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 Joseph II, 
 
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 Library 
 
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 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028117756 
 
foreign ^tatei^mm 
 
 JOSEPH II 
 
 O 
 
JOSEPH II 
 
 Eev. J. FEANCK BEIGHT, D.D. 
 
 MASTBB OF UNIVEHSITT COLLEGE, OXH3ED 
 
 Hontron 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited 
 
 NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1897 
 
 <? 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
lA-iuz*] 
 
 1 ^ 
 
PKEFATORY NOTE 
 
 It was found convenient, for reasons set forth in the 
 Prefatory Note to Maria Theresa, to -treat the reigns of 
 Maria Theresa and her son Joseph as a continuous 
 period. Hence the present volume is a direct continua- 
 tion of Maria Theresa. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE I 
 
 THE PAKTITION OP POLAND 
 1763-1769 
 
 Maria Theresa's position after the Seven Years' War — Her love of 
 peace — Death of Augustus III. of Poland — Que^Hou of 
 the~Sucoession— Election of Stanislaus — FriendW__approaches 
 between Austria and Prussia, for the_purpose _ of checking 
 Russian en"CltradnHEBtS^ Poland— Suggestedjneeting between 
 Joseph aM-;FiS!lefick — War breaks ouTbetween Russia and 
 Turkey — Threatening character of the Eussian successes — 
 Kaunitz suggests a new system of alliances — It is rejected by 
 Joseph — The first meeting between Joseph and Frederick at 
 Neisse, 1769 — It is withoiit_r'esult — On the Turkish request 
 for a joint intervention from Austria and Prussia, a second 
 meeting is held at Neustadt, in which Kaunitz takes part — It 
 is left to Frederick to check the advances of Russia . Page 1 
 
 CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE PAKTITION OF POLAND — COntmued 
 
 1770-1773 
 
 The three lines of policy taken by Maria Theresa, Joseph, 
 and Kaunitz — Joseph's is practically adopted — Consequent 
 
I JOSEPH II 
 
 convention with Turkey — Austrian occupation of Zips — The 
 unreality of Austria's warlike attitude confessed by Maria 
 Theresa — Many suggestions made by Kaunitz — Frederick 
 suggests a partition of Poland — Maria Theresa shrinks from 
 it, and s*3ggests other terms — Frederick induces the Czarina to 
 agree to it — Austria accepts it — The Polish consent is obtained 
 — The Treaty of Partition — Character of thethree_rulers of 
 Austria as illustrated by it Page 26 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE SUPPEBSSION OF THE JESUITS 
 
 1768-1777 
 
 Depressed position of the Papacy — Conciliatory action of Benedict 
 XIV. postpones a crisis — The Bourbon courts attack the 
 Jesuits — Clement XIII. supports the Order — The Bourbons 
 demand the co-operation of Maria Theresa — Her modified 
 adhesion to their demand — Accession of Clement XIV., an 
 avowed enemy of the Jesuits — Maria Theresa accepts the brief 
 for the suppression of the Order — Kauni tz'S opinion as to 
 reforms required in the Church — Maria Theresa leaves them 
 to be carried out by her son — Her educational reforms . 55 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 BIFFICTTLTIES OF THE CO-REQENCY 
 1773-1777 
 
 Acquisition of the Bucovina — Acquisitive characjiBt-QfJoseph — 
 His rough refusal of Kaunitz^ ad'VlEe^^^^^aunitz resigns, 
 December 1773 — Maria Theresa refuses his resignation — 
 Joseph's impatieuceatthe defects of the Council of State an 
 additional reasmifor tlie~Ehauuellui''iJ lesiguation — Joseph 
 resigns, jflniiarx 1774 — Maria Theresa persuades him to become 
 reconciled with Kaunitz — Outbreaks of the peasantry Jn 
 Bohemia — Divided feelings of Maria Theresa on the matter — 
 
CONTENTS IX 
 
 She offers to resign, May 1775 — Joseph and Kaunitz differ as 
 to the tr eatment of the peasa ntry — Maria Theresa disapproves 
 of J oseph's reforming principle s — He again threatens to 
 resign, DecembeLl775 — Kaunitz again resigns, March 1776 — 
 Maria TKefe^ contrives to smooth over the quarrel — Final 
 settlement of tlie status of the peasant . . . Page 70 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 
 
 1777-1780 
 
 The approaching death of Maximilian of Bavaria — Convention 
 with Charles Theodore the heir — On Maximilian's death 
 Joseph occupies the ceded territories — The Bavarians apply to 
 Frederick, who persuades the Duke of Deuxponts to repudiate 
 the convention — Efforts of Kaunitz to induce Frederick to 
 withdraw his opposition — Maria Theresa foresees their futOity 
 — Frederick enters upon the war — Marig ;_ Ther esa, contrary 
 to Joseph's wishes, despatches Thugut to treat ior peace — 
 His efforts unavaiTmg^^^^decisive caiiipaigii'-^No help from 
 either France or Russia — The mediation of France is sought 
 — The Czarina imposes her views upon the helligerents — Con- 
 gress of Teschen — Joseph's OT owinff cnnvictif ^r tliaf tJie 
 French allian ce was useless — fleseeks the friendship of the 
 Czarina^His'viSlL 10 Mohileff — Maria Theresa's death . 91 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Joseph's kefokms 
 
 1780-1790 
 
 Character of the Emperor — Peculiari ties which neutralise d his , 
 sensihle reforms — His idea olEhe State^Keforms involved in ' 
 his t3"ea— Of the provincial Estates — Of the Church — Of the 
 machinery of government — Of the position of the peasantry — 
 
JOSEPH II 
 
 Of taxation — Of law — Of education — Universal dissatisfaction 
 aroused ty the reforms Page 127 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 1780-1785 
 
 Joseph determines to trust to Russia — He assists the Czarina in 
 her negotiations with Turkey — Refuses to join in her great 
 scheme — Attempts the opening of the Scheldt — War with 
 Holland — Treaty of Fontainebleau — Influence of Kaunitz in 
 foreign afifairs^Revival of the plan of the Bavarian exchange 
 — Its failure — The Furstenbund 149 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS — COHLtinUed 
 
 1786-1790 
 
 Death of Frederick — Joseph thinks of friendship with Prussia — Is 
 persuaded to retain his old policy — His visit to Catherine — 
 Outbreak of the Turkish war — Joseph as a commander — His 
 disasters — He returns to Tienna, ill — Hertzberg's plan of 
 arbitration — Prussia strengthened by the Triple Alliance — 
 Rising difficulties in Belgium — Joseph's dread of Prussian 
 intervention — His eager desire for peace . . . 169 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 
 1784-1790 
 
 The free character of the Belgian constitution — Opposition excited 
 by the introduction of Joseph's reforms — The edicts of 1787 — 
 
CONTENTS xi 
 
 The Viceroys compelled to withdraw them — Joseph insists on 
 them — He appoints Trautmansdorf and D'Alton — The opposi- 
 tion becomes revolutionary — ^Army of emigrants invades Bel- 
 gium — Its successes — Failure of Kobenzl's mission — Belgium 
 is lost — Difficulties in Hungary — Character of the Hungarian 
 constitution — Opposition to Joseph's attempt to Germanise — 
 Introduction of his admini3 trative_a:mt Em. an d equal taxati on 
 — Abolit ion of serfdom — Rising of emancipa£ed_sevf<9^iii!Qder 
 Horja h — Joseph's demand for assistance in the Turkish war 
 refused — The Hungarians demand a diet — They appeal to 
 Prussia — Danger of the loss of Hungary — J oseph's view of his 
 position — He renounces his Hungarian refor ms — His illnes s 
 and death — Appreciation of his charac ter . Page 189 
 
 c 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 
 1763-1769 
 
 The political system established by Kaunitz was strong 
 enough to resist even the unsatisfactory results of the 
 Seven Years' War. Adhesion, to the Bourbon alliance, 
 and hostility to Prussia, remained the keynotes of the 
 foreign policy of Maria Theresa and her minister. But 
 a very important change had been worked upon the 
 mind of the empress. The arguments by which Kaunitz 
 supported his system, as he developed the thesis that, 
 small though its success had been, the results of any 
 other arrangement would have been far more disastrous, 
 appeared to her unanswerable. The assertions of 
 amicable policy which followed the Peace of Huberts- 
 burg may be safely regarded as the mere conventional 
 expressions of diplomacy ; there was no friendliness in 
 her heart. She still saw in the Prussian king the 
 wicked and godless upstart who was devoting all the 
 evil craft and energy of his character to the subversion 
 of the legitimate pre-eminence of the Austrian House. 
 
2 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 But the years of anxiety through which she had 
 passed, and the sufferings to which she had seen her 
 people subjected, had excited in her such a detestation 
 of war that, from this time onwards to the close of her 
 reign, her whole policy was governed by a fixed deter- 
 mination to avoid it. It is obvious that the strength of 
 the Austrian position in its external relations was thus 
 sapped at its very foundation. The weapon of diplomacy, 
 unsupported by a willingness as a last resource to have 
 recourse to arms, is likely to be very ineffectual ; and 
 Kaunitz found himself constantly hampered by the 
 peaceful obstinacy of his mistress. 
 
 The circumstances attending the succession to the 
 Polish throne gave ample proof of this weakness. King 
 Augustus III. died in October 1763. The event had 
 been anticipated, and did but set in immediate and 
 obvious activity schemes which had long been in con- 
 templation. The wretched country had already so far 
 fallen from its old position that all respect for its inde- 
 pendence had disappeared. It had become the common 
 ground for the intrigues of the great European Powers, 
 the common prey from which, as opportunity offered, 
 each hoped to wrest advantages for itself. Among the 
 statesmen of Europe there prevailed on this question the 
 most undisguised selfishness. A sort of pretence was 
 now and then made that the object in view was the 
 advantage of the Polish people; but it was a pretence 
 so flimsy that no one was deceived by it, nor indeed in 
 private correspondence or ambassadorial despatches was 
 it ever mentioned. It was well understood that Frederick 
 desired to round off his possessions by the acquisition of 
 Dantzig and Polish Prussia. The limits of the Czarina's 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 3 
 
 desires were unknown, but they certainly included the 
 expulsion of the Saxon prince Charles from Courland and 
 the establishment of the House of Biron. Louis XV. 
 had long been engaged in one of those secret diplomatic 
 intrigues of which he was fond, for the purpose of secur- 
 ing the throne for the Prince of Oonti. 
 
 Territorial additions to the power of Frederick, the 
 growth of the influence of Russia, or the resuscitation of 
 the intrigues of France, were all equally repugnant to 
 the received conception of the interests of Austria. The 
 fundamental principle laid down by the Vienna court 
 was the maintenance of the Polish Eepublic with 
 territory undiminished, and ruled by a king whose 
 friendship could be relied on. Such a prince had been 
 found in the Saxon Elector, and a strong desire was felt 
 in Vienna to place his son upon the vacant throne, and 
 thus maintain without change friendly relations between 
 the two countries. But Catherine II. saw her way to 
 establish a predominant influence in Poland, if no foreign 
 Powers were allowed to interfere in the election. She 
 therefore declared herself in favour of a national king ; 
 and under the plausible pretext of allowing the Poles to 
 exercise an independent choice and to elect a piast (or 
 national nobleman), she advanced the pretensions of an old 
 favourite of her own, Stanislaus Poniatowsky, who brought 
 with him all the influence of the Czartorisky family to 
 which he was related. The suggestipn that they should 
 elect one of themselves was pleasing enough to the Poles ; 
 but not so the reception of a candidate at the hands of 
 Eussia, especially when supported by the Czartorisky 
 faction. The love of independence and the spirit of 
 faction combined to raise a national party which put 
 
4 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, i 
 
 forward as its champion the Grand -general Branicki. 
 As the election of a Saxon prince was speedily rendered 
 hopeless by the death of the young elector, and as Louis 
 (who seems to have imparted to Kaunitz some portion 
 of his private intrigues) withdrew the candidature of the 
 Prince of Conti, the choice lay only between the Russian 
 candidate and the representative of the national party. 
 
 Had Austria been inclined to enter upon the quarrel, 
 if necessary with arms, it might have been possible by 
 supporting Branicki to avoid the threatened extension 
 of Russian influence. But, in its present peaceful mood, 
 it was condemned to confine itself to vain efforts to 
 render other countries as peaceful as itself. It declared 
 that it would support no candidate, but would accept 
 any piast fitted for the post when duly elected in a free 
 Diet and without the assistance of foreign arms. As 
 Frederick had not yet fuUy declared himself, the empress 
 even allowed her ambassador to appeal to him to join in 
 a declaration that Austria and Prussia would alike abstain 
 from the use of force, in the hope that by this means 
 Catherine would be driven to pursue the same conduct. 
 The effort proved entirely vain. The king had in fact 
 already (in April 1764) come to terms with Russia, and 
 had contracted an engagement, defensive in form but 
 open to immediate conversion into an armed alliance. 
 He merely put the question by. "Let the Czarina," he 
 said, " make a King of Poland, as she has let you make 
 a King of the Romans. The empress ought to be 
 satisfied with that. She cannot expect to make every 
 king." Kaunitz soon saw the futility of his efforts to 
 check the advance of Russia, and in fact threw up the 
 game. In a letter (on May 16, 1764) to Mercy, his 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 5 
 
 ambassador at Warsaw, he sketches his view of the 
 situation: "The hope of a favourable conclusion to the 
 election has been gradually disappearing. Prussia no 
 doubt pretends to be friendly, but a treaty with Eussia 
 exists, and Frederick is certain to take his opportunity." 
 Turkey, he continues, which had threatened to inter- 
 vene, and to insist upon a free election, was not to be 
 relied on ; the Sultan was peaceable and fond of money, 
 his ministers were in the pay either of Russia or Prussia. 
 France had indeed spoken so strongly that it might be 
 hoped that, if Eussia advanced, some money might be 
 sent thence ; but in fact France already recognised that 
 all money so spent would be simply wasted. Spain 
 would follow the lead of France. And as for Austria, 
 nothing could move the empress to war. 
 
 For a moment there was a thought that France and 
 Austria, treating the question as a domestic quarrel, 
 would intervene as arbitrators between the rival Polish 
 parties. But the faction fight had become too bitter to 
 admit of such a course. The Czartoriskys had thrown 
 themselves blindfold into the arms of Eussia, and were 
 determined with its aid not only to secure the election 
 of Stanislaus, but to avenge themselves upon their 
 enemies. All that France and Austria could do was 
 to make an idle protest against the infraction of the 
 freedom of election, by withdrawing their ambassadors 
 from Warsaw. On August 24 the Diet was summoned 
 under the protection of Eussian troops. The Czarina's 
 desire for the election of Stanislaus was announced. He 
 was at once elected, and on November 25 the coronation 
 took place. 
 
 The powerlessness of Austria in the presence of 
 
6 THE CO-REGENTS ohap. i 
 
 her two great neighbours cannot be concealed. The 
 diplomatic defeat had been complete. It would have 
 been something if it had been suffered in the unselfish 
 maintenance of the rights of a free people. But un- 
 fortunately the cynical patriotism of Kaunitz had found 
 support in the intolerance of the empress. When there 
 was still a chance that some compromise between the 
 rival Polish parties might have been arrived at, the only 
 points on which Austria insisted were the maintenance 
 of the strange privilege of the Liherwn Veto, and the 
 refusal of any further advantage to the Dissenters. The 
 constitution, which was the base of all the distractions 
 and weakness of the Polish kingdom, was to be perpetu- 
 ated ; and the persecuting energy of the Eomish Church 
 was to suffer no diminution. 
 
 The violent election of Stanislaus did not close the 
 incident. There still remained the question as to the 
 recognition of the king thus forcibly placed upon the 
 throne. To accept the inevitable, and speedily and 
 peacefully recognise the newly elected king, was the 
 wish both of Kaunitz and the empress; for it was 
 only thus that the covert designs of Frederick could 
 be combated. Stanislaus himself, less inclined to play 
 the part of subservient puppet to the Czarina than was 
 generally supposed, had early taken meastires to hint 
 that he felt hampered by his Russian and Prussian 
 allies, and would gladly obtain the friendship of Austria. 
 The difficulty of immediate recognition lay with France. 
 When the French ambassador had intimated to the 
 Primate of Poland his intention to withdraw, he had 
 met with treatment which could only be regarded as 
 a grave insult. The anger of France was not easily 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 7 
 
 appeased, and the activity of the French minister 
 Vergennes at Constantinople seemed to render it pos- 
 sible that the danger of war might not yet be over. 
 At his instigation the Porte had issued a declaration, 
 in vi'hich France had joined, that they would not 
 recognise the Polish king until a full amnesty had 
 been granted to all his opponents, and every altera- 
 tion made in the old form of constitution had been 
 removed. To adopt a policy which thus seemed in 
 direct opposition to France would have dealt a fatal 
 blow to the close relations which Kaunitz had estab- 
 lished between the two countries ; nor would it be 
 possible if a power so hear at hand as Turkey entered 
 upon war to avoid joining in it. In any case, war could 
 not fail to throw Stanislaus back into the protecting 
 arms of Frederick and the Czarina. Months of careful 
 negotiation were required to induce France to assume 
 a more friendly attitude. Yet the arguments adduced 
 by Kaunitz were reasonable enough, especially as there 
 was a probability that England, Eussia, and Prussia 
 were drawing towards the formation of a great northern 
 alliance to counterbalance the Family Compact. Should 
 this be completed, there could be no doubt as to the wisdom 
 of establishing friendship with Poland and withdrawing 
 it from the northern alliance. Fair terms of compensa- 
 tion for the national party and for the Saxon princes 
 were at length obtained, an apology regarded as sufficient 
 satisfied the sensibilities of France, and the recognition of 
 Stanislaus was secured. 
 
 Though the determination to maintain peace had 
 governed the action of Austria in the question of the 
 Polish election, and had compelled the assumption of 
 
8 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 tbe outward forms of friendship in intercourse with 
 the Prussian king, there can be no doubt as to the 
 persistent character of the mistrust felt for their old 
 opponMits by both the parties in the late war. It is 
 visible in every political writing of the chancellor, and 
 is frankly confessed by Frederick. Count Nugent, 
 who was despatched as ambassador to Berlin, was in- 
 structed by the empress in so many words that, though 
 his attitude was always to be peaceful, there was no 
 possibility of real confidence or close understanding 
 between herself and Frederick. When General Hordt, 
 an intimate friend and agent of the king, sought an 
 interview with Nugent in January 1766, the questions 
 he asked were all based upon the belief that Silesia was 
 not forgotten. Yet in spite of his underlying mistrust, 
 Frederick had already determined to draw closer to his 
 old enemy, and the ostensible object of Hordt's interview 
 had been to lay the basis of a friendly union and even to 
 suggest a formal alliance. 
 
 On the death of Francis I., in August 1765, his son 
 Joseph, already King of the Romans, had assumed at 
 once the title of emperor. His broken-hearted mother, 
 thinking to find in him a support which would enable 
 her to withdraw somewhat from the cares of government, 
 had appointed him co-regent of the Austrian dominions. 
 The position was beset with difficulties ; but in spite of 
 the clash of wills which at times resulted from the 
 partnership, the young emperor exerted an influence 
 always important, and sometimes preponderating, upon 
 the course of public affairs. 
 
 It has often been said that in his apparent as- 
 sumption of a friendly attitude, Frederick was influenced 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 9 
 
 by admiration for the energetic character of the young 
 emperor. No doubt he thought it easier to enter into 
 friendly relations with a young man whose admiration 
 for himself was not concealed, and with whom he had 
 many points of sympathy, than with the older statesmen 
 whose lives had been passed in an atmosphere of hatred 
 for the Prussian name. But his political views now 
 rendered friendship with Austria desirable ; and it was 
 the necessity of his political situation which, as usual, 
 was the active cause of his conduct. He retained his 
 conviction that, in all the late improvements in military 
 and financial administration, the reconquest of Silesia 
 was the object the Austrians had in view. Yet he was 
 truly desirous to avoid further war ; he recognised the 
 advantage of peace within the limits of the empire, if, 
 as seemed very probable, war should break out between 
 France and England; and he had no idea of allowing 
 the connections into which he had entered with Eussia 
 to become burdensome, to hamper him in the aggressive 
 views he had already conceived with regard to Poland. 
 On every ground he believed that good relations with 
 Austria were desirable. 
 
 His overtures did not meet with a kindly reception. 
 To the prejudiced view of the Austrian court, the 
 advances of Frederick appeared insidious ; for the 
 jealousy of France could scarcely fail to be roused 
 by any renewal of friendship with Prussia. Kaunitz 
 even believed that Frederick was acting by the sugges- 
 tion of England, in view of the approaching war, and 
 for the express purpose of undermining the Treaty of 
 Versailles. It was not without surprise that he saw 
 the matter pressed further, and a personal meeting 
 
10 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 proposed between the emperor and the king. For such 
 a meeting Joseph was himself very eager. Kaunitz 
 also looked upon it with favour ; but all the prejudices 
 of the ^mpress rose against it. She could not bear to 
 expose her virtuous son to the intercourse of a godless 
 cynic, especially as she had already observed a tendency 
 in him to imitate both the free thought and the bitter 
 speech of the Prussian king. The project therefore 
 for the present fell through. The suggestion however 
 formed the first step towards a closer and more intimate 
 union between the two countries. 
 
 The next advance in the direction of friendship, and 
 the renewal of the idea of a personal meeting between 
 the sovereigns, came from Austria, and, as before, was 
 closely connected with the course of evfents in the 
 Polish kingdom. The necessity for the balance of 
 power was a fixed article in the creed of every statesman 
 of the eighteenth century; but the idea of political 
 balance which was to allow of the safety of smfiUer 
 states in the midst of the warlike violence of their 
 greater neighbours had strangely degenerated. The 
 principle as it existed at this time was one of unmixed 
 and selfish jealousy. Each state watched its neighbour's 
 acquisitions with grudging eyes, and demanded a 
 corresponding increase for itself. To Kaunitz therefore 
 the establishment of the general pre-eminence of Russian 
 influence in Poland which seemed to be following on 
 the late election, and the acquisition by Frederick of 
 any part of that kingdom, were equally objectionable. 
 Unluckily he was but weakly armed to resist the 
 advances of his powerful neighbours ; his mistress 
 would not hear of war, and, though he might occasion- 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 11 
 
 ally venture to engage in a game of brag, it was well 
 understood that lie had no means beyond diplomacy at 
 his command, and diplomacy was but a poor weapon 
 with which to plunge into the intricacies of the Polish 
 question. 
 
 The new King of Poland was a man of enlightenment, 
 the friend and correspondent of the philosophic reformers 
 now becoming so important in France. He desired the 
 improvement of the country he had been called to rule, 
 and recognised the anarchical character of its constitu- 
 tion. But no sooner did he attempt to put his good 
 intentions into practice than he found himself thwarted 
 by the two Powers to whom he owed his crown. That 
 Poland should be reformed, and again become a nation, 
 was the last thing which either the Czarina or Frederick 
 desired. Stanislaus found, in fact, that his supporters 
 were playing that part which intending conquerors have 
 so frequently played, and were preparing the ground for 
 future encroachment. In this work Russia took the 
 lead. Catherine, with a plausible assumption of 
 liberality, at once insisted on the maintenance of the 
 Liberum Veto and an equality of rights for religious 
 ■dissenters, whether of the Greek or Protestant Churches. 
 When we remember that such equality did not exist in 
 any country in Europe, and that to demand it of the 
 Poles was to expect of a half barbarous people an action 
 of advanced liberality which the most civilised nations 
 had not yet reached, it can scarcely be questioned that 
 the purpose of such a demand was an insidious one. 
 The Greek Church under the protection of Eussia, the 
 Protestants under the protection of Prussia, were not 
 likely to prove good guardians of the integrity of the 
 
12 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 kingdom; while the eager assertion of their privileges 
 could scarcely fail to cause fresh confusion in the already 
 weakened nation. It has already been mentioned that 
 Austria had expressed approval of the Libervm Veto, 
 when there seemed a probability that Catherine would 
 interfere with the constitution in her own interest. But 
 now the fact that Russia had come to be of the same 
 mind was enough to produce a complete change of 
 opinion, especially when the demand for the mainten- 
 ance of the old constitution went hand in hand with 
 claims detrimental to the Roman Church. In his 
 opposition to the demands of Russia, Stanislaus therefore 
 received all the encouragement which could be derived 
 from good advice ; but whatever hope he may have had 
 of material assistance was without foundation ; for war 
 was regarded as impossible. In the same way he was 
 justified in expecting help from France ; but Choiseul at 
 this time seemed to be struck with a strange apathy 
 with regard to affairs in the north and east of Europe. 
 Thus when, in November 1766, Stanislaus summoned a 
 Diet for the purpose of abrogating the lAhervm Veto in 
 respect to military and financial questions, he found 
 himself without support, and in the face of Russian 
 opposition was unable to carry the measure through. 
 His attempt to ameliorate the condition of the Dissidents 
 proved equally futile ; he could effect nothing against the 
 religious vehemence of the orthodox churchmen. From 
 the Russian point of view this result could hardly be 
 improved. The kingdom was left in all its weakness, 
 and the Czarina was supplied with a most plausible 
 excuse for further interference. 
 
 Kaunitz was quick to appreciate the strength of the 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 13 
 
 Eussian position. He could however do nothing 
 practical to weaken it. Maria Theresa indeed declared 
 publicly that she could not stand by with folded arms 
 while violence was done to a friendly Power. Troops 
 were even assembled in Moravia and Bohemia. But 
 both Kaunitz and the empress knew perfectly well that 
 there was no reality in their threats ; nor did they 
 impose on the Czarina, and without noticing them she 
 quietly pursued her course. In the following j'ear the 
 Diet was subjected to open violence. The Bishop of 
 Cracow and other leaders of the opposition were seized 
 and banished, a committee under the presidency of the 
 Eussian ambassador drew up a series of resolutions 
 embodying the Eussian policy, and the Diet found itself 
 compelled to accept them, and even to appoint Catherine 
 guardian of the constitution thus established. This 
 coup d'itoi (October 1767) threw the kingdom into a 
 state of wild confusion, for neither national feeling nor 
 religious bigotry were sufficiently subdued to accept the 
 Eussian supremacy without a struggle. A confederation 
 for the support of the Catholic religion was formed at 
 Bar in Podolia, and the country was plunged into all 
 the horrors of a religious civil war. Moreover the eyes 
 of Ohoiseul had been suddenly opened, and the storm 
 was rendered yet wilder by his ill-considered action. 
 Aroused from his apathy, he saw, with the statesmanlike 
 rapidity of vision which seldom deserted him, the 
 disastrous loss of French prestige which his neglect 
 had already produced. Too late he threw himself with 
 feverish energy into the national cause, and eagerly 
 sought the co-operation of the Porte to enable him to 
 effect a counter revolution. 
 
14 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, i 
 
 Not only was such sudden and ill-regulated vigour 
 opposed to all the instincts of the formal mind of 
 Kaunitz ; he could not but see that the cure was worse 
 than the disease, and that, if France and Turkey threw 
 themselves into the quarrel, a war must result in which 
 Austria would inevitably be entangled. He at once set 
 his diplomatic ingenuity to work, and devised more 
 than one plan by which Austria might succeed in 
 checking the dreaded advance of Prussia and Russia. 
 Of these plans the first was the formation of an alliance 
 with Prussia, which, after the late negotiations and the 
 overtures of Frederick, did not seem impossible. The 
 advantages of such an arrangement were plain enough. 
 If the allies could place themselves side by side with 
 Russia as guardians of the new constitution, they would 
 certainly be able to restrain any excesses on the part of 
 that Power, while their common action would give an 
 opportunity to Austria to divert or check the aggressive 
 ambition of its ally. The possibility of the alliance was, 
 however, more problematical ; but Kaunitz saw no fatal 
 obstacle in the way. He fully recognised that any 
 arrangement must depend upon the will of the King of 
 Prussia, whose master hand was gradually shaping the 
 policy of the Europeau courts in accordance with his 
 own interests. But the chancellor's information was 
 always remarkably good. He knew of the treaty 
 connection between Frederick and Catherine, but he 
 had good reasons for suspecting that Frederick was 
 already fretting at the continual increase of Russia. 
 He knew also that, in spite of the well-known enmity 
 between France and Russia, Frederick was already 
 coquetting with the Court of Versailles ; and that, in 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 15 
 
 spite of its Austrian alliance, France was so eager for 
 his friendship that it had ofTered him Polish Prussia and 
 Ermeland as the price of his alliance. 
 
 To separate Frederick from Eussia did not there- 
 fore seem impossible. It might prove more difficult to 
 thwart his dangerous approach to France, by which the 
 advantages of the Versailles treaty seemed threatened. 
 In this direction the chancellor trusted to Frederick's 
 distaste for renewed war. So large an accession of 
 territory as had been suggested would have been in- 
 tolerable, and war must have been the result. Believing 
 that Frederick would do much for the sake of peace, 
 the advice of Kaunitz was that Austria should make a 
 show of war and advance troops towards Poland ; mean- 
 while using every effort to conciliate the Prussian king, 
 for which purpose a personal visit from the emperor 
 would probably prove the most effective step. Thus 
 for the second time the meeting between the sovereigns 
 was suggested. For the second time the proposal was 
 doomed to failure. Kaunitz drew up a most elaborate 
 memorandum, pointing out to the young emperor the 
 probable line which the negotiations would take, the 
 conduct he ought to pursue, and even the very language 
 he ought to use. This was no doubt a grave mistake ; 
 the conceit of the chancellor, and the constant considerar 
 tion which he had for many years experienced at the 
 hands of the empress, misled him. Joseph refused to 
 be instructed. He took umbrage at the didactic tone 
 Kaunitz had adopted, and withdrew his consent to the 
 projected meeting. 
 
 A second plan became necessary. One point on 
 which Kaunitz in his late advice to Joseph had laid 
 
16 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 mucli stress, was the necessity of assuring Frederick 
 that Austria no longer dreamt of recovering Silesia. 
 For so long as any suspicion of ulterior views lurked in 
 Fred^ck's mind, friendship was impossible. Yet the 
 second scheme, hatched in the chancellor's fertile brain, 
 was in~direct opposition to this assertion. If Russian 
 pre-eminence in Poland was not to be directly checked 
 by an alliance with Frederick, Austria might at all 
 events obtain some countervailing advantage. Therefore, 
 at the very time that he was asserting that all thought 
 of regaining Silesia had disappeared, Kaunitz was con- 
 sidering a plan by which the province might be regained. 
 The idea had come to him from Constantinople. The 
 dreaded war between Russia and Turkey had at last 
 broken out. Russian troops, in pursuit of some defeated 
 Poles, had crossed the frontier and violated Turkish 
 territory. The anger of the Porte had been roused, 
 and war was the result. Eager to secure allies, the 
 Grand Vizier had suggested to Kaunitz that the time 
 had come to regain Silesia, and that Turkey would 
 secretly give all its support to such an attempt. The 
 suggestion fell on fruitful ground, and in December 
 1768 Kaunitz laid before the empress and her son a 
 scheme which, in his enthusiasm for his own work, he 
 regarded as little inferior to that which had produced 
 the Treaty of Versailles. The scheme, indeed, had 
 about it much of the same unexpected character, and 
 implied a change almost as radical. The arch enemy 
 was again to be changed into the close friend. Prussia 
 and Turkey, whom, in all the earlier state papers in which 
 the chancellor had analysed the Austrian position, he 
 had treated as the natural, inevitable, and most dangerous 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 17 
 
 enemies of the empire, were now to be suddenly con- 
 verted into chief supporters. The chancellor's suggestion 
 was, that a close alliance should be formed between 
 Turkey, Austria, and Prussia. The advantages offered 
 to induce Frederick to accept such a scheme consisted 
 in the acquisition of Courland and Polish Prussia. For 
 this large territory he would, it was supposed, be ready 
 to surrender Silesia, especially if the financial support 
 which Turkey had intimated its willingness to afford 
 for the purpose of securing the Austrian alliance was 
 transferred to him. The Porte itself would be rewarded 
 by the very rapid conclusion of its Eussian war, upon 
 terms which the allies would be in a position to force 
 upon the Czarina. Apart from the special advantages 
 obtained for each of the three contracting parties, they 
 would all be satisfied by the restraint laid upon Eussian 
 advance, which they agreed in thinking the great 
 present danger to Europe. As usual, it was Poland 
 who was to pay the cost. But in the view of Kaunitz 
 the loss of territory which that country suffered would be 
 well repaid by the assured safety of the remainder, and 
 by the removal of the incubus of Eussian occupation. 
 
 Again the decided opposition of Joseph proved the 
 reef on which the hypothetical plan was wrecked. More 
 practical for once than the chancellor, or rather, it 
 is perhaps fairer to say, less open to the broad and 
 imaginative view of politics to which at times Kaunitz 
 lent himself, Joseph, with cold common sense, pointed 
 out the extreme difficulty of inducing Frederick to 
 yield so fine a bird in the hand as Silesia in exchange 
 for the uncertain prospect of a more extensive but far 
 less valuable possession, the extreme improbability of 
 
 
18 THE CO-EEGEKTS chap, i 
 
 his willingness to break with Russia, which was his 
 chief support, and the smallness of the inducement held 
 out to the Porte. Joseph, however, did not find any 
 fault wi^ the unjust and arbitrary treatment of Poland — 
 a point to be remembered in connection with the 
 frequently asserted opposition of Austria to the dis- 
 memberment of that country. 
 
 For the moment both the plans of Kaunitz failed. 
 The friendly meeting of the monarchs and the larger 
 scheme of a new triple alliance had alike proved 
 abortive. But the position of affairs peremptorily 
 demanded some sort of action. Russia and Turkey 
 were standing with unsheathed weapons, waiting only 
 tUl the season allowed of active hostility. Should a 
 war break out in such close proximity to its borders, 
 Austria could scarcely avoid being involved in it. The 
 Porte would have paid largely for Austrian help, but to 
 adopt this direct course of opposition to Russia was out 
 of the question. All suggestions of joint action with 
 the Turks met with an absolute refusal, and a distinct 
 declaration of neutrality was given to the Russian 
 court. Attempts to arbitrate between the beUigereiits, 
 though undertaken not by Austria alone, but by most 
 of the European Powers, were equally futile. If the 
 policy of neutrality was to be maintained and the war 
 avoided, no course was left but to throw over all idea of 
 immediate advantage without arribre pensie, and to seek 
 the assistance of the King of Prussia, the only other 
 Power immediately interested in the Polish question. 
 But the profound mistrust which still existed between 
 Austria and Prussia, and the system of alliances by 
 which they were tied, rendered such an approach to 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 19 
 
 Frederick a matter of no small difficulty. It would 
 be difficult to persuade France that the advances 
 made towards Prussia were not intended to weaken the 
 binding character of the Versailles alliance ; and it 
 would be difficult to persuade Prussia that all notion 
 of regaining Silesia was abandoned, that the Austrian 
 friendship with France did not imply solidarity of 
 interests in Polish affairs, and that there was no 
 intention of shaking the Prusso-Eussian alliance. 
 
 On the whole, it seemed to Kaunitz that the best 
 method for removing these difficulties would be found 
 in a personal meeting between Joseph and Frederick. 
 The admiration of the young emperor for his great 
 rival was well known, and his wish to make the 
 acquaintance of a ruler whose ability had become an 
 acknowledged fact in the public opinion of Europe was 
 but natural. If the meeting was nominally confined to 
 the gratification of this very reasonable wish, the first 
 step towards political friendship might be taken without 
 exciting the suspicion of either Russia or France. 
 Therefore, regarding Joseph's former refusal as an 
 outburst of temper rather than an expression of 
 deliberate opinion, the chancellor, with a persistency 
 which formed one element of his strength, reverted 
 to his old idea. It was not however easy to induce 
 Frederick to agree to the meeting, for he had no con- 
 fidence in the peaceful assertions of Austria. But as the 
 removal of opposition to his schemes of aggrandisement 
 in Poland was of much importance to him, he concealed 
 his mistrust and consented to the interview. His 
 acquiescence having been obtained, no difficulty was 
 now found on the part either of the empress or of 
 
20 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 Joseph, and the meeting took place in August 1769 
 at Neisse, where the young emperor was engaged in 
 superintending some military arrangements on the 
 frontier. 
 
 As far as the immediate object of establishing some 
 sort of friendship between the monarchs was concerned, 
 the meeting was successful. Frederick showed himself 
 concihatory, and flattered the young emperor by all 
 sorts of civilities. But politically all the advantages of 
 the meeting fell to Prussia ; no help was obtained either 
 towards bringing to a conclusion the war between 
 Russia and Turkey, or towards localising its effects. 
 Without formal document, and with careful precautions 
 to avoid exciting the jealousy of France, Frederick's 
 consent to join in a guarantee for the neutrality of 
 Germany was indeed secured. But this was practically 
 useless, for it was limited to the case of a war between 
 England and France ; the Eusso- Turkish war, the 
 real point of interest to Austria, was left entirely out 
 of sight. Nor was any check laid upon Frederick's 
 ambitious designs in Poland; the only result of the 
 newly established friendship was to relieve him from 
 all risk of Austrian opposition. He was practically 
 left at liberty to choose whichever line of conduct he 
 regarded as most to his own interest — either to oppose 
 the advance of the Russians or to make common cause 
 with them. The clear-sighted king formed a somewhat 
 high opinion of Joseph's ability, but was chiefly struck 
 with the traces of ambition he detected in him, which 
 would, he felt sure, lead to European diflSculties, when 
 the empire should pass under his undivided command. 
 
 Though the meeting between the monarchs was 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 21 
 
 recogBised as the first step towards a friendship, and 
 though a second and more important meeting was 
 arranged at it, Kaunitz regarded his attempt as a failure, 
 productive of no practical result. It was indeed 
 obviously Frederick's interest to keep well with Austria ; 
 the unchecked advance of Russia was little less formid- 
 able to him than to the Court of Vienna. Entangled as 
 he was in his alliance with the Czarina, his delicate 
 position would be greatly strengthened if he were able 
 to act in close harmony with the Imperial court. Yet, 
 until some definite proof of the sincerity of Frederick's 
 friendly approaches could be obtained, the chancellor 
 felt it impossible to bring any joint pressure to bear 
 upon the belligerents, and was obliged to continue 
 single-handed his efforts to convince the Turks of the 
 necessity for a speedy termination of the war. Mustapha, 
 warlike and somewhat fanatical, was little influenced by 
 his arguments. It required, as experience has shown 
 to be usual in Turkish matters, the stem teaching of 
 facts to open the Sultan's eyes to a true view of his 
 position. The total destruction of his naval power at 
 Cheshme by a Russian fleet which had made its appear- 
 ance in the Mediterranean, and a scarcely less decisive 
 defeat suffered by his army on the banks of the Kagul, 
 at length obliged him to demand, what had been so 
 frequently offered, the friendly intervention of Austria 
 and Prussia. A door was thus opened for fresh and 
 more promising negotiations between the two countries. 
 Kaunitz had just received, throughhis agent Thugut, 
 information that the Porte intended to seek this inter- 
 vention, when he set off to take his part in the second 
 meeting between the emperor and the king. The 
 
22 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, i 
 
 presence of the chancellor invested this second meeting 
 with a political importance which was wanting to the 
 first. It took place at Neustadt, within easy reach of 
 his country-house of AusterHtz, and not far from Olmiitz, 
 where Joseph was superintending the militarymanoeuvres 
 of his army. Frederick, well aware of the value of 
 flattery, spared no means to tickle the natural vanity of 
 the youthful emperor, or to leave undisturbed the 
 astonishing self-complacency of the older statesman. 
 Dressed in the Austrian uniform, and declaring them- 
 selves the willing recruits of the empire, he and his 
 staff presented themselves at Joseph's headquarters. 
 Nothing could exceed the admiration the king expressed 
 for the Austrian troops. He would have taken them, 
 he declared, for Prussians in a different uniform ; nay, 
 some he even characterised as " veritable sons of Mars." 
 The Austrians, on their side, did their best to make a 
 brilliant show, and Kaunitz at all events was well pleased 
 with the externals of the meeting — the well-served table, 
 the excellent theatre, the good accommodation, the cleanli- 
 ness and neatness of the town. All this was of course 
 mere outward show. The real business was carried on 
 between Frederick and Kaunitz. The chancellor had 
 come with his usual self-confidence, believing that he 
 would find no diflSculty in persuading the king to see 
 that his interest lay in friendship with Austria. In this 
 view Frederick fully agreed, but while Kaunitz hoped 
 to find active and militant support in checking Russian 
 advance and in preventing the destruction of Turkey, 
 Frederick desired no more than security from Austrian 
 opposition, while he carried out his own plans without 
 any breach with the Czarina. He knew his man, and 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 23 
 
 at once proceeded to play upon the inordinate vanity 
 which was always the chancellor's weak point. Contrary 
 to the habits of his own submissive court, he allowed 
 him to take the lead in the conversation at meals ; 
 led him aside as though for confidential talk after 
 dinner ; amused himself by astonishing the formal 
 and pedantic statesman by a rapid series of suggestions 
 which Kaunitz thought "extremely inconsequent and 
 frivolous in a man of such high reputation " ; and 
 then, after explaining the difficulty of discussion in 
 society, suggested a private interview. 
 
 The chancellor thought that his opportunity had at 
 length arrived. Eesolved that no light or frivolous 
 versatility should interrupt the well ordered sequence 
 of his arguments, he himself took the initiative, and, 
 before he allowed the king to utter a word, launched 
 out into an oration. The difficulty of the situation, he 
 said, lay chiefly in the alliances of the two parties ; for 
 neither Eussia nor France could regard without jealousy 
 a close approximation between the courts of Berlin and 
 Vienna. His object was to prove to Frederick that a 
 friendship between the two courts might be established 
 without in any way weakening the existing alliances. 
 He expatiated at great length on what he described as 
 the peaceful system adopted by Austria since the Peace 
 of Hubertsburg, and he finally offered to Frederick's 
 acceptance ten points, which he spoke of as a Political 
 Catechism. Under different forms they amounted to 
 little more than this, that if either party had reason to 
 feel suspicious as to the conduct of the other, it should 
 immediately in a friendly way make these suspicions 
 known, and that neither party should suggest anything 
 
24 THE CO-REGENTS chap, i 
 
 contrary to a true reciprocity of interests. Frederick 
 listened complacently, allowed Kaunitz to believe that 
 his arguments were producing their full effect, and took 
 away a^opy of the " Catechism," that he might master 
 it more fully before he accepted it. But the elaborate 
 care with which the chancellor had guarded himself from 
 any imputation of an attempt to draw Frederick from 
 his Russian friendship entirely defeated its intention. 
 When, in the midst of the conference, the formal demand 
 for intervention arrived from Turkey, Frederick was at 
 once able to point out that, according to the chancellor's 
 own arguments, the duty of approaching the Russian 
 court lay with Prussia. The only practical result of 
 the meeting, therefore, was that the conduct of the 
 intervention passed away from Austria and into 
 Frederick's own hands. An uneasy feeling that there 
 had been no diplomatic victory, but that Kaunitz might 
 even have appeared in rather an absurd light, is plainly 
 visible in Maria Theresa's writings, in spite of the rose- 
 coloured descriptions he himself gave her of the trans- 
 action, and the flattering words she received from Berlin. 
 The loss of the direction of the intervention certainly 
 secured its failure as far as Austrian objects were con- 
 cerned. It was not to be expected that Frederick would 
 feel any eagerness to obtain good terms for Turkey, or 
 to thwart the wishes of the Russian court, on whose 
 friendship so much depended. He no doubt fulfilled 
 his engagement literally. He asked the Czarina whether 
 she would be wUling to listen to the mediation of Austria 
 and Prussia, and held out hopes that if favourable terms 
 were given to the Poles, he himself, with the help of 
 Austria, would force the insurgent confederations to 
 
1763-69 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 25 
 
 accept them; and he declared that Austria would be 
 quite satisfied if, in the terms offered to Turkey, 
 Moldavia and Walachia were allowed to remain under 
 Turkish rule. But there was no sign that he intended 
 to use vigorous means to enforce his intervention. 
 Indeed, to all appearance he submitted at once to the 
 rejection of his overtures ; for Catherine was not 
 inclined to allow of any intervention. Her success 
 seemed to justify large acquisitions of territory ; media- 
 tion by external Powers implied a limitation of these 
 justifiable hopes ; and there was every reason to fear 
 that peaceful mediation might become armed interven- 
 tion, and a general war ensue. She much preferred to 
 treat single-handed, whether her terms were high or 
 low. She therefore instructed her general, Eomanzoif, 
 to open direct negotiations with the Turks, and expressed 
 her wish to Frederick that intervention should be 
 restricted to the offer of good offices. Though the 
 king regarded this as a rejection of his propositions, 
 he put up with the affront and waited quietly for 
 further opportunity. 
 
CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE PARTITION OF POLAND {continmd) 
 
 1770-1773 
 
 To Maria Theresa the ■whole of this business was 
 exceedingly distasteful. She saw, as Catherine had 
 seen, the danger that intervention would drift into a 
 war, which before aU else she dreaded, and she desired 
 for many reasons that the Czarina should be allowed 
 to make her own terms with the Turks. She was thus 
 brought into opposition both to her son and to her 
 minister, who, though holding different views as to the 
 line of action to be pursued, were yet both far less 
 averse to war than she was. 
 
 A change of ambassadors at Berlin, where Van 
 Swieten, the son of the physician, was to replace Nugent, 
 afforded an opportunity for the clear expression of the 
 various lines of policy which recommended themselves 
 to the empress, to her son, and to the chancellor ; for 
 instructions had to be drawn up to guide the conduct 
 of the new ambassador. In his draft Kaunitz expressed 
 his belief that he had clear proof that, however friendly 
 her language might be, the Czarina was determined to 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 27 
 
 demand conditions of peace which would entirely subverl/ 
 the balance of power in the east of Europe. They would 
 include, he said, the independence of the Crimea, the 
 possession of strong positions on the Black Sea, and 
 exclusive supremacy in Poland. To peace, on such 
 terms, he preferred war ; and such a war might be 
 undertaken with a prospect of success if Frederick could 
 be persuaded to see the imminence of the risk he was 
 running from the rapid aggrandisement of his Russian 
 ally. The ambassador's first duty was to impress this 
 upon Frederick's mind. If he succeeded, a joint army 
 might be sent into Poland and the belligerents be forced 
 into peace. According to the diplomatic habit of the 
 time, territorial advantages had to be ofi'ered. Prussia 
 might receive Courland and SenegaUa, while something 
 might be found for Austria, such as Little Walachia, 
 taken from Turkey, or the strip of land lying along the 
 north of Transylvania and Moldavia. Should Frederick 
 reject these propositions, he might at least be persuaded 
 to neutrality. The chancellor's suggestion was in fact 
 little less than the reiteration of his former plan, which 
 had already been rejected by his own court, and which • 
 consisted in a rearrangement of alliances scarcely less 
 complete than that which had accompanied the treaties 
 of Versailles; Prussia and Turkey, the hereditary enemies 
 of Austria, were by some means to be changed into 
 close allies. 
 
 But, to Joseph, to whom as co- regent the draft 
 instructions were referred, it did not appear that any 
 plan involving friendship with Frederick was practic- 
 able. Nor did he believe that Austria was in a position 
 at that moment to undertake a war. His own plan was 
 
28 THE CO-REGENTS chap, n 
 
 far less straightforward. In his opinion it was from 
 Turkey, not from Prussia, that territorial advantages 
 might he secured. Let Austria, without actual partici- 
 pation in the war, give its full sympathy to the Porte, 
 and let Thugut continue to excite the warlike feeling 
 in Constantinople ; for the inevitable result of the con- 
 tinuation of the war would be to weaken both the one 
 party and the other, and, inasmuch as it seemed likely 
 that Eussia would prove the stronger of the combatants, 
 there was every probability that sooner or later the 
 Porte in its distress would pflfer a large price to secure 
 Austrian assistance. In view of such a contingency 
 he recommended the collection of a powerful army, in 
 readiness to fall upon the Russians if they advanced 
 beyond the Danube. But meanwhile let ostensible 
 friendship be continued with Frederick, who should be 
 informed that whatever steps he took in Poland would 
 receive sympathetic support from Austria, biit that that 
 country would not take the initiative. The general 
 result of this combination, as explained somewhat later 
 by the emperor, would be the destruction of the influ- 
 ence of the Prussian king both in Turkey and in Eussia ; 
 while the Porte would recognise that the empress was 
 its only friend, and the Czarina would find any steps 
 that were taken to cross her wishes in Poland arising to 
 all appearance from the action of Frederick. 
 
 Although Joseph assured his brother Leopold that 
 the empress had given her adherence to his plan, as a 
 matter of fact its indirect and Machiavelian character 
 was profoundly distasteful to her. Not less so was the 
 threat of war implied in the instructions to be sent to 
 Thugut at Constantinople. The final decision in all 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 29 
 
 matters of importance, especially in foreign affairs, still 
 rested witli her ; and she was now a prey to such painful 
 doubt, that her son complained bitterly of her want of 
 firmness. At length, with much misgiving, she threw 
 the weight of her opinion on Joseph's side. " You will 
 be disappointed with me," she wrote to Kaunitz, 
 " because I have approved of the emperor's views, that 
 no war should be undertaken against Russia (in alliance 
 with Turkey). On the other hand, I have completely dis- 
 carded his political suggestions, and will never consent 
 to them. I have ever been of opinion that we ought to 
 speak plainly to the king of Prussia and to the Turks ; 
 and neither mislead, flatter, nor threaten, but hold our 
 own strength well in hand." 
 
 The instructions actually sent to Van Swieten and 
 to Thugut were in fact almost in exact accordance with 
 Joseph's wishes. Van Swieten was to secure, if possible, 
 a declaration of neutrality. Both at Berlin and Con- 
 stantinople the courts were informed that Austria had 
 determined to collect a large army in Hungary, to be 
 used if the Russian troops crossed the Danube. Mean- 
 while Thugut was instructed, not only to assure the 
 Porte that Austria would not stand idly by and see the 
 destruction of Turkey, but also to contract a defensive 
 alliance, by which the burden of the war expenses should 
 fall upon the Turks, and the friendship of Austria be 
 rewarded by the cession of Little Walachia, Belgrade, 
 and Widin. 
 
 The work entrusted to Thugut was well and success- 
 fully carried out. As victory continued to attend 
 the Russian armies, and the danger of their advance 
 became more threatening, even the empress herself, 
 
30 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 for a while at all events, thought that war might 
 be necessary. She declared that it was impossible 
 to maintain any longer the indifferent attitude she 
 preferre^. She even approved of the orders given 
 to Lacy to prepare troops for the active assistance of 
 the Turks in the next campaign. With such evidences 
 of sympathy with the Turkish cause to support him, 
 Thugut's chief difficulties lay in the magnitude of the 
 expectations cherished by his court. It soon became 
 evident that the surrender of Widin and Belgrade 
 could not be made without the risk of a fanatical 
 revolution, and that the enormous sums demanded by 
 Austria were beyond the means of the Turks. But they 
 were willing to pay 10,000,000 gulden and to surrender 
 Little Walachia as the price of a close alliance. Upon 
 these terms, in July 1771, a convention was signed, by 
 which Austria pledged itself to prevent Russia from 
 procuring conditions of peace disastrous to the Porte. 
 The future peace was to be either in accordance with 
 the stipulations of the Treaty of Belgrade, or upon 
 other conditions suitable to the circumstances and 
 acceptable to the Porte. In exchange, Austria was 
 to receive large subsidies and the district of Little 
 Walachia. 
 
 The empress from the first regarded the convention 
 with much dislike. The conduct of the Turks in re- 
 fraining from taking advantage of her difficulties in the 
 earlier part of her reign had won her permanent gratitude. 
 She shrank from taking territory from them. Both 
 her kindly feeling and her dignity were hurt by the 
 acceptance of subsidies ; and the participation in the war, 
 which seemed an almost necessary consequence of the 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 31 
 
 honest observance of the new convention, was opposed to 
 the fundamental principle of her policy. To Joseph and 
 Kaunitz, for the moment, the convention appeared a great 
 success. It enabled them, as they thought, to place 
 Frederick in an awkward position from which they 
 could draw their advantage, and in a certain degree 
 deprived him of his command of the negotiation. 
 
 The negotiations at Berlin had proved much more 
 difficult than at Constantinople. Van Swieten was in 
 fact pitted against the man in whose hands the final 
 decision really lay, and who, while all the rest of the 
 negotiators were uncertain in their objects and clear 
 only on the one point that they wanted to get as much 
 as they could, had himself very definite views as to 
 what he intended to do. As the Austrians had again 
 and again to learn, single-minded and unscrupulous 
 determination is the secret of all successful diplomacy. 
 The terms on which Russia was willing to close the 
 war — including, as they did, the independence of the 
 Tartar tribes of the Crimea, the Bug, the Dniester, and 
 the Dnieper, the occupation of Moldavia and Walachia 
 for twenty-five years, and the possession of an island in 
 the Archipelago — had been imparted to Frederick. As 
 there was no sign that he would himself acquire any- 
 thing by them, — as indeed a suggestion that Moldavia 
 and Walachia should subsequently pass into Austrian 
 hands seemed to point to an inclination on the part of 
 Russia to show favour to that country rather than to 
 himself, — he regarded them as absolutely unacceptable. 
 Direct peace appearing thus impossible, he began to 
 suggest the idea of a division of Poland, by which the 
 claims of all parties might be satisfied. This idea he 
 
32 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 never again relinquished. As such an arrangement 
 could be arrived at only in co-operation with Eussia, 
 he would not listen for a moment to Van Swieten's 
 suggestion of a joint opposition to that Power. He 
 therefore rejected, although with words of friendship, 
 all thought of alliance with Austria, and devoted 
 himself to bringing about the completion of that 
 solution of the difficulty on which he had set his 
 mind. For this purpose he was able to use as a lever 
 the action of Austria itself. 
 
 The district of Zips had, as early as 1769, been 
 occupied by the Austrian forces. It had once belonged 
 to Hungary, and some centuries before had been 
 mortgaged to Poland, while the republic was stiU 
 flourishing. Under the pretence that the mortgage 
 was now to be paid oflF, and that it did not at all events 
 carry with it a change of sovereignty, Joseph had 
 ordered the limits of the province to be marked out, 
 and the Austrian eagle to be set up at intervals along 
 the frontier. The demarcation was completed ; and in 
 the country marked out in accordance with these orders 
 not only was Zips itself included, but portions of other 
 districts which were certainly PoHsh, but to which the 
 Austrians raised claims. To the complaints of the Poles 
 they replied that it was a matter of detail to be settled 
 by inquiry and treaty. Unsatisfied with this reply, the 
 formal complaint was renewed in 1770. Both the 
 empress and her minister recognised the justice of the 
 complaint, but, as was now too often the case, they were 
 overruled by the ambitious emperor, who not only insisted 
 on maintaining possession of the disputed districts, but, 
 to aU appearance setting aside the promised inquiry 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 33 
 
 into the rights of the case, instructed the governor to 
 assume the title of "Minister of the Eeincorporated 
 Provinces," thus entirely begging the question as to a 
 possible necessity for restitution. 
 
 This took place late in the year 1770. According to 
 the common and dramatic story, the news did not reach 
 Russia till January 1771. As soon as it arrived, 
 Catherine is said to have at once declared to Prince 
 Henry of Prussia, who was acting as his brother's agent 
 at St. Petersburg, that if Austria chose to take a piece 
 of Poland she must do the same. It would, however, 
 seem more probable that negotiations between Berlin 
 and St. Petersburg had been already going on, and 
 that the action of Austria was now purposely adopted 
 as a pretext. Frederick was able in March of that 
 year to tell Van Swieten that the Czarina was de- 
 termined to obtain an explanation of the Austrian 
 intentions with regard to Zips, and that as far as he 
 was himself concerned he thought the Vienna court had 
 hit upon the right course, and that the much wanted 
 solution of existing difficulties lay in the establishment 
 of such rights and claims as the three countries might 
 find it possible to raise against Poland. Nothing was 
 further from the mind of Maria Theresa than a division 
 of Poland ; but it was in vain that her ambassador 
 attempted to explain her exact position with regard to 
 Zips — in vain that he called attention to the orders 
 already issued for an inquiry as to her rights on the 
 occupied districts, and to the intended change in the 
 obnoxious title of the governor. Frederick took 
 advantage of the arguments of Van Swieten, and wrote 
 to his brother in St. Petersburg that the hands of 
 
 D 
 
34 THE CO-REGENTS chap, ii 
 
 Prussia and Eussia were now untied; that if Austria 
 could make good its claims upon some portions of 
 Poland, the other countries might certainly pursue a 
 similar course. 
 
 An equal increase of the three countries at the 
 expense of Poland was the practical meaning of 
 Frederick's suggestion. Both Russia and Austria at 
 first repudiated such an idea. Catherine thought a 
 slice of Poland but a poor exchange for the indirect 
 authority she at present exercised over the whole 
 country. Maria Theresa honestly disliked to lend her 
 hand to a direct act of robbery, while her son and her 
 minister had different projects of their own. For the 
 instant, Catherine even seemed inclined to desert her 
 friend and turn towards Austria. It is probable that 
 the convention which Thugut was negotiating with the 
 Turks had also some effect upon her. The terms of 
 peace which she now offered were considerably lower 
 than any that had as yet been mentioned. She 
 declared that she would be satisfied with Azov, the 
 freedom of the Tartars, and some sort of independence 
 for Walachia. But the Court of Vienna saw no 
 attraction in these terms. Two independent, or quasi- 
 independent Powers, called into existence on the im- 
 mediate frontier of the empire, might well prove only 
 additional sources of discomfort. The overture of 
 Eussia met with a decided refusal, coupled with a 
 threat that, if the Danube was crossed, war would be 
 the immediate result. 
 
 This warlike reply of Kaunitz, which seemed to re- 
 establish the deadlock Frederick had thought to loosen 
 by the division of Poland, was not much more than a 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 35 
 
 diplomatic device. It was believed in Austria that 
 Frederick could, if he chose, compel the Eussians to 
 contract a peace which should leave the principalities in 
 the hands of Turkey. He was known to be exceedingly- 
 anxious to avoid war ; yet his treaty arrangements with 
 Russia would oblige him to give them armed assistance 
 if hostilities should arise between Austria and the 
 Czarina. Kaunitz believed that to avoid this necessity 
 the king would apply the required pressure. That such 
 hostilities were possible neither he nor the emperor nor 
 Maria Theresa really believed ; but his policy rested 
 entirely upon maintaining, in Frederick's mind at all 
 events, the belief that the Austrians were quite ready 
 for war. The empress however was incapable of conceal- 
 ing her pacific intentions, and the discomfiture of the 
 chancellor may be imagined when, in September 1771, 
 he was informed that Maria Theresa had confessed 
 them to Von Rhode, the Prussian ambassador, and had 
 told him that, if his master could persuade Russia to 
 give up its demands on the principalities, she could 
 secure the assent of the Porte to all the other terms 
 demanded. The chancellor's game was thus absolutely 
 spoilt. Frederick joyfully seized upon the admissions 
 of the empress ; he saw at once that all danger of war 
 was over, and that he had reached the Austrian ulti- 
 matum. A letter which the discomfited chancellor 
 wrote to his mistress was couched in a tone of out- 
 spoken reproach not usual in the intercourse of ministers 
 with their sovereigns. It shows the extraordinary 
 strength of the position he occupied. Not less charac- 
 teristic is the empress's reply. It contains no word 
 of anger. But while explaining that the Prussian 
 
36 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 ambassador had in fact mistaken her words, she owns that 
 his inference was entirely correct, that Austria was not 
 in a position to enter upon a war or even to make war- 
 like demonstrations. The country was suffering deeply 
 from the failure of the harvest, from widespread sickness, 
 and from want of money. These were real obstacles 
 which could not be set aside. The convention contracted 
 with the Turks, which almost implied a war, was to her 
 mind the great difficulty; but, in spite of what she 
 considered the erroneous policy which had been pursued, 
 she still put full trust in the friendship and wisdom of 
 her minister. 
 
 Prolific in his alternatives as usual, and with more 
 than his usual prolixity, Kaunitz drew up an answer 
 of portentous length. He freely confessed that a griev- 
 ous error had been committed in the occupation of the 
 territory surrounding Zips. What was intended as a 
 mere definition of frontier had to all appearance been 
 changed into a plan for territorial acquisition. But the 
 the fault was not his — it was the emperor's. On that 
 error his schemes had been ruined, and as it now 
 became necessary to adopt some fresh course of action, 
 he described to the empress, under no less than thirteen 
 separate heads, the position of affairs. The empress, 
 habitually honest and open in her dealings with her 
 son as co-regent, laid the letter before him. 
 
 From the consideration of the document Joseph de- 
 duced three possible lines of policy. The belligerents 
 might be induced to make peace upon terms of com- 
 parative equality. Such an arrangement, however good 
 in itself, could no longer be hoped for ; the unbroken 
 successes of Eussia had already rendered it impossible. 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 37 
 
 As a second alternative, Eussia might be sa'tisfied with 
 some considerable though moderate advantage ; and 
 Turkey, resting upon the support of Austria, might 
 arrive at peace upon terms far short of disastrous. 
 In that case Turkey, which would have obtained its 
 object by Austrian assistance, must scrupulously fulfil 
 the late convention^ the promised subsidies must be 
 paid, Little Walachia be surrendered to Austria, and 
 all idea of upsetting the settlement in Poland be given 
 up. If Austria withdrew (and its readiness to do so 
 had already been declared) from all except the thirteen 
 towns of Zips, Eussia would be enabled to act as Catherine 
 seemed to desire, and to resist any further division of 
 Poland. Thus Eussia would gain some advantage, 
 Turkey would be thrown entirely into the hands of 
 Austria, Austria would win money and territory, and, 
 best of all, the Prussian influence in Constantinople 
 would disappear and Frederick be left out in the cold. 
 These results might be arrived at by going behind 
 Prussia and negotiating directly with St. Petersburg. 
 A third solution of the difficulty might be found in 
 an equal division, among the three great neighbouring 
 Powers, of the advantages secured by Eussia during 
 the war. And this equality of advantage might be 
 either at' the cost of Turkey, or, as in Frederick's 
 suggestion, at the cost of Poland. If the latter, the 
 suggested treaty of partition should be contracted at 
 once. 
 
 It is obvious that the second of these propositions 
 was the one most likely to commend itself to the 
 empress. As she herself said, what she wanted was 
 no war, no change in the existing system (a wish 
 
38 THE CO-REGENTS chap, ii 
 
 which meant that she was not inclined to forego her 
 dislike to Prussia), and no complete desertion of the 
 Turks. As both the empress and her son regarded 
 a direct approach to Russia as the best method of 
 arriving at the much desired peace, Kaunitz could do 
 nothing but obey, although his own opinion would 
 have led him to seek his object through joint action 
 with Frederick. But while carrying out the instruc- 
 tions of the CO -regents he was unable to resist the 
 suggestion of his own plans. When defining the 
 limits of Austrian concession, and proposing as a 
 desirable arrangement the withdrawal of all the three 
 Powers from Poland and the re-establishment of the 
 constitution there upon its old basis, he threw out a 
 hint that an alternative solution of the difficulty might 
 be found in an equal distribution of advantages. This 
 was exactly what Frederick desired ; and it certainly 
 implied that Austria was no longer absolutely determined 
 to resist the idea of a partition treaty. Frederick had 
 in fact already found an opportunity of coming to a 
 settlement with the Eussian court exactly upon this 
 basis. As a matter of course therefore the Czarina 
 declined to accede to the Austrian propositions (which, 
 as she pointed out, offered her nothing she did not 
 already possess), and substituted for them propositions 
 of her own, offering them simultaneously to the Austrian 
 ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Berlin. If the freedom 
 of the Tartars was secured, together with the possession 
 of Otchakoff and Kinburn, the Czarina was willing to 
 leave the principalities in Turkish hands in exchange 
 for, an indemnity. 
 
 When it became evident to Kaunitz that Eussia 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 39 
 
 and Prussia were acting in entire unison, and when 
 the Russian arms continued in the autumn of 1771 
 their unbroken course of victory, he could not but 
 confess that he was worsted in the diplomatic struggle, 
 and that all hope of carrying out the intricate pro- 
 gramme Joseph had adopted was at an end. Nothing 
 could prevent the Russians from establishing themselves 
 on the Black Sea ; nothing could save from the hands 
 of Catherine and Frederick those portions of Poland on 
 which they had set their hearts. It only remained for 
 him to fall back upon Joseph's third alternative, accede 
 to the Prussian proposition and allow Austria to take 
 its share in a partition treaty. The question of what 
 the share should be was still undecided, whether it should 
 be found in the dominions of Turkey, or in Poland, or 
 elsewhere. Again the unwearied statesman set to work 
 and reduced to writing all possible alternatives, of which 
 no less than seven presented themselves to him. Several 
 of them, by which Austria should become possessed of 
 various parts of the Turkish Empire, obviously implied 
 co-operation with the Russians against the Turks ; and 
 though Kaunitz himself saw no objection to this, he 
 could not but be aware that so flagrant a disregard of 
 late engagements would be highly distasteful to the 
 empress. Much more to her mind, and therefore on 
 the whole to be recommended, was an arrangement by 
 which Austria should obtain something in Germany, 
 perhaps even Glatz and Silesia, or, failing these, 
 Anspach and Baireuth, so long the object of desire. 
 If the worst came to the worst, there was still left 
 the division of Poland. 
 
 Joseph was not at first so ready to sit down quietly 
 
40 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 under a diplomatic defeat. He thought it better that 
 there should be no peace at all. The continuation of 
 the war, he again urged, would weaken the belligerents ; 
 sooner or later Eussia would claim from Frederick the 
 support to which he was pledged ; and the first attempt 
 to put pressure upon him would be the signal for a 
 change of attitude ; in his anger he might even throw 
 himself into the arms of Austria. It was true that they 
 were too weak to fight at the present moment ; but, if 
 the Turks paid the subsidies due from them by the 
 convention, in a year or two war would be quite possible. 
 If they failed to pay, all reason for sparing them would 
 disappear, and even the empress would allow that Austria 
 might seek its advantage at their expense. 
 
 So speculative a project found no favour either with 
 the empress or with Kaunitz. A long memorial from 
 the chancellor convinced Joseph that his scheme was 
 impracticable. "Great as was my anxiety," he writes to 
 his brother, " that the war should be continued, I must 
 confess that the reasons against it under the present 
 circumstances, which Prince Kaunitz has worked out 
 to mathematical demonstration, are quite convincing. 
 It only remains a question which of the other pro- 
 positions should be accepted." He goes on to say 
 that he thinks Baireuth and Anspach worthless, that 
 Glatz and Silesia, if they could be obtained, would no 
 doubt be the best acquisitions ; and failing these, he 
 recommends Belgrade with a portion of Bosnia. 
 
 But Maria Theresa's view was of a much more sweep- 
 ing character. She regarded all the seven propositions 
 as bad. To rob Turkey in the face of the late convention 
 was not to be thought of. German and Silesian ex- 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITIOK OF POLAND 41 
 
 changes were impracticable. The division of Poland, 
 which seemed the only resource left, could in no way 
 be justified. Her conscience and the political necessities 
 of the time were terribly at war. She had found herself 
 inevitably carried away by the arguments of the minister 
 in whom she felt profound trust, and the son with whom 
 she had divided her power, and whose position as co-regent 
 she was honestly determined to recognise. The struggle 
 in her mind was most distressing. She writes to Joseph, 
 " Peace we must have, and that quickly, but we cannot 
 retrace our steps after those measures, which I have 
 always regarded as false, which have been taken since 
 the month of November 1770, when the march of the 
 troops from Italy and the Low Countries was resolved 
 upon, and since the unhappy convention with the Turks. 
 The menacing tone we have adopted with the Eussians, 
 the mysterious conduct we have pursued both with our 
 allies and our enemies, all this has arisen from our 
 determination to try and wring profit from the war 
 between the Porte and Eussia, to extend our frontiers 
 and to win advantages of which we did not dream 
 before the war. "We have wished to act h la 
 Pmssienne, and at the same time to keep up an 
 appearance of honesty. ... It may be that I 
 deceive myself, and that events are more favourable 
 than I think. But though they enabled us to secure 
 Walachia and even Belgrade, I should always regard 
 these advantages as too dearly purchased at the price 
 of honour, of the glory of the monarchy, and of our 
 own good faith and religious duty. All through my 
 unfortunate reign we have at least tried to pursue a 
 conduct marked by truth and justice, by good faith 
 
42 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 and moderation and fidelity to our engagements. We 
 have thus acquired the confidence, and I may even 
 venture to say the admiration, of Europe, the' respect 
 and veneration of our enemies. One year has lost it 
 all. I declare that I can scarcely bear it, and that 
 nothing in the world has been so painful to me as the 
 loss of our reputation. Unfortunately, I must declare 
 too, and to you, that we have deserved it. It is for 
 this that I am seeking a reniedy, which must be found 
 in rejecting as evil and ruinous all idea of deriving 
 advantage from the existing troubles. What I desire 
 is that we should consider how we can most rapidly 
 make our escape from our unfortunate situation with 
 the least evil to ourselves, without thinking for a 
 moment of making any acquisitions, but by re-establish- 
 ing our credit and our good reputation, and, as far as 
 this is possible, the political balance of power." 
 
 The attitude adopted by the empress put the chan- 
 cellor in the greatest difficulty. The steps taken during 
 the last year, which she so severely reprobated, were 
 those on which his other master, Joseph, had insisted. 
 They were also more or less in harmony with his own 
 views. With all the wish in the world, 'with which we 
 must certainly credit him, to please the mistress he had 
 so faithfully served, to retrace those steps was now 
 impossible. He was no longer free to act, as he had 
 once been ; he was the servant of two masters. The 
 best he could do was to arrive at some intermediate 
 course which should not too glaringly cross the wishes 
 of either. He had at all events gained one point by 
 Joseph's concession in the matter of the continuation 
 of the war. On that first principle he was safe. He 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 43 
 
 could at once instruct Thugut to induce the Turks to 
 accept an armistice, and to set to work to bring about 
 a peace conference. There were obvious inconsistencies 
 in Maria Theresa's view. The very words with which 
 she had closed her letter to Joseph showed the uncertainty 
 of her position. The political balance could scarcely be 
 maintained, except by some general increase in the 
 territories of all three of the Great Powers. It was 
 impossible to talk about the integrity of Poland, and at 
 the same time to demand an indemnity for Frederick's 
 appropriations in that country. But knowing well the 
 constant and ineradicable desire of his mistress, Kaunitz 
 thought to follow her real wishes in refusing for Austria 
 a portion of Poland, while asking for a restoration of 
 Glatz and part of Silesia, or failing that, of Anspach and 
 Baireuth. At the same time Joseph's wish might be 
 met, if as a third alternative the possession of Belgrade 
 and Bosnia was demanded. With great difiioulty he 
 persuaded the empress to approve of this plan. First 
 Glatz, then Belgrade, then Anspach and Baireuth. If 
 all three suggestions failed, then, and then only, must 
 Austrian increase be looked for in Poland. 
 
 When Van Swieten, in February 1772, opened these 
 propositions to Frederick, he found, as no doubt Kaunitz 
 had expected, so absolute an opposition to the Silesian 
 restitutiqns that this question was at once dropped. A 
 much less assured refusal was given to the suggestion 
 that Bosnia and Belgrade should form the Austrian 
 share. Van Swieten pointed out that Russia, secure 
 of its winnings in Poland, might now be induced to 
 insist upon its old terms, and to clear the Turks out of 
 those ijrovinces which Austria wanted. But although 
 
44 THE CO-REGENTS chap, ii 
 
 Frederick did not express any dislike to this plan, his 
 letters to his brother Henry show his real thought upon 
 the matter. "With, as it were, a shrug of his shoulders, 
 he said that it might do, but that he could not help 
 thinking it a very dishonest act on the part of Austria, 
 considering its relations with Turkey, and that he 
 gathered from his whole conversations with Van Swieten 
 that the empress was yielding to his wishes, and that, 
 in dread of war, she would speedily be induced to give 
 her adherence to the Polish plan. 
 
 The feeling which Frederick here expressed had 
 arisen also in the mind of Maria Theresa. The receipt 
 of Van Swieten's report called forth a fresh protest from 
 her against the whole of the propositions. No doubt, 
 she said, it was easiest to fall in with the proposition for 
 the division of Poland ; " but with what right," she asks, 
 "can we rob an innocent Power, the defence and support 
 of which has hitherto been our constant boast ? I do 
 not understand the policy which allows a third Power, 
 for the mere sake of present convenience and prospect- 
 ive advantage, to imitate the unrighteous action of two 
 sovereigns who have employed their overwhelming might 
 to destroy an innocent neighbour. A prince and a private 
 man stand upon equal grounds of justice. If the con- 
 trary can be proved to me, I am only too willing to 
 submit, I am eagerly anxious to think I am mistaken." 
 She then points out the slightness of the advantages 
 which any partition could secure for her. She was 
 bound to the Porte, and had even received its money. 
 All pretences which might be discovered to throw blame 
 upon the Turks, and to gain advantage at their expense, 
 were entirely opposed to the principles of honesty. 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 45 
 
 Bosnia and Servia were therefore out of the question ; 
 nothing was left but Moldavia and Walachia, miserable 
 devastated countries which a great monarchy might well 
 do without. The exchange must therefore practically 
 be at the expense of the Poles, and, to be honest, Moldavia 
 and Walachia should be given to them as an indemnity. 
 Every other course would produce war with the Turks, 
 which was unjust, or deprive the Turks of territory 
 without securing them any compensation, which was an 
 act of robbery. What would the world say of such 
 conduct 1 " I cannot but see that this would be a formal 
 renunciation of everything that has happened in the 
 thirty years of my reign. Let us then aim at lessening 
 the claims of others, rather than at sharing with them 
 on such unequal conditions. Let us rather be looked 
 upon as weak than as dishonest." It is plain that this 
 depreciation of the advantages to be gained was used 
 as an argument to diminish the acquisitiveness of Joseph 
 and Kaunitz. Her real thought was the dishonesty of 
 joining, for the mere sake of advantage, in the unjust 
 destruction of a neighbouring Power. 
 
 The revival in full strength of the empress's con- 
 scientious scruples showed Kaunitz that the plan he had 
 submitted to Frederick through Van Swieten, and which 
 the king had appeared to accept, could no longer be 
 carried out. In February he therefore suggested a new 
 arrangement which he assured the empress was quite 
 compatible with her conscientious scruples. Walachia 
 and the southern half of Moldavia and Bessarabia, 
 as far as the mouths of the Danube, might form the 
 share of Austria in the general distribution, the other 
 half of the two provinces being given to Poland as an 
 
46 THE OO-KEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 indemnity for the losses it had sustained at the hands 
 of Prussia and Eussia. As the territory demanded 
 had already passed out of the hands of the Turks, they 
 would saSer no fresh loss. The empress would have 
 done her best to minimise the injury inflicted upon 
 Poland, and as a ruler interested in the safety of her 
 subjects she had no right to expose them to the dangers 
 which must inevitably attend a change in the balance 
 of power. 
 
 These arguments seem to have been accepted by 
 Maria Theresa. It was Joseph who was now recalcitrant ; 
 so extended a line of frontier he held to be a disadvantage 
 rather than a gain to Austria. To hold that there was 
 any conscientious duty to make good the loss which 
 Poland was suffering from the injustice of other Powers 
 seemed to him most unreasonable. All Walachia and 
 Moldavia, as far as the Pruth, was, he thought, the 
 fair measure of Austrian acquisition ; and if Bessarabia 
 could be restored to the Turks they might even be 
 induced to surrender Belgrade. The empress was 
 unable to adopt this view of the question. She saw 
 clearly enough that to take the Turkish provinces was 
 merely an indirect method of giving a free hand in 
 Poland to the other Powers. All division she declared 
 to be dishonourable in its very principle ; she could not 
 but feel ashamed of any such proposition. The severity 
 of the struggle weighed heavily upon her. As usual she 
 feU back upon her friend Kaunitz to save her. " Never," 
 she says, " have I felt so sad. When claims were raised 
 to the whole of my succession I stood firm, for God was 
 on my side. But now, when treaty and right and 
 honour are all against me, I have not a moment's peace." 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 47 
 
 In absolute uncertainty between the different views 
 of the empress and emperor, Kaunitz was obliged to 
 confine himself to demanding a reciprocal promise from 
 Prussia, that whatever division was made, the three 
 Powers should be treated on a footing of equality. To 
 define what Austria wanted was impossible till the 
 Eussian claims were known. He had not to wait long. 
 About the middle of February 1772 news came from 
 St. Petersburg of the completion of a partition treaty. 
 Galitzin was instructed to assert that from this treaty 
 Eussia would never go back. Austria vras indeed 
 invited to join in it, but the partition would proceed, 
 whatever the answer of Austria might be. Again, 
 firmness and a clear view of the object to be obtained 
 triumphed over shifty and ingenious indecision. Kaunitz 
 confessed that there was nothing left but to point out 
 the districts in Poland which the empress wanted. 
 With a bad grace she yielded. " I find," she wrote upon 
 the chancellor's letter, " that there is nothing else to be 
 done. I cannot look on quietly at the increase of these 
 two Powers, but still less do I wish to join them." 
 Brief and almost contradictory though her words were, 
 Kaunitz took them, and took them rightly, as a 
 permission to proceed. He, however, wished to put off 
 the evil moment as long as possible, and threw such 
 difficulties in the way that the Prussian king charged 
 him sharply with duplicity. The charge is only so far 
 well founded that Kaunitz, striving to please two 
 masters, with neither of whom he himself agreed, and 
 driven backwards step by step by the firm attitude of 
 his opponents, found himself compelled to sanction 
 things which he entirely disapproved, and could not 
 
48 THE CO-REGENTS chap, ii 
 
 avoid showing the different influences which were 
 working on him. 
 
 In the midst of the confusion, of plans it is perhaps 
 possible, to trace the fundamental difference of policy 
 between the three important persons in the Austrian 
 court. While the chancellor was dreaming of his great 
 political combination, and a reversal of existing alliances 
 leading to a firm opposition to Russia, Joseph was 
 already bent upon the destruction of the Turks, and 
 desired for that purpose a close friendship with St. 
 Petersburg. The empress, full now as always of in- 
 veterate mistrust of Frederick, could not bring herself 
 to approve of the chancellor's view. On the other hand, 
 with a persistent friendship for the Turks, the outcome 
 of a long-standing gratitude for their behaviour at the 
 beginning of her reign, she was entirely indisposed to 
 join in the plans of her son. She shared with Kaunitz 
 a dislike for the Russian alliance, and her scrupulous 
 conscience would have led her, if possible, to have refused 
 ail share in the transaction of which Poland was the 
 victim. 
 
 It cannot, however, be said that the conscience of 
 Maria Theresa, sensitive though it was, was of a very 
 perfect character. The arguments of her advisers found 
 a strong ally in a deep-lying desire which she herself 
 felt, and which perhaps she could hardly have avoided 
 in the general feeling existing at the time, to increase 
 her dominions as far as possible. In some respects, too, 
 her virtue was of that secondary character which is 
 derived from the wish to stand well with others. From 
 the extracts which have already been given, it will be 
 evident that she laid great stress upon her general 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 49 
 
 reputation for honesty. This is still more marked in 
 her expressions of content at the change of ministry 
 which had lately taken place in France. Her old ally, 
 Choiseul, had been driven from iis position by the 
 clique which made use of the influence of Madame du 
 Barry, and the Due d'Aiguillon had taken his place. 
 The empress wrote that she did not think that the 
 change would injure the alliance, of which the real 
 cement was to be found in the personal wishes of the 
 king, while certainly the strife of parties and the 
 withdrawal of the vivacity of the late minister from the 
 political arena would render transactions taking place 
 in the east of Europe less likely to attract attention. 
 
 The Court of Vienna, having agreed to accept a share 
 of any partition which was carried out, had now to 
 decide as to what share they would demand. The reins 
 had for the time at all events slipped from the hands 
 of Maria Theresa into those of her son. In his policy 
 of acquisition Joseph, though frequently irritated by the 
 slow and prudent methods of the old diplomatist, was 
 fully supported by him; and no scruple was felt by 
 either in making the best use of the opportunity which 
 had now arrived. When Van Swieten explained at 
 Berlin the vast demands of his employers, Frederick 
 could not refrain from remarking upon the very fine 
 appetite shown by the Austrian court. The demands 
 were indeed so large that they could not be allowed to 
 pass. From the side of Eussia, in all probability 
 inspired by Frederick, serious objections were raised. 
 Kaunitz, following his usual diplomatic method, had 
 put forward the Austrian claims without much hope of 
 their realisation, and at once prepared for concession. He 
 
 E 
 
50 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 drew up a sort of sliding scale of alternatives, to be sent 
 to the ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Berlin, to 
 which they might step by step retreat Joseph, however, 
 would listen to no such suggestion. In language which 
 betrayed his self-willed character, and which he might 
 well have spared in intercourse with so old a servant, 
 he stigmatised the chancellor's plan as "nothing but 
 childish fear, ignorance, hesitation, and weakness." He 
 was all for marching an army at once into the districts 
 which were claimed. "We have no need," he said, "of 
 any advice from Russia or Prussia to tell us what we 
 want, or to enable us to set to work to realise it. 
 Believe me, we shall much sooner win our point thus 
 than by an endless exchange of state papers." He had 
 his way. While Hadik and Estherhazy marched into the 
 contested provinces, and Count Pergen was despatched 
 to take over the government, Kaunitz, either yielding 
 to the emperor's firm will, or really persuaded of the 
 wisdom of his advice, replied to the objections of the 
 Russian court by repeating his first demands. At the 
 last moment he recalled the alternatives which he had pre- 
 pared and was on the eve of sending to the ambassadors. 
 They were thus left with no choice but to follow their 
 original instructions. They were to declare that three 
 things were absolutely necessary : the possession of the 
 salt mines in the neighbourhood of Cracow, whence alone 
 any great addition of revenue could be expected, and of 
 Lemberg, the only town of much importance in the 
 territory claimed ; while, thirdly, whatever their acquisi- 
 tions might be, they must be so placed as to secure a 
 connection with the Austrian provinces through upper 
 SUesia. Without this, as Kauuitz expressed it, " the 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 51 
 
 new possession would be a house without a door." Along 
 with these demands there went, as a matter of course, the 
 great object of the whole negotiation, the restoration of 
 the Danubian principalities to the Turks. The dreaded 
 contact with the Eussians would thus be avoided, and 
 some little salve found for the conscience of Maria Theresa, 
 sorely oppressed by the late convention with Turkey. 
 The favourable reception accorded to these terms almost 
 exceeded the chancellor's hopes. With no alternatives 
 in their hands, his ambassadors were compelled to be 
 firm. All obstacles were at length removed, and the 
 great Treaty of Partition was signed at St. Petersburg, 
 August 2, 1772. 
 
 The next step to be taken was to secure the consent 
 of the Polish Republic. The decent cloak of treaty had 
 to be thrown over what would otherwise have been 
 undisguised robbery. A manifesto was therefore issued 
 in September, the joint production of Panin and Kaunitz, 
 setting forth "the rightful claims" on which the an- 
 nexations might be justified ; while in the newly ap- 
 propriated lands the Poles were instructed at once to 
 submit themselves to the government of Count Pergen. 
 The empress's honesty exhibited itself in the erasure of 
 the word "rightful," which in the draft of the manifesto 
 was used as an epithet to " claims," and her weakness 
 in the restoration of the word in the printed copy. 
 
 Divided as they were, the Poles were at one in their 
 bitter opposition to the partition of their country. 
 While the insurgent confederates opposed in arms, 
 though vainly, the advance of the troops which were 
 poured into the provinces, from the king's side a counter 
 manifesto was issued, giving an absolute denial to the 
 
52 THE CO-REGENTS chap, ii 
 
 validity of the claims raised by the three Powers. It 
 therefore became necessary to summon a Diet, and in 
 some way or other to wring from it some form of 
 national consent to the Partition treaty. It must be 
 said for Kaunitz that, if his lust for acquisition was 
 immoderate, he had no wish to destroy what was left of 
 Poland, or to inflict more injury upon the unhappy king 
 and country than was necessary for the completion of 
 his plans. He thought to find in the secularisation of 
 certain bishoprics a means of restoring the royal revenue, 
 and to establish certain constitutional changes, among 
 others the partial abolition of the Liherum Veto, which 
 should relieve the Republic from the chronic anarchy 
 from which it sufiered. He even shrank from degrading 
 the nobility by the contemplated wholesale system of 
 bribery. He hoped to attain his end and the ratifica- 
 tion of the treaty by a declaration, which contained a 
 scarcely veiled threat, that the claims of the partitioning 
 monarchs, especially those of Austria, extended far 
 beyond the provinces mentioned, and which took credit 
 for the moderation of the demands they had made. 
 Like more than one of the chancellor's plans, it was too 
 intricate and too clever to succeed. The empress would 
 not consent to any diminution of the wealth of the 
 Church ; both Russia and Prussia were anxious for the 
 continued weakness of the Polish Republic ; and Russian 
 experience led to a high estimij^tion of the value of 
 bribery. It was the plan of his rivals — a show of 
 violence, vast briberj^, and the entire repudiation of all 
 constitutional change — which was the finally accepted 
 programme. When the Diet assembled in Warsaw in 
 April 1773, the success of this plan became obvious. 
 
1770-73 THE PARTITION OF POLAND 53 
 
 Arms and money carried the day, and the treaty was so 
 far accepted that a delegation of the Diet was appointed 
 and armed with full powers to carry out the division. 
 The work was completed and the final treaty contracted 
 on September 18, 1773. 
 
 The part played by the three directors of Austrian 
 policy during the whole course of these negotiations is in 
 the highest degree characteristic. 
 
 The chancellor's extreme opportunism and infinite 
 readiness of resource are brought into striking relief. 
 A new plan is ready to suit every conceivable accident. 
 There is no political arrangement but has its alternative, 
 nay, probably, its six or seven alternatives. One 
 principle, and one alone, connects them. An earnest 
 desire to secure the greatness of the empire, as repre- 
 sented by the sovereign for whom he felt an almost 
 enthusiastic admiration, supplies him with all the 
 conscience he possesses. No scruple as to the means 
 employed ever arises in his mind, no ties of old alliances 
 bind him. Indeed, in his wide sweeping views, in his 
 pride in his own ingenuity, sudden and complete 
 revolutions in the existing relations of States seem to 
 have had a strong fascination for him. 
 
 No less striking is the exhibition of Joseph's warlike 
 and ambitious disposition, and the speculative and 
 doctrinaire turn of mind by which it was limited. With 
 no more conscience than Kaunitz, and with the same 
 desire for the greatness of his country, Joseph is wanting 
 in that submission to facts which is the groundwork of 
 the chancellor's diplomac}'. His fixed view of things as 
 they ought to be seems incapable of accommodating itself 
 to things as they are. Coupled with this characteristic 
 
54 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, ii 
 
 goes a hard and inelastic view of all public transactions 
 which rather befits a lawyer than a statesman. 
 
 Between these unscrupulous patriots, the empress, 
 with Bar highly sensitive conscience, has to pick her way, 
 dragged, now here now there, by her own very clear 
 perception of what is right and honest, and by the 
 arguments of her advisers, varying in their methods and 
 their political tendencies, but united in forcing on their 
 mistress her duty, as the head of the empire, to disregard 
 her scruples and to distinguish between her private and 
 her political morality. There is something very tragical 
 in the position of Maria Theresa during these protracted 
 negotiations. The strong and masterful queen, whose 
 will had once been unquestioned, whose sanguine and 
 lively temperament and unshaken courage had breathed 
 life into the whole action of the State, appears in her 
 advanced age as a sad, self-questioning, almost timid 
 woman, driven to yield, step by step, before the reckless 
 impetuosity of her son. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE SUPPRESSION OP THE JESUITS 
 1768-1777 
 
 A DEVOTED attachment to the Catholic Church was so 
 marked a feature in the character of the empress, that 
 it is somewhat strange to find her consenting to the 
 suppression of the Order of the Jesuits. It is partly 
 explained by her connection with the Bourbon courts 
 who took the lead in the attack upon the Order, but 
 chiefly by the strength of the principle which guided 
 her domestic policy, her fixed determination to centralise 
 in her own hands all the powers of the State. 
 
 No such attempt at the establishment of a strong 
 central power has been made in Europe since the 
 Christian era, without bringing to light the ineradicable 
 difficulty of harmonising the claims of the secular 
 authority with those of the universal monarchy claimed 
 by the Eoman See. The authority even of the most 
 absolute monarch fails to reach one part, and that the 
 noblest part, of the subjects over whom he rules. He 
 cannot coerce the minds or the religion of his people. 
 So many of the actions of life are indissolubly bound up 
 
56 THE CO-REGENTS chap, hi 
 
 with the mental and sphitual state of those who do them, 
 that an external power, which has made good its claims 
 to command and regulate religion and thought, is a rival 
 of the jnost formidable character. The difficulty is 
 much enhanced when, as in the case of the Roman 
 Church, the government of the external power is sup- 
 ported by a vast and intricate machinery, and by agents 
 whose first duty is to uphold the authority of their 
 chief. It has been found, and is still found, a 
 matter of the gravest difficulty to draw a satisfactory 
 line between the spiritual and secular powers. The 
 relations of the rising State of Austria with the papacy 
 formed of necessity one of the great questions which 
 Maria Theresa had to encounter in her efforts to re- 
 establish her powerful monarchy. 
 
 The time was very favourable for the assertion of the 
 independence of the secular power. The course of events 
 during the last hundred years had been full of disaster 
 for the Papal See. Incapable of maintaining his position 
 of supremacy, and hampered by his position as temporal 
 prince, the pope had been unable to stand alone. Siding 
 now with one, now with the other alliance in the War of 
 the Spanish Succession, he had lost all authority as a 
 general arbiter. Forced against his will to grant the 
 investiture of Naples to a Bourbon prince, Clement XII. 
 found himself surrounded by hostile Powers, and in 
 possession of the merest shred of temporal authority. 
 For even among the great Catholic Powers, by which the 
 influence of the Papal See had hitherto been upheld, 
 there seemed a widespread inclination to strip it of its 
 temporal rights. The flection of Benedict XIV. to the 
 papacy in 1740 alone postponed a catastrophe. Under- 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 57 
 
 standing the change which had come over his position, 
 he succeeded by a series of concessions in establishing 
 a reconciliation with the Catholic courts. But it was 
 not only political circumstances which had caused the 
 depressed condition of the papacy ; a great intellectual 
 movement in opposition to its claims was agitating the 
 mind of Europe. It was visible not only among Pro- 
 testants but within the Church itself, and particularly in 
 the rapid increase of the number of those philosophers 
 and free-thinkers to whom even a reformed Church, 
 were it authoritative, seemed inadmissible. The form of 
 thought of which Jansenism was the expression had 
 gained strength under the violent persecution it had 
 suffered from the hands of Louis XIV. The philosophy 
 which, passing from England, had found a congenial soil 
 in France, had taken advantage of the same acts of 
 violence to support its opposition to all ecclesiastical 
 authority. Thus, while within the limits of the Church 
 there was a difference of opinion which was little short 
 of schism, there lay outside it, and ready to support the 
 anti-papal party, a strong body of the most advanced 
 thinkers of the time. 
 
 Austria had become deeply infected with these 
 ideas, and as they fell in exactly with Maria Theresa's 
 view of the importance of concentrating the powers 
 of the State in a single head, there seemed every 
 reason to expect some practical result from them in her 
 dominions. But there was another side to her character 
 which rendered a compromise certain. Her monarchical 
 views went hand in hand with the strongest attachment 
 to religion as represented by the Catholic Church. How- 
 ever far she might push her claims as a sovereign, there 
 
58 THE CO-REGENTS chap, hi 
 
 always lay in the background a determination to avoid 
 any action derogatory to the Papal See and a deep- 
 rooted preference for the doctrine of the Jesuits. 
 
 Though the election of Pope Benedict XIV. blunted 
 the extreme animosity of the European courts towards 
 the papacy, it was not without considerable difficulty 
 that he effected a reconciliation even with Austria. The 
 strong impression that he was the enemy of Austrian 
 interests and a friend of the intrusive Emperor Charles 
 VII. was not removed till after that monarch's death; 
 and even then it was only through the intercession 
 of the Portuguese court that friendly relations were 
 established. As in the case of nearly every other 
 Catholic country, the renewal of friendship cost Benedict 
 some concessions. They were trivial enough ; yet, 
 small as they were, it was not without the exertion of 
 much pressure that the pope was induced to make them. 
 The most important perhaps was a diminution in the 
 number of Saints' days, the large number of which 
 seemed to the Austrian Government a grave limitation 
 on the industry of the people. 
 
 Such re-established harmony as had prevailed during 
 the life of Benedict XIV. came to an end on his death 
 in 1758. Against the character of the new pope, 
 Clement XIII., nothing could be alleged. He was a man 
 of exemplary life and high aspirations. But he was one 
 of those to whom innovation appeared a crime. He 
 regarded the rights of the papacy as a sacred charge to 
 be defended at all hazards, and, bitterly deploring the 
 encroachments that had been made on them, believed 
 that he could by adopting a firm attitude regain what 
 had been lost. It was an unfortunate moment for the 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 59 
 
 election of such a pope. A weak point in the armour 
 of the papacy had been found in the conduct of the 
 Jesuits, and an attack upon the Order at once religious 
 and political was at its height. Already in Portugal the 
 late pope had expressed grave disapprobation of their 
 mercantile pursuits and had given their property over 
 to the Government. Already in France Choiseul had 
 brought them within the grasp of the law on the 
 failure of one of their mercantile houses. With liberal 
 ministers at the head of the Government of every 
 Catholic Power, the wisdom of the papacy lay in 
 conciliation. But to Clement XIII. the Order of the 
 Jesuits appeared the very citadel of the Church, in the 
 midst of the fierce assaults of innovation and unbelief ; 
 and though the storm continued to rise around him, 
 he still held firm. In Portugal the Jesuits, implicated 
 in a conspiracy against the king, were banished and took 
 refuge in Italy. In France the absolute power of their 
 general was declared incompatible with the constitution 
 of the State, and in 1762, on their refusal to modify 
 the rules of their Order, the Parlement of Paris decreed 
 its suppression. In Spain, as in Portugal, the Jesuits were 
 charged with treason and all their establishments closed. 
 The Bourbon courts of Naples and Parma followed the 
 example of the leading members of their house. Clement 
 however showed fio sign of yielding. Surrounded by 
 like-minded advisers, excited by the clamour of the 
 Jesuit refugees, far from listening to the demands of the 
 Bourbon courts, he proceeded in January 1768 to fresh 
 assertions of authority, which, though they had not all 
 reference to the question of the Jesuits, were closely 
 connected with the same principles. For the accusations 
 
60 THE CO-REGENTS chap, m 
 
 levelled against the Order were but blinds. Behind the 
 charges of peculation and of treason, there lay, in the 
 minds at least of statesmen, a more real and political 
 ground of •hostility. To them it was as agents of a 
 foreign Power, the avowed servants of an alien general 
 and of an encroaching pope, that the Jesuits were 
 obnoxious. The war was in fact not between the crown 
 and the Jesuits, but between the secular sovereign and 
 his spiritual rival. 
 
 In 1768 events occurred which implicated Austria in 
 the quarrel, from which it had hitherto contrived to 
 hold aloof. Duke Philip of Parma, under the influence 
 of the reforming minister De Tillot, had gone so far as 
 to limit the power of holding land in mortmain. His 
 son Ferdinand, under the same influence, entered upon 
 a still more decided course. He closed the papal 
 law courts, forbade the presentation of foreigners 
 to livings, and declared that the royal licence was 
 necessary for the promulgation of any Papal Bull or 
 letter. The pope, supported by his Jesuit friends, took 
 up an attitude which would have befitted the medieval 
 papacy. He declared the duke's edicts null and void, 
 and threatened him as his vassal with ecclesiastical 
 censure. A burst of anger from all the Bourbon 
 courts followed this violent act. They withdrew their 
 ambassadors from Rome and threatened to occupy 
 certain of the papal provinces ; and, treating the pope's 
 conduct as an intolerable assault on the rights of 
 sovereigns, they called upon Maria Theresa • to join 
 them in their coercive measures. Though the Austrian 
 court had as yet kept terms with Eome, it was fully 
 conscious of the obstacle placed in the way of the 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 61 
 
 realisation of a complete national monarchy by the 
 interference of the spiritual power, and had already 
 taken a step similar to that of the Duke of Parma. 
 In 1767 it had forbidden the reception of any papal 
 brief without leave of the crown. It was therefore 
 supposed that the invitation of the Bourbon courts 
 would be favourably received, especially as the marriage 
 of the Archduchess Amelia with Ferdinand of Parma 
 was then in contemplation. 
 
 But while neither the empress nor her minister thought 
 it possible to refuse the co-operation demanded, their 
 view of the situation and of the attitude to be assumed 
 towards Eome was more statesmanlike than that taken 
 by the Bourbons. To break with the papacy and 
 destroy its authority was not to be thought of ; nor 
 could a daughter of Austria be allowed to enter a 
 house in hostility with Rome. They considered the 
 threatened occupation of Avignon and Benevento an 
 undignified form of assault on so feeble a foe as 
 the pope. To them it appeared that, far from with- 
 drawing ambassadors from Eome, the opportunity should 
 be taken for insisting upon the long desired definition of 
 the line separating temporal from spiritual jurisdiction. 
 The Great Powers acting in concert should convince the 
 pope by arguments that the time for interfering with 
 the secular government of a crowned head had gone 
 by for ever. The reply to the Bourbon demand was 
 drawn up in this sense. It arrived too late to produce 
 its intended efi'ect. Choiseul had already recalled his 
 ambassador, and on the refusal of the pope' to withdraw 
 his letter to the Duke of Parma, Avignon and Benevento 
 had been actually occupied by French and Neapolitan 
 
62 THE CO-EEGENTS ohap. hi 
 
 troops. But even the modified adhesion to the general 
 demand of the European courts contained in the reply 
 was sufficient. Clement, who could no longer hope 
 for the assistance of anj' great Power, gave up the 
 struggle. When one after the other, in the following 
 year, the Bourbon courts demanded the entire suppres- 
 sion of the Jesuit Order, he deserted his haughty 
 attitude, and consented to summon a consistory to 
 debate the subject. 
 
 What might have been the results of such a meeting it 
 is impossible to say. The evening before it assembled, 
 broken and in despair, Clement XIII. died. Under such 
 circumstances the pressure of the sovereigns was too 
 great to be resisted. The presence of Joseph, who took 
 the opportunity of visiting Rome, was not without its 
 effect. Cardinal Ganganelli, an avowed enemy of the 
 Jesuits, but a man of gentle temperament and of deep 
 spiritual religion, emerged from the conclave as Pope 
 Clement XIV. Much as he disliked the Jesuits, their 
 entire destruction was so violent a measure that he not 
 unnaturally shrank from it, and declared that he would 
 only act upon the general demand of all the Catholic 
 Powers. As Maria Theresa was known to be personally 
 favourable to the Order, its partisans hoped that her 
 assistance might be secured and the Order yet be saved. 
 But she was scarcely a free agent. Not only were her 
 son and minister strong upholders of the reforming 
 party ; the whole pohcy of her reign pledged her to 
 keep on good terms with the Bourbon courts. It was 
 impossible to return a direct refusal to their earnest 
 demands. She was obliged to content herself with 
 declaring her absolute neutrality in the quarrel, and 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 63 
 
 her -willingness, while doing nothing either for or against 
 the Jesuits, to accept without question, as an obedient 
 daughter of the Church, the decision of the Papal 
 See. Thus, when in 1773 information was given her 
 that the King of Spain actually held in his hand the 
 brief for the suppression of the Order, she could raise no 
 further objection. But with the worldly wisdom which 
 always led her to wring some advantages for her State even 
 from events which she herself deplored, she demanded 
 the alteration of the clause which placed the confiscated 
 property of the Jesuits in the hands of the pope. Only 
 upon the condition that this property should fall to 
 the State to be used for purposes of religion would 
 she acquiesce in the brief. The abolition of the 
 Order, once allowed, was effected without disturbance. 
 Although the commission entrusted with carrying it out 
 consisted of men with strongly progressive opinions, the 
 influence of the empress secured gentle and liberal 
 treatment for the members of the suppressed society. 
 Sufficient pensions were allotted to them ; and of the 
 residue of the wealth a fund was formed for the com- 
 pletion of certain educational reforms which the empress 
 had much at heart. 
 
 Though the abolition of the Jesuit Order may be 
 regarded as the high-water mark of the opposition to 
 the papacy during the eighteenth century, as far as 
 Austria was concerned it was a matter rather of ex- 
 ternal than of domestic politics. The struggle between 
 the supporters of the secular and the spiritual authority 
 continued with unabated bitterness. Strong in the 
 support of the empress, who believed that every blow 
 aimed at ecclesiastical authority gave a fresh opening 
 
64 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, hi 
 
 to the rising tide of immorality and infidelity, the 
 conservatives fought their battle with unflinching 
 consistency. It was of no avail that the emperor and 
 the minister sided strongly with the reforming party. 
 There is a memorandum presented by Kaunitz to the 
 empress immediately after the news of the election of 
 Pope Clement XIV. had been received, which gives a 
 picture of the objects at which the reformers aimed, and 
 of the opposition which they encountered. In a few 
 brief words he explains what he regarded as the con- 
 tinual encroachment of the Papal See, and enumerates 
 the changes he considered necessary. There is the 
 diminution of land held in mortmain, so contrary to 
 the due balance of property on which society rests ; 
 the equal taxation of the clergy as subjects and citizens 
 of the State ; the abolition of encroachments upon 
 jurisdiction and police duties, which are essentially the 
 functions of the State ; the curtailment of the number 
 of the ecclesiastics and of their vast wealth ; the re- 
 establishment of proper discipline among the regular 
 orders ; some check upon the maladministration of 
 pious foundations ; the diminution of the inordinate 
 number of holidays, which threw a most unfair ad- 
 vantage into the hands of Protestant traders ; and 
 the exclusion of the clergy from the share they had 
 acquired in testamentary and similar matters which 
 really belonged to the State, though the Church had 
 chosen to regard them as connected with the sacrament 
 of marriage. Reforms on these points he declares to 
 be necessary and natural. "But the opposition is 
 so bitter, the incessant outcry against confiscation, 
 injustice, impiety, and sacrilege so loud, that the 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 65 
 
 Church is threatened with complete disruption and 
 an entire separation of kingdoms from its communion, 
 to its own unspeakable loss." But none of these great 
 reforms were carried out in any complete degree under 
 Maria Theresa. Not only did the empress herself oppose 
 them, but among the chief officials and advisers of the 
 crown, drawn, most of them, from the old nobility, there 
 existed a strong feeling against meddling with either 
 property or privilege ; while many even of the more 
 liberal minded feared that more harm than good might 
 result from touching those external forms in which the 
 masses are apt to see so large a portion of religion. 
 
 With opinions and parties so equally balanced, it 
 was certain that no fundamental changes could be 
 carried out. Though Maria Theresa's clear sight pre- 
 vented her from opposing innovations, though her views 
 of the State obliged her on some points to initiate useful 
 reforms, it was left for her son to give them their 
 completion. She limited the increase of convents, and 
 diminished their wealth ; precluded monks from serving 
 as witnesses to wills ; insisted upon the royal licence on 
 excommunications and bulls ; got rid of the pernicious 
 use of the right of asylum ; withdrew the right of 
 imprisonment from the ecclesiastical courts ; and in 
 some other respects limited the spiritual power. 
 But in every case she was careful to explain that 
 she acted entirely with a view to support the proper 
 independence of her State, and remained to the end of 
 her life the friend and supporter of the papacy, even 
 when in the hands of so strong an upholder of its full 
 authority as Pius VI. 
 
 The same character of compromise, of initiation rather 
 
 F 
 
66 THE CO-REGENTS chap, in 
 
 than completion, is to be found in all the administra- 
 tive and social reforms of Maria Theresa's reign. Her 
 kindness of heart, her respect for established privilege, 
 and th,e conservative bias which was natural to her, 
 prevented her from pushing to their perfected form 
 improvements, the value of which her intellectual acute- 
 ness compelled her to acknowledge. This was especially 
 the case with education. It was impossible for her, 
 bent as she was upon the elevation of her empire, to be 
 blind to the necessity of raising the whole intellectual 
 life of her people. Yet she cannot be said to have been 
 in any sense a real patron of learning ; the object which 
 she set before her reached no higher than the production 
 of good servants of the State and good citizens. Early 
 in her reign, under the influence of Van Swieten, she 
 had carried' out important reforms in the university, and 
 brought its semi-independent condition to complete 
 dependence upon the central authority of the State. 
 Its property had been placed in the hands of officials, 
 its professors were officials, it became in fact a civil 
 department. The opening of the new university build- 
 ings in 1756 may be regarded as the beginning of this 
 new era. Later in her reign, when somewhat free 
 from the pressure of great political questions, she found 
 time again to turn her attention to the subject. And 
 as her son had now a distinct predominance in the 
 counsels of the State, it was the improvement of the 
 lower walks of education, wherein he was more par- 
 ticularly interested, which came under discussion. 
 
 It was inevitable that the dissolution of the Jesuit 
 Order should introduce a new educational system. 
 The weakness of the secondary schools had been already 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 67 
 
 forced into notice. Far too numerous for the wants of 
 the population, and for the most part in the hands of 
 the Jesuits, or of the Piarist brothers, they retained the 
 Uf eless and mechanical processes of the preceding century. 
 Though the instruction was almost entirely classical, it 
 was so inferior that we find Von Kressl, by no means an 
 extreme reformer, asserting that at the age of twenty- 
 one he could hardly understand the simplest classical 
 author. In 1771 Count Pergen was entrusted with the 
 duty of reforming the whole system of secondary educa- 
 tion. As his scheme included the complete secularisa- 
 tion of teaching and the importation of foreign experts, 
 it encountered the opposition both of the clerical party 
 and of the emperor. Joseph saw no reason for bringing 
 learned foreigners to carry out the simple alterations 
 that were necessary. He described, in the opinion which 
 he delivered on Pergen's scheme, what he considered to 
 be the real necessities of education. "What we want," 
 he says, "is that all our subjects should be able to read, 
 write, and sum. For this, learned men are scarcely 
 necessary." The increase of primary schools, good 
 masters, the subordination of purely religious teaching 
 and its essential connection with the best secular 
 teaching, the diminution of useless classical subtleties, 
 the introduction of suitable subjects to form a ground- 
 work for more advanced science, foundations in colleges 
 where maintenance should be given at the public expense 
 but only upon merit — such were the sort of reforms he 
 contemplated. " The lower classes," he continues, "find 
 their livelihood in business, or in service, or in the army. 
 Plans have been already made for the education of the 
 upper classes ; the main thing to be aimed at is that 
 
68 THE CO-REGENTS chap, hi 
 
 there should be no difference between the lord and the 
 commoner in the civil service, any more than in the 
 Church or the army. And when these views have been 
 realised, it will be time to think of finding learned men. 
 The best foreigner could but give the same advice, and 
 could not know the wants of the people so well as a 
 native." 
 
 Count Pergen was sent to manage the newly acquired 
 district of Galicia, and his scheme was dropped. But 
 the question was not shelved. Plan after plan was 
 suggested; the dispute between the ancient and the 
 modern arose, with the cry that the Gymnasium was 
 being changed into the Technical School. Maria 
 Theresa, true to her own feelings, sided with the 
 ancients and at length accepted the plan of a Piarist 
 named Marx. Latin remained the groundwork of 
 secondary instruction, and the regular clergy were 
 admitted to a large share in the management of the 
 schools. 
 
 When the question of primary education came under 
 consideration, there was a greater consensus of opinion. 
 The subjects of instruction were more simple, and there 
 already existed a good supply of suitable teachers, either 
 laymen or belonging to the secular clergy. It was 
 generally accepted that three classes of schools, all de- 
 pending on the State, were necessary. But every variety 
 of opinion was expressed as to their methods and organ- 
 isation. And it became evident that the hand of some 
 general organiser was needed to set the reform in motion. 
 Such a man was found in Felbiger, Abbot of Sagan in 
 Prussian Silesia. Before his assistance could be obtained, 
 the leave of his sovereign was necessary. The object 
 
1768-77 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS 69 
 
 appealed directly to Frederick's desire for the spread 
 of enlightenment, and he at once and in most cordial 
 terms gave his permission to the abbot to visit Vienna. 
 Felbiger received the full confidence of the empress ; 
 and she placed the task of organising the primary 
 education unreservedly in his hands. He did not 
 disappoint her expectations. In a very short time, 
 by the suppression of certain small schools, by a careful 
 selection of teachers, and by a wise course of study, 
 he established in most of the provinces of the empire 
 a fairly successful organisation. The threefold classi- 
 fication of schools was adopted. He placed in most 
 of the large towns normal schools which should re- 
 present the perfection of the system, and a head school 
 in the centre of each district, usually in the seat of 
 some decayed Jesuit establishment; while the villages 
 were supplied with primary schools in which the first 
 and necessary elements of education were taught. The 
 movement was energetically supported by the empress. 
 At all her country houses she set schools on foot 
 and personally superintended the examinations. The 
 wealthier landowners followed her example; and so 
 great was the effect that in 1777 the number of scholars 
 was three times as great as it had been ten years 
 before. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-KEGENCY 
 
 1773-1777 
 
 If the negotiations whicli led to the partition of Poland 
 exhibit strikingly the decadence of the great empress, 
 they show no less clearly the commanding attitude 
 which her son was assuming. It is his spirit which 
 begins henceforward to be visible in all transactions, 
 whether public or private. His acquisitive temper in- 
 forms all the external policy of the empire, his enquir- 
 ing and reforming mind makes itself visible in repeated 
 domestic changes. The maintenance of his opinions, in 
 opposition to the strongly expressed wishes of his 
 mother, shows that the hour of his independence had 
 arrived ; while, in face of his masterful assertion of his 
 position, Kaunitz found himself unable to make good 
 his own wiU, and was compelled to assume the attitude 
 of a minister, trusted indeed and consulted, but no 
 longer more than the agent of a superior. 
 
 While negotiations were stUl pending with the Polish 
 Delegation, the emperor, supported by his favourite 
 adviser, Lacy, had demanded a considerable extension 
 
r 
 
 1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY/' 71 
 
 of the terms already accepted. So far jmd he push 
 these encroachments, that Kaunitz foum3<^imself obliged 
 to point out to him that he was G^ly entering upon 
 quite a new system of partition, Mfo. that a fresh treaty 
 would be necessary if his clail^ were carried out. In 
 this case Joseph yieldedj^md contented himself with 
 obtaining certain aitfflj|)non4tevhich would secure, as he 
 believed, a good mmwy frontier. His opinion on the 
 matter had been gained by personal inspection. With 
 his unflagging activity and love of first-hand knowledge, 
 in spite of the earnest prayers of his mother, he had 
 insisted in the months of August and September 1773 
 on visiting Galicia. He had rapidly made up his mind 
 not only as to the districts which were necessary to. give 
 value to the new provinces, but also as to the miserable 
 condition of the peasants. His love of improvement 
 had led him to disagree with the somewhat old-fashioned 
 government of Count Pergen, and to dread the addi- 
 tion of the new province to those districts of the empire 
 which were under the rule of Kaunitz and the court 
 chancery. He therefore demanded and succeeded in 
 obtaining the establishment of a separate office in 
 Vienna for Galician affairs. Over it was placed a man 
 of his own choice. Count Urbna. At the same time he 
 obtained the dismissal of Pergen, and the substitution 
 of Marshal Hadik as governor. 
 
 Another point which was subsequently to play so 
 large a part in Joseph's history, the position of the 
 clergy, had also forced itself on his attention, and in 
 his correspondence he laid bare, in a way which could 
 scarcely have been acceptable to his mother, the neces- 
 sity for toleration and for curtailment of ecclesiastical 
 
72 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, iv 
 
 privileges, and the false position occupied by a churcli 
 dependent upon a foreign prince such as the pope. 
 Joseph was in fact already beginning to assume, in a 
 far greater degree than his mother had ever done, the 
 position of a benevolent and reforming despot. 
 
 Meanwhile the worst side of the Austrian policy, 
 under the inspiration of the young emperor, was ex- 
 hibiting itself in the complicated negotiations with 
 Turkey which had proceeded side by side with those 
 relating to the Polish partition. In the earlier part of 
 the late war, when the Austrians were looking round on 
 all sides for means to neutralise the successes of Russia 
 and check its growing power, and before all to hold it 
 aloof from immediate contact with their own provinces, 
 they had contracted with Turkey the convention of 1771. 
 Whatever may have been their intention, it is certain 
 that the Porte regarded this convention seriously, and 
 believed that it might rely on Austrian assistance, 
 even armed assistance in case of extremity. But the 
 Austrians had subsequently found means to obtain their 
 object in the partition of Poland. As that plan ripened, 
 they threw aside all thought of opposition to Eussia, 
 and, eager to secure as favourable a share as possible, 
 they felt obliged to enter into friendly relations with 
 their partners in the intended spoliation. It was ob- 
 viously necessary, by some means or other, to get rid of 
 the convention. To explain such a change of policy 
 without exciting the anger of the Porte was a matter 
 of much delicacy, and taxed all the great ability of 
 Thugut, the ambassador at Constantinople. In April 
 1773 Kaunitz instructed him to declare that the 
 Austrians had practically carried out their share in the 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 73 
 
 convention by securing in the Polish arrangements the 
 restitution of the principalities; that it was no longer 
 possible to think of giving any vigorous assistance to 
 the Turks ; and that their wisest plan was to adopt a 
 very moderate course in the peace negotiations which 
 were proceeding, and no longer to trust to Austrian 
 help. He even offered to repay the subsidies which 
 had already been paid, and to let the convention be 
 considered as non-existent. 
 
 With great skill, Thugut carried out the instructions 
 thus given. He explained the situation to representa- 
 tives of the Porte, and a month later, in June 1773, 
 received the reply. It was conceived in a most mag- 
 nanimous temper. The Sultan entered fully into the 
 difficulties of the Austrian position. He recognised 
 that change of circumstances required different action, 
 and since the Austrians found themselves now unable 
 to give the help which had been the mainstay of the 
 Turkish opposition to Russia, he could only thank them 
 for what they had hitherto done, and offer to abrogate 
 the convention. He went even further than this. 
 If, in the negotiations which were now going on at 
 Fokchani, a peace should be obtained of a thoroughly 
 favourable character, — if, that is, the Danubian princi- 
 palities and the Tartars of the Crimea were restored to 
 the supremacy of Turkey, — he was willing, on his side, 
 to hold himself bound by the stipulations of the con- 
 vention. Should the peace prove unfavourable, he was 
 willing to allow the convention to be regarded as though 
 it had never been. At the same time, he expressed 
 a hope that his friendship with Austria would be 
 permanent, and promised that if any change of circum- 
 
74 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, iv 
 
 stances should place that country in a position to require 
 help, he would willingly afford it all the assistance in 
 his power. 
 
 The fipe conduct of the Turks met with a somewhat 
 sorry return. When, at the Congress of Bucharest, 
 which followed shortly after the abortive meeting at 
 Fokchani, they asked for the good word of Austria to 
 support them in their opposition to terms which still 
 appeared to them too stringent, Kaunitz coupled with 
 his assent a proposal that Little Walachia should be 
 the price of his help. Both assent and proposal were 
 too late. The ultimatum of Russia — demanding not 
 only Kertch and Yenikale, but much territory on the 
 east of the Crimea, and the opening of the Black Sea — 
 had been already offered and refused. The war broke 
 out again. But domestic difficulties, caused chiefly by 
 the revolt of Pougatcheff, weakened the Russian advance. 
 The passage of the Danube was vainly attempted. It 
 seemed as though fortune had at length come to the 
 Turkish arms, and Russia became in its turn eager for 
 peace. 
 
 The opportunity had apparently arrived for Joseph 
 and his minister to pursue that line of policy which the 
 empress had of old, when speaking of the conduct of 
 the Prussian king, stigmatised as "fishing in troubled 
 water." Though eager for peace, Russia was no doubt 
 the stronger of the belligerents. To side with that 
 Power, forgetful of all that had passed before, afforded 
 a ready means of gaining something in the forthcoming 
 peace at the expense of Turkey. Little Walachia had 
 no charms for Joseph. He had already condemned it 
 as a thoroughly worthless acquisition. He now fixed 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-KEGENCY 75 
 
 his desires upon the district of Old Orsova, and the 
 strip of Moldavia, known as the Bucovina, between the 
 north of Transylvania and the newly acquired Polish 
 provinces. The Eussians offered no objection, and 
 neither Kaunitz nor Joseph thought it beneath them to 
 threaten, in conjunction with Prussia and Eussia, to 
 compel the Turks to conclude a peace by force of arms. 
 They might have spared themselves the somewhat dis- 
 graceful threat. The death of Mustapha, in January 
 1774, placed on the throne Abdul Hamed, who immedi- 
 ately proceeded to throw to the winds all suggestions 
 for peace, and to plunge afresh into the war. It was 
 but idle violence. The Eussians, freed from their 
 domestic difficulties, carried all before them. The pass- 
 age of the Danube was effected. The Grand Vizier, 
 shut up in Shumla, had to sue for peace. The Eussians 
 were delighted to be able to act single-handed in the 
 matter, and in July 1774 the Treaty of Kainardji, which 
 secured to them all they wanted, closed the long war. 
 
 But if acquisition of territory as part of the settlement 
 in a general peace was no longer possible, there seemed 
 no great difficulty in silently robbing a beaten and fallen 
 Power. The old game was again played. Obsolete 
 claims were raised ; the disputed districts were occupied 
 by troops ; opposition on all sides was gradually over- 
 come, and the Turks were compelled to grant the desired 
 territory. The claim upon Orsova was indeed resigned, 
 but the district of Bucovina was extended from Tran- 
 sylvania to the neighbourhood of Chotin. Even yet there 
 remained something to be done before all the questions 
 hinging upon the Turkish war and the Polish partition 
 were completely settled ; the exact boundaries of the 
 
76 THE CO-REGENTS chap, iv 
 
 new acquisitions had to be carefully marked out, and 
 again the emperor vigorously insisted upon pushing the 
 new frontier forward to the farthest extreme. 
 
 It is (impossible not to recognise the paramount in- 
 fluence exerted by Joseph in all these transactions. It 
 would be unfair to attribute to Kaunitz the unrestrained 
 desire for territorial encroachment which marks them. 
 He had bowed to the necessity of his situation, and had 
 subordinated his unrivalled powers to a will he was not 
 able to resist. His position was a hard one, and it 
 excites no surprise that when Joseph, as was too fre- 
 quently his habit, allowed himself the use of unbridled 
 language, the great minister felt that his real part was 
 played out, and that it would be well for him to retire. 
 Such a crisis occurred in the course of the definition of 
 the boundaries of the newly acquired provinces. The 
 experience of the chancellor had taught him that every 
 inch of territory won would be paid for by a correspond- 
 ing encroachment on the part of Frederick ; a few miles 
 more or less seemed a very trifling matter compared 
 with the threatening growth of Austria's great rival. 
 Urging therefore that encroachment would beget en- 
 croachment, he strongly recommended moderation. This 
 was a word which Joseph did not recognise. He per- 
 sisted in his own view, and so far lost his self-restraint 
 as to speak of his old adviser as a coward. With 
 his usual unfailing loyalty, Kaunitz carried out the 
 emperor's instructions against his own better judgment, 
 but while doing so took the opportunity, in December 
 1773, of placing in the hands of the empress a request 
 to be allowed to withdraw into private life ; his failing 
 health and long services deserved such repose. It is 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-EEGENGY 77 
 
 hard to say whether he was in earnest or not ; at all 
 events, his request was at once refused. The refusal 
 was accompanied by a letter from the empress which 
 throws a pathetic light both upon her position and upon 
 that of her minister. "Your letter," she writes, "has 
 neither shocked nor surprised me, though it has pained 
 me very bitterly. Looking at my own position, I have 
 long expected it. I neither can nor will give you the 
 permission that you want, I must therefore pass your 
 request over in silence. But from your loyalty, and 
 indeed your friendship, I expect that you will not leave 
 me in the lurch in the miserable position I now hold. 
 Let us see whether, after thirty-three years of faithful 
 and toilsome service which side by side we have devoted 
 to the State, there be not still some means of saving 
 it. If none such can be found, then let us withdraw 
 together, but never in any other way. And do you rely 
 upon my friendship, my esteem, and my gratitude, as I 
 rely on your devotion." The two life -long partners, 
 who had steered the Austrian State through so many 
 diflSculties, could neither easily brook, nor indeed quite 
 understand, the abrupt and energetic spirit which had 
 arisen to share and dominate their power. 
 
 The difficulty of bringing three jarring wills into 
 unison was not confined to the sphere of foreign affairs. 
 Nor was it only the old servant, whose position of 
 adviser had given him hitherto what was little short of 
 an equal voice in all public matters vnth that of his 
 masters, who felt overpowered by the difficulty. The 
 constant divergence in the opinions of the empress and 
 her son gave rise to even more important complications. 
 Each in turn felt the position untenable ; and within a 
 
78 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, iv 
 
 year the three rulers of tlio empire had each expressed 
 the wish to withdraw from public life. 
 
 The questions which produced this curious state of 
 things were reforms in the machinery of government, 
 and the attempt to ameliorate the condition of the 
 peasantry in Bohemia and Moravia. The work of 
 centralisation had been begun by the establishment 
 of the Directorium in 1753, according to the plans of 
 Haugwitz. The incorporation of the duties of the 
 chanceries of Bohemia and Austria in the Directorium, 
 and the concentration in its hands of all administrative 
 powers with the exception of justice, had not proved 
 successful during the difficulties of the Seven Years' 
 War. The work of finance had been withdrawn from 
 it, its name had been changed, and the old title of 
 Chancery resumed. Some of the other provinces of 
 the empire had chanceries of their own, while the 
 Netherlands and Lombardy were joined to the ministry 
 of foreign affairs and were under the immediate super- 
 vision of the State chancery. To give a more complete 
 concentration to this complex machine, and to establish 
 a body in which local interest would give place to 
 imperial objects, in 1758 a Council of State consisting 
 of a few highly important ministers had been established. 
 Contrary to the original conception of this Council, 
 according to which all men holding other civil oflBces 
 were to be rigorously excluded from it, several of its 
 members had retained positions which frequently pre- 
 vented them from attending the discussions of the 
 Council. Thus Stahremberg, who next to Kaunitz was 
 the man of greatest weight, was plenipotentiary in the 
 Netherlands ; Bori^ was the ambassador at the Imperial 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 79 
 
 Diet at Eatisbon ; Rosenberg, who had been added to 
 the Council in 1766, was minister at Florence; and 
 Stupan was an invalid. The attempt was made in 
 1768 to reinforce the Council by the addition of Gebler, 
 one of the councillors of the chancery, a man of very 
 progressive tendencies and wide literary interests. The 
 addition of a single minister, however able, did not go 
 far to cure defects which had begun to show them- 
 selves in the Council. An enormous mass of small and 
 detailed work prevented it from turning its attention 
 to those greater imperial questions which should have 
 occupied it; while certain customs which had arisen, 
 probably with the intention of sparing trouble to the 
 empress, and in accordance with which the drawing of 
 the resolutions fell practically into the hands of the 
 keeper of the minutes, placed very real restrictions upon 
 the power of the head of the State. 
 
 These were exactly the defects to strike a man of the 
 rapid and self-asserting character of the emperor. He 
 was unceasing in his complaints, which were levelled 
 not only against the Council but also indirectly against 
 his mother. Her earnest and deeply touching efforts 
 to restore confidence had some effect. She yielded to 
 his wishes. 
 
 To appoint a Prime Minister as director of the 
 Council during the lifetime of Kaunitz was impossible. 
 But an attempt was made to secure some degree of 
 unity, by appointing Hatzfeldt, who since the death 
 of Rudolph Chotek in 1771 had been Chief Chancellor 
 of Bohemia and the Austrian provinces, to the position 
 of Directing Minister of State to the Council. With 
 this exception, things went on as before ; and though 
 
80 THE CO-REGENTS chap, iv 
 
 for the moment satisfied, it was not long before Joseph 
 renewed his complaints. They met with some support 
 from Kaunitz, to whom as a matter of course the 
 empress referred them. He too recognised the want 
 of a general spirit of combination and of conciliation in 
 the Council, and the littleness of the questions on which 
 its time was wasted. He believed that in the pro- 
 positions which he laid before the empress he was 
 expressing Joseph's own views ; but he certainly oflfered 
 no radical cure such as the emperor desired. The pro- 
 positions seemed to Joseph mere verbiage and thoroughly 
 commonplace ; and, in his wish for concentration, he 
 urged the entire destruction of the Council and the 
 formation of a real Cabinet over which the empress or 
 her co-regent should constantly preside. One primary 
 duty of this Cabinet should be the direction and super- 
 vision of the State chancery. 
 
 This proposal could not but be deeply injurious to 
 the chancellor. The Council of State had been his own 
 creation ; the State chancery was his own particular 
 department. The time, moreover, when the proposal 
 was made was just when Joseph had insisted upon a 
 separate chancery for Galicia, and when his stringent 
 views with regard to the limits of the newly acquired 
 provinces had brought him into keen opposition to his 
 minister. It was therefore not only the disregard of 
 his advice upon the limits of the Polish acquisition and 
 the hasty language of the emperor, but a not un- 
 reasonable feeling that his work was mistrusted, which 
 had driven Kaunitz to his attempted resignation in 
 December 1773. 
 
 No sooner had the friendly words of Maria Theresa . 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 81 
 
 averted this catastrophe, than an even more important 
 resignation seemed to threaten. It was now Joseph, 
 who only two days later, in an able letter, explained 
 the difiBculties of his situation. From his first appoint- 
 ment as co-regent he had foreseen them. He had done 
 his best to avoid them. He knew that his mother over- 
 rated his ability, and attributed to him what he could 
 never possess, the power of taking his father's place 
 beside her as her adviser and support. He would not / 
 hide from her that he believed the great machine of 
 government was entirely out of gear. There was no 
 use patching here and there. The true cause of the 
 evil lay in their miscomprehension of their mutual/ 
 position. The final decision must of necessity lie witn 
 her. He was nothing but one of her chief ministers, 
 his duty was to lay before her his honest opinion ; she 
 must judge. Yet as a matter of fact she constantly 
 attempted to avoid responsibility, and threw the work 
 of decision upon him. He closed his letter with the 
 strongest expressions of love and devotion, but asked 
 leave to retire to the enjoyment of private life. 
 
 The poor empress was in despair. She answered 
 him in the warmest terms. "I am ready," she says, 
 "to give over everything into your hands without 
 keeping the least thing to myself, even entirely to 
 withdraw ; but you have so often told me that you 
 could not bear the thought of this." Her only hope 
 of getting through her difficulties lay in his help. 
 " Oast down as you see me, I find new courage, and feel 
 again within me something of that spirit which never 
 left me in the times of our greatest depression, if I may 
 only count on your support, and if you will stand by me 
 G 
 
 U 
 
82 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, iv 
 
 with your advice. You say that you will not yourself 
 give commands. I must then confess to you, if you 
 have any thought of supporting me in the vast toil with 
 which J am overburdened, that my mind and talents, 
 my sight, my hearing, my rapidity, are all miserably 
 failing; and that that weakness which through my 
 whole life I have dreaded, my want of decision, is now 
 increasing as my low spirits grow upon me and I find 
 myself deprived of people in whom I can place 
 confidence. That you and Kaunitz both desert me, 
 the death of all my trusted councillors, the growth of 
 irreligion, the decay of morality, the manner of speaking 
 which people now adopt and which I cannot hear with- 
 out pain ; all this is surely more than enough to bow 
 me to the ground." She then tells him to have his own 
 way in the organisation of administration. " Give your 
 help to a mother who for thirty-three years has had no 
 other object of her care than you, who is living now 
 disconsolate, and will so die if she sees all her loving 
 care and toil thrown away. Tell me what you wish 
 me to do. Nothing will be too grave a sacrifice in the 
 ead plight in which for the last six years I have been 
 living." Her words had some efiect. The emperor 
 made friends with Kaunitz, who no longer declined to 
 give advice on the matter of the Council of State. 
 
 Ultimately the proposition to get rid of the Council 
 was rejected, Lacy and some other new members were 
 added to it, and in May 1774 a statute reorganising its 
 work was issued. 
 
 In her letter to Joseph, Maria Theresa had hinted at 
 the possibility of her own retirement. The difficulties 
 attending her attempts to ameliorate the condition of 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 83 
 
 the peasantry in Bohemia led to a more formal pro- 
 position of withdrawal on her part in May 1775. There 
 can be no doubt that the late events had deeply shaken 
 her. She had become aware that she belonged to an 
 age which was rapidly passing away. But her difficulty 
 in fact lay in the largeness of her mind, which enabled 
 her, nay, obliged her, to see and appreciate many of the 
 advantages of the new forms of life which her age, her 
 education, and her taste led her to dislike. Too good 
 and noble to be a mere conservative, too thoroughly 
 saturated with the feelings and even prejudices of her 
 own youth to be a good reformer, she was incapable of 
 joining decidedly with either of the currents of opinion 
 which were moving not only in Austria but throughout 
 Europe. 
 
 The burden of feudal incidents pressed heavily upon 
 the peasantry in the Austrian dominions. As early as 
 1738, it had been found necessary to issue regulations 
 on the subject highly favourable to the cultivator. It 
 might have been expected that the better organisation 
 of the administration introduced by Maria Theresa, the 
 h^irarchy of courts under the supervision of the Directory 
 or the great provincial chanceries, would have tended to 
 the further improvement of his position, more especially 
 as the Circle Courts had been established for the express 
 purpose of insisting upon proper effect being given to 
 the directions of the central authority and listening to 
 the appeals of those who suffered from the irregularities 
 or injustice of the feudal courts. But the guardians of 
 the public liberty were themselves infected with the 
 prejudices of the aristocracy. The chiefs of the Circles 
 were either themselves members of the higher nobility 
 
84 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, iv 
 
 or closely connected with them in interest. Thus en- 
 croachments on the part of the landlords received no 
 check, and the plight of the peasant under the oppres- 
 sion of his lord was enough, according to the report of 
 State Councillor Greiner, to excite astonishment and a 
 deep sense of horror in those who were conversant with 
 it. From Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia the cry of the 
 down-trodden peasantry was so loud that it was found 
 necessary to send commissioners to attempt some 
 amelioration on the spot. Maria Theresa, whose desire 
 for the welfare of her people was almost passionate, 
 was deeply raoved by the narrations which were brought 
 her. Even more strong were the feelings aroused in 
 the young emperor with his liberal tendencies. But 
 the weight of aristocratic influence, of what may with- 
 out oflfence be called the selfishness of possession, was 
 very great. The dread of inflicting injury upon the 
 nobility, which would naturally have arisen in the 
 mind of the empress, was further supported by the 
 opinion of her provincial chanceries and even of Prince 
 Kaunitz. There is clear evidence that she herself 
 desired nothing less than the entire destruction of 
 villeinage and of the incidents of feudalism. But the 
 influence brought to bear upon her and the prejudices 
 of her own education drove her before long to give up 
 aU hope of accomplishing so great a change ; while the 
 armed outbreaks of the peasantry in Bohemia in 1774 
 and 1775 were in the highest degree repugnant to her, 
 and threw her back stiU further upon the side of 
 authority. As a natural consequence of this divided 
 frame of mind she found extreme diflSculty in arriving 
 at any conclusion. 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 85 
 
 The position was indeed one of great perplexity. 
 Even Joseph seemed to quail for a time before the 
 angry claims of the interests which stood to one another 
 in diametrical opposition. He saw no exact middle 
 path, but strongly recommended that every case should 
 be tried upon its own merits, the settlement of the 
 dispute being left as far as possible to amicable arrange- 
 ment between landlord and tenant, but that the final 
 appeal should be in the hands of a single person, armed 
 with absolute power, who should go down to the dis- 
 turbed districts and himself inquire and adjudicate. 
 As the wisdom of the provincial chanceries had early 
 foreseen, the suggestion of change, the belief that both 
 empress and emperor were strongly disposed to secure 
 a definite diminution of the burdens laid upon the 
 people, excited a deep feeling of unrest among them. 
 When they found that their hopes were certainly not 
 fully gratified, and that the contest of opinion led to 
 no practical results, they no longer restrained themselves, 
 but broke out in 1775 in uproarious and apparently 
 revolutionary movements which could be suppressed 
 only by force. 
 
 The empress was far too clear-sighted to suppose 
 that a real and deep-seated grievance could be thus 
 authoritatively dealt with. But she seems to have 
 become fully alive to her impotence. Unable to gratify 
 her benevolent impulses, shocked by finding that those 
 she had wished to assist had put themselves entirely in 
 the wrong, she lost all heart, and actually determined 
 to withdraw from the government. " For the few days 
 that are left," she writes to Mercy, in May 1775, "I 
 may well be allowed a little peace. Five and thirty 
 
86 THE CO-REGENTS chap, rv 
 
 years have I sacrificed myself to the coinmon weal. I 
 am so strained, so overwhelmed, that I do more harm 
 than good. In the late uproars in Bohemia, which are 
 indeed suppressed but far from being extinguished, I 
 find another reason to strengthen my determination. 
 It is not fear ; for I am unconscious of the feeling. It 
 is because I am unable to find any solution of the difii- 
 culty, and by my presence here I am the cause of great 
 misfortune. The emperor, who carries his love of pop- 
 ularity much too far, although he has never made 
 any formal promises to these people during his journeys, 
 has yet said far too much to them about their liberty 
 in matters of religion and in relation to their landlords." 
 And then she goes on as usual to describe her gradual 
 failure since her husband's death. "The softness and 
 the weakness of an old woman have done the rest. The 
 State has suffered too much from it to allow me to 
 continue any longer in my present position. When 
 the emperor feels alone the weight of the government, 
 he too wUl understand the difficulties that beset him, 
 and will no longer be able to shift the responsibility 
 upon me." 
 
 It may of course be questioned whether this was 
 not merely the expression of a deep though momentary 
 dejection on the part of the empress. At all events, 
 the earnest prayers of her best friends, and the consci- 
 entious feeling which they succeeded in arousing that 
 it was her duty to continue to occupy the place in 
 which Providence had placed her, induced her to forego 
 further thought of retirement, and to turn her mind 
 to some settlement of the difficulty. 
 
 Again the war of parties and its attendant vacillation 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 87 
 
 resumed its course, but the empress had at least arrived 
 at the determination that something more than the 
 mere suppression of uproar was necessary. Joseph 
 meanwhile clung to his old idea. The first thing 
 necessary was to define accurately the feudal services. 
 A new patent should be issued limiting them to a 
 maximum of three days in the week. Voluntary 
 arrangements between landlord and tenant, and the 
 conversion of services into money payments, should 
 receive all possible support, and a single absolute au- 
 thority should be established in the disturbed districts. 
 It is evident that it was himself of whom he was 
 thinking as the one all powerful arbitrator. He seems 
 to have sufi'ered deeply from the want of decision shown 
 by the Government. " More than ten times," he writes 
 to his brother, "has the empress brought herself to 
 give the order for the settlement of the question, but 
 her intention has never lasted long enough for her 
 commands and patents to be duly engrossed or printed. 
 Other influences have intervened, and have caused her 
 to hesitate, draw back, and recall her orders. I would 
 have offered to go and set the whole matter straight, 
 but this is impossible so long as I cannot be sure that 
 the orders which are given me will not be counter- 
 manded." 
 
 The adverse influence of which Joseph complained 
 was no doubt that of the chancellor. His interests 
 were certainly with the landlords, and his feeling for 
 strong government was much shocked at the idea of 
 conciliatory measures until the rebellious peasants had 
 been reduced to absolute submission. But, for the 
 present, the victory lay with Joseph. The sentiments 
 
88 THE CO-REGENTS chap, iv 
 
 of the empress were upon this point too much in unison 
 with those of her son to allow her to withstand his 
 arguments. A patent limiting the feudal services was 
 issued, |ind General Wallis was despatched to explain 
 it and to see to its execution. The correctness of 
 Joseph's view became obvious when no difficulty was 
 found in bringing the people quietly to accept the new 
 order. But though carried away for a while by his 
 persuasions, the empress could not bring herself into 
 hearty agreement with her son. No sooner had she 
 listened to the dictates of her warm heart and to her 
 strong sympathy with the down-trodden peasantry, than 
 her sense of justice awoke and made itself felt. The 
 claims of the other party in the dispute began to acquire 
 prominence in her mind. She listened with compla- 
 cency to a suggestion made by Kaunitz, that loans 
 should be raised in the Netherlands to be spent in 
 recompensing the landlords for the losses caused by 
 the late legislation. In the dispute which arose 
 between herself and her son on this point she expressed 
 her opinion with regard to his principles in the strongest 
 language. " He had," she said, " but three principles of 
 government — free exercise of religion, the destruction 
 of the higher nobility, and the emphatic reiteration of 
 the necessity of universal freedom, which was likely 
 to be the cause of perpetual discontent." So strong 
 an expression of disapproval of his principles seemed 
 to Joseph to justify him, on December 25, 1775, in 
 repeating his wish to retire from the co-regency. This 
 was scarcely a legitimate step. Experience must have 
 already taught him that his mother would listen to 
 no such proposition; he can scarcely have made it 
 
1773-77 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CO-REGENCY 89 
 
 with any other view than that of coercing her judgment. 
 It certainly had that effect. The raising and expendi- 
 ture of the loan for the objects in contemplation was 
 given up. 
 
 But the extraordinary difficulty of the empress's 
 position was made apparent by the second resignation 
 of the chancellor, which followed in March 1776. If 
 the idea of losing the support of her son was more than 
 she could bear, the loss of the help of her life-long 
 counsellor would have been even more intolerable. She 
 found means to smooth over the quarrel, and to pacify 
 both the eager young emperor and the experienced 
 minister ; she placed herself, in fact, in the chancellor's 
 hands, and asked him to give her a formal and written 
 opinion upon the state of affairs. As might be expected, 
 his views were at once wise and conservative. He recom- 
 mended that the people should be clearly told that it 
 was impossible to go beyond the legislation of 1775. 
 The Government had then done all that a government 
 could do ; for the rights of property must be carefully 
 respected. At the same time, an expression of her dis- 
 pleasure at the riotous attitude of the peasants, and of 
 the satisfaction she would feel in any private arrange- 
 ments of conciliation, might be issued. For two years 
 longer the discussions continued, and in 1777 a new 
 edict was put out nearly in the sense of the chancellor's 
 advice. He had succeeded in drawing the empress away 
 from the wider views she had at first conceived ; and 
 the result to the peasant, on the whole arrangement, 
 was the fixed limit of three days a week set to com- 
 pulsory labour, and the abolition of many of the smaller 
 encroachments of which the landlords had lately been 
 
90 THE CO-REGENTS chap, iv 
 
 guilty. The idea of the total abolition of feudal and 
 service rent had to be dropped. 
 
 If, as is generally the case, gradual and conservative 
 amelioration is better than the sudden realisation even 
 of well-grounded rights, the prudence of Kaunitz must 
 command our approbation, although it is difficult not to 
 sympathise with the liberal views of the young emperor. 
 In matters of internal government, though terribly 
 lacking in judgment, Joseph always exhibited his better 
 side. When the scene is changed, and the battle-ground 
 of opinion is transferred to the sphere of foreign politics, 
 the case is different. All that is worst in him rises to 
 the surface, and the vast superiority of the empress, 
 both in political insight and in nobility of cl^aracter, 
 becomes strikingly apparent. Amid the clash of wills 
 so strong as those of the co-regents, the voice of the 
 minister was for a whUe drowned. But, as was inevitable 
 from his diplomatic training and from the traditions he 
 had inherited, such influence as he had was chiefly 
 thrown on the side of the narrower and more selfish 
 combatant. 
 
 The question of the Bavarian succession, the last im- 
 portant event in the hfe of the great empress, affords 
 not the least noble exhibition of her qualities. Old and 
 broken though she was, she succeeded in winning, over 
 the mistaken policy both of her son and her minister, a 
 practical triumph which sheds a ray of quiet glory over 
 the evening of her life, and brings her reign to no unfit 
 conclusion. 
 
CHAPTEE V 
 
 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 
 1777-1780 
 
 The unexpected death of Maximilian Joseph, Elector 
 of Bavaria, in December 1777, brought on a crisis which 
 threatened a renewal of the great wars between Prussia 
 and Austria. 
 
 It had long been evident that the male line of the 
 Bavarian house was doomed to extinction ; and the 
 Austrian court had secretly been ripening plans for 
 obtaining considerable territorial acquisitions when the 
 question of the succession should arise. The possession 
 of Bavaria, or of some part of it, was most desirable to 
 fill up the gap between Bohemia and the southern 
 provinces of the Austrian empire, and it seemed by no 
 means impossible to raise colourable claims to a large 
 portion of the vacant inheritance. It was chiefly with 
 a view to securing this advantage that the unfortunate 
 second marriage of the young emperor had been con- 
 tracted. The speedy death of the Empress Josepha in 
 1766 had thrown matters back into their old position ; 
 and while Maximilian directed his energy to secure the 
 
92 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, t 
 
 integrity of his dominions on his death, Kaunitz and 
 Joseph, who in matters of territorial aggrandisement 
 was ever an over willing pupil, continued to ripen their 
 aggressive schemes. 
 
 Well aware of the opposition they were likely to 
 encounter in Europe, and especially from Frederick of 
 Prussia, they hoped to effect their purpose by a private 
 arrangement with the co-lateral heir. This was the 
 Elector Palatine, Charles Theodore. A man chiefly 
 devoted to pleasure and without legitimate male heirs, 
 he was well fitted to serve the purposes of the Austrian 
 intrigues. The integrity of Bavaria was of no great 
 importance in his eyes ; he cared more for the security 
 of his own possessions, and for the peaceable acquisition 
 of the very considerable portion of Bavaria which must 
 at all events fall to him. He may also have felt some 
 fear lest, in the confusion, Frederick should lay hands 
 upon the coveted districts of Julich and Berg. At aU 
 events, after some negotiation, he threw himself entirely, 
 as he expressed it, into the arms of Austria. Kaunitz, 
 therefore, who after many projects and counter-projects 
 had arrived at what he believed to be the amount of 
 aggrandisement which it was possible to secure, incorpor- 
 ated the Austrian claim in a convention, in the hope 
 that, when thus it assumed the form of a treaty between 
 two friendly princes, no third Power would interfere with 
 it. The basis of the convention was a surrender to 
 Austria of the inheritance of John of Straubigen, which 
 so long ago as 1425 had been granted for a while by the 
 Emperor Sigismund to Albert, Duke of Austria ; and to 
 this was added the county of . Mindelheim in Swabia. 
 The Elector further pledged himself to raise no objection 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSIOlSr 93 
 
 to the resumption by the empress, as Queen of Bohemia, 
 of the fiefs of that crown which he held in the Upper 
 Palatinate. In exchange for these concessions, the 
 remainder of the Bavarian lands were to be guaranteed 
 to him. In order to keep the general heirship, and 
 to secure himself against the claims of the Dowager 
 Electress of Saxony (the late king's sister), who claimed 
 aU the allodial property, and against the Duke of Meck- 
 lenburg, who had claims upon Leuchtenberg, the Elector 
 Palatine had thus consented to a very considerable dis- 
 memberment of the Bavarian State. The convention 
 was rendered still more advantageous to Austria by a 
 clause which authorised the exchange of the ceded 
 provinces for others more conveniently situated. The 
 exact nature of this exchange was not defined ; but in 
 the dreams of the Austrian statesmen it covered the 
 possibility of the exchange of the whole of Bavaria for 
 the Low Countries. 
 
 Maximilian died before the convention had been 
 signed, and there was a moment of extreme anxiety for 
 all parties concerned, but more especially for Maria 
 Theresa, whose heart was set upon an arrangement 
 which, as she believed, would save her from the necessity 
 of war. For she knew that her wishes in this case would 
 be disregarded, as Joseph and Kaunitz were determined 
 at all hazards to make good their claim to the vacated 
 provinces. The emperor, indeed, in his strong belief 
 in the advantage derived from possession, had already 
 decided to occupy with an armed force the territories 
 mentioned in the convention, whether it was or was not 
 completed. 
 
 On January 2, the very day on which, as it proved, 
 
94 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 the convention was signed, she wrote to Joseph entreating 
 him not to he hasty; and, in words which show how 
 little sympathy she had with the aggressive policy of her 
 son and jninister, she pointed out to him, " Even were 
 our pretensions far hetter grounded than they are, it 
 would be our duty to hesitate before exciting a general 
 conflagration for a convenience peculiar to ourselves. 
 Judge for yourself how carefully rights, obsolete and 
 but half established, as the minister himself owns, and as 
 you yourself know as well as I do, ought to be balanced 
 before they are allowed to cause a disturbance of the 
 peace with all its attendant misfortunes." 
 
 Her pleading had no effect on Joseph. Three days 
 later he wrote to his brother Leopold, narrating how 
 the convention had been signed, and only awaited the 
 Elector's ratification, and that meanwhile troops of all 
 arms had been set in motion, ready to occupy the 
 countries in dispute. " Whether the convention is 
 ratified or not," he writes a few days subsequently, 
 " the troops will take possession. In the first case we 
 shall seize upon what belongs to us, in the other, as 
 emperor, I will declare the fief vacant, and occupy it till 
 arrangements are made among the claimants." One 
 would suppose from this bold tone that Joseph really 
 regarded his claim as sound, and was ready to bid de- 
 fiance to all opposition. Yet he makes it plain enough 
 that he knew how weak and obsolete his claim was, and 
 that he was engaged upon an act of theft which would 
 scarcely bear the light. " The circumstances of Europe 
 appear favourable," he says; "the attention of all the 
 world is occupied elsewhere, and I flatter myself that this 
 stroke wiU. succeed without a war, and the acquisition, 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION" 95 
 
 though it be not complete, will still be a fine one, as it will 
 have cost nothing." For some weeks, indeed, he flattered 
 himself that all was going well. The ratification arrived, 
 the troops took possession, the French, though full of 
 rage in their hearts, seemed unable to interfere, on 
 the verge as they were of a war with England. " The 
 Prussian king was much put out, and knocked at every 
 door to find some one who could make common cause 
 with him, but found them all shut." The Elector 
 Palatine turned a deaf ear to the arguments of Frederick, 
 and held firm to the convention. Eussia and Turkey, 
 between whom a fresh war seemed inevitable, uttered no 
 word of protest. 
 
 But before long Joseph found out his mistake. The 
 Bavarians could not without distress see their country 
 parcelled out to suit the selfish wishes of a foreign heir 
 and the ambition of an aggressive neighbour. Supported 
 by the busy activity of the Archduchess Marianne, 
 the widow of the late Elector's younger brother, the 
 ministers at Munich proceeded to publish the patent of 
 succession by which the electorate in all its integrity had 
 passed to Charles Theodore, and further to take the still 
 more important step of opening communications with the 
 Prussian king. As the empress had all along foreseen, 
 Frederick was not inclined to sit with his hands folded 
 while his Austrian rival was devouring Bavaria. He 
 lent a willing ear to the representations which reached 
 him from Munich, and at once set busily to work to 
 counteract the threatened danger. He found a ready 
 agent in Charles Augustus, Duke of Deuxponts. This 
 prince came next in the succession, after the Elector 
 Palatine. Having no power to make an eflfective opposi- 
 
96 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 tion, he had thought it necessary to express in general 
 terms his readiness to accept the arrangements of the 
 Elector. But his signature, which, as the nearest agnate, 
 was requisite to render the convention valid, he had not 
 yet given. When, therefore, he found that he could 
 rely upon the friendship of the Prussian king, he threw 
 to the winds the engagements his weakness had forced 
 upon him, refused to consent to the convention, and 
 marked his sense of the injustice to which he had been 
 subjected, by declining to receive the Golden Fleece with 
 which the emperor was on the point of honouring him 
 as a»reward of his complacency. 
 
 "The sterm begins to rage," writes Joseph, "and 
 there is hardly any longer a chance of avoiding war." 
 In letter after letter, he pours into the ear of his con- 
 fidential correspondent, his brother Leopold, the story 
 of his fading hopes. "The French have refused to 
 regard the aggrandisement of Austria as one of the cases 
 contemplated in the Versailles treaties, and will not 
 hear of sending their stipulated assistance ; they have 
 listened to the voice of Frederick, and have declared a 
 strict neutrahty. The Saxons " (as was but natural when 
 they were being robbed of their claims on the allodial 
 property) " must be regarded as enemies. The language 
 of Eussia has anything but the firm ring it ought to 
 have in opposition to Frederick." "The arrangements 
 for the exchanges in Bavaria all hang fire." "The 
 assembling of the Prussian troops has called for similar 
 action on our part, but it is only carried out with much 
 difficulty." "The empress has declared herseK to be 
 absolutely opposed to the war." The attitude of his 
 mother was perhaps his greatest difficulty. She had 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 97 
 
 written to him with something of her old spirit. " Every 
 inconvenience and danger which I foresaw when we sent 
 troops into Bavaria have become realities, and are 
 increasing to such an extent that I should be unworthy 
 to be called queen or mother if I did not take steps 
 fitted to the circumstances of the case, without caring 
 how much my good name may suffer. To put a stop in 
 time to these misfortunes, nothing can be too strong. I 
 will lend myself willingly to any step, I will suffer even 
 the dishonour of my name. I will bear to be called a 
 dotard, feeble, and little-hearted. Nothing shall prevent 
 me from saving Europe from its terrible situation." 
 These words are followed by a vivid picture of the weak- 
 ness of the monarchy, and the ruin which must await 
 it if it should plunge into war. There would be no 
 possibility of defending Galicia, or Hungary, or Italy, 
 or the Netherlands, or the new acquisition. "Where, 
 then," she asks, "can we find resources to maintain a 
 war which from its very beginning will oblige us to 
 abandon five countries of such great importance. After 
 what I have just said to you, I feel bound to declare 
 that I cannot and wiU not go on consenting to 
 act against my conscience and against my conviction. 
 I am not speaking in anger, I am not influenced 
 by personal cowardice, I feel within me the same 
 strength of character as thirty years ago. But I will 
 not lend a hand to the ruin of my house and State." 
 The vivid colours with which the melancholy picture is 
 painted, probably owe something to the literary skill 
 of her faithful secretary Pichler. A few autograph lines 
 with which the letter ends disclose the background of 
 depression and sadness which never left her. " If this 
 H 
 
98 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 war breaks out, you must not count on me. I shall 
 withdraw to Tyrol and end my days in deep retirement, 
 occupied only in weeping for the sad fortune of my house 
 and peoples, and in trying to bring to a Christian end my 
 miserable life." 
 
 The marked divergence in the opinions of the rulers 
 of Austria explains both the character of the negotiations 
 and the conduct of the negotiating Powers. It soon 
 became evident that though subsidiary questions were 
 raised as to the exchanges of territory to be effected 
 with the new Bavarian Elector, or as to the settlement 
 of the claims of Saxony, the only negotiation of real 
 importance was that carried on with Frederick of Prussia. 
 Unfortunately from the first all the directing rulers of 
 Austria were inclined by life-long prejudice to form an 
 entire misconception of Frederick's intentions. The 
 negotiations were thus forced into a false channel, and the 
 disputants could never find a common ground on which 
 they could fairly meet. It must, of course, be a matter of 
 opinion how far Frederick was actuated by selfish motives 
 in the line of conduct which he pursued. But the 
 position which he assumed was that of protector of the 
 rights of the princes of the Empire. With a breadth of 
 view contrasting strongly with the ostentatious legalism 
 of Kaunitz and Joseph, he swept aside the web of 
 chicanery spun from obsolete reversionary rights and 
 feudal charters, and regarded the conduct of Austria as 
 an attempt on the part of the emperor to vindicate a 
 right to the disposal of inheritances in accordance with 
 his own will and pleasure. 
 
 The standpoint of the Austrian court was the consent 
 of Charles Theodore to the convention, which it persisted 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAK SUCCESSION 99 
 
 in regarding as a valid arrangement between two equal 
 princes, with which no third party had a right to inter- 
 fere. It is hardly necessary to point out that the 
 convention owed its existence to the assertion of the 
 questionable right of the emperor to the disposal of 
 lapsed fiefs, and to the revival of obsolete claims, the 
 validity of which, even from a strictly legal point of 
 view, was more than doubtful. Incapable of believing 
 that Frederick could be disinterested, Kaunitz met all his 
 propositions with offers of the old diplomatic sort. He 
 supposed that a countervailing advantage was all that 
 the king really desired, and believed himself to possess 
 the means of satisfying this desire. The Franconian 
 margraviates of Anspach and Baireuth had hitherto 
 formed a separate inheritance for the younger branch of 
 the Prussian house, and he knew that Frederick was 
 anxious to unite them to his crown. The bribe he 
 proposed to offer him was the withdrawal of all opposi- 
 tion on the part of the emperor to this scheme. But 
 Frederick had already taken all the steps for the settle- 
 ment of this question, and entirely denied the right of 
 Imperial interference. Even on the supposition that in 
 his action with respect to Bavaria he had no higher 
 motive than his own advantage, he could scarcely regard 
 the offer of what already belonged to him as a gift of 
 much value. Kaunitz had, however, a further offer 
 which he hoped might tempt the king's acquisitiveness. 
 As a counterpart to the Bavarian exchanges, he suggested 
 that the margraviates might be exchanged with Saxony 
 for the Lausitz, a district which from its position would 
 be of the greatest importance to Prussia. There was no 
 doubt a real value in the suggested bribe, but it had no 
 
100 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 more effect than the idle offer with regard to the 
 inargraviates themselves. 
 
 True to his old methods, while the interchange of 
 propositions and arguments proceeded, Frederick had 
 been assembling his forces. But he was quite as 
 anxious as the empress herself for a solution of the 
 question by peaceful means. He laid aside a brilliant 
 plan for a sudden advance on Vienna through Moravia, 
 and though fully conscious of the advantage time would 
 give to his enemies, it was not till April 6 that 
 he joined his army in Silesia. His example was 
 immediately followed by Joseph, who took over the 
 command of the army at Olmiitz. But it was thought 
 at Vienna that the opening of persorial communication 
 between the sovereigns might be advantageous. No 
 sooner had the emperor joined his troops than he wrote 
 an autograph letter to the king, suggesting that a 
 convention should be concluded upon the terms which 
 Kaunitz had already laid before him. Putting aside all 
 personal considerations, Frederick in his reply proceeded 
 to the real point of the quarrel. He emphasised what 
 he considered the injury done to the princes of the 
 Empire by Joseph's " despotic action," and set out the 
 substantial counter-claims of the Duke of Deuxponts, 
 the Electress of Saxony, and the Duke of Mecklenburg. 
 Written with his own hand, iar away from any advisers, 
 it was the letter of a wise and experienced veteran, 
 attempting in friendly words to put upon the right track 
 a young man whom he really liked. But all Joseph's 
 spleen was stirred by the word " despotic." In stilted 
 language, while stigmatising the king's letter as an idle 
 tirade, he proceeded to lecture him, in the tone of a 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 101 
 
 schoolmaster, upon the excellence of the position taken 
 up by Austria. Maria Theresa thought her son's letter 
 a most admirable production. Its only effect upon 
 Frederick was to make him assume something of the 
 same tone, and decline, in a letter full of ironical flattery, 
 any further personal negotiation, preferring to leave the 
 matter in the hands of a conference of ministers to be 
 held at Berlin. 
 
 There Kobenzl on the part of Austria, and Hertz- 
 berg on the part of Prussia, met to try what they could 
 do with the thorny question. It was hardly possible 
 that the conference could lead to any favourable result. 
 Although Frederick certainly desired peace, he was not 
 a man to give way at the threat of war. Yet, in the 
 persistent belief in his peaceful tendencies and selfish 
 views, the instructions given to Kobenzl were always 
 drawn on the supposition that reciprocal advantages 
 for the negotiating Powers were the sole objects at 
 which to aim. The one point on which Joseph was 
 fully determined was that there should be no retracta- 
 tion of the claims he had raised. In his desire for 
 peace Frederick offered him certain territories, but 
 saddled the offer with a demand for such complete 
 renunciation of his imperial rights as practically amounted 
 to a confession that the emperor's seizure of Bavaria 
 had been nothing but an encroachment. Yet Joseph 
 still believed that if he stood firm the Prussian king 
 would give in. " The one thing," he says, writing to 
 Kobenzl, "on which we can feel certain is this, that the 
 king's desire for war is very small, and his greed for 
 the Lausitz is very great ; from all which I conclude 
 that if we hold a firm but reasonable language, the 
 
102 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 great Frederick with his Xerxes army will sooner or 
 later much modify his Quixotic talk of the salvation of 
 Germany ; and will be ready to give up all the rest for 
 the sake of his advantageous position and the repose of 
 his old bones." 
 
 At length, wearied with the constantly varying 
 propositions presented to him, Frederick demanded 
 from Kaunitz a categorical answer to certain questions : 
 What parts of Bavaria and of the Upper Palatinate did 
 the Austrians mean to hold, and what to give back ? 
 What were the territories which they meant to ex- 
 change, and what did the equivalents consist in 1 What 
 advantages would be secured to the Elector -Palatine to 
 enable him to satisfy the just demands of Saxony? 
 Was it their intention to make a just division of the 
 disputed inheritance, keeping in view the rights of the 
 Elector Palatine, the Elector of Saxony, and the Dukes 
 of Deuxponts and Mecklenburg, in conjunction with the 
 king, as the friend and ally of these princes and as an 
 elector and prince of the Empire 1 No favourable 
 residt could reasonably have been expected from such 
 an appeal. The chancellor was in far too delicate a 
 position with respect to the emperor, who would soon be 
 his sole master, to commit himself to any declarations 
 without Joseph's authority. He merely replied what 
 was in fact perfectly untrue, that the emperor and 
 empress were at one on all these questions, and that 
 they alone had the right of speaking on them. 
 
 It was certainly untrue. Throughout the negotiation 
 the letters of Maria Theresa were all in one tone. Two 
 things before all else she deprecated : the suggested 
 exchange of Bavaria for the Low Countries, and a war. 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 103 
 
 She repeatedly, and with a vehement, almost exaggerated, 
 emphasis declared her belief in the impossibility of a suc- 
 cessful resistance to Prussia. The war, she could not but 
 think, would come, and would inevitably be the ruin of 
 her State. In language which is almost fulsome even 
 from a tender mother, she praised and flattered her son. 
 But every outburst of admiration was coupled with an 
 exhortation to make peace, in words which implied a 
 complete disapproval of the attitude he had assumed. 
 When an unfavourable answer was given to Frederick's 
 last demands, she summed up her feelings in a few 
 remarkable words : — "I confess to you that I think 
 the last memorial of the Prussian king thoroughly 
 reasonable. Unfortunately it is we who are to blame, 
 for we will not speak plainly ; and we cannot speak 
 plainly because we desire things to which we have 
 no right, and we have been hoping to get hold of 
 them by the chance of circumstance, or by holding out 
 the Lausitz as a bait for the king. I have always said 
 that it was impossible for him, without betraying his 
 real character, to draw back or to follow his own un- 
 righteous wishes. He has gone too far, and the answer 
 now sent to him means nothing else than war. Heaven 
 grant it may prove shorter and less bloody than those 
 which have preceded it." In all respects the empress 
 showed herself much wiser than her son. From the 
 first, she had seen that the hope of appropriating any 
 large portion of the Bavarian succession was chimerical, 
 that assistance was not to be expected either from 
 Eussia or from France, that war with Prussia must be the 
 inevitable result of persistence, and, with that broad 
 moral view of politics which she on most occasions took, 
 
104 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 she saw that there was more credit in withdrawing from 
 a false position and in seeking honour in the cultivation 
 of the prosperity of her dominions, than in obstinate 
 persistencg in wrong-doing. 
 
 Her political foresight did not fail her in the present 
 case ; the refusal on the part of the Austrians to give 
 any direct explanation as to their wishes was immedi- 
 ately followed by the outbreak of war. It drew from 
 the Prussian ministers a recapitulation of their case ; and 
 as Austria declined to give any definitive explanations 
 they presumed that the original propositions brought 
 forward by Kobenzl must be regarded as the ultimatum. 
 As these were absolutely incompatible with the views 
 of the Prussian king, the question at issue could be 
 only solved by the sword. Two days after, on July 5, 
 Frederick's army crossed into the Bohemian territory 
 at Nachod. 
 
 To all appearance, the conduct of Maria Theresa 
 immediately changed. War once entered upon, her 
 former spirit seemed to revive. The demands of her 
 son for assistance from Vienna met with the fullest and 
 most energetic response. She would no longer, she 
 said, trouble him with her complaints, and was only 
 hurt at the fear which he expressed that she would at 
 all fail him. She assured him that she felt within her 
 the same vigour as when she was twenty-five. And she 
 practically threw much energy into the completion of 
 the organisation of the army of defence. Joseph wrote 
 home in delight at her sympathetic attitude. "If I 
 wished," he said, " to reply to your precious letter 
 of July 11, I could not do so. All I can do is 
 to assure you that it moved me to tears, and that 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 105 
 
 my admiration for your noble way of thinking is 
 only equalled by my gratitude." But this new found 
 unanimity was not fated to last long. Between her 
 expression of vigorous support and Joseph's reply, her 
 heart had been still further gladdened by a note from 
 her son, in which he had expressed an ardent desire 
 for peace. "If means," he wrote, "could be found to 
 bring back peace on any reasonably honourable terms it 
 would be a great thing, but I do not see the means." 
 For in spite of his ambitious character, Joseph had a 
 sensitive heart. The realities of war had touched him. 
 " Certainly," he says, " war is a terrible thing. The 
 evils which it causes are frightful, and I venture to 
 swear to your Majesty that any picture I had formed of 
 it was infinitely below what I now see. If there is any 
 way of shortening it, or of inducing France or Eussia to 
 arbitrate for a reasonable accommodation, it would be the 
 best thing." No doubt Maria Theresa should have read 
 these two passages, which were in different letters, as 
 explaining one another. But she only saw in them a 
 sign that her son was yielding, and believed that in his 
 heart he thought with her. We can conceive therefore 
 the horror of Joseph, when, just as he believed that 
 all the difficulties with the empress were over, and 
 that she would throw herself heart and soul into the 
 great contest which he had brought about, he received 
 from her a note informing him that in accordance with 
 his expressed wish she had sent off Thugut to Berlin to 
 renew the negotiations. "If your letter of the 7th 
 moved me, think of the pleasure which was given me 
 by your other two letters. By God's grace I foresaw 
 in January and February all the evils you mention, so 
 
106 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 that I am quite in a position at this moment to take 
 measures, my beloved son, to get you out of your 
 difficulties." 
 
 Full of, indignation at the rapidity with which his 
 peaceful expressions had been taken up, and at the mis- 
 conception of his meaning, Joseph replied bitterly that 
 nothing could be more injurious to her own honour or 
 that of the country than the step the empress had 
 taken. He had never for a moment dreamt of any 
 further negotiations except through the intervention of 
 friendly Powers, and he would rather lose half Bohemia 
 than take any share in so humiliating a step. He even 
 spoke, and apparently spoke in earnest, of withdrawing 
 into Italy and making a formal breach with his mother. 
 It may be that a very nobly conceived letter from 
 Marshal Loudon, pointing out the advantages of a far 
 higher line of conduct, induced him to give up this 
 intention. He continued to keep the command and to 
 write almost daily of the events of the campaign, but he 
 washed his hands absolutely of all participation in the 
 negotiations. His mother had taken upon herself to 
 renew them without his knowledge, and he would not 
 in any way help her. 
 
 The empress, therefore, and Kaunitz, who was not 
 sorry to take advantage of the opportunity to administer 
 something like a check to his overbearing young master, 
 took the matter in hand. The letter with which Thugut, 
 who travelled in the strictest secrecy, was supplied, was 
 intended to represent the outpourings of Maria Theresa's 
 own feelings. Any formal and diplomatic language or 
 suggestion was carefully excluded. She expressed her 
 deep distress that the former negotiation had been 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 107 
 
 broken oif, and her overwhelming anxiety as a queen 
 for the well-being of her people, but still more as a 
 woman for the safety of her two sons and a dearly 
 beloved son-in-law, who were present with the army. 
 Thugut met with a most favourable reception. Frederick 
 could not conceal his joy at having thus at length got 
 behind the obstinate young emperor and into friendly 
 relations with the empress herself. A paper of sug- 
 gestions accompanied the letter. The empress's offer 
 amounted to little less than the resignation of all her 
 late Bavarian acquisitions, except some conveniently 
 situated country which should produce a million of 
 revenue. Frederick seemed much inclined to accept 
 this offer as a basis of negotiation. He appended 
 however a few more demands, notably a formal renun- 
 ciation of all opposition to his possession and exchange 
 of the Franconian margraviates, and sent Thugut back 
 to Vienna. But before the departure of the envoy, 
 Frederick had several interviews with him, which made 
 it plain that he would not be contented with so in- 
 definite an arrangement and would regard it only as a 
 basis on which a more accurate treaty could be rested. 
 The reply of the Austrian court — of a very favour- 
 able description — was on the point of being placed in 
 Thugut's hands to take back to the king when another 
 letter arrived from him, which went far to destroy all 
 chance of accommodation. Frederick had had time to 
 summon his ministers to his camp, and to talk the 
 matter over with them ; and he now laid before the 
 Court of Vienna a more formal set of propositions, 
 which were, in fact, little else than a reproduction of 
 the terms originally advanced by Hertzberg at the 
 
108 THE CO-KEGENTS chap, v 
 
 conference in Berlin. They were throughout conceived 
 on the supposition that the whole claims of Austria 
 were without foundation and injurious to the German 
 Empire, ^ut that the king would consent to certain 
 arrangements which, while satisfying his allies, — Saxony, 
 Deuxponts, and Mecklenburg, — would leave to Austria a 
 desirable strip of property along the Inn. The empress 
 asked for time to consider the propositions. This was 
 at once granted, with a repetition of the promise with 
 which the king had met her first letter, that he would 
 carefully avoid any important action at all likely to 
 bring with it personal danger to her sons. Neither the 
 empress nor Kaunitz could well accept terms which the 
 emperor had already specifically refused. Thugut was 
 therefore sent back with a new counter-proposition. 
 The empress declared her freedom from all views of 
 aggrandisement ; she was willing to give up the con- 
 vention of January and to restore Bavaria, but only 
 upon condition (and here peeps out her inveterate 
 distrust of Frederick) that the margraviates of Baireuth 
 and Anspach should not be reunited to the elder branch 
 of the Prussian house. The whole question of the 
 Bavarian succession would be thus left untouched, and 
 might be settled by some arrangement and legal process. 
 The propositions were not such as Frederick could accept, 
 for while there was no recantation of the Austrian 
 claims, there was a distinct reassertion of imperial 
 authority over the margraviates, which he had always 
 denied. He therefore withdrew from the attempt at 
 reconciliation by personal intercourse, and referred the 
 matter to a meeting held at Braunau between his 
 ministers and Thugut. It was inevitable that so long 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 109 
 
 as the Austrians refused to confess themselves in the 
 wrong such negotiations would fail, whatever the terms 
 might be. It required only three days to render this 
 plain, and the meeting broke up on August 16. 
 
 Side by side with the negotiations, an uneventful 
 campaign had been dragging itself out in Bohemia. 
 Twice had the masterly schemes of Frederick been 
 postponed to meet the exigencies of diplomacy. His 
 intended advance into Moravia had given place to the 
 conferences at Berlin, his junction with his brother 
 Henry in Bohemia had been interrupted by the mission 
 of Thugut. The delays had been entirely in favour of 
 Austria. Time had been allowed for the occupation of 
 positions in the neighbourhood of Koniggratz, which 
 when fully manned and fortified were little short of 
 impregnable. And at the close of the campaign the 
 emperor could plume himself upon having successfully 
 withstood the greatest warrior of the age. It is im- 
 possible to believe that had the war been a reality, 
 Joseph could have held his own against so great a 
 master as Frederick. But he deserves much of the 
 credit which he attributed to himself for the firm and 
 steadfast front which he consistently opposed to his 
 great antagonist. That he felt much natural appre- 
 hension is abundantly proved by his letters, yet he 
 never for a moment flinched from his task, and, if 
 circumstances allowed him no opportunity of proving 
 his qualities as a soldier, he was at all events a cool- 
 headed, courageous, and vigilant commander. When 
 Frederick, declaring the Austrian positions unassailable, 
 withdrew without a battle into Silesia, and Prince 
 Henry, following his example, went into winter quarters 
 
110 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 in Saxony, the voice of public opinion was raised in 
 wonder at the change which age seemed to have wrought 
 in the king, and even his own generals murmured that 
 it was no longer the old Frederick. Yet the wise king 
 knew well what he was doing. Throughout the campaign 
 he had refrained from all enterprise, dreading before 
 all else to plunge afresh into a great war, the end of 
 which no one could foretell, and feeling certain from 
 his political knowledge that he could attain his object 
 by the more peaceful methods of diplomacy. For it 
 was not with Austria alone that he had been negotiating. 
 In Constantinople, in St. Petersburg, and in Paris, his 
 agents had been actively at work. 
 
 When the troops got into winter quarters, the 
 question at once arose in Vienna whether the war 
 should be continued or not. The result of the campaign, 
 though certainly not glorious, had been in some degree 
 satisfactory. The strong positions occupied by the 
 Austrian army had thwarted the king's plans ; but it 
 had not escaped the notice of good judges among the 
 Austrians themselves, that greater activity on the part 
 of Prince Henry would have ruined their defensive 
 tactics ; and though the emperor felt some satisfaction 
 in his success, he was too sharp-sighted not to attribute 
 it in a certain degree to the king's desire for a peaceful 
 solution of the difficulties. Reckoning upon this feeling, 
 he believed that good terms would be best secured by a 
 continuation of the war. He recommended that for 
 the next campaign the defensive attitude should be 
 abandoned, and offensive operations be undertaken 
 against Saxony, a country whose conduct had roused a 
 very bitter feeling in Vienna. 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 111 
 
 But the empress took a different view of the situation, 
 undoubtedly a wider and more statesmanlike view, if 
 wanting in the youthful hopefulness and energy which 
 inspired her son. Her close connection with France, 
 through her ambassador Mercy and her daughter 
 Marie Antoinette, enabled her to judge with great 
 certainty of the weakness of the Court of Versailles. 
 She was convinced that no hope of armed assistance, or 
 even of energetic diplomatic help, could be looked for 
 from the ministry of Maurepas, entangled in domestic 
 difficulty and oppressed by the weight of war with 
 England. If she turned to the other side of Europe 
 the prospect seemed equally hopeless. The Prussian 
 king had won over Potemkin, the Czarina's favourite ; 
 Potemkin had persuaded the minister, Panin; and 
 Frederick throughout the late campaign was known to 
 have been expecting armed assistance from his Russian 
 ally. Maria Theresa, to whom war in itself appeared a 
 gigantic evil, saw no hope of successfully maintaining 
 her position against the combined forces of Russia, 
 Saxony, and Prussia. She had no confidence in her 
 generals, she was bitterly distressed at the inevitable 
 suffering which would fall upon her people, and disturbed 
 by the prospect of the overthrow of her careful financial 
 arrangements. Peace as soon as possible was the con- 
 stant burden of her communications with her son and 
 minister. 
 
 The position of Kaunitz was not to be envied. Had 
 it not been for the feeling of the empress that his aid 
 was absolutely necessary for the suecessful transaction 
 of political business, a feeling in which in spite of his 
 frequent complaints Joseph shared, it would have been 
 
112 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 impossible for the chancellor to play his difficult part. 
 His vast experience and unquestioned ability had how- 
 ever secured him a position from which he was not only 
 able to exercise a predominant influence on foreign 
 affairs, but which enabled him also to allow himself to 
 take extraordinary liberties with his employers. Plead- 
 ing ill health, he had formed the habit of keeping away 
 from the court, and carrying on his business by writing ; 
 only now and then did he condescend to visit the empress. 
 He even detained despatches, and, merely indicating 
 their arrival, would inform her that he wished to keep 
 them for several days in order that he might send a 
 proper reply. There was no doubt much method in 
 these vagaries. He feared the personal influence of the 
 empress and the long habit of close sympathy with her 
 political views. Compelled to please two masters, he 
 preferred to assume for a while the attitude rather of 
 the servant than the adviser. Even then, with Maria 
 Theresa close beside him, he was inevitably drawn some- 
 what towards her views, and had gone so far in that 
 direction, that Joseph had for a while completely quar- 
 relled with him. But neither party could really dis- 
 pense with his assistance, and now on the great question 
 as to the continuance of the war he found himself able 
 to give advice of so oracular a character that both 
 mother and son were equally charmed. Fully recognis- 
 ing the impossibility of receiving aid from France or 
 of withstanding the combined forces of Frederick and 
 the Czarina, he advised that the terms offered should be 
 so far lowered as no longer to excite the certain opposi- 
 tion of the Great Powers. But at the same time he 
 recommended that all the preparations for war should 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 113 
 
 be rapidly continued, and that, if as was possible even 
 the lowered terms were rejected, the war should assume 
 an offensive character. 
 
 It must now have become plain to the rulers of 
 Austria that the attempted stroke for the appropriation 
 of Bavaria had failed. Their object was henceforward 
 to find some way of escape from their position without 
 a complete acknowledgment of their false step ; and the 
 only way of saving their honour seemed to lie through 
 a peace brought about by external arbitration. The 
 chancellor still clung to the hope that France might 
 play the part of arbitrator in the Austrian interest, and 
 counterbalance the weight of Russia employed in a 
 similar way in the interest of Frederick. Every effort 
 was used to bring France to some declaration in this 
 sense. The influence of the queen was set to work, 
 and although Marie Antoinette's conduct had not 
 always been pleasing to her mother, she proved on the 
 present occasion her willing agent, and busied herself 
 with extreme assiduity in re-establishing the Austrian 
 interest both with her husband and his ministers. The 
 charge of Austrian proclivities, which exercised so 
 disastrous an effect upon her subsequent career, gained 
 much of its strength from her persistent support of her 
 mother's wishes at this time ; the only efi'ort made by 
 France on the Austrian behalf must be attributed to her 
 influence. The French ambassador at Berlin declared 
 the adhesion of his court to the proposition of the 
 empress that she was ready to give up all claims upon 
 Bavarian territory, if the king, on his side, would re- 
 nounce his intention of uniting the Franconian mar- 
 graviates with his kingdom. But when the Prussian 
 
 X 
 
114 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 ministers replied as usual that the two questions were 
 in no way connected, the short-lived energy of the 
 ambassador faded away. He accepted the Prussian 
 arguments, and nothing further was for the present 
 heard of French support for the Austrian claims. 
 
 Very different to the lukewarm friendship of the 
 allies of Versailles was the energy shown by the Czarina 
 in favour of their enemy. The despatch requesting her 
 to undertake jointly with France the duties of arbitra- 
 tion had not yet reached its destination, when Prince 
 Galitzin, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, suddenly 
 informed Kaunitz that the Czarina was determined to 
 insist upon peace. She was well aware, she said, that 
 the empress desired peace ; she wondered at its post- 
 ponement. The continuation of the war, which seemed 
 to threaten the security of the Westphalian treaty 
 on which every European arrangement hinged, obliged 
 her now to interfere ; and unless peace was at once 
 made, her interference must be on the side of her 
 Prussian allies. 
 
 Again the war of words grew fierce in Vienna. Plan 
 after plan, alternative after alternative, issued from the 
 chancellor's fruitful brain, only to find opposition from 
 the emperor, still bent on making the most of his 
 Bavarian claims, and from the empress, eager to advance 
 no claims at all but to secure peace if possible without 
 the necessity of a congress. In such a meeting, she 
 saw only an opportunity for fresh demands on the part 
 of the lesser princes interested in the question; it 
 could not but be injurious to her interests, and a certain 
 cause of delay. She would have preferred that every- 
 thing should be thrown back to the position occupied in 
 
177r-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 115 
 
 1777, and the settlement of the whole question left to 
 the decision of the Imperial Diet. At length, however, 
 in spite of the wishes of the empress, in spite of her 
 expressed disapprobation of the chancellor's conduct, 
 when it was known that Catherine was ready to act with 
 France in procuring peace, letters were despatched to Ver- 
 sailles and St. Petersburg, leaving the settlement of the 
 question entirely in the hands of the mediating Powers. 
 
 It was the close of November 1778 when the mes- 
 sengers to France and Russia were despatched. The 
 resulting conference assembled at Teschen in March of 
 the following year. The intermediate time was passed 
 in arranging the terms which should form the basis of 
 mediation. 
 
 It has been seen that Kaunitz set his hopes on the 
 friendly interference of the French court. He early 
 placed in the hands of Breteuil, the French ambassador 
 in Vienna, a statement of what he considered the least 
 with which Austria would be satisfied. But Frederick 
 had already been beforehand with him in Paris, and the 
 propositions formulated by the French court were con- 
 ceived more in the Prussian than the Austrian interest. 
 That it should have been so is not wonderful. The 
 conduct of Austria had been so violent and unreasonable, 
 that a total rejection of all its demands would not have 
 been unnatural. There were however some claims, such 
 as the sovereign rights over certain feudal holdings, 
 which, though they rested upon laws practically obsolete, 
 could scarcely be contravened. Nor was it possible, if 
 peace was to be re-established, to insist upon such a 
 complete humiliation of Austria as would have been 
 implied had no result at all attended its demands. Its 
 
116 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 acquisitions were, in the French propositions at all 
 events, reduced to a minimum. Either a strip in the 
 Upper Palatinate in the neighbourhood of the river 
 Naab, or the corner of land included between the Danube, 
 the Inn, and the Salza, were suggested as the limits of 
 its new territory. In exchange for this, the position 
 taken up by Prussia was to be maintained, the fiefs 
 which the late Elector had held were to be restored to 
 Charles Theodore, and in future all claim of suzerainty 
 was to disappear. The union of the Franconian mar- 
 graviates to Prussia was to pass unquestioned, and a sum 
 of money was to be paid to assist the Elector in satisfying 
 the Saxon claim on the allodial property. 
 
 These propositions were in the main accepted, but 
 certain points roused strong opposition. Of these the 
 most important were the payment of the Saxon com- 
 pensation, and the recognition of the Prussian right to 
 the Franconian margraviates. That the compensation 
 was to be indirect seemed only a further proof that the 
 obligation lay with the Bavarian Elector and not with 
 Austria. The terms in which the union of the mar- 
 graviates to the crown was mentioned allowed of their 
 exchange for the Lausitz, an advantage to Prussia too 
 great to be tolerated except upon necessity. Amended 
 on these two points, the propositions were communicated 
 to the Prussian king. Taking exception to the amend- 
 ments, Frederick expressed his preference for the 
 original propositions of the French court, suggested 
 that the Austrian acquisitions should be in the .Upper 
 Palatinate and not in Bavaria, and demanded that the 
 privilege "De non appellando" should be granted to 
 his ally the Duke of Mecklenburg as satisfaction for 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCOESSIOST 117 
 
 his claims. The anger of the Austrian court was 
 excited by this apparent intention to enter upon 
 fresh discussions ; the propositions laid before Frederick 
 had been intended as an ultimatum. A severe reply 
 was sent him. Her claims, the empress told him, were 
 upon Bavaria; it was a portion of Bavaria which she 
 must have. She could not think of compensating 
 Saxony, for it seemed to change the whole matter into 
 a bargain. Nor could she allow the Lausitz exchange. 
 If her ultimatum was not accepted, there was no 
 alternative but to fall back upon her own simple plan, 
 to refuse all negotiation, and to throw the whole matter, 
 both the Bavarian succession and the junction of the 
 margraviates, as litigious questions into the hands of 
 the Imperial Diet. If this was unsatisfactory, there 
 remained nothing but war. Whether Frederick should 
 or should not accept this ultimatum depended upon the 
 reply of the Czarina, for without her support he was 
 unable to act. He demanded time for the reception of 
 her answer, and promised to send to Vienna his own 
 ultimatum as soon as possible. Meanwhile, Joseph, 
 who had yielded to the necessity for peace most 
 unwillingly, believing that honourable terms would be 
 best secured by the constant threat of war, con- 
 tinued his preparations for the next campaign. He 
 even allowed, during the winter, a war of outposts to 
 be carried on and so vigorously maintained that 
 Frederick felt obliged to take the field. The king 
 however contented himself with keeping his frontiers 
 clear, while patiently waiting for news from Russia. 
 
 At length, in January 1779, there arrived the 
 momentous document by which Catherine, who had 
 
118 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 become the arbiter of Europe, expressed her view of 
 the situation. On the three important points — the 
 territory to be ceded, the Lausitz exchange, and the 
 compensaition to Saxony — she gave her voice in favour 
 of the Austrian propositions. On the other hand, she 
 advised that the small territory of Schonberg should be 
 ceded to Saxony ; that the Duke of Mecklenburg should 
 receive his privilege ; and that all claims to the suzerainty 
 of fiefs should be resigned with the exception of those in 
 the Lausitz. • Frederick, as he tells us, anxious though 
 he was to uphold the advantages of his allies, did not 
 feel able to withstand the joint pressure of France, 
 Russia, and Austria. Therefore, taking the Russian pro- 
 positions as a basis, the congress assembled at Teschen. 
 
 A few weeks should, under such circumstances, have 
 been amply sufficient for the conclusion of the peace. 
 But, as not unfrequently happens in peace negotiations, 
 the expectations of the various lesser parties concerned 
 had been gravely crossed by the terms accepted by the 
 great patron states. Frederick had appeared upon the 
 scene as the champion of the Electors of Saxony and 
 Bavaria and of the Duke of Deuxponts. Though glad 
 enough to accept his support, they all raised clamorous 
 objections against the terms he had thought it necessary 
 to accept. The Duke of Deuxponts had believed him- 
 self the heir to the undiminished Bavarian inheritance, 
 and protested against any cession whatever to Austria. 
 The outrageous claim of Saxony had been lowered from 
 forty million gulden to six million, while Charles 
 Theodore, who should have been well satisfied with his 
 actual gain, grudged the payment of even this smaller 
 sum. The greedy complaints of the Bavarian Elector 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSIOlSr 119 
 
 threatened to break up the conference, and threw a 
 serious doubt upon the honesty of Austria. When the 
 question of the Saxon compensation was raised, it 
 appeared that Seveldt, the Bavarian plenipotentiary, was 
 authorised to offer at the outside but one million gulden. 
 The astonishment of the members of the congress at 
 this niggardly proposal was much increased when he 
 asserted that it was expressly at the Austrian desire 
 that the payment of a larger sum was refused. There 
 appears to be no documentary evidence of the truth of 
 this assertion. Yet it is difficult to believe that Seveldt 
 would have ventured to make it on his own authority. 
 The Prussian king always believed that it was a trick 
 of the emperor for the express purpose of securing 
 the renewal of war. Be that as it may, the mediating 
 Powers were roused to great indignation, and wrote 
 pressing letters to Kaunitz. The chancellor was obliged 
 to follow their lead, and the joint influence brought to 
 bear upon the Elector induced him, though only by 
 slow degrees, to consent to the payment of the full 
 sum. Although the removal of this obstacle seemed 
 to render the conclusion of the peace easy, a series of 
 little disputes dragged out the negotiations for three 
 weeks longer. At length, influenced perhaps by the 
 signature of the peace between the Ottoman Empire 
 and Russia, and the consequent increase of authority 
 with which the Czarina could speak, all parties with- 
 drew their opposition, and the peace was signed on 
 May 13, 1779. 
 
 It was Maria Theresa's birthday ; and Frederick, 
 who had always regarded her as in earnest in her 
 pursuit of peace, showed his respect for her by issuing 
 
120 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 a formal order for the withdrawal of all the Prussian 
 troops upon this day. He was not wrong in his 
 appreciation of her honesty. Writing to Kaunitz, after 
 joining in J;he Whitsuntide Te Deum on May 23, she 
 says : " I have this day gloriously ended my career 
 with the Te Deum. Dearly though it may have cost 
 me, I took part in it with joy at the thought of the 
 peace which, with your help, I have brought to my 
 countries. There is not much left for me to do." 
 
 The Treaty of Teschen is more important from a 
 European than from an Austrian point of view. The 
 position of Russia as the arbiter of Europe marks the 
 full entrance of that great Power into the fellowship of 
 European states. All parties rejoiced at the peace, 
 though none were satisfied. The daring theft perpe- 
 trated by Austria had produced only one little scrap of 
 territory. The Prussian king grudged even that small 
 amount of success. Charles Theodore obtained Bavaria, 
 but he had lost his six million gulden. Saxony had 
 been compelled to reduce its claim by more than three- 
 fourths. The Duke of Deuxponts had gained little 
 or nothing by his action. The Duke of Mecklenburg 
 had been obliged to satisfy himself with an improvement 
 in his law-courts. It was, indeed, a fitting termination 
 to a mean squabble, chiefly interesting as exhibiting 
 the incurable land-hunger of Joseph, the noble honesty 
 of the empress, and the extraordinary tact of the 
 chancellor. At the same time the position taken up 
 by Frederick seems at once to show the complete 
 effeteness of the Empire under Austrian leadership, and 
 to afford no uncertain indication as to the power which 
 was eventually to take its place. 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 121 
 
 The attempt of Austria to make use, for its own 
 advantage, of the difficulties of the Bavarian succession 
 had been almost entirely the work of Joseph. Through- 
 out the whole of the dispute he had devoted his energies, 
 both in negotiations and in arms, to the realisation of 
 his plan. He could not regard the settlement of 
 Teschen as anything short of defeat. The main cause 
 of his failure was no doubt the anxiety which filled 
 the mind of his mother to arrive at a peaceful and 
 honourable solution. But apart from this, he had found 
 himself thwarted by the two great Powers of the West 
 and East — by the jealousy of France, and the persistent 
 support given by Eussia to the Prussian king. He had 
 thus learnt the unreality of that great change of policy 
 which was the pride of the chancellor's political life, 
 and the uselessness of that close connection with the 
 Bourbon houses which Maria Theresa had so sedulously 
 cultivated. French support had proved of little value. 
 Indeed, the internal condition of France, with its dis- 
 credited government and deep-seated discontent, and 
 the folly of its rulers in allowing themselves to be 
 drawn into a war with England at such a crisis, gave 
 but little hope that its assistance could be of advantage. 
 To Joseph the wisdom of the Versailles treaty had 
 become more than questionable. On the other hand, 
 the increasing influence of Eussia and the unassailable 
 position which its consistent support afl'orded to the 
 Prussian monarchy had forced itself upon his notice. 
 Always more inclined than his mother to see the centre 
 of Austrian politics in its relations with Eussia rather 
 than in those with France, late events drove him to 
 the conviction that the arrangement of Versailles had 
 
122 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 lost its vitality, and that the future of the Empire 
 depended largely upon breaking through the tradition 
 of enmity between his own court and that of St. 
 Petersburg.!! 
 
 But the political system of Russia was essentially 
 personal. The somewhat aggressive virtue of the 
 Austrian empress had excited a permanent feud be- 
 tween her and the Czarina, a feud carefully fostered 
 and embittered by the diplomacy of the Prussian king, 
 who, whatever may have been his excellencies, was a 
 master of the art of detraction. Frederick had spared 
 no pains to inspii-e the Czarina with a profound mistrust 
 of the young emperor, or to impress upon her the 
 reckless ambition which formed the ground- work of his 
 character. To remove the impression thus formed, 
 Joseph, with much wisdom, believed that a personal 
 interview with Catherine would be most effective. He 
 had a well-grounded belief in his own ability to in- 
 gratiate himself with a ruler so open to the charms of 
 pleasant society, and so vulnerable through her insatiable 
 vanity. He therefore proposed, early in 1780, to pay 
 her a visit. The proposition was weU received, and it 
 was arranged that, with the strict incognito which he 
 always affected, the emperor, under the title of the 
 Count of Falkenstein, should take advantage of her 
 journey southward, and meet her at Mohileff. As was 
 to be expected, it was only with great reluctance that 
 the empress consented to allow her son to visit a woman 
 of such questionable character. Equally as a matter of 
 course, Kaunitz persuaded her to yield, and plied the 
 emperor with elaborate sketches of the conduct he 
 should pursue and the advantages he should seek. 
 
1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 123 
 
 Though Joseph thanked him with all courtesy, and no 
 doubt found much that was suggestive in his memoranda, 
 he took the matter entirely into his own hands, deter- 
 mined that at all events his first object was to make 
 himself agreeable. Should opportunity offer, political 
 questions might be introduced, but the primary object 
 of the meeting was what it pretended to be — the removal, 
 by better acquaintance, of the obstinate prejudices of 
 the Czarina. It proved entirely successful ; and prob- 
 ably no wiser line could have been adopted. His free 
 and graceful manners, his apparent honesty, even the 
 carelessness with which he put political questions by, 
 had a deep effect upon Catherine's mind. She would 
 not allow him to leave her when his visit at Mohileff 
 was over, but induced him to accompany her to St. 
 Petersburg, where for three weeks he lived in friendly 
 intercourse with her. It is not to be supposed that 
 political questions were entirely untouched. The 
 imaginative Czarina gave him glimpses now and then 
 of her own projects with respect to Eastern conquest, 
 at the same time suggesting that a parallel course was 
 open to him in the conquest of Italy and the establish- 
 ment of the Austrian power in Eome. The good sense of 
 Joseph induced him always to put such questions lightly 
 on one side ; and as the Czarina would never commit 
 herself to any direct proposition, no definite treaty or 
 arrangement resulted from the meeting. But the 
 emperor had every reason to be satisfied with his 
 success. The wall of prejudice was broken down, and 
 a sound basis laid for future approaches to a Russian 
 alliance, should circumstances require it. 
 
 V/hile Joseph had been absent in Eussia, the empress 
 
124 THE CO-EEGENTS chap, v 
 
 had brought to a successful issue her plan for securing a 
 maintenance for her youngest son, Maximilian. She 
 had obtained with some difficulty his election as 
 coadjutor to the Elector of Cologne, both in Miinster 
 and in his capital. It had been a triumph over the 
 opposition raised by Frederick, and seemed to secure 
 not only a dignified position for Maximilian, but the 
 predominance of Austrian over Prussian interest among 
 the spiritual electors. It was a little gleam of sunshine 
 to brighten the close of her life. 
 
 For the days of the great empress were numbered. 
 Her naturally robust constitution had been severely 
 tried. It is not with imijunity that a woman can give 
 birth to sixteen children, or struggle for days at the 
 very gates of death in the powerful grip of the small- 
 pox. But she was aged more by mental than by physical 
 sufiering. Even in the fulness of her youthful strength, 
 from the hour that she ascended the throne and took 
 upon herself the burdens of the monarchy, there had 
 been few years in which she had not been called upon 
 to bear an overwhelming load of anxiety. Her masculine 
 steadfastness and greatness of soul had saved her empire 
 from dismemberment, and had enabled her through 
 weary years to wage a not tmequal war with her great 
 rival. But her power of endurance had been terribly 
 tried by the long War of Succession, so closely followed 
 by the Seven Years' War ; and she had met the trial 
 practically single-handed. The husband she had loved 
 so well had proved but a broken reed. Her disillusion- 
 ment on this point must have been very bitter; yet 
 to her steadfast heart the loss of the broken idol was 
 the most terrible of blows. The death of her husband 
 
- 1777-80 THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 125 
 
 at Innsbruck made an indelible impression upon her. 
 The vivacious, pleasure -loving, self -asserting queen dis- 
 appeared in the anxious woman, dreading war before 
 all else, shrinking from making up her mind, and 
 dominated by a melancholy and often bigoted religion. 
 Thus broken, she was thrown into all the diflBculties 
 of the co-regency, and forced to hold her own as far 
 as might be against the imperious and aggressive 
 character of her son, and the astute worldliness of her 
 chancellor. The latter years of Btaria Theresa's life 
 must have been full of that unhappiness which waits 
 on the sense of failure. The great political work of 
 her life, her friendship with France, seemed to produce 
 no good results. The marriages of her daughters, made 
 to support it, were the cause of the keenest anxiety. 
 With one daughter all intercourse was broken off; 
 another had found a husband who rendered domestic 
 happiness impossible ; over a third the great cloud of 
 the French Eevolution was already beginning to gather. 
 The son in whom she mainly trusted was showing no 
 doubt plenty of ability, but was filling her with deep 
 misgivings by his religious carelessness, his incessant and 
 morbid activity, and by the divergence of all his views 
 from her own. Christina, the daughter who with her 
 husband, Albert of Saxony, had furnished her with all 
 the joy of her later life, had just left her to assume 
 the viceroyalty of the Netherlands, after the death 
 of her brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, whose loss 
 was also a heavy grief. 
 
 But though life must have lost its charms, the 
 empress fought a dignified and noble battle with 
 approaching death. In spite of her consciousness of 
 
126 THE CO-REGENTS chap, v 
 
 the state of her health, she continued her habitual life. 
 On November 2 she paid her usual solemn visit to her 
 husband's grave, and even in the following week refused 
 to spoil the pleasure of the family shooting party at 
 Schonbrunn by absenting herself from it. But a few 
 days later the oppression on her chest became unbearable. 
 Prevented by her constant cough from lying down, she 
 sat at her desk writing and doing business, tiU at last 
 her physician, yielding to her request, told her the 
 truth, that she could not live many days. On November 
 26, the last sacrament was administered to her. Her 
 children, who had been summoned to her bedside, received 
 her last blessing, and she was still able to write a note, 
 full of affection, to her absent son Leopold. From that 
 time onward, though perfectly clear in her mind and 
 anxiously thoughtful for those about her, she sat much 
 in silence. There is a touching story told of how, after 
 one of these long fits of silence, she said to her children, 
 "Never think, although my manner is changed, that 
 my heart is any way changed towards you ; it is only 
 that I have given you to God, all that I have most 
 valuable in the world, and that which is alone hard for 
 me to leave. This is the reason why I look upon you 
 in silence." On November 28, her illness gained ground. 
 Towards the evening, when her doctor brought her 
 some medicine, she smilingly put it aside. She was 
 much obliged, she said, but its only use was to keep 
 her longer aUve, and therefore she would not take it. 
 Shortly afterwards, she rose and tottered towards her 
 bed. " Her majesty lies uncomfortably," said Joseph. 
 " I am comfortable enough to die," she said, and with 
 three deep sighs her great spirit passed away. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 JOSEPH'S KEFOKMS 
 
 1780-1790 
 
 The death of Maria Theresa placed on the throne of 
 Austria, with undivided power, one of the most remark- 
 able personalities of the time. An emperor at the age 
 of twenty-five, it was impossible that Joseph should 
 escape some of the faults of a spoilt child. He was 
 frequently self-willed and arbitrary ; his utterances were 
 often hasty, petulant, and bitter. But it was not the 
 self-will of vanity, nor the petulance of weakness; 
 behind the one lay a well-grounded self-confidence, 
 behind the other a strong will which he was capable of 
 imposing upon all with whom he had to do, and to 
 which even the great ability of Kaunitz had to bend. 
 Again and again we find the minister withdrawing his 
 opposition to his master's wishes, and directing his 
 energies to carry them out. Perhaps the most marked 
 characteristics of his mind were his detestation of all 
 inferior work, and his extreme intolerance of evils 
 which he thought might be avoided. Gifted with an 
 unequalled capacity for work, with which no fatigue or 
 
128 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 danger was allowed to interfere, the perfunctory perform- 
 ance of duties, which is habitual with most men, and 
 which was the besetting sin of the Austrian bureaucracy, 
 excited his bitter scorn. His singular versatility and 
 rapidity of invention outran the wits of his ministers, 
 and left him in the solitude of genius to carry out the 
 constant succession of reforms which issued from his 
 fertile brain. Such gifts do not conduce to happiness ; 
 but when connected, as they were in Joseph, with an 
 intellectual brilliancy and charm which rendered him 
 when he pleased the most attractive person in any 
 company in which he mixed, they seemed to point him 
 out for a great and successful monarch. His domestic 
 life still further fitted him for such a position. Early 
 sorrow from which he never recovered, and a second 
 marriage contracted against his own will and on political 
 grounds, had detached him from those more senti- 
 mental connections which might have interfered with 
 his devotion to the commonweal. Without having 
 been rendered morose, he was thus left free to give 
 his whole attention to his public duties, and to find all 
 his interest in the improvement and advance of the 
 people he was called to govern. There was never a 
 king who spared himself less, or who gave himself up 
 with more absolute self-devotion to the work of kingship. 
 Yet seldom did reforming efforts meet with less success 
 than did his largely - conceived and well-intentioned 
 measures. Certain faults in his character — his want of 
 imagination and his intolerance of conservative pre- 
 judice — gave to all he did an over-hasty and doctrinaire 
 appearance under which the nobility of his conception 
 was hidden. To his contemporaries (and subsequent 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS 129 
 
 historians have generally adopted their views), he 
 appeared an arbitrary and injudicious meddler, rather 
 than an enlightened and earnest reformer. 
 
 On the other hand, it is only fair to say that his 
 credit as a reformer requires some modification. The 
 rapidity and inventiveness of his genius, his warm 
 participation in the great movements^'of the time, and 
 the authority with which he supported his opinions, 
 induced the world to believe that he stood alone as the 
 spring of the reforming action of his reign. Such a 
 view is not wholly correct; his frequent complaint of 
 w.ant of competent assistance was exaggerated,, and robs 
 of their due munjj^of-thercgjffiielloxs and ministers on 
 whose suggestions he acted. It is true that, throughout 
 the period of his co-regency, he had been the repre- 
 sentative of the reforming theories of the eighteenth 
 century. But it would be a great error to suppose 
 that he was the initiator of the new form assumed by 
 the Austrian monarchy, or even the leader in the line 
 of policy which had been adopted. The movement of 
 the century had not been confined to France and 
 Prussia, but had made its way in no small degree in 
 Austria also, where nearly all the most important 
 statesmen were more or less imbued with what was 
 spoken of as the "enlightenment" of the time. The 
 course pursued by Maria Theresa had been in accordance 
 with it. No one had held morfi__strongly than the late 
 empress the prevalent' view of the importance of the 
 State, the necessity of subordinating -all action to its 
 advantage, or the duty of the sovereign to use the 
 absolute power placed in her hands for the general 
 benefit of her subjects. But, born in another generation 
 
 K 
 
130 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 and trained in the theories of a time when the Church 
 and aristocracy were regarded as the privileged supports 
 of the crown, she had inevitably pursued her objects in 
 a gradual, and tentative fashion. From the trammels of 
 traditional conservatism the new emperor was free. No 
 longer restrained by the deep affection and respect with 
 which his mother inspired him, or checked by the 
 moderation which long experience had taught her, he 
 found himself in a position to give immediate effect to 
 his own more advanced views. 
 
 As expressed in writing, nothing could be finer than 
 the programme Joseph set himself to accomplish. Equal 
 justice, intellectual freedom, religious toleration, to be 
 enjoyed equally by all good subjects of the State, under 
 the protecting shadow of a sovereign of unquestionable 
 authority, who regarded himself, however, only as the 
 responsible servant of his people and devoted solely to 
 their welfare ; this was the ideal which he set before 
 himself of his own position and that of the State. 
 Unfortunately, the peculiarities of his character stood in 
 the way of the attainment of this noble ideal. Convinced 
 of the correctness of his views and of the excellence of 
 his intentions, delay appeared to him unreasonable. As 
 he himself said, what he undertook he chose to bring 
 to immediate completion. "When I was planting the 
 Augarten," he writes as an illustration of his own char- 
 acter, " I did not choose young saplings for the good of 
 posterity, but strong trees which would serve at once 
 for the advantage and pleasure of the present gener- 
 ation." Thus, without respect or consideration for the 
 prejudices of those with whom he had to deal, he 
 endeavoured to sweep away what he considered as their 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S EEFOKMS 131 
 
 unreasonable opposition, and to establish Ms reforms at 
 once and in a complete form. This intolerance of delay 
 was aggravated by the extraordinary vivacity of his mind, 
 which prevented him from pursuing with that dogged 
 perseverance, which is in most cases necessary for success, 
 any one single object. As his great adversary said of 
 him, " he always wished to take the second step before 
 he had taken the first." When to this doctrinaire 
 impatience there is added that sense of personal power 
 which is the inevitable consequence of unrestrained 
 authority, it is not difficult to see the causes of the 
 very tragical failure of his noble aspirations. 
 
 As Joseph and his mother had been at one in their 
 general conception of the State, there was no necessity 
 for any immediate change in domestic administration. 
 But the emperor had felt deeply the incompleteness of 
 the reforms which Maria Theresa had introduced. It 
 speaks well for his self-restraint that his respect foi? her 
 had induced him_during— hfir Jifetime to keep himself 
 comparatively in Jihejjackground. . He was now free to 
 push to logicarcompleteness the partial measures already 
 taken for giving effect to his ideas. He contemplated 
 changes which, if carried out, would have been little 
 short of an entire reconstitution of Austrian society in 
 all its principal branches. 
 
 The unity of the Empire, the subordination of the 
 interests of the provinces to the general good, was the 
 key-note of his reforms in organisation. At the very 
 beginning of his reign he busied himself with this 
 change, in order that the national spirit, so close upon 
 extinction, should be reawakened, and the view become 
 general that the interests of crown and subject were one. 
 
132 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 When it is remembered that the Austrian dominions 
 included several distinct nationalities, that at least ten 
 different languages were in common use within its 
 limits, and that the provinces were held by very various 
 titles, the difficulty of such a unification becomes obvious. 
 One part of this difiSculty the emperor thought to 
 remove by refusing the ceremony of coronation. Con- 
 vinced of the strength of his position as head of the 
 State, called to rule by divine order for the advantage 
 of the people, he declined to weaken that position by 
 allowing that his authority rested in any degree upon a 
 special ceremony, or that he was in any peculiar manner 
 more the head of the State in one of his provinces than 
 in any other. This step was followed by a plan for the 
 division of his empire into homogeneous districts. The 
 opposition of his ministers prevented it from being logic- 
 ally complete ; the two great chanceries of Austria and 
 Bohemia, and of Hungary and Transylvania were main- 
 tained. The provinces were broken up into thirteen 
 great governments, and these again divided into circles, 
 which in turn rested upon city and village communities. 
 The real basis of the organisation was the circle. Within 
 the sphere of its authority lay all the most important 
 branches of government. The conscription, the schools, 
 the relation of over-lord and tenant, the new land system, 
 and such poor-law as then existed, were all placed in 
 the hands of the circle. Only comparatively unimportant 
 functions were left to the village or city authorities. 
 In the same way the administration of justice was 
 reorganised. It was separated from the political govern- 
 ment and placed independently under the High Court 
 of Justice in Vienna. Under this there spread out 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS 133 
 
 a succession and net-work of courts through the 
 provinces, ending in city and village courts which 
 were supplied with suitable well -trained magistrates. 
 Where the village was not able to bear the expense of 
 such judges, the justice still remained in the hands of the 
 superior territorial lords. Nearly all courts or authorities 
 already existing were thus swept away, and the land 
 was filled with officials. The intention was no doubt 
 that from one end to the other of the official structure, 
 well educated, able, and zealous men, depending directly 
 upon the central authority, should execute the duties of 
 government. 
 
 In a document published in 1783 the emperor 
 sketched, in a few strong lines, the duties which he 
 considered should belong to the servants of the State. 
 " As the provinces of the monarchy constitute a single 
 whole, all the rivalries and prejudices which have been ' 
 the cause of so many idle quarrels between province and 
 province, nation and nation, and even between the 
 various heads of departments, must cease. One thought 
 should fill the mind. As in the case of the human body, 
 so in the body corporate of the State, the whole suffers 
 when one least member is sick, and all must work hand 
 in hand for the curing of even the smallest evil. All 
 quarrels between various religions must disappear, and 
 all citizens of the State must regard each other as 
 brothers, pledged to mutual usefulness." The difficulty 
 of finding such men was great. But the emperor, full 
 of a devouring anxiety to produce his political ideal, 
 was absolutely convinced of the excellence of his reforms. 
 Full of self-denial himself, without external ties, simple, 
 laborious, and devoted, he expected all his subordinates 
 
134 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 to show the same virtues. The inevitable disappoint- 
 ment of such an expectation aroused in him a sort of 
 contempt even for his best and ablest advisers, vrhich 
 frequently found expression in bitter words. For 
 instance, when writing to his brother in 178.3, he says : 
 "As for my home affairs, they go on much as usual; 
 by dint of driving, pressing, and shoving, I manage 
 to get some of them done." He seldom mentions any 
 appointment he had made without adding the curious 
 qualification that the person appointed was "the least 
 bad that he could find." Nor did he confine his 
 strictures to private letters. He did not scruple, in 
 a public utterance, to use such words as these : " It is 
 with sorrow that, after all I have said, all that I have 
 made so convincingly clear, no other course is left for 
 me — in the face of such wretched, contemptible creatures, 
 who can be moved only by motives of pounds, shillings, 
 and pence — but to punish every slackness in carrying 
 out my orders, from the highest to the lowest, by 
 knocking off their salaries. I am forced to treat the 
 servants of the State, on whom every argument has been 
 wasted, like idle lackeys, and to bring them into some 
 activity by lowering their wages." It was in some 
 degree to avoid this difficulty that he established the 
 strange and very unpopular custom of good conduct 
 lists ; it became the duty of each chief of a department 
 to send every half year a report of the conduct of all his 
 subordinates. 
 
 The system of centralisation thus carried out, of 
 
 necessity brought with it the limitation or suppression 
 
 of the power of the provincial Estates. There was no 
 
 / room in such a system for constitutional rights. Maria 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFOEMS 135 
 
 Theresa had struck the first blow against them by the 
 establishment of the ten years' recess. Joseph followed 
 in her footsteps. The expenditure of public money, the, 
 power of taxation, and the establishment of standing! 
 committees, without the consent of the central authority, \ 
 were all withdrawn from the Estates. Two members 
 elected by the Diet were indeed added for financial 
 purposes to the provincial government, but the business 
 which had hitherto been in the hands of the Estates 
 was practically taken over by the crown. The attitude 
 assumed by the emperor may be seen in a declaration 
 which he sent to the Bohemian Estates in 1784. He 
 told them that he was intending to introduce a new 
 system of taxation, and that " it was not for them to 
 discuss whether the measure was desirable or not, but 
 merely to consider the best means for carrying it out." 
 This new system, the most important and in some 
 respects the most unpopular of his reforms, was pub- 
 lished in 1789 without any understanding with the 
 Estates. And finally, even the meeting of the Diets was 
 forbidden except on the express summons of the crown. 
 A still more important limitation to the single handed 
 power of the sovereign lay in the position occupied by 
 the Church. tlQse_ph was no enemy to the Catholic 
 Church ; but th e intrusive authority of the Papal See, 
 and the_cosm6politan character of the monastic orders, 
 were inconsistent with the self-contained independence 
 which he desired for his empire. Moreover, priding 
 himself upon his reasonableness, he looked with per- 
 haps exaggerated disapproval upon many usages of the 
 Church, which to him at all events savoured of supersti- 
 tion. To render the Church exclusively national, and 
 
136 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 to purge it of the superstitious practices overlaying the 
 simplicity of the faith, were the primary objects of his 
 religious innovations. In the hierarchical arrangements 
 he desired no change. On the contrary, his action was 
 regarded by himself as favouring the independence of 
 the bishops, and in many instances was so regarded by 
 the bishops themselves. 
 
 He pushed the claims of the State so far, that it 
 seemed as though an actual separation from Rome 
 would have resulted. During his visit to Rome in 1783, 
 while demanding as a right his power to nominate 
 bishops, he used language to Cardinal Bernis of very 
 deep significance. " My determination," he said, " is 
 taken, and it would be very sad if the pope's obstinacy 
 compelled me to adopt " certain measures. Again, when, 
 in opposition (as he believed) to an arrangement agreed 
 to during this visit, the pope refused to ratify his 
 nomination of Herberstein to the archbishopric of 
 Laibach, Kaunitz, by his direction, replied that " the 
 opposition of the pope would form an insurmoimtable 
 wall of separation between the Roman See and the 
 States of the Empire, and would oblige his majesty to 
 throw aside for ever the respect and consideration he 
 had hitherto shown to the pope." He even, in reply to 
 the Elector of Mainz and the Archbishop of Salzburg, 
 who complained that the appointment of a new nuncio 
 at Munich waaf limiting the authority of the German 
 bishops, declared that "henceforward the papal nuncio 
 should be regarded as merely the ambassador of a 
 secular prince." The answer was taken up by the great 
 bishops of Germany ; and the holders of the four 
 great -archbishoprics, Mainz, Salzburg, Trier, and Coin, 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS 137 
 
 adopted in solemn conference the Imperial principles 
 in Cliurch matters. Joseph encouraged the German 
 bishops to give adhesion to this view, and permitted 
 the Imjjerial Council to censure the Bavarian Elector 
 for allowing the establishment of the nunciature. The 
 crisis was only averted by the emperor's determination (^ 
 to avoid a formal breach with Rome. It is not surprising 
 that steps which tended to save them from foreign 
 interference, and to lessen the charges of their oflSces, 
 should have been welcome to the bishops. But behind 
 the independence which he attempted to secure for them, 
 there lay a servitude oi a different kind ; for his great 
 object in his Church reforms, as in other matters, was to 
 produce a government by competent officials. As he 
 himself expresses it, he "desired the bishops to become 
 the recipients of wages, so that the Church might be 
 in fact only one of the numerous departments of the 
 State." 
 
 It was with the same object, for the purpose of 
 ridding himself of hampering connections with foreign 
 forces over which he could exert no authority, that he 
 early insisted upon the great monastic orders renouncing 
 their connection with their brethren in other countries, 
 ■ and their subordination to foreign generals. Side by 
 side with this reform went a sweeping destruction of the 
 monasteries and convents. The enormous number of 
 these establishments in Austria seemed to him 'to eat 
 into the manhood of the country, and to deprive the 
 State of the services of many thousand citizens. All 
 purely contemplative orders which did nothing for the 
 benefit of society were entirely abolished. The process 
 was gradual ; but before the end of the reign the 
 
138 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 number of monks had been reduced by 36,000 ; and of 
 the 2000 convents,' 700 had disappeared. 
 
 Intrusive jurisdictions and idle hands were injurious 
 enough ; but even more injurious were those laws which 
 laid disabilities on certain members of the State, not on 
 any ground of inferiority in the performance of their 
 duties as men and citizens, but on account of their religious 
 opinions. Accordingly, in October 1781, the emperor 
 issued a patent of toleration, in some respects the most 
 important and interesting of his many reforms. It is 
 true that the toleration was not complete ; it was not in 
 fact compatible with his general views that there should 
 be no State religion, nor was it possible for the son of 
 Maria Theresa to place Jews or Deists on exactly the 
 same footing as orthodox Christians. But even with these 
 limits, the wide toleration granted is no slight proof of 
 liberality in one who had passed his life in the rigorously 
 -orthodox atmosphere of. the Austrian court. Although 
 non-Catholics were not allowed the complete exercise of 
 public worship, they were in other respects to be held 
 as on a complete equality with Catholics. Even with 
 respect to worship, considerable freedom was allowed. 
 Any unorthodox community of a hundred families 
 might have a chapel and a school ; and for this purpose 
 they might even obtain consecrated churches if no longer 
 in use. The full right of citizenship, and the admission 
 to all academical ranks and civil services, were secured 
 to them. Most liberal enactments regulated the appoint- 
 ment of their pastors, the celebration of their sacraments, 
 and the education of their children. 
 
 It was only natural that in Rome all the reforms in the 
 Church which Joseph had made should appear as a direct 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFOEMS 139 
 
 assault on the position of the papacy. "When remon- 
 strances proved vain, Pius VI., with an overweening 
 belief in his own powers of persuasion, undertook, in the 
 beginning of 1782, a personal visit to Vienna. Joseph, 
 like the rest of the world, was astonished at this step. 
 He attributed it to " the pope's mystical desire to pose 
 as the saviour of the rights of the Church, though no 
 one has done him any harm. However extraordinary 
 his visit may be, and though it is impossible to guess 
 what line he will take, I hope I shall show myself a 
 respectful son of the Church, a polite host, and a good 
 Catholic in every sense of the term, but at the same 
 time a man who can look down on mere phrases, im- 
 movable in my principles, and following without any 
 other consideration whatsoever the advantage of the 
 State." The attitude which he here sketched he suc- 
 ceeded in maintaining. Though rather surprised and 
 hurt by the extreme enthusiasm of the Vienna crowd for 
 their unusual visitor, he showed the greatest personal 
 respect to the pope. Writing of this visit to Catherine 
 of Eussia, he says : " I must confess that our daily three 
 hours' conversation was wearisome and stupid enough. 
 We passed it in long arguments on theology and other 
 subjects, in which we used words incomprehensible one 
 to the other ; and it not unfrequently happened that we 
 sat silent, staring at one another as though we wished to 
 say that we neither of us could understand the other in 
 the least." When any practical question arose, Joseph 
 referred the pope to his imperturbable chancellor, who 
 followed the same course of carefully avoiding important 
 topics. Joseph, however, succeeded in ingratiating him- 
 self with the pope and convincing him that he was a 
 
140 JOSEPH II ■ CHAP. VI 
 
 good Catholic. "The emperor," said Pius after his 
 return, "is at heart deeply religious. He has assured 
 me, and indeed has proved to me, that he is the best 
 Catholic ij the world." He was indeed so determined 
 to keep on good terms with the pope, while pursuing his 
 own way, that in the following year he paid him a 
 surprise visit, coming, as he said, "like a bombshell into 
 the Vatican." But he stiU confined his efibrts to making 
 himself agreeable and to proving his orthodoxy. There 
 could be no political agreement between men of such 
 entirely opposite views, and his interviews with the 
 pope caused no cessation in his Church reforms. The 
 futility of the conferences is well described by MmseK in 
 a letter to his sister Christina. "As far as the questions 
 are concerned which touch Church and State, we remain 
 exactly in our own views. Each of us is earning his 
 bread. He defends the authority of the Church, I 
 uphold the rights of the State. We are personally 
 friends, and though we act from different motives, we 
 are both aiming at the same object, the increase of 
 religion and the instruction of the people. He uses 
 words ; I use deeds." 
 
 In his zeal for administrative uniformity, Joseph's 
 earlier measures had been directed to changes in the 
 machinery of government. It was not tiU after these 
 fundamental changes had been made that he discovered 
 the deficiencies of the material on which his beautiful 
 instrument was to work. The ignorance, prejudice, and 
 superstition of the mass of the people, the difficulty of 
 finding fit agents for carrying out his enlightened system, 
 forced themselves upon his notice as soon as his new 
 arrangements got into working order. And then followed 
 
1780-90, JOSEPH'S REFORMS 141 
 
 a flood of ordinances for the purpose of bringing his 
 subjects into the degree of cultivation which would 
 enable them to appreciate his improvements. Thus, 
 in what would seem to be a false sequence, the condi- 
 tion of the secular clergy attracted his attention. He 
 abolished the ecclesiastical schools, and founded state 
 establishments known as general seminaries, at which 
 all candidates for the ministry were to be trained, in 
 order that improvement in knowledge should go hand 
 in hand with unity of thought and dependence on the 
 State. 
 
 "Whatever may have been the wisdom of so exclusive 
 a clerical training, it was at all events within the limits 
 of those powers which Joseph attributed to himself as 
 head of the State, The steps which he took to secure 
 his second object, the destruction of what he regarded 
 as superstition, were more questionable. As long as the 
 Church is allowed a separate existence, and Joseph did 
 not contemplate breaking entirely from Eome, the 
 regulation of its services and the forms of popular 
 religion must be subject to its own government. Nor 
 can the secular power, except by means of education, 
 attempt to change the religious beliefs of its subjects, 
 without encroaching upon a sphere of action which does 
 not belong to it. But Joseph did not refrain from 
 issuing new service books, and arranging the .exact order 
 of public worship. 
 
 In his love of reasonableness he went even further, he 
 attacked all the popu]ar_forms_of religion which, find a 
 home in the Roman Catholic countries. He attempted 
 to sweep from K^he churches the side altars, pictures, 
 religious emblems, andTSe'special objects of devotion 
 
142 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 round which the religious enthusiasm of the common 
 people was largely centred. 
 
 Of equal importance with the reforms which were 
 directed t© the centralisation of government were those 
 which had for their object the establishment of equal 
 rights of citizenship among all classes of the people,. It 
 was a necessary corollary of the absolute power of the 
 State that all privilege which could hinder its free action 
 should disappear. The measures designed to secure this 
 equality in the eye of the law attracted attention to the 
 remnants of the feudal system by which privilege had 
 been accorded to the possession of land ; and the question 
 of serfdom at once occupied the mind of the emperor. 
 In January 1781 he pointed out the advantages which 
 had already arisen in the hereditary provinces from the 
 definition of the peasant's duties under the legislation 
 of Maria Theresa. " Eeason and humanity," he urged, 
 "alike demanded the change." He therefore abolished 
 serfdom in all his Slav provinces, and defined, though 
 he did not actually destroy, the labour rents to 
 which the vassals were subject. He secured to the 
 peasant fuU possession of his property, freedom of 
 marriage, liberty of movement from off the land, the 
 payment of a definite amount of money in exchange for 
 forced service, in accordance with the previous edicts of 
 Maria Theresa. He did not, however, -destroy all the 
 rights of the territorial superiors. Where an official 
 magistrate did not exist, the territorial courts were stiU 
 active. Even to the end of his reign he declared the 
 responsibility of the peasant to his lord as well as to the 
 Government courts ; and the maintenance, even though 
 in a limited form, of compulsory service left the peasant 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS 143 
 
 without complete freedom. But the A bolit ion of all 
 perso nal sej fdom, and of the more oppressive incidents 
 of vassalage, the security of the peasant's property and 
 his separation from the land, went far towards changing 
 the feudal peasant into the complete citizen. At the 
 same time he placed him under the immediate guardian- 
 ship of the State. By his edict of September 1781 
 he arranged an elaborate system of appeals from one 
 court to another, laying upon the court against whose 
 judgment the appeal was made the duty of stating the 
 appellant's case without payment, and established in 
 each capital city an official trained in the law, whose 
 special duty it was to advocate the cause of the peasant. 
 The same view of the necessity of the equality of 
 classes largely influenced the great financial measure of 
 the reign. In a centralised monarchy, where recourse 
 to popular grants is impossible, a supply of money to 
 the exchequer from fixed sources is a matter of the 
 greatest importance. The late empress had devoted 
 very close attention to financial questions ; and honest 
 efforts to keep up the balance between income and ex- 
 penditure had been constantly made. No changes in 
 the system of taxation had, however, been found 
 possible ; while the ofiicial handling of the accounts had 
 not been free from the slackness which seems to have 
 been the pervading fault of Austrian administration. 
 A reign so full of exhausting wars, with intervals of 
 peace largely employed in expensive improvements, 
 involved a constant demand for money which it was 
 diflBcult to meet. There was, besides, a permanent 
 cause of financial weakness in the extremely small 
 share of the public burdens borne by Hungary. The 
 
144 JOSEPH II CHAP. VI 
 
 efforts to increase the national contributions from this 
 country had proved abortive, and the largest, and in 
 some ways the richest, province of the Empire con- 
 tinued to be of slight value as a financial resource. 
 It was a time when questions of political economy 
 were much discussed, when inquiry was being pushed 
 below the surface, and liberal views upon the methods 
 of establishing national wealth were gaining credit. 
 The keen intelligence of Kaunitz led him to adopt 
 these new views. As early as 1766, when the necessity 
 of increased taxation had been urged in the Conference, 
 he ventured on the remarkable declaration that the 
 true method of improving the revenue lay not in the 
 increase but in the removal of burdens ; that the 
 potential wealth of a country consisted in the well-being 
 of its inhabitants ; and that the present system of taxa- 
 tion prevented the proper development of the national 
 resources. His colleagues in the Conference regarded 
 his suggestion as entirely impracticable, and their dis- 
 approval was supported by all the weight of the emperor's 
 opinion. Any risk of a diminution of the revenue, and 
 of its consequent ability to support the army, which he at 
 that time regarded as the one thing necessary for main- 
 taining the power of the Empire, was a risk he could not 
 contemplate. On Maria Theresa the opinion of Kaunitz 
 had more weight. The suffering of her people appealed 
 strongly to her benevolence, and when after her illness' 
 in 1767 she wished to show some mark of gratitude for 
 her recovery, she thought it could assume no better form 
 than the relief of her people from taxation. She con- 
 sulted the chancellor, and he replied with a definition 
 of the requirements of good taxation. Equality, cheap 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS U5 
 
 and convenient collection, and strict relation to the needs 
 of the tax-payer and the wealth of the State, were the 
 true principles to be followed. In accordance with this 
 last principle, the condition of the people required that 
 the imposts should be lowered. He recognised the 
 necessity of increasing the revenue, and saw the possi- 
 bility of lessening the burdens and increasing the receipts 
 by a careful examination of the effects of various taxes, 
 and by a systematic plan to take the place of the 
 haphazard methods of taxation hitherto adopted. The 
 difficulty of such an enquiry, and the long postponement 
 it implied of any relief or advantage, put an end to the 
 benevolent wishes of the empress. All attempt at a 
 far-reaching system was laid aside, and the simple plan 
 of wringing all that was possible from the tax-payer 
 continued in force during the rest of the reign. 
 
 Although the emperor had decidedly opposed the 
 tendency to free trade in the views of Kaunitz, and 
 had preferred during the co-regency the continuation of 
 the established forms of taxation, he was ready, as soon 
 as the exclusive power was in his own hands, to produce 
 a system less confused, and based upon a definite theory. 
 He was largely influenced by the writings of the physio- 
 crats or economists, and had arrived at a very decided 
 opinion that " the soil, which nature has given for the 
 maintenance of mankind, is the sole source from which 
 all comes, and to which all flows back." In this he 
 found a fixed point on which to rest a uniform system 
 of taxation. There had hitherto existed several classes 
 of land, variously taxed or entirely free from taxation : 
 noble land, crown land, peasant land, and church land. 
 All such distinctions were riow to be removed. The land 
 
 L 
 
146 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VI 
 
 was to be re -measured, and re -assessed in accordance 
 with its productiveness, its area, and its position, and a 
 uniform percentage laid upon it. It was an enormous 
 undertaking, and, as every attempt at re-valuation in 
 any country has proved, was open to all sorts of op- 
 position and difficulty. When the land had been valued, 
 it still remained to be decided what percentage was due 
 to the State from it. A commission was appointed for 
 the purpose of carrying out the scheme. Only after 
 long deliberations, and towards the close of the reign, 
 was the result arrived at. The conclusion of the com- 
 mission was that for every hundred florins the occupier 
 would require for his maintenance seventy, that rather 
 more than seventeen ought to belong to the landlord, 
 and the remainder to the State. On the supposition 
 that the percentage laid upon the land was the highest 
 it would bear after allovidng proper means of livelihood 
 to the occupier, no further taxes should have been 
 levied. But although Joseph was eager for the adoption 
 of his land tax, he did not relinquish his commercial 
 views. He was essentially a protectionist. Many 
 times in writing to his brother he explains that in order 
 to find employment for labour and to encourage new 
 industries, it was necessary to lay a tax upon imports, 
 frequently rising to entire prohibition. 
 
 Reforms, of which these are but instances, were 
 pushed forward in every branch of social Hfe. The 
 same great principles are to be observed in all, and 
 underlying all these is plainly visible an unaffected love 
 for the welfare of the people. Thus, in the administra- 
 tion of the criminal law, his enactments mark a distinct 
 progress from medieval to modern ideas. The fierce 
 
1780-90 JOSEPH'S REFORMS 147 
 
 cruelty to be found even in his mother's code yields 
 to a reasonable and graduated system of punishment. 
 Justice is no longer the imperfect effort of man to give 
 effect to the divine anger against sin, but the means 
 employed by society to guard itself or its individual 
 members from injury. No court of justice was hence- 
 forward to act inquisitorially ; it could only be called 
 into action to rectify some definite complaint. In very 
 few cases was capital punishment to be allowed ; second- 
 ary punishments of all sorts were devised to take its 
 place. Strange crimes, such as- magic or apostasy 
 or the marriage of Christians with infidels, disappear 
 from the pages of the law-book. The intention be- 
 came an integral part of the crime. In civil law 
 nothing was completed, but numerous preparatory 
 edicts cleared the way for a perfected code. Marriage 
 was declared a civil contract; the law of inheritance 
 was regulated, and property passed divided among 
 certain defined heirs ; while a second step was taken 
 in the direction of a reasonable distribution of landed 
 property by the discouragement of the practice of entail. 
 As regards education, the general principles had 
 already been established. Joseph had already made it 
 plain that^he did not consider it the duty of the State 
 to produce learned men. To secure that the bulk of 
 the people~^ere- sufiiciently educated to know their duty 
 as citizens was his object ; but his activity in this direc- 
 tion was not less marked than his mother's. A universal, 
 gratuitous, compulsory education, conducted by qualified 
 teachers, either lay or clerical, and inspected by official lay- 
 men, seems to foreshadow with curious exactness the pro- 
 gramme secured by the educationalists of the present day. 
 
148 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VI 
 
 The emperor's early devotion to the army never ceased. 
 Indeed, in his keen apprehension of the dangers to which 
 his empire was exposed, to neglect it was impossible. 
 In conjunction with General Lacy, who was his intimate 
 personal friend, he gave constant attention to improve- 
 ments in its organisation. The development of a very 
 powerful artillery was a marked characteristic of his 
 reign. But, as an illustration of his general principles, 
 it is more important to observe that he established a 
 conscription or universal liability to service in the army, 
 perhaps the most simple and direct expression of the 
 equal duty laid on all men to serve the State. 
 
 The reforms were not all issued at once, but cover 
 with their activity the whole of the reign. Many of 
 them were of gradual growth ; not a few contradicted 
 those immediately preceding them. For in his haste 
 the emperor was apt to apply an instant remedy to 
 some evil which had caught his attention, and then to 
 find that his ministers were strongly opposed to him, 
 and that it was necessary with their aid to discover and 
 hammer out some more complete or moderate cure. 
 The changes were seldom or never received without 
 bitter opposition from some section or other of the 
 people. Proprietor, peasant, unwilUiig scholar, un- 
 willing soldier, ultramontane Catholic priest, and super- 
 stitious worshipper, all alike found abundant cause of 
 discontent. But it is impossible to deny not only the 
 greatness of the conception which Joseph formed of his 
 duty, but the reasonableness and excellence of the 
 larger part of his enactments; nor can the enormous 
 influence which they exercised upon the mind of Austria 
 be underrated. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 1780-1785 
 
 In interoal policy no change was caused by the change 
 of rulers ; the stream continued to flow in the same 
 direction, only intensiiied and deepened. In external 
 policy this was not precisely the case. As long as 
 Kaunitz maintained his position, any sudden reversal 
 of the system hitherto pursued was impossible ; but 
 the conviction that Austrian policy had been forced 
 into a false direction induced the emperor, without 
 actually breaking with France, to seek his chief support 
 from Russia, whose predominance had been so clearly 
 asserted at the close of the Bavarian war. It was with 
 this view that he had undertaken his late visit to 
 Catherine, and though nothing had been definitely 
 arranged, and no further advantage obtained than the 
 removal of personal mistrust, he made it _the first 
 business of his reign to carry this friendship a step 
 further, and to bring about a definite understanding 
 between himself and the Czarina. Catherine had now 
 entered upon the pursuit of the second of those political 
 
150 JOSEPH II. CHAT. VII 
 
 objects which, modified as they were by the singularly 
 personal character which marks the course of the 
 external politics of her reign, she always, with more or 
 less consistency, kept before her. Satisfied with the 
 commanding attitude she had won at Teschen, and 
 the predominant influence she exerted over Poland, she 
 had now turned her thoughts eastward, and was dream- 
 ing of the annihilation of the Turkish empire, and the 
 substitution of a Christian kingdom at Constantinople. 
 The necessity of a close friendship with Prussia was no 
 longer so apparent ; the influence of her minister Panin 
 was on the wane; for her future projects the advice 
 of Potemkin and the support of Austria were better 
 suited. The Russian court was therefore at once ready 
 to listen to the overtures of Joseph, and to his proposals 
 tor a mutual guarantee. Yet it was found impossible 
 to contract a formal treaty. Old usage demanded that 
 the name of Joseph as emperor should stand first in the 
 signatures, an honour which the Czarina not unreason- 
 ably, considering the commanding position which she 
 now occupied, refused to grant. But as both courts 
 were eager for some form of convention, the trivial 
 obstacle of etiquette was surmounted by an interchange 
 of letters, in which all that was needed was promised on 
 both sides without being reduced to a definite treaty. 
 Joseph guaranteed to the Czarina European Russia, her 
 possessions in Poland, and the maintenance of the exist- 
 ing constitutional arrangements there, together with some 
 advantages to the younger branch of the House of 
 Holstein. The Czarina, on her side, gave the same 
 guarantee for Poland, and for all the possessions of the 
 Austrian house with the exception of the Italian Duchies. 
 
1780-85 FOREIGN AFFAIES 151 
 
 The omission oil the one side of conquests to be made 
 towards the East, and on the other side of Italy, are an 
 indication of the great plan of aggrandisement which 
 was working in the Czarina's mind. It is evident that 
 during Joseph's visit she had wished to secure his 
 assistance, and on more than one occasion had broadly 
 hinted that his position suggested a corresponding action 
 in the direction of Italy. She appears to have dreamt 
 of the re-establishment of two great empires, having 
 Rome and Constantinople as their capitals. Joseph 
 had not fallen into the snare, and had always laughingly 
 put the suggestion by. But, though without any definite 
 explanation, Catherine had made her wishes clearly 
 understood, and Joseph had not actually refused to 
 entertain them. The friendship between the two courts, 
 and as a necessary consequence the weakening of the 
 connection between Catherine and Frederick, continued 
 to advance. A visit of the Grand Duke Paul to Vienna, 
 and the betrothal of his wife's sister, the Princess 
 Elizabeth of Wiirtemberg, to Francis, the eldest son of 
 Leopold and heir to the Austrian throne, tended further 
 in the same direction. 
 
 The strength of the connection was soon to be put to 
 the test. Disturbances, fostered by Russia, broke out 
 among the Tartars of the Crimea. The Czarina at once 
 declared her intention of intervening, and demanded 
 Joseph's assistance. In the summer of 1782, letters full 
 of friendly promises were interchanged, and in September 
 the Czarina sketched in full outline a plan for the joint 
 action of the two courts. She thought the moment had 
 arrived for giving reality to her great project. Help 
 might be expected from Poland ; it was not likely that 
 
152 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 England, to whom Joseph had lately offered his assist- 
 ance as mediator in the colonial war, would raise 
 objections ; and should France throw obstacles in the 
 way of naval action in the Mediterranean, it lay with 
 Joseph to neutralise them by a closer connection with 
 England, which was evidently inclined for a renewal of 
 its old relations in Europe. She explained that she was 
 contemplating the formation, under a Christian prince, 
 of an independent kingdom, consisting of Moldavia, 
 Walachia, and Bessarabia. For her own personal ad- 
 vantage she asked only for Otchakoff and a strip of land 
 between the Bug and the Dniester, together with an 
 island or two in the Mediterranean, as resting-places 
 for her fleet. Prom their joint conquests, with these 
 exceptions, Austria might take what it pleased, nor could 
 she doubt that Joseph would be willing to join in the 
 re -establishment of a Greek empire, of which the per- 
 manent separation from Eussia might be guaranteed. 
 
 Less sanguine than his correspondent, the realisation 
 of such a scheme seemed to Joseph full of difficulty ; to 
 his practical mind the danger was far greater than the 
 visionary advantages. It was inconceivable that the 
 Prussian king, always on the watch for an opportunity 
 to injure Austria, should look on quietly while the 
 troops of his rival were employed in destroying the 
 Ottoman empire. Before any steps in that direction 
 could be taken, it was necessary that the avowed 
 approval of France and the establishment of a powerful 
 Russian army upon the Prussian frontier should remove 
 all danger upon that side. If this could be satisfactorily 
 arranged, the frontier towards Turkey, which Austria 
 would require, still remained to be examined. Nothing 
 
1780-85 FOEEIGN AFFAIRS 153 
 
 would be satisfactory but the possession of Choczim and 
 its neighbourhood, Walachia as far as the Aluta, and 
 the fortresses of Widin, Orsova, and Belgrade. Thence 
 a direct line might be carried to the Adriatic Sea, where 
 the Venetian territories of Istria and Dalmatia, if they 
 could be exchanged for the Morea, Cyprus, and Crete, 
 would supply that exit for the products of Hungary 
 which his mercantile system required, and would afford 
 him the opportunity of appearing as a naval power and 
 supporting the direct trade between Austria and the 
 East which was one among his numerous plans. 
 
 Suggestions which implied a simultaneous war against 
 Prussia and Turkey, and a considerable diminution of 
 the Christian empire she intended to establish, were 
 not acceptable to the Czarina ; and it was with difficulty 
 that Kaunitz succeeded in soothing Joseph's anger at 
 her sharply worded refusal. He however induced him 
 to confine his reply to the general assertion that his 
 promises reached no further than a pledge of assistance 
 if the Turks should assume the offensive, and that in 
 his opinion the time was ill chosen for the realisation of 
 the great scheme. Not that Joseph in any way shrank 
 from assaulting Turkey. In a letter to Kaunitz, in May 
 1783, he explains his views. His moderation, he said, 
 in declining the Czarina's offers would help to maintain 
 the good opinion of France, and meanwhile he would be 
 better prepared to deliver his blow; the Turks might 
 declare war, and thus afford a good opportunity ; or the 
 Czarina might declare war and besiege Otchakoff, and 
 thus draw the Turkish army in that direction. 
 
 The Czarina, though she expressed deep disappoint- 
 ment, found herself compelled for the present to limit 
 
154 JOSEPH. II. CHAP. VII 
 
 her aggressive views. None the less the assistance 
 afforded her by Joseph was of the greatest value to her. 
 Not only did he support by diplomatic means all her 
 demands upon the Porte, and so far make common cause 
 with her as to claim for himself a full share in any 
 commercial advantages she might acquire, but his collec- 
 tion of troops on the Hungarian frontier, and his personal 
 visit to the probable seat of war, formed a threat which 
 the Ottoman Government could not resist. In very 
 distressed circumstances at the time, suffering from the 
 devastations of the plague, and from a conflagration 
 which had destroyed a large portion of Constantinople, 
 the Turks yielded to the pressure of their two imperial 
 neighbours. Finding some safety in the friendly arbitra- 
 tion of France, now freed from its English difficulty, they 
 concluded, in the beginning of 1784, an arrangement by 
 which the annexation of the Crimea and the Kuban by 
 the Czarina was guaranteed, and the commercial ambition 
 of Joseph was satisfied by the opening of the Danube. 
 Catherine was not slow to acknowledge the assistance 
 she had received, and the breach of friendship, which 
 Kaunitz had feared as the result of Joseph's refusal to 
 join in her great scheme, did not occur. In all the 
 numerous plans of improvement or of aggrandisement 
 which filled the emperor's mind, he was still able to 
 count upon the support of Russia. 
 
 The most prominent of these plans at the moment 
 was the exchange of Bavaria for the Low Countries, 
 the resurrection of the idea which had been foiled at 
 the Peace of Teschen. 
 
 Almost immediately after the death of his mother, 
 the emperor had set out upon one of bis usual journeys, 
 
1780-85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 155 
 
 and had visited the Low Countries, Holland, and France. 
 For with characteristic versatility, far from confining 
 his attention to cultivating his friendship with Russia, 
 or amending his eastern frontier, the emperor had 
 already from the first hour of his accession been busily 
 occupied in improving his position in his distant western 
 dominions. The mistaken policy of Holland in breaking 
 with its old ally and joining the ranks of its enemies 
 in the colonial struggle had proved disastrous to the 
 Eepublic. Not only had it suffered severely at the 
 hands of England, and displayed an unexpected weak- 
 ness in all branches of administration ; it had also lost 
 much of its commercial superiority. The commerce 
 which it was unable to protect had sought refuge under 
 the neutral flag of the Empire, and the mercantile energy 
 of the Low Countries, which it had been the policy of 
 the Maritime Powers to repress, had sprung into new 
 life. Ostend had become a great centre of trade, and 
 was rapidly growing into an important city. It was 
 natural that Antwerp, debarred by treaty from a similar 
 resurrection, should eagerly wish to secure its share in 
 the trade which was leaving Amsterdam. Scarcely had 
 Joseph entered upon his sole authority, when the three 
 chief cities of Brabant addressed him with a suggestion 
 for the opening of the Scheldt. Nor was it from his 
 own subjects only that the suggestion arose. In his 
 intercourse with the English Government, connected 
 with his offer to mediate in the American difiiculty, he 
 had met with similar proposals. Kaunitz, however, 
 had been outspoken in his opposition. Not only did he 
 consider that it would imply a flagrant breach of treaty, 
 but that it would inevitably produce a general war and 
 
156 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 dissolve the French alliance ; for it was impossible that 
 France should suffer quietly a grave assault upon 
 the interests of Holland, which would throw their newly 
 secured «lly again into the arms of England. But if 
 the moment for so strong a step had not yet arrived, 
 the position of affairs, the promising growth of the trade 
 of the Netherlands, and the weakness of Holland, did 
 not cease to arouse in Joseph the wish to take advantage 
 of the crisis. It was with this in his mind that he 
 visited the Low Countries in 1781. Though, as usual, 
 his progress was very rapid, he saw enough to induce 
 him to act. Like his mother before him, he felt the 
 disgrace of allowing fortresses lying within his dominions 
 to be occupied by foreign troops, and recognised the 
 injury the restrictive treaties inflicted upon provinces 
 which from their position and fertility might have been 
 the most valuable of his possessions. 
 
 In the main, these treaties were two : the Treaty of 
 Miinster, 1621, by which the Scheldt had been closed, 
 and the Barrier Treaty, 1715, which had formed a part 
 of the settlement closing the great war of the Spanish 
 Succession. By the last named treaty certain towns had 
 been occupied by Dutch troops, paid from the revenue 
 of the Low Countries, while, as a further defence against 
 the dreaded encroachments of France, the right had 
 been given to the Dutch to inundate the frontier dis- 
 tricts. The cessation of war with France had allowed 
 the Dutch to neglect their duty as guardians of the 
 Barrier ; the fortresses were nearly in ruins, they had 
 never been found effectual to check French advance, 
 and Maria Theresa had succeeded in freeing herself 
 from the required payments. But the ruined fortresses. 
 
1780-85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS " 157 
 
 garrisoned by a few Dutch soldiers, still remained. 
 Apparently without argument or formal demand of any 
 sort, Joseph ordered the demolition of these strongholds. 
 The Dutch quietly withdrew, and seemed to acquiesce in 
 the assertion with which Kaunitz met their objections, 
 that the treaty, having been directed against France, 
 had become absolutely null and void now that France 
 and Austria were close allies. But by the Barrier Treaty 
 there had been certain territorial cessions which had 
 never been completely carried out. A thoughtless act of 
 a Dutch commandant, who had caused one of his soldiers 
 to be buried in the disputed territory, afforded Joseph the 
 opportunity of denying the validity of the cession, and 
 giving further effect to the declaration that the Barrier 
 Treaty no longer existed. The question was complicated 
 by a number of minor conventions and arrangements, 
 and by the change of ownership which had taken place 
 in 1714, when the Netherlands had passed from Spain 
 to Austria. However, in May 1784, Joseph so far 
 yielded to the complaints of the Dutch that he allowed 
 conferences to be opened at Brussels. The claims of the 
 emperor were numerous, but the most important was a 
 demand for the surrender of Maestricht and its de- 
 pendencies, in accordance with a convention concluded 
 so long ago as 1673 between Spain and Holland. 
 The reply of the Dutch was in substance that the 
 Barrier Treaty was still in force, and that, as in that 
 treaty Maestricht had been regarded as belonging to 
 Holland and had been solemnly guaranteed, no claim 
 upon it could be valid. 
 
 The negotiations were cut short by an ultimatum 
 presented by Joseph in August. The terms offered 
 
158 JOSEPH II. CHAP. Tii 
 
 were intended to represent a compromise. If Holland 
 would declare the Scheldt open, raise no objection to 
 the trade between the Low Countries and India, and 
 leave the emperor free to make his own customs and 
 tariffs, all further claims either for money payment or 
 for the district of Maestricht should be dropped. Having 
 laid down the law, trusting to the submissive attitude 
 hitherto adopted by the States -General, he regarded 
 the Scheldt as henceforward absolutely open, and declared 
 that the slightest attempt to stop the passage of his ships 
 would be a casus helli. The States-General sent a firm 
 refusal, and proceeded at once to prepare for war. 
 Joseph lost no time in giving effect to his threats, send- 
 ing two ships bearing the Imperial flag, the one down, 
 the other up, the river. They were both at once stopped 
 by an overwhelming force. He had all along buoyed 
 himself up with the belief that his demands would be ac- 
 cepted without question ; it was in vain that his minister 
 had placed before him the risk if the Dutch should offer 
 armed opposition. He persisted in his belief that no 
 such opposition would be made. He had acted with his 
 usual haste, and was not prepared for the event. But 
 he trusted to the support of Russia and of France to 
 carry him over the difficulty. As far as Russia was 
 concerned he found his hope weU grounded ; the Czarina 
 wrote strongly on his behalf to the States-General. But 
 from Prance, where he trusted much to the influence of 
 his sister, his overtures met with a different reception. 
 Although the king himself would probably have been 
 willing to give him help, the minister Vergennes 
 was too much implicated in the late alliance with 
 Holland, too fearful of throwing new weapons into the 
 
1780-85 FOEEIGN AFFAIRS 159 
 
 hands of the English enemy, to allow of his taking such 
 a step. His answer explicitly declared that the Dutch 
 were only upholding their rights, sanctioned by more 
 than a century of custom, and that if an appeal was 
 made to arms, France would feel obliged to side with 
 them. 
 
 It is probable that already Joseph's zeal for the 
 improvement of his Belgic provinces was growing cool, 
 as the idea gained ground in his mind that they might 
 not be his at all if he could carry out his far more 
 advantageous plan of an exchange with Bavaria. He 
 therefore sought and obtained the mediation of France, 
 a measure which, after Vergennes' declaration, carried 
 with it the renunciation of all hope of opening the 
 Scheldt. One by one his claims were dropped, and 
 finally he expressed himself ready to renounce all his 
 original demands, and to consent to declare himself 
 satisfied with an apology for the insult to his flag, a 
 slight territorial cession, and a sum of fifteen millions of 
 florins. The States-General were willing enough to make 
 the necessary apologies ; the heavy payment demanded 
 was however quite another thing. The claim was lowered 
 to twelve, and then to ten millions, but still the States 
 declined, and limited the payment they would authorise 
 to five millions and a half. It seemed, after all, as if war 
 would result, when the French ministry, eager before 
 everything to secure the continued friendship of Holland, 
 stepped in with an offer to complete the required sum. 
 Upon this footing, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was 
 concluded on November 10, 1785. The emperor 
 had entirely failed to support his two principal claims. 
 Maestricht remained to Holland, the Scheldt remained 
 
160 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 closed. The slight advantages acquired were a sorry 
 compensation for the mistrust which his conduct had 
 excited among his Belgian subjects. Their hopes had 
 been raised high by the apparent completeness of the 
 demands first raised, only to be dashed to the ground 
 by a result which secured no advantage to them, though 
 a considerable sum of money had reached the Imperial 
 treasury. The mistrust in the persistency of Joseph's 
 views thus engendered was accentuated by the know- 
 ledge which had reached them that he was even now 
 thinking of bartering for his own purposes some of the 
 provinces in exchange for Bavaria. 
 
 The foreign policy of Joseph, which seemed to con- 
 temporaries to threaten aggression upon all sides, has 
 been not unnaturally attributed to Kaunitz. The pre- 
 dominant position which the minister had occupied, the 
 well-known subordination in his mind of aU scruple and 
 principle to the advancement of the Austrian State, not 
 unnaturally led men to suppose that the measures which 
 kept the political world of Europe in a state of ferment 
 were the offspring of his fertile brain. But it is well 
 that every man should bear his own burden, and in this 
 case it is Joseph who is responsible. It is impossible to 
 read the mass of the chancellor's correspondence with 
 the emperor without perceiving that his position had 
 been entirely changed by the death of the empress. 
 Though Joseph's language was always kind and even 
 affectionate, there was no longer the full friendship 
 which marked the intercourse between Maria Theresa 
 and her minister. There is a tone of submission, of 
 flattery, and an assumption of careful personal interest 
 in the chancellor's letters. It is evident that he had 
 
1780-85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 161 
 
 assumed with as good a grace as possible the attitude of 
 an adviser rather than that of a guide. Unquestionably 
 he retained his strong political views, but the peculiarity 
 of his mind, leading him always to carry out with 
 extraordinary care and acumen the plan on which he 
 was engaged, irrespective of its intrinsic excellence, lent 
 itself easily to his new part. It was by accepting the 
 emperor's suggestions, and by elaborating them in a 
 direction as far as possible in harmony with his own 
 wishes, that he henceforth was able to give effect to his 
 political views. It was certainly not by his advice that 
 the attempt to open the Scheldt was made. He had 
 foreseen the danger of such a step, and had warned the 
 emperor. But, once involved in the quarrel, he did not 
 cease to urge the necessity of firm and dignified action. 
 Demonstrations unbacked by real force appeared to 
 him the height of folly. Yet no sooner was the inter- 
 vention of France accepted than, mindful of the interests 
 of the European system he had created, he used all his 
 efforts to turn the negotiations into channels acceptable 
 to the Court of Versailles. He checked the angry ex- 
 pressions with which Joseph would have met the half- 
 hearted measures of the French ; and when Joseph, full 
 of his friendship for Eussia, was inclined, at Catherine's 
 suggestion, to renew relations with England, Kaunitz 
 found means again to persuade him of the superior 
 advantages of the French alliance. So, again, the plan 
 for the exchange of Bavaria in its new form did not 
 come before Kaunitz till it had been already talked over 
 and largely settled during a visit paid by Joseph to his 
 brother Leopold. But when it was imparted to him, 
 and he was asked his opinion on it, he was able to 
 M 
 
162 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 defend it with argument upon argument, and became its 
 most ardent supporter. 
 
 The idea was of course not new. It had already 
 given (JCcasion to a war which threatened to involve 
 Europe, and had failed before the skilful and determined 
 opposition of the Prussian king. All the arguments 
 which could be adduced in its favour in 1778 were still 
 extant. It was still as desirable as before to round off 
 the Austrian dominions, to withdraw from outlying 
 provinces, and concentrate the force of the State as a 
 balance to the power of Frederick. It was even more 
 desirable, for the time seemed growing nearer when the 
 Franconian margraviates would fall into Prussian hands, 
 and the northern and eastern frontiers of the Empire be 
 equally open to assault. And there was now this great 
 difference on which to reckon. The support of Russia, 
 which had enabled the king to thwart the design, and to 
 secure the Peace of Teschen, had passed to the side of 
 Austria. In both his Dutch and Bavarian schemes 
 Joseph could rely upon the gratitude of the Czarina. 
 As early as the summer of 1783 he had determined 
 that the two plans could be fused, and that advantage 
 could be taken of his quarrel with the States-General to 
 secure what to him was a more real object than the 
 opening of the Scheldt, the annexation of Bavaria. 
 The approbation of his sober brother Leopold, and the 
 almost enthusiastic reception accorded to his suggestion 
 by Kaunitz, induced him at once to take steps to 
 realise it. It was this plan, carried on simultaneously 
 with the negotiations for the opening of the Scheldt, 
 which accounted for the extraordinary ease with which 
 step by step he withdrew his demands on Holland and 
 
1780-85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 163 
 
 agreed to the Treaty of Fontainebleau. This treaty 
 was in fact the purchase money for the friendship of 
 France in the question of the exchange. 
 
 The Peace of Teschen had abrogated the convention 
 contracted between Austria and Bavaria in 1778. That 
 arrangement had been complicated by the attempt to 
 give reality to obsolete claims, and by acts of armed 
 violence, and it did not seem to Joseph that a mere 
 private arrangement of an amicable sort with the Elector 
 Charles Theodore would, in the present state of Europe, 
 be open to the same opposition. Charles Theodore, 
 called to the throne of Bavaria when he was already 
 well advanced in years, and a man of retiring and self- 
 indulgent character, was bound by no personal attach- 
 ment to his new dominions, and no patriotic scruple 
 stood in the way of his carrying out an exchange 
 gratifying to himself. It was from the Duke of Deux- 
 ponts only that opposition might be expected. As the 
 presumptive heir, his acquiescence was necessary to the 
 realisation of the scheme, and he had always shown 
 himself easily influenced by the Prussian king. But 
 Joseph hoped to find support both from Eussia and 
 from France in overcoming the duke's objections. Pro- 
 found secrecy was however necessary; for the restless 
 character of the emperor, and the tone he had adopted 
 in his dealings with the Imperial Diet, had raised among 
 the princes of Germany a strong feeling of mistrust. 
 Already in their correspondence they had hinted at 
 the possible necessity of combination to resist Imperial 
 aggressions, and Frederick was ever on the watch to 
 oppose any step advantageous to Austria. But it had 
 been necessary to explain the project to the Czarina. 
 
164 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 Armed assistance in her late disputes with Turkey had 
 been impossible in face of the constant danger of 
 Prussian attack. It was now pointed out that in order 
 to aUow> Austria to throw itself with any heartiness into 
 her great scheme of eastern conquest, it was necessary 
 that this danger should be removed ; and nothing was 
 more likely to secure this end than such a consolidation 
 of the Austrian dominions as was now proposed. The 
 argument appeared conclusive to the Czarina. She 
 threw herself eagerly into the plan ; and it was upon 
 her influence with the Duke of Deuxponts that Joseph 
 at first relied. For a while France was not approached, 
 but the emperor believed that the influence of his sister, 
 and the compliance he would be able to show to the 
 wishes of France in its mediation with respect to 
 Holland, would be certain to secure its acquiescence 
 when the time arrived. 
 
 Of the political advantages of the exchange there was 
 no doubt either in the mind of Kaunitz or in that of his 
 master. But the positive and practical character of the 
 emperor prevented him from listening to the urgent per- 
 suasions of his more imaginative minister, until careful 
 inquiry had been made as to the exact value, resources, 
 and revenue, of the territories it was intended to ex- 
 change. The examination seemed to show a considerable 
 advantage upon the side of the Low Countries. Joseph 
 therefore determined that hand in hand with the larger 
 question should go arrangements for the acquisition of 
 the district of Salzburg. In May 1784, he wrote to 
 Kaunitz declaring his determination to carry out both 
 exchanges. Luxembourg, Limburg, and perhaps Namur, 
 were to be cut oflf from the other provinces and given 
 
1780-85 rOEEIGN AFFAIRS 165 
 
 to the Archbishop of Salzburg, while the loss of his 
 diocese was to be made up to him by his presentation 
 to the Prince-bishopric of Lifege, in which at the time 
 there happened to be a vacancy. Joseph also tried to 
 insist that the Elector should make himself answerable 
 in his new capacity for the Bavarian debt. 
 
 The whole arrangement as devised by Joseph is a 
 curious instance of that want of imagination, the faculty 
 of entering into the feelings of those with whom he had 
 dealings, which was the great cause of his failure as a 
 statesman. While priding himself on the care with 
 which he put himself in their place, he attributed to 
 them only those views which he would himself have 
 held under similar circumstances. Fully convinced that 
 his plan was for the advantage of all concerned, he 
 failed to allow weight to any motives except those of a 
 strictly material character. It did not occur to him 
 that he was dealing a heavy blow to the patriotic 
 feelings of the inhabitants of the Belgic provinces, and 
 forfeiting the gratitude which his late appearance as 
 champion of their commercial rights had aroused. They 
 saw themselves severed without compunction from their 
 Austrian rulers and handed over, without their own 
 consent, to the government of a foreign prince. The 
 previous steps taken for their benefit seemed merely 
 measures to enhance their value as a saleable property ; 
 while, to complete their disillusionment, their unity was 
 to be broken up, and two of their best provinces given 
 as compensation to a prince ousted from his own 
 dominions to satisfy the greed of Austria. In the 
 same way the emperor entirely failed to conceive the 
 sense of injury excited in the Elector's mind when he 
 
166 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 found that the territory he had learnt to expect was to 
 be largely diminished, and that his revenue was to be 
 saddled with a heavy debt. The addition of Salzburg 
 to the intended exchange put an end, moreover, to all 
 chance of secrecy, for secrecy became impossible when 
 the whole of the capitular body of Salzburg was included 
 in the negotiations. All idea, therefore, of reticence 
 disappeared. Joseph at once communicated his plan to 
 the Court of Versailles ; and, to secure its adhesion, the 
 rapid surrender of his threatening attitude towards 
 Holland, closing in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, became 
 necessary. 
 
 In Germany itself however it cannot be said that 
 the enforced publication of the scheme produced much 
 result. Frederick was already sufficiently informed, and 
 had taken measures to secure the refusal of the Duke 
 of Deuxponts. When therefore, in January 1785, the 
 Russian ambassador EomanzofiF, now free to speak 
 openly, told the duke the details of the plan, declaring 
 that the exchange would take place under the guarantee 
 of France and Russia, and ofifering him a miUion gulden 
 for his acquiescence, at the same time assuring him that 
 whether he agreed or not the thing would be done, 
 he met with an absolute refusal. The duke, already 
 primed with instructions from Frederick and sure of his 
 support, declared that he would rather be buried under 
 the ruins of Bavaria than agree. Joseph was not wrong 
 in telling the chancellor that this answer "smacked 
 chiefly of Potsdam." The refusal was in fact a check- 
 mate to Joseph. As such it was recognised both by 
 himself and Kaunitz. " I think as I thought before," 
 writes the emperor, " and if the Elector is able eventu- 
 
1780-85 FOKEIGN AFFAIRS 167 
 
 ally to open the eyes of the duke to his own advantage, 
 I am still ready to carry out the exchange." "Future 
 events," writes Kaunitz, " we cannot foretell : they may 
 some time or other render practicable what we must 
 now leave undone." The Elector, disappointed of his 
 full hopes, had in fact withdrawn his consent. In 
 February 1785, he openly denied to the Estates of 
 Bavaria the existence of any plan of exchange. The 
 failure was completed when the Austrian ambassador at 
 the Imperial Diet explained that his negotiations with 
 Bavaria had come to an end, and that the emperor was 
 willing to uphold the existing system of the Empire. 
 
 It was not only before the individual refusal of the 
 duke that the emperor had been forced to bend. 
 Trusting, as he had, to his foreign relations rather than 
 to his position in Germany, his action had excited the 
 deepest mistrust j and of this his watchful ally had 
 taken full advantage. It is difficult to say how far the 
 suspicions prevalent in the German courts were well 
 grounded. But the frequent instances to be found in 
 Joseph's conduct of his determination to enforce his 
 rights as emperor, which had long been in abeyance, 
 and the carelessness which he displayed as to the rights 
 of individual princes when they contravened his own 
 freedom of action as a sovereign, certainly afforded some 
 ground for suspicion. The virtual dissolution of the 
 German Empire, and the complete sovereignty of the 
 individual rulers, was a marked characteristic of the 
 time. It was scarcely to be expected that the princes 
 of the Empire, or the King of Prussia, would agree to 
 the so-called " Panis-brief e," by which the emperor could 
 appoint a lay canon in every ecclesiastical corporation of 
 
168 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VII 
 
 their dominions, or would see without a feeling of dis- 
 quietude the division of the princely bishopric of Passau, 
 and the incorporation of a portion of it with the Austrian 
 bishoprics. So strong was the dread of the encroach- 
 ments of the Imperial power in the hands of Joseph 
 that for some time there had been a scheme for establish- 
 ing within the Empire some sort of union to preserve the 
 existing constitution. The idea was now realised under 
 the instigation of Frederick. In the first half of the 
 year 1785, a " Fiirstenbund," or alliance of princes for 
 the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the German 
 constitution, was elaborated. In this convention, to 
 which the majority both of the spiritual and temporal 
 princes gradually gave their adhesion, it was expressly 
 declared that the proposed exchange of Bavaria should 
 be withstood by force of arms. 
 
CHAPTEE VIII 
 
 FOREIGN AJTAIRS (continued) 
 
 1786-1790 
 
 The Fiirstenbund, although it was no doubt a severe 
 blow to Joseph, had no very immediate or extensive 
 results. It made him thoroughly understand the strength 
 of the opposition he was likely to encounter, and the 
 persistency of the ill-will and suspicion of Frederick. It 
 might indeed have raised serious difficulties but that, on 
 August 17, 1786, the great king died. The news 
 was characteristically received by Joseph. "As a 
 soldier," he writes, " I regret the loss of a great man. 
 As a citizen, I am sorry that this death did not occur 
 thirty years earlier." He then adds that so long as 
 Hertzberg was the moving spirit of Prussian foreign 
 policy he had no hope of friendship between the two 
 nations. It was a critical moment. The views of 
 Frederick William II., who had succeeded to the throne 
 upon his uncle's death, were as yet unknown and per- 
 haps undecided. It seems highly probable that Joseph, 
 had he been uninfluenced, would have seized the oppor- 
 tunity of removing the bitter rivalry which had divided 
 Germany and had proved so constant a danger during 
 
170 JOSEPH 11. CHAP, vin 
 
 the old king's life. But, in spite of Ms strong will and 
 his irritable assertion of his dignity and position, Joseph 
 stUl trusted to the experience of his old minister and 
 friend, ^nd Kaunitz refused to think of any approach 
 to friendship with Prussia. Obstinately wedded to the 
 system he had created, with great skill he pointed out 
 to his master the necessity of waiting to see the line 
 which the new king would take. The opportunity was 
 thus allowed to slip; and the retention of Hertzberg, 
 the traditional enemy of Austria, closed the door against 
 any hope of the success of friendly approaches to the 
 Prussian court. 
 
 Joseph was not at first entirely convinced j and while 
 yielding to the persuasions of his minister, he still 
 turned over in his mind the advantages of a Prussian 
 alliance. As late as December he laid before Kaimitz 
 a carefully reasoned project for such a friendship. " If 
 Austria and Prussia," he urged, " could come to an under- 
 standing and pursue a common course of action, nothing 
 was to be feared either from any single Power or from 
 any alliance of Powers. We should become masters of 
 the situation in Germany and in Europe ; and a lasting 
 peace might be secured." Such an alliance had been 
 impossible in the Hfetime of the late sovereigns ; their 
 ingrained hostility was too strong. But now that these 
 prejudices no longer existed, an alliance between two 
 Powers of the same nationality and the same speech 
 seemed both possible and in the highest degree desirable. 
 It was a union "which would astonish all Europe, excite 
 the admiration and joy of our subjects, and of aU future 
 generations." 
 
 It was certainly a fine project, and rested upon that 
 
1786-90 FOEEIGN AFFAIRS 171 
 
 rising feeling of the unity of nationalities which has 
 since played so large a part in politics. But already, 
 before Frederick's death, an intimation had been given 
 that the Czarina would be pleased if Joseph would 
 accompany her on a proposed visit to the Crimea; 
 and on August 21 a formal invitation arrived from. 
 St. Petersburg. Such a proposal by no means suited 
 Joseph, and the letter which contained it ruffled his 
 temper. He was anxious to avoid war at present and to 
 act as mediator between Russia and the Porte. He was 
 thinking of a possible approach to Prussia, and was 
 already beginning to feel a little fear that the Czarina 
 was trying to use him as a cat's-paw. Her letter men- 
 tioned that she had applied to France and not to him for 
 mediation ; and the proposed visit could scarcely fail to 
 involve him in the war, if war there was to be. "I 
 find," he writes, "this request for the good offices of 
 France, after all that I did to secure the Crimea for 
 Russia, very singular, and the invitation to drag myself 
 all the way to Kherson thrust in as a postscript a very 
 off-hand proceeding. My answer will be dignified and 
 short, but will let the Princesse de Zerhst, Gatherinisie, 
 understand that she ought to show more respect in 
 ordering me about." 
 
 Nevertheless, as he had not made up his mind to 
 break with the Czarina, he was open to the adroit flattery 
 of Kaunitz, who reminded him of the complete success 
 which had attended his first visit ; and he listened 
 willingly to the argument that some good might surely 
 be got from such a meeting in such able hands as his. 
 Nor did Kaunitz stand alone in this view. Joseph had 
 always recognised the position of Leopold as his successor, 
 
172 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 and not only felt for him a strong personal affection, but 
 treated him as his political confidant. When therefore 
 there came from him an earnest warning against break- 
 ing withjRussia, he yielded the opinion which for a time 
 had filled his mind, fell back upon his old policy, and 
 consented to the meeting. 
 
 On April 4, 1787, he set out from Vienna, forti- 
 fied with a letter of advice from Kaunitz. It did not 
 contain any very complicated projects, nor did it in 
 any way hint at vast plans to be taken in union with 
 Russia. The minister chiefly impressed upon his 
 master what he already knew : that his first duty was 
 to be agreeable, and that he had the power to make 
 himself so. It advised that there should be no close 
 political conversation, but that, just before leaving, the 
 opportunity should be taken of expatiating upon the 
 unity of the interests of the two empires, and, as two 
 special points, that the justice of the lately attempted 
 Bavarian exchange should be emphasised, and the 
 Fiirstenbund described as a mere effect of the late King 
 of Prussia's bitter enmity. It is plain that the chan- 
 cellor's thoughts were still directed in their old course 
 towards the destruction of that hated country. The 
 journey took place. Joseph spent some days with the 
 Czarina in the midst of the curious splendour which 
 accompanied her progress. The Russian ambassador 
 from Constantinople and the Imperial nuncio attended 
 the meeting of the sovereigns. Alarmed at the news 
 of difiiculties in the Netherlands which reached him at 
 Kherson, Joseph shortened his visit and hurried home 
 as speedily as possible. 
 
 How far he had followed the advice of Kaunitz, it is 
 
1786-90 FOEEIGW AFFAIRS 173 
 
 impossible to say; but certainly the visit produced the 
 results which Joseph had dreaded and Kaunitz had 
 desired. A very close feeling of intimacy arose betvi^een 
 the emperor and the Czarina, the fruit of which was 
 immediately obvious. Ever since the Treaty of Kain- 
 ardji, the Russians had been pursuing a policy which 
 must be called one of encroachment. The great scheme 
 of partition, which in the earlier years of his reign had 
 been imparted to Joseph, still formed a sort of background 
 to Catherine's policy. She had by the assistance of Austria 
 been enabled to annex the Crimea; Kherson had be- 
 come a formidable arsenal ; Sebastopol formed a port for 
 Russian fleets within two days' sail of Constantinople. 
 She now raised claims upon Georgia. Her agents were 
 at work agitating every province of the Turkish 
 empire ; her intrigues extended even to Egypt. While 
 exposed to such perpetual causes of irritation, the Porte 
 could scarcely look without anger and dread at the 
 triumphal procession of the Czarina to her conquered 
 province, or at her meeting there with the head of the 
 second great empire conterminous with Turkey, and 
 known to be in close alliance with her. On the return 
 of the Russian ambassador from the Crimea, he laid 
 before the Porte certain demands which were unhesitat- 
 ingly refused. On the following day he was summoned 
 to the Council and requested to sign a counter project, 
 whicji included the resignation of all claims upon Georgia 
 and the restoration of the Crimea. This he refused to 
 do, alleging the insufficiency of his powers. But the 
 Turks had determined that the threatei.^ ' breach should 
 be no longer delayed, and on his firm refusal, following the 
 barbarous custom of their country, they at once arrested 
 
174 JOSEPH II. CHAP, vill 
 
 and imprisoned him. That Turkey, long regarded as a 
 weak and failing Power, should venture to bid defiance to 
 Eussia, took the world by surprise. Neither the Czarina 
 nor Jos^h were really ready for war. No doubt the Porte 
 hoped that, as in 1784:, Austria would remain neutral. 
 The old relations of friendship from the time of Maria 
 Theresa, and the constant declaration of Joseph that he 
 desired peace, justified this hope. But any struggle 
 which had existed in Joseph's mind as to the line of 
 pohcy he should pursue was now over. The views of 
 Kaunitz had entirely triumphed ; the emperor had 
 fallen back to the view which he had adopted in the 
 beginning of his reign, that in a close alliance with 
 Russia was his only safety. The meeting in the Crimea 
 had unquestionably strengthened him in this opinion. 
 He at once acknowledged his responsibility under the 
 treaty of 1781 to assist Catherine with troops. With 
 many expressions of his determination to remain faith- 
 ful to his pledges, he declared his readiness for war, and 
 his willingness to go even beyond the demands of his 
 treaty obligations. He would not only appear on the 
 scene as an auxiliary, but would join her as an inde- 
 pendent ally. 
 
 Before the end of the year the whole frontier to- 
 wards Turkey was garnished with troops. There could 
 not be any doubt that war was intended, though the 
 declaration was put off. The Austrian ambassador at 
 Constantinople even received orders to attempt media- 
 tion and the restoration of peace. But a sudden and 
 treacherous attempt to secure Belgrade gave the lie to 
 this assumed peacefulness, and in February 1788, his 
 armies being now ready for action, the emperor issued 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 
 
 his declaration of war, basing it upon no apparent reason 
 except that the Turks had been hasty in the arrest of 
 the Eussian ambassador. It is somewhat difficult to 
 understand Joseph's conduct. No doubt he expected 
 very strong support from Eussia ; no doubt he believed 
 in the thorough disorganisation and weakness of his 
 enemy. It is in accordance also with his character that, 
 having once determined to pursue his old policy, he 
 should, for a time at all events, have thrown himsel 
 with feverish activity and exaggerated zeal into the war;' 
 and perhaps it is unfortunately not inconsistent with 
 his character that he should have desired to filch some 
 advantage, without much eare as to the morality of 
 the action, from the troubles of his neighbours. His 
 treacherous assault upon Belgrade seems to throw some 
 light upon his objects.. He hoped at least to snatch from 
 the Ottomans that fortress, the loss of which had always 
 rankled in the Austrian mind. He was before long 
 doomed to see the complete falsity of the grounds on 
 which he was acting ; for the unpreparedness of Eussia 
 and the vigour of the Turks showed him that he had 
 in fact become the very thing he had most dreaded, a 
 mere cat's-paw of the superior diplomacy of the Eussian 
 court. In the whole course of his negotiations with the 
 Czarina, in spite of the care with which he had guarded 
 himself against any definite political arrangements, it is 
 clear that she had been engaged in inducing him to draw 
 upon himself the enmity which, whether from Europe or 
 from Turkey, might more naturally have been directed 
 against herself, and have hampered her ambitious designs. 
 The first campaign was little short of a fiasco. Not 
 that the Austrian troops were anywhere thoroughly 
 
176 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 defeated, but, when compared with the hopes with which 
 the campaign opened, its results were miserably small. 
 Late in the year Choczim was captured by Coburg in 
 co-opera*ion with the Eussian forces, and on the west, in 
 Bosnia, a few not very important fortresses were taken. 
 But the main army under Joseph himself, with Lacy as 
 his constant adviser, had been compelled to occupy a 
 defensive position. The spring, which was to have 
 produced the capture of Belgrade, had been passed in 
 inaction. The emperor himself had been ready enough 
 to attempt the siege, but his generals, and indeed the 
 voice of the whole army, were against it, and he yielded. 
 A terrible sickness had decimated his troops. The 
 Grand Vizier, left free to act by the slowness with which 
 the Russians had put their forces in the field, had 
 directed the bulk of his army towards the Upper Danube. 
 He had forced the advanced posts of the Austrians, and 
 when Joseph, hastening to the assistance of his general, 
 had found himself compelled to withdraw towards 
 Temesvar, his retreat had been a scene of terrible con- 
 fusion ; his troops had fired one upon the other, and 
 much cannon and baggage had been lost. The farther 
 advance of the Turks had indeed been checked, and, 
 before the troops retired into winter quarters, the 
 Vizier had found it necessary to withdraw behind the 
 Danube. But there was no sign of important success, 
 and Belgrade, the great prize which had been in view, 
 still remained in Ottoman hands. 
 
 It was the first time that the emperor had had an 
 opportunity of showing his ability in the field. Li the 
 Bavarian campaign he had a right to be well satisfied 
 with having thwarted so great a master of the art of war as 
 
1786-90 FOKEIGSr AFFAIRS 177 
 
 Frederick, but tte whole proceedings had been so much 
 influenced by political considerations as to afford no real 
 test of his military ability. He had gone to this 
 campaign full of hope ; the organisation and improve- 
 ment of the army had been the hobby of his life ; full 
 of self-confidence, he believed in his power to use the 
 instrument he had constructed. The sense of his failure 
 was exceedingly bitter. But in fact Joseph was not 
 made for a great general. In every branch of his 
 activity it is evident that he was entirely deficient in 
 the power of attracting and securing able assistance. 
 Again and again in his letters to his brother and intimate 
 friends he emphasises his solitary position, and asserts 
 that everything depended entirely upon himself. It 
 was this failing more than anything else which robbed 
 him of his influence. Ever ready to find fault and to 
 throw the blame of any failure upon his subordinates, 
 he at the same time lowered their sense of responsibility 
 by his want of trust in them, and by his personal super- 
 intendence of the smallest details. It is significant that 
 all his best officers were anxious to obtain commands as 
 far as possible from his person. Thus deficient in the 
 gift of inspiring confidence, he did not possess — he had 
 in fact had no opportunity of acquiring — that unquestion- 
 able ability in the art of war, or that unvarying success 
 which sometimes takes its place. There have been 
 commanders who have inspired their troops and secured 
 victory by the personal greatness of their character; 
 and there have been commanders who have won such con- 
 fidence by the brilliancy of their successes that men 
 have followed them blindly in spite of personal dislike. 
 Joseph was deficient in both these qualifications. 
 
 N 
 
178 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 In addition to this absence of the power of inspiring 
 others, Joseph was deficient also in that disregard for 
 human suffering which seems absolutely necessary for 
 success in war. Eagerly interested as he was in military 
 matters, strong as was his belief in the necessity of a 
 powerful army as a political engine, and really able as his 
 first conceptions of a campaign appear to have been, when 
 the moment arrived for action, his highly civilised and 
 humane mind, his instinct of good government, and the 
 real love for the welfare of his people, intervened to hold 
 him back from plunging into the cruel necessities of war- 
 fare. To this, perhaps, even more than to the persuasions 
 of his generals, is to be traced the defensive attitude which 
 he occupied in this campaign. Again and again the chan- 
 cellor wrote to him in language so plain as to be almost 
 disrespectful, urging him to assume the offensive. He 
 was willing enough, had his hands been free, to follow 
 such advice, but he pointed out the difference between 
 the plan of a cabinet and the reality of a campaign. 
 It was easy, he said, to call into existence in your study 
 two great armies, but it was a very different thing 
 to organise and move them in the field. It was 
 because of the difference between theory and practice 
 that he*had so constantly been in the habit of insisting 
 upon seeing things with his own eyes ; and as for the 
 examples which Kaunitz had adduced, of Prince Eugene 
 and the other heroes of Austrian history, who had done 
 great deeds of arms upon the very ground he then occu- 
 pied, the instances were not to the point. Many years 
 of careful nursing had changed the wilderness of the 
 Banat into a rich and smiling district, one of the best 
 populated and most comfortable of the Austrian pro- 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 179 
 
 vinces. He could not bear to see all this great work 
 of good government wasted ; and any movement which 
 would allow the Turks to break in upon it simply meant 
 its destruction, for whgrever they came fire and ruin 
 followed their course. 
 
 Already, as early as August, Joseph had written to 
 the chancellor of his failing health : a dry cough and 
 difficulty in breathing, sleepless nights, a recurrent 
 fever, a constant wasting, and such weakness that he 
 could scarcely sit his horse. This letter called forth a 
 very warm reply from Kaunitz, alleging that the most 
 important thing of all was the preservation of his life, 
 begging him to leavie his army in the hands of his 
 generals, as his predecessors had done, to return to 
 Vienna, to bring Leopold to his assistance, and to place 
 Marshal Loudon in the general command. It will scarcely 
 be doing injustice to Kaunitz to attribute to him, besides 
 his very real anxiety for his master's personal welfare, 
 the wish to withdraw from the command of the army a 
 man who seemed wanting in the necessary qualification 
 for such a post. Always a partisan of Loudon, Kaunitz 
 believed that the emperor's return would bring with it 
 the return of Lacy, in whom he had no trust. As usual, 
 entirely self-devoted, Joseph refused to spare himself, 
 and wrote that nothing could induce him to withdraw 
 from the war at so critical a moment. To this resolve 
 he clung. He waited until the fall of Ohoczim on Michael- 
 mas day and successes on the Black Sea had showed the 
 Grand Vizier the rising activity of Russia, and had in- 
 duced him to withdraw behind the Danube. But when 
 the troops finally retired into winter quarters, Joseph 
 found himself no longer able to bear up against his 
 
180 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 increasing weakness, and returned to Vienna in fact a 
 dying man, leaving the army in the hands of Marshal 
 Haddik. It was indeed time that he should resign the 
 command. The slow result of the campaign had brought 
 both him and his adviser strong unpopularity. As for 
 Lacy, he dared not appear in Vienna, and Joseph him- 
 self at his entry was treated with derisive and injurious 
 caricatures. 
 
 There was no need for these outward marks of un- 
 popularity to prove to Joseph the falseness of the step 
 he had taken in plunging into the Turkish war. He 
 was already eagerly desirous for peace. Even at the 
 meeting at Kherson he had felt strongly the danger 
 which might arise from Prussia. He writes that 
 the Czarina was " dying with eagerness to be at the 
 Turks again, and would listen to no argument"; and 
 that he had vainly tried to point out to her the objections 
 that might be raised by Prussia and by France. His 
 apprehensions were well grounded. The new King of 
 Prussia had retained Hertzberg in his position ; and the 
 foreign policy of the country was that of the disciple 
 of Frederick the Great, and had for its first principle 
 opposition to the House of Austria. Kaunitz would 
 appear to have felt such relief at Frederick's death 
 as to be filled with very undue contempt for the new 
 regime. He constantly speaks slightingly of Hertzberg, 
 whom he calls " the king's pedant," and, bent upon sup- 
 porting the Russian alliance, he made light of the danger 
 which Joseph foresaw. Yielding his better judgment 
 to the pressure of his chancellor and to the dictates of 
 his own ambition, which constantly prompted him to 
 take advantage, for the sake of his kingdom, of any dis- 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 181 
 
 turbances in Europe, Joseph had thrown himself heartily 
 into the Turkish war. But the iirst campaign had 
 scarcely begun before he became aware that the Prussian 
 opposition he had dreaded was indeed a reality. 
 
 The desire to obtain advantages from the troubles of 
 his neighbours was by no means a monopoly of Joseph. 
 Hertzberg was quite as alive to the opening afforded by 
 such opportunities, especially when by adroit usage of 
 them a blow could be struck at Austrian influence. The 
 Naboth's vineyard in this case was Swedish Pomerania 
 and the towns of Dantzig and Thorn ; and as these towns 
 were Polish territory they could not be obtained with- 
 out a direct act of violence, unless some compensation 
 were given to the Poles. Such a compensation might 
 be procured if Galicia could be restored to them. As 
 this was now Austrian property, its restitution must be 
 purchased by some advantage to Austria. The war 
 with Turkey seemed to throw open an opportunity 
 of procuring such an advantage ; for Joseph might 
 be allowed to conquer and appropriate Moldavia and 
 Walachia, and if he could be induced to exchange these 
 provinces for Galicia, it would have the additional 
 advantage of driving Austria still further out of Ger- 
 many, and of allowing Prussia to assume the lead of 
 the German lands, which it had already nearly acquired. 
 There was, however, Russia also to be reckoned with, 
 but Hertzberg thought that Otchakoff and advantages 
 in the Far East might be looked upon as suflBcient com- 
 pensation for Eussia. The manner in which the arrange- 
 ment was to be arrived at was by the admission of Prussia 
 to the position of mediator between Eussia and Turkey, 
 to be changed if necessary into an armed intervention. 
 
182 JOSEPH 11. CHAP. VIII 
 
 Prussia could not take up this attitude single-handed, 
 but circumstances had just opened to it an opportunity 
 of acting in common with a strong alliance. A revolu- 
 tion h^d taken place in Holland, partly caused by the 
 traditional opposition between the Stadtholder and the 
 republican party, but much strengthened by the influence 
 of popular feeling in France. To uphold the Stadt- 
 holder was the traditional policy of England. The 
 Princess of Orange was the sister of the King of Prussia, 
 and her apprehension by the mob had roused his anger ; 
 the Duke of Brunswick had marched into the country, 
 had suppressed the disturbances by Prussian arms, and 
 the Stadtholder had been replaced in his position. In 
 Holland, therefore, common ground of union between 
 Prussia and England had been found. The younger 
 Pitt was now at the head of the English ministry. 
 With much of his father's enthusiastic patriotism, he 
 was bent upon raising the country from the depression 
 into which it had fallen after the loss of its colonies. 
 The opportunity seemed now to have arrived of entering 
 again in a commanding position upon the scene of 
 European politics. The policy of Kaunitz, and his 
 breach with the Maritime Powers, had severed England 
 from its Austrian connection and thrown it into a 
 position of constant hostility. The conduct of the 
 Czarina, who had contracted a commercial alliance with 
 France, and in her attempt to establish the neutrality 
 of the seas had dealt a heavy blow to English trade, had 
 loosened all the ties of friendship between England and 
 Eussia. While the great imperial allies were thus 
 looked upon with enmity, the country they were attack- 
 ing was one which England was traditionally in the 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 
 
 habit of upholding, and the maintenance of which was 
 regarded as a necessary part of the proper balance of 
 European Powers. Allied with Prussia and Holland, 
 there was now an opening for stepping forward and 
 insisting upon such a peace as should save Turkey from 
 destruction, prevent any overwhelming increase of the 
 power of the eastern empires, and re-establish the shaken 
 balance. With common interests, and private interests 
 which could be realised by common action, a triple 
 alliance was formed in the spring and summer of 1788 
 between England, Prussia, and Holland, with the 
 avowed intention of producing an equitable peace. 
 
 With such an ally behind it, the Prussian Govern- 
 ment was able to act. In such company, to the surprise 
 of Kaunitz, who had always believed in the impossibility 
 of such a step, it did not even shrink from opposing 
 Eussian influence in Poland. Stanislaus, placed upon 
 the throne by Catherine, had naturally, and probably 
 wisely, held that his kingdom would find its best support 
 from the protection of Russia. He had met the Czarina 
 upon her journey towards Kherson, and had consented 
 to join the alliance with an army of 100,000 men. But, 
 after all, Poland was a republic, and there existed a 
 strong party, regarding themselves as patriotic, decidedly 
 opposed to the king's action. To this party Hertzberg 
 addressed himself. In October 1788, a declaration 
 was delivered to the Diet at Warsaw by the Prussian 
 ambassador, protesting against the intended alliance, as 
 either tending to cause a breach between Poland and 
 Prussia, or as leading to an attack upon the Turks, whom 
 they should have regarded as their friends. It received a 
 most favourable reception, and all chance of an alliance 
 
184 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 with Russia disappeared. Poland, or at all events the 
 patriotic party, was willing to accept Hertzberg's plan. 
 
 The Prussian designs were well known to the Vienna 
 court, where they produced a marked though opposite 
 effect upon the views of the two presiding spirits. 
 Kaunitz at heart disbelieved the probability of a war 
 with Prussia, but used the dread which such a thought 
 inspired in order to induce the emperor to act with 
 more energy in the Turkish war. It supplied him with 
 a strong argument in support of his own policy of close 
 connection with Russia. He urged that if by his dilatory 
 action the emperor prolonged the hostilities it was quite 
 within the range of possibility that Hertzberg's fanciful 
 plan might become a reality, and that the Court of 
 Berlin by armed mediation might force upon the two 
 imperial courts a peace on disadvantageous and dis- 
 honourable conditions. To the emperor himself, the 
 threat of Prussian interference, far from appearing a 
 mere bugbear, seemed a disastrous reality. He repeated 
 again and again that he should " not be doing his duty 
 to his country if he did not declare at once that it was 
 absolutely impossible to resist at the same time two 
 such enemies as Turkey and Prussia." " If Prussia and 
 England chose to mingle in the war, the monarchy was 
 lost." On this ground he gave distinct instructions to 
 Kaunitz to prepare a peace with Turkey, or to procure 
 a joint guarantee of Russia and France against the evil 
 designs of Prussia. And upon the publication of the 
 Prussian declaration in Poland he writes that "the 
 Czarina could no longer question the ill-feeling of the 
 Prussian king, and must be aware that nothing could 
 be done tUl he was crushed." He seems even to have 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 185 
 
 believed that a clear exposition of the selfish views of 
 Prussia would dissolve the Triple Alliance, and open 
 the eyes of England and Holland to the fact that they 
 were merely engaged in securing advantages for Prussia. 
 He was so thoroughly frightened by the course pursued 
 by Hertzberg, and irritated by the slackness of the 
 Kussian court, that in November he declared himself 
 irrevocably determined rather to resign his alliance with 
 Eussia than to take any step to drag the monarchy into 
 a twofold war which would b.e its inevitable ruin. The 
 divergence of opinion was so strong as to cause a 
 decided coolness between Kaunitz and his master. It 
 is impossible to read the cold and sneering letters in 
 which he twitted the emperor with his inactivity, or 
 hinted his soreness at being no better informed than the 
 rest of the world as to what was going on, without seeing 
 that such was the case. But behind the surface quarrel 
 there lay a real respect and even love; the letter in 
 which he replied to the first intimation of his master's 
 illness is an outburst of genuine affection. Yet the 
 characters of the two men were so different that, even 
 after Joseph's return to Vienna, close personal relations 
 were never resumed. It is one of the instances of the 
 wide liberties which the experienced statesman allowed 
 himself, that he indulged to the full his well-known 
 peculiarity, his dislike to the presence of sick persons. 
 He would not visit Joseph, and, as the emperor pathetic- 
 ally says, being too ill himself to flatter the prince's 
 weakness by calling on him, for two whole years, in the 
 midst of all his greatest difiiculties, he never saw his 
 most important minister. 
 
 The error of the political system, devised and carried 
 
186 JOSEPH II. CHAP. VIII 
 
 out in Maria Theresa's reign and accepted by Joseph, 
 was gradually forcing itself upon him. He had found 
 the friendship of Russia but a broken reed on which to 
 lean. The circumstances of France were such as to 
 deprive its formal alliance of any value, while the rising 
 feeling among that party which was rapidly becoming 
 predominant there was one of marked hostility to his 
 house. Yet he could not break loose. With despair- 
 ing eagerness he clung to his Russian alKance. In spite 
 of the complaints which broke from him as to the folly 
 and lukewarmness of the Court of St. Petersburg, he 
 maintained a close and intimate correspondence with 
 the Czarina, couched in language of warm friendship 
 amounting almost to flattery. And, in the spring of the 
 year 1789, he carried his determination of continuing 
 the alliance so far that he renewed the friendly treaty 
 of 1781, contracted, in the same indirect form as before, 
 by autograph letters from the two sovereigns. The 
 step was not without a certain success. The campaign 
 assumed a far more favourable aspect than the last, 
 when at length, late in the summer, the armistices and 
 negotiations came to an end and hostilities recom- 
 menced. The retirement of Haddik, too old and broken 
 in health to continue in active command, at length 
 allowed the appointment of Marshal Loudon, for whom 
 the popular voice had long been calling. Relieved from 
 the fear of her Swedish enemy, the Czarina was able to 
 enter the field with undivided resources. The genius of 
 Suwaroff added fresh life to the campaign. WTiile 
 Loudon swept the Upper Danube, a combined army 
 pushed southward through Moldavia. The Grand 
 Vizier could no longer afford to disregard his advance. 
 
1786-90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 187 
 
 Again and again the main body of the Turks was 
 defeated, and an opportunity was at length afforded for 
 Loudon to form the siege of Belgrade. 
 
 But over all this success the hostile shadow of the 
 Triple Alliance was thrown. In February Joseph was 
 trying to induce France to work at Constantinople for 
 a cessation of hostilities, because " the Prussian ministers 
 were still successfully busied with their disastrous plans." 
 In April he writes : "The Turks will listen to no peace, 
 because they are puffed up with hope of the alliance which 
 Prussia is offering them." A month later, information 
 reached him of difficulties between the armies in Moldavia 
 which cut away the hope of any successful action rapid 
 enough to check the designs of Prussia, and of the 
 impatience testified by England to bring about a general 
 armistice. While in October, when the siege of Belgrade 
 had been formed, he eagerly hopes that " its speedy fall 
 may assure a good peace before the winter, for peace has 
 been rendered necessary from the action of Prussia, and 
 by the turn which affairs are taking in France." He 
 was beginning in fact to open his eyes to the danger of 
 the popular movement which was spreading through 
 Europe. It was becoming evident to him that his great 
 effort to put himself at the head of the democratic 
 tendencies of the time, and, while allowing their reason- 
 able expansion, to place the monarchy beyond the reach 
 of their assaults, had been a failure. In spite of his 
 strong desire for reasonable reforms, he had found him- 
 self driven to fall back upon his old position as despotic 
 ruler whose will was law. Events which had happened 
 in the Netherlands had forced him to the conclusion that 
 he had played too long with edged tools, and that nothing 
 
188 JOSEPH II. CHAP, vili 
 
 but the firm and united opposition of the crowned heads 
 of Europe could set a barrier to the threatening ad- 
 vance of revolutionary principles. "The madness," he 
 writes to the Czarina, " which excites all the inhabitants 
 of Europe, accustomed to follow the example of France 
 and dazzled by the grand phrases of liberty, renders it 
 most desirable that two Powers such as ours should be 
 at peace and have leisure to restrain the threatened 
 outbreaks." 
 
 To understand the fuU force of the impending danger, 
 to estimate the overpowering gloom of the clouds which 
 were rising round him, it is necessary to turn aside from 
 his foreign policy and foUow the course of those 
 domestic reforms which had so filled his mind at the 
 beginning of the reign. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 
 1784-1790 
 
 Joseph's reforms were so aggressive in their character, 
 and touched so many interests, that they inevitably 
 excited the strongest opposition. The mere effort to 
 force a homogeneous administration upon a variety of 
 provinces which had hitherto regarded themselves as 
 independent members of a federative empire, offended 
 the sentiment of nationality. The enactments which 
 accompanied that effort shocked more personal senti- 
 ments. Aimed, as they were, at the destruction of 
 privilege in countries where hitherto it had played an 
 overwhelming part, they could scarcely fail to excite 
 bitter hostility in the minds of the despoiled holders of 
 privilege. The levelling of classes, under the influence 
 of an even-handed justice and a universal extension of 
 the rights and duties of citizenship, wounded the pride 
 of the nobility. The feeling of injury was increased 
 when the equality was seen to affect not only varying 
 classes, but varying religions. If toleration had appeared 
 to a large-minded woman like Maria Theresa an assault 
 
190 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 upon religion, it must certainly have assumed that aspect 
 in redoubled strength in the eyes of the ignorant and 
 bigoted multitude whose religious life was wrapt up 
 in close* Catholic orthodoxy. How much more deeply 
 must their feelings have been injured when the question 
 i seemed no longer between orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, 
 but between religion and free-thinking ; when they saw 
 the churches stripped of the altars at which they had 
 learnt to worship, and the homes of the monks they had 
 learnt to regard with religious reverence carelessly con- 
 verted into barracks and stables for the troops. 
 
 With national feelings shocked, with privilege and 
 property assaulted, and the religious instinct of the 
 masses insulted, the dead weight of opposition which 
 Joseph undertook to move can scarcely be overrated. It 
 is part of the tragedy of his life that he was unable to 
 understand this. A true son of the age of reason, 
 absolutely convinced of the beauty and truth of his own 
 conceptions, he never doubted that they would make 
 their way by mere force of reasonableness. He never 
 appreciated the depth of the hereditary sentiment and 
 traditional morality which habitually miderHe men's 
 judgments and render the acceptance of things purely 
 reasonable a slow and difiBcult process. The disappoint- 
 ment was grievous when he found opposition where he 
 expected assistance, and complaint where, according to 
 his own reckoning, deep gratitude was his due. 
 
 If the reforms excited opposition even in the im- 
 mediate neighbourhood of the capital, it is not surprising 
 that they caused greater indignation in those provinces 
 which had hitherto enjoyed some measure of autonomy, 
 such as Hungary and Belgium. In both cases the 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 191 
 
 opposition to Church reforms was closely blended with a^ 
 patriotic movement in favour of national privilege. The > 
 formation of a centralised administration, implying, as 
 it did, the removal of many existing forms both of the 
 judicial and administrative courts, required time for its 
 completion, especially where peculiar and national forms 
 still remained. This was particularly the case in the 
 Low Countries. Far from the centre of government, 
 these provinces had retained the traditional and 
 chartered rights of independence which their long 
 and remarkable history had secured them. They had 
 been ruled by viceroys, usually of the royal house, by 
 whose side had been set an imperial minister pleni- 
 potentiary, who formed the connecting link between the 
 viceroy and the sovereign. So much was the Govern- 
 ment regarded as separate, that Maria Theresa considered 
 the appointment of her favourite daughter, Christina, 
 and her husband to the joint viceroyalty as securing 
 her a permanent establishment ; and, in writing to her 
 sister, who had held the same position, she always wrote 
 as though they were the heads of two nearly equal 
 houses. The wisdom of attempting to bring a country 
 so separate as Belgium into the inelastic machinery of 
 a centralised system may well be questioned. Nor was 
 the time well chosen for such an effort, when the minds 
 of the people were smarting under the disappointment 
 of the high hopes raised by the friendly conduct of the 
 emperor at the beginning of his reign. Yet the 
 ecclesiastical reforms had been carried out there as 
 stringently as elsewhere. The religious orders had 
 been diminished, and their property appropriated by 
 the State ; professors of a liberal tone of mind had been 
 
192 JOSEPH II OHAP. IX 
 
 introduced into the universities ; and, finally, a blow was 
 struck at the theological teaching of the episcopal schools 
 hy the introduction of the general seminary for the 
 education) of the priesthood. It was ordered that two 
 such establishments — the one at Louvain, the other 
 at Luxembourg — should be opened on November 1, 
 1786. The opening ceremony was the signal for an 
 outburst of anger on the part of the ecclesiastical 
 students, so serious that Count Belgiojoso, the pleni- 
 potentiary, found it necessary to call in the soldiery to 
 suppress the riot. The students expelled from the 
 university took back with them to their homes a bitter 
 feeling of discontent, and spread still further the mis- 
 trust and anger already excited by the ecclesiastical 
 measures of the Government. Moreover, a fresh blow, 
 which touched men of all forms of belief, and united 
 liberal and ultramontane in one firm body, was being 
 prepared; and on New Year's Day 1787 two edicts 
 were promulgated which seemed to strike at the very 
 root of constitutional freedom. 
 
 Though the provinces difiiered considerably among 
 themselves, there was a general similarity in their 
 constitutions. In all, there were parliamentary in- 
 stitutions and yearly meetings of Estates, consisting, 
 with the exception of Flanders, where the nobility were 
 excluded, of representatives of the three orders. In all, 
 the administration was local : in the country districts in 
 the hands of the lords, in the cities in those of the 
 municipalities. In Brabant, where the discontent first 
 showed itself, the full powers of the Estates were 
 lodged, when the Estates themselves were not sitting, 
 in the hands of a committee of the three orders. A 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 193 
 
 very important institution, known as the Council of 
 Brabant, acted as the high court of justice. But it "also 
 possessed political powers. The guardianship of the 
 constitution was entrusted to its care ; no act of the 
 sovereign was valid without the approval of the Council, 
 attested by the Great Seal, which the Chancellor of 
 Brabant alone could affix. The liberties of Brabant 
 were formulated in a charter known as the Joyeuse entrde, 
 to which each sovereign on his accession pledged his 
 adherence. Among other privileges secured by it were 
 the exclusive employment of native-born Brabanters in 
 the administration, and the right of every citizen to be 
 tried within the limits of his own country. By the new 
 edicts, the varying constitutions and privileges of the 
 provinces were all swept away. The whole country was 
 broken up into three circles, in each of which an intendant 
 and an apparatus of small courts were established. The 
 edifice was crowned by a high court of justice holding 
 its sittings in Brussels, and a council of general govern- 
 ment over which the plenipotentiary was to preside. 
 
 There can be no question that however excellent 
 Joseph's arrangements may have been, they were 
 entirely subversive of the liberties to which the people 
 were devoted. The landlord, whether lay or clerical, 
 the citizen who clung to his municipal rights, the 
 peasant and artisan forced into an administrative 
 machinery of unknown character and foreign origin, all 
 alike felt themselves assaulted; while the thinking 
 politician could scarcely fail to see that constitutional 
 freedom no longer existed in the presence of so de- 
 termined a unification of powers. Obedience to the 
 new edicts was opposed at once to individual, national, 
 
 
194 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 and religious feeling. The inevitable result followed. 
 Those bodies whose existence was threatened, the 
 Council of Brabant and the Committee of Representa- 
 tives, at once issued strong protests against the 
 threatened innovations. The syndics of the cities 
 called attention in plain-spoken language to a formid- 
 able clause of the Joyewse entrde, which authorised in- 
 surrection if the sovereign infringed the liberties it 
 affirmed. The public feeling excited by these protests 
 was moved to even greater indignation when, appar- 
 ently in direct contravention of the Joyeuse entrSe, a 
 M. de Hondt was sent to Vienna to be tried, under the 
 plea that the peculations with which he was charged 
 had reference to army contracts, and were therefore 
 subject to military jurisdiction. All seemed to depend 
 upon the conduct of the Brabant Estates, which were to 
 meet in April. They were not long in making their 
 intentions plain. Enumerating the late infractions of 
 their rights in both ecclesiastical and political matters, 
 they refused to grant the subsidy for the carrying on of 
 the government. The revenue officers were forbidden 
 to pay regard to the orders of the new intendants, and 
 the Council of Brabant was instructed to continue in the 
 exercise of its duties. 
 
 The chief anger of the people was directed against 
 Belgiojoso, a foreigner, and, as it was believed, the 
 instigator of the reforms. The joint viceroys stDl 
 maintained their popularity. As Christina wrote to 
 Prince Kaunitz, " the blood of Maria Theresa which ran 
 in her veins, and the upright and gentle character of her 
 husband, had so won the affection of the people that the 
 present troubles had not shaken their attachment." The 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 195 
 
 joint viceroys were in fact largely in sympathy with the 
 nation. It was rather the dread of the emperor's anger 
 than their own inclination which led them to temporise 
 and postpone the recall of the obnoxious edicts. As the 
 storm rose around them, they tried to calm it by their 
 temporary suspension ; but finally, on May 30, a violent 
 outbreak drove them to sign the complete withdrawal 
 of the edicts, and to authorise the reversal of all the 
 late changes. " People thronging in thousands, with 
 their hats blazoned with the arms of Brabant, made it," 
 says Christina, " a day full of terror — all the more so as 
 we had certain information that it was intended to begin 
 that very evening the pillage of the royal and ecclesiastical 
 treasuries, that the minister and those members of the 
 Government who were in ill odour were to be put to 
 death, and complete independence declared." In the 
 midst of a great display of arms, the deputies of the 
 Estates brought the paper for signature, and after con- 
 sultation with the minister, though full of fear as to 
 Joseph's reception of what they had done, they signed 
 the revocation. 
 
 It was one of Joseph's misfortunes that at this critical 
 moment he was travelling with the Czarina in Eussia ; it 
 was at Kherson and at Sebastopol that he received the 
 news of the Belgian insurrection. On first hearing from 
 Belgiojoso an account of the disaffection, he understood 
 that the two points on which his advice was necessary 
 were the opposition to the introduction of the new 
 tribunals and the refusal of the subsidy. He thought 
 that in both cases his opponents were open to money 
 considerations. With regard to the tribunals, arguments 
 must be used, and meanwhile all salaries must be stopped. 
 
196 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 The same step might be taken in respect to the subsidy; 
 the meaning of the refusal must be brought home to the 
 Estates by the stopping of all salaries. The troops were 
 meanwhile to be fed, as of old, by local requisitions. He 
 seems at this time to have thought that the employment 
 of force would not be necessary. A week later he had 
 heard that the viceroys had temporarily suspended the 
 edicts. He had also been told by his brother-in-law and 
 Belgiojoso of the military difficulties of the situation and 
 the possible untrustworthiness of the troops in garrison. 
 The news appeared to him very serious, the more so as 
 he well saw that the success of his reforming efforts in ' 
 the Netherlands would govern the conduct of the people 
 of Hungary and of Transylvania. He therefore ordered 
 troops to be sent to the Netherlands, and expressed his 
 intention of himself going there if necessary. His view 
 of the conduct of the Government was very severe. The 
 temporary revocation of the edicts he considered a grave 
 mistake. The next news which he received was still 
 more serious. He was full of indignation when he heard 
 of the events of May 30, the "rising impertinence 
 of his subjects, all caused by the timid action of the 
 Government." He sent a message demanding that 
 nothing should be done until the viceroys, the minister, 
 and deputies from the Estates should meet him at Vienna. 
 For, he says, " I have made up my mind to force this 
 matter through, cost what it may; and, after having 
 exhausted my arguments, to use my last man and my last 
 penny to reconquer, if it be necessary, the provinces 
 afresh." Apparently afraid that his letter was not severe 
 enough, he added a brief postscript bidding Kaunitz send 
 a formal reprimand to the Belgian Government, to 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 197 
 
 disavow all concessions made, and to point out that 
 it was only from his extreme condescension, and his 
 tolerance of ignorant prejudice, that he put off the 
 actual execution of his threats until he had seen the 
 deputies. 
 
 Meanwhile things had gone from bad to worse. The 
 whole nation had taken arms and enrolled themselves 
 in volunteer corps. Their anger against the minister 
 grew even hotter. The delay in the ratification of the 
 concessions of the governors seemed to them so incom- 
 prehensible as to be full of danger. They could not 
 believe that the emperor would go upon so long a 
 journey without having left full powers with his minister; 
 and they clamoured for a reply from Kaunitz, whom 
 they trusted as an old friend of Maria Theresa. Even 
 the viceroys, who knew the absolute and self-sufficing 
 character of the emperor too well to suppose that under 
 any circumstances he would allow another person to act 
 for him, plied the chancellor with eager letters on behalf 
 of liberal concessions and a promise of ratification of 
 their conduct. Kaunitz listened and sympathised, and 
 even went so far as to send back De Hondt to be tried by 
 his countrymen. He urged the case warmly upon the 
 emperor, but failed to convince him. " I am sorry to 
 see myself forced to be of a different opinion," Joseph 
 wrote in a hurried note immediately on his return to 
 Vienna on June 30. This disregard of his advice 
 left a permanent impression on the chancellor's mind. 
 Even in a letter which he sent to Joseph when he 
 was lying on his deathbed, he could not refrain from 
 tracing the whole of the disasters which had befallen 
 the Empire to the rejection of his deliberate advice. 
 
198 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 In spite of his strong disapprobation of the conduct 
 of the viceroys, when Joseph took the matter into his 
 own hands he was not more successful. It was in fact 
 one of those imbroglios from which escape seemed 
 impossible, except by a decided step backward, such as 
 the governors had taken, or by an appeal to the sword. 
 An angry people demanding what they believe to be 
 their rights will not be content with any concession 
 granted as an act of grace. But it was equally impossible 
 for a monarch of Joseph's character to believe in any 
 limitation of his power not set by himself. 
 
 The disaffection followed the course which might 
 have been expected. The deputies, after some demur, 
 appeared at Vienna, and were kindly received by Joseph, 
 though not without some expressions of his displeasure. 
 In subsequent interviews he succeeded in making a 
 favourable impression upon them, and they returned to 
 their constituents cheerful enough. But the definite 
 answer forwarded through Kaunitz to the Estates fell far 
 short of the ratification of the action of the viceroys 
 which had been so ardently hoped for. The orders 
 stated that no discussion on constitutional questions 
 could be entered into by the emperor till after the 
 acceptance of certain indispensable preliminaries. These 
 were practically the restoration of the country to the 
 same condition that it had occupied on April 1 
 last. Thus the two obnoxious edicts were removed; 
 the religious edicts and the establishment of the 
 seminaries remained; and specific orders were given 
 that the subsidies should be paid, the volunteers dis- 
 banded, and Chose officials who, for the purpose of 
 taking a part in the new system, had resigned their 
 
1/84-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 199 
 
 offices, should be re-instated. The disarmament of the 
 volunteers nearly produced a violent outburst. But the 
 skill and tact of General Murray, to v^^hose hands the 
 government had been temporarily entrusted, brought 
 him successfully through the difficulty ; the arms were 
 laid down, and on the following day he issued the 
 declaration by which the fundamental laws and privileges 
 of the provinces were maintained, the new tribunals 
 abolished, and the promise given that the emperor 
 would listen to arguments and decide equitably with 
 regard to the alleged infringements of the Joyeuse 
 entrie. The publication of this declaration was in itself 
 a concession ; for the preliminaries had not been fulfilled, 
 and the officials had not been replaced. The Govern- 
 ment and the Estates succeeded however in coming to 
 an agreement on this matter, and the ejected councillors 
 re-entered on their offices. But there still remained 
 the re-establishment of the general seminary, upon 
 which the emperor firmly insisted. The only concession 
 he would grant was that the bishops might come up 
 with their pupils and act as sub-rectors, and this they all 
 refused to do. 
 
 The question was therefore still unsettled when the 
 new minister, Trautmansdorf, was appointed to take 
 the place of the unpopular Belgiojoso. He accepted 
 the office with much misgiving, and with the certainty 
 that the emperor would not listen to his advice. He 
 was joined a month later by General d' Alton, a rough 
 and energetic soldier, to whom the military com- 
 mand was entrusted. This change of ministry showed 
 how completely Joseph disapproved of the action of 
 the previous governors. Christina and her husband 
 
200 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 returned to their viceroyalty from Vienna, but their 
 power was practically placed in the hands of Traut- 
 mansdorf. The comparative gentleness of the minister 
 was to l5e kept in check by the fierce character of the 
 military commandant, to whom a separate and co-ordinate 
 authority was entrusted. 
 
 It was evident that the emperor contemplated the use 
 of force, and believed in its efficacy ; and it was not 
 long before violent means of repression were adopted. 
 On January 22, 1788, the Council of Brabant 
 refused to publish the minister's first edict for the 
 restoration of the seminary. Trautmansdorf threatened 
 to employ the "grievous method of cannons and 
 bayonets." D'Alton went further than the threat. 
 Apparently on the very slightest provocation, he 
 allowed one of his oflBcers to fire on the people. The 
 emperor promoted the active subordinate and lavished 
 praises upon the military chief. " It is of the first im- 
 portance," he wrote, " that the people should see once for 
 all that the. soldiery are not to be insulted, and that I 
 am immovable in upholding by force of arms what I 
 have a good right to demand." Meanwhile all sorts of 
 vexatious persecutions were carried on. The Bishop of 
 Malines was fined for his refusal to come to Louvain, 
 and his seminary was closed ; oppressive measures were 
 taken in Brussels ; the professors of Louvain were de- 
 prived, with the result of emptying the university. In 
 order to secure a majority, the minister weeded the 
 Council of Brabant, and ordered the eight members of 
 the opposition to hold their sittings henceforward at 
 Antwerp. For a while the system seemed to answer. 
 D'Alton could write that "the success was entirely due 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 201 
 
 to firmness, and furnished a fresh proof that it was the 
 right way of leading the Belgian lion." But new acts of 
 authority roused the public temper afresh. The closing 
 of the episcopal schools was carried out by the general 
 with fresh bloodshed. Arbitrary rule ran its accustomed 
 course — men were apprehended without warrant and 
 imprisoned in the citadels ; journals were suppressed, 
 public meetings were forbidden, and as usual the 
 perpetrators of these follies believed that the forced 
 silence meant success. 
 
 The disaifection spread even into the army; yet 
 Joseph still refused to treat the warnings of the viceroy 
 and Trautmansdorf as serious. As so often happens 
 in revolutionary times, the opposition began to assume a 
 more popular form. It had been found possible to cajole 
 or intimidate the upper classes, but, as their leaders 
 lost heart, the people themselves took the matter up. 
 When the Estates of Brabant met in November, the two 
 first orders were induced to consent to the collection of 
 the subsidy, but the third estate intervened, and the 
 subsidy was refused. The same step had already been 
 taken in Hainault. Joseph met the difiieulty in 
 a tone of complete despotism. On January 7, 1789, 
 he declared that he held himself "henceforward freed 
 from all constitutional ties with respect to Hainault 
 and Brabant." On January 26, in the presence of 
 an armed force, the two aristocratic orders of the 
 Brabant Estates so far deserted their position that they 
 declared that they left it to the emperor to take what 
 steps he thought right, in virtue of his sovereign power, 
 to overcome the opposition of the third estate. The 
 Estates of Hainault courageously persisted in their refusal. 
 
202 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 and the constitution of the province was abrogated. 
 Joseph's answer to the declaration of the Brabant Estates 
 was couched in haughty and unyielding terms ; he de- 
 clared that if he found any one refractory, or allowing 
 himself the slightest seditious step, he should proceed 
 against him without observing any of the forms of law. 
 He had determined to collect the taxes by force of arms, 
 and, as he expressed himself, " to purify ihe dark, incom- 
 prehensible, and even impracticable constitution." He 
 hoped to break down the opposition by assaulting the 
 exclusive privileges of the great towns. He therefore 
 restored to the small cities the franchise which had been 
 monopolised by Antwerp, Brussels, and Louvain. Sound 
 though his measure might have been in itself, it was 
 not to be expected that the Estates and the Council of 
 Brabant would consent to such a violent alteration. 
 Foreseeing the crisis, Joseph used language scarcely con- 
 ceivable in the lips of a man of his really benevolent 
 character. " If it is necessary to employ force, it must 
 be used with firmness and energy ; the more or less of 
 bloodshed which such an operation causes ought not to 
 be taken into consideration when the question is to save 
 all, and to put an end for ever to these eternal insolences." 
 On June 18, the Estates were again assembled in the 
 presence of the troops. On this occasion they had 
 reached the limit of their concessions. Unmoved by the 
 danger of their position, they refused to sanction the 
 changed constitution. A councillor of the Government 
 then made his appearance and read to them an ordinance 
 by which the JoyeiLse entrie and all other privileges 
 were revoked, the Estates suppressed, and the Council 
 cashiered. Several of the members were arrested, a 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 203 
 
 fate which had already attended some of the judges and 
 the Council of Brabant. "A happy day," said D'Alton 
 to Trautmansdorf, "for the House of Austria is this 
 18th of June. The battle of Kolin saved the monarchy, 
 and now the emperor has become absolute master of 
 the Netherlands." It was the idlest of boasts. On 
 July 14, the Bastille was taken. It was not to be 
 expected that a people groaning under unusual oppres- 
 sion would fail to read the lesson. "Already," says 
 Trautmansdorf, " the arrival of the French princes flying 
 before the enemies of authority increases the ferment. 
 The parks, the streets, the houses, are filled with the 
 placards ' Here, as in Paris.' " In many of the cities 
 outbreaks occurred which required all the efforts of the 
 military for their suppression. 
 
 Joseph was meanwhile suffering and weakened by 
 the illness which ultimately proved fatal. For a long 
 time he flattered himself that DAlton's vigorous efforts, 
 as he called them, had been successful. As late as 
 August 10, 1789, he tells his brother that all is 
 quiet in the Netherlands. A fortnight later the truth 
 began to dawn upon him ; he complained that the 
 example of France was exciting the people. The next 
 news which he received showed him the falseness of the 
 calm on which he had congratulated himself. He had 
 no longer to do with unarmed citizens who could be 
 awed by a few soldiers, but with an invasion of deter- 
 mined men supported by the feeling of the whole 
 nation. In the time of the persecution, large emigration 
 had been going on, and the more marked opponents of 
 the Government had taken refuge in Holland. Two 
 men of different characters and different views had 
 
204 JOSEPH 11. CHAP. IX 
 
 taken the lead among them. Van der Noot, a some- 
 what talkative and empty person, had contrived to 
 enter into diplomatic negotiations with Prussia, England, 
 and Holland, who were now forming the Triple Alliance 
 with a view to restoring the peaceful equilibrium of 
 Europe. But at the same time, Vonck, an abler man, 
 of secretive character, had adopted the views of the 
 French Eevolution, and had created a widely ramifying 
 secret society, known by its watchword "Pro aris et 
 focis." Thus two distinct and essentially opposed move- 
 ments were on foot. One party looked for foreign help, 
 upon political grounds, from courts which were them- 
 selves the upholders of strong governments ; the other 
 desired that the people of Belgium should work out 
 their own salvation, trusting that help might come to 
 them from a revolutionised France. The energy of 
 Vonck overcame the political delays of his rival, and 
 the emigrants, finding a commander in Van der Marsh, 
 organised themselves into an army, and, without waiting 
 for foreign help, crossed the frontier. 
 
 There were two incurable weaknesses in the Austrian 
 position. D'Alton, despising his burgher and peasant 
 opponents, had disseminated his troops, with the acqui- 
 escence of the emperor, so as to keep in check the various 
 centres of disaffection. His conduct and that of his 
 troops had rendered them so hateful that, like an army 
 occupying a hostile country, they were masters only of 
 the ground they occupied. A second weakness was the 
 strong opposition between the independent chiefs of the 
 civil and military powers, which rendered firmness or 
 rapidity of action impossible. A succession of disasters 
 attended the small and isolated bodies of Austrian troops. 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 205 
 
 The emperor was lavish in his expressions of blame at 
 the stupidity of D'Alton. "The miserable and unex- 
 pected events," he writes on November 26, " which have 
 occurred in the Low Countries, and especially the dis- 
 sensions between the minister and the general, and the 
 dispositions, at once erroneous in themselves and badly 
 executed, which brought on these disasters, all seem to 
 call for some prompt remedy." He therefore recalled 
 General d'Alton and gave the command to General 
 Ferraris. At the same time, " believing it to be more 
 important to pacify than to conquer," especially as he 
 was only too conscious that he could spare no troops 
 from his Eastern wars, he determined to send a com- 
 missioner with full powers to arrive at some arrangement. 
 His choice fell upon the vice-chancellor, John Philip 
 Kobenzl, who had long been his intimate friend. He 
 could not have selected a better man for the purpose. 
 In his official capacity he had become thoroughly 
 acquainted with all the facts of the case and with the 
 views of Kaunitz. The relations between Joseph and 
 his chancellor were somewhat peculiar. Their opinion 
 had differed as to the method to be adopted in dealing 
 with the Belgian disturbances; and the chancellor's 
 determination to oppose all friendly advances towards 
 Prussia had been the chief means of throwing Joseph 
 into the close co-operation with Russia which he was 
 now beginning to regret. The divergence in their 
 political views had caused a considerable coolness be- 
 tween them. The chancellor's peculiarities accentuated 
 it. His unconquerable dislike to the presence of illness 
 and the thought of death kept him entirely apart from 
 his master, and their necessary business was carried on 
 
206 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 in writing. The inevitable delays caused by such a 
 method were increased by the slowness and prolixity 
 which had for some years been growing upon him, and 
 threw constant obstacles in the way of that rapid trans- 
 action of business which Joseph loved. To this was 
 added the strange independence of action assumed by 
 Kaunitz, who frequently withheld for many days the 
 despatches which reached him. Under these circum- 
 stances, Joseph had been compelled to find in the 
 chancery some more active and less impracticable 
 person. Kobenzl had supplied the want, forwarding 
 privately the contents of despatches as they arrived, and 
 the instructions which were to be issued in reply to them. 
 
 But though thus fully equipped for the part he was 
 called upon to play, Kobenzl's mission proved un- 
 successful It was too late for any such step. " What 
 you tdl me is happening," wrote Joseph to him, "is 
 only what I expected. Accommodation with such people 
 is impossible, except at the head of 80,000 men." In 
 December he sums up the state of affairs to his brother. 
 " The minister has yielded aU that was possible, with the 
 sole effect of making the insurgents bolder. I think 
 that for the instant we must regard the provinces as 
 lost. What has been done is without excuse ; the fault 
 must be shared equally by civil and military gcfvem- 
 ment." 
 
 Private news had reached him that Brussels itself had 
 been given up. The people had risen upon the troops ; 
 and the military and civil government had withdrawn to 
 Luxembourg, the last stronghold of Austrian power in 
 the provinces. "It is a misfortune," said Joseph, 
 " which in truth is killing me." It was true. He was 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 207 
 
 in the agonies of a terrible illness. "My health," he 
 writes, " is miserable; my cough, and the painful difficulty 
 of breathing, prevent me from making the least movement. 
 I have always to sit up in bed, and cannot lie down for 
 a moment. At night I get no sleep, and, sunk in the sad 
 reflection of all my own misfortunes and those of the 
 State, I am, I believe, the most wretched mortal in the / 
 world. You may conceive, my dear brother, what my 
 sorrow is. You know, if I may use the word, my, 
 fanatical zeal for the good of the State, to which I have 
 sacrificed everything. Such reputation as I had, such 
 political consideration as the monarchy had won, all is 
 sinking beneath the waters." 
 
 The brother to whom he thus wrote was his heir- 
 apparent, and his confidential friend. Of a much less 
 brilliant character than Joseph, Leopold possessed far 
 more tact and prudence. He had been quietly carrying 
 out in his own duchy many of the reforms which had 
 caused such diflSculties in Austria. But he seems to 
 have been, like most of those who approached Joseph, 
 mastered and somewhat awed by his brother's vehemence. 
 His letters, though there are hints of his real meaning 
 judiciously introduced now and then, are generally full 
 of approval, and indeed in many cases are but the 
 repetition at length of the letter he had just received 
 from Vienna. But it would appear that now the time 
 had come for speaking plainly. It would be difficult to 
 give a clearer description of the unfortunate condition 
 into which the Austrian dominions had fallen, than that 
 which is contained in a long letter in which he sets 
 before his brother his view of the situation. In spite 
 of a successful campaign, it had been impossible to 
 
208 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 persuade the Turks to make peace. Eussia could not be 
 trusted; she was exhausted and scarcely able to hold 
 her own against Sweden. It was plain that Prussia was 
 on the verge of taking up the cause of Poland, and was 
 ready to mix in the difficulties of the Low Countries. 
 France, with a king who was a nonentity, and under a 
 ministry the creation of the party of the Duke of Orleans, 
 was renouncing every principle, every connection, and 
 every alliance, and throwing to the winds all good faith 
 and honest dealing, if only it could succeed in injuring 
 Austria. Spain was following the same course, and 
 seeking alliances in Berlin and London; while as for 
 the Low Countries, it was evident that the patriots had 
 been too long despised; too much trust had been put 
 in the soldiery ; the violence of the military, Ulegal 
 arrests, and domiciliary visits had alienated and em- 
 bittered the people. The misunderstanding between 
 minister and general had also been disastrous. As for 
 the steps to be taken, he thinks the recall of D' Alton 
 and the mission of Kobenzl might be of some use. At 
 all events, the truth would then be known. The one 
 thing which was absolutely necessary was the conclusion 
 of the business as soon as possible, the surrender of all 
 hope resting upon the army, and the restoration of con- 
 fidence ; but this must be done at once, for Hungary 
 and GtaKcia were on the point of insurrection, and the 
 causes of their discontent must be found and if possible 
 remedied. 
 
 The difficulties in Hungary, which were thus spoken 
 of by Leopold as forming a second intolerable weight 
 upon the monarchy, were of a more directly political 
 character than those which had arisen in Belgium. The 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 209 
 
 religious reforms introduced at the beginning of the 
 reign had met with strong reprobation in Hungary. 
 The curtailment of episcopal revenues, the suppression of 
 pluralities, the re-division of parishes, the establishment 
 of seminaries, had excited grave discontent, but had 
 been regarded as injudicious measures of an administra- 
 tive character, against which subjects might grumble, 
 but which touched neither the constitution nor the 
 national life. They had, however, strengthened the 
 suspicion, aroused by Joseph's refusal to be crowned, 
 that attacks upon the national freedom were imminent. 
 The constitution of Hungary was of a character to 
 be particularly objectionable to Joseph. On the one 
 hand, it rested entirely on privilege, and on the other it 
 inspired that national feeling of pride which is inherent in 
 a free people. Constitutionally speaking, the Hungarians 
 were the Magyars only, a conquering race, every member 
 of which was considered as noble ; while the bulk of the 
 people, conquered and depressed, were in a state of 
 serfdom. The Diet was the Diet of the Magyars. The 
 language in which public affairs was carried on was not 
 the language of the people of Hungary, but was Latin. 
 The independence of which so much was made was the 
 independence of the Magyars. The king was in no 
 sense regarded as the head of the Austrian State, but as 
 the king of the conquering race, with whom, on his own 
 coronation, he entered into a specific contract. Exclusive 
 national pride, a strong conservative temper, and a 
 tenacious maintenance of privilege, were the necessary 
 consequences of such a state of things. The opposi- 
 tion arose chiefly from |;he nobles, though at times the 
 liberal language which Joseph used excited the people 
 
210 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 to disorderly outbreaks wliich he was compelled to quell 
 with a strong hand. 
 
 The uneasy suspicion that Joseph intended to 
 Gennanj^e the country seemed to be justified when, 
 in 1784, with a declaration that the interests of the 
 unity of the State demanded the employment of one 
 official language, he ordered that German should take 
 the place of Latin in aU public business. This step 
 was taken contrary to the advice of Kaunitz. It was 
 Joseph's misfortune that he had among his State 
 counsellors a Hungarian, Izdenczy, who had adopted 
 his views even more strongly than he had himself. To 
 his advice he listened, and insisted on his order being at 
 once carried out, regarding the deep discontent which 
 Kaunitz foresaw as " mere bubbles and bugbears." The 
 excitement caused by the introduction of the German 
 language was chiefly due to the fear that it would place 
 the government in the hands of Austrian officials. This 
 danger was in some respects overrated. Joseph had 
 sufficient wisdom to employ generally men of native birth 
 for his officials. But there was no doubt that in a far 
 more important matter — the reconstruction of the ad- 
 ministration upon Austrian lines — the fear of innovation 
 was well grounded. All the great centralising measures 
 which had been adopted in the other provinces were 
 soon extended to Hungary. The whole administrative 
 apparatus connected with the circles was introduced. 
 Ten of these divisions were formed, with a royal com- 
 missary at the head of each. Justice, separated from 
 administration, was arranged with its three degrees of 
 courts and its sequence of appeals. No greater blow 
 could have been dealt at the privileges of the nobility. 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGAKY 211 
 
 For the new system practically reduced to impotence 
 those county congregations of nobles to which, when 
 the Diet was not sitting, the government had hitherto 
 been entrusted, and which, with their right of protest, 
 had been regarded as the main bulwark of the national 
 freedom. The establishment of the new adininistration 
 was followed by the introduction of the rest of the 
 system of which it formed a part, and each step seemed 
 more directly to threaten the privileges of the nobles 
 than the last. While the abolition of serfdom and the 
 equalisation of the subjects robbed the noble of his 
 territorial power, and made him see an enemy in every 
 court established and charged with the duty of support- 
 ing his peasants against him, the re-measuring and 
 re -assessing of the land appeared a direct assault 
 on property. The noble's exemption from taxation 
 disappeared. The proud and lucrative privilege which 
 had enabled him hitherto to throw all the burdens upon 
 the "miserable contributory commonalty " disappeared. 
 Even his allodial property was henceforward to be 
 subjected to the same rigid rule. He was not even to 
 be allowed his predominant share in the arrangement of 
 the military forces ; for the irregular feudal " insurrec- 
 tion " was to give place to the organised conscription ia 
 which all classes were included. The king, who had 
 refused to take the coronation oath, and had supplied its 
 place with a somewhat ambiguous letter, promising to 
 uphold the national liberties, did not seem to find him- 
 self much embarrassed by his promises. The Church, 
 nobility, and nation seemed alike the victims of his 
 arbitrary centralisation. 
 
 Meanwhile the changes had not proved beneficial even 
 
212 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 to those whose advantage they were intended to secure. 
 The sudden freeing of slaves, the sudden amelioration of 
 a whole class, is always full of danger. The ignorant 
 hut newly emancipated citizen thinks that his hour of 
 triumph has arrived. Insurrections and disturbances 
 between the lords and their tenants broke out in many 
 places. Confident in the sympathy they would receive, 
 the peasants even sent deputations to Vienna demanding 
 their rights. Insubordination was as repugnant to 
 Joseph's principles as slavery. The deputies were there- 
 fore sent back unsatisfied ; and the peasants, at a loss to 
 understand what seemed, to them such inconsistent con- 
 duct, joined the ranks of the disafiected. In one instance, 
 at all events, the riots assumed a very sanguinary character. 
 The Walachian peasants in Transylvania, serfs hitherto of 
 Hungarian lords, believed that the new edict of conscrip- 
 tion entirely broke their feudal connection and rendered 
 them free men. They imderstood that they were to 
 be enrolled in the frontier militia, and to enjoy the 
 advantages which were given to the soldiers in that 
 position. They fell an easy prey to the dangerous influ- 
 ence of a demagogue known as Horjah, or the Precentor. 
 Armed with a showy document which they could not 
 read, he persuaded them that he was the agent of the 
 emperor, and induced them to refuse all feudal services 
 to their masters. A terrible social insurrection was the 
 result. In face of the miserable mismanagement of the 
 military commander, the gentry were allowed to form 
 themselves into a union against the peasants. While 
 hundreds of mansion-houses were burnt, the landlords 
 took a bloody revenge : on one occasion thirty -seven 
 captured peasants were beheaded without trial. It 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 213 
 
 required the employment of a considerable body of 
 troops, and a leniency on the part of Joseph which 
 only added to his unpopularity among the nobles, to 
 put an end to the difficulty. 
 
 It is impossible to sympathise wholly with the 
 Hungarian opposition. On one side, it must be admitted 
 that it was the outcome of conservative prejudice. The 
 personal privileges of the ruling race were touched by 
 the advantages given to their former vassals. Equality 
 with regard to the law, taxation, and conscription 
 appeared to obliterate the line of distinction between 
 the conquering and the conquered races. On the other 
 side, the movement was patriotic, directed against the 
 introduction of German habits and administration by 
 means of an authority which superseded the national 
 Diet. These two lines, closely connected and frequently 
 mixed, are visible in all the complaints which from time 
 to time were with much vehemence urged by the con- 
 gregations of the counties. The large body of forces 
 kept in Hungary, and their skilful distribution, prevented 
 the possibility of armed opposition. The question 
 therefore gradually assumed the form of a constitutional 
 opposition to an arbitrary sovereign. To Joseph it 
 appeared absolutely unreasonable, and, supported by 
 the opinion of his advisers, he steadily refused to listen 
 to the national complaints. 
 
 The approach of the Turkish war, and the need of 
 money, as is usual in constitutional disputes, brought 
 matters to a crisis. In the face of the obstacles raised on 
 all sides, the new system had not been completed ; and it 
 was to the congregations of the counties that the emperor 
 had to betake himself to obtain assistance. In November 
 
214 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 1788, his demand for men and money, addressed to the 
 nobles of Transylvania, was answered by a flood of 
 grievances, all pointing in one direction, to the restora- 
 tion of tl^e old state of things and the summoning of the 
 Diet. As money was refused, and of the 15,000 recruits 
 only about 1000 were granted, and as the necessities of 
 the war were great, Joseph began to hesitate. He 
 addressed to the Hungarian chancery the question 
 whether under existing circumstances, and while the 
 nobility was in so angry and excited a mood, it would 
 be wise to hold a Diet. Without much hesitation, the 
 chancery replied that not only was it wise but necessary, 
 as in no other way was it possible that supplies could be 
 obtained. Their advice was neglected. Again the evil 
 influence of the Hungarian counsellor Izdenczy made 
 itself felt, and Joseph answered that " neither time nor 
 circumstance was fitted for holding the Diet." It was in 
 December that he made this reply. Already the country 
 was seething with unquiet, and there. was every sign that 
 before long recourse would be had to arms. A fortunate 
 campaign might have enabled Joseph to refrain from 
 further demands, but though the campaign of 1789 
 had brought some success, it had also brought large 
 necessities. Fresh demands for recruits and for corn 
 were raised, and were again refused. The violent open- 
 ing of some storehouses by the military still further 
 exasperated the people ; and the congregations began to 
 speak of the necessity of holding the Diet whether the 
 emperor summoned it or not. 
 
 Kaunitz took a gloomy view of the situation. " It is 
 a second Belgian business," he said. For always behind 
 domestic difficulty lay the shadow of Prussian interven- 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 215 
 
 tion. We have, indeed, the authority of Jacobi, a 
 member of the Prussian legation at Vienna, for believing 
 that the great mass of the Hungarians did not dream of 
 a separation from Austria. He informs his court that 
 they would be satisfied by a guarantee of their constitu- 
 tion and privileges ; that a few hot-headed leaders talked 
 of an elective monarchy, but that on the whole the 
 people were true to their allegiance to the house of 
 Hapsburg. At the same time there were indications 
 leading to a different conclusion. Early in 1789 some 
 Hungarian nobles addressed themselves to Frederick 
 William, asking him to guarantee their freedom and 
 even to nominate a new ruler. He apparently suggested 
 the election of Charles Augustus of Saxe- Weimar, but 
 that prince prudently declined the dangerous under- 
 taking. It was not wonderful that both Kaunitz and 
 the emperor believed in the possibility of the very worst 
 termination of the difficulty. When Joseph had first 
 heard at Sebastopol of the disturbances in Belgium, he 
 had written to Kaunitz saying that the greatest prudence 
 was necessary, because they were a " touchstone " by 
 which the conduct of Hungary and Transylvania would 
 be governed. His predictions had proved true. It 
 seemed as though he was within measurable distance of 
 losing his Hungarian provinces as he had already lost 
 Belgium. 
 
 It was indeed a touchstone, not only with respect 
 to the threatened insurrections in other parts of the 
 Austrian dominions, but in respect of the far broader 
 question implied in the political position which Joseph 
 had adopted. It was in fact to set at rest for the time 
 the great question whether it was possible for the 
 
216 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 crowned and proprietary sovereignty of the last century 
 to transform itself into a beneficent and popular rule. 
 It was to decide whether the two things were not 
 essentially opposed the one to the other; whether the 
 wisest, most humane, and self -devoted despot can so 
 throw himself into the position of the people he governs 
 as to do for them the things which their condition 
 requires better than they can do it for themselves ; and 
 whether a people, be it ever so loyal, can bring itself 
 into so reasonable an attitude as to receive with thanks, 
 and by way of grace, changes which, however good in 
 themselves, do violence to their hereditary and deep- 
 rooted sentiments. 
 
 To appreciate the full bitterness of the emperor's 
 failure, it must be remembered that all this time he was 
 lying in constant pain, and in immediate expectation of 
 death. With the enthusiastic love of his country for 
 which he rightly claimed credit, the outlook was indeed 
 terrible. Belgium was lost. Hungary might easily 
 follow the same course, and at the best was all blazing 
 with discontent. Similar disturbances had arisen in 
 TyroL The vice in which the Triple Alliance had 
 grasped his kingdom was ever tightening. The treaty 
 between Poland and Prussia was completed. A treaty 
 offensive and defensive between Prussia and the Porte 
 was under negotiation. Frederick William was preparing 
 for war against him in the spring. The war with Turkey, 
 though latterly victorious, was becoming too burdensome 
 to be borne. Even in Vienna crowds of the over-taxed 
 lower orders were pressing round the palace crying for 
 peace. Desertions were going on wholesale from the 
 army. And in no direction did assistance seem possible. 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGAEY 217 
 
 France was buffeted in the midst of its own revolutionary 
 storm. Russia was bent upon its own objects, and still 
 hampered by the attitude of Sweden. And all this com- 
 Ijlication of disaster was now to be handed on to a 
 successor who, whatever his prudence may have been, 
 was without that vehement activity which Joseph must 
 have recognised as a necessary force if, in the midst of 
 such difficulties, his great ideas were to be brought to 
 completion. On January 4 he writes to his brother : 
 " The Low Countries are lost. I have certain news 
 that the insurgents are pledged to the King of Prussia, 
 who is acting with England and Holland, not to enter 
 into any negotiation with me, but to assure themselves 
 of their independence as a new republic under the 
 guarantee of those powers. Peace with the Porte seems 
 a long way oflf, and even questionable. I believe it to 
 be certain that the King of Prussia will attack us in the 
 spring. It is a fact that he is contracting an alliance 
 with Poland. It is strongly stated that he is exciting 
 the disturbances in Galicia and Hungary. And, in the 
 midst of all this, I am unable to move. All work 
 certainly costs me twice as much as it used to do. And 
 if I do not think of everything myself, you know that 
 with us nothing is done." He felt much confidence in 
 the prudence of his successor, but he may well have asked 
 himself whether it was quite fair to call upon him to 
 meet so tremendous a crisis. He was fully aware of his 
 approaching death, and made all arrangements for hand- 
 ing over the government. He had discussed with his 
 brother the names of those to whom the various depart- 
 ments could best be entrusted. He re-established the 
 conference for foreign affairs which had fallen into 
 
218 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 abeyance. It only remained to remove some of the 
 terrible difficulties which had arisen from his reforms. 
 The outcry of the Hungarian nobles demanded his 
 coronation, with its accompanying compact, and the 
 immediate summoning of the Diet. Of these demands, 
 the first was of course impossible; the second, under 
 present circumstances, seemed inadmissible. Such 
 advice as Kaunitz gave him was wholly in favour of 
 concession; and at length, on February 4, he wrote to 
 Leopold that, as partial concession would not be enough, 
 he had with deep pain signed an order for the with- 
 drawal of all his ordinances, and re-establishing every- 
 thing in Hungary on the same footing as it had been at 
 his mother's death. There was one notable exception. 
 He was willing to forego the realisation of his political 
 ideal, and to leave it to time to teach the refractory 
 nobility that the hours of privilege were numbered. 
 But he could not bring himself to desert the more help- 
 less classes of his subjects, or to trust to the chapter of 
 accidents to secure the amelioration of their condition 
 which his legislation had promised. Amid the general 
 ruin, the ordinances in favour of the tenant and the 
 serf were allowed to remain unrepealed. There is no 
 sign that, in thus undoing the work of his life, he re- 
 pented of his efi'orts. He yielded against his will to 
 inexorable fate. " I own to you," he writes, " that, 
 humiliated as I am, when I see how unfortunate I have 
 been in all I undertook, and the fearful ingratitude 
 with which all my good arrangements are met, and with 
 which I am treated, — for you cannot conceive what excess 
 of insolence the public voice allows itself with respect to 
 me, — all this deprives me of the power of decision. I no 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AND HUNGARY 219 
 
 longer venture to have an opinion of my own, but follow 
 the advice of my ministers, even when I do not regard 
 it as the best." 
 
 With a thoroughness which is in itself some claim 
 to greatness, the emperor made his great renunciation. 
 No half-hearted measure weakened its completeness. 
 The splendid dreams of his youth had vanished. Ten 
 years of the most unremitting toil and watchfulness, of 
 unequalled self-devotion to the good of his people, had 
 brought him to this. It was better for him to die. He 
 had no delusions on the subject. Two days later he 
 told his brother that a council of physicians had 
 pronounced a verdict of certain death ; and he 
 entreated him, by all their past affection, to come to 
 him and help him through his last moments. But 
 nothing of the bitterness of death was to be spared 
 him. Leopold was slow to move, and careful of his 
 own health : he did not come. Two or three close 
 friends still surrounded him — Lacy, Rosenberg, and 
 the young Archduke Francis, whose education he had 
 superintended and whose happy married life with 
 Elizabeth of Wiirtemberg he had watched. But even 
 this niece, who felt for him the affection of a daughter, 
 was not to be with him. She tried to come, but the 
 sight of the terrible ravages of his disease was too much 
 for her ; she went home, only to be prematurely confined 
 and to die. The emperor was not spared the knowledge 
 of this last disaster. "Alas," he cried, "and I still 
 live." The one man who certainly ought to have been 
 with him — the man who in youth had acted as a father 
 to him, and throughout his reign had been his chief 
 adviser — could not bring himself to conquer his prejudice. 
 
220 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 and for once to approach a sick or dying man. It is 
 pleasant, however, to find that the coolness which had 
 latterly arisen between them disappeared in the presence 
 of death. The chancellor's last note is full of devoted 
 affection, and bears pencilled upon it, in the hand of the 
 dying emperor, "Dear friend, deeply touched by your 
 expressions of affection, what can I say to the decrees 
 of Providence, but that I submit ? For yourself, accept 
 the fullest assurance of my most perfect gratitude, my 
 highest esteem, and my truest confidence. Beyond all 
 others you have deserved it. You can believe the pain 
 it costs me to be forced to think that I shall never again 
 enjoy your enlightened advice. I embrace you, and at 
 this moment of its extreme danger I recommend to your 
 care that country which lies so close to my heart." 
 
 Many and various verdicts have been passed on 
 Joseph's character. A pedantic philosopher upon the 
 throne ; a meddling busybody who could not leave well 
 alone ; a high-handed doctrinaire, trampling beneath 
 him all the natural sentiments of his subjects ; a reckless 
 free-thinker. A man of extraordinary enlightenment, 
 suffering the fate of all whose intelligence places them 
 in advance of their age ; a real lover of the human race, 
 whose every act was directed to the general advantage ; 
 martyr and victim to ignorance and ingratitude. Such 
 may be taken as examples of the various verdicts passed 
 upon him. To the writers of his own time, especially 
 if they happened to have views which colUded with his, 
 he is the incarnation of arbitrary ambition. Yet in 
 truth, although there are certain episodes in his policy 
 which give some colour to the charge, his attitude with 
 regard to the other states of Europe seems to have been 
 
1784-90 BELGIUM AN"D HUNGARY 221 
 
 generally defensive. It is too mucli to expect that any 
 man should quite avoid the prevalent feelings of his 
 class and time, and the patriotism of rulers in the middle 
 of the eighteenth century went always with the desire for 
 territorial acquisition. No doubt Joseph felt the impulse, 
 and sometimes yielded to it. But the great instances 
 alleged against him — the attempt, for example, to acquire 
 Bavaria — were distinctly of a defensive character. He 
 was deeply convinced, and his mother's history justified 
 the conviction, that the geographical conditions of the 
 Austrian empire exposed it to unusual danger. To 
 consolidate his widespread dominions and form a solid 
 mass to resist the Prussians and the Turks ; to be free 
 of distant provinces, whose proximity to his great rivals 
 in Western Europe exposed them to constant danger, 
 would seem to have been his real object. No doubt, in 
 his war with Turkey he aimed at acquiring consider- 
 able and valuable additions to his dominions. For the 
 love of trade was strong in him, and he desired free 
 access to the Adriatic Sea. But his primary object was 
 partly to break the power which was a standing threat to 
 his southern frontier, partly to gratify the Czarina, with 
 whose assistance alone he believed himself capable of 
 withstanding the increasing strength of Prussia. From 
 the first, he had learnt to look upon Russia as his only 
 valuable ally. So far from, desiring to increase his 
 empire at the expense of Prussia, it is plain froni his 
 letters that he lived in constant dread of that power ; 
 and it seems likely that, had it not been for the in- 
 veterate prejudices of his minister, he would even have 
 sought, when opportunity offered, to form a close con- 
 nection with it. \ 
 
222 JOSEPH II. CHAP. IX 
 
 If to speak of Joseph as ambitious without qualifi- 
 cation is to give an erroneous view "of his character, 
 it is no less misleading to attribute to him in his 
 domestig government a love of despotic rule. It was 
 his intense belief in the excellence of the measures he 
 was taking, coupled with the hold which his funda- 
 mental theory of the State had upon his mind, which 
 frequently gives his action this appearance. Of the 
 reforms themselves, it must be confessed that there is 
 scarcely one which, carried out under different circum- 
 stances, would have failed to produce excellent results. 
 With the exception of a few unimportant ordinances, 
 almost whimsical in their exaggeration, they all breathecl 
 a spirit of enlightenment and humanity. They were all 
 directed to the realisation o^ a very high ideal. They 
 were generally well adapted to the objects sought, and 
 in many instances, in spite of the opposition they 
 encountered, have stood the test of time. That feudal 
 Austria, full of the worn-out relics of the middle ages, 
 has become an empire not unfitted to hold a forward 
 place in the society of mpdern times, is chiefly due to 
 the legislation of Joseph. 
 
 THE END 
 
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