the 
 rule that whenever an owner of land 
 is bound to maintain a fence, and his 
 neighbor's cattle, by reason of his 
 failiire so to do, enter npon his land 
 and do damage, there being no negli- 
 gence or fault on the part of the own- 
 er of the trespassing cattle, such owner 
 of land so damaged cannot recover 
 therefor, his own negligent wrong-do- 
 ing having occasioned the mischief. 
 
 ' Railway Clauses Consolidation 
 Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 20, § 6g; Fawcett 
 e. York, &c., Ry. Co., 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 322. 
 
 ' Construciicn (>f the statute.— Btaith 
 D. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 58; 
 8. c. 8 8. W. Rep. 836; Mcintosh v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 26 Mo. App. 
 
 377; Smith «. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 91 Mo. 58; Henderson v. Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 605; Parks v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 
 440; Davis v. Hannibal, &c., Ry. Co., 
 19 Mo. App. 425; Vaughn v. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 17 Mo. App. 4; Holland 
 V. West End, &c., Ry. Co.. 16 Mo. 
 App. 172; Townsley v. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co.. 89 Mo. 31; s. c. 1 S. W. 
 Rep. 15; Hendrix v. St. Joseph, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 38 Mo. App. 520; Donovan 
 V. Hannibal. &c., R. Co., 89 Mo. 147; 
 8. 0. 1 8. W. Rep. 232; Ferris e. St. 
 Louis. &c., Ry. Co., 30 Mo. App. 122; 
 Dooley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 36 
 Mo. App. 381 ; Cowgill v. Hannibal, 
 &c.. R. Co., 33 Mo. App. 677; Pear- 
 son «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co.. 33 Mo. 
 App. 543; MUes «. Hannibal, &c., R. 
 Co., 31 Mo. 407; Burton «. North Mo., 
 &c., R. Co., 30 Mo. 372; Gorham ®. 
 Pacific, &c.. R. Co., 26 Mo. 441; Caiy 
 V. St. Louis, &c.. R. Co., 60 Mo. 213; 
 Collins B. Atlantic. &c., R. Co., 65 
 Mo. 230; Sflver v. Kansas City, &c.. 
 R. Co., 78 Mo. 538; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 118; Morris e. St. Louis, &c., R. Co.. 
 68 Mo. 78. 
 
 PUadiTig. — Ward «. St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 168. A petition un- 
 
296 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 226. 
 
 have been a most prolific source of litigation, and in that 
 State the decisions relating to the construction of the statute 
 and the proceedings under it are so numerous as almost to 
 furnish sufficient material of themselves for a treatise on 
 the subject. The Iowa reports also abound in cases under 
 this head,^ and in other States where the land is largely 
 
 derMo. Eev. St. § 800, need not nega- 
 tive the fact that the place where the 
 animal went upon the track was 
 within the limits of an incorporated 
 town or city. Meyers v. Union Trust 
 Co., 82 Mo. 337; Briggs v. Missouri 
 Pac. Ky. Co., 83 Mo. 37; Nicholson 
 o. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 83 Mo. 73; 
 Manz V. 8t. Louis, &c., Ky. Co., 87 
 Mo. 378. The complaint is defective 
 if it fails to aver that the stock got on 
 the track at a point where the com- 
 pany was required to fence. Wilson 
 V. Wabash, &c., By. Co., 18 Mo. App. 
 358. The killing of a mmiber of cat- 
 tle at the same time constitutes but 
 one cause of action, otherwise when 
 they are killed at different times. 
 Pucket V. St. Louis, &c.. By. Co., 35 
 Mo. App. 650. 
 
 iVesMmpiiitwg. —If cattle were killed 
 at a point where the track is not 
 fenced, it may be presumed, in the 
 absence of evidence, that they en- 
 tered at that point. Asher v. St. 
 Loiiis, &c., By. Co., 89 Mo. 116; Mc- 
 Guire v. Missouri Pac. By. Co., 28 
 Mo. App. 325; Pearson v. Chicago, 
 &c., By. Co., 33 Mo, App. 543. 
 
 Proof. -^It need not be shown by 
 direct evidence where the animal 
 strayed upon the track. Lepp e. St. 
 Louis, &c.. By. Ctf., 87 Mo. 139; Mc- 
 Bride V. Kansas City, &c., B. Co., 30 
 Mo. App. 316; Townsley v. Missouri 
 Pac. By. Co., 89 Mo. 31; Radcliffe «. 
 St. Louis, &c;, By. Co., 90 Mo. 137; 
 s. c. 3 S. W. Bep, 277. 
 
 ' The Iowa act, making railroads 
 liai)le in double damages for stock 
 
 killed in cases of failure to erect 
 proper fences, does not impose the 
 duty to build fences so high that they 
 will never be covered with snow, nor 
 that of removing the snow and drifts 
 from the fences. Patton ». Chicago, 
 &c., By. Co., 75 Iowa, 459; b. c. 39 N. 
 W. Kep. 708; Shellabarger v. Chicago, 
 &c., By. Co., 66 Iowa, 18. If a rail- 
 road company would exonerate itself 
 from liability for swine killed, it must 
 build a fence sufScient to turn swine. 
 Lee V. Minneapolis, &c.. By. Co., 66 
 Iowa, 131; Glandon®. Chicago, &c.. 
 By. Co., 68 Iowa, 457. Under Code 
 Iowa, § 1389, making a railroad com- 
 pany liable for the value of stock 
 killed by reason of its failure to fence 
 its road "unless the same was occa- 
 sioned by the wilful act of the owner 
 or his agent," the owner cannot re- 
 cover for the killing of a cow when 
 he was himself present, and saw the 
 effort of the train-men to stop the 
 train, and had the power and oppor- 
 timity to drive the cow from the 
 track, but wilfully refused to do so. 
 Moody V. Minneapolis, &c.. By. Co., 
 77 Iowa, 39; s. c. 41 N. W. Bep. 477; 
 Payne v. Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 73 
 Iowa, 214; s. c. 33 N. W. Bep.- 638; 
 Aylesworth «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 30 Iowa, 457; Stewart v. Burlington, 
 &c., B. Co., 83 Iowa, 561; Hinman «. 
 Chicago, &c., B. Co., 28 Iowa, 491; 
 Hammond v. Chicago, &c., B. Co., 
 43 Iowa, 168; Pearson v. Milwaukee, 
 &c., E. Co., 45 Iowa, 497; Davis v. 
 Chicago, &c., E. Co., 40 Iowa, 293. 
 
§ 226.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 297 
 
 gi^en up to grazing, it is believed that litigation in which 
 railroad companies are subjected to suits for damages arising 
 from neglect to comply with the fence law will not diminish 
 in the near future. In Maine/ New Hampshire,'' Ver- 
 mont,' Massachusetts * and Connecticut,' these statutes have 
 been long in force, and the authorities in those States being 
 frequently consulted by the courts of last resort in the newer 
 States, have tended much to the development of a reasonably 
 harmonious body of law in this behalf. The Wisconsin statute 
 expressly makes contributory negligence a bar to recovery. 
 And where one who, knowing that a storm has prostrated 
 fences, turns his cattle loose without inquiring whether the 
 rfdlroad fences have been blown down, he can maintain no 
 action for the \alue of cattle which, straying upon the track 
 where the fences have been blown down, are killed by a train.* 
 
 ■ Norris V. Androscoggin, &q., R. 
 Co., 39 Me. 273; s. c. 63 Am. Dec. 
 621; Perkins e. Eastern, &c., E. Co., 
 
 29 Me. 307; 8. c. 50 Am. Dec. 589; 
 Wyman®. Penobscot, &c., R. Co., 46 
 Me. 162; Wilder v. Maine, &c., R. 
 Co., 65 Me. 333; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 
 698. YHiere a colt is injured by be- 
 coming entangled in a barbed-wire 
 fence whicli had become dilapidated 
 by the company's negligence, and 
 which was likely to cause injury to a 
 colt, without misconduct on its part, 
 the company is liable, though the 
 fence was legally sufficient to prevent 
 the escape of animals. Gould v. 
 Bangor, &c., R. Co., 82 Me. 122; s. c. 
 19 Atl. Rep. 84. 
 
 ' Smith V. Eastern, &c., R. Co., 35 
 N. H. 356; Horn v. Atlantic, &c., R. 
 Co., 85 N. H. 169; Dean v. SuUivan, 
 &c., R. Co.. 22 N. H. 316; Cressey v. 
 Northern, &c., R. Co., 56 N. H. 390; 
 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 227. 
 
 • Trow v. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 24 
 Vt. 487; 8. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Nel- 
 son V. Vermont, Sec.; R. Co., 26 Vt. 
 717; Holden v. Rutland, &c., R. Co., 
 
 30 Vt. 298; Congdonc. Central, &c.. 
 
 R. Co., 56 Vt. 390; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 793; St. Johnsbury, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Himt, 59 Vt. 294. 
 
 * Rogers v. Newburyport, &c., R. 
 Co., 1 Allen, 16; Eames «. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 14 Allen, 151; Baxter «. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 103 Mass. 383; 
 Maynard «. Boston, &c., E. Co., 115 
 Mass. 458; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 119. 
 
 ' Bulkley v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 27 Conn. 480. 
 
 ' Carey «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 61 
 Wis. 71 . Contributory negligence bars 
 recovery by express statute. Martin 
 ®. Stewart, 73 Wis. 553; s. c. 41 N. W. 
 Rep. 538. A statute making a rail- 
 road company failing to fence liable 
 to "persons " injured, may be availed 
 of by an employee of the company, 
 nor does an employee lose his right of 
 recovery by remaining in the service 
 of the company with knowledge that 
 there is no fence. Quackenbush v. 
 Wisconsin, &c., R. Co., 62 Wis. 411. 
 Plaintiff must show that his cattle 
 strayed on the track at a point where 
 the company was bound to fence. 
 Bremmer v. Green Bay, &c., R. Co., 
 61 Wis. 114. Brown v. MUwau- 
 
298 
 
 FENCES AKD FIRES. 
 
 [§ 226. 
 
 Under the Nebraska statute contributory negligence is no de- 
 fense/ and in Michigan it has been held that where sheep got 
 upon the track through an open gate, the owner could not 
 recover without showing that the gate was left open through 
 the negligence of an employee of the company,' In the notes 
 are cited many cases in which these fence laws have been 
 considered in the courts of Minnesota,' Ohio,* Indiana,' 
 
 m 
 
 kee, &c., R. Co.. 31 Wis. 39; Mc- 
 Call V. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; 
 Blair ®. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Wis. 354; Sika v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 21 Wis. 370; Curry v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Wis. 665; Veerhusen 
 «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 53 Wis. 689. 
 
 ■ Burlington, &c., R. Co. v. Webb, 
 18Neb. 315; s. c. 53 Am. Rep. 809. 
 
 2 Lemon «. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 59 Mich. 618; Talbot «. Min- 
 neapolis, &c., Ry. Co. (Mich.), 45 
 N. W. Rep. 1113. The plaintiff 
 sold the defendant railroad ties, 
 which were to be delivered at the 
 side of the track. While engaged in 
 hauling them, the plaintiff used a gap 
 • in the fence along the track, through 
 which he- entered to deliver the ties. 
 During the absence of the plaintiff's 
 son, who was doing the hauling, the 
 team got on the track and was killed. 
 The company was held not negligent. 
 Clark «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Mich. 358; s c. 38 N. W. Rep. 914. 
 Gardner v. Smith, 7 Mich. 410; Bay 
 City, &c., R. Co: «. Austin, 31 Mich. 
 390; Robinson v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 33 Mich. 333; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Eder, 45 Mich. 339; Grand Rapids, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Monroe, 47 Mich. 153. 
 Cf. Williams ®. Michigan Central 
 R. Co., 3 Mich. 359; s. C. 55 Am. 
 Dec. 59, holding that the defendant 
 , company, having purchased its road 
 from the State, is bound neither by its 
 charter nor the common law to fence 
 its tracks for the protection of other 
 persons' domestic animals, or for any 
 other purpose 
 
 ^ Whittier v. Chicago, &o,, R. 
 Co., 34 Minn. 394; Gillam v. Sioux 
 City, &c., R. Co., 36 Minn. 368; Fitz- 
 gerald V. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 39 
 Minn. 336; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 312. 
 Under ordinary circumstances a rail- 
 road company is not required to re- 
 move the natural accumulations of ice 
 and snow from cattle-guards. Clais 
 D. Minneapolis, &c., R. Co., 34 Minn. 
 57. The Minnesota statute makes 
 a wire fence a lawful fence. It is, 
 therefore, a sufScient fence for a rail- 
 road required to fence. Halverson v. 
 Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 33 Mum. 
 88. 
 
 * Cincinnati, &c., B. Co. v. Smith, 
 32 Ohio St. 337; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 
 732; Sloan «. Hubbard, 34 Ohio St. 
 585. 
 
 ' A railroad company's obligation 
 to fence includes the duty of main- 
 taining cattle-guards, when they are 
 necessary to prevent access from inter- 
 secting highways. Wabash, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ». Tretts, 96 Ind. 450; Cincinnati, 
 &c., Ry. Co. ■». Parker, 109 Ind. 335; 
 s. c. 9 N. E. Rep. 787; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Dunlap (Ind.), 13 N. E. Rep. 
 403; Pennsylvania Co. «. McCarty, 
 113 Ind. 833; s. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 409; 
 Williams*. New Albany, &c., R. Co., 
 5 Ind. Ill; Toledo, &c., R. Co. « 
 Cory, 39 Ind. 318; Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. ■». Kinney, 8 Ind. 403. The 
 statutes never require fencing where 
 public rights would be interfered 
 with. Cleveland, ^c, R. Co. v. 
 Crossley, 36 Ind. 370; Jeffersonville, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Ross, 37 Ind. 545; Lou- 
 
§ 227.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 299 
 
 Oregon,^ Illinois," New York,' Kansas,^ Utah," Nevada,' and 
 Texas.' 
 
 § 227. These statutes considered.— These statutes have 
 been held not to require railway companies to fence their 
 tracks within the limits of incorporated cities and towns,' nor at 
 
 isville, &c., R. Co. «. Cahill, 63 Ind. 
 34; Louisville, &c., B. Co. «. Whit- 
 sell, 68 Ind. 297; Cincinnati, Ac, R. 
 Co. c. HUdreth, 77 Ind. 504. 
 
 ' Eaton e. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 
 19 Or. 871, 391;' 8. c. 24 Pac. Rep. 
 418. 
 
 ' C^lena, &c., R. Co.. v. Crawford, 
 35 HI. 539; Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Augustus, 21 111. 186; Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co. s. Crane, 68 HI. 355; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Umphenor, 69 IlL 198; 
 Peoria, &c., R. Co. v. Barton, 80 III. 
 73; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Saunders, 
 85 HI. 388; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. 
 «. HaU, 88 111. 868. 
 
 ' The obligation of a railroad com- 
 pany to fence its road is imperative, 
 and, if by reason of its failure to do so 
 pasture land is rendered unfit for use 
 as such, the owner may recover his loss 
 from the company. Leggette. Rome, 
 &c., R. Co., 41 Hun, 80. But a 
 company failing to fence is not 
 liable for an injury to an animal 
 caused by its straying upon the track, 
 and becoming caught between the ties 
 of the bridge. Enight v. New York, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 99 N. T. 25. [Re- 
 versing 8. c. 80 Hun, 25.] Suydam 
 «. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Staats v. Hud- 
 son River R. Co., 4 Abb. App. Dec. 
 387; 8. c. 3 Keys, 196; 33 How. Pr. 
 139; Rhodes ». Utica, &c., R Co., 
 5 Hun, 344; Brooks v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 13 Barb. 594; McDowell 
 B. New York, &c., R. Co., 37 Barb. 
 19^ Spinner ®. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 67 N. Y. 153; Tracy t». Troy, 
 &C., R' Co., 38 N. Y. 433; Corwin «. 
 New York, &c., B. Co., 13 N. Y. 43. 
 
 * Kansas, &c., R. Co. «. McHenry, 
 34 Kan. 501; St. Joseph, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Glover, 11 Kan. 303; Kansas, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Hop- 
 kins a. Kansas, &c., R. Co., 18 Kan. 
 463. But see Sherman v. Anderson, 
 37 Kan. 333; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 414; 
 Missouri, &c., R. Co. ■». Leggett, 27 
 Kan. 323; Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Cash, 37 Kan. 587. 
 
 ' Act March 13, 1890 (Laws 1890, 
 c. 52, p. 78). 
 
 ' Walsh V. Virginia, &c., R. Co., 8 
 Nev. 111. 
 
 ' Under 3 Sayles' Civil St. Tex. art. 
 4345, providing that railway compa- 
 nies shall be liable for stock injured 
 or kUled on the track by their trains, 
 without regard to negligence, except 
 when the right of way is fenced, where 
 horses attached to a wagon run away, 
 and are injured at a place on the 
 track which was not fenced, nor a 
 public crossing, defendant is liable, 
 without regard to negligence. Gulf, 
 &c., Ry. Co. V. Keith, 74 Tex. 387; 
 8. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 1117. 
 
 " Rippe V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 43 Minn. 34; 8. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 652; 
 Fitzgerald v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 18 Mo. App. 891; Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. V. Dunham (Tex.), 4 S. W. Rep. 
 472; Beckdolt v. Grand Rapids, &c., 
 R. Co., 113 Ind. 843; 8. c. 15 N. E. 
 Rep. 686; Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Hogan, 27 Neb. 801; 8. c. 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 1148. The burden of proof is 
 upon the defendant. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. Dunham (Tex.), 4 S. W. 
 Rep. 472; Meyer «. North Mo., &c., 
 R. Co., 35 Mo. 353; Edwards b. Han- 
 
300 
 
 FENCES AKD PIEES. 
 
 [§ 227. 
 
 highway crossings/ nor around depot grounds.^ In order to 
 fix the liability of the company, it is generally held that the 
 
 nibal, &c., R. Co., 66 Mo. 571; 
 Davis V. Burlington, &c.,'R. Co., 36 
 Iowa, 649; Rogers v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 26 Iowa, 558; Illinois, &c,, R. Co. 
 V. Williams, 27 111. 49; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Rice, 71 lU. 667. 
 
 ' Soward v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Iowa, 551; Missouri, &c.; R. Co. «. 
 Leggett, 27 Kan. 323; Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Francis, 58 Ind. 389; Eaton 
 V. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 19 Or. 371, 
 391; Parker*. Rensselaer,, &c., R. Co., 
 16 Barb. 315; Halloran ». Kew York, 
 &c., R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257; Mar- 
 fell V. South Wales, &c. Ry. Co., 8 
 C. B. (N. 8.) 525; s. c. 7 Ins. (N. S.) 
 240; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 315; 8 Week. 
 Rep. 765; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 629. Accord- 
 ingly, where a railroad track was laid 
 through one of the streets of a village, 
 and at the end of the street it entered 
 upon a bridge extending across a 
 stream, it was held that the company 
 was not bound to erect a cattle guard 
 at the entrance upon the byidge, and 
 that they were not liable for the value 
 of an animal destroyed by the locomo- 
 tive in passing over the bridge, no 
 negligence being charged. Vander- 
 kar ■». Rensselaer, &c., R. Co., 13 
 Barb. 390. But see Brace ®. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 27 IST. Y. 269, 
 where the statute is subjected to a very 
 strict construction. Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Howell, 38 Ind. 447; Toledo, 
 &c.,R. Co. «. Owen, 43 Ind. 406; Wal- 
 ton i>. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 67 Mo. 66; 
 Davis V. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 26 
 Iowa, 649. Under the Kansas railroad 
 stock law the fact that the stock was 
 killed at a highway crossing will not 
 defeat recovery, where it appears that 
 the stock escaped from the pasture 
 through the failure of the company to 
 properly fence its road. Kansas City, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Surge, 40 Kan. 736; s. c. 
 
 21 Pac. Rep. 589. See, also, Cincinnati, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Jones, 111 Ind. 369; s. c. 
 13 N. E. Rep. 113; Coleman «. PUnt, 
 &c., R. Co., 64 Mich. 160; 8. c. 31 N. ^ 
 W. Rep. 47; Fort Wayne, &c., B. Co. e. 
 Herbold, 99 Ind. 91. Plaintiff's testi- 
 mony showed that he drove his cows 
 across defendant's railroad track, and 
 paid no further attention to them, 
 though he knew that the track was not 
 feiiced; that at the time of the accident 
 plaintiff was about 70 rods distant; and 
 that the cow entered on defendant's 
 grounds at a place" where it was not 
 required to maintain a fence. Held, 
 that plaintiff was guilty of negligence, 
 and could not recover. Niemann v. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co., 80 Mich. 197; 
 s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 1049. 
 
 ' Indiana. &c., Ry. Co. v. Sawyer, 
 100 Ind. 343; Indiana, &c., Ry. Co. 
 v. Quick, 109 Ind. 295; Moses «. South- 
 em Pac. R. Co., 18 Or. 385; s. c. 23 
 Pac. Rep. 498; Johnson ®. Chicago, 
 «fcc., Ry. Co., 27 Mo. App. 379. It is 
 the duty of a company to erect and 
 maintain suitable fences and guards to 
 prevent domestic animals from pass- 
 ing over or through the depot grounds, 
 on the track, beyond the limits of such 
 grounds. Kobe v. Northern Pac. R. 
 Co., 36 Minn. 518; B. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 
 783. As to. what are the proper limits 
 of depot grounds, see Moser v. St. 
 Paul, &c., 43 Minn. 480; b. c. 44 N. 
 W. Rep. 530; Jaeger v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 130; B. c. 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 732; Dixon n. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 4 N. Y. Supl. 296; Rinear v. 
 Grand Rapids, &c., R. Co., 70 Mich. 
 630; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 599; McGrath 
 V. Detroit, &c, R. Co., 67 Mich. 655; 
 Hooper «. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. 
 (Minn.), 33 N. W. 314. The burden 
 of proving exemption from duty to 
 fence is upon the defendant. Atchi- 
 
§ 227.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 301 
 
 animal must have been injured by actual contact with the 
 train.^ The plaintiff's recovery for an animal killed depends 
 on where it entered the track, without regard to the place 
 where it was killed.* Such statutes, moreover, have in gen- 
 eral been held to be remedial in their nature, and hence have 
 been liberally construed.' And in actions against railway 
 companies, for killing or injuring stock, in consequence of a 
 failure to make or maintain proper fences, these enactments 
 are usually held to apply only to the negligence or miscon- 
 duct of the defendant. The common law rule, that a plaint- 
 iff to maintain an action for damages from negligence, must 
 himself be free from contributory fault, remains unchanged, 
 and this, although the defendant may have failed in a statu- 
 tory duty.* But, in Indiana, it has been held that the liability 
 
 son, &c., R. Co.tJ. Shaft, 33 Kan. 531; 
 Wilder v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 70 
 Mich. 382; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 289. 
 And the question is usually one of fact 
 for the jury. Rhines v. Chicago, &c. , 
 Ry. Co., 75 Iowa, 597; s. c. 39 N. W. 
 Rep. 912; Dinwoodie v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 70 Wis. 160; s. c 35 N. 
 W. Rep 396; Bean «. St. Louis, &c., 
 -Rj. Co., 20 Mo. App. 641. 
 
 ' Burlington, &c., R. Co. ®. Shoe- 
 maker, 18 Neb. 369; New Orleans &c., 
 R. Co. V. Thornton, 65 Miss. 256; s. c. 
 3 So. Rep. 654; Louisville, &c., Ry. 
 Co. D. Thomas, 106 Ind. 10; Foster v. 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 90 Mo. 116; 
 B. c. 2 8. W. Rep. 138; Penn. R. Co. 
 V. Dunlap (Ind.), 13 N. E. Rep. 403; 
 Penn. R. Co. v. McCarty, 113 Ind. 
 322; 8. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 409; Inter- 
 national, &c., R. Co. v. Hughes, 68 
 Tex. 290; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 492. But 
 see Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Upton, 
 18 m. App. 605; Boggs «. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Mo. App. 274. In 
 the latter case an action was held to 
 be maintainable, though not under 
 the statute. 
 
 » Indiana, &c., Ry. Co. v. Quick, 
 109 Ind. 295; Ehret t. Kansas City, 
 &c., R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 251; Foster 
 
 v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 90 Mo. 116; 
 ■ 8. c. 3 S. W. Rep. 138. If stock get 
 on the track at a point where the com- 
 pany should have a fence and are in- 
 jured at a point where no fence is 
 necessary, the company is liable. 
 Alsop V. Ohio, &c., Ry. Co., 19 HI. 
 App. 393. It is for defendant to show 
 that at the point where the animal got 
 upon the track, there was no obliga- 
 tion to fence. Cincinnati, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ». Parker, 109 Ind. 335; Banister 
 ■B. Pennsylvania Co., 98 Ind. 230; 
 Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. ». Hurst, 98 
 Ind. 330. 
 
 ' Tracy v. Troy, &c., R. Co., 38 N. 
 Y. 433; Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. Brubaker, 
 47 111. 462; Rockford, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Heflin, 65 lU. 367. 
 
 ' In an action against a railroad 
 company for killing plaintiff's cow, 
 which was on defendant's track, with 
 a block attached to her by a small 
 rope, an instruction that if the injury 
 was the consequence of the block and 
 chain attached to the cow, and would 
 not have occurred but for that incum- 
 brance, then defendant should have a 
 verdict, is not error of which plaintiff 
 can complain. Guess <o. South Caro- 
 lina Ry. Co., 30 S. C. 163; s. c. 9 8. 
 
302 
 
 FENCES AND FIKES. 
 
 [§ 228. 
 
 of a railway company, not fencing its tracks as required by 
 the statute, for injuries to cattle is so absolute that even the 
 contributory negligence of the owner of the cattle is no de- 
 fense.' 
 
 § 328. Contributing to a breacli in a fence, or failnre to 
 
 repair.— Contributing to a breach in the fence is such negli- 
 gence on the part of a plaintiff as will bar his recovery from 
 the company.* Any failure on the part of the plaintiff to 
 
 E. Rep. 18; Hanna v. Terre Haute, &c., 
 R. Co., 119 Ind. 316; B. c. 21 N. E. 
 Rep. 903; Kansas, &c., R. Co. ®. Mc- 
 Henry, 24 Kan. 501; Marsh v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 14 Barb. 364; Ton- 
 awanda R. Co. «. Hunger, 5 Denio, 
 255; B. c. 49 Am. Dec, 239; Hunger 
 V. Tonawanda R. Co., 4 N. T. 350; 
 s. 0. 58 Am. Dec. 384; Curry v. Chica- 
 go, Ac, R. Co., 43 Wis. 665, holding 
 that in an action agdnst a railroad 
 company for injury occasioned by 
 failure either to erect or to maintam 
 fences, contributory negligence is a 
 defense. In such action, it is further 
 held, it will make no difference if the 
 animal injured passed to the defend- 
 ant's road from land not belonging to 
 the plaintiff. The latter will not be 
 barred on that account. See oOntra, 
 on this last point, Brooks v. Kew 
 York, &c., R. Co , 13 Barb. 594, on 
 the ground that the fences are only 
 erected to protect cattle of the adjoin- 
 ing owners. Hance «. Cayuga, &c., 
 R. Co., 26 N. T. 428; Browne v. Provi- 
 dence, &c., R. Co., 12 Gray, 55; 
 Eames «. Boston, &c. , R, Co., 14 Allen, 
 151; Kansas City, &c., R. Co. «. Lan- 
 dis, 24 Kan 406; Toledo, &c., R. Co. 
 ®. Thomas, 18 Ind. 215; Indianapolis, 
 &c., R. Co. ». Shimer, 17 Ind. 295; 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. «. Methven, 
 21 Ohio St. 586; Rockford, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Irish, 72 111. 405. 
 
 ' Jeflersonville, &c., R. Co. v. Ross, 
 37 Ind. 545; Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 «. CahlU, 63 Ind. 34i Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co. «. Whitesell, 68 Ind. 297. See 
 
 Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. s. Qoodbar, 
 102 Ind. 596. In Kentucky where 
 railroads are liable for stock killed 
 by negligence of passing trains, it is 
 held that if stock were killed by such 
 negligence, it is immaterial that the 
 railroad track was inclosed by a law- 
 ful fence, which the stock broke 
 through; the railroad is liable unless 
 it show that the killing was the result 
 of an accident which could not have 
 been avoided by the exercise of ordi- 
 nary care and diligence. Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Simmons, 85 Ky. 151; 
 B. c. 3 S. W. Rep. 10. 
 
 " Ellis «. London, &c., Ry. Co., 2 
 Hurl. & N. 424; s. c 26 L. J. (Exch.) 
 349; 3 Jut. (N. S.) 1008; Haigh 
 v. London, &c., Ry. Co., 1 Post. & 
 Pin. 646; s. c. 8 Week. Rep. 6; San- 
 dusky, &c., R. Co. ■». Sloan, 27 Ohio 
 St. 342. This is particularly applicable 
 to partition fences. By statute in 
 Ohio the adjacent owners of such 
 fences are required to keep them in 
 repair in equal shares. So that, in 
 Dayton R. Co. v. Hiami Co. Infirm^ 
 ary, 32 Ohio St. 566, where both 
 plaintiff and defendant knew of a de- 
 fect in their partition fence, and the 
 former allowed his horses to escape 
 through the breach, it was held, in an 
 action to recover for injuries suffered 
 by them through collision with a 
 train, that both parties were negligent, 
 and no action could be maintained. 
 Duffy «. New York, &c., R. Co., 2 
 Hilt. 496; Eames «. Boston, &c., B. 
 Co., 14 Allen, 151; Illinofe, &c., R. Co. 
 
§ 228.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIBE8. 
 
 303 
 
 perform any duty devolving upon him, in reference to the 
 fence, contributing to the injury will be a defense for the 
 company,* even though the fence may have been damaged by 
 the railroad itself.' Where, however, the owner of mules, for 
 his own convenience, had made two gaps in a railroad fence, 
 the company was held liable if the mules were killed by get- 
 ting on the track through a third gap which it should have 
 fenced.' If the railroad has built its fence in a defective 
 manner, it is presumed to have knowledge of the defects, and 
 it is not in such a case incumbent upon a plaintiff to notify 
 the company of it.* The doctrine that a reasonable time must 
 elapse after a gate or a fence gets out of repair, in which a 
 railroad company may discover its condition, does not apply 
 
 v. McEee, 43 m. 120; lUinois, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Arnold, 47 111. 173; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. fi. Seirer, 60 ni. 295; 
 Koutz V. Toledo, &c., R. Co., 54 Ind. 
 515; Indianax>olis, &c., R. Co. v. Pet- 
 ty, 35 Ind. 414; Indianapolis, &c., R. 
 Co. V. AdMns, 23 Ind. 340; Indian- 
 apolis, &c., R Co. V. Shimer, 17 Ind. 
 295; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Wright, 13 Ind. 213; Jones v. She- 
 boygan, &c., R. Co., 43 Wis. 306. 
 I One who maintains for his own con- 
 venience a gate between his land and 
 a lailroad track has no right of action 
 against the railroad company, if his 
 cattle stray through the gate on to the 
 track and are killed by a train. 
 Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. v. Goodbar, 
 102 Ind. 596. Laney v. Kansas City, 
 &c., R. Co., 83 Mo. 466; Davidson v. 
 Central Iowa Ry. Co., 75 Iowa, 23; 
 8. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 163; Hungerford, 
 V. Syracuse, &c., R. Co., 46 Hun, 339. 
 But the fact that- the fence enclosing 
 the land-owner's field was joined to 
 the railroad company's fence with its 
 consent, creates no obligation on the 
 part of the land-owner to aid in keep- 
 ing up the fence. Bushby v. St. 
 Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 43. 
 Where an animal killed by a train gets 
 from A.'s lot to B.'s and thence to the 
 track, unless the fence between the 
 
 lots was a lawful fence, the railroad 
 company is not liable. Peddicord ». 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 160; 
 Poler v. New York, &c., R. Co., 16 
 N. T. 476; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Seirer, 60 HI. 295. 
 
 " Terry v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 22 Barb. 575. 
 
 ' Accola V. Chicago, &c., R. Co , 70 
 Iowa, 185. 
 
 ' Hammond v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 43 Iowa, 169. If the cattle entered on 
 the track simply because the gate was 
 left open by third persons the com- 
 pany would not be liable. Binicker e. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co. , 83 Mo. 660. A 
 railroad company which, while as- 
 . suming to maintain a fence, maintains 
 it with such defects that it is not a 
 protection against stock which, be- 
 cause of the defects, get on the track 
 and are injured, is liable for the injury. 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co. c. Schultz, 43 
 Ohio St. 370. Of. upon the question 
 of a plaintiff's duty to notify the 
 company of a defect in the fence, 
 Chicago, Sue., R. Co. s. Seirer, 60 m. 
 395, where plaintiff repaired a fence 
 with defective materials, and failed to 
 notify the company of this fact, and 
 it was held, that he became liable for 
 the natural consequences of his neg- 
 ligence. 
 
304 
 
 FENCES AND PIBE8 
 
 [§ 228. 
 
 where the gate never had such a fastening as the law re- 
 quired/ and the fact that the bars of a fence were half rotten 
 may constitute evidence of negligence on the part of the com- 
 pany.* A failure to repair a division fence, when it is a 
 plaintiff's duty to repair it, is negligence,' but in Texas it is 
 not negligence to leave the repair of fences to the railroad 
 company,* and in Vermont, where a plaintiff knew that a fence 
 was defective, and that his horse was " breachy," the com- 
 pany was, nevertheless, held liable for killing the horse when 
 it had passed the fence and gotten upon the track.* 
 
 ' Duncan v. St. Louis, &c., By. Co., 
 91 Mo. 68. 
 
 ° Hovorka «. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 34 Minn. 381. On the question 
 of reasonable time in which to repair, 
 see Walt v. Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 
 74 Iowa, 207; s. c. 37 N. "W. Rep. 159; 
 King V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 90 Mo. 
 530; Young «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 83 Mo. 437; Heaston v. Wabash, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 18 Mo. App. 403; Morrison 
 ®. Kansas City, &c., R, Co., 37 Mo. 
 App. 418; Crosby ». Detroit,_&c., Ry. 
 Co., 68 Mich. 458; Giger «. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 80 Iowa, 493; s. c. 45 
 N. W. Rep. 906; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Kennedy, 33 111. App. 808. Grahl- 
 man v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 78 Iowa, 
 564; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 539, and 
 Robinson ®. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 79 
 Iowa, 495; s. o. 44 N. W. Rep. 718, 
 were cases where cattle-guards became 
 filled with snow and ice. 
 
 ' Sandusky, &c., R. Co. e. Sloan, 37 
 Ohio St. 841; Warren «. Keokuk, &c., 
 R. Co., 41 Iowa, 484; St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Washburn, 97 111. 393; Rock- 
 ford, &c., R. Co. ®. Lynch, 67111. 149; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. ■». Pease, 71 111. 
 17^ Georgia, &c., R. Co.®. Anderson, 
 33 Ga. 110. But the duty of keeping 
 railroad fences, gates, and bars in re- 
 pair cannot be shifted from the com- 
 pany to the owner of stock injured, 
 merely because, through the neglect 
 
 of the company, such owner has found 
 it necessary to make such temporary 
 repairs thereof. Peoria, &c., Ry. Co. 
 V. Babbs, 33 111. App. 454. 
 
 * Texas, &c., R. Co. v. Young, 60 
 Tex. 201. If a railroad company ne- 
 glects its statutory duty of erecting 
 fences or maintaining proper cattle- 
 guards, it cannot escape liability for 
 damages resulting therefrom to a 
 land-owner's crops, on the ground that 
 he was guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence in not himself erecting and 
 maintaining them upon the company's 
 omission. Houston, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Adams, 63 Tex. 300. 
 
 ' Congdon «. Central, &c., R. Co., 
 56 Vt. 390; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 793, 
 holding that in the presence of statu- 
 tory liability, the doctrine of contribu- 
 tory negligence could not apply. See, 
 also, South, &c., R Co. ■». Williams, 
 65 Ala. 74; Cressy v. Northern, &c., 
 R. Co., 59 N. H. 564; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 327. It is no bar to plaintiff's 
 right of recovery that he knew that 
 the fence was defective and did not 
 repair it. Wilson i. St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 431. But where hogs 
 passed upon the track through an in- 
 sufficient fence, the company was not 
 liable it a lawful fence would not have 
 been sufficient to turn them. Leebrick 
 V. Republican Val., .fee., R. Co., 41 
 Kan. 756; b. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 796. 
 
§ 230.] FENCES AND PIEES. 305 
 
 § 229. Where the land-owner contracts to fence for the 
 railway. — When an adjacent owner has contracted, for a 
 consideration, to erect and maintain a fence which the law 
 requires the railway company to make, but has failed to per- 
 form his contract, he cannot recoTer from the- company for 
 injury to his stock, on the ground that there was no fence, or 
 that the fence was defective and insufficient.^ So, also, where 
 the owner of the land agrees or assents to the failure of the 
 railway company to erect fences or cattle-guards, there can 
 he no recovery.* But where a railroad company agreed with 
 a land-owner to fence the right of way, it was held that the 
 company could not escape its liability for stock killed and 
 for injuries to pasturage by trespassing animals, by contend- 
 ing that the land-owner might have fenced, aa the company 
 did not.* Wh«n the plaintiff undertakes to repair a fence, it 
 is a question for the jury whether his repairs were such as a 
 prudent and cautious man would have made.* Where an 
 owner of land uses a defective fence of an adjoining proprie- 
 tor as a "part enclosure, but without consent or contract, he 
 cannot recover for damages to his crops by cattle of his 
 neighbor wandering through the insufficient fence.' 
 
 § 230. Where the stock escape and are injured.— In many 
 of the States where fence laws have been enacted, as well as 
 where the common law rule obtains, it has been held that 
 the owners of cattle, wrongfully in the highway, or in an ad- 
 joining close, cannot recover, under the statute, for their in- 
 
 ' Ellis ■». Pacific, &c., R. Co., 48 R. Co. «. Smith, 16 Ind. 103. But 
 
 Mo. 231; Talmadges. Rensselaer, <fcc., see, also, Kew Albany, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 R. Co., 13 Barb. 493; Georgia, &c.. Maiden, 13 Ind. 10, and Baltimore, 
 
 R. Co. B. Anderson, 33 Ga. 110; War- &e., R Co. ». Johnson, 59 Ind. 188. 
 ren v. Keokuk, &c., R. Co., 41 Iowa, " Whittier ®. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 
 484; Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. v. Water- 24 Minn. 394; Hurd v. Rutland, &c., 
 
 son, 4 Ohio St. 424. The tenant of R Co.,35Vt.H6. Corairas, Cincinnati, 
 
 the land-owner, thus bound by con- Ac. , R. Co. v. Hildreth, 77 Ind. 504. 
 tract to maintain the fence, or a per- ' Louisville, izc, R. Co. ■». Sumner, 
 
 son whose animals trespass upon the 106 Ind. 55. 
 
 land, is in no better position to main- * Poler «. ■ New York, &c., R. Co., 
 
 tain an action than the proprietor. 16 N. T. 476; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 
 Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. ■». Petty, 25 Seirer, 60 111. 295. 
 Ind. 413; Pittsburgh, &c. , R. Co. e. ' Markin ®. Priddy, 39 Kan. 462; 
 
 Smith, 26 Ind. 124; Terre Haute, &c., b. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 514. 
 20 
 
306 
 
 FENOES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 230. 
 
 jury or destruction by the railway ; ^ eyen though animals 
 were lawfully in the highway in charge of a suitable keeper, 
 and breaking away, escape into a lot adjoining a railway 
 track, insufficiently fenced, and thence get upon the track 
 and suffer injury.^ But there is a better rule in Alabama,* 
 where it is held that contributory negligence cannot be im- 
 puted to an owner of stock that escapes from lawful custody, 
 and gets upon the track and is injured.* Neither, in Iowa, 
 
 ' It is prima facie contributory neg- 
 ligence for one to voluntarily allow a 
 horse to run at large inthe public 
 streets, contrary to law, in the im- 
 mediate vicinity of unf enced railroad 
 tracks. Moser v. St. Paul, &c., E. 
 Oo., 43 Minn. 480; s. c. 44 N. "W. 
 Rep. 530; Trow «. Vermont, &c., R. 
 Co., 34 Vt. 487; s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 
 191; Staats ». Hudson River R. Co., 
 4 Abb. App. Dec. 387; s. c. 3 Keyes, 
 196; Woolson «. Northern, &c., R. 
 Co., 19 N. H. 367; Chapin «. Sullivan, 
 &c., R. Co., 39 N. H. 564. To have 
 the law otherwise, would be " to as- 
 sume that the corporation is bound to 
 fence, not only against the adjacent 
 land owner and for the protection of 
 animals placed there by him, but lalso 
 against all animals which are there 
 under such circumstances that he 
 would not be entitled to treat them as 
 trespassers." Cushing, C. J., in 
 Giles «!. Boston, &c., R. Co., 55 N. H. 
 553; Van Horn v. Burlington, &c., 
 R. Co., 59 Iowa, 83; Miller ». Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 59 Iowa, 707; In- 
 man v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Iowa, 459; Missouri, &c., R. Co. ®. 
 Leggett, 37 Kan. 333; Eames ■». 
 Salem, &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 560. 
 See, also, Stacey «. Winona, &c., R. 
 Co., 43 Minn. 158; s. c. 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 905; Palmer «. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co., 37 Minn. 323; 33 N. W. Rep. 
 707. 
 
 " Pittsburgh, &c., R Co. ■». Stuart, 
 71 Ind. 504; Spinner v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 153; Giles v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 55 N. H. 553; 
 
 Mayberry v. Concord, &c., R. Co., 
 47 N. H. 391; North Penn. R. Co, v. 
 Rehman, 49 Penn. St. 104; McDonnell 
 ®. Kttsfleld, &c., R. Co., 115 Mass. 
 564; Eames v. Boston, &c.^ R. Co., 14 
 Allen, 151; Indianapolis, &c., R. Oo. 
 ». Shimer, 17 Ind. 395; Indianapolis, 
 ifcc, R. Co. V. Adkins, 33 Ind. 340; 
 Hance ®. Cayuga, &c., R. Co., 26 
 N. Y. 438. 
 
 » South. & North., &c., R. Co. ». 
 Williams, 65 Ala. 74. 
 
 * To the same effect, see Eansas, 
 &c., R. Co. e. Wiggins, 34 Kan. 588; 
 Trout B. Virginia, &c., R. Co., 23 
 Gratt. 619; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Kellam, 93 111. 245; b. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 128; Clark v. Boston, &6., R. Co., 64 
 N. H. 328; s. c. 10 Atl. Rep. 676; 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. «. Johnston, 
 85 Kan. 58; Moriarty ». Central Iowa ' 
 Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 696; Cox v. Minne- 
 apolis, &c., Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 101; 
 s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 934; Bowman v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 85 Mo. 533; 
 Emmerson ®. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 85 Mo. App. 631; Doran ». Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 73 Iowa; 115; s. c. 34 
 N. W. Rep. 619. Although a horse is 
 crazy, the company is liable, where It 
 is killed on the track because the 
 company failed to maintain a suf- 
 ficient fence. Listen ». Central Iowa 
 Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 714; Story v. Chi 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 79 Iowa, 403; s.c. 
 44N. W. Rep.690; Courson v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry.' Co., 71 Iowa, 28; s. C. 
 33 N. W. Rep. 8. Plaintiff cannot re- 
 cover for colts injured by defendant's 
 train, while he was driving them 
 
§ 231.] FENCES AND FTBES. 307 
 
 does the lawful exposure of stock to danger, by the owner, 
 constitute such wilful negligence on his part as to bar a re- 
 covery, as matter of law.* When a railroad divides a farm 
 into two parts, it is not negligence on the part of the owner 
 to allow his stock to cross the track from one part of the 
 farm to the other at any point, if there be no pubHc way or 
 other assigned place for crossing ; ' but it is negligence to 
 suffer a blind horse to wander about in the neighborhood of 
 an unfenced railway.' 
 
 § 231. The New York decisions.— In New York there has 
 been some inccHisistency in the decisions upon this point. It 
 appears, however, to be the law in that State that a railway 
 company cannot avoid liability for injuries to stock, in con- 
 sequence of their failure to comply with the provisions of 
 the statute, merely because the owner of the stock has been 
 guilty of negligence in permitting it to stray at large. And 
 the reason upon which that court proceeds, is that the statute 
 imposes a public duty superior to any merely individual in- 
 terest.* There are some decisions in New York to the con- 
 trary. Hunger v. Tonawanda R. Co.,* an early and leading 
 
 along the right of way inside the &c., R. Co. ■». Ross, 37 Ind. 549,' In- 
 
 fences to a croasiiig, intending there dianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Totrnsend, 
 
 to turn them off, in the absence of 10 Ind. 39; Belief ontalne, &c., R. Co. 
 
 negligence on defendant's part. Da- v. Reed, 33 Ind. 476; Matthews v. St. 
 
 vidson V. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 75 Paul, &c., R. Co., 18 Minn. 434. 
 
 Iowa, 32; 8. c 39 N. W. Rep. 163. ' Knight c. Toledo, &c., R. Co., 34 
 
 ■ Smith V. Kansas, &c., R Co., 58 Ind. 402. Of. Macon, &c., R. Co. a. 
 
 Iowa, 633. See, also. White v. Con- Davis, 13 Ga. 68; St. Louis, &c., R. 
 
 cord, &c., R Co., 30 N. H. 188; Co. ®. Todd, 36 Dl. 409. 
 
 Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Barbee, 74 •* Corwin v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Ind. 169; Sawyer d. Vermont, &c., 13N.T. 43; Dufly ». New Tork, &c., 
 
 R. Co., 105 Mass. 196; Midland, &c., R. Co., 3 Hilt. 496; Munch s. New 
 
 Ry. Co. V. Daykin, 17 C. B. 136; York, &c., R. Co., 39 Barb. 647j 
 
 Valleau n. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 73 Morrison ®. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Iowa, 723; 8. c. 36 N. "W. Rep. 760, 33 Barb. 568; McDowell v. New 
 
 and the Iowa cases cited in the preced- York, &c., R. Co., 37 Barb. 195; 
 
 ing note. Hodge v. New York, &c., R. Co., 27 
 
 " But the owner has no right to Hun, 394; Wheeler ®. Erie Ry. Co., 2 
 
 allow his stock to loiter, or stand on Thomp. & C. 634. 
 
 the track. He only has the right to ' 4 N. Y. 349; b. c. 53 Am. Dec. 
 
 allow them to cross, and even this 384; s. c. sub turn. Tonawanda R. 
 
 license must be exercised reasonably. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 355; s. c. 49 
 
 Housatonic R. Co. v. Waterbuiy, 33 Am. Dec. 339. 
 Conn. 101. See, also, JefEersonville, 
 
308 TENCES AND FIRES. [§ 232. 
 
 case, in which the cause of action arose prior to the passage 
 of the fence law/ decided that the common law rule with 
 reference to the duty of restraining cattle is the law of New 
 York, and that one whose cattle are injured in consequence 
 of straying about and going upon a railroad track is a tres- 
 passer, and, therefore, cannot recover. This case has been 
 followed, whenever the cause of action does not involve the 
 act of 1848, as to fences.^ 
 
 § 332. The same subject continued.— It is impossible to 
 reconcile all the decisions of the lower courts of New York, 
 in the endeavors of the judges to apply the provisions of the 
 fence law to the common law rule of Hunger v. Tonawanda 
 H. Co. A line of decisions hold that, under the statute as a 
 police regulation, a plaintiff may recover for an injury to his 
 cattle, consequent upon a defective fence, notwithstanding 
 the circumstance that the cattle were allowed to roam at large 
 in the vicinity of the track f and another line, of equal value, 
 lay down an exactly contrary rule.* The case of Hance v. 
 Oayuga, &c., E. Co.,' which decides that the owner of cattle 
 "which escape from his enclosure and go upon a railway track, 
 and are injured, though guilty of no actual negligence, is, 
 nevertheless, chargeable with contributory negligence, and 
 can maintain no action against the railway company, although 
 it had been guilty of negligence in maintaining the fence and 
 cattle-guards, stands alone in the New York reports. The rule 
 in that State is plainly the reverse of this.^ Corwin v. New 
 
 • N. T. Laws of 1848, page 331. T. 641. In this case the court is of 
 
 " Halloran v. New York, &o., R. the opinion that if the construction 
 
 Co., 3 E. D. Smith, 357; Fitch «. Buf- in the Tonawanda case were allowed 
 
 lalo, &c., R. Co., 13 Hun, 668; Clark to hold, the statute would virtually 
 
 «. Syracuse, &c., R. Co., 11 Barb, be nullified. It would mean that 
 
 113; Bowman s. Troy, &c., R. Co., failure of the statutory duty on the 
 
 37 Barb. 516; Spinner v. New York, part of the railroads would cast neg- 
 
 &c., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 156; Eaton «. ligence on the land-owners. 
 
 Delaware, &c., R. Co., 57 N. Y. < Marsh «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 
 396. 14 Barb. 364; Mentges v. New York, 
 
 "Waldron v. Rensselaer, &c., R. &c., R. Co., 1 Hilt. 425; Shanahani?. 
 
 Co., 8 Barb. 390; Labussiere v. New New York, &c., R. Co., 10 Abb. Pr. 
 
 York, &c. , R. Co. , 10 Abb. Pr. 898 (n): 398. 
 
 Brady v. Rensselaer, &c., R. Co., 3 » 36 N. Y. 438. 
 
 Thomp. & C. 537; B. o. 1 H\m, 378. • See generally the New York cases 
 
 .Shepard v. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 35 N. cited in the preceding notes. 
 
§ 234] FENCES AND FIRES. 309 
 
 York, &c., R. Co.,* is still cited as the leading case upon this 
 point. In this case, decided in 1856, it is distinctly laid down 
 that no failure on the part of an owner of stock, as to confining 
 it, can operate to excuse a railway corporation for a failure 
 to comply with the provisions of the statute as to fences, and 
 this is still the law in New York. 
 
 § 233. Summary statement of the mle.— Judge Cooley 
 has said : — " Indeed, if contributory negligence could consti- 
 tute a defense, the purpose of the statute might be in a great 
 measure, if not wholly, defeated ; for the mere neglect of the 
 railway company to observe the directions of the statute 
 would render it unsafe for the owner of beasts to suffer them 
 to be at large or even on his grounds in the vicinity of the 
 road, so that if he did what, but for the neglect of the com- 
 pany, it would be entirely safe and proper for him to do, the 
 very neglect of the company would constitute its protection, 
 since that neglect alone rendered the conduct of the plaintiff 
 negligent."^ This is a reasonable view, and one which has 
 been adopted, even in cases where animals were at large in 
 violation of law.* 
 
 § 234. The rule in Xew England and in Wisconsin.— In 
 
 several of the New England States, where it appears that an 
 owner of stock has knowingly suffered his cattle to run at 
 large in the highway in the neighborhood of a railroad, and 
 that the raUroad company has neglected to fence its tracks, 
 the courts have held that, in respect of negligence, " honors 
 are easy" between plaintiff and defendant, and hence that 
 there can be no recovery.* There is much the same rule in 
 
 ' 13 N. Y. 42. * Wilder v. Maine, &c., R. Co., 65 
 
 ' Flint, &c., R. Co. o. Lull, 28 Mich. Me. 333; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 698; Trow 
 
 510. V. Vermont, &c., R. Co., 34 Vt. 488; 
 
 'Cairo, Ac., R. Co. r. Woolaey, s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Eames v. 
 
 85 m. 370; Fritz r. Milwaukee, &c., Salem, &c., R. Co., 98 Mass. 560; 
 
 R Co., 34 Iowa, 337; Louisville, &c., McDonneU v. Plttsfield, &c., R. Co., 
 
 R. Co. V. Cahill, 63 Ind. 34; Boyle v. 115 Mass. 564; Woolson e. Northern, 
 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 21 Mo. App. &c., R. Co., 19 N. H. 367; Towns v. 
 
 416; Apitz c. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Cheshire, &c., R. Co., 31 N. H. 364; 
 
 17 Mo. App. 419; BurUngton, &c., R. Chapm t>. Sullivan, &c., R. Co., 39 
 
 Co. V. Webb, 18 Neb. 215; s. c. 53 N. H. 564; Maybeny v. Concord, 
 
 Am. Rep. 809. See, also, Hamilton &c., R. Co., 47 N. H. 391; Giles©, 
 
 e. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 85. Boston, &c., R. Co., 55 N. H. 552; 
 
310 FENCES AND PIEES. [§ 235. 
 
 "Wisconsin.^ The Wisconsin court seem to have distinguished 
 between actions brought against railway companies for injuries 
 to cattle from, failure on their part to construct the fence re- 
 quired by statute, and such as are brought for injuries from 
 failure on the part of the railroad to maintain in good repair 
 fences already made. In the latter case, it holds that the 
 negligence of the plaintiff would be sufficient to defeat his 
 action.^ One cannot be deprived of the proper and ordinary 
 use of his own property by the failure of a railway company 
 to perform its statutory duty. Therefore, it is not negli- 
 gence for dn owner of stock to pasture it upon his own 
 premises, although he knows that the fence between his land 
 and the railroad, which it is the duty of the company to keep 
 in order, is out of repair and defective.' 
 
 (B.) FlKES. 
 
 § 335. Negligent communication of fire. — What consti- 
 tutes contributory negligence on the part of an owner of 
 property situated near a railroad track, which is damaged or 
 destroyed by fire negligently permitted to escape from the 
 company's locomotives, is a question that has very frequently 
 
 Tower v. Providence, &c., R. Co., 460; Ricketts v. East & West India 
 
 '3 R. I. 404. Bocks, &c., R. Co., 31 L. J. (C. P.) 
 
 'Sika «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 21 301; s. c. 16 Jur. 1073; 13Eng. Law 
 
 Wis. 370. & Eq. 530; Manchester, &c. Ry. Co. 
 
 "Lawrence v. Milwaukee, &c., R. •». Wallis, 14 C. B. 313; s. c. 33 L. J. 
 
 Co., 43 Wis. 323; Jones v. Sheboygan, (C. P.) 185. 
 
 &c., R. Co., 43 Wis. 306; Curry v. ' Congdon v. Central, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Chicago, (fee, R. Co., 43 Wis. 665; 56 Vt. 390; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 793; 
 
 Bennett «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 19 Rogers «. Newburyport, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Wis. 145. Cf. McCall ». Chamber- 1 A,llen, 16; Shepard «. Buffalo, &c., 
 
 lain, 18 Wis. 637, where the abso- R. Co., 35 N. Y. 644; McCoy v. Cali- 
 
 lute liability of railroad companies fornia, &c., R. Co., 40 Cal. 533; s. c. 
 
 for failure to fence is laid down. This 6 Am. Rep. 633; Cressey v. Northern, 
 
 case, however, is criticised in Pitzner v. &c., R. Co ., 59 N. H. 564; b. c. 47 Am. 
 
 Shinnick, 39 Wis. 129, the court seem- Rep. 337; Wilder v. Maine, &c., R. 
 
 ing to think that if the plaintiff's Co., 65 Me. 333; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 
 act was the proximate cause of the 698; Mead v. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 
 
 injury, he cannot recover in spite of 53 Vt. 378; Brady v. Rensselaer, &c., 
 
 the statute. Joliet, &c., R. Co. ■». R. Co., 1 Him, 378; s. c. 3 Thomp. 
 
 Jones, 20 111. 321; Dunnigan «. Chi & C. 537; Donovan v. Hannibal, &c., 
 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 18 Wis. 38; Louis- R. Co., 89 Mo. 147; Gooding v. Atchi- 
 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Spain, 61 Ind. son, &c., R. Co., 33 Kan. 150. 
 
§ 236.] FENCES AND FIBES. 311 
 
 presented itself. It is the settled rule of law in England 
 that, while a railway company, authorized by the legislature 
 to use locomotire engines, is not responsible for damage 
 from fire occasioned by sparks emitted therefrom, provided 
 it has taken every precaution in its power, and adopted 
 every means which science can suggest, to prevent injury 
 frotai fire, and is not guilty of negligence in the management 
 of the engine, still, in the event of its awn negligence, it is 
 no defense that the plaintiff who has used his land in a nat- 
 ural and proper way, for the purpose for which it is fit, has 
 thereby allowed it to become peculiarly liable to take fire by 
 neglecting to clear away combustible matter accumulating 
 thereon. The gist of the action is negligence.' 
 
 § 236. The effect of a statute.— " When the legislature 
 lias sanctioned and authorized the use of a particular thing, 
 and it is used for the purpose for which it was authorized, 
 and every precaution has been observed to prevent injury, 
 the sanction of the legislature carries with it this conse- 
 quence : that if damage results from the use of such thing, 
 independently of negligence, the party using it is not re- 
 sponsible."^ In this case, touching upon the question of the 
 duty of the land-owner to protect himself and his out-lying 
 property from the danger incident to the proximity of the 
 railroad track, one of the judges said :—" It would require a 
 strong authority to convince me that, because a railway runs 
 along my land, I am bound to keep it in a particular state ; " 
 and another said : — " The plaintiff used his land in a natural 
 and proper way for the purposes for which it was fit ; the 
 defendants come to it, he being passive, and do it a mis- 
 chief." In this country the weight of authority sustains the 
 English rule as declared in the case just cited. " The con- 
 
 ' Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 3 Water Works Co., 11 Eich. 783, 
 
 Hurl. & N. 742; s. c. on appeal, 5 where Martin, B., in answer to an ar- 
 
 Hurl. & N. 678; Hammersmith, &c., gument by counsel, says that if loco- 
 
 Ry. Co. V. Brand, L. R. 4 H. L. 171; motives are Bent through the coimtry 
 
 Piggot V. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 3 emitting sparks, the persons doing so 
 
 Man., 6. & S. 230; Aldridge v. Great incur all the responsibilities of insur- 
 
 Westem Ry. Co., 3 Man., G. & S. ers, and are liable for the conse- 
 
 515; Bliss V. London, &c., Ry. Co., 2 quences. Shaw «. Roberds, 6 Adol. 
 
 Post. & Fin. 341; Dimmock v. North & E. 83, per Denham, C. J. 
 
 Staffordshire Ry. Co., 4 Fost. & ' Vaughan «. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 3 
 
 JFin. 1058. Cf. Blyth v. Birmingham Hurl. & N. 742; b. c. 5 Hurl. &N. 678. 
 
312 FENCES AND FIBES. [§ 237. 
 
 elusion from the cases," said the Supreme Court, of Pemi- 
 sylvania/ " is very clear that a plaintiff is not responsible for 
 the mere condition of his premises lying along a railroad,, 
 but, in order to be held for contributory negligence, must 
 have done some act, or omitted some duty, which is the 
 proximate cause of his injury concurring with the negligence 
 of the company. Farmers may cultivate, use, and posses* 
 their farms and improvements, in the manner customary 
 among farmers, and are not bound to use unusual means to^ 
 guard against the negligence of the railroad company ; in- 
 deed, are not bound to expect that the company will be- 
 guilty of negligence."" 
 
 § 337. A further statement of the rule in the United' 
 
 States.^In a leading case in New Jersey it is said : — " In the 
 leading case in Illinois,* it is assumed that the same duty 
 which will compel the railway company to clear its railway 
 of combustibles, imposes an equal obligation on the owner 
 of the contiguous land, but the distinction is obvious. The 
 company uses a dangerous agent, and must provide proper 
 safe-guards ; the land-owner does nothing of the kind, and 
 has the right to remain quiescent."* This view, as to the 
 duty of an owner of land contiguous to a railway track,, 
 is approved in several other States. It is the rule in 
 Massachusetts,* . Virginia,* West Virginia,' New Hamp- 
 
 1 Philadelphia, &c., E. Co. v. Hen- s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 214. See, also,, 
 
 drickson, 80 Perm. St. 182; s. o. 21 Morris & Essex R. Co. «. State, 36 N. 
 
 Am. Rep 97. ' J. Law, 553; Rev. Stat, of N. J. 
 
 » Patten V. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., (1877), 911, §§ 13, 14 
 87, Mo. 117; s. c. 56 Am. Rep. 446. 'Ross v. Boston, &c., R. Co,, 6- 
 
 See, also, Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. v. Allen, 87. See, also. Eastern R. Co. 
 
 Schultz, 93 Penn. St. 341; Lehigh ?'. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 423; 
 
 Valley R. Co. ®. McKeen, 90 Penn. Hart v. Western, &c., R. Co., 13- 
 
 St. 122; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 644; Penn. Mete. 99; s. c. 46 Am. Dec. 719; Per- 
 
 R. Co. V. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 378; ley ». Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; 
 
 s. 0. 21 Am. Rep. 100; Penn. R. Co. Ingersoll v. Stockbridge, &c., R. Co., 
 
 V. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 358; s. c. 1 Am. 8 Allen, 438; Gen. Sts. of 
 
 Rep. 431. chap. 63, § 101, giving the railway 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Simonson, companies an insurable interest in the 
 
 54 m. 504; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 155, property along their routes. 
 
 Breese, J. * Richmond, &c., R. Co. v. Med- 
 
 • Salmon v. Delaware, &c., R. Co., ley, 75 Va. 499; s. c. 40 Am. Rep- 
 
 38 N. J. Law, 5; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 734. 
 
 856; s. c. m«6 nom., Delaware, &c., ' Snyder ». Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 R. Co. V. Salmon, 39 N. J. Law, 299; Co., 11 "West Va. 14. 
 
§ 23S.] 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 313 
 
 shire,* Connecticut,'' New York,* Missouri,* Tennessee,* 
 California,* Delaware,' Nebraska,* Kansas,' North i Caro- 
 lina,*' South Carolina," Indiana," Maryland,'' Georgia," 
 and Wisconsin.*' 
 
 § 238. Yanghan v. Taff Yale Ry. Co.— the doctrine of this 
 case criticised. — In several States the rule of Vaughan v. 
 Taff Vale Ey. Co. is denied, and it is held that the presence 
 of the railway imposes additional burdens and responsibility. 
 
 ■ RoweU V. EaUroad, 57 N. H. 133; 
 s. c. 24 Am. Rep^59; Genl. Stat, of 
 K. H., c. 148. §§ 8, 9. 
 
 ' Bunoughs V. Housatonic R. Co., 
 15 Coim. 124; 8. c. 38 Am. Dec. 64, 
 and the note. 
 
 = Fero V. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 22 
 N. T. 209; Cook v. Champlain Trans. 
 Co., 1 Denio, 91; "Webb v. Rome, 
 &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420; s. c. 10 
 Am. Rep. 389; Collms v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 5 Hun, 499; Bevier u. 
 Delaware, &c.. Canal Co., 13 Hon, 
 254 
 
 * Ktch ». Pacific, &c., R. Co., 45 
 Mo. 322; Smith e. Hannibal, &c., R. 
 Co., 37 Mo. 287; Coates v. Missouri, 
 &c., R. Co., 61 Mo. 38. The biirden 
 of proof is on the railroad company 
 to show that it used all proper appli- 
 ances. Clemens v. Hannibal, &c., R. 
 Co., 53 Mo. 366; 8. c. 14 Am. Rep. 
 460; Pahner v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 76 
 Mo. 217. 
 
 * Burke «. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 
 7 Heisk. 451; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 618. 
 
 * Flynn v. San Francisco, &c., R. 
 Co., 40 Cal. 14; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 595. 
 
 ' Jefferis j>. Phila., &c., R. Co., 3 
 Houst. 447. 
 
 ' Burlington, &c., R. Co. ■». West- 
 over, 4 Neb. 268. 
 
 ' St. Joseph, &c., R. Co. «. Chase, 
 11 Ean. 47; Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Owen, 25 Ean. 419; Missouri, &c., R 
 Co. V. ComeU, 30 Kan. 35. 
 
 '» Doggett o. Richmond, &c., R. 
 Co., 78 N. C. 305. 
 
 " McCready v. South Cai'olina R. 
 Co., 2 Strobh. (Law) 356. 
 
 '" Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Richard- 
 son, 66 Ind. 43; s. c. 82 Am. Rep. 94; 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Noel, 77 
 Ind. 110; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hixon, 77 Ind. Ill; Pittsburgh, &c., 
 R. Co. ». Jones, 86 Ind. 496; s. c. 44 
 Am. Rep. 334; Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 B. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351; Louisville. 
 &c., R. Co. «. Hagan, 87 Ind. 602. 
 
 " Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. Wood- 
 ruff, 4 Md. 242; 8. c. 59 Am. Dec. 
 72; Rev. Code of Maryland (1878), 
 723, § 1. 
 
 " Macon, &c.,R Co. ». McConnell, 
 27 Ga. 481. 
 
 '= " Owners of land have the right 
 to remain passive, and use and enjoy 
 their property as they will so far as 
 responsibility for the negligence of 
 the party setting the unruly and de- 
 structive agent in motion is con- 
 cerned. . . . The company can- 
 not say: — ' Do this or that with your 
 property, or I wiU destroy it by the 
 negligent and improper use of my 
 fire.' " Dixon, C. J., in Kellogg v. 
 Chicago, &C., R. Co., 26 Wis. 223; 
 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 69. But see Mur- 
 phy V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 45 
 Wis. 222; Caswell v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 42 Wis. 193; Martin e. West- 
 em, &c., R. Co., 23 Wis. 437; Erd ®. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co.. 41 Wis. 65; 
 Ward V. Milwaukee, &c., R. Co., 29 
 Wis. 144. 
 
3U 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 [§ 238. 
 
 as to the use of adjacent property, upon the owners thereof, 
 and that a variety of acts and omissions, not otherwise neg- 
 ligent, become so by reason of the juxtaposition of railroad 
 tracks. This is the view taken by the courts of Illinois, 
 although the decisions in point found in the reports of that 
 State appear, many of them, to have been applications of the 
 local rule of comparative negligence, rather than any very ex- 
 plicit repudiation of the English rule.^ In Iowa,'' Vermont,' 
 and Michigan,^ the courts have seemed to incline to rules in 
 opposition to the weight of authority. This tendency has, in 
 Illinois and Iowa, been checked by legislation/ and it may be 
 believed that at present no court in this country is squarely 
 committed to any rule which contradicts the English doc- 
 trine. For the owner of a warehouse near a railway track to 
 leave the windows open in a room in which he had stored 
 husks, rags, cobs and other inflammable material, was held, in 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. MUls, 43 
 111. 409; Illinois, &c., R. Co. u. Frazier, 
 47 lU. 505; Ohio, «&c., R. Co. v Shane- 
 felt, 47 111. 497; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Simonson, 54 lU. 504; 8. c. 5 Am. 
 Rep. 155; Great Weatem, &c. , R. Co. 
 ■B. Haworth, 39 111. 347; Bass «. Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co., 28111. 9; lUinois, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Nunn, 61 111. 78; Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Pmdar, 53 111. 447; s. c. 5 
 Am. Rep. 57; Toledo, &c., R. Co. u. 
 Maxfield, 73 111. 95, in which it is held 
 that if one erects his buildiag on or 
 near a railroad track, he must assume 
 some of the hazards to which his prop- 
 erty is exposed. To be safe, he should 
 build at a reasonable distance from 
 the track. Rev. Stat, of 111. (1880), 
 1161, c. 114, § 89. 
 
 ' Kesee v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 30 
 Iowa, 78; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 648; Or- 
 mond D. Central, &c., R. Co., 58 Iowa, 
 743; Slosson «. Burlington, &c., R. 
 Co., 60 Iowa, 315; Small v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co , 55 Iowa, 583. See, also. 
 Rev. Code of Iowa, § 1389. 
 
 ' Bryant v. Central, &c., R. Co., 56 
 Vt. 710. See, also, Genl. Stat, of 
 Vermont tl863), 333, § 78. 
 
 ^ Marquette, &c., R. Co. v. Spear, 44 
 Mich. 169; b. c. 38 Am. Rep. 343. 
 
 ' The prima faeie inference of neg- 
 ligence which is declared by Rev. St. 
 111. (1889), c. 114, § 89, to arise from 
 the fact that damage has been caused 
 by fire communicated from a locomo- 
 tive engine is not rebutted by proof 
 that the engine was provided with the 
 best and most approved appliances, un- 
 less it is also shown that such appli- 
 ances were at the time in suitable 
 order and repair, and that there was 
 no negligence in their use. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Goyette, 133 111. 31; s. c. 
 34 N. E. Rep. 549. See, also, Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co. 8). Hunt, 34 111. App. 
 744. Under Code Iowa, § 1389, a 
 railroad company is liable for setting 
 a fire on its right of way, which de- 
 stroyed certain stacks of hay of plaint- 
 iff, though he was guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence in failing to protect 
 them by plowing around them. West 
 V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co.. 77 Iowa, 
 654; 8. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 513; Engleo. 
 Chicago, Ac, R. Co., 77 Iowa, 661; 
 8. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 513. 
 
§ 239.] FENCES AND FIBES. 315 
 
 Illinois, contributory negligence.* But where only one pane 
 of glass was allowed to remain out of a plaintiff's window in a 
 house adjoining a railroad track, it has been held, in Wisconsin, 
 not such contributory negligence as to preyent a recovery, 
 and the court intimates that even a whole window open would 
 not be any worse in point of negligence.^ And in Indiana it 
 is expressly held that an open window, under such circum- 
 stances, into which sparks from a locomotive flew and set fire 
 to the building, is not such negligence as to defeat an action.' 
 
 § 239. The rule as to combustibles, shavings, dried 
 grass, etc. — In 'New York it is not negligence to leave the 
 doors open, even though the floor is covered with shavings, 
 in a house adjoining the tracks,* nor, in Pennsylvania and 
 Delaware, to suffer the roof of a building situated near the 
 track to get into such a condition that sparks can be blown 
 through and set fire to what is within.^ But it has been held in 
 Pennsylvania that one who stores a large quantity of lumber 
 by a railroad siding, partly for convenience in loading and 
 partly for storing and seasoning, with full knowledge of the 
 danger to which it is exposed from inflammable rubbish ac- 
 cumulated upon the track, is guilty of negligence precluding 
 his recovery if the lumber is set fire to in a dry season from 
 sparks from the engines of the railroad company, even 
 though there is negligence on the part of the company.' In 
 
 ' Great Western, &c., R. Co. t. * Fero r>. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 32 
 
 Haworth, 39 111. 347. QT. Fero ». Buf- N. T. 309. Nor for the owner of a 
 
 falo, &c., R. Co., 33 N. T. 309. varnisli factory to set out of doors a 
 
 ' Martin t. Western, &c., R. Co., 23 lot of varnish and benzine, thus using 
 
 Wis. 437. See, also, Rowell t. Rail- his premises in the usual mode, 
 
 "road, 57 N. H. 133; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. Kalbfleisch v. Long Island R. Co., 103 
 
 69; Ross T. Boston, &c, R. Co., 6 N. T. 520; b. c. 55. Am. Rep. 833. 
 
 Allen, 87. So, also, in Ross v. Boston, &c., R. 
 
 » Louisville, &c., R Co. v. Richard- Co., 6 Allen, 87. 
 
 son, 66 Ind. 43; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 94 » Phila., &c., R. Co. v. Hendrick- 
 
 Qf. Murphy v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., son, 80 Penn. St. 183; s. c. 31 Am. 
 
 45 Wis. 223; 8. c. 30 Am. Rep. 731, Rep. 97; Jefferis «. Phila., &c., R. 
 
 where it was held to be contributory Co., 3 Houst. 447. 
 
 negligence to permit an accumulation ' Post v. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 108 
 
 of hayandshavings between twobuild- Penn. St. 585. But see Gulf, &c., Ry. 
 
 ings, and under one of them, the side Co. v. McLean, 74 Tex. 646, and Gib- 
 
 of which next to the railroad was left bons c. Wisconsin Valley R. Co., 66 
 
 open below the siUs. Wis. 161, where on a similar state of 
 
316 
 
 FENCES AND FIRES. 
 
 [§ 239. 
 
 New Jersey it is not negligence to allow leaves and dried 
 grass alid other such combustible stuff to accumulate on land 
 lying near the track of a railway.^ So, in Missouri,* Cali- 
 fornia,' West Virginia,* Virginia,* Pennsylvania,* Indiana,' and 
 Wisconsin,' but in Vermont such accumulations are ques- 
 tions for a jury, ifi respect of the negligence involved.* To 
 allow shavings and other combustible rubbish to accumulate 
 about an unfinished house near a railway track is negli- 
 gence," while, in some of the Western States, to place stacks 
 of grain and ricks of straw upon one's own land near the 
 track is not negligence. ^^ And he is not required to burn off 
 or plow the land on which hay is stacked.^ When a fire 
 commences from a spark from a locomotive, on the com- 
 pany's own land in an accumulation of dried leaves and 
 grass, and thence spreads to a' similar accumulation upon 
 the adjoining land of the plaintiff, the defendant may show 
 that plaintiff's property was in no better condition than its 
 own — and that, therefore, if the fire originally escaped 
 from the locomotive without negligence on the part of 
 
 facts the question of contiibutoiy 
 negligence was held to he a proper 
 one for the jury. 
 ' Salmon^«. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 
 
 38 N. J. Law, 5; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 
 356; Delaware, &c., R. Co. ■». Salmon, 
 
 39 N. J. Law, 399; s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 
 214. 
 
 " Smith v. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 
 37 Mo. 387; Fitch v. Missouri, &c,, R. 
 Co., 45 Mo. 333. 
 
 ° Flynn r>. San Francisco, &c., R. 
 Co., 40 Oal. 14; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 595. 
 
 • Snyder v. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 
 11 West Va. 15. 
 
 » Richmond, &c., R. Co. «. Medley, 
 75 Va. 499; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 734. 
 
 « Penn. R. Co. «. Schultz, 98 Penn. 
 St. 341. 
 
 ' Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. ■». Jones, 
 86 Ind. 496; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 334. 
 
 ' Kellogg «. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 36 "Wis. "223; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 69; Erd 
 v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 Wis. 65. 
 
 ' Bryant v. Central, &c., R. Co., 56 
 Vt. 710. 
 
 " Coates V. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 61 
 Mo. 38; Murphy ®. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 45 Wis. 333; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 
 731; Macon, &c., R. Co. v. McCon- 
 nell, 37 &a. 481. 
 
 "St. Joseph, &c., R. Co. v. Chase, 
 11 Kan. 47; Burlington, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Westover, 4 Neb. 368. QT. Col- 
 lins V. New York, &c., R. Co., S 
 Hun, 499, holding that it was a proper 
 question for the jury whether or no< 
 the plaintiff was contributorily negli- 
 gent in allowing the bedding and ma- 
 nure of a stable to accumulate with- 
 in two fefet of the track during a hot, 
 dry season. 
 
 '= Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. v. Hart, 
 119 Ind. 373; s. o. 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 753; Hoffman «. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 60 ; s. c. 41 N. W. 
 Rep. 301. 
 
§ 240.] FENCES AND FIEES. 317 
 
 the company, the plaintiff was, in that regard, equally in 
 fault.i 
 
 § 240. The obligation of the plaintiff herein.— Conceding 
 
 the plaintiff's freedom from any duty to use his property 
 with reference to the presence of the railroad, and while 
 he may nse his property as he wishes, without antici- 
 pating danger from that source, yet, when the fire is kin- 
 dled, and his property is in peril, it is negligence not to use 
 his best efforts to avoid damage. He must not be supine. 
 He must put the fire out, or rescue his goods, if he can. 
 Failing to do. this, he is negligent.^ And where a plaintiff 
 owned and operated a warehouse near the main line of a 
 railway, and had a switch from that line running to his ware- 
 house, upon which the company used a locomotive, in doing 
 bis business, that threw off sparks, and the plaintiff, after 
 noticing the defect in the locomotive and complaining of its 
 use to the company, still continued to allow its use upon his 
 property, such acquiescence on his part, as to the continued 
 employment of the defective engine, was held negligence suf- 
 ficient to bar his recovery as against the company.' Where 
 
 ' Ohio, &c., R. Co. V. Shanefelt, Wis. 223; Illinois, &c., R. Co. ». Mc- 
 47 Dl. 497; Fitch v. Pacific, &c., R. Clelland, 42 111. 355; Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co., 45 Mo. 335. See, also, Atchison, Co. v. Pindar, 53 lU. 447; s. c. 5 Am. 
 &c., • R. Co. V. Stanford, 12 Kan. Rep. 57; McMarra v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 354; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 362; Peep- Co., 41 Wis. 69; Doggett «. Rich- 
 pers V. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 67 Mo. mond, &c., R. Co., 78 N. C. 305. But 
 715; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 518; Hoag v. an instruction that plaintiff cannot re- 
 Lake Shore, &c., R. Co., 85 Penn. cover if he made no attempt to put 
 St. 293. out the fire is error, as making no 
 
 '^ And where the plaintiff knew that reference to plaintiff's ability to cope 
 
 the place where the fire started, and with the same. TiUey v. St. Louis, 
 
 from whence it spread to his land, &c., Ry. Co., 49 Ark. 635; s. c. 6 
 
 was a place where Are had often S. W. Rep. 8. It is also the duty of 
 
 caught from locomotive sparks, he the company to exercise such care to 
 
 was contributorily negligent in not prevent the spread of the Areas a pru- 
 
 cutting the grass and weeds and mak- dent man would deem proper under 
 
 ing the danger less imminent. Snyder the circumstances. Missouri Pac. 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 11 West Ry. Co. v. Platzer, 73 Tex. 117; s. o. 
 
 Va. 15; Eaton v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 11 S. W. Rep. 160. See, also, on the 
 
 Co., 19 Or. 391; Little Rock, &c., R. duty of the company, Bighme v. 
 
 €o., V. Hecht, 38 Ark. 357; Chicago, Rome, &c., R. Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 Ac., R. Co. ■». Pennell, 94 111. 448; 600. 
 KeUogg 8. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 26 * Marquette, &c., R. Co. v. Spear, 
 
318 
 
 FENCES AND FIBES. 
 
 [§ 241. 
 
 a railway company has negligently set fire to the property of 
 one person, and the j&re has spread to the property of an- 
 other, the question at once arises whether, in an action 
 against the company for damages resulting from the com- 
 municated fire, the negligence that kindled the first fire is 
 not too remote to enable the action to be maintained ; or, in 
 other words, when the railway company ias set A.'s property 
 on fire negligently, and the fire spreads to B.'s or C.'s prop- 
 erty and burns it up, can B. or 0. maintain an action against 
 the railway company ? 
 
 § 341, The analogy of the " Sqnib case."— This is pre- 
 cisely the question that arose in what is known as the " Squib 
 case,"' — the question of proximate and remote cause. The 
 courts, both in England and the United States, are now agreed 
 that in such a case the action will lie.* It has never been 
 
 44 Mich. 169: b. c. 38 Am. Kep. 
 242. But see Kendrick v. Towle, 60 
 Mich. 363; s. c. 27 N. W. Eep. 567, 
 where the plaintiff had warned the, de- 
 fendant that its engine endangered his 
 property on account of the way it 
 emitted sparks, and the court held 
 that increased care was due from the 
 defendant, and that the plaintiff was 
 not chargeable with contributory neg- 
 ligence by letting combustible ma- 
 terial accumulate on his property near 
 the track. 
 
 ' Scott V. Shephard, 2 Wm. Black. 
 892. 
 
 " O'Neill ». New York, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 115 N. Y. 579; s. c. 22 N. E. 
 Eep. 217; Adams e. Young, 44 Ohio 
 St. 80; Piggot V. The Eastern Coun- 
 ties Ry. Co., 3 Man., G. & S. 230; 
 B. c. 54 Eng. Com. Law, 229; Smith 
 v. London, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. 
 P. 98; Fent «. Toledo, &c., R. Co., 59 
 111. 349; B. c. 14 Am. Rep. 13 [a very 
 instructive opinion by Lawrence, C. 
 J.]; Hart «. Western, &c., R. Co., 
 13 Mete. 99 (by Shaw, C. J.); s. c. 
 46 Am. Dec. 719; Perley v. East- 
 ern R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Cleveland 
 
 v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 42 Vt. 449. 
 In Poeppers v. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 
 67 Mo. 715; B. c. 29 Am. Rep. 518, a 
 prairie was set on fire by sparks from 
 a locomotive. The fire burnt all 
 night, but very slowly, the wind not 
 being high. In the morning the wind 
 rose and blew with great violence, 
 carrying the Are some five miles fur- 
 ther. Held, that as the rise of the 
 wind was a thing which a prudent 
 man might reasonably anticipate, it 
 could not be regarded as the interven- 
 tion of a new agency, and hence the 
 company was liable for all the injury 
 caused. Henry v. Southern, &c., R. 
 Co., 50 Cal. 176; Burlington, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Westover, 4 Neb. 268; Hook- 
 sett c. Concord, &c., R. Co., 38 N. H. 
 242; Troxler v. Richmond, &c., R. 
 Co., 74 N. C. 377; Anderson®. Wa- 
 satch, &c., R. Co., 2 Utah, 518; Dela- 
 ware, &c., R. Co. ». Salmon, 39 N. J. 
 Law, 299: b. c. 23 Am. Rep. 214; 
 Small V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 55 
 Iowa, 682; Atchison, &e., R. Co. v. 
 Bales, 16 Kan. 252. While the plaint- 
 iff, in such cases, is bound to prove to 
 the satisfaction of the jury that the 
 
§ 241.] FENCES AND FIEES. 319 
 
 pretended that such, an action could not be maintained, ex- 
 cept in two overruled cases.* In Kuhn v. Jewett, Beceiver,* 
 it appeared that a railway train, laden with petroleum, was 
 wrecked through the negligence of the defendant, and the oil 
 escaping, took fire, ran down into a stream of water, and was 
 borne down in a blaze against the plaintiffs stable some dis- 
 tance below, in consequence of which the stable was de- 
 stroyed. The defendant was held liable, and the Vice-Chan- 
 cellor said : — " There can be no doubt, I think, if in this 
 instance the flames of the burning oil had been carried by 
 the wind directly from the point of collision to the petition- 
 er's building, and it had thus been set on fire and destroyed, 
 that the injury would, in judgment of law, have been the nat- 
 ural and direct, or proximate result of the collision. So, too, 
 if the burning oil had descended from the point where it was 
 first ignited by the mere force of its own gravity, upon the 
 petitioner's building and destroyed it, the connection between 
 cause and effect would have been so close and direct that the 
 defendant's liability could not have been successfully ques- 
 tioned. So, also, if the fire had been carried from the place 
 of its origin to the petitioner's building by a train of com- 
 bustible matter, deposited in its track by the operation of 
 the laws of nature, the petitioner's injury, I think it could 
 not have been doubted, would have been esteemed the direct 
 result of the defendant's negligence. These principles must 
 rule this case. Their application is obvious, for, although 
 water is almost universally used as a means to extinguish 
 fire, and it seems, at first blush, absurd to say that it can be 
 used for the purpose of extending it, yet it is true, as a mat- 
 
 flre was occasioned by the negligence Isee, &c., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 TJ. 
 
 of tlie defendant, he is not bound to S. 469 ; Insurance Co. «. Transporta- 
 
 prove this beyond what is termed a tion Co., 13 Wall. 199; Insurance Co. 
 
 reasonable doubt, as applied to the v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 543. See, also, 
 
 trial of criminal causes. Baltimore, Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Pennell, 110 
 
 &c., R. Co. V. Shipley, 39 Md. 351; 111. 435, and a thorough discussion 
 
 Webb V. Rome, &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. of the subject in Shearman & Redfleld 
 
 430; a c. 10 Am. Rep. 389; Penn. R. on Negligence, 4th ed., § 666. 
 Co. V. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 373; s. c. ' Ryan ». New York, &c., R. Co., 
 
 21 Am. Rep. 100; Lehigh Valley R. 35 N. Y. 310; Penn. R. Co. v. Kerr, 
 
 Co. «. McKeen, 90 Penn. St. 133; s. C. 63 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 
 
 35 Am. Rep. 644. Of. Insurance 431. 
 Co. V. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44; Milwau- ' 33 N. J. Eq. 647. 
 
320 FENCES AND FIBE8. [§ 242. 
 
 ter of fact, that, as an agency for the transmission of burning 
 oil, it is just as certain and effectual in its operation as the 
 wind, in carrying flame, or a spark, or combustible matter, in 
 spreading a fire. In keeping up the continuity between cause 
 and effect it may be just as certain and effectual in its opera- 
 tion as any other material force," 
 
 § 242. The rale in Fennsylrania. — Upon a precisely simi- 
 lar state of facts, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylva- 
 nia held that even if the defendants were negligent in wreck- 
 ing their train, still the damage to the plaintiff was too 
 remote to warrant a recovery.^ But this, in my judgment, is 
 wholly incorrect. Upon what principle of legal ratiocina- 
 tion can it be determined that when fire, negligently kindled 
 by a railway company, is borne through the air upon a burn- 
 ing shingle, or passes over the dried grass of a prairie and 
 sets fire to my house, the company is liable, but when it is 
 floated down in burning oil upon the waters of a creek and 
 sets fire to my property, the company is not liable? The 
 Pennsylvania court is not likely to be followed upon this 
 point. 
 
 ' Hoag ». Lake Shore, &c., R. Co., 85 Penn. St. 393; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 653. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 HIGHWAYS OTHER THAN RAILWAYS; THE LAW OP 
 THE ROAD. 
 
 § 243. Liability of municipal corpo- 
 rations for injuries from de- 
 fective highways. 
 844. Duty of" corporate oflScials. 
 
 245. Liability for injuries to runa- 
 way horses occasioned by de- 
 fects in the streets. 
 
 246. Traveler's own negligence con- 
 tributing to the injury. 
 
 247. Not negligent to use a defec- 
 tive highway. 
 
 248. Qualifications of this rule. 
 
 249. The obligation of the traveler 
 on a defective highway. 
 
 250. Injuries from excavations in 
 the highway. 
 
 251. Right of pedestrian in the 
 roadway. 
 
 252. Deviation from the highway. 
 
 253. Duty of the municipal author- 
 ities herein. 
 
 254. The rule further stated. 
 
 255. Further illustrations. 
 
 256. Trespass upon the highway. 
 
 257. Dlustrations of this rule. 
 
 268. Leaving horses untied or un- 
 attended on the highway. 
 
 259. The same subject continued. 
 
 260. Unskilful or reckless driving. 
 
 261. Sunday traveling. 
 
 262. The New England rule. 
 
 263. The Massachusetts rule illus- 
 trated. 
 
 § 264. The same subject continued. 
 
 265. The rule in Maine and Ver- 
 mont. 
 
 266. The Rhode Island rule. 
 
 267. These decisions criticised. 
 
 268. Pedestrians crossing the high- 
 way. 
 
 269. The same subject continued. 
 
 270. Icy sidewalks. 
 
 271. The same subject continued. 
 
 272. Mere slipx)eiine8s not a defect 
 in the highway. 
 
 273. The duty of the traveler on an 
 icy highway. 
 
 274. The liability of the owner of 
 property in respect to icy 
 pavements. 
 
 275. The foregoing rules summar- 
 ized. 
 
 276. Injuries to persons in the high- 
 way from something falling 
 from the adjoining property. 
 
 277. The same subject continued. 
 
 278. Children injured upon the 
 highway. 
 
 279. This rule further illustrated. 
 
 280. The rule in New Hampshire. 
 
 281. The author's criticism. 
 
 282. Collisions upon the highway. 
 
 283. The same subject continued. 
 
 284. Injuries upon ferry boats. 
 
 § 243. Liability of mnnicipal corporations for injaries 
 from defective highways. — At common law no action lies 
 against a municipal corporation for damages occasioned by 
 defective highways.* " It is well settled that the common 
 
 * Shirley's Leading Cases, 279; Elli- 
 ott on Roads and Streets, 40; Russell 
 
 21 
 
 V. Men of Devon, 2 T. R 667; Bartlett v. 
 Crozier (by Chancellor Kent), 17 Johns. 
 
322 
 
 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. 
 
 [§244. 
 
 law gives no such action. Corporations created for their 
 own benefit stand on the same ground, in this respect, as 
 individuals, but quasi corporations, created by the legislature 
 for purposes of public policy, are subject by the common law 
 to an indictment for the neglect of duties enjoined on them, 
 but are not liable to an action for such neglect unless the 
 action has been given by some statute."* Accordingly, inas- 
 much as among the most important duties which the law 
 imposes upon municipal corporations is that of making and 
 maintaining roads and streets,' and because every member 
 of the community has a personal interest in the condition of 
 the highway, the right to bring a civil action against the cor- 
 poration for an .injury resulting from a breach of this duty 
 has generally been conferred by statute.* 
 
 § 244. Duty of corporate officials. — Ordinary care must 
 be exercised by the officers and servants of the corporation 
 to keep the highways in a safe and convenient condition for 
 travelers,* and the duty and responsibility of the corporation 
 
 449; s. c. 8 Am. Dec. 428; Riddle v. 
 Proprietors, 7 Mass. 169; 8. c. S Am. 
 Dec. 35; Mower v. Inhabitants of Lei- 
 cester, 9 Mass. 347; B.C. 6 Am. Dec. 63; 
 Hill «. Boston, 132 Mass. 344; s. c. 28 
 Am. Rep. 332; Adams D.Wicasset Bank, 
 1 Greenl. 361; Reed «. Belfast, 30 Me. 
 246; Pamum v. Concord, 3 N. H. 393; 
 Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; 
 Hyde v. Jamaica, 37 Yt. 448; State v. 
 Burlington, 36 N. H. 521; Chidsey «. 
 Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Taylor*. Peck- 
 ham, 8 R. I. 349; 2 Dillon on Munic- 
 ipal Corporations, §§ 761, 764. 
 
 * Abbett V. Johnson County, 114 
 Ind. 61; s. 0. 16 N. E. Rep. 127. 
 Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 
 9 Mass. 347; s.c. 6 Am. Dec. 63. Qf. 
 Raymond v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. 
 534; B.C. 53 Am. Dec. 67; Providence 
 V. Clapp! 17 How. (U. S ) 167; Jones 
 V. Inhabitants of Waltham, 4 Cush. 
 299; B.C. 50 Am. Dec. 788; Parker v. 
 Boston & Maine R. Co., 3 Cush. 107; 
 e.c. 60 Am. Dec. 709; Marini v. Gra- 
 ham, 67 Cal. 130. 
 
 ''Bullock v. Mayor, &c., of New 
 York, 99 N. Y. 654; B.C. 1 East. Rep. 
 170, and cases cited; Shearman & 
 Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., 
 §g 332, 337. 
 
 ' 3 Dillon on Municipal Corpora- 
 tions, § 786; Richards v. Enfield I 
 18 Gray, 344 ; City of Lexington v. 
 McQuillan, 9 Dana, 613; a. c. 36 
 Am. Dec. 169. These statutes ex- 
 tend to cities as well as towns (or 
 townships), and also to sidewalks, 
 where they constitute a part of the 
 public highways. Providence ». 
 Clapp, 17 How. (U. S.) 161, 167; Nel- 
 son ®. Village of Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 
 89; Eellogg v. Janesyille, 34 Minn. 
 133; Milarkey v. Foster, 6 Or. 878; 
 B. c. 26 Am. Rep. 631; DuUon v. 
 Weare, 17 N. H. 84; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 
 690; EUiott on Roads and Streets, 
 c. 33, and the cases generally cited 
 suj)ra. 
 
 * Moore v. KenockeeTp., 75 Mich. 
 382; B. 0. 43 N. W. 944j Goodfellow 
 V. Mayor, &c., 100 N. Y. 15. It is 
 
§ 244.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 323 
 
 \nth respect to the condition of the highway are npt limited 
 to the traveled path, but extend to the whole width of the 
 way.* But ditches, properly constructed for the drainage of 
 the highway at the sides of the traveled way, canopt he re- 
 garded defects, as matter of law — nor is the city liable for a 
 failure to place railings between such ditches or drains and 
 the thoroughfare proper.' Except in the States of New 
 Jersey,' Texas,* Michigan,' and South Carolina,* it is not 
 denied that a municipal corporation is liable to private indi- 
 viduals for any injury which results from the failure of the 
 corporation or its agents to keep the streets and ways in a 
 safe and proper condition.'' The obligation of the corpora- 
 
 some evidence of negligence on the 
 part of a city that a decayed tree falls 
 upon a person traveling along the 
 street. Gubasko v. New York, 12 
 Daly (N. T.) 183. The question of 
 reasonable care is one of fact upon 
 which the finding of the jury is con- 
 dusive. Burrell v. Uncapher, 117 
 Penn. St. 373; s. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 619; 
 Hopkins v. Town of Rush River, 70 
 "Wis. 10; B. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 909. A 
 slight inclination in a sidewalk is not 
 a defect for which a city is liable. Seh- 
 roth V. City of Prescott, 63 Wis. 652. 
 The town is not hound to guard against 
 extraordinary accidents; only reason- 
 able skill and care is required. Bishop 
 e. Township of Schuylkill (Penn.), 8 
 Atl. Rep. 449; Jackson Tp. v. Wag- 
 ner, 127 Penn. St. 18^ s. c. 17 Atl. 
 Rep. 903; 24 W. N. C. 217. Photo- 
 prophs of a defective highway are 
 competent evidence at a trial. Bar- 
 ker V. Town of Perry, 67 Iowa, 146; 
 Raymond v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. 
 524; B. c. 53 Am. Dec. 57 ; Gould v. 
 City of Topeka, 32 Kan. 485; b. c. 49 
 Am. Rep. 496; Johnson b. White- 
 field, 18 Me. 218; b. c. 36 Am. Dec. 
 731; Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176; 
 B. c. 63 Am. Dec. 658. But see 
 George V. HaverhUl, 110 Mass. 511. 
 
 ' Johnson «. Whitefield, 8 Me. 218; 
 8.C. 36 Am. Dec. 721 ; Durant v. Palmer, 
 
 39 N. J. Law, 544; Yale v. Bliss, 50 
 Barb. 368; Raymond «. City of Low- 
 ell, 6 Cush. 524; B.c. 53 Am. Dec. 57; 
 Street«.Holyoke,105Mass.86. Contra, 
 Perkins v. Inhabitants of Fayette, 68 
 Me. 152, which holds that a town need 
 keep only a width of a highway in a 
 smooth conditio^, sufficient to render 
 the passing over it safe and con- 
 venient, s. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 84. " It 
 is only such portions of the street 
 or highway as have been used by 
 the public for travel therein which 
 are required to be kept ti«e from de- 
 fect." Fitzgerald v. City of Berlin, 
 64 Wis. 207. And see AngeU on High' 
 ways, § 232. 
 
 ' Morse v. Inhabitants pf Belfast, 
 77 Me. 44; B.C. 1 East. I^p. 67. 
 
 'Pray «. Mayor, See., 32 If. J. Law, 
 394. 
 
 ^City of Navasota i>. Pearce, 46 
 Tex. 525; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 279. 
 
 'Detroit «. Blakeby, 21 Mich. 84; 
 B. c. 4 Am. Rep. 460; Mcputcheon v. 
 Homer, 43 Mich. 483; s. c. 38 Am. 
 Rep. 212. 
 
 • Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116; 
 B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 82?. 
 
 ' Gould V. City of Topeka, 32 Ean. 
 485; B. c. 49 Am. Rep. 496; Browning 
 V. City of Springfield, 1? Dl. 143; 
 B. 0. 63 Am. Dec. 846, ai)A tb^ note. 
 O'Neill V. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 
 
324 
 
 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. 
 
 [§ 245. 
 
 tion is as great in respect of obstructions as defects, and the 
 traveler who is injured because of an obstruction permitted 
 to be in the highway, may have his action against the town "• 
 in the same way and to the same extent as in case of injury 
 from a defect in the highway. And, to an action of this sort, 
 it is not a defense that the obstruction was necessary for the 
 repair of the street.^ 
 
 § 215. Liability for iigaries to runaway horses occasioned 
 by defects in the streets. — Upon the question whether munic- 
 ipal corporations are liable for an injury to a runaway horse 
 or his owner, occasioned by a defect in a street, the courts 
 are not agreed. In several jurisdictions it is held that high- 
 ways need not be so constructed that travelers and their 
 horses shall be safe -when the horses run away or become 
 unmanageable. This is the rule in Massachusetts,' Maine,* 
 
 220, holding that while the city is 
 not an insurer against accidents, it 
 yet is liable for those injuries which 
 result from its neglect to maintain, in a 
 safe condition, sidewalks and bridges 
 within its Umits. "Sidewalks are to 
 be used by common people, and only 
 a few of them are expected to possess 
 the skill of a Blondin." s. c. 31 Am. 
 Rep. 321. Noble v. City of Richmond, 
 31 Gratt. 271; s. c. 31 Am. Rep. 726; 
 Drew V. Town of Sutton, 55 Vt. 586; 
 B. c. 45 Am. Rep. 644; Baker v. Port- 
 land, 58 Me. 199; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 
 274; Dowd «. Chicopee, 116 Mass. 95, 
 and the cases generally cited supra. 
 
 'Dutton V. "Weare, 17 N. H. 34; 
 s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 590; French «. 
 Brunswick, 21 Me. 29; 8. c. 38 Am. 
 Dec. 250; Bennett v. Fifleld, 13 R. I. 
 139; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 17; Snow v. 
 Adams, 1 Cush. 447; Barber ®. Rox- 
 bury, 11 Allen, 320. 
 
 ^ Jacobs «. Bangor, 16 Me. 187; b. c. 
 33 Am, Dec. 652. But a person in- 
 jured by an accident occasioned by an 
 authorized public work, constructed 
 and kept in repair in a lawful man- 
 oer, has no legal remedy; as, where 
 
 one fell into a cattle-guard near the 
 highway, at a raDway crossing, prop- 
 erly constructed and maintained. 
 Jones «. Inhabitants of Waltham, 4 
 Cush. 299; B. 0. 50 Am. Dec. 783; 
 Hawks «. Northampton, 116 Mass. 423. 
 Qf. Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 
 Hill, 531; S.C. 38 Am. Dec. 669; Da- 
 vis V. Leominster, 1 Allen, 184; Rear- 
 don v. City, 66 Cal. 492; B.C. 19 Am. 
 Law Rev. 492. But see, also. City v. 
 Neudmg, Sup. Ct. Ohio (1885), 19 
 Am. Law Rev. 492. 
 
 ' Davis n. Inhabitants of Dudley, 4 
 Allen, 558; Titus v. Inhabitants of 
 Nortlibridge, 97 Mass. 358; Fogg v. 
 Inhabitants of Nahant, 98 Mass. 576. 
 But where the defect consisted in a 
 wall of insufficient height and the 
 plaintiff lost control of his horse for 
 a moment only, and would have re- 
 gained it had the wall been a sufficient 
 barrier, the town was held liable. 
 Hinckley ®. Town of Somerset, 145 
 Mass. 326; B. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 166. 
 
 * Moulton V. Inhabitants of Sanfoid, 
 51 Me. 127; Perkins «. Inhabitants of 
 Payette, 68 Me. 152; Aldrich e. Qor- 
 ham, 77 Me. 287. 
 
§ 246.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE ROAD. 
 
 325 
 
 Wisconsin/ and West Virginia.' But in New York/ Peiin- 
 sylyania,* Georgia,* Maryland,* Missouri,' Indiana,* Connect- 
 icut,' New Hampshire," Vermont," and Texas," it is held that 
 where it appears that the corporation was negligent in con- 
 structing or maintaining the highway, and such negligence 
 was a cause of the injury, the action may be sustained, and 
 the mere fact of the runaway is not a defense." The negli- 
 gence of the town is not the proximate cause of injuries suf- 
 fered by one who is wilfully thrown into a pit by another 
 p6rson." 
 
 § 246.. Traveler's own negligence contributing to the in- 
 jury. — In the earliest case in which contributory negligence 
 is pleaded as a defense ^° to an action for damages growing 
 
 ' Doeher v. Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 675; 
 House V. Iiihabitants of Fulton, 29 
 Wis. 296; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 568; 
 Goldsworthy v. Town of Linden, 75 
 Wis. 24; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 656. 
 
 i Smitli v. County Court, 33 West 
 Va. 713; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 1. 
 
 ' Wliere a trench was dug in the 
 course of repairs, and travel suspended 
 over that part of the road, the mere 
 neglect to furnish a warning of the 
 danger' is not a breach of duty toward 
 the owner of a horse running away 
 without a driver. Stacy ■». Town of 
 Phelps, 47 Hun, 54; Ivory v. Town of 
 Deer Park, 116 N. Y. 476; s. c. 22 N. 
 E. Rep. 1080; Ring«. City of Cohoes, 
 77 N. T. 83; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 574, a 
 case where plaintiff was driving a 
 blind horse up one of defendant's 
 streets; the horse became frightened 
 and could not be restrained by the 
 driver. Seld that this last fact was 
 no defense. 
 
 * Wagner v. Township of Jackson, 
 138 Penn. St. 61; Hey v. City of Phil- 
 adelphia, 81 Penn. St. 44; s. c. 23 
 Am. Rep. 733. 
 
 * City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 59 Ga. 
 644; 8. c. 27 Am. Rep. 396; 60 Ga. 
 473. 
 
 * Baltimore, <fce.. Turnpike Co. v. 
 Bateman, 68JMd.,389; s. c. 13 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 54; Kennedy u County Comm'rs, 
 69 Md. 65; a. c. 14 Atl. Rep. 524. 
 
 ' Hull V. City of Kansas, 54 Mo. 
 601; s.c.l4Am. Rep. 487. 
 
 * Brooksville, &c.. Turnpike Co. «, 
 Pumphrey, 59 Ind. 78; s. c. 26 Am. 
 Rep. 76. 
 
 ' Baldwin v. Tumpikfe Co., 40 Conn. 
 238. The burden of proof of negli- 
 gence is on the plaintiff. Button v. 
 Prink, 51 Conn. 342; 8. c. 50 Am. 
 Rep. 24. 
 
 '° Winship e. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197. 
 
 " Hunt v. Town of Pownall, 9 Vt. 
 411. 
 
 " Balbridge, &c.. Bridge Co. v. 
 Cartrett, 75 Tex. 628; s. c. 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 8. 
 
 " Cf. Sherwood v. City of Ham- 
 ilton, 37 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 410, 
 which contains an extensive review of 
 the cases bearing on the subject, and 
 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 448. A 
 defect which causes a horse to run 
 away upon a railroad track for over a 
 mile, where it is killed by a train, is 
 not the proximate cause of the injury. 
 West Mahanoy «. Watson, 116 Penn. 
 St. 344; 8. c. 9 Atl. Rep. 430. 
 
 '* Alexander v. Town of New Cas- 
 tle, 115 Ind. 61; 8. C. 17 Atl. Rep. 200. 
 
 " Butterfield «. Forrester, 11 East, 
 60, and see § 8, supra. 
 
326 
 
 THE LAW OP THE ROAD, 
 
 [§ 246. 
 
 out of (b« defendant's neglect, it was held that a traveler who 
 suffers an iltjar j from a defect, or obstruction, in the high- 
 way, mniii, in order to recover damages, be able to show that 
 he himself exercised ordinary care to ^void the injury. In 
 that case Lbrd EUenborough said : — " A party is not to cast 
 himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the 
 fault of aiiother, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself 
 use common and ordinary caution to be in the right." ^ 
 This is the general rule of law as to contributory negli- 
 gence, which applies, as of course, to actions brought by 
 travelers for injuries received by reason of defects or ob- 
 structions upon the highway,^ and is not affected by an omis- 
 
 ' See the opinion in tliis case in full 
 in § 9, m/gva. 
 
 ' Smith *. Sniith, 2 Pick. 621; s. o. 
 
 13 Am. Dec. 464; Thompson ■e. 
 Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 190; Lane v. 
 Crombie, 12 Pick. 177; Adams v. Car- 
 lisle, 21 Pick. 147; Oarsley «. "White, 
 21 Pick. 256; Palmer v. Andover, 2 
 Cush. 605; Eirby v. Boylston Market, 
 
 14 Gray, 251; Hibbard v. Thompson, 
 109 Mass. 288; Reed v. Northfield, 13 
 Pick. 94; 8. 0. 23 Am. Dec. 662; Hor- 
 ton v. Ipswich, 12 Cush. 493; Johnson 
 ■B. Whitefleld, 18 Me. 286; s. c. 36 
 'Am. Dec. 721; !Prench v. Brunswick, 
 21 Me. 29: s. c. 88 Am. Dec. 250; 
 Kaymond v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. 
 '524; s. c. 53 Am. Dec. 57. In (Jerald 
 
 v. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 580, 
 plaintiff, instead of crossing the street 
 to avoid an obstruction, went around 
 it on the patt of the highway used for 
 carriages Only, aiid was injured by a de- 
 fect in the road. Held, that whether he 
 -was justified in so doing, and whether 
 his conduct was reasonable and pru- 
 dent must be left to the jury. Baker 
 «. Portland, 58 JlLe. 199; 8. c. 4 Am. 
 Bep. 274; Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 
 Mass. 69; a. c. 6 Ain. Rep. 191; City 
 of Vickstyiir^ i. Hennessy, 54 Miss. 
 391; 8 c. 28 Am. Rep. It64; Evans «. 
 City of ITtfca, 69 N. T. 166; s. c. 25 
 Am. Rep. ISS; BMg v. thoinpson, 87 
 
 Penn. St. 365; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 364; 
 Bruker v. Town of Covington, 69 Ind. 
 33; 8. c. 35 Am. Rep. 202; Town of 
 Albion V. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545; B. c. 
 46 Am. Rep. 230: Cityof Montgomeiy 
 V. Wright, 72 Ala. 411; 8. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 422; Erie v. Magill, 101 Penn. 
 St. 616; 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 789. In 
 City of Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 HI, 
 329, where the person injured was a 
 young lady, it was held that the stand- 
 ard of caution to be adopted was not 
 "what ordinary young ladies would 
 do," but rather "what a woman of 
 ordinary prudence would do." City 
 of Huntington v. Breen, 77 Ind. 29; 
 Henry Co. Turnpike Co. v. Jackson, 
 86 Ind. Ill; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 274; 
 Wilson V. Trafalgar, 93 Ind. 287; Mc- 
 Laury «. City of McGregor, 54 Iowa, 
 717; Munger v. Marshalltown, 66 
 Iowa, 216; s. c. 59 Iowa, 763; Cressy 
 «. Postville, 59 Iowa, 62; Parkhill v. 
 Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103; followed in 
 McGinty «. City of Keokuk, 66 Iowa, 
 725; Osage City «. Brown, 27 Kan. 
 74; City of Salina «. Trosper, 27 Kan. 
 545; Corbett v. City of Leavenworth, 
 27 Kan. 673: Maultby % City of Leav- 
 enworth, 28 Kan. 745. " The way in 
 which an accident happens usually 
 shows, after it is over, that it might 
 have been avoided if the injured pailif 
 had been possessed with the fon- 
 
§ 247.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 327 
 
 sion to accept such cases in the statute giving the right of 
 action.^ 
 
 § 247. Not negligent to use a defective highway.— When 
 
 the highway is out of order it is held, as a general rule, not 
 negligent to use it in as prudent a way as practicable, which 
 is to say that using a defective highway is not negligence as 
 a matter of law. It would be an extraordinary rule that 
 made it negligence not to stay indoors whenever the highway 
 is out of repair.' But when the condition of the highway is 
 
 thought to escape U, by taking some 
 other route. But ordinary prudence 
 is not inspired with such forethought, 
 and the law does not impute negli- 
 gence for a failure to foresee and es- 
 cape such dangers. It is for the jury 
 to say whether, under all the circum- 
 stances, his conduct was not ordinarily 
 prudent." Soewer n. City of Sedalia, 
 77 Mo. 431, 446, per Martin, C. ; Drew 
 V. Town of Sutton, 55 Vt. 586; s. c. 45 
 Am. Rep. 644; Reynolds v. Burling- 
 ton, 52 Vt. 300; Fassett «. Roxhury, 
 55 Vt. 553; Durant b. Palmer, 39 N. 
 J. Law, 544; Maloy s. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 58 Barb. 182; Templeton 
 c. Montpelier, 56 Vt. 828; Dewire v. 
 Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 319; Weston «. Elevated R. Co., 
 73 N. T. 595; Aurora v. Dale, 90 Bl. 
 46; Hutchison v. Collins, 90 III. 410; 
 Aurora v. Hillman, 90 lU. 61. One 
 who crosses a bridge with an unusual- 
 ly heavy load does so at his own risk. 
 Fulton Iron Works v. Kimball, 52 
 Mich. 146. A person has a right to 
 assume the safety of the sidewalk on 
 which he is walking until warned of 
 danger; and where the jury finds that 
 a person who in broad day falls into 
 an open coal-hole, which is unguarded, 
 as required by city ordinance, is not 
 guilty o£ contributory negligence, 
 auch finding w conclusive. Jennings 
 «. Van Schaick, 108 N. T. 530; s. c. 
 15 N. £. Rep. 424. A driver of a 
 loaded team may be in the exercise of 
 
 reasonable care, although he is lying 
 down upon his load, vrrapped up in 
 blankets. Parish v. Eden, 63 Wis. 
 272. Schonhoff s. Jackson Branch R. 
 Co., 97 Mo. 151; s. c. 10 S. W. 618; 
 Abemethy v. Van Buren, 52 Mich. 
 383; Tordy 9. Marshall County, 80 
 Iowa, 405; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 1043; 
 Clapp V. Town of Ellington, 3 N. T. 
 Supl. 516; 8.C. 33 Abb. New Cas. 387; 
 Woodbury i>. City of Owosso, 64 
 Mich. 339; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 130; 
 Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Penn.), 
 
 8 Atl. Rep. 209. In Pennsylvania in- 
 toxication is negligence per se. Her- 
 shey ». Township of Millcreek(Penn.), 
 
 9 Atl. Rep. 452. 
 
 • Laney v. Chesterfield County, 29 
 8. C. 140; 8. 0. 7 S. E. Rep. 56. 
 
 ' City Council of Montgomery v, 
 Wright, 72 Ala. 411; b. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 422. That plaintiff was running 
 through a public street. On a dark 
 night, to assist in extinguishing a fire, 
 when he fell into a ditch and received 
 the injury complained of, does not 
 show contributory negligence. No- 
 blesville Gas & Imp. Co. v. Loehr, 134 
 Ind. 79; B.C. 24 N. B. Rep. 579. City 
 of Huntington «. Breen, 77 Ind. 29; 
 Henry Co. Tunipike Co. d. Jackson, 
 86 Ind. Ill; 8. 0. 44 Am. Rep. 274; 
 Albion V. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545; b. c. 
 46 Am. Rep. 230; Osage City v. 
 Brown, 37 Ean. 74; City of Salina o. 
 Trosper, 27 Kan. 645; Dewire «. 
 Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; & c. 41 Am. 
 
328 
 
 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. 
 
 [§ 247. 
 
 such that it is bbviously dangerous to go upOn it, and it ap- 
 pears that the plaintiff might easily have taken another 
 course and avoided the danger, there can be no recovery in 
 case of an injury. To go upon such a highway, under such 
 circumstances, is negligence sufficient to bar an action for 
 damages.' Mere knowledge, however, of defects or danger in 
 the highway, on the part of the person injured thereby, is 
 not conclusive evidence of negligence contributing to the 
 injury.* As, for instance, where one has proceeded so far in 
 
 Rep. 219 ; Weston v. Elevated R. Co., 
 73 N. T. 595. So a city may become 
 liable for an injury from the slippery 
 condition of a sidewalk by reason of 
 ice upon it. Dooley «. City of Meri- 
 den, 44 Conn. 117; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 
 433; Aurora ®. Hillman, 90111.61; 
 Reed v. Northfleld, 13 Pick. 94; s. c. 
 23 Am. Dec. 662; Evans v. City of 
 Utica, 69 N. T. 166; 8. c. 25 Am. 
 Rep. 165; Nave v. Flack, 90Ind. 205; 
 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 205. 
 
 ' Merrill v. North Yarmouth, 78 Me. 
 200; S.O. 57 Am. Rep. 794; City of Erie 
 ■e. Magill, 101 Penn.lSt. 616; s. c. 47 
 Am. Rep. 739; Fleming d. City of 
 Lockhaven, Sup. Ct., Penn., 16 W. 
 N. C. 216; Schaefler v. City of San- 
 dusky, 33 Ohio St. 246; s. c. 31 
 Am. Rep. 533; City of Centralia 
 V. Krouse, 64 111. 19. Here the prin- 
 ciple of mlunti non fit ir^v/ria ap- 
 plies. Durkin n. City of Troy, 61 
 Barb. 437; Parkhill ®. Brighton, 61 
 Iowa, 103; Wilson r>. City of Charles- 
 town, 8 Allen, 137; Corbett v. City of 
 Leavenworth, 27 Kan. 673. See, 
 however, Pomfrey v. Saratoga 
 Springs, 34 Hun (N. T.) 607, where it 
 was held that the defendant was not 
 entitled to a charge that if plaintiff 
 could see the obstruction he should 
 have gone around it, the question for 
 the jury being whether, on all the 
 facts, there was negligence on the 
 plaintiff's part. 
 
 ' Alleghany County v. Broadwaters, 
 
 69 Md. 533; s.c. 16 Atl. Rep. 223; Har- 
 ris V. Township of Clinton, 64 Mich. 
 447; S.C. 31 N. W. Rep. 425, two good 
 cases. See, also, § 37, twpra, and the 
 notes. Reed 'b. Northfleld, 13 Pick. 
 94; 8. 0. 23 Am. Dec. 662; Marble n. 
 Worcester, 4 Gray, 404; Frost v. Wal- 
 tham, 12 Allen, 86; Snow v. Housa- 
 tonic R. Co:, 8 Allen, 4S0; Henry Co. 
 Turnpike Co. n. Jackson, 86 Ind. Ill; 
 s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 274; Estelleu. Lake 
 Crystal, 27 Minn. 243; Kelly v. Rail- 
 road Co., 28 Minn. 98; Evans «. City 
 of Utica, 69 N. T. 166; b. c. 25 Am. 
 Rep. 165; GriflSn «. Auburn, 58 N. H. 
 121; Thomas v. Mayor, 28 Hun, llOr 
 County Commissioners u. Burges, 61 
 Md. 29; Bullock a City of New York, 
 99 N. Y. 654, holding that the city 
 was under the duty to maintain its 
 sidewalks in a reasonably safe con- 
 dition for public use, and though de- 
 fective, persons still had the right to 
 walk on them, though they knew of the 
 defects, and whether they were care- 
 less in so using them would be a 
 question for the jury. Maultby 
 11. City of Leavenworth, 28 Kan. 746; 
 Loewer v. City of Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431; 
 Templeton v. Montpelier, 56 Vt. 828; 
 Dewire d. Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; s. c. 
 41 Am. Rep. 219; City Councfl of 
 Montgomery v. Wright, 72 Ala. 411; 
 s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 422; Town of Al- 
 bion u Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545; B. c. 46 
 Am. Rep. 230; Nave ». Flack, 90 
 Ind. 205; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 205. 
 
§ 248.] THE LAW OF THE BOAB. 329 
 
 a narrow pass before being warned of danger ahead that he 
 is unable to turn baok.^ 
 
 § 248. Qualification of this rale.— But it has been held 
 in Indiana that a person injured bj an obstruction in the 
 highway, of which he has knowledge, and which he 
 attempts to pass in the night, when it was too dark for him 
 to see it, has no remedy, such conduct being negligence 
 per se.^ So, also, where one attempts in the dark to pass 
 an open cellarway in a sidewalk, knowing, but for the 
 moment forgetting, about it, it is such contributory negli- 
 gence as will defeat his recovery for injuries sustained by 
 falling into it.* In City of Bloomington v. Perdue * it was 
 held that a young woman who was injured by a fall upon 
 a defective pavement, which induced a more serious in- 
 ternal disorder, but who, from ignorance of the nature of 
 her affection, did not promptly call in a physician, was 
 not, on that account, guilty of contributory negligence j 
 that the disease superinduced by the fall was a proximate 
 effect of the fall, and that an action for damages therefor 
 would lie against the city.' 
 
 ' Atrwater v. Town of Veteran, 6 316, "with the case of Bovee b. Town 
 
 N. T. Supl. 907. of Danville, 53 Vt. 190, an action for 
 
 ' President and Trustees of the injuries from a defective highway, one 
 
 Town of Mt. Vernon v. Desouchett, 2 of the injuries being a miscarriage, 
 
 Ind. 586; s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 467. whereby twins prematurely came into 
 
 So, also, in Iowa as to a side- the world, and proved love's labor 
 
 walk in bad condition. McGinty lost. The trial court charged that 
 
 V. City of Keokuk, 66 lovra, 725. plaintiff, the mother, was entitled to 
 
 ' Bruker o. Town of Covington, 69 recover, among other tlungs for any 
 
 Ind. 33; s. c. 35 Am, Rep. 302; and injury to her feelings occasioned by 
 
 see King s, Thompson, 87 Penn. St. the misfortune. Ross, J., in review- 
 
 365; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 364; ParkhiU ing this part of the charge, uses this 
 
 V. Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103; followed in language: — 'Any injured feelings fol- 
 
 McGinty ». City of Keokuk, 66 Iowa, lowing the miscarriage, not part of 
 
 725; Aurora v. Dale, 90 111. 46; the pain naturally attending it, are 
 
 Hutchison v. Collins, 90 HI. 410 ; too remote to be considered an ele- 
 
 Kelly V. Doody, 116 N. Y. 575; 8. c. ment of damage. If the plaintiff 
 
 22 N. E. Rep. 1084. lamented the loss of her offspring, 
 
 ' 99 HI. 329. such grief involves too much an ele- 
 
 ' "I must close this amusing sub- ment of sentiment to be left to the 
 
 ject," says Mr. Irving Browne, at the conjecture and caprice of a jury. If, 
 
 end of his chapter on Kegligence, in like Rachel, she wept for her children, 
 
 "Humorous Phases of the Law," p. and would tmI be comforted, a ques^ 
 
330 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 250. 
 
 § 219. The obligation of the traTeler on a defectire 
 highway. — The law imposes upon the traveler the duty of 
 ordinary care, and this is the measure of his obligation 
 when he brings an action for damages for an injury sustained 
 by reason of an obstacle or defect in the highway. Accord- 
 ingly, in proportion as the risk of injury increases, must his 
 care and diligence to avoid injury be increased. It is, there^ 
 fore, held that a traveler is bound to exercise greater care 
 and attention in passing over a highway while it is under- 
 going repairs, by which it is partly obstructed, than he 
 would be required to exercise under ordinary circumstances,* 
 and more care in going about in the darkness of the night 
 than in the day-time,' But when one drives from the country 
 into a city, it is not contributory negligence for him to drive 
 through a public street and through what appears to be a 
 mere pool of water standing there, there being in fact a con- 
 cealed hole two and one-half feet deep under the pool.' 
 
 § 250. Injuries from excavations in the highway.— 
 
 Where one, by permission of the city authorities, has dug up 
 the sidewalk, or some portion of it, in excavating for a vault, 
 or other proper purpose, and has built a bridge or passage- 
 way over his excavation somewhat higher than the rest of 
 the walk, he is bound to make the passage reasonably safe, 
 but not exactly as safe as though there were no excavation ; 
 and, in passing such a place, it is the duty of travelers to 
 
 tionof eontinuing damage is presented, 735; Pierce v. Wliitcomb. 48 Vt. 127; 
 
 too delicate to be weighed by any s. c. 81 Am. Rep. 120; Evans v. City 
 
 scales which the law has yet in- of TJtica, 69 N. Y. 166; b. c. 25 Am. 
 
 vented.'" ,, Rep. 165; Rectors. Kerce, 3 Thomp. 
 
 ' Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Me. 187; s c. & C. 416; Durant e. Palmer, 39 N. J. 
 
 33 Am. Dec. 653. Law, 544. Testimony to prove that 
 
 ' Crofts V. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. plaintiff's wife was in ill health, and 
 319; Davis v. Falconbridge, an En- his anxiety to reach home, when it is 
 glish county court case, reported, admitted that he was able to leave 
 on this point, in 45 Am. Rep. 650, home to attend to his ordinary busi- 
 note; Bruker v. CoTingtonj 69 Ind. ness, is inadmissible as an element nf 
 33; B. c. 35 Am. Rep. 303; Maloy e. proof to excuse the plaintiff in incur- 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 58 Barb. 183; ring the risk which he might not other- 
 King V. Thompson, 87 Penn. St. 365; wise have taken. Harris «. Township 
 8. c. 30 Am. Rep. 364; Parkhill v. of Clinton, 64 Mich. 447; a. c. 31 N. 
 Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103; followed in W. Rep. 425. 
 McGinty t>. City of Keokuk, 66 Iowa, ' Hedges «. Kansas, 18 Mo. App. 63. 
 
§ 250.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 331 
 
 exercise somewhat more than their nsnal care and caution.* 
 But when one unlawfully places an obstruction in the high- 
 way, whereby an injury is occasioned, he is, of course, lia- 
 ble.* Where a municipal ordinance requires the owner of 
 
 • Clifford «. Dam, 81 N. T. 56. 
 One who, duly licensed by city au- 
 thorities, removes a sidewalk in order 
 that he may build, and constructs a 
 temporary bridge for the use of per- 
 sons passing, is bound to make the 
 bridge reasonably safe for travelers. 
 Nolan V. King, 97 N. Y. 565; s. c. 49 
 Am. Sep. 561; Fimegan v. Moore, 46 
 N. J. Law, 603. A ditch dug in the 
 street of a borough to lay a water- 
 pipe from & spring to a dwelling- 
 house by authority of a municipal 
 license, is not necessarily a public 
 nuisance, rendering the licensee liable 
 for the neigligence of an independent 
 contractor in performing the work. 
 Smith e. Simmons, 103 Penn. St. 33. 
 One may temporarily obstruct a side- 
 walk for the pTirpose of removing 
 merchandise from his store, without 
 becoming liable for an injury sus- 
 tained by one who, rather than wait, 
 attempts to pass around the obstruc- 
 tion on the steps of defendant's store. 
 Welsh e. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254; a. c. 
 64 Am. Bep. C98. Where a merchant 
 blocked a sidewalk by placing a skid 
 across it during prohibited hours and 
 proceeded to unload goods from a 
 truck, it was held to be a proper ques- 
 tion for the jury, whether a person 
 was negUgent in attempting to climb 
 over the skid instead of going around 
 by the horses' heads or waiting until 
 the obstruction was removed. Lee t>. 
 Nixey, 63 L. T. 385; s. c. 64 J. P. 807. 
 HcGuire v. Spence, 91 N. Y. 303; s. c. 
 43 Am. Rep. 668; Wasmer e. Dela- 
 ware. &c., R Co., 80 N. Y. 313; 8. c. 
 S6 Am. Rep. 608. Where such exca- 
 vation is unauthorized, it is a nui- 
 sance, and those responsible for it be- 
 come liable to any person injured 
 thereby, irrespective of any question 
 
 of negligence. Irvine v. Wood, 51 
 N. Y. 234; 8. c. 10 Am. Rep. 603; 
 Rehberg v. Mayor, &c., of New Yorkj 
 91 N. Y. 137; 8. c. 43 Am. Rep. 657; 
 Brusso V. City of Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 
 679. For a contrary doctrine see 
 City of Lincohi s. Walker, 18 Neb. 
 244, in which it is held that in such a 
 case the pavement must be kept in as 
 safe a condition as though there were 
 no excavation. See, also, Cahill e. 
 Layton, 57 Wis. 600; s. c. 46 Am. 
 Rep. 46; Nave v. Flack, 90 Ind. 305; 
 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 305. 
 
 ' His liability does not necessarily 
 relieve the town. Township of North 
 Manheim i>. Arnold (Penn.), 18 Ati. 
 Rep. 444. One who causes a ditch 
 six feet deep, and two and a half feet 
 wide, to be dug across the traveled 
 portion of a highway, the probable 
 effect of which is to injure third per- 
 sons, is not relieved from liability for 
 injuries thence ai;ising, because he has 
 let the work to a contractor over 
 whom he has no control in the mode 
 of doing it. Ohio South. R. Co. e. 
 Morey (Ohio), 24 N. E. Rep. 269. A 
 telephone company, having a license 
 to erect and nuuntain wires, must 
 remove them within a reasonable 
 time when they become encumbered 
 with ice and fall into the street. 
 Nichols c. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 
 430; 8. c. 53 Am. Rep. 56. It is 
 no defense that there was a good 
 and unobstructed sidewalk on the 
 opposite side of the street. Stuait 
 V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211. Clark 
 V. Chambers, 3 L. R. Q. B. Div. 
 337; Milarkey e. Foster, 6 Oregon, 
 378, 8. c. 35 Am. Rep. 531; Ben- 
 nett e. Lovell, 12 R. L 166; 8. c. 34 
 Am. Rep. 638. 
 
332 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 251. 
 
 materials forming an obstruction in a street to prepare and 
 place lights thereon with such care and diligence as reasona- 
 bly to secure their burning till ddylight, such owner is lia- 
 ble to third persons for injuries incurred through negligence 
 in the performanbe of this duty, either by himself or by a 
 contractor in his employ, even if the lights were extin- 
 guished by an unknown cause.^ And,, where one suffers an 
 injury from an^ obstruction in the street, for which obstruc- 
 tion he is himself responsible, he cannot recoTer.* 
 
 § 251. Eight of pedestrian in the roadway,— A pedestrian 
 has the right to walk in the roadway if he prefers it. Lord 
 Denhanl said : — " A man has a right to walk in the road if he 
 pleases. It is a way for foot passengers as well as for car- 
 riages." His lordship, however, wisely added : — " But he had 
 better not, especially at night, when carriages are passing 
 along."* It is also the right of a pedestrian to cross the road 
 or street at any point, not only at regular crossings, but else- 
 where.* But a pedestrian, while he has equal, has no superior 
 or prior rights in the roadway of a street in a city over 
 vehicles.' It is, therefore, not such an act of negligence as 
 
 ' Wilson V. White, 71 Ga. 506; s. c. from that fact alone negiigence might 
 
 51 Am. Rep. 369. be inf erred." But see the dissenting 
 
 ' Sioux City ®. Weare, 59 Iowa, 95, opinion by Cutting, J., in which he 
 
 Of. Born v. Albany Plank Road, 101 draws a distinction between walking 
 
 Penn. St. 334. along a carriage way, and walking 
 
 ' Boss v. Litton, 5 Car & P, 407. acroga. Gerald v. Boston, 108 Mass. 
 
 A person heedlessly standing in the 584. See, also, McLaiuy v. City of 
 
 oaniage-way of a public street after McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717; Aurora v. 
 
 nightfall, engaged in conversation, Hillman, 90 111. 61. 
 cannot recover for injuries received * Raymond ■■». City of Lowell, 6 
 
 from a carelessly driven vehicle, when Cush. 534; Simons «. Gaynor, 89 
 
 it appears that the driver did not see Ind. 165; Cottrell v. Starkey, 8 Oar. 
 
 the plaintiff in time to avoid the col- & P. 691; Sprihgett, ». Ball, 4 Post. & 
 
 lision. Evans v. Adams Exp. Co., Pin. 473; Collins «. Dodge, 37 Minn. 
 
 132 Ind. 362; s.c. 33 N. E. 1039. Ray- 503; s. 0. 35 N. W. Rep. 368, where 
 
 mond V. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; plaintiff, to avoid an obstruction in the 
 
 B. c. 53 Am. Dec. 67; Coombs h. Pur- walk, turned into an unimproved 
 
 . rington, 43 Me. 332, in which Apple- street in the night time, 
 ton, J., says : — "It would be a novel ' Belton®. Baxter, 54N. T. 245; b. c. 
 
 doctrine to hold that foot-passengers 13 Am. Rep, 578; 58 N. Y. 411; 
 
 have no right to walk in, the street, or, Barker «,'Savage, 45 N. T. 191f B. c. 
 
 that walking therein was prima fade 6 Am. Rep. 66. 
 evidence of want of ordinary care, or 
 
§ 252.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 333 
 
 will bar a recovery for one to walk in the roadway, or attempt 
 to cross the highway elsewhere than at a regular crossing. 
 But where the plaintiff started into the street to enter a street 
 car, and saw an ice-wagon coming up the same track about 
 fifty feet ahead of the car, but after that he did not look to 
 see which side the wagon went to give place to the car, and 
 was run over by it, it was held that he was guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence.^ It is the duty of pedestrians and 
 3)ersons in vehicles alike, when on the highway, to exercise 
 ordinary care, and there is, it seems, no peculiar application 
 of the general rules of law in point in this class of cases.' 
 
 § 353. Deviation from the highway.— In actions against 
 municipal corporations, in cases where a traveler has sus- 
 tained an injury upon the highway because of some defect or 
 ■obstruction therein, it is a general rule that a deviation from 
 the generally traveled track or path will be such negligence 
 as to prevent a recovery. The corporation is to be held re- 
 sponsible for the condition of i]ie highway, not for that of 
 the adjoining land. When the traveler, therefore, leaves the 
 Tiighway, and thereby sustains an injury, he has no action 
 against the town.' But when the traveled part of the high- 
 way is obstructed, it may not be negligent to deviate from the 
 road. It is a proper question for the jury.^ So it is held 
 not contributory negligence to turn somewhat out of the 
 
 » Brooks 0. Schwerin, 54 N. T. 343. Peabody, 128 Mass. 561; Ramsey ». 
 A charge that, ordinarily, the law re- RushviUe, 81 Ind. 894; Leslie «. Lewis- 
 quires the same diligence from the ton, 62 Me. 468. In Kelly v. Fon du 
 -driver of a carriage as from a foot- Lac, 31 Wis. 179, and Fitzgerald v. 
 passenger was held to be erroneous in City of Berlin, 64 Wis. 207, the cor- 
 Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223. See poration is only held responsible for 
 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, defects on the traveled track, and not 
 4th ed., § 654; Chisholm «. Enicker- for the whole width of the highway, 
 bocker Ice Co., 1 N. T. Supl. 743; Hence, even if a defect be in the way 
 Weil «. Wright, 8 N. Y. Supl. 776; proper, but on the side, a person 
 Deegan v. Chapel, 6 N. T. Supl. 166; deviating from the track and suffering 
 Oowan D. Snyder, 5 N. T. Supl. 340; injury cannot recover. Ozier«. Hines- 
 Kendall v. Kendall, 147 Mass. 482; burgh, 44 Vt. 220; McLaury v. City 
 B. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 233; Corey «. of McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717; Drew v. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co., 32 Minn. 457. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 
 
 "ThompsononNegligence, 378, §6. 644. Elliott on Roads and Streets; 
 
 ' City of Scranton d. Hill, 102 Penn. 641, 642. Qf. Aurora v. Hillman, 90 
 
 St. 378; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 211; Zettler HI. 61. 
 
 «. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 195; Larrabee v. * Ramsey ®. Rushville, 81 Ind. 394^ 
 
334 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAS. 
 
 [§ 253. 
 
 •wrought part of the road to get better sleighing;^ and so, also, 
 when a bridge is impassable, it is not negligent to take a by- 
 road to get across the stream.^ 
 
 § 353. Duty of the municipal authorities herein.— It is the 
 
 duty of the town, or other municipal corporations, at any 
 point in the highway where, for any reason, there is danger 
 that travelers may be exposed to injury because of high em- 
 bankments, or because of any other peril of the way, to make 
 and maintain a suitable fence or railing,^ and for any failure 
 so to do, which results in injury to a traveler lawfully pursu- 
 ing his journey, the corporation is liable. But the traveler, 
 in order to recover, must have been using the highway not 
 as a convenience in caring for his stock, but strictly for travel- 
 ing. It was accordingly held, in Vermont, that the town was 
 not liable to one whose horse was injured in falling into a 
 gulf upon the side of the road as he was backing it out of a 
 shed, where it had been left merely for convenience.* The 
 
 ■ Joyner v. Great Barrington, 118 
 Mass. 463. But see Bice v. Montpelier, 
 19 Vt. 470; Green «. Danby, 12 Vt. 
 338; Wheeler v. Westport, 30 Wis. 
 393, and Marshall v. Ipswich, 110 
 Mass. 533. 
 
 " Erie V. Schwingle, 33 Penn. St. 
 384; Briggs «. Guilford, 8 Vt. 364. 
 
 ' Baltimore, &c.. Turnpike Co. v. 
 Cassell, 66 Md. 419; Maxim v. Town 
 of Champion, 4 N. T. Supl. 515; s. c. 
 .60 Hun, 88; Carver «. Detroit, &c., 
 Plank-Road Co., 69 Mich. 616; s. c. 
 25 N. W. Kep. 183. A city street broke 
 ofE in a wall twenty-flve feet high, 
 which in the night-time was not 
 guarded or lighted. Seld, that the 
 jury was justified in finding that one 
 found injured at the bottom of the wall 
 was not guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence. Nowell V. New York, 53 N. 
 T. Super. Ct. 383. Brew «. Town of 
 Sutton, 55 Vt. 586; s. o. 45 Am. Rep. 
 644; City of Chicago v. Hesing, 83 El. 
 204; B. 0. 25 Am. Rep. 378; Hey «. 
 Philadelphia, 81 Penn. St. 44; s. o. 33 
 , Am. Rep. 733; CoUifl v. Dorchester, 
 
 6 Cush. 396; Britton «. Cummingtou, 
 107 Mass. 347; Page v. Bucksport, 64 
 Me. 51; B. G. 18 Am. Rep. 339; Clapp 
 «. City of Providence, 17 How. (IT. S > 
 161; Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176; 
 Baldwin v. Greenwoods Turnpike Co., 
 49 Conn. 338; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 33, 
 where a person, whose horse became 
 frightened through the breaking down 
 of the carriage, ran away, and fell 
 over the side of a bridge by reason of 
 a defect in the railing, was allowed to 
 recover for the injuries the animal re- 
 ceived. Munson ®. Town of Derby, 
 37 Conn. 398; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 332; 
 Houfe V. .Pulton, 29 Wis. 396; a. c. 9 
 Am. Rep. 568; Manderschid «. City 
 of Dubuque, 39 Iowa, 73; b. c. 4 Am. 
 Rep. 196; Oliver v. Worcester, 103 
 Mass. 489; B. c. 3 Am. Rep. 485; Nib- 
 lett V. Nashville, 12 Eeisk. 684; 8. c. 
 27 Am. Rep. 755. 
 
 * Sykes v. Town of Pawlet, 43 Vt. 
 44^; s. 0. 5 Am. Rep. 295. Along the 
 side of the traveled part of a high- 
 way, and within the limits of its loca- 
 tion, was an open ditch made for 
 
§ 253.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 335 
 
 eorporation is bound to guard against the ordinary dangers 
 of travel in this respect, but not against extraordinary or 
 remote dangers — e. g., a town is not bound to erect barriers 
 merely to prevent travelers from straying from the highway 
 and from falling into a pit that they may reach by straying.* 
 But while an action, in such a case, may not lie against the 
 corporation, the owner of land adjoining a highway is liable 
 if he digs a pit so near the traveled way that one in passing 
 along falls in and is thereby injured. Such pitfalls, unfenced 
 •and unguarded, in close proximity to a traveled road or street, 
 are nuisances for which the owner of the land is liable ; * and 
 a barbed wire fence may be constructed so negligently as to 
 
 drainage of the road. Plaintlfl, in 
 paasing from a school-Iiouse to the 
 Toad, in the darkness, fell into this 
 ditch and was injured. &ld, that he 
 had not become a traveler upon the 
 road, and the town was not liable for 
 the injury. Brown «. Skowhegan, 82 
 Me. 273; 8. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 399. See, 
 also. Rice d. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470. 
 InVamey v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 
 430; 8. c. 42 Am. Rep. 592, the plaint- 
 iff, who was six years old at the time 
 of the accident, testified that she was 
 standing by the side of a ditch dug for 
 a sewer, and fell in, that she was play- 
 ing tag with another girl. A verdict 
 ordered for the defendant was sus- 
 tained on the ground that the plaint- 
 iff was using the highway as a 
 play-ground. Bassett t. City of St. ' 
 Joseph, 53 Mo. 290; 8. C. 14 Am. 
 Rep. 446. 
 
 ' A town is not boimd to erect a 
 barrier on a highway to protect trav- 
 elers from falling over a dangerous 
 bank thirty-four feet distant from the 
 traveled part, and nine and a half feet 
 from the line of the highway as lo- 
 cated. Barnes v. Chicopee, 138 Mass. 
 67; B. c. 52 Am. Rep. 259; Puffer v. 
 Orange, 123 Mass. 389; 8. p. 23 Am. 
 Rep. 368; Murphy o. Gloucester, 105 
 Mass. 470; Warner o. Holyoke, 113 
 Mass. 363; Sparhawk«. Salem, 1 Allen, 
 
 30; Adams ®. Natick, 13 Allen, 439; 
 Chapman u Cook, 10 R. I. 304; s. c. 
 14 Am. Rep. 686; Davis v. Hill, 41 N. 
 H. 339; Keys v. Village of Marcellas, 
 50 Mich. 439; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 52; 
 Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R I. 353; s. c. 6 
 Am. Rep. 578. 
 
 " Jones ®. Nichols, 46 Ark. 307; s. c. 
 55 Am. Rep. 575. So where one 
 allows a portion of his premises adjoin- 
 ing the street to be used by the public 
 as part of the highway, and makes an 
 excavation near by, he will be liable if 
 he does not take reasonable care in 
 protecting passers-by from falling in. 
 Beck V. Carter, 68 N. T. 383; s. c. 33 
 Am. Rep. 175 ; Homan v. Stanley, 
 66 Penn. St. 464; b. c. 5 Am. 
 Rep. 389 ; Sanders v. Reister, 1 
 Dakota, 151; Vale v. Bliss, 50 Barb. 
 858; Haughey r>. Hart, 63 Iowa, 96; 
 s. c. 49 ^Am. Rep. 138; Young v. 
 Harvey, 16 Ind. 314; Addison on 
 Torts, 301; Shearman & Redfleld on 
 Negligence, 4th ed., § 347; Du- 
 rant ®. Palmer, 39 N. J. Law, 544; 
 Hadley v. Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P. 53; 
 Barnes o. Ward, 9 C. B. 393; b. c. 19 
 L. J. (C. P.) 195; Corby n. Hill, 4 
 C. B. (N. S.) 556; Hounsell « Smyth, 
 7 C. B. (N. 8. ) 731. See, also, Moyni- 
 han V. Whidden, 143 Mass. 287; Wood 
 on Nuisance, § 289. 
 
336 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 254. 
 
 ma^e the owner liable for injuries to animals lawfully at large 
 in attempting to pass from the highway into the field.* 
 
 § 264. The rule farther stated.— This is the law, notwith- 
 standing the general rule that the owner of land adjoining a 
 highway is not liable for a failure to keep his premises in a 
 safe condition for mere trespassers. It is, indeed, a rule of 
 law that if a person traveling on the highway deviates there- 
 from and falls into a pit on my land, he shall not hold me re^ 
 sponsible for his bruises,* but I must not set traps or dig pitr 
 falls upon my land close to the roadside, and leave them 
 unf enoed and unguarded for my neighbors to fail into. The 
 mere technical trespass involved in stepping off from the high- 
 way and on to the land is not a defense to an action for 
 injuries sustained through such neglect on the part of an 
 owner of land adjacent to the highway.' And, moreover, when 
 a traveler goes from the highway upon adjoining land from 
 necessity, because the highway is temporarily impassable, as 
 from snow drifts, he is not guilty of any trespass whatever, 
 but only does what he has a right to do, if he do no unneces- 
 sary damage.* This rule is insisted upon in the English cases. 
 
 ' Sisk V. Crump, 112 Ind. 504; s. c. * Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush. 408; 
 
 14 N. E. Eep. 381. s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 738, and the note; 
 
 ' Beck V. Carter, 68 N. T. 283; Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487; S. c. 
 
 Victoria ». Baker, 67 N. T. 366; 48 Am. Rep. 811; Holmes v. Seely, 
 
 Gillespie «. McGowen, 100 Penn. St. 19 Wend. 507. While this is so in re- 
 
 144; B. c. 45 Am. Rep. 366; Severy gard to a public highway, it is held 
 
 V. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306; s. c. 21 in Williams v. SafEord, 7 Barb. 309, 
 
 Am. Rep. 514; Indermaur v. Dames, that the grantee of a private way 
 
 L. R. 1 C. P. 274; B. c. L. E. 2 C. P. which has become foundrious and 
 
 311; Sweeny v. Old Colony R. Co., impassable, cannot, without being a 
 
 10 Allen, 368; Sullivan v. Waters, 14 trespasser, go on the adjoining close, 
 
 Ir. C. L. Rep. 460; Southcote ■». Stan- and thus pass around the obstruction, 
 
 ley, 1 Hurl. & N. 247; Housell «. Newkirk v. Sabler, 9 Wend. 652; 
 
 Smyth, 7 0. B. (N. S.) 731; s. C. 97 Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 163; Henn's 
 
 Eng. Com. Law, 731; Howland v. Case.i W. Jones, 296; Ponfret v. 
 
 Vincent, 10 Mete. 371; Harlow v. Ricroft, 1 Saund. 323, note 3; Absor 
 
 Humiston, 6 Cowen, 189; Staffoi-d v. v. French, 2 Show. 28; Young v. 
 
 Ingersol, 3 Hill, 38; Wells e. Howell, , 1 Ld. Raym. 725; Taylor v. 
 
 19 Johns. 385. Qf. Toll Bridge Co. ■». Whitehead, 2 Doug. 645; Bullard v. 
 
 Langrell, 47 Conn. 228. Harrison, 4 Mau. & Sel. 387; B.C. 2 
 
 .' Sanders u Reister, 1 Dakota, 151; Blackstone's Commentaries, 36; 3 
 
 Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217; B, c. Kent's Commentaries, 424; 3 Cruise's 
 
 86 Am. Rep. 367. Digest, 89; Wellbeloved on Ways, 88 
 
§ 255.] THE LAW OF THE ROAD, 337 
 
 "Highways," aaid Lord Mansfield, " are for the public service, 
 and, if the nsual track is impassable, it is for the general good 
 that people should be entitled to pass in another line." ^ And 
 in Comyn's Digest it is said : — " A passenger may break the 
 fence and go extra viam as much as is necessary to avoid the 
 bad way." ^ Very few cases are found in the reports in 
 this country upon this point, but there are, among the few 
 adjudications upon the subject, none that contradict the 
 English rule. But where a town voluntarily provides a tem- 
 porary passage-way over land adjoining a highway obstructed 
 by snow-drifts, it is not liable for defects in the former if the 
 statute prescribes no duty in such a case.' 
 
 § 265. Farther illustrations.— In King v. Thompson,* it 
 was held that an opening in the sidewalk fifteen inches wide 
 and three feet long in front of a cellar window, which was 
 designed for the lighting and ventilation of the cellar, and 
 made in the manner usual in Alkgheny City, is not per se a 
 nuisance, and that when the street is lighted, and one, pass- 
 ing by in the night, steps into the opening and is thereby in- 
 jured, the question of his contributory negligence is one 
 proper to go to the jury.' But when one, in a blinding snow 
 storm, steps into a hole in the pavement, for which he has no 
 reason to be on the lookout, it is not Contributory negligence 
 and he may recover from the town.* Nor is there necessarily 
 contributory fault in failing to notice an open cellar-way 
 while looking into a shop window,' and when the plaintiff 
 fell into a hole in the sidewalk badly covered up, or so cov- 
 ered as to mislead one coming upon it, it was held that he 
 might have his action against the owner of the adjoining 
 property, whose duty it was to keep the sidewalk, as to this 
 
 Woolrych on Ways, 50; Angell on open both by day and by night, and 
 
 Highways, § 353; Thompsonon High- in cases of injury questions of negli- 
 
 ■ways, 3; 3 Waterman on Trespass, gence are for the jury. Day v. Mt. 
 
 § 703. Pleasant, 70 Iowa, 193. 
 
 ' Taylor v. Whitehead, 2 Doug. 749. " Qf. Dillon on Municipal Corpora- 
 
 ' Tit. Chimin, D. 6. tions, § 794; Stewart v. Alcorn, 2 
 
 ' Bogie V. Town of Waupun, 75 Week. Notes Cas. (Penn. 1876) 401. 
 
 Wis. 1; s. c. 43 K. W. Rep. 667. " Aurora v. Dale, 90 111. 46. 
 
 <87 Penn. St. 366; s. c. 30 Am. ' Houston v. Traphagen, 47 K J. 
 
 Rep. 364. The doors of cellar-ways Law, 23. 
 
 in city sidewalks may be lawfully 
 22 
 
338 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 [§ 255. 
 
 opening, reasonably safe for travelers.^ The employment of 
 a man of supposed skill and experience to make a cover for 
 a coal hole does not excuse an abutting owner for failure to 
 have it reasonably secure.* But where one maintains a 
 hatchway in a pavement in a public street, unsafe for travel- 
 ers, and a stranger takes the cover off, and one, being injured 
 thereby, recovers damages from the occupant of the prop- 
 erty, the latter cannot recover indemnity from the intermed- 
 dler, upon the principle in pari ddicto, etc.^ In Indiana, 
 moreover, where one attempts in the night time to pass an 
 open oellarway in the sidewalk, of which he knew, but whiqh, 
 for the moment, he had forgotten, he is held guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence sufficient to bar a recovery for injuries 
 sustained by falling into the cellar.* It was held in New 
 York, two judges dissenting, that where there was no affirm- 
 ative evidence of negligence on the part of a person killed by 
 falling into aihatchway, and no eye-witness of the accident, 
 and the defendant's negligence was clear, a nonsuit was im- 
 
 ' The city is also liable after notice 
 of the defect Peoria v. Simpson, 110 
 111. 294; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 683; Calder 
 V. Smalley, 66 Iowa, 319; s. c. 55 
 Am. Bep. 270; Landrue «. Lund, 38 
 Minn. 538; s. o. 38 N. W. Rep. 699; 
 Dickson «. HoUister, 123 Fenn. St. 
 421; 8. C. 23 W. ir. C. 128; 16 Atl. 
 Rep. 48^ Jennings v. Van Schaick, 
 108 N. Y. 530; s. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 
 424. Whether it is negligent to keep 
 a trap-door open and unguarded in the 
 sidewalk on a much frequented street 
 is a question for the jury. Smith «. 
 Wildes, 148 Mass. 556; s. o. 10 N. E. 
 Rep. 446. The fact that the plaintiff 
 was walking fast on a lighted sidewalk 
 in the evening when he fell over the 
 unguarded door of a manhole does 
 not warrant a nonsuit. Wells v. Sib- 
 ley, 9 N. T. Supl. 343. Hutchison v. 
 Collins, 90 111. 410- Calder «. Smalley, 
 66 Iowa, 219; s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 664 
 
 » Dickson ■b. HoUister, 123Penn. St. 
 421; B. c 16AtLRep. 484. 
 
 ' Churchill ®. Holt, 131 Mass. 67; 
 
 s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 191. But see, also, 
 s. c. 127 Mass. 165; 34 Am. Rep. 355, 
 and Gray v. Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 
 149; s. c. 19 Am: Rep. 344. Thie oc- 
 ' cupant of a building in which is an 
 opening to an elevator shaft facing on 
 a public street, but separated from the 
 sidewalk by a lintel 3 inches high and 
 18 inches wide, is not responsible for 
 injuries received by a passer-by who 
 is accidentally pushed into the open- 
 ing by third persons. Mclntire v. 
 Roberts, 149 Mass. 450; s. c. 22 X. 
 E. Rep. 13. Where a coal hole was 
 4)roperly made and safely covered the 
 owner was not liable for injuries from 
 the wrongful act of a stranger who 
 broke the stone support, the proprie- 
 tor having no notice or knowledge of 
 the defect. Wolf ©. Kilpatrick, 101 
 N. T. 146: s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 672. 
 
 * Broker ®. Town of Covington, 69 
 Ind. 33; s. o. 35 Am. Rep. 202. Qf. 
 President, &c., of Mt. Vernon ■c. Du- 
 souchett, 2 Ind. 586; s. c. 54 Am Dec. 
 467, and the note, and see, also; Dillon 
 on Municipal Corporations, § 789. 
 
§256.] THE LAW OP THE SOAD. 339 
 
 proper, as it was for the jury to. determine the degree of care 
 which the deceased was bound to exercise, to infer; the motive 
 which led him to the hatchway, and to pass upon the ques- 
 tion of negligence.^ 
 
 § 266. Trespass upon the highway.— The use of the high- 
 way for games or sports, dangerous to travelers, is a trespass, 
 and renders the parties guilty of it liable for ^11 damages oc- 
 casioned thereby. " The highway is established for the con- 
 venience of travelers, and the use of it for any g^me or sport, 
 that actually exposes or puts to hazard the personal safety 
 of the traveler thereon, is not justifiable, and subjects the 
 party thus using the road improperly to the payment of all 
 damages occasioned thereby to the traveler." ^ And so, 
 where one using the highway not as a traveler,' but for pur- 
 poses of play or sport, receives an injury from a defect in a 
 highway, it is contributory negligence, and no action will lie 
 against the corporation whose duty it is to keep the highway 
 in repair.' But, in another line of cases, it appears that mere 
 collateral violations of law upon the highway, not contribu- 
 ting to the injury, will not always bar a recovery ; as, where 
 two persons were speeding their horses upon the highway, in 
 violation of a rule as to fast driving, and one purposely ran 
 into the other and injured his sleigh, it was held that the in- 
 jured party might have his action, in spite of the collateral 
 violation of law on his part.' 
 
 ' Galvin v. New York, 113 N. T. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530. See, also, 
 
 223; 8. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 675. Stickney «. Salem, 3 Allen, 374; Stin- 
 
 " Vosburgh v. Moak, 1 Cush. 453; son «. Gardner, 43 Me. 348; Sykes v. 
 
 a c. 48 Am. Dec. 613. Pawlett, 43 Vt. 446; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 
 
 ^ The obligation of the municipality 295; and, for a contrary rul^, in favor 
 
 to keep the highways in repair is en- of one who stopped his horses by the 
 
 forceable only in favor of Jxma fide way to pick some berries, and the 
 
 travelers. Richards e. Enfield, 13 horses, becoming frightened, backed 
 
 Gray, 344. See, also, 2 Dillon on Mu- down a steep bank negligently left 
 
 nicipal Corporations, § 786. The use unfenced, see Britton v. Cimningham, 
 
 of a velocipede on a public sidewalk is 107 Mass. 347 ; and see, also, Babson v. 
 
 not necessarily and universally unlaw- Rockport, 101 Mass. 93; Gregory d. 
 
 ful. Purple V. Greienfleld, 138 Mass. 1. Adams, 14 Gray, 242. 
 
 * McCarthy «. Portland, 67 Me. 167; "Welch ». Wesson, 6 Gray, 505. 
 
 B. c. 24 Am. Rep. 23; Blodgett ®. QT. Schultz «. Milwaukee, 49 Wfc. 
 
 Boston, 8 Allen. 337; Harper v. Mil- 354; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 779, and note, 
 
 waukee, 30 Wis. 365; Higginson d. See, also, § 45, »u§ra. 
 
340 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 258, 
 
 § 357. niastrations of this rnle.— So, also, where the ac- 
 tion was against the city, and the plaintiff, having driven 
 through the streets at a rate of speed forbidden bj a munic- 
 ipal ordinance was injured by a defect in the street, it ap- 
 pearing that the rate of speed did not contribute to the in- 
 jury, such illegal driving did not prevent a recovery.^ And 
 where one placed his team in the street in a manner forbidden 
 by a municipal ordinance, and was run into and injured by 
 the negligence of the defendant, it was held that he might 
 recover, the position of the plaintiffs team not appearing to 
 have contributed to the collision.* The maintenance of a 
 fruit stand, a permanent structure, upon the sidewalk in the 
 street of a city, so constructed as to encroach upon the high- 
 way, is a nuisance, and that without reference to whether it 
 essentially interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of the 
 sidewalk by travelers or not.' 
 
 § 35S. Leaving horses untied and unattended on the 
 liighway. — Upon the question whether or not it is negligent 
 to leave horses untied and unattended in the public high- 
 way, there is not entire unanimity in the decisions. In Nor- 
 Tis i;. Kohler,* on the one hand, it was said : — "Leaving the 
 liorses unfastened in a public street is undoubted negligence, 
 and so it has been often held," which is the rule declared in 
 several other cases f whereas, in Wasmer v. Delaware, &e., 
 
 > Baker v. Portland, 58 He. 199; city and build thereon permanent 
 B. G. 4 Am. Bep. 274. Of. Heland v. structures for private use. But, more 
 Lowell, 3 Allen, 407. It is not per se than this, he who does seize a part of 
 culpable negligence to drive rapidly the public highway for private pur- 
 through a city street. Carter v. poses knows, not merely as a matter 
 Chambers, 79 Ala. 323. of law, but as matter of fact, that he 
 
 ' Steele «. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59; is invading the rights of all the dti- 
 
 8. c. 6 Am. Bep. 191. But see, also, zens of the State, for all have a right 
 
 Xe Baron «. Joslin, 41 Mich 318; to the free use of every part of the 
 
 State r>. Edens, 85 N. C. 532; Turner highway." 
 
 s. Holtzman, 64 Md. 148; b. c. 39 Am. * 41 N. T. 43. 
 
 Hep 361. » Devilles. Southern Pacific R Co., 
 
 ' State fl. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; s. c. 50 Cal. 383; Morris v. Phelps, 2 HUt. 
 
 '38 Am. Rep. 117, an interesting and 38; Buckingham v. Fisher, 70 III, 
 
 learned opinion. See, also, the anno- 121; Loeser v. Humphrey (Sup. Gt. 
 
 tation in the report. In concluding Ohio), 32 Albany Law Jour. 56; 
 
 iis opinion, the judge said:— "Surely, Gray «. Second Avenue R Co., 
 
 no man can justly claim that he can 65 K. Y. 561. Where a team is 
 
 fieize the public sidewalks of a large left unhitched on a public street, in 
 
§ 259.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 341 
 
 E. Co.,^ on the other hand, it was said : — " There is no absolute 
 rule of law that requires one who has a horse in the street 
 to tie him, or to hold him by the reins. It would, doubtless, 
 be careless to leave a horse in a street wholly unattended, 
 without tying him to something. But it is common for per- 
 sons doing business in streets with horses to leave them 
 standing in their immediate, presence, while they attend to 
 the business, and it is not unlawful for them to do so. It is 
 commonly safe so to do, and accidents are rarely occasioned 
 thereby ; " and in that case it was held that it was not con- 
 tributory negligence for one peddling kindling wood to leave 
 his horse untied,' and go a short distance away from the 
 wagon to solicit a customer, although the horse, being fright- 
 ened by an approaching railway train, ran upon the track, 
 and the owner going after it in pursuit was run over and 
 killed, and this, although there was also a city ordinance for- 
 bidding any man to leave his horse in the street unless se- 
 curely tied.' 
 
 § 259. The same subject continaed.— A horse unlawfully 
 at large upon a highway is a nuisance, and its owner is liable 
 for any damage done by it, whether the horse is vicious or 
 not.' But where a horse escapes from a proper enclosure 
 without fault on the part of the owner, and does damage, it 
 seems that the owner is not liable.* When the plaintiff's 
 horse is frightened by some unusual object, likely to frighten 
 
 violation of a city ordinance, and s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 205; Decker v. 
 
 runs away and injures a person, the Gammon, 44 Me. 332; Barnes v. Cha- 
 
 owner is liable. Bott v. Pratt, 33 pin, 4 Allen, 444. The owner is 
 
 Minn. 323; s. c. 53 Am. Kep- 47. Of. bound to keep such animals, at aU 
 
 Southworthi). Old Colony, Ac, R. Co., times and in all places, properly se- 
 
 105 Mass. 343 ; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 528; cured; and is responsible to any one 
 
 Davis V. Dudley, 4 AJlen, 557. who without fault on his part is in- 
 
 ' 80 N. Y. 212; e. c 86 Am. Rep. jured by them. Lyons ». Menick, 105 
 
 608. Mass. 76; Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. 
 
 ' See, also, Southworth v. Old Col- Y. 400; Goodman v. Gay, 15 Penn. 
 
 ony, &c., R. Co., 105 Mass. 343; St. 188; Fallon v. O'Brien, 13 R. I. 
 
 Titcomb v. Fitchburg R. Co., 13 518; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 713; Lee v. 
 
 Allen, 254; Albert v. Bleecker St. Riley, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 732; Moak's 
 
 R. Co., 2 Daly, 389; Griggs «. Fleck- Cnderhill's Torts, 396, 397, citing 
 
 ensteia, 14 Minn. 81; Strett v. Lau- Southall e. Jones, 5 Vict. L. R. 402. 
 
 mier, 34 Mo. 469; Elliott on Roads < Con a. Burbridge, 13C.B.(N. S.) 
 
 and Streets, 628. 430; Fallon v. O'Brien, 12 R. I. 518. 
 
 ' Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113; Qf. Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336. 
 
342 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 [§259. 
 
 horses, ujpon the highway for which the defendant is legally' 
 responsible, and the horse, being so terrified, does damage, 
 runs awayi or causes other injury to the plaintiff, the defend-^ 
 ant is liable.* But what a oitj has licensed, for a considera- 
 tion, cannot be treated as a nuisance, and accordingly there 
 is no actioid against the city for damages sustained by reason 
 of one's horse becoming frightened at an exhibition of wild 
 animals lawfully upon the highway f nor when the plaint- 
 iff's house was set on fire and burned up by licensed fire- 
 works upoti a holiday f nor when the plaintiff was gored by 
 a cow lawfully at large upon the street of a city.* A de- 
 fective vehicle or harness, if the defect is known to the 
 plaintiff, is a defense to an action for damages for an injury 
 from a defective highway. It is contributory negligence to 
 
 ' Bennett v. Lovell, 12 R. I. 166; 
 8. c. 34 Am. Rep. 628, and note; Por- 
 shay B. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288; 
 8. c, 3 Am. Rep. 73; Ayer ®. City of 
 Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; 8. c. 12 Am. 
 Rep. 396; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. 
 H. 199; Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N. H. 
 18; Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 
 358; Knight «.' Qoodyear Rubber Co., 
 38 Conn. 438; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 406; 
 Ring V. City of Cohoes, 77 N. T. 83; 
 8. c. 33 Am. Rep. 574; Brooksville v. 
 Pumphrey, B9 Ind. 78; s. c. 26 Am. 
 Rep. 76. But see, contra, Keith t. 
 Easton, 2 Allen, 552, wherein plaint- 
 ifi'8 horse became frightened at a 
 large vehicle used as daguerreotype 
 saloon, which stood partly within the 
 limits of a highway. It was held 
 that the town was not liable for inju- 
 ries sustained by the horse in running 
 away. The test adopted by the court 
 was, whether the cause of fright was 
 a defect in one of the proper attri- 
 butes of a way, for which only the 
 town could be liable. Such a daguer- 
 reotype saloon was held to be entirely 
 without the attributes of a road. The 
 court inter alia said : — " Cattle or 
 horses rucming at large might frighten 
 the traveler's horse; the sight of flags 
 displayed; the goods displayed in 
 front of shops; the gathering of agri- 
 
 cultural fails, military trainings, and 
 other public occasions, may any or all 
 of them tend to frighten many pass- 
 ing horses; yet it would be a novel 
 doctrine to hold that highway survey- 
 ors may interfere in such cases under 
 their authority to repair highways, or 
 that the attributes of away include 
 them because they may frighten 
 horses," Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 
 Allen, 186; Macomber v. Nichols 
 (Cooley, C. J.), 34 Mich. 212; s. c. 22 
 Am. Rep. 522; Favor «. poston, &c., 
 R. Co., 114 Mass. 350; 8. c. 19 Am. 
 Rep. 364; Rivers n. City Council of 
 Augusta, 65 Ga. 376; 8. c. 38 Am. 
 Rep. 787; Little v. City of Madison, 
 42 Wis. 643; s. o. 24 Am. Rep. 435; 
 Cole «. City of Newbuiyport, 129 
 Mass. 594; and see, also, Harris «. 
 Mobbs, 3 L. R. Exch. Div. 268; Wat- 
 kins e. Reddin, 2 Fost. & Fin. 629; 
 Smith D. Stokes, 4 Best & S. 84; Hill 
 ®. Board of Aldermen of Charlotte, 
 72 N. C. 55; 8. c. 21 Am. Rep. 451. 
 
 ' Cole i>. City of Newburyport, 129 
 Mass. 594; Little v. City of Madison, 
 49 Wis. 605. 
 
 • Hill «. Board of Aldermen of 
 Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; Tindleye. City 
 of Salem, 187 Mass. 171. 
 
 < Rivers j>. City Council of Augusta, 
 65 Ga. 376. 
 
§ 260.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 
 
 343 
 
 go upon the highway with such a conyeyanee.* " The 
 plaintiff," said Shepley, 0. J., " must show that the accident 
 occurred wholly by the defect of the road, and without any 
 fault on his part."' But if the defect in the conveyance is 
 unknown to the plaintiff, it is not as a rule a defense to his 
 action.* 
 
 § 260. Unskillful or reckless drlTlng.— Unskillful or reck- 
 less driving is also such negligence on the part of a plaintiff as 
 will prevent a recovery in case it contributes to produce the in- 
 jury ;* but, in case it does not appear to have contributed . to 
 occasion the misehief , the plaintiff may, nevertheless, recover.^ 
 So it is held that permitting a woman to drive a horse upon a 
 
 ' Jenks ». Wilbraham, 11 Gray, 142; 
 Allen v. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230; Farrar v. 
 Oreene, 32 Me. 574; Moore «. Abbott, 
 33 Me. 46. In an action for injuries 
 caused by the upsetting of a stage in 
 which plaintiff was riding, through ob- 
 structions in the highway, an instruc- 
 tion that if either of the horses draw- 
 ing the vehicle was balky or otherwise 
 unmanageable it was negligence to 
 drive them, was properly refused. 
 Clamberlain v. Town of Wheatland, 
 7 N. Y. 8upl. 190. Where the harness 
 was in good condition and the rein 
 broke because of the driver's efforts 
 to restrain the horse, it did not pre- 
 vent a recovery. PhiUips v. New 
 Tork, &c., K. Co., 6 N. T. Supl. 621. 
 Springett d. Ball, 4 Post. & Pin. 472; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1208, § 55. 
 
 ' Farrar n. Greene, 33 Me. 574; and 
 see Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 Car. & P. 691. 
 
 » Palmer e. Andover, 2 Cush. 600; 
 Hodge V. Bennington, 43 Vt. 450; 
 Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; 
 Winship «. Enfield, 43 N. H. 197; 
 Tutfle V. Parmington, 58 N. H. 126. 
 But see, contra, Anderson v. Bath, 42 
 Me. 346; Perkins v. Fayette, 68 Me. 
 152; Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen, 557; 
 Titus «. Norihbridge, 97 Mass. 258; 
 Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Hawes 
 «. Fox Lake, 33 Wis. 438. See, also. 
 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1086, § 3; 
 Shearman & Bedfield on Negligence, 
 4th ed., § 378; Elliott on Roads and 
 Streets, 453, 626. 
 
 * Flower v. Adams, 3 Taunt. 314; 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 
 Penn. St. 306; a. c. 49 Am. Rep. 680. 
 The fire department is subject to a 
 city ordinance which prohibits im- 
 moderate driving in the streets the 
 same as the general public. Morse e. 
 Sweenie, 15 111. App. 486. Peoria 
 Bridge Association v. Loomis, 20 111. 
 235; Acker v. County of Anderson, 
 
 20 S. C. 495; Cassidy n'. Stockbridge, 
 
 21 Vt. 391. 
 
 ' Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407; 
 Stuart V. Machias Port, 48 Me. 477; 
 Welch c. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505; Baker 
 ■B. Portland, 58 Me. 199; B. c. 4 Am. 
 Rep. 274. And see, also, § 45, supra. 
 In Alger v. LoweU, 3 Allen, 403, it is 
 held that an action lies against a ^ity - 
 to recover damages sustained by being 
 pushed from a public street down an 
 unguarded declivity, if it was not done 
 by the wilful act or negligence of the 
 crowd, or any person therein. The 
 fact that the plaintiff was intoxicated, 
 however, would have to go to the 
 jury in order to determine whether 
 any contributory negligence was pres- 
 ent. 
 
344 THE LAW OF THE BOAD, [§ 261. 
 
 highway is iiot conclusive upon the question of the plaintiff's 
 want of care.^ The law inclines to require the same degree of 
 care of a woman as of a man f but it is said that a woman 
 driving a horse upon a highway may be presumed to be 
 somewhat wanting in the amount of knowledge, skill, dex- 
 terity, steadiness of nerve, and coolness of jndgmentr— in 
 short, that reasonable degree of competeilcy which we may 
 presume in a man, and that a person meeting her under cir- 
 cumstances threatening collision should govern his own con- 
 duct with some regard to her probable deficiencies.' 
 
 I 361. Sanday traveling. — "Dies dominicm non est juridi- 
 cus," but with this qualification Sunday, at common law, 
 differed from no other day in the week. Courts might not 
 lawfully sit upon that day ; service of process and arrest in 
 civil causes were prohibited, and no judicial act could be 
 done,* but business transactions of every kind upon that day- 
 were valid." Lord Mansfield said that Sunday is a dies non 
 juridicus, not made so by statute but by a canon of the 
 church incorporated into the common law.' Prior to the year 
 A. D. 517, however, the Christians used all days alike for the 
 hearing of causes, not sparing Sunday itself. This they did 
 
 ' Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 198 ; Bl. 526; MacKaUe/s Case, 9 Co. 66; 
 Bigelow v. Hutland, 4 Cush. 247; s. c. Cro. Jac. 279. In Isaacs v. Beth 
 Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93; Hamedasli Society. 1 Hilt. 469, how- 
 Blood V. Tyngsboro, 103 Mass. 509. ever, it was held that an award drawn 
 
 " Hassenger >. Michigan, &c., R. up on Sunday, the arbitrators all 
 
 Co., 48 Mich. 205; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. being Jews, but not dated and de- 
 
 470, an Instractive opinion by Judge livered up until the next day, was 
 
 Cooley; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29 Conn. valid. Van Riper v. Van Riper, 1 
 
 204; Snow B.Provincetown, 120 Mass. Southard (N. J.) 156; s. c. 7 Am. 
 
 580. Dec. 576; Proffatt on Jury Trial, § 
 
 » Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 83; cf. 455; Browne's "Humorous Phases of 
 
 City of Bloomington o. Perdue, 99 the Law," 14. 
 111. 329. = Comyns «. Boyer, Crd. Eliz. 405; 
 
 * See, upon this point, in general. Rex. v. Brotherton, Stra. 708; Prin- 
 
 Hiller v. English, 4 Strobh. (Law) 486; sor's Case, Cro. Car. 602; Walte v. 
 
 Story 0. Elliot, 8 Cowen, 27; b. c. 18 Hundred of Stoke, Cro. Jac. 496. See. 
 
 Ajn. Dec. 423; Coleman f>. Henderson, also, City Council c. Benjamin, 2 
 
 Littell's Select Cases (Ky.) 171; s. c. Strobh. 508; s. c. 49 Am. Dec. 608, 
 
 12 Am. Dec. 290, and note ; True v. and the note. 
 Plumley, 36 Me. 466; Swan v. Broome, " Swan ®. Broome, 3 Burr, 1597. 
 
 3 Burr, 1597; b. c. 2 Bl. 527; 1 Wm. 
 
§ 262.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 345 
 
 for two reasons ; first, to rebuke the heathen superstition as 
 to lucky and unlucky days, and second, that, by keeping their 
 own courts always open, they prevented Christian suitors 
 from resorting to the heathen tribunals.^ " But, in the year 
 517, a canon was made : ' Qitod niHltis episcoptts vd infra positus 
 die dominico causas judicare prcesumat;' and this canon was 
 ratified in the time of Theodosius, who fortified it with an 
 imperial constitution : ' Sdis die \jjuem dominicum rede diocere 
 majoresl omnium omnio litium et negotiorum quiescat inteniio.' 
 Other canons were made, in which vacations were appointed. 
 These, and other canons and constitutions, were received and 
 adopted by th& Saxon kings of England. They were all con- 
 firmed by William the Conqueror, and Henry H, and so be- 
 come part of the common law of England."^ By statute 29, 
 Car. n,^ which has been copied in most of the States of the 
 Union, it is provided, inier alia, that: — "No tradesman, 
 artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever, 
 shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work, of 
 their ordinary calling, upon the Lord's day, or any part 
 thereof, work of necessity and charity only excepted." 
 
 § 262. The New England mle. — The adjudications in the 
 several States, and in England, under these statutes are very 
 numerous,* but with them, for the purposes of this treatise, 
 we are not concerned, except so far as in the New England 
 States it has been held that the wrong-doing involved in 
 traveling upon the Lord's day, whenever it is not a work of 
 " necessity or charity," is a defense to actions brought by 
 travelers for injuries from defective highways, collisions or 
 any other misadventure upon such Sunday journey. This 
 
 ' Sir Heniy Spelman, quoted by 368, and note. Raising subscriptions 
 
 Lord Mansfield in Swan o. Broome, on the Lord's day to purchase a church 
 
 3 Burr, 1597. was held to be a work of charity. 
 
 =■ Story e. Elliot, 8 Cowen, 27; 8. c. Allen c. Duffle, 43 Mich. 1; s. c. 38 
 
 18 Am. Dec. 428, an interesting opin- Am. Rep. 159, and note. State «. 
 
 ion, in which the learning upon this Larry, 7 Baxt. 95; 8. c. 32 Am. Rep. 
 
 point is fully set out. 555, and note; Robeson ®. French, 12 
 
 -' Chap. 7, § 1. Mete. 2^ s. c. 45 Am. Dec. 236; 
 
 * Many cases are collected in Coleman ». Henderson, Littell's Select 
 
 Browne's "Humorous Phases of the Cases (Ky.) 171; 8. c. 12 Am. Dec. 
 
 Law, "14-47. See, also, Myers e. Mein- 290, and the note, 
 rath, 101 Mass. 366; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 
 
346 THE LAW OF THE BOAS. [§ 263. 
 
 anomalous and erratic doctrine was first announced by Chief 
 Justice Bhaw, of Massachusetts, in the case of Bosworth v. 
 Inhabitants of Swansey.* It was an action brought by a per- 
 son injured, while traveling upon Sunday, by a defect in a 
 highway, and it was held, as an application of the local 
 statute, which provides that " no person shall travel on the 
 Lord's day, except from necessity or charijiy," and that " every 
 person so offending shall be punished by a fine not exceedr 
 ing ten dollars for every offense," that the traveler, in order 
 to maintain his action, must show that he was traveling from 
 necessity or charity, and that a failure so to do would pre- 
 vent any recovery. In many subsequent cases this rule has 
 been applied by the Massachusetts courts — and it is settled 
 law in that State that, when one travels on a Sunday, except 
 upon an errand of " necessity or charity," he can maintain 
 no action for any injury that he may sustain by reason of a 
 defect in the highway, or from collision, or railway accident, 
 or other misadventure. In effect, such a traveler, in Massa- 
 chusetts, takes his life in his hand, and goes forth at his own 
 proper peril. 
 
 § 363. The Massachusetts rule iUnstrated.— It is held, for 
 example, not to be a traveling from necessity or charity to 
 go, on Sunday, to see whether a house, into which you pro- 
 pose to move on Monday, has been properly cleaned and put 
 in order f nor to walk along the streets of Boston to see your 
 employer for the purpose of getting him to change your 
 hours of labor on week days f nor to ride in the street cars 
 from one city to another to call upon a stranger ;* nor to 
 travel about for the purpose of furnishing fresh meat to 
 marketmen f nor for the purpose of selling pigs ;* nor to go 
 to see your friend, on the way home from a funeral (when 
 you venture out on Sunday to a funeral you must go straight 
 there and straight back) ;' nor for a traveling insurance 
 agent, whose sick sister had written to him to meet he;r and 
 
 • 10 Mete. 363; 8. c. 43 Am. Dec. 441. » Jones «. Andover, 10 ADen, 18. 
 
 ' Smith V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 120 « Bradley v. Rea, 103 Mass. 188; 
 
 Mass. 493. s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 534. 
 ' Connolly v. Boston, 117 Mass. 64 ^ Davis v. Somerville, 128 Mass. 594; 
 
 * Stanton v. Metropolitan R. Co., 14 s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 899. 
 Allen, 486. 
 
§ 284,] THE LAW OP THE ROAD. 347 
 
 carry her home, to go on Sunday by rail to a point at which 
 he expected to receive another letter from that sister as to 
 their proposed journey home together ;^ nor to perform the 
 ordinary duties of a street car conductor.* In each of these 
 cases the plaintiff found himself remediless. So, also, where 
 the plaintiff had merely tied his horse by the roadside and 
 another drove against it he could not recover, inasmuch as, 
 although the plaintiff was attending a camp meeting, it did 
 not clearly appear that he attended from religious motives ;* 
 and if one lets a horse for a Sunday drive and Hie horse is 
 injured, by the neglect of the person who hires it, the owner 
 cannot recover.* 
 
 § 364. The same subject continued.— On the contrary, 
 the Massachusetts courts have held it a journey made from 
 "necessity or charity," within the contemplation of the 
 statute, for one to drive his horse upon the highway on Sun- 
 day morning to get a maid-servant, in order that she might 
 prepare necessary food for the family during the day,* or for 
 one to take a walk merely for exercise, and to get the air.^ 
 And when one travels from one town to another to visit a 
 sick friend whom he thinks may need his assistance,'' or goes 
 on Sunday to a camp meeting of spiritualists,^ he is, entitled 
 to go to the jury on the question, whether he was traveling 
 lawfully or not. It is also lawful, under the statute, to travel 
 on Sunday for the purpose of visiting a sick child, or other 
 
 ' Bucher o. Pitchbiirg R. Co., 131 contract of hiring was illegal and void, 
 
 Mass. 156; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 216. the owner might, nevertheless, main- 
 
 ' Day V. Highland Street R. Co., tain tort for the conversion of the 
 
 135 Mass. 118; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 447. horse. In the opinion. Judge Gray re- 
 
 But see Sunday cases in § 299, note, considers at length the question pre- 
 
 infra. sented in Gregg v. Wyman, which was 
 
 ' Lyons ■». Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387. overruled by a unanimous court Qf. 
 
 * Gregg 9. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322. Nodine s. Doherty, 46 Barb. 69. 
 
 But the court has receded from this " Grossman v. City of Lynn, 121 
 
 position in the later case of Hall v. Mass. 301. 
 
 Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251; 8. c. 9 Am. ' Hamilton v. City of Boston, 14 
 
 Rep. 30, in which jt was held, when Allen, 475. 
 
 the owner of a horse let it, on the ' Doyle v. Lynn, &c., R. Co., 118 
 
 Lord's day, to be driven for pleasure Mass. 195; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 431. 
 
 to a particular place, and the hirer ' Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 
 
 drove it to a different place and in do- Mass, 398; 8. c. 12 Am. Rep. 720. 
 log so in jured it, that, although the 
 
t8 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 265. 
 
 sar relative.* And where the defendant's dog frightened 
 le plaintiff's horse so that it ran away and broke his buggy, 
 le plaintiff was allowed his action, although he was riding 
 t the time unlawfully upon the Sabbath day.* In this case 
 is said that the plaintiff's unlawful traveling on the Lord's 
 ay will not defeat his right to recover, unless his unlawful 
 3t was a contributory cause of the in jury»he sustains.' But 
 lis, in my opinion, is not the law in Massachusetts upon 
 lis point, and even if it were, it hardly helps things much, 
 nee in Hall v. Corcoran* it is expressly declared that in 
 lese oases the illegal Sunday traveling "necessarily con- 
 •ibutes" to the injury — from which the inference is that 
 lere is no escape.' 
 
 § '265. The rule in Maine and Yermont.— The Massachu- 
 stts doctrine upon this point obtains in Maine, where one 
 ho travels on Sunday to visit a friend, in violation of the 
 batute, cannot maintain an action against the town for in- 
 iries from a defective highway.* But if a woman walks 
 nly about a mile in a town, for exercise on Sunday, she is 
 eld not a traveler in such a sense as to bar her recovery 
 gainst the town for injuries suffered during such a walk 
 om a defect in the street,' and when a man walking on the 
 lord's day for exercise went into' a beer shop and drank a 
 lass of beer, and on resuming his walk was injured by a de- 
 ict in the highway, it was held that he might recover.* A 
 
 ' Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, Sunday, was negligently injured in a 
 
 iO; Gorman n. Lowell, 117 Mass. 65. collision. Xy. Myers ®. Meinrath, 
 
 ' Wliite V. Lang, 138 Mass. 598; 101 Mass. 366; s. c. 3 Am. Kep. 368; 
 
 c. 35 Am. Kep. 403. Qf. on this 3 Allen, 165; Commonwealth v. Samp- 
 
 )int Schmid «. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, son, 97 Mass. 407. 
 
 i3; s. p. 30 Am. Rep. 414. > Cratty v. Bangor, 57 Me. 433; 
 
 ' White v. Lang, 138 Mass. 598; s. c. s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 56. See, also, Hinck- 
 
 i Am. Rep. 402, by Morton, J. leys. Penobscot, 42 Me. 81; Tillock 
 
 * 107 Mass. 251; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 30. v. Webb, 56 Me. 100. 
 
 ' See, also, as indicating the attitude ' O'Connell v. City of Lewistown, 
 
 ' this court upon this general ques- 65 Me. 3^ s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 673. 
 
 jn, McGrath v. Merwin, 113 Mass. Cf. Hamilton v. Boston, 14, Allen, 
 
 17; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 119; Wallace 475. 
 
 Merrimack, &c., Co., 184 Mass. 95; s << xjnless the beer contributed to 
 
 c. 45 Am. Rep. 301, wherein the the injury," the court adds. David- 
 
 ineral Massachusetts rule is applied son v. City of Portland, 69 Me. 116; 
 
 one who, in sailing his yacht on s. c. 31 Am. Rep. 253. See, also, At- 
 
§ 266,] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 349 
 
 woman visiting at plaintiff's house on a cold, windy Sunday 
 in December, informed him that she had to go home that 
 night, a distance of two miles. He thereupon took her home 
 with his horse and sleigh. It was held that the act was not 
 unlawful, it being justifiable on the ground of necessity or as 
 a deed of charity ; and plaintiff was not precluded from re- 
 covering for damages caused by his horse slipping on a 
 street.^ But if one lets his horse for a pleasure drive on 
 Sunday, and the horse is injured by the hirer's neglect, the 
 owner is remediless.* Vermont is the only other State in 
 the Union where this theory prevails. In that State the 
 Massachusetts rule upon this subject is followed, and there 
 is no recovery for injuries received from a defect in the high- 
 way by one who is traveling on Sunday in violation of the 
 statute.^ But where the plaintiff traveled eight miles on 
 Sunday, from one town to another, to visit his two little sons 
 from whom he was separated during the week, and whose 
 mother was dead, and was injured by a defect in the high- 
 way, it was held that a recovery would not be defeated by 
 the Vermont statute, which prohibits travel on Sunday ex- 
 cept for attendance at places of moral instruction and from 
 necessity.* 
 
 § 266. The Rhode Island rule.— In Baldwin v. Barney^ 
 it was held by the Supreme Court of Ehode Island, that 
 where one driving carefully on Sunday on a highway in the 
 
 Mnson v. Sellers, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 442; » Johnson ®. Town of Irasburgh, 47 
 
 Taylor v. Humphreys, 10 C. B. (N. Vt. 28; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 111. 
 
 8.) 429; Beglna b. Bymer, 13 Cox's C. * McCIary «. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116; 
 
 C. 378; Peplow v. Richardson, 4L. R s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 366. Note that in 
 
 {C. P.) 168. - Pennsylvania it is a work of necessity 
 
 ' Buck v. City of Biddef ord, 82 Me. or charity for a child to visit his father 
 
 433; 8. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 913. on Sunday, and to make a journey in 
 
 ' Parker ■». Latner, 60 Me. 538; s. c. a wagon so to do. Logan n. Matthews, 
 
 11 Am. Rep. 210. But see Morton v. 6 Penn. St. 417. But in Massachu- 
 
 irloster, 46 Me. 520; and see, also, setts it is in doubt, whether a young 
 
 Hall V. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251; a. c. fellow may lawfully travel on a Lord's 
 
 9 Am. Rep. 30; Stewart v. Davis, 31 day to visit his sweetheart. BuflSng- 
 
 Ark. 518; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 576; No- ton v. Swansey, 2 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 dine 0. Doherty, 46 Barb. 59; Frost «. 285, cited in Browne's "Humorous 
 
 Plumb, 40 Conn. Ill; s. c. 16 Am. Phases of the Law," 17. 
 
 Rep. 18; Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I. " 12 R. L 393; b. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 
 464; 8. c. 33 Am. Rep. 509. 670. 
 
350 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. [§ 267. 
 
 State of Massachusetts was negligently run into and injured, 
 he could maintain an action in Bhode Island against the per- 
 son who injured him, without showing that he was traveling 
 at the time of the injury upon an errand either of necessity 
 or charity.* In the opinion in this case. Chief Justice Dur- 
 fee, explicitly repudiates the Massachusetts doctrine, which 
 has found no favor outside of the three States in New En- 
 gland that have been long committed to it. It is generally 
 denied throughout the Union in both the State and the federal 
 Courts.* 
 
 § 267. These New England Sunday law decisions criticised.. 
 
 — The objections to such a rule suggest themselves, but Chief 
 Justice Dixon, in Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa,^ has drawn 
 the indictment in a veiy quotable fashion as follows: — f The 
 cases may be summed up, and the result stated generally to 
 be the affirmance of two very just and plain principles of law 
 as applicable to civil actions of this nature, namely: First, 
 that one party to the action, when called upon to answer for 
 the consequences of his own wrongful act done to the other, 
 cannot allege or reply the separate or distinct wrongful act 
 of the other, done not to himself nor to his injury, and not 
 
 ' This is a good case for people in iston (Idaho), 13 Pac. Rep. 80. In 
 
 Massachusetts to make a note of, if Wilkinson d. State, S9 Ind. 416; s. c. 
 
 they are given to taking drives on 36 Am. Rep. 84, it was held to he a 
 
 Sunday. work of necessity to gather melons on 
 
 " Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. ®.Phila- a Sunday, so as to prevent waste, 
 delphia, &c., Towboat Co., 33 How. But in Whitcomb «. Oilman, 35 Vt. 
 (U. S.) 309, wherein it is said that 397, the court would not commit it- 
 " the Massachusetts decisions upon the self into saying that it was necessary 
 Sunday law depend on the peculiar to make maple sugar on "the Lord's- 
 legislation and customs of the State, day," to prevent the loss of sap. The 
 more fftan on any general principles learned judge seemed to think that a 
 cf lam or jusUee." Carroll v. Staten religious man would provide against 
 Island R. Co., 58 N. Y. 136; Platz v. any emergency on the Saturday be- 
 City of Cohoes, 89 N. T. 319; 8. c. 43 fore. [Qf. with this case, Whit- 
 Am. Rep. 386; Commonwealth «. comb ». Gilman, 35 Vt. 387]; Sutton 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 80 Ky. 391; v. Town of Wauwatosa, 39 Wis. 31; 
 s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 475; Phila., &c., R. b. c. 9 Am. Rep. 534; Mohney v. 
 Co. V. Lehman, 56 Md. 309; s. c. 40 Cook, 36 Penn. St. 343; Baldwin v. 
 Am. Rep. 415; Tonoski v. State, 79 Barney, 12 R. I. 392; s. c. 34 Am. 
 Ind. 393; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 614; Loeb Rep. 670; Cooley on Torts, § 157. 
 V. City of Attica, 82 Ind. 175; s. c. 43 See, also, § 175, supra. 
 Am. Rep. 494; Black v. City of Lew- » 29 Wis. 31; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 534. 
 
§ 268.] THE LAW OF THE BOAS. 351 
 
 necessarily connected with, or leading to, or causing, or pro- 
 ducing the wrongful act complained of ; and, secondly, that 
 the fault, want of due care, or negligence on the part of the 
 plaintiff which will preclude a recovery for the injury com- 
 plained of, as contributing to it, must be some act or conduct 
 of the plaintiff having the relation to that injury of a cause 
 to the effect produced by it. Under the operation of the 
 first principle, the defendant cannot exonerate himself, or 
 claim immunity from the consequences of his own tortious 
 act, voluntarily or negligently done to the injury of the 
 plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff has been guilty of 
 some other, and independent wrong or violation of law. 
 Wrongs or offenses cannot be set off against each other in 
 this way. ' But we should work a confusion of relations, and 
 lend a very doubtful assistance to morality,' say the court in 
 Mohney v. Cook, ' if we should allow one offender against the 
 law, to the injury of another, to set off against the plaintiff 
 that he, too, is a public offender.' Himself guilty of a wrong 
 not dependent on, nor caused by that charged against the 
 plaintiff, but arising from his own voluntary act, or his neg- 
 lect, the defendant cannot assume the championship of pub- 
 lic rights, nor to prosecute the plaintiff as an offender against 
 the laws of the State, and thus to impose upon him a penalty 
 many times greater than what those laws prescribe. Neither 
 justice nor sound morals require this, and it seems contrary 
 to the dictates of both, that such a defense should be allowed 
 to prevail. It would extend the maxim ex turpe causa non 
 oritur actio beyond the scope of its legitimate application, and 
 violate the maxim equally binding and wholesome, and more 
 extensive in its operation, that no man shall be permitted to 
 take advantage of his own wrong. To take advantage of his 
 own wrong and to visit unmerited and over rigorous punish- 
 ment upon the plaintiff, constitute the sole motive for such 
 defense on the part of the person making it." 
 
 § 268. Pedestrians crossing the highway.— Pedestrians 
 have no superiority of right at street crossings over teams. 
 Persons upon the highway on foot in the act of crossing, 
 and those upon the highway riding upon vehicles, have the 
 right of way in common, each equally with the other, and in 
 its exercise each is bound to use ordinary care for his own 
 
352 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. [§ 269. 
 
 safety, and to avoid doing injury to any others who may be 
 in the exercise of the equal right of way with them.^ The 
 pedestrian has, however, the right to cross the street at any 
 point, and is by no means restricted to the regular cross- 
 ings,* although he is entitled to a somewhat higher measure 
 of care on the part of a driver of a team when he attempts 
 to cross at a regular crossing,' It is .the duty, as we have 
 seen,^ of one upon the highway who attempts to cross a 
 railway track upon the same level as the roadway, to look 
 attentively up and down the track in order to see whether or 
 not a train is approaching. So, in some jurisdictions it is 
 held to be the duty of a pedestrian, upon attempting to 
 cross a highway, and especially in attempting to cross the 
 street of a city, to look carefully up and down the street in 
 order not to put himself into the way of approaching ve- 
 hicles, and that a failure so to do is negligence as a matter 
 of law.° But, in Massachusetts and in Georgia, such a fail- 
 ure is only evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff is enti- 
 tled to have it go to the jury.* The same rule applies where 
 a person is walking along the highway, and the law does not 
 require him to look in all directions.' 
 
 § 269. The same subject continued. — One must not take 
 desperate chances, or make nice calculations as to his ability 
 to dodge approaching vehicles, in attempting to cross the 
 crowded thoroughfares in New York, Accordingly, where 
 one attempted to cross a street by rushing in front of a pass- 
 
 ' Cotton «. Wood, 8 C B. (N. S.) * § 180 ei leq., mpra. 
 568; Barker «. Savage, 45 N. T. 191; * Barker u Savage, 45 N. T. 191; 
 B. c. 6 Am. Rep. 66; Belton v. Baxter, s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 66; Baker «. Pender- 
 64 N. Y. 245; b. c. 13 Am. Rep. 578; gast, 33 Ohio St. 494; s. c. 30 Am. 
 Brooks ®. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343; Rep. 630. See, also, Sheehan v. Ed- 
 Myers ®. Dixon, 3 Jones & S. 390; gar, 58 N. Y. 631; Woolf b. Beard, 8 
 Beach v. Parmenter,23 Penn. St. 196; Car. & P. 373; Perrin v. Devendorf, 
 Birkett ®. Knickerhocker Ice Co., 110 32 111. App. 384. 
 N. Y. 504; b. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 108. « Shapleigh v. Wyman. 134 Mass. 
 
 » Raymond «. City of Lowell, 6 118; Bower ®. Wellington, 136 Mass. 
 
 Cush. 534; B. 0. 53 Am. Dec. 57; Si- 391; Williams*. Grealy, 112 Mass. 79; 
 
 mons «. Gaynor, 89 Ind. 165; CotterlU Orr «. Garabold (Ga.), 11 S. E. Rep. 
 
 V. Starkey, 8 Car. &P. 691, and see 778. Qf. Stocks. Wood, 136 Mass. 353. 
 
 Boss V. Litton, 5 Car & P. 407. ' Wiel ». Wright, 8 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 ' Williams ». Richards, 3 Car. & 776; Undhejem «. Hastings, 38 Minn. 
 
 Kir. 81. 485; B. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 448. 
 
§ 269.] THE LAW OF THE ROAD. 353 
 
 ing street oar, but was run over by a cart which he had seen 
 and calculated that he should be able to dodge, such conduct 
 at a crossing was held contributory negligence in an action 
 by the injured party against the owner of the cart.* But it is 
 not negligent, in se, said the Supreme Court of Louisiana, to 
 wear a sun-bonnet in the street which may prevent a woman 
 from seeing perfectly in all directions.* In crossing the 
 streets of a crowded city, a person is bound to use reasona- 
 ble care ; and if he have ample time to get across, although a 
 vehicle is approaching, he is not guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence if he fail in attempting to do so.^ Aged and infirm 
 persons, it is to be remembered, have the same rights upon 
 the highway as young, and active, and agile persons,' and it 
 is not negligence per se for a blind man to walk the streets of 
 a city unattended.^ But it devolves upon such persons to ex- 
 ercise the greater care in proportion to their disability,' e. g., 
 a pedestrian, far advanced in years, must not venture upon 
 an icy sidewalk when he might just as well have taken a 
 safer course on the other side of the street,'' and one whose 
 eye-sight is poor must exercise greater caution than one who 
 sees perfectly.* When a pedestrian is run over in a public 
 street and injured by one of a coasting party who accident- 
 ally struck him with his sled, the coasting going on without 
 any license from the city authorities, there is no action 
 against the city ;' nor for a similar injury received by a per- 
 
 ' Belton «. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 345; ' City of Centralia v. Rrouse, 64 111. 
 
 s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 578. 19. 
 
 ' Shea V. Reems. 36 La. Ann. 969. » Peach *. Utlca, 10 Hun, 477. 
 
 ' Fenton v. Second Ave. R. Co., 9 ' While the use of a public high- 
 
 N. T. Supl. 162; s. c. 56 Hun, 99. way in a city for coasting may be a 
 
 * Shapleigh e. "Wyman, 134 Mass. public nuisance, its suppression is a 
 118; Boss 0. Litton, 5 Car. & P. 407; police duty, and not a duty in which 
 Barker o. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191; s. c. the corporation as such has a particular 
 6 Am. Rep. 66. interest, or from which it derives any 
 
 ' NefE «. Town of Wellesley, 148 special benefit in its corporate capac- 
 
 Mass. 487; B. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 111. ity; and for the non performance of 
 
 • Winn e. City of Lowell, 1 Allen, such duty by its agents, the corpora- 
 177; Sinmis «. South Carolina Ry. tion is not liable. Schultz v. Milwau- 
 Co., 37 S. C. 268; s. c. 3 8. E. Rep. kee, 49 Wis. 254; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 
 301; Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N. 779; Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind. 130; 
 T. 568; Peach «. Utica, 10 Hun, 477; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 1; Ray e. Manches- 
 Sleeper e. Sandown, 53 N. H. 244; ter, 46 N. H. 59; Pierce v. New Bed- 
 City of Centralia «. Krouse, 64 HI. 19. ford, 139 Mass. 534; s. c. 37 Am. 
 
 23 
 
354 THE LAW OP THE SOAD. [§ 270. 
 
 son while crossing Boston Common along one of the paths 
 where coasting was going on.^ 
 
 § 370. Icy sidewalks. — A very considerable amount of 
 litigation has been occasioned by the presence of ice and 
 snow upon the highways and in the streets of towns and 
 cities. In this section it is proposed to consider the rules of 
 law upon that subject so far as they impinge upon the law 
 of contributory negligence. In those States where ice and 
 snow are likely to accumulate in large quantities upon the 
 public highways, the proper authorities are usually re- 
 quired, by statute or municipal ordinance in respect of ob- 
 structions from those causes, to exercise ordinary care and 
 diligence to keep the highways in a reasonably safe and con- 
 venient condition. When the highways are blocked up or 
 incumbered with snow, it must be removed or trodden down 
 to the extent of rendering, the road or street passable. It 
 may be supposed that this would be the duty, at least, of a 
 municipal corporation, even in the absence of an express 
 statutory requirement, under that more general rule of law 
 that the highways are to be kept in reasonably good and con- 
 venient condition. Upon the question how far ice and snow 
 upon a sidewalk will constitute a " defect," we look to the 
 case of Providence v. Clapp,* as the leading authority. This 
 case arose under the Bhode Island statute requiring towns 
 to keep the highways in order, which, also, specifically re- 
 quired the removal of snow and ice when it obstructed 
 passage along the way. It seems that the plaintiff, walking 
 upon the street in the night, slij^ed and fell and injured 
 himself upon a ridge of trodden snow and ice in the middle 
 of the sidewalk, and it was held that, without reference to 
 any specific requirement in the statute s^ to the removal of 
 snow and ice from the pavement, it was the duty of the city 
 to use ordinary care and diligence to restore the street, after 
 a fall of snow, to a reasonably safe and convenient condi- 
 tion, and that whether the street is in that condition or not 
 is a proper question for the jury. It is a fair conclusion 
 
 Rep. 387; Hutchinson «;. Concord, 41 Mass. 583. See,>also, Clark v. Wal- 
 Vt. 271. tham, 128 Mass. 567. 
 
 ' Steele v. City of Boston, 128 ' 17 How. (U. 8.) 161. 
 
§ 271.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 355 
 
 from the opinion in that case that, while snow when it first 
 falls, or ice when it first forms, and until the municipality 
 has had a reasonable time to remove the obstruction and re- 
 store the highway to a safe and convenient condition, are not 
 defects or obstructions for which the corporation may be 
 held liable, the accumulation of ice or snow, if it causes in- 
 jury, after a reasonable time has elapsed in which it might 
 have been removed, is such a defect in the highway as will 
 render the city liable. 
 
 § 371. The same subject continued.— The court in the case 
 considered in<the preceeding section stated the law as follows : 
 — " The treading down of snow when it falls in great depth, or 
 in case of drifts, so that the highway or street shall not be 
 blocked up or incumbered, may, in some sense and for the 
 time being, have the effect to remove the obstructions ; but as 
 it respects sidewalks and their uses, this remedy would be, 
 at best, temporary, and, in case of rain or extreme changes 
 of weather, would have the effect to increase rather than re- 
 move it. ... . The just rule of responsibility and the 
 one, we think, prescribed by the statute, whether the ob- 
 struction be by snow or any other material, is the removal 
 or abatement so as to render the highway, street or sidewalk 
 at all times safe and convenient, regard being had to its lo- 
 cality and uses." * It is the general rule, in accordance with 
 this view, that snow and ice are not per se defects for which 
 a city may be held responsible, but that accumulation of 
 snow or ice, after a reasonable time has elapsed within which 
 they might have been removed, are actionable obstructions 
 and defects.' And when one is injured by reason of such an 
 accumulation, if he himself, at the time of the injury, were 
 in the exercise of due care under the circumstances, he may 
 maintain an action against the corporation whose duty it was 
 to keep the highway in order.* 
 
 ' Providence v. Clapp (by Nelson, ' McLaughlin ». City of Corry, 77 
 
 J.), 17 How. (TJ. S.) 161. Penn. St. 109; s c. 18 Am. Kep. 432; 
 
 ' " The fault for which the town is Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn, 
 
 chargeable, consists in permitting the 117; 8. c. 26 Am. Rep. 433; Luther v. 
 
 defect to remain, not in causing it to Worcester, 97 Mass. 269; Seeley v. 
 
 exist." Billings ». Worcester, 102 Town of Litchfield, 49 Conn. 134; s. c. 
 
 Mass. 329; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 460. 44 Am. Rep. 213; Billings «. Worces- 
 
356 
 
 THE LAW or THE BOAD. 
 
 [§ 272. 
 
 § 272. Mere slipperiness not a delect in the highway.— It 
 
 is also a sound rule that mere slipperiness, arising from a 
 smooth surface of ice or snow upon a sidewalk, is not such a 
 defect as will render the city liable to one who sustains in- 
 juries from a fall thereon.^ But when the construction or 
 shape of the pavement is such as to hold the water, and so 
 render accumulations of ice inevitable* or probable in cold 
 weather, for slipperiness so caused the city may be liable f 
 and so, also, when a pedestrian using due care is injured by 
 falling on a portion of a city sidewalk made of glass and iron, 
 and worn smooth and slippery, and it appears that the slip- 
 periness of the pavement was the sole cause of his fall, he may 
 maintain an action against the city for damages for the in- 
 jury he sustained.' So much for the duty and liability of the 
 
 ter, 103 Mass. 339; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 
 460; Nason v. Boston, 14 Allen, 508. 
 In Collins «. City of Council Bluffs, 33 
 Iowa, 834, the court said : — " It can- 
 not be doubted that a city would be 
 liable for negligently permitting 
 ditches washed in the street by floods 
 from the rains. These would be effects 
 of natural causes. So the deposits of 
 snow from natural causes, if permitted 
 to remain ; and damage to one using 
 the street resulting therefrom renders 
 
 the city liable To repair 
 
 means to restore to a good state after 
 partial destruction. A street may be 
 destroyed by depositing obstructions 
 upon its surface, as well as by excavat- 
 ing below its surface." B.C. 7 Am Rep. 
 300; Todd 8. City of Troy, 61 N. T. 
 506; Dewire ». Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; 
 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 319; Moseys. Troy, 
 61 Barb. 580; Mayor v. Marriott. 9 Md. 
 160; Cook V. City of Milwaukee, 24 
 Wis. 270; Cloughessy v. City of Water- 
 bury, 51 Conn. 405; s. c. 19 Am. Law 
 Rev. 493. See Elliott on Roads and 
 Streets, 459, 460. 
 
 • Cook V. City of Milwaukee, 34 
 Wis. S70; 8. c. 1 Am. Rep. 183; Stan- 
 ton «. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566; 
 j;ohn8on «. Lowell, 13 Allen, 572; Oil- 
 
 bert ®. Roxbury, 100 Mass. 185; Dur- 
 kin V. Troy, 61 Barb. 437; City of 
 Chicago V. McGiven, 78 HI. 353; City 
 of Chicago v. BL£by,84 111. 82; s. c. 25 
 Am. Rep. 439; McKellar v. City of 
 Detroit, 57 Mich. 158, holding that the 
 Michigan statute allowing actions to 
 be brought for injuries from defective 
 highways, only applies to injuries that 
 are "due to defects from being out 
 of repairs, and not to such as are 
 caused by the mere acc\imulation of 
 snow and ice." In Providence v. 
 Clapp, 17 How. (U. S.)161, the law 
 is so construed as to exonerate the town 
 from liability unless express notice is 
 given of the existence of the slippery 
 ice accumulations. Cf. Billings d. 
 Worcester, 102 Mass. 339; s. 0. 3 Am. 
 Rep. 460; Kenney v. City of Co- 
 hoes, 16 N. Y. Week. Dig. 306; Kelly 
 «. Newman, 63 How. Pr. 156. 
 
 " Stanton v. Springfield, 13 AUen, 
 566; and see Billings v.- Worcester, 
 102 Mass. 339; Adams e. Town of 
 Chicopee, 147 Mass. 440; s. c. 18 N. 
 E. Rep. 331. 
 
 ' Cromarty ®. City of Boston, 127 
 Mass. 329; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 381. 
 See, also, Crocheren «. North Shore, 
 &c.. Ferry Co., 1 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
§ 273.] THE LAW OF THE ROAD. 357 
 
 town, or other municipal corporation whose duty it is to keep 
 the highway in order, with respect of ice and snow. 
 
 § 273. The duty of the traveler on an icy highway.— Turn- 
 ing to the reciprocal obligations of the traveler upon the 
 highway, at times when the presence of ice and snow render 
 traveling especially or unusually hazardous, we find that 
 many cases insist upon the rule that when a person volun- 
 tarily attempts to pass over a sidewalk which he knows to be 
 dangerous by reason of the ice or snow upon it, when he 
 might avoid it, he is guilty of such contributory fault as will 
 prevent a recovery from the corporation whose duty it is to 
 keep the way in a safe condition, in case of an injury because 
 of such an attempt.^ When there is snow and ice upon the 
 ground it is the duty of pedestrians to exercise increased care 
 and caution in going about. They must in each instance ex- 
 ercise ordinary care, under the circumstances in determining 
 whether to proceed or return, when confronted with a dan- 
 gerous pavement or roadway, and if they are guilty of negli- 
 gence in concluding to proceed they cannot recover in case 
 they receive injuries.* But it is not necessarily negligent for 
 one who knows there is ice upon the pavement to attempt to 
 pass over it, even at night. In such a case one is bound to 
 
 446; 8. c. 56 N. T. 656; and Bor- tifying that the sidewalk was then 
 
 ough of Mauch Chunk e. Kline, 100 crowded, and that he did not see the 
 
 Penn. St. 119; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. ice until after he fell. . The court left 
 
 364, wherein a municipality is held the question of contnbutoiy negU- 
 
 not liable for an injury to one who gence to the jury, instructing them 
 
 slipped upon the icy surface of cobble that if they belieyed that the plaintiff's 
 
 stones in a street crossing. attention was diverted by the crowd, or 
 
 ' Shaefler «. City of Sandusky, 33 by any other circumstance, or mental 
 
 Ohio St. 246; s. c. 31 Am. Rep. 533: condition, not involving a failure to 
 
 City of Erie t>. Magill, 101 Penn. St. observe ordinary care, they should 
 
 613; 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 739; City of bring in a verdict for the plaintiff. 
 
 Quincy v. Barker, 81 111. 300; s. c. 35 Wilson e. City of Charleston, 8 Allen, 
 
 Am. Rep. 278; Thomas v. New York, 137; Durkin t>. Troy, 61 Barb. 437; City 
 
 28 Him, 110, where it appears that the of Centralia v. Krouse, 64 HI. 19; 
 
 plaintiff on the Saturday preceding Twogood «. Mayor, 11 Daly, 167. 
 
 the accident had been in the same See, also. City of Aurora v. Hilhnan, 
 
 locality, and had crossed the street on 90 111. 61; Lovenguth v. City of 
 
 seeing an accumulation of ice on the Bloomington, 71 111. 238; Osage City c. 
 
 sidewalk. The accident happened Brown, 27 Kan. 74. 
 
 on the next Tuesday, the plaintiff tes- ' Horton v. Ipswich, 12 Cush. 488. 
 
358 THE LAW OF THE EOAD. [§ 274. 
 
 exercise only ordinary care and prudence.' The fact that a 
 woman sixty years old, and weighing two hundred pounds, 
 noticed before attempting to ascend a street crosswalk that 
 it was rough and slippery, and that she must step two feet 
 over a ditch and glare ice, is not conclusive evidence 
 that she did not exercise due care.' Nor, in an action 
 against a town by a husband and wife, for injuries sus- 
 tained by the wife, by falling on a ridge of ice, which was 
 a plain defect in the highway, will the husband's knowledge 
 of the bad condition of the pavement at that point and that 
 his wife was going there, coupled with his failure to warn 
 her of the' risk and caution her to beware of it, prevent a re- 
 covery from the town.^ 
 
 § 274. The liability of the owner of property in respect 
 to icy pavements. — The owner of city property is not liable 
 for injuries sustained by one in passing over the pavement 
 in front of his premises and slipping on ice formed by water 
 dripping from his house, there being no defect in the prem- 
 ises, no obstruction of the sidewalk by the adjacent owner, 
 and no duty imposed upon him, either by ordinance or 
 statute, to keep the pavement free from ice •* but the city 
 may, of course, in such a case, be liable upon the grounds 
 already set forth.' Neither is a street car company which, 
 
 ' Evans n. City of TJtica, 69 N. Y. owner is required by the city to repair 
 
 166; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 185; Dewire v. the sidewalks, it is simply a method 
 
 Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; s. c. 41 Am. of exercising the power of taxation, 
 
 Rep. 219; Weston v. Elevated Ry. hy which he is made the agent of the 
 
 Co. , 73 N. Y. 695. Qf. Henry County city to expend the amount of the tax, 
 
 Turnpike Co. v. Jackson, 86 Ind. Ill ; the responsibility for the performance 
 
 B. c. 44 Am. Rep. 374; Kelly ti. Rail- of the work remaining where the 
 
 road Co., 28 Minn. 98; Griffln v. Au- authority to control it is foimd. City 
 
 bum, 58 N. H. 121. of Keokuk i>. Independent District of 
 
 = Gilbert «. Boston, 139 Mass. 313. Keokuk, 53 Iowa, 352; s. c. 36 Am. 
 
 » The husband himself, were he in- Rep. 326; Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 
 
 jured, could recover if the jury were N. Y. 123; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 358. 
 
 satisfied that he had used ordinary » Reich v. Mayor, &c., 17 N. Y. 
 
 care. Street v. Inhabitants of Hoi- Week. Dig. 140; Kenney n. City of 
 
 yoke, 105 Mass. 82; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. Cohoes, 16 N. Y: Week. Dig. 206; 
 
 500. Of. Mahoney v. Metropolitan Kelly r>. Newman, 63 How. Prac. 156; 
 
 R. Co., 104 Mass. 73; Whittaker v. Mosey «). Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor, 
 
 West Boylston, 97 Mass. 373. &c. v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160, and the 
 
 * Moore «. Gadsden, 87 N. Y. 84; cases cited to this point, supra. 
 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 352. Where the lot- 
 
§ 275.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 359 
 
 in the lawful and orderly exercise of its franchise, clears the 
 snow from its tracks, liable to the owner of adjacent property 
 for injury done him, by reason of the snow so cleared from 
 the street railway track obstructing the flow of water in the 
 gutter and causing it to back up upon the adjoining property.^ 
 The question whether or not one who leaves the sidewalk 
 and takes to the roadway on foot, and is injured by coming 
 upon a pile of snow in the street, is in a position to complain 
 of such pile of snow as a defect, must be left to the jury.' 
 It is much questioned whether city ordinances, or, as they 
 are called in New England, by-laws, requiring the owners or 
 occupants of houses upon public highways to clear the snow 
 from before their houses, are valid. Chief Justice Shaw, in 
 an early case in Massachusetts, thought they were, and so 
 decided,* and such regulations have been upheld in that State 
 by subsequent decisions, in no degree, however, relieving the 
 city or town from its proper responsibility for the condition 
 of its ways.* But a contrary view is more usually taken, and 
 such ordinances have, as a rule, found little favor.^ 
 
 § 275. The foregoing rales summarized. — The weight of 
 authority brings us to the following conclusions upon this 
 subject : that ice and snow upon the highway are not in se 
 defects for which the town is liable ; that wherever the town 
 is bound to maintain the public highways, it is bound to 
 clear away or remove, within a reasonable time, snow that 
 falls or ice that forms upon the traveled portion of the pub- 
 lic ways, and that for a failure so to do an action may be 
 maintained ; that for mere slipperiness, the result of natural 
 causes, there can be no liability, or, in other words, that a 
 municipal corporation is not liable to suits for damages be- 
 cause water will freeze upon the ground in cold weather ; 
 that the traveler must exercise somewhat more than his usual 
 
 ' Short v. Baltimore City Passenger * Kirby v. Boylston Market Associa- 
 
 Ry. Co., 50 Md. 73; 8. c. 33 Am. Rep. tion, 14 Gray, 252. 
 
 £98. " Gridley «. City of Bloomington, 
 
 " Gerald v. Boston, 108 Mass. 584. 88 Bl. 554; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 566; but 
 
 Cy. Hall V. Lowell, 10 Cush. 260; Stan- see, also, City of Hartford v. Talcott, 
 
 ton V. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566. 48 Conn. 525; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 189. 
 
 ' €roddard. Petitioner, &c., 16 Pick. 
 504; s. c. 28 Am. Dec 259. 
 
360 THE LAW OF THE BOAD. [§ 276. 
 
 care and prndence in going about when there is snow and ice 
 upon the ground ; that it is contributory negligence on his. 
 part to go upon pavements, or parts of the highway that he 
 knows to be dangerous by reason of the presence of ice or 
 snow, when he might avoid it and take another course ; that 
 mere knowledge that the pavement is icy or slippery is not 
 sufficient to fasten negligence upon one who goes upon it ; 
 and that city ordinances which require every man to sweep 
 the snow from before his own door are of somewhat ques- 
 tionable validity. 
 
 § 376. Injuries to persons in the highway from something 
 falling from the adjoining property. — It is the duty of the 
 owners of property adjoining a public highway to take rea- 
 sonable and ordinary care to prevent anything from falling 
 into the highway to the injury of persons who are lawfully 
 there. Accordingly, when buildings whose walls are upon 
 the street become ruinous, and are likely to fall, it is the duty 
 of the owner to take proper steps to prevent them from fall- 
 ing into the highway.* Such a building is, moreover, a pub- 
 lic nuisance, for which an indictment will lie ;* and when one> 
 in the exercise of due care in using the highway, is injured 
 by something falling from such a ruinous and tumble-down 
 structure, he may have his action against the owner or occu- 
 pant of the property.' And there is a like rule when some- 
 thing falls out of Bi window and injures one passing along the 
 highway beneath ;* and so when a hanging sign falls upon the 
 head of a passer-by,* there is an action against the owner or 
 occupant of the property, but not against the city as for a 
 defect in the highway.' It seems, however, that the munici- 
 
 ' Mullen ». St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; liable. Mohoney «. Libbey, 123 Mass.. 
 
 8. c. 15 Am. Rep. 530 (by Dwight, C); 20; 8. c. 25 Am. Rep. 6. 
 
 Rector of the Church of the Ascension * Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722, 
 
 V. Buckhardt, 3 Hill. 193. « Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 100- 
 
 ' Regina v. Watts, 1 Salk. 357. Mass. 458. The defendant in using a 
 
 ^ Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217; hanging sign was violating a munici- 
 
 B. c. 86 Am. Rep. 367. See, also, gen- pal ordinance. It would seem that 
 
 erally the cases cited supra. But the case would have been difEerenily 
 
 where the falling of a wall was a mere decided had it not been for this fact, 
 
 accident, there being no negligence on s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 354. 
 
 the part of the owner, he was not • Taylor v. Peckham, City Tresis- 
 
§ 276.] 
 
 THE LAW OF' THE BOAD. 
 
 361 
 
 pality is liable for injuries to passers-by from defectively 
 hung awnings over the pavement/ and from weak show-boards 
 erected next to the sidewalk and blown down by the wind,* 
 but not for snow that falls from an adjoining roof to the in- 
 jury of a traveler.' When signs are negligently put up, the 
 person who is responsible for the defective hanging is liable ;* 
 and so when buildings are so constructed as to project ice or 
 snow upon the highway during a thaw, the owner of the prop- 
 erty is liable for damage resulting to a passer-by;' or when, 
 in erecting a wall upon property adjoining the highway, a 
 brick is carelessly allowed to fall upon the head of a trav- 
 eler,* an action: may be maintained, but not in favor of tres- 
 passers or persons not exercising due care.' 
 
 urer, &c., 8 R. I. 349; s. c. 5 Am. 
 Rep. 578; Hewiston v. City of Kew 
 Haven, 37 Conn. 475; 8. c. 9 Am. 
 Rep. 343; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 
 75; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 194. 
 
 ' It was the duty of the surveyors 
 of the highway to see that everything 
 thereon should be kept in repair. It 
 was in their power to cause the re- 
 moval of the awning if it was defec- 
 tively attached. Failing to take any 
 steps, the city assumed all liability. 
 Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 393; Day 
 V. Milford, 5 Allen, 98. 
 
 '■' Langan d. City of Atchison, 35 
 Kan. 318; 8. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 38. 
 
 ' Hixon V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59 ; 
 Rowell V. City of Lowell, 7 Gray 100; 
 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 
 351. 
 
 * See generally the cases cited su- 
 pra. The owner of the building is 
 liable to one who is injured by the fall 
 of an awning insecurely supported in 
 violation of a city ordinance. Jessen 
 n. Swelgert, 66 Cal. 183. 
 
 " One who is unloading a wagon in 
 a street, in a reasonable and proper 
 manner, is rightfully in the highway 
 as a traveler, so as to be entitled to 
 recover for injuries caused by snow 
 falling from a building. Smethurst 
 V. Barton Square Church, 148 Mass. 
 
 361; 19 N. B. Rep. 387. One who 
 sits down on a step to rest, and is in- 
 jured by the fall of a cake of ice, is 
 not, necessarily, guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence. The question is for 
 the jury. Eaples ». Orth, 61 Wis. 
 531. Where, through defendant's 
 negligence, snow falls from his build- 
 ing and strikes plaintifiE's horse, caus- 
 ing it to run away, the injuries re- 
 ceived by the plaintiff in being thrown 
 from the wagon to which the horse 
 was attached are the proximate result 
 • of such negligence. Smethurst «. 
 Barton Square Church, 148 Mass 361. 
 If the roof is so constructed that 
 ice and snow collecting on it will 
 naturally and probably fall upon 
 the sidewalk, that is sufficient proof 
 of negligence. Hannem v. Pence, 40 
 Minn. 137; 8. c. 41 N. W. Rep. 657; 
 Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55; s. c. 
 30 Am. Rep. 164; Hixon v. Lowell, 13 
 Gray, 59. See, also, Kearney ». Lon- 
 don, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 759; 
 Rylands «. Fletcher, L. R. 1 Exch. 
 365; affirmed L. R. 3 H. L. 330; 8. c. 
 3 Hurl. & C. 774; Bigelow v. Reed, 
 51 Me. 335. 
 
 ' Jager «. Adams, 188 Mass. 36; s. c. 
 35 Am. Rep. 7. 
 
 ' Zoebisch v. Tarbell, 10 Allen, 385; 
 Roulston V. CJark, 5 E. D. Smith, 366; 
 
362 THE LAW CiP THE KOAD. [§ 278. 
 
 § 277. The same subject continned.— In Byrne v. Boadle,^ 
 it appears that an injury was caused by the falling of a bar- 
 rel into the highway from the upper window of a shop. To 
 the point of the proprietor's liability Baron Pollock said : — 
 " There are many accidents from which the presumption of 
 negligence cannot arise ; but this is not true in all cases. . . 
 It is the duty of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to 
 take care that they do not roll out, and, I think, that such a 
 case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of 
 negligence. A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse with- 
 out some negligence. So, in building or repairing a house, 
 if a person passing along the road is injured by something 
 falling upon him, I think the accident would be prima facie 
 evidence of negligence." ^ 
 
 § 278. Children injured upon the highway. — The general 
 rules of law which require the exercise of especial care to- 
 ward children of tender years when they are exposed or ex- 
 pose themselves to the danger of injury from the negligence 
 of others,' and which, in some jurisdictions, impute the negli- 
 gence of a parent or custodian to the infant who brings an 
 action for damages for injuries sustained by reason of another 
 person's want of care and caution,^ are applicable, of course, 
 in all respects, to actions brought for injuries which befall 
 children , upon the highway. The question often arises 
 whether children may lawfully and properly play in the 
 street, and whether, in case they are injured, while at play 
 upon the highway, by the negligence of the driver of a ve- 
 hicle or otherwise, there can be a recovery, or whether 
 such conduct on their part is not such contributory negli- 
 gence as to bar the action. In New York it seems that chil- 
 dren may lawfully play in the street ; ' and so in Pennsyl- 
 
 Stone V. Jackson, 16 C. B. 199; s. c. 148; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1107; Maddox v. 
 
 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 349; Bolch v. Cunningham, 68 Ga. 431; B. c 45 
 
 Smith, 7 Hurl. & N. 736. Am. Rep. 500; Domat on Civil Law, 
 
 ' 2 Hurl. & C. 722; s. c. 33 L. J. § 1557. 
 
 <Exch.) 13; 9- L. T. (N. S.) 450; 12 ' §§ 117, 122, supra. 
 
 Week. Rep. 279. , « § 116 e« seg., infra. 
 
 " See, also, Scott v. London Docks ' McCary v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104; 
 
 Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 696; s. C. 11 Jur. s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 512; McGuire «. 
 
 (N. S.)204; 34 L.J. (Exch.) 17,330; Spence, 91 K. Y. 303. Of. Pear- 
 
 11 Week. Rep. 410; 11 L. T. (N. S.) sail ». Post, 30 Wend. Ill, 131; 
 
§ 279.] THE LAW OF THE ROAD. .363 
 
 vania * and in New Hampshire," while in Maine ' and Mas- 
 sachusetts* the courts incline to the opposite view, and refuse 
 a remedy to children who are injured while playing in the 
 street. It appears, therefore, that the courts are not agreed 
 upon the point. 
 
 § 279. This rule further Ulustrated.— The New York rule 
 was well announced by Chief Justice Church in MoGary v. 
 Loomis : * — " A point is made upon an exception to the remark 
 of the judge that the child had the right to play on the side- 
 walk. This language was used in connection with the remark 
 that the child had a right to be on the sidewalk, and the 
 whole force of the remark as to the right to play was, that 
 being on the sidewalk, the fact of playing there would not 
 constitute contributory negligence so as to defeat a recovery. 
 If it did not mean this it had no relevancy to the case, and 
 was not for that reason error. There was no occasion for a 
 charge as to the legal right of children to play on the side- 
 walk, to the exclusion of or interference with persons passing 
 and repassing, nor was any such idea intended. That it is 
 not unlawful, wrongful or negligent for children on the "side- 
 walk to play is a proposition which is too plain for comment." * 
 But, on the other hand, we find the Supreme Court of Maine 
 saying : — " When children appropriate a part of the road for 
 their sports, and cease to use it as a way for travel, the town 
 
 Cosgrove d. Ogden, 49 K. T. 355; of Mt. Washington Road Co., 35 N. 
 
 s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 361; Ihl v. Forty- H. 134. 
 
 second St. Ry. Co., 47 N. T. 317; ^ StiDson v. City of Gardiner, 43 
 
 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 450. Me. 284. 
 
 ' Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. ?). Pearson, < Tighe «. Lowell, 119 Mass. 472; 
 
 72 Penn. St. 169; Kay e. Penn. R. Lyons v. Brookline, 119 Mass. 491. 
 
 Co., 65 Penn. St. 369; 8. q. 3 Am. Of. Stickney v. Salem, 3 Allen, 374; 
 
 Rep. 628; Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. Hunt v. Salem, 121 Mass. 294; Blod 
 
 D. Long, 75 Penn. St. 257, in which gett v. Boston, 8 Allen, 237; Stock 
 
 the question is intelligently discussed. ®. Wood, 136 Mass. 353; Gibbons®. 
 
 Of. Smith V. Hestonville, &c., R. Co., Williams, 135 Mass. 333. 
 
 92 Penn. St. 450; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. ' 63 N. Y. 104. 
 
 705; Gillespie ». McGowen, 100 Penn. * In the later case of McGuire «. 
 
 St. 14i- s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 365; Fair- Spence. 91 N. T. 303, this right of 
 
 banks ». Kerr, 70 Penn. St. 86; a c. children, upon general principles, to 
 
 10 Am. Rep 664. play in the street, is further insisted 
 
 ' Vamey ®. Manchester, 58 N. H. upon. 
 430; 8. 0. 42 Am. Rep. 592; Petition 
 
364 THE LAW OP THE BOAD. [§ 280, 
 
 or city through which the way passes is not responsible for 
 injuries which may be received by any of the children so en- 
 gaged, although the injuries may take place through a defect 
 in the road." ^ And, in Blodgett v. Boston,* the Supreme 
 Judicial Court of Massachusetts said: — "We by no means 
 intend to say that a child, who receives an injury caused by 
 a defect in a street while passing over or through it, would 
 be barred of all remedy against a town merely because he was 
 also engaged in some childish sport or amusement. There 
 would exist in such a case the important element that he was 
 actually traveling over the way. But this element is wholly 
 wanting in the case at bar. We have thel naked case of an 
 appropriation of a portion of a puMic street to a use entirely 
 foreign to any design to pass or repass over it for the pur- 
 pose of travel within the meaning of the statute. It is to this 
 precise case that we confine the expression of our opinion." 
 In later cases in this State it is plainly declared to be the law 
 that whenever children make a play-ground of the highway, 
 they are remediless in case oi injury from defects in the 
 street.' 
 
 § 280. The rule in New Hampshire.— " It being legally 
 possible," said Chief Justice Doe, of New Hampshire, " to 
 cease moving forward or backward in a street without dis- 
 continuing a traveler's use of the street, and it being possible 
 for a child as well as an adult to make a traveler's use of it 
 for recreation, there may be some doubt how the line is to be 
 drawn between the law and the fact in such a case as Blod- 
 gett V. Boston. Of the case of a boy injured while using a 
 portion of the highway solely for the purpose of enjoying the 
 amusement of coasting, the court there say it would hardly be 
 contended that the town could be held liable. Perhaps such 
 a case should be considered in connection with the case of the 
 boy's parents injured while using the same portion of the 
 highway solely for the purpose of enjoying the amusement 
 of a sleigh-ride. In the highway act there is no arbitrary 
 rule of discrimination against the amusements of children, 
 
 ' Stinson «. City of Gardiner, 42 * See generally the cases cited #»2>ra 
 Me. 248. to this point. 
 
 " 8 Allen, 337. 
 
§ 2S1.] THE LAW OF THE BO AD. 365 
 
 no proldbition of the use of gravitation as a motive power, 
 and no requirement that a person going out to drive for 
 amusement, or for fresh air and health of body or mind, shall 
 not turn in the road more than once, or shall not go over the 
 same route more than twice." ^ 
 
 § 281. The author's criticism.— The sounder view, in my 
 judgment is, that it is not in se negligence for children to 
 amuse themselves in the street nor, necessarily, negligent in 
 parents to permit their childrett to do so. Much must de- 
 pend upon the circumstances of each individual case. It is 
 easy to see that for children of tender years to be allowed to 
 play in Broadway, in the city of New York, might not 
 improperly be held negligence as matter of law, while 
 upon many other streets, even in the great cities, which are 
 not greatly thronged with teams and pedestrians, it might 
 as justly be held entirely prudent to allow children to amuse 
 themselves. Any straiter rule than this would deny the chil- 
 dren of the poor in the cities the benefit of air and exercise. 
 If all children must go to the park, or be attended by a nurse 
 to escape the imputation of negligence, how shall the chil- 
 dren of parents whose lack of means forbids these luxuries, 
 take exercise, and what is the parent of such children to do ? 
 The courts of Pennsylvania have taken an eminently just and 
 humane view of this matter,* and what seems to be the only 
 view that does not deny to poor parents the ordinary bless- 
 ings of light and air for their children. This is not at all the 
 same thing as to justify the use of the highway for sports or 
 games to the inconvenience or trouble of travelers. The 
 lawful purposes and uses of the king's highway are well de- 
 fined. When sport, either of children or adults, interferes 
 with the regular and proper use of the street, it is a nuisance 
 for which the law provides an action or an abatement. Con- 
 ceding this, it may well be insisted that children shall not, 
 because they play in the highway without interfering with 
 
 ' Vamey v. Manchester, 58 N. H. v. Hestonville Street R. Co., 57 Penn. 
 
 430; 8. c. 42 Am. Rep. 593. St. 172. Qf. O'Flaherty v. Union R. 
 
 ' Phila., &c., R. Co. v. Long, 75 Co., 45 Mo. 70. See ^ 133, supra, and 
 
 Penn. St. 257; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. Elliott on Roads and Streets, 473. 
 V. Pearson, 72 Penn. St. 169; Glassey 
 
368 THE LAW OF THE EOAD. [§ 282. 
 
 the rights of others, be, on that account, denied a remedy 
 when they are injured through the carelessness or negligence 
 of others. Aside from the question of the right of children 
 to play upon the highway, there is, perhaps, nothing peculiar 
 or worthy of mention in the law as it affects the rights and 
 liabilities of this class of persons upon the highway, which, 
 as properly pettaining to the subject-ciatter of this treatise, 
 is not adequately considered elsewhere. 
 
 § 282. Collisions npon the highway.— The law of the road 
 in the United States requires travelers in vehicles, when 
 they approach each othier upon a highway, each to turn to 
 the right, if it be reasonably practicable so to do, and stat- 
 utes in most of the States prescribe it explicitly. These 
 statutes usually provide that travelers shall, in passing, each 
 turn to the right of " the centre* of the road."^ When one 
 is on the wrong side of the road at the time of a collision it 
 is prima facie evidence of negligence upon his part,* but will 
 not, as matter of law, defeat the action if it appears that it 
 did not contribute to produce the injury for which the action 
 is brought, and the plaintiff be himself free from the impu- 
 tation of negligence in other respects.* Being upon the 
 proper side of the road, however, will not, of itself, be con- 
 
 1 Anglice, middle. . Bartch, 120 Ind. .46; 8. c. 23 N. E. 
 
 " As to what this meaus, see Ear- Rep. 83. 
 ing V. Lansing, 7 Wend. 185; Pal- " Newman v. Ernst, 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 mer «. Barker, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 338; 310; Burdick «. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596; 
 
 Smith V. Dygert, 12 Barb. 613; Ja- Damon v. Inhabitants of Scituate, 119 
 
 quith®. Richardson, 8 Mete. 213. A Mass. 66; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 815; 
 
 bicycle is a " carriage " or " vehicle," Smith v. Gardiner, 11 Gray, 418; Spof- 
 
 within the meaning -of these provis- ford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176; Jones v. 
 
 ions. State v. Collins, 16 R. I. 371; Andover, 10 Allen, 18. See, also, 
 
 B. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 131. A person in a Steele «. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59; 
 
 carriage drawn by horses, and the b. c. 6 Am. Rep. 191. 
 rider of a bicycle have equal rights ■• Kennard «. Burton, 25 Me. 89; 
 
 upon the highway; and allegations s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 249; Parker d. Ad- 
 
 that defendant rode a bicycle in ams, 12 Mete. 415; b. c. 46 Am. Dec. 
 
 the center of the road at the rate of 694; Simmonson e. Stellenmerf, 1 
 
 15 miles an hour, up to vrithin 25 feet Edm. Sel. Oas. 194t Clay «. Wood, 5 
 
 of the ifaces of plaintiff's horses, Espin. 44; Chaplin ®. Hawes, 3 Car. & 
 
 whereby they became frightened and P. 555; Wayde v. Lady Carr, 2 Dow. 
 
 ran away and injured plaintiff, do not & Ry. 255, and the cases generally 
 
 state a cause of action. Holland s. last cited. IMnegan e. L. & N. W. 
 
 Ry. Co., 53 J. P. 663. 
 
§ 283.] THE LAW OF THE BOAD. 367 
 
 elusive evidence of an exercise of dne care and caution. One 
 may be upon the right side and yet be wrong,^ especially if it 
 appears that by taking the other side, instead of rigidly ad- 
 hering to the right, the injury might have been avoided.* 
 The law of the road is said, in Pennsylvania, to apply only 
 to travelers who approach each other in coming from oppo- 
 site directions,* but in Louisiana it is held to apply equally 
 to persons moving in the same direction when one attempts 
 to pass the other.* When one traveler attempts, as he has a 
 right to do, to pass another who is ahead of him and moving 
 in the same direction, it is said that the one ahead is not 
 under any legal* obligation to turn to either side to allow the 
 one behind to go on in front of him,' and that the one who 
 attempts to pass does so at his peril, and is responsible for 
 all damages which he thereby causes to the one whom he at- 
 tempts to pass.^ 
 
 § 283. The same subject continued. — But, in an action 
 against a town for injuries sustained through a defect in the 
 highway while attempting to pass another traveler going in 
 the same direction, it is distinctly declared that such at- 
 tempt, if not made recklessly, is not in se negligent, and, ac- 
 cordingly, not contributory negligence which will prevent a 
 recovery.' It is not negligent, said the Supreme Court of 
 
 ■ Parker v. Adams, 12 Mete. 415; ' Bolton v. Colder, 1 Watts, 360. 
 
 s. c. 46 Am Dec. 694. ' Avegno v. Hart, 25 La. Ann. 235; 
 
 » Brooks V. Hart, 14 N. H. 307; s. c. 13 Am. Bep. 133. See, also, 
 
 Johnson v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25; Good- Knowles o. Crampton, 55 Conn. 336; 
 
 hue B. Dix, 2 Gray, 181; Smith v. s. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 598, where the rule 
 
 Gardiner, 11 Gray, 418; O'Malley v. is applied when the team in advance 
 
 Dom, 7 Wis. 236. "As a matter of is standing still, 
 
 common practice, however, the fact ' Fopper v. Wheatland, 59 Wis. 
 
 that a person was driving on the 623; Mochler b. Town of Shaftsbuiy, 
 
 wrong side would be strong evidence 46 Vt. 580; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 634. 
 
 of negligence on his part." Hastings One cannot be charged with negli- 
 
 on Torts, 176. gence in calling out on the highway to 
 
 ' Bolton V. Colder, 1 Watts, 360. a driver that a team wants to pass 
 
 * Avegno v. Hart, 35 La. Ann. 235; him, although the sound frightens the 
 
 8. c. 13 Am. Bep. 133. The statute driver's horse and brings about a col- 
 
 "law of the road " has no aipplication lision, Pigott v. Lilly, 55 Mich. 150. 
 
 to carriages meeting at the junction of Plaintiff, having turned out of the road 
 
 two streets. Morse v. Sweenie, 15 lU. to pass another traveler only so far as 
 
 App. 486. '^^ necessary to pass, was not negli- 
 gent in failing to see a wire running 
 
368 THE LAW or THE BOAD. [§ 283. 
 
 Kansas, not to be on the lookout for a runaway team that 
 dashes up from behind, and runs against your vehicle and 
 does you an injury; * but it is such contributory negligence as 
 will prevent a recovery to hitch a horse by the roadside in 
 such a way that the hind wheel of your buggy stands in the 
 ri;t of the beaten track, so that another person in driving by 
 runs into it without diverging to any degree from the track.' 
 In New York the driver of an ambulance, being entitled to 
 the right of way by statute, may assume that the driver of a 
 wagon ahead of him will heed the ambulance bell, and if the 
 ambulance driver is injured by a collision without negligence 
 on his part, he may recover damages.' The law of the road 
 does not usually apply to persons on horseback who must, 
 as a rule, yield the road to a vehicle,* especially to one 
 heavily loaded.' It is an almost unnecessary reiteration of 
 elementary rules to say that contributory negligence, upon 
 the part of one who brings his action for damages for inju- 
 ries sustained upon the highway by reason of the negligence 
 of another, is a defense in the same sense and to the same 
 extent that it is in actions for any other class of injuries. 
 There is nothing, that I know peculiar in this respect in ac- 
 tions of this nature. The plaintiff must himself be free from 
 fault contributing to produce or occasion the mischief of 
 which he complains, or his right of action is gone.* 
 
 from a sunken stone in the road to a ' Kennard ®. Burton, 25 Me. 39; 
 
 telegraph pole, aij& used to support s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 249; Parker v. Ad- 
 
 the latter. Sheldon v. Western Union ams, 12 Mete. 415; s. c. 46 Am. Dec. 
 
 Tel. Co., 4 N. T. Supl. 536; s. c. 51 694; Lane v. Crombie, 13 Pick. 177; 
 
 Hun, 591. Monroe «. Leach, 7 Mete. 374; Mabley 
 
 • Moulton V. Aldrich, 38 Kan. 300. v. Kittleberger, 37 Mich. 360; Moody 
 
 A like rule applies when a traveler is ». Osgood, 54 N. Y. 488 ; Wynn v. 
 
 overtaken by persons racing at a speed Allard, 5 Watts & 8. 521; Drake o. 
 
 prohibited by ■ ordinance. Potter v. Mount, 38 N. J. Law, 441; Lane v. 
 
 Moran, 61 Mich. 60; s. c. 37 N. W. Bryant, 9 Gray, 345; Wood v. Lus- 
 
 Rep. 854. combe, 33 Wis. 387; Larrabee v. Sew- 
 
 ' Le Baron ». Joslin, 41 Mich. 313. all, 66 Me. 376; Harpell «. Curtis, 1 
 
 ' Byrne «. Knickerbockef Ice Co., E. D. Smith, 78; McLane ®. Sharpe, 
 
 56 N. T. Super. Ct. 337; s. c. 4 N.Y. 2 Harr. (Del.) 481; Fales v. Dearborn, 
 
 Supl. 531. 1 Pick. 344; Daniels «. 01 __ 
 
 * Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Wend. 465. Mich. 32; Brooks ■». Hart, 14 N. H. 
 
 ' Washburn «. Tracy, 3 D. Chip. 307; Knapp v. Salsbury, 2 Camp. 500; 
 
 (Vt.) 128; B. 0. 15 Am. Dec. 661; Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493; Chaplin 
 
 Beach v. Parmenter, 23 Penm. St. 196. «. Hawes, 3 Car. & p. 554; Pluckwell 
 
§ 284.] 
 
 THE LAW OF THE EOAD. 
 
 369 
 
 § 284. Injuries upon ferryboats.— A ferryman is a com- 
 mon carrier and, as such, becomes liable for the safety of his 
 passengers and their baggage as soon as he signifies his 
 readiness or willingness to receive them.' But when one, in 
 taking his property upon a ferryboat, retains possession of it, 
 the liability of the ferryman is thereby essentially modified. 
 He is liable for negligence, but is not an insurer as to such 
 property.'' In view of the construction of ferryboats, and the 
 habit of passengers to crowd toward the bow as the boat 
 approaches the landing, it is held not necessarily negligent — 
 that is, not negligent as matter of law, for a passenger on a 
 ferryboat to stand near the bow as the boat is landing.* Nor 
 is he in fault in standing near the head of a stairway down 
 
 ■V. Wilson, 6 Car. & P. 375; Williams 
 V. Holland, 6 Car. & P. 33; Wayde «. 
 Lady Carr, 2 Dow. & E. 355. 
 
 ' May V. Hanson, 5 Cal. 360; s. c. 
 63 Am Dec. 135; BicliaTds o. Fuqua's 
 Adm'r, 28 Jliss. 792; s. c. 64 Am. Dec. 
 121; Griffith V. Cave, 33 Cal. 385; 
 Clark V. Union Perry Co., 35 N. T. 
 485; WiUoughbyB. Homdge, 13 C. B. 
 745; Self V. Dunn, 43 Ga. 538; Albright 
 v. Verm, 14 Tex. 290; Littlejohn «. 
 Jones, 2 McMuU, 365; s. c. 39 Am. 
 Dec. 132; Sanders v. Young, 1 Head, 
 219; Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio St. 
 722; Miller v. Pendleton, 8 Gray, 547; 
 Claypool ®. McAllister, 20 HI. 504; 
 Chevalier ®. Straham, 2 Tex. 115; s. c. 
 47 Am. Dec. 639, and the note; Slim- 
 mer V. Merry, 33 Iowa, 94; AngeU on 
 Carriers, § 82; Story on Bailments, 
 § 496; 3 Kent's Commentaries, 599. 
 
 ' WyckofE i>. The Ferry Co., 52 N. 
 Y. 33; 8. o. 11 Am. Rep. 650; Harney 
 ■B. Rose, 36 Ark. 3; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 
 595. The proprietor of a strictly fer- 
 ry business is not necessarily a com- 
 mon carrier of property, and is bound 
 only to dae care and diligence as to 
 property transported with the owner; 
 but if he combines, as is frequently the 
 case, with the business of a ferryman 
 the carrying of merchandise without 
 the presence of the owner, he is bound 
 24 
 
 by the obligations of a common car 
 rier as to such property, including the 
 obligation to carry all merchandise 
 delivered to him. City of New York 
 V. Starin, 13 N. E. Rep. 631. A ferry- 
 man, receiving horses in charge of a 
 driver for transportation, is not liable 
 for an accident to them, in the absence 
 of negljgence on his part. The fact 
 that between the apron of planks at- 
 tached to the boat and thrown out at 
 the landing and the boat there was a 
 crack in which a frightened horse 
 caught his leg and broke it, was, held 
 not to show negligence. Yerkes i>. 
 Sabin, 97 Ind. 141; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 
 434. See, also, upon the general ques- 
 tion of when the liability of a common 
 carrier attaches to a ferryman, Blake- 
 ley V. Le Due, 19 Minn. 187; Gour- 
 dine v. Cook, 1 Nott & M. 19; Cohen 
 V. Hume, 1 McCord, 444; White v. 
 Winisimmet Co., 7 Cush. 156; Whar- 
 ton on Negligence, § 707. 
 
 •Peverly v. City of Boston, 136 
 Mass. 366; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 37; 
 Cleveland v. Steamboat Co., 68 N. Y. 
 806; Gannon a. Union Ferry Co., 39 
 Him, 631; Hawks v. Winans, 74 N. 
 Y. 609; 8. C. 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 451. 
 But see, contra, Cunningham v. Lynes9, 
 33 Wis. 345. 
 
370 THE LAW OP THE ROAD. [§ 284. 
 
 which he is thrown by the concussion of the boat in entering 
 the slip.^ But where a child six years of age, in leaving a 
 ferf yboat constructed in the usual manner, fell through the 
 guards where the boat fitted into the slip and wasdro wned, 
 it appearing that no similar accident had ever happened, the 
 ferry company was held not liable.** Where a ferryboat has 
 two gangways by which passengers can leave, a passenger 
 who attempts to leave by the gangway intended for teams, 
 and who is injured by the guard-chain for such gangway be- 
 ing dropped on his leg while he is astride of it, is guilty of 
 contributory negligence, and cannnot recover from the owner 
 of the boat.' If a person on leaving a ferryboat voluntarily 
 joins a crowd which is so dense as to prevent him from see- 
 ing where he treads, and voluntarily proceeds with such 
 crowd, and is injured by his foot being caught between the 
 boat and the dock, such conduct, 2>ei* se, manifests contribu- 
 tory negligence, and he should be nonsuited.^ And when 
 one drove a spirited team upon a ferryboat and negligently 
 suffered them to get away from him, whereupon they became 
 frightened, plunged overboard, and were drowned, it was held, 
 that in the absence of any proof of negligence on the part of 
 the ferry company, they were not liable for the loss.* Where 
 it was a common occurrence for passengers, in passing from 
 the waiting-room down the passage-way towards the boat, to 
 be forced into the roadway by the pushing of the crowd, the 
 company was held negligent in not providing against, such 
 accidents.* 
 
 'Bartlett®. New York, &c.,Traiisp. 'Graham v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 
 Co., 8 N. T. Supl. 309; s. c. 57 N. T. 39 Fed. Rep. 596. 
 
 Super. Ct. 348. * Droyer v. N. Y., &c., Ry. Co., 48 
 
 ' Loftus V. Union Ferry Co., 84 N. N. J. Law, 373; s. c. 7 Atl. Rep. 417. 
 
 Y. 455; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 533. It was decided to be a judicious act 
 
 Plaintiff, in passing from defendant's for a passenger to jump out of a cabin 
 
 waiting-room to its ferryboat, was window after the boat had turned on 
 
 struck by a swinging door. 3eld, its side and righted again with the 
 
 that, 88 the door was an ordinary one, cabins full of water. Ladd v. Poster, 
 
 in plain view, and not part of defend- 31 Fed. Rep. 837. 
 
 ant's machinery for transportation, « Dudley v. Camden and Phila. 
 
 plaintiff must prove his allegations of Ferry Company, 33 N. J. Eq. 25; s. c. 
 
 negligence. Hayman b. -Pennsylvania 38 Am. Rep. 501. See, also, Evans o. 
 
 R. Co., 118 Penn. St. 508. (y. Dou- Rudy, 34 Ark. 885; Yerkes v. Sabin 
 
 gan V. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 97 Ind. 141 ; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 434. 
 
 1. And see, also, Crocheron v. North • Tonkins c. New York Peny Co., 
 
 Shore, &c.. Perry Co., 56 N. Y. 656. 47 Hun, 562. 
 
CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 STREET RAILWAYS. 
 
 § 385. Duties of street railway com- 
 panies as conunon carriers. 
 
 386. Intoxicated passengers. 
 
 387. Duty as to pedestrians. 
 
 388. "Walking upon a street railway 
 track. 
 
 389. The track not a highway. 
 
 390. The degree of care not the 
 same as that required in case 
 of steam railroads. 
 
 391. Alighting from or boarding 
 moving street cars. 
 
 .893. The same subject continued. 
 
 § 393. Riding upon the platforms of 
 street cars. 
 
 394. How far it is the duty of the 
 passenger to ride inside the 
 car when there is room. 
 
 395. The same subject continued. 
 
 396. Passenger's hand or arm out- 
 side of the car window. 
 
 397. Free passengers and trespass- 
 ers upon street cars. 
 
 398. The New England Sunday 
 rule applied to street rail- 
 ways. 
 
 § 285. Duties of street railway companies as .common 
 carriers. — In actions brought against street car companies, 
 by passengers and others, for injuries sustained by reason of 
 the negligence of the company's employees in faciendo, or in 
 nonfadendo, contributory negligence is very often a defense. 
 We, therefore, in this and the following sections, proceed to 
 consider the law in point as affecting that defense in actions 
 of this nature. Street railway companies, as carriers of pas- 
 sengers, are common carriers and ipso facto bound to the full 
 measure of a carrier's liability for the safety of those who 
 ride in their cars. They are accordingly liable for injuries 
 that result to their passengers from the negligence of their 
 servants and agents within the scope of their proper em- 
 ployment.* Among the duties which the law imposes upon 
 
 •HoUy V. Atlanta Street Railroad, 
 61 (Ja. 315; B. c. 34 Am. Rep. 97; 
 Balto. City Passenger R. Co, v. Kemp, 
 61 Md. 619; s. C. 48 Am. Rep. 134; 
 Putnam ». Broadway, &c., Ry. Co., 
 55 N. T. 108; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 190; 
 ef. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. a. Hinds, 
 53 Penn. St. 513; New Orleans, &c., 
 
 R. Co. «. Burke, 53 Miss. 300; B.C. 
 34 Am. Rep. 689; Weeks®. New York,, 
 &c., R. Co., 73 N. T. 50; s. o. 38 
 Am. Rep. 104. Where a passenger 
 on a street-railway car is injured by a 
 sudden jerk of the car, in transit, 
 there is a presumption of negligence; 
 on the part of the earlier. Dougherty 
 
372 
 
 STREET EAILWAYS. 
 
 [§ 285. 
 
 the street railway company is that of protecting its passen- 
 gers from insult or assault, and for a failure in this regard 
 the passenger may have his action, if the company's servants 
 are in any respect negligent or blameworthy.* The com- 
 pany is also responsible for an unlawful assault or for 
 an excess of force on the passenger by its employees 
 acting in the line of their duty,' even though the act be 
 wanton and malicious.* In Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ey. 
 
 ■». Missouri, &c., K. Co., 81 Mo. 325; 
 s. c. 51 Am. Eep. 339; and where the 
 iniury is caused by a collision be- 
 tween the car and a bridge, the bur- 
 den of disproving negligence is on the 
 railroad company. Wilkerson v. Corri- 
 gan, &c.. Street Ry. Co., 36 Mo. App. 
 144. The same rule applies when the 
 cars collide. Smith v. St. Paul, &c., 
 Ey. Co., 33 Minn. 1; s.c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 550. The utmost care and foresight 
 are required in the construction and 
 operation of the road. Watson v. St. 
 Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 46; s. c. 
 43 N. "W. Rep. 904; McSwyny ». 
 :Broadway, &c., R. Co., 7 N. T. Supl. 
 456; Citizens' St. Ry. Co. ■». Twi- 
 -name, 111 Ind. 587; s. c. 13 N. E. 
 Rep. 55. Where the driver, after giv- 
 ing up the reigns to a substitute, care- 
 lessly knocked a passenger oS the 
 platform in leaving the car himself, 
 the company was held liable. Com- 
 monwealth V. Brockton, &c., Ry. Co., 
 143 Mass. 501; s. c. 10 N. E. Rep. 
 506. A person acquires the rights of 
 a passenger while stepping on a car 
 that has stopped for him. McDon- 
 ough V. Metropolitan R. Co., 137 
 Mass. 310; Smith v. St. Paul, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 33 Minn. 1. 
 
 ' See, also, generally the cases cited, 
 supra. 
 
 ' Springer Transp. Co. ». Smith, 16 
 Xea, 498; s. o. 1 So. W. Rep. 380; 
 Passenger Railroad Co. v. Young, 21 
 Ohio St. S18; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 78; 
 Higgins V. WatervUet, &c., R. Co., 
 •46 N. Y. 33; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 2,98; 
 
 Sanford e. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 33 
 N. Y. 343; Jackson ®. Second Ave. 
 R. Co., 47 N. Y. 374; s. c. 7 Am. 
 Rep. 448; Sherley «. Billings, 8 
 Bush, 147; HofEman v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 87 N. Y. 35; s. c. 41 
 Am. Rep. 337; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Plexmaa, 103 111. 546; Keokuk, 
 &c.. Packet Co. v. True, 88111. 608; 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 
 Me. 303, holding that if the company 
 retain the offending employee in their 
 service after his misconduct is known 
 to them, they will be liable to exem- 
 plary damages; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 39; 
 Carter v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 98 
 Ind. 553; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 780; 
 Johnson v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 58 
 Iowa, 348; Benton v. Chicago, &c., 
 B. Co., 55 Iowa, 496; Nevin v. Pull- 
 man, &c. Car Co., 106 111. 233; s.c. 
 46 Am. Rep. 688; Bryant v. Rich, 106 
 Mass. 180; a. c. 8 Am. Rep. 311; Rams- 
 den v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 104 
 Mass. 117; s. o. 6 Am. Rep. 300; Lim- 
 pus B. London Gen'l Omnibus Co., 1 
 Hurl. &C. 541; Bayley «. Manchester, 
 &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 415; The 
 Thetis, L. R. 2 A.&E. 365. 
 
 ' Isaacs «. Third Ave. R. Co., 47 
 N. Y. 123, lays down a contrary doc- 
 trine, but that case is distinctly over- 
 ruled by Stewart v. Brooklyn, &c., 
 R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588. This exception 
 to the general rule exempting the mas- 
 ter from liability for wanton and 
 malicious acts of his servant rests 
 upon the existence of a contract rela- 
 tion between the carrier and the pas- 
 
§ 286.] STEEET BAILWAYS. 373 
 
 Co.^ the court, upon this point, said : — " The carrier's obli- 
 gation is to carry his passenger safely and properly, and to 
 treat him respectfully ; and, if he entrusts the performance of 
 this duty to his seryants, the law holds him responsible for 
 the manner in which they execute the trust. . . . He must 
 not only protect his passengers against the violence and in- 
 sults of strangers and co-passengers, but a fortiori against 
 the violence and insults of his own servants. If this duty to 
 the passenger is not performed — if this protection is not fur- 
 nished — but, on the contrary, the passenger is assaulted and 
 insulted through the negligence of the carrier's servant, the 
 carrier is necessarily responsible." 
 
 § 286. Intoxicated passengers.— It is held in New York 
 that a street car conductor is not bound to eject a passenger 
 who addresses insulting remarks to his fellow passengers, 
 although he is manifestly intoxicated, if, upon being admon- 
 ished by the conductor, he remain quiet and unoffensive, and 
 that the company is not to be held responsible for the results 
 of a subsequent unlocked for attack committed by the 
 drunken passenger upon the passenger whom he had previ- 
 ously insulted.* But in the District of Columbia it seems 
 that when one appears to be drunk, being sick and unable to 
 sit up properly, and vomiting, the conductor may lawfully 
 eject him from the car, and that, too, whether his sickness 
 
 senger. In the case last cited, where car by the act of the agent to ■whom 
 a passenger was maliciously beaten by the defendant had entrusted the exe- 
 the driver of a horse car, this point cution of the contract. It is the de- 
 was elucidated by the New York fendant's failure to carry safely and 
 Court of Appeals as follows: — "By without injury that constitutes the 
 the defendant's contract with the breach, and it is no defense to say that 
 plaintiff, it had vmdertaken to carry that failure was the result of the wil- 
 him safely and to treat him respect- ful or malicious act of the servant," 
 fully; and while a common carrier To the same effect are Bryant v. Rich, 
 does not undertake to insure against 106 Mass. 180, 190; North Chicago, 
 injury from every possible danger, &c., Ry. Co. ». Oastka, 138 111. 613; 
 he does undertake to protect thepas- s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 533; Lyons v. 
 senger against any injury arising Broadway, &c., R. Co., 10 N. Y. 
 from the negligence or wilful miscon- Supl. 337. 
 
 duct of its servants while engaged in ' 57 Me. 303; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 39. 
 
 performing a duty which the carrier ' Putnam «. Broadway, &c., R. Co., 
 
 owes to the passenger He 55 N. Y. 108; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 190. 
 
 was injured while in the defendant's 
 
374 STBEET EAILWAYS, [§ 286. 
 
 proceeds from drunkenness or not,^ Where passengers are 
 intoxicated and disorderly, and, upon being admonished by 
 the conductor, refuse to be quiet, it is the plain duty of the 
 conductor to compel them to leave the car. Street cars 
 are for the exclusive use and benefit of sober and orderly 
 folk. That a passenger is drunk will not, of itself, justify the 
 conductor in ejecting him, but if, in addition to that, he is 
 disorderly and refuses to be controlled, or is, by reason of his 
 cups, disgusting and offensive to the other passengers, he has, 
 being in that condition and so deporting himself, no right to 
 ride, and the conductor may lawfully require him to leave 
 the car.* Where it appeared that plaintiff had been drink- 
 ing, was riding on the front platform, although without 
 objection, and stepped to the lower step to permit persons to 
 pass, and that a sudden movement of the car, by which he was 
 injured, was not unusual, and should not have been unex- 
 pected, it was held that a nonsuit should have been granted.' 
 It is not necessary that a passenger on a street car should 
 tender the exact amount of his fare, but he must tender a 
 reasonable amount, and the carrier must furnish change, and 
 five dollars is such a reasonable amount.^ And the act of a 
 street car driver in delivering a passenger over to a police- 
 
 > Lemont v. Washington, &c., R. Co., 1 Mackey, 180. And see, also, 
 
 Co., 1 Mackey, 180; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. Pittsbiirgh, &c., R. Co. ». Hinds, 53 
 
 238. See, also, s. c. 3 Mackey, 502; Penn. St. 512; Flint u. Norwich, 
 
 47 Am. Rep. 268, upon another point &c.. Trans. Co., 34 Conn. 554; b. c. 6 
 
 which will interest the curious reader. Blatchf . 158; Pearson v. Duane, 4 
 
 Of., however, ConoUy «. Crescent R. Wall. 605; Vinton ■». Middlesex R. 
 
 Co, 41 La. Ann. 57, where a passenger Co., 11 Allen, 304. Whether it Is due 
 
 on a street car was stricken with apo- care and proper exercise of this right 
 
 plexy, which was attended with vom- for the conductor to attempt to re- 
 
 iting, causing inconvenience and dis- move the intoxicated person while 
 
 comfort to' the other passengers. He the car is in motion, is not a quration 
 
 was removed from the car and laid in of law for the court, but of fact for 
 
 theopenstreet.withnoefforttoprocnre the jury. Murphy «. Union Ry. Co., 
 
 him attention. It was held that the 118 Mass. 338; New Orleans, &c., r! 
 
 mistakeof the driver in supposing that Co. ■». Burke, 53 Miss. 200; s. c. 24 
 
 the passenger was drunk, when the Am. Rep. 689; Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 
 latter had ridden a considerable dis- Co. e. Pillow, 76 Penn. St. 510; b. c. 
 
 tance without misbehavior, and had 18 Am. Rep. 424. 
 
 been guilty of none except the vomit- » Hayes v. Forty-second St., &c., 
 
 ing occasioned by his illness, was de- R. Co., 97 N. T. 259. 
 
 cided not to relieve the company from « Barrett v. Market St. Ry. Co 81 
 
 liabiUty. Cal. 296. 
 
 '' Lemont ». Washington, &c., R. 
 
§ 287.] STBEET RAILWAYS. 375 
 
 man on the ground that he has not paid his fare and will not 
 leave the car, is an act for which the company can be held 
 liable by the passenger, if, in fact, he has paid his fare.* 
 But a passenger who stands in a crowded street car without 
 objection from the conductor, and who is injured by being 
 thrown from the car while it is rounding a curve, is not pre- 
 cluded from maintaining an action against the street car com- 
 pany.'' 
 
 § 287. Duty as to pedestrians.— The driver of a street car 
 must, like the driver of any other vehicle upon the highway, 
 exercise ordinary care not to run over pedestrians, or to 
 drive his car into collision with wagons or carriages also 
 upon the street. His failure in this respect will render the 
 company liable in damages to the person injured ;' as where, 
 from idle curiosity the driver, instead of watching his horses' 
 and looking ahead and otherwise properly attending to his 
 duties, stares at a young lady in a doorway,* or looks at a 
 fire,^ or a pigeon,' or talks to his friend riding with him 
 upon the platform,' or otherwise neglects his business to 
 gratify his own curiosity or idleness.' A driver who is blind 
 
 ' Brown v. Christopher, &c., R Co., be dependent on the locality through 
 
 34 Hun, 471. which he is driving. Thus, in a large 
 
 ' Lapointe v. Middlesex R. Co., 144 populous city, where all descriptions 
 
 Mass. 18. of vehicles are constaotly passing, he 
 
 ' Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Robinson must not only see that the track is 
 
 {HI.), 18 N.E. Rep. 773; Hill. ®. Ninth clear, but must exercise constant 
 
 Ave. R. Co., 109 N. T. 339; s. c. 16 N. watchfulness for persons who may be 
 
 E. Rep. 61; Franilin ». Forty-second approaching the track. Brooks v. 
 
 St. R. Co.,3N. Y. Supl. 339. Heucke Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 33 Neb. 816; 
 
 V. Milwaukee City Ry. Co. , 69 Wis. s. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 539, holding that 
 
 401; s. 0. 34 N. W. Rep. 243, exacts the place for the driver is on the plat- 
 
 a high degree of care of the driver. form with the lines in his hands. 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. ° Commonwealth v. Metropolitan 
 
 401; Albert b. Bleecker St. R. Co., 2 R. Co., 107 Mass. 336. 
 
 Daly, 389; Cohen v. Dry Dock, «&c., « Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 38 
 
 R. Co., 69 N. T. 170; Pendleton St. N. Y. 455. 
 
 R. Co. V. Shires, 18 Ohio St. 355; ' Mentz v. Second Avenue R. Co., 
 
 Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Stallman, 33 2 Robt. 356; s. c. 3 Abb. App. Dec. 
 
 Ohio St. 355; Liddy n. St. Louis, &c., 374. 
 
 R. Co., 40 Mo. 506. ' Collins v. South Boston R. Co., 
 
 * Baltimore. &c., R. Co. ■». McCon- 142 Mass. 301; Fenton v. Second Ave. 
 
 nell, 43 Md. 534, 553, where it was R. Co., 56 Htm, 99; s. c. 9 N. Y. Supl 
 
 also said tha* what would be ordinary 162; Winters v. Kansas City, &c., Ry. 
 
 care on the part of the driver would Co., 99 Mo. 509; 8. c. 13 So. W. Rep. 
 
376 
 
 STREET RAILWAYS. 
 
 [§ 287. 
 
 in one eye should not be indifferent to tlie added responsi- 
 bility resting upon that organ, and if he turns his head away 
 from the direction in which the oar is moving, it is a circum- 
 stance unfavorable to him in determining whether he was ex- 
 ercising due care.^ To rush a " grip-oar " over a street cross- 
 ing at a rapid speed, without signal or warning, while a train 
 bound in the opposite direction is discharging passengers at 
 the crossings, is an act which warrants a finding of negli- 
 gence on the part of the company,' Where the driver of a 
 street car, observing a woman driving in a buggy ahead, and 
 being able to stop the car in time for the buggy to i)ass out 
 of danger, nevertheless drove at an extraordinary speed, and 
 crowding the buggy into a narrow space between a sand- 
 bank and the track, struck and injured it, the company was 
 liable, though the woman might have been careless in not 
 observing the approach of the car.* But where a woman 
 
 653; Galveston City R. Co. «. Hewitt, 
 67 Tex. 473. Evidence that the cars 
 on the company's lines are habitually 
 crowded is admissible and important, 
 because it charges the company with 
 knowledge that the attention of the 
 driver is thereby frequently distracted 
 from the path of the car. Anderson i>. 
 Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 490; 
 s. 0. 44 N. W. Rep. 518. If there is 
 no conductor, and the driver is inside 
 collecting fares while the car is in 
 motion, it is at the peril of the com- 
 pany. Saare v. Union Ry. Co., 20 
 Mo. App. 311; Hyland v. Tonkers 
 R. Co., 1 N. T. Supl. 363. Qf. 
 Stone v. Dry Dock, &c., R. Co., 46 
 Hun, 184. In "Wright «. Third Ave. 
 Ry. Co., 5 N. T. Supl. 707, it was 
 held that inattention on the part of the 
 driver should not take the case from 
 the jury, and that the question of 
 contributory negligence must not be 
 overlooked. PendriU v. Second Ave- 
 nue R. Co., 3 Jones & 8. 481; s. o. 43 
 How. Pr. 899; Oldfield v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 14 N. T. 810; Cook ®. 
 Metropolitan R. Co., 98 Mass. 861. 
 But see Citizens' Street Ry. Co. ». 
 
 Carey, 56 Ind, 896. If he is vigi- 
 lant to see and avoid any obstruction 
 on or dangerously near the track in 
 front of him, he is guilty of no negli- 
 gence in omitting also to keep a con- 
 stant watch on each side of the car, 
 to see that no one is injured by 
 coming laterally in collision with it. 
 Bulger V. Albany Ry., 43 N. T. 459^ 
 Boland v. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 36 
 Mo. 484; Albert «. Bleecker St. R., 
 Co., 3 Daly, 389; Lynam «. Union R. 
 Co., 114 Mass. 83; Suydam ■». Grand 
 St. R. Co., 41 Barb. 375; s. c. 17 
 Abb. Pr. 304; Thompson on Negli- 
 gence, 398, §§ 3, 4, where the cases 
 are collected. 
 
 ' Silberstein v. Houston, &c., R. 
 Co.,4N. Y. Supl. 843. 
 
 ° Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Robioson,. 
 137 111. 1; 8. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 772. 
 
 ' Citizens' i St. Ry. Co. ■». Steen, 
 43 Aik. 321. Nor is a person driving 
 on the track in advance of a car ap- 
 proaching at a rapid rate bound, as a 
 •matter of law, to believe that the rate 
 of speed will be continued and thus end 
 in a collision. Gumb v. Twenty-Third 
 St. Ry. Co.,9 N. Y. Supl. 376. It is not 
 
§ 288.] STREET RAILWAYS. 377 
 
 knew a car was coming, and was near, but could not see it 
 until she turned her horses to cross the track at a slow walk, 
 she was held guilty of contributory negligence barring re- 
 covery.^ When the driver's negligence has been the occasion 
 of a collision, and an injured passenger brings his action 
 against the person with whom the car collided, who was also 
 at fault, the negligence of the driver of the street car in 
 which the plaintiff rode cannot, as we have seen,* be imputed 
 to the plaintiff to bar his recovery.^ 
 
 § 288. Walking upon a street railway track.— Inasmuch 
 as he who walks upon the track of a steam railway is usually 
 a trespasser, going at his peril, and entitled only to that 
 small measure of care on the part of the railway company 
 that the law requires to be exercised even towards mere tres- 
 passers or bare licensees, it has been held in Louisiana that 
 it is a trespass to walk upon the track of a street railway laid 
 in the thoroughfares of a city or town,* but this is denied in 
 California* and Texas.* Under the rule in Louisiana, one who 
 is run down while Walking upon a street car track, in the ab- 
 sence of wantonness upon the part of the driver of the car, has 
 no remedy, his contributory negligence in walking upon the 
 track being held sufBcient to prevent a recovery.' But this is 
 believed to be an untenable position. In no proper sense can 
 the pedestrian who wa,lks in the roadway, as he has a right 
 to do, upon the street car track, be said to be a trespasser. 
 
 alone conclusive proof of negligence Trans. Co., 3fi N. J. Law, 325; s. c 
 to drive upon and along the track 13 Am. Kep. 435; Thompkins ®. Clay- 
 ahead of a car In motion. It is a St. Ry. Co. (Cal.), 19 Am. Law Eev. 
 proper question for the jury. Brooks 163,318. 
 
 «. Lincoln St. Ry. Co. (Neb.), 36 N. * Johnson v. Canal St. Ry. Co.. 27 
 
 W. Rep. 529; Buhrens v. Dry Dock, La. Ann. 53; Childs «. New Orleans 
 
 &c., Ry. Co., 53 Hun, 571; s. o. 6N. St. Ry. Co., 33 La. Ann. 154. See, 
 
 T. Supl. 224. also, Hearn v. St. Charles St. Ry. Co., 
 
 ' Citizens' Pass. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 34 La. Ann. 160. 
 
 132 Penn. St. 504; s. c. 19 Atl. Rep. » Shea v. Potrero, 44 Cal. 414; <sf. 
 
 286. See, also, Schlater v. Wilbert, Robinson v. Western Pacific R. Co., 
 
 41 La. Ann. 406; b. c. 6 So. Rep. 107; 48 Cal. 409. 
 
 Wood v. Detroit Ry. Co., 52 Mich. « Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Walker, 70' 
 
 403; s. 0. 50 Am. Rep. 259. Tex. 126; s. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 831. 
 
 ' § 110, mpra. ' See, also, generally the cases cited> 
 
 ' Bennett v. New .Jersey R. & supra. 
 
378 8TBEET BAILWAT8. [§ 290. 
 
 The street car company has no such exclusive, proprietary 
 right to any part of the street as entitles them to warn the 
 public off, or gives them a license to abate any part of that 
 ordinary care in going through the streets with their vehicles 
 which is justly required of other persons who drive upon the 
 highway. The steam railroad company owns the land upon 
 which it runs its trains, or, if it does hot, its easement is an 
 exclusive right to use the land except at public crossings. 
 
 § 289. The track not a highway.— The street railway track, 
 although in the highway, is not a king's highway nor a part 
 of a highway. For a steam railroad the law very properly and 
 justly insists upon a clear track,* not only as the right of the 
 railway company, but also from the most obvious considera- 
 tions of general convenience and policy. It were safer to 
 drive the car of Juggernaut through Broadway than to abate 
 anything from the strictness of this rule. The franchise of 
 the street railway company, on the other hand, is a mere ease- 
 ment to use the highway in common with the public generally. 
 There is nothing exclusive or proprietary in their ownership 
 of this right or franchise, and they have no higher right to 
 use the street than the humblest pedestrian.^ Moreover, the 
 reasons which render it prudent and proper to hold persons 
 who walk upon railway tracks trespasseirs, are wholly want- 
 ing in the case of persons walking in the highway upon a 
 street car track. The measure, or gucmtum of care and prii- 
 dence which will constitute " ordinary care," with respect to 
 street railways, on the part of those who have to do with 
 them, is much less than is required to be exercised by per- 
 sons who are brought in any way in connection with steam 
 railways.' 
 
 § 290. The degree of care not the same as that required 
 in case of steam railroads. — The danger of accident from col- 
 lision with street cars is very trifling as compared with that 
 from collision with trains of cars running at a high rate of 
 speed upon a railroad. Street cars never run very fast, and 
 
 ' Railroad Co. ■». Norton, 24 Penn. N. Y. 554; Government St. E. Co. v. 
 St. 465; 8. c. 64 Am. Dec. 672. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70. 
 
 = Adolph V. Central, &c., R. Co., 65 ' Thompson on Carriers, 444, § 6. 
 
§ 290.] STREET RAILWAYS. 379 
 
 are easily and almost instantly stopped.^ What, therefore, 
 might be gross negligence as respects a steam railroad, might 
 be perfectly prudent and perfectly proper to be done in deal- 
 ing with street cars. We must not, therefore, attempt to ap- 
 ply to street railways the rules of law applicable to steam 
 railroads. The cases are essentially different, and the reason 
 for the rule ceasing, the rule itself must also cease. It is in 
 accordance with this view that the courts hold that the rule 
 that one upon approaching a railroad crossing upon the 
 highway, must look carefully up and down the track before 
 he attempts to cross, is not to be applied to' one who attempts 
 to cross a street car track upon the highway.^ Due care, 
 that is to say, ordinary care, under the circumstances, must 
 be exercised both in walking upon a street railway track and 
 also in attempting to cross it, A failure to have done this 
 on the part of one who brings his action against the com- 
 pany for injuries received while being upon the track, will be 
 held a legal offset to the negligence of the company's ser- 
 vants; but it is not necessary in such an action for the 
 plaintiff to establish his carefulness to the same extent as in 
 a similar action against a railway company. He need not 
 show absolutely that he looked carefully up and down the 
 track before venturing upon it. It need only appear that he 
 was in the exercise of ordinary care, and he will not be held 
 a trespasser if he walks upon the track. He has his common 
 law right to walk there if he chooses,' and wherever the ser- 
 vants of the street railway company fail to exercise the ordi- 
 
 'Meesel v. Lynn, &c., R. Co., 8 Co., 2 Robt. 356; s. c. 3 Abb. 
 
 Allen, 234. App. Dec. 274 But see, also, Kelly v. 
 
 ' Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Robinson, Hendrie, 26 Mich. 255; Buzby v. 
 
 127 ni. 1; B. c. 18 N. E. Rep. 772. Philadelphia Traction Co., 126 Penn. 
 
 This is especially trae where the com- St. 559; b. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 895; 24 
 
 pany has been accustomed to keep a W. K C. 155; Cowan v. Third Ave. 
 
 track free while discharging passen- R. Co., 1 N. T. Supl. 612; Cowan 
 
 gers on another track who are com- ». Third Ave. Ry. Co., 9 N. T. 
 
 pelled to cross the former. A passen- Supl. 610; Miller v. St. Paul, &c., Ry. 
 
 ger alighting may proceed without Co., 42 Minn. 454. 
 being on the alert for a violation of ' § 251, aupra. See, also, Govern- 
 
 the rule. Burbridge ®. Kansas City ment St. R. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70, 
 
 R. Co., 86 Mo. App. 669; Lynam 81; McClain ». Brooklyn City R. Co., 
 
 ■B. Union, &c., R. Co., 114 Mass. 116 N. T. 459; s. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 
 83; Mentz v. Second Avenue R. 1062. 
 
380 
 
 STBEET BAILWAYS. 
 
 [§ 291. 
 
 nary care of any other person who drives a vehicle upon the 
 highway not to run over him, the company is liable,^ 
 
 § 291. Alighting from or boarding moving street cars.— 
 
 It is well settled that it is not contributory negligence in ge 
 for one to alight from or to board a moving street car ; * and 
 here, again, we find the severily of the rule, as applicable to 
 steam railways, essentially relaxed.' " Ordinarily," said the 
 Court of Appeals of New York, " it is perfectly safe to get 
 upon a street car moving slowly, and thousands of people do 
 it every day with perfect safety. But there may be excep- 
 tional cases, when the car is moving rapidly,* or when the 
 person is infirm and clumsy, or is incumbered with children, 
 packages,* or other hindrances, or when there are other 
 unfavorable conditions, when it would be reckless to do so ; 
 and a court might, upon undisputed evidence, hold, as a mat- 
 
 ' See the preceding section and the 
 cases there cited, and Thompson on 
 Negligence, 396, 397. But when a 
 person solely by his own negligence 
 was thrown under the front platform, 
 and the driver backed the car with- 
 out unhitching the horses, whereby 
 the plaintiff was trampled upon, the 
 driver's error of judgment gave no 
 ground of action. Riling v. Broad- 
 way, &c.. By. Co., 53 Hun, 321; b. C- 
 6 N. T. Supl. 641. 
 
 "^ Schacherl ®. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 
 42 Minn. 43; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 837; 
 Valentine ii. Broadway, &c., R. Co., 
 4 N. y. Supl. 481; 8. c. 14 Daly, 540; 
 West End, &c., R. Co. v. Mozely, 79 
 6a. 463; s. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 324; 
 Stager e. Ridge Ave., &c., Ry. Co., 
 119 Penn. St. 70; s. c. 12 Atl. Rep. 
 821; Ashton u. Detroit City Ry. Co., 
 78 Mich. 587; s.c. 44 N. W. Rep. 141; 
 McDonough v. Metropolitan R. Co., 
 137 Mass. 210; Briggs v. Union Street 
 Ry. Co., 148 Mass. 72; s. c. 19 N. E. 
 Rep. 19; Eppendorf «). Brooklyn City, 
 &c., R. Co., 69 N. Y. 195; 8. c. 25 
 Am. Rep. 171; Mettlestadt v. Kinth 
 Avenue R. Co., 4 Robt. 377; Rath- 
 
 bone V. Union R. Co., 13 R. I. 709; 
 People's Passenger R. Co. n. Green, 
 56 Md. 84. See, also, Diethick v. 
 Balto., &c., R. Co., 58 Md. 347. 
 Contra, Hagan v. Philadelphia, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 15 Phila. (Penn.) 278. 
 
 ' See two recent and very full and 
 learned Indiana cases upon this point. 
 Terre Haute, &c., R. Co. «. Buck, 96 
 Ind. 346; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 168; 
 Stoner v. Pennsylvania Co., 98 Ind. 
 384; 8. c. 49 Am. Rep. 764, and g§ 146, 
 147, supra. 
 
 * The Supreme Court of Texas, 
 however, has held a charge that it is 
 negligence to alight from a rapidly 
 moving railway train, whOe it is not 
 negligence to alight from one moving 
 slowly, error and ground upon which 
 appellant may have a new trial. 
 Texas, &c., R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 
 Tex. 356. 
 
 ' Ricketts v. Birmingham St. Ry. 
 Co., 85 Ala. 600; s. c. 5 So. Rep. 353, 
 where the passenger had a keg of 
 lead in his hand. Reddington i>. 
 PhOa. Traction Co., 132 Penn. St. 154; 
 8. 0. 19 Atl. Rep. 28. 
 
§ 293.] STBEET BAILWAYS. 381 
 
 ter of law, that there was negligence in doing so. But in 
 most cases it must be a question for a jurj. Here there was 
 nothing exceptional, and no reason apparent why plaintiff 
 might not, with prudence, have expected to enter the car 
 with safety. He had the right to expect that the speed of 
 the car would continue arrested until he was safely on the 
 car. It was the act of the driver in letting go the brake 
 without notice, and thus suddenly giving the car a jerk 
 while plaintiff was getting upon it, that caused the acci- 
 dent." 1 
 
 § 292. The same subject continaed. — In a recent Mary- 
 land case it appeared that, while the plaintiff with several 
 other passengers was riding upon the front platform of the 
 defendant's street car, the car ran off the track, and the pas- 
 sengers upon the platform, at the request of the driver, got 
 off and assisted in replacing the car on the track. When 
 -this was done, the passengers proceeded to get upon the 
 front platform again, and the plaintiff, in trying to climb over 
 ihe wire enclosure at the front of the car, as the car was 
 moving, fell under the wheels, and his foot was crushed. He 
 had given up his seat in the car to an elderly lady and had 
 gone out upon the front platform because there was no other 
 seat for him inside. In this state of facts, the question of 
 the driver's negligence in starting the car before his passen- 
 gers had all safely gotten on again, and of the negligence of 
 the passenger in trying to board the car in motion at the 
 iront platform, and in spite of the railing which was three 
 feet high and entirely enclosed. the platform, was held a 
 proper one for the jury, the court decling to say that the 
 passenger's conduct was negligent as matter of law.* 
 
 § 293. Riding upon the platforms of street cars.— It is an 
 equally well established rule that the mere fact of riding on 
 
 » Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City, &c.. There was evidence of negligence on 
 
 B. Co., 69 N. T. 195. See, also, her part, but a compulsory nonsuit 
 
 Conley v. Forty-second St., &c., was held to be erroneous. Neslio «. 
 
 By. Co., 3 N. T. Supl. 239; Morison Second, &c., Passenger Co., 113 
 
 V. Broadway, &c., B. Co., 8 N. T. Penn. St. 300. 
 
 Supl. 436. A woman, in alighting " People's Passenger R. Co. ®. Green, 
 
 from a street car, slipped and fell. 56 Md. 84. 
 
382 STREET BA.ILWAYS. [§ 293. 
 
 the platform of a street car is not conclusive evidence of neg- 
 ligence.* "The seats inside are not the only places," said 
 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, " where the 
 managers expect passengers to remain; but it is notorious 
 that they stop habitually to receive passengers to stand in- 
 side till the car is full and then to stand on the platforms 
 till they are full, and continue to stop and receive them after 
 there is no place to stand except on the steps of the plat- 
 forms. Neither the officers of these corporations, nor the 
 managers of the cars, nor the traveling public, seem to regard 
 this practice as hazardous, nor does experience thus far seem 
 to require that it should be restrained on account of its 
 danger. There is, therefore, no basis upon which the" court 
 can decide upon the evidence reported that the plaintiff did 
 not use ordinary care " [he was injured while standing on the 
 platform]. "It was a proper case to be submitted to the 
 jury upon the special circumstances which appeared in evi- 
 dence."* It is not negligent to take a o&t upon which there 
 is no place to ride except the platform, and, having taken 
 such a car, it is not negligent to remain upon it, and to ride 
 upon the platform ; or, to express the same rule in another 
 way, it is not negligent to ride upon the platform from neces- 
 sity, when the alternative is to ride there or get off the car.* 
 
 1 Fleck ®. Union Ry. Co., 134 Mass. Ry. Co., 72 Wis. 307; s. o. 39 N. W. 
 
 481; Nolan «. Brooklyn City, &c., R. Rep. 866; City Ry. Co. v. Lee, 50 N. J. 
 
 Co., 87 N. T. 63; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. Law, 435; s. c. 14 Atl. Rep. 883. 
 
 345; Thirteenth St., &c., R. Co. ■». « Ginna v. Second Ave. R. Co., 67 
 
 Boudrou, 92 Penn. St. 475; s. c. 37 N^ T. 696, which holds that it is not 
 
 Am. Rep. 707, and the note; GJerman- negligence p^ se for one so riding 
 
 town Passenger R. Co. «. Walling, upon the platform to omit to take 
 
 97 Penn. St. 55; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. hold of the iron bar or rail to prevent 
 
 711; 2 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 20, and being thrown upon the platform, 
 
 the note; Meesel v. Lynn, &c., R. Gferman Passenger R. Co. v. Walling, 
 
 Co., 8 Allen, 234; Maguire v. Middle- 97 Penn. St. 55; Thirteenth St., &c., 
 
 sex R. Co., 115 Mass. 239; Burns v. R. Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Penn St..475; 
 
 Belief ontaine, &c., R. Co., 50 Mo. s. o. 37 Am. Rep. 707; Clark®. Eighth 
 
 139; Spooner v. Brooklyn City, &c.. Avenue R. Co., 86 N. Y. 135; s. c. 32 
 
 R. Co., 54 N. Y. 230; s. c. 18 Am. Barb. 657; Augusta, &c., R. Co. «. 
 
 Rep. 570; " Street Railways," 24 Alb. Renz, 55 Ga. 126; Hadencamp s. 
 
 Law Jour. 365; "Rights of streetcar Second Ave. R. Co., 1 Sweeney (N. 
 
 platform passengers," by Eugene Mc- Y. Super. Ct.) 490; Sheridan v. 
 
 Quillen, 20 Cent. Law Jour. 104. Brooklyn City, &c., R. Co., 36 N. Y. 
 
 = Meesel v. Lynn, &c., R. Co., 8 39; Werle v. Long Island R. Qp., 98 
 
 Allen, 234; Geitz v. Milwaukee City N. Y. 650. 
 
§ 294.] STREET BAILWAYS. 383 
 
 Where it is customary in a busy season to allow passengers 
 on street cars to ride on the side steps of an open car, there 
 being no seats vacant, in the absence of any warning or ob- 
 jection from the conductor, a passenger injured whil^ so rid- 
 ing is not guilty of contributory negligence, though he was 
 a cripple.^ 
 
 § 294. How far it is the doty of the passenger to ride in- 
 side the car when there is room. — Neither is it negligent in se 
 to ride upon the platform even when there is room inside the 
 car ; ^ nor is it necessarily negligence, being upon the plat- 
 form, not to t%ke hold of the railing to prevent being thrown 
 off;' nor to stand down upon the steps of the platform, if one 
 holds on to the railing ; * nor to pass on one of the side steps 
 of an open car, from the rear platform to the front seat, there 
 being no other means of passing from one end of the car to 
 the other.* But to stand in a dangerous position upon the 
 platform, after an opportunity is offered the passenger of 
 exchanging it for a safer one, is contributory negligence.® 
 The law does not regard one platform of a street car with any 
 more favor than the other, and it is no more an act of negli- 
 gence to ride upon the front than upon the rear platform.' 
 
 > Topeka City Ry. Co. v. Higgs, 38 ° Craighead «. Brooklyn City R. 
 
 Kan. 375; s. c. 15 Pac. Kep. 667. Co., 5 N. Y. Supl. 431. 
 
 "Connolly n. Knickerbocker Ice ° Ward ». Central Park, &c., R. Co., 
 
 Co., 114 N. T. 104; s. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 33 N. T. Super. Ct. 392; s. c. 11 Abb. 
 
 101; Burns v. BeUefontaine, &c., R. Prac. (N. 8.) 411; 43 How. Prac. 
 
 Co., 50 Mo. 139; Maguire v. Middle- 289. A man, while standing on the 
 
 sex R. Co., 115 Mass. 239. But see, front step of a horse-car bowing to his 
 
 contra, Andrews «. Capitol, &c., R. wife inside, was thrown from the car 
 
 Co., 2 Mackey, 137; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. by its sudden starting, and the court 
 
 266; Solomon v. Central Park, &c., R. was ungallant enough to declare it 
 
 Co., 1 Sweeney (N. Y. Super. Ct.) contributory negligence. Ashbrook 
 
 398, where it is held that where a v. Frederick Ave. Ry. Co., 18 Mo. 
 
 passenger rides in a place of hazard or App. 290. 
 
 danger, such as the front platform, ' Meesel «. Lynuj «&c., R. Co., 8 
 
 his negligence is prima fade proved, Allen, 334; Maguire v. Middlesex R. 
 
 and the onus is on him to rebut the Co., 115 Mass. 339; Nolan ®. Brooklyn 
 
 presumption. City, &c., R. Co., 87 N. Y. 63; B.C. 41 
 
 ■ Ginna ®. Second Avenue R. Co., Am. Rep. 345; People's Passenger R. 
 
 67 N. Y. 596. Co. ■». Green, 56 Md. 84; Germantown 
 
 « Fleck V. Union R. Co., 134 Mass. Passenger R. Co. «. "Walling, 97Penn. 
 
 481; Huelsenkamps). Citizens' R. Co., St. 55; Bums v. BeUefontaine, &c , R. 
 
 34 Mo. 45; 8. c. 37 Mo. 567. Co., 50 Mo. 139; West Phila.Pass. Ry. 
 
384 
 
 STREET EAILWATS. 
 
 [§ 295. 
 
 But it is held that a rule which prohibits passengers from 
 riding upon the front platform is a reasonable rule, and where 
 a passenger, having been informed of the rule, violates it 
 without some extenuating circumstances, he has no remedy 
 in case of injury by reason of the mere negligence of the 
 company's servants ; ^ as, for an example, when one sits upon 
 the steps of the front platform in spite of the rule of the 
 company and the warning, of the driver,^ or upon the window 
 sill, with one foot upon the iron rail of the dash-board upon 
 the front platform.* 
 
 § 395. The same subject continned. — In a recent case the 
 Supreme Court of Michigan held it contributory negligence, 
 and intimates that it is evidence of exceeding stupidity and 
 folly for one, at the invitation of the driver, when there is 
 plenty of room unoccupied inside the car, to ride upon the 
 front platform and sit on the driving bar.* In Andrews v. 
 
 Co. ■». Gallagher, 108 Penn. St. 524; 
 Hourney v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 7 
 N. T. Supl. 603. 
 
 'Wills «. Lynn, &c., R. Co., 139 
 Mass 351; Balto. City Passenger R. 
 Co., 30 Md. 334. In a recent case in 
 Maryland, it was held to be the duty 
 of a passenger frequently using the 
 line to be aware of such reasonable 
 regulations promulgated by placards 
 in every car, and he failed to recover 
 though he testified he had never seen 
 them. Baltimore, &c., Turnpike Road 
 «. Cason (Md.), 30 Atl. Rep. 113. 
 
 "Wills «. Lynn, &c., R. Co., 139 
 Mass. 351; Solomon v. Central Park, 
 &c., R. Co., 1 Sweeney (N. T. 
 Super. Ct.) 398; Clark «. jEighth Ave. 
 R. Co.,36N. T. 135. 
 
 " Heckrott «. Buffalo St. R. Co., 
 Super. Ct. of Buffalo (1883), 13 
 Am. Law Record, 395. 
 
 * Dovraey «. Hendrie, 46 Mich. 498, 
 re-reported for substance, 41 Am. Rep. 
 347 (in the note). The court said: — 
 "The point is undetstood as being, 
 that granting the driving bar to have 
 been, as the plaintiff knew, a danger- 
 
 ous seat, and, also admitting that the 
 fact of his occupying it was a proxi- 
 mate contributory cause of his injury, 
 yet; as his sitting there was at the 
 driver's invitation, it ought not to be 
 reckoned as contributory, negligence. 
 There is no doubt that it has been laid 
 down as a rule that an assignment of 
 the passenger by the carrier to a posi- 
 tion of danger may, in case of injury, 
 estop the carrier from setting up the 
 occupation of that position as contrib- 
 utory negligence. But the rule is 
 plainly not one of universal applica- 
 tion. Regard must be had to the pas- 
 senger's capacity to look out for him- 
 self; to the opportvmity there may be 
 to get a safer position; to the distinct- 
 ness, certainty and extent or degree of 
 the peril, and so on. Take the case 
 of a child, and the case of a man every 
 way qualified to take care of himself; 
 the case where the position given 
 seems tolerably safe, and no better 
 perceived; and the case where it is 
 manifestly one full of danger, and a 
 safe one is known which is equally 
 accessible. It would be very tmrea- 
 
§ 295.] 
 
 STBEET EAILWAYS. 
 
 385 
 
 Capitol, &c., Bailroad Go.,^ it is held that if there is standing 
 room inside a street car, with straps for holding on, it is 
 negligent to ride upon the platform ; but such a rule is 
 against the current of authority. So, also, it has been held 
 that where a woman stands up in a street car she must, when- 
 ever it is possible, hold on to the straps that hang from the 
 ceiling, and that not to do so when she might, is such negli- 
 gence on her part as wi^l prevent a recovery, in case she suf- 
 fers an injury which such a course might have prevented.^ 
 On the other hand it is held in New York that it is not neg- 
 ligent in a passenger, upon approaching his destination, to 
 leave his seat in a railway train before the cars stop, upon 
 the ground that he did as passengers usually do.* 
 
 sonable to apply the rule equally to 
 all. May the ordinary passenger, with 
 his eyes open, and with abundant ac- 
 commodations before him which are 
 safe, accept an invitation from the 
 carrier to ride on the cow-catcher, and 
 then, if injury arise from it, be al- 
 lowed to set up the invitation as a 
 legal answer to the charge of contrib- 
 utory negligence? To conclude that 
 he might, would be to permit a person 
 of full capacity to exempt himself 
 from the duty and responsibility ap- 
 pertaining to him as a moral being, 
 and, in substance, to stultify himself 
 in order to cast a liability on another. 
 'Judges cannot denude themselves of 
 the knowledge of the incidents of rail- 
 way traveling which is common to us 
 all.' [Siner v. Great Western Ry. Co., 
 L. R. 4 Exch. 133r Dublin, &c., Ry. 
 Co. o. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155; 
 Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. v. Miller, 25 
 Mich. 274.] And, in the example 
 put, the negligence would be so obvi- 
 ous, and its commission so palpably 
 and, certainly, inexcusable, that a 
 court would not be justified in treat- 
 ing the question of the passenger's re- 
 sponsibility as an open one. A direct 
 charge would be called for. Other 
 cases may be supposed, where, from 
 the nature of the circumstances, a 
 blind acceptance of the carrier's sug- 
 25 
 
 gestion, however hazardous, would 
 not so clearly reveal the passenger's 
 disregard of that primary duty, which 
 rests on every one, to exert his own 
 will and judgment to guard against 
 needless perils, as to justify the judge 
 in taking the matter from the jury. 
 No doubt the riding on a cow-catcher 
 would, to ordinary apprehension, if 
 not in fact, be an exposure to conse- 
 quences more serious than any at all 
 probable to arise from riding on the 
 driving bar of a street car in the 
 way in which the plaintiff rode on 
 this occasion; but the imfltness of the 
 situation, and the fact that it involves 
 great risk of some injury, more or 
 less severe, and is, therefore, one of 
 extreme danger, is just as conspicu- 
 ous in the one case as in the other." 
 Downey d. Hendrie, 46 Mich. 498. Qf. 
 Camden, &c., R. Co. ■». Hoosey, 99 
 Penn. St. 492; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 120. 
 
 > a Mackey, 137; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 266. 
 
 ' Whipple V. West Phila., &o., St. 
 R. Co., 11 Phila. 345. InLapointe e. 
 Middlesex R. Co., 144 Mass. 18; s. c. 
 10 N. E. Rep. 497, the court held that 
 it was not necessarily negligent for a 
 woman to stand between the seats, 
 there being no unoccupied seats. 
 
 • Wylde V. Northern, &c., R. Co., 
 58 N. T. 156; Nichols v. Sixth Ave. 
 
386 STREET BAILWAYS. [§ 296. 
 
 § 296. Passenger's hand or arm outside of the carTdndow. 
 
 — Where a passenger in a street car puts his arm, or elbow, 
 outside of the car window, voluntarily, and without any 
 qualifying or extenuating circumstances impelling him to it, 
 it is held, in Pennsylvania, to be the duty of the court to de- 
 clare the act negligence, as matter of law.^ But in an earlier 
 case the same court held, where one, in riding upon the de- 
 fendant's street car with his arm extending out of an open 
 window, was struck by a passing load of hay and his arm 
 broken, that if the injury was caused by the contributory 
 negligence of the passenger, or by the sole negligence of the 
 driver of the wagon, there should be no recovery against the 
 company, and the jury below, having been allowed to find 
 that the passenger was without fault, the case turned upon 
 the negligence^ or freedom from negligence, of the street car 
 driver.'' In Minnesota, where a passenger on a street car sat 
 down and placed his hand on the window-siU, with his fin- 
 gers outside, and his hand was injured by coming in contact 
 with some planks piled within an inch of the car by the city 
 authorities, to be used in constructing a sewer underneath 
 the track, it was held that the question of the passenger's 
 contributory negligence was for the jury.' And in Louisiana 
 it is held not negligent, as matter of law, for a passenger to 
 allow his arm to project from the window of a street car " a 
 few inches," in a case in which it appears that the passenger's 
 arm so exposed was struck by a passing car, belonging to the 
 same company, as the cars met each other upon a curve — 
 it being decided, also, that it is negligent for a street railway 
 company to have two tracks laid so near together that such 
 an accident can happen.^ 
 
 R. Co., 38 N. Y. 131; "Wniis v. ' Dahlberg v. Minnesota St. R 
 Long Island R. Co., 34 N. Y. 670. Co., 32 Minn. 404; s. c. 19 Am. 
 And see Zemp e. Wilmington, &c.,R. Law Rev. 332; Francis v. New 
 Co., 9 Rich. (Law) 84; s. c. 64 Am. York Steam Co., 114 N. Y. 380; s. c. 
 Dec. 763, an early case upon railroad 21 N. E. Rep. 988. See, also, Sander- 
 law, wherein it is held not negligent, Bon®. Prazier, 8 Colo. 79; s. c. 64 Am. 
 as matter of law, for one to ride upon Rep. 544, which was the case of apas- 
 the platform of a railway train. senger who had his arm partly out- 
 
 1 People's Passenger Railway Co. side a stage-coach window when the 
 
 «. Lauderbach, Sup. Ct. Penn., 19 coach overturned and broke the bmb. 
 
 Am. Law Rev. 163. He was held not negligent. 
 
 ' Federal St. R. Co. v. Gibson, 96 * Summers v. Crescent City Rail- 
 
 Penn. St. 83. road Co., 34 La. Ann. 139; s. c. 44 
 
§ 297.] STREET RAILWAYS. 387 
 
 § 297. Free passengers and trespassers apon street cars. 
 
 — When a newsboy is allowed free access to the cars for the 
 purpose of selling his papers to the passengers, he is held 
 to enjoy that license with its accompanying perils. He is 
 not a passenger, and if injured by the mere carelessness or 
 neglect of the company's servants, he has no remedy against 
 the company.^ So, also, when a passenger hiis left the car 
 and is going about his business, the relation of carrier and 
 passenger is thereby terminated ; and toward such a person 
 the duty of the company is not that of extraordinary dili- 
 gence, as during the continuance of that relation, but only 
 such care as "the law;requires two persons, each lawfully in 
 the highway, to exercise toward each other.* Drivers and 
 conductors of street cars have no authority, plainly, to carry 
 passengers free, but when they suffer or invite young chil- 
 dren to ride upon the cars, without collecting fare from 
 them, and these children are injured upon the car by the 
 negligent or wilful acts of the company's servants, it is gen- 
 erally held that tie company is liable, and, in the absence of 
 contributory neglect, an action may be maintained.' 
 
 Am. Eep. 419; Germantown Passen- They had a right to collect the fare, 
 
 ger R. Co. v. Brophy, 105 Penn. St. and as between themselves and their 
 
 38. employeiB it was their duty to do so. 
 
 1 Fleming v. Brooklyn CSty, &c.. Their neglect of this duty did not 
 
 R. Co., 1 Abb. New Cas. 433. See, make him a trespasser, and did not 
 
 also, Duff V. Allegheny R. Co., 91 relieve them of the obligation to use 
 
 Penn. St. 458; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 675. reasonable care not to injure him." 
 
 In Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Or- s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 678; Muehlhausen 
 
 bann, 119 Penn. St. 37; b. c. 13 Atl. v. St. Louis R. Co., 91 Mo. 332; Met- 
 
 Rep. 816, a newsboy who was on the ropoUtan St. R. Co. ». Moore, 83 Ga. 
 
 car by permission was pushed by the 453; s. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 730; Biddle v. 
 
 conductor, and fell under the follow- Hestonville, &c., Ry. Co., 113 Penn. 
 
 ing car. As the act was not wanton St. 551; Caldwell v. Pittsburgh, &c., 
 
 or malicious, an instruction as to ex- R. Co., 74 Penn. St. 431; Wilton «. 
 
 emplary damages was held erroneous. Middlesex R. Co., 107 Mass. 108; s. c. 
 
 ' Piatt v. Forty-seconti St. R. Co., 9 Am. Rep. 11; 125 Mass. 130; Day v. 
 
 2 Hun, 124. See, also, Merrill v. Brooklyn City, &c., R. Co., 12 Hun, 
 
 Eastern R. Co. (Holmes, J.), 139 Mass. 435; Philadelphia, &c., R. Co. ». 
 
 238; 8. c. 31 Alb. Law Jour. 503. Hassard, 75 Penn. 367; East Saginaw, 
 
 ' Brennan v. Fair Haven, &c., R. &c., City R. Co. v. Baker, 27 Mich. 
 
 Co., 45 Conn. 284, in which the court 603. See, also, §§ 165, 204, gupra. Cf. 
 
 said (p. 298): — "PlaintifiE was right- McDonough «. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 
 
 fully on the car— was there by the 137 Mass. 210. But where the ser- 
 
 consent of the defendants' servants, vants of the company are ignorant of 
 
388 
 
 STBEET EAILWAYS. 
 
 [§ 298. 
 
 §398. The New England Sunday rule applied to street 
 railways. — A street car driyer or conductor, in Massachu- 
 setts, who performs his ordinary duties on Sunday, can 
 maintain i^o action for an injury sustained by reason of a 
 collision with a car of another company while so employed.^ 
 Neither can one in that State who rides in a street car on 
 Sunday, for the purpose of making a social visit, recover 
 damages from the street car company for an injury received 
 in consequence of their neglect.' These -decisions would 
 not, however, be followed elsewhere.' 
 
 the boy's presence upon the car, and 
 he falls or jumps ofi the platfonnthe 
 company is not liable. Bishop v. 
 Union R. Co., 14 R. I. 314; s. c. 51 
 Am. Rep. 386. 
 
 ' Day V. ffighland St. R. Co., 135 
 Mass. 113; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 447. 
 
 ' Stanton v. Metropolitan R. Co., 
 14 Allen, 485. 
 
 ' §§ 175, 261, supra. 
 
CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT; THE SERVANT'S RIGHTS AND 
 OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 J 399. Servant's own contributory 
 negligence a bar. 
 
 300. The same subject continued. 
 — niustiations. 
 
 301. Servant's . contributory negli- 
 gence further considered. 
 
 303. Master's individual neglect a 
 ground of liabily. 
 
 303. This doctrine stated. 
 
 304. So when the master's negli- 
 gence combines with that of a 
 co-servant in producing the in- 
 jury. 
 
 305. Herein of proximate cause. 
 
 306. Be^aondeat superior. 
 
 307. The early cases. 
 
 308. The exception to the rule of 
 respondeat superior. 
 
 309. Later English cases following 
 Priestley «. Eowler. 
 
 310. The same subject continued. 
 
 311. The rule in the United States. 
 — Murray «. South Carolina 
 R. Co. 
 
 313. The reasoning of the South 
 Carolina case. 
 
 313. Parwell b. Boston & Worcester 
 R. Co. 
 
 314. The rule stated. 
 
 315. The reasoning of the Massa- 
 chusetts case. 
 
 316. The reason of the rule criti- 
 cised. 
 
 , 317. The same subject continued. 
 
 318. The* modification of this rule 
 in Kentuclsy. 
 
 319. The leading case in Kentucky. 
 380. The opinion in the Collins 
 
 case. 
 331. The rule in Illinois. 
 333. The rule in Tennessee. 
 
 § 333. Who are fellow-servants. 
 
 334. The rule stated. 
 
 335. When the servant is deemed 
 the agent of the master, or his 
 vice-principal, as qualifying 
 the rule. 
 
 336. A further statement of this 
 rule in the United States. 
 
 1337. Applications of this doctrine. 
 
 338. Test whether one is a mere 
 servant or the representative 
 of the master. 
 
 339. Should there be one rule in 
 this particular applicable to 
 corporations and another less 
 stringent one applicable to 
 other defendants ? 
 
 330. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. 
 Paul R. Co. B. Ross. 
 
 331. This case further considered. 
 333. What is common employ- 
 ment ? 
 
 333. The same subject continued. • 
 
 334. Illustrations. — Railway em- 
 ployees. 
 
 335. The same subject continued. 
 
 336. Further illustrations. — Miscel- 
 laneous employees. 
 
 337. Servants not in common em- 
 ployment. — niustiations. 
 
 338. Servants of different masters. 
 
 339. The rule stated. 
 
 340. This rule approved. 
 
 341. As between different railway 
 corporations having running 
 connections. 
 
 343. As to volunteers. 
 
 343. The same subject continued. 
 
 344. Partnerships and receivers as 
 employers. 
 
390 
 
 MASTEB AND SERVANT. 
 
 [§ 299. 
 
 § 299. Servant's own contributory negligence a bar.— 
 
 The rule of law that a plaintiff, in order to maintain his 
 action for damages for an injury occasioned by the negli- 
 gence of another, must himself be free from contributory 
 negligence is, when the action involves only the individual 
 neglect of the servant and his employer, in no way affected 
 by the consideration that the relation of master and serv- 
 ant subsists between the parties. If the servant is to 
 recover damages, in such a case, from his master, he, like 
 any other plaintiff, comes into court under the legal obli- 
 gation of showing, or having it sufficiently appear, that his 
 own negligence has contributed in no legal sense to the in- 
 jury. His own contributory fault will defeat him in an 
 action against his employer just as it would in an action 
 against any one else.^ 
 
 ' Pennsylvania E. Co. ■». O'Shaugh- 
 nessy, 133 Ind. 588; s.o. 33 N. E.Kep. 
 675; Elliot v. Chicago, &c., By. Co., 
 5 Dak. 533; s. c. 41 N. W. Kep. 758; 
 EUis V. Houston, 4 N. Y. Supl. 733. 
 In Murphy d. N. T., &c., R. Co., 11 
 Daly (N. T.) 133, and Redmond v. 
 Rome, &c., R. Co., 10 N. T. Supl. 
 330, railroad employees were injured 
 ■while walking upon or across the 
 track without taking due heed of ap- 
 Jfoaching trains. The question of 
 contributory negligence in such cases 
 was submitted to the jury in Inter- 
 state, &c., Ry. Co. V. Fox, 41 Kan. 
 715; s. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 797, and Bo- 
 bieski u St. Paul, &o., R. Co., 41 
 Minn. 169; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 863. 
 Gibbons ■». Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 66 
 Iowa, 331; Chambers v. Western 
 K^orth Carolina R. Co., 91 N. C. 471; 
 Roul V. East Tenn., &c., Ry. Co. 
 (Ga.), 11 S. E. Rep. 558, and Dandle 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (La.), 7 So. 
 793, were cases where employees 
 failed to recover for injuries received 
 in boarding or alighting from moving 
 engines and cars. But it was held 
 to be a question for the jury in Pullu- 
 tro V. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 7 N. Y. 
 
 Supl. 510, and New York, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Coulboum, 69 Md. 360; 8. c. 16 
 Atl. Rep. 308. If an employee un- 
 necessarily rides on the pilot of the 
 engine or on the platform at the end 
 of the tender while being carried to 
 his work, even with the knowledge of 
 the conductor or trainmen, and, by 
 reason of being there, is injured by a 
 collision, he has no right of action 
 against the company. Lehigh Valley 
 R. Co. V. Greiner, 113 Pa. St. 600; 
 Downey v. Chesapeake, &c., Ry. Co., 
 38 W. Va. 733; St. Louis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. B. Marker, 41 Ark. 543. On the 
 other hand, it is held not to be con- 
 tributory negligence for a switchman 
 to ride on the front foot-board of the 
 switch-engine to which he is attached 
 while en route to the work he has to 
 do. Lockhart v. Little Rock, &c., R. 
 Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 631. See, also, 
 Conners t. Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 
 71 Iowa, 490; 8. c. 33 N: W. Rep. 
 465; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. ■». Mc- 
 Cally, 41 Kan. 639; 8. o. 31 Pac. Rep. 
 574; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zink, 136 
 Penn. St. 388; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 614; 
 Crabell v. Wapello Coal Co., 68 Iowa, 
 751. A laborer on a railroad section 
 
§ 300.] 
 
 MASTEB AND SERVANT. 
 
 391 
 
 § 300. The same subject continued.— Illustrations.— The 
 
 fact that the servant is violating a city ordinance is not such 
 
 froze his feet when, by keeping in 
 motion or going to a fire provided, he 
 might have avoided it. Held, that he 
 had no right of action against the 
 raUroad company employing him. 
 Farmer 9. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 67 
 Iowa, 136. StoU v. Hoopes (Penn.), 
 14 Atl. Rep. 658 ; Newman «. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 80 Iowa, 673; s. c. 45 
 K. W. Rep. 1054; Powers v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 98 N. T. 274; 
 Lane «. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 69 
 Iowa, 443; Chicago, &c.. By. Co. 
 -D. Snyder, 117 111. 376; The John 
 B. Lyon, 83 Fed. Rep. 184; Chesa- 
 peake, &c., Ry. Co. c. Lee, 84Va. 
 643; s. c. 5 S. E. Rep. 579. It is not 
 contributory negligence for a servant 
 to neglect to take meastires to protect 
 himself from a possible defect in his 
 employer's machinery or tackle which 
 he is not aware of and has no reason 
 to expect. Rooney v. Allan, 10 C. of 
 8. Cas. 1224 (Sc). Brown v. Wood 
 (Penn.), 16 Atl. Rep. 42; Houston, &c., 
 Ry. Co. v. Conrad, 63 Tex. 627; 
 Larson v. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 43 
 TVTiTiii 488; 6. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 1096; 
 East Tenn., &c., R. Co. v. Rush, 15 
 Lea (Tenn.) 145; Taylor v. Carew 
 Manuf'g Co., 143 Mass. 470; s. c. 10 
 N. E. Rep. 308; Goodlett v. Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co., 133 U. S. 391; Campbell 
 jj. Lunsford, 83 Ala. 512 ; s. c. 3 So. 
 Rep. 533; Wert «. Keim (Penn.), 18 
 Atl. Rep. 548; Piedmont Electric 
 Illuminating Co. o. Patteson's Adm'x, 
 84 Va. 747; s. c. 6 S. E. Rep. 4. 
 Where the master furnishes his serv- 
 ant with defective machinery, and 
 an accident occurs which so suddenly 
 and unexpectedly places the servant 
 in a position of imminent peril as to 
 allow him no sufficient time for reflec- 
 tion, and the servant in endeavoring 
 to save the machinery commits an er- 
 
 ror of judgment, without which he 
 would not have sustained injury, he 
 is not chargeable with contributory 
 negligence. Schall v. Cole, 107 Penn. 
 St. 1. See, also, on this jwint, § 40, 
 suppa. Kelly ®. Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co. (Penn.), 11 Atl. Rep. 659; Rogen 
 9. Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co., 1 N. T. 
 Supl. 273; Hartwig v. Bay State S. & 
 L. Co., 118 N. T. 664; s. c. 38 N. E. 
 Rep. 34 ; St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Morgart, 45 Ark. 318; Bauer v. St. 
 Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 46 Ark. 388; 
 Bums V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 69 
 Iowa, 450. That the injury for which 
 a brakeman sues the company em- 
 ploying him was received on Sunday, 
 does not preclude a recovery, although 
 it is unlawful to labor on Sunday. 
 LouisviUe, &c., Ry. Co. v. Frawley, 
 110 Ind. 18; Houston, &c., Ry. Co. ■». 
 Rider, 62 Tex. 367; Louisville, &c., 
 Ry. Co. «. Buck, 116 Ind. 666; John- 
 son n. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Neb. 
 690. Before the enactment of Mass. 
 St. 1884, ch. 37, a locomotive engineer 
 injured on Sunday in the performance 
 of his ordinary duties could not re- 
 cover of the corporation. Nor did he 
 show himself to have been engaged in 
 a labor of necessity or charity by 
 showing merely that there was live 
 stock on the train, for which there 
 were no conveniences for feeding and 
 watering at the point of the departure 
 of the train. Read v. Boston & Albany 
 R. Co., 140 Mass. 199. Eureka Co. 
 e. Bass, 81 Ala. 200; Hubgh v. New 
 Orleans, &c., R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495; 
 s. c. 54 Am. Dec. 565; Brown c. Max- 
 well, 6 HUl (N. Y.) 592; 8. c. 41 Am. 
 Dec. 771; Abends. Terre Haute, &c., 
 R. Co., Ill 111. 302; B. c. 19 Cent. 
 L. J. 350; McKinne v. California, &c., 
 R. Co., Sup. Ct. Cal., 1884; s. c. 5 Pac. 
 Rep. 505; Galveston, &c., R. Co. «. 
 
392 ' MASTEB AMD 8EBVANT. [§ 301. 
 
 an act of negligence as to bar his action, unless the illegal 
 act was a contributory cause of the accident. This was so 
 held in a case where an engineer was killed at an open switch 
 while running his train at a forbidden rate of speed.^ And 
 the fact that the servant was injured while engaged in uiilaw- 
 ful labor on Sunday does not preclude him from recovering 
 damages.' So, also, the recklessness of a vice-principal for 
 whose act the master is responsible may amount to wilfulness 
 and thus leave no place for the doctrine of contributory neg- 
 ligence in the case. Where the conductor of a gravel train, 
 knowing that another servant was in a position of danger 
 upon one of the cars, switch them with such an impetus 
 against others as to indicate an indifference to consequences, 
 the United States Circuit Court sustained a verdict awarding 
 heavy damages against the company regardless of the plaint- 
 iffs negHgenoe in being in a situation exposing him to in- 
 pry-' 
 
 § 301. Servant's contributory negligence further con- 
 sidered.— In determining the degree of contributory fault 
 which will defeat the servant's action, the Superior Court of 
 Deliaware adopts the rule which exacts from the plaintiff the 
 exercise of ordinary care in its fullest measure. Said that 
 court in a recent case :* — " Wherever it is the fault of a 
 
 Drew, 59 Tex. 10; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. Ryall «. Central Pac. R. Co., 76 Cal. 
 
 261; Wright u Rawson, 52 Iowa, 329; 474. 
 
 s; c. 35 Am. Rep. 275; Cowles v. " Shumacher «. St. Louis, &c., R. 
 
 Richmoud, &c., R. Co., 84 K. 0. 309, Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 174. This case 
 
 and the cases generally hereinafter goes to the verge of the law in defining 
 
 cited. wilfulness, and leaves little, if any, 
 
 ' Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. v. Parker, room between gross negligence and a 
 
 131 m. 557; 9. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 237. wilful act. It seems to raise gross 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, will the mas- negligence to the second power and 
 
 tor's violation of law support the denonunates its wilfulness. It is also 
 
 action if the servant's negligence was there held that if an injury is charged 
 
 the proximate cause of the injury, in a complaint to have been negligent- 
 
 Ryall V. Central Pac. R. Co., 76 Cal. ly done, a plaintiff may prove any 
 
 474; s. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 430. See, also, degree of negligence, although it may 
 
 I 45 «« geq., supra. be such a degree as to make a case of 
 
 ''Houston, &c., Ry. Co. v. Rider, constructive or legal wilfulness. See, 
 
 62 Tex. 267; Louisville, &c., Ry. Co. also, § 64 et geq., mpra. 
 
 ®. Rusk, 116 Ind. 666; Johnson v. * Stewart «.Phila.,&c.,R. Co. (Del.), 
 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Neb. 690; 17 Atl. Rep. 639. 
 
§ 302.] MASTER AND SERVANT. 393 
 
 plaintiff, no matter how slight, that an accident happens to 
 him, the party from whose act or omission the accident or 
 injury occurred cannot be held liable, the law never under- 
 taking, in such cases, to measure the degree of culpability. 
 The injury must be wholly the fault of the party sued to sub- 
 ject him to liability, and not be relieved by any want of 
 proper care on the part of a plaintiff, such as a reasonably 
 prudent man would take under like circumstances as those 
 under which the injury in the case happened." But in New 
 Jersey a statement of the rule which bars a recovery if the 
 plaintiff is negligent to any extent, however little, was held 
 to be inaccuralie, the court declaring that " to conclude the 
 plaintiff from maintaining his action, his conduct must have 
 been negligent, and his negligence must have contributed to 
 the injury in such a way that, if he had not been negligent, 
 he would have received no injury from the negligence of the 
 defendant." ^ This is also the rule in Texas.' 
 
 I 302. Master's individnal neglect a ground of liability. 
 
 — Every man is liable for his own torts and breaches of con- 
 tract, and a master to his servant neither less nor more than 
 to other persons. This is, like the preceding proposition, 
 elemental law. If a servant is injured through the direct 
 negligence of his master, as where the master is present giv- 
 ing orders or superintending the work, the master is answer- 
 able in damages to the same extent as he would be if the 
 relation of master and servant did not subsist. And the 
 master when taking a hand and engaging in common labor 
 with the servant does not thereby lose his position as an em- 
 ployer, or become a fellow-servant in such a legal sense that 
 the servant impliedly undertake^ to assume the risk of 
 injury from his negligence when so jointly injured.' 
 
 ' Smith D. Irwin, 51 N. J. Law, 507; » Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410 
 
 B. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 852. Leonard®. Collins, 70 N. Y. 98; Ander- 
 
 ' Murray v. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co., 73 son v. New Jersey Co., 7 Robt. 611 
 
 Tex. 2; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 125, hold- Keegan ®. Kavanagh, 62 Mo. 230 
 
 ing that an act of negligence proxi- Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3 El. & El. 701 
 
 mately contributes to the injury when s. c. 7 Jur. (N. 8.) 467; 30 L. J. (Q, 
 
 without the act the injury would not B.) 134; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 85; Roberts v. 
 
 have been inflicted. See, also, § 19, Smith, 2 Hurl. & N. 213. 
 supra. 
 
894 MASTER AND SERVANT. [§ 304. 
 
 § 303. This doctrine stated.—" The doctrine that a serv- 
 ant on entering the service of an employer takes on 
 himself, as a risk incidental to the service, the chance of in- 
 jury arising from the negligence of fellow-servants engaged 
 in the common employment, has no application in the case 
 of the negligence of an employer. Though the chance of in- 
 jury from the negligence of fellow-servdnts, may be supposed 
 to enter into the calculation of a servant in undertaking the 
 service, it would be too much to say that the risk of danger 
 from the negligence of a master, when engaged with him, in 
 their common work, enters in like manner into his specula- 
 tion. From a master he is entitled to expect the care and 
 attention which the superior position, and presumable sense 
 of duty of the latter ought to command. The relation of 
 master and servant does not the less subsist because, by 
 some arrangement between the joint masters, one of them 
 ;takes on himself the functions of a workman. It is a fallacy 
 to suppose that on that account the character of master is 
 converted into that of a fellow-laborer." ^ 
 
 § 304. So when the master's negligence combines with 
 that of a co-servant in producing the iiynry.— Whenever the 
 
 negligence of the master, united to the negligence of a fellow- 
 servant, contributes to the injury, the servant injured thereby 
 
 ' Crompton, J.,mAshworth 1). Stan- case of an employee no presump- 
 wix, 3 El. & El . 701 ; s. c. 7 Jur. (N. S. ) tion of negligence on the part of the 
 467. See, also, Flike v. Boston, &c., R. company arises from the accident 
 Co., 53 N. T. 550; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. alone, as it does in' the case of a pas- 
 645; Shearman & Redfleld on Negli- senger, but the plaintiff must at least 
 gence, 4th ed., § 89; Ormond s. Hoi- show that he was using due care. East 
 land. El., Bl. &E1. 103; Baker «. Al- Tennessee, &c.,R. Co. w.Maloy, 77 Qa. 
 legheny R. Co., 95 Penn. St. 311; s. c. 387; Hufe «. AustM, 46 Ohio, 386; 
 40 Am. Rep. 63^ Oilman ®. Eastern s. c. 31 N. E. Rep. 864. A com- 
 R. Co., 10 Allen, 333; s. c. 13 Allen, pkint alleging, in general terms, that 
 438; Ford «. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 defendant corporation negligently 
 Mass. 340; s. o. 14 Am. Rep. 598; ran its snow-plough over plaintiff's 
 Holden v. Fitchburg R. Co., 139 intestate, defendant's servant, it may 
 Mass. 268, 373; Harkins v. Standard be shown that the accident was direct- 
 Sugar Refinery, 133 Mass. 400, 405. ly caused by the negligence of the 
 The rule, of liability of a railroad corporation or a superior ofllcer, and 
 company for negUgence is not the not alone by the negligence of a fellow- 
 same in the case of an employee as servant. Olson v. St. Paul, «&c., Ry. 
 in the case of a passenger. In the Co., 84 Minn. 477. 
 
§ 305.] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 395 
 
 may recover from the common employer. The servant will 
 not be held to have taken any chances of negligence on the 
 part of his master, and it is believed that no case has gone so 
 far as to hold that where such combined negligence contrib- 
 utes to the injury the servant may not recover. It would 
 be both impolitic and unjust to allow an employer, under 
 these circumstances, to evade the penalty of his misconduct 
 in neglecting to provide for the security of his servant. Con- 
 tributory negligence in order to defeat a right of action in 
 such a case must be solely the negligence of the party in- 
 jured, or the negligence of a co-employee unmixed with any 
 negligence or default upon the part of the common employer.' 
 
 § 305. Herein of proximate cause. — In the foregoing sec- 
 tion it is not intended to assert that the doctrine of proxi- 
 mate cause is to be wholly disregarded in actions against a 
 master, where his negligence has combined with that of a fel- 
 low-servant, although there are expressions in some of the 
 cases that seem to carry the rule to that extent.' The doc- 
 
 ' Paulmier v. Erie Ey. Co., 34 N. 
 J. Law, 151, which holds the master 
 liable in such a case on the ground 
 that he is one of two joint wrong-do- 
 ers. Franklin v. Winona, &c.,B. Co., 
 37 Minn. 409; 8. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 898; 
 Jones V. Florence Mining Co., 66 Wis. 
 268; s. c. 57 Am. Rep. 269; Thall ®. 
 Camie, 5 N. T. Supl. 244; Hvmn v. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co., 78 Mich. 513; 
 8. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 502; Kem v. De 
 Castro, &c.. Refining Co., 5 N. T. 
 Supl. 548; Faren v. Sellers, 39 La. 
 Ann. 1011; 8. c. 3 So. Rep. 803; Sher- 
 mans. Menemonee River Lumber Co., 
 72 Wis. 122; 8. c. 39 N. W, Rep. 365; 
 Pullutro V. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 7 
 N. T. Supl. 510; Stringham v. Stew- 
 art, 100 N. T. 516; Houston, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Lowe (Tex.), 11 S. W. 1065; 
 Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. 'v. Pettis, 69 Tex. 
 689; 8. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 93. See, also, 
 Kevem v. Providence Mining Co., 70 
 Cal. 392; Wood on Master and Serv- 
 ant, 812; Clark v. Soule, 137 Mass. 
 380; Crutchfleld v. Richmond, &c., R. 
 
 Co., 76 N. C. 320; Cayzer v. Taylor, 
 10 Gray, 274; Booth v. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 73 N. T. 38; s. c. 29 Am. 
 Rep. 97; Hayes v. Western R. Co., 3 
 Cush. 270; Stetler v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 46 Wis. 497; s. C. 29 Am. Rep. 
 102, note; Durgin v. Munson, 9 Allen, 
 396; Cone «. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 
 81 N. Y. 206; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 491. 
 Where a workman is injured under 
 circumstances which make it doubtful 
 whether the injury was owing to his 
 own negligence or to the fault of the 
 master in furnishing defective tools, 
 the burden of proving the master in 
 fault is on the workman. East Tenn. , 
 &c., R. Co. «. Stewart, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 
 432. 
 
 ' " The rule which excuses the mas- 
 ter under such circumstances [defect- 
 ive machinery] presupposes that he 
 has performed the obligations which 
 the law imposes upon him, and that 
 the injury occurs solely through the 
 negligence of the co-employee." String- 
 ham V. Stewart, 100 N. T. 516, 526. 
 
396 MASTER AND 8EBVANT. [§ 306. 
 
 trine of proximate cause is too firmly founded on reason and 
 justice to be lost sight of in any discussion of liability for 
 jiegligence. Accordingly, if the master's negligence is a re- 
 mote cause or mere condition of the accident, he is not re- 
 sponsible in damages. Thus, where a train became uncoupled 
 through a defective appliance, and a brakeman, while engaged 
 in repairing the mishap in the portion of the train remaining 
 stationary, was, by the negligence of the engineer, backed 
 upon by the engine and forward part of the train and killed, 
 it was held that the proximate cause of the accident was not 
 the defective appliance.* But where the train broke apart by 
 reason of a defective brake, and the forward part being after- 
 wards stopped, was run into by the detached rear cars, the 
 defect in the brake was deemed the proximate cause of the 
 accident, although a sudden increase of the speed of the loco- 
 motive might have contributed to cause the train to break in 
 two.' It is held by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
 Virginia, that if the proprietors of a coal mine have been 
 negligent in permitting fire-damp to accumulate in their 
 mine, which will not produce any injury until ignited, and it 
 be ignited by a servant, who goes into the dangerous part of 
 the open mine with a lighted lamp instead of a safety lamp, 
 contrary to the orders of the proprietor of the mine, and by 
 such lighted lamp the fire-damp is ignited and exploded, in- 
 juring a fellow-servant, such explosion and injury are caused 
 directly and immediately by the act of the fellow-servant, and 
 not by the negligence of the master.' 
 
 § 306. Respondeat Superior. — A well-known principle of 
 law, which makes every man liable for his own wrong-doing 
 or breaches of contract whenever they have caused actual or 
 
 ' Course ®. New York, &c., R. Co., a safe place for his servants to work 
 3 N. Y. Supl. 313; Pease «. Chicago, in was operating at the time of the ex- 
 Ac, By. Co., 61 Wis. 163. plosion— it was concurrent in time 
 
 ^ Raiisier ®. Minneapolis, &c.,Ry. and action with the negligence of the 
 
 Co., 33 Minn. 331. See, also. Gulf, fellow-servant. See Kern «. De Cas- 
 
 &c., Ry. Co. «. Pettis, 69 Tex. 689; tro, &c.. Refining Co., 5 N. Y. Supl. 
 
 8. c. 7 S. W. Rep. 93. 548, which holds that if the master's 
 
 ' Berus u Coal Co., 37 West Va. negligence and that of a fellow-servant 
 
 385. I am constrained to doubt the are both proximate causes contribut- 
 
 soundness of this decision. The mas- ing to the accident, the master is lia- 
 
 ter's negligence in failing to provide ble. 
 
§ 307.] MASTER AND SERVANT. 397 
 
 legal damage, holds him liable also for those of his duly 
 authorized agent so long as that agent acts within the scope 
 of his authority. This is the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
 The agent is the alter ego, doing the bidding and guided by 
 the mind of the principal for whose misfeasances, inattentions 
 and negligences, in the line of his duty, the principal is held 
 liable. The reason of the rule is nowhere clearly stated, and 
 speculative and philosophical writers have found much fault 
 with it. But, whether based upon a sound reason or not, it 
 is found in the Eoman law, has been crystallized into a 
 maxim,* and from the days of Charles II. has been the un- 
 challenged rule of the common law of England.* 
 
 § 307. The early cases. — The first recorded reference to 
 it is in the case of Michael v. AUestree.* It appears in this 
 old case that a servant was sent by his master to Lincoln's 
 Inn Fields, a place where people are always going about, 
 with two ungovernable horses attached to a coach ; that the 
 servant then drove them to make them tractable and fit them 
 for the coach, and that the horses, because of their ferocity, 
 ran upon the plaintiff and hurt and grievously wounded 
 him. Upon which facts shown, the master, as well as the 
 servant, was held liable in case. Another early case an- 
 nouncing the doctrine is Turberville v. Stampe.* Following 
 these earlier authorities is a great array of adjudications 
 both in this country and in England enforcing and estab- 
 lishing the rule. It is beyond dispute," and " a rule," says 
 
 ^ "Quifaeitpmr almm fadt per se." a. c. 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 138; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 
 
 'Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence 677; Quannan a. Burnett, 6 Mee. & 
 
 (3d London ed.), 513; Doctor and W. 499; Ware ®. Barataria, &c., Ca- 
 
 Student, Dial. 2, eh. 42; Holmes' nal Co., 15 La. 169; 8. c. 35 Am. Dec. 
 
 Common Law, Lect. L 189, and the note in whicli Mr. Free- 
 
 ' 2 Levintz, 172; s. c. sub nom., man has considered at much length 
 
 Mitchell »* AJlestry, 1 Vent. 295; s. c. the question of a master's liability in 
 
 «m6 nom., Mitchell v. Alestree, 3 Keb. these classes of cases; Corrigan v. 
 
 650. Union Sifgar Refinery, 98 Mass. 577; 
 
 ♦ 1 Lord Raym. 264 (by Lord Holt). Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180; a. c. 
 
 ' Limpus*. London Omnibus Co., 8 Am. Rep. 311; Sherley v. Billings, 
 
 IHurl.&C. 526; Burns d. Poulson, 8 Bush, 147; B.C. 8 Am. Rep. 451; 
 
 L. R. 8C. P; 563; s. c. 29 L. T. (N. Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co., 50 
 
 S.)329; Patten v. Rea, 3 C. B.( N. 8.) Mich. 516; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 54; Al- 
 
 606; Booth v. Mister, 7 Car. & P. 66; lison v. "Western, &c., R. Co., 64 N. C. 
 
 Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. «S; Bl. 570; 382; Snyder®. Hannibal, &c.,R. Co., 
 
398 MASTEE AND SEBVANT. [§ 308. 
 
 Judge Thompson, " so plain and easy of application that it 
 could not be made clearer by illustration."^ 
 
 § 308. The exception to the rule of respondeat superior. 
 
 —In 1837 the great case of Priestley v. Fowler' was decided, 
 being the first recorded exception in the English law to the 
 ancient rule of respondeat superior. It' was decided by Lord 
 Abinger without any reference to the earlier doctrine, but it 
 constitutes a clear exception, from which has flowed in a co- 
 pious flood all the modern law as to fellow-servants and a 
 common employment. It is not extravagant to say that this 
 decision in its influence upon subsequent jurisprudence is 
 second to no adjudication to be found in the reports. No 
 other reported case has changed the current of decision more 
 radically than this. All subsequent common law report 
 books contain refinements upon the doctrine, here for the 
 first time announced,* that the superior may not under given 
 conditions be held to respond for the tortious or negligent 
 acts of his agent. The case was as follows : — A butcher sent 
 one of his men to deliver meat on a wagon which had been 
 loaded by another employee, but loaded too heavily. The 
 wagon broke down and the man's thigh was broken. His 
 lordship decides that the butcher was not liable for the in- 
 jury. The ground of the decision is not plain. It does not 
 appear whether the wagon broke down because it was not 
 in proper condition for the journey, or because it had been 
 carelessly overloaded, and the opinion does not say whether 
 the butcher is n6t liable because the law does not imply a 
 
 60 Mo. 413; Tuel ®. "Watson, 47 Vt. ant, §379; Smith on Master and Serv- 
 634; Mitchells. Robinson, 80 Ind. ant, 130; Hill on Torts, 407; Shearman 
 281; 8. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 813; Blake v. & Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., 
 Ferris, 5 N. T. 48; b. c. 55 Am. Dec. § 69; Wharton on Negligence, § 187. 
 304; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. T. ' Thompson on Negligence, 885. 
 397; s. c. 57 Am. Dec. 455; Lannon « 3 Mees. & W. 1. 
 ®. Albany Gaslight Co., 46 Barb. 364; = The dictum of Gordon, J., in Wad- 
 8. c. 44 N. T. 459; Courtney ». Baker, dell «. Simonson, 112 Penn. St. 576, 
 60 N. y. 1; 8. c. 5 Jones & 8. 249; — " that the employer cannot be made 
 Thorpe v. New York, &c., R. Co., 76 responsible for damages resulting to 
 N. Y. 406; Vogel «. Mayor, &c., of a servant from thenegligfence of a f el- 
 New York, 92 N. Y. 17; Shea v. low-servant is a principle as old as 
 Reems, 36 La. Ann. 969; Cooley on the common law," must be taken cum 
 Torts, 533; Wood on Master and Serv- grano soIm. 
 
§ 310.] MASTER AND SERVANT. 399 
 
 contract of warranty as to the safe condition of the wagon 
 on the part of the employer, or because the law does not 
 imply a contract to indemnify against the negligence of his 
 servant. No authorities are cited in support of the position 
 taken, but several instances are loosely suggested, as if by 
 way of analogy, with the skill which advocates possess in 
 suggesting analogies, several of which are quite as applica- 
 ble to other relations as to the relation of master and serv- 
 ant. 
 
 § 309. Later English cases following Priestley v. Fowler. 
 
 — The question arose again in England, in 1850, in the suit 
 of Hutchinson v. The York, New Castle and Berwick Kail- 
 way Company.* This case, although Priestley v. Fowler is 
 the earlier authority, has been regarded the leading English 
 case, properly speaking, upon the subject. Here it is ex- 
 plicitly laid down that there is no implied contract of in- 
 demnity between employer and employed, but an implied 
 contract on the part of the servant to run the ordinary risks 
 of the service. In the judgment, Alderson, B., says : — " The 
 difficulty is as to the principle applicable to the case of sev- 
 eral servants employed by the same master, and injury re- 
 sulting to one of them from the negligence of another. In 
 suqh a case we are of opinion that the master is not, in gen- 
 eral, responsible when he has selected persons of competent 
 care and skill." He continues, giving the reason for this 
 rule, as follows : — " They have both engaged in a common 
 service, the duties of which impose a certain risk on each 
 of them, and in case of negligence on the part of the other, 
 the party injured knows that the negligence is that of his 
 fellow-servant and not of his master" — which comes only 
 something short of assigning as a reason for the rule that 
 when he is hurt he knows exactly who hurt him. 
 
 § 310. The same subject continued.— "He knew," con- 
 tinued the learned baron, " when he engaged in the service 
 that he was exposed to the risk of injury, not only from his 
 own want of skill and care, but also from the want of it on 
 the part of his fellow-servant, and he must be supposed to 
 
 » 5 Exch. 343; s. c. 14 Jur. 837; 6 Eng. RaU. Cas. 588; 19 L. J. (Exch.) 396. 
 
400 MASTEK AND 8EEVANT. [§ 311. 
 
 have contracted on the terms that, as between himself and 
 his master, he would run the risk." This is an implied 
 contract; "a risk," he says, "which Hutchinson must be 
 taken to have agreed to run when he entered into the defend- 
 ant's service." In a single sentence, in conclusion, his lord- 
 ship defines both the principle and the terms of the implied 
 contract, as follows : — " The principle is, that a servant, 
 when he engages to serve a master, undertakes, as between 
 himself and his master, to run all the ordinary risks of the 
 service, and this includes the risk of negligence on the part 
 of a fellow-servant, whenever he is acting in discharge of his 
 duty as servant of him who is common master of both." This 
 statement of the rule has been accepted in the English courts 
 as the law in point, and a long line of authorities, from 1850 
 to the passage of the " Employers' Liability Act," in 1880, 
 are found in ' the reports, affirming and reiterating the doc- 
 trine.* 
 
 § 311. The rule in the United States.— Murray y. South 
 Carolina Railroad Company. — The first case in this country 
 involving the rights of employees in this respect as against 
 their employers, was Murray v. South Carolina E. Co.,' de- 
 cided in 1841. Priestley v. Fowler had been decided three 
 years before, but Judge Evans, of the South Carolina 
 
 1 Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Exch. 354; s. c. employer, at least so far as dvil con- 
 
 19 L. J. (Exch.)300; Seymour 9. Mad- sequences are concerned, to invite 
 
 dox, 16 Q. B. 326; 8. c. 30 L. J. (Q. persons to work for him under cir- , 
 
 B.) 337; SMpp v. Eastern Counties cumstances of danger caused or ag- 
 
 Ry. Co., 9 Exch. 333; s. c. 33 L. J. -gravated by want of due precaution 
 
 (Exch.) 33; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & on the part of the employer. Ifanuin 
 
 Bl. 403; 8. c. 18 Jur. 576; 33 L. J. chooses to accept the employment, he 
 
 (Q. 3.) 131. (In this case the doctrine must bide the consequences, so far as 
 
 is applied to the relation of ship owner any claim to compensation against the 
 
 and seainan.) Brydon «. Stewart, 3 employer is concerned." Woodleyw. 
 
 Macq. 30; 8. c. 1 Pat. 8c. App. 447; Metropolitan, &c., R. Co., 3 Exch. 
 
 s. o. mb nom., Marshall « Stewart, 33 Div. 384, 389. Tarrant r>. Webb, 18 
 
 Eng. Law & Eq. 1; Bartonshill Coal C. B. 797; s. c. 35 L. J. (N. s!) C. P. 
 
 Co. v. Reid, 3 MacQueen, 366; s. c. 263; Conway «. Belfast, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 4 Jut. (N. 8.) 767; 1 Pat. Sc. App. 11 Ir. C. L. 353; Griffiths v. London 
 
 796; Bartonshill Coal Co.«. McGuire, Docks, &c., Co., 50 L. T. (N. 8.) 755; 
 
 3 Macq. 300; s. c. 4 Jur. (N. 8.) s. 0. 13 Q.B. Div. 493; affirmed L. R. 
 
 773; 1 Pat. 8c. App. 785; Wilson 13 Q. B. D. 259. 
 V. Meny, L. R. 1 Sc. «& Div. App. ' 1 McMillan's Law, 385; s. c. 36 
 
 Cas. 326. "It is competent to an Am. Dec. 368. 
 
§ 312.] MASTEE AND SERVANT. 401 
 
 Court, seems not to have had Lord Abinger's opinion before 
 ^~"^i^. In his opinion, however, in this case. Judge Evans 
 cam^ to the same conclusion as that reached in Priestley v. 
 Fowler, by an essentially similar process of reasoning. The 
 facts were these : — ^A fireman upon a locomotive owned and 
 operated by the defendant corporation, was injured while 
 engaged in the discharge of his duty by reason of the engine 
 on which he was employed being thrown from the track, in 
 consequence of the negligent and careless conduct of the 
 engineer who had charge of the engine, and who refused to 
 lessen the speed or stop the engine after his attention had 
 been called to the obstacle on the track which occasioned the 
 accident. These facts presented fairly the question, whether 
 the railroad company was liable to one servant for an injury 
 arising from the negligence of another servant, and the' court 
 held that in such a case the servant could not recover. 
 
 § 312. The reasoning of the South Carolina case.— In 
 
 the case referred to in the preceding section. Judge Evans 
 argued : — " Is it incident to this contract " (that between 
 plaintiflf and defendant, as master and servant) "that the 
 company should guarantee him against the negligence of his 
 co-servants ? It is admitted he takes upon himself the ordi- 
 nary risks of his vocation ; why not the extraordinary ones ? 
 Neither are within his contract, and I can see no reason 
 for adding this to the already known and acknowledged lia- 
 bility of a carrier, without a single case or precedent to sus- 
 tain it. The engineer no more represents the company than 
 the plaintiff. Each in his several department represents his 
 principal. The regular movement of the trdiin of cars to its 
 destination is the result of the ordinary performance by each 
 of his several duties. If the fireman neglects his part, the 
 engine stands still for want of steam; if the engineer neglects 
 his, everything runs to riot and disaster. It seems to me, it 
 is on the part of the several agents, a joint undertaking, where 
 each one stipulates for the performance of his several part. 
 They are not liable to the company for the conduct of each 
 other. Nor is the company liable to one for the misconduct 
 of another, and, as a general rule, I would say that, where 
 there was no fault in the owner, he would be liable only for 
 wages to his servants, "and so far has this doctrine been 
 26 
 
402 MASTER AND SEEVANT, [§ 314, 
 
 carried that in the case of seamen, even wages are forfeited 
 if the vessel be lost^and no freight earned."* This doctrine 
 was subsequently adopted in Massachusetts, in the case of — 
 
 § 313. Farwell t. Boston & Worcester R. Co.,* in which 
 the opinion of the court was rendered by Chief Justice 
 Shaw. In this case, which also presents the precise question 
 fairly, the earlier cases of Priestley v. Fowler,' and Murray v. 
 South Carolina E. Co.,* are followed. The rule as laid 
 down in those cases is expounded and enforced with much 
 ingentiity and ability, and with such cogency of logic that 
 the Farwell case has since been regarded one of the most pro- 
 found and masterly to be found in any of our reports. It has 
 been cited with admiration and approval, it may safely be 
 said, in all the courts of this country, as well as in England* 
 but it must not be overlooked that the rule was first laid 
 down in the South Carolina case. With these two leading 
 American adjudications as cases of first impression, handed 
 down at nearly the same time, declaring the law as just 
 previously held in England, this doctrine became, in pro- 
 cess of time, firmly established as the American rule. 
 
 § 314. The rale stated. — It is the common law rule in 
 every State and Territory of the Union and in the federal 
 courts, that a master or employer is not responsible to those 
 engaged in his employment for injuries suffered by them as 
 the result of the negligence, carelessness or misconduct of 
 other servants in his employ, engaged in the same common 
 or general service or employment, denominated fellow-serv- 
 ants or co-employees, unless the employer himself has been 
 at fault. The rule is so undisputed that it is sufficient to 
 cite one leading or recent decision in point in each jurisdic- 
 tion.^ 
 
 ' Murray v. Soutli Carolina R. Co., Chicago, &o., R. Co. «. Ross, 8 Fed. 
 
 1 McMillan's Law, 385, 388; s. c. 36 Rep. 544; s. c, affirmed, 118 U. S. 
 
 Am. Dec. 368. 877; Qulnn v. New Jersey Light- 
 
 = 4 Mete. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Dec. 339. erage Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 363; s. c. 
 
 8 3Mees. & "W. 1. 32 Alb. Law Jour. 86; Alabama, &c., 
 
 < 1 McMillan's Law, 385. R. Co. «. Waller, 48 Ala. 459; McLean 
 
 » Keilley «. Belcher, 3 Sawyer, 500; «. Blue Point, &c., Co., 51 Cal. 255. 
 
§ 315.] 
 
 MASTEE AND SERVANT. 
 
 403 
 
 § 315. The reasoning of the Massachusetts case.— It is 
 
 clear that this exception to the rule of respondeat superior 
 
 Summerhays v. Kansas, &c., B. Co., 
 2 Colo. 484; Colorado, &c., E. Co. v. 
 Ogden, 3 Colo. 499; Burke v. Nor- 
 wich, 34 Conn. 475; Georgia, &c., R. 
 Co. v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645; Shields ®. 
 Tonga, 13 Ga. 349; s. c. 60 Am. Dec. 
 698. " He, the master, is not liable 
 for the negligence of a fellow-servant 
 while engaged in the same employ- 
 ment, unless he has been negligent in 
 the selection of that servant, or re- 
 tained him after knowledge of his 
 incompetency." Crusselle®. Pugh, 67 
 Ga. 430, 435; e. c. 44 Am. Rep. 724; 
 Stafford «. Chicago, &c., R. Co. (111.), 
 6 Chic. Law Jour. 329, 330; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Rusch, 84 Dl. 570; 
 Sullivan v. Toledo, &c.,,R. Co., 58 
 Ind. 26; Robertson v. Terre Haute, 
 &c., R. Co., 78 Ind. 77; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 552; Peterson b. Whitebreast 
 Coal, &c., Co., 50 Iowa, 673; B. c. 82 
 Am. Rep. 143; Union Trust Co. v. 
 Thomason, 25 Kan. 1; Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co. B. Caven's Adm'r, 9 Bush, 
 559; Camp ®. Church "Wardens, 7 La. 
 Ann. 321; McGee v. Boston Cordage 
 Co., 139 Mass. 145; 8. c. 1 East. Rep. 
 126; Carle b. Bangor, &c., R. Co., 43 
 Me. 269; Blake v. Maine, &c., R. Co., 
 70 Me. 60; 8. c. 35 Am. Rep. 279; 
 Hanrathy v. Northern, &c., R. Co., 
 46 Md. 280; Smith v. Lowell Manfg. 
 Co., 124 Mass. 114; Johnson v. Boston 
 Towboat Co., 135 Mass. 209; s. c. 46 
 Am. Rep. 458; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205. "When the 
 employer has done all that can be 
 reasonably required of him to prevent 
 risks to his servants, he has done all that 
 he owes them. Smith ». Flint, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 46 Mich. 258, 264; 8. c. 41 
 Am. Rep. 161; JosUn ■». Grand Rapids 
 Ice Co., 50 Mich. 516; s. c. 46 Am. 
 Rep. 54; Foster v. Minnesota, &c., R. 
 Co., 14 Minn. 360; Brown «. Winona, 
 
 &c., R. Co., 27 Minn. 162; s. c. 38 
 Am. Rep. 285; Tiemey®. Minnesota, 
 &c., R. Co., 33 Minn. 311; b. c. 32 
 Albany Law Jour. 133; Memphis, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Thomas, 51 Miss. 639; Howd 
 «. Mississippi, &c., R. Co., 50 Miss. 
 178; Gibson v. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 
 46 Mo. 163; Gormly v. "Vulcan Iron 
 "Works, 61 Mo. 492; McAndrews v. 
 Bunls, 39 N. J. Law, 118; Slater v. 
 Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61; s. c. 39 Am. 
 Rep. 627; Brick v. Rochester, &c., R. 
 Co., 98 N. Y. 311; 8. c. 32 Albany 
 Law Jour. 52; Sherman v. Syracuse, 
 &c., R. Co., 17. N. Y. 153; Laning «. 
 N. Y., &c:, R. Co., 49 N. Y. 512; 
 Murphy ». Boston & Albany R. Co., 
 88 N. Y. 146; b. c. 42 Am. Rep. 240; 
 Hardy v. Carolina, &c., R. Co., 76 N. 
 C. 5; Murray v. South Carolina R. 
 Co., 1 McMul. 385; b. c. 36 Am. Dec. 
 268, which is expressly declared, in 
 Boatwright ». Northeastern R. Co., 
 25 S. C. 128, to be still the law in 
 South Carolina. "Whaalan v. Mad. 
 River R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249; Key 
 Stone Bridge Co. «. Newberry, 96 
 Penn. St. 246; B. c. 42 Am. Rep. 543. 
 When no negligence on the part of 
 defendant is proved, and it appears 
 that the injury was directly caused 
 by a fellow-workman's negligent dis- 
 obedience of orders, it is the court's 
 duty to give a specific instruction to 
 find for defendant. Allegheny Heat- 
 ing Co. V. Rohan, 118 Penn. St. 8. c. 
 11 Atl. Rep. 789; Fox «. Sandford, 4 
 Sneed, 36; Nashville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Wheless, 10 Lea, 741; s. c. 43 Am. 
 Rep. 317; Price v. Houston, &c., R. 
 Co., 46 Tex. 535; Hard v. "Vennont, 
 &c., R. Co., 32 Vt. 472; Brabbits v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 38 Wis. 289; 
 Luebke v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 59 
 Wis. 127; 8. c. 48 Am. Rep. 488. A 
 complaint in an action by a servant 
 
404 MASTER AND SEBVANT. [§ 315. 
 
 in favor of employers had its origin in tlie common 
 law in the case of Priestley v. Fowler,^ in England, and 
 in Murray v. South Carolina B. Co.,* in the United 
 States. We shall loot in vain in the reports of either 
 country for any earlier adjudications than these in point. 
 A consideration of the later cases will phow that the doc- 
 trine has been mainly developed under the influence upon 
 the jurisprudence of each country of the great railway cor- 
 porations. A Tery large proportion of the cases in which 
 the question of an employer's liability to his employees in 
 this regard has arisen have been railway cases, and the com- 
 mercial importance and power of these corporations have ex- 
 tended the rule in their interest much beyond what might, 
 under other circumstances, have been expected. But, while 
 the origin of the rule is not far to seek, and its development 
 from 1837 to the present time can be intelligently appreciated, 
 with the principal underlying causes of its extension and 
 growth, in the opinion of the author no entirely satisfactory 
 reason for the exception has ever been found. The reasons 
 of the rule were well stated by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massa- 
 chusetts, in Fai'well v. Boston & Worcester E. Co.' His 
 opinion contains, in substance, all the arguments which in 
 forty succeeding years have been discovered by the courts in 
 favor of the rule as therein adopted, and they amount, it is 
 submitted, in reality to this : — that from considerations of 
 public policy and general convenience, the law will refuse, in 
 the absence of an express contract, to imply a contract on the 
 ^part of the employer of liability ,for the negligence of his 
 employee as to a fellow employee, but will, from the same 
 considerations, in the absence of an express contract, imply 
 a contract on the part of the employee . to run the risk as to 
 
 against his master to recover damages servants is discussed, and extracts from 
 
 for injuries sustained, which makes a statutes and decisions on the subject 
 
 general averment, charging facts suf- are collected in 33 Weekly Law Bui. 
 
 flcient for a recovery, and specific 84. See, also, Cooley on Torts, 541; 
 
 statements showing that the injuries 1 Redfleld on Railways, § 131 et seq., 
 
 were caused by the negligence of a and McKinney on Fellow Servants, m 
 
 fellow-servant, states no cause of loeo. 
 
 action. Indianapolis, &c., Ry. Co. ' 3 Mees. & W. 1. 
 
 o. Johnson, 103 Ind. 353. The non- ' 1 McMillan's Law, 385. 
 
 liability of masters for injuries to ser- ^ 4 Mete. 49. 
 
 vants through the negligence of fellow- 
 
§ 316.] MASTEB AND SEEVANT. 405 
 
 his oo-employees of all the ordinary and extraordinary dan- 
 gers of the common employment. 
 
 § 316. The reason of the rule criticised.— If this be an 
 essentially fair statement of what is proposed as the raiio 
 decidendi, it is safe to charge that it is not entirely satisfac- 
 tory. It may be briefly urged, in objection to the present 
 state of the law upon this pointr— (a) that, inasmuch as it is 
 essentially a question of agency, it is a violent rule that al- 
 lows the judges to say, as matter of law, beforehand, in every 
 case where a servant injures a fellow-servant, that he is not 
 qiwad hoc the master's agent, when it is not denied that he is 
 his master's agent for some purposes. Shall the courts pre- 
 sume to say, when the question of agency is properly a ques- 
 tion of fact, that when injury results, there is no agency, 
 while when advantage results the agency is not to be dis- 
 puted ? If the servant is the master's agent there is an end 
 of controversy; and were not the Scotch judges right, in 
 Wilson V. Merry ,^ in holding that in such a case the question 
 of the agency must go to the jury ? (ft) It may further be 
 asserted that, upon this subject, as to the question of public 
 policy, judges, as a rule, are jot more capable of deciding 
 than other equally informed and experienced men, and that 
 in assuming that the rule of the non-liability of employers is 
 the better policy, questions of fact are involved which the 
 policy of the law has usually referred to juries. Moreover, 
 this question of public policy and general convenience was 
 decided for us in the very infancy of the great corporate in- 
 terests of the country, when railways were an experiment, 
 and powerful private corporations had not been born. What 
 was sound public policy before the middle of the century, 
 even if it be conceded that the judges of half a century ago 
 divined it aright, when Priestley v. Fowler and Murray v. 
 South Carolina E. Co. were decided, may, in view of the 
 extraordinary change in position as regards employer and 
 employee, reasonably be challenged in 1892. It is quite pos- 
 
 ■ L. R. 1 Sc. App. 326; 8. c. 19 L. T. (N. S.) 30. 
 
406 MASTER AND SERVANT, [§ 317. 
 
 sible that what was good public policy then, is not policy in 
 any sense now.^ 
 
 § 317. The same subject continued.— (c) Is it in point of 
 fact true that the employee takes the risk qi the employment, 
 by entering into it with his eyes open ? Verily, he does in a 
 legal point of view. in the present attitude of the law toward 
 him. If he is injured, as the law is, he gets no damages, and 
 it is a legal presumption that every man knows the law. But 
 this is not enough to sustain the position. It proceeds upon 
 the presumption, not of law, but of fact, that the employee 
 actually thinks of the possibility of injury, and deliberately 
 decides to take the risk. This is an assumption contrary to 
 all human experience, and the position seems wholly untena- 
 ble. In reality the servant does not voluntarily and intelli- 
 gently decide to assume any such risk as the law casts upon 
 him. (d) But, it is said, as a controlling argument, that 
 there is the implied 'contract on the part of the servant, im- 
 plied through considerations of public convenience. To 
 which it may be replied that the policy is questioned. It is 
 insisted, also, that, aside from this supposed consideration of 
 public policy, there is no consideration whatsoever for such 
 a contract, the price of labor not being pretended to be in 
 any proportion to the risk — rf g., a railway brakeman receives 
 smaller wages than a conductor, while his exposure to danger 
 is many times more ; and a fireman is paid less for risking 
 his life every other night than a station agent is paid for run- 
 ning no risk at all. Moreover, this implied contract, fastened 
 upon the employee, is one which, on the one hand, he did 
 not make for himself, bufc which, on the other hand, if he 
 consulted his interests, he would wholly refuse to make if the 
 matter were brought to his notice. By what right does a 
 
 1 See the discriminating opinion of or may not be a term to conjure with, 
 Lord, J., in Anderson v. Bennett, 16 Or. but it is interesting to observe that in 
 515, in which he notes the vast change Ohio the liability of railroad compa- 
 in industrial interests since Farwell v. nies for injuries caused by the careless- 
 Boston & Worcester R. Co. was decided, ness of those who are superior in 
 and criticises the severity of the broad authQrity and control over them is 
 rule of exemption as declared in Mas- placed chiefly upon considerations of 
 sachusetts, affirming that its applica- "public policy." Railway Co. «. 
 tion has often worked manifest injus- Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471, 478. 
 tice and hardship. Public policy may 
 
§ 318.] MASTER AND SERVANT. 407 
 
 court assume to frame this contract for him ? To which the 
 only answer is, by virtue of considerations of public policy 
 and under the operation of the rule of stare decisis. Because 
 Lord Abinger in England, in 1837, and Judge Evans in South 
 Carolina, in 1841, in cases of novel impression, believed that 
 public policy required the adoption of this rule at that day — 
 when at least it is barely possible that these two judges were 
 mistaken — all the courts of the two countries follow these 
 precedents, and the law is as it is.^ 
 
 § 318. The modification of this rule in Kentucky.— Under 
 
 a statute in Kentucky, giving punitive damages in case of 
 death resulting from wilful neglect, it is held that when the 
 wilful neglect of the defendant is established, the ccfttribu- 
 tory negligence of the plaintiff is no bar to his recovery.^ 
 The statute is as follows : — " If the life of any person is lost 
 or destroyed by the wilful neglect of another person or per- 
 sons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, 
 their agents or servants, then the personal representative of 
 the deceased shall have the right to sue such person or per- 
 sons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, 
 and recover punitive damages for the loss or destruction of 
 the life aforesaid,"* "Wilful neglect," within the meaning 
 of this statute, is such conduct as implies malice, or a reck- 
 less disregard of human safety, i. e. such negligence as is 
 g'Mtm-criminal ;* but if the killing be intentional, it does not 
 come within the statute. " The redress of injuries consisting 
 
 ' See an intelligent discussion of Claxton v. Lexington, &c., B. Co., 13 
 
 this subject in " Employers' Liability Busb, 636; Jones' Adm'r v. Louisville, 
 
 for Personal Injuries to their Employ- &c. , R. Co., 83 Ky. 610. 
 
 ees," a pamphlet written for the Com- ' 2 Stanton's Rev. Stat. Ky. 510, 
 
 monwealth of Massachusetts, in ac- § 3; Genl. Stat. 1873, ch. 57, § 3. 
 
 cordance with a resolution of the * Board of Internal Improvements 
 
 legislature. By Charles G. Fall, Esq., v. Scearce, 2 Duv. 576; Louisville, 
 
 •of Boston, 1883. &c., Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush, 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Goodell, 522; Louisville, &c., R. Co., v. Case, 
 17 B. Mon. 586; Louisville, &c., R. 9 Bush, 738; Jacobs «. Louisville, &c., 
 Co. V. Sickings, 5 Bush, 1; Louisville, R. Co., 10 Bush, 263; Claxton «. Lex- 
 Ac., R. Co. V. Fflbum, 6 Bush, 574; ington, &c., R Co., 13 Bush, 642, 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. d. Mohony, 7 Lexington v. Lewis' Adm'x, 10 Bush, 
 :Bush, 235; Digby c. Kenton Iron 677; Hansford's Adm'x s. Payne, 11 
 Works Co., 8 Bush, 166; Jacobs v. Bush, 380; Chiles v. Drake, 3 Mete. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 10 Bush, 263; 146. 
 
408 MASTER AND SEBVANT. [§ 320. 
 
 in the destruction of life resulting from negligence, is the ex- 
 clusiye subject to which all the provisions of the statute 
 relate ;"^ neither will the statute apply where the injuries do 
 not result in death ;' nor in cases where the loUfvl neglect of 
 the defendant is not clearly made out,' 
 
 § 319. The leading case in Kentncky.— The leading case 
 in Kentucky, considering an employer's liability in this re- 
 gard, is Louisville, &c., E. Co. v. Collins,* in which the opin- 
 ion was written by Chief Justice Robertson. This case set- 
 tled the law as to the liability of an employer to his em- 
 ployee for injuries occasioned by the negligence of a fellow- 
 servant j and the doctrine of that decision has sometimes been 
 underStood to be something near the Georgia and Illinois 
 rule of " comparative negligence." It is, however, not ex- 
 actly that, as a careful reading of the leading case will show.* 
 It was a simple case presenting the question fairly. A rail- 
 way engineer ordered a young and inexperienced laborer to 
 go under an engine, which was standing on the track with 
 steam up, for the purpose of making repairs, and the engineer 
 neglected to check the hind wheels, and the engine started, 
 cutting off both the legs of the laborer. The court held that, 
 while the laborer may have been negligent, yet, as the negli- 
 gence of the engineer was wilful, the company must pay 
 damages. 
 
 § 330. The opinion in the Collins case.— The court said : 
 — " The only consistent or maintainable principle of the cor- 
 poration's responsibility is that of agency. Qui fadt per 
 alitim facit per se. It is, therefore, responsible for the negli- 
 gence or unskillfulness of its engineer, as its controlling 
 agent in the management of its locomotives and running cars, 
 and that responsibility is graded by the classes of persons 
 injured by the engineer's neglect or want of skill. As to 
 strangers, ordinary negligence is sufficient ; as to subordinate 
 
 ' Spring's Adm'r v. Glenn, 12 Bush, ' Sullivan v. Louisville Bridge Co., 
 
 173; Morgan ». Thompson, 82 Ky. 9 Bush, 81. 
 
 383. ' 2 Duv. 114. 
 
 ^ Louisville, &c., R. Co. ■». Collins, ' Vide § 98, aupra, for an extended 
 
 2 Duv. 114; Louisville, &c., R. Co. discussion of that case. 
 •B. Bobinson, 4 Bush, 507. 
 
§ 321.] MASTER AND SEBVANT. 409 
 
 employees, associated -with the engineer in conducting the 
 cars, the negligence must be gross,^ but as to employees in- a 
 different department of service, unconnected with the running 
 operations, ordinary negligence may be sufficient. Among 
 common laborers constituting a distinct class, all standing 
 on the same platform of equality and power and engaged in 
 a merely incidental but independent service, no one of them, 
 as between himself and his co-equals, is the corporation's 
 agent, and, therefore, it is not, on the principle of agency or 
 otherwise, responsible for damages to one of them resulting 
 from the act or omission of another of them, although each 
 of the company's employees would be its agent as to entire 
 strangers to it."' This is the Kentucky doctrine. It is, per- 
 haps it should be admitted, something more than the general 
 rule, but it is plainly not the same thing as the rule of " com- 
 parative negligence."' 
 
 § 321. The rule in Illinois.— In Illinois, under the influ- 
 ence of the rule of comparative negligence, the general rule, 
 as to an employer's liability to his employee for the negli- 
 gence of a co-employee, is so modified that a comparison is 
 instituted between the negligence of plaintiff and defendant, 
 and if it appear that the negligence of the former is slight 
 
 ' «. e. wilful. See § 98, supra. 676. But the statute does not vary 
 = Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Collins, the common law rule of liability so as 
 2 Duv. 114. Where a brakeman is to allow recovery for the death of a 
 injured by the wilful negligence of servant when caused by the negU- 
 the engineer of the same train, the gence of a fellow-servant, in the same 
 railroad company is liable, the brake- grade of employment. Casey's Adm'r 
 man and engineer not being co- «. LoulsviUe, &c., R. Co., 84 Ky. 79. 
 equals. Louis vUle, &c., R. Co. e. See Lingenfelter*. Louisville, &c., R. 
 Brook's Adm'x, 83 Ky. 129. So, also, Co. (Ky), 4 8. W. 185, where the en- 
 where he is injured by the gross gine bell was ringing, and head light 
 neglect of a fireman acting according burning, but the engineer was not on 
 to the custom of the road, as engineer the lookout, and it was held sufficient 
 while switching. A railroad company to charge the company vrith wilful 
 is liable for injuries to a brakeman, negligence in running over a watch- 
 through the gross neglect of a fireman, man who must have been aware of his 
 acting according to the custom of the danger. 
 
 road as engineer, while switching the ' See, particularly, Louisville, &c., 
 
 train, the brakeman not being his R. Co. ■». Robinson, 4 Bush, 507; 
 
 co-equal while so employed. Louis- Digby «. Kenton Iron Works Co., 8 
 
 ville, &c., R. Co. v. Moore, 83 Ky. Bush, 166. 
 
410 MASTEB AND SEEVANT. [§ 323. 
 
 while that of the latter is gross, the plaintiff may recover. 
 So thoroughly is this pernicious principle engrafted upon 
 the jurisprudence of that State that it is asserted even here.^ 
 
 § 322. The rule in Tennessee.— A somewhat similar qual- 
 ification of the rule has been asserted in Tennessee. There, 
 a plaintiff may not recover if, by the exercise of ordinary- 
 care, he could have avoided the mischief, but if only by ex- 
 traordinary care could it have been avoided, he may recover ; 
 and it is also held that a plaintiff's negligence, which is not 
 sufficient altogether to defeat a recovery, may be looked to 
 in mitigation of damages.^ " Where a party/' said McKin- 
 ney, J., in the leading case, " brings an injury upon himself, 
 or contributes to it, the mere want of a superior degree of 
 care or diligence cannot be set up as a bar to the plaintiff's 
 claim for redress, and, although the plaintiff may himself 
 have been guilty of negligence, yet, unless he might, by the 
 exercise of ordinary care, have avoided *the consequence of 
 the defendant's negligence, he will be entitled to recover."^ 
 
 § 323. Who are fellow-servants.* — ^A servant, in law, is 
 any person, male or female, minor or of full age, paid or un- 
 paid, who works for another with his knowledge and con- 
 sent. Two or more such persons working for the same mas- 
 ter are co-employees, or fellow-servants. The earliest case 
 in which the question, as bearing upon the matter of negli- 
 
 ' Chicago, &o. , R. Co. v. Gregory, ery for injuries sustained, and It is 
 
 58 111. 273; Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». for the jury to determine whether 
 
 Sullivan, 63 HI. 393; Fairbank v. such acts should prevent recovery, or 
 
 Haentzsche, 73 111. 336; St. Louis, only mitigate damages. Louisville, 
 
 &c., R. Co. B. Britz, 73 111. 356; Tole- &c., R. Co. v. Stacker, 3 Pickle, 343; 
 
 do, &c., R. Co. V. O'Connor, 77 HI. s. c. 6 S. W. Rep. 737. 
 
 391; Foster ■o. Chicago, &c., R. Co., = Whirley ®. Whiteman, 1 Head, 
 
 84 111. 165; and see §§ 72 to 79, mpra. 610; and see §§ 71, 93, 98, et >eq., m- 
 
 ' Whirley ®. Whiteman, 1 Head, pra. 
 610; Nashville, &c., R. Co. v. Carroll, * See 30 Cent. Law J. 504, note; 39 
 6 Heisk. 347. For a railroad servant. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 332, note; Mc- 
 who had boarded the pay train to re- Kinney on Fellow-Servants, in loco; 
 ceive the amount due him, and had Bailey on Conflict of Judicial De- 
 completed his business, to attempt to cisions, 311 ; Garrahy v. Kansas City, 
 alight from the train which was then &c., R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 362, and the 
 moving is not such contributory neg- note, 
 ligence per se as will prevent recov- 
 
§ 324.] MASTER AND SERVANT. 411 
 
 gence, arose, is Priestley v. Fowler,^ decided in the English 
 Court of Exchequer, in 1837. In this case, two men, working 
 for a butcher and riding in his van, were held fellow-servants. 
 Here there was a similar occupation, and they had full knowl- 
 edge, or opportunity for knowledge, of each other's care and 
 character and judgment. In the next case, Murray v. South 
 Carolina R. Co.,* decided in the Court of Appeals of South 
 Carolina, in 1841, an engineer and fireman, employed to- 
 gether upon the same locomotive, were held fellow-servants. 
 In Farwell v. Boston and Worcester E. Co.,' decided in 1842, 
 a locomotive engineer and a switchman were declared to be 
 within the rule. In Brown u. Maxwell,* a New York case, 
 decided in 1844, a workman and his foreman, whose orders 
 the workman was required to obey, were held co-employees. 
 In 1850, in Albro v. Agawam Canal Co.,^ the rule as origi- 
 nally declared in Massachusetts, in Farwell v. Boston and 
 Worcester E. Co.,' was extended, and an operative and his 
 superintendent were held fellow-servants. In 1856, the New 
 York Court of Appeals topk a similar ground in Sherman v. 
 Rochester and Syracuse R. Co.' In Wiggett v. Fox,* an 
 English case decided in the same year, there is a still more 
 radical extension of the doctrine, which in that case was held 
 to apply to an employee of a sub-contractor, whose negli- 
 gence caused injury to the defendant's servant, and who was 
 hired to do work by the piece. The wages of the employee 
 were paid by the defendant, but he worked under the direc- 
 tion of the sub-contractor. In the later cases, the rule has 
 been sufficiently extended to include almost every possible 
 employee. 
 
 § 324. The rule staled.— In the present state of the law 
 the essence of common employment is a common employer 
 and payment from a common fund. The weight of au- 
 thority is to the effect that all who work for a common 
 
 ' 3 Mees. & W. 1. « 4 Mete. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Dec. 339. 
 
 ' 1 McMUlan's Law, 385; s. c. 36 ' 17 N. Y. 158. 
 
 Am. Dec. 268. * 11 Exch. 833; b. c. 2 Jur. (N. 8.) 
 
 = 4 Mete. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Dec. 339. 955; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 188. See, also, 
 
 * 6 Hill, 592; s. 0. 41. Am. Dec. Riley v. O'Brien, 6 N. T. Supl. 129; 
 
 771. s. 0. 53 Hun, 147. 
 
 » 6 Gush. 75. 
 
412 
 
 MASTEB AND 8EEVANT, 
 
 [§ 324. 
 
 master, or who are subject to a common control, or derive 
 their compensation from a common source, and are engaged 
 in the same general employment, working to accomplish the 
 same general end, though it may be in different departments, 
 or grades of it, are co-employees, who are held in law to as- 
 sume the risk of one another's negligence.^ Lord Cranworth, 
 
 ' Lewis V. Seifert, 116 Perm. St. 
 628; 8. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 514; Lindvall 
 «. Woods, 41 Minn. 313; Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. B. O'Byran, 15 HI. App. 134; 
 Doughty V. Penob8<!Ot Log Driving 
 Co., 76 Me. 143; Scott v. Sweeney, 34 
 Hun (N. Y.) 393. " It is only when 
 the master or superior places the en- 
 tire charge of the business, or 'a distinct 
 branch of it, in the hands of an agent 
 or subordioate, exercising no discretion 
 or oversight of his own, that the mas- 
 ter is held liable for the negligence of 
 such agent or subordinate. The lat- 
 ter must have a general power of 
 control over the busiaess, not a mere 
 authority to superintend a certain class 
 of work, or a certain gang of men, in 
 order to make the master liable." 
 Kinney v. Corbin, 132 Penn. St. 341. 
 Kenny v. Cunard Steamship Co., 55 
 N.T. Super. Ct. 558; Loughlinu. State, 
 105 N. T. 159; 8. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 371; 
 Anderson b. Winston, 31 Fed. Rep. 
 528; McBride v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Wyo.), 31 Pac. Rep. 687; Wigmore «. 
 Joy, 5 Exch. 354; s. c. 14 Jur. 838; 19 
 L. J. (Exch.) 300; Peltham v. En- 
 gland, 3 L. R. (Q. B.) 33; 8. c. 4 Fost. 
 & Fin. 460; 7 Best & S. 676; Wonder 
 V. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 83 Md. 411; 
 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 143; Thayer v. St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 33 Ind. 26; Foster 
 V. Minnesota, &c., R. Co., 14 Minn. 
 360; Collier v. Steinhart, 51 Cal. 116; 
 Zeigler t. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Law- 
 ler ®. Androscoggin, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Me. 463; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 493; Peter- 
 son v. Whitebreast C. & M. Co., 50 
 Iowa, 673; 8. c. 32 Am. Rep. 143; 
 McLean v. Blue Point M. Co., 51 Cal. 
 355. "The rule is the same although 
 
 the one injured may be inferior in 
 grade, and is subject to the con- 
 trol and direction of the superior, 
 whose act caused the injury, provided 
 they are both co-operating to efEect 
 the same common object." Lehigh 
 Valley Coal Co. c. Jones, 86 Penn. St. 
 433, 439. McGtowan «. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 61 Mo. 528; O'Connor «. 
 Roberts, 130 Mass. 337; Malone ®. Hath- 
 away, 64 N. Y. 5; 8. c. 31 Am. Rep. 
 573; Blake v. Maine, &c., R. Co., 70 
 Me. 60; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 297. 
 "Superiority in grade or rank does 
 not change the relation." Woo4 
 on Master & Servant, 847 et eeq.; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1026. See, 
 however, Dutzi «. Oeisel, 33 Mo. App. 
 676. A railroad hand ordered to quit 
 work before the usual hour and take 
 a train to carry him to a point where 
 he was to be paid, while boarding the 
 train was injured by the negligence of 
 another workman. It was held that 
 he was in the service of the company 
 at the time, so that the negligence of 
 his fellow-workman exonerated the 
 company. O'Brien v. Boston, &c., R. 
 Co., 138 Mass. 387; 8. c. 52 Am. Rep. 
 379. In Broderick v. Detroit Union 
 R. Co., 56 Mich. 261; e. c. 56 Am. 
 Rep. 382, the relation of master 
 and servant operated in the work- 
 man's favor. He was ordered to 
 assist in opening a ventilator while 
 staying on the premises during the 
 dinner hour, and was injured by a 
 defect without fault on his part. 
 Be had judgment against the em- 
 ployer. A brakeman off duty on 
 Sunday and returning home on a con- 
 ductor's pass is not a co-employee of 
 
§ 324] 
 
 MASTEE AND SEBVANT. 
 
 413 
 
 in the famous case of Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Eeid,^ defined 
 the relation as follows : — " To constitute fellow-laborers with- 
 in the meaning of the doctrine which protects the master from 
 responsibility for injuries sustained by one servant through 
 the wrongful act or carelessness of another, it is not necessary 
 that the servant causing and the servant sustaining the in- 
 jury shall both be engaged in precisely the same, or even 
 similar acts. Thus, the driver and guard of a stage-coach, 
 the steersman and rowers of a boat,, the man who draws the 
 red-hot iron from the forge and those who hammer it into 
 shape, the engineer and switchman, the man who lets the 
 miners down into, and who afterwards brings them up from 
 the mine, and the miners themselves — all these are fellow- 
 servants and coUahorateurs within the meaning of the doctrine 
 in question." This is, in general, a fair statement of the pre- 
 vailing rule as held in England and this country. It must be 
 admitted that the terms " fellow-servant " and " common em- 
 ployment," under late decisions both in England and the 
 United States, are of very comprehensive import.' 
 
 those running the train, by whose neg- 
 ligence he is killed. State d. Mary- 
 land R. Co., 63 Md. 433. The re- 
 lationship of the plaintiff and a third 
 person as fellow-servants is for the 
 jury to determine, under proper in- 
 structions. Theleman v. Moeller, 73 
 Iowa, 108; S. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 765; 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co. «. McEenzie, 
 81 Va. 71. But where it so clearly ap- 
 pears from the evidence that the injury 
 to the plaintiff was caused by the neg- 
 ligence of a fellow-servant that a find- 
 ing based thereon that they were not 
 f eUow-servants could not be sustained 
 by the courts, it is proper to direet 
 a verdict for the defendants. Miller 
 «. Ohio, &c., Ry. Co., 24 IlL App. 
 326. 
 
 ■ 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266; 8. c. 4 
 Jut. (N. S.) 767; 1 Pat. Sc. App. 796, 
 decided in 1858. " Reid and McGuire 
 were both victims of the same accident 
 which, though melancholy, has settled 
 the law," naively observed the Scotch 
 reporter. 
 
 " Brodeur v. "Valley Palls Co. (R. 
 I.), 16 R. I. 448; 8. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 54; 
 Holden v. FitchburgR. Co., 129 Mass. 
 268; 8. 0. 37 Am. Rep. 343; Summer- 
 sell V. Fish, 117 Mass. 312; Hofnagle 
 «. New York, &c., R. Co., 55 N. T. 
 608; Weger v. Penn. R. Co., 55 Penn. 
 St. 460; Marshall v. Schricker. 63 Mo. 
 208; Columbus, &c.,R. Co. «. Arnold, 
 81 Ind. 174, holding that a master- 
 machinist who has the immediate 
 charge, control, and direction of the 
 engines and other machinery of a rail- 
 road company, and the control and 
 direction of the engineers and firemen 
 on the trains, is a fellow-servant of 
 such a fireman. Railway Co. v. Lew- 
 is, 33 Ohio St. 196; Cooper ®. Milwau- 
 kee, &c., R. Co., 23 Wis. 668; St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co- ®. Blitz, 72 111. 256; 
 Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. Salmon, 11 
 Kan. 83; Gilshannon v. Stony Brook, 
 &c., R. Co., 10 Cush. 298; Sever ®. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 14 Gray, 466: 
 Manville v. Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 11 
 Ohio St. 417; McAndrews v. Bums, 30 
 
414 
 
 MASTEB AND SEKTANT. 
 
 [§ 325. 
 
 § 325. When the serrant is deemed the agent of the 
 master, or his yice-principal, as qnalifying the rule.— 
 
 In the federal Supreme Court and in several of the State 
 courts, it is held that where the negligent servant is, 
 in his grade of employment, superior to the injured 
 servant, or where one servant is placed by the employer 
 in a position of subordination, and subject to the orders 
 and control of another in such a way and to such an 
 extent that the servant so placed in control may reasonably 
 be regarded as representing the master, as his alter ego, or 
 vice-principal, when such inferior servant, without fault, and 
 while in discharge of his (Juty, is injured by the negligence 
 of the superior servant, the master is liable in damages for 
 the injury.^ 
 
 N. J. Law, 117; Valtez v. Ohio, &c., 
 R. Co., 85 m. 500; Hodgkins v. East- 
 ern R. Co., 119 Mass. 419; Baulec a 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 59 N. Y. 356; 
 B. c. 5 Lans. 436; 63 Barb. 638; Sam- 
 mon ®- New York, &c., R. Co., 63 N. 
 Y. 351; Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. Ham- 
 mersley, 28 Ind. 371; Tunney «. 
 Midland Ry. Co., 1 L. R. (C. P.) 391; 
 Murphy®. Smith, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 361; 
 
 B. c 13 L. T. (N. S.) 605; Allen v. 
 New Gas Co., 1 Exch. Div. 354; b. c. 
 45 L. J. 668; s. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 35; 
 33 L. T. (N. S.) 19; 33 Weekly Rep. 
 335. "Since the case of Wilson «. 
 Merry, in the House of Lords [L. R. 
 H. L. Sc. 836], it is not open to dis- 
 pute, that in general the master is not 
 liable to a servant for the negligence 
 of a fellow-servant, although he be the 
 manager of the concern." Cockbum, 
 
 C. J., inHowells v. Steel Co., L. R. 10 
 Q. B. 63; Conway «. Belfast Ry. Co., 
 L:. R. 9 C. L. 498; Wilson v. Merry, 
 L. R. 1 H. L. Cas. Sc. App. 836; 
 Peschel®. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Wis. 338; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 369; 
 30 Cent. L. J. 303; Mobile, «fcc., R. 
 Co. ■». Smith, 59 Ala. 245, where it 
 is said that it is not the relative grades 
 of different employees, or the subor- 
 dination of one to the other which 
 
 determines when they are fellow-serv- 
 ants, but it is the nature of the duty 
 intrusted to them. Wilson o. Madi- 
 son, &c., R. Co., 81 Ind. 336; Colorado, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Martin, 7 Col. 593; s. c. 
 19 Am. Law Rev. 163; Johnson «. 
 Boston Towboat Co., 185 Mass. 209; 
 B. c. 46 Am. Rep. 458; McGee v. Bos- 
 ton Cordage Co., 139 Mass. 445; b. c. 1 
 East. Rep. 136. 
 
 ' Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553; 
 aflBrming s. c. 3 Dill. 359; Mann jj. 
 Oriental Print Works, 11 R. I. 163; 
 Mason «. Edison Machine Works, 38 
 Fed. Rep. 338. One may be a feUow- 
 servant concerning a certain employ- 
 ment, although he has other duties in 
 exercising which he is the alter ego of 
 the master. Brick ». Rochester, &c.,, 
 R. Co., 98 N. Y. 311; Borgman «.. 
 Omaha, &c., Ry. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 
 667; Criswell «. Pittsburgh, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 30 West Va. 798; B. c. 6 S. B. Rep, 
 31; Taylor ». Evansville, &c., R. Co., 
 121 Ind. 134; s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 876; 
 Stephens ■b. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 80 
 Mo. 321; Missouri Pac R. Co. «. 
 Williams, 75 Tex. 4; B. c. 13 B. W. 
 Rep. 835. See, also, Anderson b. Ben- 
 nett, 16 Or. 515; Slater v. Chapman, 
 67 Mich. 523; 8. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 106; 
 Peterson v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 64 
 
§ 326.] 
 
 MASTER AND SEBVANT. 
 
 415 
 
 § 326. A farther statement of this rule in the United 
 States. — This rule is stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois 
 as follows : — " The mere fact that one of a number of servants 
 who are in the habit of working together in the same line of 
 employment for a common master has power to control and 
 
 Mich. 621; s. c. 34 N. W. Eep. 260; 
 Hussey e. Coger, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 639; 
 Beddon v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Utah), 
 15Pac. Rep. 262; Little Miami, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415; 
 Dixon V. Rankin, 1 Am. R. Cas. 567, 
 and note; Cleveland, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201; Whaalan®. 
 Mad River, &c., R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 
 249; Berea Stone Co. ■». Kraft, 31 Ohio 
 St. 287; Greenleaf «. Illinois, &c., R. 
 Co., 29 Iowa, 14; Cooper v. Iowa Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 44 Iowa, 134; Patterson v. 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 
 389; Brothers d. Carter, 57 Mo. 373; 
 s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 424; Whalen v. 
 Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 226; Cook 
 ■0. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 63 Mo. 397; 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Bowles, 9 
 Heisk. 866; Nashville, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 Jones, 9 Heisk. 27; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Lalor «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 52 HI. 401; Mul- 
 lan V. Phila. Steamship Co., 78 Penn. 
 St. 25; B. C. 21 Am. Rep. 2; Kansas, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Little, 19 Kan. 267; 
 Walker b. Bowling, 32 Ala. 294; 
 Moon's Adm'r v. Richmond, &c., R. 
 Co., 78 Va. 745; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 401; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. 
 S. 377; 8. c. 8 Fed. Rep. 544. " Where 
 the employer leaves everything in the 
 hands of a middle-man, reserving to 
 himself no discretion, then the middle- 
 man's negligence ia the master's neg- 
 ligence, for which the latter is liable." 
 Wharton on Negligence, § 229; 
 Thompson on Negligence, 1028, § 34; 
 Shearman & Redfleld on Negligence, 
 4th ed., § 102; Brabbits v. Chicago, 
 &c.,R. Co., 38 Wis. 289; Cumberland, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». State, 44 Md. 283; Ful- 
 ler V. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46; s. c. 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 575; Toledo, &c. R. Co. v. 
 Ingraham, 77 HI. 309; Dobbin ». Rich-^ 
 mond, &c., R. Co., 81 N. C. 446; s. c. 
 31 Am. Rep. 512; Baun v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 58 Iowa, 595; Booth «. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 73 N. Y. 38; 
 8. c. 29 Am. Rep. 97; Railway v. 
 Sullivan, 5 Tex. Law Rev. 183 (Tex- 
 as, 1885); Davis v. Central Vermont 
 R. Co., 55 Vt. 84; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 
 590; Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179; 
 s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 35; Dowbng v. Al- 
 len, 74 Mo. 13; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 
 WUson v. Willimantic, &c., Co., 50 
 Conn. 433; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 653; 
 Flike «. Boston, &c., R. Co., 53 N. 
 Y. 549; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 645; Pant- 
 zar «. Tilly Foster Mining Co., 99 N. 
 Y. 368; McCasker*. Long Island, &c., 
 R. Co., 84 N. Y. 77; Gunter ». Gran- 
 iteville Manfg. Co., 18 S. C. 263; s. c. 
 44 Am. Rep. 573; Cowles ■». Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co., 84 N. C. 309; s. c. 37 
 Am. Rep, 620; Malone v. Hathaway, 
 64 N. Y. 5; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 573; 
 Mitchell «. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281; 
 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 812; Corcoran*. Hol- 
 brook, 59 N. Y. 517; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 
 369; Atlanta Cotton Factory «. Speer, 
 69 Ga. 137; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 750. 
 But see Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 
 516 ; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 521, 527, 
 where, in a dissenting opinion. Earl, J., 
 said: — "If one selects a suitable 
 agent to do a lawful and proper act, 
 and is guilty of no negligence in 
 making the selection, or in directing 
 and instructing his agent, and the 
 agent does a negligent or wrongful 
 act, causing injury to another, there 
 is no principle of natural law or ab- 
 stract justice by which the master can 
 be held responsible for the injury." 
 
416 MASTEB AND SERVANT. [§ 326. 
 
 direct the actions of the others, with respect to such employ- 
 ment will not of itself render the master liable for the negli- 
 gence of the governing servant, resulting in an injury to one 
 of the others, without regard to other circumstances. On 
 the other hand, the mere fact that the servant exercising such 
 authority sometimes, or generally labors with the others as 
 a common hand, will not of itself exonerate the master 
 from liability for the former's negligence in the exercise of 
 his authority over the others. Every case in this respect 
 must depend upon its own circumstances. If the negligence 
 complained of consists of some act done or omitted by one 
 having such authority which relates to his duties as a co- 
 laborer with those under his control, and which might jusi 
 as readily have happened with one of them having no such 
 authority, the common master will not be liable. For 
 instance, if the section boss of a railway company, while 
 working with his squad of men on the company's road, should 
 iiegligently strike or otherwise injure one of them, causing 
 his death, the company would not be liable ; but when the 
 negligent act complained of arises out of and is the direcl 
 result of the exercise of the authority conferred upon him 
 l)y the master over his co-laborers, the master will be liable. 
 In such case he is not the fellow-servant of those under his 
 charge with respect to the exercise of such power, for no on« 
 but himself, in the case supposed, is clothed with authoritj 
 to command the others."^ And the Supreme Court of Michi- 
 gan speaks to the same point as follows : — " The master maj 
 not choose to give his personal attention to his business, anc 
 may desire to put another in his place, to manage and con 
 trol it for him as fully as he might do if personally present 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., KCo. ■». May, 108 master's duty to his servants, such a 
 
 111. 303. From this opinion three the supplying of safe machinery, th 
 
 3udges dissented. In the dissenting selection of competent servants. Ii 
 
 opinion, it is said : — "We believe the Chicago Dredging and Dock Co. « 
 
 true rule now prevailing as estab- McMahon, 30 111. App. 858, on th 
 
 lished by the great weight of authority authority of the foregoing case, 
 
 and the only one to be sustained on master was held liable to a servant f c 
 
 principle is that the master cannbt be the negligence of a superior servani 
 
 held chargeable for any act of negli- See, also, generally the cases cited i 
 
 gence on the part of the superior serv- the preceding note, and an article b 
 
 ant, except in so far as such servant is Judge Dillon, 24 Am. Law Rev. 175 
 charged with the performance of the 
 
§ 327.] MASTEB AND SERVANT. 417 
 
 Such person is his alter ego, and the master is as responsible 
 for his acts of omission and commission, while engaged in 
 the business entrusted to him, as if he did such acts himself. 
 It is the duty of the master to supervise, direct, and control 
 the operations and management of his business, so that no 
 injury shall ensue to his employees -through his own careless- 
 ness or negligence in carrying it on, or else to furnish some 
 person who will do so, and for whom he must stand sponsor. 
 This is true of natural persons, and it is especially true of 
 corporations who can only act through natural persons. 
 Whenever the business conducted by the person selected by 
 the master is such that the person selected is invested with 
 full control (subject to no one's supervision, except the 
 master's) over the action of the employees engaged in carry- 
 ing on a particular branch of the master's business, and act- 
 ing upon his own discretion, according to general instruc- 
 tions laid down for his guidance, it is his province to direct, 
 and the duty of the employees to obey, then he stands in the 
 place of the master, and is not a fellow-servant with those 
 whom he controls.'" 
 
 § 327. Applications of this doctrine.— It is held in Ohio 
 that where one servant is a subordinate and subject to the 
 orders and control of another servant, and such inferior 
 servant is injured while in discharge of his duty, without fault, 
 through the negligence of his superior, the master is liable. 
 In such a case the superior servant is held to be the vice- 
 principal.^ And in Ehode Island the same rule is applied 
 as between an engineer of a manufacturing establishment 
 and his fireman. When, therefore, the engineer ordered the 
 fireman into an extra hazardous position, to perform a duty 
 outside of that which he was engaged to perform, in conse- 
 quence of which he was injured, the company was held liable.* 
 In several jurisdictions it is held that an employer is liable 
 
 ' Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. Ct. of Ohio (1885), 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 513, 519, where it is held that a train 330. It is so held chiefly upon con- 
 dispatcher is not a fellow-servant with siderations of public policy. RaOway 
 other employees acting under his Co. o. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471, 478. 
 orders. ' Mann «. Oriental Print Works, 11 
 
 » Berea Stone Co. «. Kraft, 31 Ohio R. I. 152. 
 St. 287; City of Toledo ». Cone, Sup. 
 27 
 
418 
 
 MASTER AND 8EBYANT. 
 
 [§ S27. 
 
 for the negligence of a superintendent which causes injury 
 to a mere employee ; that the negligence of such a superior 
 o£&cer as this one, entrusted with the general management 
 and control of a business, is the negligence of the employer, 
 for which he is liable.^ So held in Missouri, of an architect 
 and superintendent having general charge of building a 
 church ;' and of the foreman of a mine^ having entire super- 
 vision of a mine, including the employing and discharging of 
 laborers ;' and of a " section boss " upon a railroad ;* and of 
 the captain of a ship f and of an ordinary superintendent, 
 although engaged at the time of the injury at the same work 
 with the servant injured.^ And in Iowa, a foreman is a fellow- 
 servant of the men under him, within a statute authorizing 
 employees to rfecover from the employer for injuries by the 
 negligence of other employees.' 
 
 1 Stephens t. Hannibal, &c., B. Co., 
 86 Mo. 231. In an action by a brake- 
 man against the railroad company for 
 injuries alleged to have been caused 
 by the negligence of defendant's en- 
 gineer in charge of the train, who 
 was averred by the declaration to have 
 been plaintiff's superior, a plea of not 
 guilty raises an issue as to whether 
 the injury was caused by the engi- 
 neer's acting in the capacity of plaint- 
 iffs superior, but none as to whether 
 he was plaintiff's negligent fellow- 
 servant. East Tennessee, &c., B. Co. v. 
 Collins, 85 Tenn. 227; s. c. 1 S. W. 
 Eep. 883; Hussey v. Coger, 39 Hun. 
 (N. Y.) 639; Keddon v. Union Pac. 
 B. Co. (Utah), 15 Pac. Eep. 362; Bail- 
 road Co. V. Fort, 17 WaU. 553; Cook 
 V. Hannibal, &c., B. Co., 63 Mo. 397; 
 ■Washburn v. Nashville, &c., E. Co. , 3 
 Head. 688; Bailway v. Sullivan, Sup. 
 Ct. Texas (1886), 5 Tex. LawEev. 183; 
 Dobbin ®. Bichmond, &c., B. Co., 81 
 N. C. 446; Wilson v. Willimantic, 
 &c., Co., 50 Conn. 433; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Bep. 658 ; Gunter v. Grraniteville 
 Manfg. Co., 18 S. C. 262; s. c. 44 Am. 
 Bep. 573; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 
 13; B. c. 41 Am. Bep. 298. See, also. 
 
 Peschel «. Chicago, &o., E. Co., 63 
 "Wis. 338; B. c. 21 N. W. Eep. 269; , 
 Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 
 Me. 100; s. c. 19 Am. Law Bev. 328. 
 
 ' Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 
 Mo. 226. 
 
 ' Bedden v. Union Pac. E. Co. 
 (Utah). 15 Pac. Bep. 262. 
 
 * Louisville, &c., E. Co. e. Bowles, 
 9 Heisk. 866; Patton e. Western 
 North Carolina B. Co., 96 N. C. 455; 
 s. c. 1 S. E. Eep. 863; Herriman v. 
 Chicago, &c., B. Co., 27 Mo. App. 
 435. 
 
 " Bamsay v. Quinn, Irish Common 
 Pleas, 4 Cent. Law Jour. 478. See, 
 also, Wharton on Negligence, § 239. 
 
 • Crispm v. Babbitt, 81 N. T. 516; 
 8. c. 37 Am. Eep. 521; Gormly ®. 
 Vulcan Iron Works, 61 Mo. 493; Mc- 
 Casker «. Long Island, &c., E. Co., 
 84 N. Y. 77. Contra, as to the Ua- 
 bility of the master when his vice- 
 principal is doing the duty of a co- 
 employee of the servant who is in- 
 jured. Quinn ®. New Jersey Lighter- 
 age Co., 23;Ped. Eep. 363. 
 
 ' Houser v. Chicago, &c., B. Co., 
 60 Iowa, 280; b. c. 46 Am. Bep. 65. 
 
§ 328.] MASTEK AND 8EBVANT. 419 
 
 § 328. Test whether one is a mere servant or the repre- 
 sentatiTe of the master. — It has been held that the power to 
 employ and discharge servants, or to purchase and change 
 machinery is the true test whether an employee is or not a 
 representative of his master.^ But this is, in the author's 
 judgment, a narrow and somewhat superficial view. It seems 
 plain that if the person in question is employed to perform 
 any of the duties of a master, either these or any others that 
 a master alone may properly do, then is the person no longer 
 a mere servant, but at once, and ipso facto, the agent, the alter 
 ego of his employer. In Gunter v. Graniteville Manufactur- 
 ing Co.,^ Mclver, J., said : — " The test as to whether an em- 
 ployee is the representative of the master is, not whether 
 such employee has the power to employ or discharge hands, 
 or to purchase or change machinery, for while these are 
 some of the duties of the master they are not all of his du- 
 ties, and hence an employee who is not intrusted with either 
 of these powers may still be the representative of the mas- 
 ter. The true test is whether the person in question is employed 
 to do any of the duties of the master; if so, then he cannot be 
 regarded as a fellow-servant or co-laborer with the opera- 
 tives, but is the representative of the master, and any negli- 
 gence on his part in the performance of the duty of the mas- 
 ter thus delegated to him, must be regarded as the negligence 
 of the master." This is the rule most consonant with jus- 
 tice and right reason.^ 
 
 • Stoddard v. St. Louis, &c., R. v. Babbitt, 81 N. T. 521; McKinney 
 Co., 65 Mo. 51^ Chapnum v. Erie Ry. on Fellow Serrants, $ 23. A train- 
 Co., 55 IT. Y. 579; Kansas, &c.. R. dispatcher, especially if he has au- 
 Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267; Walker v. thority to employ and discharge men, 
 Bowling, 22 Ala. 294; Laning «>. New or make new time schedules, is a vice- 
 York, &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; principal. McKunes. Cal. Southern 
 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, R. Co., 66 Cal. 302; Lewis v. Seifert, 
 4th ed., § 230. 116 Penn. St. 628; s. o. 11 Atl. Rep. 
 
 ' 18 8. C. 362; 8. c. 44 Am. Rep. 514; Smith®. Wabash, &c.,Ry. Co., 92 
 
 573. Mo. 359; s. o. 4 S. W. Rep. 129; Darri- 
 
 " Shearman & Redfleld on Neg- gans. N. Y.,&c.,R. Co., 52 0onn. 285; 
 ligence, 4th ed., § 280; Lindvall v. b. c. 52 Am. Rep. 590; Hunn v. Rail- 
 Woods, 41 Minn. 212; s. c. 42 N. W. road Co., 78 Mich. 513. The master 
 Rep. 1020; Loughlin e. State, 105 N. mechanic of a railroad company is a 
 Y. 159; s. c. 11 N. E. 371; Flike v. vice-principal as to a fireman upon 
 Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 549; Crispin one of its locomotives. Kruger v. 
 
4^0 
 
 MASTER ANB SEEVANT. 
 
 [§ 329. 
 
 § 329. Should there be one rnle in this particular appli- 
 cable to corporations and another less stringent one appli- 
 cable to other defendants? — The constructive or presumed 
 presence of the corporation in the acts of its servants is a 
 favorite doctrine with some judges and text-writers. Under 
 the influence of this theory, in some jurisdictions there is 
 a,ttempted a distinction in this regard 'between a corporation 
 .and a natural person. Inasmuch as bodies corporate can, 
 from their very nature, act only through an agent it is urged 
 ihat, unless this executive agent is to be deemed for the pur- 
 poses of this rule the corporation' itself, there will result in 
 favor of the corporation an immunity wJiich is denied to 
 men who carry on their business in person.^ A corporation 
 should unquestionably be held liable in damages for the 
 negligence of its servant whenever that servant, under the 
 operation of an impartial rule, stands to it in the relation of 
 vice-principal. Whenever a body corporate comes in its re- 
 lations to its employees fairly within the general rule of law 
 which regulates the liability of a master for the neglect of 
 
 liOuisville, &C!., Ry. Co., Ill Ind. 51; 
 ■.8. c. 11 N. B. Rep. 957. An em- 
 ployer is not liable to an employee 
 for the negligence, of a vice-principal 
 in doing the duty of a co-emplpyee of 
 the person injured. Quinn ». New 
 Jersey Lighterage Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 
 363; Johnson «. Ashland Water Co., 
 77 Wis. 51; 8. C. 45 N.W. Rep. 807. 
 Plaintiff, a carpenter, working on a, 
 railroad trestle, intending to descend 
 to a lower bent, asked the foreman of 
 his gang, who was above him on the 
 trestle, if a certain hanging rope was 
 made fast. On answer that it was, 
 plaintiff swung himself off, and, the 
 rope being loose, he was thrown to the 
 ^ound and injured. It appeared 
 that plaintiff's descent was without 
 orders of the foreman, and might 
 have been made another way; that he 
 ^d not tell the foreman of his inten- 
 tion to descend; and that no duty 
 lested on the foreman to see to the 
 means of descent. Seld, that the 
 
 foreman's negligence was merely per- 
 sonal, and not as a vice-principal, and 
 that plaintiff could not recover from 
 the railroad company. Louisville, 
 &c., Ry. Co. ». Lahr, 3 Pickle, 335; 
 9. c. 6 8. W. Rep. 663. See, also, 
 Brick V. Rochester, &c., R. Co., 98 
 N. T. 211; Garrahy ®. Kansas City, 
 &c., R. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 258; Hus- 
 sey V. Coger, 39 Hun (N. T.) 639; Lin- 
 coln Coal Mining Co. v. McNally, 15 
 m. App. 181; 7 Am. «& Eng. Cyclop. 
 Law, tit. "Fellow-Servants," where the 
 authorities upon the question when 
 and under what circumstances a ser- 
 vant becomes a representative of the 
 master are exhaustively cited and 
 classified. 
 
 • 1 Redfleld on Railways, 310, § 2 
 and the notes; Patterson ■s. Pittsburgh, 
 &c., R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 389; Brick- 
 ner v. New York, &c„ R. Co., 49 N. 
 T. 672; Cumberland, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Hogan, 45 Md. 229; Cumberland, 
 &c., R. Co. t. Moran, 44 Md. 288. 
 
§ 330.] MASTER AND SEBVANT. 421 
 
 Ms servant then it should answer, like any other master in 
 like case, for the servant's negligence. It is not easy to see 
 why the rule should go farther, or why there is any reason, 
 in fact or in law, for carrying out a rule especially applicable 
 to corporations. Under the operation of the rule as it 
 stands, the corporation is liable whenever it ought to be lia- 
 ble. Judge Bedfield, in his treatise on the law of Railways, 
 attempted to extend the doctrine, but it may well be ques- 
 tioned whether the rule, if generally adopted, would be salu- 
 tary in its effect. The English courts refuse to recognize 
 such a distinction,^ and in this country it has been severely 
 criticised. In* the case of the Evansville, &c., K. Co. v. 
 Baum,' the Supreme Court of Indiana said : — " Nor will 
 sound policy maintain the application of a; rule of law to rail- 
 ways, or corporations, on this subject, which shall not be ap- 
 plied alike to others — as has been intimated in some quarters. 
 The suggestion is not fit to be made, much less sanctioned in 
 any tribunal pretending to administer justice impartially." 
 This is a reasonable and perfectly just position, and one 
 which will not be challenged by any court of justice not dom- 
 inated by labor organizations or small politicians. 
 
 § 330. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. PanI R. Co. t. Boss.'— 
 
 This case came up from the Circuit Court of the United 
 States for the District of Minnesota. It involved the liabil- 
 ity of a railway corporation for an injury to one of its serv- 
 ants resulting from the negligence of another, and as the 
 deliberate judgment of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States upon this frequently recurring and most important 
 question, it has attracted much attention and provoked much 
 criticism and comment. It is a little remarkable that the 
 question had never before been squarely presented to the 
 Supreme Court. In the multitude of decisions upon this, 
 point, we find no Supreme Court case upon the question a» 
 here presented, and as it has frequently presented itself in 
 the State courts of last resort. In this state of the matter 
 
 ■ Allen ®. New Gas Co., 1 Exch. L. T. (N. 8.) 19; 23 Week. Rep. 335; 
 
 Div. 251; Conway v. Belfast Ry Co., 31 L. T. (N. 8.) 433. 
 
 It. R. 9 C. L. 498; Howells v. Lan- « 26 Ind. 74. 
 
 dore Sieman's Steel Co., L. R. (10 Q. ' 112 U. 8. 377. 
 B.)62; 8. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 25; 32 
 
422 MASTEB AND 8EETANT. [§ 331. 
 
 it was fortunate that a case arose which required that august 
 tribunal to pass upon this precise question, and the opinion 
 is worthy of very careful consideration. The case was a 
 simple one involving nothing but the bare question whether 
 a railway company is liable to a locomotive engineer for the 
 neglect of a train-conductor. The facts were these: — The 
 conductor of a freight train, which left Minneapolis at about 
 midnight, neglected to notify the engineer of an order which 
 he had received from the train-dispatcher to stop the train 
 at South Minneapolis until a gravel-train coming toward the 
 city and not running on schedule time passed. The engi- 
 neer, not having received the order, through the negligence 
 of the conductor, and without fault on his part, ran his train 
 into the gravel train, and, being injured, sued the company. 
 He had judgment in the court below, and upon a writ of er- 
 ror prosecuted to the Supreme Court of the United States 
 the judgment was there affirmed.^ 
 
 § 331. This case farther considered.— It appeared in evi- 
 dence that the conductors of each train were guilty of 
 gross negligence, and that this negligence caused the col- 
 lision. The court argued that the conductor, by virtue of 
 his general control and charge of the train, and of his 
 power and authority to direct the other persons employed 
 with him to move the train, represented the company ; that 
 ordinary prudence on his part would have prevented the 
 accident, and that, therefore, the company must be held 
 liable in damages for his failure to exercise it. The precise 
 point decided in this case is that a conductor of a regular 
 railway train is not a fellow-servant of the other persons em- 
 ployed to run that train, but is the vice-principal, represent- 
 ing the company, for whose negligent acts, when they result 
 in injury to the other employees upon the train, the com- 
 pany is liable, and in arriving at this conclusion the court 
 enters into a very full and discriminating discussion of the 
 general rule. The opinion, in my judgment, contains the 
 clearest and ablest presentation of the law in this behalf, and 
 the fairest and most satisfactory argument upon it to be 
 
 ' Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion, Bradley, Matthews, Gray and 
 Blatchford, JJ., dissenting. 
 
§ 332.] MASTER AND SEBVANT. 423 
 
 found in any English or American decision upon the sub- 
 ject. It is certainly entitled to outrank and to outweigh 
 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester E. Co.,^ or Bartonshill Coal 
 Co. V. Eeid,' in point of sound logic and right reason, as cer- 
 tainly, it is submitted, as the " Massachusetts doctrine," as 
 it is sometimes called, and its trend or tendency is to be 
 superseded and changed in this country by legislation more 
 or less modeled after the English Employers' Liability Act.' 
 A Kentucky text-writer may be pardoned for reminding his 
 brethren that the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States as expounded in this case is the Kentucky doc- 
 trine declared; more than thirty years theretofore, in Louis- 
 ville & Nashville E. Co. v. Collins,* by Chief Justice Eobert- 
 son, and which has since been the rule in that State. It is 
 certainly the rule of humanity as it may confidently be de- 
 clared the rule of even justice. This decision of the federal Su- 
 preme Court may be expected to have a powerful influence, in 
 this country at least, upon the future of the rule regulating a 
 master's liability to a servant for the negligence of another 
 servant. It is contrary to the general course of decision ; 
 but, partly for this reason, as well as because of its intrinsic 
 force and reasonableness, and because it is the judgment of 
 our high court of appeal, it will have the greater tendency 
 to attract attention and to assist in checking the extension of 
 the rule of non-liability which, already, in some jurisdictions, 
 has proceeded to the extent of holding every possible em- 
 ployee, from a general superintendent entrusted with the 
 entire control of a great business to an office boy, or a por- 
 ter, a fellow-servant. 
 
 § 332. What is common employment.— It is generally held 
 that all servants in the employ of the same master, subject 
 to the same general control, paid from a common fund, and 
 •engaged in promoting or accomplishing the same common 
 object, are to be held fellow-servants in a common employ- 
 ment. In the earlier cases, the term common employment is 
 used to designate the employment of two or more workmen 
 
 ' 4 Mete. 49; s. c 38 Am. Dec. » 43 and 44 Vic., ch. 43. 
 
 339. ♦ 2 Duv. 114. 
 
 '8Macq.395. ^ 
 
424 MASTER AND SERVANT. [§ 333. 
 
 by one master — e. g., the two employees of the butcher in 
 Priestley v. Fowler.^ As soon as the rule became recognized 
 law, the courts were called upon to say what classes of cases 
 the term included. Having established the rule, they were 
 asked to apply it, and as case after case arose, it became 
 necessary to determine whether it should have a wide or a 
 nari^ow application. On the one hand it might be held to 
 include only those employees who worked side by side in a 
 similar occupation, as masons building a wall, or carpenters 
 a house, or weavers attending adjacent looms ; and, on the 
 other hand, it might be so extended as to include all employT 
 ees of every grade who are hired by the same person, as, all 
 the hands in a factory, or all the employees of a railway cor- 
 poration; and between the two extremes would b^ found 
 many various degrees, where the rule might be held to in- 
 clude or exclude occupations more or less dissimilar. The 
 chief embarrassment seems to have been to settle whether it 
 should be strictly confined to persons engaged in similar 
 occupations, or should include any and every occupation 
 however essentially unlike. 
 
 'I 
 
 § 333. The same subject continued.— Some courts have- 
 done one thing, and some another, and decisions abound ex- 
 cluding and including almost every mentionable occupation. 
 It is said by a very competent authority, that twenty years, 
 ago no more than a dozen cases could be found in which 
 the point is raised. Now, there are hundreds and hundreds, 
 of wholly irreconcilable decisions in point. No court, as. 
 far as my reading has gone, has attempted to define the 
 term, to circumscribe it by metes and bounds, or attempted 
 more , than to say that the particular case before it waa 
 one where common employment ought or ought not to be 
 a defense. Indeed, the term is one which, from the very 
 nature of the subject, cannot be defined. It is entirely 
 impossible to anticipate all the various kinds of employ- 
 ment in their varying degrees of similarity. In Massachu- 
 setts the rule has received its widest development. The 
 Supreme Judicial Court of that State holds the most 
 
 > 8 Mees. & W. 1. 
 
§ 334] 
 
 MASTER AND SEBVANT. 
 
 425 
 
 radical views upon this subject,^ and the influence of that in- 
 dependent and exceptionally able tribunal has, in this par- 
 ticular, been strongly felt throughout the Union, so that, 
 it must be admitted, the Massachusetts rule is the general 
 rule in this country. 
 
 § 334. Ilinstratious.— Railroad employees.— It has, under 
 the influence of the Massachusetts doctrine, or otherwise, 
 been held that all the employees of a railway corporation in 
 almost every possible combination or association, are fellow- 
 servants in a common employment, and this, notwithstanding 
 that the negligent servant is of a grade superior to the seryant 
 injured, or that the two are employed in entirely distinct and 
 separate departments of the common service — e. g., an en- 
 gineer of a locomotive" and the fireman working with him ; * 
 an engineer and a brakeman on the same train;* an engineer 
 and a brakeman on different trains of the same company ; * 
 
 '■ Shearman & Redfield on Negli- 
 gence, 4th ed., §§ 237, 230; and the 
 Massachusetts cases cited m/gra. 
 
 ' Murray v. South Carolina R. Co., 
 1 McMil. 385; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 
 268; Gulf, &c.. By. Co. s. Blohn, 73 
 Tex. 637; 8. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 867. 
 Cont/ra, Nashville, &c.. By. Co. 
 v. Handman, 13, Lea (Tenn.) 423; 
 Ragsdale t. Northern Pac. R. Co., 42 
 Fed. Rep. 383. St. Louis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. 9. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412, is author- 
 ity for the rule that an engineer and 
 section foreman are not fellow- 
 servants. 
 
 ' St. Louis, &c., R. Co. n. Brifez, 72 
 HI. 256; Summerhays v. Kansas, &c., 
 R. Co., 2 Colo. 384; Sherman ■». Ro- 
 chester, &c., R. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; 
 Nashville, &c., R. Co. t. Wheless, 10 
 Lea, 741; b. c. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. n. Texas, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 537; Wallis v. 
 Morgan's, &c.. B. Co., 38 La. Ann. 
 156; Fowler «. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 61 Wia. 159. Contra, Louisville, 
 &c., R. Co. v. Brooks' Adm'x, 83 Ky. 
 129; East Tenn., &c., R. Co. b. Col- 
 
 lins, 85 Tenn. 227. In Rodman r>. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co., 55 Mich. 57; 
 s. c. 54 Am. Bep. 348, the court was 
 equally divided on the question 
 whether a brakeman could recover 
 for injuries received in consequence 
 of the conductor's managing the loco- 
 motive in the engineer's absence. 
 Louisville, &c., B. Co. t. Moore, 83 
 Ky. 675, holding that a fireman act- 
 ing as engineer, according to the cus- 
 tom of the road, while switching, and 
 a brakeman on the same train are not 
 fellow-servants. 
 
 * Wright «. N. T., &c., B. Co., 25 
 N. Y. 562; LouisviUe, (fee, B. Co. o. 
 Eobinson, 4 Bush. 507; Pittsburgh, 
 &c., E. Co. n. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 
 197; Bandall ». Baltimore, &c., B. 
 Co., 109 U. S. 478. See, also. Armour 
 t. Hahn, 111 U. 8. 313; Hough v. 
 Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 213. And a 
 passenger-train engineer is not a fellow- 
 servant with the train-men in charge 
 of a freight train. Kentucky Cent. R 
 Co. V. Ackley, 87 Ky. 2781; B. c. 
 8. W. Rep. 691. 
 
426 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 [§ 334. 
 
 engineers on different trains ; ^ an engineer and conductor on 
 the same train ; * an engineer and a switch-tender;' an en- 
 gineer and a telegraph operator ; * an engineer and a track 
 repairer ; ' an engineer and an inspector of the tracks ; ° an 
 engineer and a servant employed to put danger signals on the 
 track ; ' an engineer and a shoveler on a gravel train ; ' an 
 
 ' Van Aveiy ». TJmonPac. By. Co., 
 35 Fed. Rep'. 40. But not an engineer 
 and fireman on different trains. 
 Howard v. Denver, &c., Ry. Co., 26 
 Fed. Eep. 837. 
 
 ' Bagsdale v. Memphis, &c.,B. Co., 
 59Tenn. 436; Slater n. Jewett, 85 
 N. T. 61; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 637. See, 
 also, Chicago, &c.,Ry. Co. d. Snyder, 
 117 m. 876. OonPra, Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Ross, 113 U. S. 377. 
 
 ' Farwell v. Boston & Worcester 
 R. Co., 4 Mete. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Dec. 
 339; Naylor ®. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 801. But Louis- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Sheets (Ky.), 13 
 8. W. Rep. 248, holds that an engi- 
 neer and a yard switchman are not 
 fellow-servants. 
 
 * Slater v. Jewett, 86 N. T. 61; s. c. 
 39 Am. Rep. 627; Monaghan ■». New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 45 Hun, 113. 
 Contra, Madden v. Chesapeake, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 38 W. Va. 610; B. C. 57 Am. 
 Rep. 695. Engineer and " train dis- 
 patcher" are not fellow-servants. 
 Darrigan v. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 53 Conn. 385; s. c. 53 Am. Rep. 590. 
 Train dispatchers are vice-principals. 
 McKune v. Cal. Southern R. Co., 66 
 Cal. 303; Lewis «. Siefert, 116 Penn. 
 St. 628; s. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 514; Smith 
 u Wabash, &C., R. Co., 93 Mo. 359; 
 8. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 129. When it ap- 
 pears that a collision was caused by 
 an operator's negligent misinterpreta- 
 tion of a dispatcher's order as to hold- 
 ing a delayed train, although the 
 operator is a fellow-servant of the en- 
 gineer of the train, who was killed by 
 the accident, the question of the de- 
 fendant railroad company's negligence 
 
 ought still to be submitted tothejuiy, 
 since they may find that due diligence 
 required that the dispatcher should 
 have sent orders directly to the con- 
 ductor and engineer of the train, in 
 which case the possibilities of mistake 
 would have been decreased. Suther- 
 land o. Troy, &c., R. Co., 46 Hun, 
 373. 
 
 ' Boldt V. New York, «fcc., R. Co., 
 18 N. Y. 432; Whaalen v. Mad River 
 R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249; Ohio, &c„ 
 R. Co. V. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; s. c. 
 38 Am. Rep. 134; (Jormley v. Ohio, 
 &c., R. Co., 72 Ind. 33; Van Wickle 
 V. Manhattan Ry. Co., 23Blatchf. 
 433; CUfford «. Old Colony R. Co., 
 141 Mass. 564; Connelly v. Minneap- 
 olis,&c., Ry. Co.(Minn.), 35 N.W.Rep. 
 583. See, also, Corbett x. St. Louis, 
 &c.,R. Co., 36Mo. App. 621. Contra, 
 as to an engineer and section-master, 
 according to Calvo v. Charlotte, &c., 
 R. Co., 33 8. C. 526; s. c. 55 Am. 
 Rep. 28; and as to a passenger-train 
 engineer and a section hand; Sullivan 
 V. Missouri Pac. Ry.. Co., 97 Mo. 113; 
 B. 0. 10 S. W. Rep. 852. 
 
 * Waller «. Southeastern Ry. Co., 3 
 Hurl. & C. 103; Coon v. Syracuse, 
 &c.,.R. Co., 5 N. Y. 492; Lovejoy v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 125 Mass. 79; 
 s. c. 28 Am. Rep. 306. 
 
 ' East Tennessee, <fcc., R. Co. «. 
 Rush, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 145. 
 
 'Ohio, &c., R.^Co. V. Tindall, 13 
 Ind. 366. See, also, St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co. ®. Britz, 72111.356; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. McDonald, 31 111. App. 
 409; St. Louis, &c., R. Co. v. Shackel- 
 ford, 43 Ark. 417. 
 
§335.] 
 
 MASTER AND 8EEVANT. 
 
 427 
 
 engineer of a switch-engine and a car repairer ;^ an engineer 
 and a station agent ; ' an engineer and a servant employed at 
 a station, whose duties involved the coupling and uncoupling 
 of cars ;' an engineer and a workman employed in an engine 
 yard ; * an engineer and a tunnel repairer, while being trans- 
 ported from one point to another on that line of railroad ; ' 
 an engineer and any employee of the railroad company, in- 
 cluding, specifically, the general superintendent, the super- 
 visor of the road, a section boss, and a common laborer ; ° an 
 engineer and the laborers on a gravel or construction train ; ' 
 an engineer and the servants of a contractor, engaged in fur- 
 nishing wood "to the railroad under the contract, being on the 
 train.* 
 
 § 335. The same subject continued.— So, also, a conduc- 
 tor and a brakeman on the same train are fellow-servants ;' 
 a conductor and a brakeman on another train j^" a conductor 
 
 ' Chicago, &C., R. Co. v. Murphy, 
 63 ni. 336; Valtez v. Ohio, &c., E. 
 Co., 85 lU. 500. 
 
 ' Evans v. Atlantic, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Mo. 49; Brown v. Minneapolis, &c., 
 R. Co., 33 Am. Law. Reg. 335. See, 
 also. Brown v. "Winona, &c., R. Co., 
 27 Minn. 162; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 285, 
 a case of a section-man and a road- 
 master held under the same rule. 
 
 ' Wilson V. Madison, &c., R. Co., 
 81 Ind. 236; and an engineer and a 
 yardman, attempting to couple cars, 
 that being out of his line of duty. 
 Bradley v. Nashville, &c., Ry. Co., 
 14 Lea (Tenn.) 374. 
 
 * Texas, &c., Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 
 62 Tex. 597. 
 
 ' Capper v. Louisville, &c.,Ry. Co., 
 103 Ind. 305. 
 
 " MobUe, &c., R. Co. «. Smith, 59 
 Ala. 245. This should seem to be the 
 culmination of the rule as far as it 
 affects railway corporations. Krpgg 
 V. Atlanta, &c., R. Co., 77 Cfa. 202, 
 holds that an engineer is not a fellow- 
 servant with the general manager of 
 the road. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Keefe, 47 
 111. 108; Ryan v. Cumberland, &c., 
 R. Co., 23 Penn. St.. 384. 
 
 « Illinois, &c., R." Co. ®. Cox, 21 
 111. 20; but not an engineer and a de- 
 tective in the employ of the railway 
 company, walking on the track. 
 Pyne v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 54 
 Iowa, 233; nor an engineer of a traia 
 with a teamster hauling ties, who, 
 with other workmen, rides on the 
 train to dinner. Hobson «. New 
 Mexico, &c., R. Co. (Ariz.), 11 P. 
 545. 
 
 ' Dow V. Kansas Pacific R. Co., 8 
 Kan. 642; Sherman v. Rochester, &c., 
 R. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; Hayes v. "West-, 
 em R. Co., 3 Cush. 370; Pease v. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 61 "Wis. 168; 
 Johnston «. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 
 114 Penn. St. 443. But see Central 
 R. Co. ®. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406; Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co. V. "Williams, 86 Va. 
 165; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 990. 
 
 "> Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. ■». Devin- 
 ney, 17 Ohio St. 197; and see Au «. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 39 Fed. 
 Rep. 73. 
 
428 
 
 MA8TEB AND SEBVANT, 
 
 [§ 335. 
 
 of a construction or gravel train and the laborers employed 
 upon the same ;* a conductor and the servants of a contractor 
 working upon his train f a conductor traveling on a train 
 other than his own in going to his post of duty, and the 
 other employees in charge of such train f a conductor and a 
 switchman ;* a conductor and a fireman :' a conductor and a 
 station baggage master ;' a conductor and a laborer employed 
 to remove snow and other obstructions ;'' a conductor and a 
 railroad blacksmith on their way to remove a wreck;* a 
 brakeman, in addition to the relations swpra, and another 
 brakeman on the same train, f a brakeman and a fireman on 
 the same train ;" a brakeman and the employees operating 
 another train ;" a brakeman and a car inspector ;^ a brake- 
 
 ' G-ilshannon v. Stoney Brook R. 
 Co., 10 Cush. 338; Cassiday «. Maine, 
 &c., R. Co., 70 Me. 488; Abend t. 
 Terre Haute, &c., R. Co., IH 111. 
 202; 8. c. 20 Cent. L. J. 77; McGowan 
 o. St. Louis, &c., R. Co , 61 Mo. 528; 
 Ryan «. Cumberland, &c., R. Co., 23 
 Penn. St. 384; Cliicago, &c., R. Co. 
 v. Keefe, 47 ni. 108; O'Connell ®. 
 Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 20 Md. 212; 
 ' Cumberland Coal Co. ■ «. Scally, 27 
 Md. 589; Cafisidy v. Maine Central R. 
 Co., 76 Me. 488; Rodman «. Mich., 
 &c., R. Co., 55 Mich. 57; s. c. 31 Alb. 
 Law Jour. 34. Oontra, Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254, 
 where the conductor was held as vice- 
 principal, the laborers being under 
 his direct control. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. ®. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Moon's 
 Adm'r *. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 78 
 Va. 745; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 401; Lalor 
 0. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 53 111. 401. 
 And see Moon v. Richmond, &c., R. 
 Co., 78 Va. 745; s. c. 49 Am. Ret». 
 401; Coleman s. Wilmington, &c., R. 
 Co.,25S. C. 446. 
 
 » Hlmois, &c., R. Co. ®. Cox, 21 
 
 . 20. 
 
 ' Manville v. Cleveland, &c., R. 
 Co., 11 Ohio St. 417. See, also, Vick 
 v. New York, &c., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 
 267; B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 36. 
 
 * Wilson v. Madison, &c., R. Co., 
 81 Ind. 226. 
 
 ' Slater v. Jewett, 85 N.Y. 61; b. c. 
 39 Am. Rep. 627. 
 
 ' Colorado, &c., R. Co. v. Martin, 
 7 Colo. 592; s.c.19 Am.LawRev. 163. 
 
 ' Fagimdes v. Central Pac. R. Co., 
 79 Cal. 97; s. c. 36 Fed. Rep. 437. 
 
 ' Abend v. Terre Haute, &c., R. 
 Co., Ill 111. 302. 
 
 9 Hayes ». Western R. Co., 3 Cush. 
 270. 
 
 '" Galveston, &c., Ry. Co. «. Paber, 
 63 Tex. 344. 
 
 ' ' McMaster v. Illi&ois Cent. Ry. Co., 
 4 So. Rep. 59. 
 
 " Mackin v. Boston, «&c. , R. Co. , 135 
 Mass. 201; b. c. 46 Am. Rep. 456; 
 Smith ■B. FUnt, &c., R. Co., 46 Mich. 
 258; 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 161; Ballou «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 54 Wis. 259; 
 8. c. 41 Am. Rep. 31; Michigan, &c., 
 R. Co. .«. Smithson, 45 Mich. 213; 
 Columbus, &c., R. Co.' v. Webb, 8 
 Ohio Law Jour. 201 (Ohio, 1884); 
 RaUroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ohio 
 Law Jour. 203 (Ohio, 1884); 8. c. 
 19 Am. Law Rev. 163; St. 
 Louis, &c., Ry. Co. v. Gaines, 46 Ark. 
 555. See, also, Byrnes «. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 113 N. Y. 251; 8. c. 21 
 N. E. Rep. 50. Omtra, O'Neil o. St. 
 Louis and Iron Mountain, &c., R. Co., 
 
§ 335.] 
 
 MASTEB AND SEBVANT. 
 
 429 
 
 man and a train dispatcher ;^ a brakeman and a switch ten- 
 der ;' a brakeman and the mechanics in a repair shop, includ- 
 ing the inspector of machinery ;' a brakeman and one whose 
 duty it is to fill the sand-box on the engine t a brakeman 
 and a " section boss "f a fireman in addition to the relations 
 supra, and the master-machinist of the railway company f a 
 fireman and the servants of an independent contractor at 
 work for the company, and being upon the train ;' a fireman 
 and a track repairer;* a fireman and a track walker;* a fireman 
 and a telegraph operator ;^'' a carpenter or other employees of 
 a railway company, and the men in charge of the train by 
 
 9 Fed. Rep. 337; Smith b. Cliicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 520; Daniels 
 v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (Utah), 23 Pac: 
 Rep. 762; Morton v. Detroit, &c., R. 
 Co., 81 Mich. 433; B. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 
 Ill; 30 N. E. Rep. 287; Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. ®. Dwyer, 36 Kan. 58; s. c. 
 12 Pac. Rep. 852; Tierney v. Minne- 
 apolis, &C., Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 311; 
 B. c. 53 Am. Rep. 35. 
 
 ' Robertson v. Terre Haute, &c., R. 
 Co., 78 Ind. 77; b. c. 41 Am. Rep. 553. 
 
 » Slattery's Adm'r v. Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co., 23 Ind. 83. 
 
 ' Wonder v. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., 
 32 Md. 418; b. c. 3 Am. Rep. 143; 
 Besel V. New York, &c., R. Co., 70 
 N. Y. 171. Cf. Murphy v. Boston, &c. , 
 R. Co., 88 N. Y. 146; s. c. 42 Am. 
 Rep. 240; Cooper ». Pittsburgh, &c., 
 Ry . Co., 34 W. Va. 37. Gmtra, Condon 
 V. Missouri, &c., R. Co., 78 Mo. 667; 
 Blessing ■». Missouri, &c., R. Co., 77 
 Mo. 410. 
 
 * Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Petty, 67 
 Miss. 255; s. c. 7 So. Rep. 361. 
 
 ' 81atteiy«. Toledo, &c., R. Co., 33 
 Ind. 81. ConVra, Nashville, &c., R. 
 Co. v. CarroU. 6 Heisk. 347. See, 
 also. Waller «. Southeastern Ry. Co., 
 3 Huri. & Colt. 103; 8. c. 7 Jur. (N. 
 8.) 501; 33 L. J. (Exch.) 305; but not 
 the train-men running a material train, 
 and a section boss. Moon's Adm'r «. 
 Richmond, &c., R. Co., 78 Va. 745; 
 s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 401. 
 
 « Columbus, &c., R. Co. ,». Arnold, 
 31 Ind. 174; but not a fireman and the 
 company's bridge builder; Davis «. 
 Central, &c., R. Co., 55 Vt. 84; s. c. 
 45 Am. Rep. 590. Gillenwater «. Mad- 
 ison, &c., R. Co., 5 Ind. 339; B. c. 61 
 Am. Dec. 101, and note. 
 
 ' Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Cox, 31 HI. 
 30. Gf. Davis v. Central, &c., R. Co., 
 55 Vt. 84; 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 590. 
 
 8 Whaalan n. Mad River R. Co., 8 
 Ohio St. 349; Boldt ». New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 18 N. Y. 433; Ohio, &c., R. 
 ■ Co. V. Collam, 73 Ind. 261; s. c. 38 
 Am. Rep. 131; King n. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 9 Cush. 113; s. o. 129 Mass. 377 
 (ji.); Corbett «. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 
 36 Mo. App. 621. But see, contra, a 
 very carefully considered case, Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co. s. Moranda, 93 Bl. 
 302, holding that to be in the same 
 common employment, servants must 
 actually co-operate at the time of the 
 injury in the particular business in 
 hand, or their usual duties should 
 bring them into habitual consociation, 
 so that proper caution for their com- 
 mon safely would be likely to result; 
 B. 0. 34 Am. Rep. 168. 
 
 'Schultz v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 67 Wis. 616; s. c. 58 Am. Rep. 881. 
 
 '° Not the train dispatcher, but one 
 who communicates instructions from 
 him to the train-men. McKaig «. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep.388. 
 
430 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 [§ 335. 
 
 which they are carried to their work ;' an employee going on 
 a train to his work and a signal man ;' a carpenter at work 
 for a railway company and servants of the company in charge 
 of a turn-table f a road master and a common laborer ;* a 
 section hand running a hand-car and the employees on a 
 train f a car-repairer and a yard master ;* a baggage-master 
 on a passenger train and a switch-tender ;' an engine- wiper 
 and train-men;* a night watcher employed by a railroad com- 
 pany to note and report upon the conduct of the foreman of 
 a night crew whose duty it was to make up trains and such 
 foreman ;' a track-repairer and a switchman operating a 
 derrick in removing a wreck f^" members of different gangs 
 of workmen on a railroad engaged in work of a different 
 sort ;" a foreman of a yard subject to the orders of a yard- 
 master and one employed there in moving cars.^ 
 
 ' Seaver v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 14 
 Gray, 466; Gillshannon «. Stony Brook 
 R. Co., 10 Cush. 238; Morgan v. Vale 
 of Neath Ry. Co., 5 Best. & 8. 736; 
 s. c. C. L. R. 1 Q. B. 149; 35 L. J. (Q. 
 B.) 23; 13 L. T. (N. S.) 564; 12 Week. 
 Rep. 144 (affirming B. c. 5 Best. & S. 
 570; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1074; 33 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 260; 13 Weekly Rep. 1031); 
 Tunney v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 1 
 C. P. 291; s. c. 3 Jur. (N. 8.) 691; 
 Vick v. New York, &c., R. Co., 95 N. 
 T. 267; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 36; Brick 
 v. Rochester, &c., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 
 211. Contra, O'Donnell o. Allegheny, 
 &c., R. Co., 59 Penn. St. 289; Gillen- 
 water v. Madison, &c., R. Co., 5 Ind. 
 339; s. c. 61 Am. Dec. 101. 
 
 " Moran ®. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 S N. Y. 770. 
 
 = Morgan d. Vale of Neath Ry. Co., 
 5 Best & S. 736, as more fully cited in 
 a preceding note. Cf. Killea v. Fax- 
 on, 125 Mass. 485; Colton «. Richards, 
 123 Mass. 484; Kelley v. Norcross, 121 
 Mass. 508. 
 
 * Lawler v. Androscoggin, &c., R. 
 Co., 62 Me. 463; 8. c. 16 Am. Rep. 
 492; Brown v. Winona, &c., R. Co., 
 27 Minn. 163; b. c. 38 Am. Rep. 285; 
 and if. Poster v. Minnesota, &c., R. 
 Co. , 14 Minn. 360. But it is otherwise 
 
 as to a road-mafiter and a fireman, 
 Davis ». Vermont, &c., R. Co., 55 
 Vt. 84; 8. 0. 45 Am. Rep. 590. See, 
 also,Ryan v. Bagley, 50 Mich. 179; 
 s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 35. 
 ' Easton v. Houston, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 32 Fed. , Rep. 893. In running cars 
 on the track these employees were 
 brought into direct relations with one 
 another, wliich distinguishes the case 
 from Howard v. Delaware & H. Canal 
 Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 195, where it is laid 
 down as a general rule that trackmen 
 are not fellow-servants of those in 
 charge of trains. 
 
 ' Kirk V. Atlanta, &c., Ry. Co., 94 
 N. C. 625; 8. c. 55 Am. Rep. 621. 
 But not a car inspector and a yard 
 master: Macy v. St. Paul, &c., R. 
 Co., 35 Minn. 200. 
 
 ' Roberts ».. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 33 Minn. 318. 
 
 ' Ewald V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 70 Wis. 430; s. c. 36 N. W. Rep. 12. 
 
 "Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Geary, 
 110 111. 383. 
 
 '« Slatterly b. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 4 N. Y. Supl. 910. 
 
 " New York, &c., R. Co. v. BeU, 
 112 Penn. St. 400. 
 
 " Fracker u. St. Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 
 32 Minn. 64. 
 
§ 336.] 
 
 MASTER AND SEEVANT. 
 
 431 
 
 § 336. Further illustrations.— Miscellaneous employees. 
 
 — A master and mate of a vessel are fellow-servants ;^ a " gang 
 boss," or foreman, and an ordihary laborer ; '^ the master of a 
 lighter and one of the crew ; ' the chief engineer on a steam 
 vessel and one of the crew;^ an " underlooker " in a mine whose 
 duty it was to examine the roof of the mine and prop it When 
 dangerous and one of the miners;' a scaffold-builder and 
 a rigger employed on a steamship in port f a laborer load- 
 ing cargo in the hold of a vessel and another laborer handling 
 the tackle above ;' a second mate, who superintends the 
 reeling in of a hawser, and a seaman engaged in turning the 
 reel ;' a mate and a sailor, the vessel being in charge of the 
 captain ;' the carpenter, the porter, and the stewardess of a 
 steamship, though belonging to different departments of the 
 ships company ;^'' the foreman of a gang of laborers, engaged 
 in building a shed under the direction of a superior, and one 
 of the laborers, is the fellow-servant of the laborers ; " a sig- 
 nal man at a curve in the track and the gripman of a motor 
 
 ' Mathews v. Case, 61 Wis. 491; 8. c. 
 50 Am. Bep. 151. See, also, Connolly v. 
 Davidson, 16 Min. 519; e. c. 2 Am. 
 Rep. 154. . 
 
 ' Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 
 96 Penn. St. 346; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 
 543; Clifford d. Old Colony R. Co., 
 141 Mass. 564; Olson v. St. Paul, &c., 
 By. Co., 38 Minn. 117; s. c. 35 N. 
 W. Rep. 866; Kinney «. Corbin, 132 
 Penn. St. 341. See, also. Mitchell 
 V. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 812; Houser v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 60 Iowa, 230; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 
 65; Stephens v. Doe, 73 Cal. 26; s. c. 
 14 Pac. Rep. 378; Brazil & Chicago 
 Coal Co. V. CaiQ, 98 Ind. 282; and 
 contra. Railroad Co. v. Bowler, 9 
 Heisk. 866; McDermott v. Hannibal, 
 &c., R Co., 87 Mo. 285; Patton v. 
 Western N. C. R. Co., 96 N. C. 455; 
 Rowland v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 20 Mo. App, 463; Glowers v. Wabash, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 21 Mo. App. 213; 
 Luebke v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 59 
 Wis. 127; B. c. 48 Am. Rep. 483, not 
 decided on the ground, however, that 
 
 the foreman was a vice-principal. 
 East Tennessee, &o., R. .Co. v. Duf- 
 fleld, 12 Lea, 63; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 319; Guthrie ®. Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co., 11 Lea, 372; b. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 286; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13; b. c. 
 41 Am. Rep. 298. 
 
 = Johnson v. Boston Towboat Co., , 
 135 Mass. 209; b. c. 46 Am. Rep. 458. 
 
 * Searle v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 
 429. 
 
 ° Hall u Johnson, 3 Hurl. & C. 589. 
 Of. Kelly V. Howell, 41 Ohio St. 246. 
 
 ' Packett V. Atlas S. S. Co., 12 Daly 
 (K T.) 441. 
 
 ' Kenny ®. Cunard S. S. Co., 52 K. 
 Y. Super. Ct. 434. See, also, Hussey 
 V. Coger, 112 N. Y. 114. 
 
 ' The Egyptian Monarch, 36 Fed. 
 Rep. 778. 
 
 » Benson v. Goodwia, 147 Mass, 237; 
 s. c. 17 N. E. Rep. 517. 
 
 '» Quebec S. S. Co. e. Merchant, 133 
 U. S. 375. 
 
 ■1 WUlis «. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 
 11 Or. 267. 
 
432 MASTER AND SERVANT. [§ 337. 
 
 car ;^ a seryant emplojed to operate a machine and other 
 operatives who repair it f a-laborer employed in constrncting 
 a sewer and one having the oversight and direction of the 
 work f an employee of the State, injured while digging clay, 
 and the captain of a boat belonging to the State under whose 
 direction he was acting ;* one drilling holes in a girder of a 
 building in process of construction and another clearing rub- 
 bish on a floor above f the head carpenter and repairer in a 
 saw-mill and a sawyer while both are moving lumber in the 
 mill f a servant blasting rocks and another hauling the rock;' 
 the engineer of a coal mine, whose duty it is to lower and 
 raise the cages, and a common laborer preparing the bottom 
 of the shaft to receive them.* 
 
 § 337. Servants not in common employment.— lUnstra- 
 tions. — But a " mining captain " and the miners are not fel- 
 low-servants.® Nor a common workman employed about a 
 mine, but not himself a miner, and one of the miners.'* Nor 
 a deck-hand and pilot." Nor the foreman of a gang to whom 
 a stevedore delegates the entire management of unloading a 
 vessel and one of the gang.'^ Nor an employee of the E. 
 company engaged in shoveling ashes from a pit and the engi- 
 neer of a locomotive belonging to the T. company^ though 
 the E. company had exclusive control over the servants of 
 the T. company employed on its locomotives while in the 
 yard." Nor a master mechanic and foreman of the shops 
 of a railroad company and a watchman." Nor one em- 
 ployed to superintend the construction of a cistern and a 
 workman whom he employs." Nor a servant to whom a mas- 
 
 ' Murray «. St. Louis, &o., Ey. Co., ' Ryan «. Bagaley, 60 Mich. 179; 
 
 98 Mo. 573; B. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 253. s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 35. 
 
 = Reading Iron Works v. Devine, '» James ». Emmet Mining Co., 55 
 
 109 Penn. St. 246. Mich. 385. 
 
 " Conley v. Portland, 78 Me. 217. " The Titan, 38 Fed. Rep. 413. 
 
 * Loughlin ®. State, 105 N. Y. 159. " Brown v. Sennett, 68 Cal. 325. 
 
 ' Somer ®. Harrison (Penn.), 8 Atl. " Sullivan v. Tioga R. Co., 44 Hun, 
 
 Rep. 799. 304. 
 
 • Sayward v. Carson, 1 Wash. 29; " St. Louis, &c.,Ry. Co. «. Harper, 
 B. c. 23 Pac. Rep. 880. 44 Ark. 524. 
 
 ' Bogard v. Louisville, &c., Ry. Co., " Mulcairns ®. Janesville, 67 Wis. 
 100 Ind. 491. 24. 
 
 ' Stame v. Schlothane, 21 HI. App. 
 97. 
 
§ 339.] MASTER AND SEBTANT. "433 
 
 ier intrusts the duty of furnishing machinery for other serv- 
 ants and such other servants;* so, also, of a servant ignorant 
 of the use of a machine and an instructor furnished him by 
 iihe master.' 
 
 § 338. Servantsof different masters.— It is generally held 
 that those only are f ellow-servantSj within the intent of this 
 rule, who are the servants of the same master, " A fellow- 
 servant," said Dalrymple, J., in Mc Andrews v. Burns,' "I 
 take to be any one who serves and is controlled by the same 
 master." Whenever a definition of the term fellow-servant 
 is attempted, it is made an essential element of the relation 
 that it include only servants of the same master.* In the 
 very nature of the case, under the rule of non-liability, the 
 relation of fellow-servants to the same master must actually 
 subsist, if the master is to escape responsibility for the neg- 
 ligence of his servant, or the rule to have any proper applica- 
 tion. If, when the negligence of one servant injures another, 
 it cannot be made clearly to appear that the servant injured 
 and the servant whose fault occasioned the injury are the 
 servants of the same master, then the rule does not apply, 
 and the injured person will be free to seek his remedy under 
 some other rule of law. It is obvious that, in the majority 
 of cases, this question cannot arise. It will usually happen 
 that the fact of a common master will be beyond dispute ; 
 but, in a class of cases a difficulty in this respect presents 
 itself which we now proceed to consider. 
 
 § 339. The rule stated. — It is generally held that the em- 
 ployees of an independent contractor are not fellow-servants 
 of the employees of the proprietor for whom the contractor 
 is engaged to work. If, therefore, the employee of such con- 
 tractor is injured through the negligence of a servant of the 
 proprietor, the maxim respondeat superior usually applies, and 
 
 > Kellyo.ErieTelegraph, &c., Co., selle v. Pugh, 67 Ga. 430; s. o. 44 
 
 34 Minn . 321. Am. Rep. 734; Shearman & Bedfield 
 
 ' Brennan «. Gtordon, 13 Daly, 208. on Negligence, 4th ed., § 224; Abra- 
 
 ' 39 N. J. Law, 119. ham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurl. & N. 142; 
 
 ♦ Smith V. New York, &c., R. Co., 8. c. 6 Jur. (N. 8.) 53; 8 Week. Rep. 
 
 19 N. Y. 132; Svenson r>. Atlantic 181. 
 Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 112; Cras- 
 28 
 
434 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 [§ 339. 
 
 the proprietor is liable in damages for the injury,^ It is ac- 
 cordingly held, that the servant of a lighterman, at work 
 upon his master's barge unloading a ship, is not a fellow- 
 servant with one of the crew ; * nor a grain-trimmer employed 
 by a contractor to assist in trimming the grain with which 
 a vessel is being loaded, and a sailor on the ship ; ' nor a 
 laborer employed by a contractor engaged in grading a- 
 railroad, and the engineer of a train furnished by the com- 
 pany to move the dirt ; * nor one who contracts with a- 
 mining company to break down rock, &c., at a certain price 
 per foot, and the superintendent of the mine ; ° nor an em- 
 ployee of a railroad company who is storing sleepers in a 
 shed, and one who is repairing the roof under contract.' A 
 railroad company which has entered into an agreement with 
 a contractor to build a portion of the road, and whose roll- 
 ing-stock, &c., used in the construction is controlled by the 
 contractor, is not liable for the negligence of persons running 
 the rolling-stock.'' The servant of a stevedore who has a 
 
 ' Smith «. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 19 2Sr. T. 137; Svenson ®. Steamship 
 Co., 57 N. T. 108; Burke ?>. Norwich, 
 &c., R. Co., 34 Conn. 474; Young v. 
 N. Y., &c., R. Co., 30 Barb. 239; 
 Woodley v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 
 2 Exch. Biv. 284 (dissenting opinions 
 of Mellish and Baggallay, JJ.); Abra- 
 ham V. Reynolds, 5 Hurl. & N. 142; 
 8. c. 6 Jur. (N. S.) 53;' 8 Week. Rep. 
 181; Swainson v. Northeastern Ry. 
 Co., 3 Exch. Div. 341; Lake Superior 
 Iron Co. ■». Erickson, 39 Mich. 492; 
 s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 423. And see, par- 
 ticularly, Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 
 470; B. c. 42 Am. Rep. 311; Coggin v. 
 Central, &c., R. Co., 62 Ga. 685; s. c. 
 35 Am. Rep. 132. But the master is 
 not liable for the negligence of the 
 contractor (a stevedore in the cases 
 cited) or his foreman, whereby a serv- 
 ant of the contractor is injured. The 
 Wm. F. Babcock, 81 Fed. Rep. 418. 
 Whether the relation be that of mas- 
 ter and servant, so as to invoke the 
 rule of respondeat superior, depends 
 mainly on whether the employer re- 
 
 tains direction and control of the 
 work, or has given it to the contrac- 
 tor. Andrews v. Boedecker, 17 El. 
 App. 313. 
 
 " Svenson v. Steamship Co., 57 N. 
 Y. 108. 
 
 8 Crawford ®. The Wells City, 38 
 Fed. Rep. 47. 
 
 « Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Conroy, 
 63 Miss. 563. 
 
 ' Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 
 76 Me. 100. 
 
 « Gorman v. Morrison, 12 Ct. of 
 Ses. Cas. 1073 (Sc). 
 
 ' Hitte V. Republican Valley R. Co., 
 19 Neb. 630. But see New Orleans, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Norwood, 63 Miss. 387; 
 8. c. 52 Am. Rep. 191, where defendant 
 company employed a contractor to do 
 work, and gave him a construction 
 train and an engineer, placing them 
 under his control, except that he was. 
 not to run above a certain speed and 
 was to have the train on a side track 
 fifteen minutes before the schedule 
 time of regular trains. The company 
 was bound to discharge the engineer 
 
§ 340.] 
 
 MASTEB AND SEBVANT. 
 
 43& 
 
 contract to load a vessel from a dock, the "owner of the dock 
 furnishing the hoisting apparatus with a person to manage 
 the same, is not a fellow-servant with the latter, and may 
 maintain an action against the dock owner for injuries caused 
 by the negligent management of the apparatus.^ But, where 
 a steamship company employed a stevedore to unload its ves- 
 sels, and this stevedore employed his own men, and used his 
 own machinery, when one of the crew was injured through 
 the fault of one of his servants, it was held in Pennsylvania a 
 proper question for the jury, whether this stevedore was a 
 servant of the steamship company, or a contractor, and 
 whether or not the injured servant was a fellow-servant.' 
 So, also, it is held that the servants of a contractor, and those 
 of a sub-contractor, are not co-servants within the meaning 
 of this rule.^ 
 
 § 340. This rule approved. — The rule as here stated is un- 
 questionably sound and just. Upon what principle of right 
 
 on complaint of the contractor, but 
 paid his wages, deducting the amount 
 from the sum due the contractor. It 
 was held that the engineer was a serv- 
 ant of the company. 
 
 ' Sanford v.- Standard Oil Co. , 118 
 N. Y. 571; s. c. 34 N. E. Kep. 
 313; Coyle v. Kerrepont, 37 Hun, 
 379; reversing 8. c. 33 Hun, 311. 
 A., the owner of a miU, engaged 
 B., a machinist, to make certain alter- 
 ations in the wheel, it being imder- 
 stood that the mill should run when 
 work was not going on. A.'s engineer 
 negligently started the wheel while 
 B.'b workman was at work, and the 
 workman was injured. Held, that he 
 and the engineer were feUow-servants, 
 so that he could not recover against 
 the owner. Ewan v. Lippincott, 47 N. 
 J. Law, 193; s. c. 54 Am. Kep. 148. 
 
 ' Haas s. Phila. Steamship Co., 88 
 Penn. St. 369; s. C. 33 Am. Rep. 463. 
 But see Riley v. State Line Steamship 
 Co., 29 La. Ann. 791; B. C. 39 Am. 
 Rep. 349. 
 
 ' Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 113; 
 
 Murphy v. Caralli, 3 Hurl. & C. 463; 
 s. c. 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1307; 84 L. J. 
 (Exch.) 14; 13 Week. Rep. 165. 
 Builders contracted to build certain 
 houses, the contract providing that 
 the defendants, a firm of iron-f oimders 
 selected by the architect, should do a 
 certain specified part of the work at a 
 fixed price, which the builders were 
 to pay out of the contract price. The 
 builders were also to provide scaffoldr 
 ing and other assistance. In the course 
 of the work the plaintiff, one of the 
 builders' workmen, was injured by 
 the negligence of one of the defend- 
 ants' workmen. It was held that the 
 plaintiff and the servant who caused 
 the injury were not engaged in a com- 
 mon employment under a common 
 master and that the action could be 
 maintained. Johnson v. Lindsay, 65- 
 L. T. R. 97 [H. of L.]; reversing s. c. 
 33 Q. B. Div. 508. Murray «. Currie,, 
 6 L. R. (C. P.) 34; s. c. 40 L. J. (C. 
 P.) 26; 33 L. T. (N. S.) 657; 19 "Week. 
 Rep. 104. Of. Devlin v. Smith, 8» 
 N. T. 470; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 311. 
 
436 MASTER AND SERVANT. [§ 341. 
 
 ■can the servants of one man be held to be the fellow-servants 
 •of another man's servants ? If the servant be held by his im- 
 plied contract to assume all the risks of the negligence of his 
 <30-servant, is not this the end of his contract ? How can he 
 be held to assume the risk of the negligence of any other 
 anan's servants, with whom he may chance to be employed or 
 associated ? How can he exercise any influence upon such 
 servants or what duty does he owe to their master to report 
 ■delinquencies if he happen to discover them ? Upon what 
 principle can he be held to sustain any relation to them ? Is 
 he not a mere stranger ? Is not the rule as laid down in some 
 late Massachusetts and English cases the perfection of injus- 
 tice ? In these cases it is plainly declared that a servant is 
 to be held to assume the risk, not only of the carelessness of 
 all the other employees of his master, but of all the servants 
 of all the various persons or corporations with whom he may 
 be associated in any work assigned him, and a master is 
 held free from liability, in almost every concievable set of 
 ■circumstances, for the negligence of his servant, though oper- 
 ating to injure persons with whom he is not the most re- 
 anotely connected, upon the bare fact being shown that his 
 servant and the injured person were, in some more or less 
 intimate way, associated in labor. Under the operation of 
 the rule as announced in these cases, a servant is absolutely 
 remediless, and a master absolutely free from liability, for 
 the most aggravated negligence of his employees. For prac- 
 tical purposes, the rule might as well be made absolute by 
 statute, so perfectly is the ancient rule of respovideat superior 
 set aside as to master and servant in cases of this nature.^ 
 
 § 341. As between different railway corporations having 
 running connections. — Where the servants of one railway 
 
 ' Albro 9. Agawam Canal Co., 6 undertaken to do the plumber work 
 
 Cush. 75; Johnson v. Boston, 118 of the same building. It was held 
 
 3Iass. 114; Connors o. Hennessy, 113 that the latter contractor was not 11a- 
 
 Mass. 96. A laborer in the employ- ble, as the servants were engaged in a 
 
 ment of a firm who had contracted to common work. Maguire «. BusseU, 
 
 ay the cement flooring of a building 12 Ct. of Ses. Gas. 1071 (Sc). HarUns 
 
 in course of erection was injured by a v. Sugar Refinery, 112 Mass. 400; 
 
 hammer let fall through a skylight in Wiggett c. Fox, 11 Ezch.832; s. c. 
 
 the roof, as alleged by the fault of 2 Jur. (N. S.) 955; 35 L. J. Exoh. 
 
 A workman employed by one who had 188. 
 
§342.] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 437 
 
 company have been injured by reason of the negligence of 
 the servants of another railway company, there existing be- 
 tween the two companies an arrangement by which one com- 
 pany runs its cars over the tracks of the other company, or 
 one forms a junction with the other, by which the roads of 
 the two companies constitute the whole, or some part of a. 
 trunk, or through line, or by which one uses the railway 
 station of the other, we find the authorities for the most part 
 consistent in holding that in such a case the employees of 
 the two roads are not fellow-servants, and that either com- 
 pany is liable to the servants of the other for the negligence 
 of its own servants.^ 
 
 § 342. As to TOlunteers. — There are a number of striking 
 English cases upon this branch of the subject. In Degg v. 
 Midland Ey. Co.,* it is held that, when one voluntarily as- 
 sists the servant of another, in an emergency, he cannot 
 
 > Smith ®. New York, &c.. R. Co., 
 19 N. Y. 137; Taylor v. Western Pa- 
 cific R. Co., 45 Cal. 433; Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. v. GkkUagher, 40 Ohio St. 
 637; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 689; Carroll 
 ■B. Minnesota, &c, R. Co., 13 Minn. 
 . 30; Sawyer v. Rutland, &c., R. Co., 
 27 Vt. 370; Gulf, &c.. By. Co. v. 
 DoTsey, 66 Tex. 148; Augusta, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Kalian, 79 Ga. 234; 8. c. 4 
 S. E. Rep. 165; Phillips o. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co.. 64 Wis. 475. Neither 
 company is liable for injiuies to its 
 own servants sustained by the negli- 
 gence of the employees of the other 
 company. G^rgia R. , &c., Co. d Prld- 
 dell (Ga.), 79 Ga. 489; B. c. 7 S. E. 
 Rep. 314; Zeigler v. Danbuiy, &c., R. 
 Co., 53 Conn. 543; Sullivan j). Tioga 
 R Co., 113 N. Y. 643; 8. c. 20 N. E. 
 Rep. 569. See, also, Naiy v. 'New 
 York, &xi., Ry. Co., 9 N. Y. Supl. 
 153; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 
 76 Tex. 151; s. c. 13 8. W. Rep. 973; 
 Budianan v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 75 Iowa, 393; s. c. 39 N.W. Rep. 663. 
 Ckmtra, MUls v. Alexandria, &c., R. 
 
 Co., 2 McArthur, 314, where it is said 
 that the train ia to be regarded as a 
 unit in regard to its management and. 
 not as under two separate govern- 
 ments with divided responsibilities. 
 Cruty V. Erie Ry. Co,, 3 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 244. Warbur- 
 ton V. Great Western Ry. Co., L. 
 R. 2 Exch. 30; s, c. 36 L. J. 
 (Exch.) 9; 15 L. T. (N. S.) 361; 15 
 Week. Rep. 108; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 
 695; Atkyn «. Wabash Ry. Co., 41 
 Fed. Rep. 193. Nor can a railway 
 escape liability by an agi-eement of 
 lease, placing its employees.and trains 
 under the control of the manager of 
 another road. Wabash, &c., R. Co. 
 B. Peyton, 106 Dl. 534; s. c. 46 Am. 
 Rep. 705. But see Foley ®. Chicago,. 
 &c., R. Co., 48 Mich. 632; 8. c. 4» 
 Am. Rep. 481; Singleton v. South- 
 western R. Co., 70 Ga. 464; b. c. 4S 
 Am. Rep; 574; Abbott v. Johnstown,. 
 &c., R. Co., 80 N. Y. 27; s, c. 38 
 Am. Rep. 573. 
 
 ^IHurl. & N. 773; 8 c. SJur. 
 (N. S.) 395; 36 L. J. (Exch.) 171. 
 
438 
 
 MASTER AND SEEVANT. 
 
 [§ 342. 
 
 recover from the master for an injury caused by the negli- 
 gence or misconduct of the servant, and the reason assigned 
 is, that a 'stranger cannot by his officious conduct impose 
 upon an employer a greater duty than that which he owes to 
 his employees in general. This is the rule as to a mere 
 volunteer, and it seems also to be the law in this country,' 
 But wherever there is a temporary employment of a by- 
 stander, in an emergency, by a servant, who may be held to 
 have had the authority to contract for the assistance, the 
 master will be liable if such an assistant is injured by the 
 negligence of his servants.^ The justness of the rule in gen- 
 eral is beyond dispute. When the service is entirely volun- 
 tary, the volunteer may reasonably be held to assume the 
 risks of his undertaking, and the employer may properly be 
 held not to owe him any duty. And, even though the service 
 be not voluntary, as where an employee of a railway com- 
 pany, a conductor of a freight train at a way station, com- 
 pelled a bystander— a mere lad — by a threat, to uncouple 
 some cars, and the boy's leg was run over and cut off, the 
 company was held not liable.' 
 
 ' Mayton v. Texas, &c., Ry. Co., 
 63 Tex. 77; B. c. 51 Am. Rep. 637. 
 An employee in a mUl sustained per- 
 sonal injuries while undertaking to 
 make repairs to the machinery, which 
 it was no part of his regular duty to 
 make, and which he had started to 
 do, knowing the danger, upon obtain- 
 ing the mere consent of his own im- 
 mediate superior. He failed to re- 
 cover, the court holding that he was a 
 mere volunteer. Mellor ®. Merchants' 
 Manuf'g Co., 150 Mass. 362; s. c. 33 
 N. E. Rep. 100. Bradley v. Nashville, 
 &c. , Ry. Co., 14 Lea (Tenn. ) 374, is a 
 similar case. Flower v. Penn., &c, 
 R Co., 69 Penn. St. 310 ; s. c. 8 Am. 
 Rep. 351 ; New Orleans, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Harrison, 48 Miss. 113; s. c. 13 Am. 
 Rep. 356; Everhart «. Terre Haute, 
 &c., R. Co., 78 Ind. 393; b. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 567; Honor v. Albrighton, 93 
 Penn. St. 475; Osborne v. Knox, &c., 
 
 R. Co., 68 Me. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 
 16. Cjf. Pennsylvania Co. v. (JaUagher, 
 40 Ohio St. 637; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 689; Kelly ®. Johnson, 138 Mass. 530; 
 B. c. 35 Am. Rep. 398; Brown v. By- 
 roads, 47 Ind. 435; Central R. Co. of 
 6a. V. Sears, 53 Ga. 630. See, also, 
 McCuUough v. Shoneman, 105 Penn. 
 St. 169; Barstow v. Old Colony R. 
 Co., 143 Mass. 535; s. c. 10 N. E. 
 Rep. 355. 
 
 ' Central Trust Co. v. Texas, &c., 
 Ry. Co , 33 Fed. Rep. 448; Bradley 
 B. New York, &c., R. Co., 63 N. Y. 
 99. qf. jTerre Haute, &c., R. Co. 
 ®. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358; a. c. 49 
 Am. Rep. 753; Louisville, &c, R. 
 Co. ■». McVay, 98 Ind. 391; s. c. 49 
 Am. Rep. 770. 
 
 ' New Orleans, &c., R. Co. v. Har- 
 rison, 48 Miss. 113, on the ground 
 that the conductor's act was out of 
 the line of his duty. 
 
§ 343.] MASTEB AND SERVANT. 439 
 
 § 343. The same subject continued.— But, where one as- 
 sists the servants of another, at their request, for the pur- 
 pose of expediting his own business, or the business of the 
 master, the rule is otherwise, and if he is injured by the serv- 
 ant's negligence, the master is liable. In such a case the 
 relation of fellow-servants is held not to exist ; and, in case 
 of injury, the rule of respondeat superior applies.' Accord- 
 ingly we find in Wright v. London & Northwestern Ey. Co.,* 
 that, where the plaintiff had shipped a heifer by defendant's 
 railway, and, upon the arrival of the train at the station, was 
 assisting in shunting the horse-box, in order to avoid delay 
 in getting the .heifer out, and while so assisting was run 
 against and hurt, the defendant was held liable. There was 
 ■evidence that there was an insufficient number of servants at 
 hand to unload the heifer promptly, and that the stationmas- 
 ter knew that the plaintiff was assisting in the shunting, and 
 assented to it. The court held that in such a case as this the 
 plaintiff was not a mere volunteer, but that he was on the 
 ■defendants' premises with their consent, assisting their serv- 
 ants for the purpose of hastening the delivery of his own 
 goods, and that hence they were liable to him for the negli- 
 gence of their servants.' And in Texas an action is main- 
 tained against a railroad company for the negligence of its 
 engineer, causing injuries to one who was employed by per- 
 sons shipping lumber on the cars, while he was making a 
 
 > Holmes v. North Eastern Ey. Co., Spier, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 398, wherein 
 
 L. R. 4 Exch. 354; affirmed L. R. 6 a passerby, being appealed to, by 
 
 Exch. 133. This is a case, says Chief workmen upon a gas pipe in a street. 
 
 Justice Coleridge, of the greatest au- for information, and being injured by 
 
 thority, in, that seven judges in the their negligence while giving the in- 
 
 Exchequer Chamber affirmed the de- formation, it was held that he was 
 
 cision, for the reasons given by the something more than a mere volun 
 
 judges in the Court of Exchequer. tear, and might recover from the mas- 
 
 ' 1 Q. B. Div- 353; s. c. L. R. 10 ter of the workmen; and Ormonde. 
 
 Q. B. 398. Hayes, 60 Tex. 180, wherein a passen- 
 
 ' Wright V. London, &c., Ry. Co., ger upon a railway train, who, upon 
 
 1 Q. B. Div. 353; s. c. L. R. 10 Q. B. arriving at his destination, went for- 
 
 298. See, also. Potter v. Faulkner, 1 ward to the baggage car to assist in 
 
 Best & S. 800; s. c. 8 Jur. (N. S.) getting out his baggage, and was neg- 
 
 259; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 30; 10 Week, ligently run over and killed while so 
 
 Bep. 93; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 455, wherein doing, was allowed his action against 
 
 a plaintiff recovered nothing, being the company, 
 held a mere volunteer; Cleveland v. 
 
440 
 
 MASTER AND 8EBVANT. 
 
 [§344. 
 
 coupling at the request of the conductor, the company being 
 short of men.* 
 
 § 344. Partnerships and receirers as employers. — ^A serv- 
 ant who is employed by a partnership concern, and is injured 
 by the negligence of a member of the firm, if the work is 
 within the scope of the partnership business, may have his 
 action against the firm.^ So, also, the receiver of an insolvent 
 corporation, being in control of the property, is answerable 
 in his official capacity to employees, for injuries, whenever 
 the corporation itself would otherwise be liable.^ This is 
 the settled rule.^ 
 
 1 Easont). Habine, &o., Ry. Co., 65 
 Tex. 577; s. c. 57 Am. Rep. 606. 
 
 " Ashworth B. Stanwix, 3 El. & El. 
 701; s. c. 7 Jut. (N. 8.) 467; 30 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 183; 4 L. T. (N. 8.) 85; Conr 
 noUy V. Davidson, 15 Minn. S19; s. c. 
 2 Am. Rep. 154, See, also, Zeigler v. 
 Day, 123 Mass. 152. 
 
 ' Meara's Adm'r «. Eolbrook, 20 
 
 Ohio St. 137; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 638. 
 See, also. Slater «. Jew«tt, 85 N. T. 
 61 ; s. c. 89 Am. Rep. 627. In this case 
 such an action was brought against 
 a receiver of the Erie railway, and 
 the right to bring was npt questioned. 
 * Beach on Receivers, §^ 717, 718, 
 719, 720. 
 
CHAPTEE XIIL 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT; THE MASTER'S OBLIGATIONS AND 
 
 LIABILITIES. 
 
 345. 
 
 The obligation of the master. 
 
 § 364. 
 
 Injuries to trainmen in coup- 
 
 846. 
 
 Defective, dangerous or unfit 
 
 
 ling cars. 
 
 
 machinery, appliances, tools, or 
 
 365. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 
 premises. 
 
 366. 
 
 Eiiowledge on the part of the 
 
 347. 
 
 Applications of this rule.— Dan- 
 
 
 employer. 
 
 
 gerous premises. 
 
 867. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 348. 
 
 The same Subject continued.— 
 
 368. 
 
 The obligation of the servant. 
 
 
 Defective machinery. 
 
 369. 
 
 He must possess a fair measure 
 
 349. 
 
 The master's duty as to ma- 
 
 
 of skill for ithe service he un- 
 
 
 chinery a continuing duty. 
 
 
 dertakes, and must inform 
 
 350. 
 
 This rule criticised. 
 
 
 himself at the outset of the 
 
 351. 
 
 Master must provide safe and 
 
 
 duties and dangers peculiar to 
 
 
 good, but not the safest and 
 
 
 his work. 
 
 
 best, appliances. 
 
 370. 
 
 His knowledge when a bar. 
 
 852. 
 
 Master not a guarantor of the 
 
 371. 
 
 Continued service, after knowl- 
 
 
 safety or sufficiency of his ap- 
 
 
 edge, a waiver of the danger 
 
 
 pliances. 
 
 
 or defect. 
 
 853. 
 
 Incompetent and unfit employ- 
 
 373. 
 
 A qualification of this rule. 
 
 
 ees. 
 
 373. 
 
 Servant must obey rules estab- 
 
 354. 
 
 The duty as to servants also a 
 
 
 lished to promote his safety. 
 
 
 continuing duty. 
 
 374. 
 
 Liability of a servant to a fel- 
 
 355. 
 
 The master not held to war- 
 
 
 low-servant. 
 
 
 rant the faithfulness or com- 
 
 375. 
 
 His liability to the master 
 
 
 petency of his servants. 
 
 
 and to third persons. 
 
 356. 
 
 The master may act through 
 
 376. 
 
 Statutory modifications of the 
 
 
 an agent and become respon- 
 
 
 rule which exempts a master 
 
 
 sible for his acts. 
 
 
 from liability to one servant 
 
 357. 
 
 The rule as to minor servants. 
 
 
 for the negligent wrong-doing 
 
 358. 
 
 Where the master orders the 
 
 
 of a co-servant. 
 
 
 servant into danger or into a 
 
 377. 
 
 The Employer's Liability Act 
 
 
 service which he did not con- 
 
 
 in England. 
 
 
 tract to perform. 
 
 378. 
 
 The effect of the Act. 
 
 359 
 
 The patent and latent dangers 
 
 879. 
 
 Legislation on this subject in 
 
 
 of the employment 
 
 
 the United States. 
 
 360. 
 
 The servant's assumption of 
 
 380. 
 
 Should the employee be al- 
 
 
 risk. , 
 
 
 lowed to make a contract re- 
 
 361. 
 
 Risks not assumed. — Illus- 
 
 
 leasing his employer from the 
 
 
 trations. 
 
 
 liability imposed by these 
 
 362. 
 
 The master's duty toward mi- 
 
 
 statutes. 
 
 
 nor servants. 
 
 381. 
 
 The same subject continued. 
 
 363. 
 
 Overhead railway bridges and 
 
 
 — Griflith ®. The Earl of Dud- 
 
 
 depot roofs. 
 
 
 ley. 
 
442 
 
 THE MASTEB's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 346. 
 
 I 382. The English doctrine not ap- 
 proved In America. 
 
 383. Contracts releasing the em- 
 ployer from his Common law 
 liability. — The general Ameri- 
 can rule. 
 
 384. The Georgia cases. 
 
 385. The laws of other countries as 
 
 to the liability of an employer 
 for injuries to an employee 
 caused by the carelessness of a 
 fellow-employee. — Scotland. 
 § 386. The Scotch rule further stated. 
 
 387. The rule in Ireland. 
 
 388. The nile on the Continent of 
 Europe. 
 
 § 346. The obligation of the master.--" The only ground," 
 said the Court of Appeals of New York, in Warner v. Erie 
 Tij. Co.,^ " of liability of a master to an employee, for injuries 
 Tesulting from the carelessness of a co-employee, which the 
 law recognizes, is that which arises from personal negligence, 
 or from want of proper care and prudence in the manage- 
 ment of his affairs, or the selection of his agent or machinery 
 and appliances." This is a complete statement of the rule as 
 now established. It appears accordingly that the master's 
 liability in this regard is three-fold, (a.) for his own per- 
 sonal negligence ; (6.) for defective or dangerous maqhinery, 
 appliances, tools, or premises ; (c.) for incompetent or unfit 
 servants. We have considered the first of these in the pre- ' 
 ceding chapter,' and it is not necessary here to do more than 
 suggest the rule. We may, therefore, proceed to consider 
 the liability of the master to an employee for — 
 
 § 346. Defective, dangerous, or unfit machinery, appli- 
 ances, tools, or premises. — In general, a master is bound to 
 exercise ordinary care in respect of the machinery, appliances, 
 tools, materials and premises, which he furnishes to his serv- 
 ants, for the prosecution of the work required of them. If 
 he fail in this regard, and injury result, he is liable. It 
 is his duty not to require his servants to work for him on 
 dangerous premises, or in dangerous buildings, or with dan- 
 gerous tools, machinery, materials, or appliances. If the serv- 
 ant is injured while in the discharge of his duty, and without his 
 own contributory fault, through the master's dereliction in 
 ihis respect, the servant may have his action against him.' 
 Personal negligence is the gist of the action, and it must, 
 
 ' 39 N. T. 468. 
 
 = § 303. 
 
 ' See upon this point, Justice Har- 
 
 lan's learned opinion in Hough v. RaO- 
 way Co., 100 U. S. 218, and the cases 
 cited in the Reporter's note. 
 
§ 346.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 443 
 
 therefore, appear, to render the master liable, that he knew, 
 or from the nature of the case ought to have known, of the 
 unfitness of the means of labor furnished to the servant, and 
 that the servant did not know, or could not reasonably be 
 held to have known of the defect. Knowledge on the part of 
 the employer, and ignorance on the part of the employee are 
 of the essence of the action ; ^ or, in other words, the master 
 must be at fault and know of it, and the servant must be free 
 from fault, and ignorant of his master's fault, if the action is to 
 lie. The authorities all state the rule with these qualifications.' 
 
 ' In an action for injuries resulting 
 from the unsafe tsondition of the 
 premises upon which the servant was 
 employed the statement of claim 
 must allege not only that the master 
 knew, but that the servant was igno- 
 rant of the danger. Onfflths «. Lon- 
 don, &c.. Docks Co., 13 Q. B. D. 359: 
 8. c. 53 L. J. Q. B. 504 [51 L. T. 533; 38 
 W. R. 35 (0. A.)]. If a servant 
 charges injuries received to a defective 
 coupling-pin, he must in his complaint 
 aver that he had no knowledge or 
 means of knowledge of the defect. 
 Indiana, &c., Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 110 
 Ind. 75. 
 
 ' "Wright V. New York, &c., B. Co., 
 25 N. T. 562; Booth v. Boston, &c., 
 B. Co., 67 N. T. 593; 8. c. 73 N. Y. 
 38; 29 Am. Rep. 97; Murphy v. Bos- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., SSN. Y. 146; s. c. 43 
 Am. Rep. 340; Laning v. Kew York, 
 &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 531; s. c. 10 
 Am. Rep. 417; Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. 
 Y. 410; Fuller s. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46; 
 s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 575; Vosburgh n. 
 Lake 8hore,&c.,R. Co., 94 N. Y. 374; 
 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 148; Cone -a. Dela- 
 ware. &c., R. Co.. 81 N. Y. 306; s. c. 
 37 Am. Rep. 491;Flike«. Boston, &c., 
 R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549; s. c. 13 Am. 
 Rep. 545; Corcoran *. Holbrook, 59 
 N. Y. 519; Hickey i>. TaafEe, 32 Hun, 
 7; s. c. 1 East. Rep. 7; Hawley v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 83 N. Y. 370; Da- 
 ley V. Shaaf, 28 Hun, 314; EUis v. New 
 York, &c.. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 546; 
 
 Holden v. Fitchburg.B. Co. (an in- 
 structive and learned opinion by Gray, 
 C. J.), 139 Mass. 368, and many cases 
 there cited; s. c. 3 Am. & Eng. Ry. 
 Cases, 94; Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., 
 110 Mass. 34(^, Snow «. Housatonic, 
 &c., R. Co., 8 Allen, 441; Hackett «. 
 Manfg. Co., 101 Mass. 101; Arkerson 
 V. Dennison, 117 Mass. 407; "Walsh v. 
 Peet Valve Co., 110 Mass. 23; Wheeler 
 7>. "Wason Manfg. Co., 135 Mass. 394; 
 McGee v. Boston Cordage Co., 139 
 Mass. 145; s. c. 1 East. Rep. 136; 
 Baker v. Allegheny R. Co., 95 Penn. 
 St. 311; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 634; Patter- 
 son v. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 76 
 Penn. St. 389; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 412; 
 Johnson d. Bruner, 61 Penn. St. 
 58; O'Donnell v. Allegheny R. Co., 
 59 Penn. St. 389; Ardesco Oil Co. v. 
 Gilson, 63 Penn. St. 146; Riley®. State 
 Line Steamship Co., 29 La. Ann. 791; 
 8. c. 39 Am. Rep. 349; Greenleaf ®. 
 HI., &c., R. Co., 29 Iowa, 14; Mul- 
 downey «. 111., &c., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 
 615; Tuttle v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 48 Iowa, 336; Brann v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 53 Iowa, 595; Baldwin v. Rail- 
 road Co., 50 Iowa, 680; "Wayc. Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co., 40 Iowa, 341; Hallower 
 V. Henley, 6 Cal. 309; McGlynn v. 
 Brodie, 31 Cal. 376; Baxter v. Roberta, 
 44 Cal. 187; Sullivan «. Louisville 
 Bridge Co., 9 Bush, 81; Quaid «. 
 Cornwall, 18 Bush, 601; Hayden •!). 
 Manfg. Co., 39 Conn. 549. Where the 
 servant is a minor, his experience and 
 
444 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 347. 
 
 § 347. Applications of this rule.— Dangerons premises.— 
 
 ' The general duty of a master to exercise care to preyent the 
 
 want of judgment -vrill be taken into 
 account in deciding whether, he 
 should have known of the defective 
 machinery. St. Louis, &c., R. Co. 
 B. Valiriu3,56 Ind. 511; Columbus, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; 
 Thayer v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 33 
 Ind. 36; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Love, 10 Ind. 554; Shanny v. Andros- 
 coggin, &c., R. Co., 66 Me. 430; Buz- 
 zle V. Manfg. Co., 48 Me. 113; Wonder 
 V. Baltimore, &c.,R. Co., 33 Md. 411; 
 s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 143; Cumberland R. 
 Co. V. Hogan, 45 Md. 329; Hardy n. 
 Carolina, &c., R. Co., 76 N. C. 5; 
 Cowles 0. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 84 
 N. C. 809; B. c. 37 Am. Rep. 630; Fifield 
 V. Northern, &c., R. Co., 43 N. H. 325; 
 Harrisons. Central, &c., R. Co., 31 
 N. J. Law, 393; Paulmier v. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151; Smith v. Ox- 
 ford Iron Co., 43 N. J. Law, 467; s. c. 
 36 Am. Rep. 535; Manfg. Co. v. Mor- 
 rissey, 40 Ohio St. 148; 8. c. 48 Am. 
 Rep. 669; Columbus, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Webb, 13 Ohio St. 475; Mad River R. 
 Co. V. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; Guthrie 
 ®. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 11 Lea, 873; 
 B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 386; East Tennes- 
 see, &c., R. Co. V. Duffield, 13 Lea, 68; 
 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 819; Nashville, &c., 
 R. Co. u. Jones, 9 Heisk. 37; Nash- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. «. Elliott, 1 Caldw. 
 611; Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. Holt, 
 39 Ean. 149; Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Moore, 39 kan. 683; Noyes «. Smith, 
 29 Vt. 59; Hathaway u. Michigan, &c., 
 R. Co., 51 Mich. 253; b. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 569; Foley v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 48 
 Mich. 633; B. c. 42 Am. Rep. 481; 
 Botsford V. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 38 
 Mich. 356; Fort Wayne, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Qildersleeve, 38 Mieh. 184; Michi- 
 gan, &c., R. Co. «. Smithson, 45 Mich. 
 312; Huizega «. Cutler, &c.. Lumber 
 Co.. 51 Mich. 272; Houston, &c,. R. Co. 
 «. Dunham, 49 Tex. 181; Houston, &c.. 
 
 R. Co. V. Oram, 49 Tex. 341; Inter- 
 national R. Co. «. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190; 
 Hobbs v. Stauer, 63 Wis. 108; b. c. 19 
 Alb. Law Jour. 490; Wedgewood ». 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 41 Wis. 478; 
 8. c. 44 Wis. 44i Dorsey «. Philips, 
 &c., Co., 43 Wis. 583; Ballou «. Chica- 
 go, &c., R. Co., 54 Wis. 259; s. o. 41 
 Am. Rep. 31; Flannagan v. Railroad 
 Co., 45 Wis. 98; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 463: Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Russell, 
 91 m. 398; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Troy, 91 El. 474; s. o. 88 Am. Rep. 
 57; Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Asbuiy, 84 
 ni. 439; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Flanigan, 77 111. 865; Columbus, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Troesch, 68 111. 545; 8. c. 
 18 Am. Rep. 578; Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co. v. Jackson, 55 111. 493; Illinois, 
 &c., R. Co. «. Welch, 53 HI. 183; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Swett, 45 111. 
 197; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 
 107 111. 44; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 425; 
 East, &c., R. Co. ®. Hightower,92, Bl. 
 139; Le Claire v. First Div., &c., R. 
 Co., 20 Minn. 9; Greene e. Minneapo- 
 lis, &c., R. Co., 31 Minn. 248; s. c. 47 
 Am. Rep. 785; Flynn v. Kansas, &c., 
 R. Co., 98 Mo. 195; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 99; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13; s. c. 
 41 Am. Rep. 398; Stoddard v. St. 
 Louis, &c.,R. Co., 65 Mo. 514, holding 
 that though the plaintiff knew that 
 defendant's brake beam and fog were 
 dangerous and the force of hands in- 
 sufScient, yet it was for the jury, 
 under proper instructions, to say 
 whether they were so glaringly defec- 
 tive and insufficient that a man of 
 common prudence would not have 
 undertaken the work, or on the other 
 hand would have supposed that with 
 great caution he could do the work 
 with safety.' Dale «. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 63 Mo. 466; Conroy «. Iron 
 Works Co., 63 Mo. 35; Porter v. Han- 
 nibal, &c., R. Co., 60 Mo. 16{h Lewis 
 
§ 347.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 445 
 
 exposure of his servant to unnecessary and unreasonable 
 risks requires him among other things to use reasonable dil- 
 igence in seeing that the place where the service is to be per- 
 formed is safe for that purpose."* A railroad company must 
 use reasonable care to keep its roadway in a safe condition 
 for its employees,' and a want of ordinary diligence in guard- 
 
 ■B. St. Louis. &c., R. Co.. 59 Mo. 495; 
 Devitt t>. Pacific, &o.. R. Co.. 50 Mo. 
 302; Gibson v. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 
 46 Mo. 163; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 407; 
 Brickman v. South Carolina, &c., R. 
 Co., 8 S. C. 173; Holland v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 5 McCrary, 549; Dillon 
 «. Union Pac. Ry. Co.. 3 Dill. 319; 
 Jones V. Teager, 2 Dill. 64; Wood- 
 worth V. St. Paul. &c., R. Co., 5 Mc- 
 Crary. 574; Patterson v. Wallace, 1 
 Macq. 748; Clark v. Holmes, 6 Hurl. 
 & N. 349; 8. c. 7 Hurl. & N. 937; Mar- 
 shall V. Stewart, 3 Macq. 30. See, 
 also, 39 Am. &Eng. R. Cas. 333, note. 
 • Cook v. St Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 34 
 Minn. 45. McPherson v. St. Louis, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 253; s. c. 10 S. 
 W. Rep. 846; Atchison, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Thul, 33 Kan. 355; Mulcaims v. 
 Janesville, 67 Wis. 34; Murray v. 
 Usher, 117 N. Y. 543; a. c. 23 N. E. 
 Rep. 564; Mulvey v. Rhode Island 
 Locomotive Works, 14 R. I. 304; Bur- 
 lington, &c., R. Co. «. Crockett, 19 
 Neb. 138; Sioux City, «&c.. R. Co. v. 
 Smith. 33 Neb. 775; b. c. 36 N. W. 
 Rep. 285; Northern Pac. R.' Co. ■». 
 O'Brien, 1 Wash. 599; s. c. 21 Pac. 
 Rep. 33; Tissue v. Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co., 113 Penn. St. 91; s. c. 56 Am. 
 Rep. 310; Hewitt v. Flint, &c., R. 
 Co., 67 Mich. 61; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 659; Davis v. Button, 78 Cal. 247; 
 s. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 133; Diamond State 
 L-on Co. V. Giles (Del.), 11 Atl. Rep. 
 , 189; Sangamon Coal Min. Co. ®. Wig- 
 gerhaus, 122 HI. 279; s. c. 13 N. E. 
 Rep. 648; Cullen v. Norton, 4 N. T. 
 SupL 77^ 8. c. 52 Hun, 9; Haley v. 
 Western Transit Co., 76 Wis. 344; 
 8. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 16; Hogan o. 
 
 Smith, 9 N. Y. Supl. 881; Pantzar «. 
 Tilly Poster Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 
 368; Kaspari v. Marsh, 74 Wis. 562; 
 s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 368; Hyatt v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. , 
 287; Ford ®. Lyons. 41 Hun, 512; 
 Anderson v. Northern Mill Co.. 42 
 Minn. 434; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 
 315; Conner v. Pioneer Fire-Proof 
 Const. Co.. 29 Fed. Rep. 629; Wan- 
 namaker v. Burke, 111 Penn. St. 433. 
 And a servant, familiar with the loca- 
 tion of a trap-door, who falls through 
 it when suddenly and negligently 
 opened by a fellow-workman, has no 
 right of action against his master. 
 Anthony v. Leeret, 105 N. Y. 591. 
 And the servant cannot recover when 
 injured by the fall of a scaffold 
 which he helped to construct of de- 
 fective scantling, having suitable tim- 
 ber to choose from. Hogan v. Field, 
 44 Hun, 73. A.'s business of haul- 
 ing for B. required him to drive 
 under a revolving shaft, which, with- 
 out his knowledge, was repaired be- 
 tween two of his trips in such a man- 
 ner that there was not room to drive 
 under it without injury. The change 
 was not apparent, and A. . was not 
 warned thereof. B. was held liable 
 for injuries sustained. Hawkins «. 
 Johnson, 105 Ind. 29; s. c. 55 Am. 
 Rep. 169; Stewart v. Philadelphia, 
 &c., R. Co. (Del.), 17 Atl. Rep. 639; 
 Sayward «. Carlson, 1 Wash. 129; s. c. 
 23 Pac. Rep. 830. And see generally 
 on this subject, 39 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 332, and the note. 
 
 ' It must use reasonable care to 
 keep its roadway in a safe condition. 
 St. Louis. &c.. Ry. Co. v. Weaver. 35 
 
446 THE mastee's obligations and liabilities. [§ 347. 
 
 ing against injuries to brakemen while coupling cars, by 
 reason of defects in the track or road-bed, makes the com- 
 pany liable.' So, also, where sheds or water-tanks ate per- 
 mitted to be placed in such proximity to the track that servants 
 of the company are injured while in the proper performance 
 of their duties, they may have their actions.* Reasonable care 
 must be taken to protect car repairers or other servants work- 
 ing upon or under stationary cars against injuries from move- 
 ments of the train without notice.* And, generally, the com- 
 pany should frame and promulgate such rules and schedules 
 for the moving of its trains as will afford safety to the oper- 
 atives engaged in moving them.* But so long as the master 
 keeps the places where the workman is employed or likely to 
 
 Kan. 412; MoFee v. Vicksbuig, &c., 
 R. Co., 42 La. Ann. 790; s. c. 7 So. 
 Rep. 720; Van Amburg v. Vicksburg, 
 &c., R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 650; s. c. 55 
 Am. Rep. 517. Of. Brick v. Roches- 
 ter, &o., R. Co., 98 N. T. 211; Balti- 
 more, &c., R. Co. ■». McKenzie, 81 
 Va.-71; Bowens. Chicago, &c., By. 
 Co., 95 Mo. 368; s. o. 8 S. W. Rep. 
 230. 
 
 1 Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. «. Rediker, 67 
 Tex. 190; s. c. 2 8. W. Rep. 513; 
 Huhn V. Miasouri Pac.^ Ry. Co., 92 
 Mo. 440; s. c. 4 S. W. Rep. 937; Mis- 
 souri Pao. Ry. Co. ■». Jones, 75 Tex. 
 151; s. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 972; Flynn 
 V. "Wabash, &o., Ry. Co., 18 111. App. 
 235; Franklin ®. Winona, &c., R. Co., 
 37 Minn. 409; e, c. 4 N. W. Rep. 898. 
 But snow removed from the track 
 may be left at the side of it. Brown 
 ». Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 652. 
 
 ' To permit sheds, water-tanks, 
 &c., to be placed so near the track as 
 to be a source of danger to employees 
 in the discharge of their duty is evi- 
 dence of negligence. Keams «. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 66 Iowa, 599; 
 Riley v. West Virginia C, &c., R. 
 Co., 27 West Va. 145; Illinois, &c., 
 R. Co. ■». Whalen, 19 III. App, 116; 
 Davis «. Columbia, &c., R. Co., 21 
 S. C. 93. 
 
 ^ Quick V. Indianapolis, &c., R. 
 Co., 130 111. 334; s. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 709; Pierce v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 
 73 Iowa, 140; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 783; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. 
 V. Johnson, 114 111. 57; Murphy®. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 118 N. T. 527; 
 s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 812; Ritt's Adm'x 
 «. Louisville, &c., R. Co. (Ky.), 4 
 S. W. Rep. 796; Campbell «. New 
 York, &c., B. Co., 35 Hun, 506; 
 Moore v. Wabash, &c., R. Co., 85 
 Mo. 588; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Bin- 
 genheimer, 116 HI. 226. Of. with 
 the foregoing eases Luebke v. Chica- 
 go, &c., Ry. Co., 63 Wis. 91; s. c. 53 
 Am. Rep. 266; Central R. &. B. Co. 
 «. Kitchens, 83 Ga. 83; s. c. 9 S. E. 
 Rep. 827. 
 
 ' Lewis «. Seifert, 116 Penn. St. 
 828; B. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 514; Erickson 
 V. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 41 Minn. 500; 
 s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 333; Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Normant, 84 Va. 167; 
 s. c. 4 S. E. Rep. 211. In CMord v. 
 Denver, &c., R. Co., 9 Colo. 333; 
 s. 0. 12 Pac. Rep. 319, the plaintifiE, a 
 laborer employed in the construction 
 of a road, maintained an action on 
 account of sickness caused by being , 
 compelled to sleep on the cold and 
 wet ground, without sufficient blank- 
 ets. 
 
§ 348.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 44T 
 
 go in a safe condition he discharges his whole duty in that 
 regard* 
 
 § 348. The same subject continued.— Defective machinery^ 
 
 — The ordinary care to be exercised by the master in respect 
 of the machinery must be measured by the character and 
 risk and exposures of the business; and the degree required 
 is higher where life and limb is endangered, or a large 
 amount of property is involved, than in other cases.' The 
 
 ' Belford v. Canada Shipping Co., 
 36 Him, 347, 348, %here a carpenter, 
 employed to do work on the upper 
 deck of a yiessel in port, hid his tools 
 below at night, and on going to get 
 them again fell into a bunker hole. 
 The ship-owner was held not liable. 
 
 ' Cayzer ®. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274. 
 Bean ®. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 24 
 Fed. Rep. 124; Hull v. Hall, 78 Me. 
 11^ Herbert «. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 3 Dak. 38; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
 Henry, 75 Tex. 220; s. c. 12 S. W. 
 Rep. 828; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Stites, 20 HL App. 648; Covey v. Han- 
 nibal, &c., R. Co., 86 Mo. 635; Rice 
 V. King Phillip MiUs, 144 Mass. 
 229; B. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 101; Steen 
 V. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 37 Minn. 
 310; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 113. 
 The master's duty to furnish suitable 
 machinery, &c., is not universal. It 
 may depend upon the nature of the 
 employment, and the circumstances 
 of the case. Robinson v. George F. 
 Blake Manuf'g Co., 143 Mass. 528; 
 s. c. 10 N. E. Rep. 314. See, also, 
 Peschel v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 62 
 Wis. 338; George H. Hammond «& 
 Co. e. Schweitzer, 112 Ind. 246; 8. c. 
 13 N. E. Rep. 869; Hewitt v. Flint, 
 &c., R. Co., 67 Mich. 61; s. c. 34 N. 
 W. Rep. 659; The Truro, 31 Fed. Rep. 
 158; Atchison, &c., R. Co. d. McKee, 
 37 Kan. 592; s. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 484; 
 Spicer «>. South Boston Iron Co., 138 
 Mass. 426; Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. 
 Van Sant, 99 Ind. 188; The Carolina, 
 
 30 Fed. Rep. 199; s. c. 32 Fed. Rep. 
 112; Judkins ®. Maine Cent. R. Co., 
 81 Me. 351; s. c. 14 Atl. Rep. 735; 
 Columbia, &c., R. Co. v. Hawthorn, 
 3 Wash. T. 353; s. c. 19 Pac. Rep. 25; 
 Puget Sound Iron Co. v. Lawrence, 
 3 Wash. T. 226; b. c. 14 Pac. Rep. 
 869; Gulf, &c., R. Co. ■». Silliphant, 
 70 Tex. 623; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 673; 
 Burns t. Ocean S. S. Co., 84 Ga. 709; 
 B. c. 11 ^. E. Rep. 493; Bajus v. Syra- 
 cuse, &c., R. Co., 103 N. T. 312; 
 8. c. 57 Am. Rep. 723; Boardman v. 
 Brown, 44 Hun 836; Goodman v. 
 Richmond, &c., R. Co., 81 Va. 576; 
 Richmond, &c., R. Co. ■». Moore, 
 78 Va. 93; Nelson v. Dubois, 11 Daly 
 (N. Y.) 127; Steiler v. Hart, 65 Mich. 
 644; 8. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 875; Hobbs 
 D. Stauer, 62 Wis. 108; Madden v. 
 Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 
 .303; Malone v. Morton, 84 Mo. 436; 
 Bradbury v. Goodwin, 108 Ind. 286; 
 Withcofsky v. Weir, 32 Fed. Rep. 
 301; Hartwig ®. Bay State Shoe & 
 Leather Co., 43 Hun, 435; Burke 
 T. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 563; Cen- 
 tral Trust Co. v. Texas, <SiC., Ry. Co., 
 33 Fed. Rep. 448; Muirhead v. Han- 
 nibal, &c., Ry. Co., 19 Mo. App. 
 68^ Pittsburgh & W. Ry. Co..«. Mc- 
 Combs. 18 Atl. Rep. 613; Joseph 
 Gameau Cracker Co. v. Palmer, 38 
 Neb. 807; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 463; 
 International, &c., R. Co. v. Bell, 75 
 Tex. 50; s. C. 13 S. W. Rep. 321; 
 Johnson «. Spear, 76 Mich. 139; b. o. 
 42 N. W. Rep. 1093; Siela v. Hanni- 
 
448 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 348. 
 
 burden of proving the master's negligence in this regard is 
 upon the servant,* and the breaking of the machinery is not 
 alone sufficient proof of negligence.* But where negligence 
 on the master's part is established, it is no defense that the 
 negligence of a fellow-servant contributed to the injury.^ The 
 servant must exercise ordinary care to avoid injury, and if 
 the tool furnished by the master is so obviously defective 
 that no prudent person would have used it, the master is not 
 liable for an injury resulting from its use.* In Illinois, the doc- 
 trine of comparative negligence is applied in these as in other 
 cases, and where the master's negligence is gross, slight negli- 
 gence on the part of the servant will not prevent a recovery,' 
 
 bal, &c., R. Co., 83 Mo. 430; Careys. 
 Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 608; 
 Griffln «. Boston, &c., R. Co., 148 
 Mass. 143; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 166. 
 Where repairs are made upon a ma- 
 chine shortly after an accident has 
 occurred at the machine, evidence of 
 such repairs is competent as tending 
 to establish that it was not safe at the 
 time of the accident. Atchison, &c., 
 R. Co. «. McKee, 37 Kan. 592; s. c. 
 15 Pac. Rep. 48^ Memphis, &c., Ry. 
 Co. V. Askew, 90 Ala. 5; s. c. 7 So. 
 Rep. 833; Goins v. Chicago, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 37 Mo. App. 221. In order to 
 charge an employer with neglect to 
 furnish safe appliances, the danger 
 must be shown to be such as to sug- 
 gest itself to a man of ordinary pru- 
 dence. Nelson v. Allen Paper Car- 
 Wheel Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 840. 
 
 ' St. Louis, &c.,, Ry. Co. ■». Haiper, 
 44 Ark. 524; Lindall v. Bode, 72 Cal. 
 245; s. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 660. The 
 question of negligence is usually for 
 the jury. Marshall v. Widdicomb 
 Furniture Gq., 67 Mich. 167; s c. 34 
 N. W.Rep. 541; Ford v. Lake Shore, 
 &c., R. Co., 2 N. Y. Supl. 1; Robin- 
 son V. Qeorge F. Blake Manuf'g Co., 
 . 143 Mass. 528; s. o. 10 N. E. Rep. 814; 
 Cunard Steam-Ship Co. ■». Carey, 119 
 U. S. 246; Lilly ®. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 107 N. Y. 566; 8. c. 14 N. E. 
 Rep. 603; Barbo «. Bassett, 35 Minn. 
 
 485. Where the suf^ciency of the 
 machinery, plaintiff's knowledge of 
 the danger, or the performance of de- 
 fendant's duty to notify plaintiff of it, 
 are controverted questions, the case 
 is for the jury. McDade u. Washing- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 5 Mackey (D. C.) 
 144. 
 
 ^ Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188; 
 8. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 537; Atchison, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Ledbetter, 34 Kan. 326. 
 An allegation that the machine caus- 
 ing the injury was unsafe and defec- 
 tive is not sustained by proof that the 
 machine repeatedly required to be put 
 in order while being used. Coffey v. 
 Chapel, 2 N. Y. Supl. 648. 
 
 ^ Sherman «. Menomonee River 
 Lumber Co., 73 Wis. 122; s. c. 39 
 N. W. Rep. 365; Stringham v. Stewart, 
 108 N. Y. 616; Pullutra «. Delaware, 
 &c., R. Co., 7 N. Y. Supl. 510. See, 
 also, § 104, supra. 
 
 * Moline Plow Co. ». Anderson, 19 
 n. App. 417. A servant may rely 
 upon his master furnishing safe ma- 
 chinery, and, in the absence of notice, 
 is under no primary obligation to in- 
 vestigate and test it. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co. s. Hines, 132 Rl. 161; 8. C. 23 
 N. E. Rep. 1021; Heath «. White- 
 breast Coal & Mining Co., 65 Iowa, 
 737. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Warner, 
 123 m. 88; 8. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 206. 
 
§ 349.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 449 
 
 § 349. The master's duty as to machinery a continuing 
 duty. — Not only must the master furnish safe and suit- 
 able means and facilities to his servants for performing the 
 work he requires of them, but the law imposes upon him 
 the additional duty of taking care that this machinery, and 
 these tools and instrumentalities of labor are kept in a safe 
 and proper condition. Having provided safe and suitable 
 machinery, the master's duty is not done. He cannot remain 
 passive. He must continue to take ordinary care, and see to 
 it that the machinery is properly inspected, and kept in re- 
 pair, and in no way allowed to grow dangerous or unfit by 
 use.^ The duty of maintaining machinery in repair, for the 
 protection and safety of employees, is the same in kind as 
 the duty of furnishing a safe and proper machine in the first 
 instance, and an employer is equally chargeable, whether the 
 negligence was in originally failing to provide, or in after- 
 wards failing to keep the machinery in safe condition.* This 
 
 'Gulf, &c., By. Co. O.Pettis, 69 
 Tex. 689; 8. c. 7 S.W. Rep. 93; Gulf. 
 &c., B. Co. «. Silliphant, 70 Tex. 633; 
 B. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 673; Buckley «. 
 Port Heniy Iron Ore Co., 2 N. T. 
 Supl. 133; The Neptune, 30 Fed. Rep. 
 935; Rice d. King Philip Mills. 144 
 Mass. 339; Eichler v. St. Paul Furni- 
 ture Co., 40 Minn. 363; 8. c. 41 N. W. 
 Rep. 975; Enapp «. Sioux City, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 41; s. c. 32 N. W. 
 Rep. 18; Warden o. Old Colony B. 
 Co., 137 Mass. 204. A declaration 
 founded on the negligence of the 
 master in failing to keep the machin- 
 eiy used by his servants in repair 
 must allege that the master .knew its 
 condition, or, by the exercise of due 
 care, might have known it. Ciirrent 
 ®. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Mo. 62. 
 While the servant is not required to 
 search for defects, unless bound to do 
 so by contract; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 
 o. Crenshaw, 71 Tex. 340; B.C. 9 
 8. W. Rep. 263; yet, if a defect be- 
 comes apparent, it is his duty to ob- 
 serve and report the fact to liis em- 
 ployer. Kinney v. Corbin, 133 Penn. 
 29 
 
 St. 341, 344. Fuller ®. Jewett, 80 N.Y. 
 46; 8. 0. 36 Am. Rep. 575 ; Laning 
 «. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 49 N. T. 531; 
 8. c. 10 Am. Rep. 417; Warner s. 
 Erie Ry. Co., 39 N. T. 468; Brick «. 
 Rochester, &c., R. Co., 98 N. T. 211; 
 Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 
 240; 8. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 598; Shanny 
 •0. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420; 
 Brann v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 53 
 Iowa, 595; Solomon B. Co. e. Jones, 
 30 Kan. 601; Atchison, &o., B. Co. t. 
 Holt, 29 Kan. 149; Condon «. Mo. 
 Pac. B. Co., 78 Mo. 567; Kain ®. 
 Smith, 25 Hun, 149; Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co. ■». Moore, 77 111. 217; Hough ®. 
 BaUway Co., 100 U. S. 213; Holden 
 v. Fitchburg R. Co., 129 Mass. 268; 
 Oilman «. Eastern R. Co., 13 Allen, 
 440; Pierce on Railroads, § 370. 
 
 '' " In fact, we cannot see how, on 
 principle, there can be any difterence 
 whatever between the duty of fur- 
 nishing safe machinery in the first in- 
 stance and the duty of maintaining it 
 in a safe condition thereafter, con- 
 ditioned always that the employer's 
 duty in both instances goes only to 
 
450 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 351. 
 
 rule has been somewhat modified in recent decisions affecting 
 the liability of railway companies for injuries to their em- 
 ployees from the defective condition of cars received by them 
 from other roads in the usual course of business, for trans- 
 portation. If these cars come into their possession in ap- 
 parent good order, it has been held that the receiving com- 
 pany is under no obligation as to its employees to inspect, 
 them, and is not liable for injuries to them occasioned by 
 defects in such cars.* 
 
 § 350. This rule criticised.— This is a harsh rule, and the 
 reasoning upon which these cases are based is not satisfac- 
 tory. In O'Neil v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ey. 
 Co.^ it was denied by Treat, D. J., in the Circuit Court of the 
 United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. In this 
 case it was held that where an accident occurs to an employee, 
 from such a cause, he may recover from the company, the 
 court sturdily insisting upon the importance of holding em- 
 ployers to a strict account in the matter of injuries to their 
 employees. It has also been held in Illinois that the respon- 
 sibilities of a railroad company to its servants are the same in 
 respect of cars of other companies which they are compelled 
 to handle as in respect of its own cars.' 
 
 § 351. Master must provide safe and good, but not the 
 safest and best, appliances. — We have seen that the law re- 
 quires the master to furnish safe and reasonably good ma- 
 chinery to his servant, and to keep that machinery in reason- 
 ably good order ; or, in other words, that the law imposes 
 
 the extent of using proper care and Boston, &c., R. Co., 125 Mass. 79; 
 
 foresight, and not to the extent of an s. c. 28 Am. Rep. 206; Foley v. Chi- 
 
 absolute insurer." Clowers®. Wabash, cago, &c., R. Co., 48 Mich. 622; 8. c. 
 
 &c., R. Co., 21 Mo. App. 213, 217. 42 Am. Rep. 481. 
 
 ' Ballou V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 54 ' 9 Fed. Rep. 337. 
 Wis. 259; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 31; "Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Aveiy, 
 
 Smith v. Flint, &c., R. Co., 46 Midi. 109 111. 314. See, also, Bushby «. 
 
 258; Michigan, &c., R. Co. v. Smith- New York, &c., R. Co., 37 Hun. 
 
 son, 45 Mich. 212; Mackin v. Boston, 104; Haugh v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 
 &c., R. Co., 135 Mass. 201; Baldwin 73 Iowa, 66; s. 0. 35 N. W. Rep. 
 
 «. Chicago. &c., R. Co., 50 Iowa, 680. 116; Cincinnati. &c., R. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Bee, also, Davis ®. Detroit, &«!., R. Mullen, il7Ind. 439; b. o. 20 N. E. 
 
 Co., 20 Mich. 105; Hulett v. St. Louis, Rep. 287. 
 &c., R. Co., 67 Mo. 240; Lovejby e. 
 
§ 351.] THE master's obligations and LIABILITIEa, 451 
 
 Tipon an employer the duty of ordinary care, bo*h as to" 
 furnishing the instrumentalities of labor, and also as toi keep- 
 ing them in repair. And here it is necessary to be carefult 
 not to go further. The law imposes no further or higher 
 obligation upon an employer than this. As a general rule he' 
 is not under obligation to make use of the safest appliances, 
 and instruments, nor to change his machinery with every 
 new invention, nor to introduce every supposed improvement; 
 in appliances.* In Kelley v. Silver Spring Co.' it was heldi 
 that where an employer has kept imperfect and unfenced 
 machinery in use for a long time, and it has been safely used 
 by his employees, he is not liable in damages for an injury 
 to one of them occasioned by its unfitness.* While, per con- 
 
 ' Railroad v. Wagner, 33 Kan. 660; 
 B. c. 7 Pac. Bep. 201; Hannibal, &c., 
 B. Co. ■». Kanaley, 39 Kan. 1; s. c. 17 
 Pac. Rep. 334; Bems v. Coal Co., 37 
 West Va. 385; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 804; 
 Robertson o. Comelson, 34 Fed. Rep. 
 716; Hickey v. Taafte, 105 N. Y. 36; 
 s. c. 12 N. E. Rep. 286. A master 
 may cany on his business with an old 
 machine not provided with all the 
 safeguards attached to newer ma- 
 chines; he may discharge a servant 
 employed to run it, who refuses to 
 perform his stipulated service, and a 
 threat to do so is not coercion, which 
 will make the master liable for injuries 
 to the servant resulting from the use 
 of the machine. Sweeney v. Berlin, 
 &c., Envelope Co., 101 N. T. 530; 
 B. c. 54 Am. Rep. 722; Bums v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., Ry. Co., 69 Iowa, 450; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Smith, 18 111. 
 App. 119. An employer is not liable 
 to his employee for injuries received 
 because he had failed to furnish im- 
 plements for shifting belting, when it 
 does not appear that such implements 
 would have prevented the accident if 
 they had been furnished. Gordon v. 
 Reynolds Card Manuf g Co., 47 Hun, 
 378. Lehigh, &c.. Coal Co. c. Hayes, 
 128 Penn. St. 394; a. c. 34 W. N. 
 C. 559; 18 Atl. Rep. 387; Wright 
 
 V. Delaware, &c.. Canal Co., 40 Hun, 
 343; Tabler v. Hannibalj &c., R. 
 Co. (Mo.), 5 S. W. Rep. 81(^ Won- 
 der v. Baltimore, &c., B. Co., 32; 
 Md. 411; s. c. 3 Am. Bep. 143;; 
 Jones v. Granite MUIb, 126 Mass. 84;; 
 Keith ®. Granite Mills, 136 Mass. 90^ 
 Ft. Wayne, &c., B. Co. ». Gilder- 
 sleeve, 33 Mich. 133; Mad Biver R. 
 Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541. The 
 master is simply required to furnish, 
 such appliances as a prudent man 
 would furnish if his own life were ex- 
 posed to the danger that would result 
 from unsuitable or unsafe appliances.. 
 Burke v. ;Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562.. 
 Western, &c., k Co. ■». Bishop, 50 Ga. 
 465; Leonard v. CoUins, 70 N. Y. 90^, 
 Botsford «. Michigan, &c., B. Co., 33. 
 Mich. 256; Ladd«. New Bedford, &c., 
 R Co., 119 Mass. 412; b. c. 30 Am.. 
 Bep. 331; Greenleaf «. Illinois, &c.. B 
 Co., 39 Iowa, 14; Devitt v. Pacific, 
 &c., B. Co., 50 Mo. 303; East Ten- 
 nessee, &c., B. Co. «. Duffleld, 12 Lea, 
 63; B. c. 47 Am. Bep. 319; Dynen «. 
 Leach, 36 L. J. (Exch.) 331. 
 
 ' 13 B. I. 112; B. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 615. 
 
 " See, also, Sullivan v. India Manu- 
 factming Co., 113 Mass. 396; Burke 
 ®. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562; Hayden 
 V. Masuf. Co., 29 Conn. 648; Hobbs. 
 
452 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 352. 
 
 ira, some courts go to the other verge of the rule and hold 
 that railway companies, in equipping their roads with freight 
 cars, as between those that are more and those that are less 
 dangerous in their construction, are bound to use the safer 
 kin(j, and are responsible to their employees if they do not.* 
 -Either extreme is within the rule. The obligation of the 
 master is to act in good faith, with ordinary care, and whether 
 iihe rule shaU be more or less stringently applied will depend 
 upon the circumstances of each case. In some vocations, 
 :good faith and ordinary care alike may justify the continued 
 use of very primitive and inefficient apparatus; in others, 
 nothing short of the most perfect appliances may be justifia- 
 ble. The courts will hardly ever be in danger of misapply- 
 ing so simple and so reasonable a rule.* 
 
 § 352. Master not a guarantor of the safety or sufficiency 
 'Of his appliances. — Neither is the master to be held to insure 
 the safety, or sufficiency, of his machinery. His duty is fully 
 discharged when he has furnished proper appliances and in- 
 strumentalities, and while he keeps them in ordinary repair. 
 The test of his liability, therefore, is no^ the question: " Was 
 the machinery absolutely safe ? " nor, " Could the master 
 have done anything which he did not do to render it safe ? " 
 but, " Did the master exercise ordinary care ? " " Did he do 
 anything affecting the safety of the machinery, which, in the 
 exercise of ordinary care, he should not have done ; or did 
 he omit anything that ordinary prudence dictates ? " ' It is 
 
 V. Stauer, 63 Wis. 108; s. c. 19 Am. tice Harlan in Hough v. Texas and 
 Law Rev. 690; 8chroeder«. Michigan Pacific R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 1 Red- 
 Car Co., 56 Mich. 133; s. 0. 32 Alb. fieldon Railways, 521, note; "Wharton 
 Law Jour. 184. on Negligence, §§ 211, 212, 213; Ma- 
 
 ' Greenleaf v. Illinois, &c., R. Co., ginnis v. Canada Southern Bridge Co., 
 29 Iowa, 14; St. Louis, &c., R. Co. ■». 49 Mich. 171; Batterson v. Chicago, 
 Valirius, 56 Ind. 511. See, also, Abel &c., R. Co., 49 Mich. 184. 
 «. Delaware, &c., danal Co., 108 N. = The Flowergate, 31 Fed. Rep. 762; 
 T. 581; B. c. 57 Am. Rep. 778; Cop- The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. Rep. 
 pins V. New York, &c., R. Co., 48 477; Atchison, &c., R. Co. ». McKee, 
 Hun, 26; Toledo, &c., R. Co. 37 Kan. 592 ; s. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 484; 
 ■0. Wand, 48 Ind. 476; Hegeman v. Leonard v. Collins, 70 N. T. 90; In- 
 Western, &c., R. Co., 13 N. T. 9; dianapolis, &c., R. Co. «. Toy, 91111. 
 Smith 9. New York, &c., R. Co., 19 474; Ladd v. New Bedford, «Sic., R. 
 N. Y. 127. Co. , 119 Mass. 412 ; Indianapolis, &c., 
 
 > See the learned opinion of Jus- R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 554. A ship- 
 
§ 353.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 453 
 
 obvious that, were the master the warrantor of the ma- 
 chinery in his factory, or the tools and appliances which h© 
 furnished to his servants — if he were held, as to his servants, 
 to guarantee that no harm should come from defects or faults 
 in the instrumentalities employed in performing their labor, 
 there would be no end to his liability. It would be a most 
 misphievous doctrine. The possibility of injury from ma- 
 chinery, under the rule of law requiring ordinary care in 
 respect to it from the master, is one of the proper risks that 
 the servant takes into account when he enters the service. 
 The tendency of one or two of the State courts to extend the 
 rule as to the responsibility of the master in this regard 
 until it shall amount, for practical purposes, to a warranty 
 of all his tools and machinery and premises, is, in the 
 writer's opinion, without any sound basis in the reason of 
 the case, and it may easily be believed that such a rule, as 
 a rule, would be as nearly wholly bad as any rule of law 
 is ever likely to be.* 
 
 § 353. Incompetent and nnfit employees.— The respon- 
 sibility of a master to each of his servants for the com- 
 petency and fitness of the other servants he employs to work 
 with them is, in every way, analogous to the duty he owes 
 them in regard to the machinery and all the other instru- 
 mentalities he furnishes for the performance of the work. 
 As it is his duty to furnish only safe facilities for the work, 
 in the shape of tools, machinery, premises, etc., and to 
 
 owner does not insure against latent v. Holland, El., Bl. & El. 102; Shear- 
 and indiscoverable defects in the yes- man & Redfield on Negligence, 4th ed. , 
 sel. The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. Kep. § 184. See, also, Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 477; nor does a railroad company ®. Swett, 45 111. 197; Hayden «>. Smith- 
 guarantee the good condition of its ville Manfg. Co., 29 Conn. 548. 
 tracks and roadway. St. Louis, &c., ' See e.g^.East., &c., R. Co. v. High- 
 By. Co. V. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412; b. c. tower, 92111. 139; Indianapolis, &c., 
 11 Pac. Rep. 412; Little Rock, &c., R. Co. v. Toy, 91 111. 474; Warner v. 
 By. Co. D. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382; Erie Ry. Co , 49 Barb. 558; b. c. 39 
 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470; s. c. N. T. 468; StefEen v. Chicago, &c., 
 42 Am. Rep. 311; East Tenn., &c., R. Co., 46 Wis. 259; Morrison b. Con- 
 R. Co. V. Duflleld, 12 Lea, 63; 8. c. 47 struction Co., 44 Wis. 405; Smith v. 
 Am. Rep. 319; Hard v- Vermont, Chicago, &c., R. Co., 42 Wis. 520; 
 Ac, R. Co.,32 Vt. 478; Wood on Mas- DeGrafE v. New York, &c., R. Co., 7S 
 ter and Servant, 696; Skerritt v. N. Y. 125. 
 Scallan, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 389; Ormond 
 
454 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 353. 
 
 use ordinary care, as we have shown, to keep them in a safe 
 and sound condition, so the law imposes upon him the duty, 
 as toward his servants, of seeing to it that only competent 
 and suitable persons are employed to perform his work in 
 association with them. And here, also, the measure of his 
 obligation is ordinary care.* He must take ordinary and 
 reasonable precautions not to employ feckless, dissipated or 
 incompetent servants for positions where their fault may 
 injure their fellow-servants, and if he fail to do this, he is 
 liable in case of such an injury.* So the master is liable if 
 
 ' A complaint whicli shows that 
 the plaintiff and the person by 
 whose negligence he was injured were 
 fellow-servants, and does not aver 
 that the defendant was negligent in 
 ■employiag s\ich servant, or retained 
 him aft6r he knew, or ought to have 
 known, that he was negligent, nor 
 that the plaintiff did not know it, and 
 did not have means of knowledge 
 «qual to the defendant, is bad on de- 
 murrer. Indiana, &c., Ey. Co. «. 
 Dailey, 110 Ind. 75; s. c. ION. E. 
 Eep. 631. 
 
 " Lakin v. Oregon Pac. R. Co., 15 
 Or. 230; b. c. 15 Pac. Bep. 641; 
 Chesapeake, &c., R. Co. «. McMan- 
 non (Ky.); 8 S.W. Rep. 18; Maxwell v. 
 Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 85 Mo. 95; 
 lyons 11. New York, &c., R. Co., 
 39 Hun, 385. The mere fact 
 that a railroad engineer is near- 
 sighted does not prove him to be an 
 improper person for the duty. 
 Texas, &c., Ry. Co. ■». Harrington, 62 
 Tex. 597. The plaintiff, a carpenter, 
 employed on a building by defendant, 
 was sent by one S., who had been 
 placed in full control of the building 
 by defendant, upon some stairs from 
 which S. had removed the cleat 
 w^hich kept them from slipping. 
 There was evidence that defendant 
 knew S. was careless, and that he 
 Jiad been careless in other work about 
 the building. Held, that an instruc- 
 tion that if the accident was caused 
 
 by the negligence of S. and defendant 
 knew 8. was a careless workman in 
 the place where he put him, and S. 
 was in fact careless, then defendant 
 was liable if plaintiff was in the exercise 
 of due care and in ignorance that 8. 
 was careless, and had removed the 
 cleat, was not erroneous. 81ater v. 
 Chapman, 67 Mich. 523; B. c. 35 
 N. W. Rep. 106. The burden of 
 proof of incompetency is upon the 
 plaintiff. Stafford v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 114 HI. 244. A servant has 
 the right to presume that his master 
 has performed the duty of Exercising 
 reasonable care in ascertaining the 
 qualifications of other servants, and 
 is not bound, at his peril, himself 
 to investigate their qualifications. 
 United States Rolling Stock Co. v. 
 Wilder, 116 HI. 100; Kean v. Detroit 
 Rolling Mills, 66 Mich. 277; a. c. 33 
 N. W. Rep. 395; Probst v. Delamate*, 
 100 N. Y. 266. The incompetency, 
 or intemperance, must be a contribut- 
 ing cause of the injury in order to 
 make the master liable. Harrington 
 D. New York, &c., R. Co., 4N. Y. 
 8upl. 640.; Johnston v. Pittsburgh, 
 (fee, R. Co., 114Penn. 8t. 448; 8. c. 
 7 Atl. Rep. 184; Galveston, &c., Byv 
 Co. e. Paber, 77 Tex. 158; s.c. 8 S.W. 
 Rep. 64. Whether the master was 
 negligent in employing an incom- 
 petent servant is a question for the 
 jury. Newell v. Ryan, 40 Hun, 286; 
 Cowles «. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 84 
 
§ 354.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 455 
 
 lis servant is injured, not throngh the unfitness or incom- 
 'petenoe of a fellow-servant, but because an insufiScient num- 
 ber of servants are provided to do the required work 
 properly, and with due regard to the safety of those per- 
 forming it. It is equally wrong to hire too few as to hire 
 tinfit servants. The master must provide servants enough 
 in every instance to do his work.^ A servant is not neces- 
 sarily negligent who, in obedience to orders and with knowl- 
 edge of the danger, attempts to do that which requires more 
 assistants than the master has provided, where he believes, 
 -with reason, that by being careful they may succeed, even 
 though he is mistaken in his judgment.' 
 
 § 354. The duty as to servants also a continning duty. — 
 
 As in the matter of machinery, and the Uke, so^ in regard to 
 servants, the master must not only use ordinary care in hiring 
 only such as are fit and competent and reasonably skillful, but 
 it is his duty not to retain a servant in his employ when he 
 discovers him to be unfit for the place he occupies. It is as 
 wrong to retain an unfit servant as to employ one at the start, 
 and this is the rule when a servant, who was originally com- 
 
 N. C. 309; a.C. 37 Am. Rep. 620; 38; s. C. 39 Am. Rep. 97, a case hold- 
 Laning v. New Tork, &c., R. Co., 49 ing that the contributory negligence 
 -N.T. 521; Illinois,&c.,R.Co.B. Welch, of an engmeer of a train to an acci- 
 52 Dl. 183; Houston. &c., R. Co. ». dent causing injury to a fellow- 
 Oram, 49 Tex. 341; Tyson ». North servant, would not excuse the corn- 
 Alabama, &c., R. Co., 61 Ala. 564; s.g. pany for not employing a sufficient 
 32Am. Rep. 8. It is not necessary that uumber of brakemen to take charge 
 the master should know that the of the train. Flike v. Boston, &c, R. 
 .servants are unsafe and incapable. Co., 53 N. Y. 549; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 
 It is sufficient that he would have 545; Chicago, &c., R Co. v. Taylor, 
 known it if he had exercised reason- 69 lU. 461; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 626; 
 able care and diligence. Noyes «. Luebke v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 59 
 Smith, 28 Vt. 63; Cayzer e. Taylor, Wis. 127; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 
 10 Gray, 274; McMahon v. Davidson, Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. «. Lavalley , 
 13 Minn. 357; Hogan ». Central Pac., 36 Ohio St. 321; Smith d. Chicago, 
 &c., R.Co., 49Cal. 128; Davis ®. De- &c., R. Co., 42 Wis. 526; Vose «i. 
 troit, &c.. R. Co., 20 Mch. 105; Moss London & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 2 Hurl, 
 e. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 49 Mo. 167; Se N. 738. See, also, Harvey f>. New 
 Fiazier v. Penn., &e., R. Co., 38 York, &c., R. Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 Penn. St. 104 645. 
 
 » Johnson «. Ashland Water Co., 71 " Thorpe ®. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 
 Wis. 553; s. o. 37 N. W. Rep. 823; 89 Mo. 650. 
 Booth V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 73N.Y. 
 
456 
 
 THE MASTER S OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. 
 
 [§ 355. 
 
 petent and skillful when employed, has become, subsequent- 
 ly, either from habits of intemperance, or from any other 
 cause, incompetent, or habitually careless and reckless.' 
 
 § 355. The master not held to warrant the faithfnlnesg 
 or competency of his servants. — Again, as has appeared in 
 regard to machinery, the master does not warrant the com- 
 petency and faithfulness of any of his servants to the rest. 
 His liability is not of so strict a nature as this. His duty in 
 the matter of employing and retaining and watching over his 
 servants is measured by the rule of ordinary carefulness and 
 prudence, and when he has selected them with discretion, 
 and omitted nothing that prudence dictates in overseeing 
 them, he has done what the law requires of him.* 
 
 ' Hats v. Chicago, &c , Ry. Co., 55 
 Mich. 437; Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co. 
 V. Stupak, 133 Ind. 310; s. c. 23 
 N. E. Rep. 246; Bossout v. Rome, 
 Ac, R. Co;, 10 N. Y. Supl. 603; Neil- 
 son D. Kansas City, &c., R. Co., 85 
 Mo. 599. One injured by the negli- 
 gence of a fellow-servant must allege 
 and prove his ignorance of the latter's 
 negligent habits; and an allegation 
 that he was "wholly unacquainted" 
 with the fellow-servant is not suffi- 
 cient. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co. v. 
 Stupak, 108 Ind. 1. He must allege 
 want of care in engaging the servant, 
 or that he was retained after notice of 
 his forth-comings. Indiana, &c., Ry. 
 Co. D. Dail^, 110 Ind. 75; Laning v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co.. 49 N. Y. 621; 
 8. c. 10 Am. Rep. 417; Columbus, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Troesch, 68 111. 545; 
 B. c. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Chapman «. 
 ErieRy. Co.,55N. Y. 579; Corson 
 «. Maine, &c., R. Co., 76 Me. 244; 
 Baulec «. New York, &c., R. Co., 59 
 N. Y. 356; s. 0. 5 Lans. 436; 63 Barb. 
 623; 17 Am. Rep. 325; Michigan, &c., 
 R. Co. «. Dolan. 32 Mich. 510; Shan- 
 ny 0. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 418; 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 HI. 
 99. A single act of negligence does 
 not necessarily charge the master with 
 
 notice of his servant's incompetency 
 so as to preclude him from defending 
 an action brought by another servant 
 injured by the negligence of the first 
 servant. Baltimore Elevator Co. v. 
 Neal, 65 Md, 438. Nor is negligence 
 by the master to be inferred from the 
 mere fact that the servant was slow 
 and lazy, and that the master knew it^ 
 Corson v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 76 Me. 
 244. See, also, Curran v. Merchants' 
 Manufacturing Co., 130 Mass. 374; 
 B. c. 39 Am. Rep. 457; Ohio, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Collam, 73 Ind. 261; 8. o. 38 
 Am. Rep. 134; Gillenwater v. Madi- 
 son, &c., R. Co., 5 Ind. 339; b. c. 61 
 Am. Dec. 101. 
 
 ' Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797; 
 Ormond v. Holland, £1., Bl. & El. 
 103; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Love, 
 10 Ind. 554; Faulkner e. ErieRy. Co., 
 49 Barb. 324; Columbus, &c., B. Co. 
 V. Troesch, 68 111. 545; 8. c. 18 Am. 
 Rep. 678; Beaulieu «. Portland Co., 48 
 Me. 291 ; Moss v. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 
 49 Mo. 167; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 126. In 
 Blake v. Maine Central Ry. CO., 70 
 Me. 60, 64; B. C. 35 Am. Rep. 297, it 
 was held that when suitable and compe- 
 tent persons have been employed, the 
 same degree of diligence is no longer 
 required. Proper qualificationB once 
 
§ 356.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 457 
 
 § 356. The master may act throngh an agent and become 
 rORponsible for his acts. — Obviously, an employer may per- 
 form all his dnties in respect of the instrumentalities and 
 surroundings of labor and his employees through agents, 
 and will, in such a case, be responsible for their acts. In 
 this respect a corporation stands on the same footing as an 
 individual, and both are equally bound to use, with respect 
 of employees and machinery, such care and prudence as the 
 nature and dangers of their business require. If either en- 
 trust their duties to an agent they Are equally responsible if 
 injury results from the improper acts of their representa- 
 tive.^ " Indeed," said Justice Field, " no duty required of 
 
 possessed may be presumed to con- 
 tinue, and the master may rely on that 
 presumption until notice of a change. 
 Lawler c. Androscoggin R. Ck)., 62 
 Me. 467; 8. c. 16 Am. Bep. 493. See. 
 also, Cotton e. Edwards, 123 Mass. 
 484; Commingsc. Grand Trunk Ry. 
 Co., 4 Cliff, 478. 
 
 ' Brown e. Gilchrist, 80 Mich. 56; 
 s. o. 45 N. W. Rep. 83; Missouri Paa 
 Ry. Co. c. Peregoy, 36 Kan. 427; s c. 
 14 Pac. Rep. 7; Louisvflle, &e., Ry. 
 Co. e. Graham, 124 Ind. 89; s. c. 24 
 N. E. Rep. 668. Plaintiff was in- 
 jured in a collision between a special 
 freight train and a working train. 
 The &^ght train had orders to look 
 out for the working train, but the lat- 
 ter, although it was all the previous 
 night at a telegraph station, had no 
 such orders in regard to the former. 
 Held, that the neglect of the defend- 
 ant's superintendent to give such or- 
 ders was the negligence of the de- 
 fendant, imposing a liability on the 
 latter if the injury resulted therefrom. 
 Gralveston, &c., Ry. Co. «. Smith, 76 
 Tex. 611; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 562. 
 Lewis ti. Seifert, 116 Fenn. St. 628; 
 8. O. 11 Atl. Rep. 514; Johnson v. 
 Spear, 76 Mich. 131 ; Yan Dusen v. 
 Letellier, 78 Mich. 492; Morton c. 
 Detroit, &c., R. Co., 81 Mich. 423; 
 Everson e. RoUinson (Penn.), 8 Atl. 
 Rep. 194; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. «. 
 
 McBlyea, 71 Tex. 386; 8. c. 9 S. W. 
 Rep. 313; Moynihan e Hills Co., 146 
 Mass. 586; s. c. 16 N. E. Rep. 574; 
 Pennsylvania, &c., R. Co. v. Mason, 
 109 Penn. St. 296; 8. c. 58 Am. Rep. 
 722; Hoke ®. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 88 Mo. 36(^ Douglas v. Texas, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 63 Tex. 564; Kelley «. Cable 
 Co., 7 Mont. 70; s. c. 14 Pac. Rep. 
 633; Rogers v. Ludlow Manufg. Co , 
 144 Mass. 198; 8. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 77, 
 in which the Massachusetts decisions 
 are collected. Cf. Sanborn v. Madera 
 riume Co., 70 CaL 261; St. Louis, &c., 
 Ry. Co. f>. Weaver, 35 Kan 412; s. c. 
 11 Pac. Rep. 408: Benzing ». Stein- 
 way, 101 N. Y. 547; Indiana Car Co. 
 V. Parker, 100 Ind. 181; Mayhew e. 
 Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100. A 
 master cannot racape responsibility to 
 his servant for an accident resulting 
 from defective machinery by delegat- 
 ing to another servant the duty of 
 seeing that the machinery is safe. 
 Mulvey ». Rhode Island Locomotive 
 Works, 14 R. I. 204; Hall v. Galves- 
 ton. &c.. By. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 18; 
 Torians «. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 84 
 Va. 192; s. c. 4 8. E. Rep. 339; Atchi- 
 son, Ac, R Co. u. McKee, 37 Kan. 
 592; 8. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 484; Kelly v. 
 Howell, 41 Ohio St. 438; Cregan v. 
 Marston, 10 N. Y. Supl. 681; Trihay 
 t). Brooklyn Lead Min. Co., 4 Utah, 
 468; 8. C. 11 Pac. Rep. 612; Texas & 
 
458 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 357. 
 
 Mm [the master] for the safety and protection of his serv- 
 ants can be transferred so as to exonerate him from such lia- 
 "bility. The servant does not undertake to incur the risks 
 arising from the want of sufficient and skillful co-laborers, or 
 from defective machinery, or other instruments with which 
 ie is to work. His contract implies that in regard to these 
 matters his employer will make adequate p rovision that no 
 •danger shall ensue to him."^ 
 
 § 367. The rule as to minor servants.— The rule of law 
 which exempts an employer from liability to one of his em- 
 ployees for an injury occasioned by the fault of a co-em- 
 
 Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kirk, 63 Tex. 327; 
 Kyan «. MUler, 13 Daly 77; 
 Kruger v. Louisville, &c., Ry. Co.> 
 111 Ind. 51; s. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 957; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitcomb, 111 
 iid. 212; 8. C. 12 N. B. Rep. 380; 
 Sangamon Coal Min. Co. v. Wigger- 
 haus, 132 lU. 279; b. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 
 648; ' Moore v. Wabash, «fcc., Ry. Co., 
 85 Mo. 588. In Iowa it is held that 
 in order to render the master liable 
 for the negligence of an inspector of 
 machinery the latter must be con- 
 fined by his duty to a mere inspec- 
 tion, and that if it be also his duty to 
 repair it when broken or defective 
 , this duty is not separated from the 
 operation of the machinery, and he is 
 deemed a co-servant of one who is 
 actually operating the machine. 
 Theleman v. Moeller, 73 Iowa, 108; 
 s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 765. See, also, 
 on this point, McGee v. Boston Cord- 
 age Co., 139 Mass. 445; Benn v. Null, 
 65 Iowa, 407; Rogers, &c.. Works ». 
 Hand, 50 N. J. Law, 464; s. c. 14 
 Atl. Rep. 766; Luebke v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 63 Wis. 91; s. c. 53 
 Am. Rep. 266; Filbert v. Delaware, 
 &c.. Canal Co., 121 N. Y. 207; b. c. 
 23 N, E. Rep. 1104; McCoy «. Empire 
 Warehouse Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 99. 
 In Pennsylvania the owners of a mine 
 are not liable for the negligence of a 
 mining boss employed pursuant to a 
 statutory requirement to look after 
 
 the ventilation, &c., the court holding 
 that it has no authority to impose any 
 obligation in addition to that of rea- 
 sonable care in selecting the boss. 
 Redstone Coke Co. v. Roby(Penn.), 8 
 Atl. Rep. 593; WaddeU ». Simonson, 
 112 Penn. St. 567; Reese ». Biddle, 
 112 Penn. St. 72. Michigan, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510; Corcoran 
 V. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517; Crispin «. 
 Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516; s. c. 37 Am. 
 Rep. 521; Mitchell ®. Robinson, 80 
 Ind. 381; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 813; Flike 
 V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549; 
 8. 0. 13 Am. Rep. 545. An agent 
 may appoint one who shall stand in 
 such relation to the other servants 
 that the master may be held responsi- 
 ble for his negligence; as where the 
 agent of an owner of a mine ap 
 pointed a mining captain. Ryan v. 
 Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179; 8. c. 45 Am, 
 Rep. 35; Tyson ». North Ala., &c. 
 R. Co., 61 Ala. 554; Harper®. Indian 
 apolis, &c., R. Co., 47 Mo. 567 
 Brickner v. New York, &c., R. Co., 3 
 Lans. 506; affirmed, 49 N. Y. 672; 
 Wilson V. Willimantic, &c., Co., 50 
 Conn. 433; 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 658 
 Cowles V. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 84 
 N. C. 309; Gunter v. Graniteville 
 Manfg. Co., 18 S. C. 362; s. c. 44 
 Am. Rep. 573. Qf. § 325, supra. 
 
 ' Northern Pac. R. Co. ». Herbert, 
 116 U. S. 642, 647. 
 
§ 357.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 459 
 
 plojee, pTooeeding upon the theory of the implied con- 
 tract that the servant takes the risks of his employment,, has 
 been applied in many jurisdictions to minor servants. As- 
 suming that an adult employee does tacitly contract with his 
 employer that if he is injured through the carelessness of a 
 fellow-employee he will bear the consequences, the rule, in 
 all its strictness, has been held to apply to children ten, twelve 
 and fourteen years old, injured without any contributory 
 carelessness through the carelessness of some other so-called 
 fellow-employee, with whom, in some instances, they had no 
 association or connection. If this rule has any substantial 
 basis it is the basis of an implied contract. Upon no other 
 ground yet suggested is it for an instant tenable. Inasmuch 
 as minors are not bound by their express contracts with 
 their employers,* having, in contemplation of law, no power 
 to make a contract, it is not plain upon what theory this rule 
 can in justice be held to apply to them. If the policy of the 
 law refuses to bind a minor by his own deliberate express 
 contract to his employer, much more, it is submitted, should 
 the policy of the law refuse to fix upon an employee of ten- 
 der years so onerous and artificial an implied contract as 
 this. The law in this regard is in a very unsatisfactory con- 
 tion. It is held that the fact of infancy does not alter or 
 modify the rule, and in this position, as in very many of the 
 others tending to extend the rule, the Massachusetts Su- 
 preme Judicial Court takes the lead.' Even in those cases 
 
 > 3 Kent's Commentaries, 193; 17; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 264. Where a 
 
 Gartland v. Toledo, &c., R. Co., child is injured by dangerous ma- 
 
 67 m. 498; Nashville, &c., R. chinery, upon which he is negligently 
 
 Co. V. Elliott, 1 Caldw. 611; Fones set to work by a fellow-servant, the 
 
 V. Phillips, 89 Ark. 17; b. c. 48 Am. case is held to come within the rule 
 
 Rep. 264; "Wood v. Fenwick, 10 which excuses the master from liabil- 
 
 Mee. & W. 195; Keane d. Boycott, 2 ity. Fisk v. Central Pac. R. Co., 72 
 
 Heniy B. 511; R. «. St. Petroix, 4 Cal. 38; b. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 144; North 
 
 T. R. 196; R. v. Arundel, 5 Mau. & Chicago Rolling Mills Co. v. Benson, 
 
 Sel. 257; R. s. Chillesford, 4 Bam. & 18 III. App. 194; Brown v. Maxwell, 6 
 
 C. 94. Hill. 592; B. o. 41 Am. Dec. 771; 
 
 ' King D. Boston, &c., R.-Co., 9 Gartland v. Toledo, &c., R. Co., 67 
 
 Cush. 112; Curran v. Manfg. Co., 180 Dl. 498. "The question whether the 
 
 Mass. 874; 8. c. 39 Am. Rep. 457; minor had a sufficient understanding 
 
 Sullivan v. India Manfg. Co., 113 of the hazards of the employment to 
 
 Mass. 396; O'Connor v. Adams, 120 bring him withia the general rule was 
 
 Mass. 427; Fones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. one of fact to be decided by the jury." 
 
460 
 
 THE MASTER S OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. 
 
 [§ 358. 
 
 in which the facts were such that a judgment for the infant 
 plaintiff was sustained, and in which the master was held to 
 a somewhat higher degree of responsibility and care as to 
 his infant employees, the rule itself is not questioned. It is 
 in every such case that I have found, assumed to be the law, 
 that under a proper state of facts an infant employee can, 
 neither less nor more than an adult, recover for injuries that 
 , befall him through the carelessness of his co-employees.* 
 
 § 358. Where the master orders the servant into danger 
 or into a service which he did not contract to perform.— If 
 
 the master order the servant into danger, or into a service 
 other than that for which he was employed, his obedience 
 will not, as a matter of law, be negligence ; in case he is in- 
 jured in such an undertaking, and for such an injury it is held 
 that the master is liable. So, also, has the servant his action 
 when he is exposed to some sudden or unusual danger, by the 
 master's neglect, in performing his work.* But where a serv- 
 
 Hayden ». Smithville Manf g. Co., 29 
 Conn. 548. Kashville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Elliott, 1 Cold. 611; Ohio, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Hamersley, 28 Ind. 371. Gf. 
 Hickey v. Taafe, 99 N. Y. 204, a de- 
 cision under the New York statute 
 designed to protect minor servants. 
 In Evans v. American Iron & Tube 
 Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 519, the jury were 
 instructed that if the child by reason 
 of his youth and inexperience was in- 
 capable of appreciating the danger- 
 ous character of the machinery, he 
 was not a fellow-servant of the adult 
 servants employed in the factory. 
 Niantic Coal & Min. Co. v. Leonard, 
 25 ni. App. 95; afSrmed, 126 111. 
 216. 
 
 ' Hill o. Gast, 55 Ind. 45; Coombs 
 V. New Bedford Co., 102 Mass. 572; 
 8. 0. 3 Am. Rep. 506; Bowling «. Al- 
 len, 74 Mo. 13; 6. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 
 Wood on Master and Servant, § 349; 
 Fort e. Union Pacific R. Co., 2 Dill. 
 259; 8. c. 17 Wall. S53; Atlanta Cot- 
 ton Factory «. Speer, 69 Oa. 137; a c. 
 47 Am. Rep. 760; Orizzle v. Frost, 3 
 
 Fost. & Fin. 622; Britton «. Great 
 Western Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 130; An- 
 derson e. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274. 
 
 * Mann v. Oriental Print Works, 11 
 R. I. 163; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Bayfield, 37 Mich. 206; Berea Stone 
 Co. D. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287; b. c. 27 
 Am. Rep. 610; Fort v. Union Pac. R. 
 Co., 17 WaU. 653; 8. c. 2 Dill. 259; 
 Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274; 
 Luebke v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 69 
 Wis. 127; 8. 0. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Harney, 28 
 Ind. 28; Fairbank v. Haentzsche, 78 
 111. 237; Lalor v. Chicago, &c., R Co., 
 62 lU. 40J; Bradley v. New York. &c., 
 R. Co., 62 N. Y. 99; Patterson v. 
 Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 
 394; 8. c. 18 Am. Rep. 412; Dowling 
 V. Allen, 74 Mo. 13; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 298; Miller v. Union Pac. R. Co., 4 
 McCrary, 116; Thompson v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 4 McCraiy, 629; Stephens 
 B. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 86 Mo. 221; 
 Jackson v. Georgia R. Co., 77 Ga. 82; 
 Pittsburgh, &c., Ry. Co. e. Adams, 
 106 Ind. 161. See, also. East Line, 
 
§ 359.] THE master's oblioations and liabilities. 461 
 
 ant wanders voluntarily away from his post of duty, prompted 
 by curiosity or idleness, and is injured, he has no remedy.* 
 
 § 359. The patent and latent dangers of the employment. 
 
 — It follows almost necessarily from what has gone before, 
 in view of the consideration that a master is not to be held 
 to warrant the safety of the machinery he furnishes to his 
 servants, but that the measure of his responsibility in re- 
 gard to it is ordinary care and prudence, that a master is not 
 liable to an en^ployee for latent defects in the tools, machin- 
 ery, materials or appliances furnished for the work. If an 
 injury befalls an employee by reason of a defect which ordi- 
 nary inspection and oversight would not, or did not detect, 
 ordinary care in the premises having been exercised, then the 
 master is not liable. It is one of the assumed risks of the em- 
 ployment.' It is the theory of the decisions that the servant 
 takes the risk only of what may be denominated " seen dan- 
 
 Ac., R. Co. o. Scott, 68 Tex. 694: b. c. 
 6 8. W. Rep. 501; Cook v. St. Paul, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 34 Minn. 45. Contra, 
 Cummiags v. Collins, 61 Mo. 530, 
 holding that notwithstanding the un- 
 dertaking be out of the line of the 
 servant's employment, thfi master is 
 not liable for any injury resulting 
 from causes open to the observation 
 of the servant and which it requires 
 no special skill or training to foresee 
 are likely to occasion harm. Williams 
 v. ChurchiU, 137 Mass. 343; Kean v. 
 Detroit, &c., Rolling Mills, 66 
 Mich. 377; 8. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 395; 
 Wormell v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 79 
 Me. 397; s. c. 10 AtL Rep. 49; Leary v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 139 Mass. 580; 
 B. c. 53 Am. Rep. 733. 
 
 ' Evans i). American Iron & Tube 
 Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 519, where the 
 servant was a child imder 12 years of 
 age, but with sufficient experience to 
 appreciate the danger. "Wright v. 
 Rawson, 53 Iowa, 339; 8. c. 35 Am. 
 Rep. 375; Sinclair v. Berndt, 87 111. 
 174; Honor v. Albrighton, 93 Penn. 
 St. 475; Texas. &c., R. Co., v. Vallie, 
 
 60 Tex. 481; Batchelor v. Portescue, 
 11 L. R. Q. B. Div. 474. 
 
 ' Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Nelms, 83 
 Ga. 70; s. c. 9 S. B. Rep. 1049. The 
 boiler of a locomotive engine burst, 
 owing to a flaw in the boiler, injuring 
 an employee of the corporation own- 
 ing it. The flaw was latent, and dis- 
 coverable only by the steam and water 
 tests, which are not in ordinary use' 
 with railroad corporations. Seld, that 
 the corporation was not liable. Louls- 
 viUe & Nashville R. Co. ■». Allen, 78 
 Ala. 494. O'Donnell®. Baum, 38Mo. 
 App. 345; Reitman v. Stolte, 130 
 Ind. 314; 8. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 304; Ma- 
 lone V. Hathaway, 64 N. T. 5; s. c. 31 
 Am. Rep. 573; Georgia, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485; Ladd v. New 
 Bedford, &c., R. Co., 119 Mass. 413; 
 8. c. 30 Am. Rep. 331; Ford «. Fitch- 
 burg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240; s. c. 
 14 Am. Rep. 598; Riley v. Steamship 
 Co., 39 La. Ann. 791 ; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 
 343; Murphy n. Boston, &c., R. Co., 
 88 N. T. 146; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 240; 
 Readhead v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 
 3 Q. B. 413. 
 
462 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 359. 
 
 gers," but by this is niuderstood nothing more than that a 
 servant is entitled, when there is any danger connected with 
 the machinery or employment in which he is engaged and 
 which ordinary inspection and carefulness on his part will 
 not enable him to avoid, to have it distinctly announced to 
 him. It is meant that, as to such danger, it is particularly 
 the duty of the employer to warn him. He is plainly entitled 
 to have them pointed out when he enters upon the service. 
 When this is done in good faith they become a part of his 
 contract, but for any failure in this regard, when injury en- 
 sues, the master is liable ;^ and the obligation to warn the 
 employee of danger is the greater in proportion as the em- 
 ployee is inexperienced and in need of the caution, and greater 
 as to minor employees than to adults.' It is no excuse for 
 the master's neglect that the servant did not solicit in- 
 formation.' Nor is the master's duty to give notice con- 
 fined to cases where the servant is a man of manifest imbecil- 
 ity.* But it is held that wherever the employee's means of 
 information are equal to or greater than those of his em- 
 ployer, the employer will be excused from giving the warn- 
 ing, and will not be liable in case of injury from a defect of 
 
 ' McDonald «. Chicago, &c., Ry. livan d. India Manfg. Co., 113 Mass. 
 Co., 41 Minn. 439; b. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 396; International, &c., R. Co., «. 
 380; Lofrano «. New York & M. V. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190. 
 Water Co., 8 N. T. Supl. 717; s. c. 55 'An inexperienced servant employed 
 Hun, 452; Smith ». Peninsular Car to run an elevator is entitled to be in- 
 Works, 60 Mich. 501; s. c. 27 struoted, and the master is liable for 
 N. W. Rep. 662; Parkhurst n. injuries arising from the incompetency 
 Johnson, 50 Mich. 70; s. c. 45 Am. or negligence of the instructor. Bren- 
 Rep. 28; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. nan «. Oordan, 118 N, T. 489; b. c. 
 420. Where the servant has full knowl- 23 N. E. Rep. 810. Parkhurst v. John- 
 edge of the danger of the machinery, son, 50 Mich. 70; s. o. 45 Am. Rep. 28; 
 but the latter is punishable, it becomes Coombs ®. New Bedford, &c., Co., 
 the duty of the master to renew it at 102 Mass. 585; O'Connor v. Adams, 
 proper inttervals without the solicita- 120 Mass. 427; Wood on Master and 
 tion of the servant. Baker b. Alle- Servant, §349; Sullivan®. India Manfg, 
 gheny R. Co., 95 Penn. St. 211; s. c. Co., 113 Mass. 396; Grizzle v. Frost, 3 
 40 Am. Rep. 634. Smith «. Oxford Fost. & Pin. 622; Port B.Pacific, &c., 
 Iron Co., 42 N. J. Law, 467; 8. c 36 R. Co., 17 Wall. 554; s. c. 2 Dill. 259. 
 Am. Rep. 535; Coombs v. New Bed- * Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. «. Watts, 
 ford, &c., Co., 102 Mass. 585; s. c. 64 Tex. 668. 
 
 3 Am. Rep. 508; Spelman v. Fisher * Atkins ». Merrick Thread Co., 142 
 
 Iron Co., 56 Barb. 151; Paulmier v. Mass. 431. 
 Erie Ry. Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151; Sul- 
 
§ 360.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 463 
 
 that sort.^ But this is, perhaps, but little more than to say 
 that the servant, as well as the master, is bound to ordinary 
 care. For patent dangers or defects the master, as a rule, is 
 not liable, and in many cases it has been held that they need 
 not be pointed out, even to minor employees, if the latter be 
 capable of discerning them.* 
 
 § 360. The servant's assumption of risk.— The reports 
 contain a multitude of cases wherein it has been determined 
 what risks are and what are not assumed by the servant upon 
 entering the master's service. The kinds of employment are 
 so diverse that no rule of easy and universal application can 
 be deduced from the authorities further than that he assumes 
 such risks as are reasonably incidental to the character of the 
 work, and each case must depend upon the particular circum- 
 stances. But it may, at least, be said that the servant does not 
 assume the chance that the master will neglect his duty, and 
 the careful reader will consult the preceding sections * in which 
 the master's obligation is discussed and illustrated. One 
 who works on a raised platform without a railing takes the 
 risk of falling off ; * and a laborer employed to wheel earth 
 
 * This is usually the case in the rail- 43 Am. Bep. 264, a decision not to be 
 road employees. Georgia, &c., B. commended. But in two Tennessee 
 Co. V. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485; Mad Biver cases, a railway company is held liable 
 B. Co. e. Barber, 6 Ohio St. 541. A to employees for patent defects in tools 
 workman was ordered by his master's furnished them, the tools being in each 
 foreman to go up a ladder which was case a maul or hammer, and the de- 
 in an obviously dangerous position. feet in one case being of such a char- 
 Instead of moving the ladder the acter that the servant might have seen 
 workman attempted to ascend it where it if he had looked. Guthrie v. Louis* 
 it stood, and sustained injuries. It viUe, &c., B. Co., llLea, 372; s. c. 47 
 was Tielcl, that he had no cause of ac- Am. Bep. 286, and in the other, of 
 tion against the master. Bussell v. such an obvious nature that the serv- 
 Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201 ; Thorn v. N. ant used it only under protest. East 
 Y. Ice Co., 46 Hun, 497; Gilbert v. Tennessee, &c., B. Co. v. Duffleld, 12 
 Guild, 144 Mass. 601; 8. c. 12 N. E. Lea, 63; s. C. 47 Am. Bep. 319. See 
 Bep. 368; The Truro. 31 Fed. Bep. § 362, infi-a. 
 
 158. Where the danger of an employ- » §g 302, 303, 304, 325, supra. 
 
 mentis obvious to any one of ordinary See, also, an article in 39 Axa. &h 
 
 inteligence, the employer is under no Eng. B. Cas. 332, note, in which 
 
 obligation to warn an employee, many cases are collected relating. 
 
 Johnson v. Ashland Water Co., 77 to this and cognate matters under 
 
 Wis. 51. the head of Master and Servant. 
 
 ' Fones v. Philips, 39 Ark. 17; s. c. * Moulton c. Gage, 138 Mass. 390. 
 
464 THE mastee's obligations and liabilities. [§ 360. 
 
 along the edge of a bank when the posts are coming out of 
 the ground, is presumed to know the danger and to assume the 
 risk of the bank oaTing in.^ Where a servant who was killed 
 by falling through a hatchway, knew when he entered the 
 employment that there were no guards around it, he took all 
 risks incident to the employment.' So, also, a workman em- 
 ployed by a railroad company to stand in a dangerous place to 
 signal trains assumes the obvious risks of the position,' and a 
 railroad track walker, who knew that coal was customarily 
 over-loaded on tenders, could not recover for injuries from the 
 fall of a piece of it;* and a section hand cannot complain of the 
 increased risk in being ordered out to work on a foggy day,' nor. 
 
 The risk from an uncorered saw pro- 
 jecting over its frame and partly across 
 a, narrow passage-way, over which a 
 servant in a mill is obliged to go in 
 the performance of his dvities, being 
 apparent, is assumed by the servant in 
 accepting and remaining in the serv- 
 ice. Stevenson v. Duncan, 73 Wis. 
 404; s. c. 41 N. "W. Eep. 337. 
 
 ' Olson V. McMullen, 34 Minn. 94; 
 Pederson v. City of Rushford, 41 
 Minn. 289. An employer is not liable 
 for the death of a servant caused by 
 the falling in of a bank of earth upon 
 him, he having been for a long time 
 engaged in removing the same by dig- 
 ging under it. Rasmussen v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 236; s. c. 43 
 N. W. Rep. 1063. 
 
 " Gleason v. Excelsior Manuf 'g Co. 
 (Mo.), 7 S. W. Rep. 188. A machin- 
 ist employed by a corporation in its 
 factory, not to use machinery, but to 
 keep it in good order, and having 
 knowledge that some of it is imper- 
 fect, and that employees cannot be re- 
 lied upon to prevent it from becoming 
 dangerous for lack of oil, takes the 
 risk of discovering the condition of 
 the machinery at the time he attempts 
 to repair it, such risk being incident 
 to his vocation. Dartmouth Spinning 
 Co. ®. Achard, 84 Ga. 14; b. c. 10 8. 
 £. Rep. 449. 
 
 8 Kennedy v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 
 33 Hun, 467. A fireman who 
 knows that for want of a turn-table the 
 engine is run backward three times 
 every day, assumes the risk incident 
 thereto. Euhns S.Wisconsin, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 70 Iowa, 561. Where an inex- 
 perienced man enters on the duties of 
 a conductor of a railroad train, he 
 cannot recover for damages resulting 
 from his inexperience, though the 
 company knew of his want of skill 
 when it employed him. Alexander v. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co., 83 Ky. 589. 
 A fireman was killed, while cleaning 
 the ash-pan of his locomotive, by the 
 running of a work train, contrary to 
 the rules of the road, into the fireman's 
 train. Held, that this was one of the 
 ordinary hazards of his employment 
 for which his administrator could not 
 recover. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co. «. 
 Conkling, 15 HI. App. 157. 
 
 •■ Schultz v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 67 Wis. 616; 8. c. 58 Am. Rep. 881. 
 The throwing of a barrel from a 
 fourth-story window so as to strike 
 and kill a fellow-servant, is not such 
 an unforeseen and extraordinary act of 
 carelessness as not to come within the 
 risks of employment assumed by the 
 deceased. Brodeur s. Valley Falls 
 Co., 16 R. I. 448; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 54. 
 
 ' International, &c., R. Co. v. Hester, 
 
§ 360.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 465 
 
 while pushing a hand-car, of falling into a properly con- 
 structed water-way,^ nor the risk from special trains not run- 
 ning on schedule time.* One, however, whose employment in a' 
 lailroad yard requires him to move damaged cars, takes the 
 risk of mistaking damaged cars for sound ones.' So, also, a 
 
 64 Tex. 401. Where plaintifEhas been 
 railroading for 30 years, 16 with de- 
 fendant, and 8 on the run where he 
 was injured, defendant is entitled to 
 &n instruction that if plaintiff knew of 
 the risks he ran, as the business was 
 conducted, he could not recover even 
 though the business might have been 
 conducted in a safer way, whereby 
 the injury might have been prevented. 
 Hewitt «. Flint, &c., R. Co., 67 Mich. 
 61; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 659. 
 
 ' A section-hand, while pushing a 
 hand-car under orders from the fore- 
 man, fell into a water-way, of which 
 he was not specially warned, and 
 which was properly constructed. 
 Held, in his action against the railroad 
 •company, that a nonsuit was properly 
 ordered, the risk being incident to the 
 employment. Couch v. Charlotte, 
 &c., R. Co., 22 S. C. 557. Where a 
 switchman had for a long time been 
 employed in a railroad yard, and knew 
 the shape and purpose of a "frog," 
 and knew that it was unblocked, it 
 was error to submit to the jury, as a 
 question of fact, whether he was 
 charged "with notice of the difficulty 
 of removing his foot from the con- 
 verging rails, and of the danger result- 
 ing from having his foot caught there- 
 in. Appel V. Buffalo, &c., R. Co., 
 Ill N. T. 550; 8. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 93. 
 A competent switchman, employe^ 
 for two years in switching, cannot re- 
 cover against the railroad for failure 
 to provide certain safeguards to pre- 
 vent the injury complained of, since 
 the condition of the railway tracks 
 and the danger must have been known 
 to the employee, and he therefore as- 
 sumed the risk, and waived any neg- 
 30 
 
 ligence that might otherwise be imput- 
 able to the railway company. As 
 between the railway company and 
 himself, the railway company cannot 
 be charged with culpable negligence; 
 and all these questions are questions 
 of law for the court, and not questions 
 of fact for the jury. Rush v. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Kan. 129; s. c. 13 
 Pac. Rep. 582. 
 
 " Larson v. St. Paul, &o., Ry. Co., 
 43- Minn. 423; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 
 722; Olson v. St. Paul, «&c., Ry. Co., 
 38 Minn. 117; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 866. 
 Where a man applies for 4he post of 
 fireman on a short line without a turn- 
 table, and on which he is well aware 
 that it is the custom to run the engine 
 backward, the fact that so running the 
 engine was dangerous cannot be relied 
 upon in an action for the death of such 
 fireman, caused by the engine leaving 
 the rails when running backward. 
 Kuhns B. Wisconsin, &c., Ry. Co., 70 
 Iowa, 561; s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 868. 
 Where an engineer has knowledge 
 that the flues of his locomotive leak, 
 the result being that it is difficult to 
 maintain sufficient steam to enable 
 him to control and check the speed, 
 he assumes the risk of an accident re- 
 suiting from an inability to check the 
 speed as soon as could have been done 
 with a better supply of steam. Mon- 
 aghan v. New York, &c., R Co., 45 
 Hun, 113. 
 
 'jFraker*. St. Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 
 32 Minn. 64. And the risk of the neg- 
 ligence of his fellow-servants in hand- 
 ling such cars Kelly «. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 490. The evi- 
 dence being that plaintiff, an engineer 
 of defendant, was leaving the shops 
 
466 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ o61. 
 
 fireman assumes the risk incident to the use of snow-ploughs, "^ 
 and where an unfenced railroad runs through pasture land 
 cattle must be expected on the track at any point, and it is not 
 the duty of the company to warn employees of the danger of 
 encountering cattle,^ 
 
 § 361. Ristsnotassamed.— IllnstratioBS.— The rule that 
 a servant engaged in a dangerous employment assumes thp 
 risk of injury which exists while the business is carried on in 
 the usual and ordinary way does not apply when recovery is 
 sought from a third person, whose negligence caused the in- 
 jury, although exposure to such injury is one of the risks of 
 the employment.^ Thus, a carpenter working on the roof of a 
 building in process of construction is not bound to inspect 
 the condition of the walls, and does not take the risk of the 
 building falling in consequence of their insufficiency;* and rail- 
 
 to go home on a dark night, walking 
 through the yard on the tracks, as was 
 the custom of the employees, when he 
 was struck by a yard engine, going 
 backwards, with no light on the rear 
 end, and that he was well acquainted 
 with the tracks, and the customs of 
 the yard, it is error to refuse an in- 
 struction that in walking on the track 
 he assumed the risk of being injured 
 by the ordinary operation of trains on 
 defendant's road. , Williams •o. Dela- 
 ware, &c., R. Co., 2 N. T. Supl. 435. 
 ' Brown v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 69 Iowa, 161 ; Drake v. Union Pac. Ry. 
 Co. (.Idaho), 21 Pac. Rep. 560; Bryant 
 V. Burlington, &c., Ry. Co., 66 Iowa, 
 305; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 275. A rail- 
 road hand who rides on a hand-car, 
 knowing that a train may come along 
 at any time, assumes the risk. Mc- 
 Grath v. New York, ,&c., R. Co., 14 
 R. I. 357. So in the case of a brake- 
 man injured by the sudden jerk of the 
 train while a " flying switch" was being 
 made. Toull ®. Sioux City, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 66 Iowa, 346. A brakemanwho, 
 in attempting to let off a defective 
 brake, is struck by a cattle-guard 
 which, like all the guards along the 
 
 road, is dangerously near the track, 
 and who knows the defective charac- 
 ter of the brake, and that many of the 
 guards were so near as to be danger- 
 ous, though he did not know as to the 
 one in question, cannot recover, as he 
 will be held to take the risk incident 
 tq the employment. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. Somers, 71 Tex. 700; s. c. 
 9 S. W. Rep. 741. See, also, Kelly 
 V. Baltimore, &c., R. Co. (Penn.), 11 
 Atl. Rep. 659. 
 
 '' Patton e. Central Iowa Ry. Co. 
 (Iowa), 35 N. W. Rep. 149. A de- 
 claration alleging that it was plaintiff's 
 duty at a railroad station to throw the 
 mail-bags into the train while in mo- 
 tion, "a service known to defendants 
 to be dangerous," and while so en- 
 gaged without fault on his part he 
 was thrown under the train and in- 
 jured. Held, to show no more than 
 the ordinary and apparent risks which 
 a servant in such case assumes. Cool- 
 broth V. Maine Central R. Co., 77 Me. 
 165. 
 
 ' P«m. Co. ■». Backes, 133 lU. ?55; 
 8. o. 34 N. E. Rep. 563. 
 
 * Giles «. Diamond State Iron Co. 
 (Del.), 8 Atl. Rep. 368. 
 
§ 331.] THE master's obligations aot) liabilities. 467 
 
 • road employees have a right to assume that the companj will 
 use all reasonable care in keeping its road and appliances in 
 good order, and if any injury occurs to them other than by 
 their own negligence, it is not a risk incident to the employ- 
 ment.^ An engineer of a railroad, which is in general use, 
 although he have knowledge that the rails of the track are 
 old, light and well worn, is not bound to pursue the inquiry 
 and to determine for himself and at his own peril whether 
 the road is or is not fit for use f and the fact that a brakeman, 
 who has been injured in an accident caused by a bull on the 
 track, knew that the engine was without a cow-catcher ; that 
 the fences aloifg the track were defective, and that cattle fre- 
 quently intruded on the track, was not held to warrant a non- 
 suit in an action by him for the injuries, as the question is for 
 the jury whether his negligence had any share in causing the 
 injury.^ A servant does not necessarily assume the risks inci- 
 dent to the use of unsafe machinery furnished by his master,, 
 because he knows its character and condition ; it is also 
 necessary that he should know, or by the exercise of common 
 observation might have known, the risks attending its use.^ 
 
 > Enapp «. Sioux City, &c.. By. Co., cies; but he did not assume the risk, 
 
 71 Iowa, 41; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 18. from the negligence of the company 
 
 • Devlin v. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co., in failing to keep its road-bed in good 
 
 87 Mo. 545. Where an employee is order, which required the prompt ac- 
 
 injured by reason of a latent defect tion, and which was the proximate 
 
 in the handle of a hand-car which he cause of plaintififs injury. Enapp v. 
 
 was using, the mere fact that he was Sioux City, &c., Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 
 
 in view of those who placed the ban- 41; s. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 18. Risks of 
 
 die in the car, he being engaged at the employment do not include risks aris- 
 
 time in other busiiiess, does not relieve ing from neglect to use safety blocks, 
 
 his employer from liability, on the in frogs, on the employer's railroad 
 
 ground that, as the employee remained track; that being a reasonable means 
 
 and performed the same services on to prevent injury to employees making 
 
 the hand-car as. before, without com- couplings. Seley «. Southern Pac. 
 
 plaint, he must be deemed to have By. Co. (Utah), 23 Pac. Rep. 751. 
 
 undertaken the risk of the danger * Russell v. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. 
 
 which might result from the condition Co., 32 Minn. 230. Plaintiff was em- 
 
 of the handle. Burton v. Missouri ployed by defendant to keep in motion 
 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Mo. App. 456. a heavy iron pipe suspended above 
 
 ' Magee v. North Pac. R. Co., 78 some open vats containing hot liquors. 
 
 CaL 430. In entering defendant's He performed his work by pushing 
 
 employment as locomotive engineer, against the pipe with a pole, and was 
 
 the plaintiff assumed the risk of hav- stationed upon some pipes laid upon 
 
 ing to act in haste in sudden emergen- the top of the vats, and along their 
 
468 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 362. 
 
 And although it be negligence on the part of the master to 
 leave dangerous machinery uncovered, yet the servant is not 
 necessarily guilty of contributory negligence because he 
 ■works in the vicinity of it, knowing its condition.* 
 
 § 363. The master's duty toward minor servants.— 
 
 Although, as we have seen,* minor servants are held to assume 
 the full measure of risk of injury by the negligence of fellow- 
 servants, some indulgence is conceded to their tender years 
 in respect of the other dangers of the employment. It is 
 generally held to be incumbent upon the employer of an in- 
 fant to explain to him fully the hazards and dangers con- 
 nected with the business, and to instruct him how to avoid 
 them.' And if, in employing a person of immature years and 
 judgment to work upon dangerous machinery, the employee 
 is too young to realize, after full instruction, the danger of 
 
 sides. Held, that it could not be said, 
 as a matter of law, that plaintiff as- 
 siuned the risk of falling into the vats. 
 Heavey v. Hudson Elver Water-Power 
 & Paper Co., 10 N. T. Supl. 585. 
 Where defects in the internal con- 
 struction Of an emery-wheel are not 
 apparent or visible, and are unknown 
 to one who attempts to operate it, he 
 does not assume the risks and perils 
 arising from such defects. Murtaugh 
 i>. New York, &c., R. Co., 3 N. T. 
 Supl. 483; s. c. 49 Hun, 456. In an 
 action for damages caused by the 
 death of an employee through expo- 
 suie, in defendant's service, to a dan- 
 ger not commonly connected with the 
 employment, knowledge of such dan- 
 ger cannot be presumed in proof of 
 contributory negligence, but must be 
 brought home to deceased. Smith «. 
 Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich. 501; 
 s. c. 27 N. W. Bep. 662. A farm 
 hand was kicked by a vicious horse, 
 which he had attended for months 
 without complaint. He knew the 
 horse was vicious, but it did not ap- 
 pear that the master knew it. Held, 
 that there was no right of action 
 against the master on accoimt of the 
 
 injury. Shaw v. Deal, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 Eep. 378. 
 
 ' Wuotilla V. Duluth Lumber Co., 
 37 Minn. 153; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 
 551. 
 
 " § 357, supra. 
 
 « Smith «. Irwini 51 N. J. Law, 507; 
 s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 852; Thall v. Camie, 
 5 N. T. Supl. 244; LouisYille, &c., 
 Ry. Co., V. Prawley, 110 Ind. 18; s. c. 
 9 N. E. Rep. 594; Whitelaw v. Mem- 
 phis, &c., R. Co., 16 Lea, 391; s. c. 1 
 S. W. Rep. 37; Louisyille, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ■». Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; Hayes v. 
 Bush & Denslow Manuf. Co., 41 
 Hun, 407; Carey v. Arlington Mills, 
 148 Mass. 338; s. o. 19 N. E. Rep. 525; 
 Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co. v. Corri- 
 gan, 46 Ohio St. 283; B. c. 20 N. E. 
 Rep.. 466; Robertson «. Comelson, 34 
 Fed. Rep. 716; Gamble v. Hine, 2 N. 
 T. Supl. 778; Lynn v. Illinois Central 
 R. Co., 63 Miss. 157. This duty to- 
 ward minor employees is personal to 
 the master, and a neglect of it renders 
 him liable though the negligence of 
 a fellow-servant is the immediate 
 cause of the injury. Jones v. Flor- 
 ence Mining Co., 60 Wis. 268; s. c. 57 
 Am. Bep. 269. See, also, § 304, supra. 
 
§ 363,] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 469 
 
 the work, and the necessity of exercising care, the employer 
 puts or keeps him at such work at his own risk.^ But where 
 the servant, despite his youth, is capable of appreciating 
 obvious dangers, or they are pointed out to him so that he 
 understands them, the master's duty is fulfilled,* and all 
 these are questions of fact for the jury.' 
 
 § 363. OTerhead railway bridges and depot roofs.— 
 
 Among " seen dangers," or patent defects, some courts have 
 classed such railway bridges as have covers or overhead 
 frame-work, so constructed that a man standing upon the 
 top of a freight car cannot pass under them without being 
 struck. There are a number of cases which, in substance. 
 
 ' In employing a person of imma- 
 ture years and judgment to work upon 
 daDgerous machinery, it is the duty 
 of the master to see that such person 
 fully understands its dangerous char- 
 acter, and appreciates such dangers, 
 and the consequences of a want of 
 care; and if the employee is too 
 young to realize, after full instruction, 
 the danger of the work, and the ne- 
 cessity of exercising care, the employer 
 puts or keeps him at such work at his 
 own risk. Hickey v. Taafe, 99 N. Y. 
 204; Sharp v. Pathhead Spinning Co., 
 12 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 574. A boy of 
 10 years of age, who is employed at a 
 coal mine, and directed to couple coal- 
 cars, a hazardous duty, does not as- 
 sume the risks of the employment, as 
 they cannot be apparent to his imma- 
 ture judgment, but the master im- 
 pliedly agrees to require no work of 
 the boy beyond his capacity, and the 
 latter can recover for injuries received 
 in the attempt to obey his instructions. 
 Brazil Block Coal Co. «. Gaffney, 119 
 Ind. 455; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 1102. 
 A girl of eleven, under an agreement 
 between her father and A., worked 
 for A at his house. He permitted her 
 to go across a pj-airie so insufficiently 
 clothed that she suffered severely from 
 the cold. She recovered damages. 
 
 Nelson v. Johnson, 18 Neb. 180; s. o. 
 53 Am. Rep. 806. 
 
 = Smith V. Irwin, 51 N. J. Law, 507; 
 s. 0. 18 Atl. Rep. 852; Goins v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 676; 
 Gordon «. Reynolds' Card Manuf'g 
 Co., 47 Hun, 278; Oszkoscil v. Eagle 
 Pencil Co., 6 N. T. Supl. 501; Pro- 
 bert®. Phipps, 149 Mass. 258; s. c. 21 N. 
 E. Rep. 370; Crowley «. Pacific Mills, 
 148 Mass. 228; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 344; 
 O'Keefe v. Thorn (Penn.), 24 W. N. 
 C. 379; s. c. 16 Atl. Rep. 787; Pahner 
 v. Harrison, 57 Mich. 183; Buckley «. 
 Gutta-Percha, &c., Manuf'g Co., 113 
 N. T. 540; s. c. 21 N. E. Rep. 717; 
 Sanborn v. Atchison, &c., R. Co., 35 
 Kan. 392; Hickey v. Taafe, 105 N. T. 
 26; Rock v. Indian Orchard Miffi, 142 
 Mass. 533. 
 
 ' Ogley «. MUes, 8 N. T. Supl. 270; 
 Steiler v. Hart, 65 Mich. 644; s. c. 33 
 N. W. Rep. 875; Ciriack ». Mer- 
 chants' Woolen Co., 151 Mass. 152; 
 s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 839; Rummell v. 
 Dillworth, Porter & Co., 131 Penn. 
 St. 509; 8. c. 19 Atl. Rep. 345. See. 
 also, Neilon v. Marinette Paper Co., 75 
 Wis. 579: s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 772; 
 Nadau v. White River Lumber Co., 
 76 Wis. 130; b. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 
 1136; Schwandner «. Birge, 33 Hun, 
 186. 
 
470 THE mastee's obligations and liabilities. [§ 363 
 
 have held that it is neither negligent nor criminal for a rail- 
 ■way company to build bridges in this way ; that such struc- 
 tures are among the ordinary risks of the employment of 
 freight train-men ; that, when they are informed of the exist- 
 ence and situation of such bridges, they must be held to 
 assume the risk of being hit by them, and that, therefore, 
 when they are hit and killed, or injured by them, it is the 
 result of their own negligence, for which the company is not 
 liable. The duty of freight train-men requires them, or 
 «ome of them, to be upon the top of the cars much of the 
 iime when the train is in motion ; they must stand erect 
 and go rapidly from one car to another, in the night as well 
 as in the day-time. If the roof or overstructure of the 
 bridge is so low that it will strike a brakeman standing erect 
 upon the top of his train, it is an essentially murderous con- 
 trivance, and it is not creditable to our jurisprudence that 
 such buildings are not declared a nuisance. There is 
 nothing in the reports worse than the cases that sustain 
 the railway corporations in building and maintaining these 
 man-traps. Such bridges are, notwithstanding all that can 
 be urged against them, lawful structures in Alabama, Ken- 
 tucky, Kansas, Minnesota, Vermont, Indiana, Georgia, South 
 Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Missouri, Penn- 
 sylvania, and Virginia.^ 
 
 ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Hall, 87 Rep. 105; Altee u. South Carolina 
 Ala. 708; s. c. 6 So. Rep. 377; Jones Ry. Co., 21 S. C. 550; s. c. 53 Am. 
 •B. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 83 Ky. 610; Rep, 699, note; Baylor v. Delaware, 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co. B. Irwin, 37 &c., R. Co., 40 K. J. Law, 33; s. c. 
 Kan. 701; B. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 146; 39 Am. Rep. 308; Owen ■». New York, 
 Robel V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 85 &c., R. Co., 1 Lans. 108. See, also, 
 Minn. 84. By continuing in the serv- Gibson ». Erie Ry. Co., 68 N. T. 449, 
 ice of the company with knowledge where plaintiff's intestate, a conductor 
 of the dangerous condition of a of a freight train, was struck and 
 l)ridge, the employee assumes the killed by the projecting roof of a de- 
 risk. Carbine's Adm'r v. Bennington, pot building. The same rule was 
 &c., R. Co., 61 Vt. 348; s. c. 17 Atl. applied as stated in the text, the risk 
 Rep. 491. The company isliable if it being held apparent to ordinary ob- 
 fails to warn a brakeman of the dan- servation and part of the contract of 
 ger of bridges so low as to require employment; s, c. 30 Am. Rep. 553; 
 him to stoop to pass under them safe- WUliams «. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 
 ly. Baltimore, &c., R. Qo. «. 116 N. Y. 628; s. c 33 N. B. Bep. 
 Bowan, 104 Ind. 88; Stirk ». Cenlaral 1117; Ryan v. Long Island R. Co., 51 
 R. B. Co., 79 Ga. 495; s. c. 5 S. E. Hun, 607; s. c. 4 N. Y. Supl. 381. 
 
§ 364.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 471 
 
 § 364. Injuries to train-men in coupling cars.— It is not, 
 as has already appeared/ negligence in se to engage in a dan- 
 gerous occupation, or to do dangerous work. It is accord- 
 ingly held not negligence, as a matter of law, for a brakeman 
 to make dangerous couplings of freight cars ; ' nor even to go 
 between the cats while the train is in motion to couple or 
 uncouple them.* While it is the duty of train-men to observe 
 the condition of the cars or other appliances with which they 
 are required to work ; * and although it is negligent in them 
 voluntarily and unnecessarily to use defectiye or dangerous 
 tools or machinery,' still, in rushing in between moving cars 
 to make a coupling, it is not negligent in a brakeman to as- 
 sume that the bumpers are in proper condition, and to act 
 upon that assumption.* He must, however, obey all the rules 
 
 But where a brakeman went to Ms 
 place on the train in response to a 
 signal for brakes, and was struck by 
 a bridge which he could not see on 
 account of smoke from the engine, he 
 was held not guilty of contributory 
 negligence. Dukes v. Eastern Dis- 
 tilling Co., 4 N. Y. Supl. 562; s. c. 51 
 Hun, 605. Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Strickler, 51 Md. 47; s. c. Si Am. 
 Rep. 291 ; Devitt «. Pacific, &c. , R Co. , 
 SO Mo. 303; Rains c. St. Louis, &c., 
 R. Co., 71 Mo. 164; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 
 459; Kttsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Sent- 
 meyer, 93 Penn. St. 276; s. c. 37 Am. 
 Rep. 684; Brossman v. Lehigh Valley 
 R. Co., 113 Penn. St. 490; B. o. 57 
 Am. Rep. 479; Sheeler v. Chesapeake, 
 ■&C., R. Co., 81 Va. 188; Clark's 
 Adm'r v. Richmond, &o., R. Co., 78 
 Va. 709; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 394. See, 
 also. Love joy v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 
 125 Mass. 79; s. c. 28 Am. Rep. 206; 
 Wells V. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 56 
 Iowa, 520; HallB. Union Pac. R. Co., 
 5 McCrary, 465; Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Russell, 91 HI. 298; 8. c. 33 Am. 
 Rep. 54; Sewell b. Qity of Cohoes, 75 
 N. Y. 45; B. c. 31* Am. Rep. 418; 
 Warden v. Old Colony R. Co., 137 
 jyiass. 204. 
 ' §§ 36, 37, mpra. 
 
 » Baird v. Chicago, &c.> R. Co., 61 
 Iowa, 359; Beems v. Chicago,. &c., 
 R. Co., 58 Iowa, 150; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Long, 94 Ind. 250. Qf. Farley v. 
 Chicago, &c., B. Co., 56 Iowa, 337; 
 Missouri, &c,, R. Co. ®. HoUey, 30 
 Ean. 465. 
 
 " Snow V. Housatonic R. Co., 8 Al- , 
 len, 441; Beems v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 58 Iowa, 150. But see, contra, 
 WiUiams v. Iowa, &c., R. Co., 43 
 Iowa, 396; Marsh c. South Carolina R. 
 Co.. 56 Ga. 274. 
 
 ■* Scott «. Oregon By. & Nav. Co., 
 14 Or. 211; Lake Shore. &c., R. Co. 
 ®. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440. Where 
 a defect in the machinery used for 
 coupling was unknown to the 
 brakeman, and was not obvious, and 
 could have been discovered only by 
 stooping down and looking under the 
 car, he was not guilty of contributory 
 negligence in going in between the 
 cars to uncouple them. Louisville, 
 &c., Ry. Co. II. Buck, 116 Ind. 566; 
 s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 453. 
 
 ' Umback v. Lake Shore, &c., R. 
 Co., 83 Ind. 191; Perigo v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 55 Iowa, 336; Jackson v. 
 Kansas, &c., R. Co., 31 Kan. 761. 
 
 • King V. Ohio.&c, R. Co., 11 Blss. 
 326; Wedgewood «. Chicago, &c., R. 
 
472 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 365. 
 
 prescribed by the company, with respect to couplings, look- 
 ing to his safety and convenience ; a failure in any respect to 
 do this is such negligence upon his part, as will wholly 
 prevent a recovery in the event of an injury of which such 
 disobedience upon his part may be regarded a cause ; as, for 
 an example, omitting to use a stick in making the coupling, 
 as the rule required, if the requirement of the rule had been 
 properly brought to his knowledge;* or uncoupling cars 
 in motion, in violation of the company's rule,* or coupling 
 cars without waiting to know if the engineer has understood 
 his signal to slacken the speed.' 
 
 § 365. The same subject continued. — In general, any negli- 
 gence on the part of a brakeman, in making couplings, if it 
 amount to a want of ordinary care, contributing proximately 
 to cause the injury, will prevent a recovery from the com- 
 pany.* In Georgia it is held negligent for a conductor to 
 make couplings, it being the duty of the brakeman, unless 
 
 Co., 41 Wis. 478. See, also, Texas, 
 &c., R. Co. V. McAtee, 61 Tex. 695; 
 Haugh V. Chicago, &c., By. Co., 
 73 Iowa, 66; s. c. 35 N. W. Eep. 
 116; Goodrich v. New York, &c., B. 
 Co., 116 N. T. 398; B. c. 32JM. E. Bep. 
 397. 
 
 ' Pay «. Minneapolis, &c., R. Co., 
 30 Minn. 331; Hulett v. St. Louis, &c., 
 E. Co., 67 Mo. 339; Memphis, &c.. 
 By. Co. ■». Askew, 90 Ala. 5; s. c. 7 
 So. Eep. 823. Conflicting testimony 
 as to plaintiff's knowledge of the rule 
 makes a proper question for the jury. 
 Seese v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 39 Fed. 
 Eep. 487; Louisville, &c., B. Co. v. 
 Perry, 87 Ala. 393; s. c. 6 So. Bep 
 40; Propst ». Georgia Pac. By. Co. 
 (Ala.), 3 So. Rep. 764. See, also, Wha- 
 len V. Chicago, &c., By. Co., 75 Iowa, 
 563; s. c. 39 N. W. Eep. 894. 
 
 ' Sedgwick «. nimois Cent. E. Co., 
 76 Iowa, 340; 8. c. 41 N. W. Eep. 35; 
 Sedgwick v. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 73 
 Iowa, 158; s. c. 34 N. W. Eep. 790; 
 Tuttle V. Detroit, &c.. By. Co., 133 
 U. 8. 189; Savannah, &c.. By. Co. v. 
 
 Barber, 71 Ga. 644; Henry v. Sioux 
 City, &c., Ey. Co., 66 Iowa, 53; Goulin 
 V. Canada Southern Bridge Co., 64 
 Mich. 190; 8. c. 31 N. W. Bep. 44; 
 Webb V. Bichmond, &c., E. Co., 97 
 N. C. 387; 8. c. 3" S. E. Rep. 440; Re- 
 belsky ». Chicago, &c., E. Co., 79 
 Iowa, 55; 8. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 536; 
 St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. «. Rice, 51 
 Ark. 467; s. c. 11 S. W. Eep. 699; 
 Barkdoll v. Pennsylvania B. Co. 
 (Penn.),.18 Atl. Eep. 83; Lockwood v. 
 Chicago, &c., B. Co., 55 Wis. 50. 
 
 ' Deeds «. Chicago, &c.. By. Co., 74 
 Iowa, 154; 8. c. 37 N. W. Bep. 134. 
 
 * Muldovraey v. Illinois, &c., B. 
 Co., 39 Iowa, 615; Chicago, &c., B. 
 Co. ®. Ward, 61 111. 130; Kleyc Con- 
 necticut, &c., B. Co., 135 Mass. 392 j 
 Toledo, &c., B. Co. ■». Asbiiry, 84 HI. 
 439; Sears «. Central, &c., E. Co., 53 
 Ga. 630; Cunningham v. Chicago, &c., 
 E. Co., 5 McCrjiry, 465; Kresanowski 
 V. Northern Pac. E. Co., 5 McCraiy, 
 538; Hallikan v. Hannibal, ifcc, B. 
 Co., 71 Mo. 113; Sweeney v. Boston^ 
 &c.,E. Co., 128 Mass. 5. 
 
§ 365.] THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 473: 
 
 in some emergency, it be especially necessary for the con- 
 ductor to do it.* But when the cars are so constructed, th& 
 bumpers being of different heights, or being in any other 
 respect so made that the slightest indiscretion on the part 
 of the operative will prove fatal to him, it has been held that 
 when injury results from such causes, the company is liable.*^ 
 "The machinery and cars," said the Supreme Court of 
 Illinois, " furnished for use, should not be so unskillfully 
 constructed that the slightest indiscretion on the part of the 
 operatives would prove fatal."* It is, as the weight of 
 authority indicates, well settled that, however dangerous it 
 may be to mjkke these couplings, when one, after being duly 
 advised of the danger, and warned to take care, undertaken 
 the work, the manifest risk involved becomes a part of hi& 
 contract, and if injury result, in the absence of wantonness- 
 on the part of the company, there can be no recovery.* The 
 railways have, by no means, it is believed, provided as they 
 
 » Sears v. Central, &c., R. Co., 53 
 6a. 630. 
 
 ' Toledo, &c., B. Co. s. Fredericks, 
 71 m. 394; Crutchfield v. Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co., 76 N. C. 320; 8. c. 78 Rl. 
 300. See, also, Guthrie v. Maine 
 Cent. R. Co., 81 Me. 573; s. c. 18 Afl. 
 Rep. 395 ; and it makes no difference 
 that the cars belonged to another 
 company. Giottlieb v. Kew York, 
 &c., R Co., 100 N. Y. 463. See, 
 however, on this point, Scott v. Ore- 
 gon Ry. & Nav. Co., 14 Or. 211; s. c. 
 13 Pac. Rep. 98. An inexperienced 
 brakeman is entitled to be cautioned 
 against such danger. Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. f>. White (Tex.), 76 Tex. 103; 
 s. 0. 13 S. W. Rep. 65; Missouri Pac. 
 Ry. Co. t>. Calbreath, 66 Tex. 526. 
 See, also, Drane v. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co., 87 Mo. 588. But if the disparity 
 in height is evident, the brakeman 
 takes the risk. Kelly v. Abbott, 63 
 Wis. 307; 8. c. 53 Am. Rep. 392. 
 Norfolk, &c., R. Co. e. Emmert, 83 
 Va. 640; 8 S. E. Rep. 145; St. Louis, 
 &c., Ry. Co. V. Higgins, 44 Ark. 
 303. 
 
 ' In Ft. Wayne, &c , R. Co. c. 
 
 Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133, Judge 
 Cooley said, however, that even if the 
 bumpers are of different heights, and 
 the coupler makes no protest, he is 
 held to assume all risks. Toledo, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Fredericks, 71 HI. 374; 
 Schroeder «. Michigan Car Co., 56 
 Mich. 133; s. c. 82 Alb. Law Jour. 
 134; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Flanigan, 77 111. 365; Greenleaf «. 
 Illinois, (Ssc., R. Co , 29 Iowa, 14. 
 
 * Hathaway ®. Michigan, &c., R. 
 Co., 51 Mich. 253; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 569 (a case in which this branch of 
 the general question is fuUy dis- 
 cussed); Northern, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Husson, 101 Penn. St. 1; s. c. 47 Am, 
 Rep. 690. See, also. Smith v. Flint, 
 &c., R. Co., 46 Mich. 258; s. c. 41 
 Am. Rep. 161; Ballou •». Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 54 Wis, 350; B. c. 41 Am. 
 Rep. 31; Louisvflle, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Gower, 1 Pickle, 465; s. c. 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 824; Brice c. Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co. (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 288; Louis- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. r. Gower, 85 Tenn. 
 465; Atchison, &c., R. Co. r. Wagner, 
 33 Kan. 660; Wormell ■». Maine Cent. 
 R. Co., 79 Me. 397; s. c. 10 Atl. Rep. 
 
474 THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. [§ 367. 
 
 ought against accidents to train-men in making couplings in 
 freight trains. The greater part of the present contrivances 
 for connecting the cars of a freight train are rude and mur- 
 derous, but as the law stands, if one chooses to run the risk, 
 and contracts to perform such service as is required of a brake- 
 man on a freight train, he has, in case he is hurt, no legal 
 remedy. 
 
 § 366. Knowledge on the part of the employer.— In deter- 
 mining the master's liability, inasmuch as the measure of it 
 is ordinary care, it is plain that his knowledge or want of 
 knowledge of that which occasioned the injury, will be a most 
 material element in the case. If he knew, or was under a 
 legal obligation to know, and the servant did not know, or 
 was not bound to know, of the danger, the servant having ex- 
 ercised due care, then the master is, as we have already 
 shown, liable. So it will come to pass, generally, that the 
 master's knowledge is of the essence of his liability.^ 
 
 § 367. The same subject continued.— To state it broadly, 
 ■without the qualifications, if the master knows of the dan- 
 ger, or defect, he is liable; if he does not know, he 
 is not liable. By knowledge, in such a statement as 
 ■this, is meant both what the master actually knows and 
 Tvhat it is negligence for him not to know.' Said Lord 
 Cranworth, in Patterson v. Wallace :' — "It is the master's 
 ■duty to be careful that his servant is not induced to work 
 under the notion that tackle or machinery is staunch and se- 
 cure, when, in fact, the master knows, or ought to know, that it 
 is not so." This rule is everywhere sustained.* It being the 
 
 49; Vietsi). Toledo, &c., Ey. Co., 55 Crowley «. Appleton, 148 Mass. 98; 
 
 Mich. 130. 8. c. 15 N. E. Eep. 675. See, also, 
 
 ' Nason v. West, 78 Me. 253; Chi- the cases cited In § 346, supra. 
 cago, &c., R. Co. v. Montgomery, 15 ^ See S§ 36, 37, supra, for a discus- 
 Ill. App. 205. Ignorance by a servant sion of the element of knowledge on 
 of a malady which he had, and which the part of a plaintiff, 
 rendered certain labor dangerous, and ' 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748. 
 knowledge of it by his master, is not * "Ignorance by the master of defects 
 sufficient to entitle the servant to re- in the instrumentalities used by his 
 cover where the master places him at servants in performing his work is no 
 such labor; it being necessary to show defense to an action by the employee 
 further that the master did not know who has been injiired by them when, 
 that the servant was ignorant of it. by the exercise of proper care and in- 
 
§ 368.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 475 
 
 duty 6i the employer to keep himself informed of the condi- 
 tion of his machinery, tools, premises, etc., notice of a defect 
 will be presumed after the lapse of a sufficient time.* But 
 in insisting upon the rule that the master's knowledge, or 
 negligent ignorance, will render him liable to an employee 
 for an injury resulting from dangerous or defective ma- 
 chinery, and the like instrumentalities of labor, the correla- 
 tive duty on the part of the servant is not to be overlooked. 
 In connection with the master's knowledge, there must be 
 the servant's want of knowledge. If the servant run the 
 risk with his eyes open, he will ordinarily have no remedy, 
 no matter what the knowledge on the part of the master. 
 This rule is fully considered in the following sections.^ 
 
 § 368. The obligatioii of the servant.— The obligation of 
 the servant to use ordinary care to prevent and avpid injuries 
 to himself is correlative to the duty of the master to exer- 
 cise ordinary care not to expose him to danger. The servant 
 
 spection, the master could have dis- 
 covered and remedied the defects, or 
 avoided the danger incident there- 
 from." Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. 
 T. 547, 553. Wright v. New York, 
 &c., R. Co., 35 N. T. 562; Gihson ®. 
 Pacific, &c., R. Co., 46 Mo. 163; s. c. 
 2 Am. Rep. 497; Lewis v. St. Louis, 
 &c., R. Co., 59 Mo. 495; s. c. 31 Am. 
 Rep. 385; Greenleaf «. Illinois, &c., 
 R. Co., 29 Iowa, 14; Sullivan v. Lou- 
 isville Bridge Co., 9 Bush, 81; Mobile, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Thomas, 42 Ala. 673; 
 ■Colorado, &c., R. Co. v. Ogden, 8 
 Colo. 497; Walsh v. Peet Valve 
 Manfg. Co., 110 Mass. 33. See, also, 
 Johnson v. Boston Towboat Co., 135 
 Mass. 209, in which the rule in evaded 
 on the ground that when the master 
 employs a servant to see that machin- 
 ery is renewed, he has done his duty, 
 and failure of the servant to remedy 
 defects is a risk which fellow-servants 
 must take. Columbus, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Troesch, 68 111. 545; s. c. 18 Am. 
 Rep. 578; Baxter «. Roberts, 44 Cal. 
 187; Spelman «. Iron Co., 56 Barb. 
 
 151; Strahlendorf ». Rosenthal, 30 
 Wis. 674; Guthrie «. Louisville, &c., 
 R. Co., 11 Lea, 372; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 386. Of. Frazier v. Penn., 
 &c., R. Co., 38 Penn. St. 104; Boyle v. 
 Mowry, 133 Mass. 251; Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. V. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; Tex- 
 as, (fee, R. Co. V. Carlton, 60 Tex. 
 397; Mo. Pac. R. Co. «. Haley, 35 
 Kan. 35; Russell v. Village of Canas- 
 tota, 98 N. T. 496. 
 
 ' Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Russell, 
 91 111., 298; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 54; 
 Kibele v. City of Philadelphia, 105 
 Peim. St. 41. In the absence of evi- 
 dence showing how long a defect in 
 macbinervj by which a servant is in- 
 jured, has existed, the complaint will 
 be dismissed. Oehme v. Cook, 7 N. 
 T. Suplj 764; Indianapolis, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Planigan, 77 Ind. 365; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58. 
 See, also, Vosburgh «. Lake Shore, 
 &c., R. Co., 94 N. Y. 374; s. c. 46 
 Am. Rep. 148; Edwards v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 345. 
 
 " See, also, §§ 36, 37, supra. 
 
476 THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. [§ 369. 
 
 is Titider no less obligation to provide for his own safety than 
 the master is to provide for it for him. He may, like any 
 other plaintiff, in various ways contribute, to such a degree, 
 to his injury as to destroy his right of action. The measure 
 of his duty is ordinary care, and unless he exercise that, in 
 good faith, his conduct is negligent ; and when such negli- 
 gence contributes, in the legal sense, to an injury that hap- 
 pens to him, it is held to be contributory negligence, and his 
 action against his master is barred. His duty, as affecting 
 his right of rec.overy against his master in case of injury 
 while in his service, may be considered under thel following 
 heads, proceeding from the general rule that he must exer- 
 cise ordinary care to the specific and particular obligations 
 imposed upon him : • ' 
 
 § 369. He mnst possess a fair measure of skill for the 
 service he undertakes, and must inform himself at the ontset 
 of the duties and dangers peculiar to his work. — It is not 
 
 properly within the scope of this treatise to consider particu- 
 larly the duty of a servant to be qualified for the position he 
 assumes. It need not here be more than alluded to, but when 
 a servant enters upon his duties in any employment involv- 
 ing risk of life or limb, it is his duty to inform himself of 
 the danger to which he is to be exposed. As we have seen 
 it to be the duty of the master to point out such dangers 
 as are not patent,^ so it is the duty of the employee to go 
 about his work with his eyes open. He may not wait to be 
 told, but must act affirmatively. He must take ordinary care 
 to learn the dangers which are likely to beset him in the serv- 
 ice. If the master provides written or printed instructions 
 or warning, it is' his duty to read them. He must not go 
 blin<Jly and heedlessly to his work, when there is danger. 
 He must inform himself. This is the law everywhere.^ 
 
 ' § 359, iwpral Chicago, &c., R. Co. ®. Jackson, 55 
 
 = Wilson ®. Willimantic, &c., Co., 111.493; s.c. 8 Am. Rep. 661; Ladd 
 
 50 Conn. 438; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 653; v. New Bedford R. Co., 119 Mass. 
 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Clark, 108 413; s. o. 30 Am. Rep. 331; Hatha- 
 
 111. 113; Chicago, &c., R. Co. e.'War- way v. Michigan, &c., R. Co., 51 
 
 ner, 108 111. 538; Lake Shore, &c., R. Mich. 353; 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 569. 
 
 Co. «. McCormick, 74 111. 440; Illi- And in some cases it seems that the 
 
 nois, &c., R. Co. e. Jewell, 46 111. 99; .master need not expressly notify his 
 
§ 370.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 477 
 
 § 370. His knowledge when a bar.— The servant is held, 
 by his contract of hiring, to assume the risk of injury from 
 the ordinary dangers of the employment; that is to say, 
 irom such dangers as are known to him, or discoverable by 
 the exercise of ordinary care on his part.' He has, there- 
 fore, no right of action, in general, against his master for an 
 injury befalling him from such a cause. His right to re- 
 cover will often depend upon his knowledge or ignorance of 
 the danger. If he knew of it, or was under a legal obli- 
 gation to know of it, it was part of his contract, and he can- 
 not, in general, recover.' There need be no confusion here 
 
 servant of a risk where the only ef- 
 fective notice he can have is from the 
 visible presence of that from which 
 the danger is to be apprehended. 
 Michigan Central R. Co. v. Smithson, 
 45 Mich. 213 (by Cooley, J.); Cun- 
 ningham V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 5 
 McCraiy, 465; Northern, &o., R. Co. 
 1). Husson, 101 Penn. St. 1; s. c. 47 
 Am. Rep. 690; Atchison, &c., R. Co. 
 ■0. Plunkett, 35 Kan. 188; s. c. 2 Am. 
 & Eng. Ry. Cas. 128; Wait's Actions 
 & Defenses, 417, and the cases there 
 cited. 
 
 ' A distinction is well elucidated by 
 the Supreme Court of Minnesota and 
 Is also recognized elsewhere, that it is 
 one thing to be aware of dtfeeU in the 
 instrumentalities or plan furnished by 
 the master for the performance of his 
 services, and another thing to know 
 or appreciate the risks resulting or 
 which may follow from such defects. 
 The mere fact that the servant knows 
 of the defects may not charge him 
 with contributory negligence, or the 
 assumption of the risks growing out 
 of them. The question is, did he 
 know, or ought he to have known, in 
 the exercise of ordinary common 
 sense and prudence, that the risks, 
 and not merely the defects, existed ? 
 Wuotilla ». Duluth Lumber Co., 37 
 Minn. 153; s. C. 33 N. W. Rep. 551; 
 Russell V. Minneapolis, &c., Ry. Co., 
 32 Minn. 230; Cook ». St. Paid, &c.. 
 
 Ry. Co., 34 Minn. 45; Johnson «. 
 St. Paul, &c., Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 53; 
 Davis ». St. Lotus, &c., Ry. Co., 53 
 Ark. 117; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 801. 
 See, also, Eddy v. Aurora Iron Min. 
 Co., 81 Mich. 548; s. c. 48 N. W. 
 Rep. 17; Colbert «. Rankin, 73 Cal. 
 197; s. c. 13 t^ac. Rep. 491; Huhn «. 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 440; 
 s. c. 4 S. "W. Rep. 937. 
 
 " Linch 11. Sagamore Manuf . Co. , 143 
 Mass. 206 ; Hurst v. Burnside, 12 Or. 
 530; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. ■». "Watts, 
 68 Tex. 549. The owner of a printing 
 establishment is not liable to an em- 
 ployee who sustains an injury by fall- 
 ing on a slippery floor against an im- 
 covered cog of a printing-press. 
 Clark ®. Barnes, 87 Hun, 389. Bat- 
 terson v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 53 
 Mich. 135; Tuttle v. Detroit, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 122 U. S. 189; Richards ». Rough, 
 53 Mich. 212; Anderson v. Winston, 
 31 Fed. Rep. 528; Wells v. Coe, 9 Col. 
 159. Where the control of an em- 
 ployer does hot extend over the work 
 being done by his employee, i^ho has 
 the entire charge and control thereof, 
 and directs his own acts, and the man- 
 ner of doing the work, the employer 
 is not liable for an injury caused by 
 the employee's negligence. Brown «. 
 McLeish, 71 Iowa, 381; s. c. 32 N.W. 
 Rep. 385; Stroble v. Chicago, &c., 
 Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 555; Wells v. Coe, 
 9 Colo. 159; b. C. 11 Pac. Rep. 50; 
 
478 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILKriES. [§ 370. 
 
 between the ordinary risks of his employment on the one 
 hand, and his contributory negligence on the other. As- 
 
 Bunt V. Sierra Buttes Gold Mining 
 Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 847. The fact that 
 a servant contracted for a certain sum 
 per day while learning the business, 
 and a larger sum after he should he 
 taught, does not affect the assumption 
 of risk. Taylor v. Carew Manuf'g 
 Co., 143 Mass. 470; s. c. ION. E. Eep. 
 308; Wilson v. Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co., 85 Ala. 369; s. c. 4 So. Rep. 701. 
 A brakeman is not bound to look 
 for latent or hidden defects in the 
 brake. Carpenter v. Mexican Nat. 
 R. Co., 39 Fed. Eep. 315; Monaghan 
 e. New York, &c., R. Co., 45 Hun, 
 113. An employee of a railroad 
 company sustained injury from catch- 
 ing his foot in a frog without a guard. 
 It was held to be a question for 
 the jury whether so many of the 
 frogs were thus unprotected as to 
 charge the employee with notice. 
 Sherman v. Chicago, &c., Ey. Co., 
 34 Minn. 259. A workman in a mine 
 does not assume risks incident to de- 
 fects in the hoisting apparatus used 
 for lowering him to the place where 
 he works. This is not machinery 
 about which he is employed. Moran 
 V. Harris, 63 Iowa, 390. See, also, 
 Giles i>. Diamond S. I. Co. (Del.), 8 
 Atl. Eep. 368; Chicago, &c., E. Co. ■». 
 Bragonier, 119 111. 51; Houston, &c., 
 Ey. Co. V. O'Hare, 64 Tex. 600. An 
 ordinary laborer is not supposed to 
 know Whether the banks of a ditch 
 will cave in, the question being one 
 of engineering. Doyle ®. Baird, 6 
 N. T. Supl. 517; Taylor v. Baldwin, 
 78 Cal. 517; s. c. 21 Pao. Rep. 124: 
 Kossmann «. Stutz, 5 N.Y. Supl. 764. 
 A laborer employed in stacking ice 
 assumes the risk incident thereto, 
 which is apparent, and the employer, 
 though he has erected no barrier ' 
 around the stack to prevent persons 
 from falling off, is not liable for in- 
 
 juries resulting to a laborer from such 
 a fall. Thorn v. New York City Ice 
 Co., 46 Him, 497. Schmidt v. Leiste- 
 kow, 6 Dak. 386; 8. c. 43 N. W. Eep. 
 830; Eicheler v. St. Paul Furniture 
 Co., 40 Minn. 263; s. c. 41 N. W. 
 Rep. 975; Odell v. New York, i&c., 
 R. Co., 130 N. Y. 333; B. c. 24 
 N. E. Rep. 478; Haas v. Buffalo, &c., 
 R. Co., 40 Hun, 145. A car in- 
 spector and repairer who voluntarily 
 goes to work between cars, know- 
 ing that a newly-loaded car is liable 
 to be " kicked " up against the cars 
 behind him, and thus push them for- 
 ward upon him, is guOty of contribu- 
 tory negligence. Whitmore v. Boston, 
 &c., R. Co., 150 Mass. 474; s. c. 33 
 N. E. Eep. 230. Simmons v. Chicago, 
 &c., E. Co., 110 m. 340; Woodward 
 Iron Co. ■». Jones, 80 Ala. 123; The 
 Sir G^arnet Wolseley, 41 Fed. Eep. 
 896; Kinney «. Corbin, 132 Penn. St. - 
 341; B. c. 19 Atl. Eep. 141; Eickert 
 V. Stephens (Penn.), 19 Atl. Eep. 410; 
 McDonald v. Eockhill Iron & Coal 
 Co. (Penn.), 19 Atl. Eep. 797 ; B. c. 
 26 W. N. C. 101 ; Jenkins v. Mahopac 
 Iron-Ore Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 484j 
 O'Rorke v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 22 
 Fed. Rep. 189; English v. Chicago, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 906; 
 Mayes v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 63 
 Iowa, 562; Sanborn e. Madera Flume 
 & Trading Co., 70 Cal. 261. There 
 is no presumption that a brakeman 
 has sufficient skill to determine, from 
 an inspection of the brakes, their fit- 
 ness for use. Central R. Co. ». Has- 
 lett, 74 Ga. 59; Kelley v. Wilson, 21 
 111. App. 141; Mad River, &c.,R Co. 
 V. Barber, 5 Ohio St 541; Dale v. St. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 63 Mo. 455; 
 Mansfield, &c., Co. «. McEnery, 91 
 Penn. St. 185; b. c. 36 Am. Rep. 662; 
 Pingree v. Leyland, 135 Mass. 398; 
 Umbeck v. Lake Shore, &c., R. Co.,. 
 
§ 370.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 47& 
 
 suming the risks of an employment is one thing, and quite 
 an essentially diflferent thing, from incurring an injury 
 through contributory negligence. It is not contributory 
 negligence, per se, to engage in a dangerous occupation. 
 Men may properly and lawfully do work that is essentially 
 dangerous work, or work that is, for some reason or another, 
 more than ordinarily dangerous for the time being, and to 
 contract to do such work is not, in itself, an act of negligence.'- 
 Accordingly, an employee may know that his work is danger- 
 ous, and yet not be guilty of contributory negligence in 
 doing it. This is not such knowledge as the rule in question 
 contemplates.* 
 
 SSInd. 191; Perigo ®. Chicago, &c., 
 B. Co., 55 Iowa, 336 ; Shanny v. An- 
 droscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420 ; Coombs 
 v. New Bedford, &c., Co., 103 Mass. 
 572; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 506; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Jackson, 55 111. 492; 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Asbury, 84 111. 
 429; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Clark, 
 108 lU. 113; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 "Warner, 108 111. 338; Davis «i. Detroit, 
 &c., . R. Co., 20 Mich. 105; Dillon ®. 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co, 3 Dill. 319; 
 Biyant s. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 66 
 Iowa, 305; s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 669, Coolbroth d. Maine, &c., R. Co., 
 77 Me. 165; s. c. 1 East. Rep. 140; 
 Powers V. New York, &c., R. Co., 98 
 N. T. 274; Jackson v. Kansas, &c., 
 R. Co., 31 Kan. 761. But see, also, 
 where judgments have been sus- 
 tained, notwithstanding that the 
 servant had knowledge of the defect 
 or danger which resulted in his in- 
 jury. White V. Nonantum Worsted 
 Co., 144 Mass. 376 ; Dorsey v. Phillips, 
 43 Wis. 583; Fairbanks ®. Haentzsche 
 73 HI. 336; Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl, 
 &N. 349; 8. c. 7 Hurl. «fc N. 937 
 Mo. Pac. R. Co. V. Holley, 30 Kan 
 465; Baiid v. Chicago, &c., R. Co. 
 61 Iowa, 359; Parley ». Chicago, &c. 
 R. Co., 56 Iowa, 337; Beems v. Chi 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 58 Iowa, 150 
 Lawless v. Conn., &c., R. Co., 136 
 Mass. 1. In a note in 30 Cent. Law. 
 
 Jour. 464, by R. K Boney, Esq., the- 
 matter of assumption of risk by the 
 employees of railway companies, and 
 whether the question is one for the' 
 jury, is discussed, and many authori- 
 ties collected. See, also, §§ 360, 361, 
 supra, and the cases cited in the pre- 
 ceding note. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania Co. v. Long, 94Ind. 
 350; Baird v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 61 
 Iowa, 359; Reems v. Chicago, &c., 
 R. Co., 58 Iowa, 150; Flynn v. Kan 
 sas, &c., R. Co., 78 Mo. 195; b. c. 47 
 Am. Rep. 99; Missouri Furnace Co, 
 V. Abend, 107 III. 44; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 435. 
 
 ' Laning v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 49 N. Y. 631; b. c. 10 Am. 
 Rep. 417; Mehan v. Syracuse, &c., R. 
 Co., 73 N. Y. 585; Hawley «. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 83 N. Y. 370; 
 Daley v. Shaaf, 38 Hun, 314; Aid- 
 ridge V. Blast Co., 78 Mo. 559. The 
 fact that an employee has performed 
 work, knowing it to be dangerous, 
 does not of itself make him guilty of 
 contributory negligence, but it must 
 appear that he performed that which 
 was dangerous in a negligent manner. 
 Mobile, &c., Ry. Co. v. Holbom(Ala.), 
 4 So. Rep. 146. But the rule is modi- 
 fled in case of an infant employee. 
 Smith v. HestonviUe, &c., R Co., 93 
 Penn. St. 450; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 
 705. 
 
480 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 371. 
 
 § 371. Continued service after kno^rledge a wairer of tlie 
 -defect or danger. — This is, by far, tjie most important branch 
 -of the subject. It is the rule applicable to this matter that if 
 the servant, when the defect or danger is brought to his 
 knowledge— when he discovers that the machinery, buildings, 
 premises, tools, or other instrumentalities of his labor, are 
 unsafe or unfit, or that a fellow-servant is careless or incom- 
 petent — continues in the employment, without protest or 
 complaint, he is deemed to assume the risks of such danger, 
 ^nd to waive any claim upon his master for damages in case 
 of injury.* But, as has already been suggested, the severity 
 
 ' Worden v. Humeston, &c., K. Co., 
 73 Iowa, 301; s. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 639; 
 Patton «. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 
 73 Iowa, 306; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 
 149; Hewitt «. Flint, &c., R. Co., 
 ■67 Mich. 61; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 
 ■659; Wilson «. "Winona, &c., R. Co., 
 87 Minn. 336; b. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 
 908. The rule applies although 
 the servant uses the defective ap- 
 pliances by the order of his su- 
 perior. JTexas, &c., Ry. Co. v. Brad- 
 ford (Tex.), 3 S. W. 595; Linch v. 
 ;8agamore Manfg. Co., 143 Mass. 306; 
 S. c. 9 N. E. Rep. 738; Schulz v. Chi- 
 <!ago, &c. Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 616; s. c. 
 31 K. W. Rep. 331; Hatt v. Nay, 144 
 Mass. 186; s. c. 10 N. E. Rep. 807; 
 Neilling «. Industrial Manf'g Co., 78 
 <Ja. 360; Rogers v. Galveston CityR. 
 Co., 76 Tex. 503; b. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 
 ■540; Rush v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 36 Kan. 139; PoUich v. Sellers (La. ), 
 7 So. 786; Smith «. Sibley Manuf 'g Co., 
 85 Ga. 333; s. C 11 8. E. Rep. 616; 
 Lord V. Pueblo Smelting & Refining 
 Co., 13 Colo. 390; a. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 148; 
 Hawk B. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Penn.), 
 11 Atl. Rep. 459; Beittenmiller v. Berg- 
 ner, &&, Brewing Co. (Penn.),18 Atl. 
 Rep. 599. In an action by an em- 
 ployee against a railroad company for 
 injuries, it appears that these were 
 caused by the carelessness and reckless- 
 ness of an engineer, who was in the hab- 
 it of acting recklessly, to the danger of 
 
 his co-employees; that the company 
 knew his character; that plaintifihad 
 been in the employ of the company 
 with this engineer only a week. It 
 was held that whether the failure of the 
 plaintiff to refuse to work amounted 
 to negligence was a question for the 
 jury. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mares, 
 133 U. S. 710; New York, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Lyons, 119 Penn. St. 
 334; B. 0. 13 Atl. Rep. 305; Mc- 
 Dermott «. Hannibal, &c., R. Co., 87 
 Mo. 385; Hatt v. Nay, 144 Mass. 186; 
 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. «■. Bradford, 
 66 Tex. 733; Pleasants*. Raleigh, &c., 
 R. Co., 95 N. C. 195; Bogenschutz «. 
 Smith, 84 Ky. 330; B. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 
 578; Grube v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 98 Mo. 330; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 736; 
 Needham v. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 
 85Ky. 433; Anthony v. Leeret, 105 
 N. T. 591; B. c 13 N. E. Rep. 561; 
 Devitt V. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 50 Mo. 
 303; O'Rourke b. Pacific, &c., R. Co., 
 33 Fed. Rep'. 189; Foley v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 48 Mich. ^33; s. c. 43 
 Am. Rep. 481; Fort Wayne, &o., R. 
 Co. «. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133; 
 Davis V. Detroit, &c., R. Co., 30 Mich. 
 105; FonesD. Philips, 39 Ark. 17; B. c. 
 43 Am. Rep. 364; Dillon v. Union 
 Pacific Ry. Co., 3 DUl. 319; Kielley 
 V. Belcher, &c., Co., 3 Sawyer, 500, 
 Jones V, Yeager, 8 DUl. 64; Ladd v. 
 New Bedford R. Co., 119 Mass. 413; 
 B. 0. 30 Am. Rep. 331. But the ac- 
 
§ 371.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 481 
 
 of this rule is somewhat relaxed in favor of persons who are 
 too young or too ignorant to appreciate the dangers to which 
 they are exposing themselves.* Neither does the rule apply 
 to the case of a seaman serving on board a ship, as his re- 
 fusal to work might be visited with corporal punishment.^ 
 Whenever an employee discovers anything affecting the safety 
 of the machinery, or appliances, which he is obliged to use, 
 or the fitness and competence of the servants with whom he 
 is associated, it is his duty to inform his employer at once of 
 the fact. He cannot be silent and escape the consequences, 
 failure to speak promptly is such contributory negligence as 
 will bar a recoTjery from the master in case he is injured by the 
 
 m. 492; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 661; Hule- 
 han v. Green Bay, &c., R. Co., 68 
 "Wis. 520; 8. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 529; 
 Miirtaugh u. K T., &c., B.' Co., 49 
 Hun, 456; Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Asbury, 84111. 429; Perigo v. Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co., 55 Iowa, 326; Hanrathy 
 n. Northern, &c., B. Co., 46 Md. 280; 
 Crutchfleld «. Richmond, &c.,R. Co., 
 78 N. C. 300; Prazier s. Penn. B. Co., 38 
 Penn. St. 104; Cowles v. Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co,. 84 N. C. 309; s. c. 37 Am. 
 Rep. 620; Sullivan v. India Manufac- 
 turing Co., 113 Mass. 396; Clark v. 
 St. Paul, &e., B. Co., 28 Minn. 128; 
 Assop ®. Tates, 2 Hurl. & N. 767; 
 Skipp v. Eastern By. Co., 240 Eng. 
 L. & E. 396; 8. c. 9 Exch. 223; Grif- 
 fith V: Gidlow, 3 Hurl. & N. 648; 
 Woodley «. Metropolitan, &c., Ry. 
 Co., 2 Exch. Div. 384; Ogden v. Rum- 
 mens, 3 Fost. & Fin. 751; Dynen v. 
 Leach, 26 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 221. 
 
 ' Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage 
 Co., 102 Mass. 572; s. c. 8 Am. Bep. 
 506; Laning v. New York, &c., B. 
 Co., 49 N. Y. 521; s. c. 10 Am. Bep. 
 417; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Grizzle 
 V. Frost, 3 Fost. & Fin. 622; Britton 
 o. Great Western Cotton Co., L. B. 7 
 Exch. 130. 
 
 » Eldridge ■o. Atlas S. S. Co., 55 Hun, 
 309; 8. C. 8 N. Y. Supl. 433; Bothwell 
 ■B. Hutchison, 13 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 468. 
 
 quiescense of the servant must rest 
 upon positive knowledge, or reason- 
 able means of positive knowledge 
 of the precise danger assumed, and 
 not on vague surmiee of the possibil- 
 ity of danger. Dorsey v. Phillips Con 
 struction Co., 42 Wis. 583; Waldhier 
 «. Hannibal, &c., B. Co., 87 Mo. 37; 
 Robinson n. Houston, &c., R. Co., 46 
 Tex. 540; Dale v. St. Louis, &c., R. 
 Co., 63 Mo. 455; Buzzell e. Manfg. 
 Co., 48 Me. 113; Sullivan b. Louisville 
 Bridge Co., 9 Bush, 81; Hayden i>. 
 Manfg. Co., 29 Conn. 548; Kelley c. 
 Silver Spring Co., 12 R. I. 112; s. c. 
 34 Am. Bep. 615; Hough v. Texas, 
 Ac., B. Co., 100 U. S. 213, and the 
 cases collected in the Reporter's note; 
 Cooley on Torts, 559; Shearman & Bed- 
 fleldonNegligence,4thed., §§211,215; 
 LeClaire®. First Div., &c., B. Co., 20 
 Minn. 9; Wright ®. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Laning v. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; 8. c. 
 10 Am. Bep. 417; Gibson v. Erie By. 
 Co., 63 N. Y. 449; s. c. 20 Am. Bep. 
 552; Georgia, &c., R. Co. d. Kemiey, 
 
 r58 Ga. 485; Western, &c., I^. Co. v. 
 Johnson, 55 Ga. 133; Lumley v. Cas- 
 well, 47 Iowa, 159. While such de- 
 fect or danger is notice in law to the 
 servant, whether his knowledge will 
 prevent recovery for injuries received 
 is always a question for the jury. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. «. Jackson, 55 
 31 
 
482 
 
 THE MASTEB's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 372. 
 
 defect in the maclimery, or the unfitness of the servant.^ That 
 the servant, in such a case, has lost his right of action is con- 
 ceded, but the authorities disagree somewhat as to whether it 
 should be upon the ground of waiver or of contributory negli- 
 gence.^ 
 
 § 373. A qnaliflcation of this rule.— But if, when the mas- 
 ter is notified of the defect in the machinery or of the in- 
 competence of the servant, he promises to remedy it within 
 a reasonable time, the servant will not, as a matter of law, be 
 presumed to have consented to it, or to have waived his 
 rights by remaining for such reasonable time in the service ; 
 but mere complaint to the master, unless a promise to repair 
 is made will not justify the servant in continuing to expose 
 himself to the danger.' It is also asserted by some courts. 
 
 'Patterson ■». Pittsburgh, &c., R. 
 Co., 76 Penn. St. 389; s. C. 18 Am. 
 Rep. 412; Toledo, &c., R. Co., ®. Ed- 
 dy, 73 lU. 138; Lumley v. Caswell, 47 
 Iowa, 159; Crutchfield ®. Richmond, 
 &c., R. Co., 78 N. 0. 300; Allerton 
 Packing Co. «. Egan, 86111. 258; Davis 
 V. Detroit, &c., R. Co., 20 Mich. 105; 
 Clark V. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 38 
 Minn. 128. 
 
 ' Clark v. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 28 
 Minn. 138. 
 
 » Galveston R. Co. ■». Drew, 59 Tex. 
 10; 8. c. 46 Am. Rep. 361. "If ma- 
 chinery upon which a servant is em- 
 ployed has become dangerous, and the 
 servant has complained of it and has 
 been promised that it shall be repaired, 
 but is injured before the defect is rem- 
 edied, and while he is reascaiably ex- 
 pecting the promise to be performed, 
 the promise is a circumstance to be 
 considered by the jury in determining 
 whether he has assumed the risk in 
 the meantime, and whether he was 
 using due care when he knew there 
 was danger. But no case, we believe, 
 has gone the length of deciding that 
 the promise entitles the servant to re- 
 cover, as matter of law, which was 
 the effect of the ruling asked. And 
 if, as is supposed in the request, the 
 
 time for performance has gone by be- 
 fore the accident, as must have been 
 the fact, the servant knows that the 
 repair has not been made, there is a 
 very strong argument that the servant 
 is no longer relying upon the promise 
 but has decided to take the risk." 
 Holmes, J., in Counsell v. Hall, 145 
 Mass. 468. Gulf, &c., Ry. Co. v. Don- 
 nelly, 70 Tex. 371; s. o. 8 So. Rep. 
 52. A laborer working under a gravel 
 bank saw that the bank was in danger 
 of falling, and asked the supervisor 
 that a man should be placed to watch 
 it. The supervisor promised to send a 
 man, but failed to do so. The laborer 
 went on working imtil the bank fell 
 and injured him. It was held by 
 the Supreme Court of the United 
 States that he had no cause of action. 
 District of Columbia v. McElligott, 
 117 TJ. 8. 631. Webber j>. Piper, 
 38 Hun, 353; Atchison, &c., R. Co. 
 V. McKee, 37 Kan. 592; s. c. 15 
 Pac. Rep. 484; Sioux City, «&c., R. 
 C6. «. Pmlayson, 16 Neb. 578; Central 
 Trust Co. ■». "Wabash, &o.,Ry. Co., 26 
 Fed. Rep. 897. A lamplighter con- 
 tinued to use a ladder without hooks 
 or spikes, knowing that without them 
 it was dangerous. His master had 
 several times promised that it should 
 
§ 372.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 483 
 
 and it is, perhaps, the prevailing view, that the servant need 
 not, for every slight defect, abandon the service, even though 
 he kn«w of it. He may run some risk, such as a prudent 
 man would run, without losing his right of action against the 
 master, in case injury results. Judge Thompson ^ makes a 
 pertinent criticism of this impingement upon the general 
 rule, as follows : — " This modification of the rule cannot be 
 defended on strictly logical grounds, for, if the servant has 
 full knowledge of the defect, and yet the defect is of such a char- 
 acter as not to lead to a reasonable probability that it will 
 result in injury to him, how can negligence be imputed to the 
 master for suffering it to continue. The rule as thus modi- 
 fied, in effect, declares that the master is bound to take more 
 care of the servant than the servant is bound to take of 
 himself." To which one might reply : — Xea, verily, but it is. 
 a pretty gabd rule of la,w after all. The doctrine is fully set 
 forth in Patterson v. Pittsburgh, &c., E. Co.,* by Judge Gor- 
 don, and it is clearly the rule in many jurisdictions.' 
 
 be hooked and spiked. One stormy 
 night the ladder slipped. Held, that 
 for the resulting injury the lamplighter 
 could not maintain an action against 
 his master. [Ruger, C. J., dissent- 
 ing.] Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N. 
 T. 396. Thorpe v. Missouri Pac. Ky. 
 Co., 89 Mo. 650; b. c. 2 8. W. Rep. 
 3, declares, however, that there is no 
 waiver on the part of the servant if 
 there has been any notice given by 
 him, though timid and hesitating, so 
 long as it plainly conveys to the mas- 
 ter the idea that a defect exists and 
 that the servant desires its removal. 
 Wilson D. Winona, &c., R. Co., 37 
 Minn. 326; S. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 908; 
 McDowell «. Chesapeake, &c., R. Co. 
 (Ky.), 5 S. W. Rep. 413; Worden «. 
 Humeston, &c., R. Co., 72 Iowa, 201; 
 B. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 629; East Tenn., 
 &c., R. Co. v. Duffleld, 12 Lea, 63; 
 B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 319; Kroy v. Chi- 
 cago, &c,, R. Co., 32 Iowa, 257. No- 
 tice given by a servant to a subordi- 
 nate is ordinarily not sufScient, how- 
 ever exclusive the tetter's authority, 
 
 he being but a fellow-servant. ' Pat- 
 terson V. Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co., 76 
 Penn. St. 389; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 412; 
 Ford «. Pitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 
 241; B. c. 14 Am. Rep, 598; Houghs. 
 Texas, &c., R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 
 Conroy v. Vulcan Ironworks, 62 Mo. 
 38; Cooley on Torts, §559; Shearman 
 & Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., 
 § 216; Wharton on Negligence, § 220; 
 Snow «. Housatonic R. Co., 8 Allen„ 
 441; Huddleston v. Machine Shop, 
 106 Mass. 282; Missouri Furnace Co.. 
 ®. Abend, 107 HI. 44; s. c. 47 Am. 
 Rep. 425; Man'fg. Co. v. Morrissey,, 
 40 Ohio St. 148; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 
 669; Greene v. Minneapolis, &c., R. 
 Co., 31 Minn. 248; B. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 785; Moak's UnderhUl's Torts, 61, 62. 
 
 ' Thompson on Negligence, 1010. 
 
 » 76 Penn. St. 389; s. c. 18 Am. 
 Rep. 412. 
 
 ' Greene «. Minneapolis, &c., R. 
 Co., 31 Minn. 248; s. o. 47 Am. Rep. 
 785 [a carefully considered case]; 
 Thorpe n. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 89' 
 Mo. 650; B. c. 2 8. W. Rep. 3; Plyna 
 
484 
 
 THE master's obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 373. 
 
 § 373. Servant must obey rales established to promote 
 bis safety. — It is contributory negligence of an aggravated 
 character on the part of, an employee to disobey reasonable 
 Tules and regulations enacted to protect him from injury. 
 If he is injured through such a gross and unwarranted dis- 
 regard of his own safety, his remedy is gone. Such negli- 
 :gence is the most pronounced contributory negligence possi- 
 Tale. It properly leaves the person injuried by it wholly 
 remediless.^ The disobedience of the servant must, however, 
 
 D. Kansas, &c., R. Co., 78 Mo. 195; 
 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 99;' Keegan d. Kav- 
 anaugh, 62 Mo. Z32; Ford v. Fitch- 
 *urg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240; s. c. 14 
 Am. Rep. 598; Kroy v. Chicago, &c., 
 B. Co., 32 Iowa, 357; Colorado, &c., 
 Tl. Co. «. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499; Buz- 
 zell V. Man'f g. Co., 48 Me. 113; Whar- 
 ton on Negligence, § 221; Hawley v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 82 N. Y. 370 
 [(y. this case with Mehan «. Syracuse, 
 Ac, R. Co., 73 N. Y. 585]; Greenleaf 
 ■0. Dubuque, &c., R. Co., 33 Iowa, 52; 
 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 
 -4th ed., g§ 213, 214; Clarke v. Holmes, 
 V Hurl. & N. 937; s. c. gtib nom., 
 Holmes v. Clarke. 6 Hurl. & N. 349; 
 Solmes ®. Worthington, 2 Fost. & 
 Fin. 633. Note the dictwm of Byles, 
 J., in Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & 
 N. 937, "but a servant knowing the 
 fact may be utterly ignorant of the 
 risks." See, also, §§ 363, 364, si^ara, as 
 to the risks from overhead railway 
 structure and from coupling freight 
 cars; Vosburgh ■». Lake Shore, &c., R. 
 €o., 94 N. Y. 374; s.c. 46 Am. Rep. 148. 
 ' Darracutts v. Chesapeake, &c., R, 
 Co., 83 Va. 288; B. c. 2 S. E. Rep. 
 511; Olson v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 38 
 Minn. 412; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 352. 
 The question of contributory negli- 
 gence is for the jury, when the serv- 
 ant's knowledge of the rule is a matter 
 of dispute. Bunlap v. Northeastern 
 R. Co., 130 tJ. S. 649; Gulf, &c.,Ry. 
 ■Co. V. Ryan, 69 Tex. 665; s. c. 7 S. 
 'W. Rep. 83; Alexander «. Louisville, 
 Ac, R. Co., 83 Ky. 589; Murray v. 
 
 Gulf, &c., Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 2; a. c. 11 
 S. W. Rep. 125; Prathers. Richmond, 
 &c, R. Co., 80 Ga. 427; s. c. 9 S. E. 
 Rep. 530; International, &c, R. Co. 
 J). Hester, 72 Tex. 40; s. c. 11 S. W. 
 Rep. 1041. A conductor's place on 
 his freight train going down a grade 
 was, under the rule of the company, 
 in the middle of the train. He was 
 killed while he was forward warning 
 the engineer to look out for certain 
 obstructions ahead. The fact that he 
 was not in the middle of the train, un- 
 der these circumstances, did not pre- 
 clude a recoveiy against the company. 
 Somerset & Cambria R. Co. «. Gal- 
 braith, 109 Penn. St. 32. Ignorance 
 of rules which have never been 
 brought to his attention does not pre-, 
 judice the servant. Le Croy v. New 
 York, &c, R. Co., 10 N. Y. Supl. 
 382; Carroll v. EastTenn., &c, Ry., 
 Co., 82 Ga. 452; Central R. t. Ryals 
 (Ga.), 11 S. E. Rep. 499; Covey 
 V. Hannibal, &c, R. Co., 27 Mo. 
 App. 170; Gardner ®. Michigan 
 Central R. Co., 58 Mich. 584; Beck- 
 ham V. Hillier, 47 N. J. Law, 12; 
 Quick V. Indianapolis, &c, Ry. Co., 
 130 m. 334; Abend v. Terre Haute, 
 &c, R. Co., Ill m. 202; Memphis, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637; 
 Lockwood V. Chicago, &c.. R. Co., 65 
 Wis. 50; Fay ». Minneapolis, &c., R. 
 Co., 30 Minn. 231; Lyon «. Detroit, 
 &c., R. Co., 31 Mich. 429; Shanny v. 
 Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420; Gates 
 V. Burlington, &c, R. Co., 89 Iowa, 
 45; Locke «. Sioux City, &c., R. Co., 
 
§ 374.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 485 
 
 have been the proximate cause of the injury; unless it were, 
 it will, upon familiar grounds, cut no figure in the case.^ 
 Accordingly, it was held in Indiana, that a locomotive engi- 
 neer, although violating the rules of the company in running^ 
 his e];igine at a rate of speed far in excess of that prescribed 
 by the printed regulations furnished him, and by which he 
 was bound to be guided, was, nevertheless, not guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence in standing at his post in the face of an 
 impending collision which was rendered imminent by a mis- 
 placed switch, when, by jumping from the locomotive, h& 
 might have escaped injury. For an injury which he sus- 
 tained under su<^ circumstances, although at the time he wa» 
 violating a plain rule of the company, he was held entitled 
 to recover, it not appearing that his violation of the rule was 
 the proximate cause of the collision.' 
 
 § 374. LiaMity of a servant to a fellow-servant. — It is 
 
 now well settled that one servant may maintain an action 
 against a fellow-servant for damages resulting from such 
 fellow-servant's negligence in the discharge of his duties in 
 the common employment.' In Albro v. Jaquith^ the Supreme 
 
 46 Iowa, 109; Hubgh v. New Orleans, Cas. 30; 8. c. 1 Pat. Sc. App. 447; 3S 
 
 &c., R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495; 8. c. 54 Eng. Law & Eq. 1. 
 
 Am Dec. 565; Illinois, &c., R. Co. «. ' Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roney, 89 
 
 Houck, 72 111. 385. It is not negli- Ind. 453; s. c.46 Am. Rep. 173. SeSv 
 
 gence upon the part of the employee also, Cottrill v. Chicago, &c., R. Co.,. 
 
 to act, in an emergency, upon the 47 Wis. 634; s. c. 82 Am. Rep. 796. 
 
 verbal order of the train dispatcher, Cf. § 45, supra. 
 
 although a rule of the road required ^ Hare «. Mclntire, 82 Me. 240; s. C. 
 
 that the specific order should be in 19 Atl. Rep. 453; Osbom «. Morgan, 
 
 ■writing. Smith v. Wabash, &c., Ry. 130 Mass. 103; 8. c. 39 Am. Rep. 467; 
 
 Co., 93 Mo. 359; s. c. 4 8. W. Rep. 137 Mass. 1 (overruling Albro v. Ja- 
 
 129. And see, also, Ohio, &c., R. Co. quith, 4 Gray, 99; s. c. 64 Am. Dec. 
 
 'v. CoUam, 73 Ind. 361; s. c. 38 Am. 56); Hinds «. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121; 
 
 Rep. 134. Cf. George v. Gobey, 138 Hinds ». Overacker,66 Ind. 547; s. c. 
 
 Mass. 389; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 376. 33 Am Rep. 114; Rogers v. Overton, 
 
 Beckham v. HUlier, 47 N. J. Law, 87 Ind. 410; Griflths «. Woltram, 32; 
 
 313, in which a boy of sixteen, who Minn. 185; Swainson v. Northeastern 
 
 had been told to get assistance in re- Ry. Co. , 8 Exch. Div. 341, 343; Wright, 
 
 placing a belt in a machine shop, was v. Roxburgh, 2 Ct. of Sess. Cass. (3d 
 
 held guilty of contributory negligence series), 748. Of. Wiggett v. Fox, 11 
 
 if he failed to do so and was mjured. Exch. 832, 839; Degg. v. Midland. 
 
 ' Ford v. Fitchburg R. ■ Co., 110 Ry. Co., 1 Huri. & N. 773, 781. 
 
 Mass. 340; s. o. 14 Am. Rep. 598; * 4 Gray, 99; 8. c. 64 Am. Dec. BS. 
 Marshall v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L. 
 
486 THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. [§ 375. 
 
 Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided in 1855 that such 
 aiCtions were not maintainable. This was an action of tort 
 gainst the superintendent of the cotton and woolen mill of 
 the Agawam Canal Company, to recover damages for an in- 
 jury sustained from the escape of gas, caused by the negli- 
 gence of the defendant in the management of the apparatus 
 used in lighting the mill, and the defendant had judgment 
 upon the ground that there was no contract stipulating for 
 «are between the defendant and the plaintiff, and that the act 
 complained of was a mere act of non-feasance for which the 
 servant was liable only to the master, and also upon the 
 further ground that the matter was res adjvdicata, because an 
 action had been previously brought against the mill owners 
 for the same injury by the same plaintiff,^ wherein it had been 
 adjudicated that the negligence of the superintendent, being 
 the negligence of a fellow-servant, did not confer upon the 
 injured employee any right of action against the common 
 employer. This was equivalent to holding that servants 
 in a common employment owe to each other no duty even of 
 ordinary care that can be enforced in a court of justice — a 
 doctrine which has been much criticised by the text-writers,' 
 and one so obviously opposed to plain principles of justice 
 and right legal reason that, in 1881, the court completely re- 
 ceded from its anomalous and erratic position, and, in a case 
 in which the facts were for substance the same, held — over- 
 ruling Albro V. Jaquith — that in Massachusetts such actions 
 may be maintained, thereby falling in line with other courts 
 in this countiy, as well as those of England and Scotland, 
 upon this point. The right to bring these actions, which 
 ought never to have been for an instant questioned, will, it 
 may safely be said, never hereafter be denied in any court 
 where the common law obtains. 
 
 § 375. His liability to the master and to third persons.— 
 
 The servant, moreover, is liable as well to his master as to 
 
 ' Albro «. Agawam Canal Co., 6 Dicey on Parties, 465, note. Judge 
 
 Cush. 75. Thompson says: — "This case must 
 
 "Shearman & Eedfleld on Negli- rank as a mere judicial aberration. If 
 gence, 4th ed., § 344; Thompson on it had been decided by a less eminent 
 Negligence, 1063, § 3; Wharton on court it would not deserve to be men- 
 Negligence, § 345; Story on Agency, tioned in terms of respect." Thomp- 
 § 453 ((i)note; Bigelow's Leading Cases son on Negligence, 1063, § 3. 
 on Torts, 710; Addison on Torts, 345; 
 
§377.] THE master's OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. 487 
 
 his fellow-servant for any damage that comes of his negli- 
 gence,^ and when a master has been compelled to pay the 
 damages caused by the negligence of his servant, he may sue 
 the servant and recover back the money paid.^ The servant 
 is also, as of course, liable to any third person injured by 
 his negligent wrong-doing. He is in no way excused or 
 shielded, by reason of the liability of his master in cases for 
 the consequences of his acts, from personal responsibility 
 for the wrong he does. This, however, is not pertinent to 
 our treatise, and is, therefore, here merely alluded to. 
 
 § 376. Statntorymodiflcationsof the rule which exempts 
 a master from liability to one servant for the negligent 
 wrong-doing of a co-servant. — It became evident, early in 
 the course of the development of the law upon this point, 
 that, in order to preserve to the employee any vestige of the 
 right of action which the common law gave him against his 
 employer, in a proper case, for personal injuries attributable 
 to the negligence of another, and received in the course of 
 the common employment, the tendency to extend the rule 
 which had its inception in England, in the case of Priest- 
 ley V. Fowler,' and, in the United States, in the early cases of 
 Murray v. South Carolina E. Co.,* and Farwell v. The Bos- 
 ton & Worcester K. Co.,' and under the operation of which 
 the defense of a common employment had come to be urged 
 to the practical destruction of all such rights of action, 
 would have to be checked, and could only be checked, by leg- 
 islation. Accordingly, on the 7th of September, 1880, Par- 
 liament changed the law of England by passing the Employ- 
 ers' Liability Act,* which, pending its final enactment, was 
 popularly known as " the Gladstone Bill," and which, at the 
 time, attracted much attention both here and in England. 
 
 § 377. The Employers' liability Act in England.— The 
 
 statute provides, in sections 1 and 2, that common employ- 
 
 • Page c. WeUs (by Cooley, J.), 37 " 3 Mee. & W. 1. 
 
 Mich. 415, 421. ■* 1 McMullan's Law, 385; s. c. 36 
 
 » Davis «. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716; Am. Dec. 268. 
 
 Zulke V. Wing, 20 Wis. 408. See, ' 4 Mete. 49; s. c. 38 Am. Dec. 339. 
 
 however. White*. Phillipston, 10 • 43 and 44 Vict., eh. 42. 
 iletc. 108. 
 
488 THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. [§ 378. 
 
 ment, so called, shall not be a defense where a workman re- 
 ceives persojnal injury : — 1. By reason of any defect in the 
 ways, works, machinery or plant connected with or used in 
 the business of the employer, which defect existed in conse- 
 quence of the negligence of the employer, or of an employee 
 by him entrusted with the duty of guarding against any de- 
 fect. 2. By reason of the negligence of any person entrusted 
 with superintendence. 3. By reason- of the negligence of any 
 superior workman whose orders the person injured was bound 
 to obey. 4. By reason of obeying proper rules or by-laws, or 
 any rule or by-law duly approved by certain public officers 
 therein specified. 5. By reason of the negligence, on a railway, 
 of any person at the time in control of the train. Unless the 
 person injured knew, or failed, when necessary, to give notice 
 of the defect which caused the injury. Section 3 limits the 
 sum recoverable as compensation. Section 4 limits the time 
 for recovery of compensation. Section 5 makes any penalty 
 received by any other act part payment. Section 6 relates 
 to the trial of actions. Section 7 provides for the service of 
 a notice of any injury received. Sections 8, 9 and 10, re- 
 spectively, define terms used in the act, tell when it shall 
 go into operation, by what title it shall be called, and how 
 long it shall (continue in force.* 
 
 § 378. The effect of the Act.— From this resume of the 
 statute it appears that the defense of common employment has 
 not been wholly abolished in England, and that where the 
 employee who causes and the employee who receives the in- 
 jury are fellow-servants of the same grade, the liability of the 
 master remains as before. Had it been intended to abolish 
 this defense in all cases, it might have been accomplished in 
 a single sentence. It rather brings back the law to the orig- 
 inal position in which it stood in 1837, after Priestley v. 
 Fowler' had been decided. The authority of that case is not 
 overthrown, and it is still good law in Westminster Hall ; 
 but the thousand refinements upon the doctrine of Priestley 
 V. Fowler, which the English courts were not slow to distin- 
 guish, and under the operation of which English employers 
 in recent years have, for the most part, gone scot-free of any 
 
 ' The operation of the statute has by subsequent enactments been indefinite- 
 ly extended. 
 « 3 Mee & "W. 1. 
 
§ 379.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 
 
 489 
 
 liability or responsibility for the personal injuries which 
 their servants or employees have sustained in the course of 
 their employment through the negligence of others, for 
 whom the common employer was justly responsible, will no 
 longer avail as defenses in actions of this nature.^ 
 
 § 379. Legislation on the subject in the United States. — 
 
 Comparatively recent legislation in several of the States 
 of the Union has in some degree modified for us iu this 
 country the rule of non-liability which the courts of every 
 jurisdiction, as we have seen, have uniformly declared. 
 In California,* Dakota,' Georgia,* Kansas,* Iowa,* Mis- 
 
 * A collection of cases that have 
 arisen under the Employers' Liability 
 Act may be found in Shirley's Lead- 
 ing Cases, p. 279, and in McEJnney 
 on Fellow-Servants, § 98, and the 
 notes. 
 
 ' Codes and Statutes of California, 
 6971, § 1971, modified by 6970, § 1970, 
 so as to make the change in the law of 
 no practical value. 
 
 » Civfl Code Dak., § 1130, precisely, 
 verbaMm, et literatim, the same as the 
 law of California. 
 
 ♦ Codeof 1873, page 531, 3086(2981). 
 In this State the law, so far as the 
 liabilty of railway companies is con- 
 cerned, is completely changed. The 
 material part of the statute is, viz. : 
 — "Injury by co-employee. If the 
 person injured is himself an em- 
 ployee of the company, and the 
 damage was caused by another 
 employee, and without fault or neg- 
 ligence on the part of the per- 
 son injured, his employment by the 
 company shall be no bar to the re- 
 covery." Code, § 8036 (3981), enact- 
 ed by the legislature during the session 
 of 1855-56. It was the first State to 
 make any change in the common law 
 doctrine of co-service. See, also, 
 Thompson b. Central, &c., K. Co., 54 
 Ga. 509. 
 
 ' Revised Laws of Kansas, 1879, 
 
 page 784, ch. 84, § 4914, taken from, 
 Statutes of 1876, 869, § 4604, enacted 
 March 4, 1874, viz.: — "Every railroad 
 company, organized or doing business- 
 in this State, shall be liable for all 
 damages done to any employee of 
 such company, in consequence of any 
 negligence of its agents, or by any 
 mismanagement of its engineers or 
 other employees, to any person sus- 
 taining such damage." In 1878 the 
 case of Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Sal- 
 mon, 11 Kan. 98, was decided, and 
 owing to the hardship felt to exist in 
 this case, the law was changed by the 
 statute referred to above in the fol- 
 lowing year. The jury in the court 
 below had given a verdict for $7,500 
 to a widow for personal injuries re- 
 sulting in the death of her husband, 
 and a new trial was refused. The 
 case was then taken up on error and 
 decided against the plaintiff, upon the 
 ground that a previous statute making 
 railways liable for negligence in 
 certain cases (Laws of 1870, ch. 93, 
 § 1), did not .apply to negligence be- 
 tween co-employees of a railway com- 
 pany. 
 
 ' Revised Code of 1880, vol. I, page 
 343, §1307, viz.:— "Every corpora- 
 tion operating a railway shall be lia- 
 ble for all damages sustained by any 
 person, including employees of such 
 
490 THE master's obligations and liabilities. [§ 379. 
 sissippi,^ Montana," Ehode Island,' Wisconsin,* Wyo- 
 
 corporation, in consequence of the 
 neglect of agents, or by any misman- 
 agement of the engineers or other em- 
 ployees of the corporation, and in 
 consequence of the wilful wrongs, 
 whether of commission or omission, 
 •of such agents, engineers, or other 
 ■employees, when such wrongs are in 
 any manner connected with the use 
 and operation of any railway on or 
 about which they shall be employed; 
 and no contract which restricts such 
 liability shall be legal or binding." 
 The note to this section is as follows, 
 viz. : — " Under the statute prior to the 
 passage of chap. 169, Laws of 1863, it 
 was held in harmony with the current 
 of common law authority that the 
 principal is not liable for damages 
 sustained by an employee for the 
 negligence of a co-employee in the 
 same general service, and that the 
 14th section of the act, entitled, An 
 Act to grant railroad companies the 
 right of way, approved January 18, 
 1853, did not change the general rule 
 ■on the subject. After the act of 1863 
 took effect, it was held that while the 
 jseventh section thereof gave an em- 
 ployee of a railroad company a right 
 to recover for injuries caused by the 
 negligence of a co-employee, the lia- 
 bility was nevertheless measured by 
 a different standard and rule as to 
 negligence from what it is in cases of 
 injuries to passengers. While extra- 
 ordinary care and caution are required 
 with respect tc passengers, ordinary 
 •care only is due to the employee." 
 See, also, a long list of authorities in 
 support of the new doctrine, in the 
 same note, pp. 343, 344, 845, 846. 
 
 " Eevised Code of 1880, 309, § 1054, 
 viz.; — "Every railroad company shall 
 be liable for all damages which may 
 be sustained by any person in con- 
 sequence of the neglect or mismanage- 
 ment of any of their agents, engineers, 
 
 or clerks, or for the mismanagement 
 of their engines; but for injury to any 
 passenger upon any freight train not 
 being intended for both passengers 
 and freight, such company shall not 
 be liable except for the gross negli- 
 gence of its servants." 
 
 = Laws of Revised Statutes (1879), 
 471, § 318, viz. ! — "That in every.case 
 the liability of the corporation to a 
 servant or employee acting imder the 
 orders of his superior, shall be the 
 same, in case of injury sustained by 
 default or wrongful act of his superior, 
 or to an employee not appointed or 
 controlled by him, as if such servant 
 or employee were a passenger." See, 
 also. Laws, &c., of the Territory of 
 Montana, 1873 (extra), 104 and 109, 
 note. 
 
 = Public Statutes of 1883, 553, ch. 
 204, § 15, viz. :— " If the life of any 
 person, being a passenger in any 
 stage-coach, or other conveyance, 
 when used by common carriers, or 
 the life of any person, whether a 
 passenger or not, in the care of pro- 
 prietors of, or common carriers by 
 means of, railroads or steamboats, or 
 the life of any person crossing upon a 
 public highway with reasonable care, 
 shall be lost by reason of the negli- 
 gence or carelessness of such common 
 carriers, proprietor or proprietors, or 
 by the imfltness, or negligence, or 
 carelessness of their servants or 
 agents, in this State, such common 
 carriers, proprietor or proprietors, 
 shall be liable to damages, for the in- 
 jury caused by the loss of life of such 
 person, to be recovered by action of 
 the case, for the benefit of the hus- 
 band or widow and next of kin of the 
 deceased person, one-half thereof to 
 go to the husband or widow, and one- 
 half thereof to the children of the de- 
 ceased." 
 
 * Laws of 1875, published March 
 
§ 379.] THE master's obligations and liabilities; 
 
 491 
 
 ming,* Alabama' Massachusetts' and Missouri/ statutes, the 
 
 18, 1875, approved March 4, 1875, 
 ■viz.: — "Every railroad corporatioii 
 shall be liable for all damages sus- 
 tataed hj any agent or servant there- 
 of by reason of the negligence of any 
 other servant or agent thereof, with- 
 out contributory negligence on his 
 part, when sustained within this 
 State, or when such agent or servant 
 is a resident of, and his contract of 
 employment was made in, this State; 
 and no contract^ rule or regulation 
 between any such corporation and 
 any. agent or servant shall impair or 
 diminish such liability." The influ- 
 ence of the railroads procured a re- 
 peal of this statute in 1880. Laws 
 1880, ch. 233. 
 
 ' Compiled Laws of Wyoming 
 (1876), 513, ch. 97, §1. Approved 
 December 7, 1869, viz.: — "An Act to 
 protect railroad employees who aie 
 injured while performing their duty." 
 "Any person in the employment of 
 any railroad company in this Terri- 
 tory, who niay be MUed by any loco- 
 motive, car, or other rolling stock, 
 whether in the performance of his 
 duty or otherwise, his widow or heirs 
 may have the same right of action for 
 damages against such company as if 
 said person so killed were not in the 
 employ of said company ; any agree- 
 ment he may have made, whether 
 verbal or written, to hold such com- 
 pany harmless or free from an action 
 for damages in the event of such kill- 
 ing, shall be null and void, and shall 
 not be admitted as testimony in behalf 
 of said company in any action for 
 damages which may be brought 
 against them; and any person in the 
 employ of said company who may be 
 injured by any locomotive, car, or 
 other rolling stock, of said company, 
 or by other property of said company, 
 shall have his action for damages 
 against said company the same as if 
 
 he were not in the employ of said 
 company; and no agreement to the 
 contrary shall be admitted as testi- 
 mony ia behalf of said company . " § 2. 
 "This act shall take effect from and 
 after its passage." 
 
 ' Code 1886, § 2590, et seq., passed 
 Feb. 12, 1885. Masters in general are 
 made liable for Injuries caused by 
 reason of defective ways, works, or 
 machinery, or by the negligence of 
 superior servants, or by the act of any 
 employee while obeying rules and 
 regulations of the master, or by exe- 
 cuting particular instructions. It is a 
 substantial copy of the English act. 
 
 ' Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1887, 
 ch. 370. It is modelled after the Em- 
 ployers' Liability Act, and compre- 
 hends all classes of employees ex- 
 cept domestic servants and farm 
 laborers. 
 
 * 1 Revised Statutes (1879), 349, ch. 
 25, § 3131, viz.;— "Damages for in- 
 juries resulting in death in certain 
 cases, when and by whom recover- 
 able." "Whensoever any person 
 shall die from any iojury resulting 
 from or occasioned by the negli- 
 gence, unskillfulness or criminal in- 
 tent of any oflScer, agent, servant or 
 employee, whilst running, conducting 
 or managing any locomotive, car or 
 train of cars; or of any master, pilot, 
 engineer, agent or employee, whilst 
 running, conducting or managing any 
 steamboat, or any of the machinery 
 thereof; or of any driver of any stage- 
 coach, or other public conveyance, 
 whilst in charge of the same as a 
 driver; and when any passenger shall 
 die from any injury resulting from or 
 occasioned by any defect or insuf- 
 ficiency in any railroad or any part 
 thereof, or in any locomotive or car, 
 or in any steamboat or the machinery 
 thereof, or in any stage-coach or other 
 public conveyance, the corporation, 
 
492 
 
 THE MASTEB'S obligations AND LIABILITIES. [§ 380. 
 
 substance of which is set out in the notes, have been 
 passed, under the wholesome operation of which the old rule 
 of non-liability is practically abrogated. Except in Califor- 
 nia and Dakota, it may be said that in each of the States 
 just mentioned the old rule is entirely abandoned, and an 
 adequate remedy provided by the statutes for the proper 
 protection of railway employees, while in California and 
 Dakota the statutes define the limit of liability, and quoad Jwc 
 recognize and assert the propriety of legislation upon this 
 subject.^ 
 
 § 380. Should the employee be allowed to make a contract 
 releasing his employer from the liability imposed by these 
 
 statntes.^Immediately upon the passage of such statutes as 
 are considered in the preceding section, the question arose 
 whether the employee might lawfully contract himself out of 
 the operation of the act. In the English Act,' there is noth- 
 
 individual or individuals, in whose 
 employ any such officer, agent, 
 servant, employee, master, pilot, en- 
 gineer or driver shall be at the time 
 such injury is committed, or who owns 
 any such railroad, locomotive, car, 
 stage-coach or other public convey- 
 ance at the time any injury is received, 
 resulting from or occasioned by any 
 defect or insufficiency above declared, 
 shall forfeit and pay, for every person 
 or passenger so dying, the sum of 
 $5,000, which may be sued for and 
 recovered: First, by, the husband or 
 wife of the deceased ; or, second, if 
 there be no husband or wife, or he or 
 she fails to sue within six months 
 after such death, then by the minor 
 child or children of the deceased; or, 
 third, if such deceased be a minor and 
 unmarried, then by the father and 
 mother, who may join in the suit, 
 and each shall have an equal interest 
 in the judgment; or, Lf either of them 
 be dead, then by the survivor. In 
 suits instituted under this section, it 
 shall be competent for the defendant, 
 for his defense, to show that the de- 
 
 fect or insufficiency named in this sec 
 tion was not of a negligent defect or 
 insufficiency." "Although," says Mr. 
 Fall ["Employers' Liability," 41], "at 
 first sight this law would seem to 
 afford a remedy for injuries sustained 
 by a servant, and was quoted during 
 the discussion in England " [over the 
 Gladstone Bill] " to show that in Mis- 
 souri it changed the rule of the com- 
 mon law, the Court of Appeals has 
 decided (one judge dissenting) that the 
 phrase ' any person ' does not include 
 fellow-servant, and that his remedy 
 (see 64 Mo. 112; overruling 36 Mo. 13j 
 59 Mo. 285;, Revised Statutes, p. 350, 
 note) remains the same as it was be- 
 fore the statute was passed." 
 
 ' See, also, " Liability of Masters to 
 Servants," by Judge Cooley, 2 South- 
 em Law Rev. (N. S.) 108; "Master's 
 Liability to Servants," by Francis 
 Wharton, 3 Southern Law Rev. (N. S.) 
 780; and two articles upon the same 
 subject, by A. B. Jackson, Esq., 
 of the Minneapolis, Minn., bar, 5 
 Southern Law Rev. 200 and 380. 
 
 = 43 and 44 Vict., ch. 42. 
 
§ 381.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 493 
 
 ing either permitting or forbidding such a contract ; and, no 
 sooner was it enacted, than many railway and mining cor- 
 porations, as also many other companies and private indi- 
 viduals, who employ large numbers of servants, attempted to 
 compel their laborers to sign contracts of hire releasing them 
 from liability for damage under the act ; and these contracts 
 have been declared valid and enforceable, in the Court of 
 Queen's Bench, in the case of Griffiths v. The Earl of Dudley.^ 
 Such contracts are, I am informed, very generally made by 
 flnglish operatives ; and, inasmuch as the courts uphold them, 
 and all efforts to amend the act of 43 and 44 Vict, so as to ren- 
 der them illegal have failed, when it is considered that in more 
 than ninety per centum of all the actions of this nature which 
 are brought in the English Courts of Eecord, the contributory 
 negligence of the plaintiff is, as has been shown by a careful 
 examination of the court records as to this very point, a valid 
 defense, we see that the practical benefits of the act are in 
 reality, speaking from the standpoint- of the employee, less 
 than they at first sight appeared to be. It is, moreover, as- 
 serted, and the assertion has at least a show of foundation, 
 that English employers have found that the operation of 
 the act, in connection with the contract of exemption required 
 from the employee, has been to diminish materially the 
 amount of gross recoveries by employees in actions of this 
 nature, in the English courts since 1880 — which is only an- 
 other way of saying that the Employer's' Liability Bill is 
 money in the pocket of the employer, and a corresponding 
 actual money loss to the employee. 
 
 § 381. The same subject continued.— Griffiths t. The 
 Earl of Dudley. — In this country, so far as my reading goes, 
 such contracts are forbidden by statute only in Iowa,' Wis- 
 consin, Wyoming,* and in Massachusetts.* But it is held in 
 
 ' L. R. 9 Q. B. DiT. 357. of Statute," in McKinney on Fellow- 
 
 ' In the statute to -which reference Servants, whose excellent treatise I ' 
 
 has already been made. 1 Rev. Code have freely consulted in writing this 
 
 of 1880, 342, § 1307, viz.; "No con- chapter. 
 
 tract which restricts such liability " * Chapter 74, § 3, of the public Stat- 
 
 <». «. the liability imposed by the stat- utes says:— " No person or corporation 
 
 ute) "shall be legal or binding." shall, by a special contract with per- 
 
 ' See "Contracts in Contravention sons in his or its employ, exempt him- 
 
494 THE mastee's obligations and liabilities. [§ 382, 
 
 Kansas, that a railway company may not contract in advance 
 with its employees for the waiver and release of the statutory 
 liability iidposed upon such companies for the negligence of 
 one employee causing injury to another employee without 
 regard to the negligence of the company.^ In Griffiths v. 
 The Earl of Dudley," it is held that an employee may not 
 only contractSmself out of the operation of the act of 43 and 
 44 Yict., ch. 42, but that such a contract on his part will 
 operate so as to bind his widow in the event of his death 
 from injury, and thus bar her right to sue ; that is to say, 
 that an employee, by such a contract, not only cuts himself 
 off from his right of action under the act, but also prevents 
 the prosecution of an action by his widow under Lord Camp- 
 bell's Act. It not being questioned that the contract bars an 
 action by the personal representatives, it was argued that the 
 widow obtained a new independent right of action under the 
 act of 27 and 28 Vict., ch. 95 ; that this right her husband had 
 no power to contract away, and that while he might have 
 the power to bargain away his own right to recover damages,, 
 he should not be allowed to bargain away the right of his- 
 family, under the Act of Lord Campbell. But the court 
 thought this an unsound view, and held, without any dissent,, 
 that the contract was valid to bar alike the one right and the 
 other.' 
 
 § 383. The English doctrine not approved in America. — 
 
 The w^eight of authority in this country is plainly in favor of 
 a doctrine upon this point,the opposite of that asserted in 
 the English case of Griffiths v. The Earl of Dudley,* and it is^ 
 easy to learn from the practical outcome of the English act 
 
 self or itself from any liability which Kan. 169; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 630. See,. 
 
 he or it might otherwise be under to also, Union Pacific By. Co. v. Harris, 
 
 such persons for injuries suffered by 33 Kan. 416; s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 
 
 them in their employment, and which 669. 
 
 result from the employer's own negU- ' L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 357. 
 
 gence, or from the negligence of other ' Griffiths ». Earl of Dudley, L. R. 
 
 persons in his or its employ." This 9 Q. B. Divi 367. Qf. Wilson e. 
 
 must, however, be understood to refer Merry, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. App. 326;. 
 
 only to the eommon law liability of Read «. Great Eastern Ry. Co., L. R> 
 
 the employer as understood by the 3 Q. B. 655. 
 
 courts of Massachusetts. • L. R. 9 Q. B. Div, 357. 
 ' Kansas, &c., R. Co. ®. Peavey, 29 
 
§ 383.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 495 
 
 — which was intended to secure greater protection for the em- 
 ployee, but which in verity does him more harm than good — 
 that if anything of substantial benefit is to come to the serv- 
 ing class, from legislation of this character, such contracts of 
 exemption as we have been considering must be made illegal 
 and impossible ; otherwise, the shield turns itself into a sword, 
 and the last end of such legislation is, for the class sought 
 to be benefited, worse than the first. 
 
 § 383. Contracts releasing the employer from his common 
 law liability.— In addition to the restraint imposed by the 
 statutes hereinbefore referred to, contracts waiving a claim 
 for damages against the master have also been declared in- 
 avlid at common law by several courts of the highest rank. 
 In Boesner v. Hermann,^ it was held by Judge Gresham, in 
 the United States Circuit Court, that an employer cannot 
 protect himself by contract with his employee against the 
 consequences of his own negligence in not providing safe and 
 suitable machinery. It was also decided by the Supreme 
 Court of Ohio, in Eailroad Company v. Spangler,^ that rail- 
 road companies are liable to their servants for injuries 
 caused by the carelessness of those who are superior in 
 authority and control over them on grounds of public 
 policy. Bind that a contract for exemption from such 
 liability contravenes the policy thus established and is 
 void. The Supreme Court of Arkansas also declares such 
 contracts iniquitous. In Little Eock, &c., Ey. Co. v. 
 Eubanks,^ that court, after suggesting that it might be a 
 question whether under the constitution of that State rail- 
 road companies could denude themselves of responsibility by 
 stipulation in advance, put the contention on higher grounds 
 and said : — " But we prefer to rest our decision upon the broad- 
 er ground of considerations of public policy. The law requires 
 the master to furnish his servant with a reasonably safe place 
 
 ' 10 Biss. 486, Judge Oresham Albsuiy Law Journal (24 Albany Law 
 
 saying: — " If there was no negligence Jour. 383), who cites the Georgia cases 
 
 the defendant needed no contract to with approbation, and declares tiiat 
 
 exempt him from liability; if he was he has no doubt the decision of Judge 
 
 negligent, the contract set out in his Gresham is wrong, 
 
 answer will be of no avail." This " 44 Ohio St. 471. 
 
 case is criticised by the editor of the ' 44 Ark. 460, 468. 
 
496 THE MASTEE'S OBLIGiTIONS AND LIABILITIES. [§ 384. 
 
 to work in, and with sound and suitable tools and appliances 
 to do his work. If he can supply an unsafe machine or de- 
 fective instruments, and then excuse himself against the con- 
 sequences of his own negligence by the terms of his contract 
 with his servant, he ii enabled to evade a most salutary rule. 
 In the English case above cited (GriflB.th v. Earl of Dudley) it 
 is said this is not against public policy because it does not 
 affect all society, but only the interest of the employed. But 
 surely the State has an interest in the lives and limbs of all 
 its citizens. Laborers for hire constitute a numerous and 
 meritorious class in every community, and it is for the wel- 
 fare of society that their employers shall not be permitted, 
 under the guise of enforcing contract rights, to abdicate their 
 duties to them. The consequence would be that every rail- 
 road company and every owner of a factory, mill or mine 
 would make it a condition, precedent to the employment of 
 labor, that the laborer should release all right of action for 
 injuries sustained in the course of the service, whether by 
 the employer's negligence or otherwise. The natural ten- 
 dency of this would be to relax the employer's carefulness in 
 those matters of which he has the ordering and control, such 
 as the supply of machinery and materials, and thus increase 
 the perils of occupations which are hazardous, even when 
 well managed ; and the final outcome would be to fill the 
 country with disabled men and paupers, whose support would 
 become a charge upon the counties or upon public charity." 
 In Memphis, &c., E. Co. v. Jones,* the Supreme Court of 
 Tennessee has held that such a contract would not protect 
 the master against gross negligence. 
 
 § 384. The Georgia cases.— On the other hand, the Su- 
 preme Court of Georgia have in several cases ' held contracts 
 of this character legal and binding upon the employee so 
 far as they do not waive any criminal neglect of the em- 
 ployer. The effect of these decisions is that the servant of a 
 railroad company, for instance, not duly takes upon himself 
 
 ' 3 Head, 517. v. Western, «fcc., R. Co., 57 Ga. 512. 
 
 » Hendricks v. Western, &c. , R. Co., See a criticism of these cases by Judge 
 
 52 Ga. 467; Western, &c., R. Co. «, Thompson, in Thompson on Negli- 
 
 Bishop, 50 Ga. 465; Western, &c.-, R. gence, 1035, and 1 Cent. Law Jour. 
 
 Co. V. Strong, 52 Ga. 461; Galloway 465. 
 
§ 385.] THE MASTEB's obligations and LIABILITIiis. 497 
 
 the incidental risks of the service, but he may, by previous 
 contract, release the company from its duty to furnish him a 
 safe track, safe cars, machinery, and materials, and suitable 
 tools with which to work. 
 
 § 385. The laws of other countries as to the liability of 
 an employer for injuries to an employee caused by the care- 
 lessness of a fellow-employee.— Scotland.- In Scotland, the 
 courts made a persistent but ineffectual fight against the in- 
 fluence of the case of Priestley v. Fowler.' In the case of 
 Sword V. Cameron,' decided in 1839, a year after Priestley 
 V. Fowler, the Scotch judges declined to follow the English 
 authority. It was an action to recover damages from the 
 owner of a quarry, because one of the quarrymen, while care- 
 lessly blasting a rock, had injured a fellow-workman. The 
 court held the employer responsible for the negligence of his 
 workman, and the plaintiff had judgment against him. In 
 Dixon V. Bankin,' decided in 1852, the Scotch Court again dis- 
 approved of the position taken by the English Court, and after 
 carefully reviewing Priestley v. Fowler,* unanimously followed 
 the rule of Sword v. Cameron.' Lord Justice Clerk, in de- 
 livering the opinion, after declaring the obligation of the em- 
 ployer as to safe and suitable machinery and apparatus, it 
 being an action wherein a master was held liable for an acci- 
 dent in a coal-pit, said : — " In this obligation is equally in- 
 cluded — as he cannot do everything himself — the duty to 
 have all acts by others whom he employs done perfectly and 
 carefully in order to avoid risk. The obligation to provide 
 for the safety of the lives of his servants by fit machinery, is 
 not greater or more inherent in the contract, than the obli- 
 gation to provide for their safety, from the acts done by 
 others whom he also employs. The other servants are em- 
 ployed by him to do acts which, of course, he cannot do him- 
 self ; but they are acting for him, and instead of himself, as 
 his hands. For their careful and cautious attention to duty, 
 for their neglect of precautions, by which danger to life may 
 be caused, he is just as much responsible as for such miscon- 
 
 ' 3 Mee. & W. 1. See §§ 308, 309, 
 
 » 14 Ct. of Ses. Gas. 430, 
 
 tupra. 
 
 ♦ 3 Mee. & "W. 1. 
 
 « 1 Ct. of Sea. Gas. 493. 
 
 ' 1 Gt. of Ses. Gas. 493. 
 
 32 
 
 
498 THE masteb's obligations and liabilities. [§ 386. 
 
 duct on his own part if he were actually working or present ; 
 and this particularly holds to the person he entrusts with 
 the direction and control over any of his workmen, and who 
 represents him in such a matter. The servant, then, in the 
 contract of service in Scotland, undertakes no risks from the 
 dangers caused by other workmen from want of care, atten- 
 tion, prudence and skill which the attention and presence of 
 the master, or others acting for him, might have prevented. 
 His master is bound to him in obligations which are to pro- 
 tect him from such dangers. The principle of the contract 
 in England being different, of course, different results fol- 
 low." 1 
 
 § 386. The Scotch rule further stated.— Again, in Gray v. 
 
 Brassey,' the same doctrine is emphasized, the judges still 
 refusing to follow the rule of Priestley v. Fowler. The 
 Lord President said that the master was liable for the negli- 
 gence of his authorized servants as well as for his own neg- 
 ligence, and Lord Cunningham, for the court, said : — " Al- 
 though our reports for many years show that masters have 
 been held liable to all third parties (without excepting fel- 
 low-servants) suffering from the negligence and unskillfulness 
 of other servants hired by the employer, followed up by the 
 late case of Kankin v. Dixon, in the Second Division, the 
 books hardly show the extent of the understanding in Scot- 
 land, as it is believed there is no man of common intelli- 
 gence, and experience in our affairs, who entertains a different 
 opinion. Many industrious people may have relied on that 
 security ; and, at any rate, when servants in this country 
 have suffered severe injury from the fault of another work- 
 man hired by the master, we are not entitled suddenly to 
 abrogate the responsibility of the latter, existing at the date 
 of their employment. The law of Scotland on this point 
 has been long established and acted on, while this question 
 is new in England, arising merely under an act recently 
 passed ; and I must, with perfect deference, remark that the 
 reasons assigned in the English cases for the distinction 
 urged by the defender, do not appear to be altogether satis- 
 
 ' Dixon v. Rankin, 14 Ct. of Ses. ' 16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 135 
 Cas. 420. 
 
§ 388.] THE master's obligations and liabilities. 499 
 
 factory or reasonable."^ But, in 1858, the House of Lords, 
 in the cases of Bartonshill Goal Co. v. Eeid, and Bartonshill 
 Coal Co. V. McGuire,* overruled the unanimous judgments of 
 the Scotch judges in favor of the plaintiffs in the actions to 
 which I have referred, which had been rendered upon the 
 ground that an employer is liable to his employee for the 
 negligence of his authorized agent, although that agent is a 
 fellow-servant of the injured person, in accordance with the 
 rule of the earlier case of Sword v. Cameron.' " Thus the 
 Scotch law was brought into harmony with the position taken 
 by the English courts upon this question, and what had been 
 declared law by twenty-five judges was changed by this judg- 
 ment, and the law of both countries was made the same."^ 
 
 § 387. The rule in Ireland.— In Ireland, the courts have 
 always followed Priestley v. Fowler. The question first 
 came before those courts in 1858, in McEnery v. Waterford & 
 Kilkenny Ey. Co.," which affirmed the English rule, and all 
 of the subsequent Irish decisions uniformly accept it. 
 
 § 388. The rule on the Continent of Europe.— In France, 
 under the Civil Code, it seems that an employer is liable to 
 an employee for the negligence- of a co-employee.* And in 
 Italy the law is the same. The Italian Code was modeled 
 upon the French Code, and that section which considers this 
 subject is an almost literal translation of the French.' In 
 Prussia, upon the authority of Mr. Fall, who may be called 
 as an expert witness, it may be said that employers are held 
 liable, for the most part, for injuries to their servants occa- 
 sioned by the negligence of their fellow-servants.* It ap- 
 
 ' See, also, Baird s. Addie, 16 Ct. ' Civil Code. Art. 1882, 1383, 1384. 
 
 of Ses. Oas. 490; Brownlie v. Tennant, Qf. Serandat v. Saisse, L. R. 1 P. 
 
 16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 998; O'Byme v. C. 152, a decision by the judicial 
 
 Bums, 16 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 1025; Hill committee of the Privy Council on 
 
 Hill V. Caledonian By. Co., 16 Ct. of appeal from the Mauritius which is 
 
 Ses. Cas. 569. under the control of the French law. 
 
 » 3 Macq. H. L. Cases, 266; 8. c. 4 See, also. Fall's Employer's Liability, 
 
 Jur. (N. S.) 767, 772; 1 Pat. So. App. 33. 
 
 785 796. ' Italian Civil Code, Art. 1153. 
 
 ■1 Ct. of Ses. Cas. 493. " Fall's Employer's Liability, 35>. 
 
 * Fall's Employer's Liability, 33. citing Holtzendorfl's Encyclopsedia. 
 
 ' 8 Ir. C. L. R. 312. 
 
600 THE MASTER'S OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. [§ 388. 
 
 pears, therefore, that the position of the English and Ameri- 
 can courts upon the matter of an employer's liability to his 
 employees for personal injuries is somewhat anomalous ; 
 that it is very far from being a satisfactory position, and 
 that there is a growing tendency to modify by legislation the 
 extreme grounds the courts have taken, and even to abolish 
 entirely common employment as a defense. The law in its 
 present attitude upon these questions seems to have been de- 
 veloped under the more or less conscious influence of the 
 great railway corporations of the country. It cannot be 
 doubted that such an influence is, upon the whole, unfavora- 
 ble to the servant, and the tendency of the courts to go to the 
 very verge upon this point in the interest of these companies 
 has in some cases been not improperly checked by appropri- 
 ate legislation. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR CASES. 
 
 § 389. Intoxication as contributory 
 negligence. 
 
 390. Intoxication as want of ordi- 
 nary care. 
 
 391. The intoxication of trespassers. 
 
 393. This rule aiiistrat«d. 
 
 893. The presumption of sobriety. 
 
 394. This rule further stated. 
 
 395. One intoxicated not beyond the 
 pale of the law. 
 
 396. Deafness, blindness, or other 
 physical infirmity as a defense. 
 
 397. The rule as to physical disa- 
 bilities further considered. 
 
 398. Negligence as a defense in 
 actions upon policies of insur- 
 ance. 
 
 399. The same subject continued. 
 
 400. In actions for failure to trans- 
 mit or deliver telegraphic dis- 
 patches. 
 
 401. The same subject continued. 
 
 402. The rule in the admiralty. 
 
 i 403. LordStowell'srulesconsidered. 
 
 404. Lord Stowell's second rule 
 defended. 
 
 405. Contributory negligence in ac- 
 tions between attorney and 
 client. 
 
 406. In actions between physician 
 and patient. 
 
 407. The same subject continued. 
 
 408. In actions between innkeeper 
 ■ and guest. 
 
 409. Cayle's case. 
 
 410. The key of the guest's room. 
 
 411. Duty of the guest to exercise 
 care. 
 
 413. The rule illustrated. 
 
 413. Accidents in disdtarge of fire- 
 works. 
 
 414. Injury to one walking on the 
 • sea shore. 
 
 415. Where the plaintiff's property 
 is a nuisance. 
 
 416. Miscellaneous. 
 
 § 389. Intoxication as contributory negligence. — Intoxi- 
 cation on the part of a plaintiff is not, as a general rule, in 
 itself, and as a matter of law, such negligence, or eyidence of 
 such negligence, as will bar a recovery when an action is 
 brought for injuries sustained by reason of the culpable and 
 negligent default of another.* " A drunken person sometimes 
 
 > Ford V. Umatilla County, 15 Or. 
 313; Seymer v. Lake, 66 Wis. 651 
 Stuart V. Machias Port, 48 Me. 477 
 Weymire «. Wolfe, 53 Iowa, 533 
 Loewer v. City of Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431 
 City of Salina ®. Trosper, 27 Kan. 545; 
 Alger B. Lowell, 3 Allen, 406. Baker 
 V. Portland, 58 Me. 199, 305; b. c. 4 
 Am. Rep. 274, where the court said : 
 
 — "Recrimination is not a good plea 
 in bar in actions of this kind, unless 
 the plaintiff's claim originates in his 
 offense (drunkenness), or unless the 
 offense has in some way contributed 
 to produce the injury. ... It has 
 been settled that intoxication is not 
 conclusive evidence of a want of ordi- 
 nary care." Baltimore, &c., R. Co. 
 
502 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. [§ 390, 
 
 acts with great care, although the contrary is undoubtedly 
 the general rule."' The law refuses, therefore, to impute 
 negligence, as of course, to a plaintiff from the bare fact that 
 at the moment of suffering the injury he was intoxicated. 
 Intoxication is one thing, and negligence sufficient to bar an 
 action for damages quite another thing. "Intoxicated per- 
 sons," it is said in Alger v. Lowell,* " are not removed from 
 all protection of law, the plaintiff was bound to show that he 
 was in the exercise of due care, and the jury were so in- 
 structed. If he used such care, by himself or others, his 
 intoxication had nothing to do with the accident ; the city 
 may be liable under some circumstances* for an injury sus- 
 tained by ... an intoxicated person if the condition of 
 the injur€!d person does not contribute in any degree to occa- 
 sion the injury " — which is very nearly the same thing as to 
 say that the mere concurrence in point of time between the 
 plaintiff's intoxication, and the happening of the injury will 
 not, in itself, be sufficient to bar the right to recover. 
 
 § 390. Intoxication as want of ordinary care.— ,When 
 
 contributory negligence is the issue, it must appear that the 
 plaintiff did not exercise ordinary care, and that, too, with- 
 out reference to his inebriety, or he may have his action. 
 The question is whether or not the plaintiff's conduct came 
 up to the standard of ordinary care, not whether or not the 
 plaintiff was drunk. This principle is well illustrated in the 
 case of Ford v. Umatilla County,* decided by the Supreme 
 Court of Oregon. The plaintiff, while intoxicated and driv- 
 ing across a bridge, was injured by the falling of the struc- 
 ture. The court in delivering judgment against the defend- 
 ant said : — " Whether the respondent (^the plaintiff) was drunk 
 or sober, he had the right to suppose that a bridge open to 
 
 «. Boteler,58 Md. 568; Bums «. Elba, ' Shearman & Redfleld on Negli- 
 33 Wis. 605; Thorp v. Brookfleld, 30 gence, 4th ed., § 93 (n.). 
 Conn. 331; Healy «. New York, 3 ' 3 Allen, 406. 
 Him, 708; Ditchett «. Spuyten Dny- ' " A drunken man is as much en- 
 vil, &c., R. Co., 5 Hun, 165; O'Hagan titled to a safe street as a sober one, 
 «. Dillon, 10 Jones & S. 456; Cramer and much more in need of it." said 
 v. Burlington, 43 Iowa, 315; Robin- Heydenfelt, J., in the case of Robin- 
 son V. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460; Shearman son ®. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460. 
 <& Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., * 15 Oregon, 313. 
 § 93; Thompson on Negligence, 1174, 
 i< 33, 1303, § 50. See, also, § 197, svpra. 
 
§ 390.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. 503 
 
 the use of the public, and under control of the county offi- 
 cials, would bear up his load in crossing it. Possibly his 
 judgment as to its strength would have been better while 
 sober than while drunk, but the appellant can claim nothing 
 upon that ground. The county, by leaving the bridge open 
 to public travel said, in effect, that it was secure, and because 
 the respondent might be inclined to be more credulous when 
 intoxicated than when sober, it was no fault that would ex- 
 cuse the appellant. We are unable to discover where or how 
 the question of negligence could have arisen. The traveling 
 public are not required to be bridge inspectors in order to 
 entitle them to recover for such neglect, and their attempting 
 to cross such a structure circumstanced as this one seems to 
 have been under the assumption that it was safe, could not 
 be charged as contributory negligence whatever might be 
 their condition as to intoxication or sobriety. There is no 
 pretence that the respondent drove his team carelessly or reck- 
 lessly, or did any act which contributed to the injury, except 
 in attempting to cross the bridge, and the appellant in the 
 manner before suggested invited him to do that." As sober 
 men are frequently careless and guilty of negligence, so it very 
 occasionally happens that drunken men are careful and pru- 
 dent, or if negligent, that their intoxication cut no figure in 
 the matter. From which the law infers that there is no 
 proper and necessary connection between sobriety and care- 
 fulness, nor between, inebriety and negligence. This is a 
 view, however, to be taken with the qualification that while 
 Intoxication is not, as a matter of law, to be regarded con- 
 tributory negligence, it is held that it tends to show negli- 
 gence on the part of the plaintiff.* " Intoxication is compe- 
 tent, but not conclusive evidence of negligence."' The plaint- 
 iff is, therefore, on the one hand, entitled to an instruction to 
 the effect that his intoxication is not, as matter of law, con- 
 tributory negligence or conclusive evidence of such negli- 
 gence as will prevent a recovery ; and the defendant on his 
 
 ' Aurora «. Hillman, 90 El. 61; citing Stuart v. Macbiasport, 48 Me. 
 
 Illinois, &c., E. Co. v. Cragin, 71 lU. 477; Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. 199; 
 
 177; City of Rock Island v. Vanland- b. c. 4 Am. Rep. 274; Wynn v. Allard, 
 
 schoot, 78 ni. 485. 5 Watts & 8. (Penn.) 534. 
 
 ' Abbott's Trial Evidence, 585, § 12, 
 
504 SPECIAL AND PAETICULAE CASES. [§ 391. 
 
 part is entitled to an instruction to the effect that the intoxi- 
 cation of the plaintiff is evidence of negligence, from which 
 the jury are at liberty to infer such negligence as will bar the 
 action.* Under the Georgia Code in certain classes of actions 
 against railway companies, the intoxication of the plaintiff is 
 made an absolute defense,' but this is counter to the current 
 of authority. 
 
 § 391. The intoxication of trespassers. — Drunkenness, 
 however, on the part of a trespasser is universally held to be 
 such negligence as will prevent entirely any recovery of dam- 
 ages for injuries sustained at the time, or by reason of the 
 trespass. Intoxication under these circumstances is, in law, 
 a more serious irregularity than intoxication merely. When 
 one comes upon my premises without warrant, and in addi- 
 tion to the wrong-doing involved in the trespass, drinks him- 
 self drunk, and thus renders himself helpless and irresponsible, 
 and under these circumstances, and being in that condition, 
 sustains an injury, he is in no position to call upon me for 
 damages for anything he has suffered, for which any conduct 
 upon my part, short of a wanton and wilful infliction of injury 
 is the cause or occasion.' Drunkenness is a wholly self-im- 
 posed disability, and in consequence is not to be regarded 
 with that kindness and indulgence which we instinctively con - 
 cede to blindness, or deafness, or any other physical infirmity. 
 Trespassers go at their peril. That is settled law. Much 
 more is it just to hold that they make themselves drunk at 
 their peril. Disabilities, moreover, of any kind are to be a 
 shield, and never a sword. It would be a strange rule of law 
 that regarded a certain course of conduct negligent and blame- 
 worthy upon the part of a sober man, but that held the same 
 conduct, on the part of the same man when intoxicated, venial 
 and excusable. Drunkenness will never excuse one for a 
 
 ' Wynn v. AUard, 5 "Watts & 8. 53 Wis. 354; Cityof Salinatj.Trosper, 
 
 524; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Cragin,71 37 Zan. 545. 
 
 lU. 177; Cleghorn «. New York, &c., ' Code of Ga., §§ 2972, 3034. Qf. 
 
 R. Co., 56 N.Y. 44; People «. East- Southwestern R. Co. «. Hankerson, 
 
 wood, 14 N. Y. 563; Wood u. Andes, 61 Ga. 114. 
 
 11 Hun, 543; Cassedys. Stockbridge, ' Mulherrin ». Delaware, &c., R. 
 
 31 Vt. 391; Chicago, &c., R. Co. •». Co., 81 Penn. St. 366. 
 Bell, 70 111. 102; Fitzgerald «. Weston, 
 
§ 393.] SPECIAL AND PAETICULAE OASES. 505 
 
 failure to exercise the measure of care and prudence which 
 is due from a sober man under the same circumstances.* 
 Men must be content, especially when they are trespassers,, 
 to enjoy the pleasures of intoxication cum pericidis. When 
 they make themselves drunk, and in that helpless condition 
 wander upon the premises of sober men and sustain an injury,, 
 they will not be heard to plead their intoxication as an an- 
 swer to the charge of negligence ; and the courts consistently 
 hold that such intoxicated trespassers have no standing in 
 any forum where justice is impartially administered. 
 
 § 392. This rale illustrated.— Many cases illustrate and 
 enforce this doctrine. Herring v. Wilmingto:;! & Raleigh E. 
 Co.' is the leading case. The facts were these : — Two of th& 
 plaintiff's slaves, being allowed to go about on Sundays as 
 they pleased, became intoxicated ; and, wandering upon de- 
 fendant's track, lay down and fell asleep at a point upon a 
 straight line in the road where they could be seen from an 
 approaching train for more than a mile. They were, how- 
 ever, run over by a passing train, one of them being killed, 
 and the other being seriously injured. The plaintiff argued 
 that under these circumstances the law should imply negli- 
 gence upon the part of the defendant's train-men, but the 
 court held that position not tenable, and insisted that being 
 upon the track in a condition of helpless intoxication, was 
 in itself such contributory negligence as would prevent a 
 recovery. This is the rule consistently adhered to by all the 
 courts in actions brought by trespassers upon railway prop- 
 erty for injuries sustained in a fit of intoxication.* 
 
 § 393. The presumption of sobriety. — It is to be presumed 
 that a person of mature years will not stand still upon a 
 
 ' Chicago, «fcc., R. Co. d. BeU, 70 HI. Co. v. Sympkins, 54 Tex. 615; s. c. 38 
 
 102; Toledo, &c., R. Co. o. RUey, 47 Am. Rep. 632; Illinois, &c., R. Co. 
 
 111. 514. V. Hutchinson, 47 111. 408; Manly ».. 
 
 » lOIred. 402; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 395. Wilmington, &c., R. Co.. 74 N. C. 
 
 ' Demnan v. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 655; Richardson «. Wilmington, &c., 
 
 26 Minn. 357;McCelland®. Louisville, R. Co., 8 Rich. (Law) 120; Felder v. 
 
 &c., R. Co., 94 Ind. 376; Tamall v. St. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 3 McMull. 403;. 
 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 75 Mo. 575; Little Southwestern R. Co. ■». Hankerson, 
 
 Rock, &c., R. Co. V. Pankhurst, 36 61 Ga. 114; Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 
 
 Ark. 371; Houston, &c., R. Co. v. Iowa, 643; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. v.. 
 
 Smith, 52 Tex. 178; Houston. &c., R. Miller, 25 Mich. 279. 
 
506 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. [§394. 
 
 railway track and deliberately suffer himself to be run down. 
 It is also a presumption that all men are in the possession of 
 their senses, and will exercise ordinary diligence in times of 
 -danger to take care of themselves. It is in accordance with 
 these assumptions held, that when an engineer of a locomo- 
 tive engine sees ahead of him a man upon the track, he may 
 presume that the man possesses ordinary capacity, that he can 
 see, and hear, and reason from cause to effect, and that, as a 
 train approaches him, he will step aside and not be run over. 
 It is, therefore, not negligence on the part of the engineer 
 not to stop his train and go forward and push such a person 
 •off the track, nor is it wrong not to slacken the speed of the 
 train, but to rely upon the person on the track, if he may 
 reasonably be supposed to see or hear the train, to take care 
 of himself.^ The train-men need not, in order to escape the 
 imputation of negligence, assume that persons, they see upon 
 ihe track are deaf or blind, or paralyzed or idiots, or drunk, 
 but are justified in acting freely upon the contrary assump- 
 "tions. 
 
 § 394. This rule farther stated. — " If an engineer," said 
 the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a leading case, " sees a 
 ieam and carriage, or a man, in the act of crossing the track 
 -far enough ahead of him to have ample time, in the ordinary 
 ■course of such movements, to get entirely out of the way 
 before the approach of the engine ; or if he sees a man 
 walking along upon the track at a considerable distance 
 ahead, and is not aware that he is deaf or insane, or, from 
 some other cause, insensible of the danger ; or if he sees a 
 man or a team approaching a crossing, too near the train to 
 get over in time, he has a right to rely upon the laws of na- 
 ture and the ordinary course of things and to presume that 
 the man driving the team, or walking upon the track, has 
 the use of his senses, and will act upon the principles of 
 common sense, and the motive of self-preservation, common 
 to mankind in general, and that they will, therefore, get out 
 -of the way ; that those on the track will get off, and those 
 -approaching it will stop in time to avoid the danger ; and 
 
 'Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. v. Mo- delphia, &c., R. Co. «. Spearen, 47 
 Claren, 63 Ind. 568; Lake Shore, &c., Penn. St. 30^ Houston, &c., R. Co. 
 R. Co. V. MiUer, 35 Mich. 379; Phila- ■». Smith. 52 Tex. 178. 
 
I 394.] SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR CASES. 507 
 
 he, therefore, has the right to go on without checking his . 
 speed, until he sees that the team, or man, is not likelj to get 
 out of the way, when it would become his duty to give extra 
 alarm by bell or whistle, and if that is not heeded, then, as a 
 last resort, to check his speed or stop his train, if possible, in 
 time to avoid disaster. If, however, he sees a child of ten- 
 der years upon the track, or any person known to him to be, 
 or from his appearance giving him good reason to believe 
 that he is insane, or badly intoxicated, or otherwise insensi- 
 ble of danger, or unable to avoid it, he has no right to pre- 
 sume that he will get out of the way, but should act upon 
 the belief that he might not or would not, and he should, 
 _therefore, take means to stop his train in time. A more 
 stringent rule than this — a rule that would require the engi- 
 neer to check his speed, or stop his train, whenever he sees 
 a team crossing the tradk, or a man walking on it, far enough 
 ahead to get out of the way in time, until he can send ahead 
 to inquire why they do not ; or which would require the en- 
 gineer to know the deafness or blindness, or acuteness of 
 hearing or sight, or habits of prudence or recklessness, or 
 other personal peculiarities, of all those persons he may 
 see approaching, or upon the track, and more especially of 
 all those who may be approaching the crossing upon a high- 
 way — though not seen — any such rule, if enforced, must 
 effectually put an end to all railroads as a means of speedy 
 travel or transportation, and reduce the speed of trains be- 
 low that of canal boats forty years ago, and would effectually 
 defeat the object of the legislature in. authorizing this mode 
 of conveyance. But how are railway companies, or their 
 engineers or employees, to know the personal peculiarities, 
 the infirmities, personal character, or station in life, of the 
 hundreds of persons crossing or approaching their track ? 
 By inspiration or intuition ? And if they do not know, then 
 how and why shall the company be required to run their 
 road, or regulate their own conduct, or that of their serv- 
 ants, by such personal peculiarities of strangers, of which 
 they know nothing ? These questions suggest their own an- 
 
 ' Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. ®. Miller, 25 Mich. 279. See, also, Wharton on 
 Negligence, § 389, a. 
 
508 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAE CASES. [§ 395, 
 
 § 39&. One intoxicated not beyond the pale of the law. — 
 
 An intoxicated person, it is, however, to be remembered, ia 
 not, by reason of his intoxication, so far beyond the pale of 
 the law that he may be injured with impunity. He is as 
 much entitled to care and caution on the part of others as 
 though he were sober, and plainly much more in need of it."^ 
 Accordingly, if he is injured when, by* the exercise of ordi- 
 nary care upon the part of the person inflicting the injury, 
 he might have escaped the injury, he may, in spite of hi^ in- 
 toxication, have his action.^ Where the plaintiff became 
 intoxicated in thedefendant's saloon, and a companion, also 
 intoxicated, pinned paper to the back of the former, in the 
 defendant's presence, it was held that the plaintiff might 
 sustain his action for the injuries received.^ And in a case 
 in Michigan it was held that if goods of a guest are placed in 
 charge of an innkeeper, and the guest gets intoxicated at the 
 bar, the landlord is, if anything, required to exercise a higher 
 degree of care.^ So, too, where a helpless drunken passen- 
 ger on a railway train refusing to pay fare, the conductor 
 knowing his condition expelled him, not at a station, and in 
 the snow, by reason whereof the passenger was severely 
 frozen, the company was compelled to pay him damages.* 
 In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff 
 to his property, by reason of the negligent and careless con- 
 duct of the defendant, it is insufficient as a defense to admit 
 the injury, and aver that at the time the damage was done 
 the defendant was intoxicated by liquor, sold to him by the 
 plaintiff.* This sort of a plea amounts to setting up the 
 contributory negligence of the plaintiff in selling liquor, by 
 means of which the defendant became intoxicated and did 
 the damage, in bar of the action. Neither does the purchas- 
 ing and drinking of liquor constitute contributory negligence, 
 
 ' Kobinson «. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460; * Bubenstein v. Cruikshank, 64 
 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 33 Mich. 199. But if the intoxication of 
 
 Iowa, 467; Whalen v. St. Louis, &c., the guest actually contributes to his 
 
 R. Co., 60 Mo. 323. loss he is without remedy. Shultz v. 
 
 " Kean «. Baltimore, &c., R. Co., Wall. 134 Penn. St. 262; following 
 
 61 Md. 154; Houston, &c., R Go. ■». "Walsh «. Porterfleld, 87 Penn. St. 
 
 Reason, 61 Tex. 618; Thompson on 376. 
 
 Negligence, 1174, § 22. ' Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 
 
 " Rammell ®. Schambacher, 120 81 Ky. 624; s. o. 60 Am. Rep. 186. 
 
 Penn. St. 579; 8. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 779. • Cassady «. Magher, 85 Ind. 228. 
 
§ 396.] SPECIAL AND PABTIOULAE' CASES. 509 
 
 ■which would bar a recovery in an action in which it appears 
 that the plaintiff, having bought liquor from the defendant, 
 drank of it until he became intoxicated and unconscious ; 
 and in that condition was expelled from the defendant's sa- 
 loon late in the night, and died from the consequent expos- 
 ure.^ From these two cases it appears that it is hot contrib- 
 utory negligence either to sell liquor to the man who, when 
 he is made drunk by it, does you an injury, or to buy and 
 drink the liquor yourself, although, as a result of your spree, 
 you suffer an injury at the hands of the liquor-seller.* In- 
 toxication is one of the things that may be proven by the 
 opinions of witaesses, and it is held that in this particular, 
 one need not be an expert in order to be a competent wit- 
 ness.* It is, also, error to exclude evidence that the plaintiff 
 was intoxicated at the time of the happening of the acci- 
 dent.* While, what constitutes negligence, is a question of 
 law — the question, whether or not there was intoxication, 
 belongs to the jury as an issue of fact. 
 
 § 396. Deafness, blindness, or other physical infirmity as 
 a defense. — As a general rule of law, it may be said that phys- 
 ical infirmities, of themselves, do not constitute a defense for 
 a, failure to exercise ordinary care under given circumstances. 
 The bluntness of one faculty will not excuse a failure to use 
 the other — as, for an example, deafness will not operate to 
 palliate a failure to use the sense of sight. When one is 
 conscious that his hearing is defective, instead of exercising 
 less, he should, rather, exercise greater care in other respects. 
 What is lacking in the sense of hearing must, if possible, be 
 made up by increased vigilance in looking out for danger 
 with the eye.' And so, also, in case of blindness, common 
 
 ' Weymire v. Wolfe, 53 Iowa, 633. 71 HI. 177. See, also, Cas?edy «. 
 
 'McCueti. Klein, 60 Tex. 168; B. 0. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391; Wood v. 
 
 48 Am. Bep. 260. Andes. 11 Hun, 543; Rock Island «. 
 
 ' People v. Eastwood. 14 N. T. 563; Vanlandschoot, 58 111. 485; Hubbard 
 
 McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cowen, 855; Wool- v. Mason City, 60 Iowa, 400. 
 heather v. Risley, 38 Iowa, 486; Bran- ' Cleveland, &c., R. Co. v. Terry, 8 
 
 non e. Adams, 76 111. 331; Thompson Ohio St. 570; Central, &c., R. Co. ■». 
 
 on Negligence, 779, § 2, and the cases Feller, 84 Penn. St. 236; Morris, &c., 
 
 there collected. R- Co. v. Haslan, 38 N. J. Law, 147 
 
 * Wynn v. Allard, 5 Watts & 8. [Of. with this case, New Jersey, &c., 
 
 534; Illinois, &c., R. Co. v. Cragin, Trans. Co. ■». West,33N. J. Law, 91]; 
 
510 SPECIAL AND PABTIOULAB CASES. [§ 397. 
 
 prudence requires that the blind should exercise far greater 
 care in proportion to the danger to which men, in general, 
 are constantly exposed, than is required of those in full pos- 
 session of the faculty of sight.^ The old and the infirm, how- 
 ever, not less than the young and the agile, have a right to 
 move about and attend to their business, and are entitled to 
 the protection of the law in so doing.' Said Chief Justice 
 Hunt, in the opinion in the case of O'Mara v. Hudson, &c.,. 
 E. Co.:^ — " The old, the lame, and the infirm, are entitled to- 
 the use of the street, and more care must be exercised towards 
 them by engineers than towards those who have better pow- 
 ers of motion. The young are entitled to the same rights^ 
 and cannot be expected to exercise as good foresight and 
 vigilance as those of maturer years." Physical disabilities^ 
 of the character considered in this section, which may be 
 designated as natural or providential disabilities, are to be 
 conceded a far higher indulgence in the law than the self-in- 
 flicted disability of drunkenness. It may be said that men 
 make themselves drunk at their own proper peril, but men 
 are not to be held blind, or deaf, or laime, or aged, in any- 
 such sense. 
 
 § 397. The rale as to physical disabilities farther consid- 
 ered.—" A blind man is not required to see at his peril," said 
 Judge Holmes, in his entertaining work entitled "The Common 
 Law." * Toward these classes of persons, it is a well settled 
 rule that there is required^ to be exercised by the public gen- 
 erally especial care and prudence, while, perhaps, all that can 
 be said of a drunken man in this respect, is that he is not to 
 be wantonly injured.* But even in the case of a deaf person,. 
 
 Steves V. Oswego, &c., R. Co., 18 N. 477. Qf. Oity of Centralia v. Krouse, 
 
 T. 432; Butterfleld v. Western, &c., 64 ill. 19; Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 
 
 R. Co., 10 Allen. 532; Chicago, &c., N. Y. 568; Thompson on Negligence, 
 
 R. Co. V. Still, 19 111. 508; Illinois, 431, § 9, 1303, § 51. 
 &c., R. Co. v. Ebert, 74 111. 399; Han- ' Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584. 
 
 over, &c., R. Co. v. Coyle, 54 Pena. Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N. T. 568. 
 
 St. 396; Elkins v. Boston, &c., R. Co., Qf. Phillips s. Dickeraon, 85 111. 11. 
 115 Mass. 190. « 38 N. Y. 445. 
 
 ' Oyshterbank v. Oardner, 49 N. Y. * Holmes' Common Law, 109. 
 Super. Ct. 263; Winn v. Lowell, 1 ' Illinois, &c, R. Co. c. Hutchinson, 
 
 Allen, 177; Sleepers. Sandown, 53 47111. 408; Field on Damages, §§ 198, 
 
 N. H. 244; Peach v. Utica, 10 Hun, 199; Warton on Negligence, §§306. 
 
§ 398.] SPECIAL AND PAETIOULAE OASES. 511 
 
 the infirmity, if unknown to others, does not impose upon 
 the latter any higher degree of care not to inflict an injury 
 than they would be required to exercise toward a person in 
 full possession of the faculty of hearing. Thus, the engineer 
 of a railway train is justified in assuming that a person on the 
 track at a crossing is not deficient in the sense of hearing, 
 and he is not bound to take any precautions upon a contrary 
 hypothesis.^ It is plainly the law that negligence will never 
 be imputed to the halt, or the blind, or the deaf, simply and 
 solely because they go about their business, as other men do, 
 in as careful a way as their faculties permit. Such conduct 
 upon the part, of such person is never, ire se, contributory 
 negligence. They must exercise what care they can — up to 
 the measure of ordinary care, under the circumstances, and 
 if they do, there is no room to impute negligence. " A per- 
 son may walk or drive in the darkness of the night, relying 
 upon the belief that the corporation has performed its duty, 
 and that the street or the walk is in a safe condition. He 
 walks by a faith justified by law, and if his faith is unfounded, 
 and he suffers an injury, the party in fault must respond in 
 damages. So one whose sight is dimmed by age, or a near- 
 sighted person whose range of vision was always imperfect, 
 or one whose sight has been injured by disease " [and it 
 might have been added, in view of the caution in the succeed- 
 ing sentence, one wholly blind, or deaf, or otherwise a victim 
 of some disabling physical infirmity], " is each entitled to the 
 same rights, and may act upon the same assumption. Each 
 is, however, bound to know that prudence and care are in 
 turn required of him, and that if he fails in this respect, any 
 injury he may suffer is without redress." ' 
 
 § 398. Negligence as a defense in actions upon policies of 
 insurance. — The negligence of the assured, his agents or 
 
 307, 332, 389, a; Shearman & Redfleld Chester Turnpike Co., 33 Barb. 413; 
 
 on Negligence, 4th ed., § 93. Frost v. Waltham, 13 Allen, 85; 
 
 > Cleveland, Sac., R. Co. v. Terry, 8 Thompson c. Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 
 
 Ohio St. 570. See, also, §§ 203, 393, 188; Renwick v. New York, &c., R. 
 
 gupra. Co., 36 N. Y. 133; Holmes' Common 
 
 " Davenport «. Ruckman, 37 N. Y. Law, 109; Thompson on Negligence, 
 
 568 (Hunt, C. J.); aflarming b. c. 10 1203, § 51. 
 Bosw. 20. See, also, Cox. v. West- 
 
■512 SPECIAL AND PAETICULAB CASES. . [§ 399. 
 
 servants, in the absence of fraud or wilfulness, occasioning a 
 loss by a peril insured against, is no defense to an action, 
 either on a fire or marine policy.* As it is often expressed, 
 loss occasioned by negligence is one of the principal risks 
 against which men insure. So the insurance company has 
 been held liable where the accident arose from the careless 
 use of fire in drying the plastering of a room,* or from the 
 negligent use of fire in compounding chemicals in a drug 
 store.' Neither will the use of the premises as a house of 
 prostitution avoid the policy if there is nothing in the policy 
 forbidding it.* But where the negligence is so gross as to 
 squint at fraud, or to amount to positive misconduct and 
 wrong-doing, as where a steamboat captain, in order to in- 
 crease the speed of his boat for the purpose of winning a 
 race, makes use of turpentine for fuel, and in consequence 
 the boat takes fire and burns up, the insurer is not liable." 
 
 § 399. The same subject continned. — So, also, in respect 
 of policies of life insurance, it is the rule that accidental or 
 unintentional self-destruction is not within a condition for- 
 feiting a policy for suicide.* This is equally the rule 
 
 • American Insiirance Co. v. Insley, Waters v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 11 
 7 Penn. St. 223; s. c. 47 Am. Dec. Peters, 313; Henderson v. Western, 
 509; Hillier «. Allegheny, &c., Ins. &c., Ins. Co., 10 Kob. (La.) 164; s. c. 
 Co., 3 Penn. St. 470; s. c. 45 Am. 43 Am. Dec. 179; Sherwood «. Gen- 
 Dec. 656, and note; Cumberland, &c., eral Ins. Co., IBlatchf. 255; Shaw t. 
 Ins. Co. ■». Douglas, 58 Penn. St. 419; Eobberds, 6 Ad. & El. 75; May on 
 Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 8 Cush. Insurance, §§ 407-411. 
 497; Gates v. Madison, &c., Ins Co., ' Troy, &c., Ins. Co. «. Carpenter, 
 
 5 N. T. 469; s. c. 55 Am. Dec. 360; 4 Wis. 39. 
 
 Tilton ®. Hamilton Ins. Co., 1 Bosw. ' Brown v. Kings Co., &c., Ins. Co., 
 
 393; O'Brien v. Commercial Ins. Co., 31 How. Pr. 512. 
 
 6 Jbnes & S. 526; Brown «. Kings Co., ■* Behler v. German, &c., Ins. Co., 
 Ac, Ins. Co., 31 How. Pr. 513; Bui- 68 Ind. 353. 
 
 man ®. Monn^outh Ins. Co., 35 Me. ' Citizens', &c., Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 
 
 237. Nor will gross negligence re- 55 Penn. St. 387. 
 
 lease the insurers; for "the law makes ' Breasted v. Parmer's Loan & Trust 
 
 a clear distinction between even gross Co., 8 N. T. 299; a. c. 59 Am. Dec. 
 
 negligence and fraud, and although 482; Dean v. American Mutual Life 
 
 the former may be evidence tending Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 103; s. c. 1 Bigelow's 
 
 to show malafdei, it is not in fact the Life & Ace. Ins. Cas. 195; Cooper «. 
 
 same thing." Johnson %. Berkshire Massachusetts, &c., Ins. Co., 102 
 
 Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 388, 390. Columbia Mass. 337; Knickerbocker Life Ins. 
 
 Ins. Co. «. Lawrence, 10 Peters, 517; Co. t. Peters, 42 Md. 414; Penfold v. 
 
§ 400.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB OASES. 513 
 
 *' whether death result from taking poison by mistake, sup- 
 posing it a wholesome medicine, or taking an overdose of a 
 dangerous medicine ; or from an act done in frenzy or deliri- 
 um, as by leaping from a window, tearing oflf a bandage from 
 an artery ; or from an act done under the stress of an over- 
 powering force,"* as, for an example, where one, being 
 intoxicated, took poison by mistake without intent to destroy 
 his life,' or where one holding an accident policy, was injured 
 in carelessly attempting to jump on to the step of an omnibus 
 while in motion.' But, in Iowa, it was held, where one was 
 insured against accident while traveling on the conveyances 
 of any common carrier, provided he complied with the rules 
 and regulations of the carrier and exercised due diligence 
 looking to his self-protection, and while riding on a railway 
 train, stood upon the step of the car, upon approaching a 
 station, in violation of the carrier's rules, which were known 
 to him, and was in consequence thrown from the train and 
 injured, that there could be no recovery on the policy.' 
 
 § 400. In actions for failnre to transmit or deliver tele- 
 graphic dispatches. — In Eoons v. Western Union Telegraph 
 Oo.,f it was held that where the sender of a telegraphic dispatch, 
 intending to write a certain word, negligently writes what more 
 resembles another word — " two " being so written as to ap- 
 pear to be " ten " — the telegraph company is not liable for 
 damages caused by transmitting the word as it appeared to 
 be written, which is perhaps equivalent to a rule that, in 
 dealing with a telegraph company, illegible chirography will 
 be held, if it occasion any trouble or injury, such negligence 
 or default on the part of the sender of the dispatch as will 
 
 TJniveisal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; Rep. 127. See, also, as in point upon 
 
 B. c. 39 Am. Rep. 660; May on Insur- the general question of accidental self- 
 
 ance, § 307. destruction as a defense as distin- 
 
 ■ Mr. Freeman's note, 59 Am. Dec. guished from suicide. Breasted «. Far- 
 
 489, § 3. mer's Loan & Trust Co., 8 N. Y. 299; 
 
 ' Equitable Life Ass. Soc. ■». Pater- s. c. 59 Am. Dec. 482, and the learned 
 
 son, 41 Ga. 338; 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 535; annotation at pages 487-497. Bliss on 
 
 3 Bigelow's Life& Ace. Ins. Cas. 534. Life Insurance, § 228; Bunyon on Life 
 
 ' ChampUn v. Railway Passenger Assurance, 2d ed., 71; May on Insur- 
 
 Ins. Co., 6 Lans. 71. ance, § 308; Reynolds on Lite Insur- 
 
 * Bon 9. Railway Passenger Assur- ance, 105, 107. 
 
 ance Co., 56 Iowa, 664; 8. c. 41 Am. » 102 Penn. St. 164. 
 33 
 
514 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAK CASES. [§ 400. 
 
 prevent his recovery of damages from the company. A person 
 who addressed his telegram to " Mrs. La Fountain, Kankakee," 
 a city of twelve thousand inhabitants, and failed to make the 
 address more definite when the company called his attention 
 to it, was held guilty of contributory negligence barring re- 
 covery of a statutory penalty for negligence in transmission. 
 The court said : — " The appellee was guilty of negligence. 
 His attention was called to the fact that the name of the per- 
 son to whom the message was addressed should be given, 
 and that the street and number should be given. He, failed 
 to give either and rested upon the supposition that she was 
 well known. This was not such prudence and care as the law 
 requires. If a man addresses a message to Mrs. Jones, or Mrs. 
 Smith, in a city of twelve or fifteen thousand inhabitants, he 
 exercises a degree of care much below the legal standard. 
 It may possibly be, that if the telegraph company had accepted 
 the message without calling the sender's attention to the in- 
 sufficiency of the address, it could not be held that there was 
 contributory negligence, but here the sender of the message 
 had his attention directed to the insufficiency of the address, 
 and instead of endeavoring to remedy the defect, elected to in- 
 cur the hazard of its safe transmission. He was in fault, he 
 assumed the risk, aj^d he ' cannot make another suffer for the 
 consequences of his own negligence. Slight care on his part 
 would have provided the means of identifying the person to 
 whom the message was sent, and having after due warning 
 failed to exercise this care, he is in no situation to demand a 
 penalty." ^ And where a dispatch was addressed to " 291 
 Eampart street," and it appeared that the street was divided 
 into North and South Eampart streets, each having a number 
 291, and the person to whom the dispatch was delivered re- 
 ceipted for it and said the one to whom it was addressed 
 
 ' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mc- Co. v. Du Bois, 128 111. 248; s. c. 21 
 
 Daniel, 103 Ind. 294, One to whom N. E. Hep. 4. The negligence of the 
 
 a telegram is sent may maintain an sender will not relieve the company 
 
 action against the company for its from liability to the person to whom 
 
 negligence in the delivery of the mes- the message is sent, for actual negli- 
 
 sage. Western Union Tel. Co. ■». gence in failing to find him. West- 
 
 Longwell (H. M.), 31 Pac. Rep. 339. ern Union Tel. Co. ■». McKibben, 114 
 
 But the action must be in tort, not Ind. 511; s. c. 14 N. E. Rep. 894. 
 X contractu. Western Union Tel. 
 
§ 401.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. 515 
 
 lived there, the company was held not liable.* A regulation 
 of a telegraph company, printed on' blanks, prescribing lim- 
 its within which a message will be delivered free, and requir- 
 ing a deposit to cover delivery charges if the message is to be 
 delivered outside of the limits, is reasonable ; and where the 
 person to whom a message is addressed lives outside the pre- 
 scribed limits, it is incumbent on the sender of the message, 
 who knows of the regulationSj to ascertain the fact, and make 
 the required deposit, and the illiteracy pi the sender is no 
 excuse for his failure to comply with such regulation.^ 
 
 § 401. The same subject continued.— In Given v. Western 
 Union Telegraph Co.,' it was held, by Mr. Justice Miller, at 
 circuit, that when a message is sent to one who is at the time 
 of its receipt out of town, and consequently not at his usual 
 place of business, and the company delivers the message to 
 his wife at his house who does not know where her husband is, 
 and cannot, therefore, forward the dispatch to him promptly, 
 the failure of the husband to inform his wife of his where- 
 abouts for the day, or his failare to notify the telegraph com- 
 pany in advance where he may be reached, or the failure of 
 the wife to act promptly to the end of getting the dispatch 
 into her husband's hands, amounts to such contributory neg- 
 ligence upon the part of the plaintiff as will defeat a recovery 
 of damages for any injury resulting from the failure to re- 
 ceive the dispatch promptly.* 
 
 ' Deslottes B. Baltimore, &c., Tel. that the plaintifE was not chargeable 
 
 Co., 40 La. Ann. 183; s. o. 3 So. Eep. with knowledge of regulations printed 
 
 566. The company cannot avoid on the company's blanks, even though 
 
 liability on the ground that compen- he was in the habit of using them, 
 
 sation was not paid at the time the Pearsall ». Western Union Tel. Co., 
 
 message was delivered by the sender, 44 Him, 532. 
 
 where the agent declined to receive ' 34 Fed. Rep. 119. 
 
 the compensation at the time, and ■■ Saee fabula docet that, , when a 
 
 requested that the person to whom man goes away from home, if only 
 
 the message was sent be allowed to for a day, he must, in order to render 
 
 pay. Western Union Tel. Co. «. the Western Union Telegraph Com- 
 
 Topst, 118 Ind. 348; s. c. SON. E. Rep. pany liable for a failure to deKver his 
 
 232. dispatches promptly, tell his wife 
 
 " Western Union Tel. Co. v. Har- where he is going, or at the very 
 
 derson, 89 Ala. 510; s. c. 7 So. Rep. least, notify the company before he 
 
 419. Where a message was written on leaves, where he may be readied dur- 
 
 an ordinary piece of paper, it was held ing that day. See, also. Western 
 
516 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. [§ 402. 
 
 I 403. The rule in the Admiralty.— In Admiralty the 
 matter of negligence and contributory negligence is dealt 
 with in a peculiar way. When one brings his action in the 
 Court of Admiralty for damages for an injury he has sus- 
 tained in collision by reason of the culpable negligence of 
 another, the plaintiff's own contributory negligence is not a 
 defense as in a court of English common law, neither is there 
 a comparison instituted between the negligence of plaintiff 
 and defendant, to the end that a judicial balance may be 
 struck as is the rule in Illinois, nor does the plaintiff's neg- 
 ligence, as in Georgia and Tennessee, go in mitigation of 
 damages. " The rule of admiralty in collisions, apportioning 
 the loss in case of mutual fault, is peculiar to the maritime 
 law. It is not derived from the civil law, which agrees with 
 the common law in not allowing a party to recover for the 
 negligence of another where his own fault has contributed to 
 the .^njury. It emanated from the ancient maritime codes, 
 and the reasons which are assigned by commentators as 
 commending it are various and divergent."' The general 
 principlos of the law maritime on which depends the right to 
 recover in the Court of Admiralty for damage arising by col- 
 lision, were thus stated by Lord Stowell :' — " There are four , 
 possibilities under which a loss of this sort may occur. 1st. 
 It may happen without blame being imputed to either party ; 
 as, where a loss is occasioned by a storm, or by any other 
 vis major; in that case the misfortune must be borne by the 
 pariy, on whom it happens to light ; the other not being re- 
 sponsibl& to him in any degree. 2dly. A misfortune of this 
 kind may arise where both parties are to blame, where there 
 has been a want of skill and due diligence on both sides; in 
 
 Union Telegraph Co. v. Blanchard, 68 the House of Lords; Hay v. LeNeve, 
 
 Ga. 299; 8. c. 45 Am. Rep. 480, 2 Shaw's Appl. Cases, 395; who also 
 
 and Mr, Browne's note, wherein cited a similar statement of the law by 
 
 the liability of telegraph compa- the same learned judge, from a JfS. 
 
 nies is considered at length, and note of the case of The Lord Melville, 
 
 mamjr, cases are collected. Western 1816, ibid. See The Catherine of 
 
 Union Telegraph Co. s. Reynolds, 77 Dover, Dawson, 2 Hagg. Ad. 145, 
 
 Va. 173; k c. 4« Am. Bep. 715. 154." I have taken this citation and 
 
 ' ^y'ftUace, J., in The Max Morris, note bodily from Maclachlan's "Law 
 
 28 Fed. :^ep, 881. of Merchant Shipping " (3d London 
 
 " "The Wardrop-Sims, Jones, 2 ed., 1880), 304. 
 Dods. 83, 86, cited by Lord Oiflord in 
 
§ 403.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAE CASES. 517 
 
 such a case, the rule of law is, that the loss must be appor- 
 tioned between them, as having been occasioned by the fault 
 of both. 3dly. It may happen by the misconduct of the suf- 
 fering party alone ; and then the rule is that the suffering 
 party must bear his own burthen. 4thly. It may have been 
 the fault of the ship which ran the other down ; and in this 
 case, the injured party would be entitled to an entire com- 
 pensation from the other." Upon these four famous propo- 
 sitions, formulated and declared by the foremost of English 
 admiralty judges, hangs all.the law in the Admiralty upon 
 the matter of the recovery of damages in collision. • 
 
 § 403. Lord StowelFs rules considered.— " These rules," 
 says Mr. Maclachlanj^ " with a difference to be immediately 
 pointed out, are also the law of the French Code,* which dif- 
 fers from the French Ordinance of 168P only in this, that the 
 modern law, improved by the clear expositions of Emerigon,* 
 and Valin,' provides for the case of accidental collision.* The 
 defect, so remedied in the French law, exists in the laws of 
 Oleron' and of Wis by,* from which the ordinance of Louis 
 XIV. borrowed extensively ; and yet the principle overlooked 
 in these earlier and later codes is obviously accepted by the 
 Digest,* the common source of much of the legislation of 
 those times." "It has been," the same writer continues, "the 
 custom of writers upon jurisprudence, to bestow much atten- 
 tion and but little praise on a rule somewhat resembling the 
 second of these," in consequence of its dividing the loss ber 
 tween the parties for a reason quite unknown to English Law, 
 which the jurists of Cleirae's time called jwiicium msticorwn, 
 the rule of arbitrators who compromise where they cannot 
 decide." It is with the second of Lord Stowell's rules that, 
 for the purposes of this treatise, we have to do. Where 
 both parties are in fault, it is, in accordance with this rule, 
 
 ■ Maclachlan's "Law of Merchant ' 2 Valin, 178, 179, 180. 
 
 Shipping," 305. ' Boulay-Paty, Droit Marit, vol. IV, 
 
 " Code de Com., art. 407, which 492, t. 12, § 6. 
 
 reduces the third and fourth rules into ' Oleron, art. 15—1 Pardess, 334. 
 
 one. ' Wisby, art. 29, 30, 49, 50, 51, 65— 
 
 ' Liv. 2, t. 7, art. 10, 11. 1 Pardess, 481 et teg. 
 
 * Emerigon des Assur. vol. I, page ° Dig. 9, 2, 29, §g 2 and 4. 
 
 408, c. 12, § 14. "" Lord Stowell's Rules, supra. 
 
618 
 
 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAE OASES. 
 
 [§ 404. 
 
 settled law in courts of admiralty, tliat the loss shall be 
 equally divided between them. This rule is universally de- 
 clared by all the foreign ordinances and jurists, and is uni- 
 versally applied both here and in England in admiralty.* 
 
 § 404. Lord Stowell's second rule defended.— I have found 
 no better elucidation of the rule in question than that con- 
 tained in the letter of the Registrar of the Admiralty Court 
 in London to Lord Chancellor Selborne, written in 1873, when 
 the Lord Chancellor moved his bill in the House of Lords, 
 which afterwards became law as the Supreme Judicature 
 Act,' in which it was proposed to abolish the difference be- 
 tween the common law courts and the Court of Admiralty in 
 damage causes at sea, by extinguishing with a stroke of the 
 pen this ancient rule. Mr. Eothery, the Registrar, comes to 
 the defense of the rule in a letter addressed to the Lord Chan- 
 cellor, an extract from which I have set out in the note,' in 
 
 ' The Baltimore, 8 WaU. 377; The 
 Catherine, 17 How. (U. S.) 170; The 
 Continental, 14 Wall. 345; The Con- 
 stitution, Gilp. 579; Boggs «. Parr, 3 
 Hughes, 504; Vaux v. Sheffer, 8 Moo. 
 P. C. 75; The Sappho, 9 Jur. 560; 1 
 Parson's Mar. Law, 189; Lees' L. Brit. 
 Sh. 355; 3 Kent's Commentaries, 931; 
 Maclachlan's Law of Merchant Ship- 
 ping (3d London ed.), ch. VI, pp. 
 304-321. 
 
 = 36 and 37 Vict., ch. 66 (1873). 
 
 ' The learned Registrar said, omit- 
 ting such part of the letter as is pre- 
 fatory and complimentary : — " I will 
 take your Lordship's figures, and will 
 assume that A and B are the owners 
 of two vessels, worth respectively 
 10,000i. and 50,000i.; that they come 
 into collision, and that both alike are 
 to blame for the collision, that being 
 a condition precedent to the equal 
 division of the damages. And, first, 
 I will assume that A's vessel goes to 
 the bottom, and that B's is uninjured, 
 a not very unusual occurrence in col- 
 lision at sea. Then A, who has lost 
 10,0002. by the sinking of his vessel, 
 
 would, under the Admiralty rule, both 
 being to blame, be entitled to re- 
 cover one half of his loss, or 5,0002., 
 from B. Secondly. Let us assume 
 that B's vessel goes -to the bottom, and 
 that A's is uninjured ; then B, who 
 has lost 50,0002. by the sinking of his 
 vessel, will be entitled to recover one 
 moiety of his loss, or 35,0002., from A. 
 Thirdly. I will suppose that both 
 go to the bottom, both being alike to 
 blame for the collision. Then A, 
 having lost 10,0002. by the sinking of 
 his vessel, is entitled to recover 5,0002. 
 from B, for a moiety of his damage; 
 while B is entitled to recover 25,0002. 
 from A, for the moiety of his damage. 
 Each loses 30,0002. ; A, by having to 
 bear the loss of one moiety of his own 
 vessel, or 5,0002., and by having to 
 pay to B 35,0002. for the moiety of 
 his, B's loss; and B, by having to 
 bear the loss of one moiety of his own 
 vessel, or 25,0002., and by having to 
 pay to A 5,0002. for a moiety of his, 
 A's loss. The mistake of those who 
 think that the owner of a vessel 
 worth 10,0002. might, by a collision 
 
§ 404.] 
 
 SPECIAL AND PABTIOULAR CASES. 
 
 519 
 
 ■which, assuming that the rule is misunderstood and, taking 
 his cue from the argument against it in the House of Lords, 
 he argues with such force and cogency of logic in its favor 
 that, in the Judicature Act as finally adopted, the rule is not 
 only preserved as to the Courts of Admiralty, but is made 
 the rule of the other courts in like case, where it used not 
 to be.* In this country, however, as in England prior to the 
 passage of the Supreme Judicature Act,' when an action for 
 collision is brought in a court of common law, the admiralty 
 rule is disregarded, and if the plaintiff, by his own negligence, 
 contributed in any degree to occasion the collision, he has no 
 remedy.^ The tule for dividing damage, in case of collision, 
 applies to all cases of marine tort founded upon negligence.^ 
 Ordinarily to determine the right and remedies of parties for 
 marine torts the courts recur to the rules of the common law 
 to ascertain what acts are torts.' Where a seaman is injured 
 
 with a vessel -worth 50,000?., recover, 
 under the Admiralty law, no Ijsss a 
 sum than 30,0002. as a compensation, 
 arises from their supposing that the 
 amount at stake is a common fund, 
 to be divided between two claimants, 
 not a joint loss which has to be appor- 
 tioned between them. Let us now 
 see what the result would be under 
 the Common Law rule, where, if both 
 are to blame, neither can recover any- 
 thing. In the first of the three cases 
 cited above, the whole loss of 10,0002. 
 would fall upon A; in the second, the 
 whole loss of 50,0002. wovild fall upon 
 B; and in the third case, B's loss 
 would be 50,0002., while A's loss 
 would be only 10,0002., or one-fifth 
 part that of B. And this, too, be it 
 observed, although both may have 
 ibeen «quaUy to blame for the collision, 
 and although the fact whether one or 
 hoth went to the bottom would depend 
 very much upon the accident, of which 
 parts of the two vessels came into 
 collision. A rule which depends 
 upon so mere an accident can, I ven- 
 ture to submit, hardly be so equitable 
 as the rule which directs that a loss, 
 resulting from the common fault of 
 
 two parties, shall be equally divided 
 between them." "A Defense of the 
 Rule of the Admiralty Court, etc., in 
 a letter to the Right Hon. Lord Sel- 
 bome, etc., by H. C. Rothery, M. A., 
 Registrar, etc., 1873." 
 
 ' 86 and 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 25, 
 sub. 9. 
 
 » 36 and 37 Vict., ch. 66. 
 
 » Broadwell v. Swigert, 7 Ben. M. 
 39; 8. c. 45 Am. Dec. 47, and the 
 note; Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 
 69 K. y. 470; Owners of the steam- 
 boat Farmer v. McCraw, 36 Ala. 189; 
 s. 0. 63 Am. Dec. 718; Vanderplank 
 V. Miller, 1 Moody & M. 169 (by Lord 
 Tenterden). See, also. The Clara, 103 
 U. S. 300; The Morgan v. The Zebra, 
 3 Hughes, 64: The R. L. Maybey, 4 
 Blatchf. 88; The Scranten and The 
 Emerald Isle, 2 Ben. 35; The Morn- 
 ing Light, 3 WaU. 550; Union S. S. 
 Co., v. New York, 34 How. (U.S.) 307; 
 1 Parsons' Shipping and Admiralty, 
 535; Abbott's Shipping, 230; 2 Sedg- 
 wick on Damages, 7th ed. 351, note; 
 Cohen's Admiralty, 215, 334. 
 
 * The Max Morrip, 28 Ped.Rep. 881. 
 
 » The Max Morris, 28 Fed. Rep. 881. 
 
520 SPECIAL AND PABTICULAE CASES. [§ 405. 
 
 in the service of a vessel, his own negligence contributing to 
 the injury, it seems that the rule of apportionment is applied 
 by awarding him indemnity for the wages he would have 
 earned but for the accident, and denying him damages for 
 pain and suffering.* 
 
 § 405. Contributory negligence in actions between attor- 
 ney and client. — We find very few reported cases of actions 
 brought against attorneys for negligence,' and therefore, few 
 cases in which the contributory negligence of the client is 
 pleaded as a defense. In such decisions as there are, we find 
 the case turning rather on the right than the measure of the 
 recovery.' In the recent case of Bead v. Patterson,* the con- 
 tributory negligence of the client is Bxpressly held a bar to 
 an action upon his part, for damages sustained by reason of 
 the negligence of his attorney, and aside from this single 
 adjudication, I have not found any case in point. It appears 
 that, in 1860, Patterson placed in the hands of his attorney. 
 Bead, some notes for collection ; that Bead obtained a judg- 
 ment upon each of the notes, and that executions were issued 
 in due time and severally returned unsatisfied. Then came 
 the war ; inter arma silent leges; which is to say, returning to 
 the vernacular, that nothing further was done, toward coUect- 
 > ing these notes, until 1866, when Bead had alias executions 
 
 ' The Truro, 31 Fed. Kep. 158. It negligence has been such as to furnish 
 is the right of a seaman injured in the a right of action against them (i. e., 
 service of a vessel to he cared for at actions of negligence by clients against 
 least to the end of the voyage, and their attorneys), the rule of damages 
 nothing short of gross negligence, or is the same with that in like case 
 wilful misconduct causing or concur- against sheiifls. The plaintiff is en- 
 ring to cause the injury, will forfeit titled to be in the same position as if 
 such right. The City of Carlisle, 39 the attorney had done his • duty." 
 Fed. Rep. 807. Sedgwick on Damages, 6th ed., 635,. 
 
 " In Sedgwick on Damages, 6th citing Tatham s. Lewis, 65 Penn. St. 
 ed., 635, in the note, it is suggested 65. See, also, 2 Sedgwick on Dam- 
 that the reason for the paucity of au- ages, 7th ed., 447, note; and Weeks 
 thorities upon this point is, either that on Attorneys at Law, ,ch. xii., 
 "attorneys are a very faithful class," 470, in which the liability of attorneys; 
 or "very skillful in covering the to their clients, with respect of negli- 
 tracks of any devious steps." gence generally, is very fully consid- 
 
 ' Godefrby «. Jay, 7 Bing. 413; ered, and a great number of cases are. 
 
 Hoby «. Built, 3 Bam. & Ad. 350; cited. 
 Langdon e. Gpdfrey, 4 Fost. & Fin. * 11 Lea (Tenn.) 430. 
 445. "In other cases where their 
 
§ 406.] SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR OASES. 521 
 
 issued, upon which returns were not made up to the time 
 when this suit was brought, in 1871. The plaintiff had judg- 
 ment against his attorney in the court below for the whole 
 amount of the judgments remaining unpaid, but upon ap- 
 peal, the court held that, although the defendant was negli- 
 gent in not collecting the money, inasmuch as the judgment- 
 debtor was perfectly solvent during all the years which had 
 elapsed since the issuing of the alias executions, yet that neg- 
 ligence not being the proximate or natural occasion of the 
 loss, the plaintiff ought not to recover, for the plain reason 
 that he himself, at any time, without reference to what his 
 attorney did, or omitted to do, might have had executions is- 
 sued upon the judgments, which coald have been collected ;. 
 that this failure upon the part of the plaintiff to proceed as 
 he might have done, was the true proximate cause of his 
 failure to get his money, and that, having employed other 
 counsel to assist in enforcing the claim, which, in fact, as it 
 appears, was practically a repudiation of the defendant as his 
 attorney in the premises, which counsel also failed to tak& 
 the proper steps to collect the judgments, he was guilty of 
 such contributory default as would p*revent a recovery from 
 the defendant. This decision, reversing the judgment of the- 
 court below, was rendered at the April term, 1883 — more than 
 twenty-three years after Bead obtained the original judgments- 
 — and granted a new trial. 
 
 § 406. In actions between physician and patient. — ^It is a 
 
 well settled rule of law that when a patient has, by his own 
 imprudence, negligence, or disregard of the directions of his 
 physician, directly contributed to the aggravation of his dis- 
 ease or disorder, he cannot recover damages for anything 
 which is the result of mere negligence or unsuccessful treat- 
 ment by the physician. Contributory negligence here, as in 
 any other case, is a bar to the action. Many cases in all the 
 courts enforce this rule.* " Nothing can be more clear," said 
 
 ' Potter V. Warner, 91 Penn. St. Haire v. Reese, 7 Phila. 138; Cham- 
 
 362; B. c. 36 Am. Rep. 668; Gwynn v. herlin «. Morgan, 68 Penn. St. 168; 
 
 Duffleld, 61 Iowa, 64; s. c. 47 Am. Bogle d. ■Winslow.SPhila. 186; Geisei- 
 
 Rep. 802; Hlbbard v. Thompson, 109 man «. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 86; Wohl- 
 
 Mass. 286; McCandless c. McWha, 22 fahrt v. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 490; s. c. 
 
 Penn. St. 261; s. c. 25 Penn. St. 95; 44 Am. Rep. 406; Thompson on Neg- 
 
^522 SPECIAL AND PABTIOULAB OASES. [§ 407. 
 
 -Judge "Woodward,^ "than that it is the duty of the pa- 
 tient to co-operate with his professional adviser, and to con- 
 form to the necessary prescriptions ; but if he will not, or, 
 under the pressure of pain, cannot, his neglect is his own 
 wrong or tnisfortune, for which he has no right to hold his 
 •surgeon responsible. No man may take advantage of his own 
 wrong, or charge his misfortune to the account of another." 
 If the patient is insane, and so incapable of exercising proper 
 ^care, or of co-operating with his physician, contributory neg- 
 ligence is not to be imputed to him, and the physician is 
 bound to take a just account of this incapacity on the part of 
 his patient, and act accordingly.' In Hibbard v. Thompson,' 
 it was held that, in an action of negligence brought by a patient 
 ■against his physician, in which it appears that, although the 
 plaintiff, while under treatment, had injured himself by his 
 ~own carelessness, the physician had also inflicted a distinct 
 and separate injury by careless and unskillful treatment, the 
 plaintiff may have his action, provided that the injurious re- 
 -sults of the patient's negligence can be distinctly and clearly 
 separated and distinguished from those which flowed from 
 the malpractice of the physician ; or, in other words, that 
 when in actions of this nature the damages are capable of 
 •apportionment, so that it can be made to appear with reason- 
 able distinctness what part is due to the plaintiff's neglect and 
 what to the wrong-doing of the defendant, then an action may 
 be maintained by the plaintiff for the injury resulting from 
 the defendant's separate default.* 
 
 § 407. The same subject continued.— It is not, however, 
 contributory negligence for a patient, after one physician has 
 injured him by negligent treatment, to refuse to allow another 
 physician to make a somewhat dangerous experimetft upon 
 him for the purpose of repairing the injury, unless there be 
 reasonable assurance of the success of the experiment.'' In 
 the case in which this doctrine is declared, the court said : — 
 
 ligence, 1215, § 63; Wharton on Neg- ' People «. New York Hospital (by 
 ligence, § 737; Shearman & Redfield Ordrohaux, C), 3 Abb. N. C. 229. 
 on Negligence, 4th ed., § 615. » 109 Mass. 286. 
 
 ' McCandless «. McWha, 22 Penn. * See, also, § 69, »upra. 
 St. 261. ' Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Penn. 
 
 St. 168. 
 
§ 407.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAE CASES. 523 
 
 "" Is it the duty of a person who has been injured by the mal- 
 practice of a physician" or surgeon, to make any experiment 
 "which may be suggested to him, however plausible it may 
 appear ? A man who is not himself a physician, and cannot 
 be expected to know anything upon the subject, cannot be 
 himself a judge of such matters. It was very reasonable for 
 the father of Hattie Morgan to say, when Dr. Eichardson 
 proposed to put her under the influence of an anaesthetic and 
 attempt to reduce the limb, ' that, so long as she was improv- 
 ing so fast as she had done since he came home, he should 
 not have it disturbed.' Had Dr. Ohamberlin proposed this 
 experiment, there might be some reason to hold that he 
 should have the opportunity of redeeming his mistake ; or 
 even if he had called in Dr. Eichardson to act on his behalf. 
 Mr. Morgan merely requested Dr. Eichardson to examine 
 his daughter's arm and give his opinion about it. That did 
 not oblige him to adopt his advice, or to incur the hazard 
 and expense of another operation. He owed no such duty to 
 Dr. Ohamberlin. It was offered to prove that the injury 
 could then have been reduced. But how was Mr. Morgan or 
 Hattie to have known this? Had the experiment failed it 
 might well have been urged that, as she was improving, she 
 ought to have been let alone, and that Dr. Ohamberlin was 
 relieved from all responsibility by the case having been taken 
 out of his hands." ^ Where an action is brought against a 
 person for injuries inflicted by him, the negligence of the 
 physician employed by the person injured is not imputable 
 to the latter, if he have used due care in procuring professional 
 treatment.^ In Pullman Palace Car Oo. v. Bluhm,' the court 
 said : — " The appellee, when injured, was bound by law to 
 VLse ordinary care to render the injury no greater than neces- 
 sary. T[t was therefore his duty to employ such surgeons 
 
 ' Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Fenn. geon of the highest professional skill 
 St. 168. Upon the question of the and most infallible judgment, before 
 liability of the physician in general for he could hold the defendants answer- 
 negligence or ignorance, see State v. able for the condition in which he was 
 Hardister, 38 Ark. 605; s. c. 42 Am. left at the end of his medical treat- 
 Rep. 5; and contra, State v. Schulz, 55 ment." Loesers. Humphrey, 41 Ohio 
 Iowa, 698; 8. c. 39 Am. Rep. 187. St. 378. Stover v. Bluehill, 51 Me. 
 
 ' " It is not incumbent upon him to 439. 
 
 incur the greatest expense, and call ^ 109 111. 20. 
 in the most eminent physician or sur- 
 
524 SPECIAL AND PAETICULAE CASKS. [§ 408. 
 
 and nurses as ordinary prudence in his situation required, 
 and to use ordinary judgment and care in doing so, and to- 
 select only such as were of at least ordinary skill and care im 
 their profession. But the law does not make him an insurer 
 in such case that such surgeons or doctors or nurses will be= 
 guilty of no negligence, error in judgment, or want of care. 
 The liability to mistakes in curing is incident to a broken^ 
 arm, and where such mistakes occur (the injured party using 
 ordinary care) the injury resulting from such mistakes is 
 properly regarded as part of the immediate and direct dam- 
 ages resulting from the breaking of the arm." 
 
 § 408. In actions between innkeeper and gnest. — The inn- 
 keeper, like the common carrier, is an insurer, and responsi- 
 ble to his guests, for losses and damage of eyery character, 
 except such as are occasioned by the act of God, the king's 
 enemy, or the party complaining.^ Another view of the inn- 
 keeper's liability is that he is excused for losses occasioned 
 by vis major, or irresistible force, such as robbery and fire.* 
 But whether the innkeeper is to be held to the one degree of 
 liability or the other, it is plain that he is liable for losses 
 occasioned by theft, unless the contributory negligence of 
 the guest is the proper proximate cause of the loss.* It is 
 
 ' Chitty on Contracts, 675; 2 Par- son v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 306; s. c. 47 
 sons on Contracts, 146; 3 Story on Am. Rep. 754. Where the lock on 
 Contracts, § 909; Savmders on the door furnished the guest was out 
 Negligence, 313; Lusk ». Belote, 33 of repair, and the guest failed to no- 
 Minn. 468; Olson v. Crossman, 31 tify the host, but slept in the room 
 Minn. 333; Batterson v. Vogel, 10 with the door unlocked, he still cannot 
 Mo. App. 235. he said to have been guilty of con- 
 
 " Story on Bailments, §472; Red- tributory negligence. Lanier u. Young- 
 field on Carriers, § 596; Wharton on blood, 73 Ala. 587; Addison on Torts 
 Negligence, § 678; 3 Kent's Commen- 613, 613, 614; Story on Contracts, 
 taries, 593; Thompson on Neghgence, § 748; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 593; 
 1215, § 63; Schultz v. WaU (Penn.), Herbert v. Markwell, Q. B. Div., 1881 
 19 Atl. Rep. 743. (unreported); Oppenheim v. White 
 
 ' Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 380; Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515; 
 
 s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 471; Dickinson v. Spice v. Bacon, L. R. 2 Exch. 
 
 Winchester, 4Cush. 121; Houser d. Div. 463; Cashill v. Wright, 6 
 
 Tnlly, 63 Penn. St. 92; 8. c. 1 Am. El. & Bl. 891; Annistead v. 
 
 Rep. 390; Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 361. It is not 
 
 (N. T.) 175; B. c. 7 Am. Deo. 449, within the scope of this treatise 
 
 and note; Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. to consider the liability of innkeepers 
 
 596; s. 0. 41 Am. Rep. 772; Murchi- in detail tmder the various statutes 
 
§ 409.] SPECIAL AND PAETICULAB CASES. 525 
 
 not contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in the guest 
 not to lock or bolt his door. At most, it is only a circum- 
 stance to go to the jury upon the question of the guest's 
 jiegligence.^ 
 
 § 409. Cayle's case.— This is the ancient learning in 
 •Cayle's Case r* — " The innkeeper in that case," saith Lord 
 Coke, " is bound in law to keep them " [the goods of his 
 guest] " safe without any stealing or purloining, and it is no 
 •excuse for the innkeeper to say that he delivered the guest 
 the key of the chamber door in which he is lodged, and that 
 he left the chamber door open ; but he ought to keep the 
 goods and chattels of his guest there in safety. And, al- 
 though the guest doth not deliver his goods to the innkeeper 
 to keep, nor acquaint him with them, yet, if they be carried 
 away or stolen, the innkeeper shall be charged. And, al- 
 though they who stole or carried away the goods be un- 
 known, yet the innkeeper shall be charged. But if the 
 guest's servant, or he who comes with him, or he whom he 
 desires to be lodged with him, steals or carries away his 
 goods, the innkeeper shall not be charged, for then the fault 
 is in the guest to have such companion or servant. But if 
 the innkeeper appoint one to lodge with him, he shall an- 
 swer for him." [If] " The innkeeper requires his guest that 
 lie will put his goods in such a chamber under lock and key, 
 and then he will warrant them, otherwise not," [and] " the 
 guest lets them lie in an outward court, where they are taken 
 
 which affect that liability in England by whom his goods were stolen, 
 
 and in every State in the Union. Statutory notice if not complied with 
 
 The careful practitioner need not be does not release the landlord unless 
 
 TemindM, however, that such a stat- brought to the knowledge of the 
 
 ute will almost certainly, in any juris- guest. Olson v. Grossman, 31 Minn, 
 
 diction, need to be consulted when a 222; Oppenbeim v. White Lion Hotel 
 
 case of this nature is in hand. . Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515; Spice v. Ba- 
 
 ' Batterson v, Vogel, 10 Mo. App. con, L R. 2 Exch. Div. 463; Bohler 
 
 235; Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186; v. Owens, 60 Ga. 185; Classen v. Leo- 
 
 B. c. 13 N. E. Rep. 479. It is not pold, 2 Sweeney, 705; Cayle's Case, 8 
 
 imputable as negligence in the guest Coke's Rep. 32. 
 
 that he consented to be placed to ^ 8 Co. 32; 26Eliz.; s. c. 1 Smith's 
 
 sleep in a room with another guest Leading Cases, Sth ed. (1885), 249, 
 
 with whom he did not come to the and the note, 
 inn, and who was a stranger to him. 
 
526 SPECIAL AND PARTICULAB CASES. [| 410. 
 
 away, the innkeeper shall not be charged, for the fault is in 
 the guest. The words are hospitihvs damnv/m non eveniai." 
 such was the early strictness of the common law, which,' 
 indeed, has been only somewhat modified in modern times 
 by statute. It is still the law, in the quaint language of 
 Lord Coke, tha,t " it is no excuse for the innkeeper to say 
 that he delivered the guest the key of the chamber door in 
 which he is lodged, and that he left the chamber door open ; 
 but he ought to keep the goods and chattels of his guest 
 there in safety."^ 
 
 § 410. The key of the guest's room.—" I agree," said 
 Lord EUenborough, " in what is stated in Cayle's Case, that 
 the mere deliyery of the key of a room will not dispense 
 with the care and attention due from the landlord, and that 
 he cannot exonerate himself by merely handing a key over 
 to his guest ; but, if the guest takes the key, it is a very 
 proper question for a jury whether he takes it ammo custo- 
 diendi, and for the purpose of exempting the landlord from 
 his liability, or whether he takes it merely because the land- 
 lord forced it upon him, or for the sake of securing greater 
 privacy, in order to prevent persons from intruding them~ 
 selves into his room."' And Mr. Addison says : — " "Where a, 
 guest, having the key delivered to him, omits to use it, and a, 
 thief comes into his room by the door, and steals his goods,, 
 that is, or may be, evidence for the jury of contributory 
 negligence, which will disentitle him to recover against the 
 innkeeper."' One may also, without necessarily exposing 
 himself to the imputation of negligence, accept and occupy 
 a room in a hotel, the door of which has no lock or no bolt, 
 or is otherwise incapable of being securely fastened. In 
 such a case the proper question is not whether the door was 
 actually locked or not, or whether the room was occupied 
 
 > Cayle's Case, 8 Co. 32, 33. See, ney, 707; Lanier v. Toiingblood, 73 
 
 also, to the point that it is not negli- Ala. 587; Hadley v. TJpshaw, 27 Tex. 
 
 gence in law for the guest to leave 547; Addison on Torts, 612; 1 Smith's . 
 
 his door unlocked or unbolted, Mur- Leading Cases, 8th ed. (1885), 249, 
 
 ■chison V. Sergent, ■ 69 Ga. 306; s. c. 353. 
 
 47 Am. Rep. 754; Buddenburgh v. " Burgess v. Clements, 4 Maul. <fc. 
 
 Benner, 1 Hilt. 84; Gill v. Libby, 36 Sel. 306. 
 
 Barb. 70; Classen v. Leopold, 2 Swee- ' Addison on Torts, 612. 
 
§ 411.] SPECIAL AND PABTICULAB CASES. 527|' 
 
 when the door could not be locked, but whether the loss,., 
 would or would not have happened had the guest exercised 
 the ordinary care of a prudent man under the circum-w 
 stances.^ 
 
 § 411. Duty of the guest to exercise care.— "The fact of 
 the guest having the means of securing himself, and choosing 
 not to use them, is one which, with the other circumstances 
 of the case, should be left to the jury. The weight of it 
 must of course depend upon the state of society at the time, 
 and place. What would be prudent in a small hotel in a, 
 small town, might be the extreme of imprudence in a large. 
 . hotel in a city like Bristol, where probably three hundred 
 bed-rooms are occupied by people of all sorts." ' It is not, 
 correct, however, to say that there is no duty on the part of 
 the guest to lock his door, and consequently, that there is no. 
 negligence involved in leaving it unlocked.* A jury of pru-, 
 dent men, it is believed, would more frequently regard such 
 a failure, if the guest had anything valuable in his pos- 
 session, a grossly negligent omission of a plain duty, than a^ 
 proper and prudent thing to do. So, where a guest makes 
 an ostentatious display of his money in the presence of 
 strangers in the public rooms of the hotel, and then leaves, 
 it in his room, with the door ajar or unlocked, a charge that 
 gross negligence on the part of the guest would relieve the 
 landlord, and that it was for the jury to say whether or not, 
 such conduct was gross negligence was, upon appeal, de- 
 clared correct.* It is never necessary to show gross negli- 
 gence on the part of a landlord in order to maintain an action 
 against him for loss of goods. Any want of ordinary care 
 contributing to the loss is sufficient.' Where a traveler upon 
 
 ' Lanier v. Toungblood, 73 Ala. * Armistead v. Wilde, 17 C. B. 361, 
 
 587; Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Qf. Cashiil v. Wright, 6 El. & Bl. 
 
 Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515. 891. 
 
 " Montague Smith, J., in Oppenheim ' Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118. An 
 
 V. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. inmate of a lodging-house who leaves 
 
 515 the door of his room unlocked, know- 
 
 ' Spice V. Bacon, L. R. SExch. Div. ing that persons may enter the house 
 463 (overruling Mitchell «. Woods, 16 . and go to his room unnoticed, cannot 
 
 L. T. (N. S.), 676, a case at nisi prius recover from the keeper of the house 
 
 in which, upon that theory, the for property stolen from his room, 
 
 judge had directed a verclict f or the being himself lacking in ordinary 
 
 plaintiff). care. Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly, 114, 
 
^28 SPECIAL AND PARTICULAK OASES. [§ 412. 
 
 arriving at a depot delivered his valise to the porter of an 
 inn he was not negligent in failing to call the porter's atten- 
 tion to the fact that it contained valuable jewelry and cloth- 
 ing.* If an innkeeper, for, the purpose of securing the safety 
 of the goods of his guests, makes a reasonable and proper 
 rule or requirement to be observed by them, or he will not 
 'be responsible therefor, and the gopds of a guest having 
 knowledge of the rule are lost from the inn solely by reason 
 of his neglect to comply therewith, the innkeeper is not lia- 
 ble for the loss thus occasioned by the negligence of the 
 guest.* 
 
 § 412. The mle illustrated. — In the case of Hayward v. 
 Miller ^ it appears that the plaintiff, who was a guest in the 
 
 ■defendant's hotel, in searching for his room in the night, 
 along a hall dimly lighted, opened a door which he supposed 
 
 -to be the door of his room and stepped in, but which was in 
 reality the door~ to the elevator, and next to his own door. 
 In consequence of this mistake he fell from the second floor 
 to the cellar, and suffered serious injuries. The court held 
 that the defendant was grossly negligent in leaving the ele- 
 vator door in such a condition that it could be opened from 
 the outside, and that the plaintiff's attempt to find his room, 
 without the guidance of a servant, inasmuch as he had been 
 
 .a guest of the hotel before, and was somewhat familiar with 
 the hallways in that part of the house, was not such con- 
 tributory negligence as would prevent a recovery of damages 
 from the innkeeper.* It is not negligence, as the law is de- 
 Independent of the statute the leaving The innkeeper is not liable for the 
 by the guest of $3,000 in gold coin in loss of money entrusted by a guest to 
 his trunk in a room mth no person another guest or inmate in whom he 
 therein, in the city 6f New York, after reposes confidence. Houser n. Fully, 
 personal notice that a safe was pro- 63 Penn. St. 93. 
 vided, was held contributory negli- ■ 94 111. 349; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 
 gence barring recovery. Purvis v. 239. 
 
 Coleman, 21 N. Y. 111. Smith v. * See, also, to the same point, and 
 
 Wilson, 36 Minn. 384; s. c. 31 N. W. to the point of the liability in general 
 
 Rep. 176. of one who invites others to come 
 
 ' Coskery v. Nagle, 83 Ga. 696. See, upon his premises, Camp v. Wood, 76 
 
 _also, Rubenstein «. Cruikshanks, 54 N. Y. 92; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 282; 
 
 Mich. 199. Southcote v. Stanley, 1 Hurl. & N. 
 
 ' Fuller V. Coats, 18 Ohio St. 843. 250; Plckarde. Snjith, 10 C. B. (N.S.) 
 
I 413.] SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR CASES. 529 
 
 clared in the Common Pleas in Philadelphia,* for one who is 
 being fitted with new clothing in a tailor's or clothier's 
 store, to leave his coat and vest, with his watch and money, 
 in a compartment behind a curtain, such as are common in 
 such stores and into which he was shown by the salesman 
 for the purpose of changing his clothes and trying on his 
 new suit, while he walked to another part of the store to 
 stand before a mirror. In the case cited, it appears that a 
 customer who did so was robbed of his watch and money 
 during an absence from the compartment of about four min- 
 utes. The plaintiff asked the court to extend the law 
 governing innkeepers, and apply it to clothing-house keepers. 
 This the court declined to do, upon essentially the same 
 grounds upon which it is refused to hold palace and sleeping- 
 car companies either innkeepers or common carriers,^ but 
 held ,the defendants liable as bailees for hire, and as such 
 bound to exercise a high degree of care and diligence,' and 
 that the plaintiff was guilty of no negligence in leaving his 
 clothing in the defendant's care as he did. 
 
 §413. Accidents in discharge of fireworks.— "When a city 
 undertakes to celebrate a holiday, and the municipal au- 
 thorities have licensed an exhibition of fireworks, it is held 
 that there can be no action against the city on behalf of one 
 who sustains personal injuries through the negligence of the 
 servants of the city in discharging the fireworks, for the pur- 
 pose of the celebration,* neither can an action be maintained 
 against the municipality because one's house is set on fire, 
 and burned by squibs or firecrackers set off upon a holiday 
 by a crowd of men and boys collected in the street, if the 
 city ordinances have made such fireworks lawful ; ^ nor even 
 
 470; Axford ®. Pryor, 4 Week. Rep. " Welch v. Pullman Palace Car 
 
 611; Bolch V. Smith, 7 Hurl. & N. Co., 16 Abb. N. S. 352; JefEords v. 
 
 736; McAlpin v. Powell, 70 N. T. Crump, 5 Week. Notes Cas. 10. 
 
 126; B. c. 26 Am. Kep. 555, and the ' Citing Pullman Palace Car Co. v. 
 
 Bote. Of. Larue v. Farren Hotel Gardner, 14 Week. Notes Cas. 17. 
 
 Co., 116 Mass. 67; Bennett b. Louis- *Tind]ey«. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 
 
 ville, &c., R. Co. (by Harlan, J.), 102 171; Morrison e. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 
 
 TJ. 8. 577. 219. 
 
 ' McCollin v. Reed, 18 Week. " Hill v. Board of Aldermen of 
 
 Notes Cas. 287. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55. 
 
 34 
 
530 SPECIAL AND PARTICULAB CASES. [§415. 
 
 is the town chargeable for resulting damages when the fire- 
 works are discharged by citizens in violation of an ordinance, 
 and although the council and officers, and a majority of the 
 citizens, actively participated in the pyrotechnics, and the 
 town officers made no attempt to stop the demonstration.* 
 But it is not such contributory negligence as will bar a re- 
 covery, to stand in the street and look ,at fireworks, and one 
 who is injured while so doing, by the negligence of another 
 in shooting Eoman candles may have his action." 
 
 § 414. Injury to one walking on the sea shore.— In the 
 
 case of Murphy v. The City of Brooklyn,* it was held that the 
 sea-shore is not a highway for public travel, either on foot 
 or in vehicles ; and that, while any one may, unless the public 
 authorities by lawful action interfere, go thereon between 
 high and low-water mark, for any lawful purpose, he must 
 use it as he finds it, and can look to no one for damages sus- 
 tained from any defect therein. When, therefore, one who' 
 walks upon the sea-shore falls into an excavation on private 
 property near high water-mark, and suffers injury there- 
 by, the rule of law that one who causes an excavation to be 
 made on his own land so near a highway that a traveler there- 
 on without fault falls into the hole and is injured may be held 
 liable for the damages, does not apply. 
 
 § 416. Where the plaintift's property is a nuisance.— 
 
 It seems that, while the contributory negligence of a plaintiff 
 will prevent a recovery in an action for damages for a per- 
 sonal injury occasioned by the negligence of the defendant,, 
 the fact that the plaintiff's property is a nuisance is not a de- 
 
 » Ball V. Town of Woodbine, 61 QT. Moebus v. Becker, 46 N. J. Law„ 
 
 Iowa, 83; s. c. 47 Am. Kep. 805. 41; Fairbanks v. Kerr. 70 Penn. St. 
 
 ' The mere presence of plaintiff at a 86; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 654; Morgan v. 
 
 display of fire-works as a spectator, Cox, 32 Mo. 373, and the annotation 
 
 it appearing that he had nothing what- in Thompson on Negligence, 288. 
 
 ever to do with the discharge of the A child of 13 -was held not negligent 
 
 fireworks by which he was injured, in stopping on the sidewalk to look 
 
 does not make him a joint wrong-doer, at something across the street, so as 
 
 or render him guilty of contributory to bar a recovery for injuries by the 
 
 negligence. Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 fall of a fence next to the sidewalk. 
 
 Mo. 653; B. c. 12 So. W. Rep. 900. Hussey v. Ryan, 64 Md. 426. 
 
 Bradley v. Andrews, 51 Vt. 530. = 98 N. Y. 642. 
 
§ 416.] SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR CASES. 531 
 
 fense to an action for negligently injuring it. This is the 
 inference from the case of The Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke,* 
 a much bequoted authority. This was the case of a man 
 who planted an oyster-bed in a public river, in such a way 
 and at such a place as td constitute it a nuisance, and the de- 
 fendant passing carelessly over it with boats, was held liable 
 for the damage, notwithstanding the fact that the Oyster-bed 
 was an obstruction and a nuisance. It does not appear from 
 the opinion, whether this conclusion was reached because 
 the court regarded the commission of a nuisance as an offense 
 of a lower grade than an act of contributory negligence, or 
 because it is the policy of the law to protect property more 
 scrupulously than life and limb, or because collateral viola- 
 tions of law are not a defense in actions of negligence ; but 
 upon whatever theory the conclusion was reached, the doc- 
 trine of the case is often criticised. It is usual to contrast it 
 with the cases of Davies v. Mann,* and Hartfield v. Eoper,' to 
 the end of pointing the moral that the law has more regard 
 for the safety of oysters and asses than it has for little 
 children.* - The joke is " something musty," at the best, and 
 appears hardly to have a sound basis, inasmuch as the case 
 decides nothing more than that a collateral violation of law 
 on the part of the plaintiff is not a defense to an action of 
 negligence ; while the cases just referred to, of which Hart- 
 field V. Eoper^ is a type, hold that a parent's negligence 
 may sometimes properly be imputed to an infant child in bar 
 of an action by it for an injury sustained by the negligence 
 of another, and of Davies v. Mann* it may be said that it is 
 aptly designated " the donkey case," and does not decide any- 
 thing.' 
 
 § 416. Miscellaneous.— In King v. American Transporta- 
 tion Co.' it is held that it is not an act of contributory negli- 
 gence to put up a wooden building upon your own property, 
 
 > 7 Q. B. 339, decided by Lord Den- ' 31 "Wend. 616; s. c. 34 Am. Dec. 
 
 ham in the Queen's Bench in 1845. 273. 
 
 = 10 Mee. & W. 546. " 10 Mee. & "W. 546. 
 
 = 21 Wend. 615; b. c. 34 Am. Dec. ' See §§ 26 et seq., 127, mpra; 1 
 
 girg ' Sedgwick on Damages, 293; 2Thomp- 
 
 * See 5? 26 et sea., 127, mpra. son on Negligence, 1179. 
 
 « 1 Flippm, 1. 
 
532 SPECIAL AND PABTIOULAB CASES. [§ 416. 
 
 although that property is situated near a dock upon a 
 navigable river, and the house is consequently exposed to the 
 sparks and fire from steamers touching at that dpck. When 
 such a house, so built is set on fire by sparks from a steam- 
 er and burned, the owner may have his action against the 
 steamboat company, although he put his hou^e there in the 
 face of the risk. Dr. Wharton has set out the law upon in- 
 juries to contestants at games in his treatise on Negligence.* 
 It appears from his exposition that under the Eoman law, 
 which is full and explicit upon this question^ there is, in 
 general, no liability on either side when one or the other 
 contestant suffers an injury during' the progress of a game 
 involving violent exercise, or contest of strength or dexterity, 
 unless there be malice or an intentional infliction of harm.' 
 In Marks ■u, Borum,' the Supreme Court of Tennessee has 
 decided that the act of a negro in coming upon the defendant's 
 premises stealthily, in the darkness of the night, with the 
 plain intent to steal his chickens, did not constitute such 
 contributory wrong-doing as would defeat a recovery of 
 damages for injuries sustained by reason of the defendant's 
 shooting buck shot at him. This settles the law, it may be 
 divined, at least in Tennessee, to the point that stealing chick- 
 ens by the darkies is not contributory negligence,* which, it is 
 submitted, is a wholesome doctrine. 
 
 1 §406. Young «. Harvey, 16 Ind. 314; Con- 
 
 ■' Wharton on Negligflice, § 406, radtji. Clauve, 93 Ind. 476; Green, &c., 
 
 and the citations; Wharton's Criminal St. Ry. Co. v. Bresmer, 97 Penn. St. 
 
 Law (7thed.), § 1013; Penn. v. Lewis, 103. See, also, Wharton on Negligence, 
 
 Addibon, 279 ; Fenton's Case, 1 Lewin, § 936; Shearman & Redfleld on Negli- 
 
 179; Addison on Torts, 494. gence, 4th ed., § 639; Thompson on 
 
 « 1 Baxt. 87; "a c. 35 Am. Rep. 764. Negligence, 333. Inasmuch as there 
 
 * In the following cases the general is nothing pertiaent to my treatise, 
 
 principles of the law of contributory which is peculiar or noteworthy in 
 
 negligence are applied in actions in- actions of this character, nothing more 
 
 volvingtherightsof owners of animals, is necessary than to cite some late 
 
 for injuries by or to them, Mareau o. or leading cases — which I have done 
 
 Vanatta, 88 HI. 183; Williams v. Mo- — ^therebyreferring the practitioner to 
 
 ray, 74 Ind. 35; Houghey v. Hart, 63 the sources of information. 
 
 Iowa, 96; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 138; 
 
CHAPTEE XV. 
 THE BURDEN OP PROOF. 
 
 The rule distinguished. 
 The rule in New York. 
 The rule in New York further 
 stated. 
 
 The development of the rule in 
 New York., 
 
 This development further con- 
 sidered. 
 
 The position of the New York 
 court stated. 
 
 The New York cases further 
 considered. 
 
 The New York rule summar- 
 ized. 
 
 The disagreement of the courts 
 upon this question. 
 No possible middle ground. 
 Tendency toward the better 
 rule. 
 
 Pleading contributory negli- 
 gence. 
 
 § 417. The qnestion stated.— The question whether ihe 
 burden of proof, where contributory negligence is the issue, 
 is upon plaintiff or defendant, resolves itself, in the last 
 analysis, into a matter of legal presumptions. If the plaint- 
 iff may be presumed to have been in the exercise of ordinary 
 care, then the burden of showing his contributory negligence 
 will plainly be upon the defendant. If ordinary care on the 
 part of the plaintiff is not to be presumed, then it will de- 
 volve upon him to disprove contributory negligence. If 
 neither ordinary care, nor the want of it, are to be presumed 
 in the absence of evidence, then, if the facts show a duty of 
 care, the plaintiff must furnish some evidence that he exer- 
 cised it, but otherwise he need not, which is something near 
 to saying that in this condition of the presumptions, there is 
 no rule as to the omis probandi in these cases. It is a general 
 rule of law that the burden of proof is upon him who main- 
 
 417. 
 
 The question stated. 
 
 §432. 
 
 418. 
 
 The rule in Butterfield v. For- 
 
 433. 
 
 
 rester. 
 
 434. 
 
 419. 
 
 Whether the presumption 
 
 
 
 should be against the plaintiff. 
 
 435. 
 
 420. 
 
 The plaintiff in this class of 
 
 
 
 cases generally at fault. 
 
 436. 
 
 421. 
 
 The presumption sometimes in 
 
 
 
 iavor of the plaintiff. 
 
 437. 
 
 422. 
 
 The burden upon the plaintiff. 
 
 
 423. 
 
 This rule defended. 
 
 438. 
 
 424. 
 
 Mr. Freeman's criticism of the 
 
 
 
 rule. 
 
 439. 
 
 435. 
 
 His position untenable. 
 
 
 426. 
 
 The burden upon the defend- 
 ant. 
 
 440. 
 
 427. 
 
 This rule not inflexible. 
 
 441. 
 
 428. 
 
 The rule in Connecticut. 
 
 442. 
 
 429. 
 
 Judge Redfleld's statement of 
 
 
 
 the rule. 
 
 443. 
 
 430. 
 
 The rule in Kansas. 
 
 
 431. 
 
 This rule criticised. 
 
 
534 THE BUBDEN OF PEOOF. [§ 418. 
 
 tains the affirmative of the issue — that he who asserts a fact 
 material to the issue, must prove it. But when this general ' 
 rule is to be applied in actions where it is sought to recover 
 for an injury from the negligence of another, the courts have 
 found very considerable difficulty. There is the elementary 
 rule that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
 is sufficient to defeat his action, and, when attention is di- 
 rected to this rule stated in this usual way, it seems clear 
 that such negligence is a matter of defense, and that it should 
 devolve upon the defendant to prove it. This view as- 
 sumes the ordinary care of the plaintiff, and that he has fully 
 made out his prima facie case when the negligence of the 
 defendant is shown. It throws the burden of proof, as to 
 contributory negligence, upon the defendant, if the plaintiff 
 can prove his case without showing it, which is the same 
 thing as to proceed upon the assumption that the plaintiff is 
 not bound to prove affirmatively that he was f re^ from negli- 
 gence. 
 
 § 4:18. The rale in Butterfleld v. Forrester.~In the earli- 
 est reported case, however, in which contributory negligence - 
 appears to have been passed upon as a defense in an action 
 of negligence, there is, it may be, an intimation that an 
 essential element of the plaintiff's case is that he appear 
 free from contributory neglect. " Two things," said Lord 
 Ellenborough in that early case,^ " must concur to support 
 this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the 
 defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the 
 part of the plaintiff." From which it has been inferred 
 that, in his lordship's view, freedom from contributory 
 negligence as a part of the plaintiff's cause of action, is 
 an affirmative issue, to be alleged and proved equally with 
 the other necessary element in the case — i. e., the defend- 
 ant's culpable negligence contributing to the injury. He 
 said, indeed, "two things must concur'," the fault of the 
 defendant and the freedom from fault of the plaintiff, but 
 this, as the law stands, is not disputed, and in my opinion, 
 inasmuch as that case contains no more explicit statement 
 upon the question than this, we are not justified in citing 
 Butterfleld v. Forrester as authority for the proposition 
 
 > Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 60. 
 
§ 4:20.] THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 535 
 
 that the burden is upon the plaintiff when contributory 
 negligence is an issue. 
 
 § 419. Whether the presumption should be against the 
 plaintiff.— Those who object to casting this burden upon 
 the plaintiff urge that it is equivalent to a presumption 
 of law that the plaintiff was negligent, and that this the 
 law ought not to presume against the plaintiff any more than 
 against the defendant. But this is nothing more than a play 
 upon the word presumption, and, as a bit of legal ratiocina- 
 tion, is scarcely better than to say that the law presumes 
 that the witness will lie, and, therefore, imposes the obliga- 
 tion of an oath, or, in an action upon a note, presumes it a 
 forgery until the signature is proven. There is, indeed, in 
 every action at law, this sort of a presumption against the 
 plaintiff upon every fact essential to his cause of action. The 
 onus is upon him to establish his facts, and, quoad hoc, the 
 presumption, if you please to say so, is agalingt him. This 
 sort of a presumption is an incident of every possible action, 
 and, while justice is administered as it now is, it cannot be 
 changed. It involves no more of an injustice, nor of unfair- 
 ness in respect to the legal presumption, to require the 
 plaintiff to show, or to have it sufficiently appear, that his 
 own negligence did not contribute to occasion the injury for 
 which the suit is brought, than to require him to prove the 
 signature on the note upon which he sues, or to prove that 
 conditions precedent have been duly performed when he 
 brings an action on a contract which involves that question. 
 When one comes into court, and claims damages for an in- 
 jury to his person, or his property, by reason of the negli- 
 gence of another, it is not clear why it is unfair to pre- 
 sume that his own carelessness contributed to the resulting 
 injury. 
 
 § 430. The plaintiff in this class of cases generally at 
 fault. — In more than ninety per centum of all the actions of 
 negligence that are brought in courts of justice, it appears 
 that the plaintiff's own negligence did, of a verity, help to 
 cause the injury. Is it then, indeed, so violent a presump- 
 tion that the plaintiff in any individual case was careless ? 
 If, in very deed, he is proved to be careless, nine times out 
 of ten — or, for the matter of that, fifty-one times in a hun- 
 
536 THE BUEDEN OF PEOOF. [§ 421. 
 
 dred — ^may we not reasonably presume in any given case that 
 he was careless ? Where is the injustice ? Moreover, is 
 there not another presumption that every man is able to take 
 care of himself and his property, and, by the exercise of 
 ordinary care, can keep out of mischief? If so, where is 
 the wrong, when he brings his action of negligence, in as- 
 suming that he has failed to exercise his capacity to take 
 care of himself? What is casting upon the plaintiff the 
 burden of showing himself to have exercised due care, more 
 than to require him to prove that he performed his legal duty 
 — a thing required to be proved very frequently in simple 
 actions upon a contract ? Without reference to the reported 
 cases, and upon general principles, it may be said that there 
 ought to be no inflexible rule as to the onibs prdbandi in these 
 cases — but that in some sort, each case, or each class of 
 cases, should be a rule unto itself. It must in fairness de- 
 pend upon the presumption of care in any given case. If 
 the circumstances of the case are such as to make it a rea- 
 sonable presumption that the plaintiff was careless, then it 
 should be a part of his case, and an essential part, to allege 
 and prove his freedom from contributory negligence. In 
 such a case the burden of proof is very properly upon him, 
 and such cases very frequently arise. Perhaps that is the 
 just presumption in a majority of instances. 
 
 § 421. The presnmption sometimes in favor of the plaint- 
 iff. — But in another class of cases the reasonable presump- 
 tion is exactly the other way, and when such a case arises, 
 the presumption being that the plaintiff, at the time of the 
 happening of the injury, was in the exercise of due and or- 
 dinary care, the. burden of proof should be upon the defend- 
 ant. He should, as a necessary element of his defense, 
 allege and prove the concurrent wrong-doing or negligence 
 of the plaintiff. When the peculiar circumstances of the > 
 case raise the presumption of care on the part of the plaint- 
 iff, it is an injustice, or at least an inequality, to impose 
 upon him the burden of proving his own freedom from fault, 
 but when the peculiar circumstances of the case raise the 
 contrary presumption, it is a plain injustice not to impose 
 upon the plaintiff the burden of showing that his own con- 
 duct was what it should have been. When the circumstances 
 of any case are such as not to raise any presumption either 
 
§ 422.] THE BTJBDEN OP PROOF. 537 
 
 way, which, in practice, it is believed, is a case not likely 
 to arise frequently, then let the court apply its arbitrary 
 rule, and place the burden upon either plaintiff or defend- 
 ant, as the rule may be. The burden of proof in actions of 
 negligence, when contributory negligence is an issue, is no 
 nearer an exact science than that, and, in the nature of ih& 
 case, can never be reduced to any exact«^ certitude. Until all 
 the accidents from which men suffer can be made to fall into 
 assigned categories, and until men, by common consent, will 
 expose themselves and their property to danger, and expose- 
 others and the property of others to danger, only under de- 
 fined conditioiis, and expressed and agreed limitations, that 
 is to say, until men get hurt and hurt other people only by 
 rule, there can be no rule as to the burden of proof in these 
 cases, at once inflexible and just. 
 
 § 422. The burden upon the plaintiflF.— Upon turning to 
 the decisions we shall find that the decided weight of au- 
 thority is in favor of the rule that the burden is upon the 
 plaintiff in these actions to show his own freedom from con- 
 tributory negligence ; that as part of his case, to be affirm- 
 atively established, he must make it appear that he himself 
 was not in fault ; that until he has shown the absence of con- 
 tributory negligence, and the presence of ordinary care in 
 himself, his case is not duly presented. This is the rule in 
 Maine,^ Mississippi,* Louisiana,* Georgia,* Massachusetts,^ 
 
 ■ Foster c. Dixfleld, 18 Me. 380; * Prather u. Richmond, &c., R. Ca, 
 
 French v. Brunswick, 21 Me. 39; s. c. 80 Ga. 437; s. c. 9 8. E. Rep. 530. 
 88 Am. Dec. 350; Kennard v. Burton, ' Where the statute does not others 
 
 35 Me. 39; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 249; wise provide, the rule requiring the 
 
 Merrill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 23^ Per- plaintiff, in an action for negligence, 
 
 kins V. Eastern, &c., R. Co., 29 Me. to show due care on his own part, i?- 
 
 307; Dickey v. Maine Telegraph Co., the same in actions brought under a 
 
 46 Me. 483: Buzzell v. Laconia Manfg. statute and at common law. Taylor 
 
 Co 48 Me 113; Gleason v. Bremen, v. Carew Manuf'g Co., 143 Mass. 470; 
 
 50 Me 333; Benson v. Titcomb. 73 e. c. 10 N. E. Rep. 808. But in ao- 
 
 Me. 31: Chase v. Maine, &c., R. Co., tions against a raOroad company for 
 
 77 Me 63- 8 c 1 Bast. Rep. 96; Lea- the death of a passenger, due care 
 
 san V. M^e, &c., R. Co., 77 Me. 85; need not be proved, as contributory 
 
 8 c 1 East. Rep. 100. negligence is no defense by statute. 
 
 ' Central, &c., R. Co. v. Mason, 51 McKimble «. Boston, Ac, R. Co., 139 
 
 Miss 234- City of Vicksburg «. Hen- Mass. 543. Lane v. Crombie, 13 Hck. 
 
 nessy, 54 'Miss. 391. "7; Adams v. Carlisle, 31 Pick. 146; 
 
 ' Moore v. City of Shreveport, 3 Bigelow ». Rutland, 4 Cush. 247; Bos- 
 La Ann. 645 worth v. Inhabitants of Swansey, 10< 
 
538 
 
 THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 [§ 422. 
 
 North Carolina/ Michigan,^ Oregon,' Illinois,* Connecticut,* 
 Iowa,* and Indiana.' 
 
 Mete. 363; s. c. 48 Am. Dec. 441; 
 Parker v. Adams, 13 Mete. 415; s. c. 
 46 Am. Dec. 694; Lucas v. New Bed- 
 ford E. Co., 6 Gray, 64; Robinson v. 
 Fitchburg R. Co., 7 Gray, 93; Calla- 
 han V. Bean, 9 Allen, 401; Hickey v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 14 Allen, 429; 
 Gay nor ®. Old Colony R. Co., 100 
 Mass. 308; Murphy «. Deane, 101 
 Mass. 455; AUyn v. Boston, &c., R. 
 'Co., 105 Mass. 77; Lane v. Atlantic 
 Works, 107 Mass. 104; Crafts v. Bos- 
 ton, 109 Mass. 519; Prentiss o. Boston, 
 113 Mass. 43; Hinckley v. Cape Cod 
 R. Co., 130 Mass. 357;. Corcoran v. 
 Boston, &c., R. Co., 133 Mass. 507; 
 RUey V. Conn. River R. Co., 135 
 Mass. 393; Wheelwright v. Boston, 
 ^c, R. Co., 135 Mass. 335; Stock «. 
 Wood, 136 Mass. 353. But the bur- 
 den of proof is upon the defendant to 
 show gross or wilful negligence upon 
 the part of the plaintiff. Copley v. 
 New Haven, &c., R. Co., 136 Mass. 6. 
 This case is miscited by Mr. Freeman 
 in 63 Am. Dec. 666, 687, in his 
 note to the case of Parish v. Reigle, 
 11 Gratt. 697, in support of the general 
 proposition that in Massachusetts 
 " contributory negligence is a matter 
 of defense, and the burden of estab- 
 lishing it is upon the defendant," 
 whereas, in fact, the rule in that State 
 is exactly the contrary. 
 
 ' Manly v. Wilmington, &c., R. 
 Co., 74 N. C. 655; Doggett «. Rich- 
 mond, &c., R. Co., 78 N- C. 305; Ow- 
 ens V. Richmond, &c., R. Co., 88 N. 
 •C. 503. 
 
 9 Detroit, &c., R. Co. «. Van Stein- 
 burg. 17 Mich. 99; Lake Shore, &c.,R. 
 Co. V. Miller, 25 Mich. 373; LeBaron 
 «. Joslin, 41 Mich. 313; Mynning v. 
 Detroit, Ac, R. Co., 67 Mich. 677. 
 But it is enough if the plaintiff merely 
 puts in evidence the facts and circum- 
 stances attending the injury; and if 
 these show negligent conduct in the 
 'defendant from which the injury fol- 
 
 lowed as a proximate consequence, 
 and do not show contributory negli- 
 gence, a prima fade case is estab- 
 lished. Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 
 Mich. 461 (by Cooley, J.); Mitchell v. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 51 Mich. 336; 
 s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 566. 
 
 ' Kahn v. Love, 3 Oregon, 206; 
 Walsh V. Oregon, &c., R. Co., 10 
 Oregon, 250. Of. Conroy v. Oregon 
 Construction Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 71. 
 
 ' Aurora, &c., R. Co. v. Grimes, 18 
 111. 585; Dyer v. Talcott, 16 111. 300; 
 Galena, &c., R. Co. s. Fay, 16 HI. 
 558; B. c. 63 Am. Dec. 323; Chicago 
 V. Major, 18 111. 349; Galena, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Jacobs, 30 HI. 478; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. ■». Hazzard, 26 HI. 373; 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 
 m. 273; Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 
 354; Missouri Furnace Co. d. Abend, 
 107 m. 44; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 435. 
 
 ' Park V. O'Brien, 33 Conn. 339; 
 Button v. Frink, 51 Conn. 342; b. c. 
 60 Am. Rep. 24. 
 
 ' Rusch V. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; 
 Raymond i>. Burlington, &c., R. Co., 
 65 Iowa, 152; Hawes v. Burlington, 
 &c., Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 315; Reynolds 
 V. Hindman, 33 Iowa, 148; Plaster «. 
 111., &c.,R. Co., 35 Iowa, 449; Carlin 
 V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 37 Iowa, 316; 
 Muldowney v HI., &c., R. Co., 39 
 Iowa, 615; s. c. 36 Iowa, 463; 32 
 Iowa, 176; Patterson v. Burlington, 
 &C., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 379; Way«. 
 111., &c., R. Co., 40 Iowa, 341; Nel- 
 son V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 
 564; Murphy d. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 
 38 Iowa, 539; s. c. 45 Iowa, 661; 
 Greenleaf d. 111., &c., R. Go., 29 Iowa, 
 14; B. c. 4 Am. Rep 181; Bonce v. Du- 
 buque, &c., R. Co., 53 Iowa, 278; 
 Slosson 1!. Biu-lington, &c., R. Co., 55 
 Iowa, 394. See, also, Breutner «. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co., 68 Iowa, 630; 
 B. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 668. 
 
 ' The burden of proof of negligence 
 of defendant, and absence of contrib- 
 
§ 423.] 
 
 THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 539 
 
 § 423. This rule defended. — Although this rule has not 
 in general found favor with the text-writers and the theorists 
 and critics, it is submitted that, if there is to be any in- 
 flexible rule, this is the one which will most often subserve 
 the ends of substantial justice. If men who appear as plaint- 
 iffs in actions of negligence were, as matter of fact, careful 
 more often than careless ; if, in practice, it were found that 
 the defense of contributory negligence only now and then 
 availed the defendant anything, then the opposite rule would 
 be the better rule ; but in point of fact these meli generally 
 blunder, and are generally in fault. Contributory negligence 
 is a good defense in a great majority of the cases. It follows 
 then that, if we are to have an inflexible rule, it must, in 
 order to do even justice as nearly as possible, take account 
 of this element in these cases. It must be grounded and 
 
 utory negligence of plaintifE, is on the 
 latter, but it will be sulHcient if these 
 facts appear either directly or circum- 
 stantially. Cincinnati, &c., B. Co. v. 
 McMullen, 117 Ind. 439; s. c. 20 N. 
 E. Kep. 287. Mount Vernon v. Du- 
 souchett, 2 Ind. 586; s. c. 54 Am. 
 Dec. 467; Wayne Co. Turnpike Co. 
 •B. Berry, 5 Ind. 386; Wabash Canal 
 Co. V. Mayor, 10 Ind. 400; Indianapo- 
 lis, &c., R. Co. V. Keely, 33 Ind. 133; 
 Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Dexter, 34 
 Ind. 411; Evansville, &c., R. Co. ». 
 Hiatt, 17 Ind. 103; JefEersonville, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Hendricks, 36 Ind. 238; To- 
 ledo, (fee, R. Co. ■». Bevin, 36 Ind. 
 443; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. v. Vin- 
 ing, 37 Ind. 513; Michigan, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Lantz, 29 Ind. 528; Riest v. 
 Goshen, 42 Ind. 339. The rule, 
 though seemingly harsh, is neverthe- 
 less applied in the same way to an in- 
 fant. Hathaway v. Toledo, &c., R. 
 Co., 46 Ind. 35, 30; Jackson ». Indian- 
 apolis, &c., R. Co., 47 Ind. 454; City 
 of Anderson v. Hervey, 67 Ind. 430; 
 Gormley v. Ohio, &c., R. Co., 72 Ind. 
 31; JefEersonville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 liyon, 72 Ind. 107; Williams v. Mo- 
 ray, 74 Ind. 25; Toledo, &c., R. Co. 
 n. Brannagan, 75 Ind. 490; Hunting- 
 
 ton V. Breen, 77 Ind. 29; Pittsburgh, 
 (fee, R. Co. •». Noel, 77 Ind.llO; Penn- 
 sylvania Co. ■». Gallentine, 77 Ind. 323; 
 Louisville, &c.,R. Co. ®. Head, 80 Ind. 
 117; Bloomington v. Rogers, 83 Ind. 
 261; Wilson v. Trafalgar Co., 83 Ind. 
 326: Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. Orr. 84' 
 Ind. 50; RushVille v. Poe, 85 Ind. 83; 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Krinning, 
 87 Ind. 351; Louisville, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Hagen, 87 Ind. 602; Gheens v. Golden, 
 90 Ind. 427; Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Lockridge, 93 Ind. 191. In that State 
 the declaration, or complaint, must 
 aver or show the ^.bsence of negli- 
 gence upon the part of the plaintiff. 
 Board of Trustees, &c. v. Mayer, 10 
 Ind. 401; Evansville, &c., R. Co. ®. 
 Hiatt, 17 ind.. 102; Indianapolis, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Keely's Adm'r, 33 Ind. 134; 
 Jeffersonville, &c., R. Co^ v. Hend- 
 rick's 'Adm'r, 36 Ind. 330; Williams 
 ®. Moray, 74 Ind. 27; Pennsylvania 
 Co. «. Gallentine, 77 Ind. 339; Louis- 
 vUle, &c., R. Co. V. Boland, 53 Ind. 
 402; Rogers «., Overton, 87 Ind. 411. 
 Qf. the note, in 54 Am. Dec. 467, 470, 
 to the case of President and Trustees 
 of the Town of Mount Vernon v. 
 Dusouchett (the case in which this 
 rule had its origin), 3 Ind. 586. 
 
540 , THE BUBDEN OF PBOOF. [§ 424. 
 
 predicted upon the presumption of negligence rather than 
 the presumption of care, for verily that is the presumption 
 of fact in these cases. When the average plaintiff comes into 
 court with his action of negligence, the mathematical chance 
 is more than six to one, at the very lowest, that, when the 
 evidence is all in, it will give the defendant a verdict, on the 
 ground of the plaintiff's own participating and concurring 
 default.' It must appear, as the law stands, before a verdict 
 for the plaintiff can be sustained, that the plaintiff was not 
 guilty of contributory negligence. It is an essential element 
 in the case upon which the issue depends,, and, inasmuch as 
 the chances are very largely in favor of the defendant when 
 the question of contributory negligence is raised, it is diffi- 
 cult to see upon what ground it is unjust or unreasonable to 
 put the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. The fact must be 
 established in order to the plaintiff's success, and the chances 
 are that it cannot be established. Where is the unfairness in 
 requiring him to establish it as part of his case ? or upon 
 what ground shall it be held proper to impose upon the de- 
 fendant the duty of establishing the want of care on the part 
 .of the plaintiff? In my judgment, no arbitrary and inflexible 
 rule upon this matter is just ; but, if there is to be such a 
 rule, I am unable to understand how any other rule than that 
 which puts the burden of proof upon the plaintiff can be in 
 any wise defended. 
 
 § 424. Mr. Freeman's criticism of tlie rnle.— Mr. Freeman, 
 the learned editor of the American Decisions, and of the 
 American State Eeports, has said in criticism of this view : * — 
 " It is certainly a presumption of fact or common sense that 
 persons are ordinarily prudent. In fact the very phrases 
 which obtain in legal terminology, ' ordinary prudence or 
 care,' or ' the care ordinarily exhibited by persons reasonably 
 prudent under the same circumstances,' convey with them, 
 and are based upon the supposition that people as a general 
 rule are ordinarily careful. Whereas, the authorities that 
 render it necessary for the plaintiff to free himself from neg- 
 ligence in the first place, seem necessarily to assume that 
 people are usually negligent. The anomaly of requiring the 
 
 ' 62 Am. Dec. 687, note. 
 
I 425.] THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 641 
 
 party holding the affirmative to negatively prove part of his 
 case is apparent, while the necessarily attendant presumption 
 of the negligence of mankind in general, requires for its sup- 
 port the nlind of a cynic or a pessimist." It is upon this key 
 that all the objections to the rule which puts the burden of 
 proof upon the plaintiff in these cases, proceed. 
 
 § 425. His position untenable.— But such an objection 
 begs the question and is founded upon a wholly unwarranted 
 Sissumption. The question of the carefulness and prudence 
 of mankind in general is not involved. The question of con- 
 tributory negligence affects only the few who get hurt in their 
 persons or property by reason of some other person's neglect. 
 Uncounted millions of the human family are born, and live 
 out their allotted span, and die, and bring no single action 
 of negligence in all the days of their life. With them and 
 their care or carelessness we have nothing to do, except that 
 from their conduct on the average, we get a meaning for those 
 phrases that Mr. Freeman quotes. " Ordinary care," it seems 
 hardly necessary to say, means the care of the average pru- 
 dent man who does not get hurt in his person or property. 
 By his supposed conduct under given circumstances we test 
 the propriety and fitness of the conduct of a man who has 
 suffered an injury and brings an action for redress. Now the 
 precise question is, not whether the race is upon the whole a 
 careful race, but whether the few out of the multitude, who 
 suffer injuries, are upon the whole careful and prudent. Di- 
 viding the human family into the injured and the uninjured, 
 and subdividing the first class into those who bring, and those 
 who do not bring actions in courts of justice for the redress 
 of their injuries, we inquire whether that class of the injured 
 who bring civil suits for damages are, upon the average, care- 
 ful and prudent men and women. Perhaps it may not seem 
 to involve any revolting amount of cynicism to take the 
 ground that this class of persons are not, upon the whole, or 
 in a majority of cases, up to the average in point of careful- 
 ness and prudence ; or were not, at the time of the happen- 
 ing of the injury of which they complain, in full exercise of 
 that full qtiantum of care and prudence that passes among 
 men as " ordinary care ; " that it is a fair presumption in any 
 given case, that the injured person was at fault, and that the 
 
542 THE BUBDEN OF PBOOF. ' [§ 426. 
 
 rule that imposes upon such plaintiffs the burden of showing 
 themselves free from contributory negligence is, in a vast 
 majority of cases, shown to be a reasonable rule of law, by 
 the fact that, in a vast majority of cases, it turns out that the 
 plaintiff was in fault, and, in fact, a joint author of the injury 
 of which he complains. It may even seem, after a full con- 
 sideration, that the rule which would make contributory neg- 
 ligence a matter of defense, and something in every instance 
 for the defendant to allege and prove, is grounded more in a 
 sentiment than in right reason. 
 
 § 426. The burden upon the defendant.— In many juris- 
 dictions it is the rule that contributory negligence is matter 
 of defense, and that the burden of establishing it is upon the 
 defendant. Where this rule obtains, the plaintiff has made 
 his case when he has shown injury to himself, and negligence 
 on the part of the defendant which was a proximate cause 
 of it. It then devolves upon the defendant to allege and 
 prove contributory negligence as matter of defense, the pre- 
 sumption being in favor of the plaintiff, that he was, at the 
 time of the accident, in the exercise of due care, and that the 
 injury was caused wholly by the defendant's negligent mis- 
 conduct. This is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States,^ and it is the rule in Alabama,^ Kentucky,* 
 
 ' Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 "Wall. Mobile, &c., R. Co. v. Crenshaw, 65 
 401; Indianapolis, &c., R. Co. ■». Ala. 566; Thompson v. Duncan, 76 
 Horst, 93 U. S. 391; Hough «. Rail- Ala. 334; Montgomery Gas Light Co. 
 way Co., 100 U. S. 313; Crew o. St. u Montgomery, &c., Ry. Co., 86 Ala. 
 Louis, &c., R. Co., 20 Fed Rep. 87; 373; Montgomery, &c.,. Ry. Co. v. 
 Tolson V. Inland, &c., Coasting Co., 6 Chambers, 79 Ala. 338. 
 Mackey, 39; Conroy v. Oregon Ccn- ' Paducah, &c., R. Co. v. Hoehl, 
 stmction Co., 33 Fed. Rep.71; Secord 12 Bush, 41; Louisville Canal Co. s. 
 ®. St. Paul, &c., R. Co., 5 McCrary, Murphy, 9 Bush, 632. Contributory 
 515; Morgan v. Bridge Co., 5 Dillon, negligence is a defense that confesses 
 96; Dillon v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 3 and avoids the plaintiff's case, and 
 Dillon, 335; Wabash, &c., R. Co. v. must be made out by showing not 
 Central Trust. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 513; only that plaintiff was guilty of 
 s. c. 33 Alb. Law Jour. 96. Contra, negligence, but that it co-operated 
 Beardsley v. Swann, 4 McLean, 333; with defendant's negligence to pro- 
 Hull «. Richmond, 2 "Woodb. & M. duce the injury. Kentucky, &c., R. 
 337, 345; Dunmead v. Am., &c., Co., Co. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; Louisville, 
 4 McCrary, 344. &c., R. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 443; s. c. 
 
 « Smoot V. The Mayor, 34 Ala. 113; 43 Am. Rep. 237. 
 
§ 426.] 
 
 THE BUEDEK OF PROOF. 
 
 643 
 
 California,^ Georgia,^ Kansas,* Maryland,* Minnesota," Mis- 
 souri,* New Hampshire,' New Jersey,' Oregon,' Arizona/"' 
 Idaho," "Washington,'^ Arkansas," Nebraska," Ohio," Pennsyl- 
 vania,'* Ehode Island," West Virginia,'' South Carolina,'* 
 
 ' Finn v. VaUejo St. Wharf Co., 7 
 CaL 255; May v. Hanson, 5 Cal. 360; 
 B. c. 63 Am. Dec. 135; Gay v. Winter, 
 
 84 Cal. 158; Robinson b. Western, &c., 
 R. Co., 48 Cal. 426; McQuilken v. 
 Central, &c.. R. Co., 50 Qal. 7; Mac- 
 dougall V. Central, &c., R. Co., 63 
 Cal. 431; Nehrbas «. Central, &c., R. 
 Co., 62 Cal. 320. 
 
 ' Thompson v. Central, &c., R. Co., 
 54 Ga. 509. Contra, Branan v. May, 
 17 6a. 186; Campbell v. Atlanta, &c., 
 R. Co., 53 (Ja. 488. 
 
 ' St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 
 
 85 Kan. 412; s. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 408; 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. it. McCally, 41 
 Kan. 689; s. c. 21 Pac. Rep. 574; 
 Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 
 Kan. 620; s. c. 14 Kan. 38; Kansas, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Phillibert, 25 Kan. 583. 
 
 * Irwin V. Sprigg, 6 Gill. 206; Bal- 
 timore ti. Morriott, 9 Md. ito; Nor- 
 thern, &c., R. Co. «. State, 31 Md. 
 357; Freeh «). Phila., &c., R. Co., 39 
 Md 574; Covmty Commissioners v. 
 Burgess, 61 Md. 29. See, also, Twigg 
 «. Ryland, 62 Md. 380; s. c. 19 Am. 
 Law Rev. 819. 
 
 ' Hocum v. Weitherick, 22 Minn. 
 152. 
 
 * Hudson V. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 
 32 Mo. App. 667; Mitchell «. City of 
 Clinton, 99 Mo. 153; s. c. 12 S. W. 
 Rep. 793; Thompson v. North Mo. R. 
 Co., 51 Mo. 190; Hicks v. Pacific, &c., 
 R. Co., 65 Mo. 34; s. c. 64 Mo. 430; 
 Buesching ». tit, Louis Gas Light Co., 
 73 Mo. 219; B. c. 39 Am. Rep. 503, 
 and the note. 
 
 ' White V. Concord, &c., R. Co., 30 
 N. H. 207; Smith ». Eastern, &c., R. 
 Co., 35 N. H. 386. 
 
 * Moore v. Central, &c., R. Co., 24 
 N. J. Law, 268; Durant v. Palmer, 
 29 N. J. Law, 544; N. J. Express Co. 
 
 V. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 166; s. c. 
 33 N. J. Law, 434. 
 » Grant v. Baker, 12 Or. 829. 
 
 '° Hobson V. New Mexico, &c., R. 
 Co. (Ariz.), 11 Pac. Rep. 54 . 
 
 " Hopkins v. Utah Northern Ry. 
 Co. (Idaho), 13 Pac. Rep. 343. 
 
 " Northern Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien 
 (Wash. T.), 21 Pac Rep. 82. 
 
 " Texas, &c., Ry. Co. v. On, 46 
 Ark. 182; Little Rock, &o.. Ry. Co. 
 V. Atkins, 46 Ark. 428. 
 
 >*City of Lincoln v. Walker,' 18 
 Neb. 224; s. c. 19 Am. LaW Rev. 162. 
 
 " Cleveland, &c., R. Co. v. Craw- 
 ford, 24 Ohio St. 636; Balto., &c., R. 
 Co. «.Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627. See, 
 also. Little Miami, &c., R. Co. u. 
 Stevens, 20 Ohio St. 415. 
 
 " Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Penn. St. 
 463; Erie v. Schwingle, 32 Penn. St. 
 384; Bush v. Johnson, 23 Penn. St. 
 209; Penn. R. Co. v. McTighe, 46 
 Penn. St. 316; Allen v. Willard, 57 
 Penn. St. 374; Waters ». Wing, 59 
 Penn. St. 211; Penn. Canal Co. •». 
 Bentley, 66 Penn. St. 30; Penn. R. 
 Co. V. Weber, 72 Penn. St. 27; s. c. 
 76 Penn. St. 157; Hays v. Gallagher, 
 72 Penn. St. 136 (distinguishing 59 
 Penn. St. 311); Weiss v. Penn. R. 
 Co., 79 Penn. St. 387; Mallory «. 
 GrtfEey, 85 .Peun. St. 275. Contra, 
 Federal St. R. Co. v. Gibson, 96 Penn. 
 St. 83; Baker v. Pehr, 97 Penn. St. 70; 
 Phila., &c., R. Co. ■». Boyer, 97 Penn. 
 St. 91. In the later cases the Penn- 
 sylvania Court inclines, it seems, to 
 the other rule, putting the burden of 
 proof upon the plaintifif. 
 
 " Oassidy «. Angell, 12 R. I. 447; 
 s. c. St Am. Rep. 690. 
 
 " Sheff V. City of Huntington, 16 
 West Va. 317. 
 
 '" Banner v. South Carolina R. Co., 
 
544 
 
 THE BUBDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 [§427. 
 
 Texas,* Wisconsin,* Vermont,' and Colorado,* as well as in 
 England." 
 
 § 437. This rule not inflexible.— But, in all those juris- 
 dictions where contributory negligence is held a matter of 
 defense, whenever the plaintiff's own case raises a presump- 
 tion of contributory negligence, the burden of proof is 
 immediately upon him. In such a case it devolves upon the 
 plaintiff, as of course, to clear himself of the suspicion of 
 negligence that he has himself created. He must make out 
 his case in full, and, where the circumstances attending the 
 injury were such ks to raise a presumptioli against him in 
 respect of the exercise of due care, the law requires him to 
 establish affirmatively his freedom from contributory fault.' 
 And when the plaintiff's case, on the face of it, shows contrib- 
 utory negligence, there should be a nonsuit,' but if there be 
 
 4TJ;icli. (Law) 339; b. c. 55 Am. Dec. 
 678; Carter v. Columbia, &c., R. Co., 
 19 S. C. 20; s. C. 45 Am. Rep. 754; 
 Roof «. Railroad Co., 4 8. C. 61. 
 
 ' Texas, &c., R. Co. ■». Murphy, 46 
 Tex. 356; Houston, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Cowser, 57 Tex. 393; Dallas, &c., R. 
 Co. s. Spicker, 61 Tex. 437; s. c. 48 
 Am. Rep. 397. "It is only when the 
 averments of the petition show a 
 prima facie case of negligence on the 
 ;part of the injured party, that it he- 
 comes necessary that the plaintifi 
 should negative by averment and 
 proof the existence of such negli- 
 gence." San Antonio, &c., Ry. Co. ». 
 Bennett, 76 Tex. 151, 155. Centra, 
 "Walker v. Herron, 32 Tex. 55. 
 
 '' Milwaukee, &c., R. Co. v. Hunter, 
 11 Wis. 160; Achtenhagen v. "Water- 
 town, 18 Wis. 331; Potter v. Chicago, 
 &c , R. Co., 31 Wis. 873; s. c. 32 Wis. 
 <615; Hoyt a. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105; 
 Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 48 Wis. 
 513; 8. c. 38 Am. Rep. 558, and the 
 note; Hoth v. Petfir^ 55 Wis. 405. 
 The older cases are overruled. Cham- 
 berlain V. Milwaukee &c., R. Co., 
 7 Wis. 431; Dressier v. Davis, 7 Wis. 
 .537. 
 
 ' Barber v. Essex, 37 Vt. 62; Hill v. 
 New Haven, 37 Vt. 501. 
 
 * Sanderson v. Prazier, 8 Colo. 79; 
 s. c. 19 Am. Law Rev. 313. 
 
 ' Holden v. Liverpool Gas Co., 3 C. 
 B. 1; Davey B. London, &c., Ry. Co., 
 11 L. R. (Q. B. Div.) 213; Bridge v. 
 Grand Junction Ry. Co., 3 Mee. & 
 W. 244; Martin v. Great Northern, 
 &c , Ry. Co., 16 C. B. 179. 
 
 'Baltimore, &c., R. Co. v. Whit- 
 acre, 35 Ohio St. 637; Hays v. Galla- 
 gher, 73 P6nn. St. 140; New Jersey 
 Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 
 434; Dallas, &c., R. Co. v. Spicker, 
 61 Tex. 437; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 397; 
 Winship d. Enfleld, 43 N. H. 197; 
 Louisville, &c. , R. Co. «. Goetz, 79 Ky. 
 443; s. 0. 43 Am. Rep. 237; Miller v. 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 5 Mo. App. 
 471; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 
 107 HI. 44; 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 425; Pri- 
 deaux V. City of Mineral Point. 43 
 Wis. 513; 8. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 558, and 
 the note. 
 
 '"Starry v. Dubuque, &c., Ry. Co., 
 51 Iowa, 419; Prideaux v. City of 
 Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513; 8. o. 38 
 Am. Rep. 558; Baltimore, &c., R. 
 Co. s. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627; 
 
§ 428.] THE BUEDEN OF PROOF. 545 
 
 any real question as to the plaintiff's negligence, lie should 
 not be nonsuited, but the question is for the jury,* In the 
 early and leading case of Zemp v. Wilmington & Manchester 
 B. Co.,' it was said that declarations of the plaintiff, in the na- 
 ture of admissions, to the effect that the injury resulted from 
 his own carelessness and that he alone was in fault, the admis- 
 sion having been made almost immediately after the accident 
 in which the injury was received and before the plaintiff was 
 fully informed of the causes of the accident, are not conclusive 
 evidence of contributory negligence, but are to be left to the 
 jury to receive their appropriate weight in connection with 
 other evidence. • 
 
 I 428. The rule in Connecticut.— In Park v. O'Brien,' the 
 Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut set forth the rule 
 that in these actions the burden is upon the plaintiff to es- 
 tablish that his own negligence did not concur in producing the 
 mischief of which he complains, in the following luminous 
 language : — " We accord entirely with the decision cited by 
 the plaintiff in error, the defendant below, to show that, in 
 this suit, the burden of showing that the injury was not at- 
 tributable to the want of reasonable care on his part, rested 
 on the plaintiff. The reason of this rule is that the plaintiff 
 must prove all the facts which are necessary to entitle him 
 to recover, and this is one of those facts. It was necessary 
 for the plaintiff to prove ; first, negligence on the part of the 
 defendant in respect to the collision alleged, and, secondly, 
 that the injury to the plaintiff occurred in consequence of 
 that negligence. But in order to prove this latter part, the 
 plaintiff must show that such injury was not caused in 
 whole or in part, by his own negligence, for although the 
 defendant was guilty of negligence, if the plaintiff's negli- 
 gence contributed essentially to the injury, it is obvious that it 
 did not occur by reason of the defendant's negligence. There- 
 fore the plaintiff would not prove enough to entitle him to re- 
 cover, by merely showing negligence on the part of ihe 
 defendant, but he must go further, and also prove the injury 
 
 Cassidy «. Angell, 13 R. I. 447; s. o. ' See generally the cases cited In the 
 
 34 Am. Eep. 690; Lee v. Woolsey, preceding notes. 
 
 109 Penn. St. 134; Schum v. Penn. » 9 Rich. (Law) 84; s. c. 64 Am. 
 
 R. Co., 107 Penn. St. 8; Longenecker Dec. 763. 
 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 105 Penn. St. 338. = 23 Conn. 339. 
 35 
 
646 THE BUBDEN OP PEOOP. [§ 429. 
 
 to have been caused by such negligence, by showing a want 
 of concurring negligei^oe on his own part contributing materi- 
 ally to the injury. Hence, to say that the plaintiff must show 
 the latter, is only saying that he must show that the injury 
 was owing to the negligence of the defendant. And as the de- 
 fendant had the right to have the jury informed as to what 
 facts the plaintiff must prove, in ordpr to recover, he had a 
 right to require the court to instruct them that it was incum- 
 bent on the plaintiff to prove a want of such concurring 
 negligence on his part." 
 
 § 429. Judge Redfleld's statement of the rule.— Perhaps 
 there is no more explicit and satisfactory statement of the rule 
 in the reports than this. It is not, however, a favorite rule with 
 the text- writers and commentators, who almost universally in- 
 cline to indorse the opposite doctrine, which makes contribu- 
 tory negligence a matter of defense, and puts the burden of 
 proving it upon the defendant.* Judge Eedfield to this point 
 has said :' — " Although the majority of the American courts 
 lay down the rule . . . that the burden of proof is upon 
 the plaintiff to show that he was guilty of no negligence on 
 his own part, we think the point is not well defined in 
 these terms. All that is meant, we apprehend, is, that where 
 there is any evidence tending to prove, either directly, or 
 from the manner of the accident, that there might have been 
 fault on the part of the plaintiff, he must assume the burden, 
 upon the wTiole issue, of satisfying the jury that the injury 
 occurred through the fault of the defendant, and that his own 
 want of care at the time did not in any sense contribute di- 
 rectly to it. The result of the rule thus stated would be that, 
 where there was no evidence of any want of care on the part 
 of the plaintiff, the law will presume none existed, as in re- 
 gard to good character in a witness, or sanity in one where 
 there is no proof. ... It has sometimes been claimed, 
 that the plaintiff must give affirmative evidence of his 
 own exercise of due care and caution at the time the injury 
 
 ■ Shearman & Bedfleld on Kegli- field on Railways, 5th ed., 263, notes; 
 
 gence, 4th ed.,§109: Thompson on 28 Am. Bap. 563, Mr Browne's note; 
 
 Negligence, 1176; Thompson on Car- 62 Am. pec. 686, Mr. Freeman's note, 
 
 riers of Passengers, 257 et seq.; ' 2 Bedfleld on Bailways, 5th ed., 
 
 Wharton on Negligence, § 423; 2 Red- 258. 
 
§ 431.] THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 547 
 
 occurred. But this in principle is much like one giving evi- 
 dence of the good character of his witness, before any impeach- 
 ment, and we think should never be required." 
 
 § 430. The rule in Kansas.— In Kansas Pacific B. Co. v. 
 Pointer,* the court, arguing to the same effect, said : — " It 
 seems to us also correct to hold that the oniis probandi as to 
 the negligence of the plaintiff is on the defendant, that, if 
 the record shows negligence on the part of the defendant, 
 and is silent as to the conduct of the plaintiff, it makes out a 
 case for recovery. We are aware of contrary decisions, and 
 that in some States it is held that the burden is on the 
 plaintiff to show affirmatively that he exercised due care, and 
 was without fault. But if it is shown that a party has done 
 wrong and caused injury thereby, is not a prima facie case 
 for compensation made ? Logically, the wrong-doer should 
 always compensate, and the wrong and the injury always 
 entitle to relief. When the wrong of both parties contrib- 
 utes to the injury, the law declines to apportion the damages, 
 and so leaves the injured party without any compensation. 
 This is not strictly justice, the wrong-doer causing injury 
 ought not to be released from piaking any compensation, 
 simply because the injured party is also a wrong-doer, and 
 helped produce the injury. But many considerations, espe- 
 -ciaUy the difficulty of correctly apportioning the damages, 
 and determining to what extent the wrong of the respective 
 parties was instrumental in causing the iiijury, uphold the 
 rule so universally recognized, that where the wrong, the neg- 
 ligence of both parties, contributes to the injury, the law will 
 not afford any relief. But if the wrong-doer ought always 
 to compensate for the injury he has wrought, and is relieved 
 from the obligation to compensate only by the fact that the 
 wrong of the injured party helped to cause the injury, it is 
 incumbent on him to show such wrong. It is a matter of 
 defense to avoid the consequences of his own wrong." 
 
 § 431. This rule criticised.— These arguments in favor of 
 the rule which places the burden of proof as to the contribu- 
 tory negligence of the plaintiff upon the defendant, proceed, 
 
 • 14 K»n. 37. 
 
648 THE BUBDEN OP PBOOP. [§ 432. 
 
 it is suggested 'with deference, always upon the reasonable- 
 ness, or justice, of the presumption of carefulness upon the 
 part of the plaintiff. This presumption is after the analogy 
 of the presumption of innocence in the criminal law, and is 
 always defended upon the same grounds as that presumption.. 
 , Judge Bedfield, in the passage just quoted from his treatise 
 upon the Law of Railways, says that the opposite rule is 
 very much like requiring evidence of the good character of 
 one's witnesses before their character is impeached, and as- 
 sHimes that the presumption in favor oiE the plaintiff's care- 
 fulness and prudence is like the presumption in favor of the 
 sanity of plaintiff. Now, in point of fact, the character of 
 most persons whose testimony is offered in evidence in courts 
 of justice, is good, or good enough so that it cannot be suc- 
 cessfully impeached, and it is beyond cavil that an over- 
 whelming majority of those who bring actions in the courts 
 are not crazy. Whereas, as I have endeavored to show,^ it is 
 not a fact that a majority of those persons who bring actions 
 of negligence, were themselves free from the imputation of 
 contributory negligence, but, on the contrary, it is a fact, 
 that in a very large proportion of the cases it turns out that 
 the plaintiff was himself at least partly to blame, and that 
 his own negligence, concurring with that of the defendant, 
 produced the n\ischief of which he complains. Inasmuch as 
 that is true, the presumption of fact in any individual case is 
 that the plaintiff was himself careless. The mathematical 
 chance is largely against the plaintiff in these actions, taking 
 account of all the actions that are brought. He succeeds 
 not oftener than twice or three times in ten in actions of this 
 nature. The presumption, therefore, that the plaintiff was 
 careful is not in tliese actions a reasonable presumption. 
 The chances are that he was careless, and the presumption 
 accordingly should be that he was careless, to the extent of 
 requiring him, as a material part of his case, to show his 
 freedom from contributory fault. This, however, need not in 
 every instance be proved by affirmative testimony, but it may 
 be inferred from all the circumstances of the case. 
 
 § 433. The rule distingaished.— This is well set forth by 
 Wells, J., in Mayo v. Boston & Maine K. Co.," in the foUow- 
 
 > Bee § 438 et teg., supra. * 104 Mass. 137, 140. 
 
§ 433.] THE BURDEN OF PBOOF. 549 
 
 ing language : — " The burden rests upon the plaintiff " (to 
 show his own freedom from negligence). "Although in form 
 a proposition to be established affirmatively, it is not neces- 
 sarily to be proved by affirmative testimony addressed di- 
 rectly to its support. The burden is held to be upon the 
 plaintiff for the reason that it is a subordinate proposition, 
 necessarily involved in the more general one upon which the 
 action is founded, to wit, that the injury to the plaintiff was 
 caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of the defend- 
 ant. If this be shown by evidence which excludes fault on 
 the part of the plaintiff, the proposition pf due care is estab- 
 lished as effectually as by affirmative testimony, all the cir- 
 cumstances under which the injury was received being 
 proved, if tKey show nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff, 
 either of acts or neglect, to which the injury may be 
 attributed in whole or in part, the inference of due care may 
 be drawn from the absence of all appearance of fault." ^ 
 
 § 433. The rule in New York — The courts of New York 
 seem to have dealt with this question, at least in the earlier 
 cases, in a spirit of compromise. In th,e later volumes of the 
 reports there is to be observed a decided tendency toward 
 the rule that the plaintiff, as part of his case, must establish 
 his freedom from contributory neglect, putting, accordingly, 
 the burden of proof upon him ; but in the earlier cases it 
 appears that the court endeavored to avoid committing itself 
 irrevocably to either of the two antagonistic rules, letting 
 each case depend upon its own peculiar circumstances in the 
 matter of the burden of proof as to contributory negligence. 
 On the one hand they avoid giving the odds arbitrarily, in 
 every case, to the plaintiff, by assuming his carefulness, as 
 matter of law, at the start, and, on the other hand, the plaint- 
 iff is not handicapped with an obligation, in respect of the 
 evidence, which assumes the contrary. Under this ruling 
 each case may be said to be the rule unto itself. If the 
 
 ' To the same eflfect, see Smith ». ' Way v. 111., &c., E. Co., 40 Iowa, 345; 
 
 Boston Gaslight Co., 139 Mass. 318; Tolman «. Syrapuse, &o., R. Co., 98 
 
 Craig V. New York, &c., R. Co., 118 K. T. 198, 303; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 649; 
 
 Mass. 487; Commonwealth b. Boston, Railroad Company v. Gladmon, 15 
 
 Sic. R. Co., 136 Mass. 61; Hinckley v. "Wall. 401, 407; Teipel v. Hilsendegen 
 
 Cape Cod R. Co., 130 Mass. 357; (by Cooley, J.), 44 Mich. 461. 
 
550 THE BUBDEN OP PBOOF. [§ 434. 
 
 plaintiff's case, from the evidence, turns ont to be of such a 
 character as in any degree to implicate him in respect of 
 negligence, then the burden of proof is upon him to clear 
 himself of blame, and his freedom from fault must appear as 
 a factor of his prima facie case. But if, per contra, the 
 plaintiff's case involves no such implication, he may rest 
 when he has shown the injury sustainpd and the defendant's 
 fault, and the burden of proof will then be upon the defend- 
 ant, to go free if he may, because of the contributory fault of 
 the plaintiff, which it is for him to establish. It is only 
 upon such a theory as this that the decisions of the New 
 York courts can be reconciled. An extended and somewhat 
 careful reading of the cases seems to warrant this distinction. 
 Judge Thompson says : — " In New York . . , the de- 
 cisions are irreconcilable ; " ^ but it is believed that hardly 
 one in the long list can be found where this rule, fairly ap- 
 plied, will not appear to have controlled the ruling as to the 
 burden of proof. 
 
 § 434. The rule in Neir York farther stated.— In Johnson 
 V, Hudson Eiver E. Co.," which was referred to with approval 
 in the Supreme Court of the United States by Mr. Justice 
 Hunt ' in' Bailroad Co. v. Gladmon,* the court said : — " I am 
 of opinion that it is not a rule of law of universal application 
 that the plaintiff must prove aflirmatively that his own con- 
 duct, on the occasion of the injury, was cautious and prudent. 
 The onus prdbamdi in this, as in most other cases,, depends 
 upon the position of the affair as it stands upon the undis- 
 puted facts. Thus, if a carriage be driten furiously through 
 a crowded thoroughfare, and a person is run over, he would 
 not be obliged to prove that he was cautious and attentive, 
 and he might recover, though there were no witnesses of his 
 actual conduct. The natural instinct of self-preservation 
 would stand in the place of positive evidence; aijd the dan- 
 
 ' Thompson on Negligence, 1117. case of Bailroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 
 
 » 20 N. Y. 65. Wall. 401, 406, by Mr. Justice Hunt, 
 
 ' By a somewhat curious misar- and cited as taken from the opinion in 
 
 rangement of authorities this extract the case of Oldfleld v. New Tork.&c, 
 
 from the opinion of Denio, J., in the R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, affirming 8. C. 
 
 case of .Tohnson v. Hudson Biver R. 3 E. D. Smith, 103. 
 
 Co., 20 N. Y. 65, is quoted in the * 15 Wall. 401, 406. 
 
§ 434.] THE BUBDEN OF PBOOF. 651 
 
 gereus tendency of the defendant's conduct would create so 
 strong a probability that the injury happened through his 
 fault that no evidence would be required. . . . The cul- 
 pa^Uty of the defendant must be affirmatively proved before 
 the case can go to the jury, but the absence of any fault on 
 the part of the plaintiff may be inferred from circumstances, 
 and the disposition of men to take care of themselves and 
 keep out of difficulty may be properly taken into considera- 
 tion." It is in this spirit that the New York cases proceed, 
 and by way of summing up, in the same opinion, the learned 
 judge said : — " The true rule, in my opinion, is this : The 
 jury must eventjjially be sa,tisfied that the plaintiff did not, by 
 any negligence of his own, contribute to the injury. The 
 evidence to establish this may consist in that offered to show 
 the nature or cause of the accident, or in any other com- 
 petent proof. To carry the case to the jury, the evidence on 
 the part of the plaintiff must be such as, if believed, would 
 authorize them to find that the injury was occasioned solely 
 by the negligence of the defendant. It is not absolutely es- 
 sential that the plaintiff should give any affirmative proof 
 touching his own conduct on the occasion of the accident. 
 The character of the defendant's delinquency may be such as 
 to prove pnTna facie the whole issue ; or the case may be such 
 as to make it necessary for the plaintiff to show by independ- 
 ent evidence that he did not bring the misfortune upon 
 himself. No more certain rule can be laid down." In a 
 majority of cases, as has been been already suggested, under 
 the operation of this rule, the burden will fall upon the 
 plaintiff, because it will most generally happen that something 
 in the circumstances of the case puts the plaintiff in a posi- 
 tion where it is necessary and proper for him to show not 
 only that the defendant was wrong, but that he was right. 
 Wherever this is the case, this rule very justly imposes the 
 burden of proof upon him ; but whenever it is not the case, 
 as it will very occasionally happen, the burden of proof as to 
 contributory negligence is upon the defendant. That this is 
 exactly the New York rule as the older judges, at the least, 
 understood it, a long line of cases — otherwise irreconcilable 
 — sufficiently demonstrates.^ 
 
 ■ Spencer ■». Utica, &c., R. Co., 5 &c., B. Co., 6Laiis. 381; 8. c. 43 How. 
 Barb. 337; Hackford ». New York, Pr. 332; Robinson d. N. T., &c., R. 
 
552 THE BUBDEN OF PBOOF. [§ 435, 
 
 § 436. The deTelopmeut of the rule in New York.— The 
 
 development of the rule in New York upon this point is a 
 curious, but very satisfactory demonstration, in my judg- 
 ment, of the essential reasonableness and propriety of that 
 rule of evidence which makes it incumbent upon the plaint- 
 iff, as part of his case, to show his own freedom from con- 
 tributory fault when he brings an action of negligence. We 
 find in the New York reports, as Judge Thompson suggests, 
 a great number of wholly irreconcilable decisions upon the 
 point in question. The Court of Appeals of that State has, 
 in individual oases, taken now one position and now the other 
 upon the matter of the burden of proof in actions of this 
 nature. But, taken together, the reported cases seem to 
 indicate that the court, after groping abput, or perhaps 
 beating about, for some middle ground, and after much re- 
 luctance and some plain mistakes, has finally come squarely 
 to the position that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff 
 to show that his own conduct, in faoievdo or in non fadendo, 
 did not, in the legal intent, contribute to occasion the mischief 
 of which he complains. Turning to the report books we find 
 that, in the case of Spencer v. Utica, &c., E. Co., decided in 
 
 Co., 65 Barb. 146; Suydam v. Grand R. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 29; War- 
 St B. Co., 41 Barb. 375; Bush v. ner «. New York, &c., R. Co., 44N. 
 Brainard, 1 Cowen, 78i Harlow v. Y. 465; s. c. 45 Barb. 299; Gillispie v. 
 Humiston, 6 Cowen, 189; Button «. Newburgh, 54 N. Y. 468; Reynolds 
 Hudson River, &c., R. Co., 18 K. Y. «. New York, &c., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 
 248; Wilds v. Hudson River, Ac, R. 248 (reversing s. c. 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 Co., 24 N. Y. 430; Squire v. Central 644); Cordell v. New York, &c., R. 
 Park R. Co., 4 Jones & Sp. 436; John- Co., 6 Hun, 461; s. c. 64 N*. Y. 535; 70 
 son «. Hudson River, &c., R. Co., ,20 N. Y. 119; Hale v. Smith, 78 N. Y. 
 N. Y. 65; s. c. 6 Duer, 633; 5 Duer, 480; Hart®. Hudson River Bridge Co.; 
 21; Ryan v. Hudson River, &c., R. 80 N. Y. 622; s. c. 84 N. Y. 56; Rice- 
 Co., 1 Jones & Sp. 137; Holbrook v. man ■». Havemeyer, 84 N. Y. 647; 
 TJtica, &e., R. Co., 16 Barb. 113; s. c. Jones ®. New York, &c., R. Co., 10 
 12 N. Y. 236; De Benedetd v. Mauch- Abb. N. C. 20(^ s. c. 62 How. Pr. 450; 
 in, 1 Hilt. 213; Ernst v. Hudson River, Becht v. Corbin, 92 N. Y. 658; Lee ®. 
 &c., R. Co., 24 How. Pr. 97; s. c. 32 Troy Citizens' Gas Light Co., 98 N. 
 How. Pr. 263; 19 How. Pr. 205; 32 J. 115; Tolman v. Syracuse, &c., R. 
 Barb. 159; 35 N. Y. 9; 39 N. Y. 61; Co., 98 N. Y. 198; b. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 , Curran •». Warren Chemical Manfg. 649; Debevoise v. New York, &c., R. 
 Co., 36 N.Y. 153; Burke®. Broadway, Co.,98N. Y. 377; a. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 &c., R. Co., 34How. Pr. 289;b. c. 49 683; McDermott ». Third Avenue 
 Barb. 529; Besiegel v. New York, &c., R. Co., 44 Hun, 107. 
 
§ 436.] THE BtJBDEN OF PEOOF. 553 
 
 1849,^ the Supreme Court declared it a " stern and unbending 
 rule " that the plaintiff in these actions " must establish the 
 proposition that he himself was without negligence and with- 
 out fault." ' This is the earliest case in which it is clear 
 that any New York court undertook to lay down a rule upon 
 this point. The cases cited by the learned judge in support ' 
 of his position, "which," he says, " has been settled by a long 
 series of adjudged cases," ' do not, in my opinion, very cle9,rly 
 declare such a doctrine. No one of them is any stronger 
 authority to this point than the case of Butterfield v. Forres- 
 ter,* from which the rule is a mere inference. But, in 1849, 
 w^e find the Supreme Court of New York committed to the 
 position that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and 
 all the earlier cases, as far as they go, inclining, it may be 
 said, to that rule. 
 
 § 436. This derelopment farther considered.— In 1873 
 this court took an opposite ground, ^declaring that " the 
 concurring negligence of the plaintiff is matter of defense, 
 and the plaintiff is under no obligation to prove anything to 
 entitle him to recover but the injury, and that it was caused 
 by defendant's negligence."' The question first came before 
 the Court of Appeals in 1858, in the case of Button v. Hud- 
 son Kiver K. Co.,* wherein a very singular position was taken. 
 The reporter seems to have thought that the case declared 
 the rule that the burden is upon the plaintiff, for in the head 
 note he said : — " In an action for negligence the burden is 
 upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that he is guiltless 
 of any negligence proximately contributing to the injury." 
 If only the opinion were equal to the syllabus there would 
 be no room for conjecture or dispute, and we might count 
 
 J «fi 
 
 5 Barb. 337. v. Cumming, 6 Cowen, 181, 184; 
 
 'This is a stem and unbending Brownell ®. Flagler, 5 Hill, 882. 
 
 rule which has been settled by along ' Spencer v. TJtica, &c., R. Co., 5 
 
 «eries of adjudged cases, which we Barb. 337, 338. 
 
 cannot overrule if we would," citing * 11 East, 60. 
 
 Bush V. Brainard, 1 Cowen, 78; Brown ' Hackford v. New York, &c., R. 
 
 «. Maxwell, 6 Hill, 592; Rathbun s. Co., 6 Lans. 381. See, also, Robinson 
 
 Payne, 19 Wend. 399; Harlow v. v. TSew York, &c., R. Co., 65 Barb. 
 
 Humiston, 6 Cowen, 189, 191; Corlies 146. 
 
 « 18 N. Y. 248. 
 
554 ■* THE BUBDEN OP PBOOF. [§ 437^ 
 
 « 
 
 this earliest utterance of the court of last resort in New York 
 in favor of one rule. But in the opinion Strong, J., said : — 
 " The other point " [for the appellant]/ " presents the ques- 
 tion upon whom was the burden of proof, in reference to neg- 
 ligence of the intestate, conducting to the injury — whether 
 it belonged to the plaintiff to prove affirmatively the absence, 
 or to the defendant to prove affirmatively the presence of such 
 negligence. In regard to all the circumstances essential to 
 the cause of action, the plaintiff held and was required to 
 sustain the affirmative. Among those circumstances were 
 that the defendants were negligent, and that the injury re- 
 sulted from that negligence. If the intestate was negligent,, 
 and his negligence concurred with that of the defendants in 
 producing the injury, the plaintiff had no cause of action. . 
 , . . In this view the exercise of due care by the intestate 
 was an element of the cause of action. Without proof of it, 
 it would not appear that the negligence of the defendants 
 caused the injury." 
 
 § 437. The position of the New York court stated.— This 
 
 language is plain, and indicates clearly the mind of a court that 
 would put the burden of proof upon the plaintiff in such an 
 action. This utterance, moreover, is fortified by an impos- 
 ing array of authorities, including Spencer> v. Utioa, &c., B. 
 Co., to which I have already referred, and the cases cited by 
 the Supreme Court judge in that case,* as well as many other 
 English and American decisions that require the plaintiff, as 
 part of his case, to establish his own freedom from negligent 
 default. This done, the court continued : — " It must not be 
 understood that it was incumbent on the plaintiff, in the first, 
 instance, to give evidence for the direct and special object of 
 establishing the observance of due care by the intestate ; it 
 would be enough if the proof introduced of the negligence of 
 the defendants and the circumstances of the injury, prima^ 
 fade established that the injury was occasioned by the negli- 
 gence of the defendants, as such evidence would exclude the- 
 idea of a want of due care by the intestate aiding to the re- 
 sult." This is not far from saying that the plaintiff must 
 
 ' Mr. Charles O'Conor was counsel ^ See § 486, n. 2, supra. 
 for the appellant. 
 
§ 438.] THE BURDEN OF PEOOP. 555 
 
 show himself free from fault, which he may do by showing 
 the defendant in fault — no very luminous proposition. In^ 
 the reporter's note it is said of Selden, J. : — " The latter 
 objected to an implication which he conceived to lurk in the 
 opinion of Strong, J. {but which Strong, J., disclaimed), that, in 
 the absence of proof of any circumstances importing negli- 
 gence on the part of the plaintiff, there might be a presump- 
 tion thereof which he is required to rejpel, whereaSj his negli- 
 gence must be inferred from evidence and is not to be pre- 
 sumed." From which it is to be inferred that so much of 
 Judge Strong's opinion as plainly imposes upon the plaintiff 
 the burden of proof in these cases is to be readj as of some 
 esoteric or acroamatical significance, being designed to be 
 understood to announce something quite different from what 
 it appears prima facie to announce. 
 
 § 438. The New York cases ftirther considered.— With- 
 out any attempt to place this case as either for or against 
 the rule which puts the burden of proof upon the plaintiff, 
 we find in Johnson v. Hudson River E. Co.^ that Judge Denio, 
 after declaring that " the person injured must not by his own 
 negligence have contributed to the injury," and insisting that 
 " this is an element in the definition of the cause of action," 
 defined the rule as follows : — " I am of opinion that it is not 
 a rule of universal application that the plaintiff must prove 
 affirmatively that his own conduct on the occasion of the in- 
 jury was cautious and prudent." This should seem to imply 
 that such a rule obtained in the courts of New York at that 
 period, generally, if not as " a rule of universal application." 
 The influence of this decision, as I have already indicated,* 
 is — so far as it may be regarded as authoritative at present, 
 and not, by implication at least, overruled — in favor of allow- 
 ing each case to be a rule unto itself on this point, requiring 
 the plaintiff to show, or the defendant to show, contributory 
 negUgence as the circumstances of each particular case may 
 warrant. Passing by the case of Wilds v. Hudson River R. 
 Co.,' a landmark in the law on this point in New York, we 
 come to the case of Ernst v. Hudson River R. Co.,* wherein 
 
 >20N. T. 65. »24N. T. 430. 
 
 ' See § 434 et teq., supra. * 24 How. Prac. 97. 
 
S56 THE BURDEN OP PROOF. [§ 439. 
 
 the court for the first time was fully and plainly committed 
 to the rule that requires the burden of proof to be upon the 
 plaintiff. The language is unqualified : — "A party suing for 
 negligence must come into court faultless. He must not 
 present a mere balanced case. The burden of proof is upon 
 him and he must satisfy the court, by the greater weight of 
 testimony, that, without any carelessness or blame on his 
 part, he has suffered an. injury." 
 
 § 439. The Xew York rale summarized. — This seems to 
 have been the culmination of a long series of years of doubt 
 and vacillation, and here the court has rested. The later 
 cases, without exception I believe, impose upon the plaintiff 
 the burden of proving, as an essential element of his case, 
 that his own conduct did not contribute to occasion the in- 
 jury.^ It is sometimes said that the plaintiff must prove 
 " affirmatively " that he was himself free from negligence, 
 but by this it is believed nothing more is meant than that 
 the fact of such freedom from negligence on the part of the 
 plaintiff must be made to appear. It is a necessary element 
 in the plaintiff'^ case, and something for him to show. In 
 the very recent case of Tolman v. Syracuse, &c., K. Co.,' 
 Finch, J., said : — " The burden was upon the plaintiff of 
 showing affirmatively, either by direct evidence, or the drift 
 of surrounding circumstances, that the deceased was himself 
 without fault, and approached the crossing with prudence , 
 and care, and with sense alert to the possibility of approach- 
 ing danger."' From which it may be inferred that when it 
 
 ' Warner v. New York, .&c., E. &c., R. Co., 98 N. T, 377; ». c. 50 
 
 Co., 44 N. Y. 465; Reynolds v. New Am. Rep. 683. 
 
 York, &c., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 248; Cor- ' 98 N. Y. 198, 202; 8. c. 50 Am. 
 
 dell V. New York, &c., R. Co., 75 N. Rep. 649. 
 
 Y. 330; Hale v. Smith, 78 N. Y. 480; ' To the same effect see Hart e. 
 Hart V. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 
 N. Y. 623; s. C. 84 N. Y. 56; Rice- 622; s. c. 84 N. Y. 56; in which the 
 laan v. Havemeyer, 84 N. Y. 647; court says :^^" It was incumbent upon 
 Becht V. Corbin, 92 N. Y. 658; Jones the plaintiff to show affirmatively 
 V. New York, &c., R. Co., 10 Abb. that the negligence of the defendant 
 N. C. 200; 8. c. 63 How. Prac. 450; was the sole cause of the death of the 
 tee «. Troy Citizens' Gaslight Co., 98 deceased. But it needs hot that this 
 U. Y. 115; Tolman v. Syracuse, &c., be done by the positive and direct ev- 
 R. Co., 98 N. Y. 198; s. o. 50 Am. idence of the negligence of the de- 
 Rep. 649; Debevoise v. New York, fendant and of the freedom from nog- 
 
439.] 
 
 THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 557 
 
 is said that the plaintiff must " show affirmatively," etc., it is 
 meant that the fact must appear, if not by the drift of sur- 
 rounding circumstances, by direct evidence to the point. In 
 Lee V. Troy Citizens' Gaslight Co.,* it was held that it is not 
 essential that the complaint, in an action of negligence, shall 
 specifically allege absence of contributory negligence on the 
 part of the plaintiff ; that such an allegation is substantially 
 involved in the averment that the injury complained of was 
 occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, and that to 
 prove this averment it is necessary, the burden being upon 
 the plaintiff, for the plaintiff to establish the fact that his 
 own negligence did not cause or contribute to cause the in- 
 jury.' In Connecticut* and Vermont * there is to be observed, 
 especially in the earlier decisions, some of which are cited 
 in the notes, a tendency to the same incertitude upon this 
 question that I have considered at length in the New York 
 cases.' 
 
 ligence of the deceased. The proofs 
 may be indirect, and the evidence had 
 by showing circumstances from which 
 the inference is fairly to be drawn 
 that these principal and essential facts 
 existed." 
 
 ' 98 N. T. 115. 
 
 ' In 1872, Mr. Justice Hunt, who 
 may be supposed to have been famil- 
 iar with the trend of the New York 
 decisions, said, in his opinion in the 
 Supreme Court of the United States 
 in the case of Kailroad Company v. 
 Gladmon, 15 "WaU. 401, 407 :— "The 
 later cases in the New York dourt of 
 Appeals, I think, will show that the 
 trials have almost uniformly pro- 
 ceeded upon the theory that the plaint- 
 iff is not bound to prove affirmatively 
 that he was himself free from negli- 
 gence, and this theory has been ac- 
 cepted as the true one. Generally, as 
 here, the proof which shows the de- 
 fendant's negligence shows also the 
 negligence or caution of the plaintiff." 
 While the latter remark is clearly 
 true, and serves to emphasize what 
 has already been said as to the re- 
 
 quirement of affirmative proof of the 
 plaintiff's freedom from negligence, 
 it is obvious that the former part of 
 the learned justice's dictum would not 
 now be made by any informed lawyer 
 or judge. The Court of Appeals is 
 as clearly committed to the rule de- 
 clared for the -first time in Ernst v. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 24 How. Prac. 
 97, as the Supreme Court of the 
 United States can ever be to the op- 
 posite. Mr. Justice Hunt's dictum, 
 was hatdly correct in 1872, and would 
 not now be correct at all. 
 
 ' Beers v. Housatonic, &c., R. Co., 
 19 Conn. 566 ; Park v. O'Brien, 23 
 Conn. 339; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29 
 Conn. 204; BeU v. Smith, 39 Conn. 
 211. 
 
 * Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158; 
 Barber v. Essex, 27 Vt. 62; Trow v. 
 Vermont, &c., R. Co., 24 Vt. 487; 
 Hyde s. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443; Hill v. 
 New Haven, 37 Vt. 501; Walker v. 
 Westfleld, 39 Vt. 246; Bovee v. Town 
 of Danville, 53 Vt. 183. 
 
 ' Consult upon the general question 
 of the burden of proof as to contribu- 
 
558 THE BURDEN OP PROOF. [§ 440. 
 
 § 440. The disagreement of the courts upon this ques- 
 tion. — Upon the question of where to place ' the burden of 
 proof in actions of negligence when contributory negligence 
 is the issue, which we have considered in this chapter, we 
 find the courts of last resort by no means agreed. On the 
 one hand, in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, 
 Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Louisiana, North Caro- 
 lina, Oregon, and New York the burden is upon the plaintiff.^ 
 In each of these States the rule is, as it is well expressed in 
 ■Cordell V. New York, &c., K. Co.,^ by the Court of Appeals 
 of New York, that " care on the part of one seeking to hold 
 another liable for neglect must be established by proof. 
 Where there is no proof of such care the court should non- 
 suit. . . . Absence of negUgence will never be pre- 
 sumed ; " or, as it is well put by Judge Cooley in Teipel v. 
 Hilsendegen: *-^" When one sues to recover damages for a 
 negligent injury the gravamen of his complaint i^ that he has 
 been damnified by the wrongful and negligent action of the 
 defendant, without having contributed thereto by negligent 
 conduct of his own. The absence of contributory negli- 
 gence is therefore a part of his case, and it is quite proper 
 to say that he should show that he acted with due care." 
 £ut, on the other hand, in Alabama, California, Colorado, 
 Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, 
 New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
 Bhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West "Virginia, Wis- 
 consin, and Vermont, as well as by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, and in England, it is held that contribu- 
 tory negligence is matter of defense, and that the burden is 
 upon the defendant, unless the plaintiff's own case raises a 
 presumption of negligence on his part, to allege and prove 
 the concurrent default of the plaintiff. •' The rule intended," 
 
 tory negligence, Abbott's Trial Evi- Edward E. Sprague, Esq., of New 
 
 dence, 594, §§ 33-38 incl. ; Shearman & York; 6 New York State Bar Asso- 
 
 Redfield on Negligence, 4th ed., §§ 43, ciation Reports; Mr. Browne's notes 
 
 44; Thompson on Negligence, 1053, in 28 Am. Bep. 563, snd 39 Am. Bep. 
 
 § 48, 1175, § 24, 1253, § 36; Wharton 511. See, also, 15 Western Jurist 
 
 on Negligence, S§ 421, 423, 430, incl., (1883), 197, 209, 529. 
 
 477, 990; Field on Damages, 182, ' 64 N. Y. 535. 
 
 §§ 189, 190, 191; " Contributory Neg- » 44 Mich. 461. 
 ligence and the Burden of Proof," by 
 
§ 441.] THE BUBDEN OF PBOOF. 559 
 
 said Chief Justice Eyan, in the case of Prideaux v. City of 
 Mineral Point,* " is, that a plaintiff giving evidence of the 
 negligence of the defendant and the resulting injury to him- 
 self, without showing any contributory negligence, is bound 
 to go no further ; he is not required to negative his own 
 negligence. If, however, the plaintiff, in proving the injury, 
 shows contributory negligence sufficient to defeat the action, 
 he disproves his own case of injury by the negligence of 
 the defendant alone. If the plaintiff's evidence leave no 
 doubt of the fact, his contributory negligence is taken, as 
 matter of law, to warrant a nonsuit. If the plaintiff's evi- 
 dence leave the fact in doubt, the evidence of contributory 
 negligence on both sides should go the jury." 
 
 § 441. No possible middle ground.— Between these two 
 a.ntinomies there seems to be no practicable middle ground. 
 The courts in New York, Connecticut and Vermont strove to 
 find some tenable mean, but the result has been that, in the 
 iwo former States, the courts have at la,st settled down to the 
 rule that puts the burden upon the plaintiff, while in the 
 latter State the tendency is toward the other rule. In Ver- 
 mont, the law is not yet entirely settled. As long ago 
 as the year 1880, Mr. Browne, in his note to the case 
 of Buesching v. St. Louis Gaslight Co.,' after an ex- 
 tended review of the later New York decisions, summed up 
 as follows : — " We think the following is the rule deducible 
 from the New York decisions : If on the plaintiff's affirma- 
 tive evidence it clearly appears that he himself was materi- 
 ally negligent, he may be nonsuited,* otherwise the defend- 
 ant, assuming that negligence on his part is shown, must 
 give his proof. If on the whole case it does not clearly ap- 
 pear that the plaintiff was free from negligence, he may be 
 nonsuited ; but if the evidence is conflicting and doubtful it 
 must go to the jury." This, as a statement of the rule, is 
 hardly more than a circumlocution, and is about equivalent 
 
 ' 43 Wis. 513; s. c. 28 Am. Rep. English common law rule as to con- 
 
 558. tributoiy negligence obtains, the 
 
 » 39 Am. Rep., 503, 513; s. c. 73 plaintiff, it is believed, would suffer a 
 
 Mo. 219. nonsuit if his own case demonstrated 
 
 ' This is of course the rule every- his negligence, 
 where. In any jurisdiction where the 
 
560 THE BUBDEN OF PROOF. [§ 443. 
 
 to a rule that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. 
 Since 1880, when this statement of the law was published, 
 the Court of Appeals has taken somewhat advanced ground 
 in favor of the rule, and reiterated many times the doctrine 
 first announced in Ernst v. Hudson Eiver E. Co.* in 1862, so 
 that in New York the rule may be considered as well settled 
 as any rule of law is ever likely to be. 
 
 § 442. Tendency toward the better rule.— While, as the 
 reports show, there is no tendency on the part of any court 
 which holds that the burden of proof in these cases is upon 
 the plaintiff, to recede from that position, it is suggested 
 that, from the opinions in the reports of those States where 
 the obntr&ry rule obtains, it may be spelled out that the 
 doctrine which makes contributory negligence, semper iMqine, 
 matter of defense, and puts the burden always upon the de- 
 fendant, is ]>ot regarded entirely satisfactory. It is those 
 courts that have all the trouble over the matter. Were their 
 position mo^e tenable, and if their doctrine were less 
 grounded in a sentiment, it is, with deference, submitted that 
 the reported cases might show less floundering, and fewer 
 attempts to modify and extenuate, with a correspondingly 
 higher measure of evenness and certitude. 
 
 § 443. Pleading contributory negligence.— Having dis- 
 cussed the burden of proof in the foregoing pages, we come 
 by natural transition to the subject of pleading, for, as a gen- 
 eral rule, a party must allege all the facts which he is re- 
 quired to prove in order to defeat his adversary. Accord- 
 ii<gly, we find it consistently held in those courts where the 
 burden of proving contributory negligence rests upon the 
 defendant, that it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
 allege the absence of fault upon his part.^ But it is also de- 
 clared in Massachusetts ' and New York,* jurisdictions where 
 
 ■ 24 How. Pr. 97. 657; Conroy v. Oregon Construction 
 
 ' Watkinds D. Southern Pac. R. Co., Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 71; Shearman* 
 
 38 Fed. Rep. 711; Church v. Charles- Redfleld on Negligence, 4th ed., § 113. 
 
 ton, Ac, Ry. Co., 21 S. C. 495; Con- ' Fuller d. Boston, &c., R. Co., 134 
 
 solidated Coal Co. s. Wombacher Mass. 491. 
 
 (111.), 24 N. E. Rep. 627; Keitel v. * Lee «. Troy, &c.. Gas Co., 98 N.T. 
 
 St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 28 Mo. App. 115, 119. 
 
§ 443.] THE BURDEN OF PBOOF. 561 
 
 the plaintiff has the burden of proof, that no direct averment 
 of freedom from contributory negligence on his part is 
 necessary in the complaint. The reason for this seeming 
 departure from the general rule of pleading is specious, but 
 not entirely satisfactory. It is thus stated by the Court of 
 Appeals of New York in the case last cited: — " Substantially 
 that averment is always involved in the averment setting out 
 that the injury was occasioned by the defendant's negligence. 
 To prove that it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, and 
 the burden is upon him to establish that his own negligence 
 did not cause or contribute to the injury." Where the con- 
 tributory negligence of the plaintiff is shown by his own 
 proof, it is no ground of objection that the defendant did 
 not specially plead and prove it,' and a general averment 
 of contributory negligence in an answer without specifying 
 the particular act is sufficient ; ' but evidence of the plaintiff 's 
 fault is inadmissible under a general denial.' 
 
 ■ McMurtry h. Louisville, &c., Ry. " Stone v. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475; s. c. 7 
 
 Co., 67 Miss. 601; b. c. 7 So Rep. 401; S. "W. Rep. 431: And see the note in 
 
 Hudson V. Wabash, &c., Ry. Co. 13 Am. St. Rep. 75, where many de- 
 
 (Mo.), 14 8. W. Rep. 15. cisions on pleading contributory neg- 
 
 " Neier v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. ligence are collected. 
 (Mo.), 1 S. W. Rep. 387. 
 
 ^R 
 
CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 LAW AND FACT. 
 
 (j 444. General statement. 
 
 445. A mixed question of law and 
 fact. 
 
 446. A preliminary question of law 
 for the court. 
 
 447. Oontributory negligence as 
 matter of law. 
 
 448. When a question of fact. 
 
 449. A question of law only in a 
 plain case. 
 
 g 450. Contributory negligence as a 
 question of fact. 
 451. Judge Cooley's statement of 
 
 the rule. 
 453. What the inquiry involves. 
 
 453. The tendency of the law in its 
 development. 
 
 454. Summary statement of this 
 tendency. 
 
 § 441. General statement. — As a general proposition of 
 law, it is agreed that cases of negligence present a mixed 
 question of law and fact, by which it is meant to say, that 
 in an action in a court of justice in which the negligence of 
 either plaintiff or defendant is an issue, or the issue, it de- 
 volves upon the court to say, as a matter of law, what is, or 
 amounts to negligence, and upon the jury to say, as matter 
 of fact, in the light of the instruction from the bench, whether 
 or not in the particular case at bar, the facts as proven to 
 their satisfaction, warrant the imputation of negligence. In 
 other words, the court tells the jury what negligence is, and 
 the jury tells the court what the facts of the case show upon 
 the question of negligence ; the judge defines negligence in 
 the charge, and the jury apply the definition to the facts in 
 the verdict. " Negligence," said the Supreme Court of Cali- 
 fornia, " is always a mixed question of law and fact, and when 
 the facts are doubtful, they must be submitted to the jury 
 under such instructions from the court as will enable them 
 to apply the law to the facts."' An uncounted multitude 
 of authorities might be cited in support of this elementary 
 proposition.* 
 
 ' Femandes «. Sacramento City Ry. 
 Co., 52 Cal. 45, 50. 
 
 " Wharton on Negligence, § 420, 
 and the cases collected; Thompson on 
 
 Negligence, 1235, § 10; Wells' Law 
 & Fact, §§ 363-265 inch; Hohnes' 
 Common Law, 120 et seg. See, also, ' 
 Herring v. Wilmington, &c., R. Co., 
 
§ 445.] 
 
 LAW AND FACT. 
 
 563 
 
 § 445. A mixed question of law and fact. — Dr. Wharton, 
 in his discussion of this subject, said : — " Negligence, we must 
 
 10 Ired. (Law) 402; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 
 395; Wright o. Maiden, &c., R. Co., 4 
 Allen, 289; Cleveland, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Terry, 8 Ohio St. 584; Detroit, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 118; 
 Trow V. .Vermont, &c., R. Co., 24 Vt. 
 487; s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 191; Barton «. 
 St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 52 Mo. 253; 
 B. c. 14 Am. Rep. 418; Keller b. New 
 York, &c., R. Co., 34 How. Prac. 
 173; Pittsburgh, &c., R. Co. ■». Mo 
 Clurg, 56 Penn. St. 300; Norris v. 
 Litchfield, 35 N. H. 277; Raymond 
 v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. 534; s. c." 
 53 Am. Dec. 57; Lane v. Atlantic 
 Works, 107 Mass. 104; Gerald v. Bos- 
 ton, 108 Mass. 580; Knight ®. Ponchar- 
 tTMn, &a, R. Co., 33 La. Ann. 462; 
 Wherley v Whitman, 1 Head. 610; 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rollins, 5 
 Kan. 180; Lake Shore, &c., R. Co. s. 
 Miller, 35 Mich. 27'^ Baker s. Fehr, 
 97 Penn. St. 70; Germantown, &c., 
 R. Co. s. Walling, 97 Penn. St. 55; 
 Pitts V. Cream City, &c., R. Co., 59 
 Wis. 333; City of Montgomery v. 
 Wright, 73 Ala. 411 ; 8. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 432; Lanier v. Toimgblood, 73 Ala. 
 587; Hall ». Union Pacific Ry. Co., 4 
 McCrary, 357; Harris o. Union Pac. 
 R. Co., 4 McCrary, 454; Delgar t. 
 City of St. Paul. 4 McCrary, 684; 
 McKeever v. Market St., &c., R. Co., 
 59 Cal. 394; Kansas, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Ward, 4 Colo. 30; Colorado, &c., R. 
 Co. V. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197; Behrens 
 V. Kansas, &c., R. Co., 5 Colo. 400. 
 It is not for the court to tell the jury 
 what facts constitute negligence. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 112 Dl. 
 398; Andrews v. Runyon, 65 Cal. 629; 
 Myers v. Lidianapolis, &c., R. Co., 
 113 111. 386; aay v. Chicago, &c., R. 
 Co., 17 Mo. App. 629; Dexter i). Mc- 
 Crary, 54 Conn. 171. Rutin Atlanta, 
 &c. , R. Co. n. Wyly, 65 Ga. 130, it was 
 held that while negligence, as a gen- 
 eral rule is a question for the jury, yet 
 
 where the statute makes a certain 
 act imperative upon the agents of the 
 company, the court may instruct the 
 jury that proper diligence required 
 such act. South, &c., R. Co. «. 
 Singlefon, 66 Ga. 253; Cook v. West- 
 em, &c., R. Co., 69 Ga. 619; Chicago, 
 &c., R. Co. ®. Pennell, 94 111. 448; 
 Wabash, &c., R. Co. ■». Elliott, 98 111. 
 408; Pennsylvania Co. v. Stoelke, 104 
 m. 201; Wabash, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Shacklet, 105 HI. 864; s. c. 44 Am. 
 Rep. 791; Ohio, &c., R. Co. v. Col- 
 lam, 73 Ind. 361; s. c. 88 Am. Rep. 
 134; Cincinnati, &c., R. Co. v. Peters, 
 80 Ind. 168; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Dean, 93 Ind. 459; McLauiy ®. City 
 of McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717; Slosson ®. 
 Burlington, &c., R. Co., 60 Iowa, 315; 
 , Central, &c., R. Co. ■». Henigh, 33 
 Kan. 847; Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 38 Kan. 561; County Com. «. 
 Burgess, 61 Md. 391; Johnson ■€. Bos- 
 ton Towboat Co., 135 Mass. 209; 
 Peverly v. Boston, 136 Mass. 366; 
 Tyler ®. New York, &c., R. Co., 137 
 Mass. 338; Loewer v. City of Sedalia, 
 77 Mo. 431; Ruland v. South New- 
 market, 59 N. H. 391; Dudley v. 
 Camden Ferry Co., 45 N. J. Law, 368; 
 Moebus V. Becker, 46 N. J. Law, 41 ; 
 Pahner v. Dearing, 93 N. Y. 7: Och- 
 senbein n. Shapley, 85 N. Y. 214; 
 Bucher n. New York, &c., R. Co., 98 
 N- T. .128; Walsh ®. Oregon, &c., R. 
 Co., 10 Oregon, 250; Texas, &c., R. 
 Co. ». Herbeck, 60 Tex. 603; Louis- 
 ville, &c., R. Co. V. Gtoetz, 79 Ky. 443; 
 Claxton's Adm'r v. Louisville, &c., R. 
 Co., 13 Bush, 636; Thompkins ■». Kan- 
 awha Board, 21 West Va. 334; Fassett 
 V. Roxbury, 55 Vt. 553; Kemp ». Phil- 
 lips, 55 Vt. 69; Metropolitan, &c., Ry. 
 Co. ■». Jackson, 3L. R. App. Cas. 193; 
 Dublin, &c., Ry. Co. v. Slatteiy, 3 L. 
 R. App. CasB. 1155; Manzoni v. Doug- 
 las, 6 L. R. Q. B. Div. 145. 
 
664 LAW AND FACT. [§ 446. 
 
 remember at the outset, is not a fact which is the subject of 
 direct proofs but an inference from facts put in evidence. A 
 witness is asked, not whether A. was negligent at a particu- 
 lar juncture, but what was the facts of the case, and from 
 these, negligence, if there be any, is to be inferred." * It is 
 the province of the jury, not only, in such cases as these, to 
 find the facts, but to draw for themsiglves the inferences from 
 the facts. Said the Supreme Court of California to this 
 point : — " The testimony consists of a series of circumstances 
 from which the jury are to find on the issue of negligence. 
 The jury under such circumstances, are to make such infer- 
 ences from the testimony as legitmately and justly follow, on 
 which to base their verdict. , They are not only to find the 
 facts, but the inferences from them," ^ and to the same effect 
 in Longenecker v. Pennsylvania E. Cb.,^ it was said : — " Upon 
 a state of facts admitted, or proved by direct and undis- 
 puted testimony, the court may pronounce the law applicable 
 thereto ; but when alleged facts are the subject of inference 
 from other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, 
 it is the exclusive province of the jury to consider the testi- 
 mony and ascertain the facts under proper instructions from 
 the court." 
 
 § 446. A preliminary question of law for the coart.^ 
 
 In the trial of a cause in which the negligence 6f either party 
 is an issue, it is a preliminary question of law for the court, 
 whether there is any evidence that ought reasonably to satisfy 
 the jury that an alleged fact is established. If there is evi- 
 dence from which the jury can properly find the question for 
 the party upon whom the burden of proof rests, it should be 
 submitted, but on the other hand, if the evidence is wholly 
 insufficient to justify the jury in such finding, and the court 
 would be justified in setting aside the verdict, as against evi- 
 dence, if they did so find, then the testimony should be with- 
 drawn from the consideration of the jury, and the question 
 is one of law.* Inasmuch as contributory negligence is noth- 
 
 ' Wharton on Negligence, 3d ed., ' Longenecker v. Pennsylvania R. 
 
 §420. Co., 105 Penn. St. 328. Although 
 
 'McKeever«. Market St. B. Co., the question of negligence is for the 
 
 59 Cal. 294, 800. jury, it is the province of the trial 
 
 ' 105 Penn. St. 828, 882; Philbrick justice, in the flist instance, to deter- 
 
 V. Miles, 25 Fed. Bep. 26S. mine whether a primifi fouiie case has 
 
§ 447.] LAW AND FACT. 565 
 
 ing else than negligence merely, on the part of one who is 
 plaintiff in an action of negligence all the rules of law appli- 
 cable to the negligence of the defendant, or negligence merely, 
 are applicable, without addition or abatement, to the negli- 
 gence of the plaintiff, or contributory negligence,^ knd the 
 same rules that apply to contributory negligence upon this 
 point are equally to be applied to comparative negligence 
 as that doctrine obtains in Illinois.^ 
 
 § 447. ContriMtory negligence as matter of law.— What 
 amounts to negligence is, as we have already seen, a question 
 of law. It is for the court to say, in a majority of instances, 
 what is, and what is not, negligence as an abstract proposi- 
 tion. When, therefore, the facts of a given case are undis- 
 puted, and the inferences, or conclusions to be drawn from 
 the facts, indisputable ; when the standard of duty is fixed 
 and defined, so that a failure to attain it is negligence beyond 
 a cavil, then contributory negligence is matter of law. In 
 such a case there would be nothing for the jury to decide. 
 JThe case has decided itself, and it only remains to the court 
 to declare the rule. When the facts are unchallenged, and 
 are such that reasonable minds could draw no other inference 
 or conclusion from them, than that the plaintiff was, or was 
 not, at fault, then it is the province of the court to determine 
 the question of contributory negligence as one of law,* and 
 
 teen made out ; that is to say, &c., R. Co. ■». McEIwee, 67 Penn, St. 
 whether, regarding the evidence as 311; Rudolphy ». Fuchs, 44 How. 
 true, the case, as it stands on motion Prac. 155; Baker v. Pehr, 97 Penn. St. 
 by defendant »for a nonsuit, is such 70; Germantown, &c., R. Co. e. Wall- 
 as to authorize the jury properly to ing,' 97 Penn. St. 55; City Council of 
 find for the plaintiff. Simms«. South Montgomery v. Wright, 73 Ala. 411; 
 Carolina Ry. Co. (S. C), 3 S. E. 486. s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 433; Colorado, &c., 
 
 ' Hoye V. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 63 R. Co. v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197; Mc- 
 
 Wis. 666; 8. c. 33 IT. W. Rep. 14; Laury «. City of McGregor, 54 Iowa, 
 
 Thompson on Negligence, § 1178. 717; Moebus «. Becker, 46 N. J. Law, 
 
 •Wabash, &c., R. Co. e. Elliott, 41; Curran «. Warren Manfg. Co., 36 
 
 98111. 481; Wells' Law & Fact, 331, N". T. 153; Walsh v. Oregon R. & 
 
 § 363. Nav. Co., 10 Or. 350. It is only when 
 
 ' Ludwig n. Pillsbury, 85 Minn. 356; the conclusion of negligence neces- 
 
 Femandes v. Sacramento City R. Co., sarily results from the facts that 
 
 53 Cal.'45; Abend v. Terre Haute, the court can be called upon to 
 
 &c., R. Co., Ill 111. 303; s. c. 19 Cent, say that the facts establish negli'- 
 
 Law. Jour. 850, and the note ; Hoye gence, as matter of law. Chicago, 
 
 ». Chicago, &c., R. Co., 63 Wis. 666; &c., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 686; 
 
 8. c. 33 N. W. Rep. 14; West Chester, Matthews ®. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 
566 LAW AND FACT. [§448." 
 
 when the case is all against the plaintiff, there may properly 
 be a nonsuit; but^ in the language of Mr. Field,* "to justify 
 a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence, the evi- 
 dence against the plaintiff should be so clear as to leave no 
 room for doubt, and all material facts must be conceded, or 
 established beyond controversy." 
 
 § 448. When a question of fact.— It will, it is plain, in 
 point of fact, very rarely occur that the case which the evi- 
 dence discloses, either for or against the plaintiff, is so clear 
 and incontestable as to leave no room for difference of opin- 
 ion as to the merits. In almost every case something will 
 appear upon which there may be contrariety of judgment, so 
 that, in the majority of instances, the question of the plaint- 
 iff's negligence will be one of fact to be ultimately deter- 
 mined by the jury. In the case of Detroit, &c., E. Co, v. Van 
 Steinburg,* Judge Cooley said: — "The case, however, must 
 l)e a very clear one which would justify the court in taking 
 upon itself this responsibility. For, when the judge decides 
 that a want of due care is not shown, he necessarily fixes in 
 his own mind the standard of ordinary prudence, and measur- 
 ing the plaintiff's conduct by that, turns him out of court 
 upon his opinion of what a reasonably prudent man ought 
 to have done under the circumstances. He thus makes his 
 own opinion of what would be generally regarded as pru- 
 
 26 Mo. App. 75. In an action by one apolis, &c., Ry. Co. v. Watson, 114 
 employed in a tunnel for injuries Ind. 20; s. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 824; 
 caused by the falling of rock from the Columbus, &c., Ry. Co. v. Bradford, 
 roof, testimony of plaintifE that he 86 Ala. 574; s. o. 6 So. Rep. 90. It is 
 could not say whether he had or had also the business of the court to deter- 
 not, prior to the accident, noticed the mine the question of proximate cause, 
 dangerous condition of the roof, does where the facts are undisputed. Pike 
 not sufSciently show his own freedom «. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 
 from negligence to authorize the sub- Rep. 255. " When the facts are 
 mission of the case to the jury. Eades clearly settled, and . the course which 
 «. Clark, 55 K. Y. Super. Ct. 132. common prudence dictated, can be 
 When the evidence so clearly shows clearly discerned, the court shoiild 
 plaintiff's contributory negligence that decide the case as a matter of law." 
 a verdict for him, if rendered, would Shearman & Redfield on Ne^gence, 
 necessarily be set aside, it is proper 4th ed., §56. 
 for the court to order a verdict for ' Field on Damages, 519. 
 defendant. Goodlett ■». Louisville, ' 17 Mich. 99, 120. 
 &c., R. Co., 122 U. 8. 391. Indian- 
 
■ § 449.] LAW AND FACT. 587 
 
 dence a definite rule of law. It is quite possible that if 
 the same question of prudence were submitted to a jury, 
 collected from the different occupations of society, and, 
 perhaps, better competent to judge of the common opinion, 
 he might find them differing with him as to the ordinary 
 standard of proper care.^ The next judge, trying a similar 
 case, may also be of a different opiijion, and, because the 
 case is not clear, hold that to be a question of fact which the 
 first has ruled to be one of law. Indeed, I think the cases 
 are not so numerous as has been sometimes supposed in 
 which a judge could feel at liberty to take the question of 
 the plaintiff's negligence away from the jury." That con- 
 tributory negligence is matter of law is plainly the exception 
 and not the rule. In a perfectly plain case, plain as to the 
 facts at issue, and plain as to all the reasonable inferences 
 from those facts, the negligence of the plaintiff may be a 
 question for the court alone ; but, inasmuch as questions 
 about which there can be no dispute are not often litigated, 
 it does not often occur that a court is warranted in taking 
 the question wholly from the jury. 
 
 § 449. A qaestion of law only in a plain case. — It is some- 
 times insisted that whenever there is any evidetice, even the 
 slightest, that tends to prove a fact from which the negli- 
 
 ' In Walsh «. Oregon B. & Nav. to acquire a fund of experience which 
 Co., 10 Oregon, 250, 258, it was said, enables him to represent the common 
 by Lord, J., to this point: — "Twelve sense of the community in ordinary- 
 men, drawn from the body of the instances, far better than an average 
 community, comprising men of vari- jury. He should be able to lead and 
 ous occupations and grades of intelli- to instruct them in detail, even where 
 gence, better secures that average he thinks it desirable, on the whole, 
 judgment which it is the aim of the to take their opinion. Furthermore, 
 law to obtain, and which, the law as- the sphere in which he is able to rule 
 sumes, better understand the ordinary without taking their opinion at all, 
 affairs of life, and can draw wiser and should be continually growing." It 
 safer conclusions from admitted facts is not a question that each of these 
 thus occurring than can one man, or views is sound, and it maybe admitted 
 a single judge," citing Kailroad Co. ■». that the best judges can administer 
 Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Greenleaf B. Uli- justice as well in nine cases in ten, 
 nois, &c., B. Co., 29 Iowa, 36. Judge without, as with a jury, or better, for 
 Holmes, however, in The Common the matter of that, without any reflec- 
 Law, 124, says:— "A judge who has tion even upon a jury much beyond 
 long Siat at nidprim ought gradually the average of juries. 
 
568 LAW AND PACT. [§ 449. 
 
 gence or due care of the plaintiflf might be inferred, it should 
 be submitted to the jury ; * but the better rule is that there 
 must be a substantial basis for difference of opinion, or some 
 reasonable ground of dispute, or the court may refuse to 
 entertain it. In Cotton v. Wood* it was said : — "To war- 
 rant a case of this class being left to the jury it is not 
 enough that there be some evidence, A mere scvrdUla of 
 evidence is not suflScient, but there must be proof of well- 
 defined negligence." * This is also the rule in this country, 
 and one " which," said Judge Thompson, " ought to prevail 
 universally."* Among the cases in the reports in which 
 the court has passed upon the question of negligence as 
 matter of law, are those in which the conduct of the plaint- 
 iff was such as to shock the mind of an ordinarily pru- 
 dent man, and to evince a plain disregard of common care 
 and caution, as, for an example, in cases where it appeared 
 that the plaintiff took desperate chances in crossing a rail^ 
 way track,® or jumped from a rapidly moving train," or lay 
 down in a fit of intoxication upon a railway track,' or 
 disobeyed plain rules enacted -with a view to his protec- 
 
 ' Cumberland, &c.. Iron Co. v. law, that it appears from the allega- 
 
 Scally, 37 Md. 589; Flori«. St, Louis, tions of the complaint that the plaint- 
 
 3 Mo. App. 231. . iff was guilty of contributory negli- 
 
 " 8 C. B. (N. S. ) 568. gence, or had voluntarily assumed, as 
 
 ' See, also, Toomey v. London, &c., incident to his employment, the risks 
 
 Ry. .Co., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 146; Com- which caused the injury, unless these 
 
 man t. Eastern Counties By. Co , 4 allegations so clearly show that fact 
 
 Hurl. & N. 781, 786; Jewell «. Parr, that there could be no room for differ- 
 
 13 C. B. 916; Jackson v. Metro- ent minds reasonably arriving at any 
 
 politan By. Co., 3 App. Cas. 193. different conclusion, upon any possi- 
 
 * Thompson on Negligence, 1337, ble evidence admissible under and 
 citing Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48 consistent with the allegations. Bol- 
 Me. 391; Greenleaf u. Illinois, &c., seth v. Smith, 38 Minn. 14; s. c. 35 
 E. Co., 29 Iowa, 32; Lehman ». N. W;. Rep. 565. Plamtifl cannot be 
 Brooklyn, 39 Barb. 334. Qf. Whar- nonsuited on the ground that his con- 
 ton on Negligence, § 431, and note. tributory negligence concliisively ap- 
 The federal courts do not recognize pears from his own testimony, if his 
 the doctrine that, when there is but a conduct, imder the peculiar circum- 
 scmtilla of evidence to support the is- stances of the case, is compatible with 
 sue of negligence, the case must go to the exercise of reasonable care, 
 the jury ; but in such a case the court Crowley ®. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 24 
 will give a peremptory instruction to Mo. App. 119. 
 the jury. Hathaway v. East Tennes- ' § 188, supra. 
 see, &c., R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 489. • §8 147, 391, mpra. 
 A court cannot say, as a matter of ' § 197, supra. 
 
§ 450.] 
 
 LAW AND FACT. 
 
 569 
 
 tion from some obvious danger,* or crawled under a train of 
 cars,' or rode upon a locomotive as a passenger,^ subjects 
 which have been considered at some length in preceding 
 chapters. In such cases as these a court may well say that 
 the plaintiff 's plain and reckless disregard of his own safety 
 was negligence as matter of law. But even here it is not to 
 be overlooked, that cases may arise in which, while there is 
 no dispute as to the facts, there is yet room for difference of 
 opinion as to the inferences and conclusions which may 
 be drawn from those facts. It is for the jury not only to 
 find the facts, but to make the proper inferences and draw 
 the conclusions from those facts ; and when such a case 
 arises, the questipn of negligence is no longer one of law, 
 even upon the undisputed facts, but should be left to the 
 jury, which we now proceed to consider. 
 
 § 450. Contributory negligence as a question of fact.— 
 
 In general it cannot be doubted that the question of negli- 
 gence is a question of fact and not of law.* Whenever there 
 
 ' §§ 150, 151, supra. 
 
 ' § 216. 
 
 ' § 150. Unless the inference of 
 negligence or its absence is necessarily 
 deducible from the undisputed facts 
 and circumstances proved, the ques- 
 tion is for the jury. Dahl v. Milwau- 
 kee, &c., Ry. Co., 62 Wis. 652; Hoye 
 V. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 62 Wis. 
 666. 
 
 ■* Pennsylvania R. Co. ■». Horst, 110 
 Penn. St. 326; s. c. 1 Atl. Rep. 217; 
 Colorado Central R. Co. h. Martin, 7 
 Colo. 592; Walton v. Ackerman, 49 
 N. J. Law, 234; s. c. 10 Atl. Rep. 709. 
 The question of wilful neglect is not 
 a question of law, but a mixed ques- 
 tion of law and fact, which it is the 
 peculiar province of the jury to deter- 
 mine, especially as to the degree of it. 
 Needham «. Louisville, &c., R. Co., 
 85 Ky. 423; s. c. 3 8. W. Rep. 797; 11 
 S. W. Rep. 306; Alabama Great 
 Southern R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 
 600; Seefeldc. Chicago, &c.,Ry. Co., 
 70 Wis. 216; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 278; 
 
 Carver ■». Detroit Plank-Road Co., 61 
 Mich. 584; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 731; 
 Wight Fire-Proofing Co. v. Rocze- 
 kai, 130 lU. 139; s. c. 22 N. E. Rep. 
 543; Davis v. Utah Southern R. Co., 
 8 Utah, 218; Sheldon v. Mint, &c., 
 R. Co., 59 Mich. 172; Detroit, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 
 188 (by Cooley, J.); 'Rrow v. Vermont^ 
 &c., R. Co., 24 Vt. 497; s. c. 58 Am. 
 Dec. 191; North Penn. R. Co. v. Heil- 
 eman, 49 Penn. St. 60; Linfleld v. Old 
 Colony, &c., R. Co., 10 Cush. 569; 
 Barton v. St. Louis, &c., R. Co., 52 
 Mo. 253; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 418; Kel- 
 ler «. New York, &c.,R. Co., 24 How. 
 Prac. 172; Huelsencamp v. Citizens' 
 Ry. Co., 34 Mo. 54. " From the very 
 nature of the case [where the amount 
 of prudence is involved], the question 
 of contributory negligence cannot re- 
 solve into one of law, but must needs 
 be submitted to the jury with instruc- 
 tions." Faasett «. Roxbury, 55 Vt. 
 553; Kemp v. Phillips, 55 Vt. 69; 
 Thompkins v. Kanawha Board, 31 
 
-570 
 
 LAW AND FACT. 
 
 [§ 450. 
 
 is any doubt as to the facts, it is the province of the jury to 
 determine the question ; or whenever there may reasonably 
 be a difference of opinion as to the inferences and conclu- 
 sions from the facts, it is likewise a question for the jury. 
 It belongs to the jury, not only to weigh the evidence and to 
 ^nd upon the questions of fact, but to draw conclusions as 
 well, alike from disputed and undisputed facts.' 
 
 West Va. 324; Louisville, &c., R. Co. 
 «. Goetz, 19 Ky. 442; s. c. 42 Am. 
 Kep. 227; Claxton's Adm'r v. Lexing- 
 ton, &c., R. Co., 13 Bush, 636; Texas, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Herbeck, 60 Tex. 602; 
 Walsh r>. Oregon R. & Trans. Co., 10 
 Oregon, 250; Ochsehbein v. Shapley, 
 «5 N. T. 214; Palmer v> Dearing, 93 
 N. T. 7; Bucher«. New York, &c., 
 R. Co., 98 N. T. 138; Dudley ®. Cam- 
 dem Ferry Co., 45 N. J. Law, 368; 
 Moebus V. Becker, 46 N. J. Law," 41; 
 Ruland v. South Newmarket, 69 N. 
 H. 291; Loewer «. City of Sedalia, 77 
 Mo. 431; Johnson v. Boston Tow Boat 
 Co., 135 Mass. 209; Shapleigh v. Wy- 
 man, 184 Mass. 118; Randall v. Conn. 
 River R. Co., 132 Mass 269; Tyler v. 
 New York, &c., R. Co., 137 Mass. 
 238; Bom v. Albany Plank Road, 101 
 Penn. St. 334; Lohgenecker v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 105 Penri. St. 338; 
 County Commissioners v. Burgess, 61 
 Md. 291; Osage City «. Brown, 37 
 Kan. 74; Atchison, &c., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 38 Kan. 561; Hatfield v. Chi- 
 cago, &c., R. Co., 61 Iowa, 434; 
 Houser v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Iowa, 230; Slosson v. Burlington, &c., 
 R. Co., 60 Iowa, 315; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Deui, 92 Ind. 459; Ramsey v. 
 Rushville, '81 Ind. 394; Wabash, &c., 
 R. Co. V. Shacklet, 105 111. 364; Wa- 
 bash, &c., R. Co. V. Elliott, 98111. 
 481; Cooke. Western, &c., R. Co., 69 
 Ga. 619; South, &c., R. Co. «. Single- 
 ton, 66 Ga. 252; Kansas, &c., R. Co. 
 V. Ward, 4 Colo. 30; McKeever v. 
 Market St. R. Co., 59 Cal. 294. 
 
 ' Hoye V. Chicago', &c., R. Co., 63 
 Wis. 666, holding that even where all 
 
 the facts are undisputed, yet if it is 
 possible that different men might 
 draw different conclusions, the case 
 has to be submitted to the jury. Pin- 
 egan «. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 53 J. P. 
 663, holding that when there is con- 
 flicting evidence on a question of fact, 
 no matter what may be the opinion of 
 the judge who tries the case as to the 
 value of that evidence, he must leave 
 the consideration of it to the jury. 
 Cook V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 19 
 Mo. App. 329; Johnson v. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Neb. 690; Orange, 
 &c., R. Co. V. Ward, 47 N. J. Law, 
 560; Leavitt^. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 
 64 Wis. 328; Dufour ®. Cent. Pac. R. 
 Co., 67 Cal. 319; Nugent v. Boston, 
 &c., R. Corp. (Me.), 19 Atl. Rep. 797; 
 Bennett «. Syndicate Ins. Co., 39 
 Minn. 354; s. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 488; 
 Popp V. New York, &c., R. Co., 7 N. 
 Y. Supl. 349; Longenecker v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 105 Penn. St. 337; 
 Nelson v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 60 
 Wis. 834;:,Hm v. City of Fon du Lac, 
 56 Wis. 346; Sutton «. Town of Wau- 
 watosa, 29 Wis. 21; McKeever v. 
 Market St. R. Co., 59 Cal. 294; John- 
 son «. Bruner, 61 Penn. St. 58; 
 Pitcher v. Lake Shore, &c., Ry. Co., 
 8 N. Y. Supl. 389; Stoker v. Minne- 
 apolis, 32 Minn. 478. The issue of 
 negligence should go to the jury (1) 
 when the facts which, if true, would 
 constitute evidence of negligence are 
 controverted; (2) where such facts are 
 not disputed, but there might be a 
 fair difference of opinion whether the 
 inference of negligence should be 
 drawn; (3) when the facts are in dis- 
 
§452.] LAW AND FACT. ' 571 
 
 § 461. Judge Cooley's statement of the rule.— Judge Gooley 
 has stated the rule in the following language:' — "Negligence, 
 -as I understand it, consists in a want of that reasonable care 
 which would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence, 
 under all the existing circumstances, in view of the probable 
 •danger of injury. The injury is, therefore, one which must 
 take into consideration all these circumstances, and it must 
 measure the prudence of the parties' conduct by a standard 
 of behavior likely to have been adopted by other persons of 
 <5ommon prudence. Moreover, if the danger depends at all 
 upon the action of any other person under a given set of cir- 
 cumstances, the prudence of the party injured must be esti- 
 mated in view of what he had a right to expect from such 
 other person, and he is not to be considered blamable if the 
 injury has resulted from the action of another which he 
 could not reasonably have anticipated. Thus the problem is 
 complicated by the necessity of . taking into account the two 
 sets of circumstances affecting the conduct of different per- 
 sons, and is only to be satisfactorily solved by the jury 
 placing themselves in the position of the injured person and 
 examining those circumstances as they then presented them- 
 selves to him, and from that standpoint judging whether he 
 was guilty of negligence or not. It is evident that such a 
 problem cannot usually be one upon which the law can pro- 
 nounce a definite sentence, and that it must be left to the 
 sifting and determination of a jury."^ 
 
 § 462. What the inquiry involves.— In the ultimate deter- 
 mination of the question whether the plaintiff was guilty of 
 
 pute, and the inferences to be drawn nia E. Co. «. Heileman, 49 Penn. St. 
 
 therefrom doubtful. But when no 60; Meeael i). Lynn, &c.,^ R. Co., 8 
 
 fair inference of negligence can be Allen, 234; Beers b. Housatonic R. 
 
 drawn from evidence favorable to the Co., 19 Conn. ,566; Park i>. O'Brien, 
 
 plaintiff, upon the assumption that it 33 Conn. 347; Isbell v. New York, 
 
 is true, the issue should be withdrawn &c., R. Co., 27 Conn. 393; Button v. 
 
 from the jury. Hathaway v. East Frink, 51 Conn. 342; s. c. 50 Am. 
 
 Tennessee, &c., R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. Rep. 24; Ireland v. Oswego, &c., R. 
 
 489. Co., 13 N. Y. 533; Oldfleld v. New 
 
 ' Detroit, &c., R. Co. v. Van Stein- York, &c., R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; 
 
 hurg, 17 Mich. 99, 118. • Ernst ». Hudson River, &c., R. Co., 
 
 ' To the same effect see Briggs v. 35 N. Y. 38. 
 Taylor, 38 Vt. 183; North Pennsylva- 
 
572 LAW AND FACT. [§ 453. 
 
 negligence, two separate inquiries are involved : first. What 
 was ordinary care under the circumstances? and second. 
 Did the conduct of the plaintiff come up to that standard ? 
 With respect to the standard of ordinary care it may be re- 
 marked that it is not always a fixed standard, and in many 
 cases it must first be found by the jury. In such a case each 
 of these inquiries is for the jury. TJiey must assume a 
 standard, and then measure the plaintiff's conduct by that 
 standard. Whenever the standard is fixed, and when the 
 measure of duty is precisely defined by law, then a failure to- 
 attain that standard is negligence in law and a matter with 
 which a jury can properly have nothing to do. This is well 
 illustrated by the rule which requires one who crosses a rail- 
 way track to be on his guard, and, before attempting to cross 
 to look attentively up and doWn the track. In the early 
 periods of the development of the law upon this point it waa 
 the rule that one, under such circumstances, must exercise 
 due care. In case of an action for a negligent running down 
 of the plaintiff at a crossing, under that rule, it was incum- 
 bent upon the jury, first to set up the standard of ordinaiy 
 care in their own minds, and then to say whether or not the 
 plaintiff has come up to the standard. But as the law now 
 stands the standard is fixed. One must look up and down 
 the track ; anything short of that is negligence. So that, ai 
 present, the jijry, having the standard set up for them, have 
 only to say whether the plaintiff did look up and down, and 
 so bring himself within the protection of the rule. 
 
 § 453. The tendency of the law in its development. — 
 
 When the law has outgrown, in any particular, the featurelesa 
 generality that one must exercise due care, and has come to 
 require, or prohibit, specific acts, and to say that is negli- 
 gence and this is carefulness, the function of the jury is sa 
 far forth curtailed, and the tendency plainly is to make the 
 question of negligence, in this way, more and more a ques- 
 tion of law, giioocZ Aoc, and less and less a question for the 
 caprice of a jury. "When a case arises in which the 
 standard of conduct, pure and simple, is submitted to the 
 jury, the explanation is plain. It is that the court, not enter- 
 taining any clear* views of public policy applicable to the 
 matter, derives the rule to be applied from daily experience^ 
 
§ 454.] LAW AND FACT. 573 
 
 as it has been agreed that the great body of the law of tort 
 has been derived. But the court further feels that it is not 
 itself possessed of sufficient practical experience to lay down 
 the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve men taken 
 from the practical part of the community can aid its judg- 
 ment. Therefore, it aids its conscience by taking the opinion 
 of the jury. But, supposing a state of facts often repeated 
 in practice, is it to be imagined that the court is to go on 
 leaving the standard to the jury forever ? Is it not manifest, 
 on the contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a ' 
 tribunal as it is represented to be, the lesson which can be 
 got from that source will be learned ? Either the court will 
 find that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct 
 oomplained of usually is, or is not, blameworthy, and there- 
 fore, unless explained, is, or is not, a ground of liability ; or 
 it will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the 
 necessity of making up its mind for itself. . . . The 
 trouble with many cases of negligence is that they are of a 
 kind not frequently recurring, so as to enable any given judge 
 to profit by long experience with juries to lay down rules, 
 and that the elements are so complex that courts are glad to 
 leave the whole matter in a lump for the jury's determina- 
 tion. "^ 
 
 § 454. Summary statement of the rule.— It appears, 
 therefore, on the one hand, that, as the law is developed, and 
 approaches more and more to the fixedness and certitude of 
 the exact sciences, outgrowing the abstract and the general, 
 and growing up to the concrete and the particular, enriching 
 itself by statutes and judicial decisions, and thereby settling 
 and determining point after point in the law of negligence, 
 the function of the jury in respect of the standard of conduct 
 is, in a corresponding degree, curtailed ; while, on the other 
 hand, in the very nature of things, and by reason of the essen- 
 tial variety and complexity of the cases, that, whatever be 
 the standard of conduct, must continue forever to perplex 
 the courts, the function of the jury in respect of the particular 
 facts of each particular case — that is, the function of the jury 
 in measuring individual conduct by the juridical yardstick, 
 
 ' The Common Law, by Judge O. W. Holmes, Jr., pp. 133, 129. 
 
574 LAW AND FACT. [§ 454. 
 
 and so determining for each plaintiff and defendant whether 
 his conduct is, or is not, up to the standard of ordinary care 
 under the circumstances, can never be curtailed, but, however- 
 fixed, the standard must forever remain. 
 
INDEX. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 [Tbe references are to sections.] 
 
 ABSENT-MINDEDNESS : 
 
 at a railway crossing, contributory negligence, 37, n. 193. 
 forgetfulness of danger, 37, 255. 
 ACCIDENT : 
 
 inevitable, what is, 36. 
 
 no action for consequence of, 36. 
 
 in discharge of fireworks, 413. 
 
 licensed or unlicensed exhibition, city not liable, 413. 
 ADMIRALTY : 
 
 the rule of damages in collisions, 402. 
 commended as just, 12, n. 
 origin of, 402. 
 stated by Lord Stowell, 402. 
 Lord StoweU's rules considered, 403. 
 collisions by the fault of both parties, 403. 
 an apportionment of damages, 404. 
 this rule defended, 404. 
 Mr. Rothery's defense of the rule, 404. 
 disregarded at common law, 404. 
 applies to all cases of marine tort, 404. 
 apportionment how made, 404. 
 imputed negligence of carrier in. See Imputed Contbibutobt Neolt- 
 
 eBNCE. 
 
 ADMISSIONS : 
 
 of contributory negligence by plaintiff, not conclusive, 427. 
 AGENT : 
 
 principal responsible for agent's negligence, 103, 104. 
 
 servant leaving team loose, 104. 
 parent not child's by mere relationship, 129. 
 when servant deemed master's, 325, 326, 327. 
 
 test whether one is mere servant or vice-principal, 328. 
 in respect of care of machinery, &c., 356. See Master Ain> Servant. 
 AGGRAVATION OP THE INJURY : 
 
 plaintiff's, goes only in mitigation of damages, 34, 69, 70. 
 (}ouId s. McKenna, 70. 
 a misapplication in Iowa, 71. 
 the application in Tennessee and Georgia, 71, 92, 93. 
 very near comparative negligence, 71. 
 37 
 
678 INDEX. . 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 AGGRAVATION OF THE INJURY (conUnMeO) : 
 the rule criticised, 71. 
 plaintiff contributing to a breach in a fence, 338. 
 by a patient in action against physician, 406. 
 
 ALABAMA : 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied, in, 77. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child, in, 130. 
 
 curier's stipulation limiting liability in, 173. 
 
 lailw&j prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 324. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in 332, 330. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 
 rule in respect of feUow servants modified by statute, 379. 
 
 burden of proof in, 436, 440. 
 ALDER80N, BARON : 
 
 definition of negligence by, 5. 
 
 statement of the exception to the rule of respondeat mperior, 309, 310. 
 
 ALIGHTING FROM MOVING CARS : 
 railway train. See Railways. 
 street car. See Stkbkt Railways. 
 railway servants, whether contributory negligence, 399, n. 
 
 ALTER EGO : 
 
 vice-principal. See Master and Besvant. 
 
 AMBULANCE : 
 
 entitled to right of way by statute in New York, 383. 
 
 ANIMALS : 
 
 owner exposing horse to object calculated to frighten, 37, n. 
 
 trespassing on railway track, 50, n. 
 
 putting in pastures with known defective fence, 58, n. 
 
 servant leaving team loose on highway, 104. 
 
 crazy horse killed on railway through insufScient fence, 230. 
 
 runaway horse, owner liable for damage by, if negligent, 359. 
 injury to, by defects in highway. See Highways. 
 
 injured, or doing injury by reason of insufficient fences. See Fences. 
 
 injuries by or to, contributory negligence considered, 416, n. See Horse, 
 Doos. 
 APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES : See Aggravation of Injury, and 
 
 Admiralty. 
 ARCHITECT : 
 
 co-servant with a superintendent, 327. 
 ARIZONA : 
 
 burden of proof in, 426. 
 
 ARKANSAS : 
 
 carriers negligence imputed to shipper of goods, 109, 114. v 
 rule as to stock at large, in, 233, 
 
 Tailweey prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 servants contract releasing master from liability for negligence, 883. 
 burden of proof, in, 426. 
 
INDEX. 579 
 
 [The references areto sectious.] 
 
 ARM: 
 
 passenger's outside of railway car window, 155. 
 street car window, 296. 
 stage-coach window, 296, n. 
 ASSAULT AND BATTERY: 
 
 action for, contributory negligence no defense, 65. 
 
 unnecessary force in ejecting passenger, 65, n. See Wilful Negli- 
 gence. 
 railway passenger entitled to protection from, '285. 
 ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: 
 
 contributory negligence in actions between, 405. 
 Read v. Patterson, 405. 
 AUSTIN, Mk. JOHN: 
 
 definition of negligence by, 5. 
 
 AWNING: 
 
 defectively hung, liability of city, 276. 
 
 B. 
 
 BACON, LORD : 
 
 his paraphrase of the Latin rule of proximate cause, 32. 
 
 BAGGAGE : 
 
 what constitutes, 173, n. 
 
 mixed questions of law and fact, 173, n. 
 duty of railway company in respect of, 173, 174. 
 
 when carrying gratuitously, 174, n. 
 liability of palace and sleeping car companies, 173 . 
 
 contributory negligence when no defence, 173. 
 effect of conditions printed on checks, 174. 
 not negligent to look after in lawful manner, 174. 
 of guest. See Iitnkebpik and Gubst. 
 
 BAGGAGE CARS : 
 
 passengers riding in. See Railways. 
 
 BAGGAGE CHECKS : 
 
 effect of conditions printed on, 174, 
 
 BAGGAGE MASTER : 
 
 at station, co-servant with conductor, 335. 
 with a switch tender, 335. 
 
 BAILEE : 
 
 negligence of imputable to bailor, 114, n. 
 
 BAILMENT : 
 
 law of, connected with that of negligence, 2. 
 
 bailee's negligence imputable to bailor, 114, n. See Imputed Con- 
 
 TKIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 delivery of baggage to railway company, 173. 
 to parlor and sleeping car companies, 178. 
 
580 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 BARBED WIRE FENCE : 
 
 injuriea to cattle by, 226, n. See Fences. 
 
 BARON, ALDER80N: 
 
 definition of negligence by, 5. 
 
 BBRNINA CASE, THE. 
 
 overruling Thorogood ««. Bryan, 107. See Imputed Contbibotobt 
 Ne&lioence. 
 
 BICYCLE : 
 
 one riding, subject to law of the road, 282, n. See Highways. 
 riding, on the sidewalk, 256, n. 
 
 BLACK, Hon. JEREMIAH : 
 
 rule of contributory negligence stated by, 14. 
 
 BLACKSMITH : 
 
 railway, co-servant with conductor on the way to a wreck, 335. 
 
 BLIND PERSONS : 
 
 entitled to ordinary care, 141, n. 
 increased vigilance required of, 396. 
 right of, to use the street. 
 
 entitled to a safe highway, 396, 397. 
 O'Mara ®. Hudson & C. R. Co., 398. 
 duty of the public toward, 397. 
 
 BOARDING MOVING CARS : 
 
 contributory negligence in. See Railways, and Stseet Railways. 
 ' by railway servants, 299, n. 
 
 BBAKEMAN: 
 
 co-servant with engineer on same train, 334. 
 on different trains, 334. 
 with another on same train, 335. 
 with a fireman on same train, 335. 
 with employees of another train, 335. 
 with a car inspector, 335. 
 with a train-dispatcher, 335. 
 with a switch tender, 335. 
 
 with the inspector of machinery in a repair shop, 335. 
 with one who fills the locomotive sand-box, 335. 
 with conductor on same train, 3S5. 
 
 on different trains, 335. 
 with a section-boss, 335. 
 
 BRIDGE : 
 
 plaintiff's knowledge of defect in, 37. See Knowledge op Danger. 
 railway train stopping upon, 161. 
 horse falling off defective, 253, n. 
 
 BROWNE, Mr. IRVING : 
 
 Humorous Phases of the Law, 177, 248, n. 
 
iniSex. 581 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 BUTLDINGS : 
 
 erecting near chimney with defective spark-arrester, 37, n. 
 projecting ice or snow on sidewalk, 276. 
 ruinous, contiguous to highway, 276. 
 obstructing view at railway crossing, 191. 
 wooden, exposed to sparks and fire from steamers, 416. 
 BURDEN OF PROOF : 
 
 of negligence where railway passengers alight at unusual places, 162, n. 
 of infant's negligence at a railway crossing, 181, n. 
 of railway company's neglect to signal at crossing, 186, n. 
 in action against railway for injuries by flre, 237, n. 
 of master's negligence in furnishing defective tools, 305. 
 of existence or absence of contributory negligence, 417. 
 the question stated, 417. 
 depends on legal presumptions, 417, 420. 
 the rule in Butterfield v. Forrester, 418. 
 not decisive on this question, 4l8. 
 presumption not unjustly against the plaintiff, 419, 420. 
 plaintiff generally at fault, 420, 423, 425, 437. 
 in ninety per cent, of the cases, 420. 
 presumption of, should depend on the circumstances, 420. 
 
 sometimes in favor of the plaintiff, 421 . 
 weight of authority against the plaintiff, 422. 
 
 but circumstantial evidence sufficient, 423, n., 431, 433. 
 an infant subject to the rule, 422, n. 
 plaintiff's gross or wilful negligence a matter of defence, 422, n. 
 the rule against the plaintiff defended, 423. 
 nil. Freeman's criticism, 424. 
 his position untenable, 435. 
 in some jurisdictions upon the defendant, 426. 
 
 the rule not inflexible, 427. 
 plaintiff's admissions not conclusive against him, 437 . 
 
 2!emp o. "Wilmington, <fec., R. Co., 437. 
 the rule in Connecticut, 428. 
 
 Park c. O'Brien— the language, of the court, 428. 
 the burden upon the plaintiff, 428. 
 Judge Redfleld's statement of the rule,' 429. 
 the rule in Kansas, 430. 
 
 Kansas Pac. R. Co. ■». Pointer— the language of the court, 430. 
 the burden upon the defendant, 430. 
 
 the rule of contributory negligence not strictly just, 12, n., 430. 
 against the defendant criticised, 431 . 
 against the plaintiff, explained in Massachusetts, 432. 
 
 Mayo V. Boston, &c., R. Co., 433. 
 the rule in New York, 433. 
 
 earlier and later cases compared, 433. 
 
 not an arbitrary rule, 433. 
 
 Johnson b. Hudson River R. Co.— language of the court, 434, 438. 
 
 development of the rule, 435, 436. 
 
582 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 BTJEDEN OF PROOF {continued) : 
 
 a reasonable rvile, 435. 
 
 Bpencer «. TJtica, &c., R. Co., 435. 
 
 Button V. Hudson River R. Co.— language of the court, 436, 437. 
 
 the cases further considered, 438. 
 
 Ernst V. Hudson River R. Co., 438. 
 
 the rule summarized, 439, 441 . 
 
 Lee V. Ttoy Citizens' Gaslight Co., 439. 
 disagreement of the courts, 440. 
 
 the opposing courts marshalled, 440. 
 no possible middle ground, 441. 
 tendency of authority against the plaintiff, 442. 
 
 BUTTERFIELD v. FORRESTER : 
 the rule declared in, 8. 
 
 text of Lord Ellenborough's decision, 9. 
 
 the author's comments, 9. 
 
 repudiated in Davies v. Mann, 10, 11. 
 generally followed, as of course, 246. 
 
 BY-LAW : 
 
 requiring removal of snow from highways, 274. See Highways. 
 
 CABOOSE CAR : 
 
 passenger injured while riding in, 151, n, 154, n. See Railways. 
 
 CALIFORNIA : 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child, in, 123, 130. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 232. 
 
 land owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against fires, 
 
 237. 
 
 accumulations of combustible stuff near thetrack, 339. 
 walking on street railway track, in, 288. 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute in, 379. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 
 CAMPBELL, LORD : 
 
 actions under his act. See Lobd Campbell's Act. 
 
 CANADA: 
 
 Carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 172. 
 
 CAPTAIN : 
 
 of a ship ; co-servant with seaman, 337. 
 
 CAR WINDOWS : 
 
 Injuries at car windows. See Railways, and Strbet Railways. 
 
 CAR INSPECTOR. 
 
 co-servant with brakeman, 385. 
 
htdbx. 583 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 CAR-REPAIRER : 
 
 co-servant with engineer of switch engine, 334. 
 with a yard master, 335. 
 
 CARE : See Osdinaky Cabe, Negligence, and Contributory Negli- 
 gence. 
 
 CARPENTER : 
 
 railway, co-servant with train-men, 335. 
 
 with servants in charge of time-table, 335. 
 on a steamship co-servant with porter, 336. ■ 
 
 with the stewardess, 336. 
 in a saw mill, co-servant with sawyer, when, 336. 
 
 CATTLE : See Animals and Fences. 
 
 CATTLE GUARDS : 
 
 near railway track, brakeman injured by, 360, n. See Master and 
 Servant, Fences. 
 
 CAUSAL CONNECTION : 
 
 distinction between, and plaintiff's negligence, 33, 34. 
 
 CATLE'S CASE : 
 
 duty of an innkeeper at common law, 409. 
 
 CHARITY : 
 
 necessity or, as applied to Sunday travelling. See Highways, 261, et aeg. 
 Railways, 175, et seg. Street Railways, 298. 
 
 CHICAGO, &c., R. CO. v. ROSS. 
 
 rule of the Supreme Court of the United States in respect of fellow- 
 servants, 330, 332. 
 railway engineer not a co-servant with the conductor, 330. 
 
 CHILDREN : 
 
 are non 8ui juris, when, 116, 117, 118. 
 
 ordinary care in, 130, 136, 141, n., 204, 396. 
 a question of fact, not determinable on demurrer, 117, n. 
 Lynch v. Smith, 136. 
 Munn V. Reed, 136. 
 
 duty to "look and listen " at railway crossing not absolute, 136, n. 
 instructions to the jury, 136, 
 averments in defendant's plea of contributory negligence of, 117, n. 
 as trespassers, 50, n, 137-142. ^ 
 Lynch v. Nurdin, 137. 
 Hughes B. Macfle, 138. 
 Mangan v. Atterton, 138. 
 exposing a dangerous machine to, 138. 
 goods colored with poisonous paint, 138. 
 the general American rule, 140. 
 injuries to, on turntables, 140, 207, et seq. 
 Railroad Co. v. Stout, 140, 207. 
 
684 nroEz, 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 CHILDREN (continued) : 
 
 falling into unguarded excavations, 140. 
 
 lumber pile falling upon, 140. 
 
 heavy casting falling upon, 141. 
 
 the Massachusetts rule, 141. 
 
 Lane «. Atlantic Works, 141. 
 
 injured by dangerous machinery, 141, n. . 
 
 objects alluring to, 141, n. 
 
 stealing rides on trains, 148, n. 
 
 on railway tracks, degree of care due to, 199, 200. 
 riding free, alighting from moving train, 167, n. 
 
 on railway property, 304. 
 
 sleeping on the track, 204, n. 
 injuries to, while playing on highway, 278. 
 
 imputed negligence of parent, 278. 
 
 the conflicting decisions, 278. 
 
 the New York rule, 379. 
 McGary v. Loomis, 279. 
 
 the rule in, Maine, 379. 
 
 the rule in Massachusetts, 279. 
 Blodgett o. Boston, 279. 
 riding free on railway or street cars, 167, 297. 
 as fellow-servants of adults, 357. 
 stopping on the sidewalk out of curiosity, 413, n. 
 imputed negligence of parents or custodians. See Iufuted CoNTRisn- 
 
 TORY NKGLIGKWCB. 
 
 as employees, duty of employer to. See Master and Servakt. 
 
 CITY : See MuinciPAL Cokpohation. 
 
 COASTING : 
 
 on the highway, 269. See Highways. 
 
 CO-EMPLOYEE : See Master and Servant. 
 
 COGGS V. BERNARD : 
 
 foundation of modern English law of negligence, 3, 17. 
 
 COLLATERAL NEGLIGENCE: See Contributort Negligence, Col- 
 lateral Violations of Law. 
 
 COLLATERAL VIOLATIONS OP LAW: 
 
 by plaintiff, not contributory negligence, 23, 45, 49, n, 266, 415. 
 driving on wrong side of the road, 45, 283. 
 
 a circumstance for the jury, 45. 
 wagon placed in violation of city ordinance, 45, 257. 
 servant violating master's rules, 378. 
 ferryboat going at unlawful speed, 45, n, 
 defective highway, smoking on, 45. 
 
 Baker v. Portland, 45. 
 
 racing on, 256. 
 
INDEX. 685 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 COLLATERAL VIOLATIONS OF LAW (conUnued) : 
 unlawful speed on, 257. 
 othertrise if a proximate cause of injury, 45, 47. 
 a misapplication in Oeorgia, 48. 
 no excuse for defendants' wilful negligence, 45, n, 46. 
 by defendant not negligence, 49. 
 unless a proximate cause, 49, n. 
 
 Sunday traveling, the New England rule, 263 et seq. 
 the rule criticised, 267. 
 not recognized elsewhere, 266. 
 
 COLLISION : See Admiralty, Railwatb, Highways. 
 
 COLORADO : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222. 
 
 railway prima/ocie liable by statute for killing animals, 426, 440. 
 
 COMBUSTIBLES: 
 
 set afire by locomotives. See Fibes. 
 
 COMMON CARRIERS : 
 
 of goods, palace and sleeping car company not generally a, 173, 413. 
 imputed negligence of. See Imputed Contkibutort Nbgligbnce, 
 Fersieb, Railwats, Street Railways. 
 
 COMMON EMPLOYMENT : 
 
 servants of railways having running connections, 341. See Master and 
 Servant. 
 
 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 apportionment of damages nearly equivalent to, 71. 
 the theory of the rule,' 73. 
 the rule stated, 74, 79, 84. ' 
 the prevalence of the rule, 75. 
 
 generally repudiated, 76, 77. 
 the rule in Illinois, 78. 
 
 Galena, &c., R. Co. v. Jacobs, 79. 
 
 ordinary care essential to a recovery, 79, n. 85. 
 
 the later Illinois cases, 80. 
 
 attributed to Chief Justice Breese, 81. 
 
 the rule criticised, 82, 83. 
 
 proximate cause under, 83. 
 
 not a rule of contributory negligence, 84. 
 
 a comparison of relative degrees of negligence, 85. 
 
 combined with imputed negligence, 121, n. 123. 
 
 applied in actions by servant against master, 331. 
 
 communication of fire, 338. 
 
 where a passenger falls from a car platform, 149, n. 
 the rule in Kansas, 86. 
 
 the confusion with proximateuess and remoteness, 87. 
 the rule in Georgia, 88. 
 
 mitigation of damages, 88, 92, 98. 
 
586 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 COMPARATIVE NEGLiaBNCE {emtinued): 
 Macon, &o., K. Co. ®. Davis, 89. 
 Davies v. Mann and comparative negligence, 89. 
 the later Georgia cases, 90. 
 the confusion pointed out, 91. 
 summary statement of the rule, 92. 
 the rule in Tennessee, 93. 
 
 not strictly comparative negligence, 93. 
 mitigation of damages, 93, 94. 
 . Whirley «. Whiteman, 94 
 this rule defended, 95. 
 the rule in Kentucky; 96, 99. 
 
 not comparative negligence, 96. 
 the Kentucky statute, 97. 
 Louisville, &c., R. Co. v. Collins, 98. 
 
 CONDUCTOR : 
 
 imputed negligence of. See Imputed CoNTKiBnTOET Neglioence. 
 co-servant with engineer on same train, 337. 
 
 contra, Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Ross, 330, 331. 
 with a switchman, 335. 
 with a fireman, 335. 
 with a station baggage-master, 335. 
 with a laborer on the track, 335. 
 
 with a railroad blacksmith on their way to a wreck, 335. 
 with a brakeman on same train, 835. 
 
 on different trains, 335. 
 not vrith a railway detective on the track, 334, n. 
 not with a teamster hauling ties riding in the train, 335. 
 on a gravel train with the laborers, 335. 
 with servants of a contractor working on the train, 335. 
 riding as passenger and trainmen, 335. 
 
 CONNECTICUT : 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child, in, 130.^ 
 
 rights and liabilities of an infant trespasser, in, 140. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219, 226. 
 
 landowner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 
 fires, in, 237, 
 injuries to runaway horse on defective highway, 245. 
 burden of proof in, 422, 428, 439, 441. 
 
 CONTRACT : 
 
 carrier's liability limited by. See Railways. 
 
 servant's contract releasing master from liability. See Masteb and 
 
 Servant. , 
 
 CONTRACTORS: 
 
 independent, servants of, not fellow-servants, 339. 
 
INDEX. 687 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 CONTRIBUTION : 
 
 none between parties in pari delicto, 255. 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE : 
 origin of the law of , 1 . 
 definition of, 7. 
 two necessary elements in, 7. 
 
 law of firet announced in Butterfield v. Forrester, 8, 9. 
 the doctrine of, repudiated in Davies «. Mann, 10, 11. See Davibs v. 
 
 Mann. 
 reasons for the rule of, 12, 13, 14, 72. 
 
 stated by Judge LoonuB, 12, n. 
 
 comments by Judge Holmes, 13, n. 
 rule of not strictly just, 12, n, 430. 
 proximatene.ss of, 14, n. See Prozimatb Causb. 
 however slight, may bar recovery, 14, n, 30. 
 general statement of the rule of, 14. 
 express or implied waiver of a right of action, 15, 16. 
 slightest want of ordinary care may be, 30. 
 
 the rule in Wisconsin, 30. 
 mere collateral negligence is not, 33, 34. See Collatbbal Violations 
 
 OP Law. 
 summary statement of the doctrine, 35. 
 plaintiff's previous knowledge of the danger, 36, 37. 
 
 presimiptive evidence of contributory negligence, 37. 
 
 the presumption disputable, 37. See Knowledge of the Dangeb. 
 voluntary exposure to danger, 37. 
 forgetfulness as, 37, 355. 
 
 absent-mindedness at railway crossing, 37, n. 193. 
 failure to anticipate defendant's negligence, 39, 40. 
 plaintiff acting under fear produced by defendant, 40, 189, 399, n. 
 
 leaping from moving train in fear of collision, 40. 
 
 jumping the wrong way to avoid a train, 40. 
 
 contributory negligence a question of fact, 40, n. 
 plaintiff acting erroneously in trying to save hvmian life, 43, 43, 44. 
 
 Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43. 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney, 43, 373. 
 
 engineer attempting to save his train, 43, 373. 
 
 Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Hiatt, 43. 
 
 mother attempting to rescue her child, 43, n. 
 a trespass as, 50, 53, 53. 
 
 Bush V. Brainard, 53. See Childeen, Tkespabs, Tkespassbr, 
 plaintiff's prior, defendant's subsequent negligence, 54, 56, 
 no defense for willful negligence, 55. See Assault and Battbkt, 
 
 Willful Negligence. 
 plaintiff's contemporaneous negligence, 56. 
 plaintiff's negligence after the catastrophe, 57, 58, 348. 
 
 failure to extinguish fire, 58. See Fires. 
 
 Illinois, &c., R. Co. «. McClelland, 58. 
 
mvEx. 
 
 [The references are to sectionB.] 
 
 588 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
 
 Toledo, &c., R. Co. v. Pindar, 58. See Aggravation op the In- 
 jury. 
 negligence of decedent under Lord Campbell's Act, 60. See Lord Cauf- 
 
 bell's Act. 
 presupposes negligence on the part of defendant, 64. 
 when defendant's, conduct throws plaintiff off his guard, 67, 68, 
 imputed, of third persons, 53, n, 100. See Imputed CoNTBiBnTORT 
 
 Negligence. 
 of a parent in his suit for injury to child, 131-135, 142. 
 of plaintiff and driver of private conveyance, 115. 
 of children, averments in defendants' plea of, 117, n. See Pleading. 
 
 Childben. 
 plaintiff's admissions of not conclusive, 427. 
 intoxication as. Sbb Intoxication. 
 whether a question of law or fact. See Law and Fact. 
 COUPLING CARS : 
 
 injuries to trainmen in, 364 . See Master and Servant . 
 CRAWLING UNDER CARS : See Railways. 
 CROSSING : 
 
 railway. See Railways. 
 street. See Highways. 
 
 DAKOTA : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 333. 
 
 railway prima faeie liable by statute for killing animals, 334 T 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute in, 379. 
 DAMAGES : 
 
 in actions under Lord Campbell's Act, 60, n. 
 
 preventive, provision in Kentucky statute, 66, 97, 318 . See Aggravation 
 OF the Injury. 
 
 DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA : See Accident . 
 DANGER : 
 
 plaintiff's knowledge of. See Knowledge of Danger, Contributoby 
 Nbglioencb, Highways, Trespassers. 
 
 DANGEROUS MACHINE : 
 
 exposed in a public place, 51, m. 
 trespassing child injured by, 188. 
 
 children allured by, turn-table cases, 206 et acq. See Master and 
 Servant. 
 
 DANGEROUS POSITION : 
 
 plaintiff placing himself in, 37, n. See Knowledge of Danger, High- 
 ways. 
 defendant putting plaintiff in, 67. 
 railway passenger riding in. See Railways, Street Railways. 
 
589 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 DANGEROUS PREMISES : See Master and Skkvaht, Lsvitation or 
 License, NssLiaEKCE. 
 
 DARKNESS : 
 
 traveling in the, 248. See Highways . 
 alighting from and boarding trains, 160. 
 
 DAVIES V. MANN : 
 the case stated, 10. 
 the author's criticism, 11. 
 a dangerous expression of the rule, 27. 
 one aspect of adopted in Qeorgia Code, 37, n. 
 the rule in analyzed, 28. 
 in New York, 29. 
 in other States, 30. 
 Judge Thompson's formulation, 54. 
 
 his position criticised, 55. 
 resolved into comparative negligence, 89. 
 an application of, in imputed contributory negligence, 122 . 
 a donkey contrasted with a child, 127. 
 application of, to trespassers on a railway track, 203. See Negligence, 
 
 Contbibutort Negligence, Discovert Clause. 
 
 DEAF PERSONS : 
 
 entitled to statutory signals at railway crossings, 67, n. 
 care required of in crossing railway track, 197. 
 walking on railway track, duty of engineer, 203, n. 
 increased vigilance required of, 396. 
 entitled to more care, if infirmity be known, 396. 
 
 DECK-HAND : 
 
 not a co-servant with the pilot, 337. 
 
 DEFECTIVE HIGHWAYS : See Highways, Knowledge of Danger. 
 DEFECTIVE MACHINERY : See Master and Servant. 
 DEFECTIVE VEHICLES : See Highways. 
 DEGREES OF CARE : See Ordinary Care. 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE : See Negligence. 
 DELAWARE : 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability in, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precaution against fires, 
 237. 
 
 DETECTIVE : 
 
 railway, on the track, co-servant with conductor, 335, n. 
 
 DEVIATION : 
 
 from highway. See Highways. 
 
 DILIGENCE : See Contributory Negligence, Negligence, Ordinary 
 Cabs. 
 
590 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 DISABILITIES, PHYSICAL : See Blind Persons, Deaf Persons, Intox- 
 ication. 
 
 DISCOVERY CLAUSE, JUDGE THOMPSON'S : 
 an attempt to make sense out of Davies v. Mann, 54. 
 may be read backward, 59. 
 the expression of the rule deprecated, 59. 
 
 proximate cause the real issue, 59. 
 applied to trespassers upon a railway track, 201, 203, 203. 
 
 DOCK : 
 
 invitation or license to go upon, 50, n. See Invitation or License. 
 
 DOGS : 
 
 injuries by or to, 127, n, 136. 206, n, 222, n, 264. See Animals. 
 
 DOMESTIC ANIMALS: 
 
 injury to, on railways. See Fences. 
 
 DOORS : 
 
 injuries at car windows and. See Railways. 
 
 injury by swinging door at ferry waiting room, 284, n. 
 
 DRIVING AND RIDING : 
 
 driver's assumption that others will exercise care, 88, n. 
 on wrong side of the road, 45, 282. See Highways. 
 fast, at a railway crossing, 188. 
 a horse near an engine, 189, 196. 
 . negligence of driver of private vehicle. See Imputed Contributory 
 Negligencb. 
 
 DROVERS : 
 
 traveling on free railway passes, 170, 172. 
 
 DRUNKENNESS: See Intoxication. 
 
 E. 
 
 ENCROACHMENTS UPON THE HIGHWAY : 
 fruit stand encroaching, a nuisance, 257. 
 
 ECKERT r>. LONG ISLAND R. CO. 
 plaintiff trying to save human life, 42. 
 
 ELEVATED RAILWAYS : 
 
 passenger leaving his seat upon approaching station, 68, n. See Railways, 
 Street Railways. 
 
 ELLENBOROUGH, LORD : 
 
 opinion of, in Butterfleld ®. Forrester, 8, 9. 
 not decisive of burden of proof, 418. 
 
 EMBANKMENT : 
 
 on highway, 253, 256, n. See Highways. 
 
mDBx. 591 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 ENGINEER : 
 
 remaining at his post to save his train, 42, 373 . 
 
 imputed negligence of . See Imputbd CoNTurBUTORT Negligence. 
 
 co-servant with a fireman, 311. 
 
 with a switchman, 328. 
 
 co-servant with a fireman, 334. 
 
 with a brakeman on same train, 834. 
 on different trains, 384. ' 
 
 with engineer on another train, 334. 
 
 with a conductor on the- same train, 334. 
 
 contra, Chicago, &c., R. Co. ■». Ross, 830, 331. 
 
 with a switch-tender, 384. 
 
 with a telegraph operator, 334- 
 
 with a traek repairer, 334. 
 
 with an inspector of tracks, 334. 
 
 with a signal man, 334. 
 
 with a shoveler on a gravel train, 384. 
 
 on a switch engine, with a car repairer, 334. 
 
 with a station agent, 884. 
 
 with a servant coupling cars,.884. 
 
 with a workman in an engine yard, 384. 
 
 with a tunnel repairer, 384. 
 
 with the superintendent, 834. 
 
 with a section boss, 834. 
 
 with a common laborer, 334. 
 
 with the servants of a contractor on the train, 334. 
 in a factory, co-servant with his fireman, 327. 
 of 'a coal mine, co-servant with laborer at bottom of shaft, 336. 
 
 ENGINE-WIPER : 
 
 co-servant with train-men, 335. 
 
 ENGLAND : 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 172. 
 railway track, when a giiasi public way, 213. 
 
 EVANSVILLE, &c., R. CO. v. HIATT : 
 
 defendant's negligence, not plaintiff's merit, the ground of liability, 43. 
 
 EVIDENCE : 
 
 of Iiabitual carelessness to prove negligence, 21, n. 
 
 conduct of others in the particular danger competent, 41. See Lord 
 
 Campbell's Act. 
 photograph of defective highway, competent, 244, n. 
 opinion, competent to prove intoxication, 395. 
 admissions of contributory negligence not conclusive, 427. 
 
 EXCAVATION : 
 
 near a highway, liability of land owner, 102, n. 
 in the highway, 250. See Highways. 
 unguarded, children falling into, 140. 
 on the seashore. See Seashore. 
 
592 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 EXPRESS AGENT : 
 
 carrier's contract limiting liability for injury to, 172, n. 
 
 EXPRESS COMPANIES : 
 
 contract limiting liability, 168-173. See Railways. 
 
 FACT : 
 
 question of. See Law and Fact. 
 
 PARWELL V. BOSTON &WORCESTER R. CO. : 
 the exception to the rule of respondeat superior, 313. 
 Judge Shaw's opinion in the case of, 313. 
 
 FEAR: 
 
 plaintiff acting under. See Contmbutokt Negligence. 
 
 FELLOW-SERVANT : See Mastbr and Servant. 
 
 FENCES : 
 
 putting horse in pasture with known defective fence, 58, n. 226. 
 
 Knowledge of the Danger. 
 duty of owner of cattle to maintain, 218. 
 the common law of England, 218. 
 
 its prevalence in the United States, 219. 
 contributory negligence, 219, 220, 221, 323. 
 
 proximate cause, 219. 
 a modification of the English rule, 220. 
 
 animals escaping from well-fenced enclosure, 230. 
 the American rule, 231. 
 Kerwhacker ?). Cleveland, &c., R. Co., 231. 
 abrogation of the English rule, 232. 
 the prevalence of this doctrine, 232. 
 dog on a railway track, 223, n. 
 contributory negligence, the effect of a statute, 333. 
 generally a question for the jury, 333. 
 municipal ordinances, 223. 
 turning animals loose upon one's own land, 333. 
 turning cattle loose upon railway track, 323. 
 summary statement of the prevailing doctrine, 384. 
 
 ordinary care by a railway, 224. 
 statutes making killing prima fade evidence, 225. 
 duty of a railway to maintain fences, 235. 
 may arise out of contract, 225. 
 a contract when implied, 225. 
 the rule in Kentucky, 235. 
 Vioksburg, &c., R. Co. ■». Patton, 225. 
 neglect to fence, how treated, 225. 
 statutes requiring railways to f6nce, 236. 
 the English statute, 336. 
 
INBBX. 593 
 
 [The references are to sections.) 
 
 FENCES (continue^ : 
 
 statutes in the United States, 236. 
 contributory negligence, 326. 
 construction of, 326, n. 
 pleading in actions under, 226, n. 
 presumptions, 326, n. 
 proof, 236, n. 
 
 injuries to cattle by barbed wire fence, 226, n. 
 " persons " injured includes employees, 226, n. 
 plaintiff's knowledge that fences are blown down, 236. 
 cattle guards included in fence laws, 236. 
 no duty to fence in cities and towns, 237. 
 
 burden of proof, 327, n. 
 nor at highway crossings, 337. 
 
 contributory negligence, 237, n. 
 nor around depot grounds, 227. 
 burden of proof, 237, n. 
 question of fact, 237, n. 
 animal must come in contact with train, 227. 
 
 place of entrance controls, 237. 
 these statutes liberally construed, 227. 
 
 contributory negligence as a defense, 337, 238. 
 contributing to a breach in fence, 338. 
 
 failure to repair, 228. 
 fences defectively built by railway, 228. 
 defective partition, 338, «.. 
 out of repair, 228. 
 
 notice to company, 328. 
 reasonable time to repair, 228. 
 failure to repair division fence, 338. 
 
 breachy horse, 228. 
 plaintiff's knowledge of defect in fence, 58, n. 338, 234. 
 adjacent owner's contract to repair, 239. 
 assent to company's neglect to repair, 339. 
 company's agreement to repair, 339. 
 sufficiency of repairs a question for the jury, 339. 
 using adjoining owner's fence as part enclosure, 329. 
 stock wrongfully in highway or adjoining close, 230, 234. 
 stock escaping from lawful custody, 330. 
 crazy horse and insufficient fence, 230. 
 where a railroad divides a farm, 230. 
 blind horse near unfenced railway, 230. 
 stock straying at large, whether contributory negligence, 231. 
 Hunger «. Tonawanda R. Co., 231. 
 the New York common law rule, 281. 
 the New York statute, 333. 
 Hance v. Cayuga, Ac, R. Co., 332. 
 Corwin «. N. Y., &c., R. Co., 333. 
 summary statement of the rule, 333. 
 38 
 
694 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 FENCES (Contimied) : 
 
 the rule in New England and ■Wisconsin, 334. 
 at highway embankment, duty of municipal corporation, 353. 
 barbed wire along highway, 253. 
 
 PERRIES : 
 
 ferryman a common carrier, 284. 
 
 when not an insurer, 384. 
 passengers crowding toward the bow, 384. 
 
 standing near a stairway, 284. 
 
 joining a crowd, 284. 
 
 driving a spirited team, 284. 
 
 injured by a swinging door, 384, n. 
 
 FERRYMAN : See Ferkibs. 
 
 FIREMAN : 
 
 in a factory, co-servant with the engineer, 337. 
 railway, co-servant with engineer, 311, 334. 
 
 with conductor, 335. 
 
 with brakeman on same train, 335. 
 
 with a master-machinist, 335. 
 
 with servants of a contractor on the train, 335. 
 
 with a track repairer, 335. 
 
 with a track walker, 335. 
 
 with a telegraph operator, 335. 
 
 FIRES: 
 
 spread by unexpected wind, whether proximate cause of injury, 33, n. 
 negligent commimication by railway locomotives, 335. 
 duty of railways, 335. 
 contributory negligence of property owner, 235. 
 
 the rule m England, 335, 236. 
 the effect of a statute, 236. 
 
 Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 338. 
 
 the rule in England and the United States, 386. 
 whether property owner should guard against negligence, 236, 338, 340- 
 
 the rule in the United States further stated, 237. 
 
 Yaughan d. Taff Vale Ry. Co. criticised, 238. 
 
 comparative negligence in Illinois, 338 
 
 leaving windows open near railway track, 238. 
 
 leaving doors open, 239. 
 
 combustibles, shavings, dried grass, &c., 239. 
 
 storing lumber near railway track, 339. 
 
 whether contributory negligence a question for the jury, 239. 
 
 stacks of grain, 339. 
 
 fire spreading from railway company's land, 330. 
 duty of property owner to put out, 58, 340. 
 
 his acquiescence in use of defective engine, 340. 
 
 duty of the company herein, 340, n. 
 spread from A's property to B's, 240.1 
 
596 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 FIRES (Cdntinued) : 
 
 proximate and remote cause, 341. 
 the analogy of the " Squib case," 341. 
 the rule in England and the United States, 341. 
 Euhn v. Jewett, 341. 
 communication by burning oil, 341. 
 the rule in Pennsylvania, 343. 
 communicated by fireworks, city not liable, 413. 
 communicated by steamer to plaintiff's woQden building, 416. 
 
 FIRE INSURANCE : See Insubancb. 
 
 FIREWORKS : 
 
 licensed or unlicensed, city not liable for accidents, 359, 413. 
 not contributory negligence to stand and look at, 413. 
 
 FLAGMEN, GATEMEN, &c., 190 : See Railways. 
 
 FLORIDA : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 333. 
 
 railway pn'ma/ocM liable by statute for killing animals, 334. 
 
 " FLYING SWITCH " : 
 
 injuries from a " running," or, 317. 
 practice of making, condemned, 317. 
 
 FOREMAN : 
 
 co-servant with a laborer under him, 333, 337, 336. 
 
 in a railway yard, co-servant with employees moving cars, 386. 
 
 under stevedore, having entire charge, not co-servant with laborer, 387. 
 
 FORGETFULNESS : 
 
 as contributory negligence, 37, 355. 
 
 absent-mindedness at railway crossing, 37, n. 193. 
 
 FRAUD: 
 
 riding free on railway by stealth or, contributory negligence, 47. 
 
 FREE PASSENGERS: 
 injuries to, 165-167. 
 
 limitation of liability to by contract, 168-178. See Railways. 
 on street cars, 397. See Si^rbbt Railways. 
 
 FREE PASSES : 
 
 limiting a carrier's liability, 168-173. See Railways. 
 
 FREIGHT TRAINS : 
 
 riding upon, 154. See Railways. 
 
 FRENCH LAW : 
 
 liability of master to servant under the, 888. 
 rule of damages in Admiralty in the, 403. 
 
 FRUIT STAND : 
 
 encroaching upon the highway a nuisance, 357. 
 
596 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 c. 
 
 GAMES : 
 
 playing at upon the highway, 356. 
 children using the highway to play at, 278. 
 
 conflict of authorities, 278. 
 contestants not liable to each other for injuries, 416. 
 
 "GANG-BOSS": 
 
 co-servant with a laborer, 336. 
 
 GAS COMPANIES : 
 
 liability for explosions caused by defective pipe, 101. 
 liability to volunteer assisting servant by request, 343, n. 
 
 GATEMEN, FLAGMEN. &c.: 190. See Railways. 
 
 GEORGIA : 
 
 Davies v. Mann in the Georgia Code, 27, n. 
 
 collateral violation of law, misapplication of rule in, 48. 
 
 the rule of contributory negligence in, 71, 75, 88-92. 
 
 mitigation of damages, 71, 75, 88-92. 
 
 attempted application of Davies v. Mann, 71, 75, 89-90. 
 partly adopted by statute, 37, n. 
 
 not settled, 93. 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 130. 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability in, 172. 
 
 neglect to " look and listen " at railway crossing not negligence per se, 183. 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222. 
 
 modified rule of contributory negligence applied, 219, n. 
 railway prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 234. 
 land owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 
 fire, 237. 
 injuries to runaway horses by defective highways, 245. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 
 negligence of freight train conductor in coupling cars, 365. 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute, 379. 
 servant's contract releasing master from liability for negligence, 384. 
 intoxication as a defense under the Code of, 197, 390. 
 burden of proof in, 436, 440. 
 
 GRADE CROSSINGS : See Railways. 
 
 6RIPMAN : 
 
 on motor car, co-servant with signalman, 431. 
 GROSS NEGLIGENCE : See Negligence. 
 
 H. 
 
 HAND: 
 
 passenger's outside of car window, 155, 156, 296. 
 
INDEX. 597 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 HAND-CAR : 
 
 free passenger on, 165, n. See Railways. 
 
 HARNESS: 
 
 defective highway — runaway horse — breaking of reins, 33, n. 
 
 HARTFIELD v. ROPER : See Imputed Contributoky Negligence. 
 
 HATCHWAY : 
 falling into, 255. 
 
 contributory negligence for the jury, 255. 
 mother falling into when trying to rescue child, 42, n. 
 servant falling into — assumed risk, 360. 
 
 HIGHWAYS: , 
 
 liability of municipal corporations for injuries from defective, 243. 
 no liability at common law, 348. 
 generally liable by statute, 243, 344. 
 duty of corporate oflScials, 244. 
 
 to keep highways in repair, 344. 
 
 not limited to travelled path, 244. 
 ditches for drainage not defects, 244. 
 slight inclination in sidewalk not a defect, 244, n. 
 photoe;raph of defective, competent evidence, 244, n. 
 obstructions in are defects, 244. 
 injuries to runaway horses, 245. 
 
 the authorities in conflict, 245. 
 injuries to one wilfuUy thrown into a pit, 245. 
 
 proximate cause, 245. 
 traveler's contributory negligence, 246. 
 
 Butterfield v. Forrester, 246. 
 'a question for the jury, 246, n. 
 
 sidewalk presumed to be safe, 36, n., 246, n. 
 
 not negligent to use a defective highway, 247. 
 
 traveling upon when obviously dangerous, 247. 
 
 knowledge of the danger, 191, n, 347. 
 
 passing obstruction in the night, 348. 
 open cellarway in the night, 348. 
 City of Bloomington «. Perdue, 248. 
 
 plaijitifE's negligence after the injury, 248. See Aggravation 
 OP THE Injort. 
 duty of traveler on a defective, 248. 
 care proportionate to the risk, 248. 
 
 in avoiding obstructions, 248. 
 
 traveling in the dark, 248., 
 
 driving through pool of water, 248. 
 excavations in, injuries from, 250. 
 
 duty of one making, 250. 
 
 when authorized by municipal license, 250. 
 
 when unauthorized, 258, n. 
 
 duty of traveler, 350. 
 
598 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 HIGHWAYS 
 
 excavations near, 103, n. 
 
 ditch dug by municipal license, 350, n. 
 
 injuries from unlawful obstruction, 250, n. 
 effect of municipal ordinance, 850. 
 one injured by his own obstruction, 150. 
 right of pedestrian in the roadway, 251. 
 
 may cross at any point, 251, 368. 
 
 equal, but not superipr to vehicles, 351, 368. 
 
 pedestrian must exercise ordinary care, 351, 268, 369. 
 deviation from the highway, 353. 
 
 from necessity, 254. 
 
 when the highway is obstructed, 252. 
 
 to get bettter sleighing, 253. 
 
 contributory negligence a question of fact, 252. 
 embankment on, duty to maintain railing, 253, 356, n. 
 
 due only to actual travelers, 253. 
 backing horse out of a shed, 353. 
 
 extent of the duty, 253. 
 
 horse falling off defective bridge, 253, n. 
 pitfalls on adjoining land, 253, 254. 
 barbed wire fence, 353.' 
 open cellar window in sidewalk, 255. 
 hole in the pavement, 255. 
 unguarded trap-door in sidewalk, 255, n. 
 open cellarway, forgetfulness of traveler, 255. 
 falling into hatchway, 355. 
 
 contributory negligence for the jury, 355. 
 trespass upon the highway, 256. 
 
 use of for games or sports, 356. 
 
 racing upon, 356. 
 
 riding velocipede on a sidewalk, 356, n. 
 unfenced embankment, 256, n. 
 driving at unlawful speed upon, 257. 
 collision with team placed in unlawful manner, 257. 
 fruit stands eDcroaching upon, 257. 
 leaving horses imtied and unattended upon, 258. 
 
 the decisions not in accord, 258. 
 Norris V. Kohler, 258. 
 Wasmer s. Delaware, &c., R. Co., 258. 
 horse unlawfully at large upon, a nuisance, 259. 
 object calculated to frighten horse, 359. 
 licensed fireworks, 359. 
 cow lawfully at large upon, 259. 
 defective vehicle or harness, 359. 
 
 owner's knowledge of, 259. 
 
 defective highway and harness — ^proximate cause, 33, n. 
 unskillful or reckless driving, 260. 
 
 bars recovery if a proximate cause, 260. 
 
INDEX. 599 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 HIGHWAYS {Gontinued) : 
 
 permitting a -woman to drive, 260. 
 immoderate driving by Are depari;ment, 260, n. 
 intoxication as contributory negligence, 260, n. 
 Sunday traveling, 261-267. 
 
 Sunday dies nonjuridicus, 261. 
 the Englisb statute, 261. 
 the New England rule, 262. 
 
 Massachusetts Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansea, 175, 176, 262. 
 the Massachusetts rule illustrated, 263, 264. 
 the rule in Maine and Vermont, 265. 
 the rule in Rhode Island, 266. 
 
 Baldwin a. Barney, 266. 
 the Massachusetts rule generally denied, 266. 
 the New England decisions criticised, 267. 
 Sutton ». Wauwatosa, 267. 
 
 Sunday traveling not a proximate cause, 267. See Railways, 
 Sunday Tbavkling. 
 pedestrians crossing the, 268. 
 equal right with vehicles, 268. 
 may cross at any point, 268. 
 entitled to higher care at regular crossing, 268. 
 whether he must look for vehicles, 268. 
 attempting to dodge vehicles, 269. 
 a woman wearing a sun-bonnet, 269. 
 aged and infirm persons on the highway, 269, 
 blind man walking streets unattended, 269. 
 persons with physical infirmity, care required of, 269. 
 aged person on icy sidewalk, 269. 
 city not liable for coasting accidents, 269. 
 
 coasting on Boston Common, 269. 
 accumulations of snow upon, 270. 
 ice and snow upon a sidewalk, 270. 
 Providence v. Clapp, 270, 271. 
 duty of the municipality, 270, 271. 
 
 must remove in a reasonable time, 271. 
 mere slipperiness not a defect, 272. 
 otherwise, if caused by shape of the pavement, 272. 
 slippery sidewalk of glass and iron, 272. 
 duty of the traveler, 273. 
 
 knowledge of the danger, 247, n, 273. 
 
 by husband, whether imputable to wife, 273. 
 corpulent woman crossing slippery crosswalk, 273. 
 ordinances (or by-laws) requiring removal of snow, 274. 
 liability of abutting owner in respect of icy sidewalks, 274. 
 
 his exemption does not relieve the city, 274. 
 street railway obstructing gutter with snow, 274. 
 contributory negligence in departing from obstructed sidewalk, 374. 
 rules as to ice and snow on, summarized, 275. 
 
600 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 HIGHWAYS (Continued) : 
 
 not in se defects, 275. 
 
 municipality bound to remove, 375. 
 
 mere slipperiness not a defect, 375. 
 
 traveler's duty of increased care, 375. 
 municipal liability for something falling on traveler, 376. 
 
 defectively hung awnings, 376. 
 
 weak show-boards, 276. 
 
 snow from an adjoining roof, 376. 
 
 ruinous building contiguous to highway, 276. 
 
 something falling from window, 376. 
 
 falling of hanging sign, 276. 
 
 buildings projecting ice or snow upon the highway, 276. 
 
 no action in favor of trespasser, 376. 
 
 contributory negligence of traveler, 276, n. 
 
 Byrne ®. Boadle, 277. 
 
 barrel falling from window, 277. 
 presumption of negligence, 277. 
 injuries to children while playing on, 378. 
 
 ' imputed negligence of parent, 278. See Imputed CoNTRiBtJTORT 
 Negligence. 
 
 the conflicting decisions, 378. 
 
 the New York rule, 379. 
 McGary v. Loomis, 279. 
 
 the rule in Maine, 279. 
 
 the rule in Massachusetts, 379. 
 Blodgett u. Boston, 379. 
 
 the rule in New Hampshire, 280. 
 
 the author's criticism, 381. 
 collision upon the, 283. 
 
 the law of the road, 382. 
 
 plaintiff driving on the wrong side, 45, 282. 
 
 one riding bicycle subject to, 382, n. 
 racing on the, 383, n. 
 
 ambulance entitled to right of way by statute in New York, 383. 
 persons on horseback, 383. 
 seashore not a, 414. See Bridge, Street Railways. 
 
 HOLT, LORD -. 
 
 his opinion in Coggs v. Bernard, 3. 
 
 HORSE : 
 
 owner exposing to object calculated to frighten, 37, n. 
 
 easily frightened, driving near cars, 196. 
 
 putting in pasture with known defective fence, 58, n. 
 
 servant leaving team loose on the highway, 104. 
 
 crazy, killed on railway through insufficient fence, 230. See Fences. 
 
 leaving horse untied on the highway, 258. 
 
INDEX. 601 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 "HORSE {Continued) : 
 
 runaway, owner liable for damage by, if negligent, 259. 
 injury to runaway by defects in highway, 345. See Highways. 
 servant kicked by, knowing vicious propensity, 360, n. 
 
 HORSEBACK : 
 
 person on, must turn out for a vehicle, S83. 
 
 HORSE CARS : See Stbebt Railways. 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIPE : 
 
 husband's knowledge of danger not imputable to wife, 373. 
 
 imputed negligence of a husband, 109. See Imputed Cohtributory 
 Neoligence. 
 
 ICE: 
 
 accumulation of in cattle guards. See Fences. 
 
 ICY SIDEWALK: See Highways. 
 
 IDAHO : 
 
 burden of proof in, 436. 
 
 IDENTIFICATION : 
 
 of passenger and carrier. 111. See Imputed Contributory Negli- 
 gence. 
 
 IDIOTS AND LUNATICS : 
 
 negligence not imputable to, 36. 
 are twu gui juris, 117. 
 
 imputed negligence of custodians. See Imputed Contbibctoby Neg- 
 ligence . 
 
 IGNORANCE : 
 
 traveler ignorant of a railway crossing, his duty, 188. 
 ignorance of danger. See Knowledge of Danger. 
 
 ILLEGAL ACT : See Collateral Violations op Law, Contributory 
 Negligence. 
 
 ILLINOIS : 
 
 the rule of comparative negligence in, 73, 74, 78-86. 
 
 negligence of carrier not imputed to passenger in, 111. 
 
 riding on platform of railway car in, 149. 
 
 carrier's stipulations limiting liability in, 173. 
 
 duty to " look and listen " at railway crossing a question of fact, 181, n. 
 
 walking upon a railway track in, 313. 
 
 slight intoxication not contributory negligence in, 197. 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 333, 336. 
 railway prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 324. 
 
602 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 ILLINOIS (Gontinued) : 
 
 accumulations of combustible matter on land near railway in, 237, 238. ^ 
 law of master and servant affected by rule of comparative negligence in, 
 
 321. 
 cars rendering coupling dangerous, 365. 
 burden of p^oof in, 423, 440. 
 
 IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE : , 
 the rule stated, 100. 
 contributory negligence of third persons, 100, 101, n. 
 
 generally no defence, 100, 101, 102. 
 
 passengers crowded from street cars, 100. 
 
 railway company running over fire hose, 101 . 
 
 explosion from defective gas pipe, 101. 
 
 Are started by concurring negligence of third person, 101, w. 
 
 no contribution among tortfeasors, 102. ^ 
 
 negligehce of fellow-servant and stranger, 102, n. 
 
 negligence of children on turn-tables, 102, n. 
 agent's negligence imputed to the principal,108. 
 when the cause of action is derived from a third person, 103. 
 illustrations of agency, 104. 
 
 servant leaving team loose, 104. 
 Thorogood v. Bryan, the rule in, 105. 
 imputed negligence in the Admiralty, 106. 
 Baron Pollock's criticism of Thorogood v. Bryan, 107. 
 Thorogood v. Bryan overruled, 107. 
 
 the Bernina case, 107. 
 
 the case repudiated in part in Pennsylvania, 108. 
 Simpson v. Hand, 108. 
 Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 108. 
 negligence of a private driver, 108, 109. 
 
 Thorogood v. Bryan, in Arkansas, 109. 
 Duggins V. Watson, 109. 
 
 in Iowa, 109. 
 
 Nisbet V. Oarner, 109. 
 
 in Wisconsin. 
 
 in the case of private conveyances, 109. 
 
 in Michigan, 109. 
 imputed negligence of a husband, 109, 273. 
 Thorogood v. Bryan not the general American rule, 110. 
 
 Little e. Hackett, 111. 
 
 Bennett v. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co., 111. 
 
 the New Jersey rule further stated, 112. 
 Carrier's negligence imputed to shipper of goods, 113. 
 
 the reason of the rule, 110, 114. 
 
 the prevalence of the rule, 114. 
 
 Vanderplank v. Miller, 114. 
 imputed negligence of a bailee, 114, n. 
 combined negligence of plaintiff and his driver, 115. 
 
603 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE {Gontinued) : 
 
 the rule stated in New York, 115. 
 
 Hoag V. New York &c. R. Co., 115. 
 in the case of persons non mi juris, 116. 
 
 negligence of custodians, 116. 
 
 who are non »ui juris, 117. 
 
 the status of infants, 118 
 
 the New York rule, Hartfleld v. Roper, 119. 
 the language of the court, 130. 
 
 later cases following Hartfleld v. Roper, 131. 
 
 the rule modified in various jurisdictions, 133. 
 
 comparative and imputed negligence combined in Illinois, 123. 
 
 the modification in New York, 123, 134. 
 McGarry v. Loomis, 133. 
 Ihl V. Forty-second Street R. Co., 133. 
 a child's exercise of care, 133. 
 defendant's gross negligence, 124. 
 children entitled to more care than adults, 134. 
 negligence of defendant essential, 135. 
 
 Lygo V. Newbold, 135. 
 
 North Penn. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 135. 
 negligence of self-constituted custodian, 135. 
 
 Waite V. Northeastern Ry. Co., 135. 
 negligence of parent, 135, 136. 
 
 the English doctrine further considered, 136. 
 
 Holly V. Boston Gaslight Co., 126. 
 Hartfleld v. Roper criticised, 127, 128, 1^. 
 the mle in Hartfleld v. Roper denied, 130. 
 
 Robinson v. Cone, 130. 
 ordinary care in an infant, 130. 
 when the action is for the parent's benefit, 131. 
 
 Belief ontaine, &c. R. Co. v. Snyder, 131. 
 
 the rule illustrated, 132. 
 
 actions under Lord Campbell's act, 132. 
 
 the plaintiff's poverty or destitution, 133. 
 Kttsburgh, &c. R. Co. v. Pearson, 133. 
 further statement of the Pennsylvania rule, 134. 
 Kay V. The Pennsylvania R. Co., 134. 
 Phila., &c. R. Co. v. Long, 134. 
 the doctrine commended, 135. 
 contributory neglTgence of parents, 143. 
 
 permitting children to play in streets, 143. 
 
 to pass from one railway car to another, 143. 
 
 to go to and from school alone, 143. 
 
 lending children on errands, 142. 
 
 generally a question for the jury, 142, n. 
 
 children placed in dangerous occupations, 143. 
 
 INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS : 
 servants of, not fellow-servants, 339. 
 
604 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 INDIANA: 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child in, 132, 130. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, in, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219, 236, 237. 
 
 railway comyany prima fade liable by statute for liilling animals, 334. 
 
 land owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 
 fire, 337, 239. 
 plaintifE running risk to save human life, in, 43, 43, 373. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 burden of proof in, 433, 440. 
 
 INDICTMENT : 
 
 ruinous building contiguous to highway a nuisance, 276. 
 INEVITABLE ACCIDENT : See Accident. 
 INFANTS : See Imputed CoNTRtBtJTOiiT Negligence, Children. 
 INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH : See Lord Campbell's Act. 
 INNKEEPER AND GUEST : 
 
 contributory negligence in actions between, 408. 
 
 the innkeeper an insurer except against guest's negligence, 408. 
 guest's neglect to lock his door, 408, 410, 411. 
 
 the negligence a question of fact, 408. 
 Cayle's case, 409, 410. 
 duty of guest to exercise care, 411. 
 ostentatious display of money, 411. 
 delivering valise to porter, 411. 
 must conform to reasonable rules, 411. 
 loss of guest's money entrusted to another guest, 411, n. 
 guest falling through an elevator shaft, 413.' 
 
 Hayward v. Miller, 413. 
 clothing store proprietor no 1: an innkeeper, 413. 
 liable as bailee for hire, 412. 
 
 customer's watch stolen while trying on a new suit, 412. 
 INSPECTOR : 
 
 of railway track, co-servant with an engineer, 334. 
 
 of machinery in repair shop, co-servant with a brakeman, 335. 
 
 in a shop, not a co-servant with one he is instructing, 337. 
 
 INSURANCE : 
 
 plaintiff's negligence no defence to action on the policy, 398. 
 nor for use of premises as bawdy house, 398. 
 accidental self-destruction not suicide, 399. 
 non-compliance with common carrier's rules, 399. 
 
 INTOXICATION AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE : 
 when alighting from a moving train, 160. 
 
 an absolute defense in certain cases under Georgia Code, 50, n., 197, 390. 
 when crossing a railway track, 197. 
 as a proximate cause of an injury, 197, n. 
 of one injured by defective highway, 360, n. 
 
INDEX. 605 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 INTOXICATION AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (Continued) : 
 no excuse for a wanton injury to one intoxicated, 208, n., 395. 
 must be a proximate cause to bar recovery, 389. 
 
 Alger e. Lowell, 389. 
 as want of ordinary care, 890. 
 
 Ford V. Umatilla County, 390. 
 intoxicated traveler entitled to a reasonably safe highway, 389, 390. 
 not conclusive evidence of negligence, 390. 
 the intoxication of trespassers, 391. 
 
 fatal to recovery, 393. 
 the presumption of sobriety, 393. 
 
 trainmen may presume trespassers to be sober, 393, 394. 
 intoxicated person not an outlaw, 895. 
 
 duty of innkeeper in respect of goods of one intoxicated,^395. 
 expulsion of drunken passenger from train in the snow, 395. 
 ejection from defendant's saloon, 895. 
 proof of. 
 
 opinions of witnesses admissible, 395. 
 accorded less indulgence than natural disabilities, 396. 
 
 INTOXICATED PASSENGERS : 286. See Street Railways. 
 
 INVITATION OR LICENSE : 
 to go upon property, 50, 51. 
 
 duty of the occupant, 50, 51, 205. 
 to enter house as a visitor, 50. 
 to use private way, when implied, 50, n. 
 to use dock or wharf, 50, n. 
 implied to enter business houses, 51. 
 
 duty of occupant, 51. 
 distinction between invitation and 'license, 51. 
 to enter railway stations, 160. 
 
 to cross a railway track to board or leave a train, 100. 
 to alight from a train at dangerous places, 161, 162. 
 
 the burden of proof, 162, n. 
 to enter railroad premises on business, 179. 
 by flagmen at a rajlway crossing, 190. 
 to go upon dangerous premises, duty of the owner, 205. 
 
 objects alluring children, 206. 
 
 the turn-table cases, 207, et teg. 
 Judge Dillon's decision, 207. 
 the Minnesota case, 208. 
 the later cases, 209. 
 the New York rule, 210. 
 walking on a railway track by permission, 212. 
 
 not a mere trespass, 212. 
 by street car conductor to children to ride free, 297. See Nkgligbnce. 
 
 IOWA: 
 
 negligence contributing in any degree bars recovery in, 26. 
 
606 INDKX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 IOWA (Oontinued) : 
 
 doctrine of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of driver of private vehicle not Imputed to occupant in, 109. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to infant child in, 130. 
 
 duty of pedestrian at railway crossing, 195. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222, 223, 226, 230. 
 
 railway prima fade liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 
 contributory negligence of land-owner next to railway in respect of fires, 
 
 238. 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute in, 379, 381. 
 burden of proof in, 422, 440. 
 
 IRISH LA.W: 
 
 liability of master to servant under the, 387. 
 
 J. 
 
 JOINT TORT-FEASORS : 
 
 one not excused by combined negligence of another, 102. 
 
 JUDICIUM R U8TIG0B UM: 
 
 rule of damages in Admiralty sometimes known as, 403. 
 
 K. 
 
 KANSAS : 
 
 rule of contributory negligence in, 71, 75, 88, 86, 87. 
 
 denied to be one of comparative negligence, 77, 87. 
 negligence of parent imputed to child in, 121, n, 130. 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219, 226. 
 xaXivia,j prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against fire, 
 
 237. 
 collision with runaway team, 283. 
 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants, modified by statute, 283. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 430, 440. 
 
 KENTUCKY : 
 
 contributory negligence must be an " efficient " cause, 26. 
 " wilful neglect" under a statute, 66, 97, 318. 
 rule of contributory negligence, as applied in, 96, 320. 
 carrier's negligence imputed to shipper of goods, 109, 114. 
 ' duty of railway company to signal at crossings in, 186. 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219, 225. 
 railway pnma/aae liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 
 KERWHACKER v. CLEVELAND, &c., R. CO.: 
 owner of cattle not required to fence. See Fbnceb. 
 
607 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGER : 
 
 essential to constitute contributory negligence, 36. 
 
 obligation to know equivalent to knowledge, 86, 188. 
 
 what one knows he must remember, 37. See Pobgetfulnbss. 
 plaintiff placing himself in dangerous position, 37, n. 
 servant kicked by horse known to be vicious, 36, n. 
 complaint showing plaintiff's not demurrable, 37, n. 
 placing horse in pasture with defective fence, 58, n. 
 defective highway, 191, n. 
 driving horse easily frightened near cars, 196. 
 lumber exposed to sparks from railway, 239. 
 traveling on icy sidewalks, 373. 
 by husband, not imputable to wife, 273. See Contribtjtort Nkgli- 
 
 GENCB, Master and Servant, Fences, Highways, Railways, 
 
 Street Railways. 
 
 L. 
 
 LABORER : 
 
 a co-servant with his foreman, 323, 327, 336. 
 
 with section boss, 327. 
 
 with a superintendent, 327. 
 on railway, co-servant with locomotive engineer, 334. 
 on gravel train, co-servant with conductor, 335. 
 on railway track, co-servant with conductor, 335. 
 
 with roadmaster, 335. 
 
 with a gang-boss. 338. 
 in hold of a vessel, co-servant with one above, 336. 
 at bottom of coal mine shaft, co-servant with engineer, 336. 
 common, in a mine, not co-servant with a miner, 837. 
 not a co-servant with stevedore's foreman having entire charge, 337. 
 
 LAW AND FACT : 
 
 negligence a mixed question of, 444, 445. 
 
 what constitutes baggage a mixed question of, 173, n. 
 the Court defines negligence, 444, 445. 
 the jury determine the facts, 444, 445. 
 
 may infer facts from facts proved, 445, 449. 
 a preliminary question of law for the Court, 446. 
 
 in the absence of evidence, wholly a question of law, 446. 
 
 same rules apply to negligence and contributory negligence, 446. 
 as a matter of law, 447. 
 
 only when the facts are indisputable, 147, 148, 447, 448, 449. 
 
 the exception, and not the rule, 448, 450. 
 
 proximate cause for the Court if facts undisputed, 447, n. 
 usually a mixed question of, 24, n. 
 
 recklessness in crossing railway track, 449. 
 
 jumping from rapidly moving train, 147, 148, 449. 
 
 drunk on a railway track, 449. 
 
, [The references are to sections.] 
 
 LAW AND PACT (Continued) : 
 
 disobeying important rules of railway, 449. 
 
 crawling under cars, 449. 
 
 passenger riding on locomotive, 449. 
 when a question of fact, 448, 450. 
 
 effect of plaintifl's knowledge of danger, 37. 
 
 contributory negligence of land-owner in respect of railway fires^ 
 239. 
 
 in keeping trap-door open near sidewalk, 255. n 
 
 contributory negligence of parent in suit for injuries to child, 
 143, w. 
 
 plaintiff acting erroneously under sudden fear, 41, n. 
 
 a mere scintilla of evidence not sufficient, 449. 
 
 when there is a reasonable doubt, 146, n, 450. 
 
 Judge Cooley's statement of the rule, 452. 
 what the inquiry involves, 452. 
 duty to " look and listen " at railway crossings, matter of law, 181,, 
 
 452. See " Look AND Listen." 
 tendency of tfie law ip its development, 453. 
 summary statement of the rule, 454. See Contbibutobt Keoli- - 
 
 OENCE. 
 
 LAW OF THE ROAD : See Highways. 
 
 LAW MARITIME : See Admibaltt. 
 
 LICENSE : See Invitation or License. 
 
 LIFE INSURANCE: See Insukance. 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTION : See Lokd Campbell's Act. 
 
 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY : 
 
 stipulation by carriers in free passes, 168-172. See Railways. 
 
 LOCOMOTIVES: 
 
 passengers riding on, 150. See Railways. 
 
 " LOOK AND LISTEN." 
 
 duty of travelers to, at railway crossings, 181-184. See Railwayb. 
 
 presumption as to looking and listening, 181, n: 182. 
 pedestrian crossing the highway, 368. 
 
 LORD'S DAY : 
 
 traveling on. See Railways, 175 et acq., Highways 261 et seg., Btbbet - 
 
 Railways, 298. 
 unlawful labor on. See Master & Servant, 299, n. 
 
 LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT : (9 and 10 Vict., ch. 93.) 
 negligence of decedent under, 60. 
 pleading in suits under, 60, n. 
 limitation of action, 60, n. 
 evidence, 60, n. 
 damages, 60, n. 
 
 contributory negligence of child bars suit by parent, 133. 
 servant's'contract releasing master binds his widow, 381. 
 
INDEX. 609 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 LOUISIANA : 
 
 application of law of the road in, 283. 
 trespass to walk upon a street railway track in, 288. 
 passenger's arm projecting from car window, 286. 
 burden of proof in, 422, 440. 
 
 LOUISVILLE, &c. R. CO. ■». COLLINS : See Mabtek and Servant, 319. 
 
 LUMBER : 
 
 set afire by locomotives. See FmES. 
 LUMBER PILE : 
 
 falling upon a child, 140. 
 LUNATICS : 
 
 imputed neglfgence of custodians of. See Imputed CoNTRrBUTOKT 
 Nbolioence. 
 
 LYNCH V. NURDIN : 
 
 the rule as to trespassing children declared in. See Children. 
 
 M. 
 
 MACHINERY : 
 
 duties of master and servant in respect of. See Master and Servant. 
 MAIL AGENT : 
 
 carrier's contract limiting liability for injury to, 172, n, 
 MAINE: 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child In, 122, 130. 
 
 Sunday traveling in, 219, 236. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 177, 265. 
 
 injuries to runaway horses by defective highways, 345. 
 
 children playing in the highway, 278. 
 
 burden of proof, 422, 440. 
 
 MARYLAND : 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child in, 132, 130. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219. 
 
 land-owner next to highway need not take unusual precautions against 
 
 fire, 287. 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 245, 
 boarding a moving street-car, in, 293. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 burden of proof in, 433, 440. 
 MASSACHUSETTS : 
 
 doctrine of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 negligence of bailee imputed to bailor in, 114. 
 negligence of parent imputed to chOd in, 130. 
 children as trespassers in, 141. 
 boarding moving trains in, 146. 
 Sunday traveling in, 47, n, 175-177, 262-265. 
 89 
 
610 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS (GontimieO) : 
 
 BoBworth v. Inhabitants of Swansey, 176-262. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 173. 
 
 contributory negligence at railway crossing in, 184. 
 
 no duty due to mere trespasser on railway track, 210. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219, 226. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take, unusual precautions against 
 fire, 237. 
 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, in, 245. 
 
 city ordinances requiring removal of snow, valid in, 274. 
 
 right of children to play upon the highway, in, 278, 279. 
 
 riding upon platform of street-car in, 293. 
 
 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 313. 
 
 master's liability to servants, in, 313, 315, 331, 333, 357, 374. 
 
 liability of servant to a fellow-servant, in, 374. 
 
 rale in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute in, 379, 381. 
 
 burden of proof in, 422, 440. 
 
 contributory negligence in pleading in, 443. 
 MASTER : 
 
 of a lighter, co-servant vrith one of the crew, 336. 
 
 of a vessel, co-servant with the mate, 336. 
 
 MASTER MACHINIST : 
 
 co-servant witli a fireman, 335. 
 MASTER MECHANIC : 
 
 on a railroad, a vice-principal, 328, n. 
 
 not a co-servant with a fireman, 328, n. 
 
 in railway shop, not co-servant with a watchman, 337. 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT : 
 
 servant's collateral violation of law no defense to his action, 48. 
 
 a misapplication of the rule in Georgia, 48. See Collateral Viola- 
 tions OP Law. 
 servant's contributory negligence a bar to recovery, 299. 
 
 walking upon a riailway track, 299, n. 
 
 alighting from and boarding moving cars, 299, n. 
 
 riding upon engine pilot, 299, n. 
 
 upon front foot-board of switch-engine, 299, n. 
 
 error of judgment in sudden peril, 299, n. 
 
 unlawful labor on Sunday, 299, n. 
 
 wilful negligence of a vice-principal, 300. 
 
 the degree of care required, 301. 
 
 the rule in Delaware, New Jersey and Texas, 301. 
 master liable for his own neglect, 302. 
 
 master working with the servant, 302. 
 
 the rule stated, 303. 
 
 master's negligence combining with that of co-servant, 304. 
 proximate cause, 305. 
 defective brakes, 805. 
 fire damp in a coal mine, 305. 
 
INDEX. 611 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT (OowWnMed) : 
 respondeat superior, 306. 
 the early cases, 307. 
 
 Michael o. Allestree, 307. 
 Tuberville v. Stampe, 307. 
 the exception to the rule, 308. 
 Priestley v. Fowler, 308. 
 later English cases, 309. / 
 
 Baron Alderson's statement of the exception, 310. 
 the exception in the United States, 311. 
 Murray v. South Carolina R.'Co., 311. 
 
 reasoning of the South Carolina case, 313. 
 Farwell «. Boston, &c., R. Co., 313. 
 the exception stated, 314. 
 reasoning of Farwell «. Boston, &c., R. Co., 315. 
 the reasoning criticised, 316, 317. 
 the modifications in Kentucky, 818. 
 the Kentucky statute, 318. 
 " wilful neglect," 66, 97, 318. 
 
 the leading case— Louisville, &c., R. Co. ». Collins, 319. 
 the opinion in the Collins case, 330. 
 comparative negligence in Illinois, 331. 
 the rule in Tennessee, 333. 
 who are fellow-servants, 833. 
 the rule stated, 834. 
 
 BartonshiU Coal Co. ■». Raid, 334. 
 master machinist, engineers and firemen, 334, n. 
 who are vice-principals, 335. 
 
 the rule in the federal courts, 335. 
 
 further statement of the rule, 336. 
 
 applications of the doctrine, 337. 
 
 test whether one is mere servant or vice-principal, 338. 
 
 Gunter v. Q-raniteville Mfg. Co., 338. 
 corporations not excepted from the rule, 339. 
 
 Evansville, &c., R. Co. v. Baum, 339. 
 Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. Ross, 330. 831. 
 what is common employment, 833, 333. 
 radical views in Massachusetts, 883. 
 illustrations, railroad employees, 384, 835. . 
 
 miscellaneous employees, 336. 
 servants not in common employment, illustrations, 337. 
 servants of different masters, 338. 
 McAndrews «. Burns, 338. 
 the rule stated, 339. 
 
 employees of independent contractors, 339. 
 the rule approved, 340. 
 
 independent railways having running connections, 341. 
 as to volunteers, 342. 
 
 Degg v. Midland Ry. Co., 343. 
 
612 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections ] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT (Continued) : 
 the rule modified, 343. 
 "Wright ®. London, &c., Ry. Co., 343. , 
 partnershipB and receivers as employers, 344. 
 the obligation of the master, 345. 
 
 defective machinery, premises, &c., 346. 
 
 whether proximate cause of injury, 32, n. 
 averments in servant's complaint, 346, n. 
 'knowledge the essence of liability, 346. 
 dangerous premises, 347. 
 defective machinery, 348. 
 
 ^master's duty as to machinery a continuing duty, 349. 
 duty of servant to report defects, 349, n. 
 modified in respect of railway cars from another line, 349. 
 this modification criticised, 350. 
 O'NeilB. St. Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 350. 
 modification not recognized in Illinois, 350. 
 master not required to furnish the best appliances, 351. 
 Kelly V. Silver Spring Co., 351. 
 imperfect and unfen^ed machinery, 351. 
 dangerous freight cars, 351 . 
 master not a guarantor of the safety of appliances, 352. 
 
 ordinary care the measure 'of duty, 352. 
 master's duty as to competency and fitness of employees, 353. 
 analogous to the duty in respect of machinery, 353. 
 ordinary care the measure of obligation, 353. 
 averments in servant's complaint, 353, n, 354, n. 
 incompetency must contribute to the injury, 353, n. 
 near-sighted railroad engineer, 353, n. 
 insufficient number of servants, 353, n. 
 a continuing duty, 354. 
 master not a guarantor of fit;iess of servants, 355. 
 only ordinary care required, 355. 
 plaintiff must allege ignorance of unfitness, 354, n. 
 mere laziness not unfitness, 354, n. 
 qualifications once possessed presumed to continue, 355, n. 
 master's delegation of his duty to an agent, 356. 
 inspection of machinery, 356, n. 
 negligence of a mine boss, 356, n. 
 a minor subject to rule of common employment, 357. 
 this application criticised, 357. 
 exceptions hereto, 357, n. 
 the Massachusetts cases, 357. 
 master ordering servant into danger, or service not contracted for, 358. 
 servant's duty of care, 358, n. 
 servant wandering from post of duty, 358. 
 patent and latent dangers of the employment, 359. 
 latent dangers are assumed risks, 359. 
 extent of master's duty to give.^notice of, 859 
 
INDEX. 613 
 
 (The references are to sections.] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT {Continued) : 
 
 inexperienced servant entitled to instruction, 359, n. 
 as to minor employees, 359, 362. 
 the servant's assumption of risk, 860. 
 
 working on platform without a railing,' 860. 
 
 a question of law for the court, 360, n. 
 
 risks incident to the use of snow ploughs, 360. 
 
 cattle upon an unfenced railway, 360, 361. 
 
 wheeling earth at the edge of a bank, 360. 
 
 passing near uncovered saw, 360, n. 
 
 falling through unguarded hatchway, 360. 
 
 standing in dangerous place to signal trains, 360. 
 
 digging under a bank of earth, 360, n. 
 
 repairing'defective machinery, 360, n. 
 
 a railroad track-walker, coal from passing engine, 360. 
 
 railroad section hand working on a foggy day, 360. 
 falling into a waterway, 360. 
 risk from special trains, 860. 
 
 unblocked frogs in a railroad yard, 360, n. 
 
 mistaking damaged cars for sound ones, 360. 
 
 negligence of fellow-servant in handling such cars, 360, n. 
 
 brakes known to be defective, 360, n. 
 
 throwing mail-bags into a train in motion, 360, n. 
 
 working near dangerous machinery, 361. 
 
 farm laborer kicked by a vicious horse, 361, n. 
 risks not assumed— illustrations, 361. 
 
 negligence of third persons, 361. 
 
 a carpenter working on a roof Injured by defective walls, 361. 
 
 railroad employees in respect of road-bed and appliances, 861. 
 
 unsafe machinery, 361. 
 
 knowledge of risk distinguished from knowledge of defect, 361, 
 the master's duty toward minor servants, 862. 
 
 instruction how to avoid dangers, 362. 
 
 minors of inunature years, 863. 
 
 his liability a question of fact, 362. 
 overhead railway bridges and depot roofs, 363. 
 
 train-men assume the risk, 868. 
 
 these structures condemned, 363. 
 
 lawfulness of generally recognized, 363. 
 contributory negligence, 868, n. 
 injuries to train-men in coupling cars, 864. 
 
 while the train is in motion, 864 . 
 servant's voluntary use of defective tools, 364. 
 
 ignorance of defects, 364. 
 
 disobedience of rules, 364. , 
 
 his want of ordinary care, 865. 
 
 a conductor making couplings, 365. 
 bumpers of different heights, 365. 
 master's knowledge of defect, essential to a recovery, 866, 867. 
 
614 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sectioiiB.] 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT {Continued) : 
 
 obligation to know equivalent to knowledge, 366, '367. 
 servants ignorance also essential, 367. 
 the servant's duty of ordinary care, 368. 
 in informing himself of dangers, 369. 
 must possess fair skill, 369. 
 knowledge of the danger, 370. See B^nowlbdok of the Dangek 
 
 knowledge of defects and of dangers "distinguished, 370, n. 
 continued service after knowledge a waiver, 371. 
 railway's neglect to fence, 226, n. 
 the rule relaxed in favor of minors, 371. 
 does not apply to seamen, 371. 
 servant's duty to report defects, 371. 
 the rule qualified, 372. 
 complaint and promise to repair, 172. 
 Judge Thompson's criticism, 372. 
 Patterson ». Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 372. 
 servant must obey rules to promote his safety, 373. 
 
 disobedience no bar unless a proximate cause of injury, 373. 
 locomotive engineer violating rules, 373. 
 servant's liability to a fellow-servant, 374. 
 
 Albro V. Jaquith — the Massachusetts cases, 374. 
 liability to the master and to their persons, 875. 
 statutory modifications of the rule of common employment, 376. 
 Employer's Liability Act (43 and 44 Vict., Ch. 42), 376. 
 provisions of, 377. 
 the effect of, 378. 
 legislation in the United States, 879. 
 servant's contract releasing master from liability, 380. 
 Griffiths V. The Earl of Dudley, 380. 
 forbidden in some of the States, 881 . 
 
 the English doctrine not generally approved in America, 382. 
 contracts releasing master from common law liability, 383. 
 Roesner v. Hermann, 888. 
 Railroad Co. v. Spangler, 383. 
 Little Rock, &c., Ry. Co. v. Eubanks, 383. 
 Memphis, &c., R. Co. v. Jones, 388. 
 the Gteorgia cases, 384. 
 master's liability in other countries, 385. 
 in Scotland, 885, 386. 
 in Ireland, 387. 
 
 on the continent of Europe, 388. 
 the influence of railway corporations, 388. 
 
 MATi; : 
 
 on a vessel, co-servant with the master, 336. 
 
 with a sailor, vessel in charge of captain, 336. 
 second, co-servant with a seaman, 386. 
 
INDBX. 615, 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 MICHIGAN : 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of private driver imputed to occupant of vehicle in, 109. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 319, 226. 
 
 contributory negligence of land-owner next to railway in respect of fire, 
 238. 
 
 town not liable to private action for defective highways, 244. 
 
 burden of proof in, 423, 440. 
 MINER: 
 
 co-servant with an " underlooker," 336. 
 
 not co-servant vyith a " mining captain," 337. 
 
 not with common laborer, 837. 
 ' ' MINING CAPTAIN ": 
 
 not a co-servalit with miners, 3.S7. 
 MINNESOTA : 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child in, 122. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability in, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 219, 236. 
 
 passenger's arm out of car window, in, 296. 
 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 MINOR : See Childrbn, Master and Servant. 
 MISSISSIPPI : 
 
 negligence of parent not imputable to infant child in, 130. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222, 224, 225. 
 
 railway j>n»ia/ac2is liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 
 rules as to fellow-servants modified by statute in, 379. 
 
 burden of proof in, 433, 440. 
 MISSOURI : 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child, in, 130. 
 
 carrier's stipulations limiting liability in, 173. 
 
 duty to " look and listen " at railway crossing not absolute in, 183. 
 
 trespassers upon a raUway track in, 201, 203. 
 
 an attempt to apply the rule of Davies ». Mann, 202. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222, 236. 
 
 railway prima fade liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 
 land- owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 flre. 237, 239., 
 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 245. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 368. 
 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants modified by statute in, 879. 
 
 burden of proof in, 436, 440. 
 
 MITIGATION OF DAMAGES : 
 
 the strict rule of contributory negligence, 69. See Aggravation of the 
 
 Injury. 
 proper in certain cases, 69, 71. 
 rule in Georgia and Tennessee something near a rule in, 88, 91, ,93, 98, 95. 
 
616 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 MONTANA : 
 
 rule in respect of fellow servants modi&ed by statute in, 379. 
 
 MOVING TRAIN : 
 
 alighting from and boarding. See Railways. 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION : 
 
 not liable for accident in discharge of fireworks, 413. 
 duty in respect of highways, See Highways. 
 
 MURRAY V. SOUTH CAROLINA R. CO : 
 
 exception to the rule of respondeat superior declared, 311. 
 
 N. 
 
 NEBRASKA: 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 130. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in 232, 226. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against flre, 
 
 237. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 
 NECESSITY OR CHARITY : 
 
 applied to Sunday travelling. See Railways, 175 e<«ej., Hiohways, 
 261 et seq., and Strbbt Railways, 298. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 derivation of the law of, 1 . 
 
 Coggs V. Bernard, 2. 
 
 Sir William Jones, 2. 
 
 Chancellor Kent, 2. 
 variance between modern practice and scholastic theory, 3. 
 modern law of, essentially Roman, 8. 
 not capable of exact definition, 4. 
 
 Baron Alderson's definition, 5. 
 
 John Austin's definition, 5. 
 
 Doctor Wharton's definition, 5. 
 
 the author's definition, 6. 
 degrees of, 17. 
 
 in the Roman law, 17. 
 
 in the scholastic jurisprudence, 17. 
 
 Coggs V. Bernard— a triple classification, 17. 
 
 implies three degrees of care, 18. See Obdinaky Cake. 
 slight, a want of great care, 17-19. 
 
 sometimes confounded with " remote cause," 83, 86, 87. 
 gross, a want of slight care, 18, 61, 63, 74, 98, 171. 
 
 insuflioient to overcome plaintiff's contributory, 14, n. 
 
 said to be mere vituperation without uniform meaning, 18, 61, 127, 
 171. 
 
 sometimes confounded with wilful, 61, 63, 98, 99. 
 
 sometimes used to mean a "proximate cause," 82, 86, 87. 
 the triple classification defended, 62. 
 
INDEX. 617 
 
 [The references are to sectiona.] 
 
 NEGLIGENCE {ContinuecC) : 
 
 comparative. See Compakativb Negligence. 
 
 burden of proof in actions of. See Burden op Proof. 
 
 as a question of law or of fact. See Law and Pact. 
 
 a general charge of in a complaint is sufficient, 19, n. See Pleading. 
 
 of third person combining with defendants, ^2, n, 100-103. 
 
 defendant's invitation or license, 50, 51. See Invitation or License. 
 
 imposes duty of ordinary care, 50, 51. 
 
 invitation defined, 51. 
 
 distinction between invitation and license, 51 . 
 
 Hargreaves v. Deacon, 51. 
 plaintiff's prior, defendants' subsequent, 54. 56. See Davies ». Mann. 
 
 Judge Thompson's discovery clause, 55, 198 et seq. See Discovery 
 Clause. 
 defendant's acts throwing plaintiff off his guard, 67, 213, n. 
 
 abandonment of customary signals at private railway crossings, 185, n. 
 
 withdrawal of a flagman at a crossing, 190. Siee Contribdtoet 
 Negligence, Proximate Cause, Wilpul Negligence. 
 NEVADA : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 222, 226. 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SUNDAY RULE : See Railways, 175, et seq. High- 
 ways, 261, ei seq. Street Railways, 298. 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE : 
 
 parents' imputed contributory negligence repudiated in, 130. 
 
 Sunday traveling in, rule as to, 177. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219, 226. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precaution against 
 fire, 237. 
 
 injuries to runaway horses by defective highways, 245. 
 
 right of children to play upon the highway in, 278, 280. 
 
 burden of .proof in, 426, 440. 
 NEW JERSEY : 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 carrier's negligence not imputed to passenger in, 106, 111, 112. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 180. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 fire, 237, 239. 
 
 remote fire communicated by burning oil, 241. 
 
 municipal corporation not liable to private action for defective highways, 
 244. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 influence of Davies v. Mann, 29. 
 
 plaintiff acting wildly under under impulse of fear in, 42, 44. 
 
 distinction between gross and wilful negligence, 62. 
 
618 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 NEW YORK (Goniinuea) : 
 
 doctrine of comparative negligence denied in, 76. 
 
 negligence of parent imputed to child in, 118-20, 133; 127-130. 
 
 negligence of carrier imputed to shipper of goods in, 109, 114. 
 
 riding on platforms of railway cars, 149. 
 
 the several grades of negligence defined in, 171. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liabilities in, 173., 
 
 duty of traveler at railway crossing, in, 193. 
 
 children trespassing on railway property in, 210. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large iu) 219, 226, 281, 239. 
 
 railway prima facie, liable by statute for killing animals, 224. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 fire, 237, 239. 
 
 injuries to runaway horses by defective highways, 245. 
 
 pedestrians crossing the street in, 279. 
 
 ambulance entitled to right of way by statute in, 383. 
 
 right of children to play upon highway in, 378, 279, 381. 
 
 boarding a pioving street car in, 291. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363 . 
 
 burden of proof in, 433-441. ' 
 
 contributory negligence in pleading in, 443. 
 NEWSBOYS : 
 
 riding free on railway or street cars, 167, 397. 
 NIGHT: 
 
 traveling in the, 248. See Highways. 
 NINETY PER CENTUM OF ACTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 contributory negligence defeats plaintiff in, 380, 430, 435. 
 JfTON SUI JURIS: 
 
 who are, 117. See Imputed Contbibdtory Negligence. 
 NORTH CAROLINA: 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 332. 
 
 railway prima facie liable by statute for killing animals, 324. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 fire, 237. 
 
 burden of proof in, 422, 427, 440. 
 NOTICE : 
 
 by sleeping and parlor car companies disclaiming responsibility for bag- 
 gage, 173, 174. 
 
 to railway company of defective fence, 228. 
 
 of danger. See Knowledge of Dangbs. 
 NUISANCE : 
 
 plaintiff's property a, no defense for injury to, 415. 
 Colchester «. Brooke, 415. 
 oyster bed obstructing public river, 415. 
 the case criticised, 415. 
 
 overhead railway bridges ought to be held, when, 363. 
 
 ruinous building contiguous to highway, 376. 
 
IHDKX. ' 619 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 NUISANCE {Continued) : 
 
 unguarded pitfall near highway, 253. 
 opening in a sidewalk, when not a, 255. 
 fruit stand encroaching upon the highway, 257. 
 what a city has licensed not a, 269, 413. 
 horse unlawfully at large in highway, 269. 
 
 OBSTRUCTION : 
 
 in highway or sidewalk, 244, 248, 250, n, 274, See Highways. 
 plaintiff's knowledge of obstruction, 248, 250, n. 
 snow as an obstruction, 374. 
 
 of navigable river, by oyster bed, 415. 
 
 of crossing by cars, whether proximate cause of injury, 32, n. 
 OHIO : 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child, in, 130. 
 
 carrier's stipulations limiting liability in, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 221, 226. 
 
 servant's contract releasing master from liability for negligence, 383. 
 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 ONUS PEOBAJIfDI: See Burden of Proof. 
 ORDINANCE : See Highways, Railways. 
 ORDINARY CARE : 
 
 what is, generally, 17-21. 
 
 Chancellor Walworth's definition of, 21. 
 
 contributory negligence if plaintiff fails to exercise, 7, 9, 14, 19-21. See 
 
 CONTRrBUTORY NBGLIGBNCE. 
 
 failure io exercise is ordinary negligence, 18. See Nbgliobncb. 
 
 a relative not an absolute, term, 21, 22. ' 
 
 generally a question of fact, 23. See Law and Fact. 
 
 tends to become a question of law, 23. 
 
 in a cliild. See Children. 
 
 by a passenger under various circumstances. See Railways, Street 
 Railways, Ferries. 
 
 by a carrier towards strangers. See Railways. 
 , by the public at railway crossings. See Railways. 
 
 by the owner of animals. See Aniuals and Fences. 
 
 by municipal corporation in respect of highways. See Highways. 
 
 by traveler upon the highway. See Highways. 
 
 the co-relative obligation of master and servant. See Master and 
 Servant. 
 
 presumptions in respect of exercise of. See Presumptions and Burden 
 OF Proop. 
 ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE : See Negligence. 
 OREGON : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 222. 
 
 burden of proof in, 422, 440. 
 
620 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 ORIGIN OP MODERN LA.W OP NEGLIGENCE : See NBOLiGKiifCK. 
 OVERHEAt) RAILWAY BRIDGES : 
 
 injuries to train-men by. See Master and Sebvant. 
 
 PALACE CAR COMPANY : 
 
 not generally an insurer of passenger's property, 173, 412. 
 otherwise If there is an actual bailment, 173. 
 contributory negligence when no defense, 173. 
 
 PARENTS AND CHILD : 
 
 contributory negligence of parent in his action for injury to child, 131-135, 
 143. See Children ; Imputed Conteibutoby NEOLiesNCE. 
 
 PARLOR CAR COMPANY: 
 
 liability for loss of baggage, 173, 413. See Railways. 
 
 PASSENGERS : See Imputed CoNTBrBUTOEY Negligence, Febbies, Rail- 
 ways, Steeet Railways. 
 
 PASSES, FREE: 
 
 limiting carrier's liability, 168-173. See Railways. 
 
 PATENT AND LATENT DANGERS : See Mastkb and Sebvant. 
 
 PEDDLERS : 
 
 riding free on railway trains, 167. See Railways. 
 
 PEDESTRIANS : See Highways, Railways, Steeet Railways, Tbes- 
 
 PASSERS. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA : 
 
 rule as to trespassers on railway tracks, 66, 198-300, 311, 314. 
 doctrine of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 imputed negligence of common carrier in, 108, 109, 113, 114. 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 130. 
 
 poverty of the parent as affecting the question, 133-135. 
 passengers riding on car platforms, &c., 149, 151, 153. 
 injury to passengers at car windows, in, 155. 
 injuries at and about railway stations, in, 160. 
 
 intoxication as contributory negligence in,, 160. 
 carrier's stipulation, limiting liability in, 173. 
 crossing a railway track in, 193. 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 319. 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precaution against flres, 
 
 336, 339. 
 fire communicated by burning oil, 343. 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 345. 
 right of children to play upon the highway, in, 378, 281. 
 law of the road in, 282. 
 
 passenger's arm extending out of car window, 296. 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 
IHDBX. 881 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA. CO. v. RONEY: 
 
 engineer attempting to save his train, 43, 373. 
 PERIL : 
 
 plaintiff acting erroneously under fear. See Contbibutobt Nbgli- 
 esNCB. 
 
 PHYSICAL DISABILITIES : See Deaf Peksonb, Blind Pbrbons, Ihtoxi- 
 
 CATION. 
 
 PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT : 
 
 contributory negligence in actions between, 406. 
 
 plaintiff's aggravation of the injury, 406. See Aggravation op the 
 
 Injcbt. 
 Hibbard v. Thompson, 406. 
 Chamberlain v. Morgan, 407. 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 407. 
 actions by patient against a third person, 407. 
 reasonable care in selecting physician, 407. 
 PILOT : 
 
 not a co-servant with deck-hand, 337. 
 PIT: 
 
 child falling into unguarded, 140. See Highwats. 
 
 PLATFORMS OF CARS : 
 
 passengers standing or riding on, 68, n, 149, 293. See Railways, Street 
 Railways. 
 
 , PLATFORMS AT RAILWAY STATIONS : 
 duty of the company. See Railways. 
 PLEADING: 
 
 averment of negligence in a complaint, 19, n. 
 
 of contributory negligence in a plea, 19, n. 
 complaint must show proximate cause, 33, n. 
 
 complaint showing plaintiff's knowledge of danger not demurrable, 37, n. 
 in suits under Lord Campbell's Act, 60, n. 
 plaintiff's averment of due care, when unnecessary, 144, n. 
 contributory negligence of infant plaintiff not determined on demurrer, 
 117, n. 
 
 averments in defendant's plea of, 117, n. See Master and Servant 
 346, n. 
 in Indiana complaint must aver absence of contributory negligence, 433, n. 
 of existence or absence of contributory negligence, 443. 
 POLICIES OF INSURANCE : See Inbdrancb. 
 
 POLLOCK, BARON: 
 
 his criticism of Thorogood v Bryan, 186. 
 PORTER : 
 
 on steamship a co-servant with the stewardess, 336. 
 with carpenter, 336. 
 POSTAL CLERK : 
 
 riding in postal car as a passenger, ISl, n. 
 
622 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 POVERTY OR DESTITUTION : 
 
 parents' imputed negligence affected by 135. 
 
 pregnant; "WOMAN : 
 
 carelessly directed to alight from a train far from home, 163. 
 
 PREPONDERANCE OP NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 mere, does not satisfy rule of comparative negligence, 74. See Cou- 
 
 FABATIYE NeOLIOBNCE. 
 
 PRESUMPTION : 
 
 of negligence against common carrier when, 144, 285, n. 
 
 presumptions as to looking and listening at railway crossings, 181, n, 183. 
 
 of negligence, from barrel falling into highways, 377. See Bubden of 
 Pkoop. 
 PRIESTLEY B. FOWLER : 
 
 exception to the rule of respondeat miperior, 308, 309, 315. 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT : See Master amd Servant ; Imputed Con- 
 
 TRiBnTORY Negligence ; Agent. 
 PRIOR NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF : 
 
 as a defence to subsequent negligence of defendant, 54, 55, 56. See Con- 
 TRiBUTORr Negligence. 
 
 PRIVATE CONVEYANCE : 
 
 Negligence of driver. See Imputed Contributort Negligence. 
 PRIVATE WAY : See Wat. 
 PRIVITY IN NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 between a common carrier and passenger or shipper. See Imputed Con- 
 tributory Negligence. 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE : 
 
 essential to constitute contributory negligence, 7, 9, 14, 34. 
 the doctrine Stated, 35. 
 remoteness of cause, 35. 
 need not be the sole cause, 37, 34. 
 negligence must subatantiaUy contribute, 36. 
 negligence must be an efficient cause, 36. 
 
 these circumlocutions unsatisfactory, 37, 28. 
 what is a, 31, 33. 
 Judge Cooley's definition of, 31. 
 Lord Bacon's deflnition of, 32. 
 
 where negligence of both parties is a, 14, n., 20, n., 66, «., 305, n. 
 complaint must state facts showing, 33, n. 
 of suicide, injuries in railway collision not a, 33, n. 
 fire spread by unexpected wind, 33, n. 
 the "Squib case "—Scott®. Shepherd, 33, n. 
 question of, usually for the jury, 84, n., 33, n. 
 wrongful intervention of third person, 33, n. 
 co-servant falling upon plaintiff from defective ladder, 33, n. 
 obstruction of crossing by cars, 33, n. 
 defective highway— runaway horse— breaking of reins, 32, n. 
 
INDBX. 633 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 injuries in attempting to extinguish a fire, 44, n. 
 
 negligence must be contributory to be.a, 33, 
 
 collateral negligence not a, 33. 
 
 plaintiff's unlawful act, 44, n, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, n, 50. See Collatbral 
 
 Violations of Law. 
 plaintiff a trespasser, 50. 
 plaintiff's prior, defendant's subsequent negligence, 54, 56. See Con- 
 
 TRrBUTOKT NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 plaintiff's negligence after the catastrophe, 57. See Aggravation op 
 
 THE Injury. 
 plaintiff's negligence subsequent to defendant's, 58. 
 is disregarded under the rule of comparatiye negligence in Illinois, 81, 83. 
 negligence in alighting from moving trains, 147, n. 
 of injuries to passenger riding in express car, 150, n. 
 passengers injured after alighting at unusual places, 32, n, 163. 
 injuries to one while traveling on Sunday, 175, 176, 367. 
 intoxication as a proximate cause of an injury, 197, n. See Intoxication. 
 of flre communicated from intervening property, 341, 242. 
 runaway horse injured by defective highway, 345. 
 one wilfully thrown into a pit in the highway, 245. 
 runaway horse killed upon a railway track, 245, n. 
 master's negligence combining with that of co-servant, 805. 
 servant's disobedience of mastei's rules, 373. See Discovert Clause. 
 
 PRUDENCE : See Contrbbutoby Negligence, Negligence Ordinary 
 Care. 
 
 PRUSSIAN LAW : 
 
 liability of master to servant under, 388. 
 
 PUBLIC CARRIER : See Railways, Street Railways, Ferries, Imputed 
 
 Contributory Negligence. , 
 
 PUBLIC POLICY : 
 
 rule of contributory negligence sustained by, 73. 
 
 as a reason for the exception of the rule of respondeat superior', 317. , 
 PUNITIVE DAMAGES : 
 
 statute in Kentucky for the recovery of, 66, 97, 318. 
 
 QUESTION OP PACT : See Law and Fact. 
 QUESTION OF LAW: See Law and Fact. 
 
 RACING ON THE HIGHWAY : See Highways. 
 RAILING : 
 
 at side of highway when duty to maintain, 253 
 
624 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 RAILROAD: See Railways. 
 
 wilful neglect of, not excused by contributory negligence, 29. See 
 Wilful NEGLiaENCS. 
 
 RAILWAYS : 
 
 the term "passengers" as used herein,'143. 
 the term " strangers" 143. 
 contributory negligence a frequent defence, 143. 
 duty of a public carrier to passengers, 144. 
 not an insurer of safety, 144. 
 wrongful acts of servants, 144, n. 
 great care required, 144. 
 presumption ot negligence. 144. 
 duty exists toward all passengers, 144. 
 intended passengers, 144, n. 
 quasi passengers. 
 
 employees of express companies, 144, n. 
 
 mail agents, 144, n. 
 
 drovers in charge of stock, 144, n. 
 reciprocal duty of the passenger, 145. 
 ordinary care required, 145. 
 boarding moving trains, 146. 
 
 contributory negligence a question for the jury, 146. 
 
 generally pronounced negligence, 146. 
 
 prima fade negligent in Massachuesetts, 146. 
 
 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Murphy, 146. 
 alighting from moving trains, 147. 
 
 not always negligence per se, 147. 
 
 the doctrine of many cases, 147, 160. 
 
 proximateness of contributory negligence, 147, n. 
 
 the advice of the train men, 68, 148. 
 
 negligence and contributory negligence for the jury, 68, n, 148. 
 
 a misdemeanor in Iowa, 148. 
 
 children riding free, 167, n. 
 
 under apprehension of peril, 40, 148. 
 leaving the seat before the train stops, 295. 
 standing or riding on platforms, 149. 
 
 not negligence per se, 149. 
 
 the rule in Pennsylvania and Illinois, 149. 
 passing from car to car, 149. 
 riding in a baggage car, 150, 151, 158, 153. 
 
 whether a proximate cause of injury, 150. 
 
 a quasi trespass, 150. 
 
 the conductor's consent, 151. 
 must conform to reasonable rules, 151. 
 riding in a caboose car, 151, n. 
 postal clerk riding in postal car, 151, n. 
 employee's waiver of the rules, 151, 152, 153. 
 
626 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 RAILWAYS (ConUnueO) : 
 
 the reasoning in Pennsylvania, 151. 
 
 tlie reasoning approved, 153. 
 the rule summarized, 153. 
 riding in exposed or unlawful places, 154. 
 upon locomotives, 154. 
 upon hand-cars, 154. 
 upon the tops of freight care, 154. 
 upon the pilot of the engine, 154, n. 
 drovers in exposed places. 154, n. 
 tipped up on a seat near an open side door, 154. 
 upon freight trains, 154. 
 
 standing or leaning against the seat, 154. 
 passenger's ignorance of prohibitory rule, 154, n. 
 injuries at car windows and doors, 155. 
 in the case of a free passenger, 165, n. 
 putting head or elbow outside the window, 155. 
 resting an arm on the window sill, 155. 
 the rule in Pennsylvania, 155. 
 whether a proper question for the jury, 156. 
 the cases analyzed 156. 
 
 the rule in Dlinois, 156. 
 the rule ia Missouri, 156. 
 the rule in Wisconsin, 156. 
 
 reasoning of the court, 157. 
 notice of the danger, 158. 
 passenger attempting to close the door, 158. 
 
 the English rule, 159. 
 leaning against the door, 159. 
 injuries at and about railway stations, 160. 
 the duty of the Company, 160. 
 
 Judge Cooley's statement, 160. 
 contributory negligence of the passenger, 160. 
 entering premises in the dark, 160. 
 climbing an enbankment to the track, 160. 
 the duty of the railway to light the platform at night, 160. 
 a stranger alighting in the dark, 160. 
 boarding cars in the dark, 160. ' 
 going upon defective unlighted platform, 160. 
 waMng off dark platform, 160. 
 leaving the station by a dark stairway, 160. 
 boarding train elsewhere than at a platform, 160. 
 
 running to get aboard, 160. 
 reasonable time to alight, 160. 
 a question for the jury, 160. 
 reasonable facilities for stepping off the train, 160. 
 personable assistance in alighting, 160. 
 going through the smoking car to alight, 160. 
 alighting when intoxicated, 160. 
 40 
 
636 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sectione.] 
 
 RAILWAYS (ftonUmed) : 
 
 getting off the wrong side of the train, 160. 
 
 crossing the track to board a train, 160. See also Invitation ob License. 
 
 alighting at dangerous places, 161. 
 
 the train stopping elsewhere^than at a station, 161. 
 at a water tank, 161. 
 upon a side track, 161. 
 
 upon approaching another railroad crbssing, 161. 
 upon a bridge or culvert, 161. 
 in a tunnel, 161. 
 announcing the station, 161. 
 the English rule, 163. 
 
 invitation to alight, 160, 161, 162. 
 alighting at unusual place by compulsion, or advice of trainmen, 68, 162, 
 163. 
 ordinary care in leaving the place, 163, n. 
 
 proximate cause, 163, n. 
 duty to move the train to the plaltf orm, 163. 
 
 a pregnant woman carelessly directed to alight far from home, 163. 
 See Fboxiuati: Cause. 
 plaintiff hit by something thrown or dropped from a moving train, 164. 
 throwing out mail bags at a station, 164. 
 
 Carpenter v. Boston & Albany B. Co., 164. 
 Snow «. Fitchburg R. Co., 164. 
 injuries to free passengiers, 165. 
 
 free carriage how far a defense, 165. 
 gratuitous passengers injtired at a car door, 166, n. 
 mail agents riding free, 165, n., 172, n. 
 assent of the company to carry free, 165. 
 
 unauthorized invitation to ride by employees, 165, 166. 
 passenger riding on a horse car, 165, n. 
 riding on a non-transferable pass, 47. 
 stealing a ride, 47. 
 injuries to free passengers. 
 
 newsboys, peddlers, &c,, 167. 
 
 Commonwealth n. Vermont, «fec. R. Co., 167. 
 Yeomans «. Contra Costa Steam Nav. Co., 167. 
 a child riding free on th6 platform, 167, n. 
 carrier's liability limited by contract, 168. 
 stipulations in free passes, 168. 
 the English rule, 169. 
 
 Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 169. 
 construction of, 169. 
 the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States, 170. 
 RaUroad Co. ». Lockwood, 170. 
 the conclusion stated, 170. 
 drovers traveling on free passes, 170, 172. 
 carrier's liability limited, &c. 
 the New York rule, 171. 
 
INDEX. 627 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 RAILWAYS (Continued) : 
 
 tendency to abolish distinction between gross and ordinary negligence 
 
 See Negligence. 
 the general American rule, 172. 
 
 limitation of liability as an insurer, 178. 
 carrier's liability for, 172. 
 
 ■wilful negligence, misconduct of employees, 172, n. 
 mail and express agents traveling on free passes, 172, n. 
 carrier's liabilities limited by contract. 
 
 stipulations limiting amount of liability, 172. 
 summary of the authorities, 172. 
 drovers travelling free, 172. 
 passenger's negligence as to baggage, 173. 
 the carrier an insurer, 173. 
 what constitutes baggage, 173. 
 delivery of possession to the carrier, 173. 
 liability of sleeping and parlor car companies, 173. 
 
 baggage intrusted to the porter, 173. 
 passenger's negligence as to baggage, 
 theft of baggage, 173. 
 
 posting notices disclaiming responsibility, 173. 
 passenger leaving property exposed to theft, 173. 
 . theft by the company's servants, 173. 
 
 contributory negligence immaterial, 173. 
 conditions printed on baggage checks, 174. 
 passenger's assent necessary, 174. 
 not contributory negligence to take such checks,.174. 
 passenger injured while assisting about his baggage, 174. 
 travelling on Sunday, 175. 
 
 the rule in Massachusetts, 175. 
 proximate cause involved, 175. 
 BoBworth V. Inhabitants of Swansey, 176. 
 Stanton v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 176. 
 riding upon a street car on Sunday, 176. 
 the rule in Vermont, 177. 
 the rule in Maine, 177. 
 the rule in Rhode Island, 177. 
 the rule in New Hampshire, 177. 
 the rule elsewhere than in New England, 177. 
 duty of a common carrier to strangers, 178. 
 ordinary care the measure of, 178. 
 slight care to mere trespassers, 179. 
 persons coming on business, 179. 
 travelers lawfully upon the track at a crossing, 179. 
 duty of the public at railway crossings, 180. 
 ordinary care required, 180. 
 
 a question of law as a rule, 180. 
 but not always, 192, n , 2. 
 tiie duty to look and listen, 181, 185, 188, 192, 193, 196. 
 
•628 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 BAILWAYS (Continued) : 
 
 absent miadedness, 37, n., 193. 
 
 presumptions as to looking and listening, 181, n., 183. 
 not required as matter of law of cliildren, 136, n. 
 a reasonable requirement, 181. 
 the traveller must come to a halt, 181. 
 
 the proper place a question for a jury, 181, n. 
 need not get out of the vehicle, 181. 
 the rule in Pennsylvania, 182. 
 the rule in Minnesota, 183. 
 duty to look and listen relaxed in some jurisdictions,.188. 
 person crossing in a covered wagon, 188. 
 traveller with his ears wrapped up, 183. 
 
 language of the Massachusetts court, 184. 
 duty of the railway company at crossings, 185. 
 statutory requirements, 185, 186. 
 
 the travelers not absolved from using care, 49, 185. 
 at private crossings, 185, n. 
 
 ordinary care a question of fact, 185, n. 
 abandonment of customary signals, 185, n. 
 effect of a statute, 186. 
 
 neglect of signals and lookout, 186. 
 the rule in Kentucky, 186. 
 burden of proof, 186, n. 
 horse frightened by train, 186, n. 
 when traveler's negligence no defence, 187. 
 
 subsequent negligence of the company, 187. 
 traveler presumed to know his danger, 187, n. 
 traveler's ignorance of the crossing, 188. 
 
 if a stranger, his negligence a question of fact, 188. 
 train behind time, 188. 
 fast driving— traveler unable to stop, 188. 
 to cross ahead of train in view, 188. 
 when retreat is impossible, 189. 
 
 principle of "sudden peril" may justify, 189. 
 driving frightened horse near an engine, 189. 
 flagmen, gatemen, &c., 190. 
 effect of a statute, 190. 
 
 duty to provide not due to trespassers, 190, «., 211, n. 
 withdrawal of without notice, 190. 
 invitation to cross, 190. 
 
 an open gate, 190. 
 forbidding to cross, 190. 
 
 attempt to cross aga,inst advice, 190. 
 flagman canhot recover if run over himself, 190. 
 when the view of the track is obstructed, 191, 195. 
 increased vigilance required of the company, 191. 
 ordinary care under the circumstances, 191. 
 failure to signal, 67, 191. 
 
629 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 RAILWAYS (Continual -. 
 
 the track obscured by smoke or fog, 191. 
 big buildings or piles of lumber, 191. 
 
 contributory negligence a question for the jury, 191. 
 several tracks at common grades, 192. 
 crossing after a train has passed, 193. 
 traveler's duty of care, 193, 193. 
 backing or switching trains over a crossing, 194. 
 
 duty of the railway, 194. 
 vigilance in crossing where the view is obstructed. Si, n., 195. 
 language of the Supreme Court of Iowa, 195. 
 the rule summarized, 196. 
 where a standing train obstructs a crossing, 196. 
 climbing over a standing train, 196. 
 reasonable attempts to pass, 196. 
 deafness of one crossing the track, 197. 
 
 imposed the duty of increased vigilance, 197. 
 intoxication of a person crossing, 197. 
 
 no excuse for want of ordinary care, 197. 
 matter for the jury, 197. 
 the Greorgia code, 197. 
 asleep or drunk on the track, 197. 
 
 in a fit, 197, n. 
 trespassers on a railway track — the Pennsylvania rule, 66, 198. 
 Phila, ifcc, E. Co. ®. Hummell, 198. 
 
 language of the court, 198. 
 Judge Gibson's statement of the rule, 199. 
 Railroad Co. v. Norton, 199. 
 decree of care due to, 56, n., 199, 305. 
 the Pennsylvania rule further stated, 199. 
 the modified rule as to trespassers, 301, ei acq. 
 the Missouri doctrine, 301, et seq. 
 
 Judge Thompson's discovery clause, 301, et seg. See also 
 Davibs v. Mann. 
 the rule summarized, 303. 
 trespassers presumed to appreciate the danger, 38, n, 203. 
 intoxication of, 303, n. 
 children as, on railway premises, 304. 
 
 playing upon turn tables, 140, 305, 310. 
 
 Judge Dillon's decision— Stout «. Sioux City, &c. R. Co., 307. 
 the Minnesota case, 308. 
 the New York rule; 310. 
 the general rule, 309. 
 walking along a railway track, 38, n., 56, n., 211. 
 whether negligence per le, 211. 
 
 the Pennsylvania rule, 211, n. 
 riding on horse-back between the crossings, 311. 
 signals at crossings not due to trespassers, 211. 
 where the track is a quasi public way, 212 . 
 
630 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 RAILWAYS {Continued) : 
 
 the pedestrian a licensee, 313. 
 a tacit license, 312. 
 
 the English rule, 313. 
 
 the Illinois rule, 313. 
 
 the Massachusetts rule, 313. 
 
 the Pennsylvania, rule, 314. 
 
 the Tennessee rule, 314. 
 
 the general American rule, 313, 314. 
 duty to a trespasser after the injury, 315. 
 
 person run over left uncared for, 215. 
 various acts of trespass, 316. 
 meddling with a torpedo, 53, 
 crawling under stationary cars, 316. 
 standing between tracks while a train passes, 316. 
 climbing over cars, 216. 
 
 in the case of ^ child, 316. 
 drovers riding on top of cars, 216. 
 plaintiff placing himself in dangerous position, 216. See Daitgebous 
 
 POSITIOK. 
 
 "flying" switches, 217. 
 
 negligence even toward trespassers, 317. 
 over crossings, 317. 
 
 the practice condemned, 317. • See Contbibdtort NBaLioENCE, 
 Imputed Contributory NBaLioBNCE, Fences, Fires, 
 Master and Servant, Street Railways. 
 RAILWAY CROSSINGS : See Railways. 
 RECEIVER : 
 
 liability to servants for negligent management, 344. 
 
 REMOTE NEGLIGENCE : See Contributory Negligence, Negligence, 
 
 Proximate Cause. 
 REPAIRER : 
 
 machine, co-servant with operatives, 386. 
 RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR : 
 
 the rule of. See Master and Servant. 
 RHODE ISLAND : 
 
 Sunday traveling in, 177; 266. 
 
 fences, 'and cattle at large in, 319. 
 
 icy sidewalks, how far a defect in highway, in, 370. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 863. 
 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 RIGGER : 
 
 on steamship, co-servant with scaffold-builder, 336. 
 ROAD: 
 
 law of. See Highways. 
 ROAD-MASTER : 
 
 co-servant with laborer, 385. 
 
INDBX. ■ 631 
 
 [The references are to sections. ] 
 ROMAN LAW: 
 
 modern law of negligence derived from, 1, 2, 3. 
 RUNAWAY HORSE : See Horse. 
 "RUNNING" SWITCHES : 
 
 the practice condemned, 317. See Railways. 
 
 s. 
 
 SABBATH DAY : 
 
 traveling on. See Highways, 361 et >eq. Railways, 175 et seq. Stbbet 
 Railways, 298. 
 SAILOR. See Sbamau . 
 SAWYER : 
 
 co-servant with carpenter in the mill when engaged in common work, 336. 
 SCAFFOLD-BUILDER : 
 
 co-servant with a rigger on steamship in port, 886. 
 SCOTCH LAW : 
 
 liability of master to servant in the, 385, 386. 
 SEA SHORE : 
 
 not a highway for public travel, 414. 
 traveler takes the risk of defects, 414. 
 SEAMAN: 
 
 co-servant with the mate when, 336. 
 with captain, 327. 
 
 continued service after knowledge, not a waiver of defects, 371. 
 
 SECTION BOSS : 
 
 co-servant with locomotive engineer, 334. 
 with a brakeman, 335. 
 with a laborer, 337. 
 SECTION-MAN : 
 
 not a co-servant with an engineer, 334, n. 
 
 on a hand-car, co-servant with train-men, 335. 
 
 SEEN DANGER : 
 
 servant assumes the risk from, IS, 359, 371, 372. See Master akd Seb- 
 
 VANT. 
 
 SERVANT : See Master amd Servant. 
 
 SHOVELER : 
 
 on a gravel train, co-servant with engineer, 334. 
 
 SHOW-BOARD : 
 
 falling on pedestrian, liability of city, 276. 
 
 SIDEWALKS ; See Highways. 
 SIDE TRACK : 
 
 train stopping upon, 162. 
 
 SIGNALS : 
 
 at railway crossing &c. See Railways. 
 
632 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 SIGNAL MAN : 
 
 co-servant with an engineer^ 334. ■ 
 
 with employees riding to their work, 385. 
 with gripman of a motor car, 336. 
 SIGNS : 
 
 falling on pedestrian, liability of owner, 276. 
 
 SLEEPING CAR CO.: 
 
 not generally an Insurer of passenger's property, 173, 413. 
 liability for loss of baggage. See Railways. 
 when contributory negligence no defence, 173. 
 
 SLIGHT CARE : See Thespassers, Obdinabt Case. 
 SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE : See NBGLmBNCB, Okdinart Care. 
 SLIPPERY SIDEWALK : See Highways. 
 SMOKE : 
 
 obscuring railway crossing. See Railways. 
 
 SNOW : 
 
 accumulation of in cattle guards. See Fences. 
 
 on highways. See Highways. 
 SNOW DRIFTS : 
 
 deviation from highway on account of, 254. See Highways. 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA : 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 232. 
 
 railway prima Jade liable by statute for killing animals, 234. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against fire, 
 
 237. 
 municipal corporation not liable to private action for defective highway, 
 
 244. 
 rule in respect of fellow-servants first declared in, 311, 312. 
 test of common employment, 338. 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 
 "SQUIB CASE": 
 
 a leading case on proximate cause, 33, n. 
 
 applied to injuries by fire from remote source, 241. 
 
 STAGE COACH: 
 
 passenger's arm outside of window, 396. 
 STATIONS : 
 
 Injuries at and about railway. See Railways. 
 STATION AGENT : 
 
 co-servant with an engineer, 334. 
 STEALING A RIDE : See Railways. 
 STEAMBOAT COMPANY : 
 
 liability for negligent communication of fire, 416. 
 STEWARDESS : 
 
 on steamship, co-servant with porter, 336. 
 with the carpenter, 336. 
 
INDEX. 633 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 STOCK : 
 
 injuries to. See Fences. 
 
 STREET : See Highways. 
 
 STREET RAILWAYS : 
 
 passengers crowded ofiE the platform, 100. See Imputed Contributoiiy 
 
 Negligence. 
 duties of as common carriers, 285. 
 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 285. 
 accident raises presumption of negligence against, 285, n. 
 duty of to intoxicated passenger, 286. 
 duty to furnish cha^ige, 286. 
 duty as to pedestrians, 287. 
 
 driver must be watchful, 287. 
 
 rushing over street crossings, 287. 
 
 driver inside collecting fares, 287, n. 
 
 driving across the track, 287. 
 driver's negligence not Imputable to passenger, 287. See Imputed Con- 
 
 TKIBUTOKY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 walking upon the track, 288. 
 
 a trespass in Louisiana, 288. 
 
 otherwise in California and Texas, 288. 
 
 not properly a trespass, 288, 289, 290. 
 the track not a highway, 289. 
 compared with steam railroad, 289, 290. 
 
 ordinary care by pedestrians, 290. 
 by the railway, 290. 
 alighting from or boarding moving cars, 291. 
 
 not negligence per se, 291. 
 
 leaping in fear of collision, 41. 
 
 duty of the railway company, 291, 292. 
 
 boarding at the front platform, 292. 
 riding upon platforms, 292, 294. 
 
 not negligence per se, 293, 294. 
 
 riding on the steps, 293, 294, 295. 
 
 standing in dangerous position, 294. 
 
 when there is room inside, 294, 295. 
 standing room only, 295. 
 
 passing on side steps from front to rear, 294. 
 
 in violation of rules, 294. 
 sitting upon a window sill, 294. 
 sitting on the driving bar, 295. 
 
 contributory negligence in Michigan, 294. 
 holding on to the straps when standing, 295. 
 leaving seat before the cars stop, 295. 
 passenger's hand or arm outside of car window, 296. 
 
 the rule in Pennsylvania, Minnesota and Louisiana, 296. 
 
 where the tracks are near together, 296. 
 free passengers and trespassers, 297. 
 
634 nn>Bx. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 STREET RAILWAYS (Contirmed) : 
 
 newsboys, 397. 
 
 the driver or conductor's invitation, 397. 
 Sunday traveling on, 176, 398. 
 SUDDEN PERIL: See Coktribtjtokt NKaLiaBNCK 
 
 SUICIDE : 
 
 not a proximate result of injuries, 33. See Insttkanck. 
 
 SUNDAY: 
 
 servant unlawfully laboring on Sunday, 399, n. 
 traveling on, 175, et seq., 361, et seq., 298. 
 SUPERINTENDENT : 
 
 co-servant witlx a laborer, 337. 
 
 with an architect, 337. 
 railway, co-servant with engineer, 334. 
 
 SWITCHES : 
 
 " running " or " flying " condemned, 317. 
 
 SWITCHMAN : 
 
 co-servant with an engineer, 333. 
 
 with conductor, 334, 335. 
 
 with a brakeman, 335. 
 
 with baggage master, 335. 
 
 " with a track-repairer, 335. 
 
 T. 
 
 TEAMSTERS : 
 
 iajuries to while unloading cars, 178, n. 
 
 hauling railroad ties, riding on train, co-servant with conductor, 335. 
 TELEGRAPH COMPANIES : 
 
 actions against for failure to transmit or deliver dispatches, 400. 
 contributory negligence of the sender, 400. 
 illegible chirography, 400. 
 insufScient address, 400, 401. 
 
 regulations requiring deposit charge for delivery, 400. 
 Given v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 401. 
 TELEGRAPH OPERATOR : 
 co-servant with engineer, 339. 
 with a flremiin, 335. 
 TENNESSEE : 
 
 modified rule of contributory negligence in, 71, 75, 93-95. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 130. 
 
 statutory duty of railway company as to signals, 214. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 
 fire, 337. 
 s ervant's contracts releasing master from liability for negligence, 888. 
 contributory negligence in actions by client against attorney, 406. 
 
INDEX. 685 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 TEXAS: 
 
 doctrine of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 130. 
 
 rules as to boarding moving trains in, 146. 
 
 carriers stipulation limiting liability in, 173. 
 
 duty to " look and listen " at railway crossing not absolute, 183. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large, in, 223, 226, 228. 
 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 245. 
 
 not a trespass to walk on street railway track in, 388. 
 
 burden of proof in, 436, 440. 
 
 THEFT : 
 
 of baggage, liability of sleeping and parlor companies ^or, 173. 
 when contributory negligence no defence, 178. 
 
 THIRD PERSONS' NEGLIGENCE : See Imputbd Contributoey Neo- 
 
 LIOENCE. 
 
 THOMPSON, JUDGE : 
 
 his discovery clause, 54, 59, 301, 303, 303. See Discovebt Clause. 
 
 THOROGOOD v. BRYAN : See Imputed Contributokt Negligence. 
 
 TORPEDO : 
 
 on railway track, trespasser meddling with a, 53. 
 
 TORT: 
 
 actions in historically antecedent to actions in contract, 7. 
 
 TORT-FEASORS: 
 
 no contribution among, 102. 
 
 TOWN : See Highways, Mdnicipal 'Cobporations. 
 
 TRACK REPAIRER : 
 
 co-servant with an engineer, 334. ^ 
 
 with a foreman, 335. 
 with a switchman, 835. 
 
 TRACK "WALKER : 
 
 co-servant with a fireman, 335. 
 
 TRAIN-MEN : 
 
 co-serrant with section-man, 335. 
 with engine-wiper, 385. 
 with brakemen on another train, 835. 
 with conductor riding on his way to work, 335. 
 
 TRAIN-DISPATCHER : 
 is a vice-principal, 338, n. 
 
 contra (co-servant with brakeman), 335. 
 
 TRAP-DOOR : 
 
 unguarded in the sidewalk, 355, n. 
 servant falling through, 347, n. 
 
 TRAVELER : See Highways, Railways, Street Railways. 
 
636 INDEX. 
 
 [The references are to sections.] 
 
 TBESPASS : 
 
 upon the highway. See Highways. 
 
 by cattle. See Fences. See Trespassers, Contributort Negligence, 
 Railwats, Street Railwats. 
 
 TRESPASSERS : 
 
 degree of care due to, 50, n., 178. 
 
 as a plaintiff under rule of comparative negligence, 79, n. 
 
 rights of, on a railway track, 56, n., 160, 187. 
 
 not to be expected on a railway track — the Pennsylvania rule, 199, 200. 
 
 the modification of this rule, 301. 
 wilful negligence toward, 200, 202, n. 
 
 a trespass as contributory negligence, 50, 53, 53, 203. 
 on a railway track presumed to appreciate the danger, 208. 
 
 intoxicated trespassers, 203, n., 391. See Intoxication. 
 walking along a railway track, 311. 
 riding oh horseback between the crossings, 211. 
 signals at railway crossings not due to, 211. 
 upon land adjoining a highway, 254. 
 on highway, injury from something falling, 376. 
 may recover for wilful injuries, 416. 
 a child as a. See Children, Invitation or License, Railwatb, Street 
 
 Railways, Highways, Contributory Negligence. 
 
 TUNNEL : 
 
 railway train stopping in, 161. 
 TUNNEL REPAIRER : 
 
 co-servant with locomotive engineer, 337. 
 TURN-TABLES : 
 
 injuries to children playing upon, 140, 305, et seg. See Children. 
 TURNPIKES. See Highways. 
 
 u. 
 
 "UNDERLOOKER." 
 
 in a mine, co-servant with a miner, 336. 
 UNLAWFUL ACT. See Illegal Act, Collateral Violations of Law 
 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT :■ 
 
 carrier's negligence not imputed to passenger, 111. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 170. 
 
 burden of proof, 436. 
 UTAH: 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 336. 
 
 V. 
 
 VELOCIPEDE : 
 
 riding on sidewalk not necessarily unlawful, 356, n. 
 
INDEX. 637 
 
 tThe references are to sections.] 
 
 VERMONT: 
 
 negligence of parent not imputed to child in, 180. 
 
 Sunday traveling in, 177, 365. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219, 326, 328. 
 
 contributory negligence of land-owner next to railway in respect of fire, 
 238, 239. 
 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 345, 253. 
 
 overhead railway bridges in, 363. 
 
 burden of proof in, 436, 439, 440. 
 VICE-PRINCIPAL: See Master and Servant. 
 VIEW: 
 
 obstructed at railway crossing. See Railwats. 
 VIOLATION OF LAW: See Illegal Act, Collateral Violation of 
 
 Law. 
 VISITOR : See Invitation or License, Negligence. 
 VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO DANGER: See Contributory Negli- 
 gence, Knowledge of Danger, Dangbrocs Position. 
 VOLUNTEERS : See Master and Servant. 
 
 w. 
 
 WAIVER : See Conteibutory Negligence, Master and Servant. 
 WALKING ON RAILWAY TRACK : See Railways, Street Railways, 
 
 Trespasser. 
 WALKING ON THE SEA SHORE : See Sea Shore. 
 WANTONNESS : See Negligence, Wilful Negligence. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 burden of proof, in, 426. 
 
 WATCHMAN : 
 
 on raQway, co-servant with employee he was to watch, 335. 
 
 in railway shop, not a co-servant with a master mecluinic, 337. 
 WATER TANK: 
 
 train stopping at, 161. 
 WAY: 
 
 a railroad track when a quasi public, 313, 288, 390. See Street Railways. 
 
 deviation from private, 254. 
 
 deviation from highway. See Highways. 
 WEST VIRGINIA: 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability, 173. 
 
 fences and cattle at large in, 333. 
 
 railway j?nma facie liable by statute for killing animals, 324. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against flre, 
 237, 339. 
 
 Injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, 245. 
 
 burden of proof in, 436, 440. 
 
638 T^^^^- 
 
 [The references ore to sectionB.] 
 
 WHARF: 
 
 invitation or license to go upon, duty of owner, 50, n. See Intitatioh 
 
 OB LiCENBB. 
 
 WILFUL NEGLIGENCE: 
 
 flot the same thing as gross, 61-68. 
 
 the term a misnomer, 63. 
 
 •what is meant by, 62, 64. , 
 
 contributory negligence no defense, 46, 50, 64, 65, 416. 
 
 under a Kentucky statute, 66, 97, 98, 318. 
 
 toward trespassers, 66, 200, 204, 205. 
 
 of a vice-principal, liability of master, 200. 
 
 of plaintifl, burden of proving is on defendant, 422, n. 
 
 WINDOW : 
 
 of railway or street railway car, 155, 158. 
 passenger's hand or arm outside of j 296. 
 leaving open near railway track. See Pibes. 
 
 WINDOW SILL: 
 
 of street car, passenger sitting upon, 294. 
 WISCONSIN : 
 
 slightest want of ordinary care contributory negligence, 19. 
 
 rule of comparative negligence denied in, 77. 
 
 negligence of private driver imputed to occupant of vehicle, 109. 
 
 injuries at car windows, the rule in, 157. 
 
 carrier's stipulation limiting liability in, 172. 
 
 fences, and cattle at large in, 219, 223, 236, 234. 
 
 land-owner next to railway need not take unusual precautions against 
 fire, 237, 238. 
 
 injuries to runaway horse by defective highway, in, 245. 
 
 Sunday traveling in, 267. 
 
 rule in respect of fellow servants inodifled by statute, 879. 
 
 servant's contract releasing master from statutory liability void by statute 
 381. 
 
 burden of proof in, 426, 440. 
 WOMAN: 
 
 same care required of as of a man, 260. 
 
 corpulent, crossing slippery crosswalk, 273. 
 WYOMING: 
 
 rules as to fellow servants modified by statute, in, 379, 381. 
 
 Y. 
 
 YARD MASTER: 
 
 co-servant 'with a car repairer, 335. 
 
 [Whole number of pages 754.]